Case Title: Florida Department Of Labor & Employment v. Boise Cascade

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC94-103

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC94103
____________
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT SECURITY,
Petitioner,
vs.
BOISE CASCADE CORPORATION, et al.,
Respondents.
[July 12, 2001]
PER CURIAM
William M. Bowman, Jr., was injured during the course of his employment
with Boise Cascade Corporation.  On appeal the First District Court of Appeal
reversed the trial court’s determination that it was proper for the employer to
recalculate the offset annually to include increases in supplemental benefits.  The
First District also certified the same question it had certified in Acker v. City of
Clearwater, 755 So. 2d 651 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), approved, 755 So. 2d 597 (Fla.
1999), to be of great public importance:
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WHERE AN EMPLOYER TAKES A WORKERS'
COMPENSATION OFFSET UNDER SECTION
440.20(15), FLORIDA STATUTES (1985), AND
INITIALLY INCLUDES SUPPLEMENTAL BENEFITS
PAID UNDER SECTION 440.15(1)(e)(1), FLORIDA
STATUTES (1985), IS THE EMPLOYER ENTITLED
TO RECALCULATE THE OFFSET BASED ON THE
YEARLY 5% INCREASE IN SUPPLEMENTAL
BENEFITS? 
See Department of Labor & Employment Sec. v. Boise Cascade Corp., 23 Fla. L.
Weekly D2124 (Fla. 1st DCA Sept. 11, 1998).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, §
3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  For the reasons expressed in City of Clearwater v. Acker, 755
So. 2d 597 (Fla. 1999), we answer the certified question in the negative and
approve the First District’s decision. 
The First District did not certify for review the issue of whether Acker
should be applied retroactively, although the Florida Department of Labor &
Employment Security (the Department) raises this issue in its brief.  We do not
express an opinion on this issue since it was not considered by the judge of
compensation claims and since the record is devoid of evidence that would permit
a meaningful review.  See Weaver v. Southern Bell, 703 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 1st DCA
1997).
Finally, Bowman has requested attorney’s fees be awarded against the
-3-
Department.  The law is clear that there must be statutory authority to award fees. 
See Shipp v. State Workers’ Compensation Trust Fund, 481 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1986); Knight v. City of Miami, 421 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). 
Bowman seeks fees pursuant to section 440.20, Florida Statutes (1973), but this
section permits fees against the carrier.  There is no provision awarding fees against
the Department in this situation, and we therefore approve the First District’s denial
of Bowman’s motion for fees.  
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - 
Certified Great Public Importance 
First District - Case No. 1D97-4038 
Elizabeth Teegen, General Counsel, and Nancy Staff Terrel, Senior Attorney,
Office of General Counsel, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioner
Irvin A. Meyers of Meyers, Mooney & Meyers, Orlando, Florida,
 
for Respondents