Case Title: Powell v. Cox

Citation: 608 P.2d 239

Docket Number: 

State: utah

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Date: 1980-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
608 P.2d 239 (1980) Carl H. POWELL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. S. Tony COX, Director, Drivers License Division, Department of Public Safety for the State of Utah, Defendant and Respondent. No. 16660. Supreme Court of Utah. March 3, 1980. Robert M. McRae of McRae & DeLand, Vernal, for plaintiff and appellant. Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Bruce M. Hale, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent. HALL, Justice: Defendant appeals the revocation of his driving privilege for refusing to submit to a chemical test. Defendant was arrested by a Vernal City police officer on March 13, 1979, for the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol. Subsequently, he was taken to the Uintah County jail and instructed that he must take a breathalyzer test or lose his driver's license for one year.[1] Defendant initially refused outright to take the test, but after conversing by telephone with his attorney, defendant agreed to submit to the testing procedure. However, he refused to follow precisely the officer's instructions in giving a breath sample. The following testimony of Officer Parker (the arresting officer) gives rise to this appeal: On cross examination Officer Parker testified: The single issue raised therefore relates to the discretion an officer has in administering a chemical test. Specifically, the question is, can an officer reasonably require a defendant to do more than merely activate the green light of a breathalyzer, which indicates that he has furnished a given volume of air? We believe an officer can require an arrested person to furnish what the officer reasonably believes to be a viable sample, and that the "green light" is merely an aid to him in making that determination. Such a ruling is consistent with the general thrust of the statute[2] which invests the officer with broad and discretionary powers to administer "chemical tests" for alcohol abuse. The reason for permitting an officer to take an additional sample is because the result of the test is dependent not upon the volume of the sample, but the quality. This is explained as follows: It is therefore in the best interest of the state as well as an arrested person to obtain a deep lung sample. As long as the officer administering the test is not unreasonable in his request he has considerable discretion in obtaining a satisfactory sample.[4] We have previously ruled that "[t]he Implied Consent Statute should be construed in a fashion to make its application practicable and to enable an officer to deal realistically with arrested drivers who may be uncooperative... ."[5] Furthermore, "[e]ach case is based on its own facts, and we do not reverse the trial judge unless he clearly does violence to the facts as they relate to his findings."[6] The trial court found that defendant unreasonably refused to submit to a reasonable request by the officer for a more complete sample. Because the defendant was found to have refused to submit to the test, his driving privileges were properly revoked. The decision of the trial court is hereby affirmed. No costs awarded. CROCKETT, C.J., and MAUGHAN, WILKINS and STEWART, JJ., concur. [1] Pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, 41-6-44. [2] U.C.A., 1953, 41-6-44.10(b). [3] Richard E. Erwin, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases, Third Edition, Vol. 2 (1979), § 22.02, p. 22-15. [4] This is not to suggest that an officer could obtain a second sample after an analysis had been done on the first sample merely because the officer was dissatisfied with the results. [5] Beck v. Cox, Utah, 597 P.2d 1335, 1337 (1979). See also Moran v. Shaw, Utah, 580 P.2d 241 (1978). [6] Gassman v. Dorius, Utah, 543 P.2d 197, 198 (1975).