Case Title: Stansbury v. Heiduck

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-07-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Stansbury v. Heiduck1998 WY 88961 P.2d 977Case Number: 97-327Decided: 07/20/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

Doris 
STANSBURY, surviving spouse of Donald L. Stansbury, deceased, Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

Howard F. HEIDUCK, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the District Court 
of Laramie County, Nicolas G. Kalokathis, J.

 

Timothy C. Kingston of 
Graves, Miller & Kingston, P.C., Cheyenne, for 
Appellant.

Stanley K. Hathaway of 
Hathaway, Speight & Kunz, LLC, Cheyenne, for 
Appellee.

 

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and 
TAYLOR*, JJ.

 * Chief Justice at time of 
expedited conference.

 

MACY, 
Justice.

 [¶1] Appellant Doris 
Stansbury (Doris) appeals from the district court's judgment which quieted the 
title to certain Laramie County property in favor of Appellee Howard Heiduck 
(Howard).

 

[¶2] We 
affirm.

 

                                             
ISSUES

 

[¶3] Doris presents the 
following issues for our review:

 

A. Did Heiduck establish that his use of the subject 
property was adverse to that of the real owner?

 

B. 
If Doris Stansbury did not know that she had an interest in the subject 
property, could Heiduck's use of the property be hostile to her 
interest?

 

                                              
FACTS

 

[¶4] On August 8, 1977. 
Donald Stansbury (Donald) executed a warranty deed, conveying certain property 
located in Laramie County to Howard and his wife, Lillian Heiduck (Lillian). 
Lillian and Howard were Donald's daughter and son-in-law. Although Donald and 
the Heiducks believed that the deed conveyed 180 acres, it actually described 
only ninety acres. Donald subsequently married Doris.

 

[¶5] On September 12, 1978, 
Donald filed an action in the district court against the Heiducks. He alleged 
that the Heiducks had used fraud and undue influence to procure the deed to the 
property. The district court held a jury trial, and the jury returned a special 
verdict, finding that the Heiducks had not engaged in fraud or undue influence 
in obtaining the transfer of the property.

 

[¶6] Lillian died on April 
15, 1981. Shortly thereafter, on June 3, 1981, Donald died. Howard paid the real 
property taxes on the entire 180-acre tract every year from 1978 until 1997. In 
1982, Howard discovered that the deed from Donald described only ninety 
acres.  He continued, however, to 
use and to pay taxes on the entire property. He did not inform Doris that the 
deed conveyed only ninety acres.

 

[¶7] On February 12, 1997, 
Howard filed a quiet title action in the district court. He claimed that he had 
acquired the title, by adverse possession, to the ninety acres which were not 
included in the deed. He published notice of the quiet title action, and Doris 
answered the complaint, disputing Howard's ownership claim. She also filed a 
counterclaim in which she asserted that she was the rightful owner of the 
property.

 

[¶8] The district court held 
a bench trial on July 30, 1997. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court 
entered a judgment, quieting the title to the property in favor of Howard. Doris 
appealed from that judgment.

 

                                      
     DISCUSSION

 

[¶9] The trial court made 
specific findings of fact and conclusions of law. We, therefore, apply our 
traditional standard for reviewing a trial court's findings and conclusions. 
Resource Technology Corporation v. Fisher Scientific Company, 924 P.2d 972, 
974-75 (Wyo. 1996). This Court will not set aside a district court's findings of 
fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous. McNeiley v. Ayres Jewelry Co., 
886 P.2d 595, 597 (Wyo. 1994). " 'A finding is "clearly erroneous" when[,] 
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire 
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.' " Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 538 (Wyo. 
1993) (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S. Ct. 525, 92 L. Ed. 746 (1948)). Stated alternatively: "[A] determination that a 
finding is against the great weight of the evidence means a finding will be set 
aside even if supported by substantial evidence." Id. "The review standard 
recognizes that deference must be given to the opportunity of the trial court to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses, and that a reviewing court will not set 
aside the court's findings merely because it might have reached a different 
result." Doenz v. Garber, 665 P.2d 932, 937 (Wyo. 1983). We review a district 
court's conclusions of law de novo on appeal. McNeiley, 886 P.2d  at 
597.

 

[¶10] The trial court 
concluded that Howard had acquired the property by adverse possession. Doris 
argues that Howard's use of the property was not hostile to the true owner. 
Howard maintains that the trial court properly determined that his use of the 
property was adverse.

 

[¶11] The elements of 
adverse possession are "actual, open, notorious, exclusive and continuous 
possession of another's real property for the statutory period, which possession 
must be hostile, and under a claim of right or color of title." Rutar Farms and 
Livestock, Inc. v. Fuss, 651 P.2d 1129, 1132 (Wyo. 1982). A person who is 
claiming the title to real property by adverse possession must notify the 
landowner of his hostile use so that the landowner will know his title is at 
risk and the running of the ten-year statutory period has commenced. 651 P.2d  at 
1134. "It has been declared that the disseisor 'must unfurl his flag on the 
land, and keep it flying, so that the owner may see, if he will, that an enemy 
has invaded his domains, and planted the standard of conquest.' " Marvel v. 
Barley Mill Road Homes, 104 A.2d 908, 911 (Del. Ch. 1954).1

 

[¶12] The trial court made 
the following pertinent findings of fact:

 

2. 
On September 12, 1978, Donald L. Stansbury filed a Complaint in the District 
Court of Laramie County charging that Heiducks obtained his property by fraud 
and undue influence. He described his real property as consisting of 
approximately 180 acres. . . . The case was tried to a jury in a two-day trial 
beginning on August 20, 1979. The jury found for the Heiducks on all three 
counts of a Special Verdict. Judge Alan Johnson entered a Judgment for 
Defendants Heiduck on August 31, 1979. . . .

 

3. 
Doris Stansbury attended all of the trial with her husband and was aware of the 
nature of the trial and the hostile relationship with the Heiducks. . . . 
Testimony at the trial dealt with all of the real property previously owned by 
Stansbury southwest of Cheyenne consisting of 180 acres. Neither [Heiduck's 
attorney] nor Heiduck [was] aware that the legal description in the Deed was 
incorrect, but Heiduck was aware that the property owned by Stansbury was 
approximately 180 acres. . . . Stansbury and his attorney met with Heiduck and 
his attorney and removed all of his personal property requested by Mrs. 
Stansbury, whereupon Stansbury vacated the premises and the hostile relationship 
with Heiducks continued. . ..

 

4. 
After August 8, 1977, Heiducks did not operate and use the subject property with 
permission from Stansbury, but under color of right. Stansbury made no claim 
upon any of the property titled in his name in the Southwest Quarter of Section 
12, Township 13 North of Range 61 West of the 6th P.M. in Laramie County, 
Wyoming, from the date of the Judgment against him in August of 1979 to the date 
of his death on June [3], 1981. Mr. Stansbury paid no taxes on the subject lands 
after August of 1977 to the date of his death in 1981. Heiduck occupied and used 
the subject property openly and continuously from August of 1977 to the present. 
He has pastured horses upon the property year round, and no one has claimed any 
interest in the property. Lillian Heiduck died before her father's death in 
1981. . . . Mrs. Stansbury, who stopped using her husband's name after his 
death, made no claim to any of the subject property and did not probate any estate left by her husband. . . 
.

 

          
. . . .

 

7. 
Plaintiff Heiduck had no contact from or with Doris Stansbury since 1979 and had 
no reason to contact her. He continued to use and operate the subject property 
openly, exclusively, notoriously, and continuously under a claim of right and 
adversely to anyone claiming ownership thereof. . . . The hostility that existed 
at the time of the jury trial of complaints by Donald Stansbury against Heiducks 
remains the same.

 

[¶13] We agree with the 
district court that the hostile nature of Howard's use of the property commenced 
with the 1979 fraud trial and continued until he filed his quiet title action. 
Both Donald and the Heiducks believed that the entire 180-acre tract was at 
issue in the fraud trial. The clear purpose of Donald's action was to take 
ownership of the property from the Heiducks. Howard's actual, open, notorious, 
and continuous use of the property subsequent to the fraud action was, 
therefore, adverse and hostile to Doris' ownership of the property. Howard 
unfurled his flag on the property, and Doris could have, with a little 
investigation, seen that the property had been invaded.

 

[¶14] Doris argues that 
Howard's use of the property could not have been hostile to her ownership of the 
property because, until he filed his quiet title action, she was not aware that 
she had an interest in the property. She cites Klett v. Eboch, 430 Pa. Super. 
193, 633 A.2d 1204 (1993), appeal denied, 537 Pa. 662, 644 A.2d 1200 (1994), to 
support her argument. In that case, property was conveyed to Eboch when she was 
five years old. 633 A.2d  at 1205. Six years later, the same property was 
transferred to Eboch's sister, but the transfer document did not contain Eboch's 
signature. Id. The sister thereafter conveyed the property to the girls' mother, 
who claimed ownership of the property for the remainder of her life. Id. Upon 
the mother's death, her grandson received the property through her will. Id. The 
grandson brought a quiet title action, claiming that the mother had acquired the 
title to the property by adverse possession. Id.

 

[¶15] The Pennsylvania 
Superior Court affirmed the judgment which was entered in favor of Eboch because 
the mother did not acquire the title to the property by adverse possession. Id. 
The court ruled that Eboch was not technically the record title holder while the 
mother occupied the property. 633 A.2d  at 1208. The court also concluded that 
the mother and the sister did not place Eboch on notice that her interest was in 
jeopardy. Id.

 

[¶16] The case at bar is 
entirely different from Klett. During the period that the Heiducks occupied the 
property, Donald was the record owner of the ninety acres which were not 
included in the deed. Doris was aware that Donald was the owner of the property, 
at least prior to the 1977 conveyance, and a careful examination of the deed 
would have revealed that only ninety acres were included in its description. 

 

[¶17] A case which is more 
analogous to the case at bar is Kranenberg v. Meadowbrook Lodge, Inc., 623 P.2d 1196 (Wyo. 1981). In that case, Kranenberg purchased property which had a cabin 
located on it. 623 P.2d  at 1197. The vendor informed Kranenberg that the 
property line ran through a corner of the cabin, but the vendor assured 
Kranenberg that he would take care of the problem. Id. Kranenberg's neighbor 
also told him that "everything was fine, that he, Mr. Kranenberg, need not worry 
about it." 623 P.2d  at 1198.  The 
land description was not, however, corrected of record. Id. For eighteen years, 
Kranenberg continued to use the cabin and a yard area which technically belonged 
to the neighbor. Id.

 

[¶18] In evaluating 
Kranenberg's claim that he had obtained the title to the property by adverse 
possession, this Court stated: "The evidence is clear that during these years 
the Kranenbergs as well as their neighbors regarded the disputed property 
between the log house and the fence, as Kranenberg property." Id. We held that 
Kranenberg's possession of the disputed property was adverse and that he had 
acquired the title to the property. 623 P.2d  at 1199-1200.

 

[¶19] Like Kranenberg and 
his neighbor, both the Heiducks and the Stansburys regarded the disputed ninety 
acres as belonging to the Heiducks. Howard occupied the property for the 
statutory period, and his possession was adverse to Doris' ownership of the 
property.  The trial court's finding 
that Howard's use of the property was hostile was not clearly erroneous. The 
trial court, therefore, correctly quieted the title to the property in Howard's 
name.

 

[¶20] 
Affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

1 Doris 
maintains that, under Hillard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d 1255, 1261 (Wyo. 1995), 
"[t]here must be actual notice of the hostile claim or declarations of hostility 
so manifest and notorious that actual notice will be presumed." in Hillard, we 
discussed changing permissive use to adverse use; therefore, Hillard does not 
apply to the facts of this case.