Case Title: State v. Baker

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1990-02-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
 
 
                                No. 88-616
 
 
State of Vermont                             Supreme Court
 
                                             On Appeal from
     v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                             Unit No. 2, Chittenden Circuit
 
Timothy R. Baker                             February Term, 1990
 
 
Michael S. Kupersmith, J.
 
William Sorrell, Chittenden County State's Attorney, Burlington, and
  Rosemary Hull and Gary S. Kessler, Department of State's Attorneys,
  Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee
 
Walter M. Morris, Jr., Defender General, and Daniel Smith, Montpelier,
  for defendant-appellant
 
 
PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson, Dooley and Morse, JJ.
 
 
     DOOLEY, J.   Defendant appeals from a jury conviction of operating a
motor vehicle while his license was suspended (DLS), in violation of 23
V.S.A. { 674(a).  He alleges two errors:  (1) the trial court placed the
burden of proving the necessity defense upon him rather than requiring the
State to disprove the existence of the defense; and (2) the court refused to
consider community service as an alternative to imprisonment.  We reject
both claims and affirm.
     On August 27, 1988, an Essex Junction police officer stopped a car
driven by defendant after observing that the car had a large crack in the
windshield and a loud muffler.  The officer asked defendant for identifi-
cation, and, at first, defendant misidentified himself.  He then furnished
his true identity and stated that he did not have a driver's license.  The
officer cited defendant for driving with a suspended license and released
him.
     At trial, the State produced evidence that defendant operated a motor
vehicle on a public highway at a time when his license was under suspension.
The defense then produced evidence to establish the affirmative defense of
necessity.  Defendant's wife and sister testified that they were passengers
in the car when it was stopped by the officer and further related the
following events.  Defendant's wife was initially driving the car when they
stopped at the drug store for a snack.  When defendant's sister bit into the
plastic wrapper of her snack to open it, a piece of the wrapper lodged in
her throat and she began to choke.  Defendant's wife took control of the
situation because defendant was apparently unable to handle medical
emergencies.  She directed defendant to drive the car to the hospital while
she remained in the back seat to assist her sister-in-law.  Shortly before
the car was stopped, the plastic was dislodged and defendant's sister was
breathing normally again.
     The trial court determined that defendant established a prima facia
case for each of the elements of the necessity defense and therefore gave
instructions to the jury concerning this defense.  Defendant requested that
the court instruct the jury that the State had the burden of disproving the
defense of necessity beyond a reasonable doubt, but the court denied the
request.  The court instructed the jury that the State had the burden of
proving every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and
explained that defendant was presumed innocent and need not introduce any
evidence on his own behalf.  The court went on to charge, over defendant's
objection, that defendant had the burden to prove the necessity defense by a
preponderance of the evidence in order to gain an acquittal on that ground.
The jury returned a guilty verdict.
     At sentencing, the State emphasized that defendant's license had been
suspended for operating a motor vehicle under the influence of an
intoxicating liquor, in violation of 23 V.S.A. { 1201, and that the DLS
statute, 23 V.S.A. { 674(c)(1), established a two-day jail sentence as a
mandatory minimum sentence in such instances.  The defense argued for
community service as an alternative to imprisonment.  The court imposed a
three-day jail sentence.
     Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by placing the burden
of proving the necessity defense upon him rather than allocating to the
State the burden of disproving this defense.  In analyzing this claim, we
begin by noting that there are two burdens which must be met when a
defendant wishes to go forward with an affirmative defense.  The first is
the burden of production.  We have previously held that a defendant carries
the burden of production in such instances and must establish a prima facia
case on each of the elements of the affirmative defense before the court can
submit the defense to the jury.  See State v. Squires, 147 Vt. 430, 431,