Case Title: Kroh v. Continental Gen. Tire, Inc.

Citation: 2001-Ohio-59

Docket Number: 20000016

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2001-06-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Kroh v. Continental Gen. Tire, Inc., 92 Ohio St.3d 30, 2001-Ohio-59.] 
 
 
 
KROH, APPELLANT, v. CONTINENTAL GENERAL TIRE, INC., APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Kroh v. Continental Gen. Tire, Inc. (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 30.] 
Employer and employee — Unlawful discriminatory practices — Court of 
appeals’ reversal of jury award in sex discrimination action and finding 
that trial court erred in denying motion for directed verdict reversed and 
trial judgment reinstated. 
(No. 00-16 — Submitted November 28, 2000 — Decided June 13, 2001.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, No. 19412. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J.  Plaintiff-appellant, Nancy O. Kroh, filed suit against 
defendant-appellee, Continental General Tire, Inc. (“General Tire”), claiming that 
General Tire had discriminated against her because of her gender, in violation of 
R.C. 4112.02 and 4112.99.  At the close of Kroh’s case, General Tire moved for a 
directed verdict, claiming that Kroh had failed to establish a prima facie case of 
gender discrimination because the males with whom she compared herself were 
not situated similarly to her.  The trial court denied the motion. 
 
After a jury trial, the jury found for Kroh and awarded $708,000 in 
damages for back pay and benefits, front pay and benefits, pension losses, and 
pain and suffering. 
 
On appeal, the court of appeals found that the trial court erred by denying 
the motions for directed verdict.  The court of appeals stated, “Considering the 
evidence presented by Kroh, reasonable minds could only conclude that she did 
not demonstrate that General Tire treated her differently from similarly situated 
male employees. * * *  It is clear from reading their testimony on direct 
examination by Kroh, however, that these [allegedly similarly situated] 
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employees performed jobs that differed significantly in function, responsibility, 
and scope from her own. * * * 
 
“In effect, her claims noted legitimate differences in the conditions of 
employment, but invited the jury to find discrimination by comparing apples with 
oranges.” 
 
The court reversed the judgment of the trial court and entered judgment 
for General Tire. 
 
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
 
A directed verdict may be granted when “the trial court, after construing 
the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion is 
directed, finds that upon any determinative issue reasonable minds could come to 
but one conclusion upon the evidence submitted and that conclusion is adverse to 
such party.”  Civ.R. 50(A)(4).  The court of appeals correctly noted that a motion 
for a directed verdict must be denied when “substantial, competent evidence has 
been presented from which reasonable minds could draw different conclusions.” 
 
The only issue before us in this case is whether Kroh established, to the 
extent necessary to survive a motion for directed verdict against her, that the male 
employees to whom she compared herself were “similarly situated” in all relevant 
respects.  Without such a showing, Kroh’s claim of gender discrimination is 
fatally flawed, and the court of appeals was correct to reverse the judgment in her 
favor. 
 
In holding that Kroh had not made the required showing, the appellate 
court relied on Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp. (C.A.6, 1992), 964 F.2d 577, and in 
particular the following language: 
 
“It is fundamental that * * * the plaintiff must show that the ‘comparables’ 
are similarly-situated in all respects.  Thus, to be deemed ‘similarly-situated,’ the 
individuals with whom the plaintiff seeks to compare [her] treatment must have 
January Term, 2001 
3 
dealt with the same supervisor, have been subject to the same standards and have 
engaged in the same conduct without such differentiating or mitigating 
circumstances that would distinguish their conduct or the employer’s treatment of 
them for it.”  (Citation omitted and emphasis sic.)  Id. at 583. 
 
The court of appeals in this case found that Kroh’s evidence was 
“insufficient as a matter of law” to establish that her male colleagues were 
situated similarly to her under the above standard, and that therefore the trial court 
had erred in denying General Tire’s motion for a directed verdict.  We disagree. 
 
General Tire hired Nancy Kroh in 1966.  In 1987, Kroh was promoted to 
cash manager, with the responsibility of reorganizing the Treasury Department, 
including the creation of job descriptions for all of the positions in the department.  
At that time, Kroh was the cash manager, Charles Nagy was assistant treasurer, 
Ladd Leder was risk manager, and Steven Schwartz was real estate manager. The 
manager positions of real estate, risk, and cash were all considered 
interchangeable by General Tire.  Kroh, Leder, and Schwartz were at the same 
salary grade level. 
 
In 1992, while Nagy was reassigned temporarily to Hanover, Germany, 
Kroh performed his duties as assistant treasurer.  As a result, Kroh expected to be 
promoted to assistant treasurer.  Instead, General Tire hired Michael Worthington, 
a male, into a newly created position entitled “manager of treasury planning and 
analysis,” though the job was essentially equivalent to assistant treasurer and 
those duties Kroh had been performing.  Kroh testified that she had been 
performing approximately sixty-five percent of the duties and responsibilities 
listed in Worthington’s job description.  Worthington admitted to assuming 
twenty-five percent of Kroh’s former duties. 
 
John Gritman was named Treasurer in April 1992, at which time all of the 
Treasury Department managers, including Kroh, reported to him.  Mike Brabec, 
the credit manager, testified that if Kroh reported to Gritman, then he would 
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consider her to be his (Brabec’s) peer.  Brabec, Ray Doyle (the national credit 
manager), and Kroh were on the same or similar level of the organizational 
structure. 
 
“A prima facie standard that requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that he or 
she was similarly-situated in every aspect to an employee outside the protected 
class receiving more favorable treatment removes from the protective reach of the 
anti-discrimination laws employees occupying ‘unique’ positions   * * *.  [I]f the 
non-protected employee to whom the plaintiff compares himself or herself must 
be identically situated to the plaintiff in every single aspect of their employment, a 
plaintiff whose job responsibilities are unique to his or her position will never 
successfully establish a prima facie case.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Ercegovich v. 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (C.A.6, 1998), 154 F.3d 344, 353.  See, also, 
Graham v. Long Island RR. (C.A.2, 2000), 230 F.3d 34, 40. 
 
Kroh was the cash manager at General Tire.  There were no other cash 
managers, so she could not compare herself to anyone who had exactly the same 
duties as herself.  She did, however, present evidence that tends to show that the 
male managers she compared herself to reported to the same boss, had similar 
titles, were at a similar level on the company’s organizational chart, and had the 
same salary classification. 
 
As with all records, the one before us is incomplete.  However, we do not 
need to know everything to be able to determine that Kroh was “similarly-situated 
to the non-protected employee in all relevant respects.”  (Emphasis sic.)  
Ercegovich, 154 F.3d at 353.  According to Ercegovich, what is relevant depends 
on the case.  Id.  In this case, we believe that Kroh established the relevant aspects 
of the “similarly situated” issue in her case, i.e., that the male colleagues who 
allegedly received favorable treatment were in the same department, occupied 
similar positions according to the organization chart, and reported to the same 
manager.  In other words, she compared herself to her peers. 
January Term, 2001 
5 
 
To be sure, counsel for General Tire presented ample evidence supporting 
their arguments.  It is even possible that they presented more and better evidence.  
However, our task is not to weigh the evidence.  We conclude that substantial, 
credible evidence was presented from which reasonable minds could draw 
different conclusions.  Accordingly, we are unwilling to reverse a jury verdict 
simply because the court of appeals considered Kroh to be an apple and her peers 
to be oranges. 
 
Similarly, there was ample evidence before the trial court to warrant its 
decision to deny Kroh’s motion for prejudgment interest, its decision not to  send 
the issue of punitive damages to the jury, and its decision not to award attorney 
fees and costs. 
Judgment reversed and 
trial court judgment reinstated. 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur in judgment and 
concur separately. 
 
COOK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in part and dissent in part. 
__________________ 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurring.  While I concur in the judgment of the 
majority, I would also reverse the trial court’s denial of prejudgment interest and 
attorney fees.  Further, I would remand the case to the trial court for trial solely on 
the issue of punitive damages.  Only when we start allowing these additional 
sanctions as compensation and punishment for discriminatory practices against 
women (and minorities) will the practice not be so prevalent.  How else will the 
laudatory goal of equal pay for equal work and equal opportunity for promotion 
and advancement ever be reached?  Herein, a jury heard all of the evidence and 
the surrounding facts and did the best it could with what it was permitted to 
decide. 
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RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur in the foregoing concurring 
opinion. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.  I agree with the 
majority that Kroh established, to the extent necessary to survive a motion for 
directed verdict, that the male employees to whom she compared herself were 
“similarly situated” for purposes of her unequal-pay claim. 
 
The only case that the court of appeals relied upon in support of its 
decision to the contrary is Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp. (C.A.6, 1992), 964 F.2d 577.  
Mitchell, however, is readily distinguishable from the case at bar.  In that case, the 
Sixth Circuit noted that the plaintiff had “produced no facts to establish that the 
two white employees she identified as not having been fired” were similarly 
situated to her.  (Emphasis added.)  Id.  In a footnote, the Sixth Circuit reiterated 
that there was “no evidence of record” (emphasis sic) to establish that the duties 
and responsibilities of those employees to whom Mitchell compared herself were 
similar, or that they reported to the same supervisor.  Id. at 583, fn. 5. 
 
Here, in contrast to Mitchell, Kroh did present evidence during her case-
in-chief tending to establish that at least some of the males to whom she compared 
herself for purposes of her unequal-pay claim performed several similar job 
functions, occupied the same position on the company’s organizational chart, and 
reported to the same supervisor for a certain period.  Kroh also testified that she 
had been “told by management” that these other positions were “interchangeable” 
with her own.  For purposes of a directed verdict, such evidence must be 
construed most strongly in her favor.  Civ.R. 50(A)(4). 
 
The court of appeals determined that “Kroh’s feelings and perceptions that 
these men constituted her peer group are not determinative.”  Yet the evidence 
adduced at trial here included more than just self-serving testimony by Kroh about 
her own “feelings and perceptions.”  Kroh’s case-in-chief included testimony 
January Term, 2001 
7 
from eight other company employees, including testimony from several of the 
male employees to whom Kroh compared herself.  As the majority notes, at least 
one of the males to whom Kroh compared herself testified that if Kroh reported to 
the same supervisor, then he would have considered Kroh to be his peer. 
 
Because Mitchell was the only case relied on by the court of appeals in its 
analysis of Kroh’s evidentiary burden on the issue of comparability, it is also 
worth noting that the Sixth Circuit has cautioned district courts against “applying 
an exceedingly narrow reading of the Mitchell decision” and has slightly modified 
the standard that it announced in Mitchell.  Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co. (C.A.6, 1998), 154 F.3d 344, 352.  In Ercegovich, the Sixth Circuit 
reasoned: 
 
“We explained in Mitchell that when the plaintiff lacks direct evidence of 
discrimination, ‘the plaintiff must show that the “comparables” are similarly-
situated in all respects,’ absent other circumstantial or statistical evidence 
supporting an inference of discrimination.  * * * Although this statement appears 
to invite a comparison between the employment status of the plaintiff and other 
employees in every single aspect of their employment, Mitchell has not been so 
narrowly construed. * * * The plaintiff need not demonstrate an exact correlation 
with the employee receiving more favorable treatment in order for the two to be 
considered ‘similarly-situated’; rather, * * * the plaintiff and the employee with 
whom the plaintiff seeks to compare himself or herself must be similar in ‘all of 
the relevant aspects.’ “  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 352. 
 
Though I agree with the majority’s decision to reverse the court of 
appeals’ judgment, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to 
simply reinstate the jury’s verdict.  Given our reversal here of the decision 
regarding the directed verdict, there remain two assignments of error and three 
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cross-assignments of error that have yet to be examined on appeal.1  In a single 
sentence, without any discussion of the parties’ arguments or citation to 
supporting legal authority, the majority purports to resolve three of these assigned 
errors even though they were never passed upon by the court below.  This cause 
should be remanded to the court of appeals for proper consideration of any 
assignments of error and cross-assignments of error that it had previously deemed 
moot. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Katherine C. Hart Smith, for appellant. 
 
Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, LLP, James D. Kurek and Eleanor J. 
Tschugunov, for appellee. 
__________________ 
                                                          
 
1. 
In its first and third assignments of error below, General Tire argued that the trial court 
erred in refusing to grant its motion for new trial, and that the trial court should have granted it a 
directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict on Kroh’s claim for lost pension benefits.  
Kroh’s three cross-assignments of error concerned the denial of her motion for prejudgment 
interest (here, Proposition of Law No. VI), the trial court’s refusal to send the issue of punitive 
damages to the jury (Proposition of Law No. IV), and the trial court’s failure to award Kroh 
attorney fees and costs (Proposition of Law No. V).  When a majority of this court granted Kroh’s 
discretionary appeal, it did so on all propositions of law.  See Kroh v. Continental Gen. Tire, Inc. 
(2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 1501, 727 N.E.2d 924.