Case Title: Craig Const. Co., Inc. v. Hendrix

Citation: 568 So. 2d 752

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1990-08-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
568 So. 2d 752 (1990)
CRAIG CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.
v.
Bob HENDRIX, d/b/a Glass Service Center.
89-861.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
August 31, 1990.
*753 Mary Anne Westbrook of Gonce, Young & Westbrook, Florence, for appellant.
John R. Benn of Slusher & Benn, Florence, for appellee.
HORNSBY, Chief Justice.
This appeal comes to us following a trial on a cross-claim by Craig Construction Company, Inc. ("Craig"), against Bob Hendrix, d/b/a Glass Service Center ("Hendrix"). Josephine Gist was injured in an accident at South Central Bell Telephone Company's office in Florence, Alabama, on November 15, 1985. As she was leaving the premises, Gist ran into a solid glass panel that was part of the entrance door. She sued several defendants, including Craig. Craig cross-claimed against Hendrix, alleging that Hendrix was bound by the terms of an indemnity agreement that was a part of the contract for installation of the glass doors involved in the Gist accident. Eventually, Gist settled all of her claims against the defendants; Craig then pursued its cross-claim in a separate action against Hendrix.
The suit on Craig's cross-claim was tried pursuant to stipulated facts agreed to by Craig and Hendrix. Those facts were as follows:
The subcontract between Craig and Hendrix included an indemnity agreement in favor of Craig. That clause provided as follows:
The trial court noted that Gist, in her original complaint, had stated two theories of liability against Craig. One claim, the trial court said, was derivative in nature that Craig was liable for Hendrix's failure to put any marker on the glass panel to make it visible. The second claim was that Craig had its own independent duty to keep the work site safe for invitees, and she alleged that this duty arose from the express language of the contract between Craig and the owner. Based on these findings, the trial court stated:
Craig contends that the trial court found that it could not enforce the indemnity agreement set out above absent a jury determination of whether there was a claim *756 subject to indemnification under the contract. Craig argues that the indemnity clause was sufficiently broad to cover any theory of liability under which Craig might suffer a loss. Craig also argues that the indemnity clause was not void as against public policy.
Normally, a trial court's judgment is accorded great weight where that court hears evidence ore tenus. Copeland v. Richardson, 551 So. 2d 353 (Ala.1989); Cale v. City of Bessemer, 393 So. 2d 959 (Ala.1980). However, as in this case, when a trial court sits in judgment on facts that are undisputed, an appellate court will determine whether the trial court misapplied the law to those undisputed facts. Home Indemnity Co. v. Reed Equipment Co., 381 So. 2d 45 (Ala.1980). Furthermore, where the trial court sits without a jury and hears evidence in the form of stipulations, briefs, and writings of the parties, then an appellate court will sit in judgment on the evidence. Hacker v. Carlisle, 388 So. 2d 947 (Ala.1980). See, also, Ex parte British Steel Corp., 426 So. 2d 409 (Ala. 1982). In this case, because the trial court decided this case without a jury and based upon written stipulations, this Court sits in judgment on the evidence.
Initially, we must note that the stipulated facts set out above are devoid of any facts that would indicate that the subcontractor, Hendrix, negligently allowed the glass to become unmarked and not visible to persons entering the South Central Bell offices. The parties stipulated, however, that there was no evidence as to who actually removed the marking tape from the glass plate. On that basis, the trial court was justified in holding that there was no indemnifiable occurrence with respect to any negligence on the part of Hendrix.
Second, we note that language very similar to the above-quoted indemnity provision has been construed by this court on a previous occasion. In Brown Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Centennial Insurance Co., 431 So. 2d 932 (Ala.1983), this court stated that the clause at issue was not sufficiently precise to warrant a finding that the parties intended that the subcontractor would hold the general contractor harmless for matters that arose out of the general contractor's own negligence; we stated:
Brown Mechanical, 431 So. 2d  at 945. (Emphasis added in Brown Mechanical.)
The language in Brown Mechanical was held not to clearly and unequivocally express an intention that the subcontractor should indemnify the general contractor for injuries that might occur as a result of the general contractor's negligence. At first blush, the rationale of Brown Mechanical would seem to apply in this case. However, the language quoted in Brown Mechanical lacks certain critical language that is present here.
The indemnity agreement at issue in this case stated that the subcontractor, Hendrix, would save harmless Craig for incidents that might arise "whether or not due in whole or in part to conditions, acts or omissions done or permitted by the Contractor or Owner." This same language was included within the indemnity agreement that was at issue in the case of Davis Constructors & Engineers, Inc. v. Hartford *757 Accident & Indemnity Co., 308 F. Supp. 792 (M.D.Ala. 1968). In Davis Constructors, the court stated:
Davis Constructors, 308 F. Supp.  at 795.
Even though the indemnity clause in this case is similar to the one in Davis Constructors, there are no facts contained within the stipulations set out above showing that the acts or omissions giving rise to the claim for damages in this case were done "by [or] for and on behalf of" the subcontractor, Hendrix. The indemnity agreement set out above clearly states that the acts or omissions giving rise to the adverse claim must be done "by [or] for and on behalf of" the subcontractor. When one seeks indemnification from another for damages that were caused by his own negligence, strict construction of the indemnity agreement against the contractor is particularly appropriate. Because no facts stated within the stipulations would lead to a conclusion that Hendrix, or someone acting "by [or] for and on behalf of" Hendrix, negligently removed the tape marker from the plate glass, Craig cannot claim indemnity under the terms of the indemnity agreement.
Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that Craig was not entitled to indemnification under the facts of this case even if the event giving rise to the indemnity claim was caused by Craig's negligence. Although we find it unnecessary to follow the trial court's rationale that a jury finding was prerequisite to any recovery by Craig on the indemnity agreement, we note that the trial court reached the appropriate result in concluding that Craig was not entitled to recovery on this theory. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is due to be, and it hereby is, affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
MADDOX, ALMON, SHORES and STEAGALL, JJ., concur.