Case Title: Miles v. Sheriff of Va. Beach City Jail

Citation: 

Docket Number: 021718

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2003-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
JAMIE LAMONT MILES 
v.  Record No. 021718  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
June 6, 2003 
SHERIFF OF THE VIRGINIA BEACH 
CITY JAIL 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS 
Robert W. Curran, Judge 
 
 
This case is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit 
court dismissing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
filed by Jamie Lamont Miles.  In the petition, Miles 
asserted ineffective assistance of counsel because his 
trial counsel failed to perfect an appeal to the Court of 
Appeals of Virginia.  Although Miles pled guilty to the 
charges, we conclude that his trial counsel’s failure to 
file an appeal after having been instructed to do so by 
Miles constituted deficient performance and that Miles, 
having objectively demonstrated his intent to appeal, is 
entitled to a belated appeal.  Thus, we will reverse the 
judgment of the circuit court dismissing the petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus. 
 
Miles pled guilty to two counts of robbery, in 
violation of Code § 18.2-58, and one count of using a 
firearm in the commission of a felony, in violation of Code 
§ 18.1-53.1.  During the guilty plea colloquy, the court 
asked Miles if he understood that, by pleading guilty, he 
was waiving the right to appeal the court’s decision.  
Miles responded affirmatively to the court’s question.  
After hearing a summary of the evidence, the Circuit Court 
for the City of Newport News found Miles guilty of the 
offenses.  At the sentencing hearing held on November 29, 
2001, the court sentenced Miles to a five-year term of 
imprisonment on each conviction, for a total sentence of 15 
years.  The court also advised Miles that, if he wished to 
appeal the court’s decision, he needed to advise his 
counsel so that a notice of appeal could be timely filed. 
 
In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Miles 
states that he wrote a letter dated December 11, 2001, 
informing his attorney that he “wanted to appeal” his 
convictions.  Receiving no response from his trial counsel, 
Miles then wrote the circuit court judge on three 
occasions, each time stating that he wanted to file an 
appeal.  In the third letter, Miles asked the court to 
appoint a different attorney to represent him on appeal, 
and the court subsequently did so.  The petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel and seeking a belated appeal then followed. 
 
The respondent argued before the circuit court, as he 
does on appeal, that the petition should be dismissed 
because Miles failed to identify any anticipated grounds 
 
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for an appeal of his convictions.  The respondent contended 
that, by pleading guilty to the charges, Miles waived all 
non-jurisdictional grounds for appeal, see e.g., Walton v. 
Commonwealth, 256 Va. 85, 91, 501 S.E.2d 134, 138 (1998); 
Peyton v. King, 210 Va. 194, 196-97, 169 S.E.2d 569, 571 
(1969), and that the record does not reveal any 
jurisdictional or sentencing errors upon which to base an 
appeal.  The respondent further pointed out that Miles did 
not allege any such errors in his petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus.  Given the limited nature of the grounds 
available for an appeal of a conviction after a defendant 
has pled guilty and the fact that Miles received the 
minimum sentence allowed for each of his convictions, the 
respondent asserted that Miles had not demonstrated that he 
was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to file an 
appeal.  The circuit court agreed with the respondent’s 
position and granted the motion to dismiss Miles’ petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus. 
 
Miles appeals from the circuit court’s judgment.  He 
contends that the court erred by dismissing his habeas 
corpus petition because he directed his trial counsel to 
file an appeal and the attorney failed to do so.  Miles 
posits that the court could not “presume a priori and in 
the absence of any evidence” that he did not intend to 
 
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raise jurisdictional or sentencing errors on appeal.  
According to Miles, there is no requirement that he set 
forth his intended grounds of appeal in a habeas corpus 
petition seeking a belated appeal. 
 
As the respondent argues, the law is well-settled that 
“a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty by an accused 
is . . . a self-supplied conviction authorizing imposition 
of the punishment fixed by law” and waives all non-
jurisdictional defects that occurred prior to entry of the 
guilty plea.  Peyton, 210 Va. at 196, 169 S.E.2d at 571; 
accord Savino v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 534, 538-39, 391 
S.E.2d 276, 278 (1990); Beaver v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 
521, 526, 352 S.E.2d 342, 345 (1987); Guthrie v. 
Commonwealth, 212 Va. 550, 551, 186 S.E.2d 26, 28 (1972); 
see also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973).  
The waiver of non-jurisdictional defenses applies not only 
in the trial court but also in this Court.  Peyton, 210 Va. 
at 196, 169 S.E.2d at 571.  When a conviction is based upon 
a defendant’s guilty plea and the defendant receives the 
sentence fixed by law, “there is nothing to appeal” absent 
a jurisdictional defect.  Id. at 197, 169 S.E.2d at 571. 
 
However, this case is not a direct appeal from Miles’ 
convictions.  Instead, it is a collateral attack on those 
convictions based on Miles’ claim of ineffective assistance 
 
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of counsel.  Consequently, the issue here is whether trial 
counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to 
file a notice of appeal.  With regard to this issue, it is 
important that Miles wrote his attorney prior to the 
expiration of the period of time allowed for filing a 
notice of appeal, see Rule 5A:6, and stated that he wanted 
to appeal his convictions.  Miles’ trial counsel did not 
dispute this allegation in his affidavit filed as an 
exhibit with the respondent’s motion to dismiss Miles’ 
habeas corpus petition.  Instead, the attorney stated only 
that he was not aware of any grounds upon which Miles could 
have appealed his convictions. 
 
Our analysis of Miles’ claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel is guided by the decision of the Supreme Court 
of the United States in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 
(2000).  There, the Court held that the two-part test for 
adjudicating claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
previously enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668 (1984), applies to a claim “that counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective for failing to file a notice 
of appeal.”  Roe, 528 U.S. at 477.  Under the Strickland 
test, a convicted defendant “must show (1) that counsel’s 
representation ‘fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness,’ and (2) that counsel’s deficient 
 
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performance prejudiced the defendant.”  Id. at 476-77 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694). 
 
In Roe, the question under the first prong of the 
Strickland test was whether counsel was deficient for 
failing to file a notice of appeal “when the defendant 
[had] not clearly conveyed his wishes one way or the 
other[.]”  Id. at 477.  In framing that question, the Court 
pointed out that it had previously “held that a lawyer who 
disregards specific instructions from the defendant to file 
a notice of appeal acts in a manner that is professionally 
unreasonable.”  Id. (citing Rodriquez v. United States, 395 
U.S. 327, 330 (1969); Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 
23, 28 (1999)).  At the opposite end of the spectrum, as 
the Court noted, is the defendant who explicitly instructs 
counsel not to file an appeal.  Id.  Such a defendant 
cannot later complain that counsel, by following 
instructions, engaged in deficient performance.  Id.
 
The ineffective assistance of counsel claim in Roe 
fell between those two extremes and was, therefore, “best 
answered” by making two additional inquiries.  Id. at 477-
78.  The first inquiry was whether counsel had consulted 
with the defendant.1  Id. at 478.  If counsel had done so, 
                     
1 The Court defined the term “consult” as “advising the 
defendant about the advantages and disadvantages of taking 
 
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“the question of deficient performance [was] easily 
answered: Counsel perform[ed] in a professionally 
unreasonable manner only by failing to follow the 
defendant’s express instructions with respect to an 
appeal.”  Id.  However, if counsel had not consulted with 
the defendant about an appeal, the second question was 
“whether counsel’s failure to consult with the defendant 
itself constitute[d] deficient performance.”  Id.  Because 
the attorney in Roe had not consulted with the defendant, 
the Court then addressed under what circumstances counsel 
has an obligation to consult with a defendant about an 
appeal.  Id.  A relevant factor with regard to the duty to 
consult is whether the conviction followed a trial or a 
guilty plea.  Id. at 480. 
 
However, it is not necessary in the present case to 
address these subsidiary questions because Miles’ claim 
falls squarely at the end of the spectrum where an attorney 
disregards a defendant’s instructions to file a notice of 
appeal.2  In that situation, an attorney “acts in a manner 
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an appeal, and making a reasonable effort to discover the 
defendant’s wishes.”  Roe, 528 U.S. at 478. 
 
2 We do not agree with the respondent’s 
characterization of Miles’ communication with his attorney 
as “a desire to appeal.”  At sentencing, the court told 
Miles that, if he wanted to appeal, he needed to advise his 
counsel so that a notice of appeal could be timely filed.  
 
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that is professionally unreasonable” by failing to follow 
the defendant’s specific instructions.  Id. at 477.  Since 
it is not disputed that Miles timely instructed his trial 
counsel to initiate an appeal, we hold that counsel’s 
failure to do so was deficient performance under the first 
prong of the Strickland two-part test.  See Roe, 528 U.S. 
at 477; Rodriquez, 395 U.S. at 330. 
 
We reach this conclusion even though Miles pled guilty 
to the charges.  The decision whether to file an appeal 
ultimately rests with the defendant.  Jones v. Barnes, 463 
U.S. 745, 751 (1983).  In this case, trial counsel’s 
failure to follow Miles’ timely instruction to appeal 
cannot be considered a strategic decision but, instead, 
“reflects inattention to the defendant’s wishes.”  Roe, 528 
U.S. at 477.  That a defendant pled guilty is an 
appropriate factor to consider when determining whether 
counsel was ineffective for failing to consult with the 
_______________ 
Miles then wrote his attorney and told the attorney that he 
“wanted to appeal.”  Receiving no response from his 
attorney, Miles persisted in his decision to appeal by 
writing the circuit court on three occasions and stating 
that he wanted to file an appeal.  As we have already 
noted, Miles’ trial counsel did not dispute these 
assertions in his affidavit filed in the circuit court.  
Thus, we cannot say that Miles’ claim is merely a “blanket 
assertion” that he requested an appeal, which, it if were, 
would be insufficient to establish deficient performance.  
Ledbetter v. United States, 182 F. Supp.2d 510, 517 
(W.D.N.C. 2001). 
 
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defendant about an appeal.  See id. at 479.  Failure to 
consult is not the issue in this case. 
 
With regard to the “prejudice” prong of the Strickland 
test, the Court in Roe held that “when counsel’s 
constitutionally deficient performance deprives a defendant 
of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken, the 
defendant has made out a successful ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim entitling him to an appeal.”  Id. at 484.  
The question whether a particular defendant has made the 
requisite showing of prejudice will turn on the facts of 
the case.  Id. at 485.  However, the Court reiterated its 
prior holding in Rodriquez:  “[T]he defendant, by 
instructing counsel to perfect an appeal, objectively 
indicated his intent to appeal and was entitled to a new 
appeal without any further showing.”  Id.
 
We reach the same conclusion in this case even though 
we recognize that the defendant in Rodriquez did not enter 
a guilty plea.  Nevertheless, the respondent argues that, 
given the narrow scope of issues available for appeal 
following a guilty plea in Virginia and Miles’ failure to 
identify any viable ground of appeal, Miles has not 
 
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demonstrated the requisite prejudice to justify habeas 
relief.3  We do not agree. 
 
Although the range of potential grounds for appeal 
following a guilty plea is limited in Virginia, a defendant 
who has pled guilty still retains the statutory right to 
file a notice of appeal and present a petition for appeal 
to the Court of Appeals of Virginia.  See Code §§ 17.1-406 
and –407.  Thus, when a defendant, after pleading guilty, 
timely instructs counsel to file an appeal, we conclude 
that it would be unfair to find an absence of prejudice 
solely because the defendant failed to state, in a habeas 
corpus petition, the anticipated grounds of a belated 
appeal.  Such a requirement is not imposed on a defendant 
who has pled not guilty and seeks a belated appeal.  See 
Roe, 528 U.S. at 486.  As the Court in Rodriquez 
recognized, “[t]hose whose right to an appeal has been 
frustrated should be treated exactly like any other 
appellants.”  Rodriquez, 395 U.S. at 330 (rejecting any 
requirement that a defendant “specify the points he would 
raise were his right to appeal reinstated”).  Otherwise, 
                     
3 Two cases relied upon by the respondent, Sarroca v. 
United States, 250 F.3d 785 (2nd Cir. 2001), and Montero-
Melendez v. United States, ___ F. Supp.2d ___ (S.D.N.Y. 
2003), are not relevant because the defendants in those 
cases had not instructed their respective counsel to file 
 
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the defendant who has entered a guilty plea would often 
have to search the record for meritorious grounds for an 
appeal before an attorney has done so, and this Court would 
have to use its resources to determine whether nonfrivolous 
grounds for an appeal exist when ruling on the defendant’s 
habeas corpus petition rather than doing so more 
efficiently in the direct appeal process.  However, we 
emphasize that our holding today is limited to those 
situations where a defendant has unequivocally and timely 
instructed counsel to perfect an appeal. 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment 
appealed from and remand the case to the circuit court with 
directions to issue the writ of habeas corpus and to grant 
leave to Miles to file a notice of appeal and to petition 
the Court of Appeals of Virginia for an appeal from the 
judgments rendered on November 29, 2001 by the Circuit 
Court for the City of Newport News upon two convictions of 
robbery and one conviction for use of a firearm in the 
commission of a felony. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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an appeal.  Instead, both cases focused on counsel’s duty 
to consult with the respective defendant about an appeal. 
 
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