Case Title: Lafferty v. Nickel

Citation: 

Docket Number: 5758

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-05-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Lafferty v. Nickel1983 WY 49663 P.2d 168Case Number: 5758Case Number: 5758Decided: 05/09/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
JOHNNY FRANKLIN LAFFERTY, 
APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

OFFICER MARK S. NICKEL, 
OFFICER RICH PATTON, RESERVE OFFICER BRITE AND THE TOWN OF MILLS, WYOMING, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS). No. 
5758

Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

Kenneth R. 
Marken, Casper, 
for appellant.

James W. Owens 
and Jo Sherman of Murane & Bostwick, Casper, for appellees.

Before ROONEY*, C.J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE**, and BROWN, 
JJ.

* Became Chief Justice on 
January 1, 1983.

** Chief Justice 
at time of oral argument.

ROONEY, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     On November 27, 1981, 
Johnny Franklin Lafferty, appellant-plaintiff, filed a civil action against 
Officer Mark S. Nickel, Officer Rich Patton, Reserve Officer Brite, and the Town 
of Mills, appellees-defendants, alleging that appellees were liable for various 
torts and civil rights violations arising out of appellant's March 24, 1979, 
arrest. Appellees moved for summary judgment, relying on the pleadings. The 
district court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment1 finding that the statutes of 
limitations applicable to appellant's claims for relief had run and that the 
Town of Mills 
was protected from appellant's claims by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. On 
appeal, appellant words the issues as follows:

"A. Did the District 
Court err in granting Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment on grounds that 
Appellant's claims were barred by statutes of limitations where the Appellant's 
pleadings alleged and Appellees' Answer denied the existence of a material fact 
underlying the application of said statutes, and where Appellees' Motion was 
otherwise unsupported by Affidavits or discovery 
materials?

"B. Does the 
applicability of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act extend the liability of the 
Appellee law enforcement officers for the torts of assault, battery, malicious 
prosecution, and/or false imprisonment beyond the one-year statute of 
limitations provided by Wyoming Statute § 1-3-105(a)(v), (1977)? 

"C. Is the Appellee Town 
of Mills shielded from any or all of Appellant's claims by the Doctrine of 
Sovereign Immunity?"

[¶2.]     We agree with the 
district court that appellant's claims for relief were barred by the applicable 
statutes of limitations and we affirm.

[¶3.]     The grant of a motion 
for summary judgment requires the district court to make the dual determinations 
"that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P. As a 
general rule, motions for summary judgment are to be supported by competent 
evidence admissible at trial, and we are required to examine that evidence from 
a viewpoint most favorable to the party opposing the motion in making the 
determination of whether or not there is a genuine issue as to a material fact. 
Hyatt v. Big Horn School District No. 
4, Wyo., 636 P.2d 525, 528 (1981); and Bancroft v. Jagusch, Wyo., 
611 P.2d 819, 820 (1980). Of course, a motion for summary judgment is proper 
where a question of law is prescribed and there is no factual dispute. 
Mason v. Laramie Rivers Company, Wyo., 490 P.2d 1062, 1065 (1971); Fugate v. Mayor and City Council of 
Town of Buffalo, Wyo., 
348 P.2d 76, 81, 97 A.L.R.2d 243 (1959).

[¶4.]     In this case appellees 
based their motion for summary judgment on the pleadings without providing any 
other competent evidence to support the motion. In this posture appellees' 
motion for summary judgment is equivalent to either a motion to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted made pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6), W.R.C.P., or a motion for a judgment on the pleadings made pursuant to 
Rule 12(c), W.R.C.P. Schwartz v. 
Compagnie General Transatlantique, 405 F.2d 270, 273 (2nd Cir. 1968); United States v. Mills, 372 F.2d 693, 
696 (10th Cir. 1966); Parker v. DeKalb 
Chrysler Plymouth, 459 F. Supp. 184, 187 (D.C.Ga. 1978), aff'd 673 F.2d 1178 
(11th Cir. 1982); 6 Moore's Federal Practice, ¶¶ 56.02[3], pp. 56-29, 56.11[3], 
p. 56-229. Therefore, for the purpose of this appeal the facts alleged in the 
complaint are deemed admitted and the allegations contained therein are viewed 
in a light most favorable to the appellant. Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 
Wyo., 600 P.2d 733, 734 (1979); State 
Highway 
Commission v. Bourne, Wyo., 425 P.2d 59, 63 
(1967).

[¶5.]     Appellant's complaint 
consists of five separate claims - the first claim alleges various tortious acts 
on the part of appellees and the second through fifth claims allege various 
civil rights violations.

[¶6.]     The sequence of events 
upon which appellant predicates his claims are: He was stopped, arrested and 
jailed on March 24, 1979, for two violations of the municipal ordinances of the 
Town of Mills. 
His imprisonment ended approximately twelve hours after arrest on March 25, 
1979. He was formally charged on March 26, 1979, and was convicted after a trial 
on April 30, 1979. On May 10, 1979, a formal judgment and sentence was entered. 
Appellant appealed his convictions to the district court and the convictions 
were reversed on November 29, 1979.2 Appellant filed the present civil 
action on November 27, 1981, more than two years after his arrest, imprisonment, 
and conviction, but within two years of the district court's reversal of his 
conviction in municipal court.

[¶7.]     Because we accept as 
true the allegations contained in appellant's complaint, the question presented 
is whether or not as a matter of law the applicable statutes of limitations 
periods had run when appellant filed his complaint on November 27, 1981.3 Because appellant's complaint 
alleged claims for relief based on common-law tort principles and on civil 
rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985, and because appellant has 
advanced separate arguments concerning the statute of limitations applicable to 
each, we will treat each argument separately.

LIMITATIONS - CIVIL 
RIGHTS CLAIMS

[¶8.]     The claims based on the 
federal civil rights statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985, are governed by the 
two-year statute of limitations period contained in § 1-3-115, W.S. 1977. Spiegel v. School District No. 1, LaramieCounty, 600 F.2d 264, 265-266 (10th 
Cir. 1979). Section 1-3-115 provides as follows:

"All actions upon a 
liability created by a federal statute, other than a forfeiture or penalty, for 
which no period of limitations is provided in such statute, shall be commenced 
within two (2) years after the cause of action has 
accrued."

[¶9.]     Appellant concedes that 
the appellees' actions giving rise to appellant's claims for relief which were 
based on alleged civil rights violations occurred between March and May of 1979, 
more than two years before he filed his action, but argues that the municipal 
court convictions effectively estopped him from pursuing his civil claims 
because of the implicit finding of probable cause in those convictions. 
Therefore, he contends that either the claims did not accrue until the reversal 
of his municipal court convictions or the convictions tolled the running of the 
statutes of limitations until such reversal.

[¶10.]  A claim for relief accrues or 
arises:

"`* * * when that person 
first comes to a right to bring an action. A cause of action implies that there 
is some person in existence who can bring suit, and also a person who can 
lawfully be sued. Again, when a wrong has been committed, or a breach of duty 
has occurred, the cause of action has accrued, although the claimant may be 
ignorant of it. A cause of action does not accrue until the existence of such a 
state of things as will enable a person having the proper relations to the 
property or persons concerned to bring an action. * * *'" Cantonwine v. Fehling, Wyo., 582 P.2d 592, 596 (1978), quoting from Bliler v. 
Boswell, 9 Wyo. 57, 72-73, 59 P. 798, 803 reh. denied 9 Wyo. 80, 61 P. 867 
(1900).

[¶11.]  In this case the actions giving rise to 
the alleged civil rights violations arose upon appellant's arrest, confinement, 
and prosecution in March of 1979. At that time, appellant had a cause of action 
which could be brought against appellees. See: Rodarte v. City of Riverton, 
Wyo., 552 P.2d 1245 (1976). Appellant's causes of action 
based on appellees' alleged civil rights violations occurred in March of 1979 
and the two-year statute of limitations period began to run at that point. 
Therefore, unless the statute of limitations was tolled, it expired prior to 
appellant's filing of his complaint barring his 
action.

[¶12.]  In support of appellant's contention that 
the running of the statutes of limitations was tolled during the pendency of the 
municipal court criminal proceedings and until the district court's reversal of 
the conviction resulting from those proceedings, he relies on Keith v. Schiefen-Stockham Insurance 
Agency, Inc., 209 Kan. 537, 498 P.2d 265 (1972), and Hoover v. Galbraith, 7 Cal. 3d 519, 102 Cal. Rptr. 733, 498 P.2d 981 (1972). However, these cases are easily 
distinguishable.

[¶13.]  In Keith, supra, plaintiffs filed an action 
against an insurance broker for failure to procure worker's compensation 
coverage for the employer of the plaintiffs' decedents after plaintiffs' claims 
for worker's compensation were denied. The court held that the action sounded in 
both contract and tort and went on to say at of 498 P.2d:

"* * * Plaintiffs were 
effectively prevented from suing defendants [on a contract theory] until it was 
finally determined in Otta v. Johnson, supra [204 Kan. 366, 461 P.2d 758], that 
insurance had not been procured, nor an election caused to be filed, and with 
respect to the action sounding in tort actual damages did not result until a 
final determination of those matters."

[¶14.]  In this case, it is unnecessary to wait 
for a determination as to whether or not insurance had actually been procured or 
to wait for the damages to result. Contract provisions are not here present for 
determination and the alleged damages occurred when the civil rights were 
alleged to have been violated.

[¶15.]  In Hoover, supra, a 
judgment creditor brought an action against the former directors of a defunct 
corporation to collect on a judgment debt of the corporation. The court held 
that the judgment creditor could take no action against the director until the 
appeal of the judgment against the corporation was final because he was not a 
judgment creditor until that time. A similar situation does not here 
exist.

[¶16.]  In Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185 (2nd Cir. 1980), cert. denied 450 U.S. 920, 101 S. Ct. 1368, 67 L. Ed. 2d 347 
(1981), the issue was presented as to whether or not the pendency of criminal 
charges against Singleton tolled the statute of limitations applicable to his 
civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Singleton's civil 
rights claims arose out of the same incident as the criminal charges. The court 
held that the statute of limitations was not tolled during the pendency of the 
criminal proceedings. The same conclusion was reached in Rinehart v. Locke, 454 F.2d 313 (7th 
Cir. 1971), and in Strung v. 
Anderson, 452 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1971). Cf. Spiegel, supra.

[¶17.]  Appellant also refers to the holding of 
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 S. Ct. 411, 66 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1980), to sustain his contention that the statute of limitations is tolled 
pending a final decision in a criminal case. The plaintiff there filed a civil 
rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging liability by the defendants 
for an illegal search and seizure. The search and seizure question had been 
previously addressed on the plaintiff's criminal case wherein plaintiff was 
convicted and the conviction was affirmed. The Supreme Court held that a 
litigant may be collaterally estopped from raising an issue in his civil rights 
action if that issue has been fully and fairly litigated in a prior state court 
criminal proceeding, but the court did not address the question before 
us.

[¶18.]  In Singleton v. City of New York, supra, 
the court commented on the better procedure to be followed in those instances in 
which an action for violation of civil rights had been filed but could not be 
processed until facts pertaining to it were finally determined in a pending 
criminal action:

"* * * As suggested by 
the Fifth Circuit, the better course in situations where the district court 
feels compelled to abstain is to stay, rather than dismiss, the § 1983 action so 
that the plaintiff is protected from a possible statute of limitations bar to 
the § 1983 suit. Conner v. Pickett, 
552 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); see also Mastracchio v. Ricci, 498 F.2d 1257 (1st 
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 909, 95 S. Ct. 828, 42 L. Ed. 2d 838 (1975) (§ 
1983 suit stayed `by agreement of counsel' pending outcome of state criminal 
proceedings); Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1976), affd. en banc, 550 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977). Accord, 
Zurek v. Woodbury, 446 F. Supp. 1149, 
1152 (N.D. Ill. 1978)." 632 F.2d  at 
193.

[¶19.]  Appellant's civil rights claims based on 
his March 24, 1979 arrest accrued at that time, and the applicable two-year 
statute of limitations was not tolled during the pendency of the criminal 
prosecution. Inasmuch as appellant's action was not filed until more than two 
years after his claims accrued, they are barred.

LIMITATIONS - TORT 
CLAIMS

[¶20.]  Appellant's complaint also alleged claims 
for relief based on assault and battery, malicious prosecution and false 
imprisonment committed by the law enforcement officers acting within the scope 
of their duties. The applicable statute of limitations for these claims provides 
in pertinent part: 

"(a) Civil actions other 
than for the recovery of real property can only be brought within the following 
periods after the cause of action accrues:

* * * * * 
*

"(v) Within one (1) year, an action 
for:

"(A) Libel or 
slander;

"(B) Assault or 
battery;

"(C) Malicious 
prosecution or false imprisonment; or

"(D) Upon a statute for a 
penalty or forfeiture, except that if a different limitation is prescribed in 
the statute by which the remedy is given the action shall be brought within the 
period prescribed by the statute." (Emphasis added.) Section 1-3-105(a)(v), W.S. 
1977.

Without more, 
these claims are clearly barred since appellant's complaint was filed on 
November 27, 1981, more than two years after the occurrences upon which such 
claims were based.

[¶21.]  Appellant argues, however, that the 
Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act, § 1-39-101 et seq., W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1982, provides 
a three-year4 statute of limitations for an 
action "resulting from tortious conduct of law enforcement officers while acting 
within the scope of their duties." Section 1-39-112, W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 1982. 
Assuming that appellant's tort claims are subject to the Wyoming Governmental 
Claims Act5, they were not properly processed 
under it. Appellant relies on the notice provision of § 1-39-113, supra, fn. 4, 
to extend the statutes of limitations period. That section requires notice of 
the claim to be given the government entity within two years of the alleged act, 
error or omission unless it was not discoverable or not discovered despite the 
exercise of due diligence within two years of the act, error or omission. The 
failure to timely notify the government entity precludes the claimant from 
bringing an action under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. Section 1-39-113, 
supra, fn. 4.

[¶22.]  In this case appellant concedes that the 
actions of which he complains occurred in March, April, and May of 1979 and were 
discovered within two years of their occurrence. Therefore, appellant was 
required to present his claim to the Town of Mills not later than May 1981 in order to 
preserve his right to bring an action under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. 
Appellant did not file his claim with the Town of Mills until November 25, 1981, 
more than two years after the date of the alleged actions, and he is precluded 
by § 1-39-113(a), supra, fn. 4, from bringing an action under the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act.

[¶23.]  Our holding that appellant's civil rights 
claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations period and that 
appellant's tort claims may not be brought because of appellant's failure to 
timely file a claim with the Town of Mills, makes it unnecessary to address the 
third issue raised by appellant.

[¶24.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 The district court 
dismissed without prejudice appellant's claim of unlawful conversion made 
against the officers.

2 In his brief, appellant 
argues that the district court should have taken judicial notice of this 
reversal and that its failure to do so left a genuine issue of material fact 
precluding the grant of summary judgment. However, as noted above, we accept as 
true the allegations contained in appellant's complaint for the purposes of this 
appeal including appellant's allegation concerning the date his convictions were 
reversed.

3 Service of the complaint 
on each of the defendants was made within sixty days after the filing of the 
complaint. Therefore, the action is deemed commenced on the date of the filing 
of the complaint for purposes of statutes of limitations. Rule 3(b), 
W.R.C.P.

4 He reaches this 
three-year figure by adding the one-year limitation in § 1-39-114, W.S. 1977, 
Cum.Supp. 1982, to the two-year notice provision in § 1-39-113, W.S. 1977, 
Cum.Supp. 1982. Section 1-39-113 provides in pertinent 
part:

"(a) No action shall be 
brought under this act against a governmental entity unless the claim upon which 
the action is based is presented to the entity as an itemized statement in 
writing within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error or omission, 
except that a cause of action may be instituted not more than two (2) years 
after discovery of the alleged act, error or omission, if the claimant can 
establish that the alleged act, error or omission was:

"(i) Not reasonably 
discoverable within a two (2) year period; or

"(ii) The claimant failed 
to discover the alleged act, error or omission within the two (2) year period 
despite the exercise of due diligence."

Section 1-39-114 
provides in pertinent part:

"Except as otherwise 
provided, actions against a governmental entity or a public employee acting 
within the scope of his duties for torts occurring after June 30, 1979 which are 
subject to this act shall be forever barred unless commenced within one (1) year 
after the date the claim is filed pursuant to W.S. 1-39-113. * * 
*"

5 Without this assumption 
appellant's tort claims clearly would be barred by the one-year limitation 
period applicable to these causes. See § 1-3-105(a)(v), 
supra.

THOMAS, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶25.]  I concur in the result of this case as 
announced in the majority opinion. I would prefer, however, that the court 
espouse for such instances a tolling rule with respect to the statute of 
limitations because it seems to me that there is a likelihood of situations 
arising in which the accused person would be foreclosed by the doctrines of res 
judicata and collateral estoppel from pursuing his civil action by virtue of a 
criminal conviction which ultimately might be set aside. If that reversal 
occurred after the statute of limitations for his civil action had run he would 
be effectively denied a remedy for the wrong. Because his opportunity for 
pursuing the civil action prior to conviction would be practically limited in 
many instances, I am not satisfied that the rule espoused by the majority 
opinion from Singleton v. City of New 
York, 632 F.2d 185 (2nd Cir. 1980), is adequate to 
protect all whose rights might be infringed.

[¶26.]  My position is influenced by the stance I 
took in my concurring opinion in Jessee 
v. State, Wyo., 640 P.2d 56, reh. denied 643 P.2d 681 
(Wyo. 1982). I 
there urged abrogation of the exclusionary rule in criminal cases in those 
instances in which there existed a reasonable good-faith belief by the law 
enforcement officer that his action was proper. I also 
said:

"* * * 
Furthermore, I identify in the development of civil actions for deprivation of 
constitutional rights, and in the legal rules, whether statutory or common law, 
which have developed to permit suits against police officers a more effective 
deterrent than the exclusionary rule. * * *" Jessee v. State, supra, 640 P.2d  at 
66.

I have not 
retreated from that position, but in order for the civil action to be a more 
effective deterrent it must be freely available to those whose rights are 
infringed. In my judgment it is more effectively preserved with a tolling rule 
than by proposing the prompt filing of the civil action with a stay until the 
criminal action appeal is determined as a solution.

[¶27.]  I am satisfied that the thrust of Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 S. Ct. 411, 66 L. Ed. 2d 308 (1980), is that the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel are 
applicable to prevent the relitigation in a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
of issues tried in state court criminal proceedings. I can see no reason why 
those principles should not also foreclose the retrial of issues in claims based 
upon common-law torts. See also, Preiser 
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 497, 93 S. Ct. 1827, 1840, 
36 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1973), and the cases there cited. During the time in which the 
criminal conviction remained unreversed the civil claim of the criminal 
defendant for a violation of his rights would be subject to dismissal. Since 
this is a very evident disability, arising out of a pending legal proceeding, I 
would rely upon it to justify the tolling.

[¶28.]  I recognize that this is not a legal 
disability such as those contemplated in § 1-3-115, W.S. 1977. I also recognize 
the rule of Rowray v. McCarthy, 48 
Wyo. 108, 42 P.2d 54 (1935), to the effect that as a general proposition courts 
have no power to read into statutes of limitations exceptions not found therein 
because exceptions in favor of persons laboring under some disability are 
strictly construed, and the enumeration of specific exceptions by implication 
excludes all others. I believe this to be the general rule, but it is not an 
absolute rule. In State ex rel. Pink v. 
Cockley, 110 Ind. App. 417, 37 N.E.2d 284 (1941), it was 
essential to pursuing an action that a prior civil proceeding be reversed on 
appeal. The court held that the time during which the action was prevented by 
the judgment in the other proceeding would not be counted against the party in 
determining whether the statute of limitations barred his 
action.

[¶29.]  In 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 
247, p. 278, the following language appears:

"Where a person is 
prevented from exercising his legal remedy by the pendency of legal proceedings, 
the time during which he is thus prevented should not be counted against him in 
determining whether limitations have barred his right, even though courts are 
reluctant to acknowledge exceptions additional to those contained in the statute 
itself. * * *"

The cases cited 
there do support the textual conclusion. While factually different, the 
rationale of those cases does support a conclusion in cases like this that the 
statutory period of limitations should not be held to run during the pendency of 
the criminal appeal.

[¶30.]  In 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 
140, p. 711, the proposition is stated as follows:

"The broad rule is laid 
down that whenever some paramount authority prevents a person from exercising 
his legal remedy, the time during which he is thus prevented is not to be 
counted against him in determining whether the statute of limitations has barred 
his right even though the statute makes no specific exception in his favor in 
such cases. This rule enables the courts to give effect to a law creating an 
exception the object of which is to prevent the statute from running during the 
time the claimant is prevented, without fault on his part, from suing, so that 
he can have the full benefit of the time allowed him in which to bring his 
action. Under this rule, an injunction or other legal proceeding which prevents 
one from exercising his legal remedy against another tolls or suspends the 
operation of the statute of limitations. * *"

Of like tenor 
and effect is the language found in 51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 170, p. 
740.

[¶31.]  Because of my view that it is necessary 
to preserve this cause of action to citizens whose rights may be violated, I 
would not apply against them the statute of limitations during the period of 
time for which a criminal conviction is effective and could be asserted to 
foreclose the prosecution of civil claims under the doctrine of res judicata or 
the doctrine of collateral estoppel. If my argument in Jessee v. State, supra, has validity 
then the preservation of the civil action to serve as a deterrent to unlawful 
action by law enforcement officers is necessary and requires the creation of an 
exception to the statute of limitations. In this case the same result is reached 
as in the majority opinion because the statute is tolled for only 213 days yet 
the action was filed 2 years and 250 days after the causes of action accrued, 
except for malicious prosecution.

[¶32.]  I do add that I am not in agreement with 
the position of the majority opinion that the cause of action for malicious 
prosecution accrued at the time of the defendant's arrest and prosecution. The 
law in Wyoming 
is that the claim for malicious prosecution does not accrue until the underlying 
state court proceeding has terminated in favor of the plaintiff. Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., 
Wyo., 540 P.2d 535 (1975). In this instance that cause of action did not accrue until November 
27, 1979. I still concur in the decision of the majority, however, because there 
is no indication that these police officers were not acting within the scope of 
their official duties, and they therefore cannot be sued for malicious 
prosecution. Kimbley v. City of Green River, Wyo., 
663 P.2d 871 (1983).

[¶33.]  One other facet of the majority opinion 
troubles me. I do not agree that even the hypothetical application of the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, §§ 1-39-101 et seq., W.S. 1977 (Cum.Supp. 
1982), is appropriate. That statute became effective July 1, 1979, more than 
three months after the arrest of Lafferty. I am satisfied that it is substantive 
in nature and could have no application to those events which occurred prior to 
the date that it became effective. I would, therefore, rule that it has no 
application to these circumstances and would not discuss even hypothetically the 
computation of a period of limitations as affected by the 
statute.

[¶34.]  I would hold in this case that the period 
of limitations was tolled from the date the criminal conviction was effective 
until the date it was reversed. In this instance that period of time is not long 
enough, however, to bar the application of the statute of limitations to 
appellant's claim.