Case Title: Rennard v. Vollmar

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-04-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rennard v. Vollmar1999 WY 40977 P.2d 1277Case Number: 98-59Decided: 04/15/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

THOMAS and NANCY RENNARD, Appellants (Plaintiffs),

v.

JERRY and RONDI VOLLMAR, Appellees 
(Defendants).

                                 

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona 
County Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

    Patrick T. Holscher of 
Schwartz, Bon, Walker & Studer LLC, Casper, Wyoming, Representing 
Appellant.

     
Keith P. Tyler, Casper, Wyoming, Representing 
Appellee.

    Before LEHMAN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* JJ.

   * 
retired November 2, 1998.

    GOLDEN, 
JUSTICE.

   
[¶1]      This appeal presents a dispute about an 
irrigation ditch between two adjoining landowners, the Rennards and the 
Vollmars, whose respective parcels earlier were joined as one under a unity 
of ownership. At issue are 
the rights in the irrigation ditch which runs across the Vollmars' non-irrigated 
parcel while delivering appropriated water to the Rennards' irrigated parcel. 
The Rennards' water rights and the irrigation ditch through which the Rennards' 
appropriated water flows were established when these adjoining parcels were one under a unity of ownership. In 1973, the 
unified property was divided, creating the two adjoining parcels involved in 
today's dispute; the two parcels have not been under common ownership since. The 
precise question we must answer is the applicability in this dispute of the rule 
stated in Frank v. Hicks, 4 Wyo. 
502           
            
             
              
      , 522, 35 P. 475, 480 (1893), 
reh. denied, 35 P. 1025      
   (Wyo. 1894), that "a right to the use of water for the irrigation of 
land, together with the ditch making such right available, becomes . . . so 
attached to the land irrigated as to pass by a conveyance of the land without 
mentioning the water right. . . ." After a bench trial, the district court held that the law of implied 
easements, not the Frank rule, applied to this dispute; that the Rennards had 
failed to prove the elements of the law of implied easements and, therefore, 
their claim of ditch ownership failed; and that the Vollmars owned the ditch. We 
hold that the district court erred; that the Frank rule applies to this dispute; 
and that the Rennards, as owners of the irrigated parcel, are owners of and are 
entitled to reasonable access to the ditch which crosses the Vollmars' 
non-irrigated parcel. We reverse and remand this case for further proceedings 
consistent with this decision.

  

                               
ISSUES

  [¶2]    Rennards present this single 
issue for our review:

            Is 
the means of conveying water attached to a water right such that it passes in a 
transfer of water right ownership 
without specific mention of that means of conveyance.

    Vollmars restate the issue 
presented to the Court for review as:

            
whether or not the tests of implied easement under Wyoming law are 
applicable to an existing irrigation ditch for which there is no express grant or 
reservation of easement.

                                   
FACTS

  [¶3]      The parties' two adjoining parcels are 
located in Natrona County and were originally one contiguous parcel under one 
ownership.  The Rennard parcel is a 
portion of the property generally described as the NE 1/4 of Section 11. The 
Vollmar parcel is described as the NW 1/4 of Section 11. While the parcels were 
under one ownership, farming was 
established on the Rennard parcel; and it has always been irrigated and received 
water from an irrigation ditch crossing the entire property, including that part 
which is now the Vollmar parcel. The irrigation ditch runs across the Vollmar 
parcel before entering the Rennards' irrigated acreage.

  [¶4]      The irrigation ditch apparently was 
built sometime in the 1940's while both parcels were owned by the Engbergs. The 
Engbergs irrigated the NE 1/4 of Section 11 of their land that eventually was 
sold to the Rennards. In 1964, the unified property was sold to the 
Schwartzkopfs. In 1967, the Schwartzkopfs were granted water rights for the 
irrigated land in the NE 1/4 of Section 11 with priorities of appropriation of 
July 27, 1934, April 25, 1936, and December 1, 1931. Water was delivered to the 
irrigation ditch from the Casper-Alcova Irrigation System.

  [¶5]      In 1968, the unified property was again 
sold. After yet another sale in 1969 to the Kellers, the unified property, in 
1973, was divided into the two adjoining parcels that exist today, the Kellers 
selling the irrigated NE 1/4 of Section 11 (the Rennard parcel) to Bruce and 
Esther Allen while retaining the non-irrigated NW 1/4 (the Vollmar parcel). This 
transfer included "all water allotments and water rights appurtenant thereto," 
but was silent on the irrigation ditch 
which crossed the adjoining NW 1/4 (Vollmar parcel). The Allens sold the NE 1/4 
parcel to Larry and Vicki Jo Allen, who later sold it to the Rennards on 
November 4, 1994. The Rennards purchased this parcel in order to farm it and 
intended to irrigate their fields. The contract for sale provided that the Rennards were to be given written permission 
for access to all the irrigation ditches for the purpose of clean up, 
preventative work, and the like. No such written permission was provided to 
Rennards nor was an easement for the ditches included in the deed from the 
Allens to the Rennards; however, the Rennards closed on their purchase with the 
Allens and accepted the property. The deed conveying the property was silent on 
water rights as well as access to the irrigation ditch.

  [¶6]      The parcel that the Vollmars ultimately 
purchased went through a series of transfers that were entirely silent on ditch 
and water rights, and the record indicates that the Vollmars were not deeded any 
water rights and are not entitled to any of the water flowing through the 
irrigation ditch that is part of the Rennards' appropriation from the 
Casper-Alcova Irrigation System.  
The Vollmar parcel has never been used for agricultural purposes and is 
not so used today. The parties do not dispute that there was never an express 
grant or reservation of easement for the ditch in question in any of the 
transfers.

  [¶7]      Shortly after acquiring their property, 
the Rennards began to order water from the Casper-Alcova system in order to 
irrigate their fields. They experienced difficulty receiving the water as it 
passed through the Vollmar property, and their investigations revealed that the 
Vollmars had placed irrigation headgates on two reservoirs they had built immediately astride the 
ditch and were taking water from the ditch. Believing the Rennards had no 
ownership interest in the ditch, the Vollmars denied the Rennards access to 
their property for maintenance and use of the ditch.

  

  [¶8]      Rennards filed suit alleging intentional 
destruction of property, conversion, negligence, and prescriptive easement. They 
sought both damages and injunctive relief. The Vollmars filed a counterclaim for 
trespass and property damage. Both parties moved for summary judgment. In 
denying the Rennards' motion, the district court stated 
that

            
[p]laintiffs' argument that "The Ditch Follows the Right," citing Frank 
v. Hicks, 35 P. 1025  (Wyo. 1893), 
would appear to have logical application to the case at bar. However, it would 
also appear essential to the claims 
asserted in this case for Plaintiffs to have a legally established 
easement or property right upon the 
property of the Defendants in order to sustain any of their 
claims.

The Vollmars were granted 
summary judgment on the issue of a prescriptive easement, all other summary 
judgment motions were denied, and the matter proceeded to bench trial. The 
district court issued findings of fact and concluded that the issue was whether 
the Rennards had an implied easement in the ditch. The district court found that the Rennards' use was 
permissive, and it was feasible for them to build their own ditch. The district 
court concluded, as a matter of law, no implied easement was intended at the 
time of the property division.

                             
DISCUSSION

                         
Standard of Review

  [¶9]      When a trial court in a bench trial 
makes express findings of fact and conclusions of law, we review the factual 
determinations under a clearly erroneous standard and the legal conclusions de 
novo. Stansbury v. Heiduck, 961 P.2d 977, 978 (Wyo. 1998); Springer v. Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield of Wyoming, 944 P.2d 1173, 1176 (Wyo. 1997).

                           
Applicable Law

  [¶10] 
  The Rennards contend that 
the district court erred, as a matter of law, in applying the law of implied 
easements to resolve this dispute. They assert that long ago, in Frank, this 
Court adopted for this state the rule that a water right and the ditch which 
makes that right available to the land irrigated become so attached to the land 
irrigated as to pass by a conveyance of the land irrigated even though the 
conveyance is silent on the water right and ditch. In opposition, the Vollmars 
contend that the district court properly determined that the evidence showed 
that (1) Bruce and Esther Allen and the Kellers, at the time the unified 
property was divided, had no intention to create a ditch easement across the 
non-irrigated NW 1/4 parcel; and (2) the use of the ditch by the Rennards' predecessors in title had 
always been permissive. The Vollmars assert that, as a matter of law, no implied 
or prescriptive easement existed.

  [¶11] 
  We hold that the rule 
announced in Frank provides the applicable law with which to resolve this 
dispute. Among many other issues, Frank considered whether property conveyed to 
a trust by deed included water rights and irrigating ditches. Judgment creditors 
had foreclosed upon the trust deed, and one judgment creditor in a separate 
action was seeking to sell the water rights and irrigation ditches. The trustee 
presented the issue whether a right to the use of water for the purpose of 
irrigation, together with the necessary conduit for delivering the water to the 
place where it is used, is appurtenant to the land irrigated. This Court 
stated:

            The 
discussion should not be confined to the meaning or proper use of the word 
"appurtenant" or "appurtenance." 
The real question is one of vastly more importance than a mere question of the 
proper use of words. It is, 
substantially, whether a right to the use of water for the irrigation of 
land, together with the ditch 
making such right available, becomes in any way so attached to the land 
irrigated as to pass by a 
conveyance of the land without mentioning the water right, and to become subject 
to the liens and liabilities which 
attach to the land, and entitled to the exemptions to which the land 
is entitled.

  Frank, 4 Wyo. at 522, 35 P.  at 
480.

  [¶12] 
  In considerable detail, 
this Court in Frank analyzed the effect of a decision that the water right would 
not pass by a sale and conveyance of the land that did not mention the water 
right, and eloquently captured the issue's substance:

  

            If 
this means that [the owner of the unified property] himself, or any one claiming 
the water right under him by deed 
executed by him after he parted with the land, could deprive the parties of the 
use of the water, it is a startling 
proposition. We cannot ignore, as judges, what we know, as men, of the general 
condition of the country. As 
residents of the arid region, interested in its business conditions, we know - 
and as lawyers and judges, deriving our 
knowledge from reported cases, we know - that there are vast quantities of 
agricultural land cultivated in the arid region, and made valuable by the use of 
water, the right to which depends upon a conveyance of the land without 
mentioning water, water right, or irrigating ditch.  Land and water together are of great 
value. The value of the land without the use of the water is trivial.  And the conditions are such, in many 
instances, that, if the owner of the land is deprived of the use of the water to 
which he has been accustomed, he cannot procure other water. In other instances 
it can be done only at great expense.

Frank, 4 Wyo. at 524, 35 P. 
at 481. Our attention is caught by several other passages as well. In the 
following passage, this Court spoke favorably of the widely approved common law 
doctrine "[w]hoever grants a thing grants, by implication, that which is 
necessary to the beneficial use and enjoyment of the thing granted." Id. at 526, 
35 P.  at 482. This Court said:

            To 
take away the water right by which agricultural land is irrigated in the arid 
region leaves the land more nearly 
useless and valueless than a mill without a kiln, or a saw mill without a lumber 
yard, or a water mill without a dam. The 
water mill may be moved and used elsewhere. The land cannot be. Another kiln or 
lumber yard might be provided at comparatively small expense.  In most of the arid region, water rights 
furnishing sufficient water for the irrigation of farms have become quite 
valuable, and difficult to obtain, in many localities, at any reasonable expense. The pipes 
used to conduct water to a dwelling house would pass at common law by a 
conveyance of the house, because necessary to the use and enjoyment of the house 
in the usual manner, though they extend far beyond the premises granted, and 
might be replaced at small expense. The water right also passes. Whatever is 
necessary to the beneficial use and enjoyment of the thing granted, whether 
corporeal or incorporeal, passes, at common law, as incident or "quasi 
appendant" to the thing granted; but we must not call them appurtenances, if 
they are corporeal things. They then pass as part and parcel of the 
grant.

  Id.

  [¶13] 
  Later in the opinion, after 
reviewing cases from California, Montana, Washington, and Oregon, this Court 
accepted the prevailing view of the courts in the arid region states "that a 
water right becomes appurtenant to the land upon which the water is used, and 
the ditch, water pipe, or other conduit for the water becomes attached to the land, either as 
appurtenant or incident to the land, and necessary to its beneficial enjoyment, 
and therefore becomes part and parcel of the realty." Id. at 531, 35 P.  at 
484.

  [¶14] 
  As the district court 
noted, Frank clearly established the precept that "a ditch follows the right;" 
the question is whether that precept applies within the context of this dispute, 
i. e., the irrigation ditch crosses the land of one not entitled to any of the 
water carried by the ditch, and the water right and the ditch were established 
before the unified property was divided.  
The district court chose, incorrectly, to find the answer in the intent 
of the parties at the time the unified property was divided. Frank teaches that 
the answer is found in the intent of the party who established the water right 
and the ditch before the unified property was divided. That intent is that the 
water right and the ditch for the water become part and parcel of the land 
irrigated. Accord, Bard Ranch, Inc. v. Weber, 538 P.2d 24, 34 (Wyo. 1975) ("It 
is necessary and usual in this state for water appropriations to be served by ditches, or an 
interest in ditches, and we can see no purpose to be served by anatomizing the 
interest in a ditch necessary to serve a water right into finer categories. If a 
person has a right to convey water through a ditch, he owns an interest in that 
ditch or a share of the ditch to the 
extent of the water right he is entitled to convey through it."). See also, 
Wallis v. Luman, 625 P.2d 759, 765-66 (Wyo. 1981); White v. Bd. of Land Comm'rs, 
595 P.2d 76, 80-81 (Wyo. 1979); Condict v. Ryan, 79 Wyo. 211, 227-29, 333 P.2d 684, 689-90 (Wyo. 1958); Big Goose & Beaver Ditch Co. v. Wallop, 382 P.2d 388, 392-93 (Wyo. 1963); and Sturgeon v. Brooks, 73 Wyo. 436, 456, 281 P.2d 675, 
682 (Wyo. 1955).

  [¶15] 
  We hold, therefore, that 
the Vollmars do not have adjudicated water rights and are not entitled to any of 
the Rennards' appropriated water received, via the ditch, from the Casper-Alcova 
Irrigation System; the Rennards have exclusive ownership of the ditch and the 
Vollmars are not entitled to divert any water from that ditch to their reservoir; and the Rennards' 
ownership of the ditch permits them to enter the Vollmars' land to maintain and 
use the existing ditch.

  [¶16] 
  We reverse the district 
court's order and remand with directions that judgment on this issue be entered 
for Rennards and for trial on the remaining claims.