Case Title: Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Eddins

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018 ME 47

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2018-04-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2018 ME 47 
Docket: 
Pen-17-342 
Submitted 
On Briefs: February 26, 2018 
Decided: 
April 3, 2018 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY 
 
v. 
 
JESSE S. EDDINS JR. et al. 
 
 
HJELM, J.  
[¶1]  Jesse S. Eddins Jr. and Naomi L. Eddins appeal from a judgment of 
foreclosure entered by the Superior Court (Penobscot County, Mallonee, J.) in 
favor of Deutsche Bank National Trust Company.  The Eddinses argue on appeal 
that the court abused its discretion by admitting in evidence a copy of the notice 
of default that contains an assertion that it was sent by mail.  We agree and 
therefore vacate the judgment and remand for entry of judgment for the 
Eddinses. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  The following facts are either undisputed or taken from the 
judgment, viewed in the light most favorable to Deutsche Bank.  See Homeward 
Residential, Inc. v. Gregor, 2015 ME 108, ¶ 2, 122 A.3d 947. 
 
2 
[¶3]  On November 9, 2005, Francine Eddins and Jesse S. Eddins, Jr. 
executed a promissory note in favor of Argent Mortgage Company, LLC, in the 
principal amount of $78,200.  To secure payment on the note, Francine and 
Jesse executed a mortgage on residential property located in Mount Chase.  
Argent later assigned the note to Deutsche Bank as trustee.  Francine died in 
2009.  The following January, Jesse executed a quitclaim deed to the 
encumbered property to himself and his daughter, Naomi L. Eddins.  Later in 
2010, Jesse agreed to a modification of the note, increasing the amount owed to 
approximately $89,000.   
 
[¶4]  On August 10, 2015, Deutsche Bank filed a complaint for foreclosure 
in the District Court (Lincoln), naming Jesse as the defendant and Naomi as a 
party in interest and alleging that Jesse had defaulted by failing to make 
payments on the note beginning April 1, 2014.  The Eddinses filed an answer 
that included several affirmative defenses, including an assertion that the Bank 
failed to comply with the notice provisions of 14 M.R.S. § 6111 (2017).1  The 
Eddinses also filed a notice of removal to the Superior Court (Penobscot 
County).  See M.R. Civ. P. 76C. 
                                         
1  The Eddinses also filed a counterclaim against the Bank.  The counterclaim is not relevant to this 
appeal and, in any event, has been dismissed, leaving only the foreclosure claim. 
 
3 
[¶5]  After considerable—and contentious—pretrial proceedings, in 
April of 2017 the court (Mallonee, J.) conducted a bench trial.  Deutsche Bank’s 
only witness was Blaine Shadle, a senior loan analyst for Ocwen Loan Servicing, 
the company responsible for servicing the Eddinses’ mortgage on behalf of 
Deutsche Bank.    
[¶6]  Shadle testified that he became employed by Ocwen in February of 
2013 and has held a variety of positions there, including working as a phone 
agent in “customer care,” a member of the “coach line” where he assisted other 
agents with questions during phone calls with customers, a supervisor in 
various departments, and a member of the “email live chat team.”  In his current 
position as a senior loan analyst, he reviews “mortgage accounts, records in 
[Ocwen’s] system, also documents, usually the collateral file, like originating 
document[s] such as the note, the mortgage, things like that.”  Shadle testified 
that in preparation for trial, he reviewed Deutsche Bank’s trial exhibits and 
related documents, which he stated are kept in the “normal course of business 
with the [B]ank[,] . . . made near or at the time of the event described[,] . . . [and] 
maintained on a regular and permanent basis” to ensure accuracy.    
[¶7]  Shadle identified Deutsche Bank’s Exhibit E, which is a notice of 
default and right to cure purportedly sent in May of 2015 to Jesse at two 
 
4 
addresses and which states, among other things, that there was an amount 
overdue on the note.  The notice was printed on the letterhead of Shechtman 
Halperin Savage, which is the law firm that represents Ocwen in this action, and 
bears the signature of an attorney with the firm.  Two sets of unidentified 
numbers are on the notice,2 as well as a statement at the end of the notice 
indicating that it was “sent via certified mail/rrr and regular mail.”  Shadle 
testified that he had no “personal knowledge as to who mailed [the notice of 
default],” and when asked whether he had proof that the notice was mailed, he 
stated, “Not with me.”  During his testimony, Shadle did not describe any 
familiarity with any process used by the law firm to create or maintain records.  
When the Bank offered Exhibit E into evidence, the Eddinses objected, arguing 
that Shadle lacked personal knowledge about the law firm’s processes relating 
to its documents.  The court summarily overruled the objection and admitted 
the document in evidence.   
[¶8]  At the close of the evidence, the court stated that it would enter 
judgment for the Bank, and it did so by written judgment later that day.  After 
the court denied the Eddinses’ motion for further findings and conclusions, see 
                                         
2  In its brief on appeal, Deutsche Bank states that those numbers represent certified mail tracking 
numbers, but there is nothing in the record to substantiate that statement. 
 
5 
M.R. Civ. P. 52(b), they filed a timely notice of appeal.  See 14 M.R.S. § 1851 
(2017); M.R. App. P. 2(b)(3) (Tower 2016).3   
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶9]  To obtain a judgment of foreclosure, the Bank was required to 
prove—among other things—that it had provided Jesse with proper notice of 
default and right to cure.4  See Bank of Am., N.A. v. Greenleaf, 2014 ME 89, ¶ 18, 
96 A.3d 700.  Here, Exhibit E was Deutsche Bank’s only evidence that it had sent 
a proper notice of default to Jesse.  Over the Eddinses’ objection, the court 
admitted that document in evidence as a business record based on Shadle’s 
foundational testimony.  The Eddinses argue here that the admission of the 
document was error.   
[¶10]  When the admissibility of business records is at issue on appeal, 
we review the court’s foundational findings for clear error and its ultimate 
                                         
3  The restyled Maine Rules of Appellate Procedure do not apply because this appeal was filed 
prior to September 1, 2017.  See M.R. App. P. 1 (restyled Rules). 
4  This basic requirement of proof is applicable here irrespective of whether this action is governed 
by the requirements of 14 M.R.S. § 6111 (2017), which is an issue disputed by the parties because of 
evidence that Jesse was not occupying the mortgaged premises as his primary residence.  See id. 
§ 6111(1); Bordetsky v. JAK Realty Trust, 2017 ME 42, ¶ 7, 157 A.3d 233.  If section 6111 does apply, 
as the Eddinses contend, then the Bank was required to satisfy the statutory requirements governing 
such notice.  See 14 M.R.S. §§ 6111, 6321 (2017); see also Bank of Am., N.A. v. Greenleaf, 2014 ME 89, 
¶ 18, 96 A.3d 700.  Alternatively, if, as the Bank argues, section 6111 is inapplicable, then the 
mortgage instrument itself nonetheless required the Bank to send Jesse a notice of default and right 
to cure with certain information contained in that notice.  Therefore, either way, the Bank was 
required to prove that it had sent Jesse a notice of default and that the notice contained certain 
information. 
 
6 
determination of admissibility for an abuse of discretion.  See Bank of Am., N.A. 
v. Barr, 2010 ME 124, ¶ 17, 9 A.3d 816; see also JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. 
Lowell, 2017 ME 32, ¶ 8, 156 A.3d 727.  When “making foundational findings, 
the court may only consider evidence established prior to the exhibit’s 
admission in evidence.”  Gregor, 2015 ME 108, ¶ 14 n.11, 122 A.3d 947. 
[¶11]  A document that is supported by the foundational standards 
prescribed in Maine Rule of Evidence 803(6) is admissible as an exception to 
the general rule precluding admission of hearsay evidence.5  The witness who 
testifies to the predicate for the admission of a business record need not have 
personal knowledge about the matter that is memorialized in the document, 
                                         
5  Maine Rule of Evidence 803(6) provides in full: 
(6) Records of a regularly conducted activity. A record of an act, event, condition, 
opinion, or diagnosis [is not excluded by the rule against hearsay, regardless of 
whether the declarant is available as a witness,] if:  
(A) The record was made at or near the time by—or from information 
transmitted by—someone with knowledge; 
(B) The record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a 
business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit; 
(C) Making the record was a regular practice of that activity; 
(D) All these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or 
another qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with 
Rule 902(11), Rule 902(12) or with a statute permitting certification; and 
(E) Neither the source of information nor the method or circumstances of 
preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness. 
 
7 
because the foundational elements of a Rule 803(6) business record, by 
themselves, provide sufficient indication that the information contained in the 
record is reliable and trustworthy.  See M.R. Evid. 803(6); Lowell, 2017 ME 32, 
¶ 11, 156 A.3d 727; Beneficial Maine Inc. v. Carter, 2011 ME 77, ¶ 12, 25 A.3d 
96.  Pursuant to the Rule, and as we have stated, however, to demonstrate the 
record’s reliability and trustworthiness, the proponent of the document must 
present evidence that the qualifying witness is either the custodian of the 
record or some other person with sufficient knowledge of the processes used 
by the creator of the record to produce and retain the record.  See M.R. 
Evid. 803(6); Lowell, 2017 ME 32, ¶¶ 9, 11, 156 A.3d 727; Carter, 2011 ME 77, 
¶ 12, 25 A.3d 96.  “A qualified witness is one who was intimately involved in the 
daily operation of the [business] and whose testimony showed the firsthand 
nature of his knowledge.”  HSBC Mortg. Servs., Inc. v. Murphy, 2011 ME 59, ¶ 10, 
19 A.3d 815 (alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted). 
[¶12]  The witness who provides foundational testimony need not be an 
employee of the entity that created and maintained the document at issue if, for 
purposes of Rule 803(6), that witness has adequate knowledge of the processes 
used by the entity that created and preserved the document.  See Carter, 
2011 ME 77, ¶ 13, 25 A.3d 96; see also KeyBank Nat’l Ass’n v. Estate of Quint, 
 
8 
2017 ME 237, ¶ 15, 176 A.3d 717.  Consequently, when a document is created 
by one entity and then transmitted to another, and the document is then offered 
as a business record pursuant to Rule 803(6), the witness must be shown to 
have “sufficient knowledge of both businesses’ regular practices to 
demonstrate the reliability and trustworthiness of the information.”  Carter, 
2011 ME 77, ¶ 13, 25 A.3d 96 (emphasis added); see also Estate of Quint, 
2017 ME 237, ¶¶ 16-17, 176 A.3d 717.  The incorporation of one entity’s record 
into the records of the receiving entity is not a sufficient basis, by itself, for the 
admissibility of that record.    
 
[¶13]  Here, Deutsche Bank presented Shadle as the witness to provide 
the foundational predicate for admission in evidence of the notice of default.  
Shadle testified about various positions he held with Ocwen and described 
some measure of familiarity with Ocwen’s business practices.  The notice of 
default, however, was not issued by Ocwen.  Rather, the notice was issued and 
at least initially maintained by the law firm representing Ocwen.  Deutsche 
Bank did not present any evidence that Shadle had any familiarity with the 
processes used by the law firm to generate documents, such as a notice of 
default, and to maintain any such documents.      
 
9 
[¶14]  In the absence of any evidence that Shadle had knowledge of the 
law firm’s practices regarding business records, the court abused its discretion 
by admitting the document in evidence.  See Carter, 2011 ME 77, ¶¶ 12-14, 
25 A.3d 96; Murphy, 2011 ME 59, ¶ 10, 19 A.3d 815.  Because Deutsche Bank 
presented no competent evidence that a notice of default was sent to Jesse or 
that any such notice met the requirements of either section 6111 or the 
mortgage instrument itself, the Bank failed as a matter of law to prove a 
necessary element of its foreclosure claim, see Greenleaf, 2014 ME 89, ¶ 18, 
96  A.3d 700, and the Eddinses are therefore entitled to judgment.6  See Lowell, 
2017 ME 32, ¶¶ 1, 21, 156 A.3d 727 (stating that when a mortgagee fails at trial 
to prove a required element of a foreclosure claim, the mortgagor is entitled to 
judgment); CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Chartier, 2015 ME 17, ¶¶ 1, 10, 111 A.3d 39 
(same).  
The entry is: 
Judgment vacated.  Remanded for entry of 
judgment for Jesse S. Eddins Jr. and Naomi L. 
Eddins.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                         
6  Because Deutsche Bank’s failure of proof on the notice of default and right to cure is dispositive 
of the outcome of this appeal, we need not and do not reach the Eddinses’ argument that the court 
also erred by admitting in evidence a different document, which purported to show the amount due 
on the secured loan.   
 
10 
Thomas A. Cox, Esq., Portland, for appellants Jesse S. Eddings and Naomi L. 
Eddins 
 
Brett L. Messinger, Esq., Andrea T. Holbrook, Esq., and David C. West, Esq., 
Portland, for appellee Deutsche Bank National Trust Company 
 
 
Lincoln District Court docket number RE-2015-12 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY