Case Title: Parker v. Elco Elevator Corp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 942042

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1995-09-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Whiting,
1 Lacy, 
Hassell, and Keenan, JJ. 
 
RONNIE D. PARKER 
 
v.   Record No. 942042 
OPINION BY ELIZABETH B. LACY 
                                         September 15, 1995 
ELCO ELEVATOR CORPORATION 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY 
 
Benjamin N. A. Kendrick, Judge 
 
 
In this negligence action, we review the rulings made by 
the trial court initially sustaining the defendant's pre-trial 
motion in limine and culminating in the entry of an order 
granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
 
Ronnie D. Parker was riding in an elevator when it began 
to descend at an excessive rate of speed, actuating a 
multispeed governor which stopped the elevator abruptly.  As a 
result of the incident, Parker claimed that his back and knees 
were injured.  He was treated by several physicians and 
ultimately he retired from his employment as a result of his 
alleged injuries.   
 
Parker filed a motion for judgment against Elco Elevator 
Corporation, alleging that Elco was responsible for the 
maintenance of the elevator and that its negligence resulted in 
his injuries.  Parker sought to recover damages for the pain 
and suffering he experienced as a result of his injuries.  
Because the accident occurred during the course of his 
employment, Parker received reimbursement through his workers' 
                     
    
1Justice Whiting participated in the hearing and decision of 
this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on 
August 12, 1995. 
 
 
 
 
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compensation coverage for both his lost wages and medical 
expenses. 
 
Following discovery, Elco filed a motion in limine seeking 
the exclusion of certain evidence.  Specifically, Elco sought 
to exclude:  (1) the testimony of Parker's treating physician 
because Parker failed to identify the physician as an expert 
within the agreed discovery period; (2) Parker's testimony 
regarding his medical treatment and the cause of his injuries; 
(3) Parker's medical bills; and (4) the testimony of William J. 
Meese, offered by Parker as an expert on elevator maintenance 
and safety.   
 
Following argument of counsel, the trial court sustained 
Elco's motion in limine in its entirety.  Immediately 
thereafter, Elco moved for summary judgment, arguing that 
without expert testimony on the issue of elevator maintenance, 
Parker could not present a prima facie case of negligent 
maintenance and was not entitled to rely on the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur.  The trial court sustained this motion and 
entered summary judgment in favor of Elco.  We granted Parker's 
appeal of these rulings and will reverse the judgment and 
remand the case for further proceedings. 
 
The trial court erred in at least three particulars.  
First, the trial court erred in precluding Parker from 
testifying as to the medical treatment he received and the 
cause of his injuries.  We have consistently held that "'lay 
 
 
 
 
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testimony of causal connection between an automobile accident 
and injury is admissible . . . even when medical testimony 
fails to establish causal connection expressly.'"  Todt v. 
Shaw, 223 Va. 123, 127, 286 S.E.2d 211, 213 (1982) (quoting 
Peterson v. Neme, 222 Va. 477, 483, 281 S.E.2d 869, 872 
(1981)). 
 
Next, the trial court erred in excluding Parker's medical 
bills.  The court's decision was based on Parker's failure to 
identify the bills or the amount of the bills as elements of 
his financial damage within the agreed discovery period.  
Parker, however, argued that the medical bills were offered 
solely to show that he was treated for physical injuries which, 
he contends, supports his allegation that he endured pain and 
suffering.  Parker does not seek recovery for the amount of the 
medical bills; rather, he seeks recovery for the pain and 
suffering associated with the injuries he sustained.  
Therefore, Parker was not required to identify the medical 
bills as elements of financial damage when those bills were to 
be used for this limited purpose. 
 
Finally, the trial court erred in excluding the testimony 
of Meese based on its finding that he "lacks scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge pertinent to the 
issues of this case."  The record reflects that the trial court 
reached this decision based on Meese's testimony that he did 
not know what caused the elevator's excessive speed of 
 
 
 
 
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descent.
2  The trial court observed that this lack of knowledge 
made Meese's testimony speculative and therefore precluded 
Meese from appearing as an expert witness.  However, lack of 
this knowledge is fatal only if Parker's sole theory of 
negligence was Elco's failure to correct the condition of the 
elevator which allowed it to fall at an excessive rate of 
speed.  Parker's theory of Elco's negligence was not so 
limited.   
 
Parker also alleged that Elco was aware of two previous 
incidents in which the multispeed governor was activated by an 
overspeed condition.  Relying on Otis Elevator Company v. 
Tuerr, 616 A.2d 1254 (D.C. 1992), and Otis Elevator Company v. 
Robinson, 287 F.2d 62 (5th Cir. 1961), Parker asserts that, 
under these conditions, Elco was negligent in not removing the 
elevator from service until the cause of the excessive speed 
was identified and corrected.  This theory of the case was not 
dependant on knowledge of the specific elevator defect causing 
the incident which allegedly resulted in injuries to Parker.  
Therefore, Parker was entitled to present evidence to support 
                     
    
2We note that the trial court relied without objection on 
excerpts of Meese's discovery depositions as read into the 
record by Elco's counsel.  The ruling on this issue was 
immediately followed by Elco's motion for summary judgment, 
which was granted.  Rule 3:18 prohibits the use of discovery 
depositions "in whole or in part" in supporting a motion for 
summary judgment absent agreement of counsel.  See also Code 
§ 8.01-420.  In the absence of a clear objection to the use of 
the discovery deposition in this manner, however, we review the 
court's decision in the posture presented to us. 
 
 
 
 
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his alternative negligence theory and to offer Meese as an 
expert on this standard of care. 
 
Furthermore, because Meese's competence was considered 
based solely on excerpts from his discovery deposition, Parker 
had no opportunity to establish Meese's qualifications through 
voir dire.  Under these circumstances, we conclude that the 
trial court erred in excluding Meese from testifying as 
Parker's expert on elevator maintenance and safety. 
 
These errors require that the judgment of the trial court 
be reversed and that the case be remanded for further 
proceedings.  In light of this disposition, Parker's remaining 
assignments of error are moot and we need not address them. 
 
Reversed and remanded.