Case Title: Commonwealth v. Chiappini (Concurring Opinion)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
[J-25-1999] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA MIDDLE DISTRICT COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. PETER CHIAPPINI, Appellant : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : No. 125 M.D. Appeal Dkt. 1998 Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court entered on February 7, 1997, at No. 232 Philadelphia 1996, affirming the Judgment of Sentence of the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County entered March 30, 1995 at 92CR1447 695 A.2d 435 (Pa. Super. 1997) ARGUED: February 3, 1999 CONCURRING OPINION MR. JUSTICE NIGRO DECIDED: July 23, 2001 I agree with the majority that the trial court did not err in allowing Denise Chiappini to testify about her observations of Appellant’s actions. I write separately, however, because I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that house arrest constitutes “custody” for purposes of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9760(1), as I generally frown upon a process that allows people to serve sentences in the comforts of their own home. Instead, in my view, the Superior Court properly concluded in Commonwealth v. Shartle that time spent in “custody” must be the “equivalent of time served in an institutional setting.” 652 A.2d 874, 877 (Pa. Super. 1995). Given the particular circumstances in the instant case, however, I agree with the majority that Appellant should be credited for his time spent in the electronic monitoring program. Here, Appellant was put on the monitoring program as a condition of bail following a guilty verdict in his first trial. He remained in the program while the trial court considered his motion for a new trial, after the trial court granted that motion and while he awaited his new trial. After his second trial resulted in a guilty verdict, Appellant continued to be subject to electronic monitoring until his sentence was imposed. At that point, Appellant had been in the electronic monitoring program for a total of 518 days. In light of these circumstances, I believe that Appellant should, on the basis of equity, receive credit for the 518 days he spent in the electronic monitoring program.