Case Title: SHERIDAN COUNTY COMMISSION, SHERIDAN COUNTY, WYOMING v. V.O. GOLD PROPERTIES, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0071

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-02-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
SHERIDAN COUNTY COMMISSION, SHERIDAN COUNTY, WYOMING v. V.O. GOLD PROPERTIES, LLC2011 WY 16Case Number: No. S-10-0071Decided: 02/04/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
SHERIDAN 
COUNTY COMMISSION, SHERIDAN COUNTY, WYOMING

Appellant 
(Respondent),

 
 
v.

 
 
V.O. 
GOLD PROPERTIES, LLC,

Appellee 
(Petitioner).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Sheridan County

The 
Honorable John G. Fenn, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Matthew 
F. Redle and Lynn M. Smith of the Sheridan County Attorney's Office, Sheridan, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Mr. 
Redle.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Eric 
K. Nelson of Brown, Drew & Massey, LLP, Casper, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, 
J., delivers 
the opinion of the Court; 
HILL, J., files 
a concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The Board of 
County Commissioners of Sheridan County (the Board) appeals from a district 
court order reversing the Board's denial of a subdivision permit application 
submitted by V.O. Gold Properties, LLC (Gold) and remand of the matter to the 
Board for further proceedings.  The 
Board concedes that the agency record is inadequate to allow judicial review, 
and concedes that remand is necessary to make a complete record.  On appeal, the Board asks whether the 
hearing it will provide upon remand must be a contested case hearing, or may be 
a public hearing.  We conclude that 
a contested case hearing is not required.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Is a subdivision 
applicant under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-5-301 et seq. (LexisNexis 2009) entitled to a 
contested case hearing?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The relevant 
facts of this case are not many and are not disputed.  Gold owns certain property in Sheridan 
County.  In 2007, at Gold's request, 
the Board rezoned the property from agricultural to rural residential.  Sometime prior to January 7, 2009, Gold 
submitted a subdivision and final plat application to the Sheridan County Public 
Works Department.  On January 7, 
2009, after allowing for public comment, the Sheridan County Planning and Zoning 
Commission (the Commission) recommended denial of the application.  Gold requested, and was granted, a 
hearing before the Board to review the Commission's recommendation.  The Board allowed Gold to continue to 
pursue the application.  After 
allowing additional public comment, the Commission on April 1, 2009, again 
recommended denial of the application.  
On April 21, 2009, after a public hearing, the Board denied the 
application.  The record basis for 
the Board's decision is limited to the minutes of the April 21, 2009, meeting 
because the Board's recording equipment failed.  No separate findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, or final order were entered.

 
 
[¶4]      Gold filed a 
Petition for Review in the district court on May 21, 2009.  The allegations in that petition were 
that the Board's decision (1) was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
and not in conformity with the law; (2) was made without observing procedures 
required by law; and (3) was not supported by substantial evidence.  The district court heard the matter on 
December 1, 2009, and issued a decision letter on March 1, 2010.  The district court determined (1) that 
the Board's actions were adjudicative and were, therefore, subject to judicial 
review, and (2) that the agency record was insufficient to allow judicial 
review.  The district court 
"waffled" on the question now before this Court, remanding the matter to the 
Board for an "appropriate" hearing and declining "to mandate a contested case 
hearing under all circumstances."

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶5]      
The 
Board's concessions make it unnecessary for us to answer "substantive" questions 
about the Board's decision, because the Board will make a new decision upon 
remand.  The question we must answer 
is what procedure the Board is to follow in reaching that decision; that is, is 
a public hearing sufficient, or must a contested case hearing be held?  That is a question of law that we review 
de novo.  Hall v. Perry, 2009 WY 83, ¶ 13, 211 P.3d 489, 494 (Wyo. 2009); Union Pac. 
Res. Co. v. Dolenc, 2004 WY 36, ¶ 13, 86 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Wyo. 
2004).

 
 
[¶6]      We have said 
many, many times that "if no statute or other law requires the legal right, 
duties or privileges of a party' to be determined at a trial type hearing, no 
contested case proceeding is required."  
Northfork Citizens for Responsible 
Dev. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Park County, 2010 WY 41, ¶ 51, 228 P.3d 838, 855 (Wyo. 2010); see, e.g., In re 
Bd. of County Comm'rs, Sublette County, 2001 WY 91, ¶¶ 12-18, 33 P.3d 107, 112-114 (Wyo. 2001) (statute did not require State Board of Equalization to 
provide contested case hearing in examination of alleged improper tax 
assessment); In re Application for 
Certificate of Need by HCA Health Serv., 689 P.2d 108, 110-114 (Wyo. 1984) 
(federal/state statutory scheme contemplated contested case hearing in review of 
agency authorization of new hospital); Carlson v. Bratton, 681 P.2d 1333, 1338 
(Wyo. 1984) (neither statute nor city ordinance required contested case hearing 
where mayor fired chief of police); Scarlett v. Town Council of Jackson, 463 P.2d 26, 29 (Wyo. 1969) (municipality's annexation decision did not require 
contested case hearing).

 
 
[¶7]      In determining 
what "other law" would require that a hearing be a contested case hearing, we 
have frequently held that the determination of "adjudicative facts" requires a 
contested case hearing, but the determination of "legislative" facts does not. 
 See, e.g., Sheridan Planning Ass'n v. Bd. of 
Sheridan County Comm'rs, 924 P.2d 988, 990 (Wyo. 1996) (approval of a 
planned unit development is "tantamount to amending zoning regulations and is, 
therefore, a legislative act"); Tri-State 
Generation & Transmission Ass'n v. Wyo. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 735 P.2d 718, 
721 (Wyo. 1987) (hearing on application of one utility company to purchase 
assets of another raised issues of adjudicative facts requiring contested case 
hearing); Bd. of County Comm'rs of Teton 
County v. Teton County Youth Servs., 652 P.2d 400, 416 (Wyo. 1982) (decision 
to zone or rezone an area is legislative decision not requiring contested case 
hearing, while decision to deny zoning certificate under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
18-5-203 is adjudicative in nature, thus requiring contested case hearing).  We have also noted that the distinction 
between adjudicative facts and legislative facts is not always entirely 
clear.  Foster's Inc. v. City of Laramie, 718 P.2d 868, 873-74 (Wyo. 1986); Scarlett, 463 P.3d  at 28.  Generally speaking, legislative action 
"produces a general rule or policy," while adjudicatory action applies to 
"identifiable persons and specific situations."  Foster's, 718 P.2d  at 873 (quoting Holding's Little Am. v. Bd. of County 
Comm'rs of Laramie County, 670 P.2d 699, 702 (Wyo. 1983)).  And finally, in recognizing the 
difficulty in distinguishing between legislative and adjudicative facts, we said 
the following:

 
 
            
In cases where the adjudicative-legislative distinction is unclear, it is 
better to begin the analysis by determining whether there is statutory or 
constitutional law which demands a trial-type hearing.  If such a hearing is not required by 
law, then it may be unnecessary for us to make the adjudicative-legislative 
determination.  This is just such a 
case.  There is a difficult issue of 
whether the facts before the agency were adjudicative or 
legislative.

 
 

Foster's, 
718 P.2d  at 873-74.1

 
 
[¶8]      The appellee 
cites two casesFrankel v. Board of 
County Commissioners of Teton County, 2002 WY 13, 39 P.3d 420 (Wyo. 2002) 
and Board of County Commissioners, Albany 
County v. Federer Development Co., 682 P.2d 1062 (Wyo. 1984)for the 
proposition that this Court "has repeatedly applied these contested case 
requirements to decisions of county commissioners in deciding subdivision and 
development permit issues."  In 
neither case, however, was the question of whether a subdivision permit 
application requires a contested case hearing raised directly.  In Frankel, which involved not a 
subdivision permit application, but the county commissioners' denial of a 
grading and erosion control permit, the parties had agreed that the "matter 
constituted a contested case."  Frankel, 2002 WY 13, ¶ 11, 39 P.3d  at 
424.  In Federer, which did involve a subdivision 
permit application, the agency hearing appears to have been conducted as a 
contested case hearing, and judicial review took place pursuant to the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act, but the sole question presented on appeal was 
whether substantial evidence supported the result, not whether a contested case 
hearing was required.  Federer, 682 P.2d  at 
1064.

 
 
[¶9]      The confusion 
engendered by the attempt to draw a line distinguishing legislative action from 
adjudicatory action is exemplified by two of our own cases.  In Holding's Little America v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Laramie County, 670 P.2d 699, 702 (Wyo. 1983), we quoted 1 
Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law § 93 for 
the following proposition:

 
 

"Legislative 
power is the power to make, alter, or repeal laws or rules for the future.  To 
make a rule of conduct applicable to an individual who but for such action would 
be free from it is to legislate.

 
 
"Legislative 
power is distinguished from judicial power, or legislation from adjudication, in 
that basically or usually it operates in the future, rather than on past 
transactions and circumstances, and generally, rather than particularly. * * 
*"  (Footnotes 
omitted).

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
[¶10]   The question before us in Holding's Little America was whether the 
agency action was legislative in nature and therefore not subject to judicial 
review, or was adjudicatory in nature and therefore subject to judicial 
review.  We found the specific 
action at issuethe authorization of industrial development revenue bondsto be 
adjudicatory action subject to judicial review, but we concluded further that 
"[t]he right of judicial review of an administrative decision is 
statutory."  Id. at 702.  This, of course, suggests that 
reviewability does not depend so much on our legislative versus adjudicatory 
decision as it does upon legislative intent.  Beyond that, despite the conclusion that 
the agency action was adjudicatory, we stated that the applicable statute did 
not require a trial-type contested case hearing.  Id. at 703.  In other words, determining that agency 
action is adjudicatory, rather than legislative, does not define the nature of 
the statutory hearing that must be provided to an applicant.2

 
 
[¶11]   At first glance, the case of Pickle v. Board of County Commissioners of 
the County of Platte, 764 P.2d 262 (Wyo. 1988) appears to be on point with 
the instant case, and appears to say that approval or denial of a subdivision 
permit is not a legislative function, and therefore is an adjudicatory 
function.  A close reading of the 
case, however, reveals that it involved questions quite different from those 
presented here.  In Pickle, homeowners in a subdivision were 
forced to move out of their homes because their water and septic systems were 
inadequate.  Id. at 262.  The lawsuit was not a challenge to 
agency action under the Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act.  Rather, it was a negligence action 
against the county commissioners for failing "to comply with W.S. 
18-5-306(a)(iv), which states that the Board shall require written certification 
of a licensed Wyoming engineer that the proposed sewage disposal system is 
adequate and safe."  Id. at 264.  The significant holding of the case was 
as follows:

 
 
We 
should emphasize that the Board's policy determinations are not at issue here; 
we merely hold that the Board may be liable for failing to exercise reasonable 
care in performing basic tasks, such as the gathering of 
information.

 
 

Id. 
at 266.

 
 
[¶12]   This brings us full circle to what 
we said in Foster's, 718 P.2d at 
873-74:  rather than trying to draw 
a line between legislative and adjudicative action, we should start our analysis 
by determining whether there is any law that requires a trial-type hearing.  The statutes at issue in the instant 
case are those found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-5-301 et seq. (LexisNexis 2009), which pertain 
to real estate subdivisions.  
Nothing in these statutes requires a board of county commissioners or a 
county planning commission to provide a contested case hearing to an applicant 
for a subdivision permit.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 18-5-305 does require each board of county commissioners to adopt 
rules and regulations necessary to implement the subdivision act, and Sheridan 
County has adopted such rules and regulations.  The only pertinent hearing requirement 
in those rules and regulations is the requirement that the Commission receive 
public comment for the preliminary and final plats.  Because neither the statutes nor the 
administrative rules provide for a contested case hearing, such is required when 
the Commission and the Board approve or deny a subdivision permit only if the 
applicant has a property right in that subdivision plan that is protected by 
constitutional due process.

 
 
[¶13]   This Court has never directly 
addressed the question of whether an applicant for a subdivision permit under 
these statutes has a vested property interest that entitled him or her to due 
process of law.  We have, however, 
occasionally considered the nature of a vested property right in similar 
contexts.  See Gilbert v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Park 
County, 2010 WY 68, ¶ 12, 232 P.3d 17, 24 (Wyo. 2010) (no property right in 
variance request for contemplated land use change); Northfork, 2010 WY 41, ¶¶ 21-22, 228 P.3d  at 846-47 (no vested right to variance or permit while matter under appeal 
or other challenge); Snake River Brewing 
Co. v. Town of Jackson, 2002 WY 11, ¶ 10, 39 P.3d 397, 403-04 (Wyo. 2002) 
(right to continue existing non-conforming use after zoning change is vested 
property right); Ebzery v. City of 
Sheridan, 982 P.2d 1251, 1256-57 (Wyo. 1999) (no vested right in variance 
until time for appeal has run); Snake 
River Venture v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, Teton County, 616 P.2d 744, 750 
(Wyo. 1980) (only non-conforming use protected as property right in face of 
zoning change is use that is in existence, not use that is simply contemplated); 
Scarlett, 463 P.2d  at 29-30 (in 
annexation proceeding, no vested right to be either included or excluded from a 
municipality).

 
 
[¶14]   The question of whether the review 
of an application for a subdivision permit requires a contested case hearing 
should be determined under reasoning consonant with the reasoning of the 
above-cited cases.  Broadly stated, 
that reasoning is as follows: one has a vested property right only in existing 
land uses, and not in prospective land uses.  In 1996, in the context of a civil 
rights action, the District Court for the District of Wyoming reasoned as 
follows in that regard:

 
 
            
In order to establish a § 1983 violation, the plaintiff must prove (1) 
that "the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of 
state law" and (2) that the conduct deprived plaintiff "of rights, privileges or 
immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States."  Martinez-Velez v. Simonet, 919 F.2d 808, 
810 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing Parratt v. 
Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S. Ct. 1908, 1913, 68 L. Ed. 2d 420 (1981)); 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.  It is generally 
recognized that state law may endow an individual with a property interest.  To have such a property interest, 
however, one "must have more than an abstract need or desire for it.  [One] must have more than a unilateral 
expectation of it.  [One] must, 
instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it."  Martinez-Velez v. Simonet, 919 F.2d  at 
810 (citing Board of Regents of State 
Colleges, et al. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972)).

 
 
            
Once it is determined an individual does have a property interest, 
"[p]rocedural due process must accompany the deprivation of an established 
property or liberty interest.  Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 
569, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2705, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972).  The range of protected interests is 
finite."  Elam v. Williams, 753 F. Supp. 1530, 1535 
(D. Kan. 1990), aff'd 953 F.2d 1391 
(10th Cir. 1992).  Quoting from Unified School Dist. No. 457 v. Phifer, 
729 F. Supp. 1298 (D. Kan. 1990), the Kansas district court 
stated:

 
 
            
Though protected by it, property interests are not creations of the 
Constitution; they emerge from and their scope is defined "by existing rules or 
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law. . . 
."  Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 
470 U.S. 532, 538, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 1491, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1985) (quoting Roth, 408 U.S.  at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 
2709).  A property interest is more 
than an "abstract need or desire" and also more than a "unilateral 
expectation."  Roth, 408 U.S.  at 577, 92 S. Ct.  at 
2709.  "The hallmark of property, . 
. ., is an individual entitlement grounded in state law, which cannot be removed 
except for cause.'"  Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430, 102 S. Ct. 1148, 1155, 71 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1982); see also Setliff v. Memorial Hosp. of Sheridan 
County, 850 F.2d 1384, 1395 (10th Cir. 1988).  "It is a purpose of the ancient 
institution of property to protect those claims upon which people rely in their 
daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined."  Roth, 408 U.S.  at 577, 92 S. Ct.  at 
2709.

 
 

Elam 
v. Williams, 
753 F. Supp. 1530, 1535-36 (D. Kan. 1990).

 
 

            
This Court has uncovered no 
authority that suggests a property owner has a vested property right in a 
contemplated development or subdivision.  In fact, all authority that has been 
studied by this Court suggests no such broad and loosely-defined property right 
exists.  See e.g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo 
County, 477 U.S. 340, 348-351, 106 S. Ct. 2561, 2566-2567, 91 L. Ed. 2d 285 
(1986); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1013-19, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2892-2895, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798 
(1992); Snake River Venture v. Board of 
County Commissioners, Teton County, Wyoming, 616 P.2d 744, 751 (Wyo. 1980) 
("This is, of course, simply a more specific statement of the general rule that 
a property owner has no vested right (which will withstand a later zoning 
regulation) in a development which is merely 
contemplated.").

 
 

Marshall 
v. Bd. of County Comm'rs for Johnson County, 
912 F. Supp. 1456, 1463-64 (D. Wyo. 1996) (emphasis 
added).

 
 
[¶15]   Had the legislature intended that a 
contested case hearing was required for subdivision permit applications, it 
would have said so.  The legislature 
knows how to require a contested case hearing.  See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-105(c) 
(LexisNexis 2009):  "[T]he applicant 
shall have the right to request a contested case hearing before the board . 
. . ."  Where words are missing from 
a statute, we are not at liberty to supply them.  Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc. v. Bldg. Code Bd. 
of Appeals of City of Cheyenne, 2010 WY 2, ¶ 9, 222 P.3d 158, 162 (Wyo. 
2010).  Beyond that, the practical 
considerations for not requiring a contested case hearing, which practical 
considerations we may presume were considered by the legislature, are 
persuasive: A contested case hearing requires adverse parties.  Who are the adverse parties in a 
subdivision application process?  If 
the planning commission recommends against the application, does it become the 
adverse party before the board of county commissioners?  That makes no sense.  And what happens if the planning 
commission is in favor of the application?  
Do neighbors or other members of the public have to intervene in the 
contested case to comment upon the effects of the subdivision?  Must they all be placed under oath?  Must they all be subject to 
cross-examination, and do they all have the opportunity to cross-examine the 
applicant?  The answers to these 
questions lead to the inevitable conclusion that a public hearing, rather than a 
contested case hearing, fits the situation.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶16]   This applicant, under existing 
statutes and county regulations, was not entitled to a contested case hearing, 
and the prospect of developing a subdivision is not a vested property right 
protected by the constitutional right to due process.  Therefore, no law requires a trial-type 
hearing.  Furthermore, the decision 
whether to grant or deny a subdivision permit application is more nearly akin to 
legislative action than it is to adjudicative action.  The existence of a subdivision 
implicates many policy and public welfare considerations, including the 
availability of water, soil conditions, population densities, neighborhood 
impact, access and road improvements, and the sufficiency of local schools.  Consequently, the district court's 
remand to the board of county commissioners for a hearing is affirmed, with that 
hearing required to meet the Land Division Rules' requirement that the planning 
commission receive public comment on the preliminary plat and the final 
plat.  As conceded by the Board, a 
complete record of its decision, with findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
must be provided because the agency action is subject to judicial 
review.

 
 
[¶17]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, 
and remanded to the district court for further remand to the Board for action 
consistent herewith.

  
 
 

Hill, 
Justice 
concurring in part and dissenting in part.

 
 

[¶18]   I concur in the majority's decision 
to reverse so that the Board of County Commissioners can create a record.  I dissent because I am convinced that a 
contested case hearing may 
be required, although a more informal resolution of this matter is still a 
possibility.  The current condition 
of the record is such that we know only that the Board voted to deny the 
subdivision permit.  Upon careful 
consideration of all the facts and circumstances, the Board may yet grant the 
permit.  However, prior to any 
hearing, I believe Gold is entitled to a formal notice of the deficiencies in 
his application, an opportunity to correct them, and if the Board still votes to 
deny the permit, then it must inform Gold upon what the basis of its decision 
rests, as well as all the facts and circumstances that justify its 
decision.  Such a process would then 
allow both the district court and this Court an opportunity to meaningfully 
review that decision. 

 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1In 
Foster's, 718 P.2d  at 873, we 
recognized the circular reasoning inherent in the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act that makes it difficult at times to determine whether a contested 
case hearing is required:

 
 
Under 
the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, all parties in a contested case must 
be afforded an opportunity for a trial-type hearing.  A contested case is a 
proceeding

 
 
"in 
which legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required by law to be 
determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing."

 
 
We 
have interpreted the final phraseopportunity for hearingto mean opportunity 
for a trial-type hearing.  This 
interpretation makes our analysis essentially circular.  If the applicable law, usually a 
statute, requires a hearing and not a trial-type hearing, then that hearing is 
not defined as a contested case.  
If, on the other hand, that applicable law requires a trial-type hearing, 
then that case fits the definition of a contested case.  A contested case mandates a trial-type 
hearing, completing the circle.

 
 
(Internal 
citations omitted.)

 
 

2We 
also cited several cases indicating that both annexation proceedings and school 
unification proceedings were legislative in nature and did not require contested 
case hearings, but the record was reviewable to determine statutory compliance. 
 Holding's Little America, 670 P.2d  at 
702.