Case Title: State ex rel. Glunt Indus., Inc. v. Indus. Comm'n

Citation: 2012-Ohio-2125

Docket Number: 2010-1948

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-05-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Glunt Industries, Inc. v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-2125.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-2125 
THE STATE EX REL. GLUNT INDUSTRIES, INC., APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State ex rel. Glunt Industries, Inc. v. Indus. Comm.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-2125.] 
Workers’ compensation—Violation of specific safety requirement—Ohio 
Adm.Code 4123:1-5-23(A) applies when “equipment to be worked on” 
has not been isolated from all possible sources of electricity or is not 
properly grounded—Claimant’s failure to request required safety 
equipment is no defense to failure to provide it. 
(No. 2010-1948—Submitted March 20, 2012—Decided May 16, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 09AP-260,  
2010-Ohio-4600. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellee, Thomas E. Hamrick II, has alleged that his employer, 
appellant Glunt Industries, Inc., committed a violation of a specific safety 
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requirement (“VSSR”).  The requirement in question directs employers to supply 
protective apparatus to employees working on specified electrical equipment.  
Hamrick asserts that this violation proximately caused his industrial injury, and he 
now seeks additional workers’ compensation benefits for that purported violation. 
{¶ 2} On April 19, 2006, Glunt experienced a plant-wide power failure, 
and Hamrick, an electrician, alleges that he was told to investigate.  Hamrick went 
first to the plant’s main electrical breaker cabinet.  It is undisputed that he was not 
using or wearing any electrical safety equipment. 
{¶ 3} The main breaker cabinet housed two separate breakers, each with 
a separate cover panel that had to be removed in order to access the circuitry 
inside.  The right side of the breaker had 440/480 volts and the left side, 4,160.  
Hamrick denied that the cabinet had high-voltage warning signs or signs 
specifying the voltage.  Hamrick knew that the voltage on the left side was higher 
than on the right, but he did not know by how much. 
{¶ 4} While Hamrick was standing in front of the cabinet, it exploded 
and he was seriously injured.  The inquiry that followed focused heavily on 
whether Hamrick had accessed the higher-voltage left side of the breaker 
cabinet—an action that Glunt claimed was forbidden by company policy.  
Physical evidence established that the higher-voltage left side of the cabinet was 
damaged, but it did not conclusively establish that Hamrick had opened the 
cabinet on that side.  Glunt’s safety manual, for example, indicated that when two 
unequal circuits were adjacent, a minor shock from the lower-voltage side could 
rebound into the higher circuit and cause an explosion. 
{¶ 5} Hamrick’s memory of events is inconsistent, due at least in part to 
the massive head trauma he sustained.  Hamrick’s earliest and most detailed 
statement of record indicates that he opened the cabinet’s higher-voltage left side 
and inadvertently crossed some wires.  A later affidavit disavowed any memory 
January Term, 2012 
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of his actions just before the explosion.  Still later, Hamrick testified that he was 
certain that he had never opened the left panel, only the right. 
{¶ 6} Hamrick’s VSSR application was heard by a staff hearing officer 
(“SHO”) for appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio.  At issue was Ohio 
Adm.Code 4123:1-5-23(A): 
 
Unless the electrical conductors or equipment to be worked 
on are isolated from all possible sources of voltage or are 
effectively grounded, the employer shall provide protective 
equipment approved for the voltage involved, such as rubber 
gloves with protectors, rubber sleeves, hot line tools, line hose, line 
guards, insulator hoods, blankets, and access boards. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  
{¶ 7} Glunt admitted that with the possible exception of safety gloves, it 
had not provided Hamrick with the safety equipment required by Ohio Adm.Code 
4123:1-5-23(A).  Glunt attempted to excuse that failure by arguing that the safety 
requirement did not apply.  It denied that the main breaker cabinet was 
“equipment to be worked on” within the meaning of Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-
23(A), claiming that company policy prohibited any employee—including 
Hamrick—from working on equipment exceeding 440/480 volts.  According to 
Glunt, Hamrick had been negligent in accessing the main breaker—a claim that, if 
true, might shield Glunt from VSSR liability. 
{¶ 8} Glunt additionally tried to disavow a causal relationship between 
the absence of safety equipment and Hamrick’s injuries.  Glunt argued that it 
would have provided safety equipment if Hamrick had asked for it, and 
speculated that even if the equipment had been provided, Hamrick would not have 
used it. 
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{¶ 9} The SHO granted Hamrick’s VSSR application after first 
determining that Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-23(A) applied.  The hearing officer 
rejected Glunt’s contention that the main breaker was not “equipment to be 
worked on,” based on his belief that Glunt had specifically ordered Hamrick to 
check that breaker on the date of injury. 
{¶ 10} In finding that the provision had been violated, the SHO stressed 
that Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-23(A) imposed a clear duty upon Glunt to provide 
appropriate safety gear that was not contingent upon the employee requesting the 
gear.  Glunt’s noncompliance, in turn, precluded it from asserting claimant 
negligence as a defense.  Ultimately, the SHO concluded that Glunt’s violation 
was the proximate cause of Hamrick’s injuries, and awarded the additional 
compensation requested. 
{¶ 11} After the commission denied reconsideration, Glunt filed a 
complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, alleging that 
the commission had abused its discretion in finding a VSSR.  The court of appeals 
disagreed and denied the writ, prompting Glunt’s appeal to this court as of right. 
{¶ 12} A VSSR award has been characterized as a penalty.  State ex rel. 
Burton v. Indus. Comm., 46 Ohio St.3d 170, 172, 545 N.E.2d 1216 (1989). Thus, 
the specific safety regulation must be strictly construed in the employer’s favor, 
and all reasonable doubts concerning its applicability must be resolved in the 
employer’s favor.  Id. 
{¶ 13} Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-23(A) applies when the “equipment to 
be worked on” has not been isolated from all possible sources of electricity or is 
not effectively grounded.  Glunt has argued that the main breaker was not 
equipment to be worked on because company policy prohibited employees from 
working on it.  The SHO rejected this proposition after he concluded that a Glunt 
supervisor had ordered Hamrick to investigate the main breaker on the date of 
January Term, 2012 
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injury.  There is, however, no evidence supporting this finding.  Glunt perceives 
this error to be fatal. We disagree. 
{¶ 14} Glunt believes that Hamrick caused the explosion by opening the 
higher-voltage left breaker panel.  This prompted considerable debate at the 
hearing as to whether Hamrick was authorized to work on circuitry over 440/480 
volts.  No one disputes, however, that Hamrick was permitted to service 
equipment with a voltage of 440/480 or below, which would include the main 
breaker’s right-side circuit.  This alone negates Glunt’s claim that Hamrick’s mere 
presence at the main breaker cabinet was unauthorized.  The evidence, moreover, 
suggests at least two possible causes for the explosion that implicate the cabinet’s 
lower-voltage right side—the side Hamrick was unquestionably authorized to 
service. 
{¶ 15} We find that Glunt’s main breaker cabinet was “equipment to be 
worked on” that was covered by Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-23(A).  We 
additionally find that Glunt did not satisfy the requirement because it did not 
supply Hamrick with “protective equipment approved for the voltage involved.”  
Glunt’s claim that Hamrick could have requested safety equipment fails for the 
reason stated by the SHO.  Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-23(A) imposes a clear duty 
on the employer to supply safety equipment that is not contingent upon employee 
request. 
{¶ 16} Glunt also argues that the absence of safety equipment did not 
proximately cause Hamrick’s injury because even if it had been available, 
Hamrick would not have used it.  Glunt bases this assertion on Hamrick’s 
statement that he did not need any safety equipment for the task he was 
performing when he was injured.  Glunt’s statement, however, is only conjecture 
given Hamrick’s necessary proximity to a 4,160-volt circuit, and it goes less to 
proximate cause than it does to the defense of unilateral claimant negligence.  
This defense, however, is available only if the employer first complies with the 
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applicable safety requirement.  Compare State ex rel. Frank Brown & Sons, Inc. 
v. Indus. Comm., 37 Ohio St.3d 162, 524 N.E.2d 482 (1988) (award denied 
because employer fully complied with specific safety requirement, and claimant’s 
injury was caused by his own negligence).  Glunt cannot take advantage of this 
defense since it did not satisfy Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-23(A). 
{¶ 17} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Anne Marie Sferra, and Jennifer A. Flint, for 
appellant. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Charissa D. Payer, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
Harrington, Hoppe & Mitchell, Ltd., Kevin P. Murphy, and Matthew  G. 
Vansuch, for appellee Hamrick. 
______________________