Case Title: Lobatos v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1994-05-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Lobatos v. State1994 WY 57875 P.2d 716Case Number: 93-174Decided: 05/26/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
Sabino 
LOBATOS,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The 
STATE of Wyoming,

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Representing 
Appellant:

State 
Public Defender Program, Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Deborah 
Cornia, Appellate Counsel, Cheyenne, and Bernard P. Haggerty, 
Laramie.

Representing 
Appellee:

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia L. Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., D. Michael Pauling, 
Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., and Georgia L. Tibbetts, Asst. Atty. Gen., 
Cheyenne.

 

Before 
THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ., and BROWN, J. 
(Retired).

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Following a jury 
conviction for two felony charges of delivery of marijuana within five hundred 
feet of a public school to an individual under the age of eighteen years, 
appellant Sabino Lobatos was sentenced to concurrent terms of two to four years 
in the Wyoming State Penitentiary, fined $1,000, and ordered to compensate the 
Victim's Compensation Fund. Appellant alleges constitutional rights violations 
and insufficient evidence require a reversal of his 
conviction.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant raises 
the following issues:

I. 
Whether trial counsel's deficient performance - including his failure to file 
any pretrial motions - deprived Mr. Lobatos of his state and federal 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, requiring reversal of 
Mr. Lobatos's convictions.

II. 
Whether the circumstantial "other crimes" evidence used by the jury to find Mr. 
Lobatos guilty of count I was constitutionally insufficient 
evidence.

III. 
Whether Mr. Lobatos's absence at arraignment, the jury instruction conference, 
the jury question conference, and a portion of sentencing, constituted 
reversible error.

IV. 
Whether the trial court's failure to advise Mr. Lobatos, on the record, about 
his right to testify constituted reversible error.

V. 
Whether the trial court's issuance of a no-knock search warrant violated Mr. 
Lobatos's state and federal constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable 
search and seizure.

[¶4]      The state 
restated the issues as:

I. 
Was there sufficient evidence to convict appellant on count 
I?

II: 
Was appellant's right to be present satisfied by his presence at all critical 
stages of his trial?

III: 
Did the trial court commit reversible error by failing to obtain an on the 
record waiver by appellant of his right to testify?

IV: 
Was the no-knock search warrant properly issued pursuant to W.S. § 
35-7-1045?

V: 
Did appellant receive effective assistance of counsel?

FACTS

[¶5]      On the mornings 
of December 2 and December 3, 1992, several junior high school students entered 
the basement of an apartment building across the street from their school in 
Gillette, Wyoming. The students frequently congregated in a laundry room of the 
basement to smoke cigarettes. Appellant's apartment adjoined the laundry room. 
Two students testified that on the morning of December 2, 1992, appellant 
entered the laundry room and gave them something which looked like a cigarette 
but which he called a "doobie." The students who smoked it testified it smelled 
differently than cigarettes, had a strong stench and affected them differently 
than cigarette smoking by either giving them a "buzz" or making them feel 
"lightheaded." Three students testified they were in appellant's apartment on 
the morning of December 3, 1992, when he passed around a pipe filled with 
marijuana. Two students smoked from the pipe. One returned to school and visited 
her counselor. The school nurse and the principal of the junior high school 
smelled a heavy smoke odor from the student and after conducting a brief 
evaluation suspected she had used drugs. The Gillette police department was 
called; a detective came to interview the student and also smelled the smoke. 
The detective identified the odor as marijuana and had the student draw a 
picture of the pipe which had been passed around in the apartment. The detective 
then interviewed two other students about the events of the previous two 
mornings while a fellow detective left to get a search warrant for the basement 
apartment.

[¶6]      The search 
warrant the police acquired and executed was a "no-knock" search warrant. A 
junior high student was inside the apartment when the police searched. She later 
testified she too had smoked from the pipe. During the search, police found a 
baggie of leaves and a pipe. Chemical analysis confirmed the contents of the 
pipe and baggie were marijuana. Chemical analysis of the appellant's and two 
students' urine and blood were negative for marijuana use, however. It was 
established at trial that appellant's age was fifty-two years and the apartment 
was located within 500 feet of a public school. Appellant was positively 
identified by fourteen and fifteen-year old students as the one who delivered 
marijuana to them.

[¶7]      During jury 
deliberations, the trial court received two questions from the jury. One asked, 
"[C]an you explain what circumstantial evidence is and how it can or cannot be 
used?" The court's response instructed the jury to reread instruction No. 9 
which was a definition of circumstantial evidence and direct evidence. The other 
jury question and the court's response is discussed in detail in the discussion 
of this opinion.

[¶8]      The jury found 
appellant guilty on both charges, and this appeal 
followed.

DISCUSSION

[¶9]      Conviction for 
unlawful delivery of a controlled substance carries a maximum imprisonment 
penalty of ten years and a maximum fine of $10,000. WYO. STAT. § 
35-7-1031(a)(ii) (1988). However, if the delivery is to a person under eighteen 
who is at least three years junior to the deliverer, WYO. STAT. § 35-7-1036(a) 
(1988) authorizes the penalty under § 35-7-1031(a) to double. WYO. STAT. § 
35-7-1036(b)(i)(A)(I) and (II) (Supp. 1993) further increase the penalties if 
one is convicted of a delivery under § 35-7-1031(a) or § 35-7-1036(a) made 
within 500 feet of school property used primarily for kindergarten through 
twelfth grade education.

INSUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE

[¶10]   Appellant contends the only 
evidence that marijuana was the substance delivered to the students on the 
morning of December 2 was inadmissible and, therefore, the jury improperly 
concluded the state had proven the element of substance identity beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This court's standard for reviewing insufficient evidence 
claims in criminal cases is well established. Bouwkamp v. State, 833 P.2d 486, 493 (Wyo. 1992). We view the evidence and appropriate inferences in the 
light most favorable to the state and determine whether any rational jury could 
have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant violated the statute as 
charged. Id. We do not consider the conflicting evidence of the defendant 
and, as a reviewing court, we do not reweigh the evidence or reexamine the 
credibility of the witnesses. Pisano v. State, 828 P.2d 666, 669 (Wyo. 
1992); Ostrowski v. State, 665 P.2d 471, 481 (Wyo. 1983). Circumstantial 
evidence stands equally with direct evidence and is tested for sufficiency under 
this same standard. Seaton v. State, 811 P.2d 276, 278-79 (Wyo. 1991). 

[¶11]   Appellant recites the events during 
jury deliberations as proof the jury's guilty verdict on count I was based upon 
inadmissible evidence. As already mentioned, the jury asked two questions during 
deliberations. The jury's second question asked, "[A]nd can we use evidence from 
the December 3rd to reach a verdict for December 2nd?" There was no objection 
when the court responded:

Yes, 
you can consider all evidence produced during the trial but you must find beyond 
a reasonable doubt all elements as shown in instruction # 4 * * * including the 
date of occurrence, in order to find the defendant guilty on Count I. If you 
find one or more elements not proved beyond a reasonable doubt as shown in 
instruction # 4, you should find the defendant not guilty on Count 
I.

Appellant 
now claims this instruction was inconsistent with jury instruction No. 8. That 
instruction stated:

The 
defendant has been charged with two separate offenses. It is your duty to 
deliberate upon and decide each of the State's charges separately and 
independently from the other and under no circumstances are you to consider the 
facts and evidence relating to one of the charges in determining the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant on the other charge.

[¶12]   Appellant contends the lack of 
direct evidence of the cigarette's contents and the court's response permitted 
the jury to find him guilty of count I using only the circumstantial evidence 
that he was guilty of count II. He reasons that since this instruction permitted 
the jury to consider the contents of the baggie seized December 3, 1992, to 
determine whether marijuana was in the cigarette delivered December 2, 1992, the 
jury used circumstantial evidence of "other crimes" in violation of WYO.R.EVID. 
404(b) and its verdict was therefore supported by constitutionally insufficient 
evidence. We do not agree with this characterization of events and believe 
appellant misconstrues the operation of Rule 404(b).

[¶13]   The jury instructions are not 
inconsistent with one another, but complementary. As informed by instruction No. 
8, the jury could not assume that the cigarette's contents was marijuana simply 
because the baggie's contents was proven to be marijuana. However, as informed 
by the second instruction, the jury is permitted to consider all of the facts 
and evidence produced during the trial. The jury was also instructed that it was 
proper to consider circumstantial evidence and weigh it equally with direct 
evidence.

[¶14]   While there was no direct evidence 
identifying the contents of the cigarette given to the students on December 2, 
1992, the element of substance identity can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
based upon circumstantial evidence. United States v. Harrell, 737 F.2d 971, 978 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1027, 105 S. Ct. 1392, 
84 L. Ed. 2d 781 (1985). Such a rule is generally followed by courts because it is 
realized that unlawful distribution of a substance, which by its nature is to be 
consumed, should not escape prosecution because the state could not seize a 
sample of the substance. United States v. Schrock, 855 F.2d 327, 334 
(1988).

[¶15]   The trial court correctly 
instructed the jury to consider all of the evidence in its deliberations because 
the evidence was produced in accordance with general evidentiary principles 
which sufficiently allowed the jury to identify the substance beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Schrock, 855 F.2d  at 334; United States v. 
Osgood, 794 F.2d 1087, 1095 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 596, 93 L. Ed. 2d 596; and see, WYO. R.EVID. 402. The jury 
could properly consider the relevance of the contents of the baggie and pipe to 
the question of whether marijuana was delivered to students on both December 2 
and December 3, 1992, in combination with other evidence. The state provided 
testimony that it was appellant who delivered both the cigarette and the pipe to 
the students. Several students testified they had smoked cigarettes for a number 
of years and the smell and effect of the cigarette from appellant was quite 
different. Two students testified the stench of the cigarette was of marijuana, 
they took "hits" off of it, passed it around, and got a "buzz" or "lightheaded." 
Two students with prior experience testified that it was "pot" or "marijuana." 
One student who smoked on both days testified that the odors and physical 
effects were similar. The state provided testimony that chemical tests confirmed 
the baggie held marijuana and students inside the apartment on December 3 
confirmed that appellant knew the location of the baggie and actually accessed 
it.

[¶16]   From this cumulative circumstantial 
evidence the sufficiency of the evidence test is met since the jury could have 
rationally inferred that the substance delivered by appellant on December 2 was 
the same substance seized on December 3. The jury could properly infer from all 
circumstantial evidence that the contents of the cigarette was marijuana. There 
was no use of "character evidence" in violation of WYO.R.EVID. 404(b) and no 
error.

SEARCH 
WARRANT

[¶17]   On three fronts, appellant attacks 
the validity of the search warrant as both constitutionally and statutorily 
inadequate. Because appellant's counsel offered no pretrial motion to suppress 
the evidence gained during the search and no objection to admission at trial, we 
consider appellant's claim under the plain error standard. Porth v. 
State, 868 P.2d 236, 242 (Wyo. 1994). This court determines plain error when 
(1) the record clearly shows the incidents alleged as plain error; (2) appellant 
demonstrates the violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and (3) it is 
shown that a substantial right of the appellant was materially prejudiced. 
Id.

[¶18]   We agree with appellant that the 
record concerning the warrant and affidavit is clear. We disagree that reversal 
is warranted because of clear violations of the constitution's Fourth Amendment 
and WYO. STAT. § 35-7-1045 (1988) and material prejudice to 
appellant.

[¶19]   Appellant complains that counsel 
should have moved to suppress the warrant as invalid because of its no-knock 
provision and because it failed to particularly describe the pipe and marijuana 
seized and failed to state with particularity that appellant would be seized. 
Police obtained an arrest warrant the day following the arrest in order to 
further restrain appellant. We hold that the no-knock provision of the search 
warrant was valid, the item descriptions were adequate, and appellant's seizure 
under the law of warrantless arrests was constitutional.

No 
Knock Warrant

1. 
Constitutional Validity

[¶20]   The state concedes the United 
States Supreme Court decided in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 39-40, 83 S. Ct. 1623, 1632-33, 10 L. Ed. 2d 726, 741-42 (1963) that the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution requires officers executing a search warrant to 
knock and announce their presence and intent before searching a residence unless 
exigent circumstances warrant an unannounced entry.1 Appellee contends these exigent 
circumstances are codified in WYO. STAT. § 35-7-1045(e) and if shown to the 
issuing judge's satisfaction, permit issuance of a no-knock search 
warrant.

[¶21]   The relevant portion of the search 
warrant affidavit presented to the judge stated:

6. 
This warrant is requested pursuant to violation of Wyoming law involving 
controlled substances, the penalty for which is imprisonment for more than one 
(1) year, and the property sought may and, if such notice is given, will be 
easily and quickly disposed of or destroyed. Therefore, affiant requests 
authorization for a no-knock search of said premises.

[¶22]   Appellant claims that a no-knock 
search warrant is constitutionally invalid if it is issued upon the mere 
statement that the search is for drugs which are easily disposed of or 
destroyed. He characterizes this search warrant as so general as to create a 
"blanket rule" approach of no-knock searches whenever drugs are involved. 
Appellant relies on State v. Cleveland, 118 Wis.2d 615, 348 N.W.2d 512, 
519 (1984) for his argument against such a blanket rule. Since appellant filed 
his brief, the Wisconsin Supreme Court overruled Cleveland in State v. 
Stevens, 181 Wis.2d 410, 511 N.W.2d 591 (1994), where the court adopted the 
"blanket-rule" approach whenever there is evidence of drug 
dealing.

[¶23]   However, we do not consider the 
application of these cases since we find that this warrant properly permitted an 
entry without announcement based on the affidavit's contents describing the 
quantity and nature of the property and the circumstances surrounding its 
possession. See Patterson v. State, 691 P.2d 253, 259 (Wyo. 1984) 
(upholding a warrantless search to avoid destruction of evidence). Since we have 
never before considered the issue, we hold that the standard of review in 
considering whether a no-knock search warrant was properly issued is similar to 
our review of whether there was probable cause to issue a search warrant. Just 
as when reviewing probable cause, we shall afford the issuing judge's 
determination great deference upon appeal and the determination must be reviewed 
under a "totality of the circumstances test." Davis v. State, 859 P.2d 89, 94 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶24]   After concluding probable cause 
exists to issue a search warrant, the issuing judge should separately consider 
whether exigent circumstances justify execution of a search warrant without the 
requirement of first knocking and announcing the purpose for the police 
presence. The appropriate test is whether the police information obtained in 
advance shows reasonable cause to believe exigent circumstances as set forth in 
the statute exist which would endanger the successful execution of the warrant. 
2 WAYNE L. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 4.8(d) at 283 (1987). By affidavit, the 
issuing judge must have sufficient information to independently judge whether 
the exigent circumstances described in the statute exist and justify the 
no-knock warrant. Although certainty is not required, the affidavit in support 
of the warrant must include more than bare conclusions or mere suspicions of 
those seeking the warrant. It must include facts sufficient to warrant a 
reasonably prudent and cautious person to believe the exigent circumstances 
existed.

[¶25]   The state justifies the issuance of 
the no-knock search warrant here because the affidavit stated sufficient facts 
to determine the property might be easily disposed of or destroyed. Those facts 
were that marijuana and pipe items were the objects of the search and there were 
three adult males inside who could destroy the evidence. We also note that the 
affidavit stated "the substance . . . was stored in a small plastic 
baggie."

[¶26]   We agree with the state that these 
facts are constitutionally sufficient to permit the issuance of the no-knock 
search warrant. We reject appellant's characterization of the warrant as 
approving a no-knock entry simply because drugs are by their nature amenable to 
ready disposal or destruction. Based on these facts, we do not find that the 
search warrant was issued simply because drugs were the property to be searched 
for and seized. In this case, the search warrant affidavit contained a minimum 
showing of facts which effectively permitted the judge to evaluate whether there 
was reasonable cause to believe that the notice would endanger the successful 
execution of the warrant. Here, the small quantity indicated that the property 
might be easily disposed of or destroyed and the number of people inside made it 
more likely the property could be easily destroyed should the police first knock 
and announce.

[¶27]   The facts above indicate particular 
reasons to reasonably believe in this particular case that evidence would be 
destroyed. There was no constitutional violation.

2. 
Statutory Validity

[¶28]   WYO. STAT. § 35-7-1045(e) 
authorizes execution of a search warrant without notice of an officer's 
authority and purpose under certain circumstances. The statute unambiguously 
states a no-knock warrant may be issued only when the offenses involve 
controlled substance violations which carry a penalty of imprisonment for more 
than one year. Appellant contends the statute is violated in paragraph four of 
the search warrant affidavit because the officer cited the suspected violation 
as WYO. STAT. § 35-7-1031(c), which is misdemeanor possession of controlled 
substances and punishable only by six months of imprisonment. Appellant claims a 
statutory violation warrants suppression of the evidence. 

[¶29]   The state argues that the criminal 
activity description contained in the rest of the affidavit satisfies the 
statute. Since appellant offers no authority or argument why consideration of 
the contents of the affidavit as a whole does not comply with the statute, we do 
not address the issue. We also disagree that had there been a violation, it 
would automatically result in exclusion of the evidence. See United States v. 
Shelton, 742 F. Supp. 1491, 1502 (D.Wyo. 1990).

Description

[¶30]   The Fourth Amendment specifically 
requires that no warrant issue which does not particularly describe the thing to 
be seized. U.S. CONST.AMEND. 4. If the requisite description does not meet the 
constitutional standard, the appropriate remedy is suppression of the evidence 
unless the good faith exception applies. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 3415, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677, 692 (1984). The underlying 
purpose of the particularity requirement is to "[make] general searches under 
them impossible and prevent the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing 
another." Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196, 48 S. Ct. 74, 76, 72 L. Ed. 231, 237 (1927).

[¶31]   The warrant described the evidence 
as "controlled substances and paraphernalia used the use of controlled 
substances." [sic] Courts have routinely upheld similar descriptions of 
contraband that includes narcotic drugs, controlled substances and narcotics 
paraphernalia. United States v. Spears, 965 F.2d 262, 277 (7th Cir. 
1992); People v. Henry, 173 Colo. 523, 482 P.2d 357, 361 (1971); State 
v. O'Campo, 103 Idaho 62, 644 P.2d 985, 988 (1982); State v. 
Williams, 297 S.C. 404, 377 S.E.2d 308, 310 (1989). Such property is 
contraband and the character of contraband makes a more particular description 
unnecessary. People v. Schmidt, 172 Colo. 285, 473 P.2d 698, 700 (1970). 
The concern that an officer not seize the wrong specific property is not present 
with property of the specified character of contraband. Id. This is not 
to say that a general reference to contraband would be sufficiently particular. 
United States v. Morris, 977 F.2d 677, 682 (1st Cir. 1992), cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S. Ct. 1588, 123 L. Ed. 2d 155 (1993) (impermissibly 
broad to authorize seizure of "any other object in violation of the law.") We 
find no error with the description in this case.

Seizure 
of Person

[¶32]   WYO. STAT. § 7-2-103(a)(ii) (1987) 
allows a peace officer to arrest without warrant when the officer has probable 
cause to believe that a felony has been committed and that the person to be 
arrested committed it.2 We have previously held the statute 
does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
Ostrowski, 665 P.2d  at 476 (citing Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 99 S. Ct. 2627, 61 L. Ed. 2d 343 (1979)). There is probable cause to 
arrest without a warrant when the facts and circumstances within the peace 
officer's knowledge came from reasonably trustworthy information and were 
sufficient to warrant a reasonably cautious or prudent person to believe that 
the person arrested had committed an offense. Ostrowski, 665 P.2d  at 476. 
Our review is limited to whether the probable cause was reasonable based upon an 
objective consideration of the record when viewed in a practical, sensible 
manner. Id.

[¶33]   The record indicates the police 
detective had information to cause him to believe that appellant had committed 
three different crimes. He had interviewed students who stated that appellant 
had delivered an illegal substance to minors in a location across the street 
from the school. The students had described appellant, the baggie of drugs and 
the pipe. Based on his training and experience, the detective smelled and 
recognized an odor of marijuana from one student. That same training led to the 
detective's reasonable belief that the grassy substance he found in the baggie 
was marijuana. Further confirmation of probable cause to believe a crime had 
been committed was the presence of a minor inside the apartment when the search 
was executed. There was no error.

RIGHT 
TO TESTIFY

[¶34]   Appellant premises his claim that 
his right to testify was denied upon a portion of the opinion in Sanchez v. 
State, 841 P.2d 85 (Wyo. 1992), where this court suggested that appellate 
review would be assisted by a trial court's asking the defendant out of the 
presence of the jury whether he wanted to testify. This suggestion is not a 
mandatory procedure, and appellant incorrectly asserts that the trial court's 
failure to ask is a denial of the right to testify. Appellant here has the 
burden of proving his right to testify was denied and a minimal burden of 
showing the relevant testimony he would have offered. See, Sanchez, 841 P.2d  at 88. Since appellant fails in proving his right to testify was denied, 
there was no error.

RIGHT 
TO BE PRESENT

[¶35]   Appellant claims he was denied his 
right to be present at the jury instruction conference and the conference to 
determine the trial court's response to two jury questions. Appellant further 
contends that, because of his language deficiency, he was "functionally absent" 
from his arraignment and a portion of his sentencing 
hearing.

[¶36]   There is no right to be present at 
the jury instruction conference or the jury question conference. Article 1, § 10 
of the Wyoming Constitution and the Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution guarantee an accused the right to be present during trial and other 
critical stages of his prosecution. Maupin v. State, 694 P.2d 720, 722 
(Wyo. 1985). This right is incorporated into the Wyoming Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, providing: "The defendant shall be present at the initial appearance, 
at the arraignment, at the time of the plea, at every stage of the trial 
including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the 
imposition of sentence * * *." WYO. R.CRIM.P. 43(a). The defendant's presence, 
however, is not required "[a]t a conference or argument upon a question of law." 
WYO. R.CRIM.P. 43(c)(3). Our review of the record indicates the conferences 
encompassed purely legal issues and, therefore, appellant's presence was not 
required. Dean v. State, 865 P.2d 601, 614 (Wyo. 
1993).

[¶37]   Appellant next argues that, because 
of his language deficiency, he was "functionally absent" from his arraignment 
and a portion of his sentencing hearing. There is no evidence in the record that 
appellant had a language deficiency that inhibited his participation or that he 
was prejudiced by the absence of an interpreter. At arraignment, appellant pled 
"not guilty" to the charges. Before entering his plea, appellant advised the 
court that he could read and understand English. He also advised the court that 
he understood the charges filed against him and the possible penalties that 
could be imposed. Appellant responded appropriately and without hesitation to 
the rest of the court's questions. The sentencing hearing record also reveals 
that appellant had no trouble understanding or 
participating.

EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

[¶38]   Appellant identifies a number of 
acts and omissions by trial counsel to support a claim that his constitutional 
right to effective assistance of counsel was violated. However, unless appellant 
can show that trial counsel's performance was deficient because counsel made 
errors so serious counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed 
appellant by the Sixth Amendment and that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense, there is no violation. Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 145 
(Wyo. 1986) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984)).

[¶39]   Appellant merely lists the acts and 
omissions, labels them as error and does not make the requisite showing of 
prejudice. Other portions of this opinion considered many of the items on the 
list, and no error was found. A review of the record finds no error occurred as 
a result of any of the remaining items listed by appellant. There was no error 
and no prejudice.

[¶40]   Affirmed.

Footnotes

1 Many commentators and a few courts disagree that the Supreme Court 
decision so held. See State v. Stevens, 181 Wis.2d 410, 511 N.W.2d 591, 
593 (1994) (collecting cases and other 
authorities).

2 WYO. STAT. §§ 7-2-102 and 7-2-103 (1987) were amended pursuant to 1993 
WYO. SESS. LAWS, ch. 165 § 1. The amendment was approved March 3, 1993. The 
statute in its entirety now reads:

(a) A peace officer may arrest a person when the officer has a warrant 
commanding that the person be arrested or the officer has reasonable grounds for 
believing that a warrant for the person's arrest has been issued in this state 
or in another jurisdiction.

(b) A peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant 
when:

(i) Any criminal offense is being committed in the officer's presence by 
the person to be arrested;

(ii) The officer has probable cause to believe that a felony has been 
committed and that the person to be arrested has committed it; 
or

(iii) The officer has probable cause to believe that a misdemeanor has 
been committed, that the person to be arrested has committed it and that the 
person, unless immediately arrested:

(A) Will not be apprehended;

(B) May cause injury to himself or others or damage to property; 
or

(C) May destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the 
misdemeanor.

WYO. STAT. § 7-2-102 (Supp. 1993).