Case Title: State ex rel. Doe v. Court of Common Pleas (Capper)

Citation: 2012-Ohio-2686

Docket Number: 2012-0133

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-06-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Doe v. Capper, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-2686.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-2686 
THE STATE EX REL. DOE ET AL. v. CAPPER, JUDGE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Doe v. Capper, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-2686.] 
Prohibition—Writ sought by adoptive parents of a minor child to prevent juvenile 
court judge from proceeding in a parentage action involving the child—
Judge patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed because 
the child is not a party to the action and good cause was not shown for the 
child’s not being a party—Writ granted. 
(No. 2012-0133—Submitted April 24, 2012—Decided June 21, 2012.) 
IN PROHIBITION. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an action for a writ of prohibition by relators, John and Jane 
Doe, the adoptive parents of a minor child, to prevent respondent, Judge Thomas 
J. Capper of the Clark County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations 
Division, Juvenile Section, from proceeding in a parentage action involving the 
child and to direct Judge Capper to enter a finding that all orders that have been 
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entered in that case are void.  Because Judge Capper patently and unambiguously 
lacks jurisdiction to proceed in the parentage proceeding, since the child was not 
made a party to the case and good cause was not shown for not making the child a 
party, we grant the writ. 
Facts 
{¶ 2} In November 2009, Rachel Arnold gave birth to a child in Ohio.  
Arnold, who was unmarried, executed a document permanently surrendering her 
rights to the child, and the child was placed for adoption through a private 
adoption service.  On May 26, 2010, relators’ adoption of the child was finalized.  
No putative father had registered with the Ohio Putative Father Registry at that 
time.  Relators and the child do not reside in Ohio. 
{¶ 3} On October 6, 2010, Todd S. Roccaro filed a complaint to establish 
paternity in the Clark County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations 
Division, Juvenile Section.  Roccaro named only Arnold—the child’s biological 
mother—as a defendant and requested a judgment declaring him to be the child’s 
biological father, designating him as the child’s sole and residential custodial 
parent, and ordering child support and other relief to which he may be entitled.  
Roccaro did not name the child as a party to the case and did not show good cause 
for not doing so. 
{¶ 4} In August 2011, Judge Capper denied Arnold’s motion to dismiss 
and determined that the juvenile court had jurisdiction to determine Roccaro’s 
paternity claim solely for the limited purpose of allowing him to exercise his 
statutory rights to provide information regarding his social and medical history for 
placement in the child’s adoption records.  In November 2011, Judge Capper 
ordered the parties to the parentage action—the alleged biological father 
(Roccaro) and the biological mother (Arnold)—as well as a nonparty—the minor 
child—to submit to genetic testing. 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
{¶ 5} On January 25, 2012, relators, the child’s adoptive parents, filed 
this action for a writ of prohibition to prohibit Judge Capper from proceeding in 
the underlying parentage action and to direct him to enter a finding that all orders 
that have been entered in the case are void.  After Judge Capper submitted an 
answer to relators’ complaint, we granted an alternative writ staying the pending 
juvenile court proceedings, including the order for genetic testing, and ordered the 
parties to submit evidence and briefs, including briefing on the “issues of whether 
the juvenile court has subject-matter jurisdiction and in personam jurisdiction 
over relators and the minor child.”  131 Ohio St.3d 1464, 2012-Ohio-714, 962 
N.E.2d 313.  The parties have now submitted their evidence and briefs. 
{¶ 6} This cause is now before the court for our consideration of Judge 
Capper’s motion for leave to file an amended answer and on the merits. 
Legal Analysis 
Respondent’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Answer 
{¶ 7} Judge Capper filed a motion for leave to file an amended answer, 
and he attached the written consent of relators’ counsel to his motion.  In his 
amended answer, which was filed after the court ordered briefing on, inter alia, 
the issue whether the juvenile court has in personam jurisdiction over relators and 
the minor child in the parentage case, Judge Capper admits that he has exercised 
and is about to exercise judicial power in the case when he patently and 
unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to do so.  More specifically, the judge agrees 
that the juvenile court lacks in personam jurisdiction over the child: 
 
 
In the underlying case, Clark C.P. 2010-JUV-0536, the 
child was not named as a party, and the plaintiff in the underlying 
case did not show good cause why the child should not be named 
or attempt to amend the complaint, pursuant to R.C. 3111.07(A).  
Therefore, in personam jurisdiction over the child and Relators is 
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lacking, and Respondent does not have jurisdiction to order the 
genetic testing or to order the filing of a social and medical history 
by the claimed putative father of the child, and the underlying 
matter must be dismissed. 
 
{¶ 8} The Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure supplement the Supreme Court 
Rules of Practice unless they are clearly inapplicable.  S.Ct.Prac.R. 10.2.  Civ.R. 
15(A), which governs amendments to pleadings, is not clearly inapplicable to 
original actions filed in this court.  See State ex rel. Essig v. Blackwell, 103 Ohio 
St.3d 481, 2004-Ohio-5586, 817 N.E.2d 5, ¶ 16.  “[T]he language of Civ.R. 15(A) 
favors a liberal amendment policy and a motion for leave to amend should be 
granted absent a finding of bad faith, undue delay or undue prejudice to the 
opposing party.”  Hoover v. Sumlin, 12 Ohio St.3d 1, 6, 465 N.E.2d 377 (1984). 
{¶ 9} We find that the motion was not filed in bad faith and that granting 
the motion will not result in undue delay or undue prejudice to relators.  The 
judge’s motion was filed only a little over a month after his answer was filed, and 
relators have consented to the amendment, which concedes that they are entitled 
to the requested writ.  For these reasons, and given the policy favoring liberal 
amendment of pleadings under Civ.R. 15(A), we grant Judge Capper’s motion for 
leave to file his amended answer.  See State ex rel. Hackworth v. Hughes, 97 Ohio 
St.3d 110, 2002-Ohio-5334, 776 N.E.2d 1050, ¶ 26. 
Prohibition—General Standards 
{¶ 10} In general, to be entitled to the requested writ of prohibition, 
relators must establish that Judge Capper is about to exercise judicial or quasi-
judicial power, that the exercise of that power is unauthorized by law, and that 
they lack an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. Bell v. 
Pfeiffer, 131 Ohio St.3d 114, 2012-Ohio-54, 961 N.E.2d 181, ¶ 18.  Judge Capper 
January Term, 2012 
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is exercising judicial power by proceeding in the parentage action instituted by 
Roccaro, who claims to be the child’s biological father. 
{¶ 11} For the remaining requirements, if a lower court patently and 
unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to proceed in a cause, prohibition will issue to 
prevent any future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to correct the results 
of prior jurisdictionally unauthorized actions.  See State ex rel. Otten v. 
Henderson, 129 Ohio St.3d 453, 2012-Ohio-4082, 953 N.E.2d 809, ¶ 22.  When a 
court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction, the availability of other 
remedies, such as an appeal, is immaterial.  State ex rel. Bates v. Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Appellate Dist., 130 Ohio St.3d 326, 2011-Ohio-5456, 958 N.E.2d 
162, ¶ 12. 
{¶ 12} Relators claim that Judge Capper patently and unambiguously 
lacks both personal and subject-matter jurisdiction to proceed in the parentage 
action. 
Personal Jurisdiction 
{¶ 13} “It is rudimentary that in order to render a valid personal judgment, 
a court must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.”  Maryhew v. Yova, 11 
Ohio St.3d 154, 156, 464 N.E.2d 538 (1984).  Consequently, a “ ‘trial court is 
without jurisdiction to render judgment or to make findings against a person who 
was not served summons, did not appear, and was not a party to the court 
proceedings.’ ”  MB West Chester, L.L.C. v. Butler Cty. Bd. of Revision, 126 Ohio 
St.3d 430, 2010-Ohio-3781, 934 N.E.2d 928, ¶ 29, quoting State ex rel. Ballard v. 
O’Donnell, 50 Ohio St.3d 182, 553 N.E.2d 650 (1990), paragraph one of the 
syllabus. 
{¶ 14} Moreover, a parentage action under R.C. 3111.04(A) brought to 
establish the existence of a father-and-child relationship must include the child as 
one of the necessary parties: 
 
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The natural mother, each man presumed to be the father 
under section 3111.03 of the Revised Code, and each man alleged 
to be the natural father shall be made parties to the action brought 
pursuant to sections 3111.01 to 3111.18 of the Revised Code or, if 
not subject to the jurisdiction of the court, shall be given notice of 
the action pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure and shall be 
given an opportunity to be heard.  The child support enforcement 
agency of the county in which the action is brought also shall be 
given notice of the action pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure 
and shall be given an opportunity to be heard.  The court may align 
the parties.  The child shall be made a party to the action unless a 
party shows good cause for not doing so.  Separate counsel shall 
be appointed for the child if the court finds that the child’s interests 
conflict with those of the mother. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  R.C. 3111.07(A). 
{¶ 15} A party’s failure to join an interested and necessary party 
constitutes a jurisdictional defect that precludes the court from rendering a 
judgment in the case.  See Portage Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Akron, 109 Ohio St.3d 
106, 2006-Ohio-954, 846 N.E.2d 478, ¶ 99 (declaratory-judgment action).  In the 
underlying parentage action, the alleged biological father, Roccaro, failed to name 
the minor child—an interested and necessary party pursuant to R.C. 
3111.07(A)—as a party and failed to show good cause why the child should not 
be joined as a party.  The child was not served with a summons, did not appear, 
and was not a party to the parentage action.  Therefore, as Judge Capper now 
concedes, he patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to proceed in the 
case by ordering that the child submit to genetic testing, and the writ of 
prohibition is appropriate. 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 
{¶ 16} Relators next claim that Judge Capper patently and unambiguously 
lacks jurisdiction to order the child to undergo genetic testing in the parentage 
case because their adoption of the child was finalized before the parentage case 
was filed.  Judge Capper contends otherwise, relying on our decision in State ex 
rel. Furnas v. Monnin, 120 Ohio St.3d 279, 2008-Ohio-5569, 898 N.E.2d 573, 
¶ 23 (denying a writ of prohibition sought by adoptive parents by holding that “a 
final decree of adoption does not patently and unambiguously divest a juvenile 
court of jurisdiction to determine paternity solely for the limited purpose of 
allowing the putative father to establish that he is the biological father so that he 
can exercise his statutory rights under R.C. 3107.09 and 3107.091 to provide 
information regarding his social and medical history for placement in the child’s 
adoption records”). 
{¶ 17} Because relators’ personal-jurisdiction claim, which Judge Capper 
agrees has merit, resolves this prohibition case, we need not address relators’ 
subject-matter-jurisdiction claim.  “This result is consistent with our well-settled 
precedent that we will not indulge in advisory opinions.”  State ex rel. Keyes v. 
Ohio Pub. Emps. Retirement Sys., 123 Ohio St.3d 29, 2009-Ohio-4052, 913 
N.E.2d 972, ¶ 29. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 18} In sum, because Judge Capper patently and unambiguously lacks 
jurisdiction to proceed in the underlying parentage case, we grant the requested 
extraordinary relief in prohibition to prevent him from exercising further 
jurisdiction and to compel him to find void the orders that have been entered in 
that case, including his order of genetic testing, and to dismiss the case. 
Writ granted. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
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__________________ 
MCGEE BROWN, J., concurring. 
{¶ 19} I concur in the judgment granting the requested extraordinary relief 
in prohibition but write separately to add that I believe that the court should 
address the second issue raised by relators and hold that Judge Capper patently 
and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to order genetic testing because the 
claimed biological father did not timely register on the Ohio Putative Father 
Registry and did not timely object to relators’ adoption of the minor child. 
{¶ 20} In general, “R.C. 3107.15(A) provides that a final decree of 
adoption issued by an Ohio court has the effect of terminating all parental rights 
of biological parents and creating parental rights in adoptive parents.”  State ex 
rel. Kaylor v. Bruening, 80 Ohio St.3d 142, 145, 684 N.E.2d 1228 (1997).  
Therefore, the final decree of adoption entered in May 2010 generally terminated 
the parental rights of the child’s biological parents. 
{¶ 21} The importance of finality in adoption proceedings cannot be 
overstated.  Nevertheless, in State ex rel. Furnas v. Monnin, 120 Ohio St.3d 279, 
2008-Ohio-5569, 898 N.E.2d 573, ¶ 23,1 we recognized an exception to this 
general rule by authorizing paternity testing “solely for the limited purpose of 
allowing the putative father to establish that he is the biological father so that he 
can exercise his statutory rights under R.C. 3107.09 and 3107.091 to provide 
information regarding his social and medical history for placement in the child’s 
adoption records.”  The applicability of this limited exception, however, was 
circumscribed by the facts of that case, which included an objection in the 
adoption proceeding before the adoption became final.  Id. at ¶ 3 and 4. 
{¶ 22} Because no comparable facts are present here, the putative father 
lacked standing to raise his paternity claim by not timely registering on the 
                                          
 
1 For the reasons expressed in the dissenting opinions in Furnas, I am also troubled by the holding 
in that case.  See Furnas at ¶ 28-41 (O’Donnell and Lanzinger, JJ., dissenting).  
January Term, 2012 
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putative-father registry and by failing to timely object to the adoption.  Therefore, 
I believe that the judge patently and unambiguously lacked subject-matter 
jurisdiction to order genetic testing in the parentage case.  And given the 
possibility that other judges may similarly misconstrue the court’s limited holding 
in Furnas by applying it to cases that do not have facts similar to those in Furnas, 
the issue is capable of repetition, yet evades review.  Thus, the court should 
address relators’ remaining jurisdictional claim and hold that it also has merit. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER, J., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Voorhees & Levy, L.L.C., and Michael R. Voorhees, for relators. 
 
D. Andrew Wilson, Clark County Prosecuting Attorney, and Andrew P. 
Pickering, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondent. 
______________________