Case Title: Maniatis v. Karakitsios

Citation: 422 P.2d 52

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1967-01-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
422 P.2d 52 (1967) George MANIATIS, Plaintiff in Error, v. Georgia KARAKITSIOS, Defendant in Error. No. 20875. Supreme Court of Colorado, In Department. January 9, 1967. Harry H. Haddock, Charles Ginsberg, Charles Murdock, Denver, for plaintiff in error. Richard Hartman, Denver, for defendant in error. DAY, Justice. We will refer to the plaintiff in error as respondent and to the defendant in error as petitioneras they were designated in the juvenile court. This writ of error is directed to a judgment of the juvenile court of the City and County of Denver which adjudicated that respondent was the father of a child born to the petitioner out of wedlock and that he was contributing to its dependency. The court ordered that respondent pay the sum of $40 a month for child support. Although there are many assignments of error, only one, dealing with the manner in which the lower court proceedings were conducted, is dispositive of this writ of error. Because the matter will have to be retried on all issues, the other arguments advanced for reversal of the judgment need not be considered. *53 The case was initiated by petitioner under the provisions of C.R.S. 1963, 22-7-1, in which the respondent was charged with contributing to the dependency of the child. In trials held under this article a respondent has the right to a jury unless waived. C.R.S. 1963, 22-7-4. It is also provided in C.R.S. 1963, 22-9-1, that: C.R.S. 1963, 22-9-3, in pertinent part, states: Instead of a jury trial as first requested and in lieu of a trial before a master or referee as provided by statute, the court asked counselnot the same as appearing in this courtto consent to a procedure whereby the parties were to have a "jury trial in all respects" with the understanding, however, that it would be conducted by the referee. In the "arrangement" between the court and counsel it was agreed that the referee and the court would be bound by the jury verdict, although the jury was described as being "an advisory one." The following explanation was offered by the court and the referee sitting together in conference with counsel in chambers: * * * * * * It is contended in this writ of error that the trial court was without authority and had no jurisdiction to conduct the trial as it actually did, and that the stipulation of counsel (whereby it was made to appear that a jury trial was being in all respects conducted) is void. We agree with this contention. Lack of jurisdiction in this respect may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by agreement. Meyers v. Williams, 137 Colo. 325, 324 P.2d 788. We disapprove of the procedure in this case and offer the admonition that it not be followed in the future. In Everett v. Barry, 127 Colo. 34, 252 P.2d 826, construing the juvenile court's authority under the statute in effect when the case was tried, we succinctly stated: C.R.S. 1963, 37-9-1 et seq., the then pertinent statute, established the juvenile court and its powers. In section 37-9-3 it is provided: Pertaining to juries in the juvenile court, C.R.S. 1963, 37-9-14, provides: From the foregoing, the conclusion is inescapable that the authority in the juvenile judge to prescribe such procedure as used here is totally lacking. It is contrary to the statutes and rules of civil procedure of this state. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for retrial in consonance with the views herein expressed. FRANTZ and PRINGLE, JJ., concur.