Case Title: Meadow Lake v Shoemaker

Citation: 2008 MT 41

Docket Number: e636781e-e846-4f74-9ad9-7219baa2dec9

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 2008-02-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED

 

 

 

February $2008
DA 06-0261
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2008 MT 41
MEADOW LAKE ESTATES HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, FILED
Plaintiff and Appellee,
y FEB 05 2008,
DANIEL SHOEMAKER, an individual, cone cuangcoumt
‘SHOEMAKER, an individual, and JOHN DOES F-X, ‘Seat Ge onane
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL FROM: District Court ofthe Twenty-First Judicial District,
In and For the County of Ravalli, Cause No. DV 00-334
Honorable Jeffrey H. Langton, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellants:
Quentin M. Rhoades, Sullivan, Tabaracci & Rhoades, P.C., Missoula,
Montana
For Appellee

Martin S. King, Worden, Thane, P.C., Missoula, Montana

 

‘Submitted on Briefs: May 31, 2007

Decided: February 5, 2008

Filed:

 
Justice Brian Morris delivered the Opinion of the Cour.
$1 Daniel Shoemaker and Jane Shoemaker (the Shoemakers) appeal from the District
Court's order granting summary judgment to Meadow Lake Estates Homeowners
Association (the Association), We affirm.
{2 The Shoemakers present the following issues for review:
{8 ___1. Whether the District Court properly determined that the Shoemakers had waived
the affirmative defense of statute of limitations.
$4 2. Whether the District Court improperly resolved a genuine issue of material factin
‘granting the Association's motion for summary judgment,

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
{5 Meadow Lake Estates is a residential development located in Ravalli County.

Developers of the subdivision intended to preserve the “natural beauty, primitive

 

characteristics, and seclusion” of the property by filing a Deed of Restriction with the Ravalli
County Clerk and Recorder in August 1979. The Deed of Restriction set forth a variety of
land use limitations on property owners within the subdivision, including the prohibition of
‘commercial activities not “compatible with the residential nature and characteristics of the
area.” ‘The Deed of Restriction reserved easements on all existing roads within the
subdivision for the “scenic views and enjoyment” of the property and for the “reasonable

‘general use” by all subdivision property owners to access public lands.

{6 The Shoemakers bought three tracts of land in the Meadow Lake Estates subdivision
in 1984, The Jack Creek access road encumbered the Shoemakers’ property atthe time of
their purchase, The Shoemakers promptly erected gate across the road where it intersected
with their property. When locked, the gate blocked vehicular access to public lands on the
‘other side of the Shoemakers’ tract. The Association demanded in 1987 thatthe Shoemakers
unlock or remove the gate because it was interfering with the property owners’ access to
public lands. The Shoemakers refused. The Shoemakers wamed the Association that it
‘would have to initiate legal action to resolve the issue surrounding the locked gate, The
Association took no immediate action,

{V7 The Shocmakers then launched an outfitting business from their property in 1988.
‘The business operated under an outfitter license and provided guided hunting tips ineastem
Montana. The business also occasionally guided hunters on the public lands near the
Shoemakers" property. The Shoemakers ceased operations after several years of business,
{8 The Association filed a complaint against the Shoemakers in November 2000. The
Association accused the Shoemakers of violating provisions of the Deed of Restriction by
interfering with the easement over the Jack Creek access road and by operating an outfitting
business on their property. ‘The Association sought a permanent injunction ordering the
Shoemakers to remove all obstructions from the Jack Creek access road and prohibiting the
‘Shoemakers from operating the outfitting business on their property. At the same time, the

‘Association filed an application for a temporary injunction and a request to set a show cause

 

hearing. The District Court issued an order on November 15,2000, direeting the Shoemakers
to appear on December 4, 2000, to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be
granted,

$9 The Shoemakers filed their answer to the Association's complaint on January 31,
2001. ‘The Shoemakers’ answer asserted general denials of the allegations in the
‘Association's complaint, including a denial that an express casement encumbered their
property forthe benefit of Association members. They admitted that “a gate exists on their
driveway and thatthe gate is sometimes locked.” (Emphasis added.) The Shoemakers alleged
‘as ther first affirmative defense thatthe Association had waived or abandoned any easement
due to the fact that the Association had not used the Jack Creek access road for over
seventeen years. The second and third affirmative defenses asserted that, in ight of other

  

ble forest service access roads inthe subdivision, the easement encumbering their land
‘was unnecessary and moot. Their final affirmative defense asserted that, if the easement
exists, parking vehicles onthe section of Jack Creek access road that sits on the Shoemakers’
property is outside the scope ofthe easement.

{10 The court held the show cause hearing on February 5, 2001. Larry Wilkins (Wil

 

)
testified on behalf of the Association. ‘The Shoemakers did not appear, although their
counsel cross-examined the Association’s witness and presented arguments. The court
‘granted a preliminary injunction directing the Shoemakers to keep open the gate across the
Jack Creek access road and to remove all “no trespassing” signs during the pendency of the

action.
{11 Thecour’s scheduling order of March 9, 2001, directed the parties to file ll pretrial

 

“including motions in limine and motions for summary judgment” on or before July
20, 2001. By stipulation of the parties, the court later extended the deadline for filing
motions to October 28, 2001

112 The Association filed # motion for summary judgment, The Association sought
summary judgment that it held a valid easement across the Jack Creek access road and that
the Shoemakers could not sustain their abandonment defense as @ matter of law. The
Association attached to its motion the deposition of Daniel Shoemaker, taken August 21,

2001, the deposition of Wilkins, also taken August 21, 2001, and the Shoemakers’ Response

 

to Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents.
{13 Wilkins testified that he continued to use the road after the Shoemakers lived there.

Wilkins explained that he would get around the Shoemakers" locked gate by walking around

 

the section of fence or climbing over the gate. “I used it when they weren't there and I've
used it since they lived there, along with other people.” He stated that “[tJhere’s been periods
of time when the gate has stood wide open for days, weeks ata time, but its always locked
during hunting season.” He stated that he used to drive up the road when the forest service
land was open to vehicles, but that when the forest service became closed to vehicles, he
‘would bike, sk, or ride his horse up to the forest service land, using the Jack Creek access
road through the Shoemakers" property to get there, He stated that, as a member of the

Association's Board, he knows that the money from the Association dues goes to the road
grader and that he saw the Jack Creek access road over the Shoemakers property graded at
least once.

{14 Daniel Shoemaker asserted in his deposition that non-use extinguished the easement.
‘Yet Shoemaker declared that he “caught [Wilkins] twice in the last couple years,” riding his
bike on the Jack Creek access road, that he gave Mr. Trautman, a lot owner, permission to
retrieve an elk that he shot on public land, and that he saw and confronted some children of
Dwayne Allen, another lot owner, who were using the road, presumably while lost. He also
stated that he gave a key to his cousin, Mike Uffelman, a lot owner, to access the road.
{15 Shoemaker claimed that he had confronted people six or seven times about using the
road since owning the property and admitted that he may have been carrying a gun during
those confrontations. When asked ifthe gate was locked 24 hours a day, Daniel Shoemaker

replied “yes,” that it was locked 99.9% of the time. He also stated that,

 

ince March of 1997,
he has worked full time in Arizona and comes back to his Montana property on vacations,
maybe four to six weeks out of the year. He admitted to paying Homeowners Association
dues that, in par, go to road maintenance and that a road grader had graded the road on his
property in the past year

{16 The Shoemakers filed their own motion for summary judgment on November 6,
2001. For the first time, the Shoemnakers claimed thatthe eight-year statute of limitations on

contract el

 

1 barred the Association’

 

jon with respect to the outfitting business. Also

forthe first time, the Shoemakers claimed that they had extingui

 

sd any easement across the
Jack Creek access road by adversely possessing the easement for the five-year statutory
period. The Shoemakers claimed that the Association should be barred from asserting its
interest in the easement because it had failed to raise an objection tothe Shoemakers’ adverse
use within five years of discovering the Shoemakers’ locked gate.

{17 The Shoemakers appended the affidavit of Daniel Shoemaker, subscribed and swom

 

‘on November 5, 2001 ~ two-and-one-half months after his deposition —to their motion for
summary judgment. Shoemaker alleged that the gate had remained locked since the time of
installation in 1984 other than for permitting his family to enter and exit the property
Shoemaker further alleged that no one within the subdivision ever had asked him or his wife
for permission to use the roadway: “Any use of the roadway claimed by Mr. Wilkins, oF
others, has been without permission or consent. To the best of our knowledge, no one other
than my family and guests has used the roadway through my property.”

418 Shoemaker mentioned two exceptions to this exclusion. The first exception involved
some deer hunters, non-members of the subdivision, to whom he denied permission to go
pasthis gate. The second exception was a real estate agent to whom he had given permission
and a key to unlock the gate to show land beyond Shoemakers’ property to clients.
‘Shoemaker also admitted to leaving for Arizona on extended trips throughout the year.
119 The Association objected to the Shoemakers’ statute of limitations claim on the basis
‘that the Shoemakers had waived the claim by failing to raise it as an affirmative defense

‘The Association likewise objected to the Shoemakers" adverse possession claim on the
grounds that the Shoemakers had never raised the claim in their answer as an affirmative
defense, through a counterclaim, or otherwise.

{20 The District Courtheld a hearing on February 7, 2002. Daniel Shoemaker testified
that he had locked the gate since he bought his property in 1984 until the court granted the
temporary injunction requiring that he open it. He claimed that the easement providing
Association members access tothe neighboring Forest Service property had been eliminated
before his purchase. Shoemaker stated that he saw Wilkins one or two times, a man during
‘hunting season who had been lost, and Mr. Daniels’s son and companion all using the access
road at some point after he purchased the property

{21 The court determined that no justiciable controversy existed as the Shoemakers had
‘ceased outfitting operations long ago and had no present plans to reopen itand thus declined

issue, The court determined that the Shoemakers had waived their statute of

 

torule on
limitations defense on the outfitting business by failing to raise itas an affirmative defense in
their answer. The court granted the Association’s motion for summary judgment, however,
regarding the easement along the Jack Creek access road, The court determined thatthe Jack
Creck access road constituted a valid easement encumbering the Shoemakers’ property. The
court further determined that the Shoemakers had failed to raise a genuine issue of material
fact to support their claim of having extinguished through adverse possession the
Association's easement over the Jack Creek access road,

$22 The court first noted that the Shoemakers had failed to raise the defense of adverse
possession in their responsive pleading or in any of their discovery answers. The court then
‘noted thatthe party seeking to establish an easement by prescription has the burden to prove
each element of prescriptive right by clear and convincing evidence, citing Tanner v. Dream
Island, Inc., 275 Mont. 414, 424, 913 P.2d 641, 648 (1996) (emphasis added). The court

stated,

{t]he Shoemakers have to plead each of the elements of adverse
possession, and their attempt to prove those elements consists solely of this
‘statement in their Motion for Summary Judgment: “[t]he locked gate at the
entryway to {the Shoemakers'] property was ‘open, notorious, exclusive,
adverse, continuous and uninterrupted’ since its construction and installation in
the summer of 1985.”

 

(Emphasis added.)
$23 The court focused on the “exclusive” and “uninterrupted” elements of adverse
possession because the evidence presented on summary judgment demonstrated that certain

property owners had continued to use the easement across the Shoemakers” property. The

 

‘court identified the contested issue between the parties as frequency of use rather than the
“fact of such use. The court cited the testimony of Wilkins at the preliminary injunction
hearing regarding his continued use of the easement. The court aso relied upon Wilkins's

"uncontroverted testimony that the Association had maintained the development's roads over

 

the years, Daniel Shoemaker conceded in his deposition that Association members had used
the easement, without his permission and that his Association dues had been used on at least

‘one occasion to maintain the Jack Creek access road. The court concluded that no genuine
issue of fact existed in support of their extinguishment claim because their adverse use was
not exclusive or uninterrupted. The Shoemakers appeal,

STANDARD OF REVIEW
$24 Wereview de novo a district court's decision to grant summary judgment under the
standard set forth in M. R. Civ. P. 56(€). Gliko v. Permann, 2006 MT 30, § 12, 331 Mont
112, $12, 130 P.3d 155,412. In evaluating cross motions for summary judgment, this Court
‘must evaluate each party's motion on its own merits. Hajenga v. Schwein, 2007 MT 80, 19,

336 Mont. 507, 4 19, 155 P.3d 1241, § 19. Summary judgment is appropriate when “the

 

pleadings, deposit

 

ns, answers to interrogatories, and admi

 

ons on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving,
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” M. R. Civ. P. 56(6).

{25 Theparty moving for summary judgment must establish the absence of any genuine
issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Giiko, 4 12. Once the
moving party has met its burden, the party opposing summary judgment must present
‘substantial evidence essential to one or more elements of its case to raise a genuine issue of
material fact. Fielder v. Board of County Commissioners, 2007 MT 118, 4 12, 337 Mont.

256, $ 12, 162 P.3d 67, 4 12. Summary judgment is inappropriate where, based on the
record, reasonable jurors could reach different conclusions as to a particular material fact.

LaTray v. City of Havre, 2000 MT 119,433,299 Mont. 449, § 33, 999 P.2d 1010, $33; Scott

v. Henrich, 1998 MT 118 ,§ 22, 288 Mont. 489, § 22, 958 P.2d 709, § 22.

10
DISCUSSION
Whether the District Court properly determined that the Shoemakers waived the affirmative
defense of statute of limitations.
126 The Shoemakers do not dispute the underlying facts concerning the statute of
limitations issue. They argue that the District Court incorrectly determined that they had
‘waived the statute of limitations defense under M. R. Civ. P. 8(c) by failing to plead it san
affirmative defense in an answer to the Association's complaint.
{27 The Shoemakers urge this Court to adopt a more liberal reading of M. R. Civ. P. 8(6),
based on the application of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c), in Rivera v. Anaya, 726 F.2d 564, $66 (9th
Cir. 1984) (allowing a defendant to raise a statute of limitations defense for the first time on
‘motion for summary judgment when the plaintiff failed to demonstrate prejudice). ‘The

‘Shoemakers argue that the Association suffered no prejudice by the untimely assertion of the

 

affirmative defense and, thus, the defense should have been allowed under federal standards.
$28 The Montana Rules of Civil Procedure govern all civil suits in Montana district
courts, We apply the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure as written. M.R. Civ. P. 1; Busch v
Atkinson, 278 Mont. 478, 483, 925 P.2d 874, 877 (1996). The plain language of M. R. Civ.
P. &(¢) requires a party affirmatively to set forth the statute of limitations defense by answer.

M. R. Civ. P, 8(c)’s requirement that an affirmative defense be pled by answer serves the

 

tiff to set forth the basis of claim

 

‘same principles of faimess and notice that require a pl

in a complaint. Brown v. Ehlert, 255 Mont. 140, 146, 841 P.2d 510, 514 (1992). The

ul
 

affirmative pleading avoids surprise and eliminates the sweeping ambiguities of a general
denial. Rambur v. Dieh! Lumber Company, 144 Mont. 84, 89, 394 P.2d 745, 748 (1964).

{29 Nothing in M. R. Civ. P. (¢) suggests that an affirmative defense may be raised later
in the proceedings upon the showing of alack of prejudice to the opposing party. This Court
consistently has ruled against the circumvention of M. R. Civ. P 8(¢)'s requirement that an
affirmative defense be pled by answer. We long have held that a party waives an affirmative
defense if not raised by answer. Brown, 255 Mont. at 146, 841 P.2d at 514; Chandler v.

‘Madsen, 197 Mont. 234, 241, 642 P.2d 1028, 1032 (1982); Estabrook v. Baden, 284 Mont.

419, 422, 943 P.2d 1334, 1336-37 (1997).

 

$80 The Shoemakers failed to plead the statute of limitations as affirmative defenses in
their answer. The Shoemakers raised the statute of limitations defenses for the first time in
‘an untimely motion for summary judgment that they filed almost a year after their answer to
the Association's complaint. The Shoemakers first cited the eight-year statute of limitations

for contracts, barring a clai

 

for breach of the Deed of Restriction, and they also cited the
five-year statute of limitations for quieting title against an adverse possessor, barring a claim.
for enforcement of the Jack Creck access road easement by reservation. The Shoemakers
made no attempt, however, to amend their answer to include these defenses in the months
leading up to their motion for summary judgment.

{81 The District Court's ruling denying their summary judgment claim prompted the

Shoemakers to seek leave of court to amend their answer. The amendment came too late as

2
‘more than three years had passed between the start of the litigation and the Shoemakers’
motion for an amended answer. The Shoemakers’ untimely presentation of the statute of
limitations defense cuts against M. R. Civ. P.8()'splain language and its purpose to provide
notice of the specific defenses not raised by general denials. Brown, 255 Mont. at 146, 841
P.2d at S14. We agree with the District Court that the Shoemakers waived the statute of
limitations defenses by failing to assert the defenses by answer. Brown, 255 Mont. at 146,
841 P.2d at 514.

Whether the District Court improperly resolved a genuine issue of material fact in granting
the Assoctation’s motion for summary judgment.

{82 Our analysis begins with the fact that the Association possesses a valid recorded

‘easement along the Jack Creek access road. The Deed of Restriction filed by the Association

 

reserved easements on all existing roads within the subdivision, including the Jack Creek
‘access road, forall property owners to access public lands. Furthermore, the Shoemakers do
not challenge the District Court's determination that a valid Deed of Restriction created an
‘easement by reservation,

{83 The Association provided Wilkins’s and Daniel Shoemaker's deposition testimony to
establish that the Shoemakers’ gate interfered with the Association members’ enjoyment of
the easement. The Shoemakers’ attempts to eliminate use of roadway by locking the gate and

1g Jack Creek access road users directly violated the Deed of Restriction.

 

434 All subdivision lot owners in Mason v. Garrison similarly enjoyed the use of

1B
‘communal dock through an easement until the servient tenement lot owner began to impede
the path to the dock by putting up fencing, building gardens, and letting his dogs scare away
‘other dock users. Mason, 2000 MT 78, 299 Mont. 142, 998 P.2d 531. Although we stated
thatthe servient lot owner may not be excluded from reasonable use of his property by the
‘other lot owners, we concluded that the servient lot owner may not put his property to a use
that materially interferes with the rights of the dominant estates. Mason, 49.

{35 Similarly, the Shoemakers’ placement of a gate over the roadway may have been
reasonable for purposes of excluding neighboring horses and livestock from their property.
‘Their decision to lock the gate, to approach Association members while wearing a sidearm,
‘and to call the Sheriff when Association members used the easement, however, materially
interfered with the Association members" enjoyment of their easement. This material
interference violated the Deed of Restriction. Therefore, the Association met its burden on
summary judgment by demonstrating no genuine issue of material fact as to (1) creation of
the easement, and (2) the Shoemakers” interference with the easement.

{86 The Shoemakers’ defense presents a twist on the usual easement analysis as they
seek to extinguish through adverse possession a recorded easement ~ the Jack Creek access
road ~ rather than establish an easement through adverse possession. The owner of the
servient tenement extinguishes an easement through adverse use in the same manner as
acquisition of title by adverse possession and acquisition of an easement by prescription:

‘open, notorious, exclusive, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted use for the five-year

4
statutory period. Pearson v. Virginia City Ranches Ass'n, 2000 MT 12, § 46, 298 Mont. 52,
146, 993 P.2d 688, 4.46,

$37 The District Court applied the incorrect standard of proof. At tral, the party
asserting a claim for adverse possession must prove each element by clear and convincing
evidence, Wareing v. Schreckendgust, 280 Mont, 196, 206,930 P.2d 37, 43 (1996). Upon a
‘motion for summary judgment, the moving party if asserting easement by prescription or
adverse possession, must establish by clear and convincing evidence the elements of
prescription in order to be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Hitshew v.
Bute/Silver Bow County, 1999 MT 26, $4 16-20, 293 Mont. 212, $9 16-20, 974 P.2d 650,
{9 16-20; Unruh v. Tash, 271 Mont. 246, 254, 896 P.2d 433, 438 (1995).

{88 The non-moving party, however, need only submit evidence of sufficient facts to

rial fact to preclude summary judgment in favor of the

 

support a genuine issue of mi
movant. M.R. Civ. P. 56. The non-movant must present evidence of some probative force,
rather than merely rely on the defense pled. Conboy v, State, 214 Mont. 492, 500, 693 P.2d
547, $51 (1985). ‘The Shoemakers defended by alleging that they had extinguished the
‘Association's easement through adverse possession. As the non-movant, the Shoemakers
‘must present facts supporting, rather than negating, the elements of adverse possession.

{39 The Shoemakers do not contest the District Courts determination on summary
judgment thatthe Association had established the existence of a valid recorded easement and

that the easement encumbered their land. They assert that the District Court improperly

Is
‘granted summary judgment in favor of the Association because a genuine issue of material
fact exists as to their adverse possession defense. This assertion falls short because the
Shoemakers failed to present sufficient evidence to support each element of their
extinguishment by adverse possession claim. In fact, they presented evidence that negated
their claim.

{40 Like the District Court, we focus our analysis here on the “continuous” and
“uninterrupted” elements. Continuous and uninterrupted denotes use that has not been
interrupted by an act of the owner of the land or by the voluntary abandonment by the party
claiming the right. Brimstone Min, Inc. v Glaus, 2003 MT 236, 23, 317 Mont. 236, $23,
77 P3d 175, $23. In Brimsione, we held that acts of adverse possession had not
extinguished an already existing easement when the servient estate owner put up a locked

‘gate and granted permission to a few users because “permissive use after a hostile act is

 

sufficiently inconsistent to extinguish an easement.” Brimstone, ] 36,41. “Continuous use”
4oes not mean constant use; rather, if the claimant used the property in dispute whenever he
desired, without interference by the owner of the servient estat, the use was continuous and
uninterrupted. Cook v. Hartman, 2003 MT 251, 4 29, 317 Mont. 343, § 29, 77 P.3d 231,
$29, quoting Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Vulles, 437 F.2d 177, 180 (9th Cir.
1971).

{41 The record

 

replete with admissions from Daniel Shoemaker that Association

members used the easement and with testimony from Wilkins that he and others continued to

16
use the Jack Creek access road during the years that the Shoemakers claimed to have blocked
access. This use by Association members interrupts the Shoemakers’ attempted adverse
possession of the easement.

$42 The Shoemakers admitted in their answer that their gate was only “sometimes”

locked. Wilkins testified in a deposition that the Shoemakers’ gate had been “left wide open

 

for days, weeks ata time” and that he and atleast ten other Association members continued
to.use the Jack Creek access road. The Shoemakers conceded that they left Montana for a
‘B0od part ofthe year and, therefore, would not have known if the easement was used while
they were out of state. Wilkins further testified thatthe Association regularly maintained and
‘graded the road using money collected from Association dues. The Shoemakers even
conceded that the Association had graded the road. The Shoemakers’ inconsistently locked
‘ate, the uncertainty in thei ability to enforce their claim of right while out of state, and the
Association's payment for road grading constitute sufficient inconsistency by the
Shoemakers, the party asserting the adverse possession right, similar to that present in
Brimstone.

{43 Like Brimstone, the Shoemakers put up a gate, sometimes locked it, and granted
permission to a few users: a realestate agent, an elk hunter, and their cousin. We similarly
conclude here that the Shoemakers” inconsistent actions failed to extinguish an easement.
‘Our review of the record reveals, however, sufficient evidence to determine that the District

‘Court reached the right result that the Shoemakers failed to establish a prima facie case for
‘uninterrupted possession in granting summary judgment to the Association even if it
‘employed the wrong standard. State v, Rensvold, 2006 MT 146,434, 332 Mont, 392, 4 34,
139 P3d 154,934,

{44 The Shoemakers contend that they adequately challenged Wilkins’s testimony
through Danie! Shoemaker’s deposition and other affidavits to the point of raising a genuine
issue of material fact. The record highlights, however, the Shoemakers’ ever-evolving
defense, The Shoemakers claimed in their answer to have locked the gate “sometimes.” The

Shoemakers’ answer asserted abandonment and waiver as their affirmative defense. These

 

claims contradict Daniel Shoemaker's deposition testimony, affidavit declarations, and
‘hearing testimony. In his deposition, Shoemaker asserted non-use as his affirmative defense.
Inhis affidavit, he asserted adverse possession as his affirmative defense and, in his hearing
testimony, he continued to assert adverse possession through his locking of the gate.

$45. A party may not avoid summary judgment by creating factual inconsistencies in the

record. “It is the general rule that allegations, statements, or admissions contained in a

 

pleading are conclusive as against the pleader, and are admissible as against the party making

 

them in the litigation as proof of the facts which they admit.” Anderson v. Mace, 99 Mont.
421, 427-28, 45 P.24 771, 73-74 (1935). We take the admissions made in the Shoemakers"

answer as proof.

 

{46 Similarly, “when statements in an affidavit submitted pursuant to Rule 56(e),

 

M.R.Civ.P., are repudiated in a later deposition, the affidavit statements do not raise a

18
‘genuine issue of material fact.” Herron v. Columbus Hosp., 284 Mont. 190, 195, 943 P.2d
1272, 1275 1997). District courts may grant summary judgment where a party's sudden and.
Unexplained revision of testimony creates an issue of fact where none existed before. Stottv.
Fox, 246 Mont. 301, 309, 805 P.2d 1305, 1310 (1990); Kaseta v. N. Western Agency of Gr.
Falls, 252 Mont. 135, 140, 827 P.24 804, 807 (1992). Therefore, we must consider the
‘unexplained inconsistencies between the answer, deposition testimony, affidavit and hearing
testimony of Daniel Shoemaker.

{47 The Shoemakers contradicted themselves throughout the litigation when asked how
‘many Association members they had seen using the easement across their property. The

‘Shoemakers’ answer declared that no one had used the easement in the 17 years they had

 

‘owned the property. Daniel Shoemaker admitted in his deposition that he saw Wilkins using,
it two times and that he could not say whether Wilkins otherwise had used the easement.
‘Shoemaker estimated a total of seven users in 17 years. His affidavit named only two
‘exceptions tothe assertion that no one used the easement in 17 years: a deer hunter who was
denied permission and the real estate agent who was granted permission. Finally, in his
testimony at the summary judgment hearing, he claimed that he saw Wilkins use the
‘easement twice, that he caught a lost hunter on the easement once, and that he had seen

Dwayne Allen’s son using it once, We consider these contradictions in light of Wilkins’s

 

consistent statements at the show cause hearing and during his deposition.

148 Daniel Shoemaker's statements regarding how often the gate was locked further

19

 
‘evidence the Shoemakers’ evolving defense. For example, the Shoemakers’ answer included
the admission that the gate was “sometimes” locked — a position consistent with Wilkins's
testimony. Daniel Shoemaker’s deposition, affidavit and hearing testimony declared,
however, thatthe gate had been locked always, except for his family entering and leaving.
$49 The parties do not provide conflicting accounts. We instead have one party making
admissions in its answer that conflict with statements provided in a deposition that, in tum,
conflict with statements in an affidavit and testimony during a hearing. This scenario does
not create a genuine issue of material fact between the partis; it highlights the evolving,

nature of the Shoemakers’ defense. The Shoemakers’ shifting accounts fal to refute the

 

‘Association's evidence to the point of creating a genuine issue of material fact regarding their
adverse possession claim that could be resolved only at trial. These contradictory
declarations would leave a jury no reasonable basis on which to find adverse possession,

LaTray, 4 33; Scott, 422. The Shoemakers presented no credible evidence

 

respect to
the continuous and uninterrupted elements of adverse possession that could allow a jury to
‘determine that the Shoemakers had extinguished the Jack Creek access road easement by
adverse possession. LaTray, § 33; Scot, § 22.

{50 Once the prima facie case of adverse possession has been made, the presumption
shifts in favor ofthe adverse user’s ttle and the burden shifts to the other party to show that
such use was permissive rather than adverse. Warnack v. Concen Family Trust, 266 Mont,

203, 216, 879 P.2d 715, 723 (1994). The presumption of adverse use never sprang into

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existence here, however, because the Shoemakers failed to establish a prima facie case in
support of all ofthe elements. Warnack, 266 Mont. at 216-17, 879 P.2d at 724. We agree
‘with the District Court that the fact of some use, regardless of frequency, defeats the
continuous and uninterrupted elements of the Shoemakers’ defense of extinguishment by
adverse possession. This deficiency entitles the Association to judgment as a matter of law.
Osterman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,2003 MT 327, 4 34, 318 Mont. 342, § 34, 80 P.3d 435,
134.

151 Weaffirm the District Court's order.

Justice

We Concur:

 

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Tustives

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