Case Title: People v. Beach

Citation: 418 N.W.2d 861, 429 Mich. 450

Docket Number: 75058, 76536

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 1988-01-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Decided January 19, 1988.
Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General, Louis J. Caruso, Solicitor General, Robert H. Cleland, Prosecuting Attorney, and Peter R. George, Chief Appellate Attorney, for the people in Beach; William F. Delhey, Prosecuting Attorney, and Lynwood E. Noah, Deputy Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for the people in Edwards.
State Appellate Defender (by Mardi Crawford) for defendant Beach.
Don Ferris for defendant Edwards.
BRICKLEY, J.
These two cases require a determination whether the conclusions of the lower courts, that evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support requests for instructions on cognate lesser included offenses, were in error. If these determinations were in error, we are asked to decide whether the failure to instruct on the lesser included offenses was harmless.
In People v Edwards, we conclude that the requested cognate lesser offense instruction for *453 involuntary manslaughter was not supported by the evidence, and, hence, the failure to instruct was not error.
In People v Beach, we conclude that the requested cognate lesser offense instruction for conspiracy to commit larceny in a building was supported by the evidence, thus, failure to instruct was error. However, because the jury rejected the lesser included offense of conspiracy to commit unarmed robbery and convicted the defendant of the greater charged offense of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, we hold the error to be harmless. In doing so, we adopt and apply a type of harmless error analysis developed in People v Herbert Ross, 73 Mich App 588; 252 NW2d 526 (1977).[1]
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE
A. PEOPLE v EDWARDS
We accept the Court of Appeals recitation of the facts in this case:
Defendant presented virtually no evidence at trial.
The felony-murder instruction, it was argued by the defendant, left the jury with an impression that the intent necessary to establish first-degree murder could be inferred by finding an intent to commit arson. The Court of Appeals found no error since the prosecution had introduced evidence to support either first-degree murder or *455 felony murder, see People v Johnson, 99 Mich App 547; 297 NW2d 713 (1980), lv den 412 Mich 928 (1982), and found that the instructions, in their entirety, were not prejudicial because they clearly directed the jury to not equate intent to commit arson with malice. Any ambiguity was found to be minimal and "corrected."
The allegation of error in the trial court's refusal to instruct on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter was also rejected by the Court of Appeals. Edwards argued that the proofs presented by the state, and the fact that the fire started outside the residence, could lead to the inference that the perpetrator acted in a grossly negligent manner rather than with malice, that is, he never intended anyone in the house to be killed in the fire. The trial court refused the lesser included offense instruction because it determined that the evidence would not support such an instruction.
As a cognate lesser included offense, the Court of Appeals reviewed the evidence to determine whether an instruction on involuntary manslaughter was required. The panel agreed with the trial court that the evidence did not support the requested instruction, finding the felony of arson to preclude an instruction on involuntary manslaughter. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
B. PEOPLE v BEACH
The Court of Appeals set forth a lengthy and detailed recitation of this case, including defendant's first trial. Essentially, defendant's live-in male companion, Jack Turner, testified against her about a series of events that led to defendant being charged with the first-degree felony murder *456 of Sidney Dunbar and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. She was convicted of attempted murder in the second degree and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. Excerpts of the Court of Appeals factual recitation are as follows:
A denial of a motion to quash the conspiracy to commit armed robbery charge was upheld as being supported by the evidence. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court had correctly concluded that the magistrate did not abuse his discretion.
A challenge to the trial court's denial of motions for mistrial due to prosecutorial misconduct was also rejected. The trial court informed counsel of the guidelines for argument and cautioned the jury.
The Court of Appeals found that the trial court read both parties' theories accurately and set forth their positions at trial; they were stated fairly, and equal stress was given to each party. In addition, defendant did not specify what her objection to the prosecutor's theory was.
Defendant's claim that the trial court erred on its reinstruction on the intent required for attempted second-degree murder was also rejected. The Court of Appeals held that any confusion was "cleared up."
The Court of Appeals majority briefly addressed what has become the issue of primary concern  the lesser included offense instruction.
Although the majority did not deem it necessary to present a detailed analysis, Judge HOOD did in his partial concurrence and partial dissent. Judge HOOD believed that the trial court did err when it refused to give an instruction on conspiracy to commit larceny. He based his conclusion on the cognate lesser included analysis of People v Ora Jones, 395 Mich 379; 236 NW2d 461 (1975), and the evidence.
Judge HOOD also took exception to the trial court's rationale for refusing to instruct on the lesser included offense.
Neither the majority nor Judge HOOD discussed harmless error.
II. PRIMARY LEGAL DOCTRINES
The resolution of the primary issues in these cases requires the application of two legal doctrines. Each will be briefly reviewed in this section before applying them.
A. LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS
Although case law now provides sure guidance to instructions on lesser included offenses, Michigan case law prior to 1975 was not particularly clear in the realm of lesser included offenses.[2] In response to the problem, the Court released a series of opinions in 1975. As Chief Justice COLEMAN stated, "The definitions and the array of possible components of `lesser included offenses' of the one(s) charged have fueled many appellate confrontations in Michigan.... It was our purpose *461 to provide some uniformity and direction in nine simultaneously released opinions." People v Jones, supra, 395.
The two classes of lesser included offenses and the differences in application were articulated in Jones, supra. Jones was tried for the shotgun slaying of his roommate. He argued that it was accidental. The court instructed the jury on murder in the second-degree and voluntary manslaughter, but ruled that the defendant was not entitled to an instruction on the statutory offense of killing or injuring a person by careless, reckless, or negligent discharge of a firearm. The Court found that the defendant was entitled to an instruction on negligent discharge.
The separation of cognate and necessarily included offenses developed in order to expand the common-law definition of lesser included offenses.
Although recognition of a necessarily included offense is fairly simple, cognate lesser offenses can be more difficult. The Court looked to Paterno v *462 Lyons, 334 US 314; 68 S Ct 1044; 92 L Ed 1409 (1948), for due process guidance. The United States Supreme Court held that due process notice requirements were satisfied if the greater charged crime and the lesser included offense were of the same or overlapping nature. Thus, the Court stated:
While reckless discharge of a firearm is not always a lesser included offense of second-degree murder, it may be, as it was under the facts in Jones.
Thus, the lesser offense of reckless discharge was held to be an included offense because it was cognate. However, the inquiry does not end here; *463 it remains to be determined whether the judge must instruct the jury on the cognate offense. It is the evidence presented at trial in each case which determines whether the court has a duty to instruct on cognate lesser included offenses.
In People v Kamin, 405 Mich 482, 493; 275 NW2d 777 (1979), the Court made clear in which cases the evidence needs to be reviewed when considering an instruction on a lesser included offense.
This is referred to as the Kamin "automatic instruction rule," although the case was granted primarily to decide the retroactivity of Jones, supra.[3]
Thus, when the lesser offense is necessarily included, *464 rather than cognate, the evidence will always support the lesser offense if it supports the greater. However, cognate offenses require the evidence in each particular trial to be examined to determine whether the specific evidence adduced would support a conviction of the requested lesser offense. People v Jones and People v Kamin, supra.
The lesser included offense instruction scheme developed by the Court is more protective of defendants than a significant number of states and the federal system.[4] The federal courts, by contrast, do not recognize cognate lesser included offenses. FR Crim P 31(c) limits instructions in federal criminal prosecutions to necessarily included offenses only.[5] Indeed, the federal standard is further restrictive by requiring that the evidence must permit a jury rationally to convict of the lesser offense and acquit of the offense charged. Keeble v United States, 412 US 205; 93 S Ct 1993; 36 L Ed 2d 844 (1973). A Michigan defendant may request and receive necessarily included offense instructions *465 without regard to the evidence, and a cognate lesser included offense instruction if the evidence adduced at trial would support a conviction of the requested lesser offense.
B. MICHIGAN HARMLESS ERROR DOCTRINE
1. STATUTORY SOURCES
The concept of harmless error for trial imperfections is affirmatively codified in our jurisprudence.
MCR 2.613(A) provides:
The Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
2. ROSS
In People v Ross, supra, the Court of Appeals advanced a harmless error analysis for refusal to *466 instruct on a cognate lesser offense. The Court employed a different analysis for the refused instruction of a necessarily included lesser offense, however. Because the cases sub judice present only cognate lesser included offenses, we do not elaborate on the second analysis.
Defendant Ross was charged, in a two-count information, with assault with intent to murder and assault with intent to rape. On count one, the trial court instructed the jury that its verdict could be guilty of assault with intent to murder, guilty of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, guilty of felonious assault, or not guilty. On count two, the court instructed the jury that it could find verdicts of guilty of assault with intent to rape or not guilty. However, the court refused defendant's requests to instruct the jury on assault and battery (count one) and attempted rape (count two). Ross was convicted of both charged offenses.
The Court of Appeals engaged the analysis articulated by this Court in Jones and People v Chamblis, 395 Mich 408; 236 NW2d 473 (1975), in order to determine the class of lesser offense. As to count one, assault and battery was found to not be an offense necessarily included in assault with intent to murder. Jones, supra; People v Ray, 56 Mich App 610; 224 NW2d 735 (1974); People v Stram, 40 Mich App 249; 198 NW2d 753 (1972). Hence, because this was a cognate offense, the evidence was examined. The evidentiary inquiry required the Court to ask: "[I]f [Ross] had been originally charged with assault and battery, would the evidence adduced at trial have supported a guilty verdict?" Ross, supra, 592. The Court agreed that *467 the evidence would have been sufficient. Therefore, the requested instruction should have been given.
Rather than holding this error to require reversal, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the refusal was harmless, that is, the jury had sufficient alternatives with which to express doubts about the defendant's guilt of the charged offense of assault with intent to murder.
The Court of Appeals second reason, based on Chamblis, supra, has since been invalidated by this Court;[6] the validity of the first reason remains to be decided in this opinion.[7]
This Court's first consideration of Ross was in *468 People v Richardson, 409 Mich 126; 283 NW2d 332 (1980). Although the decision to grant leave to appeal was founded, in part, on the Court of Appeals application of harmless error, the opinion did not ultimately rely on Ross for its holding.[8]
Defendant Richardson shot and killed a man with a rifle after fighting with the victim's brother. The defendant testified that he and the victim had struggled with the rifle and the shooting was accidental. The prosecutor argued that the shooting was premeditated.
At the conclusion of the proofs, defendant requested the trial court to instruct the jury on first-degree murder only. The judge denied the request and stated that he would instruct on both first- and second-degree murder, at least. In response, the defendant requested that the court instruct the jury on the lesser offenses of manslaughter and reckless use of a firearm causing death or injury. The judge instructed on first- and second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter, but refused to instruct on reckless use of a firearm reasoning that the information did not encompass *469 that offense. The jury returned a verdict of guilty of first-degree murder.
The Court began its review with a consideration of Jones, supra, reasoning that an instruction on the lesser included offenses was not mandated without a review of the evidence because involuntary manslaughter and reckless use of firearms are not necessarily included offenses. As cognate lesser included offenses, this Court undertook a determination "whether evidence was presented which would have supported conviction of either of the lesser offenses of involuntary manslaughter or reckless use of a firearm." 409 Mich 135.
A review of the evidence convinced us that a conviction of involuntary manslaughter would have been supported. Hence, it was error to refuse an instruction on the cognate-lesser offense, voluntary manslaughter. We also considered the evidence to have been sufficient to convict of the lesser offense of reckless use of a firearm; thus, that refusal was also error.
The Court of Appeals had come to the same conclusion, but had relied on the Ross harmless error analysis.
This Court's consideration began with an acknowledgment that the general harmless error doctrine is stated both in court rule and statute. A distillation of the rule, statute, and case law produces a fairly simple, if broad, rule: "[A]ppellate courts should not reverse a conviction unless the error was prejudicial." People v Robinson, 386 Mich 551, 562; 194 NW2d 709 (1972). However, before the Court engaged in a harmless error application, it was decided that
The defendant's theory was that he did not intend any of his acts to produce serious bodily harm. Hence, the effect of the trial judge's refusal to instruct on involuntary manslaughter and reckless use of a firearm, was considered by the Court to be prejudicial because it foreclosed the jury's option to convict the defendant in accordance with his own testimony, evidence, and theory. Thus, the Court's decision purportedly was made independently of the Ross harmless error analysis.[9]
*471 The next opportunity this Court had to consider harmless error in a refusal to instruct on a lesser included offense was People v Rochowiak, 416 Mich 235; 330 NW2d 669 (1982). This case produced an equal division with regard to substance and a concurrence in the result only. Two justices did not participate.
Police officers found a body in an automobile in Rouge Park at 8:15 A.M. on July 31, 1976. Deceased had been killed by a shotgun blast. The passenger side window was shattered.
Defendant's neighbor testified that at about 7:30 A.M. on July 31 the defendant had telephoned him and then arrived at the neighbor's house a minute later. He was bleeding and bruised, so the neighbor drove him to the hospital. During the drive, the defendant made statements; such as, he had "killed a queer" and "[m]aybe that will keep the rest of them from coming in there." He explained his own wounds as a result of holding the gun too close to his mouth. Defendant made other incriminating statements to the neighbor and to the police, and a song or poem, in which he confessed, was found at the hospital.
Rochowiak was charged with first-degree murder. However, the charge was reduced to second-degree murder at the preliminary examination.
The defendant's defense was that he was under the influence of drugs and had diminished capacity at the time of the killing and at the time he made the incriminating statements.
At the close of the trial, defendant requested that the judge instruct the jury on reckless use of a firearm. Jones, supra. The judge refused to give the instruction, ruling that the evidence would not support a conviction of this lesser offense. The trial court did instruct on second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter. Defendant was *472 convicted of second-degree murder; the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The lead opinion for reversal, joined by one justice, acknowledged reckless use of a firearm as a cognate lesser included offense of second-degree murder, and, although the evidence most strongly suggested intent, it was determined that the evidence in the case would also support a conviction of reckless use. The people argued a harmless error application, and the following summary of Ross was given:
The Rochowiak opinion also distinguished Richardson, supra, where the jury was given an instruction consistent with the theory of his case, i.e., involuntary manslaughter.
Rochowiak's basic argument was that the harmless error doctrine would dilute the jury's authority. That is, in order for the jury to work as factfinder, it must be fully aware of possible verdicts.
*473 The people argued that it "strains credulity" to say that a jury which rejects a finding of gross negligence, wilfulness, and wantonness in favor of a finding of an intentional act, would have found the acts careless and reckless if given the opportunity. In Rochowiak, the jury was not interested in leniency; it rejected involuntary manslaughter as a verdict between murder and not guilty.
The opinion of the Court founded its decision on possible reactions by the jury to the omitted lesser included offense instruction.
Although the opinion was decided by finding the omitted instruction necessary for the jury's understanding *474 of the theory of the case, it made observations on the harmless error rule:
Thus, although the harmless error doctrine was acknowledged, it was neither explicitly applied nor rejected.
The opinion for affirmance, also joined by one justice, found this approach "unsupportable." It stated that "the office of the lesser included offense instruction is to provide the jury a verdict option which is reasonably raised by the evidence," not "to enable the jury to [better] assess the defendant's argument":
The dissent would have found harmless error.
Hence, this Court has passively acknowledged the Ross harmless error analysis, and, in a case with limited precedential value,[10] has offered qualifications for its use. However, the analysis has never been affirmatively applied or expressly rejected.
III. APPLICATION AND RESOLUTION
A. PEOPLE v EDWARDS
Defendant Edwards argues that the trial court and Court of Appeals were incorrect in their conclusions that the evidence at trial did not support the requested instruction on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter. The Court of Appeals found that the elements of involuntary manslaughter preclude a conviction for that offense if the act causing death amounts to a felony. We do not rest our holding upon the finding of a felony, as did the Court of Appeals, but on the uncontroverted evidence of an unlawful act which *476 naturally tends to cause death or bodily harm.[11] Because we discern no evidence adduced at trial which would support a conviction of involuntary manslaughter, we affirm the Court of Appeals holding that Edwards was not entitled to an instruction on the lesser included offense of manslaughter. We find Edwards' argument  the fact that the fire started on the porch was unintentional and therefore supplied a sufficient inference of gross negligence  to be ill-conceived in light of the elements of involuntary manslaughter. We also find that the jury was properly instructed on the question of malice.
As discussed above, lesser included offense instructions require a distinction as to type. Jones, supra. This Court has held that manslaughter is not a necessarily included offense of murder, but may be an included offense if the evidence adduced at trial would support a guilty verdict.[12]People v Van Wyck, 402 Mich 266; 262 NW2d 638 (1978). See also People v Carter, 395 Mich 434; 236 NW2d 500 (1975); People v Paul, 395 Mich 444; 236 NW2d 486 (1975). However, a review of the evidence must be preceded by an examination of the elements of involuntary manslaughter.
The Court of Appeals utilized the definition of *477 the elements of involuntary manslaughter which has resurfaced in our opinions since 1923. Indeed, this definition was endorsed in the seminal case of Jones, supra.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that only the first form of involuntary manslaughter applied to the facts of the case. The Court then reasoned that the conduct here, burning of a dwelling house, is a felony; hence, an instruction on involuntary manslaughter was not warranted. As noted above, the definition also requires the unlawful act to be of a type which does not naturally tend to cause death or great bodily harm. The conduct in this case  the burning of a dwelling house in which residents were sleeping  does naturally tend to cause death or great bodily harm. Thus, regardless of the statutory degree of severity of the conduct, the unlawful act in this case could not meet the definition of involuntary manslaughter.[13]
*478 Where the evidence suggests only that the criminal act naturally tends to cause death or great bodily harm, an instruction on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter is simply not justified. This does not mean, however, that evidence which suggests an unlawful act naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm categorically precludes an instruction on involuntary manslaughter. That possibility depends upon the evidence adduced at trial.
An example of trial evidence which could support both a felony murder instruction and an involuntary manslaughter instruction may be found in People v Roeder, 79 Mich App 595; 262 NW2d 872 (1977). The defendant was charged with two counts of felony murder in the death by fire of her two children. The victims were killed by a fire in the mobile home in which they were sleeping. An arson investigator testified that in his opinion the fire was started by someone piling up combustible material and lighting it. The defendant testified that she had emptied an ashtray into a wastebasket and that she had tried to rescue her children. The defendant's testimony tended to negate both malice and the existence of an act naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm.
The offense of arson is defined as follows:
Because the offense of arson requires a wilful or malicious act, Ms. Roeder's testimony presented evidence which would suggest that no arson occurred.
Edwards argues that the location of the fire  the porch  provides an inference upon which an involuntary manslaughter instruction may be founded. Yet no evidence was presented which would suggest that the fire was not wilfully set.[14] We agree, however, that the location of the fire may be an indication of lack of malice, i.e., it could be inferred, with some imagination, that the fire was set on the porch merely to frighten the occupants. If the jury accepted this inference, then only a conviction of arson could have been returned because it was instructed that a conviction of murder, including felony murder, requires malice. However, we do not agree that the location of the fire presents evidence to support a lack of a wilful or malicious act.
If our standard of evidence adduced at trial to warrant an instruction on cognate lesser offenses were based on "pure speculation," one could imagine that Edwards stood on the porch and accidentally dropped a lighted match. However, our standard involves a determination of whether the evidence *480 would support a conviction on the requested cognate lesser included offense.
There must be some evidence on the record to support the elements of the requested lesser included (cognate) offense. Here, however, a disbelief of the evidence of an intentional firesetting leaves no evidence at all  only speculation.[15] This distinguishes our requirements for instructions on lesser included felonies from our requirements for lesser included misdemeanors and the federal system. See People v Steele, 429 Mich 13; 412 NW2d 206 (1987). However, in this case, there is no way of separating uncontested evidence of an intentional act of arson from a theory of unintentional death. Unlike Roeder, there simply is no evidence to support a conviction of manslaughter if Edwards had been charged originally with involuntary manslaughter. Cf. post, pp 489-490.
It has been suggested that a lesser included offense instruction should be given if it would help the jury understand the theory of the defendant's case, and increase the possibility of a compromise verdict;[16] however, we adhere to the standard articulated in Jones, supra.
Because the evidence in Edwards' trial would not support a conviction of involuntary manslaughter, we affirm the Court of Appeals conclusion that the instruction was not warranted. We agree with the United States Supreme Court that the cost of allowing instructions for lesser included offenses for which a defendant could not be convicted, would be a distortion of the factfinding process.
For the reasons stated in its opinion, we also affirm the Court of Appeals finding that the jury was not improperly instructed on felony murder, and hold that the issue whether the defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder was not properly preserved.
B. PEOPLE v BEACH
We agree with the defendant's argument that there was sufficient evidence to warrant the lesser included offense instruction of conspiracy to commit larceny in a building, and find that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in rejecting this conclusion.
However, Beach was convicted of the charged greater offense of conspiracy to commit armed robbery. If the jury had doubts about her guilt of the charged offense, it could have found her guilty of the instructed lesser included offense of conspiracy to commit unarmed robbery. Because it did not do so, we can conclude that it had no reasonable doubts as to the defendant's guilt of conspiracy to commit armed robbery. Hence, we hold the error to be harmless.
In this case, we must determine exactly what lesser included offense instruction was requested before we can decide whether or not the request was warranted. The trial transcript discloses the following exchange:
*482 Mr. Heyboer:
Mr. Dean: No, your Honor.
From the face of the record, only conspiracy to commit larceny in a building was specifically requested. We have consistently required that a party must inform the trial court of the exact lesser included offenses which are being requested. People v Stephens, 416 Mich 252; 330 NW2d 675 (1982); People v Herbert Smith, 396 Mich 362; 240 NW2d 245 (1976).
In Stephens, the Court reevaluated the misdemeanor cutoff rule of Chamblis, supra, but also made an observation about lesser included offense instruction requests.
Smith was decided on more general requests:
We find Beach's request for "some type of felony larceny" to be an improper general request. Thus, only conspiracy to commit larceny in a building was requested in this case.
*484 Beach argues that larceny  of some form  is necessarily included in a charge of robbery, and, because larceny itself is an element of robbery, larceny is a necessarily included offense of robbery. We find this reasoning to be specious. In fact, only larceny from the person is necessarily included in robbery. It is precisely the differences between larceny from the person and larceny from a building which distinguishes them as necessarily or cognate lesser included offenses.[17] Because instruction on only conspiracy to commit larceny in a building was requested in this case, and conspiracy to commit larceny in a building is a cognate lesser included offense of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, a review of the evidence is necessary in order to determine whether the instruction should have been given to the jury.
*485 Ms. Beach was charged in her second trial with first-degree felony murder and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. The jury was instructed on the lesser included offenses of attempted felony murder, second-degree murder, attempted second-degree murder, assault with intent to commit armed robbery, voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, assault with a deadly weapon, and conspiracy to commit unarmed robbery. The court refused an instruction on conspiracy to commit larceny in a building.
The Court of Appeals majority was very brief in its discussion of the refusal to instruct on conspiracy to commit larceny in a building.
Judge HOOD dissented:
We agree with Judge HOOD that in addition to the evidence of conspiracy to rob, there was evidence which would support an instruction on conspiracy to commit larceny in a building when requested.
We find the following testimony to be important in considering whether the evidence would have supported a conviction on conspiracy to commit larceny in a building.
Turner testified that Beach had committed larceny in a building on a prior occasion by taking money from the same victim's wallet. He also testified that they discussed returning:
A. Yes, we did.
Q. What were these conversations about?
A. Going back and ripping the man off.
Q. Did you plan to go back ... ?
A. We talked about it.
Turner testified to the following about the plan for returning to Dunbar's:
A. True.
Q. Proposition him in what way?
A. Whatever way possible.
A. Not exactly.
Q. How about inexactly?
A. I'd say so.
Q. Inexactly what line had you thought of?
A. Same, sexual favors or whatever.
As for the circumstances of the stabbing, Turner testified that he approached Dunbar, but that Dunbar would not speak to him. However, he allowed Beach to sit in his car and talk and then accompanied her into his house. Turner then followed them with their eighteen-month-old child into the house where they drank beer and talked. Dunbar suggested that he might overlook the theft if Beach were to offer sexual favors.
Q. Then what did he do?
Q. What did you do at this point?
A. Went to the bathroom.
*488 A. Yes.
A. Both sitting down.
Q. In what room would this be?
A. Living room.
Q. What did you do at that point?
A. I pulled the knife on Mr. Dunbar.
Q. When you pulled the knife, what did you say?
Q. What happened next?
A. He jumped at me. I cut his hand.
Additional testimony revealed the following:
Q. At that point you decided this man had to die?
Q. And the problem was Mr. Dunbar?
A. Yes.
A. Yes.
A. Possible, yes.
As to the actual knifing, Turner testified:
A. Right.
Q. And you cut Mr. Dunbar's hand?
A. Right.
Q. What was your intention right at that point?
A. I don't even know.
Q. You don't know?
A. No.
Dr. Max Kopp, the medical examiner, testified that he could not tell if the wounds inflicted were from two different blades.
Turner testified that after the struggle and killing they left the house and then returned later to remove fingerprints.
This testimony does not lead us to the undisputed conclusion that Turner and Beach planned only to rob and murder Dunbar. Contradictions within Turner's testimony suggest that the killing may not have been planned or anticipated and that Beach may have conspired to commit a larceny, similar to the prior incident. Unlike the federal test for necessarily included offenses or the Michigan test for lesser included misdemeanors, acquittal on the greater charge is not a necessary condition for instruction on the lesser. Cf. People v Steele, supra.
There is a substantial distinction between the evidence in Edwards and the evidence in Beach. In Beach, evidence was given that she had, on a prior occasion, committed larceny from a building from the same victim. There was evidence which could support a conclusion that a similar attempt was to be made on the second occasion. Also, the evidence of the circumstances surrounding the killing was not such as to completely exclude the theory that Beach had conspired to commit larceny in a building. *490 In Edwards, there simply was no evidence on the record which would have supported a conviction of involuntary manslaughter.
The case was built on accomplice Turner's testimony. His account of the agreement to go to the victim's house and the varying nature of his testimony provided enough evidence to support the cognate offense. The jury could have disbelieved that part of his testimony regarding a plan to use weapons and force, especially in view of the evidence which would indicate that use of force was considered, for the first time, in response to the prospect of Dunbar arranging a "contract." The quoted passage from Judge HOOD'S dissent recognized that the possession of weapons did not necessarily mandate force. Accordingly, we find that though Beach had only an alibi defense, Turner's testimony varied. This differs from our conclusion in Edwards, where there was no testimony by the defendant, but the other testimony would not allow any other interpretation.
Because the instruction should have been given, upon the basis of the state of the record, we are presented with the decision whether or not to conclude that this omission was harmless error. To apply the reasoning of Ross: Beach was convicted of the greater charged offense of conspiracy to commit armed robbery. If the jury had doubts about her guilt of the charged offense or if it concluded that the defendant was not planning to use force, it could have and undoubtedly would have, found her guilty of the instructed lesser included offense of conspiracy to commit unarmed robbery, which would represent a lesser use of force. Because it did not do so, we can conclude that it had no reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt of conspiracy to commit armed robbery. We believe that the jury's decision is a *491 reasonable indication that the failure to give an instruction on the lesser included offense of conspiracy to commit larceny in a building was not prejudicial to the defendant. We require a fair trial, not a perfect trial.[18]
The existence of an intermediate charge that was rejected by the jury does not, of course, automatically result in an application of the Ross analysis. For it to apply, the intermediate charge rejected by the jury would necessarily have to indicate a lack of likelihood that the jury would have adopted the lesser requested charge.
We note that our recent cases, which did not adopt or apply the harmless error analysis, are distinguishable. In People v Richardson, supra, the Court declined to apply a harmless error analysis because the refusal to instruct was reasoned to foreclose the jury's option to convict the defendant consistently with his own testimony, evidence, and theory. Beach differs because the defense theory was alibi, and no evidence to make a theory of larceny essential to the defense was provided, that is, there was no specific denial of the use of force. There was only an alibi defense and an inference built on a possibility that the jury might disbelieve part of Turner's testimony.
In People v Rochowiak, supra, the opinion of the Court offered qualifications regarding the finding of harmless error under such circumstances. Although we do not adopt the qualifications, we note that this case complies with the suggestions for finding harmless error.
Implicit in the jury's verdict in the case sub judice is a finding of a use of a weapon which indicates a greater use of force than would be the case in unarmed robbery.
An analysis of United States Supreme Court decisions reveals a general unwillingness to find error requiring reversal in a failure to instruct on a lesser included offense except when, in a death penalty case, a jury is given only the alternative of conviction or acquittal. See Spaziano v Florida, supra; Beck v Alabama, 447 US 625; 100 S Ct 2382; 65 L Ed 2d 392 (1980); Hopper v Evans, 456 US 605; 102 S Ct 2049; 72 L Ed 2d 367 (1982); Keeble v United States, 412 US 205; 93 S Ct 1993; 36 L Ed 2d 844 (1973). Indeed, even in cases which rise to constitutional levels, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the importance of harmless error.
Michigan provides more opportunities for lesser included offense instructions than federal courts or the courts of a significant number of other states. The limited harmless error doctrine employed here does not create an unacceptable erosion of the ability of a defendant to have a jury consider lesser included offenses. Instead it preserves a conviction in spite of a harmless mistake, provided the jury had another lesser offense to consider.
Harmless error analysis, under these circumstances, effectuates a balance of justice; that is, a weighing of the conviction by the jury against judicially generated theories of possible harm to a defendant. Because this doctrine is limited to situations where the jury had the choice of a lesser offense and rejected it in favor of conviction of a higher offense, we believe the balance is just.
We find no error in the Court of Appeals analysis of the remaining issues and, accordingly, affirm Beach's conviction.
*494 IV. CONCLUSION
In People v Edwards, we hold that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to warrant an instruction on the cognate lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter, and affirm the Court of Appeals analysis of the remaining issues.
In People v Beach, we hold that the failure to instruct on the cognate lesser included offense of conspiracy to commit larceny in a building was error. However, because the jury rejected the lesser included offense of conspiracy to commit unarmed robbery and, instead, convicted of the charged greater offense of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, we hold this error to be harmless. We affirm the Court of Appeals analysis of the remaining issues.
RILEY, C.J., and LEVIN, CAVANAGH, and ARCHER, JJ., concurred with BRICKLEY, J.
BOYLE, J.
I concur in the reasoning and result in part II, B, and in the result in part III, A and B, of the majority opinion. I therefore concur with the conclusion of the majority.
GRIFFIN, J., took no part in the decision of these cases.
[1]  Although we accept this analysis, we have not reviewed and do not adopt every prior application by the Court of Appeals of the Ross analysis.
[2]  See Koenig, The many-headed hydra of lesser included offenses: A Herculean task for the Michigan courts, 1 Det C L R 41 (1975).
[3]  In People v Ross, supra, 593, n 4, the Court of Appeals provided an historical perspective on the effect of Jones and People v Chamblis, 395 Mich 408; 236 NW2d 473 (1975).

It is in the area of determining when the evidence adduced at trial supports a conviction of a lesser included offense that Chamblis, supra, and Ora Jones, supra, appear to have changed the rule of law formerly followed in this state. Prior to Chamblis and Ora Jones it was generally recognized that evidence supporting a greater offense would not always support a lesser offense even if the lesser offense were of the genre described in Ora Jones as "necessarily included." If the evidence was consistent only with a verdict of guilty of the charged offense or not guilty it was not error for the trial court to refuse to instruct even on a necessarily included lesser offense. See People v Hearn, 354 Mich 468; 93 NW2d 302 (1958), People v Utter, 217 Mich 74; 185 NW 830 (1921), People v Repke, 103 Mich 459; 61 NW 861 (1895), People v Cardigan, 41 Mich App 629; 200 NW2d 446 (1972). See, also, People v Gregory Thomas, 38 Mich App 777, 779; 197 NW2d 97 (1972), in which Judge LEVIN stated the rule as follows:
"The rule is that entitlement to a charge on a lesser included offense largely turns on whether, on view of the evidence favorable to the defendant, there is evidence which would justify the jury in concluding that the greater offense was not committed and a lesser included offense was committed." (Emphasis supplied.)
This rule was expressly repudiated in Chamblis.
[4]  See anno: Lesser-related state offense instructions: Modern status, 50 ALR4th 1081.
[5]  31. Verdict
(c) Conviction of less offense. The defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense charged or of an attempt to commit either the offense charged or an offense necessarily included therein if the attempt is an offense. [See 11 ALR Fed 173, for what constitutes a lesser included offense under Rule 31(c).]
[6]  People v Miller, 406 Mich 244; 277 NW2d 630 (1979); People v Stephens, 416 Mich 252; 330 NW2d 675 (1982).
[7]  The Ross analysis has remained alive in Court of Appeals decisions. An example of its application may be found in People v Stein, 90 Mich App 159; 282 NW2d 269 (1979). But see n 1.
[8]  granted leave to appeal in this case to consider a number of issues, including whether a trial judge's refusal to give a properly requested lesser included offense instruction is harmless error in a case where the jury was instructed on some other lesser offenses and returned a verdict of guilty on a higher, charged offense.
Our review of the record reveals two errors which require reversal of defendant's conviction and remand for a new trial. First, on the record evidence in this case, the defendant was entitled to have the jury instructed on the lesser offenses of involuntary manslaughter and reckless use of a firearm causing death or injury. The refusal to give instructions on those properly requested and applicable lesser offenses was, in this case, prejudicial error. [409 Mich 130. Citations omitted.]
[9]  To the extent that Richardson is inconsistent with the Ross harmless error approach and its application in this case, it is modified.
[10]  See Negri v Slotkin, 397 Mich 105; 244 NW2d 98 (1976), which held that a decision by this Court in which no majority of the justices participating agree as to the reasoning is not an authoritative interpretation binding on the Court under the doctrine of stare decisis.
[11]  The defendant has raised the issue whether the negative element of the absence of a felony remains a requirement for involuntary manslaughter in light of our decision in People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672; 299 NW2d 304 (1980), in which we held that a conviction for felony murder requires more than the mere existence of a felony. We need not reach that question in this case because the definition of involuntary manslaughter relied upon by the Court of Appeals contains two negative elements. "Involuntary manslaughter is the unintentional killing of another without malice in (1) the commission of some unlawful act not amounting to a felony and not naturally tending to cause death or great bodily harm...." Because setting fire to a house in which residents are sleeping is an unlawful act which naturally tends to cause death or great bodily harm, the conduct in question could not satisfy the requirements for involuntary manslaughter regardless of whether the unlawful act was a felony.
[12]  See n 11.
[13]  We note that Michigan courts, ours included, have been less than precise in the use of language denoting voluntary or involuntary manslaughter. Although we accept, for this case, that involuntary manslaughter is a cognate lesser included offense of first-degree murder and second-degree murder, we observe that the precedents upon which this conclusion is built are primarily considerations of voluntary or statutory manslaughter. As we observed in Jones, supra, quoting People v Townes, 391 Mich 578; 218 NW2d 136 (1974):

"The elements of involuntary manslaughter, although not completely exclusive of those found in voluntary manslaughter are distinguishable in several respects. They define a crime that originates out of circumstances often quite different from those found in voluntary manslaughter and apply to a defendant who did not proceed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury." [395 Mich 392.]
Because this distinction was not at issue in this case, we do not pursue it here.
[14]  There was no evidence tending to show, or basis in the evidence for an inference, that the cause of the fire was an accident or negligence.
[15]  See n 14.
[16]  People v Rochowiak, supra.
[17]  The essence of a necessarily included offense is that it is impossible to commit the greater offense without also committing the lesser. Jones, supra. A conspiracy to commit larceny from the person is necessarily included in a conspiracy to commit armed robbery. This was recognized in People v Chamblis, supra, 425.

Robbery is committed only when there is larceny from the person, with the additional element of violence or intimidation. Perkins on Criminal Law (2d ed), pp 279, 281. We are committed to the view that the crime of larceny from the person embraces the taking of property in the possession and immediate presence of the victim. People v Gould, 384 Mich 71; 179 NW2d 617 (1970). If such taking be by force and threat of violence, it is robbery, and hence every robbery would necessarily include larceny from the person and every armed robbery would necessarily include both unarmed robbery and larceny from the person as lesser included offenses. "Without force" is the absence of an element in this context, it is not an additional element.
However, the Court's decision in People v Kamin, supra, found larceny from the person to be a cognate lesser included offense. We believe this was a mistake.
In People v Jankowski, 408 Mich 79; 289 NW2d 674 (1980), decided one year after Kamin, the Court returned to the Chamblis conclusion that larceny from the person is necessarily included in armed robbery.
See also People v Stein, n 7 supra, holding larceny in a building to be a cognate lesser included offense of armed robbery.
[18]  See Darden v Wainwright, 477 US 168; 106 S Ct 2464; 91 L Ed 2d 144 (1986); Bruton v United States, 391 US 123; 88 S Ct 1620; 20 L Ed 2d 476 (1968); Lutwak v United States, 344 US 604; 73 S Ct 481; 97 L Ed 593 (1953).