Case Title: Brown v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 324, 2009

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2009-11-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MONTREZ BROWN, 
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 324, 2009 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID 0810006006 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: September 22, 2009 
  Decided: November 2, 2009 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER, and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 2nd day of November 2009, upon consideration of the appellant's 
Supreme Court Rule 26(c) brief, his attorney's motion to withdraw, and the 
State's response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Montrez Brown (Brown), pled guilty 
to one count of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited.  The Superior 
Court immediately sentenced Brown to eight years at Level V incarceration 
to be suspended after serving three years for decreasing levels of 
supervision.  This is Brown’s direct appeal. 
(2) 
Brown's counsel on appeal has filed a brief and a motion to 
withdraw pursuant to Rule 26(c).  Counsel identifies one arguably 
 
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appealable issue but nonetheless asserts that, based upon a complete and 
careful examination of the record, the appeal is without merit.  By letter, 
Brown's attorney informed him of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided 
Brown with a copy of the motion to withdraw and the accompanying brief.  
Brown also was informed of his right to supplement his attorney's 
presentation.  Brown filed a response and asserts that his plea was not 
entered knowingly and voluntarily and that the Superior Court sentenced 
him in excess of his plea agreement.  The State has responded to Brown’s 
points, as well as to the position taken by Brown's counsel, and has moved to 
affirm the Superior Court's judgment. 
(3) 
The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
Rule 26(c) is twofold:  (a) this Court must be satisfied that defense counsel 
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable 
claims; and (b) this Court must conduct its own review of the record and 
determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably 
appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.1 
(4) 
The record reflects that Brown was charged in a fourteen count 
indictment with numerous drug and weapon offenses.  Prior to trial, he filed 
                                                 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of 
Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
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a motion to suppress, which was denied.  Thereafter, Brown filed a second 
motion to suppress, alleging different grounds for suppression.  A hearing on 
that motion was scheduled for the day of trial.  Prior to trial, however, 
Brown entered into a guilty plea agreement.  In exchange for his plea of 
guilty to a single charge of possession of a firearm by a person prohibited, 
the State agreed to dismiss all of the remaining charges and to request 
immediate sentencing to a term of eight years at Level V incarceration to be 
suspended after serving three years for decreasing levels of supervision.  
Brown, in turn, agreed to voluntarily withdraw two appeals that he had filed 
in earlier, unrelated criminal cases. 
(5) 
In the opening brief on appeal, Brown’s counsel asserts that 
Brown’s waiver of his right to appeal in his earlier criminal cases arguably 
was impermissible. We disagree.  This Court has recognized that defendants 
may waive their constitutional rights when entering into plea agreements so 
long as the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.2 Unless 
enforcement would work a “miscarriage of justice,” we have held that 
waiver-of-appeal agreements are valid.3  We find no miscarriage of justice in 
Brown’s case.  Accordingly, we reject this claim. 
                                                 
2 McDonald v. State, 778 A.2d 1064, 1074 (Del. 2000). 
3 Wall v. State, 2005 WL 76950 (Del. Jan. 11, 2005) (citing United States v. 
Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
 
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(6) 
Moreover, we find no merit to Brown’s suggestion that his 
guilty plea was involuntary.  Delaware law mandates that, in the absence of 
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, a defendant is bound by his 
sworn statements during the guilty plea colloquy.4  The record of the plea 
colloquy is clear that no one promised Brown what his sentence would be 
and that he was entering a guilty plea because he, in fact, was guilty of the 
crime charged.  Brown clearly was informed that the State was 
recommending an eight-year sentence, to be suspended after a three-year 
minimum mandatory term of incarceration, which is exactly the sentence the 
Superior Court imposed.  Brown’s belated contention that he was sentenced 
to more time than he bargained for is simply unsupported by the record.  
Accordingly, we conclude that Brown has not sustained his burden of 
proving by clear and convincing evidence that his guilty plea was 
involuntary. 
(7) 
This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Brown’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Brown's counsel has made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has properly 
determined that Brown could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
                                                 
4 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997). 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State's motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Carolyn Berger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice