Case Title: THUNDER BASIN COAL COMPANY V. CAMPBELL COUNTY, WYOMING ASSESSOR

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-04-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
THUNDER BASIN COAL COMPANY V. CAMPBELL COUNTY, WYOMING ASSESSOR2006 WY 44132 P.3d 801Case Number: 05-117, 05-118, 05-119Decided: 04/12/2006
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
THUNDER 
BASIN COAL COMPANY,

 
 
Appellant

(Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 

CAMPBELL COUNTY, 
WYOMING 
ASSESSOR,

 
 
Appellee

(Respondent).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price, II, Judge (05-117)

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge (05-118 and 05-119)

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Lawrence J. Wolfe of Holland & Hart, 
LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Carol Seeger, Deputy Campbell County Attorney, Gillette, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      In these 
consolidated appeals, Thunder Basin Coal Company (ThunderBasin) contests the Campbell County Assessor's 
(CountyAssessor) ad valorem tax assessments for the tax years 
2001 and 2002 on its personal property at the Black Thunder and Coal Creek Mines 
in CampbellCounty.  ThunderBasin 
argues the CountyAssessor greatly overvalued 
the personal property, including machinery, equipment and buildings, located at 
each mine.  For both years, 
ThunderBasin argues the CountyAssessor improperly used the allocated 
purchase price it paid when it purchased the mines in 1998, rather than the 
original cost of the individual items of property, to calculate the total value 
using the cost method.  
ThunderBasin also contends the CountyAssessor failed to properly account for economic 
obsolescence and the Campbell County Board of Equalization (CountyBoard) failed to make appropriate findings 
of fact and conclusions of law.  We 
affirm the CountyBoard's decisions in Cases 
No. 05-117 and 05-119.  With regard 
to Case No. 05-118, we conclude the matter is not properly before this Court 
and, consequently, dismiss that case for lack of jurisdiction.    

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      In Case No. 
05-117, ThunderBasin presents the 
following issues for review:

 
 

A.                 
In 
determining the value of personal property and improvements to real property, 
the CountyAssessor is required by 
Department of Revenue rules to account for all three forms of depreciation: 
physical depreciation, functional obsolescence and economic obsolescence. 
CampbellCounty's Assessor 
completely ignored economic obsolescence in arriving at the value of the 
property of the Black Thunder Mine for tax year 2001.  The State Board's decision affirming the 
CountyBoard and Assessor is 
erroneous and must be reversed.

 
 

B.                 
Campbell 
County's 
Appraiser treated all property at both mines as new on June 1, 1998, the date 
Arch acquired TBCC from ARCO.  This 
ignored the physical depreciation of the property and is not in accordance with 
generally accepted appraisal techniques.  
The State Board decision failed to correct this appraisal defect, which 
constitutes appropriate grounds to reverse the State Board's 
ruling.

 
 

C.                
The 
State Board and CountyBoard decisions are fatally flawed as they 
do not contain sufficiently detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law to 
adequately explain their decision regarding economic 
obsolescence.

 
 
The 
CountyAssessor articulates the 
issue in Case No. 05-117 as follows:

 
 
Whether 
the decision of the Board affirming the 2001 assessed value of petitioner's 
personal property established by the Campbell County Assessor was (a) arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law; (b) 
contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity; (c) in excess of 
statutory jurisdiction or authority; (d) without observance of procedures 
required by law; or (e) unsupported by substantial 
evidence.

 

In Case 
No. 05-118, ThunderBasin poses the following issues on 
appeal:

 
 

A.                 
Is the 
Campbell County Board of Equalization's decision fatally flawed because it 
failed to set forth the rationale for its decision?

 
 

B.                 
Did the 
State Board of Equalization exceed its authority when it acted as an expert 
appraiser, thereby poisoning further review by the Campbell County Board of 
Equalization?

 
 

C.                
Are the 
Campbell County Board of Equalization's findings of fact regarding the life of 
the facility contrary to substantial evidence?

 
 

D.                
Is the 
Campbell County Assessor's determination of physical depreciation, which has the 
effect of treating the property as new in 1998, contrary to appraisal practice 
and the Department of Revenue's instructions?

 
 

E.                 
Whether 
the appraisal judgments of the Campbell County Board of Equalization and State 
Board of Equalization, particularly as to economic obsolescence, are wrong, 
contrary to substantial evidence and arbitrary and 
capricious?

 
 

F.                 
Whether 
the decisions of the Campbell County Board of Equalization and State Board of 
Equalization violate  Wyoming 
Constitution Article 15, § 11 because the fair market value of the property was 
not determined using a rational method, equally applied, that results in 
essential fairness?

 
 
In Case 
No. 05-119, ThunderBasin's issues are similar to those in 
Case No. 05-118:

 
 
A.        Is the 
Campbell County Board of Equalization's decision fatally flawed because it 
failed to set forth the rationale for its decision?

 
 
B.        Is the 
Campbell County Assessor's determination of physical depreciation, which has the 
effect of treating the property as new in 1998, contrary to appraisal practice 
and the Department of Revenue's instructions?

 

C.        Whether the 
appraisal judgments of the Campbell County Board of Equalization and State Board 
of Equalization, particularly as to economic obsolescence, are wrong, contrary 
to substantial evidence and arbitrary and capricious?

 
 
D. 
Whether the decisions of the Campbell County Board of Equalization and State 
Board of Equalization violate Wyoming Constitution Article 15, § 11 because the 
FMV of the property was not determined using a rational method, equally applied, 
that results in essential fairness?

 
 
The 
CountyAssessor does not provide a 
separate statement of the issues in either Case No. 05-118 or Case No. 
05-119.  

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      ThunderBasin, which is owned by Arch Coal, Inc. (Arch Coal), 
purchased the Black Thunder and Coal Creek Mines located in CampbellCounty in 1998.  ThunderBasin closed the Coal Creek Mine in 2000. 

 
 
Case No. 
05-117  Black Thunder and Coal Creek Mines  Tax Year 
2001

 
 
[¶4]      For the tax year 
2001, the CountyAssessor contracted with a 
private company, Thos. Y. Pickett & Company, Inc. (Pickett), to appraise the 
personal property located at the mines.  
Pickett had provided this service for CampbellCounty since the mid-1980s and performed 
approximately twenty complex mine appraisals each year.  Pickett requested ThunderBasin provide certain information, 
including an asset list and depreciation schedules for all buildings, machinery, 
and equipment, by February 15, 2001.  
ThunderBasin missed the deadline, but, sometime after 
February 26, 2001, ThunderBasin's property tax manager sent Pickett 
a fixed assets schedule.  The 
schedule contained "current book costs, taken from an appraisal by Price 
Waterhouse Coopers LLP at the time of acquisition [of the mines from ARCO] in 
June, 1998."  ThunderBasin 
did not provide any depreciation schedules until after the tax assessments were 
issued by the CountyAssessor.  

 
 
[¶5]      Pickett used the 
cost based approach to appraise the personal property at the mines based upon 
the information it had received from ThunderBasin.  Using Pickett's appraisal, the 
CountyAssessor valued the 
personal property for the Black Thunder mine at $231,558,310 and the personal 
property at the Coal Creek Mine at $23,861,300.  ThunderBasin 
disagreed with the CountyAssessor's valuations and employed an 
independent appraiser, Ernst & Young LLP (Ernst), to value the personal 
property at the two mines.  Ernst 
completed its appraisal on May 31, 2001, and concluded the personal property at 
the Black Thunder Mine was worth $168,788,000 and the property at the Coal Creek 
Mine was worth $12,459,000.  The 
disparity between ThunderBasin's and the CountyAssessor's valuations resulted primarily 
from differences in their respective calculations of physical depreciation and 
economic obsolescence.  

 
 
[¶6]      The 
CountyBoard held a hearing on June 20, 2001, and, 
subsequently issued findings of fact and conclusions of law upholding the 
CountyAssessor's 
determinations.  ThunderBasin 
appealed to the State Board of Equalization (SBOE), which affirmed the 
CountyBoard's decision.  ThunderBasin 
filed a petition for review of the SBOE's decision in the district court, which 
also affirmed the CountyBoard's rulings.  ThunderBasin then appealed to this Court.   

 
 
Case 
Nos. 05-118 & 05-119  Black Thunder and Coal Creek Mines -- Tax Year 2002 

 
 
[¶7]      In 2002, 
CampbellCounty again contracted with Pickett to appraise 
property at the mines within the county, including ThunderBasin's Black Thunder and Coal Creek 
Mines.  As in 2001, Pickett utilized 
information provided by ThunderBasin to prepare the appraisals, employing 
the cost approach.  Relying upon the 
Pickett appraisals, the CountyAssessor issued property tax valuations 
for the personal property at the mines.  
The Black Thunder Mine valuation was $253,547,380, and the Coal Creek 
Mine valuation was $17,946,290.    

 
 
[¶8]      ThunderBasin 
disagreed with the CountyAssessor's valuations, and again hired 
Ernst to conduct an individual or "fee" appraisal of the personal property at 
both mines.  Like Pickett, Ernst 
used the cost approach to appraise the property.  ThunderBasin's appraisals, however, resulted in valuations 
which were very different from the CountyAssessor's valuations.  For the Black Thunder Mine, Ernst valued 
the personal property at $153,502,788, which was over $100,000,000 less than the 
CountyAssessor's valuation.  Ernst valued the Coal Creek Mine 
personal property at nearly one-half of the CountyAssessor's appraisal, or $9,724,320.    

 
 
[¶9]      ThunderBasin 
appealed the Black Thunder Mine valuation and the CountyBoard held a hearing.  The CountyBoard 
upheld the CountyAssessor's valuation, and ThunderBasin 
appealed to the SBOE which issued a comprehensive decision agreeing with many of 
the CountyBoard's findings.  Nevertheless, the SBOE ultimately 
concluded the CountyAssessor failed to properly calculate economic 
obsolescence of the personal property at the Black Thunder Mine and, therefore, 
the CountyBoard's decision affirming the CountyAssessor's valuation for that mine did not 
comply with the law.  Consequently, 
the SBOE ordered:  "The decision of 
the CountyBoard affirming the Assessor's valuation of 
[ThunderBasin's] property shall be 
and the same is, hereby remanded." 
(emphasis in original).  Even though 
ThunderBasin ostensibly prevailed 
before the SBOE, it filed a petition for review with the district court.  The district court affirmed the SBOE's 
decision, "including its remand to the CountyBoard."  Still not content, ThunderBasin appealed to this Court.  

 
 
[¶10]   ThunderBasin also appealed the Coal Creek Mine 
2002 assessment.  As stated above, 
ThunderBasin closed the Coal Creek 
Mine in 2000.  By 2002, much of the 
machinery and equipment had been removed from the mine, and the buildings were 
unoccupied.  As in 2001, the 
difference between the CountyAssessor's and ThunderBasin's valuations of the personal 
property at the Coal Creek Mine rested largely upon the appraisers' divergent 
calculations of physical depreciation and economic obsolescence.  Consequently, ThunderBasin 
focused on those issues at the hearing before the CountyBoard.  The CountyBoard 
concluded the CountyAssessor's valuations complied with law 
and, consequently, affirmed the valuations.  ThunderBasin appealed to the SBOE, which also 
affirmed.  ThunderBasin 
filed a petition for review with the district court, and that court affirmed the 
CountyBoard's decision, leading 
to an appeal to this Court.  

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶11]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2005) sets 
forth the scope of appellate review for agency decisions:

 
 
(c) 
To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing 
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review 
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be 
taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court 
shall:

(i) 
Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and

(ii) 
Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A) 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law;

(B) 
Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;

(C) 
In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking 
statutory right;

(D) 
Without observance of procedure required by law; or

(E) 
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute.

 

[¶12]   When an appealing party contests an 
agency's findings of fact, we examine the entire record to determine if the 
agency's findings are supported by substantial evidence.  RT Communications, Inc. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 11 P.3d 915, 920 (Wyo. 2000), Laramie County Bd. of 
Equalization v. Wyo. State Bd. of Equalization, 915 P.2d 1184, 1189 (Wyo. 1996).  If the agency's findings of fact are 
supported by substantial evidence, we will not substitute our judgment for that 
of the agency and will uphold the factual findings on appeal.  RT Communications, 11 P.3d  at 921.  "Substantial evidence is more than a 
scintilla of evidence; it is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept in 
support of the conclusions of the agency."  
Id.   
"When an agency decides that the party charged with the burden of 
proof has failed to meet that burden, the case is reviewed under the arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law' 
language of WYO. STAT.  § 16-3-114(c)(ii) (1990)."  Newman v. State ex rel. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶ 12, 49 P.3d 163, 168 (Wyo. 2002) (citations 
omitted).  See also, Veile v. Bryant, 2004 WY 107, ¶ 9, 97 P.3d 787, 792 (Wyo. 2004).  

 
 
[¶13]   With regard to appeals of property 
tax matters, we have stated:  

 
 
     The Department's 
valuations for state-assessed property are presumed valid, accurate, and 
correct.  This presumption can only 
be overcome by credible evidence to the contrary.  In the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, we presume that the officials charged with establishing value 
exercised honest judgment in accordance with the applicable rules, regulations, 
and other directives that have passed public scrutiny, either through 
legislative enactment or agency rule-making, or both.

 
 
     The petitioner has the 
initial burden to present sufficient credible evidence to overcome the 
presumption, and a mere difference of opinion as to value is not 
sufficient.  If the petitioner 
successfully overcomes the presumption, then the Board is required to equally 
weigh the evidence of all parties and measure it against the appropriate burden 
of proof.  Once the presumption is 
successfully overcome, the burden of going forward shifts to the DOR to defend 
its valuation.  The petitioner, 
however, by challenging the valuation, bears the ultimate burden of persuasion 
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the valuation was not derived 
in accordance with the required constitutional and statutory requirements for 
valuing state-assessed property. . . .

 
 
* * * 
*

 
 

Colorado 
Interstate Gas Company v. Wyoming Department of Revenue, 2001 
WY 34, ¶¶ 9-11, 20 P.3d 528, ¶¶ 9-11 (Wyo. 2001) (citations 
omitted).

 
 

Airtouch 
Communications, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 2003 
WY 114, ¶ 12, 76 P.3d 342, 348 (Wyo. 2003).1  

 
 
[¶14]   The CountyAssessor's choice of appraisal methods is 
reviewed under the substantial evidence standard.  It is not the duty of the reviewing 
court

 

"to 
determine which of various appraisal methods is best or most accurately 
estimates FMV [fair market value]; rather, it is to determine whether 
substantial evidence exists to support usage of the [particular] method of 
appraisal, and, if so, whether substantial evidence exists to support the manner 
in which it was used."  Holly 
Sugar Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 839 P.2d 959, 963 ( 
Wyo. 
1992).

 
 

RT 
Communications, Inc. 11 P.3d  
at 921, quoting Gray v. Wyo. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 896 P.2d 1347, 
1350-51 (Wyo. 
1995).   

 
 
The 
proper application of appraisal methods to the facts is an issue of ultimate 
fact requiring de novo review.  An 
ultimate fact is a mixture of fact and legal precept.  

 
 
"When an 
agency's determinations contain elements of law and fact, we do not treat them 
with the deference we reserve for findings of basic fact.  When reviewing an "ultimate fact," we 
separate the factual and legal aspects of the finding to determine whether the 
correct rule of law has been properly applied to the facts.  We do not defer to the agency's ultimate 
factual finding if there is an error in either stating or applying the 
law."

 
 

Pacificorp, 
Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 2001 
WY 84, ¶ 6, 31 P.3d 64, 65-66 (Wyo. 2001) (citations omitted).  

 
 
[¶15]   We review an agency's conclusions 
of law de novo.  Wyo. Dep't of Revenue v. Guthrie, 2005 WY 
79, ¶ 13, 115 P.3d 1086, 1091 (Wyo. 2005).  
If a conclusion of law is in accord with the law, it is affirmed.  Airtouch Communications,  2003 WY 114, ¶ 10, 76 P.3d  at 347.  "However, when an agency has failed to 
properly invoke and apply the correct rule of law, we correct the agency's 
error."  Id.  
 

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Case No. 
05-117  Black Thunder and Coal Creek Mines  Tax Year 
2001

 
 
[¶16]   With regard to the 2001 personal 
property tax assessment for the two mines, ThunderBasin raises three issues on appeal.  It alleges the CountyAssessor erred in his calculation of 
physical depreciation of both mines by using the 1998 allocated purchase price 
as the starting point and failed to properly account for economic obsolescence 
for the Black Thunder Mine.  
ThunderBasin also claims the CountyBoard's findings of fact and conclusions 
of law failed to adequately explain its decision. 

 

1998 
Values

 
 
[¶17]   We will begin with the issue of the 
1998 values which pertains to both mines.  
ThunderBasin purchased the mines 
from ARCO in 1998.  Throughout its 
arguments, ThunderBasin contests the CountyAssessor's use of the values the company 
allocated to the personal property when it purchased the property in 1998.  ThunderBasin claims use of the 1998 values is not 
the correct way to apply the cost approach.  It also claims the values do not 
accurately reflect the fair market value of the property because the allocation 
of the purchase price paid by ThunderBasin was for income tax purposes and not 
to establish fair market value for purposes of property tax. 

 
 
[¶18]   Pursuant to the Wyoming Constitution, 
Art. 15, § 11, property must be uniformly assessed.  To accomplish that directive an assessor 
must adopt "a rational method [of appraisal], equally applied to all property, 
which results in essential fairness.'"  
Holly Sugar Corp. v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 839 P.2d 959, 964 (Wyo. 
1992), quoting Teton Valley Ranch v. 
State Bd. of Equalization, 735 P.2d 107, 115 (Wyo. 1987) (Urbigkit, J. 
concurring).  To that end, all 
property must be valued at its fair market value for property tax purposes.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-13-103(b)(ii) 
(LexisNexis 2005).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 39-11-101(a)(vi) (LexisNexis 2005) defines fair market value 
as:

 
 
(vi) 
"Fair market value" means the amount in cash, or terms reasonably equivalent to 
cash, a well informed buyer is justified in paying for a property and a well 
informed seller is justified in accepting, assuming neither party to the 
transaction is acting under undue compulsion, and assuming the property has been 
offered in the open market for a reasonable time . . . .

 
 
[¶19]   The rules and regulations of the 
Department of Revenue (DOR) provide three methods of appraisal to determine fair 
market value: cost, sales comparison, and income or capitalized earnings.  DOR Rules, Ch. 9, § 6.  In the circumstances present in this 
case, the CountyAssessor and ThunderBasin agreed the cost approach method of 
appraisal was the appropriate one to use.  
As the regulations provide, "The cost approach is a method of estimating 
value by summing the land value, where applicable, with the depreciated value of 
improvements . . . .   The cost 
approach relies on the principle of substitution in which an informed buyer will 
not pay more for a property than its comparable replacement."  DOR Rules, Ch. 9, § 
6(b).  To apply this method, costs 
are estimated on the basis of typical reproduction or replacement costs which 
are then trended (to account for inflation) from the date of acquisition to the 
tax lien date using an appropriate construction cost index.  That trended cost is then depreciated, 
beginning on the first assessment date after the property is acquired, to 
reflect the actual value of the item at the time the tax is imposed.  Depreciation continues on an annual 
basis until the residual value is reached.  
The regulations establish the lowest allowed residual value to be 25% 
unless the appraiser has sufficient market information to indicate a lower 
residual value would be appropriate.  
DOR Rules, Ch. 9, § 
6(b)(iv). 

 
 
[¶20]   The regulatory definition of the 
"trended original cost method" refers to trending the "acquisition or original 
costs."  DOR 
Rules, Ch. 9, § 6(b)(v)(H).  In the Personal Property Valuation Manual (Ad 
Valorem Tax Div. 2002), the DOR provides guidelines to counties for purposes of 
application of the cost approach to appraisal.  That manual addresses valuation of used 
personal property in particular and it states:

 
 
            
Valuing used personal property requires that the Assessor make a decision 
about the remaining economic life of the equipment.  The purchase of 
used equipment that has not reached the end of its economic life would be valued 
normally.  In 
other-words you 
would use the purchase price (if accurate) and then trend the property and 
depreciate it.  
If the equipment has reached its residual value, the acquisition cost 
should be treated as an RCNLD value and frozen at that value, RCN trending and 
depreciation would not be applied.  Residual value is referred to in Chapter 9 of 
the DOR rules, February 11, 1999.  

 
 
Personal Property Valuation Manual, § 1, p. 36. (emphasis 
added).  

 
 
[¶21]   Nothing in the statutes, regulations or 
guidelines prohibits the use of the acquisition cost of used personal property 
as the starting place for the cost method of appraisal and, in fact, the 
guidelines seem to direct it.  However, ThunderBasin 
argues that doing so essentially resets the economic life of the used property 
and treats it as "new" when that is not the case.  This "resetting" arguably occurred when the 
CountyAssessor applied a 
standard useful life for like property, assuming the property was new when it 
was acquired by ThunderBasin in 1998.  For example, 
ThunderBasin argues when 
valuing a 1991 used dozer acquired in 1998, the CountyAssessor applied a full useful life of a 
new dozer to the used dozer.  The CountyAssessor, on the other hand, contends the purchase 
price, as allocated by ThunderBasin, is the best 
evidence of the fair market value of the property.  In addition, the 
CountyAssessor argues 
those values were provided by ThunderBasin as its "booked values" and, therefore, if any 
error was made it was ThunderBasin's fault.

 
 
[¶22]   The standard life of personal property 
affects the depreciation calculation in two ways.  It drives both the amount of annual 
depreciation (100% divided by the number of years in effective life of the 
property) and the total allowed depreciation which is governed by length of time 
necessary to reach residual value.  Personal Property Valuation Manual, § 
6-3.  
ThunderBasin and the 
CountyAssessor used the same annual depreciation 
factor (5% for equipment and 4% for improvements).  However, 
ThunderBasin complains 
that the CountyAssessor's appraisal 
started the effective life of the property in 1998 which resulted in only three 
years of depreciation compared to many more years when the original date of 
acquisition (or construction, in the case of improvements) is used.  The result of the 
CountyAssessor's approach was, in some cases, to 
presume the useful life of the property extended beyond the life of the 
mine.  The 
CountyAssessor claims the assumption that 
personal property has no value beyond the life of the operation is 
unfounded.  In 
addition, ThunderBasin's approach 
allows so much depreciation that the residual value of most of the property was 
well below the 25% limit established by the regulations.

 
 
[¶23]   As we said, the goal of the appraisal 
is to estimate fair market value.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 39-11-101(a)(vi).  The County Assessor's expert opined that the 
many years of depreciation allowed by Thunder Basin's appraisal was unwarranted 
because the 1998 purchase price was a much better indicator of what a willing 
buyer would pay a willing seller for the property in an arms length 
transaction.  
The CountyAssessor argued, 
therefore, the depreciation of the property was taken into account by the buyer 
and seller in negotiating the 1998 transaction.  The CountyBoard concluded the CountyAssessor's method was in accordance with 
the law and was a "rational method of appraisal, equally applied to all 
property." 

 
 
[¶24]   After a thorough review, we conclude 
the record supported the CountyBoard's conclusion.  ThunderBasin provided no citation to any 
guideline, rule or statute requiring the use of the original acquisition date 
and price when applying the cost method of appraisal.  In fact, both the 
guidelines and the rules suggest, directly and indirectly, the actual 
acquisition price and date are a proper starting point for applying the cost 
method to used property.  See also, Jim Paws, Inc. v. Equalization Bd. of Garland County, 
Arkansas, 710 S.W.2d 197 (Ark. 1986) (stating the actual sales price of used 
personal property in an arms length transaction is generally a more accurate 
means to estimate fair market value than calculating the replacement cost by 
subtracting depreciation from the trended new cost).  Also, the 
CountyAssessor's expert testified the older the 
asset, the less accurate the cost method is, and his approach more closely 
approximated actual fair market value.  See also, The Appraisal of Real Estate, pp.358-59 (Appraisal 
Institute, 12th ed. 1992).

 
 
[¶25]   ThunderBasin 
pointed out the 1998 allocated purchase price provided to the county was 
prepared for federal income tax purposes and was not intended to accurately 
represent the fair market value of the individual items of property.  However, 
ThunderBasin forgets it 
provided the 1998 values to the CountyAssessor in response to the CountyAssessor's requests for current book value 
information.  
The CountyAssessor was 
entitled to rely upon the information submitted by ThunderBasin as accurate and reliable.  As we have 
repeatedly stated in the past, the taxpayer bears the burden of providing 
accurate information to the assessor for preparation of a valuation of its 
properties.  See e.g., Guthrie, 2005 WY 79, ¶ 14, 115 P.3d  
at 1092; Airtouch 
Communications, 2003 WY 114, ¶ 39, 76 P.3d  at 357; RT Communications, 
11 P.3d  at 927.  
The taxpayer should not, therefore, be heard to complain when the 
assessor relies upon the information supplied to him for the particular purpose 
of establishing value.  Id.

 
 
 [¶26]  The regulations require depreciation to end 
when a residual value of 25% is reached, "unless the property tax appraiser has 
collected sufficient market information to indicate a different residual 
value."  DOR 
Rules, Ch. 9, § 
6(b)(iv)(D).  
In an effort to support his use of residual values of less than 25%, 
ThunderBasin's expert 
obtained information from ThunderBasin, 
including an appraisal completed by Wyoming Machinery, which estimated values 
for some of the used equipment.  The CountyBoard concluded that information was insufficient to 
justify a departure from the 25% residual value and to do so would be 
inconsistent with the residual values used for all mines in CampbellCounty.  ThunderBasin simply failed to carry its burden to overcome 
the presumption that the CountyAssessor's reliance on the 25% residual 
value limit was proper.  Airtouch Communications, 2003 WY 114, ¶ 12, 76 P.3d  at 
348.  The 
CountyBoard's decision 
was well justified and we cannot conclude it acted in an arbitrary or capricious 
manner in concluding ThunderBasin failed to carry 
its burden.

 
 
[¶27]   With regard to the calculation of 
physical depreciation, we can find no error in the manner in which the cost 
method of appraisal was applied by the CountyAssessor.  Instead, it is clear the differences in value 
between the County Assessor's and Thunder Basin's appraisals resulted from 
differences of expert opinion about the proper date for starting depreciation 
for used property and whether sufficient information existed to justify varying 
from the 25% limit on residual value.  These are precisely the types of differences 
of expert opinion that are to be resolved by the CountyBoard.  Airtouch Communication, 2003 WY 114, ¶ 25, 76 P.3d  
at 352; Holly Sugar, 
839 P.2d  at 963.  
"The choice of the appraiser regarding which indicator of value is most 
appropriate and the final value itself are matters of appraisal judgment with 
which this Court will not interfere if they are supported by substantial 
evidence."  
Id.  The record 
adequately supports the CountyBoard's decision to accept the CountyAssessor's opinion and we find no legal 
error in his application of the cost method.

 
 
            
Economic 
Obsolescence

 
 
[¶28]   ThunderBasin contends the CountyAssessor failed to account for economic 
obsolescence in arriving at the value of the Black Thunder Mine.  Although not stated 
as a separate issue for review, ThunderBasin's brief also discusses alleged 
errors in the manner in which economic obsolescence was calculated for the Coal 
Creek Mine.  
Because it was addressed in the body of the brief, we will also address 
economic obsolescence for Coal Creek.

 
 
[¶29]   The rules provide depreciation must be 
applied in the cost method of appraisal beginning at the first assessment date 
after the property is acquired.  Such depreciation may take the form of 
physical depreciation, functional obsolescence or economic obsolescence. DOR 
Rules, Ch. 9, § 6(b)(v)(D).  Economic obsolescence is defined as 
"impairment of desirability or useful life arising from factors external to the 
property, such as economic forces or environmental changes which affect 
supply-demand relationships in the market."  DOR Rules, Ch. 9, § 6(b)(v)(D)(III)   See also, Holly Sugar, 839 P.2d  at 961.  
Three methods of measuring economic obsolescence are set out, but they 
are not exclusive and the DOR regulations do not require the use of those 
methods.  DOR 
Rules, Ch. 9, § 6(b)(v)(D)(III).  Moreover, the regulations do not provide that 
all forms of depreciation must be found in all instances.  Id.  

 
 
[¶30]   The CountyAssessor concedes he did not perform any 
calculations to test for the existence of economic obsolescence for the Black 
Thunder Mine in 2001.  
Instead, he contends the 1998 allocated purchase price reflected, on that 
date, any economic obsolescence that may have existed since the purchase price 
resulted from an arms length transaction and that transaction was relatively 
recent.  In 
reference to reliance upon the 1998 values, the CountyAssessor's expert testified, ". . . this 
sale, being a fair market sale, all functional and economic obsolescence is 
negated because a market approach took over." In addition, when questioned about 
economic obsolescence, the CountyAssessor's expert testified the 
"information was not there."  It is not completely clear from the record 
whether he meant there was no indication of economic obsolescence or the 
information necessary to calculate it was not provided by ThunderBasin.2  ThunderBasin cites to no statute or regulation 
that would require a certain method to "test" for economic obsolescence.  Given the 
CountyBoard's conclusion that the 1998 allocated 
value was a reliable indicator of fair market value at that time, it is not 
unreasonable that those values would also be relied upon for purposes of 
economic obsolescence.  Obviously, that approach becomes less viable 
as more time elapses between the sale and the assessment date.   In fact, in 
the 2002 assessment process, the CountyAssessor no longer took that approach, but 
instead performed an analysis of income shortfall to determine whether economic 
obsolescence existed.  
The CountyBoard concluded 
ThunderBasin did not meet 
its burden of showing the CountyAssessor's appraisal was flawed or did not 
comply with generally accepted appraisal practices.  We cannot say the 
CountyAssessor's approach in 2001 was arbitrary 
or contrary to law.  
As we noted above, reliance upon the 1998 values as accurately reflecting 
the fair market value of the property at that time was supported by substantial 
evidence.

 
 
[¶31]   We turn now to the issue of the 
economic obsolescence calculation for the Coal Creek Mine.  Although not stated 
as a separate issue for review, ThunderBasin argues, in one page of its brief, the CountyAssessor's calculation of economic 
obsolescence for the Coal Creek Mine improperly included the value of the 
reserves and working capital, neither of which are subject to personal property 
tax.  However, 
ThunderBasin fails to provide any citation to the 
record where such error occurred.  ThunderBasin's evidence in the record on this issue consists 
only of a conclusory, four sentence statement by its expert that because the 
CountyAssessor's appraisal did not deduct income 
attributable to the reserves and working capital from the total income when 
conducting its income shortfall calculations, it somehow indirectly taxed those 
items.  Without 
further explanation, he simply stated "essentially that's what happened there . 
. . ."  On this 
record, ThunderBasin clearly did 
not meet its burden of establishing the economic obsolescence portion of the 
CountyAssessor's valuation was incorrect.  Moreover, as can be 
seen in the SBOE's discussion concerning the 2002 assessment, removal of those 
items from the total income when calculating income shortfall, as advocated by 
ThunderBasin's appraiser, may not have been the 
proper approach.  
See, The Appraisal of Real 
Estate, supra, 
358-59.  
Instead, the percentage shortfall in total income is simply applied only 
to the personal property at the end of the calculation.  ThunderBasin failed to carry its burden 
with regard to overcoming the presumption of correctness enjoyed by the 
CountyAssessor's valuation in this regard.  Airtouch 
Communications, 2003 WY 
114, ¶ 12, 76 P.3d  at 348; Colorado Interstate Gas Company, 2001 WY 34, ¶¶ 9-11, 20 P.3d  at 531.

 
 
            
Adequacy of CountyBoard's Findings and 
Conclusions

 
 
[¶32]   ThunderBasin contends the CountyBoard's decision was inadequate and did 
not comply with the law because its findings of fact and conclusions of law did 
not specifically address the issue of economic obsolescence.  In particular, 
ThunderBasin points out 
that the SBOE's order relied on different record citations than the 
CountyAssessor's brief 
does to support the reasoning of the CountyBoard 
on this issue.  
Thus, contends ThunderBasin, the reasoning of the CountyBoard cannot be identified on review and 
its decision must be remanded for adequate findings.  

 
 
[¶33]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-110 (LexisNexis 
2005) sets forth the statutory requirements for an agency's final decision:

 
 
A final decision or order adverse to a party in a contested 
case shall be in writing or dictated into the record.  The final decision 
shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law separately stated.  Findings of fact if 
set forth in statutory language, shall be accompanied by a concise and explicit 
statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings.   

 
 
Although there is no bright line rule for determining the 
adequacy of an agency's findings of fact, we have described the attributes of 
sufficient findings of fact as follows:

 
 
In discharging its duty under [Wyo. Stat. Ann.] § 16-3-110, 
the agency must "make findings of basic facts upon all of the material issues in 
the proceeding and upon which its ultimate findings of fact or conclusions are 
based."   
Pan American 
Petroleum Corporation v. Wyoming Oil and Gas 
Conservation Commission, 446 P.2d 550, 555 (Wyo.1968).  This Court needs to know "why" an agency 
decided the way it did.  When an agency does not make adequate 
findings of basic fact, we do not have a rational basis upon which to review its 
ultimate findings and conclusions.

 
 

Davis v. City of Cheyenne, 2004 WY 
43, ¶ 12, 88 P.3d 481, 486-87 (Wyo. 
2004), quoting State 
ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. Legarda, 2003 WY 130, ¶ 13, 77 P.3d 708, 713 (Wyo. 
2003).  
"Similarly, we have held that a contested case hearing must provide, and 
the record of that proceeding must document, information sufficient to the 
making of a reasonable decision."  Jackson v. State ex. rel. 
Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 
786 P.2d 874, 878 
(Wyo. 1990).  Absent such information, the agency decision 
must be set aside as arbitrary.  Id.   Incomplete or 
insufficient findings of fact fall under the umbrella of arbitrary and capricious 
actions.  Decker v. State ex rel, 
Wyo. Med. Comm'n, 2005 WY 
160, ¶ 25, 124 P.3d 686, 694 (Wyo. 
2005); Padilla v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety and 
Comp. Div., 2004 WY 
10, ¶ 6, 84 P.3d 960, 962 (Wyo. 
2004).

 
 

[¶34]   While the CountyBoard's findings in this case are 
sparse and somewhat conclusory, we cannot conclude the CountyBoard's decision was arbitrary or 
capricious under the circumstances presented here.  The County Board's decision states Thunder Basin had the 
burden to overcome the presumption the County Assessor's value was correct and 
it failed to do so, a mere difference of opinion between appraisers was not 
sufficient to establish a valuation error, and the County Assessor's appraisal 
was consistent with the regulations and applicable law and relied on the best 
information available.  True, it would have been helpful had the 
CountyBoard specifically 
addressed ThunderBasin's argument 
concerning economic obsolescence.  However, no doubt exists concerning the 
reasoning of the CountyAssessor's expert 
that the recent purchase obviated the need to do an economic obsolescence 
calculation.  
The CountyBoard made a 
specific finding that the CountyAssessor's valuation was proper in all 
respects.  
Thus, it is clear from the record what the basis of the CountyBoard's determination was on that issue. 

 
 
[¶35]   This situation is different from other 
cases where we have held an agency's decision to be arbitrary and capricious for 
failing to make sufficient findings of fact on evidentiary issues that are 
disputed.  See, e.g., Decker, 2005 WY 160, ¶ 27, 124 P.3d  at 694.  
We have said when there is disputed evidence on an issue, the hearing examiner must

 
 
make findings of basic facts upon all of the material 
issues in the proceeding and upon which its ultimate findings of fact or 
conclusions are based. Unless that is done there is no rational basis for 
judicial review.

 

* * * *

 

All of the material evidence offered by the parties must be 
carefully weighed by the agency as the trier of the facts; conflicts in the 
evidence must be resolved, and the underlying or basic facts which prompt the 
ultimate conclusion on issues of fact drawn by the agency in sustaining the 
prima facie case made, or in rejecting it for the reason it has been 
satisfactorily met or rebutted by countervailing evidence, must be sufficiently 
set forth in the decision rendered.

 
 

Bush v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Comp. 
Div., 2005 WY 120, ¶ 9, 120 P.3d 176, 180 (Wyo. 
2005) (quoting Pan 
Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Comm'n, 446 P.2d 550, 555, 557 
(Wyo. 1968)).  

 
 

Id.  
In the instant case, the CountyAssessor's expert testified the 1998 
values represented fair market value and were, in the absence of some other 
indication of negative market influences, sufficiently current such that further 
economic obsolescence calculations, such as the income shortfall method, were 
unnecessary.  
ThunderBasin's position was 
simply that when such calculations are completed, some shortfall in income is 
seen and thus, some economic obsolescence has occurred.  However, 
ThunderBasin's expert did 
not directly contest the CountyAssessor's position that reliance on 
reasonably current, arms length sales values was an appropriate basis upon which 
to conclude no further economic obsolescence calculations were necessary.3  Because the evidence upon which the 
CountyAssessor relied in 
concluding an economic obsolescence deduction was not appropriate was not 
contested, we hold the CountyBoard's order was 
adequate to conduct our review.  It would do little good to remand this matter 
in order for the CountyBoard to state the 
obvious, e.g. it found the 1998 allocated value, derived from an arms length 
transaction and provided by the taxpayer, fairly included economic obsolescence 
in 2001.  

 
 
Case No. 05-118  Black Thunder MineTax Year 2002 

 
 
[¶36]   ThunderBasin presents several issues in its appeal from the 
CountyBoard's order 
affirming the CountyAssessor's valuation 
of the personal property at the Black Thunder Mine for the 2002 tax year.  We must, however, 
question whether ThunderBasin had the right 
to appeal the SBOE's decision in the first instance and, thus, whether we have 
jurisdiction to consider this appeal.  Issues of subject matter jurisdiction may be 
raised sua sponte 
at any time.  
Scherer v. 
Schuler Custom Homes Const., Inc., 2004 WY 109, ¶ 10, 98 P.3d 159, 162 (Wyo. 
2004).    

 
 
[¶37]   "The right to judicial review of 
administrative decisions is entirely statutory, and agency actions are not 
reviewable absent statutory authority."  Brandt v. TCI Cablevision of Wyoming, 873 P.2d 595, 597 
(Wyo. 1994), quoting Casper Iron & 
Metal, Inc. v. Unemp. Ins. Comm'n, 845 P.2d 387, 391 
(Wyo.1993).  See also, Antelope Valley 
Improvement and Serv. Dist. of Gillette v. State Bd. of Equalization for the 
State of Wyoming, 4 P.3d 876 (Wyo. 2000).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 39-11-102.1 and 39-11-109 
(LexisNexis 2005) set forth the statutory requirements for appeals of tax 
determinations.  

 
 
[¶38]   A person who is adversely affected by 
the CountyBoard's decision may 
appeal to the SBOE.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 39-11-102.1(c) and 
39-11-109.  The 
SBOE hears appeals in its adjudicatory capacity.  Antelope Valley, 4 P.3d  at 
878.  "When the 
[state board] acts in its adjudicatory capacity, the [b]oard resembles a lower 
tribunal,' not an administrative agency."  Id.  After the SBOE 
issues its appellate decision, an "aggrieved person" may then appeal to the 
district court.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-13-109; W.R.A.P. 12.01 et seq. 4

 
 
[¶39]   The concern we have in this case is the 
effect of the SBOE's remand to the CountyBoard 
for further proceedings.  Because the SBOE concluded the County Board's 
decision did not comply with law and remanded the matter for further 
proceedings, Thunder Basin was the prevailing party and was not, therefore, 
"aggrieved" under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-13-102 and Rule 12 of the Wyoming Rules 
of Appellate Procedure.  Moreover, the SBOE's remand order did not 
finally conclude the matter.  As we stated many years ago in Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. 
LowerValley Power and 
Light, Inc., 608 P.2d 660, 661 (Wyo. 1980):

 
 
Generally a judgment or order which determines the merits 
of the controversy and leaves nothing for future consideration is final and 
appealable, and it is not appealable unless it does those things.  4 C.J.S. Appeal and 
Error § 94, p. 252.  
We conclude that the order of the district court was not designed finally 
to dispose of the matter but only to obtain additional information which should 
be considered by the commission in the first instance.  No substantial 
rights of the commission were adversely affected by that order.

 
 
The order remanding the matter to the CountyBoard for further proceedings did 
not finally determine the merits of the controversy and, consequently, did not 
affect ThunderBasin's substantive 
rights.5  

 
 
[¶40]   Moreover, we held in Bd. of Trustees of 
Mem'l Hosp. of Sheridan County v. Martin, 2003 WY 1, ¶ 16, 60 P.3d 1273, 1277 (Wyo. 
2003), that "a judgment of the district court remanding an administrative 
proceeding to the agency for further proceedings is not an appealable order 
under W.R.A.P. 1.05."  
Thus, even if ThunderBasin's appeal from the SBOE to the district court was 
authorized, the district court's order remanding the matter to the CountyBoard was, itself, not appealable.  We, therefore, 
dismiss ThunderBasin's appeal in 
Case No. 05-118 for a lack of jurisdiction.  In accordance with the SBOE's order, the 
matter remains remanded to the CountyBoard 
for further proceedings.  

 
 
Case No. 05-119  Coal Creek MineTax Year 2002

 
 
[¶41]   ThunderBasin objected to the CountyAssessor's assessment of the Coal 
Creek Mine for the year 2002 raising similar issues as it did in 2001, e.g. the 
1998 dates and values were improperly relied upon for physical depreciation 
calculations, the CountyAssessor improperly 
calculated economic obsolescence, and the findings were inadequate.  The CountyAssessor used the same procedures for his 
2002 assessment as he did in 2001 and consequently, our analysis above of those 
similar issues remains applicable in 2002.

 
 
            
New 
Issues

 
 
                        
Physical 
Depreciation - 1998 Values

 
 
[¶42]   With regard to use of the allocated 
1998 sales values, ThunderBasin raised two new 
arguments in 2002.  
First, it points to statements made in the Price Waterhouse appraisal 
upon which the values were based as indicating they were not to be used for this 
type of purpose.  
The appraisal stated:

 
 
The premise of Fair Market Value is applicable only for 
this engagement, and accordingly, our results should not be used for any other 
purpose.  
Further, the value reported does not represent the amount that might be 
realized from the sale of the individual assets on the open market or from their 
use for an alternate purpose.

 
 
However, it also stated:

 
 
We define Fair Market Value as the price at which property 
would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being 
under any compulsion to buy or to sell, and both having reasonable knowledge of 
the relevant facts, (Estate Tax Regs., Sec. 20.2031-(9b); Rev. Rul. 59-60, 
1959-1, C.B. 273).  
In estimating the Fair Market Value in Continued Use, we assumed that the 
subject property would continue to be part of the respective ongoing businesses, 
unless otherwise specified. 

 
 
[¶43]   On the basis of this language, Thunder 
Basin claims the Price Waterhouse appraisal, on its face, was not intended to 
establish fair market value of the property for personal property tax purposes 
and its reliance on continued use and not value in exchange was inconsistent 
with the applicable tax statutes.  We find two problems with ThunderBasin's position.  First, the 1998 
values from the Price Waterhouse appraisal were provided to the CountyAssessor by ThunderBasin for the very purpose of 
establishing the company's book values to be utilized by the CountyAssessor in determining personal property 
tax valuations.  
It was not unreasonable for both the CountyAssessor and the CountyBoard 
to rely upon that information as reliable and a disclaimer by the accounting 
firm, the obvious purpose of which was to limit its own liability, should not 
prevent them from doing just that.  Second, despite ThunderBasin's attempts to inject confusion into 
the issue by reference to the concepts of continued use and use in exchange, the 
definition of fair market value used by Price Waterhouse bears a very close 
resemblance to that contained in both the statute and DOR rules.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-11-101(a)(iv); 
DOR Rules, Ch. 9 
§4(f).  
Further, the SBOE cites to authorities which suggest when a property is 
utilized at its highest and best use, its value in use and its value in exchange 
are the same.  
Property 
Assessment Valuation 16 (International Association of Assessing Officers, 2d 
ed. (1996)).  
We see nothing in the Price Waterhouse appraisal which would have 
prevented the CountyBoard from relying upon the information submitted to 
it by ThunderBasin as the book 
value of the property at issue.  See also, Guthrie, 2005 WY 
79, ¶ 14, 115 P.3d  at 1092; Airtouch Communications, 2003 WY 114, ¶ 39, 76 P.3d  at 
357; RT 
Communications, 11 P.3d  at 927.

 
 
[¶44]   Second, in an effort to demonstrate use 
of the 1998 values resulted in an inaccurate valuation of the improvements, 
Thunder Basin presented the testimony of a local real estate appraiser who had 
compared the County Assessor's valuation of buildings on the mine property with 
its valuation of other commercial buildings in Campbell County and, on a per 
square foot basis, the latter values were much lower.  The obvious purpose 
of this evidence was to demonstrate the CountyAssessor's valuations were not uniform and 
equal as required by law.  However, the local appraiser admitted on 
cross-examination that the buildings he used for comparison were selected by 
ThunderBasin, none were located on mining 
property, and he did not attempt to find any similar mining buildings to include 
in his comparison.  
Given the problems in finding true comparable values in this situation, 
little weight can be given to ThunderBasin's effort to show the values 
resulting from the cost approach were inaccurate by comparing them to randomly 
selected buildings.  
Instead, the difference in the value of the improvements between the 
CountyAssessor's and 
ThunderBasin's appraisals 
arose simply from the CountyAssessor's use of the 
1998 value which resulted in fewer years of depreciation.  As we previously 
discussed, that approach was not inconsistent with the statute or the 
regulations.  

 
 
[¶45]   We would also note the County 
Assessor's expert testimony in 2002 clarified that use of allocated sales data 
in the cost method for property tax purposes, such as was done in the case of 
the Coal Creek Mine, was typical and, in fact, had been used by the County 
Assessor to value personal property after the sale of at least three other 
Campbell County mines.  Use of either the original cost data or an 
allocated purchase price was acceptable for purposes of the cost method.  Even the 
CountyAssessor's expert 
testified that while his approach was an "accepted method," it was not the only 
one, and ThunderBasin's approach was 
also acceptable.  
The choice between the two was, therefore, a matter of appraisal 
judgment.  RT Communications, 
11 P.3d  at 921.  
There was substantial evidence to support the appraiser's approach; 
consequently, we find no basis upon which to reverse the CountyBoard's decision affirming the 
CountyAssessor's use of the 1998 values.

 
 
Economic Obsolescence

 
 
[¶46]   The CountyAssessor calculated the economic obsolescence for the 
Coal Creek Mine to be 50%, whereas ThunderBasin 
claimed it was 64.06%.  The CountyAssessor's expert concluded the personal 
property at the mine still had some value even though the mine was closed.  To estimate that 
value, he averaged zero production when the mine was closed and 100% of 
production at full capacity and used the resulting 50% as his economic 
obsolescence factor.  
He testified this approach was justified in his appraisal experience and 
common practice throughout CampbellCounty 
in these kinds of situations.  However, he did recognize that if a mine 
remained idle for a "lengthy period," he would revisit that value and reduce it 
further.   

 
 
[¶47]   ThunderBasin's expert, on the other hand, used 
the production shortfall method, which required that he determine the production 
capacity of the mine.  
On the basis of publicly filed mine plans, he used a production capacity 
of 18 million tons per year even though the mine had never operated at that 
level.  He then 
averaged the last three years of the mine's production and concluded it was 
operating at 18.16% of production capacity.  Using a scaling factor, he determined the 
economic obsolescence was 64.06%.  Had he used a different production capacity 
figure, such as 11 million tons which was the highest production at the Coal 
Creek Mine appearing in the record, his calculation would have resulted in a 
much lower percentage. 

 
 
[¶48]   The record discloses quite clearly the 
difference between the two economic obsolescence calculations was one of 
opinion.  This 
was exemplified when the CountyAssessor's expert testified that ThunderBasin's 64.06% number was within the range 
of acceptable economic obsolescence, but "excessive."  Differences of 
opinion are not a sufficient basis upon which to reverse the CountyBoard's decision.  BP America Prod. Co. v. 
Dep't of Revenue, 2005 WY 
60, ¶ 26, 112 P.3d 596, 608 (Wyo. 
2005); Teton Valley Ranch v. State Bd. of 
Equalization, 735 P.2d 107, 113 (Wyo. 
1987).  We 
conclude there was substantial evidence to support the CountyAssessor's economic obsolescence 
calculation for the Coal Creek Mine in 2002.

 
 
Adequacy of CountyBoard's Findings and Conclusions

 
 
[¶49]   As it did in the 2001 case, 
ThunderBasin complains 
the CountyBoard's findings and 
conclusion are insufficient to explain the reasons for its decision and allow 
for adequate judicial review.   We disagree.

 
 
[¶50]   The CountyBoard's findings for the Coal Creek Mine 
in 2002 detailed the valuation methods used by the two appraisers and compared 
those methods with the requirements of the statute and regulations.  They noted the 
CountyAssessor was 
relying upon the information provided by ThunderBasin 
and utilized a residual value of 30% which was within the 25% limit provided by 
the regulations.  
The CountyBoard explained 
the CountyAssessor's 
approach of relying upon updated booked costs when a sale occurred was the 
approach used for all mines in CampbellCounty.  With regard to economic obsolescence, the 
findings explained how the CountyAssessor's expert calculated the utility 
of an idle asset and found that approach was a generally accepted appraisal 
method. 

 
 
[¶51]   The County Board also carefully 
outlined the approach taken by Thunder Basin's expert, noted the information 
provided to him was different than that available to the County Assessor, and 
found the residual values he used were below those allowed by the regulations. 
Regarding the residual values, the CountyBoard specifically found insufficient information had 
been submitted to vary from the 25% limit in the regulations and to do so would 
result in unequal treatment of other mining properties in CampbellCounty.  Finally, the County Board concluded, after 
explaining both parties used acceptable appraisal methods, the differences were 
primarily the result of differing professional opinions and Thunder Basin had 
failed to overcome the presumption the value assigned by the County Assessor was 
valid and correct.  
BP America 
Production Co. 2005 WY 
60, ¶ 26, 112 P.3d  at 608; Teton Valley Ranch, 735 P.2d  at 
113.  We 
conclude the CountyBoard's findings and 
conclusions adequately explain its decision.  

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶52]   The CountyBoard had an adequate basis upon which to determine, 
in Cases Nos. 05-117 and 05-119, the CountyAssessor used a rational appraisal method, equally 
applied to all property, when he valued ThunderBasin's personal property at both mines in 
2001 and at the Coal Creek Mine in 2002.  Applying the appropriate standard of review, 
we conclude there is no basis in the record upon which to reverse the CountyBoard and, therefore, affirm.  With regard to Case 
No. 05-118, we conclude the matter is not properly before this Court because it 
was remanded to the CountyBoard by both the 
SBOE and the district court.  Those orders were not appealable under 
W.R.A.P. 1.05, and the appeal is, therefore, dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction.

 
 
[¶53]   Affirmed in part and dismissed in 
part.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The quoted material 
pertains to cases in which the Department of Revenue assesses the property.  The standard is, 
however, equally applicable to assessments by county assessors.  See, e.g., 
Teton Valley Ranch v. State 
Bd.  of 
Equalization, 735 P.2d 107 (Wyo. 1987).

  

2Thunder Basin's expert 
made a brief reference to the coal market and the possibility that it may not 
continue to support high spot prices.  However, lacking was any substantial evidence 
of economic forces within the coal industry that would cause one to believe the 
Black Thunder Mine suffered from substantial economic obsolescence.

 
 

3We recognize that 
ThunderBasin's expert did testify the allocated 
sales price was not prepared for purposes of personal property tax.  However, he did not 
contend that if a current, bona fide arms length sales price were 
available,  
further economic obsolescence calculations would still be necessary.

 
 

4A county assessor is not 
an "aggrieved person" within the meaning of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-11-109 and, 
consequently, may not appeal from a decision of the state board of 
equalization.  
Brandt v. TCI 
Cablevision of Wyoming, 
873 P.2d 595, 587 
(Wyo. 1994).  

 
 

5Thunder Basin maintains 
the SBOE exceeded its authority by providing an extensive analysis of the 
evidence in its remand order and, therefore, somehow poisoned the proceedings on 
remand.  This 
argument presumes the SBOE cannot, in its appellate capacity, discuss the 
details of the CountyBoard decision and 
state whether, in its opinion, that decision complies with law.  In fact, that is 
precisely the role of the appellate body and often an appellate opinion, whether 
it be an administrative agency or a court, informs the entity to which the 
remand is made.  
See, 
Antelope Valley, 4 P.3d  at 
878.  Whatever 
decision is made upon remand will be subject to review and if the direction of 
the SBOE decision is ultimately found to be in error, those issues can be raised 
properly on appeal.  
The fact remains that because the matter has been remanded to the 
CountyBoard, the taxpayer's substantive rights 
have not yet been adversely affected.  We refuse to speculate on what actions the 
CountyBoard will take upon remand.