Case Title: Ex Parte Wilson

Citation: 571 So. 2d 1251

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1990-08-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
571 So. 2d 1251 (1990)
Ex parte Shep WILSON, Jr.
(Re Shep Wilson, Jr. v. State).
89-561.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 17, 1990.
Rehearing Denied November 2, 1990.
*1253 Carlos A. Williams and J.L. Chestnut, Jr. of Chestnut, Sanders, Sanders, Williams & Pettaway, Selma, for petitioner.
Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and William D. Little, Asst. Atty. Gen., for State.
HORNSBY, Chief Justice.
This is a death penalty case. Shep Wilson, Jr., is a 33-year old black man with a history of emotional disturbance and violence toward women, including one prior conviction of rape. Although Wilson was one of several suspects in the kidnapping, rape, and murder of Monica Cook, he was not initially arrested in that regard. On February 14, 1986, Wilson was arrested for unlawful possession of a handgun; information obtained after that arrest eventually led to his conviction for the murder of Monica Cook.
The evidence showed that on the morning of January 27, 1986, Monica Cook was abducted from the Shell Discount Food Mart at which she worked in Sylacauga, Alabama. Cook had reported to work at 11:00 p.m. the evening before and was seen at the store by two persons, Officer Dusty Zook and Booker Harris, whose testimony placed her in the store at 12:30 a.m. and at a point between 1:30 and 2:00 a.m., respectively. Harris stated that as he was leaving the store between 1:30 and 2:00 a.m., he noticed a blue Buick automobile in the parking lot. Harris stated that he watched this automobile for some time but that no one got out of it. Just after 2:00 a.m., Jim Green entered the store and found no one there. Green testified that he called the police from a pay telephone that was close by.
Inside the store, the police found evidence that indicated that Cook had been forcibly abducted. A package of Kool cigarettes, which showed traces of blood, was found on the floor. Traces of blood were also found on the front door of the store building. The police found a woman's watch that appeared to be twisted as if had been forcibly wrenched from someone's arm.
Monica Cook's body was found on January 30, 1986, in the vicinity of Riser's Mountain near Riser's Mill Road. In one ear, police found an earring. Cook's clothing was in disarray. Evidence indicated that she had suffered numerous blunt force injuries and that as a result of one such blow her skull was fractured. Physical evidence indicated that Cook had been both raped and sodomized.
Upon his arrest for unlawful possession of a handgun, Wilson waived his Miranda rights and denied possession of the pistol. However, when police questioning shifted to the investigation of Monica Cook's murder, Wilson asked for an attorney and all questioning then ceased. The trial court found that the police did not arrest Wilson as a pretext to question him about Monica Cook, and the court further found that *1254 Wilson had made no incriminating statements at any time before the appointment of his attorney.
On the day after the handgun arrest, George Sims was appointed as Wilson's attorney, and Sims was contacted by the district attorney, who was seeking permission to search Wilson's home in connection with the Monica Cook investigation. Sims consulted with Wilson about the search and advised Wilson not to consent if he was involved with the Cook case. Wilson denied any involvement and subsequently signed a written consent to the search of his house and car, and both Wilson and Sims were present during the house search. Wilson's car was found on the property of his mother and was searched there.
Significant circumstantial evidence implicating Wilson in Monica Cook's death was discovered during these searches. This evidence included: (1) a simulated pearl earring substantially similar to the one found on Monica Cook's body, found in the carpet in Wilson's house; (2) fibers taken from carpet in Wilson's home that were later found to be identical to fibers found on Monica Cook's body; (3) bloodstains on a quilt on Wilson's bed; and (4) fibers taken from the automobile that were later found to be identical to fibers found on Monica Cook's body.
After the search was completed, Wilson approached investigator Alvin Kidd, a police officer he was acquainted with, and asked to talk with him later. Apparently Wilson wished to find out what the search and investigation had revealed. That evening the district attorney contacted Sims and informed him that Wilson had expressed a desire to discuss the Cook case with investigator Kidd. Sims responded by saying that he had no objections to Wilson's talking with Kidd and that Sims would come to the place of the questioning if Wilson requested his presence.
After the conversation between Sims and the district attorney, Kidd approached Wilson and Wilson told him that he still wanted to discuss the Cook investigation. Wilson was again advised of his rights and was informed of Sims's willingness to be present, and Wilson indicated that he wished to discuss the case without Sims's presence. During the interview, investigator Kidd discussed with Wilson some of the evidence that had been found in the search that linked Wilson to Cook's murder. Wilson eventually stated that he had unintentionally strangled Cook after they had had sexual relations. Wilson stated that he was angry at Monica Cook because she did not have the money she allegedly received from selling his marijuana and he admitted that he struck her with his fists. He further admitted that he had left the body in his residence for several days, and had slept in the same bed with the body on at least one occasion before dumping it in the area where it was later discovered.
The trial court found that Wilson's statement had been made voluntarily and without coercion. The trial court further found that even though the statements given by Wilson were given at approximately 3:00 a.m. on the morning of February 16, 1990, he was not exhausted at the time the statements were given and was aware that he could stop the interview at any time.
At trial, the state presented evidence obtained as a result of the searches of Wilson's residence and vehicle. The incriminating statement was also allowed into evidence. Wilson did not testify. The jury convicted Wilson of three counts of capital murder, and the trial moved to the penalty phase. The defense presented testimony indicating prior mental illness and possible mental retardation, and the state presented evidence that tended to rebut the defendant's evidence as to any mental illness or defect. The jury's determination in the penalty phase was a recommendation of death by a vote of 11 to 1. The trial court subsequently sentenced Wilson to death.
Wilson makes numerous allegations of error at his trial, and several of these issues merit discussion. Specifically, he challenges the validity of the consent searches of his home and automobile, and he also contests the voluntariness of statements that he made to police officers. In connection with the statements given to police and the consent searches mentioned *1255 above, the defendant further claims that he suffered ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant also challenges the State's use of various mental evaluations prepared pursuant to the trial court's order as a prerequisite to his receipt of state assistance in obtaining mental health evaluations to aid in his defense. We will address these issues separately.
The defendant argues that the search of his residence was invalid because, he says, he merely gave consent to a police search for weapons and did not give consent to the search for evidence in the Monica Cook murder case. However, the record indicates that George Sims was contacted by the district attorney and was advised that the police wished to search the defendant's residence in connection with Cook's murder. When questioned on this issue, Sims testified that he informed the defendant that he was indeed a suspect in the Monica Cook murder case. Sims testified that he specifically told the defendant that he doubted that the district attorney had collected enough evidence against him to acquire a search warrant, and that if the defendant had anything to do with the case, he should refuse to consent to any search. Sims's testimony indicates that the defendant specifically denied that he either knew of or participated in the Cook murder. Sims stated that he told the defendant that a search might be of some benefit to him if he had nothing to do with the crime.
A person may consent to a search without a warrant and thereby waive any protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment to his right of privacy. Duncan v. State, 278 Ala. 145, 176 So. 2d 840 (1965). Consent to a search must be knowingly, intelligently, and freely given. Id. Based upon the evidence set out above, we conclude that the defendant did satisfy these criteria in his consent to the searches of his home and automobile. Further, the record establishes that the defendant gave the consent with knowledge that he was a suspect in the Monica Cook murder case. The trial court's ruling on this issue is supported by substantial evidence. See Prince v. State, 420 So. 2d 856 (Ala.Crim.App. 1982).
The evidence shows that the defendant approached Officer Alvin Kidd while the search of his residence was in progress. The record further indicates that the defendant asked Officer Kidd to come to the jail at a later time because he wanted to talk to him. The record further indicates that the defendant approached Kidd when Sims was not present, and that it was the defendant's intent that Sims not be included in his conversation with Kidd. Before Officer Kidd began any discussions with the defendant, the district attorney contacted Sims to seek permission to speak with the defendant. The evidence indicates that Sims inquired as to whether the defendant had requested his presence and, when informed that the defendant had indicated that he did not wish Sims to be present, made no objection to the conversation between Kidd and the defendant. Sims did state that he would be present during the conversation if the defendant wished that he be there and that he would be ready to come to the place of the interview at any time the defendant requested his presence. The record indicates that the defendant did not request his attorney, and Sims was not present at the interrogation.
We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals, 571 So. 2d 1237, that the statements were voluntarily given and that they evidenced an effective waiver of the right to counsel. In this case, the facts indicate that the defendant initiated further contact with the police and requested that Officer Kidd speak with him. In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981), the United States Supreme Court recognized that an accused may validly waive his right to counsel by voluntarily initiating conversation with the police concerning an investigation. In Edwards, the Court stated that when a defendant asserts his right to counsel under *1256 Miranda, questioning must cease until "counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." Id. at 484-85, 101 S. Ct.  at 1884-85.
In this particular case, the defendant had available counsel. George Sims had been appointed his attorney and had accompanied the defendant during the search of his home. It was only after Sims was appointed that the defendant approached Officer Kidd and asked that he speak with him later. Kidd specifically reminded the defendant that his attorney could be present during their conversation. Moreover, the record shows that the defendant was read his Miranda rights and that he stated that he understood those rights. In fact, the taped conversation preserved in the record shows a painstaking and patient approach by the investigators to ensure that the defendant was aware of each of his rights and that he made a knowing and intelligent waiver. Further, it appears in the record that the defendant was not unfamiliar with the criminal process and the importance of his rights, in light of his previous conviction for rape.
In any case, the "determination of the waiver issue must necessarily depend ... upon the peculiar facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience and conduct of the accused." Bartlett v. Allen, 724 F.2d 1524, 1527 (11th Cir.1984). See North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 99 S. Ct. 1755, 60 L. Ed. 2d 286 (1979). In this case, based upon the totality of the circumstances, we find that the facts and circumstances show a knowing waiver of the defendant's right to counsel at the time the incriminating statements were made. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1047, 103 S. Ct. 2830, 2835, 77 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1983).
The defendant claims that George Sims, who was initially the defendant's appointed attorney following his arrest, was ineffective in his representation. Specifically, the defendant claims that Sims was ineffective in allowing a consent search of the defendant's home and in allowing the defendant to make a voluntary and inculpatory statement to the police.
As to both issues raised by the defendant, we conclude that Sims was not ineffective in representing the defendant. Although we are cognizant of the analysis of the Court of Criminal Appeals concerning when and if the defendant's right to counsel attached under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, an analysis of the fine distinctions on this point is made unnecessary by our agreement with the conclusion of the Court of Criminal Appeals that the defendant failed to carry his burden of proving that his counsel was ineffective in his representation of the defendant's interests.
The test for determining whether counsel is effective is set out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); it requires that the defendant show that the performance of the attorney was deficient and that the deficiency resulted in prejudice to the defendant. In this context, the term "deficient" has generally been defined as outside the range of reasonable professional conduct. Singleton v. Thigpen, 847 F.2d 668 (11th Cir.1988); cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1019, 109 S. Ct. 822, 102 L. Ed. 2d 812 (1989). Application of the standard articulated in Strickland and its progeny to the facts of this case does not demonstrate to us that the actions of Sims were deficient.
With respect to the searches, the record indicates that while Sims advised the defendant that a consent could serve the defendant's interest by removing him as a suspect in the Cook investigation only after the defendant assured him that he was in no way involved in the murder. Sims was not ineffective in advising the defendant to act on facts that the defendant represented to Sims were the truth. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 106 S. Ct. 988, 89 L. Ed. 2d 123 (1986). Moreover, Sims specifically told the defendant that he should not consent to the search if he was in any way involved in the Cook case. Plainly, the defendant cannot meritoriously *1257 argue ineffective assistance of his counsel when he disregarded his counsel's advice.
With respect to Sims's actions in relation to the defendant's statement, our preceding discussion with respect to the voluntariness of this statement establishes that the defendant validly waived any right to counsel prior to making any statement. The waiver of the right to counsel would certainly preclude the defendant's raising an argument concerning ineffective assistance of counsel. Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 102 S. Ct. 1300, 71 L. Ed. 2d 475 (1982).
The record indicates that at the time Sims was informed that the defendant wished to converse with Officer Kidd, Sims had no knowledge of the evidence that implicated defendant in the Cook murder and was still operating under the defendant's representations that he was in no way involved. We cannot hold that it was outside the range of reasonable professional representation for Sims to rely on the representations of his client as to his innocence and on the instructions of his client that he was not to be present at the interview with Officer Kidd. Nix, supra; see Phelps v. State, 435 So. 2d 158 (Ala.Crim.App.1983) (counsel's advice that defendant make a statement to police not ineffective assistance of counsel). Here, Sims simply followed his client's instruction not to come to the interview. Our law would not require Sims, in order to render effective assistance of counsel, to anticipate that the defendant was lying and to disregard the defendant's instructions not to participate in the interview.
Pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S. Ct. 1087, 84 L. Ed. 2d 53 (1985), the defendant sought the assistance of a psychiatrist in the preparation of his defense. The State argued that if the defendant presented expert psychiatric testimony, it was entitled to have the defendant examined by its own experts. Following a hearing on the defendant's Ake motion, the trial court ordered that the defendant be transferred to the Taylor Hardin Secure Medical Facility for examination by State experts. The records generated by the Taylor Hardin staff were made available to the defendant's State-paid expert.
During the guilt phase of the trial, the defendant offered no psychiatric evidence. However, at the sentencing phase, the defendant informed the court that he intended to prove that the offense was committed at a time when the defendant was under extreme mental or emotional distress, in an attempt to prove a mitigating circumstance under Code 1975, § 13A-5-51(2). (We note also that from the outset the defendant had pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity.) The defendant produced a number of witnesses at this phase of the trial, including Dr. Edward Benson, a psychiatrist, who was provided to the defendant at the State's expense. Dr. Benson testified that the defendant suffered from paranoid personality disorder, underlying generalized anxiety disorder, and intermittent explosive disorder.
In rebuttal, the State called Dr. Kamal Nagi, a Taylor Hardin psychiatrist who had examined the defendant. Dr. Nagi testified that the defendant was not suffering from any mental disease or defect at the time the crime was committed.
The defendant complains that the trial court erred in requiring that he be examined first by the State in order to receive State funds to pay his expert's expenses, and that his Fifth Amendment rights and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel were violated in this respect. However, it is clear that a trial court may compel the defendant, when he pleads insanity, to undergo psychiatric examination, without infringing on the defendant's constitutional rights. Isley v. Dugger, 877 F.2d 47, 49 (11th Cir.1989). In this regard, one court has stated:
United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43, 47-48 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 855, 97 S. Ct. 149, 50 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
Under the analyses of the Isley and Cohen cases, any defendant who raises the insanity issue may be compelled to undergo a psychiatric examination. Thus, the defendant's claim that he was denied equal protection of the laws under the decision in Ake, supra, is not well taken. We agree with the contention of the State that the defendant would have been subject to State examination in any case. Therefore, we hold that there was no error with regard to the defendant's right of equal protection of the laws.
We are mindful that the defendant offered the psychiatric testimony in this case in order to establish mitigating circumstances under Code 1975, § 13A-5-51(2). The defendant clearly bears the burden of proving mitigation under § 13A-5-45(g). However, § 13A-5-45(g) states that once the defendant interjects the issue of mitigation "the State shall have the burden of disproving the factual existence of that circumstance by a preponderance of the evidence." Thus, the State was justified in producing its own expert to rebut the evidence of mitigation offered by the defendant's expert. Moreover, we note that the defendant and his counsel were advised that the examination at Taylor Hardin would include any mitigating circumstances. In that regard, the defendant claims that the testimony of the state's expert violated his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The defendant relies heavily on the case of Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S. Ct. 1866, 68 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1981).
We find Estelle distinguishable. In Estelle, the appellate court was required to make a finding of "future dangerousness" in order to impose the death penalty, while in the present case no such requirement exists. The Estelle court held that the examination was improper because the defendant was not informed of his Miranda rights before he was examined by the State's expert and his attorneys were not informed that the scope of the examination would include the issue of "future dangerousness." In this case, the defendant's counsel was informed that the examination would encompass matters of mitigation and the defendant was informed of his Miranda rights prior to the examination. In Estelle, the Supreme Court stated:
Estelle, supra, at 466, 101 S. Ct.  at 1874-75.
In this case, the defendant did enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Thus, the trial court was justified in compelling the defendant to undergo psychiatric evaluation. In addition, the defendant and his counsel were informed of the State's intention to examine the defendant on matters of mitigation and it appears that, prior to the examination, the defendant was informed of his Fifth Amendment rights. Moreover, the Supreme Court noted that "a different situation arises where a defendant intends to introduce psychiatric evidence at the penalty phase" as opposed to the case where the defendant intends to offer no such evidence.[1]
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the defendant's claims regarding the admission of the State's psychiatric evidence are without merit. Because we reverse on the issue addressed below regarding the comment made during the closing argument by the district attorney, we need not consider the remaining issues raised by the defendant.
The following took place during the state's rebuttal in closing arguments in this case:
The district attorney continued with the remainder of his closing argument, which consists of over 9 typed transcript pages, and was made over at least the next 25 minutes, as calculated by this Court's reading of the closing argument. After the closing argument was completed, the trial court proceeded with an instruction just *1260 before the formal oral instructions given to the jury. This "curative" instruction is found in the record as follows:
Wilson contends that the district attorney's comments constituted a remark or comment on Wilson's failure to testify on his own behalf; specifically, he points to the following statement:
(Emphasis added.) As shown above, the defense made an objection to this argument, moved for a mistrial, and requested an instruction. We note that the trial court overruled defense counsel's request for a mistrial and for a curative instruction, although, after the closing arguments had been completed, it gave an instruction on the defendant's right not to take the stand. The defendant asserts, however, that the curative instruction did not specifically address the comment in question and therefore did nothing to address the prosecutorial error.
The defendant contends that under Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1965), any comment by a prosecutor on a defendant's failure to testify is reversible error. He also directs our attention to Ex parte Williams, 461 So. 2d 852 (Ala.1984), and Stain v. State, 494 So. 2d 816 (Ala.Crim.App.1986).
The State argues that the district attorney's comment was not on the defendant's failure to testify, and that his explanatory sentence "made it clear to the jury that he was referring to the defendant's sketchy incriminating statements, which had been admitted into evidence." The State further contends that where the argument would reasonably have been understood by the jury to be a comment on a defendant's statement that is in evidence, rather than on a defendant's failure to testify, there is no Fifth Amendment violation. United States v. Blackwood, 768 F.2d 131, 139 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020, 106 S. Ct. 569, 88 L. Ed. 2d 554 (1985); see Grady v. State, 391 So. 2d 1095, 1102 (Ala.Crim.App. 1980). The State asserts that because the prosecutor stated to the jury that he was referring to the defendant's taped statement, the jury could not have thought he was speaking regarding a lack of testimony. Finally, the State contends that any error was corrected by the trial court's "very strong" charge on the defendant's right not to testify, to which the defendant's attorney stated that he was satisfied.
For this discussion, we first note that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself. Alabama Constitution, Art. I, § 6.
Ala.Code 1975, § 12-21-220 (emphasis supplied); see also Ex parte Yarber, 375 So. 2d 1231, 1233 (Ala.1979); Whitt v. State, 370 So. 2d 736, 738-39 (Ala.1979). The United States Supreme Court has held that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution are also violated when a comment is made by the prosecution on the accused's silence. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S. Ct. 1229, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106 (1965); accord Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319, 96 S. Ct. 1551, 1558, 47 L. Ed. 2d 810 (1976) ("Griffin prohibits the judge and prosecutor from suggesting to the jury that it may treat the defendant's silence as substantive evidence of guilt"); United States v. Monaghan, 741 F.2d 1434 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1085, 105 S. Ct. 1847, 85 L. Ed. 2d 146 (1985); Solomon v. Kemp, 735 F.2d 395, 401 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1181, 105 S. Ct. 940, 83 L. Ed. 2d 952 (1985).
In a case where there has been a direct reference to a defendant's failure to testify and the trial court has not acted promptly to cure that comment, the conviction must be reversed. Ex parte Williams, 461 So. 2d 852, 854 (Ala.1984); Whitt v. State, supra; Ex parte Yarber, 375 So. 2d 1231, 1234 (Ala.1979); see also Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 98 S. Ct. 1091, 55 L. Ed. 2d 319 (1978) (the giving of such a curative instruction over the defendant's objection does not violate the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination). The federal cases have held that "a statement by a prosecutor is improper if it was manifestly intended to be, or was of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be, a comment on the failure of the accused to testify." Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1547 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 488 U.S. 983, 109 S. Ct. 534, 102 L. Ed. 2d 566 (1988); United States v. Betancourt, 734 F.2d 750, 758 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1021, 105 S. Ct. 440, 83 L. Ed. 2d 365 (1984).
In a case where there has been only an indirect reference to a defendant's failure to testify, in order for the comment to constitute reversible error there must be a close identification of the defendant as the person who did not become a witness. Williams, supra; United States v. Norton, 867 F.2d 1354, 1364 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S. Ct. 200, 107 L. Ed. 2d 154 (1989).
This Court in Whitt determined that a comment almost identical to the statement here was a direct comment on the failure of the defendant to testify and that the trial court's failure to promptly remedy the prejudice caused by the comment constituted reversible error. See also Ex parte Yarber, supra; Beecher v. State, 294 Ala. 674, 320 So. 2d 727 (1975); Warren v. State, 292 Ala. 71, 288 So. 2d 826 (1973); Troup v. State, 32 Ala.App. 309, 319, 26 So. 2d 611, 220 (1946). In Whitt, supra, the defendant was indicted for first degree murder arising out of a fatality in an automobile collision. He was convicted of second degree murder and the conviction was affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals. This Court reversed, however, finding that the district attorney's argument to the jury was an impermissible comment on the defendant's failure to testify. In Whitt, none of the closing arguments appeared in the record except the statements objected to by counsel, including the comment regarding the defendant's failure to testify: "The only person alive today that knows what happened out there that night is sitting right *1262 there." The defendant promptly objected to this remark and made a motion for mistrial.
370 So. 2d  at 738.
Alabama law clearly holds that "[w]here there is the possibility that a prosecutor's comment could be understood by the jury as reference to failure of the defendant to testify, Art. I, § 6 [Const. of Ala. of 1901] is violated." Ex parte Tucker, 454 So. 2d 552, 553 (Ala.1984); Ex parte Dobard, 435 So. 2d 1351, 1359 (Ala.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063, 104 S. Ct. 745, 79 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1984) (quoting Beecher v. State, 294 Ala. 674, 682, 320 So. 2d 727, 734 (1975)). However, as asserted by the State here, the prosecutor does have a right to point out to the jury that the State's evidence does stand uncontradicted, in an appropriate comment to that effect, but the comment must not cross over the line drawn by the right of a defendant not to testify at trial. Ex parte Williams, 461 So. 2d 852, 853 (Ala.1984); Ex parte Dobard, supra; Beecher, supra; see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1978) (repeated comments by prosecutor that the evidence was uncontradicted was not error in light of promise by defense counsel that the defendant would take the stand); Marsden v. Moore, supra (quoting Duncan v. Stynchcombe, 704 F.2d 1213, 1215-16 (11th Cir. 1983) ("Comments `on the failure of the defense, as opposed to that of the defendant, to counter or explain the testimony presented or evidence introduced is not an infringement on the [defendant's] Fifth Amendment privilege'").
In Williams, the deputy district attorney made the following statement in closing:
Ex parte Williams, 461 So. 2d  at 853. This Court reversed the conviction, with instructions to the Court of Criminal Appeals to remand to the trial court for a new trial. We stated in Williams:
461 So. 2d  at 853-54.
Justice Embry, in his special concurrence in Williams, stated:
Id. at 854 (Embry, J. concurring specially). We find the rationale expressed in the above language to be controlling here.
The statements in this case do not fall within the bounds set forth in Ex parte Dobard, supra, or Beecher. The district attorney clearly did not comment generally on the State's evidence standing uncontradicted. His statement falls well outside the permitted range available to a district attorney in closing and is far more prejudicial than those statements deemed to be indirect comments in Ex parte Williams, supra. See also Stain v. State, 494 So. 2d 816 (Ala.Crim.App.1986) (court unable to distinguish comment from that in Williams). We are also unable to find that the district attorney's statement constituted harmless error under the guidelines *1264 of Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S. Ct. 824, 828, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967), which requires "that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"; but see Marsden v. Moore, 847 F.2d 1536, 1548-49 (11th Cir.1988).
The State attempts to use United States v. Blackwood, 768 F.2d 131, 139 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020, 106 S. Ct. 569, 88 L. Ed. 2d 554 (1985), as support for its argument. We find that the following occurred in Blackwood, where the defendant was charged with racketeering and extortion:
768 F.2d  at 139. (Emphasis added.)
The facts in Blackwood are just not analogous to the facts here. The argument presented by the Statethat the district attorney was referring to the defendant's taped statementis without merit. Our examination of the record indicates that the comment was not made in the context of a discussion of the taped statement. The content of the taped statement was simply not argued in the state's rebuttal. In fact, we find that there was no reference to the taped statement made throughout the closing arguments of the assistant district attorney and the district attorney along the lines suggested by the State. We find no argument about the content of the taped statement prior to, or at any point subsequent to, the comment made by the district attorney in that portion of the record containing the district attorney's rebuttal argument.
The district attorney's reference to taped evidence comes after the defense objection to the comment that "he ain't going to tell you." The State's argument that the comment was a permissible reference to the taped statement completely overlooks the obvious inference available to the jury that the defendant did not take the stand so as to contradict or amplify his statement. Given the context of the rebuttal, it is *1265 difficult to imagine a more specific comment on Wilson's failure to testify, notwithstanding the district attorney's later attempt to limit the comment to a reference to the taped statement.
In connection with Ala.Code 1975, § 12-21-220, the case law in Alabama contains a subsidiary doctrine that prevents a reversal of the case if the trial court sustains an objection to improper remarks and promptly and appropriately instructs the jury of the impropriety of those remarks. The trial court here overruled the objection, and we do not find the instruction given by the trial court here to be prompt, or to have been appropriately given. Here, the instruction given fails to clearly address or identify for the jury the exact statement made by the district attorney that was to be remedied. Absent such identification, the instruction can not be taken as "appropriately given" to address the state's impermissible argument.
At a minimum, under such circumstances, the trial judge should sustain the objection and immediately instruct the jury as to the impropriety of the remark made by the district attorney. In giving a curative instruction on the defendant's right not to testify, the trial judge should read the statute and explain thoroughly and immediately to the jury that the defendant's failure to testify in his own behalf shall not create any presumption against him. As we previously stated in Whitt, supra:
A curative instruction in a situation of this type, to be of any value, must be given immediately after the harmful statement is made. Further, where there can be any reasonable doubt as to the particular statement in question, the statement should be explicitly identified to the jury so that it can know what must not be considered. Anything less can in no way cure the error. See Beecher v. State, 294 Ala. 674, 320 So. 2d 727 (1975); Warren v. State, 292 Ala. 71, 288 So. 2d 826 (1973); see also United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 108 S. Ct. 864, 99 L. Ed. 2d 23 (1988) (comments by prosecutor that respondent could have explained his story to the jury were in response to references by defendant's counsel to the Government's failure to provide respondent an opportunity to "explain" his side of the story and were not reversible error); Troup v. State, 32 Ala.App. 309, 319, 26 So. 2d 611, 620 (1946) (the case was not reversed due to the prompt and appropriate instructions given to the jury).
We find here that the comment made by the district attorney was a direct comment on the defendant's failure to testify and violated the defendant's rights as found under the United States Constitution, the Constitution of Alabama of 1901, and Ala. Code (1975), § 12-21-220. We cannot agree that the comment made by the district attorney could have been understood by the jury only as a reference to the defendant's "sketchy incriminating statement." The judgment is therefore due to be reversed and the cause remanded to the Court of Criminal Appeals with instructions to order a new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
JONES, ALMON, ADAMS and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
MADDOX, HOUSTON and STEAGALL, JJ., dissent.
*1266 MADDOX, Justice (dissenting).
I must respectfully dissent. After the district attorney made his improper comment, defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial. After the trial judge denied the motion for a mistrial, defense counsel did not ask the trial judge to give the jury a prompt curative instruction. Nonetheless, the trial judge later gave a curative instruction specifically referring to the district attorney's comment, and defense counsel stated that he was satisfied with that instruction. I do not think that a trial judge, even in a death penalty case, must automatically instruct the jury to ignore an improper comment, especially when the defendant does not ask for such an instruction; and I am reluctant to find reversible error when defense counsel states that he is satisfied with the curative instruction.
[1]  Id., 451 U.S.  at 472, 101 S. Ct.  at 1877. The Supreme Court noted that the Fifth Circuit "carefully left open" the possibility that a defendant who intends to offer psychiatric evidence at the penalty phase of a trial could be precluded from offering such evidence unless he consents to examination by the State's own psychiatric expert. Estelle, 451 U.S.  at 466 n. 10, 101 S. Ct.  at 1874 n. 10.