Case Title: Baures v. Lewis

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-135-99

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2001-04-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). LONG, J., writing for a unanimous Court. In this appeal, the Court clarifies the legal standards that should apply in addressing a removal application, and what role visitation plays in that determination. On October 5, 1985, in Rothschild, Wisconsin, Carita Baures, a native of Wisconsin, married Steven Lewis, a native of Iowa and an officer in the United States Navy. Their only child, Jeremy, was born in 1990. In 1994, the couple moved to new Jersey when Lewis was stationed in Leonardo. At age four, Jeremy was diagnosed with Pervasive Developmental Disorder (PDD), a form of autism. Over the next few years, an effective therapeutic and educational program was created for Jeremy through a combination of public school and the Douglass College Outreach Program. Baures and Lewis planned to move near Baures' parents in Wisconsin after Lewis' discharge from the Navy. Baures' parents were retired school teachers and offered to help care for Jeremy while Baures and Lewis worked. In anticipation of that move, Baures' parents moved to Galesville, Wisconsin because Galesville was a short distance from the Chileda Institute (Chileda), a program for autistic children. In 1996, Baures filed for divorce. A consent order was entered, providing for custody and visitation and restraining either parent from leaving the State with Jeremy. In June 1996, Baures' parents came to live in New Jersey to help care for Jeremy and remained for over a year. During that time, Baures' father transported Jeremy to and from his programming and provided additional child care. Baures' parents also contributed money each month to supplement Lewis' court ordered child support. In April 1997, Baures filed an amended complaint for divorce requesting permission to relocate to Wisconsin. At trial, Baures testified that the parties had limited funds and could no longer afford to live in New Jersey without the help of her parents. Without a car, she could not take Jeremy to his special programming or to his doctors. Moreover, Jeremy's special needs precluded regular day care. Baures testified that in Wisconsin, her parents could provide childcare and a place to live so that she could work. Although Baures testified that Chileda offered outreach programming similar to the Douglass Program, she failed to provide information about available services in the Wisconsin public schools. Baures noted that the relationship between Lewis and Jeremy was important and to encourage it, she proposed that Lewis visit Jeremy one week a month and stay free of charge in her parents' basement. She also agreed to pay a portion of Lewis' transportation costs. Lewis testified that there were no jobs in Galesville and that he would not be permitted to travel to Wisconsin one week each month to visit Jeremy. He claimed that Jeremy would regress if he is separated from his father for an extended period of time. The trial court denied the removal request, finding the move would not be in the best interests of Jeremy because of the adverse affect the move would have on Lewis' visitation. The court acknowledged that Baures sought removal in good faith but that she had failed to provide sufficient evidence of comparable educational opportunities for Jeremy in Wisconsin. Baures moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court following a best interests analysis. Lewis was discharged from the Navy in July of 1998. He found a full-time job in Edison as an electronics technician and a part-time job as a quality assurance tester. Because of Lewis' discharge, Baures requested and was granted a Rampolla hearing on the issue of whether Lewis could relocate to Wisconsin. At that hearing, Lewis testified that he investigated job opportunities in Wisconsin but had no success. He did acknowledge on cross- examination that his entire job search consisted of looking at classified ads on the Internet. The trial court affirmed its denial of Baures' motion, finding that Baures failed to prove the prospective advantages of the move; that Jeremy is doing well in New Jersey; that the proximity of both parents is important to a special needs child; and that there was insufficient evidence demonstrating Lewis' ability to obtain a job in Wisconsin at a location near Jeremy. Most importantly, the trial court relied on Baures' failure to provide adequate evidence of the comparability of educational and therapeutic facilities available to Jeremy in Wisconsin. The Appellate Division affirmed the ruling of the trial court and the Supreme Court granted certification. HELD: In a removal case, the burden is on the custodial parent who seeks to relocate to prove: 1) a good faith motive; and 2) that the move will not be inimical to the best interest of the child. Visitation is not an independent prong of the standard, but an important element of proof on the ultimate issue of whether the child's interest will suffer from the move. 1. Courts have significantly eased the burden on custodial parents in removal cases, for reasons including: increased geographical mobility and post-divorce demands; advances in technology that make communication over long distances much easier; social science research linking a positive outcome for children of divorce with the welfare of the custodial parent and the stability of and happiness within the newly formed household; and research suggesting that so long as a child has regular communication with the noncustodial parent that is extensive enough to sustain the relationship, the child's interests are served. (Pp. 14-21) 2. Under New Jersey's removal statute, the custodial parent may remove a child from the jurisdiction with the consent of the noncustodial parent or by making a successful removal application to the court. In Cooper v. Cooper, the Court recognized the fundamental tension that exists in a removal case: the interests of the custodial parent in self-governance versus the interests of the noncustodial parent in maintaining a relationship with the child. The Court held that the custodial parent must show that there is a real advantage to that parent in the move and that the move is not inimical to the best interest of the child. Four years later, in Holder v. Polanski, the Court held that the real advantage test was too great a burden and that Cooper had failed in its intent to allow custodial parents the same freedom enjoyed by noncustodial parents to seek a better life. Under Holder, removal should not be denied solely to maintain the same visitation scheme where a reasonable alternative visitation schedule is available and there are good faith reasons for the move. Current decisions applying Holder demonstrate confusion regarding the burden of going forward, the ultimate burden of proof, and the elements of the burden in determining whether the move would be inimical to the best interest of the child. (Pp. 21-31) 4. In making a removal determination, the court should assess the following factors: 1) reasons for the move; 2) reasons for the opposition; 3) past history of dealings between the parties as bears on the reasons for and against the move; 4) whether the child will receive comparable educational, health, and leisure opportunities; 5) any special needs or talents of the child that require accommodation and whether such accommodation is available in the new location; 6) whether a visitation and communication schedule can be developed that will allow the noncustodial parent to maintain a full and continuous relationship with the child; 7) the likelihood that the custodial parent will continue to foster the relationship of the child with the noncustodial parent; 8) the effect of the move on extended family relationships; 9) if the child is of age, his or her preference; 10) whether the child is entering senior year in high school; 11) whether the noncustodial parent has the ability to relocate; and 12) any other factor bearing on the child's interest. Not all factors will be relevant or equally weighted. (Pp. 31-35) 5. The moving party bears the burden of proving a good faith reason for the move and that the child will not suffer for it. In terms of the burden of going forward, the party seeking to move should initially produce evidence to establish prima facie that 1) there is a good faith reason for the move and 2) that the move will not be inimical to the child's interests. Included in that showing should be a visitation proposal. Thereafter, the burden of going forward moves to the noncustodial parent to produce evidence opposing the move as being either not in good faith or inimical to the child's interest. Where visitation is concerned, the burden is on the noncustodial parent to produce evidence that the change will negatively affect the child. (Pp. 35-39) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for proceedings consistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, VERNIERO, LAVECCHIA and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE LONG'S opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 135 September Term 1999 CARITA L. BAURES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STEVEN R. LEWIS, Defendant-Respondent. Argued January 17, 2001 -- Decided April 23, 2001 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Veronica M. Davis argued the cause for appellant (Lomurro, Davison, Eastman & Munoz, attorneys; Cheryl K. Brunner, on the brief). Barbara L. Birdsall argued the cause for respondent (Stout & O'Hagan, attorneys). The opinion of the court was delivered by LONG, J. Ideally, after a divorce, parents cooperate and remain in close proximity to each other to provide access and succor to their children. But that ideal is not always the reality. In our global economy, relocation for employment purposes is common. On a personal level, people remarry and move away. Noncustodial parents may relocate to pursue other interests regardless of the strength of the bond they have developed with their children. Custodial parents may do so only with the consent of the former spouse. Otherwise, a court application is required. Inevitably, upon objection by a noncustodial parent, there is a clash between the custodial parent's interest in self- determination and the noncustodial parent's interest in the companionship of the child. There is rarely an easy answer or even an entirely satisfactory one when a noncustodial parent objects. If the removal is denied, the custodial parent may be embittered by the assault on his or her autonomy. If it is granted, the noncustodial parent may live with the abiding belief that his or her connection to the child has been lost forever. Courts throughout the country, grappling with the issue of relocation, have not developed a uniform approach. Ann M. Driscoll, Note, In Search of a Standard: Resolving the Relocation Problem in New York, 26 Hofstra L. Rev. 175, 176 (1997). Some use a presumption against removal as their point of departure; others use a presumption in favor of removal; still others presume nothing, but rely on a classic best-interests analysis. Id. at 178. We have struggled to accommodate the interests of parents and children in a removal situation in our prior cases. Holder v. Polanski, 111 N.J. 344 (1988); Cooper v. Cooper, 99 N.J. 42 (1984). In so doing, we have developed something of a hybrid scheme. Although it is not based upon a presumption in favor of the custodial parent, it does recognize the identity of the interests of the custodial parent and the child, and, as a result, accords particular respect to the custodial parent's right to seek happiness and fulfillment. At the same time, it emphasizes the importance of the noncustodial parent's relationship with the child by guaranteeing regular communication and contact of a nature and quality to sustain that relationship. Further, it incorporates a variation on a best interests analysis by requiring proof that the child will not suffer from the move. We revisit the issue in this appeal, not only to resolve the matter before us, but because of what we perceive as confusion among the bench, Bar, and litigants over the legal standards that should apply in addressing a removal application, and particularly over what role visitation plays in the calculus. I Carita Baures (Baures), a native of Wisconsin married Steven Lewis (Lewis), a native of Iowa and an officer in the United States Navy, on October 5, 1985, in Rothschild, Wisconsin. Their only child, Jeremy, was born on June 24, 1990. During the marriage, the couple lived in the various locations in which the Navy billeted them. In 1994, they moved to New Jersey when Lewis was stationed in Leonardo. At age two, Jeremy began to exhibit developmental difficulties. By 1994, Jeremy, then aged four, was diagnosed with Pervasive Developmental Disorder (PDD), a form of autism.See footnote 11 Over the next few years, through trial and error, the parents arranged an effective therapeutic and educational regimen for Jeremy through a combination of public school and the Douglass College Outreach Program. In 1995, recognizing that their financial resources were being taxed to the limit, Baures and Lewis discussed moving to Wisconsin. Baures' parents live in Wisconsin and are retired school teachers who offered to help care for Jeremy while Baures and Lewis worked. According to both parties, the couple planned to move to Wisconsin after Lewis was discharged from the Navy in 1998. In anticipation of the discharge, Baures' parents sold their home in Schofield, Wisconsin and moved to Galesville because, according to them, it was a short distance to the Chileda Institute (Chileda), a Program for autistic children. Lewis flew to Wisconsin to research job opportunities. In 1996, escalating marital discord brought the case to court. Lewis sought custody of Jeremy because he believed that Baures was going to remove the child to Wisconsin. One day before the hearing, Baures filed a complaint for divorce alleging extreme cruelty. In response to Lewis's application for custody, Baures denied that she had any intention of moving Jeremy out of New Jersey. The parties then entered into a consent order that provided for custody and visitation and restrained both parties from leaving New Jersey with Jeremy. Baures and Lewis separated in late 1996. In April 1997, Baures filed an amended complaint for divorce requesting permission to relocate to Wisconsin. A three-day trial was held to resolve the issue. At trial, Baures claimed that she should be allowed to relocate to Wisconsin because the parties had limited funds and could no longer afford to live in New Jersey without the help of her parents. Without a vehicle (Lewis had taken the family car), Baures had no way to get Jeremy to his special programming or to his doctors. Moreover, because Jeremy is a child with special needs, he could not be admitted to regular day care. Baures testified that in Wisconsin, her parents would be able to provide child care and shelter for her and Jeremy so that she could work. Although Baures holds a master's degree in human resources management that she obtained in 1989, she never worked in that field and has held only part-time cleaning and baby-sitting jobs since Jeremy was born. She attempted to find more suitable employment but, of the twenty-four jobs in her field that she researched, Baures testified that none was able to provide child care for Jeremy because of his special needs. In June of 1996, Baures' parents came to New Jersey to help her care for Jeremy and remained for over a year after Lewis took Baures' name off the checkbook, credit cards and savings account, and denied her the use of the automobile. In that time, Baures' father transported Jeremy to and from his programming, and provided additional child care. In total, Baures' parents paid her in excess of one-thousand dollars per month to supplement the court ordered child support she received in the amount of one- hundred dollars per week. Baures testified that the Chileda Institute offers outreach programming to children who have been diagnosed with autism or PDD. The program is similar to the Douglas Program in that it provides trained professional therapy for the child at home. Chileda is located within twenty minutes of Baures' parents' house. Baures inquired whether Jeremy would be eligible for services at Chileda and faxed the school Jeremy's diagnostic materials and other documentation. A representative of Chileda responded that, based on the materials she had received, Jeremy would be eligible. She could not, however, say specifically what programming would be provided until there was an accurate assessment of Jeremy to determine what approach should be incorporated into the home program. Baures conceded that, although her father visited Chileda, she never did so, and that what she knew about the program was elicited from telephone calls, literature, and her father's visit. Baures offered no information regarding what services are available in the Wisconsin public schools. Baures acknowledged that Lewis should have ongoing contact with Jeremy. To encourage the relationship, she stated that Lewis could visit Jeremy one week a month and stay in her parents' basement free of charge. That offer was reiterated by Baures' father. In addition, Baures agreed to pay half of the transportation costs from New Jersey to Wisconsin if Lewis could obtain an economical rate. On cross-examination, Baures testified that Lewis was a good father to Jeremy, and that his presence in Jeremy's life is important to the child's progress. Moreover, she acknowledged that in the initial action instituted by Lewis to prevent her from moving to Wisconsin, she had stated that if Jeremy was to leave the State of New Jersey, he would lose his relationship with his father and would be prevented from attending the Douglass Program, the best available program, both of which would adversely affect his progress. Joan Hurst, a coordinator at the Douglass Program, testified at trial on Baures' behalf. Hurst was offered and accepted as an expert in the field of autism and PDD. Hurst explained that a child with autism needs a highly structured, full-day program beyond normal school hours that teaches and applies behavior modification techniques throughout the day. Hurst explained that a strong family support system is important because: [i]t's really the basis of the child's program. The school and the professionals can lay the foundation and show the family what to do, but it needs follow through in all areas of their lives. And since home is really the most common place for them and in their security and where they are most of the time, everything needs to continue when they come home from school. And it needs to continue to go on with the family at home. When asked what a family member might have to do to continue home programming, Hurst went on: every minute is a teaching minute . . . especially with Jeremy having the diagnosis of autism, since language is such an issue, there should be constant modeling of language. There should be constant modeling of appropriate reactions to situations . . . . There should be constant teaching on how to successfully complete daily activities of the day. And constant teaching and modeling and prompting of what is normal and acceptable to society of things that we go through each day. Hurst made several recommendations with respect to Jeremy that include the following: that any program for Jeremy must be highly structured and staffed by professionals experienced in the field of autism; have a low student/teacher ratio; provide appropriate peer models; operate on a twelve month basis; support the family; offer a trained professional to assist Jeremy as a shadow,See footnote 22 and provide speech therapy sessions as needed. She did not render an opinion regarding whether the Wisconsin public schools and Chileda could provide those services. At the time of the hearing, Lewis, who holds a bachelor's degree in economics, was employed in the United States Navy, and had been for over nineteen years. His rank was that of a chief petty officer, electronics technician. He indicated that his ultimate career goal is to be an electrical engineer, but that he will be required to take further courses. Further, he claimed, based on advertisements in the newspaper and talking with people in the area, Galesville, Wisconsin offered no jobs. He stated that he has no property or family in Wisconsin, however, his mother lives in Minnesota, about a five-hour distance from Wisconsin. At the time of the hearing, his visitation schedule was two afternoons a week from 4:30 p.m. until 7:30 p.m. and alternate weekends. Lewis testified that his command would not let him travel to Wisconsin one week a month to visit his son. Regardless, he stressed that he could not visit at the Baures's house due to the estranged relationship with their daughter. Lewis stated that Jeremy will regress if he is separated from him for an extended period of time. The trial court denied the removal. Although acknowledging that Baures had a good faith reason to move (financial and emotional stability and caregiving by her parents), the court held that the move would adversely affect Lewis' visitation with Jeremy; that Lewis could not visit regularly or relocate because of his Navy service; and that he does not have the financial resources to travel back and forth to Wisconsin. Further, the court held that Baures had not provided sufficient evidence that the educational opportunities for Jeremy in Wisconsin are comparable to that which he was receiving in New Jersey. Accordingly, the court held it was not in Jeremy's best interests to move to Wisconsin. She stated that a move to Wisconsin does not seem to be in Jeremy's interest because Jeremy was doing well in East Brunswick, and because he would be unable to sustain a long distance relationship with his father who could not relocate because of his Navy commitments. Reconsideration was denied. Lewis was discharged from the Navy on July 31, 1998. He found a full-time job in Edison as an electronics technician at a starting salary of $26,500, and a part-time job as a quality assurance tester for $9 an hour. As a result of Lewis' discharge, Baures requested the trial court to conduct a hearing on the issue of whether Lewis could relocate to Wisconsin pursuant to the requirements of Rampolla v. Rampolla, 269 N.J. Super. 300, 307-08 (App. Div. 1993). Rampolla holds that in a removal case, the court should inquire about the capacity of the noncustodial parent to relocate as a method of ensuring the vitality of a shared custody arrangement. Id. at 307. Lewis testified that he had investigated job opportunities in Wisconsin, but had no success. He said that the jobs that were available in Galesville, a very small town, were not in his area of expertise and were low paying. He identified only two jobs that were commensurate with his skill level, but claimed that they were located in Milwaukee, a six-hour drive from Galesville. Lewis said that he had considered working at IBM, located in nearby Rochester, Minnesota, but that he did not have the necessary digital electronics background or computer skills. Several cases are instructive regarding the import of the cause provision of that statute. In Cooper, supra, 99 N.J. at 46, the trial court was faced with an application by a custodial parent (the mother) to move to California to take advantage of a business opportunity. Her former husband objected on the basis that the reasons for the move were frivolous; that the children had a deep connection to his close-knit east coast family; and that he could not arrange blocks of time in his schedule to make his former wife's visitation proposal realistic. Id. at 48. The trial court allowed the move and the Appellate Division reversed. Id. at 49. We granted certification and began our opinion by emphasizing that the purpose underlying N.J.S.A. 9:2-2 is to preserve the rights of the noncustodial parent and the child to maintain and develop their familial relationship. This mutual right of the child and the noncustodial parent to develop and maintain their familial relationship is usually achieved by means of visitation between them. Because the removal of the child from the state may seriously affect the visitation rights of the noncustodial parent, the statute requires the custodial parent to show cause why the move should be permitted. [Id. at 50-51.] However, citing D'Onofrio v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J Super. 200 (Ch. Div.), aff'd o.b., 144 N.J. Super. 352 (App. Div. 1976) and Helentjaris v. Sudano, 194 N.J. Super. 220 (App. Div. 1984), we also recognized a countervailing interest: '[T]he family unity which is lost as a consequence of the divorce is lost irrevocably, and there is no point in judicial insistence on maintaining a wholly unrealistic simulation of unity.' [citations omitted]. The realities of the situation after divorce compel the realization that the child's quality of life and style of life are provided by the custodial parent. That the interests of the child are closely interwoven with those of the custodial parent is consistent with psychological studies of children of divorced or separated parents. NO. A-135 CARITA L. BAURES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STEVEN R. LEWIS, Defendant-Respondent. DECIDED April 23, 2001 Chief Justice Poritz