Case Title: People v. Woods

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88198

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-10-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 88198-Agenda 34-May 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
								 VELTON L. WOODS, Appellant.
Opinion filed October 26, 2000.
	JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:
	Petitioner, Velton L. Woods, filed a petition in the circuit
court of Madison County requesting relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.
(West 1996)). The appellate court dismissed his petition as not
timely filed. 306 Ill. App. 3d 1144. The sole question presented is
whether the phrase "date of conviction," as it is used in section
122-1(c) of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West Supp. 1997)),
means the date that a final judgment including sentence was
entered, or the date that a plea, finding or verdict of guilty was
entered. We hold that the phrase has the former meaning and,
accordingly, reverse the appellate court.
BACKGROUND
	On July 26, 1994, petitioner's guilty plea to first degree
murder and armed robbery was entered by the circuit court. On
February 7, 1995, the circuit court sentenced petitioner to
concurrent terms of 45 years' imprisonment for murder and 20
years' imprisonment for armed robbery. The appellate court
affirmed petitioner's convictions and sentences on direct appeal on
March 25, 1997. No. 5-95-0230 (unpublished order pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 23).
	On August 7, 1997, petitioner mailed his post-conviction
petition to the circuit court, along with accompanying materials.
The circuit court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that it
was not timely filed and patently without merit.
	Petitioner appealed, arguing that he had filed his petition in a
timely manner, and that he had stated the gist of a constitutional
claim. The appellate court affirmed the summary dismissal of the
petition on the ground that it was not timely. The appellate court
held that, for purposes of section 122-1(c), the "date of
conviction" was the date of petitioner's guilty plea. Having found
the timeliness issue dispositive, the appellate court did not address
the merits of the petition.


ANALYSIS


	Petitioner contends that his post-conviction petition was
timely filed. According to petitioner, as used in section 122-1(c)
of the Act, the phrase "date of conviction" means the date of his
sentence, not the date of his guilty plea.
	Section 122-1(c) sets forth the time limit within which a post-conviction petition must be filed, as follows:
			"No proceedings under this Article shall be commenced
more than 6 months after the denial of a petition for leave
to appeal or the date for filing such a petition if none is
filed or more than 45 days after the defendant files his or
her brief in the appeal of the sentence before the Illinois
Supreme Court (or more than 45 days after the deadline
for the filing of the defendant's brief with the Illinois
Supreme Court if no brief is filed) or 3 years from the
date of conviction, whichever is sooner, unless the
petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due
to his or her culpable negligence." (Emphasis added.) 725
ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West Supp. 1997).
The parties agree that, of the various dates provided for by section
122-1(c), post-conviction proceedings must have been
commenced by whichever date was sooner, i.e., the earliest date.
	The parties also agree on how to calculate the first time period
under the statute. Six months from the due date for the filing of
petitioner's petition for leave to appeal with this court was October
15, 1997. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(b).
	The parties' disagreement concerns how to calculate the last
time period, which is "3 years from the date of conviction." If, as
petitioner argues, "date of conviction" means the date that final
judgment including sentence was entered, the filing date would be
February 7, 1998, three years from the date of entry of petitioner's
sentence. If, on the other hand, "date of conviction" means the date
on which an adjudication of guilt was entered, as the State
contends, the filing date would be July 26, 1997, three years from
the date of entry of his guilty plea.
	Petitioner here mailed his post-conviction petition on August
7, 1997. Petitioner asserts that the earliest date under section
122-1(c) was October 15, 1997, and, thus, that his petition was
timely filed. In contrast, the State claims that the petition was not
timely filed, because the earliest date was July 26, 1997. We agree
with petitioner.
	The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and
give effect to the true intent of the legislature. Paris v. Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177 (1997). The best evidence of legislative intent is
the language used in the statute itself, which must be given its
plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Tucker, 167 Ill. 2d 431, 435
(1995). In construing a statute, a court may also consider the
reason and necessity for the law, the evils to be remedied, and the
objects and purposes to be obtained. People v. Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d 310, 316 (1985). The interpretation of a statute is a question of
law, for which we conduct de novo review. People v. Robinson,
172 Ill. 2d 452, 457 (1996).
	The State concedes that the word "conviction" is ambiguous.
We agree with this concession. Depending on the context, the
word "conviction" can be reasonably construed to mean the date
of sentence, or the date on which an adjudication of guilt was
entered. For example, in People v. Robinson, 89 Ill. 2d 469 (1982),
this court equated the date of conviction with the date of
sentencing. At issue was the interpretation of section
5-5-3.2(b)(1) of the Unified Code of Corrections, which allowed
extended-term sentencing when " 'a defendant is convicted of any
felony, after having been previously convicted in Illinois of the
same or greater class felony, within 10 years.' " Robinson, 89 Ill. 2d  at 472, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 38, par.
1005-5-3.2(b)(1). This court held that, for purposes of
determining when the 10-year period began to run, "the date of a
conviction is the date of entry of the sentencing order." Robinson,
89 Ill. 2d  at 477. This holding was recently followed in People v.
Lemons, 191 Ill. 2d 155, 159 (2000). On the other hand, in People
v. Franklin, 135 Ill. 2d 78, 105-07 (1990), this court held that, for
purposes of the multiple-murder death eligibility factor, a
defendant is "convicted" once a court enters judgment on a guilty
verdict. Therefore, given this ambiguity, we must look to other
aids of construction in order to interpret "conviction" for purposes
of section 122-1(c) of the Act.
	The Act contains no definition of the phrase "date of
conviction" or the term "conviction." See 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et
seq. (West 1996). The Act is part of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963 (the Code) (725 ILCS 5/100-1 et seq. (West
1996)). Although the Code defines several words and phrases, it
does not define the term "conviction." See 725 ILCS 5/100-1 et
seq. (West 1996). Nonetheless, the Code instructs that a word with
no definition may be given the meaning ascribed to it in article 2
of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/2-.5 et seq. (West
1996)). 725 ILCS 5/102-2 (West 1996). That article defines the
term "[c]onviction" as "a judgment of conviction or sentence
entered upon a plea of guilty or upon a verdict or finding of guilty
of an offense, rendered by a legally constituted jury or by a court
of competent jurisdiction authorized to try the case without a
jury." (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/2-5 (West 1996). In
addition, the Code defines the term "[j]udgment" as "an
adjudication by the court that the defendant is guilty or not guilty
and if the adjudication is that the defendant is guilty it includes the
sentence pronounced by the court." (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS
5/102-14 (West 1996). These statutory definitions support the
view that, for purposes of section 122-1(c) of the Act, "date of
conviction" means the date that sentence was entered, because that
date includes the sentence pronounced by the court.
	More importantly, equating "conviction" in section 122-1(c)
with the date of sentence is consistent with the purposes
underlying the Post-Conviction Hearing Act. The Act is intended
to provide a remedy for constitutional violations that occur at trial
or sentencing. See People v. Brisbon, 164 Ill. 2d 236, 242, 245-58
(1995). The Act thus contemplates that a petitioner will raise in
one post-conviction petition all constitutional issues (see People
v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 273 (1992)), whether they relate to trial
or sentencing (see Brisbon, 164 Ill. 2d  at 242, 245-58).
	In conclusion, we hold that, for purposes of section 122-1(c)
of the Act, "date of conviction" means the date that final judgment
including sentence was entered. To the extent that the decisions in
People v. Perry, 293 Ill. App. 3d 113 (1997), and People v.
McClain, 292 Ill. App. 3d 185 (1997), suggest that "date of
conviction" means the date that a verdict or finding of guilty was
entered, those decisions are hereby overruled.
	As a final matter, both petitioner and the State request that we
remand this matter to the appellate court for consideration of any
issues that were raised but which the appellate court did not reach
as a result of its holding that the petition was not timely. This
request is granted. See People v. Lowery, 178 Ill. 2d 462, 473
(1997).

CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
is reversed. The cause is remanded to the appellate court with
directions.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
cause remanded with directions.