Case Title: State v. David W. Oakley

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1998AP001099-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2000-05-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
2000 WI 37 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
98-1099-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
David W. Oakley,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 
226 Wis. 2d 437, 594 N.W.2d 827 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999 – Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 9, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
January 7, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Sheboygan 
 
JUDGE: 
John B. Murphy 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
WILCOX, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
 
PROSSER, J., joins dissent. 
 
 
PROSSER, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there 
were briefs by Timothy T. Kay and Kay & Kay Law Firm, Brookfield, 
and oral argument by Timothy T. Kay. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Daniel J. O’Brien, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 98-1099-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :  
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
David W. Oakley,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded. 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals, State v. 
Oakley, 226 Wis. 2d 437, 594 N.W.2d 827 (Ct. App. 1999), 
affirming a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court for 
Sheboygan County, John B. Murphy, Circuit Court Judge.  We 
reverse the decision of the court of appeals.  David Oakley, the 
defendant, was convicted of witness intimidation in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 940.43(3) (1997-98).1  The circuit court withheld 
sentence and imposed probation for a period of three years.  One 
of the conditions of his probation was that the defendant would 
                     
1 All subsequent references to statutes will be to the 1997-
98 text unless otherwise noted. 
FILED 
 
MAY 9, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
98-1099-CR 
 
 
2 
pay an old, unpaid fine and forfeiture previously imposed on the 
defendant in prior convictions.2 
¶2 
The issue presented is whether a circuit court may 
require payment of an old, unpaid fine that was imposed in a 
prior sentence as a condition of probation for a new conviction 
when violation of the condition of probation exposes the 
defendant to incarceration in county jail for more than six 
months.  In the present case, upon revocation of probation, the 
defendant would be subject to a maximum term of ten years in 
prison.  We conclude, as did Judge Snyder in his dissenting 
opinion in the court of appeals, that imposing the payment of a 
fine as a condition of probation in this case violates Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.07. 
                     
2 The defendant had been fined a total of $2517 to be paid 
in sixty days in 1989 after pleading no contest to operating a 
motor vehicle after revocation.  In 1993 he was "fined" $100 for 
disorderly conduct plus various fees, for a total of $185.80, to 
be paid in 25 days after he failed to appear for sentencing for 
disorderly conduct.  The disorderly conduct charge was an 
ordinance violation, not a criminal offense, and the money 
penalty is more accurately labeled a forfeiture.  At the time of 
the conviction for witness intimidation, the defendant had paid 
a total of $100 against the 1989 fine and thus still owed most 
of the amounts imposed in 1989 and 1993. 
For ease of reference, the body of this opinion addresses 
the fine for the 1989 criminal offense and not the forfeiture 
for the 1993 disorderly conduct charge.  The reasoning of our 
opinion also applies, however, to the forfeiture imposed in the 
1993 civil offense.  Wis. Stat. § 66.12 provides the method for 
collecting a forfeiture in a civil action.  We read that statute 
to mean that a forfeiture cannot be enforced as a condition of 
probation under § 973.09(1)(a). 
No. 
98-1099-CR 
 
 
3 
¶3 
Section 973.07 provides that if a fine is not paid as 
required by a sentence, a defendant may be committed to the 
county jail for a period fixed by the circuit court not to exceed 
six months until the fine is paid or discharged.  We therefore 
conclude that the circuit court erred as a matter of law by 
denying the defendant's motion to strike the payment of the old, 
unpaid fine as a condition of probation for the new offense, 
because the defendant would be exposed to more than six months in 
county jail for violating the condition of probation by failing 
to pay the fine.3  We reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court with directions 
to vacate the payment of the old, unpaid fine as a condition of 
the defendant's probation.4 
¶4 
The facts of the case are not in dispute.  On July 3, 
1997, a criminal complaint was filed against the defendant 
alleging that he intimidated a witness in violation of Wis. 
Stat. §  940.43(3).  After the defendant pled no contest to the 
charges, the circuit court found the defendant guilty, withheld 
                     
3 This case does not raise the question of whether a circuit 
court may impose as a condition of probation payment of an old, 
unpaid fine if the penalty upon revocation of probation does not 
exceed six months in county jail. 
4 The circuit court has means to enforce the outstanding 
old, unpaid fine against the defendant.  The court may issue a 
judgment for the unpaid amount and direct the clerk to file and 
docket 
a 
transcript 
of 
the 
judgment 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.05(4)(a).  The court may also issue an order assigning the 
defendant's wages or other income under § 973.05(4)(b)(c).  
Pursuant to § 973.07, the defendant may be committed to the 
county jail until the fine is paid, for a period fixed by the 
court not to exceed six months. 
No. 
98-1099-CR 
 
 
4 
sentence and imposed probation for a period of three years.  The 
court established three conditions of probation: First, the 
defendant was ordered to serve six months in the county jail, 
with two months served up front, and four months held in 
abeyance.  Second, the defendant was ordered to have no contact 
with the victim or the victim's family.  Third, the defendant 
was ordered to pay an old, unpaid fine that had previously been 
imposed for a prior conviction totaling approximately $2600. 
¶5 
The defendant brought a post-conviction motion to 
strike the payment of the fine as a condition of his probation. 
The circuit court denied his motion, and the defendant appealed. 
 The court of appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction and 
the order of the circuit court denying the defendant's motion. 
¶6 
This case involves the intersection of three statutes: 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 973.05(2), 
973.09(1)(a) 
and 
973.07. 
 
The 
interpretation and application of the three statutes to the 
undisputed facts in the present case is a question of law that 
this court determines independently of the circuit court and 
court of appeals, benefiting from their analyses. 
¶7 
Section 973.05(2) authorizes a circuit court to impose 
a fine as part of a sentence and to make payment of the fine a 
condition of probation.  "When a defendant is sentenced to pay a 
fine and is also placed on probation, the court may make payment 
of the fine . . . a condition of probation."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.05(2) (emphasis added).  Section 973.05(2) does not govern 
this case, and this case does not govern cases arising under 
§ 973.05(2).  The defendant in the present case was neither 
No. 
98-1099-CR 
 
 
5 
sentenced to pay a fine arising out of the conviction that 
resulted in his probation nor placed on probation when the 
defendant was ordered to pay a fine.  Neither § 973.05(2) nor 
any other statute expressly authorizes a circuit court to 
require payment of an old, unpaid fine as a condition of 
probation for a new conviction.  Thus we must look further for 
the circuit court's authority to impose the payment of an old, 
unpaid fine as a condition of probation for a new conviction. 
¶8 
Section 973.09(1)(a) grants a circuit court broad 
discretion in imposing conditions of probation.  The circuit 
court may impose, according to Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(a), "any 
conditions which appear to be reasonable and appropriate."5  
Reasonable and appropriate conditions of probation are those 
that rehabilitate the offender and protect the interests of 
society.  See State v. Heyn, 155 Wis. 2d 621, 627, 456 N.W.2d 
                     
5 Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(a) states in full: 
Except as provided in par. (c) or if probation is 
prohibited for a particular offense by statute, if a 
person is convicted of a crime, the court, by order, 
may withhold sentence or impose sentence under s. 
973.15 and stay its execution, and in either case 
place the person on probation to the department for a 
stated period, stating in the order the reasons 
therefor.  The court may impose any conditions which 
appear to be reasonable and appropriate.  The period 
of probation may be made consecutive to a sentence on 
a different charge, whether imposed at the same time 
or previously.  If the court imposes an increased term 
of probation, as authorized under sub. (2)(a)2 or 
(b)2, it shall place its reasons for doing so on the 
record. 
 
No. 
98-1099-CR 
 
 
6 
157 (1990); Huggett v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 790, 798, 266 N.W.2d 
403 (1978). 
¶9 
The court of appeals reasoned that repayment of the 
fine was a reasonable and appropriate condition of probation 
because the repayment would aid in the rehabilitation of the 
defendant's defiant attitude towards the judicial system.  The 
State and the defendant disagree whether requiring the defendant 
to pay an old, unpaid fine as a condition of probation upon 
conviction of another unrelated crime is a reasonable and 
appropriate condition of probation.  We do not address this 
issue because, as we explain below, we conclude that this 
condition of probation contravenes Wis. Stat. § 973.07. 
¶10 Section 973.07, which governs the powers of a circuit 
court when a defendant fails to pay a fine, is the third statute 
applicable to this case.  Section 973.07 states that "if the 
fine . . . [is] not paid . . . as required by the sentence, the 
defendant may be committed to the county jail until the 
fine . . . [is] paid or discharged . . . for a period fixed by 
the court not to exceed 6 months."6 
                     
6 Wis. Stat. § 973.07 provides as follows: 
If 
the 
fine, 
costs, 
penalty 
assessment, 
jail 
assessment, 
crime 
victim 
and 
witness 
assistance 
surcharge, crime laboratories and drug law enforcement 
assessment, applicable deoxyribonucleic acid analysis 
surcharge, applicable drug abuse program improvement 
surcharge, 
applicable 
domestic 
abuse 
assessment, 
applicable driver improvement surcharge, applicable 
enforcement 
assessment 
under 
s. 
253.06(4)(c), 
applicable weapons assessment, applicable uninsured 
employer 
assessment, 
applicable 
environmental 
assessment, 
applicable 
wild 
animal 
protection 
No. 
98-1099-CR 
 
 
7 
¶11 The defendant argues that the circuit court may not, 
by using probation for a new conviction, extend the six-month 
maximum period in county jail prescribed by Wis. Stat. § 973.07 
for failure to pay an unpaid fine.  The defendant argues that in 
this case if he does not abide by the terms of his probation 
requiring him to pay the old, unpaid fine, he may, on revocation 
of probation, be exposed to more than six months in county jail. 
 Indeed, the maximum sentence for the crime for which the 
defendant was convicted is ten years of imprisonment. 
¶12 In contrast, the State asserts that the circuit court 
did not intend to revoke the defendant's probation and impose a 
ten-year prison term should the defendant fail to pay the fine. 
 The circuit court's statement at the hearing on the post-
                                                                  
assessment, applicable natural resources assessment 
and applicable natural resources restitution payments 
are not paid or community service work under s. 
943.017(3) is not completed as required by the 
sentence, the defendant may be committed to the county 
jail until the fine, costs, penalty assessment, jail 
assessment, 
crime 
victim 
and 
witness 
assistance 
surcharge, crime laboratories and drug law enforcement 
assessment, applicable deoxyribonucleic acid analysis 
surcharge, applicable drug abuse program improvement 
surcharge, 
applicable 
domestic 
abuse 
assessment, 
applicable driver improvement surcharge, applicable 
enforcement 
assessment 
under 
s. 
253.06(4)(c), 
applicable weapons assessment, applicable uninsured 
employer 
assessment, 
applicable 
environmental 
assessment, 
applicable 
wild 
animal 
protection 
assessment, applicable natural resources assessment or 
applicable natural resources restitution payments are 
paid or discharged, or the community service work 
under s. 943.017(3) is completed, for a period fixed 
by the court not to exceed 6 months. 
 
No. 
98-1099-CR 
 
 
8 
conviction motion, upon which the State relies in making this 
argument, is printed in the margin.
 7  We disagree with the 
                     
7 At the March 18, 1998, post-conviction motion hearing, 
Judge Murphy remarked: 
I can tell you, the general rule [is] we typically 
throw back fines in on probation conditions because we 
found actually it seems to benefit many of the 
defendants.  First of all, from the standpoint that it 
imposes upon them a certain responsibility for some 
past financial obligations.  We believe that’s healthy 
for 
the 
defendant, 
in 
terms 
of 
his 
overall 
rehabilitation. 
 
But I think on a more practical level, we have found 
that while on probation, for extended periods of time, 
typically defendants have an opportunity to pay these 
fines back in an installment fashion.  We find that 
overall 
that 
seems 
to 
help 
them, 
because 
the 
alternative for Mr. Oakley is I will have him 
committed to the county jail for 96 days, and unless 
he coughs up the money.  We have not chosen to do 
that.  If that would be Mr. Oakley’s preference to 
serve 96 days in the county jail and still owe us the 
money, that can be arranged. 
 
But I thought really he was given a chance here to 
make good on this money over a three-year period of 
time, which should be something he can accomplish, I 
would hope, and I saw that as being helpful to him and 
also 
helpful 
to society 
and, specifically 
quite 
helpful to Sheboygan County, since we make a real 
effort [to] make sure that when we fine somebody they 
actually pay the money. 
 
Because when they don’t pay the money the punishment 
was 100% meaningless.  There is no reason to give a 
person a fine and not have it be paid.  He can pay it 
on probation, because I believe that would be the best 
way for him to do it.  Or in the alternative, I will 
have him committed to the county jail, and then he can 
pay the money to get himself out or do his 96 days, 
and he still owes us the money. 
 
No. 
98-1099-CR 
 
 
9 
State's interpretation of the circuit court's comments at the 
hearing on the post-conviction motion. 
¶13 A violation of a condition of probation could lead to 
a revocation of probation.  The judgment of conviction simply 
states that payment of the fine is a condition of probation.  
Indeed at the sentencing hearing the circuit court made clear 
that if the defendant did not live up to the conditions of 
probation, the probation would be revoked, the defendant would 
                                                                  
I think the best route to go is stick with the 
probation.  If it becomes an impediment to him being 
released from probation at the end of his term, I 
would consider at that time his efforts in that 
regard.  It is possible, I believe, that Mr. Oakley 
might not be able to pay the entire sum within three 
years.  But if he doesn’t, I want to know why not and 
what efforts he’s made, and I will expect the 
probation agent to provide me with that information.  
I am not inflexible with regard to these things if a 
person is making a reasonable effort consistent with 
their financial abilities to make good on one of their 
obligations under the probation condition. 
 
First of all, I believe it’s a reasonable condition, 
because it is a past crime for which Mr. Oakley has 
not yet been punished because he didn't pay the fine. 
 That was part of his punishment. 
 
Secondly, it benefits Mr. Oakley to get this matter 
cleaned up, because if not, he will be incarcerated in 
the county jail, which is not beneficial to Mr. 
Oakley, though it might be beneficial to society. 
 
The motion is denied.  We will leave that on as a 
condition of probation.  Let’s just see David [Oakley] 
make a reasonable effort to get that money paid up. 
 
Neither the circuit court nor the State explains this 
reference to 96 days. 
No. 
98-1099-CR 
 
 
10
be returned to circuit court and the circuit court would give 
the defendant the maximum amount of time available under the 
law, namely ten years in prison.  The circuit court warned the 
defendant at the sentencing hearing as follows: 
 
THE COURT: If you botch your probation, you have to 
get your probation taken away.  That's what the 
probation department will do.  They will revoke your 
probation, and then they will send you back to me.  I 
will not be happy to see you, Mr. Oakley, because 
probation is your second and last chance. 
 
If you come back here with unsuccessful probation, I 
am probably going to give you the maximum amount of 
time available to me under the law, which is ten years 
in prison.  So if you are inclined, while on 
probation, to this screwing off in regard to your 
obligations, keep in mind that I will be seeing you 
again, and then you are going to go right from here, 
right up to prison.  That's not what you want to do. 
 
I want you to be successful.  I have no wish to ever 
see you again.  But if I do, you can pretty much 
assume I am going to lower the boom on you.  Any 
questions about that? 
 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
 
¶14 The conditions of the defendant's probation set forth 
in the judgment of conviction and the circuit court's comments 
at the sentencing, as well as at the hearing on the post-
conviction 
motion, 
do 
not 
clearly 
indicate 
the 
term 
of 
incarceration to which the defendant would be subjected should 
the defendant fail to pay the fine.  The maximum sentence for 
the conviction is ten years in prison. 
No. 
98-1099-CR 
 
 
11
¶15 Wis. Stat. § 973.07 expressly limits incarceration as 
a means of collecting a fine to a period in county jail not to 
exceed six months.  Accordingly we conclude that the circuit 
court erred as a matter of law in making the payment of an old, 
unpaid fine a condition of probation for a new conviction when 
violation 
of 
the 
condition 
exposes 
the 
defendant 
to 
incarceration in county jail for more than six months. 
¶16 This conclusion is supported by the language of Wis. 
Stat. § 973.07, the legislative history of § 973.07, and case 
law interpreting §§ 973.07 and 973.09(1)(a). 
¶17 The plain words of Wis. Stat. § 973.07 that the 
defendant may be committed to county jail "for a period fixed by 
the court not to exceed 6 months" for failure to pay a fine 
demonstrates the legislature's intent to limit incarceration 
imposed for the failure to pay an outstanding fine to no more 
than six months in county jail. 
¶18 The legislative history of Wis. Stat. §  973.07 also 
reflects the legislature's intent to limit the length of 
incarceration for failure to pay a fine to six months in county 
jail.  For more than 120 years, the legislature has limited 
incarceration for nonpayment of a fine to no more than six 
months in county jail.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 959.055(1) 
(1967); Wis. Rev. Stat. (1878) § 4633.  This consistent 
statutory limitation on incarceration for failure to pay a fine 
is strong support for our decision today. 
¶19 Our interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 973.07 is further 
supported by case law.  In State v. Schuman, 173 Wis. 2d 743, 
No. 
98-1099-CR 
 
 
12
496 N.W.2d 684 (Ct. App. 1993), the court of appeals held that 
§ 973.07 provides for a six-month limit on the time a defendant 
may be incarcerated for nonpayment of a fine.  The court of 
appeals declared that once a defendant has served six months in 
county jail for nonpayment of a fine, the circuit court may not 
issue another commitment order based upon the defendant's 
failure to pay the fine.  The court of appeals concluded that 
although § 973.07 has been amended several times over the years, 
the six-month limitation on incarceration in county jail has 
remained constant.  Schuman, 173 Wis. 2d at 748.  The Schuman 
court further concluded that when the legislature enacted the 
statute it intended to provide for a threat of incarceration to 
coerce payment, but it also intended to limit that threat. 
¶20 Several 
cases 
preceding 
Schuman 
interpreted 
the 
earlier versions of Wis. Stat. § 973.07 as limiting the state's 
ability to incarcerate a defendant for more than six months in 
county jail when the defendant has not paid a fine.  See, e.g., 
State ex rel. Pedersen v. Blessinger, 56 Wis. 2d 286, 290, 201 
N.W.2d 778 (1972)(noting that the legislature adopted a six-
month incarceration limit to collect a fine because if six 
months' incarceration will not induce payment, a longer time 
will be fruitless); Starry v. State, 115 Wis. 50, 90 N.W. 1014 
(1902) (noting that Wis. Stat. (1898) § 4633 expressly forbids 
indefinite commitments to jail for the failure to pay fines); 
Bonnville v. State, 53 Wis. 680, 689, 11 N.W. 427 (1882) 
(concluding that the legislature adopted Wis. Rev. Stat. (1878) 
No. 
98-1099-CR 
 
 
13
§ 4633 for the express purpose of limiting incarceration in all 
cases of the nonpayment of a fine). 
¶21 The State argues that Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(a), which 
grants circuit courts the power to "impose any conditions [of 
probation] which appear to be reasonable and appropriate," should 
be read to allow a circuit court to fashion conditions of 
probation and to override the limitation on incarceration for 
failure to pay a fine provided in § 973.07. 
¶22 The State relies on State v. Heyn, 155 Wis. 2d 621, 456 
N.W.2d 157 (1990), to support its interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 973.07 and 973.09(1)(a).  In Heyn the circuit court required a 
convicted burglar, as a condition of probation, to compensate the 
victim for installation of a burglar alarm system.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.09(1)(b) (1985-86) limited restitution as a condition of 
probation to compensation for a pecuniary loss.8  This court 
agreed 
that 
compensation 
for 
the 
alarm 
system 
was 
not 
compensation for a pecuniary loss and therefore did not 
constitute restitution under Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(b)(1985-86). 
                     
8 Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(b) (1985-86) provided in relevant 
part as follows: 
If the court places the person on probation, the court 
shall require restitution designed to compensate the 
victim's pecuniary loss resulting from the crime to 
the extent possible, unless the court finds there is 
substantial reason not to order restitution as a 
condition of probation.  If the court does not require 
restitution to be paid to a victim, the court shall 
state its reason on the record . . . . 
 
No. 
98-1099-CR 
 
 
14
¶23 The Heyn court, however, concluded that the circuit 
court could require the defendant to compensate the victim for 
the alarm system under the probation statute, § 973.09(1)(a) 
(1985-86).  The Heyn court viewed § 973.09(1)(b)(1985-86), 
governing 
restitution, 
as 
cumulative 
and 
concurrent 
with 
§ 973.09(1)(a) (1985-86), the general probation statute, and held 
that the restitution statute neither usurped nor abridged the 
general probation statute.  Heyn, 155 Wis. 2d at 628 (quoting 
State v. Connelly, 143 Wis. 2d 500, 505, 421 N.W.2d 859 (Ct. App. 
1988)).9 
¶24 The State argues in the present case that Wis. Stat. 
§§ 973.09(1)(a) and 973.07 should be interpreted in the same way 
that 
this 
court 
interpreted 
§ 973.09(1)(a) 
(1985-86) 
and 
§ 973.09(1)(b) (1985-86) in Heyn.  In other words, the State 
urges that § 973.07, limiting incarceration for the nonpayment of 
a fine, should be read as cumulative and concurrent with 
§ 973.09(1)(a), the general probation statute, and that § 973.07 
neither usurps or abridges the general probation statute nor 
restricts the circuit court's broad discretion in fashioning 
conditions of probation. 
¶25 We reject the State's interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§§ 973.09(1)(a) and 973.07.  The statute at issue in Heyn, 
§ 973.09(1)(b) (1985-86), required the circuit court to order 
                     
9 See also State v. Brown, 174 Wis. 2d 550, 497 N.W.2d 463 
(Ct. App. 1993)(upholding as a condition of probation that a 
defendant pay $7000 to his sexual assault victim for tuition 
incurred when she had to change schools to avoid classmate 
harassment resulting from the assault). 
No. 
98-1099-CR 
 
 
15
restitution, that is, to order certain types of compensation to a 
victim under certain circumstances, or to explain on the record 
why it did not do so.  Nothing in Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(b) 
(1985-86) indicated that the legislature intended to limit a 
circuit court in ordering a defendant to compensate a victim for 
items that did not constitute restitution under the statute.  
Indeed the legislative intent to be drawn from  § 973.09(1)(b) 
(1985-86) was that the legislature favored the circuit court's 
ordering a defendant to compensate a victim. 
¶26 In contrast, Wis. Stat. § 973.07 specifically limits a 
circuit court's means of collecting fines by incarceration.  Our 
case law has determined that the legislature intended § 973.07 to 
limit a circuit court in enforcing the payment of fines by 
incarceration.  Allowing a circuit court to enforce collection of 
fines under § 973.09(1)(a), the general probation statute, when 
failure to pay the old, unpaid fine results in a defendant being 
exposed to more than six months in county jail, would permit a 
circuit court to do what the legislature expressly forbade in 
§ 973.07.  We conclude the legislature did not intend such a 
result. 
¶27 We thus conclude that the circuit court erred as a 
matter of law, and thus erroneously exercised its discretion, by 
setting forth as a condition of probation the payment of an old, 
unpaid fine when the defendant would be exposed to more than six 
months in county jail for failure to pay the fine.  This 
condition of probation to pay an old, unpaid fine in the present 
case conflicts with the clear statutory mandate in Wis. Stat.  
No. 
98-1099-CR 
 
 
16
§ 973.07 that incarceration for failure to pay a fine is limited 
to incarceration in county jail for no more than six months. 
¶28 The decision of the court of appeals is reversed and 
the cause remanded to the circuit court with directions to 
vacate the condition of the defendant's probation that requires 
the defendant to pay the old, unpaid fine. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court. 
 
No. 98-1099-CR.jpw 
 
1 
¶29 JON P. WILCOX, J. (dissenting).  I agree with Justice 
Prosser that the correct way to resolve this case is to hold 
that a court may impose old fines as a condition of probation 
but that failure to comply with such a condition cannot result 
in incarceration for more than six months in the county jail.   
¶30 I write separately to point out that what the trial 
judge did in this case is a common practice in some circuit 
courts in this state, and with good reason.  By failing to make 
court ordered payments in the past, the defendant in this case 
has demonstrated his disrespect for the law and his contempt for 
the authority of the court.  It is therefore entirely reasonable 
and appropriate for the court to address the old, unpaid fines 
when setting conditions of probation for the defendant's new 
offense.  Imposing such a condition is well within the court's 
broad discretion under Wis. Stat. § 973.09 and is not expressly 
prohibited under Wis. Stat. § 973.07.  I therefore would not 
interfere with the courts' flexibility to address old, unpaid 
fines when setting conditions of probation in a new case as long 
as the court makes clear that the penalty for failure to pay the 
fine is no more than six months incarceration in the county 
jail. 
¶31 I share Justice Prosser's concern that the court 
implicitly holds that the payment of old, unpaid fines can never 
be a condition of probation except in a few misdemeanor cases.  
Instead, 
the 
enforcement 
of 
old 
fines 
will 
now 
require 
commencement 
of 
separate 
judicial 
proceedings. 
 
It 
is 
unfortunate that additional judicial resources will be required 
No. 98-1099-CR.jpw 
 
2 
to enforce payment of old fines when the court's discretion 
under Wis. Stat. § 973.09 is clearly broad enough to address 
these matters as conditions of probation. 
¶32 I would remand the case for clarification.  The court 
has the authority to require as a condition of probation that 
the probationer be confined.  On remand, the circuit court 
therefore could clarify that one of the conditions of the 
defendant's probation is that he either pay the old, unpaid 
fines or serve six months of his probation period in the county 
jail.  I believe that such a condition of probation would be 
reasonable and appropriate under Wis. Stat. § 973.09 and would 
be consistent with Wis. Stat. § 973.07.   
¶33 For the above-stated reasons, I respectfully dissent.  
¶34 I am authorized to state that Justice DAVID T. PROSSER 
joins this dissent.   
 
 
98-1099-CR.dtp 
 
1 
¶35 DAVID T. PROSSER, J. (dissenting).  David W. Oakley 
was convicted of intimidating a witness after his negotiated 
plea of no contest.  The court withheld sentence and ordered 
Oakley placed on probation for 36 months.  The court established 
several conditions of probation, including the payment of two 
"old fines" that Oakley owed to Sheboygan County.  One of the 
old fines was part of Oakley's sentence for a past criminal 
conviction; the other was actually a civil forfeiture imposed 
for a past ordinance violation.  Together, the two monetary 
penalties totaled $2,602.80.  Oakley later challenged the 
lawfulness of making payment of these old fines a condition of 
his probation.  The majority upholds his challenge.  I disagree 
and respectfully dissent. 
¶36 There is no reason to believe that Oakley's probation 
has ever been revoked.  Consequently, we can only speculate what 
would have happened had Oakley's probation been revoked for 
failure to pay the two unpaid fines.  If Oakley's probation had 
been revoked for failure to pay those fines and he had been 
sentenced either to a state correctional institution or to jail 
for more than six months, I would not be filing a dissent.  
Rather, I would be concluding that those sentences were 
inconsistent with Wis. Stat. § 973.07.  State v. Schuman, 173 
Wis. 2d 743, 496 N.W.2d 684 (Ct. App. 1993); see also State ex 
rel. Pedersen v. Blessinger, 56 Wis. 2d 286, 201 N.W.2d 778 
(1972). 
¶37 In this case, the majority holds that making payment 
of the old fines a condition of probation for a felony that 
98-1099-CR.dtp 
 
2 
carries a potential maximum sentence of ten years "conflicts 
with the clear statutory mandate in Wis. Stat. § 973.07 that 
incarceration 
for 
failure 
to pay 
a 
fine 
is 
limited to 
incarceration in county jail for no more than six months."  
Majority op. at ¶27.  Inasmuch as Oakley was never sentenced to 
more than six months, the majority grounds its decision on 
Oakley's "exposure" to a sentence of more than six months if his 
probation were revoked.  Majority op. at ¶¶2, 3, 11, 15, 27.  
This exposure principle is disturbing because it bases this 
court's decision on the mere possibility of an unlawful 
sentence, and it creates confusion for the future. 
¶38 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.09 sets out the basic principles 
of probation.  Subsection (1)(a) of the statute authorizes a 
court to impose "any conditions" of probation "which appear to 
be reasonable and appropriate."  This language grants the 
circuit court "broad discretion."  State v. Heyn, 155 Wis. 2d 
621, 627, 456 N.W.2d 157 (1990).  For instance, the existence of 
specific 
authority 
under 
§ 973.09(1)(b) 
to 
require 
victim 
restitution does not inhibit or restrict the authority of a 
circuit court to impose "reasonable and appropriate" conditions 
requiring 
other 
payment 
under 
§ 973.09(1)(a). 
 
State 
v. 
Connelly, 143 Wis. 2d 500, 505, 421 N.W.2d 859 (Ct. App. 1988). 
Of course, any condition of probation must serve one or more of 
the objectives of probation, namely, the rehabilitation of the 
offender, the restoration of the victim, and the protection of 
state and community interests.  State v. Tarrell, 74 Wis. 2d 
647, 653, 247 N.W.2d 696 (1976); Huggett v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 
98-1099-CR.dtp 
 
3 
790, 798, 266 N.W.2d 403 (1978); State v. Brown, 174 Wis. 2d 
550, 554, 497 N.W.2d 463 (Ct. App. 1993).10 
¶39 Oakley challenges the proposition that the payment of 
old 
fines 
is 
a 
reasonable 
and 
appropriate 
condition 
of 
probation.  The court never answers this challenge.  It cannot 
embrace Oakley's contention without substantially narrowing the 
broad discretion given by statute to circuit courts.  Requiring 
Oakley to pay his old monetary obligations is clearly in the 
community's interest.  Permitting the Department of Corrections 
to oversee Oakley's progress and develop an orderly schedule of 
payment on his old fines facilitates payment of the overdue 
obligations without resorting to a separate court proceeding or 
imposing jail time.  Depriving the State of the means to monitor 
and pressure Oakley for payment of his unpaid obligations forces 
the State to abandon the obligations or resort to incarceration. 
 Vindicating Oakley's challenge does 
not promote Oakley's 
rehabilitation.  Jailing Oakley is not in Oakley's interest if 
incarceration can be avoided. 
¶40 The majority does not conclude that payment of the old 
fines is beyond the broad discretion of the circuit court under 
                     
10 Article I, § 9m, the "Victims of crime" amendment to the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution 
adopted 
in 
1993, 
reemphasizes 
the 
importance of restitution to the victim as part of the criminal 
justice process.  It provides in part that "This state shall 
ensure that crime victims have all of the following privileges 
and 
protections 
as 
provided 
by 
law: . . . restitution; 
compensation . . . ."  By implication, the amendment enlarges 
the objectives of probation.  
98-1099-CR.dtp 
 
4 
Wis. Stat. § 973.09(1)(a).  Instead, it employs a theoretical 
device to reach the same result.  
¶41 Under 
the 
exposure 
principle established by the 
majority, payment of an old unpaid fine may not be made a 
condition of probation for any felony because all felonies 
expose defendants to potential penalties of more than six 
months.  Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3).  Payment of an old unpaid fine 
may not be made a condition of probation for a Class A 
misdemeanor because all Class A misdemeanors expose defendants 
to 
a 
potential 
penalty 
of 
nine 
months. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.51(3)(a).  In theory, then, payment of an old fine could 
only be made a condition of probation for a Class B misdemeanor 
(90 days maximum incarceration) or a Class C misdemeanor (30 
days maximum incarceration).  Such a condition would not serve 
as an effective enforcement mechanism because revocation of 
probation for these offenses would lead to maximum incarceration 
of only 90 days for a Class B misdemeanor, or 30 days for a 
Class C misdemeanor.  Moreover, a court would be unlikely to 
impose repayment of an old fine of more than $1,000 as a 
condition of probation because the maximum fine that may be 
imposed for a Class B misdemeanor is only $1,000.  The maximum 
fine for a Class C misdemeanor is only $500.  The majority also 
determines that an old unpaid forfeiture may not be imposed as a 
condition of probation under any circumstances.  Majority op. at 
n.2.  Hence, without saying so explicitly, the majority 
implicitly rules that payment of an old unpaid fine may not be 
made a condition of probation, except, possibly, for a few minor 
98-1099-CR.dtp 
 
5 
misdemeanors in circumstances when such a condition is unlikely 
to be helpful. 
¶42 The exposure principle lays the groundwork for future 
problems.  Suppose a defendant is convicted of a Class C felony 
that subjects him to imprisonment not to exceed 10 years.  
Sentence is withheld and the court places the defendant on 
probation for three years.  The court establishes three 
conditions of probation:  (1) payment of a $2,000 fine; (2) 
payment of costs and assessments; and (3) performance of 200 
hours of community service.  What is the result if the defendant 
fails to satisfy any one of the conditions of probation?  May 
the court, after revocation, sentence the defendant to prison 
for up to 10 years?  Somewhat surprisingly, the answer must be 
"yes"on grounds that the defendant has not been "exposed" to 
anything more than the law has authorized.  If the answer were 
"no"on grounds that Wis. Stat. § 973.07 limits the penalty for 
violations of these conditions to county jail time not to exceed 
six monthsthen we would be concluding that § 973.07 applies and 
the exposure principle set forth in this case was a fiction.   
¶43 The appropriate way to decide this case is to hold 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.09(1)(a) 
authorizes 
the 
old 
fines 
condition of probation established by the Sheboygan County 
Circuit Court.  However, Wis. Stat. § 973.07 prevents the court 
or anyone else from enforcing this specific condition by 
imposing incarceration for more than six months in the county 
jail.  Here, sentence was withheld.  Had sentence been imposed 
and stayed before Oakley was put on probation, his failure to 
98-1099-CR.dtp 
 
6 
comply with the old fines condition of probation could not have 
served as grounds for revocation.  Probation authorities and the 
court would have had to find some other way to impose 
consequences for his defiant nonpayment.