Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V LEONARD LAMONT STEWART

Citation: 

Docket Number: 124055

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 28, 2005 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
No. 124055 
LEONARD LAMONT STEWART, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
WEAVER, J.   
This case is one of statutory interpretation. 
Under 
MCL 791.234(10), a prisoner may apply for a judicial 
certificate of cooperation. 
If the prisoner is found to 
have cooperated with law enforcement, then the prisoner is 
eligible for parole 2.5 years sooner than otherwise. 
The 
questions 
presented 
are: 
(1) 
when 
the 
prisoner’s 
cooperation must occur, and when a court may make a 
determination that cooperation has occurred; (2) what 
constitutes 
“cooperation” 
under 
MCL 
791.234(10), 
and 
whether defendant’s actions met that standard; and (3) 
whether this case should be remanded to the circuit court 
 
 
 
for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether defendant 
has cooperated within the meaning of the statute. 
We hold that a prisoner’s cooperation may occur at any 
time before the prisoner is released on parole. 
But the 
cooperation must occur before the filing of a motion for 
judicial determination of cooperation. 
Similarly, the 
statute imposes no limits on when a court may make a 
determination that cooperation occurred. 
Cooperation means that a prisoner engages in conduct 
where the prisoner is working with law enforcement for a 
common purpose, provides useful or relevant information to 
law enforcement, or establishes that although the prisoner 
provided law enforcement any information he or she had, and 
it turned out not to be relevant or useful, the prisoner 
never had any relevant or useful information to provide. A 
prisoner who had relevant or useful information to provide 
and chose not to provide this information, however, cannot 
be considered to have cooperated with law enforcement. 
Under these standards, defendant did not meet his 
burden of initially showing, by affidavit or otherwise, 
that he had cooperated with law enforcement. 
Accordingly, 
defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. 
To the extent that People v Matelic, 249 Mich App 1; 
641 NW2d 252 (2001), and People v Cardenas, 263 Mich App 
2  
 
 
 
 
 
511; 688 NW2d 544 (2004), conflict with this opinion, they 
are overruled. 
We affirm the trial court’s order denying defendant’s 
motion for judicial certification of cooperation. 
I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The police intercepted a package of cocaine at the 
Saginaw office of United Parcel Service. The police set up 
surveillance at the house to which the package was 
addressed and had a police officer deliver the package. 
David Harrell, a codefendant, signed for the package. 
A 
short time later, police officers raided the house. 
Harrell told the police that defendant asked him if 
defendant could have packages delivered to Harrell’s house, 
and that three or four packages had been delivered in 1994. 
Harrell stated that defendant had come to the house earlier 
with Bryant Fields, and that defendant had said that Fields 
would be picking the package up. 
During the raid, Fields 
came to the house to pick up the package. When the police 
arrested Fields, they found two rocks of cocaine wrapped in 
$50 and a green pager. 
Fields stated that the pager 
belonged to the man for whom he was picking up the package; 
Harrell said that the pager looked like the one that 
defendant carried. 
During the raid, the pager went off 
three times, displaying defendant’s home phone number. The 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
package originated in Pomona, California, and there were 
several calls made from defendant’s home phone to Pomona. 
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of 
possession with intent to deliver over 650 grams of 
cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i), and conspiracy to commit 
possession with intent to deliver over 650 grams of 
cocaine, MCL 750.157a(a). 
At the time that defendant was 
convicted and sentenced in 1995, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i) 
provided that an individual found guilty of possessing with 
the intent to deliver over 650 grams of cocaine would 
receive 
a 
mandatory 
sentence 
of 
life 
imprisonment. 
Further, there was no possibility of parole for an 
individual sentenced to a mandatory life sentence “for a 
major controlled substance offense . . . .” 
MCL 
791.234(4).1
 Consequently, defendant was sentenced to two 
consecutive life sentences without the possibility of 
parole. 
In 1998, three years after defendant was sentenced, 
the Legislature revised the statutes. 
The revisions 
removed the mandatory life imprisonment for those convicted 
of possession with intent to deliver over 650 grams of 
cocaine and replaced that punishment with “life or any term 
1 The substance of MCL 791.234(4) is now contained in
MCL 791.234(6). 
4  
 
 
 
 
of 
years 
but 
not 
less 
than 
20 
years.” 
MCL 
333.7401(2)(a)(i). 
The revisions further provided that 
such an offender would be eligible for parole after either 
twenty years (if the offender “has another conviction for a 
serious crime”) or after 17.5 years’ imprisonment (if the 
offender “does not have another conviction for a serious 
crime . . . .”). 
MCL 791.234(6). 
These same amendments 
also created MCL 791.234(10), which permits an offender 
convicted of possession with intent to distribute over 650 
grams of cocaine to be eligible for parole 2.5 years 
earlier if the offender is found to have “cooperated with 
law enforcement . . . .” 
Under MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i), defendant was found to be 
eligible 
for 
parole 
after 
17.5 
years’ 
imprisonment. 
Defendant subsequently petitioned to be certified as having 
cooperated with law enforcement under MCL 791.234(10). The 
trial court denied defendant’s request, stating: 
The Defendant states that he had no relevant 
or 
useful 
information 
to 
provide 
to 
law 
enforcement officers previously. 
Additionally,
he states that he is “ready and willing to 
proffer any relevant or useful information that
he may have, without undue haste.[”] 
He,
however, fails to allege how he will have any
relevant 
or 
useful 
information 
for 
law 
enforcement officials approximately eight years
after his arrest. 
The Court finds that due to a 
lack of facts, it cannot enter an order of 
cooperation. 
5  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Defendant sought leave to appeal, and the Court of 
Appeals denied defendant’s delayed application for leave to 
appeal. 
Unpublished order, entered May 21, 2003 (Docket 
No. 243562). 
This Court then granted defendant leave to appeal, 
asking the parties to address the following: 
(1) What constitutes “cooperation” for the
purpose of MCL 791.234(10), and did defendant’s
actions satisfy that requirement? 
(2) Does MCL
791.234(10) contain a temporal limitation on when
cooperation must occur? (3) Does MCL 791.234(10)
contain a temporal limitation on when a court may
make a determination that cooperation occurred?
(4) Was People v Matelic, 294 Mich App 1 (2001),
properly decided?[2] (5) Should this case be 
remanded to the Saginaw Circuit Court for an
evidentiary 
hearing 
to 
determine 
whether 
defendant has cooperated within the meaning of
MCL 791.234(10)? [People v Stewart, 470 Mich 879 
(2004).] 
II. Standard of Review 
This 
case 
involves 
the 
interpretation 
of 
MCL 
791.234(10). 
We 
review 
questions 
of 
statutory 
interpretation de novo. People v Jones, 467 Mich 301, 304; 
651 NW2d 906 (2002). 
The primary goal in construing a 
statute 
is 
“to 
give 
effect 
to 
the 
intent 
of 
the 
Legislature.” 
In re MCI Telecom Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 
2 This issue is now irrelevant because People v Matelic
was largely overruled by a conflict panel in People v 
Cardenas, 263 Mich App 511; 688 NW2d 544 (2004), convened
pursuant to MCR 7.215(J) after the order granting leave to
appeal was entered. 
6  
 
 
 
411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). 
We begin by examining the plain 
language of the statute. 
People v Morey, 461 Mich 325, 
330; 603 NW2d 250 (1999). 
III. Analysis 
The statute at issue, MCL 791.234(10), provides: 
If the sentencing judge, or his or her 
successor in office, determines on the record
that a prisoner described in subsection (6)
sentenced to imprisonment for life for violating
or conspiring to violate section 7401(2)(a)(i) of
the 
public 
health 
code, 
1978 
PA 
368, 
MCL 
333.7401, has cooperated with law enforcement,
the prisoner is subject to the jurisdiction of
the parole board and may be released on parole as
provided in subsection (6), 2-1/2 years earlier
than the time otherwise indicated in subsection 
(6). 
The 
prisoner 
is 
considered 
to 
have 
cooperated with law enforcement if the court 
determines on the record that the prisoner had no
relevant or useful information to provide. The
court shall not make a determination that the 
prisoner failed or refused to cooperate with law
enforcement 
on 
grounds 
that 
the 
defendant 
exercised his or her constitutional right to 
trial by jury. If the court determines at 
sentencing that the defendant cooperated with law
enforcement, 
the 
court 
shall 
include 
its 
determination in the judgment of sentence. 
A 
The first issue we must address is what temporal 
limits MCL 791.234(10) imposes on when cooperation must 
occur and when a court may make a determination that 
cooperation occurred. 
We agree with the conflict panel in People v Cardenas 
that the only temporal limitation the statute places on a 
prisoner’s cooperation is that the cooperation must occur 
7  
 
 
 
before the filing of a motion for judicial determination of 
cooperation. 
Other than that limitation, the cooperation 
may occur at any time before the prisoner is released on 
parole. 
Specifically, 
we 
agree 
with 
the 
following 
reasoning set out by Judge Wilder in his partial dissent in 
Matelic and adopted by the Cardenas conflict panel: 
“Giving the phrases ‘has cooperated’ and 
‘have cooperated’ their plain meaning, then, it
is clear that the Legislature intended that the
prisoner’s cooperation must have occurred at some
time before the prisoner’s application for parole
release under MCL 791.234(10). 
Similarly, the
phrase ‘had no relevant or useful information to
provide’, when given its plain meaning and 
considered in relation to the present perfect
tense clause ‘have cooperated,’ expresses the 
Legislature’s intent that the prisoner must have
lacked 
information 
before 
the 
prisoner’s
application for treatment under MCL 791.234(10),
in order to be found as a matter of law to have 
cooperated.” 
[Cardenas, supra at 518, quoting
Matelic, supra at 31-32.] 
We conclude also that the statute imposes no limits on 
when a court may make a determination that cooperation 
occurred. 
The statute refers to the sentencing judge or 
that judge’s successor in office making the determination 
of cooperation: 
If the sentencing judge, or his or her 
successor in office, determines on the record
that a prisoner . . . has cooperated with law
enforcement . . . . [MCL 791.234(10).] 
The statutory language that a successor judge may make 
a finding of cooperation indicates that there may be cases 
where such a finding can and would be made after 
8  
 
 
 
sentencing. Under the language of the statute, a judge may 
make the determination that a prisoner has cooperated at 
any time before an order of parole is entered. 
B 
The next question to consider is what constitutes 
“cooperation” for the purpose of MCL 791.234(10). 
i 
The statute specifically provides: “The prisoner is 
considered to have cooperated with law enforcement if the 
court determines on the record that the prisoner had no 
relevant or useful information to provide.” MCL 791.234(10) 
(emphasis added). 
This use of the past tense, “had,” 
indicates that defendant must at no time have had any 
relevant or useful information, not merely that any 
information he once had is no longer relevant or useful. 
We hold that a prisoner who has provided to law enforcement 
information that was found to be neither useful nor 
relevant can be considered to have cooperated with law 
enforcement if that prisoner never had any relevant or 
useful information to provide. 
But a prisoner who never 
provided any information or who had relevant or useful 
information to provide and chose not to provide this 
information when it was still relevant or useful cannot be 
considered to have cooperated with law enforcement. 
9  
 
 
 
Defendant alleges that he should be found to have 
cooperated because he never had any useful or relevant 
information to provide. 
Before sentencing, in 1995, 
defendant stated that he had nothing to say about the 
offense, that he was being framed, and that he knew the 
police “let the perpetrators get away scott free.” 
When 
petitioning for the certification of cooperation, eight 
years after his conviction, defendant advised the trial 
court that at the time he was sentenced he “had no useful 
or relevant information to provide.” 
In his brief on 
appeal to this Court, defendant also asserted that he 
“answered the questions the police asked of him, but was 
not able to tell the police anything about drugs and drug 
sales for he knew nothing about those things.” 
Because 
defendant 
never 
provided 
any 
information 
to 
law 
enforcement, he cannot be considered to have cooperated. 
Further, 
despite 
defendant’s 
protestations 
of 
innocence, defendant was convicted of possession with 
intent to deliver over 650 grams of cocaine and conspiracy 
to commit possession with intent to deliver over 650 grams 
of cocaine. 
We note that MCL 791.234(10) applies only to 
prisoners 
who 
have 
been 
convicted 
of 
violating 
or 
conspiring 
to 
violate 
MCL 
333.7401(2)(a)(i), 
which 
prohibits 
manufacturing, 
creating, 
delivering, 
or 
possessing with intent to manufacture, create, or deliver a 
10  
 
 
 
 
schedule 1 or 2 controlled substance that is in an amount 
of 650 grams or more. 
It may be presumed that a prisoner 
convicted of one of these crimes would have the following 
relevant or useful information for law enforcement: where 
the prisoner got the drug, how he or she processed it, how 
he or she intended to deliver it, and to whom he or she 
intended to deliver it. 
On the basis of defendant’s 
convictions, and the facts surrounding them, we conclude 
that defendant did have relevant or useful information that 
he could have given to law enforcement at the time of his 
arrest or conviction. 
Defendant could have disclosed to the police the name 
of the person who shipped the cocaine to him, the names of 
the other people involved in the drug ring, and how he was 
planning to distribute the drugs. 
At the time of 
defendant’s arrest or conviction, this information would 
have been relevant or useful. 
Because defendant had 
relevant or useful information to provide and chose not to 
provide this information, defendant cannot be considered to 
have cooperated with law enforcement. 
ii 
Cooperation can also include providing useful or 
relevant information to law enforcement. 
MCL 791.234(10) 
states 
that 
“[t]he 
prisoner 
is 
considered 
to 
have 
cooperated with law enforcement if the court determines on 
11  
 
 
 
 
the record that the prisoner had no relevant or useful 
information to provide.” 
The clear implication is that a 
prisoner is also considered to have cooperated with law 
enforcement if the prisoner has provided relevant or useful 
information. The prisoner bears the burden of proving that 
he or she has provided all the information he or she 
possesses about a crime; the prisoner cannot pick and 
choose what information he or she is prepared to disclose. 
We note that the statute does not limit the relevant 
or useful information to information about the crime for 
which the prisoner was convicted. 
If a prisoner who was 
convicted of possession with intent to deliver over 650 
grams of cocaine had relevant or useful information on a 
murder, providing that information to law enforcement could 
be cooperation. 
Defendant alleges that he should be found to have 
cooperated because he is willing to provide relevant and 
useful information to law enforcement in the future. 
Defendant’s statement in his petition for certification of 
cooperation that he was “ready and willing to proffer any 
relevant or useful information that he may have, without 
undue haste,” is an offer of future cooperation. 
But, as 
we stated in part III(A) of this opinion, a prisoner’s 
cooperation must have occurred before the petition for 
certification 
of 
cooperation 
is 
filed. 
It 
is 
not 
12  
 
 
                                                 
sufficient for defendant to allege that he would be willing 
to cooperate in the future. 
iii 
Finally, defendant alleges that on the basis of his 
conduct before and following his arrest, he should be found 
to have cooperated with law enforcement. 
“Cooperate” is 
defined as “to work together; 1) to act or work together 
with one another or others for a common purpose.” Webster’s 
New World Dictionary, Second College Edition. 
Considered 
in light of the statute, cooperation would include conduct 
such as participating in a controlled drug buy or a sting 
operation, or engaging in some other conduct to work with 
law enforcement toward a common goal.3
 The trial judge 
would determine, on the basis of the evidence in each 
individual case, whether the prisoner had cooperated within 
the meaning of MCL 791.234(10). 
Defendant asserts that he should be found to have 
cooperated with law enforcement on the basis of the 
following conduct: 
3  The discussion of whether conduct, rather
than 
providing 
information, 
can 
constitute 
cooperation under MCL 791.234(10)is not dicta,
because the defendant in this case alleged that
on the basis of certain conduct on his part he
should be found to have cooperated with law 
enforcement. 
13  
 
 
 
[D]efendant did not endeavor to hide or 
destroy 
evidence 
after 
his 
co-defendants[’]
arrest; and he did not tamper with or intimidate
witnesses. 
Defendant did not flee to avoid 
prosecution prior to his arrest nor during the 
interval 
between 
his 
release 
on 
bond 
and 
subsequent conviction. 
At all times Defendant 
was 
polite 
and 
courteous 
to 
investigating
officers and officers of the court. [Defendant’s
August 6, 2002, brief in support of motion for
certification of cooperation, p 6.] 
But defendant’s alleged conduct does not constitute 
cooperation under the statute. 
Defendant’s actions in not 
hiding or destroying evidence, not intimidating witnesses, 
not fleeing to avoid prosecution, and being courteous to 
the investigating officers did not amount to working with 
law enforcement for a common purpose. 
Defendant refrained 
from impeding law enforcement personnel in their purpose, 
but did nothing to work toward that purpose with the law 
enforcement personnel. 
C 
The final question concerns when a prisoner is 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the 
prisoner 
has 
cooperated 
within 
the 
meaning 
of 
MCL 
791.234(10). 
We agree with the Cardenas conflict panel that the 
prisoner has the burden of initially showing, by affidavit 
or otherwise, that he or she has already cooperated with 
law enforcement or that he or she provided any information 
he or she had to law enforcement, but at no time before 
14  
 
 
 
filing the motion did he or she have any relevant or useful 
information to provide. 
The sentencing court would then 
have the discretion to conduct such a hearing after 
reviewing the evidence, in the event it concludes that a 
genuine and material factual issue exists regarding whether 
the prisoner cooperated. 
Here, we have already found that defendant’s alleged 
conduct did not constitute cooperation; defendant has not 
alleged that he has provided any useful or relevant 
information; and we have concluded that defendant cannot be 
considered to have cooperated because he previously had 
useful or relevant information that he did not provide to 
the police. 
Defendant has not met his burden of initially 
showing that he has cooperated with law enforcement and, 
therefore, is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We affirm the trial court’s order denying defendant’s 
motion for judicial certification of cooperation. 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Clifford W. Taylor
Michael F. Cavanagh
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
15  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 124055 
LEONARD LAMONT STEWART, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
MARKMAN, J. (concurring). 
I agree with the majority that defendant has not met 
his burden of establishing that he has cooperated with law 
enforcement, and, thus, I agree with its affirmance of the 
trial 
court’s 
order 
denying 
defendant’s 
motion 
for 
certification of cooperation. 
I write separately to set 
forth two areas of concern. 
First, I disagree with the majority that “a prisoner 
who never provided any information . . . cannot be 
considered to have cooperated with law enforcement.” 
Ante 
at 9. While this may be reasonable as a matter of policy, 
it is simply inconsistent with the direction of the 
Legislature. 
MCL 791.234(10) states that a “prisoner is 
considered to have cooperated with law enforcement if the 
court determines on the record that the prisoner had no 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
relevant or useful information to provide.” 
The majority 
appends 
to 
the 
Legislature's 
definition 
the 
further 
requirement that a prisoner must have provided some 
information to law enforcement. 
It thus adds language to 
the statute that is not there. While I can conceive of few 
instances in which a silent prisoner will ever be able to 
satisfy his burdens under the statute, I nonetheless 
disagree with the majority's substitution of its own 
definition of “cooperation” for that of the Legislature. 
Second, I would not address, in dictum, as the 
majority does, whether “cooperation” under MCL 791.234(10) 
“include[s] conduct such as participating in a controlled 
drug buy or a sting operation,” and whether “cooperation” 
pertains to providing information about crimes unrelated to 
the crime for which the prisoner has been convicted. 
Ante 
at 12-13.1
 Perhaps precisely because it is dictum, and 
1 I am puzzled by the majority’s assertion that its
discussion of these matters does not constitute dictum. 
Ante at 13 n 3. 
The prosecutor has not argued that
defendant did not “cooperate” by failing to participate in
a controlled drug buy, and defendant has not argued to the
contrary. And the prosecutor has not argued that defendant
did not “cooperate” by failing to provide information about
an unrelated crime, and defendant has not argued to the
contrary. 
That defendant has asserted one form of conduct 
as “cooperation”-- namely, his failure to resist the 
police, an absurd argument correctly rejected by the 
majority-- does not properly allow the majority to decide
whether 
every 
other 
conceivable 
form 
of 
“conduct” 
constitutes “cooperation.” 
2  
 
 
 
 
because these matters have not been briefed by the parties, 
I find the majority’s discussion to be cursory and 
insufficiently respectful of the fact that there may be 
alternative, plausible understandings of MCL 791.234(10). 
Again, the majority sets forth a reasonable policy, but it 
fails to adequately explain why such policy is compelled by 
the statute. 
I would avoid this dictum, and await a case 
in which these issues can be explored more thoroughly, and 
in a more relevant setting. 
Stephen J. Markman 
3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
v 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
No. 124055 
LEONARD LAMONT STEWART, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
_______________________________ 
KELLY, J. (concurring in result only). 
I concur that defendant did not qualify for a 
certificate of cooperation. 
However, I disagree with 
several crucial aspects of the majority’s interpretation of 
MCL 791.234(10). 
The majority opinion creates the requirement that, to 
be 
eligible 
for 
credit 
for 
cooperation 
under 
MCL 
791.234(10), a prisoner must provide law enforcement with 
all the information he has about a crime. The statute does 
not contain this requirement. Moreover, I believe that the 
Legislature did not intend that the statute should be 
interpreted to include it. 
One might reflect that a prisoner providing less than 
all the information he possesses about a crime could 
nonetheless be very helpful to law enforcement. 
That may 
explain why the Legislature chose to confer the benefit of 
 
 
 
 
 
early parole eligibility using such general terms. 
It 
permitted the benefits to be conferred if the prisoner is 
shown to have "cooperated with law enforcement," and it 
refrained from indicating what constitutes cooperation and 
how much cooperation is enough. 
Moreover, the Legislature chose not to limit the 
statute's benefit to prisoners who provide information that 
is relevant and useful. 
Rather, it specified that the 
prisoner 
may 
be 
found 
to 
have 
cooperated 
with 
law 
enforcement even if the court determines that he had no 
relevant 
or 
useful 
information 
to 
provide. 
MCL 
791.234(10). 
The Legislature pointedly left it to the 
discretion of the judge to determine how much cooperation 
is 
sufficient 
to 
earn 
the 
benefit 
of 
early 
parole 
eligibility. 
For these reasons, I concur only in the result of 
Justice Weaver's majority opinion. 
Marilyn Kelly 
2