Case Title: State v. Eldredge

Citation: 180 Vt. 278, 2006 VT 80, 910 A.2d 816

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2006-08-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Eldredge (2005-039); 180 Vt. 278; 910 A.2d 816

2006 VT 80

[Filed 04-Aug-2006]

[Motions for Reargument Denied 30-Aug-2006]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 2006 VT 80

                                No. 2005-039


  State of Vermont                               Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.                                        District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit

  Michelle Eldredge                              December Term, 2005


  Karen R. Carroll, J.

  Dan M. Davis, Windham County State's Attorney, and Nathaniel K. Seeley,
    Deputy State's Attorney, Brattleboro, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

  Charles S. Martin of Martin & Associates, Barre, for Defendant-Appellant.


  PRESENT:  Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Burgess, JJ.

       ¶  1.  REIBER, C.J.   Following a conviction of two counts of
  cruelty to animals, defendant Michelle Eldredge appeals a trial court order
  that she repay the costs of providing care to animals seized from her prior
  to trial without first determining her ability to pay.  We affirm.

       ¶  2.  In November of 2002, the Windham County Sheriff's Department
  conducted a search of defendant's home, pursuant to a warrant, and seized a
  number of animals that appeared to be malnourished.  The deputies brought
  the nine dogs, five cats, and one goat to the Windham County Humane Society
  (WCHS).  On December 17, 2002, defendant appeared in Windham District Court
  to answer three counts of animal cruelty in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 352,
  and was assigned counsel.  
   
       ¶  3.  On January 16, 2003, the State moved for forfeiture of
  defendant's animals pending resolution of the criminal charges.  After a
  March 21 hearing, the trial court ordered forfeiture of the animals by
  written order on April 16 and ordered the animals to remain in custodial
  care as long as defendant continued to post security deposits with WCHS. 
  Defendant appealed the forfeiture order as a collateral final order, but
  this Court denied permission to appeal.   Because defendant failed to post
  the required security deposits with WCHS in accordance with that order, the
  State moved for immediate forfeiture, which the trial court granted on
  October 6, 2003.  The animals had been in custody for eleven months.  Until
  the court ordered forfeiture, the animals had been boarded at WCHS and fed,
  exercised, and given necessary veterinary treatment and care pursuant to 13
  V.S.A. § 354(c).  One dog was destroyed, but the others recovered from
  their maladies and, upon forfeiture, were put up for adoption.  

       ¶  4.  On September 30, 2004, defendant was convicted by a jury of two
  counts of animal cruelty; one count had been dismissed prior to trial. 
  Defendant received a suspended sentence and was placed on probation.  In a
  written order on October 4, Judge Wesley required the State to present
  documentation of reasonable costs claimed by WCHS for providing care to
  defendant's animals from the time of seizure until forfeiture.  Defendant
  was invited to "indicate the basis for any objection to the entry of a
  restitution order for such costs, including: a) any claim that the costs
  are unreasonable, and b) any claim that her financial means preclude any
  present order for repayment."  The court stated that if defendant claimed
  only inability to pay, without opposition from the State, the court would
  "enter judgment for the amount claimed as restitution, but defer any
  repayment order until it may be established through enforcement proceedings
  initiated by the Restitution Unit that Defendant has the ability to make
  payments."  
   
       ¶  5.  At the subsequent January 18, 2005 hearing, over which Judge
  Carroll presided, counsel for defendant requested findings on her ability
  to pay prior to issuance of any repayment order.  The court denied
  defendant's request.  Two days later, the court issued its written Order on
  Repayment of Costs of Care.  In that order, the court found that most of
  WCHS's submitted expenses of boarding and caring for defendant's animals
  were reasonable and ordered repayment of those reasonable costs in full,
  less $900 defendant had already paid, for a total of $30,629.38.  In a
  footnote, the court wrote that it disagreed with defendant's position "that
  this is a restitution order requiring the Court to find an ability to pay,"
  on the grounds that: 

    WCHS is not a victim in this case, and repayment is specifically
    allowed pursuant to a separate . . . statutory scheme and not the
    statutes relating to restitution.  The ability to pay will only
    become an issue if the amount above is not paid and there is a
    request for a finding of contempt.  In that event, the Court will
    be required to find that Defendant has the ability to pay.  

  This appeal followed.  

                                     I.


       ¶  6.  Defendant argues that the trial court erred in entering
  judgment against her for the costs of providing care to her animals without
  determining her ability to pay.  At the outset, we agree with the trial
  court that this case does not fall within the bounds of our criminal
  restitution statutes, and so defendant cannot avail herself of the
  ability-to-pay provision therein. See 13 V.S.A. § 7043(c)(2).  The animal
  cruelty statutes contain their own specific provisions regarding repayment
  of costs to the temporary caretaker of a defendant's animals.  The trial
  court analyzed this case under the following statute: 

    In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court
    may require a defendant convicted of a violation under section 352
    or 352a of this title to: . . .  Repay the reasonable costs
    incurred by any person, municipality or agency for providing care
    for the animal prior to judgment.  If the court does not order a
    defendant to pay all the applicable costs incurred or orders only
    partial payment, it shall state on the record the reasons for that
    action. 

  13 V.S.A. § 353(b)(2) (emphasis added).  Defendant argues that the
  emphasized language means the Legislature intended that the trial court not
  simply calculate the costs of caretaking of the animals, but inquire into a
  defendant's ability to pay prior to ordering repayment of costs.  We do not
  agree.

       ¶  7.  Whether a trial court properly interprets a statute is a
  question of law which we review de novo.  Heffernan v. Harbeson, 2004 VT
  98, ¶ 7, 177 Vt. 239,