Case Title: Smallwood v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: CR96-575

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-12-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Xavier SMALLWOOD v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 96-575                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered December 9, 1996


1.   Motions -- motion for directed verdict discussed -- issue here
     not properly preserved. -- A motion for directed verdict is
     treated as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and
     requires the movant to apprise the trial court of the specific
     basis on which the motion is made; since the adoption of the
     Ark. R. Crim. P. 36.21(b), a general motion is insufficient to
     preserve a defendant's argument that the statutory elements of
     the crime were not proven; because appellant failed to
     properly preserve the issue, he was procedurally barred from
     challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal. 

2.   Evidence -- credibility in issue when criminal defendant takes
     stand -- when the State may inquire about prior acts of
     misconduct. -- When a criminal defendant takes the stand in
     his own behalf his credibility becomes an issue, and the State
     may, under certain circumstances, test that credibility by
     asking the defendant about prior misconduct and criminal
     activity; pursuant to Ark. R. Evid. 608(b), the State may ask
     a criminal defendant about prior acts of misconduct,
     regardless of whether such conduct is criminal, if the act is
     clearly probative of the defendant's character for
     truthfulness; in addition, the State may, pursuant to Ark. R.
     Evid. 609, ask the defendant about any prior felony
     convictions, regardless of whether the crime involves an
     element of untruthfulness. 

3.   Evidence -- objections to questions about prior acts of
     misconduct -- preservation of issues for appeal. -- In order
     properly to preserve objections to questions about prior bad
     acts for appeal, the defendant must timely object at the first
     opportunity; in addition, the defendant must renew his
     objection each time he is questioned about the matter;
     finally, the defendant may not object if he has "opened the
     door" by discussing the matter during direct examination.  

4.   Evidence -- questions asked about previous burglary
     convictions -- failure to timely object waived issue on
     appeal. -- Where, during cross-examination, the State
     questioned appellant extensively about his burglary conviction
     and about an incident in which he threatened to shoot his
     mother, without objection by defense counsel, appellant's
     failure to timely object was a waiver of these issues on
     appeal.

5.   Evidence -- questions asked about drug sales -- failure to
     object at first opportunity constituted waiver on appeal. -- 
     Where the State asked about appellant's previous sale of drugs
     for a second time before he objected, appellant waived the
     right to raise this issue on appeal; by failing to object at
     the first opportunity, appellant waived his right to contest
     on appeal the questions regarding his prior drug sales.

6.   Evidence -- admission to gang involvement made on cross-
     examination -- counsel's failure to object precluded review on
     appeal. -- Where appellant admitted during cross-examination
     to membership in a gang that was involved in selling drugs and
     stealing cars and to making a statement that he would shoot
     anyone who threatened him, his counsel's failure to object to
     the questions precluded review of the issues on appeal.  

7.   Evidence -- appellant's own words opened door to questions
     about his propensity to violence -- trial court properly
     allowed appellee to question appellant about other violent
     acts. -- Where, on direct examination, appellant opened the
     door to any questions about his propensity towards violence by
     claiming that he was not the "type of person" to threaten
     someone with a knife, he placed his propensity towards
     violence in issue; the trial court properly allowed the State
     to question appellant about other violent acts or threats; 
     otherwise impermissible testimony may be offered when one
     party has opened the door for another party to offer it.

8.   Sentencing -- decision to impose consecutive or concurrent
     sentences up to trial judge. -- Pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. 
     5-4-403 the decision to impose consecutive or concurrent
     sentences lies solely with the province of the trial judge.  

9.   Sentencing -- request for concurrent sentences not supported
     by argument -- trial judge not required to set forth in
     writing that he has exercised discretion. -- Where appellant
     made no argument in his request for concurrent sentences and
     raised no argument on appeal, his contention that there was no
     way to evaluate the trial judge's decision, and therefore his
     proper use of discretion, because he did not explain his
     decision orally or in writing was rejected; there is no rule
     that requires a trial judge to set forth in writing that he
     has exercised discretion; since this is a matter within his
     discretion the court will not presume he did not exercise that
     discretion unless there is some indication otherwise;
     appellant did not meet his burden of showing that the trial
     court did not exercise discretion in deciding to impose
     consecutive sentences.


     Appeal from Nevada Circuit Court; Tom Keith, Judge; affirmed.
     Scott S. Freydl, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  Sandy Moll, Asst. Att'y Gen.,
for appellee.

     Andree Layton Roaf, Justice.
     Xavier Smallwood was convicted by a jury of rape and burglary
which were committed when he was fifteen years of age.   He was
sentenced to forty years' imprisonment for the rape, and ten years'
imprisonment for the burglary.  On appeal, Smallwood alleges that
there is insufficient evidence to support his convictions, that the
State should have been prohibited from questioning him about prior
misconduct, and that he should have been sentenced to concurrent,
not consecutive, terms.  We affirm.
     On the morning of December 15, 1994, the victim returned home
from working the night shift.  As she entered the bedroom,
Smallwood jumped out from behind the door, placed a butcher knife
to her throat, and demanded that she remove her clothing. 
Smallwood threatened to kill her when she refused.  The woman
agreed to remover her clothing if she could first use the bathroom. 
While in the bathroom, she attempted to call her parents on a
cordless telephone, but apparently Smallwood had cut the telephone
line.  Smallwood forced the woman into the bedroom, and again
demanded that she remove her clothing.  The victim begged Smallwood
to use a condom so that she would not get AIDS or become pregnant. 
Smallwood used a condom provided by the victim and raped her twice.
     After the rape, Smallwood told the victim that he had tried to
talk to her before but she would not speak to him, and that he was
already in trouble for a prior burglary.  Smallwood showed the
victim were he had broken a porch window and cut a screen to obtain
entry into her home.  As he left the victim's home, Smallwood
threatened to rape her again and kill her family if she told anyone
about the incident.  Smallwood left on a bicycle and took the
butcher knife with him.
     The victim immediately called her family, and her mother
notified the police.  The victim described Smallwood and the
clothes he was wearing to the police.  The victim also described
the knife taken by Smallwood as her rusty butcher knife with "Old
Hickory" written on the handle.
     The police suspected Smallwood from the victim's description,
and located him within a few hours, hiding in the woods behind his
home and wearing the clothing described by the victim.  In
addition, the police found a butcher knife inscribed with the words
"Old Hickory" lying on the table inside his house.  At the time of
his arrest, Smallwood told officers that he had consensual sex with
the victim.  The victim identified Smallwood as her attacker during
a photo line-up and at trial.
     Smallwood testified at trial and admitted to having sexual
relations with the victim on December 15, but claimed that the two
had been engaged in a consensual sexual relationship for about two
years.  Smallwood further alleged that the victim brought charges
against him only because he told her that she was getting fat and
that he intended to end their relationship.  Finally, Smallwood
claimed that the knife belonged to his mother and that he last saw
it the day before the incident.
     At trial, defense witnesses testified that Smallwood was a
cousin of the victim's husband, from whom she was separated, and
that Smallwood and the victim knew each other.  Smallwood's mother
testified that she had gone to school with the victim, and that the
victim knew Smallwood when he was a baby, but that Smallwood had
moved to Illinois when he was about ten years old.  However, the
victim denied having a consensual sexual relationship with
Smallwood and testified that she had never seen him prior to
December 15.
     The jury found Smallwood guilty of both crimes and sentenced
him to ten years imprisonment for burglary and forty years for
rape.  The judge denied Smallwood's request for concurrent terms,
and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively.
                 1.  Sufficiency of the Evidence
     Smallwood first argues that there is insufficient evidence to
support his convictions for rape and burglary.  At the close of the
State's case, Smallwood said:  "Judge, may I let the record reflect
that I move for a directed verdict at the end of the State's case?" 
The court denied the motion.  At the close of all evidence,
Smallwood renewed his motion by stating:  "Will the Court let the
record reflect that my motion is renewed?"  Again, the motion was
denied.
     A motion for directed verdict is treated as a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence and requires the movant to apprise the
trial court of the specific basis on which the motion is made. 
Stewart v. State, 320 Ark. 75,