Case Title: Moore v. Mikul

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1200671

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2022-01-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: January 21, 2022
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300
Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0649), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2021-2022
__________________________________
1200671
_________________________
Howard Moore and Charles Lloyd
v.
Margaret Sue Mikul
Appeal from Shelby Circuit Court
(CV-20-900392)
BRYAN, Justice.
Howard Moore and Charles Lloyd appeal from a summary judgment
entered by the Shelby Circuit Court in favor of Margaret Sue Mikul
regarding a complaint for ejectment filed by Moore and Lloyd concerning
certain real property ("the property").  See § 6-6-280, Ala. Code 1975.  For
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the reasons explained below, we affirm the circuit court's judgment.
Background1
The history of this dispute is somewhat complicated.  Moore and
Lloyd were judgment creditors in the aggregate amount of $185,000.  In
2012, Moore and Lloyd obtained a writ of execution and the property, in
which Mikul had an ownership interest, was sold at an execution sale, at
which Moore and Lloyd were the highest bidders at $130,000.
There was a question regarding whether Moore and Lloyd were
required to pay any cash to obtain a sheriff's execution deed concerning
the property, given that the amount of their judgment exceeded the
amount of the execution sale price.  Moore and Lloyd filed a petition for
the writ of mandamus in the circuit court to resolve the issue, and Mikul
intervened in that action, which was designated in the circuit court as
1The following summary reflects information contained in the record
on appeal in this action and in other records of this Court pertaining to
prior proceedings referenced by the parties in this case.  See Kennedy v.
Boles Invs., Inc., 53 So. 3d 60, 65 n.2 (Ala. 2010)("[T]his Court may take
judicial notice of its own records in another proceeding when a party
refers to the proceeding." (citing Butler v. Olshan, 280 Ala. 181, 187-88,
191 So. 2d 7, 13 (1966))).
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case no. CV-13-900004.  Moore and Lloyd ultimately prevailed in the
action, and the circuit court directed the sheriff to sign and deliver a deed
concerning the property to Moore and Lloyd.  Mikul appealed to the Court
of Civil Appeals, which transferred the appeal to this Court.  This Court
affirmed the circuit court's judgment, without an opinion, in September
2016.  See Mikul v. Moore (No. 1150689, Sept. 16, 2016), 233 So. 3d 926
(Ala. 2016)(table).
Days later, Moore and Lloyd initiated an ejectment action against
Mikul in the circuit court, which action was designated in that court as
case no. CV-16-900764.  Ultimately, the circuit court entered an order in
October 2018 concluding that Moore and Lloyd were entitled to possession
of the property and that Mikul was not liable to Moore and Lloyd for
mesne profits or rents.  The circuit court stated: "[T]he Court finds no
legal way [or] avenue to prevent [Moore and Lloyd] from taking possession
of the subject property ...."2
2In this sentence, the October 2018 order incorrectly referred to
Moore and Lloyd as "the Defendants."  In a subsequent order, the circuit
court stated that the reference was a clerical error and that the October
2018 order should be amended to instead refer to "the Plaintiffs."
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However, in the same order, the circuit court immediately stayed
execution of the order after considering the parties' arguments regarding
whether Mikul should be required to post a supersedeas bond to stay
execution of the judgment, insofar as it awarded Moore and Lloyd
possession of the property, should Mikul choose to appeal.  The circuit
court did not order the payment of a supersedeas bond because it had
awarded no damages, but it stated the following in explaining its issuance
of a stay: 
"[Mikul] will definitely be irreparably harmed and injured
absent a stay, the property is being maintained, evidenced by
the stipulated value [of $1,000,000. T]herefore, the stay will
not substantially injure [Moore and Lloyd], and this Court has
weighed [Mikul]'s likelihood of success on appeal among all
other relevant factors regarding whether a stay should be
granted."
The circuit court certified its October 2018 order as a final judgment
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P.  Moore and Lloyd thereafter filed
a petition for the writ of mandamus in this Court, challenging the October
2018 order insofar as the circuit court failed to award Moore and Lloyd
damages for mesne profits or rent, issued the stay, and certified the order
as final.  This Court denied the petition by order (No. 1180032, Nov. 14,
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2018).
In the circuit court, Moore and Lloyd thereafter filed various motions
directed at the October 2018 order.  Ultimately, the circuit court entered
a judgment in April 2019 concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to modify
the October 2018 order because Moore and Lloyd had not, it determined,
filed a timely postjudgment motion with respect to the October 2018 order. 
The circuit court's judgment also stated: "All other claims for relief are
hereby DENIED."  (Capitalization in original.)  The circuit court also
entered an order directing that the action be marked "as disposed and
closed to further court review."  Moore and Lloyd appealed to this Court
(No. 1180560).  By order, this Court dismissed the appeal as untimely
filed on November 13, 2019.
Two days later, a form writ of execution was issued by the circuit-
court clerk directing the sheriff to restore possession of the property to
Moore and Lloyd.  Mikul filed a motion to quash the writ of execution,
noting, among other things, that the circuit court had immediately stayed
execution of its October 2018 order awarding possession of the property
to Moore and Lloyd and that Moore and Lloyd had been unsuccessful in
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their attempts to have the October 2018 order altered.  Moore and Lloyd
filed a response to Mikul's motion, arguing, among other things, that the
case "ha[d] already been through the appeal process so no stay is entitled
to continue to have any force or affect at this time."  In February 2020, the
circuit court entered an order granting Mikul's motion to quash the writ
of execution.  Moore and Lloyd then filed a petition for the writ of
mandamus in the Court of Civil Appeals, which transferred the petition
to this Court.  This Court denied the petition by order on March 27, 2020
(No. 1190434).
On May 5, 2020, Moore and Lloyd commenced the action giving rise
to this appeal, which was designated in the circuit court as case no.
CV-20-900392.  The complaint for ejectment that Moore and Lloyd filed
in the new ejectment action, case no. CV-20-900392, appears to be
substantially identical to the initial complaint for ejectment they filed in
the previous ejectment action, case no. CV-16-900764.  In June 2020,
Mikul answered the complaint, asserting, among other things, the
defenses of estoppel and laches and the doctrine of res judicata.
Moore and Lloyd then filed a motion to inspect the property.  Mikul
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opposed the motion, stating, among other things:
"[Mikul] is 84 years old and has recently experienced serious
and significant medical issues including hospitalizations and
surgeries and treatment for a severe and life-threatening
infection which requires medication and [intravenous] therapy. 
[Mikul] has isolated herself from non-family contact, to the
extent possible, as she is a person at high risk for exposure to
the COVID-19 virus."
Before the circuit court ruled on the motion to inspect the property
filed by Moore and Lloyd, Mikul filed a motion for a summary judgment,
asserting that the relief sought by Moore and Lloyd should be denied
based on the defenses of equitable estoppel and laches and the doctrine of
res judicata.  Moore and Lloyd filed a response in opposition to Mikul's
summary-judgment motion, and Mikul replied to their response.
The circuit court denied the motion to inspect the property filed by
Moore and Lloyd.  After conducting a hearing, the circuit court entered a
final judgment on June 15, 2021, granting Mikul's summary-judgment
motion.  Moore and Lloyd appeal.
Analysis
On appeal, the principal appellate brief filed by Moore and Lloyd
focuses on the grounds asserted in Mikul's summary-judgment motion. 
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In particular, Moore and Lloyd contend that the present ejectment action
is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata because, they say, § 6-6-298,
Ala. Code 1975, specifically contemplates the prosecution of two ejectment
actions: 
"Two judgments in favor of the defendant in an action of
ejectment or in an action in the nature of an action of
ejectment between the same parties in which the same title is
put in issue are a bar to any action for the recovery of the land,
or any part thereof, between the same parties or their privies
founded on the same title."
See MacMillan Bloedell, Inc. v. Ezell, 475 So. 2d 493, 498 (Ala.
1985)(considering the interplay between § 6-6-298 and the doctrine of res
judicata).  Moore and Lloyd also argue that Mikul's defenses of equitable
estoppel and laches are inapplicable.
Even assuming, without deciding, that the arguments asserted by
Moore and Lloyd are generally correct as they relate to their claim that
they are entitled to possession of the property, their principal appellate
brief largely ignores the central impediment to the relief they seek in this
Court.  As noted above, the circuit court's October 2018 order in case no.
CV-16-900764 explicitly stated: "[T]he Court finds no legal way [or]
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avenue to prevent [Moore and Lloyd] from taking possession of the subject
property ...."  However, as Mikul notes on appeal, the reason she is still in
possession of the property is because, in the same order, the circuit court
immediately stayed execution of the October 2018 order.  
The principal appellate brief submitted by Moore and Lloyd does not
address the stay until the "Conclusion" section of the brief, in which they
state that the circuit court is acting as "as though the stay is in place
apparently forever."  Moore and Lloyd's brief at 37.  In their reply brief,
Moore and Lloyd argue, for the first time, that the apparently indefinite
stay entered by the circuit court in case no. CV-16-900764 is
"immoderate."  Among other things, Moore and Lloyd point out that, in Ex
parte American Family Care, Inc., 91 So. 3d 682, 683 (Ala. 2012), a trial
court entered an indefinite stay of a pending action without expressing a
reason for doing so.  In granting mandamus relief, this Court stated:
"It is well established that '[a] stay must not be
"immoderate." '  Ortega Trujillo v. Conover & Co. Commc'ns,
Inc., 221 F.3d 1262, 1264 (11th Cir. 2000)(quoting CTI-
Container Leasing Corp. v. Uiterwyk Corp., 685 F.2d 1284,
1288 (11th Cir. 1982)).  'In considering whether a stay is
"immoderate," [appellate courts] examine both the scope of the
stay (including its potential duration) and the reasons cited by
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the [trial] court for the stay.'  Id.  Clearly, the indefinite stay
ordered by the trial court, with no stated justification for it, is
immoderate and, consequently, beyond the scope of the trial
court's discretion."
As noted, Moore and Lloyd assert this argument for the first time in
their reply brief.
" 'The law of Alabama provides that where no legal authority
is cited or argued, the effect is the same as if no argument had
been made.'  Bennett v. Bennett, 506 So. 2d 1021, 1023 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1987)(emphasis added).  '[A]n argument may not be
raised, nor may an argument be supported by citations to
authority, for the first time in an appellant's reply brief.' 
Improved Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks v. Moss, 855
So. 2d 1107, 1111 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003), abrogated on other
grounds, Ex parte Full Circle Distribution, L.L.C., 883 So. 2d
638 (Ala. 2003).  Where an appellant first cites authority for an
argument in his reply brief, it is as if the argument was first
raised in that reply brief, and it will not be considered."
Steele v. Rosenfeld, LLC, 936 So. 2d 488, 493 (Ala. 2005).  Moreover, the
record in this case -- case no. CV-20-900392 -- demonstrates that Moore
and Lloyd did not seek dissolution of the stay entered by the circuit court
in case no. CV-16-900764 as being an immoderate stay.  "[T]he appellate
courts will not reverse a trial court on any ground not presented to the
trial court."  Rogers Found. Repair, Inc. v. Powell, 748 So. 2d 869, 872
(Ala. 1999); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Motley, 909 So. 2d
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806, 821 (Ala. 2005)("This Court cannot consider arguments advanced for
the purpose of reversing the judgment of a trial court when those
arguments were never presented to the trial court for consideration or
were raised for the first time on appeal.").  Therefore, we cannot reverse
the circuit court's judgment in this action based on the arguments
presented by Moore and Lloyd on appeal.
However, with regard to the circuit court's October 2018 order in
case no. CV-16-900764, execution of which is apparently still stayed, we
note that "[a] trial court has inherent authority to interpret, clarify, and
enforce its own final judgments."  State Pers. Bd. v. Akers, 797 So. 2d 422,
424 (Ala. 2000).  See also Ex parte Caremark Rx, LLC, 229 So. 3d 751, 757
(Ala. 2017)("[A] trial court nevertheless continues to hold 'residual
jurisdiction' even after that 30-day period [imposed by Rule 59, Ala. R.
Civ. P.,] expires such that it can still take any steps that are necessary to
enforce its judgment."); but see George v. Sims, 888 So. 2d 1224, 1227
(Ala. 2004)("Although a trial court has 'residual jurisdiction or authority
to take certain actions necessary to enforce or interpret a final judgment,'
that authority is not so broad as to allow substantive modification of an
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otherwise effective and unambiguous final order.  Helms v. Helms'
Kennels, Inc., 646 So. 2d 1343, 1347 (Ala. 1994).").  If the stay of execution
of the circuit court's October 2018 order entered in case no. CV-16-900764
should be dissolved such that the order can now be effectuated, a
dissolution should be sought in that action.
Conclusion
Moore and Lloyd have failed to demonstrate that the circuit court's
judgment in this case -- case no. CV-20-900392 -- should be reversed.  To
the extent that they seek a dissolution of the stay entered by the circuit
court pertaining to the execution of its October 2018 order in case no. CV-
16-900764, a dissolution should be sought in that action.  Accordingly, the
circuit court's judgment in this action is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Shaw, Wise, Sellers, Mendheim, and Stewart, JJ., concur.
Bolin and Bryan, JJ., concur specially.
Parker, C.J., and Mitchell, J., dissent.
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BRYAN, Justice (concurring specially).
As the author of the main opinion, I fully concur in its rationale and
disposition.  However, I write specially to express my view that the Shelby
Circuit Court can immediately dissolve the stay of execution concerning
the October 2018 order entered in case no. CV-16-900764.  As noted in the
main opinion, this Court has explained:
"It is well established that '[a] stay must not be
"immoderate." '  Ortega Trujillo v. Conover & Co. Commc'ns,
Inc., 221 F.3d 1262, 1264 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting CTI-
Container Leasing Corp. v. Uiterwyk Corp., 685 F.2d 1284,
1288 (11th Cir. 1982)).  'In considering whether a stay is
"immoderate," [appellate courts] examine both the scope of the
stay (including its potential duration) and the reasons cited by
the [trial] court for the stay.'  Id."
Ex parte American Family Care, Inc., 91 So. 3d 682, 683 (Ala. 2012).
The circuit court's October 2018 order did not specify a duration of
the stay of execution implemented in that order.  As Howard Moore and
Charles Lloyd have noted, it appears that the circuit court is treating the
stay as indefinite in duration.  However, in the same order, the circuit
court also concluded that there is "no legal way [or] avenue to prevent
[Moore and Lloyd] from taking possession of the subject property."  Thus,
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it appears that the circuit court has already concluded that Moore and
Lloyd are entitled to possession of the property; therefore, it is unclear
why the stay is still in effect.
As is also noted in the main opinion, "[a] trial court has inherent
authority to interpret, clarify, and enforce its own final judgments."  State
Pers. Bd. v. Akers, 797 So. 2d 422, 424 (Ala. 2000).  Thus, I believe the
circuit court can, sua sponte, lift or dissolve the stay of execution
concerning its October 2018 order entered in case no. case no. CV-16-
900764.  Given the protracted nature of this dispute, the circuit court may
conclude that such a dissolution is warranted to finally effectuate the
terms of its October 2018 order and enforce the legal right to which it has
already determined Moore and Lloyd are entitled.
Bolin, J., concurs.
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PARKER, Chief Justice (dissenting).
The main opinion reasons that, regardless of whether Margaret Sue
Mikul had a viable defense to the plaintiffs' ejectment claim, the summary
judgment in her favor must be affirmed because the plaintiffs' only
remedy is to seek relief from the stay of the earlier ejectment judgment in
their favor. I disagree. 
If Mikul's defense of res judicata does not apply, then the first
judgment and its stay are simply irrelevant. If the first judgment has no
res judicata effect on the present action, then there is nothing to prevent
the plaintiffs from bringing this action arising from the same facts. And
if the first judgment has no effect, then even less can the stay of that
judgment have any effect. If res judicata does not apply, the plaintiffs can
relitigate the ejectment claim on the merits and obtain a second judgment
in their favor.
Regarding whether res judicata actually applies, an ejectment
statute provides that "[t]wo judgments in favor of the defendant … in an
action in the nature of an action of ejectment between the same parties in
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which the same title is put in issue are a bar to any action for the recovery
of the land … between the same parties." § 6-6-298, Ala. Code 1975. This
statute altered the common-law rule -- that res judicata did not apply to
ejectment actions -- by limiting a plaintiff to two unsuccessful ejectment
actions against a defendant. MacMillan Bloedell, Inc. v. Ezell, 475 So. 2d
493, 497 (Ala. 1985). The statute does not apply here, though, because it
requires prior judgments "in favor of the defendant," and the judgment in
the first ejectment action was in favor of the plaintiffs, not Mikul. Thus,
the common-law rule of no res judicata applies, and the second ejectment
claim is not barred by that procedural doctrine. 
Mikul's other defenses appear to be likewise without merit.
Equitable estoppel appears irrelevant: The plaintiffs do not seem to have
made any representation or engaged in any conduct that could have led
Mikul to believe that she could retain possession of the property or that
they would not bring a second suit. Laches also appears inapplicable: The
plaintiffs have not been dilatory in pursuing ejectment since they
purchased the property.
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Because the stay in the earlier case is procedurally irrelevant and
the defenses asserted by Mikul in her summary-judgment motion do not
apply, summary judgment in her favor was improper. This Court should
reverse.
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MITCHELL, Justice (dissenting).
I agree with Chief Justice Parker that the doctrine of res judicata
does not apply here.  I write separately to say that, in my view, the
plaintiffs, Howard Moore and Charles Lloyd, have two possible courses
available to them to get the relief they seek.  As Chief Justice Parker
notes in his dissent, Moore and Lloyd are free to relitigate their ejectment
claim on the merits in this action.  Or, as Justice Bryan points out in the
majority opinion, they can seek to have the stay of execution dissolved in
the first ejectment action.  The latter option may be more expedient, as
the circuit court has already determined that Moore and Lloyd are
entitled to possession of the real property at issue.  But the plaintiffs -- not
this Court -- get to choose which course to take.
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