Case Title: State ex rel. Maras v. LaRose

Citation: 2022-Ohio-3852

Docket Number: 2022-1270

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2022-10-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Maras v. LaRose, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3852.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-3852 
THE STATE EX REL. MARAS v. LAROSE, SECY. OF STATE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Maras v. LaRose,  
Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-3852.] 
Mandamus—Elections—R.C. 3505.21—Equal Protection Clauses of the United 
States and Ohio Constitutions—Rational-basis review—R.C. 3505.21, 
which governs the process of appointing election observers, does not treat 
candidates who are not affiliated with a political party differently from 
party-affiliated candidates, and the statute serves a legitimate government 
interest by obviating the potential for boards of elections to become 
overwhelmed with too many election observers—R.C. 3505.21 does not 
provide election observers with permission to inspect the software, source 
codes, or hardware installed on automatic vote-tabulating machines, nor 
does it require poll workers to tabulate votes by hand—Writ denied. 
(No. 2022-1270—Submitted October 26, 2022—Decided October 28, 2022.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
_________________ 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Per Curiam. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
{¶ 1} Relator, Terpsehore P. Maras, is an independent candidate for Ohio 
Secretary of State on the November 8, 2022 general-election ballot.  In this 
expedited election case, Maras contends that R.C. 3505.21, which governs the 
appointment of election observers, violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the 
United States and Ohio Constitutions because it prevents certified independent 
candidates from appointing election observers to the same extent as political 
parties.  She seeks a writ of mandamus compelling respondent, Ohio Secretary of 
State Frank LaRose, to allow her to appoint election observers to inspect the 
counting of votes.  She also seeks an order compelling the secretary of state to 
provide election observers with copies of all software, source codes, and hardware 
that is installed on any automatic vote-tabulating machine.  For the reasons set forth 
herein, we deny the writ. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Statutory provisions governing election observers 
{¶ 2} R.C. 3505.21(B) provides for the appointment of election observers 
to observe the casting and counting of ballots.  The statute states: 
 
At any primary, special, or general election, any political 
party supporting candidates to be voted upon at such election and 
any group of five or more candidates may appoint to the board of 
elections or to any of the precincts in the county or city one person, 
a qualified elector, who shall serve as observer for such party or such 
candidates during the casting of the ballots and during the counting 
of the ballots; * * *. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  R.C. 3505.21(B). 
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{¶ 3} Any political party or group of candidates appointing observers must 
notify the board of elections of its appointees and the precincts at which they will 
serve as observers.  R.C. 3505.21(C).  This notification must occur at least 11 days 
before the election, on forms prescribed by the secretary of state.  Id. 
B. The evidence in the record 
{¶ 4} Maras is a general-election candidate for Ohio Secretary of State.  She 
appears on the November 2022 general-election ballot as an independent candidate, 
rather than one affiliated with a political party. 
{¶ 5} As a candidate who is not affiliated with any political party, Maras 
must join with at least four other candidates in order to appoint election observers.  
R.C. 3505.21(B).  Maras alleges that she contacted at least eight other candidates 
to join her in appointing observers but that she was unsuccessful in finding four that 
would do so. 
C. Procedural history 
{¶ 6} Maras filed this action on October 12.  She alleges that R.C. 
3505.21(B) imposes “unconstitutional restrictions on [her] ability to appoint 
election observers.”  Maras asserts that the disparate treatment between 
independent candidates and party-affiliated candidates violates the Equal 
Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions. 
{¶ 7} Maras’s complaint also contains numerous allegations concerning 
what election observers appointed under R.C. 3505.21(B) are allowed to see.  She 
contends that in the past, election observers have not been permitted to sufficiently 
observe or inspect automated voting and vote-counting machines that are used 
throughout the state.  Because the tabulation process now occurs electronically, 
rather than by hand, Maras contends that observers cannot meaningfully observe 
the tabulation process unless they are allowed to inspect all software, source codes, 
and hardware used by those machines. 
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{¶ 8} Maras seeks a writ of mandamus ordering the secretary of state to 
allow certified independent candidates to appoint election observers without having 
to join four other candidates and to allow election observers access to “copies of all 
software, [source] code[s], and hardware installed on any automatic tabulating 
machine in use in the precinct in which an observer is appointed so that the software 
may be meaningfully inspected.”  Maras further asks that tabulating-machine 
software be “open or unlocked” so that observers “may inspect [the machines] to 
the source code level or, alternatively, order poll workers to tally the votes.” 
{¶ 9} We set an expedited schedule for the submission of evidence and 
merit briefing, ___ Ohio St.3d, ___, 2022-Ohio-3646, ___ N.E.3d ___, and the 
matter is now fully briefed. 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Standard of review 
{¶ 10} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, Maras must establish by clear 
and convincing evidence that (1) she has a clear legal right to the requested relief, 
(2) the respondents have a clear legal duty to perform the requested acts, and (3) 
she has no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.  See State ex rel. 
Linnabary v. Husted, 138 Ohio St.3d 535, 2014-Ohio-1417, 8 N.E.3d 940, ¶ 13.  
Given the proximity of the election, Maras lacks an adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of the law.  See State ex rel. Cincinnati for Pension Reform v. Hamilton Cty. 
Bd. of Elections, 137 Ohio St.3d 45, 2013-Ohio-4489, 997 N.E.2d 509, ¶ 21.  The 
remaining elements require us to determine whether the secretary of state engaged 
in fraud, corruption, or an abuse of discretion or acted in clear disregard of 
applicable law.  See State ex rel. Husted v. Brunner, 123 Ohio St.3d 288, 2009-
Ohio-5327, 915 N.E.2d 1215, ¶ 9. 
{¶ 11} Maras does not allege fraud or corruption.  Thus, the dispositive 
issue is whether Secretary LaRose abused his discretion or clearly disregarded 
January Term, 2022 
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applicable law by not allowing Maras to appoint election observers and not 
allowing election observers to inspect the automatic-tabulating-machine software. 
{¶ 12} A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, exercised by this 
court with caution and issued only when the right to relief is clear.  State ex rel. 
Taylor v. Glasser, 50 Ohio St.2d 165, 166, 364 N.E.2d 1 (1977).  Not only is Maras 
required to prove clear entitlement to relief, she must also overcome the 
presumption of constitutionality that is afforded to statutes and demonstrate beyond 
a reasonable doubt that R.C. 3505.21 is unconstitutional.  See State ex rel. Purdy v. 
Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections, 77 Ohio St.3d 338, 345-346, 673 N.E.2d 1351 
(1996). 
B. This court’s jurisdiction 
{¶ 13} As a preliminary matter, Secretary LaRose contends that we lack 
subject-matter jurisdiction over this action because Maras is seeking, in substance, 
a declaratory judgment that R.C. 3505.21(B) is unconstitutional and a prohibitory 
injunction forbidding the secretary of state from enforcing the statute.  He is 
mistaken. 
{¶ 14} “In general, if the allegations of a complaint for a writ of mandamus 
indicate that the real objects sought are a declaratory judgment and a prohibitory 
injunction, the complaint does not state a cause of action in mandamus and must be 
dismissed for want of jurisdiction.”  (Emphasis added.)  State ex rel. Grendell v. 
Davidson, 86 Ohio St.3d 629, 634, 716 N.E.2d 704 (1999).  However, if a 
mandamus complaint seeks a declaratory judgment coupled with a mandatory 
injunction, a writ of mandamus is a proper remedy and this court has jurisdiction 
over the case.  See State ex rel. Arnett v. Winemiller, 80 Ohio St.3d 255, 259, 685 
N.E.2d 1219 (1997).  “The court distinguishes between the two by ‘examining the 
complaint to determine whether it actually seeks to prevent, rather than compel, 
official action.’ ”  State ex rel. Gadell-Newton v. Husted, 153 Ohio St.3d 225, 2018-
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Ohio-1854, 103 N.E.3d 809, ¶ 10, quoting State ex rel. Evans v. Blackwell, 111 
Ohio St.3d 437, 2006-Ohio-5439, 857 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 20. 
{¶ 15} The complaint here seeks relief that would compel the secretary of 
state to perform affirmative acts: allow Maras to appoint election observers to 
inspect equipment and supervise ballot counting and make available the source 
codes for the software installed on the automated equipment (or, alternatively, order 
poll workers to hand-tally the votes).  Therefore, Maras does not seek a prohibitory 
injunction. 
C. The equal-protection claim 
{¶ 16} Maras argues that the “five candidate rule”—which allows a 
candidate who is not affiliated with a political party to appoint election observers 
only if he or she makes the request as part of a group of five candidates—is 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Ohio 
Constitutions.  She argues that we should apply strict scrutiny in evaluating the 
constitutionality of R.C. 3505.21 because, in her view, “precluding the ability of 
non-party affiliated candidates to appoint election observers has a real and 
appreciable impact on and impermissibly interferes with the right to vote.”  This is 
so, Maras argues, because election observers are “critical to election integrity.” 
{¶ 17} We have interpreted the Equal Protection Clause in the Ohio 
Constitution as being equivalent to the federal Equal Protection Clause.  See 
McCrone v. Bank One Corp., 107 Ohio St.3d 272, 2005-Ohio-6505, 839 N.E.2d 1, 
¶ 7.  The first step in an equal-protection analysis is determining the proper standard 
of review.  “When legislation infringes upon a fundamental constitutional right or 
the rights of a suspect class, strict scrutiny applies.”  Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 
116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 64.  “If neither a 
fundamental right nor a suspect class is involved, a rational-basis test is used.”  Id. 
{¶ 18} Maras argues that R.C. 3505.21 is subject to strict scrutiny because 
it impacts the right to vote.  “The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s 
January Term, 2022 
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choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right 
strike at the heart of representative government.”  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 
555, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964); see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 
1, 17, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964) (“Other rights, even the most basic, are 
illusory if the right to vote is undermined”).  Maras also notes that her rights as a 
candidate are impacted negatively by R.C. 3505.21.  See Bullock v. Carter, 405 
U.S. 134, 143, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972) (“the rights of voters and the 
rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect 
candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters”).  
Election observers, she argues, help to protect the rights of voters and candidates 
by deterring and detecting voter fraud, deterring voter intimidation, and 
safeguarding voter confidence. 
{¶ 19} However, simply because a statute applies to elections does not 
mean it triggers strict scrutiny for equal-protection purposes.  Before strict scrutiny 
will apply, a legislative classification must “impermissibly interfere[] with the 
exercise of a fundamental right or operate[] to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect 
class.”  Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 96 S.Ct. 
2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976).  An election statute does not burden the right to vote 
when there is only “a speculative, future possibility that election irregularities might 
occur.”  Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Boockvar, 493 F.Supp.3d 331, 419 
(W.D.Pa.2020) (applying rational-basis review to state-law requirement that poll 
watchers be county residents).  In this case, R.C. 3505.21 has no direct impact on 
the fundamental right to vote.  See Werme v. Merrill, 84 F.3d 479, 485-487 (1st 
Cir.1996) (rejecting constitutional challenge to a New Hampshire law limiting 
election inspectors to being members of the two major political parties under 
rational-basis review).  The statute does not regulate the ability to vote or the right 
to have one’s vote tallied.  Rather, it regulates who may appoint an election 
observer.  Tellingly, Maras cites no case in which a court has applied strict scrutiny 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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to a statute limiting the appointment of election observers.  Because there is no 
fundamental right for a candidate to appoint an election observer, see id. at 484, 
strict scrutiny is not appropriate here. 
{¶ 20} Secretary LaRose suggests this court employ the Anderson-Burdick 
“sliding scale,” Arizona Green Party v. Reagan, 838 F.3d 983, 988 (9th Cir.2016), 
which is a framework often applied to assess the constitutionality of election 
statutes, see Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 
(1983); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992).  
Under the Anderson-Burdick framework, “the more severe the burden imposed, the 
more exacting [the court’s] scrutiny; the less severe, the more relaxed [the] 
scrutiny.”  Arizona Libertarian Party v. Hobbs, 925 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th Cir.2019).  
As a practical matter, it is not clear that applying the Anderson-Burdick analysis 
would yield a different result here.  See, e.g., Cook Cty. Republican Party v. 
Pritzker, 487 F.Supp.3d 707, 719-720 (N.D.Ill.2020) (challenge to extension of 
period for curing provisional ballots from 7 to 14 days failed under the Anderson-
Burdick framework because the plaintiff did not provide any basis for thinking that 
the additional time would result in election fraud, whereas the state provided a 
rational justification for the extension).  We therefore apply the rational-basis test. 
{¶ 21} Under rational-basis review, a statute will be upheld if it is rationally 
related to a legitimate government purpose.  Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-
Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, at ¶ 66.  “Under such a review, a statute will not be 
invalidated if it is grounded on a reasonable justification, even if its classifications 
are not precise.”  Id.  In order to fail the rational-basis test, a classification adopted 
by the General Assembly must be “clearly arbitrary and unreasonable.”  McCrone, 
107 Ohio St.3d 272, 2005-Ohio-6505, 839 N.E.2d 1, at ¶ 9. 
{¶ 22} Maras argues that the legislative classification in R.C. 3505.21(B) is 
between candidates who are not affiliated with a political party and party-affiliated 
candidates.  That is, Maras contends that candidates who are not affiliated with a 
January Term, 2022 
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political party are subject to the “five-candidate rule”—they cannot appoint election 
observers unless they are among a group of five who agree do so—while party-
affiliated candidates are not so restricted.  This characterization of the statute is 
incorrect.  Under R.C. 3505.21(B), candidates are not treated differently.  No single 
candidate, affiliated or not, may appoint an election observer in any county.  Rather, 
any group of five or more candidates—regardless of party affiliation—may appoint 
observers.  In any county in the state, for example, Maras could join with any four 
candidates, including local candidates, to appoint observers in that particular 
county. 
{¶ 23} Maras’s challenge fails because R.C. 3505.21 passes the rational-
basis test.  As the secretary of state argues, the statute ensures that appointed 
election observers represent the interests of multiple candidates and are not focused 
on simply furthering the interests of one particular candidate.  In this way, the 
statute is rationally related to the goal of minimizing disruptions that could occur if 
too many observers descended on a single polling location. 
{¶ 24} Maras counters that the statute cannot pass rational-basis review 
because it is not rationally related to the state interests posited by Secretary LaRose.  
She notes that there are only nine statewide elections on the November 8 ballot and 
that she is the only independent candidate running in any of those races.  Because 
party-affiliated candidates have party-appointed observers to represent them, Maras 
contends that those candidates “are not inclined to help a non-party affiliated 
candidate which makes five candidate consent practically unobtainable.”  And 
Maras argues that the five-candidate rule has no rational relationship to a state 
interest in “preventing too many election observers [from] overburdening county 
boards of elections” because there are not very many statewide candidates. 
{¶ 25} Maras’s arguments are based on a misreading of the statute.  She 
appears to assume that in order to appoint observers, she must make a joint request 
with four other statewide candidates.  But that is not what the statute says.  Under 
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R.C. 3505.21(B), Maras need only be part of a group of five candidates, regardless 
of the office those candidates are seeking.  And as the secretary of state notes, there 
are 810 other candidates throughout the state—245 of whom are running as 
independent candidates.  Thus, Maras is wrong to characterize the five-candidate 
rule as an “unobtainable” condition to appointing observers for independent 
candidates, and her constitutional challenge therefore fails. 
{¶ 26} For the same reason, the fact that there are only nine statewide 
candidates in this November’s election does not make R.C. 3505.21(B)’s 
limitations irrational.  R.C. 3505.21(B) applies to any primary, general, or special 
election and provides for the appointment of an election observer in any precinct of 
a county or city.  The limited number of statewide candidates does not mean there 
are a limited number of total candidates throughout the state, considering the county 
and district contests that are on the general-election ballot. 
{¶ 27} For these reasons, R.C. 3505.21 is rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest and is therefore constitutional under the Equal Protection 
Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions. 
D. Access to the tabulating software 
{¶ 28} As noted, R.C. 3505.21(B) provides for the appointment of persons 
to “serve as observer[s] * * * during the counting of the ballots.”  Maras asserts that 
the Revised Code has not kept pace with technology.  She contends that merely 
watching the poll workers is inadequate: “Watching the ballots go in a machine and 
then watching ballots come back out is * * * not a meaningful inspection process 
for certified observers.”  According to Maras, this observation cannot be undertaken 
in any meaningful fashion unless the observers can see and inspect the software, 
source codes, and hardware installed on any automatic vote-tabulating machine.  
And she argues that if this court will not order the relief that she requests, then to 
January Term, 2022 
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make the statute meaningful, poll workers should be required to tally the votes by 
hand in a way that can be observed.1 
{¶ 29} However, Maras does not identify any clear statutory right to the 
relief she seeks.  “It is axiomatic that in mandamus proceedings, the creation of the 
legal duty that a relator seeks to enforce is the distinct function of the legislative 
branch of government, and courts are not authorized to create the legal duty 
enforceable in mandamus.”  (Emphasis sic.)  State ex rel. Pipoly v. State Teachers 
Retirement Sys., 95 Ohio St.3d 327, 2002-Ohio-2219, 767 N.E.2d 719, ¶ 18.  There 
is nothing in R.C. 3505.21 that permits or requires the inspection of the software, 
source codes, or hardware that is installed in automatic vote-tabulating machines.  
Likewise, the Revised Code does not command poll workers to hand-tally the votes 
in lieu of relying on automatic tabulation.  We therefore find no basis for a writ of 
mandamus to issue. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
{¶ 30} For the reasons discussed herein, we deny the writ of mandamus. 
Writ denied. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and DONNELLY, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, FISCHER, and DEWINE, JJ., concur in judgment only. 
_________________ 
 
1. The secretary of state disputes Maras’s characterization of the public’s ability to observe 
tabulating by the automated equipment.  According to the secretary of state, automatic vote-
tabulating machines must be tested, certified by the federal Election Assistance Commission, and 
meet standards of functionality, accessibility, and security.  See R.C. 3506.05(H)(4)(a).  Testing 
reports are available for public review.  See U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Certified Voting 
Systems, available at https://www.eac.gov/voting-equipment/certified-voting-systems (accessed 
Oct. 27, 2022) [perma.cc/H3SA-7DJJ].  The equipment must then be forwarded to the bipartisan 
Board of Voting Machine Examiners, which conducts its own tests at meetings that are open to the 
public.  See R.C. 3506.05(B).  Boards of elections perform tests before and after each election, 
ensuring the accuracy of the equipment; boards give public notice of the time and place of testing.  
See R.C. 3506.14(B).  Finally, automatic vote-tabulating machines are subject to postelection audit 
under R.C. 3505.331, in which boards of elections audit at least three contested races and at least 
five percent of the total number of votes cast in those races. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Mendenhall Law Group, Warner Mendenhall, and John Pfleiderer, for 
relator. 
Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Ann Yackshaw, Julie M. Pfeiffer, and 
Allison D. Daniel, Assistant Attorneys General, for respondent. 
________________________