Case Title: Fritzler v. Dumler

Citation: 209 Kan. 16, 495 P.2d 1027

Docket Number: 46,214

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1972-04-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
209 Kan. 16 (1972)
495 P.2d 1027
EDDIE FRITZLER and FREDA FRITZLER, Appellants,
v.
FREDERICK C. DUMLER and NAOMI DUMLER, Appellees.
No. 46,214

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 8, 1972.
Robert L. Earnest, of Russell, argued the cause, and Eric E. Smith, of Russell, was with him on the brief for the appellants.
Mark Arthur, Jr., of Russell, argued the cause, and Marvin E. Thompson and Clifford R. Holland, Jr., both of Russell, were with him on the brief for the appellees.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
KAUL, J.:
This action involves a dispute over a boundary line between adjacent properties owned by the parties. The underlying question is whether the boundary line is that established by a legal survey as claimed by Dumlers, defendants-appellees, or is a line established by an alleged mutual agreement as claimed by Fritzlers, plaintiffs-appellants.
*17 The trial court found generally for defendants.
The land in question fronts on the west side of Highway 281 just south of the City of Russell. It was annexed to the city in 1968 and the tract now owned by plaintiffs was platted as Lot 23 and the tract owned by defendants as Lot 24, both tracts lying situate in Block 5, Witt-Carter Addition to the City of Russell. Fritzlers originally owned both tracts, having purchased the same from McKean Carter, the owner of a quarter section of which the tracts were a part.
Both parties submitted the testimony of several witnesses in a trial to the court. In rendering judgment, the trial court filed a memorandum decision in which all of the relevant facts developed by the testimony are set out  we quote as follows:
The trial court made conclusions of law which we quote in part as pertinent to the issue presented on appeal:
In line with its finding that defendants conceded it would be unfair to take the position that plaintiffs should be required to remove their improvements on the two feet of defendants' property, the trial court entered a judgment in substance that:
1. Plaintiffs are granted judgment in the sum of $75.00 for actual damages to plaintiffs' garage and for the sum of $200.00 as punitive damages.
2. Since plaintiffs are not the owners of the south ten feet of Lot 24 they are not entitled to damages for the destruction of the trees located thereon.
The court further decreed:
and further ordered:
On the hearing of plaintiffs' motion for a new trial, which was denied, the court modified the original judgment with respect to the provisions for forty-five days abeyance by directing that in case of an appeal to this court the forty-five days provision should come into effect on the filing of the mandate of the decision of this court with the Clerk of the Court of Russell County.
On appeal, plaintiffs state their challenge to the trial court's ruling in these words:
At the time of their conveyance to Anschutz, plaintiffs were the owners of all the land in question. In harmony with K.S.A. 58-2202 (formerly G.S. 1949, 67-202) which provides that every deed of real estate shall pass all of the estate of the grantor therein unless the intent to pass a less estate shall expressly appear or be necessarily implied in the terms of the grant, a deed is to be construed strictly against the grantor and to confer upon the grantee the greatest estate that its terms will permit.
The descriptions in the series of conveyances in the instant case are clear and unambiguous. The two legal surveys, the first initiated by defendants, at the request of a prospective purchaser, and the second, made later at the instance of plaintiffs, resulted in the fixing of the same boundary line. The field notes, included in the record on appeal, reflect that the survey was a simple matter in merely chain measuring the distance set out in the deed descriptions from the beginning reference point which was the northeast corner of the Carter quarter section.
As a general rule, the boundary line between adjacent properties is to be determined by reference to the deeds and the intention of the parties as reflected by the description in the deeds and where there is no ambiguity in the descriptions they are to be taken as the conclusive evidence of the intention of the parties. (12 Am.Jur.2d, Boundaries, § 2, p. 548. See, also, Winters v. Bloom, 96 Kan. 443, 151 Pac. 1109; and Hinnen v. Artz, 99 Kan. 579, 163 Pac. 141.)
*22 Therefore, where descriptions are unambiguous and in metes and bounds, as in the instant case, it requires only a survey to establish the true boundary.
On appeal, as in the trial below, the plaintiffs take the position that their situation in the case at bar falls within one of the exceptions to the general rule; namely, that the boundary line contended for by them was established through agreement and acquiescence by the plaintiffs and defendants and their predecessors in title notwithstanding the boundary line established by the survey.
Before proceeding further with plaintiffs' argument it should be noted that plaintiffs concede they have no standing with respect to adverse possession or as occupying claimants'  two other doctrines that operate as exceptions to the general rule.
Plaintiffs cite our cases and other authority to the effect that where a boundary line is in dispute or unknown it may be established by the mutual agreement of the parties fixing a line and acquiescence thereafter in the line so agreed upon. The proposition presented by plaintiffs is sound and in harmony with our decisions. The trouble is that it is not applicable to the instant case. Here, as noted, the trial court found there was no agreement, either express or implied, between Fritzler and Anschutz that the tree line was the boundary line. When the tree line was established, both tracts were owned by the same party  Fritzler. Further, the trial court noted there was no testimony that the boundary line was in dispute. When Anschutz sold to Dumlers the court, likewise, found there was no question or controversy about the boundary line.
Under similar rules of appellate review there is nothing presented in the record which could serve as a basis for overturning the trial court's findings on these matters. In short, there was no express agreement fixing the boundary line nor evidence from which an agreement could be implied. We agree with the trial court's observation that the designation of the tree line as the boundary line by Fritzler and in turn by Anschutz was a designation in each instance by one who was parting with his interest rather than consent by two people to each honor a line in the future. The statements were not made with the intention that they should be acted upon  no agreement was made in response.
With respect to plaintiffs' claim of acquiescence, that term, as applied to a boundary line controversy, is defined as a consent to the conditions and involves knowledge of them. It involves more *23 than a mere establishment of a line by one party and the taking of possession by him. There must be knowledge on the part of the other party. The line acquiesced in must be known, definite and certain or known and capable of ascertainment. (12 Am.Jur.2d, Boundaries, § 85, pp. 620-621.) In the case at bar Fritzler established the tree line when he was owner of all the property; neither Anschutz nor Dumlers were in the picture.
The case of Steinhilber v. Holmes, 68 Kan. 607, 75 Pac. 1019; Terrell v. Chessmore, 94 Kan. 611, 146 Pac. 1152; and Blanford v. Biven, 123 Kan. 269, 254 Pac. 1030, cited by plaintiffs, involved controversies where boundary lines were fixed by an express mutual agreement of the parties who were the owners of the adjoining properties at the time the agreement was made. The holdings in the cases mentioned are not determinative in the absence of a finding of an express agreement as in the instant case. Likewise, the more recent case of Beams v. Werth, 200 Kan. 532, 438 P.2d 957, was a holding based upon an implied mutual agreement fixing a boundary line and acquiescence thereafter by the parties in the line agreed upon. In Fyler v. Hartness, 171 Kan. 49, 229 P.2d 751, this court held there was sufficient evidence to show a boundary agreement "circumstantially" and affirmed the trial court's ruling to that effect. Again the holding rested on an implied agreement.
In the instant case, plaintiffs do not plead mutual mistake and ask for reformation of their deed. Their claims of an agreement, express or implied, and acquiescence were rejected by the trial court. The findings are in effect negative findings and in view of the record before us cannot be disturbed on appeal. (Jensen v. Jensen, 205 Kan. 465, 470 P.2d 829; and King v. Robbins, 201 Kan. 748, 433 P.2d 308.)
In view of our disposition of the appeal, the question of damages raised by plaintiffs need not be considered.
The judgment is affirmed.