Case Title: SAS PARTNERSHIP v SCHAFER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 82-109

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1982-10-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 82-109 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 1982 SAS PARTNERSHIP, a p a r t n e r s h i p , by and through WILLIAM E. STEIN, a g e n e r a l p a r t n e r , P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, FRED F. SCHAFER AND GAIL F. SCHAFER, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: District Court of t h e Eleventh J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County o f Flathead Honorable J. M. Salansky, Judge p r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For P l a i n t i f f : E. Eugene Atherton, K a l i s p e l l , Montana For Defendants: J a r d i n e , Stephenson, B l e w e t t & Weaver; Alexander B l e w e t t , Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted on b r i e f s : August 19, 1 9 8 2 Decided: October 4 , 1982 F i l e d : 8CT 4 - ?982 i Clerk- M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. T h i s is a c o n t r a c t d i s p u t e on a p p e a l from t h e E l e v e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t i n and f o r t h e County of F l a t h e a d . A t t h e District Court t h e seller, SAS P a r t n e r s h i p , s o u g h t to r e q u i r e t h e b u y e r s , Fred and G a i l S c h a f e r , to pay an a c c e l e r a t e d d e b t under a c o n t r a c t f o r deed. The District Court e n t e r e d judgment a g a i n s t SAS. From t h a t judgment SAS a p p e a l s . W e r e v e r s e and remand. On December 27, 1978, t h r e e p a r t i e s e n t e r e d i n t o a real estate exchange agreement; SAS P a r t n e r s h i p , t h e S c h a f e r s , and P a u l M. Jackson. M r . Jackson is not a p a r t y to t h i s a c t i o n . SAS s o l d 3,000 f e e t of undeveloped l a k e f r o n t p r o p e r t y to M r . Jackson who t r a d e d t h e p r o p e r t y f o r o t h e r real estate t h e n owned by t h e S c h a f e r s . Under t h e terms of t h e c o n t r a c t , t h e S c h a f e r s were to pay SAS a total of $1.4 m i l l i o n ; $350,000 a s a dowrr- payment, t h e b a l a n c e t o be paid i n annual i n s t a l l m e n t s o v e r a p e r i o d of n i n e y e a r s a t 85/4 p e r c e n t i n t e r e s t . A t or b e f o r e t h e c l o s i n g t h e S c h a f e r s p a i d t h e $350,000 down payment and took p o s s e s s i o n of t h e p r o p e r t y and have r e t a i n e d p o s s e s s i o n to t h e p r e s e n t t i m e . Within t h e f i r s t y e a r t h e S c h a f e r s expended o v e r $76,000 i n improvements. The f i r s t i n s t a l l m e n t payment of $100,471 became due on December 27, 1979. The S c h a f e r s were unable t o make t h e payment. On J a n u a r y 1 4 , 1980, SAS s e n t a n o t i c e of d e f a u l t t o t h e S c h a f e r s , and f a i l i n g to r e c e i v e payment, SAS s e n t a n o t h e r n o t i c e on February 26, 1980, demanding payment p l u s a p e n a l t y charge of $10,047. The S c h a f e r s could n o t meet t h e i r o b l i g a t i o n s and on March 1 4 , 1980, SAS gave n o t i c e of d e f a u l t and an i n t e n t to ac- celerate t h e e n t i r e unpaid b a l a n c e . On May 1 3 , 1980, t h e S c h a f e r s tendered t h e sum of $110,853 which r e p r e s e n t e d t h e i n s t a l l m e n t payment, t h e p e n a l t y c h a r g e , a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s , and an escrow c h a r g e . SAS r e f u s e d S c h a f e r ' s t e n d e r and on May 22 f i l e d t h e c o m p l a i n t w i t h t h e District Court f o r s p e c i f i c performance; p r a y i n g f o r judgment of t h e e n t i r e b a l a n c e of $l,050rOO0 p l u s i n t e r e s t , f o r t h e p e n a l t y of $10,047 p l u s i n t e r e s t , and f o r a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s and costs of s u i t . During t h e pendency of t h i s a c t i o n t h e second i n s t a l l m e n t became due on December 27, 1980. N o payment was made and SAS a g a i n s e n t d e f a u l t and a c c e l e r a t i o n n o t i c e s . The c e n t r a l i s s u e a t t h e District Court involved i n t e r p r e t a - t i o n of t h e c o n t r a c t ' s d e f a u l t c l a u s e . More s p e c i f i c a l l y , as s u b - i s s u e s , was SAS e n t i t l e d to a c c e l e r a t e t h e payments, f o r c i n g t h e S c h a f e r s t o immediately pay t h e o u t s t a n d i n g b a l a n c e of o v e r $1,000,000; a n d , i f SAS was w i t h i n its c o n t r a c t u a l r i g h t s by demanding t h e e n t i r e b a l a n c e , d i d it comply w i t h t h e n o t i c e r e q u i r e m e n t s of t h e c o n t r a c t ? The D i s t r i c t Court found a g a i n s t SAS; however, t h e judgment o r d e r e d t h e S c h a f e r s to t e n d e r t h e 1979 and 1980 i n s t a l l m e n t s p l u s p e n a l t i e s and i n t e r e s t . The S c h a f e r ' s o b l i g a t i o n to make t e n d e r under t h e judgment was c o n d i t i o n a l ; i f SAS made any post- t r i a l motions o r f i l e d an a p p e a l , t h e o b l i g a t i o n would n o t a t t a c h . Accordingly, to t h e p r e s e n t t i m e no i n s t a l l m e n t payments have been made. The a p p e l l a n t raises t h e f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s f o r o u r c o n s i d e r a - t i o n : 1. Whether t h e District Court e r r e d i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n of p r i n c i p l e s of c o n t r a c t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ? 2. Whether t h e District Court e r r e d by concluding t h a t ac- c e l e r a t i o n may be tantamount to f o r f e i t u r e and s i n c e c o u r t s look w i t h d i s f a v o r on f o r f e i t u r e s , t h e c o n t r a c t must be c o n s t r u e d i n f a v o r of t h e S c h a f e r s ? 3 . Whether t h e District Court e r r e d i n concluding t h a t t h e d e f a u l t n o t i c e s were vague and premature? 4. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d by n o t making f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s on v a r i o u s i n s t a n c e s of d e f a u l t ? 5. Whether t h e District Court e r r e d i n awarding a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s t o t h e S c h a f e r s ? The f i r s t two i s s u e s are o v e r l a p p i n g i n t h a t they q u e s t i o n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t v s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h e c o n t r a c t . W e choose t o d i s c u s s them a s a s i n g l e i s s u e . I n i t i a l l y , we n o t e t h a t o u r scope of review is such t h a t we may c o n s i d e r t h e c o n t r a c t language independently. It is t r u e t h a t c o n t r a c t a m b i g u i t i e s are q u e s t i o n s of f a c t ; Dooling v . Casey ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 152 Mont. 267, 448 P.2d 749; S - W Company v. Schwenk ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 173 Mont. 481, 568 P.2d 145. T h i s Court s t a t e d i n McNussen v. Graybeal ( 1 9 6 5 ) r 146 Mont. 173, 186, 405 P.2d 447, 454, "where t h e r e is a con£ l i c t of t e s t i m o n y as t o what were t h e i n t e n t i o n s of t h e p a r t i e s toward t h e use of t h e ambiguous word, d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e t r u e meaning is one of f a c t . . ." Thus, w e would o r d i n a r i l y be l i m i t e d to t h e " c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s " s t a n d a r d of review. Rule 5 2 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P. However, it is a l s o w e l l s e t t l e d t h a t t h e i n i t i a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n of whether o r n o t an ambi- g u i t y e x i s t s is one of law. - - - McNussen, s u p r a . " I t is a q u e s t i o n of l a w f o r t h e [ d i s t r i c t ] c o u r t to d e t e r m i n e f i r s t as to whether t h e r e e x i s t s ambiguity s u f f i c i e n t to submit t h e q u e s t i o n of i n t e n t i o n to t h e trier of f a c t . " S c h e l l v. P e t e r s ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 147 Mont. 21, 27, 410 P.2d 152, 155. Thus, t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n by t h e D i s t r i c t Court t h a t t h e d e f a u l t c l a u s e w a s ambiguous is a c o n c l u s i o n of law f r e e l y reviewable by t h i s Court. M a r t i n v. United S t a t e s ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 8 1 ) , 649 F.2d 701; United S t a t e s F i d e l i t y v. Newman ( 9 t h C i r . 1 9 8 1 ) r 656 F.2d 457. W e do not f i n d ambiguity i n t h e c o n t r a c t and r e l y on o u r own i n t e r p r e t a - t i o n . The e n t i r e case r e v o l v e s around t h e d e f a u l t c l a u s e . The p e r t i n e n t language r e a d s : "2. DEFAULT: I n t h e e v e n t P u r c h a s e r f a i l s or n e g l e c t s t o make any of t h e payments of p r i n - c i p a l or i n t e r e s t when d u e , or f a i l s or n e g l e c t s to perform any of t h e c o v e n a n t s P u r c h a s e r h a s agreed t o perform, t h e n S e l l e r may, a t t h e i r o p t i o n , g i v e a w r i t t e n Notice of D e f a u l t , to Puchaser s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e d e f a u l t claimed by S e l l e r . The Notice s h a l l be suf- f i c i e n t i f it d e s c r i b e s t h e d e f a u l t i n g e n e r a l terms. " ( a ) I f w i t h i n 60 d a y s of t h e d a t e of s e r v i c e of s a i d N o t i c e of D e f a u l t , t h e P u r c h a s e r c o r r e c t s and makes good t h e payments and o b l i - g a t i o n s t h e n i n d e f a u l t as set f o r t h i n s a i d Notice, t h e n P u r c h a s e r ' s r i g h t s under t h i s c o n t r a c t s h a l l be f u l l y r e i n s t a t e d and t h i s c o n t r a c t s h a l l c o n t i n u e t h e same as i f no d e f a u l t had o c c u r r e d . P u r c h a s e r a g r e e s to reimburse S e l l e r f o r a l l l e g a l expenses i n c u r r e d by S e l l e r i n g i v i n g and s e r v i n g t h e Notice of D e f a u l t . The amount of such expense s h a l l be s p e c i f i e d i n s a i d Notice of D e f a u l t and s h a l l be p a i d by P u r c h a s e r a t t h e t i m e of c o r r e c t i n g such d e f a u l t . " ( b ) However, i f t h e P u r c h a s e r f a i l s o r n e g l e c t s t o pay, c o r r e c t , o r make good such d e f a u l t , as set f o r t h i n s a i d N o t i c e , w i t h i n 60 d a y s from t h e d a t e of s e r v i c e of s a i d ~ o t i c e - , t h e n , -- upon g i v i n g - a f u r t h e r n o t i c e - o f 60 d a y s , t h e S e l l e r may: -- - - - " ( 1 ) Declare t h e e n t i r e unpaid b a l a n c e - - due - on t h e c o n t r a c t , i n c l u d i n g p r i n c i p a l and i n t e r e s t , - - - - - - immediately - -- due . - and p a y a b l e . I n such e v e n t , P u r c h a s e r a g r e e s to pay S e l l e r a l l costs of c o l l e c t i o n i n c l u d i n g a r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y ' s f e e . " ( c ) I f t h e P u r c h a s e r f a i l s to pay t h e e n t i r e unpaid p r i n c i p a l b a l a n c e p l u s accrued i n t e r e s t , p l u s a l l c o s t s and r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s , w i t h i n t h e t i m e p e r i o d as set f o r t h i n t h e second n o t i c e of d e f a u l t t h e n t h e S e l l e r may a t its o p t i o n , w i t h o u t n o t i c e , e i t h e r : " ( 1 ) Proceed to e n f o r c e its r i g h t s under t h i s c o n t r a c t f o r c o l l e c t i o n of t h e remaining c o n t r a c t b a l a n c e , t o g e t h e r w i t h i n t e r e s t , and t o g e t h e r w i t h a l l c o s t s i n c l u d i n g a r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y ' s f e e ; o r " ( 2 ) D e c l a r e t h i s c o n t r a c t , immediately ter- minated and c a n c e l l e d . . ." (Emphasis s u p p l i e d . ) The v i g o r o u s l y c o n t e s t e d p h r a s e a p p e a r s i n s e c t i o n 2 ( b ) and (1): " t h e n , upon g i v i n g a f u r t h e r n o t i c e of 60 d a y s , t h e S e l l e r may: (1) Declare t h e e n t i r e unpaid b a l a n c e due on t h e c o n t r a c t , i n c l u d i n g p r i n c i p a l and i n t e r e s t , immediately due and payable ." The a p p e l l a n t ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is t h i s : a f t e r f a i l u r e of t h e buyer to c u r e w i t h i n t h e s i x t y - d a y p e r i o d s p e c i f i e d i n 2 ( a ) , t h e s e l l e r may t h e n "upon g i v i n g a f u r t h e r n o t i c e of 60 d a y s " immedi- a t e l y d e c l a r e t h e e n t i r e b a l a n c e due. I n o t h e r words, t h e a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e g i v i n g of t h e second n o t i c e and t h e d e c l a r a t i o n of t h e e n t i r e b a l a n c e being due a r e c o n c u r r e n t e v e n t s . A s a r e s u l t , t h e buyer must pay o f f t h e a c c e l e r a t e d d e b t w i t h i n t h e second s i x t y - d a y p e r i o d and f a i l u r e t o do so w i l l r e s u l t i n t h e seller choosing h i s remedies under s u b s e c t i o n 2 ( c ) . The respondent o f f e r s a n o t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Respondent c l a i m s t h a t a f t e r h i s f a i l u r e t o c u r e t h e d e f a u l t w i t h i n s i x t y d a y s a s s p e c i f i e d i n 2 ( a ) he must be g i v e n a n o t h e r sixty-day p e r i o d to c u r e , and o n l y af ter t h e e x p i r a t i o n of a second s i x t y - d a y p e r i o d w i l l t h e seller be allowed to d e c l a r e t h e e n t i r e b a l a n c e due. Respondent argues t h a t t h e g i v i n g of n o t i c e of t h e second s i x t y - d a y p e r i o d and t h e d e c l a r a t i o n of t h e e n t i r e b a l a n c e being due a r e not c o n c u r r e n t e v e n t s . The d e c l a r a t i o n can occur o n l y a f t e r e x p i r a t i o n of t h e second s i x t y - d a y p e r i o d . Thus, t h e buyer f e e l s e n t i t l e d to t w o sixty-day p e r i o d s to c u r e a d e f a u l t and o n l y a f t e r e x p i r a t i o n of 120 d a y s w i l l t h e seller be a u t h o r i z e d t o demand a c c e l e r a t i o n of t h e d e b t . The r e s p o n d e n t ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is s t r a i n e d . It is obvious to us t h a t t h e c o n t r a c t e n v i s i o n s o n l y t w o sixty-day p e r i o d s , n o t t h r e e . The d e f a u l t c l a u s e is of t h e "double b a r r e l e d " v a r i e t y . Any o t h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is r i d i c u l o u s . A key word i n t h e p h r a s e is t h e word "upon." "The words of a c o n t r a c t a r e to be understood i n t h e i r o r d i n a r y and p o p u l a r sense . . ." S e c t i o n 28-3-501, MCA. W e b s t e r ' s Third N e w I n t e r n a t i o n a l D i c t i o n a r y , a t page 2518, d e f i n e s "upon" a s ". . .on t h e o c c a s i o n o f : a t t h e t i m e of . . . I' Thus, "on t h e o c c a s i o n o f " or " a t t h e t i m e o f " g i v i n g t h e second s i x t y - d a y n o t i c e t h e seller may d e c l a r e t h e e n t i r e balance due. Furthermore, language i n 2 ( c ) l e n d s s u p p o r t to t h i s obvious i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . I n p e r t i n e n t p a r t it states : " [ i ] f t h e p u r c h a s e r f a i l s to pay t h e e n t i r e unpaid . . . b a l a n c e . . . w i t h i n t h e t i m e p e r i o d a s set f o r t h i n t h e second n o t i c e of d e f a u l t t h e n t h e - - - S e l l e r may a t its o p t i o n . . . e n f o r c e its r i g h t s under t h i s c o n t r a c t f o r c o l l e c t i o n of t h e remaining c o n t r a c t b a l a n c e . . ." (Emphasis added.) Even i f t h e D i s t r i c t Court found ambiguity i n t h e language "upon g i v i n g a f u r t h e r n o t i c e of s i x t y d a y s " it could e a s i l y have looked to t h e language of s u b s e c t i o n ( c ) to r e s o l v e its d i f f i c u l t y . "The whole of a c o n t r a c t is to be taken t o g e t h e r so as to g i v e e f f e c t t o e v e r y p a r t i f r e a s o n a b l y prac- t i c a b l e , e a c h c l a u s e h e l p i n g - to i n t e r p r e t t h e o t h e r . " S e c t i o n - - - - 28-3-202, MCA. (Emphasis added. ) I t is a p p a r e n t to u s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court, when it rendered its judgment, had i n mind t h e much c i t e d maxim, " t h e l a w a b h o r s f o r f e i t u r e . " W e noted i n Yellowstone County v. Wight ( 1 9 4 3 ) , 115 Mont. 411, 417-4181 1 4 5 P.2d 516, 518, t h a t " [ t l h e c o u r t s have e s t a b l i s h e d . . . t h e p o l i c y . . . t h a t both i n l a w and i n e q u i t y f o r f e i t u r e s are abhorred." See also P a r r o t t v. Heller ( 1 9 7 6 ) r 1 7 1 Mont. 212, 557 P.2d 819. I n its c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w t h e District Court s t a t e d : " a c c e l e r a t i o n may be tan- tamount to f o r f e i t u r e . . . C o u r t s l o o k w i t h d i s f a v o r on f o r f e i t u r e s . 'I The laws abhorrence w i t h f o r f e i t u r e s p r i n g s from t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y may cause e x t r e m e l y h a r s h r e s u l t s . Consequently, many states have s t a t u t e s which a l l o w c o u r t s of e q u i t y t o avoid t h e u n j u s t r e s u l t s of f o r f e i t u r e . Montana's sta- t u t e r e a d s : "Whenever by t h e terms of an o b l i g a t i o n a p a r t y t h e r e t o i n c u r s a f o r f e i t u r e o r a l o s s i n t h e n a t u r e of a f o r f e i t u r e by r e a s o n of h i s f a i l u r e t o comply w i t h its p r o v i s i o n s , he may be r e l i e v e d t h e r e f r o m upon making f u l l compen- s a t i o n to t h e o t h e r p a r t y , e x c e p t i n c a s e of a g r o s s l y n e g l i g e n t , w i l l f u l , or f r a u d u l e n t b r e a c h of duty." S e c t i o n 28-1-104, MCA. The r e s p o n d e n t would have t h i s Court r e c o g n i z e t h e s t a t u t e ' s a p p l i c a b i l i t y to t h e s e f a c t s . W e cannot do so. The cause of a c t i o n a t t h e District Court was one f o r s p e c i f i c performance, n o t f o r f e i t u r e . The d i s t i n c t i o n between t h e s e two remedies is c l e a r l y set f o r t h i n t h e d e f a u l t c l a u s e . With s p e c i f i c p e r f o r - mance t h e seller is s e e k i n g to a f f i r m or uphold t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e c o n t r a c t ; whereas i n f o r f e i t u r e t h e seller is s e e k i n g to d i s a f f i r m t h e c o n t r a c t and r e g a i n p o s s e s s i o n . W e have c l e a r l y r e c o g n i z e d t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n b e f o r e . I n Glacier Campground v. Wild R i v e r s , I n c . ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 182 Mont. 389, 400, 597 P.2d 689, 695, we s a i d : "The seller h e r e is not e x e r c i s i n g h i s o p t i o n t o d e c l a r e t h e c o n t r a c t a t an end. I f he were t o d o so, t h e n he would be p r e c l u d e d from s u i n g t o r e c o v e r t h e purchase p r i c e or payments p a s t due, f o r he could n o t r e c l a i m t h e p r o p e r t y under a f o r f e i t u r e c l a u s e and a t t h e same t i m e r e c o v e r any unpaid p o r t i o n of t h e s a l e p r i c e ." The t w o remedies are m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e . Even i f t h i s were a f o r f e i t u r e a c t i o n t h e s t a t u t e could n o t h e l p t h e respondent. The s t a t u t e r e l i e v e s a p a r t y from f o r f e i t u r e upon "making f u l l com- p e n s a t i o n to t h e o t h e r p a r t y . " The r e s p o n d e n t has n e v e r o f f e r e d f u l l compensation; t h e e n t i r e o u t s t a n d i n g b a l a n c e . T h i s is e x a c t l y what t h e a p p e l l a n t is s e e k i n g . I n Hares v. Nelson ( 1 9 8 1 ) I Mont . , 637 P.2d 1 9 , 38 St.Rep. 2036, we h e l d t h e s t a t u t e i n a p p l i c a b l e f o r p r e c i s e l y t h i s r e a s o n . W e a r e n o t unmindful t h a t o u r h o l d i n g may cause t h e S c h a f e r ' s f i n a n c i a l h a r d s h i p , b u t t h i s Court cannot change t h e clear meaning of t h e c o n t r a c t . I n Glacier Campground -- we quoted and approved of language from Renard v. A l l e n ( 1 9 6 4 ) , 237 O r . 406, 3 9 1 P.2d 777: " [ b ] y e n t e r i n g a d e c r e e f o r s p e c i f i c performance t h e c o u r t h a s t r a n s f e r r e d an o b l i g a t i o n assumed by c o n t r a c t i n t o a judgment." Glacier -- Campground, - 182 Mont. a t 406, 597 P.2d a t 698. Likewise, o u r h o l d i n g h e r e does nothing more t h a n e n f o r c e a n o b l i g a t i o n v o l u n t a r i l y assumed by t h e S c h a f e r s . The Renard case also went on to s a y " [ i ] f t h e p u r c h a s e r does n o t pay t h i s o b l i g a t i o n , it is r e a s o n a b l e t h a t t h e p r o p e r t y should be s o l d ; t h e l i e n on t h e p r o p e r t y w a s c r e a t e d to i n s u r e payment i f t h e p u r c h a s e r d i d n o t pay t h i s o b l i g a t i o n . " 237 O r . a t 416, 391 P.2d a t 782. Thus, w e hold t h a t it is p r o p e r f o r t h e District C o u r t on remand t o e n t e r a d e c r e e of s p e c i f i c performance w i t h a p r o v i s i o n t h a t i f t h e e n t i r e b a l a n c e is not paid w i t h i n a speci- f i e d t i m e p e r i o d t h e p r o p e r t y should be s o l d with t h e n e t pro- c e e d s a p p l i e d to s a t i s f y t h e money o b l i g a t i o n owed to SAS. W e now r e a c h t h e t h i r d i s s u e r a i s e d by a p p e l l a n t ; w h e t h e r t h e d e f a u l t n o t i c e s were g i v e n i n accordance w i t h t h e c o n t r a c t . When t h e i n s t a l l m e n t , due on December 27, 1979, was not p a i d , SAS s e n t n o t i c e of d e f a u l t postmarked J a n u a r y 1 4 , 1980. The n o t i c e s t a t e d i n p a r t : "You w i l l p l e a s e t a k e n o t i c e t h a t such agreement is i n d e f a u l t and t h a t t h e annual payment i n t h e amount of $100,471.00 due on December 27, 1979, h a s n o t been p a i d . P u r s u a n t t o t h e terms of such agreement, SAS P a r t n e r s h i p , by and through its a t t o r n e y , is h e r e b y g i v i n g your [ s i c ] n o t i c e as p e r t h e terms of Paragraph 2 r e l a t e d to d e f a u l t . " The t r i a l c o u r t concluded t h a t t h e n o t i c e was "vague and f a i l e d t o a p p r i s e t h e S c h a f e r s as to p r e c i s e and e x a c t t i m e c a l c u l a t i o n s and payment d e a d l i n e s . " W e f a i l t o see how it c o u l d be vague. It c l e a r l y informed t h e S c h a f e r s t h a t they were i n d e f a u l t of t h e 1979 i n s t a l l m e n t of $100,471. The n o t i c e s p e c i - f i c a l l y made r e f e r e n c e t o t h e d e f a u l t c l a u s e of t h e c o n t r a c t and i f t h e S c h a f e r s were unaware of p r e c i s e "time c a l c u l a t i o n s and payment d e a d l i n e s " t h e y m e r e l y had to read t h e i r c o n t r a c t . Furthermore, t h e c o n t r a c t states " [ t l h e Notice s h a l l be suf- f i c i e n t i f it d e s c r i b e s t h e d e f a u l t i n g e n e r a l terms." On March 1 4 , 1980, SAS s e n t a n o t h e r n o t i c e e n t i t l e d : "NOTICE - DEFAULT AND INTENT TO ACCELERATE." - - - - p o r t i o n t h a t not ice r e a d s : "You have f a i l e d to correct your d e f a u l t of t h e annual payment as set f o r t h i n t h e o r i g i - n a l J a n u a r y 1 4 , 1980, n o t i c e w i t h i n 60 d a y s from t h e d a t e of such n o t i c e and p u r s u a n t t o Paragraph 2 ( b ) of such c o n t r a c t . The S e l l e r , SAS P a r t n e r s h i p , b y and through its a t t o r n e y s , is d e c l a r i n g t h e e n t i r e unpaid b a l a n c e due and p a y a b l e , t o g e t h e r w i t h i n t e r e s t , costs, p e n a l t y , and a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s . "You a r e h e r e b y n o t i f i e d t h a t such sums a r e i n t h e f o l l o w i n g amounts: " P r i n c i p a l b a l a n c e t o 3/14/80 . $1,155,383.99 " D a i l y a c c r u a l of i n t e r e s t . . . . . . .237.33 " P e n a l t y as p e r Paragraph 2 ( b ) . . . 10,047.00 " A t t o r n e y f e e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325.00 "Such sums a r e due and payable w i t h i n 60 d a y s o f t h e d a t e of t h i s n o t i c e . " The t r i a l c o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e March 1 4 , 1980, a c c e l e r a t i o n n o t i c e was premature. W e a g a i n d i s a g r e e . Respondents contend t h a t t h e a c c e l e r a t i o n n o t i c e w a s mailed b e f o r e t h e s i x t y - d a y c u r e p e r i o d e x p i r e d , making t h e n o t i c e d e f e c t i v e . The c o n t r a c t s p e c i - f ies t h a t " [ s l e r v i c e by mail s h a l l be complete." The sixty-day p e r i o d began t o run on J a n u a r y 1 5 , 1980 , t h e f i r s t f u l l day af t e r t h e n o t i c e was placed i n t h e m a i l . Our r u l e s of c i v i l procedure p r o v i d e t h e example. " I n computing any p e r i o d of t i m e . . . t h e d a y of t h e a c t . . . a f t e r which t h e d e s i g n a t e d p e r i o d of t i m e b e g i n s t o r u n is not to be included." Rule 6 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P. Consequently, t h e buyers had s e v e n t e e n days i n J a n u a r y , twenty- n i n e i n February, s i n c e 1980 was a l e a p y e a r , and f o u r t e e n days i n March f o r a t o t a l of s i x t y days t o c u r e t h e d e f a u l t by paying t h e f i r s t i n s t a l l m e n t . The r e s p o n d e n t s argue t h a t they d i d n o t r e c e i v e t h e f u l l day of March 14 t o c u r e . They contend t h a t t h e a c c e l e r a t i o n n o t i c e should not have been s e n t u n t i l a f t e r mid- n i g h t on March 14. According t o t h e example provided i n t h e r u l e s of C i v i l Procedure even i f t h e n o t i c e were mailed on March 1 4 , t h e f i r s t day is not included. The n o t i c e was not e f f e c t i v e u n t i l t h e n e x t day, March 15. Thus, we have a s i t u a t i o n where t h e f i r s t s i x t y - d a y p e r i o d ended and t h e second sixty-day p e r i o d began a t t h e same t i m e , on midnight March 14. T h i s i s s u e would d e s e r v e more c o n s i d e r a t i o n i f the respondent had t r i e d to t e n d e r payment between 5:00 p.m. and midnight on March 14. However, such is not t h e c a s e . Respondent d i d n o t t e n d e r t h e i n s t a l l m e n t u n t i l May 1 3 , 1980, approximately two months l a t e r . I t was t o o l a t e t h e n . SAS had a l r e a d y d e c l a r e d t h e e n t i r e b a l a n c e due and p r o p e r l y r e f used t h e i n s u f f i c i e n t t e n d e r . Next, a p p e l l a n t a l l e g e s e r r o r f o r t h e District C o u r t ' s f a i l u r e to make f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s on v a r i o u s o t h e r d e f a u l t s ; t h e S c h a f e r ' s f a i l u r e t o pay t a x e s , t h e S c h a f e r ' s f a i l u r e to name SAS a s c o - l o s s payee on an i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y , and t h e S c h a f e r l s assignment w i t h o u t t h e p e r m i s s i o n of SAS. W e n o t e t h a t t h e p l e a d i n g s o n l y s p e c i f i e d t h e i s s u e of assignment and t h e r e c o r d i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h i s d e f a u l t had been cured a t t h e t i m e of t r i a l . Also, t h e r e s p o n d e n t s s t a t e i n t h e i r b r i e f t h a t a l l of t h e s e " a l l e g e d d e f a u l t s were cured by t h e S c h a f e r s , " and "no n o t i c e under t h e c o n t r a c t was given by SAS and such d e f a u l t s have no b e a r i n g on t h i s l a w s u i t . . . N o n e t h e l e s s , on remand t h e District Court should c o n s i d e r t h e s e a l l e g e d breaches i n l i g h t of t h e c o n t r a c t and d e t e r m i n e i f SAS is e n t i t l e d to any damages o r costs . F i n a l l y , t h e a p p e l l a n t a l l e g e s e r r o r i n t h e District C o u r t ' s award of a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s t o t h e S c h a f e r s . The c o n t r a c t p r o v i d e s : " I n t h e e v e n t e i t h e r p a r t y f a i l s to perform, comply w i t h , o r a b i d e by each and e v e r y agreement, c o n d i t i o n and covenant i n t h i s c o n t r a c t , such d e f a u l t i n g p a r t y s h a l l pay a l l c o s t s , c h a r g e s and expenses, i n c l u d i n g reason- a b l e a t t o r n e y f e e s , r e a s o n a b l y i n c u r r e d by t h e non-defaulting p a r t y because of such d e f a u l t ." The c o n t r a c t is clear. The n o n d e f a u l t i n g p a r t y , SAS, is e n t i t l e d t o a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s . The District Court e r r e d . S e e , - Hares v. Nelson, s u p r a . W e r e v e r s e t h e District C o u r t ' s judgment and remand w i t h d i r e c t i o n s t o e n t e r a d e c r e e of s p e c i f i c performance i n f a v o r of t h e a p p e l l a n t , SAS. Such d e c r e e should make p r o v i s i o n f o r sale o f t h e p r o p e r t y i f t h e e n t i r e b a l a n c e cannot be paid w i t h i n a r e a s o n a b l e t i m e . The District Court is f u r t h e r i n s t r u c t e d to make f i n d i n g s r e g a r d i n g t h e o t h e r a l l e g e d b r e a c h e s and of r e a s o n a b l e c o s t s and a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s owing to S 9 " 1