Case Title: State v. Biros

Citation: 1997-Ohio-204

Docket Number: 19960423

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-05-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
The State of Ohio, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. Biros, Appellant and 
Cross-Appellee. 
[Cite as State v. Biros (1997), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Criminal law -- Aggravated murder -- Death penalty upheld, when. 
 
(No. 96-423 -- Submitted January 22, 1997 -- Decided May 14, 1997.) 
 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL1 from the Court of Appeals for Trumbull 
County, No. 91-T-4632. 
 
On Thursday, February 7, 1991, at approximately 5:30 p.m., Tami 
Engstrom dropped off her one-year-old son, Casey, at her friend Sharon King’s 
house before reporting to work at the Clover Bar in Hubbard, Ohio.  Tami’s 
mother, Mary Jane Heist, worked with Tami at the Clover Bar.  Tami arrived at 
work at 6:30 p.m.  Later, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Tami had to leave work 
due to illness.  Heist relieved Tami so that she could go home early.  However, 
instead of going directly home, Tami drove to the Nickelodeon Lounge in 
Masury, Ohio, to visit her uncle, Daniel Hivner, who was a regular patron at 
that tavern.  Tami arrived at the Nickelodeon at approximately 10:00 p.m.  She 
was wearing a black leather coat, a sweater, black pants, black shoes, black 
 
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stockings or socks, and a $1,200 diamond cluster ring she had purchased from 
King a few weeks earlier.  She was also carrying a small gray purse which, 
according to one witness, contained a significant amount of money. 
 
At the Nickelodeon, Tami had several drinks and spoke with Hivner and 
others.  Kenneth Biros, appellant, arrived at the Nickelodeon at approximately 
11:00 p.m., having earlier participated in a drinking event sponsored by the 
Nickelodeon and other bars.  Appellant knew Hivner but was a stranger to 
Tami.  By midnight, Tami had passed out, due to either sickness or 
intoxication, while seated at a table.  She later fell off her chair and onto the 
floor.  Hivner and appellant helped Tami back into her seat.  At approximately 
1:00 a.m., when the bar was closing, appellant and Hivner assisted Tami 
outside to the parking lot.  Tami insisted on driving herself home, but Hivner 
took Tami’s car keys upon determining that she was too intoxicated to drive.  
According to Hivner, appellant then volunteered to take Tami for coffee to help 
sober her up.  Hivner handed Tami her purse and noticed that she was wearing 
her leather coat.  At approximately 1:15 a.m., appellant and Tami left the 
 
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Nickelodeon in appellant’s car.  Hivner remained at the bar after closing and 
waited for appellant to return with Tami.  However, appellant never returned 
Tami to the Nickelodeon. 
 
Meanwhile, on February 7, at approximately 11:30 p.m., Andy 
Engstrom, Tami’s husband, went to the Clover Bar to deliver a gift he had 
bought for Tami.  However, Heist informed Andy that Tami had left work and 
had gone home sick.  Andy drove home and discovered that Tami was not 
there.  Andy then asked King to continue watching Casey while he went out to 
search for Tami.  At approximately 1:00 a.m., Andy spoke with Tami’s sister, 
Debra Barr, who suggested that Tami might have gone to the Nickelodeon.  At 
1:10 a.m., Andy called the Nickelodeon and was told that Tami and Hivner had 
already left the bar.  Andy then went to sleep, assuming that Tami would soon 
return home.  When he awoke later that morning, he discovered that Tami was 
still missing. 
 
On Friday, February 8, 1991, at or about noon, Andy and King went to 
the Nickelodeon to pick up Tami’s car, which had been left there overnight.  At 
 
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some point, Andy learned that appellant had been the last person seen with 
Tami.  Therefore, Andy drove to appellant’s home and confronted appellant 
concerning Tami’s whereabouts.  Appellant told Andy that after he and Tami 
had left the Nickelodeon to get coffee, he tapped her on the shoulder and she 
“freaked out, * * * got out of the car and started running through these people’s 
yards on Davis Street” in Sharon, Pennsylvania.  The location where appellant 
claimed that Tami had jumped from the vehicle was approximately three- 
tenths of a mile from the Nickelodeon.  Andy told appellant that he had already 
contacted the police in Sharon, Pennsylvania, and that he intended to file a 
missing person’s report with the Brookfield Township (Ohio) Police 
Department.  Andy told appellant that “‘[i]f she [Tami] don’t turn up right fast, 
they [the police] are going to come looking for you, and it’s going to be your 
ass.’” 
 
Throughout the day on Friday, February 8, appellant told a number of 
witnesses similar stories concerning Tami’s disappearance.  Specifically, he 
told Tami’s mother, Tami’s brother, Tami’s uncles, her friends, acquaintances, 
 
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and others, that after he had left the Nickelodeon with Tami, she woke up, 
became frightened, jumped from his vehicle and ran between houses near 
Carpenter’s Towing or Carpenter’s Garage on Davis Street in Sharon, 
Pennsylvania.  Appellant also indicated that he had initially chased after Tami 
but that he had been unable to catch her.  Appellant told a number of these 
witnesses that he had abandoned the chase to avoid being caught while driving 
under the influence of alcohol.  Several of the witnesses noticed fresh cuts or 
scratches on appellant’s hands and a fresh wound over his right eye that had 
not been present the night before.  Appellant explained that he had cut his 
hands because he had been locked out of his house and had to break a window, 
and that he had obtained the cut above his eye while chopping wood.  Tami’s 
brother threatened to kill appellant if Tami had been hurt in any way.  One of 
Tami’s uncles told appellant that if Tami had been hurt, he would “rip 
[appellant’s] heart out.”  Tami’s mother told appellant, “if you put one scratch 
on my daughter, I will * * * kill you.”  Appellant tried to comfort Heist by 
telling her, “Don’t worry.  Your daughter is going to be just fine.  You wait and 
 
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see.”  On Friday evening, appellant helped Tami’s relatives search the area in 
Sharon, Pennsylvania, where he claimed to have last seen Tami. 
 
Appellant lived on King Graves Road in Brookfield Township, Ohio, 
with his mother, Jo Anne Biros, and his brother, Cury Biros.  On Friday 
morning, February 8, appellant’s mother found a gold ring on the bathroom 
floor.  The next day, she asked appellant if he knew anything about the ring.  
Appellant claimed to know nothing about it.  Appellant told his mother that the 
ring appeared to be made of “cheap gold.”  When appellant’s mother responded 
that the ring was not cheap, appellant suggested that perhaps it had belonged to 
the girl who jumped out of his car early Friday morning.  Appellant then took 
the ring and said that he would return it to the Nickelodeon.  However, 
appellant never returned Tami’s ring to the Nickelodeon.  Rather, according to 
appellant, he hid the ring in the ceiling of his house. 
 
On Friday night, Cury Biros was at home watching television while 
appellant was outside in a pasture behind the house.  Cury went outside and 
 
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called to appellant to see what he was doing.  Appellant responded that he was 
“watching stars.”  Cury then returned to the house and retired for the evening. 
 
On Saturday, February 9, Tami’s family and friends spent hours 
searching for Tami in Sharon, Pennsylvania.  They also searched a wooded area 
along the railroad tracks near appellant’s home on King Graves Road.  
However, the search party was unable to uncover any clues concerning Tami’s 
disappearance. 
 
On Saturday afternoon, police called appellant’s home and left a message 
requesting that he come to the police station for questioning.  After receiving 
the message, appellant drove to the police station to discuss Tami’s 
disappearance with Brookfield Township and Sharon, Pennsylvania police 
officers.  Police informed appellant that he was not under arrest and that he was 
free to leave at any time.  During questioning, appellant reiterated the same 
basic story that he had previously told Tami’s friends and relatives.  
Specifically, appellant told police that he had left the Nickelodeon with Tami in 
the early morning hours of February 8 to get coffee or food at some location in 
 
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Sharon, Pennsylvania.  Appellant claimed that Tami had passed out in his 
vehicle after they left the Nickelodeon.  Appellant told police that he stopped at 
an automated teller machine to withdraw some money and, at that point, Tami 
woke up and insisted that appellant drive her back to the Nickelodeon.  
Appellant told police that as he was driving on Davis Street in Sharon, 
Pennsylvania, Tami jumped from the vehicle and ran away.  When asked 
whether Tami’s purse might have been left in his vehicle, appellant responded 
that he had thoroughly cleaned the vehicle and had found no purse. 
 
At some point during the interview, Captain John Klaric of the Sharon 
Police Department began questioning appellant’s version of the story.  Klaric 
suggested to appellant that perhaps he (appellant) had made some sexual 
advance toward Tami which, in turn, may have caused her to jump from the 
vehicle.  Appellant denied making any sexual advances.  Klaric also suggested 
that perhaps appellant had made some sexual advance and that Tami had 
jumped from the car and struck her head.  Appellant denied this as well.  Upon 
further questioning, Klaric suggested that maybe an accident had occurred in 
 
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which Tami had fallen out of the car and struck her head.  At that point, 
appellant responded “yes,” and admitted that he had done something “very 
bad.”  Klaric offered to speak with appellant alone.  Appellant agreed, and 
indicated that he wanted to speak with Klaric outside the presence of other 
police officers.  According to Klaric, after the other officers had left the room, 
appellant stated, “It’s like you said, we were in the car together.  We were out 
along the railroad tracks.  I touched her on the hand.  Then I went further.  I 
either touched or felt her leg.  She pushed my hand away.  The car wasn’t quite 
stopped.  She opened the door and fell and struck her head on the tracks.”  
Appellant told Klaric that Tami was dead and that the incident had occurred 
along the railroad tracks near King Graves Road in Brookfield Township.  At 
that time, police informed appellant of his Miranda rights.  See Miranda v. 
Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. 
 
After signing a written waiver of his Miranda rights, appellant repeated 
his story in the presence of Detective Rocky Fonce of the Brookfield Township 
Police Department.  According to Fonce, appellant admitted that he had 
 
10 
reached out and grabbed Tami while parked along the railroad tracks near his 
house on King Graves Road.  Appellant told Fonce that Tami had then jumped 
out of the vehicle, fell, struck her head on the metal part of the railroad track, 
and died.  Appellant told police that Tami’s body was in Pennsylvania.  When 
police asked appellant for the precise location of the body, appellant requested 
to speak with an attorney.  After appellant consulted with counsel, he agreed to 
show police the location of Tami’s body. 
 
In the early morning hours of Sunday, February 10, 1991, Pennsylvania 
and Ohio authorities discovered several of Tami’s severed body parts in a 
desolate wooded area of Butler County, Pennsylvania.  Police found other 
portions of Tami’s body in a desolate wooded area of Venango County, 
Pennsylvania, approximately thirty miles north of the Butler site.  Tami’s head 
and right breast had been severed from her torso.  Her right leg had been 
amputated just above the knee.  The body was completely naked except for 
what appeared to be remnants of black leg stockings that had been purposely 
rolled down to the victim’s feet or ankles.  The torso had been cut open and the 
 
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abdominal cavity was partially eviscerated.  The anus, rectum, and all but a 
small portion of her sexual organs had been removed from the body and were 
never recovered by police. 
 
Forensic technicians, police and homicide investigators searched the area 
of the railroad tracks near King Graves Road where appellant had indicated 
that the incident with Tami occurred.  There, investigators discovered a large 
area of bloodstained gravel near the railroad tracks.  Investigators also found 
blood spatters on the side of one of the steel tracks.  A number of other 
bloodstains were found in the same general area.  Bloodstains and swabbings 
of blood collected at the scene were later tested and were found to be consistent 
with Tami’s blood.  Additionally, investigators found what appeared to be part 
of the victim’s intestines in a swampy area near the railroad tracks.  DNA 
testing revealed that the intestines were, in fact, part of Tami’s remains.  
Approximately one month later, police recovered Tami’s black leather coat, 
which was found partially buried a short distance from the tracks.  Two cuts or 
slash marks were found on or near the collar of the coat.  Tami’s house keys 
 
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and a tube of lipstick were found in a shallow hole in close proximity to the 
coat.  Police also found one of Tami’s black leather shoes in the area of the 
railroad tracks.  Dale Laux, a forensic scientist with the Ohio Bureau of 
Criminal Identification and Investigation, found a single pubic hair inside 
Tami’s shoe.  Laux determined that the microscopic characteristics of that hair 
were consistent with the characteristics of known samples of Tami’s pubic hair. 
 
Police also recovered a number of items during searches of appellant’s 
residence.  Investigators found a bloodstained pocket knife hidden in 
appellant’s basement.  A much larger knife was recovered from appellant’s 
bathroom.  Investigators also recovered a bloodstained coat from appellant’s 
bedroom, which was later identified as the coat appellant had worn to the 
Nickelodeon.  Forensic experts found numerous bloodstains on the front of the 
coat, and blood spatters inside the left sleeve.  Bloodstains from appellant’s 
pocket knife and coat were later tested and were found to be consistent with the 
blood of the victim.  Additionally, authorities removed a pair of size eleven 
tennis shoes from a bedroom in appellant’s home.  Rodney M. Cole, a forensic 
 
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scientist in the trace evidence section of the Ohio Bureau of Criminal 
Identification and Investigation, found a single hair embedded in a seam near 
the tread of one shoe.  Cole compared the hair to known samples of hair from 
the victim’s head.  According to Cole, the hair from the tennis shoe was 
microscopically consistent with the known samples of hair from the victim’s 
head. 
 
The automobile appellant had driven to the Brookfield Township Police 
Department was also searched.  Forensic technicians found numerous 
bloodstains consistent with the blood of the victim.  Several other bloodstains 
found in the vehicle were determined to be consistent with appellant’s blood.  
A small piece of human tissue, believed to be Tami’s liver tissue, was found 
inside the trunk. 
 
Dr. William A. Cox, the Summit County Coroner, performed the autopsy 
of Tami’s body.  Cox testified that he was board certified in anatomic 
pathology, clinical pathology, forensic pathology, and neuropathology.  Cox 
determined that the victim had suffered ninety-one premortem injuries which 
 
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were indicative of a “severe beating” and “an attempt at sexual mutilation.”  He 
also found five stab wounds that had been inflicted immediately after the 
victim’s death.  Among the premortem wounds were at least five blunt force 
injuries on the top of the victim’s head which, according to Cox, had been 
caused by an object such as fists or the handle of a knife.  Other premortem 
wounds were found on the victim’s breasts and in the area of her groin.  Two 
premortem knife wounds were discovered near the nipple of the right breast.  
There were fine linear scratches and a premortem knife laceration or incised 
wound along the victim’s face and, according to Cox, “[t]he way that is done is 
the blade of the knife runs down across the mouth [and] finally gets into the 
skin, into the soft tissues, then breaks the skin as it continues in the downward 
direction.”  Cox also found numerous wounds on the victim’s hands which 
appeared to be “defensive” injuries. 
 
In addition to the ninety-one premortem wounds and the five postmortem 
stab wounds, Tami’s head, right breast and right lower extremity had been 
severed from her body at some point after death.  Her anus, rectum, urinary 
 
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bladder, and virtually all of her sexual organs had been cut out and were never 
found.  The gallbladder, the right lobe of the liver, and portions of the bowels 
had been extracted from her body.  According to Cox, a pocket knife like the 
one removed from appellant’s basement could have been used to inflict some 
of the wounds found on Tami’s body.  However, Cox found that a much larger 
or heavier knife had been used to amputate Tami’s head and right lower 
extremity.  Cox testified that the victim’s right femur had been severed by a 
sharp knife which had left a “fine linear cut” in the bone.  Cox specifically 
determined that the evidence indicated that the femur had not been fractured by 
any blunt force trauma or as the result of an automobile accident.  Cox testified 
that the knife recovered from appellant’s bathroom was consistent with the type 
of knife that had been used to accomplish the amputations.  Cox found that the 
dismemberment and eviscerations all occurred within minutes after the killer 
had inflicted the five postmortem stab wounds.  He found no evidence that the 
victim had been struck by an automobile as appellant would later claim. 
 
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With respect to Tami’s cause of death, Cox concluded that the victim had 
died of asphyxia due to strangulation.  According to Cox, the victim had been 
strangled to death over a period of four to five minutes.  The mucosal lining of 
the esophagus was torn, indicating that there was a degree of retching and 
vomiting during this period.  Cox testified that, in his opinion, the victim had 
not been asphyxiated by a hand placed over the nose and mouth.  Examination 
of the victim’s oral cavity revealed no signs of injury to the tongue or the 
delicate tissue inside the mouth.  Absent such injuries, Cox found no evidence 
to support the theory that the victim had been forcibly suffocated as opposed to 
being strangled to death.  Further, the hyoid bone had been fractured and there 
was injury to adjacent tissue, which supported the finding that the victim had 
been strangled.  According to Cox, Tami was severely beaten, strangled to 
death, and then stabbed five times.  The five postmortem stab wounds had 
occurred within minutes after death.  Later, but still within minutes, the 
decedent’s body was dismembered. 
 
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Dr. Theodore W. Soboslay, the Trumbull County Coroner, was present 
during Tami’s autopsy.  Soboslay concurred with Cox’s findings and officially 
ruled that the decedent had expired “due to asphyxiation, secondary to 
strangulation.” 
 
Appellant was indicted by the Trumbull County Grand Jury for the 
aggravated (felony) murder of Tami.  Count One of the indictment charged 
appellant with the purposeful killing of Tami during the commission of an 
aggravated robbery and attempted rape in violation of R.C. 2903.01(B).  Count 
One of the indictment carried two R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) death penalty 
specifications.  The first specification alleged that appellant had purposefully 
killed Tami while committing or fleeing immediately after committing an 
aggravated robbery.  The second alleged that appellant had purposefully killed 
Tami while attempting to commit or while fleeing immediately after attempting 
to commit rape.  Count Two of the indictment charged appellant with felonious 
sexual penetration in violation of former R.C. 2907.12(A)(2).  Count Three of 
the indictment charged appellant with abuse of a corpse in violation of R.C. 
 
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2927.01(B).  Appellant was also charged, in Counts Four and Five, with 
aggravated robbery and attempted rape, respectively.  Prior to trial, the state of 
Ohio dismissed Count Three of the indictment which had charged a violation of 
R.C. 2927.01(B).  Thereafter, the matter proceeded to trial before a jury. 
 
At trial, appellant testified in his own defense.  Appellant claimed that 
when the Nickelodeon Lounge was closing at 1:00 a.m., February 8, Hivner 
asked appellant to take Tami for coffee or breakfast to help sober her up.  
Appellant agreed and left the Nickelodeon with Tami.  He then drove into 
nearby Sharon, Pennsylvania, to withdraw cash from an automated teller 
machine.  At some point, appellant reached over and shook Tami, since she had 
fallen asleep.  Tami awoke and said that she wanted to go home.  She told 
appellant that her home was in Hubbard, Ohio, but would not say exactly where 
she lived.  Therefore, appellant decided to take Tami to his home to let her 
“sleep it off.” 
 
Appellant testified that he decided on his way home to drive along the 
gravel railroad bed which would have taken him to within a few hundred feet 
 
19 
of his residence on King Graves Road.  While driving on the railroad bed, he 
reached over and grabbed Tami’s hand to wake her.  According to appellant, 
Tami suddenly awoke, looked at him, and began yelling, “I don’t know you.  
Where are we at?”  She hit appellant and yelled at him.  Appellant forcibly 
struck Tami with his forearm.  Tami then fled from the vehicle and took off 
running along the railroad tracks.  Appellant claimed that he drove along the 
railroad tracks to try to head Tami off to speak with her.  However, according 
to appellant, he inadvertently struck Tami with the vehicle, causing her to 
topple over the car at a forty-five degree angle with her head positioned toward 
the gravel railroad bed.  Appellant testified that he got out of the car and rolled 
Tami over onto her back.  She was bleeding and her head was positioned 
against the steel rail of the railroad track.  According to appellant, Tami pushed 
him and began screaming, swearing, and throwing rocks.  At that point, 
appellant decided to pull out his pocket knife to “calm” Tami down.  However, 
Tami grabbed the knife and a struggle ensued.  Appellant cut his hand, but was 
able to regain control of the knife.  Meanwhile, Tami continued to scream.  
 
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Therefore, according to appellant, he pinned Tami down and placed his hand 
over her mouth until she stopped struggling.  When appellant removed his hand 
from Tami’s mouth, he realized that she had died.  Appellant then became 
upset and frustrated, so he stabbed her several times. 
 
Appellant testified that after he had killed and stabbed Tami, he 
“panicked,” drove home, tended to his wounds, and washed his clothes.  
Appellant testified that he returned to the body fifteen to twenty minutes later 
and became very angry, believing that Tami had “just destroyed my life.”  At 
that point, appellant took his pocket knife and began cutting Tami’s body.  
Appellant claimed that he removed Tami’s clothes because they were “in the 
way.”  Next, according to appellant, he dragged the body some distance into 
the woods, and felt Tami’s ring cutting into his left hand.  Thus, he removed 
the ring and placed it in his pocket.  Appellant testified that he attempted to 
bury Tami’s body in a shallow hole in the ground, but that the body would not 
fit into the hole.  Therefore, he amputated the head and leg with his pocket 
knife and placed those body parts in a separate hole.  Appellant then placed 
 
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Tami’s clothes in other holes in the ground.  After burying the body, appellant 
returned home. 
 
Appellant testified that later on Friday morning, February 8, 1991, he 
found Tami’s purse in his car and burned the purse in the fireplace.  He then 
washed his car.  On Friday night, appellant decided to move the body, since he 
had been confronted and threatened by Tami’s relatives.  Late that night, while 
his brother (Cury Biros) was watching television, appellant retrieved Tami’s 
body parts, loaded them into the car, and drove to Pennsylvania and disposed 
of the body. 
 
Appellant lied to police, to Tami’s relatives, and to his own mother.  At 
trial, appellant denied telling police at the Brookfield Township Police 
Department that while appellant and Tami were seated in the car, appellant had 
placed his hand on Tami’s hand and then “went further” and touched or felt her 
leg.  Appellant denied having had any sexual intentions toward Tami, but 
admitted cutting out her vagina and rectum thirty to forty-five minutes after he 
killed her.  Appellant was able to recall some of the most minute details of the 
 
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night in question, but was unable to remember where he had disposed of 
Tami’s anus, rectum, and sexual organs.  He also denied having had any 
intention of stealing Tami’s property, but he admitted burying her clothes, 
taking her ring, and burning her purse.  Additionally, appellant admitted lying 
to his mother about Tami’s ring and later hiding that ring in the ceiling of his 
house.  Appellant testified that he had no intention to kill or harm Tami on the 
night in question.  He testified further that he never struck Tami with his fists 
or with the blunt end of a knife. 
 
Dr. Karle Williams, a forensic pathologist, testified for the defense.  
Williams was not present during Tami’s autopsy and never personally 
examined the body.  Williams based his opinions upon a review of, among 
other things, Dr. Cox’s autopsy report and a review of numerous photographs 
of the victim and the crime scene.  Williams disagreed, at least in part, with 
Cox’s conclusion that Tami had suffered a severe beating.  Williams believed 
that perhaps Tami’s right leg had been fractured before death and that some of 
her injuries may have been caused by being struck by a car and falling or lying 
 
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on the gravel railroad bed.  Additionally, Williams concluded that Tami may 
have died due to suffocation rather than manual strangulation.  However, 
Williams admitted on cross-examination that, in this case, “you have to think of 
manual strangulation.  Absolutely.” 
 
The jury found appellant guilty of all charges and specifications alleged 
in the indictment, with the exception of the offense charged in Count Three of 
the indictment which had previously been dismissed by the prosecution.  
Following a mitigation hearing, the jury recommended that appellant be 
sentenced to death for the aggravated murder of Tami.  The trial court accepted 
the jury’s recommendation and sentenced appellant to death.  For the remaining 
offenses, appellant was sentenced in accordance with law. 
 
On appeal, the court of appeals found that “[t]he record is completely 
devoid of evidence which would support a finding that appellant formed the 
intent to rob the victim prior to or during the acts which resulted in her death.”  
On this basis, the court of appeals, relying on State v. Williams (Mar. 24, 1995), 
Trumbull App. No. 89-T-4210, unreported, 1995 WL 237092, affirmed in part 
 
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and reversed in part (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 569, 660 N.E.2d 724, held that the 
evidence was insufficient to prove aggravated robbery as one of the underlying 
felonies for the felony-murder charge in Count One of the indictment.  Further, 
the court of appeals found that the trial court had erred in submitting to the 
jury, in the penalty phase, the R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) aggravating circumstance 
that the murder was committed in the course of an aggravated robbery.  
Nevertheless, the court of appeals upheld the sentence of death, finding that the 
remaining R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) aggravating circumstance outweighed the 
mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  In addition to affirming 
appellant’s aggravated murder conviction (with attempted rape as the 
underlying felony) and death sentence, the court of appeals also affirmed 
appellant’s other convictions, including the convictions on Counts Four and 
Five of the indictment for aggravated robbery and attempted rape, respectively. 
 
The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right and the 
state’s cross-appeal. 
 
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Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecuting Attorney, Patrick F. 
McCarthy and Deborah L. Smith, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee 
and cross-appellant. 
 
David L. Doughten and Robert A. Dixon, for appellant and cross-
appellee. 
 
DOUGLAS, J.     Appellant presents twelve propositions of law for our 
consideration.  Additionally, the state of Ohio has filed a cross-appeal 
challenging the court of appeals’ findings of insufficiency of proof that the 
murder was committed while appellant was committing or while fleeing 
immediately after committing aggravated robbery.  We have considered all of 
the propositions of law raised by the parties and have independently reviewed 
appellant’s death sentence for appropriateness and proportionality.  Upon 
review, and for the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals on the matters raised in the state’s cross-appeal, affirm the judgment of 
the court of appeals in all other respects, and uphold the sentence of death. 
I 
 
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In his first proposition of law, appellant contends that he is not 
statutorily eligible for the death penalty because the specifications of 
aggravating circumstances alleged in the indictment omitted the language from 
R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) that “either the offender was the principal offender in the 
commission of the aggravated murder or, if not the principal offender, 
committed the aggravated murder with prior calculation and design.”  
Appellant contends that the omission of this language from the specifications 
of aggravating circumstances set forth in his indictment rendered that 
indictment “insufficient to sustain a capital charge.”  We do not agree. 
 
Initially, we note that appellant never objected at any time before or 
during his trial that the R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) specifications of aggravating 
circumstances were allegedly defective on the basis that they omitted an 
allegation either that appellant was the principal offender in the commission of 
the aggravated murder or, if not the principal offender, that he had committed 
the offense with prior calculation and design.  Consequently, appellant’s failure 
to timely object to the allegedly defective indictment constitutes a waiver of the 
 
27 
issues involved.  State v. Joseph (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 450, 455, 653 N.E.2d 
285, 291.  See, also, State v. Mills (1992), 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 363, 582 N.E.2d 
972, 980 (“Under Crim.R. 12[B] and 12[G], alleged defects in an indictment 
must be asserted before trial or they are waived.”).  Accordingly, our 
discretionary review of the alleged error must proceed, if at all, under the plain 
error analysis of Crim.R. 52(B).  Plain error does not exist unless it can be said 
that but for the error, the outcome of the trial would clearly have been 
otherwise.  Joseph at 455, 653 N.E.2d at 291.  See, also, State v. Moreland 
(1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 58, 62, 552 N.E.2d 894, 899. 
 
Turning to the merits, we find that our recent decision in Joseph, 73 
Ohio St.3d 450, 653 N.E.2d 285, is dispositive of appellant’s contentions.  In 
Joseph, Richard E. Joseph and Jose Bulerin were jointly indicted for the 
aggravated (felony) murder of Ryan Young.  The indictment contained an R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7) death penalty specification alleging that Joseph and Bulerin had 
committed the aggravated murder during the course of a kidnapping, and that 
the offenders were the principal offenders in the commission of the kidnapping.  
 
28 
In Joseph, we found that the specification failed to correspond with the 
language of R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) because the specification should have 
indicated that the offenders were the principal offenders in the commission of 
the aggravated murder.   Id. at 455, 653 N.E.2d at 291.  However, we found 
that the error did not render the indictment invalid, since the record clearly 
demonstrated that Joseph “had sufficient notice that he was being tried as a 
principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder of Ryan Young 
while committing kidnapping.”  Id. at 455-456, 653 N.E.2d at 291.  In Joseph, 
we went on to explain and hold that: 
 
“The penalty for aggravated murder is life imprisonment or death.  R.C. 
2929.02.  If the state desires to seek the death penalty for a defendant who 
commits aggravated murder, the indictment charging the offense must contain 
at least one of eight specifications enumerated in R.C. 2929.04(A)(1) through 
(8).  R.C. 2929.04(A) provides: ‘Imposition of the death penalty is precluded, 
unless one or more of the following is specified in the indictment or the count 
of the indictment pursuant to section 2941.14 of the Revised Code and proved 
 
29 
beyond a reasonable doubt.’  That section then sets out eight different 
aggravating circumstances. 
 
“The form of the specification is governed by R.C. 2941.14(C), which 
requires that the aggravating circumstance ‘may be stated in the words of the 
subdivision in which it appears, or in words sufficient to give the accused 
notice of the same.’  Thus, the language of the statute clearly provides that the 
specification is sufficient if the accused knows which subsection, or which 
aggravating circumstance of the eight listed in R.C. 2929.04(A) has been 
alleged. 
 
“While the specification in the present case contained a technical error, 
we cannot find that this error rendered the indictment invalid, as the correct 
language of the specification was clearly ascertainable to appellant.  The 
indictment’s aggravated-felony-murder count and specification recited an 
obvious and undeniable reference to R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) (the felony murder 
specification) as the capital specification * * *.  The indictment informed 
appellant of all elements comprising the capital offense of aggravated murder 
 
30 
under R.C. 2901.03(B) [sic, 2903.01(B)], as the exact language of that section 
containing all the elements for that offense was correctly recited in the single 
count of the indictment.  Following the count set forth in the indictment and 
pursuant to R.C. 2941.14, a capital specification was included, which stated 
verbatim the relevant language of R.C. 2929.04(A)(7), except for the 
substitutional error in the last word of the specification.  However, appellant 
certainly had sufficient notice from the wording of the specification that the 
aggravating circumstance set forth in R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) was being alleged.  
In fact, appellant, his attorneys, the prosecutor, and the trial judge treated the 
indictment as valid at all stages of the proceedings, never noticing any flaw in 
the indictment.  Thus, the record demonstrates that the wording of the 
specification was sufficient to give appellant notice that the state was required 
to prove that he was a principal offender in the commission of the aggravated 
murder of Ryan Young pursuant to the specification contained in R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7). 
 
31 
 
“Furthermore, appellant has not shown that he was prejudiced in the 
defense of his case from this substitutional error or that he would have 
proceeded differently had this error been corrected.  Indeed, had the error been 
discovered, it was properly subject to amendment.  Crim.R. 7(D).”  Joseph, 73 
Ohio St.3d at 456-457, 653 N.E.2d at 291-292. 
 
In the case at bar, Count One of the indictment charged appellant with 
the aggravated (felony) murder of Tami Engstrom.  The single count of 
aggravated 
murder 
carried 
two 
R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7) 
death 
penalty 
specifications.  The two specifications of aggravating circumstances expressly 
referred to R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) and stated, respectively, that “KENNETH 
BIROS committed the offense at bar [aggravated murder] while he was 
committing or fleeing immediately after committing Aggravated Robbery” and 
“KENNETH BIROS committed the offense at bar [aggravated murder] while 
he was attempting to commit or fleeing immediately after attempting to commit 
Rape.”  The specifications did not expressly track the language of R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7), since there was no specific allegation that appellant was the 
 
32 
“principal offender” in the aggravated murder or that he had committed the 
offense with prior calculation and design.  However, notwithstanding that 
omission, the indictment clearly provided appellant with adequate notice of the 
death penalty specifications with which he was being charged.  The record 
clearly demonstrates that at all stages of the proceedings, appellant understood 
that he was being prosecuted for having personally killed Tami Engstrom 
during the course of an aggravated robbery and attempted rape.  Appellant, 
defense counsel, the prosecution and the trial court treated the indictment as 
valid throughout the proceedings without noticing any defect in the 
specifications of aggravating circumstances.  Moreover, appellant was indicted 
and tried on the basis that he had acted alone in the killing, without any 
accomplices.  He was the only individual accused of killing Tami Engstrom 
and, as the only offender, appellant was, ipso facto, the “principal offender.”  
Based upon the rationale and holdings in Joseph, we reject appellant’s 
arguments concerning the sufficiency of the indictment. 
 
33 
 
In this proposition, appellant also contends that the trial court erred by 
failing to instruct the jury that appellant must be found to be the principal 
offender of the aggravated murder offense to be found guilty of the R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7) death penalty specifications.  Additionally, appellant protests 
that the verdict forms failed to reflect that the jury found appellant to be the 
principal offender.  However, appellant failed to object to the absence of the 
term “principal offender” in the jury instructions and verdict forms.  Thus, 
these issues have been waived.  Further, there is absolutely no evidence in this 
case to suggest that the aggravated murder of Tami Engstrom involved more 
than one offender.  Indeed, appellant even admitted at trial that he had acted 
alone in causing the death of his victim.  Thus, appellant was either the 
principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder, or he 
committed no aggravated murder offense at all.  We find that, under these 
circumstances, the omission of R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) “principal offender” 
language in the jury instructions and verdict forms was not outcome-
 
34 
determinative.  Accord State v. Bonnell (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 179, 184, 573 
N.E.2d 1082, 1087. 
 
Additionally, with respect to the charges in connection with Count One 
of the indictment, appellant argues that “[b]ecause the verdict forms failed to 
state the ‘degree’ (capital offense) of the charge or the additional elements, 
‘principal’ or ‘prior calculation or design,’ the verdict constituted a finding of 
the ‘least degree’ of the offense charged, i.e. aggravated murder without 
specifications.”  Here, the jury returned a guilty verdict on Count One of the 
indictment, and the verdict clearly reflects that the charge upon which the 
verdict was returned was “aggravated murder.”  As the court of appeals 
recognized, “aggravated murder” is the degree of the offense with which 
appellant was charged in Count One of the indictment.  See R.C. 2901.02(A). 
Separate verdict forms were also returned for each of the two specifications of 
aggravating circumstances in connection with Count One.  Therefore, we reject 
appellant’s contentions that the verdict forms are somehow defective for failing 
to state the degree of the offense charged. 
 
35 
 
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, appellant’s first proposition of 
law is not well taken. 
II 
 
Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion to suppress the incriminating 
statements he had made to police during his February 9, 1991 interview at the 
Brookfield Township Police Department.  The trial court denied appellant’s 
motion to suppress.  In his second proposition of law, appellant contends that 
the trial court committed reversible error in denying the motion since, 
according to appellant, his statements to police were obtained in violation of 
Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694.  Specifically, appellant 
asserts that he was subjected to “custodial interrogation” before police advised 
him of his Miranda rights.  We disagree. 
 
In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that: 
 
“[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or 
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it 
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege 
 
36 
against self-incrimination.  By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning 
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody 
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.  As for 
the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means 
are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a 
continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required.  
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to 
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against 
him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or 
appointed.  The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the 
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.  If, however, he 
indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to 
consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning.  
Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not 
wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him.  The mere fact that he 
may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own 
 
37 
does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further 
inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be 
questioned.”  (Emphasis added and footnote omitted.)  Id. at 444-445, 86 S.Ct. 
at 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706-707. 
 
Police are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone 
whom they question.  Oregon v. Mathiason (1977), 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 
711, 714, 50 L.Ed.2d 714, 719.  “Nor is the requirement of warnings to be 
imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or 
because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.”  Id.  Only 
custodial interrogation triggers the need for Miranda warnings.  Id. at 494, 97 
S.Ct. at 713, 50 L.Ed.2d at 719.  See, also, Berkemer v. McCarty (1984), 468 
U.S. 420, 440-442, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150-3152, 82 L.Ed.2d 317, 335-336.  The 
determination whether a custodial interrogation has occurred requires an 
inquiry into “how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have 
understood his situation.”  Berkemer at 442, 104 S.Ct. at 3151, 82 L.Ed.2d at 
336.  “[T]he ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a ‘formal arrest or 
 
38 
restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal 
arrest.”  California v. Beheler (1983), 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 
3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275, 1279.  See, also, State v. Barnes (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 
203, 207, 25 OBR 266, 270, 495 N.E.2d 922, 925. 
 
The following matters were elicited at the hearing on appellant’s motion 
to suppress.  On Saturday, February 9, 1991, Lieutenant Frank Murphy of the 
Brookfield Township Police Department left a message on appellant’s 
answering machine asking appellant to come to the police station to discuss the 
disappearance of Tami Engstrom.  Police wanted to speak with appellant 
because he had been the last person to have seen Tami before her 
disappearance.  Subsequently, Murphy asked Officer Marchio of the 
Brookfield Township Police Department to drive to appellant’s residence to see 
whether appellant was home and to ask appellant to come to the police station.  
While en route to appellant’s residence, Officer Marchio passed appellant on 
King Graves Road.  Appellant informed Marchio that he was on his way to the 
police station.  Appellant then continued on his way to the station, apparently 
 
39 
unaccompanied by Marchio.  After arriving at the station, appellant was taken 
to a small room for questioning.  Appellant was informed that he was not under 
arrest and that he could leave at any time.  During questioning, appellant 
eventually revealed to Captain John Klaric of the Sharon Police Department 
that something bad had happened and that Tami had died.  Klaric then notified 
Detective Rocky Fonce of the Brookfield Township Police Department and 
Fonce advised appellant of his Miranda rights.  At that time, appellant 
acknowledged that he understood his rights and he agreed to waive them.  
Appellant then once again repeated his version of how Tami had died.  He also 
stated that Tami’s body was located in Pennsylvania.  When police asked 
appellant to reveal the exact location of the body, appellant did not respond.  
Instead, appellant stated that he wanted to speak with an attorney.  After 
conferring with counsel, appellant, his attorney, and the police reached an 
agreement whereby appellant voluntarily disclosed the exact location of Tami’s 
body. 
 
40 
 
Appellant argues that he was subjected to custodial interrogation from 
the beginning of his interview with police since, according to appellant, a 
reasonable person in his situation would have considered himself to be “in 
custody.”  To support this argument, appellant protests that “[o]fficers did not 
wait for [appellant] to voluntarily respond to their invitation [to come to the 
police station] but rather sent a car to look for him.”  Appellant also asserts that 
a custodial interrogation occurred because (1) “he was crowded into a small 
interrogation room with three officers,” (2) he was asked to explain 
inconsistencies in his statements, (3) Klaric questioned appellant using 
interview techniques whereby he suggested certain scenarios that might have 
occurred between appellant and Tami Engstrom, (4) appellant was asked to 
take a polygraph test, and (5) police told appellant that he would feel better if 
he “got it out.” 
 
The trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress on the basis that the 
interview conducted by the police did not constitute a custodial interrogation.  
The trial court found that appellant “came to the [station] voluntarily in his own 
 
41 
vehicle.  The evidence revealed he was not placed under arrest, booked, 
photographed, or fingerprinted.”  Further, the trial court found that appellant 
“was taken to an interview room and interviewed * * *.  [Police] not only 
advised Defendant that he was not under arrest, but also that he could get up 
and leave at any time.  This Court finds that the interview of Defendant did not 
constitute a custodial interrogation as outlined in Oregon v. Mathiason (1977), 
429 U.S. 492.” 
 
We find that the trial court did not err in reaching this conclusion.  
Officer Marchio was asked to go to appellant’s residence merely to request that 
appellant come to the police station.  Before Marchio actually arrived at 
appellant’s residence, appellant was already voluntarily on his way to the 
station in his own vehicle.  At the time, Tami was simply a missing person and 
appellant was the last individual known to have seen her.  At the station, 
appellant was taken to an interview room and the door was not closed.  
Appellant was specifically advised that he was not under arrest and that he was 
free to leave at any time.  During questioning, appellant eventually admitted 
 
42 
that he was with Tami when she died.  Appellant was never forced or 
compelled to respond to the questions posed by police.  Clearly, appellant was 
not in custody at the time he admitted his involvement in Tami’s death.  There 
is absolutely no evidence to indicate that appellant was under arrest or that 
police imposed any restraint on his freedom of movement.  Further, appellant 
was promptly advised of his Miranda rights when he admitted involvement in 
the death of Tami Engstrom. 
 
Appellant also contends that he was pressured by police to reveal the 
location of the body after he had requested to speak with an attorney.  We 
disagree.  When police asked appellant for the precise location of Tami’s body, 
appellant requested to speak with an attorney.  At that point, Detective Fonce 
terminated his interview with appellant.  Appellant was also told by Captain 
Klaric that he would not be asked any further questions.  Klaric then 
commented that appellant had “done the right thing” and that Tami’s family 
deserved to know the location of the body.  However, appellant was asked no 
further questions and Klaric’s comment elicited no response from appellant.  
 
43 
After consulting with counsel, appellant voluntarily revealed the exact location 
of Tami’s body. 
 
We find no violation of Miranda on the facts of this case.  Appellant was 
not in custody at the time he admitted his involvement in Tami’s death.  When 
appellant finally admitted involvement, he was properly advised of his 
Miranda rights.  After appellant requested to speak with his attorney, all further 
questioning ceased.  Thereafter, appellant voluntarily agreed to reveal the 
location of the victim’s body.  Thus, we reject appellant’s assertions that the 
trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. 
 
Accordingly, appellant’s second proposition of law is not well taken. 
III 
 
In his third proposition of law, appellant argues that certain statements 
made by the trial court and by counsel during voir dire violated R.C. 
2929.03(B).  Specifically, appellant contends that “the trial court in the present 
case instructed numerous jurors, and allowed the attorneys to also instruct the 
jurors that a finding of guilt on at least one of the two specifications was 
 
44 
necessary before the appellant could face the possibility of the death penalty.”  
However, appellant did not object to these statements at trial and, thus, his 
arguments have been waived.  See State v. Campbell (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 38, 
40-41, 630 N.E.2d 339, 344.  Additionally, as noted by the court of appeals, 
“appellant’s counsel engaged in questioning of the potential jurors which was 
substantially similar to that questioning to which he now objects.”  Obviously, 
appellant cannot take advantage of an error he invited or induced.  See State v. 
Seiber (1990), 56 Ohio St.3d 4, 17, 564 N.E.2d 408, 422. 
 
In any event, we find no reversible error.  Here, appellant points to 
several instances during voir dire in which prospective jurors were informed of 
the possibility of a mitigation hearing in the event appellant was found guilty of 
aggravated murder and at least one of the specifications of aggravating 
circumstances.  Appellant claims that discussing such matters with prospective 
jurors violates R.C. 2929.03(B), which provides that, in a capital case, the trial 
court’s instructions to the jury “shall not mention the penalty that may be the 
consequence of a guilty or not guilty verdict on any charge or specification.”  
 
45 
However, “R.C. 2929.03(B) applies to the guilt phase of the bifurcated trial, 
directing that during such phase the jury shall not be permitted to consider a 
possible penalty.”  State v. Jester (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 147, 154, 512 N.E.2d 
962, 970.  Nothing in the statute indicates that it was intended to apply to voir 
dire.  Further, as was the case in Jester, to apply R.C. 2929.03(B) in a manner 
suggested by appellant would needlessly complicate or render impossible the 
already difficult process of “death-qualifying” a jury.  Id. 
 
Appellant has failed to demonstrate the existence of any error rising to 
the level of plain error, and, accordingly, we reject appellant’s third proposition 
of law. 
IV 
 
In his fourth proposition of law, appellant argues that the trial court erred 
by allowing the prosecution to peremptorily challenge two prospective jurors 
who expressed or indicated some aversion to the death penalty.  However, we 
have held that “apart from excluding jurors based on race or gender, 
‘prosecutors can exercise a peremptory challenge for any reason, without 
 
46 
inquiry, and without a court’s control.’”  State v. Ballew (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 
244, 253, 667 N.E.2d 369, 379.  Therefore, appellant’s fourth proposition of 
law is not well taken. 
V 
 
In his fifth proposition of law, appellant argues that the trial court abused 
its discretion by admitting into evidence nineteen gruesome photographic 
projection slides and five enlarged (approximately twelve by eighteen inches) 
gruesome photographs.  Appellant contends that the photographs and slides 
were repetitive and cumulative in number, and that the prejudicial impact of the 
evidence far exceeded its probative value.  Additionally, appellant contends 
that the photographs had been enlarged solely to inflame the passions of the 
jury.  We find no merit to appellant’s contentions. 
 
Under Evid.R. 403 and 611(A), the admission of photographs is left to 
the sound discretion of the trial court.  State v. Landrum (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 
107, 121, 559 N.E.2d 710, 726.  In State v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 
15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768, paragraph seven of the syllabus, we held that 
 
47 
“[p]roperly authenticated photographs, even if gruesome, are admissible in a 
capital prosecution if relevant and of probative value in assisting the trier of 
fact to determine the issues or are illustrative of testimony and other evidence, 
as long as the danger of material prejudice to a defendant is outweighed by 
their probative value and the photographs are not repetitive or cumulative in 
number.”  See, also, State v. Morales (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 252, 258, 513 
N.E.2d 267, 273-274.  Further, gruesome photographic projection slides of a 
victim are not per se inadmissible.  See, generally, State v. Thompson (1987), 
33 Ohio St.3d 1, 9, 514 N.E.2d 407, 415-416; and Joseph, 73 Ohio St.3d at 
460, 653 N.E.2d at 294.  Nor does size alone automatically increase the 
prejudicial aspect of the photographic evidence in question.  See, generally, 
State v. Gumm (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 413, 425, 653 N.E.2d 253, 265; and State 
v. DePew (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 275, 282, 528 N.E.2d 542, 551. 
 
In the case at bar, the jury viewed nineteen autopsy slides which were 
projected on a screen during the testimony of Dr. William Cox, the Summit 
County Coroner.  Virtually all of the slides showed the victim’s body and body 
 
48 
parts and were, in fact, gruesome.  The slides were used to illustrate Dr. Cox’s 
testimony and corroborated his conclusions that, among other things, the victim 
had been severely beaten and that there had been an attempt at sexual 
mutilation. 
 
Nevertheless, appellant would have us believe that there were no 
contested issues concerning the cause and manner of the victim’s death and that 
the photographs and slides had absolutely no relevance to any factual matters at 
issue.  However, the record belies appellant’s assertions in this regard. 
 
At trial, appellant admitted causing the victim’s death, but claimed that 
he had simply placed his hand over the victim’s mouth and had accidentally 
killed her.  The testimony of Dr. Karle Williams, the defense pathologist, 
discounted some of the state’s evidence of a severe beating, and appellant 
testified that he never struck Tami with his fists or with the blunt end of a 
knife.  The defensive wounds and the numerous lacerations, abrasions, 
avulsions, and contusions depicted in the slides and photographs supported 
Cox’s testimony.  Specifically, the wounds depicted in the slides, combined 
 
49 
with Cox’s expert testimony, confirmed that the victim had been severely 
beaten.  Appellant also testified that he had cut apart Tami’s body in a blind 
rage, using only a pocket knife.  Conversely, the slides and photographs 
demonstrate relatively meticulous incisions, particularly in the area where 
appellant had removed, among other things, the victim’s vagina.  Cox testified 
that a second and much larger knife had been used in the amputations, and the 
slides and photographs helped prove that point.  Cox found no evidence that 
the victim had been struck by a car.  Appellant claimed that he had 
inadvertently struck Tami with his car.  Williams testified that the victim may 
have been struck by a car and concluded that the victim’s leg may have been 
fractured prior to death.  Cox found that the victim had died from strangulation.  
Williams believed that the victim may have been suffocated -- not strangled.  
The suffocation theory tended to support appellant’s claims of an accident.  
Again, the slides and photographs supported Cox’s conclusions that the 
victim’s death was no accident.  Additionally, Cox found signs of an attempt at 
 
50 
sexual mutilation.  Appellant, who stood accused of attempted rape, denied any 
sexual intentions toward Tami. 
 
Upon review of the photographic evidence and the events at trial, we 
find that the wounds depicted in the slides and photographs were probative of 
contested issues of intent, purpose, motive, and the cause, manner and 
circumstances of the victim’s death.  Although gruesome, the photographic 
evidence of the victim’s body and body parts was highly probative, and the 
value of that evidence clearly outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice. 
 
Moreover, before allowing the jury to view the slides, the trial court had 
reviewed in camera thirty-one autopsy slides that had been offered by the 
prosecution.  The record is clear that the trial court carefully examined each 
slide and entertained arguments by the prosecution and defense regarding the 
repetitive nature of some slides.  Only nineteen of the thirty-one slides were 
shown to the jury.  We agree with the court of appeals’ finding that the slides 
were neither repetitive nor cumulative and that, in fact, “[t]he number of slides 
[was] kept to a minimum in relation to the factual issues in dispute.”  As to the 
 
51 
five enlarged photographs, the court of appeals held, the state concedes, and we 
agree, that these five photographs were repetitive of some slides.  However, 
these photographs were admitted into evidence as substitutes for the slides, and 
were made available to the jury for use during deliberations in lieu of the slides.  
Further, the trial court’s charge to the jury at the conclusion of the guilt phase 
included a cautionary instruction informing the jury that “these photos are 
introduced in order to show you what has been described as premortem and 
postmortem injury.  These photos are introduced for this purpose and this 
purpose only.” 
 
In addition, we find nothing in the record to support appellant’s 
contentions that the photographic evidence at issue had been enlarged to 
inflame the passions of the jury.  There is nothing in the record to suggest that 
the prosecution intended to inflame the jury or that the passions of the jury 
became inflamed as a result of the evidence.  Indeed, the record is clear that the 
prosecution exercised extreme care with respect to the exhibits offered into 
 
52 
evidence and that the trial court exercised sound discretion in deciding which 
exhibits to admit. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting the slides and photographs into evidence.  Accordingly, 
we reject appellant’s fifth proposition of law. 
VI 
 
In his sixth proposition of law, appellant contends that the evidence was 
insufficient to support a finding of attempted rape.  On this basis, appellant 
seeks reversal of his attempted rape conviction as well as the finding of guilt on 
the R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) specification that the killing had occurred while 
appellant was committing attempted rape.  In reviewing the sufficiency of 
evidence, “the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have 
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
(Emphasis sic.)  Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 
2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573. 
 
53 
 
Appellant relies on State v. Heinish (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 231, 553 
N.E.2d 1026, to support his claim that the evidence in the present case is 
legally insufficient to sustain a finding of attempted rape.  In Heinish, a 
majority of this court reversed an aggravated murder conviction on the basis 
that the state had failed to adduce sufficient proof of attempted rape, which was 
the only felony underlying the aggravated murder charge considered in that 
case.  Id. at 238-239 and 241, 553 N.E.2d at 1034-1035 and 1037.  In Heinish, 
the victim was found with her jeans partially unzipped and pulled partially 
down from her waist.  Her blouse was partially up from the waist.  She was 
wearing no underwear and no shoes.  A saliva stain which could have come 
from the defendant was found on the outside of the victim’s jeans.  The 
majority in Heinish concluded that these facts were legally insufficient to 
sustain Heinish’s attempted rape conviction.  Id. at 238-239, 553 N.E.2d at 
1034-1035.  Appellant suggests that the evidence of attempted rape in Heinish 
was even more compelling than the evidence of the attempted rape in the case 
at bar. 
 
54 
 
Conversely, the state contends, and we agree, that the evidence of 
attempted rape in the case at bar (1) far exceeds the evidence of attempted rape 
in Heinish, (2) is even more compelling than the facts and circumstances found 
sufficient to support a rape and aggravated murder conviction in State v. Durr 
(1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 86, 568 N.E.2d 674, and (3) is at least as compelling as 
the evidence found sufficient to support an attempted rape and aggravated 
murder conviction in State v. Scudder (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 263, 643 N.E.2d 
524. 
 
In Durr, 58 Ohio St.3d at 93, 568 N.E.2d at 682, a majority of this court 
upheld Durr’s rape conviction and rejected a claim of insufficiency of proof, 
stating: 
 
“In this case, the prosecution presented highly probative circumstantial 
evidence.  Except for a pair of tennis shoes, the victim’s body was found nude 
from the waist down.  In addition, Deborah Mullins testified that when she saw 
Angel [the victim] tied up in the back of appellant’s car, appellant informed 
Deborah that he was going to kill Angel because she would tell.  Based upon 
 
55 
these facts, we believe that there was sufficient probative evidence from which 
a rational trier of fact could have found the appellant guilty of rape beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” 
 
It is important to note that Durr was decided after Heinish had been 
decided.  Additionally, both Heinish and Durr were decided under the former 
rule that convictions based solely on circumstantial evidence may be sustained 
only where the evidence excluded all reasonable hypotheses of innocence.  In 
State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492, we abandoned that 
former rule and held that “[c]ircumstantial evidence and direct evidence 
inherently possess the same probative value and therefore should be subjected 
to the same standard of proof.”  Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus. 
 
More recently, we unanimously held, in Scudder, 71 Ohio St.3d at 274-
275, 643 N.E.2d at 533, that the following facts and circumstances were 
“clearly sufficient” to support a finding of attempted rape: 
 
“[A]ppellant [Scudder] suggests that the evidence was insufficient to 
support a finding of attempted rape.  We disagree.  Appellant’s sexual interest 
 
56 
in Tina [the victim] was apparent.  The evidence indicated that appellant 
desperately wanted to be alone with Tina.  Tina was found with her pants at her 
ankles and her panties at midthigh.  The evidence indicated that Tina had been 
forcibly undressed.  The killer had apparently raked his fingers over Tina’s 
stomach and downward toward the pubic region.  Bloody hand marks were 
found on Tina’s thighs, indicating that the killer had tried to force Tina’s legs 
apart.  Appellant’s blood was found on Tina’s body and clothing.  A drop of 
appellant’s blood had apparently dripped onto Tina’s face while she was still 
alive, and while appellant was standing directly above her.  This evidence was 
clearly sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that appellant attempted to 
rape Tina.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
The evidence of attempted rape in the case at bar is at least as compelling 
as the evidence of the attempted rape in Scudder.  Here, there was an 
abundance of highly probative evidence which, if believed, was sufficient for 
any rational trier of fact to have found that appellant attempted to rape Tami 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
57 
 
By his own admission, appellant drove Tami to a secluded area near his 
home while she was sleeping and without her consent.  There was evidence that 
appellant told Captain John Klaric that while he and Tami were seated in the 
car, appellant reached over and touched Tami’s hand and then “went further” 
and either touched or felt her leg.  Appellant told Detective Rocky Fonce that 
he had reached over and grabbed Tami in the car.  Appellant testified that he 
did not make any sexual advances toward Tami and that he never told police he 
had attempted to go “further” with her.  However, the credibility of the 
witnesses was a matter for the jury to determine.  This jury apparently 
disbelieved much of appellant’s testimony concerning the events leading up to 
and culminating in the victim’s death. 
 
Tami was found completely unclothed except for remnants of black leg 
stockings which appeared to have been forcibly rolled down to her feet or 
ankles.  When police recovered Tami’s leather coat, there were two discernible 
cut marks on or near the collar.  No other cut marks were noted anywhere else 
on the garment.  The medical evidence established that Tami had been stabbed 
 
58 
five times within minutes after her death.  Some of the stab wounds were 
located in the area of the chest and abdomen.  According to appellant, Tami 
was fully clothed at the time he inflicted the postmortem stab wounds.  
However, the absence of any coinciding punctures in the material of Tami’s 
coat supports the inference that the coat had been removed at some earlier point 
during the attack.  Tami’s sweater, pants, and undergarments were never found, 
and appellant’s concealment or destruction of this and other evidence can be 
viewed as suggestive of appellant’s consciousness of guilt.  Evidence was 
presented which, if accepted, revealed that Tami had been severely beaten and 
strangled by appellant and that there had been an attempt at sexual mutilation.  
A knife had been run down across Tami’s mouth.  There were two premortem 
knife wounds near the nipple of the right breast.  There were other premortem 
injuries to the breasts and in the area of the groin.  The anus, rectum, right 
breast, and virtually all of the sexual organs had been removed from the torso 
within minutes after death.  Appellant was able to lead police to the various 
locations of Tami’s dismembered body parts but, for some reason, he claimed 
 
59 
not to recall what he had done with the anus, rectum, vagina, and sexual 
organs.  A reasonable inference to be derived from the evisceration of Tami’s 
sexual organs is that appellant was attempting to conceal evidence of rape or 
attempted rape.  As the court of appeals so ably recognized, “[the] facts evince 
lasciviousness and, further, the evisceration of the sexual organs is suggestive 
of concealment of consummated purpose.” 
 
Viewing the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be derived 
therefrom in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that the evidence 
of record was clearly sufficient for a rational jury to conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that appellant purposefully killed Tami during the 
commission of an attempted rape.  Accordingly, we reject appellant’s sixth 
proposition of law. 
VII 
 
In his seventh proposition of law, appellant contends that the evidence 
was insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated robbery and the R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7) specification premised on aggravated robbery because, 
 
60 
according to appellant, he never had any intention to steal Tami’s property (the 
diamond ring) until after he had killed her.  The court of appeals agreed, in 
part, holding that although the evidence was sufficient to sustain appellant’s 
conviction for aggravated robbery, the aggravated robbery could not serve as 
one of the underlying felonies for the felony-murder charge and that the trial 
court had erred in submitting to the jury, in the penalty phase, the R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7) aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed during 
the course of the aggravated robbery.  In reaching its conclusions concerning 
the insufficiency of proof, the court of appeals relied on the fact that there was 
no evidence to demonstrate that appellant had “formed the intent to rob the 
victim prior to or during the acts which resulted in her death.”  Specifically, the 
court of appeals apparently construed the term “while,” as that term appears in 
R.C. 2903.01(B) and 2929.04(A)(7), as requiring proof that appellant intended 
to rob Tami at the time he killed her. 
 
The state agrees with the court of appeals’ determination that there was 
sufficient evidence to sustain appellant’s conviction for aggravated robbery, 
 
61 
but vehemently disagrees with the court of appeals’ remaining conclusions 
outlined above.  The state’s sole proposition of law on cross-appeal reads: 
 
“Under both R.C. §2903.01(B) and R.C. §2929.04(A)(7), the evidence 
need not establish that an offender formed an intent to commit an aggravated 
robbery at or prior to the time he committed an aggravated murder in order to 
support a conviction so long as the aggravated robbery was committed ‘while’ 
the offender was committing aggravated murder.” 
 
The court of appeals’ findings of insufficiency of proof that the murder 
was committed while appellant was committing or fleeing immediately after 
committing aggravated robbery were based upon that court’s reliance upon its 
earlier decision in Williams, Trumbull App. No. 89-T-4210, unreported, 1995 
WL 237092, which has since been reversed in relevant part.  See State v. 
Williams (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 569, 660 N.E.2d 724.  In our decision in 
Williams at 576-578, 660 N.E.2d at 732-733, we specifically rejected any 
notion that R.C. 2903.01(B) and 2929.04(A)(7) require proof that the offender 
formed the intent to commit the pertinent underlying felony before or during 
 
62 
the commission of the acts which resulted in the murder victim’s death.  We 
held that:  “Neither the felony-murder statute nor Ohio case law requires the 
intent to commit a felony to precede the murder in order to find a defendant 
guilty of a felony-murder specification.”  Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus.  
Further, in Williams, we stated that: 
 
“This court has had occasion to explain the meaning of the word ‘while’ 
with respect to R.C. 2903.01(B), stating: 
 
“‘“The term ‘while’ does not indicate * * * that the killing must occur at 
the same instant as the [underlying felony], or that the killing must have been 
caused by [it], but, rather, indicates that the killing must be directly associated 
with the [underlying felony] as part of one continuous occurrence * * *.”  * * 
*’  State v. Cooey (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 20, 23, 544 N.E.2d 895, 903, quoting 
State v. Cooper (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 163, 179-180, 6 O.O.3d 377, 386, 370 
N.E.2d 725, 736.”  Williams, 74 Ohio St.3d at 577, 660 N.E.2d at 733. 
 
Here, appellant testified that fifteen to twenty minutes after he killed 
Tami, he began cutting her body and removing her clothes.  The medical 
 
63 
evidence confirmed that Tami had been eviscerated minutes after death.  After 
cutting the body, appellant dragged the corpse into the woods.  According to 
appellant, as he was dragging the body from the scene, he took Tami’s ring 
from her finger and placed the ring in his pocket.  Appellant claimed that he did 
not intend to steal the ring.  However, the fact that appellant took the ring gives 
rise to the inference that he intended to keep it, and the fact that he intended to 
keep the ring is supported by other inferences arising from his later activities 
with regard to that property.  After removing the ring from Tami’s finger, 
appellant continued dragging the body through the woods until he arrived at his 
intended location, severed the head and right lower extremity for ease of burial, 
and buried the body. 
 
Viewing the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be derived 
therefrom in a light most favorable to the prosecution, it is clear that any 
rational finder of fact could conclude that appellant committed an aggravated 
robbery2 beyond a reasonable doubt.  Even appellant’s own testimony was 
sufficient to show the commission of an aggravated robbery offense.  
 
64 
Specifically, appellant knowingly obtained or exerted control over Tami’s ring 
without her consent and, at least inferentially, with the purpose to deprive her 
of that property.  Thus, the evidence was sufficient to show that appellant 
committed a “theft offense” as that term is defined in former R.C. 2913.01 (see 
former R.C. 2913.02[A][1]) and that appellant had a deadly weapon on or 
about his person or under his control the entire time.  Former R.C. 2911.01(A). 
 
Moreover, the evidence was indeed sufficient to support a finding that 
the killing was “associated with” the aggravated robbery and the attempted 
rape “as part of one continuous occurrence.”  Williams, 74 Ohio St.3d at 577, 
660 N.E.2d at 733.  Evidence was presented which, if accepted, clearly shows 
that appellant beat Tami, attempted to rape her, and strangled her to death.  
Appellant’s testimony was that he began cutting Tami’s body after he killed 
her, took her ring as he was dragging the body away, severed the head and leg, 
and then buried Tami’s body parts.  Thus, even by appellant’s own testimony, 
his theft of the ring was associated with the killing as part of one continuous 
occurrence.  Appellant cannot escape the effect of the felony-murder rule by 
 
65 
claiming that the aggravated robbery was simply an afterthought.  “[T]he 
victim of an aggravated robbery, killed just prior to the robber’s carrying off 
her property, is nonetheless the victim of an aggravated robbery.  The victim 
need not be alive at the time of asportation.”  State v. Smith (1991), 61 Ohio 
St.3d 284, 290, 574 N.E.2d 510, 516.  Appellant’s intent to steal need not have 
preceded the murder for purposes of R.C. 2903.01(B) and 2929.04(A)(7).  
Williams, 74 Ohio St.3d 569, 660 N.E.2d 724. 
 
Accordingly, we reject appellant’s seventh proposition of law and, in 
accordance with our decision in Williams, we reverse the judgment of the court 
of appeals with respect to the issues raised in the state’s cross-appeal. 
VIII 
 
Dale Laux, a forensic scientist with the Ohio Bureau of Criminal 
Identification and Investigation, found blood spatters on the side of a steel 
railroad track at the crime scene, blood spatters inside the left sleeve of 
appellant’s coat, and two cut marks or defects on or near the collar of Tami’s 
black leather coat.  At trial, Laux was permitted to testify as an expert 
 
66 
concerning these and other matters.  Laux testified that the blood spatters on 
the rail of the track and the spatters inside the left sleeve of appellant’s coat 
were “typical of” and “consistent with” a beating.  He also testified that blood 
spatters of the type found inside the left sleeve of appellant’s coat are typically 
generated in a situation where the person wearing the coat holds down a victim 
using the left hand while beating the victim with the right hand.  Laux testified 
further that Tami’s black leather coat had two cut marks (as opposed to tears) 
on or near the collar.  However, Laux was not permitted to render an expert 
opinion as to how the cuts had occurred. 
 
In his eighth proposition of law, appellant claims that although Laux is 
an undisputed expert in the field of blood typing, he lacked proper 
qualifications to render an expert opinion concerning blood-spatter evidence 
and the fact that Tami’s jacket had been cut rather than torn.  Appellant further 
suggests that blood-spatter analysis is not a proper subject for expert testimony.  
However, the admission of expert testimony is a matter committed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court.  See Williams, 74 Ohio St.3d at 576, 660 N.E.2d at 
 
67 
732.  Further, we have indicated in a previous capital case that blood-spatter 
analysis is indeed a proper subject for expert testimony.  See Scudder, 71 Ohio 
St.3d at 267-270 and 280, 643 N.E.2d at 528-530 and 537 (finding no abuse of 
discretion in allowing testimony of an expert in blood-spatter analysis, and also 
rejecting Scudder’s twenty-eighth proposition of law, which had alleged error 
in the admission of expert opinion testimony in the area of blood-spatter 
interpretation).  Moreover, we note that although appellant generally objected 
at trial to some of Laux’s conclusions concerning blood spatters, he never 
specifically objected to Laux’s qualifications to render such opinions or 
challenged blood-spatter analysis as a proper subject for expert testimony.  
Appellant’s failure to object to Laux’s qualifications as an expert, and to blood-
spatter analysis as a proper subject for expert testimony, constitutes a waiver of 
the issues involved.  See Campbell, 69 Ohio St.3d at 40-41, 630 N.E.2d at 344. 
 
In any event, “‘[u]nder Evid.R. 702, an expert may be qualified by 
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to give an opinion which 
will assist the jury to understand the evidence and determine a fact at issue.’”  
 
68 
(Emphasis sic.)  State v. Wogenstahl (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 344, 362, 662 
N.E.2d 311, 325, citing State v. Beuke (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 29, 43, 526 
N.E.2d 274, 289.  In the case at bar, Laux testified that he had over eleven 
years’ experience as a forensic scientist with the Ohio Bureau of Criminal 
Identification and Investigation.  In that capacity, he has been involved in the 
analysis of bloodstains, semen stains, and the examination and analysis of trace 
evidence such as hairs and fibers.  He has attended numerous training classes in 
the areas of bloodstain and trace-evidence analysis at the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation Academy in Quantico, Virginia.  He has also attended classes in 
bloodstain analysis at the Serological Research Institute in California.  He has 
attended numerous seminars and workshops in the areas of his expertise.  He 
holds both a Bachelor of Science and a Master of Science degree.  During his 
career, Laux has been involved in several thousand cases dealing with blood 
analysis and trace evidence and has written several articles for scientific 
journals regarding, among other things, bloodstain analysis.  Laux testified that 
he had taught a workshop in blood-spatter analysis and had generated spatters 
 
69 
of the type at issue in this case.  Additionally, with respect to the cuts on the 
collar of Tami’s coat, Laux had personally examined the garment.  Laux 
testified that he had evaluated cuts and marks on similar items during the 
course of his work as a forensic scientist and that he had previously offered his 
opinions on such matters in other cases. 
 
We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the 
expert testimony in light of Laux’s extensive knowledge, experience, training, 
and education as a forensic scientist.  We also note, in passing, that the fact that 
appellant severely beat Tami before he killed her was demonstrated by 
overwhelming evidence at trial, with or without Laux’s expert testimony on the 
subject of blood-spatter interpretation.  Thus, it is clear that appellant cannot 
demonstrate plain error with respect to Laux’s expert testimony that the blood 
spatters found on the railroad track and the spatters of blood inside appellant’s 
coat were consistent with a beating.  Accordingly, we find no error, plain or 
otherwise, and we reject appellant’s eighth proposition of law. 
IX 
 
70 
 
In his ninth proposition of law, appellant complains of several instances 
of alleged prosecutorial misconduct which, according to appellant, deprived 
him of a fair trial.  We disagree. 
 
During the state’s opening argument in the guilt phase, the prosecutor 
commented that the victim’s body had not been disturbed by animals prior to 
being recovered by police.  In the guilt phase, the prosecutor elicited testimony 
from Pennsylvania State Trooper Daniel Keith Johnson that there were no signs 
of animal bites on any of the body parts recovered from Pennsylvania.  The 
prosecutor also questioned Dr. Cox on this issue, and Cox noted that there was 
no evidence that animals had tampered with the body. 
 
Appellant argues that the prosecutor’s remark during opening arguments 
was improper and inflammatory, and that Johnson’s testimony regarding 
animal bites was “completely irrelevant.”  We reject appellant’s arguments in 
this regard.  The prosecutor’s remark was not improper and was later 
substantiated by testimony in the guilt phase.  If the prosecutor had not negated 
the possibility of damage by animals, appellant may have attempted to argue 
 
71 
that tampering by animals contributed to the condition of Tami’s body.  The 
testimony of Trooper Johnson and Dr. Cox was relevant to negate mutilation by 
wildlife as a possible alternative source of damage to the body.  Thus, we find 
no prosecutorial misconduct with respect to the prosecutor’s remark and the 
above testimony. 
 
In this proposition of law, appellant also complains of four additional 
instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct that occurred during the guilt 
phase.  According to appellant, the following four instances of alleged 
misconduct involved the improper introduction of victim-impact evidence in 
the guilt phase and/or gave rise to matters that were “entirely irrelevant to the 
guilt or innocence of [the] defendant.” 
 
The first instance of alleged misconduct occurred during the prosecutor’s 
cross-examination of appellant in the guilt phase when the prosecutor referred 
to appellant’s initial failure to tell police the location of Tami’s body.  The 
prosecutor’s reference clearly did not constitute victim-impact evidence.  
Further, the trial court sustained an objection to the prosecutor’s remark and 
 
72 
instructed the jury to disregard the statement.  We presume that the jury 
followed the trial court’s instruction in this regard.  Thus, no prejudicial error 
resulted from this single remark by the prosecutor. 
 
The second instance of alleged misconduct also occurred during the 
cross-examination of appellant.  Specifically, the prosecutor asked appellant if 
Tami had cried on the night in question and whether she had asked appellant to 
“please stop.”  Appellant failed to object to these questions and, thus, his 
arguments have been waived.  Further, we find that the prosecutor’s questions 
were not improper.  Appellant testified on direct examination that Tami had hit 
him, yelled at him, and had thrown rocks at him.  Appellant portrayed Tami as 
the initial aggressor.  Appellant claimed that he had acted merely to defend 
himself from Tami, and that he had attempted to calm Tami down.  However, 
given Tami’s defensive injuries, the fact of her resistance was clear.  The 
prosecutor’s questions whether Tami had cried and had asked appellant to 
“please stop” were relevant to the circumstances surrounding her death. 
 
73 
 
The third instance of alleged misconduct occurred when the prosecutor 
asked appellant during cross-examination whether appellant had given any 
thought to Tami, her family, or her friends while burying the body at the crime 
scene.  We find that the prosecutor’s question was improper and that it was 
completely irrelevant to the issue of appellant’s guilt or innocence.  However, 
defense counsel immediately objected to the inquiry, and the jury was promptly 
instructed to disregard the question.  We presume that the jury followed the 
trial court’s instruction in this regard.  Moreover, it is clear to us that this 
comment by the prosecutor did not operate to deny appellant a fair trial. 
 
The fourth instance of alleged misconduct occurred when the prosecutor 
commented during final closing arguments in the guilt phase that, unlike 
appellant, Tami did not have the opportunity to testify.  The trial court 
sustained an objection to the prosecutor’s comment.  Although the prosecutor’s 
comment was improper, it tended to state a rather obvious fact of which 
everyone was already aware.  No prejudicial error resulted from this remark by 
the prosecutor. 
 
74 
 
We find that the foregoing instances of alleged misconduct, taken singly 
or together, did not substantially prejudice appellant or deny him a fair trial.  
Indeed, we are in total agreement with the court of appeals that “[g]iven the 
insubstantial nature of the errors, the corrective actions of the court, and the 
weight of the evidence against appellant, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the prosecutor’s behavior did not have an effect on the outcome of the 
trial.”  Accordingly, appellant’s ninth proposition of law is not persuasive. 
X 
 
In his eleventh proposition of law, appellant claims that the trial court 
erred in instructing the jury that the jury’s sentencing decision in the penalty 
phase was a “recommendation.”  Appellant also argues that certain remarks by 
the prosecutor concerning the jury’s role in the sentencing process constitute 
reversible error.  However, the argument appellant now raises has been 
considered and rejected by this court under analogous circumstances on a 
number of previous occasions.  See, e.g., State v. Woodard (1993), 68 Ohio 
St.3d 70, 77, 623 N.E.2d 75, 80-81, and State v. Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 
 
75 
72, 101, 656 N.E.2d 643, 669.  As appellant presents no compelling argument 
why we should now change our position on this issue, we reject appellant’s 
eleventh proposition of law. 
XI 
 
In his tenth proposition of law, appellant contends that he was deprived 
of the effective assistance of trial counsel.  Appellant claims that counsel was 
deficient for failing to object to the alleged errors that are the subject of his 
first, third and eleventh propositions of law.  However, with respect to these 
propositions of law, we have found either no error or no prejudicial error.  
Thus, we find that appellant has failed to meet his burden of establishing 
ineffective assistance of counsel under the standards set forth in Strickland v. 
Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.  
Accordingly, we reject appellant’s tenth proposition of law. 
XII 
 
In his twelfth proposition of law, appellant argues that Ohio’s death 
penalty scheme is unconstitutional.  We have held, time and again, that Ohio’s 
 
76 
death penalty scheme is constitutional.  As appellant presents us with no 
compelling argument why we should now find Ohio’s death penalty statute to 
be unconstitutional, we reject appellant’s twelfth proposition of law. 
XIII 
 
Having considered the propositions of law, we must now independently 
review the death penalty for appropriateness and proportionality.  Again, we 
find that the two specifications of aggravating circumstances appellant was 
found guilty of committing were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
In mitigation, appellant presented the testimony of his mother, 
grandmother, and two sisters.  These witnesses testified concerning the difficult 
circumstances surrounding appellant’s childhood.  Testimony established that 
throughout appellant’s childhood, Pete Biros, appellant’s father, was a 
domineering and tyrannical man who treated his family as property.  Pete Biros 
belittled and berated his wife and children, showed them little or no affection, 
and isolated them from family and friends.  He was an extremely jealous man 
who frequently accused Jo Anne Biros, appellant’s mother, of infidelity, and 
 
77 
oftentimes threatened to kill her and to commit suicide.  Pete Biros died in 
October 1983 from cirrhosis of the liver.  Despite being raised in a household 
with Pete Biros, appellant and his sisters, along with Jo Anne Biros, worked 
steadily and succeeded in eventually graduating from college.  Appellant’s 
family members testified that appellant is a helpful, caring, and conscientious 
individual with a “good heart.” 
 
Dr. James Eisenberg, a psychologist, testified in mitigation.  Eisenberg 
first interviewed appellant in March 1991.  Between that time and the time of 
the mitigation hearing, Eisenberg interviewed appellant on several occasions, 
performed psychological testing, reviewed appellant’s records, and interviewed 
members of appellant’s family.  Eisenberg noted that appellant had come from 
an “extremely dysfunctional family,” and believed that appellant’s relationship 
with his father had significantly affected his life and personality.  Eisenberg 
testified that while appellant was gutting and dismembering Tami’s body, 
appellant was mentally reenacting scenes from when he hunted deer with his 
father and would have to slaughter the kill while being told that he was 
 
78 
worthless and incompetent.  Eisenberg diagnosed appellant as suffering from a 
“schizoid personality disorder,” and from lifelong alcohol dependence and 
neurotic depression.  Eisenberg also testified that appellant had graduated from 
college after having worked toward obtaining a degree for thirteen years.  
According to Eisenberg, this indicates that appellant has been able to persevere 
despite the trying circumstances of his youth.  Further, Eisenberg noted that 
appellant had been employed throughout most of his adult life, that appellant 
had no significant history of prior criminal convictions, and that between 
February 1991 and the time of trial, appellant had no reported problems in the 
Trumbull County Jail.  Prior to the offenses in the case at bar, appellant’s only 
known criminal history consisted of one arrest for theft in 1977 and a 1986 
conviction for either driving under the influence of alcohol or for reckless 
operation of a motor vehicle.  Eisenberg testified that appellant was not insane 
at the time of trial or at the time of the killing. 
 
On cross-examination, Eisenberg testified that appellant knows the 
difference between right and wrong.  Eisenberg also testified that, in his 
 
79 
opinion, the mitigating factor set forth in R.C. 2929.04(B)(3) is inapplicable in 
this case.  Therefore, Eisenberg admitted that, at the time of the killing, 
appellant’s psychological conditions did not rise to the level of a mental 
disease or defect that deprived appellant of a substantial capacity to appreciate 
the criminality of his conduct or to conform to the requirements of law. 
 
Finally, appellant gave an unsworn statement in which he admitted 
responsibility for the death of Tami Engstrom “and what happened afterwards.”  
Appellant apologized to the victim’s family and to his own family for what he 
had done. 
 
Upon a review of the evidence presented in mitigation, it is clear to us 
that appellant had a troubled childhood.  We find that appellant’s troubled 
childhood, history, and family background are entitled to some, but very little, 
weight in mitigation. 
 
The nature and circumstances of the offense reveal nothing of any 
mitigating value.  The R.C. 2929.04(B)(1) and (2) mitigating factors are 
inapplicable on the record before us, since there exists no credible evidence 
 
80 
that the victim induced or facilitated the murder (R.C. 2929.04[B][1]), and 
there exists no credible evidence that appellant acted under duress, coercion, or 
strong provocation (R.C. 2929.04[B][2]).  Further, the R.C. 2929.04(B)(6) 
mitigating factor is inapplicable, since appellant was the principal and only 
offender. 
 
The R.C. 2929.04(B)(3) mitigating factor was not established by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Nevertheless, we find that appellant’s 
personality disorder, lifelong alcohol dependence, and depression, as testified 
to by Dr. Eisenberg, are collectively entitled to some, but very little, weight in 
mitigation. 
 
We have considered the R.C. 2929.04(B)(4) mitigating factor (youth of 
the offender), but find that this factor is entitled to no weight in mitigation.  
Appellant was thirty-two years of age at the time of the offense. 
 
The record is clear that appellant lacks a significant history of prior 
criminal convictions and delinquency adjudications.  We find that this R.C. 
2929.04(B)(5) mitigating factor is entitled to some weight in mitigation.  
 
81 
Additionally, we find that the evidence of appellant’s steady work record and 
his achievement in obtaining a college degree after thirteen years of effort is 
entitled to some, but very minimal, weight in mitigation.  We assign little or no 
weight to appellant’s unsworn statement wherein he apologized to the victim’s 
family and to his own family and accepted responsibility for the death of Tami 
Engstrom. 
 
We have also considered whether this appellant might be capable of 
long-term rehabilitation and ultimate reintegration into society after lengthy 
incarceration, given his favorable work record, his college degree, and his lack 
of a significant prior criminal history.  However, the acts of sheer inhumanity 
demonstrated by this appellant in the nature and circumstances of the offense 
convince us that he is incapable of any meaningful rehabilitation.  Additionally, 
we have considered Eisenberg’s testimony that appellant did well in a 
controlled institutionalized setting between the time of his arrest and the time 
of trial.  We assign this evidence little or no weight in mitigation. 
 
82 
 
Weighing the evidence presented in mitigation against the two R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7) specifications of aggravating circumstances of which appellant 
was found guilty, we find that the aggravating circumstances easily outweigh 
the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.  Indeed, even if, as appellant 
suggests, there existed insufficient evidence to support a finding that the 
murder occurred while appellant was committing or while fleeing immediately 
after committing aggravated robbery (a proposition we have specifically 
rejected but one that was accepted by the court of appeals), our conclusion 
would remain the same.  The court of appeals held, and we agree, that the 
aggravating circumstance that the killing occurred while appellant was 
attempting to commit or while fleeing immediately after attempting to commit 
rape itself outweighs the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
Finally, we have undertaken a comparison of the sentence imposed in 
this case to those in which we have previously affirmed the death penalty.  We 
have previously upheld the death sentence in cases involving murder during the 
course of an aggravated robbery (see, e.g., State v. Berry [1995], 72 Ohio St.3d 
 
83 
354, 650 N.E.2d 433; Woodard, 68 Ohio St.3d 70, 623 N.E.2d 75; State v. 
Hawkins [1993], 66 Ohio St.3d 339, 612 N.E.2d 1227; and State v. 
Montgomery [1991], 61 Ohio St.3d 410, 575 N.E.2d 167), in cases involving  
murder during the commission of an attempted rape (see, e.g., Scudder, 71 
Ohio St.3d 263, 643 N.E.2d 524), and in cases involving murder during the 
commission of an aggravated robbery and rape (see, e.g., Smith, 61 Ohio St.3d 
284, 574 N.E.2d 510).  Appellant’s death sentence is neither excessive nor 
disproportionate in comparison. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals 
in part and reverse it in part.  Specifically, we affirm appellant’s convictions 
and sentences, including the death sentence, but reverse the judgment of the 
court of appeals on the issues raised in the cross-appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed in part 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and reversed in part. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
84 
FOOTNOTES: 
1 
The discretionary cross-appeal of the state of Ohio is hereby allowed. 
2 
At the time of the offense, former R.C. 2911.01 provided: 
 
“(A)  No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined 
in section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately after such 
attempt or offense, shall do either of the following: 
 
“(1)  Have a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance, as defined in section 
2923.11 of the Revised Code, on or about his person or under his control; 
 
“(2)  Inflict, or attempt to inflict serious physical harm on another. 
 
“(B)  Whoever violates this section is guilty of aggravated robbery, an 
aggravated felony of the first degree.”  (Emphasis added.)  140 Ohio Laws, Part 
I, 583, 590.