Case Title: KENNETH POTTER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-05-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
KENNETH POTTER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 83158 P.3d 656Case Number: 06-59, 06-60Decided: 05/18/2007
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
KENNETH 
POTTER,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, 
Appellate Counsel; and Ryan R. Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Roden.

 
 

Representing Appellee:

Patrick J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. 
Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; and Cathleen D. Parker, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. 
Parker.

 
 
Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Pursuant to a plea 
agreement, Appellant, Kenneth Potter (Potter), conditionally pleaded guilty to 
one count of felonious restraint in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-202(a) (LexisNexis 2005).  After timely appealing both the Judgment and 
Sentence and the order revoking his probation, the matters were 
consolidated.  
The single issue on appeal is whether Potter was denied his right to a 
speedy trial.

 
 
[¶2]      We affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶3]      Potter states the 
single issue as follows:

 
 
Whether, even though some of the delay in bringing [Potter] 
to trial pertained to his competency, [Potter] was denied his right to a speedy 
trial; and therefore, the charges against [him] should have been dismissed with 
prejudice due to violation of W.R.Cr.P. 48 and [Potter's] Constitutional right 
to a speedy trial.

 
 
[¶4]      The State phrases the 
issue more simply:

 
 
Was [Potter] denied his right to a speedy trial?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶5]      This case has a 
prolonged history, and one that is laden with dates.  On September 26, 
2004, after an altercation with his mother, Potter was arrested.  The case was bound 
over to district court, where the information was formally filed on October 6, 
2004, charging Potter with three counts: attempted murder, battery of a 
household member, and interference with an emergency call.  He was arraigned in 
district court on October 21, 2004, and pleaded not guilty by reason of mental 
illness or deficiency.  He also claimed that he was not competent to 
proceed to trial and asked the court to order a mental evaluation.

 
 
[¶6]      On October 25, 2004, 
the district court filed its Order for Evaluation and Suspending Proceedings.  The order required 
an evaluation of Potter at the WyomingStateHospital and the completion of 
a written report.  
Potter filed a Demand for Speedy Trial on November 10, 2004.

 
 
[¶7]      After a new public 
defender entered her appearance in the case on Potter's behalf, he again 
asserted his right to speedy trial by filing another written demand on November 
23, 2004.  Also 
on that day, he filed a Motion Withdrawing Request for Evaluation and Suspension of 
Proceedings, moving the district court to withdraw his request for 
evaluation and suspension of the proceedings, and set the case for 
rearraignment.  
Accordingly, the district court set a hearing on the motion for December 
9, 2004.  
During the December 9, 2004 hearing, Potter asked the district court for 
permission to withdraw his request for an evaluation.1  The district court 
ordered the parties to brief whether or not to allow Potter to withdraw his plea 
of not guilty by reason of mental illness and change his plea to not guilty.

 
 
[¶8]      Each party filed the 
requested briefing.  
In the State's brief, it asked the court to set the matter for a 
competency hearing.  
In his brief, Potter agreed with the State that "it would be appropriate 
for the Court to have a hearing to offer the Defendant the opportunity to 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he is competent to 
proceed."  
Potter further requested that the hearing be set after January 4, 2005, 
so that he might have time to prepare.  Concurrent with filing his brief, Potter also 
filed a Motion to 
Withdraw Plea of Not Guilty by Reason of Mental Illness and Not Competent to 
Proceed and Enter Plea of Not Guilty.

 
 
[¶9]      At the January 6, 
2005 hearing on the party's aforementioned briefs, the issue was Potter's 
competency.  He 
insisted that he was indeed competent, and introduced testimony in support of 
his position.  
The State did not object to Potter withdrawing his "not guilty by reason 
of mental illness" plea, and further stated that it did not object to his 
motion.  At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the district court found Potter competent to proceed 
to trial.  
However, there remained the issue as to whether or not he intended to 
introduce evidence of his competence at trial.  As such, the issue of his mental status 
remained a matter of concern, and the district court set a Motion in Limine 
hearing for January 20, 2005.  The hearing was postponed, however, because 
the court was notified that "extra security" was needed for Mr. Potter.

 
 
[¶10]   Another delay occurred when, on 
February 25, 2005, the case was reassigned to a different judge.  Subsequently, the 
district court entered an order setting the trial for April 4, 2005.  However, on March 
28, 2005, the State filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings, for Production Evaluation, 
and Motion to Reconsider Issue of Withdrawal of Not Guilty by Reason of Mental 
Illness Plea.  
Potter objected to the motion, and as a result of these filings, on March 
30, 2005, the district court ordered the proceedings suspended and ordered the 
WyomingStateHospital to produce a mental 
evaluation of Potter.

 
 
[¶11]   The evaluation was filed in district 
court on June 1, 2005.  The report concluded that Potter was 
competent to proceed, and on June 7, 2005, the district court allowed him to 
change his plea from "not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency" to 
"not guilty."  
Subsequently, the district court set the matter for trial on July 11, 
2005.  However, 
the trial was reset for September 26, 2005.2

 
 
[¶12]   Five days before his trial was set to 
begin, Potter filed a Motion to Dismiss Charges With Prejudice for Violation of 
Defendant's Right to Speedy Trial.  Also prior to the trial date, a change of 
plea hearing was held on September 23, 2005.  Potter conditionally pleaded "no contest" to 
a single count of felonious restraint in violation of § 6-2-202(a).3  He was then released on his own 
recognizance.  
On December 6, 2005, he was sentenced, and was also heard on his motion 
to dismiss.  
The district court denied the motion, holding that Potter's right to 
speedy trial had not been violated.  He was sentenced to not less than four years, 
nor more than five years, in prison.  The sentence was suspended, and he was placed 
on probation for four years.  The judgment and sentence was filed on 
February 7, 2006.

 
 
[¶13]   Two weeks after he was sentenced, 
Potter violated the terms of his probation and, as a consequence, that probation 
was revoked.  
He was ordered to the Wyoming State Penitentiary for three years and nine 
months, to five years, with credit for time served of 421 days.  Potter appealed 
both his judgment and sentence, and the order revoking his probation. 

 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶14]   We review speedy trial claims to ensure 
that the mandates of W.R.Cr.P. 48 and constitutional guarantees have been 
met.  Taylor 
v. State, 2001 WY 13, ¶ 5, 17 P.3d 715, 718 (Wyo. 
2001).  We 
examine de novo 
the constitutional question of whether a defendant has been denied a speedy 
trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment.  Walters v. State, 
2004 WY 37 ¶ 9, 87 P.3d 793, 795 (Wyo. 
2004).

 
 
ARGUMENT

 
 
Speedy Trial

 
 
[¶15]   Potter asserts that his right to a 
speedy trial was violated under W.R.Cr.P. 48 (b) and under the Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and art. 1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution, 
claiming that even though some of the delay can be attributed to issues of his 
competency, most of the delay can be attributed to the State and the district 
court.  
Accordingly, Potter maintains that the charges against him should be 
dismissed.

 
 
[¶16]   The State responds that no violation of 
Potter's right to a speedy trial occurred under either Rule 48 or the 
Constitution.  
Addressing Rule 48, the State contends that the delay from October 21, 
2004, to June 7, 2005, can be attributed solely to the issue of Potter's 
competency, which excuses the 230-day delay.  As to his constitutional claim, the State 
contends that under the four-factor constitutional analysis, the delay was not 
unreasonable, and he was not denied his right to a speedy trial.  We find no 
violation of either Potter's statutory or constitutional right to a speedy 
trial, and affirm.

 
 
A.        W.R.Cr.P. 
48

 
 
[¶17]   Potter contends that under Rule 48 he 
was denied his right to a speedy trial by a measure of, at the most, 293 days, 
and at the least, 196 days.  Additionally, he argues that the delay in 
bringing the case to a close was due in large part to the State and the district 
court.

 
 
[¶18]   In contrast, the State argues that 
Potter's right to speedy trial was not denied under Rule 48, and the reason for 
delay was attributable to him and questions surrounding his mental condition, 
not the State or the district court.

 
 
[¶19]   W.R.Cr.P. 48 provides as follows:

 
 

Rule 48.  Dismissal; speedy trial.

. . . .

(b)  Speedy trial. 

(1)  It is the responsibility of the court, 
counsel and the defendant to insure that the defendant is timely tried.

(2)  A criminal charge shall be brought to trial 
within 180 days following  arraignment unless continued as provided in 
this rule.

(3)  The following periods shall be excluded in 
computing the time for trial:

(A)  All proceedings related to the mental 
illness or deficiency of the defendant;

(B)  Proceedings on another charge;

(C)  The time between the dismissal and the 
refiling of the same charge; and

(D)  Delay occasioned by defendant's change of 
counsel or application therefor.

(4)  Continuances exceeding 180 days from the 
date of arraignment may be granted by the trial court as follows:

(A)  On motion of defendant supported by 
affidavit; or

(B)  On motion of the attorney for the state or 
the court if:

(i)  The defendant expressly consents;

(ii)  The state's evidence is unavailable and the 
prosecution has exercised due diligence; or

(iii)  Required in the due administration of 
justice and the defendant will not be substantially prejudiced; and

(C)  If a continuance is proposed by the state or 
the court, the defendant shall be notified. If the defendant objects, the 
defendant must show in writing

how the delay may prejudice the defense.

(5)  Any criminal case not tried or continued as 
provided in this rule shall be dismissed 180 days after arraignment.

(6)  If the defendant is unavailable for any 
proceeding at which the defendant's presence is required, the case may be 
continued for a reasonable time by the trial court but for no more than 180 days 
after the defendant is available or the case further continued as provided in 
this rule.

(7)  A dismissal for lack of a speedy trial under 
this rule shall not bar the state from again prosecuting the defendant for the 
same offense unless the defendant made a written demand for a speedy trial or 
can demonstrate prejudice from the delay.

 
 
[¶20]   In addition to the provisions made in 
Rule 48(b) to protect a defendant's competency, there are further statutory 
safeguards that provide an added layer of protection for criminal 
defendants.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303 (LexisNexis 2005) provides as 
follows:

 
 
§ 7-11-303.  Examination of accused to determine 
fitness to proceed; reports; commitment; defenses and objections.

(a)  If it appears at any stage of a criminal 
proceeding, by motion or upon the court's own motion that there is reasonable 
cause to believe that the accused has a mental illness or deficiency making him 
unfit to proceed, all further proceedings shall be suspended.

(b)  The court shall order an examination of the 
accused by a designated examiner. 

(c)  Written reports of the pretrial examination 
shall be filed with the clerk of court.

 
 
Also, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-304(d) (LexisNexis 2005) 
mandates that "in all cases where a plea of not guilty by reason of mental 
illness or deficiency' is made, the judge shall order the defendant examined as 
provided in W.S. § 7-11-303(b)."  The failure to complete an adequate mental 
examination and report is reversible error when a defendant has pleaded not 
guilty by reason of mental illness.  Engle v. State, 774 P.2d 1303, 1312 
(Wyo. 1989).  It is also 
reversible error for a court to fail to conduct a competency hearing when the 
court is faced with doubt as to a defendant's competency.  deShazer v. State, 
2003 WY 98, 74 P.3d 1240 (Wyo. 
2003).  
Furthermore, this Court has placed an obligation on both courts and the prosecution 
to seek an evaluation when there is evidence of incompetency:

 
 
(a)  The court has a continuing obligation, 
separate and apart from that of counsel for each of the parties, to raise the 
issue of competence to stand trial at any time the court has a good faith doubt 
as to the defendant's competence, and may raise the issue at any stage of the 
proceedings on its own motion.

 
 
(b)  The prosecutor should move for evaluation of 
defendant's competence to stand trial whenever the prosecutor has a good faith 
doubt as to the defendant's competence.

deShazer, ¶ 20, 74 P.3d  at 1248 (citing ABA Criminal 
Justice Mental Health Standard 7-4.2 (1989)).

 
 
[¶21]   We begin our analysis by calculating 
the time between a defendant's arraignment and conditional plea, excluding the 
allowed-for time periods specified in W.R.Cr.P. 48(b).  Taylor, ¶ 5, 17 P.3d  
at 717-18.  Delays of fewer than 180 days are 
permissible, and if a delay has exceeded 180 days, we determine 
whether or not the defendant has made a written demand for a speedy trial or otherwise vigorously asserted 
his rights under W.R.Cr.P 48.  Id.

 
 
[¶22]   By our calculations, there were a total 
of 337 days that elapsed from the date of Potter's arraignment, October 21, 
2004, to the time of his conditional plea on September 23, 2005.4  Potter contends that without taking into 
account any excludable time periods, the "clock runs out" on April 18, 2005, 
well before he entered his conditional plea.  However, as the State points out, all of the 
delay from October 21, 2004, through June 7, 2005, can be attributed to 
proceedings related to Potter's mental illness or deficiency.  In other words, 230 
days of the 337 days of total delay can be attributed to proceedings related to 
Potter's mental illness or deficiency, leaving only 107 days of delay, which is 
well below the 180-day limit set forth by Rule 48.  We will discuss 
specific time periods as they relate to the delay.

 
 
[¶23]   Starting at the beginning, on October 
21, 2004, Potter pleaded not guilty by reason of mental illness or deficiency 
and "not competent to stand [trial] at this time."  Up until December 
9, 2005, the issue of his mental competence had not yet been resolved and, at 
the hearing held on that date, the question was not resolved.  As we referenced 
above, by statute, the district court was required to mandate that Potter be 
examined by a mental health professional who would then file a report.  However, no report 
was filed, nor was there an answer as to whether or not he was competent to make 
the decision to change his plea.  In light of those circumstances, the district 
court could not, and did not, accept a change of plea, and ultimately, ignored 
the requirement of a mental examination.  E.g., Hauck v. State, 2001 WY 119, ¶ 14, 36 P.3d 597, 601 (Wyo. 
2001) ("It is the district court's responsibility to determine competency.")

 
 
[¶24]   After December 9, the question of 
Potter's competency remained unanswered, and the district court asked the 
parties to brief the question of whether or not to allow him to withdraw his 
plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness and change his plea to not 
guilty.  Each 
party filed the requested briefing, and agreed that a hearing was in order.  Specifically, the 
State asked the court to set the matter for hearing, a position with which 
Potter agreed, and requested the court to "set a hearing for the purpose of 
[determining competency]."

 
 
[¶25]   At the hearing, the State expressly 
said that it did not object to Potter's withdrawal of his not guilty by reason 
of mental illness plea.  A psychologist testified that it was his 
opinion that Potter was competent to proceed at that time.  The district court 
agreed with the psychologist, and declared Potter competent.  Up until, and at 
the hearing held on January 6, the issue of competency was paramount and tolled 
the speedy trial clock.

 
 
[¶26]   This brings us to January 7, 2005.  Potter claims that 
the "speedy trial clock" began to run again on this date because of the 
competence finding at the January 6, 2005, hearing.  This claim is in 
error, however, because although Potter was declared competent to proceed, he 
still apparently planned to introduce evidence concerning his mental state at 
trial.  In 
fact, the district court scheduled a hearing on January 20, 2005, to address 
that plan, as Potter was unable to answer the district court's questions at the 
January 6 hearing:

 
 
THE COURT:  That means at trial he won't be able 
to talk about his mental illness.

DEFENSE COUNSEL:  Well, he certainly  I'm not 
sure that's what the law is.  I believe  I haven't thought that 
through.  I 
don't plan to use it, but just for purposes of argument, I think he does not 
rise  he certainly has a mental illness, and we're not denying that.  That's been found, 
diagnosed, and that's been for years.  What we're saying is that he does not have 
any type of psychotic episode such that he would be found not guilty by reason 
of mental illness.  
In this case, therefore, he does not wish to pursue that.  I think he's 
competent to make that decision.  Now, if it comes up that he's 

THE COURT:  I don't want to interrupt you, but 
this is a real simple question.  The State has I think made its position very 
clear.  I'm 
really talking about an order in limine at trial.  Maybe what you need to do is talk about it, 
think about it; and we can come back next week.  I suppose the State can file a formal motion 
in limine on that very issue.  Then we can make a formal record of 
that.  That's 
probably the better way of doing that.

DEFENSE COUNSEL:  I would be more comfortable 
with that.  
Thank you.

 
 
Clearly, at this instant, Potter's predicament stemmed from 
the fact that evidence of mental illness is not admissible to show lack of 
responsibility for criminal conduct, unless a defendant pleads not guilty by 
reason of mental illness or deficiency.  See § 7-11-304(c).  Therefore, this Court is comfortable in 
concluding that Potter's mental state, as it related to the crimes charged, was 
still an issue the district court had to address.  Thus, the delay was excludable.

 
 
[¶27]   A hearing was set for January 20, 2005, 
specifically for the purposes of addressing the court's concerns.  The hearing was not 
held on that day, however, because the district court was notified that "extra 
security" was needed for Mr. Potter.  Thus, as of January 20, 2005, the district 
court had not yet accepted a change of plea, had not received an examination 
report of Potter's mental status, had knowledge that he was suffering from a 
mental illness, and had additional concerns of his overall competency.  Additionally, the 
exclusion provided by W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(3)(A) from the 180-day rule was still in 
effect, bringing the total excludable time up to 91 days.

 
 
[¶28]   The next time period we must consider 
is from January 21, 2005, to March 27, 2005  a total of 66 days.  During that time, 
Potter filed a Request for Setting for an arraignment, which was set 
for March 3, 2005.  
The case was assigned to a new judge on February 25, 2005.  Also, the State 
filed various motions in preparation for trial.  However, the examination report, which was 
required under § 7-11-303(c), had not yet been filed with the court, and 
the Court had not yet addressed Potter's change of plea.5  Little else 
happened during this time, but, for the sole reason that the issue of Potter's 
competence had not yet been resolved, this time period is excludable.

 
 
[¶29]   We next turn to March 28, 2005, when 
the State filed its Motion to Suspend Proceedings, for Production of 
Evaluation, and Motion to Reconsider Issue of Withdrawal of Not Guilty by Reason 
of Mental Illness Plea, to which Potter objected.  The motion was 
granted.

 
 
[¶30]   On appeal, Potter argues that the court 
should not have granted the motion because it could not determine that he was 
competent at that moment without a hearing, and without having observed 
him.  However, 
at this instant, the court had knowledge of the following:

 
 

·         
Potter tried to choke his mother.

·         
Potter's mother called her son "crazy."

·         
The circuit court's concern that Potter was not competent 
to stand trial.

·         
Potter's entry of "not guilty by reason of mental illness 
of deficiency plea."

·         
Potter's claim he was not competent to proceed. 

·         
A diagnosis that Potter was a paranoid schizophrenic.

·         
Potter's admission that he was uncertain as to what 
evidence of his mental condition would be introduced at trial.

·         
A doctor's testimony that there was a greater possibility 
of psychotic episodes when Potter did not take his medication, and an inability 
to confirm he was actually taking those medications.

·         
The victim's testimony that Potter was "going into that 
schizophrenic stage again."

 
 
Given this information, the district court's decision to 
grant the State's motion and suspend proceedings pending the receipt of the 
evaluation was appropriate.  After the district court received the 
evaluation on June 1, 2005, it made its final determination relating to Potter's 
mental health issues on June 7, 2005.  Consequently, from March 28, 2005, to June 7, 
2005, the speedy trial clock was tolled, and the delay was excludable under Rule 
48.

 
 
[¶31]   On the whole, calculating the days from 
October 21, 2004, the date Potter first raised the issue of his mental illness, 
to June 7, 2005, the date the district court finally resolved the issue once and 
for all, 230 days elapsed.  Of the total 337 days of delay, those 230 are 
excludable under Rule 48, thus resulting in a remainder of 107 days.  That 107 being well 
under the 180-day limit of Rule 48, Potter's speedy trial rights were 
accordingly not violated under the rule.

 
 
B.        
Constitutional Claim

 
 
[¶32]   In the second part of Potter's speedy 
trial argument, he believes that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was 
violated because 362 days passed between his original arrest and his conditional 
guilty plea.  
Every criminal defendant is entitled to a speedy public trial under the 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and art. 1, § 10 of the 
Wyoming Constitution.  Sisneros v. 
State, 
2005 WY 139, ¶ 16, 121 P.3d 790, 796 (Wyo. 2005).  In reviewing a 
district court's decision on whether or not a defendant's constitutional right 
has been violated, we apply the de novo standard of 
review.  Id.; see also Berry v. 
State, 2004 WY 
81, ¶ 17, 93 P.3d 222, 227-28 (Wyo. 2004).  The district court's findings of fact on the 
speedy trial issue are reviewed for clear error.  Sisneros, ¶ 16, 121 P.3d  at 797.

 
 

[¶33]   Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, (1972) announced 
the benchmark test that applies to constitutional speedy trial claims.  "Under that test, 
we consider four factors in determining whether a speedy trial violation has 
occurred: 1) The length of the delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 3) the 
defendant's assertion of his right; and 4) the prejudice to the defendant." 
Id., at 
530-32.  We 
consider the factors together and balance them in relation to all of the 
relevant circumstances of the delay in bringing a defendant to trial.  Walters v. State, 2004 WY 37, ¶ 10, 87 P.3d 793, 795 
(Wyo. 2004); Barker, 407 U.S.  at 533.  The ultimate 
question is "whether the delay in bringing the accused to trial was 
unreasonable, that is, whether it substantially impaired the right of the 
accused to a fair trial." Walters, ¶ 10, 87 
P.3d. at 795 (quoting Warner v. State, 2001 WY 67, 
P10, 28 P.3d 21, 26 (Wyo. 
2001)).  When a 
defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial is violated, the charges must 
be dismissed with prejudice.  Walters, 
¶ 10, 87 P.3d  at 795.

 
 
[¶34]   We begin with the first factor of the 
Barker test - 
the length of the delay.6  There is no specific length of delay which 
automatically constitutes a violation of the constitutional right to a speedy 
trial.  We 
have, however, held that a delay of 500 days was presumptively prejudicial, 
while delays of 372, 355, and 319 days, respectively, warranted further 
analysis.  Sisneros, 
¶ 18, 121 P.3d  at 797; e.g., Berry, ¶ 32, 93 P.3d  at 231; Whitney v. State, 2004 WY 118, ¶ 40, 99 P.3d 457, 471 (Wyo. 
2004).

 
 
[¶35]   Here, Potter was arrested on September 
26, 2004, and entered his conditional plea on September 23, 2005, resulting in a 
total delay in resolution of his case of 362 days.  As we acknowledged 
in both Berry and Sisneros, once a 
defendant's speedy trial right has attached, it continues until the case is 
finally resolved.  
Sisneros, 
¶ 19, 121 P.3d  at 797; Berry, ¶ 32, 93 P.3d  at 231 (quoting 4 
Wayne R. LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, 
and Nancy J. King, Criminal Procedure, § 18.1(c) at 
670-71 (2d ed. 1999)).  Similar to Sisneros, and 
consistent with other prior cases, we conclude that a delay of 362 days between 
Potter's arrest and the final resolution of his case warrants examination of the 
other three factors.

 
 
[¶36]   That brings us to the second factor  
the reason for the delay.  In conducting this analysis, we determine 
which party was responsible for the delay.  Sisneros, ¶ 20, 121 P.3d  at 797.  We quoted Barker in Sisneros:

 
 
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper 
the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral 
reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily 
but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such 
circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. 
Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to justify 
appropriate delay.

 
 

Sisneros, ¶ 20, 121 P.3d  at 797 (citations 
omitted).  We 
further stated in Sisneros:

 
 
Official bad faith in causing delay is weighed heavily 
against the government.  Barker v. Wing, 
407 U.S. 514 at 531, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972).  "Delays attributable to the defendant are 
deducted from the equation."  Jennings 
v. State, 4 P.3d 915, 921 (Wyo. 
2000).  "We 
weigh any delay properly attributable to the defendant against the delay 
chargeable to the State.  We have frequently acknowledged a defendant 
may defeat his claim to a speedy trial by his own dilatory practices."  Wehr, 841 P.2d  at 113.

 
 

Sisneros, ¶ 20, 121 P.3d  at 797.

 
 
[¶37]   Potter argues that the State and the 
district court are largely responsible for the delay in this case - such as the 
trial being continued due to a stacked docket, the various assignments to 
different judges, and the State asking for reconsideration of Potter's 
competency.  
However, as discussed at length above, the largest part of the delay can 
be attributed to Potter when he pleaded "not guilty by reason of mental illness 
or deficiency and not competent to stand trial," and specifically requested a 
mental evaluation.  
The resulting impediments in the progression of Potter's case were 
exacerbated by Potter himself, in several instances.  For example, he 
requested a mental evaluation, but then told the examiner not to complete and 
finalize the report.  
The record also reflects that he was uncertain as to what, if any, 
evidence of his mental illness he wished to introduce in his defense, further 
complicating matters.  
We conclude, therefore, that the delay was largely due to Potter, and 
that any reason for delay caused by the State and Court can be considered 
neutral.

 
 
[¶38]   In discussing the third factor, whether 
or not a defendant affirmatively asserted his right to a speedy trial, we have 
said the following:

 
 
[I]t is not necessary for a defendant to assert his right 
to a speedy trial in order to identify a speedy trial violation. However, we 
can, and do, consider whether the right was asserted, and how vigorously, in 
determining the reasonableness of any delay. The action or inaction of the 
defendant in this regard is a reflection of the actual amount of prejudice being 
experienced.

 
 

Whitney, ¶ 52, 99 P.3d  at 474 (citations omitted).

 
 
[¶39]   Indeed, Potter filed two formal demands 
for a speedy trial on November 10, 2004, and again on November 23, 2004.  Later, a few days 
before he conditionally pleaded guilty, he filed a Motion to Dismiss 
Charges With Prejudice for Violation of Defendant's Right to Speedy 
Trial.  
However, this motion, which was filed only five days before trial and 
almost two months after the district court granted a continuance, in combination 
with the fact that Potter did not object when the district court continued the 
trial from July 11, 2005, to September 26, 2005, amounts to a less than vigorous 
assertion of his rights.  Furthermore, the record reflects no evidence 
of any intentional delay on the part of the State in order to gain a tactical 
advantage.  
Potter's trial was delayed primarily by his own actions.

 
 
[¶40]   Finally, the last Barker factor to 
consider is the degree of prejudice suffered by a defendant.  A demonstration of 
prejudice is not necessary to establishing a constitutional violation.  However, in 
conducting a speedy trial analysis, the prejudice suffered by the defendant 
should be considered.  
Sisneros, 
¶ 28, 121 P.3d  at 797.   Barker sets out three interests that the right to speedy trial was 
intended to protect and by which the level of prejudice is to be measured: (1) 
"to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration;" (2) "to minimize anxiety and 
concern of the accused;" and (3) "to limit the possibility that the defense will 
be impaired,"  
Barker, 
407 U.S.  at 532. 

 
 
[¶41]   Of these factors, the possibility that 
a defendant's defense will be impaired is the "most serious" factor "because the 
inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of 
the entire system." Whitney, ¶ 54, 99 P.3d  at 475.   Pretrial 
anxiety "is the least significant" factor and because a "certain amount of 
pretrial anxiety naturally exists," an appellant must demonstrate that he 
suffered "extraordinary or unusual" pretrial anxiety.  Id.  The length of 
the delay, alone, does not raise a presumption of prejudice. Furthermore, as we 
have stated repeatedly, that Potter's actions led to a significant amount of the 
delay weighs against a finding of presumed prejudice.  Id., ¶ 55, 99 P.3d  at 475; Sisneros, ¶ 29, 121 P.3d  at 800.  Thus, a defendant 
has the burden of showing actual prejudice.  Id.

 
 
[¶42]   Here, Potter claims that he was 
prejudiced by the length of his pretrial incarceration, from September 26, 2004, 
to September 23, 2005.7  Undeniably, his liberty was severely 
restricted, and his extended incarceration necessarily affected his "employment 
opportunities, financial resources and association" with family and 
friends.  
Berry, 
¶ 48, 93 P.3d  at 237.  Therefore, Potter may have suffered some 
incidental prejudice as a result of the delay.  However, when all of the factors are 
considered together, we conclude that he was not denied his constitutional right 
to a speedy trial.

 
 
[¶43]   While a delay of almost one year 
necessitates careful analysis, the length of the delay was not so excessive that 
it resulted in a presumption of prejudice.  The critical aspect of this case is the 
parties' relative contributions to the delay.  Although Potter was prejudiced to a very 
limited extent as a result of the delay, his much weightier contribution to the 
delay counsels against finding that he was denied his constitutional right to a 
speedy trial.

 
 
[¶44]   The Judgment and Sentence of the 
district court, as well as its order revoking probation, are affirmed in all 
respects.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1At the time of the 
hearing, the WyomingStateHospital had conducted an 
examination of Potter, but had not yet completed or filed a report.

 
 

2The record does not 
indicate why the trial was not held on July 11, 2005.  However, the record 
does show that the present case was stacked third on July 11.  Neither party 
requested a continuance, nor does there appear to be an objection to the new 
setting by either party.

 
 

3Potter pleaded to this 
charge in accordance with an amended information which was filed September 23, 
2005, the same day as his change of plea.

 
 

4In Almada v. State, 994 P.2d 299, 304 
(Wyo. 1999), this Court held that 
the speedy trial clock stops ticking at the change of plea hearing when the 
court accepts the defendant's conditional guilty plea.  See also Sisneros v. 
State, 2005 WY 139, ¶ 19, 121 P.3d 790, 797 (Wyo. 
2005).

 
 

5As to these two issues, 
the record is not crystal clear.  However, there is indication that, as to the 
examination report, defense counsel had requested it not be provided to the 
court due to Potter's desire to change his plea.  Furthermore, as to the court not addressing 
his request to change his plea, there is some indication in the record that 
there were safety issues with Potter, as he had experienced a psychotic episode 
while in custody.

 
 

6For constitutional speedy trial claims, the 
proverbial clock begins ticking upon arrest.  Taylor v. State, 2001 WY 13, ¶ 6, 17 P.3d 715, 718 (Wyo. 
2001). 

 
 

7Potter was taken into 
custody on September 26, 2004, and released on his own recognizance on September 
23, 2005.