Case Title: Fife v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83-132

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1984-02-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Fife v. State1984 WY 15676 P.2d 565Case Number: 83-132Decided: 02/02/1984RALPH FIFE, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
RALPH FIFE, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, NatronaCounty, R.M. Forrister, 
J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Wyoming Public Defender Program, Sylvia Lee 
Hackl, Appellate Counsel, Wyoming Public Defender Program, Cheyenne, Gerald M. 
Gallivan, Wyoming Defender Aid Program, and Barbara L. Lauer, Student Intern, 
Wyoming Defender Aid Program, Laramie, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Patrick Day, Legal Intern, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and 
CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Ralph H. Fife 
was tried and convicted on charges of aggravated burglary and aggravated assault 
and battery with a dangerous weapon. He was not sentenced for aggravated assault 
and battery with a dangerous weapon. Appellant appeals his conviction for 
aggravated burglary on the grounds of insufficient evidence to support the 
verdict, and the form of the verdict.

[¶2.]     We will reverse and 
remand for new trial.

[¶3.]     On March 18, 1982, at 
5:30 a.m. Sharon Underwood awoke to the clock radio in her bedroom. She reached 
out to turn off the radio so as not to awaken Mr. Williams, who was asleep in 
the same room. As she reached toward the radio, she discovered a man kneeling 
next to her bed. Mr. Williams was awakened by her outcry and sat up in bed. The 
intruder then reached across Underwood and struck Williams on the knee with a 
hammer that he had acquired after entering the apartment. Williams began to 
struggle with the intruder and, with Underwood's help, he was able to turn the 
hammer to his advantage. After three blows to the intruder's head, Williams 
finally subdued him until the police arrived. The intruder was later identified 
as appellant Ralph H. Fife, who was not acquainted with either Underwood or 
Williams.

[¶4.]     The evidence showed 
that the appellant and a companion had been carousing from approximately 10:00 
p.m. until 4:00 a.m. the morning of March 18. At approximately 5:00 a.m. 
Fife drove his companion to the apartment 
complex where Underwood lived. After dropping off his companion, Fife went to the Underwood apartment and entered through a 
door which had been left unlocked. Upon entering Underwood's apartment, 
Fife at some point locked the door and procured 
a hammer that belonged to Underwood. He then entered Underwood's 
bedroom.

[¶5.]     Appellant was charged 
with committing two crimes, 1) aggravated burglary, and 2) aggravated assault 
and battery with a dangerous weapon. He was charged in Count I1 of the amended information with 
aggravated burglary with the intent to steal or with the intent to commit 
aggravated assault and battery with a dangerous weapon pursuant to § 6-7-201, 
W.S. 1977, revised and renumbered § 6-3-301, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 
Replacement).2 

[¶6.]     The amended information 
alleged two alternative forms of intent whereby appellant could have been found 
guilty of aggravated burglary. These two forms of intent give rise to three ways 
the jury could have found appellant guilty of Count I: the jury could have found 
an intent to steal, an intent to commit aggravated assault and battery with a 
dangerous weapon, or part of the jury could have found an intent to steal and 
part an intent to commit aggravated assault and battery with a dangerous 
weapon.

[¶7.]     In Count II of the 
information, appellant was charged with aggravated assault and battery with a 
dangerous weapon. Section 6-4-506, W.S. 1977, revised and renumbered as § 
6-2-502, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement).

[¶8.]     Appellant was convicted 
of both charges by a jury but the trial court only sentenced him on the 
aggravated burglary count. Therefore, we address the aggravated burglary 
conviction exclusively in this appeal.

[¶9.]     The issues as framed by 
appellant are:

"The trial court erred in 
denying defendant's post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal on the 
aggravated burglary count because there was not sufficient evidence to support a 
finding of either intent to steal or intent to commit an assault, the two bases 
alleged in the information.

"A general verdict of 
guilty returned on an aggravated burglary count which alleges in the alternative 
intent to steal or intent to commit an assault violates defendant's right to a 
unanimous jury verdict on all essential elements of a 
crime.

"Where alternative 
theories of guilt are submitted to a jury and a general verdict of guilty is 
returned which does not specify which theory the jury unanimously agreed upon, 
insufficiency of any alternative submitted is fatal to the 
verdict."

[¶10.]  We will begin by discussing the trial 
court's denial of appellant's motion to acquit. Appellant correctly describes 
our standard of review for a denial of a motion for judgment of 
acquittal.

"`In reviewing the denial 
of a motion for judgment of acquittal, we examine and accept as true the 
evidence of the prosecution together with all logical and reasonable inferences 
to be drawn therefrom, Aragon v. 
State, Wyo., 627 P.2d 599, 602 (1981); Chavez v. State, Wyo., 601 P.2d 166, 168 
(1979); Russell v. State, Wyo., 583 P.2d 690, 694 (1978), leaving out entirely the evidence of the defendant in 
conflict therewith, Grabill v. State, 
Wyo., 621 P.2d 802, 803 (1980); Chavez v. 
State, supra; Russell v. State, 
supra.

"`A motion for judgment 
of acquittal is to be granted only when the evidence is such that a reasonable 
juror must have a reasonable doubt as to the existence of any of the essential 
elements of the crime. Or, stated another way, if there is substantial evidence 
to sustain a conviction of the crime, the motion should not be granted. * * *' 
Leppek v. State, 636 P.2d 1117, 1119 
(Wyo. 1981). 
Also see Jacobs v. State, 641 P.2d 197, 197 (Wyo. 
1982)."

We note that a 
motion for acquittal raises the question of sufficiency of the evidence, a 
determination which is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Montez v. State, Wyo., 527 P.2d 1330 
(1974).

[¶11.]  Appellant argues that his motion for 
acquittal on the aggravated burglary charge should have been granted because of 
the lack of sufficient evidence to support a finding of either intent to steal 
or intent to commit a felony, in this case, aggravated assault and battery with 
a dangerous weapon. The trial court denied appellant's motion for judgment of 
acquittal on the record and in a decision letter dated March 24, 1983. The trial 
court stated that it "* * * agrees that there was no evidence of intent to 
assault, but that there was evidence to support a finding of intent to steal; 
accordingly the motion is denied notwithstanding Court's agreement with defense 
as to one of the legs this conviction stands on."

[¶12.]  The court's decision in effect holds that 
there was no evidence, as a matter of law, from which the jury could have 
determined that the defendant, Fife, had the 
requisite intent to assault. We consider the court's decision to be the law of 
this case and do not review that determination. Therefore, the evidence was 
legally insufficient on the intent to assault alternative of the aggravated 
burglary count and should not have been submitted to the jury. 2 Wright, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 470, p. 679 (1982). A jury determination 
of guilt for aggravated burglary based upon intent to assault would be contrary 
to law. The jury's conviction for aggravated burglary could only properly be 
based upon an intent to steal. If the jury had determined that the appellant 
entered with an intent to assault and not with an intent to steal, the trial 
court would have been required to grant appellant's motion for acquittal because 
of the apparent lack of sufficient evidence. Herein lies the problem; because of 
the general verdict, we do not know whether the jury based its conviction for 
aggravated burglary upon an intent to steal or an intent to 
assault.

[¶13.]  The verdict in this case asked the jury 
to decide only two questions; the first being, is the defendant guilty or not 
guilty of the aggravated burglary count, and secondly, is the defendant guilty 
or not guilty of the aggravated assault and battery with a dangerous weapon 
count.3 The jury did in fact find the 
defendant guilty of both counts. In Count I we cannot tell from the form of the 
verdict, however, whether the jury found the defendant guilty of the aggravated 
burglary charge based upon an intent to steal, or an intent to commit aggravated 
assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, or if part of the jury found an 
intent to steal and part found an intent to commit aggravated assault and 
battery with a dangerous weapon.

[¶14.]  If both theories of intent submitted to 
the jury were sufficiently supported by the evidence, we could uphold the 
general verdict on the aggravated burglary charge. SeeState v. Dixon, 127 Ariz. 554, 622 P.2d 501 (1980); People v. Failla, 64 Cal. 2d 560, 51 Cal. Rptr. 103, 414 P.2d 39 (1966); Wells 
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 561 S.W.2d 85 (1978); State v. Hazelette, 8 Or. App. 44, 492 P.2d 501 (1972). However, there was insufficient evidence as a matter of law to 
support the intent to assault element. We cannot uphold a general jury verdict 
when one of the alternate theories upon which the jury could have relied is in 
error. Sunkist Growers, Inc., et al. v. 
Winckler & Smith Citrus Products Co., et al., 370 U.S. 19, 82 S. Ct. 1130, 8 L. Ed. 2d 305, reh. denied, 370 U.S. 965, 82 S. Ct. 1577, 8 L. Ed. 2d 834 
(1962), citing Markley v. Baldwin, 
112 U.S. 490, 5 S. Ct. 278, 28 L. Ed. 822 
(1884). If one of the alternate theories submitted to the jury is unsupported by 
substantial evidence, the general verdict must be set aside unless the court can 
ascertain that the verdict was founded upon a theory supported by substantial 
evidence. State v. Carothers, 84 Wn.2d 256, 525 P.2d 731 (1974). The intent to commit aggravated assault and 
battery with a dangerous weapon element of the aggravated burglary charge was 
unsupported by substantial evidence and we cannot say with certainty that the 
jury based its conviction on the intent to steal. 

[¶15.]  Submitting claims to the jury which have 
no foundation in the evidence allows the jury to engage in conjecture or to 
speculate as to the defendant's guilt. Russell v. State, Wyo., 583 P.2d 690, 694 
(1978), citing United States v. 
Bethea, 442 F.2d 790 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Parties are entitled to proper 
instructions covering their respective theories regarding the evidence 
submitted. Barber v. Sheridan Trust & Savings Bank, 53 Wyo. 65, 78 P.2d 1101 
(1938).

[¶16.]  We hold that it was error to instruct the 
jury on the intent to commit aggravated assault and battery element of the 
aggravated burglary when there was insufficient evidence to support the 
instruction. We further hold that the general verdict must be set aside because 
we cannot determine if the jury based its conviction upon the erroneous 
instruction. We therefore reverse and remand for a new 
trial.

FOOTNOTES

1 Count I of the amended 
information stated that defendant:

"* * * intentionally 
enter[ed] a dwelling, to-wit: 2401 Grandview # 33, Casper, Natrona County, 
Wyoming, without the consent of the person in lawful possession, to-wit: Sharon 
Underwood, with intent to steal therein, and while therein commit a battery upon 
a person lawfully therein, to-wit: Conlin P. Williams, or with the intent to 
commit a felony therein, to-wit: aggravated assault and battery with a dangerous 
weapon and while therein commit a bettery [sic] upon a person lawfully therein, 
to-wit: Conplin [sic] P. Williams, in violation of W.S. 1977, §§ 6-7-201(a)(i) 
and (b)(iv) and 6-4-506(b) * * *."

2 Section 6-7-201, W.S. 
1977, reads:

"(a) Whoever, 
intentionally enters, or attempts to enter, any of the following places without 
the consent of the person in lawful possession and with intent to steal or 
commit a felony therein may be imprisoned not more than fourteen (14) 
years:

"(i) Any building or 
dwelling; or

* * * * * 
*

"(b) Whoever violates 
subsection (a) under any of the following circumstances may be imprisoned not 
less than five (5) years nor more than fifty (50) years:

* * * * * 
*

"(ii) While unarmed, but 
arms himself with a dangerous weapon while still in the burglarized enclosure; 
or

* * * * * 
*

"(iv) While in the 
burglarized enclosure commits a battery upon a person lawfully 
therein."

3 The verdict read as 
follows:

"VERDICT

"The Jury, duly empaneled 
to try this case, finds the defendant:

"COUNT 
I

"AGGRAVATED 
BURGLARY

"(X) 
GUILTY

"(  ) NOT GUILTY

"COUNT 
II

"AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND 
BATTERY WITH A DANGEROUS WEAPON

"(X) 
GUILTY

"(  ) NOT GUILTY

"/s/ William M. 
Spicer

 FOREPERSON"

THOMAS, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶17.]  I concur with the result reached by the 
court in this case. I can agree with the determination that there was 
insufficient evidence to support an entry with intent to commit an assault and 
battery with a dangerous weapon only on the ground that it has become the law of 
this case by virtue of the ruling of the district court. Were I free to consider 
the sufficiency of the evidence of intent to commit assault and battery with a 
dangerous weapon vel non I would agree with Chief Justice Rooney that there is 
sufficient evidence present to permit the jury to draw that inference under the 
circumstances of this case.

[¶18.]  It seems to me that it is a careless 
practice to fail to dispose of a criminal conviction, such as Count 2 of this 
case, after a jury verdict has been entered. When a conviction has been reached 
in a criminal case the matter should be terminated by the entry of a Judgment 
and Sentence by the court in the interests of efficient 
jurisprudence.

[¶19.]  I would point out that if he wished to 
appeal from that conviction the defendant in this case could not do so. No final 
order has been entered. Conversely, should the State or any other jurisdiction 
have occasion to want to rely upon that conviction for any purpose, I suspect 
that it would be difficult to demonstrate. It has been left in limbo. In my view 
it is the responsibility of the trial court to attend to the resolution of loose 
ends such as this even though it well may rely upon the prosecutor's office for 
the documentation.

ROONEY, Chief Justice, 
specially concurring.

[¶20.]  I do not agree with the trial judge's 
assertion that "there was no evidence of intent to assault." A jury could make a 
finding from all of the evidence that there was no intent to assault when the 
breaking and entering occurred. However, in doing so it would have to evaluate 
the fact that appellant armed himself with a hammer immediately after the 
entrance, and that he actually used it. Such is evidence to be considered in 
determining whether or not appellant had the intent at the time he entered to 
obtain a weapon within the house and to use it if he were 
discovered.

[¶21.]  The trial court took this consideration 
from the jury and, thus, it is not pertinent to the issues here presented. The 
decision in this case should not be taken as a determination by all of this 
court that these facts are not evidence of such intent, and, thus, used as a 
precedent of a united court.

[¶22.]  I also note that appellant was found 
guilty of a second count of aggravated assault and battery. He was not sentenced 
on it and the appeal is not from that conviction. The trial court need not retry 
that count. It can now sentence him under it.