Case Title: William Frances Silvia v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC09-220

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2011-04-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-220 
____________ 
 
WILLIAM FRANCES SILVIA,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
[April 7, 2011] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
William Frances Silvia was convicted of the September 22, 2006, first-
degree murder of his estranged wife, Patricia Silvia, and the attempted first-degree 
murder of Patricia‘s mother, Betty Woodard.  Silvia seeks review of his conviction 
and sentence of death for the first-degree murder of Patricia.  We have jurisdiction.  
See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  On appeal, Silvia raises six issues regarding the 
penalty phase leading to the imposition of the death sentence.  However, because 
this Court has an obligation to review the sufficiency of the evidence in all death 
penalty cases, we review both the evidence of guilt as well as the penalty-phase 
issues raised.  For the reasons set forth below, we affirm Silvia‘s convictions and 
 
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death sentence.   
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Guilt Phase 
 
The victim, Patricia Silvia, had been married to the defendant, William 
Frances Silvia, since 2002, but they separated in July 2006.  At the time of the 
murder, Silvia was forty-one and Patricia was thirty-nine.  After their separation, 
Patricia and two of her minor children from a previous marriage, Rachel and Ross, 
ages sixteen and thirteen, moved into the Winter Park home of her mother, Betty 
Woodard, and her stepfather, Patrick Woodard.  Robin McIntyre, Patricia‘s sister, 
also lived at the home.  On several occasions prior to the evening of the murder, 
Silvia had visited the Woodard home unannounced in the middle of the night to 
speak to Patricia.  Every time, Silvia was turned away.  
 
On the day of the murder, Silvia was fired from his job.  He had already 
become homeless after the separation, was living in his truck, and at times rented a 
motel room.  That afternoon, after being fired, Silvia purchased a pump action 
twelve-gauge Mossberg 500 shotgun and ammunition and rented a motel room at 
the Regency Inn.  Later that evening, the Woodards were hosting a cookout in their 
carport area.  Those in attendance included Patricia, her children Ross and Rachel, 
her sister Robin, her parents, Patrick‘s brother Jerome Woodard, and several other 
friends.  At around 9 p.m., Silvia drove to the Woodard home with the shotgun and 
 
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ammunition in his truck, apparently hoping to reconcile with Patricia.   
When Silvia arrived at the home, he asked to speak with Patricia, who came 
outside to speak with him.  They spoke briefly, after which Patricia went back into 
the house.  As Patricia walked away, Rachel overheard Silvia tell Patricia, ―You 
will be sorry.‖  Silvia walked back to his truck—a distance of approximately one 
hundred feet—retrieved his shotgun, and fired two shots as he walked back to the 
Woodard home.     
At this point, Patrick‘s brother, Jerome, who was in the carport at the time, 
jumped to the ground between two vehicles.  After the shooting started, Patricia‘s 
sister, Robin, left the carport and entered the home.  Rachel, who was also in the 
carport, heard the gunshots and attempted to go into the house to find her brother, 
Ross.  When Rachel got up to find her brother, Silvia pointed a gun at her from a 
foot away in the carport.  At this point, Patricia and Betty were in the kitchen, 
adjacent to the carport.  As Betty opened the door from the kitchen to the carport, 
she was shot in the face.  Patricia, who was getting iced tea out of the refrigerator, 
was also shot in the head, causing her to collapse in front of the refrigerator.  Ross 
was standing near Patricia when she was shot.1  Patrick Woodard, who was in the 
bedroom when he first heard gunshots, left the bedroom to check on things and 
                                          
 
 
1.  There is conflicting testimony concerning the location of Ross during this 
incident, but the trial court stated in its sentencing order that Ross was standing 
close to Patricia when she was shot. 
 
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saw Patricia lying on the floor in front of the refrigerator door.  Patrick then looked 
outside the open door to the carport and saw Betty on the floor bleeding and 
covering her face.  Patrick saw Silvia at the end of the carport holding a twelve-
gauge shotgun, pointing the shotgun at Patrick and pumping it.   
Silvia fired a total of seven shots at the scene that evening, two shots into the 
air and the other shots at the Woodard carport and home, and then left in his truck.  
During the shooting, Silvia shot Patricia and Betty.  Patricia died at the scene.  
Betty, who was shot in the face, was airlifted by helicopter to Orlando Regional 
Medical Center in ―grim‖ condition with massive facial and head trauma and blood 
loss.   
According to the medical examiner, Patricia had numerous pellet gunshot 
entry wounds on her head.  There was a pellet gunshot entry wound behind her left 
ear which entered her skull.  A ―big pellet‖ entered through the top of Patricia‘s 
left ear, pierced her skull, and stopped in the right front lobe of her brain.  There 
were additional pellet wounds on the back of Patricia‘s head, resulting in massive 
trauma.  Either the pellets or bone fragments caused exit wounds.  The medical 
examiner concluded that Patricia died as a result of the shotgun pellet wounds to 
her head.   
Police later arrested Silvia in the parking lot of the motel where Silvia had 
rented a room.  While no evidence established that Silvia was intoxicated at the 
 
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time of the murder on September 22, 2006, during his arrest in the early morning 
hours of September 23, 2006, Silvia appeared intoxicated or impaired.2  During his 
transport to the Seminole County Sheriff‘s Office, Silvia confessed to the shooting.  
He asked the officer transporting him whether the officer was married and 
indicated that ―he was in the situation‖ because he was married.  Silvia admitted to 
shooting Patricia because she spent all of their money and then started dating her 
ex-husband.   
Law enforcement officers later obtained a search warrant for Silvia‘s motel 
room and truck.  In his motel room, they found a pump action twelve-gauge 
Mossberg 500 shotgun, shotgun shells, weapons manuals, and several empty beer 
bottles, among other items.  The shotgun shells collected from Silvia‘s motel room 
were the same brand as those collected at the crime scene.  A firearms analyst 
examined and test-fired the shotgun found in Silvia‘s motel room and concluded 
that the shells collected at the crime scene were fired from the same shotgun.   
The jury found Silvia guilty of one count of first-degree murder for the 
murder of Patricia and one count of attempted first-degree murder for the shooting 
of Betty.         
                                          
 
 
2.  Two receipts were located in Silvia‘s motel room—each for a purchase of 
a six pack of beer dated September 22, 2006, at 6:09 p.m., and September 22, 
2006, at 10:02 p.m.  This indicates that one purchase was before the murder and 
one purchase was after the murder. 
 
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The Penalty Phase 
Both the State and Silvia presented evidence at the penalty phase.  The State 
presented two witnesses, Beth Parker and Patrick Woodard, who testified about 
what they observed on the night Silvia killed Patricia.  A victim advocate read 
victim impact letters written by Patricia‘s children, Ross, Rachel, Ronny, and 
Randy, and her coworker, Aura Boyd.  Patricia‘s sister, Pam Wyatt, also testified.   
Silvia presented two penalty phase witnesses—his father, William Silvia, Sr. 
(William), and Dr. Deborah Day, a psychologist.  William testified that the 
relationship between himself and Silvia‘s mother was very volatile, characterized 
by both verbal and physical fighting, which Silvia witnessed.  As a child, Silvia 
played little league baseball and was on a swim team, but was quiet and a loner 
with few friends.  Silvia ran away several times as a teenager.  During one such 
incident, Silvia attempted to rob a bank with his brother John, was arrested, and 
subsequently spent time in the psychiatric unit of the Florida Hospital.   
William further testified that Silvia‘s mother was killed by a drunk driver in 
1999 or 2000.  Silvia was greatly affected by his mother‘s death because they 
worked together in his mother‘s screen business, and Silvia was therefore 
unemployed after she died.  In 2001, Silvia‘s brother John died of a drug-induced 
heart attack.  After the death of her mother, Silvia‘s sister was classified as being 
bipolar and placed in a psychiatric ward.   
 
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Dr. Day, a forensic psychologist, evaluated Silvia at the request of defense 
counsel.  Silvia smoked marijuana and drank alcohol since adolescence and 
eventually became alcohol dependent.  Silvia‘s father, William, was physically 
abusive to both Silvia and his mother, and Silvia‘s family has a history of 
substance abuse and mental illness.  During the time Silvia lived with Patricia, his 
second wife, he started having paranoid thoughts.  However, Silvia showed no 
gross signs of brain injury or trauma, and he has an IQ of 107, which is considered 
average.  In Dr. Day‘s opinion, Silvia has ―extreme‖ mental health problems.  She 
found him to be very immature, alienated and impulsive, and suffering from 
significant levels of anxiety and depression.  Dr. Day diagnosed Silvia with 
delusional disorder and personality disorder not otherwise specified, the latter of 
which included antisocial, schizoid, and paranoid elements. 
 
Silvia told Dr. Day that on the day of the murder, he went to see Patricia, 
they talked, and then he went to the truck and got his shotgun.  Silvia claimed that 
he did not remember anything else until he heard gunshots and that he did not 
remember leaving the residence.  He did remember being back in his motel room.  
He went to talk to Patricia about whether they were going to reconcile or get a 
divorce.  Silvia was suffering from paranoia that his wife was having an affair with 
her ex-husband and another man and that these people and others were out to get 
him.  Dr. Day opined that it was more likely that Silvia would act out the way that 
 
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he did due to his impulsiveness and alcohol abuse.  When asked about Silvia‘s 
alcohol consumption on the day of the murder, Dr. Day noted that the amount of 
alcohol Silvia consumed was not excessive for him given Silvia‘s alcohol 
dependence.  In Dr. Day‘s opinion, Silvia had the mental capacity to premeditate 
the murder in a cold, calculated, and premeditated fashion.  Although Dr. Day 
testified that Silvia‘s ability to appreciate the criminality of his actions or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was not ―substantially‖ 
impaired, she did state that it was ―somewhat‖ impaired in that he has a ―severe 
personality disorder,‖ is ―impulsive,‖ was drinking alcohol, and has ―false beliefs.‖ 
 
The State called a psychiatrist, Dr. Jeffrey Danziger, as a rebuttal witness.  
Dr. Danziger conducted an evaluation of Silvia and agreed with Dr. Day that 
psychological testing was consistent with ―severe personality and character 
pathology.‖  Dr. Danziger described Silvia as: 
Someone with a long-standing history of being suspicious of others, 
blaming others, sort of a hostile, irritable individual, suspicious, 
resentful, irritable, argumentative, perhaps often obnoxious.  Someone 
who has difficulty with authority.  Someone who likely has substance 
abuse issues.  The profile was possibly consistent with someone who 
may have bizarre thinking and bizarre thoughts.  It did not prove that 
he was psychotic . . . . 
 
On the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2) test, Silvia 
scored very high on the psychopathic deviant and paranoia scales.   
Dr. Danziger further stated that while Silvia self-reported delusions and 
 
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previous blackouts from drinking heavily, and that he drank a six-pack of beer 
before the murder, Dr. Danziger agreed that at the time of the murder, Silvia was 
not intoxicated.  Moreover, Silvia‘s jail records did not indicate paranoia, 
hallucinations, or psychosis.  Dr. Danziger noted that when Silvia was in jail, 
without access to drugs or alcohol, he was not having delusions.  However, on one 
occasion, a guard relayed to a nurse that Silvia was acting strangely and the nurse 
referred him to the jail psychologist for ―hallucination anxiety.‖  The jail 
psychologist treated Silvia for depression and made a note to ―rule out psychosis,‖ 
but subsequent to that incident, no records indicated that Silvia exhibited any other 
delusional thoughts. 
 
Dr. Danziger agreed with Dr. Day‘s diagnosis of personality disorder not 
otherwise specified, with antisocial and paranoid traits.  Dr. Danziger thought it 
was ―possible‖ that Silvia‘s personality disorder had schizoid elements, but was 
not as certain as Dr. Day of this.  In Dr. Danziger‘s opinion, the antisocial 
characteristic was the prominent one.  Dr. Danziger also agreed with Dr. Day that 
Silvia is alcohol dependent.   
After the penalty phase, the jury recommended death by a vote of eleven to 
one.   
The Spencer3 Hearing 
                                          
 
 
3.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993).   
 
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At the Spencer hearing before the trial court, the defense presented the 
testimony of Dr. Daniel Buffington, a forensic pharmacologist, and the State again 
presented the testimony of Dr. Danziger.  Dr. Buffington evaluated Silvia after the 
penalty phase.  Dr. Buffington opined that Silvia was both alcohol- and marijuana- 
dependent.  Silvia‘s substance abuse would worsen or magnify the problems 
associated with Silvia‘s personality disorders.  Chronic alcoholism causes 
pathological changes in the brain, and therefore, in Silvia‘s case, he need not be 
intoxicated to have impaired mental functioning.   
 
Dr. Buffington testified that prior to the shooting, Silvia lost his wife, his 
job, and his home.  He had a documented history of suicidal ideation at different 
times of peak stress.  Silvia‘s purpose in visiting with his wife was to reconcile as a 
foundation to keep on living, and if not, his goal was to commit suicide.  Some of 
Silvia‘s paranoia was fueled by past visits to the Woodard home, where he was 
chased away by family members and threatened by his wife‘s ex-husband and 
elder son.  On the day of the murder, Silvia consumed a six-pack of beer, but Dr. 
Buffington testified that there were no signs of intoxication at the time of the 
murder and that this is not an ―intoxication‖ case.  Nonetheless, Dr. Buffington 
opined that Silvia was impaired in his ability to function and he could have been 
operating under a delusion.  After losing his home and his job, the thought of 
losing his marriage caused an extreme emotional disturbance.    
 
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In rebuttal, the State again called Dr. Danziger who testified that Silvia does 
not have a full-blown delusional disorder or paranoid delusions.  Rather, he has 
paranoid personality characteristics.  Dr. Danziger testified that Silvia does not 
have a mental illness; instead, Dr. Danziger diagnosed him with a personality 
disorder.  Silvia never stated that he purchased the gun to commit suicide and 
actually denied wanting to commit suicide.   
The trial court followed the jury‘s recommendation and imposed a sentence 
of death for the murder of Patricia.  It imposed a sentence of life imprisonment for 
the attempted first-degree murder of Betty.  The court found three aggravating 
circumstances—each of which it gave great weight.  First, the court found that 
Silvia‘s contemporaneous conviction for attempted murder for the shooting of 
Betty Woodard established the prior violent felony aggravator.  Second, the court 
found that Silvia created a great risk of death to many persons.  Third, the court 
found that the capital felony was a homicide and was committed in a cold, 
calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal 
justification (―CCP‖).  The trial court did not find any statutory mitigating 
circumstances,4 but found several nonstatutory mitigating circumstances: (1) 
                                          
 
 
4.  The trial court considered the statutory mitigating circumstances of 
extreme emotional distress at the time of the killing and substantial impairment of 
ability to conform behavior to the requirements of the law, but found that they had 
not been established.   
 
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emotional distress from loss of job and wife (little weight); (2) impaired ability to 
conform conduct due to chronic personality disorder not otherwise specified and 
chronic alcohol dependence (moderate weight); (3) chronic personality disorder 
not otherwise specified with paranoid, antisocial, and schizoid features and alcohol 
dependence (moderate weight); (4) chronic alcohol dependence (moderate weight); 
(5) diagnosis as a teenager with ―schizoid‖ or ―schizophreniform‖ disorder (little 
weight); and (6) dysfunctional family setting when growing up with domestic 
violence (little weight).   
ANALYSIS 
 
In this direct appeal, Silvia raises six issues—all of which Silvia alleges 
relate to the penalty phase.5  In addition to the issues raised by Silvia, this Court 
must consider whether the evidence was sufficient to support Silvia‘s first-degree 
murder conviction.  We now address each issue.  
Guilt-Phase Issues 
Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Silvia has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, but this Court has a 
                                          
 
 
5.  Silvia argues: (1) the trial court erred in finding CCP; (2) the trial court 
erred in finding that Silvia knowingly created a great risk of death to many 
persons; (3) his death sentence is not proportionate; (4) the prosecutor‘s repeated 
improper and inflammatory elicitation of irrelevant evidence tainted the penalty 
phase; (5) reversible error occurred when the trial court permitted improper victim 
impact evidence; and (6) Florida‘s death sentencing scheme is unconstitutional 
under the Sixth Amendment pursuant to Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  
 
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mandatory obligation to review the sufficiency of the evidence in every case in 
which a sentence of death has been imposed.  See Jones v. State, 963 So. 2d 180, 
184 (Fla. 2007); Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(6) (―In death penalty cases, whether or 
not insufficiency of the evidence or proportionality is an issue presented for 
review, the court shall review these issues and, if necessary, remand for the 
appropriate relief.‖).  ―In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, the question 
is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a 
rational trier of fact could have found the existence of the elements of the crime 
beyond a reasonable doubt.‖  Simmons v. State, 934 So. 2d 1100, 1111 (Fla. 2006) 
(quoting Bradley v. State, 787 So. 2d 732, 738 (Fla. 2001)).   
We conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence to support Silvia‘s 
conviction for the first-degree murder of Patricia.  The State presented evidence 
that Silvia confessed to the officer transporting him to jail that he shot Patricia 
because she spent all of their money and then started dating her ex-husband.  This 
constituted direct evidence of Silvia‘s guilt.  See Simpson v. State, 3 So. 3d 1135, 
1147 (Fla. 2009) (concluding that confession by appellant constituted direct 
evidence of guilt).  Moreover, several witnesses, including Betty Woodard, Patrick 
Woodard, Jerome Woodard, and two of Patricia‘s children, Rachel and Ross, all 
testified that Silvia was firing a shotgun near the carport of the Woodard home on 
the night in question, resulting in Patricia‘s death.  Evidence established that shells 
 
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collected at the crime scene were fired from the shotgun found in Silvia‘s motel 
room.   
 
Based on a review of the evidence presented in this case, a ―rational trier of 
fact could have found the existence of the elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.‖  Simmons, 934 So. 2d at 1111.  Thus, there was sufficient 
evidence to support Silvia‘s conviction for first-degree murder. 
Penalty-Phase Issues 
The Cold, Calculated, and Premeditated Aggravating Circumstance 
Silvia first challenges the CCP aggravator.  The trial court found that this 
aggravating circumstance had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and gave it 
great weight.  The trial court entered an order describing, in great detail, the basis 
for its findings: 
The evidence is sufficient to establish that the murder of 
Patricia Silvia was the product of cool and calm reflection by the 
Defendant and not prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of 
rage. . . .  From the date of the separation until the evening of 
September 22, 2006, the Defendant came by the Woodard‘s home 
several times and called on the phone to talk to Patricia Silvia, seeking 
to reconcile with her.  Patricia Silvia was not receptive to the 
Defendant‘s attempts to reconcile. 
 
On September 22, 2006, at approximately 3:50 p.m., the 
Defendant purchased a 12 gauge Mossberg Persuader shotgun from 
Shoot Straight II.  The surveillance video from Shoot Straight II 
shows the Defendant looking at the guns in the store, speaking with 
the store clerk, selecting the 12 gauge Mossberg Persuader shotgun, 
purchasing the shotgun and leaving the store with the shotgun.  This 
video is important because it shows the Defendant on the day of the 
murder calmly participating in a routine transaction.  The Defendant 
 
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exhibited no bizarre, agitated, frenzied or panicked behavior.  The 
Defendant was calm the entire time he was at Shoot Straight II.  He 
then went to Al‘s Army Navy where he purchased four individual 
boxes of shells, including both bird and buck shot. 
 
The Defendant rented a hotel room at the Regency Inn on 
Highway 17-92 in Fern Park that same afternoon and purchased a six-
pack of beer at the nearby Winn-Dixie at 6:09 p.m.  Approximately 
five and a half hours after purchasing the shotgun, the Defendant 
drove to the Woodard‘s home with the shotgun and ammunition in his 
truck. 
 
Later that evening the Defendant went to the Woodward‘s 
home to give Patricia Silvia one last chance to reconcile with him, 
and, if she refused, to kill her.  When Patricia Silvia walked away 
from the Defendant after briefly speaking with him, Rachel Shadron 
heard the Defendant tell her mother, ―You will be sorry.‖  The 
Defendant walked back to his truck, got his shotgun, and, as he 
walked back to the Woodard‘s house, commenced shooting.  The first 
shot was fired into the air and the next six shots were fired into the 
Woodard‘s carport and house.  After firing seven rounds and killing 
Patricia Silvia, the Defendant walked back to his truck and drove 
away. 
There is no evidence that the Defendant was intoxicated at the 
time of the murder or at anytime on September 22, 2006.  There is no 
evidence that the murder of Patricia Silvia, or any of Defendant‘s 
conduct on September 22, 2006, was prompted by emotional frenzy, 
panic, or a fit of rage. 
The Defendant was arrested in the early morning hours of 
September 23, 2006.  The Defendant asked Sergeant Hardesty, the 
law enforcement officer driving him to the jail, if he was married. 
Sergeant Hardesty said, ―Yes.‖  The Defendant then stated, ―That‘s 
the reason I‘m in this situation.  My wife spent all my money.  I 
placed the checking account in her name.  She started re-dating her 
ex-husband.  That is the reason I shot her.‖  Sergeant Hardesty 
described the Defendant as lacking any type of emotion during his 
arrest and transport to jail.  The evidence supports the ―cold‖ element 
of the CCP aggravator. 
 
The evidence is sufficient to establish that the Defendant had a 
careful plan or prearranged design to commit murder before the 
killing.  Approximately five and a half hours before killing Patricia 
Silvia, the Defendant armed himself by purchasing the shotgun and 
 
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shells used to kill her.  He put the shotgun and shells in his truck when 
he went to the Woodard‘s house that evening.  The Defendant‘s plan 
was to give Patricia Silvia one last chance to reconcile with him and, 
if she refused, to kill her. 
 
When Patricia Silvia walked away from him that evening, 
Rachel heard the Defendant say to her mother, ―You will be sorry.‖  
He walked back to his truck.  The Defendant could have gotten into 
his truck and driven away.  No one followed the Defendant when he 
left the Woodard‘s home.  Instead, the Defendant calmly continued to 
carry out his plan to kill.  The Defendant got his shotgun and walked 
back approximately one hundred feet to the carport, shooting as he 
walked, until he had a clear shot of Patricia Silvia.  Then he shot her 
in the head.  
 
The Defendant gave the mental health experts in this case 
different reasons for purchasing the shotgun on September 22, 2006. 
At first, the Defendant reported that he bought it for his own safety. 
He was sleeping in his truck and he said he needed the shotgun to 
protect himself.  The Defendant had been homeless for some time 
prior to September 22, 2006.  Then, he said he was afraid of the 
Woodard family.  Yet, the Defendant did not take the shotgun with 
him the first time he went to the Woodard‘s home.  At some point, he 
reported he was afraid of Patricia Silvia‘s ex-husband.  Lastly, he told 
Dr. Buffington that he bought the shotgun to commit suicide.  Neither 
Dr. Day nor Dr. Danziger found the Defendant suicidal.  The court 
rejects the Defendant‘s inconsistent statements as to why he 
purchased the shotgun and finds the Defendant purchased the shotgun 
to kill Patricia Silvia. 
Patricia Silvia‘s murder was neither spontaneous, nor 
impulsive.  The killing of Patricia Silvia was carried out as a matter of 
course, consistent with the Defendant‘s careful plan.  The evidence 
supports the ―calculated‖ element of the CCP aggravator. 
 
(Footnotes omitted.)  We conclude that there is competent, substantial evidence to 
support the trial court‘s finding of this aggravator.  See Barnhill v. State, 834 So. 
2d 836, 850-51 (Fla. 2002) (―[T]he trial judge‘s ruling on an aggravating 
circumstance will be sustained on review as long as the court applied the right rule 
 
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of law and its ruling is supported by competent, substantial evidence . . . .‖).  
In order to establish the CCP aggravator, the evidence must show that (1) 
―the killing was the product of cool and calm reflection and not an act prompted by 
emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of rage (cold)‖; (2) ―the defendant had a careful 
plan or prearranged design to commit murder before the fatal incident 
(calculated)‖; (3) ―the defendant exhibited heightened premeditation 
(premeditated)‖; and (4) ―the defendant had no pretense of moral or legal 
justification.‖  Franklin v. State, 965 So. 2d 79, 98 (Fla. 2007).  This can be 
established ―by examining the circumstances of the killing and the conduct of the 
accused.‖  Id.  ―The CCP aggravator can ‗be indicated by circumstances showing 
such facts as advance procurement of a weapon, lack of resistance or provocation, 
and the appearance of a killing carried out as a matter of course.‘ ‖  Id. (quoting 
Swafford v. State, 533 So. 2d 270, 277 (Fla. 1988)).  ― ‗CCP involves a much 
higher degree of premeditation‘ than is required to prove first-degree murder.‖  
Deparvine v. State, 995 So. 2d 351, 381-82 (Fla. 2008) (quoting Foster v. State, 
778 So. 2d 906, 921 (Fla. 2000)).   
Silvia first asserts that the killings were not the product of heightened 
premeditation or cool and calm reflection, but rather were actions prompted by his 
―emotional‖ and ―domestic turmoil.‖  The trial court rejected this view of the 
crime, and we conclude that the trial court‘s findings are supported by competent, 
 
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substantial evidence.  As to Silvia‘s ―heightened premeditation‖ claim, the record 
indicates that approximately five and a half hours before killing Patricia, Silvia 
armed himself by purchasing the shotgun and shells he used to kill her.  The 
shotgun and shells were in his truck when he drove to the Woodard home that 
evening.  When Silvia arrived at the home, he was not provoked by Patricia or 
anyone else.  Further, when Patricia walked away from Silvia after speaking with 
him that evening, Silvia remarked, ―You will be sorry,‖ and walked back to his 
truck—a distance of approximately 100 feet.  Rather than getting into his truck and 
leaving the Woodard home, Silvia calmly chose the criminal option by retrieving 
the shotgun from his truck and returning to the carport, shooting as he walked—
ultimately shooting both Patricia and her mother, Betty.  As the trial court 
concluded, Silvia carried out the murder of Patricia as a matter of course, 
consistent with his careful plan—all of his actions reflecting a deliberate and 
conscious choice to commit murder.  In light of this evidence, we conclude that the 
trial court did not err in finding the heightened premeditation needed to establish 
CCP. 
Second, Silvia claims that because he has been diagnosed with a personality 
and delusional disorder, this diagnosis precludes a finding that he acted in a calm, 
reflective manner, as required by the CCP aggravator.  This argument is likewise 
unpersuasive.  We have held that a ―defendant can be emotionally and mentally 
 
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disturbed or suffer from a mental illness but still have the ability to experience cool 
and calm reflection, make a careful plan or prearranged design to commit murder, 
and exhibit heightened premeditation.‖  Evans v. State, 800 So. 2d 182, 193 (Fla. 
2001); see also Owen v. State, 862 So. 2d 687, 701 (Fla. 2003) (relying on Evans 
to reject defendant‘s claim that his mental illness must negate the CCP aggravator).  
Although there was certainly evidence of mental mitigation, the trial court rejected 
the mitigating circumstance that Silvia was under extreme emotional distress at the 
time of the killing.   
Certainly, there have been cases where ―we have determined that CCP was 
erroneously found because the heated passions involved were antithetical to ‗cold‘ 
deliberation.‖  Spencer v. State, 691 So. 2d 1062, 1065 (Fla. 1996).  In this case, 
however, the trial court‘s findings to the contrary are supported by the record.  
Although Patricia and Silvia had recently separated, and Silvia had visited the 
Woodard home to speak with Patricia on several occasions, the record lacks 
evidence showing the type of ongoing, highly emotional dispute needed to refute a 
finding of cool and calm reflection.  See Santos v. State, 591 So. 2d 160, 162-63 
(Fla. 1991). 
In this case, despite Silvia‘s personality disorder and alcohol dependence, 
his actions do not ―suggest a frenzied, spur-of-the-moment attack.‖  Evans, 800 So. 
2d at 193.  There is no evidence of impairment or intoxication at the time of the 
 
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crimes.  The evidence shows that Silvia calmly purchased a shotgun and 
ammunition.  He rented a motel room and prepared for his confrontation with 
Patricia, even obtaining weapons manuals in addition to the shotgun and 
ammunition.  He drove to the Woodard home and calmly talked to her, but when 
she said she would not reconcile, he walked back to his truck and got his shotgun.  
He fired seven shots, pumping the shotgun to reload it each time. 
Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in finding CCP. 
The Great Risk of Death to Many Persons Aggravating Circumstance 
 
Silvia next challenges the trial court‘s finding of the aggravator that Silvia 
knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.  The trial court entered an 
extremely detailed order explaining that Silvia‘s discharge of the firearm multiple 
times put several people in the vicinity of the shooting at great risk of death.  Silvia 
argues that there was not competent, substantial evidence to support this 
aggravator because his gunfire was intended for only one person—Patricia.  He 
also claims that ―the mere fact that several people are present during a shooting is 
not sufficient to support this aggravating factor.‖  Finally, he contends that for this 
aggravator to be established in a shooting crime, the evidence must show that 
many people were ―in the line of fire‖ during the shooting and that this was not the 
case at the Woodard home on the night in question.  
In Johnson v. State, 696 So. 2d 317, 325 (Fla. 1997), this Court explained 
 
- 21 - 
what is required to establish the aggravator that a defendant ―knowingly created a 
great risk of death to many persons‖:  
We have stated that this aggravator cannot be supported in situations 
where death to many people is merely a possibility.  Instead, there 
must be a likelihood or high probability of death to many people.  
Further, we have indicated that the word ―many‖ must be read plainly.  
Therefore, we uphold the application of this aggravating circumstance 
in scenarios in which four or more persons other than the victim are 
threatened with a great risk of death.  
 
(Citations omitted.)  It is with these guidelines in mind that we address, and 
reject, Silvia‘s claims on this issue.    
 
Silvia first relies on Williams v. State, 574 So. 2d 136, 138 (Fla. 1991), in 
which this Court concluded: 
First, the trial court found the factor of great risk to many 
persons based on the fact that several other persons were present in 
the bank at the time of the robbery.  We believe this factual situation, 
without more, is insufficient to support this factor.  This factor is 
properly found only when, beyond any reasonable doubt, the actions 
of the defendant created an immediate and present risk of death for 
many persons.  While we agree that Williams‘ actions created some 
degree of risk, we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
created an immediate and present risk to the others in the bank.  There 
is no evidence, for instance, of indiscriminate shooting in the direction 
of bank customers, but only of an intent to kill the bank guard. 
 
Silvia compares this case to Williams because the only intended victim was 
Patricia Silvia and ―[t]he evidence is not clear on the number of people present at 
the carport when Silvia began shooting.‖  Silvia also compares this case to Alvin v. 
State, 548 So. 2d 1112, 1115 (Fla. 1989), in which this Court concluded that this 
 
- 22 - 
aggravator was not met where only two other people were in the area but not ―in 
the line of fire‖: 
We agree that the evidence does not support the finding that Alvin 
knowingly created a risk of death to many persons.  The judge‘s 
findings indicated that when the shooting took place there were four 
people in the vicinity, two of whom were Powell and Grimes.  There 
were two women in the area, but they were not in the line of fire.  We 
have previously held that the presence of two persons in the 
immediate proximity to the victim of a murder by shooting is 
insufficient to establish this aggravating factor. 
 
Silvia contends that because only Betty and Patrick Woodard were in the line of 
fire, the four-person threshold required in Johnson is not met.  We conclude, 
however, that both Williams and Alvin are distinguishable from the instant case.  
Although Silvia may have intended to kill only Patricia, there is competent, 
substantial evidence to support a finding that Silvia engaged in ―indiscriminate 
shooting‖ in the direction of at least four persons other than Patricia who were not 
only put in ―an immediate and present risk of death,‖ Williams, 574 So. 2d at 138, 
but were also ―in the line of fire,‖ Alvin, 548 So. 2d at 1115.   
As concluded by the trial court, ―[n]ot counting the murder victim, the 
evidence is sufficient to establish that Betty Woodard, Patrick Woodard, Ross 
Shadron, Rachel Shadron, Jerome Woodard and Robin McIntyre were knowingly 
put in great risk of death by [Silvia].‖  Silvia concedes that Betty and Patrick 
Woodard were in the line of fire—Betty herself was shot and Silvia pumped the 
shotgun and aimed it at Patrick.  There is competent, substantial evidence to 
 
- 23 - 
support a conclusion that at least four persons in addition to Betty and Patrick were 
in the line of fire.  Ross, Patricia‘s twelve-year-old son, testified that when the 
shooting started, he was in the house and ran toward the door near the carport.  
Everyone was ―just running in‖ through the open door.  Ross was standing next to 
his mother, Patricia, as the others ran inside the house.  Silvia shot at the door and 
Patricia fell directly in front of Ross.  Rachel, Patricia‘s daughter, testified that she 
was in the carport when she heard gunshots.  She stood up to find her brother, 
Ross.  Silvia was standing less than a foot away from Rachel when he pointed the 
shotgun at her.  Additionally, Jerome Woodard, Patrick‘s brother, was in the 
carport when he heard shots.  He dropped to the ground and hid between two 
vehicles.  There was birdshot found in the car behind which Jerome hid and in a 
pillar in the carport near where he was located.  Finally, there was evidence that 
Robin McIntyre, Patricia‘s sister, was in the carport when the shooting started and 
ran into the house through the open carport door before Patrick closed it.   
We therefore conclude there was competent, substantial evidence that 
Silvia‘s actions created a great risk of death to many persons.  He approached the 
house while pumping shells into his shotgun.  Pellets hit one of the cars in the 
carport, different locations in the carport, and the door from the carport to the 
house.  Pellets were found inside the house in the kitchen, dining room, and 
bedroom.  There were six unarmed people in the carport and house when Silvia 
 
- 24 - 
approached, shooting and pointing the gun at people. 
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in finding the great 
risk of death aggravator. 
Proportionality of Death Sentence 
Silvia next argues that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for 
the murder of Patricia.  We deny relief on this claim. 
The death penalty is ―reserved only for those cases where the most 
aggravating and least mitigating circumstances exist.‖  Terry v. State, 668 So. 2d 
954, 965 (Fla. 1996).  Therefore, in deciding whether death is a proportionate 
penalty, the Court makes a ―comprehensive analysis in order to determine whether 
the crime falls within the category of both the most aggravated and the least 
mitigated of murders, thereby assuring uniformity in the application of the 
sentence.‖  Anderson v. State, 841 So. 2d 390, 407-08 (Fla. 2003) (citation 
omitted).  Accordingly, the Court considers the totality of the circumstances and 
compares the case with other similar capital cases.  See Duest v. State, 855 So. 2d 
33, 47 (Fla. 2003).  This analysis ―is not a comparison between the number of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances.‖  Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060, 1064 
(Fla. 1990).  Rather, this entails ―a qualitative review by this Court of the 
underlying basis for each aggravator and mitigator rather than a quantitative 
analysis.‖  Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 416 (Fla. 1998).  In reviewing the 
 
- 25 - 
sentence for proportionality, this Court will accept the jury‘s recommendation and 
the weight assigned by the trial judge to the aggravating and mitigating factors.  
See Bates v. State, 750 So. 2d 6, 12 (Fla. 1999).   
In this case, the jury recommended death by a vote of eleven to one for 
Patricia‘s murder.  The trial court found the following three aggravating 
circumstances:  (1) prior violent felony; (2) CCP; and (3) knowingly creating a 
great risk of death to many persons.  The trial court found no statutory mitigation, 
but found several nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, including the emotional 
distress from the loss of Silvia‘s job and his wife, chronic personality disorder and 
alcohol dependence, and growing up in a dysfunctional family. 
 
Silvia relies on Santos v. State, 629 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1994), and White v. 
State, 616 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1993), which are both cases with a single aggravator6 
and statutory mitigation.  Silvia also relies on Farinas v. State, 569 So. 2d 425, 431 
(Fla. 1990), in which this Court found a death sentence to be disproportionate: 
On review of the record, we conclude that there was evidence 
which tended to establish that the murder was committed while the 
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance.  § 921.141(6), Fla. Stat. (1985).  During the two-month 
period after the victim moved out of Farinas‘ home, he continuously 
called or came to the home of the victim‘s parents where she was 
living and would become very upset when not allowed to speak with 
the victim.  He was obsessed with the idea of having the victim return 
to live with him and was intensely jealous, suspecting that the victim 
                                          
 
6.  These cases were single-aggravator cases after this Court struck CCP in 
both cases.   
 
- 26 - 
was becoming romantically involved with another man.  See Kampff 
v. State, 371 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 1979).  We find it significant, also, that 
the record reflects that the murder was the result of a heated, domestic 
confrontation.  Wilson v. State, 493 So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 1986). 
Therefore, although we sustain the conviction for the first-degree 
murder of Elsidia Landin and recognize that the trial court properly 
found two aggravating circumstances to be applicable, we conclude 
that the death sentence is not proportionately warranted in this case.  
 
As explained previously under the CCP analysis, although Silvia was going 
through a difficult time as a result of a domestic dispute with Patricia, the evidence 
showed, and Dr. Day opined, that he was not under the influence of an extreme 
emotional disturbance at the time of the murder.  Thus, Farinas is inapposite.  In 
addition, in later cases, we have specifically declined to recognize a ―domestic 
dispute exception.‖  See Turner v. State, 37 So. 3d 212, 224 (Fla.) (―[T]his Court 
made it clear in Lynch [v. State, 841 So. 2d 362, 377 (Fla. 2003)] that it ‗does not 
recognize a domestic dispute exception in connection with death penalty 
analysis.‘ ‖), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 426 (2010); Carter v. State, 980 So. 2d 473, 
485 (Fla. 2008) (―Domestic situations are evaluated in the same manner as other 
cases.‖).  
We conclude that the death penalty is a proportionate punishment for the 
first-degree murder of Patricia Silvia.  The CCP aggravator is one of the most 
serious aggravators set out in the statutory sentencing scheme.  Buzia v. State, 926 
So. 2d 1203, 1216 (Fla. 2006).  Similarly, the prior violent felony aggravator is 
considered one of the weightiest aggravators.  Sireci v. Moore, 825 So. 2d 882, 887 
 
- 27 - 
(Fla. 2002).  In this case, the prior violent felony was attempted murder.  Further, 
this case is proportionate to other cases with similar aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances.  See Evans v. State, 838 So. 2d 1090, 1097-98 (Fla. 2002) 
(upholding the death sentence as proportionate after defendant killed his brother‘s 
girlfriend during a fight and where the court found two aggravators (prior violent 
felony and on probation), no statutory mitigators, and five nonstatutory mitigators 
(little or some weight)); Floyd v. State, 850 So. 2d 383, 392-93, 408-09 (Fla. 2002) 
(determining that death sentence was proportionate after defendant killed mother-
in-law and where there were three aggravators (avoid arrest, prior violent felony, 
and on probation), no statutory mitigators, and four nonstatutory mitigators (all 
little weight)); Robinson v. State, 761 So. 2d 269, 272-73 (Fla. 1999) (finding the 
death penalty proportionate where defendant killed his girlfriend and there were 
three aggravators (pecuniary gain, avoid arrest, and CCP), two statutory mitigators 
(extreme emotional distress (some weight) and ability to conform conduct to the 
requirements of the law (great weight)), and eighteen nonstatutory mitigators).  
 
Based on the specific facts and circumstances of the murder and the 
aggravators and mitigators found by the trial court in this case, we conclude that 
when compared with other capital cases, the death sentence in this case is 
proportionate.  
Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
- 28 - 
Under this issue, Silvia raises two separate arguments concerning alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct—one concerning evidence of lack of remorse and the 
other concerning comments about the testimony of Patrick Woodard.  We address, 
and then reject, each argument in turn. 
Lack of Remorse 
Silvia first argues that the trial court erred in overruling his objections and 
denying his motion for mistrial when the State‘s expert witness, Dr. Danziger, 
testified that Silvia lacked remorse for the murder of his wife.  We conclude that a 
close examination of the record reveals that the trial court did not err with regard to 
its rulings on this issue. 
During the direct examination of Dr. Danziger the following occurred: 
Dr. Danziger:  Then you take that MMPI data and say, well, does it fit 
what we know about this person?  Let‘s look at our interviews with 
him.  Let‘s look at other tests. . . .  Let‘s look at what people say about 
him.  You put all of the pieces together.  In this case, I believe that Dr. 
Day and I are in agreement that the MMPI-2 profile does accurately 
describe him. 
 
Prosecutor:  The 4 Scale did you call that the psychopathic deviancy 
and if so, can you explain what that is? 
 
Dr. Danziger:  The 4 Scale clinically means someone that may tend to 
violate the norms of society.  Someone who does not respect 
authority, the end justifies the means and a lack of remorse.  So the 
higher that you score on that scale, the stronger those characteristics. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, arguing 
that Dr. Danziger‘s testimony improperly introduced evidence of lack of remorse 
 
- 29 - 
in Silvia‘s penalty phase.  The State argued that the testimony was not improper 
because Dr. Danziger was talking generally about the score Silvia received on the 
MMPI.  The trial court denied the motion for mistrial but instructed the State to 
have Dr. Danziger clarify his testimony to explain that just because an individual 
has a certain profile on the MMPI does not mean that they have all of the 
characteristics of the profile.  The State complied.   
 
Later during cross-examination of Dr. Danziger by defense counsel, when 
asked about the criteria of antisocial personality disorders, the following occurred: 
Dr. Danziger:  That in my opinion is yes.  My understanding is that he 
had multiple jobs, evicted from homes, could not sustain employment.  
When he had money from his mother‘s death, apparently blew 
through that money.  Did not handle it properly.  In my opinion, there 
is a history of irresponsibility in his work and financial life leading to 
some serious consequences. 
 
Defense Counsel:  And were there other criteria of these antisocial 
personality disorders that you observed in Mr. Silvia? 
 
Dr. Danziger:  Limited remorse.  Not much remorse for what has 
happened or what has been done. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Following this exchange, defense counsel again expressed 
concern that the witness raised the issue of lack of remorse and asked that the 
question be withdrawn and the answer stricken.  The trial court granted the request 
and advised the jury to disregard the question and answer.   
There is no question that lack of remorse is an improper aggravator.  In Pope 
v. State, 441 So. 2d 1073, 1078 (Fla. 1983), this Court held: 
 
- 30 - 
[H]enceforth lack of remorse should have no place in the 
consideration of aggravating factors.  Any convincing evidence of 
remorse may properly be considered in mitigation of the sentence, but 
absence of remorse should not be weighed either as an aggravating 
factor nor as an enhancement of an aggravating factor. 
 
See also Robinson v. State, 520 So. 2d 1, 5-6 (Fla. 1988) (vacating death sentence 
in part because the State impermissibly argued during closing argument that the 
defendant lacked remorse).  
Unlike in Robinson, where the prosecutor stated in closing argument that the 
defendant lacked remorse, here the State did not attempt to introduce lack of 
remorse.  Initially, the prosecutor was questioning Dr. Danziger regarding his 
diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder.  Dr. Danziger first mentioned lack of 
remorse because, as he testified, showing little remorse is one of the diagnostic 
criteria for antisocial personality disorder.    
Defense counsel objected to the first mention of lack of remorse.  Following 
a sidebar, the response was clarified by the prosecutor when Dr. Danziger 
confirmed that when a profile is generated on a person from the MMPI-2, it does 
not necessarily mean that someone who is scored that way has all of those 
characteristics (e.g., lack of remorse).  Further, after the second mention of lack of 
remorse by Dr. Danziger, which was elicited by defense counsel, the trial court, 
upon defense counsel‘s request, struck the question and the answer and instructed 
the jury to disregard it.   
 
- 31 - 
  ―A motion for a mistrial should only be granted when an error is so 
prejudicial as to vitiate the entire trial.  A trial court‘s ruling on a motion for 
mistrial is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review.‖  England v. State, 
940 So. 2d 389, 401-02 (Fla. 2006) (citation omitted).  The State never argued lack 
of remorse to the jury, and we conclude that in light of the trial court‘s actions in 
this case to address the objectionable testimony, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying the motion for mistrial.   
Comments about Patrick Woodard 
 
Silvia next argues that the trial court erred in overruling his objections when 
the State misstated evidence during its guilt phase closing argument suggesting that 
Silvia attempted to murder Patrick Woodard.  In essence, Silvia asserts that this 
error during the guilt phase ―tainted‖ the penalty-phase trial.  Regardless of 
whether this issue should have been raised as a guilt-phase claim rather than a 
penalty-phase claim, we find that it lacks merit.   
During the prosecutor‘s closing argument in the guilt phase, he stated: 
Patrick‘s in the back master bedroom.  He hears that shot and 
he comes around.  And by the time he comes around, Patricia‘s on the 
ground.  That gun could fire that fast.  And he climbs over Patricia 
and he is shutting that door.  What does Rachel say?  Grandpa, 
Patrick, was shutting that door.  And we saw the pictures of the 
damage to the door, that buckshot was an angle, it wasn‘t directly in, 
that buckshot was not shot when that door— 
 
Defense counsel objected on the grounds that the prosecutor was misstating the 
 
- 32 - 
evidence.  The trial court overruled the objection, ruling that it would allow the 
jury to rely upon its collective memory.  The prosecutor continued: 
 
That buckshot, [the crime scene investigator] told you, she 
couldn‘t do a spread on it because it was at an angle it wasn‘t a true 
plane.  So, Rachel says Patrick was closing the door.  Patrick says he 
went over— 
 
Defense counsel again objected on the grounds that the prosecutor was misstating 
the evidence.  The trial court again overruled the objection, indicating that it would 
allow the jury to rely upon its memory.  The prosecutor went on to state the 
following without objection: 
Patrick said that he went to close the door.  What did he tell you?  he 
saw Silvia pumping the gun.  And he—if he didn‘t close that door, I 
submit to you that he would have taken some buckshot.   
 
 
Silvia claims that the trial court erred in overruling his objections because 
these statements were ―highly inflammatory and not supported by the evidence.‖7  
We disagree because the prosecutor‘s statements were fair comments on the 
evidence.  Attorneys are permitted wide latitude in closing argument, but that 
latitude does not extend to allowing improper argument.  Gore v. State, 719 So. 2d 
1197, 1200 (Fla. 1998).  ―The proper exercise of closing argument is to review the 
                                          
 
 
7.  In his initial brief, Silvia contends that defense counsel objected to the 
prosecutor‘s statement ―And he—if he didn‘t close that door, I submit to you that 
he would have taken some buckshot.‖  However, it is clear that defense counsel did 
not object to this specific comment.  Rather, defense counsel objected to the two 
previous comments. 
 
- 33 - 
evidence and to explicate those inferences which may reasonably be drawn from 
the evidence.‖  Gonzalez v. State, 990 So. 2d 1017, 1028-29 (Fla. 2008) (quoting 
Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d 130, 134 (Fla. 1985)).  The following evidence was 
introduced during the guilt phase: Patrick Woodard testified he saw Silvia point the 
gun at him.  Because he saw Silvia pump the shotgun as if to ―tak[e] a round‖ at 
him, Patrick shut the door to prevent getting ―hit in the chest.‖  Rachel also 
testified that when Patrick was kneeling down by the door, she could still hear 
gunshots.  Further, there were two impact sites on the exterior of the carport door, 
behind which Patrick took cover.  Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err 
in overruling Silvia‘s objections to these statements. 
 
Even if there was any lack of clarity in Patrick Woodard‘s guilt-phase 
testimony regarding his location, he removed any possible confusion on this issue 
when he clearly testified in the penalty phase that Silvia pointed the gun at him and 
then pumped it, after which Patrick shut the door as Silvia fired.  Accordingly, we 
reject any claim that these guilt-phase closing arguments caused harmful error in 
the penalty phase.  
Victim Impact Evidence 
 
Silvia‘s next argument is that the trial court improperly permitted 
inflammatory and improper victim impact evidence during the penalty phase.  
Because defense counsel failed to make specific objections to the content of the 
 
- 34 - 
victim impact evidence, we reject this claim as not properly preserved for appeal.   
At the beginning of the penalty phase, discussions were held concerning 
victim impact evidence, and it was determined that the victim advocate would read 
letters from Patricia‘s children and her coworker.  Before the letters were actually 
read to the jury, the defense attorney renewed a ―general objection‖ to the victim 
impact evidence and the trial judge acknowledged that the defense attorney could 
have a ―standing objection.‖  The victim advocate then read the letters.   
In Ross‘s letter, he stated, ―God needed another angel and he picked my 
mom.‖  He also stated, ―I know that my mom is watching up above and she‘s my 
Number 1 angel.‖  In Aura Boyd‘s letter, she stated, ―I have a lot [of] fear because 
this showed me it does not matter how you live your life if someone who does not 
see a value in a life wants to take it from you, they can for any reason they feel 
necessary just because they want money or your car, maybe they don‘t want you to 
end a relationship with them or just because they can.‖ 
As an initial matter, we agree with the State that this issue is not preserved 
because there was no specific objection to the comments now cited as improper.  In 
Wheeler v. State, 4 So. 3d 599, 606 (Fla. 2009), we explained: 
During the entire presentation of victim impact evidence, 
Wheeler made no specific objections to any portion of the testimony 
or any particular aspect of the photographic evidence, although 
Wheeler renewed his general objection to presentation of any victim 
impact evidence.  We conclude that the claim Wheeler now makes 
that the victim impact evidence was impermissibly made a feature of 
 
- 35 - 
the penalty phase was not preserved by Wheeler‘s general pretrial 
objections addressed to all victim impact evidence, where he made no 
specific objections to any of the evidence presented and failed to 
object below on the grounds argued here.  It is well-established that 
for a claim ―to be cognizable on appeal, it must be the specific 
contention asserted as legal ground for the objection, exception, or 
motion below.‖  F.B. v. State, 852 So. 2d 226, 229 (Fla. 2003) 
(quoting Steinhorst v. State, 412 So. 2d 332, 338 (Fla. 1982)). 
 
Silvia did not object to the specific comments with which he takes issue on appeal.  
Silvia‘s ―standing objection‖ was based on a general objection to victim impact 
evidence and not to any specific statement in the letters.  Defense counsel even 
stated that he had reviewed the letters and had come to an agreement with the State 
on the redaction of certain statements in the letters.   
Because there was no specific objection, Silvia must establish that 
fundamental error or a violation of due process occurred in this case.  See Wheeler, 
4 So. 3d at 607 (―In the event that evidence is introduced that is so unduly 
prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief.‖ (emphasis removed)  
(quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991)).  We conclude that the 
statements cited by Silvia in the letters do not rise to the level of fundamental error 
or a violation of due process.  Accordingly, we deny relief on this claim.   
Constitutionality of Florida’s Death Sentencing Scheme  
Under Ring v. Arizona 
 
 
In his final argument, Silvia contends that Florida‘s death penalty statute is 
 
- 36 - 
unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment pursuant to Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 
584 (2002).  He acknowledges our precedent to the contrary.  In any event, Ring 
does not apply to this case because one of the aggravating circumstances found by 
the trial court in this case was Silvia‘s prior conviction for a violent felony—the 
contemporaneous conviction for the attempted murder of Betty Woodard.  See 
Jones v. State, 855 So. 2d 611, 619 (Fla. 2003) (recognizing that the prior violent 
felony aggravator is ―a factor which under Apprendi [v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000),] and Ring need not be found by the jury‖).  Therefore, we deny relief on 
this claim. 
CONCLUSION 
After a thorough review of all of the issues raised by Silvia, and after our 
own independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence, we affirm Silvia‘s 
convictions and sentences.   
 
It is so ordered.  
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Seminole County,  
Donna L. McIntosh, Judge – Case No. 2006CF4522A 
 
James S. Purdy, Public Defender, and George D.E. Burden, Assistant Public 
Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
- 37 - 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Barbara C. Davis, 
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee