Case Title: Kennard v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 74, 2007

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-09-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
MATTHEW KENNARD, 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 74, 2007 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. A. No. 0603000676 and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  0505021068 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  August 22, 2007 
Decided:  September 6, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 6th day of September 2007, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
Appellant-defendant Matthew Kennard appeals his Superior Court 
convictions for Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person Prohibited (two 
counts), Possession of a Destructive Weapon, and Possession of Ammunition by a 
Person Prohibited, Receiving a Stolen Firearm (two counts), and several burglary 
related offenses.  The State entered nolle prosequis on two of the burglary charges 
and the ammunition charge.  After a four day trial, a jury acquitted Kennard of the 
remaining burglary offenses and convicted him of all of the weapons charges.  The 
trial judge sentenced Kennard to four years and nine months at Level V followed 
by probation.  Kennard appeals from those convictions and contends that the trial 
 
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judge violated his right to cross examination and confrontation when, without 
conducting a Flowers hearing, the trial judge allowed the State to conceal the 
identity of its confidential informant.  After consideration of the record, we 
conclude that because the CI did not give police any information regarding 
Kennard, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he refused to disclose 
the CI’s identity.  Furthermore, the record shows that the State continued to use the 
CI in other investigations.  Faced with those circumstances, Kennard has failed to 
demonstrate that the CI possessed any information that would materially aid his 
defense, and thus, outweigh the State’s need to protect the CI’s identity.  
Accordingly, we affirm. 
(2) 
On November 16, 2005, Michelle Lindsay reported that her home in 
Townsend had been burglarized.  According to Lindsey, a play station, games, 
DVD player, discs, two laptop computers and two shotguns were missing.  Lindsay 
gave the serial numbers of the two missing weapons to the police and identified the 
guns at trial.  On December 5, 2006, Patricia Ayala notified police that her home in 
Townsend had been burglarized and that $40,000, coins, jewelry, and $2 bills were 
missing.  Neither Lindsay nor Ayala knew who perpetrated the crime, and there 
was no physical evidence to link anyone to the crimes.   
(3) 
One month later, on January 14, 2005, Newark Police Detective Mark 
Fenney received a tip from a CI, who told him that an individual named Justin 
 
3
Jackson was trying to get rid of some guns. The CI also told Feeney that Jackson 
was with a female and that the two of them would soon be driving to Cherry Hill 
Manor Apartments in Newark to meet another person named Sean, who would 
help Jackson dispose of the guns.  Based on that information, the police surveilled 
Jackson and saw him riding in a blue Kia with a female driver in Newark, 
Delaware.  Once the police located the car, Officer Beighley pulled the car over for 
failure to signal.  The driver of the car was Lindsay Emery, Kennard’s girlfriend.  
Justin Jackson and Sean Prestbury were also in the car.  Emery could not produce 
registration and proof of insurance.   
(4) 
Beighley asked for permission to search the vehicle and Emery 
consented.  Beighley found marijuana in the passenger compartment and on the 
back seat.  Beighley also found two shotguns and two rifles in the trunk wrapped in 
what was later determined to be Kennard’s jacket.  Police determined that the two 
shotguns were the ones stolen from Lindsay’s home.1 
(5) 
The police arrested Jackson and interviewed him.  At the beginning of 
the interview, Jackson stated that he did not know where the guns came from or 
that they were stolen.  Six weeks later and after being charged with multiple 
weapons offenses, Jackson implicated Kennard.  He told police that he saw 
                                                 
1  
Kennard was incarcerated at the time of this stop.   
 
4
Kennard with a case of guns in December 2005 and that the guns had been hidden 
in the attic and basement at 3 Messen Drive.   
(6) 
Jackson also told police that Kennard had called him from prison and 
told him to get rid of the weapons, which explained why police found the guns in 
the car.  The police obtained taped recordings of phone calls Kennard made from 
the prison.  At trial, the State claimed that these recordings corroborated Jackson’s 
statement.   
(7) 
From late November to mid December 2005, Kennard had lived with 
Emery in her mother’s basement.  Emery’s mother, Joanne, testified that during 
that time Kennard did not work, but he spent a lot of money.  She also testified that 
Kennard flashed a wad of cash at her.  After leaving Joanne’s house, Kennard 
moved to 3 Messen Drive.  Three other people, Tim Meyers, Justin Campbell, and 
Joe Pszenycyniak “hung out” at that address as well.   
(8) 
At trial, the State referred to the CI during its opening statement.2  
Defense counsel then requested that the State disclose the CI’s identity.  The State 
                                                 
 
2  
During opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury that: 
 
January 14th of 2006, Detective Mark Feeney of the Newark Police Department 
received information from a confidential source that a black male by the name of 
Justin Jackson was in possession of several firearms, and he was trying to get rid 
of them.  He was advised that he would be in the company of a white female; that 
they would be going to Cherry Hill Manor in Newark, Delaware, to meet up with 
another black male by the name of Sean who was going to help him get rid of the 
guns. 
  
 
5
argued that the CI’s name was privileged and need not be disclosed because the CI 
did not have information about the burglaries, the stop and search did not result 
from the tips and the CI had no information material to Kennard’s defense.  In 
response, defense counsel asked the trial judge to meet with the prosecutors and 
ask certain questions of them to determine if the CI’s name should be disclosed. 
(9) 
The trial judge then met with the prosecutors and the police officer.  
The parties filed the transcript of that conference under seal with this Court.  After 
the conference, the trial judge told defense counsel that he had asked the 
prosecutors the questions that defense counsel had requested. 
(10) Defense counsel then told the trial judge that it was necessary for the 
CI to come in and the trial judge examine him.  Defense counsel further argued 
that the trial judge should not rely solely on the State’s representations about what 
information the CI may have about Kennard or the crimes for which he stood 
accused.  Based on the State’s representations, the trial judge denied this request 
and ruled that State was not required to disclose the CI’s identity, because the CI 
had no knowledge of the crimes for which Kennard was being tried. 
(11) At trial, the jury found Kennard guilty of two counts of Receiving a 
Stolen Firearm and Possession of a Destructive Weapon.  The trial judge found 
Kennard to be a “Person Prohibited” from possessing a firearm.  The trial judge 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
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sentenced Kennard to four years and nine months at Level V followed by 
probation.  Kennard’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial judge violated his 
rights to cross examination and confrontation when, without conducting a Flowers 
hearing, he allowed the State to conceal the identity of its CI. 
(12) “We review a trial court’s refusal to compel disclosure of the identity 
of a confidential informant for abuse of discretion.”3  “An abuse of discretion 
occurs if the trial court’s decision is based on ‘clearly unreasonable or capricious 
grounds.’”4  Delaware Uniform Rule of Evidence 509 (a) affords the State a 
privilege to refuse to disclose the identity of a CI unless it appears that the CI may 
be able to give testimony that would “materially aid the defense.”5  “The defense 
has the burden of establishing, beyond mere speculation, that the informant’s 
testimony would materially aid the defense.”6  Moreover, “where the State claims 
that the identity of an informer is privileged, the trial court must examine, in detail 
and case-by-case, whether the informer’s identity should be disclosed.”7 
                                                 
3  
Davis v. State, 1998 WL 666713, *1 (Del.), citing Brown v. State, 1992 WL 53420, *4 
(Del.). 
 
4  
Bultron v. State, 897 A.2d 758, 762 (Del. 2006). 
 
5  
D.R.E. 509 (a); D.R.E. 509 (c) (2). 
 
6  
Price v. State, 2000 WL 1616590, *2 (Del.). 
 
7  
Butcher v. State, 906 A.2d 798, 802 (Del. 2006). 
 
7
(13) “The comment to D.R.E. 509 notes that the Delaware rule of informer 
privilege follows, in part, the Superior Court’s holding in State v. Flowers.”8  The 
Flowers Court described four circumstances under which the issue of disclosing 
the informer’s identity arises:  (1) the informer’s information formed the basis to 
establish probable cause for a search; (2) the informer witnessed a criminal act; (3) 
the informer participated in, but was not a party to, an illegal transaction; and (4) 
the informer was an actual party to an illegal transaction.9  
(14) In the case at bar, the record shows that the CI made no mention of 
Kennard nor implicated him in any way, and that apparently the police did not ask 
the CI the weapons’ source.  The State notes that the police lawfully stopped the 
vehicle for a traffic violation, had the driver’s consent to search, seized the 
weapons pursuant to that search and information about their source did not come 
                                                 
 
8  
Id; see also State v. Flowers, 316 A.2d 564 (Del. Super. 1973). 
 
9  
Id. at 802, citing State v. Flowers, 316 A.2d at 567.  In Butcher, we held that: 
 
In Flowers, the Superior Court noted that while the privilege is generally 
protected in the first situation and disclosure is usually required in the fourth 
situation, there is no general rule for the second and third situations—where the 
informer witnessed the criminal act or participated in the illegal transaction.  In 
the second and third scenarios, disclosure of the informer’s identity is required 
only if the trial judge determines that the informer’s testimony is material to the 
defense. 
 
Butcher, 906 A.2d at 802-03. 
 
 
8
from the CI.10  Justin Jackson, not the CI, implicated Kennard.  Therefore, under 
Flowers and its progeny, the informant privilege prevails because the CI’s tips and 
observations satisfied none of the four Flowers criteria. 
(15) In Roviaro v. United States,11 the United States Supreme Court held 
that the appellate court was only required to “balanc[e] the public interest in 
protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to prepare his 
defense.”12  After reviewing the trial judge’s ruling13 and the sealed ex parte 
                                                 
10 At trial, the prosecutor argued that: 
 
But I think the argument Mr. Barber was making was that this stop wasn’t based 
on this [confidential informant].  When a stop is made based on the [confidential 
informant]’s information, there's often a hearing to determine was he reliable, 
what did he say, how is it reliable.  But this stop was ultimately made based on 
the traffic stop, the finding of the marijuana, and then a search pursuant to a 
lawful custodial arrest into the trunk area.  And the CI really doesn’t come into 
play at all.  That’s why we really don’t think it’s relevant.  But I have no problem 
meeting with the Court and divulging that information to the Court alone. 
 
 
11  
353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957). 
 
12  
Id. at 62.  
 
13  
In response to Kennard’s request to disclose the Informant’s identity, the trial judge ruled 
that: 
 
 
. . .  Okay.  In this case, probable cause for the stop was established by the driver's 
failure to signal.  Police had probable cause to stop the vehicle.  The driver then 
failed to produce registration and insurance information.  After the driver 
consented to a search, a green leafy substance was found consistent with 
marijuana.  That was found on the floor of the back of the car.  The search 
subsequent to the arrest led to the discovery of weapons in the trunk. 
 
The officer who testified who made the stop testified that he didn't know prior to 
the stop that the weapons were in the trunk.  Most case incidents involving a 
requirement of disclosure of an informant identity arise when the legality of the 
 
9
conference transcripts submitted to this Court, we conclude that because the CI did 
not implicate Kennard and appeared to have no information concerning Kennard, 
further inquiry to derive information from the CI would not result in material aid to 
Kennard’s defense.  Furthermore, because the State continued to use the CI in 
other investigations, Kennard has failed to demonstrate that his need for disclosure 
outweighed the State’s need to protect the CI’s identity. Therefore, the trial judge 
                                                                                                                                                             
search without a warrant is an issue, and the communications of an informer are 
claimed to establish probable cause.   
 
If you do the analysis of the case, first, if you look at Brady material, if the State 
knows that the unnamed witness can give information favorable to the defense, 
then the State has a duty to disclose.  And, typically, that is a witness who is 
referred to in trial testimony.  Here the witness has no information that would 
have been favorable to the defense.  And reference to the confidential informant 
was not made in trial testimony -- 
*** 
The jury was told in the opening -- the jury was told what was said in opening 
statements are not evidence.  If you look at the Flowers analysis, as a result of the 
hearing, as a result of talking to the officers, the confidential informant was not 
used to establish probable cause for the search.  With respect to this defendant's -- 
if you look at the defendant's charges and what he was indicted for and the 
criminal acts which he stands accused, this informant was not a party to any of the 
indicted illegal transactions that took place. 
 
Also, there’s a case out there, Boomer v. State, Supreme Court case, 1996, 
Delaware [Lexis] 374.  In this case, at the time of trial, the defendant, while cross-
examining the police officer, demanded that the confidential informant be 
revealed.  At that time the Supreme Court would not consider the issue because 
the defendant did not make a request for the identification of the informant as 
required under State v. Flowers.  He did not make use of the discovery provisions 
of Delaware Rule of Evidence 509, which are very similar to this case. 
 
Based on the hearing I had yesterday and questioning of the police officer, I drew 
the conclusion that this informant had nothing to do with any of the indicted 
crimes that the defendant is accused of having done. 
 
 
10
properly determined that the privilege not to disclose the CI’s identity should 
prevail. 
(16) Alternatively, relying on Butcher v. State,14 Kennard claims that the ex 
parte hearing was inadequate because the trial judge examined the police, but not 
the CI, in the presence of prosecutors.  We disagree.  First, we have previously 
upheld a trial judge’s conclusion that the defendant had not shown a reasonable 
probability that the CI could give testimony that would materially aid the defense, 
under similar circumstances where the trial judge examined the police officer 
alone.15  Second, in Butcher, the defendant moved to disclose the CI’s identity, by 
claiming “the informer was the only person other than [the Detective] who 
witnessed the [alleged illegal act].”16  Here, the record does not support that any of 
the four Flowers criteria are implicated. Kennard’s contention that the identity of 
the CI would have materially aided him in proving his defense by challenging 
Jackson’s credibility has no merit. Kennard’s contention that an interview with the 
CI may have furthered his defense is based on pure speculation.  Thus, Kennard 
has failed to meet his burden to show that the CI may be able to give testimony 
which would materially aid his defense.  
                                                 
14  
906 A.2d 798 (Del. 2006). 
 
15  
Hooks v. State, 1992 Del. LEXIS 305 (Del.). 
 
16  
Butcher v. State, 906 A. 2d 798, 800 (Del. 2006). 
 
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(17) We conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he 
denied Kennard’s request that the State disclose the CI’s identity or when he 
denied Kennard’s related request to produce the CI for an in camera Flowers 
hearing. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice