Case Title: WALTER C. COOK v. THE ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT for the City of Laramie, Wyoming and THE CITY ENGINEER of the City of Laramie, Wyoming

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-06-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
WALTER C. COOK v. THE ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT for the City of Laramie, Wyoming and THE CITY ENGINEER of the City of Laramie, Wyoming1989 WY 133776 P.2d 181Case Number: 88-219Decided: 06/19/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
WALTER C. COOK, APPELLANT 
(PETITIONER),

v.

THE ZONING BOARD OF 
ADJUSTMENT FOR THE CITY OF LARAMIE, WYOMING AND THE CITY ENGINEER OF THE CITY OF 
LARAMIE, WYOMING, APPELLEES (RESPONDENTS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, AlbanyCounty, Arthur T. Hanscum, 
J.

Dennis C. Cook, 
Laramie, for appellant.

Kathleen A. Hunt 
of Smith, Stanfield & Scott and David R. Nicholas of Corthell & King, 
Laramie, for appellees.

Before THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY, and GOLDEN, JJ., and 
LEIMBACK, District Judge.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This zoning controversy 
over installation of a residence side yard patio in the Alta Vista subdivision, 
Laramie, Wyoming has engendered a singular course of litigation which directs 
this court to establish whether the Zoning Board of Adjustment for the City of 
Laramie, Wyoming (Board) has jurisdiction and whether it should have considered 
an appeal from the city engineer's action to enforce the city's zoning ordinance 
by requiring homeowner removal of a cover from the recently constructed 
patio.

[¶2.]     We reverse and remand 
for further hearing by the administrative agency.

[¶3.]     In the summer of 1987, 
appellant Walter C. Cook (Cook) undertook improvements to his residence which 
were to include a concrete patio and a metal and glass panel cover. Before Cook 
started any construction, he checked with the City Engineer of the City of 
Laramie, Wyoming (City) about a building permit or other requirements for the 
installation. There is at least an appearance of conflict in the record whether 
he advised the City officials that the planned improvement would include not 
only the patio but also its cover.

[¶4.]     Based on information 
obtained, Cook went ahead to complete construction. The building inspector1 then addressed him orally and with 
a follow-up written notice dated September 29, 1987:

This letter is in regard 
to the roof structure you have erected on your lot at 1058 
Bonita.

Section 17.12.030 of the 
Laramie Municipal Code requires the structure to have a minimum side yard 
setback of at least ten feet. The structure currently extends to your property 
line. Section 301 of the Uniform Building Code requires a permit to be obtained 
for a structure such as this. My records indicate that a permit has not been 
issued.

I must ask that the 
structure be brought into compliance within a period of fifteen (15) days of 
receipt of this notice.

[¶5.]     Observedly and 
expectedly, Cook became very upset after having expended about $2,500 to 
construct the patio cover. He filed a comprehensive petition for review with the 
Board to appeal from the "order, requirement, decision or determination." He 
argued that the patio cover was not subject to side year clearance requirements 
under the zoning ordinance because it was neither a principal nor an accessory 
building. By documentation and prayer, he alternatively asked that the building 
inspector be overruled or a variance be granted. His petition proceeded to 
hearing without answer from the City as required by the Board's rules. 
Photographs of a large variety of similar structures in this area were presented 
to the Board. Also presented were the approving views of several people in the 
neighborhood, although the adjoining homeowner objected.

[¶6.]     Following the hearing, 
no separate decision providing findings and conclusions was prepared. The 
decision is only authenticated by minutes of the hearing held November 17, 1987, 
which by conclusion provided that "Toro made a MOTION to deny the variance. 
Seconded by Lauer. Valdez asked for further discussion. There was 
none. MOTION CARRIED."

[¶7.]     There is also no 
documentary evidence of any decision constituting a determination of an appeal 
from the City's action. Cook sought review in district court2 by utilizing the tape recording of 
the hearing and a summary of his testimony which had been omitted from the 
original recording. Exhaustive briefing followed with decision on the 
substantive issues:

As to whether the Zoning 
Board's failure to address Petitioner's first claim violated its duty to 
Petitioner under the law and its own rules, the Court agrees with Respondents 
that the Board of Adjustment is restricted to granting variances. No authority 
has been given to the Board to review the interpretations of the City Engineer's 
Office. Therefore, the Board did not address Petitioner's first claim because 
they are not in a position to do so.

Petitioner failed to 
present evidence to the Board that would substantiate a granting of the variance 
requested. The Board only has the power to grant a variance in the case of an 
exceptionally irregular, narrow or steep lot or other exceptional physical 
condition. Therefore, the Board's denial of a variance was properly based. This 
Court concludes that the Zoning Board of Adjustment's decision should be 
affirmed.

This Decision Letter 
constitutes the mandate of the Court from which Petitioner's further 
prerogatives for review will run. If Petitioner does not exercise those rights 
within fifteen days, then this file shall be returned by the Clerk of the 
District Court to the City of Laramie for enforcement action under the 
Board's original decision.

DISCUSSION

1. 
Procedure.

[¶8.]     The litigants initially 
present two procedural arguments. First, the City argues that the petition for 
review was improperly served when served only by delivery to the city clerk. The 
contention addresses a requirement that the petition for appeal to the Board 
must be served only on the chairman of the board.3 Second, Cook argues that by the 
terms of the Board's rules, the City was obligated to file an answer, and, 
lacking compliance, was estopped to appear and defend.

[¶9.]     Section 4 of the 
Board's rules and regulations provides:

The agencies or persons 
against whom the Petition has been filed shall be allowed Twenty (20) days from 
and after the date of service of the Petition within which to file with the City 
Clerk his, her or its answer or other appearance. A copy of such answer or other 
appearance shall be served upon the Petitioner in accordance with the provisions 
of Rule 5, Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.

Section 5 
requires a $10.00 filing fee and provides that the city clerk shall docket and 
maintain the file in each case. Section 6 provides:

In the event of failure 
of either the Council, Commission or Board as the case may be, or any contestee 
to answer or otherwise appear within the time allowed by these rules, and 
provided that Section 3 hereof has been complied with, said agency or contestee 
so failing to answer or otherwise appear, shall not be allowed to answer or 
otherwise appear thereafter and after written notice to the petitioner, the 
proceeding will be brought before the agency to which it was presented for 
consideration and appropriate action.

[¶10.]  Without attempting to unravel whether the 
layman in the volunteer office of chairman should have been served instead of 
the city clerk as the normal agent for service on the City, it will suffice to 
conclude that sufficient notice was given for the hearing to be scheduled and 
absent objection by the City, jurisdiction exists and the failure, if any, was 
waived.

[¶11.]  We are then faced with the procedural 
requirement for filing an answer, which was ignored by the City. Proper and 
prompt objection by a request for entry of default was made by Cook at the Board 
hearing so that a waiver by him cannot be applied. In these proceedings, the 
public official acts in behalf of the public in general, and we apply the rule 
that rights for the public interest to be protected and considered by an 
administrative agency cannot be foreclosed as a waiver by the responsible public 
official. See Johnson v. City of Glendale, 12 Cal. App. 2d 389, 55 P.2d 580 
(1936), municipality and its officers cannot waive compliance with claim time; 
Building Com'rs Of, Town of Brookline v. McManus, 263 Mass. 270, 160 N.E. 887 
(1928), building commissioner is without authority to waive or modify zoning 
by-laws; Cawley v. Board of Trustees of Firemen's Pension or Relief Fund of City 
of Beckley, 138 W. Va. 571, 76 S.E.2d 683 (1953); and Park Bldg. Corp. v. 
Industrial Comn., 9 Wis.2d 78, 100 N.W.2d 571 (1960), building inspector could 
not waive failure to comply with safety order.

[¶12.]  A public office is held by public trust, 
67 C.J.S. Officers § 11 (1978); therefore, sanctions or continuance may be 
appropriate and provided, but the public interest in whose discipline the city 
engineer acts cannot be waived by unintentional default.

2. 
Substantive.

[¶13.]  Our review of administrative agency 
action is confined to the matters explicitly referenced in W.S. 16-3-114(c) and 
W.R.A.P. 12.09. W.S. 16-3-114(c) provides:

To the extent necessary 
to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all 
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, 
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. In 
making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or 
those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of 
prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:

(i) Compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and

(ii) Hold unlawful and 
set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

(B) Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

(C) In excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

(D) Without observance of 
procedure required by law; or

(E) Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

[¶14.]  Originally, this appeal raises two 
issues: (1) whether the decision, if constituting a zoning decision, was 
appealable to the Board, and (2) whether the decision was a zoning 
decision.

[¶15.]  In present appellate brief, the City 
concedes the first issue correctly that under state law which is controlling, a 
zoning decision by the enforcement officer may be appealed to the governmental 
zoning board of adjustment.4 See W.S. 
15-1-608.

The more important 
appointed body is the board of adjustment which hears appeals from the actions 
of the municipal officers charged with enforcing the zoning ordinance - 
generally the city engineer or other officer having authority to issue building 
permits.

E. Rudolph, 
Wyoming Local Government Law § 5.1 at 148 (1985) (emphasis added and footnote 
omitted).

[¶16.]  The City now alternatively argues that a 
substantive decision on a zoning question was made or that the question 
presented was an interpretation of the Uniform Building Code (UBC) and not a 
zoning subject at all. Suffice it to observe that the action of the Board speaks 
from its written record, which stated that "Toro made a MOTION to deny the 
variance. Seconded by Lauer. Valdez asked for further discussion. There was 
none. MOTION CARRIED." Undeniably, a requested variance invokes a zoning 
decision.5 

[¶17.]  In Wyoming, an administrative agency is required 
to set forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law. W.S. 16-3-110 provides 
in part:

A final decision or order 
adverse to a party in a contested case shall be in writing or dictated into the 
record. The final decision shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law 
separately stated. Findings of fact if set forth in statutory language, shall be 
accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts 
supporting the findings.

Since this case 
involves an appeal from an administrative agency, this court must be guided by 
W.S. 16-3-114(c).

In determining whether 
the action of an agency is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, the 
court ascertains whether the decision is supported by the record. * * * It is an 
abuse of discretion for an administrative agency to act without collecting the 
necessary facts. First National Bank of Thermopolis v. Bonham, Wyo., 559 P.2d 42 
(1977).

* * * Thus, if the 
principal reasons for the action are not set forth, the courts have no way of 
determining whether the agency considered the relevant 
factors.

Holding's Little 
America v. Board of CountyCom'rs of LaramieCounty, 670 P.2d 699, 703-04 (Wyo. 1983). See also 
Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Service Com'n of Wyoming, 662 P.2d 878, 
886-87 (Wyo. 1983); Larsen v. Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 569 P.2d 87, 
90-91 (Wyo. 1977); Powell v. Board of Trustees of Crook County School Dist. No. 
1, Crook County, 550 P.2d 1112, 1120 (Wyo. 1976); and Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. 
Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 446 P.2d 550, 554-55 (Wyo. 1968). 
Cf. Harris v. Wyoming State Tax Com'n, 718 P.2d 49 (Wyo. 1986), where separately 
stated findings of fact and conclusions of law were not required because of 
involved stipulated facts, a limited question, and no inhibition of appellate 
review; Foremost Life Ins. Co. v. Langdon, 633 P.2d 938, 942 (Wyo. 1981), where 
findings of fact were not required because facts were stipulated to; and Regan 
v. City of Casper, 494 P.2d 935 (Wyo. 1972), where civil service commission 
decision letter satisfied W.S. 9-276.28 (1957) (predecessor to W.S. 
16-3-110).

It is insufficient for an 
administrative agency to state only an ultimate fact or conclusion, but each 
ultimate fact or conclusion must be thoroughly explained in order for a court to 
determine upon what basis each ultimate fact or conclusion was reached. The 
court must know the why.

Geraud v. 
Schrader, 531 P.2d 872, 879 (Wyo.), cert. denied sub nom. Wind River Indian 
Education Association, Inc. v. Ward, 423 U.S. 904, 96 S. Ct. 205, 46 L. Ed. 2d 134 
(1975). A variance decision must be supported by adequate findings. See E. 
Rudolph, supra, § 5.2 at 150 and R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 20.17 (3d 
ed. 1986). There is good reason for this rule as witnessed by present argument 
as to the exact decision and why that decision was made by the administrative 
agency with its negative vote.

[¶18.]  Although the Board did not make findings 
on the denial of the variance, a review of the hearing transcript reveals that 
the Board did not even determine whether minimum side yard clearance is a zoning 
question and whether the cover over a patio could create the problem not caused 
by the patio floor surface itself. Consequently, with this state of the record, 
there is little to conclude but that a variance decision was somehow made in 
contravention to W.S. 16-3-114(c)(ii)(C). We will not pursue the other issues 
argued by Cook speaking in terms of constitutional deprivation, estoppel and 
discriminatory enforcement since these issues were never considered by the 
administrative agency where the hearing was decided only on a variance for a 
claimed side yard, enclosed encroachment. W.S. 
15-1-608(b)(iii).

[¶19.]  Although the issue has at least been 
conceded, it is apparent from reading the statute, W.S. 15-1-608, that two very 
separate decisional functions are vested in this Board. Under W.S. 
15-1-608(b)(ii) and (iii), there is a power to grant zoning ordinance variances. 
As a separate and appellate function, the Board acts in appellate 
responsibility:

(a) The board 
shall:

(i) Hear and 
decide:

(A) Appeals from and 
review any order, requirement, decision or determination made by an 
administrative official charged with the enforcement of any ordinance adopted 
pursuant to this article;

(B) All matters referred 
to it or upon which it is required to pass under any such 
ordinance.

(ii) Fix a reasonable 
time for hearing an appeal, give public notice, adequate notice to the parties 
in interest and decide the appeal within a reasonable time. Any party may appear 
in person at a hearing or by agent or attorney;

(iii) Adopt rules in 
accordance with the provisions of any ordinance adopted pursuant to this 
article.

(b) The board has the 
power to:

(i) Hear and decide 
special exemptions to the terms of the ordinance upon which the board is 
required to pass under the ordinance;

* * * * * 
*

(iv) Reverse or affirm 
wholly or partly the order, requirement, decision or determination as necessary, 
but no power exercised under this paragraph shall exceed the power or authority 
vested in the administrative officer from whom the appeal is 
taken.

W.S. 
15-1-608.

[¶20.]  Furthermore, a decision of the Board is 
not subject to override by the city council, and pursuant to W.S. 15-1-609, 
"[t]he decision of the board may be reviewed by the district court pursuant to 
Rule 12 of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure."6

[¶21.]  The decision of the district court is 
reversed and the case is remanded for the district court to enter an order 
requiring the Board to hold a hearing on any issue presented by Walter C. Cook 
either addressing the zoning ordinances or action of the City Engineer of the 
City of Laramie, Wyoming with regard to homeowner maintenance of the presently 
installed patio cover.

[¶22.]  Reversed and 
remanded.

MACY and GOLDEN, JJ., file opinions concurring 
in part and dissenting in part.

FOOTNOTES

1 The building inspector 
in Laramie, Wyoming is an employee of the city 
engineer.

2 W.S. 15-1-609; Board of 
County Com'rs of Teton County v. Teton County Youth Services, Inc., 652 P.2d 400, 410 (Wyo. 1982).

3 Chapter II, Section 3 of 
the Board's rules and regulations provides:

Section 3. Service of Petition. The Petitioner 
shall cause to be served upon all agencies and persons named in the Petition a 
full, true and correct copy thereof. Service shall be made personally or by 
registered or certified mail with return receipt thereof in accordance with the 
provisions of Rule 4, Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, provided however, that 
personal service made within the City of Laramie may be made by a member of the Laramie 
Police Department. In the case of the agency service shall be made upon the 
Mayor of the City Council or the Chairman of the board or commission involved. 
Proof of service shall be made in accordance with the provisions of said Rule 
4.

4 In appellate brief, the 
City stated:

The Appellees concur with 
Appellant that as to the zoning 
interpretation made by the City Engineer, the Zoning Board of Adjustment has not 
only the authority, but the responsibility, to review the City Engineer's 
decision. The record shows that Appellant addressed that issue to the Zoning 
Board and received a decision thereon.

(Emphasis in 
original.) This posture is contrary to the position taken in the brief submitted 
to the district judge:

The powers of the Board 
of Adjustment are thus restricted to granting variances and no authority has 
been given to the Board to review the interpretations of the City Engineer's 
office.

The City's 
position espoused in its district court appellate brief 
became:

[T]he Court 
agrees with Respondents that the Board of Adjustment is restricted to granting 
variances. No authority has been given to the Board to review the 
interpretations of the City Engineer's Office. Therefore, the Board did not 
address Petitioner's first claim because they are not in a position to do 
so.

5 Although a variance is a 
zoning inquiry, we do not decide whether a side yard clearance for this patio 
cover is or is not a subject for variance, a UBC dispute, or only an argument 
between Cook and the City. A specific decision resolving disputes between the 
litigants will more understandingly present an issue for review based on 
specific findings and conclusions. We are interested why the base pad is not 
questioned and its cover then engenders this unrequited 
litigation.

6 Another concern is 
raised, which is addressed only to avoid another quick appeal. Section 17.48.060 
of the Laramie Municipal Code entitled "Adjustment determination in general - 
Assumption of official powers - Reversals," provides in subsection 
C:

The concurring vote of 
four members of the board of adjustment shall be necessary to reverse any order, 
requirement, decision or determination of any administrative official, or to 
decide in favor of the applicant on any matter upon which it is required to pass 
under any ordinance or to effect any variation in such 
ordinance.

This document 
reflects that the membership of the Board is five. The Wyoming statute, W.S. 
15-1-608(c), states:

The concurring vote of a 
majority of the board is necessary to reverse any order, requirement, decision 
or determination of any administrative official, or to decide in favor of the 
application on any matter upon which it is required to pass under any ordinance 
or to effect any variation in the ordinance.

The home rule 
amendment in Wyo. Const. art. 13, § 1(b) specifies:

All cities and towns are 
hereby empowered to determine their local affairs and government as established 
by ordinance passed by the governing body, subject * * * to statutes uniformly 
applicable to all cities and towns, * * *.

W.S. 15-1-608 is 
a statute "uniformly applicable to all cities and towns." Therefore, a city 
ordinance cannot require four affirmative votes in contravention of the 
statutorily designated majority. See also K N Energy, Inc. v. City of Casper, 
755 P.2d 207, 211 (Wyo. 1988) (a court must analyze any pertinent constitutional 
provision or appropriate statute for the purpose of determining whether express 
or implied authority has been conferred upon a municipality); Police Protective 
Ass'n v. City of Rock Springs, 631 P.2d 433 (Wyo. 1981); Laramie Citizens for 
Good Government v. City of Laramie, 617 P.2d 474 (Wyo. 1980); Tri-County Elec. 
Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Gillette, 584 P.2d 995 (Wyo. 1978); Nation v. State ex 
rel. Fire Fighters Local 279, I.A.F.F., 518 P.2d 931 (Wyo. 1974); E. Rudolph, 
supra, § 2.6; and 8A E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 25.232 
(3d ed. 1986).

MACY, Justice, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part.

[¶23.]  I agree with the majority that the 
decision of the district court should be reversed; however, I would not remand 
for a further hearing. Everyone involved in this controversy can take credit for 
making a simple matter complex and excessively litigious. Mr. Cook has been 
subjected to enough bungling of the bureaucracy. He should now be able to rest 
in the shade of his patio cover.

GOLDEN, Justice, concurring in 
part and dissenting in part.

[¶24.]  The majority opinion in this case is 
separated into two sections, the first addressing the procedural aspects of the 
Zoning Board's determination against Cook and the second addressing the 
substantive aspects. I have no argument with the majority's analysis in the 
substantive section. In Wyoming an agency is required to set forth 
findings of fact and conclusions of law under W.S. 16-3-110; because the agency 
failed in this case to provide any findings or conclusions supporting its 
decision, it is clear that the Zoning Board's decision should at least be 
reversed and remanded for written findings and conclusions. I do, however, 
disagree with the majority's analysis of the procedural aspects of this 
case.

[¶25.]  In response to the City's argument that 
Cook's Petition for Review of the Building Inspector's decision was improperly 
served, the majority states:

Without attempting to 
unravel whether the layman in the volunteer office of chairman should have been 
served instead of the city clerk as the normal agent for the City, it will 
suffice to conclude that sufficient notice was given for the hearing to be 
scheduled and absent objection by the City, jurisdiction exists and the failure, 
if any, was waived.

Ante at 
4.

[¶26.]  Ch. II, § 3 of the Zoning Board's Rules 
and Regulations requires that service be made upon the "Mayor of the City 
Council or the Chairman of the board or commission involved." (This rule is 
identical in part to Laramie Municipal Code, § 1.20.050, which further requires 
that service under the code section comply with W.R.C.P. 4.). In 17 McQuillen, 
Municipal Corporations, § 49.32, p. 213 3d 1982), it is 
stated:

Service of process or the 
waiver of it by appearance is essential to the validity of a judgment against a 
city or its officers. Substitute service on a municipality is not a permissible 
method of service. The form of the process in actions against municipal 
corporations and the manner of service are usually controlled by local laws, and 
generally strict compliance with the procedure prescribed is exacted * * 
*.

In the absence of charter 
or statutory provisions to the contrary, when a municipal corporation is sued in 
that capacity, the summons must be served on its mayor or other chief executive 
officer * * *.

[¶27.]  The local law in this case, Laramie 
Municipal Code, § 1.20.050, requires that service be completed upon the "Mayor 
of the City Council or the Chairman of the board or commission involved." Here, 
service was completed on the city clerk in violation of that local law, and was, 
therefore, improper. However, any defect in service was waived when the City 
appeared at and proceeded with the hearing without objection. Matter of Parental 
Rights to ARW, 716 P.2d 353, 357 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶28.]  Since any defect in service was waived by 
the city's appearance at the hearing, it is inconsistent for the majority to 
then posit that the City cannot be defaulted against despite its failure to 
timely answer Cook's Petition. This position contravenes the clear language of 
Ch. II, § 6 of the Zoning Board's Rules and Regulations, and the identical 
language of Laramie Municipal Code, § 1.20.080 (which also requires compliance 
with W.R.C.P. 5), which state:

In the event of failure 
of either the council, commission or board as the case may be, or any contestee 
to answer or otherwise appear within the time allowed by these rules; [twenty 
days] and provided that § 3 [Laramie Municipal Code, § 1.20.050] [service] 
hereof has been complied with, said agency or contestee so failing to answer or 
otherwise appear, shall not be allowed to answer or otherwise appear thereafter 
and after written notice to the petitioner, the proceedings will be brought 
before the agency to which it was presented for consideration and appropriate 
action.

[¶29.]  There are no provisions in either the 
Board's promulgated rules or the general provisions of the Laramie Municipal 
Code which exempt the City or its agencies from the language of these rules. 
Rules properly promulgated have the force and effect of law. Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 996 (Wyo. 1984); Yeik v. Department 
of Revenue and Taxation, 595 P.2d 965, 968 (Wyo. 1979). One cannot ignore the language of 
the rules above; the City properly should have been defaulted against for its 
failure to answer Cook's petition.

[¶30.]  The question then raised is whether the 
Board can violate or ignore its own rules and permit the City to appear and 
defend despite its failure to answer Cook's petition. It has been held that an 
agency can depart from its own rule if the rule was intended to govern a mere 
internal operating procedure rather than to protect some interest of the 
objecting party. Roberts v. Lincoln County School District No. One, 676 P.2d 577, 580 (Wyo. 1984) (quoting Violations by Agencies of 
Their Own Regulations, 87 Harvard L.Rev. 629 (1973-74)). When the procedural 
rule bears on individual rights, however, the court may find that the rule is 
binding on the agency and may not be violated or ignored because the rule is not 
a mere internal housekeeping arrangement. Brookhaven Housing Coalition v. 
Kunzig, 341 F. Supp. 1026, 1027 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (executive order, having been 
issued and published by the President pursuant to statutory authority, is not a 
mere internal housekeeping arrangement; private citizens have a right to review 
compliance with both the statutes and the regulations relating to the provisions 
of publicly assisted housing). In Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 79 S. Ct. 968, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1012 (1959), the Court held that if a rule constitutes a 
procedural safeguard, a violation of that rule will not be permitted. It would 
appear that the procedural due process requirements in Ch. II, § 6, Laramie 
Municipal Code, § 1.20.080 and W.R.C.P. 5, are just such procedural safeguards 
contemplated in the Vitarelli opinion and should not be lightly disregarded by 
agencies for the purposes of convenience.

[¶31.]  I agree that this case should be reversed 
for the reasons stated in the majority's substantive analysis. I disagree with, 
and, therefore, dissent from its inconsistent analysis in the procedural 
section. I believe the proper disposition of this case is a vacation of the 
Board's holding on jurisdictional grounds and a remand for a new hearing where 
only Cook can present evidence upon which the Board can make its findings and 
conclusions.