Case Title: Moye v. State

Citation: 369 Md. 2

Docket Number: 91/01

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2002-04-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Kevin Moye v. State of Maryland, No. 91, September Term, 2001.
[Criminal Law – Sufficiency of Evidence to Support Convictions for Possession of
Controlled Dangerous Substances and Paraphernalia in Violation of Maryland Code (1957,
1996 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, §§ 287 and 287A, held: the State failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt at trial that petitioner exercised knowing dominion or control over the
controlled dangerous substances and paraphernalia. The evidence did not disclose if
petitioner knew of the existence of drugs found in the basement area of a home in which he
had no ownership or possessory interest, and where the evidence did not demonstrate if
petitioner had recently been engaging in the mutual use and enjoyment of the contraband.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 91
September Term, 2001
KEVIN MOYE
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Filed:  April 16, 2002
1
A “cutting” as referred to in the record in this case means a common law battery
committed by striking another with a knife.  See Lamb v. State, 93 Md. App. 422, 448, 613
A.2d 402, 414 (1992)(quoting R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW, 153-154 (3d ed. 1982)(“Force
may be applied to the person of another in many ways, as by striking another with the fist or
a stick or a stone, by kicking or tripping, lassoing with a rope, cutting with a knife, or
shooting.”); see also Banks v. State, 92 Md. App. 422, 427, 608 A.2d 1249, 1251
(1992)(police called “[t]o investigate a cutting” where defendant actually had stabbed her
boyfriend to death).
2
There was little evidence to establish that Moye “lived” in the Bullock household.  In
Petitioner’s brief, Moye uses the term “live” in framing the issue before the Court.  Moye
In the present matter we are called upon to consider whether a person may be found
guilty of possession of a controlled dangerous substance (“CDS”) and / or possession of drug
paraphernalia in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, §§ 287 and
287A by virtue of having been staying in a house and having been present in the dwelling’s
basement in which drugs were located inside drawers which were open or partially open.
Petitioner, Kevin Moye, argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions
for possession of marijuana and cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia.  We agree and
therefore shall reverse. 
I.
Facts
In the early morning hours of March 6, 2000, Prince George’s County Police received
a call that a “cutting”1 was in progress at 3414 Ricky Avenue in Temple Hills, Maryland.
The home was leased by Yolanda and Joseph Bullock, a husband and wife, who rented out
the basement to Greg Benson.  All of the occupants of the Bullocks’s residence were present
in the home on March 6th, along with petitioner Kevin Moye, the brother of Yolanda
Bullock, who may have been staying in the Bullocks’s home.2
also argues, however, that if he was in fact residing in the Bullocks’s home, “he lived
upstairs with [them], not in the basement rented by Greg Benson.”  (Pet. at 17-18).  Petitioner
also noted that at trial the “[o]fficers did not testify as to any belongings, residency papers,
or any other evidence which could establish that Petitioner resided at the home.”  (Pet. at 18).
The record is clear that Greg Benson was the sole lessee of the Bullocks’s basement.
2
When the police arrived at the home, Yolanda Bullock came out of the house to meet
them and stated that someone had cut her foot.  She was followed by her husband, Joseph
Bullock, who was uninjured.  Shortly thereafter, Greg Benson came out of the house with
cuts on both of his legs and told the police that someone else remained in the home.  The
police set up a barricade around the home and contacted the Emergency Service Team, a
specialty assault weapons team, for support. 
The police observed a black male, later identified as Moye, the petitioner, on the first
floor of the Bullocks’s home moving from windows on the left side of the house to windows
at the front of the house.  The police used a public announcement system to ask Moye to
come out of the house under threat of sending in a K-9 unit.  Once the K-9 announcement
was made, Officer William R. Silvers, Jr. observed Moye looking through one of the
windows at the back of the house on the first floor and then through a window in the back
of the basement area. Thereafter, Officer Silvers saw no further movement within the house.
Several minutes elapsed before Moye exited the Bullocks’s home from a door leading out
of the basement area which had been rented to Benson.  Moye proceeded to the top of the
basement steps on the outside of the home, where the officers arrested him.  Officer Robert
Black transported Moye to the hospital following his arrest so that he could receive treatment
3
Section 286(a)(1) provides:
(a) Except as authorized by this subheading, it is unlawful for
any person:
(1) To manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or to possess
a controlled dangerous substance in sufficient quantity to
3
for a cut on his finger. 
Following Moye’s arrest, Officer Silvers testified that he and Officer Walden went
to the back of the house to “make sure there were no other victims, no other suspects or
weapons in the house.”   The officers entered the Bullocks’s home through the basement door
which had been used by Moye to leave the home.  The basement area, as described by Officer
Silvers, consisted of a small hallway opening into a larger living area bounded on one side
with a long counter area encasing a sink, kitchen cabinets, and drawers.  Three of the drawers
were open or partially opened and contained several small baggies of marijuana, a small
digital scale betraying white residue, and a dinner plate upon which rested a razor blade and
white residue. 
Officer Silvers noticed a missing ceiling panel above the counter area.  When he stood
on the counter top to look into the ceiling, he discovered a bag containing marijuana and
crack cocaine.  No other drugs or paraphernalia were found anywhere else in the house.
The Bullocks, Benson, and Moye were all indicted with charges of possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Rep. Vol., 2001
Supp.), Art. 27, Section 286(a)(1),3 possession of cocaine in violation of Maryland Code
reasonably indicate under all circumstances an intent to
manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled dangerous
substance;
Section 286 was amended by Chapters 64 and 500 of the 1999 Maryland Laws, effective
October 1, 1999, however, these amendments did not alter the text germane to the case at bar.
4
Section 287 provides in pertinent part:
Except as authorized by this subheading, it is unlawful for any
person:
(a) To possess or administer to another any controlled dangerous
substance, unless such substance was obtained directly, or
pursuant to a valid prescription or order from a practitioner,
while acting in the course of his professional practice.
* * *
(e) Any person who violates this section shall, upon conviction,
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and be sentenced to a term
of imprisonment for not more than four (4) years, a fine of not
more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000), or both;
provided, however, that any such person convicted of a violation
of this section involving the use or possession of marihuana
shall be punished by a period of imprisonment not to exceed one
(1) year or by a fine not to exceed $1,000.00 or both.
5
Section 287A provides in relevant part:
4
(1957, 1996 Rep. Vol.), Art. 27, Section 287,4 possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol., 2001 Supp.), Art. 27,
Section 286(a)(1), possession of marijuana in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.
Vol.), Art. 27, Section 287, conspiracy to violate the controlled dangerous substances law of
Maryland with regard to the cocaine, and possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of
Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, Section 287A.5  
(a) Definition. – As used in this section, the term “drug
paraphernalia” means all equipment, products, and materials of
any kind which are used, intended for use, or designed for use,
in planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting,
manufacturing, 
compounding, 
converting, 
producing,
processing, 
preparing, 
testing, 
analyzing, 
packaging,
repackaging, 
storing, 
containing, 
concealing, 
injecting,
ingesting, inhaling, or otherwise introducing into the human
body a controlled dangerous substance in violation of this
subheading.  It includes but is not limited to:
* * *
(5) Scales and balances used, intended for use, or
designed for use in weighing or measuring controlled dangerous
substances; . . .
* * * 
(b) 
Factors 
in 
determining 
whether 
object 
is 
drug
paraphernalia. – In determining whether an object is drug
paraphernalia, a court or other authority should consider, in
addition to all other logically relevant factors, the following:
(1) Statements by an owner or by anyone in control of the
object concerning its use;
(2) Prior convictions, if any, of an owner, or of anyone in
control of the object, under any State or federal law relating to
any controlled dangerous substance;
(3) The proximity of the object, in time and space, to a
direct violation of this section or to a controlled dangerous
substance;
(4) The existence of any residue of controlled dangerous
substances on the object;
(5) Direct or circumstantial evidence of the intent of an
owner, or of anyone in control of the object, to deliver it to
persons whom he knows, or should reasonably know, intend to
use the object to facilitate a violation of this section; the
innocence of an owner, or of anyone in control of the object, as
to a direct violation of this section shall not prevent a finding
that the object is intended for use, or designed for use as drug
paraphernalia; . . . 
* * *
5
(c) Use or possession with intent to use. – It is unlawful for any
person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest,
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare,
test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest,
inhale, or otherwise introduce into the human body a controlled
dangerous substance in violation of this subheading.  Any
person who violates this subsection is guilty of a misdemeanor
and upon conviction for a first offense may be fined not more
than $500 . . . .
6
The Bullocks reached agreements with the State regarding the disposition of the
charges against them. Yolanda Bullock pled guilty to simple possession of marijuana.  Joseph
Bullock testified against Moye and Benson pursuant to a plea agreement whereby the State
placed the case against him on the STET docket in exchange for his testimony against Moye
and Benson. 
7
Maryland Rule 4-324(a) sets forth the basic procedure for making a Motion for
Judgment of Acquittal:
6
On September 27, 2000, trial commenced against both Moye and co-defendant, Greg
Benson.6  The State conceded that at no time did the police find drugs on the person of Kevin
Moye, nor had he been tested for drugs at the time of his arrest.  The State presented
evidence that the digital scale found in the basement area tested positive for cocaine residue,
although no drug testing was conducted on the plate upon which white powder residue was
found.  The evidence established that there was 0.07 grams of marijuana contained in the
small baggies found in the counter drawers and 60.22 grams of marijuana along with 29.82
grams of cocaine in the bag found in the ceiling panel of the basement.
Moye moved for judgment of acquittal7 at the close of the State’s case, arguing that
A defendant may move for judgment of acquittal on one or more
counts, or on one or more degrees of an offense which by law is
divided into degrees, at the close of the evidence offered by the
State and, in a jury trial, at the close of all the evidence.  The
defendant shall state with particularity all reasons why the
motion should be granted.  No objection to the motion for
judgment of acquittal shall be necessary.  A defendant does not
waive the right to make the motion by introducing evidence
during the presentation of the State’s case.
8
The trial court instructed the jury, in part, as follows:
In order for the State to prove each Defendant guilty of
possession as charged the State must prove, one, that the
Defendant knowingly possessed the substance.  Knowingly
possessed the substance.
Number two, that the Defendant knew the general
character, or illicit nature, of the substance.  That the Defendant
7
the decision in Taylor v. State, 346 Md. 452, 697 A.2d 462 (1997), disposed of the issues in
the case.  Moye asserted that the State had failed to demonstrate that he had exercised
dominion or control over the drugs found in the basement of the Bullocks’s home and failed
to show that he had known that the drugs existed.  The trial court granted the motion for
judgment of acquittal on the charge of conspiracy to distribute cocaine but denied the motion
as to all other charges.  Neither Moye nor Benson called any witnesses, and at the close of
the case Moye renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal as to all remaining counts.  At
that juncture, the trial judge granted the motion with regard to the charge for possession with
intent to distribute cocaine.  The case proceeded to the jury on the charges of possession of
cocaine, possession of marijuana, possession with intent to distribute marijuana, and
possession of drug paraphernalia.8
knew the general character or illicit nature of the substance.
And the third and last element is that the substance was
what it was alleged to be, cocaine or marijuana.
Now, what does possession mean?
Possession means having control over that substance,
whether it is actual or indirect.
Another word for indirect is constructive.
The Defendant does not have to be the only person who
is in possession of that particular substance.  And this means to
say that more than one person can be in possession of the same
substance at the same time.  We often times call this joint
possession.
A person not in actual control, who knowingly has both
the power and the intention to exercise control over a thing,
either personally or through another person, has what we call
indirect possession.
Now, in determining whether a Defendant has indirect
possession, or, again, constructive possession, as I said earlier,
of a substance, consider all of the surrounding circumstances.
Those circumstances can include, but are not limited to, say, the
distance between that Defendant and the substance, whether that
Defendant had some ownership or possessory interest in the
place where the substance was found, and any other indications
that the Defendant was participating in other than mutual use
and enjoyment of a substance.
During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial judge asking the court to “clarify
indirect possession versus direct possession,” and querying, “Is circumstantial evidence
considered enough to determine possession?”  In response, the trial judge reinstructed the
jury on possession.
9
Co-defendant Greg Benson was found guilty of possession of cocaine, possession with
intent to distribute cocaine, possession of marijuana, possession with intent to distribute
marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia.
8
The jury returned its verdict on September 28, 2000, finding Moye guilty of
possession of cocaine, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia, and
not guilty of possession with the intent to distribute marijuana.9  On October 23, 2000, the
9
trial court sentenced Moye to four years imprisonment for possession of cocaine concurrent
with one year for possession of marijuana, with all but two years suspended and credit for
time served and fined him $100.00 for possession of drug paraphernalia. 
On January 22, 2001, Moye filed a Motion for Modification and Reduction of
Sentence pursuant to Maryland Rule 4-345, arguing inter alia, that “the controlled dangerous
substances and paraphernalia recovered in this case were located in a residence where
[Moye] had been present but was not a resident,” and “[t]hat neither any controlled
dangerous substance nor paraphernalia were recovered from [Moye’s] person.”  The trial
court denied the motion on July 2, 2001.
Petitioner appealed the final judgment to the Court of Special Appeals, which
affirmed his conviction.  See Moye v. State, 139 Md. App. 538, 541, 776 A.2d 120, 122
(2001).  The Court of Special Appeals held that Moye’s “residence at a house in which
marijuana and cocaine were found in plain view, combined with his presence in the specific
area the drugs were located, was sufficient evidence to support his conviction for possession
of those drugs.”  Id. at 541, 776 A.2d at 122.  In reaching its holding, the Court of Special
Appeals emphasized that the facts of this case were distinguishable from Taylor v. State,
supra, and the cases cited therein, because those cases involved situations where controlled
dangerous substances were located in a closed container or outside of the plain view of the
accused.  See Moye, Id. at 547-48, 776 A.2d at 125-26. 
Moye filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with this Court, which we granted, 366
10
Md. 274, 783 A.2d 653 (2001), to consider the following:
1.
Where drugs and paraphernalia were found in open drawers in the basement
of a private residence, and the record shows that Petitioner and the lessees of
the house live upstairs and that the basement is rented to a fourth individual,
is Petitioner’s mere presence in the basement sufficient to sustain convictions
for possession of CDS and possession of paraphernalia?
2.
Did the instruction given fail to inform the jury that it could convict Petitioner
of possession of CDS and possession of paraphernalia only if it found, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that Petitioner did in fact exercise some dominion or
control over the CDS and paraphernalia?
For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the Court of Special Appeals’s decision
and Moye’s conviction on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence.  Therefore, we need not
and will not address petitioner’s second question.
II.
Standard of Review
The standard of review for appellate review of evidentiary sufficiency is whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes beyond a
reasonable doubt.  See State v. Albrecht, 336 Md. 475, 478-79, 649 A.2d 336, 337 (1994).
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.  See id. (citing Jackson
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573 (1979) and
Branch v. State, 305 Md. 177, 182-83, 502 A.2d 496, 498 (1986)).  We give “due regard to
11
the [fact finder’s] finding of facts, its resolution of conflicting evidence, and, significantly,
its opportunity to observe and assess the credibility of witnesses.”  McDonald v. State, 347
Md. 452, 474, 701 A.2d 675, 685 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1151, 118 S. Ct. 1173, 140
L. Ed. 2d 182 (1998) (quoting Albrecht, 336 Md. at 478, 649 A.2d at 337).  Although our
analysis does not involve a re-weighing of the evidence, we must determine whether the
jury’s verdict was supported by either direct or circumstantial evidence by which any rational
trier of fact could find Moye guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the various possession
charges.  See White v. State, 363 Md. 150, 162, 767 A.2d 855, 862 (2001); Garrison v. State,
272 Md. 123, 128, 321 A.2d 767, 770 (1974). 
The State’s case against Moye for possession of a controlled dangerous substance and
possession of paraphernalia depended on circumstantial evidence of joint and constructive
possession of the contraband.  While a valid conviction may be based solely on
circumstantial evidence, it cannot be sustained “on proof amounting only to strong suspicion
or mere probability.”  White, 363 Md. at 163, 767 A.2d at 862 (explaining that
“[c]ircumstantial evidence which merely arouses suspicion or leaves room for conjecture is
obviously insufficient”)(quoting Taylor, 346 Md. at 458, 697 A.2d at 465)(internal quotations
omitted).  A conviction based solely on circumstantial evidence should be sustained only
where “the circumstances, taken together, are inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis
of innocence.”  Wilson v. State, 319 Md.  530, 537, 573 A.2d 831, 834 (1990); West v. State,
312 Md. 197, 211-12, 539 A.2d 231, 238 (1988).
12
III.
Discussion
Moye was convicted of possession of cocaine and marijuana in violation of Art. 27,
Section 287, and possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of Art. 27, Section 287A.  The
Maryland Controlled Dangerous Substances Act, Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.)
Art. 27, §§ 276-304 defines possession as “the exercise of actual or constructive dominion
or control over a thing by one or more persons.”  Md. Code, Art. 27, § 277(s).  We have
further defined “control” of CDS as exercising a “restraining or directing influence over” the
item allegedly possessed.  See Garrison, 272 Md. at 142, 321 A.2d at 777.  For the State to
prove that Moye had control over the drugs or paraphernalia, the “evidence must show
directly or support a rational inference that the accused did in fact exercise some dominion
or control over the prohibited . . . drug in the sense contemplated by the statute, i.e., that [the
accused] exercised some restraining or direct influence over it.”  See McDonald, 347 Md. at
474, 701 A.2d at 686 (quoting State v. Leach, 296 Md. 591, 596, 463 A.2d 872, 874
(1983))(internal quotations omitted).  
The State did not need to show that Moye exercised sole possession of the drugs and
paraphernalia.  Rather, a person may have actual or constructive possession of the CDS, and
the possession may be either exclusive or joint in nature.  See Taylor, 346 Md. at 458, 697
A.2d at 465; see also Henderson v. State, 13 Md. App. 384, 392, 283 A.2d 418, 422 (1971).
Here, the State advanced the theory that Moye and co-defendant Benson had joint and
constructive possession of the marijuana, cocaine, and paraphernalia found in the basement.
13
Knowledge is an essential element of crimes of possession of CDS under Section 287
or 287A.   For, as we explained in Dawkins v. State, 313 Md. 638, 547 A.2d 1041 (1988):
an individual ordinarily would not be deemed to exercise
“dominion or control” over an object about which he is unaware.
Knowledge of the presence of an object is normally a
prerequisite to exercising dominion and control.
Id. at 649, 547 A.2d at 1046 (explaining that although the Maryland statute is silent with
regard to a knowledge or scienter requirement, the statutory scheme as a whole “indicates
an intention on the part of the General Assembly to require scienter as an element of the §
287 offenses”).  Therefore, in order to be found guilty of a violation of § 287 or § 287A, the
accused “must know of both the presence and the general character or illicit nature of the
substance . . . such knowledge may be proven by circumstantial evidence and by inferences
drawn therefrom.”  Id. at 651, 547 A.2d at 1047.  Thus, we must determine whether the State
established beyond a reasonable doubt that Moye exercised a knowing dominion or control
over the drugs and paraphernalia for which he has been convicted of possessing.  
We believe that our decisions in Taylor v. State, supra, Garrison v. State, supra,
McDonald v. State, supra, and White v. State, supra, direct the resolution of the case.  In
Taylor, police officers responded to a complaint about a possible controlled dangerous
substances violation at a beach motel.  346 Md. at 454-55, 697 A.2d at 463.  The occupants
admitted the officers to the room and permitted the police to search their belongings.  Id. at
455, 697 A.2d at 463-64.  When the officers entered the room, Taylor was lying on the floor,
either asleep or pretending to be asleep.  Id. at 455, 697 A.2d at 464.  One of the other
14
occupants of the room, Chris Myers, took a baggie of marijuana out of his own carrying bag
and informed the officers that it was his marijuana, as well as directing the officers to another
of his bags which also contained a baggie of marijuana.  Id. at 455-56, 697 A.2d at 464.
Although the officer testified that he smelled a strong odor of marijuana in the room, he did
not observe anyone smoking it, no marijuana was visible upon entry into the room, and the
ashtrays were all clean.  Id. at 456, 697 A.2d at 464.  
We reversed Taylor’s conviction for possession of marijuana and paraphernalia, some
of the same charges facing Moye, stating:
under the facts of this case, any finding that he was in
possession of the marijuana could be based on no more than
speculation or conjecture.  The State conceded at trial that no
marijuana or paraphernalia was found on [Taylor] or in his
personal belongings, nor did the officers observe [Taylor] or any
of the other occupants of the hotel room smoking marijuana.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,
[the officer’s] testimony established only that Taylor was
present in a room where marijuana had been smoked recently,
that he was aware that it had been smoked, and that Taylor was
in proximity to contraband that was concealed in a container
belonging to another.
The record is clear that [Taylor] was not in exclusive
possession of the premises, and that the contraband was secreted
in a hidden place not otherwise shown to be within [Taylor’s]
control.  Accordingly, a rational inference cannot be drawn that
he possessed the controlled dangerous substance.
Id. at 459, 697 A.2d at 465-66.  We explained that “mere proximity to the drug, mere
presence on the property where it is located, or mere association, without more, with the
person who does control the drug or property on which it is found, is insufficient to support
15
a finding of possession.”  Id. at 460, 697 A.2d at 466 (quoting Murray v. United States, 403
F.2d 694, 696 (9 th Cir. 1969)).
In our analysis in Taylor, we discussed Garrison v. State, supra, in which we also
reversed a conviction for possession with intent to distribute heroin based on insufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case of possession of a controlled dangerous substance
in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1971 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, Section 286(a)(1). Id. at 461-
62, 697 A.2d at 466-67.  With regard to whether Garrison knew the drugs were on the
premises, we noted that the heroin was seized from a bathroom where Garrison’s husband
was attempting to dispose of the drugs, while Garrison was lying in bed in another room.
See, Garrison, 272 Md. at 126, 321 A.2d at 769.  Under such circumstances we concluded
that, “[t]he seized heroin was not in the plain view of [Garrison], nor was there a
juxtaposition between her (in the front bedroom) and the contraband being jettisoned by her
husband in the bathroom.”  Id. at 131, 321 A.2d at 771.  Although Garrison had a possessory
interest in the house, she was not the sole occupant of the home at the time the drugs were
found.  See id.  Therefore, we reasoned, “[t]he appellant and her husband may well have
jointly participated in the distribution of heroin, but on this record there was no substantive
evidence offered which showed directly or supported a rational inference that she had ‘the
exercise of (either) actual or constructive dominion or control’ – solely or jointly with her
husband – over the 173 glassine bags of heroin seized while being discarded by her spouse.”
Id. at 142, 321 A.2d at 777.  In analyzing whether there had been “mutual use and enjoyment
16
of the contraband,” we noted that although Garrison had needle marks which were
approximately two weeks old, there were no fresh marks upon her body or other evidence
indicating recent use.  Id. at 127, 321 A.2d at 769, 771. 
Subsequent to our decision in Taylor, we had another occasion to determine whether
the evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case of possession of CDS.  In
McDonald v. State, 347 Md. 452, 474, 701 A.2d 675, 685 (1997), McDonald was convicted
of possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute and possession of marijuana.  Id. at
474, 701 A.2d at 686.  McDonald personally had signed for delivery of a United Parcel
Service (UPS) package which contained eighteen pounds of marijuana.  Id.  When the police
executed a search warrant for McDonald’s home half an hour after the package was
delivered, they found M cDonald standing over the UPS package with the drugs exposed.  Id.
at 474-75, 701 A.2d at 686.  In applying the reasoning of Taylor and Dawkins, we concluded
that the evidence was sufficient to support McDonald’s conviction.  Id. at 475, 701 A.2d at
686.
In our most recent case analyzing the rudiments of possession we were called upon
to determine whether the passenger in a car was in possession of CDS found in its trunk.  See
White, 363 Md. at 153, 767 A.2d at 857.  During the search of the trunk, the police found a
box full of pots and pans which had concealed within it a separate package of 194 grams of
cocaine.  Id. at 157, 767 A.2d at 859.
Similar to Moye’s predicament, the State’s case against White rested solely on
10
The only testimony at trial which suggested that Moye may have been residing with
the Bullocks on March 6, 2000, came from the following direct examination of Joseph
Bullock:
State’s Attorney: And was Kevin in your home that night
[March 6, 2000] at some time?
Bullock: Yes.
State’s Attorney: He was living in the house with you and your
wife?
Bullock: Yes.
17
circumstantial evidence that White had joint and constructive possession of the cocaine
found in the co-defendant’s trunk.  Id. at 162, 767 A.2d at 862.  Ultimately, we reversed
White’s conviction, finding that even if we assumed the evidence in the record was sufficient
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that White had knowledge that the drugs were in the
trunk of the car, there was insufficient evidence to establish that he exercised dominion and
control over them. Id. at 165, 767 A.2d at 863.
In applying the logic espoused in Taylor and its progeny to the facts of the case sub
judice, we are left with nothing but speculation as to Moye’s knowledge or exercise of
dominion or control over the drugs and paraphernalia found in the Bullocks’s basement.
Similar to the defendant in Taylor, Moye did not have any ownership or possessory right in
the premises where the drugs and paraphernalia were found.  Joseph Bullock testified at trial
that he and his wife, Yolanda, leased their home and that the couple rented out the basement
to Greg Benson, who had been residing there for several months prior to March 6, 2000.  He
further testified that at the time of the incident, Moye was “living” in the house with him and
his wife.10  No evidence was adduced at trial as to how long Moye had been staying at the
18
Bullocks’s home.  On this record, therefore, we cannot conclude that Moye had any
ownership or possessory right to or in the Bullocks’s home.
There is also nothing in the record establishing Moye’s proximity to the drugs during
the time he was in the basement.  The evidence failed to establish where Moye was located
in the basement in relation to the substances in question and the duration of his sojourn.  The
trial testimony established that one of the officers observed Moye looking out of a window
at the back of the basement shortly before he exited the house.  The record does not indicate
where the window at the back of the basement was in relation to the drugs and paraphernalia
found in the counter drawers.  The photographs entered in evidence at trial, however, show
that the window above the counter area where the drugs were found was covered completely
with cardboard, which would have made it impossible for the police to have observed Moye
through that vantage point.
The State’s argument and the Court of Special Appeals’s analysis in its opinion below
emphasized that the illicit substances attributable to Moye were located in the open in the
basement area.  In distinguishing our decision in Taylor, the Court of Special Appeals stated:
In this case, unlike Taylor and the cases it relied on, both
marijuana and cocaine were in the open and were not concealed.
The marijuana was in an open drawer, as was the dinner plate
with the white powdery residue, and a razor blade on top of the
plate. . . .Although [Moye did not live] in the basement where
the drugs were located, there was free access between the
upstairs and the basement.  Moreover, the police observed
[Moye] in the basement of the residence where the cocaine and
marijuana were discovered. [Moye’s] residence in the premises
and his presence in the room where the plain view contraband
19
was discovered allows a reasonable inference that [Moye] was
aware of and possessed the illegal drugs.
139 Md. at 548-49, 776 A.2d at 126.  The State and the Court of Special Appeals, however,
have gauged the “openness” of the location of the drugs from the perspective of the
individual searching for the drugs, rather than from the perspective of the accused whose
knowledge and awareness of the drugs are at issue.  
The photographs of the basement area show one small baggie of marijuana in the open
drawer to the right of the sink.  That drawer also contained a box of kitchen bags, photo
negatives, and the instructions booklet for the sink’s garbage disposal unit.  Two other
photographs depict two counter drawers to the left of the sink containing baggies of drugs,
the plate upon which the razor blade rested, the digital scale, and additional odds and ends
such as coupons, packing tape, and what appears to be a phone book.  These photographs
were taken by someone standing directly over the open drawers.  In contrast, an additional
photograph taken within a few feet from the counter area reflects only the plate in the left
hand drawer, and a box of kitchen bags in the right drawer.
The State also failed to produce any evidence concerning Moye’s presence in the
basement in the vicinity of the drugs.  Although Moye suffered a cut on his finger which
required hospital treatment, the police found no blood in the basement.  In addition, the knife
used in the cutting incident, to which the police had responded, was found upstairs in the
main portion of the house, rather than in the basement.  Because the record does not
adequately disclose the duration of Moye’s visit to the basement, it is impossible to tell if,
11
For examples of cases where although the facts indicate that there may have been
suspicious drug activity taking place, the evidence was nonetheless insufficient to sustain a
conviction for possession of CDS, see Collins v. State, 322 Md. 675, 682-83, 589 A.2d 479,
20
during the time he traveled into the basement from the first floor of the home prior to exiting
through the basement door, he had, in fact, stood over the drawers in the counter and had the
“plain view” vantage point urged by the State.
Further, there were no facts established at trial as to whether Moye was present in the
room with the drugs for any given amount of time other than to say that he left the Bullocks’s
home through the basement door.  The State offered no evidence to suggest any relationship
between Benson and Moye which would have established that Moye frequented the basement
of the Bullocks’s home or that he was aware of what items were stored in the drawers of the
counter area.  Thus, we are confronted with a situation where a person has been convicted
of possessing controlled dangerous substances and yet we cannot gauge whether he even
knew the contraband was in the basement and controlled or exercised dominion over the
CDS.
We also conclude that based on the evidence in this record, no reasonable inference
could be drawn that Moye was participating with others in the mutual enjoyment of the
contraband.  There is no evidence concerning whether Moye, Benson, or the Bullocks were
observed using drugs on the night in question.  Although the facts may lead a trier of fact to
believe that someone may have been using marijuana in the Bullocks’s home, the evidence
fails to establish who may have been using it, and when such use may have taken place.11 
482 (1991)(concluding that there was no probable cause to even arrest the defendant, let
alone convict him of a possession of controlled dangerous substances offense where there
was no evidence which linked the defendant to the car or the film canister found therein
which contained cocaine); State v. Leach, 296 Md. 591, 596, 597, 463 A.2d 872, 874, 875
(1983)(finding that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for judgment of
acquittal on possession of controlled dangerous substance and paraphernalia offenses where
although defendant had access to the apartment where the substance was found the Court
reasoned that, “it cannot be reasonably inferred that he exercised restraining or directing
influence over PCP in a closed container on the bedroom dresser or over paraphernalia in the
bedroom closet”).  
In contrast, for situations where the evidence was sufficient to sustain convictions for
possession of CDS, see Birchead v. State, 317 Md. 691, 709, 566 A.2d 488, 496-97
(1989)(evidence at trial showed that Birchead was located in the hotel room where drugs
were found “several hours before and during the execution of the search” which yielded 1.7
grams of loose cocaine, a 25 gram baggy of cocaine and drug paraphernalia consisting of a
metal smoking screen, a metal sifter with a screen, a butane hand torch and a box of razor
blades which were found in plain view on top of the television set and around the hotel room,
along with additional drugs and cutting agents found on the bathroom counter, and that
Birchead admitted to using cocaine in the hotel room that morning).
21
The Court of Special Appeals relied on its decisions in Davis v. State, 9 Md. App. 48,
262 A.2d 578 (1970) and Cook v. State, 84 Md. App. 122, 578 A.2d 283 (1990), cert. denied,
321 Md. 502, 583 A.2d 276 (1991), in its determination that drugs found by the police in
plain view combined with an accused’s “presence” in the home or room in which it is found
are sufficient to support a conviction for possession of controlled dangerous substances.  The
facts of Davis and Cook are distinguishable, however, from the facts and circumstances in
the present case.  
The Court of Special Appeals’s decision in Davis came long before this Court
discussed the scienter requirement for possession of CDS in Dawkins v. State, supra.  Thus,
22
the court’s analysis relied solely on whether Davis exercised dominion or control over the
CDS.  Davis was charged with and convicted of having control of a prohibited narcotic drug
pursuant to an earlier version of Maryland’s Controlled Dangerous Substances Law.  See
Maryland Code (1957, 1967 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 277 (making it unlawful for a person to
“possess” or “have under his control” any prohibited narcotic drug); see also Bryant v. State,
229 Md. 531, 537, 185 A.2d 190, 193 (1962)(stating that “Section 277 makes the possession
of narcotics and the control of narcotics two separate offenses”).  At that time, the term
“control” meant “to exercise restraining or directing influence over, viz., to relate to authority
over what is not in one’s physical possession.” See Davis, 9 Md. App. at 52, 262 A.2d at 581
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
In Davis, an undercover officer went to Davis’s apartment on February 28, 1968 and
purchased $50.00 worth of marijuana from Davis’s wife, Maxine Green.  Id. at 50, 262 A.2d
at 580.  The officer did not enter the apartment to complete the transaction, and did not
observe Davis at that time.  Id.  On March 23, 1968, the police obtained and executed a
search  warrant for Davis’s apartment, and observed “in plain view on the living room coffee
table two small pieces of hashish and a razor blade.”  Id.  Davis had not been present in the
apartment when the police commenced the search, but he arrived home prior to the police’s
discovery of a metal box found on top of the stereo which contained “marijuana pipes, a
bottle cap, an eye-dropper, a needle, a piece of cotton still in the bottle cap, a small postal
scale and an envelope containing marijuana.”  Id. at 50-51, 262 A.2d at 580.  Davis was
23
convicted of control of marijuana based on separate indictments for February 28, 1968 and
March 23, 1968.  Id. at 49-50, 262 A.2d at 579-80.
On this evidence, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that Davis’s conviction for
possession of marijuana based on the February 28, 1968 incident was clearly erroneous.  Id.
at 52, 262 A.2d at 581.  The court reasoned that where an individual, like Davis, does not
have exclusive possession of a home or apartment where narcotics are found, “it may not be
inferred that he knew of the presence of the narcotics and had control of them, unless other
incriminating circumstances are shown which tend to buttress such an inference.”  Id. at 53,
262 A.2d at 581.  The court explained that the only evidence linking Davis to the transaction
taking place on February 28, 1968 was that Davis “was a co-lessee of the premises, resided
there at least two nights weekly, and had an intimate personal relationship with the co-lessee
Green.”  Id. at 55, 262 A.2d at 582.  
The court affirmed Davis’s conviction stemming from the March 23, 1968 search of
his apartment based on the fact that Davis was a co-occupant of the apartment where drugs
were found in plain view on the coffee table, that he entered the premises shortly after the
police began executing a lawful search warrant and discovered the drugs, and that Davis’s
arms bore fresh needle marks which “permitted an inference that he knew of the presence of,
and was directly connected with” the drugs and paraphernalia found on the premises.  Id. at
55-56, 262 A.2d at 583.  The court opined that the inference supported the conclusion that
Davis “controlled” the drug, although “the State [was] not required to show that the
24
accused’s control of the narcotic drug was knowing and wilful.”  Id. at 52, 262 A.2d at 581.
Thus, for the March 23, 1968 incident, the State established that Davis had a possessory
interest in the premises where the drugs were found, that the drugs were located prominently
on a coffee table, and that Davis bore physical markings indicative of his recent use and
enjoyment of the drugs.  Id. at 55-56, 262 A.2d at 583.
The Davis court’s analysis of the March 23, 1968 evidence supporting conviction
remains distinguishable from the present case, because in Davis, the evidence showed a clear
connection between the contraband and the accused, while there is a lack of such a nexus in
the present case.  To the contrary, the circumstances surrounding Moye’s convictions more
closely resemble those that warranted reversal, based on the insufficiency of the evidence
emanating from the February 28, 1968 incident.
We are equally unpersuaded by the application of the Court of Special Appeals’s
decision in Cook to the instant case.  In Cook, the court concluded that there was sufficient
evidence for the jury to convict Cook for possession with intent to distribute cocaine based
on a theory of constructive possession.  Cook, 84 Md. App. at 135, 578 A.2d at 289.
Presumably the Court of Special Appeals relied on Cook because of the fact that like Moye,
neither Cook nor his co-defendant, William Darby, had a possessory interest in the home
where the CDS were found.  Id. at 133, 578 A.2d at 289.  The facts presented in Cook,
however, are distinguishable from those adduced in the instant case, because in Cook, the
evidence introduced at trial showed that Cook and his co-appellant, William Darby, had
25
knowledge of and exercised control over the CDS.  Id. at 134, 578 A.2d at 289 (“one could
not conclude, by any stretch of the imagination, that appellants were unaware of [the drugs’]
presence.”)
In sum, the circumstantial evidence presented by the State in this case fails to establish
the requisite knowledge and exercise of dominion or control over the CDS and paraphernalia
for which Moye was convicted under Sections 287 and 287A.  Accordingly, Moye’s
convictions for possession of cocaine and possession of marijuana in violation of Maryland
Code, Art. 27 § 287 and possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of § 287A are hereby
reversed.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED.  CASE REMANDED
TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO
REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE’S
COUNTY.  COSTS IN THIS COURT AND
THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO
BE PAID BY PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY.