Case Title: In re B.E.

Citation: 2004-Ohio-3361

Docket Number: 20031580

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-07-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as In re B.E. , 102 Ohio St.3d 388, 2004-Ohio-3361.] 
 
 
IN RE B.E. ET AL.;  CUYAHOGA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN & FAMILY 
SERVICES, APPELLANT, v. EVANS, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as In re B.E., 102 Ohio St.3d 388, 2004-Ohio-3361.] 
Juvenile court — When a juvenile court fails to comply with the recording 
requirements of Juv.R. 37(A) and an appellant attempts but is unable to 
submit an App.R. 9(C) statement to correct or supplement the record, the 
matter must be remanded to the juvenile court for rehearing. 
(No. 2003-1580 — Submitted March 30, 2004 — Decided July 14, 2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 81781, 2003-Ohio-
3949. 
__________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
When a juvenile court fails to comply with the recording requirements of Juv.R. 
37(A) and an appellant attempts but is unable to submit an App.R. 9(C) 
statement to correct or supplement the record, the matter must be 
remanded to the juvenile court for a rehearing. 
__________ 
 
FRANCIS E. SWEENEY, SR., J. 
{¶1} 
On April 10, 2000, the Cuyahoga County Department of Children 
and Family Services (“CCDCFS”), appellant, filed a complaint against Anita 
Evans, appellee, charging her with abuse and neglect of her five children.  On 
June 20, 2000, all five children were found to be neglected, and one child was 
found to be abused.  As a result, the children were placed in the temporary 
custody of CCDCFS. 
{¶2} 
On January 19, 2001, CCDCFS filed a motion to modify 
temporary custody to permanent custody.  A hearing was held in the juvenile 
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court on May 29, 2002, at which testimony was taken from Katie Williams 
(Evans’s grandmother), a CCDCFS social worker, and Anita Evans.  The hearing 
was tape-recorded, but the court failed to record the entire proceedings.  Instead, 
the transcript of the proceedings ends abruptly during the testimony of Anita 
Evans.  On August 28, 2002, the trial court granted permanent custody of the 
children to the CCDCFS. 
{¶3} 
Evans appealed from that decision to the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals.  Counsel for CCDCFS moved for an order compelling Evans to 
complete the record pursuant to App.R. 9(C).  Evans’s counsel filed a brief in 
opposition.  The appellate court granted CCDCFS’s motion and ordered Evans to 
“attempt to comply with App.R. 9(C).”  Evans’s counsel then filed a document 
with the court of appeals advising the court that he had tried to comply with 
App.R. 9(C) but was unable to do so because trial counsel for CCDCFS did not 
recollect the case.  Although the guardian ad litem had some recollection of the 
proceeding, appellee’s counsel stated that the guardian ad litem had not given him 
a proposed statement of evidence. 
{¶4} 
Rather than dismiss the case for failure to file an App.R. 9(C) 
statement, the court of appeals permitted the appeal to go forward on its merits.  
The court found that the juvenile court had failed to comply with Juv.R. 37(A) by 
not providing a complete transcript of the custody hearing, and reversed and 
remanded the matter to the juvenile court for a rehearing. 
{¶5} 
The cause is before this court upon the acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
{¶6} 
At issue in this case is the interplay between Juv.R. 37(A) and 
App.R 9(C). 
{¶7} 
Juv.R. 37(A) provides: 
{¶8} 
“Record of proceedings.  The juvenile court shall make a record of 
adjudicatory and dispositional proceedings in abuse, neglect, dependent, unruly, 
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3 
and delinquent cases; permanent custody cases; and proceedings before 
magistrates.  * * *  The record shall be taken in shorthand, stenotype, or by any 
other adequate mechanical, electronic, or video recording device.” 
{¶9} 
App.R. 9(C) provides: 
{¶10} “If no report of the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial 
was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, the appellant may prepare a statement 
of the evidence or proceedings from the best available means, including the 
appellant’s recollection.” 
{¶11} Juv.R. 37(A) clearly requires the juvenile court to make a record in 
cases alleging abuse, neglect, dependency, unruliness, and delinquency.  
Nevertheless, appellant CCDCFS argues that where a transcript is unavailable, the 
party appealing the juvenile court’s decision must file an App.R. 9(C) statement.  
See Knapp v. Edwards Laboratories (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 15 O.O.3d 218, 
400 N.E.2d 384.  Where no App.R. 9(C) statement is provided, CCDCFS 
maintains, a reviewing court must presume regularity in the proceedings.  See, 
e.g., In re Price (Mar. 25, 2002), Butler App. Nos. CA2001-02-035 and CA2001-
04-085, 2002 WL 449455, reversed on other grounds, 100 Ohio St.3d 204, 2003-
Ohio-5600, 797 N.E.2d 976.  Appellee, however, urges us to affirm the court of 
appeals’ decision and to hold that an App.R. 9(C) statement need not be used to 
correct the juvenile court’s failure to abide by the recording requirements of 
Juv.R. 37(A). 
{¶12} Clearly, Juv.R. 37 places primary responsibility upon the juvenile 
court to record proceedings in these types of cases.  Thus, a juvenile court must 
take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that it records its proceedings.  
However, in the event that the proceedings are not recorded properly, the question 
that arises, and is posed in this appeal, is whether an appellant has the obligation 
to attempt to correct an insufficient record by using one of the options available 
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under App.R. 9 or whether the juvenile court’s failure to record the proceedings in 
and of itself necessitates reversal. 
{¶13} The court of appeals took the latter approach and held that App.R. 
9(C) was not sufficient in this type of case.  The court reasoned that it is the 
court’s duty to provide for the recording of the transcript of the proceedings under 
Juv.R. 37(A) and that App.R. 9(C) “does not absolve the juvenile court’s duty, 
pursuant to Juv.R. 37(A), to provide a record,” citing In re Hart (Dec. 9, 1999), 
Cuyahoga App. No. 75326.  The court concluded by stating:  “Although an 
App.R. 9(C) statement may be appropriate in some cases, in this case, where 
parental rights are at stake and critical testimony is missing, an App.R. 9(C) 
statement is insufficient.”  See, also, In re Collins (1998), 127 Ohio App.3d 278, 
712 N.E.2d 798; In re Estep, Meigs App. No. 01CA2, 2002-Ohio-6141, 2002 WL 
31520351; In re L.D. (Dec. 13, 2001), Cuyahoga App. No. 78750, 2001 WL 
1612114; In re Dikun (Nov. 28, 1997), Trumbull App. No. 96-T-5558, 1997 WL 
752630. 
{¶14} Although we agree with the result reached by the court of appeals, 
we decline to hold that an App.R. 9(C) statement may never be used where a 
juvenile court fails to comply with Juv.R. 37(A).  The procedures outlined in 
App.R. 9 are designed precisely for this type of situation, where a transcript is 
unavailable.  Therefore, we reject the court of appeals’ assertion that App.R. 9 is 
insufficient in a case where parental rights are at stake and critical testimony is 
missing.  In fact, the nature of the underlying case is immaterial, as we have 
allowed criminal defendants to use App.R. 9(C) to supplement the record even in 
aggravated murder cases, in which the court was also obligated to record the 
proceedings, under Crim.R. 22.  See, e.g., State v. Brewer (1990), 48 Ohio St.3d 
50, 60-61, 549 N.E.2d 491. 
{¶15} We find that our decisions interpreting the interplay between 
Crim.R. 22 and App.R. 9 are relevant to resolution of this appeal.  Similar to the 
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recording requirement in Juv.R. 37(A), Crim.R. 22 requires a criminal court to 
record proceedings in all “serious offense cases.”  In these cases, despite the 
recording requirement, we held that the appellant waived any error by failing to 
invoke the procedures of App.R. 9(C) or 9(E) and making no attempt to 
reconstruct the missing portions of the record.  E.g., id.; State v. Keenan (1998), 
81 Ohio St.3d 133, 139, 689 N.E.2d 929.  Thus, we recognized that although it is 
the court’s responsibility in the first place to record the proceedings, the appellant, 
if possible, should attempt to use one of the procedures outlined in App.R. 9 to 
supplement the record for appeal purposes. 
{¶16} In this case, appellee’s counsel stated in a document filed in the 
court of appeals that he had attempted to comply with App.R. 9(C) but could not 
do so because neither trial counsel recollected the missing testimony; thus, 
appellee alleged that she was unable to reconstruct the record.  Under the facts of 
this case, we are unwilling to presume the validity of the juvenile court’s 
proceedings in the absence of an App.R. 9(C) statement, as appellant urges us to 
do.  In this situation, where it is alleged that the missing testimony cannot be 
recreated, we believe that justice dictates that the matter be remanded for a 
rehearing.  Otherwise, we would be penalizing an appellant for the court’s 
inability to comply with an established court rule in the first place.  Therefore, we 
hold that when a juvenile court fails to comply with the recording requirements of 
Juv.R. 37(A) and an appellant attempts but is unable to submit an App.R. 9(C) 
statement to correct or supplement the record, the matter must be remanded to the 
juvenile court for a rehearing. 
{¶17} In reaching this holding, we admonish juvenile courts to take 
seriously their obligation to ensure that these types of proceedings are recorded 
properly.  Far too often, we see incomplete records, frequently caused by 
malfunctioning audio-recording devices.  Obviously, it is in the court’s best 
interest to properly record its proceedings the first time around, preferably 
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through the use of a court stenographer.  As we cautioned the court and bar in the 
context of Crim.R. 22:  “The minimal effort needed to comply with Crim.R. 22 is 
far outweighed by the expense, in time and taxpayer money, of retrying a 
complex criminal case.”  State v. Brewer, 48 Ohio St.3d at 61, 549 N.E.2d 491.  
The same holds true in juvenile court proceedings. 
{¶18} Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals and remand the cause 
to juvenile court. 
Judgment affirmed 
and cause remanded. 
 
RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and O’CONNOR, J., dissent. 
__________________ 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶19} Although I agree with the majority that App.R. 9(C) applies where, 
as here, parental rights are at stake, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that 
Evans made reasonable efforts to submit an App.R. 9(C) statement. As the 
majority correctly observes, the court of appeals—despite thereafter concluding 
that App.R. 9(C) does not apply “where parental rights are at stake”—ordered 
Evans to “attempt to comply with App.R. 9(C).” In response to that order, 
Evans’s counsel merely asserted that “an App.R. 9(C) record does not appear to 
be available.” In view of our well-settled law in this area, I believe that such an 
assertion alone is insufficient to warrant a new trial. 
{¶20} Our cases have consistently held that an appellant—the mother at 
the court of appeals in the instant case—must satisfy two requirements before a 
reviewing court will grant a new trial because of an incomplete transcript. First, 
the appellant must “point out a specific instance where effective review is 
precluded by incompleteness of the transcript.” State v. DePew (1988), 38 Ohio 
St.3d 275, 279, 528 N.E.2d 542. Evans, however, has failed to allege any specific 
January Term, 2004 
7 
instance of prejudice whatever; rather, her counsel made a general averment (if 
even that) suggesting that the missing information could be a basis for reversal. 
We rejected this precise argument in DePew, 38 Ohio St.3d at 279, 528 N.E.2d 
542—a death-penalty case, no less—where we concluded that an appeal 
predicated on an incomplete transcript must fail when the appellant “makes only 
general averments that the missing information ‘could be vital’ to his arguments.” 
See, also, State v. Palmer (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 543, 555, 687 N.E.2d 685 
(“general averments do not act as a substitute for an actual showing of 
prejudice”). 
{¶21} Second, an appellant must exhaust “all reasonable solutions to 
th[e] problem [of a missing transcript]” before a reviewing court will grant a new 
trial. Knapp v. Edwards Laboratories (1980), 61 Ohio St.2d 197, 200, 15 O.O.3d 
218, 400 N.E.2d 384. Lest there be doubt that Evans did not exhaust all 
reasonable solutions in the instant case, App.R. 9(C) specifically contemplates 
one solution that was not exhausted: the preparation of “a statement of the 
evidence or proceedings from * * * appellant’s recollection.” (Emphasis added.) 
Indeed, there is no evidence that counsel even attempted to contact Evans in an 
effort to prepare a statement based on her recollection. To be sure, counsel 
contacted the children’s guardian ad litem, but the response of the guardian only 
further undermines Evans’s argument; that is, the guardian ad litem informed 
counsel that “he did recollect the case.” Nevertheless, counsel apparently did not 
prepare a statement of the evidence based on the guardian’s recollection merely 
because he had not yet “received any proposed ‘record of proceeding’ from [the 
guardian].” 
{¶22} In view of the foregoing, I believe that Evans failed to satisfy both 
requirements—to allege a specific instance of prejudice and to make reasonable 
efforts to supply an App. R. 9(C) statement—necessary to warrant a new trial 
because of an incomplete transcript. To order a new trial based on the mere 
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assertion that an App.R. 9(C) statement “does not appear to be available” 
frustrates the well-established rule that the appellant bears the burden to provide a 
transcript. Knapp, 61 Ohio St.2d at 199, 15 O.O.3d 218, 400 N.E.2d 384. 
{¶23} For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the 
court of appeals. 
 
O’CONNOR, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________ 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Joseph 
C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Anthony A. Gedos, for appellee. 
__________