Case Title: State v. Jackson

Citation: 244 Kan. 621, 772 P.2d 747

Docket Number: 61,445

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1989-04-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
244 Kan. 621 (1989)
772 P.2d 747
STATE OF KANSAS, Appellee,
v.
RODNEY E. JACKSON, Appellant.
No. 61,445

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 14, 1989.
Steven R. Zinn, supervising attorney, of Kansas Appellate Practice Clinic, of Lawrence, argued the cause, and Jeff Bergschneider, legal intern, and Benjamin C. Wood, chief appellate defender, of Topeka, were with him on the brief for appellant.
Mona Furst, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Robert T. Stephan, attorney general, and Clark V. Owens, district attorney, were with her on the brief for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by:
HOLMES, J.:
Rodney E. Jackson appeals from his conviction by a jury of one count of aggravated battery, K.S.A. 21-3414. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction in an unpublished opinion filed October 7, 1988. We granted the appellant's petition for review. We reverse.
Robert Thurman, the victim in this case, testified that in October 1983 he attended a party at a sorority house. Shortly after midnight, Thurman went out to his car in the parking lot. He was approached by a stranger who asked where he could obtain cocaine or drugs. Thurman told the man he was not into that sort of thing. The man reacted with anger, pushed him, and took a swing at him. Thurman went back to the house and called *622 the police. When he went back outside, the windshield of his car had been broken, and a young lady told him that the man he had been arguing with earlier had broken the windshield.
Thurman did not see the man again until January 2, 1984. Late on January 1, 1984, Thurman arrived at the Chicago P.M. Club in Wichita, which had formerly been the Club International. Sometime after midnight, he recognized the man who had approached him at the sorority party three months earlier. At this point Thurman still did not know the man's name, but he had learned from friends that he was known by the name of "Slim." Thurman walked over to Slim and asked if he recognized Thurman, and Slim replied that he did.
Thurman returned to his group of friends and began telling them about the windshield incident, pointing out Slim as the one who was responsible. Thurman testified that as he turned around to continue the conversation, Slim lunged at him, stabbed him in the side with a knife, and ran. The victim sustained severe injuries.
After Thurman was released from the hospital in late February, a detective showed him some mug shots. Thurman immediately picked out a photograph of the appellant, Rodney E. Jackson, also known as Slim. Thurman also identified Jackson at trial.
The appellant was originally tried and convicted in a bench trial on July 30, 1984. On March 31, 1986, he was granted a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. At the second trial, which took place before a jury, Rodney Jackson relied upon an alibi defense, and sought to show that someone else committed the offense. The defense, at a hearing outside the presence of the jury, proffered the testimony of Gus Hankins and Darlene Finley. The proffered testimony was to the effect that a third party, Tommie Mays, had made statements indicating that he was the individual who committed the offense with which Rodney Jackson was charged.
After hearing the proffered testimony of Hankins, the trial judge ruled it was irrelevant and lacked reliability, and excluded the proposed testimony. The judge then heard the testimony of Darlene Finley and ruled it was inadmissible without giving any explanation of his ruling.
At the close of the evidence, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. The defense filed a motion for new trial, which included *623 the issues raised in this appeal. The trial court denied the motion. Jackson timely appealed.
The Court of Appeals found that the statements made by Mays to Darlene Finley were clearly against his penal interest, but that there was no evidence presented at trial to show that the statements were made within the two-year period of the statute of limitations. The court went on to summarily hold, apparently on the basis of the statute of limitations, that the trial court did not err in excluding the testimony. The court never mentioned the proffered testimony of Hankins.
Appellant raises several evidentiary issues on appeal, only one of which we need to address as it is dispositive of this appeal.
Appellant's first issue relates to the exclusion of the testimony proffered by the defense implicating Tommie Mays as the perpetrator of the offense. The trial court ruled inadmissible the proffered testimony of Gus Hankins and Darlene Finley pertaining to out-of-court statements made by Tommie Mays. Appellant argues, inter alia, that the incriminating out-of-court statements by Tommie Mays were admissible under the hearsay exception for declarations against interest and that it was reversible error to exclude the evidence.
K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 60-460 provides, in part:
....
The State contends that the appellant failed to establish the necessary foundation for the admission of the Hankins and Finley testimony as exceptions to the hearsay rule. It argues that not only did the appellant fail to establish the trustworthiness of the statements, but also he failed to show that Mays was unavailable to testify as a witness. The admissiblity of testimony under 60-460(j) was discussed in Thompson v. Norman, 198 Kan. 436, 424 P.2d 593 (1967). In Thompson, the court stated:
The test of admissibility stated in Thompson was specifically recognized and approved in State v. Prince, 227 Kan. 137, 147, 605 P.2d 563 (1980).
The State relies upon Prince and State v. Quick, 226 Kan. 308, 597 P.2d 1108 (1979), in asserting that the declarant (in this case Mays) must be present at the trial or it must be shown the declarant is unavailable as defined in K.S.A. 60-459(g). Reliance on Prince is totally misplaced. In Prince, the trial court did exclude 60-460(j) evidence for the reason that the declarant asserted his Fifth Amendment right not to testify and was unavailable for cross-examination. However, this court affirmed the defendant's conviction based upon a lack of foundation for the proffered testimony and specifically found that the trial court had excluded the testimony for the wrong reason. 227 Kan. at 147.
In Quick, the trial court excluded certain testimony which fell within the declarations against interest exception of 60-460(j). Although this court, in reversing the defendant's conviction, did discuss the unavailability requirement, the court's decision was actually based upon a finding that "[t]he indicia of reliability of the declaration against penal interest was sufficient to justify the admission of the declaration as an exception to the hearsay rule." 226 Kan. at 318. The statements in Quick that the declarant must be present at trial or, if not, the proponent must show that a diligent effort was made to locate the declarant and that he is unavailable, are specifically disapproved.
*625 The State also relies heavily on two rules established by our case law, neither of which is applicable here.
The trial court apparently relied upon State v. Brown and State v. Neff in holding that the proffered evidence was irrelevant.
The evidence presented by the State against the appellant consisted of direct evidence in the form of testimony by two eyewitnesses, the victim and Inman Standifer, who identified the appellant as the perpetrator. However, the evidence proffered by appellant was not circumstantial evidence; nor was it evidence indicating that someone other than the appellant had a possible motive to commit the stabbing. The proffered evidence was direct evidence in the form of out-of-court admissions by a third party, Tommie Mays, that he committed the crime for which the defendant was charged. The State's reliance on the foregoing cases is therefore misplaced.
We now turn to the proffered testimony to determine whether it met the necessary test of relevance, reliability, and trustworthiness to be admissible under the declarations against interest exception to the hearsay rule.
After having established the identity of Gus Hankins and his acquaintance and association with Tommie Mays, the defense presented the following testimony:
BY MR. GEARY:
"A. No, he didn't.
"Q. Did he tell you when this occurred?
"A. Just said in the club. He didn't say when.
"Q. Did he mention the name of the club?
"A. International.
"A. Naw.
"A. No, he didn't.
"Q. Okay.
The proffered testimony of Hankins indicated that Mays made his statements to two fellow inmates while walking from the prison yard at the Kansas State Penitentiary. The statements did not indicate who the victim of the stabbing was or when it allegedly occurred. Mays had merely indicated he had stabbed someone at the International Club and that "it was better the other guy than him." Such vague and indefinite admissions fall short of the necessary showing of credibility and trustworthiness required to establish a proper foundation for admissibility of Hankins' testimony. We find no error in the trial court's determination that the Hankins testimony was not only irrelevant but also lacked reliability.
The proffered testimony of Darlene Finley is another matter. After qualifying Finley by showing her acquaintance and contacts with Tommie Mays, the defense presented the following testimony from Finley:
"A. Yes.
"Q. Tell the Court what happened.
"Q. What did he tell you?
"Q. Miss Finley, do you know Rodney Jackson here?
"A. I have never seen him before this morning.
"Q. Okay. You never met him before?
"A. Never met him. Never seen him or nothing, no."
Following this proffered testimony, the State again objected to its admission, asserting, "[W]e are still going to have to determine the availability of Mr. Tommie Mays." The court then ruled the testimony was inadmissible.
We think the court erred in its determination that the testimony of Darlene Finley was inadmissible. The defense went to great lengths to establish the social relationship between Darlene Finley and her husband and Tommie Mays and Rena Mays. The two couples visited together in each other's homes and evidently were quite friendly during the spring and summer of 1984. The testimony of Mrs. Finley related numerous details of the Thurman stabbing, established who the victim was, and established when and where the stabbing took place. The evidence would appear to meet the threshold test of Thompson v. Norman, 198 Kan. 436, and the trial court has failed to articulate any basis for its ruling that the testimony was inadmissible. The Court of Appeals found that the Finley testimony constituted a clear statement against Mays' interest, and we agree. However, there is no support in the record for the Court of Appeals' sua sponte finding that there was no evidence that the statements attributed to Mays were made within the two-year statute of limitations period. It is clear to us from a review of the record that the statements allegedly made by Mays to Finley were within two years of the Thurman stabbing.
Based upon the record before us, we hold that the trial court *629 erred in refusing to admit the proffered testimony of Darlene Finley as an exception to the hearsay rule under K.S.A. 1988 Supp. 60-460(j). In view of this determination, it is not necessary for us to reach the other issues asserted on appeal.
The judgments of the Court of Appeals and the district court are reversed and the case is remanded with directions to grant the defendant a new trial.