Case Title: BEEBE v JOHNSON

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1974-09-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 12536 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A D O N A L D R. BEEBE, Administrator of t h e E s t a t e of Dorothy Beebe and Donald Beebe, PlaS-ntif £5 and Appellants, RllLPH JOHNSON and ALVIN F. SIHRER, Defendants and Respondents. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Fourth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Jack L. Green, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants : McGarvey, Morrison, White and Hedman, Whitefish, Montana Frank B. Morrison argued, Whitefish, Montana Christian, McCurdy, Ingraham and Wold, Polson, Montana For Respondent : Korn, Warden & Walterskirchen, K a l i s p e l l , Montana Merrit N. Tdarden argued, and Gary G. Christiansen argued, K a l i s p e l l , Montana Submitted: May 24, 1974 Decided: SEP 3 1974 F i l e d : S E P 3 1914 Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court . Plaintiff Donald R . Beebe secured a jury verdict in an action for damages for the wrongful death of his wife Dorothy and, in his representative capacity as administrator of her estate, maintained an action under the survival statute;and an action for personal injuries he suffered as a result of the same automobile accident which occurred in Lake County. Subsequently the district court of Lake County granted defendants a new trial. From the order granting defendants a new trial, plaintiff appeals. The issues on appeal are: 1 . Did the trial court err in failing to grant defendants' motion to set aside the verdict of the jury and enter a verdict for the defendants notwithstanding such verdict? 2. In the alternative, did the trial court err in vacating and setting aside the verdict of the jury and granting a new trial for one or more of the reasons set forth in the defendants' motion? Plaintiff brought the action ( 1 ) as administrator of his wife's estate for the wrongful death of his wife, ( 2 ) as adminis- trator of his wife's estate under Montanats survival statute section 93-2824, R.C.M. 1947, and ( 3 ) for personal injuries to himself in the same accident. The jury awarded him this verdict: "To the estate of Dorothy Beebe, the sum of ...$ 33,705.65 "To Donald R . Beebe, as Administrator in his representative capacity for the heirs of Dorothy Eeebe the sum of ................,..... $40,000.00 "To Donald R. Beebe, Individually, the sum of.. 3,304.77". The automobile accident involved occurred midafternoon on February 24, 1969. The site of the accident was in front of the Elmo Store on U . S . Highway 93 in Lake County, Montana. Plaintiff and his wife had been to Kalispell on business and were returning home along the west shore of Flathead Lake when they came up behind two loaded logging trucks, which were also proceeding south. Dorothy Beebe was driving their 1966 Datsun automobile, while plaintiff was reading. Plaintiff testified he became aware of the first logging truck ahead of them shortly after they came around a curve north of the Elmo Store and that after following the truck for a short distance, his wife pulled out into the lane to their left to pass the truck. He estimated that just prior to pulling out to pass, they had slowed down from 45 to 35 miles per hour and, in order to pass, his wife had shifted into third gear which speeded them up to between 50 and 60 miles per hour during the pass. The first of the south bound logging trucks was driven by a R.obert Hanson. The truck ahead of him was owned by Alvin S . Sihrer and was driven by Ralph Johnson, both defendants herein. Hanson testified he had followed the Sihrer truck for some time, traveling at about 55 miles per hour coming around the turn north of Elmo and into the straightaway. That at that speed he was catching up to the truck ahead, for it had begun to slow down. This caused Hanson to slow down to around 45 miles per hour and at the same time closed the distance between the two trucks to several truck lengths-- approximately 120 feet to 180 feet separating them just prior to the accident. Hanson further testified that at no time, from the top of the hill north of the Elmo Store to the point where the Sihrer truck turned off the highway in front of the store, did he see any brake lights or turning lights on the Sihrer truck. He indicated the rear of the Sihrer truck was visible to him at all times. He testified he had not seen the Datsun behind him until just prior to the accident and the first time he saw it the Datsun had pulled up alongside of the cab of his truck in the left or north lane of the highway. His testimony described what happened then: "Q. After yog gaw the Datsun, what movement, if any, did you/t6e Sihrer truck make? A. He was turning off. "Q. Where was he turning? A . Into the Elmo Store. " Q . Did. you continue to watch him as he went into the turn? "A. I was more or less watching the Datsun. "Q. Jc * Jc During the time that the Sihrer truck was s t i l l on the highway, did you continue t o watch him? A. U p u n t i l she went around him, yes. " Q . And a f t e r she went around you, had the Sihrer truck turned across the center line? A. H e had started across the center l i n e when I f i r s t seen her. "Q. A t any time did you see any signal on the Sihrer logging truck? "A. I did not notice any, no. I I A summary of p l a i n t i f f ' s testimony notes that he was a passenger i n the Datsun driven by h i s wife, and that prior t o passing the f i r s t truck, driven by Hanson, h i s car had slowed down but i n making the pass they speeded up t o approximately 60 miles per hour. It was then he f i r s t noticed the Sihrer truck turning t o the l e f t into the lane of t r a f f i c they were using t o make the pass. H e t e s t i f i e d the Sihrer truck was s t i l l i n the southbound lane and that the front wheel of the tractor had just crossed over the center line. H e further t e s t i f i e d that a s they pulled abreast of the Hanson truck and into f u l l view of the Sihrer truck, just before the accident, he saw no l i g h t s indicating the Sihrer truck was turning to the l e f t . P l a i n t i f f ' s wife, Dorothy, suffered multiple injuries which l e f t her paralyzed from the waist down. She had numerous operations, spent considerable time i n hospitals and ultimately died on November 16, 1970. Plaintiff suffered a broken arm and other injur5es which hospitalized him for several weeks. A t the time of the accident plaintiff operated a well d r i l l i n g business i n western Montana, operating two of his own r i g s and leasing another. Because of the accident he was unable t o continue i n t h i s business. H i s wife had been h i s office manager a s well a s house- keeper and mother of h i s children. Johnson, driver of the Sihrer truck, t e s t i f i e d that a s he traveled south he saw the Hanson truck behind him; that a s he came off the curve north of the Elmo Store, he decided he wanted some- thing a t the store so he made preparations t o stop there; that he looked i n h i s rear view mirror, saw that the Hanson track was a reasonable distance away and saw another car behind the Hanson truck which he estimated t o be a quarter t o half a m i l e behind him; that he put h i s signal lights on and started t o slow down; that he began crossing the center l i n e and a s he did so he heard no horn or any sound i n the area a s he pulled ogf the road t o park before the Elmo Store. H e t e s t i f i e d as t o what occurred a t that time: " Q . Did you ever see o r did you look again i n your rear view mirror while you were i n the course of turning into the Elmo Store? A. Yes, I did. "Q. And where was your truck a t that time? A. The tractor i t s e l f was pretty well off the highway and the t r a i l e r was say, i n the l e f t hand lane. It was just about t o leave i t and onto the driveway, "8. Your tractor was just about o f f ? A. It was off. The t r a i l e r was i n the l e f t hand lane. "Q. In the northbound lane? A. Right, approximately. "Q. And did you look i n your rear view mirror a t that time? A. Yes, sir, I did. "Q. And what did you observe? A. I observed the red Datsun a t that time a s near a s I can r e c a l l right alongside the Hanson truck. "Q. And how f a r behind you was Hanson's truck a t that t i m e . A, Oh, I would say maybe three, maybe four lengths. "Q. Truck lengths? A. Yes, Truck lengths. H e gained a l i t t l e maybe, not much. It was pretty hard t o t e l l i n the mirror. "Q. W e l l , what action did you take i f any? A. W e l l I had t o keep going. I didn't dare stop or anything, So I went on into the parking l o t , pulled i n along the parking l o t there, which i s a guard r a i l and as I started t o get out I seen-- "Q. I w i l l get t o that i n just a moment. A. --things happened. "Q. I suppose--was it necessary for you to--it may sound like a stupid question and it is, but was i t necessary for you t o slow your truck down? A. I had t o slow m y truck down quite considerably. II Q. And was your truck going f a s t or slow then when you saw t h i s Datsun t h i s second t i m e as you were pulling into the parking area i n front of the Elmo Store? A . I was getting pretty slow. "Q. Is it easy t o stop a load that big i n a short distance? A. No, it i s n ' t . "Q. When you have t o slow it down? A. You have t o bring it down pretty gradually. "Q. Alright. Then you proceeded on into the parking area i n front of the Elmo Store? A. Uh huh. I1 Q. You did bring your truck t o a stop? A. Yes, I did, "Q. And then what did you do or what happened? A. W e l l , that i s when I started t o get out. "Q. And then what happened? A. Well, I seen a hub cap and I knew something had happened back there but I didn't know what. "Q. Did you hear any noise? A. Well, I did a f t e r I opened the door where I could. "Q. And what kind of noise? A. It sounded l i k e a bunch of r a t t l i n g beer cans or something rolling down the road. "Q. What did you do? A . Well, I proceeded ID get on out of the truck. "Q. Did you look around or anything? A. Yes, I looked just through the window on the other side and I seen t h i s car come rolling down the road. "Q. Was there anything ahead of the car rolling down the road that you saw? A. A bunch of pieces. "Q. What do you mean pieces? Could you identify them? A. Windshield, hubcaps. "Q. And describe how the car was rolling. Was it rolling end over end o r sideways o r what? A. It would be sideways l i k e t h i s (indicating). "Q. And how many times did it r o l l that you saw? A. Well, a s f a r as I could t e l l about three from where I was a t . "Q. Did you observe any people i n connection with that car? A. Yes, a f t e r I was out and saw the car I run around the front of the truck and she was thrown, the lady was thrown out i n the middle of the highway. 11 Concerning the signal lights, Johnson t e s t i f i e d they were on for some five or s i x truck lengths (300) feet before he got t o the Elmo Store turnoff and were on a f t e r the accident. O n cross-examination Johnson t e s t i f i e d the side mirror was positioned i n such a way that when the truck was straight i n the road you could look behind and see straight behind; that h i s t r a i l e r was just ready t o break off the highway when he saw the Datsun alongside the Hanson truck; and that he was i n that position when he, a t an angle, saw the Datsun car. There was conflict i n the testimony concerning the position of the Sihrer truck a t the time the Datsun began i t s turnovers. ~ e f e n d a n t s ' witnesses maintained the truck was i n the Elmo Store parking l o t a t the time the accident occurred. Hanson, the other truck driver, disputes that testimony maintaining that only a portion of the Sihrer tractor (cab) was over the center line when he f i r s t observed t h e Datsun alongside h i s cab; t h a t the Datsun darted in between the front of h i s truck and the r e a r of the Sihrer truck; and immediately t h e r e a f t e r the ats sun's r i g h t wheels went off the shoulder of the hardtop traveling thusly f o r some distance before r o l l i n g over three times. These disputed f a c t s and others presented by the various witnesses were presented t o the jury, which returned a verdict f o r p l a i n t i f f . The principal issue before t h i s Court i s whether the t r i a l court erred i n granting defendants a new t r i a l . In Morris v. Corcoran Pulpwood Co., 154 Mont. 468, 474, 465 P.2d 827, t h i s Court i n discussing a denial of a motion f o r new trial c i t e d Campeau v. Lewis, 144 Mont. 543, 398 P.2d 960: "'Several of the cases c i t e d by t h e respondent deal with a denial of a motion f o r a new t r i a l and then an appeal t o t h i s court. In such cases the court has been somewhat reluctant t o s e t aside an a c t of discretion of t h e t r i a l judge. In t h e Tripp case [Tripp v. Silver Dyke Mining Co., 70 Mont. 120, 224 P. 2721, f o r example, t h i s court refused t o disturb the t r i a l judge's decision t o deny the motion f o r a new t r i a l . However, i n t h e i n s t a n t case the t r i a l judge did grant a new t r i a l , thereby choosing not t o follow the finding of the jury. When t h e t r i a l court denies a motion f o r a new t r i a l and thereby indicates f a i t h i n the jury verdict we a r e more a p t t o r e f r a i n from disturbing t h a t order than where the t r i a l judge s e t s aside the jury's findings and requires t h a t the f a c t s be decided again. Where the t r i a l judge i s presented with evidence i n favor of the verdict, but proceeds t o grant a new t r i a l , we f e e l it i s our duty t o t e s t the evidence against the verdict. W e respect the discretion of t h e t r i a l judge, but a r e of the opinion t h a t i n t h i s case he was unreasonable i n granting t h e new t r i a l . Of course, the advantageous position of the jury t o resolve the f a c t s does not remain when they return an 'incredible" verdict. Casey v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 60 Mont. 56, 198 P. 141; Cf. Adami v. Murphy, 118 Mont. 172, 164 P.2d 150, where the verdict f o r the defendant was an incredible one. However, i n the i n s t a n t case there i s nothing incredible about t h e verdict f o r the defendant."' Such i s t h e case before us; we find nothing incredible i n the verdict f o r t h e p l a i n t i f f . In Campeau t h i s Court expressed i t s respect f o r the discretion of the t r i a l judge and i t s reluctance t o disturb a ruling f o r a new t r i a l , but t h a t t h i s Court w i l l d i s t u r b an order granting a new t r i a l when it appears there is substantial evidence presented t o support the verdict. 0 ' ~ r i e n v, Great Northern R . Co., 148 Mont. 429, 421 P.2d 710: Estate of Maricich, 145 Mont. 146, 400 P.2d 873. Because we do not have the benefit of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s reasons f o r granting the new t r i a l we w i l l examine defendants' i . 4 . ?. motion f o r new trial and t h e reasons f o r such presented therein. ~ e f e n d a n t s ' principal argument before the t r i a l court and t h i s Court was t h a t t h e case should not have gone t o t h e jury because of contributory negligence by the Beebes. A t t h e close of p l a i n t i f f ' s case, defendants made a motion under Rule 1 2 ( f ) , M.R.Civ.P., t o s t r i k e c e r t a i n contentions made by p l a i n t i f f i n t h e p r e t r i a l order and f o r an order dismissing the action on the grounds p l a i n t i f f had shown no r i g h t t o r e l i e f . The t r i a l court granted one of the motions before t r i a l but denied a l l others. Essentially defendants made t h e same argument for judgment notwithstanding the verdict o r f o r a new t r i a l , towit: That the evidence was i n s u f f i c i e n t t o submit the case t o the jury o r t o j u s t i f y t h e verdict. During argument both counsel s t a t e d t h a t i f the case were sent back f o r r e t r i a l there would be no new evidence, f o r the case had been f u l l y and ably submitted. Defendants a l s o contend i n t h e i r motion f o r a new t r i a l , t h a t there i s no support i n the evidence f o r three allegations of negligence made by p l a i n t i f f contained i n the p r e t r i a l order. The court overruled defendants' motions t o s t r i k e the t h r e e allegations which were: (a) f a i l u r e t o signal a l e f t hand turn; (b) f a i l u r e t o yield t h e right-of-way t o the vehicle operated by p l a i n t i f f ' s decedent and i n which p l a i n t i f f was a passenger; and (c) f a i l u r e t o keep a proper lookout. A l l three of t h e allegations l i s t e d a r e covered, i n the most p a r t , by the testimony of the two truck drivers and p l a i n t i f f , Robert Hanson, the driver of the truck following the Sihrer truck was the key witness. He was a t o t a l l y disinterested witness who had a "ring-side" s e a t and throughout h i s testimony both on d i r e c t and cross, he said he saw no turn l i g h t s on the Sihrer truck. This testimony i s corroborated by p l a i n t i f f ' s testimony who admittedly was not paying too much attention t o e i t h e r truck u n t i l t h e c a r i n which he was riding came abreast of the Hanson truck. I n addition, defendant Johnson admitted h i s t a i l l i g h t s had mud on them. The jury could well have believed t h i s testimony and have found t h a t t h e operations of the Sihrer truck violated two Montana s t a t u t e s , section 32-2167, R.C.M. 1947, turning movements and req,uired signals; and section 32-21-133(b), R.C.M. 1947, display of lamps. A s t o (b), the failure t o yield the right-of-way, and (c) failure t o keep a proper lookout, the Hanson testimony could be controlling insofar a s the jury was concerned. H i s testimony was to the general effect that when the Datsun was alongside his cab, the Sihrer truck's cab had just crossed over the center l i n e and i f t h i s was the situation the driver of the Sihrer truck clearly violated ~ o n t a n a ' s right-of-way statute, section 32-2121, R.C.M. 1947. The allegations of failure t o yield the right-of-way and f a i l u r e t o keep a proper lookout were submitted t o the jury. Right- of-way i s defined by section 32-2121, R.C.M. 1947, as being he privilege of the immediate use of the roadway." The jury could well have concluded from the evidence that the Datsun was i n the passing lane a sufficient time prior t o the time the Sihrer truck turned across the center l i n e or that had the driver looked back he could have tukned t o the right t o allow the Datsun to pass. In addition, the testimony of driver Johnson that h i s side mirror focused straight back and that he saw the Datsun a f t e r he had turned raised a question of how credible h i s testimony was as t o the fact he saw the Datsun i n the mirror. A Ninth Circuit Court case, Bellon v. Heinzig, 347 F.2d 4, 6, applying ~ o n t a n a ' s section 32-2167, R.C.M. 1947, i n a passing case, said: "* * * Does ordinary care require a driver t o look t o the r e a r when he i s preparing t o turn l e f t , even though he i s i n a no-passing zone? It has been held it does [citing cases], and we are not aware of any contrary holdings. I I In an Idaho case similar t o the instant case, Madron v. McCoy, 63 Idaho 703, 126 P.2d 566, 570, the Idaho court stated the duties of turning motorists. There the truck had slowed down, a s i n t h i s case, and as here did not give a turning signal. The court said: "It would seem that t h i s conduct, on the p a r t of the driver of the c a t t l e truck, was tantamount t o saying t o the driver of any following truck, that he was slowing up t o allow the l a t t e r t o pass, -- a t l e a s t u n t i l he reached the l i n e of intersection. It would have been otherwise had he, a t any time given a signal of intention t o turn e i t h e r t o the r i g h t o r the l e f t . The very f a c t of reducing h i s speed, t o two- f i f t h s of h i s previous speed, i n the space of 200 f e e t without giving any sign o r signal, would in- d i c a t e t o the average driver following him, t h a t t h e one so reducing h i s speed was intending t o allow the following c a r t o pass. The law required him t o see and know, when he s t a r t e d t o turn, t h a t a c a r was following him; and what the law requires him t o know, it w i l l assume t h a t he did know." (Emphasis supplied.) With respect t o a proper lookout, the t r i a l court properly instructed t h e jury. c o u r t ' s Instruction No. 20 reads: "YOU a r e instructed t h a t p r i o r t o making a l e f t hand turn across a lane of t r a f f i c on an open highway, the operator of t h e motor vehicle so turning, must keep a lookout both ahead and t o the r e a r t o deter- mine i f there a r e other vehicles i n the lane of t r a f f i c across which he intends t o turn * * *". See: Holland v. Konda, 142 Mont. 536, 385 P.2d 272. W e find no merit t o defendants' objections t o the p r e t r i a l order, nor does it serve a s a basis f o r granting defendants a new t r i a l . W e next consider the c o u r t ' s giving of an imminent p e r i l instruction. c o u r t ' s Instruction No. 15 i s taken from B A J I 4.40, California Jury Instructions, and reads: "A person who, without negligence on h i s p a r t , i s suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with p e r i l a r i s i n g from e i t h e r the a c t u a l presence o f , o r t h e appearance o f , imminent danger t o himself o r t o others, i s not expected nor required t o use t h e same judgment and prudence t h a t i s required of him i n t h e exercise of ordinary care i n calmer and more deliberate moments, H i s duty i s t o exercise only the care t h a t an ordinarily prudent person would exercise i n the same situation. I f a t t h a t moment he does what appears t o him t o be the b e s t thing t o do, and i f h i s choice and manner of action a r e the same a s might have been followed by any ordinarily prudent person under the same conditions, he does a l l the law requires of him, although i n the l i g h t of after-events, i t should appear t h a t a d i f f e r e n t course would have been b e t t e r and safer." The defendants object t o the t r i a l courts granting an 11 instruction on sudden emergencyH alleging t h a t i n doing so the court was i n e r r o r due t o the f a c t t h a t the driver of the Datsun w a s negligent. W e disagree f o r under the f a c t s i t u a t i o n here t h e d r i v e r of the Datsun was not negligent, a f a c t t o be decided by the jury, f o r she was l e g a l l y passing when she suddenly was con- fronted with the respondent's truck turning i n f r o n t of her vehicle. A s w i l l be developed hereafter she could not apply the brakes and avoid h i t t i n g the turning truck ahead. So she chose t o dodge i n between t h e two trucks i n hopes of avoiding the c o l l i s i o n . W e can think of no c l e a r e r set of circumstances f o r the giving of an 11 instruction on sudden emergency1' than we have before us here. Here, from testimony given by several witnesses plus measure- ments, made by a highway patroman who arrived shortly a f t e r the accident, t h e jury could have found t h a t the Datsun was passing the Hanson truck; t h a t the Hanson truck was some 120 t o 180 f e e t behind t h e Sihrer truck; t h a t the gap was closing; and, t h a t ~ i h r e r ' s truck began t o turn l e f t over the center l i n e i n f r o n t of the Datsun. That the Datsun, i f it was traveling 60 miles per hour, would have required 240 f e e t of skid marks, plus 132 f e e t of per- ception and reaction time, making a t o t a l of 372 f e e t f o r a t o t a l stopping distance. Most certainly, under these f a c t s , instructing on imminent p e r i l was proper. See March v, Ayers, 80 Mont, 401, 260 P. 702; Bogovich v. C.M.St.P, & P,R,Co., 122 Mont. 312, 203 P,2d 971. ~ e f e n d a n t s ' objected t o allowing expert testimony r e l a t i v e t o the stopping distance of a 1966 Datsun traveling a t 60 miles per hour. Defendants, throughout the t r i a l , contended t h a t the decedent driver of the Datsun was negligent i n the operation of t h e auto- mobile. P l a i n t i f f introduced testimony of a D r . Mark Jacobson, Chairman of t h e Physics Department of the University of Montana, t o show t h a t when decedent was confronted with the turning truck had she chosen t o make a f u l l brake application, she would not have stopped before s t r i k i n g the truck. The purpose of such testimony w a s t o show i n retrospect t h a t decedent chose the correct avenue of escape by attempting t o maneuver the c a r t o her r i g h t and t o pass t o the r e a r of defendants' truck. a public s t r e e t o r highway t o exercise ordinary care a t a l l times t o avoid placing himself o r others i n danger; and t o use l i k e care to avoid an accident; t o keep a proper lookout f o r t r a f f i c and other conditions t o be reasonably anticipated and t o maintain a proper control of h i s vehicle. 5 I See Hanson v. Colgrove, 152 Mont. 161, 447 P.2d 486; Gunderson v, Nolte, 153 Mont. 208, 456 P.2d 282; Fawcett v, Irby, 92 Ida. 48, 436 P.2d 714. In addition, we note t h a t defendants' proposed instructions which were refused were n e i t h e r applicable t o the f a c t s nor the law of Montana. Also i n t h e i r motion f o r new t r i a l defendants questioned whether the jury was properly instructed on the weight t o be given the testimony of various witnesses, The t r i a l court chose t o give I I two cautionary instructions1' following the guidelines of " ~ o n t a n a Jury Instruction Guide", These were c o u r t ' s Instructions No. 3 and No. 5, which f u l l y instructed the jury on the weight of evidence. Defendants requested t h e i r proposed instruction No. 31, which was refused. This Faas a discretionary matter f o r the t r i a l court and there was no error. Did the t r i a l court err i n permitting the damage testimony offered by p l a i n t i f f ? Prior t o Krohmer v. Gbhl, 145 Mont. 491, 495, 402 P.2d 979, t h i s Court was aware t h a t i n most wrongful death actions the problem of determining the value of a decedent's services was both d i f f i c u l t and often speculative. In Krohmer, recognizing the need t o a s s i s t the jury i n i t s task, t h i s Court held: " * * * It appears t o us t h a t i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case the element of conjecture i s reduced s i g n i f i c a n t l y by the admission of expert testimony a s t o the possible future of the decedent. It a l s o appears t h a t t h i s expert testimony i s not only the b e s t evidence but t h e only evidence available in t h i s case t o prove future earnings. I I A hypothetical question was asked D r . Jacobson based on the weight of the Datsun, the assumed speed, a f u l l brake applica- tion, plus the roadway conditions a t the t i m e . D r . Jacobson using as the coefficient of friction t o be used i n h i s equation .55 for a well traveled highway and .6 for a l e s s traveled road, was able t o compute the skidding distance t o be 240 feet for the .55 co- efficient of friction and 210 feet for the -6. ~ e f e n d a n t s ' objec- tion was based on the assumption the car was traveling 60 miles per hour and that there would have been a f u l l application of the brakes. W e find no error for the question was asked t o refute defendants' allegations of contributory negligence and there was testimony the car was traveling about 60 miles per hour. Defendants' next contention i s the failure of the t r i a l court t o give an instruction on assumption of risk. The defend- ants allege error i n the failure of the t r i a l court t o instruct the jury on the "assumption of risk". W e find no error for here plaintiff was legally attempting to pass, i n a clear passing lane with no oncoming t r a f f i c and could i n no way have assumed that the lead truck would turn into her lane. This Court i n Hanson v, Colgrove, 152 Mont. 161, 447 P.2d 486, speaking on the elements of "assumption of risk"doctrine said: " * d r k This defense requires (1) knowledge, actual or implied, of a particular condition treat- ing the risk, (2) appreciation of t h i s condition a s dangerous, (3) a voluntary remaining o r continuing i n the face of the known dangerous condition, and (4) injury resulting a s the usual and probable consequence of the dangerous condition, 1 f Here the facts f a l l f a r short of meeting these elements and w e I 1 find no error i n the courts not instructing on assumption of risk" See Gunderson v. Nolte, 153 Mont. 208, 456 P.2d 282; Fawcett v. Irby, 92 Idaho 48, 436 P.2d 714. However, the court did give an instruction on contributory negligence and along with it gave i t s Instruction No. 18 which fully covered the duties of decedent: "It i s the duty of the driver of any vehicle using Here, following the statutory requirements of section 93-2810, R . C . M . 1947 (Plontana's wrongful death statute), and the holding in Krohmer the plaintiff sought to establish the value of the services of his wife as: 1 . Services contributed to the well-drilling business. 2. Domestic services contributed by decedent. Plaintiff's witness Douglas Stam, manager of the Polson State Em- ployment Service, testified that considering the services rendered to the business the going rate to replace a person such as decedent would be about $350 per month and if the replacement had five years experience, as had decedent, the wage rate would be about $500 per month. The same witness testified that domestic work was $2 per hour in the Polson area. With this testimony before the court, plus plaintiff ~eebe's estimate of the personal expenses of decedent, expert witness Dr. George B. Heliker was called. Dr. Heliker is a professor of Economics at the University of Montana whose specializa- tion is labor economics. This Court in Krohmer in accepting his expert testimony added another dimension to Dr. ~eliker's career, for since that time he has appeared in numerous cases in Montana. In the instant case, using the methods and formulae approved in Krohmer , and with the founda- tional testimony of witnesses Stam and Beebe, Dr. Heliker testified that the loss of services both domestic and to the business, totaled $213,000. The jury returned a verdict of $40,000. See: Resner v . Northern Pacific Railway, - Mon t . , 505 P.2d 86, 30 St.Rep. 55. We find no error for this presentation is in accord with Krohmer and Resner. We have carefully examined defendants' objections to the trial court's failure to give certain of their proposed instructions, numbers 20, 25, 30, 31 and 36, and find no error. These instructions are either repetitious or were not applicable to the law or the facts of this case. For the foregoing reasons none of the grounds enunicated in defendants' motion f o r new t r i a l authorizes a new t r i a l . A.ccordingly, the order of the court granting defendants a new t r i a l i s vacated and s e t aside. The jury verdict i n favor of p l a i n t i f f and t h e judg- ment a r e affirmed. J u s t i c e W e Concur: -. --a r / Justices. J M r . J u s t i c e Wesley Castles dissenting: I d i s s e n t . The statement of f a c t s i n t h e majority opinion i s not inaccurate, but it is t a i l o r e d t o f i t t h e r e s u l t reached. A l l vehicles involved i n t h i s matter were proceeding i n a southerly d i r e c t i o n on U.S. Highway 93 from various p o i n t s north of Elmo, Montana. A s t h a t highway approaches Elmo from t h e north, it t r a v e l s f o r a t l e a s t a mile and a half o r two m i l e s i n a westerly d i r e c t i o n before entering a broad, sweeping curve t o t h e l e f t a t t h e o u t s k i r t s of Elmo. From t h i s curve, t h e highway extends i n a s t r a i g h t l i n e southerly f o r a d i s t a n c e of more than a m i l e , passing through t h e small settlement of Elmo. The "Elmo Cash Store" fronted on t h e highway, facing w e s t , a considerable distance south of t h e curve. This accident took place almost i n f r o n t of t h a t s t o r e . Defendant Johnson was a truck d r i v e r employed by t h e defendant S i h r e r and was driving a S i h r e r truck and t r a i l e r loaded with logs from a logging area some twenty m i l e s north of Elmo. Robert Hanson was driving h i s own loaded logging truck a l s o i n a southerly d i r e c t i o n on Highway 93 and came up behind t h e S i h r e r truck some two o r t h r e e m i l e s north of Elmo on t h e s t r a i g h t s t r e t c h of highway before reaching t h e curve and followed it around t h e curve and i n t o t h e town of Elmo. After rounding t h e curve, Han- son became aware of t h e f a c t t h a t t h e S i h r e r truck was slowing down t o t u r n i n t o t h e Elmo Store. Both logging trucks were slow- ing a t t h a t t i m e . The Beebe c a r , a small foreign make cal1e.d a Datsun, came up behind these two logging trucks a t some point and a t some un- known rate of speed. T h e p l a i n t i f f t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was a passenger with his wife driving and paid little, i f any a t t e n t i o n t o her driving a s he was engaged i n reading some material. H e f i r s t observed t h e Hanson truck j u s t s h o r t l y before t h e acci- dent. A t no t i m e w a s Hanson aware of t h e Datsun following o r approaching from t h e r e a r u n t i l it suddenly appeared, without warning and without sounding its horn, by t h e l e f t f r o n t fender of h i s t r u c k a s it was attempting t o pass. Highway Patrolman George Goggins, a witness f o r t h e plain- t i f f , t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d r i v e r of t h e Hanson truck, another p l a i n t i f f ' s witness, t o l d him t h a t t h e S i h r e r truck was some 250 t o 300 f e e t ahead of t h e Hanson truck when t h e Datsun appeared by h i s l e f t f r o n t fender. Notwithstanding t h i s s u b s t a n t i a l d i s - tance, t h e evidence e s t a b l i s h e s t h a t t h e Datsun made an abrupt t u r n t o t h e r i g h t , a t such speed t h a t i t s l e f t t i r e s l e f t a d e f i n i t e mark i n t h e roadway f o r a distance of some 176 f e e t which mark proceeded t o t h e r i g h t shoulder of t h e highway where t h e marks in- dicated t h a t t h e vehicle had been sharply turned t o i t s l e f t , overturned and r o l l e d over and over an a d d i t i o n a l d i s t a n c e of some 228 f e e t before coming t o a stop. Defendant Johnson, driving t h e S i h r e r truck, t e s t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r rounding t h e curve on t h e highway he s t a r t e d t o slow down t o t u r n i n t o t h e Elmo Store a s it was h i s i n t e n t i o n t o obtain some c i g a r s and a Coke. A t t h a t t i m e t h e Hanson truck was t h r e e o r four t r u c k lengths behind him -- some 1 0 0 t o 240 f e e t . H e glanced t o t h e r e a r i n h i s mirror and saw another vehicle about a q u a r t e r of a mile behind him coming around t h e curve. He turned on h i s s i g n a l f o r a l e f t t u r n and crossed over t h e c e n t e r l i n e . When t h e t r a c t o r of h i s r i g was o f f t h e highway and i n t o t h e drive- way of t h e s t o r e he observed t h e Datsun attempting t o pass t h e Hanson truck. By t h e t i m e his r i g had completely cleared t h e road and came t o a s t o p t h e Datsun then was observed r o l l i n g p a s t t h e t r u c k and down the highway. Two impartial witnesses i n t h e Elmo Store, M r . and Mrs. Unzur, saw t h e S i h r e r truck p u l l off t h e highway i n t o t h e drive- way of t h e s t o r e and stop. J u s t a s it stopped and t h e d r i v e r g o t out, they saw t h e Datsun c a r r o l l i n g down t h e highway. This testimony v e r i f i e d t h e testimony of Johnson. I n addition t o t h e testimony of defendant Johnson t h a t he s t a r t e d h i s l e f t t u r n across t h e c e n t e r l i n e , with h i s l e f t t u r n s i g n a l l i g h t s on, p l a i n t i f f ' s witness Hanson t e s t i f i e d t h a t when he f i r s t observed t h e Datson by h i s l e f t f r o n t fender, t h e S i h r e r vehicle was w e l l over t h e c e n t e r l i n e i n t o its l e f t turn. A sketch made by Hanson t h e day following t h e accident of t h e r e l a t i v e position of t h e vehicles shows t h e position of t h e S i h r e r truck t o be well over the c e n t e r l i n e and i n t o i t s t u r n i n t o t h e s t o r e driveway a t t h e time t h e Datsun appeared by t h e f r o n t of t h e Hanson truck. There was no evidence a t any t i m e t h a t t h e d r i v e r of t h e Datsun ever applied any brakes o r attempted t o slow down. Following t h e accident the l e f t t u r n l i g h t on t h e l e f t mirror of t h e Sihrer truck was still a c t i v a t e d and blinking. Under t h e r u l e s concerning new t r i a l granted i n Garrison v. Trowbridge, 119 Mont. 505, 177 P.2d 464; Brennan v. Mayo, 1 0 0 Mont. 439, 50 P.2d 245; and Tigh v. College Park Realty Co., 149 Mont. 358, 427 P.2d 57, w e have s a i d t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t w i l l n o t be reversed except on a manifest abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . The majority opinion does n o t discuss nor d i s t i n g u i s h t h e s e cases; but relies on Campeau v. Lewis, 1 4 4 Mont. 543, 398 P.2d 960, t o decide i n t h i s case t h a t "there i s nothing i n c r e d i b l e about t h e b v e r d i c t f o r t h e defendant." Analyzing each of the grounds f o r both a motion f o r a judgment notwithstanding t h e v e r d i c t and a motion f o r a new t r i a l shows c l e a r l y t h a t the t r i a l judge d i d not abuse h i s d i s c r e t i o n and t h e r e was no manifest abuse of d i s c r e t i o n . The various contentions of the plaintiff and what this Court relied on to weigh the testimony and find that the verdict was not incredible show clearly that there is a serious lack of proof on plaintiff's part including the failure to signal a left hand turn, the failure to yield the right of way, failure to keep a proper lookout. All of the evidence, fairly appraised, shows that it was wholly insufficient to justify the verdict; and even more, the trial court should have stricken plaintiff's con- tention at the close of plaintiff's case. Yet, the majority opinion by taking the evidence most favorable to plaintiff, finds that the verdict was not "incredible". This would seem to be a new standard for orders granting new trials and would seem to eliminate any trial court discretion. The majority does not over- rule or distinguish Garrison, Brennan or Tigh, supra. Strangely, the majority uses an Idaho case, Bellon v. Hein- zig, 347 F.2d 4, a federal case, to support its result, but that case is clearly distinguishable. Johnson did look to the rear. He had no reason to anticipate that the driver of the Datsun would be completely inattentive to the most obvious logging tmck making a turn. It goes without saying that a loaded logging truck making a left turn is conspicuous. I would go further to say that, under the evidence here, the driver of the small foreign car was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The physical facts speak more loudly than any witness and establish that the Datsun was moving at such a speed its driver could not control it and established clearly that the proximate cause of the accident was that of the driver's own negligence. Much, much more could be said in this dissent as to why the district court was correct in granting a new trial, but it would be to no avail. This Court is apparently even approving an instruction on "sudden emergency" where the plaintiff is clearly negligent. Even the majority opinion concedes that the negligence of the plaintiff was a jury question. If that be true, no sudden emergency doctrine should apply. On this ground alone, the trial court was correct in granting a new trial. The major- ity opinion does not even discuss this issue other than to reject it. Clearly here, the trial court did not manifestly abuse its discretion. Just what the rule may now be in this Court's review of a trial court's order granting a new trial is highly speculative. U Justice