Case Title: VALERIE YVONNE AMIN, A/K/A VALERIE BANKS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 84-74

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-01-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
VALERIE YVONNE AMIN, A/K/A VALERIE BANKS v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1985 WY 19694 P.2d 119Case Number: 84-74Decided: 01/31/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming
VALERIE YVONNE AMIN, 
A/K/A VALERIE BANKS, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Joseph F. Maier, 
J.

 
 

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Sylvia Lee Hackl, Appellate Counsel, Martin J. 
McClain, Asst. Appellate Counsel; and Denise Nau, Wyoming Public Defender 
Program, Cheyenne, for 
appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Crim. Div., John W. Renneisen, 
Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., and David K. Gruver, Legan Intern, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant was convicted 
of aggravated robbery and kidnapping. The issue is whether the court should have 
given five lesser included offense instructions proposed by appellant. We will 
affirm.

[¶2.]     James Whitehead and his 
wife were in the process of moving from Wyoming and they needed cardboard boxes for 
packing their possessions. In his search for boxes on July 10, 1983, Whitehead 
went to several business establishments, including the Lamp Lounge. Outside the 
lounge, at about one o'clock a.m., according to Whitehead, he was accosted by 
appellant Valerie Yvonne Amin. Mrs. Amin was engaged in prostitution and 
propounded to Whitehead a business proposition, which he rejected. Thereupon she 
exhibited a handgun and persuaded Whitehead to get into his automobile and drive 
to an isolated area about six blocks from the lounge. Another car pulled in 
behind Whitehead's car and Abdula Amin, husband of appellant, approached the 
Whitehead car. Whitehead attempted to escape from his car, but was struck by 
Abdula. He was further assaulted and his wallet, watch, cassette player and 
other items were taken. 

[¶3.]     According to appellant 
she and Whitehead had struck a bargain and he paid $60, after which they 
repaired to an isolated area about six blocks from the Lamp Lounge. After 
appellant had performed under the contract, Whitehead demanded a refund and 
employed self help to recover the $60. At this juncture, according to appellant, 
Abdula Amin arrived and did nothing more than help his wife out of Whitehead's 
car. Another man, who had arrived with Mr. Amin, approached Whitehead, but 
appellant did not know what, if anything, happened after that.

[¶4.]     During the instruction 
conference appellant offered instructions on simple assault, battery, reckless 
endangering, and larceny. At this conference appellant argued for a simple 
robbery instruction, but did not offer one. She contends that the instructions 
offered and suggested were lesser included offenses. Appellant was tentative 
about proper lesser included offense instructions. At the conference the court 
inquired of counsel whether the proposed instruction on reckless endangering was 
a lesser included offense to aggravated robbery or to kidnapping. Counsel 
replied:

"I believe in this 
particular case it would be in kidnapping. However, I think it could potentially 
apply to both charges. But it would seem more in line with the kidnapping 
allegation. I would offer it as to both charges, as far as I'm 
concerned."

Appellant's 
reasons and argument in support of the lesser included offense of reckless 
endangering is not atypical of the argument and reasons given in support of the 
other proposed lesser included offenses. The trial court refused to give any of 
the offered or suggested instructions.

[¶5.]     During the instruction 
conference appellant did not identify any evidence which, if believed by the 
jury, would result in a conviction of a lesser included offense, nor does she 
identify such evidence on appeal. If accepted by the jury as true, the evidence 
produced by appellant would have resulted in an acquittal on both counts of the 
information.

[¶6.]     The basic law in 
Wyoming with 
respect to lesser included offenses is set out in two recent cases. In Selig v. State, Wyo., 635 P.2d 786 
(1981), we adopted the test for instructing on a lesser included offense from United States v. Chapman, 615 F.2d 1294, 
1299 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 446 U.S. 967, 100 S. Ct. 2947, 64 L. Ed. 2d 827 
(1980), as follows:

"This Court has held that 
a defendant is entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction when the 
following five elements are present: (1) a proper request is made; (2) the 
elements of the lesser offense are identical to part of the elements of the 
greater offense; (3) there is some evidence that would justify conviction of the 
lesser offense; (4) the proof on the element or elements differentiating the two 
crimes is sufficiently in dispute so that the jury may consistently find the 
defendant innocent of the greater and guilty of the lesser-included offense, and 
(5) there is mutuality, i.e., a charge may be demanded by either the United 
States or the defense. [Citation.]"

[¶7.]     In Balsley v. State, Wyo., 668 P.2d 1324, 1329 
(1983) the court said:

"In summary, we hold that 
a crime described by statute may not be necessarily included within another 
statutory offense unless all of the elements within the claimed lesser offense 
are to be found in the greater, and unless the greater offense cannot be 
committed without also committing the putative lesser offense."

Selig and Balsley are not inconsistent with Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 
349-350, 85 S. Ct. 1004, 1009, 13 L. Ed. 2d 882, 887-888 (1965):

"* * * Rule 31(c) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in relevant part, that the 
`defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense 
charged.' Thus, `[i]n a case where some of the elements of the crime charged 
themselves constitute a lesser crime, the defendant, if the evidence justifie[s] 
it * * * [is] entitled to an instruction which would permit a finding of guilt 
of the lesser offense.' [Citations.] But a lesser-offense charge is not proper 
where, on the evidence presented, the factual issues to be resolved by the jury 
are the same as to both the lesser and greater offenses. [Citations.] In other 
words, the lesser offense must be included within but not, on the facts of the 
case, be completely encompassed by the greater. A lesser-included offense 
instruction is only proper where the charged greater offense requires the jury 
to find a disputed factual element which is not required for conviction of the 
lesser-included offense. [Citations.] * * *"

[¶8.]     In the case before us 
appellant was charged with aggravated robbery defined in § 6-2-401(c)(ii), W.S. 
1977 (June 1983 Replacement):

"(c) Aggravated robbery 
is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not less than five (5) years nor more 
than twenty-five (25) years if in the course of committing the crime of robbery 
the person:

* * * * * *

"(ii) Uses or exhibits a 
deadly weapon or a simulated deadly weapon."

Appellant Amin 
was also charged with kidnapping, defined in § 6-2-201(a)(ii), W.S. 1977 (June 
1983 Replacement):

"(a) A person is guilty 
of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another from his place of residence or 
business or from the vicinity where he was at the time of the removal, or if he 
unlawfully confines another person, with the intent to:

* * * * * *

"(ii) Facilitate the 
commission of a felony."

Appellant was 
convicted of both charges.

[¶9.]     Section 6-2-501(a), 
W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement) provides:

"(a) A person is guilty 
of simple assault if, having the present ability to do so, he unlawfully 
attempts to cause bodily injury to another."

[¶10.]  Under this statute a person is guilty of 
simple assault if, having the present ability to do so, he unlawfully attempts 
to cause bodily injury to another. Present ability to cause bodily injury and 
attempt to cause bodily injury are not elements of aggravated robbery or 
kidnapping. Stated another way, both aggravated robbery and kidnapping could be 
committed without committing simple assault. Therefore, assault is not a 
necessarily included offense of either aggravated robbery or kidnapping. Balsley v. State, supra.

[¶11.]  Section 6-2-501(b), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 
Replacement) provides:

"(b) A person is guilty 
of battery if he unlawfully touches another in a rude, insolent or angry manner 
or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to 
another."

The elements of 
battery are an unlawful touching of another, in a rude, insolent or angry manner 
or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing bodily harm. An aggravated 
robbery or kidnapping can be committed without either of these elements; 
therefore, battery is not a necessarily included offense of aggravated robbery 
or kidnapping. State v. Balsley, 
supra.

[¶12.]  Appellant offered three instructions on 
reckless endangering. Section 6-2-504, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement) 
provides:

"(a) A person is guilty 
of reckless endangering if he recklessly engages in conduct which places another 
person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.

"(b) Any person who 
knowingly points a firearm at or in the direction of another, whether or not the 
person believes the firearm is loaded, is guilty of reckless endangering unless 
reasonably necessary in defense of his person, property or abode or to prevent 
serious bodily injury to another."

[¶13.]  Aggravated robbery could be committed 
without placing a person in danger of death or serious bodily injury. Likewise, 
the crime could be committed without pointing a firearm at or in the direction 
of another. About the only elements of the offense that kidnapping and reckless 
endangering have in common are venue, date of alleged offense and name of the 
accused. Kidnapping could be committed without doing any of the things 
proscribed by the reckless endangering statute.

[¶14.]  According to the strict test in Balsley, simple assault, battery and 
reckless endangering are not lesser included offenses of the crimes of 
aggravated robbery or kidnapping. Theoretically, larceny and robbery may be 
lesser included offenses of aggravated robbery, but an instruction on a lesser 
included offense need not be given where, as here, there is no evidence to 
support it.

[¶15.]  The basic flaw in appellant's argument 
for lesser included offense instructions is that there was no evidence to 
justify any of the five requested instructions. Appellant's evidence was that 
Whitehead tried to take from her person money that she had earned. According to 
her she only tried to retain that which was hers. On the other hand, Whitehead 
described a scam engaged in by appellant, her husband and perhaps another, 
resulting in him being robbed.

[¶16.]  The trouble with giving lesser included 
offense instructions that are not justified by the evidence is that 1) the jury 
becomes confused and may do strange things, and 2) the jury is invited to 
compromise. This could be an advantage to the defendant, but sometimes it is 
not. In either event, justice is not served.

"An instruction should 
not be given if it is not reasonably supported by the evidence, or if it is not 
based on some theory logically derived from some part of the evidence. 
Therefore, an instruction should not be given based on evidence which at best 
raises a possibility or conjecture, or which is inconsistent with the physical 
facts. * * *" Patterson v. State, 
Wyo., 682 P.2d 1049, 1051 (1984).

"* * * The law does not 
require instructions on all offenses theoretically included in every criminal 
information based upon the possibility that the jury might simply disbelieve the 
state's evidence. [Citation.]" State v. 
Wilson, 113 Ariz. 360, 363, 555 P.2d 321, 325 
(1976).

"* * * We can see no 
reason for submitting the issue of any lesser offense when the evidence 
conclusively shows the defendant guilty of the highest degree of homicide. While 
the jury might, if that question were submitted to them, return some verdict of 
a lesser crime, this does not require the court to invite them to do so by 
submitting to them a theory of the case not rationally supported by the 
evidence." Richmond v. State, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1217, 1233 
(1976).

"* * * The trial court 
should only give such instructions as arise from the evidence and when the 
evidence shows that the defendant is either guilty or not guilty of the higher 
grade of the offense, the court is not required to instruct on the lesser 
offense. Oldham v. State, Wyo., 534 P.2d 107, 109 
(1975). See also, Stamper v. State, 
Wyo., 662 P.2d 82 (1983).

[¶17.]  The following cases are helpful. The 
Washington Supreme Court in State v. 
Snider, 70 Wn.2d 326, 422 P.2d 816 (1967), found that a defendant charged 
with robbery was not entitled to a lesser included offense instruction of 
larceny. The defendant there denied taking any property, but did not deny 
accosting the victim. This is similar to the present case, where, if appellant 
committed a larceny it was accomplished by force. Similarly, in State v. Long, 234 Kan. 580, 675 P.2d 832 (1984), the court found that a defendant charged with robbery was not 
entitled to the lesser offense instruction of theft where he admitted "brushing" 
the victim, but denied taking any money. Finally, in State v. Yarbrough, 131 Ariz. 70, 638 P.2d 737 
(1981), the court found no basis for giving a lesser included offense 
instruction of theft when the defendant was charged with robbery, citing the 
standard of "either guilty of the crime charged or not guilty at 
all."

[¶18.]  A defendant is entitled to lesser 
included offense instructions when a rational view of the evidence would permit 
a finding of guilt of the lesser offense and not guilty of the greater offense. 
In this case resolution of any of the conflicting evidence in favor of appellant 
would result in an acquittal, not merely a finding of not guilty of the 
principal offense, but guilty of one or more lesser offenses. There is no 
evidence, which if believed by the jury, would result in an acquittal of the 
principal offenses and a finding of guilty of one or more of the proposed lesser 
included offenses.

[¶19.]  The trial court properly refused to give 
lesser included offense instructions.

[¶20.]  Affirmed.

ROSE, Justice, 
concurring.

[¶21.]  I fully agree with the conclusion reached 
by the majority in this case that no evidence in the record justifies submitting 
the lesser-offense instructions to the jury. I write separately to point out 
that, under the doctrine of lesser-included offenses, one offense is necessarily 
included within another if the elements of the minor offense are identical to 
part of the statutory elements of the greater offense charged in the information. The fact 
that it is possible to commit an aggravated robbery without also committing 
assault does not preclude a simple-assault instruction where, as in this case, 
the form of aggravated robbery charged includes the elements of 
assault.

[¶22.]  Rule 32(c), W.R.Cr.P., specifies that a 
defendant may be convicted of an uncharged offense necessarily included in the 
particular offense charged in the information:

"(c) Conviction of lesser offense. - The 
defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense 
charged or of an attempt to commit either the offense charged or an offense 
necessarily included therein if the attempt is an offense." (Emphasis 
added.)

In developing 
criteria for applying this rule in Balsley v. State, Wyo., 668 P.2d 1324 (1983), and State v. Selig, Wyo., 
635 P.2d 786 (1981), we measured the elements of the purported lesser-included 
offense against the elements of the specific offense charged in the 
information.

[¶23.]  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit, in interpreting the identical Rule 31(c), 
F.R.Cr.P., held that, even though robbery without assault is possible, assault 
with intent to rob is necessarily included in robbery where the indictment 
charged a taking by force and violence. Joyner v. United 
States, 116 A.D.C. 76, 320 F.2d 798 (D.C. 
Cir. 1963). Furthermore, the statutory offense charged in the indictment, not 
the offense established by trial proof, controls the propriety of the 
lesser-included-offense instruction. Kelly v. United States, 125 A.D.C. 205, 
370 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. denied 388 U.S. 913, 87 S. Ct. 2127, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1355 (1967). The Supreme Court of Iowa, in State v. Sangster, Iowa, 299 N.W.2d 661, 
663-664 (1980), framed the test as follows:

"The elements of an 
offense are determined by the statute defining it rather than by the charge or 
the evidence. [Citation.] When the statute defines an offense alternatively, the 
relevant definition is the one for the offense involved in the particular 
prosecution. [Citations.] "When the elements of the major offense are 
identified, the next inquiry is whether the elements of the lesser offense are 
included in them. For that purpose, it is necessary to identify the elements of 
the lesser offense. If the minor offense is defined alternatively, the offense 
is included if any of the alternatives are included. * * * Because an offense is 
necessarily included in another if it is an elementary part of the greater, an 
offense is necessarily included if one of its statutory definitions makes it an 
elementary part of a greater offense. When so included, the major offense cannot 
be committed without also committing the minor offense."

[¶24.]  The above rules follow from the nature 
and purpose of the lesser-included-offense doctrine. The doctrine developed at 
common law to aid the prosecution in cases where the evidence failed to 
establish some element of the offense originally charged. Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208, 
93 S. Ct. 1993, 1995, 36 L. Ed. 2d 844 (1973). Although the defendant may also 
request a lesser-included-offense instruction, his right extends no further than 
that of the prosecutor. The right of the prosecutor is limited to the offense 
made known to the defendant through the indictment or information. Kelly v. United States, 
supra.

[¶25.]  The information in the instant case 
charges that appellant

"* * * did unlawfully and 
feloniously, steal, take and carry away $165.00 in cash, a watch valued at 
$50.00 and a wallet valued at $6.00, the property of James Whitehead, with 
intent to deprive James Whitehead, the owner or lawful possessor, and during the 
course of committing the crime use or exhibit a deadly weapon or a simulated 
deadly weapon, contrary to W.S. § 6-2-401(c)(ii), 1977 Republished 
Edition."

Section 
6-2-401(c)(ii), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement), provides:

"(c) Aggravated robbery 
is a felony punishable by imprisonment for not less than five (5) years nor more 
than twenty-five (25) years if in the course of committing the crime of robbery 
the person:

* * * * * *

"(ii) Uses or exhibits a deadly weapon or a 
simulated deadly weapon." (Emphasis added.)

Robbery is 
defined in § 6-2-401(a), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement):

"(a) A person is guilty 
of robbery if in the course of committing [larceny] he:

"(i) Inflicts bodily injury upon another; 
or

"(ii) Threatens another 
with or intentionally puts him in fear of immediate bodily injury." (Emphasis 
added.)

Thus, appellant 
was on notice that the State might attempt to establish aggravated robbery 
through proof of her use of a deadly weapon and infliction of bodily 
harm.

[¶26.]  I agree with the majority that battery 
requires proof of a state of mind not required for conviction of the charged 
offense, and that reckless endangering also contains elements not found in the 
charged crime. Therefore, these offenses are not necessarily included within 
aggravated robbery, as charged in the information. All of the elements of simple 
assault, however, can be found in the charged crime.

[¶27.]  Section 6-2-501(a), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 
Replacement), provides:

"A person is guilty of 
simple assault if, having the present ability to do so, he unlawfully attempts 
to cause bodily injury to another."

Present ability 
to cause bodily injury cannot be considered a distinct element from "Uses or 
exhibits a deadly weapon," § 6-2-401(c)(ii), since proof of appellant's use of a 
deadly weapon necessarily results in proof of her ability to cause bodily 
injury. In addition, both simple assault and aggravated robbery contain the 
bodily injury element and an attempt to cause the common element is not a 
disqualifying element under Rule 32(c). Therefore, simple assault is a 
lesser-included offense of aggravated robbery, as charged. See Joyner v. United States, 
supra.

[¶28.]  The evidence presented at trial, however, 
did not support an instruction on simple assault. The conflict to be resolved by 
the jury was whether appellant or some unknown assailant robbed Mr. Whitehead. 
No evidence suggests that appellant committed only assault. Therefore, appellant 
failed to satisfy prong four of the Chapman test as set out in State v. Selig, supra, 635 P.2d  at 790, 
and followed in Balsley v. State, 
supra:

"* * * (4) [T]he proof on 
the element or elements differentiating the two crimes is sufficiently in 
dispute so that the jury may consistently find the defendant innocent of the 
greater and guilty of the lesser-included offense * * *."

[¶29.]  The trial court properly refused 
appellant's requested instructions based on insufficiency of the evidence.