Case Title: Cooper Industries v. Melendez

Citation: 

Docket Number: 992957

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2000-11-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
COOPER INDUSTRIES, INC., ET AL. 
 
v. Record No. 992957  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  November 3, 2000 
ANDRES MELENDEZ 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 
John C. Morrison, Jr. Judge 
 
 
In this product liability case, we address issues 
concerning proximate causation, misuse of a product, the 
statute of repose, and a trial court’s discretion to send a 
jury back for further deliberations when a juror expresses 
disagreement with the verdict during a poll of the jury.  
Because we find no error, we will affirm the judgment of 
the circuit court, which was in accordance with a jury 
verdict in favor of the injured plaintiff. 
MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS 
This product liability action arose out of an 
explosion of an industrial circuit breaker, known as a K-
Don 600 amp circuit breaker, located in Vault 21 of Pier 23 
at the Norfolk Naval Base on June 1, 1994.  The explosion 
occurred as Andres Melendez, Jr., a civil employee of the 
Navy’s Public Works Center, his supervisor, and a co-worker 
were “racking” or installing the circuit breaker in an 
energized switchgear.1  As a result of the explosion, 
Melendez and his supervisor were seriously burned, and the 
co-worker was killed. 
 
Melendez filed a motion for judgment in the circuit 
court alleging negligence, breach of implied warranty, and 
strict liability against Cooper Industries, Inc., Arrow 
Hart, Inc., and Crouse-Hinds Co. (collectively Cooper), the 
manufacturer of the switchgear at issue in this case.2  In 
its grounds of defense, Cooper raised an affirmative 
defense that Melendez’s action was barred by the applicable 
statute of repose, Code § 8.01-250.  Over Melendez’s 
objection that the plea in bar involved disputed factual 
questions to be resolved by a jury, the circuit court 
                     
1 The Public Works Center had responsibility for all 
utilities and maintenance at the naval base. 
 
2 Arrow Hart actually manufactured the switchgear.  
However, Cooper is the successor in interest to Arrow Hart 
and Crouse-Hinds.  Accordingly, we will use the name 
“Cooper” in this opinion even though certain references in 
the record are to Arrow Hart. 
Melendez named several other defendants in the motion 
for judgment, including Gould Electronics, Inc. and I.T.E. 
Imperial Corp. (collectively ITE), manufacturers of the 
circuit breaker; Glastic Corporation, manufacturer of 
insulation used in the switchgear and circuit breaker; and 
Westinghouse Electric Corporation, the company that 
retrofitted circuit breakers for the Navy.  However, these 
defendants settled with Melendez before trial.  Thus, 
Cooper was the only defendant at trial. 
Melendez also nonsuited his negligence and strict 
liability claims, leaving only the claim for breach of 
implied warranty for trial. 
 
2
conducted an evidentiary hearing and concluded that the 
statute of repose does not apply.  Because one of Cooper’s 
witnesses, Robert L. Smith, could not be present for that 
proceeding, the court agreed to reconsider the issue after 
hearing Smith’s testimony at trial. 
Following several days of trial, a jury returned a 
verdict in favor of Melendez in the amount of $5,000,000.  
After the court announced the verdict, Cooper requested a 
poll of the jurors.  During that poll, one juror responded 
“No” when asked if that was his verdict.  The court then 
instructed the jurors, “Well, ladies and gentleman, you’re 
going to have to return to your jury room at this point.  I 
had instructed you previously that your verdict must be 
unanimous.”  At that point, the foreperson of the jury 
stated, “It was unanimous, Your Honor, when we was [sic] in 
that jury room.”  Thereupon, the court stated, “Ladies and 
gentleman, step back into your jury room, please.”  Cooper 
immediately moved for a mistrial.  After approximately two 
minutes, the jury returned to the courtroom with the same 
verdict as the original.  The court polled the jurors 
again, and this time, each juror, including the one who 
initially answered “No,” responded “Yes, your Honor” to the 
question, “Is that your verdict?” 
 
3
Following the trial, Cooper renewed its motion for a 
mistrial based on the result of the first jury poll and 
also moved to set aside the jury verdict on numerous 
grounds, including the issue regarding the statute of 
repose.  After considering briefs and argument on both 
motions, the circuit court denied the motions and entered 
judgment in favor of Melendez in accordance with the jury 
verdict.3
In a letter opinion, the court explained its reasons 
for concluding, once again, that the statute of repose does 
not apply.  Rejecting Cooper’s comparison of the switchgear 
and circuit breaker at issue in this case to an electric 
panel box used in a private residence, the court concluded 
that the switchgear and circuit breaker are “equipment or 
machinery” within the purview of Code § 8.01-250 and not 
ordinary building materials.  The court described the 
switchgear, which is designed to hold 10 circuit breakers, 
as a “metal cabinet . . . 8’6” in height, 8’9” wide, and 
5’2” deep.”  The court further stated that the circuit 
breaker “measure[d] 20.5” in height, 26.5” deep, and . . . 
14” wide.” 
                     
3 In its judgment order, the court set off the sum that 
Melendez had received in settlement from other defendants 
against the amount of the jury verdict.  See n. 2, supra. 
 
4
Continuing, the court advised the parties that it had 
considered an owner’s manual and instructions regarding the 
installation and use of the circuit breaker in question, a 
shop drawing prepared by Cooper depicting the switchgear, 
and the Navy’s contract specifications for the equipment.4  
The court noted that the detailed instructions included in 
the owner’s manual probably would not have been provided 
for ordinary building materials.  The court further 
reasoned that the Navy’s specifications, such as the 
direction to put nameplates on the equipment showing, among 
other things, the manufacturer’s name; to supply “a 
switchgear with drawout (removable) circuit breakers”; to 
provide equipment that is “established standard tested 
products of the manufacturer, thoroughly coordinated and 
integrated by the manufacturer [with] the ratings of all 
equipment and components . . . guaranteed and published by 
the manufacturer”; and “[t]o factory test and certify the 
primary and secondary (circuit breaker portion) switchgear 
sections” tended to remove the items in question from the 
category of ordinary building materials. 
                     
4 The court stated that it was considering the 
instruction manual solely for the fact that such a manual 
existed because there had been other issues during the 
trial regarding the manual. 
 
5
 
We awarded Cooper this appeal on the following 
assignments of error: (1) that the circuit court erred in 
refusing to set aside the jury verdict because Melendez did 
not establish a causal connection between the alleged 
breach of warranty and his injuries; (2) that the court 
erred in refusing to set aside the verdict because both 
Melendez and the Navy misused the electrical gear; (3) that 
the court erred in deciding that the statute of repose does 
not bar Melendez’s action to recover for his bodily 
injuries; (4) that the circuit court erred in refusing to 
grant a mistrial when a juror responded “No” during the 
poll of the jury because the responses showed that the 
verdict was not unanimous; and (5) that the court erred in 
denying Cooper’s motion for a mistrial because the court’s 
instructions to the jury after the poll “in essence 
required unanimity.” 
FACTS 
In accordance with well-established principles, we 
recite the facts in the light most favorable to Melendez, 
the prevailing party at trial.  Rice v. Charles, 260 Va. 
157, 161, 532 S.E.2d 318, 320 (2000).  “The verdict of the 
jury in favor of [Melendez], upon which the trial court 
entered judgment, settles all conflicts of testimony in 
[his] favor and entitles [him] to all just inferences 
 
6
deducible therefrom.  Fortified by the jury’s verdict and 
the judgment of the court, [he] occupies the most favored 
position known to the law.”  Pugsley v. Privette, 220 Va. 
892, 901, 263 S.E.2d 69, 76 (1980) (citing Tri-State Coach 
Corp. v. Walsh, 188 Va. 299, 303, 49 S.E.2d 363, 365 
(1948)). 
In the late 1970’s, the Navy undertook a renovation of 
its piers, including Pier 23, at its naval base in Norfolk.  
With the advent of a nuclear-powered Navy, the existing 
electrical services on the piers were not adequate to meet 
the electrical demands of the changing fleet.  That 
renovation took place 17 years before the explosion at 
issue in this case. 
Pier 23, where the explosion occurred, originally 
contained three electrical vaults referred to as “Vaults 1, 
2, and 3.”  During the renovation, three additional vaults 
were added, and the switchgear in each of the existing 
vaults was upgraded to match the switchgear being installed 
in the new vaults.  Those new vaults were numbered 20, 21, 
and 22.  Vault 21 contained the circuit breaker that 
exploded. 
The top of Pier 23 is a deck where trucks and 
machinery can be driven and on which people can walk.  One 
of the Navy’s goals during the renovation was to remove any 
 
7
obstructions on the deck in order to accommodate the 
traffic on the pier needed to supply and maintain ships and 
submarines.  Thus, according to Cooper’s witness, Robert L. 
Smith, a retired electrical engineer who prepared the 
design drawings of the electrical system for the renovation 
project, the plan was to remove switchgear from the top of 
the pier’s deck and place it underneath the pier.5
A switchgear, such at the one located in Vault 21, is 
a large metal enclosure that contains many component parts, 
including circuit breakers.  Electrical power flows into 
the switchgear through a circuit breaker and goes out via a 
large cable on top of the pier to a submarine docked at the 
pier.  One end of the cable is plugged into a receptacle 
located in a box, called a “turtle back,” that sits on the 
deck, and the other end is connected to the submarine.  The 
purpose of this system is to enable a submarine to be 
moored at the pier and draw electrical power from the shore 
instead of having to run its engines and generators to 
supply electrical power. 
Cooper’s expert witness, Roger Bledsoe, agreed as to 
the purpose of the electrical system.  He testified at the 
                     
5 At the time of the renovation, Smith worked for an 
engineering firm that had contracted with the Navy to 
provide the design plans and specifications for the 
renovation project. 
 
8
hearing on the statute of repose that the switchgear in 
this case was to provide electrical power “from the land” 
to a submarine docked at the pier.  When asked whether the 
switchgear and circuit breaker served any function with 
regard to the pier, Bledsoe responded, “That’s what it 
sounds like.  It sounds like it’s through the ship.” 
 
John Kuzmack qualified as an expert on the subject of 
circuit breakers at the hearing on the statute of repose.  
He had previously worked for the manufacturer of the ITE K-
Don circuit breaker at issue in this case.  Kuzmack 
testified that a K-Don circuit breaker serves the same 
basic function as a circuit breaker used in a house, except 
that the K-Don breaker is significantly larger.  The 
circuit breaker at issue was a finished product, tested at 
the factory before it left the manufacturer.  Although the 
circuit breaker and switchgear were normally shipped in 
separate containers to the site where they would be used, 
the circuit breaker had only to be plugged into a 
compatible switchgear upon its arrival at that site. 
The manufacturer of the K-Don circuit breaker did not, 
however, select a specific breaker for its ultimate use.  
According to Kuzmack, original equipment manufacturers, 
such as Cooper, selected K-Don circuit breakers and other 
component parts to use in assembling their respective 
 
9
switchgear, which in his words was “an assembled product.”  
The ITE K-Don circuit breaker could be used in different 
manufacturers’ switchgear provided a cradle compatible to 
the K-Don breaker had been installed in the switchgear. 
Kuzmack also testified that ITE, the manufacturer of 
the K-Don circuit breaker, provided an instruction bulletin 
that was placed in the carton with each breaker.  According 
to Frederick C. Teufel, who had also worked for the 
manufacturer of the K-Don circuit breakers for many years, 
the instruction booklet advised customers to tell ITE if a 
circuit breaker was going to be exposed to unusual service 
conditions.6  Based on a shop order, Teufel identified the 
circuit breaker involved in the explosion as having been 
manufactured by ITE.  He further stated that the circuit 
breakers listed on the shop order had no special 
requirements, thus implying that they were not to be used 
in unusual service conditions. 
 
The vaults that housed the switchgear and circuit 
breakers under the piers after the renovation were 
specially designed because of the unusual service 
                     
6 Helmut Gunther Brosz, Melendez’s witness who was 
qualified at trial as an expert in the field of electrical 
engineering and equipment failures, defined the term 
“[u]nusual service condition” as “those conditions which 
involve any humidity, salt fog, dripping water, unusual 
gases, high temperatures . . . .” 
 
10
conditions in which the switchgear and circuit breakers 
would be used.  According to Smith, the special design of 
the vaults included walls and a floor that were 
monolithically cast, completely waterproof, and set in 
place with cranes.  In other words, the vaults were 
designed to provide an indoor environment.  Thus, Smith’s 
design specifications provided for indoor switchgear and 
circuit breakers for use in the vaults. 
 
According to a Materials List prepared by Cooper, it 
supplied switchgear and ITE K-Don circuit breakers to the 
Navy for the renovation project, including the switchgear 
and circuit breaker at issue in this case.  Although the 
Navy’s specifications allowed circuit breakers other than 
those manufactured by ITE, Cooper utilized the ITE K-Don 
circuit breaker.  As required by the Navy’s contract 
specifications, those circuit breakers were “draw-out” 
breakers, meaning that they were designed to be “racked” or 
installed in an energized switchgear. 
 
Cooper’s Materials List also contained items such as 
strip heaters and humidistats, which, according to 
Melendez’s expert witness Helmut Brosz, indicated Cooper’s 
awareness of the unusual service conditions in which the 
switchgear and circuit breakers would be used by the Navy 
in the piers.  Thus, Brosz opined that Cooper should have 
 
11
advised the manufacturer of the circuit breakers about the 
unusual service conditions in which the breakers would be 
used and that Cooper violated industry standards by failing 
to do so. 
In addition to providing information to the circuit 
breaker manufacturer, Brosz testified that the switchgear 
assembly manufacturer, in this case Cooper, also should 
have communicated to the end user, i.e., the Navy and its 
workers, that because of the unusual service conditions, 
special tests should be carried out from time to time.  
However, Brosz stated that Cooper did not provide any 
instruction manual for the switchgear assembly with regard 
to the unusual service conditions and the need for special 
maintenance and testing.  Thus, Brosz opined that the 
switchgear assembly, as sold to the Navy without such a 
manual, was an unreasonably dangerous product and defective 
for use in the piers. 
 
In 1993, the Navy commenced a project to overhaul and 
retrofit the circuit breakers at its naval base in Norfolk, 
including those in Pier 23.  Westinghouse performed the 
retrofit for the Navy, which included putting a new digital 
line tripping system on the circuit breakers and then 
testing the breakers.  During the project, the circuit 
breakers were removed from the switchgear and stored in a 
 
12
building on the naval base where Westinghouse performed the 
retrofit.  While the circuit breakers were being 
retrofitted, preventive maintenance was performed on the 
piers, switchgear, and vaults. 
Robert Shematek, an employee of Westinghouse during 
the retrofitting project, testified that Westinghouse 
conducted some instructional classes “for just about 
everyone who worked” for the Navy with regard to the new 
tripping system and maintenance of the circuit breakers.  
However, the record does not contain evidence that Melendez 
attended any of those classes.  Shematek stated that the 
instructions given during the classes, as well as those 
contained in a booklet titled “Westinghouse Digitrip 
Retrofit System,” included a warning not to install the 
circuit breakers in an energized switchgear.  Shematek also 
stated that he gave a similar oral warning to Melendez’s 
supervisor, Larry Dean Agee.  However, Agee denied having 
received such a warning from either Westinghouse or 
Shematek.  Shematek also testified that he told Agee that 
Westinghouse would not permit Shematek to go down into the 
vaults because the conditions in them were unsafe.  
However, Shematek admitted that Westinghouse had a general 
policy against his going into confined spaces “with live 
gear.” 
 
13
Agee testified that, on the day of the explosion, the 
circuit breaker that later exploded was moved from the 
storage building where Westinghouse had retrofitted and 
tested it to Pier 23.7  The preventive maintenance and 
testing on Vault 21 had previously been completed, and Pier 
23 had been energized for more than 24 hours.  Part of the 
maintenance work had been to dry out the vaults and 
switchgear.  Agee admitted that Pier 23 was one of the 
piers having the greatest problem with water infiltration 
in the vaults.  He specifically remembered seeing 
condensation and water on the switchgear in Vault 21. 
Because the vaults had been subjected to moisture and 
other adverse conditions for over a year during the 
retrofit project, Shematek questioned whether they had been 
properly dried out.  Shematek testified that, despite such 
concerns, Agee stated that he was going to do whatever was 
necessary to get Pier 23 back in service within two weeks 
as requested by the Navy.  However, Agee disputed making 
such a statement to Shematek. 
Once the circuit breaker arrived at Pier 23, it was 
lowered into Vault 21 through a manhole, using a rope and 
winch.  Melendez, Agee, and another co-worker were in the 
                     
7 According to a test sheet supplied by Westinghouse, 
the circuit breaker at issue was tested on August 11, 1993. 
 
14
vault to receive the circuit breaker, take off the rope, 
and install the breaker in the switchgear.  After the 
circuit breaker was slid into its cubicle and “racked in,” 
it exploded, sending out a fireball.  Melendez testified 
that he saw his co-worker with flames all over his body and 
then realized that he was also on fire. 
After the explosion, the Navy hired Brosz, through an 
engineering firm, to investigate the accident.  Brosz was 
on the site within two days after the explosion.  When he 
went down into Vault 21 on Pier 23, Brosz found “an 
electrical switchgear that was covered in soot, and . . . 
evidence of electrical arcing at the bottom right-hand 
circuit breaker . . . .”  He testified that the cause of 
the explosion was the absorption of moisture by the glass 
fiber reinforced polyester insulation (GFRP) used in the K-
Don circuit breakers.  The moisture caused the insulation 
to degrade over a period of several years.  The 
degradation, meaning that the insulation had lost its 
insulating power, in turn precipitated a short-circuit, 
arcing, and the explosion.  Brosz could find no other cause 
for the explosion, and specifically stated that Melendez 
did not do anything wrong on the day of the accident.  
Brosz testified that the circuit breaker was designed to be 
installed in an energized switchgear and that Melendez had 
 
15
followed the practice used by electricians at the naval 
base.  However, Brosz acknowledged that, if the switchgear 
had not been energized when Melendez installed the circuit 
breaker, the explosion would not have occurred. 
Cooper’s expert witness, Bledsoe, could not determine 
the cause of the explosion.  He did agree that the K-Don 
circuit breaker was designed to be installed in an 
energized switchgear and that he had done so “[p]lenty of 
times.” 
ANALYSIS 
A. Proximate Causation and Misuse 
 
Cooper argues that Melendez failed to prove “that 
anything Cooper did or failed to do was the proximate cause 
of his injuries” because Melendez’s expert witness, Brosz, 
admitted that the accident would not have occurred if 
Melendez had not installed the circuit breaker in an 
energized switchgear.  Continuing, Cooper points out that 
Melendez and his co-workers had installed 20 to 30 circuit 
breakers in switchgears that were not energized without any 
incident, and that only when he and his supervisor decided 
to “detour” the rules did the explosion ensue. 
Acknowledging that the issues of proximate causation 
and misuse are related in this case, Cooper also asserts 
that Melendez’s decision to install the breaker in an 
 
16
energized switchgear constituted a misuse of the circuit 
breaker.  Additionally with regard to the issue of misuse, 
Cooper contends that the switchgear and circuit breakers 
were intended for indoor use but that the Navy allowed 
moisture to accumulate in the vaults, thereby subjecting 
the switchgear and breakers to outdoor conditions.  It was 
this moisture that caused the GFRP insulation to degrade, 
which in turn precipitated the short-circuit, arcing, and 
explosion.  Thus, Cooper argues that both Melendez and the 
Navy misused the switchgear and circuit breakers, and that 
such misuse bars Melendez’s breach of warranty claim. 
 
 A proximate cause of an event is that “‘act or 
omission which, in natural and continuous sequence, 
unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the 
event, and without which that event would not have 
occurred.’”  Sugarland Run Homeowners Ass’n v. Halfmann, 
260 Va. 366, 372, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___, (2000) (quoting 
Beale v. Jones, 210 Va. 519, 522, 171 S.E.2d 851, 853 
(1970)).  Generally, the question of proximate cause is an 
issue of fact to be resolved by a jury.  Jenkins v. Payne, 
251 Va. 122, 128, 465 S.E.2d 795, 799 (1996). 
As Cooper argues, proximate cause and misuse are 
related in this case.  There cannot be a recovery against a 
manufacturer in a product liability case for breach of an 
 
17
implied warranty when there has been an unforeseen misuse 
of the article.  Featherall v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 
219 Va. 949, 964, 252 S.E.2d 358, 367 (1979); Layne-
Atlantic Co. v. Koppers Co., 214 Va. 467, 473, 201 S.E.2d 
609, 614 (1974). 
 
In the present case, the court instructed the jury 
that Melendez had the burden of proof to establish that, if 
Cooper breached an implied warranty of merchantability or 
fitness for a particular purpose, such breach was a 
proximate cause of the accident.  The court also instructed 
the jury that Melendez could not recover from Cooper for a 
breach of warranty if “the product was misused in a way 
that was not reasonably foreseeable by [Cooper], and . . . 
that the misuse was the proximate cause of [Melendez’s] 
injuries.”  (Emphasis added.)  Because these instructions 
were not the subject of an assignment of error, they are 
now the law of this case.8  See King v. Sowers, 252 Va. 71, 
77, 471  S.E.2d 481, 484 (1996).  Thus, Melendez had to 
prove only that Cooper’s alleged breach of warranty was a 
proximate cause of the explosion; whereas, Cooper had to 
prove that any misuse was the proximate cause. 
                     
8 We express no opinion regarding whether those 
instructions are a correct statement of the law in this 
Commonwealth. 
 
18
 
As we previously stated, the jury verdict for Melendez 
resolved all conflicts in the evidence in his favor and 
entitled him to all just inferences fairly deducible from 
the evidence.  Pugsley, 220 Va. at 901, 263 S.E.2d at 76.  
Applying these principles, we conclude that the issues of 
proximate causation and misuse were questions to be decided 
by the jury and that there is sufficient evidence to 
support the verdict in favor of Melendez with regard to 
those issues. 
First, Melendez established through Brosz’s testimony 
that the explosion was caused by the degradation of the 
insulation used in the circuit breaker.  The insulation 
degraded because it absorbed moisture.  Cooper selected the 
K-Don circuit breaker knowing that it would be used by the 
Navy in unusual service conditions, yet the evidence showed 
that Cooper did not share its knowledge with the 
manufacturer of the circuit breaker, nor did it warn the 
Navy that the insulation in the circuit breakers could 
degrade if exposed to moisture.  Although Cooper argues 
that the Navy allowed the vaults and switchgear to be 
exposed to outdoor conditions during the year that the 
circuit breakers were being retrofitted, Agee testified 
that Vault 21 had been dried out and tested before it was 
energized, approximately 24 hours prior to the explosion. 
 
19
 
Next, no one disputed the fact that the K-Don circuit 
breaker was known as a “draw-out” breaker, meaning that it 
was designed to be installed in an energized switchgear.  
In fact, many of the witnesses had performed such an 
operation themselves.  Thus, installation of the circuit 
breaker in an energized switchgear was certainly a 
foreseeable use and not a misuse.  Although Cooper argues 
that Melendez ignored instructions from Westinghouse that 
the circuit breakers should not be installed in an 
energized switchgear, and that the explosion would not have 
occurred if he had followed those instructions after the 
retrofit project, Brosz testified that Melendez did nothing 
wrong and followed the installation procedure used at the 
naval base for many years. 
Furthermore, the evidence was in conflict with regard 
to whether Melendez’s supervisor received such instructions 
from either Westinghouse or Shematek.  Based on Shematek’s 
admission that the manual titled “Westinghouse Digitrip 
Retrofit System” contained instructions regarding how to 
install the new digital line tripping system that 
Westinghouse had placed on the circuit breakers and was not 
an instruction manual for the use of the circuit breakers, 
the jury could have concluded that the manual did not 
pertain to the task being performed by Melendez.  Shematek 
 
20
also admitted that he was not aware of any warning in the 
ITE instruction manual that the breakers should not be 
installed in an energized switchgear. 
 
Finally, Cooper argues that Agee decided to “detour,” 
i.e., deviate from, one of the procedures in the preventive 
maintenance checklist by installing the circuit breaker in 
an energized switchgear.  However, Melendez correctly 
points out that the preventive maintenance checklist did 
not address the situation that existed on the day of the 
explosion.  During the retrofit of the circuit breakers, a 
new cable had also been installed on Pier 23.  In order to 
keep that cable dry and prevent it from exploding, Agee 
decided to energize the cable.  Additionally, if the vault 
had not been energized, then the very equipment designed to 
keep it dry, such as the heaters and humidifiers, would not 
have been operating. 
 
Thus, we conclude that the circuit court did not err 
in refusing to set aside the jury verdict either on the 
ground that Melendez did not prove that Cooper’s breach of 
warranty was a proximate cause of his injuries or on the 
ground that the Navy and Melendez misused the circuit 
breaker.  The facts with regard to both of these issues 
were disputed and thus subject to being resolved by the 
jury.  “The role of a jury is to settle questions of fact.”  
 
21
Supinger v. Stakes, 255 Va. 198, 203, 495 S.E.2d 813, 815 
(1998).  The jury, as reflected by its verdict, resolved 
those disputed facts in favor of Melendez and, on review, 
we will not set aside those findings unless they are 
clearly erroneous or without evidence to support them.  See 
Code § 8.01-680.  When a jury’s verdict depends on the 
weight to be given to credible evidence, that verdict 
cannot be disturbed.  Walrod v. Matthews, 210 Va. 382, 392, 
171 S.E.2d 180, 187 (1969). 
B. Statute of Repose
 
The dispositive question with regard to this issue is 
whether the switchgear and its component parts, including 
the circuit breakers, are ordinary building materials or 
“equipment” within the meaning of Code § 8.01-250, a 
statute of repose.9  See Hess v. Snyder Hunt Corp., 240 Va. 
49, 52, 392 S.E.2d 817, 819 (1990) (referring to Code 
§ 8.01-250 as a statute of repose).  That section provides, 
in pertinent part, that no action shall be brought to 
recover for bodily injury “arising out of the defective and 
                     
9 A statute of repose differs from a statute of 
limitations in that the time limitation in a statute of 
repose commences to run from the occurrence of an event 
unrelated to the accrual of a cause of action.  School Bd. 
of the City of Norfolk v. U.S. Gypsum, 234 Va. 32, 37, 360 
S.E.2d 325, 327 (1987).  The limitation period in a statute 
of limitations generally begins to run when the cause of 
action accrues.  Id., 360 S.E.2d at 327-28. 
 
22
unsafe condition of an improvement to real property . . . 
against any person performing or furnishing the design, 
planning, surveying, supervision of construction, or 
construction of such improvement to real property more than 
five years after the performance of furnishing of such 
services and construction.”  However, the statute further 
provides that the five-year limitation “shall not apply to 
the manufacturer or supplier of any equipment or machinery 
. . . installed in a structure upon real property.” 
 
Based upon the legislative history of Code § 8.01-250, 
this Court, in Cape Henry Towers, Inc. v. National Gypsum 
Co., 229 Va. 596, 602, 331 S.E.2d 476, 480 (1985), 
concluded that this section “perpetuate[s] a distinction 
between . . . those who furnish ordinary building 
materials, which are incorporated into construction work 
outside the control of their manufacturers or suppliers, at 
the direction of architects, designers, and contractors, 
and, . . . those who furnish machinery or equipment.”  The 
five-year limitation in Code § 8.01-250 protects the former 
category but not the latter one.  Id.
 
We have utilized that distinction on three occasions 
to determine into which category certain materials or 
articles fell.  First, in Cape Henry Towers, the materials 
at issue were exterior panels of a building.  Id. at 598, 
 
23
331 S.E.2d at 478.  Holding that the panels were ordinary 
building materials, this Court pointed out that machinery 
and equipment, unlike ordinary building materials, “are 
subject to close quality control at the factory and may be 
made subject to independent manufacturer’s warranties, 
voidable if the equipment is not installed and used in 
strict compliance with the manufacturer’s instructions.”  
Id. at 602, 331 S.E.2d at 480. 
Next, in Grice v. Hungerford Mechanical Corp., 236 Va. 
305, 306, 374 S.E.2d 17, 17 (1988), the question was 
whether an electrical panel box and its component parts 
were ordinary building materials or equipment.  The 
defendant, who was an electrical subcontractor, had bought 
the electrical panel box and its several component parts on 
separate occasions.  Id., 374 S.E.2d at 18.  The 
subcontractor then assembled and installed the unit as part 
of an electrical system in a house pursuant to its contract 
with the general contractor.  Id.  Additionally, the 
quality and quantity of the component parts, as well as the 
instructions for assembling and installing the electrical 
panel box as a unit in a building, were provided by an 
architect or other design professional.  Id. at 309, 374 
S.E.2d at 19.  The manufacturer did not send any such 
instructions.  Id.  Thus, this Court concluded that the 
 
24
electrical panel box and its component parts were ordinary 
building materials within the purview of Code § 8.01-250.  
Id.
The third case was Luebbers v. Fort Wayne Plastics, 
Inc., 255 Va. 368, 498 S.E.2d 911 (1998).  There, the items 
at issue were various structural component materials for 
in-ground swimming pools, such as steel panels, braces, and 
vinyl liners.  Id. at 370, 498 S.E.2d at 911.  A 
distributor purchased these component parts in bulk from 
the manufacturer and held them for resale to swimming pool 
contractors as parts of swimming pool kits.  Id., 498 
S.E.2d at 912.  In concluding that the steel panels, 
braces, and vinyl liners were ordinary building materials 
rather than equipment within the meaning of Code § 8.01-
250, this Court emphasized the following facts:  (1) the 
component parts at issue were interchangeable with other 
component materials in swimming pool construction; (2) 
distributors purchased the materials in bulk from the 
manufacturer; (3) the manufacturer of the materials did not 
oversee construction of the swimming pools, but merely 
warranted the steel panels from defects of workmanship and 
the vinyl liners from defective welding; and (4) although 
the manufacturer sold specification guides and installation 
manuals as general guides, the manuals did not address the 
 
25
construction of the specific swimming pool involved in the 
case.  Id. at 372, 498 S.E.2d at 913.  We concluded that 
the swimming pool materials were “fungible components” of 
the pool, and that they “[i]ndividually . . . served no 
function other than as generic materials to be included in 
the larger whole and [were] indistinguishable . . . from 
the wall panels . . . addressed in Cape Henry Towers.”  Id.
Relying on these cases, Cooper argues that the 
switchgear and circuit breakers were generic items that 
were “incorporated into the construction of the pier” and 
were “essential to the existence of the piers,” similar to 
the exterior panels in Cape Henry Towers and the electrical 
panel box in Grice.  Continuing, Cooper describes the 
switchgear and circuit breakers as fungible items because 
the Navy’s specifications authorized the use of several 
brands of switchgears and circuit breakers in the 
renovation project, and because the K-Don breakers 
themselves were interchangeable.  Thus, during the retrofit 
project, the Navy and Westinghouse did not have to 
designate out of which switchgear cubicle a particular 
circuit breaker had been removed. 
Cooper also points out that the Navy conceived the 
pier renovation project in the 1970’s; the Navy’s agent 
designed the project; the Navy’s subcontractor performed 
 
26
the electrical work; and the Navy’s officer in charge of 
construction supervised the project.  According to Cooper, 
it only supplied switchgears without any special warranties 
and was not present at the piers during the renovation.  
Finally, Cooper compares the switchgear to the electrical 
panel box in Grice because it serves the same basic 
purpose, although a switchgear is admittedly much larger 
than an electrical panel box used in a residential 
dwelling. 
Well-established principles guide the resolution of 
this issue.  “[A] plea in bar is a defensive pleading that 
reduces the litigation to a single issue,” Kroger Co. v. 
Appalachian Power Co., 244 Va. 560, 562, 422 S.E.2d 757, 
758 (1992), “which, if proven, creates a bar to the 
plaintiff’s right of recovery.”  Tomlin v. McKenzie, 251 
Va. 478, 480, 468 S.E.2d 882, 884 (1996).  The party 
asserting a plea in bar carries the burden of proof.  Id.  
In the present case, the circuit court, over Melendez’s 
objection, heard the evidence regarding the plea in bar and 
decided the issue rather than submitting it to the jury.  
“When the trial court hears the evidence ore tenus, its 
findings are entitled to the weight accorded a jury 
verdict, and these findings should not be disturbed by an 
appellate court unless they are plainly wrong or without 
 
27
evidence to support them.”  Bottoms v. Bottoms, 249 Va. 
410, 414, 457 S.E.2d 102, 104-05 (1995). 
Using these principles, we are not persuaded by 
Cooper’s arguments because they are premised on a 
mischaracterization of the switchgear and circuit breakers 
as “essential to the existence of the piers.”  The 
switchgear and circuit breakers were not part of the 
electrical system of Pier 23; instead, they comprised the 
electrical system for submarines docked at the pier so that 
the submarines could receive electrical power from the 
shore rather than having to operate their engines and 
generators.  The vaults that housed the switchgear and 
circuit breakers were located underneath the deck of the 
pier, and the switchgear was actually placed on rails six 
inches above the floor of the vault. 
Unlike the collection of unassembled parts in Grice, 
the switchgear and circuit breakers were each self-
contained and fully assembled by their respective 
manufacturers.  Cooper manufactured the switchgear, and in 
doing so, specified in its Materials List the use of K-Don 
circuit breakers.  When the circuit breakers left the 
manufacturer, they had been tested at the factory and 
needed only to be placed in a switchgear that contained a 
compatible cradle.  ITE supplied an instruction manual with 
 
28
each circuit breaker, and the Navy required that the 
switchgear and circuit breaker bear a nameplate containing 
certain information, including the manufacturer’s name.  As 
the circuit court noted, the Navy also required that the 
equipment “be established standard tested products of the 
manufacturer, thoroughly coordinated and integrated by the 
manufacturer.” 
Contrary to Cooper’s arguments, the switchgear and 
circuit breakers were not fungible or generic materials.  
While the Navy specifications would have permitted the use 
of circuit breakers from different manufacturers, once 
Cooper specified the ITE K-Don breaker, another 
manufacturer’s breaker could not have been used in Cooper’s 
switchgear unless the cradle had also been changed.  In the 
words of Cooper’s expert witness, Bledsoe, the cradle and 
circuit breaker were “mated component[s]” of the switchgear 
assembly.  Bledsoe also admitted that Cooper assembled the 
switchgear and, in doing so, selected the component parts, 
including the circuit breakers, though they were shipped in 
separate containers to the end user.  Thus, we conclude 
that the circuit court did not err in finding that the 
switchgear and circuit breakers are “equipment” as 
 
29
contemplated by Code § 8.01-250.10  Contrary to Cooper’s 
argument, the court did not base its decision solely on the 
size of the switchgear and circuit breaker. 
C. Jury Poll 
 
Because one juror answered “No” in open court during 
the poll of the jury, Cooper contends that there was not a 
unanimous verdict.  Thus, Cooper argues that the circuit 
court should have immediately declared a mistrial rather 
then sending the jury back for further deliberations.  In 
other words, Cooper asks this Court to create a bright-line 
rule that a trial court must declare a mistrial in a civil 
case when a juror answers “No” during the court’s poll of 
the jury.  Such a bright-line rule would, according to 
Cooper, preserve the sanctity of the jury room and insure 
that jurors are not subjected to “outside influences,” as 
Cooper suggests happened in this case.  Cooper also 
believes that the absence of a rule for civil trials, 
                     
10 We are not persuaded by the several cases cited by 
Cooper from other jurisdictions because the relevant 
statutes at issue in those cases are significantly 
different from Code § 8.01-250.  For example, in Hilliard 
v. Lummus Co., Inc., 834 F.2d 1352, 1354 (7th Cir. 1987); 
Mullis v. Southern Co. Serv., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 579, 583-84 
(Ga. 1982); Neofotistos v. Metrick Electric Co., Inc., 577 
N.E.2d 511 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); and Kleist v. Metrick 
Electric Co., Inc., 571 N.E.2d 819, 820 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1991), the respective courts addressed whether a particular 
item was an improvement to real estate, not whether the 
item was ordinary building materials or equipment. 
 
30
similar to Rule 3A:17 applicable to criminal trials,11 is an 
authoritative indication that a jury in a civil case should 
not be allowed to deliberate further when a juror expresses 
disagreement with the verdict during the polling of the 
jury. 
In discussing this issue, it is important to emphasize 
that the circuit court did not record and enter judgment 
upon a verdict that was not unanimous.  Instead, the court 
directed the jury to continue its deliberations when one 
juror answered that the verdict that had been published in 
open court was not his verdict.  Shortly thereafter, the 
jury returned with a verdict that was unanimous as 
reflected by the court’s second poll of the jurors.  We 
agree that a verdict cannot be accepted and recorded if it 
is not unanimous, and that a juror’s assent in open court 
when the verdict is published is controlling.  Thus, since 
the circuit court did not accept a verdict that was not 
unanimous, the cases cited by Cooper for the proposition 
that the only verdict that counts is the one published and 
affirmed in open court are not relevant to the issue in 
this case.  See e.g., Reed v. Kinnik, 132 A.2d 208, 210 
                     
11 Rule 3A:17(d) provides that a jury may be directed 
to retire for further deliberations if, upon the poll, all 
jurors do not agree. 
 
31
(Pa. 1957); Sanders v. Charleston Consol. Ry. & Lighting 
Co., 151 S.E. 438, 447 (S.C. 1930). 
 
Instead, the issue we must address is whether it is 
within a trial court’s exercise of discretion to direct a 
jury to deliberate further when a juror answers “No” during 
the poll of the jury or whether the court must always 
declare a mistrial in that situation.  We conclude that a 
trial court is empowered, in the exercise of its 
discretion, either to direct a jury to continue its 
deliberations or to declare a mistrial.  “There can be no 
question of the right of a juror, when polled, to dissent 
from a verdict to which he [or she] has agreed in the jury 
room, and when this happens, the jury should either be 
discharged or returned to their room for further 
deliberation.”  Bruce v. Chestnut Farms-Chevy Chase Dairy, 
126 F.2d 224, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1942); accord Patterson v. 
Rossignol, 245 A.2d 852, 855 (Me. 1968); Botta v. Brunner, 
126 A.2d 32, 40-41 (N.J. Super. 1956); Norburn v. Mackie, 
141 S.E.2d 877, 880 (N.C. 1965); State ex rel. Volkman v. 
Waltermath, 156 N.W. 946, 946 (Wis. 1916).  We find no 
reason to create the bright-line rule urged by Cooper, nor 
are we persuaded that such a rule is warranted merely 
because we do not have a rule of civil procedure similar to 
Rule 3A:17. 
 
32
 
In the present case, we conclude that the circuit 
court did not abuse its discretion by returning the jury to 
its room for further deliberations.  Some of the “outside 
influences” that Cooper asserts were brought to bear upon 
the jury in this case are Cooper’s characterizations of the 
reactions of Melendez and others in the courtroom when the 
verdict was announced and one juror then answered “No.”  
However, the circuit court stated that it did not recall 
all the events as having occurred exactly as described by 
Cooper’s counsel.  For instance, counsel for Cooper 
described the juror who answered “No” as “very emotional 
and resisting” when he came out of the jury room the second 
time.  In response, the court stated, “I don’t know about 
resisting.”  Later, when counsel asserted that some of the 
jurors started yelling when the juror answered “No,” the 
court stated that it remembered tension, but not any 
yelling by the jurors.  In sum, many of Cooper’s 
contentions with regard to these “outside influences” are 
not supported by the record in this case. 
The circuit court was in a better position than this 
Court to observe the demeanor of the jurors when they 
returned to the courtroom and during each poll.  We believe 
that a trial court has the same ability and opportunity to 
observe a juror’s demeanor during a poll of the jury as it 
 
33
does during voir dire.  In that latter situation, we have 
said, “[b]ecause the trial judge has the opportunity, which 
we lack, to observe and evaluate the apparent sincerity, 
conscientiousness, intelligence, and demeanor of 
prospective jurors first hand, the trial court’s exercise 
of judicial discretion in deciding challenges for cause 
will not be disturbed on appeal, unless manifest error 
appears in the record.”  Pope v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 114, 
123-24, 360 S.E.2d 352, 358 (1987).  We conclude that the 
same standard applies to a poll of the jury and a trial 
court’s decision, based on that poll, either to declare a 
mistrial or to direct the jury to deliberate further.  In 
the present case, the circuit court did not abuse its 
discretion when it directed the jurors to return to the 
jury room for further deliberations rather than declaring a 
mistrial. 
Cooper also argues that the circuit court’s 
instructions to the jury immediately after the juror 
answered “No” were coercive and prevented the jurors from 
freely making their own decision.  However, Cooper did not 
at that time object to the content of the court’s 
instructions to the jury.  It moved for a mistrial solely 
on the basis that the verdict was not unanimous, that the 
court therefore had to declare a mistrial, and that the 
 
34
jury had been subjected to “outside influences” in the 
courtroom.  Therefore, we will not consider this argument 
on appeal.12  Rule 5:25. 
CONCLUSION 
We recognize that the explosion in this case occurred 
17 years after Cooper supplied the Navy with the switchgear 
that utilized the K-Don circuit breaker that exploded.  
That fact alone, however, does not absolve Cooper of its 
liability for Melendez’s injuries.  Thus, for the reasons 
stated with regard to each of Cooper’s assignments of 
error, we will affirm the judgment of the circuit court. 
Affirmed. 
                     
12 Although we do not consider the merits of this 
assignment of error, we believe that when a trial court 
directs a jury to continue its deliberations in a situation 
like the one presented in this case, the court should 
instruct the jurors that they should not surrender their 
individual consciences for the mere purpose of reaching a 
verdict. 
 
35