Case Title: State v. Stietz

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2014AP002701-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2017-06-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
2017 WI 58 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP2701-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Robert Joseph Stietz, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 369 Wis. 2d 222, 880 N.W.2d 182 
(2016 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 13, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 15, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Lafayette 
 
JUDGE: 
James R. Beer 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
R.G. BRADLEY, J. concurs, joined by ROGGENSACK, 
C.J. (except part II) and KELLY, J. 
 
DISSENTED: 
ZIEGLER, J. dissents, joined by GABLEMAN, J. 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: A.W. BRADLEY, J. did not participate. 
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief filed by and 
an oral argument by Sarah Lynn Shaeffer, assistant attorney 
general, with whom on the brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney 
general. 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Charles W. Giesen and Jessica J. Giesen and Giesen Law 
Offices, S. C., Madison, and oral argument by Charles W. Giesen. 
 
 
 
 
 
2017 WI 58
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2014AP2701-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2012CF93) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Robert Joseph Stietz, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 13, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.1   This is a review of an 
unpublished per curiam decision of the court of appeals 
                                                 
1 Four justices——Justice Rebecca Bradley, Chief Justice 
Patience D. Roggensack and Justice Daniel Kelly (both of whom 
join Justice Rebecca Bradley's concurrence), and I——join this 
opinion holding that the decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and that the circuit court erred in failing to instruct 
the jury regarding self-defense.  Justice Daniel Kelly joins 
this opinion to the extent that it is not inconsistent with 
Justice Rebecca Bradley's concurrence. 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP2701-CR   
 
2 
 
affirming the judgment of conviction by the circuit court for 
Lafayette County, James R. Beer, Judge.2  The criminal charges 
arose out of a confrontation between the defendant and two 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources conservation wardens, 
Joseph Frost and Nick Webster. 
¶2 
Following a three-day trial, a jury convicted Robert 
Stietz, the defendant, of resisting a law enforcement officer, 
                                                                                                                                                             
With regard to the trespass issue, Justice Rebecca G. 
Bradley's concurrence is joined by Chief Justice Patience D. 
Roggensack except for Section II and is joined by Justice Daniel 
Kelly in full.  The concurrence would on remand "require the 
circuit court to instruct the jury on trespass" but does "not 
decide whether the language in Stietz's proposed trespass 
instruction was appropriate."  This aspect of Justice Rebecca G. 
Bradley's concurrence has not garnered a majority of the 
justices participating in the instant case. 
Justice Annette K. Ziegler is joined by Justice Michael J. 
Gableman in dissent.   
Justice Ann Walsh Bradley did not participate. 
2 State v. Stietz, No. 2014AP2701-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2016). 
No. 
2014AP2701-CR   
 
3 
 
Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1) (2013-14),3 and intentionally pointing a 
firearm at an officer, § 941.20(1m)(b).4   
¶3 
On 
appeal, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
rejected 
the 
defendant's argument that his constitutional right to present a 
defense was denied by the circuit court's refusal to instruct 
the jury on self-defense.  The court of appeals affirmed the 
judgment of conviction.   
¶4 
The dispositive issue presented is whether the circuit 
court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on self-defense 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
4 The jury found the defendant guilty of two of the 
following six offenses charged: (1) first-degree recklessly 
endangering safety (Wis. Stat. § 941.30(1)); (2) resisting or 
obstructing an officer (Warden Frost), use of a dangerous weapon 
(Wis. Stat. §§ 946.41, 939.63(1)); (3) resisting or obstructing 
an officer (Warden Webster), use of a dangerous weapon (Wis. 
Stat. §§ 946.41, 939.63(1)); (4) negligent handling of a weapon 
(Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1); (5) intentionally pointing a firearm at 
a 
law-enforcement 
officer 
(Warden 
Frost) 
(Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 941.20(1m)(b); (6) intentionally pointing a firearm at a law-
enforcement 
officer 
(Warden 
Webster) 
(Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 941.20(1m)(b)). 
The defendant filed a postconviction motion that was 
denied. 
The defendant's sentence included one year of initial 
confinement and three years of extended supervision on the 
felony and a consecutive two-year probation term on the 
misdemeanor.  The defendant had served the confinement portion 
of his sentence by the time his brief was filed in this court, 
but he remained subject to extended supervision, probation, and 
loss of civil rights. 
No. 
2014AP2701-CR   
 
4 
 
as the defendant requested.5  The dispute in the instant case 
regarding the self-defense instruction centers on whether the 
defense of self-defense is supported by sufficient evidence. 
State v. Head, 2002 WI 99, 
¶113, 255 Wis. 2d 194, 648 
N.W.2d 413. 
¶5 
On viewing the record in the light most favorable to 
the defendant, as we must,6  we conclude, contrary to the State's 
position, that there was adequate evidence supporting a self-
defense instruction in the instant case and that the circuit 
court erred in refusing the defendant's request for the 
instruction.  
¶6 
The evidence was sufficient in the instant case 
because a reasonable fact-finder could have determined that the 
defendant reasonably believed that the two men who accosted him 
                                                 
5 We need not and do not address the following issues that 
the parties addressed:   
Did the law enforcement officers violate the defendant's 
Second 
Amendment 
rights 
when 
they 
forcibly 
disarmed 
the 
defendant of his loaded rifle? 
Did the defendant have the right to argue and instruct the 
jury that the law enforcement officers who encountered the 
defendant on his uncle's property were trespassers? 
Did the court of appeals contradict State v. Hobson, 218 
Wis. 2d 350, 577 N.W.2d 825 (1998), by foreclosing a self-
defense claim against the wardens, whom the defendant did not 
know were officers and who were not claiming to arrest the 
defendant but were trying to disarm him? 
6 State v. Head, 2002 WI 99, ¶¶9, 113, 255 Wis. 2d 194, 648 
N.W.2d 413.   
No. 
2014AP2701-CR   
 
5 
 
with weapons on his land and on land upon which he had an 
easement were not wardens with the Wisconsin Department of 
Natural Resources; that the defendant reasonably believed that 
the two men were trespassers hunting illegally; that because the 
two men forcibly wrested his rifle from him and then drew their 
handguns on him, the defendant reasonably believed that the two 
men were unlawfully interfering with his person; that the two 
men pointing handguns at the defendant caused him to fear for 
his life; and that the defendant pointed his handgun at the two 
men believing he had to defend himself.7  In sum, the jury could 
conclude that the defendant threatened to use force as he 
reasonably believed necessary to prevent or terminate the 
interference with his person.   
¶7 
Because we conclude that there was sufficient evidence 
to support the privilege of self-defense, we conclude that the 
circuit court erred in failing to instruct the jury on self-
defense as requested by the defendant.  We further conclude that 
the circuit court's error affected the defendant's substantial 
rights; it was not harmless error.   
¶8 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and the judgment of conviction.  We remand the cause to 
the circuit court for a new trial.    
                                                 
7 Intentionally pointing a firearm toward or at another 
threatens use of force.  State v. Watkins, 2002 WI 101, ¶56, 255 
Wis. 2d 265, 647 N.W.2d 244. 
No. 
2014AP2701-CR   
 
6 
 
¶9 
We begin with a discussion of the statutory defense of 
self-defense and the standard of review.  We then examine the 
record.  We determine that there was sufficient evidence to 
support a jury instruction on self-defense and that the circuit 
court erred in refusing to give the instruction.  Lastly, we 
assess the error and conclude that the circuit court's error in 
refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense affected the 
defendant's substantial rights.   
I 
¶10 The defendant raised an affirmative defense of self-
defense.  The privilege of self-defense is set forth in Wis. 
Stat. § 939.48(1) as follows:  
A person is privileged to threaten or intentionally 
use 
force 
against 
another 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
preventing or terminating what the person reasonably 
believes to be an unlawful interference with his or 
her person by such other person. The actor may 
intentionally use only such force or threat thereof as 
the actor reasonably believes is necessary to prevent 
or terminate the interference. The actor may not 
intentionally use force which is intended or likely to 
cause death or great bodily harm unless the actor 
reasonably believes that such force is necessary to 
prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself 
or herself.  (Emphasis added.) 
No. 
2014AP2701-CR   
 
7 
 
¶11 The pattern jury instruction for self-defense, Wis JI—
—Criminal 800,8 instructs the jury on the elements of self-
defense as follows (footnotes omitted):   
Self-Defense 
Self-defense is an issue in this case.  The law of 
self-defense allows the defendant to threaten or 
intentionally use force against another only if:  
• the defendant believed that there was an actual or 
imminent unlawful interference with the defendant's 
person; and, 
• the defendant believed that the amount of force the 
defendant used or threatened to use was necessary to 
prevent or terminate the interference; and 
• the defendant's beliefs were reasonable. 
Determining Whether Beliefs Were Reasonable 
A belief may be reasonable even though mistaken.9 In 
determining 
whether 
the 
defendant's 
beliefs 
were 
reasonable, the standard is what a person of ordinary 
intelligence and prudence would have believed in the 
defendant's position under the circumstances that 
existed at the time of the alleged offense.  The 
reasonableness of the defendant's beliefs must be 
determined from the standpoint of the defendant at the 
time of the defendant's acts and not from the 
viewpoint of the jury now.     
                                                 
8 The 
defendant 
also 
requested 
Wis 
JI——Criminal 
810, 
relating to whether the defendant had to retreat, and also 
proposed adaptations of these pattern instructions.  We need not 
consider those formulations because we conclude that the record 
supports 
the 
defendant's 
request 
for 
this 
pattern 
jury 
instruction.  
9 See 
Maichle 
v. 
Jonovic, 
69 
Wis. 2d 622, 
628, 
230 
N.W.2d 789 (1975) ("The reasonableness of the actor's beliefs, 
moreover, is not defeated by a subsequent determination that his 
beliefs were mistaken.").  
No. 
2014AP2701-CR   
 
8 
 
¶12 A circuit court has broad discretion in deciding 
whether to give a requested jury instruction.  State v. Coleman, 
206 Wis. 2d 199, 212, 556 N.W.2d 701 (1996).10  The circuit court 
must, however, exercise its discretion in order "to fully and 
fairly inform the jury of the rules of law applicable to the 
case and to assist the jury in making a reasonable analysis of 
the evidence." State v. Vick, 104 Wis. 2d 678, 690, 312 
N.W.2d 489 (1981) (quoting State v. Dix, 86 Wis. 2d 474, 486, 
273 N.W.2d 250 (1979)). 
¶13 A 
court 
must 
determine 
whether 
a 
reasonable 
construction of the evidence will support the defendant's theory 
"viewed in the most favorable light it will 'reasonably admit 
from the standpoint of the accused.'"  Head, 255 Wis. 2d 194, 
¶113 (quoting State v. Mendoza, 80 Wis. 2d 122, 153, 258 
N.W.2d 260 (1977) (quoting Ross v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 160, 172, 
211 N.W.2d 827 (1973))).       
¶14 Whether there are sufficient facts to warrant the 
circuit court's instructing the jury on self-defense is a 
question of law that this court decides independently of the 
circuit court and court of appeals, but benefiting from their 
                                                 
10 "[A] criminal defendant is entitled to a jury instruction 
on a theory of defense if: (1) the defense relates to a legal 
theory of a defense, as opposed to an interpretation of 
evidence; (2) the request is timely made; (3) the defense is not 
adequately covered by other instructions; and (4) the defense is 
supported by sufficient evidence."  State v. Coleman, 206 
Wis. 2d 199, 212-13, 556 N.W.2d 701 (1996) (internal citations 
omitted); Johnson v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 22, 28-29, 270 N.W.2d 153 
(1978). 
No. 
2014AP2701-CR   
 
9 
 
analyses.  Head, 255 Wis. 2d 194, ¶44 (citing State v. Mayhall, 
195 Wis. 2d 53, 57, 535 N.W.2d 473 (1995)); State v. Sartin, 200 
Wis. 2d 47, 53, 546 N.W.2d 449 (1996); State v. Chew, 2014 WI 
App 116, ¶7, 358 Wis. 2d 368, 856 N.W.2d 541.   
¶15 A jury must be instructed on self-defense when a 
reasonable jury could find that a prudent person in the position 
of the defendant under the circumstances existing at the time of 
the incident could believe that he was exercising the privilege 
of self-defense.  A circuit court may deny a requested self-
defense instruction when no reasonable basis exists for the 
defendant's 
belief 
that 
another 
person 
was 
unlawfully 
interfering with his person and that the defendant used or 
threatened the use of such force as he reasonably believed 
necessary to prevent or terminate the interference.  Head, 255 
Wis. 2d 194, ¶¶112-113.   
¶16 Wisconsin law establishes a "low bar" that the accused 
must surmount to be entitled to a jury instruction on the 
privilege of self-defense.  State  v. Schmidt, 2012 WI App 113, 
¶12, 344 Wis. 2d 336, 824 N.W.2d 839.  The accused need produce 
only "some evidence" in support of the privilege of self-
defense.  Head, 255 Wis. 2d 194, ¶112; State v. Peters, 2002 WI 
App 
243, 
¶¶21-23, 
27-29, 
nn.4-5, 
258 
Wis. 2d 148, 
653 
N.W.2d 300.11   
                                                 
11 The evidence may be facts presented by the defense or the 
State or through cross-examination.  Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d at 
214.  
No. 
2014AP2701-CR   
 
10 
 
¶17 Evidence satisfies the "some evidence" quantum of 
evidence even if it is "weak, insufficient, inconsistent, or of 
doubtful credibility" or "slight."12  
¶18 Crucial to applying the "some evidence" standard is 
that a court is not to weigh the evidence.  State v. Mendoza, 80 
Wis. 2d 122, 152, 258 N.W.2d 260 (1977).  A court does not "look 
to the totality of the evidence," as that "would require the 
court to weigh the evidence——accepting one version of facts, 
rejecting another——and thus invade the province of the jury." 
Mendoza, 80 Wis. 2d at 153; Ross v. State, 61 Wis. 2d 160, 172-
73, 211 N.W.2d 827 (1973) ("This test does not call for a 
weighing of the evidence by the trial judge.").13  Rather, "the 
question of reasonableness of a person's actions and beliefs, 
when a claim of self-defense is asserted, is a question 
peculiarly within the province of the jury."  Maichle v. 
                                                 
12 State v. Schuman, 226 Wis. 2d 398, 404, 595 N.W.2d 86 
(Ct. App. 1999) (citing United States v. Sotelo-Murillo, 887 
F.2d 176, 178 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Kessee, 992 F.2d 
1001, 1003 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
13 State v. Peters, 2002 WI App 243, ¶27 n.4, 258 
Wis. 2d 148, 653 N.W.2d 300 ("The 'some' evidence standard is a 
relatively low threshold, in part because of the distinct 
functions of judge and jury."); Walter Dickey, David Schultz & 
James Fullin, Jr., The Importance of Clarity in the Law of 
Homicide:  The Wisconsin Revision, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 1323, 1347 
(The "some" evidence standard is a relatively low threshold, in 
part, because of the distinct functions of judge and jury——
evaluating the weight and credibility of the evidence is 
traditionally a task reserved to the jury.).  
No. 
2014AP2701-CR   
 
11 
 
Jonovic, 69 Wis. 2d 622, 630, 230 N.W.2d 789 (1975) (citing 
Higgins v. Minagham, 76 Wis. 298, 45 N.W. 127 (1890)).14 
¶19 In the instant case, if "some evidence" were offered 
at trial that the defendant reasonably believed that another 
person was unlawfully interfering with his person and that he 
used or threatened to use such force as he reasonably believed 
necessary to prevent or terminate the interference, "then it is 
for the jury, not for the [circuit] court or this court, to 
determine whether to believe [the accused's] version of events."  
Mendoza, 80 Wis. 2d at 153.    
¶20 With the low "some evidence" quantum of evidence 
standard in mind, we turn to the record to determine whether 
there was sufficient evidence to support an instruction to the 
jury on self-defense.   
¶21 The State argues that the defendant's testimony was 
incredible on its face and that, as a matter of law, the 
evidence was insufficient to warrant a self-defense instruction, 
and that any claim of self-defense was so discredited that no 
reasonable jury would believe the defendant.15 
                                                 
14 See also State v. Jones, 147 Wis. 2d 806, 816, 434 
N.W.2d 380 (1989) (citing State v. Mendoza, 80 Wis. 2d 123, 156, 
258 N.W.2d 260 (1977)). 
15 "If perfect self-defense is placed in issue by the trial 
evidence, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
one of the defendant's beliefs was not reasonable."  Head, 255 
Wis. 2d 194, ¶70.   
No. 
2014AP2701-CR   
 
12 
 
¶22 We focus on the encounter from the defendant's 
perspective.  We view the record favorably to the defendant, as 
the case law requires, to assess whether a reasonable jury could 
find that a person in the position of the defendant under the 
circumstances existing at the time of the incident could 
reasonably believe that he was exercising the privilege of self-
defense. 
¶23 We do not present the defendant's one-sided picture of 
the events as representing the entire story.  The defendant's 
testimony was not always consistent and it was contradicted.  We 
conclude, however, that the defendant's version of the events, 
sometimes supported on specific points by the two wardens, 
provided an adequate factual basis supporting the defendant's 
explanation that he was exercising his right to defend himself.  
The jury was not obliged to believe the defendant, but they 
could have believed him.  Following is the evidence from the 
defendant's perspective.    
II 
¶24 The defendant was a 64-year-old farmer at the time of 
the incident in question.  He owned a parcel of land in 
Lafayette County on which he pastured cattle, hunted, and 
gathered morel mushrooms.  The land consists of grassy, open 
areas, including pasture areas; rolling hills; and some wooded 
areas.      
¶25 The defendant's parcel of land is surrounded by land 
owned by the defendant's uncle.  The defendant had the benefit 
No. 
2014AP2701-CR   
 
13 
 
of an easement (right-of-way) for ingress and egress over the 
uncle's land to Highway 81.   
¶26 A fence separates the defendant's land from his 
uncle's land on all sides, interrupted only by a metal, swinging 
"cattle gate."  The gate marks the point where the easement, 
recognizable as a two-track, dirt-road-like path, connects the 
defendant's land to Highway 81.  The fence keeps trespassers out 
and cattle in.   
¶27 The 
uncle 
testified 
that 
he 
and 
the 
defendant 
generally stayed off of each other's land.  Occasionally, the 
defendant and his uncle would enter each other's land to check 
the fence line.     
¶28 The defendant testified that, over the years, he has 
had problems with trespassers.  Many would hunt illegally, and 
some would vandalize his property.  He posted "no trespassing" 
signs and asked the Lafayette County Sheriff for help with 
trespassers on numerous occasions.  During deer season——when he 
often had the worst trespassing problems——the defendant would 
check his land for trespassers.  He would be armed when he went 
on the land, because he knew that anyone hunting illegally would 
likely be armed.       
¶29 On the afternoon in question, Sunday, November 25, 
2012, the last day of gun deer season, the defendant patrolled 
his property for trespassers and walked his fence line to make 
sure that it had no holes.  Now that gun deer season was over, 
he planned to pasture a longhorn cow.  Because the defendant was 
not going to hunt and would not have to haul a deer carcass 
No. 
2014AP2701-CR   
 
14 
 
home, he drove his wife's Chevrolet sedan.  He parked the sedan 
in a field near the gate to his land.   
¶30 The defendant carried his rifle in a safe position16 
with the safety on and kept a handgun in his coat pocket as he 
always did.  Although the handgun held six rounds, he kept only 
five rounds in it because the gun did not have a safety; he did 
not like to leave a round in the cylinder that could be 
accidentally discharged.   
¶31 The defendant wore a camouflage coat and hat.  He did 
not wear any blaze orange (as most hunters would) because he was 
not hunting and was on his own private property.17 
¶32 Wisconsin 
Department 
of 
Natural 
Resources 
(DNR) 
Wardens Frost and Webster were out on patrol on the afternoon in 
question.  They were looking for hunters who were trying to nab 
an eleventh-hour deer after the gun deer season ended at 4:45 
p.m. (20 minutes after the 4:25 p.m. sunset).     
¶33 They drove on the surface roads, using binoculars to 
find hunters.  They saw no one and heard no signs of hunting.  
At around 4:58 p.m., the two wardens noticed a car (the 
defendant's wife's Chevrolet sedan) parked in a field along a 
                                                 
16 The defendant described this safe position as holding the 
rifle in front of his body, with one hand on the foregrip of the 
rifle, and the other somewhere around the stock.  Neither of his 
hands was on the trigger.  The muzzle was pointed up.   
17 The defendant did have a blaze orange vest stuffed into a 
coat pocket, which, he testified, remained in his pocket from 
weeks before.  This vest was the "sliver" of blaze orange that 
the wardens testified they saw on the defendant.   
No. 
2014AP2701-CR   
 
15 
 
fence line about a quarter-mile from the highway.  The two 
wardens drove their DNR pickup truck across the field and up to 
the sedan.  As one of them peered into the sedan, he observed 
what he concluded were signs of hunting: an empty gun case, a 
bottle of "Buck Lure" (a scent-killer spray), and a camouflaged 
tree seat.  The other warden checked the vehicle's registration 
and found that the sedan was registered to Robert Stietz, the 
defendant, and his wife, Susan Stietz.  
¶34 Apparently concluding that whoever owned this sedan 
was hunting after the gun deer season ended, the two wardens 
decided to look around.  Before leaving their DNR pickup truck, 
both 
wardens 
donned 
their 
blaze-orange, 
department-issued 
jackets.  Like their uniforms, their blaze-orange jackets bore 
DNR insignia.  The DNR patch insignia on the shoulder of each 
arm of the jacket were not, however, as conspicuous as the DNR 
insignia on their uniforms.  Each warden also had a DNR badge on 
his jacket and a hat bearing a DNR insignia patch.  Although 
neither warden had a rifle, as most deer hunters do, each 
carried a handgun and a long flashlight.   
¶35 The two wardens headed north and came upon a partially 
open cattle gate.  They walked through the open cattle gate, 
entered the defendant's fenced-in parcel, and followed a path in 
the grass worn down by cattle's hooves.   
¶36 The defendant testified that as he was walking on his 
uncle's land checking the fence line, he saw blaze orange in the 
woods.  He headed toward the cattle gate to enter his land and 
identify these blaze-orange-clad figures.  He testified:  "I 
No. 
2014AP2701-CR   
 
16 
 
encountered 
two 
people 
in 
orange 
that 
was 
on 
my 
property . . . and I didn't know who they were."  He stated:  "I 
wondered who was trespassing.  This is my thought, I was 
wondering who was trespassing in my land that I did not know."     
¶37 The 
two 
wardens 
testified 
that 
they 
heard 
the 
defendant before they saw him.  As they were walking on the 
cattle path, they heard a stick snap behind them, turned around, 
and saw the defendant walk a few steps, stop and look around, 
and then continue walking.    
¶38 It was "nearly completely dark," according to Warden 
Webster, when the three men crossed paths.  As the two wardens 
approached the defendant from a distance of about 20 or 30 
yards, flashlights were shined at the defendant.   
¶39 The defendant explained that he did not see the DNR 
insignia or badges on the men's attire as the men approached.  
The defendant testified that he did not notice the DNR insignia 
on their jacket sleeves because he was "wondering who was 
trespassing in [sic] my land" and "trying to study their 
face[s]."  The blaze-orange jackets signified hunters to the 
defendant and the darkness reduced the chance that the defendant 
would identify the two men as wardens by their uniforms. 
¶40 According to the defendant, neither man clearly 
identified himself as a game warden as they approached him, 
leading the defendant to suspect that the two were trespassers 
hunting illegally on his land.  The men did nothing to correct 
the defendant's misunderstanding of their identity.  Although he 
testified that he heard one of the men mumble something about 
No. 
2014AP2701-CR   
 
17 
 
"warden," and the other mumbled something about "Green County," 
the defendant said he thought the men were asking if he was or 
had seen a warden.     
¶41 The 
defendant's 
belief 
that 
the 
two 
men 
were 
trespassing 
hunters 
was 
bolstered 
by 
the 
defendant's 
interpretation of their words and conduct.  The two men inquired 
into how many deer the defendant had seen that day and whether 
he was hunting.  The defendant told the men he had seen seven 
doe but that he was not hunting.         
¶42 The defendant testified that when he told the two men 
that he was looking for trespassers and was not hunting, one of 
the men "threw up his arms" and appeared "riled" by this 
statement.  The defendant testified that this response was 
prompted because "I believe they took it for that they was [sic] 
trespassing and that will be my feeling."       
¶43 The defendant also testified that the two men appeared 
to be circling him early on in the encounter as he attempted to 
back away from them by ducking back through the gate and heading 
towards his car to drive home.   
¶44 One of them, Warden Webster, asked the defendant 
whether his rifle was loaded.  The defendant said yes.  The 
other man, Warden Frost, twice asked for the rifle.  The 
defendant said no both times.  The two men began to make the 
defendant fear for his life.  According to the defendant, "That 
is when they proceeded——I felt like I was being attacked right 
at that time."   
No. 
2014AP2701-CR   
 
18 
 
¶45 Warden Frost initiated physical contact with the 
defendant, grabbing the defendant by the front of his garment 
while reaching for the rifle. 
¶46 The other man, Warden Webster, entered the fray.  The 
men grappled over the rifle, pointing the barrel every which 
way.  The rifle was wrested from the defendant.  Warden Frost 
ended up on his back on the ground.  He held the rifle 
momentarily, considering whether to use it.  He cast it aside 
when he could not figure out how to turn the safety off.  This 
tussle ended when the defendant no longer had the rifle. 
¶47 The defendant then saw Warden Webster fumbling to pull 
a handgun from a holster on his hip.  At trial, all three men 
agreed that Warden Webster was the first to pull his handgun and 
that he pointed it at the defendant.  Warden Frost then drew his 
handgun and pointed it at the defendant.  The defendant reached 
for his own handgun because, as he testified, he thought "my 
God, he's going to shoot."  The three men agreed that Warden 
Frost 
and 
the 
defendant 
drew 
their 
handguns 
about 
"simultaneously."  The defendant stated to the two men that he 
had a right to protect himself.  There they were, three men with 
handguns trained on each other.  
¶48 The defendant testified he did not know the two men 
were wardens at this point; he just knew he was scared and 
feared for his life:  
I felt like I was being attacked right at that time. 
. . . . 
No. 
2014AP2701-CR   
 
19 
 
[A]ll of a sudden I seen the pistol coming up.  And I 
figured, my God, he’s going to shoot. 
. . . . 
I was scared, darn scared. 
. . . . 
At that very instant I had the pistol in my right 
pocket 
and 
I 
drew 
my 
pistol 
at 
the 
very——
simultaneously.  I said, I have the right to protect 
myself which I am doing at this time. 
. . . . 
[S]omeone else pulled their pistol out and I was 
fearful for my life so I drew mine so I would not get 
shot. 
¶49 The two wardens and the defendant testified that the 
defendant told the men that he was exercising his right to 
defend himself:  "I have the right to protect myself which I am 
doing at this time."  And the defendant told the two men, 
repeatedly, that he would lower his handgun when they lowered 
theirs because one of them, Warden Webster, drew first.     
¶50 While pointing his gun at the defendant with one hand, 
Warden Webster used his other hand to activate his collar 
microphone and call Lafayette County dispatch for assistance.  
The defendant testified that even when he heard this call being 
made, he still "really didn't know positive for sure [that they 
were officers] . . . because I never seen no credentials."     
¶51 The defendant testified he was relieved when the call 
for help was made.  He began to realize, for the first time, 
that the two men were wardens and that assistance in the form of 
sheriff's deputies would soon arrive.  The defendant then backed 
No. 
2014AP2701-CR   
 
20 
 
a few feet away from the two men, moving nearer to the gate.  He 
assumed this position and waited for the backup to arrive.  
¶52 The defendant continued to point his handgun at the 
men after they called for backup.  He stated he did so only 
because the two refused to lower their handguns first.   
¶53 The defendant refused to lower his handgun because he 
felt unsafe, even after realizing that the two men were wardens.  
It was dark out, and the three of them were in an unpopulated 
rural area.  The two men, who had earlier attacked him without 
provocation, held their handguns pointed at the defendant's 
face.  The defendant, by contrast, held his gun in one hand near 
his side and was leaning against a fence post.   
¶54 The defendant saw a squad car's emergency lights 
flashing.  After the first deputy sheriffs arrived, the two 
wardens backed away from the defendant with their handguns still 
drawn.  They retreated to the squad car along with the deputy 
sheriff.       
¶55 A lengthy standoff ensued.  As more deputies arrived, 
they spoke to the defendant to persuade him to disarm.  The 
defendant explained that after the deputies assured him that he 
would not be "gang tackled," he lowered his gun to his side, 
emptied the cartridges onto the ground, and dropped the gun to 
the ground.   
¶56 The defendant peaceably surrendered.  He walked to the 
squad car where he was arrested.   
¶57 No one was hurt.  No weapons were ever fired by 
anyone.  All three men acknowledged that the defendant never 
No. 
2014AP2701-CR   
 
21 
 
threatened to shoot the two men; he never raised his voice 
during the encounter; he never used any profanity; he did not 
try to prevent the two men from calling for help and backup; and 
he did not try to prevent or discourage the retreat of the two 
men to the squad car.    
¶58 Insofar as the instruction on self-defense hinged on 
the defendant's credibility, credibility is a question to be 
resolved by the jury, not the circuit court, the court of 
appeals, or this court.  State v. Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d 198, 213-
14, 556 N.W.2d 701 (1996).  A court does not weigh the 
testimony.  The court focuses, instead, on whether there is 
"some evidence" supporting the defendant's self-defense theory.   
¶59 The evidence that the defendant was in fear for his 
life and believed he was exercising the threat of reasonable 
force went beyond the minimal quantum of "some evidence" 
necessary 
to 
establish 
the 
defendant's 
right 
to 
a 
jury 
instruction on self-defense.  
¶60 We conclude that an adequate basis exists in the 
record to support a self-defense instruction and to allow the 
defense of self-defense to be argued to and considered by the 
jury.  A reasonable jury could find that a person in the 
position of the defendant under the circumstances existing at 
the time of the incident could reasonably believe that the two 
men were unlawfully interfering with his person and that he was 
threatening reasonable force in the exercise of his privilege of 
self-defense.  Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court 
erred in refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense.    
No. 
2014AP2701-CR   
 
22 
 
III 
¶61 Because we conclude that the circuit court erroneously 
refused to instruct the jury on self-defense, we next consider 
whether 
the 
error 
affected 
the 
defendant's 
"substantial 
rights."18  Wis. Stat. § 805.18(2).19  This statute codifies 
Wisconsin's harmless error rule.20  
¶62 The harmless error inquiry raises a question of law 
that this court decides.  State v. Magett, 2014 WI 67, ¶29, 355 
Wis. 2d 617, 850 N.W.2d 42.       
¶63 A defendant's substantial rights remain unaffected 
(that is, the error is harmless) if it is clear beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have come to the 
                                                 
18 Peters, 258 Wis. 2d 148, ¶29. 
19 The harmless error rule set forth for civil actions 
applies to criminal proceedings via Wis. Stat. § 972.11.  State 
v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶39, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189.   
Wisconsin Stat. § 805.18(2) provides: 
 No judgment shall be reversed or set aside or new 
trial granted in any action or proceeding on the 
ground of selection or misdirection of the jury, or 
the improper admission of evidence, or for error as to 
any matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the 
opinion of the court to which the application is made, 
after 
an 
examination 
of 
the 
entire 
action 
or 
proceeding, it shall appear that the error complained 
of has affected the substantial rights of the party 
seeking to reverse or set aside the judgment, or to 
secure a new trial. (Emphasis added.)   
20 State v. Sherman, 2008 WI App 57, ¶8, 310 Wis. 2d 248, 
750 N.W.2d 500 (citing Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶39 (footnote 
omitted)). 
No. 
2014AP2701-CR   
 
23 
 
same conclusion absent the error or if it is clear beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute 
to the verdict obtained.21       
¶64 The jury's acquittal of the defendant on four of the 
six charges (including the most serious felony count) in part 
depended on the defendant's testimony that at times conflicted 
with that of the wardens.  The acquittals suggest that the jury 
believed all or some of the defendant's testimony and, if given 
the self-defense instruction, might have acquitted the defendant 
on one or both of the two charges upon which they convicted the 
defendant. 
¶65 We therefore conclude that the circuit court's error 
in refusing to give the jury a self-defense instruction was not 
harmless error.  It is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
rational jury would not have come to the same conclusion absent 
the error; it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
complained of contributed to the guilty verdict.     
¶66 Because self-defense could have absolved the defendant 
of one or both of his convictions, the circuit court's refusal 
to give the self-defense instruction affected the defendant's 
substantial rights.  The error was not harmless.       
* * * * 
                                                 
21 State v. Magett, 2014 WI 67, ¶29, 355 Wis. 2d 617, 850 
N.W.2d 42; Nader v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15, 18 (1999); 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Harvey, 254 
Wis. 2d 442, ¶46 (citing Nader, 527 U.S. at 18). 
No. 
2014AP2701-CR   
 
24 
 
¶67 In sum, after viewing the record in the light most 
favorable to the defendant, as we must, we conclude that there 
was sufficient evidence supporting a self-defense instruction in 
the instant case.  Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit 
court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on self-defense.   
¶68 A reasonable fact-finder could determine that the 
defendant reasonably believed that the two men who accosted him 
with weapons on his land and on land upon which he had an 
easement were not wardens with the Wisconsin Department of 
Natural Resources; that the defendant reasonably thought that 
the two men were trespassers hunting illegally; that because the 
two men forcibly wrested his rifle from him and then drew their 
handguns on him, the defendant reasonably believed that the two 
men were unlawfully interfering with his person; that the two 
men pointing handguns at the defendant caused him to fear for 
his life; and that the defendant pointed his handgun at the two 
men believing he had to defend himself.  In sum, the jury could 
conclude that the defendant threatened to used force as he 
reasonably believed necessary to prevent or terminate the 
interference with his person. 
¶69 We further conclude that the circuit court's error 
affected the defendant's substantial rights; it was not harmless 
error.   
¶70 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and the judgment of the circuit court.  We remand the 
cause to the circuit court for a new trial. 
No. 
2014AP2701-CR   
 
25 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded. 
¶71 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., did not participate. 
 
 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶72 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I agree 
with 
the 
majority 
opinion's 
analysis 
supporting 
Stietz's 
entitlement to the self-defense jury instruction and join the 
opinion.  I write separately because the circuit court also 
erred when it refused to allow Stietz to present a defense based 
on evidence that the DNR wardens were trespassers on private 
property, and I disagree with the majority's assertion that 
"[w]e need not" address this issue.  Majority op., ¶4 n.5.  I 
also write to reaffirm that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the 
government from seizing a person on private property——including 
open fields——absent consent, a warrant, probable cause and 
exigent circumstances, or another lawful basis for interfering 
with a person's right to be free from governmental intrusion. 
I 
¶73 The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant 
the right to present a defense.  See Chambers v. Mississippi, 
410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973).1  "[A] fundamental element of due 
process of law," the right to present a defense includes "the 
right to present the defendant's version of the facts . . . to 
the jury so it may decide where the truth lies."  Washington v. 
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967); see also State v. Dodson, 219 
Wis. 2d 65, ¶¶35-36, 580 N.W.2d 181 (1998).  "Whether an 
evidentiary ruling infringes upon a criminal defendant's right 
to present a defense is a question of constitutional fact for 
                                                 
1 There are some limits on the right to present a defense 
that are not relevant here.  See State v. St. George, 2002 WI 
50, ¶15, 252 Wis. 2d 499, 643 N.W.2d 777. 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.rgb 
 
2 
 
independent review."  State v. Ward, 2011 WI App 151, ¶15, 337 
Wis. 2d 655, 807 N.W.2d 23 (quoted source omitted).  The 
majority opinion sets forth the proper standard of review as to 
whether the circuit court erred when it refused to give the 
requested jury instructions, and therefore I will not repeat it 
here.  See majority op., ¶¶12-14 & n.10.  Stietz wanted to 
testify he thought the DNR wardens were trespassers, and sought 
to make that argument to the jury, but the circuit court limited 
his testimony on trespassing,2 refused to allow his attorney's 
argument, and denied his request for the jury to be instructed 
on the law of trespass.  The circuit court erred.  These errors, 
together 
with 
the 
self-defense 
error, 
violated 
Stietz's 
constitutional right to present a defense. 
¶74 A brief examination of the facts puts the trespass 
issue into context.  Stietz had problems with trespassers in the 
past and lodged numerous trespassing complaints with the local 
sheriff's department.  One trespasser broke windows on a trailer 
Stietz kept on the land.  At the time Stietz encountered the 
wardens, he was checking for trespassers on his private, fenced 
land marked by conspicuous "no trespassing" signs; he was also 
inspecting the integrity of his fence because he intended to 
                                                 
2 The State filed a motion in limine asking the circuit 
court to prohibit any testimony referring to the wardens as 
trespassers.  The circuit court ruled:  "[Stietz] can say that 
he was patrolling for trespassers, but he can't say that the 
wardens were trespassing."  When Stietz testified "I encountered 
two trespassers on my property," the circuit court ordered the 
statement "stricken from the record" and instructed the jury to 
"dismiss it from your minds entirely and not consider it in your 
deliberations at all, as though it was never said." 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.rgb 
 
3 
 
pasture a longhorn cow there the following day.  The sun had set 
and it was fairly dark as 64-year-old Stietz walked his 
property——alone.  He had not invited anyone onto his private 
property and was not expecting any visitors.  This property, 
located approximately half a mile from the public road, was 
surrounded by other private property, part of which belonged to 
Stietz's uncle.  There was no formal or permanent walkway or 
driveway inviting visitors onto the private land. 
¶75 DNR Wardens Frost and Weber entered Stietz's private 
land shortly after hunting hours ended on November 25, 2012, 
while en route to a citizen complaint in another county.  While 
driving along the public road adjacent to privately-owned 
property, the wardens saw a small sedan parked on the grassy 
area of private property, about a quarter mile from the road.  
The wardens decided to circle the area, which included Stietz's 
private property, to check for hunters who might be hunting 
after hours.  During this trip, the wardens listened for any 
audible sound and used binoculars and a scope to scour the land 
for hunters.  They heard nothing and saw no one.  Nevertheless, 
the wardens decided to drive onto the private property to 
investigate the legally parked car.  There was no formal 
driveway, but a portion of the grassy field suggested a "field 
lane," which they used to reach the car.  Warden Webster ran the 
registration on the car, which belonged to Robert and Sue 
Stietz, the adjacent property owners.  Warden Frost got out and 
looked into the car's windows.  He saw an empty rifle case, some 
buck lure, and a tree seat.  The wardens decided to proceed 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.rgb 
 
4 
 
further onto the private property to look for illegal hunters.  
No attempt was made to contact the owners of the private land, 
there was no evidence of dead or diseased wild animals on the 
land, there was no audible noise suggesting illegal hunting or 
suspicious activity, and there was no evidence that a crime had 
been or was about to be committed. 
¶76 While checking the fence, Stietz saw two strangers 
clad in orange about 20 to 30 yards away, walking on his 
property.  When the two men approached Stietz, they turned a 
flashlight toward him and asked him to give them his rifle.  
Stietz——an armed services veteran, a citizen with no criminal 
record, and a hunter without violations in the past 50 years——
refused to turn his weapon over to two men he did not know who 
appeared uninvited on his private land.  At that point, Warden 
Webster physically grabbed Stietz, and the two wardens forcibly 
wrested the shotgun away from him.3  After the seizure, all three 
men drew their handguns, resulting in the standoff that formed 
the basis for the charges in this case. 
¶77 Stietz, who testified on his own behalf, wanted to 
tell the jurors that he believed the two men were trespassers, 
and the circuit court erred in barring this part of Stietz's 
testimony.  "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as 
otherwise provided by the constitutions of the United States and 
                                                 
3 Stietz says Warden Webster grabbed his shirt before the 
wardens grabbed his rifle.  Both wardens deny grabbing Stietz.  
For the purpose of this court's review, however, we view the 
facts in the light most favorable to Stietz.  See State v. Head, 
2002 WI 99, ¶9, 255 Wis. 2d 194, 648 N.W.2d 413. 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.rgb 
 
5 
 
the state of Wisconsin, by statute, by these rules, or by other 
rules adopted by the supreme court."  Wis. Stat. § 904.02.  A 
defendant has a fundamental right to testify and give, in his 
own words, his version of what happened.  See State v. Nelson, 
2014 WI 70, ¶19, 355 Wis. 2d 722, 849 N.W.2d 317.  Stietz's 
testimony giving his version of events was relevant and should 
have been admitted.  Excluding the trespass testimony prevented 
Stietz from fully presenting his defense. 
¶78  Stietz's attorney also sought to argue the wardens 
were in fact trespassers, and requested a trespass jury 
instruction, but the circuit court refused both requests.  It 
concluded the wardens were not trespassing.  The law, however, 
does not support the circuit court's decisions and instead 
confirms Stietz's argument that the wardens were trespassing. 
¶79 Wisconsin Stat. § 943.13 prohibits any person from 
entering the land of another without express or implied consent 
of the owner or occupant.  The wardens did not have consent from 
Stietz or his uncle.  Wisconsin Stat. § 29.924(5) allows DNR 
wardens to enter private lands for the purpose of "retriev[ing] 
or diagnos[ing] dead or diseased wild animals and tak[ing] 
actions reasonably necessary to prevent the spread of contagious 
disease in the wild animals," and wardens may enter the property 
only "after making reasonable efforts to notify the owner or 
occupant."  The wardens made no effort at all to notify Stietz 
or his uncle before entering the private land, and there were no 
dead or diseased wild animals in need of retrieval or diagnosis. 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.rgb 
 
6 
 
¶80 Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 23.58(1), 
which 
authorizes 
DNR 
wardens to conduct a Terry4 stop, provides that "an enforcing 
officer," "having identified himself or herself as an enforcing 
officer," "may stop a person in a public place for a reasonable 
period of time when the officer reasonably suspects that such 
person is committing, is about to commit or has committed a 
violation" of any applicable laws or rules.  (Emphasis added.)  
The wardens here were not in a public place and, even if Terry 
permitted investigatory stops on private property, the wardens 
did not have reasonable suspicion that Stietz was breaking the 
law when they drove onto private property to investigate.  
Reasonable suspicion exists when a law enforcement officer 
possesses "specific and articulable facts that warrant a 
reasonable belief that criminal activity is afoot."  State v. 
Young, 2006 WI 98, ¶21, 294 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 729.  The DNR 
equivalent would require a reasonable belief that a hunting 
violation is afoot.  A car legally parked on private property 
does not, alone, create reasonable suspicion of a hunting 
violation.  A mere "hunch" that the car means someone is hunting 
illegally is also insufficient.  See id. 
¶81 Wisconsin Stat. § 23.59 authorizes a search for 
weapons during a § 23.58 Terry stop if there is a reasonable 
suspicion of danger to the warden or another person.  But, once 
again, these statutes apply only to a stop in a public place, 
not a stop on private property.  Wisconsin's codification of the 
                                                 
4 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.rgb 
 
7 
 
Terry stop in Wis. Stat. § 968.24 also specifies that a stop 
under this statute must occur in a public place.  See State v. 
Stout, 2002 WI App 41, ¶15, 250 Wis. 2d 768, 641 N.W.2d 474 
(holding that police may confront citizens only in public 
places; private places require a warrant or "probable cause and 
exigent circumstances or consent").  Stietz's 25-acre parcel of 
fenced and posted land was not a public place. 
¶82 At oral argument in this case, the State could not 
identify any law authorizing the wardens to be on Stietz's land. 
There is none.  The State asserted only that the "open fields" 
doctrine justified the wardens' intrusion on private property, 
reasoning that the doctrine made Stietz's secluded, remote land 
a "public place" on which the wardens were privileged to 
traverse.  The State is wrong.  The open fields doctrine does 
not transform private fields into public places that anyone is 
free to enter uninvited or without reason.  Nor does it convert 
the act of trespassing into a lawful intrusion.  See Oliver v. 
United 
States, 
466 
U.S. 
170, 
183 
(1984) 
("The 
law 
of 
trespass . . . forbids intrusions upon land that the Fourth 
Amendment would not proscribe.")  Rather, the open fields 
doctrine only prevents suppression of evidence gathered by law 
enforcement officers who enter an open field without a warrant.  
The open fields doctrine does not sanction the seizure of a 
person, nor does it create the requisite constitutional basis 
for seizing a person acting lawfully simply because the person 
is standing in an open field.  Significantly, the open fields 
cases arose after law enforcement officers observed evidence of 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.rgb 
 
8 
 
suspected illegal activity conducted upon the land either 
directly or indirectly, through an informant or tipster.  See 
id. at 173-77 (police investigating a tip of marijuana farm saw 
illegal plants in field; suppression not required); Hester v. 
United States, 265 U.S. 57, 57 (1924) (police investigating a 
tip of illegal activity chased suspects who ran when police 
arrived; suppression of evidence tossed in open field not 
required); State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶¶9, 10, 12, 32, 37, 
43, 231 Wis. 2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552 (evidence admissible where 
informant reports marijuana plants, police see plants in open 
area beyond curtilage that is not fenced in or posted "no 
trespassing," police take a leaf to test, and police later 
obtain warrant). 
¶83 The DNR wardens did not receive a tip or make a direct 
observation that Stietz was engaged in illegal activity on his 
property.  When the wardens observed the property before 
entering, they saw no evidence of illegal activity.  Warden 
Frost testified that they drove completely around the area 
surrounding Stietz's private property and used binoculars to 
look for hunters, but they "didn't see any evidence that anybody 
was out in the field at the time."  Importantly, Stietz is not 
seeking to suppress evidence taken from his property to be used 
against him in a criminal prosecution.  The open fields 
exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement was not 
intended to eliminate property owners' rights by sanctioning 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.rgb 
 
9 
 
entry onto open land at any time for any reason, or no reason at 
all.5 
¶84 The State's bald assertion in its brief that "wardens 
do not need reasonable suspicion to believe that a crime has 
been committed before they enter private land" is erroneous.  
The State has not cited and I cannot locate any authority 
permitting DNR wardens to traverse privately owned lands without 
any legal justification.  As already noted, the reasonable 
suspicion standard applies to public places, not an individual's 
remote, secluded, fenced, and posted private land.  Even if we 
                                                 
5 Multiple states reject the open fields doctrine with 
respect to fenced, posted, or otherwise closed off private 
lands, recognizing an expectation of privacy on the part of 
landowners, particularly for land with "no trespassing" signs.  
See State v. Dixson, 766 P.2d 1015, 1024 (Or. 1988) ("[I]f land 
is fenced, posted or otherwise closed off, one does not enter it 
without permission or, in the officers' situation, permission or 
a warrant."); People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1335-37 (N.Y. 
1992) ("A constitutional rule which permits State agents to 
invade private lands for no reason at all——without permission 
and in outright disregard of the owner's efforts to maintain 
privacy by fencing or posting signs——is one that we cannot 
accept as adequately preserving fundamental rights of New York 
citizens. . . .  [T]he unbridled license given to agents of the 
State to roam at will without permission on private property in 
search of incriminating evidence is repugnant to the most basic 
notions of fairness in our criminal law."); State v. Johnson, 
879 P.2d 984, 993 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) ("[P]olice should not be 
empowered to invade land closed to the public . . . .'" (quoted 
source omitted)); State v. Bullock, 901 P.2d 61, 75-76 (Mont. 
1995) ("[A] person may have an expectation of privacy in an area 
of land that is beyond the curtilage . . . , and . . . where 
that expectation is evidenced by fencing, 'No Trespassing,' or 
similar signs, or 'by some other means [which] indicate[s] 
unmistakably that entry is not permitted,'. . . entry by law 
enforcement 
officers 
requires 
permission 
or 
a 
warrant." 
(citation and quoted source omitted; second and third brackets 
in original)). 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.rgb 
 
10 
 
applied the reasonable suspicion standard to private land, the 
only information the DNR wardens possessed before intruding onto 
private property was a legally parked car.  This falls far short 
of satisfying the reasonable suspicion standard. 
¶85 The State also asserts that Stietz lacks standing to 
invoke trespass as a defense because the physical confrontation 
with the wardens occurred on his easement just outside his 
private property.  Stietz has not sued the wardens for trespass; 
rather, he argues, in defense of his actions, that he did not 
know these two men were wardens but believed them to be 
trespassers on private property where Stietz was lawfully 
present (unlike the wardens).  Whether the wardens confronted 
and seized Stietz on the easement instead of Stietz's private 
property does not change the fact that the wardens seized Stietz 
on private property rather than in a public place, absent 
consent, a warrant, probable cause, exigent circumstances, or 
any other lawful basis to intrude. 
¶86 The 
circuit 
court's 
ruling 
on 
self-defense 
and 
trespass denied Stietz the right to tell the jury his version of 
events and therefore substantially impaired his right to present 
a defense.  It appears the circuit court's reason for refusing 
to instruct the jury on trespass arose from the court's mistaken 
belief that the wardens had authority to be on the private land 
and therefore could not be trespassers.  The circuit court 
erred.  Based on this record, there was no legal basis for the 
wardens to be on Stietz's (or his uncle's) private property.  By 
entering it merely on a hunch, the wardens exceeded their 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.rgb 
 
11 
 
authority under the law and should be treated as trespassers:  
"[W]here an authority given by law is exceeded, the officer 
loses the benefit of his justification, and the law holds him a 
trespasser ab initio although to a certain extent he acted under 
the authority given."  Wallner v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of 
Maryland, 253 Wis. 66, 70, 33 N.W.2d 215 (1948).  Stietz had the 
right to present evidence and to argue that these two men——who 
exceeded their lawful authority by entering private land 
uninvited, demanding he relinquish his rifle, grabbing him, and 
forcibly wresting the rifle out of his hands——were trespassers. 
¶87 The standard for giving a jury instruction requires 
that the circuit court instruct the jury on an issue raised by 
the evidence.  See State v. Kramar, 149 Wis. 2d 767, 792, 440 
N.W.2d 317 (1989).  The evidence presented at trial supports the 
conclusion that the wardens were trespassers.  By prohibiting 
Stietz's counsel from arguing trespass and refusing to instruct 
the jury on trespass law, the circuit court prevented Stietz 
from presenting a full defense to the jury on the two counts of 
which the jury convicted Stietz. 
¶88 Count 3 required the State to prove that the wardens 
were acting with lawful authority.  See Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1). 
Part of Stietz's defense to Count 3 was that because the wardens 
were trespassers, they acted without lawful authority.  Count 6 
required the State to prove that the wardens were law 
enforcement officers acting in an official capacity and whom 
Stietz had reason to believe were law enforcement officers.  See 
Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1m)(b).  Setting aside Stietz's claim that 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.rgb 
 
12 
 
the legislature did not include "conservation wardens" in those 
listed as "law enforcement officers" for the purposes of this 
section (which if correct could provide an independent basis for 
reversal), part of Stietz's defense to Count 6 was that he 
believed the wardens were trespassers, not law enforcement 
officers.  Whether the wardens were in fact trespassing is 
relevant to the reasonableness of Stietz's belief that these two 
men were trespassers rather than wardens. 
¶89 It is the jury's role to resolve factual disputes and 
credibility issues.  See State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 
506-07, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990).  This case was full of factual 
disputes, which the jury evidently resolved in Stietz's favor by 
acquitting him on four of the six counts.  Indeed, the majority 
correctly concludes that a reasonable jury could find that "the 
defendant reasonably thought that the two men were trespassers 
hunting illegally."  See majority op. ¶68.  The circuit court 
should have allowed the jury to consider trespass.  The trespass 
evidence and argument are also pertinent to the self-defense 
theory Stietz attempted to present.  By limiting Stietz's 
testimony on trespass, precluding Stietz's attorney from arguing 
that the wardens were trespassing, and refusing to instruct the 
jury on trespass law, the circuit court erroneously prevented 
Stietz's attorney from fully presenting his defense. 
¶90 The majority opinion properly analyzes the self-
defense error.  By not addressing trespass, however, it paves 
the way for the circuit court on remand to again violate 
Stietz's right to present his defense, which includes both self-
No.  2014AP2701-CR.rgb 
 
13 
 
defense and trespass.  I would direct the circuit court to honor 
Stietz's fundamental constitutional right by allowing his 
testimony and argument that the wardens were trespassers who 
therefore acted without lawful authority and requiring the 
circuit court to instruct the jury on trespass.6 
II 
¶91 The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures," U.S. 
Const. amend. IV. 
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully 
guarded, by the common law than the right of every 
individual to the possession and control of his own 
person, free from all restraint or interference of 
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority 
of law.  
Terry, 392 U.S. at 9 (quoting Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 
U.S. 250, 251 (1891).  "[W]henever a police officer accosts an 
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 
'seized' that person."  Terry, 392 U.S. at 16.  There is no 
authority under the law permitting DNR wardens to wander private 
property in search of unknown violations of the law.  Absent 
legal authority, a DNR warden may not enter private property to 
confront and seize an unsuspecting, law-abiding citizen who has 
fenced in his property and posted "no trespassing" signs. 
                                                 
6 I do not decide whether the language in Stietz's proposed 
trespass instruction was appropriate; rather, I hold the 
evidence supported instructing the jury on trespass. 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.rgb 
 
14 
 
¶92 The open fields doctrine "affords no protection to 
evidence either on or in the ground" outside of houses and 
curtilage.  Conrad v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 616, 624-25, 218 N.W.2d 
252 (1974) (emphasis added).  Even though "the government's 
intrusion upon the open fields is not one of those 'unreasonable 
searches' proscribed by the text of the Fourth Amendment," see 
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177 (emphasis added), the Fourth Amendment 
certainly protects a person from unreasonable seizures on an 
open field.  The open fields exception to Fourth Amendment 
protection has never been applied solely to a seizure of a 
person lawfully present on private property, without contraband.  
To the contrary, "[w]here a person is, there also is the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment."  Conrad, 63 Wis. 2d at 628.   
"[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."  United 
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (quoting Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).  Fifty years ago, the 
Supreme Court recognized that "[w]herever a man may be, he is 
entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures," Katz, 389 U.S. at 359, acknowledging 
that Fourth Amendment protections extend beyond property to 
"safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against 
arbitrary invasions by governmental officials," Berger v. New 
York, 388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967) (quoting Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 
U.S. 523, 528 (1967)). 
¶93 "The 
touchstone 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
is 
reasonableness."  Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) 
(citation omitted).  "To determine the constitutionality of a 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.rgb 
 
15 
 
seizure '[w]e must balance the nature and quality of the 
intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against 
the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify 
the intrusion.'"  Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) 
(quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983) 
(brackets in original)).  The wardens in this case overlooked 
Stietz's right to be secure in his person under the Fourth 
Amendment by forcefully disarming him and seizing him and his 
lawfully possessed rifle with no lawful basis for doing so.  The 
governmental interest in policing hunting violations cannot 
justify such an intrusion against an individual.  These actions, 
which led to the standoff and the charges against Stietz, are 
swept under the rug and forgotten.  But, had the wardens not 
trespassed and had they not forcibly wrested away Stietz's 
rifle, the standoff——leading to six charges——would not have 
occurred at all. 
¶94 The people of Wisconsin entrust DNR wardens to protect 
the state's many natural resources, including public forests and 
land.  In order to enable wardens to fulfill their duties, the 
people of Wisconsin confer powers on them.  These powers are not 
boundless; they are circumscribed both constitutionally and 
statutorily and do not include free reign to trespass on private 
lands at will.  The wardens in this case unlawfully entered 
private land, demanded a legally possessed rifle without 
explanation, and seized Stietz and his rifle when he did not 
comply.  Whether in an open field or on a public street, the 
people retain their Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.rgb 
 
16 
 
"arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials 
with [their] privacy and personal security."  United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976). 
III 
¶95 Stietz has a fundamental constitutional right to 
present a defense grounded in the law governing self-defense and 
trespass.  The circuit court erroneously prevented Stietz from 
presenting his full defense to the jury, and he is entitled to a 
new trial.  The actions precipitating the standoff in this case 
implicate the right of the people to be free——particularly on 
their 
own 
private 
property——of 
unreasonable 
searches 
and 
seizures under the Fourth Amendment.  The Constitution prevents 
DNR wardens from entering fenced and posted private property, 
and from seizing law-abiding people, unless there is a legal 
basis for doing so.  Here, there was none, which makes the 
circuit 
court's 
decisions 
on 
self-defense 
and 
trespass 
erroneous. 
¶96 For these reasons, I respectfully concur. 
¶97 I am authorized to state that Justice DANIEL KELLY 
joins this concurrence, and that Chief Justice PATIENCE DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK joins this concurrence, except as to Part II. 
 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶98 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (dissenting).  "It's 
amazing in the circumstances we aren't sitting here over an 
inquest 
rather 
[than] 
these 
charges, 
because 
in 
most 
jurisdictions that I know of with Mr. Stietz pulling a gun on 
[an] officer, he would have been shot. He is very, very 
fortunate that [the officer] didn't shoot him."  So remarked the 
circuit court below, in a case that arose after the defendant, 
Robert Joseph Stietz ("Stietz"): (1) refused to surrender his 
rifle to two Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") wardens 
lawfully investigating potential hunting violations; (2) drew a 
handgun on the wardens after being disarmed of the rifle against 
his will; and (3) failed to surrender the handgun for over half 
an hour despite repeated requests for compliance. 
¶99 Arguments have been made that Stietz is not to blame 
for the escalation of his interaction with the wardens into an 
armed standoff.  But a jury considered those arguments, and 
rendered a thoughtful verdict: it concluded that Stietz should 
not be convicted for offenses pertaining to the initial struggle 
over the rifle, but that Stietz's subsequent decision to hold 
two wardens at gunpoint——despite Stietz's own admission that he 
knew the wardens were law enforcement officers by that time——was 
a bridge too far.  With regard to Stietz's actions toward one of 
the two wardens, the jury found Stietz guilty of resisting an 
officer, use of a dangerous weapon, in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 946.41(1), 
with 
the 
penalty 
enhanced 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.63(1)(a), and guilty of intentionally pointing a firearm 
at a law enforcement officer, in violation of Wis. Stat. 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
§ 941.20(1m)(b).  With regard to Stietz's actions toward the 
other warden, the jury found Stietz not guilty of resisting an 
officer, use of a dangerous weapon, and not guilty of 
intentionally pointing a firearm at a law enforcement officer.  
The jury also found Stietz not guilty of first degree recklessly 
endangering safety, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 941.30(1), and 
not guilty of negligent handling of a weapon, in violation of 
§ 941.20(1)(a).   
¶100 What is the likely reason for the jury to conclude 
that Stietz was guilty of some offenses and not guilty of the 
others?  The jury, considering all of the factors that this 
court relies upon, concluded that Stietz was not endowed with 
the authority to continue to point a firearm at law enforcement 
under these circumstances.  This conclusion is not only 
supportable, it is wise.  Imagine the unfortunate consequences 
that might ensue if anytime someone does not believe that law 
enforcement has the authority to be somewhere or the authority 
to act, citizens could take the law into their own hands and 
escalate a situation by pointing a firearm at the officers. 
Right or wrong in belief, it is not difficult to understand the 
unfortunate outcomes that would take place. 
¶101 Stietz now appeals, arguing principally that the 
circuit court erred in declining to instruct the jury that 
Stietz might have been acting in self-defense and that the 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
wardens might have been trespassing.1  This is not a self-defense 
case.  The circuit court was not incorrect.  Moreover, the 
jury's verdict demonstrates that it found his reaction to law 
enforcement somewhat excusable with respect to the initial 
contact.  The jury, however, found that the continued exhibition 
of force was not.  In other words, the crimes for which he was 
convicted do not support a self-defense instruction. 
¶102 I dissent because I conclude that the circuit court 
did not err in declining to instruct the jury on the issues of 
self-defense and trespass.  First, Stietz's claim that he was 
acting in self-defense was "so thoroughly discredited" by the 
close of evidence "that no reasonable jury could conclude that 
the state had not disproved it," State v. Head, 2002 WI 99, 
¶115, 255 Wis. 2d 194, 648 N.W.2d 413; consequently, he was not 
entitled to the corresponding instruction and the circuit court 
properly exercised its discretion in declining to so instruct 
the jury.   
¶103 Second, even if the circuit court had erred in 
neglecting to instruct the jury on self-defense, that error was 
harmless.  As will be explained in detail below, in order to 
                                                 
1 Stietz contends that the circuit court additionally erred 
in barring him from arguing that the wardens were trespassers.  
The reasoning set forth in my discussion of the circuit court's 
decision on the trespass jury instruction disposes of this 
issue, so I will not otherwise address it. Further, given my 
analysis, I need not address the State's argument that because 
some of the property at issue in this case was owned by Stietz's 
neighbor, Stietz lacks standing to assert that the wardens were 
trespassing.  For purposes of this writing, I will refer to 
property at issue as Stietz's property. 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
have convicted Stietz of resisting an officer, use of a 
dangerous weapon, and intentionally pointing a firearm at a law 
enforcement officer, the jury had to have found as elements of 
those crimes that Stietz knew or had reason to know that Warden 
Webster was a law enforcement officer.  In other words, the jury 
plainly would have rejected Stietz's claims that he had no idea 
the wardens were law enforcement officers and was acting in 
self-defense. 
¶104 Third, Stietz had no independent legal right to 
forcibly resist the wardens simply because he thought the 
wardens lacked legal authority to seize or disarm him.  Stietz 
is badly mistaken in suggesting that the law authorizes citizens 
to attack law enforcement officers whenever those officers may 
have made a mistake of fact or law.  Law enforcement officers 
have entered houses, much less open fields, by accident; that 
does not authorize lethal resistance.  If Stietz thought that 
law enforcement was in error, his recourse was the judicial 
system, not physical assault.  To hold otherwise is not only 
incorrect as a legal matter; it would also disincentivize law 
enforcement officers from doing their job.  Most relevant to 
this case, for example, the work of DNR wardens is critical to 
ensuring the protection of Wisconsin wildlife and the safety of 
Wisconsin hunters.2   
¶105 Finally, 
with 
respect 
to 
trespass, 
the 
wardens 
possessed both statutory authority to enter Stietz's property 
                                                 
2 Stietz also briefly makes a Second Amendment claim.  As I 
will discuss, I would reject that claim as undeveloped. 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
and reasonable suspicion that hunting violations were in 
progress.  The circuit court did not err in declining to 
instruct the jury regarding the law of trespass. 
¶106 This case is not about property rights, the right to 
keep and bear arms, or the right to hunt.  In no way should this 
dissent be read to diminish those very important rights.  These 
rights are cherished by the citizens of Wisconsin in a special 
way, see, e.g., Wis. Const. art. I, § 26 ("The people have the 
right to fish, hunt, trap, and take game subject only to 
reasonable restrictions as prescribed by law."), and this court 
is of course bound to uphold and protect them.  Instead, this 
case is about an individual, Stietz, who put his own life and 
the life of two DNR wardens at risk rather than peacefully 
submit to a lawful request for his weapon.   
¶107 This 
case 
was 
fully 
litigated 
below, 
and——not 
surprisingly given the evidence——the jury found Stietz guilty of 
resisting 
an 
officer, 
use 
of 
a 
dangerous 
weapon, 
and 
intentionally pointing a firearm at a law enforcement officer.  
I do not quarrel with the jury's determination to find Stietz 
not guilty of one of the counts of resisting an officer, use of 
a dangerous weapon, one of the counts of intentionally pointing 
a firearm at a law enforcement officer, first degree recklessly 
endangering 
safety, 
and 
negligent 
handling 
of 
a 
weapon.  
However, when this case goes back for another trial, the entire 
case will not be retried, rather only the crimes for which 
Stietz was found guilty.  The jury already placed its 
determination on the entire nucleus of fact and concluded that 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
he was not guilty of resisting an officer, use of a dangerous 
weapon, with regard to one of the wardens, not guilty of 
intentionally pointing a firearm at a law enforcement officer 
with regard to the same warden, not guilty of first degree 
recklessly endangering safety, and not guilty of the negligent 
handling of a weapon.   
¶108 At the same time, the jury concluded that Stietz was 
guilty of resisting an officer, use of a dangerous weapon, and 
intentionally pointing a firearm at a law enforcement officer 
with regard to the second warden.  Regrettably, while this court 
is required to give deference to the jury determination, it 
instead upsets that jury determination even though the jury's 
conclusions are supported by sufficient evidence in the record.  
See, e.g., State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 507, 451 
N.W.2d 752 (1990) ("[I]n reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support a conviction, an appellate court may not 
substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact unless the 
evidence, viewed most favorably to the state and the conviction, 
is so lacking in probative value and force that no trier of 
fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.").  Because I would affirm the court of 
appeals (the trial court and the sound conclusions reached by 
the jury upon the facts and the law), I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶109 I begin by setting forth the facts of this case as 
established by the testimony of Warden Frost, Warden Webster, 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
7 
 
and Stietz at Stietz's jury trial.  As will be shown, this case 
hinges in large part on the testimony presented to the jury.3   
¶110 Warden Joseph Frost ("Warden Frost") testified that on 
November 25, 2012, at about 4:30 p.m., he and Warden Nicholas 
Webster ("Warden Webster") were on duty in a patrol truck on a 
highway near Lamont, Wisconsin.  Warden Frost "observed a 
vehicle north of the highway parked along the fence line"; in 
his view it was "not typical for vehicles to be parked in the 
field," though "typically during deer season that's where people 
would park if they're out hunting."  Warden Frost consequently 
thought the vehicle might belong to someone hunting deer, 
whereas Warden Webster thought the vehicle might have been 
abandoned.  It was the last day of deer season, and hunting 
hours ended at 4:45 p.m.  The wardens "decided [they would] just 
check around that section of land by driving the roads to see if 
[they] could see anybody out hunting."  The wardens did not see 
anything of note, however, and eventually made their way to the 
vehicle they had spotted. 
¶111 At 
about 
4:58 
p.m., 
Warden 
Webster 
ran 
the 
registration of the vehicle while Warden Frost "checked to see 
if there was any evidence of hunting in the vehicle and 
to . . . see if it was an abandoned vehicle or not."  Warden 
Frost saw an empty gun case on the front seat, scent killer 
spray, and a camouflaged seat that could be used on a tree 
                                                 
3 Proof that the court is stretching to reach an outcome is 
the court's incomplete and misleading presentation of the facts. 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
8 
 
stand.  Warden Webster learned that the vehicle was registered 
to Robert and Susan Stietz. 
¶112 The wardens "decided that [they] would go in and see 
if [they] could locate the hunter."  The wardens were wearing 
"blaze orange" jackets and hats.  The jackets had identification 
badges or patches on them, as did the hats.  Further, the 
wardens did not carry long guns; Warden Frost testified that 
that is "usually a give away as to us not being hunters."  The 
wardens followed the fence line until they came to an open gate 
and then headed through the gate.  Eventually they saw a "box 
blind up on an elevated box stand" and began heading toward it.  
Shortly thereafter the wardens came upon Stietz, who was dressed 
in full camouflage and carrying a "long gun."  Stietz "would 
take a few steps and stop, look around, take a few steps, stop 
and look around."  It was dark and Stietz "didn't seem to 
acknowledge [the wardens] were there."  Warden Frost "turned on 
[his] flashlight and shined it at [Stietz] and announced, 
'conservation 
warden.'" 
 
Warden 
Webster 
made 
the 
same 
announcement.  The parties continued approaching each other and 
Warden Frost saw what looked like a handgun in Stietz's pocket.  
Warden Frost told Warden Webster about the handgun.  Warden 
Webster testified that "red flags were starting to go off, 
starting to not seem right," because Stietz had "in his face a 
kind of agitation, aggression" and because Stietz "went from 
holding his gun off to the side and then turned his gun facing 
straight on as [Warden Webster] was approaching him." 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
9 
 
¶113 Warden Webster was the first to make contact, and 
asked Stietz if he had seen any deer.  Stietz responded that he 
had "seen seven doe."  According to Warden Frost, Warden Webster 
then asked Stietz "if the rifle he was carrying was loaded," and 
Stietz affirmed that it was.  Warden Frost "asked [Stietz] if 
[Warden Frost] could see the firearm," and Stietz refused.4   
¶114 Warden Frost "changed the topic" and asked if Stietz 
had any blaze orange with him.  Stietz "indicated towards" his 
pocket, and Warden Frost "could see just a sliver of a piece of 
orange clothing in there."  Warden Frost testified that "[t]he 
fact that [Stietz was] carrying orange in his pocket, based on 
my training and experience, would lead me to believe he was 
actually out hunting."  At some point during the parties' 
interaction, Stietz explained that he had not been hunting, but 
was instead looking for trespassers.  Warden Frost again asked 
Stietz if he "could see the firearm."  Warden Frost testified 
that there were two reasons he asked to see the weapon:  
One, [Stietz] is dressed in camouflage, it's after 
hours, he said his firearm is loaded, which I guess 
gave me reason to believe he was potentially hunting 
after hours, hunting without blaze orange.  And then 
when he responded he wouldn't allow us to see the 
firearm.  I guess, at that point there is a concern 
for, I guess, our safety that I guess something could 
happen if he continues to have the firearm. 
Warden Webster additionally explained that "[w]hen [the wardens] 
are working and enforcing hunting laws, depending on what's 
                                                 
4 Warden 
Webster's 
testimony 
differs 
to 
some 
extent 
regarding the order of the questions asked and the identity of 
the questioner.  These variations will not be discussed. 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
10 
 
being 
hunted, 
ammunition 
type, 
firearms 
type, 
amount 
of 
ammunition, are also parts that are regulated in hunting." 
¶115 When he made his second request to obtain Stietz's 
weapon, Warden Frost simultaneously "stepped forward and reached 
[his] hand towards the firearm."  Stietz hit Warden Frost in the 
stomach with the butt of the rifle.  Warden Frost then grabbed 
the rifle and "drove [his] body forward towards [Stietz]."  
While Stietz and Warden Frost grappled for control of the 
weapon, Warden Webster "yelled out that . . . the barrel was 
pointed at him."  Warden Webster grabbed the muzzle of the gun 
and "pulled it as hard as [he] could in the direction that 
[Warden] Frost was pulling it," yelling "drop the gun."  Warden 
Frost ultimately "ended up with the firearm in [his] hands, 
laying on [his] back." 
¶116 Disarmed of the rifle, Stietz began drawing his 
handgun.  As he was doing so, Warden Webster yelled "don't do 
it."  Warden Webster drew his handgun on Stietz before Stietz 
had fully drawn his handgun.  Warden Frost also drew his 
handgun, having thrown the rifle "to the side."  Stietz "swung 
[his handgun] by Warden Frost's direction," but then pointed it 
towards Warden Webster.  "[T]he hammer was cocked with his right 
thumb by the hammer, his trigger finger would have been inside 
the trigger guard basically on the trigger."  The wardens 
ordered Stietz to lower his weapon, but Stietz refused.  Warden 
Webster "radioed to the Sheriff's Department" at 5:07 p.m.  The 
wardens repeatedly attempted to get Stietz to drop his weapon, 
but he would not do so.  At various times during the standoff 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
11 
 
Stietz commented, among other things, that he knew his rights, 
that he was defending himself and his property, and that he 
would lower his weapon if the wardens lowered their weapons.  At 
other times Stietz would not respond to the wardens at all. 
¶117 At 5:17 p.m., Deputy Brett Broge ("Deputy Broge") 
arrived in his "squad."  The wardens retreated to the squad car.   
At that time Stietz had his handgun pointed "towards the squad."  
Warden Frost left the parties, returned to Warden Webster's 
squad, turned on its emergency lights, removed his blaze orange, 
and obtained a rifle and shotgun from the vehicle.  By the time 
Warden Frost made contact with the parties again, Stietz had 
lowered his handgun but would not put it down.  Other members of 
law enforcement arrived but Stietz "still basically wouldn't 
comply."  Finally, about "40 to 50 minutes" "from the 
time . . . [the wardens] were initially there until it was all 
over," Stietz put his weapon down and was placed in handcuffs.5 
¶118 Stietz testified that on the date in question he had 
not been hunting but was instead "checking for trespassers," a 
recurring issue for Stietz.6  That evening Stietz "encountered 
two people in orange" on his property and he "didn't know who 
they were."  While Stietz saw the individuals' "faces and their 
orange clothing," he denied seeing their patches or badges.  
                                                 
5 Deputy Broge testified that Stietz lowered his weapon at 
about 5:20 p.m. and that Stietz put his weapon on the ground at 
about 6:00 p.m. 
6 According to Stietz, the orange vest in his pocket had 
been placed there days before.   
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
12 
 
According to Stietz, one of the individuals asked, "are you Bob 
Stietz?"  Stietz replied "yes, I am.  The question is, who are 
you?"  Stietz heard a response that was "kind of mumbled, but 
sounded like one was saying Green, I didn't know if it was 
County.  And the other one said——looked at him and said a 
Warden, but it was kind of mumbled, not real loud."  Next, 
Stietz was asked if he was hunting and was told that he had to 
be in orange if he was hunting deer.  Stietz informed the 
wardens that he was not hunting deer but was instead "checking 
for trespassers."  When asked if he had seen any deer, Stietz 
replied that he had seen seven of them.  
¶119 According to Stietz, when Stietz said he was checking 
for trespassers one of the wardens "got——kind of a little bit 
riled."  Additionally, one of the wardens "threw up his arms 
like this.  You've got to be in orange."  According to Stietz, 
the wardens "c[a]me around [Stietz] in like a circle."  At that 
point Stietz "was wanting to go to [his] car and . . . would 
have been heading home."  "The Wardens proceeded around 
[Stietz] . . . asking [him] questions."  One of the wardens said 
"give me your gun."  Stietz said no and took a step back.  At 
that point he "felt like [he] was being attacked" because one of 
the wardens grabbed his shirt and told the other warden to "grab 
the gun."  Stietz denied swinging the butt of the rifle into 
Warden Frost's stomach.  The three struggled for Stietz's rifle.  
Stietz "lost [his] grip" and "all of a sudden [Stietz] [saw] the 
rifle go, and . . . heard it hit the fence."  The two wardens 
"kind of lost their footing."  Stietz saw Warden Webster 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
13 
 
"reaching for his pistol" and "all of a sudden . . . [saw] the 
pistol coming up."  Stietz thought Warden Webster was going to 
shoot and drew his pistol at the same time.  Stietz said, "I 
have the right to protect myself which I am doing at this time." 
¶120 At this point in time all three individuals had their 
handguns drawn.  Stietz was asked to put his weapon down several 
times but refused, repeatedly stating that he would put his 
handgun down if the wardens put their handguns down.  Eventually 
one of the wardens called for backup.  At trial Stietz was 
asked, "[W]hen did you know for the first time that these were 
wardens?"  Stietz responded, "I really didn't know positive for 
sure, because it was kind of dark out and when we——when 
actually, I really don't know because I never seen no 
credentials or when he called for backup, that's when I knew 
really." (Emphasis added.)  Stietz testified that he was 
"scared, darn scared."  Backup arrived.  The following exchange 
occurred at trial: 
Q: You said that you were relieved when the 
Sheriffs showed up; is that right? 
A: That is correct. Relieved. 
Q: But you weren't relieved enough to put your 
gun down at that point, were you? 
A: As I stated in my testimony, when the wardens 
put their guns down, because they draw on me first, I 
would put mine down. 
. . . . 
Q: Why didn't you put it down right away once 
Deputy Broge was on site? 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
14 
 
A: As I stated before, the Wardens would not put 
theirs down, and I wouldn't put mine down until they 
put theirs down, because they drew on me first. 
Stietz eventually lowered his weapon because "when the Sheriffs 
got there, that's when I felt halfway there'd be witnesses if 
anything bad happened, there would be witnesses." 
¶121 Relevant to Stietz's testimony, Warden Webster and 
Warden Frost denied mentioning Green County in their initial 
interaction with Stietz.  Warden Webster denied grabbing 
Stietz's shirt.  Warden Frost stated that he did not see Warden 
Webster grab Stietz by the shirt and that Warden Webster had not 
yelled at him to grab Stietz's rifle.  Warden Webster and Warden 
Frost denied getting "riled" when Stietz told them that he was 
checking for trespassers, and Warden Frost denied throwing his 
arms up in the air. 
II 
¶122 On November 28, 2012, a criminal complaint was filed 
against 
Stietz 
in 
Lafayette 
County 
circuit 
court. 
 
On 
December 11, 2012, an amended complaint was filed charging 
Stietz with one count of first degree recklessly endangering 
safety, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 941.30(1), two counts of 
resisting an officer, use of a dangerous weapon, in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1), and with the penalty enhanced by Wis. 
Stat. § 939.63(1)(a), one count of negligent handling of a 
dangerous weapon, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 941.20(1)(a), and 
two counts of intentionally pointing a firearm at a law 
enforcement officer, in violation of § 941.20(1m)(b).  On 
December 18, 2012, an information was filed. 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
15 
 
¶123 On January 22, 2014, Stietz filed requested jury 
instructions in anticipation of trial.  Stietz requested, among 
other things, that the jury be instructed regarding: (1) 
Stietz's putative Second Amendment right to refuse to surrender 
his rifle to the wardens; (2) the possibility that the wardens 
were trespassing on Stietz's land; and (3) the possibility that 
Stietz was acting in self-defense. 
¶124 On February 20, 2014, the State filed a motion in 
limine requesting an order  
prohibiting the defendant from arguing any of the 
following at trial: that the DNR Wardens were armed 
trespassers; that the DNR Wardens were not authorized 
to enter his property; that the defendant had a Second 
Amendment right to resist the Wardens; any arguments 
by the defendant of self-defense of either person or 
property. 
After a hearing on February 26, 2014, the court entered the 
following order with respect to the State's motion: 
1. The Court will allow evidence (a) that Mr. 
Stietz was looking for trespassers, (b) that the 
wardens were armed, (c) of where the wardens walked 
and what they said and did, and (d) of where and how 
all relevant events occurred.  In short, the facts of 
what happened are admissible; 
2. However, counsel for Mr. Stietz may not 
characterize the wardens' conduct as trespassing, at 
least absent a further ruling by the Court; and 
3. Further, counsel for Mr. Stietz may not argue 
that the Second Amendment permitted Mr. Stietz's 
conduct, or affords a legal defense here. 
¶125 From March 11, 2014, to March 14, 2014, Stietz was 
tried before a jury.  On March 14, 2014, at the jury instruction 
conference, it was determined (based in part on prior rulings) 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
16 
 
that the jury would not receive Stietz's requested instructions 
regarding the Second Amendment, trespass, and self-defense. 
¶126 While the charges filed against Stietz and considered 
by the jury included one count of first degree recklessly 
endangering safety and one count of negligent handling of a 
dangerous weapon, Stietz was also charged with one count of 
resisting an officer, use of a dangerous weapon, with respect to 
Warden Frost, one count of resisting an officer, use of a 
dangerous weapon, with respect to Warden Webster, one count of 
intentionally pointing a firearm at a law enforcement officer 
with respect to Warden Frost, and one count of intentionally 
pointing a firearm at a law enforcement officer with respect to 
Warden Webster.  
¶127 Later that day, the jury returned its verdict. The 
jury found Stietz not guilty of first degree recklessly 
endangering safety; not guilty of resisting an officer, use of a 
dangerous weapon with respect to Warden Frost; guilty of 
resisting an officer, use of a dangerous weapon with respect to 
Warden Webster; not guilty of negligent handling of a weapon; 
not guilty of intentionally pointing a firearm at a law 
enforcement officer with respect to Warden Frost; and guilty of 
intentionally pointing a firearm at a law enforcement officer 
with respect to Warden Webster. 
¶128 On March 24, 2014, Stietz filed a motion for acquittal 
or a new trial.  On May 21, 2014, the court denied the motion. 
On May 28, 2014, the circuit court sentenced Stietz to one year 
of initial confinement and three years of extended supervision 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
17 
 
on the charge of intentionally pointing a firearm at a law 
enforcement officer.  The court withheld sentence on the 
resisting an officer, use of a dangerous weapon charge, placing 
Stietz on probation for two years consecutive to the sentence on 
the other count. A judgment of conviction was entered, and 
Stietz filed a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief 
the same day.  
¶129 On April 14, 2016, the court of appeals affirmed 
Stietz's 
judgment 
of 
conviction. 
 
State 
v. 
Stietz, 
No. 
2014AP2701-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 
2016) (per curiam).  On May 16, 2016, Stietz filed a petition 
for review in this court.  On October 11, 2016, this court 
granted the petition.   
III 
¶130 The issues raised on appeal pertain largely to whether 
the 
circuit 
court 
erred 
in 
not 
providing 
certain 
jury 
instructions requested by Stietz.   
A circuit court has broad discretion in deciding 
whether 
to 
give 
a 
requested 
jury 
instruction.  
However, a circuit court must exercise its discretion 
in order "to fully and fairly inform the jury of the 
rules of law applicable to the case and to assist the 
jury in making a reasonable analysis of the evidence." 
State v. Coleman, 206 Wis. 2d 199, 212, 556 N.W.2d 701 (1996) 
(citation omitted) (quoting State v. Vick, 104 Wis. 2d 678, 690, 
312 N.W.2d 489 (1981)).  Even if the circuit court errs, "an 
'erroneous jury instruction warrants reversal and a new trial 
only if the error was prejudicial.'"  Kochanski v. Speedway 
SuperAmerica, 
LLC, 
2014 
WI 
72, 
¶11, 
356 
Wis. 2d 1, 
850 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
18 
 
N.W.2d 160 (quoting Fischer v. Ganju, 168 Wis. 2d 834, 849, 485 
N.W.2d 10 (1992)).  Importantly, "an error relating to the 
giving or refusing to give an instruction is not prejudicial if 
it appears that the result would not be different had the error 
not occurred."  Id. (quoting Lutz v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 70 
Wis. 2d 743, 751, 235 N.W.2d 426 (1975)). 
¶131 I first address the circuit court's decision not to 
instruct the jury on self-defense.  I then address the circuit 
court's decision not to instruct the jury on trespass. 
IV 
¶132 Stietz argues that the circuit court should have 
instructed the jury that he was privileged to defend himself 
against the wardens under certain circumstances.   
¶133 The pattern jury instruction on self-defense entitled 
"Privilege: Self-Defense: Force Less Than That Likely to Cause 
Death or Great Bodily Harm——[Wis. Stat.] § 939.48" reads in part 
as follows: 
Self-defense is an issue in this case. The law of 
self-defense allows the defendant to threaten or 
intentionally use force against another only if: 
 the defendant believed that there was an actual 
or 
imminent 
unlawful 
interference 
with 
the 
defendant's person; and,  
 the defendant believed that the amount of force 
the defendant used or threatened to use was 
necessary 
to 
prevent 
or 
terminate 
the 
interference; and 
 the defendant's beliefs were reasonable. 
Determining Whether Beliefs Were Reasonable 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
19 
 
A belief may be reasonable even though mistaken.  In 
determining 
whether 
the 
defendant's 
beliefs 
were 
reasonable, the standard is what a person of ordinary 
intelligence and prudence would have believed in the 
defendant's position under the circumstances that 
existed at the time of the alleged offense. The 
reasonableness of the defendant's beliefs must be 
determined from the standpoint of the defendant at the 
time of the defendant's acts and not from the 
viewpoint of the jury now. 
Wis JI——Criminal 800 (footnotes omitted).  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 939.48(1) (the statute referenced by the instruction) itself 
states: 
A person is privileged to threaten or intentionally 
use 
force 
against 
another 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
preventing or terminating what the person reasonably 
believes to be an unlawful interference with his or 
her person by such other person. The actor may 
intentionally use only such force or threat thereof as 
the actor reasonably believes is necessary to prevent 
or terminate the interference. The actor may not 
intentionally use force which is intended or likely to 
cause death or great bodily harm unless the actor 
reasonably believes that such force is necessary to 
prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself 
or herself. 
§ 939.48(1).7 
¶134 As an initial matter, it was Stietz's burden to place 
self-defense in issue.  See Head, 255 Wis. 2d 194, ¶111.  "[I]f, 
before trial, the defendant proffers 'some' evidence to support 
her defense theory and if that evidence, viewed most favorably 
to her, would allow a jury to conclude that her theory was not 
disproved beyond a reasonable doubt, the factual basis for her 
                                                 
7 Stietz 
requested 
Wis 
JI-Criminal 
800 
as 
well 
as 
"alternative self-defense formulations."  Stietz does not 
develop arguments suggesting that any differences between these 
formulations are material for purposes of this appeal. 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
20 
 
defense theory has been satisfied."  Id., ¶115 (emphasis added).  
On the other hand: 
[T]he standard for giving a jury instruction on self-
defense may, in some circumstances, be higher than the 
standard for admitting self-defense evidence at trial, 
because a defendant's claim of self-defense may be so 
thoroughly discredited by the end of the trial that no 
reasonable jury could conclude that the state had not 
disproved it.  
Id. (first emphasis added). 
¶135 Stietz argues that he is entitled to a self-defense 
instruction because the evidence viewed in the light most 
favorable to him showed that he had been having problems with 
trespassers; that on November 25, 2012, Stietz had been looking 
for trespassers; and that Stietz in fact encountered two 
"strangers dressed in blaze orange trespassing on his land" who 
"demanded his rifle."  Stietz claims that at the time the 
wardens ordered him to disarm "it was reasonable for him to 
infer" based on the available information that the wardens were 
"illegally trespassing hunters."  Stietz adds that the strangers 
forcibly obtained his weapon and that one of the strangers 
pointed a handgun at him.  Under the circumstances, Stietz 
contends, self-defense was warranted.   
¶136 Stietz's argument fails.  Stietz's assertion of self-
defense was "so thoroughly discredited" by the close of 
evidence "that no reasonable jury could conclude that the state 
had not disproved it."  Id.  As the State explains in its brief:   
It is undisputed that both wardens were wearing their 
issued uniforms: a "blaze orange" jacket; a DNR patch 
on the shoulder of each arm of the jacket; a DNR badge 
along either the middle zipper of the jacket or the 
left chest; and a "blaze orange" hat with a DNR patch. 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
21 
 
The wardens did not carry long guns, which Warden Frost 
testified is "usually a give away as to us not being hunters."  
Further, Stietz's own testimony confirms that he heard one of 
the wardens say to him, "a Warden"; testimony self-evidently not 
negated by Stietz's contention that the statement was "kind of 
mumbled, not real loud."  The circuit court correctly stated at 
the jury instruction conference that "[u]nder the circumstances, 
if [Stietz] didn't know [that Warden Frost and Warden Webster] 
were wardens, he should have, and he didn't have a right to 
self-defense against a police officer."  See Wis JI——Criminal 
800 ("In determining whether the defendant's beliefs were 
reasonable, 
the 
standard 
is 
what 
a 
person 
of 
ordinary 
intelligence and prudence would have believed in the defendant's 
position under the circumstances that existed at the time of the 
alleged offense.").  
¶137 Nor does rejecting Stietz's claim of self-defense 
require this court or the circuit court to improperly weigh the 
evidence, as Stietz argues.  As our case law makes clear, 
viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant 
does not mean suspending one's disbelief to the point of 
absurdity.  Cf. State v. Mendoza, 80 Wis. 2d 122, 153, 258 
N.W.2d 260 
(1977) 
("Thus 
the 
question 
before 
us . . . is . . . whether 
a 
reasonable 
construction 
of 
the 
evidence will support the defendant's theory 'viewed in the most 
favorable light it will "reasonably admit of from the standpoint 
of the accused."'" (emphasis added) (quoting Ross v. State, 61 
Wis. 2d 160, 172, 211 N.W.2d 827 (1973))).  If "no reasonable 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
22 
 
jury could conclude" on the evidence presented that the State 
had failed to disprove a claim of self-defense, a jury 
instruction is not warranted.  Head, 255 Wis. 2d 194, ¶115; cf. 
Mendoza, 80 Wis. 2d at 152-53.  To take one hypothetical raised 
by the circuit court below that is not at all far off from the 
facts of this case, if a defendant is pulled over by a uniformed 
police officer at night and resists the officer, he cannot 
simply invoke the magic words of "self-defense" to obtain the 
corresponding jury instruction.  Here, the circuit court 
properly exercised its discretion in refusing to instruct the 
jury that Stietz might have been acting in self-defense, in 
light of the fact that Stietz's claim had been sufficiently 
"discredited."  Head, 255 Wis. 2d 194, ¶115.  If anything, the 
wardens seem to have been defending themselves. 
¶138 Regardless, even assuming that the circuit court 
should have instructed Stietz's jury on self-defense, such error 
was patently harmless; there is no doubt that even absent the 
error the result would have been the same.  See Kochanski, 356 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶11.  This becomes evident when one reviews the 
crimes of which Stietz was acquitted and the crimes of which 
Stietz was convicted, in light of the facts of the case. 
¶139 The interaction between the three parties is divisible 
into two parts: (1) the initial struggle between Stietz and the 
two wardens over Stietz's rifle; and (2) the prolonged standoff 
between the three during which the wardens pointed firearms at 
Stietz and Stietz pointed his firearm at Warden Webster. 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
23 
 
¶140 Stietz was acquitted of resisting Warden Frost and of 
pointing a weapon at Warden Frost but convicted of resisting 
Warden Webster and of pointing a weapon at Warden Webster.  In 
other words, this means that the jury was unwilling to assign 
guilt to Stietz regarding the initial struggle over Stietz's 
rifle, but concluded that Stietz was guilty with regard to the 
prolonged standoff.  This is hardly shocking, given that during 
this second period: (1) Stietz continued to point his handgun at 
Warden Webster even after, by his own admission, he knew that 
the two officers were wardens; and (2) Stietz refused to 
surrender his firearm for over half an hour, despite being in 
the presence of multiple additional clearly-identified law 
enforcement officers cajoling him to submit peacefully.   
¶141 Critically, in order to have convicted Stietz of 
resisting Warden Webster, use of a dangerous weapon, in 
violation of Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1), and intentionally pointing 
a firearm at Warden Webster, in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 941.20(1m)(b), the jury had to have found, as elements of the 
crimes, that Stietz knew or had reason to know that Warden 
Webster was a law enforcement officer.  More specifically, the 
elements of the crime of resisting an officer are:  
1.  The defendant resisted an officer. . . .  
2.  The officer was doing an act in an official 
capacity. . . .  
3.  The 
officer 
was 
acting 
with 
lawful 
authority. . . .  
4.  The defendant knew that (officer) was an 
officer acting in an official capacity and with lawful 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
24 
 
authority and that the defendant knew (his) (her) 
conduct would resist the officer. 
Wis JI——Criminal 1765 (emphasis added).  
¶142 The elements of the crime of intentionally pointing a 
firearm at a law enforcement officer are: 
1.  The defendant pointed a firearm at or toward 
(name of victim). . . .   
2.  The defendant pointed the firearm at or 
toward (name of victim) intentionally. . . .   
3.  (Name of victim) was a law enforcement 
officer. 
4.  (Name of victim) was acting in an official 
capacity. 
5.  The defendant knew or had reason to know that 
(name of victim) was a law enforcement officer. 
Wis JI——Criminal 1322A (emphasis added).  
¶143 Consequently, even if the jury had been instructed 
regarding self-defense, it would not have made a difference.  On 
the evidence presented, the jury rejected Stietz's claim that he 
did not know that Warden Webster was a warden and that Stietz's 
ignorance was justifiable.  The jury's verdict makes clear that 
it carefully considered the evidence before it.  Even assuming 
that omission of a self-defense jury instruction was error, this 
court should not upset that verdict for the purpose of providing 
an instruction that would not have had any effect.  
¶144 Finally, Stietz could be read to argue that, aside 
from the discussion above, he had a right to defend himself 
against the wardens because they had no legal right to seize or 
disarm him.  That is not the law.  In Hobson, for example, this 
court abrogated the common law privilege "to forcibly resist an 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
25 
 
unlawful arrest in the absence of unreasonable force."  State v. 
Hobson, 218 Wis. 2d 350, 353, 577 N.W.2d 825 (1998).  We 
"adopt[ed] the conclusion" of another state supreme court that 
had reasoned in part: 
[T]he 
legality 
of 
a 
peaceful 
arrest 
should 
be 
determined by courts of law and not through a trial by 
battle in the streets.  It is not too much to ask that 
one 
believing 
himself 
unlawfully 
arrested 
should 
submit to the office[r] and thereafter seek his legal 
remedies in court.  Such a rule helps to relieve the 
threat of physical harm to officers who in good faith 
but mistakenly perform an arrest, as well as to 
minimize harm to innocent bystanders.  
Id. at 379-80 (quoting Miller v. State, 462 P.2d 421, 427 
(1969)).  We also quoted Judge Learned Hand, who eloquently 
noted 
that 
"[t]he 
idea 
that 
you 
may 
resist 
peaceful 
arrest . . . because you are in debate about whether it is 
lawful or not, instead of going to the authorities which can 
determine [lawfulness], . . . [is] not a blow for liberty but, 
on the contrary, a blow for attempted anarchy."  Id. at 373 
(alterations in original) (quoting Discussion of Model Penal 
Code (Tentative Draft No. 8), 35 A.L.I. Proc. 222, 254 (1958)).  
And, finally, we analogized to the Supreme Court's discussion in 
Walker v. City of Birmingham, where the Court referenced a "rule 
of 
law . . . reflect[ing] 
a 
belief 
that 
in 
the 
fair 
administration of justice no man can be judge in his own case, 
however exalted his station, however righteous his motives, and 
irrespective of his race, color, politics, or religion."  Id. at 
378 (quoting Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 320-21 
(1967)).  
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
26 
 
¶145 Here, Warden Frost and Warden Webster were not even 
arresting Stietz.  As will be discussed in greater detail below, 
they were lawfully investigating potential hunting violations.  
For their own safety and for the purpose of ensuring compliance 
with applicable laws, the wardens peaceably asked or ordered 
Stietz to disarm.  Stietz should have surrendered his firearm 
rather than resist this demand, lawful or not.  When he failed 
to respond to the verbal instruction, unjustifiably intensifying 
the pressures of the situation and the wardens' concerns for 
safety, the wardens reasonably attempted to obtain the weapon 
against Stietz's will.  Once again, Stietz had no right to 
forcibly resist the actions of the wardens. 
¶146 Much as some might wish it to be so, we are no longer 
living in the Wild West.  Disputes between law enforcement 
officers and the citizens they serve are resolved in court.  No 
matter how in the right they may be, members of the general 
public have no authority to take matters into their own hands.  
Law enforcement officers make mistakes of law or fact every day.  
There are judicial remedies for such errors, such as suppression 
or even an independent lawsuit.  Stietz could have availed 
himself of such remedies rather than risking his own life and 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
27 
 
the lives of Warden Frost and Warden Webster.  His argument that 
he was entitled to forcibly resist must be rejected.8  
V 
¶147 Stietz next argues that the circuit court erred in 
declining to instruct the jury regarding the issue of whether 
the wardens might have been trespassing on Stietz's property.  
According to Stietz, the issue is relevant because if the 
wardens were trespassing, he argues, they were not acting "in an 
official capacity" and "with lawful authority," one or both of 
which are elements of the crimes of which Stietz was convicted.  
See Wis. Stat. § 946.41(1) ("Except as provided in subs. (2m) 
and (2r), whoever knowingly resists or obstructs an officer 
while such officer is doing any act in an official capacity and 
with lawful authority is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor." 
(emphasis 
added)); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 941.20(1m)(b) 
("Whoever 
intentionally points a firearm at or towards a law enforcement 
officer, a fire fighter, an emergency medical technician, a 
first responder, an ambulance driver, or a commission warden who 
                                                 
8 Stietz also asserts that the wardens' actions "violated 
Stietz' Second Amendment rights and precludes his prosecution."  
But Stietz does little more than cite the Second Amendment and 
its counterpart in the Wisconsin Constitution.  I agree with the 
State that Stietz's argument is undeveloped.  Stietz undeniably 
possesses important constitutional rights to keep and bear arms.   
But "[l]ike most rights, the right secured by the Second 
Amendment is not unlimited.  From Blackstone through the 19th-
century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that 
the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon 
whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose."  
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).  
Stietz must do more than simply cite a constitutional provision 
and wait for the court to formulate arguments on his behalf.   
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
28 
 
is acting in an official capacity and who the person knows or 
has reason to know is a law enforcement officer, a fire fighter, 
an emergency medical technician, a first responder, an ambulance 
driver, or a commission warden is guilty of a Class H felony." 
(emphasis added)). 
¶148 Stietz's argument is meritless.  It should be noted at 
the outset that the court of appeals below concluded that the 
entry was constitutional under the open fields doctrine.  
Stietz, unpublished slip op., ¶¶15-18; see also, e.g., Florida 
v. Jardines, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013) ("The 
Fourth Amendment does not, therefore, prevent all investigations 
conducted on private property; for example, an officer may 
(subject to [Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)]) gather 
information in what we have called  'open fields'——even if those 
fields 
are 
privately 
owned——because 
such 
fields 
are 
not 
enumerated in the Amendment's text.").  Stietz does not appear 
to contest this conclusion (though he does argue that the 
wardens lacked reasonable suspicion to enter the property, a 
matter discussed below). 
¶149 Further, a number of statutes establish that the 
wardens 
possessed 
statutory 
authority 
to 
enter 
Stietz's 
property.  For instance, Wis. Stat. § 23.10(1) provides in part:  
The department of natural resources shall secure the 
enforcement of all laws which it is required to 
administer . . . . 
The 
persons 
appointed 
by 
said 
department to exercise and perform the powers and 
duties heretofore conferred and imposed upon deputy 
fish and game wardens, shall be known as conservation 
wardens. 
§ 23.10(1) (emphasis added).   
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
29 
 
¶150 Next, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 29.921, 
entitled 
"Warrants; 
arrests; police powers," provides in part: 
The department and its wardens[9] . . . may arrest, 
with or without a warrant, any person detected in the 
actual violation, or whom the officer has probable 
cause to believe is guilty of a violation of any of 
the laws cited in this subsection,[10] whether the 
violation is punishable by criminal penalties or by 
forfeiture, and may take the person before any court 
in the county where the offense was committed and make 
a proper complaint.  For the purpose of enforcing any 
of the laws cited in this subsection, any officer may 
stop and board any boat and stop any vehicle, if the 
officer reasonably suspects there is a violation of 
those sections. 
§ 29.921(1). 
¶151 Wisconsin Stat. § 29.924, entitled "Investigations; 
searches," provides in part that "[t]he department and its 
wardens shall, upon receiving notice or information of the 
violation of any laws cited in s. 29.921(1), as soon as possible 
make a thorough investigation and institute proceedings if the 
evidence warrants it."  § 29.924(1).  And Wis. Stat. § 29.931 
orders "[t]he department and its wardens" to "seize and 
confiscate any wild animal, carcass or plant caught, killed, 
                                                 
9 See Wis. Stat. § 24.01 ("In chs. 23 to 29, unless the 
context 
requires 
otherwise 
or 
unless 
otherwise 
defined: . . . (3) 'Department' means department of natural 
resources. . . . (11) 'Warden' means conservation warden, and 
includes county, special and deputy conservation wardens."). 
10 The subsection references "any law enumerated in ss. 
23.50(1), 167.31, 346.19, 940.24, 941.20, 948.60, 948.605 and 
948.61."  Wis. Stat. § 29.921(1).  Wisconsin Stat. § 23.50(1) in 
turn references, among other things, "violations of . . . this 
chapter, and chs. 26 to 31."  This would include Wis. Stat. ch. 
23 ("Conservation") and Wis. Stat. ch. 29 ("Wild animals and 
plants"). 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
30 
 
taken, had in possession or under control, sold or transported 
in violation of any of the laws for which the department and its 
wardens 
have 
enforcement 
authority 
under 
s. 
29.921."  
§ 29.931(1). 
¶152 This court has already recognized that "[t]he State 
Conservation Commission and its deputies are given rather broad 
police powers in the enforcement of the fish and game laws of 
this state."  State v. Leadbetter, 210 Wis. 327, 330, 246 N.W. 
443 (1933).11  There is much to commend the legislature's 
approach in this regard.  The DNR is tasked with enforcing a 
targeted set of laws, the violation of which will often occur on 
private land.  While wardens must of course act within 
constitutional constraints, the statutory limitations on their 
actions are relatively permissive and enable the DNR to 
                                                 
11 The conservation commission preceded the Department of 
Natural Resources.  See, e.g., Prefatory Note, 1997 Wis. Act 
248. 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
31 
 
effectively address violations of hunting and fishing laws, 
among others.12 
¶153 In 
this 
case, 
the 
wardens 
possessed 
reasonable 
suspicion that hunting violations were occurring.  On the last 
day of deer hunting season near the end of hunting hours, the 
wardens spotted a vehicle parked out in a field.  Warden Webster 
thought the vehicle might be abandoned, whereas Warden Frost 
                                                 
12 Stietz points to Wis. Stat. § 23.58(1), a provision in 
that chapter of the Wisconsin Statutes entitled "Conservation," 
which states in part that "an enforcing officer may stop a 
person in a public place for a reasonable period of time when 
the officer reasonably suspects that such person is committing, 
is about to commit or has committed a violation of" certain 
enumerated statutes.  § 23.58(1) (emphasis added).  Stietz 
argues that the wardens were not in a "public place."  But the 
putative inapplicability of § 23.58(1) proves little.  That 
subsection applies broadly to "enforcing officer[s]."  Id.  
Unlike the statutes cited that apply specifically to "the 
department and its wardens," § 23.58(1) applies to, among 
others, "a person who has authority to act pursuant to a 
specific statute."  See, e.g., State v. Iverson, 2015 WI 101, 
¶41, 365 Wis. 2d 302, 871 N.W.2d 661 (state troopers).  Thus, 
given that many different types of law enforcement officers fall 
within the terms § 23.58(1), the legislature may sensibly have 
wished to circumscribe the scope of the authority the subsection 
provides.   
Stietz also suggests that Wis. Stat. § 29.924(5) supports 
his argument.  That subsection reads as follows: "Access to 
Private Land. The department may, after making reasonable 
efforts to notify the owner or occupant, enter private lands to 
retrieve or diagnose dead or diseased wild animals and take 
actions reasonably necessary to prevent the spread of contagious 
disease in the wild animals."  § 29.924(5).  Those circumstances 
were not present here.  But section 29.924(5) does not 
unambiguously purport to provide the only circumstances under 
which wardens may enter private land.  Section 29.924(5) would 
appear to be required as an independent source of authority 
because the spread of contagion will not necessarily be tied to 
any legal violation on the part of a landowner.   
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
32 
 
thought the vehicle might have belonged to a hunter.  Warden 
Frost's suspicions were confirmed when hunting-related items 
were spotted in the vehicle: an empty gun case, a camouflaged 
seat, and scent killer spray.  By that time hunting hours were 
over.  The wardens were entitled to investigate whether the 
individual to whom the car belonged was indeed engaged in 
illegal hunting.13  As the jury's verdict suggests, the wardens 
were indeed acting in an official capacity and with lawful 
authority.  The circuit court did not err in declining to 
instruct the jury regarding the law of trespass.14   
¶154 In sum, Stietz's arguments on appeal should be 
rejected.15 
VI 
¶155 DNR wardens are tasked with the protection of the 
natural resources of this state and the enforcement of a special 
subset of our laws.  See, e.g., Wis. Citizens Concerned for 
Cranes & Doves v. DNR, 2004 WI 40, ¶23, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 677 
                                                 
13 The wardens were probably correct in thinking that 
illegal hunting was taking place.  Stietz was found in "full 
camouflage" with blaze orange in his pocket and carrying two 
weapons.  Numerous hunting-related items were found in his 
vehicle.   
14 As explained, the circuit court also barred Stietz from 
arguing that the wardens were trespassing, and Stietz objects to 
that ruling.  For the reasons already stated, the circuit 
court's decision was not in error. 
15 Stietz characterizes many of the errors that occurred 
below as violating his constitutional right to present a 
defense.  Assuming Stietz has correctly invoked the right, that 
invocation fails because Stietz's individual arguments, as 
shown, fail. 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
33 
 
N.W.2d 612 ("This court has previously recognized that the DNR 
has broad authority as custodian of Wisconsin's wildlife to 
enact regulations that maintain a balance between conserving and 
exploiting 
the 
state's 
wildlife."). 
 
In 
order 
to 
catch 
offenders, DNR wardens must sometimes enter private lands; the 
element of surprise is critical to their unique law enforcement 
mission.  
¶156 In this case, Warden Frost and Warden Webster entered 
Stietz's land and questioned Stietz to verify whether illegal 
hunting was taking place.  Landowners and hunters alike depend 
on DNR wardens to engage in this type of activity.  Many 
landowners do not have the resources to police their own land 
for illegal hunters.  Nor would this be a desirable approach: if 
landowners policed their own land looking for trespassers (as 
Stietz was allegedly doing in this case), the result would be a 
chaotic free-for-all.  The work of DNR wardens thus keeps both 
hunters and landowners safe.  Unfortunately, the court hinders 
the ability of DNR wardens to act in the way they have 
traditionally been required to act. 
¶157 As the circuit court noted, Stietz is fortunate that 
he was not shot when he drew his handgun on Warden Frost and 
Warden Webster.  He is fortunate the wardens showed such 
incredible restraint.  But a jury concluded on the evidence that 
Stietz was not blameless——that he should not have resisted 
Warden Webster and pointed a firearm at him.  There is nothing 
unjust about the proceedings that occurred below; the circuit 
court was within its discretion in declining to instruct the 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
34 
 
jury on self-defense and trespass.  Accordingly, I would reject 
Stietz's claims and affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
¶158 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
¶159 I am authorized to state that Justice MICHAEL J. 
GABLEMAN joins this opinion. 
 
 
No.  2014AP2701-CR.akz 
 
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