Case Title: State v. Cook

Citation: 2010-Ohio-6305

Docket Number: 20092122

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-12-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Cook, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-6305.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-6305 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. COOK, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Cook, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-6305.] 
Criminal law — Statutes of limitations — R.C. 2901.13(A)(1)(a), 2901.13(B)(1), 
and 2901.13(F) — For a felony offense that contains an element of fraud, 
the six-year statute of limitations begins to run only after the corpus delicti 
of the offense is discovered — In some circumstances, the state has one 
additional year to file charges after the corpus delicti of an offense 
involving fraud is discovered — Judgment affirmed. 
(No. 2009-2122 — Submitted September 29, 2010 — Decided 
December 28, 2010.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, No. L-08-1301,  
184 Ohio App.3d 382, 2009-Ohio-4917. 
__________________ 
1.  The corpus delicti of a crime is the body or substance of the crime and usually 
has two elements: (1) the act itself, and (2) the criminal agency of the act.  
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(State v. Hensley (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 136, 138, 571 N.E.2d 711, 
approved and followed.) 
2.  For a felony offense that contains an element of fraud, pursuant to R.C. 
2901.13(F), the six-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2901.13(A)(1)(a)  
begins to run only after the corpus delicti of that offense is discovered. 
3.  When a person who is aggrieved by a crime that includes an element of fraud 
or breach of a fiduciary duty discovers the corpus delicti of that offense, 
R.C. 2901.13(B)(1) provides the state one additional year within which to 
file charges from the date that the aggrieved party discovers the corpus 
delicti of the offense. 
__________________ 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
I. Introduction 
{¶ 1} The instant case involves a felony offense that includes an element 
of fraud where the corpus delicti of the offense was not discovered until 
approximately three years after the offense was committed.  There are two 
questions for our review.  The first is whether R.C. 2901.13(F) tolls the criminal 
statute of limitations for such an offense while the corpus delicti remains 
undiscovered.  The second is whether R.C. 2901.13(B)(1) provides a one-year 
statute of limitations for an offense that includes an element of fraud. 
{¶ 2} We hold that the one-year limitation period in R.C. 2901.13(B)(1) is 
not applicable to the facts in the instant case.  We also hold that pursuant to R.C. 
2901.13(F), the six-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2901.13(A)(1)(a) begins to 
run for a felony offense that contains an element of fraud only after the corpus 
delicti of the offense is discovered.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the 
court of appeals. 
II. Facts and Procedure 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
{¶ 3} In December 2000, the pastor at the United Methodist Church in 
Metamora, Ohio announced to the congregation that Esther Benfer intended to 
donate her farm to the church. 
{¶ 4} In May 2001, appellant, Linda S. Cook, who was a practicing 
attorney at the time, met with Benfer to discuss estate planning.  Toledo Bar Assn. 
v. Cook, 114 Ohio St.3d 108, 2007-Ohio-3253, 868 N.E.2d 973, ¶ 6.  Benfer 
informed Cook that she wanted to donate her farm to the church, but she wanted 
to be able to live on the farm as long as her health permitted.  Id. at ¶ 10.  Cook 
advised Benfer that she could qualify for Medicaid coverage by divesting herself 
of the farm three years before she applied to Medicaid for nursing-home care. 
{¶ 5} Cook drafted a quitclaim deed giving title of the farm to herself as 
trustee, while reserving a life estate in Benfer.  Cook at ¶ 12.  That deed purported 
to be executed and witnessed on May 20, 1998, but it was not filed until July 12, 
2001. 
{¶ 6} Subsequently, Cook struck the word “trustee” from the deed, 
inserted the word “married,” and rerecorded it on September 10, 2001.  She also 
added to the deed the phrase “being rerecorded to correct Grantee marital status.”  
Cook purportedly made this change because “she had mistakenly given the farm 
to herself as trustee, rather than to herself personally in accordance with 
[Benfer’s] wishes.”  Cook at ¶ 20. 
{¶ 7} Cook filed a third deed on December 13, 2001, which purportedly 
transferred the farm from Cook to the church, with a life estate for Benfer. 
{¶ 8} Finally, Cook filed a fourth deed on September 8, 2004, which again 
purportedly transferred the farm from Cook to the church, with a life estate 
reserved for Benfer. 
{¶ 9} In January 2004, the church trustees received a contract that 
purportedly transferred the farm to the church.  An attorney advised the church 
trustees that they should go to the Fulton County Recorder’s office to see how the 
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deed was recorded.  In February 2004, the church trustees searched deeds at the 
Fulton County Recorder’s office but found no deed transferring the farm to the 
church.  Instead, they discovered the first deed – the deed that transferred the farm 
to Cook as trustee – and the second deed – the deed that put the farm in Cook’s 
name personally. 
{¶ 10} In April 2004, the Toledo Bar Association received a grievance 
alleging disciplinary violations against Cook regarding these deeds.  In April 
2005, the bar association certified a disciplinary complaint against Cook with the 
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of 
Ohio. 
{¶ 11} A panel of the board issued findings of fact and conclusions of law 
and determined that Cook had violated various Disciplinary Rules, inter alia, by 
intentionally backdating the first deed and changing the grantee designation on 
the second deed.  The board adopted the findings of misconduct and 
recommended that Cook be disbarred.  In Cook, 114 Ohio St.3d 108, 2007-Ohio-
3253, 868 N.E.2d 973, the court disbarred her. 
{¶ 12} In October 2006, the bar association reported its findings to the 
Lucas County Prosecutor’s Office. 
{¶ 13} On July 18, 2007, a grand jury returned a two-count indictment 
against Cook, charging her with tampering with records in violation of R.C. 
2913.42(A)(1) and (B)(4) and with theft from an elderly person in violation of 
R.C. 2913.02(A)(2) and (B)(3). 
{¶ 14} R.C. 2913.42(A)(1) provides, “No person, knowing the person has 
no privilege to do so, and with the purpose to defraud or knowing that the person 
is facilitating a fraud, shall * * * [f]alsify, destroy, conceal, alter, deface, mutilate 
any writing, computer software, data, or record.”  Under R.C. 2913.42(B)(4), 
tampering with records is a third-degree felony if the record is kept by a local, 
state, or federal governmental entity. 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
{¶ 15} Cook moved to dismiss the tampering-with-records charge 
pursuant to the six-year statute of limitations for felonies in R.C. 
2901.13(A)(1)(a). Cook alleged that the crime occurred when she filed the first 
deed on July 12, 2001, and that the state did not file charges against her until the 
July 18, 2007 indictment, six days after the six-year statute of limitations had 
expired. The trial court granted Cook’s motion and dismissed the charge. 
{¶ 16} The court of appeals found that “the corpus delicti of the 
tampering-with-records charge in relation to the filing of the July 12, 2001 deed 
was not  known until, at the earliest, February 2004, when the church trustees 
discovered the irregularities in the deed[].”  State v. Cook, 184 Ohio App.3d 382, 
2009-Ohio-4917, 921 N.E.2d 258, ¶ 37.  Applying the tolling provision in R.C. 
2901.13(F), the court of appeals held that the six-year statute of limitations in 
R.C. 2901.13(A)(1)(a) did not begin to run until February 2004.  Id. at ¶ 42.  
Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the judgment dismissing the 
tampering-with-records charge, holding that the indictment returned against Cook 
on July 18, 2007, was timely. 
{¶ 17} The court of appeals certified that a conflict existed between its 
decision and the decisions in State v. Mitchell (1992), 78 Ohio App.3d 613, 605 
N.E.2d 978, an Eighth Appellate District case, and State v. Stephens (July 25, 
1997), Clark  App. No. 96 CA 0117, 1997 WL 435694, a Second Appellate 
District case. 
{¶ 18} This court determined that a conflict existed and ordered that the 
parties brief the following issue:  “Whether R.C. 2901.13(F) operates to toll the 
six-year period of limitations provided for in R.C. 2901.13(A) so that it extends 
beyond six years from the date upon which a felony offense was committed where 
the corpus delicti of the offense is discovered within the period of limitations and 
more than one year prior to expiration of the limitation period.”  State v. Cook, 
124 Ohio St.3d 1440, 2010-Ohio-188, 920 N.E.2d 371. 
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{¶ 19} Cook argues that she committed the tampering-with-records 
offense on July 12, 2001, when she filed the first deed, although the corpus delicti 
was not discovered until February 2004.  Nevertheless, relying on our decision in 
State v. Climaco, Climaco, Seminatore, Lefkowitz & Garofoli Co., L.P.A. (1999), 
85 Ohio St.3d 582, 709 N.E.2d 1191, she argues that the tolling provision in R.C. 
2901.13(F) is not applicable.  Instead, she argues that pursuant to Climaco, the 
six-year statute of limitations for felony offenses in R.C. 2901.13(A)(1)(a) began 
to run from the date of the offense on July 12, 2001, and therefore, the state’s July 
18, 2007 indictment was not timely filed. 
{¶ 20} Alternatively, Cook argues that R.C. 2901.13(B)(1) provides a 
tolling provision and one-year limitation period specifically for offenses that 
include an element of fraud, while R.C. 2901.13(F) provides a general tolling 
provision. Cook argues that because the offense herein includes an element of 
fraud, R.C. 2901.13(B)(1) provides the applicable tolling provision and one-year 
limitation period running from the date of discovery.  Thus, Cook argues that the 
state had only one year from February 2004 in which to file charges, and 
therefore, the July 18, 2007 indictment was not timely filed. 
{¶ 21} The state argues that the tolling provision and one-year limitation 
period in R.C. 2901.13(B)(1) do not apply to the facts in the instant case.  The 
state also argues that Climaco is distinguishable from this case and therefore does 
not preclude application of the tolling provision in R.C. 2901.13(F).  Thus, the 
state argues that the six-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2901.13(A)(1)(a) 
applies and that the state had six years from February 2004 in which to file 
charges against Cook.  Therefore, the state argues, its July 18, 2007 indictment of 
Cook was timely. 
{¶ 22} We agree with the state. 
III. Analysis 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
{¶ 23} We begin our analysis with a brief review of the definition of the 
corpus delicti of a criminal offense.  This court has stated that the “corpus delicti” 
of a crime is “the body or substance of the crime and usually [has] two elements: 
(1) the act itself, and (2) the criminal agency of the act.”  State v. Hensley (1991), 
59 Ohio St.3d 136, 138, 571 N.E.2d 711, citing State v. Black (1978), 54 Ohio 
St.2d 304, 307, 8 O.O.3d 296, 376 N.E.2d 948.  “For example, when the offense 
is homicide, the corpus delicti ‘involves two elements, i.e., (1) the fact of death 
and (2) the existence of the criminal agency of another as the cause of death.’ ” 
State v. Van Hook (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 256, 261, 530 N.E.2d 883, quoting State 
v. Manago (1974), 38 Ohio St.2d 223, 226-227, 67 O.O.2d 291, 313 N.E.2d 10.  
The corpus delicti is relevant in this case because a criminal statute of limitations 
may be tolled when the corpus delicti of the offense is not immediately 
discoverable.  See Hensley, 59 Ohio St.3d at 140, 571 N.E.2d 711 (“the corpus 
delicti of crimes involving child abuse or neglect is discovered when a responsible 
adult, as listed in R.C. 2151.421, has knowledge of both the act and the criminal 
nature of the act”). 
{¶ 24} Next we examine the general statute of limitations for criminal 
offenses found in R.C. 2901.13: 
{¶ 25} “(A)(1) Except as provided in division (A)(2) or (3) of this section 
or as otherwise provided in this section, a prosecution shall be barred unless it is 
commenced within the following periods after an offense is committed: 
{¶ 26} “(a) For a felony, six years; 
{¶ 27} “ * * *  
{¶ 28} “(B)(1) Except as otherwise provided in division (B)(2) of this 
section, if the period of limitation provided in division (A)(1) or (3) of this section 
has expired, prosecution shall be commenced for an offense of which an element 
is fraud or breach of a fiduciary duty, within one year after discovery of the 
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offense either by an aggrieved person, or by the aggrieved person's legal 
representative who is not a party to the offense. 
{¶ 29} “* * * 
{¶ 30} “(F) The period of limitation shall not run during any time when 
the corpus delicti remains undiscovered.” 
{¶ 31} “ ‘In construing a statute, a court's paramount concern is the 
legislative intent.  In determining legislative intent, the court first reviews the 
applicable statutory language and the purpose to be accomplished.’ ”  Fisher v. 
Hasenjager, 116 Ohio St.3d 53, 2007-Ohio-5589, 876 N.E.2d 546, ¶ 20, quoting 
State ex rel. Watkins v. Eighth Dist. Court of Appeals (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 532, 
535, 696 N.E.2d 1079.  Courts are “required to apply the plain language of a 
statute when it is clear and unambiguous.” Jaques v. Manton, 125 Ohio St.3d 342, 
2010-Ohio-1838, 928 N.E.2d 434, ¶ 14, citing State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d 507, 
2007-Ohio-606, 861 N.E.2d 512, ¶ 9. 
{¶ 32} “Generally, statutes of limitations begin to run when the crime is 
complete.”  State v. Swartz (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 131, 133, 723 N.E.2d 1084, 
citing Toussie v. United States (1970), 397 U.S. 112, 115, 90 S.Ct. 858, 25 
L.Ed.2d 156.  And unless charges are commenced against the accused prior to the 
expiration of the limitation period, the state is barred from prosecuting the 
accused.  R.C. 2901.13(A)(1). 
{¶ 33} However, “the General Assembly has afforded the state certain 
statutory exceptions to the absolute bar, and has done so in the form of specialized 
rules and tolling provisions.”  Hensley, 59 Ohio St.3d at 137, 571 N.E.2d 711.  
One of these exceptions is the tolling provision found in R.C. 2901.13(F), which 
provides that the “period of limitation shall not run during any time when the 
corpus delicti remains undiscovered.”  The language in R.C. 2901.13(F) is 
unequivocal and contains no exception, qualification, or limitation regarding the 
offense to which it applies, nor does it contain any exception for acts of fraud.  
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
See generally Hensley, 59 Ohio St.3d at 137, 571 N.E.2d 711.  Thus, we hold that 
for a felony offense that contains an element of fraud, pursuant to R.C. 
2901.13(F), the six-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2901.13(A)(1)(a) begins to 
run only after the corpus delicti of that offense is discovered. 
State v. Climaco 
{¶ 34} Cook argues that pursuant to State v. Climaco, Climaco, 
Seminatore, Lefkowitz & Garofoli Co., L.P.A., 85 Ohio St.3d 582, 709 N.E.2d 
1191, if the corpus delicti of an offense is discovered before the applicable statute 
of limitations expires, then the tolling provision in R.C. 2901.13(F) does not 
apply.  Instead, Cook claims that the state has the time remaining on the 
applicable limitation period running from the date that the criminal act occurred 
within which to charge the defendant.  We hold that the decision in Climaco is not 
applicable and should be limited to its facts. 
{¶ 35} In Climaco, the state charged a law firm with falsification (R.C. 
2921.13(A)(7)) on February 1, 1996, for improperly reporting honoraria in 1993.  
Id. at 584.  The law firm argued that the two-year statute of limitations for a 
misdemeanor offense found in R.C. 2901.13(A)(2) had expired.  The state argued 
that R.C. 2901.13(F) applied to toll the running of the two-year statute of 
limitations, because the criminal agency of the falsification did not surface until 
February 1994, and therefore, the February 1, 1996 indictment was timely filed. 
{¶ 36} Because the alleged violations regarding the honoraria were so well 
publicized, the court refused to give the state the benefit of the tolling provision of 
R.C. 2901.13(F), stating that if it did so under the circumstances of that case, “the 
purposes and principles governing criminal statutes of limitation would be 
defeated.” Id. at 587. 
{¶ 37} The present case can be distinguished because here, unlike 
Climaco, there was no media spotlight or report to alert the authorities or parties 
to investigate the deeds herein.  The corpus delicti of the offense in the instant 
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case is found only in the deeds that were created and filed by Cook.  Finally, the 
parties agree that the corpus delicti of the offense herein was not discovered until 
February 2004, the date that the church trustees discovered the deeds transferring 
Benfer’s farm to Cook.  Accordingly, the policy reasons supporting Climaco do 
not exist here.  See id. at 586 (“the intent of R.C. 2901.13 is to discourage 
inefficient or dilatory law enforcement rather than to give offenders the chance to 
avoid criminal responsibility for their conduct”).  Therefore, we hold that Climaco 
is not controlling in the instant case, and we limit Climaco to its facts. 
R.C. 2901.13(F) and 2901.13(B)(1) Do Not Conflict 
{¶ 38} Cook argues that even if the running of the statute of limitations 
was tolled until February 2004, R.C. 2901.13(B)(1) provided the state only one 
year thereafter within which to file charges.  In support of this argument, Cook 
argues that R.C. 2901.13(F) and 2901.13(B)(1) conflict because R.C. 2901.13(F) 
is a general tolling provision that applies to any offense, while R.C. 2901.13(B)(1) 
is a specific tolling provision that applies only to an offense that contains an 
element of fraud.  Because the offense in this case contains an element of fraud, 
Cook argues that the specific provision, R.C. 2901.13(B)(1), applies to provide 
the state one year within which to file charges after the corpus delicti of the 
offense was discovered.  Cook argues that because the state did not file the 
indictment against Cook within that year, the indictment was not timely filed. 
{¶ 39} The state argues that R.C. 2910.13(B)(1) does not apply to the facts 
in this case.  Again, we agree with the state. 
{¶ 40} R.C. 2901.13(B)(1) provides: 
{¶ 41} “Except as otherwise provided in division (B)(2) of this section, if 
the period of limitation provided in division (A)(1) or (3) of this section has 
expired, prosecution shall be commenced for an offense of which an element is 
fraud or breach of a fiduciary duty, within one year after discovery of the offense 
January Term, 2010 
11 
 
either by an aggrieved person, or by the aggrieved person's legal representative 
who is not a party to the offense.” 
{¶ 42} As previously discussed, R.C. 2901.13(F) provides:  
{¶ 43} “The period of limitation shall not run during any time when the 
corpus delicti remains undiscovered.” 
{¶ 44} R.C. 1.51 directs us to first construe conflicting statutory 
provisions, where possible, to give effect to both.  Only where the conflict is 
deemed irreconcilable does R.C. 1.51 mandate that one provision shall prevail 
over the other.  We have judicially recognized similar rules of statutory 
construction: 
{¶ 45} “ ‘First, all statutes which relate to the same general subject matter 
must be read in pari materia. And, in reading such statutes in pari materia, and 
construing them together, this court must give such a reasonable construction as 
to give the proper force and effect to each and all such statutes. The interpretation 
and application of statutes must be viewed in a manner to carry out the legislative 
intent of the sections. All provisions of the Revised Code bearing upon the same 
subject matter should be construed harmoniously. This court in the interpretation 
of related and co-existing statutes must harmonize and give full application to all 
such statutes unless they are irreconcilable and in hopeless conflict.’ ”  United 
Tel. Co. of Ohio v. Limbach (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 369, 372, 643 N.E.2d 1129, 
quoting Johnson's Mkts., Inc. v. New Carlisle Dept. of Health (1991), 58 Ohio 
St.3d 28, 35, 567 N.E.2d 1018. 
{¶ 46} Applying these principles, we hold that R.C. 2901.13(B)(1) and (F) 
do not irreconcilably conflict and that each applies to a particular situation 
independent of the other. 
{¶ 47} R.C. 2901.13(B)(1) gives the state a year within which to file 
charges where an offense involving fraud or breach of a fiduciary duty is 
discovered by an “aggrieved party.”  R.C. 2901.13(F) contains no such 
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qualification.  It defies common sense that the General Assembly would give 
felony offenses a six-year statute of limitations upon discovery of the corpus 
delicti of the offense, yet limit victims of fraud to only one year. 
{¶ 48} Reading these provisions in pari materia, a logical construction is 
that R.C. 2901.13(F) tolls the statute of limitations for all criminal offenses, 
including offenses involving an element of fraud, from the date the offense is 
committed until the corpus delicti of that offense is discovered.  But where an 
offense involving an element of fraud or breach of fiduciary duty is committed 
against multiple parties, who may not even know each other, the offense may be 
discovered by some of the aggrieved parties but remain concealed to others.  To 
the aggrieved party or parties who only later discover the offense, R.C. 
2901.13(B)(1) provides the state one additional year in which to file charges 
against the defendant even if the statute of limitations from the initial discovery 
has expired. 
{¶ 49} For example, if victim A discovers a felony offense involving 
fraud, the state has six years from the date of victim A’s discovery to file charges 
pursuant to R.C. 2901.13(F).  However, if victim B discovers the corpus delicti of 
the same felony offense one day after the statute of limitations has run as to 
victim A, R.C. 2901.13(B)(1) provides the state one additional year from the date 
of victim B’s discovery of the offense within which to file charges. 
{¶ 50} Thus, harmonizing these provisions, we hold that when a person 
who is aggrieved by a crime that includes an element of fraud or breach of a 
fiduciary duty discovers the corpus delicti of that offense, R.C. 2901.13(B)(1) 
provides the state one additional year within which to file charges from the date 
that the aggrieved party discovers the corpus delicti of the offense. 
The Indictment was Timely Filed 
{¶ 51} The court of appeals held that the corpus delicti of the tampering-
with-records offense was discovered in February 2004, the date that the church 
January Term, 2010 
13 
 
trustees discovered the deeds that transferred Benfer’s farm to Cook.  The parties 
also accept February 2004 as the discovery date of that offense.  Because deeds 
are filed in a government office, tampering with them is a third-degree felony 
pursuant to R.C. 2913.42(B)(4).  Felony offenses have a six-year statute of 
limitations.  R.C. 2901.13(A)(1)(a).  Thus, the indictment filed against Cook on 
July 18, 2007, was within the six-year statute of limitations.  R.C. 2901.13(B)(1) 
is not implicated nor its protections required because nearly three years remained 
on the statute of limitations in R.C. 2901.13(A)(1)(a).  Accordingly, we affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
Answer to the Certified Question 
{¶ 52} The question certified to this court was “Whether R.C. 2901.13(F) 
operates to toll the six-year period of limitations provided for in R.C. 2901.13(A) 
so that it extends beyond six years from the date upon which a felony offense was 
committed where the corpus delicti of the offense is discovered within the period 
of limitations and more than one year prior to expiration of the limitation period.”  
Cook, 124 Ohio St.3d 1440, 2010-Ohio-188, 920 N.E.2d 371.  Our answer to this 
question requires more than a yes or no response.  Our analysis concludes that for 
a felony offense that contains an element of fraud, pursuant to R.C. 2901.13(F), 
the six-year statute of limitations in R.C. 2901.13(A)(1)(a) begins to run only 
after the corpus delicti of that offense is discovered.  The one-year limitation 
period in R.C. 2901.13(B)(1) applies only where an aggrieved party discovers an 
offense that contains an element of fraud after the statute of limitations has 
expired. 
Certified question answered, 
and judgment affirmed. 
 
O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
BROWN, C.J., and PFEIFER, J., dissent. 
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__________________ 
 
BROWN, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 53} Citing a case decided by this court in 2000, the majority 
acknowledges the general rule that “statutes of limitations begin to run when the 
crime is complete.” State v. Swartz (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 131, 133, 723 N.E.2d 
1084. Similarly, the majority acknowledges R.C. 2901.13(A)(1), which codifies 
the general rule that criminal prosecutions must be initiated within certain 
prescribed time frames after an offense is committed, i.e., six years for felonies 
and two years for misdemeanors.1 
{¶ 54} The majority today nevertheless holds that R.C. 2913.01(F) is the 
starting point for determining when the criminal statute of limitations begins to 
run.  It concludes, “R.C. 2901.13(F) tolls the statute of limitations for all criminal 
offenses, including offenses involving an element of fraud, from the date the 
offense is committed until the corpus delicti of that offense is discovered.” 
(Emphasis sic.)  As a result, in future cases, subsection (F) of R.C. 2901.13, rather 
than subsection (A), will determine the time at which the criminal statute of 
limitations commences.  I dissent. 
{¶ 55} Today’s holding directly contradicts established precedent.  In 
1999, this court expressly rejected the premise today adopted by the majority, as 
follows:  
                                          
 
1.  {¶ a} R.C. 2901.13(A)(1) provides: “Except as provided in division (A)(2) or (3) of this section 
or as otherwise provided in this section, a prosecution shall be barred unless it is commenced 
within the following periods after an offense is committed:     
      {¶ b} “(a) For a felony, six years; 
     {¶ c} “(b) For a misdemeanor other than a minor misdemeanor, two years; 
     {¶ d} “(c) For a minor misdemeanor, six months.” (Emphasis added.) 
 
January Term, 2010 
15 
 
{¶ 56} “[T]o construe subsection (F) as controlling would render 
subsection (A)(2)[2] meaningless, that is, a prosecution for a misdemeanor offense 
would be barred if it were not commenced within two years after the offense was 
committed. Subsection (A) is of no consequence if subsection (F) controls all 
circumstances, including situations, such as here, in which discovery occurs 
within the statutory period. The two-year period for misdemeanors would begin 
only on discovery of the offense, regardless of the date of the commission of the 
offense. Had the General Assembly intended this, it would have required that 
prosecution be initiated within two years after an offense is discovered instead of 
within two years after an offense is committed. The language ‘except as otherwise 
provided’ contained within subsection (A) clearly does not contemplate such an 
expansive reading of the statute.” State v. Climaco, Climaco, Seminatore, 
Lefkowitz & Garofoli Co., L.P.A. (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 582, 587-588, 709 N.E.2d 
1191. 
{¶ 57} The majority attempts to distinguish Climaco from the case at bar, 
stating that in Cook, “unlike Climaco, there was no media spotlight or report to 
alert the authorities or parties to investigate.”  It concludes that this distinction 
renders Climaco inapplicable, because “the policy reasons supporting Climaco do 
not exist here.”  The majority therefore “limit[s Climaco] to its facts.” 
{¶ 58} I fear that the apt observation of Judge Patrick J. Schiltz applies 
here: “To assert that an opinion of an appellate court has been limited to its facts 
is usually a polite way of saying ‘implicitly overruled.’ ”  Bacon v. Hennepin Cty. 
Med. Ctr. (Dec. 11, 2007), D.Minn. No. 06-CV-2359, 2007 WL 4373104, *9. 
{¶ 59} Initially, I observe that the facts of Climaco and the facts in Cook 
are more similar than dissimilar in that, in each case, the prosecutors were aware 
                                          
 
2.   Subsection (A)(2)) of the 1991 version of the statute of limitations, providing a  two-year 
limitations period for misdemeanors other than minor misdemeanors, is now codified as R.C. 
2901.13(A)(1)(b).  See 134 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1866, 1896. 
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of the underlying circumstances well before expiration of the general statutes of 
limitations.  In the case at bar, the church members allegedly harmed by Cook’s 
actions knew in early 2004 enough facts to create a suspicion that Cook had 
backdated the deed prior to presenting it for filing at the county recorder’s office.  
This discovery occurred fully three years before the July 12, 2007 expiration of 
the six-year period following Cook’s alleged commission of the felony offense of 
tampering with public records.3 In addition, the prosecutor was on notice of the 
facts at least as early as October 2006, well before July 12, 2007, the date of 
expiration of the general six-year statute of limitations. On April 18, 2005, the 
Toledo Bar Association filed a disciplinary grievance against Cook and in 
October 2006 formally reported to the prosecutor its findings of probable cause of 
a disciplinary violation based in part on Cook’s backdating of the first deed. 
{¶ 60} It is a distinction without a difference that the prosecutors’ 
awareness of potentially criminal conduct was based on media attention in 
Climaco and on express advisement by the Toledo Bar Association in Cook. In 
both cases, the prosecutors knew within the general limitations period of the 
underlying facts, yet failed to timely investigate and prosecute. 
{¶ 61} But more significantly, the court in Climaco considered and 
expressly rejected the premise adopted today, recognizing, “[I]f we were to apply 
                                          
 
3.  I am perplexed as to how the state intends to prove on remand that Cook “tampered with public 
records” so as to elevate her offense from a misdemeanor to a felony. R.C. 2913.42 provides that, 
with an exception not relevant here, tampering with private records constitutes a misdemeanor 
while tampering with public records, i.e., records “kept by or belong[ing] to a local, state, or 
federal governmental entity,” constitutes a felony.  Cook’s alleged act of backdating the first deed 
occurred before the deed was in the possession of any public official.  And although Cook filed 
subsequent deeds in an attempt to “correct” the recorded chain of title, the parties do not suggest 
that Cook somehow altered the contents of the first deed while it was being “kept by” the county 
recorder after its July 12, 2001 filing. If her actions constituted merely the misdemeanor offense of 
tampering with private records, her conviction is time-barred even under the majority’s 
interpretation of the statute of limitations. The misdemeanor two-year statute of limitations would 
have expired in early 2006, as the church members discovered in 2004 that the deed may have 
been backdated. The state filed the criminal charges against Cook in 2007, after the two-year 
statute of limitations for prosecution of misdemeanors had expired.    
January Term, 2010 
17 
 
subsection (F) * * * [to afford the state] two years from the discovery of the 
offense to begin prosecution, the purposes and principles governing criminal 
statutes of limitations would be defeated.”  Id., 85 Ohio St.3d at 587, 709 N.E.2d 
1191.  Those principles were identified in Climaco as including (1) protecting 
individuals from having to defend themselves against charges when the basic 
facts may have become obscured by the passage of time and minimizing the 
danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past, and (2) 
encouraging law enforcement officials to promptly investigate suspected criminal 
activity.  See also 1974 Committee Comment to Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511 (“[T]he 
basic thrust of [R.C. 2901.13] is to discourage inefficient or dilatory law 
enforcement rather than to give offenders the chance to avoid criminal 
responsibility for their conduct. * * *  The rationale for limiting criminal 
prosecutions is that they should be based on reasonably fresh, and therefore more 
trustworthy evidence”).  The majority opinion fails to explain why these 
principles applied in Climaco but do not apply in the case at bar. 
{¶ 62} Although the majority effectively overrules Climaco, it fails 
without explanation to acknowledge that action or to undergo this court’s 
established analysis for overruling prior cases.  See Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 
100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 1256.4   
                                          
 
4.  While I have concerns about the wisdom, feasibility, and continued viability of the Galatis test 
for overruling cases, that test continues to be recognized in principle by a majority of this court.  
See, e.g., Ohio Apt. Assn. v. Levin, 127 Ohio St. 76, 2010-Ohio-4414, 936 N.E.2d 919.  Both 
Justices Pfeifer and Lanzinger have observed that Galatis has produced decisions in which the 
court strains to limit or distinguish earlier cases rather than simply to overrule them. See State ex 
rel. Shelly Materials, Inc. v. Clark Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 115 Ohio St.3d 337, 348, 2007-Ohio-
5022 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting); Groch v. Gen. Motors Corp., 117 Ohio St.3d 192, 231, 2008-Ohio-
546, 883 N.E.2d 377  (Lanzinger, J., concurring). It is difficult to disagree with their conclusion 
that Galatis establishes a “hopelessly random and formulaic approach to overuling precedent.” Id.  
In my view, the law is unclear about when Galatis applies. If the price of continued adherence to 
Galatis in some cases is the issuance of opinions that are neither forthright nor clear, then Galatis 
should itself be reconsidered.    
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 63} Climaco has been in place for over a decade and establishes a clear 
and workable standard for determining the duration within which a crime may be 
prosecuted consistent with the criminal statute of limitations. In contrast, under 
today’s holding, the commencement of the running of the statute of limitations in 
future criminal cases will be murky at best.  In any circumstance where a 
prosecutor chooses to charge an individual with a misdemeanor after two years 
(or a felony after six years) from the date of the commission of the offense, the 
prosecutor will be able to extend the statute by asserting that no one knew about 
the crime until some later time — regardless of whether discovery of the corpus 
delicti would have occurred with the exercise of due investigatory diligence by 
the state. Moreover, the majority sheds no light on the quite foreseeable issue as 
to whether today’s decision, which represents a major change to Ohio’s law, 
should be applied retroactively to extend the statute of limitations as to offenses 
that have already been committed. 
{¶ 64} If Climaco misconstrued the legislative intent underlying R.C. 
2901.13, a statute that concededly is rife with ambiguity, the General Assembly 
has had ample time to correct the Climaco interpretation of the criminal statute of 
limitations. In fact, in 2008 the 127th General Assembly did change R.C. 2901.13 
in response to Climaco — but only “with respect to the running of the criminal 
statute of limitations for certain offenses having a direct relation to certain public 
servants, whether or not the discovery of the corpus delicti of those offenses 
occurs within or outside of the otherwise generally applicable period of limitation 
for criminal prosecution under section 2901.13 of the Revised Code.” (Emphasis 
added.)  Section 3 of 2007-2008 Sub.S.B. No. 219. The logical conclusion follows 
that the General Assembly concurred, or at least acquiesced, in the Climaco 
interpretation of the statute as to crimes not specifically identified in the statutory 
amendment. 
January Term, 2010 
19 
 
{¶ 65} The majority holds, and I agree, that subsection (B) of R.C. 
2901.13 does not apply to the case at bar.  R.C. 2901.13(B) provides that where 
fraud is an element of the offense, as in the case at bar, and if the standard period 
of limitation has expired, prosecution may be commenced within one year after 
discovery of the offense by an aggrieved person. Thus, had aggrieved individuals 
first discovered after July 12, 2007, that the date on the recorded deed was 
fraudulent, the state could have initiated prosecution within an additional year 
from the date of discovery.  Because, however, church members discovered the 
relevant facts within the “standard period of limitation,” i.e., in February or March 
2004, the extension of time provided by R.C. 2901.13(B) is not available to the 
state. 
{¶ 66} But the majority’s interpretation of R.C. 2901.13(B) is nevertheless 
troubling. The majority states that “where an offense involving an element of 
fraud or breach of fiduciary duty is committed against multiple parties, who may 
not even know each other, the offense may be discovered by some of the 
aggrieved parties, but remain concealed to others. To the aggrieved party or 
parties who only later discover the offense, R.C. 2901.13(B)(1) provides the state 
one additional year in which to file charges against the defendant even if the 
statute of limitations from the initial discovery has expired.”  The majority 
illustrates its interpretation by providing the following example:  “if victim A 
discovers a felony offense involving fraud, the state has six years from the date of 
victim A’s discovery to file charges pursuant to R.C. 2901.13(F).  However, if 
victim B discovers the corpus delicti of the same felony offense one day after the 
statute of limitations has run as to victim A, R.C. 2901.13(B)(1) provides the state 
one additional year from the date of victim B’s discovery of the offense within 
which to file charges.” 
{¶ 67} Presumably, under the majority’s reasoning, if victims C, D, and E 
also existed, the state could extend the statute of limitations for an additional one-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
year period after each of those victims discovered the corpus delicti – even if that 
discovery occurred many, many years after victim A’s  and victim B’s 
discoveries. If the majority does not intend this result, it should say so.  Even 
accepting arguendo the majority’s view that the statute of limitations does not 
begin to run until some individual discovers the corpus delicti (and that individual 
might be a law enforcement official rather than an aggrieved party), I believe that 
R.C. 2901.13(B) could produce only a single one-year extension, which would 
commence at the time of the first discovery by an individual aggrieved by fraud 
and only where that discovery occurs after the standard period of limitations has 
expired. 
{¶ 68} In my view, correct application of the criminal statute of limitations 
as interpreted in Climaco bars Cook’s further prosecution. The analysis should 
begin with the general rule established in R.C. 2901.13(A).  Because the state 
charged Cook with the felony offense of tampering with public records, the 
prescribed limitation period for prosecution is six years. Under the state’s theory 
of the case, the charged criminal offense was committed on July 12, 2001, when 
Cook filed the misdated deed with the county recorder’s office. Thus, applying 
the six-year felony statute from the date of the commission of the offense, 
prosecution was barred after July 12, 2007, unless one of the exceptions to the 
general rule of R.C. 2901.13(A) applies.  R. C. 2901.13(B) does not apply in this 
case, as discovery by persons allegedly aggrieved by Cook’s fraud occurred 
within the general six-year limitations period – not after “the period of limitation 
provided in division (A)(1) or (3) of this section [had] expired.” R.C. 2901.13(B).  
The state does not suggest that any other exception to the general six-year rule 
applies. Cook was not charged until July 17, 2007 – six days after expiration of 
the limitations period.  As the trial court correctly recognized, Cook’s  
prosecution was thus time-barred.  Because the majority concludes otherwise, I 
dissent. 
January Term, 2010 
21 
 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 69} I dissent from the majority opinion and join Chief Justice Brown’s 
dissent but for one point: this court has never held applicable to a criminal case 
the analysis for overturning precedent imposed by a majority of this court in 
Westfield Ins. Co. v. Galatis, 100 Ohio St.3d 216, 2003-Ohio-5849, 797 N.E.2d 
1256.  For example, recently in State v. Horner, 126 Ohio St.3d 466, 2010-Ohio-
3830, 935 N.E.2d 26, this court overruled State v. Colon, 118 Ohio St.3d 26, 
2008-Ohio-1624, 885 N.E.2d 917, and overruled in part State v. Colon, 119 Ohio 
St.3d 204, 2008-Ohio-3749, 893 N.E.2d 169, with nary a mention of Galatis. 
__________________ 
 
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Evy M. Jarrett, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
John F. Potts, for appellant. 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, 
Brandon J. Lester, Deputy Solicitor, and Robert Kenneth James, Assistant 
Solicitor, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Attorney General. 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Peter Galyardt, Assistant 
Public Defender, urging reversal for amicus curiae Ohio Public Defender. 
______________________