Case Title: Sweetwater Union High School District v. Gilbane Building Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S233526

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2019-02-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
SWEETWATER UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
GILBANE BUILDING COMPANY et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
 
S233526 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division One 
D067383 
 
San Diego County Superior Court 
37-2014-00025070-CU-MC-CTL 
 
 
February 28, 2019 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Liu, Cuéllar, 
Kruger, and Manella* concurred. 
__________________________________________________________ 
                                        
*  
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second 
Appellate District, Division Four, assigned by the Chief Justice 
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
1 
SWEETWATER UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT v. 
GILBANE BUILDING COMPANY 
S233526 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
The narrow question here is what kind of evidence a 
court may consider in ruling on a pretrial anti-SLAPP motion 
in determining a plaintiff’s probability of success.  The inquiry 
has two aspects.  One addresses the form in which the evidence 
is produced in connection with the motion.  The other 
evaluates whether that evidence will be admissible at an 
eventual trial.  We conclude the evidence produced by plaintiff 
Sweetwater Union High School District (the District) was 
properly considered and affirm the Court of Appeal’s judgment.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
In November 2006, voters approved Proposition O, a 
bond measure to fund capital improvements in the District.  
The District solicited bids to manage various construction 
projects funded by the measure.  It received seven proposals, 
including a joint submission from defendants Gilbane Building 
Company (Gilbane), The Seville Group, Inc. (SGI), and 
Gilbane/SGI, a joint venture (the Joint Venture).  A screening 
committee selected three finalists.  The final review committee, 
consisting of School Superintendent Jesus Gandara and three 
others, selected defendants’ proposal as the winning bid.  
Gandara was authorized to negotiate a contract.  The District 
board ultimately approved several contracts with defendants to 
SWEETWATER UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT v. 
GILBANE BUILDING COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
manage projects arising from Proposition O and a previous 
measure.   
A criminal bribery investigation into the awarding of the 
contracts resulted in an indictment.  A number of guilty or no 
contest pleas followed, including those of Superintendent 
Gandara, board of trustees members Pearl Quinones, Arlie 
Ricasa, and Gregory Sandoval, as well as Gilbane program 
director Henry Amigable and SGI chief executive officer Rene 
Flores.   
The District sued to void the contracts and secure 
disgorgement of funds already paid.  It alleged that Amigable, 
Flores, and others gave meals, vacations, and event tickets to 
Gandara, board members and their families and friends.  (See 
Gov. Code, §§ 1090, 1092, subd. (a).1)  It also alleged 
contributions were made to various campaigns, charities, and 
events on the officials’ behalf.2  The conduct allegedly occurred 
                                        
1  
Government Code section 1090, subdivision (a) prohibits 
listed officers and employees from being “financially interested 
in any contract made by them in their official capacity, or by 
any body or board of which they are members.”  Section 1090, 
subdivision (b) proscribes aiding and abetting a violation of 
subdivision (a).  “Every contract made in violation of any of the 
provisions of Section 1090 may be avoided at the instance of 
any party except the officer interested therein.”  (Gov. Code, 
§ 1092, subd. (a).)   
2  
The Court of Appeal elaborated that “ ‘financial 
inducements’ ” included:  “(1) ‘Numerous dinners at expensive 
restaurants,’ (2) ‘Tickets to the theater and sporting events, 
including Charger games and . . . The Jersey Boys,’ (3) ‘Hotel 
accommodations, food, and tickets to the Rose Bowl in 
Pasadena,’ (4) ‘Airfare, hotel accommodations, wine tasting, 
 
SWEETWATER UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT v. 
GILBANE BUILDING COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
both before the passage of Proposition O and during the 
bidding and approval process.   
Gilbane and the Joint Venture3 brought a special motion 
to strike under Code of Civil Procedure4 section 425.16 (the 
SLAPP5 Act).  Defendants urged the complaint stemmed from 
constitutionally protected political expression.  The District’s 
response relied on evidence of the various guilty and no contest 
pleas.  Each plea form incorporated a written factual narrative 
attested to under penalty of perjury.  Amigable’s narrative 
stated:  “I provided gifts, meals and tickets to entertainment 
events directly to [Superintendent Gandara and board 
members Sandoval, Ricasa, and Quinones].  I provided the 
meals, tickets and gifts upon my initiative as sanctioned and 
encouraged by my employers.  I also provided meals, tickets 
and gifts at the request of the elected board members and the 
Superintend[e]nt.  The meals, tickets and gifts were made on 
behalf of my employers with the intent to influence the board’s 
decisions 
in 
granting 
construction 
contracts 
from 
the 
Sweetwater Union High School District to the firms for which I 
                                                                                                           
 
and a hot air balloon ride in Napa Valley,’ and (5) ‘Monetary 
contributions to beauty pageants, charities, and campaigns on 
behalf of District officials.’ ”   
3  
SGI did not join in the motion.   
4  
Subsequent statutory references are to the Code of Civil 
Procedure unless otherwise noted.   
5  
“ ‘SLAPP’ is an acronym for ‘strategic lawsuit against 
public participation.’ ”  (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 
381, fn. 1 (Baral); Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. 
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 57 (Equilon Enterprises).)   
SWEETWATER UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT v. 
GILBANE BUILDING COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
was working.  My expenses were generated with the 
endorsement of my employers and they were reimbursed to me 
by my employers.  At no time did the elected board members or 
Superintend[e]nt reimburse me or my employers for the meals, 
tickets or gifts I gave them on behalf of my employers.”  
Flores’s narrative included a similar statement.  Ricasa’s 
statement read in part:  “In 2009, I was an elected School 
Board Member for the Sweetwater Union High School District.  
I accepted gifts from Rene Flores (SGI) in 2009 with a value of 
$2,099 and I did not report them. . . .  Rene Flores provided 
these gifts with the intent to influence my vote on business 
awarded to Seville Group, Inc.”  Quinones’s statement said 
that she “accepted gifts from Henry Amigable in 2007 with a 
total value in excess of $500.00 and I did not report them” and 
that “Henry Amigable provided these gifts with the intent to 
influence my vote on business awarded to Gilbane, his 
employer.”  Both Sandoval’s and Gandara’s statements 
indicated that they received gifts from Amigable and Flores 
“with a total value of more than” $2,770 (Sandoval) and $4,500 
(Gandara) and failed to report them.  They acknowledged these 
gifts were provided “to influence my vote on business awarded 
to” defendants.   
The District also relied on excerpts from the grand jury 
testimony of several witnesses, including Amigable and Flores, 
who described their conduct in providing meals and tickets to 
plaintiff’s 
officers.6 
 
The 
court 
overruled 
defendants’ 
                                        
6  
These excerpts were lodged as exhibits to plaintiff’s 
summary judgment motion against SGI.   
SWEETWATER UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT v. 
GILBANE BUILDING COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
evidentiary objections and denied their special motion to 
strike.  The Court of Appeal affirmed.7   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  The Anti-SLAPP Statute 
“Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 sets out a 
procedure for striking complaints in harassing lawsuits that 
are commonly known as SLAPP suits . . . which are brought to 
challenge the exercise of constitutionally protected free speech 
rights.”  (Kibler v. Northern Inyo County Local Hospital Dist. 
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 192, 196.)  A cause of action arising from a 
person’s act in furtherance of the “right of petition or free 
speech under the [federal or state] Constitution in connection 
with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to 
strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has 
established that there is a probability” that the claim will 
prevail.  (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)  “The anti-SLAPP statute does 
not insulate defendants from any liability for claims arising 
from the protected rights of petition or speech.  It only provides 
a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims 
arising from protected activity.  Resolution of an anti-SLAPP 
motion involves two steps.  First, the defendant must establish 
that the challenged claim arises from activity protected 
by section 425.16.  [Citation.]  If the defendant makes the 
                                        
7  
After our grant of review, the parties have indicated that 
they have settled the case.  We exercise our discretion to retain 
the case to resolve a conflict in the Courts of Appeal that 
precipitated our grant of review.  (See State of Cal. ex rel. State 
Lands Com. v. Superior Court (1995) 11 Cal.4th 50, 60-62.)   
SWEETWATER UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT v. 
GILBANE BUILDING COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to 
demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a 
probability of success.  We have described this second step as a 
‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’  [Citation.]  The court 
does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims.  
Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a 
legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing 
sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.  It accepts the 
plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the defendant’s 
showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as a 
matter of law.  [Citation.]  ‘[C]laims with the requisite minimal 
merit may proceed.’ ”  (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 384-385, 
fn. omitted.)  “We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-
SLAPP motion.”  (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State 
University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067.)  As to the second step 
inquiry, a plaintiff seeking to demonstrate the merit of the 
claim “may not rely solely on its complaint, even if verified; 
instead, its proof must be made upon competent admissible 
evidence.”  (San Diegans for Open Government v. San Diego 
State University Research Foundation (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 
76, 95; see Grenier v. Taylor (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 471, 480; 
City of Costa Mesa v. D’Alessio Investments, LLC (2013) 214 
Cal.App.4th 358, 376; Paiva v. Nichols (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 
1007, 1017.)   
B.  Affidavits and Their Equivalents 
The anti-SLAPP statute describes what evidence a court 
may consider at the second step.  It provides that “[i]n making 
its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and 
supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon 
which the liability or defense is based.”  (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2), 
SWEETWATER UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT v. 
GILBANE BUILDING COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
italics added.)  “The pleadings are the formal allegations by the 
parties of their respective claims and defenses . . . .”  (§ 420.)  A 
complaint must include a “statement of the facts constituting 
the cause of action, in ordinary and concise language.”  
(§ 425.10, subd. (a)(1).)  The Code of Civil Procedure provides 
three ways in which testimony is taken:  by affidavit, 
deposition, or oral examination.  (§ 2002.)  “An affidavit is a 
written declaration under oath, made without notice to the 
adverse party.”  (§ 2003.)  An affidavit “may be taken before 
any officer authorized to administer oaths.”  (§ 2012; see also 
§§ 2013, 2014.)   
Although not mentioned in the SLAPP Act, the Code of 
Civil Procedure also allows a court to consider, in lieu of an 
affidavit, certain written declarations.  To qualify as an 
alternative to an affidavit, a declaration must be signed and 
recite that the person making it certifies it to be true under 
penalty of perjury.  The document must reflect the date and 
place of execution, if signed in California, or recite that it is 
executed “under the laws of the State of California.”  (§ 2015.5; 
see Kulshrestha v. First Union Commercial Corp. (2004) 33 
Cal.4th 601, 610 (Kulshrestha).)   
The purpose of the statutory references to affidavits and 
declarations is to enhance reliability.  “As with live testimony, 
the oath-taking procedures for affidavits help prevent perjury.  
[Citation.]  [¶]  In 1957, the Legislature enacted section 2015.5, 
authorizing declarations under penalty of perjury.  [Citation.]  
Lawmakers expressed concern that the oath-and-affidavit 
procedure 
was 
both 
cumbersome 
and 
widely 
ignored.  
[Citation.]  Declarations serve as a more streamlined means of 
ensuring 
that 
the 
witness 
understands 
‘the 
grave 
SWEETWATER UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT v. 
GILBANE BUILDING COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
responsibility he has assumed with respect to the truth[].’ ”  
(Kulshrestha, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 609.)  Kulshrestha 
concluded that the out-of-state declaration at issue there failed 
to comply with section 2015.5 because it did not reflect it was 
made under penalty of California’s perjury laws.  (Kulshrestha, 
at pp. 610-618.)   
Defendants argue that the factual narratives attached to 
the plea forms and the excerpts of the grand jury testimony are 
hearsay because they were made out of court and were being 
offered for their truth.  (Evid. Code, § 1200.)  They urge the 
court could only consider them if they fell within the former 
testimony hearsay exception.  (Evid. Code, § 1292.)  Initially, 
we agree that the hearsay rule applies.  The Evidence Code 
states that, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, this 
code applies in every action before” the California courts.  
(Evid. Code, § 300.)   
However, statutes allowing consideration of some 
statements in resolving pretrial motions provide an exception 
to the hearsay rule for purposes of the motion.  (See Elkins v. 
Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337, 1355; § 2009.)  Elkins 
emphasized that “[a]lthough affidavits or declarations are 
authorized in certain motion matters under Code of Civil 
Procedure section 2009, this statute does not authorize their 
admission at a contested trial leading to judgment.”  (Elkins, at 
p. 1355.)  Although affidavits and declarations constitute 
hearsay when offered for the truth of their content, section 
425.16, subdivision (b)(2) permits their consideration in ruling 
on a pretrial anti-SLAPP motion.  In connection with the form 
of the declaration, then, defendants’ hearsay objection fails.  
These declarations may be considered, not because they satisfy 
SWEETWATER UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT v. 
GILBANE BUILDING COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
some other hearsay exception, but because they qualify as 
declarations or their equivalent under section 2015.5, and can 
be considered under section 425.16.   
The change of plea forms may constitute declarations 
under section 2015.5 if signed under penalty of perjury.  (See 
Kulshrestha, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 606.)  “[C]ourts have made 
clear that a declaration is defective under section 2015.5 
absent an express facial link to California or its perjury laws.”  
(Id. at p. 612; see People v. Bryant (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 
1457, 1470.)  The Court of Appeal below concluded that “[e]ach 
plea form submitted by Sweetwater with respect to the anti-
SLAPP motion meets the requirements set forth in section 
2015.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  Specifically, each 
individual who signed and dated a plea form attested to the 
truth of the contents . . . under penalty of perjury under the 
laws of California.”  Accordingly, the change of plea forms and 
the incorporated factual narratives qualify as declarations the 
court may consider in determining plaintiffs’ likelihood of 
success.   
The excerpts of the grand jury testimony, however, 
require a different analysis.  Although testimony before the 
grand jury is given under oath, a transcript of that testimony is 
not a “written declaration under oath.”  (§ 2003.)  Rather, a 
transcript is a written memorialization of an oral examination 
under oath.  (See § 2005 [defining “oral examination”].)  
Likewise, a transcript of testimony is not a declaration under 
section 2015.5 because it is not “subscribed by” the testifying 
witness.   
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal concluded the grand 
jury testimony could still be considered because “the 
SWEETWATER UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT v. 
GILBANE BUILDING COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
transcripts are of the same nature as a declaration in that the 
testimony is given under penalty of perjury.”  The court relied 
on Williams v. Saga Enterprises, Inc. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 
142 (Williams).  Williams involved a summary judgment 
motion and held the trial court could consider the transcript of 
testimony 
from 
a 
related 
criminal 
case. 
 
Williams 
acknowledged that the transcript did not qualify as former 
testimony under Evidence Code section 1292 because there 
was no showing that the witness was unavailable.  It reasoned, 
however, that “inasmuch as the recorded testimony was offered 
in support of the opposition to a summary judgment motion 
and serves effectively as a declaration by [the witness], we 
treat it here as such.”  (Williams, at p. 149, fn. 3.)   
This analysis is sound.  The statutory scheme already 
permits consideration of affidavit equivalents.  (§ 2015.5.)  As 
Kulshrestha noted, the important aspect of such evidence is 
that it be made under penalty of California’s perjury laws.  
(See Kulshrestha, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 610-618.)  Sworn 
testimony made before a grand jury obviously is made under 
penalty of perjury.  (Cf. People v. Snyder (1958) 50 Cal.2d 190, 
192.)  As Williams and the Court of Appeal reasoned, a 
transcript of this testimony is the equivalent of a testifying 
witness’s declaration under penalty of perjury, assuming the 
authenticity of the transcript can be established.  Defendants 
here do not contest authenticity.   
The text of the anti-SLAPP statute does not speak 
directly to the issue, but permitting courts to consider recorded 
testimony is consistent with the purposes of the Act.  The law’s 
central aim is “screening out meritless claims that arise from 
protected activity, before the defendant is required to undergo 
SWEETWATER UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT v. 
GILBANE BUILDING COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
the expense and intrusion of discovery.”  (Baral, supra, 1 
Cal.5th at p. 392.)  The Legislature “has provided, and 
California courts have recognized, substantive and procedural 
limitations that protect plaintiffs against overbroad application 
of the anti-SLAPP mechanism. . . .  ‘This court and the Courts 
of Appeal, noting the potential deprivation of jury trial that 
might result were [section 425.16 and similar] statutes 
construed to require the plaintiff first to prove the specified 
claim to the trial court, have instead read the statutes as 
requiring the court to determine only if the plaintiff has stated 
and substantiated a legally sufficient claim.’ ”  (Briggs v. Eden 
Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1122-
1123.)   
It would not serve the purposes of the SLAPP Act to 
preclude consideration of testimony made under oath.  This 
sworn testimony is at least as reliable as an affidavit or 
declaration.  An anti-SLAPP motion is filed early in the case, 
usually within 60 days of service of the complaint.  (§ 425.16, 
subd. (f).)  Discovery is stayed once the motion is filed.  
(§ 425.16, subd. (g).)  Under these circumstances, it may not be 
practicable for a plaintiff to obtain declarations from various 
witnesses, particularly those associated with the defense.  
Further, under the present circumstances, even if declarations 
were obtained, they would have added little to the evidence 
already in plaintiff’s possession.  It seems doubtful that the 
Legislature contemplated dismissal of a potentially meritorious 
suit for want of declarations largely duplicating available 
evidence.   
Gatton v. A.P. Green Services, Inc. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 
688 (Gatton) reached a different conclusion.  In the summary 
SWEETWATER UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT v. 
GILBANE BUILDING COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
judgment context, Gatton concluded the trial court could not 
consider excerpts from two depositions in another case because 
the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the requirements of the former 
testimony hearsay exception.  (Evid. Code, § 1292.)  Gatton 
criticized “Williams’s casual view of trial testimony from 
another trial and declarations on summary judgment as being 
‘the same . . . .’  [Citation.]  Our Legislature has given this 
careful consideration and decided otherwise, mandating both 
unavailability, to ensure necessity, and a similar interest and 
motive in the prior proceeding, to ensure fairness.”  (Gatton, at 
p. 694.)  Gatton reasoned that a “deposition from another case 
differs greatly from a declaration from the same witness saying 
that, if called to trial in the current case, the witness would 
testify in a particular manner on specified subjects.”  (Id. at p. 
695; see L&B Real Estate v. Superior Court (1998) 67 
Cal.App.4th 1342, 1346-1348 [following Gatton].)   
Relying on Gatton, defendants argue that a witness 
testifying in a different case may not have been cross-examined 
with the same motive as the parties here.  Their reliance is 
misplaced.  The former testimony exception is not the correct 
lens through which to examine this question.  When satisfied, 
the former testimony exception permits admissibility at trial 
because the earlier opportunity for cross-examination ensures 
sufficient reliability.  (See People v. Gonzales (2012) 54 Cal.4th 
1234, 1262.)  In the anti-SLAPP motion context, however, 
reliability stems from the oath-taking procedures required for 
affidavits, or the execution under penalty of California perjury 
laws required by declarations.  (Cf. Kulshrestha, supra,  33 
Cal.4th 601, 606.)  Indeed, even affidavits or declarations 
produced specifically for this case would not be subject to cross-
SWEETWATER UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT v. 
GILBANE BUILDING COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
examination.  Yet, the statutory scheme clearly contemplates 
that courts may consider them.8   
Defendants further suggest that use of statements from a 
different case should not be allowed because “[n]o showing 
need be made that the declarant is available or unavailable, 
alive or dead, competent or demented.”  Defendants 
misunderstand the role of these statements in a second step 
anti-SLAPP procedure.  As we explain in detail below (see post, 
at pp. 15-21), the affidavit or declaration is offered to 
demonstrate that admissible evidence exists to prove plaintiff’s 
claims.  The statements must reflect that they were made by 
competent witnesses with personal knowledge of the facts they 
swear to be true.  A transcript of a witness’s testimony under 
oath before a grand jury would serve to establish personal 
knowledge and competence in the same manner that an 
affidavit or declaration could.   
In a somewhat related context, the statute governing 
summary judgment motions reflects a similar understanding of 
the role played by affidavits and declarations.  That statute 
requires that “[s]upporting and opposing affidavits or 
declarations shall be made by a person on personal knowledge, 
shall 
set 
forth 
admissible 
evidence, 
and 
shall 
show 
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the 
matters 
stated 
in 
the 
affidavits 
or 
declarations.”  
                                        
8  
We disapprove Gatton v. A.P. Green Services, Inc., supra, 
64 Cal.App.4th 688, and L&B Real Estate v. Superior Court, 
supra, 67 Cal.App.4th 1342, to the extent they are inconsistent 
with our opinion.   
SWEETWATER UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT v. 
GILBANE BUILDING COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
(§ 437c, subd. (d).)9  As noted, we have described the anti-
SLAPP motion as a “summary-judgment-like procedure at an 
early stage of the litigation” designed to weed out meritless 
suits “ ‘ “without great cost to the SLAPP target.” ’ ”  (Varian 
Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 192; see 
Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World 
Evangelism (2018) 4 Cal.5th 637, 642 (Newport Harbor 
Ventures).)  Similarly, “it has always been ‘[t]he purpose of the 
law of summary judgment . . . to provide courts with a 
mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to 
determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact 
necessary to resolve their dispute.’  [Citations.]  And section 
437c has always required the evidence relied on in supporting 
or opposing papers to be admissible.”  (Perry v. Bakewell 
Hawthorne, LLC (2017) 2 Cal.5th 536, 542 (Perry).)   
There are important differences between the two 
schemes.  Chief among them is that an anti-SLAPP motion is 
filed much earlier and before discovery.  However, to the extent 
both schemes are designed to determine whether a suit should 
be allowed to move forward, both schemes should require a 
showing based on evidence potentially admissible at trial 
presented in the proper form.  The grand jury transcripts at 
issue here satisfy this requirement.   
                                        
9  
We do not here create a different requirement for anti-
SLAPP litigation.  As in the summary judgment context, an 
affidavit or declaration will generally be sufficient as to form if 
it satisfies section 437c, subdivision (d).   
SWEETWATER UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT v. 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
Thus, in determining a plaintiff’s probability of success, 
the court may consider statements that are the equivalent of 
affidavits and declarations because they were made under oath 
or penalty of perjury in California.  Here, the change of plea 
forms, factual narratives, and the excerpts from the grand jury 
testimony satisfy this requirement.  That conclusion does not 
end the inquiry.   
C.  The Materials Must Describe Admissible Evidence 
In addition to submission in the proper form, courts have 
long required that the evidence relied on by the plaintiff be 
admissible at trial.  Wilcox v. Superior Court (1994) 27 
Cal.App.4th 809 (Wilcox) (overruled on another ground in 
Equilon Enterprises, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 68, fn. 5) explained 
that unless “the evidence referred to was admissible, or at least 
not objected to, . . . there would be nothing for the trier of fact 
to credit.”  (Wilcox, at p. 830.)  Similarly, Evans v. Unkow 
(1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1490 (Evans), observed that “[a]n 
assessment of the probability of prevailing on the claim looks 
to trial, and the evidence that will be presented at that time.  
[Citation.]  Such evidence must be admissible.”  (Id. at p. 1497; 
see also Tuchscher Development Enterprises, Inc. v. San Diego 
Unified Port Dist. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1219, 1235-1238 
(Tuchscher Development Enterprises); Church of Scientology v. 
Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 656 (Church of 
Scientology), overruled on another ground in 
Equilon 
Enterprises, at p. 68, fn. 5.)   
Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 
811 held a malicious prosecution claim was precluded because 
the earlier denial of an anti-SLAPP motion established 
probable cause for a suit.  Wilson observed that “[a] claim that 
SWEETWATER UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT v. 
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Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
is legally sufficient and can be substantiated by competent 
evidence is . . . one that a ‘reasonable attorney would have 
thought . . . tenable.’ ”  (Id. at p. 821, italics added.)  As one 
court observed, Wilson “contemplates a SLAPP plaintiff’s 
presentation of competent, i.e., admissible, evidence in support 
of its prima facie case in opposition to the motion.”  (Tuchscher 
Development Enterprises, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 1237.)  
Baral explained, “The court, without resolving evidentiary 
conflicts, must determine whether the plaintiff’s showing, if 
accepted by the trier of fact, would be sufficient to sustain a 
favorable judgment.”  (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396, italics 
added.)   
Defendants return to their reliance on the former 
testimony hearsay exception.  (Evid. Code, § 1292.)  That 
exception requires the declarant be unavailable as a witness, 
and “[t]he issue is such that the party to the action or 
proceeding in which the former testimony was given had the 
right and opportunity to cross–examine the declarant with an 
interest and motive similar to that which the party against 
whom the testimony is offered has at the hearing.”  (Evid. 
Code, § 1292, subd. (a)(3).)  Defendants contend, unless this 
showing is definitively made at the hearing, a court may not 
consider the statements in determining the probability of 
success.10  The argument runs ahead of itself and accordingly 
                                        
10  
Defendants do not differentiate between the grand jury 
transcript and the plea forms, arguing both must satisfy the 
requirements for former testimony in order to be admitted.  It 
is doubtful that statements in the plea forms constitute 
“former testimony.”  (Evid. Code, § 1290.)  The more 
 
SWEETWATER UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT v. 
GILBANE BUILDING COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
fails.  As explained below, evidence may be considered at the 
anti-SLAPP motion stage if it is reasonably possible the 
evidence set out in supporting affidavits, declarations or their 
equivalent will be admissible at trial.   
In Fashion 21 v. Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights 
of Los Angeles (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1138 (Fashion 21), a 
clothing retailer sued, alleging the defendants handed out 
defamatory flyers at demonstrations outside the plaintiffs’ 
stores.  In response to the defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, the 
plaintiffs presented an edited videotape purporting to show one 
of the demonstrations.  (Id. at p. 1145.)  The defendants 
objected 
that 
the 
edited 
videotape 
was 
not 
properly 
authenticated.  The court acknowledged that “[h]ad this 
videotape been offered at trial, [the defendants’] objection 
would have been well taken” (id. at p. 1146), noting that, under 
Evidence Code section 1402, authentication required a showing 
that “the alteration did not change the meaning . . . of the 
instrument” (Evid. Code, § 1402).  (See Fashion 21, at p. 1146, 
fn. 9.)11  However, the court concluded the videotape could be 
                                                                                                           
 
appropriate hearsay exception would be a declaration against 
interest.  (Evid. Code, § 1230.)  That exception also requires 
unavailability, but not a previous opportunity to cross-
examine.  (See Evid. Code, § 1292, subd. (a)(3).)  Detailed 
explanations of one’s own criminal misconduct in a formal legal 
proceeding would surely seem to satisfy the exception.  “[A] 
guilty plea falls within the hearsay rule exception for 
declarations against penal interest.”  (People v. Cummings 
(1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1321.)   
11  
The videotape was not accompanied by an affidavit or 
declaration.  (Fashion 21, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1145.)  
 
SWEETWATER UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT v. 
GILBANE BUILDING COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
considered:  “[T]he proper view of ‘admissible evidence’ for 
purposes of the SLAPP statute is evidence which, by its 
nature, is capable of being admitted at trial, i.e., evidence 
which is competent, relevant and not barred by a substantive 
rule.  Courts have thus excluded evidence which would be 
barred at trial by the hearsay rule, or because it is speculative, 
not based on personal knowledge or consists of impermissible 
opinion testimony.  This type of evidence cannot be used by the 
plaintiff to establish a probability of success on the merits 
because it could never be introduced at trial. . . .  [¶]  Evidence 
such as the videotape in this case, which is only excludable on 
the ground it lacks proper authentication, stands on a different 
footing in terms of its ability to support the plaintiffs’ cause of 
action. . . .  [E]vidence that is made inadmissible only because 
the plaintiff failed to satisfy a precondition to its admissibility 
[at trial] could support a judgment for the plaintiff assuming 
the precondition could be satisfied.”  (Id. at pp. 1147-1148, 
italics added, fns. omitted.)  Fashion 21 concluded:  “Given the 
high probability Fashion 21 would succeed in offering the 
videotape into evidence at trial and the ‘minimal’ showing 
necessary to overcome a SLAPP motion, we hold the trial court 
did not commit reversible error in considering the videotape in 
                                                                                                           
 
Apparently, the defendants did not argue the tape could not be 
considered because it was not so supported.  The Fashion 21 
court confined its discussion to whether the edited tape could 
be admissible at trial.  (See id. at pp. 1145-1146.)  Ordinarily, 
we would expect a party seeking consideration of other kinds of 
evidence demonstrate its admissibility by a supporting 
affidavit or declaration.   
SWEETWATER UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT v. 
GILBANE BUILDING COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
determining Fashion 21’s likelihood of prevailing . . . .”  (Id. at 
p. 1148, fn. omitted.)   
Other cases support the distinction between evidence 
that may be admissible at trial and evidence that could never 
be admitted.  For example, Healthsmart Pacific, Inc. v. 
Kabateck (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 416, affirmed the grant of an 
anti-SLAPP motion because the defamation suit there was 
based on privileged statements.  (Id. at pp. 430-437.)  Wilcox 
reached a similar conclusion in another defamation case, 
concluding that the petitioner could not overcome a privilege.  
(Wilcox, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at pp. 825-827.)  The privileged 
statements in both cases could not be admitted by substantive 
rule.  Likewise, Evans concluded a statement made only on 
information and belief was incompetent for lack of personal 
knowledge.  (Evans, supra, 38 Cal.App.4th at p. 1498.)  In 
other words, such evidence suffers from “the sort of evidentiary 
problem a plaintiff will be incapable of curing by the time of 
trial.”  (Gallagher v. Connell (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1260, 
1269.)   
Although not involving an anti-SLAPP motion, Perry v. 
Bakewell Hawthorne, LLC, supra, 2 Cal.5th 536, 538, is 
instructive:  “[W]hen the court determines an expert opinion is 
inadmissible because disclosure requirements were not met, 
the opinion must be excluded from consideration at summary 
judgment if an objection is raised.”  Perry noted that the 
summary judgment statute required that supporting affidavits 
and declarations “set forth admissible evidence.”  (§ 437c, 
subd. (d); see Perry, at p. 541.)  “The condition that an expert’s 
declaration must set out admissible evidence, however, has 
determinative importance. . . .  [T]he summary judgment 
SWEETWATER UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT v. 
GILBANE BUILDING COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
statute still requires the evidence provided in declarations to 
be admissible at trial.  [Citations.]  Declarations themselves 
are not ordinarily admissible because they are hearsay.  But 
the Kennedy court [Kennedy v. Modesto City Hosp. (1990) 221 
Cal.App.3d 575] erred when it suggested that the evidence 
contained in summary judgment declarations need not be 
admissible at trial.”  (Perry, at p. 541.)  Perry reasoned that, 
because the failure to comply with the disclosure statute 
rendered the evidence incurably inadmissible at trial, it could 
not properly be considered in ruling on a summary judgment 
motion.  (Id. at pp. 541-543.)12   
This case, like Fashion 21, describes evidence that is 
potentially admissible at trial.  Here, unlike the facts in Perry, 
there is no categorical bar to statements contained in the 
grand jury transcript and plea forms.  Indeed, the statements 
themselves appear to be statements against interest.  (Evid. 
Code, § 1230.)  Further, there are no undisputed factual 
circumstances suggesting the evidence would be inadmissible 
at trial.  In Fashion 21, the videotape at issue could be 
admitted at trial if properly authenticated.  In the videotaped 
demonstration, “employees and representatives of Fashion 
21 . . . along with” others were present (Fashion 21, supra, 117 
Cal.App.4th at p. 1145), suggesting there were identifiable 
witnesses who had personal knowledge of the events.  The 
                                        
12  
To clarify the distinction, the written statements 
themselves need not be admissible at trial, but it must be 
reasonably possible that the facts asserted in those statements 
can be established by admissible evidence at trial.   
SWEETWATER UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT v. 
GILBANE BUILDING COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
signers of those documents or other competent witnesses could 
testify at trial to support the District’s claims.  That live 
testimony would supplant any improper reliance on hearsay.  
Finally, plaintiff would have the opportunity to satisfy the 
requirements of any other applicable hearsay exceptions before 
admission at trial.   
Our observation in the previous section regarding the 
timing of an anti-SLAPP motion and the stay of discovery 
applies equally here.  It may not be possible at the hearing to 
lay a foundation for trial admission, even if such a showing 
could be made after full discovery.  While it may prove difficult 
at this early stage to obtain declarations from those who have 
pled guilty in the bribery case, it is not unreasonable to expect 
that those witnesses may be deposed and/or produced for trial.  
To strike a complaint for failure to meet evidentiary obstacles 
that may be overcome at trial would not serve the SLAPP Act’s 
protective purposes.  Ultimately, the SLAPP Act was “intended 
to end meritless SLAPP suits early without great cost to the 
target” (Newport Harbor Ventures, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 644), 
not to abort potentially meritorious claims due to a lack of 
discovery.  Notwithstanding the discovery stay, the court has 
discretion to order, upon good cause, specified discovery if 
required to overcome the hurdle of potential inadmissibility.  
(§ 425.16, subd. (g).)   
In sum, at the second stage of an anti-SLAPP hearing, 
the court may consider affidavits, declarations, and their 
equivalents if it is reasonably possible the proffered evidence 
set out in those statements will be admissible at trial.  
Conversely, if the evidence relied upon cannot be admitted at 
trial, because it is categorically barred or undisputed factual 
SWEETWATER UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT v. 
GILBANE BUILDING COMPANY 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
circumstances show inadmissibility, the court may not consider 
it in the face of an objection.  If an evidentiary objection is 
made, the plaintiff may attempt to cure the asserted defect or 
demonstrate the defect is curable.   
III.  DISPOSITION 
The Court of Appeal’s judgment is affirmed.   
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J.   
LIU, J.   
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J.  
MANELLA, J.* 
                                        
*  
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second 
Appellate District, Division Four, assigned by the Chief Justice 
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Sweetwater Union High School District v. Gilbane Building Company 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 245 Cal.App.4th 19 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S233526 
Date Filed: February 28, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Diego 
Judge: Eddie C. Sturgeon 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Dentons US, Charles A. Bird, Christian D. Humphreys and Gary K. Brucker, Jr., for Defendants and 
Appellants. 
 
Schwartz Semerdjian Cauley & Moot, John S. Moot, Sarah Brite Evans, Alison K. Adelman; Baker 
Manock & Jensen and James A. Ardaiz for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Charles A. Bird 
Dentons US 
4655 Executive Drive, Suite 700 
San Diego, CA  92121-3106 
(619) 236-1414 
 
John S. Moot 
Schwartz Semerdjian Cauley & Moot 
101 West Broadway, Suite 810 
San Diego, CA  92101 
(619) 236-8821