Case Title: State v. Daniel Anderson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1996AP000087-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1998-07-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-0087-CR, 96-0088-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Daniel Anderson,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  214 Wis. 2d 126, 570 N.W.2d 872 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-PUBLISHED) 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 2, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
May 27, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha 
 
JUDGE: 
David M. Bastianelli 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Geske, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
Abrahamson, C.J., Bradley, J., join 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Susan M. Crawford, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and 
oral argument by Jack E. Schairer, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
No.  96-0087-CR 96-0088-CR 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-0087-CR 96-0088-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Daniel Anderson,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant.  
FILED 
 
JUL 2, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed. 
¶1 
WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.   The State of Wisconsin 
(State) seeks review of a decision of the court of appeals1 which 
reversed convictions of Daniel Anderson (Anderson) for two 
counts of bail jumping, each count based on a violation of a 
separate condition of the same bond.  Because we determine that 
the violations of the different conditions of bond are different 
in fact and there is no clear indication to rebut the 
presumption that the legislature intended multiple punishments, 
we hold that the two convictions are not multiplicitous.  
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
¶2 
The facts relevant to this appeal are undisputed.  The 
defendant, Anderson, was charged with substantial battery, a 
                     
1 State v. Anderson, 214 Wis. 2d 126, 570 N.W.2d 872 (Ct. 
App. 1997).  
No.  96-0087-CR 96-0088-CR 
 
2 
felony contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.19(2) (1993-94).2  At 
Anderson’s initial appearance, the court commissioner set a cash 
bond, ordered statutory conditions of bond,3 and ordered as 
another condition of bond that Anderson have no contact with the 
victim, K. Lain (Lain).  Following the preliminary hearing, the 
court commissioner reduced the cash bond but added, as another 
condition of bond, that Anderson not consume alcoholic beverages 
or illegal drugs. 
¶3 
At a pretrial hearing on May 11, 1995, before Kenosha 
County Circuit Court, David M. Bastianelli, Judge, the defendant 
pleaded no contest to the charge of substantial battery.  Based 
on the plea, the court found the defendant guilty, entered 
judgment of conviction accordingly, and ordered a presentence 
investigation report.  The court also released Anderson on the 
same bond pending sentencing. 
¶4 
While Anderson was still under bond and before 
sentencing on the battery conviction, City of Kenosha police 
officers were called to the victim’s home.  Upon arrival, they 
                     
2 All references to Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1993-94 
version unless otherwise noted.  
3 Statutory conditions of bond include the following: Wis. 
Stat. § 940.49 providing that the defendant shall neither 
directly 
nor 
indirectly 
threaten, 
harass, 
intimidate 
or 
otherwise interfere with victims or witnesses in the action; 
Wis. Stat. § 969.03(2) providing that the defendant shall not 
commit any crimes or engage in any criminal activity; Wis. Stat. 
§ 969.09(1) providing that the defendant shall appear in court 
as ordered; and Wis. Stat. § 969.10 providing that the defendant 
shall give written notice to the clerk of court within 48 hours 
of any change of address or telephone number.  
No.  96-0087-CR 96-0088-CR 
 
3 
found the victim, the defendant, and another individual, R. 
Powell (Powell), all of whom were intoxicated.  All three 
individuals told the officers that they were currently residing 
at the victim’s address.  Also, there had apparently been an 
altercation between Powell and Andersonboth had lacerations and 
were bleeding.  
¶5 
As a result of this incident, Anderson was charged by 
criminal complaint with five counts: one count of battery, one 
count of disorderly conduct and three counts of bail jumping, 
all by a repeat offender.  Each count of bail jumping was based 
on a violation of a different term4 of Anderson’s bond for the 
underlying substantial battery charge.  Pursuant to a plea 
agreement, Anderson pleaded guilty to two charges of bail 
jumping, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 946.49 (reprinted below),5 one 
based on violating the term of bond prohibiting consumption of 
alcohol, and one based on violating the term of bond prohibiting 
contact with Lain.  The circuit court consolidated the bail 
jumping charges with the underlying substantial battery charge. 
 The circuit court sentenced Anderson to seven years in the 
                     
4 We use the phrases “conditions of bail” and “terms of 
bail” interchangeably throughout the opinion.  The phrases are 
synonymous.  
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 946.49 provides in pertinent part: 
Bail jumping. (1)  Whoever, having been released 
from custody under ch. 969, intentionally fails to 
comply with the terms of his or her bond is: 
(a) If the offense with which the person is charged 
is a misdemeanor, guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. 
(b) If the offense with which the person is charge 
is a felony, guilty of a Class D felony.  
No.  96-0087-CR 96-0088-CR 
 
4 
Wisconsin state prisons on one count of bail jumping and a 
withheld sentence and six years of probation with conditions, 
consecutive to the prison term on the other bail jumping count. 
 The circuit court also ordered a withheld sentence and three 
years of probation for the underlying substantial battery 
conviction, to run consecutive to the prison term and concurrent 
with the probation in the bail jumping case. 
¶6 
Anderson filed a motion for post-conviction relief, 
arguing that convictions on two counts of bail jumping were 
multiplicitous and, therefore, violated the double jeopardy 
provisions of the United States and Wisconsin constitutions.6  
The circuit court denied Anderson’s motion. 
¶7 
The 
court 
of 
appeals 
reversed 
the 
defendant’s 
conviction on one count of bail jumping and remanded for re-
sentencing on the other count.  See State v. Anderson, 214 
Wis. 2d 126, 570 N.W.2d 872 (Ct. App. 1997).  The court of 
appeals 
concluded 
that 
violating 
the 
terms 
of 
bond 
is 
determinative and Anderson violated the terms once, at the same 
time and at the same place.  See id. at 132.  Therefore, the 
court of appeals concluded that the two convictions for 
violating one bail bond were multiplicitous.  See id.   
                     
6 U.S. Const. amend. V provides in pertinent part: “No 
person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .” 
Wis. Const. art. I, § 8 provides in pertinent part: “[N]o 
person for the same offense may be put twice in jeopardy of 
punishment . . . .” 
No.  96-0087-CR 96-0088-CR 
 
5 
¶8 
We accepted the State’s petition for review and are 
presented with one issue: whether the defendant’s convictions 
for two counts of bail jumping were multiplicitous, thus 
violating the constitutional protection against double jeopardy, 
where each count was based on a violation of a separate term of 
the same bond.  We hold that charging this defendant with 
multiple counts of bail jumping for violating separate terms of 
the same bond is not multiplicitous.  Accordingly, we reverse 
the court of appeals’ decision. 
¶9 
Whether an individual’s constitutional right to be 
free from double jeopardy has been violated is a question of law 
that this court reviews de novo.  See State v. Sauceda, 168 
Wis. 2d 486, 492, 485 N.W.2d 1 (1992).   
¶10 Both the state and federal constitutions protect a 
defendant from being punished twice for the same offense.7  One 
of the protections embodied in the double jeopardy clause, and 
the one pertinent to this case, is “protection against multiple 
punishments for the same offense.”  Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d at 492 
(citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)).  
Multiplicitous charges, that is charging a single criminal 
offense in more than one count, “are impermissible because they 
violate the double jeopardy provisions of the Wisconsin and 
                     
7 The double jeopardy clauses of the federal and state 
constitutions are the same in scope and purpose.  See Day v. 
State, 76 Wis. 2d 588, 591, 251 N.W.2d 811 (1977).  Therefore, 
this court has accepted decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court as controlling the double jeopardy provisions of both 
constitutions.  See id. 
No.  96-0087-CR 96-0088-CR 
 
6 
United States Constitutions.”  State v. Grayson, 172 Wis. 2d 
156, 159, 493 N.W.2d 23 (1992) (citations omitted).   
¶11 It is well-established that this court analyzes claims 
of multiplicity using a two-prong test: 1) whether the charged 
offenses are identical in law and fact; and 2) if the offenses 
are not identical in law and fact, whether the legislature 
intended the multiple offenses to be brought as a single count. 
 See id.  We most recently applied this test in State v. 
Lechner, No. 96-2830-CR, slip op. (S. Ct. April 30, 1998).   
¶12 Under the first prong of the multiplicity analysis, if 
the offenses are identical in law and fact, the charges are 
multiplicitous in violation of the double jeopardy clauses of 
the federal and state constitutions.  See Grayson, 172 Wis. 2d 
at 159.  The analysis under this first prong is the same whether 
we are reviewing multiple charges brought under different 
statutory sections (a “lesser-included offense” challenge), or 
multiple 
charges 
brought 
under 
one 
statutory 
section 
(a 
“continuous offense” challenge).  See id. at 159-60 (referring 
to Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d at 493 n.8).  However, our focus changes 
with respect to the particular challenge raised.   
 
In a “lesser-included offense” challenge, the factual 
situations underlying the offenses are the same, so 
our focus is on whether the offenses are also 
identical in law.  See [Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d] at 493-
94 n.8, 485 N.W.2d 1; see, e.g., State v. Kuntz, 160 
Wis. 2d 722, 753-57, 467 N.W.2d 531 (1991); State v. 
Wolske, 143 Wis. 2d 175, 180-185, 420 N.W.2d 60 (Ct. 
App. 1988).  In a “continuous offense” challenge, the 
course of conduct is alleged to have constituted 
multiple violations of the same statutory provision, 
so our focus is not on statutory definitions but on 
No.  96-0087-CR 96-0088-CR 
 
7 
the facts of a given defendant’s criminal activity.  
See Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d at 493-94 n.8, 485 N.W.2d 1; 
see, e.g., State v. Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d 48, 65-68, 291 
N.W.2d 809 (1980); State v. Van Meter, 72 Wis. 2d 754, 
758, 242 N.W.2d 206 (1976). 
Lechner, No. 96-2830-CR, slip op. at 9 n.7.   
¶13 In this case, the State concedes that the two bail 
jumping charges are identical in law because both were contrary 
to the same statute, Wis. Stat. § 946.49.   
¶14 The parties disagree, however, on whether the offenses 
are different in fact.  Because the defendant’s course of 
conduct allegedly constituted multiple violations of the same 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 946.49, we focus on the facts of the 
defendant’s  offenses.  See Sauceda, 168 Wis. 2d at 493-94 n.8. 
 Anderson asserts that the offenses are identical in fact 
because the violations happened at the same time, on the same 
date and at the same place.  He argues that both offenses were 
part of the same general transgression or same episode.  The 
State, on the other hand, asserts that the two bail jumping 
charges are, in all likelihood, separated in time and that the 
charges are significantly different in nature because each 
charge involves independent deliberation and a different course 
of conduct on Anderson’s part.  
¶15 Because the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of 
bail jumping as part of a plea agreement, there is no 
evidentiary record on which to base our review.  Therefore, we 
rely on the criminal complaint and information, as well as 
statements made at the pretrial hearing to determine whether the 
offenses were identical in fact.  See, e.g., State v. Eisch, 96 
No.  96-0087-CR 96-0088-CR 
 
8 
Wis. 2d 25, 27, 291 N.W.2d 800 (1980) (reviewing case at 
pleading stage).   
¶16 One count of the complaint alleged that Anderson 
intentionally failed to comply with the term of his bond that 
prohibited him from consuming any alcoholic beverages during the 
pendency of the action regarding the substantial battery charge. 
 Another count alleged that Anderson intentionally failed to 
comply with the term of his bond that prohibited him from having 
any contact with Lain.  As a basis for the complaint, the 
complainant stated that two City of Kenosha police officers were 
dispatched to an apartment located on Sheridan Road in Kenosha. 
 When they arrived at the apartment, the officers were met by 
three occupantsAnderson, Lain and Powell.  The officers 
observed that all three individuals were extremely intoxicated, 
and both Anderson and Powell had lacerations and were bleeding. 
 All three individuals stated that they were currently residing 
at this apartment on Sheridan Road. 
¶17 At the plea/sentencing hearing, the circuit court 
narrated the contents of the complaint to Anderson stating that 
on June 11, 1995, when the police arrived at the apartment on 
Sheridan Road at 5:49 p.m., they observed that Anderson had 
consumed alcohol and that he had contact with Lain.  The court 
stated that the complaint alleged that Anderson violated the 
conditions of his bond, once by consuming alcohol and again, by 
having contact with Lain.  
¶18 Based on the record, we conclude that the count of 
bail jumping for consuming alcohol and the count of bail jumping 
No.  96-0087-CR 96-0088-CR 
 
9 
for contact with Lain are not identical in fact.  Charged 
offenses are not multiplicitous if the facts are either 
separated in time or of a significantly different nature.  See 
Eisch, 96 Wis. 2d at 31.  “[T[he appropriate question is whether 
these acts allegedly committed . . . are so significantly 
different in fact that they may properly be denominated separate 
crimes although each would furnish a factual underpinning or a 
substitute legal element for the violation of the same statute.” 
 Id. at 34. 
¶19 At first blush, the two counts of bail jumping do not 
appear to be separated in time.  On June 11, 1995 at 5:49 p.m., 
the officers arrived at the apartment located on Sheridan Road 
to find Anderson intoxicated and in contact with Lain.  However, 
all three individuals at the apartment told the officers that 
they resided at the apartment.  We agree with the State that 
this suggests that Anderson resumed contact with Lain at some 
time before June 11, 1995, when he consumed alcohol. 
¶20 Even if the offenses are not separated in time, they 
are nonetheless different in fact because they are significantly 
different in nature.  The test is whether each count requires 
proof of an additional fact that the other count does not.  See 
State v. Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d 48, 64, 291 N.W.2d 809 (1980).  The 
offenses are significantly different in nature if each requires 
“a new volitional departure in the defendant’s course of 
conduct.” 
 
Eisch, 
96 
Wis. 2d 
at 
36. 
 
The 
defendant’s 
“’successive intentions make him [or her] subject to cumulative 
punishment, and he [or she] must be treated as accepting that 
No.  96-0087-CR 96-0088-CR 
 
10
risk . . . .’”  Id. (quoting Irby v. United States, 390 F.2d 
432, 435 (D.C. Cir. 1967)).   
¶21 In Rabe, the court upheld the defendant’s convictions 
of four counts of homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle which 
resulted from a single act of negligently operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.  See Rabe, 
96 Wis. 2d at 53.  In determining whether the charges were 
multiplicitous, 
the 
court 
stated 
that 
in 
this 
type 
of 
“continuous offense case,” the issue turns on whether there is a 
sufficient break in the conduct and time between the acts to 
constitute separate and distinct criminal acts.  See id. at 65-
66.  In Rabe, the State conceded that the single negligent act 
took place at a single time and at a single place.  See id. at 
66.  However, each charge involved a different victim and not 
all the victims were in the same car.  See id.  “Each count 
requires proof of additional facts that the other counts do 
notnamely, the death of the particular victim named in each 
count and the causal relationship between the defendant’s 
negligent operation of his vehicle while intoxicated and that 
particular death.”  Id.  The court concluded that the charges 
were not multiplicitous and therefore upheld the convictions. 
¶22 Similarly, in the present case, the underlying facts 
of the two counts of bail jumpingconsuming alcohol for one 
count and having contact with Lain for the other countare 
significantly 
different. 
 
Each 
count 
requires 
proof 
of 
additional facts that the other count does not.  Each offense 
requires a different and new volitional act on the defendant’s 
No.  96-0087-CR 96-0088-CR 
 
11
part.  Consuming alcohol is separate and distinct from having 
contact with the victim.  Based on the record, we conclude that 
the count of bail jumping based on Anderson’s consuming alcohol 
and the count of bail jumping based on his contact with Lain are 
different in fact.  Accordingly, the two charges are not 
violative of the double jeopardy provisions of the federal and 
state constitutions. 
¶23 That conclusion, however, does not end our analysis.  
Turning to the second prong of the multiplicity analysis, the 
charges may be multiplicitous if the legislature intended that 
the multiple offenses, which are different in fact, be brought 
as a single count.  See Grayson, 172 Wis. 2d at 159.  Because we 
have determined that the bail jumping offenses charged are 
different in fact, in discerning legislative intent we begin 
with the presumption that the legislature intended multiple 
punishments.  See id. at 160.  This presumption may only be 
rebutted by a clear indication to the contrary.  See Missouri v. 
Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 367 (1983).  We use four factors to 
determine legislative intent in a multiplicity analysis: 1) 
statutory language; 2) legislative history and context; 3) the 
nature of the proscribed conduct; and 4) the appropriateness of 
multiple punishment.  See Grayson, 172 Wis. 2d at 160 (citing 
State v. Tappa, 127 Wis. 2d 155, 165, 378 N.W.2d 883 (1985)).  
We determine the legislature’s intent relying on a “’common 
sense reading of the statute’ that will give effect to ‘the 
object of the legislature’ and produce a result that is 
‘reasonable and fair to offenders and society.’”  Grayson, 172 
No.  96-0087-CR 96-0088-CR 
 
12
Wis. 2d at 162 (citing Manson v. State, 101 Wis. 2d 413, 428, 
304 N.W.2d 729 (1981)).  If we determine that the legislature 
intended that the charges be brought as a single count, the 
charges are multiplicitous and impermissible, not as violating 
double jeopardy but as violating the will of the legislature.  
See Grayson 172 Wis. 2d at 159 n.3. 
¶24 The specific language of Wis. Stat. § 946.49 provides 
that “[w]hoever, having been released from custody under ch. 
969, intentionally fails to comply with the terms of his or her 
bond is . . .” guilty of a Class A misdemeanor if the underlying 
charge is a misdemeanor or guilty of a Class D felony if the 
underlying charge is a felony.  The defendant points to the fact 
that the legislature uses the plural, “terms,” rather than the 
singular, “term,” of bond.  The defendant argues that Anderson 
violated the terms of bond once and therefore, multiple 
convictions are multiplicitous.  The court of appeals agreed, 
relying on Wis. Stat. § 990.001(1) which provides that in 
statutory construction, “[t]he singular includes the plural, and 
the plural includes the singular.”   
¶25 In the plain language of Wis. Stat. § 946.49, the 
legislature did not expressly provide a unit of prosecution for 
violations of multiple terms of bond.  Regarding the use of the 
plural of “terms,” we disagree with the heavy reliance on this 
plural to discern legislative intent.  Even under the court of 
appeals’ reliance on Wis. Stat. § 990.001(1) that in statutory 
interpretation the plural includes the singular, § 946.49 could 
be understood to mean that the legislature intended to impose 
No.  96-0087-CR 96-0088-CR 
 
13
one charge of bail jumping for each violation of each term of 
bond.  However, the statute could also be read to mean that the 
legislature intended to impose one charge of bail jumping for a 
violation of any of the terms of bond regardless of how many 
terms are violated.  Based on the plain language of the statute, 
reasonable 
people 
could 
disagree 
regarding 
its 
meaning; 
therefore, we turn to the next factor, legislative history and 
context, to discern the legislative intent. 
¶26 Wisconsin Stat. § 946.49 was first enacted in ch. 255, 
Laws of 1969, a major overhaul of the criminal procedure code.  
The Prefatory Note to the act provides that the bail jumping 
statute was enacted to coincide with the amendments to Wis. 
Stat. ch. 969, providing for more flexible bail provisions.  The 
act “creates the crime of bail jumping so that . . . a person 
who violates the conditions of his bond may also be prosecuted 
criminally.  The punishments are in accordance with the severity 
of the crime for which he was originally charged.”  Prefatory 
Note, ch. 255, Laws of 1969.  The statute as enacted was 
substantially the same as it is today, using the word “terms” 
and providing a lesser penalty for bail jumping if the defendant 
is charged with a misdemeanor and a higher penalty for bail 
jumping if the defendant is charged with a felony. 
¶27 The bail jumping statute essentially put teeth into a 
court’s ability to set conditions of bail.  Viewed in the 
context of the entire statutory scheme, bail and the bail 
jumping statute serve a variety of legislative interests.  
“Conditions of release . . . may be imposed for the purpose of 
No.  96-0087-CR 96-0088-CR 
 
14
protecting members of the community from serious bodily harm or 
preventing intimidation of witnesses.”  Wis. Stat. § 969.01(4). 
  
¶28 When the legislature enacted ch. 183, Laws of 1981, 
amending Wis. Stat. ch. 969 relating to bail and other 
conditions of release, it did not modify Wis. Stat. § 946.49 
regarding bail jumping.  “[Chapter] 183 codifies and expands 
upon 
the 
general 
constitutional requirements 
that release 
conditions must be reasonable and designed to assure the court 
appearance of a particular individual, protect members of the 
community from this person or prevent witness intimidation by 
this person.”  Shaun Haas, Law Implementing the Constitutional 
Bail 
Amendment 
(Chapter 
183, 
Laws 
of 
1981), 
Wisconsin 
Legislative Council Staff, Information Memorandum 82-8, April 
29, 1982, at 6. 
¶29 In sum, the legislature sought to give circuit courts 
flexibility in setting the terms of bail to achieve three 
general interests: protecting the community, protecting the 
victim, and protecting the judicial system.  See, e.g., id. at 
4-6.  Conditions of release imposed by a court serve to address 
these different interests.  The bail jumping statute, enacted to 
coincide with the greater flexibility in setting conditions of 
bail, provides courts with an enforcement mechanism and provides 
a deterrent for defendants. 
¶30 The conditions of bail set in this case are a good 
example of the different interests that the legislature intended 
to protect.  A condition to not consume alcoholic beverages is 
No.  96-0087-CR 96-0088-CR 
 
15
usually aimed at protecting the public.  A violation of this 
condition presents harm to the members of the community, as 
evidenced in this case by the altercation between Anderson and 
Powell.  A condition to have no contact with a particular person 
is aimed at protecting that individual and serves the judicial 
system by preventing the defendant from intimidating that 
individual as a potential witness.   
¶31 Legislative history and the context of the bail 
jumping statute indicate that the legislature intended to 
protect different interests.  The statutorily required terms of 
bail (Wis. Stat. §§ 940.49, 969.03(2), 969.09(1), and 969.10), 
as well as judicially imposed conditions designed to meet the 
particular circumstances of the defendant, are all aimed at 
protecting 
these 
different 
interests 
recognized 
by 
the 
legislature.  Given the context of the bail scheme in its 
entirety, we cannot perceive of any clear indication by the 
legislature to overcome the presumption of separate punishments 
for violations of different conditions of bail.   
¶32 We now turn to the third factor in determining whether 
the legislature intended cumulative punishments under Wis. Stat. 
§ 946.49: the nature of the proscribed conduct.  Multiple 
punishments are permissible if the nature of the offenses is 
separate in time and significantly different in nature.  See 
Grayson, 172 Wis. 2d at 165 (citing Eisch, 96 Wis. 2d at 31).  
The 
court 
in 
Grayson 
determined 
that 
the 
offenses 
were 
significantly different in nature because the defendant formed a 
new mens rea for each offense.  See Grayson, 172 Wis. 2d at 165. 
No.  96-0087-CR 96-0088-CR 
 
16
 Each offense required a separate volitional act.  See Tappa, 
127 Wis. 2d at 169.  Each offense caused harm that the other 
offense did not.  See id. at 170.   
¶33 As discussed above in regard to the first prong of the 
multiplicity test, the act of drinking and the act of having 
contact with the victim each requires a separate volitional act. 
 In addition, each act presents harm that the other act does 
not.  Drinking presents harm to the community, and contact with 
the victim presents harm to the victim and the judicial system 
because of the possible intimidation of the victim as a witness. 
 Because the nature of the different proscribed conduct causes 
separate harms, we perceive no clear indication under this 
factor of the analysis to overcome the presumption that the 
legislature intended cumulative punishments. 
¶34 We turn to the fourth factor: the appropriateness of 
multiple punishments.  Given the different interests meant to be 
protected 
by 
the 
legislature, 
we 
conclude 
that 
separate 
punishments for violations of different conditions of bond is 
appropriate.  Each of the conditions of bond serves to protect a 
different interest.  
¶35 Multiple punishments are appropriate for each bail 
violation because of the deterrent effect on defendants to not 
violate the terms of bail.  See, e.g., Grayson, 172 Wis. 2d at 
166 (multiple punishments provide deterrent effect).  Because 
the bail jumping statute was enacted to coincide with the 
greater 
flexibility 
given 
to 
circuit 
courts 
in 
setting 
conditions of bail, the bail jumping statute is generally meant 
No.  96-0087-CR 96-0088-CR 
 
17
to provide a deterrent to defendants from violating bail.  
Without 
imposing 
multiple 
punishments 
for 
violating 
the 
different terms of bail, a defendant may even be encouraged to 
violate multiple terms, knowing that the punishment will be no 
different whether he or she violates one or all terms of bail.  
It is difficult to believe that the legislature intended this 
result. 
¶36 Based on our analysis of the four factorsstatutory 
language, legislative history and context, the nature of the 
proscribed 
conduct, 
and 
the 
appropriateness 
of 
multiple 
punishmentswe conclude that there is no clear indication to 
overcome the presumption that the legislature intended multiple 
punishments for violations of different conditions of the same 
bond.  Accordingly, the two offenses are not multiplicitous. 
¶37 In sum, we hold that charging this defendant with 
multiple counts of bail jumping for violating separate terms of 
the same bond is not multiplicitous.  The two counts of bail 
jumping are not identical in fact because they are significantly 
different in nature.  Accordingly, charging two counts of bail 
jumping does not violate the double jeopardy provisions of the 
federal or state constitutions.  We also conclude that the two 
offenses are not multiplicitous because there is no clear 
indication to rebut the presumption that the legislature 
intended multiple punishments for these factually different 
offenses of the same bond.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision 
of the court of appeals and uphold the circuit court’s entry of 
judgment for two convictions of bail jumping. 
No.  96-0087-CR 96-0088-CR 
 
18
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
96-0087-CR, 96-0088-CR.jpg 
 
1 
¶38 JANINE P. GESKE, J. (Dissenting).   I respectfully 
dissent.  I do not believe that the legislature intended that a 
defendant who violates more than one condition of his or her 
bail bond be subject to an undefined number of potential charges 
and 
punishment. 
 
Therefore 
I 
believe 
that 
the 
multiple 
convictions and penalties for bail jumping permitted by the 
majority opinion violate the double jeopardy provisions of the 
state and federal constitutions. 
¶39 I agree with the majority that there are four factors 
used to determine legislative intent in a multiplicity analysis: 
statutory language; legislative history and context; the nature 
of the proscribed conduct; and the appropriateness of multiple 
punishments.  In my view, based on the third and fourth factors, 
the legislature could not have intended that circuit courts 
create multiple crimes by imposing multiple conditions of bail.  
¶40 This is a case where good facts make bad law.  Good 
facts, sometimes, can form a comfortable backdrop against which 
courts relax their vigilance to protect constitutional rights.  
The majority nicely articulates reasons why the conditions of 
bail set for Anderson, and which he violated, serve to protect 
different interests.  In the majority's analysis, separate 
punishments for each violated condition also serve to protect 
those interests. 
¶41 However, the majority's interpretation in the hands of 
a zealous prosecutor could lead to results not intended by the 
legislature.  In theory, a circuit court judge or a judicial 
court commissioner may set an infinite number of bail conditions 
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for a defendant pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 946.49.  Those 
conditions may include, for example, no contact orders, no 
drinking alcoholic beverages, no driving a motor vehicle, no 
weapons, no drugs, no new crimes, the requirement to attend 
school, attend AA meetings, abide by a curfew, remain in or stay 
out of certain geographical areas, attend counseling, take 
medication, live at home, keep a job, notify of change of 
address, etc.  The number and nature of the bail conditions will 
depend in part on the individual practices and philosophy of the 
judge, the time the judge has to spend on the case, the local 
practice, 
the 
prosecutor's 
particular 
request, 
and 
other 
variables.  Some judges may set bail conditions in great detail 
while other judges may simply proscribe certain conduct by 
stating "no new arrests." 
¶42 For example, Judge No. 1 might order Emily Mathews, a 
defendant charged with the crime of forging a check, a felony, 
released on bail with the detailed conditions of "no drinking, 
no violation of a curfew of 8:00 p.m., no contact with Susie 
Fox, and no new crimes."  Judge No. 2, a busier judge who is 
always concise, might release Ms. Mathews on bail with only the 
condition of "no new crimes."  One night Ms. Mathews drinks a 
couple of beers, violates her curfew and becomes disorderly with 
Ms. Fox.  Under the majority opinion, Ms. Mathews, who was 
released by Judge No. 1, now can be charged with four new felony 
charges of bail jumping and can face 20 more years in prison.  
Or, Ms. Mathews, who engages in identical conduct but was 
released by Judge No. 2, could only be charged with one count of 
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3 
felony bail jumping and face five years in prison.  If Ms. 
Mathews repeated this behavior over a four-day period, in Judge 
No. 1's court she then would face 16 felony charges and an 
exposure of 80 years in prison.  In Judge No. 2's court, she 
would only face four charges and 20 years in prison.  See State 
v. Grayson, 172 Wis. 2d 156, 493 N.W.2d 23 (1992). 
¶43 In another example, the defendant, John Riley, a 
mentally disabled, alcoholic street person, is charged with 
three counts of shoplifting three bags of potato chips from a 
drug store on separate days.  In each case, Mr. Riley was 
released on bail and ordered "to live with his mother, to see 
his mental health counselor everyday, to stay off the block 
where the drug store is located, to refrain from drinking 
alcoholic beverages, and to have no contact" with a certain 
friend of his.  On one particular day, Mr. Riley starts to drink 
and then violates the other four conditions.  Under the 
majority's opinion and under State v. Richter, 189 Wis. 2d 105, 
110, 525 N.W.2d 168 (Ct. App. 1994), Mr. Riley may be charged 
with 15 counts of bail jumping.  For these 15 offenses he faces 
a possible sentence to the county jail for over 11 years and a 
fine of up to $150,000.  This scenario is possible even if he 
were ultimately acquitted of the underlying shoplifting charges. 
 Mr. Riley could face over 11 years in jail for behavior that, 
standing alone, has not been criminalized by the legislature. 
¶44 Certainly the legislature intended that a defendant be 
held criminally accountable for violating the terms of the bail 
bond, even when the violation consists of conduct which in and 
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of itself is not criminal behavior.  Both these examples 
demonstrate the potential implications, however, of interpreting 
legislative intent as the majority has.  The real issue we face 
in this case is whether the legislature intended, when it 
created the bail jumping statute in 1969, to subject the 
defendant to a single criminal charge if he or she violated one 
or more conditions of a bail bond, or was the intent to subject 
the defendant to potentially unlimited criminal charges for 
violating multiple conditions of one or more bail bonds?  In 
other words, is each bond, or each condition of each bond, the 
appropriate unit of prosecution? 
¶45 The United States Supreme Court, in Ex Parte Lange, 85 
U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 178 (1873), established that the Double 
Jeopardy 
clause 
prohibits 
punishment 
in 
excess 
of 
that 
authorized by the legislature.  In construing the bail jumping 
statute to permit a circuit court to separately convict and 
sentence a defendant for having violated multiple conditions of 
a bail bond, the majority allows, in my view, punishment in 
excess of that authorized by the legislature. 
¶46 Moreover, the potential for infinite punishment fails 
the "appropriateness of the punishment" prong of the legislative 
intent 
analysis. 
 
Under 
the 
bail 
jumping 
statute, 
the 
legislature has authorized a certain punishment, based on the 
severity of the underlying offense, when at least one condition 
of bail is violated. 
¶47 Unlike most crimes 
the 
legislature 
creates, any 
punishment for the crime of bail jumping is often only part of 
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the serious consequences for that prohibited conduct.  When a 
defendant violates a condition of bail, the bail may be ordered 
forfeited, other conditions may be imposed, and/or the defendant 
may be taken into custody.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 969.13, 969.08(2), 
and 940.49.  If the defendant's violation of the bail bond is 
also a criminal offense, he or she could also be charged, 
convicted and sentenced for that crime.8  If the defendant is 
subject to more than one bail bond and violates a condition 
common to both, he or she may be charged with bail jumping for 
each bail bond breached.  See Richter, 189 Wis. 2d at 110.  If 
the defendant is on probation or parole at the time of the bail 
bond violation, that prohibited conduct could also become the 
grounds for revoking the probation or parole.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 973.10(2), 304.06(3).  If the defendant is convicted of the 
underlying offense, the circuit court can consider the violation 
of the terms of bail as an aggravating factor justifying an 
enhanced punishment at the time of sentencing.   See Waddell v. 
State, 24 Wis. 2d 364, 368, 129 N.W.2d 201 (1964) (permitting 
use of information regarding complaints of other offenses as 
index of defendant's character); Handel v. State, 74 Wis. 2d 
699, 701-02, 247 N.W.2d 711 (1976) (permitting consideration of 
                     
8 For instance, the defendant's violation of a condition of 
bail may also constitute violation of one of the following 
crimes: battery, Wis. Stat. § 940.19; battery to a witness, Wis. 
Stat. § 940.19; intimidation of witnesses, Wis. Stat. § 940.42 
and 940.43; intimidation of victims, Wis. Stat. § 940.44 and 
940.45; court orders and penalties for prevention or dissuasion 
of a victim or witness in a criminal matter, Wis. Stat. § 940.47 
and 940.48.  
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6 
pending criminal charges); see also Elias v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 
278, 284, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1988) (listing cases permitting other 
uncharged and unproven offenses). 
¶48 Finally, the plain language of the bail jumping 
statute itself supports my interpretation that the legislative 
intent was to impose one penalty for an intentional violation of 
"the terms of the bail bond."  Wis. Stat. § 946.49.  The 
majority correctly points out that Wis. Stat. § 990.001(1) 
provides that the word "terms" could be read in the singular.  
However, the majority then essentially reads out the word "the" 
before the word "terms" and replaces it with "a term."  Thus the 
majority effectively reads a construction into the statute which 
is not present.  Specifically, the majority interprets the bail 
jumping statute to prohibit the intentional failure to comply 
with "a term of his or her bond."  If the legislature intended 
the result reached by the majority, it simply could have written 
the statute to read "whoever, having been released from custody 
under chapter 969, intentionally fails to comply with a term of 
his or her bond," is guilty of bail jumping.  The legislature 
did not do so. 
¶49 In my view, the presumption of legislative intent to 
create multiple penalties is overcome by a careful review of the 
implications of the majority opinion.  The appropriate unit of 
prosecution is the bond, not the individual conditions. Once 
there is a violation of the "terms of the bond," the singular 
crime has been committed for each bail bond the defendant has 
signed and the defendant is then subject to the penalties set 
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7 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 969.08: to increased bail requirements and 
altered condition(s) of release, the possible revocation of his 
or her release, the possible revocation of his or her probation 
or parole, to the forfeiture of the bond, and to a possible 
harsher sentence should he or she be convicted of the underlying 
offense. 
¶50 In my view the possible scenarios I describe cannot be 
what the legislature intended when a defendant has committed the 
crime of bail jumping under Wis. Stat. § 946.49.9  The 
presumption in favor of multiple sentences is overcome by an 
analysis of the nature of the proscribed behavior and the 
appropriateness of multiple punishments.  I conclude that the 
appropriate unit of prosecution is the bond and not each 
individual condition.  Under today's majority opinion and 
existing law, there is nothing to prevent the examples I gave 
from occurring.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
                     
9 "[I]t is a precept of justice that punishment for a crime 
should be graduated and proportioned to the offense."  Weems v. 
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910).  See also Carmona v. 
Ward, 576 F.2d 405, 426 n.6, (2d Cir. 1978) discussing origins 
of proportionality, and observing that English common law "had 
established a policy against disproportionate punishment, the 
ancient origins of which can be traced to the laws of Moses." 
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¶51 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Shirley S. 
Abrahamson and Justice Ann Walsh Bradley join this dissent. 
 
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