Case Title: CHEYENNE NEWSPAPERS, INC., a Wyoming corporation V. BUILDING CODE BOARD OF APPEALS of the CITY OF CHEYENNE

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0103

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-01-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
CHEYENNE NEWSPAPERS, INC., a Wyoming corporation V. BUILDING CODE BOARD OF APPEALS of the CITY OF CHEYENNE2010 WY 2222 P.3d 158Case Number: S-09-0103Decided: 01/08/2010
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
CHEYENNE 
NEWSPAPERS, INC., a Wyoming 
corporation,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.BUILDING CODE 
BOARD OF APPEALS of the CITY OF 
CHEYENNE,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Bruce 
T. Moats of Law Office of Bruce T. Moats, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Kate 
M. Fox of Davis & Cannon, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming. 

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, 
C.J., delivers 
the opinion of the Court; 
KITE, J., 
files a specially concurring opinion in which HILL, 
J., joins; 
BURKE, J., files 
a concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      
Cheyenne 
Newspapers, Inc. (the Newspaper), appeals from a summary judgment granted by the 
district court in favor of the Building Code Board of Appeals of the City of 
Cheyenne (the Board), declaring that certain Board action did not violate the 
Wyoming Public Meetings Act, and that such action, therefore, was not null and 
void.  We affirm in part and reverse 
in part.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      1.    Are quasi-judicial 
deliberations following a contested case hearing under the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedures Act (WAPA) subject to the Wyoming Public Meetings Act 
(the Act)?

 
 
            
2.    Did the Board 
take any action that must be considered null and void when it met in private to 
deliberate on a contested case hearing and then voted on its decision in a 
public meeting?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The Board was 
created by an ordinance of the City of Cheyenne, a municipality duly 
incorporated by the State of Wyoming.  
Board procedures are governed by rules promulgated in 1997.  In 2008, the City of Cheyenne's Historic 
Preservation Board denied permits to demolish six houses in an historic 
district.  The homeowners appealed 
to the Board.  The Board conducted a 
public contested case hearing on June 27, 2008, during which hearing the parties 
were represented by counsel, witnesses were heard, and exhibits presented.  At the close of the hearing, the Board 
retired to deliberate in private.  
These private deliberations, which the Board characterized as 
"quasi-judicial" rather than "executive session," extended into a meeting on 
July 2, 2008.  The Board then 
convened a public meeting on July 14, 2008, during which it discussed its prior 
deliberations and then voted to adopt a draft decision affirming the denial of 
the demolition permits.

 
 
[¶4]      On July 8, 2008, 
the Newspaper filed in the district court a Petition for Injunction, seeking an 
order prohibiting the Board from entering a decision prior to deliberating in a 
public meeting.  Because the Board 
issued its decision before the Newspaper's petition was heard, the Newspaper on 
July 16, 2008 filed an Amended Complaint, seeking instead an order declaring the 
Board's action to be "null and void as not in conformance with the Wyoming 
[Public] Meetings Act."

 
 
[¶5]      Both parties 
filed in the district court motions for summary judgment, which motions were 
heard upon their additional filing of a Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts. 
 The district court determined that 
the Newspaper had standing to pursue the action, thatthe Act did not apply to 
quasi-judicial deliberations after a contested case hearing pursuant to the 
WAPA, and that the Board's action was, therefore, not null and void.  Summary judgment was granted to the 
Board, which led to the instant appeal.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶6]      
Before 
we discuss the substantive issues in the case, we must very briefly address the 
jurisdictional standing issue mentioned by the Newspaper, although not 
challenged by the Board.  We will 
note simply that we are satisfied that the Newspaper has standing to seek a 
declaration from the courts that the public, and the media as the public's 
representative, have standing under our precedent to determine the applicability 
of the Act under these circumstances.  
See Jolley v. State Loan & 
Inv. Bd., 2002 WY 7, ¶¶ 6-10, 38 P.3d 1073, 1076-79 (Wyo. 2002); Mgmt. Council of the Wyo. Legislature v. 
Geringer, 953 P.2d 839, 841-42 (Wyo. 1998); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. One v. 
Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 316-18 (Wyo. 1980).  In particular, Sheridan Newspapers, Inc. v. City of 
Sheridan, 660 P.2d 785, 791-95 (Wyo. 1983), recognizes that the public has 
the right to know what its government is doing, and that members of the "press 
are the eyes and ears of the people."  
Id. at 
791.

 
 
[¶7]      Although it is 
not affirmatively identified as such, the Newspaper's Amended Complaint is of 
the nature of a declaratory judgment action brought pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-37-103 (LexisNexis 2009), which reads as follows:

 
 
            
Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other 
writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal 
relations are affected by the Wyoming constitution or by a statute, municipal 
ordinance, contract or franchise, may have any question of construction or 
validity arising under the instrument determined and obtain a declaration of 
rights, status or other legal relations.

 
 
[¶8]      We have held that 
summary judgment may be an appropriate resolution of a declaratory judgment 
action.  Coffinberry v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of 
County of Hot Springs, 2008 WY 110, ¶ 3, 192 P.3d 978, 979 (Wyo. 2008).  Our standard for reviewing a summary 
judgment granted in a declaratory judgment action is as 
follows:

 
 
            
We review a grant of summary judgment entered in response to a petition 
for declaratory judgment de 
novo.  Wyo. Cmty. Coll. Comm'n v. Casper Cmty. 
Coll. Dist., 2001 WY 86, ¶ 11, 31 P.3d 1242, 1247 (Wyo. 2001).  "We accord no deference to the district 
court on issues of law and may affirm the summary judgment on any legal grounds 
appearing in the record."  Id.  "The summary judgment can be sustained 
only when no genuine issues of material fact are present and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  
Id.

 
 

Voss 
v. Goodman, 
2009 WY 40, ¶ 9, 203 P.3d 415, 419 (Wyo. 2009).

 
 
[¶9]      The question 
presented to the Court is one of statutory construction.  The rules for that process are well 
established:

 
 
In 
interpreting statutes, our primary consideration is to determine the 
legislature's intent.  All statutes 
must be construed in pari materia 
and, in ascertaining the meaning of a given law, all statutes relating to the 
same subject or having the same general purpose must be considered and construed 
in harmony.  Statutory construction 
is a question of law, so our standard of review is de novo.  We endeavor to interpret statutes in 
accordance with the legislature's intent.  
We begin by making an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning 
of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection.  We construe the statute as a whole, 
giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe all parts of 
the statute in pari materia.  When a statute is sufficiently clear and 
unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and 
do not resort to the rules of statutory construction.  Moreover, we must not give a statute a 
meaning that will nullify its operation if it is susceptible of another 
interpretation.

 
 
            
Moreover, we will not enlarge, stretch, expand, or extend a statute to 
matters that do not fall within its express provisions.

 
 
            
Only if we determine the language of a statute is ambiguous will we 
proceed to the next step, which involves applying general principles of 
statutory construction to the language of the statute in order to construe any 
ambiguous language to accurately reflect the intent of the legislature.  If this Court determines that the 
language of the statute is not ambiguous, there is no room for further 
construction.  We will apply the 
language of the statute using its ordinary and obvious 
meaning.

 
 

BP 
Am. Prod. Co. v. Dep't of Revenue, 
2005 WY 60, ¶ 15, 112 P.3d 596, 604 (Wyo. 2005) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted).  We must accept 
statutes as they are written; neither omitting words that are included, nor 
including words that are omitted.  
Id.; Hede v. Gilstrap, 2005 WY 24, ¶ 6, 107 P.3d 158, 163 (Wyo. 2005); Fontaine v. 
Bd. of County Comm'rs of Park County, 4 P.3d 890, 895 (Wyo. 2000); In re Adoption of Voss, 550 P.2d 481, 
485 (Wyo. 1976).

 
 
[¶10]   Whether a statute is ambiguous is a 
question of law for the Court's determination.  Dep't of Revenue & Taxation v. 
Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo. 1994).  A statute is unambiguous if reasonable 
persons are able to agree as to its meaning with consistency and predictability, 
while a statute is ambiguous if it is vague or uncertain and subject to varying 
interpretations.  Id. (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted).  

 
 
[¶11]   The instant case focuses upon the 
language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-403(a) (LexisNexis 2009), which reads as 
follows:

 
 
            
(a)    All meetings 
of the governing body of an agency are public meetings, open to the public at 
all times, except as otherwise provided.  
No action of a governing body of an agency shall be taken except during a 
public meeting following notice of the meeting in accordance with this act.  Action taken at a meeting not in 
conformity with this act is null and void and not merely 
voidable.

 
 
The 
following definitions found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-402(a) (LexisNexis 2009) 
are relevant to the issues presented:

 
 
(a)    As used in this 
act:

 
 
         
(i)      
"Action" means the transaction of official business of an agency 
including a collective decision of a governing body, a collective commitment or 
promise by a governing body to make a positive or negative decision, or an 
actual vote by a governing body upon a motion, proposal, resolution, regulation, 
rule, order or ordinance;

 
 
         
(ii)     
"Agency" means any authority, bureau, board, commission, committee, or 
subagency of the state, a county, a municipality or other political subdivision 
which is created by or pursuant to the Wyoming constitution, statute or 
ordinance, other than the state legislature and the 
judiciary;

 
 
         
(iii)    "Meeting" 
means an assembly of at least a quorum of the governing body of an agency which 
has been called byproper authority of the agency for the purpose of discussion, 
deliberation, presentation of information or taking action regarding public 
business[.]

 
 
[¶12]   The nature of the administrative 
proceedings in this case leads us to single out one other statute that must be 
addressed.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-110 (LexisNexis 2009), which is part of the WAPA, reads as 
follows:

 
 
            
A final decision or order adverse to a party in a contested case shall be 
in writing or dictated into the record.  
The final decision shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law 
separately stated.  Findings of fact 
if set forth in statutory language, shall be accompanied by a concise and 
explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings.  Parties shall be notified either 
personally or by mail of any decision or order.  A copy of the decision and order shall 
be delivered or mailed forthwith to each party or to his attorney of 
record.

 
 
[¶13]   The answer to the first question  
whether the quasi-judicial deliberations following a contested case hearing 
under the WAPA are subject to the Act  can readily be answered by application 
of the rules of statutory construction to the Act.  The starting point, of course, is the 
mandate in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-403(a) that "[a]ll meetings of the governing 
body of an agency are public meetings . . . ."  First, it is logical to ask whether the 
Board is an "agency" under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-402(a)(ii) because, if it is 
not, the Act does not apply.  We 
would be hard-pressed to find any ambiguity in that statutory subsection, and 
equally hard-pressed to say that the Board is not an "agency" under the 
definition.  The Board is a "board' 
created by an ordinance of the City of Cheyenne, which is a municipality.  Next, we should ask whether a "meeting," 
as defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-402(a)(iii), took place.  Once again, the statute is clear, and 
there is no factual dispute; the Board met to discuss and deliberate the appeal 
from the action of the City's Historic Preservation Board.  Surely, no one could argue that such was 
not "public business," and there has been no suggestion that fewer than a quorum 
of the members was present.

 
 
[¶14]   The Board attempts to "hang its 
hat," at least in part, on the contention that it is not a "governing body" 
under the Act.  Noting that the 
phrase "governing body" is not defined in the Act, it points out that, under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-101(a)(vi) (LexisNexis 2009), "governing body" is defined 
as "the council or commission constituting the elected legislative body of any 
city or town including the mayor who is the presiding officer."  The Board also directs the Court to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-10-201(b) (LexisNexis 2009), where "governing body" is defined 
as the city council or the board of county commissioners.  We find these statutory references to be 
unhelpful, at best, and misleading, at worst.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-101(a)(vi) defines 
the phrase solely for the purposes of Title 15, which contains the statutory 
authority for cities and towns in Wyoming.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-10-201(b) defines the phrase solely for the purposes 
of Article 2 of Title 35, which provides for the regulation of fireworks.1

 
 
[¶15]   Generally speaking, a "governing 
body" is the "group . . . having ultimate control."  Black's Law Dictionary 764 (9th ed. 
2009).  In the instant case, the 
group having ultimate control over the Board's decisions is the Board.  It is not the city council.  Furthermore, to define "governing body" 
in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-402(a)(iii) to limit it to the city council in all 
matters municipal would render the definition of "agency" in subsection (ii) of 
that statute less than meaningless; it would make it nonsensical.  Simply put, if the legislature had 
intended to limit application of the Act to city councils and boards of county 
commissioners, it would have said so.  
Instead, it unambiguously included all of the entities listed in the 
definition of "agency."2

 
 
[¶16]   So far, then, we have concluded 
that the Board is subject to the Act.  
The next question is whether quasi-judicial deliberations after a WAPA 
contested case hearing may be closed to the public.  The answer is "no."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-403(a) mandates 
that all meetings of the governing body of an agency are public meetings, 
"except as otherwise provided."  
Under the Act, the only provision for closed meetings is for executive 
sessions as described in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-405 (LexisNexis 2009), which 
does not include quasi-judicial deliberations after a WAPA contested case 
hearing.  In fact, the legislature 
in 1995 amended the definition of "meeting" to include "discussion, 
deliberation, presentation of information."  Act of July 1, 1995, ch. 110, 
sec. 1, § 16-402(a)(iii), 1995 Wyo. Laws 207, 208.3  The Act now clearly intends that an 
agency's deliberations occur during a public meeting.4

 
 
[¶17]   Finally, we will state our 
perception that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-110, set forth above, does not change 
this conclusion (see supra ¶ 
12).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-110, 
which is part of the WAPA, provides for notification of parties and their 
attorneys, either personally or by mail, of the decision or order of an agency 
after a contested case hearing.  
Similar provisions have been interpreted as indicating that the decision 
need not have been reached in a public meeting.  See Stillwater Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. 
Oklahoma Sav. & Loan Bd., 534 P.2d 9, 11 (Okla. 1975).  We do not believe that such a notice 
requirement serves to defeat the specific requirements of the Act.  First, there may be many reasons to 
require proof of notice of a contested case decision.  Second, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-407 
(LexisNexis 2009) provides that, in the event of statutory conflicts, the 
provisions of the Act control.

 
 
[¶18]   The conclusion that the 
quasi-judicial deliberations of an agency after a contested case hearing 
pursuant to the WAPA are not exempt from the Act does not answer the second 
question presented to the Court, which is whether some action was taken by the 
Board that the Court must declare to be null and void.  In that regard, we find the facts of 
this case to be much like those in Mayland v. Flitner, 2001 WY 69, 28 P.3d 838 (Wyo. 2001).  In Mayland, a board of county commissioners 
entered into executive session in violation of the Act, but took no action 
during that meeting that this Court found should be considered void.  Id. at ¶ 31, at 849.  Instead, as in this case, the 
commissioners took action only later at an appropriately called public meeting. 
 In other words, although the first 
sentence of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-403(a) was violated when the private meeting 
took place, the second sentence was not violated because the agency's action 
took place at a public meeting.  
Thus, the third sentence, wherein the action is declared null and void, 
does not apply.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶19]   The Board violated Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 16-4-403(a) by deliberating at a closed meeting, but the agency action took 
place at a public meeting, so that agency action is not null and void.  We reverse the conclusion of the 
district court that the Act does not apply to quasi-judicial deliberations of an 
agency after a WAPA contested case hearing, but we affirm the conclusion of the 
district court that the Board took no action that must be declared null and 
void.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice, specially concurring, in which HILL, J., 
joins.

 
 
[¶20]   I write separately to dispel any 
misperception that this decision renders meaningless the public deliberation 
provisions of the Wyoming Public Meetings Act (the Act). 

 
 
[¶21]   I agree that the Board is a 
governing body covered by the Act and its meeting in executive session was 
illegal.  Any action, including 
deliberations, taken during that meeting was void.  The record does not indicate what action 
was taken, if any, during the illegal meeting.  However, the Board ultimately took 
action and adopted its findings and conclusions in a public meeting and no 
provision of the Act renders void agency action taken in public that may have 
been discussed and/or acted upon in an illegal private meeting.  We faced this same conundrum in Mayland v. Flitner, 2001 WY 69, 28 P.3d 838 (Wyo. 2001), and concluded that the later action was not void.  However, in that case, the record at 
least indicated that the only action taken in executive session was discussion 
of the matter and directing the county attorney to prepare findings and 
conclusions that could be addressed "prior to the County Commissioners making a 
final decision."  Id., ¶ 29, 28 P.3d  at 848.  In contrast, the Board in this case 
convened the executive session for the purpose of deliberating, and the record 
does not indicate what occurred during the closed session.

 
 
[¶22]   The legislature has stated, in 
clear and unequivocal language, that agencies are prohibited from deliberating 
behind closed doors.  However, it 
has not adopted a statutory prohibition of public agency action taken after a 
closed door meeting.  If we were to 
conclude an agency's ultimate action was void because it had been previously 
discussed in private, we would be going beyond what the legislature has 
provided.  In addition, that 
interpretation would essentially prevent an agency from ever being able to 
correct a violation of the Act and, thus, render it unable to act at all.  So, are the citizens of this state left 
without a remedy when recalcitrant agencies simply refuse to follow the statute 
so long as they cover their tracks with a public announcement of their 
action?  The statutes provide 
otherwise.  Specifically, any member 
of an agency who either takes action, or conspires to take action, that violates 
the requirements of the Act is guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a $750 
fine.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-408(a) 
(LexisNexis 2009).  Any member who 
remains in a meeting where a knowing violation occurs is also guilty unless the 
minutes of the meeting record that member's objection.  Id.  Further, if citizens are aware in 
advance of an agency's intent to violate the Act, they may apply to the courts 
for an injunction preventing such violation.  W.R.C.P. 65.  Cheyenne Newspapers attempted to obtain 
such a remedy in this case, but the agency acted before that could be 
accomplished.  

 
 
[¶23]   The Act has been in place for over 
thirty years and agencies throughout the state, in matters arguably of much 
greater public import than those faced by this Board, have complied with its 
simple requirement to conduct the business of the public in the open. Yet, for 
some reason, the Board concluded it was exempt from these requirements and even 
went so far as to adopt regulations which purported to provide it with authority 
to ignore the statute and hold executive sessions whenever it chose.5  The Board also ignored the city 
attorney's request that it conduct its deliberations in public.  In the face of that direct defiance of 
the law, injunctive relief may well have been appropriate.

 
 

BURKE, 
Justice, concurring 
in part and dissenting in part.

 
 
[¶24]   I agree with the majority that an 
agency's deliberations after a contested case hearing are subject to the 
requirements of the Wyoming Public Meetings Act, and that the Board violated 
this Act when it deliberated at a closed meeting.  However, I conclude that the record is 
insufficient to support a finding that the Board took no action during the 
meeting.  Accordingly, I would 
reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment, and remand for further 
proceedings to resolve this genuine issue of material fact.  

 
 
[¶25]   The Wyoming Public Meetings Act 
provides that no "action" by a governing body of an agency shall be taken 
"except during a public meeting."  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-4-403(a) (LexisNexis 2009).  The term "action" is broadly defined to 
include "a collective decision of a governing body, a collective commitment or 
promise by a governing body to make a positive or negative decision, or an 
actual vote by a governing body upon a motion, proposal, resolution, regulation, 
rule, order or ordinance."  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-4-402(a)(i).  
Any "action" not taken during a public meeting is "null and void."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 16-4-403(a).

 
 
[¶26]   It is undisputed that the Board in 
this case met and deliberated during a closed meeting.  The majority holds that the Act requires 
an agency to deliberate only during a public meeting, but further concludes that 
deliberation alone is not an "action" rendered null and void when an agency 
deliberates in a prohibited meeting.  
I may agree that this interpretation is mandated by the plain language of 
the Act, but I do so reluctantly because of the practical result:  the Board violated the Act, but there is 
no meaningful remedy available for the public.

 
 
[¶27]   More significantly, when analyzed 
under the appropriate standard of review, the record in this case fails to 
establish that the Board did not take action during its private meeting.  There is no transcript or recording of 
the meeting.  The pertinent 
paragraphs of the parties' Joint Statement of Undisputed Facts provide little 
insight into what the Board did during the meeting:

 
 
5.         
The Board of Appeals conducted a public contested case hearing on the 
appeal, in accordance with its Rules and Regulations, on June 27, 2008, during 
which the parties were represented by counsel, witnesses were heard, and 
exhibits presented.  At the close of 
the contested case hearing, the Board of Appeals retired to deliberate in 
private.

 
 
6.         
The Board of Appeals did not meet in executive session, but rather 
determined that it was deliberating in its quasi-judicial 
role.

 
 
7.         
A quorum of the Board of Appeals was present for the July 2, 2008 
deliberation, which was called by the proper authority.  A transcript of the July 2, 2008 public 
meeting is attached hereto as Exhibit 1. 

 
 
8.         
The Board of Appeals drafted its 19-page Decision and held a public 
meeting July 14, 2008 to discuss the Decision, which it then adopted.  The transcript of that public meeting 
and the Decision issued by the Board of Appeals are attached hereto as Exhibits 
2 and 3.

 
 
[¶28]   According to the transcripts of the 
public meetings, on July 2, 2008, the Board passed a motion "that we go into 
closed deliberation."  Later, during 
the public meeting held on July 14, 2008, the hearing examiner explained that 
the Board "conducted a four (4) hour meeting in this matter and then we retired 
to deliberate."  He stated that he 
"began to draft our written opinion" after the private deliberations.  The "opinion" was nineteen pages long, 
was complicated enough to include twenty-eight footnotes, and dealt with 
difficult and controversial issues.  
Even so, the Board's discussion at the open meeting was quite brief, 
consisting almost entirely of the hearing examiner's explanation of a few select 
findings and conclusions in the draft decision.  After this brief discussion, the Board 
voted unanimously to uphold the Historic Preservation Board's decision.  The decision was signed immediately 
after the vote, with one Board member suggesting that it would be signed and 
finished in "like seven minutes."

 
 

[¶29]   This information is insufficient to 
establish that the Board did not take any action during the closed meeting.  To the contrary, the Board's perfunctory 
discussion during the public meeting, its unanimous vote on the question, and 
its immediate adoption of the written decision, all suggest that the Board did 
more than just deliberate during the closed meeting.  It is fair to infer that the Board 
reached its decision during the closed meeting, and did little more than ratify 
the prior decision during the public meeting.  In the language of the Act, the Board 
did take "action" if it reached "a collective decision of a governing body" 
during the closed meeting.  Pursuant 
to the Act, such action would be null and void.  See Emery v. City of Rawlins, 596 P.2d 675, 
679 (Wyo. 1979) (A city council may meet in private "for the purpose of 
discussing a subject and soliciting expert advice so 
long as no vote is taken nor a collective decision made.") 
(emphasis added).  

 
 
[¶30]  The party opposing summary judgment is 
entitled to the benefit of these favorable inferences.  Brumbaugh v. Mikelson Land Co., 2008 WY 
66, ¶ 11, 185 P.3d 695, 701 (Wyo. 2008).  As the majority states, "summary 
judgment can be sustained only when no genuine issues of material fact are 
present and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  Voss v. Goodman, 2009 WY 40, ¶ 9, 
203 P.3d 415, 419 (Wyo. 2009), quoting Wyoming Community College Comm'n v. Casper Community 
College Dist., 2001 WY 86, ¶ 11, 31 P.3d 1242, 1247 (Wyo. 2001).  Whether the Board took action during its 
closed meeting is certainly a material fact in this case, and is genuinely at 
issue given the record before us now.  
Accordingly, the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
the Board cannot be sustained.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
Board did not exhaust the list.  For 
example, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-101(b)(i) (LexisNexis 2009) exempts the 
governing body of a city or town from the definition of "agency" under the WAPA, 
and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 37-13-103(a)(viii) (LexisNexis 2009) defines "governing 
body" to include boards of county commissioners, city councils, and the boards 
of trustees of improvement districts for the purposes of the Wyoming Underground 
Conversion of Utilities Law.

 
 

2That 
is what distinguishes this case from Decker v. Wyoming Medical Commission, 
2008 WY 100, ¶¶ 17-19, 191 P.3d 105, 118-19 (Wyo. 2008), wherein we 
determined that a panel created by the Medical Commission was neither an 
"agency" nor a "governing body" under the Act.

 
 

3This 
amendment may have been in response to Ward v. Goshen County School District No. 
1, 865 P.2d 618, 621 (Wyo. 1993), where we noted that the prior definition 
of "meeting" in the Act was limited to "an assembly of the governing body of an 
agency at which action is taken."  (Emphasis added.)

 
 

4It 
is up to the legislature to decide the policy question of whether quasi-judicial 
deliberations are to take place at public meetings.  Compare Kennedy v. Upper Milford Township 
Zoning Hearing Board, 575 Pa. 105, 834 A.2d 1104, 1118 n.28 (2003) 
(quasi-judicial deliberations included as legitimate purpose for executive 
session) with Bryan County Board of 
Equalization v. Bryan County Board of Tax Assessors, 253 Ga.App. 831, 560 S.E.2d 719, 720 (2002) (board deliberations not included in statutory exclusions 
to open meetings act).

 
 

5Rules 
and Regulations of City of Cheyenne Building Code Board of Appeals, Chapter IV, 
Section 5:

 
 
All 
meetings and hearings at which official action is taken shall be open to the 
public, except for deliberations after public hearings.

 
 
Rules, 
supra, Chapter XI, Section 
7(d):

 
 
Deliberations 
may be in public or private, as determined by the 
Board.