Case Title: Smallwood v. State

Citation: 343 Md. 97

Docket Number: 122/95

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1996-08-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 122
September Term, 1995
_____________________________________
   DWIGHT RALPH SMALLWOOD
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
____________________________________
Murphy, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Raker,
JJ.
____________________________________
OPINION BY MURPHY, C.J.
____________________________________
       Filed:  August 1, 1996
In this case, we examine the use of circumstantial evidence to
infer that a defendant possessed the intent to kill needed for a
conviction of attempted murder or assault with intent to murder.
We conclude that such an inference is not supportable under the
facts of this case.
I
A
On August 29, 1991, Dwight Ralph Smallwood was diagnosed as
being infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV).
According to medical records from the Prince George's County
Detention Center, he had been informed of his HIV-positive status
by September 25, 1991.  In February 1992, a social worker made
Smallwood aware of the necessity of practicing "safe sex" in order
to avoid transmitting the virus to his sexual partners, and in July
1993, Smallwood told health care providers at Children's Hospital
that he had only one sexual partner and that they always used
condoms.  Smallwood again tested positive for HIV in February and
March of 1994.
On September 26, 1993, Smallwood and an accomplice robbed a
woman at gunpoint, and forced her into a grove of trees where each
man alternately placed a gun to her head while the other one raped
her.  On September 28, 1993, Smallwood and an accomplice robbed a
second woman at gunpoint and took her to a secluded location, where
Smallwood inserted his penis into her with "slight penetration."
On September 30, 1993, Smallwood and an accomplice robbed yet a
     In two additional indictments, Smallwood was charged with the
1
rape and robbery of the two women who were attacked on September 26
and September 30.  Smallwood pled guilty to attempted first-degree
rape and robbery with a deadly weapon in those cases as well, and
the judgments entered pursuant to those pleas are not before us on
this appeal.
2
third woman, also at gunpoint, and took her to a local school where
she was forced to perform oral sex on Smallwood and was raped by
him.  In each of these episodes, Smallwood threatened to kill his
victims if they did not cooperate or to return and shoot them if
they reported his crimes.  Smallwood did not wear a condom during
any of these criminal episodes.
Based upon his attack on September 28, 1993, Smallwood was
charged with, among other crimes, attempted first-degree rape,
robbery with a deadly weapon, assault with intent to murder, and
reckless endangerment.  In separate indictments, Smallwood was also
charged with the attempted second-degree murder of each of his
three victims.  On October 11, 1994, Smallwood pled guilty in the
Circuit Court for Prince George's County to attempted first-degree
rape and robbery with a deadly weapon.   The circuit court
1
(Nichols, J.) also convicted Smallwood of assault with intent to
murder and reckless endangerment based upon his September 28, 1993
attack, and convicted Smallwood of all three counts of attempted
second-degree murder.
Following 
his 
conviction, 
Smallwood 
was 
sentenced to
concurrent sentences of life imprisonment for attempted rape,
twenty years imprisonment for robbery with a deadly weapon, thirty
     The Court of Special Appeals concluded, however, that
2
Smallwood's conviction for assault with intent to murder should
merge into the conviction for attempted second-degree murder based
upon the same event.  Because we find that the evidence was
insufficient to convict Smallwood of either of these two crimes,
however, the issue of merger has become moot.
3
years imprisonment for assault with intent to murder, and five
years imprisonment for reckless endangerment.  The circuit court
also imposed a concurrent thirty-year sentence for each of the
three counts of attempted second-degree murder.  The circuit
court's judgments were affirmed in part and reversed in part by the
Court of Special Appeals.  In Smallwood v. State, 106 Md. App. 1,
661 A.2d 747 (1995), the intermediate appellate court found that
the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to conclude that
Smallwood intended to kill his victims and upheld all of his
convictions.   Upon Smallwood's petition, we granted certiorari to
2
consider whether the trial court could properly conclude that
Smallwood possessed the requisite intent to support his convictions
of attempted second-degree murder and assault with intent to
murder.
C
Smallwood asserts that the trial court lacked sufficient
evidence to support its conclusion that Smallwood intended to kill
his three victims.  Smallwood argues that the fact that he engaged
in unprotected sexual intercourse, even though he knew that he
carried HIV, is insufficient to infer an intent to kill.  The most
that can reasonably be inferred, Smallwood contends, is that he is
     Smallwood also argues that the legislature preempted the
3
crimes of assault with intent to murder and attempted murder with
respect to transmission of HIV when it enacted Maryland Code (1982,
1994 Repl. Vol.) §§ 18-601.1 of the Health General Article, which
makes it a criminal offense to knowingly transfer or attempt to
transfer HIV to another individual and sets a maximum sentence of
three years imprisonment.  For this proposition, Smallwood relies
on State v. Gibson, 254 Md. 399, 254 A.2d 691 (1969).  Because we
reverse Smallwood's convictions of attempted murder and assault
with intent to murder on other grounds, it is unnecessary to
address this argument.
4
guilty of recklessly endangering his victims by exposing them to
the risk that they would become infected themselves.  The State
disagrees, arguing that the facts of this case are sufficient to
infer an intent to kill.  The State likens Smallwood's HIV-positive
status to a deadly weapon and argues that engaging in unprotected
sex when one is knowingly infected with HIV is equivalent to firing
a loaded firearm at that person.3
II
A
In Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. 435, 438-440, 620 A.2d 327 (1993),
we discussed HIV and the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
in detail.  There, we described HIV as a retrovirus that attacks
the human immune system, weakening it, and ultimately destroying
the body's capacity to ward off disease.  We also noted that
[t]he virus may reside latently in the body for periods
as long as ten years or more, during which time the
infected person will manifest no symptoms of illness and
function normally.  HIV typically spreads via genital
fluids or blood transmitted from one person to another
through sexual contact, the sharing of needles in
intravenous drug use, blood transfusions, infiltration
into wounds, or from mother to child during pregnancy or
5
birth.
Id. at 439.  In Faya, we also described AIDS and its relationship
to HIV:
AIDS, in turn, is the condition that eventually results
from an immune system gravely impaired by HIV.  Medical
studies have indicated that most people who carry the
virus will progress to AIDS.  AIDS patients by definition
are profoundly immunocompromised; that is, they are prone
to any number of diseases and opportunistic infections
that a person with a healthy immune system might
otherwise resist.  AIDS is thus the acute clinical phase
of immune dysfunction. . . .  AIDS is invariably fatal.
Id. at 439-40.  In this case, we must determine what legal
inferences may be drawn when an individual infected with the HIV
virus knowingly exposes another to the risk of HIV-infection, and
the resulting risk of death by AIDS.
B
As we have previously stated, "[t]he required intent in the
crimes of assault with intent to murder and attempted murder is the
specific intent to murder, i.e., the specific intent to kill under
circumstances that would not legally justify or excuse the killing
or mitigate it to manslaughter."  State v. Earp, 319 Md. 156, 167,
571 A.2d 1227 (1990).  See also State v. Jenkins, 307 Md. 501, 515,
515 A.2d 465 (1986) ("[T]he intent element of assault with intent
to murder requires proof of a specific intent to kill under
circumstances such that if the victim had died, the offense would
be murder."); Franklin v. State, 319 Md. 116, 126, 571 A.2d 1208
(1990).  Smallwood has not argued that his actions were performed
under mitigating circumstances or that he was legally justified in
6
attacking the three women.  He was properly found guilty of
attempted murder and assault with intent to murder only if there
was sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could
reasonably have concluded that Smallwood possessed a specific
intent to kill at the time he assaulted each of the three women.
To evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence in a non-jury
trial, we must review the case on both the law and the evidence.
Wilson v. State, 319 Md. 530, 535, 573 A.2d 831 (1990); West v.
State, 312 Md. 197, 207, 539 A.2d 231 (1988).  In making this
inquiry, we will not set aside the trial court's findings of fact
unless they are clearly erroneous.  Wilson, supra, 319 Md. at 535;
Maryland Rule 8-131(c).  We must determine "whether the evidence
shows directly or supports a rational inference of the facts to be
proved, from which the trier of fact could fairly be convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt of the offense
charged." Wilson, supra, 319 Md. at 535-36; 
An intent to kill may be proved by circumstantial evidence.
"[S]ince intent is subjective and, without the cooperation of the
accused, cannot be directly and objectively proven, its presence
must be shown by established facts which permit a proper inference
of its existence."  Earp, supra, 319 Md. at 167 (quoting Davis v.
State, 204 Md. 44, 51, 102 A.2d 816 (1954)).  Therefore, the trier
of fact may infer the existence of the required intent from
surrounding circumstances such as "the accused's acts, conduct and
words."  State v. Raines, 326 Md. 582, 591, 606 A.2d 265 (1992);
7
Earp, supra, 319 Md. at 167.  As we have repeatedly stated, "under
the proper circumstances, an intent to kill may be inferred from
the use of a deadly weapon directed at a vital part of the human
body."  Raines, supra, 326 Md. at 591; Jenkins, supra, 307 Md. at
513 ("Numerous cases make it clear that evidence showing a design
to commit grievous bodily injury, such as using a deadly weapon
directed at a vital part of the body, is sufficient because it
gives rise to an evidentiary inference of an intent to murder.")
(emphasis in original).
In Raines, supra, we upheld the use of such an inference.  In
that case, Raines and a friend were traveling on a highway when the
defendant fired a pistol into the driver's side window of a tractor
trailer in an adjacent lane.  Raines, supra, 326 Md. at 586-87.
The shot killed the driver of the tractor trailer, and Raines was
convicted of first degree murder.  Id.  The evidence in the case
showed that Raines shot at the driver's window of the truck,
knowing that the truck driver was immediately behind the window.
Id. at 592.  We concluded that "Raines's actions in directing the
gun at the window, and therefore at the driver's head on the other
side of the window, permitted an inference that Raines shot the gun
with the intent to kill."  Id. at 592-93.
The State argues that our analysis in Raines rested upon two
elements:  (1) Raines knew that his weapon was deadly, and (2)
Raines knew that he was firing it at someone's head.  The State
argues that Smallwood similarly knew that HIV infection ultimately
8
leads to death, and that he knew that he would be exposing his
victims to the risk of HIV transmission by engaging in unprotected
sex with them.  Therefore, the State argues, a permissible
inference can be drawn that Smallwood intended to kill each of his
three victims.  The State's analysis, however, ignores several
factors.
B
First, we must consider the magnitude of the risk to which the
victim is knowingly exposed.  The inference drawn in Raines, supra,
rests upon the rule that "[i]t is permissible to infer that 'one
intends the natural and probable consequences of his act.'"  Ford
v. State, 330 Md. 682, 704, 625 Md. 984 (1993) (quoting Davis v.
State, 204 Md. 44, 51, 102 A.2d 816 (1954)).  Before an intent to
kill may be inferred based solely upon the defendant's exposure of
a victim to a risk of death, it must be shown that the victim's
death would have been a natural and probable result of the
defendant's conduct.  It is for this reason that a trier of fact
may infer that a defendant possessed an intent to kill when firing
a deadly weapon at a vital part of the human body.  Raines, supra,
326 Md. at 591; Jenkins, supra, 307 Md. at 513.  When a deadly
weapon has been fired at a vital part of a victim's body, the risk
of killing the victim is so high that it becomes reasonable to
assume that the defendant intended the victim to die as a natural
and probable consequence of the defendant's actions.
Death by AIDS is clearly one natural possible consequence of
9
exposing someone to a risk of HIV infection, even on a single
occasion.  It is less clear that death by AIDS from that single
exposure is a sufficiently probable result to provide the sole
support for an inference that the person causing the exposure
intended to kill the person who was exposed.  While the risk to
which Smallwood exposed his victims when he forced them to engage
in unprotected sexual activity must not be minimized, the State has
presented no evidence from which it can reasonably be concluded
that death by AIDS is a probable result of Smallwood's actions to
the same extent that death is the probable result of firing a
deadly weapon at a vital part of someone's body.  Without such
evidence, it cannot fairly be concluded that death by AIDS was
sufficiently probable to support an inference that Smallwood
intended to kill his victims in the absence of other evidence
indicative of an intent to kill.
B
In this case, we find no additional evidence from which to
infer an intent to kill.  Smallwood's actions are wholly explained
by an intent to commit rape and armed robbery, the crimes for which
he has already pled guilty.  For this reason, his actions fail to
provide evidence that he also had an intent to kill.  As one
commentator noted, in discussing a criminal case involving similar
circumstances, "[b]ecause virus transmission occurs simultaneously
with the act of rape, that act alone would not provide evidence of
intent to transmit the virus.  Some additional evidence, such as an
10
explicit statement, would be necessary to demonstrate the actor's
specific intent."  Note, Criminal Liability for Transmission of
AIDS: Some Evidentiary Problems, 10 Crim. Just. J. 69, 78 (1994).
Smallwood's knowledge of his HIV-infected status provides the only
evidence in this case supporting a conclusion that he intended
anything beyond the rapes and robberies for which he has been
convicted.
The cases cited by the State demonstrate the sort of
additional evidence needed to support an inference that Smallwood
intended to kill his victims.  The defendants in these cases have
either made explicit statements demonstrating an intent to infect
their victims or have taken specific actions demonstrating such an
intent and tending to exclude other possible intents.  In State v.
Hinkhouse, 139 Or. App. 446, 912 P.2d 921 (1996), for example, the
defendant engaged in unprotected sex with a number of women while
knowing that he was HIV positive.  The defendant had also actively
concealed his HIV-positive status from these women, had lied to
several of them by stating that he was not HIV-positive, and had
refused the women's requests that he wear condoms.  Id. at 923-24.
There was also evidence that he had told at least one of his sexual
partners that "if he were [HIV-]positive, he would spread the virus
to other people."  Id. at 924.  The Oregon Court of Appeals found
this evidence to be sufficient to demonstrate an intent to kill,
and upheld the defendant's convictions for attempted murder.
In State v. Caine, 652 So. 2d 611 (La. App.), cert. denied,
11
661 So. 2d 1358 (La. 1995), a conviction for attempted second
degree murder was upheld where the defendant had jabbed a used
syringe into a victim's arm while shouting "I'll give you aids."
Id. at 616.  The defendant in Weeks v. State, 834 S.W.2d 559 (Tex.
App. 1992), made similar statements, and was convicted of attempted
murder after he spat on a prison guard.  In that case, the
defendant knew that he was HIV-positive, and the appellate court
found that "the record reflects that [Weeks] thought he could kill
the guard by spitting his HIV-infected saliva at him."  Id. at 562.
There was also evidence that at the time of the spitting incident,
Weeks had stated that he was "going to take someone with him when
he went,' that he was 'medical now,' and that he was 'HIV-4.'"
The evidence in State v. Haines, 545 N.E.2d 834 (Ind. App.
1989), contained both statements by the defendant demonstrating
intent and actions solely explainable as attempts to spread HIV.
There, the defendant's convictions for attempted murder were upheld
where the defendant slashed his wrists and sprayed blood from them
on a police officer and two paramedics, splashing blood in their
faces and eyes.  Id. at 835.  Haines attempted to scratch and bite
them and attempted to force blood-soaked objects into their faces.
During this altercation, the defendant told the officer that he
should be left to die because he had AIDS, that he wanted to "give
it to him," and that he would "use his wounds" to spray the officer
with blood.  Id.  Haines also "repeatedly yelled that he had AIDS,
that he could not deal with it and that he was going to make [the
     The last two cases cited by the state involved inferences
4
that are markedly different from the one at issue here.  In
Commonwealth v. Brown, 605 A.2d 429 (Pa. Super. 1992), the
defendant was convicted of aggravated assault after throwing a cup
of his fecal matter into the face and mouth of a prison guard.  Id.
at 431.  The defendant had been diagnosed as carrying HIV and
Hepatitis B and had been informed by them of the means by which
these two viruses may be transmitted.  Id.  The inmate testified
that he intended to punish the prison guard for "messing with [his]
mail."  Id.  The Pennsylvania Superior Court found this evidence to
be sufficient to demonstrate an intent to cause serious bodily
injury.  Id.  Although this issue was not discussed by the
Pennsylvania court, Brown also dealt with the possible transmission
of two distinct viruses, Hepatitis B and HIV, and therefore with a
correspondingly higher probability that the defendant's actions
would cause the victim to become infected with at least one of
them.  An increased probability of infection would strengthen the
inferences that could be drawn from the defendant's knowingly
exposing his victim to the risk of infection.
The state also cites State v. Stark, 66 Wash. App. 423, 832
P.2d 109 (1992).  There, Stark was convicted of second degree
assault for engaging in sex without a condom after being informed
12
officer] deal with it."  Id.
Scroggins v. State, 198 Ga. App. 29, 401 S.E.2d 13, 15 (1990),
presents a similar scenario, where the defendant made noises with
his mouth as if bringing up spittle and then bit a police officer
hard enough to break the skin.  Immediately after this incident he
informed a nurse that he was HIV-positive and laughed when the
police officer asked him if he had AIDS.  Id.  The Georgia Court of
Appeals found that evidence showing that the defendant "sucked up
excess sputum" before biting the officer was "evidence of a
deliberate, thinking act" and that in conjunction with the
defendant's laughter when asked about AIDS, it provided sufficient
evidence of intent to support Scroggins's conviction for assault
with intent to kill.   Id. at 18.
4
that he was HIV-positive, and after a cease and desist order had
been obtained ordering him not to engage in unprotected sexual
activity.  In that case, however, the issue of intent was whether
the defendant had intentionally exposed his sexual partners to HIV,
not whether Stark intended to kill them.
We have no trouble concluding that Smallwood intentionally
exposed his victims to the risk of HIV-infection.  The problem
before us, however, is whether knowingly exposing someone to a risk
of HIV-infection is by itself sufficient to infer that Smallwood
possessed an intent to kill.  In this inquiry, Stark is not
helpful.
13
In contrast with these cases, the State in this case would
allow the trier of fact to infer an intent to kill based solely
upon the fact that Smallwood exposed his victims to the risk that
they might contract HIV.  Without evidence showing that such a
result is sufficiently probable to support this inference, we
conclude that Smallwood's convictions for attempted murder and
assault with intent to murder must be reversed.
JUDGMENTS FOR ATTEMPTED MURDER IN
THE SECOND DEGREE AND ASSAULT WITH
INTENT TO MURDER REVERSED; COSTS TO
BE PAID BY THE RESPONDENT.