Case Title: Armin Nankin v. Village of Shorewood

Citation: 2001 WI 92

Docket Number: 1999AP001058

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
2001 WI 92 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
99-1058 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Armin Nankin, Trustee of the Gertrude H. Weiss 
Revocable Trust,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Village of Shorewood,  
 
Defendant-Respondent.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  238 Wis.2d 841, 618 N.W.2d 273 
 
 
(Ct. App. 2000-Unpublished) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 6, 2001 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
March 6, 2001 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Diane S. Sykes 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
CROOKS, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
WILCOX, J., joins dissent. 
 
Not Participating: SYKES, J., did not participate. 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Alan Marcuvitz, Robert L. Gordon and Weiss, Berzowski, 
Brady & Donahue, LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by Robert 
Gordon and Alan Marcuvitz. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by 
Raymond J. Pollen, Deborah S.R. Hoffmann and Crivello, Carlson, 
Mentkowski & Steeves, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by 
 
2 
Raymond Pollen. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Gregg C. 
Hagopian, assistant city attorney, on behalf of the City Attorney 
for the City of Milwaukee, the Wisconsin Association of Assessing 
Officers, the South Eastern Wisconsin Association of Assessing 
Officers, and the Intergovernmental Cooperation Council of 
Milwaukee County, and oral argument by Gregg Hagopian. 
 
2001 WI 92 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No.  99-1058 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
  IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Armin Nankin, Trustee of the Gertrude H. 
Weiss Revocable Trust,  
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
Village of Shorewood,  
 
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   Armin Nankin (Nankin) seeks 
review of a court of appeals' decision that upheld the 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 74.37(6) (1997-98).1  This 
section operates to allow owners of property located in counties 
with a population of less than 500,000 to challenge a property 
assessment with a full trial in the circuit court; those with a 
population of 500,000 or more (populous counties) are not 
allowed a full trial "de novo" in the circuit court.  Nankin 
contends that the statute is unconstitutional because it 
                     
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1997-98 version unless otherwise indicated. 
FILED 
 
JUL 6, 2001 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
99-1058  
 
 
2 
violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the 
law, that is, it treats owners of property located in populous 
counties differently than owners of property located in other 
counties without a rational basis.  We agree.  We also conclude 
that § 74.37(6) is severable from the remainder of the statute. 
 Accordingly, we reverse the determination made by the court of 
appeals and grant Nankin's motion for summary judgment. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶2 
The facts are undisputed.  Nankin is trustee of a 
trust that owns a parcel of real property in the Village of 
Shorewood (Village) in Milwaukee County.  On May 9, 1998, Nankin 
filed a written objection to the village assessor's 1998 
assessment of the property.  On May 11, 1998, the Village of 
Shorewood Board of Review (Board) conducted a hearing on this 
objection.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board voted to 
sustain the assessment of the village assessor. 
¶3 
Pursuant to statute, once a board of review renders 
its decision, appeal from the decision may be accomplished in 
one of three ways.2  First, an owner can appeal from the board's 
determination by an action for certiorari to the circuit court 
under Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13).  Second, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.85, a property owner may submit a written complaint with 
the department of revenue requesting that the department revalue 
the property.  § 70.85(1), (4)(b).  The department's decision 
                     
2 See Hermann v. Town of Delavan, 215 Wis. 2d 370, 379-80, 
572 N.W.2d 855 (1998). 
No. 
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3 
may then be appealed through an action for certiorari in the 
county in which the property is located.  § 70.85(4)(c).  Third 
and finally, after paying the tax on the assessment, a property 
owner may proceed under Wis. Stat. § 74.37 with a claim for an 
excessive assessment against the taxation district3 or the 
county, 
depending 
on 
which 
entity 
collected 
the 
tax.  
§ 74.37(1), (2)(a), (4)(b).  Such claims seek "to recover that 
amount of general property tax imposed because the assessment of 
property was excessive."  § 74.37(1).  If this claim is denied, 
the aggrieved property owner may then commence an action in the 
circuit court to recover the amount of the claim not allowed.  
§ 74.37(3)(d).   
¶4 
Because of Wis. Stat. § 74.37(6), however, Nankin was 
prohibited from pursuing this final option.  This subsection 
provides that § 74.37 "does not apply in counties with a 
population of 500,000 or more."  In this case, because the trust 
property was located in the Village of Shorewood in Milwaukee 
County, a county that had a population of 500,000 or more, 
Nankin could not file a claim under § 74.37. 
¶5 
On June 15, 1998, Nankin filed a declaratory judgment 
action in the circuit court, seeking a declaration that Wis. 
Stat. § 74.37(6) was unconstitutional.  In particular, he 
alleged that this statute violated (1) Article I, Section 1 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
                     
3 A "taxation district" is defined as "a town, village or 
city in which general property taxes are levied and collected." 
 Wis. Stat. § 70.045.   
No. 
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4 
United States Constitution, both of which guarantee equal 
protection under the law; (2) Article IV, Section 31(6) of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, which prohibits the enactment of special 
or private laws regarding the assessment or collection of taxes; 
and (3) Article VIII, Section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution, 
which mandates that the rule of taxation shall be uniform.  
Nankin also sought a declaration from the court that § 74.37(6) 
was severable from the remainder of the statute; a permanent 
injunction prohibiting the defendant from asserting § 74.37(6) 
as a defense to any claim filed by Nankin regarding the 1998 
assessment of property; and costs incurred, including reasonable 
attorney fees.   
¶6 
With respect to his equal protection claim, Nankin 
argued 
that 
the 
statute 
was 
unconstitutional 
because 
it 
legislated disparate treatment for persons who own property in 
municipalities in counties with a population of 500,000 or more 
and persons who own property in municipalities in other 
counties.  Persons owning property in populous counties, Nankin 
argued, could ultimately only receive certiorari review of their 
property assessments in the circuit court, either under Wis. 
Stat. § 70.47(13) or Wis. Stat. § 70.85(4)(c).  In contrast, 
persons owning property in other counties could receive de novo 
review in the circuit court by pursuing an action under Wis. 
Stat. § 74.37(3)(d).  Nankin contended that there was no 
rational basis for this disparate treatment of property owners 
in assessment appeal options based solely on the population of 
the county in which the property is situated.   
No. 
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5 
¶7 
Nankin filed a motion for summary judgment.  This 
motion included a claim that Wis. Stat. § 74.37(6) also violated 
Article IV, Section 18 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  This 
constitutional provision limits the legislature from passing 
laws that have only limited application.  
¶8 
The Milwaukee County Circuit Court, the Honorable 
Diane S. Sykes, denied Nankin's motion and his request for 
declaratory relief, concluding that he failed to carry his 
burden 
of 
proving 
the 
statute 
unconstitutional 
beyond 
a 
reasonable doubt.  With respect to Nankin's equal protection 
claim, the court determined that this question had been resolved 
in S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Town of Caledonia, 206 Wis. 2d 
292, 557 N.W.2d 412 (Ct. App. 1996).  The court followed this 
precedent and opined that it was reasonable for the legislature 
to exempt populous counties from this type of review based on 
the conclusion that de novo review of municipal board of review 
decisions in the circuit court would be unworkable in such 
counties.  Certiorari review, the court noted, still provided a 
meaningful opportunity for judicial correction of municipal tax 
assessment errors, even though this review was far narrower than 
de novo review.  The court also rejected Nankin's other 
constitutional claims and denied costs to Nankin. 
¶9 
The court of appeals, in a per curiam decision, 
affirmed the circuit court's decision.  We accepted review to 
determine whether Wis. Stat. § 74.37(6) violated one or more of 
the following state constitutional provisions: (1) Article I, 
Section 1; (2) Article IV, Section 31(6); or (3) Article IV, 
No. 
99-1058  
 
 
6 
Section 18.4  Because we conclude that this statutory section 
violates Article I, Section 1, we will not review Nankin's other 
arguments.  Our analysis also reveals that § 74.37(6) may be 
severed from the remainder of the statute.   
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶10 A challenge to the constitutionality of a statute 
presents a question of law that we review under a de novo 
standard of review.  Aicher v. Wis. Patients Comp. Fund, 2000 WI 
98, ¶18, 237 Wis. 2d 99, 613 N.W.2d 849.  We presume that the 
statute is constitutional and indulge "every presumption to 
sustain the law if at all possible . . . ."  Id.  The burden is 
on the party challenging the statute to prove that the statute 
is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at ¶19.  Any 
doubt must be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of the 
statute.  Id. at ¶18.   
EQUAL PROTECTION 
¶11 Nankin challenges the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. 
§ 74.37(6) on equal protection grounds.5  To prevail, he must 
                     
4 Nankin did not pursue his Article VIII, Section 1 claim on 
appeal. 
5 Equal protection is guaranteed under Article I, Section 1 
of the Wisconsin Constitution, which states:  "All people are 
born equally free and independent, and have certain inherent 
rights; among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness; to secure these rights, governments are instituted, 
deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."  
"This court applies the same interpretation to the state Equal 
Protection Clause as that given to the equivalent federal 
provision."  Tomczak v. Bailey, 218 Wis. 2d 245, 261, 578 N.W.2d 
166 (1998).  
No. 
99-1058  
 
 
7 
show that the statute unconstitutionally treats members of 
similarly situated classes differently.  Aicher, 2000 WI 98 at 
¶56.  In cases, like here, where the statutory classification 
does not involve a suspect class or a fundamental interest, we 
will sustain the classification if there exists any rational 
basis to support it. Milwaukee Brewers v. DHSS, 130 Wis. 2d 79, 
98, 387 N.W.2d 254 (1986).  A statute violates equal protection 
only when "the legislature has made an irrational or arbitrary 
classification, 
one 
that 
has 
no 
reasonable 
purpose 
or 
relationship to the facts or a proper state policy."  Id. at 99. 
 Any doubts must be resolved in favor of the reasonableness of 
the classification.  State v. Hezzie R., 219 Wis. 2d 848, 894, 
580 N.W.2d 660 (1998). 
¶12 "'The fact [that] a statutory classification results 
in some inequity . . . does not provide sufficient grounds for 
invalidating a legislative enactment.'"  Id. at 893-94 (quoting 
State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 131, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989)). 
 Indeed, "'[e]qual protection does not deny a state the power to 
treat persons within its jurisdiction differently . . . .'"  Id. 
at 893 (quoting McManus, 152 Wis. 2d at 131).  However, "[t]he 
basic test is not whether some inequality results from the 
classification but whether there exists a rational basis to 
justify the inequality of the classification."  Milwaukee 
Brewers, 130 Wis. 2d at 99.  In determining whether a rational 
basis exists, we look first to determine whether the legislature 
articulated a rationale for its determination.  See id. at 99-
No. 
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8 
101.  If we cannot identify any such articulated rationale, it 
is the court's obligation to construct one.  Id. at 101.  
¶13 We conclude that Nankin has met his burden in proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Wis. Stat. § 74.37(6) violates 
equal protection.  We reach this conclusion based on three 
separate determinations.  The first determination is that, in 
enacting 
§ 74.37(6), 
the 
legislature 
created 
a 
distinct 
classification of citizens, that is, owners of property located 
in counties with a population of 500,000 people or more. The 
parties 
do 
not 
dispute 
that 
the 
statute 
created 
this 
classification.   
¶14 Our second determination is that the legislation 
treats this class significantly different from all others 
similarly situated.  In particular, as Nankin asserts, the 
statute treats the class differently by prohibiting it from 
filing a circuit court action under Wis. Stat. § 74.37(3)(d) to 
challenge the excessiveness of their property assessment.  All 
other owners of property located in counties with a population 
of less than 500,000 are entitled to proceed under this statute. 
 The inequality results from advantages stemming from circuit 
court actions under § 74.37(3)(d), which are not available to 
the disfavored class.  We provide analysis on our conclusion 
below. 
¶15 Our final determination is that Nankin has met his 
burden in proving beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no 
rational 
basis 
for 
the 
classification 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 74.37(6).  The legislature did not articulate any rationale 
No. 
99-1058  
 
 
9 
for the classification, and we are unable to construct a 
rationale for this classification.  There is no rational basis 
for the legislature to treat owners of property located in 
municipalities in different counties dissimilarly in challenging 
their property tax assessments based solely on the population of 
the county in which the property is situated.  Again, our 
analysis below shows how we reach this determination.  
¶16 We 
begin 
with 
some 
background 
on 
property 
tax 
administration for general property in Wisconsin.  On the whole, 
municipalities 
form 
the 
primary 
units 
of 
property 
tax 
administration in Wisconsin.  In particular, the statutes 
designate any town, city, or village in which general property 
taxes are levied and collected as taxation districts.  Wis. 
Stat. § 70.045.  Each taxation district is required to have an 
assessor, and this assessor may be appointed or elected.  Wis. 
Stat. § 70.05(1).6  In the alternative and under certain 
conditions, counties may adopt and implement a county assessor 
system.  Wis. Stat. § 70.99(1).  
¶17 The assessment of general property in each town, city, 
and village is made according to Wis. Stat. Ch. 70.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.05(1).  It is the assessor's duty to discover, list, and 
value all taxable real and personal property within the taxation 
district and annually report such information in an assessment 
roll for the district.  Wis. Stat. §§ 70.10, 70.29, 70.32(1)—
                     
6 First class cities have special provisions for their 
assessors.  Wis. Stat. § 70.06.  Classes of cities are defined 
by statute.  See Wis. Stat. § 62.05. 
No. 
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10
(2).  If a property owner disagrees with an assessment, the 
owner may file a formal objection with the municipality's board 
of review.  Wis. Stat. § 70.47(7)(a).7 
¶18 The board of review, however, "is not an assessing 
body but rather a quasi-judicial body whose duty it is to hear 
evidence tending to show errors in the assessment roll and to 
decide 
upon 
the 
evidence 
adduced 
whether 
the 
assessor's 
valuation is correct."  State ex rel. I.B.M. Corp. v. Bd. of 
Review of Fond du Lac, 231 Wis. 303, 306, 285 N.W. 784 (1939).  
The board must presume that the assessor's valuation is correct, 
and this presumption may be rebutted only by sufficient showing 
upon sworn oral testimony by the objector that the valuation is 
incorrect.  Wis. Stat. § 70.47(8)(i).  If the board determines 
that the assessment is too high or too low, it must raise or 
lower the assessment accordingly.  § 70.47(6), (9)(a).   
¶19 After the board renders its decision, the property 
owner may pursue one of the three appeal options discussed 
above.  Our analysis focuses on the differences between the 
certiorari review available under Wis. Stat. §§ 70.47(13) and 
70.85(4)(c) and a circuit court action permitted under Wis. 
Stat. § 74.37(3)(d).  A close analysis reveals that a property 
owner who is able to pursue a circuit court action is placed at 
a significant advantage when compared to other property owners. 
                     
7 In first class cities and certain second class cities, a 
board of assessors will hear complaints before objections are 
brought before a board of review.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 70.07, 
70.075, 70.47(16). 
No. 
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11
¶20 Certiorari review under Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13)8 is 
limited to a review of the record made before the board of 
review.  State ex rel. Hemker v. Huggett, 114 Wis. 2d 320, 323, 
338 N.W.2d 335 (Ct. App. 1983).  Thus, the court may not conduct 
its own factual inquiry and may not admit any new evidence.  Id. 
 On review, the court only considers the following factors: 
 
(1) whether the board acted within its jurisdiction; 
(2) whether the board acted according to law; (3) 
whether the board's action was arbitrary, oppressive 
or unreasonable, representing its will rather than its 
judgment; and (4) whether the evidence was such that 
the 
board 
might 
reasonably 
make 
the 
order 
or 
determination in question. 
Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Kenosha County Bd. of Review, 184 Wis. 2d 
541, 554, 516 N.W.2d 695 (1994).   
¶21 An assessment that was made in accordance with the 
statutory mandate must be upheld if it can be supported by any 
reasonable view of the evidence.  Id.  The court will not make 
an assessment of the property; instead, if it finds any error 
that renders the assessment void, the court must set aside the 
assessment and remand to the board for further proceedings.  Id. 
at 566; State ex rel. Garton Toy Co. v. Town of Mosel, 32 
Wis. 2d 253, 258, 145 N.W.2d 129 (1966); Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13).  
                     
8 Our discussion of certiorari review of the board of 
review's decision applies equally for certiorari review of the 
department of revenue's decision.  Wisconsin Stat. § 70.85(4)(c) 
does 
not 
expand 
on 
the 
grounds 
for 
certiorari 
review.  
Therefore, it is appropriately defined, similar to Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.47(13) review, under common law certiorari.  See Hanlon v. 
Town of Milton, 2000 WI 61, ¶23, 235 Wis. 2d 597, 612 N.W.2d 44; 
State ex rel. Wis. River Power Co. v. Bd. of Review of Armenia, 
125 Wis. 2d 94, 97, 370 N.W.2d 580 (Ct. App. 1985).  
No. 
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12
¶22 We compare this review to a circuit court action 
permitted under Wis. Stat. § 74.37(3)(d).  Again, pursuant to 
this section, after a claim in the taxation district or county 
is disallowed, a property owner may file an action in the 
circuit court to recover any amount of property tax imposed as a 
result of an excessive assessment.  § 74.37(1), (2), (3)(d).  
This action proceeds according to state civil procedure and 
practice.  See Wis. Stat. § 801.01(1), (2).  
¶23 The Village argues that S.C. Johnson, 206 Wis. 2d 292, 
already concluded that the differences between certiorari review 
and a court action under Wis. Stat. § 74.37(3)(d) do not result 
in significantly different treatment between owners of property 
located in populous counties and other property owners in the 
state.  In S.C. Johnson, an owner of property located in Racine 
County filed a claim and action under § 74.37.  Id. at 296.  
After concluding that the owner could pursue this action, the 
court examined whether prohibiting this right in populous 
counties violated equal protection.  Id. at 306-08.  The court 
addressed this argument even though it concluded that the party 
raising the argument, a municipality, had no standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of the statute.  Id. at 302-04, 
306-08.  The court concluded that, despite the anomalies that 
existed between certiorari review and a § 74.37(3)(d) action, 
the legislative distinction was insufficient to violate equal 
protection.  Id. at 308.  In reaching its determination, the 
court noted that the distinction merely dealt with "the method 
by which the right of judicial review is pursued," rather than 
No. 
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13
whether judicial review was provided at all, which the court 
suggested may have raised some equal protection concerns.  Id.  
¶24 We disagree with the characterization made by the 
court of appeals.  The problem with this characterization is 
that an action under Wis. Stat. § 74.37(3)(d) is not simply 
another means of judicial review.  Judicial review entails "[a] 
court's review of a lower court's or an administrative body's 
factual or legal findings."  Black's Law Dictionary 852 (7th ed. 
1999).  That is not the case in an action under § 74.37(3)(d).  
Instead, this statute affords the claimant the right to pursue 
an action according to state civil practice and procedure, 
including the right to a trial.9  This difference is significant 
because, unlike certiorari review, § 74.37(3)(d) actions allow 
property owners to again fully contest their case in a court 
trial despite having contested it before the board of review.   
¶25 The 
differences 
between 
such 
court 
actions 
and 
certiorari review are considerable.  To begin with, as mentioned 
above, certiorari review is limited to a review of the record.  
In comparison, during a court action, if the action proceeds to 
trial, the court may make its determination without regard to 
                     
9 In S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Town of Caledonia, 206 
Wis. 2d 292, 301, 557 N.W.2d 412 (Ct. App. 1996), the court of 
appeals referred to a Wis. Stat. § 74.37(3)(d) action as a 
"trial de novo."  This was incorrect.  "A trial de novo is a new 
trial in which the whole case is retried as if no trial 
whatsoever had been had in the first instance."  Vill. of 
Menomonee Falls v. Michelson, 104 Wis. 2d 137, 149, 311 N.W.2d 
658 (Ct. App. 1981).  Although assessments are contested at the 
board of review, such board hearings cannot be said to be the 
same as a court trial, which is permitted under to § 74.37.    
No. 
99-1058  
 
 
14
any determination made at any earlier proceeding.  Instead, new 
evidence may be introduced, and the court may examine this 
evidence in making its determination.  In addition, unlike 
certiorari review, during a court trial, the court may make its 
determination without giving deference to any determination made 
at a previous proceeding.  The court must only give presumptive 
weight to the assessor's assessment.  Wis. Stat. § 70.49(2).  
Finally, unlike a certiorari review, in a trial, the court, upon 
making its determination, is not required to remand to the board 
for an assessment.  It may make its determination based on the 
evidence.  The court is only limited in the respect that, if a 
reassessment is necessary, the court must continue the action 
and order the reassessment before rendering its judgment.  Wis. 
Stat. § 74.39(1).  However, even if a reassessment is necessary, 
the court may still proceed to judgment if it is in the best 
interests of all parties to the action.  § 74.39(3).   
¶26 The legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 74.37 also 
supports the conclusion that the legislature intended an action 
for excessive assessment to provide a significantly different 
option for property owners than mere certiorari review in 
challenging their assessments.  In 1953, the legislature created 
Wis. Stat. § 70.47(9a) (1953), which permitted certiorari review 
from the board of review decision, and Wis. Stat. § 74.73(4) 
(1953), which prohibited any claim or court action based upon an 
alleged excessive assessment and restricted appeal from the 
board of review to the manner prescribed under § 70.47(9a) 
No. 
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15
(1953) and other statutes.10  See §§ 1-2, ch. 435, Laws of 1953. 
 A 
drafting 
request 
dated 
January 
25, 
1955, 
shows 
that 
Lieutenant Governor Warren Knowles wanted to revise ch. 435, 
Laws of 1953 to allow the circuit court to "take testimony and 
make finding of fact in assessment cases."  Drafting Request, 
microformed on ch. 440, Laws of 1955 (Leg. Ref. Bureau).  More 
specifically, he sought to amend certiorari review in the 
circuit court so that the court had "the authority to weigh 
evidence and make a final determination of the facts." Id.  The 
request noted that, at that time, the court could only remand to 
the board of review for a new assessment.  Id.   
¶27 In response to this request, however, the legislature 
did not broaden the scope of certiorari review in the circuit 
court.  Instead, the legislature repealed and recreated Wis. 
Stat. § 74.73(4) (1953), to permit a circuit court action for 
any excessive assessment under § 74.73(4) (1955).  See ch. 440, 
Laws of 1955.  Wisconsin Stat. § 70.47(9a) (1953) was left 
intact and was later renumbered as § 70.47(13).  See § 878, ch. 
34, Laws of 1979.  This request and subsequent action by the 
legislature shows that the legislation's intent was to provide 
property owners with a full court trial when challenging their 
                     
10 The other statutes included Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13) 
(1953), which, like the current § 70.47(16), provided for 
special objection procedures for residents of first class 
cities, and Wis. Stat. § 70.85 (1953), which, similar to the 
current § 70.85, permitted property owners to challenge the 
valuation of their assessment before the department of taxation. 
 Section 70.85 (1953), however, did not provide for certiorari 
review in the circuit court.  
No. 
99-1058  
 
 
16
assessment, which was significantly different than the existing 
certiorari review. 
¶28 The Village argues that an equal protection violation 
is not present because the board of review provides adequate due 
process to property owners.  We interpret this argument to 
allege that no disparate treatment exists because property 
owners are essentially afforded the same process at the board of 
review as they are in a circuit court action.  Our primary 
focus, 
however, 
is 
in 
comparing 
the 
differences 
between 
certiorari review and a court trial.  However, even when 
comparing the board of review hearing to a court trial on an 
excessive assessment, it is apparent that a trial offers 
significant safeguards 
that 
provide 
further 
advantages to 
property owners who may pursue such court actions.   
¶29 First, a court trial allows property owners to present 
their case in a forum that is conducted according to the rules 
of evidence and discovery.  In contrast, evidence is not 
presented in this manner at the board.  In particular, at the 
board hearing, evidence is presented only through sworn, oral 
testimony, Wis. Stat. § 70.47(8), and only the board may compel 
production 
of 
documents, 
§ 70.47(8)(d). 
 
Such 
informal 
proceedings may lead to an incomplete or an inadequate record.  
See Hemker, 114 Wis. 2d at 323.  Nevertheless, the board renders 
a decision based on this record.   
¶30 Second, at a court trial, property owners can subpoena 
witnesses to testify at trial.  In contrast, at the board of 
review hearing, only the assessor is required to appear, Wis. 
No. 
99-1058  
 
 
17
Stat. § 70.48, and only the board may, and upon the request of 
the assessor shall, subpoena other witnesses to appear, Wis. 
Stat. § 70.47(8)(d).   
¶31 Third, a court trial is conducted by a judge; the 
board of review proceedings are not necessarily conducted by 
such legal professionals who are versed in the rules of 
evidence.  The membership and organization of the board of 
review varies depending on the size of the municipality and the 
nature of the assessment system, and the board may contain any 
number of town, city, or village residents; public officers; and 
public employees.  See Wis. Stat. § 70.46(1).  
¶32 Fourth, property owners are typically afforded a 
greater amount of time to prepare their case at the circuit 
court level than before the board of review.  The final 
assessments by the assessor and the delivery of the assessment 
roll takes place only a short time before the board of review 
meets.11  Indeed, notice must be provided to property owners 15 
days before the board meeting when property is assessed at a 
different value than the previous year.  Wis. Stat. § 70.365.  
                     
11 Property assessment must be handled in a timely manner by 
the assessor.  Assessors must assess all real and personal 
property as of the close of January 1 of each year.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.10.  Except in first and second class cities that have a 
board of assessors, the assessments must be completed before the 
first Monday in April, Wis. Stat. § 70.10, and the assessor must 
deliver the completed roll and all sworn statements and 
valuations of personal property to the clerk of the taxation 
district by the first Monday in May, Wis. Stat. § 70.50.  The 
board then is required to meet at any time during the 30-day 
period beginning on the second Monday of May.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 70.47(1). 
No. 
99-1058  
 
 
18
However, property owners are then immediately required to file 
an objection before the meeting, and the board only has to 
provide property owners with 48 hours notice before the hearing. 
 See Wis. Stat. § 70.47(3)(a)5., (7)(a).  The additional time 
afforded through a court trial enables property owners to better 
prepare their case.   
¶33 On the whole, these differences show that a property 
owner who is permitted to pursue a circuit court action is 
treated significantly different than property owners who are 
limited to mere certiorari review in the circuit court.  Thus, 
having reached this conclusion, we continue to the next step of 
our equal protection analysis:  rational basis.   
¶34 In addressing whether the legislature had a rational 
basis in establishing the classification under Wis. Stat. 
§ 74.37(6), Nankin asks us to look at where the legislature drew 
the "line of demarcation" for the classification, that is, the 
line that separates the favored and disfavored classes.  We 
examined a similar "line of demarcation" in Milwaukee Brewers 
for purposes of equal protection analysis.  Milwaukee Brewers, 
130 Wis. 2d at 104-05.  In this case, Nankin correctly asserts 
that the line is drawn at the county border, based on the 
population of the county.  The question then becomes whether 
there is a rational explanation for the legislature to have 
drawn the line at this border under a statute that affords 
property 
owners 
the 
right 
to 
challenge 
their 
property 
assessments made by a municipality within that border. 
No. 
99-1058  
 
 
19
¶35 We have upheld classifications based on population on 
several occasions.  See, e.g., Libertarian Party v. State, 199 
Wis. 2d 790, 546 N.W.2d 424 (1996) (per curiam); Johnson v. City 
of Milwaukee, 88 Wis. 383, 60 N.W. 270 (1894).  In fact, we have 
noted that it is no longer open to doubt that counties may be 
classified according to population.  Vill. of Whitefish Bay v. 
Milwaukee County, 224 Wis. 373, 377, 271 N.W. 416 (1937).  
However, such classifications are not without limitations. 
 
It is a mistaken idea that because classification 
on the basis of population is sustainable in respect 
of 
legislation 
on 
certain 
subjects, 
it 
may 
be 
appropriate for all purposes of classification in 
legislative 
enactments. 
 
Such 
a 
basis 
for 
classification must have a reasonable relation to the 
purposes and objects of the legislation, and must be 
based upon a rational difference in the necessities or 
conditions found in the groups subjected to different 
laws.  If no such relation and differences exist, the 
classification is invalid.   
16B 
Am.Jur.2d 
Constitutional 
Law 
§ 845 
(1998) 
(footnotes 
omitted); see also Chicago Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc. v. 
Thompson, 108 Ill. 2d 357, 369, 483 N.E.2d 1245 (1985).  
¶36 Nankin 
argues 
that 
the 
line 
of 
demarcation 
is 
irrational in this case because property assessments and reviews 
of these assessments are conducted at the municipal government 
level, not at the county level.  In light of this fact, Nankin 
asserts that it may have been rational for the legislature to 
have drawn the line based on the population of the municipality 
and thereby restricting some municipalities from pursuing an 
action under Wis. Stat. § 74.37(3)(d).  However, it was 
irrational for the legislature to have drawn the line at the 
No. 
99-1058  
 
 
20
county border, and therefore, it is a violation of equal 
protection.  
¶37 A review of the legislative history for Wis. Stat. 
§ 74.37(6) and its predecessor Wis. Stat. § 74.73(4) (1955) 
shows that the legislature did not articulate any rationale for 
its classification.  Therefore, we are obligated to construct a 
rationale.  To aid in our determination, the Village offers two 
reasons for the classification.  First, it asserts that the 
judicial workload in a county with a large population is 
substantially more than in a county with a small population, and 
by prohibiting § 74.37(3)(d) actions in counties with a large 
population, the judicial workload becomes more manageable.  
Second, it argues that, by restricting owners of property 
located in counties with a large population to certiorari 
actions, review of these assessments may occur at a faster pace, 
because circuit courts must give preference to such certiorari 
actions.  See Wis. Stat. § 70.47(13).  This is important, the 
Village asserts, because it depends on the tax collected on 
property for their budgets.   
¶38 We conclude that neither explanation serves as a 
rational basis for the classification.  In short, judicial 
workload and timely resolution of property assessments are 
concerns of all counties.  Certainly, the volume of cases in the 
circuit court differs between counties; however, as Nankin 
asserts, the legislature has sought to offset such disparities 
between counties by awarding each county a certain amount of 
No. 
99-1058  
 
 
21
judicial branches depending on such volume.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 753.06.   
¶39 We have stated that a legislative classification will 
satisfy the rational basis standard if it meets the following 
five criteria:   
 
(1) 
All 
classification[s] 
must 
be 
based 
upon 
substantial distinctions which make one class really 
different from another. 
(2) The classification adopted must be germane to the 
purpose of the law. 
(3) The classification must not be based upon existing 
circumstances only. [It must no be so constituted as 
to preclude addition to the numbers included within 
the class]. 
(4) To whatever class a law may apply, it must apply 
equally to each member thereof. 
(5) That the characteristics of each class should be 
so far different from those of other classes as to 
reasonably suggest at least the propriety, having 
regard to the public good, of substantially different 
legislation. 
Aicher, 2000 WI 98, ¶58 (alterations in original).  Under this 
test, the first, second, and fifth criteria are not satisfied. 
¶40 The classification under Wis. Stat. § 74.37 is based 
upon the population of a county.  Thus, applying the first 
factor, population must constitute a substantial distinction, 
such that it makes the class created by the statute really 
different from other classes.  We have indicated that population 
constitutes a substantial distinction when the classes have 
different needs, conditions, or requirements with respect to 
purposes of the legislation such that a statutory classification 
is justified to account for these differences.  See Johnson, 88 
No. 
99-1058  
 
 
22
Wis. at 390-91; cf. City of Brookfield v. Milwaukee Metro. 
Sewerage Dist., 144 Wis. 2d 896, 916, 426 N.W.2d 591 (1988).   
¶41 In this case, however, population does not constitute 
a substantial distinction that makes one class really different 
from another.  There is nothing inherent about populous counties 
to justify the classification in the statute that restricts the 
manner in which owners of property located in such counties may 
challenge their assessments.  Populous counties do not afford 
any additional means to address property assessments such that a 
Wis. Stat. § 74.37 action is unnecessary in such counties.  
Moreover, populous counties do not present any special problems 
or concerns such that it is rational to restrict such circuit 
court actions in populous counties.  Indeed, owners of property 
located in populous counties——particularly owners of property 
located in towns, villages, and small cities in the county——have 
as great an interest in obtaining a court trial on their 
property assessment as owners of property located in other 
counties in the state.  There is no reason why an owner of 
property located in the Village of Shorewood in Milwaukee County 
should be treated differently than an owner of property in the 
Village 
of 
Amherest 
in 
Portage 
County 
with 
respect 
to 
challenging 
their 
property 
assessments. 
 
No 
substantial 
distinction exists. 
¶42 The second factor is also not met in this case because 
the classification is not germane to the purpose of the law.  
The purpose of the law is to afford property owners a means to 
challenge their property assessments.  Assessments and board of 
No. 
99-1058  
 
 
23
review hearings are conducted at the municipal level.  There is 
no justification for using the population of a county in 
legislation that is based on a municipal function.  Further, as 
mentioned, there is no justification in prohibiting only owners 
of property in populous counties from challenging their property 
assessments under Wis. Stat. § 74.37.  Judicial resources in all 
counties are equally burdened by § 74.37 actions; it cannot be 
said that populous counties, with their additional judicial 
resources, are in need of greater relief in this respect than 
other counties.   
¶43 Finally, the fifth prong of the test is also not met. 
 Under this prong, we examine whether the characteristics of 
each class are so far different as to reasonably suggest at 
least the propriety, as to the public good, of substantially 
different legislation.  This factor is based on the following 
reasoning: 
 
 
"The true practical limitation of the legislative 
power to classify is that the classification shall be 
based upon some apparent natural reason,some reason 
suggested by necessity, by such a difference in the 
situation and circumstances of the subjects placed in 
different 
classes 
as 
suggests 
the 
necessity 
or 
propriety of different legislation with respect to 
them." 
State ex rel. Risch v. Bd. of Trs. of Policemen's Pension Fund, 
121 Wis. 44, 54, 98 N.W. 954 (1904) (quoting Nichols v. Walter, 
37 Minn. 264, 272, 33 N.W. 800 (1887)).  We are unable to 
identify any difference in situation or circumstance between 
properties located in populous counties and properties located 
No. 
99-1058  
 
 
24
in other counties in the state that would necessitate different 
legislation for the classes in challenging their property 
assessment.  Properties in both classes are assessed and 
reviewed in the same manner, regardless of the population of the 
county in which the property is located.  Again, there is 
nothing to distinguish property situated in Shorewood from 
property located in any other village throughout the state with 
respect to the assessment of property.  Thus, an analysis under 
these factors supports our conclusion that this classification 
is not supported by a rational basis.  
¶44 Certainly, the legislature may create a classification 
in a statute based on population.  In fact, we upheld such a 
classification in State ex rel. Johnson v. Cady, 50 Wis. 2d 540, 
185 N.W.2d 306 (1971).12  Cady involved a dispute over whether a 
certain legislative scheme for providing revocation hearings to 
probationers violated equal protection.  Id. at 550-51.  The 
scheme provided that probationers in counties with a population 
of less than 500,000 would be in the legal custody of an 
administrative agency while probationers with a population of 
500,000 or more would be in the custody of the probation 
departments of the criminal branches of the circuit courts.  Id. 
at 552.  As a result, probationers in small counties would 
receive an administrative hearing, while probationers in large 
                     
12 See also City of Marshfield v. Town of Cameron, 24 
Wis. 2d 
56, 
62-64, 
127 
N.W.2d 
809 
(1964) 
(upholding 
classifications based on county population where the statute 
pertained to apportionment of public utility taxes to school 
districts). 
No. 
99-1058  
 
 
25
counties would receive a judicial hearing.  Id. at 551.  We 
noted that such classifications by population violated equal 
protection only where they were found irrational and arbitrary, 
that is, where the legislature abused its discretion beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Id. at 552.  We concluded by stating that 
"[w]e are not convinced that a classification established by the 
legislature, which provides for different procedures in counties 
having a population of more than 500,000, is irrational or 
arbitrary.  Thus, the difference in procedure does not offend 
the constitutional provisions requiring equal protection of the 
law."  Id. at 553. 
¶45 The Village argues that Cady supports its position 
that the classification under Wis. Stat. § 74.37(6) does not 
violate equal protection.  However, the differences in procedure 
in Cady did not meet the high standard required for proving an 
equal protection violation.  Since Cady, however, we have 
determined that substantial differences in procedure may offend 
equal protection guarantees in certain instances if there is no 
rational basis to support these differences.  See Milwaukee 
Brewers, 130 Wis. 2d at 106 (finding that two legislative 
provisions 
relating 
to 
administrative 
and 
judicial 
review 
procedures violated equal protection).  In this case, Nankin has 
likewise 
proven 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt 
that 
the 
classification at issue violates equal protection because it 
treats members of classes significantly different without a 
rational 
basis. 
 
In 
turn, 
although 
Cady 
shows 
that 
No. 
99-1058  
 
 
26
classifications by population are permissible in some cases, it 
does not limit our holding in this case.  
¶46 In sum, we conclude that the statute's disparate 
treatment of Nankin and other owners of property located in 
populous counties is without a rational basis, and as a result, 
the statute violates equal protection. 
¶47 We recognize that our determination——that Wis. Stat. 
§ 74.37(6) violates equal protection——is in direct contrast to 
the conclusion reached in S.C. Johnson.  In S.C. Johnson, 
relying on Cady, the court of appeals concluded that "[g]iven 
the deference which the law accords classifications based on 
population, we see nothing irrational or arbitrary in the 
legislative scheme at issue in this case."  S.C. Johnson, 206 
Wis. 2d at 308.  However, based on our analysis above, we find 
the statute both irrational and arbitrary, and therefore, we 
conclude that S.C. Johnson incorrectly decided this issue.  As a 
result, we overrule that portion of S.C. Johnson.   
SEVERABILITY 
¶48 The legislature provides for the severability of 
statutes under the general rules of statutory construction.  
Specifically, Wis. Stat. § 990.001(11) provides: 
 
The provisions of the statutes are severable.  
The provisions of any session law are severable.  If 
any provision of the statutes or of a session law is 
invalid, or if the application of either to any person 
or circumstance is invalid, such invalidity shall not 
affect other provisions or applications which can be 
given 
effect 
without 
the 
invalid 
provision 
or 
application.   
No. 
99-1058  
 
 
27
Thus, this language generally allows for severability when the 
invalid section can be severed without affecting the remainder 
of the statute.   
¶49 We 
have 
likewise 
stated 
that 
severability 
is 
appropriate under such circumstances.  However, we have required 
that an examination of legislative intent must take place first: 
 
 
"Whether 
an 
unconstitutional 
provision 
is 
severable from the remainder of the statute in which 
it appears is largely a question of legislative 
intent, 
but 
the 
presumption 
is 
in 
favor 
of 
severability."  "Unless it is evident that the 
Legislature would not have enacted those provisions 
which are within its power, independently of that 
which is not, the invalid part may be dropped if what 
is left is fully operative as a law." 
State v. Janssen, 219 Wis. 2d 362, 379, 580 N.W.2d 260 (1998) 
(citations omitted). 
¶50 The legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 74.37(6), 
including the history of its predecessor Wis. Stat. § 74.73(4) 
(1955), reveals that the classification has been a part of the 
statute since 1955, when claims for excessive assessment were 
first permitted in the circuit court.  See ch. 440, Laws of 
1955.  However, nothing in the legislative history reveals that 
the legislature intended that any part of the statute would not 
be severable from the whole.  Indeed, as § 74.37 currently 
stands, subsection (6) may be severed and the remainder of the 
statute will remain fully operative.  Thus, because the 
legislature has not indicated its intent otherwise, we conclude 
that § 74.37(6) is severable from the remainder of the statute. 
CONCLUSION 
No. 
99-1058  
 
 
28
¶51 Based on our analysis above, we conclude that Nankin 
has met his burden of proving that Wis. Stat. § 74.37(6) is 
unconstitutional as a violation of equal protection.  The 
classification established in this statutory section treats 
members of the class significantly different than members 
outside the class.  We cannot determine any rational basis for 
this disparate treatment.  Accordingly, we find this statutory 
section unconstitutional.  We reverse the decision of the court 
of appeals and grant summary judgment in favor of Nankin.  We 
also grant Nankin's request for a permanent injunction to allow 
him to file a claim under § 74.37 with the Village.  We deny his 
request for costs associated with this case. 
By the Court.—The decision by the court of appeals is 
reversed.   
¶52 DIANE S. SYKES, J., did not participate. 
No.  99-1058.npc 
 
1 
¶53 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.  (dissenting).  I cannot join 
the majority's opinion because it fails to accord to the 
legislature's 
classification 
the 
presumption 
of 
constitutionality to which it is entitled.  Nothing that Nankin 
or the majority has presented convinces me that Wis. Stat. 
§ 74.37(6) is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  By 
focusing on procedural differences, rather than the rationale 
for allowing property owners in less populous counties the 
additional remedy of court review of their tax assessments, the 
majority has second-guessed a presumptively reasonable statute 
that has guided this state for 45 years. The legislature chose 
to 
allocate 
remedies 
regarding 
review 
of 
property 
tax 
assessments on the basis of population.  Less populated counties 
received three remedies; counties with 500,000 or more people 
received two remedies.  This statute is constitutional because 
the population distinction is intended to relieve the judicial 
burden in populous courts.  
¶54 Through its holding the majority has also called into 
question the myriad of other statutes which are based upon 
population differences.  The legislature needs to be able to 
make policy decisions based upon the various demands which 
accompany differences in population.  Here, the legislature made 
a policy decision to give one more remedy to less populated 
counties than to the populous counties, in order to prevent 
overburdening the populous counties' courts.  So long as there 
is any reasonable basis for this legislation, we should uphold 
it. 
No.  99-1058.npc 
 
2 
¶55 Wisconsin Stat. § 74.37 allows all property owners the 
following avenues of review of their property tax assessments. 
Property owners can have their assessment reviewed by a board of 
review under Wis. Stat. § 70.04.  They can then have the board's 
decision reviewed by certiorari to a circuit court under 
§ 70.47(13).  Alternatively, if the assessment is under $1 
million, they can file a complaint with the Wisconsin Department 
of Revenue in accord with § 70.85.  Those who own property in 
counties with less than 500,000 have the additional option under 
§ 74.37 of submitting a claim for excessive assessment, and, if 
the tax district or county disallows that claim, they may seek 
de novo review by initiating a claim in circuit court to recover 
the allegedly excessive assessment.  This additional option does 
not, contrary to the majority's conclusion, mean that the 
legislature 
has 
irrationally 
deprived 
property 
owners 
in 
counties with a population of 500,000 or more of equal 
protection under the law. 
¶56 As the majority acknowledges, this court must examine 
whether the legislature's choice to classify according to 
population is supported by a rational basis.  Majority op. at 
¶11.  If the legislative history does not provide the rational 
basis, the court must construct one, if possible.  Sambs v. City 
of Brookfield, 97 Wis. 2d 356, 371, 293 N.W.2d 504 (1980).  The 
legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 74.37(6) does not articulate 
a rationale for the population classification, so it is unclear 
why the majority discussed the legislative history at such 
length.   
No.  99-1058.npc 
 
3 
¶57 The rationale for Wis. Stat. § 74.37(6) seems clear 
from an analysis of the statute itself.  The additional process 
of de novo review would be too burdensome on the more populous 
counties.  The burden on a populous county, and the concomitant 
burden on its courts, is already evident as only Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court has 47 branches, 29 more than the next 
busiest circuit court, Dane County.  Wis. Stat. App. pp. 5849-
5850 (1999-2000).  Furthermore, Milwaukee County alone comprises 
a judicial administrative district, Amicus Curiae Br. at 4 n.3, 
and Court of Appeals District I also serves only Milwaukee 
County.  Wis. Stat. App. p. 5645.  Currently, Milwaukee County 
alone experiences this burden of population, but other counties 
are certainly growing in population, and will likely join the 
classification in the future.  Over 120 years ago, the United 
States Supreme Court recognized the burden of population on the 
courts and that the legislature should be able to take this into 
consideration.   
 
 ". . . A uniformity which is not essential as regards 
different 
States cannot 
be essential 
as 
regards 
different parts of a State, provided that in each and 
all there is no infraction of the constitutional 
provision. 
 
Diversities 
which 
are 
allowable 
in 
different States are allowable in different parts of 
the same State. . . .  Large cities may require a 
multiplication of courts and a peculiar arrangement of 
jurisdictions.  It would be an unfortunate restriction 
on the powers of the State government if it could not, 
in 
its 
discretion, 
provide 
for 
these 
various 
exigencies. 
State ex rel. Johnson v. Cady, 50 Wis. 2d 540, 551, 185 N.W.2d 
306 (1971) (quoting Missouri v. Lewis 101 U.S. 22, 25 (1879)).  
No.  99-1058.npc 
 
4 
As the United States Supreme Court has recognized how population 
places a burden on the courts, this court should have considered 
whether the legislature reasonably wanted to ease the additional 
burden of § 74.37 on populous counties.   
¶58 For nearly a century, this court has held that the 
legislature may classify counties according to population.  
State ex rel. Scanlan v. Archibold 146 Wis. 363, 131 N.W. 895 
(1911); see also Village of Whitefish Bay v. Milwaukee County, 
224 Wis. 373, 377, 271 N.W. 416 (1937).  "That counties may be 
classified according to population has been said to be no longer 
open to doubt."  Scanlan, 146 Wis. at 370.  Furthermore, for the 
last five years, S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Town of Caledonia, 
206 Wis. 2d 292, 308, 557 N.W.2d 412 (Ct. App. 1996), rev. 
denied, 208 Wis. 2d 212, 562 N.W.2d 602 (1997), has specifically 
held 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 74.37(6) 
does 
not 
violate 
equal 
protection, because there is a rational relationship between the 
classification and a legitimate governmental purpose.  The 
majority's decision today unfortunately has the effect of 
overruling this line of cases that support the legislature's 
classification based on population. 
¶59 In 
addition 
to 
overruling 
clear 
precedent, 
the 
majority now makes numerous other statutes vulnerable to an 
equal protection challenge. There are at least 175 Wisconsin 
Statutes that classify according to population.  Of those, there 
are at least 24 that, without dispute, explicitly regulate 
activity 
based 
on 
the 
same 
population 
classification 
of 
"counties having a population of 500,000 or more."  Wis. Stat. 
No.  99-1058.npc 
 
5 
§§ 45.058 (memorials in populous counties), 46.215 (county 
department of social services in populous counties), 46.48 
(grants for community programs), 48.07 (additional sources of 
court services), 48.561 (child welfare services in populous 
counties), 48.58 (county children's home), 49.025 (relief block 
grant to populous counties), 51.08 (maintenance of mental health 
complex), 59.20 (election of county officers), 59.60 (budgetary 
procedures), 59.79 
(county 
board 
functions), 
59.80 
(crime 
commission), 59.82 
(cash 
flow designation), 
60.05 (razing 
buildings and excavations), 75.67 (procedures for authorized 
cities), 
167.27 
(capping 
and 
filling 
wells 
or 
similar 
structures), 228.02 (certification of records), 228.03 (copy 
deemed original record), 228.04 (inspection and copies of 
records), 
228.05 (marginal 
references 
in records), 
228.06 
(corrections and alterations of records), 252.076 (joint county 
home and county tuberculosis sanatorium), 799.05 (language of 
small claims summons), and 938.06 (services for court).  These 
statutes are further justification for the conclusion that 
population is a distinguishable characteristic for legislation. 
 In fact, there is an entire chapter in the statutes dealing 
only with the treatment of records in populous counties and 
cities.  Wis. Stat. Ch. 228.  Because the majority neglects to 
provide guidance regarding what is a rational distinction, these 
statutes, as well as all other classifications based on 
population, are now vulnerable to future equal protection 
challenges. 
No.  99-1058.npc 
 
6 
¶60 In arriving at its conclusion, the majority assumes 
that towns and villages in counties with a population of less 
than 500,000 are similarly situated to those in counties with a 
population greater than 500,000.  Since this is just an 
assumption, it can reasonably be argued that towns and villages 
in counties with a population greater than 500,000 are not so 
similarly situated. 
¶61 The majority also assumes that the legislature cannot 
make a distinction as to remedies based on classifications.  
Yet, this is exactly what the legislature has done with workers' 
compensation.  The Worker's Compensation Act, Wis. Stat. Ch. 
102, 
distinguishes 
remedies 
for 
injuries, 
based 
on 
the 
classification of employment, in order to ensure that covered 
employees 
who 
become 
injured 
or 
ill 
receive 
prompt 
and 
comprehensive medical care.  UFE Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review 
Comm'n, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 288, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996). 
¶62 The majority struck down Wis. Stat. § 74.37(6) because 
the statute distinguished remedial procedures on the basis of 
population. However, this is the same legislative classification 
this court upheld in State ex rel. Johnson v. Cady, 50 Wis. 2d 
540, 185 N.W.2d 306 (1971).  In Cady, this court upheld, against 
an 
equal 
protection 
challenge, 
a 
statute 
which 
provided 
different remedies on the basis of population.  50 Wis. 2d at 
553.  The statute at issue in Cady distinguished between 
probation revocation procedures.  Probationers in counties with 
a population of less than 500,000 received an administrative 
hearing upon revocation.  Id. at 551.  Probationers in a county 
No.  99-1058.npc 
 
7 
having a population of more than 500,000 – Milwaukee County – 
received a judicial hearing upon revocation.  Id. at 550.  The 
court upheld the statute, stating:  "We are not convinced that a 
classification established by the legislature, which provides 
for different procedures in counties having a population of more 
than 500,000, is irrational or arbitrary.  Thus, the difference 
in procedure does not offend the constitutional provisions 
requiring equal protection of the law."  Id. at 553. 
¶63 Even though the similarities between this case and 
Cady 
are 
striking, 
the 
majority 
nonetheless 
attempts 
to 
distinguish Cady.  Majority op. at ¶45.  The legislative 
classification is exactly the same, as both distinguish counties 
with a population of less than 500,000 from counties with a 
population of 500,000 or more.  See Cady, 50 Wis. 2d at 552.  
Furthermore, just like here, where the population classification 
determines the remedial procedure for review of tax assessments, 
the population classification in Cady determined the remedial 
procedures for probationers.  And just like here, the population 
classification 
determines 
the 
difference 
between 
an 
No.  99-1058.npc 
 
8 
administrative hearing and a judicial hearing.13 This court found 
in Cady that an identical statutory classification – based on 
population - was not "irrational and arbitrary," Cady, Wis. 2d 
at 553, and the majority's attempts to distinguish it are not 
convincing. 
¶64 Moreover, 
the 
majority 
hangs 
its 
hat 
on 
the 
differences between certiorari review and de novo review.  
Majority op. at ¶25.  Cady implicitly rejected this distinction, 
however, 
by 
concluding 
that, 
for 
the 
purposes 
of 
equal 
protection, 
there 
is 
no 
substantial 
difference 
between 
certiorari review of the administrative hearing of probation 
revocation and a judicial hearing (de novo) for a probationer in 
Milwaukee County.  Here, the difference is even less significant 
because residents of all counties have access to certiorari 
review in the circuit courts.  The legislature has simply chosen 
to provide an additional remedy of de novo review to residents 
in less populous counties.   
                     
13 While the classification distinctions are the same, the 
difference between this case and State ex rel. Johnson v. Cady, 
50 Wis. 2d 540, 185 N.W.2d 306 (1971), is the review granted to 
each population class.  In Cady, probationers in the populous 
county received a judicial hearing and all other probationers 
received an administrative hearing followed, if desired, by 
certiorari review.  50 Wis. 2d 540, 549-51, 185 N.W.2d 306 
(1971).  The opposite is true in this case. Residents of the 
populous county receive administrative review and certiorari 
review in the circuit court, of their tax assessments.  All 
other residents have administrative review, certiorari review, 
and the additional remedy of de novo review in the circuit 
court.  
No.  99-1058.npc 
 
9 
¶65 Without meaningful distinction, the majority refuses 
to rely on the similarities in Cady.  The majority also fails to 
recognize that if there was ever a situation to require absolute 
equal treatment of individuals, it would be in the situation 
such as Cady, where probationers are being returned to prison. 
This court held in Cady, that even in a situation where a 
person's conditional liberty is at stake, it is not a violation 
of equal protection for the legislature to designate on the 
basis of population, procedures available to provide a remedy.  
Reviewing tax assessments has less severe consequences than the 
loss of liberty.14 
¶66 In addition to the statute in Cady, the legislature 
has distinguished procedures on the basis of population in 
numerous other statutes as well.  For example, under Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.06, a populous county is required to operate a children's 
court center and in a less populous county the county department 
provides intake services.  Under § 59.20, residents of a less 
populous county elect a county coroner and county surveyor, but 
residents of a county with a population greater than 500,000 do 
not.  Section § 74.37(6) should be upheld, because it does not 
deprive any individual of a review of a property tax assessment; 
the legislature simply chose to provide an additional remedial 
procedure to property owners in less populous counties. 
                     
14 Also, arguably, in Cady, it would be more of a burden on 
the populous county courts to provide a judicial hearing for 
probation revocation.  See ¶57 herein.  Yet, this court 
determined that distinguishing according to population was 
neither irrational nor arbitrary.  Cady, 50 Wis. 2d at 553. 
No.  99-1058.npc 
 
10
¶67 The law provides us with a presumption when deciding 
whether a legislative classification violates equal protection 
guarantees.  The presumption is exactly opposite of the 
majority's assumption that the legislature cannot make a 
distinction based on population.  The court must presume that 
the legislative classification is constitutional.  Milwaukee 
Brewers Baseball Club v. DHSS, 130 Wis. 2d 79, 387 N.W.2d 254 
(1986).  The court must also "indulge every presumption to 
sustain the law if at all possible" and resolve all doubts "in 
favor of the reasonableness of the classification."  Majority 
op. at ¶¶10, 11.  Such presumption must be overcome, if it is to 
be overcome, beyond a reasonable doubt.  Milwaukee Brewers, 130 
Wis. 2d  at 99.  In reaching its conclusion, the majority fails 
to apply the proper presumption in favor of constitutionality. 
¶68 Contrary to the majority's conclusion, this is not the 
situation 
we 
had 
before 
us 
in 
Milwaukee 
Brewers. 
 The 
challengers in Milwaukee Brewers were residents of a six-block 
area that were singled out by legislation, and given only the 
meaningless option of an informational hearing as the process to 
challenge an Environmental Impact Study (EIS) for building a 
prison.  Milwaukee Brewers, 130 Wis. 2d at 96-97.  This case is 
different 
because 
all 
taxpayers, 
including 
residents 
in 
Milwaukee County, are entitled to a meaningful review of their 
assessment by a board of review. Even without the additional 
claim 
procedure, 
Milwaukee 
County 
residents, 
unlike 
the 
challengers in Milwaukee Brewers, have such a meaningful right. 
No.  99-1058.npc 
 
11
¶69 The situation in Milwaukee Brewers was also different 
because it involved new legislation, so far limiting the process 
to challenge an EIS review, that it essentially prevented 
residents from contesting the prison location.  Id. at 105-106. 
 The instant case involves a statute that has been on the books 
for 45 years, and the majority now, in effect, removes it, 
without hesitation, by holding that it is unconstitutional. 
¶70 This legislative classification based on population is 
constitutional, because it meets all five of the criteria 
discussed by the majority as necessary to meet the rational 
basis standard. 
 
(1) 
All 
classifications must be 
based 
upon 
substantial distinctions which made one class really 
different from another. 
(2) The classification adopted must be germane 
to the purpose of the law. 
(3) The classification must not be based upon 
existing circumstances only and must not be so 
constituted as to preclude addition to the numbers 
included within a class. 
(4) To whatever class a law may apply, it must 
apply equally to each member thereof. 
(5) The characteristics of each class could be 
so far different from those of other classes as to 
reasonably suggest at least the propriety, having 
regard to the public good, of substantially different 
legislation. 
Milwaukee Brewers, 130 Wis. 2d at 97. 
¶71 Under the first criteria, the majority justifies its 
decision by denying that population makes one class "really 
different from another."  Majority op. at ¶41. The majority 
refuses to recognize that population distinguishes classes with 
different needs, conditions, or requirements with respect to the 
No.  99-1058.npc 
 
12
burden on the courts.  See majority op. at ¶40.  Through its 
denial, the majority fails to recognize that certain benefits 
inure 
to 
residents 
in 
populous 
counties. 
 
Residents 
of 
Shorewood, as well as all other residents of Milwaukee County, 
are benefiting explicitly from living in a county which contains 
the city of Milwaukee.  As a first class city, Milwaukee gets 
benefits and aid to which other cities are not entitled, and, 
often, all of the county's residents, therefore, also receive a 
benefit.  Unlike rural Forest County, Milwaukee County is 
eligible for relief block grants, Wis. Stat. § 49.025, and 
community program grants, § 46.48.  As a result of the benefits 
exclusive to Milwaukee County, municipalities in Milwaukee 
County, 
including 
Shorewood, 
benefit 
from 
the 
population 
distinction. 
¶72 The majority also contradicts itself by first denying 
that 
population 
is 
a 
distinguishable 
factor, 
and 
later 
specifically recognizing legislative classifications based on 
population.  Majority op. at ¶17.  In footnote seven, the 
majority acknowledges that how tax assessment contests are heard 
depends on population, which directly contradicts its position 
that population is not a distinguishable factor.  Indeed, this 
is direct evidence that population is a distinguishable factor, 
and demonstrates how the legislature regulates activity as a 
result of population. 
¶73 The population classification satisfies the second 
criteria, because the classification adopted is germane to the 
purpose of the law.  Milwaukee Brewers, 130 Wis. 2d at 97.  The 
No.  99-1058.npc 
 
13
majority simply relies on its denial that population is a 
substantial distinction in finding that the classification does 
not 
meet 
this 
factor, 
in 
regard 
to 
a 
rational 
basis 
determination.  As recognized in the list of statutes above, the 
legislature uses population as a distinguishing factor, because 
population has a direct effect on the burdens placed on 
counties.  It is entirely reasonable for the legislature to 
choose, due to population, not to further burden the courts in 
populous counties.  This is a rational basis to uphold 
§ 74.37(6), and to find it constitutional. 
¶74 The majority further believes that distinguishing 
population at the county line is not justified because property 
assessments are reviewed at the municipal level.  Majority op. 
at ¶42.  What the majority overlooks, however, is that Wis. 
Stat. § 74.37 provides for review in the circuit courts, which 
are organized by county.  Because the legislature wanted to 
prevent further burdening the circuit courts in populous 
counties, it was entirely reasonable to distinguish population 
at the county line. 
¶75 The majority fails to give the judicial burden 
rationale the weight it deserves, and simply dismisses it by 
stating, "judicial workload and timely resolution of property 
assessments are concerns of all counties."  Majority op. at ¶38. 
 However, this was the legislature's choice, and the legislature 
appears to have concluded that, for populous counties, the 
judicial workload was already too much. "Any reasonable basis 
No.  99-1058.npc 
 
14
for the classification will validate the statute."  Milwaukee 
Brewers, 130 Wis. 2d at 99.  
¶76 Although completely ignored by the majority, the third 
and fourth criteria for a rational basis determination are also 
satisfied by the population classification in § 74.37(6).  Under 
the third factor, the classification does not rest only on 
existing circumstances, as others could be added to the class.  
Currently, only Milwaukee County is a member of the class, but 
as other counties grow, they will join the class as they reach 
the 500,000 mark.  See Scanlan, 146 Wis. at 370 (recognizing 
that other counties "may grow into the class.") 
¶77 The 
population 
classification 
also 
satisfies 
the 
fourth criteria since Wis. Stat. § 74.37(6) applies equally 
throughout the class.  None of the property owners in counties 
with more than 500,000 people have access to the additional 
claim procedure.   
¶78 Finally, the population classification also meets the 
fifth prong of the test, because the characteristics of each 
class could be so far different from the other class reasonably 
to suggest the propriety, in light of the public good, of 
substantially different legislation.  Similar to the first 
factor, the majority finds itself "unable to identify any 
difference" 
based 
on 
population 
"that 
would 
necessitate 
different legislation for the classes in challenging their 
property assessment."  Majority op. at ¶43.  The population 
difference suggests that allowing more populous counties access 
to the additional excessive assessment claim procedure in Wis. 
No.  99-1058.npc 
 
15
Stat. § 74.37 might actually run afoul of the public good.  
Apart from the burden of the claim procedure on Milwaukee County 
and the tax districts in the county, having the circuit courts 
hold de novo trials on allegedly excessive assessments would be 
burdensome.  Also, there may be other justifications for the 
additional procedure only in less populated counties.  Many 
counties with smaller populations may have assessors, and those 
on the boards of review, that a majority of the property owners 
know.  Circuit court review of excessive assessments de novo 
provides an additional assurance that there is no favoritism in 
the assessment. 
¶79 Since 
the 
majority 
concluded 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 74.37(6) was unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, it 
did not need to address Nankin's two additional constitutional 
challenges: 
 
One, 
that 
§ 74.37(6) 
violates 
Article 
IV, 
Section 31 of the Wisconsin Constitution as a private or special 
law that assesses or collects taxes.15   Two, that § 74.37(6) 
violates Article IV, Section 18 because it is a private or local 
                     
15 Article IV, Section 31 provides in pertinent part that 
"[t]he legislature is prohibited from enacting any special or 
private laws in the following cases: . . . [f]or assessment or 
collection of taxes or for extending the time for the collection 
thereof."  
However, the legislature may legislate on any subject 
prohibited in Article IV, Section 31, so long as the legislation 
complies with Article IV, Section 32:  "The legislature may 
provide by general law for the treatment of any subject for 
which lawmaking is prohibited by section 31 of this article.  
Subject to reasonable classifications, such laws shall be 
uniform in their operation throughout the state." 
No.  99-1058.npc 
 
16
law which addresses more than one subject.16  Section 74.37 
violates neither constitutional provision, just as it does not 
violate equal protection. 
¶80 Wisconsin Stat. § 74.37 indisputably pertains only to 
claims made on excessive assessments, and, as such, it has 
nothing at all to do with the assessment or collection of taxes. 
 On that basis, § 74.37 does not violate Article IV, Section 31. 
 Moreover, even if § 74.37 pertained to the assessment or 
collection of taxes, § 74.37 complies with the requirements for 
a "general" and "uniform" law under Article IV, Section 32.  
"This 
court 
has 
consistently 
applied 
certain 
rules 
for 
determining the legislature's competence under Wis. Const. art. 
IV, § 32 to pass laws affecting only certain entities, such as 
cities or counties of a certain class or size, notwithstanding 
the prohibitions of Wis. Const. article IV, section 31."  
Libertarian Party of Wisconsin v. State, 199 Wis. 2d 790, 803, 
546 N.W.2d 424 (1996) (per curiam).  These rules are the same 
five criteria or factors that comprise the standard for 
determining 
whether 
there 
is 
a 
rational 
basis 
for 
the 
legislative classification.  Id.; see also ¶66 herein, above.  
Because the classification in § 74.37 is reasonable under the 
five prongs of that test, it is reasonable here, where §§ 31 and 
32 of Article IV are at issue.  "[I]f the legislation being 
                     
16 Article IV, Section 18 provides that "[n]o private or 
local bill which may be passed by the legislature shall embrace 
more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the 
title."  
No.  99-1058.npc 
 
17
challenged contains classifications which are open, germane, and 
relate 
to 
true 
differences 
between 
the 
entities 
being 
classified, then the legislation is considered general and of 
uniform application."  City of Brookfield v. Milwaukee Metro. 
Sewerage Dist., 144 Wis. 2d 896, 911, 426 N.W.2d 591 (1988).  In 
other words, even if § 74.37 addressed a tax assessment or 
collection, which it does not, it is a "general law" and 
"uniform" within the meaning of Article IV, Section 32, and 
therefore proper. 
¶81 Wisconsin Stat. § 74.37 is also proper under Article 
IV, Section 18.  Since the Article IV, Section 18 challenge 
arises in a classification context, the analytical framework is 
nearly the same as the five-part test used to evaluate equal 
protection and Article IV, Section 31 and Section 32 challenges. 
 See City of Brookfield, 144 Wis. 2d at 911-12.  The only 
difference is that the classification is not presumed to be 
constitutional.  Id. at 912 n.5.  However, even without this 
presumption, there is no indication that § 74.37 is "local" 
legislation in violation of Article IV, Section 18, even though 
"general in form."  See Village of Whitefish Bay v. Milwaukee 
County, 224 Wis. 373, 378-79, 271 N.W. 416 (1937).  At issue in 
Whitefish Bay was legislation that modified the allocation of 
collected delinquent taxes for municipalities in counties with a 
population of greater than 500,000.  This court found that the 
classification did not make the law "local" (even though the 
only county with a population of greater than 500,000 was 
Milwaukee County) because the classification was an open one.  
No.  99-1058.npc 
 
18
That is, other counties could grow into it.  The problem with 
the classification in Whitefish Bay was that it was not germane 
to any purpose of the law.  "Counsel do not suggest, and we are 
unable to discover, any basis for classification resting upon 
population applicable to Milwaukee county that does not apply 
equally to every other county in the state so far as the 
distribution of tax moneys is concerned."  Id. at 378.  Here, in 
contrast, the classification is germane to the purpose of Wis. 
Stat. § 74.37(6), namely to relieve the courts in the more 
populous counties from the additional burden of de novo review 
of allegedly excessive tax assessments. 
¶82 Based upon review of the five factors necessary to 
determine whether there is a rational basis which justifies the 
legislature's population classification, and especially given 
that the legislature's classifications are presumed to be 
constitutional, I cannot join the majority's opinion.  Nothing 
Nankin or the majority has presented convinces me that the 
judicial burden rationale fails to provide a rational basis for 
the 
population 
classification, 
and 
that 
§ 74.37(6) 
is 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. 
¶83 For all of these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶84 I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX 
joins this opinion. 
 
 
No.  99-1058.npc 
 
1