Case Title: Commonwealth v. Libby

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11749

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-06-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11749 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JEREMY LIBBY. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 4, 2015. - June 26, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, 
& Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Constitutional Law, Admissions and confessions, Waiver of 
constitutional rights.  Practice, Criminal, Motion to 
suppress, Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of 
statement, Waiver.  Waiver.  Evidence, Admissions and 
confessions, Voluntariness of statement. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on July 31, 2012. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Mary-
Lou Rup, J. 
 
 
An application for leave to prosecute an interlocutory 
appeal was allowed by Lenk, J., in the Supreme Judicial Court 
for the county of Suffolk, and the appeal was reported by her. 
 
 
 
Jane Davidson Montori, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Marissa Elkins for the defendant. 
 
 
 
CORDY, J.  The Commonwealth appeals from the ruling of a 
Superior Court judge suppressing statements made to police 
2 
 
officers by the defendant during the course of two interviews:  
the first being prearrest and the second following his arrest.  
The defendant was advised of the Miranda rights at the 
commencement of both interviews, but, in various ways, those 
rights were not accurately explained.  Among other things, we 
are required to consider the effect of the inaccurate 
explanation of those rights in a noncustodial setting on the   
voluntariness of statements made thereafter, and on the knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent waiver of those rights in a 
subsequent custodial interrogation.  We reverse the judge's 
ruling suppressing the prearrest statement, and affirm her 
ruling suppressing the postarrest statement. 
 
Background.  On June 27, 2012, members of the Palmer police 
department received a complaint regarding the sexual abuse of 
K.C., a six year old girl who resided in the home where the 
defendant was living.  Shortly after police arrived at the home, 
the defendant voluntarily1 accompanied them to the Palmer police 
station to discuss an allegation that he had inappropriately 
touched K.C.  Sergeant Scott Haley was the only officer present 
during this conversation, and he began the interview by reading 
the defendant the Miranda rights.  Haley then asked the 
                     
 
1 The record does not state whether the defendant was driven 
to the police station or if he drove himself there.  Sergeant 
Scott Haley's investigative report only notes that the defendant 
"willingly" went to the station. 
 
3 
 
defendant whether, with those rights in mind, the defendant was 
willing to talk "about these matters of concern."  After a 
somewhat lengthy colloquy regarding the appointment of counsel 
and whether the defendant was under arrest, discussed infra, the 
defendant signed a Miranda waiver form and the interview 
proceeded.  The defendant denied any inappropriate conduct with 
K.C.  The interview concluded just after 10 P.M., and the 
defendant left the police station. 
 
On June 28, 2012, Haley attended a forensic interview of 
K.C., during which she alleged that the defendant had sexually 
abused her.  The defendant was subsequently arrested and brought 
to the police station.  He was booked, fingerprinted, and 
brought back to the same interview room in which he had met with 
Haley the day before.  Haley again read the defendant the 
Miranda rights, which the defendant waived in writing.  After 
being told that additional evidence had been uncovered, the 
defendant again raised the issue of counsel.  Ultimately, after 
another colloquy with Haley, the defendant said he did not want 
a lawyer at that time and the interview continued.  The 
defendant proceeded to make inculpatory statements and admitted 
that the previous day, while he was tickling K.C., she had moved 
his hand to her inner thigh near her private parts. 
 
Procedural history.  In July, 2012, the defendant was 
indicted by a Hampden County grand jury on four counts of 
4 
 
forcible rape of a child in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 22A, as 
well as four counts of indecent assault and battery on a child 
under the age of fourteen in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13B. 
 
In April, 2013, the defendant filed a motion to suppress 
the statements he made to Sergeant Haley during both of his 
interviews.  The Commonwealth filed a written opposition in 
response.  At a hearing on the motion, the parties submitted 
digital video discs of the defendant's interviews; a stipulation 
as to the timeline of events; two signed Miranda waiver forms; a 
medical record of the examination of K.C., the complaining 
witness; and a police report authored by Haley.  No testimony 
was taken.  After a second, nonevidentiary hearing, the motion 
judge granted the defendant's motion to suppress in its 
entirety. 
 
In her decision, the judge concluded that the June 27 
interview was noncustodial, but expressed some uncertainty 
whether Miranda warnings given in a noncustodial interview had 
to be scrupulously honored under Massachusetts law.  She further 
concluded that the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant understood the full import 
of his right to counsel and that he had voluntarily, knowingly, 
and intelligently waived that right.  The judge also concluded 
that reasonable doubt remained as to the voluntariness of the 
defendant's statements on June 27, given interruptions and 
5 
 
misstatements made by Haley.  With respect to the defendant's 
June 28 interview, the judge held that misstatements by Haley 
created a fundamental misunderstanding as to the defendant's 
right to appointed counsel.  This, coupled with repeated 
"clarifying" questions that may have dissuaded the defendant 
from exercising his right to counsel, hampered the Commonwealth 
from establishing, beyond a reasonable doubt, the validity of 
the defendant's waiver.  Additionally, the motion judge found 
that the Commonwealth did not meet its burden of showing that 
the defendant's June 28 statements were voluntarily made in 
light of Haley's implicit offers of leniency in conjunction with 
misstatements about the defendant's right to counsel. 
 
Subsequently, the Commonwealth filed a motion to stay 
proceedings in the trial court, with a notice of interlocutory 
appeal.  The case is now before us pursuant to an order of a 
single justice allowing the Commonwealth's application for leave 
to pursue an interlocutory appeal. 
 
Discussion.  Typically, when "reviewing a ruling on a 
motion to suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of 
fact absent clear error, 'but conduct an independent review of 
[her] ultimate findings and conclusions of law.'"  Commonwealth 
v. Clarke, 461 Mass. 336, 340 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 646 (2004).  "A judge who has seen and 
heard the witnesses is in a better position to determine their 
6 
 
credibility than is a court which is confined to the printed 
record."  Commonwealth v. Novo, 442 Mass. 262, 266 (2004).  
However, "whenever the evidence before the trial court is 
reduced to a tangible form, and is therefore available to the 
appellate court in the same form as it was reviewed by the trial 
court," id., "the case for deference to the [motion] judge's 
findings of fact is weakened."  Clarke, supra at 340.  In such 
circumstances, "this court stands in the same position as did 
the [motion] judge, and reaches its own conclusion unaffected by 
the findings made by the [motion] judge" (citation omitted).  
Novo, supra at 266.  Accordingly, we take "an independent view 
of the evidence and analyze[] its significance without 
deference" (citation and quotation omitted).  Clarke, supra at 
341. 
 
We have previously held that "[t]he requirements of Miranda 
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), are not triggered unless 
the interrogation is custodial, and a defendant's failure to 
receive or understand Miranda warnings, or police failure to 
honor Miranda rights, does not result in suppression of a 
voluntary statement made in a noncustodial setting."  
Commonwealth v. Hilton, 443 Mass. 597, 608-609 (2005), S.C., 450 
Mass. 173 (2007).  "[T]he premise of Miranda [is] that the 
danger of coercion results from the interaction of custody and 
official interrogation."  Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 
7 
 
(1990).  Accordingly, "[t]he safeguards prescribed by Miranda 
become applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of action is 
curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest" (citation 
and quotation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Kirwan, 448 Mass. 304, 
309 (2007). 
 
"Custodial interrogation is 'questioning initiated by law 
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody 
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any 
significant way.'"  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Jung, 420 Mass. 
675, 688 (1995).  "The determination of custody depends 
primarily on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, 
and not on the subjective views of either the interrogating 
officers or the person being questioned."  Commonwealth v. 
Sneed, 440 Mass. 216, 220 (2003).  Accordingly, "'[t]he crucial 
question' . . . is whether 'a reasonable person in the 
defendant's position would have believed that he was in 
custody.'"  Commonwealth v. Molina, 467 Mass. 65, 73 (2014), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Baye, 462 Mass. 246, 253 (2012).  
Therefore, "if the defendant reasonably believed that he was not 
free to leave, the interrogation occurred while the defendant 
was in custody, and Miranda warnings were required" (citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Groome, 435 Mass. 201, 211 (2001). 
 
Whether made in a custodial or noncustodial setting, and 
even where there has been a valid waiver of Miranda rights, we 
8 
 
must consider the voluntariness of a defendant's statement, as 
"a confession or an admission is admissible in evidence only if 
it is made voluntarily."  Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 460 Mass 
199, 206 (2011).  "[T]he Commonwealth must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that 'in light of the totality of the 
circumstances surrounding the making of the statement, the will 
of the defendant was [not] overborne,' but rather that the 
statement was 'the result of a free and voluntary act.'"  Baye, 
462 Mass. at 256, quoting Commonwealth v. Durand, 457 Mass. 574, 
595-596 (2010).  "A voluntary statement is one that is the 
product of a rational intellect and a free will, and not induced 
by physical or psychological coercion."  Molina, 467 Mass. at 
75, quoting Tremblay, supra at 207. 
 
The issue of voluntariness necessarily "turns on 'all the 
surrounding circumstances -- both the characteristics of the 
accused and the details of the interrogation.'"  Baye, 462 Mass. 
at 256, quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 
(2000).  "This is not an area of the law that is governed by 
bright-line rules, but is one that requires a fact-intensive 
analysis."  Tremblay, 460 Mass. at 210.  "Relevant factors [to 
this inquiry] include, but are not limited to, 'promises or 
other inducements, conduct of the defendant, the defendant's 
age, education, intelligence and emotional stability, experience 
with and in the criminal justice system, physical and mental 
9 
 
condition, the initiator of the discussion of a deal or leniency 
(whether the defendant or the police), and the details of the 
interrogation, including the recitation of Miranda warnings.'"  
Molina, 467 Mass. at 76, quoting Commonwealth v. Selby, 420 
Mass. 656, 663 (1995).  While the "use of false information by 
police during an interrogation is deceptive and is a relevant 
factor indicating a possibility that the defendant's statements 
were made involuntarily," Novo, 442 Mass. at 267, quoting Selby, 
420 Mass. at 664, "[m]isinformation by the police does not 
necessarily render a confession involuntary."  Commonwealth v. 
Raymond, 424 Mass. 382, 395 (1997).  "The presence of one or 
more factors suggesting a statement may have been made 
involuntarily is not always sufficient to render the statements 
involuntary."  Tremblay, 460 Mass. at 207, quoting Selby, supra. 
 
With these standards delineated, we turn to assessing the 
statements at issue and the judge's ruling. 
 
1.  June 27 statements.  As noted, the defendant 
voluntarily accompanied the police to the police station on June 
27, 2012, to discuss an allegation that he had inappropriately 
touched K.C.  The defendant, who was not under arrest, sat with 
Haley in an office furnished with two chairs and a desk with a 
computer.  The interview was videotaped with the defendant's 
knowledge and assent. 
10 
 
 
Haley began the defendant's interview by reading him the 
Miranda rights.  Haley then asked the defendant whether, with 
these rights in mind, he wanted to discuss the "matters of 
concern."  The following exchange ensued: 
Defendant: "I'm thinking with the circumstances I might 
need to get a lawyer." 
 
Haley: 
"Well, we can stop this right now if you want a 
lawyer." 
 
Defendant: "But where does that put me today?  Am I 
arrested?  Am I under arrest?" 
 
Haley: 
"Well, right now you're not under arrest." 
 
Defendant: "I understand that, but if -- I'm not refusing 
to answer, but I'm thinking.  I'm just thinking 
to myself underneath the circumstances, with 
what's being alleged right now." 
 
Haley: 
"Well, we haven't alleged anything with you 
right now." 
 
Defendant: "Well, the officer said that there was 
allegations against me for inappropriately 
touching my six year old daughter.[2]  That's 
what he said." 
 
. . . 
 
Haley: 
"That's why you're in here.  That's what I'm 
here to interview you about, okay?" 
 
Defendant: "Okay." 
 
Haley: 
"So if you want a lawyer, we will stop the 
process right now and the interview ends, okay?  
If you don't want a lawyer and you want to tell 
me your side of the story, then we'll continue 
                     
 
2 Although the defendant and K.C. are not biologically 
related, the defendant considered K.C. to be his daughter given 
his past relationship with K.C.'s mother. 
11 
 
with the interview.  So that's the decision you 
have to make.  Whether or not you want to --" 
 
Defendant: "But if I stop, am I under arrest?" 
 
Haley: 
"You're not under arrest right now.  I'm going 
to talk to the sergeant as to the status of the 
investigation, and then we'll make a decision on 
that, okay?  But as of right now you're not 
under arrest, okay?" 
 
Defendant: "Okay.  Now, if I need the court to appoint me a 
lawyer because I do not have the funds?" 
 
Haley: 
"If we get to that point, okay, then the court 
will appoint you a lawyer at arraignment, 
okay?[3]  If we get to that point, but we're not 
to that point yet." 
 
Defendant: "Okay." 
 
Haley: 
"Okay?" 
 
Defendant: "I just --" 
 
Haley: 
"We're at the point of we're investigating these 
allegations, and you willingly came in here to 
talk to us about what happened --" 
 
Defendant: "Yes." 
 
Haley: 
"-- on your side, okay?" 
 
                     
 
3 This was not a completely accurate statement of law under 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  "[W]hile arraignment 
is one procedural step in criminal proceedings that will trigger 
the . . . right to counsel [under the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution], other steps occurring prior to 
arraignment may operate to initiate criminal proceedings and 
trigger those rights at an earlier stage," Commonwealth v. 
Torres, 442 Mass. 554, 570-571 (2004), including, of course, a 
custodial interrogation.  Nevertheless, as discussed infra, this 
statement was not directly material, as the defendant did not 
have a right to appointed counsel during his June 27, 2012, 
noncustodial interview. 
12 
 
Defendant: "I'll waive the right, and if I need a lawyer 
afterwards then I'll just have to somehow -- I 
just don't want to -- I have a tendency, if 
something comes out the wrong way, I don't need 
that getting used." 
 
Haley: 
"Well, what we're going to do here now is we're 
going to put a written statement. . . .  It's 
going to be your statement, okay?  And in that 
we're going to take the facts down, your side of 
the story about what happened here, alright?" 
 
Defendant: "Okay." 
 
Haley: 
"And then before we're done here, we read that 
statement back, and we correct anything that is 
not correct. . . .  It's your side, your 
statement, your side of the story.  I'm just 
recording the facts as you give them to me, 
okay?  So there isn't going to be stuff on here 
that you don't want to be on there, you know 
what I'm saying?  This is your statement of 
facts that you have to sign at the end.  
Alright? . . .  So this is your chance to tell 
me, okay, what happened here.  So you're okay 
with that?" 
 
Defendant: "I'm fine with that.  But like I said, I 
honestly don't know what." 
 
Haley: 
"Well, you can stop talking at any time you 
want, okay?" 
 
Defendant: "Yes." 
 
Haley: 
"We can end the interview.  It says right here 
in your Miranda, right?" 
 
Defendant: "Yeah." 
 
Haley: 
"Alright.  So do you understand this Miranda?" 
 
Defendant: "Yes, I do." 
 
Haley: 
"Okay.  Do you want to talk to me now and waive 
your Fifth Amendment right?" 
 
13 
 
Defendant: "Yes." 
 
Haley: 
"Yes, okay.  And you may -- and when you want to 
stop talking and you want to have a lawyer, then 
you can do that.  Is that what you're telling 
me?" 
 
Defendant: "Yes, yeah.  I just, like I said, I don't know." 
 
The defendant then signed a waiver of the Miranda rights, and 
the interview proceeded. 
 
After discussing some background information, Haley again 
mentioned, and the defendant acknowledged, that the defendant 
had received and understood the Miranda rights and that he was 
not under arrest.  When Haley asked the defendant, again, if he 
had waived the right to an attorney, the defendant responded, "I 
just don't exactly know.  Like I said, I don't know exactly 
what's being alleged here.  I don't know how to go about it.  
I'm not -- I don't want to put myself in any -- get myself in 
any trouble because of the way that I word something."  Haley 
responded, "Well, it's in a written statement form that we're 
going to read back, so there's like no trickery here.  You know 
what I'm saying?"  The defendant said he understood, and Haley 
repeated that if the defendant wanted an attorney present he 
could stop answering questions at any point.  The defendant 
acknowledged that he was not requesting a lawyer at that time.  
Haley asked the defendant if he was voluntarily giving his 
statement, to which the defendant replied in the affirmative. 
14 
 
 
The interview continued, and Haley and the defendant 
discussed the substance of the allegations.  Throughout the 
conversation, after typing a sentence or phrase, Haley would 
confirm with the defendant that he had accurately typed what the 
defendant said.  The defendant admitted he had spent brief 
periods of time alone with K.C., but denied any inappropriate 
conduct.  The defendant was given bottled water and took two 
unaccompanied bathroom breaks.  Throughout the interview, the 
defendant was articulate and responded appropriately to all 
questions.  Haley used a conversational tone and never raised 
his voice.  The interview lasted approximately one and one-half 
hours, and after it concluded the defendant left the police 
station. 
 
a.  Custody.  The defendant argues that he was in custody 
during his June 27 interview and accordingly the statements he 
made were obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights, and Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476.  He also 
argues that his statements on this date were, as the judge 
concluded, not voluntary.  In response, the Commonwealth 
contends that the defendant's June 27 statements should not be 
suppressed because Miranda does not apply to noncustodial 
interviews, the defendant only made an equivocal request for 
counsel, and his statements were made voluntarily. 
15 
 
 
We begin our analysis by agreeing with the motion judge 
that the defendant was not in custody on June 27.  While some 
factors in the custody analysis weigh against the Commonwealth, 
they are not conclusive.  For example, "the fact that the focus 
of the investigation was on the defendant," Commonwealth v. 
Barnes, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 748, 752 (1985), and "[t]he fact that 
the defendant's interview occurred at the police station [are] 
not, by [themselves], dispositive."  Hilton, 443 Mass. at 609-
610.  While a police station is not an entirely neutral setting, 
the defendant went there voluntarily and was expressly told 
several times that he was not under arrest.  Moreover, while 
Haley explained to the defendant the focus of his questioning 
and revealed some degree of suspicion, on that date his general 
demeanor indicated that the "exchange was explanatory rather 
than accusatory."  Molina, 467 Mass. at 74.  See Hilton, 443 
Mass. at 608-611 (noncustodial interrogation where officers 
"stopped short of an outright accusation").  Whether an 
investigation has begun to focus on a suspect is "material to 
the custody inquiry only to the extent that an officer's 
suspicions influence the objective conditions of an 
interrogation, such that a reasonable person in the position of 
the person being questioned would not feel free to leave the 
place of questioning."  Commonwealth v. Morse, 427 Mass. 117, 
124-125 (1998).  To whatever extent the interview may have led a 
16 
 
reasonable person to think he or she was not free to leave, "any 
such mistaken impression was dispelled by [Haley's] correct 
explanation of the defendant's actual status."  Groome, 435 
Mass. at 215. 
 
Of chief significance here is that the defendant went to 
the police station voluntarily, see Molina, 467 Mass. at 73, 
and, once there, was told numerous times that he was not in 
custody.  Both Haley and the defendant sat in a relaxed fashion.  
There is no evidence to suggest that the defendant's freedom to 
leave the interview was restricted at any time, and he took two 
unaccompanied bathroom breaks.  Haley asked all questions in a 
conversational tone and never raised his voice.  Moreover, the 
flow of the exchange was predominantly influenced by the 
defendant's own remarks.  When the interview was over, the 
defendant left the police station without hindrance.  While a 
reasonable person in the defendant's position may have believed 
that he was a suspect in the investigation, these circumstances 
do not demonstrate an environment "so dominated by the police 
that a reasonable person would perceive that his liberty was 
restrained to a degree associated with a formal arrest."  
Kirwan, 448 Mass. at 312. 
 
Given our conclusion that the defendant was not in custody 
on June 27, his interview on this date was simply not governed 
by Miranda.  Therefore, because his "inquiry about an attorney 
17 
 
occurred at a point well prior to the commencement of any 
custodial interrogation," Groome, 435 Mass. at 216, he did not 
effectively invoke a "right" to counsel.  "The fact that the 
defendant was read his Miranda rights when he arrived at the 
station may be understood to be only a step taken in an 
abundance of caution."  Barnes, 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 752.  While 
"[w]e have 'encouraged police to give Miranda warnings prior to 
the point at which an encounter becomes custodial,'" Baye, 462 
Mass. at 263, quoting Hilton, 443 Mass. at 610 n.7, "[t]he 
requirements of [Miranda] are not triggered unless the 
interrogation is custodial."  Baye, supra at 253, quoting 
Hilton, supra at 608.  See generally Groome, 435 Mass. at 215-
216.  Therefore, the interview not being custodial, the 
defendant's musings about perhaps needing a lawyer, and his 
inquiry about how to get the court to appoint him a lawyer if he 
could not afford one, did not require the officer to cease all 
questioning, and did not render his June 27 statements 
inadmissible under Miranda.  See Barnes, supra.4 
                     
 
4 Many other States have similarly held that a suspect's 
expressed desire to consult with an attorney, when voiced in a 
noncustodial setting, does not entitle the suspect to the 
protections of Miranda or require that police officers cease 
questioning, even when the suspect has been given Miranda 
warnings.  See, e.g., State v. Middleton, 220 W. Va. 89, 98-99 
(2006), overruled on other grounds by State v. Eilola, 226 W. 
Va. 698 (2010) (request for counsel during noncustodial 
interview did not invoke protections of Miranda so as to 
preclude further questioning even though Miranda rights given).  
18 
 
 
b.  Voluntariness of the statements.  "Where a defendant 
makes statements to the police while 'not in custody, we focus 
solely on the question whether his statements were voluntary.'"  
Molina, 467 Mass. at 75, quoting Durand, 457 Mass. at 595.  The 
defendant argues that his statements on June 27 were not made 
freely or voluntarily and should therefore be suppressed.  The 
Commonwealth counters that, given the totality of the 
interview's circumstances, the defendant's statements were 
voluntary and we should reverse the motion judge's order of 
suppression.  We conclude that the Commonwealth has met its 
burden of establishing that the defendant's June 27 statements 
were voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
"[W]here the police provide precustodial warnings but then 
ignore the defendant's attempts to avail himself of those 
rights, the 'coercive effect of continued interrogation [is] 
greatly increased because the suspect [could] believe that the 
police "promises" to provide the suspect's constitutional rights 
were untrustworthy, and that the police would continue to' 
                                                                  
See also State v. Stanley, 167 Ariz. 519, 525, cert. denied, 502 
U.S. 1014 (1991) (same); Zook v. State, 513 N.E.2d 1217, 1218-
1221 (Ind. 1987) (same); Hunt v. State, 687 So. 2d 1154, 1158-
1160 (Miss. 1996) (same); State v. Carpentier, 132 N.H. 123, 
127-128 (1989) (same).  Accord State v. Haddock, 257 Kan. 964, 
976-977 (1995), abrogated on other grounds by State v. James, 
276 Kan. 737, 750-751 (2003).  Quite simply, the constitutional 
rights that Miranda safeguards do not exist outside the context 
of custodial interrogation, and providing a suspect with Miranda 
warnings "does not transform a noncustodial interrogation into a 
custodial interrogation."  Haddock, 257 Kan. at 976-977. 
19 
 
ignore subsequent invocations, rendering such invocations 
futile."  Baye, 462 Mass. at 263, quoting Tukes v. Dugger, 911 
F.2d 508, 516 n.11 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. 
Singletary v. Tukes, 502 U.S. 898 (1991).  However, the totality 
of the circumstances of the defendant's June 27 statement was 
not sufficiently coercive to render his statements involuntary.  
Put another way, based on the record before us we cannot say 
that the will of the defendant was overborne. 
 
The defendant's June 27 statements appear to be the result 
of free and voluntary acts, as the interview techniques employed 
by Haley were not so unfair or oppressive as to deprive the 
defendant of his rational intellect.  The interview was 
reasonable in length, lasting approximately one and one-half 
hours.  See Commonwealth v. O'Brian, 445 Mass. 720, 728, cert. 
denied, 549 U.S. 898 (2006).  Haley neither minimized the 
seriousness of the allegations the defendant faced nor made the 
defendant any promises.  See, e.g., Baye, 462 Mass. at 257; 
Tremblay, 460 Mass. at 208-210; Sneed, 440 Mass. at 222.  Haley 
did not engage in any trickery and this was not a case in which 
the police obtained a confession by materially misrepresenting 
the defendant's fundamental constitutional rights.  Contrast 
Baye, 462 Mass. at 246, 256-260 (statement involuntary where 
officers engaged in "multiple improprieties" and employed 
deceptive tactics during ten-hour interrogation).  Nor did he 
20 
 
tell the defendant that this conversation was his sole 
opportunity to tell his story, that the strength of the evidence 
against the defendant was stronger than it was, or that he would 
charge the defendant with more serious crimes if the defendant 
did not confess.  Contrast Novo, 442 Mass. at 264-270 (statement 
involuntary where police officers repeatedly said interview was 
only chance for defendant to tell story). 
 
The defendant was twenty-eight years of age, and while he 
appeared upset and nervous at points, there was no reason to 
question his mental capacity.  Throughout the interview, the 
defendant appeared sober, alert, and lucid.  He was coherent and 
articulate, and he consistently demonstrated his understanding 
of the nature of the interview.  See Molina, 467 Mass. at 77.  
Given the defendant's reference to a prior charge of operating 
while under the influence of alcohol, it was reasonable to infer 
that he had some prior experience with law enforcement officers 
and the court system.  Significantly, the defendant's statements 
appeared to be the product of his own free will.  He directly 
answered all questions and provided "exculpatory explanation[s] 
of events . . . indicating an awareness of the consequences of 
. . . speaking to the police."  Commonwealth v. Beland, 436 
Mass. 273, 281 (2002).  See Durand, 457 Mass. at 597 
(defendant's statement voluntary where "able to decide what to 
tell the officers"). 
21 
 
 
It is true that Haley provided the defendant with seemingly 
conflicting information with regard to obtaining appointed 
counsel.  First, in the Miranda warnings, Haley advised the 
defendant that he had the right to an attorney (inferably at the 
interview), and that if he could not afford an attorney, one 
would be appointed for him.  And, later, when the defendant 
asked whether if he needed a lawyer the court would appoint him 
one because he did not have the funds, Haley told him, "the 
court will appoint you a lawyer at arraignment" "if we get to 
that point."  However, it does not appear that this conflicting 
advice coerced the defendant into making a statement.  The 
defendant was consistently told that he did not have to say 
anything and could stop speaking at any time.  Haley never 
suggested that he did not need a lawyer, and the defendant never 
unequivocally declared that he wanted one, only to be told that 
he could not have one. 
 
Where the defendant had no right to appointed counsel 
because his interview was noncustodial and no legal proceedings 
had been initiated against him, Haley's statements cannot be 
construed to be "so manipulative . . . that they deprived [the 
defendant] of his ability to make an unconstrained, autonomous 
decision to [speak]" (citation omitted).  Baye, 462 Mass. at 
256.  As "there is simply nothing about the interview . . . that 
suggests the defendant's will was overborne in any way," Molina, 
22 
 
467 Mass. at 76, the totality of the circumstances supports the 
conclusion that the defendant's June 27 statements were 
voluntary. 
 
2.  June 28 statements.  On June 28, 2012, at approximately 
12 P.M., Haley attended the forensic interview of K.C. at the 
Family Advocacy Center in Springfield, in which she alleged that 
the defendant had sexually abused her.  Thereafter, at 
approximately 1:30 P.M., the defendant was arrested at the 
Palmer Division of the District Court Department where he was 
attending a restraining order hearing. 
 
At the police station, the defendant was booked and 
fingerprinted.  He met with Haley in the same room as the day 
prior.  At the start of the interview, Haley read the defendant 
the Miranda rights, which the defendant waived in writing.  
Appearing disheveled and tired, the defendant said he had spent 
the prior night "in [his] truck" and later said he had not 
slept. 
 
Haley then told the defendant that the police had uncovered 
additional evidence since the prior day and now knew that 
information the defendant had recounted was not true.  He told 
the defendant that the police were positive "some stuff" had 
been going on with K.C., and that the defendant was the one 
doing "these things."  Haley asked the defendant to describe a 
"tickle game" that he played with his daughter.  Regarding the 
23 
 
defendant's previous denials, Haley said, "[w]e're way beyond 
that now," and explained that he wanted to know what the 
defendant was "going to take ownership of." 
 
At this point, the following exchange took place: 
Defendant: "I think with these questions I might need a 
lawyer.  I don't know exactly what to say." 
 
Haley: 
"Well, I'll stop any minute for a lawyer for 
you, okay?  If that's what you want me to do.  
This is your opportunity to say what's going on 
here, okay?  This is your opportunity to say 
what you want.  I'll stop.  If you want a 
lawyer, I will shut this thing off right now and 
leave.  Okay.  You tell me what you want to do.  
You tell me." 
 
Defendant: "Nothing's happened with the tickle thing.  
Nothing's progressed.  Nothing -- I haven't done 
anything to her." 
 
Haley: 
"My question is do you want a lawyer or do you 
want to stop right now?" 
 
Defendant: "How long would it take to get a lawyer here or 
an attorney?" 
 
Haley: 
"Well, they don't just come running out and sit 
in an interview, okay?  If you want a lawyer, 
then I'll stop the interview and you'll have a 
right to call an attorney all you want.  I'll go 
on my merry way and do other things." 
 
Defendant: "What happens to me at that point?  Am I locked 
up?" 
 
Haley: 
"I'm going to be up front with you.  You're 
locked up right now, okay?  When you're 
fingerprinted and booked and told you're under 
arrest, you're locked up, okay?" 
 
Defendant: "I understand that." 
 
24 
 
Haley: 
"I'm up in the air right now as to what criminal 
charges I'm going to be bringing against you, 
okay?  Those are some of the reasons why I 
wanted to talk to you and get your side of the 
story, okay?  As to what actual criminal charges 
I'm going to be bringing against you, you know.  
There's things here that you can do for 
yourself. But the first issue we have to get by 
here right now is whether you want to continue 
to talk to me or whether you want a lawyer.  If 
you want a lawyer, I'll stop, okay?  But you've 
got to make your mind up for me." 
 
Defendant: "I want to get this straightened up and I want 
to do it the right way, but I don't -- I don't 
know exactly." 
 
Haley: 
"Well, I've been fair with you. . . .  But my 
protocol is I'm right up front with you.  I'm 
not here to talk you out of a lawyer.  I'm here 
to advise you to have a lawyer, you have the 
right to a lawyer, and if you want if you want 
to stop the interview and have a lawyer, I will 
do that right now.  But you've got [to] make 
your mind up for me . . . , okay?" 
 
Defendant: "I need -- can you tell me what's going to 
happen to me after this?  Do I get bailed?  Do I 
go -- I mean, what measures do I need to take 
to, you know, find out, to make arrangements to 
figure out, you know, how I'm?" 
 
Haley: 
"Well, I think I just mentioned to you that 
you're already under arrest." 
 
Defendant: "Yes." 
 
Haley: 
"And I'm still -- it's still pending with me on 
what criminal charges I'm going to bring against 
you.  That's like one of the main reasons why 
you're here today for me to interview you, okay? 
. . .  You are already under arrest, okay?  
Already under arrest.  You know, we have a 
protocol which is when you clearly, distinctly 
say, 'I want a lawyer, and don't want to go any 
further,' that we stop.  But see, you don't 
really say that.  You say, well, is this the 
25 
 
point where I might want a lawyer if this is 
happening.  If that's what you want, then I will 
just shut it down and leave, okay?  That's not a 
problem either . . . ." 
 
Defendant: "This is not what -- I'm not trying to be an 
ass." 
 
Haley: 
"I know that.  I know you're not trying to be an 
ass. . . .  Very simply and equitably, right 
now, okay, we're on an interview here with the 
thing showing.  Do you want to stop the 
interview and have a lawyer or do you want to 
talk to me for a while longer?" 
 
Defendant: "I'll try to talk to you for a little while 
longer." 
 
Haley: 
"So right now you do not want a lawyer?" 
 
Defendant: "No." 
 
 
During the ensuing interview that lasted less than one 
hour, Haley told the defendant, "we have clear-cut evidence that 
certain things happened here with this six year old, with you."  
Haley also told the defendant a few times that the police either 
knew K.C. had "been penetrated" or that they had "some 
indication that she's been getting penetrated."  The defendant 
made several incriminating statements, and admitted that while 
tickling K.C. on the previous day, she moved his hands to her 
inner thigh near her private parts. 
 
In contrast to his June 27 interview, the defendant's June 
28 interview was clearly custodial.  He had been arrested, 
booked, and fingerprinted.  Additionally, Haley explained to the 
26 
 
defendant several times that he was under arrest and "locked 
up." 
 
The defendant argues that his June 28 statements should be 
suppressed because his Miranda waiver was invalid and Haley 
failed to cease questioning after the defendant invoked his 
right to counsel.  The Commonwealth contends that the defendant 
validly waived the Miranda rights on June 28 and that Haley was 
entitled to continue questioning where the defendant did not 
unequivocally invoke his right to counsel. 
 
"[A]fter a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda 
rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until 
and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney."  
Commonwealth v. Santos, 463 Mass. 273, 285 (2012), quoting Davis 
v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461 (1994).  "To invoke the 
right to counsel, 'the suspect must unambiguously request 
counsel.'"  Commonwealth v. Morganti, 455 Mass. 388, 396-397 
(2009), S.C., 467 Mass. 96 (2014), quoting Davis, 512 U.S. at 
459.  If a suspect makes reference to counsel in an ambiguous or 
equivocal manner such that "'a reasonable officer in light of 
the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect 
might be invoking the right to counsel,' the police questioning 
need not cease" (emphasis in original).  Id. at 397, quoting 
Davis, supra.  Our precedent requires police to "'honor a 
decision of a person in custody to cut off questioning,' and 
27 
 
prohibits such practices as 'refusing to discontinue the 
interrogation upon request' or 'persisting in repeated efforts 
to wear down [the defendant's] resistance and make him change 
his mind.'"  Commonwealth v. Brum, 438 Mass. 103, 111 (2002), 
quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 105-106 (1975). 
 
The defendant's reference to counsel during his 
noncustodial June 27 interview did not preclude the resumption 
of questioning on June 28.  Contrast Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 
U.S. 98, 110 (2010) (custodial invocation of right to counsel 
followed by break in custody requires period of fourteen days 
before police may resume questioning); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 
469 Mass. 531, 545-548 (2014).  Moreover, the defendant's two 
direct references to counsel during the June 28 interview, after 
signing the Miranda waiver form, were equivocal.  First, he 
said, "I think with these questions I might need a lawyer.  I 
don't know exactly what to say."  Then, after being told by 
Haley, "This is your opportunity to say what's going on here 
. . . .  If you want a lawyer I will shut this thing off right 
now and leave," the defendant subsequently asked, "How long 
would it take to get a lawyer here or an attorney?"  These 
remarks, as well as the defendant's ambiguous responses to 
Haley's direct lawyer-related questions, were not unequivocal 
refusals to speak until the defendant had an opportunity to 
confer with counsel.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Vincent, 469 
28 
 
Mass. 786, 793, 796-797 (2014) (statement not suppressed where 
defendant asked officers whether he "should get a lawyer" and 
said, "I think I might need [a lawyer]," and continued 
volunteering information about incident); Morganti, 455 Mass. at 
397-398 (defendant's statement, "thinking I might need a lawyer 
and want to talk with him before talking to you," ruled too 
ambiguous to constitute unequivocal invocation of right to 
counsel).5 
 
The motion judge concluded, however, that when coupled with 
Haley's suggestion the day before that the defendant could only 
have a lawyer appointed for him by the court "at arraignment," 
Haley's response to the defendant's question about "[h]ow long" 
it would take to "get a lawyer here," specifically that the 
defendant had "a right to call an attorney all you want," and 
"they don't just come running out and sit in an interview," 
"effectively precluded [the defendant] from understanding his 
                     
 
5 See also Commonwealth v. Dubois, 451 Mass. 20, 25-26 
(2008) ("[m]aybe I better get a lawyer" not unequivocal 
request);  Commonwealth v. Jones, 439 Mass. 249, 258 (2003) 
("going to need a lawyer sometime" not affirmative request for 
counsel); Commonwealth v. Peixoto, 430 Mass. 654, 657-658 (2000) 
(statements not suppressed where defendant only expressed 
uncertainty whether he wanted to speak to police without 
attorney); Commonwealth v. Todd, 408 Mass. 724, 726 (1990) (not 
affirmative request for counsel where defendant "wondered aloud 
about the advisability of having a lawyer"); Commonwealth v. 
Corriveau, 396 Mass. 319, 331 (1985) ("[i]t's beginning to sound 
like I need a lawyer" not affirmative request for counsel); 
Commonwealth v. Pennellatore, 392 Mass. 382, 387 (1984) ("I 
guess I'll have to have a lawyer for this" not affirmative 
request for counsel). 
29 
 
ability to exercise his right to counsel" at the custodial 
interview and, further, raised serious doubt that the 
defendant's waiver of his right to counsel was done knowingly, 
voluntarily, and intelligently. 
 
We agree.  "In order for a waiver to be 'knowing' and 
'intelligent,' the defendant must understand 'the [Miranda] 
warnings themselves.'"  Hilton, 443 Mass. at 606, quoting 
Raymond, 424 Mass. at 393.  Where "the defendant manifestly did 
not understand the meaning of one or more of the rights 
described in the Miranda warnings, the Commonwealth cannot meet 
its burden of proving a valid waiver beyond a reasonable doubt."  
Commonwealth v. Hoyt, 461 Mass. 143, 153 (2011).  Haley's 
statements that the right to appointed counsel does not attach 
until arraignment, that lawyers "don't just come running out and 
sit in an interview," and that the defendant would have to 
"call" a lawyer puts into question whether, having no funds to 
hire counsel, the defendant believed speaking with an attorney 
before speaking to the police was an actual possibility.  That 
this fundamental misunderstanding went uncorrected hampers the 
Commonwealth in establishing, beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
validity of the defendant's waiver of his right to consult with 
counsel.  See Clarke, 461 Mass. at 351 n.12.  Therefore, the 
30 
 
motion judge properly suppressed the defendant's June 28 
statements.6 
 
Conclusion.  The suppression of the defendant's June 27 
statements is reversed, and the suppression of the defendant's 
June 28 statements is affirmed.  The case is remanded to the 
Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
                     
 
6 Having concluded that the judge properly suppressed the 
defendant's statements because the Commonwealth had not 
established a valid waiver, we need not consider whether the 
statements made were also involuntary.