Case Title: State v. Sam

Citation: 412 So. 2d 1082

Docket Number: 81-KA-0897

State: louisiana

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Date: 1982-04-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
412 So. 2d 1082 (1982) STATE of Louisiana v. Alvin SAM. No. 81-KA-0897. Supreme Court of Louisiana. April 6, 1982. *1083 William J. Guste, Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., J. William Pucheu, Dist. Atty., Richard W. Vidrine, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee. Preston N. Aucoin, Ville Platte, for defendant-appellant. DIXON, Chief Justice.[*] Defendant, Alvin Sam, was indicted for the second degree murder of Milton Leday in violation of R.S. 14:30.1. After a trial by jury, defendant was found guilty as charged and sentenced to life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole or suspension. Defendant appeals, asserting thirteen assignments of error. On November 30, 1979 Alvin Sam joined a poker game in the "gambling shack" of the Happy Landing Club in Ville Platte, Louisiana. Sam sat down next to Milton Leday and an argument over the rules of the game soon developed between the two men. The victim stood up and slapped defendant on the side of the head. Sam fell back against a handrail, pulled a .22 caliber handgun and fired one shot into Leday's abdomen. On December 2, 1979 the victim died from the gunshot wound. Assignment of Error No. 5 Defendant asserts that a mistrial should have been granted because of questions asked during the state's cross-examination of Sam. The following exchange occurred between the district attorney and defendant: Defense counsel claims that the district attorney badgered Alvin Sam about the exercise of his constitutional right to remain silent thereby creating prejudice against him in the minds of the jurors. In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976), the prosecutor sought to impeach the defendant's exculpatory trial testimony by cross-examining him about his failure to tell the story after given Miranda warnings at the time of his arrest. The court held that the use of an accused's post-arrest silence after receiving *1084 Miranda warnings for purposes of impeachment violated the due process clause. This court followed Doyle v. Ohio, supra, in State v. Montoya, 340 So. 2d 557, 560 (La.1976). In that case, the arresting police officer was asked by the prosecutor whether the accused told the officer where he had procured drugs involved in the arrest. This court held: In a later case, State v. Mosley, 390 So. 2d 1302, 1305-06 (La.1980), the court addressed this question again. The prosecutor was allowed to ask two police officers called by the state if the defendant had been advised of his constitutional rights upon arrest. The conviction was upheld despite the court's disapproval of the conduct of the prosecuting attorney because the reference to the accused's silence was oblique and obscure: Most recently, in State v. Brown, 395 So. 2d 1301 (La.1981), the prosecution introduced a blank rights form into evidence. This court found no prejudice had resulted to the defendant because the form was offered only to show that he had been advised of his constitutional rights. No attempt was made by the prosecution to elicit testimony concerning the accused's failure to respond to police questioning; in fact the accused made several exculpatory statements during the interrogation. Further, the defense had opened the door to the defendant's attitude upon arrest, thereby entitling the state to produce evidence to rebut the defense's contention. In the case before us the prosecutor emphasized Sam's refusal to give a statement after his arrest. Although the defendant can be fully cross-examined when he takes the stand and is subject to impeachment by use of his silence under certain circumstances,[1] it is fundamentally unfair to allow the arrested person's silence to impeach him at trial, as explained in Doyle v. Ohio, supra: Here, the defendant took the stand and offered an otherwise plausible explanation to explain his conduct. To impeach him by casting doubt on his defense, using his constitutional right to silence to establish an inference that the defense was fabricated, constitutes reversible error. To aid in a retrial of this case, other meritorious assignments raised by defendant will be discussed. Assignments of Error Nos. 4 and 6 Defendant urges that the trial court erred in forbidding his testifying about prior incidents between himself and the victim's relative, Melvin Leday. The trial court instructed defendant not to mention any trouble between himself and the victim's family because only incidents between the victim and defendant were relevant to show the victim's violent character.[2] Defendant argues that this testimony was relevant to show why defendant began carrying a pistol and was not offered as evidence of the victim's dangerous character. As Sam, himself, told the judge (the jury had been removed): When offered to prove the reason defendant was armed, this testimony would bear directly on the self-defense theory and would be relevant. The defense also sought to introduce a logbook entry from the sheriff's office which showed that Sam came in on November 26, 1977 and declared that the Ledays beat him with chairs at the Happy Landing. The court refused to allow this entry into the record for the same reasons noted above. We cannot rule on all the evidentiary questions which might be raised by such an offering, but it is not irrelevant. Assignment of Error No. 7 By this assignment, defendant contends that the trial court erred in not *1086 allowing the introduction of a knife found in the area where the victim had lain after the shooting. The defense called Wilson Joseph who testified that he was present at the Happy Landing on the night of the shooting and that he found an open pocket knife on the ground outside the tavern. He stated that the knife displayed in court was the one he found at the scene. Joseph picked up the knife and put it in his pocket; Sam's sister and another man purportedly observed Joseph's actions. Defendant argues that the knife is crucial to show the decedent was armed and that Sam acted in self-defense. In order to introduce demonstrative evidence, it suffices if the foundation laid establishes that it is more probable than not that the object is the one connected with the case; lack of positive identification or a defect in the chain of custody goes to the weight of the evidence rather than to its admissibility. State v. Williams, 362 So. 2d 530 (La.1978); State v. Provost, 352 So. 2d 661 (La.1977). It appears that a proper foundation for admission of the knife was laid; whether or not the knife belonged to the decedent is a question of fact for the jury. Assignment of Error No. 8 By this assignment, defendant submits that error was committed by the court's refusal to allow the accused to introduce the victim's record of prior convictions to demonstrate that the victim had a dangerous character. Defendant relies on R.S. 15:482 which provides: Evidence of "hostile demonstration or of overt act" was presented by the defense.[3] Defendant claims that this provision permits introduction of criminal records. The state argues that this provision must be read in conjunction with R.S. 15:479 which states: It is the state's position that dangerous character cannot be proven by specific acts, such as conviction records, but only by evidence of general reputation. The trial court agreed with the prosecution. In State v. King, 347 So. 2d 1108, 1111 n.3 (La.1977), this court observed: Under State v. King, supra, the victim's prior record may be admitted if a showing is made that Sam knew of the record at the time of the shooting. In this instance, the traditional rule against proof of character by specific acts, R.S. 15:479, gives way to permit a defendant to prove his knowledge of the victim's violent propensity. No showing was made that Sam knew of the acts contained in Milton Leday's police record; however, Sam testified that he knew the victim "had hurt several people before" and had "beat up and cut up a dude across *1087 town." He also stated that Paul Richard and Valmond Bellard had been victimized by the decedent. There is no indication whether these individuals are named as victims in Leday's police record or whether the incidents referred to by Sam are contained in the record. If such a connection can be made upon retrial, the victim's record may be admissible. For these reasons, defendant's conviction is reversed and the case remanded to the district court for a new trial. KLIEBERT and KLEES, JJ. ad hoc, dissents. DOUCET, J. ad hoc, dissents with reasons. NED E. DOUCET, Justice Ad Hoc (dissenting). I disagree with my learned brethren that the exchange between the Prosecutor and the Defendant, complained of in Assignment of Error Number 5, constituted reversible error. I do agree that Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S. Ct. 2240, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1976) specifically prohibits the prosecutor from using a defendant's post-Miranda warning silence to impeach the defendant. I do not agree that in this case the prosecutor did so, or attempted to do so. While cross examining the defendant, the prosecutor asked a short series of questions concerning Sam's silence after having been advised of his rights, as set forth in Miranda. In this case, the District Attorney was clearly not seeking to impeach but rather was seeking to establish that the defendant had been properly advised of his rights at the time of his arrest. Only one question concerned Sam's not having given a statement. The other questions complained of by the defense addressed the sufficiency of the warnings. While I do not wish to encourage prosecutors to indulge in this type of questioning, I do not agree that in this case the questions were impermissible under Doyle, supra. It is my opinion, rather, that these questions fall squarely within this Court's holding in State v. Brown, 395 So. 2d 1301 (La.1981); that these questions were designed to show the sufficiency of the post-arrest warnings, and that there resulted no prejudice to the defendant. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. [*] Judges Ned E. Doucet, Jr. of the Third Circuit and Thomas J. Kliebert and Robert J. Klees of the Fourth Circuit, participated in this decision as Associate Justices Ad Hoc, joined by Chief Justice Dixon and Associate Justices Calogero, Dennis and Watson. [1] In Doyle v. Ohio, supra, the court noted one such circumstance: "It goes almost without saying that the fact of post-arrest silence could be used by the prosecution to contradict a defendant who testifies to an exculpatory version of events and claims to have told the police the same version upon arrest. In that situation the fact of earlier silence would not be used to impeach the exculpatory story, but rather to challenge the defendant's testimony as to his behavior following arrest. Cf. United States v. Fairchild, 505 F.2d 1378, 1383 (CA5 1975)." Id. at 619-620 n. 11, 96 S. Ct. at 2245 n. 11, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 98-99 n. 11. [2] The trial judge admonished defendant: "Mr. Sam. Excuse me. If you had any difficulty with Milton Leday, you can talkyou can say about that but you must not say about Melvin Leday. You understand? You're not to mention that. You can say about Milton. If you had any difficulty with him before, if you had a fight with him before, you can elaborate on that but you must not talk about what happened with you and Melvin." [3] Alvin Sam testified that the decedent attacked him on the night in question "in a violent way." Also, Lionel Hebert testified that Milton Leday struck defendant with his right hand causing defendant to fall against a railing. Valmond Bellard and Edwin Paul Richard both testified that they knew the decedent and that he had beaten them in the past.