Case Title: State v. Zearley

Citation: 444 N.W.2d 353

Docket Number: 880322

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1989-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
444 N.W.2d 353 (1989) STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Jeffrey ZEARLEY, Defendant and Appellee. Cr. No. 880322. Supreme Court of North Dakota. July 18, 1989. *354 Brian David Grosinger (argued), Asst. State's Atty., Mandan, for plaintiff and appellant. Feldner & Danielson, Mandan, for defendant and appellee; argued by Rodney K. Feldner. MESCHKE, Justice. The State appealed from an order suppressing evidence of possession of a controlled substance. The evidence was discovered during a patdown and pocket search of a guest in a home being lawfully searched for drugs pursuant to a no-knock warrant. We reverse and remand for reconsideration. Drug Enforcement agent Maixner and a team of Mandan police officers searched the Metzner home for drugs and related items. The no-knock search warrant did not reach other persons or property. While the other officers were at the front door with the warrant, Maixner knocked and entered the kitchen door. He identified himself to Penny Metzner but she attempted to stop Maixner from entering the hallway to the rest of the home. Metzner shouted, "Jeff, the police are here to search the house." *355 In the living room, Jeff Zearley heard shouting and went to see what the trouble was, though he testified that he did not understand what was shouted. Maixner, not knowing who "Jeff" was nor how many people were in the house, entered the hallway alone. There he met Zearley. Zearley attempted to block Maixner's way and they had a brief "pushing match." Maixner was in plain clothes without a badge, did not have the warrant, and did not identify himself to Zearley until after the pushing match. Maixner testified Zearley's manner was hostile. Maixner pushed Zearley against the wall until the other officers got to the hallway. Zearley claimed that he did not realize Maixner was an agent until he saw the other officers. Maixner then patted Zearley down for weapons. Feeling a two-inch-long pipe and a one and one-half inch square key ring ornament in Zearley's pocket, Maixner reached into the pocket and pulled out a drug pipe and packets of methamphetamine. Maixner later testified that he "expected" the pipe to be a knife. Charged with possession of a controlled substance, Zearley moved to suppress the evidence. The trial court ruled that the pipe and the packets of methamphetamine were inadmissible because the search contravened the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, § 8 of the North Dakota Constitution on reasonable searches and seizures: The State appealed, contending that the patdown was a reasonable frisk for weapons and that the pocket search was reasonable to determine if the pipe was a knife. Zearley countered that Maixner lacked reasonable cause for suspicion that Zearley was armed and dangerous and that Maixner lacked reasonable grounds to believe that Zearley's pocket contained a weapon. We reverse and remand for reconsideration. In State v. Grant, 361 N.W.2d 243 (N.D. 1985), police, with a warrant, were searching a house when Grant entered with the owner. An officer questioned Grant for a few minutes and requested to see her purse, telling her that she had no choice in the matter. Grant was charged with possession of marijuana, but the trial court granted her motion to suppress the evidence found in her purse. This court ruled that the State's appeal was untimely and ineffective. Nevertheless, this court went on to point out that the search of Grant's purse was not based on a reasonable belief that she was armed, quoting Terry, infra, Ybarra, infra, and Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S. Ct. 2587, 69 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1981). Grant, at 245. In Grant, we rejected the idea that officers executing a search warrant may routinely frisk for weapons anyone present at the scene of a valid search, but we did not foreclose a patdown search for weapons where circumstances created any valid concern for safety. In limited circumstances, police may stop and pat down an individual, checking for weapons without probable cause to arrest. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1967). The United States Supreme Court held that "stop and frisk" procedures were searches and seizures protected by the Fourth Amendment. Id., at 16-17, 88 S. Ct. at 1877-78. The Court focused on the governmental interest in protecting officers and citizens and on the reasonableness of the action. Id., at 23-24, 88 S. Ct. at 1881-82. The Court ruled that a "Terry stop" was permissible *356 but, mindful of the intrusive nature of a stop and patdown, narrowly tailored the ruling: Where a stop of a person without a warrant is justified, "a carefully limited search of the outer clothing" for potential weapons is permissible for safety reasons. Reasoning from Terry, we readily conclude that Maixner's patdown of Zearley was justifiable. In a remarkably similar case, a California appellate court arrived at a similar conclusion. People v. Thurman, 209 Cal. App. 3d 817, 257 Cal. Rptr. 517 (1989). In Thurman the appellant, relying on Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979), claimed that there was no reason to believe he was armed and dangerous and therefore, under Terry, the search was unlawful. The California appellate court rejected that contention, stating: Relying on Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110, 98 S. Ct. 330, 333, 54 L. Ed. 2d 331 (1977), the California court concluded: In Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 100 S. Ct. 338, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979), based on an informant's statements, police obtained a warrant to search a bar and the bartender for evidence of possession of illegal drugs. Upon entering the bar, the police announced that they were going to conduct a "cursory search for weapons," authorized by an Illinois statute. Id., at 88-89, 100 S. Ct. at 340-41. The officer removed nothing from Ybarra's pocket during the initial patdown. After everyone in the bar had been patted down, the officer returned to *357 Ybarra and removed a packet of heroin from his pocket. The trial court denied Ybarra's motion to suppress the heroin and Ybarra was convicted of its possession. After Illinois appellate courts upheld the conviction, Ybarra appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which reversed and remanded. The Court found that the police had no probable cause to search Ybarra because patrons were not included in the warrant and because Ybarra gave them no indication of criminal activity. Id., at 90-91, 100 S. Ct. at 341-42. "[A] person's mere propinquity to others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without more, give rise to probable cause to search that person." Id., at 91, 100 S. Ct. at 342. The Court held that a search must be supported by "probable cause particularized with respect to that person." Id. Presence at premises covered by a search warrant is not sufficient. Id. The patdown of Ybarra was not justified because it was "not supported by a reasonable belief" that he was armed and dangerous. Id., at 92, 100 S. Ct. at 342-43. The Court reminded police that Terry created a very narrow exception to the probable cause requirement: As do we, the Thurman court distinguished Ybarra: We conclude that Maixner's patdown of Zearley was a reasonable search for safety reasons. Therefore, the trial court's analysis of the reasonableness of the patdown was mistaken. While a patdown may often be reasonable for safety, the following pocket search must also be based on the same safety reasons. They are distinct efforts. To proceed without a warrant or an arrest, each must be reasonable. In Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917 (1968), a police officer observed Sibron talking with several known addicts over a period of eight hours. The officer knew nothing about Sibron, did not overhear any of the conversations, and did not see anything change hands. While Sibron was eating in a restaurant where he had been seen talking to addicts, the officer approached him and ordered him outside. Once outside, the officer said, "You know what I am after." Sibron reached into his pocket and the officer immediately thrust his hand into the same pocket, seizing several packets of heroin. Sibron's motion to suppress the heroin was denied, and Sibron pled guilty, while preserving his right to appeal. Id., at 45, 88 S. Ct. at 1893-94. After New York appellate courts affirmed his conviction, Sibron appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The Court reversed and remanded, ruling that the heroin was illegally seized. Because the officer had no probable cause to arrest Sibron for his unknown conversations with known addicts, the pocket search of Sibron was not incident to a lawful arrest. Id., at 63, 88 S. Ct. at 1902-03. The Court did not view it as an acceptable "Terry stop" because the officer was unable "to point to particular facts from which he reasonably inferred that the *358 individual was armed and dangerous." Id., at 64, 88 S. Ct. at 1903. Even if the officer had reasonable grounds for a patdown, this was an unacceptable explanation because there was no patdown before the search of the pocket and because the pocket search was not reasonably limited to the accomplishments of a limited patdown purpose. Id., at 65, 88 S. Ct. at 1904. Sibron instructs that an articulable and reasonable suspicion about safety or weapons must underlie a pocket search without a warrant. Thurman, supra, too, viewed the pocket search as an event distinct from the preceding patdown. In Thurman, the trial court denied the motion to suppress. The appellate court looked separately at the patdown and at the pocket search. That patdown for weapons was also motivated by reasons of safety and detected an unidentified "large bulge" in the subject's jacket pocket. The officer reached into the pocket. The appellate court characterized that as a "reasonable and limited component of the pat search." The California appellate court held "that where an outside clothing pat search reveals the presence of an object of a size and density that reasonably suggests the object might be a weapon, the searching officer is entitled to continue the search to the inner garments where the object is located in order to determine whether the object is in fact a weapon." 257 Cal.Rptr., at 521. We concur with this ruling. The California appellate court explained: The court concluded that condition had been met, that "simultaneous with the verification that the object was not a weapon occurred the realization that the objects were pieces of rock cocaine contained in a baggie" based on that officer's experience, and that this "tactile equivalent" of contraband in plain view justified completion of the pocket search. We are less certain about the "tactile" perceptions of this officer. Maixner testified: *359 It is not clear whether the trial court's ruled on the reasonableness of Maixner completing a search of Zearley's pocket. The trial court said: Whether this was a continuation of the trial court's mistaken analysis of the reasonableness of the patdown or was a separate finding on the reasonableness of the following pocket search is not clear to us. The trial court had the opportunity to hear and observe the witnesses and to examine the pipe and key ring in assessing the reasonableness of the officer's search. In a suppression matter, we ordinarily recognize the importance of the trial court's opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses by according deference to its decision. State v. Thordarson, 440 N.W.2d 510 (N.D.1989). But, where we are unable to understand its decision, we cannot defer to it. In a tense situation like this confrontation, the officer may not be able to adequately and quickly access the hazards before a patdown. That is why we conclude that the patdown was reasonable. But the reasonableness of a patdown, without more, does not make a pocket search reasonable. A patdown is not simply a routine preliminary to a more extensive search. Before going further, the officer must have an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and dangerous. On remand, the trial court must determine whether the pocket search following this patdown was reasonable. We reverse and remand for reconsideration of the suppression order in accordance with this opinion. ERICKSTAD, C.J., and MESCHKE, LEVINE, VANDE WALLE and GIERKE, JJ., concur.