Case Title: DONALD G. SWORD v. DUANE SHILLINGER, Warden of the Wyoming State Penitentiary and the ATTORNEY GENERAL of the State of Wyoming

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-11-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
DONALD G. SWORD v. DUANE SHILLINGER, Warden of the Wyoming State Penitentiary and the ATTORNEY GENERAL of the State of Wyoming1989 WY 200782 P.2d 1117Case Number: 89-255Decided: 11/17/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
.
DONALD G. SWORD, 
PETITIONER,

v.

DUANE SHILLINGER, WARDEN 
OF THE WYOMING STATE PENITENTIARY AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, RESPONDENTS.

Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari and/or Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Donald G. Sword, 
pro se.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen. and John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondents.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF 
COUNSEL AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI, AND/OR PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

[¶1.]     The above captioned 
matter coming before the court upon the Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma 
Pauperis, Motion for Appointment of Counsel and Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
and/or Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by the Petitioner, Donald G. 
Sword, and the court having examined the file, having reviewed the matter and 
being fully advised in the premises finds that Petitioner, Donald G. Sword, 
qualifies as an indigent person and is entitled to proceed in this case in forma 
pauperis; and that the court having found insufficient grounds to grant relief, 
it is therefore

[¶2.]     ORDERED that the 
Petitioner, Donald G. Sword, be, and he is hereby, granted leave to proceed in 
forma pauperis without being required to pay filing fees or costs; and, it is 
further

[¶3.]     ORDERED that the Motion 
for Appointment of Counsel and the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, and/or 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus be, and they are hereby, 
denied.

URBIGKIT, J., dissents and files 
an opinion.

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶4.]     For nearly four years 
now, I have argued for one 
comprehensive and complete substantive state court system 
consideration of issues raised after initial appeal, if any, when the convicted 
individual would be afforded that substantive opportunity to address 
either sentencing or the process and merits of guilt determination. It was at 
least hoped that if this state court system would do a reasonably judicious job, 
shoving off Wyoming cases onto the federal court system 
would be deterred and some reasonable access to constitutionally protected 
rights to justice would still be secured for the convicted 
person.

[¶5.]     These four years have 
seen a result totally contrary to that goal of a one-time, sincerely conducted 
post-conviction-review process. Rather than substance, we talk waiver and 
forfeiture of constitutional rights and also multiply the processes. Now, we are 
adding one more chapter to the book of substantive non-review by ignoring 
reality that simplicity would be served by doing something. By just explaining 
"why not," we do nothing.

[¶6.]     Through an entire 
course of cases, the office of the attorney general has urged a result upon this 
court which this court has generally tended to accept, that we settle with the 
excuse of waiver or default as a basis to deny review. Consistently on all 
post-conviction-review applications, the office of the attorney general has 
contended no relief was available in our state courts. As this court acceded by 
defection from substantive adjudication, I warned insistently that we only push 
the responsibility onto the federal courts if we destroy state processes which 
could otherwise provide a realistic review of contended issues.1 Consequently, petitioners such as 
Donald G. Sword accepted in conclusion what the attorney general claimed, what 
this court did, and what I said and thus have now filed their petitions to seek 
constitutional remedies in the federal courts.

[¶7.]     What has now apparently 
happened, as illustrated here, is the office of the attorney general has now 
gone to the federal court and argued the petitioner has not exhausted state 
remedies while that same office has alternatively argued for denial of 
substantive review before the courts of this state's judicial system. Directly 
contrary faces spoke on the identical subject in the two different court 
systems. The incongruity of all this facade and subterfuge is that if the issues 
presented by the petitioners had been directly addressed in substantive review 
on the first opportunity presented (in the state courts), then res judicata 
would properly have been applied rather than confiscation by incompetence, which 
is the bell cow of forfeiture of constitutional rights by counsel default or 
neglect; and in the great majority of cases with processes satisfied, the guilt 
and sentence would be constitutionally justified and rationally 
affirmed.

[¶8.]     Without question, it is 
not within the jurisdiction of this court to deny to the office of the attorney 
general the opportunity to make directly contrary presentations between the 
federal and state courts when we give due deference to both the federalist 
system of judicial powers of this nation and the internal separation of powers 
as provided within our state constitution. The case is, however, now back before 
us by the justification argued in federal court by the office of the attorney 
general that Sword had not exhausted state remedies. In my opinion, it is time 
to stop the ball from being bounced and to end here directly contrary legal 
positions from being argued before different courts and to terminate this 
charade in process and paperwork of exhausted time and expended financial 
resources. Since the office of the attorney general argued in federal court that 
state remedies had not been 
exhausted, I would accede here to what they said there, so that we should 
substantively address the submitted issues. This would relieve further 
processing and disinformation by next stage return of the petitioners to the 
district courts and courts of appeal of the federal judicial system as we now do 
by this denial of the petition for writ of certiorari.

[¶9.]     With Wyoming 
post-conviction relief decimated, if not destroyed by decisions of this court 
for most cases, disemboweled by the office of the attorney general's demands and 
concurrence by the public defender followed by action of the legislature, Sword, 
by this proceeding, accepted the assertions of the office of the attorney 
general that the state rights to relief had been exhausted, although none had 
been provided. The office of the attorney general then argued to the contrary 
before the federal court. In the interest of conservation of paper, if nothing 
else, I would also accept that last offering of the office of the attorney 
general and address, substantively, arguments made by this incarcerated 
individual which consider the invalidity of his conviction and 
sentence.

[¶10.]  A history of the Sword litigation is 
informative. Sword's conviction was a product of the CampbellCounty grand jury sessions of 1984 and 
1985. See Hennigan v. State, 746 P.2d 360 (Wyo. 1987), which spanned volumes of appellate 
litigation within its many indictments. Sword is one of the few, or perhaps only 
one, of those involved who still remains incarcerated for his conviction which 
was the result of a "bargained" guilty plea.

[¶11.]  An initial appeal after sentence, 
although the issue of violated plea bargain was never considered, the law 
student public defender function of the University of Wyoming Law School 
provided the appellate briefing and raised only issues of the grand jury 
process, see Hennigan, 746 P.2d 360, and abuse of discretion and extent of 
confinement time resulting from a three charge consecutive sentence. Issues of a 
state prosecutorial violation of the plea agreement and, of course, 
ineffectiveness of either trial or appellate counsel did not appear. The 
apparent plea agreement breach resulted after the prosecutor had agreed to stand 
mute at sentencing as part of the deal and then strongly argued to the trial 
court for an extended sentence after plea when appearing at the sentencing 
hearing. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S. Ct. 495, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1971). The apparent basis for the prosecutor to ignore the agreement which 
he had made in the plea bargain was the statement that Sword did not adequately 
identify other participants in the CampbellCounty drug dealing after he pleaded out 
and before he was sentenced. Judicial consideration has never been given by any 
court for this purported justification whereby the prosecutor violated the plea 
bargain agreement.

[¶12.]  In Sword v. State, 746 P.2d 423 (Wyo. 
1987) (Sword I), this court affirmed the grand jury proceedings, as it had in 
Hennigan, 746 P.2d 360, albeit for a different reason, and also affirmed the 
length of sentence on an abuse of discretion inquiry. Sword then filed a 
petition for post-conviction relief pro se and requested the appointment of 
counsel. The text of the petition is not present in the files of this court, but 
the general subject can be discerned from the findings and conclusions of the 
trial court as a dismissal order which was entered December 6, 1988, or one day 
before the petitioner's objection to the proposed order had been received and 
filed in CampbellCounty. Sword had 
specifically asked for the appointment of counsel and that request had been 
specifically denied despite a clear statutory right and this court's decisions 
in Fondren v. State, 749 P.2d 767 (Wyo. 1988); Alberts v. State, 745 P.2d 898 
(Wyo. 1987); and Long v. State, 745 P.2d 547 (Wyo. 1987). Then, he was not even 
given an opportunity as a pro se litigant to object before the untimely order 
was accepted, signed and entered by the trial court.

[¶13.]  Issues raised in that proceeding included 
(a) violation of W.R.Cr.P. 15(c) regarding advice at sentencing; (b) ineffective 
assistance of counsel at sentencing; (c) breach of plea bargain by the 
prosecutor at sentencing; and (d) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
for failure to raise those same issues on direct appeal and particularly so 
relative to the breached plea bargain.

[¶14.]  The State's response was that these 
issues were not "cognizable under the Wyoming Post-Conviction Relief Act" and 
"were frivolous." Since the trial court did not grant relief to Sword by 
appointment of licensed counsel, the petition also requested that Charles Pote, 
an inmate at the Wyoming State Penitentiary, be permitted to represent him and 
assist in presentation for the post-conviction-relief proceeding. This request 
was also denied. The trial court then found:

9. Defendant/Petitioner's 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing and breach of the plea 
bargain at sentencing are claims of error that occurred, if at all, after the 
proceedings resulting in Defendant/Petitioner's conviction and as such they are 
not subject to review by Post-Conviction Relief in Wyoming. Sanchez v. State, 
Wyo., 755 P.2d 245 (1988); Whitney v. State, 
Wyo., 745 P.2d 902 (1987).

* * * * * 
*

16. In any event, the 
Court is without jurisdiction to appoint an inmate of the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary, not licensed to practice law, to represent Defendant/Petitioner in 
this proceeding as Defendant/Petitioner requests.

* * * * * 
*

Defendant/Petitioner 
having filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief with a request for 
appointment of counsel, the State of Wyoming having moved to dismiss and objected 
to the appointment of counsel and the Court having conducted a hearing to 
inquire into this matter and being fully advised:

IT IS ORDERED that in 
accordance with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law made by the Court, 
Defendant/Petitioner's request for appointment of counsel is denied, the 
Petition being frivolous, and the State of Wyoming's Motion to Dismiss is granted and the 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is denied.[2]

[¶15.]  The trial court disposed of Sword's 
consideration of any issues raised in post-conviction relief relative to 
ineffectiveness of legal assistance by the following 
statement:

Defendant/Petitioner's 
claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel does not authorize the 
Court's consideration of his underlying claims of error, under the procedure 
provided by Section 7-14-103, W.S. 1977 (1988 Cum.Supp.) and Cutbirth v. State, 
Wyo., 751 P.2d 1257 (1988), as those underlying claims of error are not 
cognizable by Post-Conviction Relief in Wyoming.

[¶16.]  This order, which was simply submitted by 
the office of the attorney general and signed in unchanged form by the trial 
court, had been first submitted to Sword by letter of November 29, 1988, which 
recited the right to object within five 
days:

Dear Mr. 
Sword:

Enclosed please find a 
copy of proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and order prepared as 
requested by the Court at the hearing on your petition held November 16, 1988. 
Pursuant to Rule 404 of the Uniform Rules for District Courts you must file with 
the Court your objections, if any, to the findings, conclusions and order within 
five days.

Responsive to 
the November 30th receipt of this communication, Sword addressed a letter to the 
trial judge:

Dear Judge 
Judson,

* * * * * 
*

On Monday, December 5, 
1988, I anticipated mailing Petitioner's 
Objections to Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order of the Court in the above captioned case. Petitioner received the 
Respondent's documents on November 30, 1988. Opposing counsel, Gerald Luckhaupt, 
has advised the Petitioner that any objections must be made within five (5) 
days. This advice was provided in a letter addressed to Petitioner, dated 
November 29, 1988, and counsel indicates a copy of said letter has been sent to 
the Court. Petitioner received the documents on November 30, 1988. Petitioner 
needs two days in which to formulate his objections. The 3rd and 4th comprise 
the relevant weekend. No mail is permitted to leave the prison on weekends, thus 
eliminating any reasonable possibility that the responsive pleading can be 
mailed until the 5th.

I am writing this letter 
to preclude the possibility that the Court may inadvertently sign the 
Respondent's papers without first reviewing Petitioner's 
objections.

Service of a copy of this 
letter is being made upon Gerald Luckhaupt.

Thank you for instructing 
the Clerk to enter this letter on the docket.

(Emphasis in 
original.)

[¶17.]  The trial court then entered the order on 
December 6th, and the objection arrived on December 7th, not to be considered 
until now by this dissent. Rules for computation of time as provided by W.R.C.P. 
6 and W.R.Cr.P. 43 were obviously ignored.See Houston v. Lack, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S. Ct. 2379, 101 L. Ed. 2d 245 (1988).

[¶18.]  All of this meant the uncounseled 
petition was denied without substantive consideration, except the trial court 
said, as a finding of fact, it had at time of plea adequately advised Sword. It 
is interesting to compare the objections made by Sword to the order which were 
never considered by the trial court in advance of its approval of the office of 
the attorney general's submission. The objection taken by Sword also cited four 
recent Wyoming cases: Aden v. State, 761 P.2d 88 (Wyo. 1988); Fondren, 749 P.2d 767; Alberts, 
745 P.2d 898; and Long, 745 P.2d 547 as authority for his statutory right to 
counsel. Sword reflected:

5. In light of the recent 
Supreme Court decisions, and as shown above, to continue to fail to address the 
question of Mr. Sword's indigence and numerous requests for appointment of 
counsel, is merely to require a needless shuffling of paperwork between the 
district and appellate courts. Clearly such is not in the best interest of 
judicial economy.

6. The proposed findings 
and conclusions of law prepared by the State, are based only upon the State's 
unopposed Motion to Dismiss. The Court has failed to appoint counsel to 
represent Mr. Sword. The Court has also failed to decide Mr. Sword's motion 
dated October 26, 1988, wherein the Court is asked to grant permission for Mr. 
Sword to rebut the State's Motion to Dismiss. At the telephonic "hearing" held 
on November 16, 1988, Mr. Sword was not represented by counsel. Mr. Sword is not 
qualified to cite competent authority, make cogent argument, or argue the merit 
of his Petition. As is true of most prisoners, Mr. Sword is functionally 
illiterate. The State would have the courts continue to take advantage of 
illiterate prisoners in order to better cover-up for their illegal 
confinement.

7. Mr. Sword respectfully 
suggests that he is entitled to a determination of his motions by a fair and 
impartial jurist. For purposes of the record, the Court has also failed to 
establish whether recusal has been considered, as requested within the Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief.

[¶19.]  This analysis continues to be reflective 
of the present bouncing ball now being conducted between the state and federal 
courts. This is as close as Sword has ever reached to any consideration of his 
substantive issues of conviction and sentence, including specifically breach of 
a plea agreement by the prosecutor.

[¶20.]  Following denial of the 
post-conviction-relief petition by the December 6, 1988 order, Sword next filed 
a petition for writ of certiorari in this court addressing his 
issue:

Whether the district 
court's refusal to decide the question of indigence or to appoint counsel is 
violative of procedural due process, contrary to Supreme Court decisions, 
contrary to statutory requirements, and violates Petitioner's constitutional 
right to due process and equal protection of the law?

In the petition 
again supported by citation of this court's recent decisions of Aden, 761 P.2d 88; Fondren, 749 P.2d 767; Alberts, 745 P.2d 898; and Long, 745 P.2d 547, Sword 
stated in part for contention and summarized argument:

[¶21.]  In the interest of judicial economy, only 
one question will be presented to this Court on petition for a writ of 
certiorari. It is possible that the Court may require briefing on the many 
underlying issues which readily become apparent on a reading of the Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief presented to the district court and the district court's 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. Donald Sword respectfully 
suggests that opposing counsel has failed to plead in good faith at the district 
court level, and that Wyoming's statutory proscription against 
allowing rebuttal invites such dishonesty.

ARGUMENT

The district court's 
refusal to decide the question of indigence or to appoint counsel is violative 
of procedural due process, contrary to Supreme Court decisions, contrary to 
statutory requirements, and violates Petitioner's constitutional right to due 
process and equal protection of the law, for two independent 
reasons.

1. The court-below failed 
to meet the statutory requirement to determine whether the Petitioner is without 
any reasonable means to hire his own attorney.

* * * * * 
*

2. Recent Supreme Court 
decisions require appointment of counsel.

(Emphasis in 
original.) Charles Pote filed a motion for leave to file an amicus curiae brief 
reciting he had prepared all of the pleadings (and continues to do so through 
the present petition).3 Sword filed a notice of W.R.Cr.P. 
11 violation against the office of the attorney general which, with motion to 
file the amicus curiae brief and the petition for the writ of certiorari, were 
denied by this court and reconfirmed by reconsideration denial on February 3, 
1989 to end that sequence of state court proceedings during which Sword failed 
to receive substantive consideration of his principal complaint of breached plea 
bargain agreement at sentencing.

[¶22.]  Sword next went to the federal court 
where the office of the attorney general argued that no exhaustion of state 
remedies had occurred; which was answered by relief denial and re-reference to 
state courts for issue review and exhaustion. It is this course which now brings 
us back to an additional petition for writ of certiorari which again we deny in 
order to send the case back to the federal court system. I get exhausted in 
review of all of the documents which must be only part of the total paperwork 
that has been created while Sword still 
never received substantive judicial review of his appellate complaints, 
including specifically, prosecutorial breach of the plea bargain upon which he 
was originally convicted and sentenced. Santobello, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S. Ct. 495.

[¶23.]  The right of the individual to have 
relief when the prosecutor breaches a plea bargain is unquestionable in American 
law. W.R.Cr.P. 15(e) (similar to F.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(3)). See Cardenas v. Meacham, 545 P.2d 632 (Wyo. 1976). This specific 
issue was addressed in Santobello, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S. Ct. 495. See also 
Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 104 S. Ct. 2543, 81 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1984); 
Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 82 S. Ct. 510, 7 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1962); 
United States v. Blackwell, 694 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Ex Parte Yarber, 437 So. 2d 1330 (Ala. 1983); Hall v. State, 285 Ark. 38, 684 S.W.2d 261 (1985); 
People v. Fields, 35 Cal. 3d 329, 197 Cal. Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680 (1983), cert. 
denied 469 U.S. 892, 105 S. Ct. 267, 83 L. Ed. 2d 204 (1984); People v. Romero, 712 P.2d 1081 (Colo. App. 1985), rev'd on other grounds 745 P.2d 1003 (1987), cert. 
denied ___ U.S. ___, 108 S. Ct. 1296, 99 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1988); People v. District 
Court of City and County of Denver, 673 P.2d 991 (Colo. 1983); State v. Costa, 
64 Haw. 564, 644 P.2d 1329 (1982); State v. Hernandez, 107 Idaho 947, 694 P.2d 1295 
(1983); People v. Boyt, 109 Ill. 2d 403, 94 Ill.Dec. 438, 488 N.E.2d 264 (1985), 
cert. denied 476 U.S. 1143, 106 S. Ct. 2254, 90 L. Ed. 2d 699 (1986); Stovall v. 
State, 340 N.W.2d 265 (Iowa 1983); Com. v. Smith, 384 Mass. 519, 427 N.E.2d 739 
(1981); State v. Allen, 197 Mont. 64, 199 Mont. 204, 645 P.2d 380 (1981); Kluttz 
v. Warden, Nevada State Prison, 99 Nev. 681, 669 P.2d 244 (1983); People v. 
Tindle, 61 N.Y.2d 752, 472 N.Y.S.2d 919, 460 N.E.2d 1354 (1984); and State v. 
Schaupp, 111 Wn.2d 34, 757 P.2d 970 (1988). Cf. Ricketts v. Adamson, 483 U.S. 1, 107 S. Ct. 2680, 97 L. Ed. 2d 1 
(1987).

[¶24.]  Those issues presently presented are 
summarized in present "pro se" brief to show the history of the process and the 
summary of the issues:

On September 22, 1988, 
and pursuant to W.S. § 7-14-101 (Supp. 1988), Donald [Sword, petitioner] filed 
for post-conviction relief alleging the substantial denial of his constitutional 
rights. Appointment of counsel was requested therein, as required under W.S. § 
7-14-104 (Supp. 1988). Also on September 22, 1988, Donald filed an affidavit of 
indigence.

On October 20, 1988, the 
responding State of Wyoming filed its Motion to Dismiss and 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss. The theme of the state's argument 
was that there should be no review of constitutional claims after direct appeal. 
The state vehemently argued against appointment of 
counsel.

On October 31, 1988, 
Petitioner filed a motion requesting leave to file a further or amended 
pleading, showing that Wyoming's revised post-conviction statute prohibits a 
reply to the State's answer or motion to dismiss, except as the district court 
may order on its own motion or on that of either party.

On November 2, 1988, the 
district court entered a Notice of Setting, scheduling a telephonic hearing for 
November 16, 1988, on the State's Motion to Dismiss.

On November 10, 1988, 
Petitioner filed a Motion for Hearing to be Reported, and Second Motion for 
Appointment of Counsel. Donald specifically requested that the district court 
address the threshold question of indigence, and asked that the district court 
determine whether a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to 
bring the proceeding at his own expense.

On November 16, 1988, the 
telephonic hearing was held and Donald Sword appeared pro se, the district court 
having failed to appoint counsel. Once the hearing began, Mr. Sword, who is 
functionally illiterate, requested that another prisoner be permitted to assist 
him in understanding the proceeding and to rebut argument presented by the 
State. This oral motion was denied.

On November 18, 1988, 
Donald Sword requested to be informed of whether the State's Motion to Dismiss 
had been "granted, denied, or whether further proceedings are to be held." The 
district court apparently scribbled a note to the Clerk on Mr. Sword's 
aforementioned request, indicating the State's Motion to Dismiss had been 
granted.

On November 29, 1988, 
counsel for the State sent a letter, accompanied by a copy of the State's 
proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and order, advising Mr. Sword 
that: "Pursuant to Rule 404 of the Uniform Rules for District Courts you [Mr. 
Sword] must file with the Court your objections, if any, to the findings, 
conclusions and order within five days."

In a futile effort to 
prevent the district court from prematurely signing the State's proposed 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and order, Donald Sword mailed a letter to 
the District Court Judge, explaining that Mr. Sword's objections to the State's 
proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and order, could not be mailed 
until December 5, 1988. Donald's letter was * * * dated December 1, 198[8], the 
same day he was served by the state.

On December 6, 1988, the 
district court signed the state's proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law 
and order without giving Donald a chance to reply.

On December 15, 1988, 
Donald filed for review on Petition for Writ of Certiorari, in the Wyoming 
Supreme Court. The State filed its Brief in Opposition, arguing against review 
of Donald's constitutional claims. The Wyoming Supreme Court entered its Order 
Denying Petition for Writ of Certiorari on May 4, 1989.

On May 10, 1989, Mr. 
Sword mailed his Motion for Rehearing - En Banc to the Wyoming Supreme Court. 
The Court denied rehearing. 

The issues raised within 
this Petition have recently been presented to the United States District Court 
for the District of Wyoming on petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The federal 
court dismissed the petition on the ground that Mr. Sword has failed to exhaust 
available State remedies. Sword v. Shillinger, No. C89-146-K (D.Wyo. October 11, 
1989).

At the federal level the 
State argued that Mr. Sword could petition the Wyoming Supreme Court on petition 
for writ of certiorari because certiorari is a discretionary writ, and that Mr. 
Sword could also petition for State review under the State's habeas corpus 
statutes. Here Mr. Sword petitions for review under both possible [s]tate 
remedies. In addition Sword has also presented his issues, simultaneously, to 
the Second Judicial District Court on petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus.

This petition attacks the 
judgment and proceedings under which Sword was sentenced to prison by the County 
Court of Campbell Count[y], Sixth Judicial District, Case No. 
2055.

[¶25.]  In summary of argument, Sword then 
claimed:

[T]hat the violations of 
Mr. Sword's constitutionally secured rights are not limited to errors made by 
the trial court, but extend to defense counsel, the prosecution, and to 
appellate counsel. Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is perhaps the 
most disturbing issue in that appellate counsel purposely failed to bring forth 
the issues shown here, knowing such issues to be meritorious. Although the 
issues have been presented to the state court, they were presented only through 
a pro se effort. That the state courts refused to reach the merits is later 
proffered as evidence that the State of Wyoming has failed in its duty to provide a 
collateral forum for the ventilation of constitutional rights which were, 
through no fault of Mr. Sword, not raised on direct 
appeal.

This brief will also show 
that the trial court violated Donald's rights under the Constitution of the 
United 
States by ignoring the requirements of Rule 15, 
W.R. Cr.P., for four independent reasons.

The matters raised in 
this petition go to the fairness of the entire course of proceedings involving 
Mr. Sword; the circumstances of the plea agreement; the refusal by the state to 
abide by the terms of the agreement; introduction of false hearsay testimony; 
ineffective assistance of defense counsel; prosecutorial misconduct; purposeful 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; and, strongly indicate a cover-up 
by appellate counsel for the benefit of trial counsel, the trial court, and the 
prosecutor.

[¶26.]  Whatever the facts may generally be since 
relief is denied without examination in the absence of a record, it is 
realistically established that a plea bargain was made wherein the prosecution 
was to stand mute and that when the sentencing time came, the bargain was 
ignored; perhaps with excuse, perhaps not. In any event, the bargain was not 
kept by the prosecution. Santobello, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S. Ct. 495. Surely, at that stage, with denial of the admitted bargain by the 
prosecution, the accused was entitled to withdraw his plea and he should have been so advised by both 
counsel and the trial court. Not only is the issue of prosecutorial breach 
of the plea agreement presented, but also ineffectiveness of both trial and 
appellate counsel. Osborn v. Schillinger, 639 F. Supp. 610 (D.Wyo. 1986), aff'd 
861 F.2d 612 (10th Cir. 1988); Osborn v. State, 672 P.2d 777 (Wyo. 1983), cert. denied 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S. Ct. 1331, 79 L. Ed. 2d 726 (1984).4 Obviously, we have no reasonable 
decision of counsel demonstrated here. Cf. Bertolotti v. Dugger, 883 F.2d 1503 
(11th Cir. 1989).5 We do not even know from this 
record whether Sword knew the prosecution had decided to ignore the plea bargain 
until that was exactly what was done at sentencing after the earlier appearance 
to enter the plea when the plea bargain should have been discussed with the 
court. W.R.Cr.P. 15(e) (similar to F.R.Cr.P. 11(e)(3)).

[¶27.]  Even a law student, which is the 
essential argument made by Sword as to the inadequacy of the counsel service 
afforded, would surely have recognized that a breached plea bargain constituted 
a singular issue to be developed on appeal. Under the nature of this dissent, 
when now related to a denial by this court of present consideration of these 
issues by the order here entered, I will not further explore the text and tenor 
of the thirty-seven-page "pro se" brief now presented. Unfortunately, within 
this case most of the entire gamut of case-by-case denials of recent 
post-conviction substantive review by this court could each be hung up on a 
clothesline for unfriendly scrutiny, e.g., Cutbirth v. State, 751 P.2d 1257 
(Wyo. 1988) and the ineffectiveness of counsel trio, Murray v. State, 776 P.2d 206 (Wyo. 1989); Kallas v. State, 776 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 1989); and Amin v. State, 
774 P.2d 597 (Wyo. 1989).

[¶28.]  I dissent in this court's present 
rejection of the offer of the attorney general made to the federal court for us 
to clean up our dirty linen by providing substantive review in these proceedings 
by this petition. Somebody should, and if my absolute respect for the 
Constitution of this state and the United States carries any power of 
perception, somebody will sometime be called as judicial officers to give 
consideration to what this petitioner claims was a deprivation of his 
constitutional rights. Before that occurs, with inconsistent positions presented 
and judicial estoppel denied, we only continue to go around and 
around.

[¶29.]  I also dissent in belief that we should 
"do it now" if for no other reason than to end the ball bouncing facade and also 
to introduce some effectiveness in conclusion of our adjudicatory business as 
Wyoming's 
constitutionally established Supreme Court.

FOOTNOTES

1 The principal case on 
constitutional right waiver by procedural default was Cutbirth v. State, 751 P.2d 1257 (Wyo. 1988). It was followed by the 
ineffectiveness of assistance of counsel denial cases, Murray v. State, 776 P.2d 206 (Wyo. 1989); Kallas v. State, 776 P.2d 198 (Wyo. 1989); and Amin v. State, 774 P.2d 597 (Wyo. 1989). Other cases 
directed to deny the guaranty of any counseled assistance or effective counsel 
support include Whitney v. State, 745 P.2d 902 (Wyo. 1987); Bibbins v. State, 741 P.2d 115 (Wyo. 1987); Schmidt v. State, 738 P.2d 1105 (Wyo. 1987); and Pote v. State, 733 P.2d 1018 (Wyo. 1987). Compare for 
at least a brief moment where counsel would be provided until the public 
defender and the attorney general secured a change in the post-conviction 
statute, Fondren v. State, 749 P.2d 767 (Wyo. 1988); Alberts v. State, 745 P.2d 898 (Wyo. 1987); and Long v. State, 745 P.2d 547 (Wyo. 
1987).

2 The dispositive finding 
was obviously tailored to fit within Whitney, 745 P.2d 902 to require relief to 
be confined to a W.R.Cr.P. 36 motion and deny availability of the constitutional 
reach of post-conviction relief. This is indeed a curious adjudicatory 
conclusion and questionable prosecutorial license. The state of the law is near 
unanimous that breach of the plea bargain by prosecution entitles the accused to 
withdraw the plea which, as based on a violated agreement and is voidable by the 
accused which also vacates conviction. Santobello, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S. Ct. 495.

3 What the Wyoming justice 
delivery system does in denial of legal services to the convicted indigent in 
penal institutions is what, like many states, creates self-learned, unlicensed 
legal advisers within the walls who also, like Charles Pote, may write better 
and know more about the criminal law than many licensed practitioners. The 
luxury of adequate time is available to them. Charles Pote will likely be around 
a lot longer than any of the present members of this court or the legislature 
considering the sentence he himself has been given as the result of the quality 
of justice delivery service which was provided to him when he received two life 
sentences and ten years plus six months, all to be served consecutively. Pote, 
733 P.2d 1018; Pote v. State, 695 P.2d 617 (Wyo. 1985).

4 See Bertolotti v. 
Dugger, 883 F.2d 1503, 1510 n. 5 (11th Cir. 1989):

The state rule does not 
necessarily define a "prevailing professional norm" within the Supreme Court's 
use of the term. Strickland [v. Washington], 
466 U.S. [668] at 688, 104 S.Ct. [2052] 
at 2065, [80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)] (referring to prevailing norms in terms of 
American Bar Association standards). Otherwise, the content of a fundamentally 
fair trial would vary from state to state.

5 A member of the federal 
judiciary recently stated:

We live in a Nation in 
which liberty is cherished second only to life itself. Society commits no 
greater wrong than to convict and confine (or execute) one who may be innocent 
of the crimes with which he or she has been charged. No greater responsibility 
is reposed in the federal judiciary than the review of convictions based upon 
alleged constitutional violations.

Landano v. 
Rafferty, 126 F.R.D. 627, 629 (D.N.J. 1989).

I only perceive our 
accommodation to those of the federal system when and to the extent that the 
state judiciary system not only recognizes its responsibility under the federal 
constitution, but even more so as a third branch of Wyoming government to assure 
equal protection and due process under this state's constitution as 
well.