Case Title: KEITH KENNETH ZUMBERGE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0255

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-08-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
KEITH KENNETH ZUMBERGE V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 111Case Number: S-09-0255Decided: 08/05/2010NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
KEITH 
KENNETH ZUMBERGE,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sheridan County

The 
Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Michael 
Reese, Contract Appellate Counsel, of Michael Henry Reese, PC; Diane Lozano, 
Wyoming Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief 
Justice at time of expedited conference.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The appellant, 
Keith Zumberge, appeals his conviction for felony driving while under the 
influence, alleging that his constitutional rights to due process of law and to 
confront witnesses were violated by the district court's failure reasonably to 
accommodate his hearing impairment at trial.  Finding no error, we 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Were the measures 
employed by the district court at trial to accommodate the appellant's partial 
hearing loss so unreasonable and inadequate as to have violated the appellant's 
constitutional rights to due process of law and to confront the witnesses 
against him?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The facts 
surrounding the criminal charge in this case are not material.  The only underlying fact of significance 
is that the appellant has a 60% hearing loss in his left ear. The appellant 
brought his hearing loss to the district court's attention prior to the trial 
and accommodations were made aimed at ensuring that the appellant was able to 
hear at trial.  No specific 
objection was made regarding the district court's accommodations until two 
months after the trial when, at sentencing, the appellant informed the district 
court that due to his hearing impairment he was not able to hear portions of the 
trial proceedings.  The district 
court briefly addressed the appellant's comments and imposed its sentence.  The appellant filed a timely notice of 
appeal.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶4]      The appellant 
never formally objected to the alleged failure by the district court to 
accommodate his hearing impairment, therefore we will review this matter under 
the plain error standard:

 
 
Even 
when constitutional error is alleged, each criterion must be satisfied or a 
claim for review under the plain-error doctrine will fail.  To establish plain error, the appellant 
must prove (1) the record clearly reflects the alleged error; (2) the existence 
of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; (3) a clear and obvious transgression of 
that rule of law; and (4) the error adversely affected a substantial right 
resulting in material prejudice to him.

 
 

Snow 
v. State, 
2009 WY 117, ¶ 13, 216 P.3d 505, 509 (Wyo. 2009) (citations, quotation marks, 
and footnote omitted).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶5]      Regarding the 
first prong of plain error, the record clearly reflects the accommodations made 
by the district court to ensure that the appellant was able to hear the 
proceedings, which accommodations are now alleged by the appellant to have been 
inadequate.  Turning to the second 
prong, "[t]he Sixth Amendment and the due 
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution guarantee an accused the right to 
be present during every stage of the 
criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would 
contribute to the fairness of the procedure."  Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 102, ¶ 
20, 33 P.3d 758, 765 (Wyo. 2001).  
"The right to be present at trial stems in part from the fact that by his 
physical presence the defendant can hear and see the proceedings . . . and can 
participate in the presentation of his rights."  Id. at ¶ 21, at 765 (quoting Bustamante v. Eyman, 456 F.2d 269, 274 (9th Cir. 1972)).  Although 
this Court has previously recognized that a defendant's ability to hear the 
proceedings carries constitutional implications, see Chapman v. State, 2001 WY 25, ¶ 31, 
18 P.3d 1164, 1176 (Wyo. 2001), we have not had occasion to undertake a 
detailed analysis of the question.  
Therefore, we look to other jurisdictions that have addressed this 
matter.

 
 
A 
hearing-impaired defendant's right to due process may be implicated in the same 
way that the absence of an interpreter for a non-English speaking defendant's 
right may be implicated:  "A 
defendant who cannot hear is analogous to a defendant who cannot understand 
English, and a severely hearing-impaired defendant cannot be tried without 
adopting reasonable measures to accommodate his or her disability." State v. Schaim, 65 Ohio St. 3d 51, 64, 
600 N.E.2d 661, 672 (1992); see Ferrell 
v. Estelle, 568 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir.), vacated as moot, 573 F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 
1978). 

 
 
A 
number of courts have held, and we agree, that hearing-impaired defendants have 
a constitutional right to hearing assistance and an appropriate accommodation of 
that right. 

 
 

People 
v. James, 
937 P.2d 781, 783 (Colo. App. 1996).  
Under our state and federal constitutions, a clear and unequivocal rule 
of law exists requiring a court to make reasonable accommodations to ensure that 
a hearing impaired individual can hear and properly participate in the 
proceedings.  

 
 
[¶6]      Finally, we must 
determine whether that rule of law was violated here; that is, whether the 
accommodations made by the district court in this case were adequate and 
reasonable.  "[O]nce a trial court 
has identified that a hearing-impaired defendant requires some assistance, the 
trial court has broad discretion in accommodating the defendant's right to that 
assistance."  James, 937 P.2d  at 783 (citations 
omitted); see also Cadet v. State, 809 So. 2d 43, 44-46 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); State v. 
Riddick, 763 A.2d 1062, 1065-67 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001); State v. Neave, 344 N.W.2d 181, 188-89 
(Wis. 1984).

 
 
[T]he 
manner of protecting the defendant's rights must depend upon the circumstances 
of the case, and therefore the trial court has discretion to determine the 
proper accommodations.  People ex rel. Myers v. Briggs, 46 Ill. 2d 281, 287, 263 N.E.2d 109 (1970).  But to exercise that discretion the court 
must first make some meaningful inquiry into the nature and extent of the 
defendant's hearing impairment.  

 
 

People 
v. Williams, 
771 N.E.2d 1095, 1099 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).  

 
 
[¶7]      We will examine 
the record to determine whether the district court properly inquired into the 
nature and extent of the appellant's hearing impairment, and whether the 
accommodations made were reasonable and adequate.  At the arraignment, the appellant 
informed the district court that he did not suffer from any mental health 
illnesses or deficiencies, or "from any other illnesses or injuries that would 
prevent [him] from being able to understand or participate in these 
proceedings."  He did, however, 
inform the court that, "I can't hear very good," and his attorney added that 
"[h]e has trouble hearing, Your Honor."  Thereafter, the appellant answered all 
questions put to him by the court, without apparent hesitation or 
difficulty.  Further, upon being 
asked a second time if there was "any reason that would prevent you from being 
able to understand and participate in these proceedings[,]" the appellant 
answered in the negative.

 
 
[¶8]      At a pretrial 
conference, held about a month before trial, neither the appellant nor his 
attorney made any mention of the appellant's hearing problem.  Similarly, the issue was not raised in 
the appellant's trial brief.  About 
a week before trial, however, the appellant sent a letter to the district court 
addressing, among other things, his hearing impairment.  The letter stated, in pertinent 
part:

 
 
Dear 
[District Court Judge]: 

 
 
As 
we move closer to my trial date of July 15th, there [are] a couple of items that 
I wish to bring to your attention. 1) I am hearing impaired. [My attorney] is 
and has been aware of this fact since he came to represent me in the above 
referenced matter.  At the pre-trial 
conference, I thought he would have informed the court of this fact so that 
arrangements could have been made so that I could hear what was 
transpiring.  As it turns out, I 
heard very little what was said that day.  
I hope better arrangements can be made for my trial. 

 
 
The 
district court responded to this letter in chambers on the first day of 
trial:

 
 
THE 
COURT:  . . . .  We are scheduled to begin a jury trial 
at 9:00 a.m.  It is approximately 
8:30.  There are a few issues that 
the Court wanted to address with the parties on the record before we 
started.  First is, the Court 
received last week a letter from the defendant indicating that he has some 
hearing impairment.  We had a brief 
conversation off the record in which he indicated in a normal tone of voice in 
the context of chambers he was able to hear me.  Is that correct, Mr. 
Zumberge?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yes, I can hear most of 
it right now.  Thank 
you.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Additionally, the courtroom 
has an amplified sound system.  
There are microphones available for the Court, for the witness and for 
the attorneys.  We don't always use 
it for the attorneys but it is set up and I have requested and will require the 
attorneys to use the microphone in this case.  Also, everybody is going to have to be 
conscientious in advising their witnesses to speak up.  Lawyers please speak up loud and 
clearly.  Use your courtroom 
voice.

 
 
            
Mr. Zumberge, if you are having difficulty hearing, make sure you let 
[defense counsel] know so we can make further accommodations.  Based on my memory, my memory is as long 
as we are speaking into the microphones that you were able to hear.  Is that the way it was in the 
arraignment?  Not the pretrial, but 
the arraignment awhile back?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT: I think I have heard most of the arraignment.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Well, your obligation is to 
let [defense counsel] know if you are not hearing so we can accommodate 
that.  Will you do 
that?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  Uh huh.  Yes.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Okay, anything else with 
respect to that issue that either party would like to make of 
record?

 
 
[THE 
PROSECUTOR]:  No, Your 
Honor.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  [Defense 
counsel]?

 
 
[DEFENSE 
COUNSEL]:  No. 

 
 
The 
trial transcript reveals that, to the district court's credit, this recognition 
of the appellant's hearing impairment was not just "lip service."  In its opening remarks to the jury panel, 
the district court requested that the lawyers, witnesses, and jurors speak "in a 
clear, loud, understandable voice[,] [s]o everybody can hear and it can be 
recorded and know what is being said."  Later, during voir dire, the district court 
interrupted a juror who was answering a question and admonished the juror to 
"speak up" and to "talk loud and clear."  Further, as each witness was called to 
testify, the witness was instructed either by the judge or the prosecutor to sit 
close to the microphone, and to adjust the microphone so that the witness was 
speaking directly into it.  Upon the 
appellant's request, several witnesses were reminded during their testimony to 
speak louder or to speak directly into the microphone.  Additionally, the district court 
admonished the prosecutor twiceonce during a bench conference and once during 
closing argumentto speak louder or directly into the 
microphone.

 
 
[¶9]      During the direct 
examination of the individual who called 911 to report the appellant's erratic 
driving, defense counsel told the district court, "We can't hear," after the 
witness stated her name.  The 
district court then instructed the witness to "talk more into the 
microphone.  He is having a hard 
time hearing you."  The witness then 
repeated her name.  A few questions 
later, the prosecutor stated to the witness, "You might have to still talk a 
little louder. [The appellant] is hearing impaired, and you need to speak 
louder."

 
 
[¶10]   During the arresting officer's 
direct examination testimony regarding his arrival at the appellant's house, the 
appellant stated, "I can't hear anything."  The prosecutor then told the officer, "I 
guess they need you to speak up a little more."  The district court also told the officer, 
"Speak up, too, if you would, sir."  
The prosecutor then repeated her question, and the officer answered the 
question.

 
 
[¶11]   Although the appellant complained 
on a few occasions to not being able to hear or understand certain testimony, at 
no time during the trial did he or defense counsel make a general complaint to 
the district court that he was unable to hear or that the amplified sound system 
was inadequate.  At the noon recess, 
for instance, the district court asked whether there was "anything either party 
would like to make of record" and defense counsel responded, "No, Your Honor." 
 After the State rested, the 
appellant made a motion for judgment of acquittal.  In that motion, the appellant never 
indicated he was unable to hear any previous testimony, that the remedies 
employed to accommodate his hearing impairment were inadequate, or that he could 
not presently hear what was taking place.  
At least eight times during the appellant's cross-examination, the 
prosecutor began a question with: "You heard [the witness say or] testify that . 
. . ."  The appellant answered these 
questions without any problem and at times even acknowledged he had actually 
heard the prior testimony to which the prosecutor was referring.  Finally, the appellant did not mention 
during the discussion of his renewed motion for judgment of acquittal, during 
the jury instructions conference, or during the reading of the jury 
instructions, that he had any problem hearing during the trial or that the 
remedies employed when he had mentioned he could not hear were 
inadequate.

 
 
[¶12]   It was not until his sentencing 
hearing that the appellant, for the first time, notified the district court that 
he had had significant trouble hearing during voir dire and during his trial, and that 
the means adopted by the district court to prevent that problem were inadequate: 

 
 
THE 
[APPELLANT]:  . . . .  At the trial, I really could not hear 
much of what was going on as far as the jury selection.  There was [sic] no microphones for the 
prospective jurors to speak into, and I just had to trust [defense counsel] with 
picking the right people.  And as 
far as the prosecution witnesses, I know I spoke to [defense counsel] a couple 
of times when I could not hear what they were saying, and they did speak into 
the mic occasionally but they always seemed to look back toward the jury, and 
then again I could not hear them again.  Also, when the Court admonished them to 
speak into the microphone they never repeated what I had already missed, so 
consequently when I was on the stand defending myself, the prosecuting attorney 
brought up statements, or about statements that were made that I never heard. 
 In -- As a matter of fact, I did 
not hear them until the closing argument that they made.  Then again, also, whenever [defense 
counsel] was at the podium directing cross examination I had no one I could poke 
to say that I could not hear anything.  So I basically had to sit there and grin 
and bear it. 

 
 
I 
should say that when I was, or had a bench trial in Gillette, for misdemeanor, I 
could not hear very well there either and they took a recess and brought out a 
little amplifier with a volume control on it and an ear piece and that worked 
fine.  I could hear the prosecutor 
and I could hear the Judge and I could hear just fine. 

 
 
In 
response, the district court stated: 

 
 
THE 
COURT: Thank you.  Based upon the 
argument of counsel, the information in the PSI, the information listed at the 
trial in this matter, first, I specifically discussed with counsel and the 
[appellant] on several occasions, and the Court will rely on the record, if you 
had difficulty hearing you needed to make the Court aware of it and 
accommodations were made and continued to be made using the amplified system in 
the courtroom.  I don't view this as 
a motion for a new trial.  It has 
not been filed that way, but the [appellant]'s comment with respect to his 
ability or inability to hear, I am making a record that the [appellant] was 
admonished on several occasions if he had difficulty hearing he needed to make 
the Court aware of it so accommodations could be made and accommodations were 
made every time, is my memory. 

 
 
[¶13]   In this appeal, the appellant 
asserts that the district court should have considered "various alternatives 
other than an amplified sound system," and should have held a specific hearing 
to determine whether the amplified sound system was adequate.1  After reviewing the record, we conclude 
that the accommodations were adequate and reasonable, and therefore the district 
court did not abuse its discretion.  
After being advised of the appellant's hearing impairment, the district 
court researched the issue and discussed the appropriate course of action with 
the appellant and his counsel.  
Additionally, as outlined above, the district court ensured that 
appropriate measures were taken whenever the appellant expressed difficulty 
hearing or understanding.  
Furthermore, because the appellant expressed difficulty hearing at 
various times throughout the trial, it is reasonable to infer that he was able 
to hear during the remainder of the proceedings.  If the appellant could not hear at times 
during the trial, he should have advised the court of such.  "[T]rial judges are not omniscient. 
 A defendant's disability, if not 
obvious, must be timely communicated to the court."  State v. Howard, 730 P.2d 1030, 1032 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1986).  Finally, at 
sentencing the appellant described to the district court other accommodations (a 
personal speaker system) made in another trial in which he was the 
defendant.  Had he been unable to 
hear the proceedings in the present case, surely he would have requested such a 
device, or that other accommodations be made so that he could 
hear.

 
 
[¶14]   We conclude that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion when evaluating the appellant's hearing impairment 
and making accommodations to ensure that the appellant could hear the 
proceedings.  Therefore, no clear 
transgression of a rule of law occurred and the appellant's claim of error 
fails.

 
 
[¶15]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Although 
the appellant claims the district court should have considered and utilized 
other accommodations, he does not specifically indicate what accommodations 
would have been more reasonable or appropriate.