Case Title: Gray v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 252, 2014, 251, 2014

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2015-10-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
 
FREDERICK GRAY, 
 
 
§ 
No. 251/252, 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below – Superior Court  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware, in and 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
Cr. Id. No. 1302002738A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 Submitted:  September 16, 2015 
 
 
   Decided:      October 9, 2015 
 
Before HOLLAND, VAUGHN, and SEITZ, Justices. 
 
 
ORDER 
 
This 9th day of October, 2015, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and 
the record below, and following oral argument, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
Wilmington police officer Justin Wilkers was shot in the face and 
seriously wounded following a car chase.  A Superior Court jury found Frederick 
Gray, a passenger in the car, guilty of attempted murder and several other charges 
for shooting Officer Wilkers.  In this direct appeal Gray argues the Superior Court 
erred by not granting a mistrial after the State turned over a supplemental police 
report for the first time during trial that Gray contends contained Brady v. 
2 
 
Maryland1 material, causing prejudice to his defense.  He also argues that the court 
erred by admitting as a voluntary statement under 11 Del. C. § 3507 a prior out-of-
court statement by his mother, Shana Gray, made to police the evening after 
Officer Wilkers’ shooting.  Gray contends that his mother’s statement identifying 
Frederick Gray as the gunman was involuntary and should not have been admitted.  
We have determined that Gray’s arguments are without merit.  Therefore, we 
affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.   
 
(2) 
On February 3, 2013, Wilmington police officers Justin Wilkers and 
Kevin Murphy were on patrol in a marked patrol car on the east side of 
Wilmington near Buttonwood Street. 2   They encountered a white Chevrolet 
Equinox SUV and initiated a traffic stop after noticing that the vehicle was not 
equipped with working brake lights or tail lights. 3   Instead of stopping, the 
Equinox sped away.4  A chase ensued.  Eventually, the Equinox pulled over near 
Peach Street in Wilmington.5  Officer Murphy testified that he saw two men exit 
the driver’s side of the vehicle and flee.6  He chased the man who came from the 
                                                        
1 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
2 App. to Answering Br. at 208 (Trial Test. of Ofc. Justin Wilkers, Jan. 23, 2014). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
5 Id. at 209. 
6 App. to Answering Br. at 60 (Trial Test. of Ofc. Kevin Murphy, Jan. 15, 2014).  
3 
 
driver’s seat, Jarred Wiggins, and ultimately apprehended him. 7  As he was 
chasing Wiggins, he heard gunshots behind him.8 
 
(3) 
Officer Wilkers testified that, as he got out of the passenger side of the 
patrol car, he made eye contact with the front-seat passenger of the Equinox, who 
was exiting the car.9  At trial, Officer Wilkers identified that individual as Gray 
and testified Gray pointed a small, black semi-automatic handgun at him.10  Officer 
Wilkers was then shot in the face.11  It was a life-threatening injury.12  
 
(4) 
Ronald Boyce was the man Corporal Murphy saw flee from the 
driver’s side rear passenger door of the Equinox.13  Boyce testified at trial that he 
saw Gray exit the front passenger door of the Equinox and he saw Gray shoot 
Officer Wilkers.14 
 
(5) 
Detective George Pigford recorded an interview with Officer Murphy 
at the Wilmington Police Station the day of Officer Wilkers’ shooting, February 3, 
2013.15  The State provided the recorded interview to the defense.16  The following 
day, Detective Pigford interviewed Officer Murphy a second time at the shooting 
                                                        
7 Id. at 62-64. 
8 Id. at 65. 
9 App. to Answering Br. at 210 (Trial Test. of Ofc. Justin Wilkers, Jan. 23, 2014). 
10 Id. at 211-12. 
11 App. to Answering Br. at 174 (Trial Test. of Amy Steir, Jan. 17, 2014). 
12 Id. at 176. 
13 App. to Answering Br.  at 115-16 (Trial Test. of Ronald Boyce, Jan. 16, 2014).  
14 Id. at 116; 119. 
15 Ex. B to Opening Br. at 3-4 (Det. Pigford’s Supplemental Report). 
16 App. to Answering Br.  at 61 (Trial Transcript).  
4 
 
scene and summarized the second interview in a supplemental report. 17  The 
defense first learned about the supplemental report the second day of trial.18  In the 
first interview, Detective Pigford recorded that Officer Murphy told him he chased 
two individuals who fled from the Equinox the day of the shooting. 19  In the 
second interview, Detective Pigford recorded that Officer Murphy told him he saw 
two individuals flee from the driver’s side of the Equinox but he chased only one, 
the driver.20   
 
(6) 
The evening after the shooting, police picked up Gray’s mother, 
Shana Gray, and told her she needed to accompany them to the police station.21  
While at the station, Detective Pigford recorded an interview with her.22  In the 
interview Shana Gray stated that her son had confessed to her that he shot Officer 
Wilkers.23 
 
(7) 
The State indicted Gray for attempted murder in the first degree, 
robbery in the first degree, two counts of possession of a firearm during 
commission of a felony, two counts of possession of a firearm by a person 
prohibited, possession of a weapon with a removed, obliterated or altered serial 
                                                        
17 Ex. B to Opening Br. at 13 (Det. Pigford’s Supplemental Report). 
18 App. to Answering Br. at 61 (Trial Transcript). 
19 Ex. B to Opening Br. at 3 (Det. Pigford’s Supplemental Report).  
20 Id. at 13.  
21 App. to Opening Br. at 102-03 (Trial Test. of Shana Gray, Jan. 17, 2014). 
22 App. to Answering Br. at 160 (Trial Test. of Shana Gray, Jan. 17, 2014). 
23 Court Ex. 1. 
5 
 
number, conspiracy second degree, and resisting arrest.24  Gray proceeded to trial 
in January, 2014 for attempted murder in the first degree, one count of possession 
of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and possession of a weapon with a 
removed, obliterated or altered serial number.25  The jury found him guilty on all 
charges. 26   The trial judge sentenced Gray to a life term plus forty years 
incarceration.27  
Gray’s Brady Claim 
(8) 
Gray’s first claim on appeal is that Detective Pigford’s supplemental 
police report, first turned over to the defense the second day of trial, included 
material that the State was obligated under Brady to turn over to the defense prior 
to trial.  In light of the State’s tardy production of the report, Gray argues that the 
Superior Court abused its discretion when it failed to order a mistrial.  
(9) 
This Court reviews the Superior Court’s decision to deny a motion for 
a mistrial for abuse of discretion.28  Reversal is warranted only where the denial 
“was based on unreasonable or capricious grounds.”29  A mistrial is appropriate 
only when there are “no meaningful or practical alternatives to that remedy” or 
                                                        
24 App. to Opening Br. at 17-21 (Indictment).  
25 App. to Opening Br. at 1 (Superior Court Docket).  
26 Id. 
27 Ex. E. to Opening Br. (Sentencing Order). 
28 Guy v. State, 913 A.2d 558, 565 (Del. 2005). 
29 Id. 
6 
 
“the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated.” 30   Constitutional 
questions are reviewed de novo.31 
(10) A Brady violation occurs when there is “suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused . . . where the evidence is material 
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution.”32  This Court has made clear that 
[i]n order for the State to discharge its responsibility under Brady, the 
prosecutor must disclose all relevant information obtained by the 
police or others in the Attorney General's Office to the defense. That 
entails a duty on the part of the individual prosecutor “to learn of any 
favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's 
behalf in the case, including the police.”33 
 
 
There are three components of a Brady violation: “(1) evidence exists that is 
favorable to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching; (2) that 
evidence is suppressed by the State; and (3) its suppression prejudices the 
defendant.”34   
                                                        
30 Justice v. State, 947 A.2d 1097, 1100 (Del. 2008).  
31 Zebroski v. State, 12 A.3d 1115, 1119 (Del. 2010).  A claim that the State has committed a 
Brady violation is a claim that the defendant’s right to due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution has been violated. Brady, 373 U.S. at 86-87. 
32 Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.   We have assumed, as the parties have, that a Brady analysis is the 
proper test to resolve this appeal.  If the withheld material is not Brady material, the appropriate 
sanction for a discovery violation is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.  Doran 
v. State, 606 A.2d 743, 745 (Del. 1992).   
33 Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 988 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 438 (1995)).   
34 Wright, 91 A.3d at 988 (quoting Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 756 (Del. 2005)).  
7 
 
(11) Whether suppression of the evidence caused prejudice to the 
defendant depends on the materiality of the evidence.  As this Court explained in 
Wright v. State:  
[m]ateriality does not require the defendant to show that the disclosure 
of the suppressed evidence would have resulted in an acquittal.  Nor is 
a reviewing court required to order “a new trial whenever ‘a combing 
of the prosecutors' files after the trial has disclosed evidence possibly 
useful to the defense but not likely to have changed the 
verdict.’”  Rather, the defendant must show that the State's evidence 
creates “a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”  A reasonable probability of a different result occurs where 
the government's evidentiary suppression “undermines confidence in 
the outcome of the trial.”35   
 
(12) Materiality is determined in the context of the entire record.    After an 
item by item review of the undisclosed evidence, the court separately evaluates the 
cumulative effect of the suppressed evidence.36  “When ‘a defendant is confronted 
with delayed disclosure of Brady material, reversal will be granted only if the 
defendant was denied the opportunity to use the material effectively.’”37   
 
(13) Gray asserts that two statements contained in Detective Pigford’s 
supplemental report qualify as Brady material: a) Officer Murphy’s statement to 
Detective Pigford of February 4, 2013, correcting his statement to Detective 
Pigford of February 3, 2013 as to the number of individuals he chased as they fled 
                                                        
35 Wright, 91 A.3d at 988. 
36 Id. 
37 White v. State, 816 A.2d 776, 778 (Del. 2003) (quoting Atkinson v. State, 778 A.2d 1058, 1062 
(Del. 2001)).   
8 
 
from the Equinox;38 and b) Detective Pigford’s observation in his report that it 
“appears that it was probably” a bullet that struck the passenger-side front door of 
the patrol vehicle “that had struck [Officer] Wilkers.”39  
(14) The existence of the second component of a Brady violation, 
suppression, is undisputed with respect to the statements in the report.  The State 
conceded at trial that it was an oversight not to provide the defense with a copy of 
Detective Pigford’s supplemental report.40  It is the first and third components, 
favorability to the defendant and materiality that the State contests with respect to 
both statements.   
Officer Murphy’s Inconsistent Statements 
(15) Gray argues that Detective Pigford’s account of his February 4, 2013 
interview of Officer Murphy is favorable to Gray because it is both exculpatory 
and impeaching.  It is exculpatory, according to Gray, because it raises the 
possibility, contrary to Officer Murphy’s previously disclosed statement of the 
prior day, that Boyce rather than Gray fired the shot that struck Officer Wilkers.  
Gray also argues that it is impeaching because it demonstrates inconsistent 
recollection about the incident by a key State witness.  Gray contends that a single-
                                                        
38 Opening Br. at 14; see Ex. B to Opening Br. at 13 (excerpt from Detective Pigford’s report 
summarizing his February 4, 2013 interview with Officer Murphy).   
39 Opening Br. at 14; see Ex. B to Opening Br. at 15 (excerpt from Detective Pigford’s report 
discussing a bullet that struck the passenger-side front door of the patrol vehicle and asserting 
that it was probably the bullet that struck Officer Wilkers). 
40 App. to Answering Br. at 62 (Trial Transcript). 
9 
 
night recess did not provide defense counsel with sufficient time to use the 
evidence effectively, and defense counsel might have altered trial strategy from the 
beginning to accuse Boyce of being the gunman.  The State responds that Officer 
Murphy’s inconsistent statement in Corporal Pigford’s report was at most useful to 
the defense for purposes of impeachment, was made available ahead of Gray’s 
cross-examination of Officer Murphy, and was used effectively by the defense for 
the purpose of impeachment. 
(16) Officer Murphy’s recollection in the undisclosed report was arguably 
favorable to Gray for both exculpatory and impeachment purposes.  One possible 
defense theory, although not one that was pursued based on any other known facts 
in the case, was to place the blame on another occupant of the SUV.  For purposes 
of creating reasonable doubt as to Gray’s guilt, evidence that impeached the other 
officer’s recollection and raised doubts about the reliability of his account of 
events was favorable to Gray. 
(17) Although the interview arguably contained Brady material and 
therefore should have been disclosed, Gray did not suffer prejudice as a result of 
the State’s error.  When defense counsel raised the failure to disclose the 
supplemental report, the Superior Court ordered a recess from 3:15 p.m. January 
15, 2013, to 10:53 a.m. the next day.41  The overnight recess occurred between the 
                                                        
41 Id. at 62, 66, 80. 
10 
 
State’s direct examination of Officer Murphy and the defense’s cross-examination.  
The next day defense counsel examined Officer Murphy on the inconsistencies 
between the two interviews.42  The overnight recess provided defense counsel with 
sufficient time to make effective use of Officer Murphy’s inconsistencies during 
cross-examination.       
(18) Further, neither Officer Murphy nor the State suggested at trial that 
Boyce was being chased by Officer Murphy when the shots were fired and 
therefore could not have been the shooter.   The State also introduced substantial 
evidence to establish that it was Gray rather than Boyce who was the shooter.  
Officer Wilkers testified he made eye contact with Gray when Gray pointed a 
handgun at Officer Wilkers moments before he was shot.43  The State played a 
videotape showing Gray throwing a dark object into the alley where the police 
found a black 9 millimeter semi-automatic handgun.44  The State also presented 
evidence that the bullet that struck Wilkers was a 9 millimeter bullet.45 
(19) The defense also knew prior to trial that there were inconsistencies in 
Officer Murphy’s recollection of the events of February 3, 2014.46  They had the 
ballistics analysis of the State’s expert analyzing the trajectories of the bullets.47  If 
                                                        
42 App. to Answering Br. at 82-86, 102-04. 
43 App. to Answering Br. at 210-12 (Trial Test. of Ofc. Justin Wilkers, Jan. 23, 2014). 
44 State’s Tr. Ex. 46. 
45 App. to Answering Br. at 199 (Trial Test. of Carl Rone, Jan. 23, 2014). 
46 App. to Answering Br. at 76 (Trial Transcript). 
47 Id. at 77. 
11 
 
the defense thought it was possible to show that Boyce rather than Gray was the 
gunman, they could have pursued that defense irrespective of a single statement in 
Officer Murphy’s February 3, 2014 interview.  Therefore, Gray suffered no 
prejudice as a result of the State’s disclosure of the second interview at trial.     
The Possible “Ricochet” 
(20) Gray argues that Detective Pigford’s speculation about a ricochet 
striking Officer Wilkers is exculpatory because: (a) it suggests the shot may have 
come from a direction other than where Gray was standing; and (b) it raises the 
possibility that the shot was fired blindly and not with the intent needed to convict 
Gray of attempted murder.  
 
(21) The exculpatory nature of Detective Pigford’s statement is dubious.  
While standing alone this evidence might have some exculpatory potential, it is not 
reasonably probable that, had the defense earlier received this suggestion of a 
possible ricochet, the outcome of Gray’s trial would have been different.  As for 
Gray being the shooter, the possibility that the bullet that struck Officer Wilkers hit 
the passenger-side front door of the patrol vehicle before hitting Wilkers is not 
inconsistent with the State’s theory that the bullet was fired by Gray from the 
passenger side of the Equinox.  Regarding intent, the State did not rely on the 
trajectory of the bullet to prove intent.  Rather, according to Officer Wilkers, Gray 
made eye contact with Officer Wilkers and pointed a gun at Officer Wilkers right 
12 
 
before he was shot.  The eye contact, followed the pointing of a gun in Officer 
Wilkers’s direction, was sufficient to establish the requisite intent for attempted 
murder.  Therefore, we once again find no prejudice to Gray as a result of the 
State’s disclosure of the second interview at trial.     
Shana Gray’s Out-Of-Court Statement  
(22) Gray’s final claim on appeal is that the Superior Court erred when it 
admitted Shana Gray’s out-of-court statement to police under 11 Del. C. § 3507.  
Gray contends that the statement was presumptively involuntary under Taylor v. 
State48 because Shana Gray was in police custody at the time of the interview and 
therefore the statement was inadmissible under § 3507.  The State argues in 
response that the statement was voluntary, as established by Ms. Gray’s testimony 
on direct examination where she admitted the statements she made during the 
interview were voluntary and nobody forced her to talk to Detective Pigford.49  
This Court reviews a trial court ruling on the admissibility of a witness’s out-of-
court statement under § 3507 for an abuse of discretion.50   
 
(23) Under 11 Del. C. § 3507, “the voluntary, out-of-court prior statement 
of a witness who is present and subject to cross-examination may be used as 
affirmative evidence with substantive independent testimonial value.”  Following 
                                                        
48 23 A.3d 851 (Del. 2011). 
49 Answering Br. at 25; see App to Answering Br. at 156 (Trial Test. of Shana Gray, Jan. 17, 
2015).   
50 Wyche v. State, 113 A.3d 162, 165 (Del. 2015).  
13 
 
completion of briefing on appeal, this Court decided Wyche v. State, where we 
reaffirmed that, generally, the “totality of the circumstances” test is applied by the 
trial court to determine the voluntariness of a witness statement admitted under § 
3507: 
Because custodial interrogations have an inherently coercive quality, 
the absence of certain procedural safeguards, including Miranda 
warnings, can render a custodial statement by a Section 3507 witness 
involuntary but only under very limited circumstances.  Generally, 
however, Delaware courts take a “totality of the circumstances” 
approach in determining whether the witness’ “will was overborne” 
such that the proffered Section 3507 statement was not “the product of 
a rational intellect and a free will.”  “A totality of the circumstances 
approach ... requires the reviewing court to consider the specific 
tactics utilized by the police in eliciting the admissions, the details of 
the interrogation, and the characteristics of the defendant.”  The 
factors that bear on these circumstances include: 
 
the youth of the accused; his lack of education or his low 
intelligence; the lack of any advice to the accused of his 
constitutional rights; the length of detention; the repeated 
and prolonged nature of the questioning; and the use of 
physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or 
sleep.51 
 
 
(24) We have assumed for purposes of Gray’s argument that his mother 
was in custody because, according to Shana Gray’s uncontradicted account on voir 
dire examination, she was told that she had to accompany police to the station and 
                                                        
51 Id. at 165-66 (citing Taylor,  23 A.3d at 855–56 (Del. 2011) and quoting State v. Rooks, 401 
A.2d 943, 949–50 (Del.1979) and Baynard v. State, 518 A.2d 682, 690 (Del.1986) (quoting 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973))).     
14 
 
could not leave once there.52  Gray is correct that in Taylor v. State the Court held 
that custodial interrogations are presumptively involuntary where Miranda 
warnings are not given to the witness.53  But in Wyche we limited the “narrow” 
ruling of Taylor to the specific facts of that case, where “a Section 3507 witness 
was falsely told he was under arrest for the very crime about which he gave the 
unwarned statement sought to be introduced under Section 3507.” 54  No such 
extreme circumstances are presented here.  Therefore the proper test to determine 
voluntariness in this case is the totality of the circumstances test. 
 
(25)   The trial judge conducted voir dire and determined that Shana 
Gray’s statement to police was voluntary based on her testimony that her 
statements to police were voluntary and not coerced.55  Ms. Gray is an adult, was 
not threatened with being charged with a crime, and our review of the videotape of 
the questioning shows no extreme duress or inappropriate interrogation tactics such 
that her will was overborn.  The trial judge did not abuse his discretion to admit 
into evidence Shana Gray’s testimony under § 3507.    
 
 
                                                        
52 App. to Answering Br. at 158 (voir dire examination of Shana Gray, Jan. 17, 2014). 
53 Taylor, 23 A.3d at 855. 
54 Wyche, 113 A.3d at 166. 
55 App. to Answering Br. at 157-59 (Trial Transcript).  
15 
 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice