Case Title: Raymond v. Chittenden County Circ. Highway

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1991-12-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
 that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 90-189


 Francis Raymond, et al.                      Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Chittenden Superior Court

 Chittenden County Circumferential            December Term, 1991
 Highway


 Silvio T. Valente, J.

 Paul D. Jarvis of Jarvis & Kaplan, Burlington, for plaintiffs-appellants

 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Scott A. Whitted, Assistant
   Attorney General, Montpelier, for defendant-appellee


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      DOOLEY, J.   This is a condemnation action involving plaintiffs' land
 in the Town of Essex, which is being taken by the State for the Chittenden
 County Circumferential Highway (CCCH).  Plaintiffs appeal from the trial
 court's damage award, arguing that the court improperly valued the land,
 failed to include business losses, and failed to include an award for
 plaintiffs' litigation costs.  We affirm.
      The land consists of 50.07 acres which plaintiffs purchased in 1974 as
 an investment for later development.  In April 1984, plaintiffs began to
 work on developing the property.  In November 1985, they hired an engineer-
 ing firm to draft a set of development plans.  These plans showed a sub-
 division containing 87 residential units, 35 single-family homes and 52
 condominiums.  Plaintiffs then went before the Essex Planning Commission and
 received a permit to proceed with their development.  They sought an Act 250
 permit, but their application was denied by the district environmental
 commission.  They believed that the denial occurred because of the CCCH, but
 they submitted no evidence on that question to the court.
      Plaintiffs ceased their development plans when it became known that the
 land was in the path of the CCCH.  They did no site work, sought no financ-
 ing and did not solicit buyers.  After the State moved to acquire 27.71
 acres of their property, plaintiffs hired a contractor to estimate the cost
 of their plans.  The contractor proposed to build the infrastructure for
 the development for $1,323,075.  This bid was submitted in August 1989, in
 preparation for the condemnation trial.
      This action began as an inverse condemnation case in which plaintiffs
 alleged that the State's planning activities had effectively taken their
 property.  It was later converted into a normal condemnation proceeding in
 which the Vermont Agency of Transportation awarded plaintiffs $1,285,000
 for the land taken for the CCCH.  Plaintiffs appealed to superior court pur-
 suant to 19 V.S.A. { 513(a).  The parties stipulated that the land should be
 considered as fully permitted for plaintiffs' proposed subdivision
 development.  The court found that the value of the land condemned by the
 State was $1,511,200, based on a before-taking value of $1,531,200 and an
 after-taking value of $20,000.  It further found that plaintiffs had
 suffered no compensable business loss.  The court awarded plaintiffs
 $226,200, the difference between its finding of value and the award of the
 Vermont Transportation Board, plus costs of $79.39 and interest.
      Plaintiffs first argue that the court erred in valuing the land
 according to its "wholesale" rather than "retail" value.  This argument is
 based on the testimony of plaintiffs' appraiser who reported three values
 for the property, depending on its development state.  The first value,
 $1,609,000, reflected the state of the property at the time of condemnation
 -- that is, as raw land, permitted for development, and sold as one parcel.
 The second value, $1,974,000, reflected his estimate of the net value of the
 land if the infrastructure, such as roads and sewer, were in place but the
 property was still sold as one parcel.  The third value, $2,572,000,
 reflected his estimate of the net value of the land if the infrastructure
 were in place and it was sold by plaintiffs as building lots over a five-
 year period.  The State's appraisers evaluated the property as raw land,
 permitted for development, and sold as one parcel.  The court also consid-
 ered the property as raw land, and adopted a value between that asserted by
 the State's appraiser, and the first value presented by plaintiffs'
 appraiser.  Plaintiffs argue that the court should have considered the
 property as if the infrastructure had been developed.
      An owner whose property is taken by condemnation is entitled to the
 "value for the most reasonable use of the property," along with compensation
 for business loss and the reduced value of any remaining property.  19
 V.S.A. { 501(2).  The value referred to is fair market value when the land
 is taken at its highest and best use.  Appeal of Condemnation Award to 89-2
 Realty, 152 Vt. 426, 429, 566 A.2d 979, ___ (1989).  The parties agree here
 that the highest and best use of plaintiffs' land is as a housing develop-
 ment.
      Although our published cases do not address the specific issue
 plaintiffs raise, our decision in Children's Home Inc. v. State Highway Bd.,
 125 Vt. 93,