Case Title: State v. Manning

Citation: 117 N.J. 657, 569 A.2d 1351

Docket Number: 

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 1989-09-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
#29933-a-JMK 
2023 S.D. 7 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
* * * * 
 
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
 
 
 
v. 
 
JERREN DONALD MANNING, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
* * * * 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 
THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
BROWN COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
* * * * 
 
THE HONORABLE GREGG C. MAGERA 
Judge 
 
* * * * 
 
 
THOMAS J. COGLEY 
Aberdeen, South Dakota 
Attorney for defendant 
 
and appellant. 
 
 
MARTY J. JACKLEY 
Attorney General 
 
PAUL S. SWEDLUND 
Solicitor General 
Pierre, South Dakota 
 
 
 
 
Attorneys for plaintiff and 
appellee. 
 
* * * * 
 
 
 
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS 
 
OCTOBER 3, 2022 
 
OPINION FILED 02/01/23 
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KERN, Justice 
[¶1.]  
In May 2019, a jury found Jerren Manning guilty of two counts of first-
degree rape and two counts of sexual contact with a child under the age of sixteen.  
The court sentenced Manning only on the rape convictions, imposing two 
consecutive sixty-year terms in the state penitentiary.  Manning appeals, raising 
multiple issues including that there was insufficient evidence to support his 
convictions, that the submission of the sexual contact charges to the jury violated 
the prohibition against double jeopardy, that the court allowed improper bolstering 
of witnesses, that the courtroom was improperly closed to the public during voir 
dire, and that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.  Further, Manning 
claims that his sentence is cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment 
and constitutes an abuse of discretion.  We affirm. 
Facts and Procedural History 
[¶2.]  
In 2017, Jeremy and Amanda Ahoe lived in Aberdeen along with their 
three children, A.A. age eight, B.A. age six, and S.A. age three.  Jeremy owned a 
construction and rental company, and Amanda worked as a certified nursing 
assistant.  Manning, who was married with one child, also lived and worked in 
Aberdeen.  Jeremy and Manning were close friends, with Jeremy serving as the best 
man in Manning’s wedding.  Manning would often pick up A.A. and B.A. after 
school and babysit all three children at the Ahoe home for a few hours until one of 
their parents got home from work or Manning had to leave for work.  At times, 
Manning watched the children up to four days a week. 
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[¶3.]  
On multiple occasions, Jeremy would come home after work and find 
Manning alone with B.A. in her upstairs bedroom while his other two daughters 
were in different parts of the house.  In the fall of 2018, Jeremy came home from 
work early one day and discovered that the door to his office, located on the main 
floor of their home, was closed.  He opened the door and found B.A. and Manning 
alone in the office.  Although he was suspicious, Jeremy did not immediately 
confront Manning about the situation, but instead returned to work. 
[¶4.]  
Later that evening, Jeremy asked B.A. about being alone in the office 
with Manning.  B.A. eventually disclosed to both her parents that Manning had 
touched her, but she did not describe the extent of the touching.  Amanda stated 
that B.A. was “sad and overwhelmed” when she talked about what happened.  
Jeremy and Amanda debated back and forth about what to do with this information 
and decided not to call law enforcement.  Amanda, however, did call the school and 
inform them that Manning was no longer permitted to pick up the children. 
[¶5.]  
On the afternoon of October 4, 2018, Officer Jordan Mejeske of the 
Aberdeen Police Department was contacted by the principal of the Ahoe girls’ 
elementary school, who informed him that a student had reported a possible sexual 
assault of her sister.  Officer Mejeske went to the school and talked to the principal, 
the school counselor, and the reporting student’s teacher, but did not meet with 
either A.A. or B.A.  He then contacted the Central South Dakota Child Assessment 
Center (CAC) to set up a forensic interview for B.A.  He also contacted Amanda and 
told her that law enforcement would be investigating the report and that she should 
not discuss the situation with the children. 
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[¶6.]  
B.A. was interviewed and examined on October 11, 2018, at the CAC 
by Angela Lisburg, a family nurse practitioner.  During the interview, B.A. stated 
that Manning had touched her more than one time.  B.A. explained that sometimes 
Manning would do the touching upstairs at their house, and sometimes downstairs 
in her dad’s office.  B.A. said that Manning would touch her with his private part, 
that sometimes it would go in her bottom, and that Manning put his private part in 
her bottom more than one time.  She stated that Manning would pull her clothes 
“half down” when he put his private part in her bottom.  Lisburg asked B.A. how it 
felt when Manning’s private part was in her bottom, to which she replied, “Not that 
really bad, but it does hurt.”  According to B.A., Manning would be on his knees and 
B.A. would sometimes be laying down on her back and sometimes on her stomach.  
She said that sometimes she was on her tummy on the chair in the office and 
Manning would give her his phone so that she could play a game.  While she was on 
the phone, he would put his private part in her bottom. 
[¶7.]  
B.A. stated that there was one time her daddy “noticed” that she was 
alone in the office with Manning.  That time, she was in the office laying down on 
her back with the door to the office closed.  Her dad came into the house, so she had 
to pull her pants up and Manning put his private part back in his pants before her 
dad came into the office.  Lisburg asked B.A. if Manning or her dad said anything, 
and B.A. replied “no.” 
[¶8.]  
Lisburg also asked B.A. about the touching that happened upstairs, 
and B.A. stated that “it’s the same thing” as happened downstairs.  B.A. explained 
that the touching upstairs would occur in her bedroom on the bed and that it 
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happened more than one time.  B.A. described lying on her back on the bed, with 
Manning kneeling on the floor.  Later in the interview, B.A. indicated that Manning 
would tell her to “lay down and lift yourself up.”  When later asked to clarify this, 
B.A. said “I would be lifting my legs up and he would tell me to put them on his 
shoulder.” 
[¶9.]  
B.A. recounted that on one occasion she was upstairs looking for a 
battery when Manning came into the room and told her to come lie down on her 
bed.  She told him no.  Lisburg asked B.A. to describe this incident in more detail.  
B.A. said that Manning picked her up and told her that if she did not lie down he 
would not come over again.  She said she was scared because he said it in a mean 
voice.  She said that her sister was coming upstairs, and she pulled her pants up.  
When asked to clarify what Manning did in the bedroom, she said he “did the same 
thing as he does every single time.” 
[¶10.]  
Lisburg asked B.A. if anything ever came out of Manning’s private 
part, and B.A. responded that white stuff would come out and go on Manning’s 
hands.  He would have to wash his hands a lot to get it off.  Sometimes it would spill 
on the ground next to the chair in the office and Manning would use a baby wipe to 
clean it up.  He would then flush the baby wipe down the toilet.  Lisburg asked B.A. 
to describe what Manning’s body would be doing when his private part was in her 
bottom.  B.A. responded that it would be “going forward.”  B.A. also stated that 
sometimes Manning would tell her not to tell her dad. 
[¶11.]  
After the interview, several items of physical evidence and samples 
believed to contain potential DNA evidence were collected from the Ahoe home.  
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Investigators swabbed both the office chair and floor in Jeremy’s office and sent the 
samples to the state laboratory in Pierre for testing. 
[¶12.]  
A Brown County grand jury indicted Manning specifying the type of 
crime and location of the offenses to wit: Count 1—first-degree rape in violation of 
SDCL 22-22-1(1) (anal penetration/office); Count 2—first-degree rape in violation of 
SDCL 22-22-1(1) (anal penetration/ bedroom); Count 3—sexual contact with a child 
under the age of sixteen in violation of SDCL 22-22-7 (penis to buttocks/office); 
Count 4—sexual contact with a child under the age of sixteen in violation of SDCL 
22-22-7 (penis to buttocks/bedroom). 
[¶13.]  
A two-day jury trial began on May 22, 2019.  After opening 
statements*, the State called Officer Majeske, Kristina Dreckman (a forensic 
scientist from Pierre), Amanda, Jeremy, A.A., B.A., and Lisburg.  Manning called 
his ex-wife and testified on his own behalf. 
[¶14.]  
Amanda testified about Manning’s willingness to babysit the girls, 
stating that he once offered to watch them overnight.  The offer arose after Manning 
heard that she and Jeremy wanted to attend a concert in Sioux Falls.  Although 
Manning offered to stay overnight with the girls, Amanda testified that she was not 
comfortable leaving them with a male for this length of time.  After they had 
decided not to go because they did not have a babysitter, Manning kept “pushing 
the idea of babysitting them.”  He even told Amanda that he thought about buying 
the tickets for them so that they could attend. 
 
* 
Manning initially reserved his right to make an opening statement, but after 
the close of the State’s case he waived this right, instead proceeding directly 
with his case-in-chief. 
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[¶15.]  
Amanda also testified that on one occasion Manning came over to help 
her clean the house, something he had never done before.  He told her that he felt 
obligated to help her because he had stayed at their home after he and his wife had 
an argument.  Amanda relayed that Manning cleaned the kitchen and was 
scrubbing the floors when she left for work that day.  The children later told her 
that Manning cleaned the office as well.  Amanda testified that she found rugs from 
the office hanging outside after they had apparently been hosed down. 
[¶16.]  
Jeremy testified about the times he had found B.A. and Manning alone 
in the office and bedroom together.  Regarding the occasion where he found 
Manning alone with B.A. in the office, he testified that when he opened the door 
B.A. ran to the other side of the room, prompting him to ask Manning, “what’s going 
on?” to which Manning “didn’t really reply.”  Jeremy also testified that he and his 
wife had sex in the office on multiple occasions, which was likely why investigators 
found his sperm cell DNA in the office.  Amanda confirmed this activity, testifying 
that she and Jeremy often had sex in the office because it had a door which they 
could lock to ensure the children did not enter the room.  Jeremy also testified that 
he had never asked Manning to clean the floor in the office. 
[¶17.]  
A.A., who was nine years old at the time of trial, testified that she 
knew B.A. and Manning had been alone in the office of their home with the door 
closed.  She also testified that on one occasion when she was checking on B.A.’s 
whereabouts, she saw Manning in B.A.’s bedroom pulling up her pants. 
[¶18.]  
B.A., who was seven at the time of trial, testified, albeit very briefly.  
The State engaged in a short colloquy with her to establish that she knew the 
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difference between the truth and a lie.  B.A. promised that everything she would 
say in court would be the truth, and the circuit court placed her under oath.  B.A. 
acknowledged that she knew Manning because he babysat her and her sisters.  She 
also agreed that something bad happened while he was at the house.  The State 
asked B.A. if she told Lisburg during the recorded interview about the things that 
happened with Manning and if what she told Lisburg was the truth.  B.A. testified 
that she did tell Lisburg about what happened and that she told the truth.  The 
State then asked B.A. what Manning did with his private part and she whispered 
that Manning put his private part in her bottom.  The State ended its examination 
and Manning’s counsel did not cross examine B.A.  After B.A.’s testimony, the State 
offered the DVD of B.A.’s forensic interview which was played for the jury. 
[¶19.]  
The State next called Lisburg, who testified about her credentials as a 
family nurse practitioner and her extensive experience interviewing children.  In 
addition to conducting B.A.’s forensic interview, she also physically examined her 
genitalia and perianal regions.  Lisburg’s examination revealed no signs of physical 
trauma.  Lisburg testified that in the majority of child sexual abuse cases it is 
normal to find no signs of physical trauma.  She explained that this occurs because 
the tissues in these areas heal “very quickly and often completely without any 
evidence of scarring.” 
[¶20.]  
The State also called Kristina Dreckman, a forensic scientist at the 
South Dakota State Forensic Lab.  She testified that she received several items that 
had been collected from the Ahoe home.  After briefly explaining the nature of DNA 
to the jury, Dreckman stated that of the items collected, only two contained DNA 
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evidence.  A swab taken from a chair in the office contained a DNA mixture from 
three individuals, the major contributor being Amanda.  Manning, Jeremy, and B.A. 
were all excluded as contributors to that sample.  The other sample, taken from a 
stain on a floor mat in the office, revealed sperm cell DNA matching Jeremy and 
excluding Manning. 
[¶21.]  
At the conclusion of the State’s case, Manning moved for a judgment of 
acquittal on all counts, contending there was insufficient evidence to sustain the 
allegations.  The circuit court denied the motion. 
[¶22.]  
In his defense, Manning first called his ex-wife, Breana Olson.  She 
was asked about her sexual intimacy with Manning and the size of his penis.  She 
described it as around eight or nine inches long with a width a little less than a 
silver dollar.  She described experiencing a tear in her vaginal area prior to their 
marriage as a result of sexual penetration by Manning.  On cross examination, she 
testified that Manning preferred small breasts and shaved pubic hair. 
[¶23.]  
Manning testified in his own defense.  He stated that the only time he 
had been alone in a room with any of the girls was the day that Jeremy came home 
early and found him in the office with B.A.  He explained that after he picked the 
girls up from school and took them home, he was in the office.  B.A. opened the door 
and came into the office asking for some chapstick.  Because of the weight of the 
coats hanging on the back of the office door, Manning testified that it bounced back 
and partially closed.  He said he hung out in the office because Jeremy allowed him 
to smoke pot in there.  He also testified that the day he cleaned the rugs and mat in 
the office, Jeremy had asked him to do so.  He denied ever sexually abusing B.A.  
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On cross-examination he acknowledged that B.A. was raped by someone, as she 
described, but reiterated that he was not the perpetrator.  He also claimed his penis 
was so large that it would have caused physical trauma to B.A. if he had in fact 
committed the alleged sexual acts. 
[¶24.]  
The jury returned a verdict finding Manning guilty of all four counts.  
Manning admitted the part II information alleging that he was a habitual offender, 
having been convicted in 2010 of felony child abuse.  The court ordered a 
presentence investigation report and a psychosexual evaluation and scheduled a 
sentencing hearing for July 17, 2019.  At the beginning of the hearing, the State 
requested that the circuit court sentence Manning on only the rape convictions 
because the sexual contact convictions were based on the same factual 
circumstances as the rape charges.  Defense counsel did not object but requested 
that the court “either strike or vacate” the sexual contact convictions.  The court 
denied the request to vacate but only entered judgments of conviction and sentences 
on the rape convictions.  The court sentenced Manning to serve sixty years in the 
state penitentiary on each of the rape counts to be served consecutively. 
[¶25.]  
Manning’s trial counsel filed a notice of appeal on July 19, 2019, but 
then moved for substitute counsel to handle the direct appeal.  The circuit court 
appointed new counsel, but this Court dismissed the appeal on December 3, 2019, 
after Manning failed to file a brief.  Manning later filed a pro se petition seeking a 
writ of habeas corpus alleging ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of his 
attorney’s failure to pursue his appeal.  Manning was appointed new counsel, and 
the circuit court agreed to issue an order vacating Manning’s sentence so that he 
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could be resentenced in order to restore his right to appeal.  A hearing was held on 
January 26, 2022, at which the circuit court resentenced Manning to the same 
sentence originally given and issued amended judgments of conviction for the two 
rape counts. 
[¶26.]  
Manning raises a number of issues on appeal which we consolidate and 
restate as follows: 
1. 
Whether the circuit court erred by denying Manning’s 
motion for judgment of acquittal on the two rape charges. 
 
2. 
Whether the circuit court erred by denying Manning’s 
motion for judgment of acquittal on the two sexual contact 
charges in violation of the constitutional prohibition 
against double jeopardy. 
 
3. 
Whether there was improper bolstering of witnesses at 
trial by the circuit court and the prosecution. 
 
4. 
Whether the circuit court improperly closed the courtroom 
during the jury selection phase of Manning’s trial. 
 
5. 
Whether Manning’s sentence violates the Eighth 
Amendment or constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
 
6. 
Whether Manning received ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
 
7. 
Whether Manning was deprived of a fair trial by the 
cumulative effect of the alleged errors. 
 
Analysis 
1. 
Whether the circuit court erred by denying 
Manning’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the 
two rape charges. 
 
[¶27.]  
Manning first challenges the circuit court’s denial of his motion for 
judgment of acquittal.  “Denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal is reviewed de 
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novo.”  State v. Nelson, 2022 S.D. 12, ¶ 21, 970 N.W.2d 814, 823 (quoting State v. 
Ware, 2020 S.D. 20, ¶ 12, 942 N.W.2d 269, 272).  “We consider ‘whether, after 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational 
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt.’”  Id. (quoting State v. Snodgrass, 2020 S.D. 66, ¶ 51, 951 N.W.2d 
792, 808).  In doing so, we “will not resolve conflicts in the evidence, assess the 
credibility of witnesses, or evaluate the weight of the evidence.”  State v. Seidel, 
2020 S.D. 73, ¶ 32, 953 N.W.2d 301, 313 (quoting State v. Brim, 2010 S.D. 74, ¶ 6, 
789 N.W.2d 80, 83).  This is because “the jury is . . . the exclusive judge of the 
credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence.”  Id. (quoting State v. 
Jensen, 2007 S.D. 76, ¶ 7, 737 N.W.2d 285, 288).  “[W]e accept the evidence and the 
most favorable inferences fairly drawn therefrom, which will support the verdict.”  
Id.  “If the evidence, including circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom sustains a reasonable theory of guilt, a guilty verdict will not be 
set aside.”  State v. Otobhiale, 2022 S.D. 35, ¶ 37, 976 N.W.2d 759, 772 (quoting 
State v. Stone, 2019 S.D. 18, ¶ 38, 925 N.W.2d 488, 500). 
[¶28.]  
The jury convicted Manning of two counts of rape in the first degree in 
violation of SDCL 22-22-1(1).  Rape in the first degree is “an act of sexual 
penetration . . . if the victim is less than thirteen years of age[.]”  Id.  It is 
uncontested that B.A. is under the age of thirteen.  Sexual penetration is defined as 
“an act, however slight, of sexual intercourse, . . . anal intercourse, or any intrusion, 
however slight, of any part of the body or of any object into the genital or anal 
openings of another person’s body.”  SDCL 22-22-2. 
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[¶29.]  
Manning argues that the evidence is insufficient to establish 
penetration because the DNA evidence excludes him as the source of the semen 
found in the office and that a penis of his size would leave evidence of trauma on a 
seven-year-old victim, which was not present. 
[¶30.]  
Regarding the first count of rape that occurred in the office, B.A.’s 
testimony taken alone is sufficient to sustain the conviction.  “[W]hen a conviction 
turns in large part upon the credibility of witnesses, a circuit court properly leaves 
‘to the jury the pervasive issue of credibility and considering the evidence as a 
whole[.]’”  Seidel, 2020 S.D. 73, ¶ 36, 953 N.W.2d at 314 (quoting State v. Guthrie, 
2001 S.D. 61, ¶ 50, 627 N.W.2d 401, 422).  B.A. acknowledged that bad things 
happened with Manning and when asked what happened she told the jury that 
Manning put his private part in her bottom.  In addition, B.A.’s forensic interview, 
which was played for the jury, contained B.A.’s description of how Manning’s 
private part went in her bottom.  If the jury believed this evidence, as it appears 
they did, then the penetration element is effectively established, and this evidence 
alone is sufficient to find Manning guilty of first-degree rape. 
[¶31.]  
Although “there is no requirement that the testimony of a child 
witness be corroborated,” State v. Smiley, 2004 S.D. 119, ¶ 6, 689 N.W.2d 427, 429, 
there were other facts presented at trial to support B.A.’s testimony.  Her 
statements were corroborated by testimony from her father who found B.A. and 
Manning alone together in the office with the door closed when he came home 
unexpectedly from work.  The testimony from Amanda about Manning encouraging 
her and Jeremy to go to a concert in Sioux Falls so that he could babysit the girls 
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overnight and Manning’s decision to hose down the rugs from the office further 
corroborates B.A.’s story.  A.A.’s testimony that B.A. and Manning were alone in the 
office with the door closed along with Olson’s testimony about Manning’s sexual 
preferences also substantiate B.A.’s account. 
[¶32.]  
The second count of rape that occurred in the bedroom upstairs can 
also be sustained by B.A.’s testimony alone.  While the only evidence of penetration 
on this charge is B.A.’s statements in her interview that “the same thing” happened 
in her bedroom as happened in the office and that Manning “did the same thing as 
he does every single time,” a reasonable inference can be drawn from these 
statements that penetration took place in the bedroom as well.  Reasonable 
inferences can also be made from B.A.’s statements during her interview about 
white stuff coming out of Manning’s private part and him having to wash his hands 
a lot to remove it to show that he committed this crime.  B.A.’s account of lifting her 
legs up and Manning telling her to put her legs on his shoulder when they were in 
her bedroom would also support the jury’s conclusion of Manning’s guilt.  B.A.’s 
statements are corroborated here by A.A.’s testimony that she walked into B.A.’s 
bedroom on one occasion as Manning was pulling B.A.’s pants up. 
[¶33.]  
Manning’s argument that a penis his size would leave evidence of 
trauma was disputed by Lisburg who testified that the lack of physical trauma was 
the norm in sexual abuse cases.  Further, the jury was not obligated to accept 
Manning’s theory regarding the absence of any physical trauma as evidence that 
the crimes did not occur.  Additionally, the lack of DNA evidence does not prevent 
the jury from finding him guilty through other evidence.  Taking the evidence in the 
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light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient evidence to convict 
Manning of both rape charges.  The circuit court did not err in denying Manning’s 
motion for judgment of acquittal on these counts. 
2. 
Whether the circuit court erred by denying 
Manning’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the 
two sexual contact charges in violation of the 
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. 
[¶34.]  
Manning next argues that the circuit court should have granted his 
motion for judgment of acquittal on the sexual contact charges because they were 
based on the same conduct as the rape charges.  He claims the submission of these 
charges to the jury violated his right to be free from double jeopardy.  Both the 
United States Constitution and the South Dakota Constitution forbid double 
jeopardy.  U.S. Const. amend. V; S.D. Const. art. VI, § 9.  “These provisions shield 
criminal defendants from both multiple prosecutions and multiple punishments for 
the same criminal offense if the Legislature did not intend to authorize multiple 
punishments in the same prosecution.”  State v. Bausch, 2017 S.D. 1, ¶ 26, 889 
N.W.2d 404, 412 (quoting State v. Dillon, 2001 S.D. 97, ¶ 13, 632 N.W.2d 37, 43).  
“The prohibition against double jeopardy . . . ‘protect[s] against three types of 
governmental abuses: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; 
(2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple 
punishments for the same offense.’”  State v. Babcock, 2020 S.D. 71, ¶ 31, 952 
N.W.2d 750, 760 (quoting State v. Garza, 2014 S.D. 67, ¶ 10, 854 N.W.2d 833, 837).  
Only the third type of abuse is at issue here. 
[¶35.]  
This Court has stated, “[w]e do not believe that the legislature 
intended the sexual contact statute to apply to touching incidental to rape.”  State v. 
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Brammer, 304 N.W.2d 111, 114 (S.D. 1981).  When the charges alleged relate to the 
same act, “the offenses of rape and sexual contact are mutually exclusive.”  Id.  
Therefore, a defendant may not receive multiple punishments for rape and sexual 
contact with a minor under the age of sixteen arising out of the same conduct. 
[¶36.]  
Here, the indictment included one count of rape and one count of 
sexual contact for the conduct in the office.  It also included one count of rape and 
one count of sexual contact for the conduct in the bedroom.  The jury found Manning 
guilty of all four counts.  The charges were not made in the alternative nor were 
they required to be.  What the double jeopardy clause prohibits is “multiple 
punishments for the same offense.”  Babcock, 2020 S.D. 71, ¶ 31, 952 N.W.2d at 760 
(quoting Garza, 2014 S.D. 67, ¶ 10, 854 N.W.2d at 837).  The State is not required to 
pick between two viable theories that are supported by the evidence.  In Manning’s 
case, the circuit court emphasized that Manning was being sentenced only on the 
rape charges.  Although Manning relies on Brammer and Bausch to support his 
claim that his rights were violated, the cases are distinguishable.  In both cases, 
this Court vacated sexual contact convictions and sentences arising out of the same 
conduct on which the defendant was also convicted and sentenced for rape.  
Brammer, 304 N.W.2d at 114-15; Bausch, 2017 S.D. 1, ¶ 29, 889 N.W.2d at 413.  
Here, because there were no judgments of conviction entered on the sexual contact 
charges and Manning was not sentenced on those charges, Manning’s double 
jeopardy rights were not violated. 
[¶37.]  
Nonetheless, Manning contends that the sole fact that the State 
pursued four crimes against him instead of two constitutes a violation of his double 
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jeopardy rights.  Manning claims that his indictment was multiplicitous.  
“Multiplicity . . . is the splintering of a single offense into separate counts in an 
indictment.”  Babcock, 2020 S.D. 71, ¶ 31, 952 N.W.2d at 760 (quoting State v. 
Muhm, 2009 S.D. 100, ¶ 19, 775 N.W.2d 508, 514).  “The ‘principal danger that the 
multiplicity doctrine addresses’ is the risk that a defendant might receive multiple 
punishments for a single offense.”  U.S. v. Roy, 408 F.3d 484, 492 (8th Cir. 2005) 
(quoting U.S. v. Webber, 255 F.3d 523, 527 (8th Cir. 2001)).  Manning did not 
receive multiple punishments for a single offense.  Further, because rape and sexual 
contact are two separate offenses that are mutually exclusive if based on the same 
underlying conduct, they are not multiplicitous.  The circuit court did not err by 
denying Manning’s motion for judgment of acquittal. 
3. 
Whether there was improper bolstering of witnesses 
at trial by the circuit court and the prosecution. 
 
[¶38.]  
Next, Manning alleges that the court and the prosecution improperly 
vouched for the credibility of the child witnesses in this case.  “Improper vouching 
‘invite[s] the jury to rely on the government’s assessment that the witness is 
testifying truthfully.’”  Snodgrass, 2020 S.D. 66, ¶ 45, 951 N.W.2d at 806 (quoting 
State v. Goodroad, 455 N.W.2d 591, 594 (S.D. 1990)).  It is well established that it is 
within “the exclusive province of the jury to determine the credibility of a witness.”  
Id. (quoting State v. McKinney, 2005 S.D. 73, ¶ 32, 699 N.W.2d 471, 481). 
[¶39.]  
At the beginning of A.A.’s testimony, the circuit court had a colloquy 
with her in the presence of the jury in which it discussed the difference between the 
truth and a lie and the importance of telling the truth in court.  The State 
conducted a similar colloquy at the beginning of B.A.’s testimony, also in the 
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presence of the jury.  Manning submits that these exchanges improperly bolstered 
the credibility of the witnesses.  He also contends that the prosecutor improperly 
vouched for B.A.’s credibility during closing argument when he stated: 
Now, why should you believe [B.A.’s] testimony?  That’s the 
number one thing we’re here for.  Why should you believe it?  
Well, [B.A.] came up here, she testifies under oath.  You heard 
us go through the whole colloquy about what it means to tell the 
truth, the difference between truth and a lie.  She talked about 
all those things with me.  She talked about it a little bit with the 
judge.  She told the judge I promise you I’m going to talk about 
only the truth in here today. 
 
. . . She knew people get in trouble if they don’t tell the 
truth.  She told us that.  When she doesn’t tell the truth at 
home, she gets in trouble. 
 
[¶40.]  
Manning did not object to either colloquy prior to the children’s 
testimony, nor did he object to the statements in the State’s closing argument.  
“[W]hen ‘an issue has not been preserved by objection at trial,’ this Court may 
conduct a limited review to consider ‘whether the circuit court committed plain 
error.’”  State v. Bryant, 2020 S.D. 49, ¶ 19, 948 N.W.2d 333, 338 (quoting State v. 
Buchhold, 2007 S.D. 15, ¶ 17, 727 N.W.2d 816, 821).  “To establish plain error, an 
appellant must show (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) affecting substantial rights; and 
only then may this Court exercise its discretion to notice the error if, (4) it seriously 
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Id. 
(quoting State v. McMillen, 2019 S.D. 40, ¶ 13, 931 N.W.2d 725, 729–30). 
[¶41.]  
Here, the colloquies could not be categorized as improper vouching, 
and the court did not err by permitting them.  Ensuring that a child witness 
understands the difference between the truth and a lie is different than ensuring 
the jury that the witness’s statements are true.  Requiring child witnesses to 
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promise that they will tell the truth in an age appropriate fashion is “the same 
promise” any other witness makes at trial when they take an oath to tell the truth.  
See State v. Westerfield, 1997 S.D. 100, ¶ 12, 567 N.W.2d 863, 867 (quoting United 
States v. Leslie, 759 F.2d 366, 378 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting that a provision in a plea 
agreement requiring a witness to testify “truthfully” does not rise to the level of 
improper vouching because it is the same promise made by anyone testifying at 
trial). 
[¶42.]  
As for the statements made in the State’s closing, “the State is 
permitted to make fair comments on the credibility of witnesses during final 
argument.”  Jenner v. Leapley, 521 N.W.2d 422, 428 (S.D. 1994).  The statements 
made by the prosecutor concentrated more on what was actually said during the 
colloquy and did not express “a direct opinion as to whether the child[] [was] telling 
the truth.”  State v. Koepsell, 508 N.W.2d 591, 593 (S.D. 1993).  Indeed, the 
statements about B.A. understanding that telling a lie could get her in trouble were 
made in the specific context of foundational questioning to ensure B.A. understood 
the moral obligation to tell the truth.  This was not an argument in which the 
prosecutor was attempting to bolster an adult’s testimony with the suggestion that 
the witness would run the risk of punishment or adverse consequences if the 
witness did not tell the truth.  For these reasons, there was not an improper 
bolstering of witnesses. 
 
 
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4. 
Whether the circuit court improperly closed the 
courtroom during the jury selection phase of 
Manning’s trial. 
 
[¶43.]  
Manning contends that he is entitled to a new trial because the 
courtroom was closed during the voir dire phase of his jury trial.  “A violation of the 
right to a public trial is among the narrow class of errors regarded as structural, 
and it is, therefore, not subject to further review for harmlessness.”  State v. Uhre, 
2019 S.D. 8, ¶ 12, 922 N.W.2d 789, 795.  A structural error “necessarily renders a 
trial fundamentally unfair” to the point that “automatic reversal is required.”  
Guthmiller v. Weber, 2011 S.D. 62, ¶ 16, 804 N.W.2d 400, 406.  The United States 
Supreme Court has identified a violation of the right to a public trial as a structural 
error.  Id. (citing Neder v. U.S., 527 U.S. 1, 8, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1833, 144 L. Ed. 2d 
35 (1999)).  The right to a public trial extends to the voir dire stage of trial.  Presley 
v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 213, 130 S. Ct. 721, 724, 175 L. Ed. 2d 675 (2010). 
[¶44.]  
Manning bases his contention that the courtroom was closed on a non-
notarized “affidavit” provided by his mother, Tammy Dudley, dated August 5, 
2021—more than two years after Manning’s trial.  Dudley asserted that she 
attempted to attend jury selection but was told that no one was allowed in the 
courtroom.  She stated that there was a piece of paper hanging by the courtroom 
door that said “closed” next to Manning’s name. 
[¶45.]  
Relying on the document from his mother, Manning filed a motion for a 
new trial on September 7, 2021.  A motion for new trial must be served and filed 
within ten days after the filing of the judgment.  SDCL 23A-29-1.  Manning 
requested this motion to be held in abeyance until the amended judgments of 
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conviction were issued.  It is unclear whether this motion was addressed at the 
January resentencing hearing, as no transcript of this hearing is contained in the 
record.  Further, there is no order in the record granting or denying the motion for 
new trial.  However, “SDCL 15-6-59(b) permits a circuit court to take no action on a 
motion for a new trial, and a motion for a new trial is deemed automatically denied 
if the circuit court fails to timely rule upon the motion.”  State v. Timmons, 2022 
S.D. 28, ¶ 20, 974 N.W.2d 881, 888.  A denial of a motion for a new trial is reviewed 
under the abuse of discretion standard.  Id. ¶ 19. 
[¶46.]  
There is no evidence in the record to corroborate Dudley’s unsworn 
statement.  There is no mention at any point in the trial transcript of the courtroom 
being closed, nor is there a closure order in the record.  Further, Manning 
acknowledged in his motion for new trial that if the courtroom was ever closed, he 
and his counsel were unaware of it.  Based on this lack of evidence, we conclude 
that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by denying Manning’s motion for a 
new trial. 
5. 
Whether Manning’s sentence violates the Eighth 
Amendment or constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
 
[¶47.]  
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits 
“cruel and unusual punishment[.]”  U.S. Const. amend. VIII.  This restriction 
applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.  “[W]hen the question 
presented is whether a challenged sentence is cruel and unusual in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment, we conduct a de novo review.”  State v. Chipps, 2016 S.D. 8, 
¶ 31, 874 N.W.2d 475, 486. 
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[¶48.]  
In determining whether a noncapital sentence is in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment, we must decide whether the sentence is “grossly 
disproportionate to its corresponding offense.”  State v. Rice, 2016 S.D. 18, ¶ 13, 877 
N.W.2d 75, 80 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 
2705, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment)).  “To do so, we first compare the gravity of the offense—i.e., ‘the 
offense’s relative position on the spectrum of all criminality’—to the harshness of 
the penalty—i.e., ‘the penalty’s relative position on the spectrum of all permitted 
punishments.’”  Id. (quoting Chipps, 2016 S.D. 8, ¶¶ 35–38, 874 N.W.2d at 489).  
This analysis will “typically mark[] the end of our review” as gross 
disproportionality is rarely found.  Chipps, 2016 S.D. 8, ¶ 38, 874 N.W.2d at 489 
(quoting State v. Garreau, 2015 S.D. 36, ¶ 9, 864 N.W.2d 771, 775).  However, “[i]f 
the penalty imposed appears to be grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the 
offense, then we will compare the sentence to those ‘imposed on other criminals in 
the same jurisdiction’ as well as those ‘imposed for commission of the same crime in 
other jurisdictions.’”  Id. (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 291, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 
3010, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983)). 
[¶49.]  
We begin by examining the gravity of the offense.  Manning was 
convicted of two counts of first-degree rape.  “Rape is a heinous crime[.]”  State v. 
Yeager, 2019 S.D. 12, ¶ 6, 925 N.W.2d 105, 109.  “Child rape ‘may be devastating in 
[its] harm,’” to the individual victim.  Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 
407, 407, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2644, 171 L. Ed. 2d 525 (2008)).  Along with any physical 
injury to the victim, rape can also cause grievous “mental and psychological 
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damage.  Because it undermines the community’s sense of security, there is public 
injury as well.”  Id. (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598, 97 S. Ct. 2861, 
2869, 53 L. Ed. 2d 982 (1977)).  Thus, it is clear that the gravity of Manning’s 
crimes is comparatively high on the spectrum of all criminality. 
[¶50.]  
Turning to the harshness of the sentence, the circuit court sentenced 
Manning to two consecutive sixty-year terms.  First-degree rape is a class C felony 
which is punishable by up to life imprisonment in the state penitentiary in addition 
to a $50,000 fine.  SDCL 22-22-1(1); SDCL 22-6-1(3).  The spectrum of all permitted 
punishments in South Dakota includes the possibility of death and mandatory life 
imprisonment.  Manning argues that his sentence is essentially a life sentence.  
Although this term of years is lengthy, and the sentence is at the higher end of the 
spectrum of all permitted punishments, Manning’s term of years sentence when 
compared to the gravity of the offense, raping a child, is not grossly 
disproportionate, thus ending our review of his constitutional claim. 
[¶51.]  
In addition to his Eighth Amendment challenge, Manning also argues 
that the circuit court abused its discretion in sentencing him to two sixty-year terms 
to be served consecutively.  An abuse of discretion analysis differs from an Eighth 
Amendment analysis.  “We generally review a circuit court’s sentencing decision for 
an abuse of discretion.”  State v. Klinetobe, 2021 S.D. 24, ¶ 26, 958 N.W.2d 734, 740.  
“An abuse of discretion is a fundamental error of judgment, a choice outside the 
range of permissible choices, a decision, which, on full consideration, is arbitrary or 
unreasonable.”  Id. (quoting State v. Holler, 2020 S.D. 28, ¶ 10, 944 N.W.2d 339, 
342). 
#29933 
 
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[¶52.]  
“Circuit courts have broad discretion in sentencing.”  Klinetobe, 2021 
S.D. 24, ¶ 28, 958 N.W.2d at 741 (quoting Holler, 2020 S.D. 28, ¶ 17, 944 N.W.2d at 
344).  When fashioning an appropriate sentence, a circuit court should be guided by 
“the traditional sentencing factors of retribution, deterrence—both individual and 
general—rehabilitation, and incapacitation[,]” weighing them “on a case-by-case 
basis[.]”  Id. (quoting State v. Toavs, 2017 S.D. 93, ¶ 10, 906 N.W.2d 354, 357).  As 
part of its consideration, “[t]he sentencing court should have access to ‘the fullest 
information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics.  
Information which should be available to the court includes general moral 
character, mentality, habits, social environment, tendencies, age, aversion or 
inclination to commit crime, life, family, occupation, and previous criminal record.’”  
Id. ¶ 29 (quoting Holler, 2020 S.D. 28, ¶ 18, 944 N.W.2d at 344). 
[¶53.]  
Here, we do not conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion in 
sentencing Manning.  To assist in fashioning an appropriate sentence for Manning, 
the circuit court ordered court services to prepare a presentence investigation report 
(PSI) and obtain a psychosexual evaluation (PSE).  The PSI contained, among other 
things, information regarding Manning’s criminal history, family history, education, 
employment history, social circumstances, and attitudes/orientation.  The PSE 
contained further information on topics such as Manning’s mental state, personality 
functioning, psychosocial history, and psychosexual history.  The circuit court noted 
at sentencing that it considered both reports when applying the traditional 
sentencing factors to arrive at its decision. 
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[¶54.]  
There were many aggravating factors present in both reports that 
support the circuit court’s decision to impose a lengthy sentence.  Manning has a 
prior felony conviction for abuse/cruelty to a minor less than seven years of age.  His 
juvenile criminal history includes an incident of sexual contact with a child under 
sixteen.  The psychosexual evaluator diagnosed Manning with antisocial personality 
disorder and pedophilic disorder with a poor prognosis for treatment.  Importantly, 
Manning was found to be a “high-risk for sexual reoffense,” meaning that he is “a 
poor candidate for probation and/or community placement[,]” and rather should be 
placed in a “highly secure and structured setting[.]”  When being interviewed for the 
PSE, Manning continued to assert that he did not commit the crimes he was 
convicted of and was “unsure whether he would engage in sexual offender specific 
treatment programming” if it were offered.  The circuit court found that Manning 
had failed to accept responsibility for his crimes and that Manning was “a danger to 
the community and will likely reoffend.” 
[¶55.]  
While the State recommended fifty years on each of the rape charges, 
the circuit court’s sixty-year sentences were not beyond the range of permissible 
choices and in the court’s view were necessary to protect the public.  The circuit 
court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning Manning’s sentence. 
6. 
Whether Manning received ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
 
[¶56.]  
Manning alleges that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel 
because of errors committed by his trial counsel: (1) during the jury selection 
process, (2) by not moving to dismiss multiplicitous counts in the indictment, and 
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(3) for not objecting to the bolstering of witnesses.  He claims that the compilation of 
these errors prejudiced him at trial. 
[¶57.]  
As a general rule, “[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, we will not 
address an ineffective assistance claim on direct appeal.  We depart from this 
principle only when trial counsel was so ineffective and counsel’s representation so 
casual as to represent a manifest usurpation of the defendant’s constitutional 
rights.”  State v. Vortherms, 2020 S.D. 67, ¶ 30, 952 N.W.2d 113, 120-21 (quoting 
State v. Golliher-Weyer, 2016 S.D. 10, ¶ 8, 875 N.W.2d 28, 31).  “This is because the 
record on direct appeal typically does not afford a basis to review the performance of 
trial counsel.”  Id.  Rather, ineffective assistance claims are better heard through a 
writ of habeas corpus.  Id.  “[T]hrough habeas, an attorney charged with 
ineffectiveness can explain or defend actions and strategies[,] [a]nd this Court can 
obtain a ‘more complete picture of what occurred.’”  Golliher-Weyer, 2016 S.D. 10, 
¶ 9, 875 N.W.2d at 31-32 (quoting State v. Thomas, 2011 S.D. 15, ¶ 23, 796 N.W.2d 
706, 714). 
[¶58.]  
Manning’s second and third claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
require no further development of the record as we have addressed them, herein, as 
part of his claims on direct appeal, concluding they lack merit.  Therefore, Manning 
did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to object 
to witness bolstering or counsel’s failure to move to dismiss a multiplicitous 
indictment. 
[¶59.]  
However, the alleged error regarding the jury selection process that 
Manning has raised is not the type of “exceptional circumstance” that would 
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warrant review of this claim on direct appeal.  Because further development of the 
record regarding this issue would enhance our ability to review this claim, we 
decline to address it herein. 
7. 
Whether Manning was deprived of a fair trial by the 
cumulative effect of the alleged errors. 
[¶60.]  
Finally, Manning argues that when taken together, all of the errors 
committed at his trial amounted to an unfair trial.  “[T]o determine whether a 
defendant was denied the constitutional right to a fair trial based on the cumulative 
effect of trial errors, we review the entire record to determine if a fair trial was 
held.”  State v. Delehoy, 2019 S.D. 30, ¶ 20, 929 N.W.2d 103, 108. 
[¶61.]  
Having found no prejudicial error in any of the other issues analyzed, 
we fail to find cumulative error as well.  To do so “would recognize a degree of error 
that is greater than the sum of its parts.”  Reay v. Young, 2019 S.D. 63, ¶ 26 n.7, 
936 N.W.2d 117, 124 n.7. 
[¶62.]  
Affirmed. 
[¶63.]  
JENSEN, Chief Justice, SALTER and DEVANEY, Justices, and 
RASMUSSEN, Circuit Court Judge, concur. 
[¶64.]  
RASMUSSEN, Circuit Court Judge, sitting for MYREN, Justice, who 
deemed himself disqualified and did not participate.