Case Title: Gordon v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 210, 2013

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2013-12-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
ANTHONY GORDON,  
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 210, 2013 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below–Superior Court of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 1109011777 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: September 13, 2013 
Decided: 
December 11, 2013 
 
Before HOLLAND, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices.  
 
O R D E R 
  
This 11th day of December 2013, upon consideration of the appellant’s brief 
filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c) (“Rule 26(c)”), his attorney’s motion 
to withdraw, and the State’s response, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
In January 2013, a Superior Court jury found the appellant, Anthony 
Gordon, guilty of two counts of Rape in the Second Degree and one count of Rape 
in the Fourth Degree.  The victim in the case was the teenage daughter of Gordon’s 
live-in girlfriend.  On April 12, 2013, Gordon was sentenced to a total of thirty-five 
years at Level V, twenty years minimum mandatory, suspended after twenty-one 
years for decreasing levels of supervision.  This is Gordon’s direct appeal. 
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(2) 
On appeal, Gordon’s appellate counsel (“Counsel”) has filed a brief 
and a motion to withdraw pursuant to Rule 26(c) asserting that there are no 
arguably appealable issues.  Gordon, through Counsel, has submitted several issues 
for the Court’s consideration.1  The State has responded to Gordon’s issues and has 
moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
(3) 
When reviewing a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief 
under Rule 26(c), the Court must be satisfied that the defendant’s counsel has 
made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable claims.2  
The Court must also conduct its own review of the record and determine whether 
the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be 
decided without an adversary presentation.3 
(4) 
In this case, the record reflects that in July 2009, 44-year old Gordon 
was living in Wilmington, Delaware, with his girlfriend and her five children, 
including the 14-year old victim in this case, Arianna Thomas (“Thomas”).4  By 
May 2010, Gordon, his girlfriend, and her children, had moved to New Castle, 
Delaware. 
                                
1 Gordon also sought to “amend” his Rule 26(c) submission in a “motion for amendment” filed 
with the Court on December 9, 2013.  The “motion for amendment” does not comply with Rule 
26(c) and has not been considered by the Court. 
2 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 
429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).  
3 Id. 
4 A pseudonym has been assigned to the victim. 
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(5) 
At trial, Thomas testified about a July 2009 incident in the 
Wilmington home when Gordon pulled down her pants, touched her breast and 
vagina with his hand, and penetrated her vagina with his finger.  Thomas also 
testified about a May 2010 incident in the basement of the New Castle home when 
Gordon removed her pants and engaged in vaginal and oral intercourse with her, 
and a June 2010 incident when Gordon removed her underwear and engaged in 
vaginal intercourse with her and touched her breasts with his penis. 
(6) 
In November 2010, Thomas learned that she was five months 
pregnant.  On April 6, 2011, Thomas gave birth to a son (hereinafter “the child”).  
On April 18, 2011, Thomas reported Gordon’s sexual abuse to the New Castle 
County Police. 
(7) 
In December 2011, Gordon was tried on two counts of Rape in the 
Second Degree and one count of Rape in the Fourth Degree.  At trial, a forensic 
DNA analyst testified that DNA testing conducted on Thomas, Gordon and the 
child established to a “greater than 99.9999 percent” probability that Gordon had 
fathered the child. 
(8) 
On appeal, Gordon has submitted several issues arising from the trial.  
The Court has summarized the issues as follows.  First, Gordon claims that the trial 
judge demonstrated a “closed mind.” Second, Gordon claims that the prosecutor 
withheld exculpatory information.  Third, Gordon claims that the prosecutor 
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committed misconduct.  Fourth, Gordon alleges that there was insufficient 
evidence to support the convictions.  Fifth, Gordon alleges that there was a broken 
chain of custody for the DNA evidence.  Sixth, Gordon alleges that his right to 
testify was infringed upon, and seventh, Gordon alleges that his trial counsel was 
ineffective. 
(9) 
We first consider Gordon’s claim that the trial judge evidenced a 
“closed mind” during trial.  According to Gordon, the judge demonstrated bias 
when, during the State’s direct examination of Thomas, the judge gave the 
prosecutor latitude to frame questions in a way that could be perceived as 
sympathetic to Thomas.  Gordon also claims that the trial judge demonstrated bias 
when she scolded Gordon for not being seated at counsel table when court was 
ready to begin, and when she denied Gordon’s request to introduce Thomas’ sexual 
history.  Lastly, Gordon contends that judicial bias is indicated because the trial 
judge did not require additional DNA testing.  Having carefully reviewed the 
record, the Court has found no evidence of judicial bias. 
(10) Gordon next claims, under Brady v. Maryland,5 that the prosecution 
failed to disclose favorable evidence, consisting of photographs of basement 
windows, a paternity test of Thomas’ boyfriend, Thomas’ medical records, and a 
                                
5 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  A Brady violation occurs when a prosecutor fails to 
disclose favorable evidence that is material to either the guilt or punishment of the defendant. 
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“taped interview [and] body warrant,” all of which, according to Gordon, was 
material to his guilt or punishment.  Gordon’s Brady claim is without merit for the 
following reasons.  First, it is not clear what “taped interview [and] body warrant” 
Gordon alleges the State withheld, and he makes no argument how that evidence 
was favorable or material to his defense.  Second, to the extent Gordon argues that 
disclosure of Thomas’ medical records would have established a more precise date 
of conception, the lack of a specific date was not material to the defense.  
Similarly, to the extent Thomas testified incorrectly that the basement of the New 
Castle home was windowless, the mistake does not give rise to a “reasonable 
probability that, had the evidence [of basement windows] been disclosed to the 
defense, the results of the proceeding would have been different.”6  Finally, to the 
extent Thomas’ boyfriend took a paternity test, failure to disclose the results of that 
test was not prejudicial to Gordon given that (i) such information was already 
excluded by the Superior Court under title 11, section 3508 of the Delaware Code,7 
and (ii) the DNA testing admitted at trial established to a “greater than 99.9999 
percent” probability that Gordon was the child’s father. 
(11) Next, Gordon claims prosecutorial misconduct on the basis that the 
prosecutor “coached” Thomas’ trial testimony, as evidenced by Thomas having 
                                
6 Starling v. State, 882 A.2d 747, 756 (Del. 2005). 
7 Trial tr. at 5 (Jan. 23, 2013).  See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 3508 (Del. 2010) (codifying rape 
shield law).  
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testified that she met with the prosecutor prior to trial.  Gordon’s claim is without 
merit.   Preparation with a prosecutor in and of itself does not equal prosecutorial 
misconduct.8    
(12) Gordon also contends that the prosecutor’s remark during his opening 
statement, referring to the child as the “spawn of a rapist,” was improper because it 
was made before any evidence was introduced.  Gordon’s complaint about the 
prosecutor’s comment is without merit.  The evidence adduced at trial supported 
the prosecutor’s statement that the child was conceived in a rape.9   
(13) Gordon next claims that there was insufficient evidence presented at 
trial to support his convictions.  On a claim of insufficient evidence, the relevant 
inquiry is whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the State, could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.10  
After a thorough review of the record in this case, we conclude that the State 
presented sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that Gordon committed two counts of Rape in the Second Degree and one count of 
Rape in the Fourth Degree when he engaged in sexual intercourse and sexual 
penetration of Thomas.11 
                                
8 Webb v. State, 2006 WL 2959891 (Del. Oct. 18, 2006). 
9 Kurzmann v. State, 903 A.2d 702, 711 (Del. 2006). 
10 Robertson v. State, 596 A.2d 1345, 1355 (Del. 1991). 
11 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 772(a)(1) (Supp. 2013) (providing that “[a] person is guilty of 
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(14) In his fifth claim on appeal, Gordon challenges the chain of custody of 
the DNA samples taken of Thomas, the child, and Gordon.  Gordon’s claim is 
without merit.  The record reflects that a sufficient chain of custody was 
established from the time the DNA samples were taken until the time the samples 
were tested. 
(15) In his sixth claim, Gordon complains that the trial judge’s requirement 
that Gordon testify before Thomas’ mother testified was an infringement of his 
right to testify.  Gordon’s claim is without merit.  The trial judge’s evidentiary 
ruling as to the order in which Gordon and Thomas’ mother would testify did not 
deprive Gordon of his right to testify or to present a defense.12 
(16) Finally, Gordon makes several assertions that his trial counsel was 
ineffective.  It is well settled that this Court does not consider ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims that are raised for the first time on direct appeal.13  Absent a full 
adjudication of a claim by the Superior Court, there is no adequate record for this 
                                                                                                     
rape in the second degree when the person . . . [i]n tentionally engages in sexual intercourse with 
another person, and the intercourse occurs without the victim’s consent.”)  Under Delaware law, 
a child under the age of sixteen is deemed “unable to consent to a sexual act with a person more 
than 4 years older than said child.”  Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 761 (k).  See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, 
§ 770(a)(3)a. (providing that a person is guilty of fourth degree rape when the person 
“[i]ntentionally engages in sexual penetration with another person” and the victim has not yet 
reached his/her sixteenth birthday).      
12  See Yelardy v. State, 2011 WL 378906 (Del. Jan. 31, 2011) (citing Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 
803, 842 (Del. 2009)). 
13 Collins v. State, 420 A.2d 170, 177 (Del. 1980). 
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Court to review.14  In this case, because Gordon’s ineffective counsel claims were 
not considered by the Superior Court, we decline to consider the claims in this 
appeal. 
(17) The Court concludes that Gordon’s appeal is wholly without merit and 
devoid of any arguably appealable issue.  We are satisfied that Counsel made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and properly determined 
that Gordon could not raise a meritorious claim on appeal. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm is 
GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  The motion to 
withdraw is moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Henry duPont Ridgely 
 
  
 
 
 
Justice 
                                
14 Wright v. State, 513 A.2d 1310, 1315 (Del. 1986).