Case Title: State v. Dennis J. Reitter

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1998AP000915

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1999-06-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-0915 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Dennis J. Reitter,  
 
Defendant-Appellant.  
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 29, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
May 6, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Richard J. Kreul 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs by 
Michael C. Witt and Monogue & Witt, S.C., Jefferson and oral 
argument by Michael C. Witt. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Susan M. Crawford, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
  
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 98-0915  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Dennis J. Reitter,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant.  
FILED 
 
JUN 29, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Racine 
County, Richard J. Kreul, Judge.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This case is before the court 
on certification by the court of appeals, pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.61 (1995-96).1  The issue is whether a police 
officer is required to advise a custodial defendant, charged 
with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, that the right 
to counsel does not apply to the administration of a chemical 
test under Wisconsin's implied consent statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305.  A related question, whether the due process clause 
of the Wisconsin Constitution imposes an affirmative duty upon 
police officers to advise defendants that the right to counsel 
does not attach to the implied consent statute, was not 
certified to this court but was raised by the defendant in his 
brief to the court of appeals. 
                     
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1995-
96 statutes unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 98-0915  
 
2 
¶2 
The Racine County Circuit Court, Richard J. Kreul, 
Judge, ruled that because the right to counsel does not apply to 
the implied consent setting, the defendant, Dennis J. Reitter, 
unlawfully refused to submit to a chemical test.  Reitter 
appealed the judgment, maintaining that the arresting deputy was 
obligated to advise him that no right to counsel exists under 
the implied consent statute, and arguing that requests for 
counsel should not be construed as a refusal to submit to a 
chemical test.  The court of appeals certified the appeal to 
this court, concluding that the question raised statutory and 
constitutional issues meriting our review.  Because this issue 
is one of first impression and because it impacts a subject 
vital to the public interest, we granted review. 
¶3 
Inasmuch as the implied consent law is a statutory 
creation, it is the legislature, not this court, which should 
impose duties upon officers in the implied consent setting; and 
until the legislature modifies the implied consent statute, 
officers are under no affirmative duty to advise custodial 
defendants 
about 
rights 
for 
which 
the 
statute 
makes 
no 
provision.  We observe that where a defendant expresses no 
confusion about his or her understanding of the statute, a 
defendant constructively refuses to take a breathalyzer test 
when he or she repeatedly requests to speak with an attorney in 
lieu of submitting to the test.  We also hold that because the 
implied 
consent 
law 
creates 
statutory 
privileges, 
not 
constitutional rights, no due process violation occurs when an 
officer does not inform a defendant that the right to counsel 
No. 98-0915  
 
3 
does not attach to the stages preceding administration of a 
chemical test.  The State should not be bound by a defendant's 
mistaken assumptions about his or her constitutional rights.  In 
this case, the arresting deputy advised the defendant five times 
about the consequences of failing to take the breathalyzer test, 
and the deputy warned the defendant that continued insistence to 
speak with an attorney would be deemed a refusal.  Accordingly, 
we affirm the circuit court. 
FACTS 
¶4 
For purposes of this review the facts are not in 
dispute.  On Wednesday afternoon, December 18, 1996, Racine 
County Deputy Sheriff Melvin Sipher (Deputy Sipher) arrested 
Dennis J. Reitter (Reitter) for operating a motor vehicle while 
intoxicated (OWI).  Deputy Sipher handcuffed Reitter, advised 
him that he was under arrest, and transported Reitter to the 
sheriff’s department patrol station for administration of an 
intoxilyzer test.  Reitter explained he was "going through a 
divorce" and asked Deputy Sipher "to give him a break and take 
him home."  Reitter expressed concern that he would not be able 
to meet his son when the boy got off the bus at 4:00 p.m.  The 
record does not indicate whether Deputy Sipher read Miranda 
rights to Reitter. 
¶5 
After issuing a citation, Deputy Sipher administered 
the "Informing the Accused" Form.  The "Informing the Accused" 
Form, issued by the Department of Transportation, reads: 
 
When a Law Enforcement Officer requests that you 
submit to a chemical test, pursuant to Wisconsin’s 
No. 98-0915  
 
4 
Implied Consent Law, the officer is required to inform 
you of the following: 
 
Section A 
(applies to everyone) 
 
1.  You are deemed under Wisconsin's Implied Consent 
Law to have consented to chemical testing of your 
breath, blood or urine at this Law Enforcement 
Agency’s expense.  The purpose of testing is to 
determine the presence or quantity of alcohol or other 
drugs in your blood or breath. 
 
2.  If you refuse to submit to any such tests, your 
operating privilege will be revoked. 
 
3.  After submitting to chemical testing, you may 
request the alternative test that this law enforcement 
agency is prepared to administer at its expense or you 
may request a reasonable opportunity to have any 
qualified person of your choice administer a chemical 
test at your expense. 
 
4.  If you take one or more chemical tests and the 
result of any test indicates you have a prohibited 
alcohol concentration, your operating privileges will 
be administratively suspended in addition to other 
penalties which may be imposed. 
 
5.  If you have a prohibited alcohol concentration or 
you refuse to submit to chemical testing and you have 
two 
or 
more 
prior 
suspensions, 
revocations 
or 
convictions within a 10 year period and after January 
1, 1988, which would be counted under s.343.307(1) 
Wis. Stats., a motor vehicle owned by you may be 
equipped 
with 
an 
ignition 
interlock 
device, 
immobilized, or seized and forfeited.2 
                     
2 Section B of the "Informing the Accused" Form, which 
applies to commercial motor vehicle operators, is omitted here. 
 Deputy Sipher testified to the circuit court that he read the 
entire form to Reitter.  Under State v. Piskula, 168 Wis. 2d 
135, 140-41, 483 N.W.2d 250 (Ct. App. 1992), failure to read the 
commercial warning to the holder of a regular driver's license 
does not invalidate the administration of the "Informing the 
Accusing" Form. 
No. 98-0915  
 
5 
As Deputy Sipher read the form, he paused periodically to verify 
that Reitter was listening, and he initialed the individual 
paragraphs of the form as he completed reciting them. 
¶6 
Reitter reacted to the reading of the "Informing the 
Accused" Form by stating repeatedly that he wished to call his 
attorney.  Deputy Sipher did not respond directly to Reitter's 
request but instead explained that under the implied consent 
law, Reitter had agreed to submit to the test, and that a 
refusal to take the test would result in the revocation of 
driving privileges.  In five exchanges, Reitter repeatedly 
insisted upon the right to counsel, and Deputy Sipher repeatedly 
warned him about the nature of the implied consent law and the 
consequences of refusal.  In his written report, Deputy Sipher 
observed: 
 
I explained to Reitter 5 times that I needed a yes or 
no answer to my question, will you submit to a test of 
your breath and Reitter responded, "I want to call my 
attorney."  I made it very clear to Reitter that his 
answer could result in a refusal and his driving 
priviledge (sic) would be revoked.  Regardless of how 
I repeatedly explained this to Reitter, he would not 
answer my questions. 
Deputy Sipher also testified:  
 
I repeated again that he's deemed by the Wisconsin 
Implied Consent law to submit to a test that we're 
prepared to offer.  I repeated this five times and 
continued to get the same response that he wanted to 
talk to his attorney.  I also made it clear to him if 
he did refuse to take the test that he could have his 
driving privilege revoked. 
The record does not suggest Reitter was confused by Deputy 
Sipher’s reading of the "Informing the Accused" Form. 
No. 98-0915  
 
6 
¶7 
During these exchanges, Sheriff's Deputy Roscizewski 
began to prepare the intoxilyzer test.  Like Deputy Sipher, 
Deputy Roscizewski also urged Reitter to submit to the test and 
warned him that a refusal would result in license revocation.  
In his written report, Deputy Roscizewski noted "Reitter stated 
'I'm not refusing, I just want to talk to my attorney.'"  
Although 
the 
record 
does 
not 
indicate 
whether 
Reitter 
communicated a verbal refusal to submit to the test, he became 
very uncooperative.  He would not answer Deputy Sipher's 
questions.  He grew belligerent.  Reitter questioned Sipher's 
right to stop him and asked to see the printed OWI law.  He 
stated that his rights were violated. 
¶8 
Deputy Sipher determined "that regardless of what I 
asked him and what I said to him he was not going to take the 
test."  After informing Reitter that the repeated requests would 
be noted as a refusal, Deputy Sipher completed a Notice of 
Intent to Revoke Operating Privileges and issued a Notice of 
Intent to Suspend Reitter's driver's license.  Reitter was 
transported to the Racine County Jail, where he was given the 
opportunity to consult with an attorney. 
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶9 
Reitter filed a request for a refusal hearing on 
December 30, 1996.  Evidentiary hearings followed in July and 
August, 1997.  On March 23, 1998, the circuit court issued a 
written decision, finding that the right to counsel does not 
apply to the implied consent setting.  The circuit court also 
ruled that Deputy Sipher complied with the requirements of the 
No. 98-0915  
 
7 
implied consent statute, and it concluded that Reitter's 
repeated insistence on calling his attorney constituted an 
unlawful refusal.  Reitter appealed, and the court of appeals 
certified the issue to this court.   
¶10 In its analysis for certification, the court of 
appeals echoed the circuit court by expressing concern about a 
perceived tension between Wis. Stat. § 946.75, the statute 
creating a general right to counsel, and case law holding that 
under the implied consent statute, no right to counsel exists.  
Noting that no Wisconsin case law addresses an officer's duty to 
advise a custodial defendant that the right to counsel does not 
apply to the implied consent setting, and finding other 
jurisdictions divided, the court of appeals asked this court to 
clarify the issue. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶11 The issue in this case, whether the implied consent 
statute obligates police officers to advise custodial defendants 
that the right to counsel does not apply to the pre-test 
setting, raises two questions of law.  First, this case requires 
us to interpret Wis. Stat. § 343.305.  Application of the 
implied consent statute to an undisputed set of facts, like any 
statutory construction, is a question of law that this court 
reviews de novo.  State v. Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d 39, 44-45, 403 
N.W.2d 427 (1987); State v. Rydeski, 214 Wis. 2d 101, 106, 571 
N.W.2d 417 (Ct. App. 1997).  Second, this case asks us to 
reconcile the due process clause of the Wisconsin Constitution, 
article I, section 8(1), with the implied consent law, Wis. 
No. 98-0915  
 
8 
Stat. § 343.305.  Questions stemming from the application of 
constitutional principles are subject to our independent review. 
 State ex rel. Warren v. Schwarz, 219 Wis. 2d 616, 630, 579 
N.W.2d 698 (1998).  In its independent review of questions of 
law, this court benefits from the analyses of both the circuit 
court and the court of appeals.  State v. Hansford, 219 Wis. 2d 
226, 234, 580 N.W.2d 171 (1998).  Where the court of appeals 
does not decide an issue, we use the "limited analysis" the 
court of appeals provides in its certification to this court.  
Id. at 234 n.9. 
IMPLIED CONSENT STATUTE 
¶12 We begin our analysis by considering whether the 
implied consent statute imposes an affirmative duty upon a 
police officer to inform a defendant that there is no right to 
counsel 
in 
the 
implied 
consent 
setting, 
and 
whether 
a 
defendant's request to consult with an attorney constitutes a 
statutory refusal to submit to a chemical test. 
No. 98-0915  
 
9 
¶13 The Wisconsin Legislature enacted the implied consent 
statute to combat drunk driving.3  Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d at 46 
(citing State v. Brooks, 113 Wis. 2d 347, 355-56, 335 N.W.2d 354 
(1983)).  Designed to facilitate the collection of evidence, the 
law was not created to enhance the rights of alleged drunk 
drivers.4  Id.; State v. Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d 191, 203-04, 289 
N.W.2d 828 (1980) (citing Scales v. State, 64 Wis. 2d 485, 219 
N.W.2d 286 (1974)).  Rather, the implied consent statute was 
                     
3 The problem of drunk driving is not new.  In 1957, the 
United States Supreme Court compared "[t]he increasing slaughter 
on our highways" to a battlefield.  Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 
U.S. 432, 439 (1957).  Nearly one generation later, the Court 
underscored the persistence of the menace.  South Dakota v. 
Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 558-59 (1983) (collecting cases).  
Wisconsin first enacted its implied consent law in 1970.  Drunk 
driving continues to plague Wisconsin roadways.  In 1996, the 
year of Reitter's arrest, alcohol was a related factor in 38.9% 
of motor vehicle fatalities.  1997 Wisconsin Alcohol Traffic 
Facts Book, published by the Bureau of Transportation Safety, 
Department of Transportation, at 30.  The following year, an 
alcohol-related crash resulting in death or injury occurred 
every 74 minutes.  Id. at i. 
4 In State v. Neizel, this court reasoned: 
The proper and liberal construction of legislation 
designed for this very purpose militates against the 
court's granting the accused a limited right to 
counsel, because that right, to some degree at least, 
would impede the police in obtaining evidence against 
those 
drivers 
who 
are 
under 
the 
influence 
of 
intoxicants. 
 
State v. Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d 191, 204, 289 N.W.2d 828 (1980). 
No. 98-0915  
 
10
"designed to secure convictions."5  State v. Crandall, 133 Wis. 
2d 251, 258, 394 N.W.2d 905 (1986) (citing Brooks, 113 Wis. 2d 
at 356).  Given the legislature's intentions in passing the 
statute, courts construe the implied consent law liberally.  
Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d at 47. 
¶14 The 
implied consent 
law 
provides 
that 
Wisconsin 
drivers are deemed to have given implied consent to chemical 
testing as a condition of receiving the operating privilege.  
Wis. Stat. § 343.305(2); Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d at 193; Rydeski, 
214 Wis. 2d at 109.  Consequently, drivers accused of operating 
a vehicle while intoxicated have no "right" to refuse a chemical 
test.  Crandall, 133 Wis. 2d at 257.   
¶15 The legislature determines what arresting officers 
must tell defendants prior to the administration of a chemical 
test.  Id. at 259-60.  Section 343.305(4) requires officers to 
advise the accused about the nature of the driver's implied 
consent, and the "Informing the Accused" Form meets the 
statutory mandate of alerting defendants to the law and their 
rights under it.  Village of Oregon v. Bryant, 188 Wis. 2d 680, 
683-84, 524 N.W.2d 635 (1994).  The law requires no more than 
what the implied consent statute sets forth.  Crandall, 133 Wis. 
2d at 260. 
                     
5 In this respect, the implied consent statute is not unlike 
strict liability statutes "designed to control conduct of many 
people" and "to assure the quick and efficient prosecution of 
large numbers of violators."  State v. Dundon, No. 97-1423-CR, 
op. at 10 (S. Ct. June 11, 1999) (quoting State v. Brown, 107 
Wis. 2d 44, 54, 318 N.W.2d 370 (1982)). 
No. 98-0915  
 
11
¶16 Officers who administer a test under the implied 
consent statute are not required to advise defendants about 
Miranda6 rights.  State v. Bunders, 68 Wis. 2d 129, 133, 227 
N.W.2d 727 (1975) (Miranda rules do not apply because request to 
submit to a chemical test does not implicate testimonial 
utterances).  In addition, Wisconsin's implied consent statute 
makes no provision for a right to counsel.  Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d 
at 200. 
¶17 Reitter contends that the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, reflected in Wis. Stat. § 946.75,7 conflicts with the 
Neitzel principle.  Although Reitter does not challenge Neitzel 
in this appeal, he proposes that we recognize a broader rule 
obligating officers to advise defendants that the right to 
counsel does not pertain to the implied consent setting. 
 
¶18 In Neitzel, we first reconciled any perceived tension 
between Wis. Stat. § 946.75 and the implied consent law by 
observing that the statutory obligations imposed upon drivers by 
the implied consent law are unrelated to the general, separate 
right to counsel.  Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d at 200.  The legislature 
enacted the implied consent law after passing the general right 
                     
6 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 946.75 provides: 
 
Whoever, while holding another person in custody and 
if that person requests a named attorney, denies that 
other person the right to consult and be advised by an 
attorney at law at personal expense, whether or not 
such person is charged with a crime, is guilty of a 
Class A misdemeanor. 
No. 98-0915  
 
12
to counsel statute, and the implied consent law made no 
provision for the right to consult with an attorney prior to 
administration of a chemical test.  Id.  The acknowledged rules 
of statutory construction lead to the conclusion that the 
legislature did not intend to extend the right to counsel when 
it subsequently enacted the more recent, narrower, implied 
consent statute.  Id. 
 
¶19 Reitter relies on a South Dakota federal district 
court case and a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case to urge 
expansion of the rule by requiring officers to alert defendants 
that the right to counsel does not exist.  In Heles v. State of 
South Dakota, 530 F. Supp. 646 (D.S.D. 1982), the court found 
the right to counsel attaches prior to the administration of a 
chemical test.  See id. at 654.  In Department of Transp. v. 
O'Connell, 555 A.2d 873 (1989), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
held that police officers have a duty to issue a warning (an 
"O'Connell warning") that Miranda rights do not apply to the 
implied consent setting. 
 
¶20 Reitter's reliance on Heles is misplaced.8  The Eighth 
Circuit vacated the case as moot upon the death of the 
appellant, 682 F.2d 201 (8th Cir. 1982); therefore, the decision 
"is not precedent even in the federal court in which it was 
decided."  Department of Pub. Safety v. Gates, 350 N.W.2d 59, 61 
                     
8 Defendant suggests "[f]ederal case law provides the 
perfect study of this issue."  Defendant's Reply Brief at 8. 
No. 98-0915  
 
13
(S.D. 1984).9  The South Dakota Supreme Court later declined to 
follow the Heles rationale and instead held that the right to 
counsel does not apply prior to the administration of a blood-
alcohol test.  Id. 
 
¶21 Even if we were to apply the reasoning of Heles, the 
facts of that case, like those of O'Connell, pivot on one key 
distinction.  In Heles and O'Connell, both courts addressed the 
possibility that the reading of Miranda warnings had "confused" 
the defendants about general rights to counsel and the absence 
of that right under implied consent laws.  Heles, 530 F. Supp. 
at 649; O'Connell, 555 A.2d at 874.  Fears that confused 
defendants might be misled "into making uninformed and unknowing 
                     
9 Other courts reached similar conclusions when defendants 
advanced Heles arguments.  See Langelier v. Coleman, 861 F.2d 
1508, 1510-11 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); People v. Okun, 495 
N.E.2d 115, 117-18 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). 
No. 98-0915  
 
14
decisions to take the test" prompted creation of the "O'Connell 
warning."  O’Connell, 555 A.2d at 878.10   
¶22 A minority of other jurisdictions apply the "confusion 
doctrine" to situations in which a defendant might be misled by 
the interplay between Miranda rights and the lack of right to 
counsel under implied consent laws.  See Gentry v. State, 938 
P.2d 693, 696-97 (Mont. 1997) (collecting cases).  Under the 
"confusion doctrine," a defendant's refusal to submit to a 
chemical test will be excused if the defendant believed he or 
she had the right to invoke counsel before taking the test.  
Williams v. State, 973 P.2d 218, 221 (Mont. 1999).  A 
defendant's access to the "confusion doctrine," however, is 
                     
10 
Pennsylvania's 
experience 
in 
the 
years 
following 
O'Connell makes us reluctant to open a similar Pandora's box in 
Wisconsin.  A few years ago, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
expanded the requirement of the "O'Connell warning" to cases in 
which defendants had not been read the Miranda warning.  See 
Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp. v. Scott, 684 A.2d 539, 546 (Pa. 
1996); Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp. v. McCann, 626 A.2d 92, 
93-94 (Pa. 1993).  The O'Connell line of cases, however, 
continues to draw criticism for the new confusion it created 
between police and defendants, and it has prompted calls for the 
Pennsylvania legislature to revise that state's implied consent 
statute.  See Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp. v. Boucher, 691 
A.2d 450, 453 (Pa. 1997) (conceding that "[t]he O'Connell 
decision has engendered much confusion over its application 
under varying factual circumstances"); Scott, 684 A.2d 539, 544 
(acknowledging ongoing confusion since O'Connell and observing 
how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has "catalogued in great 
detail our litany of rulings on this issue"); Commonwealth v. 
Ingram, 648 A.2d 285, (Pa. 1994) (Papadakos, J., dissenting); 
Louis W. Schack, Criminal Procedure—Motorist Confusion: The 
Unfortunate By-Product of Pennsylvania's Implied Consent Law—
Commonwealth v. Ingram, 648 A.2d 285 (Pa. 1994), 68 Temp. L. 
Rev. 931 (1995). 
No. 98-0915  
 
15
premised on a reading of Miranda rights and a showing that the 
defendant actually was "confused."  Gentry, 938 P.2d at 696-97; 
McDonnell v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 119 Cal. Rptr. 804, 
807-08 (Cal. App. 1975); Haas v. State Dep't of Licensing, 641 
P.2d 717 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982); Ehrlich v. Backes, 477 N.W.2d 
211, 214 (N.D. 1991). 
¶23 Wisconsin has not adopted the "confusion doctrine."  
In part, its application is unnecessary because Miranda warnings 
are not required in the implied consent setting.  Bunders, 68 
Wis. 2d at 133-34.  In addition, the provisions of the statute 
are neither confusing nor contradictory.  Bryant, 188 Wis. 2d at 
693-94. 
 
Thus, 
our 
courts 
do 
not 
recognize 
"subjective 
confusion" as a defense.  County of Ozaukee v. Quelle, 198 Wis. 
2d 269, 280, 542 N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1995).11  Even when a 
defendant 
claims 
confusion 
about 
the 
provisions 
of 
the 
"Informing the Accused" Form, repeated readings of its "clear 
and unequivocal language" trump a confusion defense.  Neitzel, 
95 Wis. 2d at 206. 
 
¶24 In this case, Reitter does not rely on a confusion 
theory.  Reitter advances neither of the two premises other 
states require for the defense:  reading of Miranda rights and a 
                     
11 "[T]he legislature has adequately addressed any risk of 
confusion by imposing a statutory duty on the police to provide 
accused drivers with specific information."  County of Ozaukee 
v. Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d 269, 281, 542 N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1995). 
No. 98-0915  
 
16
showing of actual confusion.12  Even if we were to extend the 
"confusion doctrine" to Wisconsin, this is not the case in which 
to do so.13  Had Reitter claimed his insistence for a lawyer fell 
under the shadow of a Miranda warning, he might have made an 
argument for obligating the State to clarify any resulting right 
to counsel confusion.  Instead, Reitter offers little that would 
tempt us toward embarking down the tangled O'Connell path. 
¶25 This court has been reluctant "to devise a 'Miranda-
like' card" under the implied consent statute.  Bryant, 188 Wis. 
2d at 692.  The legislature decides what must be told to persons 
before the administration of a chemical test, Crandall, 133 Wis. 
2d at 259, and it is for the legislature, not this court, to add 
to the statutory scheme.   
¶26 Although in Bryant we observed that the "Informing the 
Accused" Form could benefit from simplification, this court 
chose not to graft judicial language onto the statutory 
procedures.  Bryant, 188 Wis. 2d at 692-93.  Noting that police 
officers in the implied consent setting read instructions to 
defendants who may be intoxicated, we urged the Department of 
Transportation to adopt language that was plain and "as simple 
                     
12 Although the record is silent about whether Deputy Sipher 
read Reitter Miranda rights, Reitter fails to argue that 
recitation of a Miranda warning spawned any confusion about the 
implied consent law.  Reitter does not cite the Miranda case in 
either his brief to the court of appeals or his reply brief to 
this court. 
13 Here it is not clear whether Reitter was given Miranda 
warnings.  We do not decide whether this case would have come 
out differently had Reitter been given those warnings.  
No. 98-0915  
 
17
and straightforward as possible."  Id. at 693.  We declined, 
however, to take the further step of telling the Department 
precisely how it should modify those forms.  Id. 
¶27 We conclude that an officer's only duty under these 
circumstances is to administer the information contained in the 
"Informing the Accused" Form.  Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d at 284.  The 
simplified procedure envisioned in Bryant would be contradicted 
by obligating officers to inform defendants about rights they do 
not have.  Requiring officers to address nonexistent rights 
undercuts the "simple and straightforward" approach and risks 
confusing a potentially intoxicated defendant.  If police move 
beyond the consistent statutory procedures and attempt to 
explain the law's parameters, defendants will ignite the 
confusion defense.  See id. at 273.  Explanations that exceed 
the 
statute’s 
language 
would 
cause 
an 
"oversupply 
of 
information" and encourage "misled" defendants to challenge an 
officer's compliance with statutory requirements.  See id. at 
280.  This result would frustrate the legislature’s intention to 
facilitate drunk driving convictions by offering defendants an 
avenue for litigating which presumed rights merit inclusion in 
an officer's 
explanation. 
 
Bryant, 
188 Wis. 
2d at 692 
(admonishing frequent litigation of implied consent issues). 
¶28 We therefore hold that where a defendant exhibits no 
confusion, the officer is under no affirmative duty to advise 
the defendant that the right to counsel does not attach to the 
implied consent statute.   
No. 98-0915  
 
18
¶29 Although we decline to impose duties beyond those 
created by the legislature, we prefer that every officer respond 
to defendants in a manner that is both direct and polite.  Good 
practice should lead professional, courteous officers to advise 
insistent defendants that the right to counsel does not apply to 
chemical tests.  Where a driver repeatedly asks to speak with an 
attorney, it would be courteous and simple for the officer to 
correct the accused's mistaken assumptions.  Certainly officers 
must be cautious about engaging in explanations that exceed the 
statutory requirements and risk providing the defendant with an 
"oversupply of information."  Nonetheless, we see no harm in 
allowing the officer to state briefly that the right to counsel 
does not attach to the implied consent setting.14  That said, we 
do see 
harm 
in 
transforming a common courtesy into an 
affirmative duty judicially 
superimposed on 
a 
legislative 
scheme. 
¶30 We turn to the first of Reitter's two more specific 
arguments.  Reitter contends that the circuit court erroneously 
revoked his driving privileges because Deputy Sipher failed to 
                     
14 We recognize officers might hesitate to state even this 
simple advisement, given the danger that a defendant may launch 
an "oversupply of information" attack on an officer's statutory 
compliance. 
 
There 
are, 
however, 
other 
alternatives 
for 
achieving the same result, such as posting a sign on the wall 
above the chemical testing equipment, or suggesting that the 
Department of Transportation modify the "Informing the Accused" 
Form to alert drivers that the right to counsel does not pertain 
to the chemical test setting. 
No. 98-0915  
 
19
comply with the warning requirements of the implied consent 
statute. 
¶31 If an arresting officer fails to comply substantially 
with the statute, an order of revocation will be reversed.  
State v. Sutton, 177 Wis. 2d 709, 713, 503 N.W.2d 326 (Ct. App. 
1993) (citing State v. Wilke, 152 Wis. 2d 243, 249-50, 448 
N.W.2d 13 (Ct. App. 1989)).  Section 343.305(9)(a)5.b. of the 
Wisconsin 
Statutes 
requires 
arresting 
officers 
to 
inform 
defendants orally about subsection (4) or both subsections (4) 
and (4m).15  The "Informing the Accused" Form conveys the duties 
of subsection (4) and complies with the statutory mandate.  
Bryant, 188 Wis. 2d at 684. 
¶32 To contest the sufficiency of the statutory warning, a 
defendant must satisfy a three-pronged test, showing that: (1) 
the arresting officer either failed to meet "or exceeded" his or 
her duty to inform the accused driver under subsections (4) and 
(4m); (2) the "lack or oversupply of information" misled the 
accused driver; and (3) the arresting officer's failure to 
inform the driver affected the driver’s ability to make a choice 
about submitting to the chemical test.  Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d at 
280.   
¶33 In this case, Deputy Sipher complied substantially 
with the first prong when he read the "Informing the Accused" 
                     
15 Subsection (4m) was repealed by 1997 Wis. Act 107 § 2.  
The repealed subsection (4m) addresses the requirements of an 
officer when the accused driver holds a commercial license or 
operates a commercial vehicle. 
No. 98-0915  
 
20
Form to Reitter five times.  Reitter contends Deputy Sipher 
violated 
the 
statutory 
guidelines 
because 
he 
made 
minor 
omissions in completing the "Informing the Accused" Form.16  The 
statute, however, only requires arresting officers to inform 
defendants orally about the law; it does not mandate written 
completion of the form, and it does not obligate officers to 
fill out the form in any particular manner.  Where officers 
fulfill 
the 
essential 
statutory 
requirements, 
substantial 
compliance is not fatal to an officer’s execution of the implied 
consent statute.  Wilke, 152 Wis. 2d at 250. 
¶34 Reitter also fails to show that Deputy Sipher did not 
comply substantially with the second and third prongs of the 
test.  Under the second prong, Deputy Sipher created neither a 
lack nor an oversupply of information that might mislead 
Reitter: on the contrary, Deputy Sipher rigidly followed the 
script of the "Informing the Accused" Form.17  Thus, under the 
third prong, Deputy Sipher's level of compliance did not 
compromise Reitter’s decision about whether to submit to the 
test. 
                     
16 Reitter suggests the deputy failed to record the precise 
time the form was read to him, and he argues that Deputy Sipher 
neglected to check the box confirming that Section B, the 
portion of the form addressing commercial operators, had been 
read to him. 
17 Reitter implicitly concedes this by noting twice that 
Deputy Sipher "parroted" the form.  Defendant's brief at 10 and 
15. 
No. 98-0915  
 
21
¶35 Because we find Deputy Sipher complied substantially 
with the implied consent statute, we conclude that the circuit 
court's revocation of Reitter's driving privileges was not in 
error. 
¶36 We now address Reitter's second specific argument, 
namely that his repeated requests for an attorney did not 
constitute an unlawful refusal.  When a Wisconsin driver gives 
implied consent to chemical testing, the driver has no right to 
refuse a test.  Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d at 48 (citing Crandall, 133 
Wis. 2d at 255-57).  Thus, "any failure to submit to such a 
test" constitutes refusal and triggers the statutory penalties. 
 Rydeski, 214 Wis. 2d at 106.  The statute only excuses failures 
resulting from physical disability or disease unrelated to the 
use 
of 
alcohol 
or 
controlled 
substances. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 343.305(9)(a)5.c.; Rydeski, 214 Wis. 2d at 106 (citing Village 
of Elkhart Lake v. Borzyskowski, 123 Wis. 2d 185, 191, 366 
N.W.2d 506 (Ct. App. 1985)). 
¶37 The implied consent law does not require a verbal 
refusal.  Rydeski, 214 Wis. 2d at 106.  Rather, the conduct of 
the defendant may constitute an unlawful refusal.  Id.  Conduct 
that is "uncooperative" or that prevents an officer from 
obtaining a breath sample results in refusal.  Id.  "[I]t is the 
reality of the situation that must govern, and a refusal in 
fact, regardless of the words that accompany it, can be as 
convincing as an express verbal refusal."  Borzyskowski, 123 
Wis. 2d at 192 (quoting Beck v. Cox, 597 P.2d 1335, 1338 (Utah, 
1979)).  Thus, where a defendant's only conduct is an insistence 
No. 98-0915  
 
22
on using the restroom, and the officer repeats the request to 
administer the test "at least five times," the failure to submit 
constitutes a refusal.  Rydeski, 214 Wis. 2d at 107. 
¶38 A defendant who conditions submission to a chemical 
test upon the ability to confer with an attorney "refuses" to 
take the test.  Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d at 205.18  In Neitzel, the 
                     
18 "Once there has been a proper explanation and there has 
been a refusal, even though that refusal is conditioned on the 
accused's 
willingness to 
reconsider 
after 
conferring 
with 
counsel, a refusal has occurred under the statute and the 
accused 
is 
subject 
to 
the 
consequence 
of 
a 
mandatory 
suspension."  Neizel, 95 Wis. 2d at 205.  Courts in other 
jurisdictions have addressed this same question.  See State v. 
Widmaier, 724 A.2d 241 (N.J. 1999) (defendant refused to take 
breath test when he agreed to submit to test but requested 
attorney be present for calibration purposes); Sheppard v. 
Mississippi State Highway Patrol, 693 So. 2d 1326 (Miss. 1997) 
(driver's confusion about Miranda rights applied to chemical 
testing procedure but did not preclude finding that driver 
refused to submit to the test); Dobbins v. Ohio Bureau of Motor 
Vehicles, 664 N.E.2d 908 (Ohio 1996) (where police violate 
defendant's statutory right to counsel and defendant conditions 
submission to chemical test upon consultation with an attorney, 
driver nonetheless refuses to take the test); Ehrlich v. Backes, 
477 N.W.2d 211 (N.D. 1991) (confusion about Miranda rights does 
not vitiate refusal to submit to chemical test when defendant 
demands the presence of an attorney); State v. Hoch, 500 So. 2d 
597 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (following Neitzel and holding 
that no right to refuse exists under implied consent statutes). 
No. 98-0915  
 
23
arresting officer gave the defendant the opportunity to call an 
attorney prior to the administration of the chemical test.  Id. 
at 195.  Subsequently, the officer warned the defendant "several 
more times" that "insistence on waiting for his lawyer would be 
construed as a refusal to take the test."  Id. at 196.19  This 
                                                                  
Even Pennsylvania courts, which created the "O'Connell 
warning," find that when police officers provide "an accurate 
statement about [ ] rights," the defendant's "continued demands 
to speak to a lawyer constitute a refusal."  Commonwealth v. 
Mercer, 699 A.2d 1363, 1366 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997); (citing 
Commonwealth, Dep't of Transp. v. Scott, 684 A.2d 539 (1996)).  
By contrast, in Vermont failure to submit to a test does not 
constitute refusal if the defendant is not able to consult an 
attorney.  Unlike Wisconsin, however, Vermont's statute gives 
persons the right to counsel before deciding whether to take the 
test.  See State v. Berini, 701 A.2d 1055 (Vt. 1997).  
Similarly, Missouri's statute grants OWI defendants 20 minutes 
in which to contact an attorney, and failure to submit to the 
chemical test therefore does not constitute refusal.  See Lorton 
v. Director of Revenue, 985 S.W.2d 437 (Mo. 1999).   
19 Recently, the Illinois Appellate Court modified the 
circumstances in which requests for an attorney will constitute 
a refusal.  In People v. Shelton, the court held that when an 
officer fails to inform a defendant that requests for counsel 
will be construed as a refusal, and when the officer does not 
explain the penalties of refusal, there can be no refusal 
without some other "behavioral or verbal indication."  People v. 
Shelton, 708 N.E.2d 815 (Ill. App. 1999) (citing People v. Kern, 
538 N.E.2d 184 (Ill. 1989)).  Unlike Reitter, the Shelton 
defendant was not told that his request for counsel would 
constitute a refusal.  Moreover, the officer in Shelton failed 
to follow the Illinois statutory guidelines, which required him 
to warn the driver that a refusal would result in a statutory 
suspension of driving privileges.  Id.  
No. 98-0915  
 
24
advisement, combined with the officer's repeated explanations in 
the clear language of the "Informing the Accused" Form, led this 
court to find that the Neitzel defendant had refused the test.  
Id. at 206. 
¶39 In this case, Reitter contends he never "articulated a 
refusal";20 on the contrary, he told Deputy Roscizewski "I'm not 
refusing." 
 
But 
Reitter's 
actions 
ring 
louder 
than 
his 
articulated words, and regardless of his words, he refused in 
fact.  Like the Rydeski defendant, Reitter engaged in at least 
five exchanges with the deputies and prevented the officers from 
administering the test.  Like the Neitzel defendant, Reitter 
listened to repeated readings of the "Informing the Accused" 
Form and was warned that his conduct could result in a refusal. 
 Nonetheless, Reitter refused to answer Deputy Sipher's repeated 
question.  Reitter was uncooperative and belligerent.  Both 
Deputy Sipher and Deputy Roscizewski correctly concluded that 
Reitter had no plans to take the test until he had an 
opportunity to speak with his attorney. 
                                                                  
Although the Shelton court observed, as we do, that the 
issue of refusal might have been avoided had the officer simply 
told the accused driver that he had no right to speak with an 
attorney, id., the court did not propose creation of a new duty 
to advise defendants about the lack of right to counsel.  
Significantly, 
Shelton 
reiterated 
the 
rule 
of 
People 
v. 
Buerkett, 559 N.E.2d 271 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), which holds that 
insistence on right to counsel before testing constitutes 
refusal 
when 
the 
defendant 
has 
been 
warned 
about 
the 
"consequences of that insistence."  Shelton, 708 N.E.2d 815. 
20 Defendant's brief at 6. 
No. 98-0915  
 
25
¶40 We thus find that Reitter's conduct constituted a 
constructive refusal to submit to the breathalyzer test. 
DUE PROCESS 
¶41 Having concluded that the implied consent statute does 
not impose an affirmative duty upon police officers to advise 
defendants that the right to counsel does not apply to the 
administration of a chemical test, we now turn to the second 
question of law:  whether constitutional protections impose a 
duty upon police officers to advise a defendant that the right 
to counsel does not apply to the stage preceding administration 
of a chemical test. 
¶42 Reitter argues that the State of Wisconsin (State) 
violated his due process rights when Deputy Sipher neglected to 
warn him that the right to counsel does not pertain to implied 
consent procedures.  Reitter further suggests that because the 
deputy "actively misled" him to believe he had the right to 
consult an attorney, and because he relied on that presumed 
right, Reitter failed to submit to the breathalyzer test.  
¶43 The State contends that Reitter waived this issue 
because he raises it for the first time on appeal.  Although it 
is this court's usual practice to refuse issues not raised in 
the circuit court, the rule is "not absolute."  Apex Electronics 
Corp. v. Gee, 217 Wis. 2d 378, 384, 577 N.W.2d 23 (1998) (citing 
Wirth v. Ehly, 93 Wis. 2d 433, 443, 287 N.W.2d 140 (1980)).  
This court retains the discretion to address an issue raised for 
the first time on appeal when the issue is a question of law 
that has been briefed by both parties, and when the issue merits 
No. 98-0915  
 
26
resolution on public policy grounds.  See id.  In this case, 
both parties briefed the issue.  In addition, both the circuit 
court and the court of appeals predicted that the question of 
the right to counsel in the implied consent setting will recur 
in future cases as the public gains increased awareness of its 
rights.21  After all, most people in custody assume it is a 
reasonable request to ask for an attorney.  Because due process 
protections are at the center of the public's understanding 
about its rights, we exercise our discretion and analyze the due 
process issue. 
¶44 The due process clause of the Wisconsin Constitution, 
article 
I 
section 
8(1),22 
grants 
citizens 
due 
process 
protections.  Due process protections, however, do not extend to 
defendants who refuse to submit to chemical tests under implied 
consent statutes: the right of refusal, if granted by the 
legislature, is a statutory privilege, not a constitutional 
right.  South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 565 (1983); 
                     
21 We acknowledge that in reality most people have been 
"Mirandized by television" and thus reach conclusions sometimes 
based on erroneous assumptions.  See Schack, Criminal Procedure—
Motorist Confusion at 950. 
22 Article I, section 8(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution 
reads: 
Prosecutions; 
double 
jeopardy; 
self-incrimination; 
bail; habeas corpus.  SECTION 8.  (1) No person may be 
held to answer for a criminal offense without due 
process of law, and no person for the same offense may 
be put twice in jeopardy of punishment, nor may be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself or herself. 
 
No. 98-0915  
 
27
Crandall, 133 Wis. 2d at 254-55.  Unlike similar laws in other 
states, the Wisconsin implied consent statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 343.305, creates no such statutory privilege.  Id. at 257.  By 
applying for drivers' licenses, Wisconsin residents impliedly 
consent to chemical testing.  Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d at 47-48.  An 
accused driver waives other rights and "has no choice in respect 
to granting his consent."  Neitzel, 95 Wis. 2d at 201. 
¶45 The absence of a constitutional right to refuse a test 
makes it unnecessary for officers to issue Miranda warnings 
prior to the administration of breathalyzer tests.23  Bunders, 68 
Wis. 2d at 134.  In Wisconsin, there is no right under the 
implied consent statute to consult with an attorney before 
deciding whether to submit to a chemical test.  Neitzel, 95 Wis. 
at 206.24  Because the driver already has consented to the test, 
it is unnecessary to secure the advice of an attorney about the 
decision to submit.  Id. at 193-94. 
¶46 To prove a due process violation, Reitter must show 
that the State deprived him of a constitutionally protected 
interest.  See Casteel v. McCaughtry, 176 Wis. 2d 571, 579, 500 
N.W.2d 277 (1993).   
                     
23 We note, however, that if an officer wishes to conduct a 
custodial interrogation of a drunk driver, the officer has a 
duty to issue Miranda warnings. 
24 In 1985, the United States Supreme Court dismissed for 
lack of a federal question a Minnesota case in which the 
defendant argued a constitutional right to counsel existed in 
the period when deciding whether to take a chemical test.  See 
Nyflot v. Minnesota Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 474 U.S. 1027 (1985). 
No. 98-0915  
 
28
¶47 Consistent with the rule of Neville, this court 
previously reconciled the due process clause with the implied 
consent statute in similar contexts.  In Crandall, we held that 
admission of evidence of a defendant's refusal to take a 
breathalyzer test did not violate due process because the 
officer's reading of the "Informing the Accused" Form advised 
the defendant that she had consented to chemical testing when 
she received her operating license.  Crandall, 133 Wis. 2d at 
259.  We later found that because the "Informing the Accused" 
Form adequately alerts accused drivers to the testing process 
and the consequences of refusal, the provisions of the implied 
consent statute do not violate due process.  Bryant, 188 Wis. 2d 
 at 692.   
¶48 Although Reitter asserts a constitutional right that 
he does not have, he contends that Deputy Sipher "actively 
misled" him into believing that the right to counsel existed.  
Reitter suggests he suffered a due process violation because 
Deputy Sipher did not inform him expressly that the right does 
not attach to the implied consent setting.  Reitter maintains 
that when the deputy responded to his repeated requests for an 
attorney by reading the "Informing the Accused" Form, the deputy 
confirmed Reitter's mistaken impression of a right to counsel. 
Reitter implies that the deputy failed to inform him that his 
continued insistence on calling his attorney would be construed 
as a refusal.  Reitter consequently concludes he was deprived of 
due process because he did not understand that his actions would 
result in the revocation of his driving privileges. 
No. 98-0915  
 
29
¶49 Reitter cites Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959), for 
the proposition that Deputy Sipher "actively misled" him into 
believing that the right to counsel existed.  In Raley, the 
State of Ohio had assured the defendants that they could invoke 
the privilege against self-incrimination when they testified 
before Ohio Un-American Activities Commission.  Id. at 425-34.  
State officials, however, neglected to inform the defendants 
about an Ohio immunity statute that expressly deprived them of 
that privilege.  Id.  After the defendants relied on the 
assurances about the privilege at the hearing and refused to 
answer questions, Ohio prosecuted them for criminal contempt.  
Id.  In pursuing the convictions, the state relied upon the 
immunity statute, suggesting the defendants were presumed to 
know about the statute.  Id. at 425.  The Supreme Court held 
that due process rights had been violated because the express 
assurances were "actively misleading," causing the defendants to 
believe they had a right where none existed.  Id. at 438. 
¶50 In this case, Reitter was not led to believe he had a 
right where none existed.  Deputy Sipher neither expressly 
assured nor implicitly suggested that Reitter had a right to 
counsel.  Unlike Raley, the State did not encourage Reitter to 
exercise a particular right, and the State did not neglect to 
inform Reitter about the statute.  On the contrary, Deputy 
Sipher's readings of the "Informing the Accused" Form warned 
Reitter that state law deemed him to have consented to chemical 
testing under the implied consent statute.  In response to 
Reitter’s request for his lawyer, Deputy Sipher replied that the 
No. 98-0915  
 
30
request "could result in a refusal."  Reitter additionally was 
warned that if he failed to submit to the breathalyzer test, his 
driving privileges would be revoked.   
¶51 This is not a case where the State chose to convict "a 
citizen for exercising a privilege which the State clearly told 
him was available to him."  Id. at 438.  Deputy Sipher neither 
tricked nor bullied Reitter into believing that refusal was a 
constitutional "'safe harbor' free of adverse consequences."  
Crandall 133 Wis. 2d at 255-56 (citing Neville, 312 U.S. at 
566).  Rather, Deputy Sipher made Reitter aware that his failure 
to 
submit 
to 
the 
breathalyzer 
test 
would 
have 
adverse 
consequences.  Consequently, Reitter fails to show that the 
State "actively misled" him to the belief that he had the right 
to counsel prior to the administration of the breathalyzer test. 
¶52 An accused driver's erroneous belief about the right 
to counsel, and the erroneous belief that an officer deprives 
him or her of that presumed right, should not trigger a 
constitutional duty for the arresting officer. 
CONCLUSION 
¶53 In conclusion, we hold that officers are under no 
affirmative duty to advise defendants that the right to counsel 
does not apply in the informed consent statute.  Although we 
advise arresting officers to follow the common sense rules of 
good practice and respond to accused drivers in a polite and 
direct manner, we conclude that any changes to the statute 
should be made by the legislature.  We further hold that because 
the implied consent statute operates independently from the 
No. 98-0915  
 
31
general statute reflecting the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, 
no tension between the two statutes caused a violation of 
Reitter's due process rights. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
No. 98-0915  
 
1