Case Title: KEENE v ANACONDA COMPANY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 81-270

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1982-10-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 81-270 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1982 JACKIE KEENE, Claimant and Respondent, VS . THE ANACONDA COMPANY, Employer, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: Workers' Compensation Court Honorable William Hunt, Judge presiding Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Utick & Grosfield, Helena, Montana Andrew J. Utick argued, Helena, Montana For Respondent: Bernard Everett argued, Anaconda, Montana - Submitted: September 14, 1982 Decided: October 13, 1982 Filed: 0 K T 1 3 1982 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . Claimant-respondent p e t i t i o n e d t h e Workers ' Compensation C o u r t f o r permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s , a t t o r n e y f e e s and a 20 p e r c e n t p e n a l t y f o r unreasonable d e l a y and r e f u s a l to pay b e n e f i t s , i n J u l y , 1980. The Workers Compensation Court e n t e r e d judgment f o r t h e c l a i m a n t on a l l i s s u e s . D e f e n d a n t - a p p e l l a n t , Anaconda Company a p p e a l s t h e judgment of t h e Workers Compensation C o u r t . Claimant was employed w i t h the Anaconda Company a s a b o i l e r - maker a t t h e Berkley P i t i n B u t t e , Montana. On August 23, 1978, c l a i m a n t was r i d i n g i n a two and one-half t o n t r u c k i n t h e B e r k l e y P i t when t h e t r u c k caught f i r e . Claimant jumped o u t of t h e t r u c k w i t h a f i r e e x t i n g u i s h e r i n h i s hand and landed on h i s l e f t l e g . Claimant immediately f e l t p a i n i n h i s lower back and l e f t l e g . On August 24, 1978, c l a i m a n t went t o see D r . James P . Murphy, a n o r t h o p e d i c surgeon i n B u t t e , Montana, f o r t r e a t m e n t of h i s lower back and l e g p a i n . D r . Murphy recommended c l a i m a n t undergo a myelogram b u t c l a i m a n t r e f u s e d to c o n s e n t to a myelogram and asked f o r a second o p i n i o n . D r . Murphy r e f e r r e d c l a i m a n t to D r . Johnson, a neurosurgeon , who examined c l a i m a n t on September 1 3 , 1978. D r . Johnson found c l a i m a n t had s u f f e r e d a "low back and lower l e g muscular l i g a m e n t o u s " i n j u r y b u t found no " n e u r a l component" to c l a i m a n t s p a i n . D r . Murphy t h e n r e l e a s e d c l a i m a n t and c l a i m a n t was t r e a t e d by D r . P h i l l i p A. B l o m , D.C., a c h i r o p r a c t o r i n B u t t e , Montana. D r . Blom t r e a t e d c l a i m a n t from September 29, 1978, u n t i l November 3 , 1978, f o r a "lumbar sacral s t r a i n w i t h accompanying m y o f a c i t i s and g r a d e I1 r a d i c u l i t i s l e f t . " On November 3, 1978, D r . B l o m r e l e a s e d c l a i m a n t to r e t u r n t o work. When c l a i m a n t c o n t i n u e d to complain of p a i n , D r . Blom r e f e r r e d him to D r . David P. J a c o b s o n , an o r t h o p e d i c surgeon i n Missoula , Montana. D r . Jacobson examined c l a i m a n t on November 7 , 1978, and recommended c l a i m a n t r e t u r n t o f u l l y a c t i v e employment. Claimant r e t u r n e d to work a s a b o i l e r m a k e r w i t h t h e Anaconda Company on November 9 , 1978. Claimant t e s t i f i e d he had t o q u i t a f t e r working o n l y f o u r hours because of p a i n . On November 10, 1978, c l a i m a n t saw D r . Ladd D . R u t h e r f o r d , an o r t h o p e d i c s u r g e o n , i n Bozeman, Montana. Claimant s a w D r . R u t h e r f o r d on two o c c a s i o n s a f t e r which D r . Rutherford advised c l a i m a n t t h a t he would n o t do any damage to himself by r e t u r n i n g t o work b u t t h a t he may have p e r i o d i c back p a i n . Claimant r e t u r n e d t o work w i t h the Anaconda Company as a b o i l e r m a k e r on or a b o u t December 1, 1978. Claimant continued working u n t i l March 1979, when c l a i m a n t q u i t because of p a i n . On A p r i l 1 9 , 1979, c l a i m a n t went t o work f o r Union Tank Works, I n c . , i n Missoula, Montana, as a b o i l e r m a k e r . Claimant q u i t work a t Union Tank Works, I n c . , on September 11, 1979. S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r , c l a i m a n t worked a t Weiss C o n s t r u c t i o n Company f o r a p e r i o d of e i g h t days and q u i t when t h e job w a s f i n i s h e d . On October 7 , 1979, c l a i m a n t began working f o r R e f r a c t o r y C o n s t r u c t i o n , I n c . as a b o i l e r m a k e r . Claimant q u i t work on October 17, 1979, because of l o w back p a i n . On O c t o b e r 30, 1979, c l a i m a n t r e t u r n e d t o D r . Blom f o r t r e a t m e n t . D r . B l o m t r e a t e d c l a i m a n t on f o u r o c c a s i o n s . On A p r i l 22, 1980, c l a i m a n t went t o work f o r Combustion Engineering Company. Claimant was f i r e d on A p r i l 29, 1980, because of a p e r s o n a l i t y c o n f i c t w i t h h i s employer. On December 1 3 , 1979, c l a i m a n t w a s examined by D r . Arnold G . P e t e r s o n , an o r t h o p e d i c surgeon i n Missoula , Montana. D r . P e t e r s o n s t a t e d , " [ h ] is h i s t o r y , [ c l a i m a n t ' s ] , p h y s i c a l f i n d i n g s and x-rays [ s i c ] a r e a l l f a i r l y c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of a m u s c u l o s k e l e t a l e t i o l o g y f o r h i s back p a i n and I s t r o n g l y doubt t h a t it h a s a neurogenic o r i g i n . " D r . P e t e r s o n suggested c l a i m a n t should seek work t h a t is less l a b o r i n t e n s i v e . When c l a i m a n t submitted D r . P e t e r s o n ' s r e p o r t to t h e Anaconda Company's a d j u s t e r , it was r e q u e s t e d t h a t he be examined by D r . John H. Avery, an o r t h o p e d i c surgeon i n Great F a l l s , Montana. D r . Avery s t a t e d c l a i m a n t had s u s t a i n e d a " s o f t t i s s u e i n j u r y to t h e lumbosacral s p i n e as a r e s u l t of h i s a c c i d e n t of August, 1978." D r . Avery a d v i s e d c l a i m a n t f i n d work i n an o c c u p a t i o n which would n o t i n v o l v e e x c e s s i v e bending of h i s back or heavy l i f t i n g . However, t h e Anaconda Company still r e f u s e d t o pay workers compensation b e n e f i t s t o c l a i m a n t or c l a i m a n t ' s medical e x p e n s e s . Claimant t e s t i f i e d due to Anaconda's r e f u s a l t o pay b e n e f i t s or medical e x p e n s e s , c l a i m a n t exhausted a l l of h i s s a v i n g s which amounted to o v e r $15,000 and lost h i s home and t w o t r u c k s . I n J u l y 1980, c l a i m a n t p e t i t i o n e d t h e Workers1 Compensation C o u r t f o r permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s , a t t o r n e y f e e s and a 20 p e r c e n t p e n a l t y f o r unreasonable d e l a y and r e f u s a l to pay b e n e f i t s . The Workers Compensation Court found c l a i m a n t is per- m a n e n t l y t o t a l l y d i s a b l e d , o r d e r e d t h e Anaconda Company pay c l a i m a n t ' s r e a s o n a b l e costs and a t t o r n e y f e e s and h e l d c l a i m a n t was e n t i t l e d to a 20 p e r c e n t i n c r e a s e i n award f o r unreasonable d e l a y and r e f u s a l to pay c l a i m a n t permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y b e n e f i t s . Defendant, Anaconda Company, a p p e a l s t h e r u l i n g of t h e lower c o u r t . The i s s u e s r a i s e d on a p p e a l are as f o l l o w s : 1. Whether t h e lower c o u r t e r r e d i n f i n d i n g t h a t t h e c l a i m a n t is permanently t o t a l l y d i s a b l e d because he could n o t r e t u r n to h i s former o c c u p a t i o n as a b o i l e r m a k e r . 2. Whether t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e lower c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g t h a t t h e c l a i m a n t could not engage i n h i s former o c c u p a t i o n as a b o i l e r m a k e r s i n c e August 23, 1978. 3 . Whether t h e lower c o u r t e r r e d i n awarding c l a i m a n t t h e 20 p e r c e n t i n c r e a s e f o r unreasonable d e l a y and r e f u s a l to pay bene- f i t s under s e c t i o n 39-71-2907 , MCA. The Anaconda Company c o n t e n d s t h e lower c o u r t e r r e d i n f i n d i n g c l a i m a n t to be permanently t o t a l l y d i s a b l e d because t h e c o u r t d i d n o t a p p l y t h e s t a t u t e p r o p e r l y . The s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g permanent total d i s a b i l i t y is s e c t i o n 39-71-116(13), MCA, which states: " 'Permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y means a con- d i t i o n r e s u l t i n g from i n j u r y as d e f i n e d i n t h i s c h a p t e r t h a t r e s u l t s i n t h e loss of a c t u a l e a r n i n g s o r e a r n i n g c a p a c i t y t h a t e x i s t s a f t e r t h e i n j u r e d worker is as f a r r e s t o r e d as t h e permanent c h a r a c t e r of t h e i n j u r i e s w i l l p e r m i t and which r e s u l t s -- i n t h e worker having no r e a s o n a b l e p r o s p e c t o f f i n - - - - - - - d i n g -- r e g u l a r employment o f a n y kind - h t h e normal l a b o r m a r k e t . - - ~isaFi1- s m b<-s-up- p o r t e d b y a preponderance of medical - - e v i d e n c e . " - ( ~ m ~ h a s i s s u p p l i e d . ) The Anaconda Company a r g u e s h e r e t h e lower c o u r t made no f i n d i n g t h a t c l a i m a n t had no r e a s o n a b l e p r o s p e c t of f i n d i n g r e g u l a r employment of any kind i n t h e normal l a b o r market and t h u s was i n error. I n s t e a d , t h e lower c o u r t found c l a i m a n t " i s permanently t o t a l l y d i s a b l e d from engaging i n h i s normal o c c u p a t i o n as a b o i l e r m a k e r . " Although c l a i m a n t may n o t be a b l e to engage i n h i s normal o c c u p a t i o n a s a b o i l e r m a k e r , t h a t does not n e c e s s a r i l y mean t h a t c l a i m a n t h a s a permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y . The s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e c l a i m a n t have no r e a s o n a b l e p r o s p e c t of f i n d i n g r e g u l a r employment of any kind i n t h e normal l a b o r market b e f o r e t h e c o u r t can f i n d permanent total d i s a b i l i t y . I n Dunphy v. Anaconda C o . ( 1 9 6 8 ) 1 5 1 Mont. 76, 438 P.2d 660, t h i s Court h e l d , " [ t l h e i n t e n t i o n of t h e L e g i s l a t u r e must f i r s t be determined from t h e p l a i n meaning of t h e words used, and i f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e s t a t u t e may be so determined, t h e c o u r t s may not go f u r t h e r and a p p l y any o t h e r means of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ." Claimant cites Brurud v. Judge Moving and S t o r a g e Co. & T r a n s . I n s . Co. ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 172 Mont. 249, 563 P.2d 558, where t h i s C o u r t h e l d : "The s t a t u t e does r e q u i r e t h a t he have no r e a s o n a b l e p r o s p e c t of f i n d i n g r e g u l a r employment i n t h e normal l a b o r market; b u t it d o e s n o t set o u t t h a t he must have made a r e a s o n a b l e e f f o r t to s e c u r e such employment. I n some cases, t h i s Court can f o r e s e e t h e f u t i l i t y of such an e f f o r t . " 172 Mont. a t 253, 563 P.2d a t 560. A s t h i s Court s t a t e d i n Brurud, s u p r a , i n some cases it would be f u t i l e f o r a c l a i m a n t t o even a t t e m p t to f i n d employment. I n Brurud, s u p r a , c l a i m a n t was age f i f t y - e i g h t a t the t i m e of t h e i n j u r y and had reached sixty-two by t h e t i m e of t h e h e a r i n g . H e had been involved i n heavy l a b o r a l l of h i s l i f e . The medical r e p o r t s s t a t e d c l a i m a n t w a s t o o o l d f o r h i s back i n j u r y t o be f u s e d o r g r e a t l y improved. However, i n t h e p r e s e n t case, c l a i m a n t was age t h i r t y - t w o when t h e a c c i d e n t occurred and had been t r a i n e d as a mechanic and welder p r i o r t o working a s a b o i l e r m a k e r . Here, t h e lower c o u r t made a f i n d i n g t h a t c l a i m a n t c o u l d n o t r e t u r n t o h i s normal o c c u p a t i o n as a b o i l e r m a k e r . The lower c o u r t d i d n o t make a f i n d i n g t h a t c l a i m a n t had no reaso- n a b l e p r o s p e c t of f i n d i n g r e g u l a r employment of any kind i n t h e normal l a b o r market. Thus, w e hold t h e lower c o u r t d i d n o t pro- p e r l y a p p l y s e c t i o n 39-71-116(13), MCA, and we remand t o t h e lower c o u r t to make a f i n d i n g of whether c l a i m a n t h a s no reason- a b l e p r o s p e c t of f i n d i n g r e g u l a r employment of any kind i n t h e normal l a b o r market. The Anaconda Company n e x t a r g u e s t h e r e was not s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e to s u p p o r t t h e lower c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g t h a t c l a i m a n t could n o t engage i n h i s former o c c u p a t i o n as a b o i l e r - maker. I n S t e f f e s v. 93 Leasing Co., I n c . ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 177 Mont. 83, 580 P.2d 450, t h i s Court s t a t e d : " [w] e cannot s u b s t i t u t e o u r judgment f o r t h a t of t h e t r i a l c o u r t as t o t h e weight of t h e e v i - dence on q u e s t i o n s of f a c t . Where t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e f i n d i n g s of t h e Workers1 Compensation C o u r t , t h i s C o u r t cannot o v e r t u r n t h e d e c i s i o n . " Here, t h e g e n e r a l c o n s e n s u s o f t h e d o c t o r s who examined c l a i m a n t was t h a t he should f i n d l i g h t e r work i f he could n o t be c o m f o r t a b l e while working as a b o i l e r m a k e r . T h i s Court w i l l n o t r e v e r s e t h e lower c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g t h a t c l a i m a n t could not r e t u r n to work as a b o i l e r m a k e r , b u t a g a i n w e n o t e , t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n a l o n e does not s u p p o r t a f i n d i n g of permanent t o t a l d i s a b i l i t y . The n e x t i s s u e is whether t h e lower c o u r t e r r e d i n awarding c l a i m a n t t h e 20 p e r c e n t i n c r e a s e f o r unreasonable d e l a y and r e f u - s a l t o pay b e n e f i t s under s e c t i o n 39-71-2907, MCA. T h i s s e c t i o n states: " I n c r e a s e i n award f o r u n r e a s o n a b l e d e l a y or - - - - - - p -- - - r e f u s a l - to -- pay. When payment of compensation h a s been u n r e a s o n a b l y delayed o r r e f u s e d by an i n s u r e r , e i t h e r p r i o r or s u b s e q u e n t t o t h e i s s u a n c e of an o r d e r by t h e workers' compen- s a t i o n judge g r a n t i n g a c l a i m a n t compensation b e n e f i t s , t h e f u l l amount of t h e compensation b e n e f i t s due a c l a i m a n t , between t h e time com- p e n s a t i o n b e n e f i t s were delayed or r e f u s e d and t h e d a t e of t h e o r d e r g r a n t i n g a c l a i m a n t com- p e n s a t i o n b e n e f i t s , may be i n c r e a s e d by t h e workers ' compensation judge by 20% ." From and a f t e r t h e r e c e i p t by Anaconda of D r . P e t e r s o n ' s r e p o r t , b u t t r e s s e d by t h e r e p o r t of D r . Avery, Anaconda should have e n t e r t a i n e d no doubt t h a t c l a i m a n t w a s d i s a b l e d , even though it q u e s t i o n e d t h e total e x t e n t of h i s d i s a b i l i t y . Claimant was e n t i t l e d to compensation payments when t h e d o c t o r f s r e p o r t showed a d i s a b i l i t y . S e c t i o n 39-71-709, MCA. R e f u s a l to make compensation payments t o c l a i m a n t by Anaconda i n t h e circum- s t a n c e s h e r e was u n r e a s o n a b l e , and t h e p e n a l t y provided i n sec- t i o n 39-71-2907, MCA, may be a p p l i e d by t h e compensation judge t o whatever amount of d i s a b i l i t y is e v e n t u a l l y awarded t o c l a i m a n t . Claimant is l i k e w i s e e n t i t l e d t o costs and a t t o r n e y f e e s under s e c t i o n 39-71-611 , MCA. Reversed and remanded f o r f i n d i n g s and judgment i n accordance h e r e w i t h . (- - - - - ' I - - = % J u s t i c e We concur: J u s t i c e s - 7 - Mr. Justice Fred J. Weber specially concurring: I agree with the holding of the majority opinion remanding the cause to the Workers' Compensation Court to make a finding on the absence of a reasonable prospect of finding regular employment of any kind in the normal labor market; and also agree with the majority conclusion that we will not reverse the lower court's finding that claimant could not return to work as a boilermaker. I do not agree with the holding of the majority that the twenty percent penalty allowed in section 39-71-2907, MCA, necessarily should be applied. This conclusion appears to me to be premature. We are sending the case back for determination by the court as to the extent of the disability, and do not know whether it will turn out to be permanent or temporary, partial or full. Under those circumstances, I do not believe it is appropriate to suggest that the reports of Drs. Peterson and Avery are sufficient to warrant applica- tion of the maximum penalty at this time. That appears particularly true in the present case where we find a large number of qualified medical experts who concluded that claimant in fact did not have a disability and was free to go back to work as a boilermaker. Mr. Justice Frank B. Morrison, Jr., dissenting: I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority opinion that a finding by the Workers' Compensation Court that claimant was disabled from performing work as a boilermaker is not sufficient to support a finding of permanent total disability. However, there is substantial credible evidence in the record to uphold the finding of the Workers' Compensation Court that this claimant did suffer from a total disability. The majority correctly quotes section 39-71-116(13), MCA, which sets forth the definition of permanent total disability for workers' compensation purposes. That statute requires that claimant show he has no reasonable prospect of regular employment in the normal labor market. Evidence was provided by claimant at the hearing in this matter, that claimant was unable to hold any kind of regular job due to the pain experienced by claimant. Claimant's testimony is corroborated by testimony from a highly reputable board certified orthopedic surgeon, Arnold Peterson, showing that claimant suffered from a thirty-five percent disability. This evidence, when combined with evidence of claimant's lack of education and inability to qualify for employment other than that of a boilermaker, provides substantial credible evidence for a finding by the Workers' Compensation Court that this claimant was permanently totally disabled. It certainly would have been better for the Workers' Compensation Court to make a specific factual finding supporting the reason for its determination of permanent total disability. However, we can imply such a finding. In light of the fact that the Workers' Compensation Act is to be liberally construed in favor of the worker, I would imply such a finding in this situation because there is certainly evidence in the record to uphold the determination herein made. I concur h Justice Morrison's dissent. I