Case Title: CHARLES ALLEN HAYNES v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0263

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
CHARLES ALLEN HAYNES v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 75186 P.3d 1204Case Number: No. S-07-0263Decided: 07/01/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
CHARLES 
ALLEN HAYNES,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

The 
Honorable Michael N. Deegan, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. Alden, 
Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Alden.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Craig.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  A jury convicted Charles Allen Haynes on 
two counts of first degree sexual assault.  
He appeals to this Court claiming that the evidence was insufficient to 
support his conviction for sexually assaulting a "physically helpless" victim; 
the prosecutor committed misconduct by misinforming the jury concerning the 
effect of its verdict and by using victim impact evidence to inflame the jury's 
passion; and the district court erred in refusing to address the issue of his 
mental competency before sentencing.  
We affirm.  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]  Mr. Haynes states the issues for our 
determination as follows:

 
 

I.                    
When 
evidence was presented to the court at sentencing indicating that the defendant 
may lack the mental capacity to be sentenced was the court required to address 
the issue of the defendant's mental competence prior to proceeding to 
sentence?

 
 

II.                  
When the 
prosecutor intentionally introduced untrue testimony and irrelevant argument to 
misinform the jury as to its duty and the effect of its verdict did his 
misconduct create reversible error?

 
 
III.        Where 
no evidence was presented to indicate that the victim was "physically helpless" 
as defined in the statute was there insufficient evidence to sustain a 
conviction on a charge of first degree sexual assault under W.S. § 6-2-302 
(a)(iii)?

 
 
The 
State rephrases the first issue as:

 
 
I.          
Did the district court abuse its discretion in denying appellant's motion 
for new trial?

 
 
Otherwise, 
the State presents substantially the same issues.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]  On the night of September 26, 2005, 
Officers Mike Wenz and Chad Trebby and Detective Andy Boisvert of the Gillette 
Police Department responded to a sexual assault complaint from CampbellCountyMemorialHospital.  At the hospital, N.H. told the officers 
that she believed Mr. Haynes had sexually assaulted her three-year-old daughter, 
K.H., shortly after 10:00 p.m. that night.  
N.H informed the officers that Mr. Haynes was her husband's nephew and 
had been staying at their home.  She 
told the officers that her daughter had been asleep in her bedroom and came into 
their room crying and saying she was wet.  
N.H. felt her daughter's training pants and they were dry.  K.H. said, "No, mom, in back."  N.H. felt inside the back of the 
training pants and felt a thick slimy substance.  Upon further inspection, N.H. concluded 
the substance was semen.

 
 
[¶4]  Officer Wenz spoke with Mr. Haynes who 
had come to the hospital with his uncle and aunt.  Mr. Haynes initially denied the 
allegation.  Officer Wenz informed 
Mr. Haynes that semen was found in the child's training pants.  Mr. Haynes then said he may have 
sleepwalked into K.H.'s room, but he could not remember anything else.  As the discussion continued, Mr. Haynes 
told Officer Wenz that he went into the child's room to show affection for her, 
engaged in oral sex with her and put his penis between her legs.  

 
 
[¶5]  Officer Trebby and Detective Boisvert 
transported Mr. Haynes to the police department for a taped interview.  Mr. Haynes repeated essentially the same 
story he had told Officer Wenz at the hospital.  He also said that he had sexual contact 
with K.H. previously on September 21, 2005.  Mr. Haynes was arrested and charged with 
one count of first degree sexual assault under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302(a)(iii) 
(LexisNexis 2005) and one count of third degree sexual assault in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-304(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2005) for the acts he said occurred 
on September 21, 2005, and two counts of first degree sexual assault in 
violation of § 6-2-302(a)(iii) for the acts on September 26, 
2005.

 
 
[¶6]  Thereafter, the defense moved for and 
the circuit court entered an order suspending further proceedings and directing 
the Wyoming State Hospital to evaluate Mr. Haynes pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-11-303(b) and (c) (LexisNexis 2007) to determine whether he suffered from a 
mental illness or deficiency and, if so, whether he lacked the capacity to 
comprehend his position, understand the nature of the court proceedings, conduct 
his defense, and cooperate with defense counsel.  After consideration of the StateHospital's report, the circuit court 
entered an order finding Mr. Haynes mentally fit to proceed.   

 
 
[¶7]  On February 5, 2006, following a 
preliminary hearing, the circuit court bound Mr. Haynes over to district court 
for trial.  The following day, the 
State filed an amended information adding three second degree sexual assault 
counts as alternatives to the first degree sexual assault counts initially 
alleged.  Prior to the arraignment 
in district court, defense counsel asked for and obtained an order granting a 
second mental examination of Mr. Haynes.  
As part of the examination, the district court requested an assessment of 
whether, as a result of any mental illness or deficiency, Mr. Haynes lacked the 
capacity at the time of the alleged sexual assaults to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct or conform his conduct to the law.   

 
 
[¶8]  On June 8, July 13 and July 28, 2006, 
the district court held a competency hearing during which it heard testimony 
from three of the psychologists who evaluated Mr. Haynes.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
district court found Mr. Haynes fit to proceed to trial.  On July 31, 2006, Mr. Haynes pleaded not 
guilty and not guilty by reason of mental illness.  

 
 
[¶9]  A jury trial began on May 14, 2007.  At the close of the State's 
case-in-chief, the defense moved for an acquittal on Counts I - III, VI and 
VII.  The district court granted the 
motion as to Counts I  III, the counts alleging sexual assault on September 21, 
2005, on the ground that no evidence was presented to corroborate Mr. Haynes' 
statement  and, by itself, his 
statement was insufficient evidence that a sexual assault occurred to allow the 
counts to go to the jury.  The trial 
continued on Counts IV  VII, the counts alleging first and second degree sexual 
assault on September 26, 2005.  

 
 
[¶10]  On May 17, 2007, the district court 
submitted the case to the jury.  The 
verdict form given to the jury charged Counts IV (first degree sexual assault) 
and V (second degree sexual assault) alternatively and Counts VI (first degree) 
and VII (second degree) alternatively.  
The verdict form instructed the jury that if it found Mr. Haynes guilty 
on Counts IV and VI, the first degree sexual assault counts, it should not 
answer the questions for Counts V and VII.  
After deliberating, the jury found Mr. Haynes guilty on Counts IV and 
VI.

 
 
[¶11]  On July 24, 2007, Mr. Haynes filed a 
motion for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence.  Mr. Haynes asserted that a WyomingStateHospital risk assessment conducted before 
sentencing at the State's request indicated that Mr. Haynes was functioning at a 
six to seven-year-old level, suggesting that he was not competent to stand 
trial.  The State opposed the 
motion, contending the assessment did not constitute new evidence because it 
contained no information the parties did not have before trial.  After a hearing, the district court 
denied the motion.  The district 
court entered a judgment of guilt against Mr. Haynes and sentenced him to two 
consecutive terms of 45 to 50 years in prison.  The district court later amended the 
sentence to make the terms concurrent.          

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

1.      
Sufficiency 
of the Evidence to Prove the Victim was Physically 
Helpless

 
 
[¶12]  The State charged Mr. Haynes with, and 
the jury convicted him of, first degree sexual assault under the following 
statute:

 
 
§ 
6-2-302.  Sexual assault in the 
first degree.

(a)  Any actor who inflicts sexual intrusion 
on a victim commits a sexual assault in the first degree 
if:

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
      (iii)  The victim is physically helpless, and 
the actor knows or reasonably should know that the victim is physically helpless 
and that the victim has not consented; 

 
 
The 
phrase "physically helpless" as used in the above provision is defined in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-301(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2005) as follows:

 
 
(iii)  "Physically helpless" means unconscious, 
asleep or otherwise physically unable to communicate unwillingness to 
act;

 
 
[¶13]  
In its amended information, the State also charged Mr. Haynes with 
second degree sexual assault under the following statute:

 
 
§ 
6-2-303.  Sexual assault in the 
second degree.

(a) Any 
actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits sexual assault in the 
second degree if, under circumstances not constituting sexual assault in the 
first degree:

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
(v)  At the time of the commission of the act 
the victim is less than twelve (12) years of age and the actor is at least four 
(4) years older than the victim.1

 
 
[¶14]  
Mr. Haynes contends the evidence was insufficient to support his 
convictions under § 6-2-302(a)(iii) because the State failed to prove that K.H. 
was "physically helpless" as defined in § 6-2-301(a)(iii).  In fact, Mr. Haynes asserts, the State 
did not try to prove K.H. was physically helpless within the meaning of the 
statute, but that she was physically helpless because she was a three-year-old 
girl who weighed approximately 30 pounds and Mr. Haynes was a grown man.  Proof of these facts, he contends, does 
not support a conviction of first degree sexual assault. 

 
 
[¶15]  The State asserts the evidence presented 
was sufficient to prove the victim was physically helpless as required by the 
first degree sexual assault statute.  
The State claims the mother's testimony that she believed her daughter 
was asleep during the sexual assault was sufficient evidence from which a 
reasonable juror could infer that the victim was physically helpless at the time 
Mr. Haynes sexually assaulted her.

 
 
[¶16]  When reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence, this Court accepts as true the State's evidence and affords it those 
inferences which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from it.  Kelly v. State, 2007 WY 45, ¶ 11, 153 P.3d 926, 929 (Wyo. 2007).  We do 
not consider conflicting evidence or inferences that can be drawn from such 
evidence.  Id. Our duty is to determine whether a quorum 
of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the 
same result as the jury actually did.  
Id.  We apply these standards even when no 
objection to the alleged error is made at trial.  Garay v. State, 2007 WY 130, ¶ 2, 165 P.3d 99, fn. 1 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶17]  In its case-in-chief, the State 
presented the testimony of N.H. that when she arrived home at approximately 9:30 
p.m. on September 26, 2005, she checked on her daughter and she was asleep.  N.H. testified that she went to bed and 
was watching T.V. when she heard her daughter fussing.  She testified that the sound her 
daughter made was "kind of a cry in her sleep," the "kind of muffled fussy cry 
that babies have."  She testified 
that she did not go into K.H.'s room because her daughter was "still sleeping" 
and she did not want to wake her.   

 
 
[¶18]  Mr. Haynes argues the mother's testimony 
was not sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that K.H. was asleep in 
light of the testimony of Jerry Bachman, the registered nurse who participated 
in the examination of K.H. at the hospital on the night of the assault.  Ms. Bachman testified that during the 
examination, K.H. stated that "her friend" had "licked her pee-pee."  Mr. Haynes argues that the only 
inference that can be fairly and reasonably drawn from the child's statement, 
which the State also presented as evidence, is that K.H. was awake when the 
assault occurred.    

 
 
[¶19]  Having considered the record in its 
entirety, we do not find the mother's testimony and the child's statement to the 
nurse to be contradictory.  Viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude the 
jury reasonably could have concluded that the child was asleep when Mr. Haynes 
began touching her and woke up at some point to find him engaging in oral sex 
with her.  Evidence that she was 
asleep when the assault began and woke up during it is sufficient to satisfy the 
"physically helpless" element of the statute in effect at the time.  

 
 
[¶20]  Our conclusion that the evidence was 
sufficient even though there was evidence that K.H. woke up during the encounter 
is consistent with decisions from other jurisdictions having the same or similar 
statutory provisions.  In Crable v. Sherry, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75555 (E.D.Mich. No. 
2:06-CV-14861, Oct. 11, 2007), for example, the victim woke up in the 
middle of the night to find the defendant on top of her having sexual 
intercourse. The court concluded she was physically helpless for purposes of the 
Michigan 
statute.  Similarly, in State v. Shields, 122 P.3d 421 
(Mont. 2005), 
the court held that the fact that the victim had some sensory perception during 
a sexual assault did not preclude a jury from finding that she was physically 
helpless.  In Shields, the victim testified that she 
awoke to the sensation of weight being placed on her body, but did not know what 
was happening.  Shortly thereafter, 
she realized that she was being raped.  See also, State v. Grimes, 876 A.2d 753 (N.H. 
2005), where the victim woke up several times during the assault but was unable 
to physically resist the defendant and the court held the evidence was 
sufficient for the jury to find that she was physically helpless.  

 
 
[¶21]  In concluding that the evidence 
supported the verdict, we acknowledge that, in attempting to prove the 
physically helpless element of the offense, the State introduced evidence of the 
victim's age and weight and stated in closing argument that, "a 3-years and some 
months old little girl who weighs approximately 30 pounds was physically 
helpless against a grown human male."  
Thus, the State focused not on showing K.H. was asleep but on her age, 
size and gender, factors that have no bearing on the issue of whether she was 
physically helpless for purposes of the first degree sexual assault 
statute.  Simply put, the evidence 
the State affirmatively offered at trial to prove the victim was physically 
helpless, and the argument it makes now on appeal are inconsistent.  

 
 
[¶22]  Notwithstanding the State's arguments, 
our task at this stage of the proceedings is to determine whether evidence was 
presented from which the jury could have found that each element of first degree 
sexual assault was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  The jury was instructed that in order to 
find Mr. Haynes guilty of the offense charged, it had to find that he inflicted 
sexual intrusion on a physically helpless victim and knew or should have known 
she was physically helpless.  The 
jury also was instructed that in order to find that K.H. was physically 
helpless, it had to find that she was unconscious, asleep or otherwise 
physically unable to communicate unwillingness to act.  We presume the jury followed the court's 
instructions.  Martin v. State, 2007 WY 2, ¶ 21, 149 P.3d 707, 713 (Wyo. 2007).  The jury 
heard testimony, as set forth above, from which it could have concluded that 
K.H. was asleep and, therefore, physically helpless when Mr. Haynes sexually 
assaulted her.  The jury also heard 
testimony from which it could have concluded that K.H. woke up during the sexual 
assault.  This evidence was 
sufficient to support the jury's verdict.     

 
 

2.                  
Prosecutorial 
Misconduct

 
 
[¶23]   Mr. Haynes claims that 
prosecutorial misconduct occurred in two instances during the trial.  We review allegations of prosecutorial 
misconduct by reference to the entire record to determine whether a defendant's 
case has been so prejudiced as to deny him a fair trial.  Szymanski v. State, 2007 WY 139, ¶ 27, 
166 P.3d 879, 886 (Wyo. 2007).  
Reversal is not warranted unless a reasonable probability exists that 
absent the error the appellant may have enjoyed a more favorable verdict.  Id.

 
 
[¶24]  The first instance of alleged misconduct 
occurred during the prosecutor's questioning of Abram Hitt, a forensic 
psychologist at the WyomingStateHospital called by the 
State as a rebuttal witness. 

 

Q.                
Doctor, 
if you know, given the evaluations in this case and your assessment of Mr. 
Haynes, would the WyomingStateHospital be able to detain 
Mr. Haynes if he were found not guilty by reason of mental 
illness?

A.                 
I don't 
believe so.  I mean that would be up 
to the court, of course.  Would he 
fit there 

 
 
At this 
point, defense counsel objected and asked that the answer be stricken from the 
record.  The district court 
sustained the objection.  The State 
withdrew the question.  After Dr. 
Hitt's testimony, the State rested.  

 
 
[¶25]  The following day, after hearing 
argument on and denying the defense motion for judgment of acquittal, the 
district court on its own initiative and without prompting by the defense 
expressed concern about the prosecutor's question to Dr. Hitt the previous 
day.  The court advised the parties 
that it considered the question highly improper and had drafted and was inclined 
to give the following limiting instruction:

 
 
On 
redirect examination of Dr. Hitt, the State inquired of him as to the probable 
or likely disposition of the defendant in the event the jury found the defendant 
not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency and he was remanded to the 
WyomingStateHospital.

 
 
            
The defendant objected to this question and the court sustained the 
objection.  The answer was 
stricken.  However, the witness 
answered the question before the Defendant objected.

 
 
            
You are instructed to disregard the answer of the witness and not permit 
it to enter into your deliberations in any way.

 
 
            
The disposition of the Defendant in the event you find him to be not 
guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency is a matter of no concern to 
the jury.   

 
 
The 
State responded that it had no objection to the instruction.  Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, 
asserting that the question to Dr. Hitt constituted prosecutorial 
misconduct.  The district court 
denied the motion.  Defense counsel 
stated they did not object to the proposed instruction but reiterated that the 
question constituted prosecutorial misconduct and the proper remedy was to grant 
a mistrial.  

 
 
[¶26]  It is well established that a jury is to 
base its verdict on the evidence before it, without regard to the possible 
consequences of the verdict.  Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 576, 114 S. Ct. 2419, 129 L. Ed. 2d 459 (1994).

 
 
The 
principle that juries are not to consider the consequences of their verdicts is 
a reflection of the basic division of labor in our legal system between judge 
and jury. The jury's function is to find the facts and to decide whether, on 
those facts, the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. The judge, by 
contrast, imposes sentence on the defendant after the jury has arrived at a 
guilty verdict. Information regarding the consequences of a verdict is therefore 
irrelevant to the jury's task. Moreover, providing jurors sentencing information 
invites them to ponder matters that are not within their province, distracts 
them from their factfinding responsibilities, and creates a strong possibility 
of confusion.

 
 

Id. at 
579.

 
 
[¶27]  This Court addressed the issue in Lonquest v. State, 495 P.2d 575, 584 
(Wyo. 1972) where the defendant claimed error in the trial court's refusal to 
give an instruction summarizing involuntary hospitalization proceedings that 
would be instituted if the defendant were acquitted on grounds of mental 
incompetency.  The Court 
stated:

 
 
The 
function of the jury in this case or any criminal case is to determine the guilt 
or innocence of a defendant upon the evidence presented.  This cannot depend upon probable or 
proper disposal of the defendant thereafter.  The giving of such instruction injects a 
totally irrelevant element into the jury's deliberations separate and apart from 
the function they serve and may tend to confuse them.  The suggested instruction may be an 
invitation for the jury to reach a compromise verdict. 

 
 

Id.

 
 
[¶28]  Whether the issue of the defendant's 
fate is presented to encourage the jury to reach, or not to reach, a verdict of 
not guilty by reason of mental illness, it is not an appropriate issue for the 
jury's consideration.  Id.; Janpol v. State, 2008 WY 21, ¶ 25, 178 P.3d 396, 405 (Wyo. 2008).  The 
prosecutor's question to Dr. Hitt violated this principle because it raised the 
specter that a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental deficiency would result 
in Mr. Haynes' release, a matter that was not within the province of the jury 
and had the potential to distract the jury from its fact-finding 
responsibility.  We agree with the 
district court that the question was highly improper.          

 
 
[¶29]  Our conclusion that the question was 
improper does not end the inquiry.  
We must consider whether Mr. Haynes' case was so prejudiced by the 
improper question as to deny him a fair trial.  Szymanski, ¶ 27, 166 P.3d  at 886.  We focus our attention on whether a 
reasonable probability exists that absent the prosecutor's question, Mr. Haynes 
may have enjoyed a more favorable verdict.  
From the entire record, we conclude there is not a reasonable probability 
of a more favorable verdict and Mr. Haynes was not so prejudiced as to deny him 
a fair trial. 

 
 
[¶30]  Our discussion focuses on whether a 
reasonable probability exists that the jury would have returned a verdict of not 
guilty or not guilty by reason of mental illness if the prosecution had not 
asked the improper question.  The 
evidence implicating Mr. Haynes as the perpetrator of the sexual assault was 
essentially undisputed.  The only 
witness Mr. Haynes presented in his defense was Robert Innes, a clinical 
psychologist who evaluated Mr. Haynes on two occasions prior to trial, first, to 
determine his mental competency to proceed to trial and, second, to determine 
his mental status at the time of the offense.  Dr. Innes' testimony focused exclusively 
on the defense of not guilty by reason of mental illness.  

 
 
[¶31]  Dr. Innes testified, in accordance with 
his written report, that in his opinion Mr. Haynes':  

 
 

[M]ental 
status at the time of the offense is indeterminate.  That is, although he has suffered from 
long term conditions which have precluded the establishment of mature 
appropriate or stable interpersonal relationships, what was actually going through his mind 
at the time of the offense, what his emotional status was at the 
time, or what was actually his intent 
at the time, are all unknown.  
He professes lack of memory for the time of the offense, and without his 
assistance, surmising his mental status 
at the time of the offense is viewed as being highly unreliable.  

 
 
(emphasis 
added.)  Although Dr. Innes also 
testified that in his opinion Mr. Haynes' asserted lack of memory and pattern of 
shutting down when angry raised "plausible arguments" that he met the statutory 
requirements for a finding of not guilty by reason of mental illness, he 
equivocated by prefacing that opinion with the statement that he did not think 
the lack of memory and pattern of shutting down "establish or prove that [Mr. 
Haynes] meets the requirements of the law for a determination of not guilty by 
reason of mental illness."  His 
further testimony that in his opinion Mr. Haynes "was probably not cognizant of 
right or wrong at the time of the offenses and was not at that point able to 
conform his conduct to the law" was undermined by his testimony based upon his 
written report that Mr. Haynes' mental status at the time of the offense was 
"indeterminate" and "unknown" and he viewed any attempt to surmise what it may 
have been as "highly unreliable."

 
 
[¶32]  In addition to the testimony of Mr. 
Haynes' only witness, the jury heard testimony from the State's rebuttal 
witness, Abram Hitt, a forensic psychologist at the WyomingStateHospital who evaluated Mr. Haynes by court 
order to determine his mental status at the time of the offense.  Dr. Hitt testified that in his opinion, 
Mr. Haynes did not meet the statutory criteria for mental illness or 
deficiency.  Dr. Hitt 
testified:

 
 
[T]he 
terms mental illness or deficiency mean only those severely abnormal mental 
conditions that grossly and demonstrably impair a person's perception or 
understanding of reality that are not attributable primarily to self-induced 
intoxication. I don't think he meets that threshold criteria. 

 
 
[¶33]  At the close of the evidence, the jury 
was instructed that Mr. Haynes was presumed to be mentally responsible; 
therefore, he had the burden of proving by the greater weight of the evidence 
that at the time of the sexual assault as a result of mental illness or 
deficiency, he lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness 
of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of law.  The jury was also instructed that under 
Wyoming law 
"mental illness or deficiency" means severe, abnormal mental conditions that 
grossly and demonstrably impair a person's perception or understanding of 
reality.  We presume the jury 
followed these instructions.  Martin, ¶ 21, 149 P.3d  at 713.  Given this presumption, the evidence the 
defense presented, which was at best equivocal, and the State's evidence, we 
conclude a reasonable probability did not exist that the jury would have 
returned a verdict of not guilty or not guilty by reason of mental illness if 
the prosecution had not asked the improper question.  Therefore, reversal on the basis of the 
improper question is not warranted. 

 
 
[¶34]  Having concluded that the prosecutor's 
question is not grounds for reversal in this case, we nevertheless strongly 
caution Wyoming prosecutors to refrain from questions 
and argument that inform, or misinform, the jury concerning the consequences of 
its verdict.  This is the second 
appeal to come before this Court in recent months in which we have been asked to 
reverse a criminal conviction based upon a prosecutor's improper comment 
concerning the consequences of a not guilty by reason of mental illness 
verdict.  In Janpol, 2008 WY 21, 178 P.3d 396, a 
first degree murder case, the prosecutor told the jury, incorrectly, that the 
defendant would "walk" if he was found not guilty by reason of mental 
illness.  We cannot stress enough 
that such comments are highly improper.  Such comments also do a great disservice 
to the public by creating grounds that may require this Court to overturn 
otherwise appropriate guilty verdicts, sometimes in cases involving horrendous 
offenses.  

 
 
[¶35]  As we have said 
before:

 
 
The 
[prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, 
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as 
its obligation to govern at all;  
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it 
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.  As such, he is in a peculiar and very 
definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt 
shall not escape or innocence suffer.  
He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor--indeed, he should do 
so.  But, while he may strike hard 
blows, he is not at liberty to strike 
foul ones.  It is as much his duty 
to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as 
it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.  

 
 

Moe v. 
State, 2005 WY 58, ¶ 21, 110 P.3d 1206, 1214 (Wyo. 
2005), quoting Berger v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S. Ct. 629, 79 L. Ed. 1314 (1935) (emphasis added).  The 
blow struck by the prosecutor in Mr. Haynes' case was not only unnecessary 
considering the strength of the State's case, it was a foul and improper 
one.  It is the expectation of this 
Court that such conduct on the part of the State's prosecutors will end.2  In recognition that similar directions 
have been ignored by some prosecutors, we encourage district courts in the 
future not only to instruct the jury to disregard the comment and that the 
disposition of the defendant is not a matter for jury consideration, but also to 
intervene with an instruction countering the prosecutor's misstatement.  See Shannon, 512 U.S.  at 587, 
where the Court indicated such an instruction may be necessary if, for example, 
a witness or prosecutor states in the presence of the jury that a particular 
defendant would "go free" if found not guilty by reason of insanity.              

 
 
[¶36]  Mr. Haynes also claims prosecutorial 
misconduct occurred when, during closing argument in rebuttal, the State waved a 
photograph of the victim in front of the jury and said:  "Ladies and gentlemen, of the three 
victims in this case, please do not forget her."3  Mr. Haynes contends this constituted 
improper victim impact argument which is prohibited under Wyoming case law and 
Standard 3-5.8 (c) and (d) of the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice:  Prosecution Function Standards (3d ed. 
1993).  

 
 
[¶37]  Defense counsel did not object to the 
argument at trial; therefore, Mr. Haynes has the burden of demonstrating that it 
constituted plain error.  Plain 
error exists when the incident alleged as error clearly appears in the record; 
the incident transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and the party 
claiming the error was denied a substantial right which materially prejudiced 
him.  Szymanski, ¶ 28, 166 P.3d  at 886.     

 
 
[¶38]  The record clearly reflects that the 
prosecutor made the statement while showing the jury the photograph.  The law is clear that victim impact 
argument is inappropriate during the guilt phase of a criminal prosecution and 
prosecutors should not make arguments calculated to inflame the passions or 
prejudices of the jury.  Whitney v. State, 2004 WY 118, ¶ 89, 99 P.3d 457, 487 (Wyo. 2004).  The 
State contends that is not what happened here.  Rather, the State asserts, the 
prosecutor was responding to defense counsel's statements during closing 
argument that Mr. Haynes had been subjected to sexual assault when he was a 
child. 

 
 
[¶39]  From our review of the closing arguments 
in their entirety, we are not convinced the prosecutor's statement and use of 
the photograph was a direct response to defense counsel's argument.  We assume for purposes of this 
discussion that it was improper victim impact argument intended to inflame the 
jury's passion, and we turn to consideration of whether it resulted in material 
prejudice.  

 
 
[¶40]  We have established the following 
non-exhaustive list of factors for evaluating whether material prejudice 
resulted:  1) the degree to which 
the prosecutor's remarks had a tendency to mislead the jury and prejudice the 
accused;  2) whether the remarks 
were isolated or extensive;  3) the 
strength of competent proof to establish guilt, absent the remarks;  4) whether the comments were 
deliberately placed before the jury to divert attention to extraneous 
matters;  5) the presence or absence 
of a limiting instruction;  6) 
whether the error was invited by defense counsel;  7) whether the failure to object could 
have been the result of tactical decisions;  and 8) whether, in light of all the 
evidence, the error was harmless.  
Trujillo v. State, 2002 WY 51, ¶ 28, 44 P.3d 22, 28 (Wyo. 2002).  Weighing all of the 
factors against the record as a whole, we do not think the prosecutor's isolated 
improper remark materially prejudiced Mr. Haynes.  Given the strength of the evidence 
against Mr. Haynes, it is unlikely the prosecutor's statement and use of the 
photograph misled the jury or prejudiced the accused.  The remark was isolated and there is 
nothing in the record to suggest the prosecutor made the remark or used the 
photograph to divert the jury's attention.  
There was no objection.  In 
light of all the evidence, the prosecutor's remark was not plain error.  

 
 

3.                  
Evidence 
of Mr. Haynes' Mental Incompetence at Sentencing

 

[¶41]  After the jury rendered its verdict and 
before sentencing, the State filed a motion for an order requiring the 
WyomingStateHospital to conduct a sex offender risk 
assessment of Mr. Haynes.  The 
district court granted the motion and the StateHospital conducted the risk 
assessment.  After the StateHospital submitted its report, Mr. Haynes 
filed a motion for a new trial in which he claimed that the assessment raised a 
question concerning his competency to understand the nature of the proceedings 
and charges against him.  He pointed 
specifically to a statement in the assessment indicating that he "functions at 
the level of a six or seven year old child."  Mr. Haynes claimed this constituted 
newly discovered evidence entitling him to a new trial.4

 
 
[¶42]  Prior to sentencing, the district court 
heard argument on the motion for new trial.  The court concluded that the risk 
assessment contained nothing new concerning Mr. Haynes' competency to stand 
trial, the question of his mental status at the time of the offenses or the 
question of his guilt or innocence.  
The district court proceeded with the sentencing hearing and subsequently 
entered a written order denying the motion for new trial.    

 
 
[¶43]  On appeal, Mr. Haynes claims that when 
evidence was presented at sentencing indicating that he lacked the mental 
capacity to understand the nature of the sentencing proceedings, the district 
court was required to address the issue before sentencing him.  Mr. Haynes relies on the following 
excerpt from the hearing, which he incorrectly attributes to the district 
court:

 
 
The risk 
assessment itself was designed to consider what his chances of reoffending 
are.  Not designed to determine 
whether or not he was competent to stand trial, not designed to determine 
whether or not he was responsible for his criminal conduct.  In short, that report was directed at an 
entirely different set of issues, and does not constitute new evidence.  The case has been closed as to the issue of 
competency by the Court's determination that Mr. Haynes was competent to stand 
trial as a matter of law.  The issue 
of criminal responsibility has been closed by the jury by their guilty 
verdicts.

 
 
(emphasis 
added).  Citing § 7-11-303(a)5, deShazer v. State, 2003 WY 98, ¶ 20, 74 P.2d 1240, 1248 (Wyo. 2003), and other authorities, Mr. Haynes asserts this was 
a "glaring misstatement of the law" because it is clear that the district court 
had a continuing obligation throughout the legal proceeding, including 
sentencing, to raise and consider the issue of his mental 
competency.

 
 
[¶44]  Mr. Haynes is correct that the district 
court had a continuing obligation to address the issue of his mental 
competency.  However, the statement 
quoted above was not made by the district court; the statement was made by the 
prosecutor during his argument in opposition to the new trial motion.  The record clearly reflects, contrary to 
Mr. Haynes' assertion, that the district court compared the statements contained 
in the risk assessment with the earlier testimony presented on the competency 
issue and found that no new evidence was presented.  Mr. Haynes' argument that the district 
court did not fulfill its obligation and ruled the matter of competency "closed" 
is not supported by the record.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶45]  The State presented evidence from which 
a jury could reasonably conclude the victim in this case was asleep and, 
therefore, "physically helpless" as required under the first degree sexual 
assault statute.  Mr. Haynes was not 
materially prejudiced by the prosecutor's improper comments during witness 
questioning and closing argument.  
The district court appropriately considered the issue of Mr. Haynes' 
mental competence throughout the proceedings, including sentencing.  

 
 
[¶46]  Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Section 
6-2-303(a)(v) was repealed effective July 1, 2007.  A new statute was enacted, § 6-2-314, 
with an effective date of July 1, 2007, creating the offense of first degree 
sexual abuse of a minor. The new statute provides in pertinent 
part:

 
 

(a)     
An actor 
commits the crime of sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree 
if:

(i)  Being sixteen (16) years of age or 
older, the actor inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim who is less than thirteen 
(13) years of age[.]

 
 
The statute 
imposes a maximum sentence of 50 years imprisonment.  

 
 

2Should we 
continue to see cases in which a prosecutor improperly informs the jury of the 
consequences of a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness, we will 
consider referral of the matter to the Board of Professional Responsibility as 
is our responsibility under Cannon 3D of the Code of Judicial Conduct and we 
remind district judges of their same responsibility.  For cases in which other courts have 
discussed such referrals, see United 
States v. Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 265 (3d Cir. 1984); AIG Hawai'i Ins. Co. v. Bateman, 923 P.2d 395, 402 (Haw. 1996); Gonzalez v. 
State, 768 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989); Suarez v. State, 481 So. 2d 1201, 1206 
(Fla. 1985). 

 
 

3It appears 
that the prosecutor was referring to K.H. as a victim of sexual assault by Mr. 
Haynes and Mr. Haynes as a victim of sexual abuse as a child by family 
members.  It is not clear whom the 
prosecutor was referring to as the third victim.

 
 

4W.R.Cr.P. 
33(c) provides for a new trial based on newly discovered 
evidence.

 
 

5§ 7-11-303.  Examination of accused to determine 
fitness to proceed; reports; commitment; defenses and 
objections.

    (a) If it appears at any stage of 
a criminal proceeding, by motion or upon the court's own motion, that there is 
reasonable cause to believe that the accused has a mental illness or deficiency 
making him unfit to proceed, all further proceedings shall be 
suspended.