Case Title: Amoresano v. Laufgas

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-64-00

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2002-01-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Verniero, J., writing for a unanimous Court. In this appeal, the Court considers whether the trial court erred in imposing jail sentences of varying lengths on the same litigant after finding him in contempt on three separate occasions. The City of Paterson and its Chief of Police (collectively, plaintiffs) filed suit seeking temporary and permanent restraints against the defendant as a result of his disruptive and abusive conduct directed at plaintiffs' employees. Tactics of intimidation used by the defendant against plaintiffs' employees included loud, insulting language, the filing of complaints and criminal charges against them, and obtaining their home addresses. Temporary restraints were entered against the defendant prohibiting him from contacting or communicating with plaintiffs' employees at their home addresses, going to employees' homes, obtaining or publicizing the home addresses of the employees, or personally serving papers of any kind on employees. The temporary restraints required also that defendant advise the office of Corporation Counsel two hours before he entered any City building, and restrained him from abusive or disruptive conduct while in public buildings. The defendant reacted to the temporary restraints by filing additional complaints, including one against the Mayor and one against the judge who issued the temporary restraints and his law clerk. The judge recused himself from the case and it was reassigned to a new judge. The court thereafter restrained defendant from filing further criminal complaints against any person involved in the litigation without first obtaining a probable cause finding from a neutral judicial officer. Next, defendant filed a motion seeking to disqualify the new judge in the matter and the City's attorney. The judge denied those motions. The judge explained to the defendant that he does not have the right to file criminal charges, threaten, and file ethics charges against a judge because he does not like the judge's rulings. The judge noted further that attempts at intimidation could result in criminal charges. Prior to the start of trial, defendant served the City's attorney with a subpoena to appear as a witness and again filed a motion to disqualify the judge. In support of his motion to disqualify the judge, defendant accused the judge of bias, corruption, and conspiring to fix the case. Defendant filed numerous letters and certifications reiterating these accusations. Defendant also personally presented a subpoena to the judge, explaining that the judge was his witness now and could no longer adjudicate the matter. The judge refused defendant's requests to recuse himself from the case. The trial of plaintiffs' action in the Chancery Division began on April 20, 1998, and concluded on April 29, 1998. On the first day of trial, the judge charged defendant with contempt in the face of the court, pursuant to Rule 1:10-1. This was the first of three contempt charges against the defendant. In explaining the Rule 1:10-1 charges to the defendant, the judge summarized the letters and certifications sent or filed by the defendant, including letters to the judge and the City's attorney and certifications filed in support of disqualification motions. The court relied on a total of twelve documents. The court deferred adjudication of the charges and imposition of punishment until the trial was concluded. During the pendency of the trial, however, the judge inquired of the defendant whether he wanted to address the contempt charges before the trial concluded. The defendant elected to wait until the end of the trial. At the trial's conclusion, the judge reiterated the basis for the contempt charges and provided the defendant with an opportunity respond. After hearing defendant's arguments, the judge issued a certification and order of contempt, and sentenced defendant to sixty days in the county jail. The second adjudication of contempt arose from an application by the City's attorney in which she claimed that the defendant had violated numerous paragraphs of the first judge's temporary restraining order. Witnesses testified on April 20 and 21, 1998, about defendant's conduct. Defendant testified on his own behalf and denied the violations. Following that testimony, the judge issued an order to show cause pursuant to Rule 1:10-2. On June 22, 1998, a different judge presided over the contempt proceedings. That judge did not hear the witnesses, but relied on the testimony of the witnesses contained in the transcripts of the proceeding held in April. The judge found that defendant violated various paragraphs of the temporary restraining order, and sentenced the defendant to thirty days in the county jail. The third contempt finding was also pursuant to Rule 1:10-2, and arose from an application made by the City's attorney. The basis of that application was that defendant made intimidating remarks in the courtroom to the wife of a police officer, who was a witness at the trial, and made similar comments to the City's attorney. A third judge conducted the proceeding in respect of this second Rule 1:10-2 proceeding. The State called numerous witnesses who testified before the third judge. The judge found defendant guilty of contempt for attempting to intimidate the wife and the City's attorney, and sentenced the defendant to sixty days in the county jail. The Appellate Division affirmed all three contempt dispositions. HELD: The Court affirms the Appellate Division in respect of the Rule 1:10-1 action and the second Rule 1:10-2 action. The Court reverses the order of contempt in respect of the first Rule 1:10-2 action. 1. Rule 1:10-1 governs contempt that is committed in the court's presence. Here, defendant's repeated attempts to disqualify the trial judge without foundation, coupled with his baseless efforts to subpoena the judge to cause his recusal, occurred in the presence of the judge and were willful. The defendant was permitted the appropriate opportunity to respond to the charges. Defendant's conduct obstructed the pre-trial proceedings and, if left unchecked, would have obstructed the trial itself. Therefore, the trial court did not err in the adjudication of contempt under Rule 1:10-1. Although the judiciary's summary contempt power should be exercised sparingly and in the rarest of circumstances, this is such a rare case. (Pp. 22 to 33). 2. Rule 1:10-2 governs contempt proceedings other than proceedings under Rule 1:10-1. Rule 1:10-2 contemplates that when the matter is heard by a judge other than the one who instituted the proceedings, the alleged contemnor will be permitted to cross-examine the State's witnesses and otherwise put on a defense before the judge who actually adjudicates the matter. That did not occur in the first Rule 1:10-2 proceeding. Instead, the judge who adjudicated the matter relied exclusively on the testimony of the prior witnesses contained in the transcript of the proceedings conducted before the original judge. Further, although defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses when they gave their testimony, he received inadequate notice for purposes of preparing an effective cross-examination on the contempt charge. When the matter was transferred to the subsequent judge for adjudication, defendant should have been given the opportunity to confront and cross-examine the State's witnesses before that judge. In the absence of that critical safeguard, the court was unable to evaluate fully the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses. Because the right to confrontation and cross-examination was abridged in the first Rule 1:10-2 proceeding, the Court holds that the adjudication of contempt resulting from that proceeding cannot be sustained. (Pp. 33 to 36). 3. The second Rule 1:10-2 proceeding had no procedural flaw. The State presented its witnesses before the court that actually adjudicated the contempt, the defendant had notice of the hearing, he was permitted to cross- examine all witnesses, and he had adequate time to prepare a proper defense. Further, the Court finds that the defendant's conduct was contumacious. Defendant's second adjudication of contempt under Rule 1:10-2 was proper. (Pp. 36 to 40). The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED IN PART, and REVERSED IN PART. The matter is REMANDED to the trial court for execution of the sentences and such further proceedings as are consistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, LaVECCHIA and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE VERNIERO's opinion. VINCENT AMORESANO, CHIEF OF POLICE, THE CITY OF PATERSON, and PASSAIC COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, Plaintiffs, v. BERNARD LAUFGAS, Defendant-Appellant. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. BERNARD LAUFGAS, Defendant-Appellant. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. BERNARD LAUFGAS, Defendant-Appellant. Argued October 22, 2001 -- Decided January 29, 2002 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Bernard Laufgas argued the cause pro se. Richard W. Berg, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by VERNIERO, J. The issues raised in this appeal involve the judiciary's summary contempt power. We are called on to determine whether the trial court erred in imposing jail sentences of varying lengths on the same litigant after finding him in contempt on three separate occasions. In accordance with Rule 1:10-1, the trial court founded the first adjudication on a series of letters and certifications in which the litigant made highly disparaging comments about the judge. Pursuant to Rule 1:10-2, a different judge based the second adjudication on the court's findings that the litigant had violated numerous provisions of a temporary restraining order. Finally, under that same rule, a third judge held the litigant in contempt based on the court's finding that he had attempted to intimidate a witness and opposing counsel. A divided panel of the Appellate Division affirmed the three adjudications. We affirm the disposition in the first and third actions, and reverse the disposition in the second action. A judge conducting a judicial proceeding may adjudicate contempt summarily without an order to show cause if: (a) the conduct has obstructed, or if continued would obstruct, the proceeding; (b) the conduct occurred in the actual presence of the judge, and was actually seen or heard by the judge; (c) the character of the conduct or its continuation after an appropriate warning unmistakably demonstrates its willfulness; (d) immediate adjudication is necessary to permit the proceeding to continue in an orderly and proper manner; and (e) the judge has afforded the alleged contemnor an immediate opportunity to respond. The order of contempt shall recite the facts and contain a certification by the judge that he or she saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that the contemnor was willfully contumacious. Punishment may be determined forthwith or deferred. Execution of sentence shall be stayed for five days following imposition and, if an appeal is taken, during the pendency of the appeal, provided, however, that the judge may require bail if reasonably necessary to assure the contemnor's appearance. Applying those tenets and the five enumerated requirements of the rule, we are satisfied that the trial court did not err in adjudicating defendant in contempt under Rule 1:10-1. In respect of the first requirement, we agree with the finding expressed in Judge Passero's certification that defendant attempted to obstruct the court proceedings by undermining [the] court's position and authority[.] Defendant's repeated attempts to disqualify the trial judge without foundation, coupled with his baseless efforts to subpoena the judge to cause his recusal, had obstructed the pre-trial proceedings and, if left unchecked, would have obstructed the trial itself. Defendant revealed his purpose in his April 15, 1998, letter to the judge, in which he wrote you are history, you will no longer be seating [sic] or hearing any of my cases, [i]n fact you are my witness. By the time you get this letter, you will be the proud owner of one of my subpoenaed [sic] as a witness in this matter. He essentially repeated those words directly to the judge in open court. Given defendant's extensive pattern of prior conduct, we are persuaded that the trial court was justified in its view that defendant's continued behavior would have obstructed the trial if the court had not acted when it did. The requirement of Rule 1:10-1(a) has been satisfied. I find this as a fact based on the testimony of Ms. Champion, the testimony of the Sheriff's [o]fficer . . . who testified, and the State Police detective. In addition, I -_ I make a finding because [defendant] said, I'll admit to it, after Ms. Champion had said, He tells me he's going to file a civil suit against me, that I'm the next target. And the State Trooper heard him say that. [A]nd I further find that [defendant] had indicated the day before that he was going to start a suit against the wives of police officers. And I say that that was said in earshot of Ms. Gallagher, who was sitting next to her husband, Lieutenant Gallagher. First of all, . . . Ms. Champion had indicated that she was going to produce Ms. Gallagher the following day. Ms. Gallagher was sitting in the courtroom next to her husband. And it was directed toward Ms. Gallagher in order to get _- or at least _- in order to get to her testimony or to that of Lieutenant Gallagher. I'm satisfied that both of these comments were made by [defendant], that they were made to Ms. Gallagher, knowing that she was the wife of a police officer. They were made to Ms. Champion at a critical point in the trial. NO. A-64 VINCENT AMORESANO, CHIEF OF POLICE, THE CITY OF PATERSON, and PASSAIC COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, Plaintiffs, v. BERNARD LAUFGAS, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED January 29, 2000 Chief Justice Poritz