Case Title: Wood v. Woolfolk Properties Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 981197

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1999-06-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
EDNA WOOD 
v.  Record No. 981197  OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
June 11, 1999 
WOOLFOLK PROPERTIES, INC., ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Walter W. Stout, III, Judge 
 
 
The primary issue in this premises liability case is 
whether the circuit court erred by admitting evidence 
pertaining to the absence of prior accidents.  Finding 
error in the circuit court’s judgment, we will reverse. 
I. 
This appeal arises out of an accident that occurred on 
the evening of May 20, 1994, in front of Ruth’s Chris Steak 
House (Ruth’s) located in Chesterfield County.  The 
plaintiff, Edna Wood (Wood), and several members of her 
family ate dinner at the restaurant that night.  After 
finishing their dinner, the Wood party prepared to leave 
the restaurant.  While Wood’s son went to the parking lot 
to retrieve his vehicle, Wood and the others waited outside 
the restaurant.  Wood’s son drove the vehicle into a 
circular driveway in front of the restaurant and stopped it 
approximately two or three feet from the curb.  As Wood 
approached the rear door of the stopped vehicle, she 
appeared to “step[] into air” and fell down.  As a result 
of the fall, Wood sustained physical injuries and incurred 
medical expenses. 
Ruth’s is located in a shopping center that is owned 
by defendant Bellgrade Development Company, Inc. 
(Bellgrade).  Defendant Woolfolk Properties, Inc. 
(Woolfolk), is the “managing member” of Bellgrade and 
provides property management and maintenance services to 
the shopping center. 
 
The curb where Wood fell is a transitional area that 
is slanted rather than perpendicular.  The transitional 
curb between the sidewalk and the circular driveway has a 
thirty-degree slope, is eight inches long, and drops four 
inches in height from the sidewalk to the driveway.  The 
sidewalk, transitional curb, and driveway are designed with 
varying colors, patterns, and textures of brick in order to 
give pedestrians visual clues with regard to the different 
surfaces, heights, and grades as they walk from the 
driveway onto the sidewalk and into the restaurant. 
 
Although the original design of the restaurant did not 
call for the curb to be painted, it had been painted white 
sometime prior to the night of Wood’s accident.  In 1992, 
Charles Lytton, chief executive officer of Woolfolk, 
decided that the transitional area should be painted white 
for both aesthetic and safety reasons.  He testified that 
 
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it was initially an aesthetic idea but that the white paint 
also made the curb area more visible.  He described the 
paint as “an enhancement to visibility.” 
On April 22, 1997, Wood filed a motion for judgment 
against Woolfolk and Bellgrade alleging that the defendants 
negligently owned, operated, and maintained Ruth’s and the 
surrounding premises; allowed certain unsafe conditions to 
exist on Ruth’s premises; and failed to warn the plaintiff 
about these unsafe conditions.  Prior to trial, Wood filed 
a motion in limine to exclude any evidence regarding the 
absence of prior accidents at the curb area where she fell.  
Initially, the circuit court sustained the motion.  
However, at trial, the court reconsidered its ruling and 
allowed Lytton to testify, during cross-examination, that 
no one had fallen across the curb line prior to Wood’s 
accident.∗  The court reasoned that the testimony rebutted 
the inference that, because of Lytton’s decision to paint 
the curb, the defendants had notice of an unsafe condition.  
During the cross-examination of Lytton, the court cautioned 
the jury that the evidence pertaining to the lack of prior 
accidents should be considered only with regard to the 
notice issue. 
 
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At the close of Wood’s evidence, the court sustained a 
motion to strike with regard to Woolfolk and dismissed it 
from this action.  The court took the motion under 
advisement as to Bellgrade and allowed the case to proceed 
to the jury.  After deliberating, the jury returned a 
verdict in favor of Bellgrade.  Wood then moved the court 
to set aside the verdict, but the court overruled the 
motion and entered judgment in favor of Bellgrade on March 
24, 1998. 
II. 
 
We granted Wood this appeal on two assignments of 
error:  (1) that the circuit court erred by allowing the 
defendants to introduce evidence regarding the absence of 
similar accidents at the curb area prior to Wood’s fall; 
and (2) that the court erred by granting the motion to 
strike the evidence as to Woolfolk. 
We find no merit to the second assignment of error.  
The uncontradicted testimony of Wood’s own witness, Lytton, 
establishes that Woolfolk managed the shopping center in 
which Ruth’s is located and provided maintenance services 
for it.  Lytton further stated that, when he decided to 
have the transitional curb area painted white, he was 
__________________ 
∗ Wood called Lytton as a witness.  The defendants 
elicited the challenged testimony during their cross-
 
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acting as an owner of the property and was not performing a 
maintenance function.  Moreover, the thrust of Wood’s claim 
against the defendants was that the curb was dangerous or 
unsafe in its design, not in how it was maintained.  Thus, 
we conclude that the circuit court did not err in granting 
the motion to strike with regard to Woolfolk, dismissing it 
from this action. 
 
However, we reach a different conclusion with regard 
to Wood’s first assignment of error.  In addressing that 
issue, Bellgrade acknowledges that evidence establishing 
the lack of prior, similar accidents is generally not 
admissible in a negligence action.  Nevertheless, Bellgrade 
asserts that this court created an exception to that rule 
in Sykes v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 200 Va. 559, 106 
S.E.2d 746 (1959). 
In that case, this Court allowed the defendant railway 
company to introduce evidence as to the number of accidents 
that had previously occurred at a particular railroad 
crossing.  We stated that the rule that “‘evidence of the 
absence of other injuries is not admissible when timely 
objection is interposed to it’” would be applicable “except 
for the fact that the plaintiff had introduced the 
testimony of the defendant company’s supervisor of signals 
__________________ 
examination of Lytton. 
 
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that he had recommended to his company that it install 
automatic crossing gates and flashers at [the] crossing [in 
question].”  Id. at 565, 106 S.E.2d at 751 (quoting 
Sanitary Grocery Co. v. Steinbrecher, 183 Va. 495, 500, 32 
S.E.2d 685, 687 (1945)).  The company had never implemented 
the recommendation.  Although the plaintiff asserted that 
the evidence from the supervisor of signals was to prove 
that the defendant company had notice of the inadequacy of 
the signals, we held “that it . . . [was] permissible for 
the defendants to introduce the accident experience at the 
crossing to rebut the inference of negligence that might be 
made from the failure to follow this recommendation.”  
Sykes, 200 Va. at 565, 106 S.E.2d at 751. 
Bellgrade argues that its evidence showing the absence 
of prior accidents comes within the Sykes exception.  
According to Bellgrade, the evidence rebuts the inference 
that Lytton directed that the curb be painted white because 
he knew that it was an unsafe area.  We do not agree. 
In Goins v. Wendy’s Int’l, Inc., 242 Va. 333, 410 
S.E.2d 635 (1991), the trial court allowed the introduction 
of testimony from two restaurant employees that they had 
not received any complaints of food poisoning as a result 
of the food served on the day that the plaintiff allegedly 
consumed contaminated food.  We reversed the trial court on 
 
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the basis of the well-established rule that “evidence of 
the absence of other injuries is not admissible in a 
negligence action when timely objection to it is made” 
because it interjects into the trial collateral issues that 
confuse and mislead a jury.  Id. at 335, 410 S.E.2d at 636.  
We further stated that “a departure from the rule would 
interject evidence so problematical, due to the potential 
for a lack of reporting and the variables of circumstances 
and conditions, that such evidence would have slight, if 
any, relevancy or probative value.”  Id. at 335-336, 410 
S.E.2d at 636. 
The principles reiterated in Goins apply to the 
present case and preclude the introduction of evidence 
showing the absence of prior accidents in the area where 
Wood fell.  Initially, we note that Lytton did not specify 
whether he was referring to the period of time before or 
after the curb was painted when he stated that no one had 
fallen across the curb line prior to Wood’s accident.  The 
absence of accidents after the area was painted is not 
germane to whether Bellgrade had notice of an unsafe 
condition and thus painted the transitional area white 
because of that knowledge.  Furthermore, Lytton’s testimony 
is problematical because of the potential that a customer 
will not report an accident.  Id.  Thus, to allow evidence 
 
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concerning the absence of prior accidents in premises 
liability cases for the purpose of refuting evidence 
showing notice of an unsafe condition would eviscerate the 
rule that we restated with approval in Goins. 
In addition, the present case is distinguishable from 
Sykes.  Although the plaintiff in that case offered the 
evidence concerning the recommendation by the supervisor of 
signals to establish notice of inadequate signals, we 
recognized that the evidence created an inference of 
negligence because of the failure to follow the 
recommendation.  Therefore, evidence as to the accident 
history at the crossing in question was admissible, not in 
regard to the notice issue, but to rebut that inference of 
negligence.  In the present case, Lytton’s testimony about 
the lack of prior accidents is not arguably relevant to any 
issue other than notice. 
Finally, we do not believe that the introduction of 
this evidence was harmless error.  It interjected 
collateral issues into the trial, and we are unable to say 
that it did not confuse or mislead the jury.  The 
challenged evidence was prejudicial to Wood.  See Sanitary 
Grocery Co., 183 Va. at 499, 32 S.E.2d at 686-87 (holding 
evidence showing absence of prior accidents misleads jury 
and is prejudicial). 
 
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Thus, for the reasons stated, we will affirm the 
circuit court’s judgment striking the evidence with regard 
to Woolfolk and dismissing it from this action.  We will 
reverse the circuit court’s judgment allowing the 
introduction of evidence relating to the absence of prior 
accidents and remand for a new trial. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   and remanded. 
JUSTICE COMPTON, dissenting in part. 
 
I agree that the trial court correctly granted the 
motion to strike the evidence regarding defendant Woolfolk 
Properties, Inc.  I do not agree, however, that the trial 
court erred by allowing evidence regarding the absence of 
similar accidents at the curb area prior to plaintiff's 
fall. 
 
This case is controlled by Sykes v. Norfolk & W. Ry. 
Co., 200 Va. 559, 564-65, 106 S.E.2d 746, 751 (1959).  The 
majority's argument attempting to distinguish Sykes from 
the present case is unpersuasive. 
 
Sykes stands for the proposition that when a plaintiff 
presents evidence of a contemplated change by the defendant 
in the conditions at the accident scene, in an effort to 
show notice of a defective condition, evidence of the 
absence of prior accidents at the scene becomes relevant 
 
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and admissible for the limited purpose of showing the lack 
of notice.  This is precisely the situation in the present 
case, and the trial court correctly so ruled. 
 
Consequently, I would affirm the judgment below in all 
respects. 
 
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