Case Title: BELL v. SCHELL

Citation: 

Docket Number: 03-241

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-12-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
BELL v. SCHELL2004 WY 153101 P.3d 465Case Number: 03-241, 04-1Decided: 12/02/2004Notice:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 
 
                                                                                                                                   

 
 
TERRY 
BELL,

 
 
Appellant(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
CHRIS J. 
SCHELL, state trooper for the

Wyoming 
State Highway Patrol; 
DAVE FERGUSON,

Northern 
Zone Commander for the Wyoming

State 
Highway Patrol; GARY MARSDEN,

Operations 
Commander for the WyomingState

Highway 
Patrol; and JOHN COX, Administrator

for the 
Wyoming State 
Highway Patrol,

 
 
Appellees(Defendants).

 
 
ANITA 
CLARK,

 
 
Appellant(Plaintiff),

 
 
v.

 
 
QUINCE 
OLSEN and THE STATE OF WYOMING,

DEPARTMENT 
OF AGRICULTURE,

 
 
Appellees(Defendants).

 
 

 
 

Representing 
Appellant Terry Bell in Case No. 03-241:

 
 
            
John H. Robinson of Jamieson & Robinson, LLC, Casper, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellant Anita Clark in Case No. 04-1:

 
 
            
Todd Hambrick and Stephanie Hambrick of Krampner, Fuller & Hambrick, 
Casper, Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees in Case No. 03-241:

 
 
            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney 
General; and Craig E. Kirkwood, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellees in Case No. 04-1:

 
 
            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General, John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney 
General; and Misha E. Westby, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 
 
 
 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 
 
 
 
  
            
VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      These unrelated 
cases were consolidated for argument on appeal because they involve the same 
legal issue:  the requirements for a 
valid notice of claim under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (the WGCA).  In both cases, we affirm the granting of 
summary judgment to the defendants.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

            
Case No. 03-241

 
 
[¶2]      On September 22, 
2000, Terry Bell (Bell) was involved in the third of a series of 
car accidents caused by poor weather conditions.  Bell was 
asked by a responding Wyoming state trooper to sit in a patrol 
vehicle at the scene.  The patrol 
vehicle was subsequently struck by another oncoming vehicle, causing the 
injuries claimed by Bell in this case.

 
 
[¶3]      On November 20, 
2001, Bell 
presented to the State a notice of claim seeking compensation as a result of the 
collision.  The claim was denied and 
Bell filed suit 
in federal district court.  That 
suit was later dismissed without prejudice and, on March 20, 2003, Bell filed a complaint in 
state district court.

 
 
[¶4]      In their answer 
to the latter complaint, the State alleged that Bell's notice of claim failed to comply with 
Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7 and, therefore, failed to comply with the WGCA.  The State also filed a motion for 
judgment on the pleadings or, in the alternative, for summary judgment.  The gravamen of the State's argument was 
that the notice of claim was not signed by Bell, but by his attorney, and it was not 
certified under penalty of perjury.  
The district court heard and begrudgingly granted the State's 
motion:

 
 
            
While this judge has some significant reservations concerning the legal 
analysis supporting the Beaulieu [v. Florquist, 2001 WY 33, ¶¶ 15, 
17, 20 P.3d 521, 527 (Wyo.2001)] ruling, it appears that the mandates of that 
decision are clear.  Applying those 
mandates to the matter at hand, it is necessary to conclude that the initial 
claim submitted on behalf of Bell does not comply with the requirements that 
it be signed by the claimant, and that it be certified under penalty of 
perjury.

 
 
The 
district court refers to the "initial" claim because, on December 7, 2002, while 
the matter was pending in federal court, Bell presented and served on the State a 
document entitled "Certification Under Wyo. Const. Art. 16 § 7," in which he 
certified to the truth and accuracy of the notice of claim, under penalty of 
perjury, and certified that his attorney signed the notice of claim with 
Bell's knowledge 
and authority.

 
 
            
Case No. 04-1

 
 
[¶5]      On June 3, 1999, 
Anita Clark (Clark) was driving a vehicle that 
collided with a vehicle being driven by Quince Olsen, an employee of the State 
Department of Agriculture.  On May 
10, 2001, Clark presented to the State a notice 
of claim based upon the accident.  
Upon receiving no response to the notice of claim, Clark filed a complaint in state district court on May 1, 
2002.

 
 

[¶6]      The State 
responded to Clark's complaint by filing a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted.  The basis for the motion 
was the fact that the notice of claim was not certified under penalty of 
perjury, as required by the WGCA, by Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7, and by 
Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2001 WY 33, ¶ 17, 20 P.3d 521, 527 (Wyo. 
2001) (Beaulieu I).  Clark 
then immediately filed in the district court a document entitled "Certification 
Under Wyo. Const. Art. 16 § 7," in which she certified under penalty of perjury 
that the notice of claim was true and accurate and that it had been signed by 
her attorney with her knowledge and authority.  After a hearing, the district court 
denied the State's motion to dismiss.  
The district court's findings and conclusions were (1) it had subject 
matter jurisdiction; (2) the notice of claim contained all required information; 
and (3) based on Martinez v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949 (Wyo. 1990), 
overruled by Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2004 WY 31, 86 P.3d 863 (Wyo. 2004) 
(Beaulieu II), 
Clark's failure to certify the initial notice of claim under penalty of perjury 
was not fatal to the claim.

 
 
[¶7]      Following the 
district court's ruling on its motion to dismiss, the State answered the 
complaint and filed a motion for summary judgment.  The motion for summary judgment asked 
the district court to look once again at Beaulieu I and to reconsider its 
conclusion that Clark's initial notice of claim 
was valid.  The State argued that 
Beaulieu I clearly mandated that, to be valid, a notice of claim must 
meet the requirements of both the WGCA and Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7, meaning 
that Clark's initial notice of claim was not 
valid because it did not meet the constitutional signature and certification 
requirements.  Further, the State 
contended that Clark's belated attempt to cure 
that defect failed because it was done after the statutory period for filing a 
notice of claim had expired.  The 
district court agreed and granted summary judgment.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶8]      We will restate 
the issues as follows:

 
 
            
1.         
Were the initial notices of claim invalid because they were neither 
signed by the claimants nor certified under penalty of 
perjury?

 
 
            
2.         
If the initial notices of claim were invalid, was that invalidity 
overcome by application of Wyoming's savings 
statute?

 
 
            
3.         
If the initial notices of claim were invalid, was that invalidity cured 
by later signature by the claimant certified under penalty of 
perjury?

 
 
            
4.         
Should the State be equitably estopped from raising the constitutional 
signature and certification requirements as a defense?

 
 
            
5.         
Do the district court's rulings violate public 
policy?

 
 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
 
 

[¶9]      Our standard for 
reviewing summary judgments was set forth in Beaulieu I, 2001 WY 33, ¶¶ 
8-10, 20 P.3d  at 525-26, and 
need not be repeated herein.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
            
Validity of the Initial Claims

 
 

[¶10]   Beaulieu I did not create 
new law.  Rather, Beaulieu I 
clarified that it has always been the law that governmental claims must meet 
the requirements not just of the WGCA, but also of Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 
7.  Beaulieu I, 2001 WY 33, 
¶¶ 13, 15-17, 20 P.3d  at 526-27.  See also Beaulieu II, 2004 WY 31, 
¶¶ 5-9, 86 P.3d at 865-66 and Yoak v. Ide, 2004 WY 32, ¶ 6, 
86 P.3d 872, 874 (Wyo. 2004).  A claim that has not been signed by the 
claimant and certified under penalty of perjury is not a valid claim.  Neither the Bell notice of claim nor the Clark notice of claim was valid, and the filing of an 
invalid claim is the same as the filing of no claim at all.  That was the lesson of Beaulieu 
I.

 
 

[¶11]   The direct effect of the 
holding in Beaulieu I was to save the plaintiffs' cause of action from a 
statute of limitations attack.  This 
Court reversed the district court's application of the one-year period for 
filing an action based upon a governmental claim because no valid governmental 
claim had yet been presented.  
Beaulieu I, 2001 WY 33, ¶¶ 15-17, 20 P.3d  at 527.  Certainly, having said that a defendant 
may not rely upon an invalid claimthat is, one that has not met the 
constitutional signature and certification requirementsin arguing in favor of 
application of the one-year period of limitations found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-39-114 (LexisNexis 2003), we cannot now say that a plaintiff may, to the 
contrary, rely upon a similarly invalid claim in arguing that he or she has met 
the two-year period of limitations found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 
(LexisNexis 2003).1  To repeat what we said in Beaulieu I, 
Beaulieu II, and Yoak, no governmental claim has been 
presented2 under the WGCA until a claim 
meeting the requirements of Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7 has been 
presented.

 
 
            
The Savings Statute

 
 
[¶12]   It is difficult to address this 
issue because the parties' arguments in regard to it are "like ships passing in 
the night" and because the district court did not consider the savings statute 
in its decision in either case.3  We will begin our discussion by reciting 
the statute:

 
 
            
If in an action commenced in due time a judgment for the plaintiff is 
reversed, or if the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits and the time 
limited for the commencement of the action has expired at the date of the 
reversal or failure, the plaintiff, or his representatives if he dies and if the 
cause of action survives, may commence a new action within one (1) year after 
the date of the failure or reversal.  
This provision also applies to any claim asserted in any pleading by a 
defendant.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-3-118 (LexisNexis 2003).

 
 
[¶13]   In their answer to Bell's state district court 
complaint, the State defendants alleged that the complaint was untimely in that 
it had not been "commenced in accordance with" the savings statute.  Bell's responsive motion to strike contended 
that his state court complaint was timely filed after his federal court 
complaint was dismissed.  In his 
brief opposing the State's motion for summary judgment, Bell broadened his argument 
by contending that, even if the savings statute did not apply, the statute of 
limitations was tolled during the pendency of the federal case.  In finding the claim presented by 
Bell to be defective, the district court 
mentioned neither the savings statute nor Bell's tolling argument.

 
 
[¶14]   Confusion begins to enter the 
picture in the parties' appellate briefs.  
Bell's 
principal brief restates his belief that his state court complaint was timely 
under the savings statute.  The 
State's brief, however, treats the savings statute issue as one having to do 
with the timely presentation of a notice of claim, as opposed to the timely 
filing of a complaint.  Beyond that, 
the State also contends that savings statutes do not apply to periods of 
limitation found in specialized statutes whose effect is to create a cause of 
action that did not exist at common law.  
Finally, in his reply brief, Bell points out that the savings statute played 
no part in the district court's decision, and he declines ever having "proposed 
that the savings statute extended to, or in any way affected his government 
claim."

 
 
[¶15]   We conclude that resolving the 
savings statute issue is not necessary to resolving these appeals.  As recognized by the district court, 
these cases rise and fall on the question of the validity of the notices of 
claim.  If the claims were not 
valid, it does not matter whether the complaints were timely filed.  Furthermore, Clark has not raised the 
issue at all, and Bell has not contended that the statute applies 
to the presentation of a notice of claim.  
We, therefore, will not further consider the matter.4

 
 
            
Cure

 
 
[¶16]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113(a) 
requires that a claim be presented to the governmental entity within two years 
of the alleged act, error, or omission.  
Two years from the Bell accident was September 22, 2002.  Two years from the Clark accident was June 3, 2001.  No valid claim was timely presented in 
either case.  Bell attempted to cure that 
deficiency on December 7, 2002, two-and-a-half months after the statutory period 
expired.  Clark's similar effort on May 28, 2002, was nearly a full 
year late.  Both Bell and Clark now want 
this Court to hold that their respective curative effort relates back to the 
date of presentment of the invalid notice of claim.

 
 
[¶17]   Bell's and Clark's cure 
argument is grounded in the relation back doctrine.  We recently described that doctrine, 
although in a different context:

 
 
The 
[relation back] doctrine invokes the "principle by which, when an act is done at 
one time, it is considered, by a fiction of law, as if done at some antecedent 
time."  2 Clesson S. Kinney, A 
Treatise on the Law of Irrigation and Water Rights § 743 at 1284-85 (2d 
ed.1912).

 
 

In re 
the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Big Horn River System, 
2002 WY 
89, ¶ 20, 48 P.3d 1040, 1049 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 
[¶18]   Before we discuss the possible 
application of the relation back doctrine in the present cases, it will be 
helpful to review the factual and legal context.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113(a) requires 
claims to be presented to the governmental entity within two years of the date 
of the alleged act, error, or omission.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-114 requires actions against governmental entities 
based on those claims to be filed within one year of such presentment.  We are being asked to apply the relation 
back doctrine in the first situation, not the second.5  In 
other words, the question is not whether the doctrine applies to the filing of 
an amended complaint or other pleading; the question is whether the doctrine 
applies to the presentment of a second notice of claim after the two-year period 
stated in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113(a) has expired.  More precisely, the question is whether 
the presentment of a verified notice of claim after expiration of the statutory 
period "relates back" to the date the original unverified notice of claim was 
presented to the governmental entity, so as to "cure" the 
deficiency.

 
 
[¶19]   Also pertinent to this discussion 
is recognition that the relation back doctrine, as it relates to court 
pleadings, has been adopted by this Court in W.R.C.P. 
15(c):

 
 

Relation 
back of amendments. An 
amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading 
when:

 
 
            
(1)       
Relation back is permitted by the law that provides the statute of 
limitations applicable to the action; or

 
 
            
(2)       
The claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the 
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in 
the original pleading; or

 
 
            
(3)       
The amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a 
claim is asserted if the forgoing provision (2) is satisfied and, within 120 
days after the filing of the complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment 
(A) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party 
will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or 
should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper 
party, the action would have been brought against the 
party.

 
 
[¶20]   The parties have cited numerous 
cases in which courts have applied, or declined to apply, the relation back 
doctrine.  We will briefly address 
those cases, although many of them are of little assistance because their facts 
are dissimilar or because their holdings rely upon local rules or statutes.  The cases do, however, present a good 
picture of the general nature and purpose of the relation back 
doctrine.

 
 

[¶21]   In 1943, the Appellate Court of 
Indiana held that timely verification of a will contest petition was not 
jurisdictional, and thus the lack of a required verification could be cured by 
the filing of an untimely verified petition.  Workman v. Workman, 113 Ind.App. 
245, 46 N.E.2d 718, 724 (1943).  Similarly, where allowed under the civil 
code, late verification of a divorce petition relates back to the date of filing 
of the original unverified petition.  
Pulliam v. Pulliam, 163 Kan. 497, 183 P.2d 220, 222 (1947).  Particularly in regard to W.R.C.P. 
15(c)(3), the relation back of an amended pleading is appropriate where a newly 
named defendant has sufficient notice of a claim that no prejudice will 
result.  Northern Utilities Div. 
of K N Energy, Inc. v. Town of Evansville, 
822 P.2d 829, 843 (Wyo. 1991).  This tandem finding of sufficient notice 
and no prejudice is often part of a court's decision to apply the relation back 
doctrine.  See, for example, 
Maliszewski v. Human Rights Com'n, 269 Ill.App.3d 472, 207 Ill.Dec. 59, 646 N.E.2d 625, 627 (1995); 
Drury Displays, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment of City of St. Louis, 760 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Mo. 1988); and 
Doyle v. Frost, 49 S.W.3d 853, 856, 858 (Tenn. 2001).

 
 

[¶22]   We have already noted herein Big 
Horn River System, 2002 WY 89, ¶ 20, 48 P.3d  at 1049, and 
Northern Utilities Div. of K N Energy, Inc., 822 P.2d  at 843, as 
cases where this Court applied the relation back concept to protect water rights 
and to validate an amended complaint, respectively.  The legal theory of relation back, 
although sometimes not in the precise sense identified in W.R.C.P. 15(c), has 
also arisen in the following Wyoming cases:  Nowotny v. L & B Contract 
Industries, Inc., 933 P.2d 452, 459 (Wyo. 1997) (third amended complaint); Richardson 
Associates v. Lincoln-Devore, Inc. 806 P.2d 790, 799 (Wyo. 1991) (amended complaint adding new claim); 
Thatcher & Sons, Inc. v. Norwest Bank Casper, N.A., 750 P.2d 1324, 
1327 (Wyo. 1988) (statutory relation back of construction 
lien); Walliker v. Escott, 608 P.2d 1272, 1273 (Wyo. 1980) (relation back of title from land patent 
to entry); Hagerman v. Thompson, 68 Wyo. 515, 235 P.2d 750, 756 
(1951) (placer mining location certificate); 
L.C. Jones Trucking Co. v. Superior Oil Co., 68 Wyo. 384, 234 P.2d 802, 
818 (1951) (signature on garnishee summons); 
Tendolle v. Eureka Oil Syndicate, 38 Wyo. 442, 268 P. 185, 187-88 
(1928) (multiple deeds); Roberts v. Hudson, 
25 Wyo. 505, 173 P. 786, 788 (1918) (relation back of title from land patent 
to entry); Turner v. Hamilton, 13 Wyo. 408, 80 P. 664, 665 
(1905) (failure to verify election contest 
petition can be cured by late-filed verified petition).

 
 

[¶23]   Unfortunately, none of these cases 
answers the question now before this Court.  The notice of claim contemplated under 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113 is not, of course, a court pleading, and Bell and 
Clark have provided neither cogent argument nor compelling authority for the 
proposition that W.R.C.P. 15(c) applies to anything other than court 
pleadings.6  There are a few cases, however, that do 
more directly address our issue.  In 
Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 535 U.S. 106, 112-16, 122 S. Ct. 1145, 152 L. Ed. 2d 188 (2002), the 
United States Supreme Court held that verification of an employment 
discrimination charge filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) could be accomplished via the relation back of an untimely verified 
document.  The court concluded that 
the statutory timing and verification requirements had different 
objectivesavoidance of stale claims and employer protection, respectivelyand 
that verification is not an integral part of the definition of a "charge" under 
the EEOC rules.  Id.  Therefore, verification is required only 
by such time as the employer is required to respond to the charge.  Id. at 113.7

 
 

[¶24]   Also published in 2002, and more 
directly on point with our case, is Wilson v. City of Buffalo, 298 A.D.2d 994, 747 N.Y.S.2d 657 (2002).  The court in Wilson 
reached several conclusions that are pertinent to our inquiry.  First, service of a notice of claim is a 
condition precedent to commencement of a personal injury action against a sewer 
authority.  Id. at 
659.  Second, courts cannot 
authorize late service of a notice of claim absent proof of equitable 
estoppel.  Id.  Third, the relation back doctrine 
does not authorize courts to grant leave to present a late notice of claim or 
belatedly to amend a complaint to add a party.  Id. at 660.  Fourth, the statute defines the point at 
which a claim may be interposed.  
Id.

 
 
[¶25]   This last-mentioned holding 
from Wilson leads to the next point of discussionwhat is the nature of 
the notice of claim requirement found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113(a)?  There are three distinct types of 
statutes that have been characterized as statutes of 
limitation:

 
 
            
"Special" statutes of limitation have jurisdictional effect.  They are included in statutes creating a 
new right and become elements of that right, limiting its availability; 
compliance with such a statute is a condition precedent to prosecution of a 
claim.  Commonwealth v. 
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 238 Va. 595, 
598-99, 385 S.E.2d 865, 867 (1989); Harper v. City of Richmond, 220 Va. 727, 738, 261 S.E.2d 560, 567 (1980).  Another type of statute of limitations 
is a "statute of repose."  This 
involves a legislatively mandated limitation which reflects a policy 
determination that a point in time arrives beyond which a potential defendant 
should be immune from liability for past conduct.  School Bd. of the City of Norfolk v. 
United States Gypsum Co., 234 Va. 32, 37, 360 S.E.2d 325, 327-28 
(1987).  Of course, there is a third 
type of limitation, the so-called "pure" or procedural statute of limitations, 
which serves only to place a time limit upon assertion of a remedy and furnishes 
an affirmative defense that may be waived.  
Owens-Corning, 238 Va. at 598, 385 S.E.2d  at 
867.

 
 

Friends 
of Clark Mountain Foundation, Inc. v. Board of Sup'rs of OrangeCounty, 242 
Va. 16, 406 S.E.2d 19, 21 (1991).

 
 
[¶26]   We have distinguished statutes of 
limitation from statutes of repose as follows:

 
 
"Statutes 
of repose and statutes of limitations are often confused.  They are similar in that both prescribe 
the time period within which a plaintiff may commence his suit.  The distinguishing feature between the 
two is the time at which the respective periods commence.  Generally, * * * if the plaintiff's 
cause of action accrues and the statutory period commences when the injury 
occurs, or, as is most often the case, when the plaintiff is or should be aware 
that he has been injured, the statute is properly termed a statute of 
limitations.  If the statutory 
period commences upon the occurrence of an event, regardless of when the injury 
occurs, at a time when the plaintiff may or may not be aware of any injury, the 
statute is properly termed a statute of repose.'"

 
 

Bredthauer 
v. TSP, 864 P.2d 442, 446 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Worden v. Village Homes, 
821 P.2d 1291, 1295 (Wyo. 1991) and State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Div. v. Halstead, 795 P.2d 760, 765 n.9 (Wyo. 1990)).  The parties have not contended that Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113(a) is a statute of repose; rather, the question presented 
is whether the notice of claim statute is a "special" statute of limitations, a 
"pure" statute of limitations, or something else 
altogether.

 
 
[¶27]   The concept of the "special" or 
"jurisdictional" statute of limitations, or the "something else altogether," 
carries various appellations, but the underlying legal theory is the 
same:

 
 
[T]he 
rule [is] that where a statute creates a right unknown to the common law and in 
the same statute fixes a time limit within which an action must be brought, 
ordinarily the limitation so fixed is construed as a condition on the right 
itself so that the right is extinguished by the lapse of the time fixed in the 
statute.  Both respondents cite and 
quote from 34 Am.Jur., Limitation of Actions, sec. 7, pp. 16-17, which may be 
accepted as a fair statement of the rule and its 
limitations:

 
 
            
"A statute of limitations should be differentiated from conditions which 
are annexed to a right of action created by statute.  A statute which in itself creates a new 
liability, gives an action to enforce it unknown to the common law, and fixes 
the time within which that action may be commenced, is not a statute of 
limitations.  It is a statute of 
creation, and the commencement of the action within the time it fixes is an 
indispensable condition of the liability and of the action which it 
permits.  The time element is an 
inherent element of the right so created, and the limitation of the remedy is a 
limitation of the right.  Such a 
provision will control, no matter in what form the action is brought.  The statute is an offer of an action on 
condition that it be commenced within the specified time.  If the offer is not accepted in the only 
way in which it can be accepted, by a commencement of the action within the 
specified time, the action and the right of action no longer exist, and the 
defendant is exempt from liability.  
Whether an enactment is of this nature, or whether it is a statute of 
limitations, should be determined from a proper construction of its terms.  Generally, the limitation clause is 
found in the same statute, if not in the same section, as the one creating the 
new liability, but the fact that this is the case is material only as bearing on 
questions of construction; it is merely a ground for saying that the limitation 
goes to the right created, and accompanies the obligation everywhere.  The same conclusion may be reached if 
the limitation is in a different statute, provided it is directed to the newly 
created liability so specifically as to warrant saying that it qualifies the 
right."

 
 

Myers v. 
Stevenson, 125 Cal. App. 2d 399, 270 P.2d 885, 887-88 (1954).  Rather than being statutes of 
limitations, such statutes create a condition precedent to suit.  Fishman by Fishman v. Delta Air 
Lines, Inc., 132 F.3d 138, 143 (2nd Cir. 1998).  Furthermore, "not only does the 
expiration of the time period extinguish the cause of action but also, under the 
statute, [t]he passage of time destroys the right and remedy of the injured 
party.'"  In re Paternity of 
James A.O., 182 Wis.2d 166, 513 N.W.2d 410, 415 (1994) (quoting Matter of Fessler's Estate, 
100 Wis.2d 437, 438, 302 N.W.2d 414, 420 (1981), abrogated on other 
grounds by Matter of Estate of Barthel, 161 Wis.2d 587, 468 N.W.2d 689 
(1991)).

 
 

[¶28]   Many courts describe statutes of 
this nature as "nonclaim" statutes.  
A nonclaim statute is a "law extinguishing a claim that is not timely 
asserted, esp. in the context of another proceeding."  Black's Law Dictionary 1421 (7th 
ed. 1999).  The effect is essentially the same, 
whether the statute is denominated a nonclaim statute or a jurisdictional 
statute or a statute of creation or a condition precedent:

 
 
"[A] 
nonclaim statute . . . grants to every person having a claim of any kind or 
character against a decedent's estate, the right to file the same in the court 
having jurisdiction thereof and have the same adjudicated, provided such claim 
is filed within the time specified in the statute.  Unless such claim is filed within the 
time so allowed by the statute, it is forever barred.  The time element is a built-in condition 
of the said statute and is of the essence of the right of action.  Unless the claim is filed within the 
prescribed time set out in the statute, no enforceable right of action is 
created.

 
 
While 
such statutes limit the time in which a claim may be filed or an action brought, 
they have nothing in common with and are not to be confused with general 
statutes of limitation.  The former 
creates a right of action if commenced within the time prescribed by the 
statute, whereas the latter creates a defense to an action brought after the 
expiration of the time allowed by law for the bringing of such an 
action."

 
 
[Donnella 
v. Crady, 135 Ind.App. 60, 62-63, 185 N.E.2d 623, 624 (1962)].  Thus, the statute is a nonclaim statute 
when "there is clearly evidenced a legislative intent in [the] statute to not 
merely withhold the remedy, but to take away the right of recovery where a 
claimant fails to present his claim as provided in the statute."  Rising Sun State Bank v. Fessler, 
400 N.E.2d 1164, 1166 (Ind.Ct.App.1980).

 
 

Estate 
of Decker v. Farm Credit Services of Mid-America, ACA, 684 N.E.2d 1137, 1138-39 (Ind. 1997).  "A jurisdictional nonclaim statute is 
not an affirmative defense, because it bars untimely claims without any action 
by the opposing party, and deprives the court of the power to adjudicate those 
claims."  51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation 
of Actions § 3 (2000) (citing Comerica Bank & Trust, 
F.S.B. v. SDI Operating Partners, L.P., 673 So. 2d 163, 166 (Fla.App. 
1996)).

 
 
[¶29]   This Court's experience with 
nonclaim statutes primarily has been with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 2-7-703(a) 
(LexisNexis 2003), the probate notice of claim statute.  Recently, we described that statutory 
filing requirement as a condition precedent, rather than a statute of 
limitations:

 
 
            
The Personal Representatives of the Estate counter that our decision in 
State ex rel. State Bd. of Charities and Reform v. Bower, 362 P.2d 814 
(Wyo. 1961) makes Wyo. Stat. § 2-7-703(a) applicable to HCF [Department of 
Health, Division of Health Care Financing], because the notice of claim 
requirement is a condition precedent, not a statute of limitations.  We agree with the Personal 
Representatives of the Estate that Wyo. Stat. § 2-7-703(a) is not a statute of 
limitations, and that the State is subject to its 
provisions.

 
 
            
Statutes of limitation place time limits on the filing of a cause of 
action.  Such statutes are a 
"declar[ation] that no suit shall be maintained on such causes of action * * * 
unless brought within a specified period of time after the right accrued."  Black's Law Dictionary 927 (6th 
ed.1990).  They create a defense to 
suit which must be pled and may be waived.  
See Bower, 362 P.2d  at 823 (quoting Donnally v. MontgomeryCounty Welfare Bd., 200 Md. 534, 92 A.2d 354, 358 
(1952)).  Statutes of limitation are 
applicable only when affirmative relief is sought.  Boller v. Western Law Associates, 
P.C., 828 P.2d 1184, 1187 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 869, 113 S. Ct. 198, 121 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1992).  
With respect to claims against an estate, there is no access to the 
courts, and thus no affirmative relief is sought, until the claim has been 
denied by the personal representative.  
Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 719 P.2d 234, 
238 (Wyo.1986).  After rejection of 
the claim, Wyo. Stat. § 2-7-718 allows the claimant thirty days in which to file 
an action in district court.  This 
thirty-day limitation period constitutes a statute of limitations which may be 
raised as a defense to an action filed after that deadline.  See Taylor, 719 P.2d  at 238, 
239.

 
 

Matter 
of Estate of Campbell, 950 P.2d 557, 560 (Wyo. 
1997).  See also Scott v. Scott, 918 P.2d 198, 199-200 (Wyo. 1996); 
West v. Wyoming State Treasurer, 822 P.2d 1269, 1274 (Wyo. 
1991); 
State ex rel. State Bd. of Charities and Reform v. Bower, 362 P.2d 814, 
821-22 (Wyo. 1961); and 
Delfelder v. Farmers' State Bank of Riverton, 38 Wyo. 481, 269 P. 418, 
424 (1928).8

 
 
[¶30]   The statutory scheme for 
presentment of a governmental notice of claim and the subsequent filing of a 
complaint is analogous.  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-39-113(a) is not a statute of limitations; rather, it creates a 
statutory condition precedent to the filing of a civil action.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-114 is a statute 
of limitations because it establishes a time limitation upon the seeking of 
affirmative relief from the judicial system.9  This 
distinction is important because exceptions to the application of a statute of 
limitations are not automatically exceptions to the application of a condition 
precedent.  We have already noted 
herein that it is doubtful that the savings statute applies to conditions 
precedent, and we have not been provided with cogent argument or citation to 
controlling authority to convince us that W.R.C.P. 15(c)'s relation back 
provision applies to anything but court pleadings.

 
 

[¶31]   This Court has not previously 
answered the precise question raised in this casewhether a defective notice of 
a governmental claim can be cured after passage of the statutory period for 
filing of such claimsbut Beaulieu I and Beaulieu II, and the 
cases cited therein, have established that the notice of claim requirement is 
clearly jurisdictional.10  Furthermore, we held in Awe v. 
University of Wyoming, 534 P.2d 97, 105 (Wyo. 1975), overruled on other 
grounds by Dye by Dye v. Fremont County School Dist. No. 24, 820 P.2d 982 
(Wyo. 1991), that 
the then-existing notice of claim statute was not a statute of limitations, but 
was a limitation upon the filing of a claim.

 
 

[¶32]   Other courts have grappled with 
these issues, with varying results.  
See, for example, Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Shalala, 125 F.3d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1997) (federal statutes of limitations are not 
generally jurisdictional); Chumney v. Houston County, 632 So. 2d 1328, 
1329-30 (Ala. 1994) (nonclaim statute bars filing of civil 
action where notice of claim untimely, the purpose of nonclaim statute being to 
provide broader defense to governments than that provided by statute of 
limitations); City of Birmingham v. Davis, 613 So. 2d 1222, 1223-24 (Ala. 
1992) (relation back doctrine does not apply to 
notice of claim statutes); F.D.I.C. v. Hillcrest Associates, 233 Conn. 
153, 659 A.2d 138, 143-44 (1995) (as a matter of statutory construction, 
limitation period for requesting a deficiency judgment not jurisdictional); 
Easter Seal Soc. for Disabled Children v. Berry, 627 A.2d 482, 486 (D.C. 
1993) (even when part of statute creating a 
right, time limitation for filing petition not part of right); Southside 
Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Warrington, 635 So. 2d 721, 722-24 (La.App. 
1994) (relation back doctrine found in civil 
code allows late verification of court pleading); and Doyle, 49 S.W.3d at 
858 (relation back doctrine found in civil 
rules allows amendment to pleadings to add county hospital as 
defendant).

 
 

[¶33]   If a general rule can be said to 
exist, that rule would be (1) that governmental notice of claim statutes are 
jurisdictional nonclaim statutes, rather than statutes of limitations, and (2) a 
defective notice of claim cannot be cured by untimely amendment under the 
relation back doctrine.  See 
51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions, supra, §§ 10-12, 20-26, 
30.  That rule, however, is not 
universal.  In Negron v. Llarena, 
156 N.J. 296, 716 A.2d 1158, 1160-62 (1998), the 
court describes the traditional contrast between what it calls procedural and 
substantive statutory limitation periods, and then declares that "[t]he 
interpretation of the meaning and intended application of substantive statutes 
of limitations has undergone a significant change in recent times."  The court next emphasizes "underlying 
legislative purpose" and "public policy" in holding that even a substantive 
statutethat is, one that establishes a condition precedent to exercise a 
rightcan be "relaxed."  Id. at 
1162.

 
 
[¶34]   We are convinced that the clear and 
unambiguous language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113(a) makes it a nonclaim 
statute, in the traditional sense.  
Thus, the timely presentment of a notice of claim is a condition 
precedent to suit, is jurisdictional, and cannot be waived.  The notice of claim provision is not a 
statute of limitations, but is a substantive element of the right to sue.  Therefore, the right to sue ceases to 
exist when the limitation period expires and no valid notice of claim has been 
presented.  It follows that, the 
right having expired, it cannot be resurrected by the later untimely presentment 
of a non-defective notice of claim.

 
 

[¶35]   In reaching this conclusion, we 
reject the reasoning of Negron and like cases.  Our reading of cases from across the 
nation suggests that the legislative purpose/public policy argument is little 
more than gloss over judicial legislating.  
It is the product of courts wanting to avoid the sometimes harsh result 
of the application of the traditional rule.  See, for example, Cedars-Sinai 
Medical Center, 125 F.3d at 770 (broad use of exceptions to bar of 
statute "as a practically useful principle of interpretation"); F.D.I.C., 
659 A.2d at 147 (statutory deficiency procedure may not 
have existed at common law, but strict foreclosure did); and Negron, 716 
A.2d at 1162 (doctrine of substantial compliance 
salvages wrongful death claim).  
See also J. James Fraiser III, A Review of Issues Presented by 
§ 11-46-11 of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act:  The Notice Provisions and Statute of 
Limitations, 65 Miss. L.J. 643, 652 (1996) (as to the notice of claim statute, 
Mississippi is a strict compliance state) and Michael J. Waldspurger, 
Ameliorating the Harsh Effects of Wisconsin's Municipal Notice of Claim 
Statute, 77 Marq. L. Rev. 610, 627, 631 (1994) (substantial compliance with filing time 
under state notice of claim statute insufficient).

 
 

[¶36]   We have said many times that courts 
are not free to legislate, and we cannot create exceptions in the face of clear 
legislation to the contrary.  
Scott, 918 P.2d  at 200.  Furthermore, we cannot even construe 
unambiguous statutory language without stepping outside the judicial 
province.  Seckman v. Wyo-Ben, 
Inc., 783 P.2d 161, 166 (Wyo. 1989).  In particular, we cannot judicially 
adjust clearly mandated legislative claim-filing limitation periods.  Id.  The language in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-39-113(a) is clear and unambiguous:  
"No action shall be brought . . . unless . . .."  Although strict construction of a 
statute that is in derogation of common law sovereign immunity might be 
appropriate, such construction is not necessary where the notice of claim 
limitation period is explicit.  
Campbell v. District of Columbia, 
568 A.2d 1076, 1078 (D.C. 1990).  See also Eschbaugh v. Industrial 
Com'n, 286 Ill.App.3d 963, 222 Ill.Dec. 235, 677 N.E.2d 438, 442 
(1996).  We conclude that, by its own clear 
language, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113(a) is a true nonclaim statute and that, 
therefore, the right to file a complaint against the state ceases to exist upon 
expiration of the limitation period for the presentment of a governmental claim 
if no valid governmental claim has been presented.

 
 
            
Equitable Estoppel

 
 
[¶37]   Bell did not in this appeal raise the issue of 
equitable estoppel.11  Clark's 
principal brief contains a twelve-line argument, with no case citations, in 
which she contends that the State's "course of conduct" over the years in not 
raising the issue of certification should equitably estop it from now raising 
the issue.

 
 

[¶38]   Generally, we will not address 
issues that have not been properly raised or supported by appropriate references 
to the record, citations to legal authority, and cogent argument.  State ex rel. Reece v. WyomingState 
Bd. of Outfitters and Professional Guides, 931 P.2d 958, 959 (Wyo. 1997).  Suffice it to say that equitable 
estoppel rarely is applied against a governmental entity and certainly will not 
lie in the absence of any showing of affirmative misconduct or 
misrepresentation.  Beaulieu II, 
2004 WY 31, ¶ 22, 86 P.3d  at 871; 
Appleby v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 
2002 WY 84, ¶ 19, 47 P.3d 613, 619 (Wyo. 2002); 
Snake River Brewing Co., Inc. v. Town of Jackson, 2002 WY 11, ¶ 28, 39 P.3d 397, 407-08 (Wyo. 2002); 
Thompson v. Board of County Com'rs of the County of Sublette, 2001 WY 
108, ¶¶ 11-12, 34 P.3d 278, 281-82 (Wyo. 2001); 
Campbell County School Dist. v. Catchpole, 6 P.3d 1275, 1284 (Wyo. 
2000); 
Wells v. Board of Trustees of Laramie County School Dist. No. 1, 3 P.3d 861, 866-67 (Wyo. 2000); 
State, Dept. of Family Services v. Peterson, 957 P.2d 1307, 1311-12 (Wyo. 
1998); 
Universal Equipment Co. v. State By and Through Dept. of Environmental 
Quality, 839 P.2d 967, 976 (Wyo. 1992); In 
re General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 
753 P.2d 76, 89-90 (Wyo. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 926 (1989), 
abrogated on other grounds by Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149 (Wyo. 
1998); Big 
Piney Oil & Gas Co. v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Com'n, 
715 P.2d 557, 560-61 (Wyo. 1986).  This rule applies to statute of 
limitations defenses under the WGCA.  
Archuleta v. City of Rawlins, 942 P.2d 404, 406 (Wyo. 1997).  For discussions of whether equitable 
estoppel may apply against a governmental entity in the context of a nonclaim 
statute, see Miller v. New Jersey State Dept. of Corrections, 145 F.3d 616, 617-18 (3rd Cir. 1998); 
Eschbaugh, 677 N.E.2d  at 440; 
Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse Workers Union (Independent) Pension 
Fund v. Van Vorst Industries, Inc., 800 F. Supp. 587, 592 (N.D.Ill. 1992), 
aff'd by Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Navco, 
3 F.3d 167, 174 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1115 
(1994)); 
Estate of Decker, 684 N.E.2d  at 1139; and 
Wilson, 747 N.Y.S.2d  at 659.

 
 
            
Public Policy

 
 
[¶39]   As with the issue of 
equitable estoppel, the issue of public policy was raised by Clark, but not by 
Bell.  And as with the issue of equitable 
estoppel, Clark has not supported her public 
policy argument with references to the record or citations to persuasive 
authority.  Instead, after 
suggesting that the public policy of concern is the policy behind Wyo. Const. 
art. 16, § 7, that being "to protect the public (taxpayers) from money being 
paid out of the State coffers unless it is for a bona fide claim," Clark basically repeats her equitable estoppel 
argument.  She does not explain how 
the district court's ruling, which ruling might seem to enforce that policy, 
actually offends it.  Therefore, we 
decline to address the issue.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶40]   Bell 
and Clark presented putative notices of claim 
that were neither signed by them nor certified under penalty of perjury.  Those notices of claim were invalid 
under the WGCA because they did not meet the requirements of Wyo. Const. art. 
16, § 7.  The belated attempts to 
cure the deficiencies were ineffective because the limitation period of the 
nonclaim statute had passed, thereby extinguishing the statutory right to sue 
the state.  Bell and Clark have not 
shown that the deficient notices of claim were, or could be, salvaged by the 
savings statute, by the doctrine of equitable estoppel, or as a matter of public 
policy.

 
 
[¶41]   We affirm in both 
cases.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1  

(a)        No 
action shall be brought under this act against a governmental entity unless the 
claim upon which the action is based is presented to the entity as an itemized 
statement in writing within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error 
or omission, except that a cause of action may be instituted not more than two 
(2) years after discovery of the alleged act, error or omission, if the claimant 
can establish that the alleged act, error or omission was:

 
 
(i)         
Not reasonably discoverable within a two (2) year period; 
or

 
 
(ii)         
The claimant failed to discover the alleged act, error or omission within 
the two (2) year period despite the exercise of due 
diligence.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-39-113(a).

 
 
            
Except as otherwise provided, actions against a governmental entity or a 
public employee acting within the scope of his duties for torts occurring after 
June 30, 1979 which are subject to this act shall be forever barred unless 
commenced within one (1) year after the date the claim is filed pursuant to W.S. 
1-39-113.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-39-114.

 
 
  2Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113(a) says 
"presented."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-39-114 says "filed."  We assume, 
having been shown nothing to the contrary, that the two words mean the same 
thing.

 
 
  3Bell, 
but not Clark, raised the savings statute both 
below and in this appeal.

 
 

  4For the proposition that savings 
statutes do not apply to presentation of the governmental claim, as opposed to 
filing of the complaint, see Awe v. University of Wyoming, 534 P.2d 97, 105 (Wyo. 1975), overruled on other grounds by Dye by Dye v. Fremont 
County School Dist. No. 24, 820 P.2d 982 (Wyo. 1991); Capers v. Lee, 239 Conn. 
265, 684 A.2d 696, 700-01 (1996); State v. Dixon, 1996 OK 15, 
912 P.2d 842, 844 (Okla. 1996); 51 Am.Jur.2d, Limitations of 
Actions, §§ 273-276 (2000); and 54 C.J.S. Limitations of 
Actions §§ 240-242 (1987 & Cum. 2004).

 
 

  5In Mountain View/Evergreen Imp. 
and Service Dist. v. Brooks Water and Sewer Dist., 896 P.2d 1355, 1363 (Wyo. 
1995), we held that, 
"[i]f claims that have been filed are precluded because the action to recover 
for those claims was not commenced within the mandatory one-year period, those 
claims, indeed, are forever barred."  
The relation back doctrine was not, however, directly raised in that 
case.  Rather, Mountain 
View/Evergreen Imp. and Service Dist. involved a complaint based upon two 
separate claims, where the notice of claim for the first claim had been 
presented more than one year prior to the filing of the complaint.  Id.

 
 

  6Some courts have compared the 
relation back of amended court pleadings to other situations.  See, for example, Chisholm v. 
Vocational School for Girls, 103 Mont. 503, 64 P.2d 838, 841-42 
(1936) (failure to verify worker's compensation 
claim) and State ex rel. Williams v. Jones, 179 Tenn. 206, 164 S.W.2d 823, 825-26 (1942) (failure to verify a pre-election expense 
account filing).

 
 

  7The court in Edelman relied 
upon Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 764-65, 121 S. Ct. 1801, 149 L. Ed. 2d 983 
(2001), cert. denied 537 U.S. 1215 (2003), in finding that the relation back 
doctrine applied.  Edelman, 
535 U.S.  at 116.  Interestingly enough, Becker's 
conclusion that omission of a signature on a federal court appeal may be 
corrected was based almost exclusively on the interplay between certain civil 
and appellate rules of procedure, and had nothing to do with amendments to 
governmental claims.  See Becker, 
532 U.S.  at 764-65.  See also Cedars-Sinai Medical Center 
v. Shalala, 125 F.3d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1997), and Central States, Southeast 
and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Navco, 3 F.3d 167, 173 (7th Cir. 1993), 
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1115 (1994), abrogated on other grounds by Bay 
Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of California, 
Inc., 522 U.S. 192, 118 S. Ct. 542, 139 L. Ed. 2d 553 (1997) for the proposition that, unlike some 
state statutes of limitations, federal statutes of limitations are seldom seen 
as jurisdictional.

 
 

  8See Kuntz v. Kinne, 395 P.2d 286, 287-88 (Wyo. 1964), for a comparison of the probate 
nonclaim statute with a "special statute of limitation" for probate claims where 
no administrator has been appointed.

 
 
  9We need not decide at this time 
whether Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-114 is a special substantive statute of 
limitations or a "traditional" procedural statute of 
limitations.

 
 

  10We avoided answering the question 
in the probate context in Bower, 362 P.2d  at 821, only because the initial notice of 
claim was filed in a guardianship rather than in the probate, thereby leaving no 
initial claim to be cured.

 
 
  11

"Equitable estoppel is the effect 
of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded from 
asserting rights which might otherwise have existed as against another person 
who has in good faith relied upon such conduct and has been led thereby to 
change his position for the worse.'"

 
 

Beaulieu II, 2004 WY 31, ¶ 19 n.9, 86 P.3d  at 869 
n.9 (quoting Birt v. Wells Fargo Home 
Mortg., Inc., 2003 WY 102, ¶ 34, 75 P.3d 640, 653 (Wyo. 2003)).