Case Title: Phipps v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 679, 2014

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2015-04-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
RICHARD DEAN PHIPPS, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 679, 2014 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below:  Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID No. 9406006950 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
  Submitted:  March 11, 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
  Decided:  April 7, 2015 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; HOLLAND, and VAUGHN, Justices 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 7th day of April 2015, upon consideration of the appellant’s opening 
brief, the appellee’s motion to affirm, and the record below, it appears to the Court 
that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Richard Dean Phipps, filed this appeal from the 
Superior Court’s denial of his second motion for postconviction relief under 
Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”).  The State of Delaware has filed a 
motion to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face 
of Phipps’ opening brief that his appeal is without merit.1  We agree and affirm.  
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a).   
2 
 
(2) 
In January 1995, a Superior Court jury found Phipps guilty of 
Unlawful Sexual Intercourse in the First Degree and Endangering the Welfare of a 
Child after hearing testimony that Phipps forced his nine-year old son to perform 
fellatio on him.  Phipps was sentenced to forty years of Level V incarceration, 
suspended after thirty years for decreasing levels of supervision.  On direct appeal, 
this Court affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment.2   
(3) 
In February 1999, Phipps filed his first motion for postconviction 
relief under Rule 61.  Phipps identified twelve grounds for postconviction relief, 
including error by the Superior Court, ineffective assistance of counsel, police 
misconduct, and prosecutorial misconduct.  To support his claims that his son was 
coerced, suggestible, and unreliable, Phipps amended his postconviction motion to 
include a school psychologist’s 1993 report on his son reflecting that his son had 
learning disabilities and low average overall cognitive ability.  After receiving the 
affidavit of Phipps’ former counsel, the Superior Court denied Phipps’ motion for 
postconviction relief. 
(4) 
In November 2014, Phipps filed his second motion for postconviction 
relief.  Phipps also filed a motion for appointment of counsel and a motion for an 
evidentiary hearing.  In his second motion for postconviction relief, Phipps raised 
or restated many of the claims contained in his first motion for postconviction 
                                                 
2 Phipps v. State, 1996 WL 145739 (Del. Feb. 16, 1996). 
3 
 
relief.  Phipps also asserted actual innocence based on his statements to police and 
his counsel, the 1993 psychological report on his son, and an April 18, 1994 police 
report provided to his counsel at the beginning of trial.  The Superior Court 
concluded that Phipps’ claims were procedurally barred under Rule 61 and denied 
the motion for postconviction relief.   
(5) 
On appeal, Phipps argues: (i) his claims are not procedurally barred 
under Rule 61 because he pled a colorable claim of a miscarriage of justice based 
on newly discovered evidence of his actual innocence; (ii) his counsel was 
ineffective; (iii) the Superior Court erred in not holding a hearing under 11 Del. C. 
§ 3507 and 11 Del. C. § 3508 on the reliability and voluntariness of his son’s 
statements; (iv) the prosecution violated Brady v. Maryland3 by failing to turn over 
a police report until the beginning of trial; and (v) the Superior Court erred in 
denying Phipps’ request for preparation of transcripts in this appeal.   
(6) 
We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for 
abuse of discretion and questions of law de novo.4  The procedural requirements of 
Rule 61 must be considered before any substantive issues are addressed.5  Rule 
61(d)(2) provides: 
                                                 
3 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
4 Dawson v. State, 673 A.2d 1186, 1190 (Del. 1996). 
5 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
4 
 
(2) Second or subsequent postconviction motions. A second or 
subsequent motion under this rule shall be summarily dismissed, 
unless the movant was convicted after a trial and the motion either: 
(i) pleads with particularity that new evidence exists that creates a 
strong inference that the movant is actually innocent in fact of the acts 
underlying the charges of which he was convicted; or  
(ii) pleads with particularity a claim that a new rule of constitutional 
law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the United 
States Supreme Court or the Delaware Supreme Court, applies to the 
movant’s case and renders the conviction or death sentence invalid.6    
Unless Phipps satisfied Rule 61(d)(2)(i) or 61(d)(2)(ii), his second motion for 
postconviction relief was subject to summary dismissal. 
(7) 
Phipps has not pled a claim that satisfies Rule 61(d)(2)(i) or Rule 
61(d)(2)(ii).  The new evidence Phipps relies upon—the 1993 psychological report 
on his son and an April 18, 1994 police report provided to his counsel at the 
beginning of trial—is not new and does not create a strong inference of Phipps’ 
actual innocence.  Phipps included the 1993 psychological report in the motion to 
amend his first motion for postconviction relief and stated in the motion that the 
report was available before trial.  The April 18, 1994 police report was provided to 
Phipps’ counsel at trial.  Phipps complains that he did not see the report until 
weeks after trial, but that still means he had the report in 1995.   
(8) 
As to the content of these reports, the learning disabilities and low 
average overall cognitive ability of Phipps’ son discussed in the 1993 
                                                 
6 Super. Ct. R. 61(d)(2) (2014). 
5 
 
psychological report do not create a strong inference of Phipps’ actual innocence.  
Based on references in the April 18, 1994 crime report to Phipps’ son being with 
his friends before Phipps called him back to the bedroom and forced him to 
perform fellatio, Phipps claims these children “could have possibly testified 
accused did not call noone [sic] to the bedroom.”7  Phipps also claims that the 
timeline of events set forth in the report (his son initially told his aunt that he saw 
his father having sex with other women after a daycare reported the son was 
engaging in sexually inappropriate behavior and then later stated that his father 
forced him to perform fellatio) supports his theory that his son lied in order to 
avoid angering his aunt.  This speculation does not create a strong inference of 
Phipps’ actual innocence.  We therefore conclude that the Superior Court did not 
err in denying Phipps’ second motion for postconviction relief.   
(9) 
We also conclude that the Superior Court did not err in denying 
Phipps’ request for transcripts at State expense.  Absent a showing of good cause, 
it was within the Superior Court’s discretion to deny Phipps’ request for transcripts 
at State expense.8  Given that resolution of this appeal depended on the record 
before the Superior Court on Phipps’ second motion for postconviction relief, the 
                                                 
7 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 7. 
8 Miller v. State, 2008 WL 623236, at *2 (Del. Mar. 7, 2008) (citing United States v. MacCollom, 
426 U.S. 317, 325-26 (1976)). 
6 
 
Superior Court did not err in denying Phipps’ request for transcripts at State 
expense after his second motion for postconviction relief was denied.  
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that motion to affirm is GRANTED 
and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice