Case Title: Cline v. State, Dept. of Family Services

Citation: 

Docket Number: 96-6

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-11-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Cline v. State, Dept. of Family Services1996 WY 154927 P.2d 261Case Number: 96-6Decided: 11/22/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming


DIANA CLINE, as Personal Representative of the Estate of 
ZACHARY NOECKER; and JAMES MULLINS and CARRIE MULLINS

as 
Personal Representatives of the Estate of KARY MAC MULLINS, 

Appellants 
(Plaintiffs),

 v. 

STATE 
OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES,

 and DEPARTMENT OF 
EDUCATION,

 Appellees (Defendants). 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sheridan County: The Honorable John C. Brackley, 
Judge. 

 Representing 
Appellants: H.W. Rasmussen of Badley & Rasmussen, Sheridan, WY. 
  Representing Appellees: William U. Hill, Attorney General, 
and Michael K. Davis of Yonkee & Toner, Sheridan, WY. Argument presented by 
M. Davis. Before TAYLOR, C.J., AND THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, * AND 
LEHMAN, JJ.   * Chief Justice at time of oral argument. 
LEHMAN, Justice. [¶1] 
Suit, alleging wrongful death claims, was brought against the State of 
Wyoming, Department of Family Services (DFS) and Department of Education (DOE), 
by the survivors of two teenagers killed in an automobile accident on April 19, 
1993. At the time of their death, Kary Mullins and Zachary Noecker were in the 
care of Normative Services, Inc. (NSI), a twenty-four hour care facility in 
Sheridan, Wyoming. The two  were passengers in a vehicle owned and operated 
by Edward A. Gillison, an employee of NSI, when they were involved in the fatal 
collision. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State, 
finding as a matter of law that Gillison was not a "public employee" pursuant to 
the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act and that NSI was an independent contractor 
for the State of Wyoming. [¶2] We 
affirm. [¶3] Appellants state two 
issues: 

 
1. The District Court erred in finding that Edward A. Gillison was not a 
"public employee" pursuant to the immunity statutes.   2. The 
District Court erred when it found that NSI was an independent contractor for 
the State of Wyoming.

[¶4] Appellees present the issues in this way: 

 
1. Is the State of Wyoming liable under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act 
for damages resulting from the negligence of the employee of an independent 
contractor?   2. Is the Department of Family Services entitled to 
judicial immunity in its role of monitoring children placed in a twenty-four 
hour care facility pursuant to a court order?   3. Did Appellants 
release any claims they may have had against the State of Wyoming by releasing 
the persons they claim to be agents of the State?

FACTS 

[¶5] Normative Services, Inc. is a private, 
nonprofit corporation certified by the State as a residential treatment facility 
and to provide educational services. Zachary Noecker was voluntarily placed in 
NSI's day treatment program pursuant to a consent  decree entered by the 
Sheridan County District Court. Kary Mullins was admitted to NSI's residential 
program on the order of the Washakie County District Court on a CHINS (Child in 
Need of Supervision) petition. The care of both children was paid for by the 
Department of Family Services and the Department of Education; DOE paid for the 
cost of educating the youths, and DFS paid the residential component as well as 
the cost of counseling. [¶6] On 
April 19, 1993, Edward Gillison, a counselor/educator employed by NSI, was 
driving Mullins, Noecker and other NSI students to the Sheridan County YMCA for 
recreation when his car crossed the center line and collided with an oncoming 
vehicle. Gillison, Mullins and Noecker lost their lives in the accident. 
[¶7] Gillison's insurance company, 
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, reached a settlement with Diana 
Cline, personal representative of Zachary Noecker, and James and Carrie Mullins, 
personal representatives of Kary Mullins (collectively, appellants). In return, 
appellants released all claims against Gillison and NSI. Appellants subsequently 
filed suit against the State of Wyoming, DFS and DOE (appellees), alleging that 
Gillison and NSI fell within the statutory definition of "public employee" 
contained in the Governmental Claims Act. W.S. 1-39-103(a)(iv) (Supp. 1996). 
Appellants claim that Gillison, as a public employee, was negligent in the 
operation of a motor vehicle while acting within the scope of his duties, 
thereby rendering the State of Wyoming liable through the Department of Family 
Services and the Department of Education under W.S. 1-39-105 (1988). 
[¶8] Both parties filed motions 
for summary judgment. After a hearing on the motions, on December 14, 1995, the 
district court granted summary judgment in favor of appellees. Appellants timely 
filed this appeal. 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶9] Summary judgment is appropriate where there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. W.R.C.P. 56; Rue v. 
Carter, 919 P.2d 633, 634 (Wyo. 1996). This court evaluates the 
propriety of summary judgment using the same standards and materials used by the 
district court, affording no deference to the district court's decision on 
issues of law. Scott v. Scott, 918 P.2d 198, 199 (Wyo. 1996). We look at the record from a viewpoint most favorable 
to the party   opposing the motion, allowing that party all reasonable 
inferences which may be fairly drawn from the record. Jack v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co. of Los 
Angeles, 899 P.2d 891, 893 (Wyo. 1995). 

DISCUSSION

[¶10]          
Claims against the State must be brought pursuant to the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act (Claims Act). Under the Claims Act, sovereign immunity 
is the rule, and governmental liability is the exception. W.S. 1-39-104(a) 
(1988). Unless a statutory exception is applicable, no liability will attach. 
Id. [¶11]          
Appellants claim appellees are liable under § 1-39-105 of the Claims Act, 
which provides: "A governmental entity is liable for damages resulting from 
bodily injury, wrongful death or property damage caused by the negligence of 
public employees while acting within the scope of their duties in the operation 
of any motor vehicle, aircraft or watercraft." The act defines "public employee" 
as "any officer, employee or servant of a governmental entity, including elected 
or appointed officials, peace officers and persons acting on behalf or in 
service of a governmental entity in any official capacity, whether with or 
without compensation." W.S. 1-39-103(a)(iv)(A) (Supp. 1996).  The term does 
not include an independent contractor except contract physicians in specified 
circumstances. W.S. 1-39-103(a)(iv)(B) (Supp. 1996). A "governmental entity" 
means "the state, University of Wyoming or any local government." W.S. 
1-39-103(a)(i) (Supp. 1996). "Local government" is defined as "cities and towns, 
counties, school districts, joint powers boards, airport boards, public 
corporations, community college districts, special districts and their governing 
bodies, all political subdivisions of the state, and their agencies, 
instrumentalities and institutions." W.S. 1-39-103(ii) (Supp. 1996). 
[¶12]          
The dispositive issue is whether NSI or Gillison are "public employees" 
under the Claims Act. Appellants must establish that either NSI or Gillison was 
a public employee--an officer, employee or servant of the State, DFS or DOE, and 
not an independent contractor--or their claims will be barred by the Claims Act. 
In Wyoming, the overriding element in determining whether one is an employee or 
independent contractor is whether the employer has a right to control the 
details of the work whereby liability is sought to be established. Stephenson v. Pacific Power & Light Co., 
779 P.2d 1169, 1176  (Wyo. 1989); Holliday 
v. Bannister, 741 P.2d 89, 95 (Wyo. 1987). "The control of the work 
reserved in the employer which effects a master-servant relationship is control 
of the means and manner of performance of the work, as well as of the result[.]" 
41 AM. JUR. 2D Independent Contractors § 12 (1995); see also, Natural Gas Processing Co. v. Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1185 (Wyo. 1994). [¶13]          
Ordinarily the determination of whether a master-servant relationship 
exists is a question of fact for the jury, but it becomes a matter of law when 
the pertinent facts are not in dispute and but one reasonable inference can be 
drawn. Barnes v. Fernandez, 526 P.2d 983, 985 (Wyo. 1974). Stated differently, absent evidence of control by 
appellees of the means and manner in which NSI (and Gillison) performed its 
work, appellants' case must fail as a matter of law. [¶14]          
In making their argument, appellants rely on Wyoming statutes and rules 
which govern licensing and certification of shelter care facilities and which 
mandate minimum standards for educational providers. Specifically, appellants 
argue that the DFS and DOE control the daily operation of NSI through 
DFS-promulgated Standards for Certification, DFS' authority to approve 
individual service plans for children-in-placement, DFS' and DOE's authority to 
approve individual education plans, monitoring of NSI's operation and 
methodology by local DFS caseworkers, and the ability to terminate the contract 
with NSI for noncompliance with statutory and regulatory mandates. Further, 
appellants argue that DFS and DOE must retain this level of control because they 
have a non-delegable statutory duty to protect the safety and welfare of 
children who are placed in alternative care facilities. [¶15]          
Our examination of the record leads us to conclude that there are no 
genuine issues of material fact with respect to the retention of control by 
appellees over the details of the work performed by NSI. "As a practical 
proposition, every contract for work to be done reserves to the employer a 
certain degree of control, at least to enable the employer to see that the 
contract is performed according to specifications." 41 AM. JUR. 2D 
Independent Contractors § 12 (1995). The fact that child care 
facilities must be certified by the State and meet minimum statutory and 
regulatory standards in order to retain that certification does not equate to 
control over the means and manner in which NSI operates its business on a daily 
basis. Nor is a requirement that work be performed according to standards and 
specifications imposed by appellees sufficient to establish the degree of 
control necessary to transform the relationship into one of master-servant. 
See id.; Natural Gas Processing, 886 P.2d  at 1185. [¶16]          
The DFS official primarily responsible for certification of children's 
care facilities testified that no one from DFS attended NSI board meetings, DFS 
had no power to hire or fire NSI employees and was not involved in hiring or 
firing decisions. DFS caseworkers, along with representatives from the school 
district and NSI, collaborated in developing individual written plans for 
children-in-placement. Caseworkers also reviewed monthly reports and conducted 
six-month reviews of a child's placement, but beyond that DFS did not involve 
itself in the details of treatment. DFS could voice concerns about the manner in 
which NSI provided its services; but if the disagreement was not settled, the 
court which ordered placement of the child resolved the issue. 
[¶17]          
DOE required that physical education be included in the curriculum for 
students but did not specify how often or where such activity was to take place. 
Neither DFS nor DOE mandated that the children be transported to the YMCA for 
recreation. No one at DFS was consulted about the decision to transport the 
youths on April 19, 1993, nor was there any requirement that DFS be consulted 
about such a decision. Trips off site for recreation using personal vehicles 
were subject to approval by an NSI program director or manager. DFS standards 
contained no provision regarding transportation of students. [¶18]          
In sum, the undisputed facts illustrate that NSI was fully in control of 
deciding how to conduct its day-to-day operations in order to successfully 
perform its obligations under the contracts with DFS and DOE. Thus, as a matter 
of law, NSI was an independent contractor, and neither NSI nor its employee 
Edward Gillison was a "public employee" under the Claims Act. Having so 
determined, we need not decide the additional issues raised by appellees. 

CONCLUSION

[¶19]          
We find that no genuine issue of material fact existed in this case and 
that appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [¶20]          
Affirmed.