Case Title: Murfin Drilling Co. v. Poe

Citation: 191 Kan. 637, 383 P.2d 972

Docket Number: 43,247

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1963-07-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
191 Kan. 637 (1963)
383 P.2d 972
MURFIN DRILLING COMPANY, a Partnership composed of I.W. MURFIN; FRED MURFIN; and W.R. MURFIN, Appellees,
v.
EMMA PRATHER POE, Appellant, and M.R. WATERS; BERT YOUNG; HOMER HUNTZINGER; THE FOURTH NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Wichita, Kansas; COLORADO NATIONAL BANK of Denver; ATLAS OIL CO., INC., RALPH L. HINNEN; THE SECURITY NATIONAL BANK of Kansas City; SOCONY OIL COMPANY; and JAMES SHEWMAKER, Receiver, Appellees.
No. 43,247

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed July 10, 1963.
George Stallwitz, of Wichita, argued the cause, and W.F. Lilleston, George C. Spradling, Henry V. Gott, Ralph M. Hope, Richard W. Stavely, Charles S. Lindberg, and Ronald M. Gott, all of Wichita, were with him on the briefs for appellant.
Laverne Morin, of Wichita, argued the cause, and George B. Collins, Oliver H. Hughes, Robert Martin, K.W. Pringle, Jr., W.F. Schell, and Robert M. Collins, all of Wichita, were with him on the briefs for appellees, Murfin *638 Drilling Company, a partnership composed of I.W. Murfin, Fred Murfin and W.R. Murfin.
Thomas C. Forbes, Harold G. Forbes, and George Forbes, all of Eureka, were on the briefs for appellee, Bert Young.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, C.J.:
This is an appeal from an order of partition by sale of the working interest in two unitized oil and gas leases.
The order was issued on the pleadings and motions to be presently noted. The disputed issues were reserved for future trial without prejudice to the rights of any of the cotenants because of the partition order.
The general facts as disclosed by the pleadings are stated in the trial court's order of partition, pertinent portions of which read:
..............
The contractual rights owned by Emma Prather Poe should be specifically mentioned. Originally all the working interest in the leases was owned by Mrs. Poe. All of the interests of the present *639 cotenants stemmed from an instrument executed by Mrs. Poe which reserved to her, in addition to an overriding royalty of 1/8th of the 7/8ths working interest which is not effected by the partition, (1) a 5/32nds working interest, free of development expense; (2) an operating expense credit which has now ripened into a lien against the remaining 27/32nds working interest in the amount of $3,975.92; and (3) the right to purchase the leases, or any well, at the salvage value, if the owners of the 27/32nds working interest should decide to abandon.
We will pass for the moment the consideration of certain cross-petitions and rulings made by the court in connection with demurrers to such pleadings.
After issues were joined by the pleadings the plaintiffs (Murfin Drilling company, a partnership composed of I.W. Murfin, Fred Murfin and W.R. Murfin), hereinafter referred to as appellees, filed a motion for a decree of partition with a sale if necessary, "the proceeds of the sale of such interest be held by the clerk of the court pending a determination of the interest of all parties concerned."
Mrs. Poe, the defendant and only appellant here, filed a "Motion for Sale," which stated:
In its order of partition the trial court, after setting out the interests of the cotenants in the working interest, ordered and decreed:
Mrs. Poe, hereinafter referred to as appellant, has appealed contending that:
The appellant is in no position to object on appeal to an order which she requested in the court below. It will be noted that, as heretofore indicated, she specifically requested an order decreeing partition by sale if necessary, and if necessary, "then decreeing that any sale of Emma Prather Poe's 5/32 working interest be subject to the contracts attached as Exhibit "A" and "B" to her answer heretofore filed herein and also subject to her 1/8 overriding royalty."
Appellant did not request that the 27/32nds working interest be sold subject to her contractual rights. She requested that her 5/32nds be sold subject to her contractual rights. When property is sold subject to encumbrances and contractual obligations, such burdens follow and attach to the title of the purchaser. By the same token when property is sold subject to contractual benefits, such benefits follow and attach to the title of the purchaser.
The appellant might have objected to the partition and sale of her 5/32nds interest for the reason that it carried obligations against the remaining working interests which were difficult or impossible to determine. She did not choose to do so and cannot reverse her position on appeal to this court. See Gilliland v. Kansas Soya Products Co., 189 Kan. 446 370 P.2d 78, where it is said:
It does not appear from the record that appellant's rights have been seriously affected. The purchaser at the partition sale will take the 27/32nds working interest subject to the contractual obligations. He will take the 5/32nds working interest subject to *641 the contractual benefits. One will offset the other. The purchaser will take the entire working interest, and the value of the working interest will be so determined. The appellant's lien in the amount of $3,975.92 and the value of her contractual benefits will be deducted from the proceeds of the sale which would otherwise go to the 27/32nds working interest. The court appears to have so ordered by including the following language in its order:
The appellant answered the petition for partition and cross-petitioned against the appellees for damages in the amount of $351,500.00 for improper management of the leases. The trial court sustained appellees' demurrer to the cross-petition for the reason it constituted a misjoinder of causes of action.
The appellant also filed a cross-petition in which she sought a personal judgment against defendant Bert Young, her original assignee, for the $3,975.92 which had become a lien on the 27/32nds working interest. Young's demurrer to this cross-petition was also sustained.
The appellant's claims of error on the rulings on both demurrers are without merit. Her first cross-petition seeks a personal judgment against appellees. Her second cross-petition seeks a personal judgment against defendant Bert Young who holds a reversionary interest in the leases. The controversies do not affect the title, or the interest in, the leases.
The appellant calls our attention to G.S. 1949, 60-2114, which provides:
Appellant also suggests, this court has held that in administering the provisions of the statute, the trial court has the same powers as were exercised by courts of chancery under equity practice, including full power to settle all questions involved on just and equitable principles. So it has. (Hurley v. Painter, 180 Kan. 552, 306 P.2d 184; Browne v. Loriaux, 189 Kan. 56, 366 P.2d 1016.)
However, appellant attempts to stretch the rule too far. The "questions involved" must relate to the title or some interest affecting *642 the property in question. Where numerous cotenants are involved, one cotenant cannot use an action for partition as a vehicle to settle personal differences with another, which are unrelated to the partition of the property.
Appellant further suggests that the second cross-petition "merely sought to enforce Young's personal liability for the amount due as ancillary to foreclosure of the lien." The lien was a matter of record. It necessarily has to be recognized in the partition action. If the interest to which the lien attached was not sold subject to the lien, the lien attached to the proceeds of the sale. The second cross-petition could accomplish nothing more than a personal judgment against Young.
Our careful examination of the record discloses no error which would justify a reversal of the trial court's action in this case.
The judgment is affirmed.