Case Title: State ex rel. Viking Forge Corp. v. Perry

Citation: 2015-Ohio-968

Docket Number: 2012-1268

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2015-03-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Viking Forge Corp. v. Perry, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-968.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-968 
THE STATE EX REL. VIKING FORGE CORPORATION, APPELLANT, v. PERRY ET 
AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Viking Forge Corp. v. Perry,  
Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-968.] 
Workers’ 
compensation—Temporary 
total 
disability—Termination 
of 
employment—Industrial Commission evaluates the weight and credibility 
of the evidence—Court of appeals’ judgment denying writ of mandamus 
affirmed. 
(No. 2012-1268—Submitted January 13, 2015—Decided March 18, 2015.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 11AP-226, 2012-Ohio-2738. 
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellee Kelly Perry severely injured both thumbs in an industrial 
accident on September 26, 2008.  Drew R. Engles, M.D., performed surgery that 
same day to partially amputate Perry’s left thumb and to repair Perry’s right 
thumb.  Following a period of temporary total disability, Perry returned to light-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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duty work on December 1, 2008, and to his former position of employment with 
no medical restrictions on February 4, 2009. 
{¶ 2} Dr. Engles examined Perry on February 18, 2009, and reported, “I 
believe the patient is doing well enough that he may be discharged from active 
care and no further intervention is anticipated from my standpoint.  The patient is 
currently looking into a possible prosthesis and this can be handled through the 
occupational therapist who typically assists patients with these arrangements.” 
{¶ 3} On March 2, 2009, Perry was terminated from employment for 
violating work rules.  He returned to Dr. Engles on March 18, 2009.  He told Dr. 
Engles that he had lost his job and asked to be placed on work restrictions and to 
continue therapy.  Dr. Engles reported, “With respect to the patient’s request to go 
back onto work restrictions and for additional therapy, I do not believe this would 
be prudent.  I believe that the patient has maximized the benefit of therapy.”  Dr. 
Engles referred Perry to the occupational branch of his clinic for assistance with 
obtaining a prosthesis and for any other ongoing care. 
{¶ 4} On April 7, 2009, Perry changed his physician of record to Steven 
Rodgers, M.D., and terminated his relationship with Dr. Engles, because surgical 
issues no longer needed to be addressed.  Dr. Rodgers placed Perry on restricted 
duty, and Perry applied for an additional period of temporary-total-disability 
compensation to begin April 7, 2009. 
{¶ 5} A staff hearing officer awarded Perry temporary-total-disability 
compensation.  The hearing officer relied on Perry’s testimony that the incident 
for which he was terminated was not his fault, but rather was caused by a 
coworker, to support the finding that Perry had not voluntarily abandoned his 
employment.  In addition, the hearing officer relied on the medical documentation 
from Dr. Rodgers and Perry’s testimony to find that Perry remained temporarily 
and totally disabled as of April 7, 2009. 
January Term, 2015 
3 
 
{¶ 6} Perry’s former employer, appellant, Viking Forge Corporation, 
filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus alleging that appellee Industrial 
Commission abused its discretion when it ordered payment of temporary-total-
disability compensation for the period after Perry was discharged from 
employment.  The Tenth District Court of Appeals concluded that Perry had not 
voluntarily abandoned his employment and that Dr. Rodgers’s findings of 
increased pain, loss of sensation, and hypersensitivity, coupled with his intended 
action for treatment, constituted some evidence upon which the commission could 
rely to award temporary-total-disability compensation.  The court denied the writ. 
{¶ 7} Viking Forge filed an appeal as of right.  We referred the case to 
mediation and stayed briefing.  After mediation was unsuccessful, the case was 
returned to the regular docket and briefing commenced. 
{¶ 8} R.C. 4123.56 provides for compensation for temporary total 
disability when an industrial injury prevents a claimant from performing the 
duties of his or her position of employment.  See State ex rel. Floyd v. Formica 
Corp., 140 Ohio St.3d 260, 2014-Ohio-3614, 17 N.E.3d 547, ¶ 14;  State ex rel. 
Baker v. Indus. Comm., 89 Ohio St.3d 376, 380, 732 N.E.2d 355 (2000).  If a 
claimant is no longer employed for reasons unrelated to the industrial injury and 
has not reentered the workforce, he is not eligible for temporary-total-disability 
compensation, because the injury no longer is the cause of the loss of wages.  
State ex rel. McCoy v. Dedicated Transport, Inc., 97 Ohio St.3d 25, 2002-Ohio-
5303, 776 N.E.2d 51;  State ex rel. Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 72 
Ohio St.3d 401, 650 N.E.2d 469 (1995).  The underlying principle is that the 
employee’s departure from the workplace must be causally related to the injury 
for the employee to be eligible for temporary-total-disability compensation.  State 
ex rel. Rockwell Internatl. v. Indus. Comm., 40 Ohio St.3d 44, 531 N.E.2d 678 
(1988). 
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{¶ 9} Thus, the medical aspect of an application for temporary-total-
disability compensation that is filed after a claimant’s termination must be 
carefully scrutinized, particularly when the claimant had been released to work or 
had actually returned to the former position of employment.  State ex rel. Ohio 
Treatment Alliance v. Paasewe, 99 Ohio St.3d 18, 2003-Ohio-2449, 788 N.E.2d 
1035, ¶ 7.  The onset of disability is inherently suspect when it coincides with 
termination of employment.  Id. at ¶ 9. 
{¶ 10} Viking Forge challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support 
of Perry’s claim before the commission.  Thus, we must determine whether there 
is evidence that supports the commission’s finding that Perry was entitled to 
temporary-total-disability compensation.  If so, there was no abuse of discretion, 
and mandamus was appropriately denied.  State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, 
Inc., 31 Ohio St.3d 18, 508 N.E.2d 936 (1987). 
{¶ 11} Viking Forge maintains that there were no new and changed 
circumstances in Perry’s medical condition to support an award of temporary-
total-disability compensation after Perry’s termination from employment.  
According to Viking Forge, after Perry was released for work without restrictions 
on February 4, the only circumstance that changed was that Dr. Rodgers reported 
that Perry could not work, an opinion that contradicted the medical opinion of Dr. 
Engles.  Viking Forge maintains that upon careful scrutiny, as required by 
Paasewe, the evidence does not support the commission’s finding of temporary 
total disability. 
{¶ 12} In Paasewe, without explanation, a doctor issued an opinion 
certifying the claimant as disabled through October 11, 2000, which repudiated 
the same doctor’s earlier report in which he had released the claimant for work on 
July 10, 2000.  Paasewe, 99 Ohio St.3d 18, 2003-Ohio-2449, 788 N.E.2d 1035, 
¶ 11.  Unlike Paasewe, this case presents conflicting medical evidence.  Dr. 
Engles said he could no longer provide surgical services for Perry and referred 
January Term, 2015 
5 
 
him to a clinic for ongoing care.  Perry began treating with Dr. Rodgers, whose 
opinion differed from Dr. Engle’s opinion. 
{¶ 13} The commission is exclusively responsible for evaluating the 
weight and credibility of evidence and deciding disputed issues of fact.  Burley, 
31 Ohio St.3d at 20-21, 508 N.E.2d 936.  The commission found the medical 
documentation from Dr. Rodgers to be credible evidence.  We agree with the 
court of appeals that the commission’s evaluation passed the scrutiny required by 
Paasewe. 
{¶ 14} Next, Viking Forge maintains that Perry’s termination from 
employment was a voluntary departure from the workplace.  According to Viking 
Forge, Perry had received a copy of Viking Forge’s handbook containing safety 
rules and disciplinary procedures, yet had been reprimanded several times for 
violations, and, on February 4, 2009, was advised that his next infraction would 
lead to termination.  Viking Forge argues that based on these factors, Perry was 
ineligible for temporary-total-disability compensation. 
{¶ 15} The hearing officer relied on Perry’s testimony at the hearing that 
the infraction for which he was terminated had not been his fault.  The 
commission considered this testimony credible and rejected Viking Forge’s 
argument that Perry had voluntarily abandoned his position.  It was within the 
commission’s discretion to rely on Perry’s testimony that he did not violate a 
written work rule. 
{¶ 16} Finally, Viking Forge argues that the commission abused its 
discretion because the staff hearing officer failed to adequately explain the basis 
for the decision.  The commission’s order must contain sufficient detail of its 
reasoning and the evidence supporting it.  Failure to do so constitutes an abuse of 
discretion.  State ex rel. Mitchell v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 6 Ohio St.3d 481, 483, 
453 N.E.2d 721 (1983). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 17} Here, the commission specifically relied on the medical evidence 
from Dr. Rodgers and on Perry’s testimony.  Viking Forge merely disagrees with 
the commission’s findings.  But it is not the role of a reviewing court to assess the 
credibility of the evidence.  State ex rel. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm., 
78 Ohio St.3d 176, 177, 677 N.E.2d 338 (1997).  So long as the commission’s 
order is supported by evidence in the record, there is no abuse of discretion.  State 
ex rel. Pass v. C.S.T. Extraction Co., 74 Ohio St.3d 373, 376, 658 N.E.2d 1055 
(1996). 
{¶ 18} Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and 
O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
FRENCH, J., not participating. 
___________________ 
Christopher J. Shaw, for appellant. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Andrew Alatis, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
___________________