Case Title: Wood v. Fletcher Allen Health Care

Citation: 169 Vt. 419, 739 A.2d 1201

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1999-07-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Wood v. Fletcher Allen Health Care (98-189); 169 Vt. 419; 739 A.2d 1201

[Filed 30-Jul-1999]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as  formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the  Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 98-189

Paula Wood	                                 Supreme Court

	                                         On Appeal from
     v.		                                 Department of Labor &
	                                         Industry

Fletcher Allen Health Care	                 March Term, 1999

Steve Janson, Commissioner

       Beth Robinson of Langrock Sperry & Wool, Middlebury, for
  Plaintiff-Appellee.

       Christopher McVeigh of Paul, Frank & Collins, Inc., Burlington, for
  Defendant-Appellant.

PRESENT: Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and Zimmerman, D.J., 
         Specially Assigned

       DOOLEY, J.  Defendant, Fletcher Allen Health Care (FAHC), appeals from
  a decision  of the Commissioner of the Department of Labor and Industry
  declining to terminate workers'  compensation benefits to claimant Paula
  Wood.  FAHC contends the commissioner erred by  refusing to discontinue
  claimant's temporary total disability payments when she became pregnant 
  and was, as a result, temporarily unable to have surgery to correct her
  workplace injury.  We  affirm.

       The relevant facts are not disputed.  In November 1995, claimant
  suffered a work-related  injury while employed at FAHC as a nurse and began
  receiving temporary total disability  benefits. 

 

  See 21 V.S.A. § 642 (providing for such benefits "[w]here the injury causes
  total disability for  work").  Nearly two years later, in mid-1997,
  claimant's treating physician recommended that  she have surgery on her
  shoulder to address her work-related symptoms.  However, claimant  was
  pregnant at the time and, as a result, the doctor recommended that the
  operation be delayed  until after the birth.  Claimant accepted this
  recommendation.  She gave birth to her child in  February 1998 and
  underwent the shoulder surgery the following June.

       Meanwhile, FAHC notified claimant and the department on August 14,
  1997 that it  would discontinue her benefits as of August 21, 1997, based
  on what FAHC and its insurer  characterized as the "superseding intervening
  act of getting pregnant."  Pursuant to 21 V.S.A. §  643a, the Commissioner
  reviewed the grounds presented in the notice "to determine the  sufficiency
  of the basis for the proposed discontinuance."  The Commissioner found that
  "the  evidence does not reasonably support the proposed discontinuance" and
  ordered that the  payments continue pending a hearing.  Id.  The
  Commissioner held a hearing and rendered a  decision concluding that
  claimant's benefits should not be terminated as the result of her 
  pregnancy.  FAHC's motion for reconsideration was denied, and this appeal
  followed.

       In his decision, the Commissioner considered three grounds for
  termination advanced by  FAHC: (1) pregnancy was a superseding intervening
  cause of claimant's condition as of the date  the surgery would have
  occurred; (2) pregnancy was a "flare-up"of claimant's condition up until 
  the time she gave birth; and (3) claimant refused recommended medical
  treatment.  The  Commissioner rejected the first argument because the
  pregnancy did not aggravate claimant's  work-related condition and was not
  itself disabling.  For similar reasons, he rejected the second  argument
  that pregnancy caused an aggravation or "flare-up" of the underlying
  condition.  He 

 

  rejected the third argument because claimant acted on the recommendation of
  her physician and  did not unreasonably refuse treatment.  FAHC reiterates
  its arguments to us.

       We begin with FAHC's first argument because it captures the essence of
  the employer's  position.  FAHC argues that claimant's pregnancy is a
  superseding intervening cause of her  disability because, but for the
  pregnancy, claimant would have had the surgery and reached an  end result,
  obviating the need for temporary total disability benefits.  We reject this
  argument for  two main reasons.

       The first reason is the deference we must accord the Commissioner's
  determination.  The  Commissioner's decision is presumed valid, to be
  overturned only if there is a clear showing to  the contrary.  See Close v.
  Superior Excavating Co., 166 Vt. 318, 321,