Case Title: State ex rel. Ehlinger v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 1996-Ohio-191

Docket Number: 19942171

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1996-08-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
The State ex rel. Ehlinger, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. Industrial 
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Commission of Ohio, Appellant and Cross-Appellee. 
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[Cite as State ex rel. Ehlinger v. Indus. Comm. (1996), ____ Ohio St. 
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3d ____.] 
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Workers’ compensation -- Denial of application for permanent total 
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disabilty compensation by Industrial Commission not an abuse 
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of discretion when “some evidence” is present supporting the 
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commission’s conclusion that, medically, claimant could do 
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sedentary work. 
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(No. 94-2171 -- Submitted July 24, 1996 -- Decided August 21, 1996.) 
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Appeal and Cross-Appeal from the Court of Appeals for Franklin 
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County, No. 93APD10-1393.  
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Claimant Donald M. Ehlinger, appellee and cross-appellant, sustained 
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two back injuries in the course of and arising from his employment with the 
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Cleveland Zoological Society and the Cleveland Metro Park District.  The 
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Industrial Commission of Ohio, appellant and cross-appellee, allowed both 
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workers’ compensation claims and claimant eventually filed for permanent 
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total disability compensation.   
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Among the medical evidence before the commission was the report of 
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Dr. Gnage, who concluded: 
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“The patient described to me the activity level of his job requiring 
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climbing, lifting, etc.  He has not worked at this job for eight years and is 
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now retired at age 65.  Certainly it does not seem likely that he will be able 
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to return to this job.  I would not feel there is any specific treatment for his 
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low back problem and would feel he had reached maximum recovery from 
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this.  There is one difficulty in my mind in [that] his history dictates pain 
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after walking which could be secondary to spinal stenosis or from vascular 
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insufficiency.  I would feel that evaluation by a vascular surgeon might be 
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necessary to differentiate these two at this point.  According to AMA 
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Guides, taking into account his disc operations with mild loss of motion at 
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the back and the obvious degeneration on his spinal x-rays, I would assign 
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an impairment rating of 20% to the body as a whole.  The only kind of 
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employment he would be suited * * * for is sedentary type of employment.  
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At his age of 65, I doubt that this is reasonable and I would therefore feel 
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this is a permanent impairment rating and that he would not be able to return 
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to any sustained employment.”  
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Dr. Jack D. Hutchison also assessed a twenty-five percent 
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impairment, but did not comment on claimant’s ability to work or possible 
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physical restrictions.  Dr. Aaron Schneider concurred in the twenty-five 
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percent impairment rating. 
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The commission ultimately denied permanent total disability, writing: 
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“The reports of Doctors Gnage, Ljubija [sic, Ljuboja] , Schneider, 
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Hutchison and Mr. Fink were reviewed and evaluated.  This order is based 
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particularly upon the reports of Drs. Gnage and Hutchison, and the evidence 
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in the file * * *. 
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“The medical evidence found persuasive are the reports of 
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Commission Specialists, Drs. Gnage and Hutchison.  Dr. Gnage assigns the 
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claimant a 20% PPI [permanent partial impairment] to his allowed physical 
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conditions and opines that solely on the basis of these conditions the 
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claimant can perform sedentary work.  Dr. Hutchison finds the claimant to 
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demonstrate a 25% PPI and indicates the claimant does not present evidence 
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of radiculopathy or nerve root compression.  The report of Commission 
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specialist Schneider, is found unpersuasive in that he considers non-medical 
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factors in [reaching] his conclusion that the claimant is prohibited from 
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sustained remunerative employment.  Thus, the reliable medical evidence 
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indicates the claimant has a low to moderate back impairment which, in and 
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of itself, does not preclude the claimant from engaging in sedentary 
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employment.  It is noted the claimant is 71 years old, has a B.S. in 
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agriculture, and a vocational history as a grinder, nature counselor and game 
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protector.  While it is unclear as to whether the claimant’s work experience 
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has afforded him skills transferrable to sedentary employment, his advanced 
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education degree, [and] with it concomitant technical knowledge, strongly 
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suggests the claimant has the skills and qualifications for a number of 
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sedentary jobs.  Thus, notwithstanding the claimant’s advanced age of 71 
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nor [sic] his possible lack of transferrable skills from work experience, the 
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Commission finds he does have the vocational aptitude based on his 
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education to engage in sustained remunerative employment consistent with 
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his physical restrictions.  Accordingly, the claimant’s Application for 
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Permanent and Total Disability is denied.”  
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Claimant filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for 
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Franklin County, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in 
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denying him permanent total disability compensation.  The court of appeals 
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held that the order did not satisfy State ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm. (1990), 
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57 Ohio St.3d 203, 567 N.E.2d 245, and returned the cause to the 
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commission for further consideration and amended order.  
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This cause is now before this court upon an appeal and cross-appeal 
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as of right. 
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Stewart Jaffy & Associates Co., L.P.A., Stewart R. Jaffy and Marc J. 
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Jaffy; Hahn & Swadey and Victor Hahn, for appellee and cross-appellant. 
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Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Diane M. Meftah, 
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Assistant Attorney General, for appellant and cross-appellee. 
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Per Curiam.  Claimant seeks to compel an award of permanent total 
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disability compensation pursuant to State ex rel. Gay v. Mihm (1994), 68 
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Ohio St.3d 315, 626 N.E.2d 666.  The commission seeks to have its order 
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upheld as is.  For the reasons to follow, we find in the commission’s favor. 
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Medically, the commission relied on the reports of Drs. Hutchison 
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and Gnage.  The latter assessed a twenty percent permanent partial 
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impairment and opined that the allowed conditions would permit sedentary 
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sustained remunerative employment.  As such, any alleged deficiencies in 
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Dr. Hutchison’s report are immaterial, since Gnage’s report is “some 
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evidence” supporting the conclusion that, medically, claimant could do 
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sedentary work. 
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Examining the commission’s evaluation of claimant’s nonmedical 
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disability factors, claimant asserts that the commission abused its discretion 
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in characterizing claimant’s college degree as a vocational asset.  He 
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reasons that because his degree did not generate a sedentary job, the degree 
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does not enhance his prospects for sedentary work.  We disagree. 
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A college degree implies an above-average level of intelligence that 
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would facilitate the acquisition of new skills that are conducive to sedentary 
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work.  A college education also suggests a measure of commitment, hard 
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work, and discipline that prospective employers value.  The commission did 
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not, therefore, err in viewing claimant’s education favorably. 
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The commission’s order acknowledges the strenuous, not sedentary, 
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nature of claimant’s previous jobs.  Claimant’s preoccupation with past 
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experience and current skills ignores a fundamental precept -- “[a] 
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permanent total disability compensation assessment examines both 
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claimant’s current and future, i.e., potentially developable, abilities.”  State 
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ex rel. Ewart v. Indus. Comm. (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 139, 142, 666 N.E.2d 
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1125, ____.  Claimant’s prior history and present abilities do not, therefore, 
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necessarily negate future opportunities  based on new skills.  This is 
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particularly true where a claimant, as here, possesses an above-average 
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learning capacity.  Accordingly, the commission did not err in determining 
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that reemployment/retraining was not foreclosed by claimant’s work history. 
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Claimant also emphasizes his advanced age.  While not a vocational 
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asset, age must not be deemed as insurmountable a barrier as the claimant 
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urges.  In State ex rel. Moss v. Indus. Comm. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 414, 
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417, 662 N.E.2d 364, 366, we wrote: 
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“Age must instead be considered on a case-by-case basis.  To 
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effectively do so, the commission must deem any presumptions about age 
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rebuttable.  Equally important, age must never be viewed in isolation.  A 
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college degree, for example, can do much to ameliorate the effects of 
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advanced age.   
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“Pass [State ex rel. Pass v. C.S.T. Extraction Co. (1995), 74 Ohio 
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St.3d 373, 658 N.E.2d 1055], DeZarn [State ex rel. DeZarn v. Indus. Comm. 
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(1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 461, 659 N.E.2d 1259] and Bryant [State ex rel. 
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Bryant v. Indus. Comm. (1996), 74 Ohio St. 3d 458, 659 N.E.2d 1256] 
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support these propositions.  Collectively, these cases establish that there is 
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not an age -- ever -- at which reemployment is held to be a virtual 
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impossibility as a matter of law.  Certainly, it would be remiss to ignore the 
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limitations that age can place on efforts to secure other employment.  
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However, limitation should never automatically translate into prohibition. 
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“Each claimant is different, with different levels of motivation, 
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initiative and resourcefulness.  The claimant in Bryant is an excellent 
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example of a claimant who was motivated to work well beyond retirement 
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age and was resourceful enough to find a job that valued the experience that 
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his advanced age brought. 
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“This underscores the commission’s responsibility to affirmatively 
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address the age factor.  It is not enough for the commission to just 
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acknowledge claimant’s age.  It must discuss age in conjunction with the 
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other aspects of the claimant’s individual profile that may lessen or magnify 
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age’s effects. 
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“In this case, the commission recognized the impediments that 
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claimant’s age imposed on her ability to obtain other work.  The 
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commission, however, did not find these limitations to be a complete bar to 
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reemployment.  Given claimant’s relatively low level of impairment, the 
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commission reasoned that, with the claimant’s ability to read, write, and do 
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math, sedentary work was not absolutely precluded.  This conclusion was 
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within the commission’s prerogative as the exclusive evaluator of disability, 
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and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the commission. * * *” 
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In this case, the commission found that claimant’s low degree of 
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impairment coupled with his high level of education, offset the effect of 
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claimant’s advanced age and nonsedentary work history.  We do not find 
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that this conclusion constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
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Claimant lastly accuses the commission of failing to “affirmatively 
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consider” the report of vocational consultant Michael L. Fink.  The 
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commission’s order, however, reflects its consideration of his reports.  
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Contrary to claimant’s representation, the commission is not required to 
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accept the conclusion of a vocational or rehabilitation report, since to do so 
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“makes the rehabilitation division, not the commission, the ultimate 
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evaluator of disability * * *.”  State ex rel. Ellis v. McGraw Edison Co. 
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(1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 92, 94, 609 N.E.2d 164, 166. 
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The commission’s freedom to accept or reject a vocational report is 
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particularly important in a case such as this.  The Fink reports, dated 1981 
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and 1988, were not based on personal evaluations but were instead based on 
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telephone and personal conversations.  No recent medical reports were 
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reviewed in the 1988 Fink report, nor was any vocational or aptitude testing 
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performed.  Fink conceded that claimant had the mental and educational 
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capacity for work and based his conclusion of permanent total disability 
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compensation, in large part, on claimant’s inability to travel to and from a 
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job.  The commission did not abuse its discretion in rejecting these reports. 
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Based upon these factors, the judgment of the court of appeals is 
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hereby reversed. 
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Judgment reversed. 
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MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER, COOK and STRATTON, JJ., concur. 
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DOUGLAS, RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., dissent and would affirm 
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the judgment of the court of appeals. 
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