Case Title: Watkins v. Collins

Citation: 2006-Ohio-5082

Docket Number: 20061634

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-10-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Watkins v. Collins, 111 Ohio St.3d 425, 2006-Ohio-5082.] 
 
 
WATKINS ET AL. v. COLLINS, DIR. 
[Cite as Watkins v. Collins, 111 Ohio St.3d 425, 2006-Ohio-5082.] 
Habeas corpus — Postrelease control — Writ not available to contest trial 
court’s use of discretionary language imposing postrelease control in 
sentencing entry — Writ denied. 
(No. 2006-1634 ─ Submitted September 18, 2006 ─ Decided October 4, 2006.) 
IN HABEAS CORPUS. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an action for a writ of habeas corpus to compel the release 
of 12 petitioners who are currently in prison for violating the terms of their 
postrelease control. 
Sentencing Entries for the Petitioners 
Thomas B. Watkins 
{¶ 2} On February 27, 1998, the Allen County Court of Common Pleas 
convicted petitioner Thomas B. Watkins of aggravated robbery (a felony of the 
first degree) with a firearm specification and sentenced him to an aggregate prison 
term of seven years.  The trial court’s sentencing entry included the following 
postrelease-control language: 
{¶ 3} “The Court has further notified the defendant that post release 
control is optional in this case up to a maximum of FIVE (5) years, as well as, the 
consequences for violating conditions of post release control imposed by the 
Parole Board under R.C. 2967.28.  The defendant is ordered to serve as part of 
this sentence any term of postrelease control imposed by the Parole Board, and 
any prison term for violation of that post release control.” 
John Warren Ivy 
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{¶ 4} In June 1998, after petitioner John Warren Ivy was convicted of 
two counts of aggravated robbery (a felony of the first degree) with a firearm 
specification for one count, the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas 
sentenced Ivy to an aggregate prison term of six years.  The trial court included 
the following language regarding postrelease control in its sentencing entry: 
{¶ 5} “Following the defendant’s release from prison, the defendant 
will/may serve a period of post-release control under the supervision of the parole 
board; 
{¶ 6} “Should the defendant violate any post-release control sanction or 
any law, the adult parole board may impose a more restrictive sanction.  The 
parole board may increase the length of the post-release control.  The parole board 
could impose an additional nine (9) months prison term for each violation for a 
total of up to fifty percent (50%) of the original sentence imposed by the court.  If 
the violation of the sanction is a felony, in addition to being prosecuted and 
sentenced for the new felony, the defendant may receive from the court a prison 
term for the violation of the post-release control itself.” 
Joseph Lavun Ramey 
{¶ 7} On February 28, 1997, after petitioner Joseph Lavun Ramey was 
convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery (a felony of the first degree) with a 
firearm specification on one count, the Montgomery County Court of Common 
Pleas sentenced Ramey to an aggregate prison term of eight years.  The trial court 
included the identical postrelease-control language in Ramey’s sentencing entry 
that it had included in Ivy’s sentencing entry. 
Johnny Streeter 
{¶ 8} On March 9, 2005, after petitioner Johnny Streeter was convicted 
of intimidation (a felony of the third degree), the Lorain County Court of 
Common Pleas sentenced him to one year in prison.  The trial court included the 
following postrelease-control language in its sentencing entry: 
January Term, 2006 
3 
{¶ 9} “The court has further notified the defendant that post release 
control is (mandatory/optional) in this case up to a maximum of (3/5) years, as 
well as the consequences for violating conditions of post release control imposed 
by the Parole Board under Ohio Rev.Code § 2967.28.  The defendant is ordered to 
serve as part of this sentence any term of post release control imposed by the 
Parole Board, and any prison term for violation of that post release control.” 
William A. Maddox 
{¶ 10} On February 28, 2000, after petitioner William A. Maddox was 
convicted of sexual battery (a felony of the third degree), the Highland County 
Court of Common Pleas sentenced him to three years in prison.  The trial court 
included the following postrelease-control language in its sentencing entry: 
{¶ 11} “The Court, in imposing this sentence, finds pursuant to Sections 
2929.11 to 2929.19 ORC, * * * that defendant is subject to post-release control 
which is (mandatory/optional) for up to (three/five) years.” 
Darnelle A. Moore 
{¶ 12} On April 2, 1999, after petitioner Darnelle A. Moore was 
convicted of robbery (a felony of the third degree), the Lake County Court of 
Common Pleas sentenced him to three years in prison.  The trial court included 
the following postrelease-control language in its sentencing entry: 
{¶ 13} “The Court has further notified the defendant that post release 
control is optional in this case up to a maximum of 3 years, as well as the 
consequences for violating conditions of post release control imposed by the 
Parole Board under Revised Code section 2967.28.  The defendant is ordered to 
serve as part of this sentence any term of post release control imposed by the 
Parole Board, and any prison term for violation of that post release control.” 
Jerry L. McGlone 
{¶ 14} On March 13, 2003, the Scioto County Court of Common Pleas 
convicted petitioner Jerry L. McGlone of burglary (a felony of the third degree), 
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breaking and entering (a felony of the fifth degree), receiving stolen property (a 
felony of the fourth degree), and forgery (a felony of the fifth degree), and 
sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of three and one-half years.  The trial 
court included the identical postrelease-control language used by the trial court in 
Moore’s sentencing entry. 
Jamon K. Gaskins 
{¶ 15} On August 13, 2002, after petitioner Jamon K. Gaskins was 
convicted of two counts of trafficking in crack cocaine (a felony of the second 
degree) with a specification that he had committed the offense within 100 feet of a 
juvenile on one count, the Clark County Court of Common Pleas sentenced 
Gaskins to an aggregate prison term of two years.  The trial court included 
language regarding postrelease control that is identical to the language used by the 
trial courts in the sentencing entries for Moore and McGlone. 
Arlene Bowling 
{¶ 16} On November 17, 1998, after petitioner Arlene Bowling was 
convicted of burglary (a felony of the second degree), the Greene County Court of 
Common Pleas sentenced her to three years of community control.  In the 
sentencing entry, the trial court included the following language regarding 
community control and postrelease control: 
{¶ 17} “Violation of this sentence may lead to a longer or more restrictive 
sanction for defendant, up to and including a prison term of up to 3 years.  
Defendant is notified that if a prison term is imposed for violation of community 
control, the Parole Board may extend prison time up to 1/2 of the stated prison 
term in 15, 30, 60, or 90 day increments for certain violations committed while in 
prison.  After prison release, if post release control is imposed, for violation of 
post release control conditions, the Adult Parole Authority or Parole Board could 
impose a more restrictive or longer control sanction, or return defendant to prison 
for up to nine months for each violation, up to a maximum of 1/2 of the stated 
January Term, 2006 
5 
prison term.  If the violation is a new felony, defendant may receive a prison term 
of the greater of one year of the time remaining on post release control, in 
addition to any other prison term imposed for the new offense.” 
{¶ 18} On June 14, 2000, the trial court found that Bowling had violated 
the community control and sentenced her to three years in prison.  The trial court 
did not include any term of postrelease control in this sentencing entry. 
Michael E. Abbott 
{¶ 19} On March 30, 2000, the Noble County Court of Common Pleas 
convicted petitioner Michael E. Abbott of gross sexual imposition (a felony of the 
third degree) and sentenced him to three years in prison.  The trial court included 
postrelease-control language comparable to that used by the trial court in 
Bowling’s initial sentencing entry. 
Paul D. McGowan III 
{¶ 20} On June 11, 2002, the Marion County Court of Common Pleas 
convicted petitioner Paul D. McGowan III of burglary (a felony of the third 
degree) and sentenced him to two years in prison.  The trial court included the 
following postrelease-control language in its sentencing entry: 
{¶ 21} “The defendant may be subject to a period of three (3) years of 
post-release control by the parole board. 
{¶ 22} “During any period of post-release control, the Defendant will be 
under the supervision of the Adult Parole Authority which will require the 
Defendant to comply with one or more post-release control sanctions.  In the 
event the Defendant violates a post-release control sanction, the parole board may 
then impose a more restrictive post-release control sanction, and may increase the 
duration, or period, of the post-release control subject to a statutory maximum.  
The more restrictive sanction that the parole board may impose may consist of a 
prison term, provided that the prison term cannot exceed nine months and the 
maximum cumulative prison term imposed for all violations during the period of 
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post-release control cannot exceed one-half of the stated prison term originally 
imposed.  If the violation of the post-release control sanction is a felony, the 
Defendant may be prosecuted for the new felony and, in addition to any sentence 
the court imposes for the new felony, the court may also impose a prison term for 
the violation, subject to the statutory maximum.” 
Jamie Kearns 
{¶ 23} On August 23, 2000, after petitioner Jamie Kearns was convicted 
of corruption of a minor (a felony of the fourth degree) and burglary (a felony of 
the fourth degree), the Butler County Court of Common Pleas sentenced him to an 
aggregate prison term of two years and ten months.  The trial court included the 
following postrelease-control language in its sentencing entry: 
{¶ 24} “The Court has further notified the defendant that post release 
control is optional in this case up to a maximum of 3 years, as well as the 
consequences for violating conditions of post release control imposed by the 
Parole Board under Revised Code Section 2967.28.  The defendant is ordered to 
serve as part of this sentence any term of postrelease control imposed by the 
Parole Board, and any prison term for violation of that post release control.” 
Actions of the Adult Parole Authority 
{¶ 25} According to the parties, all of the petitioners were released from 
their original prison sentences and placed on postrelease control, were found to 
have violated the terms of that control by the Adult Parole Authority and 
respondent, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction Director Terry 
Collins, and were resentenced to prison.  The petitioners are currently 
incarcerated.  The scheduled release dates for the petitioners under the Parole 
Authority’s decisions are as follows:  Watkins (Nov. 26, 2006), Ivy (Mar. 17, 
2007), Ramey (Nov. 29, 2006), Streeter (Dec. 8, 2006), Maddox (Mar. 23, 2007), 
Moore (Apr. 7, 2007), McGlone (Feb. 22, 2007), Gaskins (Jan. 16, 2007), 
January Term, 2006 
7 
Bowling (Jan. 23, 2007), Abbott (Feb. 3, 2007), McGowan (Dec. 27, 2006), and 
Kearns (Nov. 22, 2006).  www.drc.state.oh.us/offendersearch. 
Federal District Court Case 
{¶ 26} The petitioners are members of a plaintiff class in a pending 
federal class action, Hernandez v. Wilkinson (N.D.Ohio filed Jan. 24, 2006), No. 
1:06-CV-158.  In that case, the federal district court has certified a class described 
as “[a]ll persons who have been subjected to postrelease control in Ohio between 
January 24, 2004 and the present.”  The class-action plaintiffs seek to be restored 
to the status they would have held if postrelease control had not been imposed.  
The federal district court issued a remedial order in which the parties agreed that 
the class members who did not have postrelease control incorporated into their 
sentencing entries were entitled to relief.  The parties have not yet agreed on the 
proper disposition of challenges to postrelease control by those plaintiffs who 
were subject to mandatory postrelease control but whose sentencing entries 
incorrectly indicated that postrelease control was conditional. 
Habeas Corpus 
{¶ 27} On August 31, 2006, petitioners filed this action for a writ of 
habeas corpus to compel Collins to immediately release them from prison.  
Petitioners claim that they are entitled to the writ because they failed to receive 
adequate notice of postrelease control and their sentencing entries failed to 
incorporate adequate notice of postrelease control into their sentences.  The 
parties have stipulated to the facts set forth in the petition.  Petitioners did not 
attach a verification to their petition, swearing to the truth of the allegations.  
Petitioners did attach copies of their trial court sentencing entries but did not 
attach copies of the Parole Authority decisions imposing the postrelease-control 
sanctions that are the cause of their current incarceration. 
{¶ 28} On September 7, 2006, we allowed the writ and ordered Collins to 
file a return within three days of service of the petition.  Watkins v. Collins, 110 
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Ohio St.3d 1477, 2006-Ohio-4578, 853 N.E.2d 672.  On September 14, Collins 
submitted a return.  On September 18, petitioners filed their response to the 
return. 
{¶ 29} This cause is now before us for our consideration of the petition, 
the return, and the response. 
Commitment-Paper and Verification Requirements 
{¶ 30} R.C. 2725.04(D) requires that copies of the commitment papers be 
attached to the petition for a writ of habeas corpus: 
{¶ 31} “A copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person 
shall be exhibited, if it can be procured without impairing the efficiency of the 
remedy; or, if the imprisonment or detention is without legal authority, such fact 
must appear.” 
{¶ 32} “These commitment papers are necessary for a complete 
understanding of the petition.  Without them, the petition is fatally defective.  
When a petition is presented to a court that does not comply with R.C. 
2725.04(D), there is no showing of how the commitment was procured and there 
is nothing before the court on which to make a determined judgment except, of 
course, the bare allegations of petitioner’s application.”  Bloss v. Rogers (1992), 
65 Ohio St.3d 145, 146, 602 N.E.2d 602. 
{¶ 33} R.C. 2725.04 also requires that the petition be verified: 
{¶ 34} “Application for the writ of habeas corpus shall be by petition, 
signed and verified either by the party for whose relief it is intended, or by some 
person for him * * *.” 
{¶ 35} For purposes of R.C. 2725.04, “ ‘[v]erification’ means a ‘formal 
declaration made in the presence of an authorized officer, such as a notary public, 
by which one swears to the truth of the statements in the document.’ ”  Chari v. 
Vore (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 323, 327, 744 N.E.2d 763, quoting Garner, Black’s 
Law Dictionary (7th Ed.1999) 1556. 
January Term, 2006 
9 
{¶ 36} The habeas corpus petition here did not contain any copies of the 
Adult Parole Authority decisions that resulted in the petitioners’ current 
confinement.  Nor does the petition include any sworn statement verifying the 
allegations of the petition. 
{¶ 37} In general, a habeas corpus petition that fails to comply with the 
commitment-paper and verification requirements of R.C. 2725.04 is fatally 
defective and is subject to dismissal.  State ex rel. McCuller v. Callahan, 98 Ohio 
St.3d 307, 2003-Ohio-858, 784 N.E.2d 108, ¶ 4; Hawkins v. S. Ohio Correctional 
Facility, 102 Ohio St.3d 299, 2004-Ohio-2893, 809 N.E.2d 1145, ¶ 4. 
{¶ 38} Nevertheless, the petition here includes a stipulation of the parties 
agreeing to all the pertinent facts, including that “[e]ach and every Petitioner is 
currently detained in an Ohio prison, serving a sanction imposed by Respondent 
for violating the terms of his/her postrelease control.”  Therefore, because the 
stipulated facts as well as the sentencing entries included in the petition are 
sufficient for a complete understanding of the petitioners’ habeas corpus claim, 
we refrain from invoking our general rules requiring dismissal and proceed to 
address the merits of the claim. 
Habeas Corpus Claim 
{¶ 39} “A writ of habeas corpus is warranted in certain extraordinary 
circumstances ‘where there is an unlawful restraint of a person’s liberty and there 
is no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.’ ”  Johnson v. Timmerman-
Cooper (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 614, 616, 757 N.E.2d 1153, quoting Pegan v. 
Crawmer (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 97, 99, 666 N.E.2d 1091.  “ ‘Like other 
extraordinary-writ actions, habeas corpus is not available when there is an 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.’ ”  Smith v. Bradshaw, 109 Ohio 
St.3d 50, 2006-Ohio-1829, 845 N.E.2d 516, ¶ 10, quoting In re Complaint for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus for Goeller, 103 Ohio St.3d 427, 2004-Ohio-5579, 816 
N.E.2d 594, ¶ 6. 
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{¶ 40} Generally, “[s]entencing errors by a court that had proper 
jurisdiction cannot be remedied by extraordinary writ” because the petitioner “has 
or had adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law, e.g., appeal and 
postconviction relief, for review of any alleged sentencing error.”  State ex rel. 
Jaffal v. Calabrese, 105 Ohio St.3d 440, 2005-Ohio-2591, 828 N.E.2d 107, ¶ 5.  
In accordance with this general rule, “[w]e have consistently held that sentencing 
errors are not jurisdictional and are not cognizable in habeas corpus.”  Majoros v. 
Collins (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 442, 443, 596 N.E.2d 1038, and cases cited therein; 
see, also, Smith v. Walker (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 431, 432, 700 N.E.2d 592. 
{¶ 41} With these guides in mind, we next consider the petitioners’ 
habeas claim, which challenges the authority of the Adult Parole Authority to 
place them on postrelease control and sanction them for violations of that control 
in the absence of appropriate language in their sentencing entries. 
Postrelease-Control Language In Sentencing Entries 
{¶ 42} R.C. 2967.28 governs postrelease control.  Under R.C. 2967.28, 
“[e]ach sentence to a prison term for a felony of the first degree, for a felony of 
the second degree, for a felony sex offense, or for a felony of the third degree that 
is not a felony sex offense and in the commission of which the offender caused or 
threatened to cause physical harm to a person shall include a requirement that the 
offender be subject to a period of post-release control imposed by the parole 
board after the offender’s release from imprisonment.”  The terms for this 
mandatory postrelease control are either three or five years.  R.C. 2967.28(B)(1)-
(3).  According to the parties, each of the petitioners was subject to a mandatory 
term of postrelease control based upon their convictions.  Nevertheless, the 
language of their trial court sentencing entries mistakenly included some 
discretionary language concerning their terms of postrelease control. 
{¶ 43} The petitioners claim that by misrepresenting the mandatory nature 
of their postrelease control, the trial courts never properly imposed such control 
January Term, 2006 
11 
and that they therefore could not be imprisoned by the Parole Authority and 
Collins for violating that control.  Petitioners rely on the court’s opinions in 
Woods v. Telb (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 504, 733 N.E.2d 1103; State v. Jordan, 104 
Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864; Hernandez v. Kelly, 108 Ohio 
St.3d 395, 2006-Ohio-126, 844 N.E.2d 301, and Gensley v. Eberlin, 110 Ohio 
St.3d 1474, 2006-Ohio-4474, 853 N.E.2d 313, to support their claim. 
{¶ 44} In Woods, we held, “Pursuant to R.C. 2967.28(B) and (C), a trial 
court must inform the defendant at sentencing or at the time of a plea hearing that 
post-release control is part of the defendant’s sentence.”  89 Ohio St.3d 504, 733 
N.E.2d 1103, at paragraph two of the syllabus.  “Because the record clearly 
indicates that the petitioner was advised of discretionary post-release control both 
in his signed plea form and in his sentencing entry, we find no violation of the 
separation of powers doctrine in this case.”  Id. at 513, 733 N.E.2d 1103. 
{¶ 45} In Jordan, we held, in consolidated appeals from criminal 
convictions, “When sentencing a felony offender to a term of imprisonment, a 
trial court is required to notify the offender at the sentencing hearing about 
postrelease control and is further required to incorporate that notice into its 
journal entry imposing sentence.”  104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 
N.E.2d 864, at paragraph one of the syllabus. “Accordingly, if a trial court has 
decided to impose a prison term upon a felony offender, it is duty-bound to notify 
that offender at the sentencing hearing about postrelease control and to 
incorporate postrelease control into its sentencing entry, which thereby empowers 
the executive branch of government to exercise its discretion.”  Id. at ¶ 22.  The 
remedy for improper notification about postrelease control at the sentencing 
hearing is resentencing — not release from prison.  Id. at paragraph two of the 
syllabus. 
{¶ 46} Neither Woods nor Jordan entitles the petitioners to release from 
prison.  Those cases focused on whether the offenders were properly notified 
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about postrelease control at their sentencing hearings.  There was no dispute 
regarding the language incorporated into the sentencing entries.  Here, while not 
specifying the postrelease control as mandatory, the trial courts did at least notify 
the petitioners at their sentencing hearings that they could be subject to 
postrelease control. 
{¶ 47} Respondent also relies on the Woods and Jordan sentencing 
entries, but that reliance is not particularly helpful in assessing the petitioners’ 
claims.  The sentencing entries in Woods and in one of the cases consolidated for 
review in Jordan involved discretionary instead of mandatory postrelease control, 
so conditional language was warranted. 
{¶ 48} Petitioners’ citation of Hernandez, 108 Ohio St.3d 395, 2006-
Ohio-126, 844 N.E.2d 301, and Gensley, 110 Ohio St.3d 1474, 2006-Ohio-4474, 
853 N.E.2d 313, is more relevant.  In these cases as well as in the court’s recent 
decision in Adkins v. Wilson, 110 Ohio St.3d 1454, 2006-Ohio-4275, 852 N.E.2d 
749, we granted writs of habeas corpus and ordered the immediate release of 
petitioners who were incarcerated following the Parole Authority’s imposition of 
a postrelease-control sanction of imprisonment because the petitioners’ trial court 
sentencing entries did not impose a term of postrelease control.  In Hernandez, the 
sentencing entry contained no reference to postrelease control.  In Adkins, the 
sentencing entry did not contain any reference to postrelease control, and we, in 
effect, held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue a nunc pro tunc entry 
adding postrelease control to the sentence after Adkins’s original sentence had 
expired.  In addition, following Hernandez, Adkins’s trial court issued two entries 
specifically ordering the Parole Authority to terminate his postrelease-control 
sanction.  In Gensley, the sole reference to postrelease control in the sentencing 
entry was a vague statement that Gensley understood the possibility of postrelease 
control. 
January Term, 2006 
13 
{¶ 49} In Hernandez, 108 Ohio St.3d 395, 2006-Ohio-126, 844 N.E.2d 
301, at ¶ 20, we emphasized the statement from Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-
Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 19, that “unless a trial court includes postrelease 
control in its sentence, the Adult Parole Authority is without authority to impose 
it.” 
{¶ 50} By contrast, the sentencing entries for the petitioners here specified 
that postrelease control was, at a minimum, discretionary and was part of their 
sentences.  For example, the trial courts stated that petitioners Watkins, Streeter, 
Moore, McGlone, Gaskins, and Kearns were “ordered to serve as part of this 
sentence any term of post release control imposed by the Parole Board, and any 
prison term for violation of that post release control.”  The sentencing entries for 
petitioners Ivy and Ramey stated that “[f]ollowing the defendant’s release from 
prison, the defendant will/may serve a period of post-release control under the 
supervision of the parole board.”  For petitioner Maddox, the sentencing entry 
likewise provided that “defendant is subject to post-release control which is 
(mandatory/optional) for up to (three/five) years.”  The sentencing entry for 
petitioner McGowan stated that he “may be subject to a period of three (3) years 
of post-release control by the parole board.”  Finally, for petitioners Bowling and 
Abbott, the trial court sentencing entries stated that “if post release control is 
imposed, for violation of post release control conditions, the Adult Parole 
Authority or Parole Board could * * * return defendant to prison * * *.” 
{¶ 51} While these entries erroneously refer to discretionary instead of 
mandatory postrelease control, they contain significantly more information than 
any of the sentencing entries held insufficient by the court in Hernandez (no 
reference to postrelease control), Adkins (no reference to postrelease control), and 
Gensley (vague reference about petitioner’s understanding of possible penalties).  
Consequently, the sentencing entries are sufficient to afford notice to a reasonable 
person that the courts were authorizing postrelease control as part of each 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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petitioner’s sentence.  A reasonable person in the position of any of the petitioners 
would have had sufficient notice that postrelease control could be imposed 
following the expiration of the person’s sentence.  Any challenge to the propriety 
of the sentencing court’s imposition of postrelease control in the entries could 
have been raised on appeal.  The same could not be said about the sentencing 
entries at issue in Hernandez, Adkins, and Gensley. 
{¶ 52} This conclusion is consistent with the preeminent purpose of R.C. 
2967.28─that offenders subject to postrelease control know at sentencing that 
their liberty could continue to be restrained after serving their initial sentences.  
Cf. Hernandez, 108 Ohio St.3d 395, 2006-Ohio-126, 844 N.E.2d 301, ¶ 31 (“In 
this case, neither the trial judge, the prosecutor, nor the defense counsel advised 
the defendant at the hearing, or in a journal entry, that his liberty would continue 
to be restrained after he served his sentence.  That omission violated not only the 
statute, but the spirit of the changes in criminal sentencing underlying Senate Bill 
2 [146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7136]”). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 53} The petitioners’ sentencing entries, although they mistakenly 
included wording that suggested that imposition of postrelease control was 
discretionary, contained sufficient language to authorize the Adult Parole 
Authority to exercise postrelease control over the petitioners.  Consequently, in 
accordance with our general precedent, habeas corpus is not available to contest 
any error in the sentencing entries, and petitioners have or had an adequate 
remedy by way of appeal to challenge the imposition of postrelease control.  
Accordingly, we deny the writ.1 
Writ denied. 
                                                 
1.  We deny the motion for leave to file a memorandum in support of petitioners’ response to 
return of writ.  Respondent’s motion for leave to file a reply to petitioners’ response to the return 
is rendered moot by our judgment. 
January Term, 2006 
15 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
RESNICK, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR 
and 
O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
 
LANZINGER, J., dissents. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 54} I respectfully dissent from the denial of the writ in this case.  The 
question here is how accurate a trial court must be in notifying a defendant about 
postrelease control.  I would answer that for notification to be proper, a defendant 
subject to mandatory postrelease control must be informed that postrelease control 
is mandatory, rather than discretionary, with the parole authority. Because none of 
the 12 petitioners were so notified in their cases, I would grant the writ. 
{¶ 55} The 12 petitioners are currently in prison for violating their 
postrelease-control terms. Although all were subject to mandatory terms of 
postrelease control based upon their underlying convictions, they all claim they 
did not receive adequate notice of postrelease control in the sentencing entries 
issued by the trial courts.  In denying the writ, the majority concludes that “[t]he 
petitioners’ sentencing entries, although they mistakenly included wording that 
suggested that imposition of postrelease control was discretionary, contained 
sufficient language to authorize the Adult Parole Authority to exercise postrelease 
control over the petitioners.” 
{¶ 56} Previously, this court has explained the importance of notification 
in criminal cases. “[I]n order to properly impose a sentence in a felony case, a 
trial court must consider and analyze numerous sections of the Revised Code to 
determine applicability and must provide notice to offenders at the sentencing 
hearing and incorporate that notice into its journal entry.” State v. Jordan, 104 
Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864, ¶ 9. With respect to 
community-control violations, we have stated that “[w]hen an offender violates 
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community control conditions and that offender was not properly notified of the 
specific term that would be imposed, an after-the-fact reimposition of community 
control would totally frustrate the purpose behind [statutory] notification, which is 
to make the offender aware before a violation of the specific prison term that he 
or she will face for a violation.” (Emphasis sic.) State v. Brooks, 103 Ohio St.3d 
134, 2004-Ohio-4746, 814 N.E.2d 837, ¶ 33. 
{¶ 57} The petitioners in this case may have received some notice of the 
possibility of postrelease control, but the notice they received was neither proper 
nor adequate. Proper notification concerning postrelease control for these 
petitioners would have stated that postrelease control was mandatory, not just a 
possibility. Defendants are to be informed of the exact consequences of a 
conviction.  See Hernandez v. Kelly (2006), 108 Ohio St.3d 395, 2006-Ohio-126, 
844 N.E.2d 301, at ¶ 31 (stating that the objective of Ohio’s sentencing laws is to 
ensure all interested parties “know precisely the nature and duration of the 
restrictions that have been imposed by the trial court on the defendant's personal 
liberty”). This includes statements by the trial court about whether postrelease 
control is optional or mandatory and how long it will last.  I disagree with the 
majority view that mere substantial compliance is sufficient. 
{¶ 58} This court’s opinion in Hernandez supports petitioners’ claims.  
Like petitioners, Hernandez was not notified properly of mandatory postrelease 
control at his initial sentencing although he had been told that “he was ‘being sent 
to prison and placed on post-release control by the Parole Board for a period of up 
to five years.’ ” Id. at ¶ 2.  He appealed and was resentenced, but postrelease 
control was not mentioned during resentencing. Id. at ¶ 4.  After a seven-year 
prison term, the parole authority imposed five years of postrelease control, which 
Hernandez violated and for which he was returned to prison. Id. at ¶ 5-6.  When 
he filed a writ of habeas corpus, seeking release from prison and from postrelease 
control, we granted the writ rather than remanding for resentencing.  In granting 
January Term, 2006 
17 
the writ, we emphasized the importance of proper notification to defendants of the 
penalties they would face.  Id. at ¶ 31. 
{¶ 59} The length of time ordered for postrelease control and whether that 
time will be optional or mandatory are important factors for a defendant to know 
as part of the penalty imposed and, in my view, should be part of the defendant’s 
notification.  I conclude that the improper notifications to petitioners did not 
adequately inform them of the postrelease-control conditions that they faced and, 
therefore, I would grant the writ. 
__________________ 
 
Gerhardstein, Branch & Laufman Co., L.P.A., and Alphonse A. 
Gerhardstein; and Ohio Justice & Policy Center and David A. Singleton, for 
petitioners. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and M. Scott Criss, Assistant Attorney 
General, for respondent. 
______________________