Case Title: In re Estate of Shirran

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97-270

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-08-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re Estate of Shirran1999 WY 115987 P.2d 140Case Number: 97-270Decided: 08/09/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF GEORGE D. SHIRRAN:

GEORGE T. (TOM) SHIRRAN, 
Appellant (Petitioner),

v.

JAMES D. SHIRRAN, 
Appellee (Respondent).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court of Big Horn County, The Honorable Hunter Patrick, 
Judge.

Michael S. 
Messenger and Mary L. Scheible of Messenger & Jurovich, Thermopolis, 
Wyoming, representing appellant.

John P. Worrall 
of Davis, Worrall, Bancroft & Greear, P.C., Worland, Wyoming, 
representing appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN & HILL, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The district 
court granted Appellee James D. Shirran an implied easement across Appellant 
George T. (Tom) Shirran's property. Tom appeals from the district court's order 
denying his motion for reconsideration, alteration, or amendment of the 
judgment.

[¶2]      We affirm. 

ISSUES

[¶3]      Tom presents 
several issues for our consideration:

I. Whether the 
trial court erred as a matter of law when it failed to address the release 
language and ascribed to it the parties' intentions to settle their 
differences.

II. Whether the 
trial court erred as a matter of law when it held that Appellee has an implied 
easement across Appellant's property.

III. Whether the 
trial court erred as a matter of law when it relied on evidence not properly 
before it.

IV. Should this 
Court reverse, whether on remand, this Court should instruct the district court 
to award a reasonable sum for attorney fees and costs to 
appellant.

FACTS

[¶4]      George D. 
(George) Shirran and his brother, Charles Shirran, owned the Paintrock Hereford 
Ranch in Big Horn County. Tom and James were George's sons. George died on 
August 14, 1992, and, shortly thereafter, his estate was admitted to 
probate.

[¶5]      Tom and James 
were the beneficiaries of George's estate, and they initially could not agree on 
the distribution of the assets of the estate. The parties were able, however, to 
enter into a Stipulation and Agreement Regarding Distribution of Estate Assets 
(the settlement agreement) on December 10, 1993. The settlement agreement 
included a provision dividing some property located in the Big Horn Mountains 
(the mountain property). The parties agreed that James would receive the 
southern one-third of the mountain property, together with a cabin located on 
that parcel, and Tom would receive the northern two-thirds of the 
property.

[¶6]      On March 15, 
1994, the personal representative of George's estate filed a Final Report, 
Accounting, and Petition for Distribution. The personal representative requested 
that the district court distribute the assets pursuant to the terms of the 
settlement agreement. The district court subsequently entered an Order Approving 
Final Report and Accounting and Decree for Distribution.

[¶7]      On February 28, 
1996, Tom petitioned the district court for an order setting forth the ownership 
of the estate property because James refused to execute the quitclaim deeds that 
were necessary for the division of the property. James apparently refused to 
sign the deeds because Tom indicated that James could no longer use a road which 
crossed Tom's portion of the mountain property to access his parcel. Tom 
insisted that James use a U.S. Forest Service road to access his portion of the 
mountain property.

[¶8]      Tom and James 
stipulated as to the facts of the controversy, and the parties submitted 
memoranda outlining their respective legal positions. The district judge held a 
hearing and issued his decision. He concluded that James had demonstrated the 
elements for establishment of an implied easement and, accordingly, granted him 
an easement over Tom's property. Tom filed a motion for reconsideration, 
alteration, or amendment of the judgment. The district court denied Tom's 
motion, and Tom appealed to the Wyoming Supreme Court.

[¶9]      Tom filed his 
brief with this Court on November 12, 1997. On December 10, 1997, James filed a 
statement of the evidence with the district court, and he filed his brief with 
this Court on December 22, 1997. Tom filed an objection in the district court to 
James' statement of the evidence and a motion to strike the statement. The 
district court entered an order on January 8, 1998, which approved James' 
statement of the evidence, noticed certain facts, denied Tom's motion to strike, 
and supplemented the record on appeal.

[¶10]   On January 20, 1998, Tom filed a 
motion with this Court to strike the district court's January 8, 1998, order 
approving the statement of the evidence. The Supreme Court vacated the oral 
argument setting and remanded the case to the district court to settle the 
record. The district court ordered Tom to prepare and file a statement of the 
evidence, and Tom complied. James responded by submitting his statement of the 
evidence, and the district court held a hearing on October 1, 1998, to settle 
the record. The district court entered an order striking its original statement 
of the evidence and modifying the same. The parties subsequently submitted their 
respective briefs to this Court.

DISCUSSION

A. Effect of 
Settlement Agreement

[¶11]   Tom maintains that the district 
court erred by granting James an implied easement across his land because the 
settlement agreement precluded such a grant. James argues that the district 
court's decision was correct. We agree with James.

[¶12]   Wyoming law recognizes that, under 
certain circumstances, one person may be entitled to have an implied easement 
across another person's property. Beaudoin v. Kibbie, 905 P.2d 939, 941-42 (Wyo. 
1995); Corbett v. Whitney, 603 P.2d 1291, 1293 (Wyo. 1979). The elements which 
must be satisfied in order to establish an implied easement 
are:

(1) Common 
ownership followed by a conveyance separating the unified ownership; (2) before 
severance, the common owner used part of the property for the benefit of the 
other part, a use that was apparent, obvious, and continuous; and (3) the 
claimed easement is necessary and beneficial to the enjoyment of the parcel 
previously benefitted.

Beaudoin, 905 P.2d  at 941-42.

[¶13]   Tom maintains that the terms of the 
settlement agreement precluded the implication of an easement in favor of James. 
The settlement agreement stated in pertinent part:

1. The parties 
hereby stipulate and agree that there have been differences by and between them 
as respects the division of certain lands of the estate, as well as division of 
a Farm Loan Board Mortgage, cattle, grazing permits and personal 
property.

2. It is the 
intention of the parties hereto to resolve each and every one of those 
differences and to release, quitclaim and forever discharge from each to the 
other any claim that they might have against assets received under the estate by 
the other.

. . . 
.

13. The parties 
hereby stipulate and agree to divide the parcel of real estate specifically 
identified as follows:

Township 49 
North, Range 87 West, 6th P.M. Section 23: E 1/2 NW 1/4, E 1/2 SW 
1/4

Excepting 
therefrom lands described in right-ofway deed to the United States of America 
for a road and recorded in Book 167 of the Big Horn County 
Records.

The parties 
hereto stipulate and agree that James D. Shirran shall receive the south 
one-third of the above described parcel and that George T. Shirran shall receive 
the north two-thirds of the above described parcel. Said lands will be 
transferred to the individual ownership of each party as set forth above and 
will be properly fenced with each party bearing one-half of the cost of said 
fencing. Should a survey be necessary to properly delineate the boundary line 
between the two properties, both parties agree to be responsible for one-half of 
the cost of such survey.

. . . 
.

15. This 
Agreement shall constitute the entire understanding of the parties as respects 
the distribution of assets under the above estate and incorporates herein all 
prior memoranda, understandings, negotiations and agreements by and between them 
as respects the assets set forth herein.

The settlement 
agreement did not address the means by which James would access his portion of 
the mountain property.

[¶14]   Tom argues that the settlement 
agreement clearly and unambiguously stated that it was meant to settle all the 
parties' differences concerning the estate assets. He claims, therefore, that, 
if the parties intended for James to have an easement across his property, they 
would have expressly provided for an easement in the settlement 
agreement.

[¶15]   We agree that the language of the 
settlement agreement clearly reflects the parties' shared intention to resolve 
their differences concerning the estate assets. Nevertheless, the very notion of 
an implied easement recognizes the failure of the parties to a property transfer 
to address the issue of access to a severed parcel.

[C]reation of 
easements by implication is an attempt to infer the intention of the parties to 
a conveyance of land and "the `inference drawn represents an attempt to ascribe 
an intention to parties who had not thought or had not bothered to put the 
intention into words, or perhaps more often, to parties who actually had formed 
no intention conscious to themselves.'" [United States v. O'Connell, 496 F.2d 1329,] 1332 [(2d Cir. 1974)], citing Restatement of Property, § 476, comment A, 
at 2978 (1944).

Corbett, 603 P.2d  at 1293. In recognizing implied easements, courts often presume that "the 
parties contracted [for the transfer of the property] with a view to the 
condition of the property as it actually was at the time of the transaction." 25 
Am. Jur. 2d Easements and Licenses in Real Property § 29, at 600 (1996); see 
also Lutz v. Krauter, 553 N.W.2d 749, 752-53 (N. D. 1996). The condition of the 
property at the time of the transaction may include an obvious preexisting use 
of one part of the property to benefit another part. See Lutz, 553 N.W.2d  at 
753.

[¶16]   The parties to a conveyance can, 
however, prevent the implication of an easement upon severance of the property 
by entering into an agreement which clearly states that an easement will not 
pass when the property is transferred. 25 Am. Jur. 2d, supra, at § 29; see also 
Cox v. Trustmark National Bank, No. 98-CA-00402 COA, 1999 WL 56004, at *5 
(Miss.Ct.App. Feb. 9, 1999) (addressing easements by necessity). In a decision 
approving the trial court's grant of an implied easement, the North Dakota 
Supreme Court stated: "[I]f the parties intended to except or exclude the 
implied easement from the grant, that exception or exclusion should have been 
clearly stated so as to leave no room for doubt." Roll v. Keller, 336 N.W.2d 648, 651 (N. D. 1983); see also Lutz, 553 N.W.2d  at 753.

[¶17]   We conclude, therefore, that, if 
Tom intended to preclude James from claiming an implied easement across his 
property, that intent should have been made explicit in the settlement 
agreement. The settlement agreement did not address the issue of access, and, 
consequently, it cannot be read as excepting an implied easement. The settlement 
agreement did not prevent James from claiming an implied easement over Tom's 
property. This conclusion does not, however, end our inquiry; we must determine 
whether the elements necessary for the implication of an easement were satisfied 
in this case.

B. Implied 
Easement

[¶18]   Tom asserts that the district court 
improperly considered facts which were not included in the parties' stipulation 
of facts when it determined that James was entitled to have an implied easement 
across his property. Tom maintains additionally that the district court erred 
when it concluded that James had satisfied the criteria for establishing an 
implied easement. James argues that the district court's decision was correct. 
We agree with James.

[¶19]   Two maps were attached to the 
parties' stipulation of the facts. The maps disclosed two routes that could be 
used to access James' property; i. e., the Forest Service road and the road over 
Tom's property. Both the Forest Service road and the road over Tom's property 
branched off Battle Park Road. Battle Park Road intersects with U.S. Highway 16 
at the Deer Haven Lodge. The parties could apparently gain access to Battle Park 
Road by traveling from Hyattville or from the Deer Haven Lodge. The parties 
stipulated that the access desired by James over Tom's property was the usual 
means of access to James' property and that the parties usually accessed their 
properties by traveling Battle Park Road from the Deer Haven Lodge side rather 
than from the Hyattville side.

[¶20]   The district court quoted from 
James' memorandum in the decision letter that it issued after the hearing on 
whether or not James was entitled to have an implied easement across Tom's 
property.

[JAMES] points 
out in his brief that the alternate access route, the U.S. Forest Service road 
mentioned by TOM in his brief, "requires going approximately four or five miles 
out of the way as opposed to a few hundred yards. The access easement that is 
being requested by [James] in this matter enters immediately off of a regularly 
traveled road as opposed to a dirt track and would result in little if any 
disruption to the use of the property being transferred [to] his brother 
Tom."

The district 
court acknowledged that these facts were not included in the stipulated facts. 
It stated, however, that, although Tom argued that there was no evidence with 
regard to the quality of the roads, he did not dispute the significant 
difference in distance between the two routes. The district court stated that, 
in any event, the difference in distance between the two routes was immediately 
obvious from the maps that were attached to the 
stipulation.

[¶21]   After the Supreme Court remanded 
the case for a settlement of the record, the district court entered an order 
striking its original statement of the evidence and modifying the same, which 
stated in relevant part:

2. The Court is 
only considering the record in this matter and the Statement of Evidence 
contained in the record in particular. The Order approving the Statement of 
Evidence should be stricken and revised as follows:

a. The only 
actual evidence received in this matter was the stipulation of facts filed in 
the court record September 2, 1996, along with the maps that are attached to 
it.

b. In addition 
to the facts submitted by stipulation and the exhibits incorporated therein by 
reference, this Court considered its own knowledge gained through life 
experience and a degree of familiarity, which it would not characterize as 
extensive knowledge, of the Big Horn Mountains.

c. In addition 
to life experience, reasonable inferences may be drawn from the facts, among 
which are those that can be drawn, for example, from examining the maps these 
parties attached to the stipulation, such as discerning from the lines which 
roads are better than others, comparative distances and the like. The maps 
submitted by stipulation reveal the following facts:

(i) The access 
proposed by [James] is superior to the access proposed by Tom. . . . The map 
shows that it is a better road.

(ii) Driving up 
from Hyattville . . ., it would be, certainly, four to five miles longer to use 
the access proposed by Tom.

(iii) The access 
proposed by [James] is, by stipulation, the access the family has used 
traditionally to get to the cabin, even coming from Deer Haven, much less from 
Hyattville.

. . . 
.

4. Further, 
based on the life experiences of the Court, the Court is aware that it is 
extremely cold and harsh in the high mountains of the Big Horns in the winter 
time. The back roads are very rough, and they are not accessible by motor 
vehicle, except by snowmobile during the winter. The distances on the maps may 
appear short in inches or fractions of inches, but in experiences on the roads, 
those distances are considerable and sometimes burdensome. Hyattville, Wyoming, 
sits at the western base of the Big Horn Mountains at about 4,000 feet. The road 
leading from Hyattville to the Battle Park Road must proceed eastward several 
miles up the slope of the Big Horn Mountains.

5. Additional 
undisputed facts presented are:

a. The Paintrock 
Hereford Ranch has been in the Shirran family for many years, beginning with the 
father of George D. Shirran.

b. The customary 
access for the Shirrans to the cabin on the mountain property has always been 
the access off the Battle Park Road.

c. The Battle 
Park Road is a well-traveled road, being the principal thoroughfare in the area 
of the mountain property.

[¶22]   We consider first whether the 
district court erred when it relied on facts that were set out in James' legal 
memoranda but were not included in the stipulated facts. A district court has 
discretion in settling the record. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 895 P.2d 441, 444 (Wyo. 
1995). A court may not, however, consider statements made by counsel in legal 
memoranda or briefs as evidence in a case. Majority of Working Interest Owners 
in Buck Draw Field Area v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 721 P.2d 1070, 1077 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶23]   The district court did not rely on 
the unsupported statements of counsel when it made its decision concerning 
James' implied easement claim or when it settled the record. The district 
court's findings included: (1) facts which were explicit in the stipulation of 
facts; (2) facts that were readily discernable from the maps attached to the 
stipulation; and (3) general historical facts that were well within the trial 
court's knowledge as a result of its consideration of the probate matter over a 
period of several years. We have not discovered anything irregular in the 
district court's findings, and we conclude, therefore, that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion when it settled the record.

[¶24]   We turn next to the issue of 
whether or not the requisite elements for establishing an implied easement were 
proven in this case. The parties agree that the first element of an implied 
easement - unity of ownership of the dominant and servient estate and subsequent 
severance of the estate - was satisfied. They disagree, however, as to whether 
or not the other two elements were established.

[¶25]   The second element requires a 
showing that, prior to the severance of the property, the common owner used part 
of the property for the benefit of the other part in an apparent, obvious, and 
continuous manner. Beaudoin, 905 P.2d  at 942. The parties expressly stipulated 
that the access sought by James was the usual means of accessing his portion of 
the mountain property. This statement, combined with the fact that the mountain 
property had been owned by the Shirran family for many years, was sufficient to 
establish the second element.

[¶26]   We look now at the third element; 
i. e., the claimed easement was necessary and beneficial to the enjoyment of the 
benefited parcel. Id. We discussed the concept of necessity in the context of 
implied easements in Corbett, 603 P.2d  at 1293. We quoted from Restatement of 
Property § 476 cmt. G, at 2983-84 (1944), as follows:

". . . If no use 
can be made of land conveyed or retained without the benefit of an easement, it 
is assumed that the parties intended the easement to be created . . 
.

". . . If land 
can be used without an easement, but cannot be used without disproportionate 
effort and expense, an easement may still be implied in favor of either the 
conveyor or the conveyee on the basis of necessity . . .

". . . In the 
different situations that may appear, a constantly decreasing degree of 
necessity will require a constantly increasing clearness of implication from the 
nature of the prior use. Accordingly, no precise definition of necessity can be 
made.

603 P.2d  at 
1293.

[¶27]   As we stated supra, the parties 
stipulated that the road across Tom's property had historically been used to 
access James' property. The district court found that, under certain 
circumstances, James would be required to travel a greater distance if he were 
required to use the Forest Service road rather than the road across Tom's 
property. It also found that the access route proposed by James was superior to 
the access route proposed by Tom because the roads that James would be allowed 
to traverse if the easement were granted were of better quality than the roads 
which he would be required to use if the easement were 
denied.

[¶28]   The maps confirm the district 
court's findings with regard to the relative differences in the distances and 
qualities of the two roads. The differences between the two roads are material, 
especially in light of the fact that the maps show that the mountain property is 
located at an elevation of approximately 8,300 feet. With these facts in mind, 
we conclude that James would be required to endure disproportionate effort and 
expense in order to access his property if an implied easement across Tom's 
property were not allowed. The claimed easement is, therefore, necessary and 
beneficial to James' enjoyment of his part of the mountain property. The 
district court did not err when it granted James an implied easement over Tom's 
property. 

[¶29]   We do not need to address Tom's 
issue concerning attorney's fees because we are affirming the district court's 
decision.

[¶30]   Affirmed.