Case Title: State v. Dixon

Citation: 169 Vt. 15, 725 A.2d 920

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1999-01-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Dixon  (97-166); 169 Vt. 15; 725 A.2d 920

[Filed 8-Jan-1999]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter  of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any  errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 No. 97-166

State of Vermont	                        Supreme Court

                                                On Appeal from
     v.		                                
                                                District Court of Vermont,
                                                Unit No. 3, Caledonia Circuit

April Dixon	                                May Term, 1998

Walter M. Morris, J.

       Dale O. Gray, Caledonia County State's Attorney, and Alan M. Singer,
  Deputy State's Attorney, St. Johnsbury, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

       Robert Appel, Defender General, Anna Saxman, Appellate Attorney, and
  Karen Misbach, Law Clerk (On the Brief), Montpelier, for
  Defendant-Appellant.

       Stuart M. Bennett, Shelburne, for Amicus Curiae Vermont Apartment
  Owners Ass'n.

       John J. McCullough III, Vermont Legal Aid, Inc., Montpelier, for Amici
  Curiae Vermont Law Income Advocacy Council and Vermont Tenants, Inc.

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Morse, Johnson, and Skoglund, JJ.

       DOOLEY, J.  Defendant April Dixon entered a conditional guilty plea to
  a charge of  criminal trespass in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 3705(a)(1),
  after the district court denied her motion  to dismiss.  On appeal, she
  contends that the notice of trespass issued by a landlord is insufficient 
  to sustain a conviction based on her presence in the common areas of an
  apartment building while  on a visit to the daughter of one of the
  landlord's tenants.  We agree and reverse.

       The facts as assumed by the trial court in considering defendant's
  motion to dismiss are  not in dispute and we therefore summarize the
  pertinent determinations from the trial court's  decision.  Prior to the
  events at issue in this case defendant had been a tenant in an apartment 
  building in St. Johnsbury owned by David Pezdirtz.  The building contains
  13 apartments, access

  

  to which is through a common hallway and stairs.  Perceiving that defendant
  was responsible for  certain disturbances that had occurred at the
  apartment building,(FN1) Pezdirtz decided to ban  defendant from the
  building and caused a notice against trespass to be served on her on
  October  18, 1996.  Among those Pezdirtz informed of this action was Mary
  Noyes, a tenant in the  building.  Defendant maintained a friendship with
  Mary Noyes' daughter, Catherine Noyes, who  was not herself a tenant but
  who was living in her mother's apartment on a temporary basis with  the
  knowledge and consent of Pezdirtz.  Police responded to a call at the
  apartment building on  December 5, 1996 and found defendant standing
  outside of the building but on the premises.  She  told the police that she
  was aware of the trespass notice served on her at Pezdirtz's direction but 
  that she was on the premises visiting friends. Defendant was charged with
  trespass in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 3705(a)(1).  Section 3705  of Title 13
  states, in part, that:

     (a) A person shall be imprisoned for not more than three months or 
     fined not more than $500.00, or both, if, without legal authority or 
     the consent of the person in lawful possession, he enters or remains 
     on any land or in any place as to which notice against trespass is 
     given by:

               (1) Actual communication by the person in 
               lawful possession or his agent or by a 
               law enforcement officer acting on behalf 
               of such person or his agent . . . .

  

       Defendant moved to dismiss the action pursuant to V.R.Cr.P. 12(d),
  alleging that the State  was unable to prove one element of the offense:
  that the landlord was "in lawful possession" of  the apartment's parking
  area, and therefore authorized to issue the notice of trespass.  The trial 
  court denied the motion, and defendant entered a conditional plea of nolo
  contendere, reserving  the right to appeal the denial of her motion to
  dismiss.  This appeal followed. The standard for addressing a motion to
  dismiss for lack of a prima facie case under Rule  12(d) is "whether,
  taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the state and excluding 
  modifying evidence, the state has produced evidence fairly and reasonably
  tending to show the  defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."  State v.
  Fanger, 164 Vt. 48, 51,