Case Title: State v. Baird

Citation: 180 Vt. 243, 2006 VT 86, 908 A.2d 475

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2006-08-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Baird  (2004-509); 180 Vt. 243; 908 A.2d 475

2006 VT 86

[Filed 25-Aug-2006]


  NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
  40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
  Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
  order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 2006 VT 86

                                No. 2004-509


  State of Vermont                               Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.                                        District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 2, Rutland Circuit

  Cynthia Baird                                  October Term, 2005


       Theresa S. DiMauro, J.

       William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and David Tartter, Assistant
  Attorney General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee. 

       Peter F. Langrock and Devin McLaughlin of Langrock Sperry & Wool, LLP,
  Middlebury, for Defendant-Appellant.

  PRESENT:   Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Burgess, JJ., and 
             Allen, C.J. (Ret.),  Specially Assigned

        
       ¶ 1.   SKOGLUND, J.   Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder
  after a jury trial in Rutland District Court.  The district court denied
  her motions for judgment of acquittal and a new trial and sentenced her to
  a term of imprisonment of twenty years to life.  She now appeals, arguing
  that the court erred in denying her post-trial motions because: (1) the
  State presented inconsistent theories of guilt and thus failed to prove its
  case beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the court erroneously admitted
  testimony that defendant told a witness that she would like to shoot her
  husband; and (3) the jury instructions regarding circumstantial evidence
  were improper.  Defendant also argues that her sentence must be vacated
  because: (1) the court erred in its assessment of the aggravating and
  mitigating factors set forth in 13 V.S.A. § 2303(d)-(e); and (2) the court
  penalized her for exercising her right to a jury trial by considering her
  lack of acceptance of responsibility during sentencing.  Finally, defendant
  argues that the court incorrectly rejected her application to require the
  court or the State to pay for the trial transcript.  We affirm in all
  respects.

       ¶ 2.   The evidence at trial revealed the following.  On December 2,
  2000, defendant and her husband, Douglas Baird, had dinner together in
  Rutland.  After dinner, they walked to another nearby eatery, where, after
  several drinks each, they had a disagreement loud enough to catch the
  staff's attention.  Eventually, Mr. Baird, who appeared aggravated, walked
  out and left defendant behind to pay the tab.  Defendant drove the two of
  them back to their home in Poultney because Mr. Baird was too intoxicated
  to drive.
   
       ¶ 3.   At 12:21 a.m. on December 3, 2000, the Vermont State Police
  dispatcher in Rutland received a 911 call from defendant, who was screaming
  hysterically that her husband had shot himself.  Officer Dale Kerber, a
  special officer for the Town of Castleton, was the first to arrive on the
  scene.  He testified that he found defendant in a "hysterical" state,
  standing in the doorway holding a telephone, pointing into the house, and
  shouting that her husband had just shot himself.  Officer Kerber entered
  the house and turned in the direction defendant was pointing, where he
  found a door cracked open directly in front of him.  Drawing his service
  weapon, he approached the door.  In order to open it, he had to push away
  some pillows or bedding that had been placed against the other side of the
  door.  Upon entering the room, he saw a man lying on the bed with his eyes
  shut and blood around his head.  Officer Kerber observed no breathing
  movement or other signs of life.  Defendant remained directly behind
  Officer Kerber as he scanned the room.  He testified that defendant went
  silent when he drew his gun and resumed her "crying" and "hysteria" once he
  re-holstered it. 

       ¶ 4.   Officer Kerber then went into the living room with defendant,
  who appeared "very hysterical."  Defendant sat on a couch and, as Officer
  Kerber went to sit on an adjacent coffee table, he nearly sat on a sharp
  wool-carding tool.  He testified that defendant, who had been extremely
  agitated, "very calmly and very politely apologized" for leaving the tool
  out and then resumed her hysterics.  Several rescue workers on the scene
  that night also testified that they looked at defendant's face and did not
  observe tears during the time that she was hysterical.  After Officer
  Kerber spent some time with defendant and was unable to calm her down, she
  agreed to go to the hospital to see a crisis counselor. 

       ¶ 5.   Meanwhile, the police processed the scene of the shooting. 
  They found Mr. Baird's body lying supine on the bed, his head on the pillow
  and arms at his sides.  Blood had pooled on the pillow and sheet below the
  gunshot entry wound on the right side of his head but nowhere else.  There
  were two guns found in the room: an unloaded Taurus .357 revolver with a
  six-inch barrel on a night stand on the side of the bed farthest from the
  deceased, and a small .22 automatic on the floor.  In searching the house,
  the police found another Taurus .357, this one with a four-inch barrel, in
  a case in the closed bottom drawer of a bureau in an upstairs room.  This
  gun had a full cylinder containing five live .38 caliber cartridges and one
  empty cartridge case.  
   
       ¶ 6.   The medical examiner testified that Mr. Baird had died in the
  position in which he was found from a single gunshot wound to the right
  side of his head.  The bullet passed through the cerebral cortex, resulting
  in instant unconsciousness, and lodged in the left side of the skull.  The
  metallic composition of the bullet matched that of the unfired cartridges
  in the cylinder of the four-inch Taurus found in the upstairs bureau
  drawer.  In addition, a small stain on the inside of the four-inch Taurus's
  barrel was tested for DNA, yielding a pattern that matched Mr. Baird's DNA.

       ¶ 7.   Both defendant and Mr. Baird were tested for gunshot residue
  (GSR).  The State's GSR expert testified that, although he could not
  conclude based on the GSR who shot Mr. Baird,  the amount of GSR found on
  Mr. Baird was not consistent with a self-inflicted wound.  The expert
  observed a video of the processing of the crime scene and testified that
  the movements of Mr. Baird's body by personnel at the scene would not have
  caused significant shedding of GSR particles.  No GSR was found on
  defendant's hands.  The expert testified that two to five hours of normal
  activity would shed all detectable GSR particles from a person's hands;
  defendant's hands were tested more than seven hours after she called 911.

       ¶ 8.   Defendant did not testify at trial.  Thus, the only testimony
  concerning the events that transpired between the time the couple left the
  restaurant and defendant's 911 call came from the statements defendant made
  to the police after they arrived on the scene, later at the hospital, and
  the following day.  The State elicited testimony regarding defendant's
  version of what happened from law enforcement personnel who interacted with
  defendant and offered into evidence audiotapes of two police interviews of
  defendant, one conducted at the hospital after defendant was taken there
  from the scene of the shooting and the other conducted at her home two days
  later.  Both tapes were admitted and played for the jury, and a transcript
  of the hospital interview was admitted as well.
   
       ¶ 9.   In sum, defendant told the police that Mr. Baird shot himself
  after she walked into the bedroom with an unloaded gun and tried to get his
  attention by threatening to kill herself.  She explained that they had
  continued discussing things that were bothering each of them after
  returning home from having dinner and drinks.  Mr. Baird eventually ended
  the conversation by getting up and saying he was going to bed because he
  was going hunting in the morning.  Defendant said she "felt like he was
  cutting me off," so she went upstairs and got the four-inch Taurus
  revolver.  As she walked into the bedroom, she said: "I should take this
  frigging thing I should blow my brains out."  She claimed that her husband
  then reached into a drawer in the bedside table, pulled out a gun, and,
  without a word, shot himself in the head.  At that point, she told the
  police, she "saw the blood, freaked, ran to my desk and called 911."  

       ¶ 10.   Later, when interviewed at the hospital, she told the
  detective that she was not sure she was in the room when her husband shot
  himself but that she "never saw him shoot the gun."  She gave several more
  inconsistent accounts of whether she observed him shoot himself or not.

       ¶ 11.   On February 13, 2004, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on
  the single charge of second-degree murder.  Defendant filed motions for
  acquittal and a new trial under Vermont Rules of Criminal Procedure 29 and
  33, respectively, and the court denied both.  The court sentenced defendant
  on November 3, 2004, imposing a term of imprisonment of twenty years to
  life.  Defendant then filed the instant appeal.

                                     I.
                                     A.
   
       ¶ 12.   Defendant claims that her conviction must be reversed because
  the State failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.  More
  specifically, she argues that the State's case is internally inconsistent
  because if she "had murdered her husband and wanted it to look like a
  suicide, she would have put the weapon in his hand, not upstairs." 
  Therefore, she argues, the only way the jury could have reached a guilty
  verdict was through speculation and unsupportable inferences from the
  evidence.  It does not matter, however, if some of the evidence appeared
  inconsistent to the State's theory.  What matters is whether the State
  presented sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of guilt beyond
  a reasonable doubt.  The State is not required to explain a defendant's
  illogical behaviors.  Because the facts of the case support the verdict, we
  reject defendant's argument and affirm her conviction.

       ¶ 13.   With respect to defendant's claim that the evidence was
  insufficient to support the verdict, this Court will review the evidence
  presented by the State "viewing it in the light most favorable to the
  prosecution and excluding any modifying evidence, and determine whether
  that evidence sufficiently and fairly supports a finding of guilt beyond a
  reasonable doubt."  State v. Grega, 168 Vt. 363, 380,