Case Title: State v. Chapman

Citation: 2020-Ohio-6730

Docket Number: 2019-1410

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2020-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Chapman, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6730.] 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2020-OHIO-6730 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. CHAPMAN, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Chapman, Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6730.] 
Criminal law—Community-control conditions—Procreation—Nonsupport of 
dependents—A court must consider whether a community-control condition 
is reasonably related to rehabilitating the offender, has some relationship 
to the crime of which the offender was convicted, and relates to conduct 
which is criminal or reasonably related to future criminality and serves the 
statutory ends of probation—Court of appeals’ judgment reversed and 
cause remanded to the trial court. 
(No. 2019-1410—Submitted July 21, 2020—Decided December 18, 2020.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lorain County, No. 18CA011377, 
2019-Ohio-3535. 
—————— 
DEWINE, J. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 1} A man was convicted for failing to pay child support to the mothers 
of his 11 children and sentenced to community control.  One of the conditions of 
community control imposed by the court was that the man “make all reasonable 
efforts to avoid impregnating a woman” during his sentence.  The question before 
us is whether that condition was appropriate.  We conclude that it was not. 
I.  Background 
{¶ 2} London Chapman was charged with 11 felony counts of nonsupport 
of dependents in 6 separate criminal cases as a result of his failure to pay child 
support.  Chapman’s sentence included several standard conditions of community 
control, including that he undergo alcohol and drug screenings, obtain and verify 
employment, and pay restitution.  In addition, the court ordered Chapman “to make 
all reasonable efforts to avoid impregnating a woman during the community control 
period or until such time that [he] can prove to the Court that he is able to provide 
support for his children he already has and is in fact supporting the children or until 
a change in conditions warrant the lifting of [this] condition.” 
{¶ 3} Chapman appealed, asserting that the condition was impermissible 
because it was not reasonably related to a rehabilitative purpose and because it 
violated his constitutional right to procreate.  The Ninth District Court of Appeals 
rejected Chapman’s nonconstitutional argument, concluding that the anti-
procreation condition satisfied the reasonableness test enunciated by this court in 
State v. Jones, 49 Ohio St.3d 51, 52-53, 550 N.E.2d 469 (1990).  State v. Chapman, 
9th Dist. Lorain Nos. 16CA010969, 16CA010970, 16CA010971, 16CA010972, 
16CA010973, and 16CA010974, 2018-Ohio-343, ¶ 4-11.  The court of appeals 
declined to consider Chapman’s constitutional argument on the basis that it had not 
been addressed by the trial court.  Id. at ¶ 12.  Instead, it remanded the matter to the 
trial court to consider that issue in the first instance.  Id. at ¶ 12-13. 
{¶ 4} On remand, the trial court issued a 19-page judgment entry addressing 
Chapman’s constitutional arguments, the bulk of which was devoted to providing 
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examples of other fundamental rights that could be limited by community-control 
conditions.  It determined that while the procreation prohibition impacted a 
fundamental right, the condition was constitutional because it was narrowly tailored 
to serve the state’s interest in preventing Chapman from fathering more children 
than he could support.  The trial court, thus, reimposed the same condition.  In doing 
so, it noted that it could “imagine any number of reasonable efforts” by which 
Chapman could “avoid impregnating a woman during the community control 
period,” but it declined to provide any guidance as to what would constitute 
reasonable efforts.  (Emphasis sic.) 
{¶ 5} Chapman appealed a second time.  The court of appeals first 
determined that res judicata barred it from reconsidering Chapman’s 
nonconstitutional challenge to the procreation prohibition.  2019-Ohio-3535, ¶ 8.  
Turning to Chapman’s constitutional argument, the court rejected Chapman’s 
argument that the procreation prohibition should be subjected to strict-scrutiny 
analysis.  Because it did not find heightened scrutiny to be appropriate, and because 
it had already rejected Chapman’s argument that the condition was not reasonably 
related to a rehabilitative purpose, the court affirmed his sentence.  Id. at ¶ 12. 
{¶ 6} We accepted Chapman’s discretionary appeal to determine whether 
the procreation prohibition impermissibly infringes upon Chapman’s constitutional 
rights.  See 157 Ohio St.3d 1534, 2020-Ohio-122, 137 N.E.3d 1194. 
II.  Analysis 
{¶ 7} Before we decide whether the procreation prohibition is 
constitutional, we need to establish the proper standard for reviewing the condition.  
Courts imposing community control have broad discretion to impose residential, 
nonresidential, and financial sanctions.  See R.C. 2929.15(A)(1).  If a court imposes 
a nonresidential sanction, it must order the offender to abide by the law and not 
leave the state without the permission of his probation officer and abide by “any 
other conditions of release * * * that the court considers appropriate.”  Id. 
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{¶ 8} Generally, a court will not be found to have abused its discretion in 
fashioning a community-control sanction as long as the condition is reasonably 
related to the probationary goals of doing justice, rehabilitating the offender, and 
insuring good behavior.  State v. Talty, 103 Ohio St.3d 177, 2004-Ohio-4888, 814 
N.E.2d 1201, ¶ 12.  Further, a condition “ ‘cannot be overly broad so as to 
unnecessarily impinge upon the probationer’s liberty.’ ”1  Id. at ¶ 13, quoting Jones, 
49 Ohio St.3d at 52, 550 N.E.2d 469. 
A.  We Reject Chapman’s Argument that We Should Apply Strict Scrutiny 
{¶ 9} Chapman asks us to carve out an exception to the general standard of 
reasonableness review.  He argues that because the anti-procreation condition 
impinges upon a fundamental right, it should be assessed under a strict-scrutiny 
standard, by which the government must show that the condition is narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. 
{¶ 10} There is no question that procreation is a fundamental right protected 
under the United States Constitution.  Talty at ¶ 8, citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 
U.S. 535, 541, 62 S.Ct. 111, 86 L.Ed. 165 (1942).  And the trial court’s requirement 
that Chapman take “all reasonable efforts to avoid” fathering more children while 
on community-control sanctions limits that right.  The crucial question is how we 
review conditions of sentencing that limit a fundamental right. 
{¶ 11} Criminal sanctions, by their very nature, implicate an offender’s 
exercise of his fundamental rights.  A deprivation of liberty is an inherent part of a 
criminal sentence.  A term of imprisonment limits fundamental rights that are 
inconsistent with an individual’s “status as a prisoner or with the legitimate 
penological objectives of the corrections system.”  Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 
                                                          
 
1.  In 1995, community control replaced probation as a possible sanction under Ohio’s felony-
sentencing law.  Talty at ¶ 16.  We have explained that “community control is the functional 
equivalent of probation” and that there is “no meaningful distinction between community control 
and probation for purposes of reviewing the reasonableness of their conditions.”  Id. 
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822, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974).  Thus, the requirement of prison 
security justifies restrictions on many fundamental rights: prisoners lose their right 
to travel, they can’t bring a firearm with them to prison, the warden doesn’t need a 
warrant to search their cells, and their rights to association and speech are curtailed. 
{¶ 12} So too with those offenders sentenced to probation.  An individual 
sentenced to probation—or community control—does not possess the absolute 
liberty enjoyed by the general population, but rather finds his liberty dependent 
upon the conditions and restrictions of his probation.  See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 
U.S. 868, 874, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987).  “Just as other punishments 
for criminal convictions curtail an offender’s freedoms, a court granting probation 
may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some freedoms 
enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.”  United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119, 122 
S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001). 
{¶ 13} Indeed, someone who commits a crime and is duly convicted 
surrenders key aspects of his liberty.  Our constitutions command that no person 
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of the law.  
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; Ohio Constitution, Article I, 
Sections 1, 2, and 16.  But when a person has broken the laws of society and has 
been afforded due process of the law, the government may legitimately deprive that 
person of his liberty. 
{¶ 14} For that reason, we have never applied a strict-scrutiny analysis to a 
criminal punishment.  We don’t review a prison sentence and ask if a particular 
sentence imposed is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental 
interest.  To the contrary, we have recognized that certain restrictions on 
fundamental rights are inherent in criminal punishment. 
{¶ 15} Chapman argues that the right to procreate is unique because it finds 
its foundation in the right to privacy in the United States Constitution.  See, e.g., 
Eisenstadt v Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) 
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(stating that the right to privacy protects against governmental intrusion affecting 
the decision to bear a child).  But privacy rights—even those explicitly enumerated 
in the Ohio and United States Constitutions—have never been subject to a strict-
scrutiny analysis when limited by a probation condition.  Thus, an offender can be 
subject to warrantless searches of his home while on probation because he is not 
entitled to the same liberty interests as other citizens.  Knights, 534 U.S. at 118-
119, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497.  And such a limitation is a permissible 
condition of probation if it reasonably furthers the goals of rehabilitation and 
protecting society.  Id. at 119.  If a court can uphold a probation condition limiting 
a defendant’s entitlement to the protections of an enumerated constitutional right 
because the condition is reasonable, there is little basis to hold Chapman’s right to 
privacy through procreation to a higher standard. 
{¶ 16} In sum, because convicted criminals serving their sentences enjoy 
diminished liberty interests when compared with the general population, a trial 
court can impose community-control sanctions that limit the offender’s 
fundamental rights, provided that such limitations further the statutory goals of 
community control and are not overbroad.  See id.; see also Talty, 103 Ohio St.3d 
177, 2004-Ohio-4888, 814 N.E.3d 1201, at ¶ 12-13. 
B.  We Apply the Reasonable-Relationship Test Set Forth in State v. Jones 
{¶ 17} Thus, rather than strict scrutiny, the starting place for our review is 
the test we announced in Jones, which looks to whether a community-control 
condition reasonably relates to the offense at issue, furthers the twin goals of 
rehabilitation and justice, and does not cause a greater deprivation of liberty than is 
necessary to achieve those penological goals.  49 Ohio St.3d at 53, 550 N.E.2d 469. 
{¶ 18} That said, trial courts should not be unmindful of a condition’s 
impact on a fundamental right.  Some deprivations of liberty are fundamental to 
criminal punishment: by virtue of being locked up in prison, certain constitutional 
rights of a prisoner are necessarily compromised.  So too with a community-control 
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sanction; inherent in being supervised while allowed to remain in the community 
are restrictions on travel, limitations on association, restrictions on firearms 
ownership, being subject to warrantless searches, and the like.  Other restrictions, 
however, are not necessarily intrinsic to community control but are tailored to the 
rehabilitation of the offender. 
{¶ 19} When it comes to conditions of this second type, courts should take 
particular care to ensure that the sanctions are appropriately crafted to meet a proper 
rehabilitative purpose.  This is not because the Ohio and United States Constitutions 
impose an enhanced-scrutiny requirement, but rather because we call certain rights 
fundamental for a reason: these are the rights that by enshrinement in our 
constitutions we as a society have chosen to provide the most protection for.  As a 
result, a probation condition of this type that implicates a fundamental right imposes 
a more severe punishment than one that does not.  Because the punishment is more 
severe, the justification must be more exacting so as to ensure that the condition 
does not limit the probationer’s liberty more than is necessary to achieve the goals 
of community control.  See Jones at 52-53. 
{¶ 20} Our caselaw reflects this treatment of nonstandard community-
control conditions that impact fundamental rights.  In Jones, we explained that a 
probation condition “cannot be overly broad so as to unnecessarily impinge upon 
the probationer’s liberty.”  49 Ohio St.3d at 52, 550 N.E.2d 469.  At issue in that 
case was a probation condition that prohibited the offender from communicating 
with anyone under the age of 18 who was not a member of his immediate family.  
Id. at 53.  We upheld the condition, but only after modifying its scope.  Noting that 
a literal enforcement of the condition could be problematic, we determined that it 
“should reasonably be interpreted as meaning an illicit, or potentially unlawful 
association or communication.”  Id. at 54-55. 
{¶ 21} In Talty, we dealt with a community-control condition also requiring 
the offender to make reasonable efforts to avoid conceiving a child; but unlike in 
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this case, there was no specific provision for lifting the condition if the offender 
became current on his support obligations.  103 Ohio St.3d 177, 2004-Ohio-4888, 
814 N.E.2d 1201, at ¶ 18.  We began our analysis by repeating our statement in 
Jones that a condition “ ‘cannot be overly broad so as to unnecessarily impinge 
upon the probationer’s liberty.’ ”  Id. at ¶ 13, quoting Jones at 52.  “[I]nfringements 
of constitutional rights must be tailored to specific government interests,” we 
explained.  Id. at ¶ 23.  We further noted that “the availability of ready alternatives 
to a regulation is evidence that the regulation is unreasonable[.]”  Id. at ¶ 14.  We 
then applied the Jones test and carefully scrutinized the provision, ultimately 
concluding that the provision was invalid because it did not provide for a lifting 
mechanism.  Id. at ¶ 21-25.  We reached this result notwithstanding the fact that the 
offender was not current on his support obligations, and that nothing would have 
prevented him from asking the trial court to lift the ban should he become current.  
Id. at ¶ 21. 
{¶ 22} Importantly, because we concluded that the anti-procreation 
condition in Talty was overbroad, we found it unnecessary to decide whether it 
would have been permissible had it included a lifting mechanism.  We explicitly 
stated that we were “not determin[ing] whether a mechanism that allowed the anti[-
]procreation condition to be lifted would have rendered the condition valid under 
Jones * * *.”  Id.  Today, we address the question we left unanswered in Talty. 
C.  The Procreation Condition Is Not Reasonably Related to the Goals of 
Community Control 
{¶ 23} In Jones, we established a three-part test to assess whether a 
community-control condition is reasonably related to the goals of community 
control.  A court must “consider whether the condition (1) is reasonably related to 
rehabilitating the offender, (2) has some relationship to the crime of which the 
offender was convicted, and (3) relates to conduct which is criminal or reasonably 
January Term, 2020 
 
9
related to future criminality and serves the statutory ends of probation.”  Jones, 49 
Ohio St.3d at 53, 550 N.E.2d 469. 
{¶ 24} The Jones test directs us to look at the crime that Chapman 
committed—the nonsupport of his dependents.  R.C. 2919.21(B) makes it a crime 
to fail to provide support as required by court order.  But a failure to pay the entire 
support amount is excused if the accused can show he “provide[d] the support that 
was within [his] ability and means.”  R.C. 2919.21(D).  The statutory scheme does 
not criminalize the failure to support one’s dependents in and of itself.  Rather, it 
penalizes an individual’s failure to provide the mandated support that he can pay. 
{¶ 25} Thus, under the statute, the criminality of Chapman’s conduct is 
separate from the number of children he has.  While his obligation might increase 
with more children, his ability to pay is separate.  And it is his failure to pay as his 
means and ability allow that is criminal—not the number of children for whom he 
failed to provide.  And while the dissent says that the condition imposed “targets 
[Chapman’s] criminal conduct,” Chapman’s criminal conduct was not fathering 
children, it was failing to pay support.  Dissenting opinion at ¶ 36. 
{¶ 26} The same considerations also reveal that the procreation prohibition 
is not reasonably related to the other two considerations enumerated in Jones—
rehabilitation and the possibility of present or future criminality.  49 Ohio St.3d at 
53, 550 N.E.2d 469.  No doubt fathering another child would increase Chapman’s 
support obligations, but it would have little effect on preventing the criminal 
conduct that the statute proscribes.  The statute is clear—if Chapman’s means and 
ability only allow him to pay $1,000 per month to support his dependents and he 
does so, then his conduct complies with the statutory scheme.  And that remains the 
case whether Chapman has 7 children, or 77. 
{¶ 27} Chapman’s failure to properly prioritize his obligations toward his 
children and pay support as he is able could prompt several conditions of 
community-control sanctions that would reasonably relate to his offense.  The trial 
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court properly ordered Chapman to obtain and maintain full-time employment.  It 
could have gone further in this direction: it might have ordered him to participate 
in job training, placed him in a program that would ensure that he was working and 
that child support was being deducted from his paycheck, required that he undergo 
education in financial planning and management, or placed restrictions on his 
spending.  All of these would be reasonably related to Chapman’s crime of 
nonpayment of child support.  But as long as the crime of nonsupport depends on 
an offender’s ability to pay, a prohibition requiring Chapman to “make reasonable 
measures” to avoid fathering another child during his term of community control is 
not. 
{¶ 28} The lack of a fit between the offense of which Chapman was 
convicted and the availability of other more effective conditions leads to the 
conclusion that the condition “unnecessarily impinge[d] upon the probationer’s 
liberty.”  Jones at 52.  On remand, the trial court must remove the anti-procreation 
condition, but may impose other conditions that are appropriately tailored to the 
goals of community control. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 29} The procreation prohibition is not reasonably related to the goals of 
community control, nor is it reasonably tailored to avoid impinging Chapman’s 
liberty no more than necessary.  As a result, we reverse the judgment of the Ninth 
District Court of Appeals and remand the cause to the trial court for the entry of a 
sentence that conforms with this opinion. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, FISCHER, and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
DONNELLY, J., concurs in judgment only. 
FRENCH, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
_________________ 
January Term, 2020 
 
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FRENCH, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 30} I agree with the majority that we should apply the reasonable-
relationship test this court set out in State v. Jones, 49 Ohio St.3d 51, 53, 550 N.E.2d 
469 (1990), to review the anti-procreation condition that the trial court imposed on 
appellant, London Chapman.  Under Jones, we must consider “whether the 
condition (1) is reasonably related to rehabilitating the offender, (2) has some 
relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, and (3) relates to 
conduct which is criminal or reasonably related to future criminality and serves the 
statutory ends of probation.”  Id.  I also agree with the majority’s conclusion that 
“a trial court can impose community-control sanctions that limit the offender’s 
fundamental rights, provided that such limitations further the statutory goals of 
community control and are not overbroad.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 16; see also Jones 
at 52 (recognizing that a community-control condition cannot be “overly broad so 
as to unnecessarily impinge upon the probationer’s liberty”).  Rather than simply 
applying Jones, though, the majority now requires an amorphous “more exacting” 
justification for the community-control condition at issue here.  Majority opinion 
at ¶ 19.  I fear that the majority’s heightened burden will lead to confusion and 
uncertainty as courts try to grapple with whether the more-exacting-justification 
standard applies to a court’s imposition of a community-control condition that 
implicates a fundamental right.  I would simply apply the standard set out in Jones 
and uphold the trial court’s anti-procreation condition here.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
The Trial Court Provided Significant Justification to Support the Anti-Procreation 
Condition It Imposed 
{¶ 31} Before I apply our established standard of review from Jones, I must 
fill in gaps in the majority’s recitation of the facts.  The majority opinion makes it 
seem as though the trial court’s anti-procreation order was lacking in analysis and 
justification.  It was not.  After soliciting and receiving briefs from the parties, the 
trial court imposed the community-control condition that Chapman “make all 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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reasonable efforts to avoid impregnating a woman during the community control 
period or until such time that [he] can prove to the Court that he is able to provide 
support for his children he already has and is in fact supporting the children or until 
a change in conditions warrant the lifting of [this] condition.”  The court also 
imposed other community-control conditions, including one requiring Chapman to 
obtain and maintain a full-time job during the community-control period.  But 
because the trial court had not considered Chapman’s constitutional challenge to 
the anti-procreation condition, the Ninth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial 
court’s judgment and remanded the matter to the trial court so that it could consider 
that issue.  State v. Chapman, 9th Dist. Lorain Nos. 16CA010969, 16CA010970, 
16CA010971, 16CA010972, 16CA010973, and 16CA010974, 2018-Ohio-343, 
¶ 12.  On remand, the trial court issued a comprehensive judgment entry analyzing 
and rejecting Chapman’s constitutional arguments.  As part of its analysis, the trial 
court applied the Jones test and considered whether the anti-procreation condition 
was overly broad.  It then imposed the same anti-procreation community-control 
condition that it had imposed previously, but it added additional—that is, more 
exacting—justification for the condition. 
{¶ 32} In its order imposing the anti-procreation condition, the trial court 
explained that the condition has a direct relationship to Chapman’s nonsupport  
offenses, which show that Chapman has continually failed to support children who 
by law he is required to support.  It concluded that the condition relates directly to 
Chapman’s repeated conduct of fathering children who he does not support.  And 
it called Chapman’s violations of his prior nonsupport obligations “egregious and 
systemic.”  The trial court also explained that the condition has a rehabilitative 
purpose of giving Chapman a better chance to support the children he has already 
fathered.  The trial court emphasized that the condition requires Chapman only to 
make reasonable efforts to avoid impregnating a woman during the community-
control period, and it recognized that there are a number of options available to 
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Chapman to satisfy that condition.  Finally, the court discussed the condition’s 
“lifting mechanism” and outlined a nonexhaustive list of events that might warrant 
lifting the condition, including the following: 
 
1. Adoption [of the child] 
2. Child lives with [Chapman] 
3. Child reaches age of majority 
4. Child becomes emancipated 
5. Child joins the military at age 17 
6. Child pass[es] away 
7. Support forgiveness 
8. Other reasons [domestic relation court] would terminate [the] 
order 
9. Support modification 
10.  [Chapman] [p]ay[s] off arrears 
11.  [Chapman] [i]n fact support[s] the existing children 
12.  Any combination of the above 
 
It is difficult to imagine what additional justification would satisfy the majority. 
We Apply the Reasonable-Relationship Test Set Out in State v. Jones 
{¶ 33} The majority correctly recognizes that the three-part reasonable-
relationship test set out in Jones is the starting point for reviewing the 
reasonableness of a community-control condition.  And the majority recognizes 
that a trial court can impose a reasonable community-control condition that limits 
an offender’s fundamental rights if the condition satisfies the statutory goals of 
community control and is not overly broad.  But then the majority modifies the 
Jones test and imposes a higher burden for when a community-control condition 
that implicates a fundamental right is “not necessarily intrinsic to community 
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control but [is] tailored to the rehabilitation of the offender.”  Majority opinion at  
¶ 18.  In those cases, the majority says, there must be a “more exacting” justification 
to support the condition.  Id. at ¶ 19.  The problem with that standard is that it is 
standardless.  Which fundamental rights are “necessarily intrinsic to community 
control,” id. at ¶ 18, such that an amorphous “more exacting” justification, id. at 
¶ 19, is required and which are not?  Is a “more exacting” justification necessary to 
support a condition that prevents an offender from owning or possessing a firearm 
while he is on community control for a nonviolent offense?  See, e.g., State v. 
Nigrin, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2015-T-0056, 2016-Ohio-2901, ¶ 6 (offender 
prohibited from owning or possessing a firearm or ammunition while on 
community control for criminal-trespassing offense).  What about a condition that 
prohibits an offender’s freedom of speech by wholly preventing her from 
communicating with anyone who is incarcerated during the community-control 
period?  See, e.g., United States v. Holloway, 740 F.2d 1373, 1383 (6th Cir.1984) 
(offender prohibited from contacting anyone in prison as a condition of her 
probation following her conviction for tax fraud). 
{¶ 34} The majority represents that our caselaw, specifically Jones and 
State v. Talty, 103 Ohio St.3d 177, 2004-Ohio-4888, 814 N.E.2d 1201, supports the 
adoption of this more-exacting-justification standard, but it does not.  In Jones, 49 
Ohio St.3d at 52-53, 550 N.E.2d 469, this Court adopted a three-part test for 
reviewing a community-control condition that affects an offender’s fundamental 
rights—in that case, the rights to free speech and free association.  It did not adopt 
a more-exacting-justification requirement because the three-part test, plus its 
pronouncement that a condition may not be “overly broad so as to unnecessarily 
impinge upon” the offender’s liberty, was sufficient.  Id. at 52.  In Talty, we 
expressly declined to address the offender’s constitutional arguments and simply 
applied the Jones test.  Talty at ¶ 18-25.  In my view, Jones provides the appropriate 
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standard for analyzing whether a community-control condition, including one that 
implicates a fundamental right, is reasonable. 
{¶ 35} Applying the three-part test outlined in Jones, I agree with the trial 
court and the court of appeals that the community-control condition at issue here is 
reasonably related to rehabilitating Chapman, has some relationship to the crimes 
of which he was convicted, and relates to criminal conduct or reasonably relates to 
future criminal conduct and serves the purposes of community control. 
{¶ 36} The majority concludes that the trial court’s anti-procreation 
condition is not reasonably related to the goals of community control because the 
“criminality of Chapman’s conduct is separate from the number of children he has.”  
Majority opinion at ¶ 25.  I disagree.  To reach this conclusion, the majority focuses 
on R.C. 2919.21(B) and (D), and it characterizes Chapman’s failure to meet his 
court-imposed child-support obligations as the only criminal conduct relevant to 
this case, because that is the criminal conduct for which he was convicted.  But 
application of the Jones test is not limited to consideration of the exact crimes for 
which community control was imposed.  It requires that the community-control 
condition have some relationship to the crimes of which the offender was 
convicted.  Jones at 53.  It is difficult to imagine how fathering dependents that the 
law mandates Chapman to support does not have some relationship to the criminal 
act of failing to pay court-ordered support for his dependents.  The Jones test also 
requires a court to consider whether the condition relates to conduct that is criminal 
or is reasonably related to future criminality.  Id.  R.C. 2919.21(A)(2) expressly 
prohibits a person from abandoning or failing to provide adequate support for his 
child, with limited exceptions that are not at issue here.  The trial court’s anti-
procreation condition targets that criminal conduct.  Contrary to what the majority 
represents, the statutory scheme does criminalize the failure to support one’s 
dependents.  The community-control condition at issue here seeks to prevent 
Chapman from having additional children whom he will not support. 
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{¶ 37} The trial court’s anti-procreation condition is also reasonably related 
to rehabilitating Chapman.  As the majority acknowledges, “[F]athering another 
child would increase Chapman’s support obligations.”  Majority opinion at ¶ 26.  It 
stands to reason then that by taking reasonable precautions to prevent fathering 
another child, Chapman will not increase his child-support obligations.  If his child-
support obligations do not increase, Chapman is more likely to be able to meet his 
current, outstanding obligations. 
{¶ 38} Finally, the trial court’s anti-procreation community-control 
condition is not overly broad in this case.  In Talty, 103 Ohio St.3d 177, 2004-Ohio-
4888, 814 N.E.2d 1201, at ¶ 20-21, this court concluded that an anti-procreation 
community-control condition was overly broad because it did not contain a 
mechanism for lifting the condition.  But here, the trial court required only that 
Chapman make reasonable efforts to avoid impregnating another woman during 
his five-year community-control period.  The trial court then outlined a minimum 
of 12 ways by which Chapman could have the condition lifted.  This is not a case 
in which the trial court decided to impose an anti-procreation community-control 
condition for minor instances of failure to pay child support.  Chapman currently 
has at least 11 children that he is not supporting, and his child-support arrearage at 
the time of his 2018 resentencing was already over $200,000.  The trial court found 
that Chapman’s violations of his prior child-support obligations were “egregious 
and systemic.”  Under these facts, its anti-procreation condition is not overly broad. 
{¶ 39} Because the anti-procreation community-control condition that the 
trial court imposed here is reasonable under the three-part test set out in Jones and 
is not overly broad, I would affirm the judgment of the Ninth District Court of 
Appeals.  Therefore, I dissent. 
_________________ 
Dennis P. Will, Lorain County Prosecuting Attorney, and Jennifer Goodall, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
January Term, 2020 
 
17 
Bremke Law, L.L.C., and Giovanna V. Bremke, for appellant. 
David J. Carey, B. Jessie Hill, and Freda J. Levenson, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae, American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation. 
_________________