Case Title: MONTY SULLIVAN, V.THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0099

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-03-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
MONTY SULLIVAN, V.THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 46Case Number:  S-10-0099Decided: 03/11/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
MONTY 
SULLIVAN,Appellant(Defendant),V.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

          

Appeal 
from the District Court of Hot Springs 
County

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel; and Kirk A. 
Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Morgan.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage; Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Pojman.

 
 
 
 

HILL, 
J., 
delivers the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, J., files a special 
concurrence.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      After being found 
guilty of two counts of first degree sexual abuse of a minor, Monty Sullivan 
asserts that he was denied the right to a fair trial due to prosecutorial 
misconduct.  We 
affirm.

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Sullivan raises 
one issue before this Court:

 
 
Mr. 
Sullivan was denied his right to a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct 
which occurred when the prosecutor solicited inappropriate testimony from its 
witness and informed the jury that Mr. Sullivan did not take a polygraph 
test.

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In February of 
2009, the Wyoming Department of Family Services (DFS) took K.T., a minor child 
who was then nine years old, to the Child Advocacy Project (CAP) in Casper, 
Wyoming, to be interviewed.1  During the interview, K.T. revealed that 
on two separate occasions in her grandmother's bedroom, Sullivan attempted to 
have sex with her but because it was too painful, K.T. stated that Sullivan 
anally raped her when she was seven and eight years old.  K.T. also revealed that Sullivan made 
her taste his semen, and that there were occasions when Sullivan made her sit on 
his lap while he watched pornography on the computer.  During one specific instance, K.T. 
recalled that Sullivan was rubbing K.T.'s private area through her 
clothes.

 
 
[¶4]      The Thermopolis 
Police Department interviewed Sullivan after learning of the CAP interview with 
K.T.  They informed Sullivan of 
K.T.'s allegations, which he initially denied.  Eventually, Sullivan admitted to law 
enforcement that he had done to K.T. what she alleged him to have 
done.

 
 
[¶5]      On February 13, 
2009, Sullivan was charged with three counts of sexual abuse of a minor in the 
first degree in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-314(a)(i) (Counts I-III), and 
one count of sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree, in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-315(a)(iv) (Count IV).  
Counts I and IV were ultimately dismissed, and Sullivan pleaded not 
guilty at arraignment to Counts II, III, and IV.2

 
 
[¶6]      Prior to trial, 
Sullivan filed a motion in limine to preclude fifteen specific sorts of 
anticipated prosecutorial misconduct, including vouching for the credibility of 
a witness and commenting on Sullivan's guilt or his failure to take a lie 
detector test.  The court, after a 
hearing, granted the motion as to any polygraph evidence.  Otherwise, the court denied the motion, 
stating that if "one of those errors does come up, then we'll deal with it at 
the time."

 
 
[¶7]      The case went to 
trial on October 28, 2009.  At 
trial, Chief of Police Mark Nelson testified that after doing a number of 
"these" cases, the video of K.T.'s interview was "very believable."  Chief Nelson also testified that he 
asked Sullivan about a lie detector test, which elicited a colloquy that 
included the prosecutor stating to the judge in front of the jury that "one was 
not taken."

 
 
[¶8]      After two days of 
trial, the jury returned a guilty verdict on both charges.3  Sentencing occurred February 18, 2010, 
wherein the court sentenced Sullivan to the Wyoming State Penitentiary for not 
less than 20 nor more than 35 years per count, with each to run 
consecutive.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

 

[¶9]      Where there has 
been an objection at trial, we review claims of prosecutorial misconduct under a 
harmless error standard.  Harris v. State, 2008 WY 23, ¶ 12, 
177 P.3d 1166, 1170 (Wyo. 2008).  We 
typically review allegations of prosecutorial 
misconduct by reference to the entire record to determine whether 
or not a defendant's case has been so prejudiced as to deny him a fair trial. 
 Schafer v. State, 2008 WY 149, 
¶ 21, 197 P.3d 1247, 1251 (Wyo. 2008) (citing Szymanski v. State, 2007 WY 139, ¶ 27, 166 P.3d 879, 886 (Wyo. 
2007)).

 
 
[¶10]   
In addressing a claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct, this Court focuses on the prejudice suffered by the 
defendant.  Smith v. State, 2009 WY 2, ¶ 26, 
199 P.3d 1052, 1059 (Wyo. 2009).  
This Court has identified that reversal is not warranted unless a 
reasonable probability exists, absent the error, that an appellant may have 
enjoyed a more favorable verdict.  
Trujillo v. State, 750 P.2d 1334, 1337 (Wyo. 1988) (citing Jones v. 
State, 735 P.2d 699, 703 (Wyo. 
1988)).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶11]   Sullivan argues that his right to a 
fair trial was violated by several instances of prosecutorial misconduct.  First, Sullivan contends that Chief 
Nelson twice improperly commented on Sullivan's guilt, and during his testimony 
vouched for the victim.  We have 
held:

 
 
[I]t 
is impermissible for either a lay witness or an expert to vouch for the 
credibility of another witness, or to comment on the guilt of the accused.  The question becomes whether the error 
requires reversal or whether the error was harmless under W.R.A.P. 
9.04.

 
 
We 
must ascertain whether the error affects any substantial rights of the accused, 
providing grounds for reversal, or whether it is harmless.  The harmless error 
standard is set out in W.R.A.P. 9.04: "Any error, defect, irregularity or 
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded by the 
reviewing court."  See also 
W.R.Cr.P. 52(a).  An error is 
harmful if there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been 
more favorable to the defendant had the error never occurred.  To demonstrate harmful error, the 
defendant must show prejudice under "circumstances which manifest inherent 
unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair 
play."    Under our harmless error analysis, we 
must judge whether the jury's verdict might have been different but for the 
witnesses' testimony.

 
 

Wilks 
v. State, 
2002 WY 100, ¶ 21, 49 P.3d 975, 984 (Wyo. 2002).  "Among the factors to be considered are 
the nature and gravity of the error, the prosecutor's duty to do justice and 
refrain from improper methods, the likely impact on the average juror, the 
quality of the prosecution's case, and the closeness of the 
case."

 
 

Drury 
v. State, 2008 
WY 130, ¶ 10, 194 P.3d 1017, 1020-21 (Wyo. 2008) (footnote and citations 
omitted).

 
 
[¶12]   Chief Nelson testified as 
follows:

 
 
Q. [PROSECUTOR]:  Okay. 
And what did you first talk to [Sullivan] about then after the Miranda 
form?

A. [CHIEF 
NELSON]:  We told him sort of the process, what's happened when the 
children are placed in State custody.  
At that time they have a doctor's exam, a physical exam shortly after 
they are placed into State custody, and then with Family Services we decide that 
some follow-up interviews needed to be done and that's where the CAP Center was 
involved.  And then that interview 
was done and we gathered information from that recording of the interview at the 
CAP Center from [K.T.], the little girl.

Q. [PROSECUTOR]:  Okay.  And what's the next thing that you 
talked with [Sullivan] about?

A. [CHIEF 
NELSON]:  That as Officer Brown and I viewed the recording of that 
interview that there was information we gathered from that of crimes committed 
against [K.T.], the little girl.  
And in that information that there w[ere] crimes that she mentioned that 
[Sullivan] committed to her.

Q. [PROSECUTOR]:  Okay.  What did you tell [Sullivan] that you 
had seen on that CD [of K.T.'s interview]?

[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, I'm going to object as to hearsay, anything 
regarding that video.

COURT:  [Prosecutor]?

[PROSECUTOR]:  Your 
Honor, in this case we're going to show that [Sullivan] admitted, "I did 
that."  We have to have the Officer 
tell him what it was he's being told that he did in order to know what he 
confessed to.

COURT:  The 
Court will allow it. Go ahead.

Q. [PROSECUTOR]:  Would 
you please go on to what you told [Sullivan] about what you saw on the 
CD?

A. [CHIEF 
NELSON]:  I told him that from 
the information we gathered from that that there was, I think, I mentioned three 
separate crimes to [Sullivan] that he committed to [K.T.].  In that I said at one occasion they were 
at [Sullivan's] mother's home  and while there that he removed her clothing, 
attempted to have intercourse with [K.T.] vaginally and as he was doing that 
[she] said that it hurt.  He 
stopped, turned her over, and then had intercourse with her anally.  And then said on another occasion that 
he had anal intercourse with [K.T.] there at his mother's residence 
also.

 
 
[¶13]   Regarding the bold portion of the 
Chief's testimony, Sullivan alleges that Chief Nelson was improperly commenting 
on Sullivan's guilt and vouching for the credibility of the victim.  We do not agree with Sullivan.  In our review of the testimony, we agree 
with the State that because Sullivan had only generally admitted to doing to 
K.T. what they accused him of, the testimony as to K.T.'s allegations was 
relevant and critical to the jury's understanding of what Sullivan admitted to 
doing.

 
 
[¶14]   Sullivan also takes issue with the 
following testimony, contending again that Chief Nelson improperly commented on 
Sullivan's guilt and vouched for K.T.'s credibility:

 
 
Q. [PROSECUTOR]:  What 
if anything did you tell [Sullivan] about your observations of the video of 
[K.T.'s interview]?

A. [CHIEF 
NELSON]:  That from my time as 
a law enforcement officer, and I've done a number of these cases, that the 
information that was on that interview was very believable to 
me.

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, I'm going to object and move to 
strike, that's going to the province of the jury.

            
COURT:  [Prosecutor?]

            
[PROSECUTOR]:  Your Honor, in this case I am not having this 
Officer give his opinion for the jury, I'm trying to show what was stated to 
[Sullivan] so that there's no misapprehension of all the information given to 
him before he made his statement.

            
COURT:  Overruled, I will admonish the jury that the opinion of 
the Officer as to the believability is of no consequence to this case, but 
simply what was stated to [Sullivan].

 
 
[¶15]   Regarding opinion testimony, we 
have stated in looking at similar testimony, that it is "the jury's role, not 
the witness's, to make this determination."  Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879, 882 
(Wyo. 1990).  In deciding whether 
Sullivan was prejudiced by the district court's admission of the above-quoted 
testimony, we consider the improper testimony in light of the trial as a whole. 
 Drury, ¶ 14; 194 P.3d 1021-22; Pendleton v. State, 2008 WY 36, 
¶ 11, 180 P.3d 212, 216 (Wyo. 2008).  
Here, the jury was issued a curative, limiting instruction, but was also 
later instructed that testimony from law enforcement personnel was not entitled 
to any special consideration.  
Furthermore, the court also reminded the jury that it was the sole judge 
of the credibility of the witnesses, as did the State during closing 
arguments.  This Court presumes the 
jury followed the court's instructions.  
Brown v. State, 953 P.2d 1170, 
1177 (Wyo. 1998).

 
 
[¶16]   Along with the foregoing 
considerations, we also consider the strength of the evidence against Sullivan 
in order to determine whether there is a possibility that the jury could have 
found differently in the absence of the improper testimony.  Drury, ¶ 15. 194 P.3d 1022.  The confession of Sullivan to law 
enforcement was quite damning, as was the testimony of KT.

 
 
[¶17]   In light of the evidence against 
Sullivan, including his own confession and KT's testimony, we cannot say that 
the jury could have found differently in the absence of the improper testimony. 
 We give due weight to the fact that 
the prosecutor did nothing to increase the prejudicial effect of the vouching 
testimony.  For its part, the 
district court made an effort to instruct the jury to disregard Chief Nelson's 
testimony on credibility and to make its own determination as to the credibility 
of each witness.  For those reasons, 
it is our conclusion that Sullivan was not prejudiced by the testimony, and the 
error was harmless.

 
 
[¶18]   Sullivan's final allegation of 
prosecutorial misconduct is that the prosecutor made a remark informing the jury 
that he did not take a lie detector test.  
During Chief Nelson's testimony, the following exchange 
occurred:

 
 
Q. [PROSECUTOR]: 
What else, if anything, did you talk with [Sullivan] 
about?

A. [CHIEF 
NELSON]: I asked him what he knew about a lie detector 
test.

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, I'm going to object to anything 
regarding lie detectors, it's not scientifically proven, not 
foundation.

            
COURT:  Counsel?

[PROSECUTOR]:  Your 
Honor, one was not taken but I would be glad to withdraw the question if you 
want to admonish the jury we'll move to a different area.

COURT: 
Move to a different area.  The jury 
is admonished to disregard the last question and answer.

 
 
[¶19]   "A fundamental premise of our 
criminal trial system is that the jury is the lie detector.' "  United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 
313, 118 S. Ct. 1261, 1266, 140 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1998) (emphasis in original).  Wyoming adheres to the rule that it is 
error for the State to introduce evidence that a defendant has refused to take a 
polygraph or "lie detector" test.  
Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724, 732-33 (Wyo. 1986).  The 
rationale for that rule has been stated as follows.

 
 
" 
The impact upon the minds of the jurors of a refusal to submit to something 
which they might well assume would effectively determine guilt or innocence, 
under these conditions, might well be more devastating than a disclosure of the 
results of such test * * *.' "

 
 

Id. 
(quoting Mills 
v. People, 
139 Colo. 397, 339 P.2d 998, 999 (Colo. 1959)).  Beyond that, 
we have characterized the introduction of such evidence as "overzealous 
prosecution":

 
 
"All 
too frequently this court is compelled to reverse judgments of guilt in 
important criminal cases because of overzealous prosecution.  It is the duty of prosecuting officers to 
guard against the introduction of incompetent evidence.  Overprosecution of an accused should not 
be permitted by the trial court.  In 
the instant case the district attorney insisted at great length upon 
introduction into evidence of testimony [refusal to take a lie detector test] 
which is uniformly held to be incompetent, in an unbroken line of authorities 
throughout the nation."

 
 

Id. 
(quoting 
Mills, 339 P.2d at 999-1000).  The constitutional underpinning for this 
rule is that it is fundamentally unfair to assure a suspect that he has a right 
to remain silent, and then to use his exercise of that right against him. 
State v. Gutierrez, 142 NM 1, 162 P.3d 156, 162 
(2007).

 
 

Proffit 
v. State, 
2008 WY 114, ¶ 8, 193 P.3d 228, 232-33 (Wyo. 2008), 
cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1048, 173 L. Ed. 2d 476 
(2009).

 
 

[¶20]   In Proffit, we encountered a "polygraph" 
issue and found plain error in part because the prosecutor repeatedly elicited 
testimony about the defendant refusing to take a polygraph 
test because the defendant was concerned that the "polygraph 
exam may confuse some of his homosexual behavior as he was molested as a 
child[.]"  Id., ¶ 6, 193 P.3d  at 232.  We 
held that the reference to the defendant's refusal to take the lie detector test 
violated the defendant's constitutional right to remain silent.  Id., ¶ 8, 193 P.3d  at 233. 
 The testimony about the refused polygraph 
and defendant's exercise of his right to silence and his right to counsel was 
simply too fundamental to the central issue to be considered 
harmless.

 
 
[¶21]   Preceding Proffit, in Schmunk we cited to authority from other 
jurisdictions indicating that it is reversible error to reveal to a jury a 
defendant's refusal to take a lie detector test, and to then suggest such 
refusal showed consciousness of guilt.  Id., 714 P.2d 733 n.2.  While Sullivan concedes that the alleged 
error is not as "rampant" as this Court has seen, he still urges that its 
significance cannot be understated because it relates to the credibility of the 
victim and the lack of credibility of Sullivan.  While we agree with Sullivan that the 
error was noteworthy, we have never held that any reference to a polygraph requires 
automatic reversal.  We will not do 
so in this case either.

 
 
[¶22]   The record here shows little, if 
any, harm occurred as a result of the challenged comments.  In the context of the trial testimony as 
a whole, the statement that a polygraph was not given  not that Sullivan 
refused one  was brief and spontaneous.  
The remark was not solicited.  Most importantly, there was no 
prejudicial inference from the witness's remarks, because there was no explicit 
statement that there was a "refusal" to take the polygraph.  The polygraph was never referenced 
again, and the district court admonished the jury to disregard the question and 
the answer.  Given the bulk of 
evidence in this case, we cannot speculate that the jury disregarded the court's 
admonitions and placed any importance on the comments by the prosecutor and 
Chief Nelson.  We affirm the 
district court's ruling on this issue.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶23]   We affirm Sullivan's conviction, 
concluding that he received a fair trial, and that, in light of the evidence 
proven at trial, any error was harmless.

  

VOIGT, 
Justice, 
specially concurring.

 
 
[¶24]   I concur in the result of the 
majority opinion out of respect for the doctrine of stare decisis.  The majority has faithfully adhered to 
our precedent.  I write separately 
because this case exemplifies the fact that our admonitions to prosecutors and 
law enforcement officials too often fall on deaf ears.  It is hard to believe that, with 
precedent being so clear, a criminal trial in Wyoming could include both the 
investigating officer giving his opinion that the victim's interview "was 
very believable to me," and that same officer and the prosecutor in tandem 
telling the jury that the defendant did not take a "lie detector test."

 
 
[¶25]   The direct fault lies with the 
prosecutors.  The indirect fault 
lies with the harmless error rule.  
So long as the system requires an appellant to prove that he or she was 
prejudiced by prosecutorial misconduct, some prosecutors will continue to act as 
they do.

FOOTNOTES

1K.T. was removed from her home in a separate 
case.

2Count 
I was dismissed prior to arraignment, and just before trial, the State dismissed 
Count IV.

3The morning of trial, the State dismissed the second degree sexual 
assault charge, Count IV.