Case Title: State v. Winter

Citation: 162 Vt. 388, 648 A.2d 624

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1994-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE_V_WINTER.93-130; 162 Vt. 388; 648 A.2d 624

[Opinion Filed June 10, 1994]

[Motion for Reargument Denied July 20, 1994]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 93-130


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      District Court of Vermont,
                                              Unit No. 1, Bennington Circuit

 Neal Winter                                  January Term, 1994



 Robert Grussing III, J.


 Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, and Susan R. Harritt and David
      Tartter, Assistant Attorneys General, Montpelier, for plaintiff-
      appellee

 Barry E. Griffith, Rutland, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      DOOLEY, J.  Defendant Neal Winter was convicted of one count of sexual
 assault in violation of 13 V.S.A. { 3252(a)(1)(A).  He now appeals, raising
 the single issue that evidence that he committed a sexual assault on another
 woman, over four years prior to the charged incident, was improperly
 admitted.  We agree and reverse and remand for a new trial.
      The incidents for which defendant was charged occurred on two nights in
 November 1991.  Defendant was employed at a group home in Bennington and
 often was the sole staff person present overnight.  The group home, which
 housed six persons, was run by a local mental health agency as a temporary

 

 treatment facility for patients with mental illness or substance abuse
 problems.
      In November 1991, the victim in this case was thirty-two years old, and
 had entered the group home to serve a house arrest sentence for a DUI
 conviction.  She testified that defendant, whom she had known in passing,
 began making unwelcome sexual remarks to her.  She described the following
 incidents.
      On the first night, defendant entered her bedroom while she was asleep,
 knelt by her bed and fondled her breast.  She awoke and called him a name,
 whereupon he left.  Two nights later, the victim awoke to find defendant
 performing oral sex on her.  Thereafter, he overpowered her and compelled
 her to have intercourse with him.  He warned her against disclosing what
 occurred, stating that no one would believe her, and threatening to kill her
 if she talked.
      The State charged defendant with lewd and lascivious conduct for the
 events of the first night and two counts of sexual assault, one involving
 the oral sex and the other the intercourse, for the events of the second
 night.  At trial, the State called the victim and other residents and staff
 of the home, who corroborated various details of the victim's account.  In
 the investigation of the claims, defendant denied having had sex with the
 victim.  At trial, however, defendant testified that he did have sex with
 the victim, but that it was consensual.
      Defendant was found guilty of one count of sexual assault, the count
 charging him with committing nonconsensual oral sex on the second night.
 After the court imposed a sentence of four to ten years, defendant appealed.

 

      The evidence involved in this appeal was that in August 1987, when
 defendant was living in New York state, he sexually assaulted his children's
 seventeen-year-old babysitter, S.M., on numerous occasions in his home.
 Although the assaults began by forced vaginal intercourse, on later
 occasions defendant began with oral sex.  S.M. reported the sexual assaults,
 and they were investigated by the New York police.  Defendant stated that he
 had sex with S.M. on one occasion and that it was consensual.
      The State gave notice that this evidence would be introduced through
 the testimony of S.M., and defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude the
 evidence.  Based on the memoranda of the parties, and without a hearing, the
 trial court denied the motion.  It found the evidence admissible to show
 motive and a common scheme, but not to show a plan.  Holding that
 admissibility turned on similarity between the former incident and the
 incident for which defendant is charged, as well as proximity in time, the
 court found the requisite similarity and proximity.  The court found six
 similarities: (1) a power differential -- the employer/employee
 relationship with S.M., the relationship of a "prison guard" to the victim;
 (2) sexual comments as a manner of approach; (3) initial contact with the
 woman's breasts; (4) the use of physical force to complete the sex acts; (5)
 oral contact to facilitate intercourse; and (6) a claim of consent as a
 "cover-up."  It concluded that the passage of four years did not render the
 S.M. incident too remote.  The court also balanced probative value against
 prejudicial effect and found probative value controlled because the State
 had a need for the testimony to deal with the credibility problem caused by
 a victim who "was a resident of a group home for the mentally ill."

 

      S.M. testified at the trial.  In its instructions, the court explained
 the limited use that the jury could make of S.M.'s testimony and informed
 the jury that the testimony could not be considered for propensity purposes.
 The instructions authorized the jury to consider the evidence only if it
 showed motive or common scheme.  The court defined these authorized
 purposes:
           As to motive, it is not an essential element of the
         state's case that it . . . prove that the defendant had
         a specific goal or motivation or reason to commit these
         acts alleged.  However, whether or not a person had a
         motive or reason for the doing of an act is proper for
         your consideration in determining if in fact the person
         did the act in question, and also in determining the
         manner that the act in question may have occurred.

           As to common scheme, what this refers to is that if
         it is claimed that a person on the occasion in question
         did certain acts in a particular manner, and there is
         evidence that on a prior occasion that person did
         similar acts in a similar manner, then one could infer
         or conclude that it is more likely that the acts in
         question did occur in the manner alleged.

 The court went on to charge the jury that it should look at similarity and
 proximity in time in determining the weight to be assigned S.M.'s testimony.
      The question before us involves the application of V.R.E. 404(b), which
 provides:
         (b)  Other crimes, wrongs or acts.  Evidence of other
         crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
         character of a person in order to show that he acted in
         conformity therewith.  It may, however, be admissible
         for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
         opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
         identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

 The rule excludes "bad act" evidence "introduced for the purpose of showing
 a general propensity to commit the acts in question."  State v. Bruyette,
 158 Vt. 21, 27, 604 A.2d 1270, 1272 (1992).  The evidence may be admitted,
 however, if relevant to some other "legitimate issue" in the case.  Id.

 

 Even if the evidence survives the Rule 404(b) test, it still must pass the
 balancing test of Rule 403.  See State v. Ashley, ___ Vt. ___, ___,