Case Title: Hayden v. Elam

Citation: 739 So. 2d 1088

Docket Number: 1980527

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1999-06-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
739 So. 2d 1088 (1999)
Vanessa Ann HAYDEN
v.
Bill ELAM et al.
1980527.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
June 25, 1999.
*1090 William S. Halsey III of Southlaw, P.C., Birmingham, for appellant.
David Cromwell Johnson of Johnson, Liddon, Bear & Tuggle, Birmingham, for appellees.
HOUSTON, Justice.
Vanessa Ann Hayden sued Bill Elam and Elam, Inc. (a corporation owned or controlled by Bill Elam), and obtained a jury verdict for $80,000. The trial court, after assessing interest and allowing for a set-off, entered a judgment on the verdict, for $95,159.20.[1] The defendants filed a Rule 59, Ala.R.Civ.P., motion for a new trial, alleging that they had been denied a fair trial as a result of the closing argument of a legal intern; that intern had assisted Hayden's attorney during the trial and, according to the defendants, had done so in violation of this Court's rule governing legal interns"Alabama Rule for Legal Internship by Law Students." The trial court granted the motion. We reverse and remand.
The following facts are undisputed: Kim McClain assisted Hayden's attorney in the preparation and trial of Hayden's case. At the time she participated in the trial, McClain was acting as a legal intern under the guidelines set out in the rule governing legal interns. McClain participated during the trial with Hayden's written consent. Hayden's attorney did not file Hayden's statement of consent with the trial court. Neither did Hayden's attorney file his own statement of approval of McClain's appearance. The defendants' trial attorney was aware that McClain was participating in the case as a legal intern and not as a licensed attorney.[2] In response to the defense attorney's closing argument, McClain asked the jury to compare certain trial exhibits; one of those exhibits, which Hayden relied on, was a copy of the 1994 *1091 federal income-tax return filed by Elam, Inc. Addressing perceived discrepancies between certain entries in those exhibits, McClain referred to the fact that a rentexpense entry on that tax return had been filed "under penalty of perjury." The defense attorney objected to McClain's reference to perjury, stating: "Your Honor, I'm going to object, she's accusing him [Bill Elam] of perjury, there ain't no testimony of the tax returns." The trial court responded: "Well, let me just say this, perjury, if you said `perjury,' is sworn testimony before a court followed by sworn testimony before a court, one is true and one is untrue, and I don't think you've got that situation here." The defendants did not object further or move for a mistrial.
The rule governing legal interns reads in its entirety as follows:
(Emphasis added.)
Hayden concedes, as she must, that her attorney failed to comply with section II.C. of the rule by failing to file the necessary "written consent and approval" referred to in section II.A. Section II.C. of the rule is clear. The attorney, by failing to file the necessary documents, and thereby failing to apprise the trial court, before the trial, of McClain's intern status, denied *1093 the trial court the opportunity to consider whether the court deemed it appropriate for McClain to participate in the trial. One of the stated purposes of the rule is to "help the bar discharge its responsibility to provide competent legal services for all persons." Section I. The rule contemplates the trial court's participation in this process by making a law student's appearance or participation discretionary with the trial court.[3]
However, the dispositive issue here is not whether Hayden violated section II.C. of the rule governing legal interns. The critical question is whether McClain's participation during the trial, specifically her reference in her closing statement to perjury, provides a basis for ordering a new trial. Rule 61, Ala.R.Civ. P., states:
(Emphasis added.) Rule 61 applies to arguments of counsel in appropriate situations, see Lawrence v. Alabama Power Co., 385 So. 2d 986 (Ala.1980); and where no substantial rights of the complaining party are affected, any error is harmless. See Poston v. Gaddis, 372 So. 2d 1099 (Ala. 1979).
After carefully reviewing the record and the briefs, we cannot agree with the trial court's conclusion that McClain's participating in the trial and her referring to the corporate defendant's 1994 income-tax return in her closing argument so prejudiced the defendants as to require a new trial.
A ruling on a motion for a new trial rests within the discretion of the trial court. The exercise of that discretion carries with it a presumption of correctness; however, this Court will reverse an order granting a new trial when some legal right is denied and the record clearly shows that the trial court abused its discretion. Hill v. Cherry, 379 So. 2d 590 (Ala.1980). Each case must be decided on its own merits, with due inquiry into the issues, the parties, and the general atmosphere of a particular case. Calvert & Marsh Coal Co. v. Pass, 393 So. 2d 955 (Ala.1980). Although the trial court has great latitude in ruling on the propriety of an attorney's (or, as here, a legal intern's) closing argument, see Prescott v. Martin, 331 So. 2d 240 (Ala. 1976), that latitude is not without bounds.
The record indicates that a copy of the corporate defendant's 1994 incometax return was introduced into evidence. That document states that it was to be signed "[u]nder penalties of perjury." It appears to us that McClain referred to the tax return and its "under-penalties-of-perjury" language in an effort to convince the jury that the rent-expense entry on that document was more accurate or more reliable than a rent-expense entry that appeared on another document the defendants had introduced into evidence and on which *1094 they relied. Contrary to the defendants' assertion, we do not view McClain's statement as accusing Bill Elam of perjury. To the contrary, McClain held the tax return up to the jury as being the more reliable of the two disputed documents. The message she obviously hoped to convey to the jury was that Bill Elam and the corporation had filed a truthful document with the Internal Revenue Service and, therefore, that the jury should rely on that document, at least in part, in calculating her damages.
Justice Jones, writing for this Court in R.C. Bottling Co. v. Sorrells, 290 Ala. 187, 190, 275 So. 2d 131, 134 (1973), made the following observations:
The record does not indicate that McClain did anything other than assist Hayden's attorney in providing competent (and, as the verdict indicates, effective) legal representation to Hayden. Therefore, the stated purposes of the rule governing legal interns were satisfied (i.e., "to help the bar discharge its responsibility to provide competent legal services for all persons, and to encourage law schools to provide [future attorneys] with practical training during the period of their formal legal education"). Section I.[4]
Even if McClain's statement could somehow be considered an improper accusation of perjury, the defendants timely objected and the trial court gave a curative instruction. The trial court specifically told the jury: "I don't think you've got that situation [perjury] here." The defendants made no further objection and did not move for a mistrial. Under these circumstances, a new trial could not be justified unless McClain's remark was "so grossly improper and highly prejudicial" as to be beyond corrective action by the trial court. Hill v. Sherwood, 488 So. 2d 1357, 1359 (Ala.1986). With due regard to the trial court's discretion in ruling on matters of this kind, we could not hold, based on this record, that McClain's remark *1095 falls within that category of statements so grossly improper or so highly prejudicial as to be beyond corrective action.
The order granting the defendants a new trial is reversed, and the case is remanded for an order or proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, COOK, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, and JOHNSTONE, JJ., concur.
[1]  The underlying facts and Hayden's various theories of recovery are not pertinent to our resolution of this appeal.
[2]  The defendants state in their brief that Hayden's attorney made "no effort of any kind... to provide any notice whatsoever of [McClain's] legal internship status to either the trial court or defense counsel." The defendants also categorically deny learning of McClain's status until after the trial. However, page 178 of the record indicates that the following colloquy occurred at Bill Elam's deposition on September 4, 1998, several weeks before the trial:

"Ms. McClain: Can I say something on the record?
"Mr. Rockefeller [Elam's attorney]: No.
"Ms. McClain: I'm here on Vanessa Hayden's behalf.
"Mr. Rockefeller: You're an attorney?
"Ms. McClain: I have a practice card.
"Mr. Rockefeller: You have to have specific authorization from the client, and you have to haveGo ahead. Knock yourself out."
[3]  The rule governing legal interns has a specific section (VI) dealing with "Attorney's Responsibility." That section requires the supervising attorney 1) to "[a]ssume personal professional responsibility for the student's work" (the record indicates that Hayden's attorney did that); 2) to "[a]ssist the student in his or her preparation to the extent the [attorney] considers it necessary" (there is no indication in the record that Hayden's attorney failed to do that); and 3) to "[s]ecure the [client's] written consent" for the student to appear in court (the record indicates that Hayden's attorney did that). The filing requirements overlooked by Hayden's attorney do not appear in section VI., although, logically, they should.
[4]  The defendants contend that McClain's participation at the trial constituted the unauthorized practice of law, under Ala.Code 1975, § 34-3-6. Citing Ex parte Ghafary, 738 So. 2d 778 (Ala.1998), the defendants argue that McClain's presence rendered the verdict a nullity; therefore, they say, the trial court had no choice but to order a new trial. Section 34-3-6(a) states that "[o]nly such persons as are regularly licensed have authority to practice law." Section 34-3-6(b) defines "the practice of law." McClain, no doubt, was involved in "the practice of law," within the meaning of that term as it is used in § 34-3-6(b), when she assisted Hayden's attorney in the preparation and trial of Hayden's case. However, she did so under the authority conferred by, and under the conditions set out in, this Court's rule governing legal interns. See Amendment 328, § 6.11 ("[t]he supreme court shall make and promulgate rules governing the administration of all courts and rules governing practice and procedure in all courts"). Hayden's attorney filed the action and was present throughout the trial. Therefore, because McClain was a "person[] ... licensed ... to practice law," albeit only under the supervision of a regularly licensed attorney, her participation in Hayden's case did not violate § 34-3-6. These circumstances distinguish this case from Ex parte Ghafary, where the complaint, which was not signed by anyone licensed to practice law, was deemed a nullity.