Case Title: MMOE v. MJE

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-91-12

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-11-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
MMOE v. MJE1992 WY 148841 P.2d 820Case Number: C-91-12Decided: 11/13/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
MMOE, a/k/a 
PO, Appellant (Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
MJE, 
Appellee (Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal from 
District Court, CampbellCounty, Gary P. Hartman, 
J.

 
 
John M. 
Daly and Wendy M. Martin, Gillette, for 
appellant.

 
 
Michael A. 
Maycock of Maycock Law Offices, P.C., Gillette, for appellee.

 
 
Jack 
Sundquist, Gillette, Guardian Ad 
Litem.

 
 
Before MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, 
URBIGKIT* and GOLDEN, 
JJ.

 
 

* Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument

 
 

MACY, Chief 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Appellant MMOE (the 
mother) appeals from the trial court's denial of her petition for custody of her 
son due to alleged sexual abuse by Appellee MJE (the father). The lower court 
found that sufficient evidence did not exist to support the mother's allegations 
of sexual abuse and ordered that custody of the son remain in the father with 
supervised visitation rights in the mother.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

 
 

[¶3.]     The mother presents the 
following issues for our consideration:

 
 
     I. The District Court 
erred in its application of WRE 706.

 
 
(a) The 
Court failed to enter an order to show cause why an expert should not be 
appointed.

 
 
(b) The 
Court failed to inform [the] expert of his duties in writing and to file in 
writing with the clerk or in the alternative to have [a] conference in which all 
parties had an opportunity to participate.

 
 
(c) The 
Court's expert failed to follow what written instructions were given by the 
Court Order.

 
 
(d) The 
Court's expert failed to advise the parties of his 
findings.

 
 
II. The 
District Court abused its discretion when it found that Dr. Ned Tranel, the 
court-appointed expert, was qualified to give[] an opinion as to whether the 
minor child . . . was sexually abused.

 
 
(a) Dr. 
Tranel did not possess scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge of 
child sexual abuse that could assist the trier [of] fact.

 
 
(b) Dr. 
Tranel did not possess the knowledge, skill, experience, training or education 
to be a qualified expert in the field of child sexual 
abuse.

 
 
(c) The 
facts and data relied upon by Dr. Tranel in making his conclusions were not of 
the kind reasonably relied upon by the experts in the field of child sexual 
abuse in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject.

 
 
III. The 
Court erred in failing to admit the depositions of the San Diego experts pursuant 
to Rule 32 W.R.C.P.

 
 

[¶4.]     The mother and the 
father married in 1982, and their son was born in January 1984. The parties were 
divorced pursuant to a divorce decree entered on October 16, 1985, and amended 
on November 17, 1985. The court awarded the primary custody of the son to the 
mother and extensive visitation rights to the father. In 1988, the mother 
petitioned the court to suspend or terminate the father's visitation rights 
because he allegedly sexually abused his son. The father denied the allegation 
and counterclaimed for custody of the son. Following a two-day trial, the court 
found that the mother's allegations of sexual abuse were "totally without 
merit." The court further found that the mother's refusal to accept the fact 
that her allegations were unfounded damaged the father's relationship with his 
son and warranted awarding custody of the son to the father. The court's order 
granted the same visitation schedule to the mother which the father previously 
enjoyed, including summer vacations. 

 
 

[¶5.]     The son spent the 
summer of 1990 with his mother but visited his father over the July 21-22 
weekend. Upon returning from his weekend visit, the son allegedly complained to 
his mother that he had been sexually abused by his father and paternal 
grandmother. In a graphic representation of the alleged abuse, the son drew a 
picture of his father sodomizing him and his paternal grandmother "putting [a] 
knife up [his cousin] Ryan's butt." On July 25th, the mother and her son flew to 
San Diego, California, where Amy Markin, a licensed clinical social 
worker, and Cynthia Kuelbs, M.D., interviewed and examined the son at the San 
Diego Children's Hospital and HealthCenter for possible sexual 
abuse.

 
 

[¶6.]     Following her return 
from San Diego, 
the mother obtained a temporary restraining order, prohibiting any further 
contact between the father and the son. The restraining order was supported by 
the mother's signed affidavit, as well as Amy Markin's unsigned affidavit. On 
August 14, 1990, the father moved to dissolve the temporary restraining order, 
in part, because Ms. Markin did not sign her affidavit and because Dr. Kuelbs 
did not submit an affidavit. The court held a hearing on the father's motion and 
allowed the restraining order to continue, subject to the conditions that the 
mother file a petition to modify the father's visitation rights and that she 
also produce Ms. Markin's and Dr. Kuelbs' signed affidavits by August 29th. The 
mother filed the motion to modify the father's visitation rights but failed to 
obtain the required signed affidavits. The mother's failure to obtain the 
affidavits prompted the court to lift the restraining order on August 
31st.

 
 

[¶7.]     On September 4, 1990, 
the mother again sought a temporary restraining order. Because of conflicting 
evidence concerning the alleged abuse, the court denied the mother's request for 
a temporary restraining order in a hearing held on September 17th. In that same 
hearing, the court directed that the son be placed in the temporary custody of 
the Department of Public Assistance and Social Services (n/k/a the Campbell 
County Department of Family Services); appointed a guardian ad litem for the 
son; and, of particular significance to this appeal, ordered both parties to 
undergo rehabilitative counseling with Ned Tranel, Ph.D., a clinical 
psychologist.

 
 

[¶8.]     In a subsequent 
hearing, both parties expressed concern over the lack of clarity in what duties 
the court expected Dr. Tranel to perform. The judge attempted to alleviate the 
confusion by stating:

 
 
[T]he 
child[] needs some counseling to try and straighten his life out and to get him 
on a track that leads to a healthy upbringing. The Court believes that that 
could best be accomplished by Doctor Ned Tranel. And I have had a lot of 
confidence in Doctor Ned Tranel. I think it goes without saying that before he 
can start the rehabilitative efforts that he is going to have to do some type of 
evaluation. And I guess I didn't clarify that enough. I thought counsel would 
understand that that was going to be part of the process. However, apparently, 
there is some confusion. I will see if I can't clarify that so that everybody 
knows where we are going.

 
 
     Doctor Tranel 
certainly would be able to do some evaluations on this child and I believe that 
he would do those in a controlled setting. And I will also ask that included in 
that be the interactional assessment.[1] And, also, I will allow counsel to 
submit to Doctor Tranel, before he starts his work on [the son], their 
suggestions or recommendations as to any type of testing that they would like to 
see done by Doctor Tranel on [the son].

 
 
Counsel for 
both parties, as well as the guardian ad litem, had the opportunity to seek 
additional clarification of Dr. Tranel's role. None of the parties present 
registered any objection to Dr. Tranel's role, nor did they request that the 
court limit his duties. 

 
 

[¶9.]     Dr. Tranel completed 
his report assessing the parties during the first week of February 1991. The 
report described the son's behavioral pattern as not being consistent with that 
of a sexually abused child and concluded that the son's parenting needs would be 
met most effectively through continued custody with his father. The trial 
commenced on February 19th and lasted for nineteen days spread out over a 
three-month period. In those nineteen days, the trial judge heard testimony from 
over fifty witnesses and examined over five hundred exhibits. After considering 
the voluminous testimony and exhibits, the trial judge found that the mother 
failed to prove that a substantial change in the circumstances occurred or that 
the father sexually abused his son.

 
 
I

 
 

[¶10.]  The mother's first contention is that the 
district court failed to comply with W.R.E. 706 when it appointed Dr. Tranel. 
W.R.E. 706(a) provides:

 
 
     (a) Appointment. - The court may on its own 
motion or on the motion of any party enter an order to show cause why expert 
witnesses should not be appointed, and may request the parties to submit 
nominations. The court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the 
parties, and may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection. An expert 
witness shall not be appointed by the court unless he consents to act. A witness 
so appointed shall be informed of his duties by the court in writing, a copy of 
which shall be filed with the clerk, or at a conference in which the parties 
shall have opportunity to participate. A witness so appointed shall advise the 
parties of his findings, if any; his deposition may be taken by any party; and 
he may be called to testify by the court or any party. He shall be subject to 
cross-examination by each party, including a party calling him as a 
witness.

 
 
The mother 
views the lower court's appointment of Dr. Tranel as violating almost every 
procedural requirement contained in W.R.E. 706. Specifically, the mother claims 
that the court failed to enter an order to show cause and failed to inform Dr. 
Tranel of his duties in writing or at a conference in which the parties would 
have had an opportunity to participate; that, once appointed, Dr. Tranel failed 
to follow the court's limited instructions; and that the doctor failed to advise 
the parties of his findings.

 
 

[¶11.]  As a threshold matter, it is not entirely 
clear whether W.R.E. 706 even applies to this case. Apparently, the trial judge 
determined in a September 17, 1990, hearing that Dr. Tranel should provide some 
assistance in this case. The record does not contain a transcript of that 
hearing, but the court's order stemming from that hearing required both parties 
to make arrangements for rehabilitative counseling with Dr. Tranel and to follow 
his recommendations. Thus, it would appear that initially Dr. Tranel's role was 
merely that of a counselor, not a court-appointed expert. However, as discussed 
above, the court later clarified its intention to have Dr. Tranel evaluate and 
perform psychological testing on the son. The court's clarification of Dr. 
Tranel's intended role leads us to believe that the doctor was a court-appointed 
expert as contemplated by W.R.E. 706. Consequently, we must consider whether the 
trial court complied with W.R.E. 706 and whether any failure to comply was 
sufficiently prejudicial to constitute reversible error.

 
 

[¶12.]  The mother's first claim is that W.R.E. 
706(a) required the district court to enter an order to show cause why Dr. 
Tranel should not be appointed and that no such order was entered. By requiring 
an order to show cause to be entered, W.R.E. 706(a) clearly contemplates that 
the parties shall be afforded an opportunity to object to court-appointed 
experts. 3 DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER 
B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 405 (1979). The lower court did not enter an 
order to show cause in this case. However, the court did provide both parties, 
as well as the guardian ad litem, with the same opportunity to object to Dr. 
Tranel's appointment that a show-cause order would have provided. At the October 
11, 1990, hearing, both parties expressed concern over the scope of Dr. Tranel's 
role, and the judge clarified the role he intended Dr. Tranel to perform. The 
mother failed to object to Dr. Tranel's proposed role.

 
 

[¶13.]  It is not certain whether the mother's 
failure to initially object to Dr. Tranel's appointment constituted a waiver of 
any future objection. In any event, even if we assume that the mother made a 
valid objection, the court's failure to enter an order to show cause was 
harmless error. W.R.A.P. 7.04 (now W.R.A.P. 9.04). As the appellant, the mother 
has the burden of proving that the failure to enter an order to show cause was 
so prejudicial as to warrant a reversal. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Division v. Taffner, 821 P.2d 103, 107 (Wyo. 1991) (citing Spilman v. State, 633 P.2d 183 
(Wyo. 1981)). 
The only prejudice cited by the mother pertaining to the lack of a show-cause 
order was her inability to demonstrate why Dr. Tranel should not have been 
appointed. If the mother had been denied such an opportunity, we would agree. 
However, the October 11th hearing provided her with ample opportunity to object. 
We are unable to discern any prejudice to the mother caused by the court's 
failure to enter a show-cause order, much less sufficient prejudice to warrant a 
reversal. Although a surprisingly scarce number of opinions discuss the 
ramifications of a court's failure to comply with the procedural requirements of 
W.R.E. 706(a), we note that at least one other court which has considered the 
issue has been flexible in requiring a show-cause order. Swilling v. Swilling, 
329 N.C. 219, 404 S.E.2d 837 (1991). See also United States v. 
Weathers, 618 F.2d 663, 664 n. 1 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956, 100 S. Ct. 2927, 64 L. Ed. 2d 814 (1980).

 
 

[¶14.]  The mother next contends that the court 
failed to inform Dr. Tranel of his duties in writing and to file the writing 
with the clerk or, in the alternative, to have a conference at which all parties 
would have an opportunity to participate. We disagree. In two separate orders, 
filed with the clerk, the judge explained Dr. Tranel's role. The first order 
required the parties to undergo rehabilitative counseling with Dr. Tranel and to 
follow his recommendations. The second order was entered after the court 
clarified Dr. Tranel's role in the October 11, 1990, hearing and authorized Dr. 
Tranel to do evaluations, including interactional assessments in a controlled 
setting. The order also allowed the parties' attorneys to recommend tests for 
Dr. Tranel to perform on the son. In our view, the instructions contained in the 
court's order satisfy W.R.E. 706(a). The instructions were in writing and were 
filed with the clerk. It is evident from the transcript of the October 11th 
hearing that Dr. Tranel understood that the court's order would limit his 
duties.

 
 
     [MOTHER'S COUNSEL]: 
Judge, my conversation with Doctor Tranel, I want to disclose that he indicated 
what he was going to do was evaluate - his plan, at least pending the order of 
the Court today, was to essentially assess everybody in a cold fashion without 
looking at all the prior documentation and then he would request the 
documentation, the tapes and the like as he went along. That indicated, what he 
indicated the plan unless the Court otherwise ordered, was his 
plan.

 
 

[¶15.]  To the extent the court's order 
constituted written instructions, the mother claims that Dr. Tranel went beyond 
the scope of those instructions by diagnosing the mother and the father and 
expressing his opinion that their son had not been sexually abused. We have 
difficulty perceiving how Dr. Tranel could make an informed evaluation of the 
son unless he also assessed the parents and made some conclusion regarding the 
existence of sexual abuse. The son's well-being, the mental state of his 
parents, and the possibility of sexual abuse are all inextricably intertwined. 
Admittedly, Dr. Tranel's written instructions were not a paradigm of precision 
and were less explicit than those seen in some other decisions. See, e.g., 
Leesona Corporation v. Varta Batteries, Inc., 522 F. Supp. 1304, 1311 n. 17 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981). Nevertheless, we do not think that Dr. Tranel exceeded the 
scope of his instructions by diagnosing the parents or concluding that the son 
had not been sexually abused.

 
 

[¶16.]  In a related argument, the mother claims 
that Dr. Tranel failed to disclose his findings in a timely manner and, 
specifically, that he did not reveal in either his deposition or report that he 
made psychological diagnoses of the parties. Dr. Tranel explained that, in his 
report, he attempted to be conciliatory and to expedite a settlement concerning 
custody of the son. Dr. Tranel thought that attaching a psychological label to 
the parents would carry negative connotations and could possible impede a 
resolution. Consequently, he did not include his psychological diagnoses of the 
mother and the father in his report. Regarding the deposition, Dr. Tranel did 
not think the mother's attorney asked him whether he made psychological 
diagnoses of the parties, and he felt no duty to volunteer such information. At 
trial, the mother claimed surprise when Dr. Tranel testified concerning his 
diagnoses of the parties. The trial court solved the problem by granting an 
opportunity to the mother's counsel to redepose Dr. Tranel before 
cross-examining him. Any prejudice to the mother caused by Dr. Tranel's failure 
to initially disclose his diagnoses was cured by the court's allowing her to 
depose him a second time.

 
 
II

 
 

[¶17.]  As her second issue, the mother argues 
that the trial court abused its discretion when it found that Dr. Tranel was 
qualified to give an opinion on whether the son had been sexually abused. W.R.E. 
702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony:

 
 
     If scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.

 
 
On appeal, 
we will not disturb the lower court's determination unless it is clearly and 
prejudicially erroneous or is an abuse of discretion. Montoya v. State, 822 P.2d 363, 366 (Wyo. 1991); Caterpillar Tractor 
Company v. Donahue, 674 P.2d 1276, 1286 (Wyo. 1983). To demonstrate that an abuse of 
discretion exists, the mother must show that the lower court unreasonably 
determined that Dr. Tranel was a qualified expert. Montoya, 822 P.2d  at 366 
(citing Noetzelmann v. State, 721 P.2d 579 (Wyo. 1986)).

 
 

[¶18.]  The record discloses that Dr. Tranel 
obtained his Ph.D. from WashingtonStateUniversity in 1960. His first position was 
a joint appointment as an assistant professor at the University of South Dakota and the director of a child 
guidance clinic. From 1963 to 1972, he held various positions in the field of 
psychology, including appointments at the NorthernWyomingMentalHealthCenter and the EasternMontanaMentalHealthCenter. Since 1972, Dr. 
Tranel has been in private practice and involved with the ChildStudyCenter in Billings, Montana. In his private practice, Dr. Tranel 
receives requests from regional agencies, such as the Department of Family 
Services, and the school systems to assess children for possible sexual abuse. 
By his own calculations, Dr. Tranel has assessed well over a thousand children 
for sexual abuse. He testifies in court approximately once a month concerning 
allegations of child sexual abuse and has previously testified between ten and 
twenty times in Wyoming courts as an expert in the field of 
child sexual abuse. In light of the foregoing, we are persuaded that the trial 
court acted reasonably in concluding that Dr. Tranel was qualified as an expert 
in the field of child sexual abuse.

 
 

[¶19.]  The mother argues not only that Dr. 
Tranel was not qualified but also that he relied upon facts and data in reaching 
his opinion which were not of the kind reasonably relied upon by experts in the 
field of child sexual abuse as required by W.R.E. 703. W.R.E. 703 
provides:

 
 
     The facts or data in 
the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be 
those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type 
reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or 
inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in 
evidence.

 
 
Among the 
information which Dr. Tranel relied upon to form his opinion were psychological 
tests which he conducted on the son, assessments of the son interacting with his 
immediate family, and a large number of reports and data compiled by other 
professionals involved in the case. The mother primarily objects to Dr. Tranel's 
inappropriate use of the interactional assessment as a means of determining 
whether sexual abuse had occurred and his failure to properly score the 
psychological tests.

 
 

[¶20.]  We acknowledge the mother's right to 
attack Dr. Tranel's methods as being inappropriate; however, her reliance upon 
W.R.E. 703 is misplaced. W.R.E. 703 only requires the expert to base his opinion 
on information reasonably relied upon by experts in the field when the 
information would be inadmissible as evidence. The second sentence of W.R.E. 703 
does not apply to admissible evidence. Richard Neumeg, Annotation, What 
Information Is of Type "Reasonably Relied Upon by Experts" Within Rule 703, 
Federal Rules of Evidence, Permitting Expert Opinion Based on Information Not 
Admissible in Evidence, 49 A.L.R.Fed. 363, 367 (1980); Christophersen v. 
Allied-Signal Corporation, 939 F.2d 1106, 1110 n. 4 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S. Ct. 1280, 117 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1992). Of the information relied upon by Dr. Tranel, only the reports and 
information gathered by others would possibly be inadmissible as hearsay. The 
psychological tests and interactional assessments, both conducted by Dr. Tranel, 
were admissible evidence and thus not subject to W.R.E. 703's second 
sentence.

 
 

[¶21.]  Although W.R.E. 703 is an inappropriate 
mechanism for the mother to utilize to attack Dr. Tranel's use of interactional 
assessments and his failure to properly score the psychological tests, the 
mother obviously had other avenues in which to attack the reasonableness of Dr. 
Tranel's opinion. We said in Reed v. Hunter, 663 P.2d 513, 517-18 (Wyo. 1983) (emphasis 
added):

 
 
[T]he 
purpose of the identical counterparts in the Federal Rules of Evidence was not 
to provide for blanket admissibility of expert opinion testimony. The trial 
court remains vested with discretion in deciding whether to exclude such 
testimony because it is deemed unnecessary or not helpful to the trier of the 
factual issues in reaching an independent conclusion as to the facts. The 
adequacy of any foundation for such opinion testimony is subject to scrutiny 
through cross-examination.

 
 
See also 
Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361 (Wyo. 1986).

 
 

[¶22.]  The trial court in this case allowed the 
mother's attorney to redepose Dr. Tranel before cross-examining him because Dr. 
Tranel had not provided all the pertinent information in his first deposition. 
After he redeposed Dr. Tranel, the mother's counsel was allowed to exhaustively 
cross-examine him concerning the reasons for his opinion, including the facts 
and other matters upon which he based his opinion. The mother's expert witnesses 
also testified about Dr. Tranel's improper test scoring techniques and the 
dangers of using the interactional assessment as a mechanism to detect the 
presence of sexual abuse. The weight and probative values to be accorded to Dr. 
Tranel's opinion were matters for the trier of fact. Mealey v. City of Laramie, 472 P.2d 787, 793 (Wyo. 1970), appeal after remand, 485 P.2d 1019, appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 931, 92 S. Ct. 282, 30 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1971). As 
the trier of fact, the judge would be free to disregard Dr. Tranel's opinion if 
he found it were unreasonable or had inadequate factual support. Krause v. State 
ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 
803 P.2d 81, 83 (Wyo. 1990). Essentially, the existence of 
sexual abuse and the method of determining whether the son had been sexually 
abused became a battle between experts, and the trier of fact simply found that 
Dr. Tranel's testimony was more convincing. 

 
 
III

 
 

[¶23.]  In her final issue, the mother asserts 
that the district court erred by not admitting the depositions of Ms. Markin and 
Dr. Kuelbs. As mentioned earlier, Ms. Markin and Dr. Kuelbs interviewed and 
examined the son in San 
Diego for possible sexual abuse. Both Dr. Kuelbs and Ms. 
Markin prepared written reports of their findings, and Ms. Markin also 
videotaped her interviews with the son. Relying upon information obtained by Ms. 
Markin and Dr. Kuelbs, the mother procured a temporary restraining order against 
the father. In an effort to acquire information to be used to dissolve the 
temporary restraining order, the father's attorney deposed both experts. He 
fully deposed Ms. Markin but, before he finished deposing Dr. Kuelbs, the court 
lifted its temporary restraining order against the father. Since the objective 
of deposing the San 
Diego experts had been accomplished, i.e., the temporary 
restraining order was dissolved, the father's counsel did not depose Dr. Kuelbs 
any further. To protect the parties' confidentiality, a California court entered 
an order which required the deposition transcripts to remain under seal and 
prohibited them from becoming part of the court record. This order was later 
amended to keep the depositions under seal if they were placed in public records 
and did not prevent the depositions from becoming part of the 
record.

 
 

[¶24.]  The mother's counsel subsequently 
attempted to have Ms. Markin and Dr. Kuelbs testify at trial, but neither of 
them was willing to come to Wyoming to testify. Her counsel then requested 
the California 
court, through letters rogatory, to direct the experts to give trial testimony 
via teleconference. The California court denied this request. As a 
substitute for live testimony, the mother offered into evidence Ms. Markin's and 
Dr. Kuelbs' depositions, reports, and videotape. The father objected to 
admission of the depositions because they were incomplete and he would have no 
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. In his ruling, the trial judge 
said:

 
 
     Well, I guess in this 
case I am inclined to agree with [the father's counsel], since that deposition 
was not completed for whatever purpose out there, there is no way that the 
person can be cross-examined. And given the ruling by the Court in California, I am going to 
not allow the use of the Markin or Kuelbs depositions in 
court.

 
 
The court 
admitted the reports and videotape into evidence.

 
 

[¶25.]  On appeal, the mother claims that the 
trial court's failure to admit the depositions was contrary to W.R.C.P. 
32(a)(3)(B) and (D)2, which 
provided:

 
 
     (a) Use of depositions. - At the trial or 
upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of 
a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of evidence applied as though 
the witness were then present and testifying, may be used against any party who 
was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had reasonable 
notice thereof, in accordance with any of the following 
provisions:

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
(3) The 
deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for 
any purpose if the court finds: . . . (B) that the witness is absent from the 
county where the trial or hearing is held, unless it appears that the absence of 
the witness was procured by the party offering the deposition; or . . . (D) that 
the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of 
the witness by subpoena. . . .

 
 

[¶26.]  Although the circumstances of this case 
comported with W.R.C.P. 32(a)(3)(B) and (D), the trial court was not required to 
automatically admit the San 
Diego experts' deposition testimony. Rulings on the 
admission of evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial court. L.U. 
Sheep Company v. Board of County Commissioners of County of Hot Springs, 790 P.2d 663, 673 (Wyo. 1990). That rule is no less applicable to the admission of 
depositions. Waggoner v. General Motors Corporation, 771 P.2d 1195 (Wyo. 1989); Reilly v. Reilly, 671 P.2d 330 (Wyo. 
1983).

 
 

[¶27.]  The court had a twofold rationale for 
denying admission of the San 
Diego experts' depositions. First, it was concerned with 
the California 
court's order limiting the depositions' use, and, second, the father had not 
fully deposed the witnesses and could not cross-examine them at trial. We 
appreciate the court's concern for the father's right to cross-examine the 
witnesses; however, that was not a sufficient reason to deny admission in this 
case. The father's claim that he did not finish deposing the witnesses applied 
only to Dr. Kuelbs' deposition, not to Ms. Markin's deposition. More 
importantly, the father could have completed Dr. Kuelbs' deposition if he had 
chosen to do so. This was not a situation where the deponent died during the 
deposition, leaving a party with no adequate opportunity to cross-examine. See 8 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
2146 (1970). The father maintains that his failure to complete the depositions 
was justified because they were taken to dissolve the temporary restraining 
order, not in anticipation of the custody trial. Nevertheless, the father should 
have realized that the depositions might be used in the ensuing custody 
litigation. The depositions were taken at the end of August, more than a week 
after the mother filed her petition to terminate the father's visitation 
rights.

 
 

[¶28.]  In addition to the father's right to 
cross-examine, the court was also concerned with the California court's order 
restricting the depositions' use. The California court's order, as amended, limited the 
depositions' use to the CampbellCounty proceeding and required that the 
depositions would be sealed if they were placed in public records. We cannot 
find anything in the California court's order 
to prevent a Wyoming court from admitting the deposition 
testimony into evidence.

 
 

[¶29.]  Although we do not think either of the 
court's proffered reasons for denying admission of the depositions was correct, 
the error was harmless. The mother claims that, without the deposition 
testimony, the finder of fact could ignore and not fully understand the logical 
reasoning and impact of both reports' findings. Specifically, she argues that 
(1) Dr. Kuelbs' deposition could have clarified confusion over whether pictures 
taken of the son's rectum while he was in San Diego and later introduced at 
trial were originals or duplicates; (2) Dr. Kuelbs' deposition could have 
explained the term "venous congestion" as used in her report and why it was 
significant; and (3) Ms. Markin's deposition could have helped rebut the 
father's allegation that the mother coached her son regarding his responses and 
body language in the videotape.

 
 

[¶30.]  We address the mother's claims in order. 
First, it is not apparent how Dr. Kuelbs' deposition testimony was necessary to 
clarify which pictures were used at trial or how the mother was prejudiced. At 
trial, the father's witness who rebutted Dr. Kuelbs' conclusions testified that 
he relied upon the original photographs to form his opinion and that he used the 
duplicates introduced at trial only to refresh his memory. As to the mother's 
second claim, two doctors explained that "venous congestion" is anything in the 
rectal area which impedes venous flow to the heart. Both doctors explained that 
venous congestion may result from sexual abuse as well as from other less 
insidious origins. Thus, the trier of fact was certainly made aware that Dr. 
Kuelbs' finding of venous congestion in the son could signify sexual abuse. 
Finally, two experts for the mother testified regarding Ms. Markin's interview 
with the son. One of those experts explained that, in his opinion, Ms. Markin's 
interview did not reveal any significant evidence of maternal coaching or 
indoctrination. We do not think the lack of one more witness on possible 
maternal coaching prejudiced the mother.

 
 

[¶31.]  To conclude, this was a highly emotional, 
complex trial with sufficient credible evidence to support a decision in favor 
of either party. Our role in reviewing this case was to address the legal issues 
raised by the mother, not to draw our own conclusions from a cold record 
regarding the existence of abuse. No trial is perfect, and, as the mother has 
pointed out, this trial was no exception. However, after nineteen days of trial, 
over fifty witnesses, and over five hundred exhibits, the trial court should be 
commended for the manner in which it conducted the trial. Of the procedural 
errors which were committed, none was sufficiently egregious to warrant 
reversal.

 
 

[¶32.]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 A method 
in which the therapist places the child and the alleged perpetrator in the same 
room and evaluates their interactions.

 
 

2 Revised 
effective March 24, 1992.

 
 

URBIGKIT, J., files 
a dissenting opinion.

 
 

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

 
 

[¶33.]  I do not agree with either the legal 
decision or the factual resolution provided in this court's decision. In this 
contended child abuse saga, I find the risk of misconduct against the small 
child to totally outweigh parental claims based on the kind of evidence provided 
here.

 
 

[¶34.]  I would conclude that the Billings, Montana forensic expert was clearly 
unqualified to provide the character of evidence sufficient to resolve contested 
custody for retention by the father. Although this court should not embark on a 
weighing process of trial evidence, the validity and value for significant 
decision making in what the forensic expert provided in testimony is surely in 
question. No realistic view of the evidence can be obtained that the expert 
either had a relevant knowledgeable basis to use asserted normality to prove 
that sexual abuse of the child had not occurred or, unfortunately, that it will 
not conceivably occur or reoccur in the future. We are faced with the compelling 
concern of modern litigation, questioning that when a claimed expert says 
something, his statement does not necessarily make it factually valid. This is 
particularly true if a relevant factual basis and some determined reliable 
scientific theory is absent. Cf. Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036 (Wyo. 
1987).

 
 

[¶35.]  The cottage or corporate affiliate 
industry is developing as an appendage to the American trial system in both 
criminal and civil cases. This is the forensic expert who provides testimony 
directed to reduce the burden of fact finder decision making. If the expert is 
truly qualified, the subject is proper, the conclusions adequately confined, and 
the testimony factually valid and properly based on requisite standards of 
analysis, there is nothing wrong with the system. If any criteria fails, justice 
may be overlooked or lost.

 
 

[¶36.]  In Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60 
(Wyo. 1989), this court corrected the mistake 
we made in admission of a child abuse expert's opinion in Brown v. State, 736 P.2d 1110 (Wyo. 1987), Urbigkit, J., dissenting. 
Unfortunately, this present case now anticipates a return to the Brown expert 
witness of guilt or, here, non-guilt of one and guilt of the other. See Smith v. 
State, 564 P.2d 1194 (Wyo. 1977). Unfortunately here, we have a 
converse which is even more troubling. This expert asserts absence of abuse by 
normality under a circumstance where the child has not seen normality for at 
least two years prior to the date of the clinical consideration. The decision is 
made without application of any objective standard used to define what, in 
conduct, demonstrates that abuse has occurred or, conversely, why something must 
be shown or otherwise abuse is disproved. This testimony essentially 
establishes, as his view, that the mother was guilty and the father was innocent 
because, as a neuro-psychological specialist, he found no behavior or pattern 
consistent with abuse. The real question, in conflict, is whether asserted 
normality necessarily denies occurrence in converse analysis where observed 
abnormality may demonstrate objective facts. The testimony given was as 
subjective as is possible for testimony to be. Price v. State, 807 P.2d 909 
(Wyo. 1991). 
Cf. Zabel v. State, 765 P.2d 357 (Wyo. 1988).

 
 

[¶37.]  In this case, with other comprehensive 
evidence available, I do not find the Billings forensic expert qualified to give the 
valid opinion evidence justifying custodial retention of the child by his 
father. Likewise, I find the expert's conclusions supported by nothing but rank 
supposition, Stephens, 774 P.2d 60, totally different from the more qualified 
consideration which had been given by others certainly more balanced and 
qualified by experience and demonstrated by objective standard testimony. What 
is provided here approaches the unsatisfactory level of testimony we considered 
in Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724 (Wyo. 1986).

 
 

[¶38.]  Furthermore, there is nothing about the 
rejection of the deposition taken by the California experts which justifies exclusion 
except, unfortunately, a result that, when a child's well-being is at stake, the 
evidence is limited to a one-sided view. Admission of valid, persuasive and 
definitive evidence by a party is intrinsic to the constitutional right to 
justice and not confined by happenstance discretion. Stauffer Chemical Co. v. 
Curry, 778 P.2d 1083 (Wyo. 1989); Kobos By and 
Through Kobos v. Everts, 768 P.2d 534 (Wyo. 1989).

 
 
A party 
should be allowed an appropriate opportunity to present and develop that 
evidence relevant to that party's theory of the case. Such evidence certainly 
can include the offering, direct examination, and cross-examination of expert 
witnesses, under appropriate circumstances, assuming that the testimony of the 
experts will properly assist the trier of fact.

 
 
Stauffer 
Chemical Co., 778 P.2d  at 1098. See also Hall v. Hall, 708 P.2d 416 (Wyo. 
1985).

 
 

[¶39.]  Under no circumstance was the evidence 
cumulative where directly relating to the contradictory "expert" conclusion 
rendered by the Billings forensic expert witness. Technical 
concepts to exclude relevant evidence like discretion and harmless error hardly 
suffice in an expert witness-driven decision like this. Coronado Oil Co. v. Grieves, 642 P.2d 423 (Wyo. 1982). This should 
be particularly true where the safety and well-being of a small child is 
involved.

 
 

[¶40.]  This case has provided no evidence that 
the mother is unqualified to have general custody. The only basis now used for 
denial is her consuming belief and consequent litigative assertions that the 
father is a sexual abuser. When we expend technical rules to permit the alleged 
expert to say what he did and confine evidence in contradiction tendered by the 
mother, a terribly fundamental question remains: What if the mother is 
right?

 
 

[¶41.]  I respectfully 
dissent.