Case Title: Commonwealth v. Bruneau

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11820

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-08-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11820 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  PETER BRUNEAU. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     April 7, 2015. - August 27, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Mental Impairment.  Practice, Criminal, Appeal, 
Judgment. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 1, 2008. 
 
 
The case was heard by Richard J. Carey, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review.  
 
 
 
Rebecca A. Jacobstein, Committee for Public Counsel 
Services, for the defendant. 
 
Jane Davidson Montori, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  We are asked in this case to determine whether 
a defendant who has been found not guilty of murder in the 
second degree by reason of mental illness may appeal from his 
conviction pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 28, or, whether, as the 
 
2 
Commonwealth contends, the sole avenue by which such a defendant 
may seek to appeal is a petition filed pursuant to G. L. c. 211, 
§ 3. 
In 2008, the defendant was indicted on a charge of murder 
in the first degree for the stabbing death of the victim, George 
Roy, but was repeatedly found not competent to stand trial until 
2013.  At that time, having heard testimony by a medical expert 
and having considered representations by defense counsel, a 
Superior Court judge concluded that the defendant was then 
competent.  The Commonwealth filed a nolle prosequi with respect 
to so much of the indictment that charged murder in the first 
degree, and after a colloquy, the defendant waived his right to 
a jury trial and agreed to the entry of stipulations to numerous 
facts.  The defendant's motions for a required finding of not 
guilty, made at the close of the Commonwealth's case and at the 
close of all evidence, were denied.  The sole defense offered by 
the defendant at trial was that, at the time he committed the 
murder, he lacked criminal responsibility due to mental illness.  
In his closing argument, the defendant's counsel conceded that 
the defendant killed the victim by "stabbing him repeatedly."  
The defendant was found not guilty by reason of mental illness 
and ordered hospitalized at Bridgewater State Hospital pursuant 
to G. L. c. 123, § 16.  The defendant filed an appeal under 
 
3 
G. L. c. 278, § 28, which the Commonwealth argues was 
inappropriate, and we granted his application for direct 
appellate review. 
We conclude that a defendant who is found not guilty by 
reason of mental illness may appeal under G. L. c. 278, § 28.  
We conclude also that the evidence in this case was sufficient 
to support a conviction of murder in the second degree and, 
therefore, that the judge did not err in denying the defendant's 
motion for a required finding of not guilty. 
Facts.  We recite the facts a fact finder could have found.  
On September 5, 2008, Chicopee police Officer John Provost, 
responding to reports that the victim had not been at work for 
several days, went to the victim's second-floor apartment in a 
building on Florence Street in Chicopee to conduct a well-being 
check.  Provost rang the doorbell and knocked loudly on the 
front and back doors several times, but there was no answer.  
After seeing an open window to the apartment, he called for a 
supervisor and a fire engine.  Three other officers arrived on 
the scene.  Sergeant Roy Landry and Sergeant David Heroux, the 
victim's nephew, again rang the doorbell and knocked loudly on 
the front and back doors but received no response.  Members of 
the fire department arrived and put up a ladder to the open 
second-floor window; a fire fighter gained access to the 
 
4 
apartment and opened the back door, through which Provost and 
Heroux entered.  The officers saw the defendant, who lived with 
the victim, standing in the kitchen with the fire fighter.  The 
defendant was wearing shorts and was sweating; a pornographic 
movie was playing on a television.  The victim's automobile was 
later found parked on the street outside the apartment, covered 
in a layer of pollen.  According to Provost, this was unusual, 
because the victim washed his vehicle frequently, sometimes as 
often as daily. 
In response to questions from Heroux, the defendant 
responded that he had not answered the door despite the repeated 
knocking and doorbell ringing, because he had been sleeping.  
When asked when he had last seen the victim the defendant said 
that he had not seen the victim since Tuesday night, three days 
previously, when the victim had come home with a "lover," a man 
named Chet.  When Heroux again asked the defendant when he had 
last seen the victim, the defendant responded that it had been 
about two weeks earlier.  Reminded that he had said he saw the 
victim on the previous Tuesday night, three days earlier, the 
defendant said, "Oh, yeah, it was Tuesday night."  Landry asked 
the defendant if he was injured, and the defendant said either, 
"I got stabbed" or, "I got stab wounds also."  The defendant 
pulled up his shirt and pulled down his pants to expose his 
 
5 
groin; there were no visible injuries. 
The police officers searched the apartment for the victim, 
but he was not found.  They noticed some red-brown stains on a 
rug in the doorway of the victim's bedroom that appeared to be 
blood.  There were no apparent blood stains in the defendant's 
bedroom.  There were red-brown stains on a cushioned chair in 
the living room, a pool of red-brown liquid in a corner of the 
chair, and spatter stains behind and around the chair.  Police 
also found red-brown stains on the stairs leading to the second 
floor of the apartment building.  A screening test of the stains 
on the rug and the stairs was positive for human blood.  Samples 
were collected for further testing; that testing confirmed that 
the stains were human blood.  Samples also were sent to the 
State police laboratory for deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing, 
which established that the DNA matched that of the victim. 
After obtaining a search warrant, police returned to search 
the defendant's apartment.  They found additional stains in the 
kitchen in front of the oven and underneath a rug.  In the 
defendant's bedroom, police found a hatchet leaning against a 
bureau.  The bottom of the hatchet had a label with a bar code.  
Police also searched the defendant's vehicle.  They found a 
single cinder block in the bed of the defendant's truck. 
The next day, September 6, 2008, Chicopee police received 
 
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an announcement from the Vermont State police that a body had 
been found along the side of the road on the northbound side of 
Interstate Route 91.  The body, with multiple stab wounds to the 
abdomen,1 was wrapped in a sheet, duct tape, and a ten-foot 
length of chain.  Attached to the chain was a tag with the 
letter "D" in white and orange, similar to a tag from a chain 
home improvement store.  Chicopee police arranged for George 
Roy's fingerprints2 to be sent to Vermont, where testing 
confirmed the body was Roy's. 
On their way back from Vermont, Chicopee police officers 
stopped at one of the chain's home improvement stores in West 
Springfield.  They gave store employees the bar code number from 
the label on the hatchet found in the defendant's room, and a 
description of the hatchet.  A store employee was able to 
determine that two such hatchets had been purchased at that 
store, one six days earlier, and one about a year previously.  
The receipt for the hatchet that had been purchased six days 
earlier, in cash, showed that an eight-inch square cinder block, 
ten feet of zinc chain, and a pair of latex gloves had been 
                                                 
1 There is no indication that the stab wounds were inflicted 
by the hatchet found in the defendant's room. 
 
2 George Roy's fingerprints were on file in connection with 
his application for a license to carry a firearm. 
 
 
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purchased at the same time.  Store surveillance video recordings 
showed the defendant making these purchases. 
Discussion.  1.  Right to appeal.  There is no 
constitutional right to appeal from a criminal conviction.  See 
Dickerson v. Attorney Gen., 396 Mass. 740, 743 n.3 (1986) ("The 
due process clause does not require a State to afford any 
appellate process whatsoever").  The right to appeal is granted 
by statute.  See, e.g., G. L. c. 278, § 28 (appeal by persons 
"aggrieved by a judgment" of District or Superior Court); G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E (direct appeal to Supreme Judicial Court for 
defendants convicted of murder in first degree). 
The defendant's appeal from the denial of his motion for a 
required finding of not guilty was filed under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 28.  General Laws c. 278, § 28, provides that a "defendant 
aggrieved by a judgment of the [D]istrict [C]ourt or of the 
[S]uperior [C]ourt in any criminal proceeding may appeal 
therefrom to the [S]upreme [J]udicial [C]ourt."  The 
Commonwealth argues that the defendant's appeal does not lie 
under G. L. c. 278, § 28, because a finding of not guilty by 
reason of mental illness is not a "judgment," and the defendant 
is not "aggrieved" since he has not been convicted.  The 
Commonwealth contends that the defendant may seek to pursue an 
appeal only by filing a petition for extraordinary relief 
 
8 
pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.3 
We do not agree.  We conclude that an appeal under G. L. 
c. 278, § 28, is the appropriate avenue by which a defendant 
found not guilty by reason of mental illness may challenge that 
verdict. 
Prior to the enactment of the Massachusetts Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, we allowed a defendant found not guilty by 
reason of insanity to appeal under G. L. c. 278, § 33B, from the 
denial of his motion for a required finding of not guilty.  See 
Commonwealth v. Curtis, 318 Mass. 584, 585 (1945) (Curtis).  At 
that time, G. L. c. 278, § 33B,4 controlled the procedure for 
                                                 
3 General Laws c. 211, § 3, provides, in relevant part, "The 
[S]upreme [J]udicial [C]ourt shall have general superintendence 
of all courts of inferior jurisdiction to correct and prevent 
errors and abuses therein if no other remedy is expressly 
provided."  Review under G. L. c. 211, § 3, is "extraordinary" 
and is not available "for ordinary cases."  Commonwealth v. 
DeJesus, 440 Mass. 147, 150 (2003), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Lowder, 432 Mass. 92, 94 (2000).  A party seeking relief under 
G. L. c. 211, § 3, must demonstrate a substantial violation of a 
substantive right and harm that cannot be remedied in the 
ordinary course of appeal.  Commonwealth v. Negron, 441 Mass. 
685, 688 n.4 (2004). 
 
4 General Laws c. 278, § 33B, provided: 
 
"A defendant in a case of murder or manslaughter, 
or other felony . . . , aggrieved by an opinion, 
ruling, direction or judgment of the [S]uperior 
[C]ourt, rendered upon any question of law arising out 
of such case or upon a motion for new trial, but not 
upon a plea in abatement, who desires to appeal 
therefrom and whose exceptions thereto have been 
 
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filing an appeal from convictions under G. L. c. 278, §§ 33A-
33G.  General Laws c. 278, § 33B, was repealed in 1979, when the 
Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure took effect.  See 
St. 1979 c. 346, § 1.  Today, the Massachusetts Rules of 
Appellate Procedure establish the procedure for filing an 
appeal.  Although the rules changed certain aspects of the 
procedures to be followed in filing an appeal, compare Guerin v. 
Commonwealth, 337 Mass. 264, 266 (1958), with Mass. R. A. P. 
8 (a), as amended, 378 Mass. 932 (1979), they "shall not be 
construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction, as established by 
law, of the Supreme Judicial Court."  Mass. R. A. P. 1 (b), as 
amended, 421 Mass. 1601 (1995). 
2.  General Laws c. 278, § 28.  We allowed a defendant 
found not guilty by reason of insanity to appeal under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33B, because "the defendant was aggrieved unless there 
was evidence warranting a verdict of guilty."  Curtis, supra at 
585.  We must determine whether such an appeal is proper under 
G. L. c. 278, § 28.  We review questions of statutory 
interpretation de novo.  Sheehan v. Weaver, 467 Mass. 734, 737 
(2014). 
                                                                                                                                                             
seasonably saved shall, within twenty days after 
verdict, file a claim of appeal in writing with the 
clerk, who shall forthwith notify the district 
attorney of such claim." 
 
 
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a.  Judgment.  A defendant in a criminal case may appeal 
under G. L. c. 278, § 28, only if the defendant is "aggrieved by 
a judgment."  The concept of finality underlies the definition 
of a judgment; generally, a judgment must be final to be 
appealable.  See generally Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis 
for Appeal, 41 Yale L.J. 539, 552 (1932) ("The basic principle, 
then, in practically all jurisdictions in this country is that 
only final judgments are appealable").  See also Judiciary Act 
of 1789 § 22, 1 Stat. 73, 84-85 (1789) (requiring final 
judgments for Federal appeals). 
A judgment becomes final for purposes of appellate review 
"when the [court of first instance] disassociates itself from 
the case, leaving nothing to be done at the court of first 
instance save execution of the judgment."  Clay v. United 
States, 537 U.S. 522, 527 (2003).  For other purposes, however, 
"finality attaches at a different stage . . . [at] issuance of 
the appellate court's mandate."  Id. (noting certain 
determinations under Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3161).  "In a criminal case the [final judgment] rule 
prohibits appellate review until conviction and imposition of 
sentence."  Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263 (1984).  
See Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937) ("[f]inal 
judgment in a criminal case means sentence.  The sentence is the 
 
11 
judgment").  The common theme is that "a 'final decision' 
generally is one which ends the litigation on the merits and 
leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment."  
United States v. Vela, 624 F.3d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 2010), 
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2152 (2011), quoting United States v. 
Ray, 375 F.3d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 2004) (concluding that 
defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity had right to 
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291).  "When a criminal defendant is 
found guilty, it is unremarkable that there is no final judgment 
until the defendant is sentenced; it is only at sentencing that 
the criminal action terminates and 'nothing [is left] for the 
court to do but execute the judgment.'"  United States v. Vela, 
supra, quoting Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 
794, 798 (1989). 
Our jurisprudence has recognized consistently that, in 
general, "[i]n criminal cases, the final judgment is the 
sentence."  Commonwealth v. Brown, 466 Mass. 676, 679 (2013), 
quoting Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 10800 v. Sex Offender 
Registry Bd., 459 Mass. 603, 621 (2011).  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Caetano, 470 Mass. 774, 777 (2015), citing 
Commonwealth v. Delgado, 367 Mass. 432, 438 (1975) ("no appeal 
may come before us until after judgment, which in criminal cases 
is the sentence").  In the case of a defendant found not guilty 
 
12 
by reason of insanity, however, there is no sentence because 
there is no conviction.  See Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 431 
Mass. 506, 507 (2000) ("A verdict of not guilty by reason of 
insanity is not a 'conviction' within the meaning of [G. L. 
c. 278,] § 33E"). 
A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is, 
nonetheless, a final judgment.  When a finder of fact finds a 
criminal defendant "not guilty by reason of insanity, the 
docketing of the verdict amounts to a final judgment because the 
criminal proceeding has come to an end and no criminal sentence 
will follow."  United States v. Vela, supra.  See Mass. R. Crim. 
P. 28 (a), 378 Mass. 898 (1979).  After a verdict of not guilty 
by reason of insanity is docketed, there are no additional 
matters for a judge to dispose of, and the "court disassociates 
itself from the case, leaving nothing to be done . . . save 
execution of the judgment."  Clay v. United States, supra at 
527.  An acquittal solely by reason of insanity conclusively 
resolves the underlying criminal proceedings, and the criminal 
proceeding becomes final with the verdict.  See Curtis, 318 
Mass. at 585 (allowing defendant found not guilty by reason of 
insanity to appeal under G. L. c. 278, §§ 33A-33G); United 
States v. Stewart, 452 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2006).  Civil 
commitment proceedings under G. L. c. 123, § 16, which follow a 
 
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verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness, are civil in 
nature, not criminal. 
The Commonwealth argues that a finding of not guilty by 
reason of insanity is an acquittal, and therefore not 
appealable.  This contention is unavailing.  An acquittal is 
also a judgment, notwithstanding the lack of a sentence.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Labadie, 467 Mass. 81, 82, cert. denied, 
135 S. Ct. 257 (2014).  The prohibition on appealing from an 
acquittal comes not from its lack of finality, or because an 
acquittal is not a judgment, but, rather, because in the case of 
an acquittal, a defendant is not "aggrieved" under the statute, 
and therefore may not appeal under G. L. c. 278, § 28, and the 
double jeopardy clause bars the Commonwealth from any appeal.  
See, e.g., Huss v. Graves, 252 F.3d 952, 956 (8th Cir. 2001), 
cert. denied, 535 U.S. 933 and 535 U.S. 551 (2002) (jeopardy 
attached at bench trial deciding whether defendant should be 
found not guilty by reason of insanity; defendant could not be 
retried).  See also Commonwealth v. Therrien, 383 Mass. 529, 532 
(1981) ("It has long been accepted that the Commonwealth may not 
appeal from an acquittal of a criminal defendant . . ."). 
Although a finding of not guilty by reason of mental 
illness is an acquittal, in the sense that it absolves a 
defendant of criminal responsibility, it is unlike an acquittal 
 
14 
because it includes a finding that the defendant committed the 
criminal act.  Compare Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363 
(1983) ("A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity 
establishes two facts:  [i] the defendant committed an act that 
constitutes a criminal offense, and [ii] he committed the act 
because of mental illness"), with United States v. Martin Linen 
Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 579 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in 
the judgment) ("true acquittal is based upon the insufficiency 
of the evidence to prove an element of the offense" [quotation 
and citation omitted]).  If a jury has a reasonable doubt 
whether a defendant committed each of the required elements of 
the crime, it must find the defendant not guilty; if there is a 
reasonable doubt about the defendant's criminal responsibility 
at the time of the crime, then the jury must find the defendant 
not guilty by reason of mental illness.  See Instruction 9.200 
of the Criminal Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District 
Court (2009). 
b.  Whether defendant is "aggrieved".  Where a defendant 
asserts a defense of mental illness, the Commonwealth must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt both that the defendant committed the 
crime and that the defendant was criminally responsible at the 
time the crime was committed.  See Jones v. United States, 
supra.  If the Commonwealth has not met its burden to prove that 
 
15 
the defendant committed the crime, the defendant is aggrieved by 
a verdict of not guilty by reason of mental illness.  
Furthermore, although such a defendant has not been found 
guilty, and has not been sentenced, a defendant found not guilty 
by reason of mental illness faces harsh consequences because the 
defendant is eligible for civil commitment under strict 
security, where he would be confined for an indefinite period of 
time.  See G. L. c. 123, § 16.  Accordingly, where a defendant 
chooses to pursue a defense of lack of criminal responsibility 
due to mental illness, judges are required, upon request by the 
defendant, to inform the jury of the "consequences of a verdict 
of not guilty by reason of insanity."  See Commonwealth v. 
Biancardi, 421 Mass. 251, 251-252 (1995), quoting Commonwealth 
v. Mutina, 366 Mass. 810, 823 n.12 (1975). 
Because a defendant found not guilty by reason of mental 
illness has been "aggrieved by a judgment," the defendant may 
appeal from that verdict under G. L. c. 278, § 28.5 
                                                 
5 We recognize that Mass. R. Crim. P. 28 (c), 378 Mass. 898 
(1979), which provides for notification of the right to appeal 
"[a]fter a judgment of guilty is entered," does not by its terms 
require notification for defendants found not guilty by reason 
of mental illness of their right to appeal.  We therefore refer 
the rule to the standing committee of this court for criminal 
rules.  See Commonwealth v. Simmons, 448 Mass. 687, 699-700 
(2007). 
 
 
 
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3.  Sufficiency of the evidence.  We review a denial of a 
motion for a required finding of not guilty to determine 
whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, there is sufficient evidence for a rational trier 
of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-
677 (1979).  "We consider the state of the evidence at the close 
of the Commonwealth's case to determine whether the defendant's 
motion should have been granted at that time."  Commonwealth v. 
Sheline, 391 Mass. 279, 283 (1984). 
"Murder in the second degree is the unlawful killing of a 
human being with malice aforethought."  Commonwealth v. McGuirk, 
376 Mass. 338, 344 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1120 (1979).  
"Circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to meet the 
burden of establishing guilt."  Commonwealth v. Woods, 466 Mass. 
707, 713, cert. denied. 134 S. Ct. 2855 (2014).  "[I]nferences 
drawn from that evidence 'need only be reasonable and possible'; 
[they] need not be necessary or inescapable."  Id., quoting 
Commonwealth v. Merola, 405 Mass. 529, 533 (1989). 
Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the Commonwealth, there was sufficient evidence from which a 
trier of fact could have concluded that the defendant had 
committed each element of the crime, and thus that the 
 
17 
defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty properly 
was denied. 
A fact finder could infer from the many blood stains in the 
apartment that the victim had been stabbed to death in the 
apartment he shared with the defendant.  The receipt from the 
purchases at the home improvement store support an inference 
that the defendant acquired the means to kill, and planned to 
kill, the victim.  A surveillance video recording of the 
defendant, recorded six days before the body was found, shows 
him purchasing a hatchet identical to the one found in his 
bedroom, a cinder block of the sort found in his truck, latex 
gloves, and ten feet of zinc chain identical to the chain used 
to bind the victim's body.  The hatchet and the chain both had 
inventory labels on them with bar code numbers matching those on 
the receipt associated with the defendant's purchases, which 
were matched to the store's inventory.  This evidence "allowed a 
rational jury to infer that the defendant had the means (one of 
the tools lying around the victim's house) and opportunity to 
kill the victim."  Commonwealth v. Evans, 469 Mass. 834, 843 
(2014).  The evidence "not only corroborate[d] the essential 
elements needed to convict the defendant [of murder] but also 
link[ed him] to the crime."  Commonwealth v. Vacher, 469 Mass. 
425, 440 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 425 Mass. 
 
18 
357, 360 (1997).  See Commonwealth v. Donahue, 430 Mass. 710, 
711 (2000) (sufficient evidence of murder in first degree where 
human blood stains were present in bedroom, basement, and 
defendant's automobile, receipts were found for purchase of 
fifty-gallon plastic container and storage locker rental, and 
defendant stored victim's body in identical container in storage 
locker); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 426 Mass. 189, 192-193 (1997) 
(sufficient evidence that defendant "deliberately set fire with 
specific intent to murder his parents" where, among other 
things, defendant put gasoline he bought in portable canister 
day before fire). 
There was also considerable evidence that the defendant 
demonstrated consciousness of guilt.  The defendant did not 
answer the door in response to repeated knocking by police.  See 
Commonwealth v. Toney, 385 Mass. 575, 584 (1982) (inference of 
consciousness of guilt "may be drawn from evidence of flight, 
concealment, or similar acts").  After the fire fighter 
ultimately entered through a window and admitted the police 
officers, the defendant's statements to police about when he had 
last seen the victim were inconsistent.  See Commonwealth v. 
Woods, supra at 715 (consciousness of guilt "includes making 
false or inconsistent statements to police"). 
The defendant also told officers that he had been "stabbed" 
 
19 
or that he had "stab wounds also," although he had no apparent 
injuries.  This evidence supported an inference that the 
defendant was present at the time of the stabbing, and stabbed 
the victim, because he had knowledge of the method of the 
killing.  See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 431 Mass. 108, 114, 
cert. denied, 531 U.S. 864 (2000) (sufficient evidence where 
defendant assumed victim "had been stabbed even though he had 
not been informed of the circumstances of [the victim's] 
death"); Commonwealth v. Cordle, 404 Mass. 733, 741-742 (1989), 
S.C., 412 Mass. 172 (1992) (sufficient evidence where jury 
plausibly could infer defendant was present at time of shooting, 
had motive for killing, and evidenced consciousness of guilt).  
In addition, the defendant expressed no alarm over the blood 
stains in the apartment that were readily apparent.  See 
Commonwealth v. Thompson, supra (defendant's unusual behavior 
included lack of inquiry as to manner of victim's death). 
Although a conviction may not "rest upon the piling of 
inference upon inference or on conjecture and speculation."  
Commonwealth v. Lao, 443 Mass. 770, 779 (2005), S.C., 450 
Mass. 215 (2007) and 460 Mass. 12 (2011), viewing these facts in 
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, there was  
 
 
 
20 
sufficient evidence to establish that the defendant committed 
each element of the murder. 
Judgment affirmed.