Case Title: Estate of Johnson v. Randall Smith, Inc.

Citation: 2013-Ohio-1507

Docket Number: 2012-0014

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2013-04-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Estate of Johnson v. Randall Smith, Inc., Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-1507.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-1507 
ESTATE OF JOHNSON ET AL., APPELLEES, v. RANDALL SMITH, INC., ET AL., 
APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Estate of Johnson v. Randall Smith, Inc.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-1507.] 
Medical malpractice—Admissibility of statement of apology by healthcare 
provider—Prospective application of R.C. 2317.43. 
(No. 2012-0014—Submitted February 5, 2013—Decided April 23, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Portage County, No. 2010-P-0050,  
196 Ohio App.3d 722, 2011-Ohio-6000. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
R.C. 2317.43, which precludes the admission of statements of apology by a 
healthcare provider, applies to any cause of action filed after September 
13, 2004. 
__________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
 
 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we confront the proper application of R.C. 2317.43, 
Ohio’s statute that prevents the admission of certain statements made by 
healthcare providers.  Also known as the apology statute, R.C. 2317.43 provides 
opportunities for healthcare providers to apologize and console victims of 
unanticipated outcomes of medical care without fear that their statements will be 
used against them in a malpractice suit, by making the statements inadmissible as 
evidence of an admission of liability or a statement against interest.  We are asked 
to determine whether R.C. 2317.43 can be applied to a statement of apology made 
by a healthcare provider before the statute took effect. 
{¶ 2} Because we conclude that the Eleventh District Court of Appeals 
erred in its analysis, we reverse the judgment that remanded this case for a new 
trial. 
I.  Background 
{¶ 3} On April 24, 2001, appellant Dr. Randall Smith performed surgery 
on Jeanette Johnson to remove her gall bladder.1  Although the surgery was 
scheduled to be done laparoscopically, when Mrs. Johnson’s common bile duct 
was injured during the procedure (a known surgical risk), Dr. Smith converted to 
an “open procedure” to repair the duct.  After the surgery, Dr. Smith explained to 
Mrs. Johnson the manner in which the injury had occurred and the manner in 
which he had repaired the duct. 
{¶ 4} One month later, Mrs. Johnson returned to the hospital because of 
complications resulting from the bile-duct injury.  Her treatment required that she 
be transferred to another hospital.  Before the transfer, she became upset and 
                                          
 
1 Jeanette Johnson died on August 17, 2012.  Jeannine Johnson and Harvey W. Johnson are the 
administrators of the estate of Jeannette Johnson.  The estate of Jeannette Johnson is substituted in 
this action as an appellee in the place of Jeannette Johnson. 
January Term, 2013 
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emotional.  In an effort to console her, Dr. Smith took Mrs. Johnson’s hand and 
attempted to calm her by saying, “I take full responsibility for this.  Everything 
will be okay.” 
{¶ 5} On August 19, 2002, Mrs. Johnson and her husband, Harvey 
Johnson, filed a medical-malpractice action against Dr. Smith and the corporation 
through which he conducted his practice, but they voluntarily dismissed that 
action in September 2006. A new complaint was filed on July 26, 2007, in which 
the Johnsons alleged that Dr. Smith had rendered negligent medical treatment to 
Mrs. Johnson, and Mr. Johnson alleged that he had sustained a loss of consortium. 
{¶ 6} A jury trial was scheduled for June 2010.  Before the trial began, 
Dr. Smith submitted a motion in limine to prohibit the introduction of any 
evidence regarding the statement of apology that he made to Mrs. Johnson before 
her transfer to the second hospital.  Dr. Smith asserted that his statement 
constituted an expression of sympathy that could not be admitted into evidence 
under R.C. 2317.43. 
{¶ 7} The Johnsons submitted two responses to the motion in limine.  
First, they argued that the statement was not an apology or expression of 
sympathy, but rather an admission of the doctor’s negligence.  Second, they 
argued that R.C. 2317.43 did not apply to Dr. Smith’s statement, because the 
statute was enacted and took effect three years after the malpractice claim arose 
and the statement was made.  At the hearing on the motion in limine, Mrs. 
Johnson, her daughter, and their friend testified about Dr. Smith’s statement and 
the context in which it was made.  After close of this testimony, the trial court 
ruled that any evidence regarding the doctor’s statement would be inadmissible at 
trial.  Specifically, the trial court stated: 
 
She [a witness], I think, covered the circumstances where 
Miss [sic] Johnson was distressed, that she obviously was not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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comfortable, she was suffering, upset, and that Dr. Smith, in a 
compassionate manner, came over and was sympathetic and acted 
to comfort her. 
He took her hand, and in doing so, stated that he took 
responsibility for the situation in having her transferred. 
It’s the Court’s opinion that the statements and gestures and 
actions are covered under 2317.43 [effective September 13, 2004], 
and, therefore, I am going to grant the motion in limine and 
exclude the statement. 
 
{¶ 8} On June 18, 2010, the jury returned a general verdict in favor of 
Dr. Smith on the two claims asserted by the Johnsons. 
{¶ 9} The Johnsons appealed, and the Eleventh District Court of 
Appeals, in a two-to-one decision, reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding 
that the trial court had erred in applying R.C. 2317.43 retroactively to exclude Dr. 
Smith’s statement, because the General Assembly had not expressly stated its 
intent that the statute should apply retroactively. ¶ 19-22.  The court of appeals 
ordered a new trial on the merits.  Johnson v. Randall Smith, Inc., 196 Ohio 
App.3d 722, 2011-Ohio-6000, 965 N.E.2d 344 (11th Dist.).  The appellate court 
held that jurors could have determined that the words “take full responsibility” 
when taken in context meant that Dr. Smith was admitting fault.  The court of 
appeals held that the statement should have been admitted because its probative 
value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.  ¶ 27-
28.  The dissenting judge, however, focused not on when Dr. Smith made the 
statement but on when the complaint was filed.  In his view, R.C. 2317.43 was 
applicable because “the Johnsons’ civil action was not ‘brought’ until 2007, after 
the effective date of the statute.”  Id. at ¶ 31 (Cannon, J., dissenting). 
January Term, 2013 
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{¶ 10} We accepted Dr. Smith’s discretionary appeal and now consider 
two propositions of law: 
 
Proposition of Law No. 1:  Ohio Revised Code § 2317.43 
applies to any cause of action commenced or filed after the 
enactment date of the statute and serves to preclude the 
introduction into evidence [of] a healthcare provider’s sympathetic 
statements and gestures. 
Proposition of Law No. 2:  Ohio Revised Code § 2317.43 is 
procedural in nature and applies retroactively to preclude the 
introduction into evidence [of] a healthcare provider’s sympathetic 
statements and gestures. 
 
{¶ 11} The two propositions of law can be reduced to one issue:  Does 
R.C. 2317.43 apply to the statement made by Dr. Smith to apologize to and 
console Mrs. Johnson? 
{¶ 12} We now hold that R.C. 2317.43, which precludes the admission of 
statements of apology by a healthcare provider, applies to any cause of action 
filed after September 13, 2004. 
{¶ 13} We therefore reverse the judgment of the Eleventh District and 
reinstate the judgment on the jury’s verdict. 
II. Analysis 
A.  The Statute 
{¶ 14} The question before the court is whether R.C. 2317.43, which 
became effective on September 13, 2004, applies to a statement of apology made 
in 2001 but offered in evidence in a case that was not filed until 2007.  The 
General Assembly, in enacting R.C. 2317.43, prohibited the introduction of any 
sympathetic statements and gestures made by a healthcare provider in any civil 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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action “brought” by an alleged victim of an unanticipated outcome of medical 
care.  The effective date of the statute was September 13, 2004. 150 Ohio Laws, 
Part III, 4146, 4153.  Since its enactment, subsection (A) has stated:   
 
 
(A) In any civil action brought by an alleged victim of an 
unanticipated outcome of medical care or in any arbitration 
proceeding related to such a civil action, any and all statements, 
affirmations, gestures, or conduct expressing apology, sympathy, 
commiseration, condolence, compassion, or a general sense of 
benevolence that are made by a health care provider or an 
employee of a health care provider to the alleged victim, a relative 
of the alleged victim, or a representative of the alleged victim, and 
that relate to the discomfort, pain, suffering, injury, or death of the 
alleged victim as the result of the unanticipated outcome of 
medical care are inadmissible as evidence of an admission of 
liability or as evidence as an admission against interest. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  R.C. 2317.43(A). 
B. Statutory Interpretation 
{¶ 15} The first phrase, “In any civil action brought by an alleged victim,” 
determines the application of the statute. A “civil action” has been defined as an 
“[a]ction brought to enforce, redress, or protect private rights. In general, all types 
of actions other than criminal proceedings.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 222 (5th 
Ed.1979). A “cause of action” is defined as “[a] group of operative facts giving 
rise to one or more bases for suing; a factual situation that entitled one person to 
obtain a remedy in court from another person.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 251 (9th 
Ed.2009).  Case law has treated “brought” synonymously with “commenced.”  
January Term, 2013 
7 
 
E.g., Cover v. Hildebran, 103 Ohio App. 413, 415, 145 N.E.2d 850 (2d 
Dist.1957). 
{¶ 16} Where a statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, a court must 
apply it as written. Zumwalde v. Madeira & Indian Hill Joint Fire Dist., 128 Ohio 
St.3d 492, 2011-Ohio-1603, 946 N.E.2d 748, ¶  23-24; Sears v. Weimer, 143 Ohio 
St. 312, 55 N.E.2d 413 (1944), paragraph five of syllabus. The language of R.C. 
2317.43(A) is clear and unambiguous. By its express terms, R.C. 2317.43 applies 
to “any civil action brought” by persons described in the statute. This means that 
the statute applies to a civil lawsuit filed after the effective date of the statute. 
{¶ 17} The Johnsons argue that they “brought” this civil action when they 
initially filed their original complaint against Dr. Smith in August 2002.  That 
action, however, was voluntarily dismissed in 2006.  When an action has been 
voluntarily dismissed, Ohio law treats the previously filed action as if it had never 
been commenced.  Zimmie v. Zimmie, 11 Ohio St.3d 94, 95, 464 N.E.2d 142 
(1984).  The action filed by the Johnsons in 2002 must be treated as if it never 
existed.  The Johnsons “brought” or commenced this civil action upon the filing 
of their complaint on July 26, 2007. When this action was brought by the 
Johnsons, R.C. 2317.43 had been in effect for almost three years. 
C.  Prospective Application 
{¶ 18} The court of appeals, in analyzing this issue, looked at it another 
way and assumed that the statement that Dr. Smith made to Mrs. Johnson in  2001 
was to be considered in its analysis of whether the statute applied. The court of 
appeals concluded that since the conduct occurred in 2001, the statement could 
not be properly excluded under the statute.  This interpretation, however, does not 
give effect to the plain meaning of the statute, because the Johnsons’ “civil 
action” was not “brought” until 2007, after the effective date of the statute. 
{¶ 19} Unquestionably, the lawsuit filed by the Johnsons against Dr. 
Smith is a “civil action” as that term is used in R.C. 2317.43. Similarly, there can 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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be no doubt that this action was “brought” by the Johnsons.  Dr. Smith performed 
surgery on Mrs. Johnson and made the statement in 2001, when the cause of 
action for medical negligence arose.  Although the Johnsons originally filed suit 
before the effective date of the statute, they voluntarily dismissed the complaint in 
2006 after the statute’s effective date. This civil action was commenced, that is, 
“brought,” when it was filed in 2007. 
{¶ 20} R.C. 2317.43 applies to all civil actions filed after the statute’s 
effective date of September 13, 2004.  “If there is no clear indication of 
retroactive application, then the statute may only apply to cases which arise 
subsequent to its enactment.”  Kiser v. Coleman, 28 Ohio St.3d 259, 262, 503 
N.E.2d 753 (1986).  We have also held that “[l]aws of a remedial nature providing 
rules of practice, courses of procedure, or methods of review are applicable to any 
proceedings conducted after the adoption of such laws.”  Kilbreath v. Rudy, 16 
Ohio St.2d 70, 242 N.E.2d 658 (1968), paragraph two of the syllabus.  Moreover, 
a statute is properly applied prospectively if it has been enacted after the cause of 
action but before the trial of the case. See R.C. 1.48; Denicola v. Providence 
Hosp., 57 Ohio St.2d 115 at 117-118, 387 N.E.2d 231 (1979). 
{¶ 21} Here, the court of appeals’ concern over retroactive application of 
the statute was unnecessary, for the trial court used a prospective application to 
exclude Dr. Smith’s statement. R.C. 2317.43 took effect on September 13, 2004, 
covering “any civil action brought” after that date.  The Johnsons’ filing of this 
case on July 26, 2007, meant that the statute applied. This interpretation gives 
effect to the plain meaning of the statute, as well as R.C. 1.48’s instruction that 
laws are presumed to apply prospectively.  Denicola, 57 Ohio St.2d 115, 387 
N.E.2d 231; Kilbreath, 16 Ohio St.2d 70, 242 N.E.2d 658. 
D.  No Abuse of Discretion 
{¶ 22} Because we have determined that the statute applies, the next step 
is to determine whether Dr. Smith’s statement was properly excluded.  The court 
January Term, 2013 
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of appeals determined that the statute did not apply and then addressed whether 
the statement was admissible under the Ohio Rules of Evidence.  Johnson v. 
Randall Smith, Inc., 196 Ohio App.3d 722, 2011-Ohio-6000, 965 N.E.2d 344, 
¶ 22.  Decisions involving the admissibility of evidence are reviewed under an 
abuse-of-discretion standard of review.  State v. Hancock, 108 Ohio St.3d 57, 
2006-Ohio-160, 840 N.E.2d 1032.  Similarly, decisions granting or denying a 
motion in limine are reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard of review.  
Illinois Controls, Inc. v. Langham, 70 Ohio St.3d 512, 526, 639 N.E.2d 771 
(1994).  For an abuse of discretion to have occurred, the trial court must have 
taken action that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.  State ex rel. 
Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Akron, 104 Ohio St.3d 399, 2004-Ohio-6557, 
819 N.E.2d 1087, ¶ 59. 
{¶ 23} In this case, the trial court heard testimony from witnesses before 
ruling on the motion in limine.2  Based upon its observation, the court concluded 
that “the statements and gestures and actions are covered under 2317.43.”  The 
court of appeals, in reviewing the decision, did not analyze under an abuse-of-
discretion standard whether the trial court had acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or 
unconscionably in reaching its conclusion. Thus, it was improper to reverse the 
trial court’s decision to exclude Dr. Smith’s statement.  The trial court had 
determined that Dr. Smith was faced with a distressed patient who was upset and 
made a statement that was designed to comfort his patient.  This is precisely the 
type of evidence that R.C. 2317.43 was designed to exclude as evidence of 
liability in a medical-malpractice case. 
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 24} Dr. Smith’s statement was properly excluded pursuant to R.C. 
2317.43.  We therefore reverse the judgment of the Eleventh District Court of 
                                          
 
2 The witnesses were Mrs. Johnson; her daughter, Janine Johnson; and their friend, Amy 
Semprock.   
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Appeals and remand the case to the trial court to reinstate the jury’s verdict and 
the trial court’s judgment. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
PFEIFER and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
Perantinides & Nolan Co. L.P.A., Antonios P. Tsarouhas, and Paul G. 
Perantinides, for appellees. 
 
Bonezzi, Switzer, Murphy, Polito & Hupp Co., L.P.A., Brett C. Perry, 
John S. Polito, and Jason A. Paskan, for appellants. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, Alexandra T. Schimmer, Solicitor 
General, and Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae state of Ohio. 
 
Bonezzi, Switzer, Murphy, Polito & Hupp Co., L.P.A., Jennifer R. Becker, 
and Brian F. Lange, urging reversal for amicus curiae the Academy of Medicine 
of Cleveland & Northern Ohio. 
 
Bricker & Eckler and Anne Marie Sferra, urging reversal for amici curiae 
Ohio Hospital Association, Ohio State Medical Association, and Ohio 
Osteopathic Association. 
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