Case Title: Rosenblit v. Zimmerman

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-58-99

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2001-02-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Long, J., writing for a unanimous Court. This is a medical malpractice case involving the spoliation of evidence and the remedies available to a plaintiff who uncovers the missing evidence prior to trial. For several months in 1992 Dr. John F. Zimmerman, a chiropractor, treated Erin Rosenblit, a registered nurse, for midback pain. The treatment consisted of neck manipulations that Rosenblit later claimed caused neck pain, headaches, nausea and ringing in her ears. Rosenblit sought the advice of other doctors and, in January 1995, she underwent orthopaedic surgery to correct an instability in her vertebrae. Rosenblit claimed that her midback problems disappeared only after the surgery. In 1995, Rosenblit sued Dr. Zimmerman for medical malpractice and obtained a copy of her medical chart from his office. During discovery, however, Rosenblit was provided with another chart which contained a completely different report. Dr. Zimmerman claimed that the second chart was recopied off the original, which was subsequently destroyed, and any differences were due to his attempt to make the record more complete. Rosenblit subsequently amended her complaint to include counts for spoliation and fraudulent concealment of evidence. The trial court bifurcated the malpractice counts from the spoliation and fraudulent concealment counts. All claims were tried by the same jury, with the malpractice case proceeding first. Rosenblit was not permitted to enter into evidence Dr. Zimmerman's alteration of the medical chart, unless it was to be used to impeach the doctor's credibility. Defense counsel did not call Dr. Zimmerman to the stand and Rosenblit was barred from entering the record alteration into evidence. The malpractice trial proceeded with Rosenblit's original chart being placed into evidence. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Zimmerman in the medical malpractice portion of the trial and in favor of Rosenblit on the issue of fraudulent concealment. The jury awarded Rosenblit $421.75 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages. On remittitur, the punitive damages award was reduced to $150,000. Rosenblit appealed, arguing that the trial court should have permitted her to enter into evidence Dr. Zimmerman's record alterations. Dr. Zimmerman cross-appealed, arguing that Rosenblit had the original unaltered documents at trial and thus suffered no prejudice. The Appellate Division affirmed both decisions in an unpublished per curiam opinion. One judge dissented, concluding that the fraudulent concealment judgment could not be sustained. The Supreme Court granted Rosenblit's petition for certification. Dr. Zimmerman appealed as of right based on the dissent. HELD: Neither a claim for spoliation nor a separate tort action is appropriate where the plaintiff has uncovered defendant's concealment and obtained the original unaltered record prior to trial. However, absent extraordinary circumstances, evidence of intentional alteration or destruction of medical records by a physician accused of malpractice should not be excluded as prejudicial under N.J.R.E. 403. 1. One of several civil remedies for spoliation of records is the spoliation inference, which presumes all things against the destroyer, thus evening the playing field. This inference allows a jury to assume that the spoiled evidence is unfavorable to the destroyer. (Pp. 10-11) 3. A third civil remedy is a separate tort action based on either intentional or negligent spoliation. Some courts have recognized a new tort of intentional spoliation of evidence. Other courts have held that a separate tort remedy is not necessary and that the evidentiary rules, along with adverse inferences, will suffice. Still other courts have held that existing tort principles provide sufficient remedy. New Jersey case law falls under the latter category: i.e., not recognizing a new cause of action, but identifying fraudulent concealment as a pre-existing and adequate tort remedy. The elements needed to establish fraudulent concealment are as follows: (1) that defendants in the fraudulent concealment action had a legal obligation to disclose evidence in connection with an existing or pending litigation; (2) that the evidence was material to the litigation; (3) that plaintiff could not reasonably have obtained access to the evidence from another source; (4) that defendant intentionally withheld, altered or destroyed the evidence with purpose to disrupt the litigation; (5) that plaintiff was damaged in the underlying action by having to rely on an evidential record that did not contain the evidence defendant concealed. (Pp. 12-19) 4. Whether or not a particular civil remedy is available for spoliation of evidence depends upon the point in the litigation process that the concealment or destruction is uncovered. Where the concealment or destruction is uncovered prior to trial, the spoliation inference may be invoked and the injured party may amend his or her complaint to add a count for fraudulent concealment. In such a case, the trial would be bifurcated, with the jury first deciding the underlying cause of action and then deciding if the elements for fraudulent concealment have been established. Finally, the jury is to determine what damages, if any, are appropriate. A separate tort action may be filed where the concealment or destruction is not uncovered until after the litigation or after the litigation has been seriously inhibited. The injured party will then be required to establish the elements of the tort of fraudulent concealment. (Pp. 19-20) 5. Neither the spoliation inference nor a separate tort action is appropriate in this case because Rosenblit not only uncovered the concealment prior to the malpractice trial, but was fortunate enough to have obtained copies of the original records. (Pp. 20-21) 6. The trial court erred in not permitting Rosenblit to present the jury with evidence of Dr. Zimmerman's alteration of her medical records. As a party, Dr. Zimmerman was subject to N.J.R.E. 803(b), which permits a party to enter into evidence a statement made by his or her adversary. Dr. Zimmerman's actions were tantamount to a statement that was evidential against him under that rule. Such evidence could have had a substantial impact in the case and, absent extraordinary circumstances, should not have been excluded as prejudicial under N.J.R.E. 403. (Pp. 21-24) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED for a new trial consistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, VERNIERO, LAVECCHIA and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE LONG'S opinion. ERIN ROSENBLIT, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Respondent, v. JOHN F. ZIMMERMAN, JR., D.C. and HEALTH FIRST CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC, Defendants-Respondents and Cross-Appellants, and JOHN DOES 1-X, unknown defendants fictitiously named, Defendants. Argued September 25, 2000 -- Decided February 26, 2001 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Gary D. Wodlinger argued the cause for appellant and cross-respondent (Lipman, Antonelli, Batt, Dunlap, Wodlinger & Gilson, attorneys; Mr. Wodlinger and Edward A. Lopez, on the briefs). Timothy M. Crammer argued the cause for respondents and cross-appellants (Paarz, Master, Koernig, Crammer, O'Brien, Bishop & Horn, attorneys). The opinion of the Court was delivered by LONG, J. [ 94 N.J. 473, 503-04 (1983) (citing Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64 N.J. 445, 455 (1974); Berman v. Gurwicz, 189 N.J. Super. 89 (Ch.Div. 1981), aff'd, 189 N.J. Super. 49 (App. Div. 1983), certif. den., 94 N.J. 549 (1983)).] Viviano properly denominated the conduct of destruction of litigation evidence as spoliation and, in so doing, cited cases and commentaries that recognized an independent tort remedy for that conduct. Viviano, supra, 251 N.J. Super. at 549-50 (citing County of Solano v. Delancy, 264 Cal. Rptr. 721, 729 (Ct. App. 1989)(review denied and opinion ordered not officially published); James F. Thompson, Comment, Spoliation of Evidence: A Troubling New Tort, 37 U. Kan. L. Rev. 563 (1989); Solum & Marzen, supra, 36 Emory L.J. 1085; Hazen, supra, 718 P. 2d at 463- 64). Adhering to the well established principle that the recognition of a new cause of action is reserved to the Legislature and the Supreme Court, Tynan v. Curzi, 332 N.J. Super 267, 277 (App. Div. 2000), Viviano did not recognize a novel cause of action for spoliation, but identified a pre- existing tort remedy for that conduct: fraudulent concealment. The court held that plaintiff had proven the elements set forth in Ventron. Viviano, supra, 251 N.J. Super. at 549. Those elements have been summarized as follows: (1) that defendants had a legal obligation to disclose the evidence to plaintiff; (2) that the evidence was material to plaintiff's case; (3) that plaintiff could not have readily learned of the concealed information without defendant disclosing it; (4) that defendant intentionally failed to disclose the evidence to plaintiff; and (5) that plaintiff was harmed by relying on the nondisclosure. [Hirsch, supra, 266 N.J. Super. at 238 (emphasis added)(citing Viviano, supra, 251 N.J. Super. at 123).] Although some commentators have interpreted Viviano and its progeny as having created a new tort of intentional spoliation, Adamski, supra, 32 J. Marshall L. Rev. at 332; Maria A. Losavio, Synthesis of Louisiana Law on Spoliation of Evidence-Compared to the Rest of the Country, Did We Handle It Correctly?, 58 La. L. Rev. 837 (1998), we do not read our case law that way. To be sure, Viviano identified intentional spoliation of litigation evidence as wrongful conduct and also identified a tort remedy for that wrong. However, that tort remedy was not novel, but merely an invocation of the previously recognized tort of fraudulent concealment, adapted to address concealment or destruction during or in anticipation of litigation. Gilleski v. Community Med. Ctr.,___ N.J. Super. ___, ___ (App. Div. 2001)(slip. op. at 6)(noting that New Jersey recognizes tort of fraudulent concealment as remedy for spoliation and citing Viviano, supra, 251 N.J. Super. at 123, for the elements it distilled from Ventron, supra, 94 N.J. at 503). We fully approve of that approach. Our only difference with Viviano is in its articulation of the elements of the tort of fraudulent concealment. In our view, a slight modification more aptly describes what must be proved when fraudulent concealment occurs in a litigation context. The elements that must be established by a plaintiff in such a fraudulent concealment action are: (1) That defendant in the fraudulent concealment action had a legal obligation to disclose evidence in connection with an existing or pending litigation; (2) That the evidence was material to the litigation; (3) That plaintiff could not reasonably have obtained access to the evidence from another source; (4) That defendant intentionally withheld, altered or destroyed the evidence with purpose to disrupt the litigation; (5) That plaintiff was damaged in the underlying action by having to rely on an evidential record that did not contain the evidence defendant concealed. We are satisfied that those elements properly reflect the application of fraudulent concealment principles in a litigation setting. We hold that the tort of fraudulent concealment, as adopted, may be invoked as a remedy for spoliation where those elements exist.See footnote 33 Such conduct cannot go undeterred and unpunished and those aggrieved by it should be made whole with compensatory damages and, if the elements of the Punitive Damages Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.12, are met, punitive damages for intentional wrongdoing. D. A party's access to the remedies we have catalogued will depend upon the point in the litigation process that the concealment or destruction is uncovered. If it is revealed in time for the underlying litigation, the spoliation inference may be invoked. In addition, the injured party may amend his or her complaint to add a count for fraudulent concealment. As the trial court realized here, those counts will require bifurcation because the fraudulent concealment remedy depends on the jury's assessment of the underlying cause of action. In that instance, after the jury has returned a verdict in the bifurcated underlying action, it will be required to determine whether the elements of the tort of fraudulent concealment have been established, and, if so, whether damages are warranted. Further, the plaintiff may be awarded discovery sanctions if the court determines that they are justified in light of the outcome in the fraudulent concealment trial. If, however, the spoliation is not discovered until after the underlying action has been lost or otherwise seriously inhibited, the plaintiff may file a separate tort action. In such an action, plaintiff will be required to establish the elements of the tort of fraudulent concealment. To do so, the fundamentals of the underlying litigation will also require exposition. Unless such an action is allowed, a belatedly discovered spoliation claim would be without a meaningful remedy. Obviously the plaintiff in such an action also could recover discovery sanctions if the court determines that they are warranted in light of the jury verdict. NO. A-58/61 ERIN ROSENBLIT, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Respondent, v. JOHN F. ZIMMERMAN, JR., D.C. and HEALTH FIRST CHIROPRACTIC CLINIC, Defendants-Respondents and Cross-Appellants. DECIDED February 26, 2001 Chief Justice Poritz