Case Title: Paris v. Carolina Portable Aggregates, Inc.

Citation: 157 S.E.2d 131, 271 N.C. 471

Docket Number: 

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1967-10-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
157 S.E.2d 131 (1967) 271 N.C. 471 Gerald PARIS and wife, Myrtle Faye Paris v. CAROLINA PORTABLE AGGREGATES, INC. No. 31. Supreme Court of North Carolina. October 11, 1967. *135 Redden, Redden & Redden, Hendersonville, for plaintiffs. Lee, Lee & Cogburn, Asheville, for defendant. BRANCH, Justice. The General County Court of Henderson County was established under the chapter now codified as G.S. Chap. 7, Article 30. The court has jurisdiction concurrent *136 with the Superior Court in tort actions. At the threshold of this appeal we are faced with the question of whether the superior court judge erred in signing the order dismissing defendant's appeal to the superior court of Henderson County from the General County Court. Rule 17 of the Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court, inter alia, provides: To avoid dismissal, the appellant must get his appeal docketed within time, but the Court may in its discretion grant further time for filing the record if appellant files the record proper in time and then moves for certiorari, showing delay was not attributable to him. Pruitt v. Wood, 199 N.C. 788, 156 S.E. 126; State v. Walker, 245 N.C. 658, 97 S.E.2d 219. However, appeals in civil actions from the General County Courts to the Superior Courts are governed by G.S. § 7-295 which in part, provides: We note with particularity the statutory exception in G.S. § 7-295 which states: "* * * appellant shall file in duplicate statement of case on appeal, as settled, * * * [T]he record on appeal to the superior court shall be docketed before the next term of the superior court ensuing after the case on appeal shall have been settled by the agreement of the parties * * *" (Emphasis added). It is clear from the record that the case on appeal had not been settled by agreement or by order of the court. G.S. § 7-295 makes no provision for the filing of a case on appeal or for the docketing of the record on appeal from the general county court in the superior court until settlement of the case on appeal. Nor is there any provision that the case on appeal shall be transmitted by the clerk of the general county court to the superior court until after the case on appeal has been settled. That part of Judge Riddle's judgment designated as *137 "Order Forming Part of Foregoing Judgment", dated 26 January 1967 and filed 31 January 1967, was erroneously entered. The superior court sitting as an appellate court overruled defendant's assignments of error, and affirmed the judgment of the general county court of Henderson County. Defendant appealed from the judgment of the superior court of Henderson County, assigning numerous errors. Assignments of error meriting review are hereinafter considered. Defendant challenges the correctness of the ruling of the superior court in overruling the exception and assignment of error of defendant directed to the trial court's failure to strike out portions of plaintiff's complaint. The paragraphs pertinent to this assignment of error are as follows: Defendant contends that all of paragraph 4 should be stricken, and that portion of paragraph 5 reading as follows: "tremendous," "far greater than that theretofore," and that portion of paragraph 6 reading as follows: "on each occasion of the blast and particularly * * *." The test to be applied upon a motion to strike portions of the complaint is: Does the pleader have the right to introduce evidence tending to establish the ultimate facts? If so, the motion should be denied; if not, it should be allowed. The denial of this motion is not ground for reversal unless the record affirmatively reveals that the matter is irrelevant or redundant and that its retention in the pleading will cause harm or injustice to the moving party. Batts v. Batts, 248 N.C. 243, 102 S.E.2d 862. Allegations should be stricken only when they are clearly improper, impertinent, irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious. Mere scenery and stage decoration contained in a pleading do not warrant a conclusion that such may form the basis for the introduction of incompetent evidence at the trial. Rhodes v. Jones, 232 N.C. 547, 61 S.E.2d 725. From a perusal of plaintiffs' complaint, we find that they have alleged damages on previous occasions, and particularly on 13 March 1964. They would therefore have the right to introduce evidence concerning the previous occasions. The descriptive word "tremendous" referring to the explosion and the fact that it describes one explosion as being greater than the other, could be proved by competent evidence. In any event, the retention of these pleadings will not cause injustice to defendant. We hold there was no prejudicial error in the denial of defendant's motion to strike. Defendant attacks the ruling of the superior court in overruling its assignment *138 of error to the ruling of the trial court in admitting into evidence over the objection of the defendant, copies of two letters. Contents of the challenged copies are as follows: These copies of letters were not signed; neither was evidence introduced that they were made at the same time and by the same mechanical operation as the original, nor that defendant had received the originals. There was no notice to defendant to produce the originals. There was not sufficient identification of the carbon copies. Liberty Chair Co. v. Crawford, 193 N.C. 531, 137 S.E. 577, 51 A.L.R. 1496. The better practice would have been to exclude these copies from evidence; however, the contents of the "copies" were collateral and amounted to a mere notice which did not directly concern the issues of the case, McMillan v. Baxley, 112 N.C. 578, 16 S.E. 845, and the record shows that the subject matter of the letters was later proved by competent evidence. Thus, the introduction of the copies was manifestly not prejudicial error. The defendant's assignment of error that the trial judge erred in allowing Donies Justus to state that in his opinion the damage to plaintiffs' dwelling was caused by dynamiting is overruled. Objection to a witness' qualifications as an expert is waived if not made in apt time on this special ground, even though general objection is taken. Absent this special objection, the court need not specifically find the witness to be an expert, since when it admits his testimony it is presumed the court so found. Brewer v. Ring & Valk, 177 N.C. 476, 99 S.E. 358; State v. De Mai, 227 N.C. 657, 44 S.E.2d 218. Defendant failed to enter an objection as to the witness' qualifications in apt time. According to the record, the witness was a building inspector with many years' experience, including experience in *139 repairing buildings which were damaged by blast of dynamite. Certainly, he was better qualified than the jury to form an opinion on this particular subject. His statement that Mrs. Paris told him the damage was caused by a blast over at the mine was offered for the purpose of corroboration, and was in fact consistent with the witness' testimony. This was not error. See Stansbury, North Carolina Evidence, 2d Ed., Witnesses, § 52, p. 105. For the reasons above stated, the testimony of Ned Wells, an experienced builder, was likewise competent to show that he observed the cracks in the plaster of plaintiffs' dwelling and that normally construction cracks "don't operate that way." While this witness was on the witness stand, the following colloquy occurred: Defendant contends this is prejudicial error and violates G.S. 1-180, as an expression of opinion by the judge. The record shows that through experience the witness was better qualified than the jury to form an opinion on this particular subject. Thus, the statement of the court was no more than a statement holding that the witness was qualified to give opinion evidence. This statement was not prejudicial error to defendant. The trial court did not commit error in refusing to allow defendant's motion for a jury-view of plaintiffs' property Whether the court will allow a jury to view the premises is within the court's discretion. State Highway & Public Works Comm. v. Hartley, 218 N.C. 438, 11 S.E.2d 314. Here, no abuse of discretion is shown. Defendant assigns error that the superior court erred in overruling defendant's assignment of error directed to the trial court's overruling the defendant's motion for judgment as of nonsuit made at the conclusion of all the evidence. In this connection defendant contends that when the plaintiffs alleged negligence, they elected not to proceed upon the theory of absolute liability. Plaintiffs' complaint sufficiently alleged facts showing damage to their dwelling by concussion and vibration proximately caused by defendant's use of explosives in blasting. This is sufficient to state a cause of action. Guilford Realty & Insurance Co. v. Blythe Bros., 260 N.C. 69, 131 S.E.2d 900. The fact that plaintiffs alleged that defendant was negligent in other portions of the complaint is not necessarily an election to proceed upon the theory of negligence rather than absolute liability. G.S. § 1-151 states: "In the construction of a pleading for the purpose of determining its effect its allegations shall be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice between the parties." We find in 71 C.J.S. Pleading § 521, the following: "Where a single count contains distinct averments, each of which presents a substantive cause of action, proof of either will authorize a recovery," and 71 C.J.S. Pleading § 522, states: "Surplusage.As a general rule no more need be proved, even though more be alleged, than enough to sustain the cause of action or defense relied on. In other words, only those allegations necessary to a recovery need be supported by proof. Surplusages in a pleading need not be proved. Thus, as a general rule, no proof is required of allegations which are irrelevant, *140 immaterial, or unnecessary." The trial judge correctly overruled defendant's motions for nonsuit. At this point we will also consider defendant's contention that improper issues were submitted to the jury, in that no issue was submitted on negligence. "* * * only such issues as are raised by the pleadings and supported by sufficient competent evidence should be submitted to the jury." 4 Strong: N.C. Index, Trial, § 40, p. 348. The evidence in the record does not show negligence on the part of defendant which proximately caused damage to plaintiffs. The issues submitted were sufficient to dispose of the controversies arising on the pleadings and support a final judgment. In charging on the first issue, the trial judge stated: Defendant contends that this is prejudicial error as being incomplete, misleading, and particularly relies on the failure of the court to instruct the jury that it could answer the first issue No if the evidence of the plaintiffs and defendant were found to be of equal weight. It is not prejudicial to illustrate the burden of proof by analogy to a set of scales. Tarkington v. Rock Hill Printing & Finishing Co. (Dunston v. Rock Hill Printing & Finishing Co.), 230 N.C. 354, 53 S.E.2d 269, 11 A.L.R.2d 221. In the case of Hardee v. York, 262 N.C. 237, 136 S.E.2d 582, this Court said: In the instant case the court properly placed the burden of proof on the first issue and correctly stated the proper intensity of proof required. Although the court did not continue with his illustration as to the burden of proof, the court's statement, "if you are not satisfied from the evidence of this case and by the greater weight thereof, you would answer that issue No," the court thereby eliminated any confusion about the burden of proof. We do not think that this portion of the charge would have misled or confused the jury so as to prejudicially affect the defendant. The defendant strongly contends that the superior court committed error when it overruled its exception and assignment of error to that portion of the court's charge which stated: "You will consider the evidence offered by the witnesses for the plaintiffs in regard to the value of this property before this alleged damage by the blasting. You will consider the condition *141 of the property at this time, after the blasting." In cases where the injury is completed or by a single act becomes a fait accompli, and which do not involve a continuing wrong or intermittent or recurring damages, the correct rule for the measurement of damages is the difference between the market value of the property before and after the injury. Broadhurst v. Blythe Bros. Co., 220 N.C. 464, 17 S.E.2d 646; Casstevens v. Casstevens, 231 N.C. 572, 58 S.E.2d 368. In reading the entire charge, we find that the trial judge again referred to the measure of damages at a later period in his charge, stating: All of the evidence in the case was directed so as to show the reasonable market value of the property immediately before the damage and the reasonable market value immediately after the damage. The instruction as to the measure of damages was sufficiently definite to guide the jury to an intelligent determination of this portion of the issues of damages. This brings us to the consideration of defendant's exception to the failure of the court to charge the jury as to the burden of proof upon the second issue submitted to the jury. In the case of Lieb v. Mayer, 244 N.C. 613, 94 S.E.2d 658, Parker, J. (now C. J.) speaking for the Court, said: "Damages are never presumed. The burden is always upon the complaining party to establish by evidence such facts as will furnish a basis for their assessment, according to some definite and legal rule. Berry v. Hyde County Land & Lumber Co., 183 N.C. 384, 111 S.E. 707; Rice v. Hill, 315 Pa. 166, 172 A. 289." And Denny, C. J., speaking for the Court in the case of Watt v. Crews, 261 N.C. 143, 134 S.E.2d 199, stated: The trial court did not give an instruction as to the burden of proof on the second issue. This omission violates a substantial right of defendant, and we hold that this was prejudicial error. In the instant case the decisions on assignments of error relating to the first *142 issue were, in several instances, very close. The assignments of error as to both issues are so intertwined that the ends of justice will be best met by a new trial on both issues. In our discretion the judgment below is vacated and the cause is remanded to the Superior Court of Henderson County, with direction that it remand the cause to the General County Court of Henderson County for a new trial on both issues. Error and Remanded.