Case Title: Security National Bank v. City of Olathe

Citation: 225 Kan. 220, 589 P.2d 589

Docket Number: 49,179

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1979-01-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
225 Kan. 220 (1979)
589 P.2d 589
SECURITY NATIONAL BANK, Appellee,
v.
CITY OF OLATHE, KANSAS, et al., Appellants.
No. 49,179

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed January 20, 1979.
Allen R. Slater, of Haskin, Hinkle & Slater, of Olathe, argued the cause, and Frank H. Jenkins, Jr., City Attorney, was with him on the brief for the appellants.
Charles S. Schnider, of Shawnee Mission, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MILLER, J.:
This is an appeal by the city of Olathe from an order of the Johnson district court finding the city's refusal to rezone certain land unreasonable, and directing the city to grant the requested rezoning. The Security National Bank of Kansas City, Kansas, as trustee, manages the land for the trust which owns it. The bank was the successful party below.
*221 The bank first challenges our jurisdiction to hear this matter. It contends that the notice of appeal was prematurely filed, and no notice of appeal was filed after the entry of judgment. The trial court filed a memorandum decision on December 10, 1976, in which memorandum the court directed the bank's attorney to prepare an appropriate journal entry. The notice of appeal was filed January 5, 1977; the journal entry of judgment was filed January 24, 1977. The bank contends that since the notice of appeal was filed prior to January 10, 1977, the appeal is controlled by the rules of this court then in effect; and that our present rule relating to premature notices of appeal, rule 2.03, has no application to this proceeding since the rule did not become effective until January 10, 1977, in accordance with prefatory rule No. 1.01 (220 Kan. xxix). The bank bases this contention on two earlier cases of this court, Roe Village, Inc. v. Board of County Commissioners, 195 Kan. 247, 403 P.2d 970 (1965), and Guerrero v. Capitol Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 197 Kan. 18, 415 P.2d 257 (1966). While it is true that rule 2.03 was not effective at the time notice of appeal was filed in this case, our earlier rule No. 16, 201 Kan. xxvii, adopted effective July 12, 1967, was applicable. That rule is the predecessor of present rule 2.03, and is almost identical. Rule 16 was in full force and effect at the time the notice of appeal in this action was filed. It provides in effect that a notice of appeal, filed subsequent to the announcement by the judge of a judgment to be entered, but prior to the actual entry of judgment, shall be effective if it identifies the judgment from which the appeal is taken with sufficient certainty to inform the prevailing party below of the rulings to be reviewed on appeal. The bank does not contend that the notice was insufficient in this regard. We conclude that the notice of appeal was timely filed, and this court has jurisdiction to hear and determine this appeal.
The issues on appeal are whether the court abused its discretion in refusing to grant the city's motion for a continuance of trial; whether the court erred in permitting one of the landowner's witnesses, Mr. Butler, to testify as an expert in the field of land-use planning, and in receiving plaintiff's exhibit No. 17 into evidence; and whether the city's denial of the application to rezone was reasonable.
Some ten or twelve days before trial, the city served interrogatories *222 upon counsel for the bank, in an effort to learn the substance of the proposed testimony by the bank's expert witnesses, Mr. Ogburn and Mr. Butler. The city then requested a continuance until it could get the information requested in those interrogatories. The trial judge ordered the bank's counsel to provide that information orally to the city's counsel, and the judge overruled the request for continuance.
The grant or denial of a motion for continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear showing of abuse. Fouts v. Armstrong Commercial Laundry Distributing Co., 209 Kan. 59, 64, 495 P.2d 1390 (1972); and see K.S.A. 60-240(b), and the cases annotated under that section. No demonstrable prejudice or harmful surprise has been shown in the record before us. In the absence of a contrary showing in the record, we must assume that appellant was substantially informed as to the substance of the expert testimony, and that the experts were fully and fairly cross-examined by counsel.
The city contends that the trial court erred in permitting Mr. Butler to testify as an expert, primarily for the reason that Butler had not degree in land-use planning. He has a degree in civil engineering, and he is president of a firm which does comprehensive land-use planning for many communities. He has been involved in the preparation of these plans, and his testimony discloses a wide and varied background in the field. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the witness to testify as an expert in land-use planning.
Exhibit 17 is a target of the city's next point on appeal. The city contends that the document, a written petition asking that the city of Olathe create a benefit district to pave 119th Street in the area of the land here involved, was not properly identified and was hearsay. The witness testified that he was present at the meeting of the Olathe City Commission when the petition to create a benefit district was presented. The court was advised that the petition was not granted, and the district was not formed. Even if the evidence was hearsay, and we note that the document might come under some of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, no reversible error has been shown. There is no indication that prejudice resulted, and considering the collateral nature of the evidence, the error, if any, was harmless.
*223 We turn now to the major claim of error  that the trial court's finding of unreasonableness is contrary to the clear, compelling weight of the evidence; it was in fact reasonable. The trial judge summarized much of the evidence in his memorandum decision, as follows:
"MEMORANDUM DECISION
....
....
....
"b. `the speculative nature of this proposal';
The city, in support of its claim that its action was reasonable, and that the trial court erred in its finding of unreasonableness, points to five specific areas where the court made findings which the city contends were either contrary to the evidence or were beyond the trial court's limited scope of review because the evidence showed the issue was "fairly debatable."
The city contends that its action was reasonable because the bank's plan deviates from the Section Study of 1973 in two respects: it calls for three times as much land to be zoned industrial as is provided in the Section Study, and it provides no transitional use to the south. Before we turn to these questions, however, we turn first to the Section Studies to determine whether they are still valid. The trial court determined that the Section Studies were no longer effective and binding on the city because they had not been updated since the abandonment of the Indian Creek Reservoir project, and for various other reasons which we will presently discuss. There was no evidence to show that the planning commission had annually reviewed the plan "for the purpose of determining if any portion of the plan has become obsolete," or that the commission made annual reports to the governing body, all as directed in K.S.A. 12-704. Unquestionably, the proposed large impoundment of water and surrounding park areas was a primary factor in the early planning of the area here involved. When the plans to develop the lake and park were abandoned, no changes were made by the planning commission. The lake still remains as a prominent feature of Section Studies 2 and 3. The record does not indicate that the Studies were ever reviewed except when the bank's petition to rezone this one tract was referred back to the planning commission by the city. This does not conform to the statutory mandate.
In addition to the abandonment of the lake project, numerous other factors could affect the Section Studies. These include increased traffic along both 119th Street and Blackbob Road; the *230 building of a cloverleaf interchange at the intersection of 119th Street and Switzer bypass, a short distance to the east of plaintiff's property; and the development of the I-35 corridor, and of much light industrial zoning and construction in the immediate area. The principal, if not the only, evidence to support the city's claim that the Studies are still valid is the testimony of the man who prepared them. We conclude that the trial court's finding that the Studies are no longer effective and binding has abundant support in the record.
Even if the Studies were still controlling, the deviation and the buffer zone were carefully considered by the trial judge who viewed the area. His conclusions are amply supported. The undisputed evidence is that the city's comprehensive plan urges the development of industrial parks rather than "freestanding" industrial uses for many good and valid reasons, and that 40 acres or more is the minimum acreage needed for the development of an industrial park. The buffer zone proposed is shown to be twice the width of other buffer zones required in the same area. We conclude that the court's finding of unreasonableness is not contrary to the evidence, but is abundantly supported by the record.
Next, the city contends that the trial court failed to consider evidence that the city has an excess of undeveloped industrially zoned land. There is no evidence, however, that any of that undeveloped industrial land lies along the I-35 corridor or in the vicinity of the land under consideration. To the contrary, there is evidence that industrial zoning is needed in the corridor and in the immediate area. The Section Studies recommended some industrial zoning of the bank's land because of the demand for light industrial sites there. The fact that there is undeveloped industrially zoned land somewhere in the city should not be a controlling consideration, as the trial court correctly noted. We find no indication that the court failed to give this factor due consideration.
The city contends that the trial court erred in failing to find that the city considered the orderliness of the plan. One of the city's witnesses, Commissioner Craig, testified that the rezoning request was not refused because of any of the factors enumerated in K.S.A. 12-704, including "order." There was no direct evidence that the city considered the listed factors, except that Craig did *231 say that one of the grounds for denying the request could be "order" insofar as it consisted of failure to provide buffering or transitional areas,
The trial court was well aware of its review limitations (See K.S.A. 12-712) as enunciated in Golden v. City of Overland Park, 224 Kan. 591, 584 P.2d 130 (1978) and cases therein cited. In the memorandum decision quoted above, the trial court said:
We hold that the trial court properly exercised this function and employed the correct standards. It did not give undue consideration to the city's failure to consider any one of the important factors. (See Golden, at 597-598.) This includes the factor of highest and best use, which the city also contends was given undue significance by the trial court. We find no evidence to support this claim.
Upon a thorough review of the record we hold that the trial court's findings are amply supported.
The judgment is affirmed.
FROMME, J., dissenting.
This court again has approved the acts of a district court in finally administering the zoning laws of this state. There can be no doubt under the court's decision that final authority on zoning applications rests with the district courts. The statutory scope of review set forth in K.S.A. 12-712 has been ignored. This court now shifts the burden of proof to the city. It must now establish the zoning action was reasonable as viewed by the courts.
Again I wish to register my disagreement with the action of the majority for the reasons set forth in the dissent in Golden v. City of Overland Park, 224 Kan. 591, 601, 584 P.2d 130 (1978).