Case Title: Sophie Bubis, et al. v. Jack A. Kassin, etal .

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-44-04

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). In 1978, Sophie Bubis and her late husband purchased property directly across the street from the beach in Loch Arbour, New Jersey. Prior to 1995, Bubis could view the beach and ocean from her home. In 1995, Jack and Joyce Kassin purchased the beach property. Later that year, they erected an eight-foot high sand berm behind the existing six-foot chain link fence. The Kassins topped the berm with bushes and trees. At the time of the complaint, the height of the berm, trees, and shrubbery together measured approximately fourteen to eighteen feet. The berm effectively ensures the Kassins privacy and prevents Bubis from viewing the beach and ocean from her home. An 1887 restrictive covenant prohibits the construction of fences higher than four feet on the Kassins property. Both Bubis and the Kassins bought their properties subject to that covenant. The Bubis and Kassin properties are located in the beach or B zone of the village. The purpose of the beach zone is to preserve the existing natural beach area and dunes for their unique beauty and recreational assets. In 1996, Loch Arbour amended its ordinance to require that all fences be made from chain link or similar fencing materials. The maximum height for a fence is set at six feet. New Jersey s Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) regulates the creation and maintenance of dunes, pursuant to the Coastal Area Facility Review Act (CAFRA). In Bubis II, the Appellate Division remanded to the Chancery Division for consideration of Bubis argument that the Kassins berm constituted a fence that violated the zoning ordinance. On remand, Bubis alleged that the berm violated both the restrictive covenant s limitation on fence height and the similar provision in zoning ordinance. The Chancery Division held that the berm was not a fence. Bubis appealed. In Bubis III, the Appellate Division affirmed. We granted Bubis s petition for certification. HELD: This berm is a fence as that word is commonly understood. Because it exceeds six feet in height, it violates both the 1887 restrictive covenant and the local zoning ordinance. Even had we found that the berm was not a fence, it is, at least, a wall or hedge neither of which are permitted in the beach zone. Because neither the restrictive covenant nor the zoning ordinance defines fence, we must rely on other sources in deciding whether this berm is a fence. There is no single construct for the word fence. Nonetheless, the varying definitions provide two guideposts. The definitions do not limit the type of material from which a fence can be made. Each definition indicates that the user s intent and the actual function of the structure are dispositive in ascertaining whether a structure is a fence. From the above definitions, and as a matter of common sense, we can conclude that as long as the structure marks a boundary or prevents intrusion or escape, then it is a fence, regardless of the material from which it is forged. (pp. 8-9) The Kassins berm satisfies the definition of a fence. The Kassins essentially constructed a privacy fence made of sand and trees. Just as the Supreme Court of Rhode Island and the California Court of Appeals found the size and position of trees determinative of whether a structure was a fence, so too, we have considered the span, height, and location of the sand and trees and conclude that this structure is nothing less than a fence. (pp. 11-13) DEP issued a permit allowing the Kassins to create and maintain a dune, but such a permit does not determine whether in fact the Kassins actually constructed a dune, a fence, or both. Regardless of whether the structure is a dune under the CAFRA definition, it is a fence. By choosing to erect a fence that has elements of a dune, the Kassins have merely subjected themselves to an additional set of state regulations. This fence, even if it is a dune, is subject to the requirements of the restrictive covenant and zoning ordinance. (pp. 13-14) 4. The record does not reveal the precise intent of the drafters when they incorporated a height restriction into the covenant in 1887. Common sense suggests that the drafters intended that such a limitation would enable nearby residents and passers-by to view both the seascape and the landscape of the beach. Bubis relied on the covenant when she and her late husband purchased the property in 1978. For over a quarter of a century, she has enjoyed the benefits of the covenant. She now faces an obstruction that runs counter to both her reasonable reliance and the intent of the drafters who created the covenant. We conclude that this structure, which is at least fourteen feet high, violates the covenant. (pp. 15-16) Because the Kassins structure constitutes a fence and the zoning ordinance applies to this factual circumstance, the Kassins must comply with its provisions. Inasmuch as the fence exceeds the height allowance by no less than eight feet, it violates the Loch Arbour zoning ordinance. (p. 18) Even had we found that the berm was not a fence, it is, at least, a wall or hedge neither of which are permitted in the beach zone. (pp. 18-20) State legislation preempts a municipal zoning ordinance when the ordinance expressly forbids something which is expressly authorized by statute or permits something which a statute expressly proscribes. CAFRA and the Loch Arbour zoning ordinance do not govern the same field. CAFRA governs dune creation and maintenance; the ordinance makes no mention of dunes at all but discusses fence height and location. Because the ordinance and CAFRA do not attempt to regulate the same activities, they do not conflict. As a general matter, CAFRA regulations do not preempt local zoning authority. Loch Arbour acted within the traditional purview of a municipality s zoning power and did not impede the DEP s ability to accomplish its goal of protecting New Jersey s coastline from inappropriate development. (pp. 20-22) A determination that CAFRA preempts this type of municipal zoning regulation would allow beach-front property owners to avoid reasonable restrictions on fence height. We do not believe that the Legislature intended landowners to circumvent local zoning ordinances that regulate fences by invoking CAFRA, especially when the so-called dune does not protect the beach from erosion. Because CAFRA and the Loch Arbour zoning ordinance concern different fields and regulate different subject matter, we conclude that preemption is clearly inapplicable and that the ordinance applies to the Kassins fence. (pp. 22-23) The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Superior Court, Chancery Division, to grant relief in compliance with this opinion. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO, with whom JUSTICE WALLACE joins, dissenting, would affirm the Appellate Division s decision because defendants sand dune was not a fence and a vegetated berm along the western portion of defendants property did not violate a restrictive covenant or a Village of Loch Arbour zoning ordinance limiting fence heights, and because plaintiffs had no right to an unobstructed view across defendants property. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA and ALBIN join in JUSTICE ZAZZALI s opinion. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO filed a separate dissenting opinion in which JUSTICE WALLACE joins. Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JACK A. KASSIN and JOYCE KASSIN, husband and wife, Defendants-Respondents, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE VILLAGE OF LOCH ARBOUR, Defendant. Argued February 1, 2005 Decided August 10, 2005 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Leonard S. Needle argued the cause for appellants. David C. Apy argued the cause for respondents (McCarter & English, attorneys). JUSTICE ZAZZALI delivered the opinion of the Court. As this appeal illustrates, good fences do not always make good neighbors. Defendants creation of an approximately eight-foot high sand berm, topped with six-foot tall trees, for the purpose of ensuring defendants privacy, has bred extensive litigation and disharmony between these neighbors. To finally resolve this ten-year-old dispute, we must determine whether the berm constitutes a fence for the purposes of applying a restrictive covenant and a local zoning ordinance. Because the berm is a fence that is more than six feet tall, we conclude that it violates both the restrictive covenant and the ordinance. [Black s Law Dictionary 618 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).] According to Webster s Third New International Dictionary 837 (16th ed. 1971), a fence is a barrier intended to prevent escape or intrusion or to mark a boundary. (Emphasis added.) American Heritage Dictionary, Second College Edition 497 (1995) provides that a fence is a structure serving as an enclosure, barrier, or boundary, usually made of posts, boards, wire, or rails. (Emphasis added.) Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English 357 (7th ed. 1989) defines a fence as a hedge, railing, bank, etc., preventing entry to or exit from [a] field etc. (Emphasis added.) And, finally, pursuant to Webster s II New College Dictionary 412 (1995), a fence is a structure functioning as a boundary or barrier, usually made of posts, boards, wire, or rails. (Emphasis added.) As these varying definitions demonstrate, there is no single construct for the word fence. Nonetheless, they provide two guideposts for our analysis. First, the definitions do not limit the type of material from which a fence can be made. Although each lists materials often used for building fences, these are merely examples as is evidenced by the use of limiting language such as especially, usually, and etc. Second, each definition centers on the manner of use or the purpose of the structure. The emphasized language indicates that the user s intent and the actual function of the structure are dispositive in ascertaining whether a structure is a fence. From the above definitions, and as a matter of common sense, we can fairly conclude that a fence is defined primarily by its function, not by its composition. As long as the structure marks a boundary or prevents intrusion or escape, then it is a fence, regardless of the material from which it is forged. This is the ordinary understanding of fence. In construing a restrictive covenant, a Washington appeals court applied a similar rationale in determining that a row of trees could constitute a fence. Lakes at Mercer Island Homeowners Ass n v. Witrak, 810 P.2d 27, 30 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991). The court held that the trial court had erred in holding that trees could not be used as a fence because [e]ven the literal meaning of fences does not exclude a row of trees along a property line. A common and ordinary meaning of fence is a barrier , Webster s Third New International Dictionary 837 (1969), or a hedge, structure or partition, erected for the purpose of inclosing a piece of land, or to divide a piece of land . . . or to separate two contiguous estates. Black s Law Dictionary 745 (4th ed. 1968). [Ibid.] Furthermore, our understanding of the term fence is consistent with other cases in which courts have found that rows of trees can constitute fences pursuant to spite fence statutes. For example, in Dowdell v. Bloomquist, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that, under such a statute, the trial court had properly considered the proximity of the four trees that touched one another, and the broad span of sixty feet across which they spread, and rationally interpreted that the trees were a fence. 847 A.2d 827, 830 (2004). The court explained that, because of their towering presence, as well as their relative positioning on defendant s land . . . we can consider the trees nothing less than a fence. Id. at 831. A California appeals court also held that a row of trees planted on or near the boundary line between adjoining parcels of land can be a fence or other structure in the nature of a fence. Wilson v. Handley, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 269 (Ct. App. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although those decisions arose in the context of spite fence statutes, their reasoning nonetheless assists our analysis. Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JACK A. KASSIN and JOYCE KASSIN, husband and wife, Defendants-Respondents, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE VILLAGE OF LOCH ARBOUR, Defendant. JUSTICE RIVERA-SOTO, dissenting. This appeal requires that we determine whether a sand dune in the form of a berm lawfully erected by a property owner on beach property constitutes a fence, either under a restrictive covenant or under a municipal ordinance, both of which restrict, in their respective terms, the height and composition of a fence. After hearing the witnesses and considering the evidence before him, the Chancery Division judge ruled that the sand berm erected in this case by defendants Jack and Joyce Kassin did not constitute a fence, and thus denied the application of plaintiffs Sophie Bubis and Alcides Ferreira. The Appellate Division similarly held that defendants sand berm was not a fence and also denied relief to plaintiffs. The majority now holds that both the Chancery Division judge and the Appellate Division were wrong as a matter of law. According to the majority, defendants sand dune is a fence, ante, ___ N.J. ___ (2005) (slip op. at 11), and, although it is subject to the provisions of the Coastal Area Facility Review Act (CAFRA) governing sand dunes, see N.J.S.A. 19:9-3; N.J.A.C. 7:7E-3.16(a), defendants sand dune nonetheless is subject to fence restrictions in both a restrictive covenant and a municipal ordinance. Ante, ___ N.J. ___ (2005) (slip op. at 14-15, 16-18). Because I would affirm the determination of both the Chancery Division judge and the Appellate Division that defendants sand dune was not a fence and that a vegetated berm, a man-made sand dune topped with trees and shrubbery, along the western portion of defendants property did not violate a restrictive covenant or a Village of Loch Arbour zoning ordinance limiting fence heights, and because plaintiffs had no right to an unobstructed view across defendants property, I respectfully dissent. As defendants point out, it is significant that the property is a beachfront and at the time the restrictive covenant was executed, the property contained sand dunes. . . . . Thus, under the factual circumstances which existed at the time the restrictive covenant was adopted, if the drafters had meant to equate fences with sand dunes, we would have expected them to so state. The fact they were not explicit indicates that they did not consider sand dunes to be fences at the time. Finally, the judge s conservative interpretation of the word fence is consistent with the general principle that private restrictions on the use of land are generally disfavored. Restrictive covenants must always be strictly construed. I would adopt the panel s cogent, reasonable and straightforward analysis in its entirety, noting solely that the majority ignores the fact that, to me, is dispositive in this analysis: the existence of sand dunes at the time the restrictive covenant was adopted. I am in complete accord with the panel s reasoning and adopt it as my own. I also agree with the Appellate Division when it held that [w]e need not address the preemption issue for the following reasons: Here, CAFRA preemption was only an alternative basis for the Chancery Division s judgment on the question of whether the vegetated berm was prohibited under the Village zoning ordinance. Moreover, the judge s opinion on CAFRA preemption was theoretical because he concluded that the Village zoning ordinance did not regulate the height of sand dunes. That reasoning is, to me, dispositive of the question. SOPHIE BUBIS and ALCIDES FERREIRA, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JACK A. KASSIN and JOYCE KASSIN, husband and wife, Defendants-Respondents, and BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE VILLAGE OF LOCH ARBOUR, Defendant. DECIDED August 10, 2005 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Zazzali CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Rivera-Soto