Case Title: Stephans v. State

Citation: 127 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 65

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2011-10-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
4127 Nev,, Advance Opinion 6S
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA.

 

STUARD T. STEPHANS, A/K/A No. 52254

STUARD STEPHANS,

ae FILED

‘THE STATE OF NEVADA,

Respondent. OCT 06 2011
coor

Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury
verdict, of conspiracy to commit larceny, burglary, and grand larceny.
Bighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Donald M. Mosley, Judge.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Bailus Cook & Kelesis, Ltd., and Dayvid J. Figler, Las Vegas,
for Appellant.

Catherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, Carson City; David J. Roger,
District Attorney, Sandra DiGiacomo, Chief Deputy District Attorney, and
Nancy A. Becker, Deputy Distriet Attorney, Clark County,

for Respondent.

BEFORE HARDESTY, DOUGLAS and PICKERING, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, PICKERING, J.:

‘To establish grand larceny in this felony shoplifting case, the

State needed to prove that the stolen goods had a value of $250 or more

Here, the only proof of value came from the department store's loss

prevention officer. He testified, over the defense’s foundation, hearsay,

som oe and best evidence objections, that the stolen goods he recovered bore price

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tags adding up to $47. Neither the price tags nor duplicates of them were
offered or admitted.

The defense objections to this testimony should have boon
sustained, While there are several ways to establish value in a shoplifting
case, testimony from a witness whose knowledge rests on what he
remembers reading on a price tag is not, without more, one of them. For
this reason, we reverse and remand for a new trial on the grand larceny
charge. We affirm the judgment of conviction as to conspiracy and
burglary.

L

Appellant Stuard Stephans and a companion (who pleaded
guilty before trial) stole six bottles of men’s cologne from Abercrombie &
Fitch, a retail department store in the Las Vegas Fashion Show Mall. The
store's loss prevention field agent, David Scott, apprehended the duo,
recovered the stolen cologne, and called the police.

At trial, the State relied on Scott to prove both theft and
value. Scott prefaced his testimony with a perfunctory explanation of his
duties. He described himself as responsible for loss prevention in
Abercrombie & Fitch's 12 Las Vegas stores; he gave his background as
being in criminal justice, generally, and investigation of retail crime by
professional thieves, in particular. By the time of trial, Scott had changed
employers and no longer worked for Abercrombie & Fitch.

‘Through Scott, the State established that Stephans and his
companion each took three bottles of Ezra Fitch men’s cologne, for a total
of six bottles, without paying. Some of their activity was captured on
security videotape, which Scott authenticated

On value, Scott testified that he “believe[d]” Abercrombie &
Fitch carried four brands of men’s cologne, including a brand called Ezra

  

 
Fitch, The St

  

isked Scott: “And the Ezra Fitch [cologne], where would
that have fallen on the scale of price?” Stephans objected to the lack of
foundation, which the court sustained. Scott was then asked, “How would

 

you know the price of the cologne in the store?” and “Are there price tags
‘on it or how do you know how much the merchandise cost?” Scott's
response was, “The same as any customer would know ... there is a price
tagon it.” (Emphasis added).

‘The defense added hearsay and best evidence objections to its
foundation challenge to Scott's value testimony.! After an off-the-record
colloquy, the court allowed the State to proceed:

Q. Sir, my question was with regard to the
Ezra Fitch cologne .. . where was it on the price
range with regard to the four colognes that were
sold at Abercrombie & Fitch?

A. It would have been at the top of the price
range in regard to those colognes that we sell.
That was our high end brand,

Q. What was the approximate price per
bottle?

A. It was exactly 79.50 per bottle,

Q. That was, would have been the price tag
that was on the box?

A. That's correct.

1Although Stephans's best evidence objection was not as clearly
stated as it could have been, the State does not challenge its sufficiency
and, indeed, concedes in its answering brief that “Stephans objected to
Scott’s testimony regarding sales price on hearsay grounds and under the
best evidence doctrine.” We therefore treat the best evidence objection as
proserved.

 

 
Multiplying price ($79.50) by number of bottles stolen (6) works out to
‘$47, which is more than $250. Thus did the State establish value.

‘The jury convicted Stephans of grand larceny and burglary,
both felonies, and conspiracy to commit larceny, a gross misdemeanor.
The district court deemed Stophans a habitual criminal because of his
record, ‘The court sentenced Stephans for the folonies to 20 years in
prison, with minimum parole eligibility at 7 years, the sentences to run
concurrently.

Th

Stephans argues that the loss prevention officer’s value
testimony should have been excluded because it lacked foundation,
involved hearsay, and violated the best evidence rule. He further argues
that, without this evidence, his grand larceny conviction cannot stand. He
seeks acquittal of grand larceny based on insufficiency of the evidence.
While we agree with Stephans's assignments of evidentiary error, the
remedy for such error is reversal and remand for a new trial on the grand
larceny charge, not appellate acquittal.

A

Grand larceny consists of intentionally stealing property,
owned by another person, having a value of $250 (now $650) or more.
NRS 205.220(1)(a)2 “Value” in larceny cases is statutorily defined.

2As written at the time relevant to this appeal, NRS 205.220(1)(a)
provided that “a person commits grand larceny if the person: (1)
intentionally steals, takes and carries away, leads away or drives away:
(a) [plersonal goods or property, with a value of $250 or more, owned by
another person.” The 2011 Legislature increased the amount from $250 to
$650 but otherwise left NRS 205.220(1)(a) unchanged. A.B. 142, 76th Leg.
(Nev. 2011).

 

 
Drawing on section 223.1(2)(c) of the Model Penal Code, NRS 205.251(1)
provides: “The value of property involved in a larceny offense shall be
deemed to be the highest value attributable to the property by any
reasonable standard.” While the provision’s purpose “is to put the
transaction in a higher rather than a lower category where any one of
several possible criteria of value justifies the higher classification,” Model
Penal Code and Commentaries § 223.1 emt. 3(b), at 141 (Official Draft and
Revised Comments 1980), the burden remains with the State to prove
value as an element of the crime. Thus, the State must “prove by evidence
beyond a reasonable doubt that the value of the property, by any
reasonable standard, exceeds [the statutory threshold amount],” here,
$250. State _v. Ensz, 603 N.W.2d 236, 238 (N.D. 1993) (construing
comparable North Dakota statute).

We generally review a district court's decision to admit or
exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion, Hernandez v. State, 124 Nev.
639, 646, 188 P.3d 1126, 1131 (2008), but to the extent the evidentiary
ruling rests on a legal interpretation of the evidence code, de novo review
obtains. See United States v, LeShore, 543 F.3d 935, 941 (7th Cir. 2008).

In Calbert v. State, 99 Nev. 759, 670 P.2d 576 (1983), we
deemed “evidence of price tags attached to the goods at the time of the
theft... competent evidence of the value of the stolen goods for purposes
of establishing grand larceny . .. from a retail department store.” Id, at
758-60, 670 P.2d 576. But in Calbert, the price tags were admitted in
evidence, apparently without objection. The challenge was to the
sufficiency of the price tag evidence, not its admissibility.

In this case, by contrast, the only evidence of value came from
Scott, a former loss prevention officer for Abercrombie & Fitch, who
testified over objection to what he remembered reading on the stolen

 

 
goods’ price tags. Scott was neither offered nor qualified as an expert
under NRS 50.275. Nor did the State establish that Scott had the
personal knowledge required to give lay opinion testimony under NRS
50.266, or offer the price tai

An owner of property may testify to its value, Lucini-Parish
Ins.v, Buck, 108 Nev. 617, 621-22, 836 P.2d 627, 630 (1992), at least so
long as the owner has personal knowledge, or the ability to provide expert
proof, of value. Sec Cunningham v, Masterwear Corp., 669 F.3d 673, 676
(7th Cir, 2009) (‘w]hat the owner is not allowed to do is merely repeat

themselves in evidence.

 

another person's valuation"). However, “[nJon-owners who are called to
testify to property value must have some personal knowledge on which to
base their estimate .... [Rleading from the price tag on an item is not
sufficient.” 3 Barbara E. Bergman & Nancy Hollander, Wharton's
Criminal Evidence § 12:27, at 397-400 (15th ed. 1999) (emphasis added).
‘Thus, absent foundation, “[mJost courts have held that the testimony of a
security officer is incompetent to prove the value of stolen goods when it is
based on the officer’s recollection of the prices written on the price tags,
because the security officer has no knowledge of the pricing system.”
Eldridge v. United States, 492 A.2d 879, 882 (D.C. 1985); see DeBruce v.
State, 461 So. 2d 889, 891 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (‘Store security officers
are not qualified to testify as to the value of stolen merchandise where
their knowledge is based solely on the price ticket”); State v, Love, 711

 

 

P.2d 1240, 1242 (Ariz, Ct. App. 1985) (the testimony of a security
employee who “had no involvement in merchandising, selling, or pricing
items at the store” held inadmissible to prove value); State v. White, 437
A.2d 145, 149 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1981) (“a witness who testifies as to value
must be qualified to do so on the basis of his own personal knowledge or

 

 
experience; he may not merely transmit information which he receives
from outside sources in the field”).

Courts that prohibit lay witness opi to value

 

mn testimony

 

based on a remembered price tag do so because they deem the price stated
on the tag to be hearsay. A lay witness can testify to matters of fact, such
as “the light was red.” But a lay witness cannot give opinion testimony
based on otherwise inadmissible hearsay. See 30 Charles Alan Wright &
Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice & Procedure; Evidence § 6337,
at 155 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing FRE 701, the federal counterpart to NRS
50.565, and noting the requirement that lay opinion be “rationally based
‘on the perception of the witness,” FRE 701, “restricts the use of [lay]
opinions [to those] based on personal knowledge and forbids those based
on hearsay’).

NRS 61.035 defines hearsay as an out-of-court “statement
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Courts
elsewhere have divided on whether price tags amount to hearsay when
offered to prove value. Some courts have accepted price tag evidence as a
matter of “fact,” like an item's color or shape, or as circumstantial
evidence, not a direct assertion, of value. People v. Giordano, 856
N.Y.S.2d_ 568, 569 (App. Div. 2008) (holding that price tags were not
hearsay because they were “circumstantial evidence” of the price of the
merchandise and were “essentially verbal acts by the store, stating an
offer to sell at a particular price”); State v. Pulver, 95 P.3d 250, 252 (Or.
Ct. App. 2004) (where the relevant question is the value of stolen

merchandise, price tags are not assertions of the fact to be proved but
direct evidence of that fact); see Norris v. State, 475 S.W.2d 553, 555-56
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1971) (declaring that the fact an item “was displayed
for sale over a period of time with a certain price tag upon it is not

 

 
non

hearsay, but fact; and is evidence that the tag reflected its retail value").
Other courts hold that testimony about the price stated on a price tag,
when offered as evidence of value, is hearsay. See People v, Codding, 551
P.2d 192, 193 (Colo. 1976) (concluding that price tags constitute a written
record prepared by someone other than the witness and were offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted—the retail cost of the merchandise),
superseded by Colo. Rev. Stat, § 18-4-414 (1985) (creating a hearsay
exception for price tags); State v. McPhie, 662 P.2d 233, 236 (Idaho 1983)
(price tags are hearsay when testimony regarding value is based on them);
People v. Mikolaiewski, 649 N.E.2d 499, 504 (Il. App. Ct. 1995) (price tags
are hearsay when offered to prove the price stated on them); Robinson v.
Com,, 516 S.E.2d 475, 478 (Va. 1999) (price tags are hearsay).

The courts that characterize price tag evidence in a shoplifting
case as hearsay do not require much to overcome the hearsay bar. Thus,
price tag evidence has been admitted to prove value under the business
records exception to the hearsay rule, Lauder v. State, 195 A.2d 610, 611
(Ma. 1963); State v. Odom, 393 S.E.2d 146, 151 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990); see.
‘Twine v, Com., 629 S.B.2d 714, 719 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) (register receipts
generated by scanned bar codes qualify), on the theory that courts “can

 

properly take judicial notice of the fact that price tags on retail clothing

These cases have echoes of Wigmore's “mechanical trace” evidence
discussed in United States v. Snow, 517 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1975), that the
“name on a dog collar to prove ownership of [the] dog” or the numbers on a
license plate make no assertion of fact, and so are not hearsay at all but
circumstantial, identifying evidence. Id, at 443-44 (citing 1 Wigmore on
Evidence §§ 148-157 (3d ed. 1940)). Snow and its progeny are criticized in
30B Michael H. Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure: Evidence § 7006,
at 94-99 (4th ed, 2006).

 
generally reflect the market value of the clothing,” State v. Rainwater, 876
P.2d 979, 982 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994); White, 487 A2d at 148, and
pursuant to a judicially created “exception to the hearsay rule in
shoplifting cases permitting the admission into evidence of price tags
regularly affixed to items of personalty offered for sale or, in substitution,
testimony concerning the amounts shown on such tags when... there is
ro objection to such testimony on best evidence grounds.” Robinson, 616
S.E.2d at 479,

To admit price tag evidence under the recognized hearsay
exceptions, though, requires foundational proof. The price tag must be
authenticated and a basis for its admission shown. And, as Robinson, 516
S.E.2d at 479, suggests, the best evidence rule may bar oral testimony
about the contents of a price tag if the writing itself is not offered and
appropriate objection is made. Compare State v. Mohr, 632 N.W.2d 382,
387 (Neb. Ct. App. 2001) (best evidence rule applied to testimony as to
value in a shoplifting case where the witness had no knowledge beyond
what the price tags said, making the price tags’ contents a “controlling
issue”), with State v. Downing, 654 N.W.2d 793, 797-98 (8.D. 2002) (the
district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting over a best evidence
objection a senior employee's testimony as to the price of items in her
department; the testimony was offered to establish the basis for the
employee's testimony, not to prove the price tag contents); see also United
States v. Duffy, 454 F.2d 809, 812 (Sth Cir. 1972) (‘When the disputed
evidence, such as the shirt in this case, is an object bearing a mark or
inscription, and is, therefore, a chattel and a writing, the trial judge has
discretion to treat the evidence as a chattel or as a writing.”

‘The record in this case supplies no foundation for Scott's

testimony about the value of the stolen cologne beyond his memory of

 

 
 

reading the price tags. Scott testified that he knew the price by looking at
the prico tag “the same as any customer would.” His testimony repeated
the numbers shown on the tags as the price. This was hearsay, with no
exception shown,

Scott's testimony, as framed, also presented a serious best
evidence issue that went unresolved. NRS 52.225 defines “writings” to
include “numbers.” Under NRS 62.236, “{tJo prove the content of a
writing... the original ... is required, except as otherwise provided in
this title.” While NRS 52.245 provides “duplicates” are normally
admissible, a “duplicate” refers to a “counterpart” that reproduces the
original, see NRS 52.195, not secondary oral proof. ‘The substantive law
does not make the price shown on the price tag an issue ina grand larceny
case, but the State's reliance on Scott to prove value did. Because Scott
does not appear to have any knowledge of value apart from the price tag,
his testimony squarely implicated the best evidence rule.

Any witness with knowledge of facts that exist
independent of the contents of a writing,
recording, or photograph may testify without
raising an issue under [the best evidence rule].
‘This even includes knowledge in the form of
recollection that has been refreshed with a
writing, recording, or photograph. But where the
witness has knowledge only of the contents of such
an item, testimony may be excluded under [the
best evidence rule].

31 Charles Alan Wright and Victor James Gold, Federal Practice and
Procedure: Evidence § 7184, at 391 (2000) (discussing FRE 1002, the
counterpart to NRS 52.235).

‘The best evidence rule does not apply to the recovered goods.
See People v. Campbell, 331 N-Y.S.2d 199, 201 (Crim. Ct. 1972). Further,
as the State notes, the expense associated with retail crime often

10

 
oe a

 

necessitates the immediate return of recovered property to its rightful
owner despite a pending prosecution. But this does not excuse the failure
to generate a register receipt or photograph of the price tags to establish
the price of the recovered goods in a case like this, where retail price was
the only proof of value offered. See 6 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A.
Berger, Weinstoin's Federal Evidence § 1001.03[2] (Joseph M. McLaughlin
ed., 2d ed. 2011) (discussing best evidence issues associated with inscribed
chattels under FRE 1001, the federal counterpart to NRS 52.225, and
noting that they “should be approached pragmatically, focusing on
whether there is a serious risk of fraud or faulty memory” and noting the
wide availability of cameras to create duplicates and thereby obviate such
issues); see also NRS 52.385 (providing for the return of stolen property to
its owner despite a pending prosecution and permitting use of
photographs).

“When the value of property is at issue in a criminal case,
there are different methods of proving value, and no one method is
preferred over others.” Zellers v, United States, 682 A.2d 1118, 1120 (D.C.
1996) (footnote omitted). The record here, however, establishes this as a
textbook case “in which a person wants to testify to the value of goods in
reliance on the price tags affixed by a merchant. For this purpose the
price tags are hearsay and a lay witness could not testify to such an
opinion.” 30 Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil, supra, § 6337, at 156.
‘The district court committed legal error when it ruled that the price tag
testimony offered in this case did not involve hearsay. Because the State
did not establish a record basis for overcoming Stephans's foundation,
hearsay, and best evidence objections, we conclude that the district court
abused its discretion in admitting this evidence.

u

 
B

Without Scott's testimony as to price, the record does not
establish grand larceny, because nothing says the value of the stolen
cologne amounted to $250 or more. Scott recalled another Abercrombie &
Fitch cologne priced at between $24 and $34.50 a bottle which, multiplied
by the six bottles stolen, would not have crossed the line dividing grand
from petit larceny. The error in the admission of Scott's testimony thus
cannot be said to be harmless, since the grand larceny conviction
depended on it. See also Zellers, 682 A.2d at 1121 (given the “important
difference between a misdemeanor and a felony conviction” it is
appropriate to require adequate affirmative proof of value in felony
shoplifting cases, “especially when the value alleged is close to the line
Aividing one offense from another” (internal quotations omitted),

While Stephans is entitled to reversal and retrial on the grand
larceny charge, his argument for acquittal on that charge based on
insufficient evidence fails. Under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324
(1979), a defendant is entitled to acquittal if “upon the record evidence
adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Acquittal based on insufficiency of the
evidence rests on the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.
Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 40 (1988). In assessing a sufficiency of
the evidence challenge, “a reviewing court must consider all of the
evidence admitted by the trial court, regardless whether that evidence
was admitted erroneously.” McDanie] v. Brown, 558 U.S.

 

 
Ct. 665, 672 (2010) (emphasis added) (quoting Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 41).
‘This is because an appellate court “cannot know what evidence might have
been offered if the evidence improperly admitted had been originally
excluded by the trial judge.” United States v, Sarmiento-Perez, 667 F.2d
1239, 1240 (6th Cir, 1982). Assessing the record with the erroneously
admitted price tag testimony, the evidence was sufficient to sustain
Stephans’s grand larceny conviction, See Calbert v, State, 99 Nev. 759,
759-60, 670 P.2d 576, 576 (1983). ‘The remedy for the evidentiary error
committed here thus is reversal and remand for a new trial, not acquittal.

‘Our case law concerning sufficiency of the evidence makes
occasional reference to “competent” evidence. See, e.g, Hernandez v,
State, 118 Nev. 513, 531, 50 P.3d 1100, 1112 (2002) (to determine
sufficiency, “this court must determine whether the jury, acting
reasonably, could have been convinced by the competent evidence of the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” (emphasis added));
Braunstein v, State, 118 Nev. 68, 79-80, 40 P.3d 413, 421 (2002); see
Collman v. State, 116 Nev. 687, 711, 7 P.3d 413, 441 (2000); Garner wv.
State, 116 Nev. 770, 779, 6 P.3d 1013, 1019 (2000), overruled on_other
grounds by Sharma_v. State, 118 Nev, 648, 56 P.dd 868 (2002).
“Competent” in the context of a sufficiency of the evidence analysis does
not mean properly admitted; rather, it refers to evidence that was placed
before the jury by the court to the exclusion of evidence extraneous to the
judicial proceedings. See Crowe v. State, 84 Nev. 358, 366-67, 441 P.2d
90, 95 (1968) (‘The test... for sufficiency upon appellate review
is...whether this court can conclude the trier of facts could, acting
reasonably, be convinced to the degree of certitude by the evidence which
it had a right to believe and accept as true.”). Accordingly, we consider all
evidence admitted at trial when reviewing Stephans's claim of insufficient
evidence, including the evidence erroneously admitted by the district
court,

lt is unclear whether the convietion for grand larceny led the

district court to impose a harsher sentence for the burglary conviction

than it otherwise would have imposed. If Stephans is acquitted of grand
continued on next page

 

 
Stephans makes an additional, separate sufficiency of the
evidence challenge. He contends that, even accepting Scott’s testimony as
to the price of the Bzra Fitch cologne, he had only three bottles on his
person, not six. In his view, the jury should not have been permitted to
aggregate the cologne he stole with the three bottles his cohort stole.
‘Multiplying the $79.50 Ezra Fitch price tag by three instead of
out to $238.50 per person, falling short of the $250 grand larceny
threshold. NRS 205.251(2) defeats this challenge: “The value of property

works

 

involved in larceny offenses committed by one or more persons pursuant to
a scheme or continuing course of conduct may be aggregated in
determining the grade of the larceny offenses.”
i.
Finally, Stephans seeks reversal of his burglary and
conspiracy convictions based on claimed error by the district court in

rejecting a proposed jury instruction, denying his for-cause challenges to

~ continued

larceny on remand and that acquittal would have an ameliorative impact
on the district court’s sentencing determination on the burglary
conviction, the court may reconsider that sentence. The court may not,
however, increase the sentence for the burglary on remand. See Wilson v.
State, 123 Nev. 687, 170 P.3d 975 (2007). On remand, the district court,
may also consider Stephans's due process challenge to the grand larceny
charge. We express no opinion as to this argument, which Stephans
raised for the first time on appeal.

 

4

 
two members of the jury venire, and limiting voir dire. We roview these
claims of error for an abuse of discretion, Jackson v. State, 117 Nev. 116,
120, 17 P.3d 998, 1000 (2001) (reviewing district court's decision regarding
jury instructions for abuse of discretion); Blake v. State, 121 Nev. 779,
795, 121 P.3d 567, 577 (2005) ("the district court enjoys broad discretion in
ruling on challenges for cause”); Cunningham v, State, 94 Nev. 128, 190,
575 P.2d 936, 937-38 (1978) (the scope of voir dire examination is within
the sound discretion of the district court and the court's determination is
accorded considerable latitude on appeal), and we find no abuse of
discretion here

Accordingly, while we affirm the burglary and conspiracy
convictions, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion on the grand larceny charge.

Pickering

We concur:

[Svat J.

Hardesty

Lett a
Douglas