Case Title: Forbis v. Fremont County School Dist. No. 38

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-12-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Forbis v. Fremont County School Dist. No. 381992 WY 164842 P.2d 1063Case Number: 92-104Decided: 12/03/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
PEGGY D. FORBIS, 
Appellant (Plaintiff)

 
 
v.

 
 

FREMONT COUNTY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT NO. 38,  Appellee 
(Defendant).

 
 
William L. Miller of 
Miller & Fasse, P.C., Riverton, for Appellant.

 

Rebecca Lewis of Hirst 
& Applegate, Cheyenne; and Charles E. Graves of Graves, Santini & 
Villemez, P.C., Cheyenne, for Appellee.

 
 
Before THOMAS, 
CARDINE, URBIGKIT, and GOLDEN, JJ., and ROONEY, Ret. J. 

 
 
ROONEY, Justice 
(Retired).

 
 

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
the denial of appellant's Motion for a Partial Summary Judgment and the grant of 
appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment. Appellant words the issue on 
appeal:

 

"Did the District 
court err when it ruled that abstention from voting of school board members on a 
motion to award a teacher a contract were not votes but nullities in the action 
taken on the renewal of an initial contract teachers' [sic] 
contract?"

 
 

[¶2.]     Appellee words 
it:

 

"Was summary judgment 
appropriately rendered in favor of defendant/appellee Fremont County School 
District No. 38?"

 
 

[¶3.]     Appellant was employed 
by appellee as an initial contract teacher,1 who 
would have completed her third year with the 1989-90 school year. On March 29, 
1990, at a special School Board meeting, and on April 5, 1990, at a regular 
Board meeting, a member of the Board made a motion to approve the 
Superintendent's recommendation of non-renewal of appellant's contract.  Each motion died for lack of a 
second.  On April 10, 1990, the 
Superintendent advised appellant in writing that since the Board had not voted 
to renew or not renew her contract, it would expire at the end of the 1989-90 
school year. On June 11, 1990, at a regular meeting of the School Board, a 
motion was made and seconded that appellant be offered a contract for the 
1990-91 school year. The vote was two in favor, one opposed, and two abstained. 

 
 

[¶4.]     As appellant stated in 
her Pretrial Memorandum and Trial Summary: "The major issue in this case is 
whether or not Plaintiff's contract was renewed for the 1990-91 school 
year." (Emphasis added). She contends (citing authority) that an abstention from 
voting is regarded as a vote with the majority, and that the two abstentions on 
the question at the June 11, 1990 meeting carried the motion four to 
one.

 
 

[¶5.]     However, Policy No. 
002.514 of the School Board provides in pertinent part: "To pass, any motion 
must receive three affirmative votes--that is, approval by a majority of all 
Board members."

 
 

[¶6.]     The policy does not 
specify a "majority" vote for passage. It required three affirmative 
votes. An abstention is just that--an abstention. Under some circumstances, an 
abstention may be considered as a vote with the majority when a majority vote 
is required, but what is required here for passage is not a majority vote, 
but three affirmative votes. Black's Law Dictionary 55 (5th ed. 1979) 
defines "affirmative" as "that which declares positively; that which avers a 
fact to be true; that which establishes; the opposite of negative." In the 
abstentions, there was no positive declaration.  There was no declaration, 
positive or otherwise. There was no establishment of a position here--only 
silence. There was no expression of a stand contrary to negative--there 
was not expression either way.  The 
necessary approval to renew the contract was not given.

 
 

[¶7.]     The rules and policy 
are subject to the same construction as that required for contracts and 
statutes. When the language is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and 
definite meaning, it is unnecessary to resort to rules of construction (here, 
construing the effect of abstentions), and a writing is not ambiguous if it is 
not uncertain and susceptible to more than one meaning. Wyoming Insurance 
Department v. Avemco Insurance Company, 726 P.2d 507 (Wyo. 1986); Campbell v. State, 709 P.2d 425 (Wyo. 
1985).

 
 

[¶8.]     Even if it should be 
necessary to construe the policy, one need not go beyond what is usually the 
first step in such construction, i.e., the cardinal rule in construction is that 
the language used must govern.  Effect must be given to that expressed in 
the language employed. Wyoming Bank and Trust Company v. Waugh, 606 P.2d 725 (Wyo. 1980); Pilcher v. Hamm, 351 P.2d 1041 (Wyo. 1960); Fuchs v. Goe, 62 Wyo. 134, 163 P.2d 783 
(1945). Here, the language is plain in requiring three affirmative 
votes.

 
 

[¶9.]     After the special Board 
meeting on March 29, 1990, and the regular Board meeting on April 5, 1990, 
appellee properly notified appellant of her termination as required by statute 
through the April 10, 1990 letter from the Superintendent.2 Wyo. Stat. §  
21-7-109 (1992) provides:

 
 
"The board must 
offer a contract for the ensuing year to each initial contract teacher if such 
is to be offered by April 15, and it must be accepted by May 15 of each year or 
the position will be declared open." (Emphasis added.)

 
 

[¶10.]  The abstention of those Board members 
doing so on the motions of March 29, 1990, and April 5, 1990, to not renew 
appellant's contract could have been in anticipation that the contract would 
terminate on April 15, if not renewed. It did terminate on April 15, pursuant to 
Wyo. Stat. §  21-7-109. Such section 
made Board action to renew the contract a "must" to avoid termination. The 
termination was by operation of law and any action by the Board thereafter would 
not only be unnecessary, but would be a nullity. Those Board members abstaining 
from voting could have had such in mind. In any event, the provisions of Wyo. 
Stat. §  21-7-109 made the effect of 
abstentions from the vote on June 11, 1990, to be of no consequence with 
reference to appellant's employment status since she had been previously 
terminated from the position April 15.

 
 

[¶11.]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. Stat. 21-7-102 (1992) 
provides in pertinent part:

 
 
 "(a) As used in the article the follow 
definition shall apply:

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
"(ii) 'Continuing Contract 
Teacher'. -- (A) Any initial contract teacher who has been employed by the same 
school district in the state of Wyoming for a period of three (3) consecutive 
school years, and has had his contract renewed for a fourth consecutive school 
year; * * *

 
 
* * 
*

 
 
"(iv) 'Initial Contract 
Teacher'.  -- Any teacher who has 
not achieved continuing contract statutes[.]"

 
 

2The foregoing is sufficient to affirm 
the rulings of the district court, and the following is not only an additional 
basis for doing so, but could indicate the motivation for the abstention votes 
on the matter.

 
 
URBIGKIT, 
Justice, dissenting.

 
 

[¶12.]  This appeal of an administrative board's 
decision has an importance far beyond the right to continue to teach in Fremont 
County School District No. 38 as presented by Peggy D. Forbis. This court 
empirically determines the effect of an abstention from voting when a vote is 
called on a duly presented motion.1

 
 

[¶13.]  This decision determines that an 
abstention automatically constitutes a negative vote on the pending issue; at 
least for governmental bodies for which a statute or rule requires the 
affirmative vote of the entire membership whether or not present, and, if 
present, whether or not voting. See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. §  21-3-105 (1992) (regarding school 
district board of trustees) and Wyo. Stat. §  15-1-115 (1992) (regarding city adoption 
of ordinances).

 
 

[¶14.]  Underlying our recognition of this 
result, the basic issue is whether officials have a right to abstain from voting 
to escape responsibility for their conduct in handling  [*1066]  the business of the governmental 
instrumentality for which they serve as an appointed or elected board member. A 
particularly abrasive circumstance develops for a member of a school district 
board of trustees or a member of a city council when a statutory requirement 
exists for the affirmative vote of a majority of qualified elected members to 
take any action or adopt an ordinance.

 
 

[¶15.]  The applicable statutes governing this 
subject for the school district board of trustees include:

 
 
The 
board of trustees of a school district shall be the governing body of the school 
district. A majority of the number of members of the board of trustees shall 
constitute a quorum for the transaction of business at any meeting of the board 
of trustees. No action of the board of trustees shall be valid unless such 
action shall receive the approval of the majority of the members elected to the 
board of trustees.

 

Wyo. 
Stat. §  21-3-105 (emphasis 
added).

 
 
The 
trustees of each school district shall, within ten (10) days after receiving 
notification of their election and before assuming the duties of their offices, 
appear before some person qualified to administer oaths and take an oath for the 
faithful performance of their duties as required by law.

 

Wyo. 
Stat. §  21-3-106 
(1992).

 
 
Any 
member or officer of a board of trustees of a school district who willfully 
fails, refuses, or neglects to perform any duty imposed upon him by the 
provisions of this code [§ §  
21-1-101 through 21-13-721] shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall 
be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars ($ 100.00) or by 
imprisonment in the county jail for a period of not more than thirty (30) days 
or by both such fine and imprisonment.

 

Wyo. 
Stat. §  21-3-124 
(1992).

 
 

[¶16.]  Significant case lawhas been cited by the 
litigants in this case which develops one or the other of two broad concepts for 
determining the result created by the abstention of any board member. The 
posture taken by this court accepts the principle that an abstaining vote, by 
necessity, is a negative vote, in particular for decisions where a majority of 
the qualified members are required to vote in the affirmative to take action. 
Cases cited to accommodate this view include: Prosser v. Village of Fox 
Lake, 91 Ill. 2d 389, 63 Ill.Dec. 396, 438 N.E.2d 134, 136 (1982); and 
State ex rel. Stewart v. King, 562 S.W.2d 704 (Mo.App. 1978); see 
also J. R. Kemper, Annotation, Abstention From Voting of Member of 
Municipal Council Present At Session As Affecting Requisite Voting Majority, 
63 A.L.R.3d 1072, § §  7 and 8 
(1975).

 
 

[¶17.]  I would have taken the alternative 
posture, which is to assess an effect to the abstaining voting member as joining 
with the voting majority as affirmative or negative in finite action on the 
motion. The point of my departure is a desired refusal to permit defeat of 
motions [**10]  by abstention. 
Support in this case can be found in the text of school board operation Policy 
No. 002.514, which states a right to a recorded positive or negative vote only 
and not an abstention.

 

To 
pass, any motion must receive three affirmative votes - that is, approval by the 
majority of all board members. Votes shall be taken by a voice or by a show of 
hands. All actions taken on motions passed or denied in the board meeting shall 
be recorded as unanimous votes except at the request of a member, the chairman 
shall call the roll and the yeas and nays shall be recorded, including the vote 
of the chairman.

 
 

[¶18.]  This rule, that an abstention 
demonstrates agreement to join the majority in the absence of a call for a 
recorded individual vote, also comes supported with responsible and established 
authority.  Seeley v. City of 
Bridgeport, 53 Conn. 1, 22 A. 1017 (1885); Rushville Gas Co. v. City of 
Rushville, 121 Ind. 206, 23 N.E. 72 (1889); Montgomery v. Claybrooks, 
213 Ky. 493, 281 S.W. 469 (1926); Ray v. Armstrong, 140 Ky. 800, 131 S.W. 1039 (1910); [**11]  Bonsack & 
Pearce v. School Dist. of Marceline, 226 Mo.App. 1238, 49 S.W.2d 1085 (1932); 
State ex rel. Young v. Yates, 19 Mont. 
239, 47 P. 1004 (1897); Northwestern  [*1067]  Bell Tel. Co. v. Board of Com'rs of 
City of Fargo, 211 N.W.2d 399 (N.D. 1973). 

 
 

[¶19.]  Without reviewing the injustice claimed 
by this appellant, certainty in Wyoming administrative functions is highly 
desirable, including the recognition of a mandatory duty of the member to vote 
in every case (absent a conflict of interest). I would hold when a violation of 
that duty occurs, there is a recognized vote established to follow the majority. 
See Seeley, 53 Conn. 1, 22 A. 1017, which also establishes a 
duty to vote with its long and well-stated history.  See also State ex rel. Drummond v. 
Dillon, 125 Ind. 65, 25 N.E. 136 (1890); Edwards v. Mettler, 268 
Minn. 472, 129 N.W.2d 805 (1964) (affirmative duty to reject, violation of duty to vote was 
acquiescence); and Mullins v. Eveland, 234 S.W.2d 639 (Mo.App. 1950). 
[**12]  

 
 

[¶20.]  However, this court takes the opposite 
tact, and we now establish community responsibility for the abstaining member to 
have actually cast a vote in the negative for the pending motion.  Responsibility for a board member's 
abstention is, therefore, equally defined as with those who forthrightly vote 
for or against the motion then pending. In colloquial terms, sitting on one's 
hands means being counted to have cast a negative vote.

 
 

[¶21.]  Within this litigation, in the absence of 
the existence of this now determined rule, I would have reversed the summary 
judgment on the basis that the non-voters followed the majority created by those 
members who did vote. For future conduct of business, the rule that the 
abstaining voter votes "no," at least where a determined number of affirmative 
votes is required, is equally satisfactory.  By this decision, the board and the 
electorate should clearly understand that no longer will the subterfuge of 
clouded intent be created by abstention.

 
 

[¶22.]  I dissent in believing that injustice to 
this litigant has occurred, but recognize the benefit of a determined rule which 
is now established by this court's decision.

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The question of an abstention for a 
conflict of interest reason is not presented and will not be discussed. 
Cf. Wyo. Const. art. 3, §  46.