Case Title: Martinson v. City of Jackson

Citation: 215 So. 2d 414

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1968-11-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
215 So. 2d 414 (1968) Mike MARTINSON, The Richland Company, Frank M. Martinson and Mrs. Frank M. Martinson v. CITY OF JACKSON and McClelland Taylor. No. 45041. Supreme Court of Mississippi. November 11, 1968. *415 Charles E. Hughes, Binder, Bush & Selph, Jackson, for appellants. E.W. Stennett, Val Surgis, Creekmore & Beacham, Jackson, for appellees. JONES, Justice. This is an appeal from the action of the municipal authorities in rezoning certain property from its classification under the General Zoning Ordinance adopted June 1, 1950. On February 3, 1967, appellee Taylor filed with the City Zoning Department a petition to rezone the property from A-2 to A-1. There were also presented several separate typewritten petitions signed by a number of persons owning property within the area, requesting such a change. Each of such typewritten petitions contained this paragraph: This original petition was on a form presumably prepared by the city. The minutes of the meeting of the Zoning Committee, where these petitions were considered, appear in the record and contain the following: Also the minutes show: Several other witnesses concurred in the statement of Mr. Wright and no one controverted it. The minutes show that the Committee's recommendation was: The consulting engineer made his recommendation to the Director of the Zoning *416 Department, the last paragraph of which reads: Parenthetically, it may be said here the engineer's statement that the area in its entirety was composed of single family homes was shown to be erroneous by pictures taken in the area disclosing duplexes, garage apartments, three-unit constructions, and houses for four families. These pictures were taken two days before the hearing and were introduced without objection. An A-1 classification does not allow for a dwelling which is larger than a two-family residence. Classification A-2, however, permits all constructions authorized by A-1, and additionally, apartments or multiple-family dwellings, with certain limitations as to the area therefor with front and side yard requirements. Before the City Council, Mr. Martinson, appellant, testified that he and the other appellants: The permit was not granted. Proponents of the change testified that when the general zoning ordinance was adopted in 1950 the area involved was similar to surrounding or adjacent areas classified A-1 and concluded therefrom that there was "manifestly" an error or mistake in zoning the subject property as A-2. There was no proof that such an error or mistake was made in the original zoning but proponents rested on the conclusion that it must have been a mistake. We cannot know the reason for such zoning but since the area is in the immediate vicinity of Belhaven College can surmise as to the reason. However, the officials so zoning cannot be presumed to have made a mistake; the presumption is to the contrary. The aforesaid evidence would not overcome this presumption of correctness, and, as stated, was merely a conclusion. There was no proof of error or mistake and the City Council did not find error or mistake. As to changes in use or character of the area, all that appears from the record is: These were certainly not such changes in use as would alter the character of the area. The direct proof of witnesses heretofore quoted was that the character of the area had not changed. At the beginning of the hearing before the Committee, the attorney for the proponents stated positively there had been no change. On this proof the City Council changed the zoning to A-1, denying appellants' right to use the property as authorized by its original zoning. The ordinance effectuating rezoning was based on the following findings by the Council: There was no proof, either as to mistake or change of character of the neighborhood, and the Council, to justify its order, could only point to the fact that appellants desired to use their property as the ordinance, sought to be changed, authorized. There was no evidence or charge of confiscation. Mississippi has by more than one decision declared the law to be substantially as is succinctly stated by the Maryland Court in Kroen v. Board of Zoning Appeals of Baltimore County, 209 Md. 420, 426, 121 A.2d 181, 184 (1956), as follows: Our Court in City of Jackson v. Bridges, 243 Miss. 646, 139 So. 2d 660 (1962), held as follows: 1. Before rezoning, it must be shown that there was some mistake in the original zoning or that conditions in the neighborhood have changed so as to warrant rezoning. 2. An organized neighborhood desire for rezoning, without more, is insufficient to justify rezoning. 3. The determination of zoning authorities that there has been a change of conditions to warrant rezoning will not be disturbed if the question is fairly debatable. 4. Aesthetic conditions alone do not justify zoning regulations; and where such regulations are designed merely to preserve the appearance of a designated neighborhood, they are invalid. 5. There must be a positive showing of physical, economic or social change rather than aesthetic or group caprice to justify the release of zoning regulations. 6. The petitioners had the burden of proving a public need for the change * * they offered no evidence of new or additional facts or other considerations materially affecting the merits which had intervened since the original zoning * * * on August 8, 1958. 7. The evidence failed to show a mistake in the original zoning. In Westminster Presbyterian Church v. City of Jackson, 253 Miss. 495, 504-506, 176 So. 2d 267, 271 (1965), it was held: This was held insufficient to show the action confiscatory and that case was affirmed. In the instant case there was no allegation, no proof, and no finding of confiscation. We cannot conceive that a proposed use of the property in accordance with its classification would constitute such a material change as to meet the legal requirements, or that such question would be fairly debatable. Illustrative of a material change is Nelson v. County Council for Montgomery County, 214 Md. 587, 136 A.2d 373 (1957). Certain properties in the area sought to be rezoned had been changed from multiple-family residences, one to commercial office buildings, and one to general commercial; further an electric power substation had been erected in one section of the property and a public paved parking lot in another portion. The Court held this was evidence from which the Council could find the character of the neighborhood had changed to the extent that the rezoning should be granted. This is cited merely as illustrative. Each case would depend on its own facts and this Court would not necessarily require as drastic changes as in the Nelson case. There being no proof of mistake, change, or confiscation, we are unable to *419 find any support for the Council's action in rezoning. The case is therefore reversed, and the petitions for change of classification are denied and dismissed. Reversed and petitions for change of classification are denied and dismissed. ETHRIDGE, C.J., and BRADY, INZER and ROBERTSON, JJ., concur.