Case Title: People v. Reese

Citation: 

Docket Number: S230259

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2017-03-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 3/9/17 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S230259 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/8 B253610 
KEITH RYAN REESE, 
) 
 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. TA125272 
 
____________________________________) 
 
The federal Constitution‘s equal protection clause compels the government 
to provide indigent criminal defendants, free of charge, with basic tools for an 
adequate defense that are available for a price to other defendants.  (Britt v. North 
Carolina (1971) 404 U.S. 226, 227 (Britt).)  Both this court and the United States 
Supreme Court have long held that one such tool is access to a transcript of prior 
proceedings.  (Ibid; People v. Hosner (1975) 15 Cal.3d 60 (Hosner).)  In Hosner, 
we held that an indigent criminal defendant facing retrial is presumptively entitled 
to a ―full‖ and ―complete‖ transcript of the prior proceedings.  (Hosner, at pp. 65, 
italics omitted.)  We granted review in this case to consider the Court of Appeal‘s 
holding below that Hosner‘s presumption applies only to transcripts of witness 
testimony and not to transcripts of opening statements and closing arguments.   
We hold that we meant what we said in Hosner:  An indigent defendant 
facing retrial is presumptively entitled to a ―full‖ and ―complete‖ trial transcript –– 
and this entitlement extends to counsel‘s statements.  The trial court and Court of 
 
2 
Appeal therefore erred when they required defendant to demonstrate why a 
transcript of the statements was necessary for his defense.  But we nevertheless 
affirm the judgment of conviction, because we also find the error here was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.    
I.   
Defendant Keith Ryan Reese is an indigent pro se defendant.  He was 
charged with making criminal threats (Penal Code § 422, subd. (a))1, possession of 
a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)), use of a firearm in the commission of 
making criminal threats (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and assault with a firearm (§ 245, 
subd. (a)(2)).  On April 11, 2013, a jury deadlocked on the charges after a five-day 
trial, and the court declared a mistrial.  The court set the retrial for June 6, 2013.   
At a pretrial hearing on April 26, the court granted defendant‘s motion for a 
―complete record of trial transcripts.‖  The court continued the retrial date to June 
10.  On June 6, the defendant received a transcript that included all witness 
testimony from the first trial, but omitted the opening statements and closing 
arguments.  Before trial commenced on June 10, defendant argued that he did not 
receive the ―full set of transcripts which I am entitled to.‖  The trial court 
responded that it had ordered ―all the testimony‖ and that defendant was ―entitled 
only to the testimony given.‖  Defendant argued that he was ―required‖ to have 
transcripts of the opening statements and closing arguments so that he ―won‘t 
make the same mistakes,‖ given that he had a ―small amount of time to study a 
lot.‖  Without hearing from the prosecution, the trial court denied the request and 
the defendant‘s motion for a continuance.  After a three-day trial, the jury found 
                                              
1 
All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code, unless otherwise 
noted.  
 
3 
defendant guilty on all counts.  The trial court then sentenced the defendant to an 
aggregate sentence of 17 years in state prison.  
A divided panel of the Court of Appeal rejected defendant‘s challenge to 
the denial of his request for a transcript of the opening statements and closing 
arguments.  The majority recognized that a defendant facing retrial is 
presumptively entitled to a transcript of the first trial, but held that the presumption 
applies only to witness testimony.  The majority reasoned that a defendant is 
required to demonstrate a need for other portions of the trial transcript, including 
opening statements and closing arguments.  Concluding that defendant failed to 
demonstrate any such need, the majority affirmed the convictions.2  By contrast, 
the dissent argued that Hosner‘s presumption applied to counsel‘s statements as 
well as witness testimony.  Because the prosecution did nothing to rebut Hosner‘s 
presumption, the dissent found federal constitutional error.      
We granted defendant‘s petition for review to determine whether the trial 
court violated his constitutional rights when it denied his request for a transcript of 
the opening statements and closing arguments from his first trial. 
II.   
A. 
The federal Constitution guarantees indigent criminal defendants a free 
transcript of trial proceedings for their defense.  The high court first announced 
this principle in Griffin v. Illinois (1956) 351 U.S. 12 (Griffin), where it concluded 
that refusing to provide indigent defendants with trial transcripts on appeal 
violated equal protection.  (Id. at p. 19.)  The decision was grounded on a 
straightforward principle:  that equal protection bars any distinction between 
                                              
2 
The Court of Appeal did stay defendant‘s sentence for some of the counts 
to avoid violating section 654‘s prohibition on double punishment.  
 
4 
criminal defendants on the basis of their economic means.  (Id. at p. 17.)  Because 
a defendant‘s financial status bears no rational relation to a defendant‘s guilt or the 
need for appellate review, the state could not deny to indigent defendants the 
opportunity for full appellate review that remained available to defendants who 
could afford to purchase a transcript.  (Id. at pp. 18-19.)  The court nonetheless 
found that this principle did not guarantee a complete transcript in all 
circumstances.  Where alternatives to a full transcript suffice to safeguard an 
indigent defendant‘s right to effective appellate review, the state is not required to 
provide a full trial transcript.  (Id. at p. 20.)   
So important is an indigent defendant‘s right to transcripts of prior 
proceedings  that it applies in misdemeanor cases –– even where the defendant is 
sentenced only to a monetary fine.  (Mayer v. City of Chicago (1971) 404 U.S. 
189, 196-197.)  And it applies not only on appeal but where an indigent defendant 
faces retrial.  (Britt, supra, 404 U.S. at p. 227.)  In Britt, the court held that an 
indigent defendant facing retrial has a right to a free transcript of the first trial.  In 
so holding, the court emphasized the importance of two factors that determine 
whether an indigent defendant‘s interest in obtaining a transcript of prior 
proceedings is strong enough to entitle him or her to the transcript:  (1) the value 
of the transcript to the defendant; and (2) the availability of alternative means that 
would fulfill the same functions as a transcript.  (Ibid.)  In elucidating the first 
factor, the court rejected any notion that a defendant is required to demonstrate a 
need for the transcript.  Instead, Britt concluded that courts could ordinarily 
assume that a defendant would benefit from the transcript of an earlier trial.  (Id. at 
p. 228.)  What cannot be assumed –– because of the second factor –– is that an 
indigent defendant is automatically entitled to a transcript of the prior proceeding.  
With the second factor, the court struck a balance that appears calibrated to protect 
defendants‘ interests without imposing unnecessary costs on the government:  
 
5 
defendants are not required to prove the inadequacy of transcript alternatives, but 
neither are they entitled to a transcript of the first trial if the substantial equivalent 
of a transcript exists.  (Id. at p. 230.)  Indeed, because the defendant in Britt 
conceded that such an equivalent existed, the high court affirmed the conviction.  
(Ibid.)   
While Britt established the basic framework for considering an indigent 
defendant‘s claim to the transcripts of a previous trial, the Britt defendant‘s 
concession prevented the court from fully considering what showing would be 
required to overcome the defendant‘s presumption of need for a transcript.  We 
first addressed that issue in Shuford v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 903.  In 
Shuford, we relied on Mayer to hold that, if the defendant is entitled to a transcript, 
the state bears the burden of showing that a mere portion of the trial transcript (or 
a transcript alternative) will suffice.  (Shuford, at p. 907.)  Because the defendant 
in Shuford demonstrated a particularized need for the transcript, however, we had 
no occasion in that case to address the issue raised by Britt‘s statement that a court 
can ordinarily assume that indigent defendants benefit from access to a previous 
trial transcript.  We considered this issue and its relationship to Britt a year later, 
in Hosner.  The question there was whether the ―mere facts‖ of a defendant‘s 
indigence and timely request for a transcript presumptively entitled him to one.  
(Hosner, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 64.)  We answered in the affirmative, holding that 
the federal Constitution‘s equal protection clause presumptively entitles an 
indigent defendant facing retrial to a complete transcript of his first trial.  (Id. at p. 
66.)   
Our holding in Hosner proves important in two respects.  First, Hosner 
established that a defendant need not demonstrate any particular need for the 
transcript, as such a need is presumed.  (Hosner, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 65, fn. 4.)  
Second, Hosner reiterated that a defendant ―is presumed, if he needs a transcript at 
 
6 
all, to need nothing less than a complete transcript.‖  (Id. at p. 66.)  For these 
reasons, the burden is ―on the prosecution to show that the defendant would have 
an effective defense or appeal with anything less than a complete transcript.‖  (Id. 
at p. 65.)  Because the prosecution failed to establish that the available alternatives 
to a full transcript provided for an effective defense,3 we held that the trial court‘s 
denial of the defendant‘s request for the full trial transcript had ―abridged the 
defendant‘s right to the equal protection of the laws.‖  (Hosner, 15 Cal.3d at p. 
62.) 
Given the scope of the equal protection principles we articulated in Shuford 
and Hosner, we need look no further than those cases to decide whether the trial 
court violated defendant‘s equal protection rights in this case.  Before the start of 
the retrial, defendant requested the entire transcript of his first trial — including 
the opening and closing statements.  Because defendant had the benefit of 
Hosner‘s presumption, he was entitled to a full and complete transcript of his first 
trial unless the prosecution ― ‗clearly establish[ed] the contrary.‘ ‖  (Hosner, 
supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 69, quoting People v. Jones (1944) 24 Cal.2d 601, 609.)  
Here  — as the People concede — the prosecution made no showing whatsoever 
that defendant could muster an adequate defense without access to a transcript of 
the opening and closing statements from his first trial.  In fact, the trial court 
denied the request despite the prosecution never addressing defendant‘s request.  
The trial court erred in doing so because the prosecution had done nothing to rebut 
                                              
3 
The prosecution cited the short time period between the first and second 
trials, the fact that defendant had the same attorney for both trials, and the 
availability of an oral transcription of the reporters notes of the first trial.  (Hosner, 
supra, 15 Cal.3d at pp. 68-69.)   
 
7 
the presumption that defendant had a right to nothing less than a full and complete 
transcript of his first trial. 
In contrast, the Court of Appeal read Hosner‘s presumption as applying 
only to transcripts of witness testimony.  This led it to conclude that a defendant 
facing retrial must demonstrate a need for other portions of the trial transcript.  But 
we decline to read Hosner so narrowly, because the constitutional interests at stake 
foreclose any conclusion that Hosner‘s presumption applies only to witness 
testimony.  In the context of criminal adjudication, the equal protection clause 
guarantees an indigent defendant‘s opportunity to mount a similar defense against 
criminal charges as can a wealthy defendant.  (See Griffin, 351 U.S. at p. 17 
[Equal protection safeguards ―the central aim of our entire judicial system — all 
people charged with crime must, so far as the law is concerned, ‗stand on an 
equality before the bar of justice in every American court,‘ ‖ quoting Chambers v. 
Florida (1940) 309 U.S. 227, 241].)  As noted above, Hosner‘s holding is 
grounded in this important equal protection principle.  (See Hosner, supra, 15 
Cal.3d at p. 62.)  It is simply inconsistent with the purpose of this guarantee to 
distinguish between transcripts of witness testimony and transcripts of counsel‘s 
statements — both of which a wealthy defendant is certain to purchase — when 
determining whether Hosner‘s presumption applies.  For this very reason, we said 
nothing in Hosner to suggest that its framework applied only to transcripts of 
witness testimony.  To the contrary — we described the transcript to which the 
defendant was presumptively entitled as a ―full transcript of prior proceedings‖ 
and a ―complete transcript of his first trial,‖ not merely a transcript of witness 
testimony.  (Id. at pp. 65-66, original italics omitted, italics added.)   
In support of the Court of Appeal‘s holding, the People cite the high court‘s 
statement in Britt that the transcript of a previous trial is ―assumed‖ to be valuable 
to a defendant ―in at least two ways: as a discovery device in preparation for trial, 
 
8 
and as a tool at the trial itself for the impeachment of prosecution witnesses.‖  
(Britt, supra, 404 U.S. at p. 228.)  According to the People, it follows from this 
conclusion that opening statements and closing arguments are of lesser importance 
to an indigent defendant because they are not evidence and therefore not 
particularly relevant or even useful for discovery or impeachment purposes.  Yet 
Britt clearly never purported to offer an exhaustive list of the uses of a trial 
transcript, nor did it limit an indigent defendant‘s equal protection interests in the 
transcript of the previous trial.  (Ibid. [―in at least two ways,‖ italics added].)  And 
for good reason.  A transcript is important not solely for its impeachment and 
discovery value, but also for what it conveys about the prosecution‘s theory and 
key arguments.  An attorney equipped with such knowledge will be better able to 
anticipate the prosecution‘s case and devise ways in which to counter it.  Indeed, it 
may not be until a defense attorney reviews the opening statements and closing 
arguments that the prosecution‘s theory emerges.  (See Herring v. New York 
(1975) 422 U.S. 853, 862 [It is only during closing argument that ―counsel for the 
parties are in a position to present their respective versions of the case as a 
whole.‖].)               
  The considerable importance of counsel‘s statements does not imply, 
however, an equivalence for all purposes between such statements and evidence.  
The prosecution remains free, of course, to reference these distinctions when 
attempting to carry its burden of establishing that anything other than a full and 
complete transcript (including opening statements and closing arguments) suffices 
to guarantee the defendant an adequate defense.  We simply hold here that any 
differences between a transcript of witness testimony and that of counsels‘ 
statements do not justify exempting opening statements and closing arguments 
from Hosner‘s presumption of entitlement.  The Court of Appeal erred when it 
held otherwise.    
 
9 
B. 
Having found federal constitutional error, we must decide if it requires 
reversal of defendant‘s conviction.  Most federal constitutional errors are subject 
to harmless error review under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 
(Chapman).  (Washington v. Recuenco (2006) 548 U.S. 212, 218.)  Not so for 
those federal constitutional errors deemed ―structural,‖ which require automatic 
reversal without a demonstration of harm to the defendant.  (Ibid.)  In Hosner, we 
held that the erroneous denial of an indigent defendant‘s motion for a transcript of 
a prior trial was indeed structural error that required automatic reversal.  (Hosner, 
15 Cal.3d at p. 70.)  Defendant argues that this holding requires us to reverse the 
conviction here regardless of harmless error, while the People argue that Hosner‘s 
harmless error holding should be reexamined or, at a minimum, confined to a total 
denial of the right to a previous trial transcript.   
By their very nature, structural errors render a trial fundamentally unfair or 
an unreliable determinant of a defendant‘s guilt or innocence.  (Neder v. United 
States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 9.)  For an error to be structural, it must affect the entire 
―framework within which the trial proceeds.‖  (Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 
U.S. 279, 308, 310 (Fulminante).)  Accordingly, denials of the right to the attorney 
of one‘s choice (United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez (2006) 548 U.S. 140), to an 
unbiased judge (Tumey v. Ohio (1927) 273 U.S. 510), and to a valid reasonable 
doubt instruction (Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275) are all paradigmatic 
examples of structural errors.  By contrast, the high court has defined errors 
susceptible to harmless error review — so-called trial errors —  as errors ―in the 
trial process itself.‖  (Fulminante, at p. 310.)  A prime example is the erroneous 
admission of evidence.  (Ibid.)  
Although the question whether a constitutional violation is structural or trial 
error is generally thought to be categorical, the harmless error status of certain 
 
10 
constitutional violations is neither binary nor fixed.  Certain errors can shift 
between being structural or subject to harmless error review depending on the 
nature and extent of the violation.  An especially apt example is the right to 
counsel, as Hosner explicitly connected the right to previous trial transcripts and 
the right to counsel in its discussion of whether harmless error review was 
possible.  (Hosner, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 70.)  There can be no question, of 
course, that the complete absence of counsel is structural error.  (See Chapman, 
supra, 386 U.S. at p. 23, fn. 8, citing Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335.)  
Notwithstanding this fact, the high court has held that the absence of counsel at a 
critical stage of trial can be subject to harmless error review.  (See Coleman v. 
Alabama (1970) 399 U.S. 1, 10-11 [counsel‘s absence at preliminary hearing 
subject to harmless error review, in a case where state law prohibited prosecution 
from using anything from preliminary hearing at trial].)  Similarly, we have 
applied harmless error analysis to the temporary absence of counsel during trial.  
(See People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 269 [applying Chapman to erroneous 
exclusion of counsel during portion of hearing conducted pursuant to Batson v. 
Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79]; People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 848-850 
[applying Chapman where trial court responded to jury inquiry without consulting 
defense counsel], disapproved on another ground in People v. Cooper (1991) 53 
Cal.3d 771, 836.)  Various other courts have done the same.  (See, e.g., Key v. 
People (Colo. 1994) 865 P.2d 822, 826-827 [applying harmless error review to 
defense attorney‘s absence for scheduling conference with jurors during 
deliberations]; U.S. v. Toliver (3rd Cir. 2003) 330 F.3d 607, 615 [trial court 
responds to jury inquiry without consulting with defense counsel]; Vines v. U.S. 
 
11 
(11th Cir. 1994) 28 F.3d 1123, 1129 [attorney briefly absent during witness 
testimony].)4  So what matters in determining whether certain violations of law in 
the adjudicatory process are fully structural or subject to appropriate harmless 
error review is not only the fact an error occurred, but the nature and extent of it.  
In Hosner, we concluded it was structural error for an indigent defendant to 
suffer the near-total5 denial of a prior trial transcript.  The denial of a transcript, 
we reasoned, ―infects‖ the entire second trial, and an appellate court could only 
―hypothesize‖ what effect the transcript of a previous trial would have on the 
defendant‘s retrial.  (Hosner, 15 Cal.3d at p. 70.)  Moreover, an automatic reversal 
rule was required to ensure that the prosecution had an incentive to challenge –– 
before trial –– the defendant‘s right to a transcript.  (Ibid.)  And the defendant‘s 
right would be undermined by allowing the prosecution to wait until an appeal to 
litigate the need for a transcript ―disguised under the rubric of ‗harmless error.‘ ‖  
(Id. at p. 71, fn. 7.)  At the same time, we reserved decision on whether a rule of 
automatic reversal should apply to the erroneous denial of a request for the 
transcript of other proceedings, such as a hearing on a motion to suppress.  (Ibid.) 
There is no reason for us to depart from Hosner‘s reasoning with respect to 
the total — or all-but-total — denial of the right to a previous trial transcript.  For 
those errors, a reviewing court is in no position to assess the effect of the violation:  
the court cannot know how a second trial might have unfolded had the defendant 
the benefit of the prior trial transcript.  (See Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at pp. 
307-308.)  Access to the transcript of a previous trial could conceivably affect 
                                              
4 
We express no opinion on the specific outcomes in those cases but cite 
them only for the proposition that the absence of counsel can, in some 
circumstances, be subject to harmless error review. 
5 
The defendant in Hosner received the transcript of a portion of his own 
testimony from the previous trial.  (Hosner, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 68.)   
 
12 
every aspect of a retrial, from the trial‘s most granular subtleties to its overall 
course.  Possession of a transcript gives a defendant facing retrial the potential to 
impeach each and every witness called at both trials.  Evidence that initially 
seemed overwhelming might have been successfully rebutted, had the defendant‘s 
attorney anticipated the government‘s theory and prepared to argue against it.  For 
these reasons, denial of the right to an entire transcript affects the ―entire conduct 
of the trial from beginning to end‖ and therefore is not amenable to harmless error 
review on appeal.  (Id. at p. 309.)        
What does not follow from this conclusion is that the erroneous 
withholding of any portion of a previous trial transcript is automatically structural 
error.  On this issue, the Ninth Circuit held that the partial denial of the right to a 
previous trial transcript is subject to harmless error review, and suggested that the 
total denial of the same right would be structural error.  (See Kennedy v. Lockyer 
(9th Cir. 2004) 379 F.3d 1041, 1053.)  We agree.  The wrongful withholding of 
part of a previous transcript does not affect the ―entire conduct of the trial from 
beginning to end‖ and thus defy harmless error review.  (Fulminante, supra, 499 
U.S. at p. 309.)  Rather, when the denial of the right to a previous trial transcript is 
less than total, appellate courts will often have little difficulty conducting harmless 
error review.  If the missing portions of the transcript cover witness testimony, a 
court can consider whether the defense was unable to counter that testimony at the 
retrial (for example by impeaching the witness or witnesses on discrepancies 
between the testimony offered at each trial).  Similarly, if the portion missing is, as 
in this case, counsel‘s statements, a court can determine whether the record 
indicates that the defense attorney failed to anticipate the prosecution‘s overall 
theory or its argument as to a specific dispute.  What we therefore conclude is that 
where a defendant is erroneously denied all — or, as in Hosner, practically all — 
of the previous trial transcript, the error is structural.  But where a defendant is 
 
13 
wrongly denied only portions of the previous trial transcript, the error is amenable 
to harmless error review.    
We must now determine whether the defendant‘s inability to access a part 
of the transcript was harmless in this case.  Federal constitutional errors subject to 
harmless error review are reviewed under Chapman, which requires us to reverse 
the conviction unless the People can demonstrate that the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  (People v. Aranda (2012) 55 Cal.4th 342, 367 
(Aranda).)  To determine whether the People have carried their burden, we 
examine the entire record and must reverse if there is a ― ‗ ―reasonable 
probability‖ ‘ ‖ that the error contributed to the verdict.  (Ibid.)   
In this case, our review of the record convinces us that the error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  The People charged defendant with making 
criminal threats, possession of a firearm by a felon, and assault with a firearm.  
The charges arose out of an incident at the home of defendant‘s mother.  The 
prosecution alleged that defendant‘s mother called 911 and, once officers arrived, 
defendant‘s mother, uncle, and girlfriend all stated that defendant had threatened 
his mother and girlfriend with a firearm.  Both of defendant‘s trials revolved 
around two key disputes.  First, the three witnesses from the scene all recanted 
substantial portions of their earlier statements during their trial testimony.  Second, 
the officers recovered a holster in the mother‘s apartment but did not find any 
firearm despite searching with a gun-sniffing dog. 
Several factors underscore why the error did not contribute to the verdict.  
The prosecution‘s case was straightforward and quite similar at the two trials.  
During his opening statement and closing argument at the first trial, the prosecutor 
argued that the witnesses recanted to protect defendant and that defendant had 
hidden the firearm.  Defendant, by contrast, argued that the officers had lied about 
the witnesses‘ allegations at the scene and that there had never been a gun at all.  
 
14 
The People‘s case during the retrial was not meaningfully different.  The 
prosecutor‘s opening statement at the second trial previewed an identical theory of 
the case and explanation for the discrepancy between the witnesses‘ statements at 
the scene and on the stand.  Each witness again disputed that defendant had 
threatened his mother and girlfriend at the scene.  During closing argument, the 
prosecutor argued once more that the witnesses had recanted their statements to 
protect defendant and that defendant had hidden the gun while officers spoke with 
the witnesses outside the home. 
Moreover, the retrial took place just two months after the initial trial, and 
defendant represented himself both times.  There is no indication that defendant 
failed to anticipate the prosecutor‘s arguments, or that the constitutional violation 
otherwise prejudiced his defense.  Throughout the retrial, defendant drew out 
testimony regarding the two central issues in the case:  the missing firearm, and 
the discrepancies between the witnesses‘ statements.  Simply put, nothing in the 
record suggests that defendant‘s lack of access to the statement transcripts left him 
unaware of the prosecutor‘s theory or the central disputes in the case.       
Defendant argues that a full transcript would have left him better able to 
respond to the government‘s contention that he hid the gun, and he points to two 
moments from the second trial as examples of his claimed disadvantage.  Our 
review of the record persuades us, however, that the withholding of the full 
transcript from the first trial did not prejudice the defense at either moment.  First, 
defendant points to his attempts to compel the presence at trial of Officer Ramirez, 
who had handled the gun-sniffing dog at the scene.  Prior to trial, defendant 
attempted to compel the presence of Officer Ramirez at trial to help establish that 
there was never any gun at the scene.  The officer was on vacation, however, and 
the trial court declined to continue the case until his return.  Defendant argues that 
he would have been able to persuade the trial court to continue the case if he had 
 
15 
possessed a transcript of the statements from the previous trial.  But it is difficult 
to see what extra force the missing transcript portions would have added to 
defendant‘s argument.  It is clear that defendant did not need the statement 
transcripts to understand the significance of Officer Ramirez‘s potential testimony, 
as he argued to the trial court that the testimony would establish that there was 
―nowhere to hide‖ a gun in the mother‘s ―very small apartment.‖  Nor is there a 
reasonable probability that the trial court would have been more likely to grant the 
continuance had defendant pointed to those moments during the prosecution‘s 
arguments when it referenced the hidden gun.  
Second, defendant points to his cross-examination of Officer Azarte, who 
supervised the witnesses outside the apartment.  Defendant argues that he would 
have more effectively cross-examined Officer Azarte regarding the missing gun 
had he possessed a full transcript, but once again it is difficult to see how the 
defense was prejudiced.  As defendant‘s argument for a continuance proves, he 
was aware before trial commenced that the existence of the gun would be an 
important issue.  Officer Azarte‘s direct testimony only further underscored this 
point, as he testified that the responding officers searched for the gun for ―between 
twenty [or] thirty minutes‖ without finding it.  In fact, defendant cross-examined 
Officer Azarte at length regarding the abilities of gun-sniffing dogs, which proves 
that defendant did not need the transcripts of the statements from the previous trial 
to understand the salience of this issue.  There is simply no indication that the 
missing transcript portions left him unable to develop through Officer Azarte his 
theory about the existence of a gun.      
So we are  convinced — beyond a reasonable doubt — that defendant‘s 
lack of access to a transcript of opening statements and closing arguments from his 
first trial did not contribute to the verdict.  (Aranda, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 367.)         
 
 
16 
III.   
A defendant facing retrial is presumptively entitled to a full transcript of the 
previous trial –– including opening and closing statements.  The Court of Appeal‘s 
conclusion to the contrary ignores that transcripts of counsel‘s statements can be 
critical to an indigent defendant‘s ability to mount a defense similar to that 
available to a wealthy defendant.  What a defendant is not entitled to receive, 
however, is automatic reversal for the partial denial of the right to a previous trial 
transcript.  Instead, when — as happened here — defendant is denied only a 
portion of the transcript, the harmless error rule applies.  Because we find the error 
harmless in this case, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Reese 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 240 Cal.App.4th 592 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S230259 
Date Filed: March 9, 2017 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: John T. Doyle 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Esther K. Hong, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Kathleen A. Kenealy, Acting Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., 
Shaw McGahey Webb, Michael R. Johnsen, Nima Razfar and Nathan Guttman, Deputy Attorneys General, 
for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Esther K. Hong 
Law Office of E. Hong Inc. 
1255 West Colton Avenue, Suite 502 
Redlands, CA  92374 
(909) 991-5996 
 
Nathan Guttman 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2390