Case Title: Ex parte Anonymous, a minor (In the matter of Anonymous, a minor) ; Civil Appeals : 2110513 Petition Denied. No Opinion.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1110712

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2012-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
rel: 03/23/2012
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2011-2012
_________________________
1110712
_________________________
Ex parte Anonymous, a minor
PETITION FOR REVIEW
(In the matter of Anonymous, a minor)
(Court of Civil Appeals, 2110513)
MAIN, Justice.
PETITION DENIED.  NO OPINION. 
Malone, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, Shaw, and Wise, JJ.,
concur.  
Parker and Murdock, JJ., concur specially.  
Woodall, J., dissents.
1110712
2
PARKER, Justice (concurring specially).
In Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), the United
States Supreme Court described the necessity of placing limits
on the decision-making authority of minors, stating: 
"[T]he [United States Supreme] Court has held that
the States validly may limit the freedom of children
to choose for themselves in the making of important,
affirmative 
choices 
with 
potentially 
serious
consequences.  These rulings have been grounded in
the recognition that, during the formative years of
childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the
experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize
and avoid choices that could be detrimental to
them." 
443 U.S. at 635.  Acknowledging that potential "lack of
experience, perspective, and judgment" on the part of minors,
the Alabama legislature enacted the Parental Consent Act, §
26-21-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975; the first section of the
Parental Consent Act, § 26-21-1, Ala. Code 1975, states in
full:
"(a) It is the intent of the Legislature in
enacting this parental consent provision to further
the important and compelling state interests of: (1)
protecting minors against their own immaturity, (2)
fostering the family structure and preserving it as
a viable social unit, and (3) protecting the rights
of parents to rear children who are members of their
household.
"(b) The Legislature finds as fact that: (1)
immature minors often lack the ability to make fully
1110712
3
informed choices that take account of both immediate
and 
long-range 
consequences, (2) the medical,
emotional, 
and 
psychological 
consequences 
of
abortion 
are 
serious 
and 
can 
be 
lasting,
particularly when the patient is immature, (3) the
capacity to become pregnant and the capacity for
mature judgment concerning the wisdom of an abortion
are not necessarily related, (4) parents ordinarily
possess information essential to a physician's
exercise of his or her best medical judgment
concerning the child, and (5) parents who are aware
that their minor daughter has had an abortion may
better insure that she receives adequate medical
attention after her abortion.  The legislature
further finds that parental consultation is usually
desirable and in the best interests of the minor."
Thus, the Parental Consent Act expresses the Alabama
legislature's strong interest in protecting and preserving
parental rights. 
The requirement of parental consent can be waived by
court order in the case of "[a] minor who elects not to seek
or does not or cannot ... obtain consent from either of her
parents or legal guardian."  § 26-21-3(e), Ala. Code 1975.  A
waiver of parental consent is obtained through the judicial-
bypass procedure set forth in § 26-21-4, Ala. Code 1975, which
permits a pregnant minor to seek judicial authorization for an
abortion, as did the minor in this case.  That Code section
states, in relevant part: "The required consent shall be
waived if the court finds either: (1) That the minor is mature
1110712
4
and well-informed enough to make the abortion decision on her
own; or (2) That performance of the abortion would be in the
best interest of the minor."  § 26-21-4(f), Ala. Code 1975. 
In this case, the trial court, in a precise and thorough
order setting forth the facts of the case and analyzing those
facts in light of the applicable statutes and precedents,
specifically determined that the petitioner, a 17-year-old
unmarried, unemancipated minor, lacked the maturity and
knowledge necessary to determine for herself whether an
abortion of her pregnancy was in her own best interest.  The
trial court also specifically determined that the evidence
before it did not indicate that an abortion would be in the
best interest of the petitioning minor.  The trial court
therefore declined to authorize an abortion.
By properly declining to waive parental consent and
authorize the abortion requested by the minor in this case,
the trial court left the authority to determine whether an
abortion is in the minor's best interest solely in the hands
of the minor's parents.  Its doing so is in accord with our
statutes and with precedents from the United States Supreme
Court, which stated in Bellotti that "[t]here is ... an
1110712
5
important state interest in encouraging a family rather than
a judicial resolution of a minor's abortion decision."  443
U.S. at 648. 
In Bellotti, the United States Supreme Court explained
that "[t]he State commonly protects its youth from adverse
governmental action and from their own immaturity by requiring
parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by
minors."  443 U.S. at 637.  This parental involvement is not
a new phenomenon: "Consent and involvement by parents in
important decisions by minors long have been recognized as
protective of their immaturity."  443 U.S. at 649.  Nor is
this parental authority mere convenience:
"[A]n additional and more important justification
for state deference to parental control over
children is that '[t]he child is not the mere
creature of the state; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations.'  Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).  'The duty to
prepare the child for "additional obligations" ...
must be read to include the inculcation of moral
standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good
citizenship.'  Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233
(1972). 
This 
affirmative process of teaching,
guiding, and inspiring by precept and example is
essential to the growth of young people into mature,
socially responsible citizens.
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6
"We have believed in this country that this
process, in large part, is beyond the competence of
impersonal political institutions.  ...  Thus, '[i]t
is cardinal with us that the custody, care and
nurture of the child reside first in the parents,
whose 
primary 
function 
and 
freedom 
include
preparation for obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder.'  Prince v. Massachusetts, supra,
321 U.S. [158], at 166 [(1944)] (emphasis added).
"Unquestionably, 
there 
are 
many 
competing
theories about the most effective way for parents to
fulfill their central role in assisting their
children on the way to responsible adulthood.  While
we do not pretend any special wisdom on this
subject, we cannot ignore that central to many of
these theories, and deeply rooted in our Nation's
history and tradition, is the belief that the
parental role implies a substantial measure of
authority 
over 
one's 
children. 
 
Indeed,
'constitutional 
interpretation 
has 
consistently
recognized that the parents' claim to authority in
their own household to direct the rearing of their
children is basic in the structure of our society.'
Ginsberg v. New York, supra, 390 U.S. [629], at 639
[(1968)].
"Properly understood, then, the tradition of
parental authority is not inconsistent with our
tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former
is one of the basic presuppositions of the latter."
443 U.S. at 637-38.  This Court has also upheld the
fundamental right of parents to direct the upbringing of their
children.  See Ex parte E.R.G., 73 So. 3d 634, 642, 643 (Ala.
2011)("The right of parents to direct the upbringing of their
children has long been recognized as fundamental by the United
1110712
7
States Supreme Court. ...  This Court has also recognized the
fundamental nature of parental rights.").  By denying the
petition for review of the judgment of the Court of Civil
Appeals in this case and thereby leaving the final decision-
making authority to the minor's parents, this Court again
affirms its commitment to the fundamental right of parents to
direct the care and upbringing of their children. 
After reviewing the evidence and arguments before us, I
concur in denying the petition seeking review of the judgment
of the Court of Civil Appeals, which in turn affirmed the
trial court's decision in this case.   
1110712
8
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring specially).
I concur to deny the petition.  I write separately to
note that the petition before us does not address the specific
findings of the trial court, nor does it address the specific
authorities cited by the Court of Civil Appeals in its no-
opinion affirmance.