Case Title: Hall v. Danberg, et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 389, 2010

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2010-10-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
GIBSON A. HALL,   
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
CARL DANBERG et al.,  
 
Defendants Below- 
Appellees. 
§ 
§  No. 389, 2010 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  C.A. Nos. N10C-04-274 
§                   N01M-04-123 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: September 8, 2010 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: October 13, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 13th day of October 2010, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Gibson A. Hall, filed an appeal from 
the Superior Court’s May 21, 2010 order dismissing his petition for a writ of 
mandamus.  The plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to 
affirm the Superior Court’s judgment on the ground that it is manifest on the 
 
2 
face of the opening brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and 
affirm. 
 
(2) 
The record reflects that Hall is an inmate incarcerated at the 
James T. Vaughn Correctional Center in Smyrna, Delaware.  He is serving a 
sentence of life imprisonment without benefit of parole,2 plus 5 years of 
Level V incarceration, stemming from his 1979 convictions of Murder in the 
First Degree and Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of 
a Felony.  In April 2010, Hall filed a complaint in the Superior Court 
alleging that the Department of Correction (“DOC”) had not properly 
reduced his sentence in accordance with his earned good time credits.  His 
complaint made a 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim for money damages and also 
requested that the Superior Court order the DOC to apply his earned good 
time credits to his sentence.   
 
(3) 
On May 5, 2010, the Superior Court dismissed Hall’s claim for 
money damages, but did not dismiss his petition for mandamus relief.  On 
May 21, 2010, the Superior Court dismissed his petition for mandamus relief 
on the ground that, under State v. Spence, 367 A.2d 983, 990 (Del. 1976), he 
was not entitled to good time credits as a matter of law. 
                                                 
1 Supr. Ct. R. 25(a). 
2 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §4209(a). 
 
3 
 
(4) 
In this appeal, Hall claims that the Superior Court erred by 
dismissing his claims under the Spence case.  His position is that, while the 
good time statute, Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §4381, was “judicially changed” 
when the Spence decision was issued in 1976, the language of the statute 
itself was not explicitly modified by the Legislature until 1989.3  Thus, he 
argues, he is entitled to the benefit of the good time statute as it existed when 
he committed his crimes in 1979.  According to Hall, the good time statute 
as it existed at that time permitted his life sentence to be reduced by 
statutory good time credits.  Finally, Hall argues, applying his earned good 
time credits, his sentence is now complete and he must be released from 
prison immediately.     
 
(5) 
In Spence, this Court dealt with the applicability of good time 
credits to a sentence of “life imprisonment without benefit of parole” under 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §4209(a).  The Court noted that there was “[n]o 
statutory base for the computation of ‘good time’ upon such [a] sentence. . . 
.” and concluded that, “[i]f good behavior credits are to be accorded to [such 
a sentence], the General Assembly must speak on the subject.”4   As the 
Court held, “. . . the provisions of §4371 et seq. are not applicable to 
                                                 
3 At the time the Spence decision was issued, the statute governing earned good time was 
designated as §4371 of Title 11.   
4 State v. Spence, 367 A.2d at 990. 
 
4 
§4209(a); and . . . ‘life imprisonment without benefit of parole’ under 
§4209(a) means confinement for the balance of the life of the person 
convicted of first degree murder.”5     
 
(6) 
We conclude that the Superior Court properly dismissed Hall’s 
claims on the basis of Spence.  To begin with, the General Assembly has 
never acted to apply good time credits to life sentences without the benefit of 
parole.  Moreover, Hall fails to cite to any authority, nor do we know of any, 
supporting his position that a previous version of §4381 permitted a sentence 
of life imprisonment without benefit of parole to be reduced by good time 
credits.  The law as it was announced in Spence in 1976 clearly controls in 
Hall’s case.  Finally, the rationale of Kennish v. State, Del. Super., C.A. No. 
5089, Bifferato, J. (Dec. 7, 1976), relied upon by Hall in support of his 
claim, has been expressly overruled by this Court.6  Kennish is factually 
distinguishable in any case.    
 
(7) 
It is manifest on the face of the opening brief that this appeal is 
without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by 
settled Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, 
there was no abuse of discretion. 
 
                                                 
5 Id. 
6 Richmond v. State, 446 A.2d 1091, 1095 (Del. 1982). 
 
5 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice