Case Title: State v. Vairin M.

Citation: 2002 WI 96

Docket Number: 2001AP000656

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2002-07-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
2002 WI 96 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-0656 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Interest of Vairin M., a person Under the 
Age of 17: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Vairin M.,  
 
Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 10, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 30, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Diane M. Nicks   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
CROOKS, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
WILCOX and SYKES, JJ., join concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs (in the 
court of appeals) by Michael Yovovich, assistant state public 
defender, and Janice Balistreri, deputy first assistant state 
public defender, and oral argument by Michael Yovovich. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent there was a brief (in the 
court of appeals) by Lana J. Mades, assistant district attorney, 
and oral argument by Joely Urdan, assistant attorney general. 
 
 
2002 WI 96 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-0656 
(L.C. No. 
00 JV 1140 & 00 JV 1198 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Interest of Vairin M., 
a person Under the Age of 17: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Vairin M.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 10, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a non-final order denying reconsideration of a 
juvenile waiver decision, entered in the Circuit Court for Dane 
County, the Honorable Diane M. Nicks, presiding.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This case is before the court 
on 
certification 
by 
the 
court 
of 
appeals, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (1999-2000).1  It is an appeal of a 
non-final order of the Circuit Court for Dane County, Diane M. 
Nicks, Judge.  We restate the issue certified by the court of 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 statutes unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 01-0656 
 
2 
 
appeals as follows: "May a court with juvenile jurisdiction 
reconsider its order waiving a juvenile into adult court after 
the state has filed charges against the juvenile in adult 
court?"  This question requires us to interpret Wis. Stat. 
§ 938.18, the statute governing waiver into criminal court. 
¶2 
In this case, the juvenile court waived a juvenile 
into adult criminal court.  After a criminal complaint had been 
filed, after the juvenile had made an initial appearance in 
criminal court, and after the juvenile had waived a preliminary 
examination, the juvenile filed a motion asking the juvenile 
court to reconsider its waiver order.  The juvenile court 
determined that Wis. Stat. § 938.18(6) gives the criminal court 
"exclusive jurisdiction" after a waiver.  As a result, the 
juvenile court did not have jurisdiction over the matter and did 
not have authority to grant the motion for reconsideration.  
Therefore, the court denied the motion. 
¶3 
The juvenile appealed, and the court of appeals 
certified the case to this court.  We hold that a juvenile court 
has jurisdiction to reconsider its waiver order or to stay its 
waiver order pending appeal only until the filing of a complaint 
in criminal court.  After the filing of a criminal complaint, 
the juvenile court loses jurisdiction and the criminal court has 
exclusive jurisdiction. 
¶4 
In this case, criminal proceedings were commenced 
before the motion for reconsideration was filed.  The criminal 
court assumed exclusive jurisdiction, and the juvenile court 
lost jurisdiction to reconsider its waiver order.  The juvenile 
No. 01-0656 
 
3 
 
court's subsequent determination that it could not reconsider 
its waiver order was correct.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
decision of the circuit court (juvenile court). 
¶5 
Because of our answer to the restated question, we are 
presented with a second question:  Is there some means by which 
a juvenile may seek prompt review of an order waiving him or her 
into criminal court after the criminal court has assumed 
exclusive jurisdiction over the case? 
¶6 
We conclude that a juvenile seeking prompt review of a 
waiver order, after the criminal court has assumed jurisdiction, 
has two options.  First, the juvenile may bring a timely 
interlocutory appeal under Wis. Stat. § 809.50 and may move the 
court of appeals or the criminal court to stay the criminal 
proceedings pending appeal. 
¶7 
Second, if the juvenile has compelling new grounds 
bearing on waiver, he or she may file a motion with the criminal 
court asking the court to relinquish its jurisdiction by 
transferring the matter to juvenile court.  As grounds for the 
motion, the juvenile must allege a new factor that: 
(1) was not in existence at the time of the waiver 
decision or, if it was in existence, was unknowingly 
overlooked by all parties; 
(2) is highly relevant to the criteria for waiver 
under Wis. Stat. § 938.18(5); and 
(3) likely would have affected the juvenile court's 
determination that it would be contrary to the best 
interests of the juvenile or of the public for the 
juvenile court to hear the case. 
No. 01-0656 
 
4 
 
¶8 
After reviewing the motion, the criminal court may, in 
its discretion, conduct a hearing.  If the court finds good 
cause, 
it 
may 
relinquish 
jurisdiction 
by 
transferring 
jurisdiction to the juvenile court.  The juvenile may then file 
a motion for reconsideration with the juvenile court, which will 
have regained exclusive jurisdiction to entertain the motion. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶9 
Vairin M. (Vairin), then 15 years old, was the subject 
of two juvenile delinquency petitions filed by the state, one on 
November 17, 2000, and the other on December 7, 2000.  The 
November 17 petition (00-JV-1140) alleged that Vairin had 
committed four delinquent acts.2  The December 7 petition (00-JV-
1198) alleged that Vairin had committed three additional 
delinquent acts.3  The State petitioned for waiver into adult 
criminal court for both cases.  The juvenile court, Judge Nicks 
presiding, held a waiver hearing on December 18 and 20. 
¶10 On December 21, the court signed an order waiving 
Vairin into adult criminal court in both cases.  Vairin filed 
with the juvenile court a motion for stay pending appeal, and 
                                                 
2 Petition 00-JV-1140 alleged that Vairin had violated 
Wis. Stat. § 943.10(1)(a), burglary; Wis. Stat. § 943.03, arson 
of property other than a building; Wis. Stat. §§ 939.32 and 
943.02(1)(a), 
attempted 
arson 
of 
buildings; 
and 
Wis. Stat. §§ 943.01(2) and 939.05, damage to property as party 
to the crime. 
3 Petition 00-JV-1198 alleged that Vairin had twice violated 
Wis. Stat. § 943.10(1)(a), 
burglary, 
and 
also 
violated 
Wis. Stat. § 943.23(2), 
operating 
vehicle 
without 
owner's 
consent. 
No. 01-0656 
 
5 
 
the juvenile court scheduled a January 31, 2001 hearing to 
decide the motion. 
¶11 The 
state 
filed 
criminal 
charges 
against 
Vairin 
shortly after he was waived into adult court.4  The young 
defendant made his initial appearance on December 26, 2000, and 
waived a preliminary hearing on January 3, 2001.  On the same 
day, Vairin's counsel filed a motion for reconsideration of the 
waiver,5 on grounds that, at the waiver hearing: (1) the court 
had heard "misleading" evidence regarding the possibility of a 
sixteen-year-old convicted as an adult being placed in Ethan 
Allen School; (2) the court had improperly limited Vairin's 
cross-examination of three witnesses; and (3) the court had 
improperly limited Vairin's questioning of a witness regarding 
Vairin's relationship with his father. 
¶12 On January 23, 2001, Vairin's counsel asserted in a 
letter to the juvenile court that the attempted arson count 
against Vairin should have been charged as arson.  Counsel 
further asserted that if the charge against Vairin were for 
                                                 
4 It is not clear from the record exactly when criminal 
charges were filed against Vairin, but the parties agree that 
they were filed shortly after the juvenile court entered the 
waiver 
order, 
and 
before 
Vairin 
filed 
his 
motion 
for 
reconsideration. 
5 Vairin's counsel clarified that Vairin was not pursuing an 
appeal of the court's waiver decision, but would instead seek 
reconsideration of the order.  The motion was heard on January 
31, 2001, at the time originally scheduled for the hearing on 
the motion for a stay pending appeal. 
No. 01-0656 
 
6 
 
arson, Vairin might qualify for the serious juvenile offender 
(SJO) program, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 938.538. 
¶13 On January 31, 2001, the juvenile court held a hearing 
on the motion to reconsider.  At the hearing, defense counsel 
presented as a witness another attorney with the State Public 
Defender's office, who testified about the possibility of Vairin 
being deported if he were convicted in adult criminal court of 
the crimes with which he had been charged.  The witness further 
opined that if Vairin were not deported, he might be considered 
"stateless" by the 
Immigration and 
Naturalization Service 
because he was not a citizen of the United States6 and could not 
prove he was a citizen of Thailand or Laos.7  Therefore, 
according 
to 
the 
witness, 
Vairin 
could 
be 
held 
"for 
indeterminate amounts of time in the immigration detention 
facilities."  According to the witness, a finding that a person 
is "stateless" could "in essence . . . be a life sentence." 
¶14 Vairin's defense counsel asked the court to amend the 
juvenile delinquency petition so that it would allege arson 
rather than attempted arson.  Defense counsel asserted that the 
court had the authority to amend the petition, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 938.263.  She also asserted that Vairin would be 
willing to plead guilty or no contest to arson and to agree to 
                                                 
6 Vairin allegedly had a green card and alien status. 
7 Vairin was allegedly born in a refugee camp in Thailand 
and had no papers indicating Laotian citizenship. 
No. 01-0656 
 
7 
 
the serious juvenile offender program, affording the juvenile 
court five years of jurisdiction.  See Wis. Stat. § 938.538. 
¶15 The State urged the court to deny Vairin's motion for 
reconsideration.  It asserted that Wis. Stat. § 938.263 does not 
give the court authority to amend a petition without approval of 
the District Attorney's Office.  It further claimed that the 
possibility of deportation is not a criterion for consideration 
in a waiver petition and could not be considered by the court. 
¶16 Before 
deciding 
the 
motion, 
the 
juvenile 
court 
expressed concerns over its decision to waive Vairin into adult 
court.  It explained that at the waiver hearing, it initially 
understood the charge against Vairin to be for arson, and it 
believed Vairin would be subject to the SJO law, giving the 
juvenile court jurisdiction for five years.  The court realized 
near the end of the waiver hearing that Vairin had been charged 
with attempted arson and would not be subject to the SJO law.  
At the hearing on the motion for reconsideration, the court 
stated that arson "wasn't the charge before me [at the waiver 
hearing] and the court was not, therefore, able to consider 
serious juvenile offender status and the . . . variety of doors 
that 
that 
would 
open 
in 
weighing 
whether 
or 
not 
a 
waiver . . . was in the public's best interests or [Vairin's] 
interest.  It just was not available to me."8 
                                                 
8 The juvenile court further noted that it believed the 
facts of the case supported a charge of arson. 
No. 01-0656 
 
8 
 
¶17 The juvenile court also noted that the issue of 
potential deportation would have been relevant to its waiver 
decision.  It ordered briefing on two issues.9  The court stated 
that while it had "an interest in all of the grounds that have 
been brought before me for reconsideration," it had a "genuine 
question of whether or not I have jurisdiction to take any 
action in this matter" because a crime had "been charged and the 
criminal court has criminal jurisdiction."  The court noted that 
in virtually every other situation, a court could reconsider its 
decision, but "[I]f I don't have jurisdiction, it makes no 
difference what else I would find or would do——my hands are 
tied."  It further stated that:  
[I]f I do not have jurisdiction at this point, it may 
be that jurisdiction could be conveyed back to 
me. . . . I just want to emphasize the importance of 
the difference between the statute that was before me, 
the charge that was before me and a charge that 
carries 
the 
expanded 
supervision, 
treatment 
and 
incarceration as well, all three for a much more 
extended period. 
¶18 The court also ordered briefing on the issue of "the 
court's discretion to amend the charge itself."  It noted that 
"I've probably indicated here that if . . . that motion had been 
made when the court was certain it had jurisdiction and the 
court were certain it had that authority, I would have amended 
the petition and I would examine this case with the serious 
juvenile offender status in mind." 
                                                 
9 The juvenile court also heard and denied a motion to 
dismiss other charges against Vairin, which were based on 
allegations of crimes committed in Iowa. 
No. 01-0656 
 
9 
 
¶19 On February 21, 2001, two months after it waived 
Vairin into adult court, the juvenile court denied Vairin's 
motion for reconsideration in an oral decision.10  The court 
stated, "After again reviewing the briefs and the cases cited by 
the counsel, I have concluded that I do not have jurisdiction to 
reopen this matter.  I believe that the language in Sec. 
938.18(6), most specifically, the statutory provision that the 
court 
of 
criminal 
jurisdiction 
thereafter 
has 
exclusive 
jurisdiction, compels me to conclude that after the waiver order 
was entered I lost subject matter jurisdiction." 
¶20 Vairin appealed, and court of appeals certified the 
case to this court. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A.  Wisconsin Stat. § 938.18 
¶21 The certified question in this case is whether a 
juvenile court, which has determined that hearing the case would 
be contrary to the best interests of the public or the juvenile 
and which has entered an order waiving the juvenile into 
criminal court, retains jurisdiction to reconsider its waiver 
order.  At issue is subsection (6) of Wis. Stat. § 938.18, which 
provides 
in 
part 
that 
after 
the 
court 
has 
made 
its 
determination, 
"the 
court 
shall 
enter 
an 
order 
waiving 
jurisdiction and referring the matter to the district attorney 
for 
appropriate 
proceedings 
in 
the 
court 
of 
criminal 
                                                 
10 The court issued a written decision denying the motion on 
March 23, 2001. 
No. 01-0656 
 
10 
 
jurisdiction, and the court of criminal jurisdiction thereafter 
has exclusive jurisdiction."  Wis. Stat. § 938.18(6). 
¶22 Statutory interpretation presents a question of law 
that we review de novo, Teague v. Bad River Band of the Lake 
Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 2000 WI 79, ¶17, 236 Wis. 2d 
384, 612 N.W.2d 709.  Our goal in interpreting a statute is to 
discern and give effect to the intent of the legislature.  
County of Jefferson v. Renz, 231 Wis. 2d 293, 301, 603 N.W.2d 
541 (1999).  In interpreting a statute, we look first at the 
statute's plain language to determine if it clearly and 
unambiguously sets forth the legislative intent.  State v. 
Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d 397, 406, 565 N.W.2d 506 (1997). 
¶23 Wisconsin Stat. § 938.18 governs waiver of juveniles 
into 
adult 
criminal 
court. 
 
Subsection 
(1) 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. § 938.18 provides that a juvenile may be waived if the 
juvenile is "alleged to have violated any state criminal law" on 
or 
after 
the 
juvenile's 
15th 
birthday. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.18(1)(a)3.11 
¶24 Waiver may be sought by the juvenile, a district 
attorney, 
or 
in 
some 
circumstances, 
a 
juvenile 
judge.  
Wis. Stat. § 938.18(1)(a) and (b).  To initiate a waiver 
proceeding, the party seeking waiver must file a petition 
alleging delinquency and stating the facts in support of waiver.  
                                                 
11 Juveniles who are at least 14 years old may be waived if 
they are alleged to have committed certain enumerated felonies, 
or 
under 
certain 
other 
circumstances. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 938.18(1)(a)1 and 2. 
No. 01-0656 
 
11 
 
Wis. Stat. § 938.18(2).  The court may authorize an agency to 
prepare a report, and the court may rely on the report in 
determining waiver.  Wis. Stat. § 938.18(2m). 
¶25 The juvenile is entitled to a waiver hearing to the 
court.  Wis. Stat. § 938.18(3)(c).  At the waiver hearing, 
"[t]he 
juvenile 
shall 
be 
represented 
by 
counsel."  
Wis. Stat. § 938.18(3)(a).  The juvenile is also entitled to 
notice and access to any report prepared in the case and may 
present 
testimony 
and 
cross-examine 
witnesses.  
Wis. Stat. § 938.18(3)(a) and (b). 
¶26 If 
the 
petition 
for 
waiver 
of 
jurisdiction 
is 
contested, 
the 
district 
attorney 
presents 
testimony.  
Wis. Stat. § 938.18(4)(b).12  After hearing the testimony and 
considering the evidence, the court must determine whether the 
case has prosecutive merit.  Wis. Stat. § 938.18(4)(a).  If it 
does, 
the 
court 
must 
then 
determine 
whether 
to 
waive 
jurisdiction.  § 938.18(4)(b) and (c). 
¶27 Wisconsin Stat. § 938.18(5) 
provides 
four 
criteria 
upon which the court must base its decision whether to waive 
jurisdiction.  These criteria include the personality and prior 
record of the juvenile, the type and seriousness of the offense, 
the adequacy and suitability of facilities, services and 
procedures available within the juvenile system, and the 
                                                 
12 If the petition for waiver is uncontested, the court must 
determine 
if 
the 
juvenile 
"knowingly, 
intelligently 
and 
voluntarily decided not to contest the waiver of jurisdiction."  
Wis. Stat. § 938.18(4)(c). 
No. 01-0656 
 
12 
 
desirability of consolidating the case with a pending proceeding 
of another person in criminal court.13   
¶28 The statutory provision at issue in this case, 
subsection (6) of Wis. Stat. § 938.18, states: 
                                                 
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 938.18(5) reads in part: 
(a) The personality and prior record of the 
juvenile, including whether the juvenile is mentally 
ill or developmentally disabled, whether the court has 
previously waived its jurisdiction over the juvenile, 
whether the juvenile has been previously convicted 
following a waiver of the court's jurisdiction or has 
been 
previously 
found 
delinquent, 
whether 
such 
conviction or delinquency involved the infliction of 
serious bodily injury, the juvenile's motives and 
attitudes, 
the 
juvenile's 
physical 
and 
mental 
maturity, the juvenile's pattern of living, prior 
offenses, 
prior 
treatment 
history 
and 
apparent 
potential for responding to future treatment. 
(b) The type and seriousness of the offense, 
including whether it was against persons or property, 
the extent to which it was committed in a violent, 
aggressive, premeditated or wilful manner, and its 
prosecutive merit. 
(c) The adequacy and suitability of facilities, 
services and procedures available for treatment of the 
juvenile and protection of the public within the 
juvenile justice system, and, where applicable, the 
mental health system and the suitability of the 
juvenile 
for 
placement 
in 
the 
serious 
juvenile 
offender program under s. 938.538 or the adult 
intensive sanctions program under s. 301.048. 
(d) The desirability of trial and disposition of 
the entire offense in one court if the juvenile was 
allegedly associated in the offense with persons who 
will be charged with a crime in the court of criminal 
jurisdiction. 
Wis. Stat. § 938.18(5)(a)-(d). 
No. 01-0656 
 
13 
 
(6) After considering the criteria under sub. 
(5), the court shall state its finding with respect to 
the criteria on the record, and, if the court 
determines on the record that it is established by 
clear and convincing evidence that it would be 
contrary to the best interests of the juvenile or of 
the public to hear the case, the court shall enter an 
order waiving jurisdiction and referring the matter to 
the district attorney for appropriate proceedings in 
the court of criminal jurisdiction, and the court of 
criminal 
jurisdiction 
thereafter 
has 
exclusive 
jurisdiction. 
Wis. Stat. § 938.18(6) (emphasis added). 
¶29 The parties disagree as to the meaning and effect of 
the underlined language in § 938.18(6).  Vairin asserts that 
§ 938.18(6) must be interpreted to allow a juvenile court to 
reconsider its own waiver order, if it is to be consistent with 
the legislative intent behind Chapter 938 of the Wisconsin 
Statutes, the Juvenile Justice Code (JJC).14  He acknowledges 
that the statute transfers to the criminal court exclusive 
jurisdiction over the criminal matter, but he asserts that the 
statute allows the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction to 
                                                 
14 Wisconsin Stat. § 938.01(2) provides in part that: 
(2) It is the intent of the legislature to promote a 
juvenile justice system capable of dealing with the problem of 
juvenile delinquency, a system which will protect the community, 
impose accountability for violations of law and equip juvenile 
offenders 
with 
competencies 
to 
live 
responsibly 
and 
productively. 
No. 01-0656 
 
14 
 
reconsider its own waiver order for the 14-day period15 for 
appeals of non-final orders under Wis. Stat. § 809.50,16 even if 
the criminal court has assumed exclusive jurisdiction. 
¶30 The 
State 
argues 
that 
the 
plain 
language 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 938.18(6) means that: 
[O]nce a waiver order has been entered, and adult 
proceedings have begun, the juvenile court no longer 
has any jurisdiction whatsoever to take any further 
action on the case.  As jurisdiction is necessary for 
the juvenile court to decide any issue in a case, the 
State asserts that this statute specifically prohibits 
reconsideration of a waiver decision as it removes all 
jurisdiction from 
the 
juvenile trial 
court 
once 
proceedings have been initiated in adult court. 
It notes that allowing reconsideration after the filing of a 
complaint in criminal court would impermissibly result in two 
                                                 
15 The parties both refer to a 10-day period for filing an 
interlocutory appeal under Wis. Stat. § 895.50.  This reference 
was accurate under the 1999-2000 Statutes.  However, the time 
limit has been changed from 10 to 14 days by order of the 
Supreme Court.  S.Ct. Order 00-02, § 2 (April 30, 2001).  We 
will therefore consider the parties' references to a 10-day time 
limit as if they were to a 14-day time limit. 
16 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.50, Appeal from judgment or 
order not appealable as of right, provides for appeal of non-
final orders when a party shows that:  
[R]eview of the judgment or order immediately rather 
than on an appeal from the final judgment in the case 
or proceeding will materially advance the termination 
of the litigation or clarify further proceedings 
therein, 
protect 
a 
party 
from 
substantial 
or 
irreparable injury, or clarify an issue of general 
importance in the administration of justice. 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.50(1)(c). 
No. 01-0656 
 
15 
 
courts 
of 
equal 
power 
having 
concurrent 
and 
potentially 
conflicting jurisdiction. 
¶31 We agree with the State's interpretation of the 
statute.17  By using the words "the court shall enter an order 
waiving jurisdiction and referring the matter to the district 
attorney for appropriate proceedings in the court of criminal 
jurisdiction, and the court of criminal jurisdiction thereafter 
has exclusive jurisdiction," Wis. Stat. § 938.18(6) clearly and 
unambiguously calls for a transfer of exclusive jurisdiction to 
the criminal court. 
¶32 Vairin's contention that the juvenile court should be 
able to entertain a motion for reconsideration of its waiver 
order for 14 days, even after proceedings have been commenced in 
criminal court, is untenable.  It would result in the juvenile 
court retaining jurisdiction after a second court, with equal 
jurisdiction, has assumed jurisdiction.  This is impermissible.  
"In a case in which two courts are given concurrent jurisdiction 
over a particular subject matter, and one of such courts has 
assumed jurisdiction, it is reversible error for the other to 
also assume jurisdiction."  State ex rel. White v. District 
Court, 262 Wis. 139, 143, 54 N.W.2d 189 (1952) (citing Kusick v. 
Kusick, 243 Wis. 135, 138, 9 N.W.2d 607 (1943), and Cawker v. 
Dreutzer, 197 Wis. 98, 129, 221 N.W. 401 (1928)). 
                                                 
17 The State asserted in oral argument that a juvenile court 
that enters a waiver order relinquishes jurisdiction whether or 
not criminal proceedings are commenced.  For the reasons stated 
in this opinion, we agree with the position of the State in its 
brief, not its position in oral argument. 
No. 01-0656 
 
16 
 
¶33 We therefore conclude that after the state has filed a 
criminal 
complaint, 
and 
the 
criminal 
court 
has 
assumed 
jurisdiction, the juvenile court may not reconsider its waiver 
order so long as the criminal court retains jurisdiction.  The 
juvenile may seek a stay of proceedings in order to file an 
interlocutory 
appeal during 
the 14–day-period 
for motions 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.50.  However, after the criminal 
court has assumed jurisdiction, the juvenile must file the 
motion with the criminal court or the court of appeals. 
¶34 The remaining issue with regard to § 938.18(6) is 
whether the juvenile court may reconsider its waiver order 
before the commencement of criminal proceedings. 
¶35 We 
conclude 
that 
the 
juvenile 
court 
retains 
jurisdiction and may reconsider its own waiver order until a 
criminal 
complaint 
is 
filed. 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 938.18(6) 
contemplates the juvenile court waiving jurisdiction and the 
criminal court assuming jurisdiction.  As soon as the criminal 
court assumes jurisdiction, it assumes exclusive jurisdiction, 
and the juvenile court loses jurisdiction to reconsider its own 
waiver order.  However, until the criminal complaint is filed, 
the juvenile court retains jurisdiction, and the problems of 
concurrent jurisdiction, or of one court dismissing an action 
that is before another court, are not presented. 
¶36 The State asserts that reconsideration is unavailable 
in 
the 
context 
of 
waiver 
into 
adult 
court 
because 
Wis. Stat. § 806.07——"Relief from judgment or order"——applies 
only to civil actions, not to criminal or juvenile cases.  There 
No. 01-0656 
 
17 
 
is some logic to the State's argument.  After all, Chapter 806 
of 
the 
Statutes 
is 
entitled 
"Civil 
Procedure——Judgment."  
However, in H.N.T. v. State, the court of appeals specifically 
stated:  
If newly discovered evidence existed on the question, 
the state's remedy was to seek relief from the order 
and request a new hearing.  See sec. 806.07(1)(b), 
Stats.  If the adult court ruling was obtained as a 
result of H.N.T.'s fraud, misrepresentation, or other 
misconduct, the state's remedy again was to seek 
relief from such order on these grounds.  See sec. 
806.07(1)(c). 
H.N.T. v. State, 125 Wis. 2d 242, 252, 371 N.W.2d 395 (Ct. App. 
1985) (emphasis added). 
¶37 In any event, in Fritsche v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 
171 Wis. 2d 280, 294-95, 491 N.W.2d 119 (Ct. App. 1992), the 
court suggested that motions for reconsideration are "part of 
our common law."  See also Wis. Stat. § 805.17(3). 
¶38 The statutes provide avenues to reconsider issues in 
both civil and criminal cases.  We doubt that the legislature 
intended to foreclose altogether the reconsideration of issues 
in the juvenile court.  In the absence of a clear statutory 
prohibition, we conclude that juveniles and the state may offer 
appropriate motions for reconsideration in juvenile court.   
¶39 The State also asserts that Wis. Stat. § 806.07 is 
inapplicable because the statute sets out times for filing that 
are different from those applicable to criminal cases, and 
because the statute uses terms such as "equitable" that are not 
related to criminal matters.  The state acknowledges, however, 
No. 01-0656 
 
18 
 
that a waiver hearing under the JJC is not a criminal 
proceeding.  Moreover, § 806.07(2) requires that a motion for 
relief under the statute be filed within a reasonable time.  
What constitutes a "reasonable time" is undefined by the statute 
and may differ depending on context.  In the context of a motion 
for reconsideration of a waiver into adult court, we determine 
that a reasonable time is the time the criminal court assumes 
jurisdiction as the result of the filing of a criminal 
complaint. 
B.  Other Means of Appeal or Review 
¶40 Having determined that a juvenile may ask the juvenile 
court to reconsider a waiver order, but only until the filing of 
a criminal complaint, we are left with a second question: How 
may a juvenile obtain prompt review of a waiver into criminal 
court 
after 
the 
criminal 
court 
has 
assumed 
exclusive 
jurisdiction? 
¶41 The parties agree that even after the criminal court 
has asserted exclusive jurisdiction, juveniles should have some 
means of raising new grounds——new factors——that might have 
affected the juvenile court's waiver decision.  They do not 
agree, however, on what options a juvenile has after criminal 
proceedings have commenced. 
¶42 We note initially two means of review that are not 
applicable 
after 
the 
criminal 
court 
assumes 
exclusive 
jurisdiction.  First, the criminal court may not reconsider the 
juvenile court's decision to waive the juvenile into criminal 
court.  As Chief Justice Dixon stated in 1868, "The impropriety, 
No. 01-0656 
 
19 
 
I might say the utter absurdity, of applying to one court to 
restrain, modify or correct the orders or decrees of another 
court of co-ordinate jurisdiction, is also apparent.  I think it 
is wholly inadmissible to do so."  See H.N.T., 125 Wis. 2d at 
252 (citing Platto v. Deuster, 22 Wis. 482, 484-85 (1868)). 
¶43 Second, a criminal court that has assumed jurisdiction 
as the result of a waiver from juvenile court may not return the 
juvenile 
to 
juvenile 
court 
by 
reverse 
waiver, 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1m)(b). 
¶44 Keeping in mind the types of review a juvenile may not 
seek in challenging a waiver order, we turn to what means of 
review a juvenile may utilize. 
¶45 First, the parties agree that a juvenile may pursue an 
interlocutory appeal pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.50, within 14 
days of the waiver order.  The juvenile may seek a stay of the 
juvenile court's waiver from the juvenile court to permit an 
interlocutory appeal before the juvenile court jurisdiction has 
transferred; and the juvenile may seek a stay of his or her case 
in criminal court to accommodate an appeal of the waiver order 
after 
the 
criminal 
court 
has 
assumed 
jurisdiction.  
Wis. Stat. § 808.07(2).18  Nothing in the statute restricts the 
                                                 
18 Wisconsin Stat. § 808.07 provides in part: 
(2) Authority of a court to grant relief pending 
appeal.  (a) During the pendency of an appeal, a trial 
court or an appellate court may: 
1. Stay execution or enforcement of a judgment or 
order; 
No. 01-0656 
 
20 
 
juvenile from filing an appeal under § 809.50 before or after 
the criminal court assumes jurisdiction, so long as the appeal 
is filed within 14 days after the issuance of the waiver order.  
Wis. Stat. § 809.50(1).  Once the § 809.50 motion is filed, 
either the court of appeals or the circuit court with exclusive 
jurisdiction may grant a stay of proceedings pending appeal.  
Id. 
¶46 Additionally, the juvenile may bring a direct appeal 
after conviction in criminal court. 
¶47 The State asserts that a juvenile waived into adult 
court has only these two means of appealing the waiver——an 
interlocutory appeal or a direct appeal after conviction.  The 
State 
argues 
that 
reconsideration 
of 
a 
waiver 
order 
is 
unnecessary 
because 
a 
waiver 
hearing 
consistent 
with 
Wis. Stat. § 938.18 affords a juvenile all the fundamental 
fairness to which he or she is entitled,19 and an interlocutory 
or a direct appeal affords sufficient appellate review. 
                                                                                                                                                             
2. 
Suspend, 
modify, 
restore 
or 
grant 
an 
injunction; or 
3. Make any order appropriate to preserve the 
existing state of affairs or the effectiveness of the 
judgment subsequently to be entered. 
19 The State contends that even if this court were to accept 
Vairin's argument that he can seek reconsideration for 14 days 
after the waiver order, Vairin waived his right to seek 
reconsideration by not raising the issue of new evidence in his 
January 3, 2001 motion for reconsideration.  The State also 
asserts that the potential for deportation is not properly 
considered in the context of a waiver hearing. 
No. 01-0656 
 
21 
 
¶48 Vairin acknowledges that he could have pursued an 
interlocutory appeal and could later file a direct appeal if he 
is convicted of a crime, but he asserts that neither type of 
appeal offers him an adequate remedy.  Vairin points out that he 
is not claiming ineffective assistance of counsel or that the 
juvenile court erroneously exercised its discretion.  Rather he 
is claiming the existence of new grounds not considered by the 
juvenile court.  He argues that an interlocutory appeal would 
not accommodate such a claim.  In addition, Vairin contends that 
a direct appeal would not be practical because it occurs only 
after conviction, and because a waiver order cannot be appealed 
after a juvenile defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a plea 
bargain. 
¶49 We 
agree 
with 
Vairin 
that 
in 
many 
cases, 
an 
interlocutory appeal or a direct appeal is simply not an 
adequate remedy.20  We further conclude that in some cases, 
particularly in small counties, the requirement that a juvenile 
appeal a waiver decision to the court of appeals is impractical.   
It is not difficult to imagine a judge in a single-judge county 
entering a waiver order as a juvenile court, and then, after 
                                                                                                                                                             
We decline to address either issue.  We instead leave 
decisions 
on 
the 
factors 
to 
consider 
on 
a 
motion 
for 
reconsideration, and the merits of Vairin's claim, to the 
discretion of the circuit court. 
20 Although 
we 
agree 
with 
the 
concurrence 
that 
in 
appropriate cases, the court of appeals may grant permission to 
supplement the record, appellate review is usually time-
consuming and an unusual way to evaluate new evidence. 
No. 01-0656 
 
22 
 
assuming jurisdiction as a criminal court, learning of new 
evidence that would have changed his or her waiver decision.  In 
such an instance, the judge might wish he or she could 
reconsider the waiver order, and transfer jurisdiction back to 
the juvenile court.  Requiring an appeal to the court of appeals 
to afford a remedy would be absurd.  Moreover, if 14 days had 
passed after waiver before new information came to light, the 
only remedy would be to wait for a direct appeal after the 
juvenile was convicted in criminal court.  The appeal process 
embraced by the State would be unworkable in many cases. 
¶50 We conclude that some meaningful remedy must be 
available when 14 days have passed since the waiver order, and a 
criminal complaint has been filed, but the juvenile wishes to 
raise new grounds not considered at the waiver hearing. 
¶51 As we stated in D.H. v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 286, 292, 
251 N.W.2d 196 (1977),21 "The transfer of the juvenile to the 
adult criminal process is a grave step, and there should be a 
way for the juvenile to obtain immediate review of the 
decision."22 
¶52 We further stated in D.H. that:   
Review in cases where the juvenile court has waived 
jurisdiction 
must 
be 
speedy 
and 
efficient.  
Legislation could establish the necessary procedures 
but it does not.  "When an adequate remedy or forum 
                                                 
21 D.H. v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 286, 251 N.W.2d 196 (1977), has 
often been referred to as "In Interest of D.H." 
22 The statutes at issue in D.H. have changed, but the 
rationale behind the need for meaningful, timely review has not. 
No. 01-0656 
 
23 
 
does not exist to resolve disputes or provide due 
process, the courts, under the Wisconsin Constitution, 
can fashion an adequate remedy." 
Id. at 294 (quoting Hortonville Ed. Assn. v. Joint School Dist. 
No. 1, 66 Wis. 2d 469, 497, 225 N.W.2d 658 (1975)). 
¶53 Statutory authority already exists to transfer cases 
from criminal court to juvenile court, via reverse waiver.  
Wis. Stat. § 938.183(1m).  Although the reverse waiver statute 
does not apply to this situation, it establishes that a reverse 
waiver 
concept 
is 
not 
unprecedented. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 938.18(7) is even more on point.  Under this statute, a 
juvenile who has been waived to adult court after he or she 
absconded and failed to appear at the waiver hearing, may 
subsequently contest the waiver in criminal court.  The juvenile 
may contest the waiver: 
by showing the court of criminal jurisdiction good 
cause for his or her failure to appear.  If the 
criminal court finds good cause for the juvenile's 
failure to appear, it shall transfer jurisdiction to 
the court assigned to exercise jurisdiction under this 
chapter and ch. 48 for the purpose of holding the 
waiver hearing. 
Wis. Stat. § 938.18(7) (emphasis added). 
¶54 We think that if a juvenile has compelling new grounds 
bearing on waiver, he or she may file a motion with the criminal 
court asking the court to relinquish its jurisdiction by 
transferring the matter to juvenile court.  As grounds for the 
motion, the juvenile must allege a new factor that: 
No. 01-0656 
 
24 
 
(1) was not in existence at the time of the waiver 
decision or, if it was in existence, was unknowingly 
overlooked by all parties; 23 
(2) is highly relevant to the criteria for waiver 
under Wis. Stat. § 938.18(5); and 
(3) likely would have affected the juvenile court's 
determination that it would be contrary to the best 
interests of the juvenile or of the public for the 
juvenile court to hear the case. 
¶55 After reviewing the motion, the criminal court may, in 
its discretion, conduct a hearing.  If the court finds good 
cause, 
it 
may 
relinquish 
jurisdiction 
by 
transferring 
jurisdiction to the juvenile court.  The juvenile may then file 
a motion for reconsideration of the waiver order with the 
juvenile court, which will have regained exclusive jurisdiction 
to entertain the motion. 
¶56 The procedure we have outlined should be regarded as 
extraordinary.  It should be strictly limited to compelling new 
factors.  Previously considered or cumulative evidence may not 
form the basis of such a motion. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶57 In summary, we conclude that the circuit court 
(juvenile court) in this case properly determined that it did 
not have jurisdiction to reconsider its waiver order after a 
complaint was filed in criminal court.  We therefore affirm the 
circuit court decision.  We also conclude that a juvenile court 
                                                 
23 For a discussion of "new factors" in the context of 
sentence modification, see State v. Hegwood, 113 Wis. 2d 544, 
546, 
335 
N.W.2d 399 
(1983) 
(citing 
Rosado 
v. 
State, 
70 
Wis. 2d 280, 288, 234 N.W.2d 69 (1975)). 
No. 01-0656 
 
25 
 
has jurisdiction to reconsider its waiver order until a criminal 
complaint is filed and the criminal court assumes jurisdiction, 
but it has no jurisdiction after criminal proceedings have 
begun.  Finally, we conclude that a juvenile has two options for 
obtaining prompt review of a waiver order after the commencement 
of criminal proceedings: the juvenile may, within 14 days of the 
waiver 
order, 
seek 
an 
interlocutory 
appeal 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 809.50; or the juvenile may file a motion asking 
the criminal court to relinquish jurisdiction, in accordance 
with this opinion. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
No.  01-0656.npc 
 
1 
 
¶58 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority's conclusion that the circuit court (the branch 
having juvenile court jurisdiction, hereinafter the "juvenile 
court") does not have jurisdiction to reconsider its waiver 
order after a complaint has been filed in the criminal court.  
Majority op. at ¶33.  I further agree that the juvenile court 
may reconsider its waiver order before the commencement of 
criminal proceedings.  Majority op. at ¶35.  I write separately, 
however, because I cannot join the majority's judicially created 
remedy for review of the waiver order after the criminal court 
has assumed exclusive jurisdiction.   
¶59 I respectfully disagree with the majority's judicially 
created additional means of seeking review of the juvenile 
court's waiver decision after the criminal court assumes 
exclusive jurisdiction.24  The majority concludes that in many 
cases interlocutory appeal and direct appeal, though available, 
are 
inadequate 
remedies, 
and 
consequently 
creates 
a 
new 
procedure 
that 
asks 
the 
criminal 
court 
to 
relinquish 
jurisdiction.  Majority op. at ¶49.  While I believe that there 
must be a remedy available, I respectfully disagree with this 
judicially created remedy, because the current remedies are 
adequate in this case.  Furthermore, if another remedy is 
                                                 
24 The majority opinion is inconsistent.  At paragraph 6, 
the majority concludes "that a juvenile seeking prompt review of 
a 
waiver 
order, 
after 
the 
criminal 
court 
has 
assumed 
jurisdiction, has two options" one of which is interlocutory 
appeal.  Later, however, the majority concludes that it must 
create an additional remedy because interlocutory appeal is not 
meaningful.   
No.  01-0656.npc 
 
2 
 
desired, it is most appropriately provided by the legislature or 
by following this court's rule-making procedures to amend the 
Criminal Procedure Code and/or the Juvenile Justice Code.   
¶60 The majority concludes that interlocutory appeal and 
direct appeal are in some cases inadequate remedies for 
reviewing a juvenile court's waiver order.  Majority op. at ¶49.  
Specifically, the majority points to a situation, such as here, 
where the juvenile claims that there is new evidence not 
considered at the waiver hearing.  Id.  I respectfully disagree 
with the majority's conclusion because the majority completely 
overlooks the court of appeals' power to reverse a circuit 
court's order not only for error, but also in the interest of 
justice.   
¶61 Wisconsin  Stat. § 752.3525 explicitly gives the court 
of appeals authority to examine the record and in the interest 
of justice, reverse the order appealed from, regardless of 
whether the proper motion or objection appears in the record.  
See State v. Murdock, 2000 WI App 170, ¶40, 238 Wis. 2d 301, 617 
                                                 
25 Wisconsin Stat. § 752.35 states in full: 
In an appeal to the court of appeals, if it appears 
from the record that the real controversy has not been 
fully tried, or that it is probable that justice has 
for any reason miscarried, the court may reverse the 
judgment or order appealed from, regardless of whether 
the proper motion or objection appears in the record 
and may direct the entry of the proper judgment or 
remit the case to the trial court for entry of the 
proper judgment or for a new trial, and direct the 
making of such amendments in the pleadings and the 
adoption 
of 
such 
procedure 
in 
that 
court, 
not 
inconsistent with statutes or rules, as are necessary 
to accomplish the ends of justice. 
No.  01-0656.npc 
 
3 
 
N.W.2d 175 (granting a new trial in the interest of justice on 
the issue of mental responsibility).  Section 752.35 certainly 
applies on interlocutory or direct appeal of a juvenile court's 
waiver decision.  In the interest of justice, therefore, the 
court of appeals may, in my opinion, consider the proposed new 
evidence and decide if there is a substantial probability that 
the new factor would produce a different result.  See Murdock, 
2000 WI App 170, ¶31 (citing State v. Darcy N.K., 218 
Wis. 2d 640, 667, 581 N.W.2d 567 (Ct. App. 1998)); see also 
Vollmer v. Luety, 156 Wis. 2d 1, 16, 456 N.W.2d 797 (1990) 
(citing State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 370 N.W.2d 745 (1985), 
and discussing the court of appeals' discretionary reversal 
power).  If so, the court of appeals has authority to reverse 
the juvenile court's waiver decision or remit the case to the 
juvenile court for entry of the proper order.  See § 752.35.  
Based on the court of appeals' statutory power to reverse the 
juvenile court's waiver decision in the interest of justice, 
therefore, I conclude that the majority's judicially created 
remedy is unnecessary.26  Interlocutory appeal and direct appeal 
                                                 
26 I further disagree with the majority's judicially created 
remedy because it reminds me of judicial review by a court of 
co-equal jurisdiction.  See State v. Schroeder, 224 Wis. 2d 706, 
721, 593 N.W.2d 76 (Ct. App. 1999) (noting that after court 
reorganization the term "juvenile court" means the circuit court 
adjudicating a case under the juvenile code).  Prior to the 1977 
constitutional 
amendment 
restructuring 
the 
Wisconsin 
Court 
System, the legislature had authority to establish courts of 
limited 
jurisdiction 
inferior 
to 
circuit 
courts. 
 
The 
constitutional amendment created the intermediate court of 
appeals and eliminated the distinction between county and 
circuit courts.  See Dane County v. C.M.B., 165 Wis. 2d 703, 
711, 478 N.W.2d 385 (1992).  The majority's new procedure here 
seems contrary to the current structure of the court system, 
No.  01-0656.npc 
 
4 
 
appear to be adequate remedies for review of the juvenile 
court's waiver decision. 
¶62 Assuming that I were to agree with the majority, 
however, I would still take the position that an opinion by this 
court is not the proper avenue to create a new procedure for 
review of a juvenile court's waiver decision.  This is a remedy 
properly 
provided 
either 
by 
legislative 
enactment 
or 
by 
following this court's established rule-making procedures. 
¶63 The legislature enacted Wis. Stat. ch. 938.  If a new 
remedy in that chapter is desired, therefore, the legislature 
most appropriately should provide it.  The majority opinion 
acknowledges that the legislature enacted a statutory procedure 
for reverse waiver, see Wis. Stat. § 938.183, and a statutory 
procedure for a waiver hearing when a juvenile has absconded, 
see § 938.18(7).  Majority op. at ¶53.  Significantly and 
correctly, the majority then notes that neither statute applies 
here.  Still, however, the majority uses those statutes to 
create a new remedy because "a reverse waiver concept is not 
                                                                                                                                                             
because it essentially creates review of the juvenile court's 
decision in the criminal court.   
Furthermore, although the majority discusses the impact of 
requiring a juvenile to appeal a waiver decision in a single-
judge county, see majority op. ¶49, the majority ignores the 
practical effect of its new remedy in that same situation.  In a 
single-judge county, the judge acting as the criminal court 
judge will, himself or herself, consider new factors.  Then, 
based on review of the new factors, the judge will grant or deny 
the motion.  The practical impact is that the majority's 
procedure asks the judge, acting in the criminal court, to 
relinquish jurisdiction to himself or herself, acting in the 
juvenile court.   
No.  01-0656.npc 
 
5 
 
unprecedented."  Majority op. at ¶53.  Essentially the majority 
creates a new procedure out of whole cloth, and attempts to 
justify it by analogy to other legislatively enacted statutory 
remedies that do not apply. 
¶64 I cannot join such reasoning.  The majority plainly 
ignores that the legislature is the proper branch of government 
to enact statutes.  This is evidenced by the fact that the 
majority opinion seems to me to be more like a statutory 
enactment rather than a judicial decision.  As demonstrated by 
Wis. Stat. § 938.183 
and 
§ 938.18(7), 
the 
legislature 
has 
provided for remedies other than interlocutory and direct appeal 
in certain situations.  Tellingly, however, the legislature has 
not provided for a remedy, other than interlocutory and direct 
appeal, in the situation we are faced with today.   
¶65 Moreover, if this court feels that it must provide an 
additional procedural remedy, a judicial opinion is not the 
appropriate way to do so.  See Nelson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 102 
Wis. 2d 159, 173, 306 N.W.2d 71 (1981) ("If the court claims the 
power to amend the statute as a rule of practice and procedure, 
case law is not the way to do it.") (Coffey, J., dissenting).  
Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 751.1227 and this court's Internal 
                                                 
27 Wisconsin Stat. § 751.12 states in relevant part: 
The state supreme court shall, by rules promulgated by 
it from time to time, regulate pleading, practice and 
procedure in judicial proceedings in all courts, for 
the purpose of simplifying the same and of promoting 
the 
speedy determination 
of 
litigation 
upon its 
merits.  The rules shall not abridge, enlarge or 
modify 
the 
substantive 
rights 
of 
any 
litigant. . . . All statutes relating to pleading, 
practice and procedure may be modified or suspended by 
No.  01-0656.npc 
 
6 
 
Operating Procedures, the proper avenue to create or amend rules 
governing procedure in judicial proceedings, such as the one 
under review, is through a petition and public hearing.  The 
majority's decision today clearly amends Chapter 938 and the 
judicial procedure for review of a juvenile court's waiver 
decision.  This kind of significant amendment to juvenile court 
and criminal court procedure should, if not addressed by the 
legislature, appropriately be the subject of a rules petition, 
and not enacted by judicial fiat.  Consistent with established 
procedures, we should hold a public hearing and engage in open 
discussion about the proposed amendment.  Wis. S. Ct. IOP (May 
24, 1984).  We should engage in informed, open discussion 
regarding 
whether 
there 
should 
be 
a 
remedy 
other 
than 
interlocutory appeal and direct appeal, and if so, then adopt 
the new remedy for reviewing the waiver decision, in accord with 
§ 751.12 and our Internal Operating Procedures.  At the same 
time, we should address whether there is a need for a procedural 
rule, in future cases, for supplementing the record to include 
                                                                                                                                                             
rules promulgated under this section.  No rule 
modifying or suspending such statutes may be adopted 
until the court has held a public hearing with 
reference to the rule. . . . This section shall not 
abridge the right of the legislature to enact, modify 
or repeal statutes or rules relating to pleading, 
practice or procedure.  The judicial council shall act 
in an advisory capacity to assist the court in 
performing its duties under this section. 
(Emphasis added.) 
No.  01-0656.npc 
 
7 
 
the new evidence offered.28  By creating an avenue of judicial 
review 
here 
that 
asks 
the 
criminal 
court 
to 
relinquish 
jurisdiction to the juvenile court, the majority seems to be 
ignoring established rule-making procedures; consequently, I 
cannot join that portion of the opinion.   
¶66 In conclusion, I agree with the majority's holding 
that the juvenile court may reconsider its waiver order before 
commencement of proceedings in the criminal court.  I cannot 
join the majority's opinion in its entirety, however, because I 
object to the creation of a new remedy, such as the one here, by 
judicial fiat.  Whether to provide an additional remedy is a 
policy choice most appropriately left to the legislature, or to 
this court, but only by following established procedures 
involving a petition and public hearing.  Moreover, I conclude 
that interlocutory appeal and direct appeal are adequate 
remedies for review of the juvenile court's waiver decision.  
Even where the juvenile is claiming significant new evidence, 
the court of appeals may consider that claim, and decide if 
there is a substantial probability of a different result.  If 
so, the court of appeals can reverse the juvenile court's waiver 
order in the interest of justice.  For the reasons stated, 
therefore, I respectfully concur. 
                                                 
28 Supplementing the record is not an issue here because the 
juvenile court, the Honorable Diane M. Nicks, presiding, 
addressed the proposed new evidence in this case in the context 
of the motion to reconsider. 
No.  01-0656.npc 
 
8 
 
¶67 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and DIANE S. SYKES have joined this concurrence. 
 
No.  01-0656.npc 
 
 
 
1