Case Title: Hollis v. City of Brighton

Citation: 950 So. 2d 300

Docket Number: 1040073

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2006-07-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
950 So. 2d 300 (2006)
Benjamin HOLLIS and Diane Hollis
v.
CITY OF BRIGHTON.
No. 1040073.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
July 28, 2006.
*302 Stan Brobston of Brobston & Brobston, P.C., Bessemer; and Albert Lipscomb of Lipscomb & Lipscomb, Bessemer, for appellants.
Thomas S. Hale and G. Meador Akins of Burgess & Hale, L.L.C., Birmingham, for appellee.
PARKER, Justice.
Benjamin Hollis and Diane Hollis appeal from an order of the Jefferson Circuit Court granting a motion filed by the City of Brighton ("the City") for a summary judgment on the Hollises' vicarious-liability claim against it based on the actions of a police officer for the City. We affirm.
Police Officer Derwin Davis was on patrol at 1:56 a.m. on December 2, 1999, when he saw flames at a house at 4010 Keyes Avenue in Brighton. After notifying the fire department, Officer Davis entered the house and woke the occupants, Benjamin Hollis and Diane Hollis and their two sons, who had not been awakened by the smoke alarm. Officer Davis told the Hollis family to leave the house and wait outside for the arrival of the fire department. Mr. Hollis initially resisted Officer Davis's directive and attempted to extinguish the fire, which had started in the master bedroom, with a blanket. In so doing, he sustained second-degree burns that required hospital treatment and surgery, and he was out of work for approximately one month.
Although he finally followed Officer Davis's command to leave the house, Mr. Hollis continued to plead for permission to reenter the house to try and extinguish the fire. Officer Davis refused to permit Mr. Hollis to reenter the house, and the Hollises and Officer Davis remained outside. The fire department arrived about 45 minutes after they had left the house. Because of the delay, the house and its contents were totally destroyed. The following day, Mr. Hollis expressed his gratitude to Officer Davis for saving the lives of his family.
On May 22, 2000, the Hollises sued the City, alleging that the negligent, careless, and unskillful acts of the fire department in responding to the fire and the negligence or wantonness of Officer Davis in not allowing Mr. Hollis to reenter the house caused them to suffer damage. Mr. Hollis claimed that the fire initially involved only the curtains on the window in his bedroom and that the fire in the house could easily have been extinguished had *303 Officer Davis permitted him to remain in or to reenter the house.
The City moved for a summary judgment based on State-agent immunity. The trial court granted the motion on April 16, 2001. The Hollises appealed, and this Court affirmed the summary judgment as to all claims except the claim for vicarious liability based on the alleged actions of Officer Davis; as to that claim, we reversed and remanded, stating:
Hollis v. City of Brighton, 885 So. 2d 135, 143-44 (Ala.2004) ("Hollis I"). On remand, the City filed a new motion for a summary judgment, asserting that Officer Davis was entitled to immunity under the fourth category of the restated rule governing State-agent immunity set out in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392, 405 (Ala. 2000), and under §§ 6-5-338(a) and 13A-10-6, Ala.Code 1975. The trial court entered a summary judgment for the City on the vicarious-liability claim, and the Hollises appeal.
Hollis I, 885 So. 2d  at 140.
The issue the Hollises present on this appeal is whether the trial court erred in granting the City's motion for a summary judgment on the basis that the City was immune from liability for the actions of Officer Davis. The Hollises seek a jury trial to determine whether Officer Davis acted negligently in ordering the Hollises to leave the house when Mr. Hollis believed he could extinguish the fire.
The trial court granted the City's motion for a summary judgment by making the following entry on the case-action-summary sheet:
As noted earlier, this Court stated in Hollis I:
*305 885 So. 2d  at 144. In summary, this Court in Hollis I said (1) that the record did not establish immunity as a matter of law, either under Ex parte Cranman, supra, or under § 6-5-338(a) (the peace-officer-immunity statute) and (2) that the factual merits of the Hollises' negligence claim were not raised in their motion for a summary judgment.
A finding of immunity, however, precludes a claim based in negligence.
Gary v. Crouch, 867 So. 2d 310, 313-14 (Ala.2003). See also City of Birmingham v. Sutherland, 834 So. 2d 755, 762 (Ala. 2002). On the other hand, the Cranman restatement makes it clear that State-agent immunity does not cover a State-agent's acts of willfulness or maliciousness:
Cranman, 792 So. 2d  at 405.
Here, the Hollises, in response to the City's summary-judgment motion, did not assert the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. They stated:
The focus of the Hollises' argument was that "[t]he issue to be tried, as stated by the Supreme Court [in Hollis I], is factually whether or not the police officer's order of the [Hollises] to abandon their house and in [his] refusal to allow them to fight the fire was unreasonable." (Emphasis in original.) However, if State-agent immunity exists here as a matter of law, no such factual issue will be reached.
*306 The City's reply to the Hollises' response points this out:
In its motion for a summary judgment on remand from this Court, the City argued that Officer Davis was immune under § 6-5-338(a), Ala.Code 1975, because he fit within immune category (4) of the Cranman restatement. That Code section provides that every peace officer "shall have immunity from tort liability arising out of his or her conduct in performance of any discretionary function within the line and scope of his or her law enforcement duties." § 6-5-338(a). The City argued that Officer Davis fit within category (4) of Cranman based on § 13A-10-6, Ala.Code 1975, which provides:
(Emphasis added.) This statute appears to be the basis for the Hollises' argument below that Officer Davis's order not to reenter the house was not reasonable. Admittedly, if Officer Davis does not have immunity, the reasonableness of the order becomes the issue. However, if Officer Davis does have immunity, the reasonableness of the order is not at issue. Moreover, if Officer Davis is immune, then so is the City, which employed him. Howard v. City of Atmore, 887 So. 2d 201, 211 (Ala. 2003) ("It is well established that, if a municipal peace office is immune pursuant to § 6-5-338(a), then . . . the city by which he is employed is also immune."). Thus, the primary issue in this case is whether Officer Davis is immune.
*307 In Ex parte Cranman, this Court restated the test for State-agent immunity as follows:
792 So. 2d  at 405.
In Blackwood v. City of Hanceville, 936 So. 2d 495, 504 (Ala.2006), this Court said:
In Hollis I, this Court noted that the difference between the language of § 6-5-338(a) and the language used in category (4) of Cranman:
885 So. 2d  at 143-44. Writing specially in Hollis I, Justice Lyons stated:
885 So. 2d  at 145 (Lyons, J., concurring in the rationale in part and concurring in the judgment). On appeal following remand, this Court has not been asked to modify category (4) of the Cranman restatement. Nevertheless, "this Court will affirm a *309 judgment for any reason supported by the record that satisfies the requirements of due process." Smith v. Mark Dodge, Inc., 934 So. 2d 375, 380 (Ala.2006) (citing Taylor v. Stevenson, 820 So. 2d 810, 814 (Ala. 2001)). By giving notice to the bench and bar of the possibility of a future clarification of immune category (4) of the Cranman criteria, Justice Lyons's special writing in Hollis I satisfies the due-process-requirements concern noted in Mark Dodge. Consequently, this Court is free to modify category (4) of the Cranman restatement.[1]
Given the divergence between the scope of the immunity granted by § 6-5-338(a)  "conduct in performance of any discretionary function within the line and scope of his or her law enforcement duties"  and summarized in category (4) of the Cranman restatement  "exercising judgment in the enforcement of the criminal laws of the State. . . ."  we conclude that immune category 4 of the Cranman restatement should be expanded to restate the law of immunity in this area so as to reflect § 6-5-338(a).
Because the peace officers' immunity statute does not limit the availability of immunity to "enforcement of the criminal laws," we today modify category (4) of Cranman to read as follows:
(Additional language emphasized.)
Applying the immune category (4) in the modified Cranman restatement to the circumstances of this case, we conclude that because Officer Davis was exercising judgment in the discharge of his law-enforcement duties when he ordered Hollis not to reenter his house after he had already suffered severe burns, Officer Davis is immune from civil liability.
Because Officer Davis is immune the municipality that employed him is also immune. Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment for the City of Brighton.
AFFIRMED.
NABERS, C.J., and LYONS, HARWOOD, WOODALL, STUART, SMITH, and BOLIN, JJ., concur.
SEE, J., concurs specially.
SEE, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the main opinion's modification of category (4) of the Ex parte Cranman, 792 So. 2d 392 (Ala.2000), restatement and in the conclusion reached in that opinion that Officer Davis is immune from civil liability in his individual capacity and that the City is thus entitled to a summary judgment on the Hollises' vicarious-liability claim. I write only because I am concerned about the following language in the main opinion:
950 So. 2d  at 308-09 (footnote omitted).
This language could be read to suggest that this Court is required by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution of the United States to give some type of warning to litigants before we can modify or overrule court-made law. In other words, that absent some kind of foreshadowing, we may act only prospectively. Such an inference is incorrect. Our traditional function is to decide cases before us upon our "`"best current understanding of the law."'" Professional Ins. Corp. v. Sutherland, 700 So. 2d 347, 352 (Ala.1997) (quoting other cases). Retroactive application of our decisions is in keeping with that traditional function and is "overwhelmingly the normal practice." Id.
It is true, as the main opinion indicates, that the rule that we may affirm a trial court's judgment "for any reason supported by the record" is constrained by the requirements of due process. However, the due-process concern addresses a lack of notice of the issues that are before the court, when that lack of notice denies a party the opportunity to address the issues upon which the case turns and thereby effectively denies the party his "day in court." Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. University of Alabama Health Servs. Found., P.C., 881 So. 2d 1013, 1020 (Ala.2003).[2] That due-process requirement does not constrain our traditional practice of deciding cases before us under our best current understanding of the law and applying those decisions retroactively.[3]
[1]  Our recognition that due process was afforded in this case by Justice Lyons's foreshadowing in Hollis I of a possible extension of category (4) of the Cranman restatement does not imply that such notice is required in every case in which this court modifies or overrules its precedent.
[2]  

"[T]his Court will affirm the trial court on any valid legal ground presented by the record, regardless of whether that ground was considered, or even if it was rejected, by the trial court. . . . This rule fails in application only where due-process constraints require some notice at the trial level, which was omitted, of the basis that would otherwise support an affirmance, such as when a totally omitted affirmative defense might, if available for consideration, suffice to affirm a judgment, Ameriquest Mortgage Co. v. Bentley, 851 So. 2d 458 (Ala.2002), or where a summary-judgment movant has not asserted before the trial court a failure of the nonmovant's evidence on an element of a claim or defense and therefore has not shifted the burden of producing substantial evidence in support of that element, Rector v. Better Houses, Inc., 820 So. 2d 75, 80 (Ala.2001) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986), and Kennedy v. Western Sizzlin Corp., 857 So. 2d 71 (Ala.2003))."
Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. University of Alabama Health Servs. Found., P.C., 881 So. 2d  at 1020.
[3]  The Supreme Court of the United States has said that it will consider, as one factor in deciding whether to apply a new rule of law prospectively only, whether the new decision overrules clear past precedent or decides an issue of first impression the resolution of which was not clearly foreshadowed. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07, 92 S. Ct. 349, 30 L. Ed. 2d 296 (1971). The lack of foreshadowing, however, does not pose a due-process problem. We also note that the Supreme Court of the United State held in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 113 S. Ct. 2510, 125 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1993):

"[A]n opinion announcing a rule of federal law `is properly understood to have followed the normal rule of retroactive application' and must be `read to hold . . . that its rule should apply retroactively to the litigants then before the Court.' [James B.] Beam [Distilling Co. v. Georgia,] 501 U.S. [529], 539 [(1991)]."
509 U.S.  at 97-98, 113 S. Ct. 2510, 125 L. Ed. 2d 74.