Case Title: Gordon v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: CR96-28-7

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-09-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Robert Lynn GORDON and John Michael Priest v.
STATE of Arkansas

CR 96-287                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
              Opinion delivered September 30, 1996


1.   Constitutional law -- right to confrontation in criminal cases
     -- trial court may impose reasonable limits on cross-
     examination. -- The right of confrontation provides two types
     of protection for defendants in criminal cases: the right to
     face those who testify against them and the opportunity to
     conduct effective cross-examination; the right to cross-
     examine is, however, not unlimited, and a trial court has wide
     latitude to impose reasonable limits on cross-examination
     based upon concerns about confusion of issues or interrogation
     that is only marginally relevant; the supreme court will not
     disturb the discretion of the trial court upon review in the
     absence of a showing of abuse. 

2.   Constitutional law -- record reviewed to determine if
     restrictions on cross-examination rise to level of
     constitutional deprivation -- prejudice is not presumed. -- 
     To determine whether the restrictions placed on the right to
     cross-examine a witness rise to the level of a constitutional
     deprivation, the court looks to the record as a whole to
     determine if the restrictions imposed created a substantial
     danger of prejudice to appellant; prejudice is not presumed,
     and the court will not reverse absent a showing of prejudice.

3.   Constitutional law -- appellant failed to show any abuse of
     discretion or prejudice -- judgment affirmed. -- Where
     appellant failed to show either an abuse of the trial court's
     discretion or any prejudice resulting from the restriction on
     his cross-examinaiton, it could not be said that, absent the
     cross-examination appellant's counsel wished to conduct, any
     implication was left with the jury that it was appellant's
     fingerprint found on the trap-gun; the fact that the State may
     have first "opened the door" regarding the evidence did not
     overcome the problem of relevancy; in the circumstance
     presented here, the door opened by the officer's testimony
     resulted in no prejudice whatever to appellant.   

4.   Criminal law -- accomplice testimony -- corroboration
     required. -- The corroboration required to uphold a felony
     conviction based on accomplice testimony must be sufficient
     standing alone to establish the commission of the offense and
     to connect the defendant with it; the test for determining the
     sufficiency of corroborating evidence is whether, if the
     testimony of the accomplice were totally eliminated from the
     case, other evidence independently establishes the crime and
     tends to connect the accused with its commission.

5.   Criminal law -- accomplice testimony -- corroborative evidence
     may be circumstantial. -- The corroborative evidence required
     for accomplice testimony must be substantial evidence that is
     stronger than evidence that merely raises a suspicion of
     guilt; circumstantial evidence qualifies as corroborating
     evidence, but it, too, must be substantial; however,
     corroboration need not be so substantial in and of itself as
     to sustain a conviction.   

6.   Criminal law -- corroborative evidence less than sufficient --
     judgment reversed. -- Where the evidence produced by the
     State, other than the testimony of the accomplice, did no more
     than place the second appellant in a location where marijuana
     was used, and the crime against the officer was discussed, it
     was not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of Ark. Code
     Ann.  16-89-111(e)(1); the judgment was reversed and the case
     dismissed.


          Appeal from Marion  Circuit Court; Robert McCorkindale,
Judge; affirmed as to appellant Gordon; reversed and dismissed as
to appellant priest. 
     Adams & Evans, by:  Donald J. Adams, for appellant Gordon.
     Gardner & Putman, by:  John Putman, got appellant Priest.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  J. Brent Standridge, Asst.
Att'y Gen., for appellee.

     David Newbern, Justice.
     Robert Lynn Gordon and John Michael Priest were tried jointly
for attempted capital murder and manufacture of a controlled
substance.  Mr. Gordon was convicted of both offenses and sentenced
to 35 years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine.  Mr. Priest was
convicted of manufacture of a controlled substance and was given a
four-year suspended sentence.  Both have appealed, and their
appeals have been consolidated.  We affirm Mr. Gordon's conviction
as we reject his sole point of appeal having to do with alleged
error resulting from improper limitation of cross-examination of a
State's witness.  We reverse and dismiss the conviction of Mr.
Priest because we concur in his contention that the evidence
against him given by an accomplice was not corroborated.
     On Thursday, August 18, 1994, the Marion County Sheriff's
office received a report concerning the discovery of a large
marijuana plot.  Investigator Carr was the first to respond to the
call.  Upon entering the marijuana field, Mr. Carr noticed a strand
of monofilament line, a type of fishing line, running to a piece of
pipe.  Suspecting a trap-gun, he attempted to relay his discovery
to other approaching officers.  While attempting to radio the other
officers, he set-off a second, unseen trap-gun which was loaded
with buckshot.  The resulting blast struck Mr. Carr's leg. 
Although severely wounded, he managed to crawl out of the field. He
was found by other officers and rushed to the hospital.  The
officers recovered 402 marijuana plants and two trap guns
constructed of galvanized pipe and rat traps.    
     The State's primary witness was Kenneth Godat, an accomplice. 
According to Mr. Godat, the marijuana plot belonged to Mr. Gordon
and Mr. Priest.  Mr. Godat testified that he heard the two men
discussing the necessity of keeping law enforcement officials out
of the plot, and that he saw the components for the trap-guns on a
nearby picnic table immediately after the discussion.  He claimed
that he saw a trap-gun, identical to the ones found in the
marijuana plot, at the cabin shared by the two men.  Mr. Godat also
stated that he transported the two men to the plot on the day  the
trap-guns were installed.  The other evidence produced by the State
consisted of testimony from individuals who stated they knew the
marijuana patch belonged to Mr. Gordon, that he talked of
protecting it with booby-traps, and that he had a partner, although
the partner was not named.


                       Robert Lynn Gordon
                   Scope of cross-examination
     Bill Beach, one of the investigating officers, testified he
took fingerprints from a number of the suspects and submitted them
to the State Crime Laboratory for comparison to prints found on the
trap-guns.  When questioned about the result, he stated the test
was inconclusive.  Officer Beach testified a laboratory technician
told him "That he had found one, partial latent print on one of the
[trap-guns] and that . . . as a result of his comparison to the
known prints that were submitted, the print was not suitable to
identify any potential suspect, there were not enough points of
identification to identify one person."  On cross-examination, Mr.
Gordon's counsel began questioning Officer Beach about a
conversation Mr. Beach had with the fingerprint examiner, Mr.
Turbyfill, concerning which suspect the fingerprints most closely
matched.  The State's objection was sustained.  
     Mr. Gordon's counsel asked to make a proffer consisting of his
allegation that Officer Beach would testify that Mr. Turbyfill said
that he found five points on the latent print which matched the
finger print of Brad McLean and that Mr. Turbyfill had stated the
investigator should take a "hard look" at Mr. McLean as a suspect. 
The Trial Court stated that, if a statement by Mr. Turbyfill were
admissible, Mr. Turbyfill would be the proper witness but he
doubted the testimony would be admissible "under any stretch of the
rule of evidence."  Obviously, the Trial Court considered the
testimony of Mr. Beach about what Mr. Turbyfill had told him to be
irrelevant and, at best, subject to a hearsay objection on the part
of the State.  We note that in Davis v. State, 319 Ark.