Case Title: Evans v. Evans

Citation: 

Docket Number: 091469

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2010-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
HANNAH LEIGH EVANS, AN INFANT, WHO SUES 
BY HER MOTHER, NATURAL GUARDIAN AND NEXT 
FRIEND, CYNTHIA KAY STEVENS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     OPINION BY 
v. 
 
Record No. 091469 
 
   JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
          
 
   June 10, 2010 
BILLY BRADLEY EVANS, II 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BEDFORD COUNTY 
James W. Updike, Jr., Judge 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred 
when it sustained the demurrer of Billy Bradley Evans, II 
(“Evans”) to the amended complaint of Hannah Leigh Evans 
(“Hannah”).1 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
Hannah, an infant suing by her mother, filed an amended 
complaint against Evans, her father, which alleged that Evans 
placed Hannah, then four years old, “in a [portable] foam seat 
in the floorboard of a 1972 [pickup] truck” he was operating.   
The truck was involved in a head-on collision with an 
automobile operated by Caleb Justin Jarman, which caused the 
truck to travel off the roadway and hit a fence. 
                     
1 The intra-family immunity rule is subject to exception 
when an action is brought by a child against a parent for 
injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident.  Pavlick v. 
Pavlick, 254 Va. 176, 181, 491 S.E.2d 602, 604 (1997) (citing 
Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 186, 183 S.E.2d 190, 194 
(1971)).  Additionally, this case does not present a claim by a 
parent for medical expenses.  See Code § 8.01-36. 
Hannah alleged in the amended complaint that due to her 
father’s failure to secure Hannah in the vehicle, she was 
“violently thrown about in the undercarriage and cab area” of 
the truck.  As a result, Hannah sustained numerous injuries 
including, but not limited to:  multiple facial contusions, a 
skull fracture, cerebral edema and subarachnoid hemorrhage of 
the right frontal lobe, a ruptured bladder, a left acetabular 
fracture, and an inferior pubic rami fracture.  Because of the 
acquired brain injury and the seriousness of her other 
injuries, Hannah was subjected to several months of 
hospitalization and rehabilitation.   
Hannah alleged that Evans owed her a duty of care both as 
the operator of the vehicle and as her father.  Notwithstanding 
this duty, Hannah alleged that Evans “carelessly, recklessly, 
willfully, wantonly, grossly, negligently and grossly 
negligently, permitted” her to be left in such an unsafe and 
unreasonably dangerous seating arrangement.  Hannah asserted 
that Evans’ alleged negligence was the direct and proximate 
cause of her serious and permanent physical and psychological 
injuries, and she sought $100,000 in “compensatory and/or 
punitive damages.” 
Hannah’s amended complaint contained no reference to Code 
§ 46.2-1095(A), which requires that children “up to age eight” 
be placed in a child restraint device when traveling in a motor 
 
2
vehicle on the highways of Virginia.  Rather, the amended 
complaint focused on other aspects of Evans’ conduct.  Hannah 
alleged that Evans was “negligent and grossly negligent” when 
he: 
A. Placed [Hannah] in a foam seat in an 
area of a 33-year-old truck which was 
as inherently dangerous as having 
placed her in the cargo bed of the 
truck. 
 
B. Placed [Hannah] in a loose seat on the 
floorboard where said infant was 
surrounded by sharp objects and hard 
objects in the form of undercarriage 
structure, wires and front seat support 
metal rods and metal bars[.] 
 
C. Placed [Hannah] on the floorboard of 
the truck. 
 
D. Placed [Hannah] in an extreme injury-
risk location as described above while 
knowing that such placement would be 
catastrophic to the infant should any 
foreseeable motor vehicle accident 
occur. 
 
E. Ignored his duty of care to assure that 
his infant passenger was . . . safe and 
free from being tossed about in the 
confined area between the truck 
floorboard and the underside of the 
dashboard. 
 
In his responsive pleadings, Evans demurred to Hannah’s 
amended complaint, arguing that Code § 46.2-1095(C) barred 
Hannah’s claims, and that she failed to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted.  Code § 46.2-1095 (C) states in 
pertinent part:  “A violation of this section shall not 
 
3
constitute negligence.”  Evans also denied that he was liable 
to Hannah or that he breached any legal duty owing to her. 
Following briefing by the parties, the trial court held a 
hearing at which it acknowledged that Hannah was asserting a 
common law negligence claim and not a claim of negligence for 
Evans’ alleged violation of Code § 46.2-1095.  However, the 
trial court stated,  
[the] statutory duty [to secure a child in 
a vehicle] is so inextricably intertwined 
with any common law duty of care, that in 
my view it would be impossible to try this 
case without [the statute] somehow coming 
up either explicitly, or even the jury is 
thinking about it, that reference would be 
made to this statute. 
 
The trial court reasoned that if counsel for Hannah argued that 
Evans failed to exercise reasonable care by placing Hannah on 
the floor of the truck, the jury would accept that argument 
because it would know that Evans “is required by statute to put 
that child in a child restraint seat and he didn’t do it.”  
 
The trial court concluded that “the General Assembly 
exerted a whole lot of effort here to say this kind of  
conduct . . . is not going to be the basis for a civil action 
in this Commonwealth.”  Accordingly, the trial court sustained 
Evans’ demurrer to Hannah’s amended complaint and dismissed the 
complaint with prejudice.   
 
4
 
Hannah timely filed her notice of appeal, and we granted 
an appeal on the following assignments of error: 
1. 
The Circuit Court erred because it failed to view the 
Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to the 
Plaintiff and, in doing so, failed to recognize that 
a jury could reasonably find that the placement of a 
four-year old child on the floorboard of a 1972 truck 
was in and of itself a separate and identifiable act 
of negligence, without reference to the statute. 
 
2. 
The Circuit Court erred in failing to recognize that 
Va. Code § 46.2-1095(C) refers only to “negligence” 
and does [sic] regulate claims for “gross negligence” 
which[] are distinct and separate causes of action, 
commonly referred to as claims for punitive damages. 
 
3. 
The Circuit Court erred when it construed Va. Code 
§ 46.2-1095(C) other than according to its plain 
meaning and in such a way as to create the absurd 
result of immunizing a wrongdoer for any degree of 
negligence in transporting a child in a motor 
vehicle. 
 
4. 
The Circuit Court erred in failing to construe Va. 
Code §§ 46.2-1095 and 46.2-1098 conjunctively, given 
the language of Va. Code § 46.2-109[8] which 
specifically states in part that “nor shall violation 
of this article constitute a defense to any claim for 
personal injuries to a child or the recovery of 
medical expenses for injuries sustained in any motor 
vehicle accident.” 
 
II.  Analysis 
A. 
Standard of Review 
 
 
As we previously have stated, 
“[a] demurrer admits the truth of the facts 
contained in the pleading to which it is 
addressed, as well as any facts that may be 
reasonably and fairly implied and inferred 
from those allegations.  A demurrer does 
not, however, admit the correctness of the 
pleader’s conclusions of law.”  Yuzefovsky 
 
5
v. St. John’s Wood Apts., 261 Va. 97, 102, 
540 S.E.2d 134, 136-37 (2001) (internal 
citation omitted).  Accordingly, we will 
consider the facts stated, and those 
reasonably and fairly implied and inferred, 
in the [complaint] in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, but we will 
review the sufficiency of the legal 
conclusions ascribed to those facts de 
novo. 
 
Taboada v. Daly Seven, Inc., 271 Va. 313, 317-18, 626 S.E.2d 
428, 429 (2006), aff’d on reh’g, 273 Va. 269, 270, 641 S.E.2d 
68, 68 (2007).  In this appeal, we interpret Code §§ 46.2-1095 
and 46.2-1098. 
[A]n issue of statutory interpretation is a 
pure question of law which we review de 
novo.  When the language of a statute is 
unambiguous, we are bound by the plain 
meaning of that language.  Furthermore, we 
must give effect to the legislature’s 
intention as expressed by the language used 
unless a literal interpretation of the 
language would result in a manifest 
absurdity.  If a statute is subject to more 
than one interpretation, we must apply the 
interpretation that will carry out the 
legislative intent behind the statute. 
 
Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 
104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007) (citations omitted).  
Furthermore, “[t]he plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a 
statute is to be preferred over any curious, narrow, or 
strained construction.”  Commonwealth v. Zamani, 256 Va. 391, 
395, 507 S.E.2d 608, 609 (1998). 
 
 
6
B. 
Code §§ 46.2-1095 and 46.2-1098 
The dispositive issue in this case is whether Code 
§§ 46.2-1095 and 46.2-1098 preclude any cause of action for 
negligence when an injured child alleges that the adult 
responsible for her safety breached the common law duty of care 
by failing to secure the child in a safety seat. 
Code § 46.2-1095(A) provides in pertinent part that any 
person who drives on the highways of Virginia “shall ensure 
that any child, up to age eight, whom he transports therein is 
provided with and properly secured in a child restraint device 
of a type which meets the standards adopted by the United 
States Department of Transportation.”  Code § 46.2-1095(C) 
provides in pertinent part, “[a] violation of this section 
shall not constitute negligence, be considered in mitigation of 
damages of whatever nature, be admissible in evidence or be the 
subject of comment by counsel in any action for the recovery of 
damages in a civil action.”  Code § 46.2-1098 provides in 
pertinent part, “[v]iolations of this article shall not 
constitute negligence per se; nor shall violation of this 
article constitute a defense to any claim for personal injuries 
to a child or recovery of medical expenses for injuries  
 
 
7
sustained in any motor vehicle accident.”2 
Our review of these statutes is guided by well-established 
canons of construction. 
The General Assembly has proclaimed, “The common 
law of England, insofar as it is not repugnant 
to the principles of the Bill of Rights and 
Constitution of this Commonwealth, shall 
continue in full force . . . and be the rule of 
decision, except as altered by the General 
Assembly.”  Code § 1-200.  When construing a 
statute in derogation of the common law, we 
apply several established principles.  “[A] 
statutory provision will not be held to change 
the common law unless the legislative intent to 
do so is plainly manifested.”  Herndon v. St. 
Mary’s Hosp., Inc., 266 Va. 472, 476, 587 S.E.2d 
567, 569 (2003).  “Statutes in derogation of the 
common law are to be strictly construed and not 
to be enlarged in their operation by 
construction beyond their express terms.”  
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Kinzer, 206 Va. 
175, 181, 142 S.E.2d 514, 518 (1965).  
Accordingly, “[a] statutory change in the common 
law is limited to that which is expressly stated 
in the statute or necessarily implied by its 
language because there is a presumption that no 
change was intended.”  Mitchem v. Counts, 259 
Va. 179, 186, 523 S.E.2d 246, 250 (2000).  “When 
an enactment does not encompass the entire 
subject covered by the common law, it abrogates 
the common-law rule only to the extent that its 
terms are directly and irreconcilably opposed to 
                     
2 Both Code §§ 46.2-1095 and 46.2-1098 are codified in 
Article 13, which is entitled “Child Restraints.”  Because they 
clearly address the same subject matter, we construe them 
together under the “in pari materia” canon of construction.  
See e.g. USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Hertz Corp., 265 Va. 450, 457, 
578 S.E.2d 775, 778 (2003) (construing statutes appearing in 
Title 46.2 and dealing with insurance requirements for motor 
vehicles); Taylor v. Shaw & Cannon Co., 236 Va. 15, 19, 372 
S.E.2d 128, 131 (1988) (statutes are “read . . . in pari 
materia since they relate to the same subject”). 
 
8
the rule.”  Boyd [v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 346, 
349, 374 S.E.2d 301, 302 (1988)]. 
 
Isbell v. Commercial Investment Assocs., Inc., 273 Va. 605, 
613-14, 644 S.E.2d 72, 75 (2007) (some internal citations 
omitted). 
“The doctrine of negligence per se represents the adoption 
of ‘the requirements of a legislative enactment as the standard 
of conduct of a reasonable [person].’ ”  McGuire v. Hodges, 273 
Va. 199, 206, 639 S.E.2d 284, 288 (2007) (quoting Butler v. 
Frieden, 208 Va. 352, 353, 158 S.E.2d 121, 122 (1967)).  “A 
party relying on negligence per se does not need to establish 
common law negligence.”  Id.  These principles provide a clear 
distinction between statutory and common law negligence.  In 
Code § 46.2-1098, the General Assembly plainly indicated that 
it was not creating a statutory standard of care through its 
enactment of Code § 46.2-1095.  Accordingly, a plaintiff may 
not rely on an alleged or admitted violation of Code § 46.2-
1095 to prove her claim of negligence per se. 
However, the question remains whether the General Assembly 
intended for Code §§ 46.2-1095 and 46.2-1098 to abrogate a 
cause of action based upon common law negligence when the facts 
involve the failure to secure a child in a child restraint 
device.  Because “[a] statutory change in the common law is 
limited to that which is expressly stated in the statute or 
 
9
necessarily implied by its language,” Isbell, 273 Va. at 613-
14, 644 S.E.2d at 75, we hold that the legislature did not 
intend to eliminate common law causes of action arising from 
injuries sustained by a child in a motor vehicle accident.   
The language of Code § 46.2-1095(C) states in part, “[a] 
violation of this section shall not constitute negligence.”  
The language of Code § 46.2-1098 states in part, “[v]iolations 
of this article shall not constitute negligence per se.”  
Construing the statutory scheme as a whole, we hold that the 
“negligence” referred to in Code § 46.2-1095(C) is the same per 
se negligence referenced in Code § 46.2-1098.  See e.g., City 
of Lynchburg v. English Constr. Co., 277 Va. 574, 584, 675 
S.E.2d 197, 202 (2009) (construing statutes in Title 58.1 and 
explaining that “[i]t is the duty of the courts to construe 
statutory enactments so as to avoid repugnance and conflict 
between them and, if possible, to give force and effect to each 
of them”) (citing Sexton v. Cornett, 271 Va. 251, 257, 623 
S.E.2d 898, 901 (2006)); Alston v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 759, 
769, 652 S.E.2d 456, 462 (2007) (construing statutes in Title 
19.2 and explaining that “[i]t is a cardinal rule of 
construction that statutes dealing with a specific subject must 
be construed together in order to arrive at the object sought 
to be accomplished”) (quoting Prillaman v. Commonwealth, 199 
Va. 401, 406, 100 S.E.2d 4, 7 (1957) (internal quotation marks 
 
10
omitted)).  Consistent with Code § 1-200 and our case law, we 
conclude that the General Assembly intended preclusion of a per 
se negligence action based upon Code §§ 46.2-1095 and 46.2-
1098, but did not abrogate a common law action for negligence. 
The parties engage in much discussion regarding the 
meaning of the word “violation” in the statutes.  Hannah 
maintains that the term refers to a formal adjudication under 
the statute.  Evans maintains that it refers to a factual basis 
that could result in a formal adjudication.  The resolution of 
that question is not the dispositive issue in this case.  We 
hold that, read together, Code §§ 46.2-1095 and 46.2-1098:  (i) 
preclude a cause of action based upon negligence per se; and 
(ii) preclude any mention of the statutory provisions by the 
parties at trial for any reason.3 
Upon remand, the trial court should be mindful that in a 
common law cause of action for negligence, a child of four is 
not legally capable of contributory negligence.  See Grant v. 
Mays, 204 Va. 41, 44, 129 S.E.2d 10, 12 (1963); Morris v. 
Peyton, 148 Va. 812, 821, 139 S.E. 500, 502-03 (1927).  Also, 
in a suit by an infant to recover damages for personal injury, 
the negligence of a parent will not be imputed to his infant 
                     
3 Because we hold today that Hannah’s common law cause of 
action survives, it is not necessary for us to reach the 
remaining assignments of error. 
 
 
11
child.  Tugman v. Riverside & Dan River Cotton Mills, Inc., 144 
Va. 473, 481, 132 S.E.2d 179, 181 (1926).  Finally, “[w]e have 
held that a plaintiff has a duty to mitigate [her] damages.”  
Sawyer v. Comerci, 264 Va. 68, 77, 563 S.E.2d 748, 754 (2002).  
“Generally, whether a plaintiff acted reasonably to minimize 
his damage is a question for the jury.”  Id.  However, in 
accordance with other jurisdictions, we hold that a four-year 
old child is unable, as a matter of law, to mitigate her 
damages.  See Francis v. Dahl, 107 P.3d 1171, 1174 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 2005); accord Cardona v. County of Albany, 728 N.Y.S.2d 
355, 362 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001) (“the infant plaintiffs, being 
non sui juris, were, as a matter of law, unable to mitigate 
their damages”). 
III.  Conclusion 
 
For the reasons stated herein, we will reverse the 
judgment of the Circuit Court of Bedford County and remand the 
case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.  
Reversed and remanded. 
 
JUSTICE KINSER, dissenting. 
 
Today, the majority holds that the term "negligence" used 
by the General Assembly in Code § 46.2-1095(C) "is the same per 
se negligence" as the General Assembly utilized in Code § 46.2-
1098.  Because those two terms have distinct legal meanings and 
 
12
because the majority ignores important principles of statutory 
construction, I respectfully dissent. 
The majority does not find that either of these statutes 
is ambiguous, nor do I.  In construing a clear and unambiguous 
statute, "this Court looks no further than the plain meaning of 
the statute's words."  Gray v. Rhoads, 268 Va. 81, 86, 597 
S.E.2d 93, 96 (2004).  Furthermore, "[c]ourts cannot 'add 
language to the statute the General Assembly has not seen fit 
to include.' "  Jackson v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 
269 Va. 303, 313, 608 S.E.2d 901, 906 (2005) (quoting Holsapple 
v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 593, 599, 587 S.E.2d 561, 564-65 
(2003)).  "[N]or are they permitted to accomplish the same 
result by judicial interpretation."  Burlile v. Commonwealth, 
261 Va. 501, 511, 544 S.E.2d 360, 365 (2001) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
Moreover, "[w]hen the General Assembly uses two different 
terms in the same act, those terms are presumed to have 
distinct and different meanings."  Industrial Dev. Auth. v. 
Board of Supervisors, 263 Va. 349, 353, 559 S.E.2d 621, 623 
(2002) (emphasis added); accord Shelor Motor Co. v. Miller, 261 
Va. 473, 480, 544 S.E.2d 345, 349 (2001).  We must "presume 
that the 'legislature chose, with care, the words it used when 
it enacted the . . . statute.' "  Jackson, 269 Va. at 313, 608 
 
13
S.E.2d at 906 (quoting Simon v. Forer, 265 Va. 483, 490, 578 
S.E.2d 792, 796 (2003)). 
There can be no doubt that the words "negligence" and 
"negligence per se" are terms of art and have distinct legal 
meanings.  This Court has defined "ordinary or simple 
negligence as the failure to use 'that degree of care which an 
ordinarily prudent person would exercise under the same or 
similar circumstances to avoid injury to another.' "1  Griffin 
v. Shively, 227 Va. 317, 321, 315 S.E.2d 210, 212-13 (1984) 
(quoting Perlin v. Chappell, 198 Va. 861, 864, 96 S.E.2d 805, 
808 (1957)).  To establish negligence, a plaintiff must "show 
the existence of a legal duty, a breach of the duty, and 
proximate causation resulting in damage."  Atrium Unit Owners 
Ass'n v. King, 266 Va. 288, 293, 585 S.E.2d 545, 548 (2003). 
                     
1 We have defined the term "gross negligence" as "that 
degree of negligence which shows indifference to others as 
constitutes an utter disregard of prudence amounting to a 
complete neglect of the safety of [another].  It must be such a 
degree of negligence as would shock fair minded men although 
something less than willful recklessness."  Ferguson v. 
Ferguson, 212 Va. 86, 92, 181 S.E.2d 648, 653 (1971) (emphasis 
omitted).  "Willful and wanton negligence is acting consciously 
in disregard of another person's rights or acting with reckless 
indifference to the consequences, with the defendant aware, 
from his knowledge of existing circumstances and conditions, 
that his conduct probably would cause injury to another."  
Griffin v. Shively, 227 Va. 317, 321, 315 S.E.2d 210, 213 
(1984) (citing Friedman v. Jordan, 166 Va. 65, 68, 184 S.E. 
186, 187 (1936)). 
 
14
In contrast, "[t]he doctrine of negligence per se 
represents the adoption of 'the requirements of a legislative 
enactment as the standard of conduct of a reasonable 
[person].' "  McGuire v. Hodges, 273 Va. 199, 206, 639 S.E.2d 
284, 288 (2007) (quoting Butler v. Frieden, 208 Va. 352, 353, 
158 S.E.2d 121, 122 (1967)). 
A party relying on negligence per se does not need to 
establish common law negligence provided the 
proponent produces evidence supporting a 
determination that the opposing party violated a 
statute enacted for public safety, that the proponent 
belongs to the class of persons for whose benefit the 
statute was enacted and the harm suffered was of the 
type against which the statute was designed to 
protect, and that the statutory violation was a 
proximate cause of the injury. 
 
Id. (citing Halterman v. Radisson Hotel Corp., 259 Va. 171, 
176-77, 523 S.E.2d 823, 825 (2000)). 
Despite this obvious distinction between the terms 
"negligence" and "negligence per se" and the statutory 
construction principle that when the General Assembly uses two 
different terms in the same act, the terms are presumed to have 
distinct and different meanings, the majority concludes that 
the General Assembly did not mean what it said by using the 
term "negligence" in Code § 46.2-1095(C).  When the General 
Assembly first enacted legislation requiring the use of child 
restraint devices while transporting children in motor 
vehicles, see former Code § 46.1-314.2, it did not include the 
 
15
term "negligence" in the statute.  1982 Acts ch. 634.  However, 
in the same Act, the General Assembly enacted former Code 
§ 46.1-314.5(B), which did contain a reference to negligence 
per se: "Violations of the provisions of this article shall not 
constitute negligence per se; nor shall violation of this 
article constitute a defense to any claim for personal injuries 
to a child or recovery of medical expenses for injuries 
sustained in any motor vehicle accident."  1982 Acts ch. 634.  
Virtually the same language is now set forth in Code § 46.2-
1098. 
When enacted in 1982, former Code §§ 46.1-314.2 and –314.5 
were part of Article 9.1 in Chapter 4 of Title 46.1 of the 
Code.  1982 Acts ch. 634.  Current Code §§ 46.2-1095 and –1098 
are included in Article 13 of Chapter 10 in Title 46.2.  Thus, 
since its creation, a violation of the statute requiring the 
use of child restraint devices could not constitute negligence 
per se. 
In 1997, the General Assembly amended Code § 46.2-1095 and 
added the language now found in subsection C: "A violation of 
this section shall not constitute negligence, be considered in 
mitigation of damages of whatever nature, be admissible in 
evidence or be the subject of comment by counsel in any action 
for the recovery of damages in a civil action."  1997 Acts ch. 
793.  Since it was already the case, pursuant to Code § 46.2-
 
16
1098, that a violation of Code § 46.2-1095 could not constitute 
negligence per se, it is apparent that the General Assembly 
intended what it enacted and did not use the term "negligence" 
to mean "negligence per se." 
Thus, I cannot adopt the view of the majority.  To do so 
renders the 1997 amendment to Code § 46.2-1095 entirely 
superfluous and repetitious of what Code § 46.2-1098 already 
stated: a violation of Code § 46.2-1095 could not constitute 
negligence per se.  See Sansom v. Board of Supervisors, 257 Va. 
589, 595, 514 S.E.2d 345, 349 (1999) (To interpret the phrase 
"substantial surface drainage course" and "stream" to denote 
the same type of topographical feature would "violate the 
settled principle of statutory construction that every part of 
a statute is presumed to have some effect and no part will be 
considered meaningless unless absolutely necessary.") (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).  By its holding today, 
the majority presumes the General Assembly did not "[choose], 
with care, the words it used when it enacted [Code § 46.2-
1095(C)]."  Simon, 265 Va. at 490, 578 S.E.2d at 796.  I 
believe, however, that the General Assembly fully understands 
the significant legal difference between the terms "negligence" 
and "negligence per se."  See Philip Morris USA Inc. v. 
Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 273 Va. 564, 576, 643 S.E.2d 219, 
225 (2007) ("In interpreting a statute, we presume that the 
 
17
General Assembly acted with full knowledge of the law in the 
area in which it dealt.").  The numerous statutes in which 
these terms appear show that the General Assembly does not use 
them interchangeably.  Compare Code §§ 29.1-748(C) (violation 
of section shall not constitute negligence), 46.2-334.01(E) 
(same), 46.2-335(E) (same), 46.2-906.1 (same), 46.2-915.1(D) 
(same), 46.2-915.2 (same), and 46.2-1094(D) (same), with Code 
§§ 19.2-392.02(G) (violation of section shall not constitute 
negligence per se), 29.1-749.3 (same), 32.1-111.3(B)(2), -
111.3(C)(2) (same), 46.2-800.1(C) (same), 46.2-813 (same), 
46.2-842.1 (same), 46.2-910(A) (same), 46.2-1030(D) (same), and 
59.1-524 (same). 
Despite the narrow issue before us, the majority concludes 
that the General Assembly "did not intend to eliminate common 
law causes of action arising from injuries sustained by a child 
in a motor vehicle accident."  I agree.  "[A] statutory 
provision will not be held to change the common law unless the 
legislative intent to do so is plainly manifested."  Herndon v. 
St. Mary's Hosp., Inc., 266 Va. 472, 476, 587 S.E.2d 567, 569 
(2003).  But, the question is not whether the General Assembly 
intended to eliminate all causes of action for injuries 
sustained by children in motor vehicle accidents.  Instead, the 
proper inquiry is whether the General Assembly intended to 
abrogate common law negligence causes of action premised on the 
 
18
failure to secure a child in a child restraint system.  I 
conclude that it did.  What could be more plain, clear, and 
expressly stated than the language in Code § 46.2-1095(C): "[A] 
violation of this section [mandating use of child restraint 
devices] shall not constitute negligence"?2  (Emphasis added.) 
Under the majority's holding today, this infant, suing by 
her mother and next friend, can proceed with this common law 
negligence action against her father for injuries she allegedly 
sustained as a result of his failure to secure her in a child 
restraint device.  She apparently can do so even though the 
father's failure to properly restrain his daughter, which 
violated Code § 46.2-1095(A), is not admissible in evidence 
under Code § 46.2-1095(C).  Furthermore, under the terms of 
Code § 46.2-1098, a defendant sued by an infant's parent to 
recover medical expenses sustained as a result of a motor 
vehicle accident could not present a defense based on the 
conduct at issue.  Thus, in my view, the majority disrupts a 
                     
2 Reading Code §§ 46.2-1095 and –1098 "in pari materia" 
does not lead to a different result.  Related statutes are read 
"in pari materia in order to give, when possible, consistent 
meaning to the language used by the General Assembly."  
Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ. v. Interactive Return 
Serv., Inc., 271 Va. 304, 310-11, 626 S.E.2d 436, 439 (2006).  
I find nothing inconsistent about the General Assembly's use of 
the terms "negligence" and "negligence per se" in Code §§ 46.2-
1095(C) and –1098, respectively. 
 
 
19
previously consistent statutory scheme and reverses a policy 
decision made by the General Assembly. 
Having concluded that the General Assembly meant what it 
stated in Code § 46.2-1095(C), I turn now to the question 
whether the circuit court erred in sustaining a demurrer to the 
amended complaint.  As the majority notes, the infant, suing by 
her mother and next friend, alleged that her father placed her 
in a loose seat on the floorboard of a truck and by doing so, 
breached his duty of care to insure that his infant passenger 
was "safe and free from being tossed about in the confined area 
between the truck floorboard and the underside of the 
dashboard."  There is no question that the alleged conduct 
violates Code § 46.2-1095(A), but the provisions of Code 
§ 46.2-1095(C) clearly state that "[a] violation of this 
section shall not constitute negligence."  Establishing the 
alleged facts at trial will necessarily implicate the father's 
failure to secure his daughter in a child restraint device.  
And, establishing that the father's alleged negligence was the 
proximate cause of his daughter's injuries will necessarily 
entail consideration as to whether the infant would have been 
injured less seriously, or not at all, if she had been properly 
restrained.  Thus, I conclude that the circuit court did not 
err in sustaining the demurrer. 
 
20
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court and therefore respectfully dissent. 
 
JUSTICE MIMS, concurring. 
 
I concur with the majority opinion, which I join.  The 
majority and dissenting opinions thoroughly parse the language 
of Code §§ 46.2-1095 and 46.2-1098 in search of the elusive 
grail of legislative intent.  Yet the two opinions reach 
diametrically opposed conclusions.  The statutory language, 
together with the rather complex statutory history, has caused 
reasonable minds to differ. 
I write to suggest that in choosing between these opposite 
reasonable conclusions, one should not miss the forest for the 
trees.*  Code § 46.2-1095 is both admirable and minimal.  Its 
purpose is admirable: to protect children on the highways of 
the Commonwealth by requiring that they be secured by age-
appropriate safety restraints.  Yet its salutary effect is 
                     
* It is well-established that “we determine the legislative 
intent from the words used in the statute, applying the plain 
meaning of the words unless they are ambiguous or would lead to 
an absurd result.”  Wright v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 754, 759, 
685 S.E.2d 655, 657 (2009).  However, “[t]he ultimate purpose 
of these rules is to ascertain the intention of the 
legislature, and every statute is to be read so as to promote 
the ability of the enactment to remedy the mischief at which it 
is directed.”  USAA Casualty Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 248 Va. 
185, 194, 445 S.E.2d 145, 150 (1994) (internal alterations and 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
21
minimal due to its negligible sanction:  a $50 civil penalty 
with no demerit points and no imposition of court costs. 
The General Assembly enacted a remedial statute whose sole 
purpose is to protect defenseless children who cannot protect 
themselves.  The majority opinion concludes that the General 
Assembly intended to add this minimal statutory protection to 
the existing common law tort remedy available to grievously 
injured children such as Hannah.  Therefore it holds that a 
violation of the statute does not bar a tort action; rather it 
merely may not be introduced as evidence in such action. 
The dissenting opinion concludes that the General Assembly 
intended to replace entirely the tort remedy for those injured 
children.  Therefore, a guilty wrongdoer who pays his $50 fine 
is immune from any further consequence, while his injured child 
victim is left without the previously available redress for her 
grievous injuries.  I do not believe the General Assembly 
intended such an inequitable result when it enacted this 
remedial statute to protect the safety of children. 
 
22