Case Title: Boatmen's Nat'l Bank v. Cole

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-06-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
BOATMEN'S NATIONAL BANK of Arkansas v. Hon.
John COLE, Judge, et al.

96-887                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                 Opinion delivered June 23, 1997


1.   Prohibition, writ of -- when issued. -- A writ of prohibition will
     issue only when the trial court completely lacks jurisdiction
     and there is no other way to stop the proceedings.

2.   Prohibition, writ of -- improper assertion of personal jurisdiction
     justifies issuance. -- While venue is a procedural matter rather
     than an issue of jurisdiction, the supreme court has
     historically issued a writ of prohibition when venue was
     improper with respect to a party; the venue issue is one of
     jurisdiction of the person, the improper assertion of which
     justifies issuance of a writ of prohibition.

3.   Prohibition, writ of -- review confined to pleadings. -- In deciding
     whether prohibition will lie, the supreme court confines its
     review to the pleadings.

4.   Venue -- co-defendants -- joint liability required with resident defendant.
     -- While Ark. Code Ann.  16-60-116(a) (1987) provides that an
     action may be brought in any county in which the defendant, or
     one of several defendants, resides or is summoned, when venue
     is appropriate as to one defendant, then it is only proper as
     to co-defendants who are jointly liable with the resident
     defendant.
5.   Torts -- joint and several liability -- determined by impact. -- Arkansas
     has long since abolished the requirement that joint
     tortfeasors act in concert to result in joint and several
     liability; rather, joint and several liability is determined
     by impact; where there is a single injury, it is irrelevant
     that the acts of the individual defendants would not have
     caused the ultimate result; where concurrent negligent acts
     result in a single injury, each tortfeasor is jointly and
     severally liable, and a plaintiff can institute an action
     against any or all tortfeasors, individually or jointly.

6.   Torts -- joint and several liability -- jury may apportion fault. --
     Arkansas Code Ann.  16-61-202(4) (1987) provides for the
     consideration of the "relative degrees of fault" of joint
     tortfeasors where an equal distribution would be inequitable;
     therefore, when the jury is faced with joint tortfeasors
     liable in different degrees of fault, it may apportion fault
     accordingly.

7.   Prohibition, writ of -- complaint alleged joint liability -- venue proper
     as to petitioner in respondent court. -- The supreme court concluded
     that the fact that petitioner bank and respondent
     corporation's former chief financial officer were allegedly
     liable on different theories of tort recovery did not preclude
     a finding of joint liability in tort because their negligent
     and intentional acts allegedly combined to produce a single
     injury; based on the alleged facts, the supreme court found
     that respondent corporation's complaint alleged joint
     liability as between petitioner bank and respondent
     corporation's former chief financial officer, held that venue
     was proper as to petitioner bank in respondent court under
     Ark. Code Ann.  16-60-116(a) (1987), and denied the writ of
     prohibition.


     Petition for Writ of Prohibition from the Saline Circuit
Court; John W. Cole, Judge; denied.
     Allen Law Firm, by: H. William Allen, for petitioner.
     Morgan Welch & Associates, by: Donald K. Campbell, III, for
respondents.

     Annabelle Clinton Imber, Justice.
     Pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(a)(6), Petitioner Boatmen's
National Bank of Arkansas, Inc., has filed a petition for a writ of
prohibition alleging that venue for the underlying action does not
lie in the Saline County circuit court.  We deny the writ for the
reasons stated below.
     Respondent Fleming Electric, Inc., filed a complaint and an
amended complaint in Saline County circuit court, substantially
alleging as follows.  Fleming, an Arkansas corporation located in
Saline County, established a number of checking accounts at various
times with Worthen National Bank of Arkansas (and therefore its
successor in interest, Boatmen's).  In 1990, Fleming hired
Respondent Alicia Ives, a resident of Saline County, to handle its
accounts payable.  In 1992, Ives was designated as Fleming's chief
financial officer.  Fleming notified Boatmen's that Ives had
authority to request information concerning Fleming's accounts.
     Beginning in August of 1994, Ives allegedly presented a
Fleming check to Boatmen's, payable to Respondent L.C. Brock and
bearing the forged signature of C. Ann Fleming, Fleming's president
and chief executive officer.  Boatmen's paid the $3,258.00 check
despite having the actual signature of C. Ann Fleming on file. 
This check represented the first in a continuing course of alleged
check forgeries that would continue through July of 1995.  In
September of 1994, Ives presented Boatmen's with a letter bearing
C. Ann Fleming's forged signature, purporting to give Ives
unlimited authority over all Fleming accounts.  Fleming alleges
that Boatmen's had a duty to inquire to C. Ann or Loren Fleming in
an attempt to confirm the letter, which it failed to do.  Following
September 1, 1994, Fleming alleges numerous instances where Ives
forged the signature of C. Ann Fleming on Fleming checks, causing
Boatmen's to debit various Fleming accounts and to make various
deposits or transfers into accounts not owned by Fleming. 
Boatmen's allegedly paid these checks "despite the forged signature
and despite the fact that the actual (and distinctly different)
signature of C. Ann Fleming was on file with [Boatmen's] at the
time."  Some of the checks bearing the forged signatures were
payable to Brock while others were payable to corporations,
partnerships, or proprietorships owned by Ives and/or Respondent
Matthew Carman, a resident of Pulaski County.  
     Ives also allegedly made various transfers and deposits into
a "forged" Fleming checking account that Ives created at Boatmen's
without authorization.  At the time Ives opened this account,
Fleming alleges that Boatmen's did not require any corporate
resolution authorizing its creation.  After the creation of the
forged Fleming account, Ives orally transferred funds from
legitimate Fleming accounts into the forged Fleming account.  
     Ives eventually presented Boatmen's with a forged Fleming
resolution bearing Ives's signature and the forged signature of C.
Ann Fleming, purporting to authorize the creation of the forged
Fleming checking account.  Fleming further alleges that at various
times Ives orally requested that Boatmen's transfer Fleming funds
into the forged Fleming checking account, and that Boatmen's also
allowed Ives to orally transfer funds from the forged account into
accounts owned by entities other than Fleming.  Fleming also
contends that Boatmen's permitted the placement of Fleming deposits
in the forged account, despite its knowledge that Fleming normally
placed its deposits into a designated "deposit" account.  Ives
additionally drew several checks on the forged Fleming account
using the forged signature of C. Ann Fleming.  These checks were
made payable to L.C. Brock and various entities owned by Ives and
Carman.
     Fleming's amended complaint alleges causes of action against
Boatmen's for negligence, conversion, breach of contract, breach of
warranty, breach of fiduciary duty, and constructive fraud.  On the
negligence count, Fleming specifically alleges that Boatmen's
improperly disbursed funds credited to or payable to Fleming, and
that it failed to act with due care in debiting and failing to
credit Fleming's account.  Fleming also sued Ives for conversion,
breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of warranty.   The complaint
contains an allegation that the defendants should be held jointly
and severally liable.
     Boatmen's, a resident of Pulaski County, moved to dismiss the
complaint for lack of venue.  The trial court denied this motion,
finding that venue was proper "due to the simultaneous or
`successive' tortious conduct of the various defendants in this
suit which resulted in a single injury to [Fleming.]"  The trial
court also found that Fleming's "well-pleaded" claim of
constructive fraud against Boatmen's established venue.  Boatmen's
now seeks a writ of prohibition from this court, arguing that venue
does not lie with the Saline County circuit court.  
     We have often stated that a writ of prohibition will issue
only when the trial court completely lacks jurisdiction and there
is no other way to stop the proceedings.  See, e.g., Ford v.
Wilson, 327 Ark. 243, 939 S.W.2d 258 (1997); Nucor Holding Corp. v.
Rinkines, 326 Ark. 217, 931 S.W.2d 426 (1996).  While venue is a
procedural matter, rather than an issue of jurisdiction, this court
has historically issued the writ when venue is improper as to a
party.  See Steve Standridge Ins., Inc. v. Langston, 321 Ark. 331,