Case Title: Florida Department of Children & Families v. Sun-Sentinel

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2004-02-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
1.  See § 39.202, Fla. Stat. (2002).
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
____________
No. SC03-410
____________
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES,
Petitioner,
vs.
SUN-SENTINEL, INC.,
Respondent.
[February 5, 2004]
CORRECTED OPINION
BELL, J.
This case arises out of a petition filed by Sun-Sentinel pursuant to section
119.07(7)(a), Florida Statutes (2002), to gain access to certain public, but
confidential, records maintained by the Department of Children and Families
(DCF).1  We must decide three issues:  whether DCF waived its objection to the
circuit court's personal jurisdiction when it simultaneously moved to transfer venue;
whether Sun-Sentinel was required to serve DCF with the petition; and whether the
circuit court erred in refusing to apply the home venue privilege.
2.  We have jurisdiction to review the decision of the district court under
article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution.
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The district court did not reach the merits of the service of process/personal
jurisdiction issue because it held that DCF waived its objection by seeking a
transfer of venue.  Dep't of Children & Families v. Sun-Sentinel, Inc., 839 So. 2d
790, 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).  The court also held that the circuit court did not err
in refusing to apply the home venue privilege—even though none of the recognized
exceptions to the privilege were satisfied—because "[n]one of the policies that
motivated the adoption of the home [venue] privilege are present in this case."  Id.
at 792.  The district court's decision expressly and directly conflicts with
Jacksonville Electric Authority v. Clay County Utility Authority, 802 So. 2d 1190
(Fla. 1st DCA 2002), which held that trial courts are bound to apply the home
venue privilege unless one of the three recognized exceptions is satisfied, regardless
of whether application of the privilege in the particular case is supported by the
policy reasons that justify the privilege.2 
In part I of this opinion, we briefly discuss the factual and procedural history
of the case.  In part II, we hold that a motion to transfer venue, filed simultaneously
with a timely asserted objection to personal jurisdiction, does not waive the
jurisdictional objection.  With respect to this issue, we disapprove the opinion
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below and the opinion in Hubbard v. Cazares, 413 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 2d DCA
1981).  Because DCF did not waive its objection to the court's personal
jurisdiction, we reach the merits of that issue.  In part III, we hold that section
119.07(7)(a) requires formal service of process on DCF.  Accordingly, the circuit
court erred in denying DCF's motion to dismiss the petition for insufficient service
of process and lack of personal jurisdiction.  And in part IV, we approve the First
District's holding in Jacksonville Electric that a trial court must apply the home
venue privilege unless one of the recognized exceptions to the privilege is satisfied. 
However, we approve the result of the district court below because we now create
a fourth exception to the home venue privilege.  As we will discuss in greater detail
below, this new exception is similar to the "joint tortfeasor" exception that we
created in Board of County Commissioners v. Grice, 438 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 1983). 
Because this case falls within this new exception, the circuit court did not err in
refusing to apply the home venue privilege.
I.  BACKGROUND
The State brought criminal child neglect charges against Donald and Amy
Hutton.  The charges were brought in the Palm Beach County Circuit Court.  While
the criminal case was pending, Sun-Sentinel, seeking access to DCF records
concerning the Huttons and their children, filed a section 119.07(7)(a) petition. 
3.  "It is the policy of this state that all state, county, and municipal records
shall be open for personal inspection by any person."  § 119.01(1), Fla. Stat.
(2002).
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Section 119.07(7)(a) provides that
[a]ny person or organization, including the Department of Children and
Family Services, may petition the court for an order making public the
records of the Department of Children and Family Services that
pertain to investigations of alleged abuse, neglect, abandonment, or
exploitation of a child or a vulnerable adult.  The court shall determine
if good cause exists for public access to the records sought or a
portion thereof.  In making this determination, the court shall balance
the best interest of the vulnerable adult or child who is the focus of the
investigation, and in the case of the child, the interest of that child's
siblings, together with the privacy right of other persons identified in
the reports against the public interest.  The public interest in access to
such records is reflected in s. 119.01(1),[3] and includes the need for
citizens to know of and adequately evaluate the actions of the
Department of Children and Family Services and the court system in
providing vulnerable adults and children of this state with the
protections enumerated in ss. 39.001 and 415.101.
§ 119.07(7)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002).  Sun-Sentinel filed the petition in the Palm Beach
County Circuit Court and faxed a copy of the petition to DCF.
DCF moved to dismiss the petition for insufficient service of process, lack
of personal and subject matter jurisdiction, and failure to state a cause of action. 
DCF also invoked the "home venue privilege" and moved to dismiss the petition
for improper venue or, in the alternative, to transfer the case to Leon County, the
county in which DCF maintains its headquarters.  The Palm Beach County Circuit
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Court denied DCF's motions.  The court held that section 119.07(7)(a) does not
require formal service of process.  The court declined to apply the home venue
privilege because the petition was not in the nature of a lawsuit against DCF.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed.  First, the district court held
that DCF waived its objection to the circuit court's personal jurisdiction by seeking
to transfer venue to Leon County.  Dep't of Children & Families, 839 So. 2d at
791.  Second, the district court held that the trial court did not err in refusing to
apply the home venue privilege.  Id. at 792.
II.  WAIVER
DCF argues that the circuit court should have dismissed the petition for lack
of personal jurisdiction because Sun-Sentinel did not effect formal service of
process.  Sun-Sentinel argues that DCF waived its objection to the court's personal
jurisdiction by seeking a transfer of venue.  The district court agreed with Sun-
Sentinel and held that DCF waived its objection.  We disagree.
In Babcock v. Whatmore, 707 So. 2d 702, 704 (Fla. 1998), we held that "a
defendant waives a challenge to personal jurisdiction by seeking affirmative
relief—such requests are logically inconsistent with an initial defense of lack of
jurisdiction."  The question here is whether DCF's motion to transfer venue was a
request for affirmative relief.  We have not previously addressed this issue and the
4.  We stress that our jurisdiction to review the decision below is not based
on the intradistrict conflict between the decision below and the decision in Dimino.
5.  Hubbard involved a request for change of venue pursuant to section
47.101(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), which provides that a party may move for a
change of venue if that party believes that he or she will not receive a fair trial in the
court where the action is pending because that party is so odious to the inhabitants
of the county that he or she could not receive a fair trial.  413 So. 2d at 1192. 
Here, of course, we are dealing with a motion based on improper venue—a defense
specifically enumerated in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.140(b). 
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district courts that have are conflicted.  The district court below relied on the
Second District's decision in Hubbard v. Cazares, 413 So. 2d 1192 (Fla. 2d DCA
1981).  Hubbard, however, conflicts with the Fourth District's decision in Dimino v.
Farina, 572 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).4  With respect to this issue, we
disapprove the opinion below and that in Hubbard, and we approve the opinion in
Dimino.
Hubbard held that "a request for change of venue following a timely asserted
challenge to personal jurisdiction is a request for affirmative relief which constitutes
a waiver of the jurisdictional challenge."  413 So. 2d at 1193.5  The Hubbard Court
relied on two non-Florida cases:  Killearn Properties, Inc. v. Lambright, 377 N.E.2d
417 (Ind. Ct. App. 1978), and Sangdahl v. Litton, 69 F.R.D. 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
The court's reliance on these two cases is unpersuasive, and we refuse to adopt it. 
Both Killearn Properties and Sangdahl involved change-of-venue requests that
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preceded objections to personal jurisdiction.  Here the motion to transfer venue and
the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction were made simultaneously. 
This distinction was recognized by a different district of the Indiana Court of
Appeals in State v. Omega Painting, Inc., 463 N.E.2d 287 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
In Omega Painting, the court "expressly disavow[ed]" the Hubbard court's
reliance on Killearn Properties.  463 N.E.2d at 292 n.7.  The court stressed that
Killearn Properties was predicated upon "a change of venue request filed prior to
the assertion of a lack of personal jurisdiction," rather than a change-of-venue
motion "filed contemporaneously with the State's answer asserting the lack of
personal jurisdiction."  Id. at 292.  The court held that
once the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction is properly preserved,
the defendant may proceed with a defense on the merits without
waiving the jurisdictional issue.  Accordingly, we cannot say that such
a request for a change of venue, filed contemporaneously with or
subsequent to the proper preservation of the jurisdictional question,
seeks the affirmative relief of the court and, thereby, acts as a waiver
of . . . the jurisdictional claim.
Id. (citation omitted).
The court disagreed with the Hubbard court's characterization of a change-
of-venue motion, filed subsequent to the preservation of the jurisdictional challenge,
as "go[ing] beyond matters of defense and seek[ing] affirmative relief."  Id. at 292
n.7 (quoting Hubbard, 413 So. 2d at 1193).  In this regard, the court distinguished
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a defendant's filing of a permissive counterclaim, a third-party crossclaim, or a
counterpetition in a divorce proceeding—all of which had been held by various
courts to be requests for affirmative relief that waive a party's jurisdictional
objection—from a request to change venue, which the court characterized as "a
legitimate request in the defense of an action."  463 N.E.2d at 292 n.7.
The Hubbard court's reliance on Sangdahl is also unpersuasive.  In
Sangdahl, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
held that the defendant had waived his challenge to the court's personal jurisdiction. 
But again, the court focused on the fact that the defendant's motion to change
venue preceded the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
The defendant waived his objection to the court's personal jurisdiction by failing to
raise the objection, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), prior to
or simultaneously with his forum non conveniens motion.  See Sangdahl, 69 F.R.D.
at 642 (quoting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(g)) ("If a party makes a motion
under this rule but omits therefrom any defense or objection then available to him
which this rule permits to be raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion
based on the defense or objection so omitted . . . .").
6.  "[I]t seems apparent that the Hubbard decision incorrectly classified a
motion for change of venue as a request for affirmative relief.  Clearly, appellant's
motion to change venue was a defensive measure and did not waive the
jurisdictional issue."  Dimino, 572 So. 2d at 555.
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We believe that the decision in Dimino, which conflicts with Hubbard,6 is
more persuasive.  The Dimino court relied on Florida Rules of Civil Procedure
1.140(b) and 1.140(h).  Rule 1.140(b) states that
[e]very defense in law or fact to a claim for relief in a pleading shall be
asserted in the responsive pleading, if one is required, but the
following defenses may be made by motion at the option of the
pleader: . . . (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper
venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of
process . . . .  A motion making any of these defenses shall be made
before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. . . .  Any ground not
stated shall be deemed to be waived except any ground showing that
the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter may be made at any
time.  No defense or objection is waived by being joined with other
defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion.
Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(b) (emphasis added).  Rule 1.140(h) states that "[a] party
waives all defenses and objections that the party does not present either by motion
under subdivisions (b), (e), or (f) of this rule or, if the party has made no motion, in
a responsive pleading."  Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(h).  As the Dimino court stated:
Because appellant would otherwise have waived the defense of
improper venue, the motion was defensive in nature rather than a
request for affirmative relief, and his challenge to the court's
jurisdiction was not waived by being joined with the motion for change
of venue.
7.    Similar reasoning was employed in Cumberland Software, Inc. v. Great
American Mortgage Corp., 507 So. 2d 794 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987), where the court
held that the defendant did not waive his objection to personal jurisdiction by filing
a compulsory counterclaim.  Because the compulsory counterclaim would have
been waived had it not been raised at the time of the defendant's answer, see Fla. R.
Civ. P. 1.170(a), filing the compulsory counterclaim was "solely a defensive
measure," and "did not waive [defendant's] right to challenge the court's
jurisdiction."  507 So. 2d at 796. 
8.  In Babcock, we approved the decision in Hubbard and disapproved the
decision in Dimino.  707 So. 2d at 705 n.7.  However, that holding was with
respect to a precise issue: whether an objection to the court's personal jurisdiction
can ever be waived.  Our opinion resolved a conflict between the Third District's
decision in Whatmore v. Babcock, 685 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), approved in
result, 707 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 1998),  and the Second District's decision in Hubbard. 
Whatmore held that "once an objection based upon lack of jurisdiction over the
person is timely interposed, it is preserved for all purposes and is not waived
because affirmative relief is also sought."  Babcock, 707 So. 2d at 703 (quoting
Whatmore, 685 So. 2d at 84).  Hubbard, on the other hand, held that "a timely
objection to personal jurisdiction may nevertheless be waived . . . [by] a defendant
who goes beyond matters of defense and seeks affirmative relief."  Babcock, 707
So. 2d at 703 (quoting Hubbard, 413 So. 2d at 1193).  It was with respect to this
issue that we approved Hubbard and disapproved Dimino.  See Babcock, 707 So.
2d 705 n.7.  
9.  In this case, the motion to transfer venue was based on "improper
venue," which is a defense specifically enumerated in Florida Rule of Civil
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572 So. 2d at 555.  We agree with this reasoning.7  We approve the opinion in
Dimino on this point, and we disapprove the opinion below and that in Hubbard to
the extent that they conflict with Dimino and our opinion here.8  We hold that a
motion to transfer venue, filed simultaneously with a timely asserted objection to
personal jurisdiction, does not waive the jurisdictional objection.9
Procedure 1.140(b).  Under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.140(h)(1), the
objection to improper venue as well as the objection to personal jurisdiction are
waived if not presented either by motion under rule 1.140(b) or, if no motion is
made, in a responsive pleading.  See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(h)(1) ("A party waives all
defenses and objections that the party does not present either by motion under
subdivisions (b), (e), or (f) of this rule or, if the party has made no motion, in a
responsive pleading . . . .").  That is why we have spoken of motions to transfer
venue "filed simultaneously with" an objection to personal jurisdiction.  We note,
however, that a motion to change venue made subsequent to a timely interposed
objection to personal jurisdiction, if not itself waived, would not waive the
objection to personal jurisdiction.  See, e.g., § 47.101, Fla. Stat. (2002); § 47.122,
Fla. Stat. (2002).
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III.  SERVICE OF PROCESS/PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
Because DCF did not waive its objection to the circuit court's personal
jurisdiction, we will now address the merits of the objection.  Sun-Sentinel argues
that it was not required to serve DCF with the petition because section 119.07(7)(a)
does not contain an explicit service of process requirement.  Section 119.07(7)(b),
on the other hand, does contain an explicit service of process requirement:
In cases involving serious bodily injury to a child or a vulnerable adult,
the Department of Children and Family Services may petition the court
for an order for the immediate public release of records of the
department which pertain to the protective investigation.  The petition
must be personally served upon the child or vulnerable adult, the
child's parents or guardian, the legal guardian of that person, if any,
and any person named as an alleged perpetrator in the report of abuse,
neglect, abandonment, or exploitation.
§ 119.07(7)(b), Fla. Stat. (2002) (emphasis added).  Sun-Sentinel argues that if the
Legislature had intended to require that petitions filed under section 119.07(7)(a) be
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served on the agency, it could have included an express provision—just as it did in
subsection 7(b).  Because it did not, Sun-Sentinel argues, formal service of process
is not required.
We reject this argument and hold that a section 119.07(7)(a) petitioner must
serve DCF with the petition.  The Florida Rules of Civil Procedure apply to "all
actions of a civil nature." Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.010.  Rule 1.050 provides that civil
actions are commenced when the complaint or petition is filed.  Rule 1.070
provides that "[u]pon the commencement of the action, summons or other process
authorized by law shall be issued."  Section 48.031(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2002),
states that "[s]ervice of original process is made by delivering a copy of it to the
person to be served with a copy of the complaint, petition, or other initial
pleading."  (Emphasis added.)    Section 48.111(2), Florida Statutes (2002),
provides that "[p]rocess against any public agency, board, commission, or
department not a body corporate . . . shall be served on the public officer being
sued or the chief executive officer of the agency, board, commission, or
department." 
We do not—even when we read subsection (7)(a) together with subsection
(7)(b), as Sun-Sentinel suggests—perceive a legislative intent to forego formal
service of process under subsection (7)(a).  The fact that the Legislature explicitly
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named certain individuals that DCF must serve when it files a petition pursuant to
section 119.07(7)(b) does not necessarily control our construction of section
119.07(7)(a), which contains no such provision.
Section 119.07(7)(b) requires DCF to serve those parties whose interests
must be balanced by the court when it conducts the good-cause analysis.  When
DCF files such a petition, it is requesting the "immediate public release" of these
records.  It seems reasonable to assume that the Legislature thought it important, in
such situations, to alert those parties whose interests will be affected by such
release, allowing them to participate in the proceeding to determine whether good
cause to release the records exists.  When a private party files a petition pursuant to
section 119.07(7)(a), it is unlikely that the party would know the identities and
locations of the interested parties.  Much of this information will be known only to
DCF.  To have included an explicit service of process requirement similar to the
one contained in subsection 7(b) would have been unworkable (the petitioner
cannot serve parties of whom he is unaware) and unnecessary (when DCF is
served, it will then be able to alert the court to the identities of interested persons). 
It therefore seems more reasonable to conclude that the Legislature did not intend
to forego formal service of process by failing to include an explicit requirement.
This civil action to make public the records that were otherwise confidential
10.  We also note that Sun-Sentinel should not have filed the petition in the
pending criminal action to which neither it nor DCF was a party.  The proper
procedure would have been to file the petition as a separate action.  It then could
have requested that the "good cause" proceeding be conducted by the same judge
that was presiding over the criminal action.
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was commenced when Sun-Sentinel filed the section 119.07(7)(a) petition.  Sun-
Sentinel was then required to comply with the above-stated rules regarding service
of process.  Because these records are maintained by DCF, Sun-Sentinel was
required to serve DCF with the petition.  Because it did not, the circuit court erred
in denying DCF's motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process and lack of
personal jurisdiction.10
IV.  HOME VENUE PRIVILEGE
We now consider the application of the home venue privilege to this case. 
The home venue privilege provides that, absent waiver or exception, venue in a suit
against the State, or an agency or subdivision of the State, is proper only in the
county in which the State, or the agency or subdivision of the State, maintains its
principal headquarters.  Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Triple "A" Enters., Inc., 387
So. 2d 940, 942 (Fla. 1980); Carlile v. Game & Fresh Water Fish Comn'n, 354 So.
2d 362, 363-64 (Fla. 1977).
The circuit court declined to apply the home venue privilege and the district
court affirmed.  The district court noted that the records at issue were maintained
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by DCF in Palm Beach County.  Dep't of Children & Families, 839 So. 2d at 792. 
Furthermore, Sun-Sentinel was not seeking a money judgment against DCF, nor a
judgment respecting DCF's "official, non-record-keeping policies."  Id.  The court
observed that cases applying the home venue privilege "almost universally . . .
involve actions seeking judgment directly against the agency for money damages or
for declaratory relief binding the agency in regard to some policy or practice of the
agency itself."  Id.  This case, on the other hand, merely involved a party "seek[ing]
to exercise its right of access to public records maintained within the jurisdiction of
the circuit court."  Id.
The court thought that "it would severely burden the right of access to public
records to require that all such actions . . . be deemed within the home [venue]
privilege of state government."  Id.  The court also stressed that "[n]one of the
policies that motivated the adoption of the [judicially created] home [venue]
privilege are present in this case."  Id.  Therefore, the district court found "no error
with the trial court's denial of a change of venue."  Id.  The court held that "case[s]
involving access to public records entirely located in one county . . . may be
brought where the records are being kept and where access is being denied."  Id. at
793.
The district court's decision conflicts with the decision in Jacksonville
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Electric Authority v. Clay County Utility Authority, 802 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 1st DCA
2002), where the First District held that trial courts were bound to apply the home
venue privilege unless one of the three recognized exceptions to the privilege was
satisfied.  The First District reversed the trial court's refusal to apply the home
venue privilege even though application of the privilege to that particular case was
"supported by none of the policy reasons" that gave rise to the home venue
privilege.  Id. at 1193.
A.
Florida's home venue privilege dates back to Smith v. Williams, 35 So. 2d
844 (Fla. 1948), where this Court distinguished between two different types of suits
against state agencies.  The first type is those suits 
in which the primary purpose of the litigation is to obtain a judicial
interpretation or declaration of a party's rights or duties under . . . rules
and regulations [promulgated by the state agency], where no unlawful
invasion of a lawful right secured . . . by the Constitution or laws of
the jurisdiction is directly threatened in the county where suit is
instituted.
 
Id. at 846-47.  The second type is those suits 
in which the primary purpose of the litigation is to obtain direct judicial
protection from an alleged unlawful invasion of the constitutional rights
of the plaintiff within the county where the suit is instituted, because of
the enforcement or threatened enforcement by a state agency of rules
and regulations alleged to be unconstitutional as to the plaintiff, and
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where the validity or invalidity of the rules and regulations sought to be
enforced comes into question only secondarily and as incidental to the
main issue involved. 
Id. at 847.
Unlike those of the second type, which fall under what has now been termed
the "sword-wielder" exception, those of the first type are subject to the state's
home venue privilege.  The reason for subjecting such suits to the home venue
privilege is "to promote orderly, efficient, and economical government."  Id.  The
home venue privilege allows for such suits to be "defended at a minimum
expenditure of effort and public funds."  Id.  It also allows for a "uniformity of
interpretation" and "prevents conflicting judicial rulings in different jurisdictions." 
Id.; see also Carlile, 354 So. 2d at 364 ("Such a rule promotes orderly and uniform
handling of state litigation and helps to minimize expenditure of public funds and
manpower."); Triple "A" Enters., 387 So. 2d at 943 ("The common law venue
privilege allows for uniform interpretation by one court, thus promoting efficient
and uniform rulings, and minimizing expenditure of effort and public funds.").
We have recognized only three exceptions to the home venue privilege.  One
exception exists in cases where the Legislature has by statute waived the privilege. 
Barr v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 644 So. 2d 333, 336 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (citing Henry
P. Trawick, Jr., Florida Practice and Procedure, § 5-2 (1993 ed.)).  The second
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exception, known as the "sword wielder" exception, "applies only where direct
judicial protection is sought from an unlawful invasion of a constitutional right of
the plaintiff, directly threatened in the county where the suit is instituted."  Triple
"A" Enters., 387 So. 2d at 942.  The third exception to the home venue privilege
applies in those cases in which the governmental defendant is sued as a joint
tortfeasor.  Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Grice, 438 So. 2d 392, 395 (Fla. 1983).
B.
This case does not fall within any of the recognized exceptions to the home
venue privilege.  The Legislature has not statutorily waived the privilege for public
records petitions.  The petition was not filed as a "shield against the state's thrust." 
Fla. Dep't of Ins. v. Amador, 841 So. 2d 612, 614 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).  Nor was
DCF being sued as a joint tortfeasor.  
Nonetheless, as the district court recognized, the reasons generally
supporting the home venue privilege are not present in this case.  It is not clear that
requiring all such petitions to be filed and litigated in Leon County would "promote
orderly, efficient, and economical government."  Smith, 35 So. 2d at 847.  DCF
already maintains regional offices at which the records in question are located.  The
personnel at these offices would be most familiar with the records and the facts of
each case.  A section 119.07(7)(a) petition does not implicate any of DCF's
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statewide policies or interests.  The "good cause" proceeding is limited to
determining whether the public interest in access outweighs the privacy interests of
those who are the subjects of the records.  This is necessarily a fact-based, case-
by-case analysis.  It seems that such inquiries could be conducted most efficiently
in the county in which the records are maintained and the DCF personnel familiar
with the records, as well as the interested parties, are located.
Additionally, requiring such petitions to be brought in Leon County would
not promote a "uniformity of interpretation" nor "prevent[] conflicting judicial
rulings in different jurisdictions."  Id.  The "good cause" analysis, by its very
nature, requires a fact-specific, case-by-case determination.  The determination of a
circuit court in one county, determining that good cause exists to make public the
particular records sought by the petitioner, will not bind DCF to any statewide
policy or practice.  Nor could such a decision be said to "conflict" with the
decision of another circuit court that determines, in a different case, that good
cause does not exist.  In this sense, a section 119.07(7)(a) petition is fundamentally
different from a typical lawsuit.  The reasons that make the home venue privilege
appropriate in those cases simply do not translate into this context. 
The
question, then, is whether the trial court was bound to apply the home venue
privilege or whether the trial court could, in its discretion, refuse to apply the
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privilege in a case where applying the privilege would not further any of the policy
reasons that support the privilege.  We agree with the decision of the First District
in Jacksonville Electric that a trial court must apply the home venue privilege unless
one of the exceptions to the privilege is satisfied.  However, we also believe that it
would be appropriate to create a very narrow fourth exception to address this type
of case. 
In Grice, we created the "joint tortfeasor" exception to the home venue
privilege, which provides that a trial court may refuse to apply the home venue
privilege when the state agency is sued as a joint tortfeasor.  We held that
a trial court has discretion to dispense with the home venue privilege
when a governmental body is sued as a joint tortfeasor.  The exercise
of this discretion must be guided by considerations of justice, fairness,
and convenience under the circumstances of the case. . . .  The home
venue privilege, although not absolute, should be given substantial
consideration in this process along with the other circumstances
presented and the interests of the other parties.
Id. at 395.  We created this exception because we recognized that the beneficial
purposes of the home venue privilege—"promot[ing] orderly and uniform handling
of state litigation and help[ing] to minimize expenditure of public funds and
manpower"—were "not furthered when the governmental defendant is sued as a
joint tortfeasor."  Grice, 438 So. 2d at 394. "[T]he objective of minimizing public
expenditures in the operation of the courts [was] not furthered when the home
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venue privilege result[ed] in multiple lawsuits," id. at 395, which was what resulted
when trial courts were forced to sever lawsuits that otherwise would have been tried
in a single proceeding.
For similar reasons, we now adopt a Grice-like exception for cases where a
party petitions the court for an order to gain access to public records, and where
the records sought are by law confidential and cannot be made public without a
determination by the court, pursuant to the petition, that good cause exists for
public access.  In such cases, trial courts will have the same discretion they have in
cases where the governmental defendant is sued as a joint tortfeasor.  When such a
petition is filed, and the governmental agency invokes the home venue privilege and
moves to transfer the case to the county in which it maintains its principal
headquarters, the trial court should consider the policy reasons that support the
home venue privilege.  The court should consider whether and to what extent those
policies would be furthered by application of the privilege in the case before the
court.  Taking those considerations into account, the trial court's discretion should
"be guided by considerations of justice, fairness, and convenience under the
circumstances of the case."  Grice, 438 So. 2d at 395.  Because the facts of this
case bring it within this newly created exception, we approve the result reached by
the district court below insofar as it is consistent with this opinion.
-22-
V.  CONCLUSION
For the reasons just expressed, we disapprove the opinion of the district
court below, and that of the Second District in Hubbard, to the extent they held that
a motion to transfer venue is a request for affirmative relief that waives a timely
asserted objection to personal jurisdiction.  We also hold that a section
119.07(7)(a) petitioner is required to effect formal service of process on DCF. 
And finally, we approve the decision of the district court below insofar as it held
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to apply the home venue
privilege.  We agree with the First District's holding in Jacksonville Electric that a
trial court must apply the home venue privilege unless one of the recognized
exceptions to the privilege is satisfied.  However, we now create a fourth exception
to the privilege, similar to that announced in Grice and limited to cases such as this,
where a "good cause" petition is filed to access otherwise confidential public
records. 
It is so ordered.
ANSTEAD, C.J., and WELLS, PARIENTE, QUINCE, and CANTERO, JJ.,
concur.
LEWIS, J., concurs in result only.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
-23-
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct
Conflict
Fourth District - Case No. 4D02-4466
(Palm Beach County)
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Christopher M. Kise, Solicitor General, and
Lynn C. Hearn, Deputy Solicitor General, Tallahassee, Florida,
for Petitioner
John R. Hargrove and W. Kent Brown of Gordon Hargrove & James, P.A., Fort
Lauderdale, Florida; and David S. Bralow, Senior Counsel/Florida Media, Tribune
Company, Orlando, Florida, 
for Respondent
Gregg D. Thomas and Rachel E. Fugate of Holland & Knight LLP, Tampa,
Florida; and George Freeman, The New York Times Company, New York, New
York,
for The First Amendment Foundation; The Tampa Tribune; WFLA-TV 
News Channel 8; Orlando Sentinel Communications; New York Times 
Regional Newspapers on behalf of The (Lakeland) Ledger; Sarasota Herald-
Tribune, (Ocala) Star Banner, and The Gainesville Sun; Florida Today; 
News-Press; Pensacola News Journal; WTLV-TV; WJXX-TV; and
WTSP-TV, Amici Curiae