Case Title: Osborn v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-12-0042

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
KEVIN W. OSBORN v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2012 WY 159Case Number: S-12-0042; S-12-0116Decided: 12/17/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume. 
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 
2012 
KEVIN W. 
OSBORN,
 
Appellant
(Defendant),
 
v.
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,
 
Appellee
(Plaintiff).
Appeal from the 
District Court of Converse County
The Honorable John C. 
Brooks, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Pro se.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory A. Phillips, 
Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Meri Geringer, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.
 
Before KITE, 
C.J., and GOLDEN,* HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
*Justice Golden 
retired effective September 30, 2012.
 
BURKE, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]        
Appellant’s current 
appeal relates to his convictions and sentences for several serious crimes 
committed in 1982.  In 2012, the district court granted a 
motion by Appellant to correct an illegal sentence, but Appellant claims on 
appeal that the district court violated his right to be present when the 
sentence was corrected.1  He also 
challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his previous 
guilty pleas.  We will affirm the district court’s 
rulings.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      
Appellant states 
these issues, slightly reworded:
 
1.            
Did the trial court 
violate Appellant’s state and federal constitutional rights by sentencing him 
in absentia?
 
2.            
Did the trial court 
err by modifying Appellant’s sentence without allowing him to withdraw his 
plea?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]        
In 1982, Appellant 
pled guilty to, and was convicted of, aiding and abetting first degree murder, 
attempted first degree murder, and aggravated robbery, for crimes he committed 
in Sweetwater County, Wyoming.  He received two life sentences 
on the first two crimes, and 45-50 years on the third, all to be served 
consecutively.  He also pled guilty to, and was convicted of, 
aggravated robbery, conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, and felony murder, 
for crimes he committed in Uinta County, Wyoming.  He was 
sentenced to 45-50 years for each of the first two crimes, to be served 
concurrently with each other, but consecutive to the sentences for the 
Sweetwater crimes.  On the felony murder charge, Appellant was 
sentenced to death.  The convictions and sentences were 
affirmed on appeal.  Osborn v. State, 
672 P.2d 777, 779-81 (Wyo. 1983).  
 
[¶4]        
In habeas corpus 
proceedings in federal court, the Uinta County convictions and sentences were 
set aside.  Osborn v. Schillinger, 639 F. Supp. 610 (D. Wyo. 1986), aff’d 861 F.2d 612 
(10th Cir. 1988).  The charges were brought again 
in state court.  Appellant pled guilty in order to avoid the 
death penalty.  He was sentenced to life for felony murder, 
45-50 years for aggravated robbery, and 45-50 years for conspiracy to commit 
aggravated robbery.  The new sentences were to be served 
concurrently with each other, and concurrently with the sentences previously 
entered for the Sweetwater County crimes.  
 
[¶5]        
In subsequent habeas 
corpus proceedings, the federal court reversed the Sweetwater County convictions 
as well.  See Osborn v. Shillinger, 803 F. Supp. 371, 372-73 (D. Wyo. 1992).  These charges were also brought 
again in state court, and the prosecution filed notice of its intention to seek 
the death penalty.  Appellant initially pled not guilty, but 
on the third day of trial, pled guilty in order to avoid the death 
penalty.  He was given two life sentences on the murder 
charges and 22-25 years on the aggravated robbery charge, all to be served 
consecutively to each other and consecutively to the sentences in the Uinta 
County crimes.  On appeal, the new Sweetwater 
convictions and sentences were affirmed.  Osborn v. 
State, 806 P.2d 259, 260-62 (Wyo. 1991).
 
[¶6]        
In the spring of 
2011, having served nearly thirty years in prison, Appellant filed a Motion to 
Correct an Illegal Sentence.  He pointed out that, after he 
was originally sentenced in 1982, but before he was resentenced in 1989, the 
aggravated robbery statute was amended to reduce the maximum 
penalty.  Compare 1982 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 75, 
§ 3, at 533 (5-50 years for aggravated robbery) with 1983 Wyo. Sess. 
Laws ch. 171, § 1, at 552 (5-25 years for aggravated robbery). 
 Appellant claimed that the amended statute applied 
retroactively, relying on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-101(c), which provides 
that, “In a case pending on or after the effective date of this act, involving a 
crime committed prior to the effective date, if the penalty under this act for 
the crime is different from the penalty under prior law, the court shall impose 
the lesser sentence.”  Appellant committed the crimes in 1982, 
prior to the 1983 effective date of the act.  See 1983 
Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 171, § 8, at 584.  On 
this basis, he argued that his 45-50 year sentence was illegal because it 
exceeded the new statutory maximum.
 
[¶7]        
The district court 
granted the motion and reduced his sentence on the Uinta County aggravated 
robbery charge to 22-25 years.  That ruling is not at issue in 
this appeal.  Nevertheless, Appellant complains that he was 
denied the right to be present at the hearing in which the district court 
considered the motion and reduced his sentence.  He also 
claims that the district court erred because it modified his sentence without 
allowing him to withdraw the guilty plea.
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW
 
[¶8]        
In his first issue, 
Appellant contends that the district court violated his constitutional rights to 
be present at sentencing.  Claims of a constitutional nature 
are reviewed de novo.  Remmick v. 
State, 2012 WY 57, ¶ 15, 275 P.3d 467, 470 (Wyo. 
2012).
 
[¶9]        
In his second issue, 
Appellant claims that he should have been allowed to withdraw his previous 
guilty pleas.  W.R.Cr.P. 32(d) states that, after 
sentencing, a guilty plea “may be set aside only to 
correct manifest injustice.”  The district court has 
discretion in determining whether a defendant has demonstrated manifest 
injustice, and absent abuse of that discretion, we will not disturb the district 
court’s ruling.  State v. McDermott, 
962 P.2d 136, 138 (Wyo. 1998).  However, 
Appellant’s argument in this case rests to an extent on a claim that the State 
breached the plea agreement.  “Whether a breach of a plea 
agreement has occurred is a question of law that we review de 
novo.”  Duke v. State, 2009 WY 74, ¶ 9, 
209 P.3d 563, 567 (Wyo. 2009).
 
DISCUSSION
 
First 
Issue:  Appellant’s right to be present for 
resentencing
 
[¶10]     
Appellant contends 
that, when the district court granted his motion to correct the illegal 
sentence, he had the right to be present for resentencing.  He 
claims that right under state law, citing Abeyta v. 
State, 2003 WY 136, ¶ 24, 78 P.3d 664, 670 
(Wyo. 2003) (Recognizing the right “to be present during every stage of 
the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome.”).  
He also claims that right under federal law, citing United States v. 
Behrens, 375 U.S. 162, 
167, 84 S. Ct. 295, 298, 11 L. Ed. 2d 224 (U.S. 1963) (Harlan, 
J., concurring) (“[T]he requirements of criminal justice . . . leave no 
doubt of [a defendant’s] right to be present when a final determination of 
sentence is made.”).
 
[¶11]     
In deciding that 
Appellant did not have the right to be present, the district court quoted 
W.R.Cr.P. 43:
 
(a)          
 Presence 
required. — The defendant shall be present at the initial appearance at the 
arraignment, at the time of the plea, at every stage of the trial including the 
impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of 
sentence, except as otherwise provided by this rule. 
 
. . .
 
(c)          
Presence not 
required. — A defendant need 
not be present in the following situations:  
 
. . .
 
(4)       
At a reduction of sentence under Rule 35.
 
To similar effect, 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-202 (LexisNexis 2011) provides that a “defendant’s 
presence is not required at a reduction of sentence hearing.”  
The district court then provided the following explanation:
 
The Court finds 
Osborn’s presence in Wyoming for a hearing at this stage of the proceedings is 
not critical.  The Court notes that Osborn’s Motion can 
hardly be meaningful, except as an academic or procedural exercise.  
Mr. Osborn faces three consecutive life sentences for crimes he committed 
nearly thirty years ago.  Osborn’s Rule 35 motion, though 
granted, will have no effect on the ultimate length of his sentence.  
For that reason, . . . the Court finds it proper to correct the sentence 
without transporting Mr. Osborn from Florida to Wyoming for a 
hearing.  The Court finds that such a hearing is 
unnecessary.  The Court concludes Mr. Osborn’s presence at a 
hearing in Wyoming is not required under W.R.Cr.P. 43(c)(4) for the 
purposes of this Motion.
 
 (Italics 
in original; internal citation omitted.)
 
[¶12]     
Appellant concedes 
that, under W.R.Cr.P. 43(c)(4), the rule relied upon by the district 
court, a defendant need not be present for “a reduction of sentence under 
Rule 35.”  He points out, however, that W.R.Cr.P. 
35 provides for two distinct types of motions, one for correction of a sentence 
under Rule 35(a), and another for reduction of a sentence under Rule 
35(b).  Appellant’s motion was not for a reduction of sentence 
under Rule 35(b), but for the correction of an illegal sentence under Rule 
35(a).  He insists that the exception set forth in 
W.R.Cr.P. 43(c)(4) does not apply to his motion to correct a sentence, 
and accordingly, that he was entitled to be present when the district court 
corrected his sentence.  Appellant supports his position by 
quoting the federal case of United States v. Moree, 
928 F.2d 654, 656 (5th Cir. 1991):
 
We therefore hold 
that a Rule 35(a) proceeding to “correct” a sentence on remand is not a 
“reduction in sentence” under Rule 43(c)(4) when the court of appeals has 
vacated the defendant’s original sentence.  The defendant’s 
rights to be present and to allocute under Rules 32(a)(1) and 43(a) 
thus obtain.
 
[¶13]     
The State asserts 
that Appellant interprets this decision too broadly, pointing out 
that Moree cites and relies upon United States v. 
Jackson, 923 F.2d 1494, 1497 (11th Cir. 1991), which 
held that “where the entire sentencing package has not been set aside, a 
correction of an illegal sentence does not constitute a resentencing requiring 
the presence of the defendant, so long as the modification does not make the 
sentence more onerous.”  The rule set forth in Jackson 
appears to be widely applied by federal courts.  See 
27-643 Moore’s Federal Practice – Criminal Procedure 
§ 643.07; 3B Charles A. Wright, Nancy J. King, and Susan R. 
Klein, Federal Practice and Procedure:  
Criminal 3d § 722, at 24 (2004).  
In this case, Appellant’s entire sentencing package was not set aside, 
and granting his motion to correct the sentence does not make his sentence more 
onerous.  Applying the rule set forth in Jackson, the 
State contends that Appellant had no right to be present under the federal 
constitution, and urges us to reach the same conclusion under our state 
constitution.
 
[¶14]     
Appellant’s position 
and the State’s may both have merit, but it is unnecessary for us to choose 
between them.  Regardless of how W.R.Cr.P. 43(c)(4) is 
interpreted, under the circumstances presented here, Appellant had no 
constitutional right to be present when the district court corrected his 
sentence. 
 
[¶15]     
As noted previously, 
a defendant has the right “to be present during every stage of the criminal 
proceeding that is critical to its outcome.”  
Abeyta, ¶ 24, 78 P.3d  at 670 
(emphasis added).  Conversely, however, a defendant 
does not necessarily have the right to be present during stages of the 
proceeding not critical to its outcome.  As we have 
explained,
 
The Sixth Amendment 
and the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States are held to guarantee an accused the right to 
be present during every stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its 
outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the 
procedure.  Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 
745, 107 S. Ct. 2658, 2667, 96 L.Ed.2d 631(1987); Illinois 
v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 1058, 
25 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1970).  Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 10 
“is even more explicit in its guarantee to an accused of the right of presence 
at trial * * *.”  Maupin v. State, 
694 P.2d 720, 722 (Wyo. 1985). 
 
. . .  

 
However, the due 
process right to be present is not unequivocal.  The 
defendant’s presence is not required when it “would be useless, or the benefit 
but a shadow.”  Snyder v. Com. of Mass., 291 U.S. 97, 106-07, 54 S. Ct. 330, [332], 78 L. Ed. 674 
(1934).
 
Seeley v. 
State, 
959 P.2d 170, 177 (Wyo. 1998) (emphasis added).
 
[¶16]     
In this case, 
Appellant’s presence when the district court corrected his sentence would have 
been useless.  Appellant has already been imprisoned for at 
least thirty years, serving concurrent sentences for his Uinta County 
convictions.2  The district 
court granted a motion to correct his sentence for aggravated robbery, and 
imposed a corrected sentence of 22-25 years, 25 years being the statutory 
maximum.  The district court then noted that Appellant “has 
been held continuously on this charge since his arrest.”  The 
exact date of Appellant’s arrest is not apparent from the portion of the record 
before us now, but his arraignment occurred on August 23, 1982, Osborn, 
672 P.2d  at 784, so he has been serving at least thirty years on 
this sentence.  Considering the time Appellant has served, the 
district court granted Appellant “credit for twenty-five (25) years served on 
this [sentence] against both the bottom and top number of his modified 
sentence.”  Thus, Appellant has already completed his 22-25 
year sentence for the crime of aggravated robbery.
 
[¶17]     
Because Appellant has 
already completed the statutory maximum sentence for this crime, it could make 
no possible difference whether the district court imposed the maximum sentence 
or a lesser sentence.  Even assuming that Appellant’s presence 
might have influenced the district court’s decision on the corrected sentence, 
he has already served that sentence, and his presence could not change the 
amount of time he will serve.  As we previously observed, 
Appellant was sentenced to three consecutive life terms plus many years, and 
regardless of the district court’s decision in correcting his sentence for 
aggravated robbery, Appellant must still “expect to spend the rest of his life 
in Wyoming penal confinement.”  Osborn, 
806 P.2d  at 262.  Under these circumstances, 
Appellant’s presence could not have been of any possible use, and the district 
court did not err in ruling that Appellant did not have the constitutional right 
to be present at this stage of the proceedings.
 
Second 
Issue:  Denial of Appellant’s motion to withdraw guilty 
pleas
 
[¶18]     
In his second issue, 
Appellant re-emphasizes that his 1989 aggravated robbery sentence was illegal 
because it was longer than the statutory maximum.  He points 
out that he, therefore, pled guilty to an illegal sentence.  
He argues that “a defendant cannot bargain for an illegal 
sentence.”  See, e.g., Baker v. 
Barbo, 177 F.3d 149, 155 (3rd Cir. 
1999).  He maintains that he is therefore entitled to withdraw 
his guilty plea.
 
Even when a 
defendant, prosecutor, and court agree on a sentence, the court cannot give the 
sentence effect if it is not authorized by law.  Thus, when a 
defendant has entered a plea bargain contemplating an illegal sentence, the 
defendant is generally entitled to withdraw the guilty plea. 
 Smith v. United States, 321 F.2d 954, 
955-56 (9th Cir. 1963).  Because the plea bargain is based on 
a promise the trial court lacks authority to fulfill, and the defendant was 
induced to plead guilty by that promise, plea withdrawal is necessary to return 
the parties to their initial positions.  See Brady v. 
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747, 90 S. Ct. 1463 (1970).
 
United States v. 
Greatwalker, 
285 F.3d 727, 730 (8th Cir. 2002).
 
[¶19]     
Appellant’s reliance 
on Greatwalker is misplaced.  In 
that case, the defendant was convicted of a crime for which the minimum sentence 
was life in prison.  He agreed to a plea bargain for a 
thirty-five year sentence, which the trial court imposed.  
When the sentence was declared illegal, the defendant became eligible to 
withdraw his guilty plea, because he then faced a sentence longer than he had 
agreed to in the plea bargain.  As 
the Greatwalker court explained, he was entitled to 
withdraw his plea because the plea was “induced” by the promise of an illegally 
short sentence.  
 
[¶20]     
Appellant is in the 
opposite situation.  He agreed to a sentence that was not 
illegally short, but illegally long.  An assertion that he was 
induced to plead guilty by the promise of a 45-50 year sentence, but would not 
have agreed to a 22-25 year sentence, is not credible.  What 
is plausible, as we have said before, is that he pled guilty “in return for a 
life sentence” instead of a possible death sentence.  
Osborn, 806 P.2d  at 260.
 
[¶21]     
Appellant complains 
that he should have been allowed to withdraw his plea because the State did not 
honor the original 1989 Uinta County plea agreement.  Under 
that agreement, the Uinta County sentences were to be served concurrently with 
the Sweetwater County sentences.  In federal habeas corpus 
proceedings, however, Appellant was successful in challenging the Uinta County 
convictions, and then the Sweetwater County convictions.  
As we explained, 
“with federal court reversal and direction to permit withdrawal of the guilty 
plea . . . the slate was wiped clean so that Osborn could defend 
all charges and the State could pursue conviction on whatever crimes and 
penalties the evidence might sustain.”  Osborn, 
806 P.2d  at 264 (emphasis added). 
 
[¶22]     
After the federal 
court set aside all of his original convictions and sentences, the original plea 
agreements were no longer in effect.  When Appellant reached a 
new plea agreement on the Sweetwater County charges, Appellant’s defense counsel 
expressly confirmed to the district court that “There is no agreement 
as to whether the time will be concurrent or consecutive.”  
Id. at 266 n.8.  Appellant was thereafter 
sentenced to serve the Sweetwater County sentences consecutively to the Uinta 
County sentences.  Appellant’s attempt to revive the 
original 
plea agreements at this late date is unavailing.  The district 
court did not err in refusing to allow Appellant to withdraw his guilty 
pleas.
 
[¶23]     
The district court’s 
decision is affirmed.
 
[¶24]     
FOOTNOTES
1Appellant filed 
an appeal from the district court’s order granting his motion to correct an 
illegal sentence, and a separate appeal from the order correcting his 
sentence.  The two have been consolidated.
2Again, 
Appellant’s sentences for the Uinta County crimes were concurrent terms of life 
for felony murder, 45-50 years for aggravated robbery, and 45-50 years for 
conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery.  Appellant’s 
sentences for the Sweetwater County crimes were two life terms plus 22-25 years, 
all to be served consecutively to each other and consecutively to the 
sentences in the Uinta County crimes.  Osborn, 
803 F. Supp.  at 372-73.  Because Appellant has not completed 
his life sentence for the Uinta County felony murder, he has not yet begun to 
serve his sentences for the Sweetwater County crimes, and all time served to 
date is under the Uinta County sentences.