Case Title: Arbuckle v. Ciccotelli

Citation: 177 Vt. 104, 2004 VT 68, 857 A.2d 324

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2004-07-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Arbuckle v. Ciccotelli (2003-239); 177 Vt. 104; 857 A.2d 324

2004 VT 68

[Filed 30-Jul-2004]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2004 VT 68

                                No. 2003-239

  Brenda E. Arbuckle	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.           	                         Windsor Family Court

  Ernest J. Ciccotelli	                         April Term, 2004

  Amy M. Davenport, J.

  William K. Koppenheffer of Janson & Koppenheffer, Lebanon, New Hampshire,
    for  Plaintiff-Appellee.

  Ernest J. Ciccotelli, Pro Se, Norwich, Defendant-Appellant.

  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Reiber, JJ.

       ¶  1.  AMESTOY, C.J.   Appellant Ernest Ciccotelli appeals pro se
  from the family court's denial of his motion for an emergency modification
  of spousal support, and his motion for a permanent modification of spousal
  support, pursuant to 15 V.S.A. § 758.  Appellant claims that the court
  erred in holding that the family court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to
  modify an award of rehabilitative maintenance when the motion to modify is
  filed after the expiration of the original term.  We affirm. 
   
       ¶  2.  Ernest Ciccotelli and Brenda Arbuckle were divorced by decree
  of the Windsor Family Court on January 26, 1999.  The final order
  incorporated a stipulation signed by the parties and their attorneys,
  making certain provisions with regard to the parties' respective parental
  rights, and the distribution of the marital property.  In relevant part,
  the order awarded the marital home to appellant, making him solely 
  responsible for the home's mortgage and any outstanding obligations for
  maintenance, insurance and taxes on the property.  In consideration of
  Arbuckle's waiving her right to recover any share of the equity in the
  parties' marital home, appellant waived any possible claim against Arbuckle
  for contributions towards appellant's student loan obligations, which
  constitute debts of the marriage.  Arbuckle was obligated to pay appellant
  rehabilitative spousal maintenance in the amount of $600 per month through
  December 1999, "at which time [Arbuckle's] obligation to pay maintenance
  shall be concluded."  It is undisputed that Arbuckle paid spousal
  maintenance according to the terms of the final order, and that the term of
  the spousal maintenance order expired in December of 1999.

       ¶  3.  On January 3, 2003, appellant filed a motion for emergency
  modification of spousal support, and a motion for permanent modification of
  spousal support, pursuant to 15 V.S.A. § 758.  Appellant claimed that his
  inability to find suitable employment to maintain his former standard of
  living and to confront his financial obligations constituted a "real,
  substantial, and unanticipated change of circumstances," see 15 V.S.A. §
  758, that warranted modification of the maintenance award to provide him
  monthly support in the amount of $1500 for five years, or until he found
  employment that would permit him to maintain his former standard of living. 
  Arbuckle's response to appellant's motion maintained that a support order
  cannot be modified or reinstated after the rehabilitative maintenance
  period stated in the final order has expired.  After ordering the parties
  to file legal memoranda in support of their respective positions, the court
  held that the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this case. 
  The court observed that "[t]he weight of authority holds that jurisdiction
  to modify an award of rehabilitative maintenance ends when the term of the
  alimony ends.  The rationale is that otherwise, the finality of divorce
  would be illusory."
   
       ¶  4.  On appeal, appellant claims that the court erred in determining
  that it had no jurisdiction over this case because the family court always
  maintains jurisdiction over its orders, and because 15 V.S.A. § 758
  specifically allows the court to modify maintenance awards.  Appellant
  further argues that the family court's decision is not supported by the
  policy of finality and that finality should, in any case, be balanced by
  all other considerations of equity.

       ¶  5.  In asserting that the court had jurisdiction over the case,
  appellant contends that the Vermont Constitution commands the courts to
  administer justice without limitation, and this obligation should be
  construed to confer a court with continuing jurisdiction over its own
  orders.  See Vt. const. Ch. II, § 28 ("The Courts of Justice shall be open
  for the trial of all causes proper for their cognizance; and justice shall
  be therein impartially administered, without corruption or unnecessary
  delay.").  We find this argument without merit.  The jurisdiction of the
  family court to review its own orders is generally limited by res judicata
  principles.  See  Tudhope v. Riehle, 167 Vt. 174, 177-78,