Case Title: State v. Benjamin

Citation: 2007 VT 52

Docket Number: 2005-181

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2007-06-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Benjamin (2005-181)

2007 VT 52

[Filed 22-Jun-2007]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 2007 VT 52

                                No. 2005-181


  State of Vermont                               Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.                                        District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 3, Orleans Circuit

  Mark Benjamin                                  December Term, 2006


  Howard E. Van Benthuysen, J.

  Christopher C. Moll, Lamoille County Deputy State's Attorney, Hyde Park,
    for  Plaintiff-Appellee.

  Allison N. Fulcher of Martin & Associates, Barre, for Defendant-Appellant.


  PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Burgess, JJ.

       ¶  1.  REIBER, C.J.   Defendant Mark Benjamin appeals from the
  district court's finding that he was in violation of probation (VOP). 
  Defendant asserts that the VOP complaint should have been dismissed because
  he was denied his right to a hearing within a reasonable time.  The State
  contends, in opposition, that any delay in the hearing was due largely to
  defendant's own actions and that no prejudice resulted from the delay.  We
  affirm.
        
       ¶  2.  The pertinent facts are uncontested.  Defendant pled guilty on
  July 13, 2004, to one count of lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor,
  and one count of sexual assault on a minor. (FN1)  He was sentenced, on the
  first charge, to one to five years, all suspended but sixty days.  On the
  second, he was sentenced to three to twelve years, all suspended but sixty
  days on a pre-approved furlough work crew.  The two sentences were
  concurrent, and defendant was placed on probation with standard conditions. 
  On August 20, 2004, defendant's probation officer filed a VOP complaint
  alleging that defendant had violated his probation conditions by using
  regulated drugs and alcohol.  On the same day, defendant was arraigned on
  six new charges: one count of sexual assault on a minor under sixteen, 13
  V.S.A. § 3252(3); three counts of delivering regulated drugs to minors, 18
  V.S.A. § 4237(A); and two counts of furnishing alcohol to a minor, 7 V.S.A.
  § 658.  Defendant entered a plea of not guilty, and bail was set at
  $50,000.  A preliminary probable-cause hearing on the VOP charge was also
  held on August 20, and probable cause was found for the VOP.  Unable to
  make bail on the six new charges, defendant was taken into custody the same
  day. 

       ¶  3.  Defendant was assigned counsel on August 24, 2004, and a merits
  hearing on the VOP complaint was scheduled for September 20, 2004.  The
  court also set September 20 as the date for a status conference on the
  criminal charges.  Defendant's counsel withdrew on August 31, and new
  counsel was assigned that day.  Defendant then moved, on September 17,
  2004, to continue the September 20 hearing.  The motion was granted, and
  the hearing was set for October 18, 2004.  On October 13, 2004, defendant
  filed a motion to suppress certain statements he had made to police
  officers, with respect to both the VOP and the other charges.
   
       ¶  4.  The first hearing on the VOP complaint was held on October
  18, 2004.  The State called defendant's probation officer to testify, and
  the time allotted for the hearing was sufficient for the State to conclude
  its direct examination but insufficient for defendant to complete
  cross-examination.  Also on that day, five new charges were filed arising
  from defendant's conduct on August 20.  Bail on those charges was set at
  $25,000, and defendant, already incarcerated for failure to make bail on
  the August 20 charges, did not meet the additional bail.  The October 18
  hearing was continued to November 22, 2004, to take further evidence.  

       ¶  5.  At the November 22 hearing, which lasted less than an hour,
  defendant moved to merge consideration of the motion to suppress with the
  VOP hearing.  That motion was granted.  Defendant then completed the
  cross-examination of the probation officer begun at the October 18 hearing,
  after which the State conducted direct examination of one of the police
  officers who executed the search warrant on defendant's home.  The time
  allotted for the hearing did not suffice for the State to complete direct
  examination.  At the close of the hearing, counsel for defendant asked the
  court if it would reschedule the upcoming hearing on the suppression motion
  to coincide with the next hearing on the VOP.  The court agreed, and a
  hearing was scheduled for November 29.  
   
       ¶  6.  At the November 29 hearing, which lasted about forty minutes,
  defendant asserted that the scheduling had created problems with
  out-of-state witnesses - in particular defendant's mother, who feared
  losing her job if she had to miss work for other hearings - and was
  diminishing his ability to cross-examine witnesses effectively.  Citing
  these difficulties, defendant moved to dismiss the VOP complaint.  The
  motion was denied.  After the denial, the State concluded direct
  examination of the police officer, and defendant began to cross-examine
  her.  During both the State's and defendant's examination of the officer,
  counsel for both parties discussed with the court the difficulties inherent
  in examining the officer without a resolution of the motion to suppress. 
  At the close of the November 29 hearing, the court noted that, when it came
  time to focus more closely on the statements subject to the motion to
  suppress, the officer would be called upon to testify again.

       ¶  7.  Additional hearings were held, including a half-day on March 23
  and a shorter hearing on March 29, 2005.  On March 23, four witnesses
  testified.  The first was a minor who was present when defendant furnished
  drugs to other minors and who assisted police in recording a telephone call
  in which she discussed drugs with defendant.  The defense had a full
  opportunity to cross-examine her and did so.  The second witness was a
  friend of defendant.  He testified and was subject to cross-examination,
  redirect, and recross.  Third to testify on March 23 was the police officer
  who had previously testified on November 29.  Finally, the court took
  testimony from another officer who was present at the time the warrant was
  executed.  That officer was subject to direct and cross-examination.  Four
  more witnesses, including defendant, testified at the shorter March 29
  hearing.

       ¶  8.  The district court then issued an order on April 21, 2005,
  finding that defendant had violated his probation conditions.  Probation
  was revoked on June 6, 2005, and the underlying sentences on the
  sexual-assault and lewd-and-lascivious-conduct charges were imposed, with
  credit for time served, after a sentencing hearing.  Defendant appealed.

       ¶  9.  We first review the rules and statutes governing VOP hearings
  in Vermont.  Rule 32.1 of the Vermont Rules of Criminal Procedure and §§
  301-305 of Title 28 govern the modification and revocation of probation. 
  Under Rule 32.1, two hearings must be held.  First, a probationer is
  entitled to a "prompt" preliminary hearing to determine whether there is
  probable cause to detain him or her pending a merits hearing.  V.R.Cr.P.
  32.1(a)(1).  Second, the merits hearing, referred to in the statute as the
  "revocation hearing," must be held "within a reasonable time."  V.R.Cr.P.
  32.1(a)(2).  The Vermont rules mirror the Federal Rules of Criminal
  Procedure in both respects.  See F.R.Cr.P. 32.1(b)(1), (2) (preliminary
  hearing must be held "promptly"; revocation hearing must be held within "a
  reasonable time").  Both the Vermont and federal rules dictate certain
  procedural requirements for the preliminary and final hearings, but those
  requirements are not implicated in the instant case; defendant contests
  only the timing of his revocation hearing. The United States Supreme Court
  has held that the timing and nature of both hearings is mandated by the
  Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (FN2)  Vermont's rule
  was promulgated to comply with the constitutional mandates announced in
  those cases.  Reporter's Notes, V.R.Cr.P. 32.1. 

       ¶  10.  First, in Morrissey v. Brewer,