Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V KALVIN RANDOLPH

Citation: 

Docket Number: 118078

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2002-07-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 11, 2002  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff,  
v  
Nos. 117750, 118078  
KALVIN RANDOLPH,  
Defendant.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
KELLY, J.  
On appeal from defendant's conviction for unarmed  
robbery, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment for  
insufficient evidence and remanded for entry of a conviction  
of larceny in a building.  242 Mich App 417; 619 NW2d 168  
(2000).  It provided that the prosecutor could retry defendant  
on the original unarmed robbery charge if it had additional  
evidence.  Both the prosecution and defendant appeal from that  
decision.  
We conclude that defendant could not be convicted of  
unarmed robbery under the facts of this case.  We also  
reassert that a defendant cannot be retried on a charge not  
previously supported by sufficient evidence where additional  
evidence is discovered to support it.  Therefore, we affirm  
the Court of Appeals decision in part, reverse it in part, and  
remand for entry of a judgment of conviction of larceny in a  
building and for resentencing.  
I. Factual and Procedural History  
Defendant took merchandise valued at approximately $120  
from a Meijer store.  After purchasing other items, he left  
the store with a rotary tool, a battery, a battery charger,  
and a thermostat without paying for them. The store's loss­
prevention staff observed the theft and acted to apprehend  
defendant when he emerged from the store.  
There are several versions of what happened next.  Taking  
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution,  
when the plain-clothed security guards identified themselves,  
defendant lunged forward to run.  At least one guard seized  
him, putting him in an "escort hold."  Defendant broke free  
and swung his arm at the guards, physically assaulting at  
least one of them.1  In his efforts to escape, defendant lost  
1Defendant claimed he used no force at all.  
2  
 
possession of the merchandise.  The prosecutor charged him  
with unarmed robbery, and a jury convicted him as charged.  
MCL 750.530.  
When it reviewed defendant's unarmed robbery conviction,  
the Court of Appeals applied the "transactional approach,"  
which it adopted explicitly in People v LeFlore, 96 Mich App  
557, 561-562; 293 NW2d 628 (1980).2  Under this approach, a  
defendant has not completed a robbery until he has escaped  
with stolen merchandise.  Thus, a completed larceny may be  
elevated to a robbery if the defendant uses force after the  
taking and before reaching temporary safety.  See People v  
Newcomb, 190 Mich App 424, 430-431; 476 NW2d 749 (1991);  
People v Turner, 120 Mich App 23, 28; 328 NW2d 5 (1982);  
People v Tinsley, 176 Mich App 119, 120; 439 NW2d 313 (1989).  
Applying that test, the Court of Appeals reasoned "there  
was 
insufficient 
evidence 
to 
support 
defendant's 
conviction 
of  
unarmed 
robbery 
because 
defendant 
was 
unsuccessful 
in 
escaping  
and thus he never completed the larcenous transaction." 242  
Mich App 421.  Therefore, it reversed the unarmed robbery  
conviction and remanded for entry of a conviction of larceny  
in a building, "unless the prosecutor opts to retry defendant  
2Although the Court of Appeals did not identify its 
holding in People v Sanders, 28 Mich App 274; 184 NW2d 269 
(1970), 
as 
employing 
the 
"transactional 
approach," 
the 
concept 
originated there.  
3  
 
on the original charge based on additional evidence."  Id. at  
423.  We granted both parties' applications for leave to  
appeal. 465 Mich 885 (2001).  
II. Unarmed Robbery  
Michigan's 
unarmed 
robbery 
statute, 
MCL 
750.530,  
provides:  
Any person who shall, by force or violence, or  
by assault or putting in fear, feloniously rob,  
steal and take from the person of another, or in  
his presence, any money or other property which may 
be the subject of larceny, such robber not being 
armed with a dangerous weapon, shall be guilty of a 
felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state 
prison not more than 15 years. [Emphasis added.]  
Robbery is a crime against a person.  People v Hendricks,  
446 Mich 435, 451; 521 NW2d 546 (1994).  As the Court of  
Appeals acknowledged in LeFlore,3 "Both the armed and unarmed  
robbery statutes are clear that the forceful act must be used  
to accomplish the taking."  
We base our holding on the language of the unarmed  
robbery 
statute 
and 
the common-law history of unarmed robbery.  
From that we conclude that the force used to accomplish the  
taking underlying a charge of unarmed robbery must be  
contemporaneous with the taking.  The force used later to  
retain stolen property is not included.  Those Court of  
Appeals 
cases 
that 
have 
held 
otherwise, 
applying 
a  
3Supra at 562.  
4  
 
 
"transactional approach" to unarmed robbery, are herein  
overruled.  
A. Robbery at Common Law  
Michigan's unarmed robbery statute is derived from the  
common law.  The first robbery statutes, enacted in 1838,  
adopted the common-law definition of robbery, but divided the  
offense by levels of severity, depending on whether a  
perpetrator was armed.  People v Calvin, 60 Mich 113, 120; 26  
NW 851 (1886).4  The 1838 codification of unarmed robbery is  
nearly identical to our current statute.5  
4If there were any doubt that the unarmed robbery statute 
codified the common law, this Court dispelled it in Stout v  
Keyes, 2 Doug 184, 188 (Mich, 1845). 
In Stout, this Court 
rejected a claim that the common law had been supplanted by 
our constitution and the revised statutes.  It explained that 
our constitution did not abrogate, but rather retained, the 
common law. Our revised statutes repealed only earlier laws 
that were repugnant to the provisions of the revised statutes. 
The Stout Court concluded: 
"In almost every part of the 
Revised Statutes of 1838 relating to rights and remedies, the 
common law is incidentally or otherwise recognized." Id.  
51838 RS, tit 1, ch 3, § 12 provided, with regard to 
unarmed robbery:  
If any person shall, by force and violence, or  
by assault or putting in fear, feloniously rob,  
steal and take from the person of another any money 
or property, which may be the subject of larceny, 
(such robber not being armed with a dangerous 
weapon,) he shall be punished by imprisonment in 
the state prison not more than life, or for any 
term of years. [Emphasis added.]  
Other than stylistic changes, the only substantive 
(continued...)  
5  
 
 
At common law the elements of the offense of robbery were  
"the felonious and forcible taking, from the person of  
another, of goods or money to any value by violence or putting  
him in fear."  4 Blackstone, Commentaries, p 241; see also,  
People v Covelesky, 217 Mich 90, 96; 185 NW 770 (1921). The  
force or violence had to be applied before or during the  
taking. See id. at 242. ("[T]he taking must be by force, or  
a previous putting in fear. . . .")6
 (Emphasis added.)  
5(...continued) 
modification since the first statute is the addition of the  
phrase "or in his presence."  This modification is itself  
consistent with the common-law definition of robbery. See 4  
Blackstone, Commentaries, p 242 ("But if the taking be not 
either directly from his person, or in his presence, it is no 
robbery").  
6See, also, the encyclopedic work by Joel Prentiss 
Bishop, a leading nineteenth century legal commentator, who 
stated the common law as follows:  "The violence must precede 
or be contemporaneous with the taking.  When no force is used  
to obtain the property[,] force used to retain it will not 
make the crime robbery." 2 Zane & Zollman, Bishop, Criminal 
Law (9th ed), § 1168.2, p 865.  
Other commentators concur with Blackstone’s view of the  
common law.  See, e.g., 2 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal 
Law, § 8.11, p 452 ("Thus, under the traditional view it is 
not 
robbery 
to 
steal 
property without violence or intimidation 
(e.g., to obtain it by stealth or fraud or sudden snatching), 
although the thief later, in order to retain the stolen 
property or make good his escape, uses violence or  
intimidation upon the property owner.  The defendant's acts of  
violence or intimidation must occur either before the taking 
(though continuing to have an operative effect until the time 
of the taking) or at the time of the taking."); 4 Torcia, 
Wharton, Criminal Law (15th ed), § 463, pp 33-36 ("At common 
law, and in some states, force or threatened force (putting a 
(continued...)  
6  
 
6(...continued) 
victim in fear of injury) amounts to robbery only if it is 
used to 'take' property from the possession of another.  Force  
or threatened force used thereafter, in order to retain 
possession of the property taken or to facilitate escape, does 
not qualify.  At best, in such cases, the separate offenses of 
larceny and assault or larceny and battery are committed.").  
The dissent offers the views of several other common-law  
commentators.
 However, read carefully, these commentators 
support the definition of robbery under the common law that we 
have related above. For example, Odgers states that common­
law robbery consisted of "the unlawful taking possession of 
the goods of another by means of violence or threats of 
violence" and that the violence must occur "at the time of or  
immediately before or immediately after such robbery . . . ." 
1 Odgers, The Common Law of England (2d ed), ch 8, p 331. 
This definition acknowledges that the taking must be by 
violence or the threat of violence.  In this case, the taking  
occurred without violence.  
Contrary to the dissent's assertion, the use of the 
phrase 
"immediately 
before 
or 
immediately 
after" 
is 
consistent 
with our view that the use of force must be contemporaneous 
with the taking.  Possibly, the dissent missapprehends the 
immediacy of the term "immediately." Odgers illustrated the 
point with the following:  "[W]here the prisoner seized the 
prosecutor's watch and, on finding that it was secured by a 
chain around his neck, violently pulled and jerked until it 
broke, and then ran away with the watch, this was held to 
amount to robbery." 
Id. at 332, quoting Rex v Harman  
(Harman's Case), 1 Hale, PC 534.  Thus, force applied 
immediately after the taking is sufficiently contemporaneous. 
In this case, defendant did not use force until after he had 
completed the taking and left the store. Therefore, the use 
of force did not occur immediately after the taking.  
Similarly, 
the 
dissent's 
reliance 
on 
Rapalje's 
explanation of the common law of robbery is unavailing. The  
dissent fails to quote Rapalje's statement of the common-law 
definition of robbery:  
Feloniously taking the property of another in 
his presence and against his will, by putting him 
(continued...)  
7  
 
 
Accordingly, the common law concerning robbery that was  
received by the drafters and ratifiers of our constitution  
required (1) a taking from the person, (2) accomplished by an  
earlier or contemporaneous application of force or violence,  
or the threat of it.  If force was used later to retain the  
property, the crime committed did not constitute robbery.  
Thus, consistently with the rule under common law, MCL  
750.530 must be read to require a taking accomplished by  
"force or violence, or by assault or putting in fear."  The  
statute excludes a nonforceful taking, even if force were  
later used to retain the stolen property.  By the same  
reasoning, force used to escape with stolen property is  
insufficient to sustain a robbery charge under our statute.  
Nonetheless, over the past thirty years, the Court of Appeals  
6(...continued) 
in fear of immediate personal injury, is robbery at 
common law.  The taking must be either directly 
from the person or in the presence of the party 
robbed, and must be by force, or a previous putting 
in fear. 
It is the previous violence or  
intimidation 
that 
distinguishes 
robbery 
from  
larceny. [Rapalje, Larceny & Kindred Offenses  
(1892), § 445, p 633.]  
The remainder of Rapalje's statement on robbery is no more 
availing to the dissent's position.  Carefully read, the 
entire passage supports the majority's view rather than the 
dissent's view of the common law. See id. at § 446, pp 633­
637.  The dissent is simply incorrect in asserting that the 
common-law 
understanding 
of 
robbery 
supports 
the  
"transactional approach" to unarmed robbery.  
8  
  
 
has created a doctrine that strayed from the language of MCL  
750.530 and its historical common-law context.  
B. The Court of Appeals and the "Transactional Approach"  
This Court has never recognized the "transactional  
approach."  In 1971, the Court of Appeals began to expand the  
codified common-law requirements of robbery.  In People v  
Sanders,7 it concluded that the defendant, having completed  
his theft "by stealth," was guilty of armed robbery because he  
fired a gunshot into the air to frighten off pursuers.  
Although it recognized the general rule that "an assault must  
be concomitant with the taking in order to support a charge of  
armed robbery," the panel relied on the law of other  
jurisdictions. Id. at 276. It held that there was "no valid  
basis for isolating the incidents of the entire event when the  
taking is not effectively completed until after the assault.  
. . . [A]nd the incident of the taking must be viewed in its  
totality in order to ascertain the intent of the defendant  
when the assault occurs."  Id. at 277. 
Thus, with the  
decision in Sanders, the Court of Appeals began its shift  
toward the "transactional approach."  
In LeFlore, the concept was identified by name and  
applied in the context of unarmed robbery.  Supra at 561-563.  
728 Mich App 274; 184 NW2d 269 (1970).  
9  
 
 
 
 
In that case, the defendant took money from the victim after  
physically assaulting her. On appeal, he claimed that there  
was insufficient evidence to support the unarmed robbery  
conviction because the taking had been a mere afterthought.  
He claimed to have had no larcenous intent at the time of the  
assault.  The LeFlore panel held that the "larceny transaction  
should be viewed as a whole to determine the defendant's  
intent." LeFlore, supra at 562.  
In Turner, the "transactional approach" was extended  
further to express that a robbery is incomplete until the  
defendant escapes with the stolen property:  
We 
agree 
that 
a 
completed 
escape 
is  
unnecessary 
to 
constitute 
asportation. 
"Any 
movement of goods, even if by the victim under the 
direction 
of 
defendant 
. 
. 
. 
constitutes  
asportation . . . ." However, robbery is also a  
continuous offense: it is not complete until the  
perpetrators reach temporary safety. As such, while 
the essential elements were completed, the offense 
continued during the escape.  [120 Mich App 28 
(citations omitted; emphasis added).]  
The Turner holding was repeated in Tinsley. The fiction found  
there, that a robbery is not complete until a defendant  
reaches temporary safety, gave rise to the Court of Appeals  
holding in the instant case:  that the defendant must complete  
his escape with the stolen merchandise or he cannot be  
convicted of unarmed robbery.  
This "transactional approach" can not be harmonized  
10  
 
either with the language of MCL 750.530 or with the common-law  
history of our unarmed robbery statute.8  As Judge William  
Blackstone stated:  
This previous violence or putting in fear is 
the criterion that distinguishes robberies from 
other larcinies.  For, if one privately steals 
sixpence from the person of another, and afterwards 
keeps it by putting in fear, this is no robbery, 
for the fear is subsequent . . . .  [Blackstone, 
supra at 242.][9]  
8The dissent appears to agree that our unarmed robbery 
statute directly adopts and implements the common-law  
definition of robbery.  Slip op at 11, n 6. 
However, it 
diverges from us when claiming that robbery is a continuing 
offense that is not complete until the thief reaches a place 
of temporary safety.  This definition finds no support in the 
common law.  None of the commentators cited by either the 
majority or the dissent identifies the "place of temporary 
safety" as an aspect of robbery.  It finds no support, either, 
in the plain language of the statute which fails to mention, 
or even allude to, a "place of temporary safety."  In light of 
the history and text of the statute, the dissent is inaccurate 
in attempting to justify its preferential interpretation as 
true to the common law.  
9The dissent contends that we make "much of [this] 
quotation."  Slip op at 28. It asserts that Perkins states  
that "this quotation has been misapplied."  Id.  However, the 
dissent misunderstands the point that Perkins was making. 
Perkins indicated that certain courts, in certain factual 
situations, had occasionally misapplied Blackstone’s view of 
the common law.  In one case, a thief obtained a gun on the 
pretext of wishing to inspect it, turned it on the owner and 
threatened to use it before fleeing with it. Perkins  
criticized the court that reversed the thief's conviction for  
robbery. He noted that the thief initially had mere custody 
of the weapon, but his possession of it was secured by the 
threat of force. Perkins, supra at 348-349.  
The dissent claims that, in the case on appeal, defendant  
had only custody of the items when the security guard 
(continued...)  
11  
  
Thus did Blackstone identify the real difficulty with the  
"transactional approach": it inappropriately characterizes  
a completed larceny as a robbery.  
It is useful to recall that at common law simple larceny  
was defined as "the felonious taking, and carrying away, of  
the personal goods of another."  Blackstone, supra, p 229; see  
also, People v Johnson, 81 Mich 573, 576; 45 NW 1119 (1890).  
Larceny 
was 
contrasted with robbery in that common-law larceny  
was a robbery minus the use of force to accomplish the taking  
9(...continued) 
attempted to stop him.  This view is unsupportable. 
In  
Perkin's example, the owner willingly parted with physical 
control of the gun in response to the robber's nonthreatening 
request.
 It was only after the robber obtained temporary 
consensual custody of the weapon that he threatened the owner 
and exercised possession that was inconsistent with the 
owner's rights.  In this case, defendant took the items and 
concealed them under his coat.  Thus, wrongful possession and 
custody that were inconsistent with the owner's rights were 
asserted at the time of the taking.  Defendant never had  
rightful possession and custody of these items with the 
owner's consent.  
Furthermore, 
the quotation relied on by the dissent again 
supports, rather than contradicts, the interpretation of 
Blackstone that we have related above:  "[I]f subsequent to 
the larceny the owner should come upon the thief and be 
prevented from retaking his property by force or violence, the 
thief would be guilty of larceny and assault, but not 
robbery." Id. at 349.  The use of "res gestae" in the Perkins 
quotation, considered in context and in light of the comments 
of  commentators (Blackstone, Bishop, LaFave and Scott, 
Wharton, Odgers, and Rapalje), does not suggest an expansive 
"transactional" view of robbery.  Rather it narrowly refers to  
the events occurring contemporaneously with the taking, 
precisely the time frame in which the application of force 
must occur.  
12  
 
and absent the requirement that the taking be "from the  
person."  Blackstone stated this cogently when he summarized:  
"This previous violence or putting in fear, is the criterion  
that distinguishes robberies from other larcinies."  Id. at  
242.10  
We emphasize that a larceny is complete when the taking  
occurs.
 The offense does not continue. 
This fact is  
10Other 
distinguished commentators have opined similarly. 
Professor Charles Torcia, current author of Wharton, Criminal 
Law, 
the 
well-known 
and often cited contemporary exposition on 
the criminal law, explains that at common law the use of force 
"amounts to robbery only if it is used to 'take' the property 
from the possession of another."  Wharton, § 463, p 33.  He  
then continues:  
Force or threatened force used thereafter, in 
order to retain possession of the property taken or 
to facilitate escape, does not qualify.  At best, 
in such a case, the separate offenses of larceny 
and assault or larceny and battery are committed. 
[Id. at 33-36.]  
Similarly, Bishop in his previously cited work on 
criminal law states:  "The fear of physical ill must come 
before the relinquishment of the thing to the thief, not 
after; else the taking is not robbery."  Bishop, § 1175, p  
869.  
Even the Court of Appeals recognized this rule while 
declining to follow it in favor of its "transactional  
approach": "Both the armed and unarmed robbery statutes are 
clear that the forceful act must be used to accomplish the  
taking. . . .  Unless there is a purposeful relationship 
between these two elements, the criminal episode is merely two 
isolated crimes of larceny and perhaps assault and battery." 
LeFlore, supra at 562, quoting LaFave, supra.  
13  
illustrated in People v Bradovich,11 in which two defendants  
in a store concealed two suits under their own clothing and  
attempted to leave.  Realizing that store personnel were  
following them and that they would be apprehended, they  
abandoned the stolen clothing and departed.  When later  
charged with larceny, they claimed to have abandoned the  
property before leaving the store, and therefore, not to have  
completed the offense.  This Court disagreed, holding that the  
larceny was complete when the thieves concealed the store’s  
clothing under their own. Id. at 332.  
The dissent acknowledges that larceny and robbery are  
distinct crimes.  That the two crimes are distinct offenses  
indicates 
nothing 
more than that they have different elements:  
robbery is a larceny aggravated by the fact that the taking is  
from the person, or in his presence, accomplished with force  
or the threat of force.  People v Wakeford, 418 Mich 95, 127­
128; 341 NW2d 68 (1983) (opinion of Levin, J.).  
However, 
the 
dissent 
asserts 
without 
supporting 
authority  
that "for the purpose of the crime of robbery, the relevant  
act encompasses a broader spectrum of time, and includes not  
simply an initial larcenous taking, 'by force and violence' or  
'by assault,' but a robbing of the victim 'by assault' when  
11305 Mich 329; 9 NW2d 560 (1943).  
14  
the property remains in the victim's presence."  Slip op at  
13.
 Neither the common law nor contemporary authority  
supports the view that the taking that establishes the larceny  
element of robbery continues until the robber reaches a place  
of temporary safety.  
We reject the dissent's reliance on cases from other  
jurisdictions 
because 
they 
are 
either 
distinguishable 
on 
their  
facts or inconsistent with the common-law view of robbery  
adopted by Michigan.  We also find particularly instructive  
State v Manchester, 57 Wash App 765; 790 P2d 217 (1990).  
There, the Washington Court of Appeals, noting the split in  
jurisdictions on the question of the timing of the use of  
force, cited Sanders, supra, and People v Beebe, 70 Mich App  
154; 245 NW2d 547 (1976).  Manchester placed Michigan with the  
majority of jurisdictions that do not consider a robbery  
complete until the robber has reached a place of temporary  
safety.  The Court observed: "Because this approach does not  
follow the common law, courts focus on the language of the  
robbery statute to reach this result." Id. at 770.  
We agree that the "transactional approach" used by our  
Court of Appeals is contrary to the common law.  As we have  
explained above, the language of our statute does not permit  
us to adopt the view espoused by the Court of Appeals and the  
dissent.  
15  
 
 
We are also persuaded by Tennessee v Owens,12 where the  
Tennessee Supreme Court was faced with the question, "[H]ow  
closely connected in time must the taking and the violence  
be?" By way of response, the court compared the language of  
Tennessee’s 
robbery 
statute with the language of other states'  
robbery statutes.  The court noted that many jurisdictions  
have rejected the common-law rule in favor of the “continuous  
offense theory.” Id. at 638-639, 639, n 7.  
However, most of those states have statutes that  
specifically define robbery to include the use of force to  
retain property or to escape.  Id. at 639. 
Many of the  
statutes provide that a person commits robbery if he uses  
force "in the course of committing" a theft or larceny. See  
Ala Code 1975, § 13A-8-43; Ariz Rev Stat, §§ 13-1901-1904;  
Conn Gen Stat, § 53a-133; Del Code Ann, tit 11, § 831; Fla  
Stat, § 812.13; Haw Rev Stat, § 708-841; Minn Stat, § 609.24;  
Mont Code Ann, § 45-5-401; NJ Stat Ann, § 2C:15-1; NY Penal  
Laws, § 160.00; ND Cent Code, § 12.1-22-01; Or Rev Stat,  
§ 164.395; Tex Penal Code Ann, § 29.02; Utah Code Ann, § 76-6­
301.  
All the statutes define "in the course of" to include  
either "escape," "flight," "retention," or "subsequent to the  
1220 SW3d 634 (Tenn, 2000).  
16  
  
taking."  In other jurisdictions that follow this approach,  
the statutes specifically include the expressions "resisting  
apprehension,"13 "facilitate escape,"14 "fleeing immediately  
after,"15 or used to "retain possession."16  
By contrast, other jurisdictions have statutes that  
follow 
the 
common-law rule requiring that the force, violence,  
or putting in fear occur before or contemporaneous with the  
larcenous taking.  These states have statutes substantially  
similar to Michigan's.  See Ga Code Ann, § 16-8-40; Ind Code,  
§ 35-42-5-1; Kan Stat Ann, § 21-3426; Miss Code Ann, § 97-3­
73; NM Stat Ann, § 30-16-2; Tenn Code Ann, § 39-13-401; see  
also 93 ALR3d 647-649.  
In summary, at common law, a robbery required that the  
force, violence, or putting in fear occur before or  
contemporaneous with the larcenous taking. If the violence,  
force, or putting in fear occurred after the taking, the crime  
was not robbery, but rather larceny and perhaps assault.  
Hence, the "transactional approach" espoused by the Court of  
Appeals is without pedigree in our law and must be abandoned.  
Sanders, LeFlore, Turner, and Tinsley are overruled.  
13Ark Code Ann, § 5-12-102.  
14Nev Rev Stat, § 200.380.  
15Ohio Rev Code Ann, § 2911.01.  
16Wash Rev Code, § 9A.56.190.  
17  
  
III. Analysis of the Case on Appeal  
Turning to the facts of this case, the prosecution seeks  
to extend the transaction that began with the in-store taking  
to include the struggle in the parking lot.  We point out that  
defendant not only failed to escape, but, more importantly,  
did not accomplish his taking by the use of force, violence,  
assault, or putting in fear.17  
While store security personnel observed him, defendant  
removed several items from the display shelves of the Meijer  
store and concealed them beneath his coat.  He continued to  
retain possession of this property as he picked up two quarts  
of oil, went to a checkout lane, paid for the oil and walked  
from the store.  The first use of force or violence was in the  
parking lot when a security guard attempted to restrain him.  
Hence, his use of force or violence was not to take the  
property, but to retain it and escape apprehension.  It  
follows that defendant did not commit the offense of unarmed  
robbery.  
The dissent makes much of the fact that the unarmed  
robbery statute applies to a taking from "the person of  
17We agree with the dissent that escape is not an element 
of robbery, and this statement should not be construed to 
imply otherwise. We merely point out that the circumstances 
of this case go beyond what the Court of Appeals deemed 
significant, the irrelevant fact that defendant did not 
escape.  
18  
 
another, or in his presence," but overlooks the context of  
that language.  The dissent relies heavily on the notion of  
constructive 
possession 
and 
the 
intent 
to 
permanently 
deprive.  
However, we are left without a satisfactory explanation of why  
the use of force that does not accomplish a taking would  
escalate the offense of larceny to unarmed robbery.  
The dissent asserts that force used after a taking, while  
the victim has constructive possession of stolen property or  
while it is in the victim's presence, supports a charge of  
robbery.  Notably, however, in each of the dissent's examples,  
the force used was to accomplish the ultimate taking.  That  
did not occur in this case. The dissent attempts to merge a  
subsequent force not used to accomplish a taking with the  
completed taking that preceded the force.18  
We think it significant that the statute identifies  
unarmed robbery as the taking of another's property in the  
other's presence "by force and violence, or by assault or  
putting in fear."  MCL 750.530 (emphasis added). 
If the  
physical taking were accomplished without force, assault, or  
fear, the statute does not permit treating the larcenous crime  
18Certainly, as the dissent asserts, it may be wise to 
wait to apprehend a thief who has not used force or violence 
until after he has left a populated store.  In so doing, 
however, one would be apprehending a thief who committed 
larceny, not a robber.  
19  
as a robbery because of a subsequent forceful act.  Such force  
used to retain stolen property is simply outside the scope of  
MCL 750.530.19  That defendant cannot be convicted of unarmed  
robbery is particularly clear here, because his force by no  
means accomplished a severing of the store's constructive  
possession of the merchandise.  
We note that defendant's taking of the merchandise in  
this case is indistinguishable from the taking in Bradovich.  
Therefore, when defendant placed the merchandise under his  
clothing, he committed a taking without force, and his conduct  
constituted a completed larceny.  The concealment evidences  
that, at the time he took the merchandise, defendant intended  
to permanently deprive the owner, Meijer, of it. Defendant’s  
later acts, whether viewed as an unsuccessful attempt to  
retain the property or as an attempt to escape, are too  
removed 
from 
the 
completed 
taking 
to 
be 
considered  
19The dissent's reliance on Sir Edward Coke's definition  
of common-law robbery is no more illuminating.  It quotes Coke 
for the proposition that one who begins to steal by stealth 
but, then, "uses force in order to complete the taking" has 
committed robbery. Slip op at 36. Again, we agree that one 
who uses force to take the property of another has committed 
unarmed robbery. We simply will not extend that proposition 
to force used after the taking, when the force does not serve 
to accomplish the taking. 
The dissent is incorrect in  
extending Coke's definition to force used in an attempt to 
retain property where the taking has already been completed. 
Nowhere in the dissent is this significant leap supported with 
any legal or analytical foundation.  
20  
 
 
contemporaneous.20  
The dissent's reliance on People v Podolski21 is  
misplaced.
 In Podolski, this Court held the defendant  
responsible for felony murder when, after a robbery, one  
police officer shot and killed another while the robbers  
exchanged fire with the police. This Court did not base the  
felony murder on a "transactional" notion of robbery.  
Rather, the unanimous Court asserted that "'when a  
felon's attempt to commit robbery or burglary sets in motion  
a chain of events which were or should have been within his  
contemplation when the motion was initiated, he should be held  
responsible for any death which by direct and almost  
20The decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals 
provide no support for the dissent's view, slip op at 24, that 
store security's continued observation of defendant extends 
the larcenous transaction.  Nor do they support the view that 
the cessation of such observation can sever the owner's  
constructive possession of the stolen property.  These views, 
asserted 
without 
authority, 
directly 
contradict 
the 
common-law 
assessment of larceny illustrated by Bradovich that a larceny 
is complete upon the taking and concealment of the property. 
As we have endeavored to show, they are also inconsistent with 
the common-law view of robbery because the taking is  
accomplished without force.  Certainly, the owner's legal 
right to such property will always be superior to the thief's. 
However, the fact remains that physical custody and control of 
the property, actual possession, has been acquired by the 
thief when he conceals the property.  The property has been 
"robbed, stolen and taken" from the owner and that felonious 
taking has been accomplished without force or the threat of 
force.  
21332 Mich 508; 52 NW2d 201 (1952).  
21  
 
inevitable sequence results from the initial criminal act.'"  
Id. at 515-516, quoting Commonwealth v Moyer, 357 Pa 181, 190­
191; 53 A2d 736 (1947).  Where the issue is whether the force  
exerted during a robbery was used in taking the property of  
another, not whether it was a foreseeable consequence,  
Podolski is not on point.  Therefore Podolski and its progeny  
are not persuasive by analogy as the dissent contends.  
Finally, we disagree with the dissent's claim that we  
have created an impractical framework for unarmed robbery.  
The dissent greatly exaggerates the confusion generated by  
overruling the transactional approach.  The rule is simple:  
a defendant commits an unarmed robbery when he takes the  
property of another by the use of force, violence, or putting  
in fear.  After the initial larcenous act has been completed,  
the use of force against the victim to retain the property  
taken does not transform it into armed robbery.22  The force,  
22The dissent claims that the Legislature could not have 
intended that the theft of under $200 of property, followed by 
the thief's violent assault on the victim, be "merely [a] 
third-degree 
retail 
fraud and assault, rather than the greater 
crime of robbery."  Slip op at 40-41.  The dissent further  
expresses surprise that a potential fifteen-year sentence 
could be reduced to "punishment of no more than 93 days in 
jail." Id. at 41.  
As we have indicated, and as the commentators uniformly 
agree, at common law, a theft accomplished without force was 
a larceny; where the larceny was followed by the application 
of force, it was a larceny and an assault.  It should be  
(continued...)  
22  
 
violence or putting in fear must be used before or  
contemporaneous with the taking.  
We overrule the "transactional approach" to unarmed  
robbery and reassert that the force, violence, assault or  
putting in fear underlying the robbery must occur before or  
contemporaneously with the felonious taking.  Because this  
defendant did not use force, violence, assault, or putting in  
fear to accomplish his taking of property, he did not commit  
unarmed robbery.23  Accordingly, we agree with the Court of  
22(...continued) 
concluded that our Legislature was well aware of the common­
law view and intended to incorporate it into the statute when 
it codified the common law.  
Finally, the sentencing prospect contemplated by the 
dissent, that the potential sentence would drop from fifteen 
years to one year, is incorrect. We are remanding this case 
for entry of a conviction of larceny in a building.  The  
maximum sentence for that offense is four years, not one year. 
MCL 750.360 and MCL 750.503.  Depending on the facts of the 
crime, a defendant who commits an assault following a larceny 
could be charged with a ninety-day misdemeanor, MCL 750.81, a 
one-year misdemeanor, MCL 750.81a, a four-year felony, MCL 
750.82, a ten-year felony, MCL 750.84, MCL 750.86, or MCL 
750.87, or life or, if the defendant intended to murder his 
victim, a term up to life in prison, MCL 750.83.  
23As the dissent agrees, defendant accomplished a  
chargeable crime of larceny when he concealed the merchandise 
with the intent to steal it.  When the security guards 
initiated contact with him and a physical struggle ensued, 
defendant lost possession of the merchandise.  It defies logic 
to say that, when a defendant commits larceny, but loses 
possession of the property during a struggle, defendant's 
crime can be elevated to unarmed robbery.  
(continued...)  
23  
Appeals panel, albeit using a different analysis, that the  
charge of unarmed robbery was not supported by the evidence.  
Therefore, we affirm its decision insofar as it reverses  
defendant's conviction.  
IV. The Remedy  
We find that the Court of Appeals erred when it provided  
that, 
with 
new 
evidence, the prosecution could retry defendant  
on the originally charged offense.  See Burks v United States,  
437 US 1, 18; 98 S Ct 2141; 57 L Ed 2d 1 (1978); People v  
Bullock, 440 Mich 15, 26, n 7; 485 NW2d 866 (1992); People v  
Murphy, 416 Mich 453, 467; 331 NW2d 152 (1982). 
The  
prosecution concedes that this was error.24  Defendant agrees  
23(...continued) 
We recognize that one who commits retail fraud, 
essentially a larceny of merchandise for sale in a store open 
to the public, cannot be charged with larceny in a building. 
See MCL 750.356c(3). However, People v Ramsey, 218 Mich App 
191, 194-195; 553 NW2d 360 (1996), holds that one charged with 
unarmed robbery can be convicted of larceny in a building, 
even where the underlying facts would support a finding of 
retail fraud.  In this case defendant was charged with unarmed 
robbery.  The jury was instructed on that and on larceny in a 
building, not retail fraud.  Defendant concedes that he is  
guilty of larceny in a building.  For those reasons, we remand 
for entry of a judgment of conviction of larceny in a 
building, rather than for a conviction of retail fraud. See  
part IV.  
24Another panel of the Court of Appeals has already 
disavowed this portion of the Court of Appeals opinion, citing 
the United States Supreme Court in Burks v United States, 437 
US 1, 11; 98 S Ct 2141; 57 L Ed 2d 1 (1978):  
(continued...)  
24  
 
that, 
if 
defendant's 
unarmed 
robbery 
conviction 
is 
overturned,  
the proper remedy is a remand for entry of a conviction for  
larceny in a building. MCL 750.360.25  
The prosecution proposes, as an alternate position, that  
this case be remanded to the trial court for retrial on the  
lesser offense of assault with intent to commit unarmed  
robbery.  On the basis of our construction of the unarmed  
robbery statute, we reject that approach.  To support a charge  
of assault with intent to commit unarmed robbery, the  
prosecutor would again merge the initial taking with the force  
used to retain possession of the merchandise.  The taking and  
the force are too attenuated to support those charges.  The  
24(...continued) 
Indeed, "affording the prosecution another 
opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to 
muster in the first proceeding" is the chief evil 
against which the Double Jeopardy Clause protects. 
[People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 597; 629 NW2d 
411 (2001).]  
25The elements of larceny in a building are: (1) the 
actual or constructive taking of goods or property of another, 
(2) without the consent and against the will of the owner, and 
(3) a carrying away or asportation of the goods, (4) with a 
felonious intent, (5) the taking having occurred within the 
confines of the building.  MCL 750.360; People v Sykes, 229 
Mich App 254, 278; 582 NW2d 197 (1998).  Defendant admits that  
he committed larceny in a building.  Also, the jury's decision 
necessarily included a finding that defendant committed every 
element of the crime of larceny in a building. Therefore, a 
remand for entry of a conviction of that offense is  
appropriate.  See People v Bearss, 463 Mich 623, 632-633; 625 
NW2d 10 (2001).  
25  
 
larceny in a building conviction better fits the facts of this  
case.  
Because the Court of Appeals decision to allow retrial is  
in error, we reverse that portion of the opinion, but remand  
the case to the trial court.  That court is to enter a  
conviction on the lesser offense of larceny in a building, on  
which the jury was charged and that was necessarily subsumed  
in its verdict.  
V. Conclusion  
In conclusion, the Court of Appeals correctly determined  
that there was insufficient evidence to support defendant's  
conviction for unarmed robbery. 
Because the defendant  
completed a taking without using force, violence, assault or  
putting in fear, he could not be convicted of unarmed robbery.  
We remand to the trial court for entry of a conviction  
for larceny in a building and for resentencing.  Defendant  
cannot be retried for unarmed robbery.  The opinion of the  
Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part.  
CAVANAGH, TAYLOR, and YOUNG, JJ., concurred with KELLY, J.  
26  
______________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff,  
Nos. 117750, 188078  
KALVIN RANDOLPH,  
Defendant.  
MARKMAN, J. (dissenting).  
I respectfully dissent.  In affirming the Court of  
Appeals, the majority concludes that this Court has never  
adopted the “transactional approach” to robbery. Slip op at  
9.  The majority then proceeds to overrule more than thirty  
years of precedent in the Court of Appeals applying this view.  
In doing so, the majority states that “the force used to  
accomplish the taking underlying a charge of unarmed robbery  
must be contemporaneous with the taking.”  Slip op at 4. The  
majority concludes that defendant in this case “did not  
accomplish his taking by use of force, violence, assault, or  
putting in fear.”  Slip op at 18.  Therefore, the majority  
concludes that defendant cannot be convicted of unarmed  
robbery. I strongly disagree with this analysis.  
 
 
  
 
In my judgment, a person is guilty of the crime of  
robbery if, before reaching a place of temporary safety, the  
person uses force either to effect his initial taking of the  
property, or to retain possession of the property or to escape  
with the property, as long as the property remains “in [the]  
presence” of the victim.  MCL 750.530. The language of the  
robbery statute, Michigan case law, and the common-law  
understanding of robbery each support the view that a person  
can be convicted of robbery even if the required element of  
force occurs after the perpetrator’s initial seizure of the  
property, but before he has reached a place of temporary  
safety.  Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of the Court  
of Appeals.  
I. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT  
In the criminal law, a crime is not complete until the  
act element and the mental element of the particular crime  
have concurred.  People v Patskan, 387 Mich 701, 714; 199 NW2d  
458 (1972).1  In the case of unarmed robbery, the act element  
is the “felonious[] rob[bing], steal[ing] and tak[ing]” of  
1  See also Parker, The economics of mens rea, 79 Va L R 
741, 741 (1993), citing Hall, General Principles of Criminal 
Law (2d ed), pp 133-141.  See also Blakey, The RICO civil  
fraud action in context: Reflections on Bennett v Berg, 58 
Notre Dame L Rev (1982), 237, 290, n 151, stating that 
“generally, there must be a concurrence between a specified 
state of mind and prohibited conduct, the mens rea and the 
actus reus.”  
2  
 
property from the person of another or of property that is “in  
his presence.”  MCL 750.530. Further, the act element must be  
accomplished “by force and violence, or by assault or putting  
in fear.” Id., see also People v Johnson, 206 Mich App 122,  
125-126; 520 NW2d 672 (1994).  I will refer to this in the  
shorthand as the force element.  The mental element or intent  
element of unarmed robbery is the intent to permanently  
deprive the owner of his property.  People v King, 210 Mich  
App 425, 428; 534 NW2d 534 (1995).  Thus, the act element and  
the force element must concur with the perpetrator’s intent to  
permanently deprive the owner of his property.  
Because the statute, and the case law interpreting the  
statute, provide that the property may be “in the presence” of  
the victim, “actual possession” of the property by the victim  
at the time that the force is used is not required.  MCL  
750.530, see also People v Newcomb, 190 Mich App 424, 430-431;  
476 NW2d 749 (1991). The property continues to be “in [the]  
presence” of the victim where the property remains under his  
personal protection and control.  Id., see also People v  
Covelesky, 217 Mich 90, 97; 185 NW 770 (1921).  It follows  
that, as long as the victim exercises this protection and  
control over the property, the requisite force element of  
robbery may still be used against him, because the property is  
still “in his presence”.  MCL 750.530.  Thus, where an assault  
3  
 
  
occurs at any time during which the property can be said to be  
in the victim’s presence, a robbery within the meaning of the  
statute occurs. 
In this case, although defendant had  
initially seized items from the shelf of the Meijer’s store,  
the security guards continued to exercise protective custody  
and control over that property, because they continued to  
monitor defendant and they still had the right to take the  
property back.  Therefore, the property was “in [their]  
presence within the meaning of MCL 750.530 when defendant, by  
assault, attempted to unlawfully deprive the security guards  
of the property.  This “transactional view” of robbery,2 as it  
has been applied in Michigan, is consistent with both the  
common-law definition and the statute defining robbery, and  
supports defendant’s conviction.  
II. STATUTE  
The majority, in my judgment, errs in its analysis of the  
crime of robbery by interpreting too narrowly the statute’s  
requirements of the force element, the act element, and the  
concept of possession.  As a consequence, the majority’s  
conclusion that defendant “did not use force, violence,  
assault or putting in fear to accomplish his taking of  
2 
  The “transaction” designates the events occurring 
between the time of the initial seizure of the property and 
the eventual removal of such property from the victim’s 
presence.  
4  
property” is also in error. Slip op at 23.  
The statute requires only that the force and violence or  
the assault occur at some point during which the property is  
“in the presence” of the victim.3  The statute does not limit  
the force element to the initial seizure of the property. A  
robbery may occur “by force and violence” or “by assault” as  
long as the property remains “in [the] presence” of the  
victim.
 The property is in the presence of the victim,  
3  Michigan case law has long held that it is unnecessary 
that the victim be the actual owner of the property that is 
the subject of the larceny.  An employee or security guard of 
the owner of property who is assaulted during the course of a 
larceny is as susceptible to the crime of robbery as the 
owner. Durand v People, 47 Mich 332, 334; 11 NW 184 (1882).  
See also People v Cabassa, 249 Mich 543,  546-547; 229 NW2d 
442 (1930), sustaining a conviction of robbery where a 
gasoline station attendant, “[al]though not the actual owner 
of the property stolen, was in custody and control of it,” and 
stating the rule to be that “[a]s against a wrong-doer an 
actual possession or custody of the goods [is] sufficient,” 
and People v Gould, 384 Mich 71, 79-80; 179 NW2d 617 (1970). 
Other jurisdictions have come to a similar conclusion.  To  
suggest that anyone other than the lawful owner of property 
cannot be the victim of a robbery, of course, would render 
even force used contemporaneous with a taking something other 
than robbery unless the force was used directly against the 
owner.
 No force used against a security guard or other 
employee could ever amount to a robbery.  
Indeed, consistent with this long-held view, the  
complaint, warrant, and information in this case showed the 
complainants or victims as Aaron Wilmoth (one of the two 
security guards) and Meijer’s.  The charge of unarmed robbery 
against defendant charged that he: “[D]id feloniously rob, 
steal and take from the person of another, to-wit: Aaron 
Wilmoth and Nicole Lewis [the second security guard and the 
one who was injured by defendant] or in his/her presence, 
certain property . . . by force and violence or by assault or 
putting in fear . . . contrary to MCL 750.530.”  
5  
 
  
although it is in the actual physical possession of the  
perpetrator, 
where 
the 
victim 
exercises 
protective 
custody 
and  
control over the property.4
 This is in accord with the  
statute.  
MCL 750.530 provides:  
Any person who shall, by force and violence, 
or by assault or putting in fear, feloniously rob, 
steal and take from the person of another, or in 
his presence, any money or other property which may 
be the subject of larceny, such robber not being 
armed with a dangerous weapon, shall be guilty of a 
felony . . . .  
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that,  
unless otherwise defined in a statute, this Court will ascribe  
every statutory word or phrase its plain and ordinary meaning.  
See MCL 8.3a.  Further, this Court shall ensure that words in  
a statute are not ignored, treated as surplusage, or rendered  
nugatory. Hoste v Shanty Creek Mngt, Inc, 459 Mich 561, 574;  
592 NW2d 360 (1999).  
Here, to describe the element of force, the Legislature  
used the words “by force and violence, or by assault or  
4  The judge instructed the jury, without defense 
objection, that to prove the charge the prosecutor had to 
prove, in addition to the other articulated elements, “that 
this property was taken from the person of Aaron Wilmoth and 
Nicole Lewis or in their presence.  This can occur even if the  
property was not in the same immediate area as Aaron Wilmoth 
and Nicole Lewis.” 
The charge and the instructions  
demonstrate that the jury was informed of the elements in a 
manner consistently, not only with MCL 750.530, but also with 
the dissent’s analysis of the crime of unarmed robbery.  
6  
 
putting in fear”.  MCL 750.530. To describe the act that must  
be accomplished, the Legislature used the words “rob,”  
“steal,” and “take,” and to describe the allowable possession  
of the property that is subject to the robbery, the  
Legislature used the words “in his presence.”  
The majority argues that a robbery occurs only when a  
person, by force and violence, or by assault or putting in  
fear, uses that force initially to seize the property from the  
person of another, or in his presence.  But, the statute  
plainly allows for more. A robbery occurs under the statute  
where, by force and violence or by assault, the perpetrator  
takes property from the person or in his presence. That is,  
where the robber initially seizes the property by force and  
violence or by assault.  However, the statute also allows for  
a conviction of robbery where, “by assault” the perpetrator  
“robs” property that is “in [the] presence” of the victim.  
The phrase “by assault” cannot mean the same thing as “by  
force and violence.” Rather, “assault” is defined simply as  
“a sudden violent attack.”  Random House Webster’s College  
Dictionary (1991). The term is also defined more broadly as  
“illegal force.” Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed).  
Further, the word “rob” cannot encompass merely the  
taking of the property, because the term “take” is already  
used in the statute.  The Legislature is not presumed to have  
7  
used different terms to mean the same thing.  Here, the  
Legislature used the words “rob,” “steal,” and “take.”  “Rob”  
means to “[u]nlawfully deprive (a person) of or of something,  
esp. by force or the threat of force.”  The New Shorter Oxford  
English Dictionary (1993).  
Thus, the statute, summarized, provides: “Any person who  
shall . . . by assault . . . rob . . . [property] from the  
person of another or in his presence . . . shall be guilty  
. . .”  That is, a person may be guilty of robbery if “by  
assault” he “robs” property that is “in [the] presence” of the  
victim.  As the majority recognizes, the defendant in this  
case committed an assault upon the security guards. Because  
the security guards exercised protective custody and control  
over that property, it remained in their “presence”.  Viewing  
the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecutor, the  
assault was committed so that the defendant could remove the  
property “from [the] presence” of the security guards.  
Defendant’s violent act of assault evidenced his intent to  
unlawfully 
and 
permanently deprive the guards of the property.  
The majority asserts that the dissent misapprehends the  
context of the statutory phrase “in his presence”.  The  
majority emphasizes the words “by force and violence, or by  
assault or putting in fear,” slip op at 19, and assumes that  
these words apply only to the initial taking itself, and  
8  
 
  
therefore, concludes: “the statute identifies unarmed robbery  
as taking another’s property in the other’s presence ‘by force  
and violence, or by assault or putting in fear,’” and “[i]f  
the physical taking was accomplished without force, assault,  
or fear, the statute does not permit treating the larcenous  
crime as a robbery because of a subsequent forceful act.”  Id.  
However, as I have indicated, I believe that, although  
property may be in the actual and wrongful possession of the  
perpetrator, it may still be “in [the] presence” of the victim  
such that the perpetrator may still, “by assault,” “rob” the  
victim.  MCL 750.530. While the statute provides that the act  
must be accomplished “by force and violence, or by assault,”  
the requisite act is more than a mere taking or initial  
larceny of the property as evidenced by the statute’s  
employment of the word “rob.” As we have already indicated,  
“rob” means more broadly an unlawful deprivation of property  
by force.5  
5  The majority approaches the statute in a piecemeal 
fashion, restricting its application to the initial act of 
defendant’s seizure of the property, and ignoring the  
significance of the terms “by assault”, “rob” and “in his 
presence.” Indeed, in People v Calvin, 60 Mich 113, 119; 26 
NW 851 (1886), the offense of robbery was described by this 
Court as separating these two phrases.  Describing the robbery 
statute, the Court stated, of unarmed robbery, that “the 
offense is perpetrated by force and violence . . . and 
robbing, stealing, and taking from the person of another, the 
robber not being armed with a dangerous weapon.”  Id., citing 
How Stat § 9091.  
(continued...)  
9  
 
Therefore, although a larceny may be complete when the  
perpetrator initially wrongfully takes and conceals the  
property, the statute encompasses not merely a larceny, but a  
“rob[bing], steal[ing], and tak[ing]” by force and violence,  
or by assault or putting in fear, of property, that is “in  
[the] presence” of the victim.  MCL 750.530. 
Thus, while  
through 
an 
initial 
larceny the perpetrator may steal property,  
he may not yet have “rob[bed]” that same property. Thus, an  
assault to “rob” may occur after the initial seizure of the  
property.  
Further, the phrase “from the person of another, or in  
his presence” has been defined by this Court, in a manner  
consistent with this interpretation, to mean that the victim  
must 
merely 
maintain 
personal protection over the property for  
it to be considered “in his presence.”  In Covelesky, supra at  
97, this Court stated:  
“[T]he words ‘taking from the person of  
another,’ as used in connection with the common-law 
definition of robbery, are not restricted in  
application to those cases in which the property 
taken is in actual contact with the person of the 
one from whom it is taken, but include within their 
meaning the taking by violence or intimidation from 
the person wronged, in his presence, of property 
which either belongs to him or which is under his  
5(...continued)  
10  
 
 
  
personal protection and control.  And where such  
words have been incorporated into statutes defining 
robbery, 
they 
have 
received 
the 
same  
construction.”[6]  
In 
Covelesky, 
this 
Court further adopted the interpretation by  
the Iowa Supreme Court of the prepositional phrase “from the  
person of another” in the Iowa robbery statute, which “closely  
resembles” that of Michigan:  
“The preposition ‘from’ does not convey the 
idea of contact or propinquity of the person and 
property.  It does not imply that the property is 
in the presence of the person. The thought of the 
statute, as expressed in the language, is that the 
property must be so in the possession or under the 
control of the individual robbed that violence or  
putting in fear was the means used by the robber to 
take it.” [Id. at 99, quoting State v Calhoun, 72 
Iowa 432; 34 NW 194, 196 (1887).]  
As evidenced by this analysis, the majority takes too  
narrow a view of the concept of “possession” when it states  
that “this defendant did not did not use force, violence,  
assault or putting in fear to accomplish his taking of  
property.” Slip op at 23.  Neither the statute nor the common  
6  As noted by the Court in Covelesky, the phrase “in his 
presence” was part of the definition of robbery at common law. 
Id.  at 97, quoting 34 Cyc 1796.  The actual words “or in his  
presence” were not added to the statute until 1931 with the 
adoption of the Michigan Penal Code, 1931 PA 328, § 529. 
People v Moore, 13 Mich App 320, 323, n 6; 164 NW2d 423 
(1968). As the majority acknowledges, Michigan incorporated 
the common-law crime of robbery into the statute.  Slip op at 
5, n 4.  
11  
 
law requires that the victim be in actual possession of the  
property when the force is exercised.  Although in the actual  
possession of the thief, the property may still be in the  
“presence” of the victim, because it is “under his personal  
protection and control,” Covelesky, supra at 97-99, and the  
use of force at the time the perpetrator attempts to  
ultimately remove the property from the presence of the  
victim, 
sufficiently 
establishes 
the 
force 
necessary 
to 
commit  
robbery.7  For a “thief does not obtain the complete,  
independent and absolute possession and control of money or  
property adverse to the rights of the owner where the taking  
is immediately resisted by the owner before the thief can  
remove it from the premises or from the owner’s presence.”  
State v Long, 234 Kan 580, 586; 675 P2d 832 (1984), see also  
People v Clark, 113 Mich App 477, 480; 317 NW2d 664 (1982);  
Newcomb, supra at 430-431.  
The dissent does not disagree that the crimes of larceny  
7  “A thief who finds it necessary to use force or 
threatened force after a taking of property in order to retain 
possession may in legal contemplation be viewed as one who 
never had the requisite dominion and control of the property 
to qualify as a ‘possessor.’” 4 Wharton, Criminal Law (14th 
ed), § 463, at 39-40.  
12  
and robbery are distinct.8  However, for the purpose of the  
crime of robbery, the relevant act encompasses a broader  
spectrum of time, and includes not simply an initial larcenous  
taking, “by force and violence” or “by assault,” but a robbing  
of the victim “by assault” when the property remains in the  
victim’s presence. 
 Thus, as long as the property is in the presence of the  
victim, that is, before the perpetrator reaches a place of  
“temporary safety,” a robbery can occur when the perpetrator  
with actual possession attempts to sever the property from the  
victim’s presence “by force and violence, or by assault or  
putting in fear.” MCL 750.530.9  
8  The universal view at common law was that robbery was 
an aggravated form of larceny.  1 Odgers, The Common Law of 
England (2d ed), p 331. See also Rapalje, Larceny & Kindred 
Offenses (1892), § 58, p 64, noting that the “distinction 
[between larceny and robbery] lies in the presence in one of 
them and the absence in the other of the elements of force and  
putting in fear.”  That common-law robbery is a larceny 
aggravated by the use of force has continued to be the view in 
more modern times. See LaFave & Scott, Criminal Law (1972), 
§94, p 692; Perkins, Criminal Law (2d ed), § 2, at 280.  
9  The concept of “temporary safety” describes the point 
beyond which the property is no longer in the presence of the 
victim.  Practically, the perpetrator has escaped.  At this  
point, 
the 
perpetrator 
has 
consummated 
his 
wrongful 
possession 
by fully converting the property to his own use and may, 
unless apprehended, do with the property as he sees fit.  Upon 
reaching a place of temporary safety, the perpetrator finally 
exercises full “dominion and control” over the property. 
(continued...)  
13  
  
 III. INTENT TO “PERMANENTLY DEPRIVE”  
That 
the 
“transactional 
view” 
constitutes 
the 
proper 
view  
of robbery under the statute is reinforced, in my judgment, by  
the fact that the “intent to permanently deprive” element may  
occur after the initial taking.  Unarmed robbery is a specific  
intent crime.  People v Dupie, 395 Mich 483, 487; 236 NW2d 494  
(1975), citing People v McKeighan, 205 Mich 367; 171 NW 500  
(1919).  The focus of the intent element of robbery is on the  
perpetrator’s intent to permanently deprive the owner of his  
property. King, supra at 428.  
While, ordinarily, the taking and the use of force in a  
robbery are relatively contemporaneous so that the requisite  
intent may be readily inferred from these events, the act of  
force nonetheless may precede or follow the taking.  People v  
LeFlore, 96 Mich App 557, 561-562; 293 NW2d 628 (1980). For  
example, a typical  robbery occurs when, by the threat or use  
of force, the robber forces the victim to turn over property  
directly to him.  However, that the force occurs after the  
initial taking does nothing to negate the “intent to  
permanently deprive” element.  In other words, when the  
9(...continued) 
Wharton, note 7, supra. However, until that point, the victim 
is viewed as continuing to exercise protective custody and 
control over his property. Covelesky, supra at 97-98.  
14 
  
 
perpetrator, by assault, intends still to permanently deprive  
the victim of property that remains in the victim’s presence,  
a robbery can be said to have occurred. 
It is the  
perpetrator’s intent at the time of the use of force–either to  
preserve his unlawful possession of the goods or to effect his  
escape (at least where these occur while the property remains  
“in the presence” of the victim)–that completes the crime of  
robbery.10  
As long as there is a “purposeful relationship” between  
the elements of the crime of robbery: the act, whether that be  
robbing, stealing or taking, which establishes the intent to  
permanently deprive the victim of his property, and the force,  
which aggravates that crime into robbery, the robbery is  
complete. 
LeFlore, supra at 562, citing LaFave & Scott,  
Criminal Law, § 94, p 701-702.  “The entire larcenous  
10
 Further, the perpetrator’s “willingness to use force 
against those who would restrain him in flight suggests that 
he would have employed force to effect the theft had the need 
arisen,” in other words, that he has the specific intent to 
permanently deprive the owner of his property.  2 LaFave &  
Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, § 8.11, p 453.  This view of  
robbery recognizes that robbery is a crime against the person, 
and its prosecution is intended to protect the person robbed. 
People v Hendricks, 446 Mich 435, 449-450; 521 NW2d 546  
(1994).  Where a perpetrator uses force against a person with 
the intent to permanently deprive that person of property over 
which he has protective custody and control, the perpetrator 
evidences the conduct that the statute seeks to punish.  
15  
 
 
transaction should be reviewed to determine if there is a  
continuity of intent between the forceful act and the taking  
(or vice versa).” Id.11  
To clarify, consider the perpetrator who is observed  
shoplifting and manages to escape from the store before being  
apprehended.  In such a case, the only crime that occurs is a  
larceny.
 The larceny is complete upon the perpetrator’s  
concealment of the item, for it is at that time that the  
intent to deprive the owner of the property merged with the  
actual taking.  
Next 
consider 
the 
perpetrator 
who 
is 
observed 
shoplifting  
and who is followed out into the parking lot.  Before being  
confronted by the security guards, he drops the property onto  
the ground or he is apprehended.  Again, the crime is larceny,  
for no further criminal intent may be inferred from his acts.  
Finally, consider the perpetrator who uses force in the  
parking lot, as in this case, while he is still in actual  
possession of the property. The perpetrator is still viewed  
under the robbery statute as having robbed the victim because  
11  See Briley v Commonwealth, 221 Va 532, 543; 273 SE2d 
48 (1980), stating that “[i]n a robbery prosecution, where the 
violence against the victim and the trespass to his property 
combine in a continuing, unbroken sequence of events, the 
robbery itself continues as well for the same period of time.”  
16  
  
 
  
the property was still in the victim’s presence when the  
assault occurred.  The property was at the time of the thief’s  
initial taking of it, and is still at the time of the assault,  
“in [the] presence” of the victim.  MCL 750.530. The security  
guards continued to exercise “protective custody and control”  
over the property. Covelesky, supra at 97-98.  
IV. TRANSACTIONAL VIEW  
Having established that the statute encompasses not  
merely an initial taking of property “by force and violence”  
or “by assault”, but rather, a robbing of the victim by  
assault, where property continues to be in the presence of the  
victim, the question next to be addressed is whether this  
Court should recognize the transactional view of robbery as it  
has hitherto been applied in Michigan.  
A. COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS  
While this Court has never expressly adopted the  
“transactional view” of robbery, Michigan jurisprudence on  
this issue is no tabula rasa.  The Court of Appeals, including  
the panel in this case, has expressly applied this view to  
robbery for at least thirty years.12
 See, e.g., People v  
12  The deep rootedness of the “transaction approach” is 
further reflected by its regular articulation in recent  
opinions of the Court of Appeals which were not even viewed as 
(continued...)  
17  
 
 
Sanders, 28 Mich App 274, 277; 184 NW2d 269 (1970) (stating  
that, in the context of armed robbery, “the incident of the  
taking must be viewed in its totality in order to ascertain  
the intent of the defendant when the assault occurs”); People  
v Beebe, 70 Mich App 154, 158; 245 NW2d 547 (1976) (stating  
that the view of the majority of other jurisdictions considers  
robbery as an “ongoing transaction” rather than one “broken up  
into its component acts”); LeFlore, supra at 562, stating that  
the “assault may follow the taking if that force is used to  
completely sever the victim’s possession”); Clark, supra at  
12(...continued) 
warranting 
publication. 
 
People 
v 
Garrett, 
unpublished 
opinion 
per 
curiam, 
issued 
March 
26, 
2002 
(Docket 
No.  
227944)(affirming 
the 
following 
instruction: 
“The 
use 
of 
force 
in retaining property taken or in attempting to escape rather 
than in the taking of property itself is sufficient to supply 
the element of force essential to the offense of robbery”); 
People 
v 
Scruggs, 
unpublished opinion per curiam, issued March 
19, 2002 (Docket No. 225337)(affirming an armed robbery 
conviction where defendant brandished a knife during his 
escape from the scene of a larceny); People v Cherry, 
unpublished opinion per curiam, issued March 8, 2002 (Docket 
No. 224544) (affirming a conviction in an almost-identical 
case involving a parking lot fight with security guards); 
People v Garza, unpublished memorandum opinion, issued July 
27, 2001 (Docket No. 223543)(observing that the “use of force 
in retaining the property taken or in attempting to escape is 
sufficient to supply the element of force or coercion  
essential to the offense of robbery”); People v Wimbush, 
unpublished opinion per curiam, issued April 28, 2000 (Docket 
No. 210709) (asserting that “Michigan has adopted a  
transactional approach for analyzing robbery”).  
18  
 
 
 
  
480 
(stating 
that 
Michigan employs the “‘transaction’ test for  
armed robbery, which provides that a taking is not considered  
complete until the assailant has effected his escape because  
the victim is still considered in possession of his  
property”); People v Denny, 114 Mich App 320, 324; 319 NW2d  
574 (1982); People v Turner, 120 Mich App 23, 28; 328 NW2d 5  
(1982); People v Tinsley, 176 Mich App 119, 121; 439 NW2d 313  
(1989); Newcomb, supra at 430-431; People v Velasquez, 189  
Mich App 14, 17; 472 NW2d 289 (1991).  
Thus, the Court of Appeals has consistently interpreted  
the 
statutes 
defining robbery and armed robbery as “continuous  
offense[s], which [are] not complete until the perpetrator  
reaches a place of temporary safety.”  Tinsley, supra at 121.  
This 
line 
of 
precedent, with its attendant reasoning, provides  
considerable 
support 
for 
the 
proposition 
that 
the  
“transactional view” of robbery is consistent with Michigan  
jurisprudence.13  
B. ANALOGOUS PRINCIPLES IN SUPREME COURT  
In 
addition 
to 
being consistent with the robbery statute,  
13  Cases in other jurisdictions with similar statutory 
language have also found sufficient evidence of robbery in 
strikingly similar factual circumstances to the instant case. 
See, e.g., People v Estes, 147 Cal App3d 23, 26; 194 Cal Rptr 
909 (1983)[Cal Penal Code § 211]; State v Long, supra at 2  
[Kan Stat Ann § 21-3426].  
19  
Michigan case law, and the common law, the “transactional  
view” of robbery has been implicitly accepted by this Court in  
other contexts. While the majority asserts, correctly, that  
this Court has never recognized the “transactional approach”  
in the specific context of robbery, slip op at 9, this Court  
has adopted a “transactional view” of robbery in the context  
of felony murder, where the murder occurs after commission of  
the robbery.  People v Podolski, 332 Mich 508, 515-518; 52  
NW2d 201 (1952).  There, the Court stated that “the robber may  
be said to be engaged in the commission of the crime while he  
is endeavoring to escape and make away with the goods taken.”  
Id. at 518.  In Podolski at 515-518, this Court expressly  
adopted the reasoning of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in  
Commonwealth v Moyer, 357 Pa 181, 190-191; 53 A2d 736 (1947),  
which stated:  
“It is equally consistent with reason and 
sound public policy to hold that when a felon’s 
attempt to commit robbery or burglary sets in 
motion a chain of events which were or should have  
been within his contemplation when the motion was 
initiated, he should be held responsible for any 
death which by direct and almost inevitable  
sequence results from the initial criminal act . .  
. .  Every robber or burglar knows that a likely 
later act in the chain of events he inaugurates 
will be the use of deadly force against him on the 
part of the selected victim. For whatever results  
follow from that natural and legal use of  
retaliating 
force, 
the 
felon 
must 
be 
held  
responsible.”  
20  
Further, the Podolski Court at 517-518 agreed with the  
reasoning asserted by the prosecutor, quoting from Wharton,  
Homicide (3d ed), p 186:  
“Where a homicide is committed within the res  
gestae of a felony, however, it is committed in the 
perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, a felony 
within the meaning of such statutes.  That the  
attempt to commit the felony was not far advanced 
does not lessen the offense.  And a burglar who 
breaks into a building, or who shoots a person who 
discovers him in an effort to escape, cannot avoid 
punishment for murder in the first degree, upon the 
theory that the burglary consisted in breaking in, 
and was consummated before the killing. A burglar 
may be said to be engaged in the commission of the 
crime of burglary while making away with the 
plunder, and while engaged in securing it.  So, a 
robbery within the meaning of a rule that a  
homicide committed in the perpetration of a robbery 
is murder in the first degree is not necessarily 
concluded by the removal of the goods from the 
presence of the owner; and it is not necessary that 
the homicide should be committed at the precise 
time and place of the robbery.”[14]  
14 The majority criticizes the dissent’s use of Podolski.  
The majority states that in that case “[t]his Court did not 
base the felony murder on a ‘transactional’ notion of  
robbery.”  Slip op at 21. The dissent does not assert that  
Podolski adopted a transactional approach to robbery. 
The  
case is cited only to illustrate that a felony murder 
conviction can be based on a killing that occurs after the 
predicate crime of robbery.  Further, this case is cited to 
illustrate 
that 
the 
concept 
of 
an 
ongoing 
criminal  
transaction, in which the elements of the crime may be viewed 
as part of an unbroken chain of events, is an appropriate 
method for analyzing the conduct of individuals under the 
criminal law.  The transactional approach to robbery merely 
recognizes the premise of Podolski that the use of force after  
a taking of property is sufficient to consummate the crime of 
(continued...)  
21  
 
In my judgment, it is altogether reasonable to extend, by  
analogy, this reasoning with respect to felony murder for a  
killing committed after a burglary or after a robbery, to the  
case of an assault committed after an initial taking, but  
before the perpetrator’s escape.  
In People v Gimotty, 216 Mich App 254, 257-259; 549 NW2d  
39 (1996), the Court of Appeals held that the defendant had  
not reached a place of temporary safety in his escape from the  
scene of retail fraud, defined in the chapter on larceny, MCL  
750.356, and, thus, that the death of a child in a vehicle  
struck by the defendant’s vehicle during a high-speed police  
chase from the store was sufficiently connected to the  
underlying offense to support felony murder.  See also People  
v Oliver, 63 Mich App 509, 523; 234 NW2d 679 (1975); People v  
Smith, 55 Mich App 184, 189; 222 NW2d 172 (1974). Again, by  
analogy, these cases support the view that an assault  
following an ordinary larceny elevates the crime to robbery  
and that a perpetrator who uses that force at any time before  
reaching a place of temporary safety in an effort to retain  
the property or escape with the property can be charged with  
14(...continued) 
robbery.  
22  
 
 
robbery.15  
Finally, we would observe that the “transactional view”  
of robbery is also consistent with the premises that underlie  
the greater culpability of the perpetrator who resorts to  
violence in an attempt to steal property.16  It is not the  
victim, but the perpetrator who should bear the full  
responsibility for his actions.  “‘Every robber or burglar  
knows that a likely later act in the chain of events he  
inaugurates will be the [attempted] use of deadly force  
against him on the part of the selected victim.  For whatever  
results follow from that natural and legal use of retaliating  
force, the felon must be held responsible.’” Podolski, supra  
15  Surely, it is not because a larceny occurred that the 
property in this case can said to be out of the victim’s 
presence.  Indeed, because the security guards maintained 
uninterrupted surveillance over defendant and because they 
converged on him in a place where they were authorized to 
confront him and recover the property, the property was very 
much 
within 
their 
“protective 
custody 
and 
control.”  
Covelesky, supra at 97-98. 
For the purposes of some 
larcenies, the property may be removed from the victim’s 
presence, but the bare fact that a larceny occurs cannot, in 
every case, be deemed such removal.  
16  Blackstone observed that the “force . . . makes the  
violation of the person more atrocious than privately 
stealing.”  4 Blackstone, Commentaries, Public Wrongs, ch 17,  
p 242.  Blackstone refers also to the parallel view of robbery 
in the civil law:  “qui vi rapuit, fur improbior esse  
videtur,” he who steals by violence must be judged with 
greater culpability as a robber.  Id. 
See also Rapalje, 
supra, § 444, pp 632-633.  
23  
 
  
  
at 516 (citations omitted). 
The use of force by the  
perpetrator against the owner of property who discovers his  
deed is an act, the need for which should not take the  
perpetrator by surprise.  The use of force in such a  
circumstance should not be viewed as unusual or uncommon, but  
rather as a typical incident of the crime of larceny.17  
V. APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLE  
When analyzing whether sufficient evidence has been  
presented 
to 
sustain 
a criminal conviction, this Court reviews  
the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecutor and  
determines whether any rational trier of fact could have found  
that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a  
reasonable doubt.  People v Nowak, 462 Mich 392, 399-400; 614  
NW2d 78 (2000).  In that case, the Court articulated that this  
“standard of review is deferential:  a reviewing court is  
required to draw all reasonable inferences and make  
credibility choices in support of the jury verdict.” Id. at  
17
 “Robbery, while containing elements of theft of 
property, is primarily an assaultive crime . . .  “Robbery 
violates the social interest in the safety and security of the 
person as well as the social interest in the protection of 
property rights. 
In fact, as a matter of abstract  
classification, it probably should be grouped with offenses 
against the person . . . .’” [Hendricks, supra at 449.]  
24  
400.  
The 
“transactional view” of robbery, as explained in this  
opinion, and in light of the facts and charges presented to  
the 
jury, 
supports 
defendant’s conviction in the instant case.  
The record establishes that the Meijer security guards  
observed defendant commit a larceny when he concealed items  
that he had taken from a Meijer’s department store and  
proceeded to leave the store without paying for them.  The  
security guards continued to surveil defendant during this  
entire transaction, from the moment he took the property and  
concealed it until the altercation in the parking lot.  During  
their observation of defendant, the security guards continued  
to exercise protective custody and control over the property.  
That is, the security guards had the authority and the right  
to take it back.  Thus, the property was for all purposes “in  
[the] presence” of the guards.  MCL 750.530. 
As security  
guards for the property’s owner, Meijer’s, these guards had a  
right and the authority to regain possession of the property.  
In the moments prior to the confrontation, defendant had a  
choice either to surrender peacefully or to attempt to remove  
the property from their presence by force, in this particular  
case, by assault.  He chose the latter, and his conduct  
thereby evidenced an intent to forcefully and permanently  
25  
 
  
 
deprive Meijer’s of its property.  By assault, defendant  
robbed the security guards of property that was in their  
presence.  It is at the moment when the defendant turned to  
force (which caused one of the guards to suffer a fractured  
bone in her face and two broken teeth) that his intent to  
deprive the owner of its property and the use of force merged  
to satisfy the elements of the crime of robbery.  
VI. COMMON LAW  
A. FORCE AFTER INITIAL TAKING  
Finally, an analysis of the common law supports the view  
that force used after an initial wrongful seizure of property,  
to prevent the victim’s resistance or to escape with the  
property, is sufficient to satisfy the elements of the crime  
of robbery.  The common-law crime of robbery was defined as  
“the unlawful taking possession of the goods of another by  
means of violence or threats of violence, used with the object  
of obtaining those goods from the owner, without his consent  
and with the intention of depriving him permanently of all the  
benefits of his ownership.”  1 Odgers, 
The Common Law of  
England (2d ed), ch VIII, p 331.  In this work, which is a  
compilation of “all important statutes and decisions,” the  
authors declare that where a person “used any personal  
violence at the time of or immediately before or immediately  
26  
 
after such robbery, he may be sentenced” as a robber was at  
that time, “to penal servitude for life.”  Id.  The difference  
between larceny and robbery is further explained: “If the only  
violence used occurs accidentally and unintentionally in the  
prisoner’s efforts to obtain possession of the property, the  
offence is larceny from the person and not robbery.  But if  
violence is necessary to enable the prisoner to obtain  
possession of the property, and the prisoner on discovering  
this intentionally resorts to violence with that object, this  
is robbery.”  Id. at 332. 
In an example that follows, the  
author sets out the distinction between the successful escape  
and the violent altercation before the robber completes the  
escape:  
Thus, the snatching of a purse from a  
prosecutor, who is unaware of what is happening 
until after the purse is gone from his possession, 
cannot amount to robbery; but it will be otherwise 
if the prisoner does something to put the  
prosecutor in bodily fear before snatching the 
purse, for here the fear precedes the taking.  
So, if the prisoner obtains possession of the 
property without actual violence or threats of 
violence, the crime is only larceny from the 
person, unless the prisoner immediately after  
taking possession of the property uses personal 
violence.” [Id.]  
Finally, the common-law indictment for robbery was pled  
as follows:  
27  
  
 
 
A.B., on the ___day of __, in the county of  
, 
robbed C.D. of a watch, and at the time of or 
immediately before or immediately after such  
robbery did use personal violence to the said C.D. 
[2 Odgers, at 1478.]  
Compare the view expressed by Rapalje in 1892, which also  
supports the view that the force element of robbery can occur  
after the initial seizure of the property: “To constitute  
robbery, the force used must be either before or at the time  
of the taking and of such a nature as to show that it was  
intended to overpower the party robbed, or to prevent  
resistance on his part, and not merely to get possession of  
the property.”  Rapalje, Larceny & Kindred Offenses (1892), §  
446, p 637 (emphasis added).  These views are more precise  
with regard to the actual nature of the crime of robbery as  
one of force against the victim to remove property from his  
presence.
 It is the use of force “not merely to get  
possession,” but also, “to prevent resistance” that satisfies  
the elements of the crime.  Id.18  In my judgment, the majority  
18  The majority is incorrect in suggesting that this 
quotation does not reflect Rapalje’s view of the common law. 
Slip op at 8, n 6.  While Rapalje uses this quotation in 
discussing a North Carolina state court decision, he is merely 
repeating language from his own earlier statement cited by the 
majority, id., and then describing what he believes to be the 
consistent North Carolina view. Rapalje does not suggest in 
any way that the North Carolina view is inconsistent with his 
earlier statement. The phrase “not merely to get possession 
(continued...)  
28  
 
 
  
errs in concluding that the common law of robbery would not  
support defendant’s conviction in the instant case.  The  
common law, which, as the majority acknowledges, has been  
incorporated into MCL 750.530, supported a conviction for  
robbery when a perpetrator used force against the victim even  
after the property had already been taken by the perpetrator,  
if the perpetrator used that force to prevent the victim’s  
resistance or to escape with the property.  This is what  
occurred in this case.19  
B. BLACKSTONE  
In contending that the common law supports its view, the  
18(...continued) 
. . . [but also] to prevent resistance” fully supports his 
view that, even where a robber first possesses “the goods, up 
to the time of the felonious violence,” the property is still 
in “the possession of the owner; and the taking, being in [the 
owner’s] presence, is . . . from [the owner’s] person.” 
Rapalje, supra, § 445, at 633. 
When read in its entirety, 
Rapalje’s 
quote 
is 
entirely consistent with the dissent’s view 
that the property may already be in the possession of the 
perpetrator, that is, it may already have been initially 
“taken” when the forceful act necessary to complete the 
robbery occurs.  
19  By its approval of Odgers, slip op at 7, n 6, the 
majority appears to concede that the force used in a robbery 
may occur after the taking. 
Somehow, however, in the very 
same breath, the majority asserts that Odgers offers support 
for its view that the force and the taking must be  
contemporaneous.  If the force may occur immediately after the  
initial taking, it is hard to understand the basis for the 
majority’s 
proposition 
that 
there 
must 
be 
absolute  
contemporaneousness.  
29  
 
majority makes much of the quotation from Blackstone that “if  
one privately steals sixpence from the person of another, and  
afterwards keeps it by putting him in fear, this is no  
robbery, for the fear is subsequent . . . .”  4 Blackstone,  
Commentaries, Wrongs, ch 17, p 242. However, as pointed out  
by Perkins, Criminal Law (2d ed), p 348, this quotation has  
been misapplied:  
If the two transactions are essentially 
distinct–if subsequent to the larceny the owner 
should come upon the thief and be prevented from 
retaking his property by force or violence-- the 
thief would be guilty of larceny and assault, but 
not robbery.  But if the violence or intimidation  
is part of the res gestae of the larceny the 
offense is generally held to be elevated to the 
category of robbery . . . . [Id. at 349.]  
The majority attempts to distinguish this quotation from  
Perkins in three ways, all of which are unavailing.  First,  
the majority states that the dissent “fails to set forth the  
full quotation from Perkins and therefore misunderstands the  
point that Perkins was making.”  Slip op at 11, n 9. 
To  
demonstrate that the “transactional view” is not only  
consistent with the statute and Michigan case-law, but also  
consistent with the common law as reflected by Blackstone, we  
set forth the language from Perkins in full.  Following the  
disputed quotation from Blackstone, Perkins writes:  
Occasionally this has been misapplied.  For  
30  
 
 
example, during a chance meeting D suggested he 
might be interested in buying the gun X was 
carrying and asked permission to examine it, which 
was granted.  Finding the gun loaded D then pointed 
it at X and told him to run for his life.  As X  
backed away, D ran off with the weapon.  A  
conviction of robbery was reversed on the theory 
that the resort to intimidation was after the  
acquisition of the gun.[20] 
This completely 
overlooks the distinction between possession and 
custody.
 When D received the gun to examine 
momentarily in the presence of X, D had custody 
only.  Had he run off with the gun without violence 
or intimidation he would have been guilty of 
larceny because this would have been a trespassory 
taking and carrying away with all the elements of 
that offense.  And since he actually did this under 
a threat to kill he clearly committed robbery, as 
the same court had held earlier under an equivalent 
set of facts.  And a motorist whose tank had been  
filled with gas at his request, after which he held 
off the attendant at gunpoint, under threat to 
shoot while he drove away without making payment, 
was properly convicted of robbery. Furthermore, if 
one snatches property from the hand of another and 
uses force or intimidation to prevent an immediate 
retaking by the other, this is all one transaction 
and constitutes robbery.  If the two transactions  
are essentially distinct,–if subsequent to the 
larceny the owner should come upon the thief and be 
prevented from retaking his property by force or 
violence, the thief would be guilty of larceny and 
assault, but not robbery.  But if the violence or  
intimidation is part of the res gestae of the  
larceny the offense is generally held to be  
elevated to the category of robbery, although there 
is still some authority for the earlier view that  
20  As the majority points out, Perkins disagrees with the 
reversal of this conviction, and the basis of his disagreement 
lies in the rationale supporting the reversal that “resort to 
intimidation was after the acquisition of the gun.”  This  
supports the view that the force required to convict one of 
robbery may occur subsequent to the initial wrongful taking.  
31  
 
force or intimidation used to retain possession of 
property taken without it, is not sufficient. 
[Perkins, supra at 348-349.]  
The majority concedes that, in the first example given by  
Perkins, “the thief initially had mere custody of the weapon,  
but his possession of the weapon was secured by threat of  
force.”
 Slip op at 11, n 9. 
In this case, defendant,  
likewise, had mere custody of the items, and the attempt to  
gain complete possession of the items, that is, to remove the  
items from the presence of the security guards, was secured by  
the use of force.  As explained elsewhere, the successful  
escape with the property, or the complete removal of the  
property from the presence of the victim, is not a necessary  
element of robbery. Rather, escape and such removal merely  
indicate the end point of the “transaction.”21  
Second, the majority states that Perkins’ use of the  
21  The majority asserts that defendant’s “use of force 
or violence was not to take the property, but to retain it and 
escape apprehension.  It follows that defendant did not commit  
the offense of unarmed robbery.”  Slip op at 18. 
However, 
defendant attempted to escape apprehension with the property. 
Thus, defendant did use force in an attempt to complete his 
wrongful possession of the property.  Further, we do not, as 
the majority suggests, support “the fiction . . . that a 
robbery is not complete until a defendant reaches temporary 
safety.”  Slip op at 10. Rather, we believe that a robbery 
may be completed whenever a perpetrator uses force to resist 
or to escape before the time that he reaches a place of 
temporary safety.  
32  
  
 
words “‘res gestae’ . . . does not suggest an expansive  
‘transactional’ view of robbery, rather it narrowly refers to  
the 
events 
occurring 
contemporaneously 
with 
the  
taking–precisely the time frame in which the application of  
force must occur.” Slip op at 12, n 9. However, “res gestae”  
in terms of the law, and in the context in which Perkins used  
it, simply means “[t]he whole of the transaction under  
investigation and every part of it.”  It means “things or  
things happened.” Indeed, a res gestae witness is defined as  
“[a]n eyewitness to some event in the continuum of the  
criminal transaction and one whose testimony will aid in  
developing a full disclosure of the facts surrounding the  
alleged commission of the charged offense.”  Black’s Law  
Dictionary (6th ed). Thus, that the use of force against the  
owner of property occurs after the latter observes the  
wrongful acts of the perpetrator would seem not to be  
particularly relevant to analyzing whether a robbery occurs  
because the conduct of the perpetrator occurs as part of an  
unbroken sequence of events.  The concept of res gestae, in  
the context in which it is used by Perkins, is wholly  
consistent with the view that the perpetrator’s use of force  
before, contemporaneously with, or immediately after he is  
observed taking property in the presence of the victim  
33  
 
provides the requisite force required to convict the  
perpetrator of robbery.  
Third, the majority states that the quotation from  
Perkins supports, rather than contradicts, the interpretation  
of Blackstone’s quotation.  Slip op at 12, n 9. We do not  
disagree 
that 
Perkins’ 
quotation 
supports 
Blackstone’s 
concept  
of robbery.  As Perkins notes, the quotation has been  
misapplied.  And as explained in this dissent, it has been  
misapplied in the same manner that the majority seeks to apply  
it in their opinion.  The quotation has been misapplied to  
mean that force used at any time after an initial seizure of  
property from the person or from his presence by the  
perpetrator cannot constitute the crime of robbery.  
However, a closer analysis of the common-law crime of  
robbery explains the misunderstanding. Blackstone’s quotation  
contemplates 
a 
“private stealing”, one which is not discovered  
until the perpetrator and the property have left the presence  
of the victim.  Use of the words “private stealing” is  
significant, because it specifies what, at common law, was a  
theft by stealth, or a theft completed without the victim’s  
knowledge.  
Blackstone 
explicitly 
contemplates 
that 
force 
used  
by one after he “privately steals” is not considered a  
robbery.  
The 
quotation from Perkins likewise contemplates the  
34  
 
distinction between a private stealing, and the use of force  
during the time that the property is being taken.  Perkins  
states: “If the two transactions are essentially distinct,—if  
subsequent to the larceny the owner should come upon the thief  
and be prevented from retaking his property by force or  
violence, the thief would be guilty of larceny and assault,  
but not robbery.” Id. at 349.  
Blackstone’s use of the phrase “private stealing” is  
perhaps better understood by the definition of the common-law  
crime of robbery given by Sir Edward Coke, the preeminent  
chief justice of England, and author of the comprehensive  
Institutes of the Laws of England. In defining the crime of  
robbery, Coke stated:  
Robbery is a felony by the common law, 
committed by a violent assault, upon the person of 
another, by putting him in fear, and taking from 
his person his money or other goods of any value 
whatsoever. [Coke (1797), pt 3, p 68.]  
Coke 
explains 
the 
difference 
between 
the 
private 
stealing  
and the use of force by the robber by distinguishing between  
the “cutpurse”22 and the “robber.”  In this regard, he states  
that:  
22  A “cutpurse” is defined by the Oxford English 
Dictionary as “[a] person who stole by cutting purses from the 
girdles from which they were suspended; a pickpocket, a 
thief.” The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993).  
35  
 
both take [property] from the person,[23] but [the 
cutpurse] takes it clam et secrete,[24] without  
assault or putting in fear, and the robber by 
violent assault, and putting in fear. [Id. at 68.]  
Next, in defining the term “taking,” Coke describes the  
situation in which the cutpurse cuts the strings of the  
victim’s purse and the purse then falls to the ground.  In  
this situation, there is no robbery because the perpetrator  
never has possession.  Id. However, if the perpetrator picks  
up the purse, and then, “in striving . . . let[s] it fall and  
never [takes] it again,”[25] this, according to Coke, is a  
“taking” 
within 
the 
meaning of common-law robbery, “because he  
had it in his possession; the continuance of his possession is  
not required by the law” and after it was secretly in his  
possession, the use of force occurred. Id.  
It is evident from this explanation by Coke, that the  
distinction between one who successfully “privately steals,”  
as referenced by Blackstone, and the one who, attempting to  
23  As explained, both at common law, and under Michigan’s 
statutes, this includes property “in the presence” of the 
victim.  
24  “To keep secret, to conceal or hide.” The New Shorter  
Oxford English Dictionary (1993).  
25 
  The word “striving” is defined as to “[e]ngage in 
violent conflict, struggle (with or against an opponent, for 
a thing). The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (1993).  
36  
  
privately steal, is discovered in the process, and uses force  
in order to complete the taking, is the distinction between  
the cutpurse and the robber.  It is also evident, from Coke’s  
description, that force used after the initial taking of the  
property may still give rise to the crime of robbery.  The  
common-law description of the crime of robbery is, as the  
dissent 
demonstrates, 
consistent 
with 
the 
above 
quotation 
from  
Perkins, and consistent with MCL 750.530.  
Clearly, the common-law description of robbery also  
supports a conviction in the present case. 
The defendant,  
like the cutpurse, first took the property in an attempt to  
secretly steal it.  However, here there was no “private  
stealing”.  After being observed taking the property and upon  
being confronted by the security guards, defendant assaulted  
them in an effort to remove the property from their presence.  
In striving with the guards, the property fell to the ground.26  
26 
The majority wishes to assert that there were two 
separate incidents here, a larceny and an assault.  While  
legally, there was an initial larceny, that crime was elevated 
to a robbery when the perpetrator used force in order to 
finally exercise possession of the property. That defendant  
was observed taking the property in the store, and chose to 
use force only after being confronted by the security guards, 
does not in any way transform the defendant’s use of force to 
permanently deprive the owner of his property. Furthermore, 
the completed larceny in this case in no way removed the 
property from the presence of the security guards, as they 
(continued...)  
37  
  
 
The perpetrator took possession of the property while it  
remained in the presence of the security guards, and there is  
no necessity that he used force to initially take the  
property, but only that he strove to keep it, however  
unsuccessfully.27  Thus, both at common law, and consistent  
26(...continued) 
continued to exercise protective custody and control over the 
property.  
27
 The majority states that the dissent leaves the 
majority “without a satisfactory explanation” why it would 
permit a use of force that does not accomplish a taking to 
increase an offense of larceny to unarmed robbery.  Slip op at  
19.  However, we reiterate that robbery is a crime against the 
person and not against property.  Hendricks, supra at n 10.  
That the security guards waited to confront defendant in the 
parking lot does nothing to negate the fact that, in 
furthering his criminal purpose, defendant assaulted them 
while the property was still in their presence.  This incident  
satisfied the criminal conduct that the statute seeks to  
punish.  Thus, it is entirely reasonable to conclude that, 
under the statute, the crime of robbery is complete when the 
perpetrator uses force at any time during the transaction 
before his reaching a place of temporary safety, i.e., before 
escape.  There is no necessity of escape, nor is there a 
necessity 
that 
the 
perpetrator 
successfully 
sever 
the 
victim’s 
possession, which, as we explain is the same as a successful 
escape. 
A person may not be convicted of robbery if he 
successfully escapes, thereby, in fact removing the property 
from the presence of the victim, and afterwards uses force 
against those who attempt to apprehend him.  A successful  
escape simply designates the end point of the transaction, and 
it is that point in time after which the property is no longer 
in the victim’s presence and after which the use of force 
against those seeking to apprehend the perpetrator for the 
earlier larceny would be merely an assault.  Therefore, it 
does not, as the majority asserts, “def[y] logic to say that, 
when a defendant commits larceny but loses possession of the 
(continued...)  
38  
with the statute, there is no necessity that the force element  
of robbery occur before or contemporaneously with the initial  
taking.  Force used after the initial taking, where the latter  
occurs under the observation of the victim, and while the  
property can be said to remain in the victim’s presence, is  
sufficient to constitute the crime of robbery.  
Finally, I would point out that the transactional  
approach to robbery has the added practical advantage of being  
defined by a fixed beginning and end.  Where does the majority  
draw this line? Can one never be convicted of robbery if he  
uses force to retain property or to escape simply because such  
force occurs after he has initially taken the property?  When  
does the majority believe that a taking is completed?  If a  
27(...continued) 
property during a struggle, defendant’s crime can be elevated 
to unarmed robbery.” Slip op at 23, n 23.  
Further, the decision by the victim of a robbery to wait 
to confront one who has unlawfully taken property may be, in 
the case of a business, at least in part a matter of practical 
business judgment. It does not seem unreasonable for such a  
business to wait until the perpetrator is outside its store in 
order to avoid a violent confrontation within the store and to  
protect its property and customers.  Because robbery is a 
crime against the person, it is the conduct of the perpetrator 
who resorts to violence to further his criminal design, and 
not the judgment of the business when to confront the 
perpetrator, that should be analyzed in considering whether a 
robbery has occurred.  
39  
 
perpetrator does not use force at the moment he physically  
removes property from the shelf of a market and conceals it,  
would it be sufficient if he uses force when he is prevented  
from leaving the proximity of that shelf; when attempting to  
leave 
the 
particular 
aisle or department; when passing through  
the checkout area; or when attempting to leave the store  
itself?  Is the fact that one purports to conceal the property  
beneath his clothes sufficient to find that he could not  
thereafter commit a robbery? In contrast to the lack of the  
majority’s definition of “contemporaneous”, the transactional  
approach to robbery recognizes that the use of force that  
occurs at any time before the perpetrator of a larceny has  
reached a place of temporary safety transforms such larceny  
into a robbery.28  
Quite in addition to the fact that it is wrong in its  
understanding of the law of robbery in Michigan, the practical  
consequence of the majority’s opinion is as follows: in every  
instance in which a person who has stolen property from a  
28  The majority states that this dissent “asserts, 
without supporting authority, that ‘for the purpose of the 
crime of robbery, the relevant act encompasses a broader 
spectrum of time . . . .” Slip op at 14. (emphasis added). 
Although perhaps this dissent has not persuaded the majority 
of the merits of its position, see, nonetheless, pp 1-38, 
supra.  
40  
 
 
 
store in an amount less than $200,29 as in this case, and who,  
before escaping with such property is confronted by and  
engages in violence against the victim, such person will be  
guilty 
merely 
of 
third-degree retail fraud and assault, rather  
than the greater crime of robbery. Instead of being subject  
to a potential 15-year sentence for robbery, MCL 750.530, the  
perpetrator will be subject to punishment of no more than 93  
days in jail for the third degree retail fraud, MCL 750.356(5)  
and MCL 750.356d(4)(b), and no more than one year in jail if  
the subsequent assault is a serious assault under MCL 750.81  
and MCL 750.81a.  Further, the majority fails to take into  
account 
MCL 
750.356d(5), 
which 
expressly 
prohibits 
prosecution  
under MCL 750.360, larceny from a building, where a person  
commits 
third-degree retail fraud.30  See also People v Ramsey,  
218 Mich App 191, 195; 553 NW2d 360 (1996).  If, as the  
majority holds, there can be no robbery under these  
circumstances, and there can be no independent prosecution of  
29  See MCL 750.356d(4)(b).  
30  Defendant in the instant case took property from the  
store offered for sale for approximately $120. 
MCL  
750.356d(3) also prohibits prosecution for larceny from a 
building under MCL 750.360, of one who is guilty of second 
degree retail fraud, defined in MCL 750.356d(a) as occurring 
where a person steals items from a store that have a value of 
greater than $200 but less than $1000.  
41  
  
 
defendant for larceny from a building where the perpetrator  
commits second or third degree retail fraud as in the instant  
case, then the disparity in penalties between robbery and what  
the defendant here can be charged with is quite substantial.31  
We do not criticize the majority on account of this  
disparity, because it is their obligation to faithfully  
interpret the law as they see it, and they have done that  
here. It is not their obligation to correct what they might  
(or might not) view as inexplicable disparities in criminal  
punishments.  We do suggest, however, that such a substantial  
disparity in punishments, based upon whether the violence  
occurred contemporaneously with the taking, or immediately  
31  While the majority is correct in citing Ramsey for the  
proposition that “one charged with unarmed robbery can be 
convicted of larceny in a building even where the underlying 
facts would support a finding of retail fraud,” slip op at 24, 
n 23, that was a case that applied the transactional view of 
robbery to facts nearly identical to those in the instant 
case.
 There, the court correctly held that larceny in a 
building is a cognate lesser included offense of unarmed 
robbery and that one charged with unarmed robbery can be 
convicted of larceny in a building, even where the underlying 
facts support a finding of retail fraud. However, the court 
also clearly stated that this scenario is true, only “where 
the facts support ... a charge [of unarmed robbery].” Id. at  
194.  Because the majority is holding that there can be no 
unarmed robbery in cases such as Ramsey and this case, and 
because, where a person commits retail fraud in the second or 
third degree, he cannot be charged with larceny from a 
building under MCL 750.356d, our analysis of the disparity in 
penalties remains correct.  
42  
 
 
thereafter as part of the same transaction, could never  
reasonably have been contemplated by the Legislature.  
CONCLUSION  
In my judgment, the “transactional view” of robbery as it  
has been described in this opinion, is deeply rooted both in  
the common law, and in the Michigan statute and case law.  
Under the “transactional view”, a person can be convicted of  
robbery if, before reaching a place of temporary safety, such  
person uses force to permanently deprive an owner of the  
actual or constructive possession of his property.  Such force  
may either be employed in initially taking the property, in  
attempting to retain the property, or in attempting to escape  
with the property.  Defendant here used force in an attempt  
either to retain the property or to escape with the property.  
Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of  
Appeals 
and 
reinstate 
defendant’s 
unarmed 
robbery 
conviction.32  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and WEAVER, J., concurred with MARKMAN, J.  
32  Because sufficient evidence existed to sustain  
defendant’s conviction, there is no need here to address the 
majority’s conclusion that the Court of Appeals erred in 
affording the prosecutor the opportunity to retry defendant.  
43