Case Title: Covel v. Town of Vienna

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2010-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
MICHAEL W. COVEL, ET AL. 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v. 
Record No. 091343 
 
    JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    June 10, 2010 
TOWN OF VIENNA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Stanley P. Klein, Judge 
 
In this appeal we consider the validity of Vienna Town 
Code (“VTC”) §§ 18-258 to –280 (the “Historic Districts 
Ordinance”) and §§ 18-280.1 to –280.13 (the “WHHD Ordinance”), 
which create the Windover Heights Historic District (the 
“WHHD”).  We also consider an appeal from the denial of a 
certificate of appropriateness under the WHHD Ordinance. 
I. 
BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The circuit court decided this case after a bench trial; 
consequently, we state the facts in the light most favorable to 
the Town of Vienna, the prevailing party below.  Virginia Home 
for Boys & Girls v. Phillips, 279 Va. 279, 282, 688 S.E.2d 284, 
285 (2010). 
This appeal arises from three consolidated cases involving 
six parcels of land in the WHHD.  Michael Covel (“Michael”) 
owns two adjoining parcels, 130 Pleasant Street, N.W. and 346 
Windover Avenue, N.W.  Jerome and Johanna Covel own two 
parcels, 224 Walnut Lane, N.W. and 222 Lovers Lane, N.W.  
Matthew and Susan Stich own 200 Walnut Lane, N.W.1  PMY 
Associates (“PMY”) owns 210 Lawyers Road, N.W. 
A.  CASE NO. CH-2003-184618 
In February 2003, Michael applied to the Windover Heights 
Board of Review for a certificate of appropriateness (“COA”) to 
erect a fence on his parcels.  His application stated his name, 
address, and telephone number, and the date.  It incorporated a 
plat of the fence.  Michael did not respond to any other 
questions on the application form, including those requesting a 
list of adjacent properties; proposed materials, colors, and 
finishes of the fence; and proposed landscaping changes, if 
any.  The application omitted required dimensional plans 
showing existing and proposed buildings, structures, fences, or 
signs on the parcels and photographs of the proposed fence 
location.  
The board of review considered Michael’s COA application 
initially.  At the board’s hearing, he declined to supplement 
the information provided.  The board then rejected his 
application as incomplete and informed him “more information is 
need[ed] to review for the application [but] that the Board has 
no objection to the building of a fence.” 
                                                 
1 We refer to Michael Covel, Jerome and Johanna Covel, and 
Matthew and Susan Stich collectively as “the Landowners.” 
 
2
Michael appealed to the town council.  He again declined 
to provide additional information.  Following a hearing the 
council denied his application. 
Michael then appealed to the circuit court.  He challenged 
the denial of his COA application and sought a declaratory 
judgment that (a) the WHHD Ordinance was unconstitutionally 
vague, (b) the Historic Districts Ordinance was enacted in 
violation of Code § 15.2-2306, and (c) the WHHD Ordinance was 
enacted in violation of VTC § 18-261.2  The Town demurred and 
the circuit court ruled that the WHHD Ordinance was not 
unconstitutionally vague on its face.  There is no transcript 
of the circuit court’s hearing in the record and Michael did 
not note any objection to the ruling on the order.  No further 
proceedings relevant to this appeal were conducted prior to 
consolidation. 
B.  CASE NO. CH-2003-186629 
In January 2003, before he applied for the COA, Michael 
requested that his Pleasant Street parcel be withdrawn from the 
WHHD.  While Michael’s COA application was pending before the 
board of review and his request to remove his Pleasant Street 
                                                 
2 Michael brought additional claims under the due process 
provisions of the Virginia Constitution, the due process and 
equal protection provisions of the 14th Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  All these claims 
were either dismissed or non-suited and are not before us in 
this appeal. 
 
3
parcel from the WHHD was pending before the town council, the 
Landowners simultaneously requested that the other parcels they 
owned also be removed from the WHHD.  The town council denied 
all these requests. 
Thereafter the Landowners jointly filed a pleading in the 
circuit court in which they appealed from the denial of their 
requests to withdraw their parcels from the WHHD and sought 
declaratory judgment that the ordinances were invalid on the 
grounds Michael had asserted.3  No further proceedings relevant 
to this appeal were conducted prior to consolidation. 
C.  CASE NO. CL-2006-7105 
In November 2005, while both Case Nos. CH-2003-184618 and 
CH-2003-186629 were pending before the circuit court, PMY 
requested that its parcel be removed from the WHHD.  The town 
council denied that request, whereupon PMY appealed to the 
circuit court.  Although the grounds for appeal were 
substantially identical to Case Nos. CH-2003-184618 and CH-
2003-186629, PMY did not seek declaratory relief challenging 
the validity of the ordinances.  No proceedings relevant to 
this appeal were entered prior to consolidation. 
 
 
                                                 
3 The claims dismissed or non-suited in Case No. CH-2003-
184618 were also either dismissed or non-suited in this case. 
 
4
D.  THE CONSOLIDATED PROCEEDING 
In January 2008 the circuit court entered an order 
consolidating the cases with the agreement of the parties.  
That order expressly incorporated into the consolidated 
proceeding the court’s earlier ruling in Case No. CH-2003-
184618 that the WHHD Ordinance was not unconstitutionally vague 
on its face.  Neither the Landowners nor PMY noted any 
objection to the ruling on the order.  After a three-day bench 
trial in October 2008, the circuit court entered a final order 
dismissing all the appeals and denying the Landowners 
declaratory relief.  We awarded the Landowners and PMY this 
appeal. 
II. ANALYSIS 
A.  APPEALS FROM THE DENIAL OF MICHAEL’S COA 
AND THE LANDOWNERS’ AND PMY’S REQUESTS FOR  
REMOVAL OF THEIR PARCELS FROM THE WHHD 
 
Our review of the decision of a governing body relating to 
a historic district is limited by statute to “whether that 
decision is ‘arbitrary and constitutes an abuse of discretion,’ 
or ‘is contrary to law.’ ”  Norton v. City of Danville, 268 Va. 
402, 407, 602 S.E.2d 126, 129 (2004) (quoting Code § 15.2-
2306(A)(3)).  The decision of the governing body is presumed to 
be correct.  Id. at 408, 602 S.E.2d at 129-30.  The party 
challenging the decision has the burden of proving “it is 
clearly unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that it 
 
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bears no reasonable or substantial relation to the public 
health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”  Id. at 409, 602 
S.E.2d at 130 (quotation marks omitted). 
Where presumptive reasonableness is challenged 
by probative evidence of unreasonableness, the 
challenge must be met by some evidence of 
reasonableness.  If evidence of reasonableness 
is sufficient to make the question fairly 
debatable, the ordinance “must be sustained”.  
If not, the evidence of unreasonableness defeats 
the presumption of reasonableness and the 
ordinance cannot be sustained. 
 
Id. (quoting Board of Supervisors v. Snell Constr. Corp., 214 
Va. 655, 659, 202 S.E.2d 889, 893 (1974)).  An issue is "fairly 
debatable when the evidence offered in support of the opposing 
views would lead objective and reasonable persons to reach 
different conclusions."  Id. (quoting Board of Supervisors v. 
Williams, 216 Va. 49, 58, 216 S.E.2d 33, 40 (1975)). 
On appeal, neither the Landowners nor PMY point to any 
evidence in the record to rebut the presumption of validity.  
Rather, they assert that the Town’s decision to deny Michael’s 
COA application and their requests to remove their parcels from 
the WHHD are unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious solely 
because the underlying ordinances are invalid.  We previously 
have held that we may not consider whether the underlying 
ordinance is invalid when considering an appeal from a 
governing board’s denial of a COA.  Norton, 268 Va. at 407-08, 
602 S.E.2d at 129 (“Norton’s challenge to the underlying 
 
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ordinance . . . is barred from consideration in judicial review 
of the city council's action concerning the certificate of 
appropriateness.”).  The appropriate method for such challenges 
is by an action against the governing body.  Id. at 408 n.4, 
602 S.E.2d at 129 n.4 (citing Board of Zoning Appeals v. 
University Square Assocs., 246 Va. 290, 295 n.2, 435 S.E.2d 
385, 388 n.2 (1993)). 
Accordingly, we find no error in the judgment of the 
circuit court approving the Town’s denial of Michael’s COA and 
the requests to remove parcels from the WHHD.  We now turn to 
the Landowners’ appeal from the dismissal of their claims for 
declaratory relief.4 
B.  THE ENACTMENT OF THE HISTORIC DISTRICTS 
 AND WHHD ORDINANCES 
 
Whether an ordinance has been enacted lawfully is a 
question of law we review de novo.  Marble Techs., Inc. v. City 
of Hampton, 279 Va. 409, 416 & n.9, 690 S.E.2d 84, 87 & n.9 
(2010). 
The Landowners assert that the Historic Districts 
Ordinance is invalid because it exceeds the authority delegated 
by the General Assembly, specifically because it refers only to 
an “area” rather than buildings or structures.  They argue that 
the authorizing statute at the time the Town adopted the 
                                                 
4 This disposition is complete as to PMY because it did not 
raise any claims for declaratory relief. 
 
7
ordinance, former Code § 15.1-503.2,5 allowed a locality to 
enact a historic district ordinance only if it set forth a 
historic landmark established by the Virginia Historic 
Landmarks Commission or some other building or structure with 
historic, architectural, or cultural significance.  We 
disagree. 
“[C]ourts apply the plain meaning of a statute unless the 
terms are ambiguous or applying the plain language would lead 
to an absurd result.”  Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 227, 
623 S.E.2d 922, 926 (2006) (citation omitted).  A statute is 
ambiguous “if the text can be understood in more than one way 
or refers to two or more things simultaneously or when the 
language is difficult to comprehend, is of doubtful import, or 
lacks clearness or definiteness.”  Id. at 227 n.8, 623 S.E.2d 
at 926 n.8 (citation, internal quotation marks, and alterations 
omitted).  An absurd result describes “situations in which the 
law would be internally inconsistent or otherwise incapable of 
operation.”  Id. at 227 n.9, 623 S.E.2d at 926 n.9 (quotation 
marks omitted).  When statutory language is unambiguous and 
does not lead to absurd results, “courts may not interpret the 
language in a way that effectively holds that the General 
                                                 
5 This statute was amended and subsequently reenacted as 
current Code § 15.2-2306.  See 1997 Acts ch. 587, 676. 
 
8
Assembly did not mean what it actually expressed.”  Hicks v. 
Mellis, 275 Va. 213, 218, 657 S.E.2d 142, 144 (2008). 
The Landowners do not challenge the Historic Districts 
Ordinance as it first was enacted in 1975.  Rather, they 
challenge the ordinance as it existed when the WHHD Ordinance 
was enacted in April 1979.  At that time the authorizing 
statute provided: 
The governing body of any county or municipality 
may adopt an ordinance setting forth the 
historic landmarks within the county or 
municipality as established by the Virginia 
Historic Landmarks Commission, and any other 
buildings or structures within the county or 
municipality having an important historic, 
architectural or cultural interest, and any 
historic areas within the county or municipality 
as defined by § 15.1-430(b) of the Code of 
Virginia, amending the existing zoning ordinance 
and delineating one or more historic districts 
adjacent to such landmarks, buildings and 
structures, or encompassing such historic areas; 
provided, that such amendment of the zoning 
ordinance and the establishment of such district 
or districts shall be in accordance with the 
provisions of article 8 (§ 15.1-486 et seq.), 
chapter 11, of Title 15.1 of the Code of 
Virginia.  The governing body may provide for an 
architectural review board to administer such 
ordinance.  Such ordinance may include a 
provision that no building or structure, 
including signs, shall be erected, 
reconstructed, altered or restored within any 
such historic district unless the same is 
approved by the architectural review board or, 
on appeal, by the governing body of such county 
or municipality as being architecturally 
compatible with the historic landmarks, 
buildings or structures therein. 
 
 
9
Former Code § 15.1-503.2(a) (Supp. 1978).  Former Code § 15.1-
430(b), referenced therein, defined “[h]istoric area” to mean 
“an area containing buildings or places in which historic 
events occurred or having special public value because of 
notable architectural or other features relating to the 
cultural or artistic heritage of the community, of such 
significance as to warrant conservation and preservation.”  
Former Code § 15.1-430(b) (Supp. 1978). 
Considered together, these sections authorized a locality 
to create a historic district even if it contained no buildings 
or structures.  While former Code § 15.1-503.2(a) is 
conjunctive by allowing the governing body to adopt an 
ordinance setting forth “the historic landmarks within the 
county or municipality as established by the Virginia Historic 
Landmarks Commission, and any other buildings or structures 
within the county or municipality having an important historic, 
architectural or cultural interest, and any historic areas 
within the county or municipality as defined by § 15.1-430(b),” 
the relevant language for this case is disjunctive.  It permits 
the governing body to “delineat[e] one or more historic 
districts adjacent to such landmarks, buildings and structures, 
or encompassing such historic areas.”  Former Code § 15.1-
503.2(a) (Supp. 1978) (emphasis added).  Former Code § 15.1-
430(b) likewise is disjunctive:  a historic area may contain 
 
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“buildings or places.”  Code § 15.1-430(b) (Supp. 1978) 
(emphasis added). 
The differentiation in former Code § 15.1-503.2(a) between 
historic districts adjacent to landmarks, buildings, and 
structures and districts encompassing historic areas, together 
with the language in former Code § 15.1-430(b) including areas 
that do not contain buildings in the definition of historic 
areas, evidences clear intent by the General Assembly to permit 
localities to create historic districts without landmarks, 
buildings, or structures.  Accordingly, the Landowners’ 
argument that the Historic Districts Ordinance is invalid 
because it does not identify existing landmarks, buildings, or 
structures fails. 
The Landowners also assert that the WHHD Ordinance is 
invalid because it was not enacted in the manner set forth by 
VTC § 18-261.  That section requires the planning commission to 
prepare a detailed report prior to the creation of a historic 
district.  The Town responds that the requirements of VTC § 18-
261 did not apply to the enactment of the WHHD Ordinance.  We 
disagree.  By its terms, VTC § 18-261 governs amendments to the 
Historic Districts Ordinance, “including the establishment of 
historic districts.”  Moreover, the enacting clause of the WHHD 
Ordinance states that the Historic Districts Ordinance is 
“amended by adding Section 18-280.1.” 
 
11
The Town argues alternatively that the WHHD Ordinance is 
saved by Code § 15.2-1427(C).  The Town contends this statute 
cures any non-constitutional defect in the enactment of an 
existing ordinance.  The Landowners respond that the statute 
cannot save the WHHD Ordinance because VTC § 18-261 imposes 
specific prerequisites to the creation of a historic district.  
Therefore, they argue, the general terms of Code § 15.2-1427(C) 
must give way.  The Landowners also suggest that applying Code 
§ 15.2-1427(C) to save the WHHD Ordinance would conflict with 
our decision in Gas Mart Corp. v. Board of Supervisors, 269 Va. 
334, 611 S.E.2d 340 (2005). 
Code § 15.2-1427(C) provides that “[a]ll ordinances or 
resolutions heretofore adopted by a governing body shall be 
deemed to have been validly adopted, unless some provision of 
the Constitution of Virginia or the Constitution of the United 
States has been violated in such adoption.”  The statute was 
reenacted in its present form in 2000.  2000 Acts ch. 895.  By 
its unambiguous terms, it bars all non-constitutional 
challenges to the adoption of ordinances existing at that time.  
Thus, regardless of how specific VTC § 18-261’s requirements 
may have been when the Town enacted the WHHD, the Landowners 
cannot challenge that enactment today. 
 
12
The Landowners’ reliance on Code § 15.2-2315 and Gas Mart 
is unavailing.  Code § 15.2-2315 does not limit the effect of 
Code § 15.2-1427(C).  Code § 15.2-2315 provides that: 
Whenever the regulations made under authority of 
this article require a greater width or size of 
yards, courts or other open spaces, require a 
lower height of building or less number of 
stories, require a greater percentage of lot to 
be left unoccupied or impose other higher 
standards than are required in any other statute 
or local ordinance or regulation, the provisions 
of the regulations made under authority of this 
article shall govern. Whenever the provisions of 
any other statute or local ordinance or 
regulation require a greater width or size of 
yards, courts or other open spaces, require a 
lower height of building or a less number of 
stories, require a greater percentage of lot to 
be left unoccupied or impose other higher 
standards than are required by the regulations 
made under authority of this article, the 
provisions of such statute or local ordinance or 
regulation shall govern. 
 
The Landowners argue that the words “other higher 
standards” embrace the higher standards imposed by VTC § 18-261 
for the enactment of the WHHD Ordinance.  However, the context 
does not support this interpretation.  “When general words and 
specific words are grouped together, the general words are 
limited and qualified by the specific words and will be 
construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those 
objects identified by the specific words.”  Andrews v. Ring, 
266 Va. 311, 319, 585 S.E.2d 780, 784 (2003).  Each of the 
terms associated with “higher standards” refers to sizes, 
 
13
heights, or percentages.  These terms do not include the 
prerequisites for enacting an ordinance, such as the completion 
of reports.  Accordingly, Code § 15.2-2315 is not applicable. 
Similarly, Gas Mart is distinguishable.  In that case we 
compared the general requirements for enacting ordinances set 
forth in Code § 15.2-1427(F) with the specific requirements for 
enacting zoning ordinances set forth in Code §§ 15.2-2204 and 
15.2-2285.  We applied the familiar principle of statutory 
interpretation that “when one statute speaks to a subject 
generally and another deals with an element of that subject 
specifically, the statutes will be harmonized, if possible, and 
if they conflict, the more specific statute prevails.”  269 Va. 
at 350, 611 S.E.2d at 348. 
Unlike Gas Mart, this case does not require us to 
harmonize two conflicting statutes of equal dignity.  This case 
involves Code § 15.2-1427(C), a statute curing non-compliance 
with procedural requirements in the enactment of ordinances, 
and VTC § 18-261, an ordinance setting forth such procedural 
requirements.  It is well settled that when a statute and an 
ordinance conflict, the statute must prevail.  Code § 1-248; 
City Council of Alexandria v. Potomac Greens Assocs. P’ship, 
245 Va. 371, 378, 429 S.E.2d 225, 228 (1993) (citing City of 
Norfolk v. Tiny House, Inc., 222 Va. 414, 421, 281 S.E.2d 836, 
840 (1981)); King v. Arlington County, 195 Va. 1084, 1090, 81 
 
14
S.E.2d 587, 591 (1954).  Gas Mart applies when a conflict 
arises between two statutes.  It does not apply when the 
conflict arises between a statute and an ordinance. 
Accordingly, there is no error in the judgment of the 
circuit court upholding the ordinances as validly enacted. 
C.  THE VAGUENESS CHALLENGE TO THE WHHD ORDINANCE 
The scope of the Landowners’ argument on this issue is 
limited by the procedural posture of their appeal.  While they 
argue the WHHD Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague both 
facially and as applied, the circuit court dismissed Michael’s 
facial challenge and subsequently dismissed the Landowners’ 
challenge in the consolidation order by incorporating its 
ruling on Michael’s facial challenge.6  Neither Michael 
individually nor the Landowners collectively preserved any 
objection.7  Consequently, we will not consider their facial 
challenge on appeal.  Rule 5:25. 
                                                 
6 Specifically, Michael argued that the WHHD Ordinance was 
unconstitutionally vague on its face because it “contains no 
adequate and objective standards, guidelines or other rational 
criteria for evaluating applications for certificates of 
appropriateness.”  The Landowners’ challenge is identical.  The 
criteria for evaluating an application for a certificate of 
appropriateness are found in VTC § 18-280.8.  The circuit court 
expressly held that this section is not unconstitutionally 
vague on its face. 
7 No objection appears on the face of the relevant orders 
and the record includes no transcript of the relevant hearings 
where oral objections may have been stated.  “When the 
appellant fails to ensure that the record contains transcripts 
or a written statement of facts necessary to permit resolution 
 
15
The circuit court also determined that the Landowners 
lacked standing to bring an as-applied challenge to the WHHD 
Ordinance in Case No. CH-2003-186629 because the WHHD Ordinance 
sets forth standards by which the Town grants or denies COAs 
and the Landowners did not apply for COAs in that case.  The 
Landowners did not assign error to that ruling so their as-
applied challenge in Case No. CH-2003-186629 is waived.  Rule 
5:17(c); see also Kondaurov v. Kerdasha, 271 Va. 646, 658, 629 
S.E.2d 181, 188 (2006) (“[A] legal decision . . . unchallenged 
in a subsequent appeal when the opportunity to do so existed[] 
becomes the law of the case . . . and the parties are deemed to 
have waived the right to challenge that decision at a later 
time.”)  Thus, all that remains before us is Michael’s as-
applied challenge in Case No. CH-2003-184618. 
Whether the WHHD Ordinance is unconstitutionally vague is 
a question of law we review de novo.  Volkswagen of Am., Inc. 
v. Smit, 279 Va. 327, 335, 689 S.E.2d 679, 684 (2010). 
Our review of the ordinance begins with the 
principle that duly enacted laws are presumed to 
be constitutional.  Marshall v. Northern 
Virginia Transp. Auth., 275 Va. 419, 427, 657 
S.E.2d 71, 75 (2008); In re Phillips, 265 Va. 
81, 85, 574 S.E.2d 270, 272 (2003); Yamaha Motor 
Corp., U.S.A. v. Quillian, 264 Va. 656, 665, 571 
S.E.2d 122, 126 (2002); Finn v. Virginia 
Retirement System, 259 Va. 144, 153, 524 S.E.2d 
125, 130 (2000).  We are required to resolve any 
                                                                                                                                                           
of appellate issues, [the issues] affected by the omission 
shall not be considered.”  Rule 5:11(b). 
 
16
reasonable doubt concerning the 
constitutionality of a law in favor of its 
validity.  In re Phillips, 265 Va. at 85-86, 574 
S.E.2d at 272; Finn, 259 Va. at 153, 524 S.E.2d 
at 130; Walton v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 422, 
427, 497 S.E.2d 869, 872 (1998). Thus, if a 
statute or ordinance can be construed reasonably 
in a manner that will render its terms definite 
and sufficient, such an interpretation is 
required. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-
300 (2001); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 
612, 618 (1954); Pedersen v. City of Richmond, 
219 Va. 1061, 1065, 254 S.E.2d 95, 98 (1979). 
 
Tanner v. City of Va. Beach, 277 Va. 432, 438-39, 674 S.E.2d 
848, 852 (2009). 
“The constitutional prohibition against vagueness derives 
from the requirement of fair notice embodied in the Due Process 
Clause” and ensures that a law “be sufficiently precise and 
definite to give fair warning” of what it requires.  Id. at 
439, S.E.2d at 852; accord Volkswagen, 279 Va. at 337, 674 
S.E.2d at 852 (a law “may survive a vagueness challenge if the 
language . . . makes clear what [it] prohibits and what is 
required in order to comply”).  Its purpose is to safeguard 
against the arbitrary and discriminatory application of the law 
when a legislative act permits a subjective interpretation by 
those charged with its enforcement.  Tanner, 277 Va. at 439, 
674 S.E.2d at 852. 
The WHHD Ordinance prohibits the erection of a fence 
without a COA.  VTC § 18-280.4(A)(1).  An applicant for a COA 
must provide “a house location survey or dimensional drawing of 
 
17
the subject property showing . . . all existing buildings, 
accessory buildings, structures, fences or signs” and the 
proposed location of the fence.  VTC § 18-280.7(A).  Michael 
did not comply with these requirements.  The ordinance also 
requires the Town to consider the materials used to construct 
the fence and the similarity of its features with the features 
of existing “buildings, accessory buildings, structures, fences 
or signs in the immediate surroundings.”  VTC § 18-280.8(A)(3)-
(4).  Michael refused to provide the necessary information 
about his proposed fence for the Town’s consideration.8 
This is not a case where the Town considered Michael’s 
application and applied vague criteria subjectively to arrive 
at an arbitrary or discriminatory result.  The Town could not 
have done so because it lacked the required information from 
Michael to make any decision based on the criteria set forth in 
VTC § 18-280.8(A).  Rather, the Town made an objective decision 
that Michael’s application was incomplete. 
Consequently, we find that insofar as the WHHD Ordinance 
applied to Michael in Case No. CH-2003-184618, it required him 
to submit a complete application for the Town’s review.  The 
                                                 
8 To the extent that Michael argues the WHHD Ordinance does 
not set forth the existing buildings, structures, fences or 
signs the Town “uses as standards for comparison in making the 
determination with respect to an application for a COA,” we 
find that VTC § 18-280.8(A)(4) sufficiently sets forth the 
standard as the existing buildings, structures, fences or signs 
“in the immediate surroundings” within the WHHD. 
 
18
information required by the ordinance to render an application 
complete is not vague.  VTC §§ 18-280.7 and 18-280.8(A) are 
“sufficiently precise and definite to give fair warning” to 
Michael of the information he was required to provide.  He 
repeatedly declined to supply this information. 
Accordingly, on these facts we find no error in the 
judgment of the circuit court dismissing Michael’s as-applied 
challenge to the WHHD Ordinance. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
judgment of the circuit court. 
Affirmed. 
 
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