Case Title: Montrose Christian v. Carver

Citation: 363 Md. 565

Docket Number: 147/99

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2001-04-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Nos. 144 & 147, September Term, 1999
MONTROSE CHRISTIAN SCHOOL CORPORATION v. SHARON M. WALSH, et al. * * *
MONTROSE CHRISTIAN SCHOOL CORPORATION v. BARBARA ANNE CARVER
[Involves The Validity Of A Montgomery County Ordinance Which Prohibits Employment
Discrimination Based On Religious Creed]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
Nos. 144 & 147
September Term, 1999
___________________________________________
MONTROSE CHRISTIAN SCHOOL
CORPORATION, et al.
v.
SHARON M. WALSH, et al.
________________
MONTROSE CHRISTIAN SCHOOL
CORPORATION, et al.
v.
BARBARA ANNE CARVER
__________________________________________
        
Bell, C.J.,
Eldridge
  
             * Rodowsky
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell,
                                
         JJ.
___________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
__________________________________________
     
Filed:   April 12, 2001
* Rodowsky, J., now retired, participated in the hearing
and conference of this case while an active member of
this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the
Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated
in the decision and adoption of this opinion.
Chapter 27 of the Montgomery County Code contains a comprehensive statutory
scheme aimed at eliminating discrimination in the County in the areas of employment, housing,
and public accommodation.  Section 27-2 of the County Code creates the Montgomery County
Human Relations Commission and provides for its jurisdiction.  The County’s general anti-
discrimination policies, as well as the administration and duties of the Commission, are set out
in §§ 27-1 through 27-7B.  The remainder of Chapter 27 is divided into four parts, namely,
discrimination in places of public accommodation (§§ 27-8 through 27-10), discrimination
in real estate (§§ 27-11 through 27-16C), discrimination in employment (§§ 27-17 through
27-26), and intimidation (§§ 27-26A through H).    
The two cases before this Court concern the third division, employment discrimination.
Section 27-17 declares that it is Montgomery County’s public policy “to foster equal
employment opportunity for all without regard to race, color, religious creed, ancestry,
national origin, sex, marital status, age, handicap, or sexual orientation and strictly in accord
with their individual merits as human beings.”  Thus, § 27-19 provides in relevant part as
follows (emphasis added): 
“Section 27-19. Unlawful Employment Practices.
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice to do any of
the following acts because of the race, color, religious
creed, ancestry, national origin, age, sex, marital status,
handicap, or sexual orientation of any individual or
because of any reason that would not have been asserted
but for the race, color, religious creed, ancestry, national
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1
Art. 49B, § 42, provides as follows:
“§ 42.  Civil actions for discriminatory acts — Montgomery
County, Prince George’s County, and Howard County.
“(a) Authorized. — In Montgomery County, Prince George’s
County, and Howard County, in accordance with this subtitle, a person
(continued...)
origin, age, sex, marital status, handicap, or sexual
orientation of the individual:
(1)
For an employer:
(a) To fail or refuse to hire or fail to accept the
services of or to discharge any individual or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with 
respect 
to 
compensation, 
terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment.
* * *
(d) Notwithstanding any other provision of this division, it
shall not be an unlawful employment practice:
* * *
(2)
For a religious corporation, association or society
to hire and employ employees of a particular
religion to perform purely religious functions.”
(Emphasis added).
* * *
The State Legislature, in Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl. Vol.), Art. 49B, § 42, has
authorized a circuit court civil action for damages or other relief by “a person who is subjected
to an act of discrimination prohibited by the [Montgomery] county code . . . .”  The present
cases were brought pursuant to Art. 49B, § 42.1  The plaintiffs in these cases
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1
(...continued)
who is subjected to an act of discrimination prohibited by the county code
may bring and maintain a civil action against the person who committed the
alleged discriminatory act for damages, injunctive relief, or other civil
relief.
“(b) Limitations periods. — (1) An action under subsection (a) of
this section shall be commenced in the circuit court for the county in which
the alleged discrimination took place not later than 2 years after the
occurrence of the alleged discriminatory act.
“(2)  Subject to the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection, an
action under subsection (a) of this section alleging employment or public
accommodation discrimination may not be commenced sooner than 45
days after the aggrieved person files a complaint with the county agency
responsible for handling violations of the county discrimination laws.
“(3)  Subject to the provisions of paragraph (1) of this subsection, an
action under subsection (a) of this section alleging real estate
discrimination may be commenced at any time.
“(c)  Fees and costs. — In a civil action under this section, the court,
in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party reasonable attorney’s fees,
expert witness fees, and costs.”
Prior to the enactment of Article 49B, § 42, the Montgomery County Council had passed § 27-20(a) of
the Montgomery County Code which purported to authorize a circuit court civil action for damages by any
person who had “been subjected to any act of discrimination prohibited under this division . . . .”  In
McCrory Corp. v. Fowler, 319 Md. 12, 570 A.2d 834 (1990), this Court held that § 27-20(a) of the
Montgomery County Code was invalid under Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution because it was
not a “local law” within the meaning of Article XI-A.  We pointed out in McCrory that “the creation of new
causes of action in the courts has traditionally been done either by the General Assembly or by this Court
under its authority to modify the common law” and that “the creation of new judicial remedies has
traditionally been done on a statewide basis.”  319 Md. at 20, 570 A.2d at 838.  We concluded in
McCrory by holding “that an ordinance attempting to combat employment discrimination by creating a new
private judicial cause of action is not a ‘local law’ under Article XI-A of the Maryland Constitution, and
thus is not within the power of Montgomery County to enact.”  See also Sweeney v. Hartz Mountain
Corp., 319 Md. 440, 444, 573 A.2d 32, 34 (1990), invalidating a similar Howard County ordinance.
Article 49B, § 42, enacted in response to the McCrory and Sweeney decisions, applies only in three
counties, namely Montgomery County, Prince George’s County, and Howard County.  A somewhat similar
provision, Article 49B, § 43, authorizes a civil action in Baltimore County.  The General Assembly does
(continued...)
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1
(...continued)
not appear to have enacted similar provisions applicable in the other counties or Baltimore City.  No party
in the present cases has raised any issue concerning the validity of § 42 under equal protection or other
constitutional principles.
were employees of Montrose Christian School, and they claimed that they were terminated by
the school’s principal on the basis of their religious creed in violation of the County’s
employment discrimination law.  The issues before us concern the monetary liability of the
school and the principal under Art. 49B, § 42, and § 27-19 of the County Code.
I.
This opinion encompasses two cases; consequently, we shall set forth the facts and
procedural history of each case separately.
A.  No. 147, Montrose Christian School, et al. v. Carver
Montrose Christian School Corporation is a private, religious school affiliated with the
Montrose Baptist Church in Montgomery County, Maryland.  The school and the church
operate on the same grounds for which only one sign, “Montrose Baptist Church,” is displayed.
The school provides education to children from kindergarten through twelfth grade.
Enrollment is not limited to students whose families are members of the church or to students
who are Baptist.  The majority of students attending the school are not members of the church.
Students belonging to a variety of religions and denominations attend the school.
According to the school’s Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws, the Church Board of
Deacons elects the School Board, all of whom are required to be members of the Church.  The
Pastor of the Church is an “ex officio” member of the School Board and is the supervisor of
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the school’s principal. The Bylaws provide that the “Principal shall carry out the administration
of the school under the direction of the Pastor.”  
Pastor Ray Hope became the new Pastor of the Church in February 1996.  In June 1996,
the school promoted defendant Gregory Scheck, formerly vice principal, to principal of the
school.  Changes in administrative policy at the school followed the change in pastors.  All
employees of the school who were not members of the Montrose Baptist Church, with the
exception of two janitors, were discharged from employment. 
The plaintiff Barbara Anne Carver began working for the school as a teacher’s aide in
1990.  At the time she was hired, the school knew that she was not a member of the church and
was not a Baptist.  Carver’s position required her to perform tasks such as copying, typing,
grading papers, and generally assisting school staff and teachers in administrative ways.  Carver
is not a certified teacher, does not have a teaching degree, and has never been employed as a
teacher.  Carver was fired by the defendant Scheck in June 1996. 
Carver filed a charge of employment discrimination with the Montgomery County
Human Relations Commission, and more than 45 days passed without resolution of the charge.
Carver then filed a complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County against the school
and Scheck alleging employment discrimination and seeking both damages and injunctive
relief.  Specifically, Carver alleged that the defendants fired her for the sole reason that she
was not a member of the church and that firing her for that reason violated § 27-19 of the
Montgomery County Code which prohibits employers from discriminating against employees
on the basis of their religious creed.
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2
  The defendants relied on the three exceptions, listed in § 27-19(d), which provide as follows
(emphasis added):
“(d)
Notwithstanding any other provision of this division, it shall not be
an unlawful employment practice:
(1) For an employer to hire and employ employees, for an
employment agency to classify or refer for employment any
individual, for a labor organization to classify its membership or to
classify or refer for employment any individual, or for an
employer, labor organization or joint labor-management
committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining
programs, to admit or employ any individual in any such program,
on the basis of race, color, religious creed, age, sex, marital
status, national origin, ancestry, handicap, or sexual orientation in
those certain instances where such basis is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of that particular business or enterprise;
(2) For a religious corporation, association or society to hire and
employ employees of a particular religion to perform purely
religious functions; and
(3) For an employer to deny employment on the basis of religious
creed in those cases when the observance, practice or belief
cannot be reasonably accommodated by an employer without
causing undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s
business.”
In response, the defendants contended that their action fell within the exceptions to the
employment discrimination law and, further, that they were immune from liability under the
doctrine of charitable immunity.2  The defendants also asserted that the application of
Montgomery County’s employment discrimination law to the school and Scheck violated the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution, the guarantee of freedom of association under the First Amendment, and Article
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36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  Moreover, the defendants argued that the County’s
law was preempted because the local law impermissibly conflicts with state law prohibiting
employment discrimination.  See Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl. Vol.), Art. 49B, § 18. 
Montgomery County intervened in the lawsuit for the purpose of defending the local law on
constitutional and preemption grounds.
The Circuit Court resolved the action for damages in Carver’s favor following a hearing
on cross-motions for summary judgment based on stipulated facts. The court held that the
defendants had engaged in an unlawful employment practice in violation of § 27-19 of the
Montgomery County Code when they terminated Carver’s employment because of her
religious creed.  The court determined that none of the statutory exceptions in § 27-19 applied
to the defendants’ conduct.  The court further held that Montgomery County’s employment
discrimination law does not impermissibly conflict with state law.  The Circuit Court also held
that the application of § 27-19 to the defendants did not violate the First Amendment or the
Maryland Constitution.  Finally, the court ruled that the defendants were not entitled to the
defense of charitable immunity.  Judgment was entered awarding Carver $15,000.00 in
damages and awarding $16,000.00 in attorneys’ fees and costs, for a total of $31,000.00.  The
court denied the request for injunctive relief.
The defendants filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  Before argument  in the
intermediate appellate court, this Court issued a writ of certiorari.  Montrose Christian
School v. Carver, 358 Md. 162, 747 A.2d 644 (2000).
B.  No. 144, Montrose Christian School, et al. v. Walsh, et al.
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In 1979, the plaintiff Mary Lou Jones began working at the school as the bookkeeper
and the principal’s secretary.  The school hired the plaintiff Sharon M. Walsh in 1982 for a
secretarial position handling registration-type duties and general administrative tasks.  The
plaintiff Helen E. Poole was hired as a cafeteria worker in 1989.  Poole’s duties included
planning menus, ordering food, preparing meals, and cleaning up.  The three plaintiffs are not
members of the church and are not Baptists.  Scheck terminated the employment of each of
the plaintiffs in June 1996. 
The plaintiffs filed a complaint with the Montgomery County Human Relations
Commission charging the school and Scheck with employment discrimination based on
religious creed in violation of § 27-19.  More than 45 days passed without resolution of the
administrative complaint, and the plaintiffs then filed an action in the Circuit Court for
Montgomery County, seeking damages and injunctive relief against the school and Scheck. 
In response to the plaintiffs’ discrimination claims, the defendants asserted the same
defenses described in the Carver case discussed above.  Also, as in the Carver case,
Montgomery County intervened in the Circuit Court for the purpose of defending the validity
of the Montgomery County law.
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment based on the exceptions under the
Montgomery County Code, the constitutional issues, the question of preemption by conflict,
and charitable immunity.  The Circuit Court denied the summary judgment motion.  The court
did grant a motion by the plaintiffs to exclude evidence relating to the “bona fide occupational
qualification” and “undue hardship” exceptions in the local law, thus preventing the defendants
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3
The appeal taken by the Montrose Christian School in Case No. 144 was inappropriate because the
judgment was entirely in its favor based on the Circuit Court’s charitable immunity holding.  What this Court
said in Offutt v. Montgomery Co. Bd. of Ed., 285 Md. 557, 564 n.4, 404 A.2d 281, 285 n.4 (1979),
is applicable here:
(continued...)
from asserting those defenses at trial.  See § 27-19(d)(1) and (3).
After the presentation of evidence relating to the reasons for terminating the plaintiffs’
employment, the jury found that each of the plaintiffs had been terminated by the school and
by Scheck because of their religious creed.  Compensatory damages were awarded to each of
the three plaintiffs.  Subsequently, the Circuit Court filed an opinion holding that the local law
did not conflict with state law and that the application of § 27-19 to the conduct of the
defendants did not violate the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, or the guarantee
of freedom of association under the First Amendment.  The court further held that there was
no violation of Article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  In rejecting the
constitutional defenses, the court stated that it was persuaded by the evidence  which indicated
that “the duties of the plaintiffs were not the formulation or implementation of policy nor were
they educational or instructive in nature, but rather administrative and ministerial.”  The court
did hold that the school was entitled to charitable immunity but that such immunity did not
extend to Scheck.  In accordance with the jury’s verdicts, judgments for compensatory
damages, in various amounts, were rendered for each of the three plaintiffs against Scheck.
The court denied the request for injunctive relief.
Both the defendants and the plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.3  Prior
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3
(...continued)
“It should be pointed out that, as a procedural matter, the cross-
appeal in this case does not properly lie.  Although the defendant School
Board may not like the language in the trial court’s opinion stating that the
Board bargained in bad faith, the final judgment of the trial court, by
denying any relief to the plaintiffs, is entirely in the School Board’s favor.
It is established as a general principle that only a party aggrieved by a
court’s judgment may take an appeal and that one may not appeal or
cross-appeal from a judgment wholly in his favor.”  [Citations omitted]
“Where a party has an issue resolved adversely in the trial court, but
like the School Board here receives a wholly favorable judgment on
another ground, that party may, as an appellee and without taking a cross-
appeal, argue as a ground for affirmance the matter that was resolved
against it at trial.”  [Citations omitted]
See, e.g., Boitnott v. Baltimore, 356 Md. 226, 233-234 n.7, 738 A.2d 881, 885 n.7 (1999); Insurance
Commissioner v. Equitable, 339 Md. 596, 612 n.8, 664 A.2d 862, 870 n.8 (1995); Paolino v.
McCormick & Co., 314 Md. 575, 579, 552 A.2d 868, 870 (1989) (“an appeal or cross appeal is
impermissible from a judgment wholly in a party’s favor”).  See also the discussions in Auto. Trade Ass’n
v. Harold Folk Enter., 301 Md. 642, 648-649, 484 A.2d 612, 615 (1984); Joseph H. Munson Co. v.
Sec. of State, 294 Md. 160, 167-168, 448 A.2d 935, 939-940 (1982), affirmed, 467 U.S. 947, 104
S.Ct. 2839, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984).
to argument in the intermediate appellate court, the plaintiffs filed in this Court a petition for
a writ a certiorari and the defendants filed a cross-petition for a writ of certiorari.  We granted
both the petition and the cross-petition.  Walsh v. Montrose Christian School, 357 Md. 481,
745 A.2d 436 (2000).  
The parties in both cases present substantially the same issues for appellate review.  We
restate the three principal questions as follows:
I.
Whether § 27-19 of the Montgomery County Code is in conflict
with, and thus preempted by, Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl.
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4
Baltimore Sun v. Baltimore, 359 Md. 653, 659, 755 A.2d 1130, 1133-1134 (2000), quoting
Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 347 Md. 561, 579 n.15, 702 A.2d 230, 239 n.15 (1997).  See also
Harryman v. State, 359 Md. 492, 503 n.6, 754 A.2d 1018, 1024 n.6 (2000), and cases there cited.
Vol.), Art. 49B, § 18;
II. Whether the doctrine of charitable immunity precludes the award of
damages against the school and Scheck;
III. Whether § 27-19 of the Montgomery County Code violates the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article 36 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights.  
If the defendants prevail under either the first or the second of the questions set forth above,
it would not be necessary for us to reach the constitutional issues in the third question.
Consistent with the “‘principle that a court will not decide a constitutional issue when a case
can properly be disposed of on a non-constitutional ground,’”4 we shall first consider the
conflict and charitable immunity issues.
II.
Montgomery County has charter home rule under the Home Rule Amendment, Article
XI-A of the Maryland Constitution.  See, e.g., Save Our Streets v. Mitchell, 357 Md. 237,
246-249, 743 A.2d 748, 753-755 (2000); Haub v. Montgomery County, 353 Md. 448, 450,
727 A.2d 369, 390 (1999); McCrory v. Fowler, 319 Md. 12, 16, 570 A.2d 834, 835 (1990).
The Home Rule Amendment enables those counties adopting a home rule charter to enjoy a
significant amount of self-governance by transferring the General Assembly’s power to enact
many types of public local laws to the home rule counties themselves.  Nevertheless, under
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5
 As this Court has noted, “state law may preempt local law in one of three ways: 1) preemption by
conflict, 2) express preemption, or 3) implied preemption.”  Talbot County v. Skipper, 329 Md. 481,
487-488, 620 A.2d 880, 883 (1993).  The defendants here urge preemption by conflict only.
Article XI-A, § 1, “[a] local government ordinance which conflicts with a public general law
enacted by the General Assembly is preempted and thus is invalid.”  Coalition v. Annapolis
Lodge, 333 Md. 359, 379, 635 A.2d 412, 422 (1994).
The defendants in the instant cases argue that § 27-19 of the Montgomery County Code
is preempted by Maryland Code (1957, 1998 Repl. Vol.), Art. 49B, § 18, because the County’s
employment discrimination law does not provide a broad exemption from coverage for
religious organizations such as is afforded under state and federal anti-discrimination laws.
Specifically, the defendants assert that § 27-19 of the County Code, prohibiting religious
organizations from discriminating in employment on the basis of religious creed, fatally
conflicts with state law which contains no such prohibition.5  
The State’s employment discrimination law is codified at Maryland Code (1957, 1998
Repl. Vol.), Art. 49B, §§ 14 through 18.  In contrast to the Montgomery County Code, the state
law exempts religious organizations from the prohibition against religious creed
discrimination.  Art. 49B, § 18, states:
“This subtitle shall not apply to an employer with respect to the
employment of aliens outside of the State, or to a religious corporation,
association, educational institution or society with respect to 
the
employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work
connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association,
educational institution or society of its activities.”
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6
The defendants do not, however, argue that the local law is in conflict with, or preempted by, the
federal statutory provisions.
The state statute was modeled after the federal anti-discrimination law, Molesworth v.
Brandon, 341 Md. 621, 632, 672 A.2d 608, 614 (1996), providing the same broad exemption
for religious organizations.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.  Thus, the state law, like its federal
counterpart, does not prohibit discrimination by religious organizations based on religious
creed.  According to the defendants, this exemption in the state statute means that the local law
and state law are in conflict.6 
The controlling Maryland principle in determining preemption by conflict was set forth
in Talbot County v. Skipper, 329 Md. 481, 487 n. 4, 620 A.2d 880, 882 n. 4 (1993), as
follows:
“A local ordinance is pre-empted by conflict when it prohibits an
activity which is intended to be permitted by state law, or permits an
activity which is intended to be prohibited by state law.”
See Soaring Vista v. Queen Anne’s County, 356 Md. 660, 741 A.2d 1110 (1999); Holiday
v. Anne Arundel, 349 Md. 190, 210, 707 A.2d 829, 839 (1998); Coalition v. Annapolis
Lodge, supra, 333 Md. at 380, 635 A.2d at 422; Allied Vending v. Bowie, 332 Md. 279, 297
n. 12, 631 A.2d 77, 86 n. 12 (1993).
Although discrimination by religious organizations on the basis of religious creed is
not covered by state law, this Court has held that noncoverage does not mean that such activity
is authorized by the state statute.  In Annapolis Lodge, 333 Md. at 380, 635 A.2d at 422, we
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7
Some courts in other jurisdictions appear to adopt a contrary position on this issue.  See, e.g., City
of Tacoma v. Franciscan Foundation, 94 Wash. App. 663, 972 P.2d 566 (1999).
said:
“[O]ur cases have recognized a distinction between a state law which is
intended to permit or authorize a particular matter and a state law which
is simply intended to exempt the particular matter from its coverage.
When a state law simply excludes a particular activity from its coverage,
our cases have not attributed to the General Assembly an intent to
preempt local legislation regulating or prohibiting that activity.  Instead,
in such situations supplementary local legislation has not been deemed
to be in conflict with and preempted by the state statute.”
See Holiday v. Anne Arundel, supra, 349 Md. at 211 n.6, 707 A.2d at 840 n.6 (“When state
law simply regulates a matter to a limited extent, our cases have not ordinarily attributed to the
General Assembly an intent to preempt local law regulating the matter to a greater extent”);
Molesworth v. Brandon, supra, 341 Md. at 636, 672 A.2d at 615-616; National Asphalt v.
Prince Geo’s Co, 292 Md. 75, 80-81, 437 A.2d 651, 654 (1981); City of Baltimore v. Sitnick,
254 Md. 303, 324, 255 A.2d 376, 385-386 (1969).7
The state employment discrimination law simply excludes religious organizations from
coverage of the religious creed anti-discrimination provision in the state statute.  Instead of
constituting an affirmative authorization to discriminate, Article 49B, § 18, merely removes
religious organizations from the scope of the state law with regard to religious creed
discrimination.  Under the above-cited cases, there is no conflict between Art. 49B, § 18, and
§ 27-19 of the Montgomery County Code.
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III.
As previously stated, the Circuit Court in No. 147 ruled that neither the school nor
Scheck was entitled to the defense of charitable immunity with regard to their statutory
liability for damages.  In No. 144, however, the Circuit Court held that the defendant school
was immune from liability because of charitable immunity.  The court further held that the
defendant Scheck could not avail himself of the defense of charitable immunity.  In this Court,
the defendants argue that both the school and Scheck are entitled to the defense of charitable
immunity.  The plaintiffs urge that the common law doctrine of charitable immunity is not a
defense to liability imposed by statute, and that the Circuit Court erred in No. 144 by holding
that the defense of charitable immunity protected the school.  We agree with the plaintiffs. 
The doctrine of charitable immunity was first recognized in Maryland in Perry v. House
of Refuge, 63 Md. 20 (1885), and has been reaffirmed by this Court in a line of decisions.  See
Abramson v. Reiss, 334 Md. 193, 197, 206-209, 638 A.2d 743, 744-745, 749-751 (1994),
and cases there cited.  This judge-made doctrine is intended to protect charitable organizations
from tort liability.  Under Maryland law, charitable immunity is premised on the trust fund
theory, that is, because funds of the organization are impressed with a trust for charitable
purposes, those funds should not be diverted to pay tort damage awards.  See Loeffler v.
Sheppard-Pratt Hospital, 130 Md. 265, 100 A. 301 (1917).  
We assume, arguendo, that the school is a bona fide charitable organization for the
purpose of the doctrine of charitable immunity.  See Abramson v. Reiss, supra, 334 Md. at
200-201, 638 A.2d at 746-747; James v. Prince George’s County, 288 Md. 315, 336-337,
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418 A.2d 1173, 1185 (1980).  Nevertheless, the defense is not available to shelter the school
or Scheck from liability imposed by the Montgomery County employment discrimination law
and Art. 49B, § 42. 
As pointed out above, the charitable immunity defense applies only to tort actions.
Except for wrongful or abusive discharge actions pursuant to Adler v. American Standard
Corp., 291 Md. 31, 432 A.2d 464 (1981), actions for damages based on the termination of
employment relationships, including those regulated by statutes, ordinarily sound in contract
and not in tort. See generally, Montgomery County v. Broadcast Equities, Inc., 360 Md. 438,
444-445, 758 A.2d 995, 998-999 (2000); Suburban Hospital v. Dwiggins, 324 Md. 294,
303-308, 596 A.2d 1069, 1073-1076 (1991); Finch v. Holladay-Tyler Printing, Inc., 322
Md. 197, 202-206, 586 A.2d 1275, 1278-1280 (1991); Chappell v. Southern Maryland
Hosp., 320 Md. 483, 493, 578 A.2d 766, 772 (1990); Makovi v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 316
Md. 603, 625-626, 561 A.2d 179, 190 (1989); Ewing v. Koppers Co., 312 Md. 45, 49, 537
A.2d 1173, 1174-1175 (1988).  See also McMillan v. Massachusetts Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 140 F.3d 288, 307 (1st Cir. 1998) (cause of action based
on Massachusetts anti-discrimination statute is not based on tort); Blake v. Katter, 693 F.2d
677, 683 (7th Cir. 1982) (civil rights claims are not properly characterized as common law
torts).  Since the doctrine of charitable immunity applies only in tort actions, and since the
cases at bar sound in contract, the charitable immunity defense is inapplicable.
Moreover, even if a statutory employment discrimination action were characterized as
a tort suit, charitable immunity cannot be used to shield liability where the common law has
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been modified by legislation permitting actions against charitable organizations.  See, e.g.,
Abramson v. Reiss, supra, 334 Md. at 207-209, 638 A.2d at 750-751 (extent of charitable
immunity is a matter for the legislature); Howard v. Bishop Byrne Home, 249 Md. 233, 236,
241, 238 A.2d 863, 864, 867-868 (1968) (review of statutes limiting charitable immunity);
Howard v. South Baltimore General Hospital, 191 Md. 617, 619-620, 62 A.2d 574, 575
(1948).
The Montgomery County Council, by enacting § 27-19 of the Montgomery County
Code, explicitly extended coverage of the statute to include the employment activities of
charitable organizations such as the school.  See § 27-19(d)(2) (referring to a religious
corporation, association or society as an employer) and § 27-19(f)(2) (referring to positions
of employment in a religious school).  Section 27-19 of the Montgomery County Code,
together with Art. 49B, § 42, of the Maryland Code, clearly abrogate any charitable immunity
that might otherwise have existed in cases like the present ones.   
IV.
In light of our holdings that § 27-19 of the Montgomery County Code does not conflict
with Art. 49B, § 18, of the Maryland Code, and that the defense of charitable immunity is not
applicable in these cases, it becomes necessary to consider the constitutionality of § 27-
19(d)(2).
As earlier discussed, § 27-19(a) of the Montgomery County Code makes it unlawful,
inter alia, for an employer “to discharge any individual” “because of . . . religious creed . . . .”
Section 27-19(d)(2), however, contains an exception to this prohibition which allows
-18-
“religious” organizations to employ persons “of a particular religion.”  Nevertheless, the last
five words of § 27-19(d)(2) limit the exception to employees hired “to perform purely
religious functions.”  Consequently, because of this limitation, churches, religious schools,
and other religious organizations in Montgomery County are expressly prohibited from making
employment decisions based on “religious creed” except for employees hired to perform
purely religious functions.
We shall hold that the limitation in § 27-19(d)(2), “to perform purely religious
functions,” on its face violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and Article
36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.  We shall further hold that the limitation is
severable from the remaining language of § 27-19(d)(2).  As a result, the viable portion of
§ 27-19(d)(2) will provide that “it shall not be an unlawful employment practice * * * [f]or a
religious corporation, association, or society to hire and employ employees of a particular
religion.”  Because the defendants’ conduct was permitted by the valid portion of the § 27-
19(d)(2) exception, we shall reverse the judgments below.
A. 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution declares, in pertinent part, that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. . . .”  The religion clauses of the First Amendment are, of course, applicable
to the states and their political subdivisions by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See, e.g.,
Employment Div., Ore. Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-877, 110 S.Ct.
1595, 1599, 108 L.Ed.2d 876, 884 (1990); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60
-19-
8
While the liberty to worship freely is embodied in the Maryland Declaration of Rights, the Maryland
Constitution contains no express proscription against governmental “establishment” of religion.  Barghout
v. Mayor, 325 Md. 311, 327, 600 A.2d 841, 848 (1992).
S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 1217-1218 (1940); Levitsky v. Levitsky, 231 Md. 388, 396-
397, 190 A.2d 621, 625 (1963); Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590, 599, 155 A.2d 684, 690 (1959);
Hopkins v. State, 193 Md. 489, 496, 69 A.2d 456, 459 (1949).  The free exercise guarantee
of the Maryland Constitution is in Article 36 of the Declaration of Rights, which provides that
“. . . all persons are equally entitled to protection in their religious
liberty; wherefore, no person ought by any law to be molested in his
person or estate, on account of his religious persuasion, or profession,
or for his religious practice, unless, under the color of religion, he shall
disturb the good order, peace or safety of the State, or shall infringe the
laws of morality, or injure others in their natural, civil or religious rights;
nor ought any person to be compelled to frequent, or maintain, or
contribute, unless on contract, to maintain, any place of worship, or any
ministry. . . .”
8
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and Article 36 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights ordinarily do not grant to an individual or a religious organization “a
constitutional right to ignore neutral laws of general applicability” even when such laws have
an incidental effect of burdening a particular religious activity.  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 513, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2161, 138 L.Ed.2d 624, 634 (1997).  The Supreme Court
explained in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531, 113 S.Ct.
2217, 2226, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 489 (1993):
“In addressing the constitutional protection for free exercise of religion,
-20-
our cases establish the general proposition that a law that is neutral and
of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling
governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of
burdening a particular religious practice.”
See, e.g., Employment Div., Ore. Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, supra, 494 U.S. 872, 110
S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed.
645 (1944); Levitsky v. Levitsky, supra, 231 Md. at 396-397, 190 A.2d at 625; Craig v. State,
supra, 220 Md. at 599, 155 A.2d at 689.
Although religious activities may ordinarily be subject to neutral laws of general
applicability, “the First Amendment obviously excludes all ‘governmental regulation of
religious beliefs as such.’”  Employment Div., Ore. Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, supra, 494
U.S. at 877, 110 S.Ct. at 1599, 108 L.Ed.2d at 884, quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
402, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1793, 10 L.Ed.2d 965, 969 (1963).
Furthermore, under the Free Exercise Clause, laws targeting particular religious
practices, or selectively imposing burdens on conduct motivated by religious belief, are
subject to strict scrutiny, and “must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and
must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest.”  Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v.
Hialeah, supra, 508 U.S. at 531-532, 113 S.Ct. at 2226, 124 L.Ed.2d at 489.  Moreover, even
laws which are neutral and generally applicable have “failed to pass constitutional muster”
under the Free Exercise Clause when “other constitutional protections were at stake.”  City of
Boerne v. Flores, supra, 521 U.S. at 513-514, 117 S.Ct. at 2161, 138 L.Ed.2d at 634.
In addition, and particularly applicable to the cases at bar, is the principle set forth in
-21-
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 116, 73 S.Ct.
143, 154-155, 97 L.Ed. 120, 136-137 (1952), that the Free Exercise Clause reflects
“a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence from
secular control or manipulation — in short, power to decide for
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government
as well as those of faith and doctrine.  Freedom to select the clergy,
where no improper methods of choice are proven, we think, must now be
said to have federal constitutional protection as a part of the free
exercise of religion against state interference.”
In N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 504, 99 S.Ct. 1313, 1320, 59
L.Ed.2d 533, 543 (1979), the Supreme Court, holding that the National Labor Relations Act
did not apply to teachers in church-operated schools, and that the National Labor Relations
Board had no jurisdiction over such teachers, explained:
“The church-teacher relationship in a church-operated school differs
from the employment relationship in a public or other nonreligious
school.  We see no escape from conflicts flowing from the Board’s
exercise of jurisdiction over teachers in church-operated schools and the
consequent serious First Amendment questions that would follow.”
See, e.g., Downs v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Baltimore, 111 Md. App. 616, 622, 683
A.2d 808 (1996) (“matters of church . . . governance” may be beyond the authority of a court
to adjudicate); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1304
(11th Cir. 2000) (“Churches are to be free from government interference in matters of church
governance and administration”); Bollard v. California Province of Society of Jesus, 196 F.3d
940, 945 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The Free Exercise Clause restricts the government’s ability to
-22-
9
Similar to the Maryland state law, § 42 U.S.C. 2000e-1(a) now provides:
(continued...)
intrude into ecclesiastical matters or to interfere with a church’s governance of its own
affairs”); Combs v. Central Texas Annual Conference United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d
343, 348 (5th Cir. 1999) (referring to “the Free Exercise Clause’s protection to a church
against government encroachment into the church’s internal management”); E. E. O. C. v.
Catholic University of America, 83 F.3d 455, 463 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“the Free Exercise
Clause guarantees a church’s freedom to decide how it will govern itself”). 
A uniform line of cases applying this principle, namely that the free exercise guarantee
limits governmental interference with the internal management of religious organizations,
compels the conclusion that § 27-19(d)(2) of the Montgomery County Code is invalid under
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and Article 36 of the Maryland Declaration
of Rights.  Most of these cases have arisen under a federal statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.
Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice to discriminate on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.  Originally, Title VII exempted from its prohibition
against employment discrimination, based on religion, the employment by religious
organizations of persons “to perform work connected with the carrying on” of the employer’s
“religious activities.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1964).  Congress amended Title VII in 1972,
broadening the exemption for religious employers by deleting the adjective “religious” which
had modified “activities.”
9   The legislative history of the amendment stresses the
-23-
9
(...continued)
“This title shall not apply to an employer with respect to the
employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious corporation,
association, educational institution, or society with respect to the
employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work
connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association,
educational institution, or society of its activities.”
Section 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) clarifies the exemption as it applies to religious schools, providing:
“(2) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school, college,
university, or other educational institution or institution of learning to hire
and employ employees of a particular religion if such school, college,
university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is, in
whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by
a particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or
society, or if the curriculum of such school, college, university, or other
educational institution or institution of learning is directed toward the
propagation of a particular religion.”
congressional motivation to foster the separation between church and state.  As co-sponsor of
the Amendment, Senator Sam Ervin remarked: “this amendment is to take the political hands
of Caesar off the institutions of God, where they have no place to be.”   118 Cong. Rec. 4503
(1972).
In Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336, 107 S.Ct. 2862,
2868, 97 L.Ed.2d 273, 283 (1987), the Supreme Court “assume[d] for the sake of argument
that the pre-1972 exemption [in Title VII] was adequate in the sense that the Free Exercise
Clause required no more.”  The Court, however, continued (483 U.S. at 336, 107 S.Ct. at 2868,
97 L.Ed.2d at 283, footnote omitted):
“Nonetheless, it is a significant burden on a religious organization to
-24-
require it, on pain of substantial liability, to predict which of its activities
a secular court will consider religious.  The line is hardly a bright one,
and an organization might understandably be concerned that a judge
would not understand its religious tenets and sense of mission.  Fear of
potential liability might affect the way an organization carried out what
it understood to be its religious mission.
“After a detailed examination of the legislative history of the 1972
amendment, the District Court concluded that Congress’ purpose was to
minimize governmental ‘interfer[ence] with the decision-making process
in religions.’  . . .  We agree with the District Court that this purpose
does not violate the Establishment Clause.”
Later, the Court in Amos reiterated that the 1972 amendment, “expanding the . . . exemption
to cover all activities of religious employers,” was “motivated by a permissible purpose of
limiting governmental interference with the exercise of religion . . . .”  483 U.S. at 339, 107
S.Ct. at 2870, 97 L.Ed.2d at 285.
It should be noted that Title VII’s pre-1972 exemption for religious creed-based
employment discrimination by religious organizations, which the Supreme Court and Congress
indicated might be suspect under the Free Exercise Clause, was broader than the exemption in
§ 27-19(d)(2) of the Montgomery County Code.  The pre-1972 Title VII provision authorized
religious organizations to employ persons “of a particular religion to perform work connected
with the carrying on” of the employer’s “religious activities.”  Section 27-19(d)(2), however,
only allows religious organizations to employ persons “of a particular religion to perform
purely religious functions.”  There is a difference between work “connected with the carrying
on” of religious activities and the narrower “perform[ance]” of religious functions.  More
importantly, there is a large difference between “religious activities” and “purely religious
-25-
functions.”
Although Title VII, as amended in 1972, exempts religious organizations from the
prohibition against employment discrimination based on religious creed, the provisions of
Title VII proscribing employment discrimination based on race, color, sex, or national origin
are literally applicable to religious organizations.  Nevertheless, the courts have consistently
held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment precludes the application of these
Title VII provisions to employment decisions by religious organizations concerning ministers,
teachers, and other employees whose duties are “integral to the spiritual and pastoral mission”
of the religious organization.  E.E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d
795, 797 (4th Cir. 2000).
This constitutionally-required exception to Title VII has been called the “ministerial
exception to Title VII,” although it applies to other employees in addition to ministers.  It is
applicable to any employee of a religious organization whose “‘primary duties consist of
teaching, spreading the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or
supervision or participation in religious ritual and worship,’” E.E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic
Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., supra, 213 F.3d at 801, quoting Rayburn v. General Conf. of
Seventh-Day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985).  In Roman Catholic Diocese
of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied
the “ministerial exception” to a music teacher at a church-affiliated elementary school, holding
that the Free Exercise Clause compelled the dismissal of her Title VII action against the
religious organization based on alleged gender discrimination.
-26-
The constitutionally-compelled “ministerial exception” to Title VII was first recognized
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in McClure v. Salvation Army, 460
F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), where the court affirmed the dismissal of a Title VII action against
the Salvation Army by an officer of the Salvation Army who claimed that she had been
discriminated against because of her gender.  Relying upon Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral
of Russian Orthodox Church, supra, 344 U.S. at 116, 73 S.Ct. at 154, 97 L.Ed. at 136, where
the Supreme Court had stated that religious organizations must have the “power to decide for
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government,” the court in McClure
concluded (460 F.2d at 560):
“We find that the application of the provisions of Title VII to the
employment relationship existing between The Salvation Army and
Mrs. McClure, a church and its minister would result in an encroachment
by the State into an area of religious freedom which it is forbidden to
enter by the principles of the free exercise clause of the First
Amendment.”
Subsequent cases have consistently followed the holding in McClure and applied the
“ministerial exception.”  See, e.g., Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church,
supra, 203 F.3d at 1303-1304 (governmental “interference with a church’s ability to select
and manage its own clergy” would violate both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment); Bollard v. California Province of Society of Jesus, supra,
196 F.3d at 946 (“A church’s selection of its own clergy is one such core matter of
ecclesiastical self-governance with which the state may not constitutionally interfere”); Combs
-27-
v. Central Texas Annual Conference United Methodist Church, supra, 173 F.3d at 350 (“we
cannot conceive how the . . . judiciary could determine whether an employment decision
concerning a minister was based on legitimate or illegitimate grounds without inserting
ourselves into a realm where the Constitution forbids us to tread, the internal management of
a church”); Bell v. Presbyterian Church, 126 F.3d 328, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (“It has thus
become established that the decisions of religious entities about the appointment and removal
of ministers and persons in other positions of similar theological significance are beyond the
ken of civil courts”); E.E.O.C. v. Catholic University of America, supra, 83 F.3d at 461
(upholding the dismissal of a Title VII action against a university by a teacher who alleged that
she was denied tenure because of her gender, with the court observing that “[t]he ministerial
exception has not been limited to members of the clergy”); Young v. Northern Illinois Conf.
of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184, 187 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 929, 115
S.Ct. 320, 130 L.Ed.2d (1994) (“the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment forbids a
review of a church’s procedures when it makes employment decisions affecting its clergy”);
Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 951 (3rd Cir. 1991) (a parochial school teacher, who was
discharged because of her remarriage, could not maintain a Title VII action against the school);
Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991) (a
chaplain at a church-affiliated hospital, who was allegedly discharged because of her gender
and age, could not maintain a Title VII action against the hospital); Rayburn v. General Conf.
of Seventh-Day Adventists, supra, 772 F.2d at 1168 (“The ‘ministerial exception’ to Title VII
. . . does not depend upon ordination but upon the function of the position”); E.E.O.C. v.
-28-
Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 284 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 905, 102 S.Ct. 1749, 72 L.Ed.2d 161 (1982) (
McClure establishes that Title
VII does not apply to the employment relationship between this Seminary and its faculty”).  
In addition to the cases involving Title VII, state courts, relying on the free exercise
guarantees of the federal and state constitutions, have recognized a similar “ministerial
exception” in actions under state laws proscribing discrimination in employment.  See, e.g.,
Madsen v. Erwin, 395 Mass. 715, 722-726481 N.E.2d 1160, 1165-1166 (1985); Jocz v.
Labor and Industry Review Commission and Sacred Heart School, 196 Wisc.2d 273, 538
N.W.2d 588 (Wisc. App. 1995).  See also Douglas Laycock, Toward a General Theory of the
Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy,
81 Col. L. Rev. 1373, 1408-1409 (1981), where one commentator described the relationship
between religious organizations and their employees as follows (footnotes omitted):
“The free exercise of religion includes the right to run large religious
institutions — certainly churches, seminaries, and schools, and . . . other
charitable institutions as well.  Such institutions can only be run through
employees.  It follows at the very least that the free exercise of religion
includes the right of churches to hire employees.  It surely also follows
that the churches are entitled to insist on undivided loyalty from these
employees.  
“The employee accepts responsibility to carry out part of the
religious mission. . . . [C]hurches rely on employees to do the work of
the church and to do it in accord with church teaching.  When an
employee agrees to do the work of the church, he must be held to submit
to church authority in much the same way as a member.
“It follows that church labor relations are internal affairs, and the
state’s interest in interfering to protect employees must be judged
-29-
accordingly.  The state may not intervene to protect employees from
treatment that is merely arbitrary or unfair; the remedy for that is to
resign or renegotiate the terms of employment.  Modern labor
legislation may have deprived secular employers of the fiduciary duty
once owed them by their rank and file employees, but to deprive
churches of that duty would be to interfere with an interest protected by
the free exercise clause.”  
Turning to § 27-19(d)(2) of the Montgomery County Code, it is obvious that the
provision effectively contains no exemption allowing religious organizations to employ only
persons of a particular religion.  Although the first sixteen words of § 27-19(d)(2) ostensibly
allow religious organizations “to hire and employ employees of a particular religion,” the next
five words limit the authorization to the hiring of employees “to perform purely religious
functions.”  The limitation effectively nullifies the exemption.  It is doubtful that any
employees of religious organizations in Montgomery County perform purely religious
functions.  Even ministers, pastors, priests, rabbis, and other theological heads of religious
organizations occasionally perform functions which would not ordinarily be characterized as
“religious.”  Many other employees of religious organizations, such as teachers, may perform
both religious and non-religious functions.  Nonetheless, as shown by the previously discussed
cases, the constitutional free exercise guarantee restricts governmental interference with a
religious organization’s hiring and firing of employees who are involved in the religious
activities of the organization. 
Apparently recognizing the constitutional problems with the “to perform purely
religious functions” limitation in § 27-19(d)(2), Montgomery County argues that “the term
-30-
‘purely religious functions’ should be read to mean ‘primarily ministerial duties.’”
(Montgomery County’s brief in No. 147, at 14 n.17).  The County relies on the principle that
a court should “‘construe’” a statute “‘so as to avoid conflict with the Constitution . . . .’”  (
Id.
at 14-15 n.17).  The plaintiffs suggest that the language should be construed to mean “some
significant functions” that are religious.  (Plaintiffs’ brief in No. 144, at 16 n.4).
The principle of statutory construction relied on by Montgomery County is that “‘a
construction of a statute, giving rise to doubts as to its constitutionality, should be avoided if
the language permits.’”  Davis v. State, 294 Md. 370, 377, 451 A.2d 107, 111 (1982),
quoting Baltimore County v. Mo. Realty, 219 Md. 155, 159, 148 A.2d 424, 427 (1959)
(emphasis in the Davis opinion).  See also Becker v. State, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___
(2001), and cases there cited.  In Davis v. State, supra, 294 Md. at 378, 451 A.2d at 111, we
declined to construe a state statute so as to avoid holding it unconstitutional under the
Establishment Clause of the First  Amendment because “[t]he construction of [the statute]
urged by the petitioner Davis . . . is not permitted by the statutory language.”  In Davis, which
involved a statutory exemption from the compulsory immunization law for pupils in
elementary schools, the Court continued (ibid.):
“The General Assembly expressly limited the exemption to members or
adherents of a recognized church or religious denomination opposing
immunization.  To excise the phrase ‘the tenets and practice of a
recognized church or religious denomination of which he is an adherent
or member,’ and insert the phrase ‘his religious beliefs,’ as contended
for by the petitioner, would be to re-draft the statute under the guise of
construction.  In the language of Justice Harlan dealing with a similar
contention, it would be ‘to assume an Alice-in-Wonderland world where
-31-
10
Moreover, it is far from clear that substituting “primarily” for “purely,” as argued for by Montgomery
County, would remove the constitutional infirmity from the ordinance.  For courts to determine whether
positions in religious organizations perform “primarily” religious functions, for purposes of religious creed
discrimination, would involve a significant “degree of entanglement” in the affairs of religious organizations.
N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 499, 99 S.Ct. 1313, 1318, 59 L.Ed.2d 533,
540 (1979).  See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 73
(continued...)
words have no meaning,’ Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 354, 90
S.Ct. 1792, 26 L.Ed.2d 308 (1970) (concurring opinion).  This we
decline to do.”
Similarly, in the cases at bar, to substitute the phrases “to perform primarily ministerial
duties” or “to perform some religious functions” for the statutory language “to perform purely
religious functions,” would also “be to re-draft the [ordinance] under the guise of
construction.”  Davis, 294 Md. at 378, 451 A.2d at 111.  The statutory phrase “to perform
purely religious functions” clearly does not mean what is suggested by Montgomery County
or by the plaintiffs.  We decline to construe “purely” as if it were “primarily” or “some.”  See
also, e.g., Wheeler v. State, 281 Md. 593, 598, 380 A.2d 1052, 1055 (1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 997, 98 S.Ct. 1650, 56 L.Ed.2d 86 (1978) (“We are not at liberty to bring about a
different [constitutionality] result by inserting or omitting words to make the statute express
an intention not evidenced in its original form”); Slate v. Zitomer, 275 Md. 534, 544, 341 A.2d
789, 795 (1975), cert. denied sub nom. Gasperich v. Church, 423 U.S. 1076, 96 S.Ct. 862,
47 L.Ed.2d 87 (1976) (rules of statutory construction do “not extend so far as to allow a court
to substitute for the words ‘prior to [a specific date]’ words conveying an exactly opposite
meaning”).10
-32-
10
(...continued)
S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed.120 (1952).
As the limiting language of § 27-19(d)(2) effectively renders nugatory any exemption
for the employment practices of religious organizations, such limiting language violates the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and Article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights.
B.
While the limiting language, consisting of the last five words of § 27-19(d)(2), is
invalid, that language is severable from the rest of § 27-19(d)(2).  Under Maryland law, “[t]here
is a strong presumption that if a portion of an enactment is found to be invalid, the intent [of
the legislative body] is that such portion be severed.”  Board v. Smallwood, 327 Md. 220, 245,
608 A.2d 1222, 1234 (1992).  See, e.g., Sugarloaf Citizens Assoc. v. Gudis, 319 Md. 558,
574, 573 A.2d 1325, 1333 (1990); Porten Sullivan Corp v. State, 318 Md. 387, 410, 568
A.2d 1111, 1122 (1990); State v. Burning Tree Club, Inc., 315 Md. 254, 297, 554 A.2d 366,
387 (1989), and cases there cited.  “This presumption has never been limited solely to bills
enacted by the General Assembly, but has been applied to local ordinances,”  Board v.
Smallwood, supra, 327 Md. at 245, 608 A.2d at 1234.
Moreover, with regard to § 27-19(d)(2), not severing the last five words of § 27-
19(d)(2), and invalidating all of § 27-19(d)(2), would present the identical constitutional
infirmity which infected the ordinance in its original form.  If all of § 27-19(d)(2) is
invalidated, there will be no exemption for the employment practices of religious
-33-
organizations.  Under § 27-19, without subsection (d)(2), a church in Montgomery County
could not discriminate, based on religious creed, in its employment of a minister or pastor.
This would make § 27-19 unconstitutional as applied to religious organizations.  In order for
§ 27-19 to be valid under the First Amendment and under Article 36 of the Maryland
Declaration of Rights, there must be some exception to the prohibition against religious creed
discrimination for religious organizations.
Consequently, we hold that the last five words of § 27-19(d)(2) are invalid and are
severable from the remaining language of § 27-19(d)(2).  Under the remaining language of
§ 27-19(d)(2), the defendants were entitled to employ only members of the Montrose Baptist
Church.
JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR
MONTGOMERY COUNTY REVERSED,  AND
BOTH CASES ARE REMANDED TO THAT
COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO ENTER
JUDGMENTS FOR THE DEFENDANTS.  COSTS
IN NO. 144 TO BE PAID ONE-HALF BY THE
P L A I N T I F F S  
A N D  
O N E - H A L F  
B Y
MONTGOMERY COUNTY.  COSTS IN NO. 147
TO BE PAID ONE-HALF BY THE PLAINTIFF
CARVER AND ONE-HALF BY MONTGOMERY
COUNTY.