Case Title: Passwater v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 48S05-1210-PC-583

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2013-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT  
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 
Stephen T. Owens 
 
 
 
 
 
Gregory F. Zoeller 
Public Defender of Indiana 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General of Indiana 
 
Richard Denning  
 
 
 
 
 
Andrew R. Falk 
Deputy Public Defender 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputy Attorney General 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 48S05-1210-PC-583 
 
BRAD W. PASSWATER, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellant (Respondent below), 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF INDIANA, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Petitioner below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Madison Circuit Court, No. 48D03-0704-PC-86 
The Honorable Rudolph R. Pyle, III, Special Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 48A05-1201-PC-17 
_________________________________ 
 
 
June 28, 2013 
 
 
Rucker, Justice. 
 
Jun 28 2013, 11:31 am
 
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After being charged with the murder of his mother, Brad W. Passwater was found guilty 
but mentally ill and sentenced to an executed term of years.  He filed a petition for post-
conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel for, among other things,  
counsel’s failure to object to the trial court’s instruction on the penal consequences of not 
responsible by reason of insanity and guilty but mentally ill.  The post-conviction court denied 
relief.  We affirm. 
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
On October 26, 2002, Passwater struck his mother in the head twice with a frying pan and 
then stabbed her in the head with a knife.  A few days later, the State charged Passwater with 
murder.  On November 25, 2003, Passwater filed a notice of intent to present an insanity defense.  
The trial court appointed a psychiatrist, Dr. Susan Anderson, and a psychologist, Dr. Frank 
Krause, to make a determination concerning Passwater’s current competency and to evaluate his 
mental health.  See Ind. Code § 35-36-3-1.  Following a Competency Hearing the trial court 
concluded that Passwater was competent to stand trial.  
 
The trial began in August 2004.  During voir dire there was extended dialogue between 
the prospective jurors and the attorneys regarding the insanity defense.  Several jurors expressed 
concerns that the defense was overused.  One juror questioned whether a defendant who was 
mentally challenged would actually receive the treatment he needed before returning to society.  
Another juror opined that defendants who used the insanity defense “get a slap on the hand.”  
Voir Dire Tr. at 118.   
 
During trial the healthcare professionals presented conflicting testimony regarding 
Passwater’s mental health.  The defense offered Dr. George Parker who testified that Passwater 
suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, experienced a schizophrenic episode at the time of the 
offense, and lacked the ability to “appreciate the wrongfulness of his behavior.”  Tr. at 472.  The 
court’s first expert witness, Dr. Anderson, testified that she was unable to offer an opinion 
concerning Passwater’s sanity at the time of the offense in part because Passwater refused to 
cooperate with her evaluation.  The court’s second expert, Dr. Krause, testified that he had an 
 
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adequate opportunity to evaluate Passwater and make a determination as to his state of mind.  
According to Dr. Krause, Passwater experienced some mental health issues but he was 
nonetheless able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions at the time of the offense.  Various 
lay witnesses testified about Passwater’s calm and deliberate demeanor shortly before and after 
he struck his mother.  
 
At the close of evidence, defense counsel requested a jury instruction on the penal 
consequences of guilty but mentally ill and not responsible by reason of insanity verdicts.  He 
specifically requested a pattern jury instruction apparently used in the state of California.  The 
trial court rejected the tendered instruction because it was inconsistent with Indiana law and 
instead gave an instruction proposed by the State and approved of by this Court in Georgopulos 
v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1138, 1143 n.3 (Ind. 2000).  Defense counsel did not object to the State’s 
tendered instruction.  After deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of guilty but mentally ill.  
The trial court sentenced Passwater to an executed term of sixty years in the Department of 
Correction.  On review the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but remanded the cause for 
resentencing at which time the trial court entered a sentence of fifty-five years in accordance 
with Indiana Code section 35-50-2-3 (2002), that was in effect at the time of Passwater’s crime 
and sentencing.  See Passwater v. State, No. 48A02-0501-CR-50 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2005).  
 
 
Thereafter on April 17, 2007 Passwater filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief 
that was later amended by counsel on August 27, 2010.  As amended the petition essentially 
alleged that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for (1) failing to object to the trial 
court’s tendered instruction on the penal consequences of verdicts for not guilty by reason of 
insanity and guilty but mentally ill; (2) failing to provide information that had been requested 
before trial by one of the mental health professionals appointed to examine Passwater; and (3) 
failing to rebut the State’s argument at sentencing that Passwater had been malingering.   
 
The post-conviction court denied Passwater’s request for relief and Passwater appealed 
raising the same claims he raised before the post-conviction court.  In an unpublished 
memorandum decision the Court of Appeals rejected each of Passwater’s claims and affirmed 
the post-conviction court’s judgment.  See Passwater v. State, No. 48A05-1201-PC-17 (Ind. Ct. 
 
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App. July 25, 2012).  Seeking transfer Passwater challenges only the disposition of his jury 
instruction claim.  Specifically, Passwater acknowledges the Court of Appeals resolved this 
claim consistent with this Court’s Georgopulos opinion, but contends “that precedent is in need 
of reconsideration.”  Pet. to Trans. at i.  Having previously granted transfer thereby vacating the 
decision of the Court of Appeals, see Appellate Rule 58(A), we now address Passwater’s jury 
instruction claim.  We summarily affirm that portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision 
concerning Passwater’s remaining claims.  Additional facts are set forth below as necessary.  
 
Standard of Review for Post-Conviction Proceedings 
 
The petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding bears the burden of establishing grounds 
for relief by a preponderance of the evidence.  Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5); Fisher v. State, 
810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004).  When appealing the denial of post-conviction relief, Petitioner 
stands in the position of one appealing from a negative judgment.  Fisher, 810 N.E.2d at 679.  To 
prevail from the denial of post-conviction relief, a petitioner must show that the evidence as a 
whole leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-
conviction court.  Weatherford v. State, 619 N.E.2d 915, 917 (Ind. 1993).  Further, the post-
conviction court in this case made findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with 
Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(6).  Although we do not defer to the post-conviction court’s 
legal conclusions, “[a] post-conviction court’s findings and judgment will be reversed only upon 
a showing of clear error – that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been made.”  Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 729 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2000) (quotation omitted).  
 
Standard of Review for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 
To establish a post-conviction claim alleging violation of the Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish the two components set forth in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 
(2000).  First, a defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient.  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687.  This requires a showing that counsel’s representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness and that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
 
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functioning as “counsel” guaranteed to the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.  Id.  Second, a 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.  Id.  This requires a 
showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, meaning 
a trial whose result is reliable.  Id.  To establish prejudice, a defendant must show that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.  Id. at 694.  A reasonable probability is one that is sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome.  Id.  Further, when a petitioner contends that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to mount an objection at trial, in order to show prejudice petitioner must 
prove that the trial court would have sustained the objection.  Lowery v. State, 640 N.E.2d 1031, 
1042 (Ind. 1994).  Absent such a showing, the petitioner cannot satisfy the second prong of 
Strickland and thus may not prevail on his ineffective assistance claim.  Id. 
 
Discussion 
 
As a general proposition a jury may not be instructed on specific penal ramifications of 
its verdicts.  See Schweitzer v. State, 552 N.E.2d 454, 457 (Ind. 1990).  However, 
acknowledging the “potential for confusion in cases where the jury is faced with the option of 
finding a defendant not responsible by reason of insanity or guilty but mentally ill” this Court 
determined that when such options are before a jury “and the defendant requests a jury 
instruction on the penal consequences of these verdicts, the trial court is required to give an 
appropriate instruction or instructions as the case may be.”  Georgopulos, 735 N.E.2d at 1143 
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  The Court then declared “[a]lthough not binding, the trial 
court may consider the following as appropriate instructions:” Id. at n.3,  
 
Whenever a defendant is found guilty but mentally ill at the time of 
the crime, the court shall sentence the defendant in the same 
manner as a defendant found guilty of the offense.  At the 
Department of Correction, the defendant found guilty but mentally 
ill shall be further evaluated and treated as is psychiatrically 
indicated for his illness. 
 
Id. (citing I.C. § 35-36-2-5). 
 
 
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Whenever a defendant is found not responsible by reason of 
insanity at the time of the crime, the prosecuting attorney shall file 
a written petition for mental health commitment with the court.  
The court shall hold a mental health commitment hearing at the 
earliest opportunity after the finding of not responsible by reason 
of insanity at the time of the crime, and the defendant shall be 
detained in custody until the completion of the hearing.  If, upon 
the completion of the hearing, the court finds that the defendant is 
mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely disabled, then the 
court may order the defendant to be committed to an appropriate 
facility, or enter an outpatient treatment program of not more than 
ninety (90) days. 
 
Id. (citing I.C. §§ 35-36-2-4; 12-26-6-8). 
 
In this case, noting the apparent confusion displayed by some jurors during voir dire, 
defense counsel requested an instruction on the penal consequences of guilty but mentally ill and 
not responsible by reason of insanity.  As a consequence the trial court gave the precise 
instruction this Court approved as “appropriate” in Georgopulos.  On appeal from the denial of 
his petition for post-conviction relief, Passwater insists that trial counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance for failing to object to the instruction.  More specifically Passwater takes issue with 
that portion of the instruction suggesting that he could be “committed to an out-patient treatment 
facility for a period of not more than ninety (90) days.”  Br. of Appellant at 1.  Acknowledging 
the instruction represents a correct statement of the law, Passwater contends the instruction was 
nonetheless misleading because he “would have been hospitalized in a secure facility for years. 
[Because] [t]here was no chance that [he] would have been treated in an outpatient treatment 
program after a commitment hearing.”  Br. of Appellant at 13.  
 
We make two observations.  First, as the Court explained in Georgopulos, when a 
defendant so requests the trial court is required to provide an appropriate instruction or 
instructions on the penal consequences of verdicts of guilty but mentally ill and not guilty by 
reason of insanity, Georgopulos, 735 N.E.2d at 1143, not solely the consequence that the 
defendant believes is the most likely outcome of a commitment hearing.  Here, there was 
testimony presented at the post-conviction hearing that Passwater would not have been treated in 
an outpatient facility.  However no such testimony was presented at trial.  Hence there was no 
 
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particular reason to believe that the instruction given by the trial court was misleading.  Second, 
and more importantly, in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance due to the failure to 
object, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that the objection would have been 
sustained if made.  Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179, 1192 (Ind. 2001).  On this point 
Passwater has not carried his burden.  It bears repeating (i) the trial court was required to give an 
appropriate instruction at defense counsel’s request, (ii) the instruction at issue was and is a 
correct statement of the law, and (iii) the instruction is one which this Court declared 
“appropriate” where the verdicts faced by the jury are guilty but mentally ill and not responsible 
by reason of insanity.  Passwater does not explain how trial counsel can be said to have rendered 
ineffective assistance for failing to object to an instruction this Court specifically endorsed.  See, 
e.g., Warren v. State, 725 N.E.2d 828, 834 (Ind. 2000) (rejecting claim that trial court abused its 
discretion by giving a jury instruction “which this Court authorized and recommended”).  
Further, the post-conviction court found, and Passwater does not contest, “the trial court had 
intended to give the Georgopulos instruction before the State proposed it, which indicates that 
the trial court would not have sustained defense counsel’s objection had he made it.”  
Appellant’s App. at 61.  Failing to prove the trial court would have sustained his objection, 
Passwater has not satisfied the prejudice prong of Strickland and therefore cannot prevail on his 
ineffective assistance claim.  
 
Notwithstanding, we accept Passwater’s invitation to reconsider the Georgopulos 
instruction.  Several statutes control the disposition of a defendant found guilty but mentally ill 
or not responsible by reason of insanity.  With respect to the former, the relevant statute provides 
in pertinent part: 
 
whenever a defendant is found guilty but mentally ill at the time of 
the crime or enters a plea to that effect that is accepted by the 
court, the court shall sentence the defendant in the same manner as 
a defendant found guilty of the offense. . . .  If a defendant who is 
found guilty but mentally ill at the time of the crime is committed 
to the department of correction, the defendant shall be further 
evaluated and then treated in such a manner as is psychiatrically 
indicated for the defendant’s mental illness.  
 
 
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I.C. § 35-36-2-5 (a), (c).  The first portion of the Georgopulos instruction essentially tracks the 
language of the statute.  As for the latter, a number of statutory provisions come into play.  In 
summary the statutes provide: (1) there will be a mental health commitment hearing after the 
finding of not responsible by reason of insanity and the defendant will remain in custody 
throughout the duration of the hearing, see I.C. §§ 12-26-6-4; 12-26-7-4; 35-36-2-4; (2) if the 
defendant is found to be mentally ill at the conclusion of the hearing the court may either require 
the defendant to enter an outpatient treatment program or order the defendant to a regular 
commitment at an appropriate mental health facility—depending on the severity of defendant’s 
mental illness, see I.C. §§ 12-26-6-1; 12-26-6-8; 12-26-14-1; 12-26-14-7; (3) a defendant who is 
ordered to enter an outpatient treatment program on a temporary 90-day basis must be assessed 
by the attending physician or superintendent of the treatment program during the 90 days, see 
I.C. § 12-26-6-11; (4) if a person originally ordered to serve a temporary outpatient commitment 
period continues to suffer from mental illness, the court must conduct another commitment 
hearing before the 90 days expires to determine whether a second temporary commitment period 
in outpatient therapy or regular commitment to a mental health facility is appropriate, see I.C. §§ 
12-26-6-8; 12-26-6-10; 12-26-7-4; and (5) an individual ordered to a regular commitment will 
not be released until the attending physician or superintendent determines that they are no longer 
mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely disabled or so ordered by the court.  See I.C. §§ 12-
26-6-9; 12-26-7-5; 12-26-12-7. 
 
Obviously not all of the foregoing provisions are appropriate for a jury instruction.  
Consequently the second part of the Georgopulos instruction endeavored to synthesize those 
portions of the statute relevant for a jury’s consideration in order to avoid confusion in cases 
where the jury is faced with the option of finding a defendant not responsible by reason of 
insanity or guilty but mentally ill.  However, that does not mean to say that the instruction is 
flawless.  Although not used by the trial court in this case, at least one attempt to suggest an 
improved instruction is found in Indiana Pattern Jury Instruction 11.20.1  Titled “Consequences 
of Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity or Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdicts” the instruction 
provides: 
                                                 
1 The Indiana Pattern Jury Instructions are prepared under the auspices of the Indiana Judges Association 
and the Indiana Judicial Conference Criminal and Civil Instruction Committees.  Although not formally 
approved for use, they are tacitly recognized by Indiana Trial Rule 51(E). 
 
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If the Defendant is found guilty but mentally ill at the time of the 
crime, the court will sentence the Defendant in the same manner as 
a Defendant found guilty of the offense.  The Defendant will then 
be further evaluated and treated as is psychiatrically indicated for 
his illness. 
 
If the Defendant is found not responsible by reason of insanity at 
the time of the crime, the prosecuting attorney will file a petition 
for mental health commitment with the court.  The court will hold 
a mental health commitment hearing at the earliest opportunity.  
The Defendant will be detained in custody until the completion of 
the hearing.  If the court finds that the Defendant is mentally ill and 
either dangerous or gravely disabled, then the court may order the 
Defendant to be either placed in an outpatient treatment program of 
not more than ninety (90) days, or committed to an appropriate 
mental health facility until a court determines commitment is no 
longer needed.   
 
Indiana Pattern Jury Instructions – Criminal 11.20 (2013).  We are of the view that the Pattern 
Instruction represents an improvement over the instruction this Court found appropriate in 
Georgopulos and thus endorse and approve its use.  
 
Conclusion 
 
We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.  
 
Dickson, C.J., and David, Massa and Rush, JJ., concur.