Case Title: Town of Upton v. Whisler

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-01-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Town of Upton v. Whisler1992 WY 3824 P.2d 545Case Number: 90-278Decided: 01/10/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming
TOWN OF UPTON, Wyoming; 
Robert Oliver, in his official capacity as Mayor of the Town of Upton; Tom 
Barritt, Lucy McKenzie, Jennifer Silbaugh and Joseph Haynes, in their official 
capacities as members of the Town Council of the Town of Upton, 
Wyoming,

 Appellants 
(Defendants),

v.

Leonard 
WHISLER,

 Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Weston County, Terrence L. O'Brien, J.

Donald B. 
Hansen, Hansen & Peck, Newcastle, for appellants.

Kennard F. 
Nelson, Kirkwood & Nelson, Laramie, for appellee. 

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., THOMAS, CARDINE and GOLDEN, JJ., and HANSCUM, District 
Judge.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1.]     There are two primary 
issues to be resolved in this case involving the discharge of Leonard Whisler 
(Whisler) from the appointive office of municipal judge by the Town of Upton 
(Upton). The first question is whether Whisler had the requisite property 
interest in the office of municipal judge so that he enjoyed a constitutional 
right to be afforded due process of law prior to discharge from that office. 
Specifically, the due process right would relate to the opportunity for a 
pre-termination hearing that was not conducted in this case. The second question 
to be resolved, assuming that there was a denial of a constitutional right 
enjoyed by Whisler, is whether he can maintain, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an 
action to recover damages for injuries that he suffered, including emotional 
distress. The district court ruled, as a matter of law, that Whisler was 
possessed of the requisite property right in the office of municipal judge so as 
to entitle him to due process of law. In a trial to a jury, the verdict 
disclosed the jury's finding that Upton had good cause to discharge Whisler, but 
it did find damages for emotional distress in favor of Whisler because of the 
denial of his right to due process. We agree with the ruling of the district 
court with respect to the possession of property right as a matter of law, and 
we affirm the judgment in Whisler's favor based upon the verdict of the jury. In 
response to the request by Whisler, we also rule that Whisler is entitled to 
attorney fees and costs in connection with this appeal.

[¶2.]     Upton presents these 
issues in its Brief of Appellant:

"1.       Did appellee 
[Whisler] have a property right in his position as municipal judge of the Town 
of Upton, Wyoming?

2.         Did 
appellee prove that he suffered emotional distress as a direct result of the 
failure of appellants to provide notice and opportunity for a 
hearing?"

Whisler 
articulates the issues in this way, including his claim for attorney fees and 
costs with respect to the appeal:

"A.       Leonard Whisler 
possessed a property right in his employment by virtue of W.S. § 
5-6-104.

"B.       There is 
sufficient evidence to support the jury's award of emotional 
damages.

"C.       Attorney's fees 
and the costs of this appeal should be awarded to appellee."

By a Reply 
Brief, Upton contends that Whisler is not entitled to an award of attorney fees 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for defending the appeal. Upton's position is that 
any award of attorney fees has to be governed by Rule 10.05., 
W.R.A.P.

[¶3.]     The record demonstrates 
that Whisler began working for Upton on June 1, 1959, as its sole police 
officer, and he eventually was promoted to the office of chief of police. Early 
in 1984, Whisler retired as the chief of police, and he then was appointed the 
municipal judge effective April 1, 1984. He was reappointed to the office of 
municipal judge early in January of 1985 and, again, early in January of 1986. 
In late June of 1986, Whisler was discharged from the office of municipal judge 
for Upton.

[¶4.]     Whisler's discharge, in 
part, was prompted by a criminal charge that was lodged against him on June 26, 
1986 for official misconduct in violation of § 6-5-107, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 
Repl.).1 The essence of this charge against 
Whisler is that he had accepted a bribe of $350 to dismiss a charge of driving 
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Whisler did not deny that he 
had received the $350, but his position was that he received it as a bond on a 
charge of exhibition driving. In any event, the $350 was not accounted for. At 
his preliminary hearing, the criminal charge against Whisler was dismissed for 
the reason that there was not sufficient evidence that a crime had been 
committed or that Whisler had committed it. In its order, the court stated that 
the money, as likely as not, was lost in the "quagmire of ineptness" in the 
record-keeping policies of the Upton Police Department and the Upton Municipal 
Court.

[¶5.]     On June 7, 1988, 
Whisler filed a complaint in which he claimed that he had been improperly 
discharged from the office of municipal judge. The complaint sounded in tort for 
deprivation of constitutional rights protected by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In the 
complaint, Whisler alleged that Upton, its elected mayor, and the members of its 
town council deprived him of a liberty interest in his good reputation, as well 
as a property interest in the office of municipal judge. Whisler asserted that, 
in accomplishing the discharge, the defendants denied him due process of law 
because they capriciously, and without a hearing, discharged him from that 
office. He further claimed that the discharge was a breach of his contract of 
employment; a breach of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and a 
violation of public policy. He sought damages as a remedy and also sought to 
recover his costs and attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Upton filed a 
counterclaim, pursuant to which it attempted to recover $430 from Whisler 
representing money that he had received during the time he served as chief of 
police, but for which he had not accounted to Upton. Cross-motions for summary 
judgment were filed, and the district court ruled that Whisler was entitled to 
summary judgment on his claim of deprivation of a property right without due 
process of law and that Upton was entitled to summary judgment on all other 
claims made by Whisler. The scheduled trial in the district court then was to 
address the remaining issue of Whisler's damages.

[¶6.]     The parties agreed that 
Whisler had lost $2,205 in salary, if he was entitled to recover, because he was 
removed without a hearing, and that amount was entered upon the verdict by the 
trial judge. The jury then determined that Upton had good cause to remove 
Whisler as municipal judge and, therefore, he was not entitled to any damages 
for his removal. The jury did decide, however, that Whisler had suffered 
emotional distress as a result of Upton's failure to furnish him with notice and 
a hearing before removing him from office, and that the resulting damages to 
Whisler amounted to $17,640. This appeal is taken from the summary judgment 
granted Whisler by the district court and the judgment entered upon the jury's 
verdict for damages.

[¶7.]     The first issue 
concerns the correctness of the decision of the district court that Whisler was 
deprived of a property right without due process of law. The parties present two 
statutes which they claim, respectively, are dispositive of this case. Whisler 
relies upon Section 5-6-104, W.S. 1977 (1991 Cum.Supp.), and argues that this 
statute establishes his property interest in the office of municipal judge. That 
statute reads as follows:

"§ 5-6-104. Term of 
office; compensation.

"The terms of municipal 
judges shall be the same as the terms of other appointed officers of the city or 
town, unless earlier removed for good cause as provided by law. Compensation 
shall be prescribed by ordinance of the city or town."

Upton, for its 
position, relies upon Section 15-2-102, W.S. 1977 (1991 Cum.Supp.), which it 
argues impliedly repealed Section 5-6-104, W.S. 1977. Section 15-2-102 
provides:

"§ 15-2-102. Officers; 
election, appointment and removal; conditions for appointive office or 
position. 

"(a) The officers of a 
town are a mayor and four (4) councilmen, all of whom shall be elected. The 
clerk, treasurer, marshal, attorney, municipal judge and department heads as 
specified by ordinance shall be appointed by the mayor with the consent of the 
governing body and may be removed by the mayor. All other appointments, except 
the appointment of members of a board or commission, and removals shall be made 
by the mayor without consent of the governing body, unless consent is required 
by separate statute. The governing body shall determine the method of appointing 
members of a board or commission, unless the method of appointing such members 
is specified by separate statute.

"(b) The governing body, 
by ordinance or resolution, may specify conditions for any office or position to 
which a person is appointed under this section including:

"(i) Level or range of 
salary;

"(ii) A description of 
the duties and responsibilities of the office or position;

"(iii) Term of 
appointment;

"(iv) Requirements 
for:

"(A) 
Promotion;

"(B) Suspension; 
and

"(C) Hearing of appeals 
from decisions of the mayor to remove or discharge an appointee other than 
members of a board or commission, after which the governing body may affirm, 
modify or reverse the mayor's decision; and

"(v) Other matters which 
are part of the personnel policies of the town.

[¶8.]     Although the jury was 
instructed by the district court that the court already had determined that 
Whisler was entitled to notice of the cause asserted for discharge and an 
opportunity to rebut the claimed cause prior to dismissal, a pre-termination 
hearing, the jury also was instructed on the provisions of Section 5-6-104. That 
instruction related to the question of whether there was, in fact, cause for 
discharge. The jury found as a fact that cause for discharge was established 
and, consequently, with respect to the issues presented in this appeal, the only 
factual determination the jury was called to make was whether Whisler suffered 
damages in the form of emotional distress because of the failure of Upton to 
afford him a pre-termination hearing.

[¶9.]     It is clear that, in 
reaching its determination that Whisler had a right in the office of municipal 
judge, the district court did rely upon Section 5-6-104. While we do not 
discount the import of the statute in the context of a property right, we are 
satisfied that Whisler's property right in the office of municipal judge is 
identifiable because of the term established in the statute. Whisler was 
appointed to serve for a year (the statute provides that the terms of municipal 
judges shall be the same as the terms of other appointed officers of the city or 
town), and the law recognizes a property right in a position that has a one-year 
tenure. For purposes of this case, there is then a federal constitutional right 
to due process of law that demands notice of the cause and a hearing on the 
existence of the cause prior to termination of the appointment to the office. 
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S. Ct. 1487, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1985). See 4 Eugene McQuillen, The Law of Municipal Corporations, § 
12.255 (3rd ed. 1985, 1990 Cum.Supp.).

[¶10.]  Our rule of law is that implied repeal of 
statutes is not favored. McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278 (Wyo. 1980). For that 
reason, we would be extremely reluctant to adopt Upton's argument that Section 
5-6-104 has been impliedly repealed. Furthermore, the outcome of this case would 
not be affected even if we so held. In our view, Section 5-6-104 articulates a 
policy that the judiciary, including municipal judges, is entitled to a degree 
of insulation from encroachment by the executive branch upon judicial 
independence. In the instance of the municipal judge, that requisite degree of 
insulation is articulated in the statutory provision, i.e., there must be cause 
for removal during a term of office. The requirement for a pre-termination 
hearing is a function of constitutional law and is not necessarily a product of 
the statute. Our holding that the district court was correct in determining that 
Whisler had a property interest in the office of municipal judge does not depend 
upon the language of the statute, and it then follows that the due process 
clause of the Constitution of the United States requires that Whisler, or any 
other municipal judge, must be afforded a pre-termination hearing opportunity. 
That opportunity must include notice and a hearing. It is not as an 
afterthought, but in confirmation of this principle, that we point out that 
Article 1, Section 6 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming would afford 
equivalent protection to Whisler.

[¶11.]  We turn to the sufficiency of the 
evidence to sustain the award of damages, in the light of our conclusion that 
Whisler was deprived of a property right without due process of law. The 
contention of Upton is that the evidence simply was not sufficient to establish 
that the emotional distress experienced by Whisler was caused by Upton's failure 
to provide him with notice of the cause for discharge and an opportunity for a 
hearing prior to discharge. More than ten years ago, this court recognized the 
proposition that a plaintiff may recover for emotional distress, embarrassment, 
and humiliation once a constitutional violation is established pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. Board of Trustees of Weston County School District No. 1 v. 
Holso, 584 P.2d 1009, reh'g denied 587 P.2d 203 (Wyo. 1978). In Carey v. Piphus, 
435 U.S. 247, 98 S. Ct. 1042, 55 L. Ed. 2d 252 (1978), the Supreme Court of the 
United States explained more completely the nature of such damages in the 
context of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After rejecting the proposition that damages for 
violations of procedural due process rights should be available, even absent any 
proof that injury actually was caused, the court there said:

"Finally, we foresee no 
particular difficulty in producing evidence that mental and emotional distress 
actually was caused by the denial of procedural due process itself. Distress is 
a personal injury familiar to the law, customarily proved by showing the nature 
and circumstances of the wrong and its effect on the plaintiff.[20] In sum, 
then, although mental and emotional distress caused by the denial of procedural 
due process itself is compensable under § 1983, we hold that neither the 
likelihood of such injury nor the difficulty of proving it is so great as to 
justify awarding compensatory damages without proof that such injury actually 
was caused.

"[20]    We use the term `distress' to 
include mental suffering or emotional anguish. Although essentially subjective, 
genuine injury in this respect may be evidenced by one's conduct and observed by 
others. Juries may be guided by appropriate instructions, and an award of 
damages must be supported by competent evidence concerning the injury. See Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 [94 S. Ct. 2997, 3012, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789] 
(1974)." Carey, 435 U.S.  at 263-64, 98 S. Ct.  at 1052-53.

[¶12.]  In this case, the jury was properly and 
clearly instructed on the task it was required to perform with respect to 
damages. We excerpt the following from the instructions of the 
court.

"INSTRUCTION NO. 
5

*           
*           
*           
*           *           
*

"In this suit Mr. Whisler 
claims he was improperly terminated in that 1) proper procedures were not 
followed, and 2) there was insufficient cause. He claims he suffered financial 
loss and emotional distress as a result of his termination and seeks damages 
from the defendants. "The Court has previously decided that, under the law, Mr. 
Whisler was entitled to notice of the reasons for his dismissal and an 
opportunity to rebut the allegations against him and to present his side before 
he was finally terminated. Since no hearing was afforded, the procedure employed 
was deficient. The Court's ruling that proper procedures were not employed does 
not suggest that Mr. Whisler suffered compensable damage because of procedural 
deficiencies; that issue is for the jury to decide in accordance with these 
instructions.

*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*

"You must decide whether 
there was sufficient cause to discharge Mr. Whisler and, if not, the extent and 
amount of compensable damages, if any, which have been proved. If you decide 
there was good cause for his discharge you must then decide the extent and 
amount of compensable damages, if any, which have been proved to be a direct 
result of the failure of the defendants to provide notice and an opportunity for 
a hearing.

"INSTRUCTION NO. 
6

"Plaintiff must prove it 
more likely than not likely that he suffered emotional distress due to the 
actions of the Defendants.

"The defendants must 
prove it is more likely than not likely that good cause existed to remove 
plaintiff as municipal judge.

"INSTRUCTION NO. 
10

"The parties have 
stipulated that Plaintiff earned $367.50 per month as municipal judge of the 
Town of Upton, and that Plaintiff's term of office would have ended in January, 
1987, if he had not been removed as municipal judge on July 1, 1986. The parties 
agree that Plaintiff would have earned $2,205.00 between July 1, 1986, and 
January, 1987, if he had not been removed. This Court has already ruled that 
Plaintiff's procedural due process rights were violated because he had no 
hearing upon his removal as municipal judge. Because Plaintiff's procedural due 
process rights were violated, you shall award Plaintiff actual damages in the 
amount of $2,205.00. This amount of damages has been inserted on the verdict 
form.

"INSTRUCTION NO. 
11

"If you find that 
plaintiff suffered emotional distress as a result of the defendants' actions, 
you may award monetary compensation for those damages.

"No definite standard or 
method of calculation is prescribed by law to determine reasonable compensation 
for emotional distress, nor is the opinion of a witness required as to a proper 
amount. In fixing damages for emotional distress, you must exercise your 
discretion with calm and reasonable judgment.

"Damages must be 
reasonable. If you should find that the Plaintiff is entitled to damages, you 
may award him only such damages as will reasonably compensate him for such 
damage as you find, from a greater weight of the evidence, he has sustained or 
will sustain as a direct result of defendants' acts.

"You are not permitted to 
award speculative damages. You are not to include compensation for any 
prospective damages which, although possible, are not reasonably certain to 
occur in the future."

[¶13.]  Comparison of pattern jury instructions 
that have been developed by the federal court for use in circumstances such as 
those presented in this case supports our conclusion that the instructions were 
proper. For example:

"Instruction 
87-87

"Compensatory 
Damages

"Just because I am 
instructing you on how to award damages does not mean that I have any opinion on 
whether or not the defendant should be held liable. "If you return a verdict for 
the plaintiff, then you must consider the issue of actual damages.

"If you return a verdict 
for the plaintiff, then you must award him such sum of money as you believe will 
fairly and justly compensate him for any injury you believe he actually 
sustained as a direct consequence of the conduct of the defendant.

"You shall award actual 
damages only for those injuries which you find that plaintiff has proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Moreover, you shall award actual damages only for 
those injuries which you find plaintiff has proven by a preponderance of 
evidence to have been the direct result of conduct by the defendant in violation 
of section 1983. That is, you may not simply award actual damages for any injury 
suffered by plaintiff - you must award actual damages only for those injuries 
that are a direct result of actions of this defendant and that are a direct 
result of conduct by defendant which violated plaintiff's federal rights under 
color of law.

"Actual damages must not 
be based on speculation or sympathy. They must be based on the evidence 
presented at trial, and only on that evidence.

"Instruction 
87-89

"Causation and 
Damages

"I have said that you may 
award damages only for those injuries which you find the plaintiff has proven by 
a preponderance of the evidence to have been the direct result of conduct by the 
defendant in violation of section 1983. You must distinguish between, on the one 
hand, the existence of a violation of the plaintiff's rights and, on the other 
hand, the existence of injuries naturally resulting from that violation. Thus, 
even if you find that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of his rights in 
violation of section 1983, you must ask whether the plaintiff has proven by a 
preponderance of evidence that the deprivation caused the damages that he claims 
to have suffered.

"(The defendant may avoid 
damages if he can show that, even absent the deprivation of procedural due 
process alleged by the plaintiff, he, the defendant, would have reached the same 
decision with regard to the plaintiff and, therefore, that, even absent 
deprivation of procedural due process alleged by the plaintiff, the plaintiff 
would have suffered the same harm. The burden is on the defendant to prove that 
he would have reached the same decision, and, in proving it, he must show that 
he would reach the same decision at the time of the violation of the plaintiff's 
rights; the defendant may not rely upon factors discovered by him after the 
decision was made to prove that he would have reached the same decision at the 
time of the violation.)

"(If you find that the 
damages suffered by the plaintiff were partly the result of conduct by the 
defendant that was legal and partly the result of conduct by him that was 
illegal, you must apportion the damages between the legal and the illegal 
conduct - that is, you must assess the relative importance of the legal and the 
illegal conduct and allocate the damages accordingly.)" 4 L. Sand, et al., 
Modern Federal Jury Instructions, § 87.03, 87-210.1, 87-212.4 
(1991).

A definition of 
emotional distress that justifies the submission of this issue to the jury can 
be found in 2 California Jury Instructions - Civil, BAJI No. 12.72 (1989 
Revision) (7th ed.) (July 1991 Pocket Part). That definition reads as 
follows:

"The term `emotional 
distress' means mental distress, mental suffering or mental anguish. It includes 
all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, nervousness, grief, 
anxiety, worry, mortification, shock, humiliation and indignity, as well as 
physical pain."

[¶14.]  It well may be true that the evidence in 
this case is minimal. We hold, however, that it was sufficient to justify the 
jury in reaching a proper inference that the emotional distress was, at least in 
part, attributable to the discharge of Whisler from the office of municipal 
judge without notice or hearing with respect to the asserted cause for 
discharge. He was denied that opportunity to clear his name before the discharge 
was effected. Summarized, the evidence in this case is quite similar to the 
evidence alluded to in Carey, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S. Ct. 1042. Whisler, and those 
witnesses who testified in support of his claim, reported to the jury the sorts 
of things that commonly are understood to be emotional distress (like the 
emotional distress defined in the California pattern jury instruction quoted 
above). They told the jury about depression, embarrassment, dejection, and 
humiliation. Whisler's testimony, as well as that of his wife, tied these 
manifestations of emotional distress to the failure of Upton to provide notice 
and a hearing. Essentially, Whisler and his wife testified that Whisler believed 
the people of Upton simply concluded he was guilty of the charges lodged against 
him since he never had the opportunity to articulate his version of these events 
in an appropriate and constitutionally demanded forum.

[¶15.]  Turning then to the matter of attorney 
fees and costs, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides that Whisler is entitled to attorney 
fees and costs, within the sound discretion of the district court, for the 
proceedings in that court. In considering the claim for attorney fees, the 
district court appropriately would be guided by the propositions that the 
statutory provision should be given a liberal interpretation to effectuate its 
salutary purposes and a prevailing plaintiff ordinarily should be awarded 
compensating attorney fees unless special circumstances would render the award 
unjust. Bueno v. CF & I Steel Corporation, 773 P.2d 937 (Wyo. 1989); State 
ex. rel. Scholl v. Anselmi, 640 P.2d 746 (Wyo. 1982), appeal dismissed, cert. 
denied 459 U.S. 805, 103 S. Ct. 28, 74 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1982); Holso, 584 P.2d 1009; 
Annotation, Construction and Application of Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards 
Act of 1976 (Amending 42 U.S.C. § 1988), Providing That Court May Allow 
Prevailing Party, Other Than United States, Reasonable Attorney's Fee In Certain 
Civil Rights Actions, 43 A.L.R.Fed. 243 (1979). In determining the 
reasonableness of that award, the district court will be guided by our Wyoming 
precedents. See, e.g., Delgado v. Delgado, 773 P.2d 446 (Wyo. 1989). 
Furthermore, we hold that Whisler also is entitled to an award of attorney fees 
and costs in connection with this appeal.

[¶16.]  The judgment of the district court is 
affirmed in all respects, and the case is remanded to the district court for a 
determination of the amount of a reasonable attorney fee to be awarded according 
to the statute. With respect to attorney fees and costs in this court, the court 
will consider that entitlement after a timely filing (which we conclude should 
be made within fifteen days from the date of this opinion) of an appropriate 
application by Whisler. That application should present the same sort of 
evidence and documentation as would be required in the district court for an 
award of attorney fees. See Delgado. Bowker v. Bowker, 795 P.2d 1215 (Wyo. 
1990); Bueno, 773 P.2d 937.

FOOTNOTE

1           
Section 6-5-107, W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Repl.), provides:

"(a) A public servant or 
public officer commits a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than five 
thousand dollars ($5,000.00), if, with intent to obtain a pecuniary benefit or 
maliciously to cause harm to another, he knowingly:

"(i) Commits an 
unauthorized act relating to his official duties:

"(ii) Refrains from 
performing a duty imposed upon him by law: or

"(iii) Violates any 
statute relating to his official duties.

"(b) A public officer 
commits a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty 
dollars ($750.00) if he intentionally fails to perform a duty in the manner and 
within the time prescribed by law."