Case Title: Com. v. Lyons

Citation: 395 Pa. Super. 184, 576 A.2d 1105

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1990-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
395 Pa. Superior Ct. 184 (1990) 576 A.2d 1105 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. David W. LYONS, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued April 25, 1990. Filed July 3, 1990. *185 John B. Mancke, Harrisburg, for appellant. Julia A.F. Merl, Asst. Dist. Atty., Harrisburg, for Com. Before CIRILLO, Presiding Judge, and CAVANAUGH, ROWLEY, WIEAND, OLSZEWSKI, DEL SOLE, TAMILIA, JOHNSON and HUDOCK, JJ. PER CURIAM: This appeal presents the Court with an issue of first impression, namely, whether a second offense of driving while operating privileges are under suspension, which is punishable by not more than six months imprisonment, pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S. § 6503, is intended by the legislature to be a summary offense or a misdemeanor. Our analysis of the pertinent statutory provisions leads us to find that a second violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(a) is a summary offense. Driving while one's operating privilege is suspended constitutes a summary offense under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(a), which provides as follows: However, 75 Pa.C.S. § 6503, as amended by the Act of July 9, 1986, P.L. 544, No. 96, § 3, provides that a person who is convicted of a second or subsequent violation of section 1543(a) "shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than $200 nor more than $1,000 or to imprisonment for not more than six months, or both." Although section 6503 establishes a more severe penalty to be imposed than does section 1543(a), it makes no attempt to classify a second offense as a misdemeanor. While a first violation of section 1543(a) is made a summary offense, second or subsequent violations of the section come within the parameters of section 6503, and we must determine whether this undesignated offense constitutes a summary offense or a misdemeanor. Under the pertinent provisions of the Crimes Code, an offense is a summary offense if it is so designated or if a person convicted thereof may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment not in excess of 90 days. 18 Pa.C.S. § 106(c). The Crimes Code also provides that a misdemeanor of the third degree is a crime so designated or one for which a person who has been convicted may be "sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the maximum of which is not more than one year." 18 Pa.C.S. § 106(b)(8). Second or subsequent violations of section 1543(a) of the Vehicle Code, coming within § 6503, would then seem to be misdemeanors of the third degree. The legislature, however, has provided expressly in the Vehicle Code that the Crimes Code, "insofar as it relates to fines and imprisonment for convictions of summary offenses, is not applicable to this title." 75 Pa.C.S. § 6502(c). Instead, the Vehicle Code provides: Based on our holding, we consider the facts of the instant case. David Lyons was arrested and a criminal complaint was filed charging him with driving while his operating privileges were under suspension, a second or subsequent offense. The charges were dismissed by District Justice Marlin Strohm after testimony had been presented. Lyons was thereafter re-charged with the same offense,[1] and this time the District Justice, rejecting Lyons' plea of double jeopardy, returned the case to court for trial. There, a motion to quash on double jeopardy grounds was dismissed, and Lyons was subsequently found guilty. Post-trial motions were denied, and Lyons was sentenced to pay a fine of one thousand ($1,000) dollars. This appeal followed. Because appellant's offense was summary in nature, we are constrained to agree that his second trial was held in *188 violation of principles of double jeopardy. Having once been placed on trial in a court having jurisdiction to determine guilt or innocence and the charge having been dismissed, appellant could not thereafter be again placed on trial for the same offense. See Commonwealth v. Grazier, 481 Pa. 622, 630-631, 393 A.2d 335, 339 (1978); In Interest of R.R., 317 Pa.Super. 334, 342, 464 A.2d 348, 352 (1983); Commonwealth v. Mihaltian, 41 D. & C. 3d 270, 272 (1986). It follows that the judgment of sentence imposed against appellant cannot stand. Judgment of sentence reversed; appellant is discharged. [1] The District Attorney, in the interim, had issued a memorandum stating that such offenses were to be deemed misdemeanors.