Case Title: State v. Murray

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1992-04-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 91-390


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit

 Betty Murray                                 April Term, 1992


 Robert Grussing, J.

 Dan M. Davis, Windham County State's Attorney, Christopher C. Moll,
   Deputy State's Attorney, and R. Jennings Cantrel, Legal Intern,
   Brattleboro, for plaintiff-appellee

 E.M. Allen, Defender General, and Anna E. Saxman, Appellate Attorney,
   Montpelier, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      DOOLEY, J.   Defendant appeals a trial court decision extending the
 terms of her deferred-sentence agreement after the period of the deferral
 had passed but before the five-year limit on deferred sentences contained in
 13 V.S.A. { 7041(a) had expired.  We reverse.
      Defendant pled no contest in district court on October 15, 1987, to a
 charge of welfare fraud.  On that same day she and the State entered into a
 deferred-sentence agreement, which was approved by the court.  Pursuant to
 the agreement the court deferred imposition of sentence for three years,
 from "the 15th day of October, 1987, to the 15th day of October, 1990," and
 placed defendant on probation "until further order of the Court."  The
 agreement provided that during the period that it was in effect, the
 defendant agreed to abide by a number of conditions.  Among the conditions,
 defendant was required to pay restitution in an amount later determined to
 be approximately $3,000.  The agreement further stated, "It is understood by
 the defendant . . . that if the conditions of this . . . agreement are
 violated, the Court shall impose sentence.  Upon fulfillment of the terms of
 probation and of this deferred sentence agreement, the Court shall strike
 the adjudication of guilt and discharge the defendant."
      On February 19, 1991, four months after the period of sentence
 deferral agreed to and ordered had expired, the Department of Corrections
 petitioned the court to discharge defendant from her probation, (FN1) and 
 sought the court's guidance with respect to a large portion of the restitution
 that remained unpaid.  After submission of memoranda and a hearing on the
 issue, the court held that it retained jurisdiction over defendant because
 she had not been formally discharged from probation and the five-year limit
 for imposition of sentence set forth in 13 V.S.A. { 7041(a) had not expired.
 The court also ruled that defendant would remain on probation.
      On appeal, defendant claims that the court erred in extending her
 period of probation beyond the three years contemplated in the deferred
 sentence agreement, and in penalizing her for failing to make full
 restitution payments without making findings as to her ability to pay.
 Because we agree that, without provision of notice to defendant of her
 violation of probation during its term, the court was without authority to
 extend defendant's probation after it had expired, we need not reach the
 second issue.
      The statute under which the court proceeded in imposing a deferred
 sentence provides in relevant part:

             (a) Upon an adjudication of guilt . . ., the court
           may defer sentencing and place the respondent on
           probation upon such terms and conditions as it may
           require if a written agreement concerning the deferring
           of sentence is entered into between the state's attorney
           and the respondent and filed with the clerk of the
           court. . . .  Thereafter, the court may impose sentence
           at any time within five years from and after the date of
           entry of deferment.
             (b) Upon violation of the terms of probation or of the
           deferred sentence agreement, the court shall impose
           sentence.  Upon fulfillment of the terms of probation
           and of the deferred sentence agreement, the court shall
           strike the adjudication of guilt and discharge the
           respondent. . . .

 13 V.S.A. { 7041.  There is no description in the statute of the nature of
 the probation imposed.  That subject is covered in 28 V.S.A. {{ 201-305.
 Although the regulatory provisions in Title 28 are normally used for post-
 sentence probation, see 28 V.S.A. { 205, they apply equally to probation
 imposed as part of a deferred sentence.  See A. Campbell, Law of Sentencing
 { 11, at 52-53 (1978) (whether the court has suspended a sentence or has
 suspended the imposition of sentence, the rationale and effect of probation
 are the same); Neal v. United States,