Case Title: Horner v. Employees' Retirement System, State of Hawaii

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2005-07-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
LAW UBRARY
‘***NOT FOR PUBLICATION #*

 

No. 26594

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

 

THOMAS M. HORNER, Appellant-Appellant

EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM, 2
STATE OF HAWAI'I, Appellee-Appellee — E|>

12 ir sou

aaa

 

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(crv. NO. 03-1-2311)

(Supp. 2003) .*

+ the Honorable Eden Elizabeth Hifo presided.

2 HRS § 88-77(a) was repealed in 1998 and replaced with HRS $ 86-
79(a). 1996 Haw. Seas. L. Act 151 § 13. “The current provision, BRS § 28-
7S(al, 4s identical in ali relevant respects." HRS § 86°79(a) (Supp. 2003).
ks §'98-77(a] is the applicable statue for the Joly 2, 1990 incisent that is
the fubject of this appeal. HRS § 68-77 (a) provided:

 

(a) pon application of a member, or the person

appointed by the family court as guardian of an

incapacitated member, any menber who has been permanently

incapacitated a5 the natural and proxisate result of an

accident csourring whtie an the actual performance of cuty

at sone definite time and place, of as the cumulative result

of Sone occupational hazara, through no wilful negligence on

the menber's part, may be retired by the board of erustees
(continued...)

 

 

 

 
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a

Beginning in 1981, Appellant was employed by the Child

Support Enforcement Agency (CSEA) as an investigator. In that

 

Job, Appellant's duties included “locating non-custodial parents
who owed child support, and interpreting federal regulations
regarding child support collection." Appellant testified that
his job was “consistently stressful," partly because his office
was "perpetually understaffed" and his job responsibilities kept
increasing over the years.

From 1984 or 1985 until 1990, Alan Zach (Zach) wes
Appellant's supervisor. During this tine, Appellant expressed
frustration at Zach for being an ineffectual supervisor and at
many of his other colleagues for their poor work ethic. Another

significant source of stress for Appellant was a pending lewsuit

against him for gender discrimination brought by a female

 

*(.,-eontinued)
Tor service-connected total disability provided thet:
Ti” En the case of an accident Sccurring after July

i) 963, "the employer shall file with the board
a'copy of the employer's report of the accident
Submitted to the director of Lebor and
industrial relations:

(2) Rn application for retizenent is filed with the
Board within two years of the Gate of the
Seeident, or the date upon which workers’
ASepensation benefits cease, whichever is later:

(3) Gertification is made by the head of the agency
Gnunich the mesber is employed, stating the
tine, place and conditions of the service
performed by the meaber resulting in the
Resber's disability and that the disability was
ot the result of willful negligence on the part
bf the menter; and

(4) The medical boord certifies that the menber is
Tneapscitated for the further performance of
Guty and that the sember’s incapacity is likely
to be permanent,

 

(emphasis added.)
‘**NOT FOR PUBLICATION®#*

‘employee. Despite these matters, Appellant was promoted to
Investigative Supervisor in 1989. This position required that he
supervise no more than twenty people.

In early 1990, a second female employee filed suit

 

against zach for sexual assault and against Appellant for failing
to provide @ safe work environment. Appellant was eventually
dismissed from this suit. However, Zach was placed on probation
and left CSEA to work at the Medicaid Fraud Unit of the Attorney
General's Office.

During his absence, Paul Clifford (Clifford) replaced
Zach as Appellant's supervisor. Appellant enjoyed working with
cligtord who, according to Appellant, was a more effective and
efficient supervisor. However, Clifford soon thereafter retired
and Appellant replaced him as acting Branch Supervisor until
zach's return.

Between 1989 and 1990, Appellant was the subject of two
separate lawsuits and an investigation for the distribution of
illegal cable television descranblers. In June 1990, Appellant
was further distressed by the return of Albert Itsudani, a
supposed “problem employee" with whom Appellant had a history of
interpersonal conflict. Also in June 1990, Zach exercised his
civil service return rights to CSEA. Appellant was notified of
zach’s return and prior to his return date Zach visited with

Appellant at CSEA.
‘*¢NOT FOR PUBLICATION***

on July 2, 1990, Zach returned to CSEA, replacing
Appellant as branch supervisor. On that day, Appellant arrived
at work at 6:00 a.m., his usual time, booted up the computers,
checked the paper supply, and made coffee. At about 7:00 a.m,
Appellant was in his office with the door slightly ajar when Zach
arrived. He knocked on Appellant’s door, walked in, "bid him

good morning, winked, and said, "We are going to have a meeting

 

this morning.” Appellant testified at his ERS hearing that his

reaction was as follows:

And when £ heard those words, it just brought back
everything that had happened when he was there with all
these neotings, We would al get together everything would
be discusses, “shat are we going to do,” and nothing ever
(get done, And 1 think thet was the most frustrating part
Because if it was going to get done, I had to do st

‘Knd so. that day, when he opened that door and made the
knock and said, "Good morning, Tom," gave me that Look in
Rie eyes "ee. afe going to nave a meeting” ~ it all came
apart, { coulan't hold ie together anymore

 

 

 

 

 

Appellant testified that he felt "at a complete loss"
after his brief interaction with Zach. He became disoriented
and did not know what was happening. Appellant's wife picked
him up and he never returned to his position after that day. He
was officially terminated on October 31, 1991.

on October 28, 1998, the hearing officer for the ERS
Medical Board found that although Appellant was permanently
incapacitated as a result of 2 “panic disorder and depression,”
Appellant's application should be denied. The Medical Board's
recommendation to the ERS Board of Trustees (ERS Board) to deny
Appellant’s application was based on its determination that

Appellant’s incapacity was not naturally and proximately caused
‘s#eNoT FOR PUBLICATION***

ee

by an “accident” “at some definite time and place” as is
required by ERS § 88-79(a).?

on January 12, 2003, the ERS Board issued its Proposed
Decision accepting the hearing officer’s Recommended Decision.
‘he relevant findings of fact by the ERS Board are as follows:

(5) thmediately following his encounter with Mr
zach, Appellant "felt overwhelmed by feelings of
fearfuiness, difficulties in concentrating, and felt that
he could no longer work." (The "Injury")

{e)'Worester, prior to the Injury, Appellant suffered
from a ‘complexity of life-long personality, emotional, and
health iecuee, ("Pre-Injury Afflictions").

(3) Furthermore, immediately pricr to the Injury,
appellant was the target of 2 criminal investigation that
[Reolved the purchase and sale of illegal cable television
Gcscrasblers, "and he was a witness to at least one criminal
[neestigation and another civil lawsuit between coworkers.

18) Work-related atreaucrs as an Investigator IV,
coupled with an ongoing criminal investigation targeted at
Appellant, the criminal investigation involving Appellant
tea witness, and appellant's role as a witness ine
Separate eriisinal investigation and civil lawsuit,
Skacerbated Appellant’ s Pre-injury Affiictions.

 

 

 

   

 

‘The relevant conclusions of law by the ERS Board are as follows:

 

(2) Appellant’# Injury was not the natural and

proximate result of an accident occurring while in the

Performance of actual duty at sone definite tine and place.
4} Inerefore, Appellant is not entitled to service:

connected disability retirenent benefits pursuant to HRS
e679.

on January 31, 2003, Appellant timely filed exceptions
to the Proposed Decision. On October 13, 2003, the ERS Board
issued its Final Decision affirming its Proposed Decision
denying Appellant's claim. The ERS Board affirmed the hearing

officer's report on the grounds that Appellant's injury was not

2 The ERS Board refers to HRS § #6-79(a) in its findings of fact and
conclusions of lan, however, the applicable statute for the July 2, 1990
Gneident ie HAS § S6-77(a). See supza note 2. HRS § 88-77(a) was Zepealed in
1958 and replaced with HRS § €8-79(a). 1998 itaw. Sess. L, Act 151 § 13.

 

 

5
 

‘senor FOR PUBLICATION
the natural and proximate result of an "accident" as defined as

an unexpected event or unforeseen [sic] occurrence."

on November 19, 2003, Appellant filed an appeal to the
court. On Nay, 12, 2004, the court heard oral arguments, and on
May 21, 2004, affirmed the ERS Board's decision and entered
judgment in favor of Appellee. On May 27, 2004, Appellant filed
a notice of appeal to this court.

On appeal, Appellant contends that (1) the court erred
as a matter of law when it affirmed the ERS Board's Finel
Decision which affirmed and adopted the hearing officer's
Recommended Decision of December 2, 2002; (2) the court erred in
affirming the ERS Board's and hearing officer's conclusion that
“appellant’s injury was not the natural and proximate result of
an accident occurring while in the performance of duty at some
definite time and place"; (3) the court, ERS Board, and hearing
officer erred as a matter of law in reaching “1” and "2" above
inasmuch as (a) the Recommended Decision was based on a
misreading of Lopez v. Bd. of Trustees, 66 Ha. 127, 657 P.2d
1040 (1983), because Lopez contains nothing to support a
distinction between a “triggering event” and “injury” in
determining whether an “accident” occurred, (b) the Recommended
Decision ascribed a theory of causation by cumulative pressures
of employment to Appellant that Appellant never advocated,

(c) existing Hawai'i decisions support Appellant’s contention

that he suffered an “accident” within the meaning of HRS chapter
‘*#*NOT FOR PUBLICATION***

 

88, and (d) as a matter of policy, adoption of Appellee’s
definition of an “accident” will lead to absurd and unintended
results.

Assuming, arauendo, that the July 2, 1990 incident was
an “accident,” Appellee argues that Appellant's injury was not
proximately caused by the “accident.” The issue of whether the
July 2, 1990 incident constitutes an “accident” under HRS § 88-
71(a) need not be decided because there is substantial evidence
supporting the ERS Board’s decision that Appellant’s injury is
not the “natural and proximate result” of the incident.

According to Hawai'i Administrative Rules § 6-22-2,
the words “natural and proximate result” are defined as “the
result that would naturally follow from the accident, unbroken
by any independent cause.” “{i]hether the accident . . . was

the proximate cause of (Appellant’s] incapacitation involves a

factual determination.” Myers v. Bd. of Trustees of smplovees’
Ret. Sve., 68 Haw. 94, 97, 704 P.2d 902, 904 (1985). If a

finding was made by the agency that Appellant's incapacity was
not the proximate cause of an accident, then this court must
“make 2 legal conclusion that that finding was clearly erroneous
in order to overturn it.” Jd. at 97, 704 P.2d at 905. Hence,
the ERS Board’s decision on the question of proximate cause is a

question of fact that this court will review under the “clearly
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erroneous” standard as governed by HRS § 91-14(g).* Ids

 

A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when (1) the
record lacks substantial evidence to support the finding, or

(2) despite substantial evidence in support of the finding, the
appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made. Feliciano v. Bd. of Trustees of
Employees’ Ret, Svs., 4 Haw. App. 26, 31, 659 P.24 77, 81
(1983). This court has defined “substantial evidence” as
“credible evidence of sufficient quantity and probative value to

justify a reasonable person in reaching a conclusion that

supports a finding of fact.” Sui . rustes
Emplovees’ Bet, Svs., 74 Haw. 161, 194, 840 P.2d 367, 373

(1992). There is substantial evidence that supports the ERS
Board's finding that Appellant’s current incapacity was not “the
result that vould naturally follow from” the event of July 2,

1990.

 

«aps § s1-14(g) (1983) provides:

Upon review of the record the court may affirm the
decision of the agency or renand the case with instructions
for further proceesings; or it may reverse or modify the
Gecision and order if the substantial rights of the
fs may have been prejudiced because of the
‘singings, conclusions, decisions, or orders

 

  

 

(2) Im violation of constitutional or statutory
provisions
(2) Texceaa ofthe statutory authority or

 

 

a)

(4) Refected by other error of law? or

(S) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the whole
recora: oF

(6) Arbitrary, or capricious, or characterized by
abuse of Giscretion or clearly onwarranced
exeresse of discretion.

 
‘eenor FOR PUBLICATION***

br. Kwong Yen Lum, who conducted an independent
evaluation of Appellant on behalf of the State Workers’
Compensation Division in 1991, stated that Appellant “d[id] not
appear to have had a diagnosable pre-existing psychiatric
impairment prior to July 2, 1990.” This indicates that the
event of July 2, 1990 was significant in the psychological
incapacitation of Appellant. However, the same report
identifies four other sources of stress that caused Appellant’ s

“depression, anxiety, (and] headaches.” One wi

 

the “settled

[sex discrimination} lawsuit from thr

 

yeara ago,” another wa
from being a “witness in a (second) lawsuit” (the sexual
harassment sult involving Zach), a third source was from the
“probable return of [a] former problem employee to the
division,” and last was the “feeling of helplessness, [and
inability] to accomplish goals set by (the) managenent/federal
government.” Some of the work difficulties involved “the actual
work itself, and the increasing demands of [Appellant's] job
with [an] inadequate number of personnel.” These uncontested
sources of stress support Appellee’s argument that “although
(Appellant's) symptoms became visible on July 2, 1990," Zach's
return and Appellant’s resulting panic attack was not the “sole”
cause of Appellant's injury.

Furthermore, Appellant’s medical reports indicate that
personal problens that predated and antedated his July 2, 1990

incident contributed to his condition. Dr. George Bussey c
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ee

conducted an independent evaluation of Appellant on behalf of the
State Workers’ Compensation Division. He noted in his 1992
evaluation that “if it were not for this ongoing criminal
procedure and its recent resolution, [Appellant] would not be in
need of acute psychiatric or psychological intervention at this
time," and further observed that “his underlying difficulties

with alcohol, as well as his pr

 

xisting personality disorder

tment.” Dr.

 

might in and of themselves necessitate ongoing tr
Bussey opined that “these treatment interventions are not
related to the alleged incident of July 2, 1990.” This
evaluation supports the ERS Board's findings that Appellant’s
psychological incapacity did not “naturally follow" from the
July 2, 1990 incident, “unbroken by any independent cause.”
Appellant’s treating psychologist, Dr. Joseph Rogers,
also expressly stated in his August 1990 evaluation that
“ [Appellant] described several sources of stress at work as
being cumulative in nature and increasing over the last three to
four years." Dr. Rogers described the events of July 2, 1990 as
“the last straw in a cumulative series of events that had been
building up for years[.]” Dr. Rogers’ evaluation in 1997
further noted that “causation from a medical probability
perspective is that (Appellant's) current disability and much of
his impairment are related to work issues” and that “{hlis
[criminal] indictment and extracurricular legal problems became

added difficulty(.1"

10
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Dr. Robert Marvit’s evaluation in 1998 also stated
that “it is my opinion, with reasonable medical probability that

[Appeliant’s) impairment is. . . a result of his mental
state . . . {which} was generated by the cumulative and specific
stressors on hie job.” The evaluations of Dr. Rogers, Dr.
Bussey, and Dr. Marvit, coupled with Appellant's own testimony,
support the ERS Board’s finding that the incident of July 2,
1990 and ensuing incapacity was caused by cumulative pressures
from his personal and professional life. Taking into account
all the evidence, it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that
the ERS Board's findings were clearly erroneous. The ERS
Board's findings of fact and conclusions of law are supported by
“credible evidence of sufficient quantity and probative value to
justify s reasonable person in reaching (its) conclusion."
Sifacsloa, 74 Haw. at 194, 840 P.2d at 373. Inasmuch as there
4s substantial evidence that the July 2, 1990 incident was not
the proximate cause of Appellant's resulting condition, the
question of whether another cause independently led to his
condition need not be considered. Therefore,

In accordance with Hawai'i Rules of Appellate

Procedure Rule 35, and after carefully reviewing the record and
the briefs submitted by the parties, and duly considering and
analyzing the law relevant to the arguments and issues raised by

the parties,

n
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the court’s Judgment filed
on May 21, 2004, from which the appeal is taken, is affirmed.
DATED: Honolulu, Hawai'i, July 21,/ 2005.
on the briefs:
Lowell K.Y. Chun-Hoon
(King, Nakamura & Chin-Hoon)
for Appellant-Appellant.

Pes eobraeeele

Deirdre Marie-Iha, Deputy
Attorneys General, for

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