Case Title: KARIE L. NOONAN, n/k/a KARIE L. ANDERSON V. ROBERT CHRISTIAN NOONAN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 05-27

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-11-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
KARIE L. NOONAN, n/k/a KARIE L. ANDERSON V. ROBERT CHRISTIAN NOONAN2005 WY 145122 P.3d 964Case Number: 05-27Decided: 11/22/2005
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
KARIE L. 
NOONAN, n/k/a

KARIE L. 
ANDERSON,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
ROBERT 
CHRISTIAN NOONAN,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

 
 

            
Tom 
Sutherland, Casper, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

 
 

            
Richard 
L. Harden, Casper, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Karie Noonan (the 
Wife) appeals the district court's denial of her motion to vacate and set aside 
a default divorce decree granted to Robert Noonan (the Husband).  The divorce decree awarded the couple 
joint legal and split physical custody of their two children, established a 
detailed visitation schedule, and ordered the Husband to pay child support to 
the Wife.  The divorce decree was 
entered without a hearing and without any other evidentiary basis, and in the 
absence of the financial affidavits required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-308(a) 
(LexisNexis 2005).  We affirm in 
part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Did the district 
court abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the default divorce 
decree?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The Husband and 
the Wife married either on December 31, 1989 or November 12, 1994.1  Their union bore two children: one born 
in 1994, and another in 2000.  On 
July 1, 2004, the Husband filed a complaint seeking a divorce, a property 
distribution, split legal and physical custody of the children, and a child 
support determination.  The Wife was 
served with a copy of the complaint on July 16, 2004, but failed to appear or 
answer.  The Husband filed an 
affidavit for entry of default on August 6, 2004, and the clerk of court entered 
default on that same day.  A default 
divorce decree was entered on September 24, 2004, granting the divorce, dividing 
the couple's property, awarding joint legal but split physical custody of the 
children, detailing visitation, and ordering the Husband to pay monthly child 
support of $295.00.  The divorce 
decree was entered without a hearing, the only evidentiary support for the 
divorce decree being the Husband's brief affidavit estimating the parties' 
respective income.

 
 
[¶4]      On October 29, 
2004, the Wife moved to vacate the divorce decree pursuant to W.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) 
and (6).  The Wife argued that the 
divorce decree was procedurally flawed and that it deprived her of the 
fundamental right to associate with her children without due process of 
law.  The Wife later supplemented 
her motion and claimed that the divorce decree was unworkable because a mutual 
protection order prevented the parties from communicating to arrange visitation 
with the children.  After a hearing, 
the motion was denied.  This appeal 
followed.  

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶5]      The Wife 
challenged the default divorce decree under W.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) and (6).2  That rule reads, in pertinent part, as 
follows:

 
 
On 
motion, and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a 
party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons: . . . (4) the judgment is void; . . . or (6) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.

 
 

[¶6]      We have said that 
granting relief under W.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) is a matter best left to the sound 
discretion of the trial court.  MAM v. State Dept. of Family Services, 
2004 WY 127, ¶¶ 10-11, 99 P.3d 982, 984-85 (Wyo. 2004).  Under that rule, we will reverse the 
trial court for an abuse of discretion only in special situations justifying 
extraordinary relief and upon a showing of exceptional circumstances.  Id.  
Our standard for the review of discretionary decisions has been 
stated many times and will not be repeated here.  See, for example, Produit v. Produit, 
2001 WY 123, ¶ 9, 35 P.3d 1240, 1242-43 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]      The motion to set 
aside the default divorce decree should have been granted, for several reasons, 
beginning with this pertinent language from W.R.C.P. 
55(b)(2):

 
 
If, in 
order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is 
necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to 
establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of 
any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such references 
as it deems necessary and proper . . ..

 
 

The 
clear import of this language, in the context of the present case, is to require 
the district court to base its findings of fact regarding property distribution, 
child custody, visitation, and support on some evidence in the record.  An entry of default prevents the 
defaulted party from appearing and presenting evidence; it does not relieve the 
non-defaulting party of its obligation to produce an evidentiary basis for the 
desired relief, nor does it relieve the district court of its obligation to base 
its findings of fact upon such evidence.  
Spitzer v. Spitzer, 777 P.2d 587, 592-93 (Wyo. 1989).

 
 
[¶8]      Another reason 
that the motion to set aside the default divorce decree should have been granted 
is the failure of the district court to comply with the dictates of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 20-2-308(a), which provides as follows:

 
 
            
No order establishing or modifying a child support obligation shall be 
entered unless financial affidavits on a form approved by the Wyoming supreme court 
which fully discloses the financial status of the parties have been filed, or 
the court has held a hearing and testimony has been 
received.

 
 
While we 
understand that, in a default situation, it may be difficult or even impossible 
to obtain the financial affidavit of the defaulted party, the obligation remains 
for the non-defaulting party to file such affidavit, and the obligation remains 
for the district court to obtain sufficient financial evidence of both parties' 
income to make factual determinations, and to comply with the presumptive child 
support guidelines found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-304 (LexisNexis 2005), or to 
determine whether to deviate from those guidelines, as allowed by Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 20-2-307 (Lexis Nexis 2005).  
That did not happen in this case.

 
 
[¶9]      Just as the 
legislature has required the district courts to abide by these statutes in 
determining child support, so has it mandated that child custody decisions be 
based upon the best interests of the children, with consideration given to 
specific statutory factors.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a) 
(LexisNexis 2005) ("the court shall consider . . . the following factors . . 
..").  Child custody and visitation 
orders, even in the default situation, may not be entered without consideration 
of these factors.  That did not 
happen in this case.

 
 
[¶10]   And finally, we have established a 
special rule for cases where the district court orders split custody of the 
parties' children:

 
 
            
As future guidance to the trial courts, we hold that, when the exercise 
of its discretion in custody matters involves splitting custody of children 
between parents or other unconventional custody approaches, the trial court must 
provide an explanation of its reasoning and place its findings on the 
record.  A reasoned explanation and 
an expression of findings of a trial court's conclusion will assure this court 
that a comprehensive evaluation of all relevant factors occurred prior to the 
award of custody.

 
 

Pace v. 
Pace, 2001 WY 
43, ¶ 17, 22 P.3d 861, 867 (Wyo. 2001).  This rule exists

 
 
because 
close familial relationships are much to be encouraged, brothers and sisters 
need each other's strengths and association in those everyday and often common 
experiences; separating them unnecessarily is likely to be traumatic and 
harmful.  In addition, brothers and 
sisters may particularly need each other's support to cope with the strain of 
their parents' divorce.

 
 

Aragon v. 
Aragon, 2005 WY 
5, ¶ 26, 104 P.3d 756, 764 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 

[¶11]   This case presents an evidentiary 
inadequacy one step beyond Pace.  In that case, the district court 
failed to place the reasons for its decision on the record.  Pace, 2001 WY 43, ¶ 12, 22 P.3d  at 
865.  Here, not only were the district court's 
findings inadequate, there was almost no evidence before the district court.3  Based on this scant evidence, the 
district court made a finding of fact that:

 
 
Both 
parties are fit and proper persons to be awarded custody of the minor children 
and they should be awarded the joint legal custody of them, and that it would be 
in the best interests of the children to award the primary physical custody of 
[the older child] to [Husband], and to award the primary physical custody of 
[the younger child] to [Wife] subject to the reasonable visitation rights of the 
parties upon reasonable notice.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶12]   The default judgment in this case 
is vacated, with the exception of that portion of the judgment granting a 
divorce to the parties.  There was 
no evidentiary basis for the district court's findings of fact in regard to 
property distribution, child custody and visitation, and child support.  The denial of the motion to set aside 
the default divorce decree is reversed to that extent and this matter is 
remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent 
herewith.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 
  1The Husband's complaint alleges the 
1994 date, while the divorce decree states the 1989 date.

 
 
  2W.R.C.P. 55(c) provides that a 
default judgment may be set aside "in accordance with Rule 
60(b)."

 
 
  3The only evidence before the 
district court was an affidavit which stated the Husband's net monthly pay and 
asked that $750.00 per month be imputed as the Wife's monthly income for child 
support calculations.