Case Title: State ex rel. Soukup v. Celebrezze

Citation: 1998-Ohio-8

Docket Number: 19980597

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1998-11-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE EX REL. SOUKUP, APPELLANT, v. CELEBREZZE, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Soukup v. Celebrezze (1998), ___ Ohio St.3d ___.] 
Prohibition — Writ preventing judge in divorce postdecree enforcement action 
from reinstating a show cause motion that was dismissed for want of 
prosecution and from conducting further proceedings on the reinstated 
motion — Writ denied, when. 
(No. 98-597 — Submitted September 15, 1998 — Decided November 10, 1998.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 72008. 
 
In 1986, the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations 
Division, entered a divorce decree that ended the marriage of appellant, Marc J. 
Soukup, and Lisa M. Soukup, n.k.a. Salobecke. 
 
In June 1995, Salobecke filed a motion in the domestic relations court for an 
order for Soukup to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of the 
divorce decree.  Salobecke claimed that Soukup had failed to make certain 
payments, including over $12,000 in child support.  The trial court later notified 
the parties that if they did not submit an agreed entry disposing of Salobecke’s 
show-cause motion by a certain date, the motion would be dismissed. In December 
1995, appellee, Judge James P. Celebrezze, dismissed Salobecke’s show-cause 
motion for want of prosecution.  Judge Celebrezze did not specify that the 
dismissal was without prejudice, and Salobecke did not appeal the dismissal. 
 
In 1996, Salobecke filed a second motion for a show-cause order, which 
was identical to her first one.  After Soukup filed a motion to dismiss, Salobecke 
filed a brief in opposition and a conditional motion to reinstate her first show-
cause motion.  In her brief, Salobecke argued that Civ.R. 41 did not apply to 
postdecree enforcement actions, that Soukup had caused the dismissal of the first 
 
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show-cause motion by refusing to sign an agreed entry, and that she did not fail to 
prosecute her first show-cause motion. 
 
Judge Celebrezze subsequently granted Salobecke’s motion to reinstate her 
first show-cause motion and denied Soukup’s motions to dismiss and to terminate 
the proceedings.  Salobecke withdrew her second show-cause motion. 
 
In February 1997, Soukup filed a complaint in the court of appeals for a writ 
of prohibition to vacate Judge Celebrezze’s entry reinstating Salobecke’s show-
cause motion and to prevent Judge Celebrezze from conducting further 
proceedings on the reinstated motion.  After Judge Celebrezze filed a motion to 
dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, Soukup filed a motion for 
summary judgment.  Soukup argued that pursuant to the holdings of State ex rel. 
Rice v. McGrath (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 70, 577 N.E.2d 1100, and State ex rel. 
Easterday v. Zieba (1991), 58 Ohio St.3d 251, 569 N.E.2d 1028, a court loses 
authority to proceed in a matter when that court previously unconditionally 
dismisses it, and, hence, he was entitled to the writ.  In so arguing, Soukup noted 
that he was not asserting that Judge Celebrezze’s actions were barred by res 
judicata. 
 
In 1998, the court of appeals granted Judge Celebrezze’s motion for 
summary judgment and denied the writ. 
 
This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right. 
__________________ 
 
Hermann, Cahn & Schneider and James S. Cahn, for appellant. 
 
Stephanie Tubbs Jones, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Carol 
Shockley, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
__________________ 
 
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Per Curiam.  Soukup asserts in his propositions of law that the court of 
appeals erred in denying him the requested extraordinary relief in prohibition.  
Soukup claims that where a movant in domestic relations court seeks to modify an 
order that has become final without alleging a change of circumstances, res 
judicata bars the court from exercising jurisdiction.  For the following reasons, 
Soukup’s contentions lack merit. 
 
First, Soukup invited any error by the court of appeals in not granting the 
writ based on the res judicata claim he raises here because he asserted in the court 
of appeals that res judicata was inapplicable.  “ ‘Under the invited-error doctrine, 
a party will not be permitted to take advantage of an error which he himself invited 
or induced the court to make.’ ”  State ex rel. O’Beirne v. Geauga Cty. Bd. of 
Elections (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 176, 181, 685 N.E.2d 502, 506, quoting State ex 
rel. Bitter v. Missig (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 249, 254, 648 N.E.2d 1355, 1358. 
 
Second, res judicata is not a basis for prohibition because it does not divest 
a trial court of jurisdiction to decide its applicability and it can be raised 
adequately by postjudgment appeal.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Smith v. Smith (1996), 
75 Ohio St.3d 418, 420, 662 N.E.2d 366, 369; State ex rel. Lipinski v. Cuyahoga 
Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Probate Div. (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 19, 21, 655 
N.E.2d 1303, 1305-1306. 
 
Finally, because Judge Celebrezze did not patently and unambiguously lack 
jurisdiction over the postdecree motion, prohibition does not lie for Soukup’s 
claims.  “ ‘Absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having 
general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party 
challenging the court’s jurisdiction has an adequate remedy at law by appeal.’ ”  
State ex rel. Red Head Brass, Inc. v. Holmes Cty. Court of Common Pleas (1997), 
80 Ohio St.3d 149, 152, 684 N.E.2d 1234, 1237, quoting State ex rel. Enyart v. 
 
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O’Neill (1995), 71 Ohio St.3d 655, 656, 646 N.E.2d 1110, 1112.  Under Civ.R. 
75(I), the continuing jurisdiction of a court that issues a domestic relations decree 
“may be invoked by the filing of any motion by a party.”  Blake v. Heistan (1994), 
99 Ohio App.3d 84, 87, 649 N.E.2d 1304, 1305-1306.  A postdecree show-cause 
motion filed by a party invokes both the inherent power of a domestic relations 
court to enforce its own orders and the court’s continuing jurisdiction under Civ.R. 
75(I).  See, generally, 2 Sowald & Morganstern, Domestic Relations Law (1997) 
164, Section 25.44.1 
 
In fact, every case cited by Soukup to support his claim to a writ was 
resolved by appeal rather than extraordinary writ.  See, e.g., Panzarello v. 
Panzarello (1989), 61 Ohio App.3d 364, 572 N.E.2d 803; Austin v. Payne (Feb. 
11, 1998), Lorain App. No. 97CA006777, unreported, 1998 WL 78694. 
 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK and 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
FOOTNOTE: 
1. 
We need not consider the main argument raised by Soukup below, which 
relied on Rice and Easterday, because Soukup does not raise this argument here, 
instead choosing to rely on res judicata.