Case Title: RUMSEY v CARDINAL PETROLEUM

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1975-01-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12699 CECIL I N T H E S U P R E M E C O U R T O F T H E STATE O F M O N T A N A Claimant and Respondent, CARDINAL PETROLEUM, Employer and GLACIER G E N E R A L A S S U R A N C E C O M P A N Y , Respondent and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Robert Wilson, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record : For Appellant : Crowley, Kilbourne, Haughey, Hanson and Gallagher, Billings, Montana Bruce R. Toole, argued, Billings, Montana For Respondent: Michael J. Whalen argued, Billings, Montana Submitted: November 13, 1974 Decided: JAN g w 5 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court . This is an appeal from a judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Yellowstone County, which reversed an order of t h e Workmen's Compensation Division and held i n favor of t h e claimant, C e c i l J. Rumsey . O n January 1 0 , 1970, C e c i l Rumsey, an employee of C a r - d i n a l Petroleum Company, suffered an i n j u r y while working as a "roughneck" on an o i l w e l l . The accident occurred when a d r i l l e r s t a r t e d a winch while claimant w a s attempting t o connect a set of tongs t o t h e d r i l l stem of an o i l w e l l . Claimant was jerked a c r o s s t h e platform of t h e o i l r i g and sustained i n j u r i e s t o h i s r i g h t a r m , shoulder and c h e s t . Claimant's h o s p i t a l and surgery c o s t s i n t h e amount of $6,413.70 were paid by a p p e l l a n t . Weekly compensation b e n e f i t s were paid from January 17, 1970 through February 4 , 1970 and from February 2 , 1971 through October 1 4 , 1971, f o r a t o t a l of 39-1/7 weeks, i n t h e amount of $1,695.71. After a s h o r t period of recuperation, claimant q u i t h i s job a t Cardinal Petroleum Company and went t o Wyoming where he worked a s a p l a s t e r e r . During t h i s period of time, he complained of an extensive ache i n h i s r i g h t s i d e and a r m , along with c h i l l s and fever. H e a l s o found it d i f f i c u l t t o breathe and experienced a sharp pain i n h i s c h e s t when he overexerted himself. On October 7, 1970, claimant w a s admitted t o t h e i n t e n s i v e c a r e u n i t of a Wyoming h o s p i t a l a f t e r having suffered severe c h e s t pains. Claimant's i l l n e s s was diagnosed a s myocardial ischemia, a condition t h a t has caused claimant t o become permanent- l y disabled. Ischemia is a condition where t h e r e is an o b s t r u c t i o n of t h e blood flow through t h e coronary a r t e r i e s r e s u l t i n g i n t h e l a c k of an adequate blood supply t o t h e h e a r t muscle. I f t h e condition is extensive, angina p e c t o r i s o r an oppressive pain under t h e breastbone r e s u l t s . O n March 19, 1971, claimant underwent surgery t o r e s t o r e t h e capacity of h i s r i g h t lung which had become severely compro- mised a s a r e s u l t of t h e i n d u s t r i a l accident. The medical test- imony presented t o t h e Workmen's Compensation Division disclosed t h a t t h e i n d u s t r i a l accident had caused t h e claimant t o s u f f e r i n t e r n a l bleeding which had caused h i s r i g h t chest c a v i t y t o be- come f i l l e d with blood. The blood eventually formed a restric- t i v e casing around t h e r i g h t lung and prevented it from function- ing properly. The operation removed t h i s t h i c k casing of blood o r pleura and t h e r i g h t lung w a s expanded. O n September 29, 1971, claimant p e t i t i o n e d t h e Workmen's Compensation Division t o be declared permanently disabled and t o be awarded a lump-sum settlement. The c r u c i a l i s s u e presented t o t h e Workmen's Compensa- t i o n Division was whether t h e i n d u s t r i a l accident coupled with t h e compromised r i g h t lung and t h e r e s u l t a n t physical and emo- t i o n a l stress, had accelerated o r aggravated t h e claimant's preexisting condition of myocardial ischemia. During t h e hearing t h e depositions of two physicians, Doctor Movius and Doctor Roussalis were introduced. Doctor Movius t e s t i f i e d : "Q. Now, backing up a l i t t l e , and having i n mind t h e condition of t h i s lung during t h e 1 4 months be- f o r e surgery, would t h e condition t h a t e x i s t e d t h e r e during t h a t period of t i m e impose any l i m i t a t i o n upon t h e oxygen supply t h a t would be furnished t o t h e heart? A. Y e s , sir. "Q. And what would be t h e nature of t h a t l i m i t a t i o n ? A . W e l l , a s I mentioned e a r l i e r , it would be m y opinion t h a t t h e p a t i e n t would a c t u a l l y be function- ing with less than one lung inasmuch a s t h e r i g h t one w a s completely c o n s t r i c t e d and very probably pushed somewhat t o t h e l e f t and l i m i t i n g t h e function of t h e uninjured lung, so t h a t so f a r a s the t o t a l oxygenation is concerned under stress, he probably had less than 50% oxygenation t o h i s body than was possible under maximum conditions before t h e injury. "Q. And during t h i s period of time when he was attempting t o work he was under s t r e s s , is t h a t c o r r e c t ? A. I d o n ' t think t h e r e is any doubt about it. "Q. And with t h a t l i m i t a t i o n and stress, would t h a t put any s t r e s s upon other v i t a l organs of t h e body? A. I think so. "Q. And which one? A. Primarily t h e heart. "Q. Now, could you t e l l us, please, whether o r not a f t e r t h e performance of t h i s surgery t h e r e would now be any l i m i t a t i o n of t h e oxygen supply t o t h e h e a r t because of t h i s condition, a s distinguished from what it would have been p r i o r t o t h e t i m e of injury? A . Yes, t h e r e is some l i m i t a t i o n , but n o t nearly so g r e a t a s before. According t o t h e t e s t s , we f i n d t h a t , according t o t h e average individual, he has 85% a s much a s a normal individual s i n c e t h e operation. But p r i o r t o t h e operation, I would estimate t h a t it w a s somewhere i n t h e region of 40 t o 45%. "Q. And what would cause t h e continued l i m i t a t i o n of oxygen t o t h e h e a r t a f t e r t h e surgery has been completed, t h e healing period past? A. Well, I think t h a t any stress phenomenon t h a t any individual endures--and a t t h i s period of l i f e we a l l know t h a t t h e r e i s a narrowing of your blood v e s s e l s and many people d o n ' t l i v e t o be a t t h e age of many of us a r e . And i f I may go i n t o h i s h i s t o r y , t h e f a c t t h a t he had a coronary problem i n October of 1970, I think t h e r e i s no question t h a t t h e f a c t t h a t he worked f o r approximately nine months with l e s s than one lung g r e a t l y aggravated h i s probable present e x i s t i n g coronary narrowing and was l a r g e l y respon- s i b l e f o r t h e occurrence of h i s coronary a t t h a t t i m e because of t h e continued vigorous work which he d i d with a markedly compromised-oxygen supply." Doctor Roussalis t e s t i f i e d : "Q. Then, Doctor, you explained i n your opinion, your w r i t t e n opinion which i s now attached t o Doctor Movius' deposition, and I w i l l quote, 'EKG revealed t h e p a t i e n t t o have myocardial ischemia which i s not r e l a t e d t o t h i s i n j u r y and which w i l l be of permanent n a t u r e ' . I w i l l j u s t simply as you ( s i c ) , a r e you still of t h a t opinion, and t h a t is, t h e ischemia i s not r e l a t e d t o t h e i n j u r y which has been described i n your h i s t o r y and f o r which t h i s claim i s made? A. That is c o r r e c t . "Q. And it is your opinion, then, i f I understand you, t h i s is a developmental disease of aging of our society? A. Correct." When t h e hearings examiner was confronted with t h e con- f l i c t i n g medical testimony, he decided t o send p e r t i n e n t portions of t h e f i l e t o an independent physician, Doctor Goulding, f o r h i s opinion. Doctor Goulding's two page r e p o r t w a s s e n t by t h e hearings examiner t o respective counsel along with a l e t t e r s t a t i n g t h e r e p o r t would be u t i l i z e d i n reaching a decision. Doctor Goulding's r e p o r t s t a t e d , i n t e r a l i a , t h a t lung d i s e a s e and emotional trauma were not f a c t o r s i n a c c e l e r a t i n g mycardial ischemia. Upon r e c e i p t of t h i s r e p o r t , claimant's counsel wrote t o t h e hearings examiner objecting t o t h e use of evidence outside of t h e record and requesting t h e opportunity t o cross-examine Doctor Goulding and t o obtain a d d i t i o n a l medical testimony t o rebut h i s findings. O n October 30, 1972, t h e hearings examiner denied corn- pensation t o claimant without affording him t h e opportunity t o cross-examine Doctor Goulding and t o r e b u t h i s findings. Thereupon, claimant appealed t o t h e d i s t r i c t court which heard a d d i t i o n a l testimony from Doctor Movius and reversed t h e findings of t h e Division. The employer and i t s insurance company appealed. The issues a r e : 1. Did t h e Division e r r i n denying claimant an oppor- t u n i t y t o cross-examine Doctor Goulding and t o rebut h i s findings? 2. Did t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r i n reversing t h e findings of t h e Division? Issue 1. W e note t h e r u l e s of evidence a r e more relaxed i n an administrative proceeding than i n a c o u r t of law. Section 92-812, R.C.M. 1947; Ross v. I n d u s t r i a l Accident Board, 106 Mont. 486, 80 P.2d 362; Bergan v. G a l l a t i n Valley Mlg. Co., 138 Mont. 27, 353 P.2d 320. However, these r u l e s w i l l not be relaxed t o t h e p o i n t where due process of law and t h e fundamental r i g h t s of t h e injured workmen a r e disregarded. In Mulholland v. Butte & Superior Min. Co., 87 Mont. 561, 289 P. 574, two referee physicians were selected by the Industrial Accident Board to render an opinion after the board was unable to reach a decision because of conflicting medical testimony. A written report favoring the claimant was submitted. Accordingly, the board found the claimant was totally disabled and awarded him compensation. Thereupon, the defendant company perfected an appeal to the district court which upheld the decision of the board after additional evidence was heard. This Court conceded the board had erred in depriving defendants of their right to cross-examine the physicians. However, the dis- trict court was not held in error because it was presumed that it had considered only competent testimony and had ignored the reports. 3 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, B 79.63, states: "Under the increasingly common practice of referral of claimant to an official medical examiner or an independent physician chosen by the commission, it is particularly important that commissions not lose sight of the elementary requirement that the parties be given an opportunity to see such a doctor's report, cross-examine him, and if necessary provide rebuttal testimony." In Massachusetts Bond. & Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com'n, 74 C.A.2d 911, 170 P.2d 36,37, the California Industrial Accident Commission referred a case to two independent physicians because of conflicting medical testimony. Upon appeal, the petitioner contended he had been denied due process of law when his request for an opportunity to cross-examine the physicians and to produce rebuttal testimony had been denied. The court agreed with his contention and stated: " * * * Even if regarded as a purely adminis- trative agency, however, in exercising adjudi- catory functions the commission is bound by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend- ment to the United States Constitution to give the parties before it a fair and open hearing. 'The right to such a hearing is one of "the rudiments of fair play" (citation) assured to every litigant by the Fourteenth Amendment as a minimal requirement.' [Cases cited] . "The reasonable opportunity to meet and rebut the evidence produced by his opponent is generally recognized as one of the essentials of these minimal requirements [Cases cited] and the right of cross-examination has frequently been referred to as another [Cases cited]." For similar holdings see: Beeler v. Central Foundry Division, 32 Mich.App. 661, 189 N.W.2d 64; Hegglin v. Workmen's Compensa- tion Appeals Board, 93 Cal.Rptr. 15, 480 P.2d 967; Chavez v. Industrial Commission, 5 Ariz.App. 294, 425 P.2d 864; North West Trailer Sales v. McCann, (Fla. 1968) 217 So.2d 310; Armes v. Pierce Governor Co., 121 1nd.App. 566, 101 N.E.2d 199; Puncec v. City and County of Denver, 28 Col.App. 542, 475 P.2d 359; Annota- tion, 109 ALR 598. The Division erred in basing its decision upon an inde- pendent medical report made by a physician appointed by the Divi- sion, accompanied by denial of the right to cross-examine and rebut. Issue 2. Section 92-834, R.C.M. 1947, provides the dis- trict court may consider additional evidence that was not before the Division. If this additional evidence is substantial, the district court may reverse the division even though the evidence before the Division preponderates in favor of the Division. Young v. Liberty Nat. Ins. Co., 138 Mont. 458, 357 P.2d 886; OINeil v. Industrial Accident Board, 107 Mont. 176, 81 P.2d 688; wee die v. Industrial Accident Board, 101 Mont. 256, 53 P.2d 1145. Further- more, every presumption is in favor of the correctness of the district court's decision when additional evidence has been pre- sented. Murphy v. Industrial Accident Board, 93 Mont. 1, 16 P.2d 705; O'Neil, supra; Mulholland, supra. With these principles in mind, we review the additional evidence presented. Doctor Movius t e s t i f i e d a s t o t h e lack of significance a t t r i b u t a b l e t o t h e f a c t t h a t claimant had no enzyme change i n s o f a r a s h i s diagnosis was concerned. He a l s o t e s t i f i e d claimant was not s u f f e r i n g from chronic lung disease, a f a c t o r r e l i e d upon by Doctor Goulding. A t t h e t i m e t h i s matter came before t h e d i s t r i c t court, counsel f o r a p p e l l a n t s indicated t o t h e court: "MR. TOOLE: * * * But I would l i k e t o i n d i c a t e a t t h i s time t h a t I may have a r e b u t t a l witness who i s not here and t h a t would be D r . Goulding who p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h i s proceeding e a r l i e r a s a consultant t o t h e I n d u s t r i a l Accident Board, and I t o l d M r . Whalen t h a t I would t r y t o have him here t h i s morning and t o be honest about it I forgot t o c a l l D r . Goulding and I am not r e a l l y s u r e t h a t I am going t o need him i n any case, so perhaps i t ' s j u s t a s well not t o have him s i t t i n g here. N o w with t h a t reservation and with t h e r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t I may make a request l a t e r , i f necessary, t o g e t some evidence from D r . Gould- ing, we a r e ready. "THE COURT: Thank you. M r . Whalen? "MR. WHALEN: For t h e record, Your Honor, and while I have it i n mind it is n o t m y purpose t o l i m i t t h e evidence before t h e Court, but when I talked t o M r . Toole on May 11, 1973 I t o l d him a t t h a t time I intended t o c a l l D r . Movius f o r a d d i t i o n a l testimony and i f other medical witnesses were going t o be c a l l e d it was m y d e s i r e t h a t it be c o r r e l a t e d a t t h e time of the hearing s o t h a t t h e opportunity would e x i s t t o maybe put on a medical witness t h a t I had f o r r e b u t t a l i n t h e event t h a t it appeared necessary a f t e r the testi- mony of D r . Goulding. I n t h e event t h a t M r . Toole through h i s c l i e n t i s w i l l i n g t o pay f o r any additional charges t h a t may be made t o make D r . Movius a v a i l a b l e a t t h e time t h e testimony may be taken from D r . Goulding, i f it is going t o be taken a t some e a r l y d a t e I would not r e s i s t it; on t h e other hand i f Claimant i s going t o be expected t o pay f o r making a d d i t i o n a l medical witness a v a i l - a b l e a t t h a t time I would resist t h e request t h a t i s a n t i c i p a t e d i n M r . Toole's statement. "MR. TOOLE: I w i l l commit now t h a t i f we do t h i s and i f M r . Whalen wants D r . Movius present a t t h a t time, o r t o take D r . Moviusls t i m e f o r subsequent deposition, we w i l l undertake t o pay t h e c o s t of t h a t . "THE COURT: Very well. "MR. TOOLE: Not only h i s time but t h e c o s t of the deposition as well. "MR. WHALEN: With that, Your H o n o , , and the understanding that there will not be prolonged delay, I have no objection to it.'' At the end of the hearing, counsel for appellants in- formed the court he did not want to call Dr. Goulding and no fur- ther effort was made for another hearing. Dr. Movius also developed the significance of the lack of oxygen experienced by claimant as an influence upon the develop- ment of myocardial ischemia and stated that this factor can cause coronary damage whether there was a preexisting coronary disease or not. The testimony also pointed out the importance of physical and emotional stress in connection with the development of myo- cardial ischemia. We find such testimony to be both substantial and convincing. We realize that in dealing with elusive diseases and in the effect of a traumatic injury in aggravating a preexisting disease, learned medical authorities often differ. It is our duty, however, to construe the Workmen's Compensation Act liberally so that the humane purposes of the Act can be carried out. Sec- tion 92-838, R.C.M. 1947. When there is a doubt, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the injured workman. Gaffney v. Industrial Accident Board, 129 Mont. 394, 287 P.2d 256. Appellants throughout argument stressed that this Court should return the matter to the Division, citing Johnson v . Indus- trial Accident Board, 157 14ont. 221, 483 P.2d 918. In Johnson this Court returned the matter to the Division when it determined that medical evidence was admitted for the first time at the dis- trict court hearing. Such is not the fact situation here for Dr. Goulding's findings were considered by the Division's hearing examiner. He, not the district judge, brought the material into evidence, and the problems arose at the court hearing because Dr. Goulding was not available for cross-examination. Three recent cases are of import to our consideration here. McAndrews v. Schwartz, Mont. , 523 P.2d 1379, 31 St.Rep. 517; Bagley v. Florence Hotel Co., Mont. , 526 P.2d 1372, 31 St.Rep. 766; Rasmussen v. Gibson Products Co., Mont. , 527 P.2d 563, 565, 567, 31 St.Rep. 860. In McAndrews, after being denied compensation by the Board, claimant appealed to the district court which, upon hear- ing testimony of the claimant and Cr. Sims, who had not testi- fied at the Board hearing, reversed the Board. Factwise the medical testimony involved was not sufficient to move this Court to hold that it was substantial. The district court's judgment was set aside and the order of the Division affirmed. In Bagley, a latent injury case, the Division found that the employer was estopped to deny a claim after over a year had run. The district court overruled the Division and this Court upheld its ruling, noting that the trial court had properly found the evidence before the Division did not support the finding of equitable estoppel. In Rasmussen, this Court upheld the district court's reversal of a denial of the claimant's petition. Speaking for this Court Chief Justice James T. Harrison noted: " * * * Respondent's testimony was more orderly than that heard by the Division, but in substance contained nothing new except for the fact she had undergone surgery for a herniated disc after the Division proceedings closed." The Court further noted that such testimony as a whole was beyond the scope of "additional evidence" as the term is used by the statute but that the testimony of other witnesses, including her previous employers and the doctor who did the surgery, was ad- missible. The Court said: "Obviously this testimony lends independent support t o D r . Humberger's opinion t h a t a causal r e l a t i o n - s h i p existed between respondent's back trouble i n 1972 and her i n j u r y a t Gibsons i n 1969. I n s h o r t , t h e testimony took on a d d i t i o n a l relevance i n l i g h t of what D r . Humberger had t o say a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t hearing. Respondent could not reason- ably have foreseen t h i s a t t h e time t h e Division conducted its proceedings; accordingly, a p p e l l a n t s ' objection on t h i s p o i n t is not well taken. "We think t h e d i s t r i c t court could f i n d a pre- ponderance of c r e d i b l e evidence t o s u s t a i n respond- e n t ' s claim, both from t h e a d d i t i o n a l evidence presented a t t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t hearing and t h e record of t h e Division." That same argument can be made i n t h e i n s t a n t case f o r t h e find- ings of t h e d i s t r i c t court. Likewise, w e have recognized t h e doctrine t h a t an employee s u f f e r i n g from a preexisting condition i s not denied compensation i f t h e d i s a b i l i t y w a s aggravated o r accelerated by i n d u s t r i a l injury. I n Birnie v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 134 Mont. 39, 328 P.2d 133, we affirmed an award where trauma had accelerated a preexist- ing a r t h r i t i c condition. I n Young, w e affirmed an award where shock, anxiety and excessive exertion under t r y i n g circumstances aggravated an a r t e r i o s c l e r o t i c condition. Furthermore, i n Weakley v. Cook, 126 Mont. 332, 249 P.2d 926, we affirmed an award where a workman s u f f e r i n g from a r t e r i o s c l e r o s i s had sustained a f a l l and had died from coronary thrombosis. W e believe t h e same p r i n c i p l e a p p l i e s t o t h e i n s t a n t case. The judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s affirmed. J u s t i c e i We concur: - I . ----- J u s t i c e s - 1 1 - Mr. Justice Wesley Castles dissenting: I dissent. I would reverse the judgment and order the matter returned to the Workmen's Compensation Division for findings on the medical testimony. Dr. Goulding, the independent medical expert relied on by the Division, testified the arteriosclerosis could not have been aggravated by the injury and resultant stress. Dr. P4ovius, at the hearing before the district court, did not, in my view, testify to any materially different or new matters. He merely disputed the other two doctors. Dr. Goulding was not the defendants', appellants here, witness. He was the Division's witness. If the district court considered that Dr. Goulding's report was improperly received and therefore prejudicial, it should have remanded the matter to the Division so that claimant might have the opportunity of cross-examining Dr. Goulding. That is what I would now order. The majority opinion finds, on the first issue, that the Division erred in basing its decision upon an independent medical report made by a physician appointed by the Division and accompanied by denial of the right to cross-examine and rebut. Absent the Dr. Goulding medical opinion, the district court simply chose the opinion of Dr. Movius as against the con- flicting opinion of Dr. Roussalis. Whereas, the Division had chosen the opinion of Dr. Roussalis as bolstered by the independ- ent opinion of Dr. Goulding. Remand to the Division is the proper remedy because this Court or the district court is other- wise placed in the position of having to pick and choose wnich of the conflicting opinions should be accepted. This is a task properly for the trier of fact and should not be determined on appeal. Remand is a well recognized technique for this situation. See Johnson v. Industrial Accident Board, 157 Mont. 221, 225, 483 P.2d 918, where this Court unanimously said: "Finally the scope of a district court's power to reverse an order of the Industrial Accident Board was described in Moffett v. Bozeman Canning Co., 95 Mont. 347, 351, 26 P.2d 973, as: "'The district court on appeal from the board is not justified in reversing a finding of the board unless the evidence clearly preponderates against such finding.' In fact, a ruling by the Indus- trial Accident Board is presumed to be correct, and in the instant case the only evidence heard by the district court that had not been heard by the Board in the 1965 hearing was the testimony of Dr. Itoh, previously referred to. Therefore, the evidence before the district court clearly did not preponderate against the Board's order of 1966, hence the ruling of the Board should have been affirmed in the district court. "The cause is reversed and remanded to the district court with directions to return the matter to the Industrial Accident Board for its further consideration with regard to the specific injury statute application." See also: Dean v. First Trust Company, 152 Mont. 469, 452 P.2d To the same effect are the three cases cited in the majority opinion, McAndrews, Bagley, and Rasmussen. The majority opinion walks away from the effects of this line of cases by finding that Dr. Movius's subsequent testimony was "substantial and convincing". Thus, this Court has now become the finder of fact in gauging the quality of medical opinion. 4 Justice