Case Title: State v. Cox

Citation: 

Docket Number: S49495

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2003-12-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed: December 31, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent on Review,
    v.
KEVIN ANTHONY COX,
Petitioner on Review.
(CC 98C43653; CA A104550; SC S49495)
    On review from the Court of Appeals.*
    Argued and submitted September 9, 2003.
    Irene B. Taylor, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.  With her on
the brief was David E. Groom.
    Laura S. Anderson, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With her
on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
    Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham, Riggs,
De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.**
    RIGGS, J.
    The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
circuit court judgment of conviction and sentence on count two is
reversed.
    *Appeal from Marion County Circuit Court, Jamese L. Rhoades, Judge. 178 Or App 426, 37 P3d 193 (2001).
    **Kistler, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
         RIGGS, J.
         Defendant was charged in separate indictments in
Multnomah County and Marion County with aggravated theft in the
first degree, ORS 164.057, for the theft of over $10,000 worth of
aluminum.  Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated
theft "by receiving" on the Multnomah County indictment. 
Approximately five months later, the Marion County Circuit Court
denied defendant's motion to dismiss the count of the Marion
County indictment alleging aggravated theft of the aluminum. 
Following trial, a jury convicted defendant on that count.  
         Defendant appealed his Marion County conviction for
aggravated theft of the aluminum. (1)  He argued that the
second prosecution violated his right not to be placed in
jeopardy twice for the same offense under Article I, section 12,
of the Oregon Constitution. (2)  The Court of Appeals affirmed. 
State v. Cox, 178 Or App 426, 37 P3d 193 (2001).  We allowed
defendant's petition for review, and, for the reasons set out
below, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and
reverse in part the judgment of the trial court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
         We take the following facts from the Court of Appeals
opinion and the record.  Sometime during the night of February 15
and the early morning of February 16, 1998, defendant stole over
20,000 pounds of aluminum from Microwave Tower Service in Marion
County.  Later in the day on February 16, defendant contacted
Metro Metals, Inc., a Portland scrap metal dealer, for the
purpose of loading and transporting the aluminum to Portland.  On
February 17 in Marion County, defendant and an accomplice helped
a Metro Metals truck driver load the aluminum onto the driver's
truck and followed the driver to Portland.  Suspicious about the
origin of the aluminum, the driver alerted other Metro Metals
employees to the possibility that the aluminum was stolen.  Those
employees contacted the police, who subsequently arrested
defendant and his accomplice. 
         On February 25, 1998, defendant was indicted in
Multnomah County for, inter alia, a violation of ORS
164.057. (3)  Count One of the indictment was entitled
"Aggravated Theft in the First Degree by Receiving" and alleged
that, "on or about February 17, 1998, in the County of Multnomah,
State of Oregon, [defendants] did unlawfully and knowingly commit
theft of aluminum, of the total value of $10,000 or more, the
property of MICROWAVE TOWER SERVICE[.]"  On April 16, 1998,
defendant pleaded guilty to that count of the indictment. 
         On April 6, 1998, after the issuance of the Multnomah
County indictment but before defendant's guilty plea, defendant
was indicted in Marion County on two counts of aggravated theft
and one count of criminal mischief.  Entitled simply "Aggravated
Theft," the second count of the Marion County indictment also
cited ORS 164.057 and alleged that "the defendants on or between
02/16/98 and 02/17/98, in Marion County, Oregon, did then and
there unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly commit theft of
aluminum metal pipes and beams, of the total value of Ten
Thousand Dollars or more, the property of Microwave Tower
Service."  
         Defendant moved to dismiss the second count of the
Marion County indictment, arguing that a second prosecution for
aggravated theft of the aluminum violated the former jeopardy
provision of Article I, section 12.  The trial court denied that
motion.  In September 1998, a Marion County jury convicted
defendant on all counts, including the second count of aggravated
theft based on the theft of the aluminum.    
         Defendant appealed, again arguing that the Marion
County prosecution violated Article I, section 12.  The Court of
Appeals affirmed.  Cox, 178 Or App at 428.  Citing State v.
Brown, 262 Or 442, 497 P2d 1191 (1972), the court perceived the
"critical question" to be whether the charges arose out of the
same act or transaction.  Cox, 178 Or App at 430.  The court
explained that determining whether a defendant's conduct involved
the same act or transaction depends in part on whether the
defendant's conduct was part of the same "criminal episode."  Id.
at 431 (citing State v. Boyd, 271 Or 558, 566, 533 P2d 795
(1975)).  The court concluded that the two theft offenses were
not the same, because "[d]efendant's actions were not
contemporaneous or so closely linked in time, place, and
circumstance that a complete account of one could not be related
without reference to the other" and because "[d]efendant's
conduct involved separate acts with discrete criminal
objectives."  Id. at 432-33.  
         Judge Armstrong dissented.  He argued that both
prosecutions required the state to present evidence about the
taking of the aluminum in Marion County, thus satisfying the
"cross-relationship" test of Boyd, 271 Or at 566.  Even if the
two charges failed to satisfy the cross-relationship test, the
dissent concluded that defendant's actions were a single criminal
episode and that only one prosecution was proper.  Cox, 178 Or
App at 437-38 (Armstrong, J., dissenting). 
         DISCUSSION
         In the present case, both the Multnomah County and
Marion County indictments alleged that defendant violated the
same statute, ORS 164.057.  ORS 164.057 incorporates the
definition of theft in ORS 164.015. (4)  To determine whether
defendant has been prosecuted twice for the same offense, our
initial inquiry focuses on the legislature's definition of theft
in ORS 164.015, and we begin with an analysis of that
statute. (5)
         As noted, ORS 164.015 provides:
"A person commits theft when, with intent to
deprive another of property or to appropriate property
to the person or to a third person, the person:
"(1) Takes, appropriates, obtains or withholds
such property from an owner thereof; or
"(2) Commits theft of property lost, mislaid or
delivered by mistake as provided in ORS 164.065; or 
"(3) Commits theft by extortion as provided in ORS
164.075; or
"(4) Commits theft by deception, as provided in
ORS 164.085; or
"(5) Commits theft by receiving as provided in ORS
164.095."
         ORS 164.095 provides:
"(1) A person commits theft by receiving if the
person receives, retains, conceals or disposes of
property of another knowing or having good reason to
know that the property was the subject of theft.
"(2) 'Receiving' means acquiring possession,
control or title, or lending on the security of the
property." 
         The parties approach those statutes differently. 
Defendant argues that ORS 164.015 defines a single offense of
theft and that the gravamen of that offense is the deprivation of
property, regardless of the means by which such deprivation
occurs.  Defendant emphasizes that both convictions in this case
rested on the deprivation of the same property from the same
owner, Microwave Tower Service.  The only difference between the
two indictments is that the aggravated theft count in Multnomah
County alleged "aggravated theft by receiving."  Defendant
asserts that, under the statute, he committed a single theft
offense, for which he could be prosecuted only once consistently
with ORS 131.515(1) (6) and Article I, section 12.  Buttressing
his interpretation, defendant cites as context ORS 164.025, which
provides, in part, that, "[e]xcept for the crime of theft by
extortion, conduct denominated theft under ORS 164.015
constitutes a single offense."  ORS 164.025(1) (emphasis added).
         The state responds that ORS 164.025 is "procedural," in
the sense that it addresses only the pleading and proof required
to sustain a theft charge.  The state points out that the theft
statutes provide no definition of "same offense" for purposes of
either ORS 131.515(1) or Article I, section 12.  Therefore, the
state urges, this court should proceed directly to considering
the propriety of the successive prosecutions under the "same
elements" test used in federal courts, e.g., United States v.
Dixon, 509 US 688, 696, 113 S Ct 2849, 125 L Ed 2d 556 (1993)
(federal court test "inquires whether each offense contains an
element not contained in the other"), or under this court's "same
act or transaction" test, Brown, 262 Or at 458.
         Faced with that dispute regarding the interpretation of
ORS 164.015, we apply the methodology of PGE v. Bureau of Labor
and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859 P2d 1143 (1993).  Under
PGE, we look first to the text and context of the statute at
issue to determine the legislature's intent.  Id. at 610.  The
first level of analysis includes "other provisions of the same
statute and other related statutes," id. at 611, and "the
preexisting common law and the statutory framework within which
the law was enacted," Denton and Denton, 326 Or 236, 241, 951 P2d
693 (1998).  We also consider "the existing rules of substantive
law that are relevant to the statute being interpreted."  Osborn
v. PSRB, 325 Or 135, 146, 934 P2d 391 (1997). 
         To better understand the text of ORS 164.015, we
briefly review the historical context of theft offenses in
Oregon.  See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Tualatin Tire & Auto,
322 Or 406, 415-16, 908 P2d 300 (1995), modified on recons, 325
Or 46, 932 P2d 1141 (1997) (discussing historical context of
statute at first level of PGE analysis).  
         The legislature adopted ORS 164.015 in 1971 as part of
an overall revision of the criminal code.  State v. Gilbert, 281
Or 101, 105, 574 P2d 313 (1978).  Before the 1971 revision,
separate statutes described larceny, embezzlement, and other
theft-related offenses.  See, e.g., former ORS 164.310 - 164.392
(1969), repealed by Or Laws 1971, ch 743, § 432 (larceny); former
ORS 165.005 - 165.040 (1969), repealed by Or Laws 1971, ch 743, §
432 (embezzlement); former ORS 165.045 (1969), repealed by Or
Laws 1971, ch 743, § 432 (receiving stolen property); former ORS
165.205 - 165.285 (1969), repealed by Or Laws 1971, ch 743, § 432
(obtaining property by false pretenses and fraud).  Those
statutes set out a variety of elements applicable to each offense
and prescribed different -- and at times inconsistent --
penalties, depending on the nature of the larcenous act, the
nature of the stolen property, or other factors.  See Donald L.
Paillette, The Oregon Theft Laws:  Consolidation v.
Conglomeration, 51 Or L Rev 525, 526-29 (1972) (criticizing
conglomeration of different theft-related statutes in Oregon
Criminal Code and variety of penalties attached to related
offenses).  
         ORS 164.015 eliminated the problems arising from those
separate statutes by consolidating the various forms of unlawful
property deprivation into a single offense of theft that does not
depend on the relationship between the thief and the owner, the
type of property, or the manner of deprivation.  ORS 164.015
begins by specifying the required mental state for theft -- the
"intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate property
to the person or a third person."  Subsections (1) through (5)
then enumerate various means by which a deprivation of property
may occur, some of which are defined in separate statutes.  ORS
164.065 - 164.095.  Other than theft by extortion, however, those
separate definitions do not create distinct offenses with their
own punishments, as under the pre-1971 criminal code.  By
defining "theft by receiving," for example, ORS 164.095 does not
create a separate crime punishable as a felony or a misdemeanor. 
Rather, it describes further the type of conduct that constitutes
the single offense of theft under ORS 164.015, thereby making
irrelevant the technical distinctions that characterized the
previous regime of separate statutory offenses.  Thus, by
bringing various methods of property deprivation under one
umbrella, ORS 164.015 creates a single, consolidated offense
that, at its core, prohibits the intentional and unlawful
deprivation or appropriation of property from its owner.
         ORS 164.025 confirms that interpretation.  Enacted
contemporaneously with ORS 164.015, ORS 164.025 provides, in
part: 
"(1) Except for the crime of theft by extortion,
conduct denominated theft under ORS 164.015 constitutes
a single offense.
"(2) * * * In all [cases other than theft by
extortion,] an accusation of theft is sufficient if it
alleges that the defendant committed theft of property
of the nature or value required for the commission of
the crime charged without designating the particular
way or manner in which the theft was committed. 
"(3) Proof that the defendant engaged in conduct
constituting theft as defined in ORS 164.015 is
sufficient to support any indictment, information or
complaint for theft other than one charging theft by
extortion. * * *"
         ORS 164.025 removes the necessity of specifying the
exact manner in which the deprivation occurred.  It allows a
prosecutor with imperfect information to proceed against a
defendant, knowing that a difference between the theft allegation
in the indictment and the ultimate proof at trial will not be
fatal to the state's case, because the substance of the offense 
-- the intentional and unlawful deprivation of property -- is the
same.  Of course, ORS 164.025 does not eliminate the possibility
of violating ORS 164.015 more than once.  By making all conduct
under ORS 164.015 a single offense, however, ORS 164.025 ensures
that the number of thefts will depend on the number of times a
person unlawfully deprives another of property, not on the number
of different ways in which a person accomplishes a particular
deprivation.
         Following the state's approach essentially would
reverse the consolidation of the theft offenses in ORS 164.015. 
Under the state's interpretation, the consolidation of larceny,
embezzlement, and other offenses into a single theft statute
would authorize a prosecutor to divide the separate acts of
taking, retaining, concealing, and disposing of the same property
from the same victim into different offenses to pursue successive
prosecutions.  We do not think that the legislature intended such
a result, and, in fact, the consolidation of the various forms of
theft into a single offense demonstrates precisely the contrary.  
         Taking a different tack, the state invites us to
conclude that the Multnomah County prosecution and the Marion
County prosecution involved different victims (based on the
subsequent involvement of Metro Metals, the proposed buyer of the
aluminum).  That is not the offense with which defendant was
charged.  Whatever inconvenience may have resulted to Metro
Metals, that harm is not the focus of ORS 164.015, which
prohibits the deprivation or appropriation of property from the
owner of the property.  In this case, both indictments alleged
that Microwave Tower Service was the owner of the stolen aluminum
and was the party that suffered the harm that the theft statutes
at issue prohibit.
         From the foregoing analysis, we conclude that, under
ORS 164.015, defendant committed a single offense of theft by
"taking" and "receiving" the aluminum from Microwave Tower
Service. 
         Our conclusion that defendant committed only a single
theft simplifies our former jeopardy analysis.  In this court,
defendant argued that the second prosecution for the theft of the
aluminum violated the statutory protection against successive
prosecutions for the "same offense," ORS 131.515(1), and the
constitutional former jeopardy provision, Article I, section 12. 
Defendant did not cite ORS 131.515(1) until his brief on the
merits in this court.  Even when the parties frame their
arguments only in constitutional terms below, however, we may
consider an adequate subconstitutional basis for our decision. 
Crocker and Crocker, 332 Or 42, 46, 22 P3d 759 (2001) ("Although
the parties have presented and argued this case solely on
constitutional grounds, this court ordinarily will not decide
constitutional questions when an adequate subconstitutional basis
for decision exists."); Leo v. Keisling, 327 Or 556, 562, 964 P2d
1023 (1998) ("[I]t is well established that this court ordinarily
does not decide constitutional issues if there is an adequate
subconstitutional basis for decision.").  Guided by the
analytical methodology of PGE, 317 Or at 610-12, we begin with
defendant's statutory argument.     
         ORS 131.515(1) provides that "[n]o person shall be
prosecuted twice for the same offense."  Under ORS 131.505(1),
ORS 161.505 controls the meaning of the term "offense" in ORS
131.515(1).  ORS 161.505 provides:
"An offense is conduct for which a sentence to a
term of imprisonment or to a fine is provided by any
law of this state or by any law or ordinance of a
political subdivision of this state.  An offense is
either a crime, as described in ORS 161.515, or a
violation, as described in ORS 153.008."
ORS 161.515(1) defines "crime" as "an offense for which a
sentence of imprisonment is authorized," and ORS 161.515(2)
further provides that "[a] crime is either a felony or a
misdemeanor."   
         For purposes of our decision in this case, the text of
ORS 131.515(1) is clear.  Consistently with that statute and the
definitional statutes that it incorporates, a defendant may not
be prosecuted twice for conduct that the legislature has defined
as a single crime.  That is, ORS 131.515(1) prohibits a
prosecutor from dividing a single crime into multiple parts and
successively prosecuting a defendant two or more times on that
basis.     
         In this case, the state pursued precisely that
strategy.  As we have explained, defendant's separate acts of
taking and receiving the same aluminum from the same owner
constituted a single theft under ORS 164.015 and, therefore, a
single crime of aggravated theft under ORS 164.057.  It follows
that the state violated ORS 131.515(1) when it divided those
different acts into two allegedly separate crimes to institute
successive prosecutions for aggravated theft. (7)  
         The legislature's definition of the offense of theft
and the statutory protection against successive prosecutions
under ORS 131.515(1) are dispositive in this case, and,
therefore, our task is at an end. (8)  We conclude that, under
ORS 131.515(1), the Marion County prosecution was for the "same
offense" as the Multnomah County prosecution and was prohibited
by that statute.  
         The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
circuit court judgment of conviction and sentence on count two is
reversed.
1. The Marion County indictment also charged defendant
with aggravated theft of a backhoe and criminal mischief. 
Defendant does not challenge his conviction on those counts.
2. Article I, section 12, provides that "[n]o person shall
be put in jeopardy twice for the same offence."  Defendant raised
no federal constitutional arguments in the Court of Appeals.  In
this court, defendant conceded that he preserved no federal
constitutional argument in the trial court.  Therefore, we do not
consider whether defendant's multiple prosecutions violated the
federal Double Jeopardy Clause.  US Const, Amend V ("* * * nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb * * *").
3. ORS 164.057 provides:
"(1) A person commits the crime of aggravated
theft in the first degree, if:
"(a) The person violates ORS 164.055 with respect
to property, other than a motor vehicle used primarily
for personal rather than commercial transportation; and
"(b) The value of the property in a single or
aggregate transaction is $10,000 or more.
"(2) Aggravated theft in the first degree is a
Class B felony."
ORS 164.055 provides, in part:
"(1) A person commits the crime of theft in the first
degree if, by other than extortion, the person commits theft
as defined in ORS 164.015 and:
"(a) The total value of the property in a single or
aggregate transaction is $200 or more in a case of theft by
receiving, and $750 or more in any other case[.]" 
ORS 164.015 provides:
"A person commits theft when, with intent to deprive
another of property or to appropriate property to the person
or to a third person, the person:
"(1) Takes, appropriates, obtains or withholds
such property from an owner thereof; or
"(2) Commits theft of property lost, mislaid or
delivered by mistake as provided in ORS 164.065; or 
"(3) Commits theft by extortion as provided in ORS
164.075; or
"(4) Commits theft by deception, as provided in
ORS 164.085; or
"(5) Commits theft by receiving as provided in ORS
164.095."
4. ORS 164.057 defines aggravated theft in the first
degree as a violation of ORS 164.055 (subject to certain
limitations not relevant here) involving property valued at
$10,000 or more.  Consistently with the other statutes defining
lesser degrees of theft, ORS 164.043 - 164.045, ORS 164.055
provides, in part, that "[a] person commits the crime of theft in
the first degree if, by other than extortion, the person commits
theft as defined in ORS 164.015."
5. Courts and commentators have described that type of
inquiry as a search for the allowable unit of prosecution.  See,
e.g., Sanabria v. United States, 437 US 54, 69-70, 98 S Ct 2170,
57 L Ed 2d 43 (1978); United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit
Corp., 344 US 218, 221, 73 S Ct 227, 97 L Ed 260 (1952); Note,
Twice in Jeopardy, 75 Yale LJ 262, 311-12 (1965).  
6. ORS 131.515(1) provides that "[n]o person shall be
prosecuted twice for the same offense." 
7. There are exceptions to ORS 131.515(1), but none of
those exceptions applies in this case.  The circumstances
outlined in ORS 131.525 to 131.535 do not affect our analysis
under ORS 131.515(1), and ORS 131.505(3) is inapplicable here. 
That latter statute provides that "[w]hen the same conduct or
criminal episode, though violating only one statutory provision,
results in death, injury, loss or other consequences of two or
more victims, and the result is an element of the offense
defined, there are as many offenses as there are victims."  As
previously noted, because both indictments alleged that defendant
deprived a single owner, Microwave Tower Service, of the same
property, we reject the contention that defendant's theft
involved more than one victim.
8. For purposes of this case, we need not decide whether
and to what extent ORS 131.515(1) differs from the former
jeopardy provision of Article I, section 12.  In addition, we
need not consider whether the second prosecution was for the
"same offence" under Article I, section 12, or whether
defendant's conduct was part of the "same act or transaction"
under Brown.