Case Title: Jones v. State

Citation: 635 So. 2d 884

Docket Number: 90-KA-01048

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1994-04-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
635 So. 2d 884 (1994) Marcus Keith JONES v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 90-KA-01048. Supreme Court of Mississippi. April 7, 1994. *885 George T. Dickerson, Waynesboro, Thomas J. Lowe, Jr., Jackson, for appellant. Michael C. Moore, Atty. Gen., Mary Margaret Bowers, Jeffrey A. Klingfuss, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. En Banc.[1] McRAE, Justice, for the Court: Marcus Keith Jones was indicted, tried and convicted in the Circuit Court of Wayne County for possession of over one (1) ounce but less than a kilogram of marijuana with intent to sell. He was sentenced to serve eight (8) years in the Mississippi Department of Corrections and ordered to pay a fine of $3,000.00, court costs and lab fees. Aggrieved, he appeals, contending that the jury verdict, with respect to "intent to sell," was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. He further alleges the trial court erred in refusing a circumstantial evidence instruction. Finding no error in the instruction granted by the trial court, but also finding insufficient evidence to support the jury verdict of an intent to sell marijuana, we reverse and remand this cause to the trial court for proper sentencing for possession. On March 24, 1989, acting on information supplied by a confidential informant, Wayne County law enforcement officers obtained a search warrant for the mobile home residence of Marcus Jones. When the officers knocked on the entrance door of the trailer, they detected the sound of someone running inside. Jones' roommate opened the door. The officers entered and observed Jones walking toward them from the rear of the trailer. The bathroom toilet at the end of the hall was overflowing, and water was running into the hall. Officer Geoffrey Clark *886 lifted the top of the commode and observed a green substance floating in the water. Other officers immediately dug up the outside sewer pipes which expelled more green substance, subsequently determined to be marijuana. A search of Jones' home disclosed marijuana in Ziploc bags, a small pair of postal scales, one unloaded shotgun, one loaded 30/30 rifle, one ashtray containing marijuana residue, a medicine bottle containing four bags of marijuana, $800.00 in cash consisting of $20.00 bills, a shoe box containing marijuana residue, drug paraphernalia, and a pair of scissors. There were also several names and numbers written on the shoe box, described as: The total amount of marijuana confiscated weighed approximately four and one-half ounces. The money and medicine bottle were found between the mattresses in Jones' bedroom. At the time of his arrest, Jones was receiving workers' compensation payments of $285.00 every two weeks for an on-the-job injury. Jones admitted possession of the marijuana but denied he intended to sell or distribute any part of the contraband. Jones maintained the postal scales belonged to his mother, a diabetic, who used them daily to weigh meat. He contended the firearms belonged to his father although he (Jones) used them for hunting purposes. He testified that the cash was being saved for his children's Easter clothing, and the plastic bags were used for the sole purpose of preserving lunch sandwiches. He related that the writings on the shoe box consisted of bets made by him with some of his friends on the Mike Tyson-Frank Bruno fight in February 1989. On appeal, Jones presents the following issues: (a) The jury verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence with respect to the "intent to sell"; (b) The court erred in refusing to grant a circumstantial evidence instruction because there was no direct evidence of Jones' intent to sell. Jones requested, but was refused, a circumstantial evidence instruction requiring the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt, his intent to sell marijuana. He complains this was reversible error. Jones' assertion is answered in Williams v. State, 445 So. 2d 798, 808 (Miss. 1984), wherein we stated: In Boches v. State, 506 So. 2d 254 (Miss. 1987), Boches maintained he should have been granted a circumstantial evidence instruction on the question of the charge of intent to sell, transfer, or distribute marijuana. In refuting the contention, we stated: 506 So. 2d at 260. There is no merit in Jones' claim that the court erred in refusing his requested circumstantial evidence instruction. Our scope of review is well established regarding challenges to the weight of the evidence issue. Procedurally, such challenges contend that defendant's motion for new trial should have been granted. Miss. Unif.Crim.R. of Cir.Ct.Prac. 5.16. The decision to grant a new trial rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, and the motion should not be granted except to prevent "an unconscionable injustice." Wetz v. State, 503 So. 2d 803, 812 (Miss. 1987). "[We must] consider all the evidence, not just that supporting the case for the prosecution, in the light most consistent with the verdict," Jackson v. State, 580 So. 2d 1217, 1219 (Miss. 1991), and then reverse only on the basis of abuse of discretion. Id. Jones admits possession of the marijuana, but insists that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury verdict on intent to sell. He relies on the following cases which hold that the evidence was insufficient to support an intent to sell: Stringer v. State, 557 So. 2d 796 (Miss. 1990) (search of defendant and close area produced snuff cans containing 21 sets of T's and Blue's, determined to be a week supply for an average user and a two day supply for an addict); Drane v. State, 493 So. 2d 294 (Miss. 1986) (defendant found in possession of 912.3 grams of marijuana and 119.6 grams of marijuana laden brownies); Bryant v. State, 427 So. 2d 131 (Miss. 1983) (defendant arrested in lounge with possession of 55 3/4 methaqualone tablets and 85 1/2 diazepan tablets); Hollingsworth v. State, 392 So. 2d 515 (Miss. 1981) (scales, bags, paraphernalia, in addition to two bags of marijuana found in defendant's automobile). Appellant does not rely on the cases of Hicks v. State, 580 So. 2d 1302 (Miss. 1991) (eight "quarter paper" [$25] packets of cocaine and $100 in $10 and $20 bills found in Hicks' possession, even though Hicks was unemployed, were not sufficient to uphold Hicks' conviction for intent to distribute) and Clayton v. State, 582 So. 2d 1019 (Miss. 1991) (conviction *888 for intent reversed as there were insufficient quantities of cocaine [mere traces] from which the jury could infer an intent to distribute). In Jackson, the appellant was found in possession of six "nickel" bags of marijuana at a known drug dealing location and the sum of $103.00 in cash. The jury convicted him of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. The prosecution contended that the evidence was sufficient to establish intent to sell, distribute or transfer marijuana for the following reasons: (1) Jackson was at a known drug dealing location; (2) Jackson had six "nickel" bags of marijuana within a larger plastic bag, and users only purchased one or two "nickel" bags; and (3) Jackson had a large sum of money in his possession at the time of his arrest. Id. at 1218-1219. In reversing Jackson's conviction of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and remanding the case for proper sentencing for possession of the controlled substance, we stated: 580 So. 2d at 1219-20. In Stringfield v. State, 588 So. 2d 438 (Miss. 1991), the appellant was found in possession of a bag containing half an ounce of rock cocaine. In reversing his conviction of possession with intent to distribute, we stated: 588 So. 2d at 440-441. In Thomas v. State, 591 So. 2d 837 (Miss. 1991), the appellant was found in possession of a small quantity of cocaine (less than a third of an ounce) in an apartment of another defendant, where additional cocaine was seized, along with contraband used for distribution. We reversed and remanded for resentencing of Thomas for possession only, holding that the proof of intent to distribute was based on suspicion and surmise. Id. at 839. The more recent case of Jowers v. State, 593 So. 2d 46 (Miss. 1992), sheds additional light on the issue. The facts and holding in Jowers set forth the following on intent: Id. at 46-47 (Emphasis in original). The complexity of the mind-boggling question of the sufficiency of indirect evidence to sustain an intent to sell or deliver contraband is exemplified in Jowers. Four members of this Court concurred in the majority opinion while four members dissented. The majority and dissenting opinions were well reasoned and show the dilemma imposed by the efforts of professional minds to resolve the issue. In Breckenridge v. State, 472 So. 2d 373 (Miss. 1985), Keys v. State, 478 So. 2d 266 (Miss. 1985), Coyne v. State, 484 So. 2d 1018 (Miss. 1986), Guilbreau v. State, 502 So. 2d 639 (Miss. 1987) and Boches v. State, 506 So. 2d 254 (Miss. 1987), this Court has affirmed the findings of the lower courts in intent to sell or distribute cases. In Boches, 348 pounds of marijuana were found in the trunk of Boches' car. In Coyne, his trailer contained 5.4 pounds of marijuana, some of it in 27 small bags, along with scales and drug paraphernalia. In Breckenridge, the police seized fourteen different drugs, receipt and address books, $9,734.00 in cash, triple beam scales, plastic bags containing marijuana, hand-rolled marijuana cigarettes, a rolling machine and various guns and knives. In Keys, five grocery bags full of marijuana were found in the bathroom of Key's apartment. In Guilbeau, possession of 118 bales of marijuana weighing 5,100 pounds was sufficient to establish intent. In these cases, the evidence was not only something the jury could sink its teeth into, it was a virtual feast. We are again faced with the question of what constitutes "intent to sell." In drafting the statute, the legislature has not set out any parameters of "intent." As it stands, "intent" is like pornography you "know it when you see it." The road which we have traveled in the past has been very winding, and apparently will continue to wind. Our decisions and pronouncements on the "intent to sell" issue, however, require reversal in this case. The prosecution urges here, as in Jackson, that the $800.00 in currency found in Jones' mattress and the conflicting testimony pertaining to the real meaning of the names and numbers found on the shoe box containing contraband paraphernalia and residue constitute sufficient distinguishing factors to permit a jury to find the intent to sell. We are not persuaded. The evidence was insufficient for a reasonable jury to infer and conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Jones had the necessary intent to sell marijuana. For the reasons stated, Jones' conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell is hereby reversed and the cause remanded for resentencing Jones for possession of a controlled substance. HAWKINS, C.J., DAN M. LEE, P.J., and PITTMAN, J., concur. SULLIVAN, J., concurs in result only. BANKS, J., dissents with separate written opinion joined by PRATHER, P.J., and JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., and SMITH, JJ. HAWKINS, C.J., specially concurs with separate written opinion joined by SULLIVAN, J. HAWKINS, Chief Justice, specially concurring: I concur in reversing, but I do not believe the Legislature is in any position to give us guidance, as the majority suggests. Majority Opinion, p. 890. The problem comes from the difficulty of the question and the grave consequences of a wrong answer. The jury is asked to determine what is in a man's head, with consequences which can mean 27 additional years in the penitentiary. When a man is in possession of an illegal drug he is already on the way to the penitentiary for a period of up to three years. He is *891 not about to go unpunished. If the State wants to add up to 27 additional years, not for any act or deed beyond simple possession, but purely and simply for what is in his head, common sense and fairness tells you it should be substantial evidence, not mere surmise. Stringfield v. State, 588 So. 2d 438 (Miss. 1991). SULLIVAN, J., joins this opinion. BANKS, Justice, dissenting: For the reasons stated in my dissent in Jowers v. State, 593 So. 2d 46 (Miss. 1992), which apply very well to the facts of this case, I dissent from the reversal of this conviction. PRATHER, P.J., JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., and SMITH, JJ., join this dissent. [1] The original opinions are withdrawn and these opinions substituted therefor to address the only issue raised by the State, i.e., to delete the guidelines for a presumption of intent to sell or distribute a controlled substance set out in the original opinion, thereby giving the State an opportunity in possession with intent cases to determine the amounts necessary to establish a prima facie evidence threshold. We are agreeing to delete these guidelines, even though they were drawn from the Federal system of guidelines. The State accepted the decision of the Court regarding possession with intent and the case is being sent back on that basis. The State's petition for rehearing was the only one filed.