Case Title: Jeffrey A. Wagner v. Milwaukee County Election Commission

Citation: 2003 WI 103

Docket Number: 2002AP000375-OA

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 103 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-0375-OA 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Wagner,  
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Milwaukee County Election Commission,  
 
Respondent, 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 10, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 9, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins the dissent. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: SYKES, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner there were briefs by Michael A.I. 
Whitcomb and Michael A.I. Whitcomb S.C., Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Michael A. Whitcomb. 
 
For the respondent, State of Wisconsin, the cause was 
argued by Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Howard B. Eisenberg and 
Joseph D. Kearney, Milwaukee, on behalf of Janine P. Geske, and 
there was oral argument by Joseph D. Kearney. 
 
 
2003 WI 103 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-0375-OA  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Wagner,  
 
          Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Milwaukee County Election Commission,  
 
          Respondent, 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 10, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ORIGINAL ACTION for declaratory judgment  Declaration of 
rights; relief denied.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   On February 7, 2002, the Honorable 
Jeffrey A. Wagner (Petitioner), a circuit court judge in 
Milwaukee County, sought leave to commence an original action 
for declaratory judgment regarding the interpretation of Article 
VII, Section 10(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Although this 
court initially determined that it was unable to grant the 
petitioner's request for expedited review, we eventually granted 
the petitioner leave to commence this original action on March 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
2 
 
4, 2002.  In this action, we are presented with two related 
issues.  First, we consider whether Article VII, Section 10(1) 
of the Wisconsin Constitution prohibits a judge or justice of a 
court of record in this state from holding a nonjudicial 
position of public trust during the entire period of time for 
which he was elected and entitled to serve as a judge or 
justice, even if the person resigns from the judicial position 
before the term would otherwise expire.  Second, if such a 
prohibition exists, the petitioner asserts that it deprives a 
resigned judge or justice of liberty and equal protection of the 
law.   
¶2 
We conclude that Article VII, Section 10(1) is more 
than a dual office holding provision and does, in fact, prohibit 
a judge or justice from holding a nonjudicial position of public 
trust during the entire term for which he or she was originally 
elected, not simply during the judge or justice’s actual time of 
service in the position.  We further find that such a 
restriction does not violate petitioner’s constitutional rights 
to liberty and equal protection of the law. 
I 
¶3 
The facts in this action are not disputed.  On March 
26, 2002, this court ordered the parties to this matter to 
submit a Joint Stipulation of Facts, which they did on April 11, 
2002.  Other important facts emerge from the procedural history 
of the case.  The petitioner is presently serving his third term 
as a circuit judge for Milwaukee County.  His term commenced in 
August 2000 and expires in August 2006.  The petitioner may 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
3 
 
desire to resign his position as circuit judge and run for the 
office of County Executive of Milwaukee County and, if elected, 
hold the office of County Executive of Milwaukee County.  
Respondent Milwaukee County Election Commission is the agency 
with whom declarations of candidacy for the position of 
Milwaukee County Executive must be filed.  If it were clear that 
Article VII, Section 10(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution 
precluded the petitioner from holding the position of County 
Executive prior to August 2006, the Milwaukee County Election 
Commission would refuse to place the petitioner’s name on the 
ballot pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 8.30(1)(c) (1999-2000).1 
¶4 
As noted, the petitioner first sought leave to 
commence an original action in this court on February 7, 2002.  
At the time, he expressed specific interest in becoming a 
candidate 
in 
an 
upcoming 
election 
for 
Milwaukee 
County 
Executive.  On February 26, 2002, the respondent Milwaukee 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin Stat. § 8.30(1)(c) (1999-2000) provides: 
Candidates ineligible for ballot placement.  (1) 
Except as otherwise provided in this section, the official 
or agency with whom declarations of candidacy are required 
to be filed may refuse to place the candidate’s name on the 
ballot: 
 . . . . 
(c) If elected the candidate could not qualify for the 
office 
sought 
within 
the 
time 
allowed 
by 
law 
for 
qualification 
because 
of 
age, 
residence, 
or 
other 
impediment. 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
4 
 
County Election Commission filed a response indicating that it 
neither supported nor opposed the petition by Judge Wagner.  The 
deadline for filing nomination papers for the position of 
Milwaukee County Executive was March 5, 2002.  In an order dated 
February 27, 2002, this court stated that because there was no 
respondent taking a position adverse to the petitioner, the 
court would be unable to expeditiously resolve the action before 
the March 5 deadline.  However, the court further ordered that 
if the petitioner wished to proceed, it would grant the 
petitioner’s request to commence an original action and invite 
the Office of the Attorney General to serve as the respondent.   
¶5 
On March 1, 2002, the petitioner informed the court 
that he wished to proceed.  By order dated March 4, 2002, this 
court granted the petitioner leave to commence an original 
action seeking declaratory relief.  It further ordered that the 
Office of the Attorney General advise the court if it would 
accept the court’s invitation to serve as respondent.  The 
Office of the Attorney General agreed to serve as a respondent 
in this original action on March 14, 2002.  On March 29, 2002, 
this court granted Professor Janine P. Geske’s motion for leave 
to file a nonparty brief. 
II 
¶6 
Before reaching the merits of this dispute, we address 
the issue of justiciability raised by the amicus in this case.  
The amicus argues that no justiciable controversy exists in this 
action and that even if such a controversy does exist, this is 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
5 
 
an 
inappropriate 
case 
for 
the 
court 
to 
exercise 
its 
jurisdiction.  We cannot agree. 
¶7 
Wisconsin Stat.  § 806.04, the Uniform Declaratory 
Judgments Act, provides, in part, that "[c]ourts of record 
within their respective jurisdictions shall have the power to 
declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not 
further relief is or could be claimed."  The statute goes on to 
enumerate some specific powers conferred to courts, but in 
Wis. Stat. § 806.04(5), explicitly notes that these enumerations 
do not limit the general power conferred "in any proceeding 
where declaratory relief is sought, in which a judgment or 
decree will terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty."  
In the present case, a determination by this court will end 
uncertainty and terminate the controversy that exists regarding 
the interpretation of this constitutional provision. 
¶8 
This court has stated the requisites for declaratory 
judgment on previous occasions.  In Loy v. Bunderson, 107 
Wis. 2d 400, 409-10, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982), this court held that 
a 
justiciable 
controversy 
must 
exist 
in 
an 
action 
for 
declaratory judgment.  The court then went on to state that a 
justiciable controversy is defined by four factors:   
(1) A controversy in which a claim of right is 
asserted against one who has an interest in contesting 
it.  (2) The controversy must be between persons whose 
interests 
are 
adverse. 
 
(3) 
The 
party 
seeking 
declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the 
controversy——that is to say, a legally protectible 
interest.  (4) The issue involved in the controversy 
must be ripe for judicial determination.   
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
6 
 
Id. at 410 (internal quotations omitted); see also Slawek v. 
Stroh, 62 Wis. 2d 295, 306, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974). 
¶9 
The amicus suggests that this action is moot and the 
factors above not satisfied because the election in which the 
petitioner specifically expressed interest has already taken 
place.  We do not find this argument convincing.  First, the 
petitioner and respondents have stipulated that the petitioner 
maintains an interest in being a candidate for the position of 
Milwaukee County Executive sometime before his term is due to 
expire.  The State, of course, contends that the Wisconsin 
Constitution prohibits the petitioner from holding such a 
position before August 2006.  In Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 
957, 962 (1982), a case similar to the one at hand, the United 
States Supreme Court held that a Texas Justice of the Peace's 
claim that a constitutional provision made him ineligible even 
to become a candidate was sufficient to create a case or 
controversy and was not merely hypothetical. 
¶10 Second, we agree with the parties' stipulation that 
the petitioner has responsibilities to adhere "to his oath as an 
attorney and a circuit judge to uphold and abide by the laws of 
the state of Wisconsin."  (Joint Stipulation of Facts at 2.)  
Before running for Milwaukee County Executive, or any other 
nonjudicial position of public trust, he is right to ascertain 
what those laws require.  It would be bad policy for this court 
to force a public servant, particularly a judge such as the 
petitioner here, to risk violating ethical rules and the 
constitution he has sworn to uphold in order to determine his 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
7 
 
eligibility to hold a nonjudicial position of public trust.  
Because the petitioner still has an interest in holding the 
position of Milwaukee County Executive or another nonjudicial 
office of public trust before his term expires in 2006, and 
because he has a present interest in fulfilling his obligations 
as an attorney and a circuit judge, we do not find that the case 
is moot.  A decision by the court in this case will affect the 
decisions regarding candidacy to be made by the petitioner, and 
the responses by the State and Milwaukee County Election 
Commission. 
¶11 Additionally, this court has recognized circumstances 
where it is appropriate to make a determination in an otherwise 
moot case.  State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 209 
Wis. 2d 112, 120 n.6, 561 N.W.2d 729 (1997).  In Kruzicki, this 
court held that exceptions to the mootness rule exist "when the 
issues presented are of great public importance, or the question 
is capable and likely of repetition and yet evades appellate 
review because the appellate process usually cannot be completed 
in time to have a practical effect on the parties."  Id. 
(internal citations omitted).  In In re Guardianship of L.W. v. 
L.E. Phillips Career Development Center, 167 Wis. 2d 53, 63, 66-
68, 482 N.W.2d 60 (1992),2 this court used similar standards to 
                                                 
2 See also State ex rel. La Crosse Tribune v. Cir. Ct. for 
La Crosse County, 115 Wis. 2d 220, 228-29, 340 N.W.2d 460 
(1983), stating: 
[I]t is hardly in the interest of judicial economy or 
in the interest of the law-declaring function of this 
court if matters of serious public concern which are 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
8 
 
get to the merits of a case where the rights of a patient in a 
persistent vegetative state were at issue, but the patient died 
of natural causes while the case was pending. 
¶12 This court granted the petitioner in this case leave 
to commence an original action, despite its awareness of the 
fact that the specific election in which the petitioner 
originally expressed interest was over.  In our orders regarding 
acceptance of this case, we have already acknowledged the 
importance of the issues in this action and the necessity of 
deciding the issues because of the danger and tendency that this 
type of case could evade review.  See, e.g., Joyner v. Mofford, 
706 F.2d 1523, 1527 (9th Cir. 1983)(holding, in a challenge to a 
so-called resign-to-run clause,3 that such election cases were of 
the type to evade review).4 
                                                                                                                                                             
likely to cause judicial disputes in the future are 
not resolved when a factual basis on which a judicial 
declaration may be made to guide future conduct is 
presently before the court. 
3 Resign-to-run clauses are today often found in state 
constitutions.  Such a provision requires that an official 
resign his or her position in order to run for another office.  
If the person does not voluntarily vacate and runs for office, 
the former position is automatically deemed vacated.  See, e.g., 
Ariz. Const., art. XXII, § 18, art. XXII § 28 (2001); Joyner v. 
Mofford, 706 F.2d 1523, 1526 (9th Cir. 1983). 
4 The court in Joyner stated: 
Election cases like the present one come within the 
type of controversy that is "capable of repetition, 
yet evading review."  "Evading review" for the purpose 
of the exception  [to mootness] need not mean that 
review is impossible.  It only means that in the 
ordinary course of affairs it is very likely to escape 
review.  Appellate courts are frequently too slow to 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
9 
 
¶13 In our initial denial of the petitioner's request, 
this court acknowledged that the issue raised is important and 
"an appropriate subject for the exercise of this court's 
original jurisdiction."  This court also noted:  "This petition 
presents the kind of issue that is capable of repetition, yet 
evades review."  The court went on to state:  "For that reason, 
we are prepared to grant the petition for leave to file an 
original action."  The facts of this case support such 
reasoning.  Here, the court was unable to decide this case in 
time to allow the petitioner to meet the filing deadline for 
nomination papers with respect to the election in which the 
petitioner expressed particular interest.  Such a situation is 
likely to recur.  While the timing of some elections could allow 
a candidate to bring an action to court for resolution, many 
will not.  Additionally, some situations potentially affected by 
this provision could arise overnight and require immediate 
responses.  The interpretation of this constitutional provision 
forces 
review 
of 
the 
structure 
and 
independence 
of 
the 
judiciary——issues 
that 
strike 
at 
the 
very 
heart 
of 
our 
democratic institutions.  As shown by the facts of this action, 
this provision affects the rights and obligations of those who 
                                                                                                                                                             
process appeals before an election determines the fate 
of a candidate.  If such cases were rendered moot by 
the occurrence of an election, many constitutionally 
suspect 
election 
laws——including 
the 
one 
under 
consideration 
here——could 
never 
reach 
appellate 
review.  Id. at 1527 (citing Rosario v. Rockefeller, 
410 U.S. 752, 756 n.5 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 
U.S. 330, 333 n.2 (1972)). 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
10 
 
occupy positions in this state's judiciary.  The facts of this 
case are sufficient for this court to make a determination on 
the merits, and because the issues raised are so important, it 
is appropriate that this court make such a determination.   
¶14 The same reasoning applies to the argument by amicus 
that this action is not ripe for resolution.  We find that the 
facts here are sufficient to require a determination by this 
court.  As recently noted by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, 
in dealing with the issue of ripeness in the situation of a pre-
enforcement challenge to a law, "Once the gun has been cocked 
and aimed and the finger is on the trigger, it is not necessary 
to wait until the bullet strikes to invoke the Declaratory 
Judgment Act."  Stern v. United States Dist. Ct. for the 
District of Massachusetts, 214 F.3d 4, 10-11 (1st Cir. 2000) 
(quoting ANR Pipeline Co. v. Corp. Comm’n, 860 F.2d 1571, 1578 
(10th Cir. 1988)).  Here, the petitioner was prepared to become 
a candidate in an election, but the wheels of justice could not 
turn fast enough to make a determination before candidates had 
to declare themselves for the election.   
¶15 It is not this court's purpose to disrupt the flow of 
the elective process, nor is it desirable for this court to 
force potential candidates into an untenable position in which 
they must risk violating the very constitution they are 
entrusted to uphold in order to seek another position from which 
to serve the public.  As such, it is appropriate that we resolve 
the question as it arises under the facts presented in this 
case.  There is a core institutional interest in protecting the 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
11 
 
integrity of the judiciary by making a determination in this 
case.  This issue must be resolved so that all those serving as 
judges and justices of courts of record in this state may know 
and understand what is required of them under the Wisconsin 
Constitution. 
¶16 Finally, the amicus asserts that there is a lack of 
adversity in this case.  We do not find that this action is 
merely an advisory opinion on an academic question upon which 
the parties have a convenient difference of opinion.  As the 
State noted at oral argument, the Office of the Attorney General 
represents the interests of the people of the State of 
Wisconsin.  As will be shown, the people have made clear their 
interpretation 
and 
intentions 
regarding 
this 
particular 
provision of the Wisconsin Constitution.  As such, it is the 
duty of the State’s representative in this action to protect the 
interests of the citizenry.  That position is adverse to the 
position taken by the petitioner, and the State has an interest 
in preventing the petitioner’s claims of a right to resign and 
hold the position of county executive from becoming the accepted 
interpretation.  It is true that the Milwaukee County Election 
Commission declined to take an adverse position in this case, 
claiming that it did not have the power to do so as a mere 
ministerial entity.  The State, however, through the Office of 
the Attorney General, is an appropriate respondent in this 
action. 
¶17 This court noted in Loy, 107 Wis. 2d at 407:  "The 
power of a court to declare rights is broad in scope."  Based on 
No. 
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12 
 
the factors discussed above, we find that a justiciable 
controversy exists in this case and that it is an appropriate 
case for this court to exercise its original jurisdiction.  We 
therefore move to a determination of the merits of this action. 
III 
¶18 We have been called upon in this action to interpret 
the meaning of the phrase "during the term for which elected" as 
used 
in 
Article 
VII, 
Section 
10(1) 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  The interpretation of a constitutional provision 
is subject to de novo review.  State v. City of Oak Creek, 2000 
WI 9, ¶18, 232 Wis. 2d 612, 605 N.W.2d 526 (citing State v. 
Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 226, 234, 580 N.W.2d 171 (1998); Thompson 
v. Craney, 199 Wis. 2d 674, 680, 546 N.W.2d 123 (1996)(internal 
citation 
omitted)). 
 
When 
determining 
a 
constitutional 
provision's 
meaning, 
this 
court 
typically 
examines 
three 
sources:  "the plain meaning of the words in the context used; 
the constitutional debates and the practices in existence at the 
time of the writing of the constitution; and the earliest 
interpretation of the provision by the legislature as manifested 
in the first law passed following adoption."  Oak Creek, 232 
Wis. 2d 612, ¶18. 
¶19 The petitioner claims that Article VII, Section 10(1) 
of the Wisconsin Constitution does not prohibit a circuit judge 
or other judge or justice of a court of record in this state 
from holding a nonjudicial position of public trust, so long as 
he or she resigns from the judicial position.  The petitioner 
asserts that this provision merely prohibits dual office 
No. 
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13 
 
holding.  However, based on our examination of the relevant 
sources, we conclude that this provision restricts more than the 
simultaneous holding of judicial and nonjudicial offices of 
public trust.  This provision prohibits a circuit judge such as 
the petitioner from holding a nonjudicial office of public trust 
during the full period of time for which he or she is elected to 
serve in a judicial position, even if the judge chooses to 
resign before that term would otherwise expire.  Were we to 
interpret 
this 
provision 
as 
only 
a 
dual 
office 
holding 
restriction, the phrase "during the term for which elected" 
would be rendered meaningless.  The period of time constituting 
the "term for which elected" as used in Article VII, Section 10 
is set when a judge or justice is elected, and is thereafter 
unalterable by means of resignation. 
A.  Plain Meaning 
¶20 We begin with the plain meaning of the words of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, Article VII, Section 10(1).  During the 
century and a half this provision has existed, numerous sources, 
including this court, have had the opportunity to interpret the 
language at issue generally, and the provision at issue 
specifically.  This extensive history guides us to the result we 
reach today.   
¶21 The language of the constitutional provision itself 
lends support to our conclusion that Article VII, Section 10(1) 
restricts judges and justices from holding nonjudicial offices 
of public trust "during the term for which elected" regardless 
of whether or not they resign from judicial office.  In its 
No. 
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14 
 
present 
form, 
Article 
VII, 
Section 
10 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution states:   
Judges:  eligibility to office.  (1)  No justice of 
the supreme court or judge of any court of record 
shall hold any other office of public trust, except a 
judicial 
office, 
during 
the 
term 
for 
which 
elected. . . .  
There is a corresponding provision in the Wisconsin Statutes.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 757.02(2) states:  "The judge of any court of 
record in this state shall be ineligible to hold any office of 
public trust, except a judicial office, during the term for 
which he or she was elected or appointed."  The development of 
this statutory provision will be discussed in a later section. 
¶22 Article VII, Section 10 was instituted as part of the 
original constitution adopted by Wisconsin citizens in 1848.  At 
the time of its adoption, Section 10 stated: 
Each of the judges of the supreme and circuit courts 
shall receive a salary, payable quarterly, of not less 
than one thousand five hundred dollars annually; they 
shall receive no fees of office or other compensation 
than their salaries; they shall hold no office of 
public trust, except a judicial office, during the 
term for which they are respectively elected, and all 
votes for either of them for any office except a 
judicial office, given by the legislature or the 
people, shall be void. . . .  
Wis. Const. art. VII, § 10 (1848)(emphasis added); see also, 
Tenney, H.A., Smith, J.Y., Lambert, David & Tenney, H.W., 
Journal of the Convention to Form a Constitution for the State 
of Wisconsin, With a Sketch of the Debates, (1848) at 611-12; 
Milo 
M. 
Quaife, 
The 
Attainment 
of 
Statehood 
11 
(1928) 
(proclaiming the voters' acceptance of the constitution). 
No. 
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15 
 
¶23 The 
committee at 
the first 
state 
constitutional 
convention in 1846 initially reported Article VII, Section 10, 
in relevant part, as follows: 
[T]hey shall hold no other office or public trust, and 
all votes for either of them for any office except 
that of judge of the supreme or circuit court given by 
the legislature or the people shall be void.  If any 
judge shall resign his office he shall not be eligible 
or appointed to any office within one year after such 
resignation. . . .    
Milo M. Quaife, The Convention of 1846 293 (1919). 
¶24 The convention adopted a modified version of that 
provision in the 1846 constitution.  That version of Article 
VII, Section 10 stated: 
Sec. 10. Each of the judges of the supreme and circuit 
courts shall . . . hold no other office of public 
trust, and all votes for either of them for any office 
except that of judge of the supreme or circuit court, 
given by the legislature or the people, shall be void.  
If any judge shall resign his office, he shall not be 
eligible or appointed to any office within two years 
after such resignation. . . .  
Tenney, Journal of the Convention to Form a Constitution (1848) 
at 637.  One significant change between these two drafts is the 
increase from one to two years of the restriction on judges and 
justices following resignation from office.  Both versions of 
Section 10 illustrate a desire by the drafters to restrict 
judges even after resignation.  This first attempt at a 
constitution for Wisconsin was rejected by the people.  Milo M. 
Quaife, The Struggle Over Ratification, 1846-1847 697 (1920) 
(reprinting the governor's 1847 proclamation that the 1846 
constitution was not adopted).   
No. 
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16 
 
¶25 The dissent intimates that because the first attempt 
at ratification failed, the discussion from those debates on the 
subject of an elected judiciary is largely unpersuasive.  
Dissent, ¶¶89-90, 97.  We vehemently disagree.  As noted by one 
scholar: 
Although the constitution framed by this [the 1846] 
convention 
was rejected 
by the 
people, 
extended 
discussion of its proceedings is appropriate.  In 
essential 
details 
the 
1848 
constitution 
followed 
closely the rejected predecessor.  Also the framing of 
the 1846 constitution brought more sharply into focus 
the vital political, economic and social issues of the 
period than did its successor.  After the 1846 
convention, 
that 
of 
1848, 
in 
matter 
of 
public 
interest, was largely an anticlimax. 
Ray A. Brown, The Making of the Wisconsin Constitution, 1949 
Wis. L. Rev. 648, 655 n.* (hereinafter Part I).  We believe the 
debate surrounding elected judges and the best method of 
achieving an independent judiciary was one that began in 1846 
and continued its evolution through the second constitutional 
convention.5 
¶26 Whether judges should be appointed or elected was one 
of the issues extensively debated during the 1846 constitutional 
convention.  Quaife, The Convention of 1846 at 287-88.  Mr. 
Charles M. Baker, the reporter of the committee on the 
organization and functions of the judiciary, spoke upon the 
                                                 
5 As one authority noted:  "The debate on the judiciary 
article was largely an echo of that in the 1846 convention on 
the same article with the result that in essential respects the 
article in the 1848 document was the same as that in the earlier 
constitution."  Ray A. Brown, The Making of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, 1952 Wis. L. Rev. 23, 36. 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
17 
 
matter when the article on the judiciary was reported to the 
convention: 
But there is one feature in the judicial system 
proposed for adoption by a majority of the committee 
so prominent and important and upon which so decided a 
difference of opinion exists that it demands a more 
minute and extended examination.  It is the election 
of the judges by the people.  This principle lies at 
the foundation of the whole superstructure, and it is 
of the first importance to ascertain whether it is 
sound and correct.  It is conceded by all that 
government naturally resolves itself into the three 
branches, executive, legislative, and judicial, and 
that their appropriate spheres of action are so 
diverse that there is both a propriety and a necessity 
for keeping each not only distinct from but so far as 
possible entirely independent of the other.  It is 
also an axiom of government in this country that the 
people are the source of all political power, and to 
them should their officers and rulers be responsible 
for 
the 
faithful 
discharge 
of 
their 
respective 
duties. . . .   The judicial power, a distinct and 
coequal department, which should be wholly independent 
of the others, instead of emanating from the people, 
the true source of all political power, has been 
dependent 
for 
existence 
upon 
the 
executive 
or 
legislative will, or perhaps both.  The necessary 
result, in a measure, must be the dependence of the 
judiciary upon one or both of the other branches of 
government and its independence of the people. . . .    
Id.  From this it is clear that the committee was intensely 
concerned about creating and supporting a truly independent 
judiciary and proposed that an elective judiciary would be 
better fit for such purpose.  Mr. Baker went on to discuss 
objections to the elected judges: 
Another objection to the elective mode is that 
the judges may be induced to render unjust decisions 
in order to secure a reelection.  This supposes the 
preexistence of a weak and corrupt judge, that the 
parties interested are of opposite politics, or that 
No. 
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18 
 
one has very considerable and the other very little 
political influence, and that a decision is to be made 
not long before an election. . . .   Nothing in this 
country would sooner seal the political doom of any 
judge, by all parties and every honest man, than the 
attempt to bend his decisions from the line of justice 
to make political capital. . . .   He alone can be a 
popular judge who is honest, impartial, decided, and 
fearless; who holds with a steady hand the scales of 
justice, and will suffer no improper influences to 
approach them; whose judgment, though it may somewhat 
waiver 
and 
tremble 
in 
doubt, 
ultimately 
points 
steadily 
to 
the 
pole 
of 
eternal 
truth 
and 
justice. . . .  
See id. at 290.  See also Quaife, The Convention of 1846 at 587-
603 (reprinting additional portions of the debate on the 
judiciary). 
¶27 Mr. Edward G. Ryan6 brought a different perspective to 
the convention when he spoke of the proposed elective judiciary. 
Mr. Ryan was initially a member of the judiciary committee,7 but 
asked to be excused from the committee after a heated debate 
over an increase of the number of people on the committee.  See 
id. at 62.  Nevertheless, Mr. Ryan was a prominent figure in the 
convention as a whole, and a vocal participant in the debates 
                                                 
6 Edward G. Ryan served as Chief Justice of the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court from 1874-1880.  Wisconsin Legislative Reference 
Bureau, State of Wisconsin Blue Book 714 (2001-2002).  He was 
appointed by Governor William Taylor in June 1874 to fill the 
seat left absent when Justice Luther S. Dixon resigned.  Alfons 
J. Beitzinger, Edward G. Ryan, Lion of the Law, 106-10 (1960).  
He subsequently retained the position in the 1875 election, and 
continued serving as Chief Justice until his death in 1880.  Id. 
at 121, 148, 169.  At least one historian has credited Ryan with 
being the "father" of the judicial disqualification provision.  
Id. at 176-77 n.13. 
7 See Milo M. Quaife, The Convention of 1846 58 (1919). 
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02-0375-OA   
 
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over the structure of the judiciary.  See Brown, Part I, at 666-
69 (noting Ryan as one of the members of the convention that 
"deserve[s] particular mention" and discussing Ryan's views in 
the discussion of the judiciary article).8  Mr. Ryan thought 
there were problems with both systems, elective or appointed.9  
                                                 
8 An examination of the debates at the first constitutional 
convention makes it apparent that Mr. Ryan was a major figure in 
the debates on the judiciary.  See, e.g., Quaife, The Convention 
of 1846 at 590-603.  As will be seen in our discussion, it is 
clear Mr. Ryan disagreed with elements of the draft provision 
created by the committee, but it is also clear that Mr. Ryan had 
significant influence during the debates.   
9 The dissent takes issue with our discussion of Mr. Ryan's 
point of view.  The dissent states:  "[The majority] fails to 
note . . . that Ryan's proposal was for a judiciary appointed by 
the governor." Dissent, ¶91 n.1.  The dissent also goes so far 
as to suggest:  "Perhaps [the majority] does not realize that 
these statements [from the first constitutional convention] were 
made in a speech promoting the merits of an appointed judiciary, 
a 
position 
which 
was 
defeated 
in 
both 
constitutional 
conventions."  Dissent, ¶92.  The majority is well aware of 
Ryan's doubts about an elected judiciary.  However, we note 
again that Ryan had qualms about both systems and during the 
first convention, he put forth proposals that he felt would work 
best.  A description of the convention proceedings on November 
30, 1846, validates this:  
Mr. Ryan said that he had not voted for the amendment 
for simple appointment; he could not do it; he knew 
too well all the evils of the old system.  He was 
opposed to election; he was also opposed to simple 
appointment on the old plan.  Much reflection on the 
difficulties of both plans had led his mind to the 
principles embodied in his present proposition.  This 
proposition avoiding altogether the difficulties of 
election 
seemed 
to 
him 
to 
avoid 
also 
all 
the 
objections of weight to the system of appointment. 
Quaife, The Convention of 1846 at 590-91. 
No. 
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20 
 
See Quaife, The Convention of 1846 at 587.  He recommended 
several changes to the reported proposal.  Id. at 587-88.  Among 
other recommendations, Mr. Ryan specifically moved for the 
proposed 
articles 
to 
be 
returned 
to 
the 
committee 
for 
consideration of several matters, including his recommendation 
that "[n]o judge [would] be eligible to any office, except 
judicial, for the term for which he is appointed judge."  Id. at 
589. 
 Although the motion 
to recommit the 
article was 
subsequently rejected, there is uncanny similarity between the 
language proposed by Mr. Ryan and the language that eventually 
found its way into the constitution ratified by the people.  
Even in the 1846 draft put before the people, a provision 
specifically restricted judges from holding other office after 
resignation.   
¶28 On November 30, 1846, Mr. Ryan spoke again about the 
method for selecting the judiciary.  He again emphasized several 
principles, including that a judge should not be eligible to 
other 
nonjudicial 
offices 
for 
"the 
full 
term 
of 
his 
appointment."  Id. at 591.  He emphasized the importance of an 
independent judiciary, which he thought impossible if the judges 
were too often subject to election by the people.  He stated:   
                                                                                                                                                             
 
The 
dissent 
seems 
to 
suggest 
that 
the 
majority's 
interpretation rises or falls upon whether those that supported 
the type of phrase at issue here were in favor of or against an 
elected judiciary.  Dissent, ¶¶90-92.  Our whole point, however, 
is that the constitutional debates led to a compromised solution 
with which proponents of both systems could live, provided 
sufficient safeguards such as the section in issue here.  
No. 
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21 
 
Sir, in this system it is not the people I 
distrust, but the judges to be chosen by the people; 
it is not the choice of the people so much, as the 
effect of the choice upon the judges.  This objection 
combines with it the short terms of election.  And 
this, sir, is my grand distrust of the elective 
system. 
 . . . Elected by the suffrages of the people, 
for a short term, with the hope of reelection or 
promotion, the political officer looks back forever 
upon his constituents, is inquisitive of the popular 
sentiment, full of anxious regard for the popular 
will, feels the public pulse and counts his own 
healthy when it beats responsively to that.  In 
political office, this is right, this is admirable.  
It is the vitality of the representative system that 
the representative should thus forever look back from 
his own judgment to the will of his people, and thus 
anxiously ascertaining should faithfully execute the 
delegated will of those who chose him for his power 
and inclination to obey them.  But that which is the 
vitality of political representation will be the 
corruption of the judiciary. . . .   Man on the bench 
and man in political office are the same in nature, 
subject, if exposed, to the same influences . . . .  
Elect the judges by the people, for short terms, with 
the hope of reelection or promotion——sir, the judge 
will cease to be the representative of truth and right 
and justice alone; he will be the representative of 
the people and will represent the popular judgment, 
when there is one, not his own.  He, too, will 
remember 
who 
elected 
him 
and 
who 
must 
reelect 
him; . . . and, sitting on the seat of justice, her 
representative, he will look forth to mark the blowing 
of the popular breeze and will steer the course of 
public justice by the popular current . . . . 
. . . .  
I do not say that there will be no exceptions to 
this influence; I do not say that the choice of the 
people will never fall upon a man of a high strength 
of character and stern integrity of mind, above and 
beyond all such influence. . . .   But I say that this 
is 
the 
tendency 
of 
the 
system, 
the 
inevitable 
tendency . . . . 
No. 
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22 
 
Id. at 597-99.  These statements show a distrust of the elective 
system, 
particularly 
with 
short 
terms 
for 
such 
judges.10  
Although Mr. Ryan failed in his attempts to recommit the 
proposal, he did have supporters, and the product, Article VII, 
Section 10, that emerged from the 1846 convention appears, in 
all respects, to be a compromise of the two more extreme views 
expressed above.  The 1846 constitution provided that judges 
were to be elected, but it also placed limitations upon those 
serving to isolate them from the sway of popular politics.   
¶29 As noted, the constitution that emerged from the first 
convention was rejected.  However, a second constitutional 
convention met and the constitution adopted at this convention 
was ratified by the people in 1848.  During the second 
convention, on December 24, 1847, the Committee on the Judiciary 
reported to the convention a new version of Article VII, Section 
10, stating, in relevant part: 
They shall hold no other office of public trust, and 
all votes for either of them for any office, except 
that of judge of the supreme or circuit court, given 
by the legislature or the people shall be void. 
Tenney, Journal of the Convention to Form a Constitution (1848) 
at 67.  Only one amendment had explanation:   
                                                 
10 The divide over the method of selecting judges was 
reflected not only in the debates of the first convention, but 
also in public opinion of the time. As one author noted:  "Those 
who favored the elected judiciary were in the majority, though 
many supported the time honored practice of appointment.  All, 
however, recognized the need for a strong and independent 
judiciary."  Ray A. Brown, The Making of the Wisconsin 
Constitution, 1949 Wis. L. Rev. 648, 656 (emphasis added.) 
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23 
 
Mr. 
KILBOURN 
moved 
so 
to 
amend 
that 
the 
disqualification of a judge from being elected to any 
other office, should not apply to a judicial office.  
His object was to leave the restriction so that a 
judge of the district court might be elected a judge 
of the supreme court.   
The amendment was adopted. 
Id. at 422.  However, the final draft of the constitution that 
was adopted by the convention and eventually ratified by the 
citizenry included yet another variation in the text of Article 
VII, Section 10, adding the phrase now at the center of our 
discussion: 
[T]hey shall hold no office of public trust, except a 
judicial office, during the term for which they are 
respectively elected, and all votes for either of them 
for any office except a judicial office, given by the 
legislature or the people, shall be void. . . .  
Id. at 611-12.  During this second convention, the debates fell 
once again upon the subject of term length for judges.  See 
Quaife, 
The 
Attainment 
of 
Statehood 
at 
634-37, 
692-97 
(reprinting convention debates on the subject of the length of 
judicial terms of office).  On January 19, 1848, Mr. Chase, a 
delegate to the second convention, offered an amendment to 
reduce the term of office of the judges from ten to five years.  
See id. at 634.  Many other delegates then offered statements on 
pros and cons of this amendment.  Mr. Chase asserted:  "Ten 
years seemed to place the judiciary practically beyond the power 
of the people; and some gentlemen even advocated so long a term 
for that very purpose."  Id. at 635.  Mr. Dunn, on the other 
hand, suggested long terms might be better: 
No. 
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24 
 
The doctrine of short terms and low salaries was a 
favorite one with many, and in general he believed in 
it.  Yet in the case of judges there was not the same 
necessity for a frequent recurrence to the people as 
in the case of political officers. . . .  To secure 
good judges it was necessary to offer sufficient 
inducements for men of the highest order of talent to 
devote their lives to that study. . . .  Another 
reason for long terms was that too frequent elections 
would place before judges temptations to swerve from 
duty and to seek popularity as a means of reelection, 
in ways which were unbecoming to the dignity of their 
station.  A judge, after giving up his other pursuits 
in life, and in a measure unfitting himself for them, 
would very naturally desire a reelection as a means of 
subsistence. 
Id.  Again, quite a split in opinion emerged.  While no 
explanation of the particular amendment adding the "during the 
term for which elected" phrase appears in the written accounts 
of the convention,11 we believe the concerns raised at the 
conventions and the various drafts of the constitution can lead 
to only one logical conclusion.  All of the drafts from the 1846 
convention contained a provision prohibiting judges from holding 
a nonjudicial office of public trust for a period of time even 
after resignation.  The second draft lengthened the period of 
prohibition.  The first draft from the second convention 
contained no such provision, but the language was significantly 
revised into the version that went before the people.  The 
latter, the draft that became part of our original constitution, 
again contained a description of the period of prohibition.  The 
drafters of the constitution voiced concerns over the evils of 
                                                 
11 The fact of the amendment, at least, was noted.  See Milo 
M. Quaife, The Attainment of Statehood 696 (1928).   
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
25 
 
an elected judiciary and long debated over the appropriate term 
lengths for various judges.  Given the nature of the debates and 
the text itself of early versions of the constitution, it is 
clear to us that the drafters considered various periods of 
restriction and eventually settled on "during the term for which 
they are respectively elected."  The very fact that such 
restrictions 
were 
written 
into 
the 
constitutional 
drafts 
indicates a compromise between those favoring an elected 
judiciary and those leery of the elective system.  The judiciary 
was to be elected, but strict restrictions were put into place 
to preserve its independence.  While today such a provision 
might not seem the best option to some, at the time and for the 
150-plus 
years 
since 
its 
creation, 
this 
provision 
has 
effectively served to preserve the independence and integrity of 
this state's judiciary.  
¶30 Article VII, Section 10 has been amended only twice.  
The first amendment, adopted in 1912, dealt with the salary of 
judges and had no relation to the eligibility prohibition at 
issue here.12  See 1909 Joint Resolution 34; ch. 665, Laws of 
1911; 1911 Joint Resolution 24.   
                                                 
12 The section, as then amended, read: 
Section 10.  Each of the judges of the supreme and 
circuit courts shall receive a salary, payable * * * 
at such time as the legislature shall fix, of not less 
than 
one 
thousand 
five 
hundred 
dollars 
annually . . . they shall hold no office of public 
trust, except a judicial office, during the term for 
which they are respectively elected, and all votes for 
either of them for any office, except a judicial 
No. 
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26 
 
¶31 In 1977, as part of a broader court reform that 
included the creation of the court of appeals, the text of 
Article VII, Section 10 was again modified.  This amendment 
split Section 10 into two subsections and Section 10(1), the 
provision now at issue, emerged in the form it retains today, 
stating, in relevant part: 
Section 10. (1) No justice of the supreme court or 
judge of any court of record shall hold any other 
office of public trust, except a judicial office, 
during the term for which elected. . . .  
Wis. Const. art. VII, § 10(1) (1977).  See also 1975 Enrolled 
Joint Resolution 13; 1977 Enrolled Joint Resolution 7.  
¶32 In 1995, Wisconsin voters were presented with another 
opportunity to amend Article VII, Section 10; however, this time 
they declined to do so.  In April 1995, Wisconsin voters 
rejected a referendum under which the phrase "during the term 
for which elected" would have been eliminated from Section 
10(1).  See 1995 Assembly Joint Resolution 15.  Because the 
referendum failed, though, the phrase "during the term for which 
elected" remains part of the constitution.  
¶33 This phrase has survived all the various changes to 
this section of the constitution.  As the 1995 proposed 
amendment makes clear, had the drafters intended only a 
                                                                                                                                                             
office, given by the legislature or the people, shall 
be void. 
Wis. Const., art. VII, §  10 (1912) (emphasis added to 
amended text). 
 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
27 
 
prohibition of simultaneous office holding, this phrase would be 
unnecessary 
and, 
in 
fact, 
stand 
in 
the 
way 
of 
such 
interpretation.  Our constitution was adopted directly by the 
people and for that reason its words should be construed in the 
manner most consistent with common understanding.  State ex rel. 
Martin v. Heil, 242 Wis. 41, 55, 7 N.W.2d 375 (1942); Payne v. 
Racine, 217 Wis. 550, 555, 259 N.W. 437 (1935).  Keeping this in 
mind, it is logical that were this phrase not in Article VII, 
Section 10, the restriction would seem to apply to those who 
held the stated offices and only while they held those offices.  
If one resigns from the bench, the entitlement to the office is 
surrendered.  Why is the phrase included, if not to define the 
period of prohibition?  The drafters clearly could have created 
only a dual office holding prohibition, had they so intended.  
They did so elsewhere in the constitution.  For example, they 
plainly created such a provision in Article IV, Section 13: 
No person being a member of congress, or holding any 
military or civil office under the United States shall 
be eligible to a seat in the legislature; and if any 
person shall, after his election as a member of the 
legislature, be elected to congress, or be appointed 
to 
any 
office, 
civil, 
or 
military, 
under 
the 
government 
of 
the United 
States, 
his 
acceptance 
thereof shall vacate his seat. 
Wis. Const. art. IV, § 13 (1848).  Another example is found in 
Article XIII, Section 3: 
No member of congress, nor any person holding any 
office of profit or trust under the United States, 
(postmasters 
excepted), 
or 
under 
any 
foreign 
power . . . shall be eligible to any office of trust, 
profit, or honor in this state. 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
28 
 
Wis. Const. art. XIII, § 3 (1848).  As this court has noted 
before, terms in statutes or, in this case, constitutional 
provisions, should be construed to give effect "to each and 
every word, clause and sentence" and "a construction that would 
result in any portion of a statute being superfluous should be 
avoided wherever possible."  County of Columbia v. Bylewski, 94 
Wis. 2d 153, 164, 288 N.W.2d 129 (1980).  The petitioner's 
interpretation of Article VII, Section 10(1), suggesting that 
"the term" ends when a judge or justice resigns, would render 
the phrase "during the term for which elected" meaningless.  As 
suggested by the State, this interpretation "ignores the 
language it is supposed to be interpreting."  (Resp't Br. at 
12.)   
¶34 Additionally, such an interpretation conflicts with a 
literal interpretation of the words used in the provision.  The 
constitution provides specific terms of service for those on the 
bench.  Article VII, Section 7 proclaims, in pertinent part:  
"Circuit judges shall be elected for 6-year terms."  Since 1977, 
when the court of appeals was created, a parallel provision has 
existed for court of appeals' judges in Article VII, Section 
5(2).  Finally, Article VII, Section 4(1) states that justices 
of the state supreme court "shall be elected for 10-year terms 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
29 
 
of office."13  Such clear language cannot be ignored.  The 
constitution sets the length of the prohibition to be "during 
the term for which elected" and the "term for which elected" has 
been defined in the text of the constitution.  Thus, we must 
agree with the State's argument that although one's "term" may 
refer to the time a particular person serves, the "term for 
which elected" as used here appears to be fixed by the 
constitutional language. 
¶35 The legislative history surrounding the 1977 amendment 
and the proposed 1995 amendment to Article VII, Section 10 
further support our interpretation.  The history of the 1977 
amendment to Section 10 is somewhat murky, most likely because 
the changes to Section 10 were only a small part of an extensive 
overhaul of the Wisconsin court system.  One need only glance at 
the related legislation to realize the scope of the changes 
suggested.  See 1977 Enrolled Joint Resolution 7.  The language 
of the pertinent question placed on the 1977 ballot illustrates 
the point.  It stated, in relevant part:  "[S]hall section 21 of 
article I, sections 17 and 26 of article IV, and sections 2 to 
4, 6 to 10 and 14 of article VII of the constitution be 
amended . . . ?" 1977 Enrolled Joint Resolution 7.  Since the 
                                                 
13 The same was true when the constitution was adopted in 
1848.  Although the length of terms has varied, even in 1848, 
judges and justices were elected to serve for a set term of 
years.  See Wis. Const. art. VII, §§ 4, 7; Tenney, H.A., Smith, 
J.Y., Lambert, David & Tenney, H.W., Journal of the Convention 
to Form a Constitution for the State of Wisconsin, With a Sketch 
of the Debates (1848) at 610-11. 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
30 
 
goal was overall reform of the state court system, it is not too 
surprising that the language of Section 10 did not receive much 
individual attention, at least in the written commentary on the 
reforms.  That noted, however, the legislative history regarding 
the 1977 amendment does, indirectly, reveal some clues.  The 
1977 Senate Joint Resolution 9 included a short analysis by the 
Legislative Reference Bureau regarding the changes to Article 
VII, Section 10, which stated, in relevant part: 
Deleted are existing provisions which now guarantee 
judges an annual salary of not less than $1,500, which 
now require justices and judges to be at least 25 
years old, and which declare void any votes cast for 
the holder of a judicial office who, during his term 
of office, seeks election to a nonjudicial office. 
1977 Senate Joint Resolution 9 (emphasis added).  There is 
nothing in the analysis to suggest the deletion would affect the 
interpretation of "during the term for which elected." 
¶36 As required under Wisconsin law, the Attorney General 
authored 
an 
Explanatory 
Statement 
regarding 
the 
proposed 
amendment.14  See Wisconsin Briefs, Constitutional Amendments to 
                                                 
14 Wisconsin Stat. § 10.01(2)(c)(1977) provided that public 
notice must be given for referendum issues.  The statute at the 
time provided, in part: 
Type C——The type C notice shall be given whenever referenda 
questions are submitted to a vote of the people.  The 
notice shall contain the entire text of the referenda 
questions and an explanatory statement of the effect of 
either a "yes" or "no" vote.  For state questions, the 
statement shall be prepared by the attorney general. . . .  
Although the language of this provision has been modified 
since 1977, the requirement that the Attorney General provide an 
explanatory 
statement 
for 
state 
referendum 
questions 
has 
remained.  See Wis. Stat. § 10.01(2)(c). 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
31 
 
be Considered by the Wisconsin Electorate April 5, 1977, LRB-77-
WB-1 (March 1977).  Regarding the referendum question that 
included the changes to Article VII, Section 10, the Attorney 
General wrote: 
If you answer 'Yes' to the above-stated question, you 
will be voting (a) to create certain new features in 
the Wisconsin Constitution; (b) to repeal certain 
other features of it; and (c) in a few instances, to 
recreate one of the repealed features by inserting it 
elsewhere in such Constitution. 
Id. at 7.  The Attorney General then detailed the changes.  Id.  
Among the "new features" would be an "amendment of [the] 
prohibition against supreme court justices or circuit judges 
holding any other office of public trust, except judicial 
office, during the term for which elected, to make it applicable 
to such justices and judges of any court of record instead of to 
such justices and circuit judges."  Id.  The Attorney General 
then went on to explain that a "yes" vote would be a vote "to 
repeal, that is, to eliminate," certain features of the 
constitution, including:  "[the] provision that votes for 
supreme court justice or circuit court judge, for office he is 
ineligible to hold, given by the Legislature or the people, 
shall be void."  Id. at 8.  These are the only statements 
related to the Section 10 eligibility clause.  These analyses 
show that the reform not only left the prohibition intact, but 
in fact, expanded the number of jurists covered by the 
prohibition.  The analyses also suggest that the other changes 
to the section were intended to eliminate obsolete language from 
the text of the constitution. 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
32 
 
¶37 The legislative history surrounding the 1995 proposed 
amendment is more clear.  The petitioner argues that the purpose 
of the 1995 proposed amendment was to clear up an ambiguity.  
However, the legislative history of this amendment belies such 
an interpretation.  The amendment survived first consideration 
by the 1993 legislature and arose for second consideration and 
presentation to the voters in 1995.  See 1993 Assembly Joint 
Resolution 81, Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau.  In 
the 1993 legislation, the Legislative Reference Bureau included 
the following explanation of the proposal: 
Unlike any other elective office, the state 
constitution prohibits any justice of the supreme 
court or judge of any court of record, "during the 
term for which elected," from holding any other office 
of public trust. 
This constitutional amendment, proposed to the 
1993 legislature on "first consideration", eliminated 
that restriction.  With the restriction gone, a judge, 
like any other elected or appointed officer, could be 
elected or appointed to a different office of public 
trust if the judge resigns the judgeship before 
assuming the different office. 
Id.  Similarly, when taken up on second consideration in 1995, 
the Legislative Reference Bureau noted: 
The state constitution prohibits any justice of 
the supreme court or judge of any court of record from 
holding any other office of public trust, except a 
judicial office, during the term for which elected. 
This constitutional amendment permits a justice 
or judge to be elected or appointed to a different 
office of public trust if the justice or judge vacates 
the judicial office before assuming the different 
office. 
No. 
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33 
 
1995 Assembly Joint Resolution 15, Analysis by the Legislative 
Reference Bureau.  There can be no doubt as to the position of 
the Legislative Reference Bureau.  In discussing this and other 
proposed changes to the constitution in Wisconsin Briefs, the 
Bureau titled its section on the proposed amendment to Section 
10, "Removing Restriction on Judges Holding Nonjudicial Public 
Office after Resignation During the Judicial Term."  Wisconsin 
Briefs, Constitutional Amendments to be Considered by the 
Wisconsin Voters April 4, 1995, LRB-95-WB-6 (March 1995). 
¶38 In 
1992, 
in 
response 
to 
questions 
raised 
by 
Representative Scott Jensen, the Wisconsin Legislative Council 
staff issued the following analysis of Section 10: 
Based on the language of the holding-other-office 
prohibition and the interpretation of that language, 
it appears that a judge may not hold any other state 
office of public trust during his or her term, even if 
the judge resigns his or her judicial office. 
It 
is 
significant 
that 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, Wisconsin Statutes and Supreme Court 
Rules refer to the period "during the term for which 
elected," "during the term for which he or she was 
elected or appointed" and "during the term for which 
he or she is elected or appointed," respectively.  Had 
the intent of the prohibition been merely to prevent 
the simultaneous holding of another office of public 
trust by a judge, there would have been no need to 
refer to the period during the judge's term. 
Wisconsin Legislative Council Staff Memorandum, Eligibility of 
Judge to Hold Other Office of Public Trust During Term, June 30, 
1992, at 2 (hereinafter 1992 Eligibility Memorandum). 
¶39 According to the 1992 Eligibility Memorandum, the 
Director of State Courts at the time apparently read the 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
34 
 
prohibition to allow the holding of another office of public 
trust if the judge or justice resigned from judicial office 
because successors elected to fill vacancies are elected for an 
entire term.  Id. at 3.  The petitioner now asserts the same 
argument based on the vacancy-filling provisions of Article VII, 
Section 9 and Wis. Stat. § 8.50(4)(f)4.15  However, as the 1992 
Eligibility Memorandum noted: 
It is difficult:  (1) to understand the significance 
of the election to a full term by a successor filling 
a 
judicial 
vacancy, 
particularly 
in 
light 
of 
constitutional and statutory references to specific 
judicial terms (10 years for Supreme Court Justices, 
six years for Court of Appeals and Circuit Court 
Judges); and (2) to reconcile the Director's position 
with 
the 
language 
of 
the 
holding-other-office 
prohibition. 
Id.   
¶40 In his explanatory 
statement regarding 
the 
1995 
proposed amendment, the Attorney General appears to have 
concurred with the analysis of the Bureau: 
Article 
VII, 
section 
10(1) 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution presently prohibits any justice of the 
supreme court or any judge of a court of record from 
holding any other office of public trust, except a 
judicial office, during the term for which the justice 
or 
judge 
was 
elected. 
 
A "yes" 
vote 
on 
this 
constitutional amendment would allow a justice or 
judge to be elected or appointed to a different office 
of public trust if the justice or judge vacated the 
                                                 
15 Notably, if one looks back at the original constitution, 
when Sections 9 and 10 of Article VII were created, the slant of 
Section 9 is different.  Originally, Section 9 provided that 
once a successor was elected to fill a vacancy in a judicial 
office, that successor "shall hold his office the residue of the 
unexpired term."  Wis. Const., art. VII, § 9 (1848). 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
35 
 
judicial office before assuming the different office.  
A "no" vote would retain the present language of 
section 
10(1) 
of 
article 
VII 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
and 
would 
continue 
the 
prohibition 
against a justice or judge holding any other office of 
public trust, except a judicial office, during the 
term for which the justice or judge was elected. 
Wisconsin Briefs, LRB-95-WB-6 (March 1995).  It cannot be 
explained much more clearly.  Moreover, the referendum question 
posed to the people of Wisconsin was stated as follows: 
Eligibility of judges for nonjudicial office.  Shall 
section 10(1) of article VII of the constitution be 
amended to permit a judge to assume a nonjudicial 
office of public trust after vacating the judicial 
office during that term of office? 
1995 Assembly Joint Resolution 15; Elections Board, Record of 
Rejected Referenda (May 3, 1995).  That terminology suggests 
that the amendment would allow activity that was previously 
prohibited.  If the purpose was only to clarify an ambiguity, 
the referendum question could have easily stated that purpose.  
With the explanation by the Attorney General and the referendum 
question itself at their disposal, the people of Wisconsin 
rejected the amendment to Section 10.  Thus, as recently as 
1995, the people of the state have made clear that they intend 
for the prohibition of Section 10 to extend even beyond 
resignation.  While we are aware that voter intent is not always 
clearly discerned, this court has recognized its value to 
interpretation of the law.  As we noted in Ekern v. Zimmerman, 
187 Wis. 180, 193-94, 204 N.W. 803 (1925):  "The people voted 
intelligently upon this proposition, which clearly evidences 
their 
intention, 
and, 
where 
such 
intention 
appears, 
the 
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construction 
and 
interpretation 
of 
the 
acts 
must 
follow 
accordingly." 
¶41 The textual evidence and legislative history thus 
appear to us to support the State's position.  We next turn to 
this court's precedents.  Fortunately, we do not begin in a 
vacuum, because this court has previously interpreted this very 
provision.  In 1909, this court was asked to interpret the 
language 
of 
Article 
IV, 
Section 
26 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution.  See State ex rel. Bashford v. Frear, 138 
Wis. 536, 538, 120 N.W. 216 (1909).  In so doing, this court 
compared the use of the word "term" in Article IV, Section 26 to 
its use in Article VII of the Wisconsin Constitution and 
concluded they were intended to have different meanings, 
stating: 
So the conclusion is that the judicial term 
mentioned in art. VII of the constitution has regard, 
primarily, to the office, disassociated from the 
occupant of it; in other words, it contemplates unity, 
so that several incumbents during the term take mere 
parts of its entirety; that "his term of office," as 
used in sec. 26, art. IV, of the constitution, has 
regard, primarily, to 
the personal element, the 
incumbent of the office; contemplates the period of 
incumbency, whether of a whole term, or a part of the 
entirety, under art. VII. . . .  
Bashford, 138 Wis. at 556 (emphasis added).  The court took 
particular notice of Article VII, Section 10.  After repeating 
the text of the section prohibiting holding of a nonjudicial 
office of public trust "during the term for which he is 
elected," the court found:  "Here we have the office, the term 
of office, the incident of office, to wit, the salary and the 
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exclusion from every field of official life outside of the 
judicial field during such term, to wit, the elective term."  
Id. at 541-42. 
¶42 Also important is this court's analysis in Bashford of 
Article VII, Section 9.  The court found that Section 9 further 
supported the interpretation that use of the word "term" in 
Article VII meant the full elected term, because Section 9 
operated to recognize "the unity of the term."  Id. at 543.  At 
the time of the case, under Section 9, if a vacancy existed on 
the supreme court, the governor appointed someone to fill the 
vacancy until a successor was elected and qualified.  See id.  
As previously noted, the newly elected successor would then hold 
the office for "the residue of the unexpired term."  Id.  Thus, 
at least in 1909, the period constituting the full elected term 
had significance in the operation of the courts.  In sum, the 
court found that "from first to last" the word "term" in Article 
VII dealt with the entire elected term.  Id. 
¶43 During the 1940s, this court twice revisited the 
language of Article VII, Section 10.  Both cases, Wettengel v. 
Zimmerman, 249 Wis. 237, 24 N.W.2d 504 (1946) and State v. 
McCarthy, 255 Wis. 234, 38 N.W.2d 679 (1949), involved the 
election of Wisconsin circuit court judge Joseph R. McCarthy to 
a seat in the United States Senate.  In Wettengel, 249 Wis. at 
239-40, the petitioners sought to keep McCarthy's name off of 
the ballot, arguing that under Section 10, McCarthy, as a 
circuit court judge, was prohibited from holding an office such 
as that of United States Senator until his term expired in 
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January 1952.  Additionally, they argued that under the same 
provision, all votes cast for him were null and void.  Id. at 
240.  This court, however, held that it had no jurisdiction to 
grant the petition sought, because the election was for federal 
office and controlled by the United States Constitution and 
solely within the realm of authority of the United States 
Senate.  Id. at 247-48. 
¶44 In 1949, we again dealt with Article VII, Section 10 
when the Board of State Bar Commissioners filed a petition in 
the 
Wisconsin 
Supreme 
Court 
requesting 
that 
McCarthy 
be 
disciplined because he ran for office and was elected as a 
United States Senator without resigning and surrendering his 
office as a circuit judge.  McCarthy, 255 Wis. at 238.  In that 
case, we held that McCarthy violated the constitution and laws 
of the State of Wisconsin by conduct in "clear disregard of the 
provisions of sec. 10, art. VII, Const., and sec. 256.02(2) 
Stats."  Id. at 242.  We explicitly described the fault with 
McCarthy's actions:  
In this case the defendant was not only a 
candidate for the office of United States senator but 
was a holder of that office during the term for which 
he was elected circuit judge, although he was not a 
holder of the office of circuit judge and United 
States senator contemporaneously. 
Id. at 243. That is exactly the same problem that would arise in 
this case were the petitioner to resign from the bench and run 
for Milwaukee County Executive before August 2006.  The court in 
McCarthy further explained the issue: 
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39 
 
While a circuit judge may become a candidate 
under the laws of the United States for the office of 
United 
States 
senator 
at 
an 
election 
held 
and 
supervised under state law, he nevertheless does so in 
defiance of the laws of the state, which are not 
effective to prevent his candidacy, but his conduct is 
nevertheless a clear violation of provisions of the 
constitution and the statute. . . .  
We again call attention to the fact that the 
constitution, sec. 10, art. VII, provides that a 
circuit judge shall hold no office of public trust 
except a judicial office "during the term for which 
they are respectively elected." 
. . . .  
Under the facts of this case we can reach no 
other conclusion than that the defendant by accepting 
and holding the office of United States senator during 
the term for which he was elected circuit judge did so 
in violation of the terms of the constitution and laws 
of the state of Wisconsin, and in so doing violated 
his oath as a circuit judge and as an attorney at law. 
Id. (emphasis in original).  The petitioner asserts that this 
court's language was dicta and should not now bind us.  We 
disagree, because this court explicitly took up the question, 
discussed it, and answered it.  Under such circumstances, this 
court should be bound by our previous interpretation.  See State 
v. Rodriguez, 221 Wis. 2d 487, 496-97, 585 N.W.2d 701 (Ct. App. 
1998).  The dissent goes a step further, suggesting that this 
court 
misinterpreted 
and 
"mistakenly 
attributed" 
its 
interpretation to its prior ruling.  Dissent, ¶117.  We also 
disagree with this assertion.  The key passages of analysis, 
discussed above, do not rely upon the previous ruling in 
Wettengel.  The only citation to Wettengel during the relevant 
analysis is for the statement that "those who opposed the 
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candidacy of the defendant did not give full weight to the fact 
that citizens of this country are subject to two governments."  
McCarthy, 255 Wis. at 242.  Moreover, in McCarthy, this court 
did have cause to raise the overall interpretation of Article 
VII, Section 10, and do an analysis previously undone, because 
the question of whether McCarthy could run for federal office 
had already been answered and the court was left with the more 
invidious question of a moral and professional wrong, which 
required a close examination of the scope of the relevant 
provision.  Hence, we believe this court has already examined 
this provision and held, in strong terms, that the prohibition 
exists even beyond resignation.  This previous interpretation 
should not be ignored. 
¶45 Interestingly, we noted in McCarthy, 255 Wis. at 248, 
that at least three circuit judges became candidates for federal 
office while serving as judges.  After an extensive discussion 
of the oaths taken by such officials and their meaning, this 
court took a step back.  In concluding that the petition should 
be dismissed, this court found that the behavior, while wrong, 
was not likely to be repeated.  Id. at 250.  The court also held 
that the legislature's way of dealing with this type of 
constitutional breach was to leave it "to the condemnation of 
the electorate."  Id. at 251.  Candidates in the past may have 
been in a position to take their chances with the electorate.  
Like the McCarthy court, we do not dispute that such examples 
exist.  The parties in McCarthy brought a variety of examples 
before the court, all, as far as we can discern, involving 
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federal office.  See id. at 244-45.  Some involved federal 
judges or judges of other states.  Id. at 245.  We do not find 
the candidacies of the past to be persuasive regarding the 
correct interpretation of this provision.  As we noted in 
McCarthy:  "The conduct of other persons under the same or 
similar circumstances may have some bearing upon the question of 
the moral quality of the defendant's behavior but are not 
relevant 
on 
the 
question 
of 
the 
legal 
consequences 
of 
defendant's conduct."  Id.   
¶46 On November 14, 1967, a formal Code of Judicial Ethics 
was adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.  See Code of 
Judicial Ethics, 36 Wis. 2d 252, 155 N.W.2d 565 (1967).  These 
rules have been modified over the years and are now embodied in 
the Code of Judicial Conduct, SCR Chapter 60.16  See SCR Chapter 
60 (2002).  Until 1997, when the Code of Judicial Conduct came 
into effect, two provisions in the rules dealt with a judge's 
obligations regarding nonjudicial offices of public trust.  See 
SCR 60.04; SCR 60.05 (1996).  Prior to the change, SCR 60.04 
paralleled Section 10 of the constitution and its statutory 
corollary, stating:  "A judge shall not hold any office of 
public trust except a judicial office during the term for which 
he or she is elected or appointed."  SCR 60.04 (1996).  The 
current Code does not contain such a provision.  See Code of 
Judicial Conduct, SCR Chapter 60 (2002).  Supreme Court Rule 
                                                 
16 Effective January 1, 1997, the Code of Judicial Ethics 
was replaced with the Code of Judicial Conduct, SCR Chapter 60. 
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42 
 
60.05, the other related provision, remains in the Code, 
embodied in SCR 60.06.  It states:  "A judge shall not become a 
candidate for a federal, state or local nonjudicial elective 
office without first resigning his or her judgeship."  The 
Comment following SCR 60.06(1) provides, in pertinent part:  
"This provision derives from former SCR 60.05, which was 
considered necessary because of the possibility that a candidacy 
for an office to take effect after the expiration of the 
judicial term would not be barred by former SCR 60.04."  The 
1992 Legislative Council's Staff Memorandum discussing the 
proposed amendment to Section 10 found that these ethical rules 
confirm the interpretation that the Section 10 restriction is 
unaffected by resignation:   
The comment to SCR 60.05 appears to assume that a 
federal, state or local nonjudicial elective office, 
which ordinarily would be an office of public trust, 
is barred by SCR 60.04 (and, therefore, also by the 
applicable constitutional and statutory provisions) 
during the term for which a judge is elected or 
appointed, even if the judge resigns the judicial 
office. 
1992 Eligibility Memorandum, at 3 (emphasis in original).   
¶47 This court examined these particular ethical rules on 
at least two occasions.  See In re Judicial Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Stern, 224 Wis. 2d 220, 589 N.W.2d 407 
(1999); In re Complaint Against Pressentin, 139 Wis. 2d 150, 406 
N.W.2d 779 
(1987). 
 
However, 
both 
of 
the 
cases 
are 
distinguishable from the situation at hand and are, therefore, 
of limited use in our analysis.  In Pressentin, 139 Wis. 2d at 
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43 
 
151-53, this court found that a municipal judge violated the 
then existing Code of Judicial Ethics by running for nonjudicial 
elective office, county supervisor, without resigning from the 
municipal judge position.  Judge Pressentin lost the election in 
which he ran for a nonjudicial office of public trust, so the 
only provision at issue in the case was SCR 60.05 (now SCR 
60.06), the Supreme Court Rule against running for office while 
a sitting judge.  See id.   
¶48 In Stern, 224 Wis. 2d at 221-22, this court found that 
a municipal judge violated the former provision of the Code of 
Judicial Ethics 60.04 by holding two offices of public trust——
municipal judge and school board member.  This court found that, 
unlike the related constitutional and statutory provisions, the 
Supreme Court Rule did apply to municipal judges.  Id. at 224-
25.  Thus, this court found that Judge Stern violated only SCR 
60.04.  Id.  Because the only conduct at issue in Stern was 
simultaneous office holding, this court had no reason to 
speculate about the type of situation that now faces this court.  
Also, Judge Stern did not resign from his judicial position, but 
ultimately decided to resign from the school board, his 
nonjudicial position of public trust.  Id. at 226. 
¶49 Now that we have examined the interpretation of the 
specific provision, we next take a step back to take a more 
general look at interpretation of the phrase.  The Attorney 
General of this state has been asked to interpret the phrase 
"the term for which elected" on several occasions, not only in 
the context of constitutional amendments, but in other contexts 
No. 
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44 
 
as well.  Consistently, the Attorney General has found that the 
phrase means the entire time for which a person is elected, not 
just the time served.  For example, in 1908, the Attorney 
General found that a county board member was ineligible to serve 
as the county supervisor of assessments, because under sec. 2, 
ch. 523, Laws of 1925, "[n]o member of the county board shall be 
eligible to the office of supervisor of assessments during the 
term for which he was elected or chosen member of such board," 
and the member's term on the county board did not expire until 
after he would take office for the other position.  Op. Att'y 
Gen. 763-64 (1908).  The Attorney General noted:  "[The board 
member] was not capable of being chosen to the said office 
during the term for which he had been elected.  His resignation 
would not alter the case."  Id. at 764. 
¶50 Similarly, in 1912, the Attorney General responded to 
a question regarding the appointment of a city alderman to the 
position of marshal by the mayor.  See Op. Att'y Gen. 785 
(1912).  At the time, §925-249 of the Wisconsin Statutes stated:  
"No member of the common council shall, during the term for 
which he is elected, be eligible to any other municipal office, 
except the office of mayor, existing at the time of his election 
or created by the council subsequent thereto."  Id.  The 
Attorney General went on to discuss the interpretation of the 
phrase "term for which he is elected," stating: 
The term for which a person is elected does not expire 
when he resigns.  It refers to the time for which he 
was elected, and he is not eligible under a provision 
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45 
 
such as this until the full time has expired, whether 
he resigns the position then held by him or not. 
Id.17  Thus, it appears that this court, the Office of the 
Attorney General, the legislature, and the people of this state 
have all agreed that "during the term for which elected" as used 
in Article VII, Section 10 amounts to more than a prohibition of 
simultaneous office holding. 
¶51 This court's interpretation of Section 10 stands firm 
in comparison to the interpretation of similar language by 
courts in other states.  Other states have found this type of 
language in constitutional provisions to be unambiguous.  For 
instance, in 1895, the Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted the 
phrase "during the time for which he is elected" in the context 
of a restriction upon legislators.  State ex rel. Childs v. 
Sutton, 65 N.W. 262, 263 (Minn. 1895).  At the time, Article IV, 
Section 9 of the Minnesota Constitution stated:  "No senator or 
representative shall, during the time for which he is elected, 
hold any office under the authority of the United States or the 
                                                 
17 See also V Op. Att'y Gen. 762 (1916); II Op. Att'y Gen. 
775 (1913)(stating that the term for which elected does not 
expire 
with 
resignation); 
II 
Op. 
Att'y 
Gen. 
756 
(1913)(explaining again that "'[t]he term for which a person is 
elected does not expire when he resigns'" (internal citations 
omitted) and that, as such, a county board member would not be 
eligible to be county superintendent of the poor, even if he 
resigned prior to being appointed superintendent); Op. Att'y 
Gen. 769-70 (1912)("The fact that Mr. Hudson resigned his office 
does not terminate the term for which he was elected."); Op. 
Att'y Gen. 773-74 (1912) ("The fact that Mr. Hudson resigned his 
office and did not serve out his full term does not change the 
fact that he was elected for the term of one year.").  
No. 
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46 
 
state of Minnesota, except that of postmaster."18 Id.  (emphasis 
added).  In interpreting this provision, that court stated: 
[I]t is not necessary for us to speculate upon the 
intention of the framers of the constitution in 
adopting the provision in question.  A bare reading of 
this provision suffices to enable us to ascertain and 
understand its meaning, and we need not search for 
light 
through 
the 
uncertainties 
of 
extraneous 
interpretation 
or 
construction . . . . 
 
The 
respondent, Sutton, became a representative of the 
legislature of the state of Minnesota on the first 
Monday in January, 1895, and the time for which he was 
elected continues until the first Monday in January, 
1897.  He was not merely prohibited from holding any 
office during the time for which he might serve, but 
during the time for which he was elected.  The 
difference is obvious, and the language too sweeping 
to be disregarded.  The respondent could not nullify 
the constitutional prohibitory clause, "during the 
time for which he was elected," by his resignation of 
the office of representative.  The time for which he 
was elected was the entire constitutional term of two 
years, and, whether he resigned during that time or 
not, he was not permitted to hold any other office, 
                                                 
18 In 
¶119-122, 
the 
dissent 
attempts 
to 
negate 
our 
comparison of this section to the Wisconsin provision.  However, 
in its attempts to do so, we believe the dissent is comparing 
apples to oranges.  The dissent cites a different constitutional 
provision, Article VI, Section 11 of the Minnesota Constitution, 
which does not contain a phrase comparable to the "during the 
term for which elected" in the Wisconsin Constitution.  The 
dissent also cites the case of Dougherty v. Holm, 44 N.W.2d 83 
(Minn. 1950) as support.  Again, because this case references 
Article VI, Section 11, for its analysis, rather than Article 
IV, Section 9, which has the provision similar to Wisconsin's, 
it is simply not relevant.  Id. at 86.  The dissent appears to 
miss the point of our comparison.  We compare Article VII, 
Section 10 of the Wisconsin Constitution and Article IV, Section 
9 of the Minnesota Constitution because the operative language 
contained therein is similar.  The focus of the comparison is on 
the specific language used in the provisions which restricts 
eligibility for officeholding, not for whom the language 
applies. 
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47 
 
under the authority of this state, during such entire 
term. 
Id. at 263 (emphasis added).  The court explained further and 
noted the prohibition also applied to the judiciary.   
There can be no serious question raised as to the 
right of a member of the legislature to resign his 
office; but, if he does so, it cannot enlarge his 
right to hold another office, in violation of this 
constitutional 
prohibition. 
 
The 
disability 
only 
ceases at the expiration of the full period of time 
for which he was elected.  This prohibition against 
holding other offices also applies to the judiciary.   
Id. at 263-64; see also Miller v. Holm, 14 N.W.2d 99 (Minn. 
1944) (reaffirming the Childs interpretation).  Other states in 
various contexts have found similarly.  See, e.g., Wilson v. 
Shaw, 188 N.W. 940, 942 (Iowa 1922) ("The term lives on even 
though the incumbent resigns, is impeached, or dies."); Baskin 
v. State, 232 P. 388 (Okla. 1925). 
¶52 As 
seen 
in 
Childs, 
the 
context 
in 
which 
the 
interpretation has sometimes arisen is not with judges, but with 
other elected officials.  Many states, including Wisconsin, have 
language somewhat similar to Article VII, Section 10 in 
provisions dealing with legislators.  For example, Article IV, 
Section 12 of the Wisconsin Constitution states: 
No member of the legislature shall, during the term 
for which he was elected, be appointed or elected to 
any civil office in the state, which shall have been 
created, or the emoluments of which shall have been 
increased, during the term for which he was elected. 
¶53 This provision has been examined by this court.  
However, the context of this provision and others like it, make 
comparisons to Article VII, Section 10 difficult.  This court 
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48 
 
held in State ex rel. Johnson v. Nye, 148 Wis. 659, 668, 135 
N.W. 126, (1912), that "[t]he constitutional provision under 
consideration 
should 
be 
narrowly 
construed 
in 
favor 
of 
eligibility."  That case, like many others, raised a question 
concerning the clauses regarding creation of an office, or 
whether "emoluments" were increased during the term for which 
elected.  Id. at 669.  These types of cases are not helpful, 
because the subsequent phraseology of the provision affects the 
interpretation of the phrase itself.  Only where the analysis 
focuses strictly on the phrase "term for which elected" can we 
compare these provisions.  See, e.g., Chenowith v. Chambers, 164 
P. 428, 430 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1917). 
¶54 In addition, although many states have interpreted 
language similar to that of Article VII, Section 10 somewhere 
along the line, many such provisions, if they existed, have now 
been weeded out in favor of resign-to-run type clauses.  See, 
e.g., Minn. Const., art. VI, § 6 (2002); Haw. Const., art. II, 
§ 7 (1993 & Supp. 2001); Ariz. Const., art. VI, § 28 (2001), 
Alaska Const., art. IV, § 14 (2002).  The effort of tracing the 
evolution of these clauses in other states is not warranted, 
because, 
as 
we 
have 
discussed, 
our 
state 
has 
its 
own 
constitutional history that developed the provision we today 
examine.  
¶55 From 
the 
review 
of 
the 
emergence 
of 
our 
own 
constitutional language and the various examinations of that 
language by other authorities alone, we are persuaded that the 
"term for which elected" is not effectively terminated by 
No. 
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49 
 
resignation, at least in this constitutional context.  Our 
review of the other sources required by our constitutional 
analysis further supports this conclusion. 
B.  Constitutional Debates and Practices in Existence at the 
Time of the Writing of the Constitution 
¶56 Having examined in depth the plain meaning of Section 
10 in context, we now turn to the second part of our analysis, a 
discussion of the constitutional debates.  In the context of the 
plain meaning analysis, we have examined much of the debate by 
the original drafters that resulted in the creation of Section 
10.  The constitutional debates do not, of themselves, provide 
an answer to the question posed by this case.  Since even the 
most comprehensive accounts of the debates are incomplete, we 
are left to interpret what we have.  However, the debates do 
provide significant clues regarding the concerns of those 
involved in drafting the constitution, and early versions of the 
provision at issue created during the process support the 
State's interpretation.  As described in Part A, the debates 
focused on whether the judiciary should be elected and appointed 
and, after election was selected as the proper method, the 
debate shifted to the appropriate length for a judge or 
justice's term.   
¶57 We reiterate here that the concerns about judicial 
independence raised at these early debates and the textual 
evolution of Section 10 during the drafting process lead us to 
the conclusion that the text of Section 10 was a compromise of 
two extreme views.  The numerous drafts of Section 10 noted in 
No. 
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50 
 
Part A show a consistent effort to restrict judges even for a 
period after resignation.  Thus, the debates support our 
conclusion that the phrase "during the term for which elected" 
means the entire period for which elected, not simply the time a 
judge or justice chooses to serve.  Those advocating an elected 
judiciary were successful in creating a constitution providing 
for elected judges. However, those skeptical of the elective 
system also "won" to some degree in that they were able to have 
limitations placed upon that elected judiciary to distance the 
judiciary from the political landscape.   
¶58 As we have noted, the dissent suggests that review of 
the 
1846 
constitution 
is 
unhelpful 
to 
interpreting 
the 
constitutional language adopted in 1848.  The dissent states 
that the discussion is irrelevant "because it cites debates 
focusing on the wrong issue, from the wrong constitutional 
convention, to interpret a phrase that was not adopted at that 
convention, by delegates who were not elected to the subsequent 
and more relevant 1848 convention."  Dissent, ¶89.  We could not 
disagree more.  The drafting of the Wisconsin Constitution was a 
process begun in 1846.  The delegates to the convention in 1848 
did not start from scratch and, in fact, intended mainly to 
address the specific issues that led to the first draft's 
failure.  As noted in one analysis:  
As previously pointed out the main outlines of the 
1846 constitution were satisfactory.  Its rejection 
was due to the controversial articles therein on banks 
and paper money, homestead exemptions, and the grant 
of separate property rights to married women.  In the 
1848 convention constant reference was made to the 
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51 
 
1846 constitution and to the approval or disapproval 
by the people of specific articles therein.  When the 
two constitutions are laid side by side it will be 
found that many provisions in the two instruments are 
identical. 
Ray A. Brown, The Making of the Wisconsin Constitution, 1952 
Wis. L. Rev. 23, 23 n.1 (hereinafter Part II).   
¶59 The dissent suggests that the debate over election of 
judges was over by 1848, so the 1846 debates focusing on that 
point do not matter.  Dissent, ¶90.  We believe those 
discussions mattered a great deal and the issues discussed there 
began a debate that continued all the way through the second 
convention.  In fact, "[t]he debate on the judiciary article was 
largely an echo of that in the 1846 convention on the same 
article with the result that in essential respects the article 
in the 1848 document was the same as that in the earlier 
constitution."  Brown, Part II, at 36.   
¶60 We agree that by the time of the second convention, it 
was clear that judges were to be elected.  Dissent, ¶90.  
However, that does not mean everyone at the second convention 
readily acquiesced to the idea of an elected judiciary and 
certainly, 
the 
debates 
make 
clear 
that 
the 
delegates 
passionately disagreed about how to best implement such an 
elective system.  As Brown states:   
Although individual members of the 1848 convention 
expressed doubts of the elective principle as applied 
to judges, it was recognized that the popular will 
demanded election and no serious argument against it 
was made.  The contentions pro and contra in the 1846 
convention on the election of judges were, however, 
used in the 1848 convention on the question of the 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
52 
 
proper terms for supreme court and circuit court 
judges. 
Brown, Part II, at 37.  Other debated issues concerning the 
judiciary included whether or not a separate supreme court 
should be established, whether a tax should be levied on all 
civil 
suits, 
and 
whether 
membership 
in 
the 
bar 
was 
a 
prerequisite to practice in Wisconsin courts.  Brown, Part II, 
at 36-37, 40-41. 
¶61 The debates are our best information about the 
practices at the time the constitution was adopted.  As shown 
through the discussions included in Part A, the debates show the 
concerns of the drafters and suggest the reasoning behind the 
text.  As noted in our discussion of the McCarthy case, we do 
not dispute that judges in the past may have run for nonjudicial 
offices of public trust during what we have now defined as the 
"term for which elected."  However, information we have on these 
cases and other possible "violations" is scant and analysis 
based on these examples could only be speculation on the part of 
this court.19  McCarthy, 255 Wis. 2d at 245.  Finally, as noted 
by this court in McCarthy, the existence of such conduct in the 
                                                 
19 Indeed, the dissent has put forth examples it asserts 
violate the provision.  See dissent, ¶¶104-106, 108, 111-114.  
While there do appear to be some valid examples, we dispute the 
dissent's assertion that "examples abound."  Dissent, ¶111.  
Many of the examples noted by the dissent, including Isaac 
Walker, George Noyes, and Herman Humphrey, must be discounted 
because the constitutional provision explicitly does not apply 
to the judicial offices they held.  See dissent, ¶¶111-114.  
Article VII, Section 10 of the Constitution, as adopted in 1848, 
expressly stated that it only applied to "judges of the supreme 
and circuit courts."   
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
53 
 
past makes no difference to the present legal analysis.  Id. at 
245.  Simply put, multiple wrongs do not make a right. 
¶62 In addition to the debates, contemporaneous statements 
at the time of the drafting support our interpretation.  During 
the debate over ratification of the constitution following the 
conclusion of the first constitutional convention, the Racine 
Advocate published a series of letters about the proposed 
constitution, many of which were anonymous.  Quaife, The 
Struggle Over Ratification at 13-66, 208-215, 436-513.  One 
letter, almost certainly written by Edward G. Ryan,20 explained 
the provisions of the article on the judiciary, leaving little 
doubt of the intent regarding the prohibition against judges 
holding other office.  The article stated:   
And finally the prohibition of the judges to hold any 
other office during their full term of election, 
whether they remain on the bench or not, will forever 
end the disgraceful practice by which the sacred 
duties of the bench have been prostituted to the 
political advancement of the judges.21   
                                                 
20 Quaife, The Struggle Over Ratification at 13 n.1; 
Beitzinger, Lion of the Law 177-78 n.14. 
21 In ¶¶93-94, the dissent notes that Ryan was nominated by 
the Wisconsin Senate for the office United States Senator.  The 
dissent suggests that because Ryan was serving as chief justice 
at the time, he either interpreted the provision at issue here 
differently than the majority or was willing to violate the 
constitution.  Dissent, ¶94.  This, however, can only be 
speculation.  Ryan was never elected to the Senate, and never 
held a nonjudicial office of public trust during his term.  1879 
Senate Journal, 65-72; see also Beitzinger, Lion of the Law 167 
(noting that upon his loss, Ryan "hinted in a humorous vein that 
he had been the victim of a conspiracy on the part of the three 
Republican candidates.  At this the legislators broke into good-
natured laughter and applause."). 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
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Quaife, The Struggle Over Ratification 1846-1847 at 488 (1920) 
(emphasis added). 
¶63 Similarly, one of the judges cited as an example by 
the dissent, actually discussed what the concerns were about the 
judiciary during the 1846 convention and after, during the 
ratification debates.  His statements support our interpretation 
that the idea of restricting judges began during the first 
convention and had support as the debate continued.  Isaac P. 
Walker, in his "Address to the People of Wisconsin," given on 
March 
31, 
1847, 
discussed 
the 
benefits 
of 
the 
proposed 
constitution, particularly the provisions serving to restrain 
the political ambitions of those on the bench: 
 . . . But 
above all, 
by 
our 
constitution 
every 
officer, 
whether 
executive, 
administrative, 
legislative, 
or 
judicial, 
is 
expressly 
rendered 
ineligible during his term of office "to any other 
office of trust, profit, or honor in the state. 
 
Now, fellow citizens, under such a system of 
government what opportunity is left for a corrupt 
office-seeking 
or 
office-holding 
regency, 
junto, 
clique, or dynasty either to concentrate or to combine 
to 
trample 
upon 
the 
people's 
rights 
and 
interests? . . .   No; they have not only to pass the 
ordeal of our suffrage, but the constitution declares 
that each must have served out his term before he can 
take another station.  And I have no fears but that he 
will be required to have served it faithfully before 
the people will call upon or elevate him again.  Our 
constitution would present but few charms to such a 
politician as the Senator from Illinois, to whom I 
have alluded; and quite as few to another new-made 
Senator in Michigan, who in about two years past has 
leaped from the ranks of mere ambition to the bench, 
from the bench to the gubernatorial chair, and from 
that into the United States Senate, serving the people 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
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in neither capacity any longer than to enable himself 
to get a better office.22 
Quaife, The Struggle Over Ratification, at 601 (emphasis added).  
Such written, contemporaneous interpretations lend credence to 
our interpretation by pointing out the prevalent concerns that 
prompted 
the 
drafters 
to 
institute 
various 
protections.  
Walker's statement indicates that even before the actual phrase 
"during the term for which elected" became part of the 
constitution at the second convention, there were those who 
believed it proper to restrain judges during the entire period 
of time for which the people originally elected them to serve 
and even beyond. 
¶64 We note also, in discussing practices at the time the 
constitution was drafted, that other states were participating 
in similar debates.  In August of 1847, only a few months before 
the second constitutional convention in Wisconsin, delegates to 
a convention in Illinois adopted a new constitution that was 
accepted by the people of Illinois in March 1848.  See Illinois 
Constitutions 51 n.1 (Emil J. Verlie, ed.) (1919).  Article V, 
Section 10 of that constitution, dealing with the judiciary, 
contained a provision extraordinarily similar to that eventually 
adopted in Wisconsin: 
                                                 
22 We disagree with the dissent's contention that Walker 
"apparently changed his mind" about these statements in later 
years of his life.  See dissent, ¶112 n.4.  As the dissent 
acknowledges, Walker was a territorial probate judge.  See John 
R. Berryman, History of the Bench & Bar, Vol. 2, p.40 (1898).  
Although it appears he became a United States Senator before his 
term expired, the prohibition against holding other offices did 
not apply to probate judges.  Wis. Const. art. 7, § 10 (1848). 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
56 
 
The judges of the supreme court shall receive a salary 
of 
twelve 
hundred 
dollars 
per 
annum, 
payable 
quarterly, and no more. . . .   The judges of the 
supreme and circuit courts shall not be eligible to 
any other office or public trust of profit in this 
state, or the United States, during the term for which 
they are elected, nor for one year thereafter.  All 
votes for either of them for any elective office 
(except that of judge of the supreme or circuit 
court,) given by the General Assembly or the people, 
shall be void. 
Id. at 73.  Thus, it was not unheard of to restrict judges 
beyond the time they actually served on the bench and, in fact, 
it appears that Wisconsin's convention delegates were not alone 
in believing it was necessary to do so.23 
                                                 
23 The dissent cites the case of Ballou v. DuBois, 23 Ill. 
498, [*547] (1860) to dispute the contention that Illinois 
interpreted the provisions similarly.  Dissent, ¶123.  We find 
this case, at best, ambiguous.  An Illinois court was called 
upon 
to 
examine 
the 
constitutional 
provision 
similar 
to 
Wisconsin's when the legislature redistricted and essentially 
left a judge in office with no physical territory in which to 
serve.  Ballou, 23 Ill. at 502.  The dissent quotes a piece of 
the court's analysis, but conveniently leaves out an important 
attached statement.  See dissent, ¶123.  The court's whole 
statement regarding the constitutional provision is interesting, 
but ambiguous.  The court stated:   
The tenth section of the same article provides, that 
"the judges of the Supreme and circuit courts shall 
not be eligible to any other office or public trust, 
of profit, in this State, or the United States, during 
the term for which they are elected, nor for one year 
thereafter."  If the legislature can legislate a judge 
out of office the next day after he is elected, he 
must stand disqualified for any other office or trust, 
of profit, for the remainder of the seven years; while 
it was the intention of the constitution that he 
should only be disqualified for one year after he went 
out of office, unless he voluntarily resigns, or is 
impeached or addressed out of office. 
Ballou, 23 Ill. at 502-03 (emphasis added). 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
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C.  Earliest Legislation 
¶65 The final part of our analysis leads us to seek the 
earliest interpretation of Article VII, Section 10 by the 
legislature as manifested in the first law passed following 
adoption.  Oak Creek, 232 Wis. 2d 612, ¶18.  Unfortunately, 
there was no law passed relative to Section 10 until 1913, over 
50 years later, in Wis. Stat. ch. 115, § 2523-22 (1913).24  
However, since Section 10 was amended in 1912, and because, 
technically, it is the first law passed on this provision, we 
find it appropriate to look at the 1913 legislation.   
¶66 Wisconsin Stat. ch. 115, § 2523-22 (1913) provided: 
No judge of any court of record in this state, except 
judges of county courts, shall be eligible to or hold 
any office of public trust, except a judicial office, 
during the term for which he is elected, and all votes 
cast for any such judge for any office, except a 
judicial office, shall be void. 
This 
statutory 
language 
appears 
to 
simply 
codify 
the 
constitutional provision and provides no real guidance regarding 
correct interpretation.  However, it is of note that the 
drafters of this statute carried over the language of the 
constitution and left intact the prohibition of holding any 
office of public trust "during the term for which [] elected."  
See id.   
                                                 
24 The dissent points to the election of two judges to 
office as earlier legislative acts.  Dissent, ¶116.  As we have 
stated previously, we do not find such examples persuasive and 
in fact, as we have noted, one of the examples cited, Judge 
Isaac Walker, was a probate judge, a position for which the 
constitutional prohibition did not apply.  See Berryman, History 
of the Bench & Bar, Vol. 2, at 40.   
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
58 
 
¶67 Although this early legislation does not allow much 
insight into the intent of the provision, we find it important 
that, similar to the constitution, the phrase "during the term 
for which elected" has remained in the statutes through a 
variety of alterations, during which the text of the provision 
was 
scrutinized, 
and 
remains 
in 
the 
present 
statute, 
Wis. Stat. § 757.02(2). 
¶68 Because this first law is of so little use, we follow 
the trail of this statute a bit further in our quest for 
answers. 
 
In 
1919, 
the 
statute, 
renumbered 
as 
Wis. Stat. § 2564m(2), was amended to read: 
The judge of any court of record in this state 
shall be ineligible to hold any office of public 
trust, except a judicial office, during the term for 
which he was elected, and all votes cast for any such 
judge for any office, except a judicial office, shall 
be void. 
(Emphasis added for amendments); see also § 5, ch. 93, Laws of 
1919.  One of the revisions, from "is" to "was," shows a focus 
on the past, on an occurrence that has already happened and is 
presently immutable.  This focus again suggests that the 
language refers to the full term for which a candidate is 
originally elected, a set time period, rather than the time 
until a person chooses to resign. 
¶69 In 1923, the legislature added penalties to the 
provisions of Wis. Stat. § 2564m.  See ch. 134, Laws of 1923.  
Under Wis. Stat. § 2564m(2)(a) (1923), a judge that decided to 
run for an office of public trust during the term for which 
elected, vacated his office when becoming a candidate.  Also, 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
59 
 
nomination papers were not to be accepted.  Id.  Under 
Wis. Stat. § 2564m(2)(b) (1923), becoming a candidate was a 
felony offense, punishable with a fine and prison. Under 
Wis. Stat. § 2564m(2)(c) (1923), if convicted, a judge would 
thereafter be ineligible to a variety of offices of public 
trust, unless granted an executive pardon.  However, under that 
same provision, excepted were those judges whose term would 
expire prior to the holding of office.  Id.  Although these 
provisions have long-since been repealed, the language used 
suggests that the drafters of the constitution and original 
statute meant what they said with the phrase "during the term 
for which elected."  That phrase is used repeatedly in the 1923 
version of the statute.  See Wis. Stat. § 2564m(2) (1923). 
¶70 By 1961, the clause stating the votes would be void 
was eliminated.  See § 113, ch. 495, Laws of 1961.  This might 
help explain the elimination of the same language in the 1977 
constitutional amendment to Article VII, Section 10.  In 1977, 
the statute was again amended.  See ch. 187, Laws of 1977.  We 
find it of particular import that although the constitutional 
language was amended the same year, the only revisions to the 
statute were to renumber it as Wis. Stat. § 757.02(2) (1977) and 
make it gender neutral.  See id.  Since that time, no 
substantive changes have been made to the provision. 
¶71 This statutory history, while not a crystal clear mark 
of legislative intent, does provide support for a strict 
interpretation of Article VII, Section 10 in the constitution, 
particularly in light of plain meaning analysis and the timing 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
60 
 
and opportunity for change with regard to the statute.  In 
essence, when the legislature reexamined the statute at or near 
the time of constitutional revision, neither the constitution 
nor the statutory history provides any indication that the 
phrase "during the term for which elected" was intended to be 
anything other than a prohibition to last the entire period for 
which a judge or justice was originally elected. 
IV 
¶72 We have addressed the petitioner's arguments that 
Article VII, Section 10 is merely a dual office holding 
restriction.  However, the amicus in this case disagrees both 
with the State and the petitioner and has presented an 
alternative interpretation of the "term for which elected" 
language.  The amicus argues, and the dissent agrees, that 
"during the term for which elected" means the "term" ends when a 
successor is duly elected.  See dissent, ¶100.  We are not 
persuaded by this argument.  While the position may present a 
"happy medium," we find no basis for this interpretation in the 
language of the constitution, the debates, or the relevant 
legislative acts.  
¶73 This court does not have the freedom to start from 
scratch or redebate the best solution to the problem of judicial 
independence.  That was the job of the drafters, and if changes 
are necessary, it will be the job of the legislature and 
citizens.  Rather, we are presented with the duty to interpret 
the language of the constitution as written by the drafters and 
ratified by the citizens of this state.  We are not persuaded 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
61 
 
that "the term for which elected" ends simply because a new 
person has been selected for a judicial position.  The concerns 
debated by the drafters and the text of the constitution belie 
such an interpretation.   
¶74 The dissent asserts that the amicus is correct in its 
argument that the "term for which elected" ends "when a 
successor is duly elected and qualified."  Dissent, ¶100.  
Although such an interpretation would give the provision a 
meaning, we find that there is simply no basis, textual or 
otherwise, for drawing the line at the point of a new election.  
Based on our analysis in Part III, we find that while the word 
"term" may be interpreted in a variety of ways depending on the 
context in which it is used, and in the context of "during the 
term for which elected," a "term" is the fixed period of time 
set out 
by the 
constitution that 
cannot 
be 
altered by 
resignation.  The plain language of the constitution and the 
numerous interpretations of that language since its adoption 
support no other alternative.  Judges and justices, by accepting 
roles in the judiciary, accept a restriction on their ability to 
be candidates for nonjudicial offices of public trust for the 
entire period of time for which the voters elected them into 
office.  These "terms" are specifically outlined in the 
constitution.  Nothing requires a judge or justice to actually 
serve the entirety of the term for which he or she is elected, 
but it cannot be concluded on that basis that a judge or justice 
is automatically excused from the responsibilities acquired by 
assuming a role on the bench, even if a successor is elected.   
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
62 
 
¶75 The independence of the judiciary is a bulwark of the 
democratic system, and promoting such independence may require 
those taking judicial positions to accept sacrifices even beyond 
the time they are actually on the bench to preserve the 
integrity of the system.  See Clements, 457 U.S. at 968 n.5 
("The State's particular interest in maintaining the integrity 
of the judicial system could support § 19, even if such a 
restriction could not survive constitutional scrutiny with 
regard to any other officeholder.").  The election of a new 
judge or justice does not negate the responsibilities taken on 
by a prior judge or justice.  We agree that a "term" may in one 
sense end with resignation, but we agree with the State that the 
"term for which elected" does not.  That term is explicitly set 
by the constitution, and the restriction in Article VII, Section 
10 supports voters' expectation that when they elect a judge or 
justice, he or she will serve the term constitutionally set——the 
term for which elected. 
V 
¶76 We turn now to petitioner's final argument, that a 
prohibition such as Article VII, Section 10 deprives the 
petitioner of his constitutional rights to liberty and equal 
protection of the law under both the Wisconsin Constitution and 
the United States Constitution.  The analysis of restrictions on 
candidates for office often intermingles with an analysis of the 
effect on the rights of voters.  See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 
U.S. 780, 786-87 (1983).  These types of cases often raise 
issues related to the First Amendment, due process, and equal 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
63 
 
protection under the law.  See id.  The analysis for all these 
types of cases is essentially the same.  See id. at 786 n.7 
(noting that various types of constitutional claims required the 
same analysis in the election context).  Courts have recognized 
that the right to run for public office is a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest.  See, e.g., Becton v. Thomas, 48 F. 
Supp.2d 747, 757 (W.D. Tenn. 1999).   
¶77 In analyzing a constitutional challenge to a state's 
election law, a court "must first consider the character and 
magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected."  
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.  Further, "[i]n passing judgment, the 
Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of 
each of [the state] interests, it also must consider the extent 
to which those interests make it necessary to burden the 
plaintiff's rights."  Id.  As noted by this court in the case of 
State v. Hezzie R., 219 Wis. 2d 848, 893, 580 N.W.2d 660 (1998):  
"Equal protection requires that there exist reasonable and 
practical grounds for the classifications created by the 
legislature."  This court has held that the constitutional 
guarantees of the Wisconsin Constitution and United States 
Constitution are substantially equivalent.  See id. at 891 
(finding state and federal due process clauses equivalent); 
Treiber v. Knoll, 135 Wis. 2d 58, 68, 398 N.W.2d 756 (1987) 
(noting 
equivalency 
in 
equal 
protection 
guarantees).  
Fortunately, the analysis of the Supreme Court in Clements has 
already laid the groundwork for our analysis of the petitioner's 
liberty and equal protection interests. 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
64 
 
¶78 While we agree that petitioner's rights are somewhat 
burdened in this case, we find that the State's legitimate 
interests in creating Article VII, Section 10 far outweigh the 
burdens put upon the petitioner's right to be a candidate for 
office.  Petitioner concedes that his liberty and equal 
protection interests are only violated if there is no reasonable 
basis for the restriction, but argues that no such rational 
basis exists for this type of restriction.  Following the 
guidance put forth in Clements, we cannot agree.  We find there 
are significant state interests protected by a provision such as 
Section 10. 
¶79 Under 
Clements, 
it 
is 
clear 
that 
no 
suspect 
classification or fundamental right is involved in this type of 
case, so strict scrutiny is not demanded.  As the Clements court 
noted:  "Far from recognizing candidacy as a 'fundamental 
right,' we have held that the existence of barriers to a 
candidate's access to the ballot 'does not of itself compel 
close scrutiny.'" Id. at 963 (quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 
U.S. 134, 143 (1972)).  That court went on to define the 
appropriate standards for examining a case such as this: 
Decision in this area of constitutional adjudication 
is a matter of degree, and involves a consideration of 
the facts and circumstances behind the law, the 
interests the State seeks to protect by placing 
restrictions on candidacy, and the nature of the 
interests of those who may be burdened by the 
restrictions.  
Id.  (internal citations omitted).  Wisconsin case law also 
supports our finding that the petitioner has no fundamental 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
65 
 
right to be a candidate.  In Frederick v. Zimmerman, 254 
Wis. 600, 617, 37 N.W.2d 473 (1949), this court held that 
although "the right to vote is an inherent or constitutional 
right, the right to be a candidate is not of that character."  
We must concede, based on Supreme Court precedent, that there is 
a recognized right in candidacy.  However, Frederick and the 
Supreme Court precedent agree that the right is clearly 
something less than fundamental.  In Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788, 
the United States Supreme Court held that a "State's important 
regulatory 
interests 
are 
generally 
sufficient 
to 
justify 
reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions."  In Becton, 48 F. 
Supp.2d at 758, a district court found that the liberty interest 
in running for public office could not be denied or infringed 
"unless [the state] can offer a reasonable justification or 
rational basis for doing so."   
¶80 In Clements, 457 U.S. 960, the United States Supreme 
Court dealt with Texas provisions very much like the one we 
interpret today.25  The Supreme Court there interpreted two 
provisions of the Texas Constitution.  One provision was 
                                                 
25 We note that since the United States Supreme Court 
decided Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982), the Texas 
Supreme Court has had the opportunity to again review the 
language of one of the provisions at issue in Clements, namely 
Article III, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution.  See 
Wentworth v. Meyer, 839 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. 1992).  The Texas 
Supreme Court in Wentworth found Section 19 should be construed 
strictly 
against ineligibility 
and 
overruled 
its previous 
interpretations of the provision to hold that Section 19 only 
applied during the officerholder's actual time of service.  See 
id. at 767-68.  We do not find that court's analysis persuasive 
and we maintain that the Clements analysis is proper. 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
66 
 
essentially a resign-to-run clause.  See Clements, 457 U.S. at 
960.  The other, Article III, Section 19 of the Texas 
Constitution, was a provision much like Article VII, Section 10 
of the Wisconsin Constitution.  That section provided that 
"judges of any court" were not eligible to the legislature 
"during the term for which he is elected or appointed."  Id.  
Regarding Section 19, the Supreme Court found: 
Resignation is ineffective to avoid § 19 if the 
officeholder's current term of office overlaps the 
term of the legislature to which he seeks election.  
In other words, § 19 requires an officeholder to 
complete his current term of office before he may be 
eligible to serve in the legislature. 
Id.   
¶81 In 
upholding 
the 
Texas 
restrictions, 
the 
Court 
identified several important state interests:  1) the state has 
an interest in encouraging judges to devote full time to the 
duties of their office instead of spending time on a campaign 
for a different office; 2) there is a legitimate state interest 
in discouraging judges from vacating their offices early to 
avoid the difficulties accompanying interim appointments and 
elections; and 3) the state has a strong interest in insuring 
that sitting judges will not abuse their present power because 
of aspirations for higher office.  Id. at 968.  All of these 
apply with equal force to Article VII, Section 10 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶82 Similar to those rationale put forth in Clements are 
those put forth by the State in this case.  The State asserts 
here: 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
67 
 
It is reasonable to believe, moreover, that judges who 
seek a different office earlier in their term are more 
likely than judges who serve their entire term to view 
judicial office as a mere stepping stone to political 
office, and are therefore more likely to misuse their 
judicial office for the purpose of advancing their own 
career.   
(Resp't Br. at 25.)  We agree with the perspective that 
preventing judges from holding another office of public trust 
until their term expires, whether or not they resign, helps 
discourage people from taking positions on the bench to use as 
"mere stepping stone[s]" to political office.  As the Supreme 
Court noted, such "waiting periods" are not substantial burdens 
in comparison to the state interests.  Clements, 457 U.S. at 
968. 
¶83 In a somewhat similar case to that faced here,26 the 
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals eloquently stated the 
strong state interest in creating restrictions upon those 
serving in the judiciary: 
Concomitant to the sustained confidence of the public 
in the judiciary is the correlative responsibility 
that integrity must be the cynosure of all judicial 
endeavors, both actual and perceived.  So crucial is 
the state's interest in maintaining the integrity of 
its judicial system that regulations or restrictions 
which temporally affect an officeholder's access to 
the ballot have been found to withstand constitutional 
challenge on this ground alone. 
                                                 
26 In Carenbauer v. Hechler, 542 S.E.2d 405 (W.Va. 2000), 
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals interpreted Article 
VII, Section 7 of its constitution, a resign-to-run restriction 
on justices, judges and magistrates.  In the case, an incumbent 
supreme court justice filed a certificate of candidacy for 
another seat on the same court while still serving his unexpired 
term.  Id. at 408. 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
68 
 
Carenbauer v. Hechler, 542 S.E.2d 405, 409 (W.Va. 2000).  These 
considerations and those noted by the United States Supreme 
Court far outweigh any burden laid upon the petitioner to wait 
to become a candidate for a nonjudicial office of public trust.  
Even though the restriction does not end with the resignation of 
a judge or justice, it was concern for the integrity of the 
judiciary as a whole and desire to promote that integrity from 
sitting members of the bench that appropriately led to the 
creation of this type of restriction.  These state interests are 
of the utmost importance.  As noted in Carenbauer, 542 S.E.2d at 
410:  "Undergirding the constitutional prohibition against 
seeking nonjudicial elective office is the correlative objective 
of both removing and insulating judges from the political 
realm."  Given all of these significant state interests, we 
conclude that the petitioner's rights to liberty and equal 
protection of the law have not been violated by Article VII, 
Section 10 of the Wisconsin Constitution. 
¶84 By no means do we exalt the provision discussed in 
this case as the solution to all evils related to the judiciary 
or the best support for judicial independence.  The reality is 
that this provision appears to us to fall short of optimum in 
more than one respect.  However, it is not the job of this court 
to assess the wisdom of any given provision; rather, we 
ascertain what the law is and whether it may be applied when 
balanced against the constitutional protections guaranteed to 
citizens of this state and of this country.  Moreover, the 
provision as it stands need not be the best option.  The State's 
No. 
02-0375-OA   
 
69 
 
interests here are important and the purposes behind this law 
have long been served by the language of this provision.   
VI 
¶85 We therefore conclude that Article VII, Section 10(1) 
of the Wisconsin Constitution prohibits a circuit court judge or 
any judge or justice of a court of record in this state from 
holding a nonjudicial position of public trust during the entire 
term for which elected, regardless of whether he or she chooses 
to resign from the judicial position.   
By the Court.—It is declared and adjudged that Article VII, 
Section 10 of the Wisconsin Constitution prohibits petitioner, a 
circuit judge, from holding a nonjudicial office of public trust 
during the full period of time for which he was originally 
elected and that, as such, petitioner is ineligible to run for 
Milwaukee County Executive or any other nonjudicial office of 
public trust until his term expires in August 2006. 
Relief denied.  
¶86 DIANE S. SYKES, J., did not participate.   
 
No.  02-0375-OA.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶87 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  I agree with 
the majority that our task is to discern the meaning of the 
phrase "during the term for which elected" as intended by the 
drafters of the 1848 constitutional convention. I acknowledge 
the tried and true analytical framework employed by the majority 
when determining the meaning of a constitutional provision:  
examine the words of the text, the constitutional debates, the 
practices 
at 
the 
time, 
and 
the 
earliest 
interpretations 
manifested by the legislature.  Majority op., ¶18. 
¶88 I part ways with the majority, however, because its 
interpretation is unsupported by the 1848 convention debates and 
is inconsistent with the early practices and legislative acts.  
Rather, after stripping away the irrelevant discussion of the 
majority, and employing the accepted analytical framework, I 
conclude that the "term for which elected" ends after a 
successor is duly elected and qualified. 
¶89 First, let us discard some of what is irrelevant.  
Much of the discussion in both the plain meaning section and the 
constitutional debates section of the majority's opinion is 
irrelevant because it cites debates focusing on the wrong issue, 
from the wrong constitutional convention, to interpret a phrase 
that was not adopted at that convention, by delegates who were 
not elected to the subsequent and more relevant 1848 convention.  
¶90 As the majority correctly notes, one of the issues of 
great debate at the first convention in 1846 focused on whether 
the constitution should provide for an elected or appointed 
No.  02-0375-OA.awb 
 
2 
 
judiciary.   The eloquent orations of Charles Baker and Edward 
Ryan cited by the majority argue the pros and cons of an elected 
judiciary.  Yet, the discussion from the first convention on 
this issue is largely unpersuasive because the issue of an 
elected judiciary had essentially been put to rest by the time 
of the second convention.   It was recognized that the popular 
will demanded election and no serious argument against it was 
made at the second convention.  Ray A. Brown, The Making of the 
Wisconsin Constitution, 1952 Wis. L. Rev. 23, 37. 
¶91 Indeed, although the majority quotes liberally from 
Edward Ryan, it seems to be misguided about the influence that 
he had on the judiciary article at either convention.  As the 
majority notes, Ryan never served on the all-important judiciary 
committee of the first convention.  Most of his commentary on 
the 
article 
on 
the 
judiciary 
dealt 
with 
his 
determined 
opposition to the election of judges.  See Milo M. Quaife, The 
Convention of 1846, 590-603.  The 1846 convention ultimately 
presented for ratification a constitutional provision on the 
selection of judges that was at odds with the position espoused 
by Ryan.  He was not a delegate to the second convention, and 
there is little to show that he had any influence on the 
relevant discussion, the meaning of the phrase "during the term 
for which they are respectively elected."27 
                                                 
27 The majority observes that Ryan recommended similar 
language during the debate over the 1846 constitution.  Majority 
op., ¶27.  It fails to note, however, that Ryan's proposal was 
for a judiciary appointed by the governor. 
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¶92 It is curious that the majority relies so heavily on 
statements made by Edward Ryan at the first constitutional 
convention as support for its interpretation.  Perhaps it does 
not realize that these statements were made in a speech 
promoting the merits of an appointed judiciary, a position which 
was 
defeated 
in 
both 
constitutional 
conventions. 
 
More 
pointedly, it is difficult to understand why the majority so 
heavily relies on Ryan because he did not interpret the phrase 
at issue as the majority does today.   
¶93 In April 1875, Ryan was elected chief justice of the 
supreme court to fill the unexpired term of Chief Justice Luther 
Dixon, who had resigned.  If he had lived, Ryan's term would 
have expired on the first Monday of January 1882.  John R. 
Berryman, History of the Bench and Bar, Vol. 1, p. 180-81 
(1898).  On January 22, 1879, while Ryan was serving as chief 
justice 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Supreme 
Court, 
the 
Wisconsin 
legislature met in joint session to elect a United States 
Senator.  Ryan was one of the three nominees for the position.   
¶94 In a hotly contested election, Ryan finished second.28 
1879 Senate Journal, pp. 96-101.  If he had been elected 
                                                                                                                                                             
The word "respectively" was removed as part of the 
revisions to this section made in 1977.  See 1975 Enrolled Joint 
Resolution 13; 1977 Enrolled Joint Resolution 7. 
28 Both the Assembly and Senate voted for nominees for 
United States Senate.  They met first separately and then met in 
a joint session.  In the initial vote in the Senate, Ryan 
finished second out of four candidates.  He fared better in the 
Assembly, finishing first out of five candidates.  However, when 
the Senate and Assembly voted in joint session, Ryan ultimately 
lost the election.   
No.  02-0375-OA.awb 
 
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senator, he would have had to resign his position on the court 
in the middle of his term.  By his actions, we must conclude 
that either Chief Justice Ryan intentionally and publicly 
violated the constitutional prohibition, or that he did not 
interpret the prohibition as does the majority today.  I 
conclude the latter.  His actions reflect an interpretation of 
the phrase in issue that is decidedly at odds with that advanced 
by the majority. 
¶95 Although the acceptance of an elected judiciary, which 
Ryan opposed, was well settled by the time of the second 
constitutional convention, other issues in the judiciary article 
remained in dispute.  The remarks of Byron Kilbourn at the 
opening of the second constitutional convention indicate that 
the judiciary article, along with a handful of other articles, 
would be the most prominent at the new convention. 
It was the province of this body to study out and 
avoid those measures known to be repugnant to the 
popular will, and although there might be some little 
difference of opinion as to what those articles were 
and precisely to what effect they had been condemned, 
yet he apprehended that all would agree that the 
judiciary article, the bank article, and the articles 
on exemption and the rights of married women were most 
prominent and had met with most disapprobation. 
Milo M. Quaife, The Attainment of Statehood, 179 (1928). 
¶96 The phrase at issue, which was introduced at the 
second constitutional convention, was not a part of the initial 
                                                                                                                                                             
The majority attempts to minimize Ryan's nomination by 
noting that he was not elected.  The fact remains, however, that 
his name was placed in nomination for an office of public trust 
while he was serving as chief justice of the supreme court. 
No.  02-0375-OA.awb 
 
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Article VII, Section 10 draft submitted to the 1848 convention 
by the Committee on the Judiciary.  It first appeared before the 
convention on the afternoon of January 21, 1848.  The Committee 
on the Judiciary reported Article VII back to the convention 
with "sundry amendments." Quaife, The Attainment of Statehood, 
at 691.  Among the amendments advanced by the Committee on the 
Judiciary was a fifth amendment which added the phrase "during 
the term for which they are respectively elected."  Id. at 696.  
Apparently the creation and discussion of this phrase took place 
in committee.  No discussion is reflected in the written 
accounts of the convention.  Id. 
¶97 In addition to the largely unpersuasive discussions of 
the 
majority 
noted 
above, 
the 
opinion 
is 
replete 
with 
irrelevant, albeit interesting, discussion.  The legislative 
history concerning the 1977 court reform (majority op., ¶¶34, 
35) and the defeated 1995 referendum (majority op., ¶¶31-33, 36-
39) offers current views of what the phrase provides or what it 
should provide.  Such discussion sheds no light on the essential 
inquiry before us:  what did the drafters of the 1848 
constitution mean by the phrase "during the term for which they 
are respectively elected." 
¶98 Likewise discussion concerning the adoption in 1967 of 
the Code of Judicial Ethics, and cases cited concerning 
enforcement actions brought under the Code, miss the mark of our 
essential inquiry. See Majority op., ¶¶45-47.  Similarly, since 
the attorney general opinions cited are not interpreting the 
Wisconsin constitution, but are offered to interpret subsequent 
No.  02-0375-OA.awb 
 
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statutory provisions, they are of little assistance. See 
Majority op., ¶¶48-49. 
¶99 The majority and I differ as to the length to which 
the prohibition is extended.  The majority would extend the 
period of prohibition as though the judge had remained on the 
bench and not resigned.   
¶100 I believe such an interpretation is not supported by 
the constitutional debates and is inconsistent both with the 
practices at the time and the early legislative acts.  Rather, 
the more reasonable interpretation is that the prohibition ends 
when the term ends:  when a successor is duly elected and 
qualified.   
¶101 Unlike the majority, I focus not on Edward Ryan as 
providing the key to understanding the meaning of the phrase in 
question, but on Charles Dunn.  Morgan Martin, president of the 
second 
constitutional 
convention, 
described 
Dunn 
as 
the 
strongest 
man 
intellectually 
in the 
second 
constitutional 
convention.  Quaife, The Attainment of Statehood, at 911.  When 
Wisconsin became a territory in 1836, President Andrew Jackson 
appointed Dunn chief justice of the new court.  He served as the 
chief justice during the entire territorial period.  See also, 
John Bradley Winslow, Story of a Great Court, 33-36 (1912). 
¶102 Of greater significance for our discussion, Dunn also 
served as chair of the five-member Committee on the Judiciary of 
the second constitutional convention.  Quaife, The Attainment of 
Statehood, at 912.  Serving as chair of the judiciary committee, 
he was considered very influential in preparing the judiciary 
No.  02-0375-OA.awb 
 
7 
 
article of the constitution.  Id.  As noted above, the wording 
of the phrase in question came from his committee and passed the 
constitutional convention without discussion by the convention 
as a whole.  Since no record exists of the committee discussion, 
I look to his actions and the practices of the time for 
illumination of how the drafters interpreted the phrase "during 
the term for which they are respectively elected." 
¶103 The majority builds a house of cards premised on the 
foundation that the drafters, out of a heightened concern for 
preserving judicial independence, intended that the prohibition 
at issue be interpreted to last the entire period for which the 
judge or justice was originally elected.  Majority op., ¶¶28, 
63.   As with an examination of the life of Chief Justice Ryan, 
the house of cards collapses when we examine how Dunn and the 
early legislature approached this limitation. 
¶104 After the second constitutional convention, Dunn was 
elected to the state senate and served as the chair of its 
Judiciary Committee.  In 1857 he was a candidate for the United 
States Senate, which was a position elected by the state 
legislature.  His main opponent, and the ultimate victor, was 
none other than James R. Doolittle, a former circuit court 
judge.  Doolittle had been elected judge of the first circuit in 
1853, taking office on January 1, 1854, for a term of six years.  
He resigned two years later, in March of 1856, and within a 
month John Keep was elected to fill the judgeship.  Berryman, 
History of the Bench and Bar, Vol. 1, p. 352. 
No.  02-0375-OA.awb 
 
8 
 
¶105 In addition to Dunn, five members of the legislature 
in 
1857 
were 
also 
members 
of 
the 
second 
constitutional 
convention.  Laws of 1857, pp. 3-6.29  All participated in this 
election of a former circuit court judge, who resigned mid-term 
and accepted a position of trust, the United States Senate.  But 
the election of Doolittle was not accomplished until his 
successor had already been duly elected and qualified.   
¶106 Certainly, if such an election violated a judicial 
provision of the new constitution, a provision which he advanced 
as chair of the convention's judiciary committee, Dunn would 
have insisted that the votes cast for Doolittle, his opponent 
and the victor, should be voided.  Surely if such an election 
violated the constitution which the five legislators/convention 
delegates had so recently drafted, they would not have condoned 
such a violation.   
¶107 The majority's interpretation requires us to believe 
that Charles Dunn would silently acquiesce in allowing his 
opponent to unconstitutionally declare victory.  It requires us 
to believe that the five former delegates quietly participated 
in an unconstitutional election.  Instead, I believe that 
neither Dunn nor the 1857 legislature interpreted the phrase as 
does the majority.   
                                                 
29 Members of the 1857 legislature who were also members of 
the second constitutional convention were:  James Fagen from 
Cedarburg; Ezra Albert Foot from Footville; Louis Powell Harvey 
from Shopiere; Frederick S. Lovell from Kenosha (he was also 
chair of the Assembly Judiciary Committee in 1857); and James 
Denoon Reymert from Milwaukee. 
No.  02-0375-OA.awb 
 
9 
 
¶108 Likewise, Charles Larrabee, a circuit court judge and 
early supreme court justice who served as a delegate to the 
second constitutional convention, did not interpret the phrase 
as does the majority.  He resigned mid-term in 1858 to serve as 
a member of congress.  Winslow, Story of a Great Court, p. 18.  
¶109 Admittedly 
these 
positions 
of trust 
are federal 
positions.  The constitutional provision at issue, however, 
makes no distinction between federal and state positions of 
trust.  As the court noted in State v. McCarthy, 255 Wis. 234, 
38 N.W.2d 679 (1949), the "clear" language of Article VII, 
Section 10 would have also applied to federal positions of 
trust:  "It may have been argued that sec. 10, art. VII, Const. 
applied only to state offices of public trust. The subsequent 
language of the section that all votes cast for circuit judges 
by the legislature or the people makes perfectly clear that the 
office of United States senator was included."  McCarthy, 255 
Wis. at 248.   
¶110 A review of the practices of the time reveal that the 
rationale espoused by the majority for extending the period of 
prohibition also lacks support.  The majority asserts that a 
heightened concern for the "evils" attendant to an elected 
judiciary led the second constitutional convention to extend the 
period of prohibition not just until the incumbent resigned, or 
not just until a successor was duly elected and qualified, but 
for the entire length of the original term elected. Majority 
op., ¶28.  The practices of the day do not reflect this 
heightened concern. 
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10 
 
¶111 Examples abound in the early days of statehood of 
judges who resigned mid-term to accept positions of trust.  Many 
of these were not justices or circuit court judges, but their 
practices illustrate that the heightened concern necessitating a 
prolonged period of prohibition simply did not exist. 
¶112 Isaac Walker, the first probate judge from Milwaukee, 
resigned 
mid-term 
in 
1848 
after 
being 
selected 
by 
the 
legislature to serve as a U.S. Senator.   The selection of this 
judge to a position of trust after his mid-term resignation 
represents one of the earliest acts of the newly created 
Wisconsin legislature.  The legislature first convened on June 
5, 1848, and three days later, on June 8, 1848, it selected 
Walker as one of the two initial senators from Wisconsin.  1848  
Senate Journal, pp. 1, 17.30 
¶113 George Noyes, the first superior court judge in 
Milwaukee, resigned in March of 1890 after serving only two 
years of a six-year term.  He was well acquainted with the early 
leaders of the bench and bar, having been a law partner with the 
                                                 
30 I am perplexed by the majority's lengthy quote and 
discussion 
of 
Isaac 
Walker, 
a 
delegate 
of 
the 
first 
constitutional convention.  Majority op., ¶63.  The quote is 
offered by the majority as a contemporaneous statement decrying 
the kind of ambition which would cause a jurist to leap from the 
bench to a higher office of trust.  Walker is quoted as 
complaining about men who ". . . leaped from the ranks of mere 
ambition to the bench  . . . into the United States Senate." 
What the majority fails to note or connect is that Walker 
himself later became an example of the very thing he earlier 
decried.  In "leaping" from the position of probate judge to the 
United States Senate, Walker apparently changed his mind about 
the wisdom set forth in the quote which the majority now 
embraces. 
No.  02-0375-OA.awb 
 
11 
 
former chief justice of the Wisconsin supreme court, Luther 
Dixon.  Shortly after his resignation Governor Hoard appointed 
Noyes to a position of trust as a regent of the state university 
of Wisconsin.  Berryman, History of the Bench and Bar, Vol. 2, 
p. 51-53. 
¶114 Other examples include Herman Humphrey, a county 
judge, who resigned in February 1862, to become a member of the 
state legislature, after serving only one year of his judicial 
term (Berryman, History of the Bench and Bar, Vol. 2, p. 300); 
and A. P. Hodges, a Winnebago county judge, who resigned in 
December 1861 to occupy a position of trust, the state prison 
commissioner, which at that time was an elected position.  
Berryman, History of the Bench and Bar, Vol. 2, pp. 76-77. 
¶115 Thus, not only do the practices of the day undermine 
the interpretation advanced by the majority, but also the early 
acts of the legislature evince a contrary interpretation.  The 
majority advances that the earliest legislative interpretation 
of Article VII, Section 10 did not occur until over 50 years 
after its ratification when in 1913 the constitutional language 
was codified in Wis. Stat. Ch. 115, § 2523-22. (Majority op., 
¶57). 
 
It 
acknowledges 
that 
the 
codification 
of 
the 
constitutional language "provides no real guidance regarding 
correct interpretation."  Id.   
¶116 The majority has overlooked the earliest legislative 
acts shedding light on the interpretation of this phrase.  As 
noted above, as one of its first acts the legislature selected 
Judge Isaac Walker to a position of trust in the middle of his 
No.  02-0375-OA.awb 
 
12 
 
judicial term.  Such an act by the legislature undermines the 
rationale which is central to the majority's interpretation of 
the phrase.  Additionally, the election of former Judge James 
Doolittle to the United States Senate represents an early 
legislative act that is completely at odds with the majority's 
interpretation.   
¶117 In 
buttressing 
its 
interpretation, 
the 
majority 
discusses at length the case of State v. McCarthy, 255 Wis. 234, 
38 N.W.2d 679 (1949).  The question before the court in that 
case was whether to impose judicial discipline against a judge 
who ran for the United States Senate while still serving in his 
capacity as a circuit court judge.  In its per curiam decision, 
the court mistakenly attributed to an earlier McCarthy case, 
State ex rel. Wettengel v. Zimmerman, 249 Wis. 237, 24 
N.W.2d 504 (1946), an interpretation to Article VII, Section 10, 
which the Zimmerman court did not make.   
¶118 The Zimmerman court had no need to analyze and 
interpret Article VII, Section 10 because it based its holding 
on the premise that a state could not prescribe qualifications 
for the United States Senate in addition to those prescribed the 
constitution of the United States.  Zimmerman, 249 Wis. at 247.  
The petitioner argued that Article VII, Section 10 precluded 
McCarthy from seeking the nomination by the Republican party for 
the office of senator of the United States.  Without addressing 
whether the language of Article VII, Section 10 precluded such a 
candidacy, the court held that even "if the argument of the 
[petitioner] is sound," the state does not have the authority to 
No.  02-0375-OA.awb 
 
13 
 
prescribe the qualifications for United States senator "in 
addition to those prescribed by the United States Constitution."   
Id.  
¶119 In a further attempt to support its interpretation, 
the majority cites to the constitutions of Minnesota, Majority 
op., ¶51, and Illinois, Majority op., ¶64.  In State ex rel. 
Chiles v. Sutton, 65 N.W. 262 (Minn. 1895), the Minnesota 
Supreme 
Court 
interpreted 
a 
provision 
in 
the 
Minnesota 
Constitution 
prohibiting 
senators 
and 
representatives 
from 
holding any office "during the time for which he is elected."  
However, the constitutional provision prohibiting judges from 
holding another office does not contain a similar phrase.   
¶120 Article 6, § 11 provides:  "[t]he justices of the 
supreme court  . . . shall hold no other office under the United 
States nor any other office under this state."  Thus, the 
majority 
opinion 
correctly 
details 
the 
Minnesota 
court's 
analysis as it relates to senators and representatives, but the 
language relating to the judiciary is different in the Minnesota 
constitution, 
and 
different 
from 
the 
language 
in 
our 
constitution. 
¶121 The majority advances that the purpose for including 
the phrase in the Wisconsin constitution is to preserve the 
independence of the elected judiciary.  It is unclear how that 
stated purpose applies to Minnesota legislators given that there 
is no similar phrase in the judiciary article of the Minnesota 
constitution.   
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14 
 
¶122 In 1950, Minnesota Supreme Court Justice Harry H. 
Peterson resigned his seat on the court and immediately became a 
candidate for governor. See, Dougherty v. Holm, 44 N.W.2d 83 
(Minn. 1950).  In a case involving the election, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court noted that Peterson could not ethically have 
announced his candidacy while he occupied the bench.   Id. at 
86.  Nothing in the court's opinion suggests that he was 
constitutionally prohibited from resigning and then seeking the 
position of governor.  Contrary to the majority's suggestion, 
neither the Minnesota constitutional provision on the judiciary 
nor 
the 
practice 
in 
Minnesota 
supports 
the 
majority's 
interpretation.   
¶123 Likewise, the earliest Illinois case interpreting the 
cited constitutional provision falls short of supporting the 
majority's claim.  The court in Ballou v. DuBois, 23 Ill. 547 
(1860) interpreted article 5, section 10 of the Illinois 
Constitution which provides:  "the judges of the Supreme and 
circuit courts shall not be eligible to any other office or 
public trust, of profit, in this State, or the United States, 
during the term for which they are elected, nor for one year 
thereafter."  However, it appears as though the Ballou court did 
not interpret this provision to apply when a judge voluntarily 
resigns:  "it was the intention of the constitution that he 
should only be disqualified for one year after he went out of 
office, unless he voluntarily resigns, or is impeached or 
addressed out of office."  Id.  
No.  02-0375-OA.awb 
 
15 
 
¶124 I look instead to how a relatively early Wisconsin 
case, State ex rel. Johnson v. Nye, 148 Wis. 659, 668, 135 N.W. 
126 (1912), interpreted the same phrase "during the term for 
which he was elected" as it appears in Article IV, Section 12 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution.  Article IV, Section 12 provides: 
No member of the legislature shall, during the term 
for which he was elected, be appointed or elected to 
any civil office in the state, which shall have been 
created, or the emoluments of which shall have been 
increased, during the term for which he was elected. 
¶125 Although 
the 
court 
in 
that 
case 
dismissed 
the 
complaint concluding that it failed to state a cause of action 
because no emoluments of office were increased during the 
relevant period, it gave a cautionary instruction:  "The 
constitutional provision under consideration should be narrowly 
construed in favor of eligibility."  Johnson, 148 Wis. at 668.  
Although acknowledging the Johnson court directive that the 
provision interpreting the same phrase for legislators should be 
narrowly construed in favor of eligibility, the majority fails 
to explain why such a directive does not apply to the same 
language set forth for the judiciary in Article VII, Section 10. 
¶126 I would apply the Johnson directive and interpret the 
same 
language 
in 
Article 
VII, 
Section 
10 
in 
favor 
of 
eligibility, 
limiting 
the 
majority's 
extended 
period 
of 
prohibition after resignation.  The majority's interpretation is 
simply incorrect.  It is not supported by the constitutional 
debates and is inconsistent with the practices at the time and 
the early legislative acts.  In addition, it does not make good 
sense.   
No.  02-0375-OA.awb 
 
16 
 
¶127 The majority's interpretation is premised on the 
belief that Article VII, Section 10 allows two people who are 
elected to have the same judicial term for the same judicial 
position at the same time.  It mistakenly defines the length of 
all judicial terms as though the judges had remained on the 
bench.   
¶128 Here, the essential question before us is:  when does 
the judicial term end when the judge resigns?  The question of 
course is important because it is instructive as to how long the 
period of prohibition extends.     
¶129 I conclude that the period of prohibition after 
resignation extends until the successor is duly elected and 
qualified.  This interpretation is consistent with the practices 
of the times and the earliest legislative acts, and finds 
support in Article VII, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  
Article VII, Section 9 provides: 
When a vacancy occurs in the office of justice of the 
supreme court or judge of any court of record, the 
vacancy 
shall 
be 
filled 
by 
appointment 
by 
the 
governor, which shall continue until a successor is 
elected and qualified.  There shall be no election for 
a justice or judge at the partisan general election 
for state or county officers, nor within 30 days 
either before or after such election. 
Wis. Const. art. VII, § 9 (2001-02) (emphasis added).   The 
interpretation is also supported by Wis. Stat. § 17.19: 
Vacancies in elective state offices shall be filled as 
follows: . . . (2) JUDICIAL.  In the office of justice 
of the supreme court, court of appeals judge or 
circuit 
judge, 
by 
temporary 
appointment 
by 
the 
governor, which shall continue until a successor is 
elected, as provided in s. 8.50(4)(f), and qualifies.  
When so elected the successor shall hold office for a 
No.  02-0375-OA.awb 
 
17 
 
full term and shall take office on August 1 succeeding 
the election.   
Wis. Stat. § 17.19 (2001-02) (emphasis added). 
¶130 Thus when a successor is duly elected and qualified, 
the successor commences an entirely new term on August 1 for a 
full six or ten years.  When the new full term commences, the 
predecessor's judicial term ends.   
¶131 In sum, the majority interprets the constitutional 
provision as barring a former judge from holding another office 
until the judicial term to which the judge was previously 
elected would have expired if the judge had remained on the 
bench.  Such an extended prohibition is not supported by the 
1848 constitutional debates and is inconsistent with the 
practices of the times and the earliest legislative acts.  
Instead, for the reasons set forth above, I interpret the period 
of prohibition to extend until a successor is duly elected and 
qualified.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.   
¶132 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.  
 
 
 
 
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