Case Title: State v. Ashley

Citation: 161 Vt. 65, 632 A.2d 1368

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1993-10-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE_V_ASHLEY.92-563; 161 Vt. 65; 632 A.2d 1368

[Filed 08-Oct-1993]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-563


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 2, Franklin Circuit
 James E. Ashley
                                              June Term, 1993



 Edward J. Cashman, J.

 Jo-Ann L. Gross, Franklin County Deputy State's Attorney, St. Albans, for
   plaintiff-appellee

 Robert Paolini of Martin & Paolini, Barre, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



     GIBSON, J.     James Ashley appeals from the trial court's denial of his
 motion for judgment of acquittal following convictions for violation of
 conditions of release, 13 V.S.A. { 7559(e) and V.R.Cr.P. 42, and obstruction
 of justice, 13 V.S.A. { 3015.  We affirm the obstruction-of-justice convic-
 tion, but reverse the conviction for violation of a condition of release.
      On October 3, 1991, defendant was arraigned on charges of sexually
 assaulting a minor.  The district court determined that defendant's future
 appearances could not be assured if he were released on personal recogni-
 zance or by an unsecured bond, and also found that he would pose a danger to
 the public.  The court issued a Conditions of Release Order, which required,

 

 among other things, that defendant post bail and that he "not associate with
 R.B., Lucille Brace, Sara Hughes nor personally contact, harass, or cause to
 be harmed R.B., Lucille Brace, Sara Hughes."  Defendant was unable to post
 bail and remained in custody.
      Between October 3 and November 17, 1991, defendant sent letters to
 Lucille Brace and made telephone calls to her.  On November 18, 1991, the
 State charged defendant under 13 V.S.A. { 7559(e) and V.R.Cr.P. 42 with
 violating a condition of his release when he contacted Lucille Brace by
 letter.  The State also charged obstruction of justice under 13 V.S.A. {
 3015, alleging that defendant endeavored to have Lucille Brace drop the
 sexual assault charges by intimidating her through threatening written and
 oral communications.  Subsequent to his trial on the sexual assault counts,
 defendant was tried and convicted for violating a condition of his release
 and for obstruction of justice.  He received a sentence of four to five
 years on the obstruction charge and a sentence of four to six months for the
 violation of a condition of release, to be served concurrently.
      Defendant appeals on three grounds from the trial court's denial of his
 motion for judgment of acquittal following the jury verdicts.  He claims,
 first, that a defendant can violate conditions of release only if he is
 actually released.  Second, he contends there was no obstruction of justice
 since by the terms of 13 V.S.A. { 3015 the intimidation must be by threat of
 physical force or it must result in actual deterrence of the witness's
 testimony, neither of which were proven by the State.  Third, he claims he
 was prejudiced by the trial court's admission of evidence referring to the
 underlying sexual assault charges.

 

      Our standard for reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment of
 acquittal is whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
 State, was sufficient to convince a reasonable trier of fact that the
 defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  V.R.Cr.P. 29; State v.
 Venman, 151 Vt. 561, 569-70, 564 A.2d 574, ___ (1989).
                                     I.
       The first ground of appeal requires us to decide whether conditions of
 release are enforceable when a defendant cannot post bail and remains in
 custody.  We look first to the plain meaning of the statute.  Wolfe v.
 Yudichak, 153 Vt. 235, 239, 571 A.2d 592, 595 (1989).  If the meaning is
 plain, we will enforce it according to its terms,  McSweeney v. McSweeney,
 ___ Vt. ___, ___, 618 A.2d 1332, 1334 (1992), giving effect to every word.
 See State v. Tierney, 138 Vt. 163, 165,