Case Title: Ex parte Victor LeShawn Gunn. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Victor LeShawn Gunn v. State of Alabama)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1051754

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2007-09-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 09/21/07 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
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before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2007
_________________________
1051754
_________________________
Ex parte Victor LeShawn Gunn
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re:  Victor LeShawn Gunn
v.
State of Alabama)
(Lauderdale Circuit Court, CC-94-361.62;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-05-1350)
SEE, Justice.
The trial court summarily dismissed Victor LeShawn Gunn's
Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., petition, which Gunn concedes was
1051754
Section 13A-5-9(c)(3) provides as follows: 
1
"(c) In all cases when it is shown that a
criminal defendant has been previously convicted of
2
actually a second motion for reconsideration of his sentence
under § 13A-5-9.1, Ala. Code 1975.  The trial court dismissed
Gunn's petition on the basis that, under Wells v. State, 941
So. 2d 1008, 1009 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005), the trial court does
not have jurisdiction to consider a successive § 13A-5-9.1
motion.  The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial
court's summary dismissal on the same ground.  To the extent
that Wells violates the constitutional principle articulated
in Kirby v. State, 899 So. 2d 968, 972 (Ala. 2004), that only
the legislature has the authority to alter the jurisdiction of
circuit courts, we hereby overrule Wells.  We therefore
reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals
affirming the trial court's dismissal of Gunn's petition based
on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and remand the case.
Facts and Procedural History
The petitioner, Victor LeShawn Gunn, was convicted of
first-degree robbery and was sentenced to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole under subsection (c)(3) of
the Habitual Felony Offender Act, § 13A-5-9, Ala. Code 1975.1
1051754
any three felonies and after such convictions has
committed another felony, he or she must be punished
as follows:
"....
"(3) On conviction of a Class A
felony, where the defendant has no prior
convictions for any Class A felony, he or
she must be punished by imprisonment for
life or life without the possibility of
parole, in the discretion of the trial
court."
Section 13A-5-9.1 provides that "[t]he provisions of
2
Section 13A-5-9 shall be applied retroactively by the
sentencing judge or presiding judge for consideration of early
parole of each nonviolent convicted offender based on
evaluations performed by the Department of Corrections and
approved by the Board of Pardons and Paroles and submitted to
the court."
3
In March 2005, Gunn moved under § 13A-5-9.1, Ala. Code 1975,2
for the reconsideration of his sentence.  The trial court
denied Gunn's motion on the ground that, because first-degree
robbery is a violent offense, Gunn did not qualify as a
"nonviolent convicted offender" for the purposes of § 13A-5-
9.1.  The trial court did not consider any of the other
evidence Gunn submitted relating to his behavior in prison or
to the nonviolent nature of the other convictions used to
enhance his sentence under the Habitual Felony Offender Act.
1051754
The relevant portions of Rule 32.1 read as follows:
3
"Subject to the limitations of Rule 32.2, any
defendant who has been convicted of a criminal
offense may institute a proceeding in the court of
original conviction to secure appropriate relief on
the grounds that:
"....
"(e) Newly discovered material facts
exist which require that the conviction or
sentence be vacated by the court ...."
4
In March 2006, the Court of Criminal Appeals released
Holt v. State, [Ms. CR-04-1250, March 3, 2006] ___ So. 2d ___
(Ala. Crim. App. 2006).  In Holt, that court held that a trial
court 
could 
not 
reject 
an 
application 
for 
sentence
reconsideration under § 13A-5-9.1 solely on the basis that the
underlying conviction was for a violent offense.  Following
the release of Holt, Gunn petitioned the trial court for
postconviction relief under Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., arguing
that the Holt decision constituted "new evidence" under Rule
32.1(e), Ala. R. Crim. P., requiring that his sentence be
vacated.   Gunn reasoned that the principle expounded in Holt
3
is new evidence related to sentencing, and that under Holt the
trial court could not summarily dismiss his motion for
sentence reconsideration on the ground that the underlying
1051754
5
offense was statutorily defined as a violent offense.  He
argued that, in deciding his initial § 13A-5-9.1 motion for
sentence 
reconsideration, the trial court should have
considered the totality of the circumstances and that, if it
had, it would not have allowed his sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole to stand. 
The trial court concluded that Gunn's petition , although
styled as a Rule 32 petition, operated as a successive § 13A-
5-9.1 motion and summarily dismissed it on the authority of
Wells v. State, supra.  In Wells, the Court of Criminal
Appeals 
stated: 
"[T]he 
circuit 
court 
will 
not 
have
jurisdiction to consider any second or successive motions for
[sentence] reconsideration filed by that defendant in that
particular case.  Instead, it should summarily deny any such
motion." 
Gunn appealed, and, in an unpublished memorandum, the
Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the trial court's dismissal
of his petition, stating that Gunn had conceded that his Rule
32 petition was a second motion for sentence reconsideration
under § 13A-5-9.1 and that, therefore, under Wells, the trial
court did not have jurisdiction over the successive § 13A-5-
1051754
6
9.1 motion.  Gunn v. State (No. CR-05-1350, August 11, 2006),
___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (table).  
Gunn petitioned this Court for the writ of certiorari,
raising three grounds under Rule 39, Ala. R. App. P.  First,
he argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision in his
case conflicts with this Court's decision in Kirby because the
Court of Criminal Appeals' decision limits the trial court's
jurisdiction to one § 13A-5-9.1 motion per defendant, although
neither Kirby nor § 13A-5-9.1 itself imposes such a
limitation.  Second, Gunn argues that the Court of Criminal
Appeals' decision conflicts with Ex parte Seymour, 946 So. 2d
536 (Ala. 2006), because, Gunn argues, Seymour holds that
"jurisdiction ... to impose a sentence" in Rule 32.1(b), Ala.
R. Crim. P., refers to subject-matter jurisdiction, and the
Court of Criminal Appeals cannot alter a trial court's
statutorily granted subject-matter jurisdiction.  Third, Gunn
argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision raises a
material question of first impression as to whether a Rule 32
petition is the proper avenue by which to raise a claim of
newly discovered evidence concerning a previous § 13A-5-9.1
proceeding.  We granted Gunn's petition for the writ of
1051754
This Court voted to grant certiorari review as to the
4
first issue only and to deny review as to the second and third
issues Gunn raises in his petition.  Because of a clerical
error, however, the parties were not informed of the limited
scope of our certiorari review; nonetheless, they ably briefed
the issue as to which we granted certiorari review.
The State argues that Gunn's contention that the Court
5
of Criminal Appeals' decision in Wells conflicts with Kirby is
not properly before this Court because Gunn did not timely
raise it.  The State argues that although the trial court
cited Wells in its order denying Gunn's second § 13A-5-9.1
motion, the first time Gunn argued that Wells should be
overruled was in his brief in support of his application for
rehearing in the Court of Criminal Appeals.  The State argues
that "[b]ecause the issue about which Gunn complains ... was
apparent in the trial court and could have been a ground for
relief on appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, he should
be barred from pursuing the claim here when it was raised for
the first time in his application for rehearing" in the Court
of Criminal Appeals.
Whether an issue is properly before this Court on
certiorari review is governed by Rule 39(a), Ala. R. App. P.
7
certiorari as to the first issue only -- whether the Court of
Criminal Appeals' decision conflicts with Kirby.  
4
Analysis
Gunn argues that the affirmance by the Court of Criminal
Appeals of the trial court's summary dismissal of his
petition, based on the holding of Wells that a trial court
lacks jurisdiction to entertain a second § 13A-5-9.1 motion
for sentence reconsideration, conflicts with this Court's
holding in Kirby.   We stated in Kirby: 
5
1051754
Rule 39(a)(1) lists six instances in which a petition for the
writ of certiorari will be considered.  Among those are the
following: 
"(D) From decisions in conflict with prior
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States,
the Supreme Court of Alabama, the Alabama Court of
Criminal Appeals, or the Alabama Court of Civil
Appeals ...
"....
"(E) 
Where 
the 
petitioner 
seeks 
to 
have
overruled controlling Alabama Supreme Court cases
that were followed in the decision of the court of
appeals."
Gunn demonstrated an apparent conflict between the Court of
Criminal Appeals' unpublished memorandum summarily dismissing
his appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the authority of Wells
and this Court's decision in Kirby.  Under Rule 39(a)(1)(D),
this issue is now properly before us, and the State offers no
authority to the contrary.
8
"Section 6.11 of Amendment No. 328[, Ala. Const. of
1901, now § 150, Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.),]
grants this Court the authority to promulgate rules
of procedure, including criminal procedure, but it
prohibits this Court from enacting a rule that
alters the jurisdiction of a court.  Only the
Legislature, within constitutional limits, has the
authority to alter the jurisdiction of the circuit
courts."
899 So. 2d at 972.  See also Seymour, 946 So. 2d at 538
("Subject matter jurisdiction concerns a court's power to
decide certain types of cases. ... That power is derived from
the Alabama Constitution and the Alabama Code.").  Thus, this
1051754
9
Court does not have the authority to adopt rules altering the
jurisdiction of the trial courts.  Kirby, 899 So. 2d at 972;
see also Ala. Const. 1901, Amend. No. 328, § 6.11 (now § 150,
Ala. Const. 1901 (Off. Recomp.)) (providing that the Supreme
Court may not promulgate rules that "affect the jurisdiction
of the circuit and district courts").  "Only the Legislature,
within constitutional limits, has the authority to alter the
jurisdiction of the circuit courts."  899 So. 2d at 972.  Gunn
contends that neither the language of § 13A-5-9.1 nor our
interpretation of it as set forth in Kirby limits the
jurisdiction of the  trial courts to a single § 13A-5-9.1
motion per defendant per case.
The Court of Criminal Appeals based its affirmance in
this case on its earlier holding in Wells, in which the Court
of Criminal Appeals faced a situation similar to the one now
before us.  The petitioner in Wells, like Gunn, had moved the
trial court for reconsideration of his sentence under § 13A-5-
9.1.  The Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the trial court's
denial of that motion and issued a certificate of judgment.
A few years later, the petitioner again moved the trial court
for reconsideration of his sentence under § 13A-5-9.1.  The
1051754
10
trial court summarily denied that motion.  On appeal, the
Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that "neither § 13A-5-
9.1, Ala. Code 1975, nor Kirby v. State, 899 So. 2d 968 (Ala.
2004), specifically mentions the filing of more than one such
motion."  Nonetheless, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that
a "circuit court will not have jurisdiction to consider any
second or successive motions for reconsideration."  Wells, 941
So. 2d at 1009.  The court reasoned that, in addressing
motions for reconsideration, courts "'must strike a proper
balance between our interest in preserving the finality of
judgments, and, thus, promoting the efficient administration
of criminal justice, and our interest in safeguarding the
rights of the accused.'" 941 So. 2d at 1009 (quoting Ex parte
Frazier, 562 So. 2d 560, 569 (Ala. 1989)).  The court
concluded that, "once a circuit court has considered one
motion for reconsideration of sentence filed by a defendant in
a particular case, the defendant's rights with regard to that
case will have been sufficiently safeguarded."  941 So. 2d at
1009.
Although 
the 
court 
in 
Wells 
correctly 
noted 
the
importance of striking a proper balance between safeguarding
1051754
This opinion should not be read as requiring the trial
6
courts 
to 
consider 
second 
or 
successive 
motions 
for
reconsideration under § 13A-5-9.1, Ala. Code 1975.  We granted
certiorari review to address only the question whether the
trial courts have subject-matter jurisdiction over successive
§ 13A-5-9.1 motions.  We do not reach the question whether the
statute can or does require such a reconsideration.
11
the rights of the accused and preserving the finality of
judgments, the Court of Criminal Appeals' conclusion that a
trial court lacks "jurisdiction" to consider a successive §
13A-5-9.1 motion appears to be in direct conflict with the
principle articulated in Kirby that the Constitution of
Alabama prohibits this Court from creating rules that limit
the jurisdiction of the circuit courts.  The legislature
specifically granted the circuit courts jurisdiction to
reconsider sentences under § 13A-5-9.1, and, as both the court
in Wells and the State in this case acknowledge, the plain
language of the statute does not limit that jurisdiction to
one motion per defendant per case.  Therefore, insofar as
Wells purports to impose such a jurisdictional limitation, it
is overruled.   Because the Court of Criminal Appeals premised
6
its affirmance of the trial court's dismissal in the case on
its holding in Wells, we reverse its judgment and remand the
1051754
12
case to the Court of Criminal Appeals for proceedings
consistent with this opinion. 
Conclusion
We 
overrule 
Wells 
insofar 
as 
it 
violates 
the
constitutional principle articulated in Kirby -- that only the
legislature has the authority to alter the jurisdiction of the
circuit courts.  Because that principle was the sole basis for
the Court of Criminal Appeals' affirmance of the trial court's
judgment, we reverse its judgment and remand the case to the
Court of Criminal Appeals for further proceedings.  
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Lyons, Woodall, Smith, and Bolin, JJ., concur.  
Stuart, Parker, and Murdock, JJ., concur specially.
Cobb, C.J., recuses herself.
1051754
Kirby v. State, 899 So. 2d 968 (Ala. 2004).
7
13
STUART, Justice (concurring specially).
I recognize the principle of stare decisis, and in light
of this Court’s decision in Ex parte Butler, [Ms. 1051636,
March 16, 2007] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. 2007), that a circuit
court has jurisdiction to entertain a Kirby  motion for
7
sentence reconsideration under § 13A-5-9.1, Ala. Code 1975,
filed by an inmate who has been convicted of an offense that
is statutorily defined as a violent offense, I concur
specially in the majority’s decision to consider the merits of
this petition.  I fully concur with this Court’s decision to
overrule the holding in Wells v. State, 941 So. 2d 1008, 1009
(Ala. Crim. App. 2005), that "the circuit court will not have
jurisdiction to consider any second or successive motions for
reconsideration filed by that defendant in that particular
case."  See my special writings in Ex parte Coleman, [Ms.
1060909, May 25, 2007] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2007), and Ex
parte Jenkins [Ms. 1051778, March 16, 2007] ___ So. 2d ___,
___ (Ala. 2007). 
I, however, adhere to my dissents in Ex parte Jones, 953
So. 2d 1210, 1210 (Ala. 2006); Holt v. State, [Ms. 1050800,
1051754
Gunn concedes that although his pleading in the trial
8
court was styled as a Rule 32 petition, the pleading operated
substantively as a motion for sentence reconsideration and
sought relief pursuant to § 13A-5-9.1, Ala. Code 1975.
14
December 22, 2006] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2006); Ex parte
Butler, ___ So. 2d at ___; and Ex parte Jenkins, and I
continue to maintain that "if an inmate has been convicted of
an offense that is defined by statute as a violent offense, he
is a violent offender, and the sentencing judge or the
presiding judge does not have jurisdiction to entertain the
[Kirby] motion."  Butler, ___ So. 2d at ___. 
Lastly, Justice Murdock in his special writing questions
"whether a decision or an opinion of this Court constitutes
'evidence' or 'facts' within the contemplation of Rule
32.1(e)." 
 
Although 
this 
statement 
warrants 
further
consideration, such consideration is not appropriate in this
case because this Court is reviewing a judgment addressing a
motion for sentence reconsideration filed pursuant to § 13A-5-
9.1, Ala. Code 1975, not a judgment addressing a Rule 32, Ala.
R. Crim. P., petition.   Rule 32, Ala. R. Crim. P., does not
8
provide a ground for relief from a decision on a motion for
sentence reconsideration filed pursuant to § 13A-5-9.1, Ala.
1051754
15
Code 1975; therefore, Rule 32 has no applicability to this
case.    
Parker, J., concurs.
1051754
16
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur in the main opinion.  I write separately to note
that I do not read footnote 5 of the main opinion as holding
that because a case falls within one of the five categories of
cases listed in Rule 39(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P., as to which
this Court may consider petitions for writs of certiorari, the
petitioner need not have taken whatever steps otherwise would
have been necessary to preserve for appellate review the
alleged error in the lower court.  Under the particular
circumstances presented in this case, and after carefully
considering the arguments made to the Court of Criminal
Appeals, I believe the alleged error has been adequately
preserved for our review.
In addition, I note that the parties (as in some previous
cases before this Court) consider a recent decision of this
Court as "newly discovered evidence" under Rule 32.1(e), Ala.
R. Crim. P.  For purposes of future cases, however, I question
whether a decision or an opinion of this Court constitutes
"evidence" or "facts" within the contemplation of Rule
32.1(e).