Case Title: In re F.P.

Citation: 164 Vt 117, 665 A.2d 597

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1995-08-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN_RE_FP.94-309; 164 Vt 117; 665 A.2d 597

[Filed 11-Aug-1995]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 No. 94-309


In re F.P., H.P., S.P., J.P.,                     Supreme Court
D.P. and L.P.
                                                  On Appeal from
                                                  Orange Family Court

                                                  June Term, 1995



Amy M. Davenport, J. (merits)

Mary Miles Teachout, J. (disposition)

David G. Reid, Brattleboro, for appellant father

       Robert DiBartolo, Orange County Deputy State's Attorney, Chelsea, for
  appellee State

       Nancy A. Smith of Cheney, Brock, Saudek & Mullett, P.C., Montpelier,
  for appellee mother


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       GIBSON, J.    Father appeals the merits and disposition orders of the
  Orange Family Court, which concluded that six of his children were in need
  of care and supervision, placed the children in the care of their mother
  under the protective supervision of the Department of Social and
  Rehabilitation Services, and ordered father to reside away from the family
  home.  We affirm.

       This case arose when twelve-year-old F.P., the oldest of father's
  seven children, ran away from home and told the State Police that her
  father had abused her.  The State subsequently filed petitions alleging
  that F.P. and five of her siblings were in need of care and supervision
  (CHINS) because they had been abused and/or lacked proper parental care
  necessary for their well-being.  See 33 V.S.A. § 5502(a)(12)(A) & (B).  The
  petitions were accompanied by affidavits specifying the allegations, which
  included that mother had failed to protect the

 

  children from abuse and that F.P. had also been sexually abused by
  father.  A hearing on the petitions took place in January and February
  1993.

       The court found that father had been the children's primary caretaker
  until the CHINS petitions were filed, and that mother, a registered nurse,
  has supported the family financially. Father, who suffers from a
  personality disorder, has a structured approach to teaching and
  disciplining the children that frequently involves physical punishment.  He
  has hit all the children, including L.P. who was two years old at the
  merits hearing.  On one occasion father struck three-year-old D.P.,
  six-year-old J.P. and eight-year-old S.P. on their faces for making too
  much noise while he was reading a book.  When D.P. told father he would not
  be quiet, father picked him up, held him against a door and shook him. 
  Father has used his hands or a belt to punish the children, but he has also
  kicked F.P.  In father's words, "under the rarest of circumstances . . . a
  loving hand . . . [is] expressed through the foot."

       Although the court did not find that father had sexually abused F.P.,
  it made findings regarding the incidents that led the State to allege
  sexual abuse.  Two of the incidents involved father touching F.P.'s
  breasts.  In the first, father ordered F.P. to lift her shirt, and after
  she complied, he touched one of her breasts.  Father's reason for touching
  F.P. in this manner was to determine if she was "psychologically
  pubescent."  In a later incident, father made F.P. remove her shirt and lie
  on his bed.  He felt her breasts using his fingertips.  Although father
  claimed he conducted the examination to determine if F.P.'s breasts were
  "histologically correct," the court did not find this explanation credible
  in light of his wife's training as a registered nurse.  The court noted
  that neither F.P. nor father had told mother about either incident.

       The last incident relevant to the sexual abuse allegation occurred a
  few days after the "breast examination."  Father took the children to swim
  at a pond, forbidding them from wearing bathing suits.  In spite of F.P.'s
  protestations about skinny dipping, father ordered her to conform and
  prohibited her from wearing anything while swimming.  At some point, while

 

  F.P. and the other children were on shore, and father was hip-deep in
  the water, father began rubbing his hands on his penis.  Sometime later
  "white stuff" came out of father's penis.  Father claims he did not
  masturbate or ejaculate, but simulated masturbation and used soap to make
  F.P. think he had ejaculated.  The court explained father's purpose for the
  demonstration: 

              He wanted to demonstrate to her what a male organ
         would look like prior to sexual contact.  He believes it
         is important for F.P. to learn this so that she can be
         as prepared as possible to control her life and not to
         become a victim of what he refers to as "heterosexual
         subjugation."  The breast exam incident and the
         masturbation incident were part of an "original lesson
         she would not forget" designed to teach her to know
         herself and know her adversary.

              . . . In [father's] opinion it will not be
         necessary for him to repeat these "intimate lessons"
         with the other children because [F.P.] can pass the
         information on to them as the oldest sibling.
  
       The court found no evidence that father intended to gratify his or
  F.P.'s sexual desires and thus could not find that father sexually abused
  F.P.  The court concluded, however, that these incidents left F.P. without
  proper parental care necessary for her well-being because they put her
  healthy psychological growth and development at a substantial risk of harm.

       The court also concluded that F.P. was an abused child.  Citing this
  conclusion, its findings that father used corporal punishment unreasonably
  and the risk that father would repeat the masturbation and breast-touching
  lessons to train F.P.'s sisters, the court concluded that H.P., S.P., J.P.,
  D.P. and L.P. were CHINS because they too were without proper parental care
  necessary for their well-being.  The court dismissed the petition against
  mother because the State did not establish that she had failed to protect
  the children.  Father filed a notice of appeal in this Court following the
  order on disposition.

                                I.

       Father first claims that the court was without jurisdiction once it
  determined that the State had failed to prove the allegations against
  mother.  In other words, father contends that 33 V.S.A. § 5526 requires the
  juvenile court to find the children CHINS with regard to both

 

  parents before it may proceed to disposition.  We disagree.

       Section 5526 requires the court to retain jurisdiction to consider
  disposition if it finds that the allegations contained in the CHINS
  petition are established.  See id. § 5526(b).  Conversely, if the
  allegations are not established, the court must dismiss the petition.  Id.
  § 5526(a).  In this case, the court determined that the allegations against
  father had been established but the allegations against mother had not.  It
  dismissed the petition as to mother but retained jurisdiction to consider
  disposition in light of the court's conclusion that the children were CHINS
  due to father's abuse of F.P. and his failure to provide F.P. and her
  siblings with proper parental care necessary for their well-being.  See id.
  § 5502(a)(12)(A) & (B).   The essence of father's argument is that if the
  allegations against one of the parents are not established, but the
  allegations against the other are, then § 5526(a) trumps § 5526(b) and the
  court must dismiss the case.

       In In re B.L., 145 Vt. 586,