Case Title: Stevens v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 110402

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2012-01-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, 
JJ., and Russell and Lacy, S.JJ. 
 
ROGER LEE STEVENS,  
S/K/A ROGER LEE STEPHENS 
 
v.  Record No. 110402 
 
 
OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    ELIZABETH B. LACY 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA  
 
    January 13, 2012 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia erred in affirming the trial court’s denial of the 
defendant’s motion to suppress his statement to police during a 
custodial interrogation because, in light of the circumstances, 
the defendant’s request for a lawyer was ambiguous and, 
therefore, the officers were entitled to ask further clarifying 
questions. 
BACKGROUND 
The facts are not in dispute.  Zachary Titus and Mark 
Hopkinson were shot and killed in the course of a drug 
transaction and robbery in Pittsylvania County.  Roger Lee 
Stevens was arrested in connection with these murders and taken 
to a police station in Chatham, Virginia for questioning.   
Officers William H. Chaney and T. L. Nicholson with the 
Pittsylvania County Sheriff’s Department conducted the 
interrogation.  Officer Chaney advised Stevens of his right to 
have counsel present during the custodial interrogation and his 
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right to remain silent or terminate the interrogation at any 
time pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and 
Stevens voluntarily waived these rights.  Stevens answered the 
officers’ questions for approximately two hours, during which 
time he did not ask for an attorney and made no incriminating 
statements.  
The next morning, pursuant to the magistrate’s order, 
Stevens was transported to the court building for his initial 
appearance before a court not of record for purposes of advising 
him of his right to bail and for appointment of counsel if 
appropriate.  Code §§ 19.2-158 and -159.  However, the 
magistrate’s order incorrectly sent Stevens to the juvenile and 
domestic relations district court rather than the general 
district court.  Because the general district court was not in 
session, Stevens was placed in a holding cell pending his 
transfer back to jail.  
Officer Chaney received word that Stevens wanted to talk 
with Chaney again.  Chaney went to the holding cell and had a 
“basic conversation” with Stevens.  Stevens asked if he could go 
home to see his child.  Chaney explained that Stevens was in 
police custody for several serious crimes and could not go home.  
Chaney told Stevens that later he would have Stevens brought 
down to Chaney’s office, which was in the same building as the 
holding cell, to talk with him some more.   
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Later in the day, Officers Chaney and Nicholson had Stevens 
brought to their office.  The conversation was digitally 
recorded and proceeded as follows:  
 
Chaney:  You wanna, you want to talk to us some more? 
 
 
Stevens:  Ya’ll want to talk to me or something? 
 
 
Chaney:  Yeah.  You want to talk to us? 
 
Stevens:  Ya’ll want to talk to me?  I ain’t doing nothing 
[inaudible] sitting. 
 
Chaney:  Well reason we ask is cause we brought you back 
over that, this morning you asked for me, and we brought 
you back over here the reason I’m asking you is because 
your rights still apply.  You still understand your rights? 
 
 
Stevens:  I have the right to remain silent. 
 
 
Nicholson:  Yeah. 
 
Chaney:  Everything that I read you last night, do you 
still understand your rights? 
 
 
Stevens:  Mm-hmm. 
 
 
Chaney:  You can have a lawyer present if you want one. 
 
Stevens:  I want, that’s what I need.  I want to know 
what’s, you know what I’m saying. 
 
 
Chaney:  You can stop answering at any time. 
 
 
Stevens:  That’s what I want, a lawyer, man. 
 
 
 
Chaney:  You do want a lawyer. 
 
Stevens:  I mean, that’s what I thought they brought me up 
here for today. 
 
Nicholson:  Well they gonna appoint you a lawyer.  I mean 
you gonna get a lawyer. 
 
4 
 
Chaney:  The question is do you want a lawyer before you 
talk to us again or are you willing to talk to us? 
 
Stevens:  I mean I’ll listen to ya but you already said if 
I could stop if I wanted. 
 
 
Chaney:  Stop answering at any time you want to.  
 
 
Stevens:  I’ll listen to what you got to say.  If you want-
if I say something-if I feel I don’t want to say no more 
ya’ll done told me I can stop.  
 
 
Nicholson:  Yes sir. 
 
Chaney:  Stop any time you want to. 
 
 
Nicholson:  No problem at all with that. 
 
Chaney:  All you got to say is I don’t want to say-I don’t 
want to talk to you no more.  That’s all you gotta say. 
 
Following this exchange, the officers continued to interview 
Stevens for approximately two-and-a-half hours during which time 
Stevens made incriminating statements. 
Stevens was indicted by a multi-jurisdictional grand jury 
impaneled at the Circuit Court of Halifax County for two counts 
of murder, Code § 18.2-32, two counts of use of a firearm in the 
commission of murder, Code § 18.2-53.1, conspiracy to commit 
robbery, Code §§ 18.2-22 and 18.2-58, robbery, Code § 18.2-58, 
use of a firearm in the commission of robbery, Code § 18.2-53.1, 
malicious bodily injury, Code § 18.2-51, and use of a firearm in 
the commission of malicious wounding, Code § 18.2-53.1. 
Prior to trial, Stevens filed a motion to suppress the 
incriminating statements he made to police on the grounds that 
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the statements were taken in a custodial interrogation 
subsequent to his request for a lawyer and therefore were taken 
in violation of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution.  The trial court denied Stevens’ 
motion finding that, under the circumstances, the statements and 
questions by the police officers following Stevens’ reference to 
wanting a lawyer were to clarify Stevens’ request and therefore 
did not violate his constitutional rights.  Stevens was found 
guilty on all indictments by a Pittsylvania County jury and the 
circuit court sentenced him to 160 years’ imprisonment. 
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals of Virginia 
reversed Stevens’ convictions and remanded the matter for a new 
trial.  The Court of Appeals granted the Commonwealth’s petition 
for rehearing en banc, vacated the panel’s previous decision, 
and affirmed Stevens’ conviction.  Stevens v. Commonwealth, 57 
Va. App. 566, 704 S.E.2d 585 (2011).  The Court of Appeals held 
that  
Stevens’ statement was ambiguous because the 
circumstances leading up to Stevens’ statement made it 
unclear whether Stevens had requested the presence of 
an attorney during custodial interrogation, or whether 
he had simply expressed his desire to have an attorney 
appointed to represent him at trial.  Because of this 
ambiguity, we conclude that the police were permitted 
to ask Stevens limited questions solely for the 
purpose of clarifying the statement.  Accordingly, we 
hold that the police did not violate Stevens’ right to 
counsel under Miranda . . . . 
 
Id. at 568-69, 704 S.E.2d at 587. 
6 
 
 
This Court granted Stevens an appeal on the following 
assignment of error: 
The Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the 
trial court’s denial of the appellant’s suppression 
motion holding the investigators could ask 
clarifying questions of appellant as the 
circumstances of his request for counsel rendered 
that request ambiguous. 
 
DISCUSSION 
In this case, there is no dispute regarding the facts. 
Consequently, this appeal presents a pure question of law that 
is subject to de novo review.  Specifically, we apply the 
requisite constitutional standards to the facts of the case to 
determine whether Stevens’ request for an attorney during the 
custodial interrogation was sufficiently unambiguous under the 
circumstances to preclude further questioning by the law 
enforcement officers.  Commonwealth v. Redmond, 264 Va. 321, 
326-27, 568 S.E.2d 695, 697-98 (2002).  See also Zektaw v. 
Commonwealth, 278 Va. 127, 134-35, 677 S.E.2d 49, 53 (2009) 
(when defendant does not dispute the content of his statements 
to police, “appellate consideration of the circuit court’s 
denial of [the defendant’s] motion to suppress is restricted to 
a de novo review of the legal issue whether [his] words, taken 
in context, were sufficient to invoke his right to counsel”) 
(quoting Commonwealth v. Hilliard, 270 Va. 42, 50, 613 S.E.2d 
579, 584 (2005)). 
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The constitutional standards we apply are well-established. 
An accused’s right to have counsel present during a custodial 
interrogation was first recognized in Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474.  
The principle is now well-established that, pursuant to the 
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, law 
enforcement officers must inform a suspect in a custodial 
interrogation of certain rights, including the right to remain 
silent and to have the assistance and presence of legal counsel 
during the interrogation.  Commonwealth v. Hilliard, 270 Va. 42, 
49, 613 S.E.2d 579, 584 (2005).  If the accused expresses a 
desire to have counsel present during a custodial interrogation, 
law enforcement officers must cease their interrogation until 
counsel is present or the accused initiates further 
communication with the authorities.  Midkiff v. Commonwealth, 
250 Va. 262, 266, 462 S.E.2d 112, 114 (1995) (citing Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981)).  See also Zektaw, 278 Va. 
at 136, 677 S.E.2d at 53 (quoting Edwards). 
To invoke the protections provided by Miranda and Edwards 
an accused must clearly and unambiguously assert his right to 
counsel.  Zektaw, 278 Va. at 136, 677 S.E.2d at 53; Midkiff, 250 
Va. at 266, 462 S.E.2d at 115.  However, in situations where  
a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is 
ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in 
light of the circumstances would have understood only 
that the suspect might be invoking the right to 
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counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of 
questioning. 
 
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 (1994).  The Supreme 
Court recognized that, in such situations, it would “be good 
police practice for the interviewing officers to clarify whether 
or not [the accused] actually wants an attorney” but the Court 
did not establish a rule that officers must ask clarifying 
questions.  Id. at 461-62.  
Finally, in Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1984), 
the Supreme Court held that “an accused’s postrequest responses 
to further interrogation may not be used to cast retrospective 
doubt on the clarity of the initial request itself” but the case 
did not address what, if any, events preceding the request could 
be considered as rendering the request ambiguous or equivocal. 
 
Stevens argues that his statement “[t]hat’s what I want, a 
lawyer, man” was clear and unambiguous and, therefore, at that 
moment, all further questioning by the officers had to stop.  He 
argues that further interpretation or clarifying questions are 
justified only when the words themselves are ambiguous or 
unclear.  The Commonwealth responds that the single statement 
should not be considered in isolation and, that taken in 
context, a reasonable police officer could have been uncertain 
as to whether Stevens was expressing a desire for the 
appointment of counsel to represent him at trial or to be 
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present during the custodial interrogation.  Under these 
circumstances, the Commonwealth contends, the officers did not 
violate Stevens’ Miranda rights when they asked questions to 
clarify Stevens’ intent. 
 
We reject Stevens’ contention that the determination 
regarding the request for an attorney during a custodial 
interrogation is limited to consideration of only the words 
spoken.  Hilliard, 270 Va. at 50, 613 S.E.2d at 585.  While 
post-request responses to questioning may not be used to “cast 
retrospective doubt on the clarity of the initial request 
itself,” Smith, 469 U.S. at 99-100, pre-request circumstances 
are relevant to determining the clarity of the request.  Whether 
a suspect has invoked his right to counsel during a custodial 
interrogation is an objective inquiry and the invocation of the 
request for counsel must be such that “a reasonable officer in 
light of the circumstances” would understand the statement to be 
a request to have counsel present for the interrogation.  Davis, 
512 U.S. at 459 (emphasis added); Zektaw, 278 Va. at 136, 677 
S.E.2d at 54; Redmond, 264 Va. at 328, 568 S.E.2d at 699.  This 
test set out by the Supreme Court does not limit the inquiry to 
the single statement requesting a lawyer as Stevens asserts, but 
includes consideration of the circumstances preceding the 
request.  If those circumstances would lead a reasonable police 
officer to conclude that Stevens’ request for a lawyer could 
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have been for a reason other than a lawyer’s presence at the 
custodial interrogation, the officers were entitled to proceed 
as they did and ask questions to clarify Stevens’ meaning.  See 
Cooper v. Taylor, 103 F.3d 366, 373 (4th Cir. 1996) (Luttig, J., 
concurring) (accused’s response to officer’s question about a 
desire for a lawyer was ambiguous in the context of the 
immediately preceding questions and answers and especially 
because of the accused’s earlier waivers).  Thus, the 
circumstances preceding Stevens’ request for an attorney are 
relevant to the determination whether his request was clear and 
unambiguous. 
Stevens next asserts that “[n]othing in the circumstances 
of the present case was ambiguous or equivocal” particularly 
because the request for an attorney was made while the officers 
were reminding Stevens of his Fifth Amendment right to an 
attorney.  Again, we disagree.  The circumstances preceding the 
moment when the officers heard Stevens say “[t]hat’s what I 
want, a lawyer, man” included Stevens’ prior waiver of his 
Miranda rights; two conversations during which Stevens did not 
request an attorney; Stevens’ re-initiation of the second 
conversation with Officer Chaney; and the officers’ knowledge 
that one of the reasons Stevens was brought to the court 
building was for the appointment of an attorney to represent him 
in the ensuing legal proceedings, but that no attorney had been 
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appointed for him by the time they met with Stevens for the 
third time because the general district court was not in 
session.∗  These circumstances support a reasonable police 
officer’s belief that Stevens was willing to talk with the 
officers without an attorney present and that Stevens was in the 
court building for the appointment of a lawyer but no lawyer had 
yet been appointed.  In this context, Stevens’ request for a 
lawyer could be understood by a reasonable police officer to 
refer to either a lawyer for purposes of the custodial 
interrogation or a lawyer to represent Stevens in court.  We 
agree with the Court of Appeals, that under the facts of this 
case, Officers Chaney and Nicholson “could have reasonably 
viewed Stevens’ statement as ambiguous, and thus they were 
permitted to ask Stevens clarifying questions . . . .”  57 Va. 
App. at 580, 704 S.E.2d at 592. 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
Affirmed. 
                                                 
∗Stevens argued on brief and in oral argument that the 
record did not support the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the 
officers knew of the “botched” proceeding to appoint Stevens an 
attorney.  We do not address this issue because Stevens did not 
assign error to the Court of Appeals’ holding.  Rule 
5:17(c)(1)(i).