Case Title: State v. Plante

Citation: 164 Vt 350, 668 A.2d 674

Docket Number: 94-053

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1995-11-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE_V_PLANTE.94-053; 164 Vt 350; 668 A.2d 674

[Filed 03-Nov-1995]


  NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the
  Vermont Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of
  Decisions, Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier,
  Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in order that corrections may be
  made before this opinion goes to press.


                             No. 94-053


State of Vermont                            Supreme Court

                                            On Appeal from
       v.
                                            District Court of Vermont,
                                            Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit

Robert Plante                               September Term, 1995


Paul F. Hudson, J.

Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and David Tartter, Assistant
Attorney General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

Charles S. Martin of Martin & Paolini, Barre, for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       ALLEN, C.J.  Defendant Robert Plante appeals his felony-murder
  conviction following a jury trial.  We affirm.

       On May 31, 1992, Glenn Michelson and Steven Zargo hosted a Memorial
  Day party at Michelson's residence on Baker Brook Road near Williamsville,
  Vermont.  Defendant met Michelson for the first time at a mutual friend's
  house that afternoon, and Michelson invited defendant to the party. 
  Defendant's behavior while at the party was abrupt and confrontational.  He
  made unwanted advances toward a woman at the party, ridiculed and
  challenged a stroke victim because of his inability to use one of his arms,
  and attempted to take without permission Michelson's car, leather jacket,
  and keg of beer.  Michelson intervened in most of these 

  

  instances.

       At eleven o'clock, the only people remaining were defendant,
  Michelson, Zargo, Christopher Lapan, William Dorton, and Bart Stacey, who
  was upstairs asleep.  At approximately 11:30 p.m., Zargo, Lapan, and Dorton
  decided to go to a pub in town.  These three told defendant he could not go
  along because he had no money.  Defendant again attempted to drive away in
  Michelson's car without permission.  Michelson took the keys away from him
  and went back into the house.  Defendant then started walking down the
  driveway.

       A neighbor of Michelson's watched three people depart from Michelson's
  home at about 11:30 p.m.  Shortly thereafter, he heard loud and
  argumentative voices coming from the house, and a few moments later saw
  Michelson's car speeding down Baker Brook Road.  Another neighbor heard and
  saw much the same events.

       Shortly before midnight, Robert and Kathleen Salzman, who live about a
  mile down Baker Brook Road, heard a car skid and crash in front of their
  house.  Mr. Salzman went to see what had happened and encountered defendant
  walking towards him.  After a brief exchange, defendant became excited and
  unruly.  Salzman returned to his house and called the State Police.  Before
  the police arrived, defendant smashed through a window on Salzman's porch. 
  At that point, Salzman removed defendant from the porch.  Defendant then
  left the Salzman home.

       Shortly thereafter, the police arrived at Salzman's and began
  searching for defendant in the surrounding area.  At about the same time,
  Zargo, Lapan, and Dorton returned to the Michelson residence.  When they
  entered, they discovered Michelson's body in the hallway with a ski pole
  impaled in his neck.  They called the police and went upstairs to see if
  Stacey had met the same fate.  The police, who were still at the Salzman
  residence, responded to the call from 

  

  the Michelson residence.  Upon entering Michelson's house, the police
  discovered Michelson in the hallway lying in a pool of blood.  Next to him
  lay defendant's shoes.  In addition, they found two knives in the kitchen
  sink, a meat cleaver in one of the closets, and a knife stuck in the wall.  
  
       The police then resumed their search for defendant and found him lying
  in the woods by Baker Brook Road near the Salzman home.  He was apprehended
  and found to be wearing Michelson's boots and leather jacket.  In addition,
  there was blood on his hands and clothing.

       The state police laboratory conducted blood-typing analyses on blood
  samples taken from the scene and from defendant's clothing, and from
  Michelson, Zargo, and defendant.  The analyses reported the type of blood
  in each sample, and screened for erythrocytes, acid, and phosphatase (EAP). 
  EAP testing shows genetic "fingerprints" in blood, and provides greater
  accuracy than simple typing alone.  The tests were performed between June
  1992 and October 12, 1992.  The results of these tests indicated that the
  blood found on clothing worn by defendant matched that of the deceased.

       The State's chemist who performed these tests and testified at trial
  about the results was discharged several months after the tests were
  completed when drugs were discovered missing from the police laboratory and
  hair sampling indicated his usage of the missing drugs.  The chemist had,
  by the time of trial, accepted a plea bargain and received a deferred
  sentence for possession of Fentanyl on October 21, 1992.

       A jury convicted defendant of felony murder, unlawful trespass, simple
  assault, and unlawful mischief.  On appeal, defendant raises three issues. 
  First, he challenges the district court's refusal to allow him to
  cross-examine the State's chemist after the chemist invoked his 

  

  Fifth Amendment self-incrimination privilege.  Second, he challenges
  the admission of a statement allegedly made by him on the grounds that it
  violates V.R.E. 403 and V.R.E. 404(b).  Third, he contends that the
  district court committed plain error when it instructed the jury on the
  necessary mental state required for the intent element of felony murder.
  
                              I.

       Defendant argues that the district court's refusal to allow him to
  cross-examine the chemist violated his right to confrontation.  He contends
  that the district court should have allowed the cross-examination because
  (1) the chemist's plea agreement had removed the threat of
  self-incrimination, (2) the court could have granted the chemist immunity,
  and (3) the exclusionary rule protects the chemist from having any
  testimony used against him in future criminal proceedings.  

       The privilege against self-incrimination allows a witness to refuse to
  testify where the testimony could be used as evidence in subsequent
  prosecutions.  Heaton Hosp., Inc. v. Emrick, 128 Vt. 405, 407,