Case Title: Commonwealth v. Mazza

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11363

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-04-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11363 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  ANTHONY D. MAZZA. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     December 5, 2019. - April 21, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Postconviction 
relief, New trial, Disclosure of evidence.  Evidence, 
Disclosure of evidence, Exculpatory. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 11, 1972. 
 
 
Following review by this court, 366 Mass. 30 (1974), a 
motion for a new trial, filed on December 23, 2009, was heard by 
Patrick F. Brady, J. 
 
 
A request for leave to appeal was allowed by Gants, J., in 
the Supreme Judicial Court for the county of Suffolk. 
 
 
 
John H. Cunha, Jr. (Charles Allan Hope also present) for 
the defendant. 
 
Dara Z. Kesselheim, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  The defendant, Anthony Mazza, was convicted in 
1973 of murder in the first degree and robbery in connection 
2 
 
 
 
with the strangling death of Peter Armata.  See Commonwealth v. 
Mazza, 366 Mass. 30 (1974).  He filed a series of motions for a 
new trial over the course of thirty-five years.  Before us is an 
appeal from the denial of his sixth motion for a new trial.  The 
motion was predicated on newly discovered evidence consisting of 
a set of affidavits averring that the key witness for the 
Commonwealth admitted to lying about the defendant's involvement 
in the victim's death, and a recently discovered witness 
statement made to police in 1972. 
 
A single justice of this court, acting as gatekeeper, 
allowed the appeal to proceed before the full court.  Following 
briefing and oral argument, the court remanded the case for an 
evidentiary hearing while retaining jurisdiction.  Over 
approximately the next five years, the defendant unsuccessfully 
attempted to locate relevant witnesses for the hearing.  When 
the hearing finally went forward, therefore, the only relevant 
evidence submitted was in the form of affidavits and other 
documentary evidence, most of which was already part of the 
appellate record.  The matter is now back before the court. 
 
Having conducted a de novo review, we conclude that the 
witness statement constitutes newly discovered evidence that 
"would probably have been a real factor in the jury's 
deliberations."  Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 306 
(1986).  We therefore reverse the order denying the defendant's 
3 
 
 
 
motion for a new trial, set the verdicts aside, and remand the 
case to the Superior Court for a new trial. 
Background.  1.  Trial proceedings.  a.  Direct examination 
of Robert Anderson.  The case against the defendant almost 
exclusively relied on the testimony of Robert Anderson,1 who was 
incarcerated for unspecified reasons at the time of trial.  
Robert testified that, on the morning of Friday, June 30, 1972, 
he met the defendant, whom he had known for approximately six or 
seven months, in the South End section of Boston.  At that time, 
the defendant informed Robert that he needed a place to stay.  
Later in the day, the two met again in downtown Boston, at which 
point Robert informed the defendant that he could stay at 
Robert's apartment.  The two then went separate ways. 
At approximately 2:45 A.M. on July 1, Robert, having spent 
the evening at a movie theater and bar, returned to his 
apartment in the Dorchester section of Boston and found the 
defendant inside, wearing brown leather gloves, and standing 
over the body of a man Robert had never seen before.2  The victim 
was lying face up on the floor, and his pants pockets had been 
                     
 
1 Three brothers, Robert, Michael, and William Anderson, 
testified at trial.  To avoid confusion, we refer to them herein 
by their first names. 
 
2 The medical examiner testified that the cause of death was 
asphyxiation by strangulation with a ligature, although no time 
of death was established at trial. 
4 
 
 
 
turned inside out.  When Robert asked what had happened, the 
defendant said that there had been a struggle. 
The two proceeded to discuss moving the body; the defendant 
suggested disposing of the body the next day, but Robert 
insisted that it be done immediately and agreed to help.3  The 
defendant then gave Robert a watch, a ring, and the key to a 
Pontiac Grand Prix that was parked outside, all of which were 
later shown to have been the property of the victim.  The 
defendant then tied the hands and feet of the body with cloth, 
and the two men moved the body into a closet in the back hallway 
off the kitchen.4 
Once the body had been moved, the defendant telephoned for 
a taxicab and the two made plans to meet again later that 
morning.  After the taxicab arrived, the defendant departed and 
Robert went to bed.  Sometime after 9 A.M. that morning, Robert 
drove the Grand Prix to downtown Boston to meet the defendant.  
                     
3 On cross-examination, Robert testified that he "had to 
help" the defendant move the body, "because it was in [his] 
house," and if the body were found there, people would think 
that he had killed the victim. 
 
 
4 Later in his direct examination, Robert denied having 
moved the body into the closet and instead asserted that he was 
in the kitchen while the defendant moved the body to the closet.  
Several exchanges later, however, he stated that he did in fact 
personally place the body in the closet, with the defendant's 
help.  On cross-examination, Robert testified that he "didn't go 
in the closet," that he was "halfway in the closet," and that he 
was "in the closet," and also that he did not know whether his 
testimony about the closet was truthful. 
5 
 
 
 
The two then went shopping, and the defendant purchased several 
articles of clothing.  Robert later drove the Grand Prix home. 
b.  Cross-examination of Robert Anderson.  Defense 
counsel's cross-examination of Robert elicited divergent 
accounts of his interactions with the defendant on the day of 
the killing.5  Among other things, as mentioned in note 4, supra, 
Robert gave varying versions of his involvement in hiding the 
body in the closet and claimed that the defendant subsequently 
put a lock on the closet door, although police did not observe a 
lock when they found the body.6  Further, Robert acknowledged 
                     
5 In many instances, Robert answered both "yes" and "no" to 
the same question posed successively, prompting defense counsel 
to ask him whether he simply was saying the first thing that 
came to mind, and whether he knew the difference between telling 
the truth and lying.  On at least one occasion, Robert stated 
that he "[didn't] know" whether his prior testimony was truthful 
or fabricated, nor did he know the difference between telling 
the truth and telling a lie. 
 
6 Although he initially testified that he watched the 
defendant put a lock on the door several hours after the 
killing, Robert later stated that he did not in fact see the 
defendant affix a lock.  He also asserted that the defendant 
bought the lock on their shopping trip and then returned to 
Robert's apartment on his own to put a lock on the closet door.  
Then, during redirect examination, Robert testified that he and 
the defendant went back to the apartment before they went 
shopping, at which point the defendant produced the lock, placed 
it on the kitchen table, and gave Robert the accompanying key.  
Finally, Robert also testified that it was possible he removed 
the lock from the closet door before the police arrived, but he 
could not be certain. 
 
6 
 
 
 
having told a friend that he "hit [the victim] too hard,"7 
although on redirect examination, Robert denied having hit the 
victim. 
Robert admitted that he continued to drive the Grand Prix 
for several days.  Initially, he suggested he had been unaware 
the car belonged to the victim because the defendant said it 
belonged to him.  After being confronted with his prior 
testimony before the grand jury on that point, however, Robert 
admitted to knowing that the car was stolen the entire time he 
was driving it.  The car key was eventually discarded in an 
incinerator at his friend Paul Clifford's apartment building 
after Robert observed police inspecting the Grand Prix.  The key 
was later recovered by investigators.  As for the victim's other 
belongings, Robert sold the watch to Clifford and gave the 
victim's ring to his brother William. 
On July 3, police visited Robert's apartment in response to 
a report of a foul smell.  Upon hearing police announce their 
presence at the front door of the apartment, Robert jumped from 
a second-floor rear window and ran to a subway station.  He was 
arrested a few days later and initially charged with murder.  By 
                     
7 Corroborating this account, Robert's friend, Richard 
Lynch, testified that in the late hours of July 1, or early 
morning hours of July 2, Robert asked Lynch to help move a body 
that was in his apartment and told him that he had hit the man 
too hard. 
7 
 
 
 
the time of trial, however, he was facing only a charge of 
accessory after the fact. 
c.  Other Commonwealth witnesses.  One other witness 
testified to having seen the defendant near the scene of the 
crime.  Florence Johnson, a friend of Robert's mother, testified 
that at between 2:30 and 2:45 A.M. on July 1, she saw Robert and 
another man, whom she did not know, in front of Robert's 
apartment building.  She described the other man as about six 
feet tall, thin, with dark hair, a mustache, and sideburns.  At 
trial, she identified the defendant as that other man. 
Another witness saw the victim with a man roughly matching 
the above description at a club at approximately 1:45 A.M. on 
July 1.  Jerry Leonard testified that he saw the victim leaving 
the club with a "Latin type person," but stated that no one in 
the court room resembled that man. 
An employee of a retail store in downtown Boston identified 
the defendant as having attempted to use a credit card issued in 
the name of the victim on July 1, 1972.8 
Robert's two brothers also testified.  According to 
Michael, the middle brother, the defendant was someone who had 
                     
 
8 The store employee called the bank that issued the card 
when the defendant indicated that he did not have 
identification.  The bank said not to return the card to the 
customer and to have the customer contact the bank.  When the 
store employee relayed this information to the defendant, the 
defendant agreed and left the store. 
8 
 
 
 
been "hanging around" with Robert.  He saw the defendant 
downtown on the morning of July 1, sitting in a Grand Prix.  
Michael also saw the defendant the next day, at which time the 
defendant approached Michael and indicated that he was looking 
for Robert in order to retrieve the Grand Prix. 
William, the youngest brother, testified that when he went 
to Robert's apartment on July 2, he found Robert and the 
defendant there.  While the defendant was in another room, 
Robert retrieved a key from a drawer, unlocked the closet door, 
and showed William the body.9  Robert also gave William the 
victim's ring. 
Several police officers also testified, including one who 
had searched the defendant's apartment pursuant to a warrant.  
There, he found the victim's driver's license and bank 
identification card, but no physical or forensic evidence 
linking the defendant to the crime. 
d.  Defense theory.  The defendant presented an alibi 
witness, William Atwood, who was one of three people who shared 
an apartment in the South End section of Boston with the 
                     
 
9 At trial, Robert acknowledged using the key to open the 
closet door and show William the body, but said this occurred on 
the morning of July 1.  When he was before the grand jury, 
however, he had testified that it occurred in the evening.  When 
he was confronted with his earlier statement at trial, Robert 
"guess[ed]" that he had been lying to the grand jury and was now 
telling the truth. 
9 
 
 
 
defendant.  Atwood testified that he was with the defendant, 
visiting various bars and restaurants, from approximately 6 or 7 
P.M. on June 30, until they returned to their apartment around 
2:30 or 2:45 A.M. on July 1, and eventually went to sleep.  The 
only time they were separated during that time was for fifteen 
or twenty minutes sometime between 1 and 2 A.M. 
At approximately 8 or 8:30 A.M. that morning, Atwood heard 
a knock on the window and saw Robert standing outside, as well 
as a Grand Prix parked at the curb.  Robert told Atwood that he 
needed to talk to the defendant about something important, and 
Atwood let him into the apartment.  Robert then shook the 
defendant awake and started "bragging" about having "convinced" 
a "guy to [go to] his house," who "was supposed to be gay or 
something like that," "and he somehow got a stocking around his 
neck, held it around his neck for a few minutes, let him drop to 
the floor, and . . . took his money, his watch and his ring, his 
credit cards, and threw him in the closet."10  Robert showed 
Atwood the watch and the ring.  He also "flash[ed] the credit 
cards in front of" the defendant and asked him to go shopping.  
                     
10 According to Atwood, Robert also stated that he "beat 
[the victim] for . . . a 1971 Grand Prix." 
 
10 
 
 
 
The defendant then dressed and left with Robert.  Later that 
day, the defendant returned with a new outfit.11 
2.  Posttrial proceedings.  Over a period of thirty-five 
years following the affirmance of his convictions,12 the 
defendant filed six motions for a new trial.  The first motion 
was filed pro se in 1977, and a substitute motion, also pro se, 
was filed in 1978 to replace the earlier motion.  The 1978 
motion was based on newly discovered evidence in the form of 
affidavits from four individuals, all averring that while Robert 
was incarcerated with the affiants in the years following the 
trial, he admitted to having lied and framed the defendant for 
the murder.  All four of the affidavits purported to have been 
                     
11 The prosecutor devoted a substantial portion of his 
cross-examination of Atwood to inquiring as to the sexual 
orientation and sleeping arrangements of the apartment's 
occupants.  Atwood testified that the defendant typically shared 
a mattress on the floor with the other male roommate; in 
response to the prosecutor's question whether there was 
"something funny about that," Atwood explained that the two kept 
to their own sides of the mattress.  Although Atwood denied that 
the other male roommate ever dressed in women's clothing, the 
Commonwealth called Robert's girlfriend for the sole purpose of 
establishing that the other male roommate had dressed as a woman 
on three or four occasions. 
 
 
12 In his direct appeal, the defendant "argue[d] no 
assignments of error but urge[d] only that we exercise our 
powers under [G. L. c. 278, § 33E,] . . . and reduce the verdict 
to a lesser degree of guilt.  The sole reason suggested for the 
invocation of such a procedure [wa]s alleged to be the 
defendant's mental retardation and consequent diminished 
criminal responsibility."  Commonwealth v. Mazza, 366 Mass. 30, 
30 (1974). 
11 
 
 
 
executed in either 1976 or 1977.  The 1977 and 1978 motions 
never were acted upon. 
In 1988 and 1995, the defendant filed two additional pro se 
motions for a new trial, both of which were denied by the judge 
who had presided over the trial on grounds that the arguments, 
largely challenging the jury instructions, had been waived.13 
In 2006, the defendant filed another pro se motion for a 
new trial, based on newly discovered evidence in the form of a 
statement that William had given to the police on July 10, 1972, 
days after the victim's body was found, in which he attributed 
certain inculpatory statements and actions to Robert.  With the 
trial judge having retired, a different Superior Court judge 
denied the 2006 motion, without prejudice, and appointed counsel 
to represent the defendant on the issues presented in that 
motion. 
In 2009, the defendant, through counsel, filed his sixth 
motion for a new trial based on both the inmate affidavits14 and 
William's 1972 statement.  In 2011, a third Superior Court judge 
                     
 
13 The defendant petitioned for leave to appeal from the 
denial of the 1995 motion pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  That 
petition was denied in 1998. 
 
 
14 In support of his sixth motion for a new trial, the 
defendant included a second affidavit from one of the inmates, 
purportedly executed in 2009, and withdrew one of the original 
affidavits, thereby bringing the count to four affidavits from 
three inmates. 
12 
 
 
 
denied the motion after a nonevidentiary hearing.  With respect 
to William's police statement, the judge was not persuaded that 
defense counsel, who was deceased by the time the sixth motion 
was filed, did not possess it prior to trial.  With regard to 
the inmate affidavits, the judge concluded that, although the 
1978 motion in which the defendant first raised the issue was 
never acted upon, the claim had been "waived or denied by 
inaction" because the defendant never sought to advance that 
motion for hearing and disposition by the court, and none of the 
subsequent motions, filed in 1988, 1995, and 2005, had relied on 
the affidavits. 
 
The defendant filed a petition for leave to appeal from the 
denial of the sixth motion, pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
which was granted in 2012 after a single justice of this court 
concluded that the appeal presented "a new and substantial 
question."  The appeal then proceeded before the full court.  
Following briefing and oral argument in 2014, the court remanded 
the case to the Superior Court for the purpose of conducting an 
evidentiary hearing to make findings concerning the credibility 
of the inmate affiants and the reliability of their affidavits, 
as well as findings as to whether the defendant's trial counsel 
was in possession of William's statement prior to trial.  
Mindful that, due to the passage of time, there may be 
challenges to locating and securing witnesses and other 
13 
 
 
 
evidence, the court requested that the judge report the findings 
back to this court within a "reasonable time." 
 
Upon remand, the anticipated challenges were realized and a 
"reasonable time" turned out to be nearly five years.  Over the 
course of that time, defense counsel kept the Superior Court 
apprised of the efforts being made to locate both trial 
counsel's original case file and the inmate affiants. 
Ultimately, however, those efforts proved unsuccessful.15  In 
late 2018, before a fourth Superior Court judge, therefore, the 
hearing consisted only of the submission of affidavits and other 
documentary evidence, almost all of which was already part of 
the record in this court,16 as well as argument by the parties. 
 
After taking the matter under advisement, the judge issued 
findings of fact.  As to William's police statement, she found 
that it did not constitute newly discovered evidence because the 
defendant failed to establish that defense counsel did not have 
possession of it at the time of trial.  As for the inmate 
affidavits, she found that they did not evince "persuasive 
assurances of trustworthiness," so as to make this one of those 
                     
 
15 The Commonwealth also made unsuccessful efforts to locate 
the inmate affiants. 
 
 
16 The defendant did call one witness, the law partner of 
his current attorney, who testified about a 2008 meeting with 
one of the inmate affiants at a prison in upstate New York.  The 
testimony was of little, if any, evidentiary value. 
14 
 
 
 
"rarest of cases" where otherwise inadmissible affidavits fall 
within the "narrow," constitutionally based exception to the 
hearsay rule recognized in Commonwealth v. Drayton, 473 Mass. 
23, 32, 34, 36, 40 (2015) (Drayton I) (affidavit will be 
admissible, despite failure to fall within any traditional 
hearsay exception, provided defendant establishes both that it 
is critical to defense and bears persuasive assurances of 
trustworthiness).  See Commonwealth v. Drayton, 479 Mass. 479, 
486-489 (2018) (Drayton II).17  In a footnote, she further 
concluded that the inmate affidavits did not qualify for 
admission as "third-party culprit" evidence.  See Commonwealth 
v. Silva-Santiago, 453 Mass. 782, 800-801, 804 n.26 (2009) 
(discussing constitutionally based exception whereby, provided 
certain conditions are met, defendant may offer otherwise 
inadmissible hearsay tending to show third party is true 
culprit).  See also Mass. G. Evid. § 1105 (2020).  Instead, she 
concluded that the affidavits consisted of mere impeachment 
material. 
 
Discussion.  Because the motion judge did not preside over 
the trial or conduct an evidentiary hearing, and the only 
relevant evidence submitted at the evidentiary hearing conducted 
upon remand consisted of affidavits and other documentary 
                     
 
17 Drayton I and Drayton II were decided after this case was 
remanded for the evidentiary hearing. 
15 
 
 
 
evidence, we review the denial of the motion for a new trial de 
novo.  See Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass. 645, 656 (2018) 
(appellate court in as good position as motion judge to review 
documentary evidence); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 451 Mass. 310, 
325-326 (2008) (review is de novo where motion judge was not 
trial judge and took no evidence). 
 
The defendant maintains that both William's statement and 
the inmate affidavits constitute newly discovered evidence 
warranting a new trial.  "A defendant seeking a new trial on the 
ground of newly discovered evidence must establish both that the 
evidence is newly discovered and that it casts real doubt on the 
justice of the conviction."  Grace, 397 Mass. at 305.  We 
conclude that, at least with respect to William's statement, the 
defendant has satisfied both prongs of the test. 
1.  William's statement.  a.  Substance of William's 
statement.  Sometime in the 1990s, after the defendant learned 
that he should have received witness statements from the police, 
the defendant embarked on a close to ten-year effort to obtain 
relevant documents from the district attorney's office and the 
Boston police department pursuant to the public records law.  
16 
 
 
 
See G. L. c. 66, § 10.  In 2005, the defendant finally received 
the statement William made to police.18 
According to his statement, William visited Robert's 
apartment on the evening of July 1, 1972.  When he arrived, he 
saw a "gold car with a black top" parked near the apartment and 
found Robert inside the apartment with an individual presumed to 
be the defendant.19  While there, William received a ring from 
Robert as a birthday present. 
William returned to the apartment the next evening, and 
Robert and the defendant were again present.  When the defendant 
was in another room, Robert asked William if he would "help him 
move somebody from the premises."  When William declined, Robert 
became angry, used a key to unlock the door to a closet, and 
showed William the body.  The hands and feet of the body were 
tied up, and there was a "nylon stocking or something" around 
the mouth.  Robert gave William a knife to cut the nylon 
stocking, but William gave it back.  Robert then proceeded to 
cut the nylon stocking from the victim's mouth20 and the "rope" 
                     
 
18 The statement appears to be a transcript, although it is 
not clear if it was prepared from a recording or by a 
stenographer who was present at the interview. 
19 The name of the individual was redacted; the individual's 
physical description roughly matched that of the defendant. 
 
20 The medical examiner testified that the body was found 
with a knotted cloth ligature around the neck, which appeared to 
have been cut adjacent to the knot. 
17 
 
 
 
from his wrists.  Robert then cleaned the knife and put it in 
the sink.  When William continued to resist helping with the 
body, Robert said he planned to put it in the automobile and 
dump it in the river.  He did not tell William how the body came 
to be there.  William then departed and never saw the body 
again. 
 
b.  Statement as newly discovered evidence.  To demonstrate 
that the proffered evidence is newly discovered, a defendant 
must "establish that the evidence was not discoverable at the 
time of trial despite the due diligence of the defendant or 
defense counsel."  Commonwealth v. Moore, 480 Mass. 799, 817-818 
(2018), citing Commonwealth v. Jones, 432 Mass. 623, 633 n.6 
(2000). 
Whether William's statement to police constitutes "newly 
discovered" evidence presents a close call.  Trial counsel is 
deceased, and his files on the defendant's case cannot be 
located.  Although the Commonwealth has not produced any 
evidence demonstrating that William's statement in particular 
was disclosed prior to trial,21 the Commonwealth asserts that we 
                     
 
21 We do not here suggest that it was the Commonwealth's 
burden to demonstrate that exculpatory evidence was disclosed.  
See Commonwealth v. Lykus, 451 Mass. 310, 326 (2008) (defendant 
seeking new trial on ground prosecution failed to provide 
exculpatory evidence has burden of showing it was not 
disclosed).  However, the assistant district attorney 
represented to the court in a prior hearing that if he were 
18 
 
 
 
should assume that it was because when the defendant filed a 
pretrial motion seeking all witness statements, the Commonwealth 
assented and produced some statements, as evidenced by the 
defendant's use of them at trial.22  Of course, this assertion 
does not establish that William's statement was among those 
disclosed prior to trial. 
The defendant submitted an affidavit asserting that neither 
he nor his attorney received a copy of William's statement prior 
to trial; however, the evidentiary value of the affidavit is 
limited, given the defendant's interest in the outcome of his 
motion.  The defendant also submitted affidavits from six 
attorneys who, postconviction, either represented him or 
reviewed his case.  Each averred that he or she did not see, or 
did not recall having seen, the statement among the defendant's 
materials.23  These affidavits, too, are of limited value, as we 
do not know what materials the attorneys had available to them. 
                     
aware of any evidence to suggest that the statement had been 
disclosed, he would have produced it. 
 
 
22 The defendant counters that his pretrial motion sought 
only the statements of the defendants (which at the time 
included Robert).  We note, however, that if the defendant 
indeed had requested all witness statements and the Commonwealth 
failed to disclose William's statement, such failure would have 
reduced the defendant's burden on a motion for a new trial.  See 
Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 407, 412 (1992).  See 
also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 
 
23 A seventh attorney affidavit, which simply vouched for 
the defendant's credibility, has no evidentiary value. 
19 
 
 
 
Trial counsel's use of other witness statements at the 
trial, however, is noteworthy.  A review of the trial 
transcripts reveals that defense counsel made thorough use of 
the pretrial statements of various other witnesses.  For 
example, on cross-examination, counsel pressed Robert on many 
details of his direct testimony, often multiple times, and 
exhaustively impeached him with numerous references to his prior 
inconsistent statements to police.  Similarly, counsel used the 
prior statements given to police by Johnson and Michael, two 
other fact witnesses, during their respective cross-
examinations. 
In stark contrast, trial counsel made no reference to 
William's prior statement during his cross-examination.  In 
fact, the cross-examination of William was limited to three 
questions:  where he lived; whether he had discussed the case 
with Robert; and whether he had discussed the case with his 
mother.  The Commonwealth argues that counsel made a conscious, 
tactical decision not to cross-examine William rigorously 
because his direct testimony, specifically that Robert showed 
William the victim's body and offered William the victim's ring, 
supported the defense's theory that Robert was the true culprit.  
However, this argument rings hollow.  Defense counsel would not 
have been limited to using the statement for impeachment 
purposes.  He also could have used it to refresh William's 
20 
 
 
 
recollection of other pertinent details of Robert's treatment of 
the body and plans to dispose of it, just as he used the prior 
statement of Robert's other brother, Michael, to refresh his 
recollection concerning the whereabouts of the defendant on 
July 1, 1972.  Indeed, William's statement contained highly 
inculpatory details of Robert's handling of the victim's body, 
details that were not mentioned in William's testimony and that 
would have been particularly beneficial to the defendant's case.  
In view of the manner in which trial counsel employed prior 
statements when cross-examining other witnesses, it is difficult 
to conceive of a tactical reason for failing to make similar use 
of William's statement.24 
Although the question whether William's statement to police 
constitutes "newly discovered" evidence is a close call, this is 
not a case where the only evidence of absence is the absence of 
evidence.  As discussed supra, there are several pieces of 
relevant, circumstantial evidence, including the defendant's 
affidavit, the affidavits submitted by his various 
postconviction counsel, and a record revealing experienced trial 
                     
 
24 We further note that trial counsel was a well-known and 
highly regarded member of the bar who, as reflected by his 
performance during this trial, knew his way around a court room.  
Had he been in possession of William's statement, it is highly 
probable, based on his treatment of other witnesses, that he 
would have used the statement in an effort to elicit details 
that further incriminated Robert. 
21 
 
 
 
counsel's skillful use of other witness statements.  Viewed 
separately, no one piece of evidence is particularly persuasive.  
When viewed as a whole, however, a more compelling picture 
emerges.  In light of the unique circumstances of this case, 
therefore, we conclude that the defendant has sustained his 
burden of establishing that defense counsel did not have 
William's 1972 police statement prior to or, for that matter, at 
trial, and, thus, that it constitutes newly discovered evidence. 
 
c.  Effect of newly discovered evidence on outcome.  In 
determining whether newly discovered evidence casts real doubt 
on the justice of a conviction, we need not predict "whether the 
verdict would have been different"; instead, we must decide 
"whether the new evidence would probably have been a real factor 
in the jury's deliberations."  Grace, 397 Mass. at 306.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bonnett, 482 Mass. 838, 844 (2019).  In so 
doing, we look both at the nature of the new evidence and the 
strength of the Commonwealth's case.  See Grace, supra (strength 
of case against defendant is relevant in assessing effect of 
newly discovered evidence). 
The theory of the defense was that Robert was the killer.  
William's statement provided details that would have strongly 
bolstered that theory because it demonstrated that Robert had 
control over the victim's body and belongings, and had a plan 
for disposing of the body.  According to William, Robert gave 
22 
 
 
 
William what turned out to be the victim's ring, and later asked 
William to help dispose of the body.  After William rejected 
Robert's request for assistance, Robert disclosed his plan to 
dump the body in the river.  Robert also had access to the 
victim's body by way of a key.  And Robert demonstrated an 
apparent ease with the body when he cut the nylon stocking from 
the victim's mouth and the rope from the victim's wrists.  
Finally, William reported that the defendant was not present 
when Robert discussed the body of the victim with, or showed the 
body to, William. 
Moreover, and significantly, the case against the defendant 
was far from overwhelming.  Robert, an admitted participant in 
handling, controlling, and plotting to dispose of the victim's 
body, was the only witness who maintained that the defendant was 
guilty of murder.  Outside of Robert's testimony, the 
Commonwealth's case against the defendant consisted of an 
eyewitness identification of the defendant near the scene on the 
same night as the killing, and the defendant's subsequent 
possession of the victim's driver's license and bank 
identification card and attempted use of his credit card. 
Given the weaknesses in the Commonwealth's case, William's 
statement, which offers a "material and credible . . . measure 
of strength in support of the defendant's position," Grace, 397 
23 
 
 
 
Mass. at 305, "would probably have been a real factor in the 
jury's deliberations," id. at 306. 
 
Where the defendant did not have possession of the 
statement prior to trial and could not have been expected to 
uncover it through reasonable pretrial diligence, there is "a 
substantial risk that the jury would have reached a different 
conclusion had the evidence been admitted at trial."  Id.  There 
is, thus, a real chance that "justice may not have been done."  
Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001). 
 
2.  Inmate affidavits.  In light of our decision with 
respect to William's witness statement, we need not consider 
whether the defendant waived his arguments with respect to the 
inmate affidavits or whether those affidavits amount to newly 
discovered evidence.  Nor do we here consider whether the 
affidavits would be admissible under one or more exceptions to 
the hearsay rules.  Those evidentiary matters can be resolved at 
any subsequent retrial of this case. 
Conclusion.  The order denying the defendant's motion for a 
new trial is reversed.  The defendant's convictions of murder in 
the first degree and robbery are vacated, the verdicts are set 
aside, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for a new 
trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.