Case Title: Scachitti v. UBS Financial Services

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97023, 97866

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket Nos. 97023, 97866 cons.-Agendas 12 & 13-November							2004.
RAYMOND G. SCACHITTI et al., Appellants, v. UBS FINANCIAL
SERVICES et al., Appellees.-THE ILLINOIS HEALTH
FACILITIES AUTHORITY ex rel. RAYMOND G. SCACHITTI et
al., Appellants, v. MORGAN STANLEY DEAN WITTER & 							COMPANY et al., Appellees.
Opinion filed June 3, 2005.
	JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the opinion of the court:
	In these related appeals we address: (1) whether taxpayers have
standing to assert common law claims on behalf of the State of
Illinois; (2) whether private citizens have standing to maintain a cause
of action on behalf of the state for recovery of fraudulently obtained
public funds under section 20-104(b) of article XX of the Code of
Civil Procedure (article XX) (735 ILCS 5/20-104(b) (West 2002));
and (3) whether private persons have standing to bring suit on behalf
of the state under the qui tam provisions of the Whistleblower Reward
and Protection Act (Act) (740 ILCS 175/1 et seq. (West 2002)). The
circuit court of Cook County dismissed plaintiffs' complaints, holding
this court's recent opinion in Lyons v. Ryan, 201 Ill. 2d 529 (2002),
foreclosed plaintiffs' claims. The circuit court further held the entire
Act unconstitutional based on this court's reasoning in Lyons.
	We allowed plaintiffs' direct appeals. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(a).
We affirm in part and reverse in part, and hold: (1) taxpayers lack
standing to assert common law claims on behalf of the state; (2)
private citizens lack standing to maintain a cause of action on behalf
of the state for recovery of fraudulently obtained public funds under
section 20-104(b) of article XX (735 ILCS 5/20-104(b) (West
2002)); (3) private persons have standing to bring suit on behalf of the
state under the qui tam provisions of the Act (740 ILCS 175/1 et seq.
(West 2002)); and (4) the circuit court erred in declaring the Act
unconstitutional.

I. BACKGROUND
	Plaintiffs' counsel issued 278 requests to various state and local
governmental units under the Freedom of Information Act (5 ILCS
140/1 et seq. (West 2002)), seeking documents relating to nearly 300
bond clearance transactions. As a result of information obtained from
the requests, plaintiffs brought these actions.
	These cases essentially repleaded pendent state claims dismissed
in earlier suits filed in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois. The federal cases were dismissed for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction.

A. Appeal No. 97023
	On November 21, 2002, plaintiffs, Raymond G. Scachitti, Patrick
J. Houlihan, and Robert F. Rifkin, filed a "taxpayer derivative action"
on behalf of the State of Illinois against defendants, Payne Webber
Group, Inc., now known as UBS Financial Services (UBS), and
Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P. (Deloitte). The lawsuit sought to recover,
on behalf of the state, overcharges made by UBS in connection with
advance refunding bond transactions in 1992. UBS served as the lead
underwriter for the state's issuance of new bonds to refinance, at
lower rates, certain bonds issued by the state between 1985 and 1992.
	Plaintiffs' complaint alleged UBS overcharged the state in
connection with the 1992 advance refunding bond transactions. An
advance refunding bond transaction is a financial investment vehicle
allowing the sale of new bonds and using the proceeds to purchase
securities. These securities are held in a defeasance escrow to assure
the future payment of outstanding bonds that cannot presently be
redeemed because the call provisions are for a future date. Deloitte
was the accounting firm engaged by the state to verify the accuracy of
the escrow account. According to plaintiffs' complaint, federal law
restricts the overall yield governmental units can earn on securities
placed in a defeasance escrow. Charging more than the market value
is referred to as "burning" the yield on the securities. Plaintiffs allege
"yield burning" violates IRS regulations requiring securities to be
purchased at market value and any profit resulting from positive
arbitrage be paid to the United States Treasury to prevent the
refunding bonds from losing tax-exempt status.
	Plaintiffs, on behalf of the state, sought recovery of fraudulently
obtained public funds from UBS under article XX (735 ILCS
5/20-101 et seq. (West 2002)). Section 20-102 of article XX
provides that any person who receives fraudulently obtained public
funds, whether or not that person has committed the fraud, must
refund the money. 735 ILCS 5/20-102 (West 2002). Section 20-103
states that a person who receives compensation, benefits or
remuneration "to which he is not entitled, or in a greater amount than
that to which he is entitled" shall be liable to repay those amounts and,
in addition, is liable for civil penalties, including treble damages. 735
ILCS 5/20-103 (West 2002).
	Plaintiffs also sought recovery, on behalf of the state, of
fraudulently obtained public funds from defendants under the qui tam
provisions of the Act (740 ILCS 175/1 et seq. (West 2002)).
Plaintiffs, as taxpayers, further asserted common law claims on behalf
of the state as follows: breach of fiduciary duty against defendants for
misrepresenting the fair market value of the treasury securities it sold
the state to be held in the defeasance escrow for the 1992 refunding
bonds; fraud and breach of contract against UBS; and breach of
contract, accountant malpractice, and negligent and fraudulent
misrepresentation against Deloitte.
	Plaintiffs sought: (1) compensatory, treble, or other damages and
civil penalties; (2) rescission of contracts "between, or for the benefit
of," the state and defendants and an award of restitution damages; (3)
attorney fees and expenses; and (4) "extraordinary equitable and/or
injunctive relief, including attaching, impounding, imposing a
constructive trust upon or otherwise restricting defendants' assets."
Although plaintiffs' complaint was filed as a putative class action, the
prayer for relief did not seek class certification.
	Plaintiffs served a copy of the complaint upon the Attorney
General. After reviewing plaintiffs' complaint and submission of
evidence, the Attorney General declined to intervene in the action.
Plaintiffs attempted to litigate the case on behalf of the state. The
circuit court of Cook County granted defendants' motions to dismiss,
holding plaintiffs lacked standing to sue on behalf of the state. The
circuit court also declared the Act unconstitutional in light of Lyons,
201 Ill. 2d 529, as a usurpation of the exclusive authority of the
Attorney General to sue on behalf of the state.
	This court allowed plaintiffs' direct appeal. See 134 Ill. 2d R.
302(a). Although the Illinois Attorney General was never involved in
the proceedings below, we granted the Illinois Attorney General leave
to intervene in the appeal (see 735 ILCS 5/2-408 (West 2002)) and
to file a brief addressing the constitutionality of the Act. We granted
the AARP and Taxpayers Against Fraud, and relators David Sipich
and George C. Hook, leave to submit amicus curiae briefs in support
of plaintiffs. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 345. Cook County Treasurer Maria
Papas was granted leave to file an amicus curiae brief in support of
defendants. See 155 Ill. 2d R. 345.

B. Appeal No. 97866
	On September 13, 2002, Raymond G. Scachitti, Patrick J.
Houlihan, and Robert F. Rifkin filed a "taxpayer derivative action" on
behalf of the Illinois Health Facilities Authority (Authority) against
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Company (Morgan), and Ernst &
Young, L.L.P. (Ernst). The lawsuit sought to recover, on behalf of the
Authority, overcharges made by Morgan in connection with advance
refunding bond transactions in 1993.
	Morgan served as the lead underwriter for the Authority's
issuance of new bonds to refinance, at lower rates, certain revenue
bonds issued by the Authority in 1989. Ernst was the accounting firm
engaged by the Authority to verify the accuracy of the escrow
account.
	Plaintiffs' complaint sought recovery of fraudulently obtained
public funds from Morgan under sections 20-102 and 20-103 of
article XX (735 ILCS 5/20-102, 20-103 (West 2002)). Plaintiffs'
complaint also sought recovery of fraudulently obtained public funds
from defendants under the qui tam provisions of the Act (740 ILCS
175/1 et seq. (West 2002)). In addition, plaintiffs asserted the
following common law claims: breach of fiduciary duty against
defendants for misrepresenting the fair market value of the treasury
securities it sold the Authority to be held in the defeasance escrow for
the 1993 refunding bonds; fraud and breach of contract against
Morgan; and breach of contract and accountant malpractice against
Ernst.
	Plaintiffs' complaint sought: (1) compensatory, treble, or other
damages and civil penalties; (2) rescission of contracts "between, or
for the benefit of," the Authority and defendants and an award of
restitution damages; (3) attorney fees and expenses; and (4)
"extraordinary equitable and/or injunctive relief, including attaching,
impounding, imposing a constructive trust upon or otherwise
restricting defendants' assets."
	The circuit court of Cook County dismissed plaintiffs' complaint,
holding plaintiffs lacked standing to sue on behalf of the state. The
circuit court also declared the Act unconstitutional in light of this
court's reasoning in Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d 529, as an unconstitutional
usurpation of the exclusive authority of the Attorney General to sue
on behalf of the state.
	This court allowed plaintiffs' direct appeal. See 134 Ill. 2d R.
302(a). We granted the AARP and Taxpayers Against Fraud leave to
submit an amicus curiae brief in support of plaintiffs. See 155 Ill. 2d
R. 345.

II. ANALYSIS
	 The issues presented in these two appeals involve identical
questions of law. Accordingly, the Court has, sua sponte, consolidated
these appeals. See 137 Ill. 2d R. 384(a).
	These appeals arise from the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaints for
lack of standing. Section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure
(Code) provides that a complaint may be involuntarily dismissed for
lack of standing. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2002). "The standing
doctrine assures that issues are presented to a court only by parties
who have a sufficient stake in the outcome of the controversy."
People ex rel. Hartigan v. E&E Hauling, Inc., 153 Ill. 2d 473, 482
(1992). A party lacking an interest in the controversy has no standing
to sue. Hartigan, 153 Ill. 2d  at 482. We review a dismissal order
based on lack of standing de novo. Glisson v. City of Marion, 188 Ill. 2d 211, 220 (1999).
	Plaintiffs argue the circuit court erred in dismissing their
complaints for lack of standing. Plaintiffs also contend the circuit
court erroneously held the Act (740 ILCS 175/1 et seq. (West 2002))
unconstitutional.
	Initially, we note plaintiffs claim standing to bring all of their
claims as taxpayers of the State of Illinois. Plaintiffs use the terms "qui
tam" and "taxpayer" interchangeably throughout their briefs and refer
to "common law" qui tam taxpayer suits, as if qui tam actions and
taxpayer actions are synonymous. As we shall explain, they are not.
While it is true all of the actions asserted by plaintiffs are purportedly
brought for public benefit, the history and case law regarding the
development of these actions reveal quite different premises for each.
	A "taxpayer action" is brought by private persons in their
capacity as taxpayers, "on behalf of themselves and as representatives
of a class of taxpayers similarly situated within a taxing district or
area, upon a ground which is common to all members of the class, and
for the purpose of seeking relief from illegal or unauthorized acts of
public bodies or public officials, which acts are injurious to their
common interests as such taxpayers." See 74 Am. Jur. 2d Taxpayers'
Actions §1 (2001), citing State ex rel. Conrad v. Langer, 68 N.D.
167, 277 N.W. 504 (1937); Canton Farm Equipment, Inc. v.
Richardson, 501 So. 2d 1098 (Miss. 1987). Illinois law specifically
provides taxpayers standing to enjoin a public officer's misuse of
public funds. See 735 ILCS 5/11-301 et seq. (West 2000). Moreover,
this court has recognized:
		"It has long been the rule in Illinois that citizens and
taxpayers have a right to enjoin the misuse of public funds,
and that this right is based upon the taxpayers' ownership of
such funds and their liability to replenish the public treasury
for the deficiency caused by such misappropriation. The
misuse of these funds for illegal or unconstitutional purposes
is a damage which entitles them to sue." Barco
Manufacturing Co. v. Wright, 10 Ill. 2d 157, 160 (1956)
(citing Krebs v. Thompson, 387 Ill. 471 (1944), and Fergus
v. Russel, 270 Ill. 304 (1915)).
	A "taxpayer derivative action," on the other hand, is an action
brought by a taxpayer on behalf of a local governmental unit to
enforce a cause of action belonging to the local governmental unit.
See Feen v. Ray, 109 Ill. 2d 339, 345 (1985) (finding that a taxpayer
who seeks to recover solely on behalf of school district brings the
action derivatively). "The claimed injury [in a taxpayer derivative
action] is not personal to the taxpayers, but rather impacts the
governmental entity on whose behalf the action is brought."Lyons,
201 Ill. 2d  at 535. See also Feen, 109 Ill. 2d  at 345 ("Where a
taxpayer sets judicial machinery in motion in a derivative action, the
direct injury to be remedied is not personal to the taxpayer. Rather,
the right of action is that of the governmental entity. [Citation.]").
	In contrast, a "qui tam action" is an action brought under a
statute authorizing an informant to bring a civil action to recover a
penalty for the commission or omission of a certain act and providing
that a part of the penalty be paid to the informer. R. Fischer, Qui Tam
Actions: The Role of The Private Citizen in Law Enforcement, 20
U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 778, 780 (1973). It "is called a 'qui tam action';
because the plaintiff states that he sues as well for the state as for
himself." (Emphasis in original.) 20 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 778, citing
Black's Law Dictionary 1414 (4th ed. 1951). The term qui tam is an
abbreviation for the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro
se ipso in hac parte sequitur, meaning " 'who pursues this action on
our Lord the King's behalf as well as his own.' The phrase dates from
at least the time of Blackstone." Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 n.1, 146 L. Ed. 2d 836, 843 n.1, 120 S. Ct. 1858, 1860 n.1 (2000), citing 3 W.
Blackstone, Commentaries *160.
	Despite plaintiffs' assertion that there is a long history and
tradition of qui tam actions in England and the United States, qui tam
actions have only existed by express statutory authorization in the
United States. See Vermont Agency, 529 U.S.  at 776, 146 L. Ed. 2d 
at 847, 120 S. Ct.  at 1864 ("there is no evidence that the Colonies
allowed common-law qui tam actions[;] *** they did pass several
former statutes expressly authorizing qui tam suits"). Accordingly, in
the United States "the rights of qui tam plaintiffs are always based on
a statute" and, "[b]y definition, qui tam rights have never existed
without statutory authorization." (Emphases added.) 20 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. at 780.
	"Whistleblower statutes" are, however, generally designed to
protect an employee from retaliation for disclosure of an employer's
misconduct. See, e.g., 5 ILCS 395/1 (West 2002) (Whistle Blower
Protection Act) (prohibiting retaliatory action against employees of
constitutional officers who disclose prohibited activity). Thus, a
"whistleblower" is an employee who reports his or her employer's
misconduct. See Black's Law Dictionary 1627 (8th ed. 1999).
	Before we can begin our analysis of plaintiffs' standing in this
litigation, we must determine the nature of plaintiffs' causes of action;
that is, whether plaintiffs' claims are "taxpayer actions," "taxpayer
derivative actions," "qui tam actions," or "whistleblower actions."
Plaintiffs' briefs claim they bring these actions as a "taxpayer action"
and a "common law taxpayer qui tam action." The term "common law
taxpayer qui tam action" is, itself, inconsistent, since qui tam actions
have never existed without statutory authorization and are not
dependent on taxpayer status. Plaintiffs' complaints identify the
actions as taxpayer derivative actions. The fact plaintiffs designate the
actions as taxpayer, taxpayer derivative, or qui tam actions does not
make them so. See, e.g., Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d  at 534-35 (the nature of
plaintiffs' cause of action depends not on plaintiffs' designation but on
a determination of the real party in interest to the litigation); see also
74 Am. Jur. 2d Taxpayers' Actions §1 (2001) ("The mere fact that the
plaintiffs designate themselves as taxpayers does not necessarily make
an action a taxpayers' action").
	In Lyons, the plaintiffs alternated in their briefs between alleging
the action was brought "on behalf of the State of Illinois," or as
"taxpayers for themselves and all other taxpayers similarly situated."
Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d  at 534. We examined the allegations of the
plaintiffs' complaint to determine the "real party in interest" to the
litigation and concluded plaintiffs were bringing the case as a taxpayer
derivative action, "seeking to enforce, on behalf of the state, a cause
of action that belongs to the state." Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d  at 535, citing
Feen, 109 Ill. 2d  at 345. Accordingly, the true nature of plaintiffs'
causes of action and, ultimately, plaintiffs' standing in this litigation
rests on the material allegations of the complaints and a determination
of the "real party in interest" under each claim. See Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d
at 534-35; see also 74 Am. Jur. 2d Taxpayers' Actions §1 (2001) ("in
determining whether an action is a taxpayers' action, the principal and
material allegations of the complaint are to be considered").
	With these concepts in mind, we now examine whether plaintiffs
have standing to maintain suit under any of the claims of their
complaints.

A. Common Law Claims
	We first consider whether the circuit court properly dismissed
plaintiffs' common law claims alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary duty,
breach of contract, accountant malpractice, and fraudulent and
negligent misrepresentation. Plaintiffs acknowledge our recent
decision in Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d 529, is controlling, but urge this court
to reconsider Lyons.
	In Lyons the plaintiffs filed a "taxpayers action brought on behalf
of the State of Illinois" against former Governor George Ryan and
others, alleging illegal solicitation and receipt of political contributions
through the office of the Illinois Secretary of State. The complaint
sought the imposition of constructive trusts on funds and benefits
alleged to be illegally received by defendants, and recovery of
fraudulently obtained public funds pursuant to article XX (735 ILCS
5/20-101 (West 1998)).
	In their briefs, the Lyons plaintiffs, as we previously mentioned,
alternated between alleging the action was brought "on behalf of the
State of Illinois," or as "taxpayers for themselves and all other
taxpayers similarly situated." We recognized that in examining the
issue of standing, a court must first determine the "real party in
interest" in the litigation. Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d  at 534. We determined the
state was the "real party in interest" because: (1) only the state would
be entitled to the benefits of a successful action; (2) plaintiffs were
seeking to enforce a cause of action belonging to the state; and (3) the
claimed injury impacted the government entity and was not personal
to the taxpayers. Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d  at 535. Since the state was the
"real party in interest" to the litigation, we concluded the Lyons
plaintiffs were bringing the case as a "taxpayer derivative action" and
standing to bring a taxpayer derivative action turns largely on the
identity of the governmental entity that is the real party in interest.
Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d  at 535. Since only the Attorney General has the
constitutional power to represent the state when the state is the real
party in interest, we were compelled to hold that the plaintiffs lacked
constitutional standing to bring a taxpayer common law action for an
accounting, restitution, and imposition of constructive trusts on behalf
of the state. Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d  at 534-40.
	This court engaged in an extensive examination of the history of
taxpayer standing and the line of cases detailing the authority of the
Attorney General in Illinois. Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d  at 534-40. Those cases
included Fergus, 270 Ill. 304, where this court recognized "that under
the 1870 Illinois Constitution, the Attorney General was the only
officer empowered to represent the state in any suit or proceeding
when the state was the real party in interest." (Emphasis added.)
Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d  at 535, citing Fergus, 270 Ill.  at 342. In Fergus, this
court could not have made its pronouncement more clear:
		"As the office of Attorney General is the only office at
common law which is thus created by our constitution the
Attorney General is the chief law officer of the State, and the
only officer empowered to represent the people in any suit or
proceeding in which the State is the real party in interest,
except where the constitution or a constitutional statute may
provide otherwise. With this exception, only, he is the sole
official adviser of the executive officers and of all boards,
commissions and departments of the State government, and
it is his duty to conduct the law business of the State, both in
and out of the courts." (Emphases added.) Fergus, 270 Ill.  at
342.
We noted in Lyons that Fergus has never been overruled and cited
People ex rel. Scott v. Briceland, 65 Ill. 2d 485, 495 (1976), holding
that Fergus remained valid law upon the adoption of the 1970 Illinois
Constitution. Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d  at 536.
	In Lyons, we also examined Briceland, 65 Ill. 2d 485. In
Briceland, this court held that " 'the Attorney General is the sole
officer authorized to represent the People of this State in any litigation
in which the People of the State are the real party in interest ***.' "
(Emphasis added.) Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d  at 536, quoting Briceland, 65 Ill. 2d  at 500. We also observed in Lyons that on the same day Briceland
was decided, "this court also held in Fuchs [v. Bidwill, 65 Ill. 2d 503
(1976)], that the Attorney General 'is the only officer empowered to
represent the State in litigation in which it is the real party in interest.'
Fuchs, 65 Ill. 2d  at 510." (Emphasis added.) Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d  at 537.
	In Lyons, we declined the plaintiffs' invitation to overrule Fuchs
and reaffirmed this court's holding that "the Attorney General
possesses the exclusive constitutional power and prerogative to
conduct the state's legal affairs." (Emphasis in original.) Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d  at 540. Consequently, we held the plaintiffs lacked standing to
bring a common law action for an accounting, restitution, and the
imposition of constructive trusts. Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d  at 540.
	The Lyons holding applies with equal force to plaintiffs' common
law claims in these appeals. Despite this court's reliance on a long line
of precedent, plaintiffs contend Lyons was wrongly decided and ask
this court to reconsider and overrule Lyons. Plaintiffs simply want this
court to rewrite history and overrule nearly a century of precedent.
This we will not do. The doctrine of stare decisis requires strict
adherence to prior decisions and we will not depart from well-settled
principles of law absent good cause or compelling reasons. People v.
Robinson, 187 Ill. 2d 461, 463-64 (1999); Moehle v. Chrysler Motors
Corp., 93 Ill. 2d 299, 304 (1982).
	This court consistently has held, under both the 1870 and the
1970 constitutions, the Attorney General is the "chief legal officer of
the State," and the state government's " 'only legal representative in
the courts.' " (Emphasis added.) Environmental Protection Agency v.
Pollution Control Board, 69 Ill. 2d 394, 398-99 (1977), quoting
Fergus, 270 Ill.  at 337. In fact, this court has recognized "[t]he
Attorney General has the common law duty to protect the public
purse as a matter of general welfare." Hartigan, 153 Ill. 2d  at 483. In
Hartigan, we reasoned that the Attorney General, as the
representative of the state, had complete authority to recover damages
sustained by any agency or political subdivision of the state. Hartigan,
153 Ill. 2d  at 484.
	Plaintiffs argue citizen or taxpayer standing "is a well-accepted
tool for protection of the public fisc." While this may be true,
plaintiffs' common law claims are not "taxpayer actions" or "qui tam
actions." Rather, plaintiffs' common law claims are, by definition,
"taxpayer derivative" claims. Similar to the common law claims made
by the plaintiffs in Lyons, "only the state would be entitled to the
benefits of a successful action, not individual taxpayers." Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d  at 535. Moreover, the alleged injury to be remedied is not
personal and direct to the taxpayer. Rather, it is the state that has been
injured, and it is the state that has the right to proceed, but has
declined to intervene in the action. Accordingly, it is the state that is
the real party in interest and plaintiffs' common law claims are actually
"taxpayer derivative actions," brought by taxpayers, on behalf of the
state, to enforce a cause of action belonging to the state. See Lyons,
201 Ill. 2d  at 535, citing Feen, 109 Ill. 2d  at 345; see also 74 Am. Jur.
2d Taxpayers' Actions §4 (2001). The state is, therefore, the only real
party in interest and the Attorney General has the exclusive
constitutional authority to represent the state. Consequently, plaintiffs
lack standing to bring a taxpayer derivative action for common law
claims of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract,
accountant malpractice, and fraudulent and negligent
misrepresentation.
	Contrary to plaintiffs' arguments, our holding in Lyons does not
interfere with a citizen's right to bring taxpayer actions. It bears
repeating that a "taxpayer action" is, by definition, an action brought
by private persons in their capacity as taxpayers, "on behalf of
themselves and as representatives of a class of taxpayers similarly
situated within a taxing district or area, upon a ground which is
common to all members of the class, and for the purpose of seeking
relief from illegal or unauthorized acts of public bodies or public
officials, which acts are injurious to their common interests as such
taxpayers." 74 Am. Jur. 2d Taxpayers' Actions §1 (2001) (citing
Conrad, 68 N.D. 167, 277 N.W. 504, and Canton Farm Equipment,
501 So. 2d 1098). Here, plaintiffs' actions are brought derivatively on
behalf of the state against third parties.
	While it is true Lyons held private persons lack constitutional
standing to bring taxpayer derivative suits when the state is the real
party in interest and in that sense restricts taxpayer derivative actions,
Lyons does not interfere with, or affect, true "taxpayer" actions, when
the taxpayer is a real party in interest. In other words, the taxpayer is
a real party in interest when "entitled to the benefits if the action is
successful" and, therefore, has an "actual and substantial interest" as
distinguished from one who has only a "nominal" interest in the
litigation. Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d  at 534 (citing Vukusich v. Comprehensive
Accounting Corp., 150 Ill. App. 3d 634, 640 (1986), and Black's Law
Dictionary 1264 (6th ed. 1990)).
	 Plaintiffs present no basis for this court to depart from nearly a
century of our well-established precedent. Accordingly, the doctrine
of stare decisis requires this court's adherence to Lyons and its
predecessors, and we decline plaintiffs' request to overrule those
cases. The circuit court therefore properly dismissed plaintiffs'
common law claims.

B. Article XX
Plaintiffs acknowledge Lyons is directly applicable to their article
XX claims. In Lyons, this court held section 20-104(b) of article XX
unconstitutional to the extent it purports to confer standing on private
citizens to sue in cases when the state is the real party in interest
because only the Attorney General has constitutional standing in those
circumstances. Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d  at 541.
	Plaintiffs again claim Lyons was incorrectly decided. Plaintiffs
contend under article XX the Attorney General retains sufficient
control of the litigation because the Attorney General receives notice
of the intention to file suit. Before the private person may proceed
with the suit, the Attorney General has 60 days either to institute
action or to notify the private citizen an action will be commenced or
arrangements have been made for settlement.
	Article XX imposes civil liability upon "[a]ny person" who
fraudulently and knowingly obtains public funds from the state or a
local governmental unit. 735 ILCS 5/20-102, 20-103 (West 2002).
The defendant is liable for refunding or repaying the amount received
and may be liable for up to treble damages and a civil penalty not to
exceed $2,000 per instance. 735 ILCS 5/20-102, 20-103 (West
2002). Section 104 of article XX provides, in relevant part:
			"(a) *** Civil recoveries provided for in this Article shall
be recoverable only: (1) in actions on behalf of the State, by
the Attorney General; ***
			(b) Notwithstanding any other provision in this Section,
any private citizen residing within the boundaries of the
governmental unit affected may bring an action to recover
the damages authorized in this Article on behalf of such
governmental unit if: (a) the citizen has sent a letter by
certified mail, return receipt requested, to the appropriate
government official stating his intention to file suit for
recovery under this Article and (b) the appropriate
governmental official has not, within 60 days of the date of
delivery on the citizen's return receipt, either instituted an
action for recovery or sent notice to the citizen by certified
mail, return receipt requested, that the official has arranged
for a settlement with the party alleged to have illegally
obtained the compensation or that the official intends to
commence suit within 60 days of the date of the notice. A
denial by the official of the liability of the party alleged liable
by the citizen, failure to have actually arranged for a
settlement as stated, or failure to commence a suit within the
designated period after having stated the intention in the
notice to do so shall also permit the citizen to commence the
action.
			For purposes of this subsection (b), appropriate
government official shall mean: (1) the Attorney General,
where the government unit alleged damaged is the State ***.
			Any private citizen commencing an action in compliance
with this subsection which is reasonable and commenced in
good faith shall be entitled to recover court costs and
litigation expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, from
any defendant found liable under this Article." (Emphases
added.) 735 ILCS 5/20-104 (West 2002).
	Standing under section 20-104(b) of article XX is not dependent
on "taxpayer" status because section 20-104(b) only requires that the
person bringing the action be a "private citizen residing within the
boundaries of the governmental unit affected." 735 ILCS 5/20-104(b)
(West 2002). Claims brought under section 20-104(b) of article XX
are not "qui tam" actions because the purported statutory grant of
standing does not make the private citizen a real party in interest, nor
does it provide that the private citizen share in the recovery. Plaintiffs'
article XX claims are, therefore, "derivative" actions brought "on
behalf of the State" (emphasis added) (735 ILCS 5/20-104(a)(1)
(West 2002)), and the state is the only real party in interest.
	We reject plaintiffs' argument that the Attorney General retains
sufficient control over the litigation of an article XX claim brought by
a private citizen. Section 20-104(b) impermissibly permits a private
citizen to represent the state without providing the Attorney General
any control over the litigation. This is not to say that the legislature
could not cure section 20-104(b) by providing the Attorney General
with the ability to maintain effective control over article XX litigation.
However, as we held in Lyons, section 20-104(b) of article XX, as
written, unconstitutionally usurps the power of the Attorney General.
Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d  at 541. We reaffirm our holding in Lyons and
reiterate that when the state is the only real party in interest, the
Attorney General has the exclusive authority to represent the state.
Under Lyons, article XX's grant of standing to private citizens is
unconstitutional and plaintiffs, therefore, lack standing to bring article
XX claims on behalf of the state. Accordingly, the circuit court
properly dismissed plaintiffs' article XX claims. See Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d 
at 541-42.

C. WHISTLEBLOWER REWARD AND PROTECTION ACT
	The circuit court dismissed plaintiffs' claims brought under the
Whistleblower Reward and Protection Act (740 ILCS 175/1 et seq.
(West 2002)), holding the Act unconstitutionally usurped the Attorney
General's duties as the sole legal representative of the state under the
rationale in Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d 529. The constitutionality of a statute
is a question of law that we review de novo. People ex rel. Sherman
v. Cryns, 203 Ill. 2d 264, 290 (2003). Statutes are presumed
constitutional and courts are required to construe statutes to "uphold
their constitutionality whenever reasonably possible." Hill v. Cowan,
202 Ill. 2d 151, 157 (2002).
	We begin our analysis with a review of the Act. The Act imposes
civil liability upon "[a]ny person" who, inter alia, "knowingly
presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the
State *** a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval." 740
ILCS 175/3(a)(1) (West 2002). A person who violates the Act is
liable to the state for a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and not
more than $10,000, plus treble damages. 740 ILCS 175/3(a) (West
2002).
	An action under the Act may be commenced by the Attorney
General. 740 ILCS 175/4(a) (West 2002). A private person may also
bring a qui tam civil action "for the person and for the State"
(emphasis added), "in the name of the State." 740 ILCS 175/4(b)
(West 2002).
	A qui tam plaintiff bringing an action under the Act must serve
the state with "[a] copy of the complaint and written disclosure of
substantially all material evidence and information." 740 ILCS
175/4(b)(2) (West 2002). The complaint is filed in camera and
remains under seal for at least 60 days. 740 ILCS 175/4(b)(2) (West
2002). The Attorney General then has 60 days (plus any extensions
granted by the court) to investigate the claim and decide whether to
intervene. 740 ILCS 175/4(b)(2) (West 2002).
	When the Attorney General intervenes, the Attorney General
assumes "primary responsibility for prosecuting the action," and the
qui tam plaintiff has a right to continue as a party in the case, subject
to certain limitations. 740 ILCS 175/4(c) (West 2002). The Attorney
General may dismiss or settle the action at any time "notwithstanding
the objections of the person initiating the action." 740 ILCS
175/4(c)(2)(A), (c)(2)(B) (West 2002). The Attorney General may
also restrict the qui tam plaintiff's participation in the action. 740
ILCS 175/4(c)(2)(C) (West 2002).
	If the Attorney General declines to proceed with the action, the
qui tam plaintiff has the right to proceed, and the Attorney General
may later intervene. 740 ILCS 175/4(c)(3) (West 2002). The Attorney
General has the right to monitor the action and receive copies of all
pleadings and deposition transcripts. 740 ILCS 175/4(c)(3) (West
2002). In the event "certain actions of discovery by the person
initiating the action would interfere with the State's investigation or
prosecution of a criminal or civil matter," the Attorney General may
seek a stay of discovery or simply exercise the Attorney General's
ultimate authority and dismiss the qui tam action. 740 ILCS
174/4(c)(2)(A), (c)(4) (West 2002).
	 The qui tam plaintiff is entitled to receive 15% to 25% of the
proceeds of the action if the Attorney General intervenes. 740 ILCS
175/4(d)(1) (West 2002). If the Attorney General elects not to
intervene, the qui tam plaintiff is entitled to receive 25% to 30% of
the proceeds, plus reasonable attorney fees and costs. 740 ILCS
175/4(d)(2) (West 2002).
	In addition to its qui tam provisions, the Act also protects an
employee from retaliation for disclosure of an employer's misconduct.
740 ILCS 175/4(g) (West 2002). The Act thus contains both
"whistleblower" and "qui tam" provisions. Plaintiffs assert standing
under the qui tam provisions of the statute.
	We must first determine the real party in interest under the qui
tam provisions of the Act. See Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d  at 534. The real
party in interest is the person or entity entitled to recovery if the
lawsuit is successful who "has an actual and substantial interest in the
subject matter of the action, as distinguished from one who has only
a nominal, formal, or technical interest in, or connection with, the
case." Lyons, 201 Ill. 2d  at 534.
	The Act closely mirrors the Federal False Claims Act originally
enacted in 1863. See 31 U.S.C. §§3729 through 3733 (2000). The
United States Supreme Court has recently addressed the issue of
standing of a qui tam plaintiff under the Federal False Claims Act, and
we find its analysis instructive. Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. 765, 146 L. Ed. 2d 836, 120 S. Ct. 1858.
	The Federal False Claims Act provides: "A person may bring a
civil action for a violation of section 3729 for the person and for the
United States Government." (Emphasis added.) 31 U.S.C. §3730
(2000). In examining standing under the Federal False Claims Act, the
Supreme Court noted that the complaint clearly asserted an injury to
the United States-an injury to its sovereignty based on the violation
of its laws, and a proprietary injury from the alleged fraud. Vermont
Agency, 529 U.S.  at 771, 146 L. Ed. 2d  at 844, 120 S. Ct.  at 1862. It
was not clear, however, if the complaint asserted an injury to the
complaining party (the relator), a prerequisite for standing under
article III of the United States Constitution. Vermont Agency, 529 U.S.  at 771, 146 L. Ed. 2d  at 844, 120 S. Ct.  at 1862. The Supreme
Court stated that"[i]t would perhaps suffice to say that the relator [in
an action brought under the Federal False Claims Act] is simply the
statutorily designated agent of the United States, in whose name ***
the suit is brought-and that the relator's bounty is simply the fee he
receives out of the United States' recovery for filing and/or
prosecuting a successful action on behalf of the Government."
(Emphases in original.) Vermont Agency, 529 U.S.  at 772, 146 L. Ed. 2d  at 845, 120 S. Ct.  at 1862. This analysis, however, could not
adequately explain the relator's standing under the Federal False
Claims Act because the statute "gives the relator himself an interest in
the lawsuit, and not merely the right to retain a fee out of the
recovery." (Emphasis in original.) Vermont Agency, 529 U.S.  at 772,
146 L. Ed. 2d  at 845, 120 S. Ct.  at 1862. The Supreme Court
therefore reasoned that some explanation of standing other than
agency for the United States government had to be identified to
explain the portion of recovery retained by the relator. Vermont
Agency, 529 U.S.  at 772, 146 L. Ed. 2d  at 845, 120 S. Ct.  at 1862.
	The Supreme Court went on to recognize that the bounty the
relator would receive if the suit succeeded undoubtedly constituted a
" 'concrete private interest in the outcome of [the] suit.' " Vermont
Agency, 529 U.S.  at 772, 146 L. Ed. 2d  at 845, 120 S. Ct.  at 1862,
quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351, 372, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2143 (1992). This interest,
however, was insufficient to give rise to a cognizable injury in fact on
the part of the relator because it was merely a "byproduct" of the
lawsuit itself. Vermont Agency, 529 U.S.  at 773, 146 L. Ed. 2d  at 845,
120 S. Ct.  at 1863, citing Steel Co., 523 U.S.  at 107, 140 L. Ed. 2d 
at 235, 118 S. Ct.  at 1019.
	Although there was no cognizable injury in fact suffered by the
relator to justify the Federal False Claims Act's conferral of an interest
in the lawsuit upon the relator, the Supreme Court concluded "the
doctrine that the assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury
in fact suffered by the assignor" provided an adequate basis for the
relator's suit. Vermont Agency, 529 U.S.  at 773, 146 L. Ed. 2d  at 846,
120 S. Ct.  at 1863. The Supreme Court reasoned that the Federal
False Claims Act could "reasonably be regarded as effecting a partial
assignment of the Government's damages claim." Vermont Agency,
529 U.S.  at 773, 146 L. Ed. 2d  at 846, 120 S. Ct.  at 1863. Therefore,
the relator's complaint alleging an injury in fact to the United States
sufficed to confer standing on the relator. Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. 
at 774, 146 L. Ed. 2d  at 846, 120 S. Ct.  at 1863.
	We adopt the reasoning of Vermont Agency and hold a qui tam
plaintiff is a partial assignee of the state's claim under the qui tam
provisions of the Act permitting a private person to "bring a civil
action for a violation of [the Act] for the person and for the State."
(Emphasis added.) 740 ILCS 175/4(b)(1) (West 2002). The qui tam
statute therefore gives a qui tam plaintiff a personal stake in the
outcome. In other words, the interest of a qui tam plaintiff in a claim
under the Act is justified as a partial assignment of the state's right to
bring suit. Accordingly, under the Act, a qui tam plaintiff is a "real
party in interest," together with the state.
	We must address, however, whether the qui tam provisions of the
Act usurp the constitutional powers of the Attorney General to
represent the state. The parties urge differing interpretations of the
Act's qui tam provisions. Plaintiffs argue the Act is constitutional
because it places sufficient control in the hands of the Attorney
General.
	In contrast, UBS argues the Act is unconstitutional because it
affords the Attorney General far less control over an action than does
article XX. UBS contends the Act does not allow the Attorney
General to preclude the qui tam plaintiff's participation in the case,
does not allow the Attorney General to settle claims absent court
approval, and limits the overall ability of the Attorney General to
intervene in the action.
	Additionally, Morgan Stanley argues that the Act poses no
constitutional problem for qui tam actions brought on behalf of
nonstate government entities. Qui tam suits on behalf of the state or
its agencies, however, stand in irreconcilable conflict with the
constitutional role of the Illinois Attorney General because it takes
away any prosecutorial discretion and the limited role of the Attorney
General does not comport with the Attorney General's constitutional
duty to represent the state.
	The Attorney General, on the other hand, argues that the Act is
unconstitutional only to the extent it purports to confer standing on
private persons to sue when the state has a real interest and the
Attorney General has declined to intervene in the case. According to
the Attorney General, when the Attorney General intervenes in an
action under the Act, the Attorney General's constitutional authority
to direct and control the litigation is safeguarded.
	Plaintiffs counter that the Act provides the Attorney General with
sufficient control over the litigation because it allows for intervention
of the Attorney General at any time. Further, according to plaintiffs,
the plain language of the Act provides the Attorney General may
dismiss the case "notwithstanding the objections of the person
initiating the action." Thus, plaintiffs argue, this court should uphold
the constitutionality of the Act.
	In considering the parties' arguments for various interpretations
of the Act's qui tam provisions, we reiterate that statutes are
presumed constitutional. In re Curtis B., 203 Ill. 2d 53, 58 (2002).
Since statutes enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality, we
must construe statutes to "uphold their constitutionality whenever
reasonably possible." Hill, 202 Ill. 2d  at 157.
	We hold the qui tam provisions of the Act do not usurp the
constitutional powers of the Attorney General to represent the state.
The Act does not suffer the same infirmities as section 20-104(b) of
article XX. Article XX, as it is currently written, purports to confer
standing upon private citizens to sue on behalf of the state when the
Attorney General declines to proceed with an action, with absolutely
no subsequent involvement by the Attorney General. In other words,
section 20-104(b) of article XX gives private citizens the unfettered
right to prosecute claims in the state's name, without the Attorney
General's oversight or participation in the action. As we have noted,
section 20-104(b) of article XX is not a qui tam provision. Rather,
section 20-104(b) of article XX is a citizen "derivative action"
provision.
	In contrast, the qui tam provisions of the Act impose significant
restrictions on qui tam plaintiffs. Although the qui tam plaintiffs may
"conduct" the litigation on the state's behalf, the Attorney General
retains authority to "control" the litigation.
	As pointed out by amici, AARP and Taxpayers Against Fraud,
the Act's qui tam provisions ensure the Attorney General retains
authority to control the litigation at every stage of the proceedings.
For example, a qui tam plaintiff commences suit by filing a complaint
in camera and serving it on the Attorney General with all material
evidence in the qui tam plaintiff's possession. 740 ILCS 175/4(b)(2)
(West 2002). The complaint remains under seal for at least 60 days
while the Attorney General investigates the allegations and the qui
tam plaintiff may not proceed with the suit until the Attorney General
completes an investigation and decides whether to intervene. 740
ILCS 175/4(b)(2), (b)(3) (West 2002). The Attorney General is
entitled to extensions of time as necessary to complete an
investigation. 740 ILCS 175/4(b)(3) (West 2002). If the Attorney
General elects to intervene, the Attorney General has primary
responsibility for prosecuting the action and is not bound by any act
of the qui tam plaintiff. 740 ILCS 175/4(c)(1) (West 2002). Even
though the qui tam plaintiff remains a party to the action, the Attorney
General may restrict the qui tam plaintiff's participation in the
litigation if it would interfere with or unduly delay the state's
prosecution or if it would be "repetitious, irrelevant, or for purposes
of harassment." 740 ILCS 174/4(c)(2)(C) (West 2002).
	Even when the Attorney General declines to intervene, the
Attorney General retains control over the litigation by monitoring the
proceedings through receiving copies of all pleadings and deposition
transcripts. 740 ILCS 715/4(c)(3) (West 2002). The Attorney General
may even stay certain discovery if it would interfere with an
investigation or prosecution of a criminal or civil suit arising out of the
same facts. 740 ILCS 175/4(c)(4) (West 2002). No one but the
Attorney General may intervene in the action, and the Attorney
General retains the right to intervene in the lawsuit at any time. 740
ILCS 175/4(b)(5), (c)(3) (West 2002). If the Attorney General has
already initiated an action under the Act or filed any other civil action
based on the allegations of the potential qui tam suit, the qui tam
plaintiff is foreclosed from bringing the action. 740 ILCS 175/4(e)(3)
(West 2002). Further, the Attorney General may elect to pursue the
allegations of the qui tam complaint through any "alternate remedy"
available to the state, including an administrative proceeding to recoup
overpayments. 740 ILCS 175/4(c)(5) (West 2002).
	Most critically, the Attorney General has authority to dismiss or
settle the action at any time, despite the objections of the qui tam
plaintiff. 740 ILCS 175/4(c)(2)(A), (c)(2)(B) (West 2002). Moreover,
even if the qui tam plaintiff is permitted to proceed with the action,
the Attorney General must give written consent to any attempt by the
qui tam plaintiff to dismiss the action. 740 ILCS 175/4(b) (West
2002).
	Although the qui tam provisions of the Act might have been more
artfully drafted to avoid confusion, we determine that under the plain
language of the qui tam provisions of the Act, once the Attorney
General receives notification of the action being filed by the qui tam
plaintiff, the Attorney General may: (1) intervene and assume primary
responsibility for prosecuting the action (740 ILCS 175/4(b)(4)(A)
(West 2002)); (2) decline to intervene and permit the qui tam plaintiff
to conduct the litigation (740 ILCS 175/4(b)(4)(B) (West 2002)); or
(3) simply dismiss the action (740 ILCS 175/4(c)(2)(A) (West
2002)).(1) When the Attorney General intervenes in the action, the
Attorney General conducts the litigation. See 740 ILCS
175/4(b)(4)(A) (West 2002). Even when the Attorney General
declines to intervene, the Attorney General retains complete control
of the litigation. See 740 ILCS 175/4(c)(2)(A), (c)(2)(B) (West
2002). For these reasons, we interpret the plain language of the Act
to provide that the Attorney General in all circumstances effectively
maintains control over the litigation, consonant with the Attorney
General's constitutional role as the chief legal officer of the state.
Unlike section 20-104(b) of article XX, the qui tam provisions of the
Act do not usurp the constitutional power of the Attorney General.
	Rather than usurping the constitutional power of the Attorney
General, the qui tam provisions of the Act support the Attorney
General's law enforcement duties. As the Attorney General's brief
points out, private citizens and their attorneys play a vital role in
bringing cases involving fraud and abuse of government-funded
programs to the attention of the state. Since the Act was enacted in
1991, the Attorney General has brought or intervened in
approximately 130 cases, almost all being brought to the attention of
the Attorney General by private citizens filing qui tam actions.
Underscoring the important role of qui tam actions in effective law
enforcement, the Attorney General insists: "In many instances, but for
the efforts of these private citizens and their attorneys, the Attorney
General would not have known of these schemes to defraud the
State."
	Lyons and its predecessors simply established that the Attorney
General possesses the exclusive authority to represent the state in
litigation. Neither the facts nor the holdings in those cases considered
whether the Attorney General's constitutional authority is usurped
when the Attorney General intervenes in a qui tam action and assumes
exclusive control of the litigation, or when the Attorney General
declines to intervene in, or consents to, a qui tam action but retains
the exclusive power to dismiss or settle the action. As this court
recognized in Fergus:
		"As the office of Attorney General is the only office at
common law which is thus created by our constitution the
Attorney General is the chief law officer of the State, and the
only officer empowered to represent the people in any suit or
proceeding in which the State is the real party in interest,
except where the constitution or a constitutional statute may
provide otherwise. With this exception, only, he is the sole
official adviser of the executive officers and of all boards,
commissions and departments of the State government, and
it is his duty to conduct the law business of the State, both in
and out of the courts." (Emphases added.) Fergus, 270 Ill.  at
342.
	This court has recognized the Attorney General's constitutional
delegation of authority is not infringed when the state's interest is
represented by other counsel who remain under the control of the
Attorney General and serves only at the Attorney General's pleasure.
See People v. Illinois Toll Highway Comm'n, 3 Ill. 2d 218, 236-38
(1954); Saxby v. Sonnemann, 318 Ill. 600 (1925). Toll Highway
Comm'n involved, inter alia, a challenge to a statute authorizing the
Illinois State Toll Highway Commission to appoint assistant Attorneys
General and retain special counsel. The statute at issue in Toll
Highway Comm'n expressly required the consent and approval of the
Attorney General for the appointment of assistant Attorneys General
and special counsel. Toll Highway Comm'n, 3 Ill. 2d  at 236. This
court noted that the statute also expressly provided assistant
Attorneys General and special counsel "shall be under and subject to
the control, direction and supervision of the Attorney General and
shall serve only at his pleasure." Toll Highway Comm'n, 3 Ill. 2d  at
236. Accordingly, this court found that even though the assistant
Attorneys General and special counsel were representing the state,
"their right to do so exists only because they are subordinates of the
Attorney General." Toll Highway Comm'n, 3 Ill. 2d  at 238.
	In Toll Highway Comm'n, this court distinguished Fergus since
the appropriations in Fergus attempted to confer the Superintendent
of Insurance with authority "entirely independent of control in the
Attorney General." Toll Highway Comm'n, 3 Ill. 2d  at 236-37. This
court further noted that Fergus acknowledged " 'there were other
representatives of the crown in the courts at common law, but they
were all subordinate to the Attorney General.' " Toll Highway
Comm'n, 3 Ill. 2d  at 237. This court also looked to Saxby, pointing
out "the multiplicity of duties of the Attorney General forbids personal
attention to all of them and that the Attorney General may act through
deputies or assistants in carrying out his duties." Toll Highway
Comm'n, 3 Ill. 2d  at 237. Accordingly, this court found no valid
constitutional objection to the appropriation. Toll Highway Comm'n,
3 Ill. 2d  at 238.
	Similar to the statute at issue in Toll Highway Comm'n, the qui
tam provisions of the Act fully recognize the Attorney General's
constitutional role as the chief legal advisor of the state. Moreover,
qui tam plaintiffs, acting as statutorily designated agents for the state,
may proceed only with the consent of the Attorney General, and
remain completely subordinate to the Attorney General at all times.
We conclude, as in Toll Highway Comm'n, that the qui tam
provisions of the Act "are a valid method of enabling the Attorney
General to perform [the requisite] legal functions as attorney [for the
state]." Toll Highway Comm'n, 3 Ill. 2d  at 238.
	In accordance with this court's duty to uphold the
constitutionality and validity of a statute when reasonably possible, we
have interpreted the Act according to its plain language. We therefore
hold the qui tam provisions of the Act is a "constitutional statute," as
it does not usurp the Attorney General's constitutional power to
conduct the legal affairs of the state when the state is a real party in
interest. See Fergus, 270 Ill.  at 342 (holding that, "except where the
constitution or a constitutional statute may provide otherwise", the
Attorney General is the sole official legal adviser of the state
(emphasis added)). Accordingly, the circuit court erred in dismissing
plaintiffs' qui tam actions for lack of standing and in declaring the
entire Act unconstitutional.
	We note by virtue of the Attorney General's intervention in
appeal No. 97023, she now has the primary responsibility for
prosecuting the action on remand. See 740 ILCS 174/4(b)(4)(A),
(c)(3) (West 2002). Since the Attorney General has not intervened in
appeal No. 97866, plaintiffs may proceed to conduct the litigation in
that case, subject to the Attorney General's oversight and her
authority to settle or dismiss the action at any time. Of course, if the
Attorney General has determined through her investigations that
neither case should proceed, she may dismiss both actions, and
plaintiffs shall have no right to proceed.
III. CONCLUSION
	We reiterate the Attorney General has exclusive power to
represent the State of Illinois in litigation when the state is the real
party in interest. We hold that the circuit court properly dismissed
plaintiffs' common law and article XX claims in accordance with
Lyons. We further hold that the qui tam provisions of the
Whistleblower Reward and Protection Act (740 ILCS 175/1 et seq.
(West 2002)) do not usurp the Attorney General's constitutional
powers and, accordingly, the circuit court erred in dismissing
plaintiffs' qui tam actions under the Act and in holding the Act
unconstitutional. We therefore remand the causes to the circuit court
of Cook County for further proceedings.

Circuit court judgments affirmed in part
and reversed in part;
causes remanded.
1. The Attorney General's brief argues the circuit court 
properly dismissed the actions on defendants' motions when the Attorney General 
declined to intervene. However, we note that the Attorney General did not 
dismiss either of these actions, despite the statutory authority to do so. See 
740 ILCS 175/4(c)(2)(A) (West 2002).
View Order