Case Title: Commonwealth v. Asenjo

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12227

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2017-08-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE: All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports. If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12227 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  GAUDY ASENJO. 
 
 
 
Essex.     February 6, 2017. - August 15, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, Gaziano, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Rape.  Evidence, First complaint, Expert opinion.  Witness, 
Expert.  Battered Woman Syndrome. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on May 22, 2013. 
 
 
The cases were tried before James F. Lang, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Emily A. Cardy, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for 
the defendant. 
 
David F. O'Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney (Jennifer 
S. Kirshenbaum, Assistant District Attorney, also present) for 
the Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  In January, 2015, the defendant, Gaudy Asenjo, 
was convicted by a Superior Court jury of three counts of 
2 
 
 
aggravated1 rape of a child.2  The complainant was the 
defendant's niece, Sara,3 who was fourteen years of age at the 
time of the rape.  The defendant appeals from the convictions, 
claiming that the judge erred in (1) interpreting the first 
complaint rule to require the disclosure of the perpetrator's 
identity to the first complaint witness and allowing a police 
officer to testify as the first complaint witness; (2) allowing 
the complainant to testify to multiple disclosures of the sexual 
assault in violation of Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. 217 
(2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1216 (2006), and its progeny; and 
(3) precluding expert testimony in support of her defense based 
on battered woman syndrome.  We conclude that the essential 
feature of first complaint evidence is the report of a sexual 
assault, not the identity of the perpetrator.  Consequently, the 
admission of the police officer's testimony as first complaint 
evidence was error, which, after viewing the evidence as a 
whole, was prejudicial.  We conclude also that the judge erred 
                     
 
1 The aggravating factor was the age difference of more than 
ten years between the defendant and the complainant, who was a 
child over the age of twelve and under the age of sixteen.  See 
G. L. c. 265, § 23A. 
 
 
2 In a separate trial in April, 2015, her codefendant, Luis 
Rivera, was acquitted on three counts of aggravated rape of a 
child. 
 
 
3 A pseudonym.  See G. L. c. 265, § 24C.  Sara was born in 
March, 1996, and she was eighteen years of age at the time of 
trial. 
3 
 
 
in admitting the complainant's testimony as to her multiple 
disclosures of the rape.  Last, we conclude that a defendant 
asserting duress under G. L. c. 233, § 23F, based on battered 
woman syndrome, is not required to present affirmative evidence 
of abuse as a predicate to the defense.  The judge erred in 
excluding the proffered expert testimony on this ground.  
Therefore, based on the foregoing, we reverse and order a new 
trial. 
 
Background.  We summarize the evidence the jury could have 
found.  In February, 2011, Sara and her twin sister spent most 
of their February school vacation at the home of the defendant, 
their maternal aunt.  One evening, toward the end of the week, 
Sara, Sara's sister, the defendant's daughter, the defendant, 
and the defendant's then boy friend, Luis Rivera, were present 
in the home socializing and drinking alcohol.  Rivera and the 
defendant had been in a relationship for a long time, such that 
Sara considered him an uncle.  That evening, Sara was upset with 
her sister and the defendant's daughter.  Although they were all 
drinking alcohol, the other girls were also smoking marijuana 
without including Sara. 
 
After the other two girls went upstairs to go to bed, Sara 
stayed downstairs talking with the defendant.  At the time, Sara 
was "really close" with the defendant and thought of her as a 
"second mom."  During the conversation, the defendant inquired 
4 
 
 
about Sara's sexual experience and told Sara how satisfying her 
sexual relationship with Rivera was.  Later that evening, the 
defendant telephoned Rivera, who had left the residence earlier, 
and asked him to return because Sara wanted him to come back.  
After the defendant told Sara that Rivera was returning, Sara 
stated that she had not showered that day.  The defendant 
instructed Sara to go into the bathroom and wipe her vagina 
clean.  The defendant helped Sara remove her pants, and Sara 
cleaned herself.  As the defendant inspected Sara's vagina, she 
told Sara that Rivera would like it and that he would be "really 
happy." 
 
Approximately ten minutes later, Rivera arrived at the 
defendant's home.  The defendant suggested that the three of 
them go into the bathroom, where Sara was instructed to lie down 
on the floor on her back.  After the door was closed and locked, 
the defendant turned off the lights and illuminated the room 
with the flashlight application on her cellular telephone.  
Rivera pulled Sara's pants and underwear down, but left her 
shirt on.  Rivera performed oral sex on Sara, as the defendant 
sat on the edge of the bathtub watching and asking Sara whether 
she liked it.  Sara did not answer, and instead focused on her 
upcoming birthday so that she would not have to think about what 
was happening to her.  A few minutes later, Rivera inserted 
something into Sara's vagina that hurt her.  Sara did not know 
5 
 
 
whether it was his finger or his penis.  Rivera directed the 
defendant to perform oral sex on Sara while he had vaginal 
intercourse with the defendant. 
 
After the assault ended, Sara went upstairs, where her 
sister and the defendant's daughter were sleeping.  Sara was 
scared because Rivera was still in the home, but she eventually 
went back downstairs to use the bathroom.  Rivera asked Sara 
whether she wanted to do it again, but she ignored him, used the 
bathroom, and ran back upstairs without incident.  Sara was hurt 
and confused, thinking that it was her fault and that she could 
have done something to stop it.  The next morning, the defendant 
did not speak about the assault, and Rivera returned to the home 
to bring everyone breakfast.  Although Rivera did not speak to 
Sara that morning, he touched her backside each time he was 
alone with her. 
 
Sara continued to visit the defendant's home after the 
assault.  Each time Sara visited, she tried to ensure that 
Rivera was not present.  A few weeks after the assault, Sara 
asked the defendant whether it was possible that Sara was 
pregnant because she was having stomach pains and had not 
menstruated that month.  The defendant stated that she did not 
know whether Sara was pregnant, but that if Sara were, she 
should tell her parents that the father was a boy from school, 
rather than Rivera. 
6 
 
 
 
Over a period of two years after the rape, Sara disclosed 
the attack on four different occasions.  Sara first disclosed 
the assault within weeks of the incident when she told her 
cousin Mary4 that Rivera had raped her at the defendant's home.  
Sara mentioned the defendant's presence during the rape, but did 
not disclose her participation.  Sara did not mention the 
defendant's participation because Sara still loved her and did 
not want to get her into trouble.  In December, 2012, Sara 
disclosed the rape for the second time to her sister and some of 
their friends at a sleepover while playing a game they called 
"if you really knew me."  Sara revealed that the defendant was 
present when it happened but again did not disclose her 
participation.  Sara made the third disclosure to her mother 
within days of the sleepover without mentioning the defendant's 
role in the rape.  Finally, Sara repeated the details of the 
rape to Detective Ashley Sanborn of the Danvers police 
department, revealing for the first time the defendant's 
participation.5 
                     
 
4 A pseudonym.  See G. L. c. 265, § 24C.  Mary's mother is 
the sister of both the defendant and Sara's mother. 
 
 
5 Sara made two disclosures to Detective Ashley Sanborn on 
January, 2, 2013.  The first, which was the basis for Sanborn's 
first complaint testimony at trial, occurred in the presence of 
Sara's mother and sister.  Sara gave a second, more detailed 
statement after her mother and sister left the room, in the 
presence of Sanborn and another detective.  Although the judge 
originally ruled that the Commonwealth could elicit testimony 
7 
 
 
 
Sanborn appeared as the Commonwealth's first complaint 
witness and testified that on January 2, 2013, she spoke with 
Sara and Sara's family, at the family's request, at the Danvers 
police station.  After Sara's father left the room, Sara 
disclosed that she had been raped by the defendant and Rivera.  
Sara's sister also testified regarding Sara's December, 2012, 
disclosure. 
 
Discussion.  1.  First complaint evidence.  On the first 
day of trial, the Commonwealth moved to introduce the testimony 
of Sanborn as first complaint evidence.  The defendant objected, 
arguing that Sanborn was not in fact the first complaint witness 
because Sara had disclosed the rape to others on at least three 
prior occasions.  In a written order, the judge allowed the 
Commonwealth's motion.  He ruled that Sara's prior disclosures 
did not meet the test for first complaint evidence because the 
statement to Sanborn was "the first time she [Sara] disclosed 
that the defendant had committed sexual offenses against her and 
participated with . . . Rivera in offenses that he committed as 
a principal." 
 
The judge's order allowing the Commonwealth's motion to 
designate Sanborn as the first complaint witness was error for 
two reasons.  First, as our cases recounting the history of the 
                                                                  
regarding both statements, he later determined that the second 
statement was inadmissible. 
8 
 
 
first complaint doctrine confirm, its essential feature is the 
report of the sexual assault, not the identity of the 
perpetrator.  As we discussed in King, 445 Mass. at 228-229, the 
original purpose of the "fresh complaint" rule was to combat the 
traditional, albeit outdated, notion that a true victim of 
sexual assault should raise a "hue and cry," or report the 
sexual assault in a timely manner.  Although the first complaint 
doctrine evolved from the fresh complaint rule, the underlying 
purpose of first complaint evidence is still "to counterbalance 
or address inaccurate assumptions regarding stereotypes about 
delayed reporting of a sexual assault or about sexual assault 
victims in general," rather than affirmative evidence that the 
alleged sexual assault actually occurred.  Id. at 240.  See 
Mass. G. Evid. § 413(a) (2017).  "At its core, therefore, the 
doctrine exists to facilitate credibility determinations where 
an allegation of sexual assault is at issue."  Commonwealth v. 
Mayotte, 475 Mass. 254, 260 (2016).  The fact that Sara 
identified the defendant as a perpetrator for the first time in 
the statement to Sanborn did not supplant the three prior 
disclosures that, in revealing that a rape actually had 
occurred, met the substantive test for admissibility as first 
complaint evidence.  Commonwealth v. Murungu, 450 Mass. 441, 446 
(2008) (disclosure of actual sexual assault necessary to 
constitute complaint).  Thus, the interpretation of the first 
9 
 
 
complaint rule to require the identification of the defendant as 
a prerequisite to admissibility was error. 
 
Second, given our interpretation of the first complaint 
rule to require only the report of the sexual assault, Sanborn 
was improperly designated as the first complaint witness.  
Sara's testimony established that Mary was the first person to 
whom Sara reported the rape, about one month after it occurred.  
Where a complainant has reported the sexual assault to multiple 
persons, the designation of the first complaint witness is 
solely a temporal consideration; it must not be subject to 
manipulation based on the likely value of the witness's 
testimony.  The Commonwealth may not "pick and choose among 
various complaint witnesses to locate the one with the most 
complete memory, the one to whom the complainant related the 
most details, or the one who is likely to be the most effective 
witness."  Murungu, 450 Mass. at 446.  Unless, for some reason, 
Mary were unavailable as the first complaint witness, she, not 
Sanborn, should have been designated as such. 
 
In certain limited circumstances, our law permits one 
witness to be substituted for another to provide first complaint 
evidence.  We address briefly whether Sanborn properly could be 
designated as the first complaint witness under this rubric.  
"[W]hen the first person told of the alleged assault is 
'unavailable, incompetent, or too young to testify 
10 
 
 
meaningfully,' the trial judge may admit testimony from a 
substitute first complaint witness."  Commonwealth v. Kebreau, 
454 Mass. 287, 292 (2009), quoting King, 445 Mass. at 243-244.  
Additionally, a judge may substitute the first complaint witness 
where the victim's disclosure to the "first person does not 
constitute a complaint," or where the victim makes a complaint 
to a person who "has an obvious bias or motive to minimize or 
distort the victim's remarks."  Murungu, 450 Mass. at 446.  See 
Mass. G. Evid. § 413(a) & note.  Mary was available to testify 
and there was no evidence that her testimony was biased or that 
she had motive to "minimize or distort [Sara]'s remarks."  
Murungu, supra.  Because the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate 
the propriety of a substitution on either ground, Sanborn's 
testimony as the first complaint witness could not be admitted 
on this basis. 
 
The defendant objected to the erroneous admission of 
Sanborn's first complaint testimony.  Therefore, we must 
determine whether the error was prejudicial.  See Commonwealth 
v. Flebotte, 417 Mass. 348, 353 (1994).  We conclude that it 
was.  Here, the defendant was indicted on three counts of 
aggravated rape:  one as a principal, and two as an aider and 
abettor.  Mary's testimony6 would have established only that the 
                     
 
6 Prior to trial, Sanborn interviewed Mary by telephone.  
During the interview, Mary explained the circumstances and 
11 
 
 
defendant was present while Rivera raped Sara.  Thus, if Mary, 
the proper first complaint witness, had testified, the only 
evidence of the defendant's participation in the rape would have 
come from Sara's testimony.  The substance of Sanborn's first 
complaint testimony implicating the defendant in the rape, taken 
together with her status as a police officer, likely tipped the 
scales unfairly in favor of Sara's credibility.  See King, 445 
Mass. at 243.  Because the Commonwealth cannot show that the 
error "did not influence the jury, or had but very slight 
effect," the defendant is entitled to a new trial.  Flebotte, 
supra. 
 
2.  Admission of the complainant's multiple disclosures.  
On Sara's direct examination, the judge allowed her testimony 
that she made four separate disclosures of the rape:  (1) to 
Mary a few weeks after the rape; (2) to her sister and friends 
during the sleepover in December, 2012; (3) to her mother 
shortly after the sleepover; and (4) to Sanborn in January, 
2013.  In overruling the defendant's objection to this 
testimony, the judge explained that the evidence was admissible 
because "the Commonwealth is entitled to elicit why [Sara] 
waited to make the disclosure regarding this particular 
defendant, and why she came forward when she did."  Although the 
                                                                  
details of Sara's first disclosure of the rape.  A transcript of 
that interview was included in the record on appeal. 
12 
 
 
judge noted his concern about "any piling on," he determined 
that the risk of prejudice was not as high for the defendant 
because Sara's prior disclosures did not actually implicate the 
defendant.7  The admission of multiple disclosures in the 
circumstances of this case was error. 
 
The judge's reliance on King, 445 Mass. at 245, for the 
proposition that a complainant may testify to multiple 
disclosures of the alleged sexual assault to give temporal 
context to the first complaint was misplaced.  King states that 
"the complainant may . . . testify to the details of the first 
complaint . . . and also why the complaint was made at that 
particular time."  Id.  This was not, however, an invitation to 
allow a complainant to testify on direct examination to multiple 
disclosures in her explanation of why the first complaint was 
made at a "particular time."  See id. at 243. 
 
We acknowledge that Sara's testimony that she made multiple 
disclosures may not have had the same impact as multiple 
witnesses testifying to Sara's report of the sexual assault.  
Nonetheless, the admission of her testimony created the same 
risk of prejudice that we sought to prevent by the limitations 
                     
 
7 Although the judge was under the misapprehension that Mary 
would testify as a defense witness, the decision to allow Sara 
to preemptively testify about her disclosure to Mary was error 
because Sanborn was the designated first complaint witness.  See 
Commonwealth v. King, 445 Mass. 217, 242-243 (2005), cert. 
denied, 546 U.S. 1216 (2006). 
13 
 
 
we imposed in King.  Sara's testimony, like that of multiple 
first complaint witnesses, "likely serve[d] no additional 
corroborative purpose, and may [have] unfairly enhance[d] [her] 
credibility."  Id. 
Because this testimony was merely corroborative, it created the 
very type of prejudice that we cautioned against in King.  The 
first complaint doctrine's limitation to one witness was 
intended to vitiate the possibility of undue prejudice to the 
defendant because it eliminated "prejudicial 'piling on' of such 
witnesses."  Id. at 245. 
 
Defense counsel's use of the prior disclosures to attack 
Sara's credibility did not cure the prejudice to the defendant.  
Sara's testimony regarding her prior disclosures was admitted 
substantively, without an instruction limiting the evidence to 
impeachment purposes.  See G. L. c. 233, § 23.  This evidence 
was particularly prejudicial to the defendant in light of the 
improperly substituted first complaint witness's testimony, 
which was the only evidence corroborating the defendant's 
participation in the rape.  Moreover, the judge compounded the 
error by allowing Sara to explain, during each of the 
disclosures, why she did not previously implicate the defendant.  
See King, supra. 
 
We have recognized that the first complaint doctrine does 
not "prohibit the admissibility of evidence that, while barred 
14 
 
 
by that doctrine, is otherwise independently admissible." 
Commonwealth v. Arana, 453 Mass. 214, 220-221 (2009).  The 
Commonwealth, relying on Arana, argues for the first time on 
appeal that the evidence of Sara's multiple complaints was 
independently admissible as prior inconsistent statements, see 
Mass. G. Evid. § 613(a)(1) & note (2017), and that, in any 
event, no prejudice resulted because of defense counsel's use of 
the statements on cross-examination.  We disagree. 
 
Sara's statements were not admissible as prior inconsistent 
statements because the Commonwealth did not offer them as such.  
See id.  The judge admitted the evidence of Sara's prior 
disclosures to allow the Commonwealth to explain why Sara waited 
to make the disclosure about the defendant's participation in 
the rape and why she came forward when she did.  Moreover, the 
Commonwealth did not attempt to prove that Sara made prior 
statements that were inconsistent with her present testimony, 
nor did it "lay a foundation by asking [Sara] if the prior 
statements were in fact made and . . . giv[e] [Sara] an 
opportunity to explain," as required.  Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 613(a)(1).  See G. L. c. 233, § 23.  Sara's testimony to the 
multiple disclosures, therefore, was not independently 
admissible. 
 
3.  Battered woman syndrome evidence.  In support of her 
duress defense, the defendant sought to introduce expert witness 
15 
 
 
testimony regarding her battered woman syndrome diagnosis.  The 
judge excluded the defendant's expert witness testimony on the 
ground that the defendant failed to lay a proper foundation for 
such evidence.  The judge determined that such testimony was 
"irrelevant, and hence inadmissible, absent competent evidence 
before the jury to support the putative expert testimony.  The 
expert's recitation of what the defendant told her is inadequate 
in that regard, as it may only be considered by the jury with 
respect to the validity of the doctor's proffered opinion."8  
This was error. 
 
As discussed infra, G. L. c. 233, § 23F, provides the 
defendant the statutory right to present such evidence.  Nothing 
in § 23F requires that a defendant proffer evidence of abuse in 
order to present expert witness testimony, where certain 
specified defenses are asserted.9  Moreover, the judge's reliance 
on Mass. G. Evid. § 703 (2017) to exclude the defendant's expert 
                     
 
8 The judge stated that "there has to be some quantum of 
admissible competent evidence of some history of psychological 
or physical abuse, that could support the opinion that [the 
defendant's expert witness] would be offering."  The judge noted 
that he was not setting an "overly high threshold," but insisted 
that there must be some admissible evidence, such as a witness 
who could testify to the abuse, to establish a foundation to 
support the defendant's proposed expert witness testimony. 
 
 
9 General Laws c. 233, § 23F, permits the defendant to 
introduce "either or both" evidence that she was a victim of 
abuse or expert evidence regarding battered woman syndrome; 
therefore, it was error for the judge to require the defendant 
to establish evidence of abuse as a predicate to introducing 
expert witness testimony.  See G. L. c. 233, § 23F. 
16 
 
 
witness testimony was misplaced where § 23F provides an 
independent statutory basis to admit such evidence. 
 
Because G. L. c. 233, § 23F, is not so narrowly construed, 
we take this opportunity to provide guidance regarding the 
statutory requirements to admit evidence under G. L. c. 233, 
§ 23F. 
 
General Laws c. 233, § 23F, states: 
 
"In the trial of criminal cases charging the use of 
force against another where the issue of defense of self or 
another, defense of duress or coercion, or accidental harm 
is asserted, a defendant shall be permitted to introduce 
either or both of the following in establishing the 
reasonableness of the defendant's apprehension that death 
or serious bodily injury was imminent, the reasonableness 
of the defendant's belief that [s]he had availed [her]self 
of all available means to avoid physical combat or the 
reasonableness of a defendant's perception of the amount of 
force necessary to dealt with the perceived threat: 
 
 
"(a) evidence that the defendant is or has been the 
victim of acts of physical, sexual or psychological harm or 
abuse; 
 
 
"(b) evidence by expert testimony regarding the common 
pattern in abusive relationships; the nature and effects of 
physical, sexual or psychological abuse and typical 
responses thereto, including how those effects relate to 
the perception of the imminent nature of the threat of 
death or serious bodily harm; the relevant facts and 
circumstances which form the basis for such opinion; and 
evidence whether the defendant displayed characteristics 
common to victims of abuse. 
 
 
"Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to 
preclude the introduction of evidence or expert testimony 
as described in clause (a) or (b) in any civil or criminal 
action where such evidence or expert testimony is otherwise 
now admissible." 
 
17 
 
 
 
The Commonwealth contends that § 23F requires foundation 
testimony or evidence supporting an instruction on one of the 
defenses specified in order to trigger the application of § 23F.  
We do not agree.  In order to present evidence under § 23F, a 
defendant need not present affirmative evidence of abuse because 
§ 23F provides that, where a defendant asserts the defense of 
self-defense or defense of another, duress or coercion, or 
accidental harm, the "defendant shall be permitted to introduce" 
certain evidence to establish the reasonableness of his or her 
apprehension that death or serious bodily harm was imminent 
(emphasis supplied).  G. L. c. 233, § 23F. 
 
Section 23F is more permissive than the common-law bases 
for expert opinions outlined in Mass. G. Evid. § 703.  Compare 
G. L. c. 233, § 23F, with Mass. G. Evid. § 703 (facts or data on 
which expert witness may base opinion include "[a] facts 
observed by the witness or otherwise in the witness's direct 
personal knowledge; [b] evidence already in the record or that 
will be presented during the course of the proceedings . . . ; 
and [c] facts or data not in evidence if the facts or data are 
independently admissible in evidence and are a permissible basis 
for an expert to consider in formulating an opinion").  Section 
23F does not restrict expert witness testimony to facts in 
evidence, require the witness's personal knowledge or 
observation, or require that the basis for the expert's opinion 
18 
 
 
be independently admissible.  Instead, the statute merely 
requires that the defendant assert certain specified defenses to 
render admissible evidence of the defendant's past or current 
abuse and expert witness testimony regarding abusive 
relationships and the impact such abuse had on the defendant.  
See G. L. c. 233, § 23F. 
 
Additionally, the Commonwealth's contention that § 23F 
applies only to criminal cases "charging the use of force 
against another," id., is without merit.  The Commonwealth reads 
§ 23F too narrowly.  Although the statute provides that a 
criminal defendant in cases "charging the use of force against 
another . . . shall be permitted to introduce" certain evidence, 
it does not require that the use of force is an essential 
element of the crime in order for § 23F to apply.  Id.  See 
Commonwealth v. Anestal, 463 Mass. 655, 675-676 (2012) (applying 
§ 23F in murder in first degree case, notwithstanding fact that 
"force" is not essential element of crime of homicide). 
 
On retrial, where the defendant asserts the defense of 
duress, expert witness testimony regarding the defendant's past 
abuse and battered woman syndrome diagnosis, and the impact 
thereof, shall be admissible, pursuant to § 23F, with proper 
notice.  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (b) (2) (A), as appearing in 
463 Mass. 1501 (2012). 
19 
 
 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons set forth above, the 
defendant's convictions of aggravated rape of a child are 
reversed and the verdicts are set aside.  The case is remanded 
to the Superior Court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.