Case Title: Lily Salm v. Mark S. Moses, D.D.S.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2009-10-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This memorandum is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 125  
Lily Salm,
            Appellant,
        v.
Mark S. Moses, D.D.S.,
            Respondent.
Gary Greenwald, for appellant.
Caryn Lilling, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM:
The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed,
with costs.
Plaintiff commenced this dental malpractice action
against defendant based on his allegedly negligent failure to
repair an oral fistula.  At trial, defendant moved in limine to
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No. 125
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preclude plaintiff from cross-examining defendant's expert
regarding the fact that he and defendant were both shareholders
of and insured by the same dental malpractice insurance company,
OMS National Insurance Company (OMSNIC).  Plaintiff opposed the
motion, but did not request a voir dire of the expert to inquire
into his connection to OMSNIC.  After a colloquy with counsel,
Supreme Court granted the motion, finding that the probative
value of the inquiry would be outweighed by the prejudicial
effect of having defendant's insurance coverage revealed to the
jury.  Upon plaintiff's appeal following a jury verdict in favor
of defendant, the Appellate Division affirmed (57 AD3d 370 [1st
Dept 2008]).  We granted plaintiff leave to appeal.
Although cross-examination is a matter of right
(see Matter of Friedel v Board of Regents of Univ. of State of
N.Y., 296 NY 347, 352 [1947]), it is well settled that its scope
and manner are left to the sound discretion of the trial court
(see Bernstein v Bodean, 53 NY2d 520, 529 [1981]; Feldsberg v
Nitschke, 49 NY2d 636, 643 [1980], rearg denied 50 NY2d 1059
[1980]).  Therefore, absent an abuse of discretion, a trial
court's determination is beyond our review.
Evidence that a defendant carries liability insurance
is generally inadmissible (see Leotta v Plessinger, 8 NY2d 449,
461 [1960], rearg denied 9 NY2d 688 [1961]; Simpson v Foundation
Co., 201 NY 479, 490 [1911]).  The rationale underlying this rule
is twofold.  First, "it might make it much easier to find an
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adverse verdict if the jury understood that an insurance company
would be compelled to pay the verdict" (Loughlin v Brassil, 187
NY 128, 135 [1907]).  Second, evidence of liability insurance
injects a collateral issue into the trial that is not relevant as
to whether the insured acted negligently.  Although we have
acknowledged that liability insurance has increasingly become
more prevalent and that, consequently, jurors are now more likely
to be aware of the possibility of insurance coverage, we have
continued to recognize the potential for prejudice (see Oltarsh v
Aetna Ins. Co., 15 NY2d 111, 118-119 [1965]; see also Barker and
Alexander, Evidence in New York State and Federal Courts § 4:63,
at 260-261 [5 West's NY Prac Series 2001] ["Because the prejudice
quotient is obvious, the rule barring such evidence is one of the
least controversial in the law of evidence"]).
The rule, however, is not absolute.  If the evidence is
relevant to a material issue in the trial, it may be admissible
notwithstanding the resulting prejudice of divulging the
existence of insurance to the jury.  For example, we have held
that evidence that a defendant insured a premises is relevant to
demonstrate ownership or control over it (see Leotta, 8 NY2d at
462).  Likewise, it was proper to allow cross-examination of a
physician regarding the fact that the defendant's insurance
company retained him to examine the plaintiff in order to show
bias or interest on the part of the witness (see Di Tommaso v
Syracuse Univ., 172 App Div 34, 37 [4th Dept 1916], affd without
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No. 125
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opn 218 NY 640 [1916]).
Here, we perceive no abuse of discretion in Supreme
Court's evidentiary ruling.  Such evidence may be excluded if the
trial court finds that the risk of confusion or prejudice
outweighs the advantage in receiving it (see Kish v Board of
Educ. of City of N.Y., 76 NY2d 379, 384-385 [1990]).  In this
case, plaintiff speculated during the colloquy that a verdict in
defendant's favor could result in a $100 benefit -- at the time
of the expert's death, disability or retirement -- based on the
expert's shareholder status in OMSNIC.  The trial court's finding
that any such financial interest was likely "illusory" and that
the possibility of bias was attenuated was reasonable on this
record.  Absent a more substantial connection to the insurance
company -- or at least something greater than a de minimis
monetary interest in the carrier's exposure -- the court did not
engage in an abuse of discretion in precluding the testimony.  We
note that a voir dire of an expert outside the presence of the
jury can better aid the court in exploring the potential for
bias.  
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Salm v Moses
No. 125
PIGOTT, J. (concurring):
I concur with the majority's conclusion but write
separately because, in my view, courts should no longer treat
insurance coverage as the third rail of trial practice such that
it can neither be mentioned, even incidentally, nor be the basis
of appropriate inquiry as to possible bias, as in the ruling
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here.  It is routine -- even statutory -- that jurors be asked if
they are "a shareholder, stockholder, director, officer or
employee . . . in any insurance company issuing policies for
protection against liability for damages for injury to person or
property" (CPLR 4110 [a]).  The reason for the question is
obvious.  Someone who is so situated may have a tendency to find
for a defendant even though, according to the way we conduct our
trials, insurance may never be mentioned again.  
Enter the defendant in this case, who by way of a
motion in limine, sought to prevent the jury from learning that
defendant's expert suffers the very disability that would have
subjected them to a challenge to the favor - that he owns stock
in a company that writes liability insurance.  In fact, he owns
stock in the very insurance company that will be required to pay
any judgment rendered against the defendant in this case.  The
jury should be made aware of that fact.  To keep this information
from them means they are arriving at a verdict without all the
material facts before them - something every court seeks to
prevent. 
It is common knowledge that most defendants carry
insurance.  Indeed, most prospective jurors are cognizant of the
significant role in litigation that liability insurance plays, be
it business, homeowner's or automobile insurance (see, e.g.,
Oltarsh v Aetna Ins. Co., 15 NY2d 111, 118 [1965] ["it is the
rare individual who today does not know that 'defendants in
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negligence cases are insured and that an insurance company and
its lawyer are defending'" (citation omitted)]). 
This is not to say that evidence of insurance should be
admitted as a matter of course; there must always be a legitimate
basis for its admission.  However, in my view, there are
appropriate instances when insurance evidence should be admitted
to establish a party's or a witness's bias or interest, and trial
courts should not shy away from admitting it if, after conducting
the appropriate balancing test, they think that its admission is
relevant under the circumstances.  The admission of such evidence
can be accompanied by a limiting instruction if the court
believes it appropriate.  Moreover, because trial courts have the
discretion to place limitations on the scope of the questioning
relative to such evidence, defendants can be assured that the
admission of such evidence will serve its intended, relevant
purpose of showing potential bias or interest without undue
prejudice to the defendant. 
Ordinarily, in a case such as the one before us, a
court should reserve decision on the motion until the expert
takes the stand and can be questioned, outside the presence of
the jury, about his interest in defendant's insurance company and
any possible bias.  Then a reasoned ruling could be made. Because
plaintiff did not request such an opportunity, under these facts,
I concur in the majority's decision to affirm.  
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No. 125
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*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order affirmed, with costs, in a memorandum.  Judges Graffeo,
Read, Smith and Jones concur.  Judge Pigott concurs in result in
an opinion in which Chief Judge Lippman and Judge Ciparick
concur. 
Decided October 22, 2009