Case Title: BRYAN ALLAN TEMEN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0071

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-02-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
BRYAN ALLAN TEMEN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2009 WY 25201 P.3d 1139Case Number: S-08-0071Decided: 02/25/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
BRYAN 
ALLAN TEMEN,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; and Tina N. Kerin, Appellate 
Counsel.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Jenny L. 
Craig, Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Bryan 
Temen (Temen), was convicted of robbery and misdemeanor credit card fraud.  He appeals those convictions asserting 
that the district court erred in allowing amendment of the information during trial.  Temen was originally charged with felony 
credit card fraud, but the evidence presented at trial fell short of the 
$1,000.00 felony level, and the district court permitted amendment of the 
information to the misdemeanor 
level.  In addition, Temen asserts 
that the district court erred in admitting prior bad acts evidence under W.R.E. 
404(b).  We will 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Temen advances 
these two issues:

 
 
I.          
Did the trial court err in allowing amendment of the information during 
trial?

 
 
II.         
Did the trial court err in admitting evidence under W.R.E. 
404(b)?

 
 
The 
State conformed its statement of the issues to those posed by 
Temen.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      The issues raised 
in this appeal do not turn on the sufficiency of the evidence, so we will relate 
only an abbreviated version of the facts and only make reference to the 
proceedings as they relate to the amendment of the information and the admission of W.R.E. 404(b) 
evidence during the State's case in chief.

 
 
[¶4]      On November 1, 
2006, Deputy Foy with the Laramie County Sheriff's Department responded to a 
call regarding a robbery and unauthorized use of a credit card. The victim of 
the crimes, Anthony Flores, told Officer Foy that in the early morning hours of 
November 1, 2006, outside of a nightclub called The Den, he had been attacked by 
three men while he was sitting in his vehicle.  He was hit in the head and face, his 
keys were pulled out of the ignition of his vehicle, and his wallet was ripped 
from a chain that was attached to his pants.  Mr. Flores stated that his Warren 
Federal Credit Union debit card1 was inside his wallet and, since 
the time of the robbery, there had been several unauthorized transactions made 
using that card.

 
 
[¶5]      Deputy Camery of 
the Laramie County Sheriff's Department conducted a further investigation into 
the incident.  He met with the Site 
and Support Manager at Warren Federal Credit Union and was able to determine 
that $939.80 of unauthorized charges had been incurred on the victim's debit 
card and that there was an additional $672.32 of attempted purchases.  Deputy Camery also observed video 
surveillance footage from the local WalMart Super Center, King Soopers, and Sapp 
Brothers Truck Stop, which showed two individuals using the victim's card.  These individuals were identified as 
Schon Shafer and Temen. Further, a King Soopers Valued Customer Card issued to 
Temen was used in conjunction with the stolen card at King 
Soopers.

 
 
[¶6]      Deputy Camery 
interviewed Schon Shafer, and Shafer stated that Temen told him he had assaulted 
a man at The Den, ripped the keys out of his vehicle's ignition, stole his 
wallet, and then used his credit card to make purchases.  Deputy Camery then interviewed an 
individual named Joshua Jennings.  
Jennings related that Temen also had told him that he assaulted a man and 
stole his credit card, and that he and Shafer then made various purchases using 
the credit card.

 
 
[¶7]      On March 6, 2007, 
the circuit court issued an arrest warrant for Temen after he had been charged 
by information with one count of robbery, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-401(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2007), and one count of credit card fraud, whereby he 
had obtained property worth in excess of $1,000.00, in violation of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-3-802(a)(i) and (b)(iii).  
Temen's arraignment was held on March 26, 2007, and he entered pleas of 
"not guilty" to both charges.

 
 
[¶8]      In preparation 
for trial, the State filed a notice of intent to introduce evidence pursuant to 
W.R.E. 404(b).  That notice 
informed Temen that the State 
intended to introduce evidence regarding his previous conviction for forgery to 
prove his intent and the absence of mistake or accident with respect to the 
current charges of credit card fraud. Temen then filed a motion in limine 
regarding potential evidence that might be produced pursuant to W.R.E. 609, if 
his client testified.  On September 
10, 2007, the district court held a motions hearing, during which it heard 
extensive argument regarding the introduction of Temen's previous conviction, as 
well as the use of prior convictions to impeach him if he testified on his own 
behalf. The district court indicated that it likely would be admissible and that 
Temen should be prepared to further address that issue when it arose during the 
course of trial.  However, the trial 
court also determined that it could not make a final ruling on the issue until 
other evidence was presented at trial.

 
 
[¶9]      Trial commenced 
on September 18, 2007. On the second day of trial, the State filed a Motion to 
Amend Charges.  The district court 
granted the motion, and Count II, formerly charging felony credit card fraud, 
was reduced to a misdemeanor.  At 
the close of the State's case, the district court took judicial notice of the 
fact that Temen had been previously convicted of forgery, and so informed the jury.  The parties had agreed to this method of 
introducing the W.R.E. 404(b) evidence.

 
 
[¶10]   After Temen presented his case, 
which consisted solely of his own personal testimony, the jury returned guilty 
verdicts on both counts of the Amended Information.  On January 11, 2008, the district court 
entered its Judgment and Sentence. Temen was sentenced to a term of 
incarceration of not less than eight nor more than ten years for the robbery and 
not less than four nor more than six months for the credit card fraud, with the 
sentences to run concurrently. He was also ordered to pay restitution and 
applicable fees.  A timely notice of 
appeal was filed on January 24, 2008.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Amendment 
of the Information Mid-Trial

 
 
[¶11]   Temen's contentions in this regard 
rely on W.R.Cr.P. 3(e) which provides:

 
 
            
(e)  Amendment of 
information or citation. -- Without leave of the court, the attorney for the 
state may amend an information or citation until five days before a preliminary 
examination in a case required to be tried in district court or until five days 
before trial for a case not required to be tried in district court.  The court may permit an information or 
citation to be amended:

                        
(1)  With the defendant's consent, at any time before 
sentencing.

                        
(2)  Whether or not the defendant 
consents:

(A)  At 
any time before trial if substantial rights of the defendant are not 
prejudiced.

            

(B)  At 
any time before verdict or finding if no additional or different offense is 
charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not 
prejudiced.

 
 
We 
note at the outset that by its very terms the cited rule vests the district 
court with wide discretion in granting or denying a motion to amend an 
information.

 
 
[¶12]   At the end of first day of trial, 
September 18, 2007, it became apparent that once the State finished introducing 
its evidence with respect to the felony credit card fraud charge, that there was 
a problem of proof in that the amount proved was $986.00, just shy of the felony 
level for that charge ($1,000.00).  
The district court called that matter to the State's attention and the 
State conceded, "I think we've got a problem.  We'll work on that."  Neither the clerk's record nor the trial 
transcript reflects that Temen's counsel objected to the amendment reducing the 
charge to a misdemeanor.  The "2nd Amended Information" was not filed of record 
until September 24, 2007.  However, 
during the trial proceedings on September 19, 2007, the district court 
informed the 
jury:

 
 
The 
charge originally referred against Mr. Temen to the allegation he violated the 
felony provisions of credit card use.  
The felony provisions of credit card misuse have a ceiling of more than 
$1,000.  It became apparent from the 
testimony of Miss Thoe-Heuer that the amount involved was less than one thousand 
dollars.

Today 
I granted the motion of the State giving them permission to amend the 
information.  An information is a 
technical term. That's the charge to allege a violation of a misdemeanor of 
credit card misuse because the evidence suggests it was less than a thousand 
dollars.

I'm 
not giving you this information to 
instruct you that the defendant has actually committed a crime, but just to 
advise you that the charge has been amended by the State to allege a violation 
of a misdemeanor rather than a felony, and I'm going to admonish you again to 
remind you again to remember the admonitions with regard to refraining from 
discussing the issues between each other.

 
 
[¶13]   Defense counsel did not object to 
that instruction.  We agree with the 
State that the proceedings strongly support a conclusion that defense counsel 
accepted the district court's decision to allow the amendment to the 
information under W.R.Cr.P. 
3(e)(2)(B).  We also conclude, under 
the circumstances presented by this case, that "no additional or different 
offense" was charged, and that the "substantial rights" of the defendant were 
not prejudiced.  See 1 Charles Alan 
Wright and Andrew D. Leipold, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, Criminal 4th § 129 (2008).  In his argument, Temen makes no cogent 
argument, nor does he cite any pertinent authority, that would cause us to 
conclude that the amendment constituted the charging of a "different" offense or 
that he was in any way prejudiced by the amendment, whether that issue is 
addressed under our usual standards for addressing error, or under the plain 
error rule.  Accordingly, we do not 
find any abuse of discretion by the district court in permitting the State to 
amend the information as it did.  See Wilkening v. State, 2005 WY 127, 
¶ 25, 120 P.3d 680, 688 (Wyo. 2005); Burton v. State, 2002 WY 71, ¶ 44, 
46 P.3d 309, 320-21 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 
W.R.E. 
404(b) Evidence

 
 
[¶14]   W.R.E. 404 
provides:

 
 
(a)  Character evidence generally. -- 
Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible 
for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular 
occasion, except:

(1)  Character 
of Accused. -- Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by an 
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;

(2)  Character 
of Victim. -- Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the 
crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or 
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the 
prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first 
aggressor;

(3)  Character 
of Witness. -- Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in Rules 607, 
608, and 609.

            
(b)  Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. -- 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity 
therewith.  It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake 
or accident.  [Emphasis 
added.]

 
 
[¶15]   Temen previously had been convicted 
of forgery.  The State gave Temen 
notice of its intent to use that conviction under this rule to show his use of 
the credit card was intentional and not the result of a mistake or 
accident.  In its notice, the State 
relied in part on our decisions in Sanville v. State, 593 P.2d 1340, 1345 
(Wyo. 1979) and Trevino v. State, 
2006 WY 113, ¶¶ 17-18, 142 P.3d 214, 219-20 (Wyo. 2006).  The prior crime at issue here was 
committed less than a year before the instant crime.  It was apparent early on in the 
proceedings that Temen intended to testify on his own behalf and to deny any 
knowledge that the credit card was stolen or that he was otherwise involved in 
any of the crimes for which he was charged (and he ultimately testified to that 
effect). 

 
 
[¶16]   The standard of review we apply 
when analyzing the admission of W.R.E. 404(b) evidence is 
rigorous:

 
 
            
We review a district court's rulings on the admissibility of evidence, 
including uncharged misconduct evidence, for an abuse of discretion, and we will 
not reverse absent a clear abuse of such discretion.  Bromley v. State, 2007 WY 20, ¶ 8, 
150 P.3d 1202, 1206 (Wyo.2007).  "A 
trial court abuses its discretion when it could not have reasonably concluded as 
it did."  Id. at ¶ 8, at 1206-1207.  The admissibility of uncharged 
misconduct evidence is governed by W.R.E. 404(b):

 
 
      Evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in 
order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

 
 
The 
district court is to determine the admission of proffered evidence under this 
rule by applying the following test:

 
 
[B]ecause 
uncharged misconduct evidence carries an inherent danger for prejudice, we have 
also adopted a mandatory procedure for testing its admissibility:  (1) the evidence must be offered for a 
proper purpose; (2) the evidence must be relevant; (3) the probative value of 
the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair 
prejudice; and (4) upon request, the trial court must instruct the jury that the 
similar acts evidence is to be considered only for the proper purpose for which 
it was admitted.

 
 

Gleason 
v. State, 
2002 WY 161, ¶ 18, 57 P.3d 332, 340 (Wyo.2002).  "Admissibility under W.R.E. 404(b) is 
not limited to the purposes set forth in the rule, and we have adopted a liberal 
approach toward admitting uncharged misconduct evidence."  Id.  

 
 

Harris 
v. State, 
2008 WY 23, ¶¶ 5-6, 177 P.3d 1166, 1168 (Wyo. 2008).

 
 
[¶17]   In Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 
161,¶¶ 26-28, 57 P.3d 332, 342-43 (Wyo. 2002) we provided this further 
guidance for trial courts to employ in deciding these very difficult 
questions:

 
 
Despite 
the resolution of this issue, we feel compelled to address in more detail the 
difficulties encountered in the appellate review of the admission of uncharged 
misconduct evidence under W.R.E. 404(b).  
The primary step in propounding uncharged misconduct evidence is 
identification of a proper purpose for its admission.  In that regard, we have previously held 
that the State need not pinpoint but one purpose for admission of such 
evidence.  Sturgis, 932 P.2d  at 203.  Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon the 
proponent to identify such purpose or purposes with specificity because, without 
such specificity, the balance of the Vigil test cannot be applied.  For evidence to be relevant, we must 
know the fact question to which it is relevant.  For evidence to be probative, we must 
know what it is meant to prove.

 
 
            
For proper appellate review of the admissibility of evidence under W.R.E. 
404(b), the record must reflect that the trial court required the State not only 
to identify the proper purpose for which uncharged misconduct evidence is being 
offered, but also to explain how or why it is probative, and why it is more 
probative than prejudicial.  In that 
regard, we have twice set out in a footnote the process that should be followed 
by the trial court in making that analysis.  To make sure there is no doubt in the 
future that this is a required process, we will repeat it now, in the body of 
this opinion:

 
 
      In determining 
the probative value of prior bad acts evidence, the trial court should consider 
the following factors:

 
 
1.  How 
clear is it that the defendant committed the prior bad act?  

2.  Does 
the defendant dispute the issue on which the state is offering the prior bad 
acts evidence?  

3.  Is 
other evidence available?  

4.  Is 
the evidence unnecessarily cumulative?  

5.  How 
much time has elapsed between the charged crime and the prior bad act?  

 
 
      Evidence is 
unfairly prejudicial if it tempts the jury to decide the case on an improper 
basis.  In balancing against its 
probative value the unfair prejudice created by the evidence, the trial court 
should consider the extent to which the evidence distracts the jury from the 
central question whether the defendant committed the charged crime.  The trial court should weigh these 
additional factors against the probative value of the 
evidence:

 
 
1.  The 
reprehensible nature of the prior bad act.  
The more reprehensible the act, the more likely the jury will be tempted 
to punish the defendant for the prior act.  

2.  The 
sympathetic character of the alleged victim of the prior bad act.  Again, the jury will be tempted to 
punish the defendant for the prior act if the victim was especially 
vulnerable.

3.  The 
similarity between the charged crime and the prior bad act.  The more similar the acts, the greater 
is the likelihood that the jury will draw the improper inference that if the 
defendant did it once, he probably did it again.

4.  The 
comparative enormity of the charged crime and the prior bad act.  When the prior act is a more serious 
offense than the charged crime, the introduction of that act will tend to place 
the defendant in a different and unfavorable light.

5.  The 
comparable relevance of the prior bad act to the proper and forbidden 
inferences.  Evidence of the prior 
bad act may be much more probative of bad character than it is of any legitimate 
inference permitted by Rule 404(b).

6.  Whether 
the prior act resulted in a conviction.  
The jury may be tempted to punish the defendant if they believe he 
escaped punishment for the prior bad act.

 
 

Rigler, 
941 P.2d  at 737 n. 1 (citing Dean, 
865 P.2d  at 609-10 n. 2).

 
 
            
In Rigler, 941 P.2d  at 737-38, 
we held that, so long as the record revealed that the trial court had subjected 
proposed uncharged misconduct evidence to the appropriate test of its probative 
value and prejudicial effect, the trial court need not make express findings on 
the record on each of these factors.  
Since that opinion was published, however, we have repeatedly been called 
upon to assess a trial court's exercise of discretion on such rulings, and we 
now remind the trial courts that, while express findings on each factor are not necessary, abuse of 
discretion, or the lack thereof, cannot be determined by reviewing a record that 
contains no information as to how that discretion was exercised. [Emphasis in 
original.]

 
 
[¶18]   When the question of the 
admissibility of the W.R.E. 404(b) evidence was first brought to the district 
court's attention at a pretrial motions hearing, the district court heard some 
argument from defense counsel but declined, because of time pressures, to rule 
on Temen's objections to that evidence, except to indicate that it would 
probably be admissible.

 
 
[¶19]   When the subject came up again, in 
light of Temen's desire to testify in his own defense, W.R.E. 609 was mixed into 
the discussion of the W.R.E. 404(b) evidence.  Temen's principal concern was that the 
404(b) evidence would be cumulative to any impeachment evidence the State sought 
to elicit.

 
 
[¶20]   W.R.E. 609 
provides:

 
 
(a)  General rule. -- For the purpose of 
attacking the credibility of a witness,

(1)  evidence 
that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was 
convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall 
be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this 
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; 
and

(2)  evidence 
that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it involved 
dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 
punishment.

(b)  Time limit. -- Evidence of a conviction 
under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed 
since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the 
confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the 
court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the 
conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs 
its prejudicial effect.  However, 
evidence of a conviction more than ten years old as calculated herein, is not 
admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance 
written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with 
a fair opportunity to contest the use of such evidence.

(c)  Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate 
of rehabilitation. -- Evidence of a conviction is not admissible under this 
rule if (1) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment, 
certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding 
of the rehabilitation of the person convicted, and that person has not been 
convicted of a subsequent crime which was punishable by death or imprisonment in 
excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, 
annulment, or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of 
innocence.

(d)  Juvenile adjudications. -- Evidence of 
juvenile adjudications is generally not admissible under this rule.  The court may, however, in a criminal 
case allow evidence of a juvenile adjudication of a witness other than the 
accused if conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the 
credibility of an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is 
necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or 
innocence.

(e)  Pendency of appeal. -- The pendency of 
an appeal therefrom does not render evidence of a conviction inadmissible.  Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is 
admissible.

 
 
[¶21]   Defense counsel accepted the 
circumstance that if his client testified, then his prior convictions could be 
used to impeach him, and they in fact were, albeit with great restraint on the 
part of the State.  The State merely 
asked Temen if he had been convicted of any felonies, and he replied that he had 
been so convicted three or four times.  
Although the discussion of the Gleason factors was very brief in this 
case, that may have been appropriate here in that defense counsel essentially 
limited his concerns to: (1) that the use of the prior conviction as W.R.E. 
404(b) evidence was cumulative ("there's other evidence"), and (2) that its 
admission was more prejudicial than probative.  This tended to relieve the district 
court of the urgency of going through all the matters outlined in the quoted 
material set out above (the five basic factors and the six supplemental 
factors).  We have not mandated that 
the district court go through all those factors, item by item, and that would be 
especially true if none of them are of any particular relevance.  To the extent the district court could, 
or should, have done more analysis in this case, at most we would be compelled 
to conclude that that was a matter of harmless error, if it was error at 
all.  W.R.A.P. 9.04.  Moreover, the district court admonished 
the jury at the time the W.R.E. 404(b) evidence was 
admitted:

 
 
I 
have a document to read to you. The parties - - the defense and the State - - 
have entered into a stipulation, and that stipulation is as follows:  On June 26th of 2006, the defendant pled 
guilty to and was convicted of the crime of forgery, which is a felony. This 
conviction took place in Laramie County.

I'm 
going to instruct you that I have admitted this evidence regarding this prior 
conviction for forgery for the limited purposes of establishing lack of mistake 
or accident by the defendant and intent of the defendant. You must not consider 
this conviction as evidence of his guilt of the crime charged and may only 
consider [it] for the limited purposes for which it was 
admitted.

 
 
[¶22]   This admonition was 
reinforced by an instruction given to 
the jury in writing before deliberations began.

 
 
[¶23]   Based upon these circumstances, we 
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 
disputed 404(b) evidence.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶24]   The judgment and sentence of the 
district court are affirmed in all respects.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-3-801(a)(i) defines "credit card:"  "[It] means an identification card or 
device issued by a business organization authorizing the person to whom issued 
to purchase or obtain property or services on credit."

 
 
Although 
"credit card," "debit card," "charge card," etc., are often used interchangeably 
in day-to-day conversation, there are distinct differences in how various types 
of such "cards" work, especially in this age of instantaneous electronic bank 
and credit transactions.  See 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Debit_card.   Although the card at issue in this 
case was a "debit card," that phrase was used interchangeably with "credit card" 
throughout this case (thus, of necessity we too have used them 
interchangeably).  The debit card at 
issue in this case had an "overdraft courtesy pay" feature which permitted 
Flores to withdraw up to $750.00 beyond the actual balance in his 
account.

 
 
            
No issue was raised in this regard below, and none is raised in this 
appeal.  However, we make brief 
mention of this matter because the Wyoming Legislature may want to update these 
statutes to reflect the many nuances now found within the credit/debit card 
industry.  See, e.g., Idaho Code 
Ann. §§ 18-3122 through 18-3128 (financial transaction card) (Michie 2004 and 
Pocket Supp. 2008).