Case Title: McDougall v. State

Citation: 254 Ind. 62, 257 N.E.2d 674

Docket Number: 1069S245

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1970-04-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
254 Ind. 62 (1970)
257 N.E.2d 674
McDOUGALL
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 1069S245.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed April 27, 1970.
*63 Don R. Money, of Indianapolis, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General and David S. Wedding, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
No rehearing filed.
ARTERBURN, J.
The appellant was tried and convicted for the crime of robbery and sentenced to the Indiana State Prison for not less than ten (10) nor more than twenty-five (25) years.
The evidence shows that in the early morning hours of November 15, 1968 the appellant and another man stopped at a service station and told the attendant their car had run out of gasoline and asked that he fill a gas can for them. When the attendant requested payment for the gasoline the appellant said "You give me your money." The appellant held his hand in his pocket as though he had a gun and jabbed the attendant in the back to hurry him up. Appellant's companion then removed the money from the cash box. The attendant was told to get his car or appellant would "blow his head off." Appellant then put a pistol to the back of the attendant's head. The attendant was forced to drive the two men for several blocks before they let him out. Appellant and his companion were later arrested by a police officer pursuant to a broadcast of the information and description given by the attendant.
The arresting officer found two handguns and a roll of pennies in the car which appellant was driving. A search of *64 appellant uncovered four twenty dollar bills, one five dollar bill, one ten dollar bill and twenty-six one dollar bills. When the appellant and his companion were later removed from the police car subsequent to their arrest, a roll of quarters and several bullets were found on the seat. The officer testified these items were not in the police car before appellant and his companion were placed therein.
We feel compelled to first comment on the brief filed by the appellant before proceeding to the merits. Rule AP. 8.3(A) sets out very clearly what the brief of the appellant is to contain and the order in which the required information is to be presented. Under Rule AP. 8.3(A) (4) appellant's brief fails to include a verbatim statement of the judgment under the appropriate heading. As will appear later we have reasons to examine the sentence herein. Rule AP. 8.3(A) (6) requires a "summary of argument." Appellant's summary is in effect the only argument in the brief. It has been entitled "Brief Argument Without Authorities." It is followed by a section entitled "Authorities Relied Upon" which consists merely of seven pages of quotations from three cases, without the slightest attempt to relate these cases to the issues presented. In short, the brief is lacking a cogent argument as required by Rule AP. 8.3(A) (7). Any tendency toward liberality in construing the rules of practice and procedure should not be treated as a license to ignore plain and concise rules of practice.
It is first stated in the summary of the argument that there is insufficient evidence to establish appellant's identity. In support of this proposition emphasis is placed upon an alleged conflict in the evidence as to the color of the jacket appellant was wearing. The attendant testified that appellant was wearing a brown jacket, whereas the appellant introduced evidence that he was wearing a gray jacket. The record is clear that when appellant was arrested he was driving the automobile and was at that time sitting on a brown jacket. A pistol was found in the pocket of the jacket. We feel *65 that further discussion of this issue is rendered superfluous for two reasons. First, the attendant, who was face to face with the robbers, made a positive in-court identification of appellant as one of the robbers. Second, the appellant himself admitted during direct examination that he was in fact present during the robbery although he denied participation therein. He testified in part as follows:
It is next said that the State failed to produce as witnesses three police officers whose names appeared on the face of the charging affidavit. In support of this proposition the dissenting opinion in Denton v. State (1965), 246 Ind. 155, 203 N.E.2d 539 is cited. The majority opinion in Denton, supra, is controlling. In that case this court stated:
We find no error in this regard. Appellant made no attempt at trial to see that these persons were called.
It is next stated that the State failed to introduce various items in evidence to the prejudice of the appellant. These items were two handguns, two jackets, a pair of glasses and some currency. It is stated that these items should have been introduced "to overcome the presumption of innocence and doctrine of reasonable doubt ..." Appellant is merely setting up "straw men" and then knocking them down. No authority is cited which holds the prosecution must introduce in evidence every physical item it possesses relating to the case. All that is required is that the State prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The means used to satisfy this burden is for the prosecution to determine. In the instant case the evidence is conclusive that appellant was at the scene of the robbery. His activities at the scene were fully related by the attendant. The judgment is amply supported by substantial evidence of probative value.
Appellant next states he was charged with robbery, while the evidence showed the crime of armed robbery; that robbery *68 calls for an indeterminate sentence, whereas armed robbery calls for a determinate sentence. This is the extent of appellant's argument on this issue. No authority is cited. We find Dembowski v. State (1968), 251 Ind. 250, 240 N.E.2d 815 and Hobbs v. State (1969), 253 Ind. 195, 252 N.E.2d 498 controlling. In Dembowski, supra, we held that the legislature may not provide a punishment for a lesser included offense (robbery) which is greater in years on the face of the statute than the greater offense (armed robbery). We noted that robbery, pursuant to Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno. § 10-4101, carries a sentence five (5) years greater than the maximum sentence permitted for armed robbery pursuant to Burns' Ind. Stat. Anno. § 10-4709. However, we did not modify the well-established rule that it is within the sound discretion of the prosecutor whether to charge a defendant with a lesser included offense where the facts show the commission of a greater offense. The sole issue before us in this regard is then the constitutionality of the sentence imposed upon the appellant.
In Dembowski, supra, we concluded that the defendant could not, however, assert an unconstitutional restraint until he had served a period greater than the maximum number of years of the greater offense. We have since had occasion to reconsider this conclusion. In Hobbs v. State (1969), 253 Ind. 195, 252 N.E.2d 498 the defendant was charged with second degree burglary, which carries a sentence of not less than two (2) nor more than five (5) years, but convicted of the lesser included offense of entering to commit a felony which carries a sentence of not less than one (1) nor more than ten (10) years. We held the reasoning of Dembowski, supra applied and stated:
In accordance with the above authorities, this cause is remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter a corrected judgment and commitment nunc pro tunc sentencing the appellant to the Indiana State Prison for not less than ten (10) nor more than twenty (20) years.
Hunter, C.J., Givan and DeBruler, JJ., concur; Jackson, J., concurs in result.
NOTE.  Reported in 257 N.E.2d 674.