Case Title: State v. Benton

Citation: 

Docket Number: 207PA14

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2015-06-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
NO. COA13-743 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 20 May 2014 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Guilford County 
Nos. 12 CRS 24372, 74225, 74227 
TIYOUN JIMEK JACKSON 
 
 
 
 
Appeal by Defendant from order entered 10 January 2013 by 
Judge C.W. Bragg and judgment entered 22 January 2013 by Judge 
A. Robinson Hassell in Guilford County Superior Court.  Heard in 
the Court of Appeals 5 February 2014. 
 
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General 
J. Aldean Webster III, for the State. 
 
Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate 
Defender Constance E. Widenhouse, for Defendant. 
 
 
STEPHENS, Judge. 
 
 
Procedural and Factual Background 
In this appeal, Defendant Tiyoun Jimek Jackson challenges 
the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence 
discovered by Officer Timothy D. Brown of the Greensboro Police 
Department following an investigatory stop of Defendant on the 
night of 9 April 2012.   
-2- 
 
 
The order denying Defendant’s motion to suppress includes 
the following pertinent findings of fact:  
1. [Officer] Brown is and has been an 
officer 
for 
the 
Greensboro 
Police 
Department since August 15, 2009. 
 
2. Officer Brown based on training and 
experience is familiar with marijuana and 
other narcotic drugs. 
 
3. Officer Brown was on duty and in uniform 
on Monday, April 9, 2012. 
 
4. Prior to April 9, 2012, Officer Brown had 
on two occasions contact with [D]efendant 
. . . . 
  
5. On the first occasion, Officer Brown 
investigating a report of the discharging 
of a firearm spoke with [D]efendant . . . 
concerning that incident and recovered 
from him a stolen firearm. 
 
6. Approximately two months prior to April 
9, 2012, Officer Brown was investigating 
a breaking and entering in the area of 
Lombardi Street in Greensboro, North 
Carolina and again came into contact with 
[D]efendant . . . . 
 
7. . . . [D]efendant . . . was standing with 
3 to 4 individuals in the area of the 
reported breaking and entering. 
 
8. As Officer Brown approached he could 
smell the odor of marijuana. 
 
9. Officer Brown conducted a search of the 
individuals including [D]efendant . . . . 
 
10. Officer Brown did find an amount of 
marijuana, but not on the person of 
-3- 
 
 
[D]efendant . . . . 
 
11. On April 9, 2012, Officer Brown was 
assigned and was patrolling zone 450 in a 
marked patrol car. 
 
12. Officer Brown at approximately 9:00 pm 
was patrolling in the vicinity of Kim’s 
Mart located at 2200 Phillips Avenue.  
 
13. Based on Officer Brown’s experience as a 
Greensboro Police Officer he knows that 
the immediate area outside of Kim’s Mart 
has been the location of hundreds of 
narcotic investigations some resulting in 
arrests. 
 
14. Officer Brown has personally made drug 
arrests in the immediate area of Kim’s 
Mart. 
 
15. Officer Brown is personally aware that 
hand-to-hand drug transactions have taken 
place on the sidewalk and street directly 
adjacent to Kim’s Mart as well as inside 
Kim’s Mart. 
 
16. At approximately 9:00 pm on April 9, 2012 
Officer Brown saw [D]efendant . . . and 
Curtis 
M. 
Benton 
standing 
near 
the 
newspaper dispenser outside of Kim’s 
Mart. 
 
17. Two days prior Officer Brown conducted a 
motor vehicle stop in which Curtis M. 
Benton was riding. 
 
18. During the motor vehicle stop, Officer 
Brown noticed the smell of marijuana 
coming from the car. 
 
19. [D]efendant . . . and Curtis M. Benton 
upon spotting Officer Brown in his marked 
patrol car stopped talking and dispersed. 
-4- 
 
 
 
20. [D]efendant . . . went to the East and 
walked into Kim’s Mart and Curtis M. 
Benton walked away, in the opposite 
direction, to the West.   
 
21. Officer Brown testified that his training 
and experience indicate that upon the 
approach of a law enforcement officer, 
two 
individuals 
engaged 
in 
a 
drug 
transaction will separate and walk away 
in opposite directions. 
 
22. Officer Brown continued past Kim’s Mart 
and down Phillips Avenue. 
 
23. After losing sight of [D]efendant . . . 
and Curtis M. Benton, Officer Brown made 
a u-turn and headed back up Phillips 
Avenue toward Kim’s Mart. 
 
24. As Officer Brown again approached Kim’s 
Mart, [D]efendant . . . and Curtis M. 
Benton were again standing in front of 
Kim’s Mart approximately 20 feet from 
where Officer Brown saw them originally. 
 
25. Officer Brown pulled into the parking lot 
at Kim’s Mart. 
 
26. As Officer Brown was pulling into the 
parking lot at Kim’s Mart, [D]efendant 
. . . 
and 
Curtis 
M. 
Benton 
again 
separated and began walking away in 
opposite directions. 
 
27. As [D]efendant . . . was walking away 
from Kim’s Mart, he came within 5-10 feet 
of Officer Brown’s patrol car. 
 
28. Officer 
Brown 
wanted 
to 
speak 
with 
[D]efendant . . . about possible drug 
activity. 
 
-5- 
 
 
29. Officer Brown asked [D]efendant . . . to 
place his hands on the patrol car . . . . 
 
30. [D]efendant . . . placed his hands on the 
front left fender of Officer Brown’s 
patrol car. 
 
Based on these findings, the court concluded “[t]hat based on 
the totality of the circumstances . . . Officer Brown had a 
reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was 
afoot” and “was legally permitted to make a brief investigatory 
stop of [D]efendant[.]”  The court further found and concluded 
that Defendant thereafter “consented to a search of his person 
by Officer Brown” which led to the discovery of a handgun.1 
While reserving the right to appeal the denial of his 
motion, see N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-979(b) (2013), Defendant pled 
guilty on 7 January 2013 to possession of a firearm by a felon, 
possession of a firearm with an altered serial number, and 
conspiracy to possess with intent to sell or deliver marijuana.  
The trial court consolidated Defendant’s offenses for judgment, 
suspended a prison sentence of twelve to twenty-four months, and 
placed him on twenty-four months of supervised probation. 
Appellate Jurisdiction 
                     
1 A subsequent search of Benton yielded “a bag containing a 
multitude of smaller bags of marijuana.”  
-6- 
 
 
Defendant has filed a petition for writ of certiorari, 
acknowledging a jurisdictional defect in his notice of appeal, 
to wit, that he did not initially appeal from the final judgment 
as required by N.C.R. App. P. 4(b), but rather appealed only 
from the denial of his suppression motion.  See State v. Miller, 
205 N.C. App. 724, 725, 696 S.E.2d 542, 542 (2010) (dismissing 
appeal for lack of jurisdiction where the “[d]efendant did file 
. . . a written notice of appeal from the denial of [the 
d]efendant’s motion to suppress, but [the d]efendant did not 
appeal from his judgment of conviction”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Further, Defendant gave oral notice of appeal 
thirteen days after the judgment was filed, rather than at trial 
as required by N.C.R. App. P. 4(a)(1).  See State v. Hammonds,  
__ N.C. App. __, __, 720 S.E.2d 820, 823 (2012) (granting writ 
of certiorari after dismissing an appeal for inadequate notice 
where the defendant’s counsel attempted to give oral notice of 
appeal to the trial court days after the trial and not “at 
trial” as required by Rule 4).   
As a result, Defendant’s “right to prosecute an appeal has 
been lost by [his] failure to take timely action[.]”  N.C.R. 
App. P. 21(a)(1).  The State has neither moved to dismiss 
Defendant’s appeal nor opposed our review by writ of certiorari.  
-7- 
 
 
Accordingly, we grant the requested writ and review Defendant’s 
challenges to the denial of his suppression motion on the 
merits.   
Motion to Suppress 
Defendant argues that the court erred in denying his motion 
to 
suppress 
because 
Officer 
Brown 
lacked 
the 
reasonable 
articulable suspicion of criminal activity needed to justify an 
investigatory stop.  See, e.g., State v. Battle, 109 N.C. App. 
367, 370, 427 S.E.2d 156, 158 (1993) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 30, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 911 (1968)).  Because the stop was 
unlawful, Defendant further contends that his subsequent consent 
to Officer Brown’s search of his person was invalid.  We agree. 
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, our task 
is to determine “whether competent evidence supports the trial 
court’s findings of fact and whether the findings of fact 
support the conclusions of law.”  State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 
167-68, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011) (citation omitted).  Findings 
not challenged by Defendant “are deemed to be supported by 
competent evidence and are binding on appeal.”  Id. (citation 
omitted).  We review de novo a trial court’s conclusion of law 
that 
an 
“officer 
had 
reasonable 
suspicion 
to 
detain 
a 
-8- 
 
 
defendant[.]”  State v. Kincaid, 147 N.C. App. 94, 97, 555 
S.E.2d 294, 297 (2001) (citation omitted). 
Here, Defendant challenges only finding of fact 5, which 
states that Officer Brown recovered a stolen gun from Defendant 
during a prior encounter with Defendant and another individual.  
The evidence, however, shows that, although Officer Brown did 
recover a stolen firearm during that encounter, “[D]efendant was 
not the one that was actually charged in that[.]”  This finding 
of 
fact 
is 
not 
supported 
by 
competent 
evidence, 
and, 
accordingly, we do not consider it in analyzing Defendant’s 
challenge to the trial court’s ultimate conclusion that Officer 
Brown had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying 
an investigatory stop.2 
                     
2 We note that no evidence was introduced and no finding of fact 
was made that Defendant had any criminal history, much less that 
Officer Brown was aware of any previous criminal activity by 
Defendant.  Further, even had such evidence been introduced, “a 
prior criminal record is not, standing alone, sufficient to 
create reasonable suspicion.”  United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 
531, 540 (4th Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  As for the findings of fact concerning Benton’s 
criminal history, “[t]here is no reasonable suspicion merely by 
association.”  Id. at 539; see also State v. Smith, __ N.C. App. 
__, __, 729 S.E.2d 120, 125 (noting that “a person’s mere 
propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal 
activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to 
search that person”) (citations and internal quotation marks 
omitted), disc. review denied, 366 N.C. 396, 735 S.E.2d 190 
(2012). 
-9- 
 
 
“The Fourth Amendment protects the right of the people 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.  It is applicable to 
the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  It applies to seizures of the person, including 
brief investigatory detentions[.]”  State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 
437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 69-70 (1994) (citations, internal 
quotation marks, and ellipsis omitted).  Accordingly, “[a]n 
investigatory stop must be justified by ‘a reasonable suspicion, 
based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in 
criminal activity.’”  Id. at 441, 446 S.E.2d at 70 (quoting 
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 61 L. Ed. 2d 357, 362 (1979)).  
“A court must consider the totality of the circumstances – the 
whole picture in determining whether a reasonable suspicion to 
make an investigatory stop exists.”  Id. (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  “This process allows officers to draw 
on their own experience and specialized training to make 
inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information 
available to them that might well elude an untrained person.”  
State v. Williams, 366 N.C. 110, 116-17, 726 S.E.2d 161, 167 
(2012) 
(citation 
and 
internal 
quotation 
marks 
omitted).  
However, case law has drawn clear limits on what inferences are 
constitutionally permissible when an officer observes a citizen 
-10- 
 
 
in an area known for illegal drug activity or other criminal 
activity. 
“[T]he presence of an individual on a corner specifically 
known for drug activity and the scene of multiple recent arrests 
for drugs, coupled with evasive actions by [a] defendant[, is] 
sufficient to form reasonable suspicion to stop an individual.”  
State v. Watson, 119 N.C. App. 395, 398, 458 S.E.2d 519, 522 
(1995) 
(citation 
omitted; 
emphasis 
added). 
 
While 
what 
constitutes an “evasive action” has never been explicitly 
defined, a careful review of case law from this State’s 
appellate courts and from the United States Supreme Court 
reveals that merely walking away from one’s companion in the 
presence of law enforcement officers cannot be considered an 
evasive action which, when coupled with one’s presence in an 
area known for drug sales or other illegal activity, will 
support the warrantless stop of a citizen.   
For example, in State v. Fleming, 
at the time [the o]fficer . . . first 
observed [the] defendant and his companion, 
they were merely standing in an open area 
between two apartment buildings [in a “high 
drug area”].  At this point, they were just 
watching the group of officers standing on 
the 
street 
and 
talking. 
 
The 
officer 
observed no overt act by [the] defendant at 
this time nor any contact between [the] 
defendant and his companion.  Next, the 
-11- 
 
 
officer observed the two men walk between 
two buildings, out of the open area, toward 
Rugby Street and then begin walking down the 
public sidewalk in front of the apartments.  
These actions were not sufficient to create 
a reasonable suspicion that [the] defendant 
was involved in criminal conduct, it being 
neither unusual nor suspicious that they 
chose to walk in a direction which led away 
from the group of officers.   
 
106 N.C. App. 165, 170-71, 415 S.E.2d 782, 785 (1992) (emphasis 
added).  Thus, walking away from law enforcement officers with 
one’s companion after watching law enforcement officers is not 
suspicious and, even when coupled with being present in an area 
known for drugs, cannot create the reasonable suspicion needed 
to justify a stop.  Id.; see also In re J.L.B.M., 176 N.C. App. 
613, 620, 627 S.E.2d 239, 245 (2006) (holding there was no 
reasonable suspicion where an officer “relied solely on the 
dispatch that there was a suspicious person at the Exxon gas 
station, 
that 
the 
juvenile 
matched 
the 
‘Hispanic 
male’ 
description of the suspicious person, that the juvenile was 
wearing baggy clothes, and that the juvenile chose to walk away 
from the patrol car”).  
In Brown, two police officers observed [the] 
defendant and another person walking away 
from one another in an alley.  The officers 
drove 
into 
the 
alley, 
approached 
[the] 
defendant and asked him to identify himself 
and to explain what he was doing there.  
[The 
d]efendant 
refused 
and 
told 
the 
-12- 
 
 
officers they had no right to stop him.  One 
of the officers told [the] defendant he was 
in a high drug area; the other officer then 
frisked [the] defendant and found nothing.  
At trial, one officer testified that he had 
stopped 
[the] 
defendant 
because 
the 
situation looked suspicious and he had never 
seen that subject in that area before.  
Further, the area where [the] defendant was 
stopped 
had 
a 
high 
incidence 
of 
drug 
traffic.  The officers never claimed to 
suspect [the] defendant of any specific 
misconduct, nor did they have any reason to 
believe [the] defendant was armed. 
 
Fleming, 106 N.C. App. at 170, 415 S.E.2d at 785 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (discussing the circumstances present 
in Brown, which did not create the reasonable suspicion needed 
to sustain a stop).  Thus, walking away from one’s companion in 
the presence of law enforcement officers, even when coupled with 
being present in an area known for drugs, cannot create 
reasonable suspicion.  
In contrast, in State v. Butler, the circumstances relevant 
to a determination of reasonable suspicion were: 
1) [the] defendant was seen in the midst of 
a group of people congregated on a corner 
known as a “drug hole”; 2) [the officer] had 
had the corner under daily surveillance for 
several months; 3) [the officer] knew this 
corner to be a center of drug activity 
because he had made four to six drug-related 
arrests there in the past six months; 4) 
[the officer] was aware of other arrests 
there as well; 5) [the] defendant was a 
stranger to the officers; 6) upon making eye 
-13- 
 
 
contact with the uniformed officers, [the] 
defendant immediately moved away, behavior 
that is evidence of flight; and 7) it was 
[the 
officer’s] 
experience 
that 
people 
involved in drug traffic are often armed. 
 
331 N.C. 227, 233, 415 S.E.2d 719, 722 (1992).  The Court 
specifically distinguished the circumstances in Butler from 
those in Brown by noting “an additional circumstance — [the] 
defendant’s immediately leaving the corner and walking away from 
the officers after making eye contact with them.”  Id. at 234, 
415 S.E.2d at 722-23 (emphasis added).  The Court construed 
these actions as “behavior that is evidence of flight[.]”  Id. 
at 233, 415 S.E.2d at 722 (emphasis added).  Thus, making eye 
contact with an officer before immediately turning and walking 
away in a manner which suggests an attempt to flee, when coupled 
with being present in an area known for drugs, will establish 
reasonable suspicion to sustain a stop.3  
                     
3 In contrast, simply observing law enforcement officers before 
walking away from them does not support a determination of 
reasonable suspicion.  See Fleming, 106 N.C. App. at 170, 415 
S.E.2d at 785 (finding no reasonable suspicion where the 
defendant and his companion “were just watching the group of 
officers standing on the street and talking” before walking 
away).  Here, finding of fact 19 simply states that Defendant 
and his companion dispersed “upon spotting” Officer Brown in his 
marked patrol car.  No finding of fact states that Defendant 
made eye contact with Officer Brown, and no testimony at the 
suppression hearing would have supported such a finding.  
Indeed, Officer Brown testified that, at the time he saw 
Defendant and his companion outside Kim’s Mart, it was “dark” 
-14- 
 
 
In Watson, upon the approach of law enforcement officers, 
the “defendant immediately attempted to enter the convenience 
store to avoid detention . . . [and] made evasive maneuvers to 
avoid 
detection, 
i.e., 
putting 
the 
drugs 
in 
his 
mouth, 
attempting to swallow the drugs by drinking Coca-Cola and 
attempting to go into the store[.]”  119 N.C. App. at 398, 458 
S.E.2d at 522 (italics added).  The defendant’s attempt to 
swallow drugs, coupled with his presence in an area known for 
drugs, created reasonable suspicion for a stop.  Id.  In State 
v. Sutton, the defendant’s evasive action was “clinch[ing]” 
something in a waistband and posturing to conceal an item from a 
nearby officer.  __ N.C. App. __, __, 754 S.E.2d 464, 471-72 
(2014) (“While many of the facts in Fleming are the same or 
similar to this case, in Fleming, the defendant did not make any 
overt actions, and here [the] defendant did when he used his 
right hand to grab his waistband to clinch an item.”).  
Similarly, in State v. Willis, the circumstances supported a 
determination of reasonable suspicion when a defendant “left a 
suspected drug house just before [a] search warrant was 
executed[,] . . . [took] evasive action when he knew he was 
                                                                  
and that, “as soon as they observed my police vehicle, you had 
[D]efendant . . . walk east, as if he was walking into the 
store.  And then [his companion] actually walked west, away from 
the store.”  
-15- 
 
 
being followed[,] . . . [and] exhibited nervous behavior.”  125 
N.C. App. 537, 542, 481 S.E.2d 407, 411 (1997).  Thus, overt, 
evasive behaviors such as attempting to destroy contraband, 
behaving nervously while being followed, or concealing items 
from the view of officers, when coupled with being present in 
high crime areas, can create reasonable suspicion.  
 
Here, the unchallenged findings of fact reveal that the 
following 
circumstances 
led 
to 
Officer 
Brown’s 
stop 
of 
Defendant:  (1) it was approximately 9:00 p.m.;4 (2) the area 
around Kim’s Mart was known for illegal drug sales and had been 
the location of numerous drug-related arrests; (3) Defendant and 
a companion were standing together in front of Kim’s Mart; (4) 
when the men saw Officer Brown’s car, they began walking in 
opposite directions and Defendant entered Kim’s Mart; (5) when 
                     
4 The time of the stop, 9:00 p.m., cannot be considered a 
suspicious time to be at Kim’s Mart, since that establishment 
was apparently open for business.  See, e.g., State v. Rinck, 
303 N.C. 551, 555-60, 280 S.E.2d 912, 916-20 (1981) (holding 
that circumstances supporting a reasonable basis for a stop 
included the defendants walking along a road at an “unusual 
hour” of approximately 1:35 a.m.); State v. Blackstock, 165 N.C. 
App. 50, 59, 598 S.E.2d 412, 418 (2004), appeal dismissed and 
disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 283, 610 S.E.2d 208 (2005) 
(holding that reasonable suspicion existed where the defendant 
and a companion were observed loitering at a closed shopping 
center shortly before midnight, and, upon seeing law enforcement 
officers, hurriedly returned to their vehicle, which was parked 
out of general public view). 
 
-16- 
 
 
Officer Brown turned his car around and returned, the two men 
were again standing together in front of Kim’s Mart; and (6) 
when Officer Brown pulled into the store parking lot, Defendant 
and his companion again walked away from each other, with 
Defendant walking toward Officer Brown.   
 
Thus, the totality of the relevant circumstances here 
consists of nothing more than (1) being in an area known for 
drug sales and (2) walking away from a companion in the presence 
of an officer twice.  Defendant’s presence with a companion at 
Kim’s Mart, a location known for drug sales, cannot create 
reasonable suspicion to support a stop.  See Brown, 443 U.S. at 
52, 61 L. Ed. 2dat 365 (“There is no indication in the record 
that it was unusual for people to be in the alley.  The fact 
that [the defendant] was in a neighborhood frequented by drug 
users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding that [the 
defendant] himself was engaged in criminal conduct.  In short, 
the [defendant’s] activity was no different from the activity of 
other pedestrians in that neighborhood.”).  As discussed supra, 
that Defendant walked away from his companion after seeing 
Officer Brown, even in a known drug area, cannot create 
reasonable suspicion.  See Fleming, 106 N.C. App. at 170, 415 
S.E.2d at 785.  Nothing in the findings of fact suggests that 
-17- 
 
 
Defendant took any “evasive” action or engaged in behavior that 
could be construed as flight such as trying to swallow drugs, 
see Watson, 119 N.C. App. at 398, 458 S.E.2d at 522; concealing 
something from Officer Brown, see Sutton, __ N.C. App. at __, 
754 S.E.2d at 466; making eye contact with the officer and then 
immediately walking away, see Butler, 331 N.C. at 234, 415 
S.E.2d at 722-23; or behaving nervously while being followed.  
See Willis, 125 N.C. App. at 542, 481 S.E.2d at 411.   
On the contrary, Defendant’s actions were anything but 
evasive or evidence of flight.  Finding of fact 27 notes that, 
as Defendant “was walking away from Kim’s Mart, he came within 
5-10 feet of . . . Brown’s patrol car.”  Here, as in Fleming, 
Officer Brown observed no overt act by Defendant nor any contact 
between Defendant and his companion that would suggest Defendant 
was engaged in, or about to engage in, criminal activity of any 
kind, including illegal drug activity.  He simply saw two young 
men standing in front of a convenience store move away from each 
other twice.  In sum, the United States Supreme Court, our own 
North Carolina Supreme Court, and previous panels of this Court 
have consistently held that these circumstances cannot create 
the reasonable suspicion required to permit police intrusion 
upon the liberty of our State’s citizens.   
-18- 
 
 
 
Having determined that the initial investigatory stop was 
unlawful, we need not consider whether Defendant’s consent to 
Officer Brown’s search of his person was valid.  See State v. 
Guevara, 349 N.C. 243, 249, 506 S.E.2d 711, 716 (1998), cert. 
denied, 526 U.S. 1133, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1013 (1999) (noting that 
evidence obtained as the result of illegal police conduct must 
be suppressed).  The order denying Defendant’s motion to 
suppress is reversed and the judgment entered upon Defendant’s 
guilty plea is vacated. 
 
REVERSED and VACATED. 
 
Judge BRYANT concurs. 
Judge 
DILLON 
dissents 
in 
a 
separate 
opinion.
NO. COA13-743 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 20 May 2014 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
Guilford County 
Nos. 12 CRS 24372 
TIYOUN JIMEK JACKSON 
     12 CRS 74225, 74227 
 
 
 
DILLON, Judge, dissenting. 
 
 
I agree with the majority that the trial court’s Finding of 
Fact 5 – the only finding challenged by Defendant – is not 
supported by the evidence of record.  However, because I believe 
that the remaining findings are sufficient to support the 
court’s conclusion that Officer Brown possessed the reasonable 
suspicion requisite to justify an investigatory stop under the 
circumstances, I respectfully dissent. 
As the majority points out, we have held that “the presence 
of an individual on a corner specifically known for drug 
activity and the scene of multiple recent arrests for drugs, 
coupled with evasive actions by [a] defendant[,] are sufficient 
to form reasonable suspicion to stop an individual.”  State v. 
Watson, 119 N.C. App. 395, 398, 458 S.E.2d 519, 522 (1995).  
Defendant does not dispute the trial court’s findings that 
Officer Brown was aware that Kim’s Mart – where the stop in 
-2- 
 
 
question occurred – was a high-crime area, where numerous drug 
transactions had taken place and where Officer Brown had made a 
number of drug-related arrests.  The sole issue, therefore, is 
whether the trial court’s remaining findings are sufficient to 
establish that Defendant engaged in “evasive actions” sufficient 
to give rise to reasonable suspicion. 
This court has held, as the majority points out, that an 
individual’s action in merely walking away from one’s companion 
cannot 
be 
considered 
evasive 
action 
sufficient 
to 
form 
reasonable suspicion.  State v. Fleming, 106 N.C. App. 165, 171, 
415 S.E.2d 782, 785 (1992).  However, as the majority also 
points out, our Supreme Court has held that there is reasonable 
suspicion to justify an investigatory stop where an individual 
who walks away from his companion in a high-crime area does so 
“after making eye contact” with a police officer.  State v. 
Butler, 331 N.C. 227, 234, 415 S.E.2d 719, 723 (1992) (emphasis 
added). 
 
I believe that Defendant’s actions here were more evasive 
than those of the defendant in Butler; and, accordingly, I 
believe that we are compelled to conclude that Officer Brown 
conducted a valid stop under the circumstances.  Unlike Fleming, 
where the defendant simply walked away from the police, here 
-3- 
 
 
Defendant engaged in a sequence of suspicious behaviors upon 
observing Officer Brown’s patrol car.  For instance, the trial 
court found that “Defendant . . . and [his companion] upon 
spotting Officer Brown in his marked patrol car stopped talking 
and dispersed [from the front of Kim’s Mart].”  (Emphasis 
added.)  This unchallenged finding is comparable to the key 
finding in Butler that the defendant “upon making eye contact 
with the uniformed officers . . . moved away.”  Butler, 331 N.C. 
at 233, 415 S.E.2d at 722.  Additionally, the trial court found 
that Officer Brown continued driving past Kim’s Mart and lost 
sight of Defendant and his companion before executing a U-turn 
and driving back toward Kim’s Mart, where he observed Defendant 
and his companion once again standing together.  Finally, the 
trial court found that when Officer Brown pulled into the Kim’s 
Mart parking lot, Defendant and his companion again dispersed. 
Any one of Defendant’s actions, standing alone, might not 
satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment to conduct a 
Terry stop.  However, I believe that Defendant’s actions, when 
considered in their totality, namely: (1) that Defendant and his 
companion split up upon spotting Officer Brown’s patrol car 
drive by Kim’s Mart the first time; (2) that Defendant and his 
companion reconvened once Officer Brown was out of site; and (3) 
-4- 
 
 
that Defendant and his companion split up a second time upon 
observing Officer Brown driving back towards Kim’s Mart – were 
certainly more evasive than the actions of the defendant in 
Butler.  Accordingly, I believe that Officer Brown conducted a 
valid investigatory stop of Defendant in the present case, and I 
would affirm the trial court on this basis.