Case Title: Julio Mora v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC94-421

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2002-01-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC94421
____________
JULIO MORA,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[January 24, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
We have on appeal judgments of conviction of first-degree murder and
attendant death sentences.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. 
We affirm the convictions but vacate the sentences and remand for a new penalty
phase.
BACKGROUND
A Broward County grand jury returned a three-count indictment charging Dr.
Julio Mora with the first-degree murder of Dr. Clarence L. Rudolph, the first-degree
murder of attorney Karen Starr Marx, and the attempted first-degree murder of
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attorney Maurice Hall.  A jury convicted Mora on all counts as indicted.
On May 27, 1994, Mora was the plaintiff in a sexual harassment suit against
his former employer, the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), and its
agent, Rudolph.  Rudolph was the project director for a division of the AARP. 
Mora acted as his own attorney, Hall represented Rudolph, and Marx represented
AARP.  Also present was court reporter Patricia Charelton, who subsequently
changed her last name to Grant.  The deposition was held at Coastal Reporting
court reporting agency located on the sixth floor of the Cumberland Building in
Broward County.
Prior to the deposition, Hall arranged the seating in the deposition room so
that Rudolph and Mora were physically separated as much as possible.  When
Mora arrived, Mora objected to the seating arrangement; however, Hall did not
allow for rearrangement.  The deposition began at approximately 10 a.m.
Because those being deposed spoke with foreign accents, Grant used a tape
recorder as well as her stenography machine.  Approximately thirty minutes into the
deposition, Mora announced that he had one more question.  Grant testified that
this announcement surprised her, so she looked up.  She saw Mora standing with a
gun in his hand.  The tape of the deposition reveals that Grant said, “No, no, no,
Dr. Mora, no.”  Grant testified that she saw Mora shoot Rudolph one time, then
1.  Marx was in her first trimester of pregnancy.
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Hall one time, and then Marx one time.  Then Mora began shooting them again. 
Grant then ran out of the room.  She turned and saw Mora lean over the table and
shoot Marx again.
Hall testified that he ran out of the conference room after being shot and hid. 
In fact, a bullet struck the door frame as Hall left the room.  At some point soon
thereafter, Mora left the conference room in pursuit of Hall.  Hall then wrestled the
jammed handgun away from Mora, and Brett Tannenbaum, owner of Coastal
Reporting, restrained Mora until the police arrived.
The tape Grant used reveals that ten shots were fired in a span of forty-eight
seconds.  Shots one through nine occurred in the first seventeen seconds, with the
last shot being fired thirty-one seconds later.  After the initial barrage of shots, the
tape reveals that Marx cried out, “Help me, help me, help me,” prior to the last
shot.  Paramedics took an unconscious Marx to Broward General Medical Center,
where she died on the operating table approximately two hours after being shot.
Dr. Nelson, the medical examiner, testified that Marx received four gunshot
wounds, one of which went through her pregnant uterus.1  Nelson testified that
Rudolph had four gunshot wounds, including one to the back of the head.  One of
the bullets may have caused two of the wounds.  Hall testified that he received two
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gunshot wounds, one to his abdomen and one to his shoulder.
Mora testified in his own defense.  He described a conspiracy against him
masterminded by Rudolph.  Mora testified that his apartment was repeatedly being
“gassed” with toxic gas at night by Rudolph and his associates and that he had
taken several pills that morning.  Mora described an incident where Rudolph’s
“associate,” an individual by the name of Wong Chung, shot out Mora’s tire the
day before the shootings.  In fact, law enforcement individuals found a shredded
tire in Mora’s trunk; however, there was no evidence that the tire had been shot. 
Mora testified that his actions were in self-defense because during the deposition, a
masked gunman, whom Mora would later believe to be Wong Chung, opened the
conference door and pointed a pistol equipped with a silencer at him.  Mora
testified that Hall threw a briefcase at his head, that Rudolph dove for the floor to
grab Mora’s gun, and that Marx turned to grab her purse as if she were attempting
to pull a gun.  Mora testified at that moment he recollected a memory from 1936 of
watching two brown-shirted Nazi soldiers kill two emaciated Jewish boys.
Prior to trial, the trial court conducted a competency hearing, after which the
trial court found Mora competent.  Jury selection began on April 7, 1997, with the
trial beginning on April 10.  There was disagreement between Mora and guilt phase
counsel Dennis Colleran over trial strategy.  Mora wanted to primarily pursue a self-
2.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).
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defense theory.  Colleran wanted to pursue an insanity defense.  Mora finally
consented to an insanity defense.  Witnesses for Mora described how for years
Mora lived in an abnormal way–Mora constantly was filing police reports alleging
that people were attempting to kill him, especially through gassings.
The jury began deliberating the morning of April 30, 1997, and returned its
verdict that evening.  The jury found Mora guilty on all counts.  The trial court
conducted a penalty hearing on Tuesday, May 27, 1997.  Mora represented himself
during the penalty hearing, as the trial court had previously allowed Mora to
discharge his penalty phase counsel, Kenneth Malnik.  The State introduced
additional portions of the court reporter’s tape but called no witnesses.  Mora
refused to present any evidence or argument.  The jury recommended death on
both counts of murder, each by a vote of eight to four.  The trial court appointed
Malnik as special court counsel to develop mitigation evidence.  The trial court
conducted a Spencer2 hearing on July 9 and 10, 1997, at which hearing Malnik
presented mitigation evidence.
On October 20, 1998, the trial court entertained further argument regarding
Mora’s competency, again finding Mora competent.  The next day, the trial court
sentenced Mora to death on both murder counts and sentenced him to a
3.  The trial court found that Mora:  (1) was under a delusional impression
that people were trying to hurt him–some weight; (2) was a good employee–some
weight; (3) had a difficult childhood–very little weight; (4) had long-standing
emotional problems–little weight; (5) had a history of mental illness in his
family–little weight; (6) possessed good characteristics–little weight; and (7) made
significant contributions to society–some weight.
4.  The trial court rejected the statutory mitigators:  (1) Mora’s extreme
mental or emotional disturbance; (2) Mora’s capacity to appreciate the criminality
of conduct or conform conduct to requirements of law; (3) Mora’s age; (4) the
victims’ participation in Mora’s conduct; and (5) that Mora had no significant
criminal history.
5.  The trial court rejected Mora’s claim that he acted with legal or moral
justification.
6.  Appellate counsel argues that the trial court erred by:  (1) finding the HAC
aggravator applied to Marx’s death; (2) rejecting the statutory mitigator of extreme
emotional or mental distress; (3) rejecting the statutory mitigator of capacity to
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or ability to conform his conduct to the
law; (4) not finding Mora’s lack of significant prior criminal history as a statutory
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consecutive sentence of life in prison for the attempted murder charge.  The trial
court found that the previous violent felony aggravator applied to both murders on
the basis of Mora’s contemporaneous convictions and that the heinous, atrocious,
or cruel aggravator (HAC) applied to the Marx murder.  The trial court found seven
nonstatutory mitigators3 and rejected five statutory mitigators4 and one nonstatutory
mitigator.5
Mora, through his appellate counsel, raises nine issues for our
consideration.6  We authorized Mora to file a pro se brief.7  In that pro se brief,
mitigator; (5) rejecting Mora’s age as a mitigator; (6) finding Mora competent to
stand trial and be sentenced; (7) allowing Mora to be the guilt phase co-counsel and
allowing him to address the jury; and (8) allowing Mora to discharge his penalty-
phase attorney.  Appellate counsel also argues that (9) cumulative error requires
reversal of the death sentence and that the death sentence is not proportionate.
7.  We authorized Mora to file a pro se brief by order dated January 31,
2000.  This authorization came before we issued our opinion in Davis v. State, 789
So. 2d 978, 979-80 (Fla. 2001), in which we held that “we will not accept pro se
filings in which there are claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel,
requests to dismiss appellate counsel, or which supplement bases for relief from
appellants on direct appeal of a death sentence.”  We address Mora’s pro se brief
in this opinion because we authorized Mora to file it prior to announcing Davis. 
We do not depart from our holding in Davis.
8.  Mora’s pro se arguments can be grouped into three general categories: 
(1) the State is withholding his legal files preventing him from fully briefing his
issues; (2) there is no competent, substantial evidence in the record to sustain his
convictions; and (3) Mora’s appellate counsel is ineffective.  We deny issues one
and three without prejudice to allow Mora to pursue these claims in a
postconviction proceeding if such an event becomes necessary.
9.  After oral argument in this case, we requested briefing with regard to
Mora’s purported request for an involuntary intoxication instruction during the jury
charge conference. 
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Mora raises three general issues.8  We also requested supplemental briefing on one
issue.9
GUILT PHASE ISSUES
Mora’s Competency
The trial court conducted an extensive competency hearing on March 20,
1997, and accepted testimony from Dr. Patsy Ceros-Livingston, Dr. Trudy Block-
10.  Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.210(b) provides that at least two
but no more than three experts will be appointed by the court to examine the
defendant.  Apparently, the trial court appointed Dr. Block-Garfield because of the
uncertainty as to whether Dr. Spencer would be able to participate due to personal
reasons.  As Dr. Spencer was available, the trial court took testimony from all four
experts.
11.  Dr. Spencer performed a competency evaluation on Mora approximately
fifteen months prior to the competency hearing.  Due to personal reasons, Dr.
Spencer was not able to perform another competency evaluation prior to the
competency hearing.  However, Dr. Spencer noted that he had on two recent
occasions observed Mora interact in court proceedings.  Dr. Spencer indicated that
he felt comfortable with his conclusion that Mora was competent based on these
additional observations.
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Garfield, Dr. John Spencer, and Dr. Thomas Macaluso.10  Dr. Ceros-Livingston
testified that Mora suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and was not competent to
stand trial.  She testified that Mora had a delusional belief system which influenced
how Mora viewed events.  Dr. Block-Garfield also indicated that Mora was very
manipulative, but she concluded that he was competent.  Dr. Spencer testified that
Mora met all of the competency criteria and therefore was competent to proceed to
trial.11  Dr. Spencer also indicated that Mora had the ability to appreciate humor. 
Dr. Macaluso indicated that while Mora satisfied many of the competency factors,
Mora was not competent because he could not testify relevantly or disclose
relevant facts to his attorneys.
Mora argues that the trial court abused its discretion in finding him
12.  As we reverse for a new penalty phase, we need not address Mora’s
argument that the trial court erred in not holding a competency hearing prior to
sentencing even though the trial court had appointed experts for a competency
evaluation.
-9-
competent by relying on the testimony of Drs. Block-Garfield and Spencer.  Mora
points out that he has a delusional belief system such that any rational person would
conclude from the record that Mora was not competent.  Mora further argues that
the trial court abused its discretion in finding Mora competent before the penalty
phase proceeding and sentencing.12  The State maintains that the trial court simply
resolved conflicting testimony among the experts and by doing so did not abuse its
discretion.
As we said in Hardy v. State, 716 So. 2d 761, 763-64 (Fla. 1998):
In determining whether a defendant is competent to stand trial,
the trial court must decide whether the defendant "has sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of
rational understanding–and whether he has a rational as well as a
factual understanding of the proceedings against him."  Dusky v.
United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960); see also § 916.12(1), Fla. Stat.
(1993); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.211(a)(1).  In situations where there is
conflicting expert testimony regarding the defendant's competency, it
is the trial court's responsibility to consider all the evidence relevant to
competency and resolve the factual dispute.  Hunter v. State, 660
So.2d 244, 247 (Fla.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1128 (1996); Watts
v. State, 593 So.2d 198, 202 (Fla.1992).  The trial court's competency
decision will be upheld absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.
Hunter, 660 So.2d at 247; Watts, 593 So.2d at 202.
The trial court entered an extensive six-page order finding Mora competent. 
-10-
In its written order, the trial court examined each factor enumerated in rule
3.211(a)(2).  The trial court observed that all of the experts generally agreed that
Mora met three of the five factors for competency as enumerated in the rule.  As to
the two factors in disagreement, the trial court wrote:
The Court heard conflicting evidence regarding Defendant’s
ability to disclose pertinent facts to counsel, and to testify relevantly. 
Dr. Garfield testified that during examination, Defendant had no
difficulty whatsoever in relating facts relevant to his case, including his
desires, needs and goals regarding his case.  Additionally, Dr. Spencer
testified that Defendant’s discussion of various topics in
chronologically correct detail showed that Defendant thus had the
capability to relate the details and pertinent facts of his own case in a
similarly organized fashion.
Dr. Livingston, however, testified that if Defendant was
delusional, his ability to relay facts relevant to his case may be
hindered.  Dr. Macaluso additionally testified that Defendant’s refusal
to accept the advice of counsel and proceed under an insanity defense
was evidence that the Defendant could not relate or communicate
rationally with his attorney, and was thus incompetent.
State v. Mora, No. 94-008906-CF10A (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct., order at 3-4, March 25,
1997).
While the experts disagreed with the ultimate conclusion concerning Mora’s
competency, the trial court resolved those conflicts in favor of finding Mora
competent.  As we find evidentiary support in the record supporting the trial
court’s finding, we find that the trial court’s finding was not unreasonable and that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion.  Thus, we do not disturb the trial court’s
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determination that Mora was competent to stand trial.
Mora as Co-counsel and Mora Addressing the Jury
Mora’s next argument on appeal consists of two subclaims.  The first
subclaim is that the trial court erred by granting Mora co-counsel status, and the
second subclaim is that the trial court further erred by allowing Mora to address the
jury during closing.
With regard to the first subclaim, Mora argues that there is no constitutional
right to hybrid representation and that Mora did not make an unequivocal request to
be his own attorney.  Therefore, according to Mora, the trial court abused its
discretion by offering to Mora the ability to become co-counsel even through there
was significant testimony that Mora had a mental disorder.
We agree with Mora that there is no constitutional right for hybrid
representation at trial.  See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984); State
v. Tait, 387 So. 2d 338, 340 (Fla. 1980).  But where a trial court allows a defendant
to act as co-counsel, such decision is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard.  See Bell v. State, 699 So. 2d 674, 677 (Fla. 1997).
In the instant case, Mora previously had indicated his general disapproval of
his counsel’s strategy and counsel’s conduct of the trial but had never made a clear
13.  The trial court conducted an exhaustive discussion with counsel and
Mora consistent with Hardwick v. State, 521 So. 2d 1071, 1074-75 (Fla. 1988)
(adopting the procedure required in Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256, 258-59 (Fla.
4th DCA 1973)), to inquire into Mora’s complaints that his trial counsel was
deficient.  The trial court found there was no reasonable cause to believe that
Colleran was rendering ineffective representation.  After the trial court advised
Mora that he was not entitled to another set of lawyers, Mora indicated that he did
not want to proceed pro se but wanted certain directions relating to his case to be
followed.
14.  Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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and unequivocal request to represent himself.13  The trial court granted Mora co-
counsel status after Mora made a clear request to become co-counsel.  The trial
court granted the request near the conclusion of the trial and after Mora testified. 
While the trial court did not conduct a contemporaneous Faretta14 inquiry, the trial
court had on several previous occasions found that Mora satisfied the elements of
Faretta.  Cf. Bell, 699 So. 2d at 677 (indicating that Faretta inquiry is not required in
trial court’s decision of whether to appoint defendant as co-counsel).  Under these
circumstances, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing
Mora to become co-counsel.  See id.
Similarly, Mora argues in the second subclaim that the trial court erred in
allowing Mora to address the jury during closing arguments after his counsel had
addressed the jury.  We likewise find no merit in the second subclaim.  A trial
court’s decision whether to allow a defendant who is represented by counsel to
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address the jury is subject to the abuse of discretion standard.  See State v. Tait,
387 So. 2d 338, 340 (Fla. 1980).  Even when the defendant acts as co-counsel, the
trial court’s decision as to whether the defendant may address the jury is reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard.  Cf. Davis v. State, 586 So. 2d 1038, 1041
(Fla. 1991), vacated on other grounds, 505 U.S. 1216 (1992).
Here, the trial court engaged Mora in an extensive colloquy before allowing
him to give a closing statement.  During that colloquy, the trial court asked Mora
what issues he was going to talk about, limited Mora to new issues not raised by
Dennis Colleran, and suggested to Mora again not to give a closing statement. 
Mora stated that his attorney had advised him not to give a closing argument.  In
this situation, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing
Mora to give a brief closing statement.
Involuntary Intoxication
Mora argues that he was entitled to an involuntary intoxication jury
instruction and cites to a line of cases from the Fourth District recognizing an
involuntary intoxication defense.  See Devers-Lopez v. State, 710 So. 2d 720 (Fla.
4th DCA 1998); Carter v. State, 710 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Brancaccio
v. State, 698 So. 2d 597 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Boswell v. State, 610 So. 2d 670
(Fla. 4th DCA 1992).  Mora argues that the gassing he received at the behest of
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Rudolph and the pills he took form the evidentiary predicate for the instruction. 
Mora, as trial co-counsel, specifically requested an involuntary intoxication
instruction during the jury charge conference.  While Mora did not reduce his
request to writing, the trial court specifically ruled that involuntary intoxication did
not exist.  Therefore, Mora argues that any written submission would have resulted
in the same ruling, so that a written request was not needed to preserve this issue.
The State argues that Mora failed to preserve this issue by not submitting a
proposed instruction in writing.  Alternatively, the State argues that Mora was not
entitled to such an instruction because there was no evidence in the record linking
the gassing received early in the morning to his actions later in the day.  The State
also points out that Mora’s knowledge of repeated gassings prevents a conclusion
that Mora’s consumption of the alleged gas was involuntary.  In any event, the
State argues the trial court’s failure to so instruct the jury was harmless.
Mora testified that Rudolph had gassed Mora in Mora’s apartment the night
before the shooting as Rudolph had done on previous nights.  Unlike previous
nights, the gas used by Rudolph that night was different.  Mora testified that this
new gas was chlorofluorocarbon, more commonly known as Freon 12, a
refrigerant.  He testified that the gas caused him to pass out but that the gassing
ceased about 2:30 a.m.  At 3:30 a.m., Mora went to the bathroom, vomited, and
15.  The record also indicates that several of the mental health professionals
who testified in the trial indicated that Mora told them that he had taken several of
these pills that morning.
16.  Mora went to the sheriff’s department to collect an incident report he
previously filed.
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took a cold shower.  At 4 to 4:30 a.m., Mora dressed.  He also testified that
Rudolph called him several times on the phone and threatened him.
Mora also testified that at some unspecified time in the morning he took
several drugs.15  Mora testified that he took Percodan, Darvocet, and Tylenol 3 for
pain.  He took two muscle relaxants, Inderal and Flexeril.  Mora also claims to have
taken Xanax for depression.  There is no evidence in the record that these drugs
were prescribed for Mora, that he took the correct prescribed dosages, or that he
was allowed to mix these prescriptions.  Mora further testified that he called a taxi
at 9 a.m. to drive him to the sheriff’s department16 and then to the deposition
because he was “like a zombie” that morning because he “was totally drugged.”
We agree with the State that Mora was not entitled to an involuntary
intoxication instruction.  In so deciding, we do not need to reach the issue of
whether the defense of involuntary intoxication exists in Florida.  But see Devers-
Lopez, 710 So. 2d at 721; Carter, 710 So. 2d at 113; Brancaccio, 698 So. 2d at
600; Boswell, 610 So. 2d at 673.  Assuming, without deciding, that the defense of
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involuntary intoxication does exist in Florida, we find that under the circumstances,
Mora was not entitled to such a jury instruction.
Florida law is clear that a defendant is entitled to have a jury instruction on
any valid defense supported by the evidence.  See State v. Weller, 590 So. 2d 923,
927-28 (Fla. 1991).  The jury and not the trial judge determines whether the
evidence supports the defendant’s contention.  See id.  However, a trial judge is
not required to give an instruction where there is no nexus between the evidence in
the record and the requested instruction.  See Gardner v. State, 480 So. 2d 91, 92-
93 (Fla. 1985) (finding no error in refusal to give voluntary intoxication instruction
where no evidence that defendant was intoxicated at time of offense or the amount
of alcohol consumed prior to offense); Linehan v. State, 476 So. 2d 1262, 1264
(Fla. 1985) (noting evidence of alcohol consumption by itself insufficient to
support giving voluntary intoxication instruction); Jacobs v. State, 396 So. 2d
1113, 1115 (Fla. 1981) (finding no voluntary intoxication instruction warranted
when there was no evidence in record of amount of alcohol consumed or that
defendant was intoxicated).
The record of this case reveals an absence of evidence which would indicate
that Mora was intoxicated at the time of the shootings.  In fact, those who observed
Mora that morning indicated that he was able to successfully conduct himself and
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that he was not acting abnormally.  The taxi driver testified that Mora was “a
perfect gentleman,” was not nervous, and engaged him in a conversation.  Ana
Benitez, a community service aide stationed at the sheriff’s office, testified that
Mora came in early that morning and asked for the location of the records
department and the bathroom.  Hall testified that Mora had an “appropriate
demeanor” during the deposition and, although Mora was not skilled as a lawyer,
Mora’s performance was consistent with that of other pro se litigants Hall had seen. 
Grant testified that Mora was able to conduct the deposition, and it was not out of
the norm of depositions.  The court reporter’s tape reveals that Mora was able to
articulate responsive deposition questions.  The first officer on the scene, Officer
Hoelbrandt, testified that the Mora was calm and that Mora told him to “be fair.”
In the instant case, there is no evidence suggesting that Mora was under the
influence of any gases or drugs at the time of the shootings.  As there was no
evidentiary nexus, Mora was not entitled to an involuntary intoxication instruction. 
Cf. Gardner v. State, 480 So. 2d at 92-93; Linehan, 476 So. 2d at 1264; Jacobs,
396 So. 2d at 1115.
Competent, Substantial Evidence
Mora in his pro se brief makes a passing notation that he did not commit any
crimes.  We view this allegation as an argument that competent, substantial
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evidence does not exist in the record to sustain the convictions.  Even if Mora had
not raised this issue, we would have still reviewed the record under our independent
duty to ensure the sufficiency of the evidence.  See, e.g., Ferguson v. State, 417
So. 2d 639, 642 (Fla. 1982).  In this case, there is competent, substantial evidence
to sustain the convictions.  Two eyewitnesses testified that Mora shot Rudolph,
Marx, and Hall.  Further, Grant’s tape indicates that she yelled “no, no, no, Dr.
Mora, no” just as the gun shots began.  Mora himself testified that he fired the
pistol, although in self-defense.  The trial judge instructed the jury on self-defense,
which the jury rejected.
Accordingly, we affirm the two first-degree murder and the attempted murder
convictions.
PENALTY PHASE
Attorney Kenneth Malnik served as Mora’s penalty phase counsel with Mora
serving as co-counsel.  On Friday, May 23, 1997, four days before the penalty
phase was to begin, the trial court conducted a penalty phase jury charge
conference.  During that hearing, a significant disagreement arose between Malnik,
Mora, and the trial court over Malnik’s investigation of certain potential mitigating
evidence.  Specifically, Malnik wanted to contact Mora’s siblings in Spain to see if
any mitigation could be developed through them.  Mora specifically prohibited
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Malnik from doing so because Mora was afraid that his siblings would not be able
to handle learning of their brother’s first-degree murder conviction because his
siblings were quite elderly and weak.  Mora continually stated that he wanted Malnik
to continue to represent him, but he felt compelled to protect his family.
The trial court, applying our decision in Koon v. Dugger, 619 So. 2d 246
(Fla. 1993), refused to allow Mora to waive any possible mitigation without first
allowing Malnik to develop all possible mitigation.  The trial court thus construed
Koon as a prohibition against waiving any possible mitigation without an on-the-
record waiver of each possible mitigating factor after a full investigation of that
mitigation by counsel.  As a result of this construction, the trial court placed Mora
in a quandary:  either Mora would have to allow Malnik to contact Mora’s relatives,
or Mora would have to discharge Malnik with the knowledge that the trial court
would not appoint successor counsel.
The trial court, Malnik, and Mora engaged in an extensive colloquy over this
issue, but Mora initially did not ask to discharge counsel.  In fact, Mora in many
instances said he needed counsel’s assistance.  The trial court construed Mora’s
repeated statement that he wanted to protect his family as a request to represent
himself.  A Hardwick hearing was conducted, and the trial court found no
reasonable cause to believe that Malnik was providing ineffective assistance.  The
17.  The record indicates that the trial court did not conduct a proper Faretta
inquiry after conducting the Hardwick hearing.  The trial court did note that it
previously conducted a Faretta inquiry and had found Mora able to waive his
counsel.
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trial court further advised that it was not required to appoint successor counsel and
thereafter discharged Malnik, as Mora continually stated that he needed to protect
his family.17  Malnik was simultaneously appointed as Mora’s standby counsel.
The penalty phase occurred on Tuesday, May 27.  During this hearing, the
trial court revoked Mora’s ability to represent himself, finding Mora unable to do
so, and reappointed Malnik as penalty phase counsel.  The trial court instructed
Malnik to contact Mora’s siblings in Spain.  Mora vociferously refused to allow
Malnik to contact these relatives and chastised Malnik that Malnik could not take
direction from the trial court on how to prepare the case.  The trial court thereafter
discharged Malnik again.  At this point, Mora refused to participate further in the
penalty phase.  While Mora and Malnik both had witnesses available at the penalty
phase to testify to potential mitigation, Mora refused to call any witnesses or give a
closing argument.
Mora argues that the penalty phase was not reliable because of the confusion
over Mora’s continually changing status as co-counsel, then counsel, then
represented defendant, and finally counsel.  Mora contends that the trial court
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committed reversible error for its failure to conduct a Faretta inquiry, even though
the trial court had just a few moments previously found Mora incapable of serving
as counsel, and that Mora’s judgment and not the trial court’s should have
controlled with regard to whether certain mitigation would be presented.  For these
reasons, Mora contends that the death sentences should be vacated.
In response, the State argues that the trial court previously had undertaken
numerous Faretta inquiries and had made the requisite findings.  The trial court
repeatedly warned Mora of the dangers of self-representation and strongly urged
Mora not to discharge his counsel.  The State also argues that the trial court
correctly applied our decisions in Hardwick and Koon and that no reversal is
required.  While we are concerned about the lack of a contemporaneous Faretta
inquiry, we do not need to decide whether there was a Faretta violation in this
instance because we reverse the death sentences on the basis of Koon.
We agree that the sentences in this case should be reversed because we
conclude that the trial court misapplied our decision in Koon.  In Koon, the
defendant wished to waive all possible mitigation and had instructed his trial
counsel not to present any penalty phase evidence or testimony.  See Koon, 619
So. 2d at 249.  Penalty phase counsel was not ineffective under the circumstances
of that case because penalty phase counsel had conducted an investigation and
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argued mitigating evidence garnered during the trial phase.  See id. at 250.  To
address the situation where a defendant refuses to present mitigating evidence, we
adopted a four-prong test for a trial court to allow a waiver of mitigating evidence:
When a defendant, against his counsel’s advice, refuses to permit the
presentation of mitigating evidence in the penalty phase, counsel must
inform the court on the record of the defendant’s decision.  Counsel
must indicate whether, based on his investigation, he reasonably
believes there to be mitigating evidence that could be presented and
what that evidence would be.  The court should then require the
defendant to confirm on the record that his counsel has discussed
these matters with him, and despite counsel’s recommendation, he
wishes to waive presentation of penalty phase evidence.
Id. at 250.
We do not agree with the trial court’s application of our opinion in Koon,
which, under the facts of this case, resulted in Koon becoming a prohibition against
waiving any possible mitigation without counsel’s full investigation of all possible
mitigation.  We have emphasized that we established the Koon procedure so that
the record would adequately reflect a defendant’s knowing waiver of his or her
right to present mitigating evidence.  See Chandler v. State, 702 So. 2d 186, 199
(Fla. 1997); Allen v. State, 662 So. 2d 323, 328-29 (Fla. 1995); see also
Waterhouse v. State, 792 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 2001) (noting result of Koon decision
was for clear record of waiver of presentation of mitigating factors).  In Chandler,
we said:
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[O]ur primary reason for requiring this procedure was to ensure that a
defendant understood the importance of presenting mitigating
testimony, discussed these issues with counsel, and confirmed in open
court that he or she wished to waive presentation of mitigating
evidence.  Only then could the trial court, and this Court, be assured
that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived this
substantial and important right to show the jury why the death penalty
should not be imposed in his or her particular case.
702 So. 2d at 199.
The record in this case is abundantly clear that Mora desired to waive only a
portion of possible mitigating evidence.  Mora, who at the time of trial was in his
seventies and his siblings in their seventies and eighties, informed the trial court of
the reasons why he did not want to contact his siblings and indicated that there was
no mitigation to be had.  We conclude Mora was not requesting a waiver of other
mitigating evidence Malnik thought appropriate.  Mora was adequately advised of
his ability to present the mitigating evidence from his family members, and his
decision not to have Malnik disturb these relatives under the circumstances of this
case should have been respected.  Mora should not have been placed in the
untenable position of either having that investigation or not having counsel.
We find that the trial court’s application of our opinion in Koon was
erroneous, and therefore we reverse for a new penalty phase.  In the new penalty
phase, the trial court is to apply our decisions in Koon, Farr v. State, 656 So. 2d
18.  As we reverse for a new sentencing proceeding, we do not address the
other penalty phase issues.
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448 (Fla. 1995), and Muhammad v. State, 782 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 2001).
CONCLUSION18
Accordingly, we affirm the convictions, vacate the sentences, and remand to
the trial court for a new penalty phase in proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
The trial court shall appoint Mora counsel for the new penalty phase.  Of course,
Mora may discharge such counsel only if he is competent and after the trial court
conducts a proper Faretta inquiry and makes the requisite findings.  If Mora’s
competency is again challenged, the trial court shall conduct appropriate
proceedings under Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.210, 3.211, and 3.212.
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, PARIENTE, LEWIS and QUINCE, JJ.,
concur.
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in result only.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Broward County,
Paul Backman, Judge - Case No. 94-8906 CF 10 A
Gene Reibman, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
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for Appellant
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Marrett W. Hanna, Assistant Attorney
General, West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Appellee