Case Title: State v. Wallace

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-04-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE of Arkansas, Office of Child Support
Enforcement v. Tamara Dixon WALLACE

96-663                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered April 21, 1997


1.   Estoppel -- necessary elements -- when estoppel applied
     against State. -- The following four elements are necessary to
     establish estoppel:  (1) the party to be estopped must know
     the facts; (2) the party to be estopped must intend that the
     conduct be acted on or must act so that the party asserting
     the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3)
     the party asserting the estoppel must be ignorant of the
     facts; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must rely on
     the other's conduct and be injured by that reliance; while
     estoppel is not readily available against the state, the
     supreme court has applied the doctrine of estoppel against the
     State where an affirmative misrepresentation by an agent or
     agency of the State has transpired.

2.   Estoppel -- State refused to pursue judgment for arrearage --
     State estopped from obtaining benefits from that judgment. --
     Where the State, through appellant, refused to represent
     appellee in her claim for back child-support payments,
     instructed appellee to hire a private attorney in order to
     seek arrears in support, and she did so and obtained a
     judgment for past support, the State was estopped from
     obtaining any benefits resulting from appellee's judgment for
     arrearage.  
3.   Appeal & error -- appellant's argument without citation of
     authority -- argument failed. -- The State's argument that,
     even though it was estopped from claiming appellee's judgment
     for back support, the State should not be precluded from
     collecting the payments made on that judgment, so long as
     appellee received AFDC benefits, was without merit; the State
     offered no citation of authority in support of its argument.

4.   Appeal & error -- argument not raised below -- argument not
     considered on appeal. -- The State's argument that the weekly
     support payments received by appellee should be considered as
     income and that the State should be allowed to factor in such
     payments when determining appellee's amount of assistance
     under Ark. Code Ann.  20-76-407 (Repl. 1991) was not
     considered on appeal where it was not raised below. 


     Appeal from Mississippi Chancery Court; Ralph Wilson,
Chancellor; affirmed.
     Burrow, Harlan & Childers, by:  Bruce Harlan, for appellant.
     Daniel G. Ritchey, for appellee.

     Tom Glaze, Justice.
     Appellee Tamara Dixon Wallace had a child and later
established her eligibility to receive monetary support from Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC).  To receive that aid,
Wallace assigned to the State Department of Human Services all
child support to which she was entitled.  The State in turn filed
a paternity suit against the child's putative father, Frank Lewis. 
Lewis eventually conceded paternity, and sought custody of the
child.  While the State, through its counsel, continued its
representation to compel Lewis to pay monthly child support, it
refused to defend Wallace against Lewis's requests for custody and
visitation, and would not represent her in seeking past child
support, lying-in expenses, or reimbursement for past medical
costs.  Consequently, Wallace employed private counsel to represent
her regarding the issues the State would not defend against or
pursue.
     The chancellor subsequently found Lewis to be the father of
Wallace's child, and ordered him to pay $42.00 per week in child
support.  The chancellor further entered judgment directing Lewis
to pay $531.40 for lying-in expenses, $365.12 for past medical
expenses, and awarded Wallace $3,320.00 in child-support
arrearages.  Lewis was ordered to pay the arrearage at the rate of
$8.00 per week, which amount would be in addition to his regular
monthly child support.
     The State decided that, under Wallace's assignment of her
support rights, it would collect and retain the $8.00 arrearage
payment along with Lewis's regular support payment.  Wallace
responded by requesting the chancellor to enjoin the State from
claiming and withholding the arrears because the State declined to
seek back child support.  The chancellor agreed with Wallace, and
found the "unique circumstances" in this case precluded the State
from collecting the weekly $8.00 payment.  He further ordered that
all such payments, on arrears, including future payments, should be
paid directly to Wallace, and held the payments would not prejudice
her rights to other AFDC benefits.  The State brings this appeal,
asserting the chancellor's ruling violates state and federal law
and should be reversed.
     Wallace received AFDC assistance as determined under Ark. Code
Ann.  20-76-407 (Repl. 1991), and by accepting such assistance,
she, as a recipient, assigned to the State Department of Human
Services the following:  
          [A]ny rights to child support from any other person
     as the recipient may have (1) in his own behalf or in
     behalf of any other family member for whom the recipient
     is receiving assistance; and (2) accrued at the time of
     such assistance, or any portion thereof, is accepted. 
     See Ark. Code Ann.  20-76-410(c) (Repl. 1991); see also
     42 U.S.C.  602(a)(8)(A)(vi) and (a)(26)(A) (Supp. 1997).
     We agree with the State that  20-76-410(c) and  602(a)
(26)(A) generally provide that DHS is assigned all rights to child-
support payments, including those in arrears, to which an AFDC
recipient is entitled.  However, the issue in the present case is
whether the State is estopped from claiming those back child-
support payments awarded to Wallace because it had refused to
represent her in establishing her claim for arrears.
     The following four elements are necessary to establish
estoppel:  (1) the party to be estopped must know the facts; (2)
the party to be estopped must intend that the conduct be acted on
or must act so that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to
believe it was so intended; (3) the party asserting the estoppel
must be ignorant of the facts; and (4) the party asserting the
estoppel must rely on the other's conduct and be injured by that
reliance.  Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Estate of Lewis, 325
Ark. 20, 922 S.W.2d 712 (1996).  In Lewis, this court recognized
that, while estoppel is not readily available against the State,
our court has applied the doctrine of estoppel against the State
where an affirmative misrepresentation by an agent or agency of the
State has transpired.  See also Foote's Dixie Dandy v. McHenry, 270
Ark. 816,