Case Title: In re L.N.G.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 252A20

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2021-03-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-29 
No. 252A20 
Filed 19 March 2021 
IN THE MATTER OF: L.N.G., L.P.G., and L.A.D. 
 
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001(a1)(1) from an order entered on 2 
March 2020 by Judge John K. Greenlee in District Court, Gaston County. This matter 
was calendared for argument in the Supreme Court on 11 February 2021 but 
determined on the record and briefs without oral argument pursuant to Rule 30(f) of 
the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
Elizabeth Myrick Boone for petitioner-appellee Gaston County Department of 
Health and Human Services. 
 
Everett Gaskins Hancock LLP, by Katherine A. King, for appellee Guardian ad 
Litem. 
 
Garron T. Michael for respondent-appellant mother. 
 
 
MORGAN, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
Respondent-mother appeals from the trial court’s order terminating her 
parental rights to her minor children L.N.G. (Nicole), L.P.G. (Peter), and L.A.D. 
(Andrew).1 After careful review, we conclude that the trial court properly adjudicated 
the existence of at least one ground for termination. Thus, we affirm the termination 
order. 
                                            
1 Pseudonyms are used to protect the identity of the juveniles and for ease of reading.  
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I. 
Factual Background and Procedural History 
¶ 2 
 
This case was initiated on 15 December 2016, upon the filing of a petition by 
the Gaston County Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) alleging that 
Nicole, Peter, and Andrew were neglected and dependent juveniles. In the petition, 
DHHS averred that it had been working with the family for several months due to a 
series of domestic violence incidents which had occurred between respondent-mother 
and Andrew’s father, “Mr. D.” Although respondent-mother and DHHS agreed to a 
case plan on 10 November 2016 in order to allow respondent-mother to address these 
matters, she and Mr. D. subsequently engaged in an argument in front of the children 
during which Mr. D. choked respondent-mother and spit in her mouth. Thereafter, 
DHHS obtained nonsecure custody of all three children.  
¶ 3 
 
On 28 February 2017, the trial court entered an order adjudicating Nicole, 
Peter, and Andrew as neglected and dependent juveniles after respondent-mother 
stipulated to the allegations in the petition. Two months later, the trial court entered 
a disposition order. The order established a case plan for respondent-mother which 
required her to complete domestic violence victim counseling, to complete parenting 
classes, to complete family counseling with Mr. D., to refrain from exposing the 
children to domestic violence, to attend and participate in any assessments with 
Nicole and Peter, and to comply with all recommendations resulting from therapeutic 
services for Nicole and Peter.  
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¶ 4 
 
On 12 April 2017, respondent-mother filed a motion for review, seeking to have 
the juvenile case terminated and thereupon converted to a civil custody case under 
Chapter 50 of the General Statutes of North Carolina. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-911 (2019). 
In the motion, respondent-mother alleged that she had completed her case plan, that 
a home study had determined that respondent-mother’s home was a safe and 
reasonable environment for her children, and that respondent-mother had ceased all 
communication with Mr. D. The trial court entered an order denying this motion on 
27 February 2018.  
¶ 5 
 
The trial court held its first Review and Permanency Planning Hearing in the 
case on 23 May 2017. Based on respondent-mother’s “significant progress” on her case 
plan, the primary permanent plan was set as reunification with a secondary 
permanent plan of guardianship. Respondent-mother was awarded ten hours of 
weekly unsupervised visitation with the children, which would increase to forty-eight 
hours weekly after the school year ended.  
¶ 6 
 
On 8 June 2017, DHHS filed a Motion for Review after Nicole made a report, 
following a visit which she had with respondent-mother, that Nicole believed Mr. D. 
was currently living with respondent-mother and that Mr. D. was in respondent-
mother’s home during the visit. When a DHHS social worker investigated these 
claims, Mr. D. admitted that Nicole’s report was true. Consequently, DHHS asked 
the trial court to suspend respondent-mother’s unsupervised visitation and instead 
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to permit her to have two hours of weekly supervised visitation. At a subsequent 
motion hearing, respondent-mother denied that Mr. D. lived with her. On 19 
September 2017, the trial court allowed DHHS’s motion to change respondent-
mother’s visitation to two supervised hours per week.  
¶ 7 
 
At a Review and Permanency Planning Hearing conducted on 13 November 
2018, DHHS presented additional evidence that challenged respondent-mother’s 
claim that she had ended her relationship with Mr. D. In its resulting order, the trial 
court found that respondent-mother’s neighbor had witnessed the presence of Mr. D. 
at respondent-mother’s home repeatedly over a period of several months. It further 
found that a private investigator made similar observations over a ten-day period in 
September 2018. Hence, the primary permanent plan for the juveniles was changed 
to adoption with a secondary permanent plan of guardianship/reunification.  
¶ 8 
 
On 30 July 2019, DHHS filed a petition to terminate respondent-mother’s 
parental rights to the juveniles alleging the grounds of neglect, willfully leaving her 
children in foster care or a placement outside the home for more than twelve months 
without making reasonable progress toward correcting the conditions that led to their 
removal, and willfully failing to pay a reasonable portion of her children’s cost of care 
for the six months preceding the filing of the petition. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–
(3) (2019). The petition also alleged that respondent-mother had relocated to New 
York and secured employment there.  
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¶ 9 
 
The hearing on the termination of parental rights petition was conducted over 
a two-day period in January 2020. On 2 March 2020, the trial court entered an order 
terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights. The trial court found that grounds 
existed for termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1)–(2), but it dismissed the 
third ground which was alleged under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3). At the disposition 
stage, the trial court concluded that termination of respondent-mother’s parental 
rights was in the children’s best interests. Respondent-mother appeals.  
II. 
Standard of Review 
¶ 10 
 
When considering a petition to terminate parental rights, the trial court first 
adjudicates the existence of the alleged grounds for termination. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1109 (2019). “At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the burden of proving by 
‘clear, cogent, and convincing evidence’ the existence of one or more grounds for 
termination under section 7B-1111(a) of the General Statutes.” In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 
3, 5–6 (2019) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109(f) (2017)). “If a trial court finds one or more 
grounds to terminate parental rights under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a), it then proceeds 
to the dispositional stage,” id. at 6, at which it “determine[s] whether terminating the 
parent’s rights is in the juvenile’s best interest.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a) (2019). 
¶ 11 
 
This Court reviews a trial court’s adjudication of grounds to terminate parental 
rights “to determine whether the findings are supported by clear, cogent and 
convincing evidence and the findings support the conclusions of law.” In re E.H.P., 
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372 N.C. 388, 392 (2019) (quoting In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 111 (1984)). 
“Findings of fact not challenged by respondent are deemed supported by competent 
evidence and are binding on appeal.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407 (2019) (citing 
Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97 (1991)). “The trial court’s conclusions of law 
are reviewable de novo on appeal.” In re C.B.C., 373 N.C. 16, 19 (2019). 
III. 
Willful Failure to Make Reasonable Progress 
¶ 12 
 
Pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), termination of parental rights is 
permitted when “[t]he parent has willfully left the juvenile in foster care or placement 
outside the home for more than 12 months without showing to the satisfaction of the 
court that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in correcting 
those conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2).  
According to N.C.G.S. § 7B-904(d1)(3), a trial judge 
has the authority to require the parent of a juvenile who 
has been adjudicated to be abused, neglected, or dependent 
to “[t]ake appropriate steps to remedy conditions in the 
home that led to or contributed to the juvenile’s 
adjudication or to the court’s decision to remove custody of 
the juvenile from the parent, guardian, custodian, or 
caretaker.” 
In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 381 (2019). “[A] trial court has ample authority to 
determine that a parent’s ‘extremely limited progress’ in correcting the conditions 
leading to removal adequately supports a determination that a parent’s parental 
rights in a particular child are subject to termination pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(2).” Id. at 385 (quoting In re S.N., 194 N.C. App. 142, 149 (2008)).  
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¶ 13 
 
In this case, the children were removed from respondent-mother’s care and 
adjudicated to be neglected and dependent based upon a series of serious domestic 
violence incidents perpetrated by Mr. D. during 2016. In order to correct the 
underlying causes of these circumstances, the trial court ordered respondent-mother 
to complete domestic violence victim counseling.  
A. Challenged Findings of Fact 
¶ 14 
 
Respondent-mother first contends that the trial court erroneously determined 
that the ground of willful failure to make reasonable progress provided a basis for the 
termination of her parental rights because she “made substantial progress on or 
completed all components of her case plan.” She challenges the following findings of 
fact,2 either in whole or in part, which address her progress in rectifying the domestic 
violence issues that she experienced in her relationship with Mr. D.: 
42. Respondent/mother failed to demonstrate the ability to 
protect the juveniles in that she has failed to take the 
necessary steps to remove herself from relationships 
involving domestic violence and she has not demonstrated 
an understanding of the traumatic impact of domestic 
violence in the home of the juveniles.  
. . . . 
47. Respondent/mother has continued a relationship with 
[Mr. D.] and there have been multiple documented 
incidents of Respondent/mother and [Mr. D.] continuing to 
                                            
2 “[W]e limit our review of challenged findings to those that are necessary to support 
the district court’s determination that this ground of respondent-mother’s willful failure to 
make reasonable progress existed in order to terminate her parental rights.” In re A.R.A., 
373 N.C. 190, 195 (2019). 
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maintain a relationship as well as additional incidents of 
domestic violence between them.  
. . . . 
64. 
Tony 
R[.], 
private 
investigator, 
did 
surveil 
Respondent/mother’s home and did observe [Mr. D.] 
coming and going from Respondent/mother’s home 
multiple times between September 20, 2018 and 
September 30, 2018.  
. . . . 
74. On November 13, 2018, Respondent/mother did attend 
a hearing on [DHHS’s] Motion for Review regarding her 
visitation with the juveniles. Respondent/mother did 
testify under oath that she had contact with [Mr. D.] on 
three (3) occasions: July 2017, Christmas 2018 and 
September 2018. Respondent/mother did not inform the 
Court of having been with [Mr. D.] in November 2017 when 
she had a car accident. Respondent/mother did not inform 
the Court of [Mr. D.] being at her home on December 17, 
2017 when [Mr. D.] did assault her. During her sworn 
testimony, Respondent/mother did not inform the Court of 
the incident that had occurred October 12, 2018, just one 
month prior to the hearing, during which [Mr. D.] did 
assault her and cause damage to the vehicle she was 
driving.  
. . . . 
98. The Court did not find on December 10, 2019 that 
Respondent/mother is unable to obtain said domestic 
violence victim’s treatment due to her lack of funds and the 
Court did not order that [DHHS] pay for said treatment. 
Respondent/mother did testify and this Court does find 
that she has at all times been employed and does not have 
difficulty ensuring her bills are paid. Respondent/mother 
did have the means and ability to comply with domestic 
violence counseling but she was unwilling to make an effort 
despite actual knowledge that it was ordered by the Court 
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on July 18, 2017.  
. . . . 
101. Respondent/mother has willfully failed to participate 
in any further therapy for domestic violence though she 
was specifically ordered to do so by the Honorable Judge 
Pennie M. Thrower on July 18, 2017.  
102. The Court also finds that after Respondent/mother 
completed domestic violence victims’ treatment in early 
2017, she continued to engage in a relationship with [Mr. 
D.] and multiple incidents of domestic violence between 
Respondent/mother and [Mr. D.] did occur. By her pattern 
of behavior, Respondent/mother has failed to demonstrate 
that she has developed the skills required to remove and 
protect herself and the juveniles from exposure to domestic 
violence.  
. . . . 
104. The Court further finds that Respondent/mother 
continues to minimize the domestic violence that occurred 
between her and [Mr. D.]. 
105. The Court further finds that Respondent/mother does 
not fully appreciate or demonstrate concern about the 
negative lifelong impact that witnessing and being a part 
of a toxic domestic violence household has had on the 
juveniles.  
106. The Court further finds that no reasonable progress 
has been made in correcting the conditions, specifically 
domestic violence, that brought the juveniles into [DHHS’s] 
custody. 
1. Finding of Fact 47 
¶ 15 
 
Finding of Fact 47, which states that respondent-mother maintained a 
relationship with Mr. D. and that it was marked by multiple new incidents of 
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domestic violence, was supported by several of the trial court’s other findings of fact 
which respondent-mother has not challenged and therefore are binding on appeal. 
For example, the trial court found that: (1) Mr. D. assaulted respondent-mother on 
15 February 2017; (2) Nicole saw Mr. D. in respondent-mother’s home during a visit 
on 29 May 2017; (3) respondent-mother was in an automobile accident on 17 
November 2017 while Mr. D. was a passenger; (4) Mr. D. assaulted respondent-
mother at her home on 17 December 2017; (5) DHHS was informed in September 
2018 that Mr. D. was living at respondent-mother’s home; (6) respondent-mother was 
again driving with Mr. D. as a passenger on 12 October 2018 when they got into a 
physical and verbal altercation which resulted in Mr. D. punching respondent-mother 
in the face; and (7) Mr. D. attended respondent-mother’s “launch party” in April 2019, 
and the two subsequently visited a museum together. Taken together, these 
unchallenged findings of fact amply support the trial court’s Finding of Fact 47. 
2. Findings of Fact 64 and 74 
¶ 16 
 
Findings of Fact 64 and 74 refer to specific additional contacts between 
respondent-mother and Mr. D. Private investigator Tony R. testified that he 
witnessed Mr. D.’s car parked near respondent-mother’s apartment on 20 September 
2018, that he witnessed Mr. D. and respondent-mother return together to respondent-
mother’s parking lot on 26 September 2018, that he witnessed Mr. D. leaving 
respondent-mother’s parking lot on 28 September 2018, that Mr. D.’s vehicle was 
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back in respondent-mother’s parking lot on the evening of 28 September 2018, and 
that Mr. D.’s car was subsequently in respondent-mother’s parking lot on 30 
September 2018. This testimony from the private investigator fully supports Finding 
of Fact 64. 
¶ 17 
 
As to Finding of Fact 74, respondent-mother challenges as impossible the 
portion of the finding which states that respondent-mother testified on 13 November 
2018 that she “had contact” with Mr. D. on Christmas 2018, since the date of 25 
December 2018 had not occurred yet. Respondent-mother is correct that her 
testimony represented that she “invited [Mr. D.] to a Christmas party in December 
2018.” At the termination hearing, respondent-mother testified that the Christmas 
party actually occurred. While this testimony from respondent-mother herself, along 
with logical inferences which can be drawn therefrom, is evidence that could support 
the reference to respondent-mother’s Christmas 2018 meeting with Mr. D., this detail 
in Finding of Fact 74 is unnecessary to support the trial court’s ultimate 
determination that a ground existed which would allow the termination of 
respondent-mother’s parental rights. Accordingly, we shall disregard the portion of 
Finding of Fact 74 that attributes contact between respondent-mother and Mr. D. on 
Christmas 2018 to respondent-mother’s 13 November 2018 testimony.  
3. Findings of Fact 98 and 101 
¶ 18 
 
Findings of Fact 98 and 101 address the additional domestic violence therapy 
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that respondent-mother was ordered to undergo after it was determined that she was 
still involved with Mr. D. In the 13 October 2017 order referenced in the termination 
order,3 the trial court ordered respondent-mother to “attend therapy to assist the 
juveniles with healing from the domestic violence they have witnessed and to develop 
a better understanding of the impact of domestic violence upon them.” Respondent-
mother submits that this language only requires additional family therapy, rather 
than her own individual therapy. Even assuming that respondent-mother’s 
resourceful interpretation of the wording in the 13 October 2017 finding of fact is 
correct, there was still ample evidence presented at the hearing that respondent-
mother was previously required to engage in additional individual domestic violence 
therapy and failed to do so. At the termination of parental rights hearing, a DHHS 
social worker specifically stated that the social worker’s team had informed 
respondent-mother that the parent “needed to engage in further domestic violence 
counseling[.]” Additionally, respondent-mother does not challenge several of the other 
findings of the trial court on this issue, including a finding that respondent-mother 
had “acknowledged that she had been advised to engage in further domestic violence 
victims’ treatment.” This evidence supports the trial court’s determination that 
respondent-mother failed to engage in further additional domestic violence therapy 
                                            
3 The termination of parental rights order references 18 July 2017—the date the 
underlying hearing occurred—but the resulting order was not entered until 13 October 2017. 
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as required. 
4. Findings of Fact 42, 102, 104, 105, and 106  
¶ 19 
 
Respondent-mother challenges Findings of Fact 42, 102, 104, 105, and 106 to 
the extent that they show that she failed to make reasonable progress in addressing 
her domestic violence issues stemming from her ongoing relationship with Mr. D. She 
argues that her early completion of domestic violence therapy and her months-long 
separation from Mr. D. after she moved to New York demonstrated that domestic 
violence was no longer an issue that interfered with her ability to care for her 
children. 
¶ 20 
 
While there is no dispute that respondent-mother completed a counseling 
program for domestic violence victims in early 2017, her subsequent behavior 
indicates that she failed to modify her behavior sufficiently as a result of the program. 
As previously noted, respondent-mother continued to maintain a relationship with 
Mr. D., despite the fact that he continued to perpetrate domestic violence against her. 
The trial court’s findings reflect that Mr. D. was convicted of the criminal offense of 
simple assault on 17 October 2018 and the criminal offense of assault on a female on 
6 December 2018, based on two separate incidents in which respondent-mother was 
the victim which occurred after she completed the domestic violence counseling.  
Respondent-mother did not report these incidents to DHHS or to the trial court. 
Despite receiving instructions from DHHS to attend additional domestic violence 
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counseling, respondent-mother failed to do so. The trial court specifically found that 
respondent-mother “did have the means and ability to comply with domestic violence 
counseling but she was unwilling to make an effort.” 
¶ 21 
 
The record reflects that respondent-mother repeatedly misrepresented the 
status of her relationship with Mr. D. The trial court’s order includes seven 
unchallenged findings detailing respondent-mother’s numerous attempts throughout 
the history of this case to falsely claim that her relationship with Mr. D. had ended.  
The trial court’s findings of fact also reflect that respondent-mother was still 
socializing with Mr. D. as late as April 2019, which was twenty-eight months after 
her children entered DHHS custody and nine months before the termination of 
parental rights hearing. 
¶ 22 
 
Respondent-mother’s false statements continued through the termination of 
parental rights hearing itself. The trial court, after evaluating respondent-mother’s 
testimony, assessed her credibility as follows: 
The Court finds that Respondent/mother’s testimony 
during this termination of parental rights hearing was not 
credible in that she was deceptive, manipulative and 
dishonest. The Court finds that Respondent/mother did 
repeatedly attempt to mislead the Court, she did exhibit 
selective memory and she did attempt to minimize and 
explain away her continued relationship with [Mr. D.]. The 
Court 
did 
caution 
Respondent/mother 
during 
her 
testimony of the consequences of perjury and contempt of 
court. 
The trial court was pointedly clear that it did not believe respondent-mother’s 
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accounts of the character of the relationship which she shared with Mr. D. 
Respondent-mother’s misrepresentations concerning her affiliation with her abuser, 
even offered in her testimony at the termination of parental rights hearing, provided 
a further foundation for the tribunal’s findings of fact in light of its determination of 
credibility, to which this Court must give deference.  
¶ 23 
 
The above-referenced evidence supports the trial court’s determination that 
respondent-mother failed to understand or adequately address the traumatic impact 
of domestic violence on her children. Over the thirty-eight months that her children 
were in the custody of DHHS, respondent-mother failed to make meaningful progress 
to correct the causes of the domestic violence that led to the juveniles’ removal from 
her home.  
B. Adjudication Under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2) 
¶ 24 
 
As to the trial court’s adjudication under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2), it properly 
determined pursuant to the evidence presented during the two-day hearing in 
January 2020 that respondent-mother did not make a reasonable effort to correct the 
issues attributable to her relationship with Mr. D. and the prevalence of domestic 
violence that led to the children’s removal from her care. Instead, respondent-mother 
prioritized her relationship with Mr. D. while falsely and repeatedly claiming that 
the relationship had ended. Based upon respondent-mother’s willful failure to make 
reasonable progress in addressing her issues with domestic violence, the trial court 
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properly concluded that her parental rights were subject to termination under 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). 
IV. 
Conclusion 
¶ 25 
 
Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the trial court properly 
determined that respondent-mother’s parental rights could be terminated pursuant 
to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2). Since we have determined that this termination of 
parental rights ground is supported, we need not address respondent-mother’s 
arguments as to the ground of neglect under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(1), which is the 
other ground found by the trial court that could substantiate the termination of 
respondent-mother’s parental rights. See In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. 190, 194 (2019) (“[A] 
finding of only one ground is necessary to support a termination of parental 
rights . . . .”). Moreover, respondent-mother does not challenge the trial court’s 
conclusion that termination of her parental rights was in the juveniles’ best interests. 
Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s order terminating respondent-mother’s 
parental rights. 
AFFIRMED.