Case Title: Commonwealth v. Ehiabhi

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12259

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2017-10-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12259 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  MOSES EHIABHI. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 4, 2017. - October 13, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, 
& Cypher, JJ.1 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Assault and Battery on Certain Public 
Officers and Employees.  Constitutional Law, Sentence, 
Separation of powers, Search and seizure.  Practice, 
Criminal, Sentence, Motion to suppress, Instructions to 
jury.  Search and Seizure, Motor vehicle, Impoundment of 
vehicle, Inventory. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on January 13, 2014. 
 
 
A pretrial motion to suppress evidence was heard by Mary K. 
Ames, J.; the cases were tried before Elizabeth M. Fahey, J., 
and the correctness of the sentence was reported by her to the 
Appeals Court. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Zachary Hillman, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Sarah E. Dolven for the defendant. 
                                                          
 
 
1 Justice Hines participated in the deliberation on this 
case prior to her retirement. 
2 
 
 
 
Patrick Levin, Committee for Public Counsel Services, & 
Chauncy B. Wood, for Committee for Public Counsel Services & 
another, amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  This case examines a sentencing scheme that 
punishes the same conduct with different mandatory minimum 
sentences.  See G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (b), (d).  Both subsections 
punish possession with intent to distribute a class B substance, 
but § 32A (b) carries a mandatory minimum sentence of two years 
while § 32A (d) carries a mandatory minimum sentence of three 
and one-half years.  In the law's current form, § 32A (a) 
punishes first-time distribution of any of forty class B 
substances, including phencyclidine (PCP), cocaine, and 
methamphetamine; § 32A (b) punishes subsequent distribution of a 
class B substance; § 32A (c) punishes first-time distribution of 
PCP, cocaine, or methamphetamine; and § 32A (d) punishes 
subsequent distribution of PCP, cocaine, or methamphetamine.  
G. L. c. 94C, § 32A.2  The defendant, Moses Ehiabhi, was charged 
                                                          
 
 
2 In relevant part, G. L. c. 94C, § 32A, provides: 
 
 
"(a) Any person who knowingly or intentionally 
manufactures, distributes, dispenses, or possesses with 
intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense a controlled 
substance in Class B of [§ 31] shall be punished by 
imprisonment in the [S]tate prison for not more than ten 
years, or in a jail or house of correction for not more 
than two and one-half years, or by a fine of not less than 
[$1,000] nor more than [$10,000], or both such fine and 
imprisonment. 
 
 
"(b) Any person convicted of violating this section 
3 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
after one or more prior convictions of manufacturing, 
distributing, dispensing, or possessing with the intent to 
manufacture, distribute or dispense a controlled substance 
as defined by [§ 31] of this chapter under this or any 
other prior law of this jurisdiction or of any offense of 
any other jurisdiction, [F]ederal, [S]tate, or territorial, 
which is the same as or necessarily includes the elements 
of said offense shall be punished by a term of imprisonment 
in the [S]tate prison for not less than [two] nor more than 
ten years.  No sentence imposed under the provisions of 
this section shall be for less than a mandatory minimum 
term of imprisonment of [two] years and a fine of not less 
than [$2,500] nor more than [$25,000] may be imposed but 
not in lieu of the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, 
as established herein. 
 
 
"(c) Any person who knowingly or intentionally 
manufactures, distributes, dispenses or possesses with 
intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense phencyclidine 
or a controlled substance defined in clause (4) of 
paragraph (a) or in clause (2) of paragraph (c) of class B 
of § 31 shall be punished by a term of imprisonment in the 
[S]tate prison for not less than two and one-half nor more 
than ten years or by imprisonment in a jail or house of 
correction for not less than one nor more than two and one-
half years.  No sentence imposed under the provisions of 
this section shall be for less than a mandatory minimum 
term of imprisonment of one year and a fine of not less 
than [$1,000] nor more than [$10,000] may be imposed but 
not in lieu of the mandatory minimum one year term of 
imprisonment, as established herein. 
 
 
"(d) Any person convicted of violating the provisions 
of subsection (c) after one or more prior convictions of 
manufacturing, distributing, dispensing or possessing with 
the intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense a 
controlled substance, as defined in [§ 31] or of any 
offense of any other jurisdiction, either [F]ederal, 
[S]tate or territorial, which is the same as or necessarily 
includes, the elements of said offense, shall be punished 
by a term of imprisonment in the [S]tate prison for not 
less than [three and one-half] nor more than fifteen years 
and a fine of not less than [$2,500] nor more than 
[$25,000] may be imposed but not in lieu of the mandatory 
minimum term of imprisonment, as established herein." 
 
4 
 
 
and convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 
second offense, under § 32A (c) and (d), but the judge, over the 
objection of the Commonwealth, sentenced pursuant to § 32A (a) 
and (b).3 
 
Pursuant to G. L. c. 231, § 111,4 and Mass. R. Crim. P. 34, 
as amended, 442 Mass. 1501 (2004),5 the trial judge reported the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Section 31 defines cocaine as "[c]oca leaves and any salt, 
compound, derivative, or preparation of coca leaves, and any 
salt, compound, derivative, or preparation thereof which is 
chemically equivalent or identical with any of these substances, 
except that the substances shall not include decocainized coca 
leaves or extraction of coca leaves, which extractions do not 
contain cocaine or ecgonine."  G. L. c. 94C, § 31 Class B (a) 
(4). 
 
 
3 The defendant faced three additional charges:  resisting 
arrest, in violation of G. L. c. 268, § 32B; operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of a controlled substance, in 
violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1); and assault and 
battery on a police officer, in violation of G. L. c. 265, 
§ 13D.  The defendant prevailed in his motion for a required 
finding of not guilty as to the charge of resisting arrest; was 
acquitted of the operating while under the influence of 
marijuana charge; and was convicted of assault and battery on a 
police officer. 
 
 
4 General Laws c. 231, § 111, provides in relevant part:  "A 
justice of the [Superior Court] . . . , after verdict or after a 
finding of the facts by the court, may report the case for 
determination by the [A]ppeals [C]ourt." 
 
 
5 In relevant part, Mass. R. Crim. P. 34, as amended, 442 
Mass. 1501 (2004), provides: 
 
 
"If, prior to trial, or, with the consent of the 
defendant, after conviction of the defendant, a question of 
law arises which the trial judge determines is so important 
or doubtful as to require the decision of the Appeals 
Court, the judge may report the case so far as necessary to 
present the question of law arising therein." 
5 
 
 
correctness of her sentencing decision to the Appeals Court, and 
allowed the defendant's motion to stay the sentence pending his 
appeal.  The Commonwealth appeals from both the sentence and the 
stay of sentence.  The defendant also appeals, claiming error in 
the denials of his motion to suppress evidence and his motion 
for a required finding of not guilty on the assault and battery 
charge, and in the jury instruction on self-defense as to that 
charge.  The Appeals Court consolidated the appeals, and we 
transferred the case to this court on our own motion.  For the 
reasons detailed below, we affirm the convictions and remand to 
the Superior Court for resentencing.6 
 
1.  The reported question and the Commonwealth's appeal.  
After the Commonwealth moved for sentencing, the judge asked why 
the Commonwealth had proceeded under the section of the statute 
that provided a harsher minimum mandatory sentence where the 
elements of both sections were identical.  The prosecutor 
explained that her office "typically" indicted cocaine charges 
under the enhanced section because cocaine is "considered a more 
dangerous substance than other items under [c]lass B, such as 
pills."  The prosecutor also justified her pursuit of harsher 
penalties in this case by the fact that the defendant was on 
Federal supervised release for the same crime when he committed 
                                                          
 
 
6 We acknowledge the amicus brief of the Committee for 
Public Counsel Services and the Massachusetts Association of 
Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
6 
 
 
the new offense. 
 
The judge rejected both arguments, concluding that 
ambiguity existed in the conflicting mandatory minimum sentences 
of two years for a repeat distributor of cocaine under § 32A (b) 
and three and one-half years for a repeat distributor of cocaine 
under § 32A (d).  The judge read this conflict to require 
application of the rule of lenity in favor of the less stringent 
sentence, citing Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 387 Mass. 567, 569, 
S.C., 387 Mass. 768 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983); 
United States v. Shaw, 920 F.2d 1225, 1228 (5th Cir.), cert 
denied, 500 U.S. 926 (1991). 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the trial judge erred in 
sentencing the defendant pursuant to G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (b), 
where he had been charged and convicted pursuant to § 32A (d), 
and where the prosecutor retains the discretion to charge under 
either subsection.  The defendant contends that the judge 
properly applied the rule of lenity where the statute is 
ambiguous in its provision of inconsistent penalties for the 
identical offense.  We agree with the Commonwealth that the 
statute is unambiguous, and preserves the prosecutor's 
discretion to choose among its subsections. 
a.  Ambiguity.  The levels of punishment upon conviction of 
possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance are 
determined with reference to which of the five classes of 
7 
 
 
controlled substances the particular controlled substance 
belongs.  G. L. c. 94C, § 31.  "Such disparate sentences embody 
the legislative judgment differentiating certain classes of 
controlled substances as more detrimental to the mind or the 
body than others."  Commonwealth v. Chavis, 415 Mass. 703, 709 
n.9 (1993). 
 
Cocaine is listed as a class B controlled substance, with 
penalties provided at G. L. c. 94C, § 32A.  Section 32A was 
inserted into the General Laws by St. 1980, c. 436, "as part of 
a major revision of the Controlled Substances Act."  
Commonwealth v. Neiman, 396 Mass. 754, 758 (1986).  As 
originally enacted, § 32A had two paragraphs.  Paragraph (a) 
provided a penalty of from one to ten years for first-time 
distribution of a class B substance, without requiring a 
mandatory minimum sentence, and paragraph (b) provided a 
mandatory minimum of three years for subsequent offenses, 
St. 1980, c. 436, § 4, later reduced to two years.  St. 2012, 
c. 192, § 13. 
 
In the years following the enactment of § 32A, the 
Legislature singled out three drugs for harsher punishment than 
other class B substances:  PCP in 1981, St. 1981, c. 522 (adding 
paragraph [c] to impose one-year mandatory minimum sentence for 
distribution of PCP); cocaine in 1988, St. 1988, c. 125, § 1 
(amending paragraph [c] to impose same penalty for distribution 
8 
 
 
of cocaine); and methamphetamine in 1991, St. 1991, c. 391 
(same, for distribution of methamphetamine).  See Commonwealth 
v. Bradley, 35 Mass. App. Ct. 525, 526 n.1 (1993) (discussing 
statutory history of § 32A).  When the Legislature added cocaine 
to paragraph (c), it also inserted paragraph (d), which provided 
a five-year minimum sentence for subsequent offenders "convicted 
of violating the provisions of subsection (c)," St. 1988, c. 
125, §§ 1-2; that minimum was later reduced to three and one-
half years.  St. 2012, c. 192, § 14.  The language of paragraph 
(b) remained unaltered, and continues to apply to "[a]ny person 
convicted of violating this section."  See Bradley, supra (§ 32A 
[b] was "[a] repeat offender provision that applied to all 
offenses outlined in the statute").  Cocaine, as well as PCP and 
methamphetamine, remain among the forty enumerated class B 
substances.  G. L. c. 94C, § 31 Class B 2 (a) (4). 
 
The statutory scheme, when read as a whole and in the 
context of its history, is not ambiguous, and therefore the rule 
of lenity is not applicable.  "It is a fundamental tenet of due 
process that '[n]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty 
or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes.'"  
Gagnon, 387 Mass. at 569, quoting United States v. Batchelder, 
442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979).  "Under the rule of lenity, 'if we 
find that the statute is ambiguous or are unable to ascertain 
the intent of the Legislature, the defendant is entitled to the 
9 
 
 
benefit of any rational doubt.' . . .  'This principle applies 
to sentencing as well as substantive provisions.'"  (Citations 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Richardson, 469 Mass. 248, 254 
(2014). 
 
We have previously rejected the argument that § 32A is 
unconstitutionally void for vagueness, reasoning that "[w]e 
simply see no significant ambiguity in the legislative intent 
expressed in § 32A (a) and § 32A (c)."  Cedeno v. Commonwealth, 
404 Mass. 190, 194 (1989).  We reaffirm the view that "[i]f 
there is a problem in a constitutional sense in the coexistence 
of § 32A (a) and § 32A (c), it does not lie in any uncertainty 
about what those sections mean."  Id. at 196.  For similar 
reasons, the United States Supreme Court upheld two firearm 
statutes that punished the same conduct with different 
sentences.  Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 116, 123 ("The provisions in 
issue . . . unambiguously specify the activity proscribed and 
the penalties available upon conviction. . . .  That this 
particular conduct may violate both [t]itles [of the United 
States Code] does not detract from the notice afforded by each.  
Although the statutes create uncertainty as to which crime may 
be charged and therefore what penalties may be imposed, they do 
so to no greater extent than would a single statute authorizing 
various alternative punishments" [citation omitted]).  Where the 
statute is unambiguous, the rule of lenity is inapposite.  See 
10 
 
 
Richardson, 469 Mass. at 254. 
 
b.  Prosecutorial discretion.  Because we find the rule of 
lenity inoperative here, we proceed to the separation of powers 
challenge.  Verrochi v. Commonwealth, 394 Mass. 633, 638 (1985) 
(construing statute to avoid constitutional difficulties).  
Article 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights forbids 
the legislative and executive branches from exercising powers 
entrusted to the judicial branch if that exercise "restrict[s] 
or abolish[es] a court's inherent powers."  Commonwealth v. 
Cole, 468 Mass. 294, 301 (2014).7  Although "[a]n absolute 
division of the [executive, legislative, and judicial] functions 
is neither possible nor always desirable," Opinion of the 
Justices, 365 Mass. 639, 641 (1974), a statute impermissibly 
allocating a power held by only one branch to another violates 
art. 30.  Cole, supra at 302. 
 
Within these constitutional confines, prosecutors enjoy 
considerable discretion.  See Commonwealth v. Rivas, 466 Mass. 
184, 188 n.4 (2013), quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 75 Mass. 
                                                          
 
 
7 Article 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights 
provides: 
 
 
"In the government of this commonwealth, the 
legislative department shall never exercise the executive 
and judicial powers, or either of them:  the executive 
shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, 
or either of them:  the judicial shall never exercise the 
legislative and executive powers, or either of them:  to 
the end it may be a government of laws and not of men." 
11 
 
 
App. Ct. 903, 906 (2009) ("The Commonwealth retains the 
authority to make the determination in the first instance of the 
offense with which a person in the defendant's circumstance 
should be charged").  Indeed, a prosecutor has the discretion to 
charge a defendant under multiple enhancement statutes, 
retaining that discretion up to the sentencing stage, where, if 
the prosecutor chooses, he or she may file a nolle prosequi on 
all but one charge.  Richardson, 469 Mass. at 254-255.  See 
Bynum v. Commonwealth, 429 Mass. 705, 707 (1999) (§ 32A [d] is 
sentence enhancement provision rather than separate crime).  
Moreover, the decision to prosecute is "particularly ill-suited 
to judicial review."  Commonwealth v. Latimore, 423 Mass. 129, 
136 (1996), quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 
(1985). 
 
Accordingly, a prosecutor does not infringe on the court's 
sentencing power merely by selecting charges from among multiple 
applicable subsections.  See Cedeno, 404 Mass. at 196-197 
("Prosecutors have wide ranges of discretion in deciding whether 
to bring criminal charges and in deciding what specific charges 
to bring").  See also Commonwealth v. Zwickert, 37 Mass. App. 
Ct. 364, 367 (1994) ("the grand jury, having before it evidence 
of the defendant's possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute, might have framed the indictment as possession of a 
[c]lass B substance with intent to distribute, thus exposing the 
12 
 
 
defendant only to the lesser penalty of § 32A [a]); but because 
the indictment identified the Class B substance as cocaine, it 
was a charge under § 32A [c]").  The Batchelder Court similarly 
rejected the concern that legislative overlap had endowed the 
prosecutor with "unfettered" discretion: 
 
"[T]here is no appreciable difference between the 
discretion a prosecutor exercises when deciding whether to 
charge under one of two statutes with different elements 
and the discretion he exercises when choosing one of two 
statutes with identical elements.  In the former situation, 
once he determines that the proof will support conviction 
under either statute, his decision is indistinguishable 
from the one he faces in the latter context." 
 
Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 125.  Compare Cole, 468 Mass. at 304 
(invalidating under art. 30 statute authorizing parole board to 
impose new mandatory sentences). 
 
Section 32A thus does not represent an executive usurpation 
of judicial sentencing powers, but an appropriate exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion.  That discretion, although broad, 
remains constitutionally constrained by the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
 
The equal protection clause prohibits selective enforcement 
"based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or 
other arbitrary classification."  Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 
456 (1962).  To prevail on a claim of selective prosecution, a 
defendant must demonstrate "that a broader class of persons than 
13 
 
 
those prosecuted has violated the law, . . . that failure to 
prosecute was either consistent or deliberate, . . . and that 
the decision not to prosecute was based on impermissible 
classification such as race, religion, or sex" (citations 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Franklin, 376 Mass. 885, 894 (1978).  
Unless the defendant makes that prima facie showing, "we presume 
that criminal arrests and prosecutions are undertaken in good 
faith, without intent to discriminate."  Commonwealth v. King, 
374 Mass. 5, 22 (1977).  At oral argument, the defendant urged 
us to consider the issue of selective prosecution, but did not 
argue it in his brief or present us with a record that would 
allow us to evaluate such a claim. 
 
 The judge's decision not to sentence the defendant 
pursuant to the statutes under which he was properly charged and 
convicted -- § 32A (c) and (d) -- was error. 
 
2.  The defendant's appeal.  a.  Motion to suppress.  After 
an evidentiary hearing, the motion judge found the following 
facts, which we supplement where necessary by uncontroverted 
testimony.  See Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 334, 337 
(2007), S.C., 450 Mass. 818 (2008).  At approximately 2 A.M. on 
June 27, 2013, Boston police Officers Steven Dodd and Andrew 
Hunter were patrolling the Roxbury neighborhood of Boston.8  The 
                                                          
 
 
8 Dodd was the Commonwealth's only witness at the hearing, 
and the motion judge credited his testimony in its entirety.  
14 
 
 
officers were traveling in an unmarked cruiser on Norfolk 
Avenue.  As they approached the Burrell Street intersection, 
Dodd observed a motor vehicle turn onto Norfolk Avenue, veer 
slightly into the opposite lane, and begin traveling in the 
opposite lane on a two-way street.  Dodd activated his lights to 
initiate a traffic stop. 
 
Although Norfolk Avenue is a two-way street, the vehicle 
pulled over to the street's left side.  When Dodd approached, he 
observed the defendant's eyes to be red and glassy, and smelled 
the odor of burnt marijuana.  In initial conversation with the 
defendant, who was driving, Dodd observed the defendant's speech 
to be slurred.  A female passenger, not wearing a seat belt, 
also appeared impaired.  Dodd further observed on the front 
center console a plastic soda bottle containing a rolled-up 
sandwich bag. 
 
Upon request, the defendant produced a valid driver's 
license and an expired rental agreement for the motor vehicle.9  
When Dodd asked whether anyone had been smoking marijuana, the 
passenger responded that they had been smoking before leaving 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
The defendant's only witness was his father.  The judge made no 
credibility findings about the father. 
 
 
9 The one-week rental agreement was dated June 4, 2013.  
Therefore, by the time of the traffic stop, the vehicle should 
have been returned at least two weeks earlier.  The motion judge 
did not credit testimony to the effect that the defendant had 
extended the agreement by telephone, where he produced no 
documentation in support of the claim. 
15 
 
 
Burrell Street.  The passenger produced a Massachusetts 
identification card but no driver's license, and was cited for 
failure to wear a seat belt. 
 
In the course of this preliminary investigation, Dodd 
formed the opinion that the defendant was operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of marijuana, and that his 
driving was impaired as a result.  Dodd concluded that he would 
not permit the defendant to resume operation of the vehicle, 
because he determined that to do so would create a danger to the 
public.  Without having yet decided whether he would make an 
arrest, Dodd ordered the defendant out of the vehicle in order 
to further assess his intoxication level.  No field sobriety 
tests were performed. 
 
At this time, Dodd also decided to have the vehicle towed 
and impounded for safekeeping.  He deemed the tow necessary 
because neither the defendant nor the passenger could safely 
operate the vehicle; the expired rental agreement created some 
question whether the defendant had lawful authority to operate 
the vehicle; and leaving the vehicle unattended in the stop's 
location could have left it vulnerable to larceny, given the 
known prevalence of break-ins in the area. 
 
When the defendant stepped out of the vehicle, Dodd 
observed him to be approximately six feet, five inches tall and 
300 pounds.  Dodd asked the defendant to step to the rear of the 
16 
 
 
vehicle for a patfrisk, which yielded nothing.  Dodd then 
informed the defendant that the officers would begin an 
inventory search of the vehicle. 
 
By this time, Boston police Sergeant Paul Quinn had arrived 
on scene to assist.  Dodd observed in the passenger's open purse 
a glass pipe, which he knew to be used in the smoking of 
marijuana.  He also saw in the purse a box of sandwich bags of 
the kind used in street-level drug distribution.  Inside the 
box, officers found a thumbtack, which they knew to be used to 
break off pieces of "crack" cocaine; they also observed a white 
residue on the tack's metal point. 
 
As Dodd and Quinn performed the search, Hunter stood with 
the defendant.  Through the silky material of the defendant's 
shirt, Hunter perceived several bumps protruding from the front 
shirt pocket.  When Hunter asked the defendant what they were, 
the defendant shoved Hunter and ran from the scene.  All three 
officers gave chase, shouting the command to stop. 
 
Crossing Norfolk Avenue, the defendant approached a field.  
The officers observed him reach into his pocket and throw items 
on the ground before they were able to overtake him in the 
field.  As they attempted to handcuff the defendant, he ignored 
orders to comply, pushed Hunter away, and kept one hand 
underneath his body.  During this struggle, the defendant spat 
from his mouth a small, knotted plastic bag containing crack 
17 
 
 
cocaine.  Dodd struck the defendant's face while holding a 
flashlight, and the blow lacerated the defendant's nose and 
subdued him such that the officers were able to handcuff and 
arrest him. 
 
Retracing their steps along the path of flight, officers 
later recovered keys to the defendant's vehicle and seventeen 
bags of crack cocaine.  These small bags were distinctively 
knotted like the one the defendant had spat from his mouth, and 
consistent with the packaging officers knew to be used in 
street-level sales.  A close-up photograph of the defendant at 
booking revealed glassy eyes and an intoxicated appearance 
consistent with Dodd's initial impression. 
 
The motion judge denied the defendant's motion to suppress, 
concluding that the officers had reasonable suspicion for the 
traffic stop and probable cause to arrest the defendant for 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence; the search 
of the vehicle was a lawful inventory search; it was properly 
conducted within the scope of the Boston police motor vehicle 
inventory search policy; and the bags of crack cocaine were 
properly seized as abandoned by the defendant. 
 
The defendant challenges the denial of his motion to 
suppress, arguing that the evidence was obtained in violation of 
his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
18 
 
 
Rights.  Specifically, he contends that the inventory search was 
pretextual and investigatory, and that any evidence subsequently 
seized is thus fruit of the poisonous tree.10,11  In reviewing a 
ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept the judge's findings 
of fact absent clear error, but review independently the judge's 
ultimate findings and conclusions of law.  Commonwealth v. 
Campbell, 475 Mass. 611, 615 (2016). 
 
Although a well-established exception to the warrant 
requirement, an inventory search must hew closely to written 
police procedures and may not conceal an investigatory motive.  
See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976); 
Commonwealth v. Rostad, 410 Mass. 618, 620 (1991).  The 
lawfulness of an inventory search turns on the threshold 
propriety of the vehicle's impoundment, and the Commonwealth 
bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of both.  See 
                                                          
 
 
10 The defendant does not contest that police had reasonable 
suspicion for the initial traffic stop.  "Erratic" driving that 
violates the civil motor vehicle code may give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion that a driver is impaired, permitting an 
investigatory stop.  Commonwealth v. Daniel, 464 Mass. 746, 756 
(2013).  The motion judge explicitly credited the entirety of 
Officer Dodd's testimony, which included observations of the 
defendant's vehicle traveling on the wrong side of Norfolk 
Avenue.  It was 2 A.M., and police reasonably suspected driver 
impairment.  Id. 
 
 
11 The defendant also contends that the police lacked 
reasonable suspicion for the exit order and patfrisk.  Because 
the patfrisk yielded no evidence, and because the determination 
to inventory the vehicle coincided with the exit order and 
preceded the patfrisk, we do not address this argument. 
19 
 
 
Commonwealth v. Eddington, 459 Mass. 102, 108 (2011); 
Commonwealth v. Ellerbe, 430 Mass. 769, 772-774 (2000). 
 
We have recognized three separate interests protected by 
warrantless inventory searches:  "the protection of the vehicle 
and its contents; the protection of the police and the tow 
company from false charges; and the protection of the public 
from the dangerous items which might be in the vehicle."  
Eddington, 459 Mass. at 108-109, quoting Commonwealth v. Garcia, 
409 Mass. 675, 682 (1991).  Against this backdrop, "[t]he 
impoundment of a vehicle for noninvestigatory reasons is 
generally justified if supported by public safety concerns or by 
the danger of theft or vandalism to a vehicle left unattended."  
Eddington, supra at 108, quoting Commonwealth v. Brinson, 440 
Mass. 609, 612 (2003). 
 
Boston police department rule 103, § 31, provides for 
disposition of a vehicle in one of four ways: 
"1.  leave it with a person having apparent authority to 
assume control of it; or 
 
"2.  park it legally, close the windows, lock it, if 
possible, and attempt to notify the registered owner; or 
 
"3.  leave it at the side of the road with windows closed 
and locked, if possible, if traffic is not obstructed and 
arrangements can be made for its removal without undue 
delay; or   
 
"4.  have it towed for safekeeping." 
 
The department's motor vehicle inventory search policy further 
20 
 
 
provides:  "A vehicle will be disposed of in the manner 
authorized in paragraph 4, when there is a danger to public 
safety; a danger to the vehicle being left unattended; a danger 
of theft or vandalism; or the possibility of false claims 
exists.  Therefore, an [i]nventory [s]earch will be performed." 
 
Because officers had determined that neither the defendant 
nor the passenger could safely operate the vehicle, the first 
option was unavailable.  Similarly, neither the second nor the 
third option was viable given the circumstances.  See Eddington, 
459 Mass. at 110 (impoundment and inventory search of vehicle 
parked on public street and vulnerable to larceny was 
reasonable, where defendant had been arrested and passenger was 
intoxicated).  See also Ellerbe, 430 Mass. at 775-776 (same, 
where defendant arrested and passenger not in possession of 
driver's license).  Contrast Commonwealth v. Oliveira, 474 Mass. 
10, 15-16 (2016) (impoundment unreasonable where vehicle could 
safely be left in parking lot for owner's retrieval). 
 
We entrust credibility determinations to the motion judge, 
Commonwealth v. Yesilciman, 406 Mass. 736, 743 (1990), and 
discern no error in her finding that the inventory search was 
not pretextual.  Because the impoundment and attendant inventory 
search were reasonable in scope and complied with written 
policy, no basis exists for the defendant's argument that the 
21 
 
 
evidence later seized was fruit of the poisonous tree.12 
 
b.  Motion for required finding of not guilty on assault 
and battery charge.  The evidence at trial was substantially the 
same as at the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, 
augmented by the testimony of Officer Hunter and Sergeant Quinn, 
Boston police Officer Robert England, the defendant, and the 
defendant's father.13  The defendant argues that his motion for a 
required finding of not guilty on the charge of assault and 
battery on a police officer should have been allowed.  In 
reviewing the denial of a motion for a required finding of not 
guilty, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth.  Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 
(1979).  The defendant asks instead that we credit his testimony 
on self-defense.  Because this view improperly casts the 
                                                          
 
 
12 Where we conclude that the judge correctly denied the 
motion to suppress, we need not address the Commonwealth's 
challenge to the stay of the sentence, which was based on the 
sentencing judge's evaluation of the likelihood that the 
defendant would prevail on appeal regarding the motion to 
suppress.  We note, however, that the judge erred in evaluating 
the likelihood of success of the appeal regarding the denial of 
the motion to suppress by relying on the evidence presented at 
trial, rather than the evidence presented at the motion to 
suppress hearing.  See Commonwealth v. Grandison, 433 Mass. 135, 
137 (2001) (when reviewing motion to suppress after trial, judge 
is limited to considering testimony at hearing on motion to 
suppress). 
 
 
13 England did not investigate the defendant's case, instead 
testifying as a drug expert that eighteen individually packaged 
bags of crack cocaine were unlikely to have been for personal 
use. 
22 
 
 
evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, we 
decline to adopt it.  Hrycenko v. Commonwealth, 459 Mass. 503, 
510-511 (2011).  Viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, Officer Hunter's testimony that the defendant 
pushed him after he asked about the bumps in the defendant's 
shirt pocket was sufficient to support the conviction of assault 
and battery on a police officer.  See Commonwealth v. Deane, 458 
Mass. 43, 52 (2010) (motion for required finding properly denied 
where sufficient evidence supported jury's rejection of 
defendant's version of events). 
 
c.  Self-defense instruction.  Finally, the defendant 
argues that his conviction of assault and battery on a police 
officer must be reversed because the jury instructions on self-
defense impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to him.  Where 
the defendant raised no objection below, we review for a 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  Commonwealth v. 
King, 460 Mass. 80, 85 (2011). 
 
Here, the judge instructed to the effect that, if the jury 
believed the defendant's testimony that police pushed him first, 
the Commonwealth bore the burden of proving the absence of self-
defense beyond a reasonable doubt.14  She did not define 
                                                          
 
 
14 Specifically, the judge instructed as follows: 
 
 
"Ladies and gentlemen, there's one additional point I 
want to make on the charge of assault and battery on a 
23 
 
 
reasonable self-defense, and the parties agree that her 
instructions were thus incomplete. 
 
"Where there is an erroneous jury instruction we review the 
entire charge to the jury to determine the interpretation a 
reasonable jury would place on the judge's words."  King, 460 
Mass. at 85.  The instruction here, although erroneously 
incomplete, did not prejudice the defendant by impermissibly 
shifting the Commonwealth's burden to him.  Instead, the judge's 
prefatory language offered context for the instructions that 
proceeded twice to state the correct burden of proof.  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Mejia, 407 Mass. 493, 494-496 (1990) 
(instruction that defendant had to show he had been assaulted as 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
police officer.  I've told you that the second element is 
that the defendant intended to touch and that the third 
element is that the touching was either likely to cause 
bodily harm to Officer Hunter or was done without his 
consent. 
 
 
"You have heard some testimony that the touching by 
[the defendant] came after Officer Hunter pushed him.  If 
you believe that testimony, you may consider whether or not 
[the defendant] acted in reasonable self-defense. 
 
 
"So, if you find that the first pushing was done by 
Officer Hunter and that [the defendant's] response was 
reasonable self-defense, it is up to the Commonwealth to 
prove the absence of reasonable self-defense beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
 
 
"So, if you believe that Officer Hunter pushed first, 
and any response by the defense was reasonable, the 
Commonwealth is obligated to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt the absence of reasonable self-defense on the part of 
[the defendant]." 
24 
 
 
"precondition to assert[ing] the defense of self-defense" was 
prejudicial error); Commonwealth v. Harrington, 379 Mass. 446, 
454-455 (1980) (instruction that "[s]elf-defense is available to 
a defendant only under [certain] circumstances" and is never 
"available" to aggressor was prejudicial error).  Here, the jury 
would have considered reasonable self-defense only if they first 
believed the defendant's version of events ("If you believe that 
testimony, you may consider whether or not [the defendant] acted 
in reasonable self-defense"), which they were free to discredit.  
This instruction created no substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, the denials of 
the motion to suppress and motion for a required finding of not 
guilty are affirmed.  The defendant's convictions are also 
affirmed, but we remand to the Superior Court for resentencing 
on the counts of possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute, pursuant to G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (c) and (d). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.