Case Title: In re Worth

Citation: 

Docket Number: S49861

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2003-12-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed: December 26, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re: Complaint as to the Conduct of 
ANTHONY L. WORTH,
Accused.
(OSB 99-125, 99-126, 99-127, 99-128, 00-149; SC S49861)
    En Banc
    On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
    Argued and submitted September 8, 2003.
    Jane E. Angus, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake Oswego,
argued the cause for the Oregon State Bar.  With her on the
briefs was Martin E. Hansen, Bar Counsel.
    Jonel K. Ricker, of Ricker & Roberson, La Grande, argued the
cause and filed the brief for the accused.
    PER CURIAM
    The accused is suspended from the practice of law for 90
days, effective 60 days from the date of the filing of this
decision.
         PER CURIAM
         In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon
State Bar (Bar) alleges that Anthony L. Worth (the accused)
violated several Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary
Rules in his handling of five post-conviction relief (PCR) cases
and in responding to the Bar's inquiries.  
         In three matters (Elder, Crescenzi, and Tompkins), the
Bar charged violations of Disciplinary Rule (DR) 1-102(A)(4)
(conduct prejudicial to administration of justice) and DR 6-101(B) (neglect of legal matter).  In the fourth matter
(Schultz), the Bar charged violations of DR 1-102(A)(4); DR 2-110(B)(2) (failure to withdraw); DR 6-101(B); and DR 7-101(A)(2)
(intentional failure to carry out contract of employment).  In
the fifth matter (Thompson), the Bar charged violations of DR 6-101(B) and DR 9-101(C)(4) (failure to return client property). 
Finally, the Bar charged violations of DR 1-102 (A)(3) (conduct
involving deceit or misrepresentation) and DR 1-103(C)
(noncooperation with disciplinary investigation) based on the
manner in which the accused responded to the Bar's inquiries.
         A trial panel of the Disciplinary Board concluded that
the accused violated DR 6-101(B) in his handling of the Elder,
Crescenzi, and Tompkins matters, and violated DR 2-110(B)(2) by
failing to withdraw from the Schultz matter.  The trial panel
concluded that the Bar failed to prove the other charges and
dismissed them.  The trial panel imposed a public reprimand, and
the Bar sought review.
         In this court the Bar contends that, in addition to
determining that the accused violated DR 6-101(B) and DR 2-110(B)(2), the trial panel also should have concluded that the
accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 1-103(C), DR
7-101(A)(2), and DR 9-101(C)(4) in his handling of the various
client matters.  The Bar argues that, because the accused
committed multiple serious violations of the disciplinary rules,
a public reprimand is not an appropriate sanction.  Rather, the
Bar contends, the accused should receive a two-year suspension.  
         The accused does not dispute the trial panel's
conclusions that he violated DR 6-101(B) in the Elder, Crescenzi,
and Tompkins matters, and DR 2-110(B)(2) in the Schultz matter. 
However, he argues that this court should uphold the trial
panel's conclusions with respect to the other allegations and
that a public reprimand is the appropriate sanction for his
misconduct.
         When a party seeks review of the trial panel's
decision, this court's review is mandatory and de novo.  ORS
9.536(2)-(3); Bar Rule of Procedure (BR) 10.6; In re Eakin, 334
Or 238, 240, 48 P3d 147 (2002).  The Bar must establish the
alleged misconduct by clear and convincing evidence.  BR 5.2. 
"Clear and convincing evidence means evidence establishing that
the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable."  Eakin, 334
Or at 240.  
I.  FACTS
         The accused has been a lawyer since 1965.  He was
admitted to practice law in Oregon in 1989.  His practice
primarily has been as a legal aid lawyer and administrator.  He
does not have a prior disciplinary record. 
         In November 1998, the accused formed a law partnership
with Ehmann. (1)  Ehmann previously had formed NECO Public
Defender, Inc. (NECO), a consortium of lawyers that defended
indigent clients.  NECO had a contract with the Indigent Defense
Services Division (IDS) of the State Court Administrator's Office
to accept court appointments for the period between September 1,
1998 and June 30, 2000.  Through that contract, Ehmann, as NECO's
administrator, received notices of appointment and assigned cases
to consortium lawyers, including the accused.  The partnership
had access to the Oregon Judicial Information Network (OJIN) and
could track its cases from its office.
         Even though the accused had limited experience handling
PCR cases, (2) Ehmann and the accused agreed that the accused
would handle all the PCR and habeas corpus cases that IDS
assigned to NECO after November 1, 1998. (3)  They also agreed
that Ehmann would continue to handle the PCR cases that he
previously had assigned to himself until the accused became
accustomed to his new caseload.   
         The contract between NECO and IDS contemplated that,
between September 1, 1998 and June 30, 1999, IDS would assign 28
PCR cases and 17 habeas corpus cases to NECO.  During that time
period, IDS actually assigned NECO 34 PCR cases and seven habeas
corpus cases.  The contract also required "prompt notification to
the court of the specific lawyer assigned to each case."  The
accused did not read the contract between NECO and IDS.
         In addition to his responsibility for all the PCR cases
that IDS assigned to NECO, the accused handled several other
civil matters that required a great deal of time and attention. 
Among other things, the accused worked as the staff lawyer for
Domestic Violence Services of Umatilla and Morrow counties, and
represented clients in several Social Security disability cases.  
         In mid-December 1998, due to a dispute with the Eastern
Oregon Correctional Institution, Ehmann decided not to return to
the prison to see clients.  He therefore reassigned eight PCR
cases to the accused--including the Elder, Schultz, Crescenzi,
and Tompkins cases.  The accused immediately assumed
responsibility for the cases, but neither lawyer promptly
notified the Umatilla County Circuit Court, which had appointed
Ehmann as counsel in each of the cases, of the change. (4)  
         A short time after Ehmann reassigned the cases, the
trial court sent Ehmann notices of intent to dismiss the Elder,
Crescenzi, and Tompkins cases in 30 days if no action was taken
on the cases. (5)  At that point, Ehmann also had requested
several extensions of time and continuances in the Schultz case. 
Neither Ehmann nor the accused had filed amended petitions for
PCR in any of the reassigned cases.
         The trial court appointed NECO to represent Thompson in
late December 1998, and the accused became Thompson's lawyer on
January 4, 1999.  The accused sent Thompson a letter that
identified him as Thompson's lawyer and that explained how the
accused planned to proceed with the case.  The accused also filed
a motion for extension of time to file the amended petition for
PCR.  He planned to leave for a month-long vacation to Arizona
during the last week of January 1999. (6)  
         At the end of January 1999, the trial court dismissed
the Elder and Tompkins cases. (7)  However, in the first week
of February 1999, Ehmann filed motions to reinstate those cases,
and the trial court granted the motions.  In late January, Ehmann
also filed a motion for continuance in the Schultz case on the
accused's behalf.  
         During the second week of February 1999, the trial
court generated another notice of intent to dismiss the Crescenzi
case.  At that point, Ehmann expected the accused to return from
his vacation within the next two weeks, so he did nothing on the
case.  When the accused returned from Arizona during the last
week of February 1999, he was ill with the flu and missed another
two weeks of work.  The accused did not check the status of his
cases immediately. 
         In the first week of March 1999, Ryan, an analyst with
IDS, asked the accused why he was representing Crescenzi when the
IDS contract did not authorize him to represent clients who had
been convicted of murder.  Because the accused had not read the
contract between NECO and IDS, he was surprised to learn that he
could not represent Crescenzi.  He immediately returned the file
to Ehmann, but Ehmann failed to reassign the case before the
trial court dismissed it at the end of March 1999.  The accused
subsequently filed a motion to have the case reinstated, and the
trial court granted that motion.  
         The accused failed to notify Crescenzi of the
reinstatement.  As a result, Crescenzi appealed the dismissal of
his case.  The appeal deprived the trial court of its
jurisdiction over the case and, even though the appeal later was
dismissed, significantly delayed reinstatement of the PCR
proceeding.  The trial court reassigned the case to another
lawyer in June 1999.  
         During the second week of March 1999, the trial court
again issued notices of intent to dismiss the Elder and Tompkins
cases and, at the end of April 1999, the court dismissed the
cases a second time. (8)  The accused told neither Elder nor
Tompkins that he planned to file motions to have their cases
reinstated.  Like Crescenzi, Elder and Tompkins independently
appealed the second dismissal of their cases, which removed the
trial court's jurisdiction.  The trial court therefore denied the
motions.  The Court of Appeals eventually dismissed the Elder and
Tompkins appeals, and remanded the cases to the trial
court. (9)  The accused withdrew from representing Elder in
March 2000, while Tompkins' appellate counsel continued to
represent Tompkins in the reinstated PCR case.
         The trial court also generated notices of intent to
dismiss the Thompson case in March 1999 and the Schultz case in
June 1999.  The accused managed to avert dismissal in both cases. 
He filed an amended petition for PCR on behalf of Thompson in
July 1999.  By that time, however, Thompson had become unhappy
with the accused's representation and filed a motion for new
counsel with the trial court.  The accused subsequently filed a
motion to withdraw, and the trial court appointed new counsel to
represent Thompson in January 2000.  
         During the last week of June 1999, two weeks after the
trial court sent the notice of intent to dismiss the Schultz
case, the respondent in that case filed a motion to dismiss the
case.  The accused filed a motion to continue the case in July. 
The trial court granted the accused's motion, but he ultimately
failed to respond to the motion to dismiss.  Schultz also became
unhappy with the accused and filed a motion for new counsel in
August 1999.  The trial court replaced the accused with other
counsel in October 1999.  
         During the occurrence of those events, the accused and
Ehmann's law partnership changed secretaries.  The new secretary,
Price, began working for the firm at the end of March 1999.  When
she started, Price immediately looked at the firm's files to
become familiar with them and with the deadlines associated with
each case.  She implemented a system for keeping track of cases
and also checked OJIN.  When she first checked OJIN, she
discovered that some of the firm's cases were pending dismissal
and that the trial court had dismissed at least five cases.  She
immediately brought that to the firm's attention.
         Price dealt primarily with PCR cases and found herself
drafting motions for extension of time and for reinstatement,
with the accused merely signing them.  The firm also authorized
her to read attorney correspondence.  When letters came in
addressed to one lawyer or the other, she read them and then
placed them in the appropriate lawyer's mailbox.  The accused
responded to some of the letters that were addressed to him.
         The accused neither filed an amended petition for PCR
in the Elder, Schultz, Crescenzi, or Tompkins cases, nor did any
substantive work on the cases.  He also failed to provide all
clients, including Thompson, with copies of notices, pleadings,
and orders filed in their cases.  The trial court informed Elder,
Tompkins, and Crescenzi that their cases had been dismissed. 
         All five clients filed complaints with the Bar about
either Ehmann's or the accused's handling of their cases.  None,
except Thompson, was clear about who his lawyer was because of
Ehmann's earlier involvement, and because the accused did not
properly notify the trial court when he assumed responsibility
for the cases. (10)  They complained generally that the lawyers
were not communicating with them and did not fulfill promises
about how they would handle the cases.  Elder, Crescenzi, and
Tompkins complained individually that their lawyer's neglect had
caused the trial court to dismiss their cases.  Schultz,
Crescenzi, and Thompson complained further that the accused
briefly visited them only once or twice, and that he repeatedly
missed scheduled visits.  Thompson also complained that the
accused did not return a newspaper article that Thompson gave the
accused to help with his case and that Thompson specifically had
told the accused that he wanted it returned. 
         In responding to the Bar's inquiries about his handling
of the cases, the accused always was untimely.  Even when he
requested time extensions, which the Bar always accommodated, he
never met the modified deadlines.  In some instances, because the
accused had not responded, the Bar was forced to make a second
request for a response.  In at least two instances, the accused
responded over one month late, and in one instance, he responded
four and one-half months late.  The accused repeatedly apologized
for his untimely responses and cited his overwhelming caseload as
contributing to his inability to respond on time.  
         In addition, some of the accused's responses to the Bar
were incomplete and others were inconsistent.  In response to an
inquiry about whether he had returned Thompson's article, the
accused stated in one letter that he was certain that he had met
with Thompson and returned the article.  In another letter,
however, he stated: 
"* * * Mr. Thompson may be accurate in that based on
the press of other business, including forty plus PCRs,
I may well have neglected to copy his newspaper article
and send it back to him.  I continue to insist that the
newspaper was impertinent [sic] to the case, and I
acknowledge that Mr. Thompson attaches much more
importance to it than I do."  
During the course of its investigation, the Bar found the article
that Thompson had given the accused in the file that the accused
maintained for Thompson's case. (11)  At the hearing before the
trial panel, the accused explained that he had made a copy of
what Thompson had given him and returned the copy.  Thompson
steadfastly claimed that the accused had not returned the
article.
         The accused also gave inconsistent responses regarding
whether he ever obtained Thompson's sentencing transcript.  In
one letter dated November 9, 1999, the accused stated:
"* * * I explained to [Thompson] what I was doing, I
told him that I was having difficulties getting any
response from Mr. Bowman, his trial counsel and that I
had not received any transcripts.
"I subsequently received the sentencing transcript
and after recovering from a two month illness[ (12)] in
February and March of this year, I filed a Formal
Petition in July[.]"
The Bar sent a copy of that letter to Thompson.  In a subsequent
letter to the Bar dated January 2, 2000, Thompson disputed the
accused's statement about having received the transcript.  In
that letter, Thompson recalled that, during a December 9, 1999
meeting, the accused told Thompson that he had not yet received a
copy of Thompson's sentencing transcript and would have to file a
motion with the trial court to obtain it.  The Bar sent the
accused a copy of Thompson's letter and, in a letter dated
January 17, 2000, the accused stated:
"Mr. Thompson is correct that I indicated that I
did not like to file motions for the production of
transcripts at State expense because I firmly believe
that transcripts exist in the public defender's office
or in the record of the Court of Appeals and that it
would be pointless to spend public money for a second
transcript.  I have endeavored to get a copy of the
transcript from the public defender's office, but with
a singular lack of success."
At the hearing before the trial panel, the accused stated that he
"did not receive or review the transcript." (13)
         At various times, the accused has suffered from health
problems that have affected his ability to do his work.  He is
diabetic and has impaired vision, and he has suffered from
recurring depression and anxiety since 1993.  His depression and
anxiety worsened when he took on the PCR caseload, because his
overall caseload increased.  In January 2000, the accused's
emotional problems led him to request that the presiding judge
relieve him from further court appointments.  The accused's
mother also became terminally ill in April 1999, and that illness
caused the accused to miss periods of work in April and October
1999.  The accused's mother died in May 2000.  
         During the hearing before the trial panel, the accused
acknowledged responsibility for the cases and acknowledged that
he did not fulfill all his responsibilities in handling the
cases.  There also was favorable testimony on his behalf. 
Nicholson, Executive Director of Domestic Violence Services of
Umatilla and Morrow counties, testified that the accused had done
invaluable work as a staff lawyer for that organization.  She
testified that he always fulfilled his responsibilities and that
she had not received any complaints about his work.  She
testified further that Domestic Violence Services had nominated
the accused for the National Crime Victims Service Award, an
award given only to those whose level of community service has
made an impact.  Entelman, an administrative law judge before
whom the accused had handled several Social Security disability
cases, testified that the accused was one of the top three or
four lawyers that he had seen practice before him.  
II.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
         After a hearing that lasted five days and that involved
testimony from 23 witnesses, the trial panel concluded that the
accused had been neglectful in handling his cases, but that
Ehmann had abandoned the accused, contrary to Ehmann's initial
promise to provide the accused guidance in handling PCR cases.  
         The trial panel also concluded that the accused had
been cooperative with the Bar's investigation and that the Bar
failed to prove that the accused made willful misrepresentations
in his responses to the Bar's inquiries.  The trial panel
interpreted DR 1-103(C) to require full and truthful responses to
Bar inquiries, but not timely ones.  It concluded that the
accused violated DR 6-101(B) in the Elder, Crescenzi, and
Tompkins cases, and that he violated DR 2-110(B) in the Schultz
case.  
         In determining the appropriate sanction, the trial
panel recognized that the accused violated his duty to do
substantive work for and to communicate with his clients, but it
considered as mitigating circumstances his lack of a prior
disciplinary record, his personal and physical problems, his
cooperative attitude, his apparent lack of a selfish motive, and
his good character and reputation.  The trial panel determined
that the appropriate sanction was a public reprimand.  The Bar
sought review because it disagreed with the trial panel's
conclusions and the sanction that it imposed.
         We agree with the trial panel's conclusion that the Bar
did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the accused
violated DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 6-101(B), and DR 7-101(A)(2) in the
Schultz matter, or DR 6-101(B) in the Thompson matter.  For the
reasons that follow, however, we conclude that, in addition to
the violations found by the trial panel, the accused also
violated DR 1-102(A)(4) in the Elder, Tompkins, and Crescenzi
matters, DR 9-101(C)(4) when he failed to return the newspaper
article to Thompson, and DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR 1-103(C) based on
the manner in which he responded to some of the Bar's inquiries.  
                        III.  DISCUSSION
A.  The Elder, Thompkins, and Crescenzi Matters
         The Bar argues that, in his handling of those client
matters, the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(4).  DR 1-102(A)(4)
provides that "[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to *
* * [e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration
of justice[.]"  In In re Kluge, 335 Or 326, 345, 66 P3d 492
(2003), this court explained that 
"[t]o establish a violation of DR 1-102(A)(4), the Bar
must show that (1) the accused lawyer's action or
inaction was improper; (2) the accused lawyer's conduct
occurred during the course of a judicial proceeding or
a proceeding with the trappings of a judicial
proceeding; and (3) the accused lawyer's conduct had or
could have had a prejudicial effect upon the
administration of justice.  The administration of
justice includes both the procedural functioning of the
proceeding and the substantive interests of parties to
the proceeding.  Prejudice may arise from several acts
that cause some harm or a single act that causes
substantial harm to the administration of justice." 
(Internal citations omitted.)  The rule also applies to the
manner in which a lawyer handles his or her own client's case. 
See In re Haws, 310 Or 741, 746-47, 801 P2d 818 (1990) (applying
rule to lawyer's handling of client's case).  
         In In re Crist, 327 Or 609, 614, 965 P2d 1023 (1998),
this court concluded that an arbitrator licensed to practice law
who repeatedly missed deadlines, failed to communicate with or
respond to the parties, and who did not respond to requests by
the trial court violated DR 1-102(A)(4).  Similarly, in In re
Gresham, 318 Or 162, 166, 864 P2d 360 (1993), this court
concluded that a probate lawyer who took an extended period of
time to close an estate and who repeatedly failed to "do anything
to administer the estate," requiring the trial court to make
repeated requests for information, violated the rule.
         Here, the trial panel concluded, without explanation,
that the accused did not violate DR 1-102(A)(4) in his handling
of the Elder, Crescenzi, and Tompkins cases.  The Bar argues
that, by neglecting those cases to the extent that he did, the
accused unnecessarily and repeatedly burdened the trial court and
jeopardized his clients' substantive interests by failing to pay
attention, to communicate, or to take action. 
         The accused attributes the case dismissals generally to
not receiving notice from either the trial court or from Ehmann,
to whom the trial court had addressed documents related to the
cases.  He also blames his overwhelming caseload and his clerical
staff's failure to implement properly his "tickle" system, which
would have alerted him to important deadlines.  The accused also
asserts that, in any event, his failures did not prejudice his
clients because the trial court eventually reinstated the
cases. (14)  
         We agree with the Bar.  When Ehmann reassigned the
Elder, Crescenzi, and Tompkins cases to the accused, the accused
immediately became responsible for those cases.  NECO's contract
with IDS required the accused "promptly" to inform the trial
court that he would be handling the cases from that point
forward.  The accused did not read the contract between IDS and
NECO, and was not aware of that requirement.  A competent,
careful lawyer under similar circumstances would have read the
contract.  Had the accused read the contract and properly
notified the trial court, he personally would have received the
notices that he claims he did not receive.  Even so, the accused
could access OJIN from his office and should have checked OJIN to
determine the status of his cases, especially after he returned
from his month-long vacation. 
         The accused's failure to read the contract with IDS,
his failure to monitor his cases properly, and his failure to
communicate with his clients caused avoidable dismissals and
delays in the Elder, Crescenzi, and Tompkins cases.  The multiple
dismissals and delays evidenced a pattern of misconduct that
harmed the procedural functioning of the judicial system.  The
dismissals increased the trial court's workload and forced the
accused's clients to seek other counsel to file appeals.  The
accused's failures to act also potentially prejudiced his
clients' substantive interests.  The Umatilla County Circuit
Court was free to deny reinstatement of the cases, especially
after it had dismissed the Elder and Tompkins cases a second
time.  
         Based on our own de novo review of the record, we
conclude that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(4) in his handling
of the Elder, Tompkins, and Crescenzi matters.        
B.  The Thompson Matter
         The Bar argues that, in his handling of the Thompson
matter, the accused also violated DR 9-101(C)(4) by failing to
return Thompson's newspaper article. 
         DR 9-101(C)(4) provides, in part, that "[a] lawyer
shall * * * [p]romptly pay or deliver to a client as requested by
the client the funds, securities or other properties in the
possession of the lawyer which the client is entitled to
receive."  A lawyer violates the rule by failing to return a
client's files or other documents of importance to the client
when asked to do so.  See In re Devers, 317 Or 261, 265, 855 P2d
617 (1993) (concluding lawyer violated rule by failing to return
client files when asked); In re Spies, 316 Or 530, 534-35, 852
P2d 831 (1993) (quoting In re Arbuckle, 308 Or 135, 138, 775 P2d
832 (1989) which explains that "client is entitled to the return
of the client's property upon demand").
         The trial panel concluded, without explanation, that
the accused did not violate this rule.  We disagree.
         The accused's inconsistent responses to the Bar's
inquiries about Thompson's article, Thompson's adamant denial
that the accused returned the article, and the fact that the Bar
found the article in Thompson's file are all factors that
indicate that the accused did not return Thompson's article. 
Indeed, the accused minimized the importance of the article and
exhibited an inability to understand why the article was
important to Thompson.  We conclude that the Bar has established
by clear and convincing evidence that the accused did not return
Thompson's article and that, in failing to do so, he violated DR
9-101(C)(4). 
C.  The Bar's Investigation
         The Bar argues that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3)
and DR 1-103(C) because he made misrepresentations in his
responses to its inquiries and because his responses were
dilatory.  
         1.  DR 1-102(A)(3) 
         DR 1-102(A)(3) provides, in part, that "[i]t is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to * * * [e]ngage in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation[.]"  In
In re Gatti, 330 Or 517, 527-28, 8 P3d 996 (2000), this court
explained that
"[m]isrepresentation is a broad term that encompasses
the nondisclosure of a material fact.  A
misrepresentation may be a lie, a half-truth, or even
silence.  A material fact consists of information that,
if disclosed, would have influenced the recipient's
conduct.  Even a misrepresentation that is made with
the best of intentions can be a misrepresentation under
DR 1-102(A)(3)."
(Internal citations omitted.)  The Bar must prove that the lawyer
knowingly misrepresented a material fact to establish a violation
of the rule.  See id.  "A lawyer acts knowingly by being
consciously aware of the nature or attendant circumstances of the
conduct, but not having a conscious objective to accomplish a
particular result."  In re Lawrence, 332 Or 502, 513, 31 P3d 1078
(2001); ABA Standards at 7. 
         The trial panel concluded, without discussion, that the
Bar did not prove that the accused made willful
misrepresentations and, thus, that the accused did not violate DR
1-102(A)(3).  The trial panel, however, applied the incorrect
mental state to determine whether the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3).  As stated above, to prove a violation of that rule,
the Bar must show by clear and convincing evidence that the
accused "knowingly" made misrepresentations, not that he
"willfully" did so.  The trial panel therefore did not properly
conclude that the accused did not violate DR 1-102(A)(3).
         In its amended formal complaint, the Bar, in compliance
with BR 4.1, (15) pleaded only the acts and omissions of the
accused and the disciplinary rules that it alleged that he
violated.  The Bar did not plead the required mental state and it
was not required to do so.  BR 4.1; see In re Kluge, 332 Or 251,
262, 27 P3d 108 (2001) (so stating).  The record does not
indicate why the trial panel applied the "willful" mental state,
but it apparently felt bound to do so. 
         By applying that mental state, the trial panel required
the Bar to prove a more egregious mental state than is required,
because this court has recognized that "willful" is synonymous
with "intentional."  See In re Morris, 326 Or 493, 501, 953 P2d
387 (1998) (observing that statute prohibiting lawyer from
"willfully" engaging in particular conduct required lawyer to act
intentionally to be subject to discipline under statute).  To
prove that the accused acted intentionally, the Bar would have
been required to show that the accused acted with "the conscious
objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result," rather
than with "the conscious awareness of the nature * * * of the
conduct but without the conscious objective * * * to accomplish a
particular result."  ABA Standards at 7 (emphasis added). 
Because the trial panel applied the incorrect mental state, we do
not know whether it would have concluded that the accused
knowingly made misrepresentations to the Bar.  We therefore must
make that determination ourselves.  
         The Bar argues that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(3)
by misrepresenting, during the Bar's investigation, that he had
visited with Thompson at times that Thompson claims that he did
not, that he had returned Thompson's article, and that he had
received Thompson's sentencing transcript.  For the reasons that
follow, we conclude that the accused misrepresented his receipt
of Thompson's sentencing transcript in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3).
         In response to the Bar's inquiries about the work that
the accused had performed on Thompson's case, the accused told
the Bar that he had received Thompson's sentencing transcript and
implied that he had used the transcript to prepare Thompson's
amended petition for PCR.  The accused had not in fact received
the transcript, and his representation that he did was false. 
The accused also made that representation in response to the
Bar's investigation into whether, among other things, the accused
had neglected Thompson's case.  If true, that representation
would have affected the Bar's evaluation of the accused's alleged
misconduct in his handling of Thompson's case.  The
representation about the article therefore was material. 
Furthermore, the accused's response to the Bar, after the Bar
confronted him with Thompson's letter, indicated that he was in
the habit of obtaining transcripts from the public defender's
office and that he had made a significant effort to obtain
Thompson's sentencing transcript, but was unsuccessful.  If the
accused went to such great lengths and was still unsuccessful in
obtaining the transcript, he likely would have remembered those
efforts when he gave his initial response to the Bar stating that
he, in fact, had received the transcript.  We conclude that, by
initially representing to the Bar that he had received Thompson's
sentencing transcript, the accused knew that he, in fact, had not
and that he knowingly indicated otherwise to the Bar.
         We conclude that the accused's initial statement to the
Bar that he had received Thompson's sentencing transcript
constitutes a misrepresentation in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3).  
         2.  DR 1-103(C)
         DR 1-103(C) provides that 
"[a] lawyer who is the subject of a disciplinary
investigation shall respond fully and truthfully to
inquiries from and comply with reasonable requests of a
tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or
act upon the conduct of lawyers, subject only to the
exercise of any applicable right or privilege."
That rule requires complete and truthful responses to reasonable
requests for information from the Bar.  A reasonable request
includes the Bar's reasonable deadlines for a response.  See In
re Schaffner, 323 Or 472, 477, 918 P2d 803 (1996) (concluding
lawyer violated rule by failing to respond timely to Bar
inquiries).  A lawyer cannot escape the reach of the rule when,
after initially failing to cooperate fully with the Bar's
investigation, he or she later cooperates fully in front of a
trial panel.  See In re Rhodes, 331 Or 231, 237, 13 P3d 512
(2000) (explaining that lawyer's eventual cooperation with local
professional responsibility committee did not absolve initial
failure to cooperate fully with Bar and committee).
          The accused's responses to the Bar's inquiries
sometimes were incomplete and, in at least one instance, false. 
The accused also responded to all the Bar's inquiries after the
Bar's stated deadlines for a reply had expired.  In each
instance, the Bar's deadline for a reply was a reasonable one. 
Contrary to the trial panel's conclusion, we conclude that the
accused violated DR 1-103(C) by failing to provide full,
truthful, and timely responses to the Bar's inquiries. 
IV.  SANCTION
         In determining the appropriate sanction, "we recognize
that the purpose of sanctions is not to penalize the accused, but
rather to protect the public and the integrity of the legal
profession."  In re Glass, 308 Or 297, 304, 779 P2d 612 (1989). 
This court relies on the American Bar Association's Standards for
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (amended 1992) (ABA Standards),
as well as its own cases, for guidance in determining the
appropriate sanction for lawyer misconduct.  See Eakin, 334 Or at
257.  The methodology that we follow is to weigh preliminarily: 
(1) the duty violated; (2) the accused's mental state; and (3)
the actual or potential injury.  Id.  "We then examine any
aggravating or mitigating circumstances to determine if the
sanction should be adjusted."  Id.  Finally, we review the
sanctions imposed in prior cases to determine the appropriate
sanction for the present case.  See id. (so stating).
A.  Preliminary Analysis
    1.  The Accused's Violation of DR 2-110(B)(2)
         In violating DR 2-110(B)(2), the accused failed in his
duty to withdraw from representing Schultz when it was obvious
that he could not pursue Schultz's objectives diligently and thus
that his continued representation of Schultz would result in a
violation of one or more of the disciplinary rules.  Schultz
suffered injury from the unnecessary delay that the accused's
neglect of his case caused.
         "[A] lawyer's mental state when engaging in particular
conduct may be intentional, knowing, or negligent."  Lawrence,
332 Or at 510.  A lawyer is negligent when he fails "to heed a
substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result will
follow, which failure is a deviation from the standard of care
that a reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation."  ABA
Standards at 7; In re Dugger, 334 Or 602, 623, 54 P3d 595 (2002). 
We conclude that the accused was negligent in failing to withdraw
from representing Schultz.  The ABA standards suggest that a
reprimand is the appropriate sanction for the accused's
misconduct under DR 2-110(B)(2).  See ABA Standard 4.43
(explaining that reprimand appropriate when lawyer not reasonably
diligent in representing client and failure to be diligent causes
potential injury to client). 
2.  The Accused's Violations of DR 6-101(B) and DR 1-102(A)(4)
         In violating DR 6-101(B) and DR 1-102(A)(4), the
accused neglected the Elder, Crescenzi, and Tompkins cases, which
led the trial court to dismiss them at various times.  The
dismissals caused the clients to pursue appeals that caused
delays in the proceedings.  The accused's neglect wasted both the
clients' and court's time and resources.  The accused thus failed
to fulfill his duties to his clients and to the legal system. We conclude that the accused's failures were the result
of negligence.  The accused's negligent conduct caused potential
injury to Elder, Tompkins, and Crescenzi's substantive interests. 
The accused's negligent conduct also caused actual injury to the
legal process because, avoidably, the trial court repeatedly
dismissed and reinstated his clients' cases.  The ABA Standards
suggest that a suspension is the appropriate sanction for the
accused's misconduct under DR 6-101(B) and that a reprimand is
the appropriate sanction for the accused's misconduct under DR
1.102(A)(4).  See ABA Standard 4.42 (explaining that suspension
appropriate when lawyer engages in pattern of neglect and causes
potential injury to client); ABA Standard 6.23 (explaining that
reprimand appropriate when lawyer negligently fails to comply
with court rules and causes interference with legal proceeding). 

    3.  The Accused's Violation of DR 9-101(C)(4)
         In violating DR 9-101(C)(4), the accused failed to
return Thompson's article and therefore failed in his duty to
ensure that, when asked to do so by a client, he promptly return
client property.  We conclude that the accused negligently failed
to return the article.  Thompson was injured when the accused
failed to return his property.  The ABA Standards suggest that a
reprimand is the appropriate sanction for the accused's
misconduct under DR 9-101(C)(4).  See ABA Standard 4.13
(explaining that reprimand appropriate when lawyer negligent in
dealing with client property and causes injury to client).
    4.  The Accused's Violation of DR 1-102(A)(3) 
         In violating DR 1-102(A)(3), the accused knowingly made
a false statement to the Bar regarding his receipt and review of
Thompson's transcript.  In making that statement, the accused
failed in his duty not to make misrepresentations to the Bar.  
         The Bar was injured because of the extra time and
effort that was required to investigate further the accused's
statements.  The legal profession was injured because a lawyer's
dishonesty undermines public trust in the profession.  The ABA
Standards suggest that a suspension is the appropriate sanction
for the accused's misconduct under DR 1-102(A)(3).  See ABA
Standard 7.2 (explaining that suspension appropriate when lawyer
knowingly engages in conduct that is violation of duty owed to
profession and causes injury or potential injury to legal
system).
    5.  The Accused's Violation of DR 1-103(C)
         In violating DR 1-103(C), the accused gave incomplete,
untruthful, and untimely responses to the Bar's inquiries.  He
did not fulfill his duty to respect the Bar's investigatory
process by properly responding to the Bar's reasonable requests
for information.  The accused knowingly submitted untimely,
incomplete responses to the Bar's inquiries.  He also knowingly
misled the Bar about his receipt of Thompson's transcript.  Both
the Bar and the legal profession were injured by the accused's
actions for the reasons stated above.  The ABA Standards suggest
that a suspension is the appropriate sanction for the accused's
misconduct under DR 1-103(C).  See ABA Standard 7.2 (explaining
that suspension appropriate when lawyer knowingly engages in
conduct that is violation of duty owed to profession and causes
injury or potential injury to the legal system).
B.  Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
         "[A]ggravating circumstances are any considerations or
factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline
to be imposed."  ABA Standard 9.21.  Here, three aggravating
circumstances are present.  
         First, the accused failed to do work on his cases and
allowed them to be dismissed repeatedly.  By so doing, he engaged
in a pattern of misconduct.  ABA Standard 9.22(c).  Second, the
accused committed multiple offenses in that there were several
victims of his misconduct.  ABA Standard 9.22(d).  Third, the
accused has been practicing law for 38 years and therefore has
substantial experience in the practice of law.  ABA Standard
9.22(i). 
         "[M]itigating circumstances are any considerations or
factors that may justify a reduction in the degree of discipline
to be imposed."   ABA Standard 9.31.  Some mitigating factors are
present.  
         First, the accused does not have a prior disciplinary
record.  ABA Standard 9.32(a).  Second the accused did not
exhibit a dishonest or selfish motive.  ABA Standard 9.32(b). 
Third, the accused suffered from recurrent depression and
experienced personal and emotional problems.  ABA Standard
9.32(c).  Fourth, both Nicholson's and Entelman's testimony
indicated that the accused has a reputation for doing very good
work for other employers and clients.  ABA Standard 9.32(g). 
Finally, the accused showed remorse at his hearing before the
trial panel.  ABA Standard 9.32(l).
C.  Oregon Cases
         Our preliminary analysis under the ABA Standards
supports imposing a reprimand or a suspension for the accused's
misconduct.  We now review this court's case law.
         In Gresham, 318 Or at 169, this court, guided primarily
by the ABA Standards, suspended a lawyer for 91 days when he
violated DR 6-101(B) and DR 1-102(A)(4) by neglecting a probate
matter and failing to follow through with assurances to the court
that he would close the estate.  In In re Spencer, 335 Or 71, 88,
58 P3d 228 (2002), this court suspended a lawyer for 60 days for,
among other violations, violating DR 9-101(C)(4) when the lawyer
had been only negligent in his handling of the client's property. 
In Schaffner, 323 Or at 481, this court explained that a 60-day
suspension was the appropriate sanction when a lawyer violated DR
1-103(C) after repeatedly failing to respond in a timely manner
to Bar inquiries.  In Glass, 308 Or at 305, this court suspended
a lawyer for 91 days after concluding that he had violated both
DR 1-102(A)(3) and DR 1-103(C) as the result of making
misrepresentations and failing to timely respond to Bar
inquiries.  
         This court's case law, however, also indicates that a
lengthy suspension is appropriate when a lawyer makes a
misrepresentation to the Bar.  In In re Devers, 328 Or 230, 239-40, 245, 974 P2d 191 (1999), this court disbarred a suspended
lawyer who violated several disciplinary rules, including making
a false statement in his reinstatement application.  That case is
distinguishable from this one, however, because the lawyer had
made several misrepresentations and had practiced law while his
license to practice was suspended.  Id. at 239-40.  In In re
Wyllie, 327 Or 175, 180-81, 184, 957 P2d 1222 (1998), this court
suspended a lawyer for two years when he was untruthful about
reporting earned MCLE credits to the Bar.  That case also is
distinguishable from this one, because the lawyer had made
several misrepresentations.  He not only lied about the MCLE
credits when he initially reported them to the Bar, but he also
continued to lie about the credits during the Bar's investigation
and at the trial panel hearing.  Id. at 180-81.
D.  Appropriate Sanction
         Based on the foregoing review of the ABA Standards and
this court's case law, we conclude that a suspension is the
appropriate sanction for the accused's violations of DR 2-110(B)(2), DR 6-101(B), DR 1-102(A)(4), DR 9-101(C)(4), DR 1-102(A)(3), and DR 1-103(C).  We must now determine the length of
the suspension.  In doing so, we are guided both by the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances as well as by the
foregoing cases.   
         We find significant the accused's extensive experience
practicing law, his pattern of misconduct, and the number of
violations that he committed.  The accused has been practicing
law for 38 years and has enough experience to understand how to
avoid dilatory conduct and how his failures to act potentially
could have impacted his clients' interests.  We also conclude,
however, that the accused's lack of a prior disciplinary record
and his good reputation weigh in his favor.  The testimony of
Nicholson and Entelman suggests that the accused generally
represents his clients in a highly professional and competent
manner.  While inexcusable, we think that the accused's
neglectful handling of the various client matters in this case
resulted primarily from inexperience and an overwhelming
caseload.
         The accused has emphasized the impact that his mother's
illness and subsequent death had on his ability to do his work. 
The illness and death of a parent can be one of life's most
traumatic events.  However, in this case, we do not think that
the accused's mother's illness played a significant causal role
in the accused's misconduct.  The accused already had been
neglecting his cases before his mother became ill and the record
does not reveal a significant nexus between the illness and the
accused's continuing neglectful conduct.  Thus, we do not assign
substantial weight to that mitigating factor.  
         This court's cases support imposing a 90-day suspension
as the appropriate sanction.  In light of the weight that we give
both the existing aggravating and mitigating factors, we conclude
that a 90-day suspension is appropriate in this case.  
         The accused is suspended from the practice of law for
90 days, effective 60 days from the date of the filing of this
decision. 
1. The Bar also charged Ehmann with multiple disciplinary
rule violations.  The Bar's allegations regarding the handling of
the Elder, Schultz, Crescenzi, and Tompkins matters were common
to both the accused and Ehmann.  The Bar also charged Ehmann with
misconduct in two other matters.  The trial panel tried the
accused and Ehmann together and disbarred Ehmann.  Ehmann
subsequently submitted, and this court accepted, a Form B
resignation.  
2. The accused read a Continuing Legal Education
publication on PCR cases, and Ehmann offered to provide the
accused with other necessary guidance in handling such cases.
3. The record reveals that, in Umatilla County, prisoners
typically initiate PCR proceedings by filing preprinted forms
that the prison makes available to them.  The prisoners fill out
the forms and file them with the trial court.  The trial court
then appoints a lawyer to represent the prisoner.  Ordinarily,
that lawyer files an amended petition for PCR within 30 days of
the appointment.  
4. The accused testified that the practice was to "just
show[] up and [say] to the judge, well, I’m going to be handling
this case."
5. Jones, the Trial Court Administrator for the Sixth
Judicial District, which includes Umatilla County, testified
that, if there is no action on a case for 30 days, his office
sends a notice of intent to dismiss.  The notices of intent to
dismiss gives the lawyer another 30 days to avoid that outcome. 
Jones also testified that the repeated dismissal and
reinstatement of PCR cases increases the workload of the
individuals who process the already high volume of PCR cases in
the Umatilla County Circuit Court.  Circuit Court Judge Murgo
also provided consistent testimony about that issue.
6. Ehmann and the accused had been friends for many years. 
Ehmann was aware that the accused took annual trips to Arizona
and agreed to cover the accused's cases while the accused was
away.   
7. Judge Murgo testified that the publication of notices
of intent to dismiss is common, but that actual dismissals are
rare because most lawyers take action to avoid that outcome.
8. The trial court sent the notices pursuant to UTCR
7.020, which requires the filing of a return or acceptance of
service on the defendant within 63 days of the filing of a
complaint.  If the plaintiff violates that requirement, the trial
court issues a notice of pending dismissal that gives the
plaintiff 28 days from the date of mailing to take action to
avoid dismissal.
9. Some time passed during the appeals, and the Court of
Appeals did not remand the cases to the trial court until late
1999.
10. Crescenzi thought that Ehmann was representing him and
wrote at least 11 letters addressed to Ehmann, two letters
addressed to "Ehmann and Worth," and one letter to the accused. 
In one letter, Crescenzi asked:  "Hello! Is anybody out there?" 
All the letters went unanswered. 
11. To facilitate its investigation, the Bar required the
accused to give the Bar the files that he maintained for each
client.
12. The accused testified before the trial panel that the
illness he experienced at the end of his vacation in late
February 1999 caused him to miss about two weeks of work.
13. The accused also exhibited negative feelings toward his
clients in some of his responses to the Bar.  In one letter, he
stated that "[m]y license is in law, not babysitting."  In
another, he stated that a client's "dissatisfaction seems to be
more a matter of not having his hand held than anything else."
14. More specifically, in Elder's case, the accused cites
the eventual denial of post-conviction relief.  In Crescenzi's
case, he cites his lack of authorization to handle the case and
Ehmann's failures both to instruct the accused on the appropriate
procedures to withdraw as counsel and to reassign the case before
it was dismissed.  In Tompkins's case, the accused cites
Tompkins's decision to drop the case.
15. >BR 4.1 sets out the procedures for filing formal Bar
complaints and delineates the required substance of those
complaints.