Case Title: Cannon v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 169, 2021

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2022-03-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JAMARR CANNON, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 169, 2021 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  Cr. ID No. K1706001541 
§                  
§  
§ 
 
Submitted: January 18, 2022 
Decided: 
March 4, 2022 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
 
ORDER 
 
After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion to 
affirm, and the record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Jamarr Cannon, appeals from the Superior Court’s May 
6, 2021, modified sentence order.  The State has filed a motion to affirm the Superior 
Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Cannon’s opening 
brief that the appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
(2) 
After a bench trial, Cannon was convicted of possession of cocaine 
(Tier 5), drug dealing cocaine (Tier 4),1 felony resisting arrest,2 and other charges 
 
1 This charge merged with the Tier 5 cocaine-possession charge for sentencing. 
2 11 Del. C. § 1257(a)(1) (class G felony). 
 
2
arising from conduct that occurred on June 2, 2017.  Cannon represented himself at 
trial and sentencing, with the assistance of standby counsel.  The State sought 
habitual-offender sentencing under 11 Del. C. § 4214(d) for the offense of resisting 
arrest.  On April 11, 2018, the Superior Court granted the State’s motion, which 
Cannon did not contest,3 and sentenced Cannon as follows:  (i) for possession of 
cocaine (Tier 5), to twenty-five years of imprisonment, suspended after fifteen years 
for decreasing levels of supervision, with the first two years of imprisonment 
imposed as a mandatory term; (ii) for resisting arrest, under 11 Del. C. § 4214(d), to 
twenty-five years of imprisonment, suspended after four years for one year of Level 
III probation, with the first two years of imprisonment imposed as a mandatory term; 
and (iii) for the remaining charges, to pay a fine.4  Cannon appealed, arguing that the 
 
3 See State v. Cannon, Cr. ID No. 1706001541, Sentencing Transcript at 10:15 (Del. Super. Ct. 
Apr. 11, 2018) (stating, when asked his position on the State’s motion for habitual-offender 
sentencing, “I’m not contesting”). 
4 We note that the sentencing transcript reflects that the court sentenced Cannon under Section 
4214(b).  See id. at 22:6-8 (“Defendant is declared an habitual offender and is sentenced pursuant 
to 11 Delaware Code Section 4214(b) on this [resisting arrest] charge.”).  But the transcript and 
the habitual-offender motion reflect that the State sought sentencing under Section 4214(d), and 
the written sentencing order imposed the sentence under that provision.  See id. at 10:1-5 
(prosecutor arguing that Cannon was eligible for sentencing under Section 4214(d)); Cannon, Cr. 
ID No. 1706001541, Docket Entry No. 48 (Del. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 6, 2018) (moving for 
habitual-offender sentencing under Section 4214(d)); Cannon, Cr. ID No. 1706001541, Docket 
Entry No. 56, Sentence Order (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 11, 2018).  Given later developments in the 
case, including this Court’s vacatur of the April 11, 2018 sentencing order and Cannon’s 
resentencing, we need not resolve these discrepancies.   
 
3
Superior Court had erred in denying his motion to suppress all evidence derived from 
the traffic stop that resulted in his arrest.5  This Court affirmed.6 
(3) 
Cannon then filed a motion for correction of sentence, arguing that his 
habitual-offender sentence was illegal because he was not eligible for sentencing 
under 11 Del. C. § 4214(d).  The Superior Court denied the motion, and Cannon 
appealed.  On appeal, the State conceded that Cannon was ineligible for habitual-
offender sentencing under Section 4214(d) but moved for remand for resentencing 
under Section 4214(b), arguing that Cannon had three predicate felony convictions.  
Cannon did not oppose the State’s motion to remand.  This Court remanded the 
matter to the Superior Court, stating:  “Upon remand, the Superior Court shall 
declare Cannon an habitual offender under the appropriate provision of § 4214 and 
resentence him for his resisting arrest conviction.”7 
(4) 
On April 1, 2021, Cannon filed a motion for modification of sentence, 
through which he sought modification of his drug-possession sentence in 
conjunction with the resentencing for resisting arrest.  On May 4, 2021, the Superior 
Court convened a hearing on the motion and resentencing.  Counsel for the State and 
Cannon’s standby counsel indicated that they had first received Cannon’s motion 
earlier that day.  During that hearing, the State took the position that, under this 
 
5 Cannon v. State, 2018 WL 6575432 (Del. Dec. 12, 2018). 
6 Id. 
7 Cannon v. State, 2021 WL 855878 (Del. Mar. 5, 2021). 
 
4
Court’s remand order, Cannon should be resentenced only for resisting arrest and 
not for drug possession.  Cannon, who stated that he desired to continue representing 
himself, explained that he was not arguing that this Court’s order required the 
Superior Court to resentence him for drug possession, but rather that he was seeking 
modification of his drug-possession sentence under Superior Court Criminal Rule 
35(d).8  The State asked for a two-week continuance so that it could respond to 
Cannon’s motion.  The court granted a two-day continuance. 
(5) 
On May 6, 2021, the Superior Court held a hearing on the resentencing 
and Cannon’s Rule 35(d) motion.  At that hearing, the State indicated that it was not 
opposed to the court’s reconsideration under Rule 35(d) of the sentence for the other 
charges.9  Cannon presented arguments for a reduced overall sentence, and the State 
argued that the Superior Court should again impose fifteen years of unsuspended 
time for drug possession, two years of which would be mandatory, and four years of 
 
8 See Cannon, Cr. ID No. 1706001541, Motion and Resentencing Transcript at 9:3-5 (Del. Super. 
Ct. May 4, 2021) (“Your Honor, I’m not saying that you must resentence me on all the other 
counts.  I was more or less asking in accordance with Rule 35(d).”); see also id. at 11:4-8 (agreeing 
that the Supreme Court order provided for resentencing on resisting arrest and stating that he was 
seeking modification of “the whole sentence in accordance with Rule 35(d)”).   
Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(d) provides:  “If judgments of sentence were entered on 
more than one offense in the same sentencing order and the court corrects, modifies, or reduces 
one or more of those judgments under the provisions of this rule, the court may consider 
modification of other judgments provided that the aggregate sentence of all such judgments after 
modification is no greater than the aggregate sentence of all such judgments entered under the 
original sentencing order.” 
9 Cannon, Cr. ID No. 1706001541, Motion and Resentencing Transcript at 2:21-3:20, 15:22-16:21 
(Del. Super. Ct. May 6, 2021). 
 
5
unsuspended time for resisting arrest under Section 4214(b), one year of which 
would be mandatory.  The Superior Court then sentenced Cannon as follows:  (i) for 
possession of cocaine (Tier 5), to twenty-five years of imprisonment, suspended 
after fifteen years for decreasing levels of supervision, with the first two years of 
imprisonment imposed as a mandatory term; (ii) for resisting arrest, under 11 Del. 
C. § 4214(b), to twenty-five years of imprisonment, suspended after four years for 
one year of Level III probation, with the first one year of imprisonment imposed as 
a mandatory term, and (iii) for the remaining charges, to pay a fine. 
(6) 
On appeal, Cannon argues that imposition of the habitual-offender 
sentence under Section 4214(b) violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and his due-
process rights because in 2018 the State sought habitual-offender sentencing under 
Section 4214(d) and failed to meet its burden of showing the requisite number of 
predicate violent felonies under that provision.  Cannon’s claim is without merit 
because the Superior Court did not increase Cannon’s punishment after remand—
rather, the sentences were the same, except that the court reduced the mandatory 
portion of the sentence for resisting arrest.10  Cannon does not contend that he did 
 
10 Cf. White v. State, 576 A.2d 1322, 1323, 1328 (Del. 1990) (“After a related sentence has been 
vacated on appeal, a trial judge may resentence a defendant up to the combined duration of the 
original sentences without violating the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.”); cf. 
also id. at 1329 (rejecting claim that resentencing violated due process because defendant’s total 
sentence “remained unchanged after resentencing, except that the mandatory portion of his 
sentence was reduced from eight to three years”). 
 
6
not have the requisite number of predicate convictions for sentencing under Section 
4214(b).11 
(7) 
Cannon also argues that his due-process rights were violated because 
the Superior Court did not advise him of his right to appeal.  Even if the Superior 
Court was required to advise Cannon of his right to appeal in the circumstances of 
this case,12 about which we express no opinion, we find no reversible error because 
Cannon filed a timely appeal.13 
(8) 
Cannon also contends that his due-process rights were violated because 
an updated presentence report was not prepared nor provided to him following the 
remand.  Cannon does not cite any authority or support for these conclusory claims, 
nor does he suggest what additional information an updated report would have 
 
11 The applicable version of Section 4214(b)—which is the version that was in effect when Cannon 
committed the offense of resisting arrest for which the habitual-offender sentence was imposed, 
Wright v. State, 2022 WL 499979, at *3 (Del. Feb. 17, 2022)—provided:  “Any person who has 
been 3 times convicted of a felony under the laws of this State . . . and who shall thereafter be 
convicted of a subsequent felony, which is the person’s first Title 11 violent felony . . ., as defined 
in § 4201(c) of this title, shall receive a minimum sentence of ½ of the statutory maximum penalty 
provided elsewhere in this title, unless the maximum statutory penalty is life in which case the 
minimum sentence shall be 30 years, for the subsequent felony which forms the basis of the States 
[sic] petition to have the person declared to be an habitual criminal, up to life imprisonment . . . 
..”).  11 Del. C. § 4214(b) (eff. Apr. 13, 2017 to July 10, 2018).   
12 See DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 32(a)(2) (“After imposing sentence in a case which has gone to 
trial on a plea of not guilty, the court shall advise a defendant who is not represented by counsel 
of the defendant’s right to appeal and of the right of a person who is unable to pay the cost of an 
appeal to apply for leave to appeal in forma pauperis.  There shall be no duty on the court to advise 
the defendant of any right of appeal after sentence is imposed following a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere.”). 
13 See generally Charbonneau v. State, 904 A.2d 295, 319 (Del. 2006) (rejecting defendant’s claim 
that her due process rights were violated by prosecution’s exclusive possession of information 
about jurors because defendant had not shown any prejudice). 
 
7
provided that would have changed the sentence.14  Moreover, Cannon included in 
his Rule 35(d) motion, and discussed during the resentencing hearing, updates 
regarding “positive changes to move forward in life,” such as coursework completed 
and remaining writeup free in prison.15  The Superior Court considered the 
information presented and determined that the sentence remained appropriate.16  We 
find no basis for reversal. 
(9) 
Cannon also asserts that his due-process rights were violated when the 
State indicated that it did not oppose his Rule 35(d) motion but then did oppose the 
motion.  This claim mischaracterizes the record.  As discussed above, after 
indicating at the May 4, 2021, hearing that it intended to oppose the court’s 
reconsideration of the drug-possession sentence and obtaining a two-day 
continuance to prepare a response, the State indicated at the May 6, 2021, hearing 
that it was not opposed to the court’s reconsideration under Rule 35(d) of the 
sentences for all the charges.  Cannon then presented arguments for a reduced overall 
sentence, and the State argued that the Superior Court should again impose fifteen 
years of unsuspended time for drug possession and four years of unsuspended time 
 
14 Cf. Averill v. State, 2010 WL 2602386, at *2 (Del. June 29, 2010) (rejecting claim challenging 
sentence on the grounds that an updated presentence report was not available, because defendant’s 
history was discussed during the sentencing hearing and “[t]here is no indication that the lack of 
an updated presentence report had any impact on the outcome of the proceedings”). 
15 Cannon, Cr. ID No. 1706001541, Motion and Resentencing Transcript at 4:3-5:23 (Del. Super. 
Ct. May 6, 2021). 
16 Id. at 17:4-18:9. 
 
8
for resisting arrest.  The Superior Court then resentenced Cannon on all the charges.  
We find no reversible error as to this claim. 
(10) Finally, Cannon argues that the Superior Court erred by failing to 
engage in a colloquy with Cannon at the May 6, 2021, resentencing regarding his 
waiver of counsel.  “The decision to proceed pro se involves a waiver of a 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”17  The benefits associated with that 
right “must be waived knowingly and intelligently.”18  “A determination of whether 
a defendant has intelligently waived the right to counsel depends upon the particular 
facts and circumstances surrounding th[e] case, including the background, 
experience, and conduct of the defendant.”19  “The trial court is entrusted with the 
responsibility of ensuring that the decision by a defendant to represent himself is 
made intelligently and competently.”20  Under the circumstances of this case, we 
conclude that Cannon’s claim that the Superior Court erred by not conducting a full 
waiver-of-counsel colloquy at the resentencing is without merit.  Cannon 
represented himself at trial and his initial sentencing, with the assistance of standby 
counsel, and he has not argued that his initial waiver of counsel was not knowing 
and intelligent.  Following remand for resentencing, the Superior Court asked 
 
17 Briscoe v. State, 606 A.2d 103, 107 (Del. 1992). 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
 
9
Cannon if he wanted to continue representing himself, with the assistance of standby 
counsel, and Cannon stated that he did.21  Under these circumstances, we conclude 
that the Superior Court did not err by not conducting a full waiver-of-counsel 
colloquy with Cannon at his resentencing.22 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion to affirm is 
GRANTED, and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        Chief Justice 
 
 
21 Cannon, Cr. ID No. 1706001541, Motion and Resentencing Transcript at 5:13-6:9 (Del. Super. 
Ct. May 4, 2021). 
22 Cf. United States v. Norwood, 566 Fed. Appx. 123, 126 (3d Cir. 2014) (“Absent an express 
revocation of the criminal defendant’s waiver or some other change in circumstances, a district 
court 
has 
no 
standing 
obligation 
to 
revisit 
the 
waiver 
question 
and 
conduct 
another Faretta colloquy at a later stage in criminal proceedings.”); United States v. Vas, 255 F. 
Supp. 3d 598, 602 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (rejecting argument that court erred by allowing defendant “to 
represent himself at his re-sentencing without first conducting an appropriate colloquy” because 
the court had conducted a thorough colloquy before the trial, there was no indication that 
circumstances had changed such that a renewed colloquy would be necessary, defendant did not 
express a desire to revoke his pro se status, and defendant repeatedly reaffirmed his desire to 
represent himself, including at the resentencing hearing).