Case Title: State v. Zimmer

Citation: 106 Ariz. 166, 472 P.2d 35

Docket Number: 

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1970-07-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
106 Ariz. 166 (1970) 472 P.2d 35 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Charles Frederick ZIMMER, Appellant. No. 2049. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Division. July 15, 1970. *167 Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., by Carl Waag, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. Charles M. Giles, Tucson, for appellant. McFARLAND, Justice: Charles Frederick Zimmer, hereinafter referred to as defendant, was convicted and sentenced for the unlawful sale of marijuana. From this conviction and sentence he appeals. On January 28, 1969, and February 18, 1969, trials of the defendant were held, and in each instance the court declared a mistrial. On February 22, 1969, he was again tried and the jury returned a verdict of guilty of the charge of unlawful sale of marijuana. Defendant contends the court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial based on improper empaneling of the jury. In the course of the trial the court examined the jurors on voir dire. Counsel for defendant made no examination, but when given the opportunity to do so by the court stated, "Your Honor, the defendant passes the panel." The list of jurors was submitted first to the county attorney who struck ten by exercise of his peremptory challenge. The defendant struck nine. The court then instructed the clerk to "call the first 12 names that are listed on the jury list." The clerk inadvertently skipped over the name of Marilyn Mae Bahn and called the name of a thirteenth juror, Joseph Burzawa. Rule 228, Rules Crim.Proc., 17 A.R.S., reads as follows: It is the contention of defendant that the skipping of Mrs. Bahn and calling of the thirteenth juror was prejudicial error. The court's attention was not called to this error of the clerk at the time the names were called, and no mention was made of it until the close of the evidence, when some one called the court's attention to the mistake. The court immediately called the counsel to his chambers and related what had happened. Thereupon defendant's counsel made a motion for a mistrial, which was denied; then he made a motion for a new trial, after the conviction, in which he stated: Counsel for the defendant bases his argument that the skipping of the juror's name was prejudicial error primarily upon the case of State v. Thompson, 68 Ariz. 386, 206 P.2d 1037, in which the defendant was charged with assault with intent to commit murder. Thirty-two jurors were drawn in the box. They were examined by the court and the counsel. Thereafter, both the county attorney and the defense counsel exercised peremptory challenges. The clerk, in calling the names of the first twelve unchallenged jurors inadvertently called three jurors upon whom the defendant had exercised peremptory challenge. The defense counsel did not realize a mistake had been made until after the trial. The court held: The facts are different in the instant case. No juror sat on the panel where a peremptory challenge had been made. In State v. Lovell, 97 Ariz. 269, 399 P.2d 674, we stated: *169 This holding reiterated what was said in Thompson, supra, in which we further stated: In State v. Webb, 101 Ariz. 307, 419 P.2d 91, we said: The basis for the holding of a violation of substantial rights is the compelling of the individual to accept a juror objectionable to him, it being recognized in Thompson, supra, that the peremptory challenge was a substantial right to reject a juror and not for the purpose of selecting one. There is nothing in the record in the instant case to show that the thirteenth juror was in any way objectionable to the defendant either from the examination on voir dire or from his counsel's affidavit which was merely to the effect that he wanted Mrs. Bahn on the jury. This is not enough. As pointed out in Webb, supra, he must show "actual prejudice." The counsel, even after trial, in the affidavit of motion for new trial does not say that the thirteenth juror was objectionable to him, nor in his brief on appeal does he say that the thirteenth juror was objectionable. He made no objection when the jury list was called in court to Mr. Burzawa's sitting on the jury, so the record was void at that time and throughout the trial in regard to any objection to the thirteenth juror, and at no time was it in any way intimated that he was objectionable to the defense. Even the motion for a mistrial was not based upon any objection to the thirteenth juror. It was merely that defense counsel thought Mrs. Bahn would have been more favorable to the defendant. All of the rules of law regarding the formation of a jury are intended to secure a fair and impartial jury for the trial of a defendant. However, defendant is not entitled to be tried by any particular jury; therefore, unless the record affirmatively shows that such a jury was not secured even though some formal provisions regulating the manner of selection may have been disregarded the case must be affirmed. State v. Hilliard, 89 Ariz. 129, *170 359 P.2d 66; Conner v. State, 54 Ariz. 68, 92 P.2d 524; Kinsey v. State, supra; Lawrence v. State, 29 Ariz. 247, 240 P. 863. We accordingly hold that the defendant has failed to show that he was not tried by a fair and impartial jury, or that the thirteenth juror was objectionable to him, and that the clerk's calling of his name actually was prejudicial to his rights. Judgment affirmed. STRUCKMEYER, V.C.J., and HAYS, J., concur.