Case Title: In re Selivonik

Citation: 164 Vt 383, 670 A.2d 831

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1995-11-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN_RE_SELIVONIK.94-170; 164 Vt 383; 670 A.2d 831

[Filed 17-Nov-1995]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 No. 94-170


In re Tonya Selivonik                             Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
                                                  Agency of Human Services
                                                  Human Services Board

                                                  February Term, 1995



Theodore C. Kramer, Chair

       Robert Appel, Defender General, Anna Saxman, Appellate Defender, and
  Karen Barney, Legal Intern, Montpelier, for appellant

       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Michael O. Duane
  and Alexandra N. Thayer, Assistant Attorneys General, Waterbury, for
  appellee Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       JOHNSON, J.  Petitioner sought to expunge her name from a state
  registry of sex abusers and appeals from an order of the Human Services
  Board denying her petition.  We affirm.

                                I.

       Petitioner was 15 years old in October 1988, when the Department of
  Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) initiated delinquency proceedings
  against her as a result of a violation of 13 V.S.A. § 3252(3), which
  allegedly occurred in May 1988.  The petition charged that she had engaged
  in inappropriate sexual conduct by fondling and kissing a child's penis
  while babysitting the child.  The court dismissed the delinquency petition
  in December 1988, and the State did not appeal.  The juvenile record in
  that matter was then sealed.

 

       The complaint was investigated by an SRS worker (FN1) and a state
  trooper, and in June 1988, SRS independently determined the complaint was
  substantiated and entered petitioner's name in its state registry for sex
  abusers.(FN2)  Petitioner was not notified of SRS's determination that the
  report was substantiated and was not told her name was entered on the state
  registry.

       In the fall of 1992 petitioner was employed at a day care center, and
  some time after she began work, the program's director was told by a parent
  that allegations of sexual assault had previously been made against
  petitioner.  The director confirmed the report with SRS, which warned that
  the program would be in violation of its license if it continued to employ
  petitioner. Petitioner was discharged from her employment.

       In January 1993 petitioner applied to the Human Services Board for an
  order expunging her name from the state's registry.  After an
  administrative hearing, the hearing officer recommended that petitioner's
  record be expunged from the state's registry, based on his interpretation
  of the registry statute and without reaching a decision on the merits.  The
  Board rejected the hearing officer's interpretation and remanded for a
  decision on the merits.  The hearing officer made further findings of fact
  and recommended that the petition be denied.  The recommendation was
  accepted by the Board.  The present appeal followed.

                                II.

       Petitioner argues first that since she was a child at the time her
  name was entered into the state child abuse registry, she has the right to
  expungement under 33 V.S.A. § 4916(g), which provides:

          (g)  A person may, at any time, apply to the human
     services board for relief if he or she has reasonable cause to

  

     believe that contents of the registry are being misused.  All
     registry records relating to an individual child shall be destroyed
     when the child reaches the age of majority.  All registry records
     relating to a family or siblings within a family shall be destroyed
     when the youngest sibling reaches the age of majority.  All
     registry records shall be maintained according to the name of the
     child who has been abused or neglected, and the name of the
     person about whom the report was made.

  (Emphasis added.)

       Petitioner contends that the Board ignored the plain meaning of the
  statute in ruling that the word "child" in § 4916(g) applied only to the
  victim and not to the person about whom the report was made, since the
  statute provides, "All registry records relating to an individual child
  shall be destroyed when the child reaches the age of majority."  We do not
  agree.

       As originally drafted, Section 4912(g) concluded with the clause, "All
  registry records shall be maintained according to the name of the child who
  has been abused or neglected." 1981, No. 207 (Adj. Sess.), § 1.  There was
  no provision for maintenance of records in the name of the perpetrator. 
  Thus, the original references to "child" had only one meaning -- the child
  who was the victim of abuse.  As petitioner concedes, the name of the
  abused child and the perpetrator were expunged when the child reached the
  age of majority.  The statute's concluding phrase, "and the name of the
  person about whom the report was made," was added by the Legislature in
  1990.  1989, No. 295 (Adj. Sess.), § 5.  The obvious purpose was to prevent
  loss of the perpetrator's name when the abused child's name was expunged
  from the registry.

       Petitioner argues that once "the person about whom the report was
  made" was included in the section, the Legislature also intended a change
  in the previous meaning of "child" to cover a child who was also a "person
  about whom the report was made."  Petitioner argues that testimony by a
  witness before the House Health and Welfare Committee in 1990 supports her
  argument that the Legislature intended to allow expungement of child
  perpetrators when they became adults.  Although a legislative witness did
  advocate this position to the committee, and suggested language be added to
  the bill to effectuate this result, the Legislature did not do so. In the
  context of a statute whose main purpose is the prevention of child abuse,
  the more

 

  persuasive interpretation is that the names of perpetrators were to be
  maintained regardless of age.

       Petitioner persuasively argues that our interpretation of the statute
  is inconsistent with the more general public policy of the state relating
  to juvenile offenders, which is to "remove from children committing
  delinquent acts the taint of criminality and the consequences of criminal
  behavior."  Title 33 V.S.A. § 5501(a)(2).  It is somewhat ironic that if
  petitioner had been convicted of child sexual abuse in juvenile
  proceedings, her record would have been sealed to protect her from the
  stigma of her misconduct in adulthood.  See In re R.D., 154 Vt. 173, 176,
  574 A.2d 160, 161 (1990).  Moreover, her conviction in the juvenile court
  would not have permitted the imposition of any civil disabilities resulting
  from the conviction or operated to disqualify her from any civil service
  application or appointment.  33 V.S.A. § 5535(a).  Instead, petitioner is
  permanently stigmatized by a Human Services Board finding, based on a
  preponderance of the evidence, that she committed one instance of sexual
  abuse.(FN3)  Although an expungement remedy is available in theory, the
  Legislature left no discretion in the Human Services Board to expunge an
  act for reasons other than that the allegation is untrue.

       Nevertheless, that the sexual abuse registry statute is seemingly
  contradictory to other public policies of the state is not sufficient to
  overcome the Legislature's intent to treat child sexual abuse as a special
  area of concern warranting different treatment.  The solution to
  petitioner's problem, if there is to be one, lies with the Legislature.

                               III.

       Petitioner next argues that her inclusion on the state registry
  violates her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.  She contends that
  the standard of proof required both for substantiation of an abuse
  complaint and at the hearing on expungement falls below the due

 

  process standard of a preponderance of the evidence articulated by the
  court in Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1004 (2d Cir. 1994) ("some credible
  evidence" standard did not allow for balancing of evidence from both sides,
  as allowed by "fair preponderance" standard, which is constitutionally
  appropriate).

       SRS does not dispute petitioner's claim that inclusion on the state
  registry implicates protected liberty and property interests of petitioner. 
  See Valmonte, 18 F.3d  at 1002 (holding that statutory impediment to
  employment caused by inclusion on state child abuse registry implicates
  liberty interest).  SRS also does not challenge petitioner's argument that
  the Human Services Board must apply a preponderance of the evidence
  standard in its hearing on petitioner's request for expungement.  See
  LaFaso v. Patrissi, 161 Vt. 46, 54,