Case Title: State v. Holohan

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0078

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-02-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE OF WYOMING v. JASON D. HOLOHAN2012 WY 23Case Number: S-11-0078Decided: 02/22/2012NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,Petitioner,v.JASON D. HOLOHAN, Respondent.
 
Original 
Proceeding
Petition 
for Writ of Review
District 
Court of Uinta County
The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge
 
Representing 
Petitioner:
Gregory 
A. Phillips, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Rehurek.
 
Representing 
Respondent:
John 
P. LaBuda and Jessica M. Stull of LaBuda Law Office, P.C., Pinedale, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. 
Stull.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
KITE, 
Chief Justice.
 
[¶1]  After initiating a traffic stop, a 
Wyoming Highway Patrol trooper found marijuana in Jason Holohan’s vehicle.  Mr. Holohan was charged with two counts 
of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver.  He filed a motion to suppress the 
evidence seized during the search of his vehicle, claiming the trooper lacked 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion to justify the traffic stop at the time 
he activated his flashing lights and could not use events occurring after 
activating his lights to justify the stop.  
The district court agreed and granted the motion.  The State filed a petition for writ of 
review of the district court’s order which this Court granted.  We reverse.  
 
ISSUE
 
[¶2]  The State presents the issue for this 
Court’s determination as follows:
 
Does 
the Fourth Amendment require reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop to exist at 
the moment an officer makes his show of authority (activating his light bar), 
and may traffic violations occurring after the show of authority be used to 
establish reasonable suspicion for the stop? 
 
Mr. 
Holohan restates the issue as follows:
 
The 
District Court correctly ruled that, under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, reasonable suspicion must exist at the moment a law 
enforcement officer makes a “show of authority” that compels a person to some 
action.  Therefore, traffic 
violations made by a non-fleeing motorist that occur after a show of 
authority cannot be used to retroactively establish the reasonable suspicion 
required to initiate the traffic stop.
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]  On July 13, 2010, Trooper Brandon Dyson 
was on patrol on Interstate 80 in Uinta County, Wyoming.  At approximately 7:30 a.m., he was 
parked in the median parallel to the highway facing west watching oncoming 
eastbound traffic.  His drug 
sniffing dog was in the seat directly behind him.  He observed a vehicle coming toward him 
at approximately 10 miles per hour under the posted speed limit.  He estimated that it was traveling 65 
miles per hour in a 75 mile per hour zone.1  As the vehicle approached his patrol 
car, Trooper Dyson observed it slow rapidly.  He watched the vehicle as it passed his 
location.  He continued to watch 
and, when the vehicle was approximately 100 yards away, he saw both of its right 
side tires cross approximately one foot over the fog line and remain over the 
line for a distance of 100 to 150 feet before crossing back into the lane.    
 
[¶4]  Trooper Dyson pulled onto the highway 
and followed the vehicle.  According 
to his affidavit, he saw the vehicle cross over the center line and the fog 
line.  Based upon his observations, 
he made the decision to initiate a traffic stop.  Before activating his flashing lights, 
however, he moved into the passing lane and pulled up next to the vehicle to get 
a look at the driver and check whether he was wearing his seat belt.  He then pulled back and activated his 
flashing lights.  The vehicle 
continued eastward for approximately two miles, swerving side to side as it 
traveled.  When the vehicle did not 
stop, Trooper Dyson turned on his siren. The vehicle then pulled off the highway 
onto an exit ramp and stopped.  
Trooper Dyson saw the driver and one of the passengers switch places. 
           
 
[¶5]  Trooper Dyson pulled up behind the 
vehicle, got out of his patrol car and approached the driver’s side door.  The person in the driver’s seat was not 
the person he had observed driving when he had pulled up parallel to the vehicle 
on the highway.  He requested the 
occupants’ identification, the vehicle registration and proof of insurance.  There was no proof of insurance.  He asked Mr. Holohan, who had been 
driving prior to the stop, to come back to the patrol car.  Trooper Dyson began filling out 
citations when another trooper arrived.  
He asked the trooper to finish the citations while he ran his dog around 
the vehicle.  The dog alerted.  The troopers searched the vehicle and 
found what later tested positive as marijuana.  Mr. Holohan was charged with two counts 
of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 35-7-1031(a)(ii) and 35-7-1014(a) and (d)(xiii) (LexisNexis 2009).    
 
[¶6]  Mr. Holohan filed a motion to suppress 
the evidence seized in the search of his vehicle.  He argued that Trooper Dyson did not 
have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying the initial stop of 
his vehicle.  After a hearing, the 
district court found the evidence did not support Trooper Dyson’s testimony that 
the vehicle crossed the fog or center lines several times before he decided to 
initiate the traffic stop; therefore, he did not have even a reasonable 
suspicion justifying using his flashing lights to stop the vehicle.  The district court further found the 
evidence that the vehicle swerved erratically after the unsupported show of 
authority could not be used against Mr. Holohan.           

 
[¶7]  The State filed a motion for 
reconsideration arguing that Mr. Holohan was not seized within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment until he pulled off the highway and stopped his vehicle at 
which point Trooper Dyson had seen the vehicle swerving side to side and had 
probable cause justifying the stop.  
After a hearing, the district court re-affirmed its earlier conclusion 
that Trooper Dyson did not have probable cause or a reasonable suspicion 
warranting the use of his flashing lights to stop the vehicle and any evidence 
obtained after that illegal show of authority must be suppressed as fruit of the 
poisonous tree.  The district court 
entered an order denying the State’s motion to reconsider and an order granting 
Mr. Holohan’s motion to suppress.  
The State filed a motion to stay further proceedings in district court 
until it had filed a petition for writ of review in this Court and received a 
ruling on the petition. The district court granted the motion.  The State filed its petition in this 
Court, which we granted.            

 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶8]  When reviewing a decision on a motion to 
suppress evidence we defer to the district court’s findings on factual issues 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  
Nava v. State, 2010 WY 46, ¶ 
7, 228 P.3d 1311, 1313 (Wyo. 2010).  
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the district court’s 
decision because it is in the best position to assess the witnesses’ 
credibility, weigh the evidence and make the necessary inferences, deductions 
and conclusions.  Id.  The constitutionality of a particular 
search and seizure, however, is a question of law that we review de novo.  Id.  
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶9]      The Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  A routine traffic stop 
constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  Tiernan v. State, Dep’t of Transp., 2011 
WY 143, ¶ 11, 262 P.3d 561, 565 (Wyo. 2011).  The decision to stop a motorist is 
constitutional when an officer has probable cause to believe he or she has 
violated a traffic law or has a reasonable suspicion that the motorist is 
engaged in criminal activity.  Id.
 
[¶10]  The district court in the present case 
concluded that at the time Trooper Dyson activated his flashing lights he did 
not have probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to 
justify stopping the vehicle Mr. Holohan was driving.  The district court based its conclusion 
on its finding that the video and other evidence did not support the trooper’s 
testimony that the vehicle crossed the center or fog lines several times before 
he activated his lights.  We have 
often said:
 
In 
reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we do not 
interfere with the trial court’s findings of fact unless the findings are 
clearly erroneous.  We view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s determination because 
the trial court has an opportunity at the evidentiary hearing to assess the 
credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary 
inferences, deductions, and conclusions. 
 
Holman 
v. State, 
2008 WY 54, ¶ 35, 183 P.3d 368, 377 (Wyo. 2008).  Viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the district court’s determination, we will not interfere with its 
finding that the evidence failed to support Trooper Dyson’s assertion that he 
had reasonable suspicion at the time he activated his lights.  However, reviewing de novo the question of whether the 
ultimate seizure was constitutional, we conclude that it 
was.
 
[¶11]  In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.6, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 n.6, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), the Court 
said:
 
[N]ot 
all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves “seizures” of 
persons.  Only when the officer, by 
means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the 
liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a “seizure” has 
occurred.
 
[¶12]  Justice Stewart expanded upon this 
principle in his concurrence in U.S. v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 
(1980), stating:
 
We 
adhere to the view that a person is “seized” only when, by 
means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is 
restrained. Only when such restraint is imposed is there any foundation whatever 
for invoking constitutional safeguards. The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is not to eliminate all contact 
between the police and the citizenry, but “to prevent arbitrary and oppressive 
interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of 
individuals.” United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554. As long as the person to whom 
questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there 
has been no intrusion upon that person’s liberty or privacy as would under the 
Constitution require some particularized and objective justification. 

 
[¶13]  Since Mendenhall, Justice Stewart’s 
concurrence has been cited as establishing the following test for determining 
when a seizure has occurred:  “a 
person has been 'seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the 
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed 
that he was not free to leave.”  Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 
572, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 1978, 100 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1988).  Applying this test in the context of Mr. 
Holohan’s case, it might appear that he was seized when Trooper Dyson activated 
his flashing lights because a reasonable person would have believed at that 
point he was not free to leave.  
Indeed, as the district court’s order states, this Court has considered 
the activation of flashing lights by law enforcement as a factor in determining 
whether a seizure has occurred.  McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1075 
(Wyo. 1999).  However, that factor 
must be considered “in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the 
incident.”  Mendenhall, 446 U.S.  at 554, 100 S. Ct. 
at 1877.  As stated in Chesternut, 486 U.S.  at 574, 108 S.Ct. 
at 1980: 
 
The 
test is necessarily imprecise, because it is designed to assess the coercive 
effect of police conduct, taken as a whole, rather than to focus on particular 
details of that conduct in isolation. Moreover, what constitutes a restraint on 
liberty prompting a person to conclude that he is not free to “leave” will vary, 
not only with the particular police conduct at issue, but also with the setting 
in which the seizure occurs.
Thus, 
in California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 113 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1991), the Court held that no seizure 
occurred when, upon a show of authority by law enforcement, the subject did not 
yield.
 
[¶14]  In Hodari, two police officers were on 
patrol in a high-crime area when they saw a group of youths huddled around a car 
parked at a curb.  When the youths 
saw the officers’ car, they ran.  
This raised the officers’ suspicions, and one of them left the car and 
ran around the block to intercept Hodari who had run into an alley.  When Hodari saw the officer, he tossed 
away what appeared to be a small rock.  
The officer tackled and handcuffed him.  The rock was found to be crack 
cocaine.  In reviewing the trial 
court’s denial of Hodari’s motion to suppress the evidence of the cocaine, the 
court of appeals reversed, holding that Hodari was seized when the officer 
showed his authority by chasing after him, the seizure was unreasonable and the 
evidence was fruit of the illegal seizure.  

 
[¶15]  On certiorari, the United States Supreme 
Court reversed, holding that even if the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to 
pursue Hodari, the cocaine was not fruit of a seizure within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment because a seizure requires either the application of physical 
force with lawful authority or submission to the assertion of authority.  Because the officer had not touched 
Hodari at the time he discarded the cocaine and because Hodari did not submit to 
the officer’s show of authority, the Court held there was no seizure at the time 
he discarded the cocaine. 
 
[¶16]  The Court reiterated its holding more 
recently as follows:  

 
A 
person is seized by the police and thus entitled to challenge the government’s 
action under the Fourth 
Amendment 
when the officer, “by means of physical force or show of authority,” terminates or restrains his freedom of 
movement, Florida 
v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 
111 S. Ct. 2382, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1991) 
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 19, n. 16, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)), 
“through means intentionally applied,” Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 
597, 109 S. Ct. 1378, 103 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1989) (emphasis in 
original).  * * *   A police 
officer may make a seizure by a show of authority and without the use of 
physical force, but there is no seizure without actual submission; otherwise, 
there is at most an attempted seizure, so far as the Fourth Amendment is 
concerned.             
    
 
Brendlin 
v. California, 
551 U.S. 249, 254, 127 S. Ct. 2400, 2405, 168 L. Ed. 2d 132 (2007).  See also Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 220 (Wyo. 
1994), in which this Court said “a seizure based on a show of authority does not 
occur unless the subject yields to the authority.”   
 
[¶17]  In the present case, the district court 
found that the vehicle continued on for a considerable distance after Trooper 
Dyson activated his flashing lights.  This finding was based on the trooper’s 
testimony that he turned on his siren because the vehicle did not respond to his 
flashing lights and the vehicle kept going for approximately two miles before 
stopping.  Applying these facts to 
the law, it must be concluded that the driver of the vehicle did not submit to 
the trooper’s show of authority and there was no Fourth Amendment seizure until 
the vehicle pulled off the highway and stopped.  There having been no seizure until then, 
the trooper’s testimony that he saw the vehicle swerving side to side as it 
traveled the two miles before stopping and saw the driver and one of the 
passengers switch seats was not fruit of an illegal seizure and was admissible. 

 
[¶18]  In concluding otherwise, the district 
court relied on McChesney, 988 P.2d 1071.  There, law enforcement 
received an anonymous REDDI (report every drunk driver immediately) report that 
a red Mercury with temporary plates was heading eastbound on Interstate 90 
weaving between lanes, passing cars, and slowing down in order to pass them 
again.  Id. at 1073.  A police officer positioned his patrol 
car to wait for the vehicle and verify the report.  Id.  When the red Mercury with temporary 
plates passed him, the officer pulled out behind it and followed.  Id.  Although he observed no weaving or other 
traffic violation, the officer followed the Mercury into  a convenience store parking lot, 
activating his flashing lights as he did so, and parked directly behind the 
vehicle, blocking it from leaving.  
Id. at 1073, 1075.  Under those circumstances, we concluded 
a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave.  We went on to conclude that the stop did 
not comply with the constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and 
seizures because the seizure that occurred when the officer activated his 
flashing lights and blocked McChesney’s vehicle was not supported by a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  
The only facts the officer pointed to as justifying the seizure were the 
anonymous uncorroborated REDDI report and his observation that as he followed 
the vehicle the passengers looked back at him and the driver looked at him in 
his side mirror.                

 
[¶19]  The district court in the present case 
focused on the statements in McChesney concerning the officer’s use 
of his flashing lights and concluded that is the point when a seizure 
occurs.  We disagree.  McChesney was seized for purposes of the 
Fourth Amendment because the officer used his flashing lights and blocked him from leaving the parking 
lot.  We concluded these 
circumstances, in combination, constituted a show of authority sufficient to 
convey to a reasonable person that he was not free to 
leave.
 
[¶20]  The present case differs from McChesney in that Trooper Dyson’s only 
show of authority initially was to activate his flashing lights.  This case also differs from McChesney in that upon the trooper’s 
show of authority, Mr. Holohan did not stop but continued to travel eastward on 
the interstate for another two miles, weaving erratically as he proceeded.  Under these circumstances, Mr. Holohan 
was not seized upon the trooper’s initial show of authority because he did not 
submit to it.  When the vehicle 
failed to pull over in response to the flashing lights, Trooper Dyson observed 
it weaving.  He turned on his siren 
and then the vehicle pulled off at the exit.  At that point, Trooper Dyson had 
probable cause to stop the vehicle for weaving erratically and a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity based upon the driver’s failure to pull over in 
response to the flashing lights.  

 
[¶21]  We reverse the district court’s order 
granting the motion to suppress and remand for further 
proceedings.
 
 
FOOTNOTES
1In his affidavit signed the day of the stop Trooper Dyson stated only 
that he estimated the vehicle’s speed.  
At the suppression hearing in November of 2010, however, Trooper Dyson 
testified that he confirmed the vehicle’s speed of 65 mph with his radar.