Case Title: Ex parte Wilcox County Board of Education et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1170621

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2018-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: December 21, 2018
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2018-2019
____________________
1170621
____________________
Ex parte Wilcox County Board of Education, Tyrone Yarbrough,
individually and in his official capacity as superintendent
of the Wilcox  County Board of Education, and Bernard Martin
and Lester Turk, individually and in their official
capacities as members of the Wilcox County Board of
Education
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Reginald Southall
v.
Wilcox County Board of Education, Tyrone Yarbrough,
individually and in his official capacity as superintendent
of the Wilcox  County Board of Education, and Bernard Martin
and Lester Turk, individually and in their official
capacities as members of the Wilcox County Board of
Education
(Wilcox Circuit Court, CV-14-12)
1170621
BOLIN, Justice.
The Wilcox County Board of Education ("the Board");
Tyrone Yarbrough, individually and in his official capacity as
the superintendent of the Board;1 and members of the Board
Bernard Martin and Lester Turk, individually and in their
official capacities, petition for a writ of mandamus directed
to the Wilcox Circuit Court. The petitioners seek an order
compelling the circuit court to vacate its order denying their
motion to dismiss and to enter an order dismissing with
prejudice all claims against them.  We grant the petition and
issue the writ. 
Facts and Procedural History
Reginald Southall was a teacher at Wilcox Central High
School.  During a meeting of the Board in April 2013, then
Superintendent Yarbrough recommended the nonrenewal of
Southall's probationary contract. Five Board members were
present during the vote.  Upon a motion to accept Yarbrough's
1At some point after the underlying litigation was
commenced but before this petition for a writ of mandamus was
filed, Yarbrough cased being the superintendent.  According to
Rule 25(d)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., the new superintendent was
automatically substituted as a party as to the claims asserted
against Yarbrough in his official capacity.  For the purpose
of consistency in this opinion, we use "Yarbrough" throughout
when referring to the superintendent.  
2
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recommendation, three Board members voted in favor of not
renewing the contract, one member opposed the recommendation,
and one member abstained. Board members Joseph Pettway, Jr.,
Martin, and Turk voted in favor of Yarbrough's recommendation
for the nonrenewal of the probationary contract. Clifford
Twilley voted against the recommendation, and Donald McLeod
abstained. 
Normally, the Board consists of six members. One seat on
the Board, however, was vacant at the time of the April 2013
meeting, due to an order of the circuit court enjoining the
Board from filling the vacant seat.2  Thus, the Board
conducted business with only five members during the April
2013 meeting.
2On March 3, 2013, the Wilcox Circuit Court removed
Jeffery Saulsberry, the sixth member of the Board, and
declared him ineligible to hold office as a Board member.  The
circuit court also issued a restraining order prohibiting the
Board from filling the vacancy. On May 7, 2013, the circuit
court appointed Saulsberry to fill the seat. This Court
subsequently vacated the circuit court's order appointing
Saulsberry as a Board member and ordered the State
Superintendent of Education to fill the vacancy left by
Saulsberry's removal. Ex parte State Bd. of Educ. (No.
1131426, April 24, 2015), 215 So. 3d 1022 (Ala. 2015) (table). 
Thus, between March 3, 2013, through May 7, 2013, the Board
was judicially enjoined from filling the vacancy and thus from
conducting business with six members.  
3
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On December 3, 2014, Southall filed a petition in the
circuit court seeking a declaratory judgment, injunctive
relief, and a writ of mandamus, in which he asserted that,
because of the vacancy on the Board, the termination of his
employment was the result of an  illegal vote of the Board in
violation of § 16-8-4, Ala. Code 1975.  On January 12, 2015,
the Board, Yarbrough, Martin, and Turk (hereinafter referred
to collectively as "the petitioners"), filed a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., asserting
that Southall failed to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted because, they argued, the Board's vote to accept the
recommendation not to renew Southall's probationary contract
complied with the law.  The petitioners also moved to dismiss
on the basis of Rule 12(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., asserting that
the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because,
they asserted, they are immune from liability. Three years
passed before the circuit court considered the motion.  After
conducting a status conference on February 22, 2018, the
circuit 
court 
denied 
the 
motion 
to 
dismiss 
without
explanation, either of the delay in ruling or of the reasoning
4
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for the ruling.  On April 5, 2018, the petitioners filed this
petition for a writ of mandamus. 
Standard of Review
"'"The writ of mandamus is a drastic
and extraordinary writ, to be 'issued only
when there is: 1) a clear legal right in
the petitioner to the order sought; 2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so;
3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and
4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the
court.' Ex parte United Serv. Stations,
Inc., 628 So. 2d 501, 503 (Ala. 1993); see
also Ex parte Ziglar, 669 So. 2d 133, 134
(Ala. 1995)." Ex parte Carter, [807 So. 2d
534,] 536 [(Ala. 2001)].'
"Ex parte McWilliams, 812 So. 2d 318, 321 (Ala.
2001).
"'Subject to certain narrow exceptions ..., we
have held that, because an "adequate remedy" exists
by way of an appeal, the denial of a motion to
dismiss or a motion for a summary judgment is not
reviewable by petition for writ of mandamus.' Ex
parte Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 825 So. 2d 758,
761–62 (Ala. 2002)."
Ex parte Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., L.P., 78 So. 3d 959,
965-66 (Ala. 2011). Among those exceptions is when the
petitioner challenges the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
trial court, Ex parte HealthSouth Corp., 974 So. 2d 288, 292
(Ala. 2007), or when the petitioner asserts immunity.  Ex
5
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parte Alabama Peace Officers' Standards & Training Comm'n, 34
So. 3d 1248 (Ala. 2009).
Discussion
A.  Sovereign Immunity and Official-Capacity Claims
The Board contends that the circuit court should have
granted the motion to dismiss as to Southall's claims against
it seeking monetary damages, on the ground of sovereign
immunity.  Yarbrough, Martin, and Turk contend that dismissal
is also warranted on those claims seeking monetary damages
against them in their official capacities, on the ground of
sovereign immunity.  We agree.  
It is well settled law that the State is generally immune
from liability under § 14, Alabama Constitution of 1901.  It
is also well settled that the State cannot be sued indirectly
by suing an officer in his or her official capacity. 
"Sovereign 
immunity 
is 
a 
jurisdictional 
bar 
that
deprives a court of subject-matter jurisdiction.  Ex
parte Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation,
837 So. 2d 808, 810-11 (Ala. 2002).  The principle
of sovereign immunity, set forth in Article I, § 14,
Alabama Constitution of 1901, is a wall that is
'nearly impregnable.'  Patterson v. Gladwin Corp.,
835 So. 2d 137, 142 (Ala. 2002).  The implications
of sovereign immunity are '"not only that the state
itself may not be sued, but that this cannot be
indirectly accomplished by suing its officers or
agents in their official capacity, when a result
6
1170621
favorable to plaintiff would be directly to affect
the financial status of the state treasury."' 
Patterson, 835 So. 2d at 142 (quoting State Docks
Comm'n v. Barnes, 225 Ala. 403, 405, 143 So. 581,
582 (1932))."
Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation,
937 So. 2d 1018, 1022-23 (Ala. 2006).
County boards of education, along with the members of the
those boards and superintendents sued in their official or
representative capacity, enjoy the protection of immunity
provided by § 14 when the action against them is effectively
an action against the State.  See Ex parte Montgomery Cty. Bd.
of Educ., 88 So. 3d 837 (Ala. 2012)(holding that the
Montgomery County Board of Education and members of the board
in their official capacity were immune from suit under § 14 on
a tort claim brought on behalf of an elementary-school student
injured in the school's restroom); Ex parte Monroe Cty. Bd. of
Educ., 48 So. 3d 621 (Ala. 2010)(holding that, for the purpose
of sovereign immunity, county boards of education are
considered agencies of the State); and Board of Sch. Comm'rs
of Mobile Cty. v. Weaver, 99 So. 3d 1210 (Ala. 2012)(holding
that superintendent was entitled to sovereign immunity in his
official capacity as a State officer).  Therefore, the Board
7
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is absolutely immune from suit, as it is considered an agency
of the State.  In addition, to the extent Southall seeks
monetary damages against the individual petitioners in their
official capacities, they are also immune from suit.
Section 14 immunity, however, is not always absolute;
there are actions against State officials that are not barred
by the general rule of sovereign immunity.
"[C]ertain actions are not barred by § 14. There are
six general categories of actions that do not come
within the prohibition of § 14: (1) actions brought
to compel State officials to perform their legal
duties; (2) actions brought to enjoin State
officials from enforcing an unconstitutional law;
(3) actions to compel State officials to perform
ministerial acts; (4) actions brought against State
officials under the Declaratory Judgments Act, Ala.
Code 1975, § 6–6–220 et seq., seeking construction
of a statute and its application in a given
situation; (5) valid inverse condemnation actions
brought 
against 
State 
officials 
in 
their
representative 
capacity; 
and 
(6) 
actions 
for
injunction 
or 
damages 
brought 
against 
State
officials in their representative capacity and
individually where it was alleged that they had
acted fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond their
authority, or in a mistaken interpretation of law.
See Drummond Co. v. Alabama Dep't of Transp., 937
So. 2d 56, 58 (Ala. 2006)(quoting Ex parte Carter,
395 So. 2d 65, 68 (Ala. 1980)); Alabama Dep't of
Transp. v. Harbert Int'l, Inc., 990 So. 2d 831 (Ala.
2008) (holding that the exception for declaratory-
judgment actions applies only to actions against
State officials). As we confirmed in Harbert, these
'exceptions' to sovereign immunity apply only to
actions brought against State officials; they do not
8
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apply to actions against the State or against State
agencies. See Alabama Dep't of Transp., 990 So. 2d
at 840–41."
Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Fin., 991 So. 2d 1254, 1256–57 (Ala.
2008).  In Ex parte Moulton, 116 So. 3d 1119 (Ala. 2013), this
Court clarified and restated the sixth exception to § 14
immunity set forth in Drummond Co. v. Alabama Department of
Transportation, 937 So. 2d 56, 58 (Ala. 2006), by holding that
the exception applies only to the following: 
"(6)(a) actions for injunction brought against State
officials in their representative capacity where it
is alleged that they had acted fraudulently, in bad
faith, beyond their authority, or in a mistaken
interpretation of law, Wallace v. Board of Education
of Montgomery County, 280 Ala. 635, 197 So. 2d 428
(1967), and (b) actions for damages brought against
State officials in their individual capacity where
it is alleged that they had acted fraudulently, in
bad faith, beyond their authority, or in a mistaken
interpretation of law, subject to the limitation
that the action not be, in effect, one against the
State. Phillips v. Thomas, 555 So. 2d 81, 83 (Ala.
1989)."
116 So. 3d at 1141.
Southall argues that, to the extent he seeks a judgment
declaring that the termination of his employment was
ineffective and prospective injunctive relief requiring
reinstatement to his previous employment, the claims against
9
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the individual petitioners in their official capacities fall
within the first, third, fourth, and sixth exceptions.  
First, Southall argues that Yarbrough and the individual
Board members had a legal duty to recognize that he remains
employed because, under § 16-8-4, there was no affirmative
vote of a majority of the entire six-member Board. He also
argues that the third exception is applicable because, he
says, he is seeking to have them perform the ministerial act
of continuing to treat him as employed and to return him to
active status because, he says, there was no valid affirmative
vote to terminate his employment.  He further argues that the
fourth exception to § 14 immunity exists because he brought
this suit under the Declaratory Judgments Act, § 6-6-220 et
seq., Ala. Code 1975, seeking the construction and application
of § 16-8-4.  Finally, he asserts that the sixth exception is
applicable because, he says, the individual petitioners were
operating under a mistaken interpretation of the law.  
Before addressing the exceptions to § 14 immunity, this
Court must differentiate between Southall's requests for
monetary relief and for injunctive relief.  In Harris v.
Owens, 105 So. 3d 430 (Ala. 2012), a former state-university
10
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employee brought an action against the university president
and the individual members of the university's board in their
official capacities, alleging that her employment had been
wrongfully terminated. The trial court found that the
university had not complied with the due-process procedures
set forth in its employee handbook and that the former
employee was entitled to backpay and benefits.  This Court
held:
"In this case, § 14 immunizes the [university
president and individual board members] from any
claim for monetary damages. Therefore, the circuit
court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over
[the former employee's] claim for backpay and
benefits. See Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Transp., 978
So. 2d 17 (Ala. 2007).  '"'"Lacking subject matter
jurisdiction [a court] may take no action other than
to exercise its power to dismiss the [claim].... Any
other action taken by a court lacking subject matter
jurisdiction 
is 
null 
and 
void."'" 
Ex 
parte
Blankenship, 
893 
So. 
2d 
[303,] 
307 
[(Ala.
2004)](quoting State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow
Drive, 740 So. 2d 1025, 1029 (Ala. 1999), quoting in
turn Beach v. Director of Revenue, 934 S.W.2d 315,
318 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)).' Ex parte Alabama Dep't of
Transp., 978 So. 2d at 27. Thus, the circuit court's
order was void to the extent it purported to award
backpay and benefits to [the former employee]."
105 So. 3d at 435.  
In his petition in the circuit court, Southall sought a
judgment declaring: 
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(1)
that the Board and its members' actions of
acting on a recommendation of Yarbrough
without the proper majority vote violated
§ 16-8-4; 
(2)
that 
the 
nonrenewal 
of 
Southall's
employment is invalid and that the act
taken 
against 
him 
was 
beyond 
their
authority; 
(3)
that Southall is due all pay and benefits
he was receiving until a proper vote on the
renewal of his contract is taken;
 
(4)
that Southall had no break in service of
his employment; and
 
(5)
that the Board and its members did not have
any authority to "non-renew" his contract
under the circumstances.  
He also sought the following injunctive relief: 
(1)
a preliminary injunction enjoining the
Board from preventing him from returning to
work as a teacher;
 
(2)
a preliminary injunction enjoining the
Board from withholding his pay and benefits
until a proper vote of the Board on the
renewal of his probationary contract could
be taken;
 
(3)
a 
permanent 
injunction 
enjoining 
the 
Board,
its members, and their successors in office
from 
releasing 
employees 
without 
having 
the
proper majority vote as required under the
Code of Alabama; 
(4)
a 
temporary 
restraining 
order 
and
preliminary 
and 
permanent 
injunctions
requiring the Board, its members, and
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Yarbrough to conform their actions to the
law 
and 
prohibiting 
the 
Board 
from
nonrenewing his contract without following
the procedures required by law; and 
(5)
an injunction enjoining the Board from
implementing § 16-8-4 contrary to its
meaning.  
In addition, he sought a writ of mandamus: 
(1)
compelling the Board and its members to
perform their legal or ministerial duties;
(2)
requiring them to reinstate him as a
teacher in the Wilcox County School System
with 
all 
duties, 
responsibilities,
privileges, and pay to which he says he is
entitled as if he had not been discharged; 
(3)
requiring an accounting of all moneys and
benefits lost as result of the alleged
breach of duty by the Board and its members
and awarding the same to Southall;
(4)
awarding costs and attorney fees; and
 
(5)
granting 
any 
other 
relief 
deemed 
sufficient
by the court.
  
Thus, Southall's requests for a declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief included requests for monetary relief, such
as an award of all moneys and benefits.  Section 14 immunity
bars any action characterized as an action seeking a
declaratory judgment or an injunction "when it is nothing more
than an action for damages."  Lyons v. River Road Constr. Co.,
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858 So. 2d 257, 263 (Ala. 2003).  Therefore, to the extent
Southall couches his requests for monetary relief within his
requests for declaratory and injunctive relief against the
individual petitioners in their official capacities, we
conclude that none of the exceptions to § 14 are applicable
and that, therefore, the individual petitioners are immune
from suit in their official capacities. 
It should be noted that, to the extent Southall argues
that Yarbrough should not be cloaked with § 14 immunity
because he failed to perform a legal duty, his argument is
unavailing.  In Board of School Commissioners of Mobile County
v. Weaver, 99 So. 3d 1210 (Ala. 2012), we held that the
superintendent of the Mobile County Public School System was
not vested with the authority to employ or to terminate
principals and teachers beyond making a recommendation to the
school board.  We stated:
"Assuming, without deciding, that a duty did arise
on behalf of Superintendent Nichols to implement the
reduction-in-force policy based on the circumstances
surrounding the representations contained in the
letter of May 9, it was the Board's individual
members in their official capacities who were vested
with the authority to provide the plaintiffs with
the ultimate relief sought, i.e., reinstatement to
their positions with backpay. § 16–8–23, Ala. Code
1975. Like the situation presented in Ex parte
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Bessemer Board of Education, [68 So. 3d 782 (Ala.
2011),] where the Board members were vested with the
statutory duty to pay the plaintiff teacher her
appropriate salary increase, it was the individual
board members in this case who were vested with the
statutory authority to reinstate the plaintiffs to
their positions as assistant principals. However,
unlike the situation presented in Ex parte Bessemer
Board of Education, the individual Board members in
this case were not sued and were not made parties in
this case. Only the Board and Superintendent Nichols
were made parties to this case. The Board is
entitled to absolute immunity, and Superintendent
Nichols is not vested with the authority under §
16–8–23, Ala. Code 1975, to grant the plaintiffs the
relief they request. Accordingly, we cannot conclude
that 
this 
action 
is 
an 
action 
to 
compel
Superintendent Nichols to perform a legal duty;
thus, it does not fall within the first designated
'exception' to § 14 immunity."
99 So. 3d at 1220-21.
Like the superintendent in Weaver, the superintendent in
the present case cannot provide Southall with the relief he
requested.  The superintendent makes recommendations to the
school board with respect to personnel matters.  Section 16-8-
23 provides that "[t]he county board of education shall
appoint, upon the written recommendation of the county
superintendent, all principals, teachers, clerical and
professional assistants authorized by the board."  Yarbrough
had the authority only to make recommendations to the Board.
Therefore, this Court cannot conclude that Southall's
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allegations 
against 
Yarbrough 
fall 
within 
the 
first
"exception" to sovereign immunity.
Southall's more convincing argument, however, is that his
nonmonetary 
requests 
for 
declaratory 
or 
prospective 
injunctive
relief against the individual petitioners in their official
capacities fall within the fourth and/or sixth exceptions in
Drummond Co.
Throughout his petition before the circuit court,
Southall alleged that the individual Board members either
acted beyond their authority or "failed to understand" § 16-8-
4 when they voted in favor of adopting Yarbrough's
recommendation not to renew Southall's probationary contract. 
He also requested a declaratory judgment regarding the
application of § 16-8-4 to his situation.  Therefore, to the
extent 
Southall 
requested 
declaratory 
or 
prospective
injunctive relief, such as the reinstatement of his position
and guidance regarding the application of § 16-8-4 to his
specific circumstances, we conclude that his requests related
to the application of § 16-8-4 meet the fourth and sixth
exceptions as to the claims against the individual Board
members in their official capacities.
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B.
State-Agent Immunity3
Yarbrough, Turk, and Martin also assert that they are
entitled to State-agent immunity as set forth in Ex parte
Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000), as to the claims asserted
against them in their individual capacities because they are
being sued based on their actions in either recommending that
Southall's employment not be renewed or voting on that
recommendation as a Board member.4   
3It is important to note that this Court rarely resolves
a claim of State-agent immunity during such an early stage of
the proceedings. We have said that "'"[a] motion to dismiss is
typically not the appropriate vehicle by which to assert ...
qualified immunity or State-agent immunity and ... normally
the determination as to the existence of such a defense should
be reserved until the summary-judgment stage, following
appropriate discovery."'" Ex parte Walker, 97 So. 3d 747, 750
(Ala. 2012) (quoting Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Youth Servs.,
880 So. 2d 393, 397-98 (Ala. 2003), quoting in turn Ex parte
Alabama Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 837 So.
2d 808, 813-14 (Ala. 2002)).  This Court has repeatedly
observed that "'"[i]t is a rare case involving the defense of
[State-agent] immunity that would be properly disposed of by
a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), [Ala. R. Civ. P.]."'"
Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Mental Health & Retardation, 837 So.
2d at 814 (quoting Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 177 (Ala.
2000), quoting in turn Patton v. Black, 646 So. 2d 8, 10 (Ala.
1994) (quoting earlier cases)). Nonetheless, because we
conclude that the Board's vote was not invalid as a matter of
law, we discuss the immunity issue. 
4Cranman was a plurality opinion.  The test set forth in
Cranman was subsequently adopted by a majority of the Court in
Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 178 (Ala. 2000).
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The law governing actions against our State and its
agents is well settled:
"'State-agent 
immunity 
protects 
state 
employees,
as agents of the State, in the exercise of their
judgment in executing their work responsibilities.'
Ex parte Hayles, 852 So. 2d 117, 122 (Ala. 2002). In
[Ex parte] Cranman[, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala. 2000),]
this Court restated the rule governing State-agent
immunity:
"'A State agent shall be immune from
civil liability in his or her personal
capacity when the conduct made the basis of
the claim against the agent is based upon
the agent's
"'(1) formulating plans, policies, or
designs; or
"'(2) exercising his or her judgment
in the administration of a department or
agency of government, including, but not
limited to, examples such as:
"'(a) 
making 
administrative
adjudications;
"'(b) allocating resources;
"'(c) negotiating contracts;
"'(d) hiring, firing, transferring,
assigning, or supervising personnel; or
"'(3) discharging duties imposed on a
department or agency by statute, rule, or
regulation, insofar as the statute, rule,
or regulation prescribes the manner for
performing the duties and the State agent
performs the duties in that manner; or
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"'(4) exercising judgment in the
enforcement of the criminal laws of the
State, including, but not limited to,
law-enforcement officers' arresting or
attempting to arrest persons; or
"'(5) exercising judgment in the
discharge of duties imposed by statute,
rule, 
or 
regulation 
in 
releasing 
prisoners,
counseling or releasing persons of unsound
mind, or educating students.
"'Notwithstanding 
anything 
to the
contrary in the foregoing statement of the
rule, a State agent shall not be immune
from civil liability in his or her personal
capacity
"'(1) when the Constitution or laws of
the United States, or the Constitution of
this State, or laws, rules, or regulations
of this State enacted or promulgated for
the purpose of regulating the activities of
a 
governmental 
agency 
require 
otherwise; 
or
"'(2) when the State agent acts
willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in
bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or
under a mistaken interpretation of the
law.'
"792 So. 2d at 405."
Ex parte Estate of Reynolds, 946 So. 2d 450, 453-54 (Ala.
2006).
Thus, State-agent immunity extends to decisions and
actions 
involving 
"the 
hiring, 
firing, 
transferring, 
assigning
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or supervising of personnel."  Cranman, 792 So. 2d at 405.
Because it is clear that Yarbrough's recommendation and the
Board's vote to accept his recommendation were acts involving
the nonrenewal of an employee contract, the individual 
petitioners have demonstrated that their acts fall within a
category of State-agent immunity.  Thus, the burden then
shifted to Southall to demonstrate that the individual
petitioners "act[ed] willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in
bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken
interpretation of the law."  Id.  Southall alleges throughout
his petition in the circuit court that the individual
petitioners acted beyond their authority or that they
misunderstood or incorrectly applied the law. The petition
filed by Southall in the circuit court, however, does not set
forth any specific facts indicating that the Board members
owed a duty in their individual capacities to provide any
employment benefits to a probationary employee.  Clearly, the
claims are actually claims against the Board for actions taken
as an employer and are not claims against State officials for
the tortious breach of a personal or individual duty.  As
previously discussed, it is clear that the Board members were
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acting in their official capacities when the Board, acting
with five members, cast three votes to accept Yarbrough's
recommendation not to renew Southall's probationary contract.
Therefore, to the extent the individual-capacity claims are in
effect claims against the State, the claims are barred by § 14
immunity. 
 
C.
Application of §§ 16-8-4 and 16-24C-5, Ala. Code
1975 
Southall contends that the Board members' vote not to
renew his contract was invalid because it was not based on a
majority of the full six-member Board.
Southall argues that the nonrenewal of his probationary
contract was void because a majority of the "whole board" did
not vote to accept Yarbrough's recommendation. In his petition
before the circuit court, he argued that the nonrenewal of his
employment contract deprived him of his property and liberty
interests without due process of law.5 
Southall bases his argument on § 16-8-4, which provides,
in pertinent part, that "[n]o motion or resolution shall be
5We note that probationary classified teachers are
afforded less due process than are 
tenured and nonprobationary
classified employees. See §§ 16-24C-5 and -6, Ala. Code 1975. 
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declared adopted without the concurrence of the majority of
the whole [county] board [of education]."  Thus, he
characterizes the issue as whether the requirement of a
majority of the "whole board" requires the total original
membership of the body, regardless of whether the actual
membership has been reduced by a vacancy beyond the Board's
control, or whether the requisite majority of the "whole
board" is determined with reference to the actual number of
members of the Board present at the time of the vote, so long
as a quorum is present.
Southall, however, ignores a section of the Students
First Act, § 16-24C-5(c), Ala. Code 1975, which specifies the
process for terminating probationary teachers.  Section 16-
24C-5(c) provides, in pertinent part, that "[p]robationary
teachers who are not employees of a two-year educational
institution operated under the authority and control of the
Department of Postsecondary Education may be terminated at 
the
discretion of the employer upon the written recommendation of
the chief executive officer, a majority vote of the governing
board, and issuance of written notice of termination to the
teacher on or before the fifteenth day of June."  (Emphasis
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added.)  Section 16-24C-3(5), Ala. Code 1975, in pertinent
part, defines a "governing board" as "[t]he body of elected or
appointed officials that is granted authority by law,
regulation, or policy to make employment decisions on behalf
of the employer."
 
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Motley,
909 So. 2d 806 (Ala. 2005), we stated:
"'"Words used in a statute must be given
their 
natural, 
plain, 
ordinary, 
and
commonly understood meaning, and where
plain language is used a court is bound to
interpret that language to mean exactly
what it says.  If the language of the
statute is unambiguous, then there is no
room for judicial construction and the
clearly 
expressed 
intent 
of 
the 
Legislature
must be given effect."'
"Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Nielsen, 714 So. 2d
293, 296 (Ala. 1998)(quoting IMED Corp. v. Systems
Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602 So. 2d 344, 346 (Ala.
1992)).
"'Of 
course, 
the 
rule 
is 
well
recognized that in the construction of a
statute, the legislative intent is to be
determined from a consideration of the
whole act with reference to the subject
matter to which it applies and the
particular topic under which the language
in question is found.  The intent so
deduced from the whole will prevail over
that of a particular part considered
separately.'  
23
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"Blair v. Greene, 246 Ala. 28, 30, 18 So. 2d 688,
689 (1944).
 
"'It is well settled that when it is
interpreting a statute this Court seeks to
give 
effect 
to 
the 
intent 
of 
the
Legislature, as determined primarily from
the language of the statute itself. Beavers
v. County of Walker, 645 So. 2d 1365, 1376
(Ala. 1994) (citing [McCall v.] McCall, 596
So. 2d 2 (Ala. Civ. App. 199[1]));
Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Dillard, 579
So. 2d 1301 (Ala. 1991). Also, our rules of
statutory construction direct us to look at
the statute as a whole to determine the
meaning of certain language that is, when
viewed 
in 
isolation, 
susceptible 
to
multiple reasonable interpretations. McRae
v. Security Pac. Hous. Servs., Inc., 628
So. 2d 429 (Ala. 1993).'
"Ex parte Alfa Fin. Corp., 762 So. 2d 850, 853 (Ala.
1999).
"'"When interpreting a statute, [a
court] must read the statute as a whole
because statutory language depends on
context; [a court] will presume that the
Legislature knew the meaning of words it
used when it enacted the statute."'
"Ex parte USX Corp., 881 So. 2d 437, 442 (Ala.
2003)(quoting Bean Dredging, L.L.C. v. Alabama Dep't
of Revenue, 855 So. 2d 513, 517 (Ala. 2003))."
909 So. 2d at 813-14.
This is not a case where the Board independently chose
not to fill a vacancy or where a member deliberately absented
himself or herself to prevent the Board from conducting
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business. This is a rare case in which a State court had
judicially enjoined the Board from filling a vacancy.  Thus,
it is clear that "the whole body" of board members who were
authorized to conduct business as a governing board was no
more than the then five members of the Board.  We therefore
must conclude that, under the limited circumstances of this
particular case, a majority of the five members was all that
was required to accept Yarbrough's recommendation not 
to renew
Southall's probationary contract.  
This Court recognizes that there are instances when a
majority of a full board or council is necessary to fill a
vacancy on the body.  Southall cites Reese v. State ex rel.
Carswell, 184 Ala. 36, 62 So. 847 (1913), for the proposition
that a vacancy on the body does not reduce the number of votes
needed, if the statute requires a majority of the whole body. 
In Reese, the president of a municipal council, who under the
council's charter was a member of the council, and seven
councilmen met to fill a vacancy on the council.  At that
time, subsection 7 of § 1192 of the Code 1907 provided that,
in all elections of municipal officers, a "concurrence of a
majority of the whole number of elected members" was required.
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184 Ala. at 44, 62 So. at 850.  We held that the statute
imposed a requirement of affirmative action by a majority of
all the elected members of the council to fill the vacancy. 
The Court therefore concluded that at least five votes were
necessary.  It reasoned that nothing in the statute itself
indicated that a majority of a quorum of members was
sufficient for the purposes of filling a vacancy.  The
circumstances and the statute at issue in Reese, however, are
substantially different from those in Southall's case.  Reese
concerned a municipal council operating under a different
statute, not a board of education proceeding under the terms
of § 16-24C-5(c), which requires a written recommendation and
"a majority vote of the governing board" before the employment
of a probationary teacher can be terminated. In addition, the
municipal council itself in Reese was not prevented from
filling a vacancy as a result of a court-ordered injunction.
Thus, Reese is distinguishable.  
Southall also cites two attorney general opinions for the
proposition that a majority of the full county board of
education is required to terminate the employment of an
employee of the school system. We note that, although an
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attorney general opinion may constitute persuasive authority,
the opinion is not binding upon this Court. T-Mobile South,
LLC v. Bonet, 85 So. 3d 963, 978 (Ala. 2011). 
In a 1983 opinion, a representative asked the attorney
general to advise what would happen if the superintendent of
education recommended the nonrenewal of a school secretary's
contract and the board, which had five members, voted two
votes for, two votes against, and one member abstained.  The
attorney general evaluated whether the secretary would remain
an employee under §§ 16-8-4 and 16-9-23, Ala. Code 1975.  He
concluded that, because § 16-9-23 provides that the
superintendent has the general authority to recommend
dismissal and because § 16-8-4 requires a "concurrence of a
majority of the whole board," there would be no majority vote
for the nonrenewal of the contract.  Ala. Op. Att'y Gen. No.
84-00102 (Dec. 20, 1983).  First, we note that the attorney
general's opinion predates the Students First Act of 2011,
which governs the Board's vote on the nonrenewal of Southall's
probationary contract.  Thus, the Board in Southall's case was
tasked with considering Yarbrough's recommendation under the
terms of § 16-24C-5(c), which requires "a majority vote of the
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governing board" before terminating a probationary teacher's
employment.  In addition, Southall's case is substantially
different because the Board was judicially enjoined from
filling a vacancy; the issue in the attorney general's opinion
was whether a 2-2-1 vote was sufficient to nonrenew.  
Southall also cites a 2009 attorney general opinion in
which a county board of education was tasked with voting on
the distribution of settlement funds and wished to change the
required concurrence for transacting such business from a
simple majority to a super majority. Ala. Op. Att'y Gen. No.
2009-082 (June 23, 2009).  Relying on § 16-8-4, the attorney
general determined that no motion could be adopted requiring
the concurrence of the majority of the whole board. Thus, the
attorney general concluded that a county board of education
could not adopt a resolution requiring a 4/5 majority vote of
the total membership of the board for the distribution of the
settlement funds.  Southall's case is markedly different. The
board in the 2009 attorney general opinion was not operating
under the Students First Act of 2011 or any court-ordered
injunction.  Furthermore, in Southall's case, the Board did
not attempt to transition from a majority to a super majority.
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Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the petitioners
have demonstrated a clear legal right to the order sought. We
grant the petition for a writ of mandamus directing the Wilcox
Circuit Court to vacate its February 22, 2018,  order and to
enter an order dismissing the underlying action.
PETITION GRANTED;  WRIT ISSUED.
Stuart, C.J., and Main, Wise, Sellers, and Mendheim, JJ.,
concur.
Parker, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. 
Shaw and Bryan, JJ., concur in the result in part and
dissent in part. 
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PARKER, Justice (concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur as to Parts A and B of the "Discussion" section
of the main opinion.  I dissent as to Part C for the reasons
stated in Justice Shaw's special writing.
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SHAW, Justice (concurring in the result in part and dissenting
in part).  
As to Part "A" of the "Discussion" section of the main
opinion, I concur in the result.  Under Ala. Const. 1901, Art.
I, § 14, the plaintiff, Reginald Southall, is clearly not
entitled to monetary damages, including "backpay."  In some
situations when a former employee has worked for the State and
then the State, contrary to statute, has paid the employee
incorrectly, the employee, seeking to obtain the 
difference in
pay, might be able to allege a claim that falls outside § 14
immunity.  See, e.g., Ex parte Bessemer Bd. of Educ., 68 So.
3d 782 (Ala. 2011).  Similarly, some claims seeking payment
when the State has contracted for services and has accepted
those services might not be barred by § 14.  Alabama State
Univ. v. Danley, 212 So. 3d 112, 127 (Ala. 2016) ("[O]nce the
State has contracted for services and has accepted those
services, it is legally obligated to pay for those services,
and a claim seeking to enforce that legal obligation falls
within the parameters of the first 'exception' to § 14
immunity."). But when an employee alleges the improper
termination of his or her employment, the employee cannot
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recover backpay for services never performed because of that
termination; such backpay is simply a form of "damages," the
recovery of which is barred by § 14.  Danley, 212 So. 3d at
126 (holding that § 14 barred a claim seeking a portion of a
salary the plaintiff would have been entitled to receive but
for an alleged wrongful termination), and Harris v. Owens, 105
So. 3d 430, 435 (Ala. 2012).6  Here, Southall is seeking money
that he would have been paid had his probationary employment 
not been terminated and had he continued working as a teacher. 
Such a claim, whether pursued by a writ of mandamus or by
seeking injunctive or declaratory relief, is one for damages
that is barred by § 14.  Danley and Harris, supra.  I agree
with the judgment of the main opinion that the monetary claims
against the petitioners are barred.7
6Additionally, Southall may not recover attorney fees in
this case.  Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro, 950 So. 2d 1203
(Ala. 2006).
7I agree that the Wilcox County Board of Education, as an
agency of the State, is absolutely immune from suit under Ala.
Const. 1901, Art. I, § 14, on the state-law claims in this
case.  Ex parte Hale Cty. Bd. of Educ., 14 So. 3d 844, 848
(Ala. 2009).  As to the official-capacity claims against
Tyrone Yarbrough, the former superintendent of the Board, I
also agree that Southall has failed to demonstrate that an
exception to § 14 immunity applies in this case.  See Board of
Sch. Comm'rs of Mobile Cty. v. Weaver, 99 So. 3d 1210, 1212
(Ala. 2012). 
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I further agree that, to the extent that Southall
requested declaratory and prospective injunctive relief to
determine 
whether 
his 
employment 
had 
been 
improperly
terminated and whether he was entitled to be reinstated as an
employee, those claims against certain members of the Wilcox
County Board of Education ("the Board") in their official
capacities are not barred by § 14.
As to Part "B" of the "Discussion" section of the main
opinion, I also concur in the result.  I believe that the
individual-capacity claims against Tyrone Yarbrough, the
former superintendent of the Board, and Bernard Martin and
Lester Turk, who are members of the Board, are barred by § 14. 
Those claims alleged a violation of their duties as officials;
no duties they might have owed Southall individually or
personally are implicated.  See Barnhart v. Ingalls, [Ms.
1170253, November 21, 2018] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2018).  Thus,
the claims against them are, in effect, claims against the
State, and any so-called exceptions to § 14 do not apply to
allow the purported individual-capacity claims to proceed. 
Phillips v. Thomas, 555 So. 2d 81, 83 (Ala. 1989) ("State
officers and employees, in their [individual capacities,] ...
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are absolutely immune from suit when the action is, in effect,
one against the State.").  Because these claims are barred by
§ 14, an analysis regarding whether State-agent immunity also
bars them is pretermitted.
I respectfully dissent to Part "C" of the "Discussion"
section of the main opinion. Whether the trial court has
jurisdiction is the only matter before us in this mandamus
petition.  The substantive merit of Southall's claim that a
majority of the Board failed to vote in favor of the 
termination of his employment is not before us; that issue can
and must be instead reviewed on appeal.  Liberty Nat'l Life
Ins. Co., 825 So. 2d 758, 761–62 (Ala. 2002) ("[B]ecause an
'adequate remedy' exists by way of an appeal, the denial of a
motion to dismiss or a motion for a summary judgment is not
reviewable by petition for writ of mandamus.").  
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BRYAN, Justice (concurring in the result in part and
dissenting in part).
I concur in the result as to Part A and Part B of the
"Discussion" section of the main opinion.  I dissent as to
Part C for the reasons stated in Justice Shaw's special
writing.
35