Case Title: TAYLOR v ANACONDA FEDERAL CREDIT U

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-05-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
ho. L3L75 IN THh SUPKbHE X U K T OF THE STAL'E 'JF MON'l'kNA 1976 LKMA TAYLOR, Piainrif f and Appellant, THE ANALONIIA FEDEKAL CKLDLT LJNION AND CHARLES McLEAN individually and i t s agent, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal frorn: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable James D. Freebourn, Judge presiding. Zounsel of Record : For Appellant: Edward D. Yelsa argued, Anaconda, Montana For Respondents: Corette, Smith and Dean, Butte, Montana Gerald R. Allen argued, Butte, Montana Submitted: A p r i l 21, 1976 Decided : %$\ 2 & 1976 Filed : . , . ; ! -;(Fp Hon. Robert J. Nelson, District Judge, s i t t i n g i n p l a c e of M r . Chief J u s t i c e James T. Harrison, d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court . This is a n appeal from t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , D e e r Lodge County, t h e Honorable James D. Freebourn, presiding. P l a i n t i f f , I r m a Taylor, f i l e d an a c t i o n i n t h e d i s t r i c t court, D e e r Lodge County, on June 26, 1975. Count One of t h e complaint a l l e g e s t h a t defendant Charles McLean, agent of t h e Anaconda Federal C r e d i t Union, promised Taylor t h a t purchasers (Hodacks) would have enough e q u i t y t o be a b l e t o borrow money from defendant C r e d i t Union t o pay a $3,000 promissory note from Hodacks t o Taylor. The balance of Count One e s s e n t i a l l y a l l e g e s t h a t Taylor had t o h i r e a n a t t o r n e y t o pursue her remedies a g a i n s t Hodacks t o c o l l e c t t h e note, and f u r t h e r attempts t o impose a duty upon defendants f o r p l a i n t i f f ' s l o s s upon her s a l e t o de- 6~dci c k / fendant C r e d i t Union a t discount of another of Hod&3' notes i n t h e sum of $1,500 and a l s o f o r her a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s . Taylor al- leged $800 a s s p e c i a l damages and $50,000 a s general damages under Count One. Count Two a l l e g e s Taylor had a c o n t r a c t with Hodacks f o r t h e payment of $3,000. I t i s alleged defendants McLean and t h e C r e d i t Union i n t e r f e r e d with t h e c o n t r a c t by using t h e premises purchased by Hodacks from Taylor a s s e c u r i t y f o r t h e o r i g i n a l loan made t o Hodacks of $4,000, which money was used as t h e down- payment on t h e purchase of t h e premises, and i n making f u r t h e r loans t o t h e Hodacks on t h e same s e c u r i t y , A s damages under Count Two, Taylor a l l e g e s s p e c i a l damages of $800, general dam- ages of $50,000 and exemplary damages of $70,000. Count Three of t h e complaint i s a r e p e t i t i o n of t h e a l - l e g a t i o n s made i n Count Two. Defendants McLean and C r e d i t Union moved t o dismiss t h e complaint and t h e motion was t r e a t e d a s one f o r summary judgment by counsel f o r p l a i n t i f f and defendants. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t granted judgment f o r McLean and t h e C r e d i t Union. Taylor appealed from t h e order and judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t . The f a c t s a r e admitted. Taylor i s a r e s i d e n t of Anaconda, Montana. The C r e d i t Union is a corporation organized under t h e laws of t h e United S t a t e s and doing business i n Montana, and Charles McLean is t h e t r e a s u r e r of t h e C r e d i t Union. O n May 7 , 1969, Taylor agreed t o s e l l c e r t a i n r e a l prop- e r t y located west of Anaconda t o Stephen and P a t r i c i a Hodack. The agreed purchase p r i c e f o r t h e property was $7,000 and it i s not c l e a r whether o r not a w r i t t e n c o n t r a c t of sale was d r a f t e d . The agreement between Taylor and Hodacks provided f o r a downpayment of $4,000. The remaining $3,000 was payable, with- o u t i n t e r e s t , 4 years from May 7, 1969. The promissory note w a s executed by t h e Hodacks and delivered t o Taylor. Taylor d i d n o t t a k e any s t e p s t o secure her i n t e r e s t a s a c r e d i t o r upon t h e r e a l property. The Hodacks borrowed from t h e C r e d i t Union through its duly authorized agent, McLean, t h e sum of $4,664.83, representing t h e agreed downpayment p l u s Hodacks' share of t a x e s on t h e property sold. This check w a s issued on May 8, 1969 and d e l i v e r e d t o p l a i n t i f f by Hodacks. I n r e t u r n f o r t h e loan t o Hodacks, t h e C r e d i t Union f i l e d a mortgage upon t h e property sold f o r t h e amount of t h e loan. This mortgage w a s d u l y recorded i n Deer Lodge County. The promissory note running from t h e Hodacks t o Taylor f e l l due on May 7, 1973. The Hodacks d i d n o t make payment upon t h e note and f e l l i n t o d e f a u l t . Due t o t h i s d e f a u l t , Taylor sued Hodacks and t h e C r e d i t Union f o r breach of c o n t r a c t . A settlement was reached i n which t h e C r e d i t Union agreed t o loan Hodacks an a d d i t i o n a l $1,500 t o be paid t o Taylor. It was a l s o agreed Hodacks would execute a new promissory note f o r $1,500 payable i n 3 years o r i n 1977. Under t h e new agreement, Taylor took a second mortgage on t h e r e a l property. A check f o r $1,500 was delivered t o Taylor by her a t t o r - ney and defendant Hodack, a s was t h e promissory note f o r $1,500 and t h e case w a s s e t t l e d . I n November 1974, t h e C r e d i t Union agreed t o extend Hodacks' l i n e of c r e d i t and paid Hodacks t h e sum of $1,500 which w a s used by them t o pay o f f t h e second prom- i s s o r y note running t o Taylor. I n r e t u r n f o r t h i s payment, Taylor executed a " S a t i s f a c t i o n of Mortgage and Releaseu t o t h e Hodacks. The s o l e b a s i s f o r T a y l o r ' s claim a g a i n s t McLean and t h e C r e d i t Union i s an o r a l statement made by McLean, apparently t o p l a i n t i f f , a t t h e t i m e t h e downpayment on t h e premises w a s made and Taylor accepted t h e $3,000 unsecured n o t e f o r t h e balance due, t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t a t t h e t i m e t h e note became due May 7 , 1973 Hodacks would have s u f f i c i e n t e q u i t y i n t h e premises f o r them t o borrow more money from t h e C r e d i t Union t o pay t h e note. The admittedly g r a t u i t o u s o r a l statement made by McLean was not a promise t o answer f o r t h e o b l i g a t i o n of t h e Hodacks and was n o t a guaranty o r of suretyship a s t h e same a r e defined by Montana's codes. McLeanls statement n e c e s s a r i l y presupposed, and of n e c e s s i t y had t o be understood by anyone who heard it, t h a t i f nothing happened t o t h e Hodacks, and i f they made t h e i r payments on t h e mortgage which t h e C r e d i t Union w a s taking on t h e premises, and i f nothing happened t o t h e premises, t h e Hodacks i n four years would have s u f f i c i e n t e q u i t y i n t h e premises f o r t h e C r e d i t Union t o make a f u r t h e r loan t o Hodacks t o pay t h e i r promissory note t o Taylor f o r t h e balance of t h e purchase p r i c e . Such statement d i d n o t c o n s t i t u t e a l e g a l l y enforceable promise t o loan Hodacks' t h e money. With regard t o Counts Two and Three of P l a i n t i f f ' s claim, t o t h e e f f e c t t h e C r e d i t Union i n t e r f e r e d with t h e c o n t r a c t between Taylor and t h e Hodacks because it took a mortgage on t h e premises when it loaned Hodacks t h e downpayment, and t h e r e - a f t e r before t h e due d a t e of Hodacks' n o t e t o Taylor f o r t h e balance of t h e purchase p r i c e , loaned t h e Hodacks a n a d d i t i o n a l sum o r sums which was secured by t h e mortgage, such a c t s stand- ing a l o n e do not c o n s t i t u t e i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h t h e c o n t r a c t . The a c t s of t h e C r e d i t Union w e r e l e g a l a c t s , f o r which it was organized and authorized t o do. Standing a l o n e , t h e acts do n o t g i v e rise t o any presumption o r i n f e r e n c e t h a t t h e a c t s w e r e done t o induce o r cause Hodacks n o t t o pay t h e i r n o t e . The a c t i o n of i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h c o n t r a c t r i g h t s i s a t o r t a c t i o n , t o r t meaning wrongful o r unlawful o r without j u s t i f i c a t i o n . The element of malice ( n o t malice as it i s understood i n t h e popular sense of s p i t e o r ill w i l l , b u t malice i n t h e l e g a l sense) meaning t h e i n t e n t i o n a l doing of a wrongful a c t without j u s t i f i c a t i o n o r excuse, i s an e s s e n t i a l element of an a c t i o n f o r i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h c o n t r a c t . Such malice i s n o t presumed and cannot be i n f e r r e d from t h e commission of a lawful a c t . Simonsen v . Barth, 64 Mont. 95, 208 P. 938; Burden v. E l l i n g S t a t e Bank, 76 Mont. 24, 245 P. 958; Quinlivan v. Brown O i l Co., 96 Mont. 147, 29 P.2d 374. Nothing more being shown than t h e commission of a lawful a c t by McLean and t h e C r e d i t Union t h e burden was on Taylor t o p r e s e n t evidence of a m a t e r i a l and s u b s t a n t i a l n a t u r e r a i s i n g a genuine i s s u e of f a c t on t h e element of malice. The governing law on a motion f o r summary judgment i s s t a t e d i n DeWinter v. Capp Homes, I n c . , 162 Mont. 1 9 , 24, 507 "The t r i a l judge was faced w i t h a set of f a c t s t h a t could o n l y produce one conclusion. I n i - t i a l l y , t h e burden was on defendant t o show a n absence of any i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t . When defendant m e t t h e burden, it w a s incumbent upon t h e p l a i n t i f f t o p r e s e n t evidence t o raise a genuine i s s u e . A s w e r e c e n t l y s a i d i n Roope v. The Anaconda Company, 159 Mont. 28, 494 P.2d 922, 29 St.Rep. 170, 174: "'The burden of e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e absence of any i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t is on t h e p a r t y seeking summary judgment. Byrne v. P l a n t e , 154 Mont. 6, 459 P.2d 266, and c i t a t i o n s t h e r e i n . But where, a s here, t h e record d i s c l o s e s no genuine i s s u e a s t o any m a t e r i a l f a c t , t h e burden is upon t h e p a r t y opposing t h e motion t o p r e s e n t evidence of a m a t e r i a l and s u b s t a n t i a l n a t u r e r a i s i n g a genuine i s s u e of f a c t . Flansberg v. Mont. Power Co., 154 Mont. 53, 460 P.2d 263, and a u t h o r i t i e s c i t e d t h e r e i n . ' (Emphasis added) "In S t a t e ex rel. Burlington Northern v. D i s t r i c t Court, 159 Mont. 295, 496 P.2d 1152, 29 St.Rep. 380, w e affirmed t h a t r u l e : " ' F a i l u r e of t h e p a r t y opposing t h e motion t o e i t h e r raise o r demonstrate t h e e x i s t e n c e of a genuine i s s u e of m a t e r i a l f a c t , o r t o demon- strate t h a t t h e l e g a l i s s u e should n o t be d e t e r - mined i n favor of t h e movant, i s evidence t h a t t h e p a r t y ' s burden w a s not c a r r i e d . Summary judgment is then proper, t h e c o u r t being under no duty t o a n t i c i p a t e proof t o e s t a b l i s h a m a t e r i a l and s u b s t a n t i a l i s s u e of f a c t . ' " F i n a l l y , when t h e Hodacks d i d n o t pay t h e $3,000 note on t h e due d a t e , Taylor not only sued Hodacks, b u t McLean and t h e C r e d i t Union a s w e l l . This s u i t was s e t t l e d by t h e Hodacks borrowing $1,500 from t h e C r e d i t Union and paying it t o Taylor, who accepted a note from t h e Hodacks a t t h a t time f o r t h e remain- ing $1,500 which n o t e Taylor t h i s t i m e secured by a second mort- gage on t h e premises. Later on November 20, 1974, Taylor f i l e d a s a t i s f a c t i o n of t h e second mortgage when Hodacks paid t h e $1,500 note with money again borrowed from t h e C r e d i t Union. This con- s t i t u t e d not only an accord and s a t i s f a c t i o n and any extinguish- ment of t h e claim she had a g a i n s t Hodacks, b u t a l s o any p o s s i b i l i t y of a claim she could have had a g a i n s t McLean and t h e C r e d i t Union. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t ' s order granting summary judgment t o defendants is affirmed. We concur: Justices u