Case Title: Celmer v. Rodgers

Citation: 2007-Ohio-3697

Docket Number: 20060305

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2007-07-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Celmer v. Rodgers, 114 Ohio St.3d 221, 2007-Ohio-3697.] 
 
 
 
CELMER ET AL., APPELLEES, v. RODGERS ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Cite as Celmer v. Rodgers, 114 Ohio St.3d 221, 2007-Ohio-3697.] 
Trials – Evidence – Expert witnesses – Evid.R. 601(D) – Physicians, osteopaths, 
and podiatrists – Court may permit witness to testify as expert even though 
witness no longer devotes half of professional time to active clinical 
practice, when the loss of that qualification is due to delays attributable to 
opposing party. 
(No. 2006-0305 — Submitted January 23, 2007 — Decided July 25, 2007.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Trumbull County,  
No. 2004-T-0074, 2005-Ohio-7054. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
In a medical malpractice action where trial continuances requested by the defense 
and the insolvency of a defendant’s carrier delay trial for such time as the 
plaintiff’s medical expert no longer devotes one-half of his professional 
time to the active clinical practice of medicine, and where the medical 
expert is not a professional witness, a trial court has discretion to permit 
that witness to testify as an expert at trial. (Evid.R. 601(D), construed.) 
__________________ 
O’DONNELL, J. 
{¶ 1} Dr. Edward Walker, Dr. Han Soo Shin, and Radiology Associates 
of Warren, Inc., appeal from a decision of the Trumbull County Court of Appeals, 
which affirmed a trial court order denying their oral motion to exclude Dr. Jay 
Thompson from offering expert testimony on behalf of Carol and Michael Celmer 
in this medical malpractice action. 
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{¶ 2} The issue presented on appeal concerns the application of Evid.R. 
601(D), which specifies that only those who are licensed to practice medicine and 
who devote at least one-half of their professional time to the active clinical 
practice of medicine may testify in a civil action on the issue of a physician’s 
liability with respect to the diagnosis, care, or treatment of a person.  We are 
asked to determine whether, in a situation where a trial is originally scheduled and 
then continued at the request of defense counsel, then stayed due to the insolvency 
of a defendant’s insurance carrier, and where more than two years after the 
original trial date the expert witness no longer devotes at least one-half of his 
professional time to the active clinical practice of medicine, a trial court may 
permit that witness to testify as an expert at trial. 
{¶ 3} The record before us reveals that in 1997 and 1998, Carol Celmer 
complained to her family physician, Dr. Sharon George, about a lump in her right 
breast.  Dr. George referred her for diagnostic testing, and as a result, Dr. Edward 
Walker read a December 1998 mammogram and diagnosed the lump in her breast 
as a benign cyst.  Dr. Han Soo Shin also reviewed the same mammogram and a 
sonogram and determined that neither showed anything suspicious.  Based on 
these opinions and her own interpretation of these tests, George advised Celmer 
that she did not have cancer. 
{¶ 4} Thereafter, in December 1999, Celmer obtained a new 
mammogram, revealing a mass in her right breast, which a biopsy showed to be a 
malignant tumor.  As a result, she underwent chemotherapy and surgery for its 
removal, though the cancer eventually spread to other organs. 
{¶ 5} Following her surgery, the Celmers’ legal counsel contacted Dr. 
Jay Thompson, who became her expert witness in this case. After reviewing her 
X-ray films, Thompson concluded that the cancer in her breast could have been 
discerned in the 1997 and 1998 mammograms and opined that the failure to 
identify the cancer constituted a deviation from the standard of care. 
January Term, 2007 
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{¶ 6} Thereafter, on April 28, 2000, the Celmers filed a medical 
malpractice action against Radiology Associates, Warren Radiologists, Inc., St. 
Joseph Health Center, and Drs. Walker, Shin, Rodgers, Goettsch, and George. 
{¶ 7} At a pretrial conference held on March 20, 2001, the trial court 
scheduled the case for trial on March 11, 2002.  However, in June 2001, the court 
continued the trial to June 17, 2002, at the request of Drs. Walker and Shin and 
Radiology Associates.  Subsequently, on October 29, 2001, the court granted Dr. 
George’s motion to stay all proceedings as a result of an insolvency proceeding in 
the state of New York involving her insurance carrier.  The stay remained in 
effect until January 2003, when the court granted the Celmers’ motion and 
rescheduled trial for February 23, 2004.  However, on April 14, 2003, at the 
request of Dr. George and over the Celmers’ objection, the trial court continued 
the February 23 trial date to May 18, 2004. 
{¶ 8} The court began trial in May 2004 against Drs. Walker and Shin 
and Radiology Associates.  On the second day of trial, the court permitted defense 
counsel to voir dire Dr. Thompson regarding his competency to testify as an 
expert witness on behalf of the Celmers.  During voir dire, Thompson 
acknowledged that he held a license to practice medicine in Ohio, that between 
February 1997 and October 2003 he had spent at least one-half of his professional 
time in the active clinical practice of radiology but admitted that as of November 
2003 he had resided in the state of Florida and had not engaged in the practice of 
medicine.  He further testified that four days before commencement of trial, he 
had accepted a new position with a radiology practice group in Ohio, where he 
would receive training to interpret computer radiology results. 
{¶ 9} Following Thompson’s voir dire, defense counsel moved to 
preclude his expert testimony, arguing that he no longer qualified as a medical 
expert witness pursuant to Evid.R. 601(D) because, at the time of his voir dire 
examination, he did not devote one-half of his professional time to the active 
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clinical practice of medicine.  The trial court overruled the motion, observing that 
the defense counsel had requested a trial continuance and noting that had the case 
been tried when first scheduled, the issue would never have arisen.  The court also 
observed that the parties did not dispute that Thompson met the requirements of 
Evid.R. 601(D) during 1997 to 1999, the period of time relevant to his testimony 
regarding the standard of care exercised in this case. 
{¶ 10} Pursuant to the court’s ruling, Thompson testified at trial that 
Walker and Shin deviated from the standard of care when they failed to diagnose 
Celmer with cancer based upon the mammograms and the sonograms.  Following 
deliberations, the jury returned verdicts in favor of the Celmers of $85,000 against 
Dr. Walker and Radiology Associates and $115,000 against Dr. Shin and 
Radiology Associates. 
{¶ 11} Walker, Shin, and Radiology Associates filed a notice of appeal to 
the Trumbull County Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court had abused its 
discretion by permitting Thompson to testify as an expert witness because he did 
not devote one-half of his professional time to the active clinical practice of 
medicine at the time of trial, as required by Evid.R. 601(D).  The appellate court 
rejected that argument, holding that the court did not abuse its discretion because 
Evid.R. 601(D) permits flexibility in determining whether an expert meets the 
requirements of the rule.  Celmer v. Rodgers, Trumbull App. No. 2004-T-0074, 
2005-Ohio-7054, ¶ 24. 
{¶ 12} We granted discretionary review to examine the issue of whether, 
in conformity with Evid.R. 601(D), a trial court may permit a witness to offer 
expert testimony on the liability of a physician if that witness at the time of trial 
does not devote one-half of his professional time to the active clinical practice of 
medicine.  Walker, Shin, and Radiology Associates urge that the court should 
strictly construe Evid.R. 601(D) to mean that a witness cannot testify as an expert 
on the issue of liability in a civil action against a physician unless, at the time of 
January Term, 2007 
5 
the testimony, that witness devotes one-half of his professional time to the active 
clinical practice of medicine.  The Celmers respond that the rule should be 
liberally construed, arguing that a strict interpretation would lead to an unjust 
result. 
{¶ 13} Evid.R. 601 identifies those competent to testify as witnesses, 
stating: 
{¶ 14} “Every person is competent to be a witness except: 
{¶ 15} “* * * 
{¶ 16} “(D) A person giving expert testimony on the issue of liability in 
any claim asserted in any civil action against a physician, podiatrist, or hospital 
arising out of the diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person by a physician or 
podiatrist, unless the person testifying is licensed to practice medicine and 
surgery, osteopathic medicine and surgery, or podiatric medicine and surgery by 
the state medical board or by the licensing authority of any state, and unless the 
person devotes at least one-half of his or her professional time to the active 
clinical practice in his or her field of licensure, or to its instruction in an 
accredited school.” 
{¶ 17} This rule incorporates much of R.C. 2743.43 but supersedes (A)(2) 
of that section, which requires an expert to devote three-quarters of his or her 
professional time to active clinical practice.  See 1980 Staff Notes to Evid.R. 
601(D) and Wise v. Doctors Hosp. N. (1982), 7 Ohio App.3d 331, 7 OBR 427, 
455 N.E.2d 1032. 
{¶ 18} Thus, Evid.R. 601(D) excepts from those competent to be 
witnesses persons who fail to meet its dual requirements, i.e., the witness both is 
“licensed to practice medicine and surgery, osteopathic medicine and surgery, or 
podiatric medicine and surgery by the state medical board or by the licensing 
authority of any state” and “devotes at least one-half of his or her professional 
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time to the active clinical practice in his or her field of licensure, or to its 
instruction in an accredited school.” 
{¶ 19} A trial court has discretion to determine whether a witness is 
competent to testify as an expert, and the trial court’s decision will not be 
reversed absent a clear showing that the court abused its discretion.  McCrory v. 
State (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 99, 105, 21 O.O.3d 63, 423 N.E.2d 156, citing Ohio 
Turnpike Comm. v. Ellis (1955), 164 Ohio St. 377, 58 O.O. 179, 131 N.E.2d 397, 
paragraph eight of the syllabus; Alexander v. Mt. Carmel Med. Ctr. (1978), 56 
Ohio St.2d 155, 10 O.O.3d 332, 383 N.E.2d 564; State v. Maupin (1975), 42 Ohio 
St.2d 473, 71 O.O.2d 485, 330 N.E.2d 708; Akron v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1966), 5 
Ohio St.2d 237, 34 O.O.2d 467, 215 N.E.2d 366; Tully v. Mahoning Express Co. 
(1954), 161 Ohio St. 457, 53 O.O. 354, 119 N.E.2d 831.  An abuse of discretion is 
more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the trial court's attitude, in 
reaching its decision, was arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable.  See 
Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 5 OBR 481, 450 N.E.2d 
1140. 
{¶ 20} In McCrory, 67 Ohio St.2d at 103, 21 O.O.3d 63, 423 N.E.2d 156, 
we considered whether the “active clinical practice” requirement bars the 
testimony of physicians who do not treat patients directly.  That case involved a 
physician-witness employed by a pharmaceutical company to develop and 
evaluate new drugs.  Over an objection that the witness did not meet the “active 
clinical practice” requirement, the trial court permitted the physician to testify as 
an expert. 
{¶ 21} On review in this court, we rejected the narrow interpretation of 
the term “active clinical practice,” explaining that “the purpose of the 
[requirement] is to preclude testimony by the physician who earns his living or 
spends much of his time testifying against his fellows as a professional witness, 
and to prevent those whose lack of experiential background in the very field they 
January Term, 2007 
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seek to judge, the clinical practitioner, makes the validity of their opinions 
suspect, from expressing those opinions for pay or otherwise.”  Id.  Based upon 
the purpose of the requirement, we concluded there that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion, as “the phrase ‘active clinical practice’ includes more than 
those physicians who regularly treat patients directly * * *.”  Id. at 104, 21 OO.3d 
63, 423 N.E.2d 156. 
{¶ 22} Similarly, Chief Justice Moyer, then sitting as a member of the 
Tenth District Court of Appeals, identified the intent of Evid.R. 601(D) and its 
statutory counterpart:  “The purpose of the restriction on expert testimony is to 
discourage, as far as possible, testimony regarding the proper standard of care by 
a ‘professional witness.’ ”  Wise, 7 Ohio App.3d at 334, 7 OBR 427, 455 N.E.2d 
1032 (explaining that “the rule merely establishes the competence of the witness 
and the parties are free to attack the credibility of the witness who spends little 
time in the clinical practice”). 
{¶ 23} Based on the foregoing, we reiterate that the purpose of Evid.R. 
601(D) is to prohibit a physician who makes his living as a professional witness 
from testifying on the liability of physicians who devote their professional time to 
the treatment of patients.  See McCrory, 67 Ohio St.2d at 103-104, 21 O.O.3d 63, 
423 N.E.2d 156. 
{¶ 24} In addition, Evid.R. 601(D) operates in conformity both with 
Evid.R. 104(A), which provides that “[p]reliminary questions concerning the 
qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the 
admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court,” and with Evid.R. 102, 
which states, “The purpose of these rules is to provide procedures for the 
adjudication of causes to the end that the truth may be ascertained and 
proceedings justly determined.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 25} Evid.R. 601(D) uses the present tense in providing that a person is 
unable to offer medical expert testimony unless that person is licensed to practice 
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medicine and devotes at least one-half of his or her professional time to active 
clinical practice.  This, however, does not preclude a trial court from exercising 
discretion in an appropriate case to determine that a physician is competent to 
testify, as in this case, where the witness would have qualified as an expert but for 
defense continuances and a stay of proceedings resulting from the insolvency of a 
defendant’s carrier.  Given the specific facts of this case and Dr. Thompson’s 
competency to testify as an expert at the originally scheduled March 2002 trial, 
his disengagement from the active clinical practice of medicine prior to the May 
2004 trial date did not render him incompetent to testify. 
{¶ 26} In this case, the record supports the conclusion that Dr. Thompson 
satisfied the requirements of Evid.R. 601(D) at the time the cause of action 
accrued, at the time of filing suit, and during the first three years of this litigation.  
As the trial court noted, the Evid.R. 601(D) issue in this case would not have 
arisen had the court commenced trial as originally scheduled.  On these facts, 
Thompson’s hiatus from the practice of medicine should not render him 
incompetent to testify in this matter and does not cause him to become a 
“professional witness.”  As the appellate court recognized, the trial court’s 
decision here was not arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable; thus, the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion when it qualified Dr. Thompson to testify as an 
expert witness in this case. 
{¶ 27} Generally, an expert witness in a medical malpractice action must 
meet the requirements of Evid.R. 601(D) at the time the testimony is offered at 
trial.  But the facts here are an exception to that general rule.  In a medical 
malpractice action where trial continuances requested by the defense and the 
insolvency of a defendant’s carrier delay trial for such time as the plaintiff’s 
medical expert no longer devotes one-half of his professional time to the active 
clinical practice of medicine, and where the medical expert is not a professional 
January Term, 2007 
9 
witness, a trial court has discretion to permit that witness to testify as an expert at 
trial. 
{¶ 28} For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in syllabus and judgment only. 
 
MOYER, C.J., O’CONNOR and CUPP, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 29} Because I believe that this case presents a unique scenario that 
does not provide the court with a sufficiently meaningful opportunity to explore 
the important legal and policy questions it implicates, I believe that the appeal 
should be dismissed as having been improvidently accepted. 
{¶ 30} I would further hold that the court of appeals’ holding should be 
limited to this case and should not be cited as authority in ensuing cases, except 
by the parties inter se. 
{¶ 31} I therefore dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm. 
__________________ 
 
CUPP, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 32} Because I believe that a plain reading of Evid.R. 601(D) must 
determine this case, I respectfully dissent. 
{¶ 33} It appears uncontroverted that appellees’ expert was competent to 
testify (1) when the alleged malpractice occurred, (2) when the trial was originally 
scheduled in 2002, and (3) when appellees’ expert continued his practice on a 
reduced basis until the fall of 2003.  Presumably, appellees’ expert would be 
competent to testify if the trial were held today.  Evid.R. 601(D) supports these 
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points of agreement; it also rendered appellees’ expert incompetent to testify at 
the time of the actual trial. 
{¶ 34} Evid.R. 601(D) uses the present tense to describe when a person is 
competent to give medical testimony as an expert.  Unless the witness “is licensed 
to practice medicine” and “devotes at least one-half of his or her professional time 
to the active clinical practice,” the witness is not competent to give medical 
testimony as an expert.  (Emphasis added.)  A plain application of this rule leads 
unavoidably to the conclusion that both in April 2004, when appellees’ expert 
gave his deposition, and in May 2004, when appellees’ expert testified at trial 
over objection, he was not competent to provide such testimony.1  At neither time 
was appellees’ expert then devoting one-half of his professional time to active 
clinical practice as required by Evid.R. 601(D).  Instead, appellees’ expert had left 
his Ohio radiology practice in October 2003 to reside in Florida.  It was not until 
sometime after the May 2004 trial that he returned to active clinical practice in 
Ohio.  According to the clear language of Evid.R. 601(D), appellee’s expert was 
not competent to testify at the deposition or at the trial. 
{¶ 35} This conclusion, however, is not meant to countenance the use of 
Evid.R. 601(D), together with repeated trial delays, as a litigation strategy to 
render an opposing party’s expert incompetent.  Nor do I conclude that a 
temporary absence of short duration, such as a sabbatical, would automatically 
render an otherwise qualified medical expert incompetent to testify. 
{¶ 36} The rule amendment process, however, is a more appropriate 
mechanism to address the policy concerns raised by appellees and to weigh the 
advisability of various options and alternatives.  It may well be that the current 
requirements of Evid.R. 601(D) are overly restrictive.  Other states have adopted 
                                                          
 
1.  The issue of whether a deposition taken of an expert witness, competent under Evid.R. 601(D) 
at the time of the taking of the deposition, may be offered in evidence at a later trial when the 
expert is no longer competent under Evid.R. 601(D) is not before us.  Consequently, no opinion is 
expressed regarding that situation.  
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variations of the rule.  These variations often require a proposed medical expert 
witness to have been engaged in active clinical practice either within a certain 
period, typically a year, before the alleged negligence or at the time of the alleged 
negligence.  See, generally, Ala.Code 6-5-548(b) and (c); Ariz.Rev.Stat. 12-
2604(A)(2); Fla.Stat. 766.102(5); Mich.Comp.Laws 600.2169(1); N.C.G.S. 8C-1, 
Rule 702(b)(2); Tenn.Code Ann. 29-26-115(b); Va.Code Ann. 8.01-581.20(A).  
Colorado requires no demonstration of having engaged in active clinical practice, 
but requires only that the expert was “substantially familiar” with the applicable 
standard of care at the time of the alleged negligence.  Colo.Rev.Stat. 13-64-401. 
{¶ 37} In the present case, however, because the duty of the trial court is 
to apply the plain meaning of the rule as it exists, the ruling contrary to such 
constituted an abuse of discretion.  The court of appeals’ decision affirming the 
trial court should be reversed. 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
Norman A. Moses and Mary Ellen Brannigan, for appellees. 
Roetzel & Andress, L.P.A., Thomas A. Treadon, Stacy A. Ragon, Michael 
J. Fuchs, and Douglas G. Leak, for appellants. 
Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., and Paul W. Flowers; Linton & Hirshman 
and Tobias J. Hirshman, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Academy of 
Trial Lawyers. 
______________________