Case Title: DUKE v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-10-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
DUKE v. STATE2004 WY 12099 P.3d 928Case Number: 02-270Decided: 10/25/2004
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                            

 

JAMES 
ROBERT DUKE,

 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sweetwater County

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Ken 
Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Marion 
Yoder, Senior Assistant Public Defender.  
Argument by Ms. Yoder.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Tibbetts.

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]           
This 
is an appeal from the judgment and sentence of the district court for the Third 
Judicial District, Sweetwater County, Wyoming, entered on September 30, 2002, 
convicting James Robert Duke of two counts of first degree murder, in violation 
of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101(a), and four counts of solicitation of the felony 
of first degree murder, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-302(a) and § 
6-2-101(a).  Duke assigns errors 
concerning the trial court's denial of his pretrial motion for a change of 
venue, the trial court's allowing him to appear before the jury in leg 
restraints and allowing excessive courtroom security during the trial, several 
instances of alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, the sufficiency of the 
evidence to sustain two convictions for first degree murder, the trial court's 
jury instructions, prosecutorial comment during closing argument, and the 
cumulative effect of these alleged errors on his right to a fair 
trial.

 

[¶2]           
We 
find no error and affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]           
Duke 
and the State agree that the appellate issues are:

 

I.  Did the trial court err in not granting 
Duke's pretrial motion for a change of venue?

 

II.  Did the trial court err in allowing Duke 
to be tried in an atmosphere of excessive courtroom security and to appear 
before his jury in restraints, and has the State shown that such measures did 
not overcome the presumption of innocence or abridge the right to a fair trial 
due every defendant?

 

III.  Was Duke denied the effective assistance 
of counsel during trial?

 

IV.  Was sufficient evidence produced at 
trial to support Duke's first degree murder convictions?

 

V.  Did the trial court commit reversible 
error in instructing the jury?

 

VI.  Did the prosecutor's comments during 
closing arguments constitute reversible error?

 

VII.  Was Duke deprived of a fair trial due to 
the cumulative effect of the alleged trial errors?

Procedural 
Background

 

[¶4]           
On 
October 11, 2001, a criminal Indictment was filed in the trial court, Docket No. 
CR-01-209-R, charging Duke with first degree murder in the August 10, 1996, 
deaths of his five-year-old son, Erik Robert Duke (Count I), and his wife, Liana 
Mae Duke (Count II), and the solicitation of their murders (Counts III and IV, 
respectively).  Duke was later 
charged by Information on January 25, 2002, Docket No. CR-02-49-R, with 
soliciting the murders of his father, James Larry Duke (Count I), and his 
mother, Roberta Duke (Count II).  On 
March 28, 2002, Duke was arraigned on the charges contained in the Indictment 
and entered pleas of not guilty. Following a preliminary hearing with respect to 
the charges contained in the Information, Duke was bound over to trial court, 
where he pled not guilty to those charges on April 8, 
2002.

 

[¶5]           
On 
March 28, 2002, Duke filed a motion for a change of venue.  Relying on five newspaper articles 
published between January 24 and March 2, 2002, Duke alleged that excessive 
pretrial publicity made it impossible for him to receive a fair trial in 
Sweetwater County.  On April 12, 
2002, the State filed a motion to join the two criminal actions for purposes of 
trial.  During a motion hearing on 
April 25, 2002, the trial court granted the State's motion for joinder after 
Duke stipulated to the joinder but deferred ruling on Duke's change of venue 
motion pending jury selection. 

 

[¶6]           
Duke's 
jury trial began on August 12, 2002.  
At the conclusion of voir dire, Duke accepted the jury as empaneled and 
did not reassert or ask the trial court to rule on his request for a change of 
venue.  On August 15, 2002, during 
the State's case-in-chief, the jury was permitted to view the area where the 
alleged murders of Liana and Erik Duke occurred.  On August 23, 2002, after approximately 
eight days of testimony and eight hours of deliberations, the jury returned a 
verdict of guilty on all six charges. 

 

[¶7]           
On 
August 29, 2002, Duke filed a motion to set aside his first degree murder 
convictions in Docket No. CR-01-209-R.  
Duke contended those convictions were void because the indictment upon 
which they were based was defective.  
A few days later, Duke filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, claiming 
the trial evidence was insufficient to sustain his murder convictions in Docket 
No. CR-01-209-R.  During a hearing 
on September 4, 2002, the trial court denied Duke's motions. 

 

[¶8]           
Duke 
was sentenced on September 25, 2002, to life imprisonment on all six 
counts.  In Docket No. CR-01-209-R, 
the trial court ordered that Counts I and III be served concurrently with each 
other, but consecutive to Duke's existing federal sentence, and Counts II and IV 
be served concurrently with each other, but consecutive to the sentences imposed 
on Counts I and III.  In Docket No. 
CR-02-409-R, the trial court ordered the life sentences on Counts I and II be 
served consecutive to each other and consecutive to the life sentences imposed 
in Docket No. CR-01-209-R. Duke filed his notice of appeal on October 3, 2002. 

 

[¶9]           
On 
January 14, 2003, this Court, pursuant to a motion filed by Duke, remanded the 
case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing, the purpose of which was to 
enable Duke to develop a record to support his claims that he was improperly 
restrained at trial and his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
properly object to the restraints.  
Following an evidentiary hearing on March 28, 2003, the trial court made 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered an order on April 11, 2003, 
finding that Duke was shackled during trial, the use of leg restraints was 
justified under the circumstances, trial counsel probably raised the propriety 
of the restraints before testimony was taken, and Duke suffered no prejudice as 
a result of having been shackled during trial. 

 

 

General 
Background Facts

 

[¶10]      Around 
3:00 p.m. on August 10, 1996, Duke notified the dispatch center at the 
Sweetwater County Sheriff's Department that his wife and son had fallen from a 
cliff in the Lost Dog area south of Green River, Wyoming.  Upon arriving at the scene, emergency 
personnel discovered the battered bodies of Duke's wife, Liana, and his 
five-year-old son, Erik, at the bottom of a two hundred foot cliff.  Duke essentially reported that he and 
his family had stopped on the cliff after a period of four-wheeling in the Lost 
Dog area.  He stated that, after 
walking around awhile, he went to his vehicle to get something to drink.  Shortly thereafter, he heard Liana 
scream his name and, when he looked up, both his wife and child were gone.  He stated he ran back to the area where 
he left them, saw them lying at the bottom of the cliff and tried, without 
success, to reach them.  Although 
authorities had their suspicions about Duke and what actually occurred that day, 
Liana's and Erik's deaths were ruled accidental.  Approximately two weeks after their 
deaths, Duke collected the $60,000 proceeds from the life insurance policies on 
Liana and Erik.  

 

[¶11]      Evidence 
of Duke's involvement in his wife's and child's deaths was provided to 
authorities on January 4, 1999.  On 
that day, Roger Brauberger, a long-time friend of Duke's, told Lieutenant Mont 
Mecham of the Green River Police Department that Duke had been calling him from 
Houston, Texas, since October 1998 offering him money to kill his parents, Larry 
and Roberta Duke.  Brauberger also 
informed Lieutenant Mecham that Duke had offered him $23,000 to kill Liana and 
Erik shortly before their deaths.  
Lieutenant Mecham contacted the F.B.I. and the Sweetwater County 
Sheriff's Department about what Brauberger had reported.  The Sheriff's Department immediately 
reopened the investigation into Liana's and Erik's deaths.  

 

[¶12]      During 
the ensuing investigation, the Green River Police Department set up three 
recorded telephone calls between Brauberger and Duke.  In each instance, the plans to kill 
Duke's parents were discussed.  
During a call on January 4, 1999, Duke informed Brauberger that his 
brother, Mike Duke, was going to do the job on January 24, 1999.  Duke told Brauberger that he needed only 
to pick Mike up in Denver, act as a lookout while the job was being done, and 
then return Mike to Denver.  

 

[¶13]      The 
next recorded call occurred on January 7, 1999.  During that call, Brauberger advised 
Duke that he was considering accepting Duke's earlier offer of $20,000 to kill 
his parents.  When Brauberger asked 
for suggestions how it could be done, Duke suggested that a .22 caliber gun be 
used, since it was quiet and no louder than a door slam, and offered to provide 
Brauberger a key to the home.  Duke 
further stated that the job needed to be done "ASAP," but the date had to be 
carefully chosen to ensure he and his brother had alibis for the time of the 
killings.  Duke also indicated his 
parents had life insurance policies, and he might be willing to up the price by 
$5,000 if Brauberger was willing to do the job.  

 

[¶14]      During 
the last recorded call on January 8, 1999, Duke told Brauberger that the plot to 
kill the parents was his "brother's gig," and his brother had agreed to pay 
Brauberger the extra $5,000 to do the job.  
Duke offered to send Brauberger money to buy a .22 caliber gun but 
declined to send him a key to the house because he did not want the killings to 
appear planned.  During that call, 
Brauberger tried, without success, to get Duke to admit killing Liana and Erik 
in 1996.  Duke, however, 
acknowledged that he and Brauberger had discussed killing family members 
earlier, but he "didn't want nothing to do with it."  Before the call was completed, police 
arrived and arrested Duke. 

 

[¶15]      The 
trial consumed two weeks, with the prosecution presenting forty-nine witnesses 
on direct (two witnesses, Dale Majhanovich and Susan Murphy, testified twice) 
and two in rebuttal, one of whom it had also called on direct.  The defense presented six, including 
Duke himself. 

 

[¶16]      
For 
the prosecution, Brauberger testified he had been friends with Duke since 
seventh grade.  He stated Duke was 
not happy about Liana's getting pregnant in high school and having to get 
married.  Brauberger recounted that 
he spent a lot of time with Duke after Erik was born and never saw Duke hug, 
kiss or play with Erik.  Brauberger 
also stated Duke enjoyed going four-wheeling and was very familiar with the 
roads and trails in the Lost Dog area.  
Brauberger also testified that, a few months before Liana's and Erik's 
death, Duke offered him $15,000 to kill them.  Duke had told him that divorcing Liana 
was not an option because his parents would not approve.  Brauberger initially thought Duke was 
joking and did not take him up on his offer.  Approximately a month later, while they 
were four-wheeling, Duke approached him again and offered him $20,000 and 
suggested a plan to kill Liana and Erik.  
Although he still believed Duke was joking, Brauberger told him he would 
consider it.  A few weeks later, 
Duke again approached Brauberger about killing Liana and Erik and asked 
him what it would cost to get the job done.  In reply, Brauberger gave him a figure 
of $23,000.  According to 
Brauberger, Duke told him, "For that amount, I don't want to know when, I don't 
want to know where.  Just do 
it."  Brauberger stated that, 
shortly thereafter, he told his brother, Roland Brauberger, and Mike Dieters 
about Duke's offers, although he did not mention Duke's name in his conversation 
with Dieters.  Brauberger also 
testified that, on August 10, 1996, he told Dieters that the wife and child he 
was asked to kill died that day. 

 

[¶17]      
Brauberger 
further testified about the numerous telephone calls he received from Duke 
between October 1998 and Duke's arrest on January 8, 1999.  He stated that, at the beginning, Duke 
merely wanted him to obtain some semi-automatic pistols with silencers for 
him.  Later on, Duke asked 
Brauberger if he would be interested in killing Duke's parents for $20,000.  According to Brauberger, Duke told him 
that, "I've done family before, I don't like it."  Duke also told him that it was going to 
happen, and he was offering him the job first because Duke knew Brauberger 
needed the money.   Brauberger 
revealed that, during another call, Duke informed him that his brother, Mike 
Duke, was going to kill his parents, and Duke offered him $5,000 to assist Mike 
in doing the job.  Brauberger 
testified he eventually told his wife and father, who advised him to call the 
police. 

 

[¶18]      
Law 
enforcement and emergency personnel at the scene on August 10, 1996, testified 
about Duke's various accounts of the events surrounding Liana's and Erik's 
deaths, which included: (1) they were in the area exploring; (2) he had never 
been in the area before; (3) they stopped on the cliff because they were tired 
of four-wheeling; (4) Erik was chasing lizards on the top of the cliff; (5) Erik 
was playing with toys; (6) he went to the vehicle to get something to drink when 
they fell; (7) he went to the vehicle to get popcorn; (8) he did not see Liana 
and Erik fall; and (9) he saw Erik slip, Liana grab his arm and both fall over 
the cliff.  Their testimony also 
cast doubt on Duke's claim that he was unable to get down to check on the status 
of his wife and child.  In fact, 
their testimony revealed that it was a very simple descent down the face of the 
cliff to the location where Liana's and Erik's bodies came to rest.  Testimony was also presented that Duke's 
demeanor was not typical of someone who had suffered such an unexpected 
tragedy.  

 

[¶19]      
The 
State also presented the following witnesses:

 

-- 
Deputy Alvesteffer of the Sweetwater County Sheriff's Department testified that 
the area of the cliff where Liana and Erik fell was not visible to anyone at the 
nearby lake or campsites.  He also 
testified that anyone standing in that area could see cars parked a quarter mile 
away and could see the dust created by cars traveling in that area several miles 
away.  He further testified that 
Duke told him he had never previously been to the area.  Additionally, Deputy Alvesteffer 
testified Duke never showed any emotion at the scene even when the bodies of his 
wife and child were brought up from the bottom of the cliff.  He also stated Duke made no attempt to 
go to the bodies after they arrived at the top. 

 

-- 
Marvin Brauberger testified that his son Roger broke down a couple of weeks 
after Liana's and Erik's deaths and told him Duke had previously asked him to 
kill them.  He also testified that 
in early January 1999 Roger told him that Duke approached him about killing 
Duke's parents.  Marvin told Roger 
to report it to the police, which Roger did the following 
morning.

-- 
Michael Dieters testified that, two weeks before Liana's and Erik's deaths, 
Brauberger told him someone had offered him $20,000 to kill his wife and 
son.  He further testified 
Brauberger told him on August 10, 1996, that the wife and child he was asked to 
kill had died earlier that day.

 

-- 
Roland Brauberger testified that Roger told him, about a month before Liana's 
and Erik's deaths, that Duke had offered him money to kill 
them.

 

-- 
James Anson testified that Brauberger told him he had been approached by Duke to 
kill Duke's parents.

 

-- 
Connie Arambel, a neighbor of Duke's in 1996, testified she heard Duke yelling 
at Liana on numerous occasions and calling her vulgar 
names.

 

-- 
Loralee Reuss, Liana's sister, recounted her conversation with Duke shortly 
after Liana's and Erik's death.  She 
stated Duke informed her that Liana and Erik were on the edge of the cliff 
throwing rocks.  He claimed he went 
to the jeep to get a soda and heard Liana scream.  When he turned around, they were 
gone.  He informed her that he was 
not able to get down to them and he drove to the main road to call 911.  She also testified that Liana was afraid 
of heights and Liana thought falling was the worst way to die.  Reuss did not believe Liana would have 
chosen to be on that cliff.  She 
further testified Liana was a protective mother and would not have allowed Erik 
to run around, stand on the edge or throw rocks over the edge of the 
cliff.

 

-- 
Cynthia McMurray-Smith testified that Duke told her during an interview on 
January 19, 1999, at the United States Marshal's Office in Houston, Texas, that 
his wife accidently died during an argument on August 10, 1996.  Duke denied having a child.  

 

-- 
Detective Don Beckum testified regarding his interview of Duke on August 19, 
1996.  According to Detective 
Beckum, Duke reported they had been riding around in their jeep and stopped on 
the cliff to stretch their legs.  
Duke related they had been walking around the cliff and letting Erik 
throw rocks.  Duke stated he had 
gone to the jeep to get something to drink when he heard Liana scream his 
name.  Upon turning around, he 
noticed they were gone.  Duke also 
said he noticed the path leading to the bodies but did not believe he could make 
it down to check on them.

 

-- 
Don Johnson testified that, while Duke worked for him as an independent 
contractor in 1995-1997, he never observed any displays of affection between 
Duke and Liana or between Duke and Erik and never heard Duke talk about 
Erik.

 

-- 
Jennifer Butler recounted what Duke had told her in November 1997 about the 
circumstances surrounding Liana's and Erik's deaths.  Duke told her that they had gone to the 
area for a picnic.  While he was 
cleaning up and loading the car, Liana and Erik fell.  She testified that Duke also told her 
Liana was "still alive a little while before help arrived."  

 

-- 
David Dell, a close friend of Duke's, testified that, after Duke was married, he 
and Duke and sometimes Brauberger, frequently went out "chasing girls," and Duke 
would remove his wedding ring.  Dell 
also stated the Lost Dog area was one of Duke's favorite places to go 
four-wheeling, and he and Duke had been to the cliff where the deaths occurred 
on a couple of occasions before August 10, 1996.  He further testified that Duke did not 
appear to be suffering at Liana's and Erik's funeral.

 

-- 
Dave Ide testified that on August 11, 1996, Duke told him that he, Liana, and 
Erik had gone to the cliff area to build a campfire and cook popcorn.  Duke stated he was at the jeep and did 
not see Liana and Erik fall.  Duke 
said he did not go to the bodies because the path was too steep for 
him.

 

-- 
Dawn and Chad Gunter each testified that Duke told them that he, Liana and Erik 
were having a picnic on the cliff.  
Duke stated to the Gunters that he was putting the toys away in the jeep 
when Liana and Erik fell.  Duke 
stated to them that the cliff had given away and it was too steep to go down to 
Liana and Erik.  Duke also indicated 
he heard Erik wheezing blood.

 

-- 
Steven Miller, a professor in botany and mycology at the University of Wyoming, 
testified regarding his examination of the cliff in 2000.  He testified no evidence existed that 
the cliff area in question had crumbled or fallen away on August 10, 1996.  He stated the last time any disturbance 
occurred in that area was around 1960-1970.  

 

-- 
Ralph Davidson, Liana's father, and John Davidson, Liana's brother, both related 
Liana was afraid of heights.  Ralph 
Davidson also testified Liana was a very cautious mother and doubted she would 
have chosen to be on the cliff with Erik that day.

 

-- 
Debra Litz testified she observed Duke yelling at a woman and child at Smith's 
Grocery in April 1996.  She said 
Duke angrily knocked over the shopping cart and continued to yell at the crying 
woman and child as they picked up the spilled items.  Litz further testified to seeing the 
same woman crying in the women's bathroom at the Wild Horse Saloon in June 
1996.  According to Litz, the woman 
reported that her husband was not nice to her and he "sometimes wants to kill 
me."  Litz testified Duke was at the 
bar and the woman said she was there because a friend had told her that her 
husband was with another woman.

 

-- 
Chrystal Robinson recounted the one-month affair she had with Duke in 1994.  Robinson testified she went 
four-wheeling with Duke on several occasions at the Gorge and cliff areas.  She said she had been with Duke on the 
cliff where his wife and son died in 1996.  
She further testified Duke told her he did not get along with his wife 
and he had never bonded with his son.  
According to Robinson, Duke said he was looking for a way out of the 
marriage, other than divorce, so he did not have to pay child 
support.

 

-- 
Kerry Kelley related that Duke had told her they were on the cliff because Erik 
wanted to go lizard hunting for his birthday.  He stated he was on his way to the jeep 
to get a soda when he heard Liana scream Erik's name.  He turned around and saw Liana grab 
Erik's arm, and then both went over the cliff.  She testified Liana was a cautious 
mother and would never have let Erik run around on the cliff chasing 
lizards.  She also indicated that, 
while Duke was very close to her daughter, McKenzie, he appeared cold to Erik 
and never interacted with him.

 

-- 
Mike Duke, Duke's brother, testified that he and Duke had discussed becoming hit 
men and bumping off people, including their parents.  Mike Duke stated he learned in October 
or November 1999, that Duke had been talking to Brauberger about killing their 
parents.  Mike Duke further 
testified that they were not serious about killing their parents, and that Duke 
was simply playing a big joke on Brauberger, although he acknowledged telling 
the grand jury and the FBI earlier that Duke was not joking.  Mike Duke denied that the murder plot 
was his idea and indicated he was unaware of the details of the conversations 
between Duke and Brauberger.  Mike 
Duke also acknowledged he and Duke stood to receive around $200,000 from their 
parents' estate and life insurance policies upon their deaths. 

 

[¶20]      In 
his defense, Duke testified that he loved Liana and Erik and did not kill 
them.  He asserted that they 
accidentally fell to their deaths while he was at the jeep packing up and 
getting something to drink.  He said 
they had planned to go to the bay along the river and make popcorn, but ended up 
on the cliff by mistake.  Among 
other things, Duke denied being at the cliff with David Dell and Chrystal 
Robinson and asking Roger Brauberger to kill Liana and Erik. Duke also claimed 
that, although he talked to Brauberger about killing his parents, he never 
seriously considered it.  In fact, 
he maintained that the murder plot was Brauberger's idea and he was only playing 
along with it as a practical joke on Brauberger.  Duke also admitted pleading guilty in 
federal court on a charge relating to the murder plot concerning his parents, 
but claimed he did so to avoid a 60-year prison sentence.  

 

[¶21]      We 
shall set forth additional facts as necessary as we discuss each of the issues 
on appeal.

 

 

Issue 
One: Change of Venue

 

[¶22]      About 
four and one-half months before trial, Duke moved under W.R.Cr.P. 21 for a 
change of venue from Sweetwater County to another county in the Third Judicial 
District.  To his motion he attached 
five newspaper articles concerning his case that had appeared on January 24, 
January 26, January 31, February 28, and March 2, 2002, in either the Green 
River Star or the Dailey Rocket Miner, newspapers of general circulation in 
Sweetwater County.  These newspaper 
articles reported, among other things, that Duke had plead guilty to, or had 
been convicted of, a felony in federal court for the same or similar crimes 
which were pending against him in state court; and the articles also contained 
purported testimony of alleged witnesses indicating Duke's involvement in the 
alleged crimes.  Duke asserted that 
the information in these articles had prejudiced prospective jurors against him 
which prejudice could not be overcome in Sweetwater County.  During a hearing on April 25, 2002, the 
trial court acknowledged the pretrial publicity about the case but concluded a 
change of venue was inappropriate absent Duke's showing of actual 
prejudice.  The trial court deferred 
ruling on Duke's motion until jury selection.

 

[¶23]      Jury 
selection began on the morning of the first day of trial, August 12, 2002.  Prosecution counsel and Duke's counsel 
examined the jury panel for cause and exercised their peremptory 
challenges.  The transcript of jury 
selection consists of 207 pages.   
During the examination, most of the venire stated they had heard about 
the case from relatives, friends, or news media (radio and newspaper) 
coverage.  Nine of the thirty-eight 
potential jurors indicated they had formed an opinion about Duke based upon what 
they had heard or read.  Of those 
nine, the trial court excused five for cause; two were excused following 
peremptory challenges, and two were seated on the jury. One of those potential 
jurors excused for cause was excused on Duke's motion.  The two seated jurors who had formed an 
opinion about Duke stated unequivocally that they could set aside such opinions 
and render a fair verdict based exclusively on the evidence presented at trial. 
Of the remaining prospective jurors, each stated that, despite the publicity 
surrounding the case, he or she could render a fair and impartial decision based 
solely on the court's instructions and the evidence presented at trial.  Each also indicated he or she would hold 
the prosecution to its burden of proving Duke's guilt as to each charge beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  At the close of 
jury selection, Duke's counsel did not object to the jury as empaneled and did 
not renew his pretrial motion for a change of venue.

 

[¶24]      Duke 
insists that, despite what occurred during jury selection, he did not receive a 
fair trial because of the excessive pretrial publicity.  He argues that neither the trial court's 
inquiry, nor counsels', was sufficient to evaluate the jurors' assurances of 
impartiality.  He claims that 
community feeling was running very high and all the major participants involved 
in the case were long-time community residents.  He contends that the degree of pretrial 
publicity was great and the trial court, in the exercise of reasonable caution, 
should have recognized that prejudice against Duke was so great within the small 
town of Green River and Sweetwater County "that venue should have been moved, 
regardless."

 

[¶25]      In 
Urbigkit v. State, 2003 WY 57, 67 P.3d 1207 (Wyo. 2003), we stated our 
standard of review and summary of Wyoming change-of-venue 
law:

 

We 
review the denial of a motion for change of venue under an abuse of discretion 
standard, meaning we will not interfere with the trial court's decision unless 
the trial court acted in a manner exceeding the bounds of reason under the 
circumstances.  Nixon v. 
State, 994 P.2d 324, 326-27 (Wyo. 1999).  The party moving for change of venue has 
the burden of showing actual prejudice in the minds of the jurors so great that 
a fair trial cannot be obtained.  
Id. at 327.

            
We have summarized the law in Wyoming relating to change of venue as 
follows:

            
Criminal defendants in Wyoming have a constitutional right to a trial by 
an impartial jury.  Wyoming's 
constitutional provision grants the right to trial "by an impartial jury of the 
county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed."  Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10.  The legislative provision mirroring the 
constitution requires "[e]very criminal case shall be tried in the county in 
which the indictment or offense charged is found, except as otherwise provided 
by law." Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-7-102(a) (LEXIS 1999).  Trial proceedings are transferred to 
another county "only if the court is satisfied that there exists within the 
county where the prosecution is pending so great a prejudice against the 
defendant that the defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial in that 
county."  W.R.Cr.P. 
21(a).

This 
Court has adopted a two-part test for determining whether a change of venue 
should be granted after voir dire because of pre-trial publicity:  "First, the nature and extent of the 
publicity must be considered; second, the difficulty or ease in selecting a jury 
must be considered along with the amount of prejudice which actually appears 
during voir dire examination.'" Sides [v. State], 963 P.2d 
[227], 231  [(Wyo. 1998)] (quoting 
Murry [v. State], 713 P.2d [202,] 208 [(Wyo. 
1986)].

 

Urbigkit, 
¶¶26-27 (alterations in original).

 

[¶26]      Applying 
the first prong of the test, we note that Duke relied on five newspaper articles 
from the county's general circulation newspapers, the first one of which 
appeared approximately seven months before his trial and the last one of which 
appeared five months before his trial.  
We have read the articles; they are generally factual in nature, 
reporting information obtained from court documents and from a potential 
witness.  We do not find them to be 
sensational, inflammatory, or prejudicial.  
Neither the nature nor the extent of the news coverage justifies a 
finding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Duke's motion 
under the first prong of the change-of-venue test.

 

[¶27]      Applying 
the second prong of the test, we also see nothing in the record requiring 
reversal.  The prosecutor, Duke's 
counsel, and the trial court appropriately and properly examined the 
venire.  The potential jurors 
responded to that examination in a forthright manner.  There is simply no indication in the 
record that the pretrial publicity in this case made jury selection difficult or 
created such prejudice that a change of venue was necessary.  Duke's first issue has no 
merit.

 

 

Issue 
Two:  Whether Duke was denied a fair 
trial because jurors observed him in leg restraints during the 
trial

 

[¶28]      On 
January 14, 2003, this Court granted Duke's motion and remanded the case to the 
trial court for an evidentiary hearing to enable Duke to develop a record on the 
issue whether he was improperly restrained at trial and whether his trial 
counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to such 
improper restraint.  The trial court 
held an evidentiary hearing on March 28, 2003, receiving testimony from Duke, 
Duke's trial counsel, one of the prosecutors, the transport officer of the 
county sheriff's office, a former county sheriff, a deputy United States 
Marshal, the jail administrator, and jurors.  After the evidentiary hearing, the trial 
court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law.  The trial court found that Duke was 
wearing leg restraints during the trial and the jurors saw him in those 
restraints.  The trial court also 
found Duke's trial counsel probably made a request for removal of those 
restraints to the trial court at the end of an in-chambers hearing on the first 
day of trial; and the trial court did not respond to that 
request.

 

[¶29]      On 
appeal, Duke claims his having to appear in leg restraints before the jury was 
inherently prejudicial and deprived him of a fair trial under Asch v. 
State, 2003 WY 18, 62 P.3d 945 (Wyo. 2003), and our decisions since that 
seminal decision. See, e.g., Urbigkit, ¶¶16-24.  The State recognizes the trial court's 
failure to hold a pretrial hearing concerning the necessity of in-trial leg 
restraints, as prescribed in Asch, could be found to be an abuse of 
discretion and, therefore, error.  
The State observes, however, that in Daniel v. State, 2003 WY 132, 
¶15, 78 P.3d 205, ¶15 (Wyo. 2003), we held that, where the jury did not view or 
hear the accused in leg restraints during trial, a trial court's error in 
allowing restraints without a pretrial hearing as mandated by Asch was 
subject to harmless error review.  
We also noted that, according to State v. Finch, 975 P.2d 967, 
1006-07 (Wash. 1999), some courts apply harmless error analysis where 
overwhelming evidence of the accused's guilt exists.  Daniel, ¶15.  Recognizing it bears the burden of 
demonstrating the trial court's error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, 
the State declares it can satisfy that burden.  The State then points to the trial 
court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in its remand decision to the 
effect that, given the trial court's knowledge of the case, the accused, 
courtroom security concerns, the trial audience, and the potential for 
disturbances, a pretrial hearing would not have changed the trial court's 
decision to allow the leg restraints during trial.  The State also points to seven factors 
which the trial court identified as justifying the allowance of 
restraints:

 

(1) 
Duke was serving a ten-year federal sentence and was facing six potential life 
sentences on the state charges; 

 

(2) 
Duke was an escape risk; 

 

(3) 
the U.S. Marshals' policy would have required that Duke be shackled during the 
trial; 

 

(4) 
the courtroom lacked adequate security; 

 

(5) 
Duke, during various stages of the trial, was in close proximity to constitute a 
physical threat to the trial judge, the jurors, his attorney, and his attorney's 
wife; 

 

(6) 
the "shock belt" available to the Sweetwater County Sheriff's Office is designed 
to be worn over clothing, which would make it readily visible to the jury and 
does not incapacitate the wearer; and 

 

(7) 
Michael Duke, Duke's brother and federal co-defendant, had been released from 
federal prison prior to Duke's trial and was residing in Green River, Wyoming. 

 

[¶30]      In 
response to the State's argument, Duke argues the trial court erred at the 
remand hearing when it received in violation of W.R.E. 606(b) juror testimony 
concerning the effect, if any, on the jury verdict of the jurors' having seen 
Duke in leg restraints for the eleven days of trial.  W.R.E. 606(b) 
reads:

 

(b) 
Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. -- Upon an inquiry into 
the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any 
matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or 
to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as 
influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or 
concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, nor may his affidavit 
or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be 
precluded from testifying be received, but a juror may testify on the questions 
whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's 
attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon 
any juror.

 

Duke 
surmises that the standard of review for the trial court's decision to allow 
such juror testimony may be the abuse-of-discretion standard, testing that 
decision as a reviewing court would when a witness's competency is tested.  Duke also argues that the reliability of 
such "after-the-fact" juror testimony is highly suspect.  He directs us to the advice of the 
United States Supreme Court in a case where a procedure is used which involves a 
probability that prejudice deemed inherently lacking in due process will result, 
"little stock need be placed in jurors' claims to the contrary."  Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 
570, 106 S. Ct. 1340, 1346, 89 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1986).  Duke also argues that the evidence 
against him, particularly with respect to the first degree murder charges and 
the solicitation-of-murder charges related thereto, was not overwhelming.  Duke asserts the verdict on those 
particular charges turned nearly entirely upon the jury's believing either Duke 
or the prosecution's key witness Roger Brauberger.  Duke argues it is impossible to measure 
the degree to which a juror was influenced, consciously or subconsciously, by 
having seen and heard Duke in leg restraints each and every day of a trial that 
spanned two weeks; but, he asserts, a prejudicial influence of some weight is 
presumed. 

 

[¶31]      The 
significant facts of this case, in the context of the leg restraints issue, are 
distinguishable from the significant facts in our prior cases involving leg 
restraints.  In Asch, 2003 WY 
18, 62 P.3d 945 (Wyo. 2003), published February 6, 2003, the remand hearing 
established that only one juror observed the accused in leg restraints during a 
one-day trial.  Id. at 
¶56.  Although we held the trial 
court abused its discretion in allowing the accused to be shackled in the 
courtroom during his trial without first requiring the prosecution to justify 
that practice on the record, id. at ¶62, we also held the accused's trial 
counsel had provided ineffective assistance in failing to investigate adequately 
a primary defense; consequently, we reversed and remanded for a new trial.  Id. at ¶¶65-66.  Because of that disposition, we did not 
undertake a harmless error analysis.  

 

[¶32]      In 
Urbigkit, 2003 WY 57, 67 P.3d 1207 (Wyo. 2003), published May 7, 2003, 
the accused, before trial and before jury selection, raised the shackling issue, 
the prosecution opposed the accused's request to be unrestrained in the 
courtroom during trial, and the trial court allowed the use of leg restraints in 
the courtroom during the trial.  
Although no testimony or evidence was presented that the jurors observed 
the defendant in shackles, the defendant was in leg restraints, and instructed 
not to move, when he testified before the jury but away from the witness 
stand.  Id. at ¶¶16-21.  We held that the manner in which the 
trial court resolved the issue generally complied with the spirit of 
Asch.  Id. at 
¶23.  We held the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in requiring the accused to wear leg restraints in the 
courtroom throughout his trial.  
Id. at ¶24.  

 

[¶33]      In 
Daniel, 2003 WY 132, 78 P.3d 205 (Wyo. 2003), published October 23, 2003, 
the remand hearing established that the accused was shackled during his trial 
without the benefit of a pretrial hearing for the prosecution to establish 
justification for shackling; thus, the trial court abused its discretion in 
allowing shackling.  Id. at 
¶14.  The remand hearing also 
established, however, that the jury did not view or hear the accused in shackles 
during his trial.  Id. at 
¶15.  The present case, then, tried 
before the Asch pretrial procedure became required, is the first case 
before us where most, if not all, of the jurors viewed and heard the accused in 
shackles during his trial, and no pretrial proceedings were held on the 
issue.

 

[¶34]      In 
light of our Asch discussion about the inherently prejudicial nature of a 
jury's viewing and hearing an accused in shackles during his trial, we can only 
hold here that the trial court's allowance of the use of leg restraints on Duke 
during his trial was an abuse of discretion and, of course, error.  Although Duke argues it is impossible to 
measure the degree of the prejudicial influence his shackling had on the jurors 
who tried him, we believe it is possible to measure that degree of prejudicial 
impact considering the weight of the evidence supporting that jury's 
verdict.  Therefore, we hold the 
trial court's error is subject to harmless error analysis.  Applying that analysis, we are impressed 
by the strong evidence of Duke's guilt on all the charges.  That Duke pleaded guilty on the federal 
charges of soliciting the murder of his parents made his conviction on the 
similar state charges a certainty.  
Duke makes no serious argument to the contrary.  With respect to the first degree murder 
charges and the related solicitation charges pertaining to Duke's wife and son, 
we are also impressed with the strong evidence of Duke's guilt on those 
charges.  We have recounted that 
evidence earlier in this opinion and need not repeat it here.  As that recounting shows, the evidence 
of Duke's guilt on those charges was much more than a credibility contest 
between Roger Brauberger and Duke.  
Quite considerable, and independent, circumstantial evidence existed 
supporting his guilt on those charges.  
After carefully studying the record and all of the evidence, we are 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the error below was harmless.  In reaching this decision, we have given 
no stock to the jurors' testimony at the remand hearing.  We need not decide today whether, in 
this shackling context, W.R.E. 606(b) prohibits such testimony.  Because of our judgment on the 
prosecution's strong evidence of Duke's guilt on all of the charges, we had no 
need to consider the jurors' remand hearing testimony.

 

 

Issue 
Three:  Ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel

 

[¶35]      Duke 
has set forth nine claims of alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel, 
namely, he (1) failed 
to object to the joinder of the charges for trial; (2) failed to object to 
hearsay testimony and unduly prejudicial evidence; (3) failed to adequately 
investigate; (4) failed to object to leading questions; (5) failed to object to 
the district court's erroneous application of W.R.E. 
613; (6) failed to make a record objection to the security measures employed at 
trial; (7) failed to object to the use of, and the jury's reliance upon, a 
demonstrative exhibit that was never introduced into evidence; (8) failed to 
object to the jury being advised it was a non-capital case; and (9) failed to 
offer any defense instructions, particularly theory-of-defense 
instructions.  

 

[¶36]      
Claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel are reviewed under the following 
standard:

 

When 
reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the paramount 
determination is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial counsel's 
acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance.  Herdt 
v. State, 
891 P.2d 793, 796 (Wyo. 1995); Starr 
v. State, 
888 P.2d 1262, 1266-67 (Wyo. 1995); Arner 
v. State, 
872 P.2d 100, 104 (Wyo. 1994); Frias 
v. State, 
722 P.2d 135, 145 (Wyo. 1986).  The 
reviewing court should indulge a strong presumption that counsel rendered 
adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of 
reasonable professional judgment.  
Herdt, 
at 796; Starr, 
at 1266; Arner, 
at 104; Strickland 
v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 
(1984).

Under 
the two-prong standard articulated in Strickland 
and Frias, 
an appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate on the 
record that counsel's performance was deficient and that prejudice 
resulted.  Strickland, 
466 U.S.  at 687, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064; Starr, 
at 1266; King 
v. State, 
810 P.2d 119, 125 (Wyo. 1991) (Cardine, J., dissenting); Campbell 
v. State, 
728 P.2d 628, 629 (Wyo. 1986); Frias, 
722 P.2d  at 145.  In other words, to 
warrant reversal on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant 
must demonstrate that his counsel failed to "render such assistance as would 
have been offered by a reasonably competent attorney" and that "counsel's 
deficiency prejudiced the defense of the case."  Lower 
v. State, 
786 P.2d 346, 349 (Wyo. 1990).  "The 
benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's 
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the 
trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."  Strickland, 
466 U.S.  at 686, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064.

 

Asch, 
¶11 (quoting Becker 
v. State, 
2002 WY 126, ¶12, 53 P.3d 94, ¶12 (Wyo. 2002); Reyna 
v. State, 
2001 WY 105, ¶19, 33 P.3d 1129, ¶19 (Wyo. 2001); Chapman 
v. State, 
2001 WY 25, ¶6, 18 P.3d 1164, ¶6 (Wyo. 2001); Grainey 
v. State, 
997 P.2d 1035, 1038-39 (Wyo. 2000)).  
The burden of proving that counsel was ineffective rests entirely on an 
appellant.  Asch, 
¶11 (citing Barkell 
v. State, 
2002 WY 153, ¶10, 55 P.3d 1239, ¶10 (Wyo. 2002)).  To satisfy his burden, an appellant must 
provide more than mere speculation or equivocal inferences.  Sincock 
v. State, 
2003 WY 115, ¶37, 76 P.3d 323, ¶37 (Wyo. 2003) (citing Barkell, 
¶13).

 

 

Failure 
to object to the joinder of the cases for trial

 

[¶37]      
A 
few days after Duke's arraignment in Docket No. CR-02-49-R, the State filed a 
motion to join that case with Docket No. CR-01-209-R for purposes of trial "on 
the grounds that all counts charged in the two referenced cases include offenses 
of the same or similar character, and are based upon acts or transactions 
connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan." That 
motion was addressed during a hearing on April 25, 2002.  As the State was presenting argument in 
favor of joinder, the following transpired:

 

[Defense 
Counsel]:   Your Honor, I have a 
question.  Is all of this 
necessary?  Are we playing to the 
press to get our story out, or are we arguing a motion?

 

[Prosecutor]:  Your Honor, I believe I'm required to 
show that this is a common scheme or plan, and I don't want to go into a lot 
more detail, but I think I'm required to give you a little bit of an offer of 
proof so you can see whether or not it was a common scheme or 
plan.

 

* 
* * *

 

[Defense 
Counsel]:   Try your case.  We know what the Judge is going to rule, 
we talked about it in chambers.

 

COURT:   Well 

 

[Prosecutor]:  If you're going to stipulate to the 
ruling, I don't need to say anything else.

 

* 
* * *

 

COURT:  [Defense counsel], are you opposed to 
the Motion for Joinder?

 

[Defense 
Counsel]:   No. I have talked 
this over with my client, your Honor, and it's my opinion that any evidence is 
going to come in on either trial, especially the first degree murder charge from 
the felony convictions if he testifies.  
I don't believe I can stop that.  
I realize what they're trying to do is take their weakest case and put it 
with their strongest case, but in order for my client to testify, I have to 
basically agree to the joinder, so that's what I'm telling you.  I'm not going to object to the joinder. 
[Duke] understands what I'm doing.

 

[Prosecutor]:  If there's no objection to the joinder, 
your Honor, I need say nothing else.

 

COURT:  All right.  It  is that 
correct?

 

[Defense 
Counsel]:   That's correct, your 
Honor.

 

COURT:  All right.  The Motion is 
granted.

 

[¶38]      
Duke 
now scores trial counsel for not contesting the joinder of the two cases for 
trial.  He contends that he was 
prejudiced by counsel's inactions because the prosecution was erroneously 
allowed to consolidate two sets of unrelated charges and all of its evidence, 
including "bad character" evidence, into one trial to his detriment.  Duke alleges error but has failed to 
make the requisite showing that counsel rendered prejudicially deficient 
assistance.

 

[¶39]      
The 
rules pertaining to the joinder of criminal cases are W.R.Cr.P. 
8(a) and 13.  W.R.Cr.P. 
8(a) provides:

 

(a)       Joinder 
of offenses. -- Two or more offenses may be charged in the same citation, 
indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses 
charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar 
character, are based on the same act or transaction, or are based on two or more 
acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme 
or plan.

 

W.R.Cr.P. 
13 
provides in pertinent part:

 

The 
court may order two or more indictments, informations, citations or a 
combination thereof to be tried together if the offenses . . . could have been 
joined in a single indictment, information or citation.  The procedure shall be the same as if 
the prosecution were under such single indictment, information or 
citation.

 

The 
rule governing the severance of criminal charges is W.R.Cr.P. 
14, which provides in pertinent part:

 

If 
it appears that a defendant or the state is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses 
. . . in an indictment, information or citation, or by such joinder for trial 
together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts . . . or 
provide whatever other relief justice requires. 

 

[¶40]      
Rule 
13 
conditions the joinder of offenses charged in separate informations or 
indictments on the same circumstances which would permit joinder of counts 
within a single information.  That 
is, if the offenses charged in separate informations or indictments are of the 
same or similar character or constitute part of a common scheme or plan, the 
offenses may be tried together as if charged in a single information.  The law relative to the joinder of 
offenses contained in the Information and Indictment against Duke is the same as 
that applicable to the joinder of the four offenses charged in the Indictment 
against him.  Tabor 
v. State, 
616 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Wyo. 1980).  We 
note that Duke has not challenged the propriety of combining the murder charges 
and solicitation charges regarding his wife and child in the same 
Indictment.

 

[¶41]      
We 
believe that 
the two solicitation offenses charged in the Information, Docket No. CR-02-49-R, 
are of the "same or similar character" as the two solicitation offenses charged 
in the Indictment, Docket No. CR-01-209-R, and constituted part of a "common 
plan or scheme."  Although the 
criminal acts occurred at different times and against different victims, the 
nature of the offenses and the circumstances surrounding the commission of those 
offenses were identical.  In each 
instance, Duke actively pursued and offered Roger Brauberger money to kill 
members of his immediate family and formulated plans by which the murders could 
be accomplished.

 

[¶42]      
As 
a general rule, joinder of offenses is proper absent compelling reasons for 
severance.  Bell 
v. State, 
994 P.2d 947, 955 (Wyo. 2000) (citing Bishop 
v. State, 
687 P.2d 242, 247 (Wyo. 1984)). "Joint trials serve the public interest by 
expediting the administration of justice, reducing docket congestion, conserving 
judicial time as well as that of jurors along with avoiding the recall of 
witnesses to duplicate their performances."  Bell, at 955 (quoting 
Jasch 
v. State, 
563 P.2d 1327, 1335 (Wyo. 1977)).  
Any prejudice caused by the joinder is weighed against the judicial 
economies created by joinder.  
Bell, at 955 (citing Dorador 
v. State, 
768 P.2d 1049, 1052 (Wyo. 1989); Lee 
v. State, 
653 P.2d 1388 (Wyo. 1982)).

 

[¶43]      
In 
Dorador, 
this Court identified a two-part test for determining whether prejudice resulted 
from the joinder of offenses:

 

The 
first is whether the evidence relating to the similar offenses charged would be 
admissible in a separate trial of each offense.  Tabor, 
616 P.2d  at 1284.  If the evidence 
would be admissible, there is no prejudice.  If the evidence would not be admissible 
in separate trials, the trial court should then determine whether the evidence 
of each crime is "simple and distinct."  Drew 
v. United States, 
331 F.2d 85, 91 (D.C. Cir. 1964).  
Stated differently, the second  
consideration is whether the evidence relating to the separate offenses 
would be so complicated that the jury could not reasonably be expected to 
separate them and evaluate the evidence properly and individually on each 
separate charge.  Pote 
v. State, 
695 P.2d 617 (Wyo. 1985).

 

Dorador, 
768 P.2d  at 1052.

 

[¶44]      
Duke 
acknowledges that the interests of judicial economy militate in favor of 
joinder.  He also acknowledges he 
bears the burden of showing he would have had a better chance at acquittal had 
the cases not been tried together.  
However, in attacking counsel's assistance, he offers only an unsupported 
assertion that he was prejudiced by the joinder of his criminal cases.  He has not provided any analysis 
applying the Dorador 
two-part 
test to the facts of this case and, instead, has relegated that task to this 
Court to undertake under the assumption that prejudice will be 
found.

 

[¶45]      
An 
examination of the record reflects that all of the prosecution's evidence 
pertaining to the solicitation charges would have been admissible in separate 
trials under W.R.E. 
404(b) to show course of conduct or to show a common plan or scheme.  Bell, 
994 P.2d  at 956.  Duke's attempted 
solicitation of Roger Brauberger to kill his wife and child was directly related 
to the murder charges.  His later 
solicitation of Brauberger to kill his parents was relevant circumstantial 
evidence to prove his involvement in his wife's and child's murder and, 
therefore, would have been admissible in the murder case.  That evidence was also relevant to 
explain why Brauberger contacted police and why police reopened the 
investigation into his wife's and child's deaths.  Conversely, the evidence of Duke's 
solicitation of his wife's and child's murder would have been relevant to the 
solicitation charges concerning his parents and, therefore, would have been 
admissible in a separate trial on those charges. Duke clearly has made no 
showing to the contrary.  That the 
evidence presented at this trial could have been separately introduced had the 
cases not been joined establishes the lack of prejudice to Duke in this 
case.

 

[¶46]      
Furthermore, 
the issues and proof in each case were relatively simple and not complex.  The issue before the jury was whether 
Duke solicited the murders of his parents, his wife and his child and whether 
he, in fact, killed his wife and child as alleged during the time periods in 
question.  In Instruction No. 10, 
the trial court instructed the jury that it had to give separate consideration 
to each count and the evidence pertaining to it, and that its finding on one 
count was not to control its verdict as to any of the other charged crimes.  Duke has provided no evidence that the 
jury did not follow the trial court's instruction, and he has not shown that the 
jury improperly cumulated the evidence in reaching its 
decision.

 

[¶47]      Duke 
has not established that counsel rendered prejudicially deficient assistance in 
not objecting to the consolidation of his criminal cases for trial.  

 

 

Failure 
to object to hearsay testimony and unduly prejudicial 
evidence

 

[¶48]      
Duke 
faults counsel for not objecting to certain hearsay testimony, evidence of his 
brother's federal guilty plea and other unduly prejudicial evidence.  Most of his claim appears to be a 
continuation of his condemnation of counsel's failure to prevent joinder of the 
criminal charges, which was addressed above.  Duke contends that the admission of that 
testimony denied him a fair trial.  
In asserting error, however, he has failed to show that counsel's 
omissions amounted to prejudicially deficient assistance.

 

[¶49]      
Duke 
first argues that various witnesses gave improper hearsay testimony to which 
counsel should have posed an objection.  
His argument, however, consists solely of a single paragraph of excerpts 
of the witnesses' trial testimony, placed in a footnote in his brief, with no 
analysis or citations to legal authorities.  His argument also fails to explain how 
the admission of that minimal testimony prejudiced his defense. This Court has 
stated that it will not consider arguments that are not cogent or supported by 
citation to pertinent authority.  
Eustice 
v. State, 
11 P.3d 897, 904 (Wyo. 2000); Blumhagen 
v. State, 
11 P.3d 889, 897 (Wyo. 2000).  We 
apply that rule here.

 

[¶50]      
Duke 
next claims that counsel should have objected when the prosecutor elicited an 
admission from his brother and federal co-defendant, Mike Duke, that he had 
pleaded guilty in federal court to a charge related to the solicitation of their 
parents' murders.  In its direct 
examination of Mike Duke, the prosecution extensively questioned him about his 
knowledge of, and his involvement in, Duke's solicitation of Brauberger to kill 
their parents.  Throughout his 
direct testimony, Mike Duke downplayed the seriousness of the murder plot and 
testified that the plot was simply a practical joke Duke was playing on 
Brauberger.  At the end of direct 
examination, the following occurred:

 

[Prosecutor].  Although it was a joke, you ended up 
pleading guilty in federal court to this joke, didn't you?

 

[Mike 
Duke].    Correct. 

 

[¶51]      
Duke 
asserts that evidence of Mike Duke's federal guilty plea was inadmissible under 
Mazurek 
v. State, 
10 P.3d 531 (Wyo. 2000), Ross 
v. State, 
930 P.2d 965 (Wyo. 1996), and Kwallek 
v. State, 
596 P.2d 1372 (Wyo. 1979).  He 
insists that counsel's failure to object to that testimony deprived him of his 
right to have a trial on its own merits and constituted reversible 
error.

 

[¶52]      
The 
State acknowledges that the testimony in question was probably inadmissible 
under existing Wyoming law.  The 
State, however, disagrees, as do we, that Duke is entitled to reversal of his 
convictions based solely on the admission of that isolated question and 
answer.  See Black 
v. State, 
2002 WY 72, ¶36, 46 P.3d 298, ¶36 (Wyo. 2002); Mazurek, 
10 P.3d  at 535 (when no objection is raised at trial, reversal is warranted only 
upon a finding of prejudicial plain error).

 

[¶53]      
To 
succeed on his ineffectiveness claim, Duke must show both a deficiency in 
counsel's assistance and resulting prejudice. Asch, 
¶11. With respect to the second prong, he has not provided any insight into how 
the admission of that testimony adversely affected the outcome of his 
trial.  Rather, he has offered 
nothing more than an unsupported assertion that prejudicial error occurred.  At a minimum, he should have evaluated 
the prejudicial effect of that testimony under the factors set forth in 
Mazurek, 
10 P.3d  at 539.  He, however, has 
neither mentioned nor applied those factors within the context of this 
case.  In the absence of a clear 
showing of actual prejudice resulting from counsel's inactions that would be 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of his trial, Duke's 
ineffectiveness claim cannot be sustained.

 

[¶54]      
Duke 
lastly faults counsel for not invoking some "helpful rules of evidence" to 
prevent other prejudicial evidence from being introduced at trial.  Although not entirely clear, he 
seemingly faults counsel for not keeping from the jury evidence pertaining to 
his federal conviction and the tapes and transcripts of the telephone calls 
between himself and Brauberger upon which the solicitation charges concerning 
his parents were based.  However, 
other than a generic reference to W.R.E. 
403 and W.R.E. 
404(b), he has provided no guidance on what "helpful rules of evidence" counsel 
could have invoked to accomplish the desired result under existing law and the 
facts of this case.  His mere 
unparticularized speculation and conjecture on what counsel should have done, 
without more, is insufficient to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that 
counsel's performance was constitutionally ineffective.

 

 

Failure 
to adequately investigate

 

[¶55]      
Duke 
next faults counsel for allegedly failing to interview any of the 
prosecution's witnesses prior to trial.  
Counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a 
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.  Strickland, 
466 U.S.  at 690-91, 104 S. Ct.  at 2066.  
This Court assesses counsel's performance by considering all of the 
circumstances existing at the time counsel made the investigative decision and 
applies a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments in this regard.  Asch, 
¶41.  A convicted defendant claiming 
counsel was ineffective bears the burden of demonstrating counsel acted 
unreasonably and that he was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness.  Strickland, 
466 U.S.  at 687, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064.  
In doing so, an appellant "must identify the acts or omissions of counsel 
that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional 
judgment."  Id. at 690, 104 S. Ct.  at 2066.

 

[¶56]      
Duke's 
contention that counsel failed to interview any of the witnesses is not 
supported by the record and is speculative at best.  This Court will not presume the truth of 
allegations that are not supported by the record.  Madrid 
v. State, 
910 P.2d 1340, 1343 (Wyo. 1996).   
In his argument, Duke assumes that counsel did not investigate or 
interview the witnesses because counsel appeared to meet several prosecution 
witnesses for the first time at trial.  
However, counsel may have interviewed the witnesses, without meeting them 
in person, perhaps by telephone.  
Or, another attorney or an investigator may have interviewed the 
witnesses for counsel.  An 
appellant's speculative contentions as to what he believes occurred are not 
considered by this Court unless they are demonstrated in the record.  Id.; Hayes 
v. American Nat'l Bank of Powell, 
784 P.2d 599, 601 (Wyo. 1989).

 

[¶57]      
Moreover, 
Duke provides no authority that counsel must meet and interview all of the 
prosecution's witnesses in person in order to act as reasonably competent 
counsel and does not explain what "solid investigation of all important 
witnesses" might entail.  Although 
this Court has acknowledged that a failure to investigate under certain 
circumstances may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel, none of those 
circumstances apply in this case.  
See Asch, 
¶¶41, 43, 45 (regarding failure to investigate a possible defense, failure to 
identify favorable evidence or witnesses that additional investigation would 
have revealed, failure to interview an eyewitness to the crime, or failure to 
investigate evidence that goes to the very heart of the prosecution's 
case).  An appellant must provide 
more than mere speculation or equivocal inferences to satisfy the burden of 
demonstrating that counsel's performance was ineffective.  Sincock, 
¶37.  Duke's purely conjectural 
allegations concerning whether counsel interviewed, or should have interviewed, 
the prosecution's witnesses simply do not support a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  He has not 
demonstrated that counsel's performance was other than reasonable or that he was 
prejudiced by the alleged failure of counsel to interview the 
witnesses.

 

[¶58]      
The 
majority of Duke's argument faults counsel for allegedly failing to interview 
Mrs. Brauberger, the wife of the prosecution's main witness.  This claim fails because it is not 
supported by the record.   His 
claim that counsel did not try to talk with Mrs. Brauberger misreads the 
record.  Counsel spoke with Mrs. 
Brauberger before trial, and she told him to contact the prosecuting 
attorney.  Apparently, she was not 
willing to provide him with any information and any attempt to interview her or 
to call her as a witness to impeach her husband would have been futile.  Indeed, when the trial court offered to 
make her available for questioning so counsel could determine whether she did 
have any relevant impeachment testimony, Duke told counsel not to talk to 
her.  He cannot now complain that 
counsel was ineffective when counsel simply followed his direction.  Strickland, 
466 U.S.  at 691, 104 S. Ct.  at 2066; Frias, 
722 P.2d  at 145.

 

[¶59]      
In 
speculative fashion, Duke also alleges that if counsel had interviewed Mrs. 
Brauberger, counsel could have been prepared for Roger Brauberger's "damning" 
testimony that he had "previous[ly]" told his wife about Duke's request that he 
kill his wife and child.  According 
to Duke, this testimony was contradicted by the fact he "twice omitted naming 
his wife as one of his early confidantes about this murder for hire 
solicitation" later in his testimony.  
Duke claims counsel might have been able to impeach Roger Brauberger's 
testimony by putting Mrs. Brauberger on the stand.  However, Duke misinterprets the word 
"previous" in the above-referenced testimony as indicating Mrs. Brauberger was 
one of Roger Brauberger's "early confidantes" about the murder for hire 
solicitation.

 

[¶60]      
Duke's 
assertion derives from the fact that, at trial, Roger Brauberger explained why 
he finally went to the police with the information about Duke.  He said, "Well, I hadn't told my 
wife about it until one night when we were driving home . . . ."  He then continued:

 

I 
said, "Something really bad and terrible has happened and something really bad 
and terrible might happen if I don't do something about this."  So I told her exactly what we [Duke and 
Roger Brauberger] talked about, about killing his parents.  I told her previous about the wife and 
child.  I said, "Look, he's capable 
of doing it.  If I don't go to the 
police, something  we may end up, you know, seeing another funeral, and I can't 
deal with that."  She advised me to 
go to my father.  My father advised 
me to go to the police.  

 

[¶61]      
Roger 
Brauberger talked to the police the next day, January 4, 1999.  Contrary to Duke's characterization of 
this testimony as an indication that Mrs. Brauberger was an early confidante, 
Roger Brauberger was discussing what he told his wife the night of January 3, 
1999.  He told her for the first 
time about Duke's previous request to kill Erik and Liana Duke to explain 
why he was concerned about Duke's request to kill his parents. Not only was 
counsel's investigation reasonable, but Duke has not demonstrated prejudice 
because there was no discrepancy in Roger Brauberger's testimony. 

 

[¶62]      
Duke 
also complains that the alleged failure to interview witnesses deprived counsel 
of the ability to determine whether they might have information that could have 
shaken the jury's confidence in Roger Brauberger.  This argument ignores the testimony that 
the jury did hear about Roger Brauberger.  
Defense counsel cross-examined Roger Brauberger and delved into his drug 
and heavy drinking habits and that he bought and sold marijuana.  Counsel noted that Roger Brauberger did 
not remember many details and contradicted himself in other ways.  Duke also testified that it was Roger 
Brauberger's idea to kill Duke's parents.  
Defense counsel presented a formidable attack on Roger Brauberger's 
credibility, and Duke has not demonstrated that counsel's performance fell below 
that of a reasonably competent counsel.  
Strickland, 
466 U.S.  at 687, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064.

 

[¶63]      
Considering 
the speculative nature of Duke's claims that counsel did not interview any of 
the prosecution's witnesses, he has not demonstrated that counsel failed to 
investigate or any alleged failure to interview witnesses was unreasonable.  Nor has he demonstrated any prejudice 
resulting from counsel's alleged failure to investigate.  

 

 

Failure 
to object to leading questions

 

[¶64]      
Duke 
complains that counsel did not object when the prosecutor asked leading 
questions of the prosecution's witnesses on direct examination. However, he 
acknowledges that "it is sometimes unwise, time-consuming and even annoying to 
the court to pose technically correct objections to things which don't matter" 
and does not even attempt to distinguish this case from a case in which counsel 
is wise to avoid annoying the court and the jury with needless objections.  Although Duke calls the challenged 
testimony "highly consequential," he does not explain why the testimony was so 
important.  If the testimony was 
important, counsel may have made a conscious and reasonable choice not to draw 
the jury's attention to that testimony with an objection when the information 
would have gotten to the jury eventually anyway.  Duke has not "overcome the presumption 
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound 
trial strategy."  Strickland, 
466 U.S.  at 689, 104 S. Ct.  at 2065 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).

 

[¶65]      
In 
addition, "[l]eading questions are not, per se, impermissible."  Pena 
v. State, 
792 P.2d 1352, 1355 (Wyo. 1990).  
W.R.E. 611(c) 
states that "[l]eading questions should not be used on the direct examination of 
a witness except as may be necessary to develop his testimony."  Duke does not assert that the questions 
were not necessary to develop the witnesses' testimony.  As such, counsel's decision not to 
object was entirely proper.

 

[¶66]      
Duke's 
comment that leading questions "may influence testimony, invoke a false memory 
of events or push a witness into false acquiescence to the questioner" is not 
sufficient to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Such speculation and conjectural 
allegations do not demonstrate that counsel's performance was not reasonable or 
affirmatively prove that Duke was prejudiced.  Sincock, 
¶37.  "It is not enough for the 
defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of 
the proceeding."  Strickland, 
466 U.S.  at 693, 104 S. Ct.  at 2067.  
"The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.  A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome."  Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct.  at 2068.

 

 

Failure 
to object to the district court's erroneous application of 
W.R.E. 
613

 

[¶67]      
Duke 
apparently contends that counsel was ineffective for his failure to object to 
the trial court's allegedly erroneous application of W.R.E. 
613 to counsel's attempts at impeaching Roger Brauberger.  However, Duke does nothing to develop or 
analyze this claim.  Rather, he 
merely cites to three pages of the trial transcript and the language of 
Rule 
613 and leaves it to the State and to this Court to determine what his complaint 
entails.  Furthermore, Duke has not 
explained how counsel's alleged deficiency in this regard actually prejudiced 
him at trial.  Because his claim is 
not supported by cogent argument or legal authority, this Court need not 
consider it.  Barkell, 
¶32; Madrid, 
910 P.2d  at 1347.

 

 

Failure 
to make a record objection to the security measures employed at 
trial

 

[¶68]      
Duke 
faults counsel for not objecting to the use of restraints at trial.  He, however, has not provided any 
argument concerning this claim but, rather, has simply directed the Court's 
attention to Argument II of his brief.  
As we explained in response to that claim, no reasonable possibility 
exists that the jurors' observation of Duke in restraints during trial 
contributed to their determination of guilt.  Because his right to a fair trial was 
not adversely affected by the shackling, he cannot show that counsel rendered 
prejudicially deficient assistance in not making a record objection to the use 
of restraints during trial.

 

 

Failure 
to object to the use of, and the jury's reliance upon, a demonstrative exhibit 
that was never introduced into evidence

 

[¶69]      
Duke 
contends that counsel should have objected to the use of a demonstrative exhibit 
representing the cliff where his wife and son died.  However, he fails to support with 
pertinent analysis his assertions that the exhibit was "inflammatory" and 
"prejudicial."  He fails to explain 
how the demonstrative exhibit could be deemed either "inflammatory" or 
"prejudicial" in this case, especially given that both the prosecution and the 
defense witnesses used the exhibit during the trial.  The facts of the cases he relies upon to 
argue that the exhibit was prejudicial are easily distinguishable from those of 
his case.  In each of those cited 
cases, the challenged exhibit was inadmissible and provided direct evidence of 
guilt or was patently inflammatory  those exhibits included, for example, 
transcripts of a defendant's drug deals and a jar containing the flesh and skin 
of the deceased.  The model of the 
cliff, however, did not directly evidence Duke's guilt and could have been 
admitted into evidence because it was relevant to a matter of consequence at 
Duke's trial.

 

[¶70]      
Relevant 
evidence is evidence which has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable than it would be without the evidence."  W.R.E. 
401.  The cliff model was used to 
aid the jury in understanding the testimony of many of the witnesses, including 
defense witnesses.  Consequently, 
both the defense and the prosecution benefitted from the use of the large 
model.  Duke simply cannot meet his 
burden of demonstrating counsel's actions were unreasonable or he was in any way 
prejudiced by the use of the model.

 

[¶71]      
When 
the jury asked to see the model of the cliff in the jury room, Duke told defense 
counsel that he did not object to allowing the jury to look at the model.  Being careful to make a clear record, 
the prosecutor explained that he did not offer the exhibit into evidence because 
of its weight and size.  The model 
was approximately four feet by five feet and weighed about 200 pounds.  The court reporter would not be able to 
store it as an exhibit and it would be too cumbersome to transport for an 
appeal.  The trial court found that 
approximately fifteen witnesses referenced the model during their testimony and 
that it would be helpful to the jury to be able to look at the model during 
deliberations.  The court also noted 
that it would not have allowed the jury to look at the non-exhibit during 
deliberations if the jury had not asked for it and it had not been approved by 
both parties.  See 
Worcester 
v. State, 
2001 WY 82, ¶¶10, 12, 30 P.3d 47, ¶¶10, 12 (Wyo. 2001) (although it is error to 
send into the jury room items not admitted into evidence, the fact that both 
parties utilized the models indicates the error was not prejudicial).   Cf. Pierce 
v. Ramsey Winch Co., 
753 F.2d 416, 431 (5th Cir. 1985), cited with approval in Worcester, 
¶10 (visual aids may be used by jury during deliberations when the parties 
consent).

 

[¶72]      
Duke 
does not argue that counsel's actions were unreasonable under the circumstances 
or that the use of the exhibit "so undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
result."  Strickland, 
466 U.S.  at 686, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064.  
Obviously, Duke believed the model was helpful to his rendition of the 
facts and proof of his innocence.  
Therefore, the use of the model was sound trial strategy.  The jury also visited the cliff site 
during the trial, and Duke recognizes the model was probably redundant to the 
site visit.  He does not explain how 
he could possibly be prejudiced by this redundant, but obviously useful, 
information.  Absent a demonstration 
that counsel failed to render such assistance as would have been offered by 
reasonably competent counsel or that Duke was prejudiced by the failure to 
object to the jury's use of the demonstrative exhibit during deliberations, this 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim must also fail.

 

 

 

Failure 
to object to the jury being advised that it was a non-capital 
case

 

[¶73]      
After 
the exercise of peremptory challenges with respect to the twelve jurors 
empaneled to sit on Duke's case, but before the selection of the two alternate 
jurors, the following transpired during voir dire:

 

COURT:   *   *   *   Do you think you  do you need to 
tell these people that this is not a death penalty case?  You keep talking about the punishment is 
up to the Judge, the punishment is up to the Judge.

 

[Prosecutor]:  I would ask that you instruct them it's 
not a death penalty case.

 

COURT:   Well, okay. . . 
.

 

* 
* * *

One 
other thing, the  it's been mentioned that the Judge makes decisions on 
punishment, and even though there are some murder charges that have been filed 
in this case, this is not a death penalty case, so I hope no one thinks that 
that is the case. 

 

[¶74]      
Duke 
now faults counsel for not objecting to the court's decision to inform the jury 
that the case was a non-capital case.  
He, however, has failed to offer any legal basis upon which counsel could 
have posed a successful objection to the court's advisement.  That is, he has not identified any legal 
authority indicating that it was improper for the court to inform the jury 
during voir dire that the death penalty was inapplicable to his case.  In this regard, it should be noted that 
other jurisdictions have acknowledged the propriety of such an advisement in 
murder cases.  See 
State 
v. Townsend, 
979 P.2d 453, 456-57 (Wash. App. 1999); State 
ex rel. Schiff v. Madrid, 
679 P.2d 821, 824 (N.M. 1984).  
Absent some basis in law to support his claim, Duke cannot show that 
counsel's omission fell outside the range of professionally competent 
assistance.

 

[¶75]      
Moreover, 
Duke has not explained how counsel's failure to object to the court's advisement 
adversely affected the outcome of his trial.  As noted above, Duke bears the burden of 
demonstrating both a deficiency in counsel's assistance and resulting 
prejudice.  Asch, 
¶11.  Because he has failed to 
identify any prejudice resulting from counsel's inaction, he cannot satisfy that 
burden and his ineffectiveness claim fails. 

 

 

Failure 
to offer any defense instructions, particularly theory of defense 
instructions

 

[¶76]      
Duke 
scores counsel for allegedly failing to offer any defense instructions.  Specifically, he faults counsel for not 
offering any theory of defense instructions with respect to the murder charges, 
including "some sort of instruction on accident" or some lesser included offense 
instructions; and not offering any instructions, beyond one dealing with 
renunciation, in defense of the solicitation charges.  He also criticizes counsel for not 
having the jury instructed about the meaning of "purposely" and "premeditated 
malice."  His contention fails for 
several reasons.

 

[¶77]      
First, 
the record in this case clearly belies his contention that counsel failed to 
ensure that the jury was instructed concerning the terms "purposely" and 
"premeditated malice."  Instruction 
No. 25 informed the jury that "purposely" meant intentionally.  Additionally, "premeditated malice" was 
defined for the jury by Instruction No. 26:

 

"Premeditated 
malice" means that the Defendant thought about and considered the idea of 
killing before the act which caused death was committed, and that the act which 
caused death was done with intent to kill and without legal justification or 
excuse.

 

"Premeditated" 
implies an interval, however brief, between the formation of the intent or 
design to kill and the commission of the act which results in death. 

 

Duke 
has neither alleged, nor has he shown, that those instructions were an incorrect 
statement of existing law.  Given 
the fact that the jury was properly instructed on the terms at issue, Duke's 
ineffectiveness claim in this regard is without merit.

 

[¶78]      
Second, 
Duke has not identified with any specificity the theory of defense instructions 
that counsel was remiss in not promoting.  
He contends that some sort of accident instruction should have been given 
in defense of the murder charges but has failed to explain what such an 
instruction would have entailed under the facts of this case.  Instead, he has simply chosen to vaguely 
reference a comment by this Court in Holloman 
v. State, 
2002 WY 117, 51 P.3d 214 (Wyo. 2002), to assert that counsel was derelict in his 
duties.  In the absence of a cogent 
argument and citations to pertinent legal authority, his contention in this 
respect must be rejected.  
Barkell, 
¶32.

 

[¶79]      
Third, 
Duke's contention that counsel was ineffective for not offering instructions to 
defend against the solicitation charges is likewise devoid of a cogent argument 
and citations to pertinent legal authority.  He bears the burden of proving that 
counsel's assistance was prejudicially deficient, and his unsupported suggestion 
 that counsel could have offered "an instruction prohibiting multiple 
convictions for a single solicitation with more than one victim[,] an 
instruction that the act of solicitation and necessary intent are not 
concurrent, and possibly many others"   
is insufficient, without more, to satisfy that 
burden.

 

[¶80]      
Finally, 
Duke has not provided any insight regarding the lesser included offense 
instructions counsel should have offered relative to the murder charges 
considering his "I didn't do anything" trial defense.  As shown by the record, Duke defended 
against those charges on the theory that his wife and child slipped and fell 
from a cliff while he was getting something from his vehicle.  Thus, Duke denied any wrongful conduct 
and maintained that his wife's and child's deaths were simply the product of an 
unfortunate accident in which he played no part.  Therefore, choosing from the facts 
presented at trial, the jury was left with only two alternatives  finding Duke 
guilty of first degree murder or not guilty.  There was no evidence from which the 
jury rationally could have acquitted Duke on the first degree murder charges and 
convicted him on any lesser included offenses:  for example, second degree murder or 
voluntary manslaughter.  As recently 
reiterated by this Court, where the facts and the defense are such that a 
defendant, if guilty at all, is guilty of the greater offense, a defendant is 
not entitled to a lesser included offense instruction.  Dean 
v. State, 
2003 WY 128, ¶34, 77 P.3d 692, ¶34 (Wyo. 2003) (collecting cases).  Consequently, counsel cannot be deemed 
ineffective for failing to pursue lesser included offense instructions with 
respect to the murder charges  instructions that Duke was not legally entitled 
to and which would have, most likely, been refused by the trial court based on 
the facts of the case.  See 
Herdt 
v. State, 
891 P.2d 793, 799 (Wyo. 1995) (ineffectiveness cannot be premised on counsel's 
failure to seek relief which is not available to him).

 

[¶81]      
Duke 
has failed to sustain his burden of proving that he was deprived of his 
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.  Throughout his trial, defense counsel 
vigorously represented his client and challenged the prosecution's 
evidence.  Duke has not demonstrated 
that counsel's performance was outside the range of professionally competent 
assistance, nor has he shown that the outcome of his trial would have been 
different absent attorney error.  
That the jury found Duke guilty does not entitle him to prevail on his 
ineffectiveness claim.  

 

 

Issue 
Four:  Sufficiency of the evidence 
to sustain convictions for first degree murder

 

[¶82]      
Duke 
contends that his first degree murder convictions cannot stand because the 
prosecution failed to provide sufficient evidence that he killed his wife and 
son and he did so with premeditated malice.  This Court's standard for reviewing 
sufficiency of the evidence claims is well settled:

 

"When 
reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim in a criminal case, we must 
determine whether a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of 
the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  We do not consider conflicting evidence 
presented by the unsuccessful party, and afford every favorable inference which 
may be reasonably and fairly drawn from the successful party's evidence.  We have consistently held that it is the 
jury's responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence.  We will not substitute our judgment for 
that of the jury, . . . our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of 
reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the same 
result as the jury actually did.'"  
[Bloomquist 
v. State, 
914 P.2d 812, 824 (Wyo. 1996)].

 

Urbigkit, 
¶44 (quoting Williams 
v. State, 
986 P.2d 855, 857 (Wyo. 1999) (alterations in original)).

 

[¶83]      
Duke 
was charged with two counts of first degree premeditated murder, in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-101(a).  Consequently, the 
prosecution had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that, on or 
about the 10th day of August, 1996, in Sweetwater County, Wyoming, Duke 
purposely and with premeditated malice killed Liana Mae Duke and Erik Robert 
Duke.  

 

[¶84]      
In 
Bouwkamp 
v. State, 
833 P.2d 486, 493 (Wyo. 1992), this Court reiterated the meaning of 
premeditation:

 

[Premeditation] 
is the "thinking over, deliberating upon, weighing in the mind beforehand, 
resulting in a deliberate intention to kill which constitutes the killing murder 
in the first degree."  
Parker 
v. State, 
24 Wyo. 491, 502, 161 P. 552, 555 (1916).  
Premeditation may be inferred from the facts and circumstances.  Murry 
v. State, 
713 P.2d 202, 206 (Wyo. 1986); Goodman 
v. State, 
573 P.2d 400, 407 (Wyo. 1977).

 

"Premeditation 
need not have existed for any given length of time before the act, it being 
sufficient that it existed at the time of the act; and the intent and the act 
may be as instantaneous as successive thoughts."  Young 
v. State, 
849 P.2d 754, 761 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Murry, 
713 P.2d at 207).

 

[¶85]      
In 
Bouwkamp, 
this Court adopted a three-part test for determining whether the trial evidence 
was sufficient to sustain a verdict of premeditated 
murder:

 

Evidence 
sufficient to sustain a finding of premeditation and deliberation "falls into 
three basic categories:  (1) facts 
about * * * what a defendant did prior to the actual killing which show 
that the defendant was engaged in activity directed toward, and explicable as 
intended to result in, the killing  what may be characterized as planning' 
activity; (2) facts about the defendant's prior relationship and/or 
conduct with the victim from which the jury could reasonably infer a motive' to 
kill the victim, which inference of motive, together with facts of type (1) or 
(3) would * * * support an inference that the killing was the result of a 
pre-existing reflection' and careful thought and weighing of considerations' 
rather than mere unconsidered or rash impulse hastily executed'; (3) facts 
about the nature of the killing from which the jury could infer that the 
manner of killing was so particular and exacting that the defendant must 
have intentionally killed according to a preconceived design' to take [the] 
victim's life in a particular way for a reason' which the jury can reasonably 
infer from facts of type (1) or (2)."  

People 
v. Crandell, 
46 Cal. 3d 833, 760 P.2d 423, 441, 251 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1988) (quoting 
People 
v. Anderson, 
70 Cal. 2d 15, 447 P.2d 942, 949, 73 Cal. Rptr. 550, 557 (1968)) (citations 
omitted).

[V]erdicts 
of first degree murder typically [are sustained] when there is evidence of all 
three types and otherwise require at least extremely strong evidence of (1) or 
evidence of (2) in conjunction with either (1) or (3).  

People 
v. Anderson, 
70 Cal. 2d 15, 447 P.2d  at 949, 73 Cal. Rptr.  at 557.

 

Bouwkamp, 
833 P.2d  at 494-95 (emphasis and alterations in original).

 

[¶86]      
As 
shown in more detail in the General Background Facts portion of this opinion, 
the jury had before it sufficient evidence from which it could reasonably 
conclude that Duke purposely and with premeditated malice killed his wife and 
son on August 10, 1996.  The jury 
heard evidence that Duke wanted his wife and son dead.  Within a few months before their deaths, 
Duke actively pursued Roger Brauberger to kill them.  He initially offered Brauberger $15,000, 
and later agreed to pay him $23,000 to do the job.  Duke suggested a plan by which the 
killings could be accomplished and divert suspicion away from him.  That evidence supports a reasonable 
inference that Duke was "engaged in activity directed toward and explicable as 
intended to result" in the killing of his wife and child.  That Duke planned to kill them is 
further supported by evidence that he initiated that fatal trip, he took them to 
an isolated area he had been to on prior occasions, and he gave varying and 
conflicting accounts of the events surrounding their deaths.

 

[¶87]      
With 
respect to the second category in the Bouwkamp 
analysis, the jury heard evidence about Duke's relationship with his wife and 
child that suggests a motive or motives to murder them.  That evidence revealed that he was less 
than a faithful and loving husband and father.  The evidence indicated that he was 
verbally abusive toward them and had been involved with other women during the 
marriage.  It also revealed that he 
was cold toward his child and never really bonded with him.  The jury also heard evidence that Duke 
was looking for a way out of the marriage, other than divorce, which would 
enable him to avoid a long-term child support obligation.  The jury further heard that, 
approximately two weeks after their deaths, Duke collected $60,000 in life 
insurance proceeds.  From that 
evidence, the jury could reasonably have inferred that he killed his wife and 
son to obtain his freedom from an unwanted relationship.  The jury could also have inferred greed 
as a motivating factor to kill, whether it was Duke's desire to avoid the 
monetary obligation of child support or to get the proceeds of their life 
insurance policies.  That greed was 
the motivating factor to kill could also be inferred from Duke's attempts to 
hire Brauberger to kill his parents, murders which would have resulted in a 
substantial monetary gain for him.  
Those motives, coupled with his planning activities, are certainly 
sufficient to justify an inference of premeditation.

 

[¶88]      
Regarding 
the final category, the jury was presented with evidence that his wife and son 
suffered a tragic death.  Both died 
from injuries sustained during a fall down the face of a two hundred foot rocky 
cliff.  The prosecution's theory at 
trial was that Duke intentionally took his wife and son to that cliff, which was 
located in an isolated area miles from the nearest town, pushed them over the 
edge of the cliff, and made sure they were dead before notifying the 
authorities.  Consequently, there 
was evidence of all three aspects of the Bouwkamp 
analysis 
from which the jury could reasonably infer that Duke purposely and with 
premeditated malice killed his wife and child.

 

 

Issue 
Five:  Jury 
instructions

 

[¶89]      
Duke 
claims that the trial court's jury instructions impermissibly allowed the jury 
to convict him if it concluded that "any" rather than "all" of the elements of 
the murder charges were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  Consequently, he insists that his murder 
convictions should be reversed with "prejudice to retrial."    

 

[¶90]      
It 
is well settled that a trial court has a duty to instruct a jury regarding the 
general principles of law applicable to the case.  Black 
v. State, 
2002 WY 72, ¶5, 46 P.3d 298, ¶5 (Wyo. 2002).  On appellate review, jury instructions 
must be considered as a whole, and individual instructions, or parts thereof, 
should not be singled out and considered in isolation.  Id.; Brown 
v. State, 
2002 WY 61, ¶9, 44 P.3d 97, ¶9 (Wyo. 2002); Ogden 
v. State, 
2001 WY 109, ¶8, 34 P.3d 271, ¶8 (Wyo. 2001).  A trial court is given wide latitude in 
instructing the jury and, as long as the instructions correctly state the law 
and the instructions in their entirety sufficiently covers the relevant issue, 
reversible error will not be found.  
Black, 
¶5; Brown, 
¶9; Ogden, 
¶8.   The accuracy of an 
instruction is a question of law which is reviewed de novo.  Williams 
v. State, 
2002 WY 136, ¶11, 54 P.3d 248, ¶11 (Wyo. 2002).

 

[¶91]      
When, 
as in this case, no objection is raised at trial to the jury instruction at 
issue, the plain error standard of review applies, which requires that: (1) the 
record clearly reveal the alleged error without resort to speculation; (2) 
appellant demonstrate a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule in an obvious, 
not merely arguable, way; and (3) appellant prove that he was denied a 
substantial right resulting in material prejudice.  Reilly 
v. State, 
2002 WY 156, ¶15, 55 P.3d 1259, ¶15 (Wyo. 2002); Williams, 
¶12; Brown, 
¶10; Ogden, 
¶9.

 

[¶92]      
At 
issue in this case is the propriety of the trial court's elements instructions 
concerning the first degree murder counts involving the wife and child.  With respect to those charges, the 
record shows that the trial court instructed the jury as 
follows:

 

                                                           
INSTRUCTION NO. 17

 

The 
elements of the crime of Murder in the First Degree, as charged in Count I of 
the Indictment in this case, are:

 

1.         
On or about the 10th day of August, 1996;

2.         
In Sweetwater County, Wyoming;

3.         
The Defendant, JAMES ROBERT DUKE;

4.         
Purposely; and

5.         
With premeditated malice;

6.         
Killed a human being, Erik Robert Duke

 

If 
you find from your consideration of all the evidence that any of these elements 
has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant 
guilty.

If, 
on the other hand, you find from your consideration of all the evidence that 
each of these elements has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
should find the defendant not guilty. 

 

The 
language of Instruction No. 18, as given to the jury, was identical to that 
contained in Instruction No. 17, except for indicating that it concerns Count II 
of the Indictment and the wife's name is referred to instead of the 
child's.  

 

[¶93]      
Duke 
contends that the second prong of the plain error doctrine has been satisfied 
because both jury instructions impermissibly permitted the jury to find him 
guilty of murder if it found "any" of the listed elements.   He claims that such violated the 
clear and unequivocal rule of law that "each" and "every" essential element of 
charged crime be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  Duke has singled out a portion of those 
jury instructions and considered it in isolation in asserting error.  However, when those instructions are 
viewed in their entirety, and in conjunction with the trial court's other 
instructions, Duke cannot show that a violation of a clear rule of law occurred 
warranting reversal of his murder convictions.

 

[¶94]      
Admittedly, 
the first degree murder jury instructions indicated that if the jury found any 
of the six elements were proved beyond a reasonable doubt, it could find Duke 
guilty.  However, in the next 
paragraph of the instructions, the jury was instructed it must find Duke not 
guilty if it found each of the six elements had not been proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Black's Law 
Dictionary defines the word "each" as synonymous with "all" and equivalent to 
"any."  It also denotes "each" as 
"every one of the . . . things mentioned."  
Black's 
Law Dictionary 507 (6th ed. 1990).  
Therefore, the latter paragraph of the instructions told the jury that it 
must find Duke not guilty if it determined the prosecution had not proved all 
six elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

 

[¶95]      
Assuming 
arguendo there was error in those instructions, this Court has held that "[a]n 
error in one jury instruction may be cured elsewhere in the jury instructions by 
conveying correct information to the jury in a clear and concise manner so that 
it is unlikely that an erroneous impression would remain in the minds of the 
jurors."  Christian 
v. State, 
883 P.2d 376, 379 (Wyo. 1994) (citing Vigil 
v. State, 
859 P.2d 659, 663 (Wyo. 1993)).  
When considering whether a jury may have been confused or misled by a 
jury instruction, the instructions are reviewed in their entirety and read 
together.  Rigler 
v. State, 
941 P.2d 734, 740 (Wyo. 1997) (citing Baier 
v. State, 
891 P.2d 754, 756 (Wyo. 1995)).  

 

[¶96]      
If 
the jury was confused by the misstatement in Instruction Nos. 17 and 18, 
Instruction Nos. 7, 8 and 9 clearly described the jury's task.  Rigler, 
941 P.2d  at 741.  The other 
instructions given by the trial court made it clear that the jury was required 
to find that the prosecution proved each of the elements in the first degree 
murder instructions beyond a reasonable doubt.  Instruction No. 7 informed the jury, in 
pertinent part, that: 

 

If 
in these instructions any rule, direction or idea be stated in varying ways, no 
emphasis thereon is intended, and none must be inferred by you.  For that reason, you are not to single 
out any certain sentence, or any individual point or instructions, and ignore 
the others, but you are to consider all the instructions as a whole, and are to 
regard each in the light of all the others.  

 

Instruction 
No. 8, the presumption of innocence instruction, informed the jury, in pertinent 
part, that:

 

The 
law raises no presumption against the defendant but rather, the presumption of 
law is in favor of his innocence.  
In order to convict the defendant of the crime charged, every material 
and necessary element to constitute such crime must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt and if the jury has a reasonable doubt on any necessary 
element, it is your duty to give the benefit of such doubt to the defendant and 
acquit him.  

 

Instruction 
No. 9 told the jury:

 

The 
law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of 
calling any witnesses or producing any evidence on the question of guilt or 
innocence.  The burden is always on 
the State to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to each 
element of the offense. 

 

[¶97]      
Additionally, 
Instruction Nos. 19 through 22, the elements instructions pertaining to the 
solicitation charges, told the jury it could not find Duke guilty of those 
charges unless it found each element of the offense had been proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Moreover, the 
prosecution reminded the jury during closing arguments that each and every 
element of the charged crimes had to be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt:

 

Now, 
the Court has just read you the elements of those crimes, instructed you on 
those. . . .

 

* 
* * *

 

When 
you view all of the evidence as has been presented to you and apply the law that 
the Court has given you, you will find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
Defendant committed each and every element of each crime charged.   

 

[¶98]      
Considering 
the arguments of counsel and all of the jury instructions given, Duke has not 
met the stringent burden under the plain error standard of showing that the jury 
was misled into believing that it could convict him of first degree murder if it 
found the prosecution proved any one of the elements of first degree murder 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Taylor 
v. State, 
2001 WY 13, ¶18, 17 P.3d 715, ¶18 (Wyo. 2001).  We do not find that the jury was left 
with the erroneous impression that it could find Duke guilty of first degree 
murder if the prosecution merely proved his name was James Robert Duke.  See Christian, 
883 P.2d  at 379-80.  A reasonable 
juror would not have considered the instruction as allowing a conviction of 
first degree murder upon a finding of only one of the elements contained 
therein, as Duke suggests.  
Ellison 
v. State, 
3 P.3d 845, 849 (Wyo. 2000).  
Therefore, Duke's argument fails.

 

 

Issue 
Six: Prosecutorial comment during closing argument

 

[¶99]      
Duke 
contends that he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutors impermissibly 
injected their personal beliefs as to his credibility by belittling his trial 
testimony and repeatedly telling the jury that he lied. With respect to claims 
of prosecutorial misconduct, this Court has stated:

 

Prosecutorial 
misconduct "has always been condemned in this state."  Earll 
v. State, 
2001 WY 66, ¶9, 29 P.3d 787, ¶9 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Valerio 
v. State, 
527 P.2d 154, 156 (Wyo. 1974)).  
Whether such misconduct has been reviewed on the basis of harmless error, 
W.R.Cr.P. 
52(a) and W.R.A.P. 
9.04, or on the basis of plain error, W.R.Cr.P. 
52(b) and W.R.A.P. 
9.05, this Court has focused on whether such error affected the accused's 
"substantial rights."  The accused's 
right to a fair trial is a substantial right.  "Before we hold that an error has 
affected an accused's substantial right, thus requiring reversal of a 
conviction, we must conclude that, based on the entire record, a reasonable 
possibility exists that, in the absence of the error, the verdict might have 
been more favorable to the accused."  
Earll, 
¶9.

 

Simmons 
v. State, 
2003 WY 84, ¶15, 72 P.3d 803, ¶15 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Williams, 
¶21; see also Wilks 
v. State, 
2002 WY 100, ¶26, 49 P.3d 975, ¶26 (Wyo. 2002); O'Brien 
v. State, 
2002 WY 63, ¶35, 45 P.3d 225, ¶35 (Wyo. 2002).  

 

[¶100]  Claims 
of prosecutorial misconduct are settled by reference to the entire record and 
hinge on whether the accused's case has been so prejudiced as to constitute the 
denial of a fair trial.  
English 
v. State, 
982 P.2d 139, 143 (Wyo. 1999) (quoting Gayler 
v. State, 
957 P.2d 855, 860 (Wyo. 1998); Arevalo 
v. State, 
939 P.2d 228, 230 (Wyo. 1997)).  The 
propriety of any comment within a closing argument is judged "in the context of 
the prosecutor's entire argument, considering the context of the statements and 
comparing them with the evidence produced at the trial."  Wilks, 
¶26 (citing Burton 
v. State, 
2002 WY 71, ¶11, 46 P.3d 309, ¶11 (Wyo. 2002)).  The burden of proving prejudicial error 
rests with the appellant.  
Wilks, 
¶26; see also Taylor, 
¶19; 
Tennant 
v. State, 
786 P.2d 339, 346 (Wyo. 1990).

 

[¶101]  Where, 
as in this case, no objection is raised at trial to the prosecutor's alleged 
misconduct, the standard of review is plain error, which 
demands:

 

First, 
the record must be clear as to the incident which is alleged as error.  Second, the party claiming the error 
amounted to plain error must demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of 
law was violated.  Finally, that 
party must prove a substantial right has been denied him and, as a result, he 
has been materially prejudiced.

 

Wilks, 
¶7 (quoting Worcester, 
¶7).

 

[¶102]  Duke 
identifies several isolated comments by the prosecutors during closing and 
rebuttal closing arguments and asserts that they were improper and constituted 
misconduct.  As noted above, Duke 
did not object to those comments and, therefore, bears the burden of 
demonstrating plain error in order to succeed on his claim.  

 

[¶103]  The 
first element of the plain error standard is satisfied because the record 
clearly reveals the alleged misconduct.  
Following are the prosecutors' remarks in the context in which they were 
made during closing and rebuttal closing arguments (emphasis 
added):

 

Let's 
look for a few minutes, ladies and gentlemen, to the Defendant's statements made 
to various witnesses about the events of August 1996.  

 

* 
* * *

 

Dawn 
Gunter, her husband, the cliff gives way.  
That's May or June of 1998.  
He can't get down.  His son 
is wheezing blood.  Here's a new 
one.  He spends the time waiting for 
the ambulance doing what?  Picking 
up the rest of the toys.  That's 
what he tells Dawn Gunter.

 

It 
goes on, ladies and gentlemen, and we know, of course, that his statements to 
Mr. and Mrs. Gunter are lies.  
The rocks did not give away.  
Dr. Miller told you those rocks had not been disturbed for 30 to 40 
years.  

 

. 
. . We know the Defendant lied about the cliff giving way, just like we know 
the Defendant would lie about putting a lattice up on the Anvil Street 
Apartments.  The owner of those 
apartments came in and talked to you and told you that that lattice went up by 
the current resident last year, not by the Defendant years 
ago.

 

The 
Defendant would lie to help himself.  
He will lie about ever even seeing Cynthia Smith, 
the federal court officer who certainly remembered him, whose job it was to 
interview him to make a report and a recommendation to a judge.  Now, why would he deny her 
existence?  Because he told her in 
Texas in 1999, he thinks he's safe in Texas, he's a long ways away from here, 
his wife had died in an accident following an argument, and then he even denies 
the existence of his son.  What 
possible reason would Ms. Smith, a court officer, have perjuring herself in 
front of you?

 

The 
one thing that he was consistent in was this lie about not being able to get 
down to the bodies.  He told 
everybody that.  He told them that 
from the very start, on and on and on, and yet, he knew every time he told 
that lie that it was a lie, because he had seen the EMTs walk down there, he 
had seen the firemen walk down there, he had seen them walk back up carrying the 
dead bodies of his family, and yet, he continued to say to everybody, even after 
seeing that, "I couldn't get down.  
There's no way.  It was too 
steep.  I couldn't do it."  He kept that lie up for 
years.

 

But 
then, of course, he's already told you that he'll do whatever it takes to get 
himself the best deal possible, to help himself, and that would include telling 
a federal district judge a story to get a good deal, and so imagine what he 
would tell you in the situation he's in now. 

 

* 
* * *

 

Let 
me ask you this  think about this.  
You know, the State, we can tell Crystal Carter to commit perjury, and 
apparently she will, and if we  if we can do that and with all our great 
resources and all our great power that he likes to talk about, we can tell Roger 
to lie and he'll say whatever we want to hear, how come if [Duke's] whole thing 
depends upon him telling you that he had never been to the top of that cliff 
before, how come Roger didn't testify to that?  Because when we asked Roger whether he 
had been up there before with [Duke], he said, "I can't be sure.  Maybe we were, maybe we weren't.  I can't be sure."  Dayton took him out there to see if he 
could be sure, and he comes back under oath and he says, "I can't be sure."  If we can force everybody to say 
whatever we want them to say, how come our main witness doesn't help us on a 
critical point in the case?  I would 
submit to you because it's one of two things; either Crystal's lying and 
practically everyone else that we called is either lying or mistaken, and so 
that would entail a lot of different people coming in with no real motivation to 
subject themselves to penalty of perjury, telling lies on the Defendant, or the 
other explanation is the Defendant is lying, and I would submit to you that 
you have all the evidence in the world to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt 
that he is, in fact, lying. 

 

[¶104]  However, 
when the prosecutors' comments are viewed in their entirety and in the context 
of the entire trial, it is clear that the second element of the plain error 
analysis, the requirement to show a violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of 
law, has not been satisfied.  The 
State argues that, by making those statements, the prosecutors were not 
attempting to induce the jurors to base their factual determinations on the 
prosecutors' personal beliefs or opinions, as Duke suggests. Rather, the State 
continues, the prosecutors were merely pointing out that the evidence and the 
testimony of the prosecution's witnesses contradicted that of Duke and 
expressing the prosecution's position upon inferences to be drawn from that 
testimony and the other evidence presented at trial.  We agree.  Argument of this nature is not erroneous 
but has been sanctioned by decisions of this Court.  Beaugureau 
v. State, 
2002 WY 160, ¶14, 56 P.3d 626, ¶14 (Wyo. 2002); Dike 
v. State, 
990 P.2d 1012, 1025-26 (Wyo. 1999); Barela 
v. State, 
787 P.2d 82, 83-84 (Wyo. 1990).  In 
Dike, 
this Court declared:

 

This 
Court has held that the purpose of closing arguments is to afford counsel the 
opportunity to explain the significance of the evidence and how it should be 
viewed by the jury.  Harper 
v. State, 
970 P.2d 400, 403 (Wyo. 1998).  
During closing arguments, counsel may assist the jury by reflecting upon 
the evidence and drawing reasonable inferences that logically flow from the 
evidence.  Gayler, 
957 P.2d  at 861.  When the jury is 
presented with contradictory testimony, counsel is allowed to communicate the 
reasonable  inference that one of 
the witnesses is lying.  
Barela 
v. State, 
787 P.2d 82, 84 (Wyo. 1990).

 

Dike, 
990 P.2d  at 1026.

 

[¶105]  Duke 
recognizes the force of the holding in Dike but urges this Court to 
overrule that decision.  He 
complains that to call a witness a liar is "inflammatory and prejudicial" and 
suggests that closing arguments be limited to observations that "someone was not 
being completely accurate," which "would be a reasonable inference."  However, we shall not abandon the 
Dike 
rule, which was based on this Court's decision in Barela, 
787 P.2d  at 83-84, and which has since been reaffirmed in Beaugureau, 
¶14. 

 

[¶106]  The 
issue to be decided in this case is whether the prosecutors' comments amounted 
to plain error.  Duke cannot show 
plain error because to do so requires him to demonstrate that an unequivocal 
rule of law was violated in a clear and obvious way.  The clear and unequivocal rule of law 
applicable here is the rule expressed in Barela, 
Dike, 
and Beaugureau, 
which supports the closing remarks made by the prosecutors.  

 

[¶107]  Because 
Duke does not establish plain error, he cannot prevail on his claim that the 
prosecutors committed reversible error in closing arguments.  There is no basis for this Court to 
examine whether to reject the Dike 
rule.  In order for a party to challenge an 
established rule of law on appeal and urge that this Court abandon that rule of 
law, the challenge should be initiated in the trial court, at the earliest 
opportunity, and the issue preserved for appeal.  This Court has consistently held that it 
will not entertain issues raised for the first time on appeal "unless they are 
jurisdictional issues or issues of such a fundamental nature that they must be 
considered."  Beaugureau, 
¶11 (citing Bell 
v. State, 
994 P.2d 947, 957 (Wyo. 2000)); see also Bailey 
v. State, 
12 P.3d 173, 177-79 (Wyo. 2000).  
Duke's request does not fall within those 
requirements.

 

[¶108]  The 
prosecutors' remarks during closing arguments were not improper and did not 
constitute reversible plain error under existing Wyoming law.  

 

 

Issue 
Seven:  Cumulative 
error

 

[¶109]  Duke 
argues that his convictions should be reversed because of the cumulative effect 
of the errors occurring at trial.  
His contention is that, even if the numerous alleged errors do not 
require reversal when considered individually, their combined effect does.  As shown above, however, no error 
occurred with respect to most of his claims, and his remaining claims, as 
demonstrated, did not affect the outcome of his trial.  Therefore, Duke's right to a fair trial 
was not impacted, and his cumulative error claim is meritless.  See Young, 
849 P.2d  at 767; Jennings 
v. State, 
806 P.2d 1299, 1306 (Wyo. 1991); Justice 
v. State, 
775 P.2d 1002, 1011 (Wyo. 1989).

 

[¶110]  We 
affirm his convictions in all respects.