Case Title: P. v. Reed

Citation: 

Docket Number: S136345

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2006-07-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 7/3/06 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S136345 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/5 A107999 
VINCENT REED, 
) 
 
) 
San Francisco County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 192303 
___________________________________ ) 
 
On January 24, 2004, two San Francisco police officers found defendant, 
Vincent Reed, a convicted felon, in possession of a loaded and concealed .25-
caliber automatic pistol.  In addition to other crimes not relevant here, he was 
charged with and convicted of (1) being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. 
Code, § 12021, subd. (a)(1)),1 (2) carrying a concealed firearm (§ 12025, subd. 
(a)(2)), and (3) carrying a loaded firearm while in a public place (§ 12031, subd. 
(a)(2)(A)).  The court sentenced him to prison for three years on the first count, 
including a prior prison term enhancement, and stayed the sentences on the 
remaining weapons counts.  The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment.  
Defendant contends he was improperly convicted of being a felon in possession of 
a firearm in addition to the other weapons crimes. 
In general, a person may be convicted of, although not punished for, more 
than one crime arising out of the same act or course of conduct.  “In California, a 
                                              
1  
All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code. 
 
2
single act or course of conduct by a defendant can lead to convictions ‘of any 
number of the offenses charged.’  (§ 954, italics added; People v. Ortega (1998) 
19 Cal.4th 686, 692.)”  (People v. Montoya (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031, 1034.)  
Section 954 generally permits multiple conviction.  Section 654 is its counterpart 
concerning punishment.  It prohibits multiple punishment for the same “act or 
omission.”  When section 954 permits multiple conviction, but section 654 
prohibits multiple punishment, the trial court must stay execution of sentence on 
the convictions for which multiple punishment is prohibited.  (People v. Ortega, 
supra, at p. 692; People v. Pearson (1986) 42 Cal.3d 351, 359-360.)  Here, the 
trial court stayed execution of sentence on two of the weapons convictions, so 
multiple punishment is not at issue.  This case concerns only multiple conviction. 
A judicially created exception to the general rule permitting multiple 
conviction “prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included 
offenses.”  (People v. Montoya, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1034.)  “[I]f a crime cannot 
be committed without also necessarily committing a lesser offense, the latter is a 
lesser included offense within the former.”  (People v. Lopez (1998) 19 Cal.4th 
282, 288.)  Defendant argues that, as charged, being a felon in possession of a 
firearm is a lesser included offense of the other two weapons crimes, thus 
prohibiting conviction of the former crime. 
The question whether one offense is necessarily included in another arises 
in various contexts.  A common one is deciding whether a defendant charged with 
one crime may be convicted of a lesser uncharged crime.  A defendant may be 
convicted of an uncharged crime if, but only if, the uncharged crime is necessarily 
included in the charged crime.  (§ 1159; People v. Lohbauer (1981) 29 Cal.3d 364, 
368-369.)  The reason for this rule is settled.  “ ‘This reasoning rests upon a 
constitutional basis:  “Due process of law requires that an accused be advised of 
the charges against him in order that he may have a reasonable opportunity to 
 
3
prepare and present his defense and not be taken by surprise by evidence offered at 
his trial.” [Citation.]’ ”  (People v. Lohbauer, supra, at p. 368.)  The required 
notice is provided as to any charged offense and any lesser offense that is 
necessarily committed when the charged offense is committed.  (Id. at pp. 368-
369.) 
We have applied two tests in determining whether an uncharged offense is 
necessarily included within a charged offense:  the “elements” test and the 
“accusatory pleading” test.  Under the elements test, if the statutory elements of 
the greater offense include all of the statutory elements of the lesser offense, the 
latter is necessarily included in the former.  Under the accusatory pleading test, if 
the facts actually alleged in the accusatory pleading include all of the elements of 
the lesser offense, the latter is necessarily included in the former.  (People v. 
Lopez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 288-289.)  Defendant does not claim that being a 
felon in possession of a firearm is necessarily included within the other weapons 
offenses under the elements test.  He does, however, argue that it is necessarily 
included under the accusatory pleading test. 
In this case, the amended information alleged as to all three weapons 
offenses that defendant was a convicted felon.  Accordingly, as charged, defendant 
could not commit the crimes of carrying a concealed firearm and carrying a loaded 
firearm while in a public place without also being a felon in possession of a 
firearm.  The Court of Appeal concluded, however, that the accusatory pleading 
test does not apply to determine whether a defendant may be convicted of multiple 
charged offenses.  We granted defendant’s petition for review to decide whether 
the Court of Appeal was correct. 
Several opinions, including some from this court, have assumed, without 
discussion, that both the elements and the accusatory pleading tests apply in 
deciding whether multiple conviction of charged offenses is proper.  But in each 
 
4
case, the assumption was unnecessary to the holding because each opinion either 
found the offenses not necessarily included or actually applied only the elements 
test.  (People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.3d 983, 988; People v. Ortega, supra, 19 
Cal.4th at p. 698; People v. Murphy (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1504, 1507-1508; 
People v. Belmares (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 19, 23; People v. Strohman (2000) 84 
Cal.App.4th 1313, 1316; People v. Thomas (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 299, 305; 
People v. Nicholson (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 617, 623; see also People v. Ausbie 
(2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 855, 862-863 [recognizing the question and applying the 
accusatory pleading test out of caution, then holding that the offenses are not 
necessarily included].) 
We have found no opinion invalidating multiple convictions due to the 
accusatory pleading test.2  In People v. Pearson, supra, 42 Cal.3d at page 356, 
footnote 2, we noted that, “while an expanded definition of necessarily included 
offenses [i.e., employing both the elements test and the accusatory pleading test] 
may be appropriate in the context of [conviction of an uncharged offense], there 
appears little reason to enlarge the meaning of the same phrase as it is used in 
other situations.”  We did not, however, decide the question because the offenses 
                                              
2  
The concurring and dissenting opinion claims that People v. Richardson 
(1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 70 and People v. Johnson (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 844, and 
perhaps even People v. Rogers (1971) 5 Cal.3d 129, somehow support its position.  
(Conc. & dis. opn., post, at pp. 2-3.)  The continuing validity of the rule stated in 
these old cases is dubious in light of more recent events.  (See People v. Watterson 
(1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 942, 944-947; People v. Thomas, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at 
pp. 304-306.)  We need not decide this question, because those cases, even if still 
valid, are irrelevant to the issue here.  They do not say that “the accusatory 
pleading alleged facts that, if proven, would establish that the defendant’s 
transportation of the drugs necessarily included possessing those drugs . . . .”  
(Conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 3.)  Indeed, none of those decisions even mentions 
the accusatory pleading test or the actual accusatory pleading, and none of them 
suggests that the accusatory pleading contained anything other than the statutory 
elements.  Whatever the basis might be for the rule stated in those cases, it is not 
the accusatory pleading test. 
 
5
were not included in each other even under the accusatory pleading test.  (Ibid.)  
More recently, we again recognized this question but did not decide it.  (People v. 
Montoya, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1035-1036.) 
As we noted in People v. Montoya, supra, 33 Cal.4th at page 1035, the 
Court of Appeal decisions that specifically consider this question have concluded 
that the accusatory pleading test does not apply in deciding whether multiple 
conviction of charged offenses is proper.  (People v. Miranda (1994) 21 
Cal.App.4th 1464, 1467; People v. Watterson, supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at p. 947, fn. 
15; People v. Scheidt (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 162, 165-171.)  Now that the 
question is squarely presented, we agree.  In deciding whether multiple conviction 
is proper, a court should consider only the statutory elements.  Or, as formulated in 
Scheidt, “only a statutorily lesser included offense is subject to the bar against 
multiple convictions in the same proceeding.  An offense that may be a lesser 
included offense because of the specific nature of the accusatory pleading is not 
subject to the same bar.”  (People v. Scheidt, supra, at pp. 165-166.) 
The accusatory pleading test arose to ensure that defendants receive notice 
before they can be convicted of an uncharged crime.  “As to a lesser included 
offense, the required notice is given when the specific language of the accusatory 
pleading adequately warns the defendant that the People will seek to prove the 
elements of the lesser offense.”  (People v. Lohbauer, supra, 29 Cal.3d at pp. 368-
369.)  “Because a defendant is entitled to notice of the charges, it makes sense to 
look to the accusatory pleading (as well as the elements of the crimes) in deciding 
whether a defendant had adequate notice of an uncharged lesser offense so as to 
permit conviction of that uncharged offense.”  (People v. Montoya, supra, 33 
Cal.4th at p. 1039 (conc. opn. of Chin, J.).)  But this purpose has no relevance to 
deciding whether a defendant may be convicted of multiple charged offenses.  
“[I]t makes no sense to look to the pleading, rather than just the legal elements, in 
 
6
deciding whether conviction of two charged offenses is proper.  Concerns about 
notice are irrelevant when both offenses are separately charged . . . .”  (Ibid.) 
The Legislature has defined three separate weapons offenses:  possessing a 
firearm by a felon, carrying a concealed firearm, and carrying a loaded firearm in a 
public place.  Defendant committed each of these crimes, albeit during the same 
course of conduct.  The Legislature has made clear that a defendant may be 
convicted of more than one offense even if they arise out of the same act or course 
of conduct.  (§ 954.)  We see no reason to prohibit multiple convictions that 
section 954 permits simply because of the way the offenses are charged.  “To 
immunize” defendant from conviction of being a felon in possession of a firearm 
simply because the felony conviction was alleged as to each of the weapons 
offenses “would be irrational and would frustrate the strong legislative purpose 
behind [all three] statutes.”  (People v. Scheidt, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at p. 171.) 
Applying the accusatory pleading test to charged crimes could also lead to 
absurd results.  Assume, for example, that the defendant robbed and killed 
someone and was charged with robbery and murder for those actions.  Under the 
elements test, neither robbery nor murder is necessarily included in the other.  One 
can easily rob without murdering and murder without robbing.  Conviction of both 
crimes would be fully warranted.  But if the prosecutor had alleged as to the 
robbery that the force used in the crime consisted of killing the victim with malice, 
then, as alleged, the defendant could not have committed the robbery without also 
committing murder.  If the accusatory pleading test applied, conviction of both 
crimes would be impermissible.  Moreover, the murder would be necessarily 
included in the robbery, not the other way around, which presumably would 
require vacating the murder conviction.  This outcome would be absurd, would 
 
7
violate the legislative mandate permitting multiple conviction (§ 954), and would 
serve no apparent purpose.3 
Defendant argues that “[j]ust as a ‘rose is a rose is a rose is a rose’ 
(Gertrude Stein, ‘Sacred Emily’ (1913)), a lesser included offense is a lesser 
included offense is a lesser included offense.”  He contends we must maintain a 
“logical consistency” in the definition of a necessarily included offense “to make 
the scheme workable and logical.”  However, we believe it is logically consistent 
to apply the accusatory pleading test when it is logical to do so (to ensure adequate 
notice) but not when it is illogical to do so (when doing so merely defeats the 
legislative policy permitting multiple conviction).  Our conclusion results in a 
straightforward overall rule:  Courts should consider the statutory elements and 
accusatory pleading in deciding whether a defendant received notice, and therefore 
may be convicted, of an uncharged crime, but only the statutory elements in 
deciding whether a defendant may be convicted of multiple charged crimes.  This 
rule is not overly complex and, we believe, is quite workable. 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
CHIN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CORRIGAN, J.
                                              
3  
The concurring and dissenting opinion would avoid this problem by 
adopting a modified version of the accusatory pleading rule.  It would disregard 
“allegations in the accusatory pleading that do not allege elements of the offense” 
(conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 4) and, presumably, consider only allegations that do 
allege elements of the offense.  We see no support for this version of the 
accusatory pleading test either in the cases or in logic; it merely adds complexity 
for no apparent purpose. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY MORENO, J. 
 
I disagree with the majority’s view that a court never should consider the 
language of the accusatory pleading in deciding whether multiple convictions are 
proper.  But I reach the same result as the majority in the present case, because the 
parties agree that defendant’s status as a convicted felon is not an element of the 
crimes of carrying a concealed firearm and possessing a loaded firearm in public 
and, thus, the allegations in those counts that defendant was a felon should not be 
considered in determining whether multiple convictions are proper. 
“[T]his court has long held that multiple convictions may not be based on 
necessarily included offenses.”  (People v. Pearson (1986) 42 Cal.3d 351, 355.)  
In determining whether a defendant properly may be convicted of two crimes 
based upon a single act or course of conduct, we examine both “the elements of 
the offenses and the language of the accusatory pleading.”  (People v. Ortega 
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 686, 698.)  We emphasized this point:  “The determination of 
whether an offense cannot be committed without necessarily committing the 
included offense must be based . . . upon the statutory definitions of both offenses 
and the language of the accusatory pleading. [Citations.]”  (Ibid.)  Similar 
language appears in our decision in People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, 988:  
“For purposes of the rule proscribing multiple conviction, ‘ “[u]nder California 
law, a lesser offense is necessarily included in a greater offense if either the 
statutory elements of the greater offense, or the facts actually alleged in the 
 
2 
accusatory pleading, include all the elements of the lesser offense, such that the 
greater cannot be committed without also committing the lesser.” ’ [Citation.]” 
The importance of the distinction between the elements test and the 
accusatory pleading test is demonstrated by our decision in People v. Rogers 
(1971) 5 Cal.3d 129, which held that the defendant properly could be convicted of 
transporting marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, §  11531) even though he had been 
acquitted of possessing marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, §  11530) because 
“possession of marijuana is not a necessary element of the offense of 
transportation of marijuana.”  (People v. Rogers, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 131.)  We 
explained that although usually a person must possess marijuana in order to 
transport it, this is not invariably so: “one may ‘transport’ marijuana or other drugs 
even though they are in the exclusive possession of another. . . . For example, were 
defendant shown to have aided and abetted his passengers in carrying, conveying 
or concealing drugs in their possession, his conduct would have sustained a 
conviction of transportation.”  (Id. at p. 134.)  We were quick to point out in a 
footnote, however:  “In cases where defendant’s possession is incidental to, and a 
necessary part of, the transportation charged, and no prior, different or subsequent 
possession is shown, the offense of possession is deemed to be necessarily 
included in the offense of transportation, and defendant may not be convicted of 
both charges. [Citations.]”  (Id. at p. 134, fn. 3.) 
Our decision in Rogers cited two decisions of the Court of Appeal that had 
held that a defendant could not be convicted of both possessing and transporting 
drugs where the act of transporting the drugs included possessing them.  People v. 
Richardson (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 70, 78, held that the defendant could not be 
convicted of both possessing heroin (Health & Saf. Code, § 11500) and 
transporting a narcotic (Health & Saf. Code, § 11501):  “The possession and 
transportation in the instant case clearly were the same act.  Under the 
 
3 
circumstances, the possession of the heroin was a lesser, but necessarily included, 
offense of the transportation of a narcotic.”  People v. Johnson (1970) 5 
Cal.App.3d 844, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Rubacalba (1993) 6 
Cal.4th 62, 66, held that the defendant could not be convicted of both possessing 
restricted dangerous drugs (Health & Saf. Code, § 11910) and transporting them 
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11912):  “[T]he possession proved in the instant case was 
incidental to, and a necessary part of, the transportation charged.  No prior, 
different or subsequent possession of the pill was shown. Under that circumstance 
the offense of possession was necessarily included in the offense of transporting 
the pill and appellant may not be convicted of both charges.  [Citations.]”  
(Johnson, supra, at p. 847.)1 
Under the elements test, therefore, a defendant may be convicted of both 
possessing and transporting the same drugs, because it is possible to transport 
drugs without possessing them.  But under the accusatory pleading test, if the 
accusatory pleading alleged facts that, if proven, would establish that the 
defendant’s transportation of the drugs necessarily included possessing those 
drugs, the defendant could not be convicted of both offenses. 
The majority unnecessarily departs from our past decisions based upon 
scanty reasoning that I do not find convincing.  The majority correctly observes 
that a defendant may be convicted of an uncharged offense that is necessarily 
included within a charged offense if the language of the accusatory pleading 
“adequately warns the defendant that the People will seek to prove the elements of 
the lesser offense.”  (People v. Lohbauer (1981) 29 Cal.3d 364, 369.)  From this, 
the majority leaps to the conclusion that the language of the accusatory pleading 
                                              
1  
We also cited in Rogers the decision in People v. Solo (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 
201, 208, which recognized that a defendant could properly be convicted of both 
possession of marijuana for sale and transportation of marijuana. 
 
4 
should not be considered in the present case because “this purpose has no 
relevance to deciding whether a defendant may be convicted of multiple charged 
offenses.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 5.) 
It is true that whether a defendant was given notice that the People would 
seek to prove the elements of a lesser offense does not affect whether multiple 
convictions are proper.  But the majority fails to consider that the language of the 
accusatory pleading not only gives the defendant notice of the charges, it also is 
instructive in determining the nature of the offense of which the defendant was 
convicted.  In People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, for example, we held that 
the trial court properly considered the language of the accusatory pleadings of two 
prior convictions in determining that the defendant had been convicted of 
residential burglary.  The trial court based its determination of the nature of the 
prior convictions on a review of “the record of each conviction, which included an 
accusatory pleading charging a residential burglary and defendant’s plea of guilty 
or nolo contendere.”  (Id. at p. 345.) 
In the same manner that the language of the accusatory pleading sheds light 
on the nature of a prior conviction, so too it sheds light on the nature of the crime 
of which a defendant was convicted for purposes of determining whether multiple 
convictions are proper.  But this does not mean that every allegation in an 
accusatory pleading affects whether multiple convictions are proper.  Consistent 
with our application of the accusatory pleading test in other contexts, I believe that 
allegations in the accusatory pleading that do not allege elements of the offense 
should not be considered in determining whether multiple convictions are proper. 
Accordingly, we need not, and should not, depart from our established, and 
correct, statements in People v. Sanchez, supra, 24 Cal.4th 983, 988 and People v. 
Ortega, supra, 19 Cal.4th 686, 698. 
 
5 
In the present case, defendant was convicted of three offenses, among 
others: being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, §  12021, subd. 
(a)(1))2, carrying a concealed firearm (§ 12025, subd. (a)(2)), and carrying a 
loaded firearm in public (§ 12031, subd. (a)(1)).  We must determine whether the 
offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm is necessarily included within 
the other two offenses.  If we do not consider the language of the accusatory 
pleading, the answer is no.  A person who carries a concealed weapon does not 
necessarily commit the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm.  The 
same is true of a person who carries a loaded firearm in public. 
But the accusatory pleading in the present case alleged that defendant was a 
felon in the counts charging him with carrying a concealed weapon and carrying a 
loaded weapon in public.  The apparent reason the prosecutor included those 
allegations is that those offenses are wobblers that can be punished as either 
felonies or misdemeanors depending upon several enumerated factors.  As 
relevant here, section 12025, subdivision (b)(1) provides that carrying a concealed 
firearm is a felony if the defendant previously has been convicted of a felony.  
Similarly, section 12031, subdivision (a)(2)(A) provides that carrying a loaded 
weapon in public is a felony if the defendant previously has been convicted of a 
felony. 
If we were to consider the allegations in the accusatory pleading in all three 
of the counts under examination that defendant was a felon, the analysis of 
whether the offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm is necessarily 
included within the other two offenses changes; the answer would be yes.  A felon 
who carries a concealed weapon necessarily also is a felon in possession of a 
firearm.  The same is true of a felon who carries a loaded firearm in public. 
                                              
2  
Further statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
 
6 
The parties agree, however, that defendant’s status as a felon is not an 
element of the crimes of carrying a concealed weapon and carrying a loaded 
weapon in public.  Rather, defendant’s status as a felon is a factor that elevates the 
sentence for the offense from a misdemeanor to a felony.  (People v. Padilla 
(2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 127, 138; People v. Hall (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 128, 134 
[“The prior conviction referred to in subdivision (b)(1) [of section 12025] is 
simply a sentencing factor which serves to elevate the offense from misdemeanor 
to felony; the prior conviction is not an element of the offense of carrying a 
concealed firearm within a vehicle proscribed in section 12025. [Citations.]”]; see 
also People v. Bouzas (1991) 53 Cal.3d 467, 473; People v. Robinson (2004) 122 
Cal.App.4th 275, 281.) 
In People v. Wolcott (1983) 34 Cal.3d 92, 101, we held that allegations of 
sentencing enhancements should not be considered in applying the accusatory 
pleading test to determine a trial court’s sua sponte duty to instruct the jury 
regarding lesser included offenses.  The defendant in Wolcott was charged with, 
and convicted of, robbery.  The defendant claimed on appeal that the trial court 
had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury that assault with a deadly weapon was a 
lesser included offense of robbery because the information alleged in addition to 
the robbery charge that the defendant used a firearm in committing the robbery 
within the meaning of section 12022.5.  Noting that “ ‘section 12022.5 does not 
prescribe a new offense but merely additional punishment for an offense in which 
a firearm is used,’ [citations]” we held “that an allegation of firearm use under 
section 12022.5 should not be considered in determining lesser included offense.”  
(People v. Wolcott, supra, at pp. 100-101.) 
In my view, the accusatory pleading test should be applied in a similar way 
to determine whether multiple convictions are proper.  In the present case, 
defendant’s status as a felon, although alleged in the information, is not an element 
 
7 
of the crimes of carrying a concealed firearm and carrying a loaded firearm in 
public but was a sentencing factor and, thus, should not be considered in 
determining whether defendant can be convicted of being a felon in possession of 
a firearm in addition to those crimes. 
Applying the accusatory pleading test in this manner to determine whether 
multiple convictions are permitted alleviates the concern expressed by the majority 
that using the accusatory pleading test could “lead to absurd results.”  (Maj. opn., 
ante at p. 6.)  The majority worries that if a hapless prosecutor were to allege in a 
charge of robbery “that the force used in the crime consisted of killing the victim 
with malice,” murder would become, under the accusatory pleading test, a 
necessarily lesser included offense of the robbery as pleaded.  That would not 
happen if the accusatory pleading test were applied in the manner I propose.  
Malice is not an element of the crime of robbery.  Thus, an unnecessary allegation 
in the accusatory pleading that a robbery was committed with malice should not be 
considered in applying the accusatory pleading test to determine if multiple 
convictions are permitted. 
Accordingly, I agree with the result reached by the majority, but not with 
its reasoning. 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Reed 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 7/12/05 – 1st Dist., Div.5 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S136345 
Date Filed: July 3, 2006 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Francisco 
Judge: John Kennedy Stewart 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
John F. Schuck, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief 
Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Stan Helfman, Melissa R. Krum 
and Jeffery M. Laurence, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
John F. Schuck 
Law Offices of John F. Schuck 
4083 Transport Street, Suite B 
Palo Alto, CA  94303 
(650) 856-7963 
 
Jeffrey M. Laurence 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5897