Case Title: MBB v. ERW

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-04-1

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-11-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
MBB v. ERW2004 WY 134100 P.3d 415Case Number: C-04-1Decided: 11/09/2004

OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

                                                                                                                                   

MBB 
and JPB, a minor child,

Appellants(Petitioners),

 

v.

 

ERW 
and MIS,

Appellees(Respondents).

 

Representing 
Appellants:

            
Robert J. Hand, Jr. of Hand & Hand, Casper, Wyoming.

 
         

Representing 
Appellee ERW:

            
Todd Hambrick and Stephanie Hambrick of Krampner, Fuller & Hambrick, 
Casper, Wyoming.

 
          
 

Representing 
Appellee MIS:

            
Richard L. Harden, Casper, Wyoming.

 
    

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 
 
        

VOIGT, Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      In 1993, J.S. 
was born to MIS (Mother) and ERW (Father).  
Seven months later, Mother and J.S. began living with Michael Bisiar 
(Bisiar).  In 1998, Mother and 
Bisiar had a child, J.B., together.  
In 1999, an order was entered awarding Mother custody of J.S.  In 2002, Mother moved out of Bisiar's 
home.  She was facing criminal 
charges and requested that Father take custody of J.S.  Father took custody of J.S. and filed a 
petition to modify the custody order, requesting that he be granted custody of 
J.S.  The district court granted 
Father's petition.  Shortly 
thereafter, Bisiar and J.B. filed a petition to set aside the modification, 
claiming that Father had refused to allow them visitation with J.S.  Mother and Father filed separate motions 
to dismiss Bisiar's petition.  The 
district court granted the motions to dismiss, finding that Bisiar and J.B. 
lacked standing to bring the action.  
Bisiar and J.B. appealed.  We 
will affirm.

 
 
 

ISSUE

 

[¶2]      The dispositive issue 
presented in this case is whether a stepparent or sibling has standing to 
challenge a custody order or to request visitation.

 
  
              
       

FACTS

 

[¶3]      In 1993, J.S. 
was born to Mother and Father, an unmarried couple.  When J.S. was approximately seven months 
old, Mother and J.S. began living with Bisiar.  Bisiar, Mother and J.S. lived together 
for approximately six years, during which time a second child, J.B., was 
born.  Bisiar held J.S. 
out as his own son and a close familial bond developed among Bisiar, J.B. and 
J.S.

 
      
            

[¶4]      In 1999, genetic 
testing established Father's paternity with respect to J.S.  At that time, Mother and Father entered 
into an agreement giving Mother custody of J.S. and providing a visitation 
schedule whereby Father and J.S., who had had little prior contact, would be 
gradually introduced into a standard visitation arrangement.  In 2002, Father moved to modify this 
agreement requesting that he be granted full custody of J.S.  Father's motion alleged that on May 29, 
2002, Mother asked Father to take custody of J.S. because she was homeless and 
awaiting arraignment on charges of aiding and abetting burglary and aggravated 
burglary.  Mother and Father stipulated to the modification and an order giving 
Father primary custody of J.S. was entered by the district court on January 30, 
2003.

 
   
            
          

[¶5]      On June 3, 2003, 
Bisiar filed a petition to set aside the modification order.  Bisiar asserted that he was not given 
his "statutory rights to reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard with 
regard to the placement of the minor child as provided in W.S. § 20-5-105."  The essence of his claim was that under 
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), he should have received 
notice of the hearing and that Father was required to provide the names of all 
persons with whom the minor child has lived during the last five years.  Bisiar also asserted that Father, by not 
allowing him and J.B. visitation with J.S., was infringing upon their 
constitutional right to freedom of association with J.S.  Bisiar requested that the order be 
modified to "provide a reasonable and liberal visitation schedule by and between 
[Bisiar and J.B.] and the minor child [J.S.] . . .."  Mother and Father filed separate motions 
to dismiss Bisiar's petition, asserting that he had no standing to request that 
the district court's order be set aside or seek visitation because Bisiar was 
not J.S.'s parent.  On October 30, 
2003, the district court dismissed Bisiar's petition, finding that he had "no 
standing under Wyoming law to bring this action."  Bisiar timely appealed.

 
  

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 
 
 

[¶6]      Bisiar's petition 
was dismissed pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for 
which relief can be granted.

 
 
            
      

"When 
claims are dismissed under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), this court accepts the facts 
stated in the complaint as true and views them in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff. Such a dismissal will be sustained only when it is certain from 
the face of the complaint that the plaintiff cannot assert any facts that would 
entitle him to relief.  Story v. State, 2001 WY 3, ¶ 19, 15 P.3d 1066, ¶ 19 (Wyo.2001).  Dismissal is 
a drastic remedy and is sparingly granted; nevertheless, we will sustain a 
W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) dismissal when it is certain from the face of the complaint 
that the plaintiff cannot assert any set of facts that would entitle that 
plaintiff to relief.  Robinson v. Pacificorp, 10 P.3d 1133, 1135-36 
(Wyo.2000)."

 
 
 

Bonnie 
M. Quinn Revocable Trust v. SRW, Inc., 
2004 WY 65, ¶ 8, 91 P.3d 146, 148 (Wyo. 2004) (quoting Manion v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage 
Corp., 2002 WY 49, ¶ 6, 43 P.3d 576, ¶ 6 (Wyo. 2002) and Van Riper v. Oedekoven, 2001 WY 58, ¶ 24, 
26 P.3d 325, ¶ 24 (Wyo. 2001)).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶7]      On appeal, Bisiar 
and J.B. contend (1) that the district court should have been made aware of 
their relationship with J.S. before granting the modification; and (2) that they 
should have been awarded visitation.  
In support of their first argument, they 
contend that the modification was defective because Father did not comply with a 
provision of the UCCJA, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-5-110 (LexisNexis 2003), which 
requires:

 
           
              
       

Every party in a custody proceeding in his first pleading 
or in an affidavit attached to that pleading shall give information under oath 
as to the child's present address, the places where the child has lived within 
the last five (5) years and the names and present addresses of the persons with 
whom the child has lived during that period.

 
 
              
             
               
              
   

Bisiar and J.B. maintain that because Father did not 
include this information in his petition for modification, the resulting order 
was defective and should have been set aside.

 
 
             
           
  

[¶8]      We disagree.  To begin with, Bisiar and J.B. failed to 
demonstrate the applicability of the UCCJA to an intrastate 
custody matter, considering that the stated purpose of the act is to avoid and 
resolve custody conflicts between different jurisdictions.1  Secondly, and more fundamentally 
problematic for Bisiar and J.B., is the fact that they lack standing to 
challenge the district court's modification order and request visitation.  Standinga stake or interest in the 
litigationmust be established for participation in a lawsuit as a party.  State ex 
rel. Bayou Liquors, Inc. v. City of Casper, 906 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Schulthess v. Carollo, 832 P.2d 552, 
556-57 (Wyo. 1992)).

 

[¶9]      In State ex 
rel. Klopotek v. District Court of Sheridan County, 621 P.2d 223, 227 (Wyo. 
1980), superseded by statute on other grounds by Marquiss v. Marquiss, 
837 P.2d 25 (Wyo. 1992), 
we stated that "[t]he father and mother are natural guardians of the 
persons of their minor children."  
Parents enjoy a constitutionally protected fundamental right to "make 
decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children."  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 
66, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000); 
see also Michael 
v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Wyo. 1995).  This fundamental right has been 
recognized as a liberty interest protected under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, and is also found in Wyo. Const. 
art. 1, § 6, which 
provides, "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without 
due process of law."  Michael, 
900 P.2d  at 1147.  In Troxel, the United States 
Supreme Court discussed this principle:

 

The 
liberty interest at issue in this casethe interest of parents in the care, 
custody, and control of their childrenis perhaps the oldest of the fundamental 
liberty interests recognized by this Court.  More than 75 years ago, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 401, 43 S. Ct. 625, 67 L. Ed. 1042 (1923), we held that the "liberty" protected by the Due 
Process Clause includes the right of parents to "establish a home and bring up 
children" and "to control the education of their own."  Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535, 45 S. Ct. 571, 69 L. Ed. 1070 (1925), we again held that the "liberty of parents and 
guardians" includes the right "to direct the upbringing and education of 
children under their control."

 
    
              
           
   

Troxel, 
530 U.S.  at 65.  "It is cardinal with us that the 
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents . . ..'"  Nulle v. Gillette-Campbell County 
Joint Powers Fire Bd., 797 P.2d 1171, 1174 (Wyo. 1990) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 
321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S. Ct. 438, 88 L. Ed. 645 (1944)).

 

[¶10]   While a parent's interest in the 
care and custody of his or her child is a fundamental right, it is not without 
limitations.  Michael, 900 P.2d  at 1148.  The State, pursuant to its police power 
and in its capacity as parens patriae, has the right and duty to 
"supervise the welfare of children and promote their best interest in a way 
which affects the rights of parents."  
Id. at 1150.  However, 
state action affecting this fundamental right is subject to strict 
scrutiny.  Id. at 1146.  Also, private action affecting a 
parent's interest in the care, custody and control or his child may only be 
accomplished by court action taken pursuant to appropriate statutory 
authority.  Id. at 1147; 
State ex rel. Klopotek, 621 P.2d  at 227.

 

[¶11]   Besides a child's biological or 
adoptive parents, the Wyoming legislature has granted statutory authority to 
request visitation to only two additional classes of persons.  First, under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-7-101 
(LexisNexis 2003),2 a child's grandparents, under 
certain circumstances, may bring an action to establish visitation with their 
grandchild.  And second, under Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 20-7-102 (LexisNexis 2003), a child's primary caregiver has 
standing to bring an action to establish visitation.3

 

[¶12]   Because of parents' fundamental 
right to direct the upbringing of their children, courts generally have held 
that only those specifically granted standing by statute may petition the court 
for visitation.  See O'Dell v. 
O'Dell, 629 So. 2d 891, 891-92 (Fla.App. 1993); 
Sandor v. Sandor, 444 So. 2d 1029, 1030 (Fla.App. 1984); 
Lihs by Lihs v. Lihs, 504 N.W.2d 890, 893 (Iowa 1993); 
Ken R. on Behalf of C.R. v. Arthur Z., 438 Pa.Super. 114, 651 A.2d 1119, 
1120-21 (1994), aff'd, 546 Pa. 49, 682 A.2d 1267 (1996); 
and Weber v. Weber, 362 Pa.Super. 262, 524 A.2d 498, 499 
(1987).  One author referred to this principle as 
the "no statuteno standingno right to visitation" rule.4  Joel V. Williams, Comment, Sibling 
Rights to Visitation: A Relationship Too Valuable to Be Denied, 27 U. Tol. 
L. Rev. 259, 287 (1995).  Neither Bisiar nor J.B. is J.S.'s biological 
or adoptive parent, grandparent, or primary caregiver; therefore, neither falls 
into a class of persons having standing to request visitation.

 
      
         
           

[¶13]   In addition to the lack of 
statutory standing, we note that the common law also prohibits Bisiar and J.B.'s 
action for visitation.  Under the 
common law, courts "deferred to the right of the parents to make decisions 
regarding their children's associations . . .."  Michael, 900 P.2d  at 
1146.  The common law is adopted in Wyoming by 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 8-1-101 (LexisNexis 2003).  We have held that legislation must 
contain clear and concise language before common law rights may be taken 
away.  Markle v. 
Williamson, 518 P.2d 621, 624 (Wyo. 1974), superseded by statute on other grounds by 
Cottonwood Steel Corp. v. Hansen, 
655 P.2d 1226 (Wyo. 1982) and Mills v. Reynolds, 807 P.2d 383 (Wyo. 
1991); 
McKinney v. McKinney, 
59 Wyo. 204, 135 P.2d 940, 942 (1943).  In that regard, the legislature has 
specifically abrogated the common law by granting to only two classes of persons 
other than parentsgrandparents and primary caregiversstanding to bring actions 
for visitation.  Michael, 900 P.2d  at 1146.  The legislature has not extended that 
right to other relatives, stepparents, boyfriends, or siblings.  Such a change to the common law is a 
policy matter best left to the legislature.5  Merrill v. Jansma, 2004 WY 26, ¶ 
26, 86 P.3d 270, 281 (Wyo. 2004); 
Sare v. Stetz, 67 Wyo. 55, 214 P.2d 486, 494 (1950).

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶14]   A parent's right to associate with 
and make decisions concerning the care, custody and control of his or her 
children is a fundamental right protected by the Wyoming and United States 
Constitutions.  The Wyoming 
legislature has created only two exceptions, other than in juvenile court 
matters, where non-parents may be granted visitation with children.  Those exceptions are for grandparents 
and primary caregivers.  Because Bisiar and 
J.B. fall into neither of these categories, they did not have standing to bring 
an action to set aside the district court's custody order or to request that 
they be awarded visitation.

 
 
             
              
      

[¶15]   Affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-5-102(a) (LexisNexis 2003) 
provides:

 
     
  

(a)        The 
general purposes of this act are:

            
(i)         
To avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with courts of other 
states in matters of child custody which have in the past resulted in the 
shifting of children from state to state with harmful effects on their 
well-being;

            
(ii)         
To promote cooperation with the courts of other states to the end that a 
custody decree is rendered in that state which can best decide the case in the 
interest of the child;

            
(iii)        To 
assure that litigation concerning the custody of a child take place ordinarily 
in the state with which the child and his family have the closest connection and 
where significant evidence concerning his care, protection, training and 
personal relationships is most readily available, and that courts of this state 
decline the exercise of jurisdiction when the child and his family have a closer 
connection with another state;

            
(iv)        To 
discourage continuing controversies over child custody in the interest of 
greater stability of home environment and of secure family relationships for the 
child;

            
(v)         
To deter abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken 
to obtain custody awards;

            
(vi)        To 
avoid relitigation of custody decisions of other states in this state insofar as 
feasible;

            
(vii)       
To facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other 
states;

            
(viii)       
To promote and expand the exchange of information and other forms of 
mutual assistance between the courts of this state and those of other states 
concerned with the same child; and

            
(ix)        To make 
uniform the law of those states which enact it.

 
 
         

  2Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-7-101 states:

 
     

            
(a)        A 
grandparent may bring an original action against any person having custody of 
the grandparent's minor grandchild to establish reasonable visitation rights to 
the child.  If the court finds, 
after a hearing, that visitation would be in the best interest of the child and 
that the rights of the child's parents are not substantially impaired, the court 
shall grant reasonable visitation rights to the grandparent.  In any action under this section for 
which the court appoints a guardian ad litem, the grandparent shall be 
responsible for all fees and expenses associated with the 
appointment.

            
. . .

            
(c)        No 
action to establish visitation rights may be brought by a grandparent under 
subsection (a) of this section if the minor grandchild has been adopted and 
neither adopting parent is a natural parent of the child.

            
(d)        In any 
action or proceeding in which visitation rights have been granted to a 
grandparent under this section, the court may for good cause upon petition of 
the person having custody or who is the guardian of the child, revoke or amend 
the visitation rights granted to the grandparent.

 
 
             
             
               
      

  3Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-7-102 states:

 
     

            
(a)        With 
notice or reasonable efforts to provide notice to the noncustodial parent, a 
person may bring an original action against any person having custody of the 
child to establish reasonable visitation rights to the child if the person 
bringing the original action has been the primary caregiver for the child for a 
period of not less than six (6) months within the previous eighteen (18) 
months.  If the court finds, after a 
hearing, that visitation would be in the best interest of the child and that the 
rights of the child's parents are not substantially impaired, the court shall 
grant reasonable visitation rights to the primary caregiver.  In any action under this section for 
which the court appoints a guardian ad litem, the person bringing the original 
action under this section shall be responsible for all fees and expenses 
associated with the appointment.

            
(b)        No 
action to establish visitation rights under subsection (a) of this section may 
be brought by a person related to the child by blood or by a person acting as 
primary caregiver for the child prior to the adoption of the minor child when 
neither adopting parent is related by blood to the child.

            
(c)        In any 
action or proceeding in which visitation rights have been granted to a primary 
caregiver under this section, the court may for good cause upon petition of the 
person having custody or who is the guardian of the child, revoke or amend the 
visitation rights granted to the primary caregiver.

 
 
             
             
               
        

  4At least one court has avoided this 
rule by invoking the doctrine of "inherent equitable jurisdiction, whereby it 
hears a sibling's petition even though it has no statutory authority to do 
so."  Joel V. Williams, Comment, 
Sibling Rights to Visitation:  A 
Relationship Too Valuable to Be Denied, 27 U. Tol. L. Rev. 259, 277 
(1995).  
See, e.g., L. v. G., 203 N.J. Super. 385, 497 A.2d 215 
(1985).  Although the court in L., 497 A.2d  at 222, recognized that the siblings had no statutory standing to 
seek relief, it heard the case because it believed that siblings possessed the 
"natural, inherent and inalienable right to visit with each other."

 
 
             
            
      

5A 
2001 article reported that "[f]ive states have statutes explicitly giving 
siblings standing to petition the court for visitation.'"  William Wesley Patton, The Status of 
Siblings' Rights: A View Into the New Millennium, 51 DePaul L. Rev. 1, 4 
(2001) (quoting  Ellen Marrus, "Where Have You 
Been, Fran?"  The Right of Siblings 
to Seek Court Access to Override Parental Denial of Visitation, 66 Tenn. L. 
Rev. 977, 1013 (1999)).