Case Title: Trace X Chemical, Inc. v. Highland Resources, Inc.

Citation: 579 S.W.2d 89

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1979-04-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
579 S.W.2d 89 (1979) TRACE X CHEMICAL, INC., Appellant, v. HIGHLAND RESOURCES, INC., et al., Appellees. No. 78-292. Supreme Court of Arkansas, In Banc. April 9, 1979. E. E. Maglothin, Jr., Fayetteville, for appellant. Hamilton H. Singleton, Camden, Shackleford, Shackleford & Phillips by Dennis L. Shackleford, El Dorado, for appellees. HOLT, Justice. Appellee Highland brought suit alleging that appellant, its lessee, had breached various lease agreements and sought possession and damages for accrued rent. Appellant answered and counterclaimed alleging compliance with the lease agreements and asserted that appellee Highland was the party who had breached the leases. By counterclaim appellant sought damages for improvements made by it to the leased premises and requested that the cause be transferred to a court of law. Appellee Highland filed a motion for summary judgment, stating that there was no issue of fact as to the breach of the leases since both parties had alleged a breach. The chancellor granted Highland's motion, finding that both had alleged breaches and that, based upon those allegations, the lease agreements were terminated. Possession of the property was awarded to appellee Highland with the right to remove appellant's property *90 from the premises. The chancellor transferred the issues of liability and damages to the circuit court for determination. Hence this appeal. We first consider appellee Highland's motion to dismiss this appeal, asserting that the chancellor's order is not appealable. We hold that the order is appealable since it concluded the parties' rights to possession of the property. See Ark. Hwy. Comm'n. v. Kesnev, 239 Ark. 270, 388 S.W.2d 905 (1965); and Johnson v. Johnson, 243 Ark. 656, 421 S.W.2d 605 (1967). Accordingly, we deny appellees' motion to dismiss. We next discuss appellant's contention that the court erred in granting a summary judgment and awarding appellee Highland possession of the property. A summary judgment, being an extreme remedy, should only be granted when it is clear there is no issue of fact to be litigated; and, before one is entitled to a summary judgment, it is incumbent upon the movant, here the appellee, to show there is no existence of a fact issue. Robinson v. Rebsamen Ford, Inc., 258 Ark. 935, 530 S.W.2d 660 (1975). The object of a summary judgment is not to try the issue but to determine if there are issues to be tried. Ashley v. Eisele, 247 Ark. 281, 445 S.W.2d 76 (1969). If there is any doubt whatever, it should be denied. Southland Ins. v. Northwestern Nat'l. Ins. Co., 255 Ark. 802, 502 S.W.2d 474 (1973). Here, as noted, appellee Highland alleged, inter alia, that appellant had breached in various ways the lease agreements between them. Appellant denied that allegation and alleged that appellee Highland was the breaching party. Appellees argue that appellant conceded that the leases had been breached in its response to the motion for summary judgment and supporting brief, where it made the statement: "True, there may not be a question that the leases have been breached .... Both..... allege in their pleadings that the leases have been breached..... This fact may not be controverted." We do not agree that this was a concession that no controversy existed; appellant merely recognized the fact that it "might not," which is different from saying that it "does not" exist. Each alleged a different basis of a breach or breaches. The issue was which one breached the leases. An issue is not decided simply because both parties to a lawsuit allege the same conclusion of law. Here, both or either party could fail to meet the required burden of proof to show that the other breached the leases. Appellant sought in its counterclaim to have the entire case transferred to a court of law. The chancellor, as indicated, after granting Highland possession of the property based upon its motion for summary judgment, transferred the remaining issues of liability and damages to a court of law. Since we hold the motion for summary judgment was incorrectly granted, we are of the view that the entire cause should be transferred to a court of law. Reversed and remanded. FOGLEMAN, J., dissents. FOGLEMAN, Justice, dissenting. Many years ago, this court was admonished not to reverse a case for an error that is not prejudicial, i. e., does not affect a substantial right, of any party. Ark.Stat. Ann. § 27-1160 (Supp.1977). No citation of authority is necessary to show that we have, on hundreds of occasions, given heed to the admonition. I do not concede that there was any error in the action of the trial court here, but if there was, it was not only harmless, it was innocuous, insignificant and trivial. The reversal in this instance is purely ceremonial and wholly unnecessary. The trial court transferred the issues of liability and damage to the circuit court. The majority holds that the summary judgment was incorrect and that the entire case should be transferred to a court of law. There really is no difference at all in what the chancery court did and what the majority says should be done. *91 The trial court held that there had been a breach of the lease contract. It left the question of liability to be determined by the trial court. The question of liability depends entirely upon the answer to the question, "Who breached the contract?" Who says the contract was not breached? Appellant does not; appellees do not; the trial court does not; and this court does not. Beyond the shadow of a doubt, the lease contract has been breached. Each of the parties contended that the lease was terminated by the other's breach. This may be the only thing on which the parties agree, but they certainly agree upon that and there is not one word in their pleadings to indicate that they did not. What was wrong with the chancery court's saying so? Highland's suit was one in unlawful detainer dressed in declaratory judgment clothing. It alleged that the lease had been breached by appellant and sought possession by mandatory injunction to appellant to remove its property from the leased premises. All the relief sought could have been obtained through an unlawful detainer action, without a mandatory injunction, an equitable remedy granted only when there is no adequate remedy at law and, actually, when there is no other remedy in equity. Text writers have spoken clearly on the subject of mandatory injunction. See 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 8, p. 751, where we find: And see, 42 Am.Jur.2d 751, Injunctions § 20, where it is said: The case should never have been in the equity court. Then the court held that Highland was entitled to possession. All parties agree by their pleadings that Highland is entitled to possession. Highland brought the suit seeking a mandatory injunction as the instrument for obtaining possession by removing appellant's property from the premises. Appellant alleges that there has been a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment by Highland. It also alleges that it has been constructively evicted by the actions *92 of Highland. Perhaps appellant has used two means of saying the same thing. In any event, retention of possession is inconsistent with the allegations of appellant's pleadings and appellant does not allege that it is in possession. Appellant seeks only to be relieved of its obligations under the lease and to recover damages for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment and for constructive eviction. The concepts of constructive eviction and breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment are very closely related, if not just different names for the same concept. An excellent discussion of the relationship between the covenant of quiet enjoyment and constructive eviction can be found in Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969). Portions of that discussion follow: Another discussion of the relationship between the two principles can be found in Petroleum Collections, Inc. v. Swords, 48 Cal. App. 3d 841, 122 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1975). That court was faced with the appeal of the action by the lessor's assignee against the lessee for rent due and owing. The trial court held for the lessee and the court of appeals held that, although the covenant of quiet enjoyment had been breached by the lessor's removing a large advertising sign from the premises without adequate replacement, the lessee was not relieved of the obligation to pay rent because he and his sublessee remained in possession of the premises after removal of the sign. From the opinion: Arkansas cases on the subject are sparse, but in harmony with the majority view expressed above. In Dupree v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 260 Ark. 673, 543 S.W.2d 465, we recognized that, in the absence of language to the contrary, every lease contains an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, citing Petroleum Collections, Inc. v. Swords, supra. In Smiley v. Thomas, 220 Ark. 116, 246 S.W.2d 419, the court cited an earlier case which apparently recognized the covenant for the quiet enjoyment of land. Although the Smiley case was concerned with the alleged breach of the covenant of warranty of title, the opinion contains the following quote: Although not explicit in the Gibbons opinion, it appears that the court felt that eviction from the premises was a necessary element of a breach of the covenant for quiet enjoyment, as evidenced by the following language: "Appellee having been brought into a suit against appellants on their motion as a voucher, in which a title paramount to theirs received from said appellee was held valid, and they were evicted by judgment therein from said lands, the breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment and warranty created by the statute was established." It is well established that there can be no constructive eviction if the tenant continues in possession. Black's Law Dictionary, De Luxe 4th Edition, contains the following definition of constructive eviction: From 52 C.J.S. Landlord 445, p. 289, there is this: Proceeding to 52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 447b, p. 293,1 read: And further, at 52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 457, p. 306, I find: And from 49 Am.Jur.2d 318, Landlord & Tenant § 303, the following: It seems quite obvious from a reading of these passages that retention of the possession of leased premises is wholly inconsistent with a claim of constructive eviction. In Lori, Limited v. Wolfe, 85 Cal. App. 2d 54, 192 P.2d 112 (1948), the lessor sought to have a lease reformed in order to prevent assignment or subletting. The lessee filed a cross-complaint, praying for declaratory judgment, an injunction and damages. The plaintiff appealed from an unfavorable judgment. The trial court found that the waiver of a right the appellant had under the lease relating to the sale of intoxicating beverages on the premises constituted a constructive eviction. The court of appeals disagreed. From the opinion: In Steinberg v. Medical Equipment Rental Services, Inc., 505 S.W.2d 692 (Tex.Civ. App.1974), that court set out the four essential elements of constructive eviction. They are: And finally from Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, supra, in which the relationship between the covenant for quiet enjoyment and constructive eviction was first pointed out herein, the court said: Although dealing with the concept of warranty of title under Texas law in Elliott v. Elliott, 252 Ark. 966, 482 S.W.2d 123, we also dealt with constructive eviction, saying: For other cases supporting the proposition that a tenant must abandon or vacate the leased premises before he can claim constructive eviction, see generally: Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 638; Indiana State Highway Com'n. v. Pappas, 349 N.E.2d 808 (Ind.App. 1976); Lippman v. Harrell, 39 Ill.App.3d 308, 349 N.E.2d 511 (1976); Thompson v. Shoemaker, 7 N.C.App. 687, 173 S.E.2d 627 (1970); Gillette v. Anderson, 4 Ill.App.3d 838, 282 N.E.2d 149 (1972); Meerbaum v. Crepes D'Asie, Inc., 85 Misc.2d 345, 378 N.Y.S.2d 874 (1975); Brine v. Bergstrom, 4 Wash. App. 288, 480 P.2d 783 (1971); McNabb v. Taylor Oil Field Rental Co., 428 S.W.2d 714 (Tex.Civ.App.1968); Sewell v. Hukill, 138 Mont. 242, 356 P.2d 39 (1960); Richards v. Dodge, 150 So. 2d 477 (Fla.App. 1963); Venters v. Reynolds, 354 S.W.2d 521 (Ky.1961); McNally v. Moser, 210 Md. 127, 122 A.2d 555 (1956); Maki v. Nikula, 224 Or. 180, 355 P.2d 770 (1960); Candell v. Western Federal Savings & Loan Association of Denver, 156 Colo. 552, 400 P.2d 909 (1965); Yaffe v. American Fixture, Inc., 345 S.W.2d 195 (Mo.1961); E. B. Jones Motor Co. v. Niedringhaus, 323 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. App.1959); Baker v. Simonds, 79 Nev. 434, 386 P.2d 86 (1963); Weiss v. I. Zapinsky, Inc., 65 N.J.Super. 351, 167 A.2d 802 (1961). So, from either party's view, Highland was entitled to possession. Why should the court not have said so? What issue remained as to possession? A partial summary judgment specifying the facts not in issue is permissible when there is no material justiciable issue as to those particular facts on which the judgment is rendered or order made. Ark.Stat. Ann. § 29-211(d) (Repl.1962). Actually we have held that it is error for the trial court to fail to specify facts that appear to be without controversy. Young v. Dodson, 239 Ark. 143, 388 S.W.2d 94. The summary judgment was partial and covered only those matters as to which there can be no issue, i. e., that the lease had been breached and Highland is entitled to possession. The remaining issues, liability and damages, were transferred to law. What error did the trial court commit? I submit, none. What substantial right of any party has been affected? Again, I say none. In substance, if not in form, the chancellor did what we have said he should do. I would affirm the decree.