Case Title: Blatt v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision

Citation: 2009-Ohio-5260

Docket Number: 20082332

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-10-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Blatt v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-5260.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2009-OHIO-5260 
BLATT, APPELLEE, v. HAMILTON COUNTY BOARD OF REVISION ET AL., 
APPELLEES; RHODES, AUD., APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Blatt v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision,  
Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-5260.] 
Taxation — Residential real property — Valuation — Board of Tax Appeals’ 
determination of value is entitled to deference from court — When no 
abuse of discretion is shown on issues of fact, court will not reverse — 
Decision affirmed. 
(No. 2008-2332 — September 2, 2009 — Decided October 8, 2009.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2006-N-1808. 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} This case involves a property tax appeal from the Board of Tax 
Appeals (“BTA”) determination of a residential property value for tax year 2005.  
The Hamilton County Auditor appeals the BTA’s valuation, which is substantially 
less than either the auditor’s original valuation or the modified valuation of the 
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property found by the Hamilton County Board of Revision (“BOR”).  The auditor 
contends that the BTA’s decision is unreasonable and unlawful because the BTA 
rejected the probative record evidence of the taxpayer and of the BOR’s 
additional appraiser and adopted a value unsupported by the record.  The auditor 
also contends that the BTA overstepped its statutory authority when it ordered the 
BOR to submit property record cards from earlier tax years. 
{¶ 2} We affirm the BTA’s decision and defer to the board’s 
determination of appropriate evidence in this case. 
Facts 
{¶ 3} Appellee Gina Blatt filed a complaint against the auditor’s 
valuation of her residential property for tax year 2005.  Blatt had purchased the 
property on January 2, 2004 for $534,000 and demolished the existing house the 
same month.  She and her husband entered into an agreement to construct a new 
house at the site for $400,000.  The auditor had concluded a value of $1,041,300,1 
adopting the property’s $534,000 purchase price and adding $507,300 for 
improvements.  Blatt sought to establish $775,000 as the true value of her 
property.  At the BOR, Blatt presented a valuation analysis through her counsel.  
First, counsel derived a per-square-foot value by examining the auditor’s land 
values for other properties along the same avenue.  This procedure yielded a land 
value of $215,047.  Next, counsel predicated value on cost of construction and 
land improvements at $550,000, for a total value of approximately $765,000. 
{¶ 4} In contrast, the auditor presented the report and testimony of an 
appraiser, William A. Grauvogel.  Grauvogel’s report used the January 2, 2004 
purchase price of $534,000 as the land value, and added $484,500 as the building 
                                                 
1. The property record card also reflects the property’s entitlement to a 15-year new-construction 
abatement beginning in tax year 2005.  The abatement limits the taxable value of the property but 
does not affect the initial determination of true value. 
January Term, 2009 
3 
 
value (a value derived from sales-comparison and reproduction-cost approaches) 
for a total value of $1,018,500. 
{¶ 5} The BOR rejected Blatt’s methodology and adopted a property 
value of $834,000, reflecting a land value of $534,000 (the January 2004 purchase 
price for the land and the house) plus 75 percent of the $400,000 actual new 
construction cost shown by the construction contract.  The BOR applied the 75 
percent factor with an understanding that the new house was only three-quarters 
finished as of the tax-lien date; at the BOR hearing, however, Blatt’s counsel 
(whose statements were made under oath) asserted that as of the lien date a 
certificate of occupancy had been issued and the house was in fact occupied. 
{¶ 6} Blatt appealed the BOR’s determination to the BTA, where the 
parties agreed to waive the presentation of additional evidence.  On November 12, 
2008, the BTA issued an order to the BOR requiring submission of complete 
property record cards for tax years 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005.  The BOR 
complied by letter dated November 14, 2008 and the BTA issued its decision. 
{¶ 7} The BTA first found that the property’s January 2, 2004 sale price 
did not constitute its full value because of the demolition and later construction on 
the parcel.  Blatt v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision (Nov. 25, 2008), BTA No. 
2006-N-1808, at 7, 9.  The BTA found that the present case fell within the 
exception to the use of an arm’s-length sale when an improvement has been added 
to the property between the time of the sale and the tax-lien date.  Id. at 8, citing 
R.C. 5713.03(B). 
{¶ 8} Next, the BTA considered whether Blatt had discharged her burden 
to show that the value of the property was $775,000.  In her brief, Blatt urged the 
BTA to focus exclusively on the value of the land to the exclusion of the value of 
her newly constructed house.  In fact, Blatt advocated a higher value for the house 
before the BOR than the value the BOR ultimately adopted. 
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{¶ 9} The BTA rejected Blatt’s submission because the valuations of 
surrounding properties appearing on the property record cards were not probative 
evidence of the subject property’s land value.  Id. at 9, 10, citing WJJK 
Investments, Inc. v. Licking Cty. Bd. of Revision (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 29, 665 
N.E.2d 1111.  The BTA also stated that it had the duty to value both land and 
building and could not value the land in isolation.  Id. at 11-12. 
{¶ 10} Having rejected Blatt’s valuation, the BTA addressed the auditor’s 
appraisal by Grauvogel.  Grauvogel’s cost approach was found unreliable because 
the actual $400,000 construction contract refuted the appraiser’s $642,388 cost 
valuation of the new house.  The BTA also faulted Grauvogel’s sales-comparison 
approach, because it failed to adjust comparables for lot size, and because one 
comparable appeared to be significantly older. 
{¶ 11} Instead, the BTA valued Blatt’s property by taking the BOR’s 
determination as its starting point and making two changes.  The BTA used the 
actual cost of the new house as the value of the building and looked to the 
purchase price of the property for the value of the land.  The BTA departed from 
the BOR’s computation by using the full $400,000 cost of construction rather than 
$300,000 as 75 percent, because the house was complete on the lien date.  In 
addition, the board determined the land value to be 70 percent rather than 100 
percent of the purchase price.  The BTA derived the 70 percent factor by looking 
to the tax year 2003 property record card and applying the same ratio of land 
value to total value as determined by the auditor for that tax year.2 
{¶ 12} Finally, the BTA computed the value of the property for tax year 
2005 by adding the $400,000 construction cost figure to the $373,800 (70 percent 
of $534,000) land-value figure, arriving at a total value of $773,800 for the Blatt 
property. 
                                                 
2. The earlier property record cards were not originally part of the record; they were submitted by 
the BOR in response to a BTA order as described previously. 
January Term, 2009 
5 
 
Analysis 
{¶ 13} Under our cases, “ ‘[t]he BTA is responsible for determining 
factual issues and, if the record contains reliable and probative support’ ” for the 
BTA’s decision, this court will affirm.  Satullo v. Wilkins, 111 Ohio St.3d 401, 
2006-Ohio-5856, 856 N.E.2d 954, ¶ 14, quoting Am. Natl. Can Co. v. Tracy 
(1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 150, 152, 648 N.E.2d 483.  More specifically, we “ ‘will 
not reverse the BTA’s determination on credibility of witnesses and weight given 
to their testimony unless we find an abuse of * * * discretion.’ ”  Strongsville Bd. 
of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 112 Ohio St.3d 309, 2007-Ohio-6, 859 
N.E.2d 540, ¶ 15, quoting Natl. Church Residence v. Licking Cty. Bd. of Revision 
(1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 397, 398, 653 N.E.2d 240.  But “ ‘we will not hesitate to 
reverse a BTA decision that is based on an incorrect legal conclusion.’ ”  Satullo, 
¶ 14, quoting Gahanna-Jefferson Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino (2001), 
93 Ohio St.3d 231, 232, 754 N.E.2d 789. 
{¶ 14} Under these standards, we defer to the BTA’s determination of 
value in this case if we find that reliable and probative evidence supports the 
board’s findings.  Whether reliable and probative evidence exists in the record is 
itself a legal conclusion for this court’s determination.  See Our Place, Inc. v. 
Ohio Liquor Control Comm. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 570, 572-573, 589 N.E.2d 
1303 (court reviewed record to determine whether reliable, probative, and 
substantial evidence supported a liquor commission order). 
{¶ 15} The auditor characterizes this as a case where the BTA should 
have simply reverted to an initial determination of value by the county pursuant to 
Simmons v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 47, 689 N.E.2d 
22.  Apart from certain exceptional cases, the BTA should revert either to the 
BOR’s determination or the auditor’s original determination of value once it has 
found that the appellant has not proved a different value.  Colonial Village, Ltd. v. 
Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2009-Ohio-4975, ___ 
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N.E.2d ___, ¶ 31.  But the issue of reverting or not reverting does not arise in this 
case because the BTA adopted the BOR’s determination and modified it.  Unless 
there is some reason to bypass the BOR’s determination altogether, the issue is 
whether the BTA’s modifications of the BOR’s determination are supported by 
the record. 
{¶ 16} Gina Blatt bought property for $534,000 in January 2004, 
demolished the existing house, and built a new one.  By January 1, 2005, the lien 
date for the applicable tax year, the new house had a certificate of occupancy.  
The auditor initially valued Blatt’s property at $1,041,300 for 2005, then offered 
an appraisal of $1,018,500 to the BOR, and finally accepted a value of $834,000.  
This last figure reflects discounted construction costs of $300,000 plus the entire 
$534,000 sale price, which the BOR equated to the value of the land. 
{¶ 17} In reversing and finding a total value of $773,800, the BTA 
ordered two modifications to the BOR’s decision.  Because the evidence showed 
that the house was complete on January 1, 2005, the BTA restored all of the 
actual costs to the computation of the property’s value.  The evidence before the 
BTA justified this modification. 
{¶ 18} The BTA then calculated the land value by using 70 percent of the 
$534,000 sale price, reasoning that Blatt purchased both the land and the house 
upon the land.  To allocate the amount of the purchase price between the land and 
the former house, the BTA relied on the ratio of land value to total value from the 
property record card from tax year 2003. 
{¶ 19} We have repeatedly stated that the “ ‘fair market value of property 
for tax purposes is a question of fact, the determination of which is primarily 
within the province of the taxing authorities, and this court will not disturb a 
decision of the Board of Tax Appeals with respect to such valuation unless it 
affirmatively appears from the record that such decision is unreasonable or 
unlawful.’ ”  EOP-BP Tower, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 106 Ohio 
January Term, 2009 
7 
 
St.3d 1, 2005-Ohio-3096, 829 N.E.2d 686, ¶ 17, quoting Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 
Revision v. Fodor (1968), 15 Ohio St.2d 52, 44 O.O.2d 30, 239 N.E.2d 25, 
syllabus. 
{¶ 20} We find no merit in the auditor’s assertion that the BTA “became 
fixated with * * * unnecessarily determining a land value” because of this court’s 
decision in Polaris Amphitheater Concerts, Inc. v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
118 Ohio St.3d 330, 2008-Ohio-2454, 889 N.E.2d 103.  The BTA’s decision 
nowhere cites Polaris.  Moreover, Polaris clearly establishes that its holding 
arises solely from the limitations on this court’s jurisdiction because of R.C. 
5717.04’s requirement that appellants set forth the errors complained of in the 
BTA’s decision.  Indeed, Polaris expressly acknowledges that the jurisdiction of 
boards of revision and, derivatively, that of the BTA is controlled in the first 
instance by R.C. 5715.19(A).  That statute explicitly places the total value of the 
property (both land and improvements) at issue in an appeal of valuation.  Indeed, 
the BTA decision in this case makes that very point.  Blatt v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of 
Revision (Nov. 25, 2008), BTA No. 2006-N-1808, at 10-11.  Accordingly, we 
find no error based upon a misapplication of Polaris. 
{¶ 21} It is undisputed that Blatt purchased a house along with the land in 
January 2004.  Although demolition occurred quickly and Blatt began 
construction on her new house, this did not mean that the existing house was 
valueless.  It does not seem unreasonable to apportion the total sale price between 
the existing house and the land value.  The BTA used a land-value to total-value 
ratio to determine the portion of the sale price that reflected the value of the land.  
We now defer to the BTA’s reasoning as part of its fact-finding expertise. 
{¶ 22} Our acceptance of the BTA’s conclusions requires discussion of 
the auditor’s additional argument that the BTA exceeded its statutory authority by 
requiring the BOR to transmit the property record cards from earlier years.  As the 
auditor acknowledges, R.C. 5717.01 expressly authorizes the BTA, in addition to 
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its power to “order the hearing of additional evidence,” to “make such 
investigation concerning the appeal as it deems proper.”  The plain language of 
the statute allows the BTA itself to determine the propriety of supplementing the 
record, and that means that we should as a general matter defer to the board’s 
decision to seek additional information. 
{¶ 23} Nothing in the BTA’s actions militates against according deference 
in this case.  The information the BTA sought related directly to the property at 
issue and constituted public-record data whose authenticity could not be 
impeached.  In addition, the auditor has not been prejudiced by the additional 
investigation:  the auditor maintained the very records requested, was fully able to 
object below, and has in fact availed himself of the opportunity to assert his claim 
of error through appeal to this court.  Taken together, these circumstances 
decisively distinguish the present case from the situation in which a party attaches 
documentation to a post-hearing brief that was never offered at hearing.  Cf. 
Columbus Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 13, 
16-17, 665 N.E.2d 1098. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 24} Accordingly, we defer to the BTA’s application of the 70 percent 
factor to determine the land value of the property and affirm the decision of the 
BTA. 
Decision affirmed. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
O’CONNOR, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 25} I dissent. 
{¶ 26} Appellee is a residential homeowner who (1) purchased the 
property for $534,000 in January 2004, (2) immediately demolished the existing 
January Term, 2009 
9 
 
house, and (3) built a new house on the parcel, thereby incurring approximately 
$400,000 in construction costs.  By January 1, 2005, which is the lien date for the 
tax year at issue, the new house already had a certificate of occupancy.  The 
appellant auditor contests the BTA’s decision because the BTA, after rejecting the 
owner’s theory for reducing the value assigned to her property, adopted an even 
lower value than the one the owner advocated.  That value, $773,800, lies well 
below the documented amount – $934,000 ($534,000 purchase price plus 
$400,000 in construction costs) – that the owner expended to acquire and improve 
the property.  It is also below the range of value indicated by the comparable sales 
submitted to the BTA by the auditor’s appraiser. 
{¶ 27} The majority affirms the BTA’s decision by deferring to its 
factfinding expertise.  But no deference is due in this case because of the clear 
legal error in the BTA’s decision.  See Gahanna-Jefferson Local School Dist. Bd. 
of Edn. v. Zaino (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 231, 232, 754 N.E.2d 789 (this court “will 
not hesitate to reverse a BTA decision that is based on an incorrect legal 
conclusion”). 
{¶ 28} We have held that, in determining the value of real property, “each 
tax year should be determined based on the evidence presented to the assessor that 
pertains to that year.”  Olmsted Falls Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of 
Revision, 122 Ohio St.3d 134, 2009-Ohio-2461, 909 N.E.2d 597, ¶ 20.  Consistent 
with this principle, we have held that the BTA’s determination of value for the 
current year should be “uncontrolled by the value assessed for prior years,” 
Freshwater v. Belmont Cty. Bd. of Revision (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 26, 28-29, 684 
N.E.2d 304, because it is improper to presume that the value assigned to a 
property for a prior tax year is correct.  Id. at 28, 684 N.E.2d 304; Olmsted Falls, 
¶ 21.  The BTA’s decision to determine land value by applying a 70 percent factor 
to the $534,000 purchase price ran afoul of this principle. 
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{¶ 29} By deriving the percentage from a prior year’s valuation, the BTA 
necessarily presumed the validity of the land-value ratio for the prior year.  
Indulging this presumption violates the holding of Olmsted Falls and Freshwater. 
{¶ 30} Moreover, even if the majority were justified in presuming the 
valuation for tax year 2003 to be correct, there is no reason why the land-value 
ratio for that year would necessarily apply to determining the land value for tax 
year 2005 given all the intervening events.  In this regard, the BTA decision does 
not merit our deference because it is unreasonable; that is, there is no reasonable 
basis for assuming that the land-value ratio from a prior year would validly apply 
to a later year. 
{¶ 31} Finally, the value determined by the BTA is not in accord with the 
record.  As already noted, the property owner was willing to expend the $534,000 
purchase price and $400,000 in construction cost over the period of a single year, 
and the comparable sales offered by the auditor’s appraiser show that homes 
similar to the brand new home the appellee constructed sold in the $1,000,000 
range.  Quite simply, the record is not consistent with finding a value of $773,800. 
{¶ 32} I would reverse the decision of the BTA and remand with 
instructions that the entire $534,000 purchase price be used as the land value. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and O’DONNELL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Aronoff, Rosen & Hunt, Richard A. Paolo, Stephen R. Hunt, and Courtney 
M. Brooks, for appellee Gina Blatt. 
 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Thomas J. 
Scheve, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
______________________