Case Title: Ex Parte Bland

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1983-09-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
441 So. 2d 122 (1983)
Ex parte Chester BLAND.
(In re Chester BLAND v. STATE of Alabama).
82-666.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 23, 1983.
*123 John I. Cottle, III of Cottle & Cottle, Tallassee, for petitioner.
Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Gerrilyn V. Grant, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
JONES, Justice.
Petitioner/Appellant Chester Bland, an inmate of the Alabama prison system, filed a petition in circuit court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that his "good time" credits had been revoked at a hearing which failed to afford him due process of law. The circuit court dismissed the petition without a hearing. The Court of Criminal Appeals, 428 So. 2d 1373, affirmed without an opinion. After Petitioner's application for rehearing was overruled, we granted his petition for certiorari, which utilized ARAP 39(k). We reverse and remand.
Petitioner Chester Bland is now, and at all relevant times has been, an inmate of the Alabama prison system. On October 13, 1982, Bland was charged with a violation of prison regulations: assaulting a prison officer. Bland allegedly engaged in physical contact with Henry DeJarnett, scratching his forehead. A disciplinary proceeding was instigated against Bland, and on October 17, 1982, Bland received notice that the charge against him would be heard by a disciplinary committee on October 19.
Upon notification of the hearing date, Petitioner requested that Officer Barnes and an inmate, Jeffery Jackson, be called to testify at the disciplinary proceedings. The record indicates that Officer Barnes was not present because the hearing was scheduled on a day when he was not on duty at the prison. As for inmate Jackson, Petitioner alleges that the record fails to indicate why he was not in attendance at the hearing, while the State claims only that the record is "unclear" on this point.
The only testimony taken at the hearing was Petitioner's sworn statement, denying his guilt of the alleged infraction. Subsequently, the disciplinary committee found Petitioner to have violated the prison regulations, and revoked more than 13 years of "good time" credits which he had accumulated during his incarceration.
In Williams v. Davis, 386 So. 2d 415 (Ala. 1980), this Court observed:
After quoting at some length from Wolff, Williams continues:
"Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 at 563, 564, 566, 94 S. Ct. 2963 at 2978-2979, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974) [emphasis added in Williams.]
"The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, Northern Division, held that loss of `good time' is a sufficient deprivation of liberty to warrant a prior due process hearing. Diamond v. Thompson, 364 F. Supp. 659 (M.D. Ala.1973). That Court also held:
"Diamond v. Thompson, 364 F. Supp. 659 at 665 (M.D.Ala.1973).
"We hold in accord with Wolff, supra, that due process requires that prisoners be allowed to produce documentary evidence and to introduce witnesses in their own behalf at a disciplinary hearing which may result in the revocation of their `good time' benefits, unless the production of such documentary evidence or the attendance of such witnesses would be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals." 386 So. 2d 417-419.
Denying the presence of a witness because of the mere fact that the requested witness is "off duty" or "cannot be reached by phone," does not comport with those basic due process rights afforded in both Williams, supra, and Wolff, supra.
This cause is remanded to the Court of Criminal Appeals with instructions to remand to the circuit court for that court to remand it to the prison disciplinary board for that board to grant petitioner a new hearing in accordance with the principles set out in this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
All the Justices concur except FAULKNER, J., not sitting.