Case Title: Clark v Heirs and Devisees of Larr

Citation: 2007 MT 237

Docket Number: 254a807c-4654-41f7-b8e4-9a280cb7816e

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 2007-09-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
“+ FILED
September 18 2007
DA 06.0399 ts
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA,

2007 MT 237

ROBERT A. CLARK and LESLIE CLARK,

ito anne
ses aNDDEWSES OF ARB 1 DYER FILED
Deceased, DWYER FAMILY TRUST, and -

TEE x selon

Defendants and Appellants,
and

 

NORTHWEST FARM CREDIT SERVICES, ACA,
Defendant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court ofthe Fifth Judicial District,
In and For the County of Madison, Cause No, DV-29-04-48,
Honorable Wm, Nels Swandal, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
Lori A. Harshbarger, JD Law Firm, P.C., Tucson, Arizona (Dwyers)
William P. Driscoll, Franz & Driscoll, PLP, Helena, Montana (Byrums)
For Respondents:
‘Stephanie Gehres Kruer, Kruer Law Firm, P.C., Sheridan, Montana

‘Submitted on Briefs: March 7, 2007
Decided: September 18, 2007

File:
Justice Jim Rice delivered the Opinion of the Court
{1 Appellants George and Virginia Byrum and the heirs and devisees of Larry Dwyer
and the Dwyer Family ‘Trust appeal from an order of the Fifth Judicial District Court,
Madison County, granting a prescriptive easement to Robert and Leslie Clark. We

affirm,

 

{2 We consider the following issues on apps
{3 1. Did the District Court err by entering findings of fact related to “public use” of
the disputed portion of roadway?

{4 2. Did the District Court err in declaring a private prescriptive roadway easement

for “subdivision or resident

 

\ecess” to tracts created by subdivision in the 1960s?

 

{5 3. Should the Clarks be awarded costs and damages for having to defend this
appeal?
BACKGROUND

{6 The disputed roadway and prescriptive easement in question here is located in
Section 33, Township 1 South, Range 5 West (Section 33) of Madison County. Section
33 is divided by the Burlington Northem Railroad that runs northeast and southwest
across the land. The Jefferson River also divides Section 33, meandering through the
northern half and southwest quadrant, Robert and Leslie Clark (the Clarks) are the
present fe simple owners of real property located in Section 33 along the Jefferson River
‘comprising of Parcel A, Tract A, ‘Tract F, and Tract H as depicted by the Certificate of

Survey filed for record on September 7, 2004, in Book 7 of Surveys, Page 1706-BA, of
the records of Madison County. The Clarks acquired this property over a seven-year
period beginning in 1979,

V7 11979, the Clarks entered a contract to purchase, including an option to purchase,
land in the southwest quadrant of Section 33 from Edward and Vivian Judd (the Judds).
From 1979 to 1986, the Clarks lived in the old Judd farmhouse. Pursuant to the contract
to purchase, the Judds executed and delivered a warranty deed to the Clarks for a twenty-
‘acre tract of the original Judd property known as Parcel A, for the purpose of building a
hhouse thereon. Parcel A is a triangular tract of land with its hypotenuse adjoining the
‘westem side of the railroad. The Clarks recorded the deed on September 11, 1986. Also
in 1986, the Clarks assigned the right they held to purchase the remaining Judd property,
including the original Judd farmhouse, to Donald and Charlene Shriver (the Shrivers).

‘The Shrivers subsequently assigned the right to George and Virgi

 

Byrum (the
Byrums), who purchased the property.

{8 Prior to assigning the right to purchase the Judd property to the Shrivers, the
Clarks purchased the subdivided Tracts A, F, and H from Al and Joy Goodwin (the
Goodwins) in 1984. ‘These tracts were subdivided in the 1960s and the subdivision was
recorded in the official records of Madison County on July 14, 1970. The Clarks
recorded their deed to these tracts on November 21, 1989. Connected from east to west,
respectively, Tracts A, F, and Hare located in the northern half of Section 33 and attach
to the northem boarder of Parcel A and run to the Jefferson River. The Clarks later built
their current home on Tract A and have resided there since 1991, They did not build a

hhome on Parcel A as originally planned.
{9 Larry and Marlene Dwyer (the Dwyers) purchased certain real property in Section
33 and recorded a warranty deed on August 28, 1971. At the time the complaint was
filed, the Dwyer land was owned in undivided one-half interests by the Dwyer Family
‘Trust and the heirs and devisees of Mr. Dwyer. However, by a transfer recorded on
September 27, 2004, John Joseph Dwyer became the owner of the Dwyer property

{10 The Dwyer property is @ semi-triangular tract of land with the hypotenuse

 

adjoining the eastern side of the

 

oad in Section 33. As such, the Dwyer property and
Parcel A border each other with the railroad acting as a visible property line. The Dwyer
property is bordered on the east by a county road named “Waterloo Road” and on the
north by a roadway known as “Byrum Lane.” Byram Lane extends from Waterloo
Road, across the Dwyer property, and across the northern border of the Clarks’ Parcel A,

‘hich lies between the Dwyer and Byrum properties, before continuing onto the Byrums”

 

property lying to the southwest of the Clarks’ Parcel A. In essence, Byrum Lane
Parcel A from the Clarks’ northern adjoining Tracts A, F, and H.

{11 The Byrums utilize Byrum Lane by virtue of two recorded easements in their
favor. The portion of Byrum Lane crossing the Clarks’ Parcel A is a recorded sixty-foot
wide roadway and utility easement. The portion of Byrum Lane traveling from Waterloo
Road over the Dwyer property is a road and utility easement executed by Larry Dwyer on

September 15, 1998, and recorded in

 

favor of the Byrums on September 16, 1998. The
recorded easement is described as

[a] 30 foot wide roadway easement located in the NI/2SE1/4 of Section 33,
‘Township 1 South, Range 5 West, P.MM., said easement being 30 fect
southerly of and parallel with the following described line: Beginning at the

4
 

East % comer of said Section 33, thence $89°40°S9"W 883,85 feet more or
less on the east-west mid section line of said Section 33 to the southeasterly
boundary line of the right of way of the Burlington Norther Railroad as
said railway is located in and surveyed across the mid section line of said
Section 33; said mid section line being the north boundary of the herein
described easement.

 

This portion of Byrum Lane crosses the Dwyer property from Waterloo Road for a
distance of approximately 834 feet before reaching the Clarks’ property.

{12 Historically, Byrum Lane was used by the Clarks and their predecessors to access
What has been referred to as the “Judd” and “Goodwin” tracts which the Clarks
purchased. During the period of 1979 to 1986 when the Clarks lived in the old Judd
farmhouse, Byrum Lane served as the Clarks’ “sole access to {their] property” and
residence, From the period of 1986 to 1991 the Clarks used Byrum Lane to access their
properties to feed livestock, load hay, and move equipment, and in 1988 the Clarks began
‘constructing their home on Tract A. taking up residence there in 1991. Since then they
have continuously used Byrum Lane to access Parcel A and Tracts A, F, and H, although
they also have access to their house by way of a roadway from Waterloo Road. As such,

the Clarks claim a prescriptive easement along the portion of Byrum Lane legally

 

described above, allowing them access over the Dwyer property to their Parcel A and
‘Tracts A, F, and H. Accordingly, the Clarks filed an action seeking declaration of a

fe prescriptive right-of-way easement on the recorded access easement owned by the

 

pri

 

Byrums and crossing the Dwyer property
413. Following a two-day bench trial, the District Court entered findings of fact that

included:
18. ‘The disputed road in question has been used by the public and Clarks?
predecessors in interest since, at least, the early 1900s, and has served
several residences since that time.

19. ‘The county road department has maintained the road on occasion.

20. ‘That the disputed road was generally knows [sic] as a public road and
no permission was asked for or granted to use the road.

21. That the public had a right to use the road and used the road long
before defendants Dwyers purchased the property

22. During the time defendants Dwyers has [sic] owned the property
surrounding the disputed road, the public, including plaintiffs, did not seck
defendants Dwyers’ permission to use the road, and defendants Dwyers’
contention that said use was permissive is unsupported by the record.
Dwyers never formally gave anyone permission to use the roads.

 

 

23, Plaintiffs, the public, and their predecessors in interest have used the
road for access to their property located in Section 33. The past use of the
road has included access for: A. Livestock purposes; B. Irrigation purposes;
C. Hauling livestock supplies; D. Farming purposes; E. Residential
purposes; F. Subdivision purposes; G. Repairing fence; H. Cutting and
hauling firewood; I. Spraying weeds; J. Movement of equipment; K.
Hunting; L. Fishing/river access; M. Burning, brush; N. Fire contr
vate roadway crossing at railroad tracks.

   

 

 

 

 

23, [sic] That defendants Dwyers failed to establish any persuasive
evidence that the use of the road was permissive

24. Alll owners of the road were put on notice in the 1960s that the road
was intended to service residences when the subdivision of the property
into various tracts took place.

33, While defendant Dwyer has concerns about addit

‘easement, there is no evidence that there is any additional burden planned

oor that additional subdivisions of the property, beyond that done in the

1960s, is going to take place. The property was subdivided and of record
6

 
prior to defendants Dwyers’ purchase of the property. They can not [sic]
now claim surprise.

{14 The court concluded as a matter of law that the Clarks established the elements of
4 prescriptive easement, to wit: open, notorious, exclusive, adverse, continuous, and
uninterrupted use of the roadway for at least five years. The District Court issued
Judgment granting the Clarks a prescriptive easement of the portion of Byrum Lane

crossing the Dwyer property. The judgment determined the scope of the prescriptive

 

‘easement as including residential, agricultural and recreational uses. The court also held
that the easement extended to and ran with all subdivided parcels of land owned by the
Clarks—specifically Parcel A, Tract A, Tract F, and Tract H.

IS The Dwyers and Byrums submitted post-judgment motions pursuant to
M.R, Civ. P. 59(g) and $2(a) seeking to: (1) set aside the District Court's “public use”
findings of fact; and (2) alter or amend the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
judgment entered by the court insofar as they provide for subdivision or residential access
to tracts owned by the Clarks that have never had residences. The District Court denied
the motions. The Dwyers and the Byrums appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

16 A district cour’s findings of fact are reviewed to determine whether they are
clearly erroneous. Leichifuss v. Dabney, 2005 MT 271, § 20, 329 Mont. 129, 20, 122
P.3d 1220, § 20. A finding is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial
‘evidence, ifthe district court has misapprehended the effect of evidence, or if a review of

the record leaves this Court with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed. Leichifuss, § 20. A district court's conclusions of law are reviewed to
determine whether they are correct. Leichifuss, § 21
DISCUSSION

417. 1. Did the District Court err by entering findings of fact related to “public
use” of the disputed roadway?

18 The Byrums and Dwyers argue the District Court’s “public use” findings of fact
are irrelevant and immaterial to this proceeding, pursuant to M. R. Evid. 401 and 402,
and should be set aside. ‘The Byrums and Dwyers contend that this is not a public
‘easement case, and furthermore, the District Court refused to let the Clarks amend their
pleadings at trial to make a public easement claim. Moreover, the Byrums and Dwyers,
assert that there is nothing in the District Court’s conclusions of law explaining or
justifying the “public use” findings. The Byrums and Dwyers do not allege any harm or

prejudice, but nevertheless they request that this Court set aside any and all findings of

  

fact by the District Court that use the word “public” or “public use.”
{19 The Clarks respond that the District Court’s limited inclusion of findings of fact
pertaining to public use of the roadway is supported by substantial clear and convincing
evidence and is relevant to the historical use of the roadway.

{20 The District Court included the following six findings of fact in its order relevant
to this issue:

18. The disputed road in question has been used by the public and

Clarks’ predecessors in interest since, at least, the early 1900s...

  

19. The county road department has maintained the road on occasion.
20. That the disputed road was generally knows [sic] as a public road
and no permission was asked for or granted to use the road,

21. That the public had a right to use the road and used the road long.
before defendants Dwyers purchased the property.

22. During the time defendants Dwyers has [sic] owned the property
surrounding the disputed road, the public, including plaintiffs, did not
seek defendants Dwyers’ permission to use the road, and defendants
Dwyers’ contention that said use was permissive is unsupported by the

 

S, the public, and their predecessors in interest have used
the road for access to their property located in Section 33,

{21 The District Court did not address public access in its conclusions of law and
Judgment, and we conclude there was no harm in referencing evidence of historic public
use of the road over which the private easement was at issue, While reflecting evidence

offered in the

 

the public use findings served only to give credibility to the Clarks"
private claim and had no other legal effect. ‘Thus, we hold thatthe District Court did not

crr by entering findings of fact related to public use.

 

{22 2. Did the District Court err in declaring a private prescriptive roadway
‘easement for “subdivision or residential access” to tracts created by subdivision in
the 1960s?

 

 

{23 The Byrums and Dwyers argue that the District Court’s order should be reversed.
insofar as it provides for subdivision or residential access to tracts owned by the Clarks
that never have had residences. The Byrums and Dwyers contend it is undisputed that the
subdivided tracts have never contained residences, with the exception of Tract A where

the Clarks have resided since 1991, and the District Court’s findings of fact and

9
conclusions of law “should be reversed insofar as they provide for subdivision or
‘residential access to tracts owned by the Clarks that have never had residences on them.”

{24 The Clarks respond that substantial clear and convincing evidence was admitted at
‘tial to support the District Court’s order and judgment allowing the Clarks to use the
roadway for subdivision and residential purposes as they have been since 1979 when they
lived in the old Judd farmhouse, ‘The Clarks assert that the residential use made of
Byrum Lane by them, their predecessors and successors, begins at and is physically
connected to the 884-foot section of roadway at issue in this case, and that the Court
cannot ignore the prior subdivision of the property or the road’s historical use for
residential purposes.

{25 To establish a private prescriptive easement, a party must show open, notorious,
exclusive, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted use of the easement claimed for the full
statutory period of five years, Swandal Ranch Co. v. Hunt, 276 Mont. 229, 233, 915 P.24
840, 843 (1996); § 70-19-404, MCA, An open and notorious use is “a distinct and
positive assertion of a right [that is] hostile to the rights of the owner and brought to the
attention of the owner.”” Brumit v. Lewis, 2002 MT 346, § 15, 313 Mont. 332, 4 15, 61
P.34 138,415 (quoting Amerimont, Inc. v. Gannett, 278 Mont. 314, 323, 924 P.2d 1326,

1333 (1996)). “As a general rule, an easement appurtenant attaches to, passes with, and

 

is incident of ownership of the particular land to which it is appurtenant.” Leichifuss,
37. “[S]uch an easement ‘runs with the land,” which means that the benefit or burden

passes automatically to successors.” Leichifuss, 437,
 

{26 Once established, the owners of a prescriptive easement are limited to the use and

frequency of use t

 

t was established during the prescriptive period. Kelly v. Wallace,
1998 MT 307, $ 31, 292 Mont. 129, § 31, 972 P.2d 1117, 4]31. “It is settled law in
Montana that in acquiring a prescriptive easement, ‘the right of the owner of the
‘dominant estate is governed by the character and extent of the use during the period
requisite to acquire it” Warnack v. Coneen Family Trust, 266 Mont. 203, 217-18, 879
P.2d 615, 724 (1994) (quoting Marta v. Smith, 191 Mont. 179, 183, 622 P.2d 1011, 1013
(1981).

{27 Section 70-17-106, MCA, provides that: “{iJhe extent of a servitude is determined
by the terms of the grant or the nature of the enjoyment by which it was acquired.” If the

‘easement is not specifically defined,

 

need only be such as is reasonably necessary and
convenient for the purpose for which it was created.”” Leffingwell Ranch, Inc. v. Cieri,
276 Mont. 421, 430, 916 P.2d 751, 757 (1996) (quoting Strahan v, Bush, 237 Mont. 265,
268, 773 P.2d 718, 720 (1989)).

{28 The District Court determined that the elements of a prescriptive easement were
‘established by clear and convincing evidence, and that is not an issue on appeal. With
regard to “the nature and scope of uses falling within the established prescriptive
easement,” the court determined that the “evidence is uncontroverted that the subdivision
‘of Plaintiffs" land establishing parcels labeled Tract A, Tract F, and Tract H took place in
the mid-1960"s” and that “[sJuch subdivision demonstrates development intended for
these tracts.” It notes that the Dwyers knew the property was subdivided and that the

road was used to service those tracts prio to thei purchase of the property, ‘The District
"
Court determi

 

that the roadway historically has been used for residential and

 

‘agricultural access, not only to the Clarks’ property, but also to the former Judd,
Goodwin, and Walks tracts adjacent to the easement, and that the testimony established
that no additional subdivision was planned. ‘The court concluded that “during the 5-year
statutory period, the scope of the use of the roadway includes residential use and that the
roadway has been used for residential purposes benefiting the Clarks’ property.”

{29 The Byrums and Dwyers rely on Leffingwell for their arguments against
subdivision access. In Leffingwell, « subdivider sought to use an old ranch access rosd
for subdivision access. The district court held that the access provided by easements
‘ranted over the road for ranch access was limited to the agricultural use intended when
the easements were created by deeds, and an expansion of use “would constitute an
overburdening” of the easements. Leffingwell, 276 Mont. at 430, 916 P.2d at 756. We
agreed and further noted that the evidence, which included gates on the road, “did not
contemplate substantial traffic or intend that the easements could be enlarged.”
Leffingwell, 276 Mont. at 431, 916 P-2d at 757. We held that “[aJo use may be made of
the right-of-way different from the use established at the time of the creation of the
‘easement So as to burden the servient estate to a greater extent than was contemplated at
the time the easement was created."” Leffingwell, 276 Mont, at 431, 916 P.2d at 757
(quoting Lindley v. Maggert, 198 Mont, 197, 199, 645 P-2d 430, 432 (1982)).

30 Here, at the time the prescriptive casement was created by the Clarks’ use, the
Clarks owned all of their tracts of land and accessed them by way of the road. Because

the easement attaches to the dominant tenement, which includes the Clarks’ property
12
‘equired from the Judds in 1979 and from the Goodwins in 1984, the easement is
attached fo each of the parcels. Prior to the time the prescriptive easement came into
being, these parcels were subdivided, which the District Court concluded had put all
owners on notice that the road was intended to service residences. The Duyers and
Byrums argue that this finding is undereut by the fact that the Clarks had alternative
access 10 their properties, but we cannot disagree with the District Court that the
Subdivision of the land into parcels made the residential purpose of the road more
obvious. Further, the Clarks lived in a residence on the old Judd property and used
Byrum Lane for eight years to access their home, the old Judd farmhouse, before later
building a residence on Tract A. Mrs, Judd testified, in reference to the Judds’ old
Property (now comprising the Clarks’ Parcel A and the Byrum property), that *{the road
bas} been used for a hundred years” to access “alll those properties.” Unlike
Leffingwell, approving a residential purpose of this easement would not expand its
criginal purpose. The road in question has historically been used to service Tracts A, F,
and H, as well as the Byrums" property, since the 1960s. Further, the Clarks testified
uring trial that they had no plans to further subdivide the land. In allowing for
“subdivision” access to these tracts of land, the court did not expand the scope of the
prescriptive easement beyond what was contemplated atthe time of its creation,

‘BI Therefore, the right to use the easement for subdivision or residential access
‘extends to each parcel in question and runs with the land. We conclude that the District

Court did not err in determining the scope of the prescriptive easement herein,

2B
2

 

"85° The Clarks argue that they are entitled to recover their Sts on appeal pursuant to
MR: App. P. 33, and t recover damages for this appeal Pursuant to M. R. App, P. 32,
Since the appeal was taken without substantial or reasonable grounds and is without
merit

SS4 “As a general rule, this Court will not impose sanctions Pursuant to Rute 32,
MRApp.P. unless the appeal is entirely unfounded and intended to cause delay or
Unless counsel's actions otherwise constitute an abuse ofthe juicil system.” Collins v,
Collins, 2004 MIT 365, § 34, 324 Mont. 500, § 34, 104 P.3d 1059, 434,

$85" Im this case, we hold the appeal was based on substantial and reasonable grounds
and not intended to cause delay. Accordingly, we decline to award the Clarks attorney
fees and costs for responding to this appeal,

136 Affirmed.

We concur:

 

\
lief Justide \

Tustices