Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Anthony

Citation: 2013-Ohio-5502

Docket Number: 2013-0226

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2013-12-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Anthony, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-5502.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-5502 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. ANTHONY. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Anthony,  
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-5502.] 
Attorney misconduct—Theft conviction—Conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation—Indefinite suspension. 
(No. 2013-0226—Submitted April 10, 2013—Decided December 24, 2013.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 11-086. 
____________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
An attorney’s suspension for failure to comply with attorney-registration 
requirements is prior discipline and therefore is an aggravating factor 
pursuant to BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(a). 
____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Mark Allan Anthony of Dayton, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0056048, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1991.  In 
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2005, we suspended Anthony’s license for failing to register, and in 2009, we 
suspended him again for failing to comply with continuing-legal-education 
requirements.  In 2011, we imposed an interim felony suspension based on his 
theft conviction for embezzling money from his employer, St. Francis de Sales 
Catholic Church, in Lebanon, Ohio.  In re Anthony, 128 Ohio St.3d 1490, 2011-
Ohio-2221, 946 N.E.2d 760.  All of these suspensions remain in effect. 
{¶ 2} Based on Anthony’s felony conviction, relator, disciplinary 
counsel, charged him with violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility 
and the Rules of Professional Conduct.  A three-member panel of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline conducted a hearing, in which the 
parties submitted stipulated facts and misconduct and jointly recommended a 
sanction of an indefinite suspension.  The parties, however, could not agree on 
whether restitution should be a condition of Anthony’s possible reinstatement to 
the practice of law.  The panel accepted the parties’ stipulated facts and 
misconduct and recommended that Anthony be indefinitely suspended and that 
reinstatement be conditioned on the successful completion of a treatment plan for 
Anthony’s gambling addiction and the establishment of a plan to pay restitution.  
The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
recommended sanction, and neither party has objected to the board’s report. 
{¶ 3} Upon review of the record, we accept the board’s findings of fact 
and misconduct and impose an indefinite suspension subject to payment of 
restitution as a condition of reinstatement. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 4} In 2004, Anthony voluntarily ceased the active practice of law and 
focused on his employment as the business manager at St. Francis de Sales 
Catholic Church.  Over a period of almost four years, Anthony embezzled church 
funds to pay for personal expenses and to maintain a gambling addiction.  
Specifically, Anthony wrote at least 60 checks to himself or to cash from parish 
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
funds, withdrew cash from various church accounts, and improperly used the 
parish credit card more than 60 times.  In February 2007, Anthony pled guilty to 
grand theft, and the Warren County Court of Common Pleas sentenced him to a 
12-month prison term and ordered him to pay restitution to St. Francis.  After 
Anthony had served four months in prison, the court modified his sentence to five 
years of community control. 
{¶ 5} The record here does not clearly set forth how much money 
Anthony took from St. Francis.  The parties stipulated, and the board found, that 
Anthony “misappropriated approximately $118,000 in parish funds,” and the trial 
court ordered that he pay $118,891 in restitution.  However, the parties also 
stipulated that Gallagher Bassett Services, Inc., a firm hired by the Archdiocese of 
Cincinnati to administer its insurance claims, calculated St. Francis’s total loss at 
$127,649.15.  When a panel member asked about this discrepancy at the hearing, 
Anthony stated that he had “no idea how they came to their numbers,” and relator 
explained that the prosecutor used the $118,891 figure, but the archdiocese and 
St. Francis concluded that the total loss was more than that amount based on the 
Gallagher Bassett findings. 
{¶ 6} We agree with the board’s conclusion that Anthony violated DR 1-
102(A)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in illegal conduct involving moral 
turpitude), 1-102(A)(4) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 1-102(A)(6) (prohibiting a 
lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to 
practice law).1   
                                                 
1 In its report, the panel stated its intention to dismiss the alleged violation in count two of relator’s 
complaint.  Gov.Bar R. V(6)(G), which permits a unanimous panel of the board to order the 
dismissal of a count without referring it to the board or this court for review, requires the panel to 
provide notice to counsel of record and other interested parties.  The record in this case does not 
establish that the panel complied with the notice requirements of that rule.   Instead, the panel 
certified its findings of fact and recommendations to the board in accordance with Gov.Bar R. 
V(6)(H) and (I).  Because the board did not order dismissal and provide the notices required by 
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Anthony’s criminal restitution order 
{¶ 7} At the time of Anthony’s thefts, the Archdiocese of Cincinnati 
maintained an employee-dishonesty insurance policy with Lloyd’s of London.  
The terms of that policy specified that the archdiocese was responsible for the 
first $100,000 of any employee-dishonesty claim, and the insurer was obligated 
for losses over that amount.  The archdiocese created a self-insured retention 
(“SIR”) fund and required its parishes and other entities to pay a predetermined 
amount to cover any claimed losses under the policy.  In 2007, the SIR fund of the 
archdiocese issued payment of $100,000 to St. Francis, and in 2008, Lloyd’s of 
London issued its check for $27,149.15 to St. Francis, representing the remainder 
of the claimed loss less a $500 deductible. 
{¶ 8} In 2011, upon learning that St. Francis had been made whole, 
Anthony moved the trial court to modify its restitution order, arguing that Ohio 
law prohibited restitution to a victim in an amount in excess of the victim’s actual 
economic loss.  The trial court agreed and terminated Anthony’s community-
control supervision.  Up to that time, Anthony had paid $13,425 in restitution—
$10,000 to St. Francis and $3,425 to Lloyd’s of London.  Since then, Anthony has 
not paid any restitution. 
Sanction 
{¶ 9} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
several factors, including the ethical duties violated, the actual injury caused, the 
existence of any aggravating and mitigating factors listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B), and the sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. 
Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16; 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio St.3d 473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 
                                                                                                                                     
Gov.Bar R. V(6)(G), we treat the purported dismissal as a recommendation that count two be 
dismissed.  See, e.g., In re Complaint Against Harper, 77 Ohio St.3d 211, 216, 673 N.E.2d 1253 
(1996); Disciplinary Counsel v. Doellman, 127 Ohio St.3d 411, 2010-Ohio-5990, 940 N.E.2d 928, 
¶ 31-33.  We accept that recommendation and dismiss count two.   
January Term, 2013 
5 
 
N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21.  In this case, relator, the panel, and the board have 
recommended an indefinite suspension; upon consideration of the relevant factors, 
we adopt that recommendation, but condition reinstatement on payment of the 
loss and impose other conditions. 
1.  Aggravating and mitigating factors 
{¶ 10} The board determined that Anthony’s prior attorney-registration 
suspension was an aggravating factor, but it also considered as a mitigating factor 
the fact that Anthony had no prior discipline except for that suspension,.  We have 
not always been consistent in treating attorney-registration suspensions as 
aggravating factors.  Compare Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Kelly, 132 Ohio 
St.3d 292, 2012-Ohio-2715, 971 N.E.2d 922, ¶ 15 (“The only mitigating factor is 
that, except for his current attorney-registration suspension, [respondent] does not 
have a prior disciplinary record”) with Disciplinary Counsel v. Lape, 130 Ohio 
St.3d 273, 2011-Ohio-5757, 957 N.E.2d 772, ¶ 11 (citing cases holding that an 
attorney-registration suspension is an aggravating factor). 
{¶ 11} An attorney’s suspension for failure to comply with attorney-
registration requirements is prior discipline and therefore is an aggravating factor 
pursuant to BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(a).  A registration suspension may not 
weigh heavily against a respondent when the prior discipline consists only of a 
registration suspension.  In this case, although respondent has also been 
sanctioned for failure to comply with continuing-legal-education (“CLE”) 
requirements, pursuant to Gov.Bar R. X(5)(C), a sanction imposed for CLE 
noncompliance “shall not be considered in the imposition of a sanction under 
Gov. Bar R. V, Section 8.” 
{¶ 12} In addition, other aggravating factors exist in this case:  (1) 
dishonest or selfish motive, (2) pattern of misconduct, (3) multiple offenses, (4) 
harm to the victims of the misconduct, and (5) failure to make restitution.  See 
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b), (c), (d), (h), and (i).  However, we reject the 
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board’s conclusion that Anthony submitted false evidence during the disciplinary 
process, because the board fails to identify the false evidence and the record does 
not support the board’s conclusion. 
{¶ 13} In mitigation, the board found that Anthony disclosed his conduct 
to the disciplinary board, cooperated in the disciplinary investigation, and had 
already been punished for his conduct by serving a prison sentence.  See BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(d) and (f).  At the hearing, relator argued that Anthony’s 
gambling addiction could not be considered as a mitigating factor because 
Anthony had not yet demonstrated a sustained period of successful treatment, as 
required by BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g)(iii).  Anthony signed a contract with the 
Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”) only three months before the panel 
hearing and therefore did not establish that his addiction qualified as a mitigating 
factor under BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g)(iii), which requires a sustained period 
of successful treatment.  We nonetheless agree with the board that Anthony’s 
diagnosed 
pathological 
gambling 
disorder, 
his 
OLAP 
contract, 
his 
commencement of treatment with a clinical psychologist, and his involvement in 
Gamblers Anonymous should be accorded some mitigating effect. 
2.  Applicable precedent 
{¶ 14} To support its recommended sanction, relator cited three cases in 
which we indefinitely suspended attorneys for misappropriating large amounts of 
non-client funds, namely, Disciplinary Counsel v. Muntean, 127 Ohio St.3d 427, 
2010-Ohio-6133, 940 N.E.2d 942 (attorney indefinitely suspended for 
misappropriating nearly $50,000 from a county board while serving as the 
treasurer), Disciplinary Counsel v. Kelly, 121 Ohio St.3d 39, 2009-Ohio-317, 901 
N.E.2d 798 (attorney indefinitely suspended for embezzling over $40,000 from a 
county humane society while serving as its volunteer treasurer), and Akron Bar 
Assn. v. Smithern, 125 Ohio St.3d 72, 2010-Ohio-652, 926 N.E.2d 274 (attorney 
indefinitely suspended for stealing over $100,000 from her employer law firm). 
January Term, 2013 
7 
 
{¶ 15} In these cases, we were influenced by the relevant mitigating 
factors—including restitution.  In Muntean, we noted that the attorney had made 
complete restitution as a condition of his criminal sentence.  Id. at ¶ 5, 12.  In 
Kelly, we conditioned the attorney’s reinstatement on full restitution.  Id. at ¶ 20.  
And in Smithern, we conditioned the attorney’s reinstatement on compliance with 
a settlement agreement between the attorney and the law firm’s insurer requiring 
the attorney to make full restitution to the insurer.  Id. at ¶ 10, 16. 
{¶ 16} In addition, our recent opinion in Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Williams, 
___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2013-Ohio-4006, ___ N.E.2d ___, while not controlling, is 
useful in determining the appropriate sanction.  In Williams, we permanently 
disbarred an attorney who, like Anthony, had committed theft offenses for 
stealing substantial amounts of money in order to maintain a gambling addiction 
and who, like Anthony, had failed to make restitution to her victims.  However, 
Williams showed little probability of recovery, and she continued gambling 
during the pendency of her disciplinary proceedings, which violated the terms of 
her community control and resulted in her serving the eight-and-a-half-year prison 
sentence.  Id. at ¶ 1, 23, 27.  In contrast, the trial court in Anthony’s criminal case 
successfully terminated him from community control in 2011.  Moreover, 
Anthony maintains that he has not gambled since 2007, and he has demonstrated 
that he has been involved with Gamblers Anonymous since 2006.  Thus, this case 
is factually distinguishable from Williams. 
3.  Conclusion 
{¶ 17} Anthony violated a private trust with his employer and caused 
great harm to St. Francis de Sales Catholic Church.  In addition, he has been 
sanctioned for failing to register and failing to comply with CLE requirements, 
and all of those sanctions remain in effect.  We recognize that he also has served a 
prison sentence, has been actively involved in Gamblers Anonymous, recently 
signed a contract with OLAP, fully cooperated during the disciplinary process, 
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and has exhibited remorse.  But he has paid only $13,425 in restitution, and the 
SIR fund is owed $90,000 and the insurer is owed almost $24,000.  On this 
record, the board recommends that we indefinitely suspend Anthony and place 
conditions on any potential reinstatement. 
{¶ 18} Having reviewed Anthony’s ethical violations and the aggravating 
and mitigating factors, and having considered the sanctions imposed for 
comparable misconduct, we accept the board’s recommended sanction.  However, 
we modify its recommended conditions for reinstatement.  As a condition of 
reinstatement in this case, Anthony is ordered to make restitution of $127,649.15, 
consisting of $100,000 to the SIR fund, $27,149.15 to Lloyd’s of London, and the 
$500 deductible payable to St. Francis de Sales Catholic Church, less amounts he 
has paid to date. 
{¶ 19} Accordingly, Mark Allen Anthony is hereby indefinitely 
suspended from the practice of law in Ohio.  To petition for reinstatement, 
Anthony must show (1) successful completion of an OLAP-approved treatment 
plan for gambling addiction and (2) the payment of restitution in the amount of 
$127,649.15.  Costs are taxed to Anthony. 
Judgment accordingly. 
PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER and FRENCH, JJ., dissent. 
____________________ 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 20} I respectfully dissent and would hold that Anthony should be 
permanently disbarred, to be consistent with our recent disbarment of the attorney 
in Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Williams, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2013-Ohio-4006, ___ 
N.E.2d ___. 
{¶ 21} The majority suggests that this case is “factually distinguishable,” 
majority opinion at ¶ 16, from a disciplinary case in which a woman was 
January Term, 2013 
9 
 
disbarred even though she claimed that she had an uncontrollable gambling 
problem and presented the testimony of three professionals who opined that she 
could successfully return to the practice of law after treatment.  The majority 
emphasizes that Williams had violated terms of her community control by 
continuing to gamble, apparently taking as fact Anthony’s claim that he has not 
gambled since 2007.  And while it is true that Anthony’s period of community 
control was terminated, this termination occurred because he convinced the court 
that he should not be ordered to pay restitution covered through the church’s 
insurance. 
{¶ 22} Williams is instructive rather than distinguishable, setting forth the 
appropriate standard for discipline in these cases: 
 
“We have consistently recognized that the presumptive 
disciplinary sanction for misappropriation of client funds is 
disbarment.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Longino, 128 Ohio St.3d 
426, 2011-Ohio-1524, 945 N.E.2d 1040, ¶ 39; see also 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Wickerham, 132 Ohio St.3d 205, 2012-
Ohio-2580, 970 N.E.2d 932, ¶ 16 (“The presumptive disciplinary 
sanction for a pattern of misconduct involving dishonesty, 
misappropriation, and lack of cooperation in disciplinary 
proceedings is disbarment”).  In addition, disbarment is “an 
appropriate sanction when an attorney is convicted of theft 
offenses.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Brickley, 131 Ohio St.3d 228, 
2012-Ohio-872, 963 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 7. 
 
Id. at ¶ 24. 
{¶ 23} The board had found four mitigating factors in Williams: the 
absence of a prior disciplinary record, good character or reputation, imposition of 
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other penalties, and Williams’s acknowledgment of the wrongfulness of her 
actions.  But we unanimously rejected the board’s recommendation of indefinite 
suspension, stating:  
 
“The continuing public confidence in the judicial system 
and the bar requires that the strictest discipline be imposed in 
misappropriation cases.” Disciplinary Counsel v. Kelly, 121 Ohio 
St.3d 39, 2009-Ohio-317, 901 N.E.2d 798, ¶ 17, quoting Cleveland 
Bar Assn. v. Belock, 82 Ohio St.3d 98, 100, 694 N.E.2d 897 
(1998).  For this reason, disbarment is the “starting point for 
determining the required sanction.” Id.  Contrary to the board’s 
recommendation, none of the mitigating factors here warrant 
straying from this starting point. 
 
Id. at ¶ 29. 
{¶ 24} 
Thus, we made a strong statement in Williams, and we explained 
to attorneys and the public-at-large what requires the “strictest discipline.”  This is 
not a case to back away from that pronouncement.  For over four years, Anthony 
embezzled more than $100,000 from the church at which he was employed.  I do 
not believe that the mitigating factors warrant a departure from the sanction of 
disbarment. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FRENCH, J., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
Karen H. Osmond, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
James T. Ambrose, for respondent. 
________________________