Case Title: IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF: BJO, AKA, and LM: WRB and GB V. GS, MO, GA, and RM

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-07-1

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-08-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF:  BJO, AKA, and LM: WRB and GB V. GS, MO, GA, and RM2007 WY 135165 P.3d 442Case Number: C-07-1Decided: 08/23/2007Modified: 08/30/2007

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
IN 
THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF:  
BJO, AKA, and LM,WRB and 
GBAppellants(Petitioners),v.GS, MO, GA, and 
RM,Appellees(Respondents).

 
 
Appeal from theDistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

DaNece 
Day of Lubnau & Bailey, P.C., Gillette, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

MO 
(Father), Pro 
se

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellants are 
the maternal grandparents (hereafter "Grandparents," WRB and GB in the caption) 
of the child at issue in this matter (hereafter "Child," BJO in the 
caption).  Grandparents petitioned 
the district court to appoint them as guardians of Child.  Child's father (hereafter "Father," MO 
in the caption) objected.  The 
district court declined to grant the petition and Grandparents appeal.  We will 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Grandparents 
raise these issues:

 
 
A.  Did 
the trial court commit reversible error by prospectively applying holdings of a 
Supreme Court case which was issued while this matter was under 
advisement?

 
 
B.  Did 
the trial court abuse its discretion by failing to find [Father] an unfit 
parent?

 
 
C.  Did 
the trial court abuse its discretion by failing to grant a guardianship for one 
child in a sibling group?

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      The Grandparents' 
daughter is the Mother (RM in the caption) of the three children.  Each of the three children has a 
different father.  Only the Child we 
have identified above is the subject of this appeal.  She was born on July 3, 1996.  The other two children (AKA and LM in 
the caption) figure peripherally in this case only because of the third issue 
listed immediately above.  Mother 
had primary custody of the children and Father had visitation with the Child, as 
ordered by the district court in other unrelated proceedings.  Although it is not crystal clear in this 
record, for purposes of our disposition of this appeal we will assume that 
Mother had consented to her parents being the guardians of her children, to the 
extent her parental rights are concerned.  
The children are in the actual physical custody of the Grandparents 
because the district court entered an order to that effect, in neglect 
proceedings precipitated by Mother's conduct.  Although the Grandparents were given 
actual physical custody of the children, that custody was made subject to 
Father's visitation rights established in a 2001 child 
custody/visitation/support order.  
The Grandparents' principal complaint was that Father exercised his 
visitation in accordance with the visitation provisions of the district court's 
order, but to the detriment of the Child's education.  So far as the record demonstrates, the 
district court was not asked to modify visitation. 

 
 
[¶4]      On June 16, 2005, 
the Grandparents filed their petition for appointment of guardians.  The petition was premised on the basis 
that Child was a minor and that the circumstances showed that the best interests 
of the Child necessitated the appointment of a guardian.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-101(a)(ii) and (v) 
(LexisNexis 2007).  The necessity for the appointment of 
a guardian must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 3-2-104(a) (LexisNexis 
2007) (emphasis added).

 
 
[¶5]      The Grandparents 
asserted that the children were placed in their custody by an order of the 
district court because the children were neglected while in their Mother's 
custody.  That order is not in the 
record on appeal, although it is attached to the Grandparents' brief.  We will take notice of it in connection 
with this appeal because it is evident that the district court took notice of 
its prior orders in its disposition of this case.  In their petition, the Grandparents also 
alleged:

 
 
            
7.  The circumstances surrounding the parents and children are 
such that the fathers and mother are presently unable to provide adequate care 
of the minor children as the children have been subjected to and/or witnessed 
continuing neglect in their mother's home.  
It is contrary to the best interest of the children to be separated from 
one another during the pendency of the juvenile 
case.

            
8.  The proposed Guardians and Petitioners herein have a loving 
and caring relationship with the children and can provide stability and security 
for the children during the pendency of the juvenile court action.  Further, Petitioners have and will work 
with the children and their parents to maintain their relationships with one 
another.

            
9.  It is in the children's best interests that the maternal 
grandparents be appointed Guardians of the minor 
children.

            
10.  The proposed Guardians and Petitioners herein are willing 
to and capable of providing for the best interests of the minor children and for 
their care, comfort and welfare.

 
 
[¶6]      Appearing pro se, Father answered the petition and 
denied all of the allegations contained in it.  The record contains a letter from Mother 
to her parents' attorney stating:

 
 
            
I am writing in regards to [Grandparents] requesting guardianship of my 
children [naming all three].  I 
would like the court to understand that I do not want my children split up and 
agree to their request for this reason while my children are not with me.  It would be real appreciated if the 
judge would set a hearing on this.  
Thank you.

 
 
[¶7]      A hearing was 
held on the petition on May 1, 2006.  
The only parent who appeared at that hearing was the Father of the Child 
directly at issue in this appeal.  
Mother did not appear and the attorney for the Grandparents asserted that 
she had consented to the guardianship "especially by her nonappearance today." 
As noted above, a letter from Mother is included in the record on appeal but it 
is an informal document and cannot be 
viewed as "consent," or as "evidence" for that matter, as those terms are used 
by Grandparents' attorney.  It is 
not an issue in this appeal whether Mother had, or had not, consented to the 
guardianship.  At the hearing, the 
Grandparents endeavored to prove the necessity for the guardianship, but 
noted:

 
 
It is 
our position that this guardianship does not affect [Father's] parental rights, 
but it is necessary to provide security and stability for [Child] that is 
particularly necessary in light of the educational needs that the Court's going 
to hear about today, and the fact that those needs will best be met by her 
remaining in a guardianship with her 
grandparents.

 
 
[¶8]      The Grandparents 
called Tami Bishop, the Child's third grade teacher, as a witness.  The Child attended school in Rozet.  She related that the Child had a 
learning disability, especially with respect to written language and reading 
comprehension, and that Father's visitation tended to interfere with the Child's 
educational processes.

 
 
[¶9]      The Grandparents 
also called as a witness Robert O'Neil, a Gillette attorney who served as the 
Child's guardian ad litem in the juvenile court proceedings related to the 
neglect allegations.  He spoke 
highly of Father's efforts to complete parenting classes and of his involvement, 
as a parent, with his Child.  Mr. 
O'Neil did say he thought it would be important to keep the three children 
together, as siblings.

 
 
[¶10]   Both Grandparents testified 
relating their concerns about Father's visitation with Child, how it tended to 
interfere with her schooling, and giving their opinions about Father's 
fitness.

 
 
[¶11]   Father testified in his own 
behalf.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶12]   It is difficult to articulate a 
standard of review for the issues presented to us in this appeal.  However, we will begin by noting that 
the Grandparents' contention that the district court erred by retrospectively 
applying our decision, In re Guardianship 
of MEO, 2006 WY 87, ¶¶ 41-57, 138 P.3d 1145, 1157-61 (Wyo. 2006), to 
the circumstances of this case, is mistaken.  MEO collected and catalogued many of the 
most important Wyoming and Federal court decisions that apply 
to circumstances such as those presented here.  However, so as far as we are concerned 
in this case, it did not announce a new rule to which the concept of 
retrospective or prospective application is pertinent.  Also see Wild v. Adrian, 2007 WY 61, ¶ 15, 
155 P.3d 1036, 1040 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 
[¶13]   The district court was not 
presented with the issue of whether Father was a "fit" parent.  On appeal, the Grandparents lament that 
they did not focus more on his unfitness in their presentation of evidence, 
because if they had, they would surely have been successful.  The focus of their evidence was on what 
they viewed as the "best interests of the child."  Grandparents contend they were misled 
into believing that the only issue was the "best interests of the child."  Of course, the focus of a hearing such 
as that had in this case, as set out in the governing statute, is the 
"necessity" for a guardianship being established in the first instance.  One aspect of the MEO case was to articulate the 
time-honored principle that a child with a living parent does not need a 
guardian, unless that parent is demonstrably unfit.  None of the materials contained in this 
record suggest that Father is "unfit," but of even more fundamental importance 
his "fitness" was not clearly posed as an issue for the district court to 
decide.

 
 
[¶14]   Finally, the Grandparents contend 
that the district court erred in making them guardians of two of the three 
children, but not the Child at issue here, because it offends our generally 
accepted rule that sibling groups should not be separated.  In Aragon v. Aragon, 2005 WY 5, 
¶¶ 23-26, 104 P.3d 756, 763-64 (Wyo. 2005) we 
held:

 
 
Finally, 
Mother argues that the district court erred by awarding Father custody of the 
children, thereby splitting the children from their half siblings and 
stepsibling.  According to Mother, 
the case of Dowdy v. Dowdy, 864 P.2d 439, 440 (Wyo.1993), stands for the proposition that separating siblings through 
custody awards to different parents is not preferred.  Mother contends that this rule of law 
should apply to half siblings and stepsiblings, as well as full siblings.  Mother also asserts that the district 
court failed to adequately state the factors upon which it relied and the 
evidence that supported its decision as required by our decision in Pace, which provides at ¶ 17 
(footnote omitted):

 
 
      As future 
guidance to the trial courts, we hold that, when the exercise of its discretion 
in custody matters involves splitting custody of children between parents or 
other unconventional custody approaches, the trial court must provide an 
explanation of its reasoning and place its findings on the record.  A reasoned explanation and an expression 
of findings of a trial court's conclusion will assure this court that a 
comprehensive evaluation of all relevant factors occurred prior to the award of 
custody.  

 
 
            
Thus, Mother asserts that, at a minimum, this matter must be remanded to 
the district court for an elaboration of such 
factors.

 
 
            
A reading of our opinion in Dowdy does indicate that generally 
speaking the separating of siblings through custody awards to different parents 
is not preferred.  Keeping siblings 
together in the same household is considered the better practice.  However, this court clarified that the 
effect of separating siblings from each other is just one of several factors 
courts consider in determining the primary issue--the best interests of the 
children.  Dowdy, at 440 (citing Jay M. Zitter, 
Annotation, Child Custody:  Separating Children by Custody Awards to 
Different Parents--Post-1975 Cases, 67 A.L.R.4th 354, § 2[a], 1989 WL 571744 
(1989) and In re Marriage of 
Barnthouse, 765 P.2d 610 (Colo.App.1988)).  In other cases we have consistently 
taken this position.  See Reavis, at 431, Rogers v. Rogers, 973 P.2d 1118, 1121 (Wyo.1999), and 
Pace, at ¶ 11.   We have instructed trial courts to 
be explicit in placing on the record the reasons supporting its determination to 
separate siblings so as to assure that a comprehensive evaluation of all 
relevant factors occurred prior to the award of custody.  We have additionally admonished trial 
counsel that they cannot remain passive and must assist the trial judge in 
articulating on the record the relevant factors and their relative weight which, 
in the lawyer's professional judgment, should act as a foundation for the trial 
court's exercise of judicial discretion.  
Pace, at ¶ 18.   The standards as enunciated within 
both Dowdy and Pace remain valid and applicable, but we 
emphasize that these standards must be applied within their full context as 
specifically identified.

 
 
            
Further while we do not expressly adopt such holdings, we find upon our 
review of established foreign case authority that other jurisdictions are 
essentially in accord with the standards established in Dowdy and Pace.  Although we acknowledge that there is 
somewhat of a split of authority in the weight to be given to sibling 
relationships in custody determinations, all jurisdictions we reviewed agree 
that the paramount focus in determining who should be given custody of a child 
is what outcome would optimally serve the best interest of each child.  That said, some jurisdictions recognize 
that sufficient circumstances, looking at the totality of the situation with the 
best interest of the child being the paramount concern, must exist before 
siblings are separated.  See Miers v. Miers, 53 S.W.3d 592, 596 
(Mo.App.2001); Viamonte v. Viamonte, 
131 Md.App. 151, 748 A.2d 493, 496-99 (2000); Mayer v. Mayer, 397 N.W.2d 638, 644-45 
(S.D.1986).  Other jurisdictions 
reserve a higher "exceptional circumstances" standard only if the contemplated 
separation involves full siblings.  
See Eaton v. Dixon, 69 Ark.App. 9, 
9 S.W.3d 535, 537 (2000).

            

            
Moreover, we find the strong public policy toward preservation of sibling 
relationships to be equally applicable whether the children are full sibling, 
half sibling, or stepsiblings.  As 
recognized in Atkinson, Modern Child 
Custody Practice, § 4-17 (2d ed.2004), a recurrent theme in custody cases is 
the importance of keeping siblings together because close familial relationships 
are much to be encouraged, brothers and sisters need each other's strengths and 
association in those everyday and often common experiences;  separating them unnecessarily is likely 
to be traumatic and harmful.  In 
addition, brothers and sisters may particularly need each other's support to 
cope with the strain of their parents' divorce.  This same treatise further notes that 
the presumption of keeping children together has been applied by many courts in 
cases where children have only one parent in common, i.e., brothers and sisters 
who were born of a parent's prior or subsequent marriage.  Id. 
Thus, we hold that our established standards enunciated in Dowdy and Pace are applicable for all siblings 
regardless of their nature.

 
 
[¶15]   We do not retreat from anything we 
said in Aragon.  However, we note that the district 
court's order does not implicate the separation of siblings as contemplated by 
that body of law.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶16]   The issue presented to the district 
court in this case was whether a guardianship was necessary for the Child.  The district court determined it was not 
necessary.  That decision is not 
challenged in this appeal.  The 
provision of the district court's order which denied Grandparents' petition to 
be appointed the guardians of the Child is 
affirmed.