Case Title: State v. Ely

Citation: 167 Vt. 323, 708 A.2d 1332

Docket Number: 96-587

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1997-12-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Ely  (96-587); 167 Vt. 323; 708 A.2d 1332

[Filed 19-Dec-1997]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                            No. 96-587

State of Vermont                             Supreme Court
                                             Original Jurisdiction
    v.

Shawn Ely                                    December Term, 1996

Walter M. Morris, Jr., J.

       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Susan R. Harritt, Assistant
  Attorney General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

       Robert Appel, Defender General, and William A. Nelson, Appellate
  Attorney, Montpelier, for appellant

PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.

       DOOLEY, J.   This case raises the single issue of whether the
  provision of use and derivative use immunity to a reluctant witness
  pursuant to 12 V.S.A. § 1664(a) is consistent with the self-incrimination
  privilege established by Chapter I, Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution.
  We hold that it is consistent as long as  derivative use  is defined
  sufficiently broadly to provide equivalent protection to that provided by
  the privilege and certain procedural protections are afforded.  We affirm.

       The State charged defendant, Shawn Ely, with the second-degree murder
  of Eddie Billings, a two-year-old child, and subpoenaed Wanda Allard
  (hereinafter witness), the mother of Eddie Billings, to testify at a
  pretrial hearing.  The witness appeared, but refused to testify, asserting
  her privilege against self-incrimination; she was offered use and
  derivative use immunity pursuant to 12 V.S.A. § 1664(a), but she continued
  to refuse to testify, asserting that only transactional immunity would be
  sufficient to provide her equivalent protection to the self-incrimination
  privilege.  The trial court disagreed and held her in contempt.

 

       Chapter I, Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution provides that  in
  all prosecutions for criminal offenses, a person . . . [cannot] be
  compelled to give evidence against himself. Consistent with the
  self-incrimination privilege established in the Fifth Amendment to the
  United States Constitution, this privilege attaches and applies to a
  non-defendant witness who is compelled to testify in a civil or criminal
  proceeding.  See Maness v. Meyers,