Case Title: Ex parte Gregory O'Neil Starr PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS (In re: Noah Dew v. Gregory O'Neil Starr and GEICO Casualty Company) (Choctaw Circuit Court: CV-22-900051).

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC-2023-0550

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2024-03-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: March 8, 2024 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern 
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other 
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
 
OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024 
 
_________________________ 
 
SC-2023-0550 
_________________________ 
 
Ex parte Gregory O'Neil Starr  
 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS 
 
(In re: Noah Dew  
 
v.  
 
Gregory O'Neil Starr and GEICO Casualty Company) 
 
(Choctaw Circuit Court: CV-22-900051) 
 
COOK, Justice. 
Gregory O'Neil Starr, a defendant in a personal-injury action 
SC-2023-0550 
2 
 
pending below, filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied by the 
Choctaw Circuit Court. He now petitions this Court for a writ of 
mandamus, asking that we direct the trial court to vacate that order and 
to instead enter an order dismissing all the claims against him based on 
a lack of personal jurisdiction. We grant the petition and issue the writ. 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
In February 2020, Dew and Starr were involved in a motor-vehicle 
collision on U.S. Highway 84 near Joe Booth Road. It is undisputed that 
U.S. Highway 84 intersects with Joe Booth Road in Mississippi.  
 
More than two years after that collision, on September 16, 2022, 
Dew sued Starr in Choctaw County, Alabama, alleging negligence and 
wantonness and seeking $74,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. 
Because Starr was allegedly uninsured at the time of the collision, Dew 
also alleged a claim for indemnification against his own insurer -- GEICO 
Casualty Company ("GEICO").  
 
In February 2023, Dew moved for a default judgment against Starr 
after Starr had failed to appear in the lawsuit. That motion was granted, 
and a default judgment was entered against Starr on April 6, 2023.  
 
On May 4, 2023, 28 days after the default judgment was entered 
SC-2023-0550 
3 
 
against him, Starr filed a "motion to set aside default" pursuant to Rules 
59 and 60, Ala. R. Civ. P. In that motion, Starr argued that the default 
judgment against him was due to be set aside because (1) Starr "has 
viable defenses to [Dew's] claims," (2) Starr "[s]hould be allowed to have 
counsel appear and defend his position in this action," and (3) "the 
judgment [that] was entered in this matter has been in effect less than 
thirty (30) days."  
 
The next day, Starr filed an "amended motion to set aside default" 
pursuant to Rules 55(c), 59, and 60, Ala. R. Civ. P. In that motion, Starr 
claimed that the default judgment against him should be set aside 
because (1) Starr "has viable defenses to [Dew's] claims including, but not 
limited to, lack of jurisdiction"; (2) "[Dew's] complaint indicates the 
subject accident occurred in Mississippi and [Starr] resides in 
Mississippi," and "[t]here is no nexus to Choctaw County, Alabama, other 
than [Dew's] residing there"; (3) Starr "should be allowed to have counsel 
appear and defend his position in this action"; (4) Starr "was not properly 
served with a copy of the summons and complaint" because "the certified 
mail return receipt was not signed by [Starr], his agent, or anyone 
residing at the service address"; and (5) "the judgment [that] was entered 
SC-2023-0550 
4 
 
in this matter has been in effect less than thirty (30) days."  
 
Dew did not respond to Starr's first motion to set aside the default 
judgment. He also did not respond to Starr's amended motion to set aside 
the default judgment. 
 
Before the trial court ruled on either motion, Starr filed a "motion 
to dismiss" pursuant to Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P. In that 
motion, Starr argued, among other things, that Dew's claims against him 
were due to be dismissed because the trial court lacked jurisdiction and 
was an improper venue for Dew's claims. In support of his assertion, 
Starr explained: (1) that he is a resident of Mississippi, (2) that Dew had 
attempted to serve him in Mississippi, (3) that the collision had occurred 
in Mississippi, (4) that the Mississippi Highway Patrol had investigated 
the collision, (5) that both Dew and Starr had sought medical treatment 
in Mississippi for their injuries caused by the collision, and (6) that there 
is no nexus to Choctaw County other than Dew's residing there.  
Starr attached to his motion to dismiss a copy of the collision report, 
which showed: (1) that the collision had occurred in Mississippi, (2) that 
the Mississippi Highway Patrol had completed the collision report, (3) 
that Starr's driver's license listed a Mississippi address as his place of 
SC-2023-0550 
5 
 
residence, and (4) that the medical personnel that had responded to the 
collision were part of an emergency medical service affiliated with a 
Mississippi hospital. Starr also attached to his motion a map of the area 
where the collision occurred, which showed that U.S. Highway 84 
intersects with Joe Booth Road in Mississippi.  
 
In response, Dew argued that Starr's motion to dismiss was due to 
be denied. Specifically, Dew argued, among other things, that Choctaw 
County, Alabama, is an appropriate jurisdiction and venue because, 
under § 6-3-7(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975,1  
"the nexus of the filing is based on [Dew's] residence and the 
contract between [GEICO] and [Dew] in writing in a policy of 
uninsured and/or underinsured motorist coverage against 
loss, damage, injury and other damages incurred as a result 
of an automobile accident which [was] the fault of [Starr] a 
motorist who did not carry sufficient liability insurance to 
compensate [Dew]."   
 
 
On June 23, 2023, the trial court granted Starr's amended motion 
to set aside default judgment. That same day, the trial court also denied 
 
1Section 6-3-7(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975, provides, in relevant part, that 
"[a]ll civil actions against corporations may be brought in … the county 
in which the plaintiff resided …." 
 
SC-2023-0550 
6 
 
Starr's motion to dismiss.2 The record contains no indication that a 
hearing was held on either motion before the trial court made those 
rulings. Thereafter, Starr timely filed his petition for a writ of mandamus 
with this Court, challenging only the trial court's order denying the 
motion to dismiss.  
Standard of Review 
 
"'A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy'" that is 
appropriate "'when the petitioner can show (1) a clear legal right to the 
order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, 
accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate 
remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.'" Ex parte 
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 320 So. 3d 550, 552 (Ala. 2020) (quoting Ex 
parte BOC Grp., Inc., 823 So. 2d 1270, 1272 (Ala. 2001)). It is well-settled 
that an order denying a motion to dismiss based on a lack of personal 
jurisdiction is reviewable by an appellate court on a petition for a writ of 
mandamus. Ex parte Alamo Title Co., 128 So. 3d 700, 707 (Ala. 2013).  
"'"'"An appellate court considers de novo a trial court's 
judgment on a party's motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
 
2The trial court's order denying the motion to dismiss did not 
include either the factual or legal findings on which the court's decision 
was based.  
SC-2023-0550 
7 
 
jurisdiction."' Ex parte Lagrone, 839 So. 2d 620, 623 (Ala. 
2002) (quoting Elliott v. Van Kleef, 830 So. 2d 726, 729 (Ala. 
2002)). Moreover, '[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving 
the court's personal jurisdiction over the defendant.' Daynard 
v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 
42, 50 (1st Cir. 2002)."'"  
 
Ex parte Bradshaw, 328 So. 3d 236, 239 (Ala. 2020) (quoting Ex parte 
Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So. 2d 226, 229 (Ala. 2004), quoting in 
turn Ex parte Dill, Dill, Carr, Stonbraker & Hutchings, P.C., 866 So. 2d 
519, 525 (Ala. 2003)).  
"'"'In considering a Rule 12(b)(2), 
Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss for 
want of personal jurisdiction, a court 
must consider as true the allegations of 
the 
plaintiff's 
complaint 
not 
controverted 
by 
the 
defendant's 
affidavits, Robinson v. Giarmarco & 
Bill, P.C., 74 F.3d 253 (11th Cir. 1996), 
and Cable/Home Communication Corp. 
v. Network Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d 
829 (11th Cir. 1990), and "where the 
plaintiff's 
complaint 
and 
the 
defendant's affidavits conflict, the ... 
court must construe all reasonable 
inferences in favor of the plaintiff." 
Robinson, 74 F.3d at 255 (quoting 
Madara v. Hall, 916 F.2d 1510, 1514 
(11th Cir. 1990)).'" 
 
"'Wenger Tree Serv. v. Royal Truck & Equip., Inc., 
853 So. 2d 888, 894 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Ex parte 
McInnis, 820 So. 2d 795, 798 (Ala. 2001)).'" 
 
SC-2023-0550 
8 
 
Ex parte TitleMax of Georgia, Inc., 340 So. 3d 395, 400 (Ala. 2021) 
(quoting Ex parte Covington Pike Dodge, Inc., 904 So. 2d 226, 229 (Ala. 
2004)). 
Discussion 
 
Among other things, Starr asserts that he is entitled to a writ of 
mandamus because Dew's lawsuit against him should have been 
dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), Ala. 
R. Civ. P.  Although Dew does not dispute that the trial court lacked 
personal jurisdiction over Starr, he contends that Starr waived his right 
to challenge personal jurisdiction in this case because (1) Starr failed to 
raise his challenge in his first general appearance, which, Dew contends, 
was Starr's May 4, 2023, motion to set aside the default judgment; (2) 
Starr's assertion that the default judgment should be set aside for "lack 
of jurisdiction" in his May 5, 2023, amended motion to set aside the 
default judgement challenged only subject-matter jurisdiction, not 
personal jurisdiction; and (3) Starr's argument that the trial court "lacks 
jurisdiction" in his motion to dismiss was a challenge to venue, not 
personal jurisdiction. Thus, before reaching the merits of Starr's 
personal-jurisdiction challenge, we must first decide whether he waived 
SC-2023-0550 
9 
 
his right to raise such a challenge.  
I. Waiver of the Right to Challenge Personal Jurisdiction 
It is a well-established principle that "'our review is restricted to 
the evidence and arguments considered by the trial court.'" Key v. 
Warren Averett, LLC, 372 So. 3d 1132, 1138 (Ala. 2022) (quoting 
Andrews v. Merritt Oil Co., 612 So. 2d 409, 410 (Ala. 1992)); Smith v. 
Stowe, [Ms. SC-2023-0198, Sept. 15, 2023] __ So. 3d __, __ (Ala. 2023) 
("'Issues not raised before the trial court will not be considered for the 
first time on appeal.'" (quoting ITEC, Inc. v. Automated Precision, Inc., 
623 So. 2d 1139, 1140 (Ala. 1993))); Moultrie v. Wall, 172 So. 3d 828, 840 
(Ala. 2015) ("'In order to be considered on appeal, issues must be 
presented to the trial court and to the opposing parties at the trial level.'" 
(quoting Birmingham Hockey Club, Inc. v. National Council on Comp. 
Ins., Inc., 827 So. 2d 73, 80 (Ala. 2002))); Black Warrior Elec. Membership 
Corp. v. McCarter, 115 So. 3d 158, 166 (Ala. 2012) ("'[I]t is a well-settled 
rule that parties are restricted to the theory on which a cause is 
prosecuted or defended in the court below. Where both parties adopt a 
particular theory they will not be permitted to depart therefrom when 
the case is brought up for appellate review.'" (quoting Inter-Ocean Ins. 
SC-2023-0550 
10 
 
Co. v. Banks, 268 Ala. 25, 27, 104 So.2d 836, 837 (1958))).3 
Here, Dew did not argue waiver in his response to Starr's motion to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2). Instead, he proceeded 
as if Starr had not waived his objection to personal jurisdiction.  
Specifically, in his response to Starr's motion to dismiss, Dew argued that 
the trial court has jurisdiction over Starr because "the nexus of filing is 
based on" (1) Dew's state of residency, which is Alabama, and (2) Dew's 
insurance agreement with GEICO.4 Therefore, because Dew failed to 
 
3In addition, opinions from other jurisdictions make clear that a 
plaintiff may not raise, for the first time, the issue of a defendant's waiver 
of the right to challenge personal jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Rainsberger v. 
McFadden, 174 Mich. App. 660, 667, 436 N.W.2d 412, 415-16 (1989) 
("Plaintiff's alternative contention that defendant waived any objections 
to the court's exercise of personal jurisdiction by requesting an attorney 
was not raised before the trial court. An issue which is not preserved at 
the trial court level cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Schanz 
v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 165 Mich. App. 395, 408, 418 N.W.2d 478 
(1988). Thus, plaintiff's argument regarding any possible waiver of 
objection by defendant is not properly before this Court."); Hasley v. 
Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc., 70 Wis. 2d 562, 569-70, 235 N.W.2d 446, 
450-51 (Wis. 1975) ("In the reply brief on this appeal, respondent urges 
decisional grounds not asserted in the trial court. … [¶] Ordinarily, 
questions which are not properly presented to the trial court will not be 
considered for the first time on appeal. … In this case, the new issues are 
presented merely to bolster the trial court's finding of jurisdiction. 
Therefore, no compelling policy exists to ignore the general rule.").  
 
4Dew abandons the second ground of his argument on appeal. 
 
SC-2023-0550 
11 
 
argue to the trial court that Starr had waived his objection to personal 
jurisdiction, this Court cannot consider that argument for the first time 
on appeal.5  
With regard to Dew's secondary argument that Starr waived his 
personal-jurisdiction challenge because his motion to dismiss challenged 
venue rather than personal jurisdiction, we note that this assertion is 
refuted by the materials before us. In his motion to dismiss, Starr 
specifically asserted that "Choctaw County, Alabama[,] … lacks 
jurisdiction for [Dew's] claims" and cited Rule 12(b)(2), Ala. R. Civ. P., in 
support of that assertion. That rule provides for a motion to dismiss for 
"lack of jurisdiction over the person."  Additionally, Starr alleged that he 
is a resident of Mississippi, that the collision had occurred in Mississippi, 
and that there is no "nexus" between Starr and Alabama. Under these 
circumstances, it seems clear to this Court that Starr sufficiently raised 
his personal-jurisdiction challenge in his motion to dismiss and thus did 
 
5Dew not only failed to raise the waiver argument in a response to 
Starr's motion to dismiss, but also failed to raise the waiver argument in 
response to Starr's amended "motion to set aside default [judgment]" and 
did not file a motion to strike such amendment, which raised the lack-of-
jurisdiction defense.  In fact, he failed to file any response to that motion.  
The trial court then proceeded to grant the amended motion, which, as 
noted, raised the lack-of-jurisdiction defense.     
SC-2023-0550 
12 
 
not waive this issue for the purposes of the present petition. We therefore 
see no reason to deny Starr's petition for a writ of mandamus on this 
basis.  
II. Personal Jurisdiction 
Because Starr did not waive his right to challenge the trial court's 
ability to exercise personal jurisdiction over him, we must now determine 
whether Starr has demonstrated that he has a clear legal right to 
mandamus relief based on that issue. The issue of personal jurisdiction 
"'stands or falls on the unique facts of [each] case.'" Ex parte I.M.C., Inc., 
485 So. 2d 724, 725 (Ala. 1986) (quoting and adopting trial court's order). 
As noted above, it is the plaintiff's burden to establish personal 
jurisdiction regardless of whether the form of personal jurisdiction is 
alleged to be general or specific. See Branded Trailer Sales, Inc. v. 
Universal Truckload Servs., Inc., 74 So. 3d 404, 409 (Ala. 2011); and 
Facebook, Inc. v. K.G.S., 294 So. 3d 122, 130 (Ala. 2019). 
Under Rule 4.2(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., the personal jurisdiction of 
Alabama courts over out-of-state defendants extends "'"to the limit of 
due process under the United States and Alabama Constitutions."'" Ex 
parte Bradshaw, 328 So. 3d at 240 (quoting Ex parte McNeese Title, LLC, 
SC-2023-0550 
13 
 
82 So. 3d 670, 673 (Ala. 2011), quoting in turn Hiller Invs., Inc. v. 
Insultech Grp., Inc., 957 So. 2d 1111, 1115 (Ala. 2006)). Due process 
provides that "the exercise of jurisdiction is appropriate so long as the 
out-of-state defendant has '"some minimum contacts with this state [so 
that] ... it is fair and reasonable to require the person to come to this state 
to defend an action."'" Id. (quoting Dillon Equities v. Palmer & Cay, Inc., 
501 So. 2d 459, 461 (Ala. 1986), quoting in turn former Rule 4.2(a)(2)(I), 
Ala. R. Civ. P.).  
A defendant is deemed to have sufficient "minimum contacts" with 
a forum state when the plaintiff shows that the defendant's contacts were 
either general or specific and that such contacts were purposely directed 
at the forum state by the defendant. Id. at 241.  
"General contacts" exist when the defendant's contacts with the 
forum state "'"'are unrelated to the cause of action and … are both 
"continuous and systematic." Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. 
v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9, 415, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404 
(1984).'"'" Id. (quoting Ex parte Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. 
Co., 889 So. 2d 545, 550 (Ala. 2004), quoting in turn Elliott v. Van Kleef, 
830 So. 2d 726, 731 (Ala. 2002), quoting in turn Ex parte Phase III 
SC-2023-0550 
14 
 
Constr., Inc., 723 So. 2d 1263, 1266 (Ala. 1998) (Lyons, J., concurring in 
the result)) (emphasis added).  
By contrast, "specific contacts" exist when the defendant's contacts 
with the forum state "'"'are related to the cause of action'"'" and "'"'rise 
to such a level as to cause the defendant to anticipate being haled into 
court in the forum state.'"'" Id. (quoting Ex parte Georgia Farm Bureau, 
889 So. 2d at 551, quoting in turn Elliott, 830 So. 2d at 731, quoting in 
turn Ex parte Phase III Constr., 723 So. 2d at 1266 (Lyons, J., concurring 
in the result)) (emphasis added). 
"'But regardless of whether jurisdiction is alleged to be 
general or specific, the nexus between the defendant and the 
forum state must arise out of "'an action of the defendant 
[that was] purposefully directed toward the forum State.'" 
Elliott [v. Van Kleef, 830 So. 2d 726, 731 (Ala. 2002)] (quoting 
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 
U.S. 102, 112, 107 S. Ct. 1026, 94 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1987)). "This 
purposeful-availment requirement assures that a defendant 
will not be haled into a jurisdiction as a result of ' "the 
unilateral activity of another person or a third person."'" 
Elliott, 830 So. 2d at 731 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 
528 (1985)).'" 
 
Leithead v. Banyan Corp., 926 So. 2d 1025, 1030-31 (Ala. 2005) (quoting 
Dill, Dill, Carr, Stonbraker & Hutchings, 866 So. 2d at 525-26) (some 
emphasis in original; some emphasis added). "'"Jurisdiction is proper, 
SC-2023-0550 
15 
 
however, where the contacts proximately result from actions by the 
defendant himself that create a substantial connection with the forum 
State."'" Ex parte Bradshaw, 328 So. 3d at 241 (quoting Ex parte Georgia 
Farm Bureau, 889 So. 2d at 551, quoting in turn Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).   
 
In denying Starr's motion to dismiss, the trial court did not indicate 
whether it regarded its jurisdiction over him to be general or specific. We 
will thus address each form of personal jurisdiction in turn. 
A. General Personal Jurisdiction 
Starr argues that the trial court lacked general personal 
jurisdiction over him because Dew failed to allege that Starr has any 
contact or connection to Alabama. Dew does not provide this Court with 
any response or argument on this point.  
As stated previously, general personal jurisdiction is established 
through a defendant's "general contacts" with a forum state.  In most 
cases, "'[f]or an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general 
jurisdiction is the individual's domicile.'" Ex parte Bradshaw, 328 So. 2d 
at 242 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 
U.S. 915, 924 (2011)).  
SC-2023-0550 
16 
 
In his complaint, Dew specifically identified Starr as "a bona fide 
resident citizen of Covington County, Mississippi, … at all times material 
to this lawsuit." Additionally, the materials before us do not indicate that 
Starr has ever visited or otherwise set foot in Alabama. Moreover, Dew 
does not assert that Starr has visited or traveled through Alabama, nor 
does he argue that Starr has engaged in any activity purposely directed 
to Alabama. As a result, there are no facts that would support a finding 
of general jurisdiction.6  
B. Specific Personal Jurisdiction 
Starr also argues that the trial court lacked specific personal 
jurisdiction over him because Dew failed to allege that his claims against 
Starr arose out of or relate to any contact Starr has had with Alabama. 
Once again, Dew does not provide this Court with any response or 
argument on this point.  
This Court has recently explained:  
 
6We are not called upon here to decide whether recent United States 
Supreme Court decisions have narrowed general jurisdiction for 
individuals to their state of domicile.  In other words, we have not been 
asked to decide whether the previous "continuous and systematic" test 
for general jurisdiction for an individual could ever render a result 
broader than simply the domicile test.  See, e.g., Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011).   
SC-2023-0550 
17 
 
"'Specific jurisdiction ... depends on an "affiliatio[n] between 
the forum and the underlying controversy," principally, 
activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State 
and is therefore subject to the State's regulation. [Arthur T.] 
von Mehren & [Donald T.] Trautman, Jurisdiction to 
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 
1136 (1966) (hereinafter von Mehren & Trautman); see [Lea] 
Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 
Texas L. Rev. 721, 782 (1988) .... In contrast to general, all-
purpose jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction is confined to 
adjudication of "issues deriving from, or connected with, the 
very controversy that establishes jurisdiction." von Mehren & 
Trautman 1136.'" 
 
Facebook, Inc., 294 So. 3d at 134 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919).  
The analytical framework used for determining whether specific 
jurisdiction exists consists of two primary requirements. First, there 
must be an indication that Starr has "purposefully availed" himself of 
the privilege of conducting activities within Alabama. See id. at 132 
(quoting Elliott, 830 So. 2d at 731). Specifically, there must be (1) a 
"'"'substantial connection' between [Starr] and [Alabama] necessary for 
a finding of minimum contacts"'" and (2) those contacts "'"must come 
about by an action of [Starr] purposefully directed toward [Alabama]."'" 
Id. (quoting Elliott, 830 So. 2d at 731, quoting in turn Asahi Metal Indus. 
Co. v. Superior Ct. of California, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987)) (first 
emphasis added). This requirement "'assures that [Starr] will not be 
SC-2023-0550 
18 
 
haled into [Alabama] as a result of "'the unilateral activity of another 
person or a third person.'"'" Id. (quoting Elliott, 830 So. 2d at 731, 
quoting in turn Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475, quoting in turn 
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 417). Second, Dew's lawsuit must "'"arise[] out 
of or relate[] to [Starr's] contacts with [Alabama]."'" Id. at 134 (quoting 
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014), quoting in turn 
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8). 
Here, Dew's complaint alleges only that Starr is a "bona fide 
resident of Covington County, Mississippi[,] and has [been] such at all 
times material to this lawsuit." It does not allege that Starr had any 
contacts with Alabama -- let alone that Starr engaged in an action 
"purposefully directed toward [Alabama]." Id. at 132. Dew also does not 
allege in his complaint that Dew's lawsuit "arose out of" or "relates to" 
any contacts that Starr may have had with Alabama. See id. at 134. 
Rather, the factual allegations in the complaint make clear that 
Dew's negligence and wantonness claims against Starr relate to the 
motor-vehicle collision between Starr and Dew that occurred on U.S. 
Highway 84 near Joe Booth Road. Dew does not dispute Starr's assertion 
that the collision occurred in Mississippi. He also does not dispute Starr's 
SC-2023-0550 
19 
 
assertion that Joe Booth Road intersects with U.S. Highway 84 in 
Mississippi.  
Considering the lack of any contacts between Starr and Alabama, 
there is nothing before us that would support the trial court's exercise of 
specific personal jurisdiction over Starr. We therefore conclude that the 
petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Starr establishes a clear legal 
right to the dismissal of the complaint against him on the basis that the 
trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him.  
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons set out above, we grant the petition for the writ of 
mandamus and issue the writ. We further direct the Choctaw Circuit 
Court to vacate its order denying Starr's motion to dismiss and to enter 
an order dismissing Dew's claims against Starr on the basis that it lacks 
personal jurisdiction.7  
 
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED. 
 
Parker, C.J., and Wise, Sellers, Mendheim, Stewart, and Mitchell, 
JJ., concur.  
 
7Because we are granting Starr's petition on the basis that the trial 
court lacked personal jurisdiction over him, it is unnecessary for us to 
consider the other arguments Starr asserted in his petition.  
SC-2023-0550 
20 
 
Shaw, J., concurs in the result.  
Bryan, J., concurs in the result, with opinion. 
 
 
SC-2023-0550 
21 
 
BRYAN, Justice (concurring in the result). 
 
The main opinion concludes that "this Court cannot consider ... for 
the first time on appeal" Noah Dew's argument that Gregory O'Neil Starr 
waived his challenge to personal jurisdiction by not timely asserting that 
affirmative defense in the circuit court. ___ So. 3d at ___.  I respectfully 
disagree with that conclusion.  Crucially, Dew is the respondent in this 
mandamus proceeding.  Subject to exceptions that are inapplicable here, 
when considering whether to affirm a judgment (or, as here, to deny 
mandamus relief), we may affirm (or deny mandamus relief) on any 
"valid legal ground presented by the record, regardless of whether that 
ground was considered, or even if it was rejected by the trial court."   
Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. University of Alabama Health Servs. Found., 
P.C., 881 So. 2d 1013, 1020 (Ala. 2003).8  See also Ex parte Moulton, 116 
 
8Liberty National states the exceptions to this general rule: 
 
"This rule fails in application only where due-process 
constraints require some notice at the trial level, which was 
omitted, of the basis that would otherwise support an 
affirmance, such as when a totally omitted affirmative 
defense might, if available for consideration, suffice to affirm 
a judgment, Ameriquest Mortgage Co. v. Bentley, 851 So. 2d 
458 (Ala. 2002), or where a summary-judgment movant has 
not asserted before the trial court a failure of the nonmovant's 
evidence on an element of a claim or defense and therefore has 
SC-2023-0550 
22 
 
So. 3d 1119, 1133-34 (Ala. 2013) (applying the principle stated in Liberty 
National in the context of a mandamus petition); and Ex parte Jones, 147 
So. 3d 415, 419 (Ala. 2013) (noting the general rule that we may affirm 
on any valid legal ground "even if that ground was not argued before or 
considered by, and even if it was rejected by, the trial court").  This well-
settled principle has been cited many times in recent years by this Court. 
In concluding that we cannot consider Dew's argument, the main 
opinion primarily relies on a statement of law found in decisions like the 
often-cited Andrews v. Merritt Oil Co., 612 So. 2d 409, 410 (Ala. 1992), 
which states: "This Court cannot consider arguments raised for the first 
time on appeal; rather, our review is restricted to the evidence and 
arguments considered by the trial court."  However, that broad statement 
should be read in the context of the procedural posture in Andrews, which 
involved an appellant's argument seeking a reversal of the trial court's 
 
not shifted the burden of producing substantial evidence in 
support of that element, Rector v. Better Houses, Inc., 820 So. 
2d 75, 80 (Ala. 2001) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986), and 
Kennedy v. Western Sizzlin Corp., 857 So. 2d 71 (Ala. 2003))." 
 
881 So. 2d at 1020. 
SC-2023-0550 
23 
 
judgment.  This Court has consistently applied this principle to 
appellants and petitioners rather than appellees and respondents.  A 
more precise statement of this principle is that "appellate courts 'cannot 
consider arguments advanced for the purpose of reversing the judgment 
of a trial court when those arguments were never presented to the trial 
court for consideration or were raised for the first time on appeal.'"  Lay 
v. Destafino, [Ms. 1210383, Feb. 17, 2023] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. 2023) 
(quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Motley, 909 So. 2d 806, 821 
(Ala. 2005)).    See also Ex parte City of Gulf Shores, 351 So. 3d 518, 521 
(Ala. 2021) ("This Court will not grant relief to a petitioner or an 
appellant based on an argument presented for the first time to this 
Court.").  That is, this principle properly applies to an appellant arguing 
for a reversal or to a petitioner seeking mandamus relief.  On the other 
hand, an appellee or a respondent is not bound by this rule because, as 
noted, this Court generally may affirm a judgment on any valid legal 
ground presented by the record even if the ground was not considered by 
the trial court.  Liberty Nat'l, supra.  In other words, we generally may 
consider an argument made by an appellee or a respondent in defense of 
the trial court's decision even if that argument was not made to the trial 
SC-2023-0550 
24 
 
court.  Thus, we may consider Dew's argument that Starr waived his 
challenge to personal jurisdiction by not timely asserting it below.  
However, I do not think that our consideration of this argument would 
change the result in this case, and I agree with the main opinion that 
Dew has failed to establish that the trial court has personal jurisdiction 
here.  Accordingly, I concur in the result.