Case Title: ROBBINS v. ROBBINS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 01-217

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-05-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
ROBBINS v. ROBBINS2002 WY 8046 P.3d 880Case Number: 01-217Decided: 05/22/2002

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                            

 

CANDI 
JUNE ROBBINS, 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

DENTON 
KIRBY ROBBINS, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Uinta County

The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
John P. LaBuda of Palmer & LaBuda, P.C., Rock Springs, Wyoming  

Representing 
Appellee:

            
John A. Thomas, Evanston, Wyoming   

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

KITE, J., 
delivered the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, J., filed a specially 
concurring opinion in which GOLDEN, J., 
joined.

  

            
KITE, Justice. 

[¶1]      Denton Robbins 
(the father) filed for a divorce against Candi Robbins (the mother).  At trial, the parties stipulated to the 
guardian ad litem (GAL) filing her report with the court and testifying 
concerning that report.  The trial 
court essentially followed the GAL's recommendation and ordered physical custody 
to alternate every six months until the child enters school at which time the father will have primary custody with liberal visitation by the mother.  The mother appeals claiming the trial 
court should not have allowed the GAL to testify.  We affirm.

 

 

[¶2]      The mother 
presents the following issue:

 

            
Did the district court err in permitting the guardian ad litem to act as 
attorney and a fact witness?

 

The 
father frames a somewhat distinct issue:

 

            
Whether the district court abused it[]s discretion by acting in a manner 
which exceeded the bounds of reason in awarding joint legal and physical custody 
of the minor child to both parties on an alternating six month basis until 
either the child starts kindergarten or the mother leaves Uinta County at which 
time the father would have primary physical custody and the mother would have 
standard visitation?

 

 

 

[¶3]      The parties 
married in May 2000.  The father 
filed a complaint for divorce on August 31, 2000, seeking custody of their 
sixteen-month-old son.  The GAL was 
appointed to "represent the best interests of the child."  Upon the parties' agreement, temporary 
custody was split on a weekly basis.  
The parties also substantially agreed with regard to the division of 
their property.  A trial was 
ultimately held on the issue of permanent custody.  The GAL provided her report to both 
parties who stipulated at trial to the admission into evidence of the report and 
the supplemental report.  The report 
described both parties as capable and loving parents.  Each had made allegations against the 
other concerning infidelity which the GAL disregarded.  The father had stable employment, and 
the mother worked part time.  Both 
were admonished to refrain from using alcohol while they were with their 
son.  The GAL recommended the joint 
custody continue but alternate every six months rather than weekly to enhance 
stability and consistency for the child.  
The supplemental report altered that recommendation slightly due to 
developments occurring between the preparation of the initial report and 
trial.  The supplemental report 
stated that the mother had been living with her parents and her brother.  Certain problems had developed with the 
brother that caused the GAL to be concerned about the parties' son living in 
that environment.  The mother then 
moved out of her parents' home, but the GAL had not inspected her new 
residence.  In addition, the mother 
had been involved in an altercation in a bar, and the police had frequently 
observed her as they performed their "bar checks."  The GAL continued to recommend joint 
custody; however, she indicated, if the court preferred a primary custodian, she 
recommended the father be the primary custodian with the mother having liberal 
visitation.  She provided three 
reasons for that recommendation:  
(1) the father demonstrated stability in his home environment and 
employment in contrast to the mother's instability in those areas; (2) although 
both parties had exhibited problems with alcohol, the mother's employment 
provided more opportunities for a continued "drinking lifestyle"; (3) the father 
had proved himself to be a more diligent facilitator with respect to visitation 
than had the mother.

 

[¶4]      At trial, the 
court received testimony from the mother, the father, and numerous individuals 
who were acquainted with both.  The 
GAL was offered the opportunity to ask questions of the witnesses, but she 
declined referencing confusion in Wyoming case law concerning the GAL's proper 
role at trial.  The mother's counsel 
then informed the trial court that he and the father's counsel had discussed the 
GAL's appropriate role and "thought it would be best if she was just called as a 
fact witness."  He also indicated he 
was aware of Wyoming law in this area and, in fact, had a case pending before 
this court concerning the proper role of a GAL.  Given that stipulation and the GAL's 
concerns, she did not participate as an attorney in the proceedings.  Instead, the father's counsel called her 
as a witness with no objection from the mother's counsel.  The GAL testified consistently with her 
report.  In response to questions 
from both counsel, she provided more detail concerning her investigation and 
recommendations.

 

[¶5]      Ultimately, the 
trial court ordered joint custody so long as both parents continued to live in 
Uinta County until the child reached school age.  Specifically, it awarded custody to the 
mother from December 1 through May 31 and to the father from June 1 through 
November 30 with liberal visitation for the noncustodial parent.  The court further ordered the father 
would have primary custody when the child reached school age or if the mother 
left Uinta County.

 

[¶6]      On the day of 
trial, this court published its decision in Pace v. Pace, 2001 WY 43, 22 P.3d 861 (Wyo. 2001), in which we confirmed our prior decision in 
Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145 (Wyo. 1998), that the ethical rules 
prohibited attorneys from serving as GALs and also testifying as witnesses.  Based upon that case, the mother filed a 
motion for a new trial claiming the trial court erred in allowing the GAL to 
testify.  The trial court denied the 
motion, and the mother appealed.

  

 

[¶7]      In Clark, 
this court held that attorneys serving as GALs may not serve as fact witnesses 
because of their ethical obligations under the Rules of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys at Law.  Instead, we 
ruled:

 

 Recommendations can be made to the court 
through closing argument based on the evidence received.  It is, therefore, unnecessary to allow 
the attorney/guardian ad litem to place his or her own credibility at 
issue.  Consequently, we join 
those jurisdictions which hold that an attorney/guardian ad litem may not be a 
fact witness at a custody hearing.

 

This is not to say that the 
attorney/guardian ad litem may not submit a written report to the parties.  A detailed report which timely informs 
the parties of the relevant facts and the basis of the guardian ad litem's 
recommendation may facilitate agreement prior to trial.  If the parties so stipulate, the report 
may be presented to the court.  
However, the report should not be filed with the court or received into 
evidence without the express agreement of the parties.  To the extent that prior Wyoming cases 
may conflict with this holding, they are here overruled.  

 

Clark, 
953 P.2d  
at 154 (citations omitted & emphasis added). Counsel for both parties in 
this case were fully aware of the Clark case, and yet they agreed the GAL 
could, and should, testify.  After 
trial, the mother's counsel seemed to suggest that the recently issued 
Pace opinion established a new requirement which prohibited attorney GALs 
from testifying and also representing the best interest of the child.  In fact, Pace created no 
additional requirement that had not previously been clearly articulated three 
years earlier in Clark.

 

[¶8]      Clark also 
stands for the proposition that such an ethical violation not instigated by the 
prevailing party would not require reversal unless it somehow resulted in a 
manifest injustice.

 

In 
Moore [v. Moore], 809 P.2d [255,] 264 [(Wyo. 1991)], we held that 
an ethical violation, not brought about by the prevailing party, will be 
reversed only if it resulted in manifest injustice.  In many district courts, it is not 
uncommon to allow the testimony of an attorney/guardian ad litem.  Thus, in the absence of objection to the 
district court, we cannot say that the prevailing party in this case was 
responsible for the ethical violation.  
Therefore, we must determine whether the admission of the 
attorney/guardian ad litem's testimony and reports, as well as the tape 
recordings, resulted in manifest injustice under the totality of the 
circumstances.  Moore, 809 P.2d  at 264.  

 

Manifest 
injustice "contemplate[s] a situation that is unmistakable or indisputable, was 
not foreseeable, and affects the substantial rights of a party."  McCarthy v. State, 945 P.2d 775, 
777 (Wyo. 1997).  

 

Id.

 

[¶9]      In this case, the 
mother cannot identify how the GAL's testimony created any injustice.  It was certainly foreseeable that the 
trial court might consider the GAL's recommendation persuasive.  That recommendation was already before 
the court in the form of the GAL's report, the admission to which the mother had 
stipulated.  The parties introduced 
other substantial evidence, including testimony by both parents, that supported 
the trial court's conclusion the father was the more stable parent.  At the hearing on the motion for a new 
trial, the trial court commented that the GAL's testimony actually convinced him 
in the mother's favor and dissuaded him from awarding full custody to the 
father.  Finding no hint of 
injustice, we perceive no reason to reverse the trial court's ruling on 
permanent custody.

 

[¶10]   An additional comment is in 
order.  To the extent error occurred 
in this case, it is difficult to conceive of a more apparent example of invited 
error.  These parties stipulated the 
GAL's report could be submitted to the trial court.  They were fully aware of the cases 
addressing the propriety of attorney GALs testifying.  The mother's counsel had actually argued 
in Pace, which was then pending before this court, that prior case law 
prevented the GAL from testifying.  
The GAL herself was well informed of the limitations on her role.  Yet they all agreed to a procedure which 
allowed the GAL to testify.  Now, 
having obtained a result that was fairly predictablethe trial court followed 
the GAL's recommendationthe mother and her counsel cry foul and seek another 
time at bat.  We are decidedly 
unpersuaded.  "[I]f a party requests 
or moves the court to make a ruling which is actually erroneous and the court 
does so, that party cannot take advantage of the error on appeal or 
review."  Mayland v. Flitner, 
2001 WY 69, ¶44, 28 P.3d 838, ¶44 (Wyo. 2001).

 

[¶11]   Affirmed.

  

            
VOIGT, Justice, specially concurring, with which GOLDEN, 
Justice, joins. 

[¶12]   I concur with the result of the 
majority opinion because the parties stipulated to the role played by the 
guardian ad litem in this case, the appellant was not prejudiced by that role, 
and the guardian ad litem was careful not to also act as an attorney for the 
child.  I write separately only 
because I believe this Court has taken a wrong turn along the way as we have 
continued to restrict the ability of guardians ad litem who happen to be 
attorneys to perform their duties.

 

[¶13]   One does not need to be an attorney 
to be a guardian ad litem.  At the 
same time, due to their training, experience in the judicial system, and 
familiarity with the issues involved in a typical custody dispute, attorneys 
often make excellent guardians ad litem.  
I do not understand why a person who has been appointed to act as a 
child's guardian ad litem, and who has not been appointed to act as that child's 
attorney, may not be called as a fact witness.  The status of being an attorney does not 
render a person, as a general matter, incompetent to 
testify.

 

[¶14]   As I read Pace v. Pace, 2001 
WY 43, 22 P.3d 861 (Wyo. 2001); 
Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145 (Wyo. 1998); and 
Moore v. Moore, 809 P.2d 261 (Wyo. 1991), it 
appears to me that the primary issue was how to deal with the dual role of 
someone appointed to be both attorney and guardian ad litem.  The problem in Pace, for 
instance, was that the "GAL, who was a licensed attorney, impermissibly acted as 
both trial counsel and a witness."  
Pace, 2001 WY 43, ¶ 24, 22 P.3d  at 869.  It goes without saying that the same 
person should not be both witness and attorney in the same case.  But we have now created a system wherein 
guardians ad litem who are not attorneys may testify, while guardians ad litem 
who happen to be attorneys may not testify, even if they do not appear as 
attorneys in the case.  That makes 
no sense.

 

[¶15]   Wyoming's small communities do not 
have an abundance of people willing to act as guardians ad litem in custody 
disputes.  This Court should do all 
it can to make it easy for attorneys to fill that role.  We have already stated what needs to be 
done to accomplish that goal:  "A 
guardian ad litem, counsel, and the court should work together at the beginning 
of a case to develop and articulate clearly the scope and nature of the guardian 
ad litem's responsibilities."  
Pace, 2001 WY 43, ¶ 26, 22 P.3d  at 870.  In truth, that could be accomplished 
with a form order of appointment, in which it is clearly spelled out that the 
person appointed is acting only in the capacity of a guardian ad litem and not 
as an attorney.

 

[¶16]   In Clark, 953 P.2d  at 
151-52, we 
made the following statement:

 

In 
providing guidance to the role of an attorney appointed to represent a child 
while at the same time acting as guardian ad litem, we do not intend to usurp 
the role of the district court in appointing individuals to act solely as an 
attorney or as guardian ad litem.  
It is imperative, however, that the appointee request clarification from 
the appointing court if questions regarding the duties 
arise.

 

[¶17]   That is exactly what happened in 
this case.  The guardian ad litem 
was appointed to represent the best interests of the child.  That is the traditional function of the 
guardian ad litem.  She was not 
appointed to act as the child's attorney, and she was careful not to perform 
that function.  I see nothing in 
this situation that violated the dictates of Clark or 
Pace.