Case Title: Agency of Natural Resources v. Godnick

Citation: 162 Vt. 588, 652 A.2d 988

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1994-10-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
ANR_V_GODNICK.94-057; 162 Vt. 588; 652 A.2d 988


[Filed:  21-Oct-1994]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609- 0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press. 
 
 
                                   No. 94-057
 
 
 Agency of Natural Resources                     Supreme Court
 State of Vermont                                
                                                 On Appeal from
      v.                                         Environmental Law Division
 
 Edward M. Godnick                               September Term, 1994
     
   
 Merideth Wright, J.
 
 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Conrad W. Smith and Ron Shems,
   Assistant Attorneys General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee
 
 Edward R. Seager and Bernard J. Boudreau of Edward R. Seager, P.C.,
 Rutland, for defendant-appellant 
 
 
PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      DOOLEY, J.   Defendant Edward Godnick appeals a $10,270 penalty
 assessed by the Environmental Law Division (ELD) pursuant to the
 administrative penalty provisions of the Uniform Environmental Law
 Enforcement Act, 10 V.S.A.  8001-8018, enacted in 1989. Plaintiff, the
 Vermont Agency of Natural Resources (ANR), cross-appeals, charging that the
 ELD failed to assess a penalty for the first year of defendant's violation
 and erroneously evaluated the statutory criteria in determining the
 penalty.  We affirm the ELD's calculation of the penalty, but remand for a
 determination of penalties for the first year of violation. 

      In August of 1987, defendant purchased a parcel of land on Route 7 in
 Rutland for the 

 

 purpose of building a furniture warehouse.  The site contained a highway
 right-of-way held by the Vermont Agency of Transportation (AOT).  Before he
 bought the property, defendant received a letter from the District AOT
 office informing him that the use of highway right-of- way on the site was
 subject to AOT guidelines.  The letter, evidently in response to
 defendant's inquiry, stated that plantings in the right-of-way must not
 interfere with sight distances or highway maintenance activities.  While
 pursuing his purchase of the property, defendant applied to the District I
 Environmental Commission (Commission) for an Act 250 land use permit to
 allow construction of the warehouse.  The permit was granted, but it
 reserved the Commission's right to impose additional conditions when the
 buildings and grading were complete. 

      The completed warehouse did not conform to the plans approved by the
 permit. Concerned about the visual impact of the warehouse along Route 7,
 the Commission informed defendant that he would have to submit a revised
 landscaping plan to achieve the same screening results as those originally
 approved.  Defendant submitted a revised plan, and although this plan
 depicted plantings in the right-of-way, it made no reference to the AOT
 guidelines.  Defendant did not seek AOT approval until after the Commission
 approved the plan.  On June 23, 1989, the Commission issued an amended Act
 250 permit requiring defendant to make plantings which would screen the
 visibility of the warehouse from the highway, and set October 1, 1989, as
 the deadline for implementing the plan. 
 
       When AOT received the revised plan in the amended Act 250 permit, it
 instructed defendant not to plant within the right-of-way without its
 approval and notified the Commission of the conflict.  Defendant tried to
 arrange a meeting in which AOT and the Coordinator of the District
 Commission could discuss the conflict, but the Coordinator was unable to
 attend.  On 



 September 27, 1989, AOT sent defendant a letter stating that  the
landscaping plan must be redesigned to meet AOT's highway right-of-way 
guidelines. 

      Despite the October 1, 1989 deadline for implementing the landscaping
 plan, this AOT letter marks the last time that defendant communicated with
 either the Commission or AOT until June of 1992, when the ANR initiated
 enforcement action against him.  Between October 2, 1989 and October 14,
 1992, a period of three years, defendant did no landscaping on the site
 except to plant grass.  Finally, in 1992, defendant submitted an
 application for a further amendment to address the landscaping concerns of
 the District Commission within AOT requirements.  This application was
 approved by both AOT and the Commission.  The Commission issued the further
 amended permit on October 14, 1992, and, consequently, defendant was in
 compliance on that date.  During the following month, defendant completed
 the required landscaping at a cost of $10,000. 
 
       In December of 1992, the Secretary of the Vermont Agency of Natural
 Resources issued an administrative order pursuant to 10 V.S.A.  8008
 and 8010 imposing penalties for violations of the amended permit between
 October 2, 1989 and October 14, 1992.  Defendant appealed the
 administrative order to the ELD.  Although the ELD concluded that defendant
 was in violation during the three-year period, it imposed a penalty for
 only the last year of violation calculated to equal the amount of economic
 benefit defendant gained. 
 
       On appeal, defendant argues that the ANR is estopped from issuing an
 administrative order, and that the ELD erred in its assessment of penalties
 against defendant.  On cross-appeal, ANR argues that the ELD's assessment
 of penalties was improper because it failed to impose penalties for the
 first year of violation, and failed to apply the penalty criteria of the
 statute. 

 

 We consider first defendant's estoppel argument, and then will review the
 ELD's calculation of the penalty. 

      Defendant argues that the Secretary is estopped from issuing the
 administrative order because defendant's noncompliance stemmed directly
 from the conflicting directions of the Commission and AOT, and that the
 Commission never advised him of his obligation to resolve this conflict. 
 Defendant argues that the Commission's silence about the conflict implied
 that it would resolve the problem with AOT and would so notify defendant. 
 We affirm the conclusion of the environmental law judge that estoppel is
 inappropriate in this case. 
 
       The doctrine of equitable estoppel "is based upon the grounds of
 public policy, fair dealing, good faith, and justice."  Dutch Hill Inn,
 Inc. v. Patten, 131 Vt. 187, 193,