Case Title: In the Matter of State of New York v. Andrew O.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2011-04-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This memorandum is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 34  
In the Matter of State of New 
York,
            Respondent,
        v.
Andrew O.,
            Appellant.
Shannon Stockwell, for appellant.
Kathleen M. Treasure, for respondent.
MEMORANDUM:
The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed,
with costs, and a new trial ordered.
On August 15, 2007, the Attorney General filed a
petition in Supreme Court against Andrew O., a detained sex
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No. 34
offender, seeking his civil management pursuant to article 10 of
the Mental Hygiene Law (see Mental Hygiene Law §§ 10.03 [g],
10.06 [a]).  Supreme Court subsequently found probable cause to
believe that Andrew O. was a sex offender requiring civil
management (see Mental Hygiene Law § 10.06 [g], [k]; § 10.03
[q]).  At the ensuing jury trial, Andrew O.'s expert -- his only
witness -- testified that Andrew O. did not suffer from a mental
abnormality within the meaning of article 10 (see Mental Hygiene
Law §§ 10.07, 10.03 [i]).  The State's attorney attacked the
expert's credibility on the basis of his religious beliefs and
affiliation, among other things.  For example, during cross-
examination, he asked the expert, a psychologist, about his
religion of Yoism, which the expert described as similar to
Unitarianism; this religion's basic tenets; and whether Yoism was
based upon a historical text.  Andrew O.'s counsel objected
repeatedly and fruitlessly to this line of questioning.  When he
subsequently moved to strike all statements related to Yoism, the
trial judge denied the motion on the ground that the expert was
one of this religion's co-founders and not merely a follower. 
During his closing statement, the State's attorney
reprised the theme of the expert's religious beliefs, telling the
jurors that they would "want to know" about the expert's religion
"because that would have an impact on [their] decision whether to
consider that doctor's opinion as being valid"; and that they
would "want to know if that doctor had founded a religion [and]
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No. 34
the saints of that religion were Bob Marley, and Timothy Leary,
and Bob Dylan."  He also warned the jurors that there "was a
child out there" who would be affected by their decision, and
asked rhetorically if they "want[ed] another victim to have to
come in [in order] to find mental abnormality."  When Andrew O.'s
counsel objected, the trial judge told the jurors that "[w]hat
the lawyers say to you, what the lawyers say to each other, or
say to me is not evidence"; and that the only evidence to be
considered in rendering a verdict was the testimony received and
exhibits admitted. 
The jury determined that Andrew O. was a detained sex
offender who suffers from a mental abnormality (see Mental
Hygiene Law § 10.07 [d]); and after a bench trial, Supreme Court
concluded that Andrew O. was a dangerous sex offender requiring
confinement, and so committed him to a secure treatment facility
(see Mental Hygiene Law §§ 10.07 [f], 10.03 [e]).  Upon Andrew
O.'s appeal of the jury verdict, the Appellate Division affirmed,
with one Justice dissenting.  The majority considered the cross-
examination of the expert about his religious beliefs to be
improper, but harmless "within the context of the entire trial"
(68 AD3d 1161, 1166 [3d Dept 2009]).  Further, the majority did
not view the inappropriate remarks made by the State's attorney
during summation sufficient, either individually or in the
aggregate, to compromise Andrew O.'s right to a fair trial in
light of the judge's instruction.  The dissenting Justice
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No. 34
concluded that the religious inquiry could have substantially
influenced the jury's verdict since the expert's credibility was
critical to Andrew O.'s case. 
The outcome of this appeal is controlled by our
decision in People v Wood (66 NY2d 374 [1985]).  In that case,
the defendant met a woman at a bar, had sex with her, and then
decided to kill her, apparently for no reason; after succeeding
in that effort but failing to take his own life, he was arrested
and pleaded insanity.  His principal expert was a psychiatrist
who chose to affirm rather than swear to tell the truth.  The
prosecutor challenged the psychiatrist's affirmation, suggesting
that his failure to "swear to God to tell the truth, nothing but
the truth" meant that he was lying on the stand; and went so far
as to ask the psychiatrist, "Do you believe in God, period?"
Defense counsel's multiple objections were repeatedly overruled. 
The trial court later provided a corrective instruction, telling
the jurors that whether the psychiatrist swore or affirmed was
irrelevant.  The jury convicted, and the defendant appealed.
The Appellate Division affirmed over a two-Justice
dissent, concluding that while the examination of the
psychiatrist's religious views was inappropriate, it was
harmless.  We reversed, stating that
"[w]hile we decline to hold that such questioning
constitutes error per se, we hold that, except under
extraordinary circumstances, it must be deemed
sufficiently prejudicial to require a new trial, at
least where the trial judge fails to give a prompt and
clear corrective instruction" (66 NY2d at 376 [emphasis
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added]).
As we observed, "[w]ith limited exceptions . . ., any attempt to
discredit or otherwise penalize a witness because of his
religious beliefs . . . is improper, because those factors are
irrelevant to the issue of credibility" (id. at 378). 
The State contends that there are extraordinary
circumstances here principally because the evidence of Andrew
O.'s mental abnormality was overwhelming.  The trial, however,
boiled down to a battle of the experts in which Andrew O.'s
expert was portrayed as unreliable because he adhered to an out-
of-the-mainstream religion.  It is impossible to know whether or
to what extent the jury's assessment of the expert's testimony
was prejudiced as a result.  And importantly, the trial judge did
not "act as a saving grace, handling the episode promptly and
forcefully" (id. at 380 [internal quotation marks omitted]);
indeed, he overruled objections to the improper cross-
examination.  Additionally, the judge failed to sustain an
objection to the State's attorney's admonition to the jurors that
they would be at fault if Andrew O. molested another child. 
Rather than striking and directing the jurors to disregard this
inflammatory commentary, he merely reminded them that argument is
not testimony.  Finally, we have considered Andrew O.'s remaining
contentions alleging evidentiary error and find them to be
without merit.
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No. 34
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order reversed, with costs, and a new trial ordered, in a
memorandum. Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo,
Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur.
Decided April 5, 2011
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