Case Title: CLETUS ROBBINS, JR. V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015-SC-000478-MR

State: kentucky

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Date: 2017-03-23T00:00:00Z

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RENDERED: MARCH 23, 2017
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2015-SC-000478-MR
CLETUS ROBBINS, JR. APPELLANT

‘ON APPEAL FROM HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE KENT HENDRICKSON, JUDGE,
‘NO, 14-CR-00083

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE,

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT
AFFIRMING

Cletus Robbins, Jr. appeals as a matter of right from a judgment of the
Harlan Circuit Court sentencing him to twenty-five years’ imprisonment. Ky.
Const. § 110(2)(b). Robbins raises two issues on appeal: (1) the trial court
erred by denying Robbins’s motion for a directed verdict as to the charges of
kidnapping and first-degree unlawful imprisonment; and (2) Robbins’s
convictions for two counts of second-degree assault, two counts of first-degree
wanton endangerment, and first-degree unlawful imprisonment were barred by
statutory double jeopardy. "For the following reasons, we alfirm the judgment
and sentence of the Harlan Circuit Court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
During the evening of May 2, 2014, Cletus Robbins Jr. and Brica Bryant

visited the home of Arbin Shepherd. Later that evening, Benji Stout and
Gabrielle Wright Cochran arrived at the residence. Subsequently, Robbins and
Stout began to argue and the argument became physical, resulting in Stout.
being badly beaten and shot with a handgun. Beyond these facts, witness
testimony differed as to what transpired that evening and what triggered the
dispute and assault.

‘The Commonwealth's first witness was Bryant, who was dating Robbins

 

step-son at the time of this incident. Bryant was with Robbins when he
received a phone call about visiting Shepherd’s house that evening. In her
interview with the police, Bryant explained that Shepherd called Robbins to
inform him that he had “got the lady,” who had sold them counterfeit Xanax
pills and that she would be at his house that evening. As a consequence of this
call, Bryant and Robbins went to Shepherd’s home.

According to Bryant the mood in the house was tense. Asked specifically
about Robbins’s mood, Bryant recalled that he was angry. Once Stout and

Cochran arrived at the residence, Stout was summoned by Robbins to come to

 

the kitchen.) Due to her vantage point in the living room, which was
immediately next to the kitchen, Bryant was able to observe how the conflict
began. Initially, Bryant heard Robbins shout at Stout that he “had got him for

$600 the day before.” Robbins then began to beat Stout and as the beating

There was conflicting testimony at trial, about the presence of an unnamed
“African-American man” who may have accompanied Stout and Cochran to Shepherd's
residence.
continued Stout fell to the ground, with Robbins kicking him in the head. The
beating continued despite Stout's pleas for Robbins to stop.

Afterwards, Robbins and Carl Edward Collins, tied Stout up with a nylon
rope Robbins then placed a gun to Stout's head, stating he was going to get,
his $600 back from Stout. While Stout was tied up, Collins took money and
illicit narcotics from his person. That money was subsequently divided among
Robbins, Collins, and Shepherd.

During this period, Bryant approached Robbins asking him to calm
down. In response, Robbins pointed his gun in her face and informed her that
he intended to shoot Stout. Bryant put her hands up and retreated to defuse
the situation. Afterwards, Robbins returned his focus to Stout, untying his
restraints. However, Robbins continued to yell at Stout about the money.
During this exchange Bryant heard a gunshot and realized that Stout had been
shot in the chest.

Bryant was ordered by Collins to clean up Stout's blood in the kitchen.
While Bryant did so, she overheard Robbins boasting that he had “got (Stout).
Later, Cochran, Stout's companion, entered the kitchen and Robbins struck
her in the face. After a short discussion, Robbins and Collins gave Stout some
of his money back so he could pay for gas to return to Lexington. Prior to

letting Stout and Cochran leave, Robbins told the pair not to stop on the way to

 

2 Later, during cross-examination Bryant contradicted this portion of her
‘account, saying that she did not see Stout tied up on the day in question,

3
Lexington or inform anyone about what had happened or he would kill
Cochran's family.

‘The Commonwealth's second witness was Shepherd, the homeowner.
Shepherd admitted to having taken Xanax the day of the assault and that as a
result he was in and out of consciousness throughout the evening, Shepherd
testified that Robbins had come to his house to rendezvous with Stout and
Cochran. Prior to the start of the altercation in the kitchen, Shepherd
overhead Stout and Robbins discussing a prior drug deal for Xanax. While in
and out of consciousness, Shepherd heard “scuffling” in the kitchen. The

sound of the gunshot in the kitchen, lifted Shepherd from his stupor, and he

 

went to his room to get his gun.

Shepherd went on to explain that his concern was to calm down Robbins

 

and get everyone out of his home. In a tense moment, Robbins and Shepherd

pointed their weapons at each other, but the moment passed without violence.
Later, Shepherd watched Stout leave his residence, while Bryant worked to
clean up his blood. During cross-examination, Shepherd claimed to not

understand the reason for the dispute between Robbins and Stout, explaining

* Robbins claims that Bryant's testimony reflected that “[tJhe whole incident
lasted about 25 minutes.” This is rather misleading, The information cited by
Robbins, is from a portion of Bryant's interview that was played for the jury. In the
interview Bryant was asked, “[hjow long do you expect that they were in the kitchen?
How long did it take till the shooting happened in the kitchen you would guess while
you all were in the living room?” Bryant responded saying “twenty-five minutes
maybe.” The twenty-five minute time period referenced by Bryant does not reflect the
entire time that Stout and Cochran were present in the home, as is suggested by
Robbins, but rather only the time from when Stout went into the kitchen with Robbins
‘until the shooting occurred.
that he had purchased genuine Xanax which he used that evening. Shepherd
explained that this was the second occasion in which Stout and Cochran came
to his house to sell Xanax. Also, Shepherd denied that anyone had been tied
up.

‘The Commonwealth's third witness was Collins. Collins, a convicted

 

felon, testified that he was home in bed when he received a call from
Shepherd's landline telephone, requesting that he come to the house. When
Collins arrived at the residence, he discovered that Shepherd was unconscious
and that Robbins had called him from Shepherd's phone. Collins explained
that had he known that it was Robbins who had called him that he would not
have gone to the house, as the two men did not get along.

Robbins told Collins that the drugs that he had previously purchased
from Stout were counterfeit. Further, he told Collins that Stout and Cochran
‘were on the way to the house to sell narcotics, as they had previously done
once before. Collins observed that Robbins was angry and intended to harm
Stout. To avoid a fight and a possible disruption in Stout and Cochran
bringing drugs from Lexington, Collins offered to buy the counterfeit drugs
from Robbins. While Robbins accepted Collins's money, he remained at
Shepherd's house waiting for Stout and Cochran to arrive. When Stout and
Cochran failed to arrive on time, Robbins used Shepherd's home phone and his
cell phone to call and threaten Cochran's family.

A short while later, Cochran arrived at Shepherd’s home and questioned

Robbins about why he contacted her family, as they did not know that she and
‘Stout sold narcotics. Robbins told her that everything was fine and questioned
her about Stout's whereabouts, who was still in the car. Collins testified that
when Stout entered the living room, Robbins immediately got up, put his arm

around Stout, and shot him in the chest. Robbins then began to beat Stout in

 

the kitchen, During the beating, Stout screamed Collins's name in a desperate
plea for help, After beating Stout for approximately ten minutes, Robbins took
f taser from Stout's pocket and shocked him with it. Collins also testified
about Robbins's crazed state, which was demonstrated by his subsequent use
of the taser on himself.

Afterwards, Robbins pointed his gun at Shepherd, which led to Collins
retrieving a gun that was located on top of the refrigerator. Collins explained
that he obtained the weapon, so that if Robbins shot Shepherd, he would be
able to retaliate against Robbins. Subsequently, Collins took Cochran into the
living room, away from Robbins who continued to repeat that he was going to
{cil and bury them, Collins testified that he was concerned that Robbins
intended to kill Stout and Cochran. In an attempt to calm Cochran down, he
slapped her in the face and urged her to listen to him so they could get out of
the situation.

Later, Collins observed Robbins standing in front of Cochran with her
shirt half buttoned; he surmised that it was due to Robbins searching her
person for narcotics. After deciding to not further harm Stout and Cochran,
Robbins informed the pair that if they were to contact the police that he would
respond by killing Cochran's whole family. Prior to Stout and Cochran’s

6
departure, Collins helped clean up Stout and gave him advice on how to

 

breathe in case his lung had been struck in the shooting. During hi
testimony, Collins denied that Stout had been tied up during his ordeal.

‘The Commonwealth’s fourth witness was Kentucky State Police Detective
Craig Miller. Detective Miller became involved in the case after receiving a
report that Stout had visited Good Samaritan Hospital in Lexington claiming to
be the victim of a gunshot wound. Subsequently, Detective Miller took witness
statements from Stout and Cochran, created photo pack lineups, and obtained
a search warrant for Shepherd's residence. The resulting search of Shepherd's

residence led to the

 

iscovery of a green nylon rope, a .38 caliber handgun, and

 

4.22 caliber rifle. Also, Stout had told the police that his beaded necklace was
broken during the beating; police recovered beads in multiple locations in
‘Shepherd's kitchen. Subsequently, Detective Miller arrested Robbins and
interviewed him, In his interview, Robbins admitted to attacking Stout saying,
“I beat the shit outta him; I beat his motherfucking brains out...” Later,
Robbins's wife provided to police the pills that Robbins had allegedly obtained
from Stout and Stout's taser.*

‘The Commonwealth's final two witnesses were Stout and Cochran.
Stout, a convicted felon, explained that he and Cochran were traveling to

Harlan County to see their children who were staying with their maternal

+ The recovered pills were sent to the Kentucky State Police laboratory for
forensic analysis, Jamie Hibbard testified that the pills contained alprazolam, the
active ingredient in Xanax. However, those tests did not identify the percentage of the
drug in each pill
grandparents, Cochran’s parents. In route to the house, Cochran received a
phone call from her mother, informing her that someone had called her house.
In response, Cochran informed Stout that they needed to make a stop at
‘Shepherd's home.

After arriving at Shepherd's residence, Stout noted that there was a
crowd of happy people who warmly welcomed them into the home.
‘Subsequently, Robbins took Stout into the kitchen and began beating him with
gun. As part of this assault, Robbins struck Stout in the back of the head
with the gun causing him to fall to the floor. Once on the ground, Robbins
began to kick Stout, which included kicking him in the face. As Stout began to
‘crawl towards the back door of the house, Robbins, using a racial epithet, told
‘Stout he was going to kill him. Robbins then shot Stout in the chest.

Stout testified that he was forced into a chair and someone tried to
remove his shirt, Then, Robbins observed that Stout had a taser, took it from
him, and used it against him, Stout testified that throughout the beating, he
was held at gunpoint. He also recounted being tied up by Bryant and Collins.
Eventually, Stout was permitted to leave the residence. Prior to leaving, Stout
‘was warned against going to the authorities, with Robbins threatening to kill
Cochran’s parents if he did so. Stout testified that he delayed going to the
hospital in Lexington for three days due to his fear of Robbins's retaliation.
During cross-examination, Stout denied possessing any illegal narcotics the
night of the incident. He claimed to have $2,400 in cash stolen from him that

night, cash which he received for selling a vehicle.

8
Next, Cochran testified. She recounted that while on the way to visit her
parents in Harlan, she received a call (the identity of the caller is unclear) in
which it was made clear that Robbins was upset. The caller explained that
Robbins believed that Cochran owed him money, and that she needed to meet
with Robbins at Shepherd's residence. Additionally, Cochran’s mother called
and told her daughter that she had received a threatening call,

After arriving at Shepherd's house, Cochran told Stout to remain in the
car while she went in to speak to Robbins. Cochran’s efforts to resolve the
situation were unsuccessful, as Robbins and Collins held her at gunpoint,
while Shepherd went outside to tell Stout to come into the house. After Stout
entered the residence, Robbins and Collins proceeded to beat him. In
particular, Stout testified that Robbins struck Stout in the head over fifty
times.

Afterwards, Robbins took Stout into the kitchen, but just before doing so
pointed a gun at Cochran's head and told her to stay in the living room, and
that he would deal with her next. In thie kitchen, Robbins proceeded to break
three chairs over Stout's head. During this period, Robbins repeatedly told
Stout that he wanted $500, Subsequently, he told Bryant to get rope and she
proceeded to tie Stout’s hands behind his back and tie his feet together. Once
Stout was tied up, Robbins took money from him and then after the robbery
was completed, Stout’s bindings were removed.

‘After robbing Stout, Robbins went into the living room and demanded

money from Cochran. Cochran refused Robbins’s demand, telling him that she

9
id not owe him anything. In response, Robbins shoved his gun into her eye,
then put it to her temple, before finally striking her in the head with the gun.
Robbins then demanded that Cochran take off her clothes. When she refused,
Robbins pulled her shirt open and began to fondle her breasts underneath her
bra, After the robbery and this incident in the living room, Stout was shot.

Cochran testified that Robbins experienced periods of lucidity, before
returning to crazed and violent actions. An example of his crazed state was
Robbins's repeated use of the taser on Stout while he chased him around the
kitchen, Additionally, when Stout began to pray, Robbins held his hand and
Joined in prayer with him asking God for forgiveness. Yet, Robbins later
demanded money from Stout within four days-time, and threatened Cochran
about going to the police and that if she did so he would kill her family.

During cross-examination Cochran denied that she and Stout were
involved in the sale of narcotics. When asked about the money that Stout had
on his person at the time of the robbery, Cochran explained that he had
received it as part of a social security payment. At the conclusion of Cochran's
testimony, the Commonwealth briefly recalled Detective Miller, and then rested
itscase.

Robbins called three witnesses. His first witness was Cochran's father,
Loyd Cochran. He testified that while he was out of the house that there was a
‘missed call and that the caller ID indicated that it was from @ person with the
last name of Shepherd. Subsequently, he called the number back and spoke to

“a Shepherd fella.” Robbins’s second witness was Cochran’s mother Cathy

10
Cochran. She testified about a missed call, which her caller ID noted as being
from “Arvin Shepherd.” Additionally, she noted that her husband later
returned the phone call.

Robbins then elected to testify on his own behalf. He explained that a
couple of days before May, 2, 2014, he had been informed by Shepherd that
there would be someone at his home selling Xanax. Subsequently, Robbins
purchased $600 of Xanax from Stout and Cochran. Stout claimed that the
drugs were counterfeit drugs that contained as little as three percent
alprazolam.

Robbins told the jury that on the date in question he had received a call,
from Shepherd that Cochran and Stout were going to meet him at his residence
and, consequently, Robbins would have an opportunity to get his money back.
Afterward, Robbins went to Shepherd's house to wait. After approximately
twenty-five minutes, Stout and Cochran arrived, with Cochran entering first.

When Stout entered the house, Robbins accused him of selling sham
‘Xanax. Stout told Robbins that he had “something else” to offer in his car, but
Robbins informed him that he did not want anything else, but he did want his
monef back. Shortly thereafter, a brawl started between the two men.

According to Robbins, when Stout attempted to take out

 

is taser, he was
disarmed and badly beaten by Robbins. During the altercation, heroin that
Stout had on his person fell to the ground; those drugs were subsequently

seized by Shepherd and Collins. Robbins placed the value on those drugs at

u
approximately $2,400. Later Robbins gave Stout $30 of his own money, 80
that he could afford gas to travel back to Lexington,

Robbins denied that the event was anything more than a fist fight. He
denied shooting Stout or even having a gun, insisting that only Shepherd and
Collins were armed with guns. Further, Robbins insisted that he did not strike
Stout with chairs or tase him. Additionally, Robbins denied knowledge about
rope or anyone being tied up that evening. Robbins also denied that he had hit
or inappropriately touched Cochran. Finally, Robbins denied taking any
money from Stout, but did admit to using some of his heroin later that evening.

‘According to Robbins, Stout and Cochran told Shepherd the following
day that they would go to the police, unless Robbins paid for Stout's lost
heroin. Robbins attempted to explain away the other witnesses’ accounts of
the evening, by saying that Collins and Stout were longtime friends. Also,
Robbins alleged the existence of a love triangle involving Robbins, Shepherd,
and Robbins’s wife who also happened to be Shepherd's former spouse.

‘After weighing all the testimony and physical evidence, the jury found

Robbins not guilty of the attempted murder of Stout and the second-degree

 

assault of Cochran. The jury found Robbins guilty of the following offenses:
kidnapping (with serious physical injury); first-degree robbery; two counts of
second-degree assault against Stout; first-degree unlawful imprisonment of
Cochran; two counts of first-degree wanton endangerment (Stout and
Cochran); two counts of intimidating a participant in the legal process (Stout

and Cochran); and being a first-degree persistent felony offender. For these

12
offenses the jury recommended a total sentence of twenty-five years, The trial
court sentenced Robbins in conformance with the jury's recommendation.
Robbins brings this appeal as a matter of right.

ANALYSI

 

I. The Trial Court Properly Denied Robbins’s Motion for a Directed Verdict
of Acquittal on the Kidnapping and Unlawful Imprisonment Charges.

Robbins contends that he should have been granted a directed verdict as
to the charges of kidnapping and unlawful imprisonment due to the
‘applicability of the kidnapping exemption statute, Kentucky Revised Statute
(KRS) 509.050. Specifically, he argues that any interference with Stout and
Cochran's liberty was incidental and occurred contemporaneously with the
underlying crimes of first-degree robbery, second-degree assault, and first-

degree wanton endangerment.

 

Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 50.01 states, in pertinent part *[a]
motion for a directed verdict shalll state the specific grounds therefor.” “We
have previously applied CR 50.01 to criminal cases and have held that its
requirement of ‘specific grounds’ must be followed to preserve for appellate
review a denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.” Potts v.
Commonwealth, 172 8.W.3d 345, 348 (Ky. 2005) (citing Pate v. Commonwealth,
134 S.W.3d 593, 597-98 (Ky. 2004); Daniel v. Commonwealth, 905 $.W.2d 76,
79 (Ky.1995)). Insufficiently specific motions for directed verdict are not

reviewed under the “any rational juror” standard, but under the palpable error

13,
standard of Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 10.26.5 Quisenberry v.
Commonwealth, 336 8.W.3d 19, 35 (Ky. 2011) (citing Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 292 S.W.3d 889 (Ky.2009); Potts, 172 $.W.3d at 348). In
determining whether Robbins was entitled to a directed verdict, the Court
reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth. See
Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 8.W.24 186, 187 (Ky. 1991); see also
Commonweatth v. Jones, 283 S.W.3d 665, 668 (Ky. 2009).

Robbins acknowledges that he failed to raise the applicability of the
kidnapping exemption in his motion for directed verdict. Accordingly, we
conclude that this argument was not properly preserved for appellate review.

In anticipation of this potential determination, Robbins alternatively requested

 

that the Court conduct palpable error review under RCr 10.26. The
Commonwealth argues against the Court granting palpable error review relying,
on an unpublished opinion, Payne v. Commonwealth, No. 2010-SC-000199-

MR, 2011 WL 4430860 (Ky. 2011). However, Payne clearly does not stand for

the proposition advanced by the Commonwealth.

5 The palpable error rule mandates reversal when “manifest injustice has
resulted from the error.” Elery v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.3d 78, 98 (Ky. 2012)
(quoting RCr 10.26). To constitute manifest injustice the error must be #o serious as
to affect “the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceeding as to be
‘shocking or jurisprudentially intolerable.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 283 S.W.34 665,
668 (Ky. 2009) (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 8.W.3d 1, 4 (Ky. 2006))

© Under CR 76.28(4)(¢), “[olpinions that are not to be published shall not be

cited or used as binding precedent in any other case in any court of this state;

however, unpublished Kentucky appellate decisions . .. may be cited for consideration

by the court if there is no published opinion that would adequately address the sue
re the court.”

4
Payne argued that his conviction for first-degree unlawful imprisonment
should have been barred by the kidnapping exemption statute. 2011 WL
4430860 at 8. The Court concluded that Payne failed to raise the issue at trial
and that as such the issue was not preserved. Id. However, the Court went on
to state that “[ulnder the circumstances of this case, there was no palpable
error.” Id. By reaching this conclusion, the Court demonstrated that it was
willing to review an unpreserved argument concerning the kidnapping
‘exemption statute for palpable error. Additionally, while there is no published
opinion that would resolve this issue, Payne is consistent with prior
‘unpublished cases from this Court. See e.g. Cecil v. Commonwealth, No. 2002-
‘SC-0252-MR, 2003 WL 22975018 (Ky. 2003); Downing v. Commonwealth, No.
2004-SC-0059-MR, 2005 WL 1412448 (Ky. 2005). Accordingly, this Court will
review for palpable error.

‘The kidnapping exemption in KRS 509.050 provides, in relevant part:
‘A person may not be convicted of unlawful imprisoriment in the
first-degree, unlawful imprisonment in the second-degree, or
‘kidnapping when his criminal purpose is the commission of an
offense defined outside this chapter and his interference with the
victim's liberty occurs immediately with and incidental to the
commission of the offense, unless the interference exceeds that

which is ordinarily incidental to commission of the offense which is
the objective of his criminal purpose.

 

‘The exemption statute is designed to bar misuse of the kidnapping statute to
obtain greater punitive sanctions for offenses that inherently involve restraint
to accomplish the crime. Calloway v. Commonwealth, 550 S.W.2d 501, 503,

(ky. 1977.

18
To ascertain whether the kidnapping exemption statute applies, the
Court employs a three-prong test. Griffin v. Commonwealth, 576 S.W.2d 514,
516 (Ky. 1978). First, we determine whether the underlying criminal purpose
was the commission of a criminal offense defined outside of KRS Chapter 509.
Id. Second, we review whether the interference with the victim’s liberty
occurred immediately with and incidental to the commission of the underlying
offense. Id. Last, we examine whether the interference with the victim's liberty
‘exceeded that which is ordinarily incident to the commission of the underlying
offense. id. Application of the exemption is determined on a case-by-case
basis. Gilbert v. Commonwealth, 637 8.W.2d 632 (Ky. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1149, 103 8. Ct. 794 (1983). It is firmly established that the decision to
apply the kidnapping exemption is left solely to the discretion of the trial court
and is not a matter on which the jury receives instruction. Calloway v.
Commonwealth, 550 $.W.2d 501 (Ky. 1977}. See also, Duncan v.
Commonwealth, 322 8.W.3d 81 (Ky, 2010),

In the case at bar, the first prong of the test is satisfied as the underlying
offenses of first-degree robbery (KRS 515.020), second-degree assault (KRS
'508.020), and first-degree wanton endangerment (KRS 508,060) are each
defined outside KRS Chapter 509. The question becomes whether the
interference with Stout and Cochran's liberty occurred immediately with and
was incidental to the commission of the underlying offenses. Also, in order for
the exemption to apply, where the victim is restrained of his liberty in order to

facilitate the commission of an offense, “the restraint will have to be close in

16
distance and brief in time.” Timmons v. Commonwealth, 555 8.W.2d 234, 241
(ky. 1977).

While it was clear that the offense was close in distance (all of the activity
occurred in Shepherd's residence), there was differing testimony concerning the
duration of Robbins's restraint of the victims. In her interview with the police,
Bryant explained that approximately twenty-five minutes passed from the time
that Robbins and Stout entered the kitchen until Stout was shot. Given all the
events that were alleged to have occurred at Shepherd's residence that evening,
the period of time that Stout and Cochran were restrained in the house easily
would have exceeded thirty minutes under any view of the evidence.
‘Additionally, Cochran testified that the incident was significantly longer, as she
and Stout arrived at Shepherd's residence in Harlan at approximately 9:00
p.m., but did not arrive at their home in Lexington until the early hours of the
following morning. Under this scenario, even assuming the most restrictive
definition of “early hours” aind a conservative commute time from Harlan to
Lexington, Cochran and Stout would have been at Shepherd’s house for at
least an hour. Cochran's view of the long length of time they spent in
‘Shepherd's home is also supported by Bryant's testimony that Cochran and
Stout arrived at Shepherd’s home between 7 and 8 p.m.

This difference in time is critical as the Court has concluded that to
trigger the kidnapping exemption the restraint must be limited in time. See
Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 423 8.W.3d 152, 165 (Ky. 2014) (trial court did not

abuse discretion by not applying kidnapping exemption where confinement of

7
victims was alleged to have lasted forty-five minutes.); Murphy v.
Commonwealth, 50 8.W.3d 173, 179-80 (Ky. 2001) (Restraint of the burglary
victim for ten and one-half hours exceeded the scope of time necessary for
defendants to commit the offense.). In the case at bar, Bryant and Cochran’s
testimony raise doubts that Robbins’s restraint of Stout and Cochran was brief
in time, Yet, even if the Court were to conchude that Robbins satisfied the
second prong, it would afford him no relief, as he clearly does not meet the
third and final prong of the test.

Itis obvious that Robbins’s restraint of Stout and Cochran exceeded that

jon of robbery, assault, and wanton

 

which is ordinarily incident to the commii
endangerment. The jury heard testimony from several witnesses which
conflicted on the timing of the events and the exact force employed against
Stout. However, those witness accounts, with the exception of that provided by
Robbins himself, were consistent that Stout was subjected to a tremendous
‘amount of abuse from Robbins. By committing a series of acts that could serve
only to terrify and coerce Stout and Cochran, Robbins exceeded the restraint
necessary to commit the charged offenses.

As an example, the robbery of Stout could have been accomplished
simply by threatening him at gunpoint, but Robbins instead opted to 1)
repeatedly beat Stout through the use of his hands, feet and the gun; 2) have
Stout physically restrained with rope; 3) hold Stout at gunpoint and place a
gun at his head; 4) shoot Stout with a handgun; 5) break chairs over Stout's

head; and 6) repeatedly use a taser on Stout. The testimony supports that

18,
there were breaks in the commission of these violent acts, to lengthen the
period of time in which Robbins tortured Stout. Additionally, Robbins took
time out from injuring Stout to humiliate him by demanding that Cochran
undress and when she refused to do so, ripped open her shirt and began to
fondle her breasts. Finally, Robbins repeatedly threatened Stout, Cochran, and
the lives of Cochran’s family, By repeatedly using force and threats to extend
the time of his crimes far beyond what was necessary to accomplish the
charged offenses, Robbins cannot take advantage of the kidnapping exemption.
‘See Commonwealth v. Stinnett, 364 S.W.3d 70 (Ky. 2011) (defendant was not
entitled to the kidnapping exemption as his “substantial detours” from the
commission of murder to “humiliate and degrade his victim,” constituted a
restraint on her liberty which “clearly exceeded what is ordinarily required to
commit the offense of murder.”). Accordingly, we find that the trial court
properly denied Robbins’s motion for directed verdict as to the kidnapping
charge. There was no error and certainly no palpable error.
IL, Robbins’s Convictions Did Not Constitute Statutory Double Jeopardy.
Robbins claims that his convictions for two counts of second-degree
assault, two counts of first-degree wanton endangerment, and unlawful
imprisonment violate Kentucky’s statutory protection against double jeopardy.
Although Robbins failed to preserve this argument before the trial court, the
lack of preservation does not bar appellate consideration of this claim. See
Walden v. Commonwealth, 805 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Ky. 1991) (overruled on other

grounds by Commonwealth v. Burge, 947 S.W.2d 805 (Ky. 1996)). Further, this

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alleged error is subject to palpable error analysis under RCr 10.26. Kiper v,
Commonwealth, 399 8.W.3d 736, 741-42 (Ky. 2012) (citing Cardine v,
Commonwealth, 283 8.W.3d 641 (Ky. 2009)).

KRS 505.020 sets forth Kentucky's statutory structure for examining
whether multiple convictions for the same course of conduct are permissible.
See Kiper, 399 S.W.3d at 742. As the Kiper Court explained, *KRS 505,020
does not bar the prosecution or conviction upon multiple offenses arising out of
a single course of conduct when the facts establish that two or more separate
and distinct attacks occurred during the episode of criminal behavior.” Id. at
745 (citing Welborn v. Commonwealth, 157 S.W.3d 608, 611-12 (Ky. 2005)).

Yet, in order for those “multiple convictions to be proper there must have been
‘ cognizable lapse in his course of conduct during which the defendant could
have reflected upon his conduct, if only momentarily, and formed the intent to
commit additional acts.” Id. (citing Welborn, 157 S.W.3d at 612; Terry v.
Commonwealth, 258 S.W.3d 466, 474 (Ky. 2008)

‘A. Robbins’s Conviction for Two Counts of Second-Degree Assault Did Not
‘Violate Statutory Protections Against Double Jeopardy.

Robbins was convicted of two counts of second-degree assault against
Stout. The first conviction was due to Robbins intentionally causing a physical
injury to Stout by shooting him with a gun. The second conviction was due to
Robbins causing a physical injury to Stout by striking him with a gun. Robbins
alleges that his two convictions for second-degree assault cannot stand as they

were part of an “uninterrupted continuous course of conduct.” Specifically, he

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maintains that ‘[t]he hitting and shooting came through a single struggle, a
‘single argument, in which [Robbins] was trying to get money and drugs off
{Stout}. As a result, [Stout] suffered one injury.”

However, the evidence presented at trial supports the proposition that
there were interludes between Robbins's violent acts against Stout. Multiple
witnesses testified that Robbins took breaks in assaulting Stout. In particular,
Cochran recalled that Robbins shot Stout after beating him with the gun and
robbing him. As such, Robbins beating Stout with the gun did not occur
simultaneously with the shooting. Rather than being one continuous act, there
were a series of moments which afforded Robbins the opportunity to consider
his behavior and “formulate intent to commit another act.” Welborn, 157
S.W.3d 608 at 612. See Van Dyke v. Commonwealth, 581 $.W.2d 563 (Ky.
1979) (defendant's commission of sodomy and two counts of rape against one
victim in a fifteen minute period did not protect the defendant from prosecution
‘and conviction for each separate offense).

Alternatively, each of Robbins's second-degree assault convictions was
based on a different act of violence perpetrated against Stout. Cochran’s and
Stout's testimony established that Robbins struck Stout in the head with the
gun.” However, Robbins also decided to shoot Stout in the upper portion of his
chest. These injuries were markedly distinct from each other demonstrating

Robbins’s differing intent in carrying them out. See Quisenberry, 336 S.W.34

7 Bryant and Collins also testified that Robbins beat Stout repeatedly, although
they did not say it was with the gun,

a1
‘at 38-43 (convictions for facilitating attempted murder and facilitating a first-
degree assault did not constitute double jeopardy, where defendant shot victim
in the thigh and head.). Accordingly, Robbins’s convictions for two counts of
second-degree assault did not constitute double jeopardy, No error occurred,
let alone palpable error resulting in manifest injustice.

B. Robbins’s Conviction for First-Degree Wanton Endangerment Did Not
Violate Statutory Protections Against Double Jeopardy.

Next, Robbins argues that his conviction for first-degree wanton
endangerment was subsumed within the offense of second-degree assault. The

basis of Robbins's conviction for first-degree wanton endangerment was his

 

pointing a gun at Stout, which created a substantial danger of death or serious
physical injury to him. Robbins asserts that this offense occurred when he
pointed a gun at Stout right before he shot him in the chest. Accordingly, he
argues that his actions constitute an unbroken course of conduct. Further,
Robbins contends that in order for him to be found guilty of first-degree

‘wanton endangerment that it would have required an “inconsistent finding of

 

fact to establish the commission of the offenses.”

 

Yet, as noted by the Commonwealth in its brief, there was testimony
establishing multiple occasions during which Robbins pointed a gun at Stout.
In one such instance, Bryant testified that after Stout had been beaten and tied
up, Robbins placed a gun to his head and threatened him. This was a separate
incident from when Robbins later pointed a gun at Stout and shot him in the
chest, Relying on Bryant's account, the jury could have readily believed that

Robbins committed first-degree wanton endangerment when he placed the gun
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to Stout's head, a separate act from when he later pointed the gun at Stout to
shoot him in the chest. There was no statutory double jeopardy error.
©. Robbins’s Convictions for First Degree Wanton Endangerment and

First-Degree Unlawful Imprisonment Did Not Violate Statutory
Protections Against Double Jeopardy.

  

Robbins’s final argument is that his convictions for first-degree wanton
endangerment and first-degree unlawful imprisonment violated statutory
double jeopardy. Based on the instructions, the jury concluded that Robbins
committed first-degree unlawful imprisonment when he unlawfully restrained
Cochran, without her consent, and that the restraint occurred under
circumstances which exposed her to serious physical injury. Additionally, the
jury found Robbins guilty of first-degree wanton endangerment for pointing @
gun at Cochran which created a substantial danger of death or serious

physical injury. Robbins argues that this was impermissible as both

 

convictions were based on the single course of conduct—Robbins pointing a
gun at Cochran,

Yet, once again, various witnesses’ testimony identified more than one
instance in which Robbins pointed a gun at Cochran. First, Cochran stated
that Robbins pointed at gun at her once she arrived at Shepherd's house.
Later in the evening, Cochran testified that after she refused Robbins’s
demands for money, that he shoved his gun into her eye, then put it to her
temple, before finally striking her in the head with the gun. As such, the jury
could have believed that by pointing the gun a Cochran when she first arrived

Robbins committed first-degree unlawful imprisonment. Also, the jury could

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have concluded that by pointing the gun at Cochran later in the evening and
striking her in the face with a loaded gun, that Robbins committed first-degree
wanton endangerment. Accordingly, there was no double jeopardy error as to
these two offenses against Cochran.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the conviction and sentence of the
Harlan Circuit Court.

Alll sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Shannon Renee Dupree

Assistant Public Advocate

Department of Public Advocacy

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Andy Beshear, Attorney General of Kentucky
Leilani K.M. Martin

Assistant Attorney General
Office of the Attorney General

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