Case Title: BARRY A LEWIS V STATE OF MICHIGAN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 114241

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
______________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C 
hief Just ice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 17, 2001  
BARRY A. LEWIS,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v  
No. 114241  
STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
TAYLOR, J.  
This case presents the question whether a judicially  
inferred private cause of action should be recognized against  
the state for violation of Const 1963, art 1, § 2, the Equal  
Protection Clause of the Michigan Constitution. We conclude  
that we should not recognize such a cause of action because  
the 
plain 
language 
of this constitutional provision leaves its  
implementation to the Legislature.  Thus, we affirm the  
 
judgment of the Court of Appeals, although we clarify the  
appropriate rationale for resolving this case.  
I. Underlying Facts and Procedural History  
Plaintiff, a white male, became a trooper with the  
Michigan State Police in 1973.  The State Police did not  
promote plaintiff to the position of sergeant.  
Plaintiff alleges that the State Police discriminated  
against him on the basis of race and sex in violation of the  
Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 1, § 2, by using  
affirmative action policies in connection with promotional  
decisions.  
Specifically, 
plaintiff 
attacks 
the 
“augmentation”  
policy used by the State Police until June 27, 1994.  Under  
the augmentation policy, the State Police would, in certain  
circumstances, give preferential treatment to minority and  
female 
candidates in 
connection 
with 
eligibility 
for  
promotions.1  In addition, plaintiff alleged that the State  
1In short, the parties agree that individual troopers 
were placed into three “bands” on the basis of the promotional 
examination with those with the highest scores referred to as 
being in the first band.  Generally, only troopers in the 
first band were considered for promotion to sergeant. 
However, if there was an “insufficient” number of women and 
minorities in the first band, then women and minorities from 
the second band (the middle range) of test scores would be 
added to the list of troopers to be considered for promotion. 
White males, such as plaintiff, who scored in the second band 
would not be added to the list of those to be considered for  
promotions.  
2 
  
Police gave favorable consideration to female and minority  
status 
in 
selecting 
individuals for promotion to sergeant even  
apart from the augmentation policy.  Indeed, Michigan State  
Police Colonel Michael Robinson acknowledged in deposition  
testimony that race and gender were considered with a  
“multitude of [other] factors” in filling vacant positions.  
The affirmative action plans of the State Police were approved  
by the Michigan Civil Rights Commission.  
In pertinent part, plaintiff brought this case to seek  
money damages from the state for violation of his right under  
the Michigan Constitution to be free of race and sex  
discrimination by the state.  The trial court eventually ruled  
in favor of plaintiff on his claim for money damages for  
violation of the Michigan Constitution, awarding damages of  
over $300,000.  The Court of Appeals peremptorily reversed the  
trial court on the basis of its earlier decision in Cremonte  
v Michigan State Police, 232 Mich App 240; 591 NW2d 261  
(1999). Like the present case, Cremonte involved a claim for  
money damages against the state for discrimination in  
violation of Const 1963, art 1, § 2 because of affirmative  
action policies followed by the State Police.  The Court of  
Appeals in Cremonte held that that case was not an appropriate  
one in which to infer such a damage remedy. Cremonte, supra  
at 252.  
3  
 
  
II. Analysis  
A. Cremonte  
The Court of Appeals panel in this case simply relied on  
Cremonte in reversing the award of money damages in favor of  
plaintiff. 
Cremonte involved facts that are virtually  
identical to those of the present case.  The plaintiff was  
also a white male trooper who had not been promoted by the  
State Police for a number of years.  Id. at 242. In pertinent  
part, the plaintiff argued that affirmative action policies  
used 
by 
the 
State 
Police 
constituted 
race 
and 
sex  
discrimination in violation of Const 1963, art 1, § 2.  
Cremonte, supra at 243. Although the lower court in Cremonte  
held in favor of the plaintiff and awarded money damages, the  
Court of Appeals reversed and held that the facts of Cremonte  
did not support imposition of a judicially inferred damage  
remedy for violation of Const 1963, art 1, § 2:  
The last line of [Const 1963, art 1, § 2] 
certainly weighs against an inferred damage remedy. 
Indeed, that sentence alone could be viewed as 
dispositive of this issue.  See Smith [v Dep’t of  
Public Health, 428 Mich 540, 632; 410 NW2d 749 
(1987) 
(Brickley, 
J.).] 
In 
addition, 
the  
availability of a remedy under the Civil Rights Act 
obviates any need for an inferred damage remedy in 
age, race, or gender discrimination cases, or in 
retaliation cases.  Here, plaintiff could, and did, 
file a Civil Rights Act action against defendant. 
Thus, we have no trouble concluding that this was 
not an appropriate case in which to infer a damage 
remedy. [Cremonte, supra at 252.]  
4  
As we will discuss below, we agree that the language of  
the last sentence of Const 1963, art 1, § 2 weighs against  
recognition of a judicially adopted damages remedy for  
violation of that constitutional provision. Accordingly, we  
conclude today that this portion of Const 1963, art 1, § 2,  
commonly referred to as the state Equal Protection Clause,  
precludes us from adopting such a judicially crafted remedy.  
Thus, we agree with the result in Cremonte.  
However, we disagree with the reliance by the Court of  
Appeals in Cremonte on the potential availability of a remedy  
under the state Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq.  As an  
initial matter, we note that there is no such remedy, because  
the “safe harbor” provision of the Civil Rights Act, MCL  
37.2210,2 gives immunity from liability under the Civil Rights  
Act to an entity carrying out such an affirmative action plan  
if it has been approved by the Civil Rights Commission. See  
Sharp v City of Lansing, 464 Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2001).  
The affirmative action plan challenged by plaintiff here was  
undertaken pursuant to such an approval, and, as a result,  
2  
A person subject to this article may adopt and 
carry out a plan to eliminate present effects of 
past discriminatory practices or assure equal 
opportunity with respect to religion, race, color, 
national origin, or sex if the plan is filed with 
the commission under rules of the commission and  
the commission approves the plan.  
5 
 
 
 
there could never be a remedy under the state Civil Rights  
Act. Thus, this unattainable remedy should not be a part of  
the justification for precluding a plaintiff from an inferred  
damages remedy under Const 1963, art 1, § 2. 
More  
importantly, as will be explained below, the existence or lack  
of an available remedy is irrelevant in this context, because  
the constitutional provision at issue expressly assigns the  
responsibility of implementation to the Legislature.  
B.  Dedication of Implementation of Const 1963, art 1, § 2 
to Legislature  
In Smith v Dep’t of Public Health, supra, this Court  
considered arguments that it should judicially recognize  
causes of action against the state for violation of the  
Michigan Constitution.  Smith involved two consolidated cases  
with 
differing 
allegations 
of 
state 
constitutional 
violations.  
The only majority opinion in Smith was a brief memorandum  
opinion summarizing the holdings on which at least four  
justices agreed.  In pertinent part, Smith held that, “[a]  
claim for damages against the state arising from violation by  
the state of the Michigan Constitution may be recognized in  
appropriate cases.”  Id. at 544. This brief majority opinion  
did not define what constitutes an “appropriate” case for  
recognizing such a cause of action for violation of the  
6  
  
Michigan 
Constitution. 
 
Regardless 
of 
whether 
an 
“appropriate”  
case may be conceived, we conclude that it is inappropriate to  
infer a damages remedy for violation of Const 1963, art 1,  
§ 2.  
The reason it is inappropriate to infer such a damages  
remedy, simply stated, is the language of Const 1963, art 1,  
§ 2:  
No person shall be denied the equal protection 
of the laws; nor shall any person be denied the 
enjoyment of his civil or political rights or be 
discriminated against in the exercise thereof  
because of religion, race, color or national  
origin. 
The legislature shall implement this  
section by appropriate legislation. 
[Emphasis 
added.]  
On its face, the implementation power of Const 1963,  
art 1, § 2 is given to the Legislature.  Because of this, for  
this Court to implement Const 1963, art 1, § 2 by allowing,  
for example, money damages, would be to arrogate this power  
given expressly to the Legislature to this Court.  Under no  
recognizable theory of disciplined jurisprudence do we have  
such power.  
Moreover, 
our 
conclusion that the language of Const 1963,  
art 1, § 2 does not allow us to judicially create a money  
damages remedy for a violation of this constitutional  
provision is consistent with the view expressed by Justice  
Brickley, joined by Justice Riley, in Smith:  
7  
[T]hose sections of the 1963 Constitution, 
comparable 
to 
the 
provisions 
of 
the 
1908  
Constitution under which plaintiff sued, indicate 
that we should defer to the Legislature the  
question whether to create a damages remedy for 
violations of a plaintiff’s rights to due process[3]  
or equal protection.  For example, the Equal 
Protection Clause of the 1963 Constitution (art 1, 
§ 2) leaves its implementation to the Legislature. 
[Id. at 631-632).][4]  
Furthermore, it is the pattern of the Michigan  
Constitution with regard to the protection of civil rights to  
provide the Legislature with authority to create remedial  
measures. This can be seen in the provision of the Michigan  
Constitution that creates the Civil Rights Commission (Const  
1963, art 5, § 295) where the drafters, after creating the  
3We do not address whether a judicially inferred damages 
remedy is ever appropriate under the Due Process Clause of the 
Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 1, § 17, inasmuch as 
the present case does not involve such a claim.  
4Similar reasoning is found in 77th Dist Judge v Michigan, 
175 Mich App 681; 438 NW2d 333 (1989) (holding that it was 
error to grant damages for equal protection violation  
involving disparate pay for state district court judges).  The  
Court of Appeals panel in 77th Dist Judge observed:  
[W]e note, as did [Justice Brickley] in Smith, 
that provision in Const 1963, art 1, § 2 empowering 
the Legislature to implement enforcement mechanisms 
for equal protection.  This reinforces judicial 
reluctance on our part to sanction a damages  
remedy. [Id. at 696.]  
5This constitutional provision states:  
There is hereby established a civil rights 
commission . . . .  It shall be the duty of the 
(continued...)  
8 
 
 
Civil 
Rights 
Commission, 
then 
indicated 
that 
its  
investigations 
and 
efforts to secure equal protection of civil  
rights “may be prescribed by law,” i.e., prescribed by the  
Legislature.  The instant civil rights provision also follows  
that approach and, thus, reinforces our confidence that the  
drafters consistently intended that these rights, which were  
coming to flower in the early 1960's, were to be implemented  
after legislative consideration of the most appropriate  
remedies.  
Finally, our holding should not be construed as a  
demurral to the traditional judicial power to invalidate  
legislation or other positive governmental action that  
directly violates the equal protection guarantee of Const  
1963, art 1, § 2.6  There is obviously a distinction between  
5(...continued) 
commission in a manner which may be prescribed by  
law to investigate alleged discrimination against 
any person because of religion, race, color or 
national origin in the enjoyment of the civil 
rights guaranteed by law and by this constitution, 
and to secure the equal protection of such civil 
rights without such discrimination. 
[Emphasis 
added.]  
6  We make this observation primarily to preclude any 
misinterpretation 
of 
this opinion as calling into question the 
ability of Michigan courts to review legislation for its 
validity under the state Equal Protection Clause. This case  
does not require us to actually decide whether injunctive 
relief 
is 
available 
against 
other 
positive 
governmental 
action 
that may violate this constitutional provision.  Rather, that 
question is addressed in this Court’s decision in Sharp, 
(continued...)  
9  
 
a judicial decree invalidating unconstitutional governmental  
action and the adoption of judicially created doctrines that  
effectively serve as de facto statutory enactments to  
implement Const 1963, art 1, § 2.  The former is classic  
judicial review recognized as a core judicial function since,  
at least, the decision in Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch)  
137; 2 L Ed 60 (1803). The latter is an improper usurpation  
of legislative authority.  To fail to heed this limitation on  
judicial power would be to fail “to maintain the separation  
between the Judiciary and the other branches . . . by ensuring  
that judges do not encroach upon executive or legislative  
authority or undertake tasks that are more properly  
accomplished by those branches.” 
Morrison v Olson, 487 US  
654, 680-681; 108 S Ct 2597; 101 L Ed 2d 569 (1988).  
Accordingly, when the political branches of state government  
affirmatively act by adopting legislation or otherwise, we  
may, in keeping with the traditional judicial role, review  
that action to determine if it is unconstitutional.  Until  
that time, however, we cannot go further.  
Given the language of the Michigan Constitution, we hold  
in this case that we are without proper authority to recognize  
6(...continued) 
supra, which is being released today. 
For the reasons  
discussed in Sharp, we disagree with Justice Kelly’s position 
on that question and see no need to repeat the extended 
analysis of that matter in this opinion.  
10  
  
 
 
 
 
 
a cause of action for money damages or other compensatory  
relief for past violations of Const 1963, art 1, § 2.7  
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.8  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and CAVANAGH, 
WEAVER, 
YOUNG, 
and MARKMAN, 
JJ.,  
concurred with TAYLOR, J.  
7We note that plaintiff’s statement of the question 
presented in this case refers to the possible availability of 
a private cause of action under Const 1963, art 11, § 5. 
However, plaintiff offers no argument about why such a cause 
of action should be recognized.  In any event, Const 1963, art 
11, § 5 states that “[v]iolation of any of the provisions 
hereof 
may 
be 
restrained or observance compelled by injunctive 
or mandamus proceedings brought by any citizen of the state.” 
This express reference to injunctive and mandamus remedies 
implies that a money damages remedy is not directly available 
for a violation of Const 1963, art 11, § 5.  
8As discussed earlier, the Court of Appeals reversed and 
remanded for further proceedings consistent with Cremonte,  
supra. 
While we disagree with part of the rationale in 
Cremonte, we agree with its holding. Thus, we do not need to 
modify the order entered by the Court of Appeals in the 
present case.  
11  
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
BARRY A. LEWIS,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
No. 114241  
STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
KELLY, J. (concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
I agree with today's holding that we should not recognize  
a cause of action for money damages or other compensatory  
relief for past violations of the Equal Protection Clause of  
the Michigan Constitution.1 I also support much of the  
supporting rationale.  
However, I disagree with the apparent dictum suggesting  
that a party can pursue equitable relief directly under the  
constitution 
where 
it 
conflicts 
with 
the 
safe-harbor 
provision  
1Const 1963, art 1, § 2.  
 
in the Michigan Civil Rights Act (CRA).2 To the extent that  
the 
majority 
holding 
represents such a proposition, I dissent.  
The majority remarks that its holding is not a "demurral  
to 
the 
traditional 
judicial power to invalidate legislation or  
other positive governmental action that directly violates the  
equal protection guarantee of Const 1963, art 1, § 2." Ante  
at 9.  Of course, I do not take issue with the general  
proposition that the constitution may offer certain equitable  
relief when not preempted by a statutory remedial scheme. See  
Sharp v City of Lansing, 464 Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2001)  
(KELLY, J., dissenting).  
It concerns me, however, that the majority appears to  
conclude that equitable relief remains available to remedy  
harms covered by a comprehensive remedial scheme, such as  
title VII and our own CRA.3  Moreover, the present case does  
not require a response from the Court on this question.  
Therefore, to the extent the majority casts its holding  
to 
sanction 
claims 
for equitable relief under the constitution  
in avoidance of a comprehensive legislative remedial scheme,  
I dissent. I oppose circuitous measures for pleading around  
2MCL 37.2210.  
3See Great American Savings & Loan Ass'n v Novotny, 442 
US 366; 99 S Ct 2345; 60 L Ed 2d 957 (1979), holding a 
constitutional equal protection claim unavailable to the 
plaintiff where the cause of action is contemplated under 
title VII.  
2  
the detailed, clear requirements of the CRA, itself enacted in  
furtherance of the will of Michigan citizens as evidenced in  
art 1, § 2.  
3