Case Title: Commonwealth v. Bass

Citation: 

Docket Number: 151163

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2016-06-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 151163 
JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS 
 
 
 
June 2, 2016 
JAYVON LARTAY BASS 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals misapplied the ends of justice 
exception to Rule 5A:18 and erroneously reversed the defendant’s conviction due to a variance 
between the indictments and the evidence presented at trial.  We also consider whether the Court 
of Appeals erred when it declined to address the defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the 
Commonwealth’s evidence after reversing the defendant’s conviction. 
I.  BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
A. 
Pretrial Background 
 
City of Richmond police obtained warrants charging Jayvon Lartay Bass with the 
robberies of Videll Smith and Freddie Brown (“Brown”), and the attempted robbery of Irving 
Smith.1  These crimes arose out of a home invasion occurring on September 2, 2013. 
 
The General District Court of the City of Richmond certified these charges to a grand 
jury.  The grand jury subsequently returned indictments charging Bass with the robberies of 
Irving Smith and Brown, and the attempted robbery of Videll Smith, thereby transposing the first 
names of the victims from the warrants.  The grand jury also returned three indictments charging 
Bass with using a firearm in the commission of these felonies. 
                                                 
 
1 Hereinafter, this opinion will refer to Videll Smith as “Videll” and Irving Smith as 
“Irving,” except where usage of their full names would provide additional context. 
2 
 
 
Thereafter, Bass was tried for these offenses by a jury.  During the arraignment, the court 
informed Bass that he was charged with the robberies of Irving Smith and Brown, and the 
attempted robbery of Videll Smith, as well as with three counts of using a firearm in the 
commission of these felonies. 
B. 
Testimony at Trial 
 
Videll testified that he was at his residence in Richmond on September 2, 2013.  Videll’s 
roommates, “Pops” and Irving, as well as two friends, Brown and William Ross (“Ross”), were 
also at the residence.2  At some point, the circuit breaker tripped, interrupting the air 
conditioning, and Videll went outside to reset the breaker.  Outside, he encountered Bass, whom 
he had met the previous day during a game of cards at the residence.  Bass asked to speak with 
Pops, and Videll let Bass inside. 
 
Videll then went back to his bedroom.  Shortly after, he heard a “commotion” and came 
out into the common area.  He immediately saw a masked man holding Brown at gunpoint while 
Bass moved throughout the rooms.  The gunman directed Videll and Brown to stand together 
against a wall, and demanded their wallets.  Brown handed over his wallet, and then Bass 
accompanied Videll to his bedroom to retrieve his wallet.  Bass took Videll’s wallet, which 
contained $85 and his identification cards, and left the residence.  After Bass left, the gunman 
told Videll to go outside and look for Pops, who had escaped as the home invasion began, which 
provided an opportunity for Videll to call the police. 
 
Brown testified he was at the residence “socializing” with Pops and William Ross.  He 
observed Bass enter the house while talking on his cell phone and ask to speak with Pops.  
Shortly thereafter, a masked gunman entered the house and began demanding money.  Brown 
                                                 
 
2 According to the testimony at trial, “Pops” is also known as Jerry Hines. 
3 
 
attempted to escape, but slipped, at which point Videll and Irving came out of their bedrooms.  
While the gunman was distracted by Brown, Pops and Ross managed to get out through the back 
door.  The gunman ordered the three remaining men to sit at the table while Bass went through 
the rooms.  Then, the gunman demanded money from the three men, and Brown gave the 
gunman approximately $45, while Bass went with Videll to get his wallet from his bedroom.  
The gunman sent Videll outside, then Bass left, and the gunman left soon after. 
 
Irving Smith testified that he was awakened by the sound of chairs being turned over and 
the back door opening.  He came out of his bedroom and saw Brown, a masked gunman, and 
Bass in the common area of the residence.  The gunman directed him to empty his pockets, but 
he did not have anything.  The gunman told him to sit down, then Bass left through the front 
door, and the gunman followed soon after. 
 
Detective Derrick Longoria testified that he responded to the scene.  After interviewing 
the witnesses, he compiled a photo lineup that he showed to Videll the following day.  Videll 
identified Bass in the lineup as the individual who had taken his wallet.  When Detective 
Longoria interviewed Bass, he denied ever being at the residence. 
 
At the close of the Commonwealth’s case, Bass moved to strike “all the charges” on the 
ground that “there has been no evidence presented that [Bass] had known who the masked 
person was . . . [or that he had acted] in concert with this masked man.”  Bass also identified a 
single discrepancy in the witnesses’ testimony, noting that Irving had testified the gunman’s face 
was completely covered while the other witnesses testified the gunman’s face was only partially 
covered.  The court denied the motion to strike. 
 
 
4 
 
C. 
Verdict and Sentencing 
 
Bass chose to not put on evidence in defense and the parties submitted jury instructions.  
After reviewing the proposed instructions, the court asked the parties to make certain 
clarifications to those regarding “the attempted robbery of Irving Smith.”  After the parties 
amended the instructions accordingly, the court instructed the jury regarding the alleged 
robberies of Videll Smith and Brown, and the alleged attempted robbery of Irving Smith.  Thus, 
the jury instructions conformed to the warrants and the evidence presented at trial, but diverged 
from the indictments.  Bass did not object. 
 
The jury found Bass guilty of the robbery of Videll Smith, but could not reach a verdict 
regarding the other offenses.  The court instructed the jury on sentencing for robbery, and the 
jury recommended a sentence of ten years.  Bass did not object. 
 
On August 11, 2014, the court entered a sentencing order, which stated that Bass had 
been found guilty of robbery and sentenced Bass to a term of ten years.  Like the jury 
instructions, the conviction and sentence were consistent with the evidence presented at trial but 
diverged from the indictment. 
D. 
Appeal to the Court of Appeals 
 
In the Court of Appeals, Bass argued that there was a fatal variance between the 
indictment and the verdict, though he conceded his trial counsel had failed to make a timely 
objection to the variance.  Accordingly, he asked the Court of Appeals to apply the ends of 
justice exception in Rule 5A:18, contending that “being convicted of a more serious crime than 
alleged in the indictment would be a sufficient miscarriage of justice.”  He also argued that the 
Commonwealth’s eyewitness testimony was “inherently incredible,” and thus the trial court erred 
by allowing the jury to consider it. 
5 
 
 
Applying the ends of justice exception, the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction and 
remanded the case for a new trial on a charge no greater than attempted robbery.  Bass v. 
Commonwealth, Record No. 1442-14-2, 2015 Va. App. LEXIS 209, at *8 (July 7, 2015).  In 
doing so, the Court of Appeals relied on Legette v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 221, 532 S.E.2d 
353 (2000) and Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 427, 658 S.E.2d 692 (2008) (en banc), 
while distinguishing Henson v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 120, 155 S.E.2d 346 (1967).  Having 
reversed Bass’ conviction, the Court of Appeals concluded that it was unnecessary to consider 
whether the evidence was otherwise sufficient to sustain the conviction. 
 
We granted the Commonwealth this appeal. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
The Commonwealth argues the Court of Appeals erred by relying on Legette and 
Ferguson, because the sentence imposed by the circuit court did not exceed the statutory 
maximum for the crime of which Bass was convicted.  The Commonwealth contends Henson 
should direct the analysis in this case, and also contends Bass failed to demonstrate that a 
miscarriage of justice occurred.  The Commonwealth therefore concludes that the Court of 
Appeals erroneously applied the ends of justice exception to Rule 5A:18, and consequently any 
argument regarding the variance is procedurally barred.  In addition, the Commonwealth assigns 
error to the Court of Appeals’ failure to address Bass’ argument that the eyewitness testimony 
was inherently incredible, as well as the remedy fashioned by the court. 
A. 
Application of the Ends of Justice Exception 
 
“Rule 5A:18 contains the contemporaneous objection rule applicable to the Court of 
Appeals and parallels the requirements of the contemporaneous objection rule applicable to this 
Court as provided in Rule 5:25.”  Maxwell v. Commonwealth, 287 Va. 258, 264, 754 S.E.2d 
6 
 
516, 518 (2014).  The rule requires litigants to make their objections “at a point in the proceeding 
when the trial court is in a position not only to consider the asserted error, but also to rectify the 
effect of the asserted error.”  Scialdone v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 422, 437, 689 S.E.2d 716, 
724 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  The rule strives to ensure “the trial 
court has an opportunity to rule intelligently on the issues presented, thus avoiding unnecessary 
appeals and reversals.”  Brown v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 210, 217, 688 S.E.2d 185, 188 
(2010). 
 
In limited circumstances, Rule 5A:18, like Rule 5:25, also “allows an appellate court to 
consider a matter not preserved by objection in the trial court ‘to attain the ends of justice.’”  
Charles v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 14, 17, 613 S.E.2d 432, 433 (2005); see Gheorghiu v. 
Commonwealth, 280 Va. 678, 689-90, 701 S.E.2d 407, 414 (2010) (noting narrow contours of 
the exception) (collecting cases).3  This Court considers two questions when deciding whether to 
apply the ends of justice exception:  “(1) whether there is error as contended by the appellant; 
and (2) whether the failure to apply the ends of justice provision would result in a grave 
injustice.”  Gheorghiu, 280 Va. at 689, 701 S.E.2d at 413 (citation omitted).  On appeal, we are 
in the same position as the Court of Appeals to review the record.  Therefore, whether the Court 
of Appeals properly applied the ends of justice exception is a question of law that this Court 
reviews de novo.  See Maxwell, 287 Va. at 264, 754 S.E.2d at 518 (“The Court of Appeals’ 
interpretation of the Rules of this Court, like its interpretation of a statute, presents a question of 
law that [the Court] reviews de novo.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Charles, 
                                                 
 
3 In relevant part, Rule 5A:18 provides:  “No ruling of the trial court . . . will be 
considered as a basis for reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the 
time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable the Court of Appeals to attain the 
ends of justice.” 
7 
 
270 Va. at 18-20, 613 S.E.2d at 433-35 (reviewing the Court of Appeals’ refusal to apply the 
ends of justice exception). 
 
Bass concedes he did not object at any point during the trial on the grounds that there was 
a variance between the indictments and the evidence presented by the Commonwealth.  We also 
observe that Bass acquiesced to jury instructions conforming to the Commonwealth’s evidence.  
Thus, Bass’ argument is procedurally barred unless we can reach it through the ends of justice 
exception.4 
1. 
Trial Court Error:  Fatal Variance Between Indictment and Evidence 
 
A fatal variance occurs when the criminal pleadings charge one offense and the evidence 
proves another.  See Gardner v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 18, 24-25, 546 S.E.2d 686, 689-90 
(2001) (indictment charged theft of money by false pretenses from one victim, while the 
evidence proved theft by false pretenses from another victim).  In the present case, one 
indictment alleged that Bass attempted to rob Videll Smith, and a second alleged that Bass 
robbed Irving Smith.  However, the evidence proved only that Bass completed the robbery of 
Videll Smith, and the jury convicted Bass accordingly.  Thus, a fatal variance existed between 
the indictments against Bass and the proof offered by the Commonwealth at trial.  A conviction 
for a crime other than the one charged in the indictment is plainly reversible.  See Gardner, 262 
Va. at 25, 546 S.E.2d at 690 (vacating a defendant’s conviction when the evidence proved theft 
by false pretenses from a victim other than the one named in the indictment); Hummer v. 
Commonwealth, 122 Va. 826, 829, 94 S.E. 157, 158 (1917) (concluding that the trial court 
                                                 
 
4 It is well settled that the question of a variance between an indictment and the proof 
offered at trial is subject to the contemporaneous objection rule.  See, e.g., Booth v. 
Commonwealth, 165 Va. 794, 795-96, 183 S.E. 257, 257-58 (1936). 
8 
 
mistakenly found there could be a conviction for “malicious cutting” under an indictment for the 
lesser offense of “unlawful cutting”). 
2. 
The Error Did Not Result in a Grave Injustice 
 
The purpose of an indictment is to provide the accused with notice of the cause and 
nature of the accusations against him.  See Henson, 208 Va. at 125, 155 S.E.2d at 349.  The 
requirement that felony prosecutions proceed by indictment or presentment is statutory, not 
constitutional, and the accused may waive the right to be tried by such.  See Code § 19.2-217.  
Accordingly, there is no error of constitutional magnitude at issue.  Henson, 208 Va. at 125, 155 
S.E.2d at 349.5 
 
Moreover, Bass has not identified any defect in the proceedings that would render any 
aspect of the judgment void.  Cunningham v. Hayes, 204 Va. 851, 855, 134 S.E.2d 271, 274 
(1964).  This point distinguishes the present case from those relied on by the Court of Appeals. 
 
In Legette, the defendant was indicted for unlawful wounding.  33 Va. App. at 222, 532 
S.E.2d at 354.  Following the presentation of evidence, the trial court pronounced the defendant 
guilty of malicious wounding.  However, the conviction order recited that the trial court had 
found the defendant “guilty as charged in the indictment.”  Id. at 223, 532 S.E.2d at 354. 
Subsequently, the trial court sentenced the defendant to six years in prison — consistent with a 
conviction for malicious wounding, but exceeding the maximum sentence for unlawful 
wounding as charged in the indictment.  Id. at 223 & n.2, 532 S.E.2d at 354 & n.2.  The 
                                                 
5 The presence of a constitutional error is a relevant, though not necessarily dispositive, 
consideration when determining whether to apply the ends of justice exception.  See Dearing v. 
Commonwealth, 260 Va. 671, 673, 536 S.E.2d 903, 904 (2000) (applying harmless error 
standard to determine whether violation of Confrontation Clause required reversal); cf. Hicks v. 
Dir., Dept. of Corr., 289 Va. 288, 301, 768 S.E.2d 415, 421 (2015) (declining to apply ends of 
justice exception to Brady argument waived under Rule 5:25 because the evidence was not 
material). 
9 
 
defendant never objected, and at the sentencing hearing the defendant’s attorney acknowledged 
the defendant had been convicted of malicious wounding.  Id. at 223, 532 S.E.2d at 354. 
 
The Court of Appeals applied the ends of justice exception, reversed the sentence for 
malicious wounding, and remanded for sentencing consistent with a conviction for unlawful 
wounding.  Id. at 228, 532 S.E.2d at 356.  Observing that a court speaks through its orders, the 
Court of Appeals found the defendant had been convicted of unlawful wounding “as charged in 
the indictment” — not malicious wounding as pronounced in open court.  Id. at 223, 225, 532 
S.E.2d at 354, 355.  Then, the court explained that “prejudice or manifest injustice results when a 
person is sentenced for a crime other than that for which he was convicted.”  Id. at 225, 532 
S.E.2d at 355. 
 
In Ferguson, the defendant was also indicted for unlawful wounding.  51 Va. App. at 433, 
658 S.E.2d at 695.  Further, as in Legette, the trial court pronounced the defendant guilty of 
malicious wounding following the presentation of evidence.  Id. at 434, 658 S.E.2d at 695.  But 
the conviction order stated that the trial court had found the defendant guilty as charged in the 
indictment.  Subsequently, the trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty years’ imprisonment 
with fifteen years suspended — a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum for unlawful 
wounding.  Relying on Legette, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction for unlawful 
wounding, reversed the sentence, and remanded for sentencing consistent with a conviction for 
unlawful wounding.  Id. at 434, 437, 658 S.E.2d at 695, 697. 
 
In Legette and Ferguson, the sentences imposed by the trial courts were void to the extent 
they exceeded the term authorized by the General Assembly for the crimes of which the 
defendants were convicted.  See Deagle v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 304, 305, 199 S.E.2d 509, 
510-11 (1973).  We agree that a manifest injustice occurs when a defendant receives a sentence 
10 
 
beyond the power of a court to pronounce.  See Charles, 270 Va. at 20, 613 S.E.2d at 435 
(“Denying [the defendant] his liberty on the basis of a void sentence would impose a grave 
injustice upon him.”).  But in the present case, the circuit court acted within its authority when it 
convicted Bass, however erroneously, of robbery.  See Hayes, 204 Va. at 856, 134 S.E2d at 275 
(“‘[W]hen the offense is one over which the court has jurisdiction and the court acquires 
jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, it has jurisdiction and power to determine the 
elements which constitute the offense and the sufficiency of the indictment, and such jurisdiction 
necessarily embraces the power to make an erroneous, as well as a correct decision.’”) (quoting 
Barnes v. Hunter, 188 F.2d 86, 89, 90 (10th Cir. 1951) with approval). 
 
This Court has previously held that no grave injustice occurs merely because a variance 
exists between an indictment and the evidence offered at trial — even where the defendant is 
convicted of a greater crime than the one charged in the indictment.  See Henson, 208 Va. at 121, 
155 S.E.2d at 346.  In Henson, the defendant was indicted for attempted robbery.  However, 
following the presentation of evidence, the court convicted the defendant of robbery.  The 
defendant did not object at any point during the trial.  Id. at 123, 155 S.E.2d at 348.  Before 
sentencing, the trial court discovered that the indictment was inconsistent with the verdict.  The 
court indicated that it would be willing to consider setting the verdict aside if the defendant 
renewed his motion to strike, assigning the variance as the grounds therefor.  Id.  The defendant 
declined to do so, hoping to persuade this Court to set aside the conviction and remand the case 
with direction to find him guilty of no greater offense than attempted robbery, rather than risk the 
possibility that the Commonwealth would obtain a new indictment charging him with the 
completed robbery.  Id. at 126, 155 S.E.2d at 350. 
11 
 
 
It was on this latter point that the Court of Appeals distinguished Henson from the 
present case.  However, this Court’s rationale in Henson did not hinge on the defendant’s 
affirmative decision to not object.  Instead, the Court refused to apply the ends of justice 
exception because the defendant identified no prejudice stemming from the variance: 
No good cause has been shown why we should apply an exception 
to the requirement of [the contemporaneous objection rule] . . . .  It 
is not necessary here that we consider the objection to attain the 
ends of justice.  [The defendant] had a fair trial on the charge 
against him, which all concerned thought was a charge of robbery.  
The ends of justice would not be promoted by setting aside the 
verdict because of defect in the indictment. 
 
Id. 
 
Like the defendant in Henson, Bass has failed to identify any reason beyond the variance 
to support application of the ends of justice exception.  The original warrant charged Bass with 
the completed robbery of Videll Smith; Bass was present throughout the trial as the 
Commonwealth produced evidence showing that he did complete the robbery of Videll Smith; 
and Bass had the opportunity to review the jury instructions, which conformed to the evidence 
presented.  Certainly, Bass was aware that he was going to trial on two charges of robbery and 
one charge of attempted robbery, and he does not argue that his defense was predicated on the 
alleged identity of his victims.  In short, Bass had notice of the charges against him, and he 
proceeded throughout trial apparently under the assumption that he was charged with the robbery 
of Videll Smith.6 
                                                 
6 We observe that a well-established mechanism exists for remedying any confusion or 
surprise that might occur due to a variance between an indictment and the evidence presented.  
Code § 19.2-231 authorizes a trial court to permit the Commonwealth to amend an indictment to 
conform to the evidence adduced.  If the Commonwealth chooses to do so, the court must re-
arraign the accused on the amended indictment and allow the accused to plead anew.  If the court 
finds the amendment comes as a surprise, the accused is entitled to a continuance to prepare his 
defense.  See Code § 19.2-231.  These procedures allow cases to be tried on their merits, while 
12 
 
 
Nothing in the record demonstrates that Bass could not properly be convicted for robbery 
based on the evidence adduced at trial, and his situation is not analogous to any of the “very 
limited circumstances” under which we have invoked the ends of justice exception.  See 
Gheorghiu, 280 Va. at 689, 701 S.E.2d at 414 (collecting cases).  Therefore, we conclude that the 
Court of Appeals erred when it applied the ends of justice exception under these circumstances. 
B. 
Bass’ Challenge to the Sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s Evidence 
 
The Court of Appeals did not address Bass’ argument regarding the sufficiency of the 
Commonwealth’s evidence, apparently reasoning that Bass could not be retried upon a charge 
greater than attempted robbery once it had reversed his conviction for robbery due to the 
variance.  This was incorrect. 
 
“It is clear that the Constitution permits retrial after a conviction is reversed because of a 
defect in the charging instrument.”  Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400, 404 (1987).  Indeed, “[i]t is a 
venerable principle of double jeopardy jurisprudence that the successful appeal of a judgment of 
conviction, on any ground other than the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, 
poses no bar to further prosecution on the same charge.”  Id. at 402 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  As the Court of Appeals reversed Bass’ conviction for robbery without 
addressing the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of that offense, the Commonwealth 
could have properly obtained a new indictment for robbery and proceeded to trial on that charge 
notwithstanding the prior proceeding.  See Code § 19.2-293 (“A person acquitted of an offense 
on the ground of a variance between the allegations and the proof of the indictment or other 
accusation, or upon an exception to the form or substance thereof, may be arraigned again on a 
                                                                                                                                                             
protecting the accused’s right to demand notice of the charges against him.  See Va. Const. art. I, 
§ 8 (“[I]n criminal prosecutions a man hath a right to demand the cause and nature of his 
accusation.”). 
13 
 
new indictment or other proper accusation, and tried and convicted for the same offense, 
notwithstanding such former acquittal.”).  Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred when it 
remanded the case for a retrial upon a charge no greater than attempted robbery without 
addressing the sufficiency of the evidence against Bass. 
 
We turn next to Bass’ sufficiency argument because, if successful, it would provide an 
alternative ground for affirming the Court of Appeals’ judgment.  In short, Bass contends the 
Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient to convict him of robbery because “the testimony of 
the Commonwealth’s eye-witness[es] was inherently incredible and [the] jury should not have 
been allowed to consider it.”  However, Bass failed to present this argument to the circuit court 
during his motion to strike, and therefore it is barred by Rules 5A:18 and 5:25. 
 
In a jury trial, the defendant preserves his objections to the sufficiency of the evidence in 
a motion to strike at the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case if he elects to not introduce 
evidence of his own, or a in motion to strike at the conclusion of all the evidence or a motion to 
set aside the verdict if he does elect to introduce evidence of his own.  See Murillo-Rodriguez v. 
Commonwealth, 279 Va. 64, 84, 688 S.E.2d 199, 210 (2010).  In his motion to strike at the 
conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case, Bass argued that there was no evidence he knew the 
gunman or acted in concert with the gunman.  This argument apparently challenged the 
Commonwealth’s evidence regarding the firearm charges and the charges involving Brown and 
Irving, as there was no evidence Bass personally carried a gun, or personally took or attempted to 
take anything from those individuals.  But this argument did not raise the question of whether the 
Commonwealth’s eyewitness testimony was inherently incredible as a matter of law.  Regarding 
this separate issue, Bass identified only a single discrepancy in the witnesses’ testimony.  He did 
not contend the testimony was unworthy of belief or that the jury should not be permitted to 
14 
 
weigh the witnesses’ credibility.  See Schneider v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 379, 382, 337 
S.E.2d 735, 736-37 (1985) (“[T]he credibility of witnesses and the weight accorded their 
testimony are matters solely for the fact finder who has the opportunity of seeing and hearing the 
witnesses.”); Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 412, 414, 164 S.E.2d 699, 701 (1968) (“For 
evidence to be incredible it must be either so manifestly false that reasonable men ought not to 
believe it, or it must be shown to be false by objects or things as to the existence and meaning of 
which reasonable men should not differ.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  Bass 
thus failed to make the circuit court aware of his legal position, and consequently he failed to 
preserve this argument for appeal.  See Brown, 279 Va. at 217, 688 S.E.2d at 189. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 
For these reasons, we conclude that the Court of Appeals misinterpreted Henson and its 
own precedent, and consequently misapplied the ends of justice exception in Rule 5A:18.  We 
also conclude that the Court of Appeals erred when it declined to address Bass’ challenge to the 
sufficiency of the Commonwealth’s evidence.  However, we find that Bass failed to preserve this 
argument for appeal, and we therefore do not consider the argument on its merits.  We therefore 
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and enter final judgment in accordance with the 
jury verdict and sentencing order. 
Reversed and final judgment.