Case Title: William Reaves v. State Of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC04-891

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2006-08-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC04-891 
____________ 
 
WILLIAM REAVES, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
[September 14, 2006] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
William Reaves, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals an order of the 
circuit court denying his motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.851.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.  
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court’s denial of relief. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Reaves was convicted and sentenced to death for the murder of Deputy 
Richard Rackowski of the Indian River Sheriff’s Department.  On direct appeal we 
summarized the facts of the case as follows:  
In the early morning hours of September 23, 1986, Deputy 
Richard Raczkowski of the Indian River Sheriff’s Department was 
 
 
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dispatched by the 911 operator to a convenience store in response to a 
call from the store’s pay telephone.  According to Reaves’ confession, 
when the deputy arrived at the store he spoke to Reaves who 
explained he had made the 911 call because he had no money to call a 
taxi cab.  The deputy then called the 911 operator and requested a cab 
be sent to the store. 
In his confession Reaves stated that while he and the deputy 
awaited the cab, a gun fell from the shorts Reaves was wearing.  
When Reaves tried to pick up the gun, the deputy prevented him from 
doing so by stepping on his hand.  Reaves pushed the deputy’s knee 
and then grabbed him by the throat.  Reaves eventually got the gun 
and declared he would not give it to the deputy.  The deputy backed 
away before turning to run.  Reaves then shot the deputy in the back 
four times, claiming he was frightened because he had been using 
cocaine and because the deputy had reached for his own gun.   
It was later determined that the deputy’s gun in fact had been 
fired three times.   
After the shooting Reaves went to the home of a friend named 
Hinton.  According to Hinton, Reaves said he was able to retrieve the 
gun after pushing the deputy in the throat.  Reaves pointed the gun in 
the deputy’s face as the deputy attempted to draw his own weapon and 
stated, “I wouldn’t do that if I were you.”  The deputy began backing 
away, turned, and ran.  Reaves then shot him as he ran away.   
 
Reaves v. State, 574 So. 2d 105, 106 (Fla. 1991).   
 
 
This Court reversed the judgment and sentence and remanded the case for a 
new trial.  See id. at 107-108.  This Court held where the prosecuting attorney had 
previously represented Reaves in a grand larceny case as a public defender and had 
actual access to privileged defense-related information, the trial court erred in 
denying the properly filed motion to disqualify the prosecutor filed before trial.  Id.  
 
 
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On direct appeal after the retrial in 1992, this Court summarized the 
following additional facts: 
Witness Whitaker, who discovered the deputy, testified he saw a black 
man wearing red shorts and a white T-shirt running from the scene in 
a manner similar to men in Vietnam under fire.  (William Reaves 
served in Vietnam.)  Witness Hinton was ruled unavailable to testify, 
[pursuant to] section 90.804 (1)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), and his 
testimony from the 1987 trial was read into the record. . . . [Hinton 
testified that he] had no trouble understanding Reaves; his speech was 
not slurred and he appeared to be in full control of his faculties.   
 
Reaves v. State, 639 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1994).  The jury convicted Reaves of 
premeditated first-degree murder and recommended death by a vote of ten to two.  
The trial court found three aggravating circumstances (prior violent felony 
conviction, avoid arrest, and murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel). 
Although no statutory mitigating circumstances were found, the trial court found 
three nonstatutory mitigating circumstances (honorable military discharge, good 
reputation in the community up to the age of sixteen, and he was a good family 
member).  Id. at 3 & nn. 2-3.    
 
On direct appeal, Reaves raised twelve issues concerning the guilt phase and 
four issues concerning the penalty phase of the trial.  In particular, Reaves asserted 
that several statements by witness Hinton, under oath, prior to Hinton’s 1987 trial 
testimony were inconsistent with his 1987 trial testimony and should have been 
admitted pursuant to section 90.806, Florida Statutes (1991).  639 So. 2d at 3.  In 
 
 
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affirming the conviction and sentence, this Court rejected all of Reaves’ claims on 
the guilt and penalty phase issues.  This Court held while it “agree[d] that Hinton’s 
prior inconsistent testimony should have been admitted,” it found the trial court’s 
exclusion harmless error.  Reaves, 639 So. 2d at 4. 
 
Reaves filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme 
Court which was denied.  See Reaves v. Florida, 513 U.S. 990 (1994).  Reaves 
filed an initial motion to vacate judgment and sentence pursuant to Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.851 in February 1995.  The motion was amended in 
February 1999.  After a Huff1 hearing on May 28, 1999, the trial court entered an 
order on February 9, 2000, summarily denying the motion for postconviction relief 
without an evidentiary hearing.  Reaves’ motion for rehearing was denied on 
March 14, 2000.  
 
Reaves appealed to this Court and raised fourteen issues.  While we found 
several of those claims were procedurally barred, insufficiently pled or premature, 
we concluded that the trial court erred in summarily denying Reaves’ claim of 
ineffectiveness of trial counsel, Jay Kirschner.   See Reaves v. State, 826 So. 2d 
932, 936 (Fla. 2002).  The case was remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary 
hearing on the claims relating to whether counsel was ineffective for failing to 
raise a voluntary intoxication defense and related subclaims.  See id. at 944.         
                                        
 
1.  Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982 (Fla. 1993). 
 
 
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An evidentiary hearing was held on March 4-6, 2003.  While awaiting the 
trial court’s decision on the pending motion, Reaves filed a successive 3.851 
motion based on Ring2 on June 24, 2003.  Reaves also supplemented his 3.851 
motion on December 10, 2003, by notifying the court of his eligibility to receive 
veteran’s benefits based on a finding of 100% disability due to Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD).  On March 10, 2004, the trial court denied both the 
amended motion for postconviction relief and the successive motion for 
postconviction relief.  After denying the motion for rehearing, the trial court signed 
final orders denying both motions on April 20, 2004.   
In this appeal Reaves raises two issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in 
denying a new trial where it was demonstrated that trial counsel was deficient in 
failing to investigate, prepare or present a voluntary intoxication defense; and (2) 
whether the trial court erred in excluding the testimony of Eugene Hinton from the 
evidentiary hearing and in denying forensic testing of evidence for drug 
metabolites.  For the reasons expressed herein, we affirm the trial court’s order 
denying Reaves’ motion for postconviction relief. 
DISCUSSION 
  Failure to Present Voluntary Intoxication Defense 
                                        
 
2.  Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
 
 
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Reaves argues that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance on retrial by 
failing to investigate, prepare, and present a voluntary intoxication defense.  
Reaves maintains he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to present this defense  
because there was ample evidence to show he was intoxicated and could not have 
formed the specific intent for murder.  Conversely, the State argues that Reaves 
failed to demonstrate that counsel was deficient for failing to present a voluntary 
intoxication defense.  The State argues Reaves failed to present any additional 
testimony regarding his level of intoxication at the time of the offense.  The State 
maintains there is substantial, competent evidence supporting the trial court’s 
finding that Reaves failed to meet this burden.  Based upon the record at retrial, the 
facts of the case, the law in Florida at the time, and counsel’s experience and 
knowledge of the case, we agree that counsel rendered reasonably effective 
representation. 
 
When considering claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court 
applies the following standard: 
An ineffective assistance claim has two components:  A petitioner must 
show that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the deficiency 
prejudiced the defense.  To establish deficient performance, a petitioner 
must demonstrate that counsel’s representation “fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness.” 
 
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (citation omitted) (quoting Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)).  The prejudice prong of the analysis 
 
 
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“requires  showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant 
of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  Failing 
to establish either prong results in a denial of the claim.  Ferrell v. State, 918 So. 2d 
163, 170 (Fla. 2005).  For ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised in 
postconviction proceedings, the appellate court affords deference to findings of 
fact based on competent, substantial evidence and independently reviews 
deficiency and prejudice as mixed questions of law and fact.  See Freeman v. State, 
858 So. 2d 319, 323 (Fla. 2003); State v. Riechmann, 777 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 2000).  
On an ineffective assistance of counsel claim the standard is not how present 
counsel would have proceeded in hindsight.  See Cherry v. State, 659 So. 2d 1069, 
1073 (Fla. 1995).   On review, “a fair assessment of attorney performance requires 
that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to 
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the 
conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.”  Rolling v. State, 825 So. 2d 293, 
298 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).   
 
This Court has held it will not second-guess counsel’s strategic decisions 
about whether to pursue an intoxication defense.  See Jones v. State, 855 So. 2d 
611, 616-617 (Fla. 2003); Johnson v. State, 769 So. 2d 990, 1001-02 (Fla. 2000); 
 
 
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Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000).3  Furthermore, we have 
said that counsel’s decision not to pursue a voluntary intoxication defense was not 
ineffective assistance where no evidence was presented that defendant was 
intoxicated at the time of the crime although there has been a history of drug abuse.  
See Dufour v. State, 905 So. 2d 42, 53 (Fla. 2005); Pietri v. State, 885 So. 2d 245, 
253 (Fla. 2004); Henry v. State, 862 So. 2d 679, 683 (Fla. 2003).4 
Reaves has failed to show how counsel’s performance at retrial was 
deficient, i.e., that he did not function as ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment.  In order to assert the defense of voluntary intoxication, Reaves must 
present evidence of intoxication at the time of the offense that would show his 
                                        
 
3.  In these cases this Court held that strategic decisions do not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and 
rejected and counsel’s decision was reasonable under the norms of professional 
conduct. 
 
4. In Dufour this Court found no ineffectiveness where trial counsel made an 
informed and reasoned decision not to pursue a voluntary intoxication defense, 
which was inconsistent with the underlying defense theory of the case.  Moreover, 
Dufour failed to establish that the defense was viable because he could not 
demonstrate that he was actually intoxicated at the time of the offense.  See 
Dufour, 905 So. 2d at 53. 
In Pietri this Court found no ineffectiveness where Pietri did not present 
evidence at the postconviction evidentiary hearing to demonstrate that he was in 
fact intoxicated at the time of the offense.  Furthermore, Pietri did not present any 
competent evidence proving his inability to form the specific intent to commit the 
crime.  See Pietri, 885 So. 2d at 253. 
In Henry this Court found no ineffectiveness where Henry failed to present 
any evidence that he was actually intoxicated at the time of the offense sufficient to 
establish that he was unable to form the i
ntent necessary to commit the crime 
charged.  See Henry, 862 So. 2d at 683. 
 
 
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inability to form the requisite specific intent.  See Rivera v. State, 717 So. 2d 477, 
485 (Fla. 1998); Linehan v. State, 476 So. 2d 1262, 1264 (Fla. 1985).  Reaves did 
not present any evidence at the evidentiary hearing to show his level or state of 
intoxication at the time of the murder.  There was no evidence to corroborate 
Reaves’ assertions that he was “high” at the time of the offense.  Importantly, 
although the mental health experts opined at the evidentiary hearing that Reaves 
was intoxicated, they did not have any objective evidence to support their 
conclusions.   
Other than his own statements during his confession, there is no direct 
evidence that Reaves was intoxicated at the time of the offense.  During his 
confession, Reaves said he was “high” at the time he shot Deputy Raczkowski, but 
he also made statements indicating he knew exactly what he was doing at the time 
of the shooting.  These statements essentially negated any voluntary intoxication 
defense that trial counsel could have presented on Reaves’ behalf on retrial.  See 
Pace v. State, 854 So. 2d 167, 177 (Fla. 2003) (finding counsel’s rejection of an 
intoxication defense was not deficient performance where Pace’s confession 
“indicated a clear recollection of the facts of the offense and involved deliberate 
behavior”); Davis v. State, 875 So. 2d 359, 367 (Fla. 2003) (finding competent, 
substantive evidence supported trial court’s determination that counsel made an 
informed, strategic decision not to pursue an intoxication defense where defendant 
 
 
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gave detailed confessions as to the circumstances of the crime that “substantially 
undermined the viability of a voluntary intoxication defense”); Damren v. State, 
838 So. 2d 512, 517-18 (Fla. 2003) (holding counsel’s strategic decision not to 
present a voluntary intoxication defense did not constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel where counsel determined the murder was not committed while Floyd was 
under the influence of cocaine).  
Furthermore, Hinton, the first person to see Reaves after the shooting, 
testified at the 1987 trial that Reaves came to his house and said he had shot a cop.  
Reaves told him the officer begged Reaves not to shoot him but Reaves said, in 
essence, “One of us has to go.”  Hinton also testified that Reaves’ speech was not 
slurred and he appeared to be in full control of his faculties.  Because Hinton made 
himself unavailable to testify at retrial, this testimony was read into the record and 
further negated the use of a voluntary intoxication defense.     
 
Trial counsel Kirschner testified at the evidentiary hearing that his theory of 
defense at the time of retrial in 1992 was excusable homicide, which was based on 
his investigation of the case.  He recalled discussing available defenses with 
Reaves and discussing Reaves’ cocaine use around the time of the incident.  
Kirschner testified he would look for lab reports, lay observations of how 
defendant was behaving, and toxicology reports to determine whether there was 
sufficient evidence to argue the defense of voluntary intoxication.  Kirschner stated 
 
 
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his thought process led him to believe that excusable homicide was “the right fit 
for the defense in this case,” and based on the record, the trial court found his 
strategic decisions were competent. 
 
In its order denying relief, the trial court found the ability to offer evidence 
of the combined effect of intoxication and a mental defect was not fully articulated 
or established in law until State v. Bias, 653 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1995), which was 
issued three years after the retrial.  Thus, the trial court found no error in the 
court’s reliance during the retrial on Chestnut v. State, 538 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1989), 
to deny trial counsel’s request to present Dr. William Weitz’s mental health 
testimony at the guilt phase.  In Chestnut, this Court held that an abnormal mental 
condition not constituting legal insanity was inadmissible for the purpose of 
proving that an accused did not or could not form the specific intent to commit an 
offense.  See Chestnut, 538 So. 2d at 820.  Dr. Weitz diagnosed Reaves as having 
an antisocial personality disorder,5 polysubstance abuse (particularly cocaine), and 
Vietnam Syndrome.6  This diagnosis did not rise to the level of legal insanity, and 
                                        
 
5.  Dr. Weitz defined antisocial personality disorder as having difficulty 
relating to authority figures.  Anger, irritability, and rage are components of this 
disorder. 
 
 
6.  Vietnam Syndrome is defined as a series or a set of personality 
characteristics and behavioral patterns of changes that have occurred in combat 
veterans as a result of combat experience.  The qualities of the syndrome include 
rage reactions, alienation, and isolation from the social environment, hypervigilant 
 
 
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trial counsel would have known that it could not support a voluntary intoxication 
defense at the time.  
Furthermore, during the proffer of Dr. Weitz’s testimony during the guilt 
phase, he revealed that Reaves’ consumption of cocaine and beer did not raise his  
level of intoxication to a point that would prevent Reaves from knowing right from 
wrong.  Dr. Weitz further testified that Reaves knew to flee the area, hide in the 
woods, and take evasive action, all of which indicated Reaves knew what he was 
doing. 
There is competent, substantial evidence in the record supporting the trial 
court’s conclusion that trial counsel provided reasonably effective assistance of 
counsel.  Without the distorting effect of hindsight, trial counsel’s strategic choice 
of excusable homicide as a defense over involuntary intoxication was reasonable 
under the facts of the case and the law at the time.  Thus, Reaves has not 
demonstrated that trial counsel’s performance was deficient under Strickland.  
Because counsel’s performance was not deficient, we need not address the 
prejudice prong.  See  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.   
 
  Exclusion of Hinton’s Live Testimony/Denial of Forensic Testing  
                                                                                                                              
type alertness known as “startle response,” a potential increase in alcohol and drug 
use, and some depression. 
 
 
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Prior to the evidentiary hearing, Reaves filed a motion for a writ of habeas 
corpus ad testificandum7 seeking to have Hinton appear and testify.  The motion 
was denied, but the trial court allowed Hinton’s affidavit to be used and argued.  
Reaves argues the trial court erred in excluding Hinton’s live testimony at the 
evidentiary hearing because the testimony was relevant and material to the claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Reaves also argues the trial court erred in 
denying his motion for forensic testing of some of the evidence for drug 
metabolites because the testing would provide scientific support to bolster the 
claim of intoxication at the time of the offense.  Conversely, the State argues that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing Hinton to testify in light 
of his prior testimony and deposition.  The State also contends the trial court did 
not err in denying the motion for forensic testing because Reaves failed to show 
how the testing would reveal his level of intoxication at the time of the offense.  In 
light of Hinton’s testimony at the 1987 trial and the fact that he would not testify at 
retrial in 1992, we agree the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing 
Hinton to testify at the evidentiary hearing.  Furthermore, denial of the motion for 
forensic testing was proper because the testing could not reveal Reaves’ level of 
intoxication at the time of the offense. 
                                        
 
7.  A motion for writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum is defined in Black’s 
Law Dictionary 728 (8th ed. 2004), as a writ used in civil and criminal cases to 
bring a prisoner to court to testify. 
 
 
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The standard of review for a trial court’s ruling on a motion for writ of 
habeas corpus ad testificandum is abuse of discretion.  See Moody v. State, 418 So. 
2d 989, 992 (Fla. 1982).  The abuse of discretion standard of review also applies to 
the denial of a motion for discovery in a postconviction case.  See State v. Lewis, 
656 So. 2d 1248, 1250 (Fla. 1994).  Reaves has failed to demonstrate an abuse of 
discretion by the trial court on either of these issues.   
Hinton was physically present as a witness for the State but refused to testify 
at the 1992 retrial and was ruled unavailable to testify pursuant to section 
90.804(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1991).  See Reaves v. State, 639 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 
1994).  Thereafter, Hinton’s testimony from the 1987 trial was read into the record.  
Id.  Hinton’s testimony revealed that when Reaves showed up at his home and told 
him about the incident he “had no trouble understanding Reaves; his speech was 
not slurred and he appeared to be in full control of his faculties.”  Id.   
Reaves sought to have Hinton testify at the evidentiary hearing in regards to 
Hinton’s 1999 affidavit wherein he described Reaves as “all strung out, he had 
been smoking crack and pretty much out of his head.”  The affidavit was created 
seven years after Hinton refused to testify at the retrial and is significantly different 
from his 1987 trial testimony.  The issue before the trial court at the evidentiary 
hearing was, however, ineffectiveness of counsel at retrial in 1992.  Trial counsel 
had reviewed the statements Hinton made prior to the 1987 trial, and he had 
 
 
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reviewed Hinton’s 1987 trial testimony as well.  Hinton’s account at the time was 
that he had no trouble understanding Reaves; Reaves’ speech was not slurred, and 
Reaves seemed to be in control of his faculties.  At retrial that was the only 
information, other than Reaves’ statements, available to counsel in regards to 
Reaves’ level of intoxication at the time of the murder.  Hinton made himself 
unavailable to testify at the retrial, and his previous trial testimony in 1987 did not 
indicate that Reaves was intoxicated when Hinton saw him after the murder.  The 
trial court properly found that the affidavit contained the sum and substance of any 
testimony that would have been procured from Hinton if he had testified at the 
evidentiary hearing.  That testimony in effect was irrelevant to the ineffectiveness 
of counsel issue because the information now being posited by Hinton was not 
available to counsel in 1992.  
Furthermore, the trial court did not err in denying the motion for testing for 
drug metabolites.  Reaves failed to show how the additional testing would reveal 
material evidence to show his level of intoxication at the time of the crime.  At the 
hearing, Reaves’ own expert, Dr. Debra Mash, testified that, at most, testing could 
reveal the presence of drugs.  However, testing could not reveal the actual time the 
drugs were taken or in what amount.  Therefore, any drugs, drug paraphernalia, 
hair sample, or clothing seized could not provide competent evidence relating to 
Reaves’ level of intoxication at the time of the crime. 
 
 
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In light of these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying Reaves’ request to have Hinton testify at the evidentiary hearing and did 
not abuse its discretion in denying his request to have items tested for the presence 
of drug metabolites.   
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Reaves’ 
motion for postconviction relief after an evidentiary hearing. 
It is so ordered.  
LEWIS, C.J., WELLS, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
ANSTEAD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
 
I cannot concur in the majority’s approval of the conduct of counsel in 
failing to properly investigate or present an intoxication defense to explain Reaves’ 
bizarre conduct that ultimately resulted in the death of a police officer when he 
responded to defendant’s emergency 911 call for help.  Unfortunately, the record is 
as devoid of an explanation for counsel’s failure to investigate and assert this 
defense as it was when we reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing in our 
earlier review of the summary denial of the claim.  All that has been added to the 
 
 
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record is more evidence, expert and otherwise, of the defendant’s cocaine addiction 
and intoxication at the time of the offense. 
 
In an earlier remand we described this claim and its setting: 
 
In Reaves’ first subclaim, he asserts that he is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing regarding whether trial counsel was ineffective in 
failing to present a voluntary intoxication defense.  The record shows 
that during the guilt phase, the State introduced Reaves’ confession--
evidence which could have supported a voluntary intoxication defense 
since Reaves claimed to be “coked up” when he fired the gun.  
Defense counsel, however, never argued this defense or presented any 
evidence which supported voluntary intoxication despite the fact that 
there was other evidence which could have supported this theory. 
During the jury charge conference, the trial judge noted that during 
Reaves’ first trial, the jury was informed as to this defense, and it was 
decided that such a jury instruction should be given again.  
Notwithstanding this fact, Reaves’ counsel never mentioned voluntary 
intoxication during closing arguments, and never discussed how the 
evidence could have supported this theory or how cocaine affects the 
user.  During the penalty phase, even more evidence was presented 
which would have supported a voluntary intoxication defense, 
including additional testimony that Reaves was on drugs at the time of 
the crime.  Moreover, numerous witnesses testified that Reaves had a 
history of serious drug abuse dating back to the Vietnam War, that he 
became involved in “heavy drugs” towards the end of his service in 
Vietnam, and that his prior convictions were drug-related. 
 
. . . . 
 
The postconviction court denied Reaves’ allegation without an 
evidentiary hearing despite evidence that his counsel had evidence 
supporting this defense which he did not present.  Specifically, the 
judge found that voluntary intoxication was not an available defense 
since the defendant’s expert witness testified during a proffer that 
Reaves was not so intoxicated that he did not know right from wrong.  
This reasoning obscures the difference between an insanity defense 
and a voluntary intoxication defense.  Insanity is a complete defense 
if, at the time of the crime, the defendant was incapable of 
distinguishing between right and wrong as a result of a mental disease 
or defect.  [N.8]  Voluntary intoxication is a separate theory and is 
 
 
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available to negate specific intent, such as the element of 
premeditation essential in first-degree murder.  [N.9]  In order to 
successfully assert the defense of voluntary intoxication, “the 
defendant must come forward with evidence of intoxication at the 
time of the offense sufficient to establish that he was unable to form 
the intent necessary to commit the crime charged.”  Rivera v. State, 
717 So. 2d 477, 485 n. 12 (Fla. 1998) (quoting Linehan v. State, 476 
So. 2d 1262, 1264 (Fla. 1985)).  Voluntary intoxication was an 
available defense in this instance, and the record is inconclusive as to 
why counsel did not advance the defense.  As Reaves’ claim of 
ineffective assistance was legally sufficient and was not refuted by the 
record, it was error not to afford him an evidentiary hearing on this 
issue. 
N.8.  Nowitzke v. State, 572 So. 2d 1346, 1355 n. 5 (Fla. 
1990) (“Florida follows the M’Naghten Rule, which 
states that any expert testimony . . . to be relevant, must 
concern whether [the defendant] (1) was incapable of 
distinguishing right from wrong (2) as a result of mental 
infirmity, disease, or defect.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); Hall v. State, 568 So. 2d 882, 885 (Fla. 1990) 
(“[A]n accused is not criminally responsible if, at the 
time of the alleged crime, the defendant was by reason of 
mental infirmity, disease, or defect unable to understand 
the nature and quality of his act or its consequences or 
was incapable of distinguishing right from wrong.”). 
N.9.  Gardner v. State, 480 So. 2d 91, 92 (Fla. 1985) 
(“Voluntary intoxication is a defense to the specific 
intent crimes of first-degree murder and robbery.”); 
Burch v. State, 478 So. 2d 1050, 1051 (Fla. 1985) (“We 
explicitly recognized [in Cirack v. State, 201 So. 2d 706 
(Fla. 1967),] that the defense of voluntary intoxication 
was available to negate specific intent . . . .”). 
Reaves v. State, 826 So. 2d at 937-39.  At the evidentiary hearing, defense counsel 
testified that he believed there was a basis for the voluntary intoxication defense 
but he viewed it as a secondary or fall-back defense that he would leave 
 
 
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completely to the jury to figure out without his assistance.  This was essentially his 
only explanation for not investigating or presenting the defense, and this 
explanation is patently unreasonable and inadequate in light of the facts and 
circumstances we outlined in our remand opinion and the additional facts and 
circumstances developed at the postconviction hearing.   
 
Try as I may, I cannot conclude, as the majority has done, that this testimony 
represents a reasonable and adequate investigation by counsel of the circumstances 
that would support this defense.  As we have noted in our past opinions, this case 
involves tragic and bizarre circumstances that included the defendant calling 911 at 
3 a.m. from a Zippy Mart apparently in an effort to get a taxicab.  When a police 
officer responded to this call for help, he was killed as a result of a struggle over a 
gun that fell out of Reaves’ clothing.  Reaves’ confession was replete with 
statements that he was high on cocaine at the time.  Reaves was also seen by a 
mental health expert who, while acknowledging that Reaves knew right from 
wrong, was prepared to testify on the voluntary intoxication defense.  Because 
even more evidence of appellant’s cocaine addiction was presented in the 
postconviction hearing, and defense counsel provided no reasonable explanation 
for his failure to investigate and present this defense, I cannot join in the majority’s 
conclusion that counsel provided competent representation.   
 
 
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In the face of a lack of an adequate explanation of counsel, the trial court 
and the majority have fashioned a speculative and hypothetical explanation by 
pointing out possible weaknesses in the defense of voluntary intoxication.  But that 
is neither the trial court’s nor our obligation on review of counsel’s actions.  
Rather, we are bound by the facts, most of which are outlined in our prior opinion, 
and by counsel’s explanations, not our own speculation or rationalization of 
counsel’s conduct.   
 
As this Court explicitly detailed in our prior opinion, on this record, with its 
bizarre facts, voluntary intoxication jumps out as an explanation for the 
defendant’s bizarre and deadly actions.  And, while even that defense could not 
have exonerated the defendant from responsibility for the death of the officer, it 
could have resulted in a jury finding of guilt of a lesser degree of homicide.  In a 
very real sense, the advancement of this defense represented a chance to save the 
appellant’s life.  It is simply not enough for counsel, as he admitted below, to leave 
it to the jury to figure out such an important defense on its own. 
 
 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Indian River County,  
Robert A. Hawley, Judge - Case No. 86-729-CF 
 
Neal A. Dupree, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel – Southern Region, William 
M. Hennis, III, Litigation Director, CCRC, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant 
 
 
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Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Debra Rescigno, and 
Leslie Campbell, Assistant Attorneys General, West Palm Beach, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee