Case Title: REITER v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 00-129

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-12-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
REITER v. STATE2001 WY 11636 P.3d 586Case Number: 00-129Decided: 12/06/2001

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

                                                                                                                                   

DAVID 
REITER, 

Appellant(Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

Representing Appellant: 

            
Sylvia L. Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel; and Ryan R. Roden, Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 Representing Appellee: 

            
Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. 
Tibbetts, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, 
Prosecution Assistance Program; and M. Kristeen Hand, Student Intern.

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 [¶1]      Appellant, David 
Reiter, was charged with first-degree arson for starting a fire that destroyed 
the V.F.W. building in Casper.  The district court ultimately entered an order 
finding that appellant was not criminally responsible for his conduct due to a 
mental illness, and committed appellant to the Wyoming State Hospital.  In April 1999, 
appellant filed an application to be discharged from the state hospital, which 
the district court denied.  Appellant appeals from the district court's 
order denying his application for discharge and an order denying his declaratory 
judgment motion, essentially arguing that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-306(f) 
(LexisNexis 2001) unconstitutionally places the burden of proof on him in such a 
discharge proceeding.  
We affirm.

ISSUES

[¶2]      Appellant raises the 
following issues on appeal:

ISSUE I

Whether the district court utilized an improper burden of 
proof when it concluded the W.S. § 7-11-306(f) proceeding?

ISSUE II

Whether the burden found within W.S. § 7-11-306(f) is 
unconstitutional and therefore violative of appellant's due process rights under 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as 
Article 1 § 6 of the Wyoming Constitution?

ISSUE III

Whether the burden found within W.S. § 7-11-306(f) is 
unconstitutional and therefore violative of appellant's equal protection 
guarantees under Article 1 §§ 2, 7, 34 and 36 of the Wyoming Constitution?

ISSUE IV

Whether the burden found within W.S. § 7-11-306(f) is 
unconstitutional and therefore violative of appellant's equal protection 
guarantees under the Fourteenth Amendments [sic] to the United States 
Constitution?

The State of Wyoming, as appellee, phrases the issues in 
substantially the same manner.

FACTS

[¶3]      On June 28, 1996, the 
Casper Fire Department responded to a fire at the V.F.W. building in 
Casper.  
Appellant was charged with first-degree arson for starting the fire and 
subsequently entered a not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency 
plea.  Following 
an evaluation at the state hospital and a competency hearing, the district court 
found that appellant was incompetent to stand trial, but that appellant's 
competency might be restored with medication.  Appellant remained at the state hospital.

[¶4]      In December 1996, the 
parties received a report from the state hospital that appellant had regained 
his competency to stand trial.  On January 14, 1997, the parties appeared 
before the district court and agreed or jointly recommended that appellant be 
found not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency.  The district court 
entered an order pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-306(a) finding that 
appellant was not responsible for the alleged criminal conduct due to a mental 
illness, and that appellant was mentally ill and presented a substantial danger 
to himself or others.  
Appellant was committed to the state hospital pending further review 
under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-306.

[¶5]      In April 1998, the 
state hospital filed an application to discharge appellant pursuant to Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-11-306(e).1  After a hearing, the district court denied the 
application, finding that appellant remained mentally ill and continued to 
present a substantial risk of danger to himself or others.

[¶6]      In April 1999, 
appellant filed an application for discharge pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-11-306(f) claiming that he no longer presented a substantial risk of danger to 
himself or others and that the referenced statute was constitutionally 
infirm.  
Appellant also filed a Motion for Declaratory Judgment seeking a 
declaration that the same statute was unconstitutional.  The district court 
denied the declaratory judgment motion, and after a December 1999, hearing, 
denied the application for discharge.  In denying the discharge application, the 
district court found that appellant continued to be affected by his mental 
illness and remained a substantial risk of danger to himself or others.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶7]      We recited the 
applicable standard of review in V-1 Oil Co. v. 
State, 934 P.2d 740, 742 (Wyo. 
1997):

Issues of constitutionality present questions of law.  We review questions 
of law under a de novo standard of review and afford 
no deference to the district court's determinations on the issues.  Anderson v. Bommer, 926 P.2d 959, 961 
(Wyo.1996).  In 
reviewing a constitutionally based challenge to a statute, we presume the 
statute to be constitutional and any doubt in the matter must be resolved in 
favor of the statute's constitutionality.  Thomson v. Wyoming 
In-Stream Flow Committee, 651 P.2d 778, 789-90 (Wyo.1982).  [Appellant] bears the burden of proving the 
statute is unconstitutional.  Pfeil v. Amax Coal 
West, Inc., 908 P.2d 956, 961 
(Wyo.1995).

Normally, this burden is "heavy" in that appellant must 
"clearly  and 
exactly show the unconstitutionality beyond any reasonable doubt.'"  Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Wyo. 
1995) (quoting Miller v. City 
of Laramie, 880 P.2d 594, 597 (Wyo. 
1994)).  
However, 

"that rule does not apply where a citizen's fundamental 
constitutional right, such as free speech, is involved.  The strong 
presumptions in favor of constitutionality are inverted, the burden then is on 
the governmental entity to justify the validity of the [statute], and this Court 
has a duty to declare legislative enactments invalid if they transgress that 
constitutional provision."

Michael, 900 P.2d at 1146 (quoting Miller, 880 
P.2d at 597).

"This is true in situations involving the right of freedom 
of expression or thought, or of speech, or association, or of the press, or of 
religion.  
Under some authority, the usual presumption in favor of constitutionality 
is merely weaker where the statute arguably inhibits fundamental rights."

Michael, 900 P.2d at 1146 (quoting Miller, 
880 P.2d at 597).

DISCUSSION

            
Wyoming Statutes

[¶8]      The Wyoming 
legislature has established both criminal and civil processes for committing an 
individual due to his mental illness.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-305(a) (LexisNexis 
2001) allows a criminal defendant to enter a plea of "not guilty by reason of 
mental illness or deficiency . . .."  The defendant is presumed to be mentally 
responsible, and bears the burden of proving by "the greater weight of evidence 
that, as a result of mental illness or deficiency, he lacked capacity either to 
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-305(b).  If the defendant is 
successful, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-306(a) and (d) state that the court, after 
entering a judgment of not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency, may 
commit the defendant to the state hospital or another facility if, based on the 
evidence at trial or at a separate hearing, the court finds that the defendant 
is affected by mental illness or deficiency, presents substantial risk of danger 
to himself or others, and is not a proper subject for release or 
supervisionunder certain circumstances, the court may discharge the defendant 
outright, or under supervision.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-306(b) and (c).  Individuals 
committed pursuant to this process are "criminal acquittees."

[¶9]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
25-10-110(g) and (j) (Michie 1997) allow an individual to be involuntarily 
hospitalized if a court or jury2 finds by clear and convincing evidence that the 
proposed patient is mentally ill.  "Mentally ill" means a "physical, emotional, 
mental or behavioral disorder which causes a person to be dangerous to himself 
or others and which requires treatment[.]"  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 25-10-101(a)(ix) (Michie 
1997).  
Individuals committed pursuant to this process are "civil 
committees."

[¶10]   The statutes also provide a procedural 
mechanism for discharging "criminal acquittees" and "civil committees."  For "criminal 
acquittees," the statute at issue in this appeal provides, in pertinent 
part:

            
(f)  
Ninety (90) days after the order of commitment, any person committed to 
the designated facility under this section may apply to the district court of 
the county from which he was committed for an order of discharge upon the 
grounds that he is no longer affected by mental illness or deficiency, or that 
he no longer presents a substantial risk of danger to himself or others.  The application for 
discharge shall be accompanied by a report of the head of the facility which 
shall be prepared and transmitted as provided in subsection (e) of this 
section.  The 
applicant shall prove by a preponderance of the evidence his fitness for 
discharge.  An 
application for an order of discharge under this subsection filed within six (6) 
months of the date of a previous hearing shall be subject to summary disposition 
by the court.

            
(g)       If the court, 
after a hearing upon any application for discharge, or application for 
modification or termination of release on supervision, under subsections (c) 
through (f) of this section, finds that the person is no longer affected by 
mental illness or deficiency, or that he no longer presents a substantial risk 
of danger to himself or others, the court shall order him discharged from 
custody or from supervision.  If the court finds that the person is still 
affected by a mental illness or deficiency and presents a substantial risk of 
danger to himself or others, but can be controlled adequately if he is released 
on supervision, the court shall order him released on supervision as provided in 
subsection (c) of this section.  If the court finds that the person has not 
recovered from his mental illness or deficiency and presents a substantial risk 
of danger to himself or others and cannot adequately be controlled if he is 
released on supervision, the court shall order him remanded for continued care 
and treatment.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-306.  Its civil counterpart, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
25-10-118(a) and (c) (Michie 1997), provide that under specified circumstances, 
a "civil committee" is entitled to a hearing to contest his continued 
hospitalization, and the hospitalization may continue only if the court, without 
a jury, finds by clear and convincing evidence that "continu[ed] hospitalization 
is justified . . .."  
Interestingly, the statute does not specify which party bears the burden 
of proof.

            
United States Supreme Court Cases

[¶11]   The issues essentially arise from the 
application of two United States Supreme Court cases, Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 118 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1992) and Jones v. United 
States, 463 U.S. 354, 103 S. Ct. 3043, 77 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1983).  In Jones, the 
District of Columbia Code, similar to Wyoming's statutes, allowed a criminal 
defendant to be acquitted by "reason of insanity" if he raised the defense and 
established his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence.  Jones, 463 U.S.  at 356.  If successful, the defendant would 
automatically be committed to a mental hospital.  Id.  The District of 
Columbia Code provided that within fifty days (and if unsuccessful, every six 
months thereafter), a "criminal acquittee" was entitled to a judicial hearing to 
determine his eligibility for release, at which hearing he must demonstrate by a 
preponderance of the evidence that he was "no longer mentally ill or no longer 
dangerous to himself or others."  Id. at 357, 
n.3.

[¶12]   The District of Columbia Code also 
provided a civil process whereby an individual could be committed to a mental 
hospital if the government proved by clear and convincing evidence to a court or 
jury that the individual was "mentally ill and likely to injure himself or 
others."  Id. at 358-59.  A "civil committee" was also entitled to a 
hearing to determine his eligibility for release, at which hearing he must prove 
by a preponderance of the evidence that he was no longer mentally ill or 
dangerous.  Id.

[¶13]   Jones was arrested for attempted petit 
larceny, a misdemeanor.  Id. at 359.  He suffered from 
schizophrenia, and the alleged crime was "the product of his mental 
disease.'"  Id. at 359-60.  Accordingly, Jones entered a not guilty by 
reason of insanity plea, which the government did not contest.  The trial court 
found him not guilty by reason of insanity and committed him to a mental 
hospital.  Id. at 360.  Jones twice requested to be discharged, both 
of which requests were denied.  By the second request, he had been committed 
for a period exceeding the maximum possible sentence for his criminal 
charge.  Id.

[¶14]   On appeal, Jones argued that the trial 
court's judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity was insufficient to 
establish his present mental illness and dangerousness.  Id. at 362.  Because the government's interest in 
preventing a "criminal acquittee's" escape expires with the maximum possible 
criminal sentence for which the "criminal acquittee" could have received if 
convicted, he claimed that due process mandates that a "criminal acquittee" then 
be released or recommitted using the existing civil process, wherein the 
government bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence and the 
"criminal acquittee" is entitled to request a jury trial.  Id. at 363.  The United States Supreme Court rejected this 
argument, finding that (1) a judgment of not guilty by reason of insanity is "a 
sufficient foundation for commitment of an insanity acquittee for the purposes 
of treatment and the protection of society" automatically, and the legislature's 
conclusion that this judgment allowed an inference of continuing insanity and 
dangerousness until recovery is proven was not unreasonable.  Id. at 364-66; (2) based on the distinctions between 
"criminal acquittees" and "civil committees," the preponderance of the evidence 
standard used to commit a "criminal acquittee" did not violate due process.  Id. at 367-68; and (3) there is "no necessary 
correlation between severity of the offense and length of time necessary for 
recovery" and the length of the "criminal acquittee's" hypothetical criminal 
sentence therefore is irrelevant to the purposes of his commitment.  Id. at 369.  The United States Supreme Court held 
that:

[W]hen a criminal defendant establishes by a preponderance 
of the evidence that he is not guilty of a crime by reason of insanity, the 
Constitution permits the Government, on the basis of the insanity judgment, to 
confine him to a mental institution until such time as he has regained his 
sanity or is no longer a danger to himself or society.  This holding 
accords with the widely and reasonably held view that insanity acquittees 
constitute a special class that should be treated differently from other 
candidates for commitment.  We have observed before that "[w]hen Congress 
undertakes to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, 
legislative options must be especially broad and courts should be cautious not 
to rewrite legislation . . .."  Marshall v. United 
States, 414 U.S. [417] at 427 [94 S. Ct. 700, 38 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1974)].  This admonition has 
particular force in the context of legislative efforts to deal with the special 
problems raised by the insanity defense.

Jones, 463 U.S.  at 370 (footnote omitted).

[¶15]   In Foucha, 
Louisiana law allowed a "criminal acquittee" to remain committed indefinitely 
unless he proved that he was no longer dangerous, regardless of whether he 
remained mentally ill.  Foucha, 504 U.S. 
at 73.  Foucha was charged with aggravated burglary 
and illegally discharging a firearm.  Id.  Doctors reported 
that Foucha was insane at the time he committed the offense.  Id. at 73-74.  The trial court found Foucha not guilty by 
reason of insanity and committed him to a mental facility.  Id. at 74.  Four years later, a report indicated that 
Foucha was no longer mentally ill, but that the same doctors who performed 
Foucha's pretrial examination could not "certify that he would not constitute a 
menace to himself or others if released'" due to an untreatable antisocial 
personality (not considered to be a mental illness at the time) and his 
involvement in several altercations at the facility.  Id. at 74-75.

[¶16]   Due process requires that the nature of 
an individual's commitment reasonably relate to the purpose for which the 
individual was committed; in other words, a "criminal acquittee" may be held as 
long as he is both mentally ill and dangerous, but no longer.  Id. at 77, 79; Jones, 463 U.S.  at 368.  Because Foucha was no longer mentally ill 
(which the government conceded), and Louisiana law allowed a "criminal 
acquittee" who was not mentally ill to be detained indefinitely until he proved 
that he was no longer dangerous, it was unconstitutional to continue to confine 
Foucha as a "criminal acquittee."  Foucha, 504 U.S. 
at 78-79.  Foucha's liberty interest required that in 
order to do so, another basis (i.e., civil commitment, criminal conviction, or 
some other form of constitutionally acceptable detention) must be utilized which 
affords the individual the protections inherent to due process.  Id. at 78-83.  In a third section of the opinion, a 
plurality of the United States Supreme Court found that the Louisiana law 
similarly violated Foucha's equal protection rights.  Id. at 84-86.

[¶17]   We note that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-11-306(f) and (g) are consistent with Foucha's 
core holding in that a Wyoming "criminal acquittee" must be released if he 
proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he is no longer "affected by 
mental illness or deficiency, or that he no longer presents a substantial risk of 
danger to himself or others" and is not a proper subject for release or 
supervision.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-306(f) (emphasis added).  In other words, a 
"criminal acquittee" cannot be detained indefinitely unless he remains both 
mentally ill and dangerous; not based on dangerousness alone.  Appellant's 
continued confinement in the instant case is based on the district court's dual 
finding that he remains mentally ill and presents a substantial risk of danger 
to himself or others, so Foucha is not violated in 
that regard.  
The primary issue on appeal concerns the constitutionality of placing the 
burden of proof on a "criminal acquittee" in a Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-306(f) 
discharge proceeding.

            
Due Process

[¶18]   Appellant contends that placing the 
burden of proof on him in a Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-306(f) discharge 
proceeding violates the due process guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 6.  Appellant relies on 
Foucha and cases from other jurisdictions in arguing 
that freedom from bodily restraint is a fundamental liberty, and substantive due 
process therefore mandates that the State bear the burden of proof, by clear and 
convincing evidence, in such a discharge proceeding.

[¶19]   The pertinent provisions of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Wyo. Const. art. 
1, § 6 essentially provide that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law.  An individual's liberty interest is not 
absolute:

"[T]he liberty secured by the Constitution of the United 
States to every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right 
in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly free from 
restraint.  
There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily 
subject for the common good.  On any other basis organized society could 
not exist with safety to its members."

Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356-57, 117 S. Ct. 2072, 138 L. Ed. 2d 501 (1997) (quoting Jacobson v. 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26, 25 S. Ct. 358, 49 L. Ed. 643 (1905)).  However, because commitment for any purpose 
"constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process 
protection,'" a state must have "a constitutionally adequate purpose for the 
confinement.'"  
Jones, 463 U.S.  at 361 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425, 99 S. Ct. 1804, 60 L. Ed. 2d 323 (1979) and O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 45 L. Ed. 2d 396 (1975)).

[¶20]   Due process is both procedural and 
substantive.  
Mills v. Reynolds, 807 P.2d 383, 395 (Wyo. 
1991).  The substantive component of due process 
"bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions "regardless of the 
fairness of the procedures used to implement them."'"  Foucha, 504 U.S.  at 80 (quoting 
Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125, 100 S. Ct. 975, 108 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1990)).  See also Michael, 900 P.2d  at 1148.  We have "largely" adopted "the two-tiered 
scrutiny employed by the federal courts in analyzing substantive due process and 
equal protection challenges."  White v. State, 
784 P.2d 1313, 1315 (Wyo. 
1989).

That is, where a statute affects a fundamental interest or 
creates an inherently suspect classification, the court must strictly scrutinize 
that statute to determine if it is necessary to achieve a compelling state 
interest.  
However, if the statute only affects ordinary interests in the economic 
and social welfare area, the court need only determine that it is rationally 
related to a legitimate state objective.

Id. at 1315.3

[¶21]   A judgment of not guilty by reason of 
mental illness or deficiency establishes that the defendant committed "an act 
that constitutes a criminal offense'" and that he committed the act "because of 
a mental illness.'"  
Foucha, 504 U.S.  at 76 (quoting Jones, 463 U.S. at 
363).  In Jones, the 
United States Supreme Court found that the legislature's determination that 
these "findings" were sufficient to justify automatically committing the 
"criminal acquittee" (without first holding a separate civil commitment hearing) 
was not "unreasonable" or unconstitutional; in effect, creating an "inference," 
or presumption, of "continuing" mental illness and dangerousness.  Jones, 463 U.S. at 364-66; Foucha, 504 U.S.  at 
76.  Considering the government's interests in 
treatment and the protection of society, it was constitutional, based on the 
insanity judgment, "to confine [the criminal acquittee] to a mental institution 
until such time as he has regained his sanity or is no longer a danger to 
himself or society.'"  
Foucha, 504 U.S.  at 78 (quoting Jones, 463 U.S. at 
370).  The United States Supreme Court noted, 
however, that the "adequacy of the release standards" was not before it.  Jones, 463 U.S.  at 363, n.11.

[¶22]   The Wyoming legislature has determined 
that once a court, based on the evidence at trial or at a separate hearing, 
finds that a "criminal acquittee" is affected by a mental illness and presents a 
substantial risk of danger to himself or others,4 the "criminal 
acquittee" may be confined at the state hospital or another facility until the 
"criminal acquittee" (if he applies to be discharged) proves by a preponderance 
of the evidence that he is no longer mentally ill or dangerous.  By doing so, the 
legislature has similarly recognized the inference or presumption of continuing 
mental illness and dangerousness, and placed the burden on the "criminal 
acquittee" to rebut it.

[¶23]   Regardless of the applicable level of 
scrutiny, we perceive no difference in the nature or extent of the State's 
interests in treating a "criminal acquittee" and protecting society at the time 
a "criminal acquittee" is initially committed, which the United States Supreme 
Court found constitutionally adequate in Jones and 
Foucha, and a subsequent discharge proceeding 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-306(f); therefore, in light of these 
interests, it is similarly not arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconstitutional to 
require the "criminal acquittee" to rebut the referenced presumption by proving 
he is no longer mentally ill or dangerous.  Our reading of Foucha does not convince us otherwise.  In Foucha, the United States Supreme Court held that 
because Foucha was not mentally ill, the government could no longer detain him 
as an insanity acquittee; at that point, the basis for Foucha's continued 
detention bore no relationship to the purpose for which he was committed.  Instead, due 
process required that another constitutionally acceptable basis be utilized in 
order to continue Foucha's confinement.  The United States Supreme Court did not 
expressly address the constitutionality of which party should bear the burden of 
proof in a "criminal acquittee" discharge proceeding, or what that burden should 
be.  But where 
the basis for confining the "criminal acquittee" remains intact, the state may, 
pursuant to the aforementioned presumption, properly require the "criminal 
acquittee" to prove his eligibility for release.

[¶24]   For these reasons, we conclude that 
requiring a "criminal acquittee" to rebut the inference or presumption of 
continuing mental illness and dangerousness by a preponderance of the evidence 
in a Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-306(f) discharge proceeding does not violate a 
"criminal acquittee's" state or federal due process guarantees.  See also Hartman v. Summers, 878 F. Supp. 1335, 1341-44 
(C.D.Cal. 1995), aff'd, 120 F.3d 157 (9th Cir. 1997); People v. Parrish, 879 P.2d 453, 457 (Colo.App. 1994); Hearne v. United States, 631 A.2d 52, 53-54 (D.C. 1993); Nagel v. State, 262 Ga. 888, 
427 S.E.2d 490, 491-92 (1993), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1006 
(1999); State v. Miller, 84 Hawai'i 
269, 933 P.2d 606, 610-12 (1997); Green v. Commissioner of Mental 
Health and Mental Retardation, 750 A.2d 1265, 1270-72 (Me. 2000); State v. Tooley, 875 S.W.2d 110, 112-14 (Mo. 1994); and State v. Platt, 143 Wash. 2d 242, 19 P.3d 412, 415-17 (2001).

            
Equal Protection

[¶25]   Appellant also asserts that placing the 
burden of proof on him in a Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-306(f) discharge proceeding 
violates his equal protection rights pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 2, 7, 34 and 36.  In particular, 
appellant contends that "civil committees" and "criminal acquittees" are 
similarly situated individuals who are treated differently in that the state 
bears the burden, by clear and convincing evidence, in "civil committee" 
discharge proceedings under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 25-10-118, and the "criminal 
acquittee" bears the burden, by a preponderance of the evidence, in discharge 
proceedings pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-306(f).  According to 
appellant, because one's liberty interest is a fundamental right, we should 
apply strict scrutiny, which requires that the claimed disparate treatment be 
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest.  Appellant further argues that the claimed 
disparate treatment in this case similarly fails to satisfy a rational basis 
review, in which the disparate treatment must bear a rational relationship to a 
legitimate state interest.

[¶26]   The pertinent provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Wyo. Const. art. 1, 
§§ 2, 7, 34 and 36 essentially provide that one is entitled to equal protection 
under the law; in effect, "all persons similarly situated shall be treated 
alike, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed.'"  Allhusen v. State By and Through Wyoming Mental Health 
Professions Licensing Bd., 898 P.2d 878, 884, 885-86 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Small v. State, 689 P.2d 420, 425 (Wyo. 1984) and State v. Freitas, 61 Haw. 262, 602 P.2d 914, 922 (1979)) (articulating Wyoming's equal protection 
analysis).  In 
order to proceed with an equal protection analysis, appellant must first 
demonstrate that "criminal acquittees" and "civil committees" are indeed 
similarly situated, for the Equal Protection Clause "does not require things 
which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were 
the same.'"  
Skinner v. State of Okl. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 540, 62 S. Ct. 1110, 86 L. Ed. 1655 (1942) (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147, 60 S. Ct. 879, 84 L. Ed. 1124 (1940)); see generally Ellett v. State, 883 P.2d 940, 944 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶27]   We find that "criminal acquittees" and 
"civil committees" are not similarly situated individuals for equal protection 
purposes.  In 
Jones, the United States Supreme Court stated that its holding 
"accords with the widely and reasonably held view that insanity acquittees 
constitute a special class that should be treated differently from other 
candidates for commitment."  Jones, 463 U.S.  at 370.  Jones had argued that his initial commitment, 
even as a "criminal acquittee," would be constitutional (based on due process or 
equal protection)5 only if his insanity was first proven by clear 
and convincing evidence.  Id. at 366-67.  The United States Supreme Court responded by 
pointing to "important differences" between "criminal acquittees" and "civil 
committees" that justified the different standards of proof, stating:

The Addington Court expressed particular concern that members of the 
public could be confined on the basis of "some abnormal behavior which might be 
perceived by some as symptomatic of a mental or emotional disorder, but which is 
in fact within a range of conduct that is generally acceptable."  [Addington] 441 U.S., at 426-427.  . . .  In view of this concern, the Court deemed it 
inappropriate to ask the individual "to share equally with society the risk of 
error."  
Addington, 441 U.S. at, 427.  But since automatic commitment under § 
24-301(d)(1) follows only if the acquittee himself advances insanity as a defense and proves that his 
criminal act was a product of his mental illness, there is good reason for 
diminished concern as to the risk of error.  More important, the proof that he committed a 
criminal act as a result of mental illness eliminates the risk that he is being 
committed for mere "idiosyncratic behavior," Addington, 441 U.S. at, 427.  A criminal act by definition is not "within a 
range of conduct that is generally acceptable."  Id., at 426-427.

            
We therefore conclude that concerns critical to our decision in Addington are diminished or absent in the case of insanity 
acquittees.  
Accordingly, there is no reason for adopting the same standard of proof 
in both cases.  
* * *  
The preponderance of the evidence standard comports with due process for 
commitment of insanity acquittees.

Jones, 463 U.S. at 367-68 (footnotes omitted and emphasis in 
original).

[¶28]   The United States Supreme Court has 
recognized "important differences" between "criminal acquittees" and "civil 
committees," and, at the initial commitment stage, has justified treating the 
two classes differently in the burden of proof, which party bears that burden of 
proof, and the resulting inferences once the burden of proof is satisfied.  Considering also 
that a "criminal acquittee" has placed his mental illness at issue, proved it by 
a preponderance of the evidence, and is therefore deemed to have committed a 
criminal act (which implicates a bevy of additional considerations not 
commensurate with those akin to "civil committees"), we find that such 
"important differences" render a "criminal acquittee" dissimilar to a "civil 
committee" for equal protection purposes.  See generally Glatz v. Kort, 807 F.2d 1514, 1522 (10th Cir. 1986); Hartman, 878 F.Supp. at 1345-47; Miller, 933 P.2d at 612-15; Green, 750 A.2d at 1273 (recognizing "good argument" that the two 
groups are not similarly situated for equal protection purposes); and Lidberg v. Steffen, 514 N.W.2d 779, 784 (Minn. 1994) (the appellant's "history of dangerousness and 
his commitment as [mentally ill and dangerous]" mean that he is not similarly 
situated to someone "committed as [mentally ill]").

[¶29]   A plurality of the United States 
Supreme Court in Foucha did find that Louisiana law "discriminates against Foucha 
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."  Foucha, 504 U.S.  at 84-85.  The plurality in Foucha recognized that in Jones, it "established that insanity acquittees may be treated 
differently in some respects from those persons subject to civil commitment, but 
Foucha, who is not now thought to be insane, can no longer be so 
classified."  
Foucha, 504 U.S.  at 85.  Accordingly, Louisiana law, without 
sufficient justification, allowed Foucha to be confined indefinitely based on 
dangerousness alone but did not "provide for similar confinement for other 
classes of persons who have committed criminal acts and who cannot later prove 
they would not be dangerous."  Id.  
Aside from the United States Supreme Court's acknowledgement of its 
holding in Jones, the United States Supreme Court's equal protection 
analysis in Foucha does not impact our holding herein because Louisiana's 
unjustified disparate treatment was not based on Foucha's status as a "criminal 
acquittee"the state conceded that he was no longer mentally ill.

            
Burden of Proof Applied by the District 
Court

[¶30]   Appellant argues that the district 
court misstated the applicable burden of proof, citing the following excerpt 
from the district court's decision letter:

The Court recognizes the heavy burden which Mr. Reiter must 
meet to gain Court acceptance of any release, but such burden is necessary for 
the protection of the public.

According to appellant, this statement is erroneous to a 
degree that we should either remand the case so the district court can 
reconsider the evidence utilizing the preponderance of the evidence standard or 
we should do so in the district court's stead.

[¶31]   The district court was certainly versed 
in the applicable burden of proof.  At the outset of the hearing on appellant's 
discharge application, counsel for appellant raised an issue regarding which 
party bore the burden of proof in that proceeding.  The district court 
ruled that appellant bore the burden of proof "to establish his fitness for 
discharge, and he has to meet that by a preponderance of the evidence."  In its December 17, 
1999, decision letter denying appellant's discharge application, the district 
court stated that it had "reviewed the applicable statutes and the case law on 
the issues presented," and cited the pertinent statutory provisions, including 
that appellant "shall prove by a preponderance of the evidence his fitness for 
discharge.'"  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-306(f).

[¶32]   We are unable to discern from the 
single statement isolated by appellant that the district court misstated or 
otherwise utilized an improper burden of proof.  The isolated statement appears in a paragraph 
detailing appellant's "established history which indicates a strong tendency to 
cease his medication once he is released from medical treatment.  Further, on each 
occasion, his relapse has resulted in increasingly violent criminal 
behavior."  The 
district court then referred to evidence that appellant did not "fit within 
established statistical patterns," that, contrary to the norm, his violent 
behavior increased with age, and concluded that "any inference that [appellant] 
will continue his medication is pure speculation, and such speculation is 
inappropriate given the [appellant's] past history."  In this context, 
the isolated statement would appear merely to refer to appellant's "heavy 
burden" in light of the evidence comprising such an "established history" and 
its resulting implications, rather than stating or applying an entirely 
different standard of proof.  Even if we were inclined to review the 
district court's factual findings according to the preponderance standard, 
appellant does not present any cogent argument, aside from a legal discussion of 
the preponderance standard itself, regarding whether the district court's 
factual findings satisfy the preponderance standard.

[¶33]   The district court's order denying 
appellant's discharge application and denying appellant's declaratory judgment 
motion are affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

  1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-306(e) provides:

Following the first ninety (90) days of commitment 
to the Wyoming state hospital or other designated facility under this section, 
if at any time the head of the facility is of the opinion that the person is no 
longer affected by mental illness or deficiency, or that he no longer presents a 
substantial risk of danger to himself or others, the head of the facility shall 
apply to the court which committed the person for an order of discharge.  The application 
shall be accompanied by a report setting forth the facts supporting the opinion 
of the head of the facility.  Copies of the application and report shall be 
transmitted by the clerk of the court to the district attorney.  If the state 
opposes the recommendation of the head of the facility, the state has the burden 
of proof by a preponderance of the evidence to show that the person continues to 
be affected by mental illness or deficiency and continues to present a 
substantial risk of danger to himself or others and should remain in the custody 
of the designated facility.

  2Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 25-10-110(g) provides that the proposed patient, his counsel, or 
the court under certain circumstances, may request that the initial civil 
commitment hearing be held before a jury.

  3But see United States v. Deters, 143 F.3d 577, 582-84 
(10th Cir. 1998), discussing the United States Supreme 
Court's lack of clarity regarding the level of scrutiny applicable to 
substantive due process issues.

  4Assuming also, of course, that the "criminal acquittee" is 
not suitable for release or supervision.

  5Jones 
argued in the Court of Appeals that the aforementioned District of Columbia Code 
violated his equal protection rights.  The United States Supreme Court noted that in 
Jones' appeal, his equal protection argument duplicated his due process 
argument, and the United States Supreme Court proceeded to analyze the issues 
under due process, because "if the Due Process Clause does not require that an 
insanity acquittee be given the particular procedural safeguards provided in a 
civil-commitment hearing under Addington [441 U.S. 418], then there necessarily is a rational basis for equal protection 
purposes for distinguishing between civil commitment and commitment of insanity 
acquittees."  
Jones, 463 U.S.  at 362, 
n.10.

            
The United States Supreme Court did address one issue based solely on 
Jones' equal protection argument.  According to Jones, equal protection mandated 
that he be provided a jury trial, the same right conferred to "civil 
committees," at the fifty-day discharge proceeding.  Id. at 362, n.10.  The United States Supreme Court stated:

Because we determine that an acquittee's commitment 
is based on the judgment of insanity at the criminal trial, rather than solely 
on the findings at the 50-day hearing . . . the relevant equal protection 
comparison concerns the procedures available at the criminal trial and at a 
civil-commitment hearing.  We therefore agree with the Court of Appeals 
that the absence of a jury at the 50-day hearing "is justified by the fact that 
the acquittee has had a right to a jury determination of his sanity at the time 
of the offense."

Id. at 362-63, n.10 (quoting Jones v. United States, 432 A.2d 364, 373 (D.C. 
1981), cert. granted, 454 U.S. 1141 (1982), aff'd, 463 U.S. 354 (1983).  
In other words, "criminal acquittees" and "civil committees" were not 
treated disparately in that respect.