Case Title: BART KNAPP V. LANDEX CORPORATION, a Wyoming corporation

Citation: 

Docket Number: 05-154

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-03-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
BART KNAPP V. LANDEX CORPORATION, a Wyoming corporation2006 WY 36130 P.3d 924Case Number: 05-154Decided: 03/22/2006
OCTOBER TERM, 
A.D. 2005

 
 
BART 
KNAPP,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
LANDEX 
CORPORATION, a Wyoming corporation,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth DeCock, Plains Law Offices, 
LLP, Gillette, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Tonia Hanson, Omohundro Law Offices, 
Buffalo, Wyoming.                                   

            

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, 
VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]       Mr. Knapp 
appeals from an order granting summary judgment in favor of Landex Corporation 
(Landex).  He contends that summary 
judgment was improper because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding 
the timeliness of his attempt to cure default on a real estate purchase 
agreement.  We agree that genuine 
issues of material fact exist and, accordingly, we reverse and 
remand.

 
 

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]       The 
dispositive issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in granting 
summary judgment in favor of Landex.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]       On 
September 22, 2004, Landex filed a Complaint for Ejectment alleging that Mr. 
Knapp was in default on an Agreement for Sale of Real Property (Agreement).  Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, 
Mr. Knapp agreed to pay Landex Three Hundred Fifteen Dollars and Ninety Cents 
($315.90) per month beginning August 1, 1995, and continuing thereafter until 
August 1, 2007, at which time the remaining balance of the purchase price would 
be due and payable in full.  The 
complaint alleged that Mr. Knapp's last monthly installment was made on or about 
August 15, 2002.  As a result of Mr. 
Knapp's missed payments, Landex sent a notice of default to him on April 17, 
2003.1

 
 
[¶4]       In its 
complaint, Landex asserted that the notice "advised [Mr. Knapp] that failure to 
pay all principal and interest payments then due on or before thirty (30) days 
following mailing of said written notice would result in a default of the 
Agreement and [Landex] would exercise all rights available to it under the 
Agreement."  The complaint further 
alleged that Mr. Knapp "failed to cure said default within thirty (30) days of 
the mailing of said notice."  In his 
responsive pleading, Mr. Knapp generally denied the allegations of the 
complaint, and, for his counterclaim, asserted that the notice extended the time 
to cure the default to May 21, 2003.  
Mr. Knapp also alleged that he mailed the curative payment to Landex on 
or about May 18, 2003.  In its 
answer to the counterclaim, Landex denied that the notice extended the time to 
cure default and also denied that the payment was timely received.  Landex then moved for summary 
judgment.

 
 
[¶5]       In support 
of its motion for summary judgment, Landex filed an affidavit, a payment 
history, a postal receipt with a delivery date of April 19, 2003, a copy of the 
Agreement, and Mr. Knapp's responses to discovery requests.  Mr. Knapp filed a response and brief in 
opposition to the motion and attached the notice, postal receipts, and a letter 
dated May 23, 2003, from Landex.2  Mr. Knapp did not file an affidavit in 
support of his opposition to the motion.  

 
 
[¶6]       After a 
hearing on the motion, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of 
Landex.  The district court found 
that the default provision of the Agreement was not effectively modified to 
extend the time to cure default because the alleged modification was unsupported 
by consideration.  As a result, the 
district court concluded that Mr. Knapp failed to timely cure the default in 
accordance with the terms of the Agreement.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
[¶7]       Our 
standard of review governing summary judgment is well known and often 
repeated:

 
 
Summary judgment is proper "if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law."  W.R.C.P. 56(c). A 
genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if proven, would 
establish or refute an essential element of a cause of action or a defense that 
a party has asserted. Metz Beverage Co. 
v. Wyoming Beverages, Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1051, [1055] (Wyo. 
2002).

 
 
We evaluate the propriety of a 
summary judgment by employing the same standards and by examining the same 
material as the district court. Id. We examine 
de novo the record, in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion, affording to that party the benefit 
of all favorable inferences that may be drawn from the record. Roussalis v. Wyoming Medical Center, 
Inc., 4 P.3d 209, 229 (Wyo. 2000). If upon review of the record, doubt 
exists about the presence of issues of material fact, that doubt must be 
resolved against the party seeking summary judgment. Id. We accord no 
deference to the district court's decisions on issues of law. Metz, ¶ 
9.

 
 

Linton v. E. C. Cates Agency, 
Inc., 2005 WY 63, 
¶¶ 6-7, 113 P.3d 26, 28 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶8]       Mr. Knapp 
contends the district court improperly entered summary judgment.  He claims that Landex extended the time 
to cure default to May 21, 2003.  He 
relies upon the language of the notice which states in pertinent part that:  "You have until May 21, 2003,  . . . to correct the . . . default."3  A copy of the notice was attached to Mr. 
Knapp's brief, but was not supported by affidavit.  The notice was not attached as an 
exhibit to Mr. Knapp's answer or counterclaim and no other foundation was 
provided for the notice.  As a 
result, we cannot properly consider its contents.  See, e.g., Hunter v. Farmers Ins. Group, 
554 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Wyo. 1976)  
("Evidence which is relied on to sustain or defeat a summary judgment 
must be such as would be admissible in evidence.");  Stauffer Chem. Co. v. Curry, 778 P.2d 1083, 1095 (Wyo. 1989) (Evidentiary materials submitted to oppose summary 
judgment "lacked proper foundation and, for that reason, were not 
competent.").  We must, however, 
consider the pleadings, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavit filed by Landex, in determining whether summary 
judgment was proper.  W.R.C.P. 
56(c).

 
 
[¶9]       In response 
to Mr. Knapp's assertions, Landex contends that it was entitled to summary 
judgment because Mr. Knapp failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding whether Mr. Knapp cured the default.  Landex contends that it was Mr. Knapp's 
burden to provide admissible evidence to avoid summary judgment.  Because Mr. Knapp did not submit an 
affidavit and only attached copies of letters and postal receipts to his brief, 
Landex concludes that Mr. Knapp failed to meet his burden of demonstrating a 
genuine issue of material fact.  

 
 
[¶10]     In making its claim, 
Landex incorrectly places the initial burden on Mr. Knapp.  Landex, as the moving party, was 
required to establish the absence of 
a genuine issue of material fact.  
Although no affidavits or other forms of admissible evidence were 
provided by Mr. Knapp in opposition to the summary judgment motion, the burden 
did not shift to Mr. Knapp until Landex sufficiently refuted the allegations 
made in Mr. Knapp's answer and counterclaim:

 
 
"[T]he motion for summary judgment 
is a drastic remedy and one which is designed to pierce the formal allegations 
and reach the merits of the controversy--but only when no material issue of fact 
is present. Although both parties are obligated to come forward with their 
evidence, the burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact."

 
 
. . .

  

"Until the moving party has 
established with its supporting evidence that there are no genuine issues of 
material fact requiring a trial, the nonmoving party has no obligation to 
support his pleadings with any evidence."

 
 

"If the moving party does not refute 
the averment of the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party may rely on its 
averment and has no obligation to present any factual support."

 
 

Drake v. Winkler, 838 P.2d 1177, 1180 (Wyo. 1992) (internal 
citations omitted) (emphasis added).  

 
 
[¶11]     Prior to summary 
judgment, Mr. Knapp raised the issue that Landex extended the time to cure 
default.  In his counterclaim, Mr. 
Knapp asserted the following:

 
 
VI.        On 
April 17, 2003[,] Plaintiff sen[t] Defendant a letter advising Defendant he was 
again in default and that Defendant had until May 21, 2003[,] to correct the 
default.  Defendant mailed Plaintiff 
the money to correct the default on or about May 18, 2003.

 
 
In response to Landex's 
interrogatories, Mr. Knapp referenced the April 17, 2003, notice and listed the 
letter as a trial exhibit.  
Additionally, Mr. Knapp denied a request for admission that he failed to 
cure the default identified in the notice within thirty (30) days of April 17, 
2003.  These averments were 
sufficient to create a dispute regarding the time available to Mr. Knapp to cure 
the default.  In order to prevail on 
summary judgment, Landex was required to demonstrate the absence of a genuine 
issue of material fact regarding the notice of default and the time provided to 
Mr. Knapp to cure the default.  
Landex failed to meet that burden.

 
 
[¶12]     Landex simply ignored 
Mr. Knapp's allegations concerning the extension of time.  In its affidavit filed in support of 
summary judgment, Landex skirted the issue by stating 
that:

 
 

9.                   
After 
receiving no payment from or after August 15, 2002, I once again mailed a notice 
of default to Knapp on April 17, 2003 advising of Knapp's default which notice 
was received by Knapp on April 19, 2003.  
A copy of the U.S. Postal Service return receipt certificate is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "2."

 
 

10.               
I did not 
receive payment by May 19, 2003 and, as a result of Knapp failing to cure his 
default, I recorded the Quitclaim Deed pursuant to the terms of the 
Contract.

 
 
Although its claim for relief depended 
upon the contents of the notice,4 and it 
repeatedly referred to the notice, Landex failed to provide a copy of the notice 
in support of its motion.  This is a 
glaring omission in light of Mr. Knapp's assertions regarding the contents of 
the notice and the requirement of W.R.E. 1002 which provides:  "To prove the content of a writing, 
recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is 
required, except as otherwise provided in these rules or by 
statute."

 
 
[¶13]     In granting summary 
judgment, the district court did not directly address whether a genuine issue of 
material fact existed regarding the time provided to Mr. Knapp to cure the 
default.  Instead, the district 
court held that the alleged May 21, 2003, extension of time to cure was void 
because it was not supported by consideration.  The district court erred in reaching 
such conclusion.  

 
 
[¶14]     The district court 
apparently applied contract modification principles and determined that any 
extension of the deadline was ineffective because it was not supported by 
consideration.  We recognize that 
modification of an agreement is void unless supported by consideration.  See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Woodcock, 2001 
WY 120, ¶ 14, 35 P.3d 1232, 1237 (Wyo. 2001) (stating that without valid 
consideration, the agreement is invalid).  
However, strict performance of the terms of an agreement may be 
waived:5

 
 
"As has been stated, the doctrine is 
that if, upon the face of a contract, it clearly appears to have been the 
distinct understanding and agreement of the parties that if a stipulated act was 
not performed within a specified time certain consequences were to follow; and 
if default has been made in the performance within the time, a court of equity 
will give no relief unless a strict 
performance was either waived by the party entitled to its benefits or is 
excused on some special ground of equitable cognizance."

 
 

McMurry Oil Co. v. Deucalion 
Research, 842 P.2d 584, 589 (Wyo. 1992) (emphasis added).  
We have noted that because forfeitures are not favored, "slight evidence 
of the    . . . intention 
to relinquish [a] right is sufficient to warrant the finding of waiver."  Angus Hunt Ranch, Inc. v. Reb, Inc., 577 P.2d 645, 650 (Wyo. 1978).  The 
issue presented regarding the time to cure was one of waiver, not contract 
modification.  The proper question 
for determination is whether Landex waived its contractual right to hold Mr. 
Knapp in default on May 19, 2003, by the language it utilized in the April 17, 
2003, notice.      

 
 
[¶15]     When all favorable 
inferences are accorded to Mr. Knapp, the record contains sufficient evidence to 
create genuine issues of material fact regarding the time available to Mr. Knapp 
to cure the default and whether his payment was timely.  Summary judgment was improper.  We reverse and remand this matter to the 
trial court for further proceedings.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The default provision of the Agreement 
provides:

 
 
17.  DEFAULT

 
 
. . . In the event the BUYER shall fail 
or neglect . . . to make any payment when said payment becomes due and payable, 
. . .  LANDEX shall have the right 
at any time thereafter, to notify the BUYER in writing of the nature and extent 
of such default, and if such default is not corrected within thirty (30) days of 
the mailing of said notice, LANDEX shall have the right, at any time thereafter, 
without further notice, to terminate and cancel all rights of the BUYER under 
this agreement, . . . and LANDEX shall have the further right to immediately 
re-enter and take possession of said real property and be released of all 
obligations to convey the same to the BUYER. . . .

 
 
  
2The May 
23, 2003, letter returned Mr. Knapp's payment.

 
 
  
3The 
letter states:

 
 
Dear Bart

            

            
This letter is pursuant to paragraph 17 of the agreement for sale of 
Property, Dated 6-3-1995, between you as buyer and Landex Corporation as seller 
regarding the following described real property;

SW1/4 SW1/4, Section 14, T.50N., R73W., of the 6th P.M. Campbell 
County, Wyoming 

 
 
Failure to make payments sense 8/15/02.  The Payment made on 8/15/02 was in the 
rears for the April. 2002 payment.  
Principle and interest as of 5/15/03 to bring this account current will 
be $3,895.63.

 
 
You have until May 21,2003, Said date 
being 30days from the date hereof to correct the above stated default.  If you do not correct the default within 
that time, then, at that time all your rights under the above mentioned 
Agreement for sale of real property shall be immediately terminated and 
cancelled without future notice to you, Landex Corporation shall be released 
from all obligation to convey the property to you, and you shall immediately 
vacate the property and give up possession of same to Landex 
Corporation

 
 
Sincerely,

Landex 
Corporation

/s/

Robert C 
Hartley

President

 
 
(Emphasis in 
original.)

 
 

4Pursuant to the default provision of the 
Agreement, Landex was required to provide written notice to Mr. Knapp of the 
nature and extent of default.  

 
 

5"[T]he elements of waiver are (a) 
existing right; (b) knowledge of that right; and (c) intent to surrender or 
relinquish it."  Ramirez 
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 580 P.2d 1136, 1138 (Wyo. 1978).