Case Title: State v. De Guair. Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by J. Acoba [pdf]. S.Ct. Order of Correction, filed 08/22/2005 [pdf].

Citation: 108 Haw. 179

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

 

00 ==~ 3

 

STATE OF HAWAI'I, Plaintiff-Appellee,

aaa

 

WALTER WAYNE DE GUATR, Defendant-Appellant « Gnd, thug, questions of constitutional law.

 

State v. Jenking, 93 Havait 87, 100, 997 P.2d 13, 26 (2000)
(eitations omitted) «

State v. Aplaca, 96 Hawai'i 17, 22, 25 P.3d 792, 797 (2001).
c. Denial Of An HREP Aule 40 Petition Without An

vii

With regard to the denial of a HRPP Rule 40 petition

without an evidentiary hearing, HREP Rule 40(f) provides in
Felevant pare

tn addition, we hav

TE a petition alleges facts that if proven would
entitle the petitioner to relief, the court shall
Grants hearing which may extend’ only to the issues
feised in the petition or answer. However, the court
may deny @ hearing if the petitioner's claim is
Retentiy frivolous and is without trace of support
Cither in the record or from other evidence submitted
by the petitionse. ‘The court may also deny a hearing
Oh a specific question of fact when a full and fair
Cvidentiary hearing upon that question was helé during
the course of the proceedings wnich led te the
judgment or custody which is the subject of the
petition or st any Later proceeding.

reviously seated:
‘aaa general rule, a hearing should be held on &
nule 40 petition for post-conviction relief where the
petition states a colorable claim. To establish a
Eolorable claim, the allegations of the petition must
Show that if taken a2 true the facts alleged would
Change the verdieti7] however, a petitioner”:
Conclusions need not be regarded as true. where
Gnamination of the record of the trial court
proceedings indicates that the petitioner’ s
Eliegecions show no colorable claim, it is not error
fo deny the petition without » hearing. The question
on appeal of a denial of a Rule 40 petition without «
fering is whether the trial record indicates that
Petitioner's application for relief made such
showing of a celorable claim as te require « hearing
Before the lower court.

 

 

 

 

 

 

state val Allen, 7 BW. App. (89,) $2-93, 744 P.2d [785,)

ss

792-93 ( (1987) | (emph

ie added) «
[in this fegard], the appellate court steps into
tthe trial court's position, reviews the sane trie
Hecord, and redecides the issue. Because the
Gppellate court's determination of “whether the trial
Teised indicates that Petitioner” s application for
Eelief made such @ showing of  colorable claim
Eequire # hearing before the lower court” is a
Guestion of lew, the trial court’ s decision is
Feviewed de nova. See United States v. Bursons, 872

 

 

 

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F.24 915 (9th Cir, 1989) (denial of a post-conviction
otion based on ineffective assistance of counsel
Mithout conducting an evidentiary hearing ts reviewed
Je nove fora determination of whether the files and
SEITE of the case conclusively show that, petitioner
{fveneitied to no relief). Therefore, we hold that.
tthe issue whether the trial court erred in
Genying 2 Rule 40 petition without a hearing based on
he showing of 8 colozable claim is reviewed de
thusy the right/urong standard of review 1s

   

spplicasie.
anv. Beate, 76 Hawas's 423, 427, 879 P.2d $28, S32 (1994)

Rarnett v. State, 91 Hawai'i 20, 26, 979 P.2d 1046, 1052 (1999)
(some brackets added and some in original) .

D. f Assi nse!

 

In asseseing claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the applicable standard is whether, “viewed as &
Shole, the assistance provided (was) ‘within the range of
“Smpetence Genanced of attorneys in criminal cases.’” State
STEetone, G2 Haw. 346, 348, 615 F.2d 102, 106 (1960)
{Station omitted).
“General claims of ineffectiveness
Sfe"inausticient and every action or
omission ia not subject to inquiry.
Speeitic actions or omissions
sileged to be error but which had an
Sovicus tactical basis for
the defendant's case
Sill not be subject to further
Ecrutiny. If, Rowever, the action
Sf omtasion had no obvious basis for
Benefiting the defendant’ s case and
ft Sresulted sn the withdrawal or
Substantial impaiment of
potentially meritorious defense,”
Ehen [it] ss will be evaluated as
ene pfeimation that... an
Srdihary competent criminal ettorey
should have had.
Buiones v. Stage, 74 Haw. 442, 462-63, 049 P.2d
SEeNSSet tases) temphases in original) (internal
citations omitted). The burden of establishing
Snetfective assistance rests with the defendant
and can only be met by denonstrating specific
Srrore of omissions resulted in the withdrawal
Gr substantial impairment of a meritorious
Sefer

 

 

 

 

 

 

Sbetermining whether a defense is
spotentinlly neriterious’ requires an evaluation
of the possible, rather than the probable,
Gitect of the defense on the decision
faker. ©. +, Accordingly, no showing of
Nictual’ prejudice is required to prove
ineffective assistance of counsel.” Briones, 74
How, at 464, 648 Po2d at 977 (citing State v,

S14 Haws 94, 73, 837 Bead 1298, 1308
tise21)-

 

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v ipuni, 98 Hawai's 387, 392, 49 P.3d 353, 358 (2002)
(quoting State v, Pacheco, 96 Hawai'i @3, 93-94, 26 P.3d S72,
982-583 (2001) (quoting Dan v. State, 76 Hawai'i 423, 427, 879
P.2d 528, 533 (1994))) (some brackets added and some in original)

(some citations omitted in original).

III. DISCUSSION

A. The Circuit Court Did Not Err In Denying De Guair’s
REP Rule 40 Petition

on appeal, De Guair argues that the circuit court erred
in denying his Rule 40 petition because he “established error by
the trial court [in] allowing his plea to withstand scrutiny for
a crime( that) did not exist at the time of (his] change of ple
and for ineffective assistance of counsel based upon his counsel
allowing him to plead to a crime that did not exist.” De Guair's
argument is without merit.

De Guair challenges the circuit court's FOF No. 12 and
its four Cols filed on April 26, 2004. He argues that by
allowing him to plead to a non-existent offense, his trial
counsel's advice “resulted in the withdrawal or substantial
impairment of a meritorious defense(.]” De Guair’s argument is
mistaken. De Gueir’s trial counsel had obvious tactical reasons
for advising him to accept a plea agreement to, inter alia, the
lesser charge of attempted manslaughter, considering -- as trial
that “{b]ut for the plea

 

counsel advised the circuit court
agreement, (De Guair] would have faced a murder in the first
degree charge[.]” The assistance De Guair’s trial counsel
provided fell well “within the range of competence demanded of
attorneys in criminal cases,” and he omitted nothing that
resulted “in the withdrawal or substantial impairment of @
potentially meritorious defense.” See Poaipuni, 98 Hawai'i at
392, 49 P.3d at 358. Accordingly, we hold that De Guair’s

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allegation of error does not constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel in violation of his state and federal constitutional
rights.

Recause De Guair’s remaining point on appeal of the
circuit court’s denial of his Rule 40 petition is identical to
that of his appeal of the denial of his Rule 35 motion, we
address it infra in section 11!.B.

B. The it Di Err In Der De
RPP Rule 35 Motion,

be Guair argues, as he does in his appeal of the
circuit court’s denial of his Rule 40 petition, that the circuit
court erred in denying his HRPP Rule 35 motion, inasmuch as,
according to De Guair, he “established an abuse of discretion by
the trial court in allowing his [no contest] plea to stand to a
crime [that) did not exist at the time of {his} change of plea.”

1 is to the circuit court's Col

 

De Guair’s sole challenge on app*
finding that “[t]he Defendant was properly found guilty of
Attempted Manslaughter.”

be Guair maintains that “(t]he plea agreement form is
silent on a single fact constituting attempted manslaughter” and
that, “[a)t the change of plea hearing, the intentional firing of
a weapon is mentioned|,] but no where is {sic} [his] state of
mind mentioned or that he was under the influence of extreme
mental or emotional distress.” De Guair then argues that, during
the relevant period, he was not under the influence of any
extreme mental or emotional disturbance and thet his action in
shooting William Mariani was purely intentional. De Guair
therefore concludes that his conviction of the offense of
attenpted manslaughter is unlawful, inasmuch es attempted
sreckless” manslaughter does not exist, pursuant to this court's

decision in Holbron, and there was no “factual basis” for a

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conviction of attempted manslaughter by virtue of extreme mental

or emotional disturbance. De Guair reasons that this court must

“reduce” his sentence accordingly and that “the judgment for that
count must be set aside.”

In Holbron, we held that “there can be no attempt to
commit involuntary manslaughter, and, thus, under the Hawai'i
Penal Code, there is no offense of attempted manslaughter by
virtue of attempting recklessly to cause the death of another
person.” 80 Hawai'i at 33, 904 P.2d at 918. Accordingly, there
is only one possible version of attempted manslaughter, iie.,
that “{iJn a prosecution for [attempted] murder in the first and
second degrees it is a defense, which reduces the offense to
[attempted] manslaughter, that the defendant was, at the time he
[attempted to] cause[] the death of the other person, under the
influence of extrene mental or emotional disturbance for which
there is a reasonable explanation.” HRS § 707-702(2).

De Guair does not dispute that he caused Kenneth
Mariani’s death and that he shot William Mariani. Moreover, he
insists that he did so intentionally. Nevertheless, De Guair’s
insistence that he intended to shoot William Mariani does not
Lift his conduct out of the realm of the attenpted manslaughter
offense to which he entered a no contest plea. De Guair’s
contention that the factual basis for his plea was not indicative
of attempted manslaughter by virtue of EMED assumes that a
“factual basis” is “a necessary precondition to the acceptance of
ano contest plea.” State v. Merino, 81 Hawai'i 198, 215, 915
P.2d 672, 689 (1996), But, as this court discussed in Merino, it
is not.

Noto contendere, or “no contest," is
defined as a "(tlype of plea which my be
Entered with leave of court to # criminal

Complaint or indictment by which the defendant
Goce not agait or deny the chares, though =

fine of sentence Ray be imposed pursuant to it

 

a5.
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‘The principal difference between a plea of
Guilty anda plea of nolo contendere is that the
[oeter may not be used against the defendant in

 

a'civit action Besed upon the same acts...
tstase vs -lGames, 19 Hawas's (32,1 33.n.3, 897 P.2d (959,
Seoac3 [iss8)1 (quoting Black"s Law Dictionary 1048 (6th
fed. 1990) (citatson omitted)) (some emphasis added and some
Seietea). ‘by contrast, a guilty plea is a “(floral
SGmissicn in court a te quilt of having committed [al

Ta ici ghich # defendant my make if he oF she

nuntarilyl.]” slaek’s Law

‘added «

  

Id, at 211, 915 P.24 at 685.

In Merino, the defendant Merino entered @ no contest
plea to conspiracy to commit first degree theft and then, after
his conviction, contended on appeal that the circuit court had
erred in accepting his plea because the factual basis for the
plea did not show that he had engaged in conspiracy to commit
first degree theft. Id, at 215, 915 P.2d at 689. We note that
Merino's argument was that the circuit court had erroneously
accepted his no contest plea because he had not in fact committed
the offense to which he had pled. Id. at 211, 915 P.2d at 685.
By contrast, De Guair argues that the offense to which he pled no
contest did not exist. As we discuss infra, the distinction
between the two arguments is without a difference with respect to
the applicability of the Merine analysis

In the present matter, as in Merino, De Guair
“tendered, and the circuit court accepted, a] no contest plea
pursuant to HRPP Rule 11” (1996).? Id, at 215, 915 P.2d at 689.

+ uREP Rule 21 provides in relevant pert:

(a) Alternatives.

‘A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or
defencent refuses to plead or if the court

‘Of guilty or nolo contendere or if a
enter

   

Tefuses to accept a pi
Extendant corporetion fails to appear, the court sha
piea of not guilty

 

 

[wp Noic contendere. A defendant may plead nolo contendere
caly wlth the consent ef che court. such a plea shall be accepted
Sp tne court only after due consideration of the views of the
(continued...)

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Pursuant to HRPP 11(f), which is key to Merino's appeal,
‘the court is prohibited from entering judgment
Upon a guilty plea if st is not subjectively
Setiefied that there is a factual basis for the
ples, The court must satisfy itself that the
Ronduct which the defendant admits constitutes
the offense charged in the indictment [,
Conplaint,] or information or an offense
{included therein to which the defendant has
Pleaded guilty. While the factual basis may
Cone from various sources, st mist appear on the
Fecord.

State ve Teves, 4 Haw. App, 966, $69, 670 P.24 834, 837

(i503) {ektations and internal quotation marks omitted)

 

 

 

+1. sconténued)
perties and the interest of the public in the effective
Rdninistestion of justice.

{cl Advice te Defendant. ‘The court shall not accept @ plea
of guilty or nelo contendere without first addressing the
Getendant persenally in open court and determining that he
Understands the following?

{2} the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered;

 

 

and

(2) the maximum penalty provided by law, and the maximum
sentence of extended term of imprisonment, which may be inposed
for the offense to which the plea is offered; and

(a) that he haa the right to plead not guilty, or to persist
in that plea if st has already been made and

(4) that if he pleads guilty or nolo contendere there will
not bes further trial of ny kind, so that by pleading guilty or
holo contendere he waives the right to a trialy and

(S) that if he ie not « citizen of the United States, a
conviction of the cffense for which he has been charged may have
the consequences of deportation, exclusion from admission to the
United States, or denis) of naturalization pursuant to the laws of
tthe Unsted state

(a) Insuring Thet the Plea Is Voluntary. The court shall
not accept a piea of guilty or nolo contendere without firet
Rddressing the defendant personally in open court and determining
thet the plea is veluntary and not the result of force or threats
Orof promises apart from plea agreement. The court shall a
Tnguire as to whether the defendant's willingness to plead guilty
Orinole contendere reaulte from any plea agreenent.

{e) Plea Agreement.

(2) In General, The prosecutor and counsel for the
defendant, of the defendant when acting pro se, may enter into
pies agrecnents that, upon the entering of a plea of guilty or
hele contendere to a charged offense or to an included or related
Defense, the prosecutor will take certain actions or adopt certain
petitions, including the dismissal of other charges and the
Feconmending oz not oppoting of specific sentences or dispositions
on the charge to which a plea was entered, The court may
participate in discussions leading to such ples agreements and may
agree to be bound thereby.

 

 

 

 

 

    

  

 

is] determining Accuracy of Plea. Notwithstanding the
acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court shall not enter ©
Jucgnent. upen such plea without making such inguiry as shall
neiety dt that there ia a factual basis for the plea.

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(emphases added) .

‘The sbsence of any reference to nolo contendere pleas
kn REP ILE) —- dn the face of the express Incorporation of
Guch pleas within the scope of HRPP lla), (bly (clr (3s
Gnd (ei == gives rise to the question whether the circuit
Court was under any obligation to ascertain « “factual
Saris fer Merino's no contest plea to criminal conspiracy.
Ritell settled canon of statutory construction, the history
Gnderlying the promilgation of HREP 11(£), and the appellate
Sige Law gf this jurisdiction all suggest’ a negative. anawer.

Of UTE this court had intended HRFP 11(£) to apply
to nolo Gontendere pleas, it ould not have expressly
Minded the section's subject matter to guilty pleas.

SUM inp 12(£) was patterned after Federal Rules of
ceiminal Procedure (FRCP) Rule 11(f), (State v. IMedeizos, @
Nowe App. (390) 43,791 Pe2d (730,] 493, (cent. denied, 72
Haw, 669, 633° P.22' 903 (1930),) which in turn substantially
USopeed the formulation recommended by the federal Advisory
Committee on Criminal Rules.

 

 

 

 

committee on Criminal Rule:

Of nolo contendere not be accepted without the

Court first satisfying iteelf that the defendant

Somuitted the exine charged. This overlooked

fhe fact that an innocent defendant may not wish

Eo'contest the charge and that the nolo plea is

a’means for him (or her] to do this.

Aecerdingly that proposal was not adopted and

Rule 11(#), requiring the court to determine the

Recuracy of a plea, applies to guilty pleas but

hot to ples of nolo contendere:
1 (c.] weight (Federal Practice and Procedure: —tedexal
fules of Criminal freceduse) $177, at 670-71 (footnotes
onitted) (emphasis added): ace also North Caroling va

ig. 400.8, 28, 35°36 ne 8s 91 S.Ct, 160, 166-67, 27
BESZ4 lez (leo) (othroughout’ ts history, | . . the plea
Ci nole contendere has been Viewed not as an expr
Sinission of guilt but ae a consent by the defendant that he
for she) may Be punished ae if he [or she) were
Galtty. (Face) 11 preserves this distinction in its
Zequitement that « court cannot accept a guilty plea ‘unless
HEM Satiaeied that there ie 4 factual basis for the pli
there is no similar requirenent for pleas of nolo
ESneenderes since it was thought desirable to permit
Sefendanes' te plead nolo without making any inguiry into
their actual guile.” (Citation omitted! )

By implication, the appellate cese law of Hawai'i has
recognized that, as is true of FRCP 11(f), HREP 11(f1 does

 

 

 

 

 

   

 

 

 

Sot Sequire the court to satisty itself that thers
nics only to ails ‘dnd thet, with respect to pleas

Ghali satisfy it that

for required to make “such

 

Merino, 81 Hawai‘, at 217-19, 915 P.2d at 691-93 (footnotes
omitted) (emphases added) .

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‘This court's holding in Merino therefore disposes of De
Guair’s argument on appeal. Inasmuch as there is no requirement
that the court elicit a factual basis for a no contest plea, it
matters not whether the facts laid out in De Guair’s change of
plea hearing failed to establish the offense of attempted
manslaughter by virtue of EMED. It is sufficient that the
offense of attenpted manslaughter exists in any form. No more
was required to convict De Guair of that offense pursuant to his
no contest plea. A defendant is convicted of “attempted
manslaughter,” not a varietal of attempted manslaughter, such as
“reckless” or “EMED.” Therefore, the circuit court’s conclusion
that De Guair entered a “valid plea” did not “exceed(] the bounds
of reason or disregard{] rules or principles of law or practice
to the substantial detriment of a party litigant.” Rauch, 94
Hawai'i 315, 322, 13 P.3d 324, 331 (citations omitted).

It is significant that De Guair received the “benefit
of his bargain” and avoided a possible sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole, which would have
resulted from a conviction of attempted first-degree murder, by
pleading no contest to the offense of attempted manslaughter.
See Merino, 81 Hawai'i at 219, 915 P.2d at 693 ("To allow . «
[d]efendants to plead no contest in exchange for the reduction
and dismissal of charges against them, and then to permit them to
attack the . . . convictions achieved by those pleas, where those
pleas were not conditioned upon the right to appeal, would
jeopardize the integrity of the plea bargaining process.”
(Quoting State v. Morin, 71 Haw. 159, 164, 785 P.2d 1316, 1319
(1990).) (Brackets in original.) (Some ellipsis points added and
some in original.)). Accordingly, we find that it “constitute(s]
the height of chutzpal,]” Merino, 61 Hawai"i at 212, 915 P.2d at
686, that De Guair now challenges the circuit court's sentence

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We therefore hold that the circuit court correctly
denied both De Guair's Rule 40 petition and his Rule 35 motion.

IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, we affirm the January

27, 2003 and the April 26, 2004 orders of the circuit court.

on the briefs:
Charlene Y. tboshi, ra io
‘Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,

for the plaintiff-appellee/
respondent/appellee
State of Hawai'i

wichae? Gat, ostendorp and blac Loin
Shawn A, “isle,

252 the defendant-appellant/

tok Elonerseppeliane

Relter Wayne be Guair

 

Dente rare are

Vm etiys b+

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