Case Title: Harris v. Delaware

Citation: 

Docket Number: 408, 2022

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2023-07-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
DESHAUN HARRIS,  
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 408, 2022 
 
Defendant Below, Appellant, 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
 
§ 
I.D. No. 2005002325A (K) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
Submitted:  May 3, 2023 
Decided:  July 14, 2023 
 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
Santino Ceccotti, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware for 
Appellant.  
 
Sean P. Lugg, Esquire, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware for 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VALIHURA, Justice:   
2 
 
 
In this appeal, defendant-below, appellant Deshaun Harris (“Harris”), asserts that 
the Superior Court abused its discretion in admitting certain prison phone call recordings.  
We find no merit to the appeal and, accordingly, AFFIRM Harris’s conviction and 
sentence.   
I. 
Facts and Procedural History 
A. Facts1 
In May 2020, William Baker (“Baker”), his mother, Christine Brittingham 
(“Brittingham”), his fiancée, Catrina Knotts (“Knotts”), and his brother, Dylan Wilkerson  
(“Wilkerson”), rented rooms 46 and 50 at the Kent Budget Inn in Dover, Delaware.2  In the 
early afternoon of May 10, 2020, Baker responded to a knock on his door.  Upon opening 
the door, he was immediately pistol whipped by two men.  The two assailants, one of whom 
Baker identified as Harris, forced themselves into the room, demanded the occupants’ 
belongings, and threatened to kill them if they did not comply.3  Harris hit Baker, knocking 
him to the floor.  Baker’s mother, Brittingham, then stood up and moved toward Harris.4   
 
1 Citations in the form of “[Last Name] Trial Test. at [_]” refer to witness testimony from the trial 
transcript. 
2 App. to Opening Br. at A140–41 (Baker Trial Test. at B47–48).  Most testimony refers to Room 
50, but some testimony refers to Room 52. 
3 Id. at A141 (Baker Trial Test. at B48:18–22).  Baker testified that the men said to him:  “You 
know what it is.  You know what we’re here for.  Give us all your shit or we’re going to kill you.”  
Id. 
4  Brittingham testified that she was asleep in her hotel room when a “thump” woke her up.  When 
she woke up, Harris was already in the room, Baker and Knotts were on the floor, and someone 
had a gun to Wilkerson’s head.  Id. at A233 (Brittingham Trial Test. at 18:1–5).  She testified that 
she moved toward Harris to see “what was going on,” when Harris struck her in the head and she 
fell over a dresser drawer, broke her ankle, and passed out for approximately 15 minutes.  Id. 
(Brittingham Trial Test. at 18:6–10).  Knotts testified along the same lines as Brittingham.  Knotts 
stated: “Christine got up to – I don’t know if she was going over to Deshaun or she was going to 
3 
 
Harris punched Brittingham in the head, knocking her to the floor.  As she fell, her foot 
became caught under a nearby dresser, causing a compound fracture to her ankle.  Harris 
then punched Baker’s fiancée, Knotts, in the head twice and her face once, grabbed her 
purse, and ran out of the room.  Meanwhile, the other assailant pointed a gun at Baker’s 
brother, Wilkerson, and took his wallet, then ran out of the room after Harris.  Baker chased 
after them, following them to an alley next to the motel where the two assailants got into a 
car and sped away.  Baker pushed a shopping cart in front of the moving vehicle, but the 
car hit the cart and the car kept moving. 
When Dover Police officers responded to the scene a short time later, Baker 
informed Detective Mullaney of Deshaun Harris’s identity and of Harris’s involvement in 
the robbery.5  Detective Mullaney viewed the motel surveillance videos depicting “an 
individual that resembled a Deshaun Harris” that Officer Mullaney had previously 
encountered.6  He testified that he had seen Harris on several prior occasions wearing the 
same type of tan “Carhartt” coat.7  Thereafter, Detective Mullaney obtained a photograph 
 
the bathroom, and that’s when Deshaun hit her and she fell.  And when she fell, she hit her ankle 
on the side of the drawer and it started bleeding, cut it open.”  Id. at A189 (Knotts Trial Test. at 
B96:2–7).  Wilkerson also testified that Brittingham “stood up and then she got punched.”  Id. at 
A74 (Wilkerson Trial test. at A61:12).  After she got punched, “she landed on the floor” and “there 
was blood pouring out of her leg.”  Id. at A76 (Wilkerson Trial. Test. at A63:15, 22–23).  Baker 
testified that Brittingham was attempting to hit Harris when Harris knocked her down.  Id. at A142 
(Baker Trial Test. at B49:1–7). 
5 Id. at A145–46 (Baker Trial Test. at B52–53).  When asked at trial how certain he was that it was 
Mr. Harris, Baker responded, “[a] thousand percent.”  Id. at A146 (Baker Trial Test. at B53:1).  
6 Id. at A103–04 (Mullaney Trial Test. at B10:21–B11:3).   
7 Id. at A118 (Mullaney Trial Test. at B25:7–14).  Detective Mullaney told the jury:  “What I’m 
saying is through my previous encounters with Deshaun Harris, looking at the video, he matches 
4 
 
of Harris and showed it to Baker, who positively identified Harris.  Detective Mullaney 
then secured a warrant for Harris’s arrest.  Dover Police arrested Harris five days later.   
After Harris’s arrest, before trial, Baker was confronted by individuals who offered 
him money to sign papers stating that Harris was not the perpetrator of the attack.  They 
threatened Baker, warning him that if he testified on the stand or identified Harris, they 
would kill his family and him.  At trial, the State produced three documents purporting to 
be affidavits of Baker recanting his identification of Harris.  Each document was in a 
different format — one was written in cursive, one was printed, and one was typed.  Baker 
testified that he did not draft any of the documents, but that he signed the typed affidavit 
under the threat of being killed.   
During its investigation, the State found multiple prison phone calls between a 
person believed to be Harris and an unidentified woman.  The State sought to introduce 
certain portions of the calls to corroborate Baker’s testimony and to contextualize the three 
affidavits wherein Baker had recanted his identification of Harris.  Harris argued that their 
admission violated Delaware Rule of Evidence (“D.R.E.”) 403.8  Specifically, Harris 
objected to the admission of the recordings on the basis of identification, clarity, and the 
“highly prejudicial” fact that he was incarcerated at the time.  The State argued the 
recordings were relevant, articulated the standard for authenticating the recordings, and 
 
the physical attributes that I was able to view as well as the clothing that I have seen Deshaun 
Harris wear.”  Id. at A118–19 (Mullaney Trial Test. at B25:23–B26:3). 
8 Id. at A203–13 (Trial Transcript at B110–20).   
5 
 
countered that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any potential unfair 
prejudice. 
The Superior Court admitted the recordings over Harris’s objection.  But to 
minimize any unduly prejudicial effect, it ordered that the recordings be edited to remove 
the reference to the company that handles the prison recordings.  It also ordered counsel to 
meet and confer regarding the preparation of a transcript of the recordings.9  Further, the 
court indicated that a limiting instruction would be given regarding the jury’s use of the 
prison call recording.10  As a result, the recording was reduced to approximately nine 
minutes and the parties presented an agreed-upon transcript of the recording to the trial 
court.  The Superior Court admitted the recording as State’s Exhibit 14 and permitted the 
jury to read the agreed-upon transcript as they listened to the recording.    
Further, Harris stipulated “that from May 27, 2020 to June 30, 2020, [he] was 
committed to a detention center.”11  In view of this stipulation, the trial judge instructed the 
jury not to draw any inference “that because of this incarceration, the defendant is a bad 
 
9 Id. at A224–25 (Trial Transcript at B131:20–B132:1).  
10 Id. at A225 (Trial Transcript at B132:2–3).  Later, the Superior Court instructed the jury as 
follows:   
With the agreement of both parties and the approval of the Court, there is an audio 
recording in evidence that has been edited to remove material that is not relevant to 
your decision in this case.  You should not speculate about the nature of the 
irrelevant material that has been removed, the edited material has no bearing upon 
this case.  
Id. at A259 (Trial Transcript at 123:19–124:2).   
11 Id. at A242 (Trial Transcript at 55:9–11). 
6 
 
person, disreputable or that he is somehow more likely to have committed the crimes for 
which he has been accused.”12  
B. Procedural History 
On September 8, 2020, approximately four months after Harris’s May 2020 arrest, 
a Kent County grand jury indicted Harris on charges related to the May 10 robbery.  On 
May 3, 2021, a Kent County grand jury returned a final, superseding indictment charging 
Harris with:  Robbery First Degree (2 counts), Assault First Degree, Possession of a 
Firearm During the Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”), Burglary First Degree, 
Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited (“PFBPP”), Aggravated Menacing, 
Wearing a Disguise During the Commission of a Felony, Conspiracy Second Degree (2 
counts), Assault Third Degree (2 counts), Theft, Aggravated Act of Intimidation, and 
Breach of Conditions of Bond During Commitment.13   
The Aggravated Act of Intimidation, Breach of Conditions of Bond During 
Commitment, and related conspiracy charges were added after the State’s discovery of the 
prison phone call recordings.  Specifically, Counts 13 and 14 charged as follows:   
COUNT 13 (Aggravated Act of Intimidation) 
DESHAUN J. HARRIS, on or between the 10th day of May, 2020 and the 
23rd day of April 2021, in the County of Kent, State of Delaware, did 
knowingly and with malice prevent or dissuade or did attempt to prevent or 
dissuade William Baker, a victim or witness to a crime, from attending or 
giving testimony at any trial, proceeding, or inquiry authorized by law and is 
accompanied by an express or implied threat of force or violence upon 
William Baker, or the property of said victim, witness or third person.  
 
12 Id. at A258 (Trial Transcript at 121:14–21). 
13 App. to Answering Br. at B1–7 (Superseding Indictment).  
7 
 
 
COUNT 14 (Breach of Conditions of Bond During Commitment) 
 
DESHAUN J. HARRIS, on or between the 10th day of May, 2020 and the 
23rd day of April 2021, in the County of Kent, State of Delaware, having 
been committed in lieu of bail in connection with one or more charges of a 
felony prior to trial, did knowingly breach a condition imposed in connection 
with that bail by having contact with William Baker after a no contact order 
was entered.14 
 
Harris’s case proceeded to a jury trial in the Superior Court beginning on September 
8, 2021.  Immediately before the start of trial, the court granted Harris’s motion to sever 
the PFBPP charge from the remaining charges.  After a four-day trial, on September 14, 
2021, the jury found Harris guilty of two counts of Robbery First Degree, Assault Second 
Degree (as a lesser included offense of Assault First Degree), Burglary First Degree, 
Wearing a Disguise During the Commission of a Felony, two counts of Conspiracy Second 
Degree, two counts of Assault Third Degree, Theft, Aggravated Act of Intimidation, and 
Breach of Conditions of Bond During Commitment, and not guilty of PFDCF, Assault First 
Degree, and Aggravated Menacing.15  Because the jury had found Harris not guilty of 
PFDCF, the State dismissed the previously severed PFBPP charge.  The Superior Court 
ordered a presentence investigation and scheduled sentencing for a later date.   On October 
10, 2022, the Superior Court sentenced Harris to an aggregate 29 years of Level V 
incarceration followed by decreasing levels of supervision.  Harris appealed.  
 
 
14 Id. at B6 (Superseding Indictment).   
15 App. to Opening Br. A272–76 (Verdict Transcript, dated Sept. 14, 2021).   
8 
 
II. 
Issue on Appeal 
Harris contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the prison 
recordings over defense counsel’s objection that the probative value of the calls did not 
outweigh the highly prejudicial nature of the calls.  He challenges the trial court’s 
conclusions both as to the probative value of the recordings and as to their prejudicial 
nature.  First, he argues that the probative value of the prison phone call recordings was 
minimal and speculative because large portions of the transcribed calls are inaudible, and 
the voices heard on the calls were not properly authenticated.  Moreover, in Harris’s view, 
it was improper for the trial court to allow the jury to use a transcript of the tape to interpret 
the inaudible portions of the phone calls.  Second, Harris contends that the phone call 
recordings were unduly prejudicial because they made the jury aware that Harris was 
previously incarcerated, undermining the constitutionally guaranteed presumption of 
Harris’s innocence, and potentially allowing the jury to convict Harris on an improper 
basis.  
Harris asserts that this evidentiary error deprived him of his constitutional due 
process right to a fair trial, and that without the admission of the recordings, there is a 
reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different.  Accordingly, Harris 
asserts that reversal of his convictions is required. 
 
 
 
 
9 
 
III. 
Standard of Review 
This Court reviews “a trial court’s decision on the admissibility of evidence under 
an abuse of discretion standard.”16  “An abuse of discretion occurs when a court has 
exceeded the bounds of reason in light of the circumstances, or so ignored recognized rules 
of law or practice so as to produce injustice.”17   
IV. 
Discussion 
After a review of the record and Harris’s argument on appeal, we conclude that the 
Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the prison phone call recordings 
that revealed Harris’s efforts to influence a witness’s participation in his trial.    
A. D.R.E. 403  
“Evidence must be relevant to be admissible at trial.”18  “Relevant evidence is 
admissible unless [a statute, these Rules, or other rules applicable in the Courts of this 
State] provides otherwise.”19  “Evidence is relevant if (a) it has any tendency to make a 
fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of 
consequence in determining the action.”20  “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: 
 
16 Hines v. State, 248 A.3d 92, 99 (Del. 2021) (citing Rivers v. State, 183 A.3d 1240, 1243 (Del. 
2018). 
17 McCrary v. State, 290 A.3d 442, 454 (Del. 2023) (citing Thompson v. State, 205 A.3d 827, 834 
(Del. 2019)). 
18 Stickel v. State, 975 A.2d 780, 782 (Del. 2009) (citing D.R.E. 402 (2009)). 
19 D.R.E. 402.  
20 D.R.E. 401.  
10 
 
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or 
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”21  “The determinations of relevancy and 
unfair prejudice are ‘matters within the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be 
reversed in the absence of clear abuse of discretion.’”22   
Here, the focus of this appeal is the Superior Court’s balancing of the probative 
value of the recordings against their prejudicial effect.  In ruling on Harris’s evidentiary 
challenge under D.R.E. 403, the Superior Court carefully considered the contentions of the 
parties in this balancing exercise.  In a concise oral bench ruling, the Superior Court ruled 
as follows:   
So it seems to the Court that the issue with regard to the prison calls turns on, 
really, a singular point; which is, whether or not the probative value is 
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice to the defendant.  
 
Delaware Uniform Rule of Evidence 403 requires this Court to exclude 
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair 
prejudice to a defendant.  
 
Two of the charges outlined in the indictment in this case involve witness 
tampering or intimidation.  Further, there is both testimonial evidence and 
documentary evidence regarding contact made with Mr. Baker regarding his 
attendance and testimony in court today.  
 
The jury was alerted at the outset of this case that one of the indicted charges 
was breach of conditions of bond during commitment, so the jury already 
knows at some point the defendant was incarcerated.   
 
 
21 D.R.E. 403.  
22 Gallaway v. State, 65 A.3d 564, 569 (Del. 2013) (quoting Mercedes-Benz of N. Am. Inc. v. 
Norman Gershman’s Things to Wear, Inc., 596 A.3d 1358, 1366 (Del. 1991)). 
11 
 
The Court concludes that the State has sufficiently articulated witness 
tampering as the applicable government interest requisite to admission of the 
recorded prison calls.  They will be admitted.23   
 
As explained below, we agree with the Superior Court’s analysis and find no 
abuse of discretion. 
1. Probative Value  
As set forth above, Harris’s indictment charged him with, among other things, 
crimes related to his efforts to dissuade a witness from testifying against him at his trial for 
the robbery.24  The phone call recordings introduced at trial were probative of the central 
elements of those crimes.  
Baker testified that, after the robbery occurred, but before the trial began, 
individuals approached him, offered him $500 to sign three affidavits recanting his 
identification of Harris, and threatened his life if he refused to do so.25  In fear for his life 
and his family’s life,  Baker went with the individuals to the Dover Federal Credit Union 
and signed a document in which he “recant[ed] any statements [he] made against Deshaun 
J. Harris on May 10, 2020.”26  At trial, however, Baker testified that the statements in the 
document were not true and that Harris was in fact one of the two people who attacked and 
robbed his family in the motel room.27 
 
23 App. to Opening Br. at A223–24 (Trial Transcript at B130:21–B31:19). 
24 App. to Answering Br. at B6–7 (Superseding Indictment).  
25 App. to Opening Br. at A155 (Baker Trial Test. at B62:10–22). 
26 Id. at A155–56 (Baker Trial Test. at B62:3–4, B63:1–2). 
27 See e.g., id. at A152 (Baker Trial Test. at B59:15–18) (“Q: And so is that statement your 
statement? A. No. Q. Is that statement accurate? A. No.”). 
12 
 
The transcripts of the recordings of prison phone calls made between May 27, 2020 
and June 30, 2020 reflect a dialogue between an unidentified woman and a man, who 
introduces himself as Shaun, and uses Deshaun Harris’s State Bureau of Identification 
(SBI) number.  In the conversations, the two discuss, among other things, that the woman 
has been trying to induce an unnamed man to sign a statement she prepared, what format 
the statement needed to be in (cursive, printed, or typed),28 that “he got in a car and went 
to his bank” to sign the statement,29 and that there was an exchange of  “$500 cash.”30  In 
short, the prison phone call recordings corroborated Baker’s description of the efforts to 
dissuade him and provided context to the three forms (cursive, printed, and typed) of 
affidavits purporting to recant Baker’s identification of Harris.31   
This Court has previously recognized the probative value of prison phone call 
recordings in the context of a challenge to their admissibility.  In Anderson v. State, for 
example, the appellant argued that the Superior Court abused its discretion during his trial 
when it permitted the jury to hear recorded prison phone calls wherein he made statements 
that, according to the State, were intended to solicit family members to tamper with 
witnesses.32   This Court agreed with the Superior Court’s finding that “[t]he statements in 
the phone calls could easily be construed to demonstrate a consciousness of guilt and also 
 
28 App. to Answering Br. at B14–18 (Transcript of Phone Call Recordings at 6–10). 
29 Id. at B21–22 (Transcript of Phone Call Recordings at 13:24–14:1). 
30 Id. at B25 (Transcript of Phone Call Recordings at 17:6). 
31 Id. at B8–26 (Transcript of Phone Call Recordings); App. to Opening Br. at A151–56 (Baker 
Trial Test. at B58–63). 
32 Anderson v. State, 197 A.3d 1049, 2018 WL 6068736, at *1 (Del. Nov. 20, 2018) (TABLE).   
13 
 
the intention to intimidate witnesses.”33  Accordingly, we held that the Superior Court did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting the prison recordings.  Here, we conclude that the 
Superior Court did not err in concluding that the statements in the prison phone call 
recordings were corroborative of Baker’s testimony and probative of the charged crimes 
where two of the charges in the indictment involve witness tampering or intimidation.  
a. Clarity 
On appeal, Harris argues that the recordings lacked probative value because large 
portions of the transcribed calls are inaudible.34  To the extent that the clarity of the 
recording could undermine the probative value of the recordings, or confuse the jury, the 
Superior Court addressed that concern by directing the parties to prepare an agreed-upon 
transcript.35  In the final portion of its oral bench ruling, the Superior Court stated: 
I think there is a potential secondary 403 issue with the clarity of the call.  So 
counsel will need to confer.  You can barely hear the male person on that 
 
33 Id. See also Whitehurst v. State, 83 A.3d 362 (Del. 2013).  In Whitehurst, we affirmed the 
admission of prison recordings corroborating testimony of witness tampering.  There, the 
defendant-below, appellant argued both that the collection of the phone call recordings violated 
his Fourth and First Amendment rights, and that the introduction of the phone recordings tainted 
his trial.  Because we found the defendant’s constitutional claims to be without merit, we did not 
reach his secondary argument that the allegedly inadmissible evidence tainted his trial.  Id. at 363.  
See also Waters v. State, 242 A.3d 778, 783–84 (Del. 2020) (affirming defendant’s murder 
conviction and rejecting defendant’s argument that the Superior Court erred in admitting prison 
phone call recordings because the Attorney General’s subpoena violated the Fourth Amendment). 
34 Opening Br. at 9.  In his reply brief, Harris raises the additional argument that the prison call 
recordings and the prepared transcripts were needlessly cumulative and confusing given that Baker 
testified as to the contact, threats, and affidavits.  Reply Br. at 1–2.  Because Harris failed to raise 
this argument in his opening brief, it is waived.   
35 App. to Opening Br. at A224–25 (Trial Transcript at B131:20–B132:1) (“The recording will be 
edited to remove the GTL reference, and counsel will meet and agree on a transcript of the 
recording, a copy of which will go back to the jury with the recording.”).  The court ruled further 
that “a limiting instruction will be given regarding the jury’s use of the prison recording.”  Id. at 
A225 (Trial Transcript at B132:2–3). 
14 
 
phone call.  It’s difficult to hear.  And so that needs to be remedied.  The 
remedy that the Court can come up with given the probative value of what is 
able to be discerned on those calls is that you all meet and confer and come 
up with a transcript, and that will accompany the prison call.36 
 
Both parties agreed on the transcript and to allow the jurors to use the transcript to 
read along as they listened to the recording.37  Harris’s response that, had the trial court 
properly excluded the recordings, there would have been no need for the transcript in the 
first instance, is unavailing.38  Given the probative value of the recordings, it was proper 
for the trial court to fashion a method by which to admit the evidence and to minimize any 
resulting prejudice.39  The method ultimately used to address the clarity was reasonable as 
evidenced by the parties’ agreement to it.   
b. Authentication 
Next, Harris argues that the recordings lacked probative value because the male 
voice was not properly authenticated as belonging to Harris.  “To satisfy the requirement 
of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence 
sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”40  “The 
 
36 Id. at A225 (Trial Transcript at B132:6–13). 
37 Id. at A237 (Trial Transcript at 35–38).  The trial court asked defense counsel if she had any 
objection to providing the transcript to the jury as they listened to the recording at trial, as opposed 
to providing it during deliberations.  Defense counsel responded that she “believe[d] that’s the 
correct way to handle it.”  Id. (Trial Transcript at 37:10–16).  The transcript is in the State’s 
Appendix at B8–26.   
38 Reply Br. at 1. 
39 Concord Towers, Inc. v. Long, 348 A.2d 325, 326 (Del. 1975) (“[T]he Trial Court must balance 
its duty to admit all relevant and material evidence with its duty to enforce standards of fairness 
and the Rules of Court.”).  
40 D.R.E. 901(a).  
15 
 
burden of authentication is easily met.  The State must establish a rational basis from which 
the jury could conclude that the evidence is connected with the defendant.”41 
The State met its burden of authentication when it offered the testimony of  Timothy 
Martin (“Martin”), the legal service administrator for the Department of Correction and the 
custodian of prison phone call records.42  Martin testified that he pulled the call recordings 
associated with Harris between May 27, 2020 and June 30, 2020, identified the certificate 
of authenticity of records introduced by the State, and explained that the recording system 
requires the inmate to log on with their SBI number and then repeat a phrase for voice 
identification.43    
The authenticity of the recordings is further established through their content and 
context.44  A male voice, using Harris’s SBI number was heard speaking with a woman 
regarding efforts to convince a man to recant his identification of Harris as one of the 
 
41 Morris v. State, 210 A.3d 724, 2019 WL 2123563, at *6 (Del. May 13, 2019) (TABLE) (citing 
Cabrera v. State, 840 A.2d 1256, 1264–65 (Del. 2004) (en banc)).   
42 See App. to Opening Br. A235–38 (Martin Trial Test. at 27–40); see also D.R.E. 901(b)(1), 
(b)(4), (b)(6), (b)(7); Morris, 2019 WL 2123563, at *6 (finding that “the Superior Court acted 
within its discretion” in finding that the State had properly authenticated prison phone call 
recordings where it considered “testimony explaining how the telephone system functions, 
including its need to verify the inmate’s voice before placing a call, how [the police officer] 
obtained the records and recordings using [defendant’s] SBI number, and how the call log was 
connected to the recordings [the officer] gave to the State” as well as the victim’s testimony 
identifying the voices on the call).  
43 App. to Opening Br. at A235–36 (Martin Trial Test. at 27–30).   
44 See, e.g., Parker v. State, 85 A.3d 682, 688 (Del. 2014) (acknowledging that “Delaware follows 
the ‘distinguishing characteristics’ rationale,” and “noting that Delaware courts have authenticated 
handwritten letters from inside prison based on the nicknames of the parties involved and 
references to the crimes”); D.R.E. 901(b)(4) (“Distinctive Characteristics and the Like.  The 
appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, 
taken together with all the circumstances” satisfies authentication requirement).   
16 
 
individuals who participated in the motel room robbery.  The discussion mentions a 
specific dollar amount being paid to the unnamed man — $500 — the number given by 
Baker in his testimony.  Furthermore, these discussions heavily concerned the form of the 
affidavits and gave background to the reason that three different affidavits in three different 
formats exist, a unique circumstance.  The evidence was sufficient to allow a juror to 
conclude that the recording was authentic.45  Additionally, Harris was afforded the 
opportunity, of which he availed himself, to challenge the weight and credibility of the 
evidence.46 
2. Danger of Unfair Prejudice 
On the other end of the D.R.E. 403 balancing scale, Harris contends that the prison 
phone call recordings were unfairly prejudicial to him because they indicated to the jury 
that Harris was incarcerated at the time the calls were made, which undermined Harris’s 
 
45 See Parker, 85 A.3d at 688 (The substance, timing, and context of social media post “was 
sufficient for the trial court to find that a reasonable juror could determine that the proffered 
evidence was authentic.”) (citing D.R.E. 901(b)(4)).  We disagree with Harris that the State’s 
reliance on Parker v. State is misplaced.  Although in Parker the evidence at issue was a social 
media post, rather than phone call recordings, the standard and basis for authentication is the same.  
In Parker, we held that “social media evidence should be subject to the same authentication 
requirements under the Delaware Rules of Evidence Rule 901(b) as any other evidence,” id. at 
687, and thus, like any other evidence, “the trial judge as the gatekeeper of evidence may admit 
the social medial post when there is evidence sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable juror 
that the proffered evidence is what its proponent claims to be.”  Id. at 688 (internal quotation 
omitted). 
46 D.R.E. 104(e) (“[Rule 104 – Preliminary Questions] does not limit a party’s right to introduce 
before the jury evidence that is relevant to the weight or credibility of other evidence.”).  As a 
result of defense counsel’s questioning during voir dire, the State stipulated to potential flaws in 
this identification system, stating that it could be possible to not give your name for the voice 
recording, and that if one did not say his or her name three different times that the call could still 
go through.  App. to Opening Br. at A236 (Trial Transcript at 33:2–9). 
17 
 
constitutionally guaranteed presumption of innocence and could have led the jury to find 
him guilty on an improper basis.  This argument lacks merit.  For one, the jury was already, 
necessarily, made aware that Harris was incarcerated for a time because the charge for 
which Harris was on trial was Breach of Conditions of Bond During Commitment, an 
element of which is that the defendant be in custody.  Moreover, Harris stipulated at trial 
that he was incarcerated at the time.47  Finally, the trial judge properly instructed the jury 
to disregard any improper inference from the fact that Harris was incarcerated during the 
relevant time period.48  Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding 
that the probative value of the redacted and agreed upon transcript of Harris’s prison calls, 
and the recordings of the phone calls, was not substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice.   
 
 
 
 
47 App. to Opening Br. at A242 (Trial Transcript at 55).  Harris stipulated at trial that “from May 
27, 2020 to June 30th, 2020, [he] was committed to a detention center.”  Id. 
48 Id. at A258 (Trial Transcript at 121:14–21).  The Superior Court instructed the jury that:  
You have heard evidence that the defendant was incarcerated for a period of time.  
You are to draw no inference that because of this incarceration, the defendant is a 
bad person, disreputable, or that he is somehow more likely to have committed the 
crimes for which he has been accused.  You are to draw no such inference from this 
evidence. 
Id. See also Bartell v. State, 183 A.3d 1280, 2018 WL 1565636, at *2 (Del. Mar. 29, 2018) 
(“Bartell’s concern that the jury could misuse the knowledge that he had been detained prior to 
trial is a valid one, but the trial court met his concern by instructing the jurors two separate times 
that they should not infer that pretrial detention has any bearing on his guilt.”). 
18 
 
V. 
Conclusion 
For the above stated reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion when it admitted the prison phone call recordings.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM 
the judgment of the Superior Court.