Case Title: David R. May v. Illinois National Insurance Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC96-652

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2000-11-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC96652
____________
DAVID R. MAY, as Administrator Ad Litem of the
Estate of Oscar T. Bradley, deceased,
Appellant,
vs.
ILLINOIS NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Appellee.
[November 16, 2000]
LEWIS, J.
We have for review a question of Florida law certified by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit as determinative of a cause pending
before that court and for which there is no controlling precedent.  Specifically, the
Eleventh Circuit has certified the following question to this Court:
WHETHER SECTION 733.702 AND SECTION
733.710 OF THE FLORIDA STATUTES
CONSIDERED SEPARATELY AND/OR TOGETHER
OPERATE AS STATUTES OF NONCLAIM SO
THAT IF NO STATUTORY EXCEPTION EXISTS,
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CLAIMS NOT FORMALLY PRESENTED WITHIN
THE DESIGNATED TIME PERIOD ARE NOT
BINDING ON THE ESTATE, OR DO THEY ACT AS
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS WHICH MUST BE
PLEADED AND PROVED AS AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSES IN ORDER TO AVOID WAIVER.
 May v. Illinois Nat’l. Ins. Co., 190 F.3d 1200, 1208 (11th Cir. 1999).  In phrasing
such question, the Eleventh Circuit stated that it did not intend to limit our
consideration of the issue presented or the manner in which we give our answer. 
See id. at 1208.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(6), Fla. Const.  As
explained below, we determine that section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1991), is a
statute of limitations that cannot be waived in a probate proceeding by failure to
object to a claim on timeliness grounds, while section 733.710, Florida Statutes
(1991), is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that is not subject to waiver or
extension in a probate proceeding.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 21, 1991, a motor vehicle driven by Donald J. Prockup, Sr.,
in which his wife, Inez Prockup, was a passenger, was involved in a collision with a
motor vehicle driven by Oscar T. Bradley and owned by Velma Murphy, his niece. 
At the time of the accident, Mr. Bradley maintained an automobile liability insurance
policy issued by Illinois National Insurance Company (INIC), with policy limits of
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$10,000 per person and $20,000 per accident.  Also at the time of the accident, Ms.
Murphy, the owner of the vehicle driven by Mr. Bradley, had an automobile liability
insurance policy issued by Atlanta Casualty Company (ACC), with policy limits of
$10,000 per person and $20,000 per accident, which provided coverage for
operation of the vehicle involved in the collision.  Mr. Bradley and Mrs. Prockup
died as a result of the accident–Mr. Bradley died at the scene–and  Mr. Prockup
sustained non-fatal personal injuries.
On May 15, 1992, Mr. Prockup, individually, and as personal representative
of his wife’s estate, filed suit in the Circuit Court in and for Escambia County,
Florida, seeking recovery of damages for both the wrongful death of his wife and
for his own personal injuries.  The suit was initiated against Ms. Murphy and Mr.
David R. May, “as personal representative of the Estate of Oscar T. Bradley,
deceased.”  On May 20, 1992, five days after filing the wrongful death/personal
injury action, Mr. Prockup filed a “Petition for Appointment of Administrator Ad
Litem” pursuant to section 733.308, Florida Statutes (1991), and Florida Probate
Rule 5.120(a), in the probate division of the Circuit Court in and for Escambia
County, Florida (the probate court).  The file number assigned to the case upon the
filing of such petition was 92-656-CP-3, in division “K” of the circuit court.  The
file number remained the same throughout the probate proceedings involving the
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Bradley Estate, while the division designation changed to “J” upon issuance of the
letters of administration for the estate.
In the petition, Mr. Prockup requested that the probate court appoint Mr.
May as administrator ad litem of Mr. Bradley’s estate (the Bradley Estate), and he
set forth in detail in the petition that (1) he represented his wife’s estate; (2) Mr.
Bradley died on September 21, 1991, and no personal representative had been
appointed for the Bradley Estate; (3) he had been unable to determine Mr.
Bradley’s next of kin or whether Mr. Bradley left a last will and testament; and (4)
he had “a cause of action which arose out of an accident in Holmes County,
Florida, on September 21, 1991, in which Inez Prockup sustained fatal injuries. 
The van in which Mrs. Prockup was a passenger was struck by an automobile
driven by Oscar T. Bradley.”  The petition, verified under oath by Mr. Prockup,
also provided the addresses of Mr. May and Mr. Lefferts L. Mabie, III, attorney
for Mr. Prockup.  On May 26, 1992, the probate court issued an order appointing
Mr. May administrator ad litem of the Bradley Estate, “to represent the estate in the
action against the estate which arose out of an accident on September 21, 1991, in
which Inez Prockup sustained fatal injuries.”
On June 18, 1992, counsel retained by Ms. Murphy’s insurer, ACC, filed an
answer in the wrongful death/personal injury action on behalf of both Ms. Murphy
1 INIC filed a declaratory judgment action in county court in Escambia County, seeking a
declaration that the automobile liability insurance policy issued to Mr. Bradley by INIC did not cover his
accident with the Prockups.  The county court rejected INIC’s arguments challenging coverage and ruled
against INIC.  On February 6, 1997, the circuit court, in its appellate capacity, affirmed the county court’s
ruling, and on March 25, 1997, the First District Court of Appeal denied certiorari review of the circuit
court’s ruling on appeal.
2 The parties have not identified the actual date on which the stipulation was executed, and such
information is not in the record before us.
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and Mr. May.  However, INIC did not provide a defense and disputed coverage
throughout the proceedings.1  In addition to a general denial of negligence, the
answer set forth only the affirmative defenses of comparative fault, fault of third
parties, failure to use seat belts, and setoff for collateral sources.  The parties
subsequently entered into a stipulation in which the defendants, both Ms. Murphy
and Mr. May on behalf of the Bradley Estate, admitted liability,2 and the case was
then submitted to a special master for a determination of damages.  After
conducting a trial concerning damages on March 18, 1994, the special master
entered “Findings of Fact and Verdict of Special Master” on April 14, 1994,
determining that (1) Mrs. Prockup’s estate suffered damages in the amount of
$81,522.73; (2) Mr. Prockup suffered damages resulting from the wrongful death of
his wife in the amount of $850,000; and (3) Mr. Prockup suffered damages for his
own personal injuries in the amount of $175,000.  On April 21, 1994, the circuit
court entered judgment in favor of Mr. Prockup, individually, and as personal
3 Under Florida law, a party that has obtained a judgment against an insured in excess of the
insured’s liability policy limits may bring a direct third-party bad faith action against the insurance company
that issued the liability policy to the insured.  See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Zebrowski, 706 So.
2d 275, 277 (Fla. 1997) (interpreting section 624.155(1)(b)1, Florida Statutes (1995)); 
Travelers Ins. Co.
v. Perez, 384 So. 2d 971, 972-73 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (citing Thompson v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.,
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representative of his wife’s estate, for the amounts determined by the special
master, totaling $1,106,522,70, against both Ms. Murphy and Mr. May, “as
personal representative of the estate of Oscar T. Bradley, deceased.”
After the circuit court entered final judgment in the wrongful death/personal
injury suit, Mr. Prockup executed a release as to only Ms. Murphy and ACC in
exchange for payment of ACC’s $20,000 policy limit.  INIC and the Bradley Estate
were specifically excluded from the release.  At the same time, Mr. Prockup and
ACC entered into a “loan agreement” in which ACC agreed to lend Mr. Prockup
$280,000.  Repayment of the loan was contingent upon Mr. Prockup being
successful in a subsequent bad faith action against INIC.  The loan agreement
specifically provided that if Mr. Prockup was successful in the bad faith action
against INIC, he would then repay the full amount of the loan and ACC would pay
his attorney $70,000 in attorney’s fees.  If the bad faith action was unsuccessful,
however, Mr. Prockup would not be required to repay the $280,000 loan and ACC
would pay Mr. Prockup an additional $256,000.  The record is silent as to whether
Mr. Prockup has separately attempted to pursue any litigation against INIC.3
250 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1971)).
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Meanwhile, during the pendency of the proceedings in the wrongful
death/personal injury action, several events occurred in the probate case involving
the Bradley Estate.  Specifically, on February 4, 1993, Emmer Bell Johnson, one of
Mr. Bradley’s nieces, filed a petition for administration requesting that the probate
court appoint her personal representative of the Bradley Estate.  Mr. Prockup and
Mr. May were provided written notice of Ms. Johnson’s petition, and on March 1,
1993, Mr. Prockup filed a pleading containing an answer, affirmative defenses, and
a counter-petition for administration (collectively “the counter-petition for
administration”) in which he requested that the probate court appoint Mr. May
personal representative of the Bradley Estate.  In support of the counter-petition for
administration, Mr. Prockup specifically and in detail asserted that (1) the probate
court already had appointed Mr. May administrator ad litem of the Bradley Estate
to defend against “an action against the estate arising out of the accident on
September 21, 1991”; and (2) Mr. Prockup was a “creditor” of the Bradley Estate
“by virtue of a wrongful death claim . . .  which arose out of an automobile
accident in Holmes County, Florida, on September 21, 1991,” resulting in “fatal
injuries” to Mrs. Prockup.  Thereafter, on March 18, 1993, Mr. Bradley’s nephew,
Fred Bradley, also petitioned the probate court to appoint him personal
4 Mr. Prockup filed a “Request for Notice and Copies” in the probate proceedings, setting forth
his address and indicating that his wife’s estate was a “creditor” of the Bradley Estate.  The record does
not indicate the exact date on which Mr. Prockup filed his request for notice, but the record does show that
in August 1993, the circuit court furnished a copy of the request to an attorney for one of the co-personal
representatives.
5 Section 733.308, Florida Statutes (1999), and Florida Probate Rule 5.120 seemingly contemplate
that, in general, an administrator ad litem functions in a probate proceeding where no personal
representative has been appointed or where the representative has a claim adverse to the estate.  Florida
jurisprudence has recognized that an administrator ad litem may (1) maintain a wrongful death action on
behalf of an estate, see Funchess v. Gulf Stream Apartments of Broward County, Inc., 611 So. 2d 43, 45
(Fla. 4th DCA 1992); and (2) function at the same time as a personal representative, with each person
being responsible for administering different aspects of an estate.  See Woolf v. Reed, 389 So. 2d 1026,
1028 (Fla.3d DCA 1980) (stating that an administrator ad litem “becomes solely responsible to the estate
for the administration of that portion of its affairs entrusted to him by the court, and thus supplants in that
regard the authority of the personal representative, who continues to be responsible for the administration
of all other aspects of the estate’s business”).  Noting that the parties have not addressed the issue, we
express no opinion regarding any possible problems surrounding the representative procedures used in the
probate proceeding and wrongful death/personal injury proceeding in this case.
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representative of the Bradley Estate.  After conducting a hearing on the pending
petitions, the probate court appointed Ms. Johnson and Mr. Fred Bradley as
co-personal representatives of the Bradley Estate by order dated July 23, 1993.4 
After their appointment, the co-personal representatives never sought to remove
Mr. May as administrator ad litem of the Bradley Estate, and the probate court
never entered an order to that effect.  Further, Mr. Prockup never substituted the
new co-personal representatives for Mr. May in the wrongful death/personal injury
action pending against Ms. Murphy and the Bradley Estate.5
On August 23, 1993, the probate court issued letters of administration to the
co-personal representatives, who in turn published a notice of administration in The
6 The record does not establish whether the co-personal representatives served Mr. Prockup with
the notice of administration consistent with section 733.712(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), which provides
that a personal representative shall serve “reasonably ascertainable” creditors with “a copy of the notice
[of administration] within 3 months after first publication of the notice.”  See also § 733.701, Fla. Stat.
(1991); § 733.702(1), Fla. Stat. (1991); Tulsa Prof’l Collection Servs., Inc., v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 491
(1988) (determining that the Due Process Clause requires that “reasonably ascertainable” creditors receive
actual notice).  The federal district court did determine, however, that Mr. Prockup had actual knowledge
and notice “of the opening of the estate and the time of its opening,” and therefore could not claim that his
due process rights had been violated, citing In re Estate of Danese, 641 So. 2d 423 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994).
The federal district court also stated that Mr. Prockup had “actual notice of the administration” of the
Bradley Estate.
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Escambia Sun-Press on September 2, 1993, and September 9, 1993.6  On
December 27, 1993, more than three months after first publication of notice of
administration and more than two years after Mr. Bradley’s death, Mr. Prockup
filed in the Bradley Estate probate proceedings a verified document entitled
“Statement of Claim.”  Using language identical to that which had been previously
set forth in the petition for the appointment of an administrator ad litem, Mr.
Prockup’s “Statement of Claim” provided that it was a “[c]laim for damages which
arose out of an accident in Holmes County, Florida, on September 21, 1991, in
which Inez Prockup sustained fatal injuries.  The van in which Inez Prockup was a
passenger was struck by an automobile driven by Oscar T. Bradley.”  The
statement also set forth (1) Mr. Prockup’s address; (2) that the amount of the claim
was undetermined; (3) that the claim was unliquidated; and (4) the claim was
unsecured.
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In response to the “Statement of Claim” filed by Mr. Prockup, the
co-personal representatives filed a proof of claim on February 22, 1994, indicating
their intention to honor Mr. Prockup’s claim in an “undetermined” amount.  The
co-personal representatives served the proof of claim on various individuals,
including heirs of the Bradley Estate, on February 23, 1994.  Later, on September
23, 1994, the co-personal representatives petitioned for discharge from the Bradley
Estate, and Mr. Prockup and Mr. May received notice of the petition for discharge. 
As part of the plan for distribution of the assets of the Bradley Estate, the co-
personal representatives proposed to pay Mr. Prockup $2,648.44 in relation to his
claim as personal representative of Mrs. Prockup’s estate.  Neither Mr. Prockup
nor Mr. May objected to the petition for discharge or the proposed distribution
plan.  Mr. Prockup accepted payment of $2,648.44 and executed a receipt
acknowledging the distribution on December 5, 1994.  On January 20, 1995, the
probate court entered an order requiring the co-personal representatives to file an
order of discharge, and the order requiring filing was furnished by mail to counsel
for Mr. Prockup on January 29, 1995.  Finally, on June 23, 1995, the probate court
entered an order discharging the co-personal representatives from the Bradley
Estate.
At the conclusion of both the wrongful death/personal injury proceedings
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and the probate proceedings, Mr. May, as administrator ad litem of the Bradley
Estate, filed a bad faith action against INIC in the Circuit Court in and for Escambia
County, Florida.  Based on diversity of citizenship, INIC removed the bad faith
action to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida,
Pensacola Division.  Before doing so, however, INIC paid $21,348.90 into the
registry of the circuit court, an amount equal to Mr. Bradley’s automobile liability
insurance policy limits plus post-judgment interest.
In federal court, INIC then proceeded to move for the entry of a summary
judgment, primarily arguing that because Mr. Prockup did not file a pleading
entitled “Statement of Claim” in the probate proceedings until over two years after
Mr. Bradley’s death and over three months after first publication of the notice of
administration, the Bradley Estate was not obligated to satisfy the judgment
obtained by Mr. Prockup in the wrongful death/personal injury action.  INIC in turn
had no obligation because the Bradley Estate had no liability.  INIC relied on the
time limits established in sections 733.702 and 733.710, Florida Statutes (1991), in
making this argument.  With no liability on the part of the Bradley Estate for
payment of the judgment, INIC argued, no bad faith action could lie against INIC.
Mr. May opposed INIC’s motion for summary judgment on various
grounds, arguing that (1) Mr. Prockup’s counter-petition for administration filed in
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the Bradley Estate probate proceedings satisfied the requirements of section
733.703, Florida Statutes (1991), and provided sufficient notice of the claim in
satisfaction of sections 733.702 and 733.710; (2) the co-personal representatives of
the Bradley Estate waived the time limitations established by sections 733.702 and
733.710 by failing to raise Mr. Prockup’s noncompliance with those statutes as an
affirmative defense in the wrongful death/personal injury action filed against the
Bradley Estate, by filing a proof of claim in the probate court, and by making partial
payment of the claim; and (3) even if the Bradley Estate was not liable for the
excess judgment, the administrator ad litem nonetheless could maintain a bad faith
action and recover the excess judgment from INIC because the potential bad faith
claim was an asset of the Bradley Estate that the estate’s representatives were
obligated to collect on behalf of creditors.
After considering the parties’ arguments, the federal district court granted
summary judgment in favor of INIC.  In granting INIC’s motion, the trial court
determined that Mr. Prockup had failed to timely file a sufficient statement of claim
in the Bradley Estate proceedings in accordance with the Florida Probate Code. 
The court specifically concluded that Mr. Prockup’s counter-petition for
administration did not constitute a valid “Statement of Claim” under the Florida
Probate Code or the Florida Probate Rules.  The lower court also determined that
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section 733.710 barred recovery against the Bradley Estate even though the statute
was not raised as an affirmative defense.  Finally, the court determined that, even
assuming the statutory bar of section 733.710 was waived if not raised as an
affirmative defense, Mr. May still could not maintain the bad faith action against
INIC because the Bradley Estate had been settled, final distribution had been made,
and the co-personal representatives had been discharged.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s entry of
summary judgment, in part, and certified a question of Florida law to this Court.  In
partially affirming the summary judgment, the Eleventh Circuit held that (1) Mr.
May’s position that an excess judgment action could be maintained against INIC
without Mr. Prockup having perfected a claim under the Florida Probate Code
lacked merit; (2) the petition for appointment of an administrator ad litem and the
counter-petition for administration, both filed by Mr. Prockup in the Bradley Estate
probate proceedings, did not state a sufficient claim under the Florida Probate
Code or the Florida Probate Rules; and (3) neither the co-personal representatives’
failure to file an objection to Mr. Prockup’s claim nor its partial payment of Mr.
Prockup’s claim constituted a waiver of the time period set forth in section
733.702(1).  See May, 190 F.3d at 1203-06.  The court then certified the question
now before this Court for consideration, noting that there is a conflict in the case
7 The 1991 version of sections 733.702 and 733.710 are applicable in this case because Mr.
Bradley died on September 21, 1991.  However, our ruling here applies equally under the current version
of those statutes because (1) the Legislature amended section 733.702 only once since 1991, and that
amendment did not effect a substantive change, see chapter 97-102, section 1016, at 1360, Laws of
Florida (making language in the statute gender-inclusive); and (2) the current version of section 733.710
is identical to the 1991 version.  Compare § 733.710, Fla. Stat. (1999), with § 733.710, Fla. Stat. (1991).
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law of Florida regarding the question.  See id. at 1207-08.  We now analyze the
question posed.
II. ANALYSIS
The Eleventh Circuit has asked us to determine the nature of sections
733.702 and 733.710, Florida Statutes.7  As discussed below, after reviewing the
plain language of the statutes, Florida case law, and various actions taken by the
Florida Legislature in relation to the Florida Probate Code, we determine that
section 733.702 is a statute of limitations that cannot be waived in the probate
proceedings by failure to assert the statute in an objection, while section 733.710 is
a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that is not subject to waiver or extension in the
probate proceedings.
A. SECTION 733.702
Section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1991), sets forth in pertinent part:
(1) If not barred by s. 733.710, no claim or
demand against the decedent’s estate that arose before
the death of the decedent . . . is binding on the estate, on
the personal representative, or on any beneficiary unless
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filed within the later of 3 months after the time of the first
publication of the notice of administration or, as to any
creditor required to be served with a copy of the notice
of administration, 30 days after the date of service of
such copy of the notice on the creditor, even though the
personal representative has recognized the claim or
demand by paying a part of it or interest on it or
otherwise. . . .
(2) No cause of action heretofore or hereafter
accruing . . . shall survive the death of the person against
whom the claim may be made, whether an action is
pending at the death of the person or not, unless the claim
is filed within the time periods set forth in this part.
(3) Any claim not timely filed as provided in this
section is barred even though no objection to the claim is
filed on the grounds of timeliness or otherwise unless the
court extends the time in which the claim may be filed.
Such an extension may be granted only upon grounds of
fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice of the claims
period.  No independent action or declaratory action may
be brought upon a claim which was not timely filed unless
such an extension has been granted.  If the personal
representative or any other interested person serves on
the creditor a notice to file a petition for an extension or
be forever barred, the creditor shall be limited to a period
of 30 days from the date of service of the notice in which
to file a petition for extension.
. . . .
(5) Nothing in this section shall extend the
limitations period set forth in s. 733.710.
In analyzing the nature of section 733.702, we begin with a review of Barnett Bank
v. Estate of Read, 493 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1986), because in that case, we were called
upon to determine “whether the three-month limitation period in section 733.702 is
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a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim or a statute of limitations.”  Id. at 448.  In sum, if
nothing has changed since we decided Barnett Bank, then that decision controls our
determination here regarding section 733.702.
The decedent in Barnett Bank died on April 5, 1983, and the notice of
administration for his estate was published on April 29, 1983.  See 493 So. 2d at
448.  Shortly thereafter, the personal representative of the estate met with several
Barnett Bank officials regarding a $100,000 promissory note that the decedent had
executed in favor of the bank prior to his death.  See id.  The personal
representative assured the bank officials that the estate would pay the note without
the bank having to file a formal claim, and the personal representative confirmed
that assurance in a follow-up letter to one of the bank officials.  See id.  Despite
these assurances, however, the estate did not pay on the note, and as a result, on
February 17, 1984, Barnett Bank filed a statement of claim to collect on the note. 
See id.  The personal representative did not respond to the bank’s claim, and the
probate court ordered the personal representative to satisfy the note.  See id.  The
Fourth District reversed on appeal, holding that the probate court had no authority
to order payment on the note because Barnett Bank did not file its statement of
claim within three months of first publication of the notice of administration as
required by section 733.702(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), which provided in
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pertinent part:
(1)  No claim or demand against the decedent’s
estate that arose before the death of the decedent . . .
shall be binding on the estate, on the personal
representative, or on any beneficiary unless presented:
(a)  Within 3 months from the time of the first
publication of the notice of administration, even though
the personal representative has recognized the claim or
demand by paying a part of it or interest on it or
otherwise.
We reviewed the Fourth District’s decision, noting the important difference
between a statute of limitations and a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim:
An untimely claim filed pursuant to a jurisdictional statute
of nonclaim is automatically barred.  Miller v. Nolte, 453
So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1984).  However, a claim filed beyond
the time set forth in a statute of limitations is only barred
if the statute of limitations is raised as an affirmative
defense or, if the defense appears on the face of a prior
pleading, by way of a motion to dismiss.  Fla. R. Civ. P.
1.110(d).  Failure to plead that the statute of limitations
has expired constitutes waiver.
Barnett Bank, 493 So. 2d at 448.  Upon reviewing the above-quoted provisions of
section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1983), we held that section 733.702 “is a statute
of limitations.”  Barnett Bank, 493 So. 2d at 448.  In so holding, we stated:
We fully recognize the strong public policy in favor
of settling and closing estates in a speedy manner.  Estate
of Brown, 117 So. 2d 478 (Fla.1960).  However, as the
facts of this case demonstrate, justice requires us to hold
that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations.  Valid
8 In Barnett Bank, a notice of administration was published for the estate, and the bank thereafter
filed a statement of claim within three years of the decedent’s death.  Thus, the factual circumstances there
did not implicate subsection (1)(b) of section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1983), which barred claims against
an estate unless filed “[w]ithin 3 years after the decedent’s death, if notice of administration has not been
published.”  That subsection of section 733.702 dovetailed with the 1983 version of section 733.710,
Florida Statutes, which provided, “Three years after the death of a person, his estate shall not be liable in
any cause of action if no letters have been issued in Florida within the 3-year period.”  Thus, although we
held in Barnett Bank that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations, such holding should be correctly
confined to the three-month time limitation established in subsection (1)(a) of that statute, not extended to
the subsection of the statute we did not address in Barnett Bank.
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grounds, such as estoppel or fraud, may exist that would
and should excuse untimely claims.  A creditor would
lose the right to assert these potentially valid claims were
we to hold that section 733.702 is a statute of nonclaim. 
Our holding that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations
confirms the fact that estates and creditors must adhere
to well-established practices when dealing with untimely
claims.  The estate must file a motion to strike or other
objection to an untimely claim.  If the creditor wishes to
raise the issue of estoppel or fraud he may file a reply
pursuant to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.100.  See
Picchione v. Asti, 354 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). 
This procedure guarantees that claims such as fraud and
estoppel are properly adjudicated.
Barnett Bank, 493 So. 2d at 449.  In light of such holding, we reinstated the probate
court’s order requiring the personal representative to satisfy the promissory note,
given the estate’s failure to assert the statute of limitations in an objection in the
probate proceedings.8
In Spohr v. Berryman, 589 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1991), we were again called
upon to interpret the provisions of section 733.702, Florida Statutes, with the 1985
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version of the statute being applicable in that case.  After setting forth the relevant
terms of section 733.702, we referred to Barnett Bank and stated, “While known as
a statute of nonclaim, [section 733.702] is nevertheless a statute of limitations.” 
Spohr, 589 So. 2d at 227; see also Olenek v. Bennett, 537 So. 2d 160, 161 (Fla.
5th DCA 1989) (citing Barnett Bank for the proposition that section 733.702,
Florida Statutes (1985), was a statute of limitations).  We then proceeded to
determine that (1) the plaintiffs in the case were required to file a statement of claim
against the estate concerning a marriage settlement agreement executed by the
decedent before his death; and (2) the filing of a lawsuit against the personal
representative of the estate within the three-month time period set forth in section
733.702 did not constitute compliance with the probate claim requirements of that
statute.  See Spohr, 589 So. 2d at 227-29.
In 1988, the Legislature amended section 733.702, Florida Statutes.  See ch.
88-340, § 6, at 1805-06, Laws of Fla.  Of particular importance to the present case,
the Legislature added the following pertinent language to the statute:
Any claim not timely filed as provided in this section is
barred even though no objection to the claim is filed on
the grounds of timeliness or otherwise unless the court
extends the time in which the claim may be filed.  Such an
extension may be granted only in the estate administration
proceeding, only after notice, and only upon grounds of
fraud or estoppel.  No independent action or declaratory
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action may be brought upon a claim which was not timely
filed unless such an extension has been granted.
Id.  This amendment clearly addressed the policy concerns we expressed in Barnett
Bank, in that the amended language allows for an extension of the time limitation on
the grounds of fraud or estoppel.  Indeed, legislative history shows that the
Legislature added the above-quoted language to section 733.702 in response to our
decision in Barnett Bank, with the intent to make the statute “an absolute bar” to
untimely filed claims, subject to an extension of the time limitation on the grounds
of fraud or estoppel.  See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Jud., HB 645 (1988), Staff Analysis
& Economic Impact Statement 6 (April 7, 1988) (on file with comm.).
In 1989, the Legislature again amended section 733.702, Florida Statutes. 
See ch. 89-340, § 5, at 2178-79, Laws of Fla.  Among other things, the Legislature
added “insufficient notice of the claims period” as a basis for extending the time
limitation under section 733.702.  See id.  Through this amendment, the Legislature
obviously responded to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Tulsa
Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988), wherein the
Court held that due process requires that actual notice of the claims period be
provided to reasonably ascertainable creditors.  See id. at 489-91.  Indeed,
legislative history shows that the Legislature undertook many changes to the Florida
9 In 1984, the Legislature added the phrase, “and any such claim shall be forever barred without
order of the court” to section 733.705, Florida Statutes, in the portion of such statute relating to the filing
of an independent cause of action against the estate after an objection has been lodged against a claim.  See
ch. 84-25, § 1, at 41, Laws of Fla.  In 1986, the Legislature amended section 733.705 by, among other
things, clarifying that an objection may be filed within thirty days of the “timely” filing of a claim.  See ch.
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Probate Code in response to the Pope decision.  See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Jud.,
HB 1408 (1989), Staff Analysis & Economic Impact Statement 2, 6 (final June 15,
1989) (on file with comm.).
Based on to the amendments to section 733.702 discussed above, several
district courts of appeal in Florida have determined that the statute now bars
untimely claims, even in the absence of an objection, unless an extension is granted. 
See Comerica Bank & Trust, F.S.B., v. SDI Operating Partners, L.P., 673 So. 2d
163, 166 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (“It is apparent that section 733.702(3) is unlike an
ordinary statute of limitations in that it contains express language barring untimely
claims without any necessity for the [personal representative] to object to the
tardiness in filing.” (footnote omitted)); HCA New Port Richie Hospital v. Estate of
Boschelli, 588 So. 2d 1012, 1013 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (noting that since this Court
decided Barnett Bank, the Legislature amended section 733.702 to make the statute
“a bar to untimely filed claims, even in the absence of an objection, unless the court
grants an extension”).  Similarly, several district courts have relied on amendments
to section 733.705, Florida Statutes, made by the Legislature in 1984 and 1986,9 to
86-249, § 1, at 1881, Laws of Fla.
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support a finding that section 733.702 now operates as a jurisdictional statute of
nonclaim, not a statute of limitations.  See In re Estate of Parson, 570 So. 2d 1125,
1125-26 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Baptist Hospital of Miami, Inc., v. Carter, 658 So.
2d 560, 563 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (relying on reasoning of Estate of Parson); Wylie
v. Inv. Mgmt. & Research, Inc., 629 So. 2d 898, 902 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (same),
receded from on other grounds, Corporate Sec. Group v. Lind, 753 So. 2d 151
(Fla. 4th DCA 2000); Thames v. Jackson, 598 So. 2d 121, 123 (Fla. 1st DCA
1992) (same).
After considering the relevant changes made to chapter 733, Florida Statutes,
we hold that section 733.702(3), Florida Statutes (1991), operates to bar untimely
claims against an estate even if the time period set forth in section 733.702(1) is not
asserted in an objection in the probate proceedings on the basis of timeliness. 
However, given the fact that the time period set forth in section 733.702(1) may be
extended based on fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice, we continue to hold, as
we did in Barnett Bank, that section 733.702 is a statute of limitations, as a true
jurisdictional statute of nonclaim could not be extended.  See, e.g., Barnett Bank,
493 So. 2d at 449 (determining that creditors would lose the right to assert valid
claims, even if estoppel or fraud existed, “were we to hold that section 733.702 is a
10 Ordinarily, unless a party asserts a statute of limitations as an affirmative defense in its answer,
the statute is waived.  See, e.g., Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110(d); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.140(h)(1).  In cases such as this
one, however, where the time period set forth in section 733.702 has not yet expired when the answer is
filed, the party relying on the statute should move the court to allow the filing of a supplemental pleading
to assert the statute as an affirmative defense.  See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(d) (“Upon motion of a party the
court may permit that party, upon reasonable notice and upon such terms as are just, to serve a
supplemental pleading setting forth transactions or occurrences or events which have happened since the
date of the pleading sought to be supplemented.”); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.190(e) (“At any time in furtherance
of justice, upon such terms as may be just, the court may permit any . . . pleading . . . to be amended or
material supplemental matter to be set forth in an amended or supplemental pleading.”).
-23-
statute of nonclaim”); Comerica, 673 So. 2d at 166 (stating that “jurisdictional
statutes of nonclaim operate to bar untimely claims without any action by the
opponent and deprive the court of the power to adjudicate them”).
Further, while we determine that section 733.702 operates to bar untimely
claims against an estate even if not asserted in an objection in the probate
proceedings, we agree with Mr. May that the time period set forth in section
733.702(1) is waived in a separate action outside of the probate proceedings if not
raised as an affirmative defense.10  This is so because the non-waiver provision
contained in section 733.702(3) is, by its own terms, limited to the probate context. 
See § 733.702(3), Fla. Stat. (1991).  Such waiver in a separate action does not
necessarily render a judgment obtained in that action recoverable from an estate,
however, because section 733.706, Florida Statutes (1991), provides:
Except upon approval by the court, no execution
or other process shall issue on or be levied against
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property of the estate.  An order approving execution or
other process to be levied against property of the estate
may be entered only in the estate administration
proceeding.  Claims on all judgments against a decedent
shall be filed in the same manner as other claims against
estates of decedents.  This section shall not be construed
to prevent the enforcement of mortgages, security
interests, or liens encumbering specific property.
See also Smith v. Fechheimer, 124 Fla. 757, 763, 169 So. 395, 397 (1936) (“A
statute giving a remedy for the collection of claims against the estates of deceased
persons and fixing a time for their presentation to the court furnishes the exclusive
remedy for the collection of such claims.”).  As correctly determined by the
Second District Court of Appeal in Hogan v. Howard, 716 So. 2d 286, 288 (Fla.
2d DCA 1998), under section 733.706, “a judgment holder is not free to execute on
estate property simply by virtue of the fact that she holds a judgment.  The
judgment holder must file a claim like any other claimant.”  Cf. Payne v. Stalley, 672
So. 2d 822, 823-24 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (barring recovery from an estate for a
judgment obtained in federal court, even though section 733.702 was not raised as a
defense in the federal court action, where the claim filed in the probate proceedings
was untimely).  Thus, the ultimate result where an estate waives or does not
affirmatively assert the protection of section 733.702 in a separate action and an
adverse party obtains a judgment against the estate in that action, but has not filed a
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timely claim against the estate in the probate proceedings, is that the sole possibility
for recovery against the estate is for the probate court to grant an extension of time
for the filing of a claim on the grounds of fraud, estoppel, or insufficient notice. 
We are not aware of any extension or any post-judgment request for extension
pending in any probate court.  With this determination in mind, we now turn our
attention to section 733.710.
B. SECTION 733.710
Section 733.710, Florida Statutes (1991), provides:
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of the
code, 2 years after the death of a person, neither the
decedent's estate, the personal representative (if any), nor
the beneficiaries shall be liable for any claim or cause of
action against the decedent, whether or not letters of
administration have been issued, except as provided in
this section.
(2) This section shall not apply to a creditor who
has filed a claim pursuant to s. 733.702 within 2 years
after the person’s death, and whose claim has not been
paid or otherwise disposed of pursuant to s. 733.705.
(3) This section shall not affect the lien of any duly
recorded mortgage or security interest or the lien of any
person in possession of personal property or the right to
foreclose and enforce the mortgage or lien.
In Carter, 658 So. 2d at 561, the Third District held that section 733.710 is a statute
of limitations and that fraud or misrepresentation may estop an estate from relying
on the statute as a defense.  Conversely, in Comerica, 673 So. 2d at 168, the
11 No party petitioned this Court for review in either Comerica or Estate of Petz, despite the
presence of a certified conflict.
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Fourth District certified conflict with the Third District’s decision in Carter,
concluding that section 733.710 “states an absolute bar–akin to a statute of
repose–that the court lacks power to avoid.”  Id. at 164.  Recently, in Lutheran
Brotherhood Legal Reserve Fraternal Benefit Society v. Estate of Petz, 744 So. 2d
596, 598 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), the Second District aligned itself with the reasoning
expressed by the Fourth District in Comerica and certified conflict with the Third
District’s decision in Carter.11  See also Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Estate
of Johnson, 743 So. 2d 83, 88 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (Nesbitt, J., dissenting and
concurring) (concluding that section 733.710 constitutes a jurisdictional statute of
nonclaim or a statute of repose).  After reading section 733.710 in pari materia with
section 733.702, see Pezzi v. Brown, 697 So. 2d 883, 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)
(stating that “sections 733.702 and 733.710, which relate to the same subject
matter, should be read in pari materia”); see generally Forsythe v. Longboat Key
Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992), we find it clear that
section 733.710 is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that is not subject to waiver or
extension in the probate proceedings.
In Comerica, the trial court extended the two-year time period set forth in
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section 733.710, Florida Statutes, so that the plaintiff could file a statement of claim
against the decedent’s estate for alleged environmental pollution.  See 673 So. 2d at
164.  On appeal, the Fourth District traced the development of section 733.710,
noting that the Legislature amended the statute in 1989 as part of a “package of
amendments” in “obvious response” to the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Pope.  See id.; ch. 89-340, Laws of Fla.  The Fourth District then
compared the terms of section 733.710 with the relevant terms of section 733.702. 
See Comerica, 673 So. 2d at 165.  After conducting this comparison, the Fourth
District reasoned as follows:
The introductory adverbial phrase in section 733.702(1),
“[i]f not barred by s. 733.710,” means that the 2-year
period of section 733.710 is paramount over the
limitations period in section 733.702(1).  Reading the two
sections together, it appears that section 733.702 fixes the
basic time frame for filing of claims in decedent’s estates
being probated in Florida, but section 733.710 sets an
absolute deadline beyond which no claim may be
entertained.
Knowing the effect of the Pope decision, it seems
inescapable that the legislative intent for section 733.710
was to create a self-executing period of repose--without
significant action by the state itself, it must be noted--for
all claims after the lapse of the 2-year period.  In its own
terms, it takes precedence over all other provisions in the
probate code.  At the same time, the text is formulated to
extinguish any liability that the estate, the beneficiaries or
the [personal representative] might have had for any claim
or cause of action against the decedent.  Hence, rather
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than merely fixing a period of time in which to file claims,
as section 733.702 does, in reality it creates an immunity
from liability arising from the lapse of the period stated. 
The only exception to section 733.710’s immunity from
liability is found within its own subsection (2), which
exempts from the bar of subsection (1) claims that were
actually filed within the 2 year period but as to which the
[personal representative] has failed to make payment or
file an objection.
We also take note of section 733.702(3), which
states that:
“[a]ny claim not timely filed as provided in
this section is barred even though no
objection to the claim is filed on the grounds
of timeliness or otherwise unless the court
extends the time in which the claim may be
filed.”  [e.s.]
It is apparent that section 733.702(3) is unlike an ordinary
statute of limitations in that it contains express language
barring untimely claims without any necessity for the
[personal representative] to object to the tardiness in
filing.  At the same time, this subsection also contains
authority for the probate court to extend the nonclaim
period of section 733.702(1).  The claimant must show
fraud, estoppel or insufficient notice to empower the
probate court to grant the extension.  But the legislature
was careful to add in section 733.702(5) that “nothing in
this section shall extend the limitations period set forth in
s. 733.710.”  There is no extension provision, moreover,
in section 733.710.  In fact, there is no authority anywhere
in the probate code to extend the 2-year period of section
733.710.
Reading the limited grant of extension authority in
section 733.702(3) to enlarge the section 733.710 period
of repose would be contrary to the structure and text of
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part VII of the probate code.  Enlarging the repose period
would also frustrate the obvious purpose underlying 
section 733.710 to provide an absolute bar date on the
estate’s liability for claims in decedent’s estates being
probated in Florida.  Paradoxically, it would tend to make
section 733.710 all but indistinguishable from section
733.702.
. . . .
Clearly, section 733.710 creates a self-executing,
absolute immunity to claims filed for the first time, as
here, more than 2 years after the death of the person
whose estate is undergoing probate.  It does not depend
on the [personal representative] timely objecting to a late
claim, and the claimant cannot avoid it by showing, as he
could for the nonclaim period under section 733.702,
fraud or estoppel or insufficiency of notice.  The absence
of a provision authorizing enlargements of the repose
period, together with the provision in section 733.702(5)
negating any use of the enlargement provision to extend
the repose period, make it clear to us that the lapse of the
2-year period erects an absolute jurisdictional bar to
late-filed claims that the probate judge lacks the power to
ignore.  It obviously represents a decision by the
legislature that 2 years from the date of death is the
outside time limit to which a decedent’s estate in Florida
should be exposed by claims on the decedent’s assets.
Comerica, 673 So. 2d at 165-67 (footnotes omitted).
In reaching its conclusion that section 733.710 operates to automatically bar
claims and is not subject to waiver or extension, the Comerica court disagreed with
the reasoning employed by the Third District in Carter.  In Carter, to support its
holding that section 733.710 is a statute of limitations, the Third District noted that
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(1) section 733.710 is entitled, “Limitations on claims against estates”; (2) the
legislative history of section 733.710 repeatedly refers to the statute as one of
limitations; and (3) the statute does not contain any of the “magic words of finality”
evidencing the Legislature’s intention to foreclose equitable claims that would be
precluded by a “true statute of repose.”  658 So. 2d at 563-64.  The Comerica
court disagreed with the Carter court’s reliance on the legislative history of section
733.710, noting that legislative history is irrelevant when the wording of a statute is
clear.  See Comerica, 673 So. 2d at 167-68.  Further, the Comerica court essentially
concluded that the interrelation of sections 733.702 and 733.710 provided the
“magic words of finality” found lacking by the Carter court, relying on the fact that
section 733.702(5) expressly disclaims any power to extend the two-year time
period set forth in section 733.710.  Comerica, 673 So. 2d at 168.  Judge Nesbitt
recently reached a similar conclusion, determining that section 733.710 operates as
a statute of nonclaim or statute of repose because “section 733.702(5) expressly
prohibits any court from granting an extension of the time to file a claim against the
decedent’s estate on any grounds including fraud, estoppel or insufficient notice of
the claim beyond two years following the death of the decedent.”  See Estate of
Johnson, 743 So. 2d at 88 (Nesbitt, J., dissenting and concurring); cf. In re Estate
of Bartkowiak, 645 So. 2d 1082, 1083 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (determining that
12 As with section 733.702, we determine that an estate may waive the time period set forth in
section 733.710 in a separate action outside of the probate proceedings.  However, unlike section
733.702, a creditor that has obtained a judgment in a separate action cannot recover against the estate
unless the creditor has filed a claim in the probate proceedings within two years of the decedent’s death.
This is so because the probate court lacks the authority to extend the time period set forth in section
733.710.
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section 733.710 barred Sun Bank from filing a claim outside the two-year time
period despite the fact that the personal representative of the estate failed to
ascertain that Sun Bank was a creditor and failed to serve the bank with the notice
of administration).
After considering the plain language of section 733.710, Florida Statutes
(1991), and its interplay with section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1991), we hold that
section 733.710 is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that automatically bars
untimely claims and is not subject to waiver or extension in the probate
proceedings.12  As stated by the Fourth District in Comerica, section 733.710
“obviously represents a decision by the legislature that 2 years from the date of
death is the outside time limit to which a decedent’s estate in Florida should be
exposed by claims on the decedent’s assets.”  673 So. 2d at 167.  Accordingly, we
now consider the facts of this case in light of our determinations regarding sections
733.702 and 733.710.
C. APPLICATION OF THE STATUTES TO THIS CASE
13 Sections 733.702 and 733.710, Florida Statutes, do not bar a creditor from stating a cause of
action to recover up to policy limits from decedent’s casualty insurance even though the creditor has not
filed a timely claim in the probate proceedings.  See § 733.702(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1991); Pezzi v. Brown,
697 So. 2d 883, 885-86 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
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In this case, Mr. Prockup did not file a document entitled “Statement of
Claim” in the Bradley Estate probate proceedings until December 27, 1993, more
than three months after first publication of the notice of administration and more
than two years after Mr. Bradley’s death.  Thus, if such document constitutes Mr.
Prockup’s sole and exclusive claim filed in the probate proceedings, then sections
733.702 and 733.710 would both bar recovery from the Bradley Estate in excess of
Mr. Bradley’s casualty insurance policy limits.13
However, on May 20, 1992, less than eight months after Mr. Bradley’s death,
Mr. Prockup petitioned the probate court to appoint Mr. May administrator ad
litem of the Bradley Estate.  That petition, verified by Mr. Prockup and providing
the address of his attorney, was the first filing concerning the Bradley Estate. 
Notably, the file number assigned to the Bradley Estate probate proceedings upon
the filing of Mr. Prockup’s petition remained the same throughout those
proceedings, including all papers filed by the subsequently appointed co-personal
representatives.  In the petition, Mr. Prockup asserted, in pertinent part, that he
represented his wife’s estate and had “a cause of action which arose out of an
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accident in Holmes County, Florida, on September 21, 1991, in which Inez
Prockup sustained fatal injuries.  The van in which Mrs. Prockup was a passenger
was struck by an automobile driven by Oscar T. Bradley.”  The probate court
granted the relief requested in Mr. Prockup’s petition, specifically appointing Mr.
May to defend the Bradley Estate regarding a claim for damages arising out of the
automobile accident on September 21, 1991, in which Mrs. Prockup was killed.
Later, on March 1, 1993, Mr. Prockup filed another pleading in the probate
court, requesting that the court appoint Mr. May personal representative of the
Bradley Estate.  To support his pleading, Mr. Prockup noted that (1) the probate
court already had appointed Mr. May to defend a claim against the Bradley Estate
“arising out of the accident on September 21, 1991”; and (2) Mr. Prockup was a
“creditor” of the Bradley Estate “by virtue of a wrongful death claim . . .  which
arose out of an automobile accident in Holmes County, Florida, on September 21,
1991,” resulting in “fatal injuries” to Mrs. Prockup.  The probate court did not
appoint Mr. May personal representative of the Bradley Estate, but instead
appointed Ms. Johnson and Mr. Fred Bradley co-personal representatives of the
estate, but no order was entered as to the status of Mr. May as previously
appointed by the same probate court.
In the opinion certifying the present question to this Court, the Eleventh
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Circuit has suggested that, under Florida law, Mr. Prockup’s petition for the
appointment of an administrator ad litem and his counter-petition for administration
failed to constitute a sufficient statement of claim under section 733.703, Florida
Statutes (1991), and Florida Probate Rule 5.490(a).  See May, 190 F.3d at 1204-05. 
In making that determination, the Eleventh Circuit (1) relied in part on our decision
in Spohr; (2) noted that the petition and the counter-petition failed to indicate that
Mr. Prockup possessed a claim in excess of Mr. Bradley’s casualty insurance
policy limits; and (3) distinguished this case from the Second District Court of
Appeal’s decision in Notar v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 438
So. 2d 531 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).  See May, 190 F.3d at 1205.  Recognizing that we
are not limited in the manner in which we answer the certified question here, see
May, 190 F.3d at 1207, we would, as a matter of Florida law, reach a conclusion
quite different from that voiced by the Eleventh Circuit.
First, our decision in Spohr does not control the facts of this case.  In
Spohr, we concluded that the filing of an independent lawsuit within three months
of first publication of the notice of administration did not constitute compliance
with section 733.702, Florida Statutes (1985).  See 589 So. 2d at 228.  In reaching
that conclusion, we stated the following, in pertinent part:
It is important that all interested parties be able to
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ascertain that claims have been filed against an estate. 
When served with a complaint, a personal representative
would know that a claim was being asserted, but other
interested parties might not have such knowledge so as to
be able to take the necessary steps to protect their
interests. . . .  Even though probate proceedings have
now been consolidated into circuit court, it is imperative
that the probate file contain every statement of claim.
Id. at 229 (footnote omitted).  The key requirement is that a claim be filed in the
probate proceeding as opposed to the filing of an independent action.  Unlike the
creditor in Spohr, Mr. Prockup filed several documents in the actual probate
proceedings setting forth the basis of his claim against the Bradley Estate.  Indeed,
Mr. Prockup’s verified petition for the appointment of an administrator ad litem
was the first filing in the Bradley Estate, which maintained the same file number
throughout the probate proceedings.  It is difficult to envision that the language
contained in that petition–which was identical to the substantive claim language set
forth in the document entitled “Statement of Claim”–would fail to place interested
persons on notice of Mr. Prockup’s claim (as personal representative of his wife’s
estate) against the Bradley Estate.  The same is true regarding Mr. Prockup’s
counter-petition.  The substance of a claim against the Bradley Estate was set forth
in detail and Florida law in this area should not elevate form over substance.
Second, we also conclude that simply because Mr. Prockup’s petition and
14 Indeed, the document entitled “Statement of Claim” did not indicate whether Mr. Prockup’s
claim against the Bradley Estate was for an amount in excess of Mr. Bradley’s casualty insurance policy
limits because it was unliquidated.
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counter-petition did not indicate whether his claim against the Bradley Estate was
for an amount in excess of Mr. Bradley’s casualty insurance policy limits does not
establish that the claim fails to satisfy the statutory scheme.14  At the time Mr.
Prockup filed his petition and counter-petition, as well as at the time he filed the
document entitled “Statement of Claim,” damages had not yet been established in
the wrongful death/personal injury action against Ms. Murphy and the Bradley
Estate.  Thus, it was not possible to state in a claim against the Bradley Estate that it
was in excess of Mr. Bradley’s policy limits.  Further, it is well settled that the total
failure to file a timely claim against an estate does not prevent a creditor from
recovering up to the policy limits of a decedent’s casualty insurance.  See §
733.702(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1991); Pezzi, 697 So. 2d at  885-86 (determining that
sections 733.702 and 733.710 did not bar plaintiffs from stating a cause of action to
recover up to policy limits from decedent’s casualty insurance even though the
plaintiffs did not file a timely claim in the probate proceedings); Kent Ins. Co. v.
Estate of Atwood, 481 So. 2d 1294, 1295 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (stating that the
failure to file a claim against an estate within three months of first publication of the
notice of administration “bars only the right to enforce any liability of the estate
-37-
which is beyond the limits of the policy of insurance”).  As a result, persons
interested in a decedent’s estate are on notice that a wrongful death claim is
pending against an estate with the amount unliquidated.  Just as with any other
unliquidated claim, the damages may or may not involve an amount covered by
insurance or in excess of the decedent’s insurance policy limits.
Third, we find the Second District’s decision in Notar persuasive here.  In
that case, the expectant claimant failed to file a formal statement of claim in the
decedent’s estate within three years of the decedent’s death, as required by section
733.702(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1981) (requiring filing of a claim in an
unadministered estate within three years of a decedent’s death).  See Notar, 438 So.
2d at 532-33.  Upon learning of the decedent’s death, however, the claimant filed a
motion for substitution of parties and appointment of personal representative in an
already initiated independent action.  See id. at 532.  In addition, the claimant’s
attorney filed in probate court a petition for administration of the decedent’s estate. 
See id.  The circuit court in the independent action denied the claimant’s motion for
substitution and appointment, and the probate court denied the claimant’s
counsel’s petition for administration.  See id.
On appeal, the Second District addressed whether the claimant’s motion in
the independent action and petition in the probate court, both filed within three
15 The federal district court and the Eleventh Circuit distinguished this case from Notar based on
the Second District’s statement that “because no notice of administration of Dombrowsky’s estate had been
filed, Woodruff and Notar could have done no more to preserve their rights against the estate.”  Notar, 438
So. 2d 533.
-38-
years of the decedent’s death, could be considered a valid presentation of claim to
satisfy the nonclaim period.  See id. at 533.  The Second District acknowledged
that to present a claim against a decedent, a creditor must file a written statement of
the claim indicating the basis of the claim, the amount of the claim, whether the
claim is contingent or unliquidated, and, if contingent or unliquidated, the nature of
the uncertainty.  See id.  (citing section 733.703, Florida Statutes (1981)).  The
court also recognized that deviations in the form of a claim may be corrected.  See
id. (citing section 733.704, Florida Statutes (1981)).  With these principles in mind,
the Second District held that both the claimant’s motion in the independent action
and the petition in the probate court stated the basis of the claim in a manner
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of sections 733.703.  See id.  After so holding,
the Second District noted that because no notice of administration had been filed
regarding the decedent’s estate, nothing more could have been done to preserve a
claim against the decedent’s estate.15  See id.  While the Notar court’s holding with
regard to the motion in the independent action is no longer valid in light of our
decision in Spohr, the court’s holding concerning the petition for administration
-39-
remains in effect and is well reasoned.
Finally, similar to the decision in Notar, we would conclude that Mr.
Prockup’s petition for the appointment of an administrator ad litem and his
counter-petition for administration were defective, if at all, only as to the caption on
the document, not substance.  Section 733.703(1), Florida Statutes (1991), requires
a creditor to file a “written statement of the claim” in probate proceedings involving
a decedent’s estate.  The statute does not set forth any requirements regarding the
form and content of the claim.  See id.  Limited requirements can be found in
Florida Probate Rule 5.490(a), which provides:
(a) Form.  A creditor’s statement of claim shall be
verified and filed with the clerk and shall state:
(1) the basis for the claim;
(2) the amount claimed;
(3) the name and address of the creditor;
(4) the security for the claim, if any; and
(5) whether the claim is due or involves an
uncertainty and, if not due, then the due date and, if
contingent or unliquidated, the nature of the uncertainty.
If a claim is defective as to form, then the probate court may allow a creditor to
amend the claim at any time.  See § 733.704, Fla. Stat. (1991) (“If a bona fide
attempt to file a claim is made by a creditor but the claim is defective as to form,
the court may permit the amendment of the claim at any time.”); Fla. Prob. R.
5.490(e) (“If a claim as filed is sufficient to notify interested persons of its
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substance but is otherwise defective as to form, the court may permit the claim to
be amended at any time.”).
When the pleadings filed on behalf of the Prockups in the probate
proceeding are compared to the elements of the rule, it becomes evident that all
requirements were substantially satisfied.  Mr. Prockup’s petition and counter-
petition clearly stated the basis of his  claim–as personal representative of his wife’s
estate–against the Bradley Estate.  Both the petition and counter-petition established
that Mr. Prockup was prosecuting a wrongful death action against the Bradley
Estate based on the September 21, 1991, automobile accident.  As ongoing
litigation, it was clear that the damages being sought in such action were
undetermined and unliquidated.  Under these particular circumstances, it would be
placing form over substance to hold that the petition and counter-petition did not
satisfy the essential requirements of section 733.703 and rule 5.490(a).  See
generally 18 Fla. Jur. 2d Decedents’ Property § 647 (1997) (stating that a
“statement of claim need not be in any particular form, and it is sufficient if it states
the character and amount of the claim”); 31 Am. Jur. 2d Executors and
Administrators § 659 (1989) (stating that the “contents of a claim should be liberally
construed” and that “the form of the presentation [of a claim] is of little importance
so long as it furnishes sufficient information of the extent and character of the
16 The legislative history of chapter 88-340, Laws of Florida, confirms that the Legislature
specifically intended “after” to be used in accordance with its plain meaning:
Claims are required to be filed within three months “after” the publication
of the notice of administration, which would defeat claims filed within three
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claim”).
In light of our analysis regarding the petition and counter-petition, it is clear
that Mr. Prockup satisfied the two-year nonclaim period set forth in section
733.710.  This is so because Mr. Prockup’s petition and counter-petition setting
forth the claim in detail against the Bradley Estate were both filed within two years
after the date of Mr. Bradley’s death.  The same cannot be said, however, with
regard to satisfying the limitation period set forth in section 733.702(1). 
Specifically, section 733.702(1) requires that a claim be filed “within the later of
three months after the time of first publication of the notice of administration or, as
to any creditor required to be served with a copy of the notice of administration, 30
days after the date of service of such copy of the notice on the creditor.”  §
733.702(1), Fla. Stat. (1991) (emphasis added).  The Legislature very specifically
added the word “after” in 1988, substituting it for the word “from.”  See ch. 88-
340, § 6, at 1805, Laws of Fla. (amending section 733.702(1)(a), Florida Statutes). 
As the word “after” is used in the statute, we have no choice but to ascribe to the
word its plain meaning.16  Although it may seem somewhat formalistic to strictly
months “prior” to the publication.  If a claim is not timely filed, it will be
barred without the requirement of an objection being raised as to its
timeliness.
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Jud., HB 645 (1988), Staff Analysis & Economic Impact Statement 3 (April 7, 1988)
(on file with comm.).
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apply the word “after,” such was the specific legislative intent.  While requiring a
creditor to file a claim after publication or service runs counter to the general
proposition that claims filed before notice is given to creditors may sufficiently
state a claim against an estate, see In re Estate of Tanner, 288 So. 2d 578, 581 (Fla.
2d DCA 1974) (permitting the filing of a claim prior to the publication of valid
notice to creditors); see generally Dag E. Ytreberg, Annotation, Validity of Claims
Against Estate Filed Prior to Publication of Notice to Creditors, 70 A.L.R. 3d 784
(1976 & 1999 Supp.), such a result is nonetheless mandated by the clear language
used by the Legislature in section 733.702(1).  Accord Roberts v. Jassy, 436 So.
2d 394, 395 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (decrying inequitable and harsh result required by
application of section 733.702(1), Florida Statutes (1981)).
III. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, as set forth above, we determine that section 733.702, Florida
Statutes (1991), is a statute of limitations that bars untimely claims even if the issue
of timeliness is not asserted in an objection in the probate proceedings, but that
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such limitation may be extended by the probate court.  Further we determine that
section 733.710, Florida Statutes (1991), is a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim that
is not subject to waiver or extension in the probate proceedings.  Finally, while we
would conclude that Mr. Prockup satisfied the nonclaim period set forth in section
733.710, he did not satisfy the limitation period established in section 733.702(1),
and we are not aware of any extension or pending request for extension in any
probate court.  Accordingly, we return the record in this case to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
It is so ordered.
SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
WELLS, C.J., concurs with an opinion, in which HARDING, J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, C.J., concurring.
I concur in the answer to the certified question, parts A and B.  I do not join
in part C of the opinion because I believe that it is beyond this Court’s jurisdiction
pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(6) of the Florida Constitution.
HARDING, J., concurs.
Certified Question of Law from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit - Case No. 98-2580
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Louis K. Rosenbloum of Louis K. Rosenbloum, P.A., Pensacola, Florida; Robert J.
Mayes, Gulf Breeze, Florida; and Lefferts L. Mabie, III of Lefferts L. Mabie, III, P.A.,
Tampa, Florida,
for Appellant
B. Richard Young and Michael T. Bill of Young and Associates, P.A., Pensacola,
Florida,
for Appellee
Robert W. Goldman and Brian J. Felcoski of Goldman & Felcoski, P.A., Naples,
Florida,
for Real Property Probate & Trust Law Section of The Florida Bar, 
Amicus Curiae