Case Title: People v. Cox

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88860

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2001-04-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 88860-Agenda 8-November 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								DERICK A. COX, Appellant.
Opinion filed April 19, 2001.
	JUSTICE FITZGERALD delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial in the Champaign County circuit court,
the defendant, Derick Cox, was convicted of unlawful possession
of a stolen vehicle and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment. The
appellate court affirmed the defendant's conviction and sentence.
No. 4-99-0122 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule
23). We granted the defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 177
Ill. 2d R. 315(a).
	The central issue in this case involves the continuing use of
the "mere-fact" method for impeaching a criminal defendant with
prior conviction evidence after our opinion in People v. Atkinson,
186 Ill. 2d 450 (1999). We reverse the defendant's conviction and
remand for a new trial.

BACKGROUND
	On May 23, 1998, a Nissan Pulsar owned by David and Rose
Sherer and loaned to their son, Zachary Fisher, a University of
Illinois student, disappeared from a student housing complex in
Champaign. A week later, the car reappeared in Rantoul, crashed
into a construction sign and stopped near a roadside tree. As a
Rantoul police officer approached the accident, he noticed the
defendant walking toward the car. The defendant saw the officer
and ran. The officer and his police dog pursued the defendant into
a nearby residence where he was arrested. The defendant was
indicted for burglary, criminal damage to property, and unlawful
possession of a stolen vehicle. Before trial, the State dismissed the
burglary and criminal damage to property counts. A jury
deadlocked on the unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle count,
and the court declared a mistrial.
	The State chose to retry the defendant, and another jury found
him guilty of unlawful possession of a stolen vehicle. The court
sentenced the defendant to 15 years' imprisonment. The appellate
court affirmed the defendant's conviction and sentence. This
appeal followed.


ANALYSIS


	The defendant raises four issues in his appeal. We focus
initially on the first issue: whether the appellate court incorrectly
sanctioned the trial court's use of the "mere-fact" method to
impeach the defendant's credibility with his prior felony
convictions. Under the mere-fact method, "only the 'mere fact' of
the felony conviction is to be brought to the jury's attention, as
opposed to informing the jury of the precise offense of which the
defendant has been convicted or the circumstances surrounding
that prior conviction or both." People v. Kunze, 193 Ill. App. 3d
708, 733 (1990) (Steigmann, J., specially concurring). The
defendant contends that this court barred mere-fact impeachment
in Atkinson.
	Immediately before trial, defense counsel filed a motion in
limine to bar all evidence of the defendant's five prior felony
convictions: two 1989 theft convictions, a 1990 burglary
conviction, a 1994 theft conviction, and a 1996 burglary
conviction. Defense counsel argued that these convictions were
closely related to the unlawful possession of a stolen motor vehicle
charge. According to defense counsel, if the jury heard evidence
of these convictions, it would believe that the defendant had a
propensity to commit these types of offenses. The court stated:
		"The court always weighs the prejudicial impact of
informing the jury about the Defendant's prior
convictions against the probative value. And if this
Defendant wishes to testify, the jury is going to be told
that their duty will be to judge the credibility of the
witnesses. And I am of the opinion that it's only fair that
the jury be aware that the Defendant does have prior
felony convictions when they weigh his credibility, should
he choose to testify.
			I will, however, not specifically tell the jury of the
burglary convictions and the theft conviction. I will
merely tell the jury the Defendant has a prior theft and
felony convictions, as opposed to-well, theft, this is a
stolen car. I will not even go so far as to say theft. I'm just
going to say felony convictions if he's going to be
impeached with his prior record."
	On direct examination of the defendant, defense counsel
asked, "[Y]ou have a couple of prior felony convictions, don't
you?" The defendant answered that he did. In a post-trial motion,
the defendant asserted that the court erred in allowing evidence of
his prior convictions to reach the jury. The trial court denied this
motion.
	The appellate court held that, despite our decision in Atkinson,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the mere
fact of the defendant's prior convictions because the defendant
agreed to mere-fact impeachment. No. 4-99-0122 (unpublished
order under Supreme Court Rule 23). We, however, see no such
agreement on the record. To the contrary, the defendant filed a
motion in limine asking the court to exclude any evidence of his
prior convictions and a post-trial motion reiterating that position.
The prior conviction issue was properly preserved for review. See
People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 187 (1988).
	Before addressing Atkinson, we review briefly Illinois law
concerning impeachment of a witness though the use of prior
convictions, beginning with People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510
(1971). In Montgomery, we adopted the 1971 proposed draft of
Federal Rule of Evidence 609. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d  at 519.
Under this rule, evidence of a prior conviction is admissible for
impeachment purposes if (1) the witness' crime was punishable by
death or imprisonment for more than one year, or the crime
involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the
punishment; (2) the witness' conviction or release from
confinement, whichever date is later, occurred less than 10 years
from the date of trial; and (3) the danger of unfair prejudice does
not substantially outweigh the probative value of the conviction.
Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d  at 516.(1) This final factor involves a
balancing test: probative value versus prejudicial effect. In
performing this test, trial courts should consider " 'the nature of
the prior crimes, *** the length of the criminal record, the age and
circumstances of the [witness], and, above all, the extent to which
it is more important to the search for truth in a particular case for
the jury to hear the defendant's story than to know of a prior
conviction.' " Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d  at 518, quoting Luck v.
United States, 348 F.2d 763, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1965). We concluded
that the trial court has discretion in conducting this balancing test
and determining whether a witness' prior conviction is admissible.
Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d  at 517-18.
	In People v. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1 (1994), we revisited the
Montgomery balancing test. We found "a regression toward
allowing the State to introduce evidence of virtually all types of
felony convictions for the purported reason of impeaching a
testifying defendant." Williams, 161 Ill. 2d  at 38-39. Noting that
trial courts often mechanically applied the balancing test to allow
more prior-conviction evidence, we stated, "The Montgomery rule
does not, however, allow for the admission of evidence of any and
all prior crimes. The focus of Montgomery was on crimes which
bear on the defendant's truthfulness as a witness." Williams, 161 Ill. 2d  at 39. Trial courts should not tip the balancing test toward
probative value simply because all felonies show a disrespect for
society and, thus, indicate a willingness to lie on the witness stand.
Williams, 161 Ill. 2d  at 39. More importantly, trial courts should
not admit prior-conviction evidence as probative of guilt, rather
than credibility. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d  at 40. We reaffirmed that
trial courts, in exercising their discretion to admit evidence of a
defendant's prior convictions, should consider the nature of the
prior crime, its recency and similarity to the current charge, and
the length of the defendant's criminal record. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 
at 38; accord People v. Redd, 135 Ill. 2d 252, 325 (1990).
Convictions for the same crime for which the defendant is on trial
should be admitted sparingly. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d  at 38, quoting
Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
Williams, however, did not modify Montgomery. People v.
Williams, 173 Ill. 2d 48, 82 (1996).
	In the wake of Williams, an appellate court panel sanctioned
the mere-fact impeachment method if trial courts found the
Montgomery balancing test leaned toward excluding the prior
conviction evidence as unfairly prejudicial. See People v. Taber,
271 Ill. App. 3d 576, 580 (1995). Several years later, in another
case from the same appellate court district, the propriety of mere-fact impeachment finally reached this court.
	In Atkinson, the defendant was charged with burglary of a
motor vehicle. After the defendant testified at trial, the State
sought to present evidence of his two prior burglary convictions
for impeachment purposes. Defense counsel objected, arguing the
prejudicial effect of these convictions outweighed their probative
value. Defense counsel asserted that the jury should learn only that
the defendant had two prior felony convictions. The trial court
denied defense counsel's request, and the State impeached the
defendant with evidence of his two burglary convictions. The jury
later found the defendant guilty.
	The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial,
holding the trial court erred in permitting the State to reveal the
nature of the defendant's prior convictions. People v. Atkinson,
288 Ill. App. 3d 102, 107 (1997). Instead, the appellate court
determined that the trial court should have factored the mere-fact
method of impeachment into its Montgomery balancing test.
Atkinson, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 107. The jury should have heard only
that the defendant had two prior felony convictions. Atkinson, 288
Ill. App. 3d at 107.
	We reversed the appellate court and reinstated the defendant's
conviction. Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d  at 451. After reviewing the
Montgomery balancing test, we declined to adopt the mere-fact
method of impeachment. Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d  at 458. We noted,
"Our case law interpreting Montgomery suggests that it is the
nature of a past conviction, not merely the fact of it, that aids the
jury in assessing a witness' credibility." Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d  at
458. Mere-fact impeachment, by eliminating evidence regarding
the nature of the prior conviction and, thereby, inhibiting the jury's
evaluation of witness credibility, undermines Montgomery.
Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d  at 458. We further noted the potential
prejudice to the defendant in using the mere-fact approach:
		"Under the mere-fact approach, the jury hears direct proof
that the accused has been convicted of a felony, the exact
nature of which is excluded from the jury. This bare
announcement unavoidably invites jury speculation about
the nature of the prior crime. There is a potential danger
that the jury would speculate that the defendant was
previously convicted of a more serious crime.
Consequently, the mere-fact approach may result in unfair
prejudice to the defendant arising from jury speculation as
to the nature of the prior unnamed crime. Under the
Montgomery rule, however, there is no potential for
speculation by the jury. Moreover, the possibility of
resulting prejudice to the defendant from revealing the
nature of the prior conviction is controlled by the judicial
balancing test set forth in the third prong of Montgomery.
Under that test, if prejudice to the defendant substantially
outweighs the probative value of admitting the
impeachment evidence, the prior conviction must be
excluded." Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d  at 459.
	Atkinson, which was decided while the defendant's appeal
was pending, applies to this case. See People v. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d 67, 75 (1999) ("As a general rule, this court's decisions apply to
all cases that are pending when the decision is announced, unless
this court directs otherwise").
	The State attempts to limit our holding in Atkinson. The State
contends Atkinson did not instruct that a trial court could not
consider mere-fact impeachment as a means to lessen the
prejudicial effect of a defendant's prior convictions within the
context of the Montgomery balancing test. In Atkinson, however,
we held that "trial courts should not consider the mere-fact method
of impeachment." (Emphasis added.) Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d  at 461.
We find no suggestion in this unequivocal language that a trial
court's discretion encompasses mere-fact impeachment.
Additionally, the State contends Atkinson only governs cases in
which a trial court declined to consider a defendant's request for
mere-fact impeachment. Again, we see no such limitation.(2)
	Admitting the mere fact of the defendant's prior felony
convictions was error. In order to determine whether this
evidentiary error was "a material factor in his conviction such that
without the evidence the verdict likely would have been different"
(Williams, 161 Ill. 2d at 42), we turn to the evidence presented at
trial and the second issue raised by the defendant: whether the
State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
	"A criminal conviction will not be set aside unless the
evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a
reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt." People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). In viewing the sufficiency of the evidence,
we will not retry the defendant. People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532,
541 (1999). Instead, our inquiry is limited to "whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
(Emphasis in original.) Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19,
61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2788-89 (1979); accord
People v. Schmalz, 194 Ill. 2d 75, 80-81 (2000).
	The State called Ira Philbeck as its first witness. Philbeck
testified that she was watching television with her two grandsons
around 3:30 p.m. on May 30, 1998, when the defendant came to
the front door of her house. He looked upset and sweaty from
running. The defendant told Philbeck that he had been in a fight
and hurt someone, though he did not appear injured. He asked to
use the telephone, and she pointed toward her phone. Before the
defendant could place a call, Philbeck saw a police officer in her
driveway and suggested she and the defendant speak with him.
The defendant ran down a hallway and asked Philbeck to hide
him. When she refused and told him to leave, he shut himself in
the bathroom. Two police officers entered the house with a police
dog. Eventually, they arrested the defendant.
	Rantoul police officer Sawlaw testified that he responded to
a traffic accident call on May 30, 1998. As Officer Sawlaw
approached the accident scene, he observed the defendant walking
toward a Nissan Pulsar sitting against a tree. The defendant,
wearing a green hat, stopped in the middle of the road and looked
at Officer Sawlaw, then turned and ran in the opposite direction.
On his radio, Officer Sawlaw learned from another officer that a
small back window on the car was shattered and the steering
column was peeled, indicating that the car had been stolen. With
help from his police dog, Dutch, and witnesses directing him after
an African-American man in a green hat, he tracked the defendant
to Philbeck's house. Officer Sawlaw spoke with Philbeck, who
advised him that the defendant was inside the house. Dutch began
barking at the bathroom door, and Officer Sawlaw told the
defendant, "Come out with your hands up or you will be bitten."
Officer Sawlaw heard glass breaking from inside the bathroom and
another officer ordering the defendant to stick his arms out the
broken window so he could be handcuffed. The Rantoul chief of
police told Officer Sawlaw to back Dutch away from the bathroom
door. The defendant emerged, handcuffed and crying; he was
taken into custody immediately.
	Rantoul Police Sergeant Glenn Williams testified that he
assisted Officer Sawlaw in his pursuit of the defendant. At
Philbeck's house, Sergeant Williams discovered the defendant was
barricaded in the bathroom, breaking the window. Sergeant
Williams ran outside the house and saw a foot protruding from the
bathroom window. He ordered the defendant to put his hands out
the window so he could be handcuffed. The defendant screamed,
"[G]et the dog back," and threatened to cut Dutch with a shard of
broken glass. After 10 minutes, the defendant was handcuffed and
taken into custody.
	Rantoul police officer Charles Smith testified that he received
a call that a car accident had occurred and the driver had fled the
scene. At an intersection Officer Smith saw a Nissan Pulsar had
driven over a construction sign, off the road, and into a tree. He
noticed a small back window of the car was broken and the
steering column was peeled. He also found two screwdrivers used
to start the stolen car on the passenger seat. Officer Smith later
joined Officer Sawlaw at Philbeck's house. Inside the bathroom,
the defendant was yelling and threatening Dutch. After 10
minutes, the defendant was handcuffed by police officers outside
the house, and Officer Smith took him into custody.
	Fisher and Rose Sherer testified about the condition of the car
before and after it was stolen. Both testified that the defendant did
not have permission to drive the car.
	Champaign police officer James Clark testified that he
processed the car for evidence. He pulled some fingerprints from
the car, including a print from the inside of the driver's window.
Champaign police officer Charles Claudill testified that the print
matched the defendant's right thumb print. Gary Harvey, a
forensic scientist at the Illinois State Police lab in Springfield,
agreed with Officer Claudill.
	The defense called Harold Phipps as its first witness. Phipps
testified that he heard a car crash near his house on May 30, 1998.
When he went to investigate the noise, he saw an empty car sitting
by a tree and called the police. While waiting for the police, he
never clearly saw the driver of the car, but, from his driveway, he
may have seen somebody leaving the accident scene. On cross-examination, the State asked Phipps if he told the police that he
saw an African-American man wearing a green hat run from the
wreck. Phipps stated that he could not remember giving such a
statement.
	The defendant testified that he was working at the Solo Cup
Company on the night the car was stolen. On May 30, 1998, he
was painting mobile homes for his cousin. His cousin dropped him
off in Rantoul that afternoon. The defendant was socializing with
a group of people at an apartment building when he heard a noise
and saw a car jump the curb and stop beside a tree. A dark-skinned
man with long hair ran from the car to the apartment building and
into a nearby apartment. According to the defendant, he and a few
acquaintances proceeded to that apartment to ask about the
accident. The driver appeared upset and stated that he had lost
control of the car. The driver requested a cigarette and told the
defendant that he had left a pack in the wrecked car. The defendant
wanted a cigarette too, so he agreed to return to the car.
	At the car, the defendant could not find any cigarettes, so he
went back to the apartment. The driver said the cigarettes were
under the seat. The defendant returned again to the car and found
a pack of Newports under the passenger seat. According to the
defendant, he did not notice the stripped steering column or the
screwdrivers on the passenger seat. Walking back to the
apartment, the defendant saw a police officer driving toward him.
The defendant went to the apartment to alert the driver that the
police were in the area, then left the apartment to elude the police
because he had an outstanding arrest warrant for a fight with a
friend. After a short walk the defendant started jogging when he
saw a police officer with a dog pursuing him. The defendant
denied that he ever had possession of the car.
	The defendant testified that he went to Philbeck's house.
Philbeck let him in, and he asked to use the telephone. The
defendant called his cousin for a ride. When he saw Officer
Sawlaw and Dutch outside Philbeck's house, he told Philbeck that
the police were chasing him in connection with a fight. According
to the defendant, Philbeck told him that he could not stay, and she
walked to the back of the house to talk with the police. Officer
Sawlaw entered the house with Dutch, and the defendant fled to
the bathroom. Officer Sawlaw attempted to kick in the door, and
the defendant kicked out the bathroom window and grabbed a
piece of glass for protection from the dog. Eventually, the
defendant stuck his hands out the window and allowed the police
to handcuff him. On cross-examination by the State, the defendant
testified that he did not realize the police were chasing him
regarding the car until after his arrest.
	In rebuttal, Officer Sawlaw testified that he interviewed
Phipps after the defendant's arrest. Phipps told him that an
African-American man in a green hat ran from the wrecked car,
walked back toward the car, and ran away from the car again.
Officer Smith also testified in rebuttal that he interviewed Phipps
when he first arrived at the accident scene. Phipps told him an
African-American man in a green hat ran from the wrecked car.
	To obtain a conviction for possession of a stolen motor
vehicle (see 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(1) (West 1998)), the State was
required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant
possessed the vehicle, that he was not entitled to possess the
vehicle, and that he knew the vehicle was stolen. People v.
Anderson, 188 Ill. 2d 384, 389 (1999). The defendant never
disputed that he did not have permission to drive the Nissan
Pulsar, and the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for the
jury to conclude that he possessed the car and that he knew the car
was stolen. The evidence, however, was not overwhelming, and
the improper mere-fact impeachment evidence may have been a
material factor in the jury's decision. Cf. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d  at
41-42. We remand for a new trial.(3)
	Finally, the defendant raises two issues concerning the length
of his sentence. These issues are unlikely to recur on retrial, and
we decline to address them.
CONCLUSION
	For the reasons we have discussed, we reverse the judgments
of the appellate and circuit courts and remand the cause to the
circuit court for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
	The circuit court, in the exercise of its discretion, found that
the mere-fact method of impeachment was the most appropriate
approach in presenting evidence of defendant's five prior felony
convictions to the jury. The majority, relying upon People v.
Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d 450 (1999), concludes that the circuit court's
decision constitutes reversible error.
	In Atkinson, this court held that, as a matter of law, it is
always improper for a circuit court to employ the mere-fact
method to impeach a testifying defendant. Justice Rathje and I
dissented from this holding. As the dissenting opinion in Atkinson
explained,"[h]istorically, this court has vested the trial court with
great discretion to determine what evidence should be presented
at trial." Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d  at 464 (Rathje, J., dissenting, joined
by McMorrow, J.). In holding that circuit courts are prohibited
from considering the mere-fact impeachment method, the Atkinson
majority unwarrantedly departed from our traditional
jurisprudence by "remov[ing] from the trial court the discretion to
determine whether or to what extent evidence is admissible."
Atkinson, 186 Ill. 2d  at 472 (Rathje, J., dissenting, joined by
McMorrow, J.). I continue to adhere to my position that the
decision of whether or to what extent evidence of a prior
conviction may be admitted for purposes of impeachment is within
the circuit court's sound discretion. It is within the wide discretion
traditionally afforded the circuit court to permit the use of mere-fact impeachment if the court determines that it is the most
appropriate impeachment method.
	For the reasons stated, I respectfully dissent from the opinion
of the majority.
	 
	 
1.      1Rule 609 ultimately was enacted in a different form. In federal
court, the danger of unfair prejudice need not substantially outweigh the
probative value of the conviction. See Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1). The
proposed rule, however, has remained the touchstone for admitting
evidence of the defendant's prior convictions in Illinois. See People v.
Elliot, 274 Ill. App. 3d 901, 907 (1995).

2.      2We do not reach the question of whether a defendant can challenge
an Atkinson violation when he requests or agrees to improper mere-fact
impeachment. We note, however, "an accused may not ask the trial
court to proceed in a certain manner and then contend in a court of
review that the order which he obtained was in error." People v. Lowe,
153 Ill. 2d 195, 199 (1992); accord People v. Payne, 98 Ill. 2d 45, 50
(1983) (a defendant who invites or acquiesces to the admission of
improper evidence cannot complain).

3.      3Following People v. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d 289, 309-10 (1979), we make
no implication concerning the defendant's guilt which would be binding
on retrial. Our finding is intended only to protect the defendant from
double jeopardy. People v. Holloway, 177 Ill. 2d 1, 12 (1997).