Case Title: Anne Pasqua, et al. v. Hon. Gerald J. Council, et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-131-04

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2006-03-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Pasqua was ordered to pay $3,400 in child support arrears. She spent fifteen days in jail (in addition to three days she served before her hearing) and was released without making any payment toward arrears that totaled $12,886 as of January 2003. Tolbert was ordered to pay $10,000 in arrears. He spent fifty-six days in jail (in addition to seventeen days he served before his hearing) and was released, apparently without making any payment toward his arrears that totaled $134,700 as of January 2003. Anthony served twenty-four days in jail before he appeared at an enforcement hearing and was released after paying $125 toward his arrears of $49,234. As of January 2003, Anthony remained unable to satisfy his $145 weekly support obligations. In June 2000, Pasqua, Tolbert, and Anthony filed suit in United States District Court seeking relief under 42 U.S.C.A. 1983. They named Judges Council and Forrester as defendants, along with Chief Justice Deborah Poritz and Richard J. Williams, the then Administrative Director of the Courts. The federal court dismissed the action on the ground that it should not intervene in pending state court actions. In February 2003, plaintiffs filed suit in Superior Court, Mercer County. Assignment Judge Linda Feinberg heard the matter. After determining that there were no material facts in dispute, Judge Feinberg heard oral argument and filed a written opinion. Relying on Fourteenth Amendment due process grounds, she held that an indigent child support obligor who faces incarceration is entitled to appointed counsel. In so holding, she distinguished an Appellate Division case that had concluded, on Sixth Amendment grounds, that the right to counsel did not apply to a non-criminal setting such as a child support enforcement hearing. She also concluded that plaintiffs were not entitled to counsel fees, defendants having acted within the scope of their judicial duties, and that funding for attorney representation of indigent obligors rested solely with the Legislature. Both sides to the case appealed to the Appellate Division. In the meantime, the Administrative Office of the Courts issued a protocol implementing Judge Feinberg's rulings. The protocol specifically provided that indigent parents could not be incarcerated to coerce compliance with a child support order. In an unpublished opinion, the Appellate Division reversed, finding Judge Feinberg's decision to be in direct conflict with binding precedent (the Appellate Division case that concluded parents were not entitled to appointed counsel in a child-support hearing context). The Supreme Court granted the petition for certification filed by Pasqua, Tolbert, and Anthony. HELD: The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause mandates the appointment of counsel to assist parents found to be indigent and facing incarceration at child support enforcement hearings. The due process guarantee of the New Jersey Constitution compels the same result . 1. When a parent's arrears amount to at least fourteen days of child support, the Probation Department is required to file a verified statement setting forth the facts that constitute the disobedience of the court's order. The noncompliant parent may be subject to either a criminal contempt proceeding under Rule 1:10-2 or a proceeding in aid of litigants' rights under Rule 1:10-3, or both. In this case, the matters have proceeded civilly under the latter Rule, which is the approach commonly taken for enforcement hearings. (pp. 12-14) 2. The right to assigned counsel under the federal Constitution does not depend solely on whether a case is classified as criminal or civil. The United States Supreme Court has held that "due process" is nothing more than affording fundamental fairness to a litigant in a particular situation. There is a presumption that an indigent litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when he or she may be deprived of physical liberty. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not decided the issue presented in the within matter, several United States Courts of Appeals and many state courts have held that assigned counsel are required for indigent litigants facing incarceration at support enforcement hearings. (pp. 14-19) 3. The Court rejects the contention that a judge can adequately protect an indigent parent by conducting a thorough and searching ability-to-pay hearing. However well intentioned and scrupulously fair a judge may be, when a litigant is threatened with the loss of his or her liberty, process is what matters. Although requiring counsel may complicate court order enforcement proceedings, it protects important constitutional values, including the fairness of our civil justice system. (pp. 19-21) 4. Although the text of the New Jersey Constitution does not contain an express "due process" clause, the Court has found that the right to due process is implicit in Article I, Paragraph 1. In other contexts, the Court has determined that indigent parties are entitled to assigned counsel when facing termination of parental rights, tier classification under Megan's Law, or the imposition of a substantial fine and loss of motor vehicle privileges in municipal court. There is no principled reason why indigent parent facing incarceration for an alleged willful refusal to pay child support should be treated differently. (pp. 22-26) 5. Plaintiffs are not entitled to counsel fees. Judges Council and Forrester were acting within the scope of their jurisdiction and performing functions normally performed by judges. They are immune. Further, neither Chief Justice Poritz nor Director Williams caused plaintiffs to be subjected to the deprivation of their right to appointed counsel. Neither committed or omitted any act -- either in their judicial or administrative capacities -- that can properly be found to trigger counsel fee liability under 1983 of the federal statute. They are absolutely immune on a claim for counsel fees under that statute. (pp. 26-31) 6. In the future, at child support enforcement hearings, all parents charged with violating a court order must be advised of their right to counsel. Those parents facing potential incarceration must be advised of their right to appointed counsel if they are indigent and, on request and verification of indigency, must be afforded counsel. Otherwise incarceration may not be used as an option to coerce compliance with support orders. Those parents arrested on warrants for violating their support orders must be brought before a court as soon as possible, but, in any event, within seventy-two hours of their arrest. (p.32) 7. We realize that unless there is a funding source for the provision of counsel to indigent parents in Rule 1:10-3 proceedings, coercive incarceration will not be an available sanction. We will not use our authority to impress lawyers into service without promise of payment to remedy the constitutional defect in our system. The benefits and burdens of our constitutional system must be borne by society as a whole. In the past, the Legislature has acted responsibly to provide funding to assure the availability of constitutionally mandated counsel to the poor. We trust that the Legislature will address the current issue as well. (pp. 32-33) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED. ASSOCIATE JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, WALLACE, and RIVERA-SOTO join in JUSTICE ALBIN's opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ did not participate. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 131 September Term 2004 ANNE PASQUA, RAY TOLBERT and MICHAEL ANTHONY, individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HON. GERALD J. COUNCIL and HON. F. LEE FORRESTER, individually and in their official capacity as Judges of the Superior Court and on behalf of all Superior Court Judges of the State of New Jersey who have in the past conducted Ability to Pay Hearings or who will in the future conduct Ability to Pay Hearings, HON. DEBORAH PORITZ, individually and in her official capacity as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey and HON. RICHARD J. WILLIAMS, individually and in his official capacity as Administrative Director of the Courts of the State of New Jersey, Defendants-Respondents. Argued October 24, 2005 Decided March 8, 2006 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. David Perry Davis argued the cause for appellants. Patrick DeAlmeida, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents (Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Michael J. Haas, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel). Melville D. Miller, Jr., President, argued the cause for amicus curiae Legal Services of New Jersey. David B. Rubin argued the cause for amicus curiae New Jersey State Bar Association (Stuart A. Hoberman, President, attorney). JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. The right to counsel is among our most precious of constitutional rights because it is the necessary means of securing other fundamental rights. It has long been recognized that the right to a fair trial would be an empty promise without the right to counsel. In this appeal, we must determine whether indigent parents charged with violating child support orders and subject to coercive incarceration at ability-to-pay hearings have a right to appointed counsel. We now hold that our Federal and State Constitutions guarantee that right. [ 42 U.S.C.A. 1988(b) (emphasis added).] As earlier determined, indigent parents at child support enforcement hearings must be advised of their right to appointed counsel. It is undisputed that Judges Council and Forrester omitted to inform plaintiffs of that right. The question remains whether Judges Council and Forrester were acting within their judicial capacities and therefore are shielded by judicial immunity. Judicial immunity has been fashioned for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S. Ct. 1213, 1218, 18 L. Ed. 2d 288, 294 (1967) (internal quotation marks omitted). If judges were personally liable for erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous but vexatious, would provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to provoke such suits. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226-27, 108 S. Ct. 538, 544, 98 L. Ed. 2d 555, 565 (1988). Accordingly, [a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S. Ct. 1099, 1105, 55 L. Ed. 2d 331, 339 (1978) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 351, 20 L. Ed. 646, 651 (1872)). [T]he factors determining whether an act by a judge is a judicial one relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. Id. at 362, 98 S. Ct. at 1107, 55 L. Ed. 2d at 342. In presiding over plaintiffs enforcement proceedings, both defendants were acting within their jurisdiction and performing functions normally performed by judges, despite their failure to inform plaintiffs of their right to appointed counsel. Plaintiffs do not argue that Judges Council and Forrester were not acting in their judicial capacities when they presided at plaintiffs ability-to-pay hearings. Rather, plaintiffs claim that it is the strong policy of New Jersey that prevailing 1983 plaintiffs should be awarded counsel fees and costs. Contrary to plaintiffs suggestion, New Jersey courts must interpret federal statutes, such as 1988(b), consistent with the intent of Congress, not with plaintiffs conception of state policy. Accordingly, Judges Council and Forrester are clothed with judicial immunity. We also find that plaintiffs do not have a 1983 cause of action against Chief Justice Poritz and Director Williams. Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . . [ 42 U.S.C.A. 1983 (emphasis added).] Neither Chief Justice Poritz nor Director Williams cause[d] [plaintiffs] to be subjected to the deprivation of their right to appointed counsel. Indeed, neither committed or omitted any act -- either in their judicial or administrative capacities -- that can properly be found to trigger liability under 1983. Before the commencement of this lawsuit, no rule of court or administrative directive intimated that Superior Court judges should not appoint counsel for indigent parents at child support enforcement hearings. The complaint suggests that Chief Justice Poritz should have adopted a rule or Director Williams should have issued a directive that anticipated the constitutional issue before us and provided counsel for indigent parents at such hearings. Court rules and directives cannot anticipate every constitutional issue that may be raised outside the context of a contested case. Constitutional issues are ordinarily raised, litigated, and resolved in cases before Superior Court judges, and then are subject to appellate review. The Chief Justice and Administrative Director of the Courts cannot be held liable for not forecasting those issues in advance of a party raising them in a contested case. On that basis, Chief Justice Poritz and Director Williams did not violate plaintiffs constitutional right to counsel under 1983. Even if we were to accept plaintiffs claim that those defendants had the obligation of foreseeing the constitutional issue and adopting an anticipatory remedy by way of a court rule or directive, we would find that the failure to do so was a legislative act shielded by legislative immunity. Article VI, Section 2, Paragraph 3 of the New Jersey Constitution invests the Supreme Court with the authority to make rules for the practice and procedure of the courts. Court rules serve the purpose of guiding judges and lawyers in the basic protocols and procedures that apply in our judicial system. The promulgation of a court rule is a legislative act. See Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 731, 734, 100 S. Ct. 1967, 1974, 1976, 64 L. Ed. 2d 641, 653, 655 (1980). Those who draft and promulgate such rules, or omit to do so, are protected by legislative immunity. See id. at 731-34, 100 S. Ct. at 1974-76, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 653-55 (granting legislative immunity in 1983 action to Virginia Supreme Court exercising legislative power in promulgating set of rules governing Virginia State Bar); see also Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877-78 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that justices of Michigan Supreme Court act[] in their legislative capacity in promulgating court rules of practice and procedure). Thus, even if Chief Justice Poritz and Director Williams violated plaintiffs right to counsel by failing to promulgate a court rule or issue an administrative directive, they would be absolutely immune from any liability. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-131 SEPTEMBER TERM 2004 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court ANNE PASQUA, RAY TOLBERT and MICHAEL ANTHONY, individually and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HON. GERALD J. COUNCIL and HON. F. LEE FORRESTER, etc., et al., Defendants-Respondents. DECIDED March 8, 2006 Justice Long PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Albin CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY