Case Title: Querbach v. Dept. of Human Services

Citation: 

Docket Number: S068395

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2022-06-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
786	
June 16, 2022	
No. 27
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF OREGON
Bruce QUERBACH,
Petitioner on Review,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
Respondent on Review.
(CC 18CV06040) (CA A170325) (SC S068395)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted September 22, 2021; resubmitted 
January 25, 2022.
Margaret H. Leek Leiberan, Jensen & Leiberan, 
Beaverton, argued the cause and filed the briefs for peti-
tioner on review.
Inge D. Wells, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued 
the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. Also 
on the brief were Ellen Rosenblum, Attorney General, and 
Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Before Walters, Chief Justice, and Balmer, Flynn, 
Duncan, Nelson, Garrett, and DeHoog, Justices.**
BALMER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. The 
judgment of the circuit court reversing the “founded” dispo-
sition for physical abuse of son is reversed but is otherwise 
affirmed.
______________
	
*   Appeal from Washington County Circuit Court, Theodore E. Sims, Judge. 
308 Or App 131, 480 P3d 1030 (2020).
	
**  Nakamoto, J., retired December 31, 2021, and did not participate in the 
decision of this case.
Cite as 369 Or 786 (2022)	
787
788	
Querbach v. Dept. of Human Services
	
BALMER, J.
	
In this judicial review proceeding, petitioner sought 
to overturn a final order of the Department of Human 
Services (DHS) that determined that reports to DHS that 
petitioner had abused two children were “founded,” mean-
ing that there was “reasonable cause to believe [that] the 
abuse [had] occurred.”1 OAR 413-015-1010(2)(a). The cir-
cuit court, reviewing the order as an order in other than 
a contested case, assumed that the “reasonable cause to 
believe” standard in that rule is a “probable cause” stan-
dard. After holding a trial to develop the record for review, 
as required by Norden v. Water Resources Dept., 329 Or 641, 
648-49, 996 P2d 958 (2000), the circuit court concluded that 
only two of DHS’s four “founded” determinations could be 
sustained under that standard. On petitioner’s appeal and 
DHS’s cross-appeal, the Court of Appeals rejected the cir-
cuit court’s application of a “probable cause” standard and, 
instead employing the “reasonable suspicion” standard that 
it had used in an earlier, similar case, concluded that not 
just two, but three of DHS’s “founded” determinations must 
be sustained. 2
	
Before this court, petitioner argues that “proba-
ble cause” is the correct standard for determining that a 
report of abuse is founded and that none of DHS’s “founded” 
determinations hold up when the record on review is consid-
ered under that standard. Petitioner also argues that, given 
that the circuit court found that the DHS investigation and 
analysis into the reported abuse was incomplete and flawed 
in various respects, the “founded” determinations must be 
set aside. As explained below, we reject those arguments 
and affirm the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that three of the 
four “founded” dispositions were supported by substantial 
evidence.
	
1  Although the “founded” determination did not cause DHS to take any 
protective action with respect to the children, it has been included in a cen-
tral registry of child abuse investigations that DHS is required to maintain. 
 
See ORS 419B.030(1) (requiring DHS to establish and maintain central state 
registry of reports of child abuse that have been investigated and determined to 
be founded).
	
2  For consistency, we cite the current versions of administrative rules and 
statutes unless otherwise indicated.
Cite as 369 Or 786 (2022)	
789
I.  LEGAL BACKGROUND
	
We begin by explaining the purpose of and process 
for determining that a report of child abuse is “founded.” 
ORS chapter 419B contains a group of statutes that seek 
to ensure that DHS is able to identify children who are 
affected by abuse or neglect and potentially in need of its 
services. One statute, ORS 419B.007, announces a legisla-
tive policy of requiring “mandatory reports and investiga-
tions of abuse of children” in order to “facilitat[e] the use 
of protective social services to prevent further abuse” and 
“safeguard and enhance the welfare of abused children.” 
In keeping with that policy, the statutes impose a duty on 
certain persons—designated “public and private officials”—
to make a report to DHS if they have “reasonable cause to 
believe that any child with whom [they] come[ 
] in contact 
has suffered abuse.” ORS 419B.010(1). DHS is required to 
“[c]ause an investigation to be made” when it receives a 
report of child abuse, ORS 419B.020(1)(a), and the statutes 
specify how and by whom the required investigation shall 
be carried out, ORS 419B.021; ORS 419B.023. Finally, and 
of particular relevance here, the statutes mandate that 
any such investigation into a report of child abuse con-
clude with one of three findings: that the report of abuse 
is “founded,” “unfounded,” or “cannot be determined.” ORS 
 
419B.026(1)(a) 
- 
(c).
	
DHS has defined the terms “founded,” “unfounded,” 
and “unable to determine” in its administrative rules. A 
“founded” determination means that “there is reasonable 
cause to believe [that] the abuse occurred,” OAR 413-015-
1010(2)(a)—the same standard that, under ORS 419B.010, 
triggers a mandatory reporter’s duty to make a report to 
DHS. An “unfounded” determination means that “there is no 
evidence [that] the abuse occurred,” OAR 413-015-1010(2)(b), 
 
and an “unable to determine” disposition means that “there 
is some indication [that] the abuse occurred, but there is 
insufficient evidence to conclude that there is reasonable 
cause to believe [that] the abuse occurred,” OAR 413-015-
1010(2)(c). “Reasonable cause,” for purposes of those rules, 
has the same meaning as it does in ORS 419B.150(1)(b): 
 
“a subjectively and objectively reasonable belief, given all 
790	
Querbach v. Dept. of Human Services
of the circumstances and based on specific and articulable 
facts.” OAR 413-015-0115(58).
	
When DHS determines that an allegation of child 
abuse is “founded,” it must assess the risk of further abuse 
and the child’s need for services and provide protective ser-
vices as necessary. ORS 409.185(2)(b). That might include 
taking the child into protective custody and petitioning the 
juvenile court to determine that the child is under its juris-
diction. ORS 419B.150; ORS 419B.100(1)(c). But regardless 
of whether DHS concludes that further action is necessary, 
any report of child abuse that it determines is “founded” 
must be included in a central state registry that DHS is 
required to maintain. ORS 419B.030(1). Once a “founded” 
determination is included in the registry, it is part of the 
history of the child and the family that DHS must consider 
in any later child abuse assessment. OAR 413-015-0415 
(1)(a)(B), (b). But the “founded” determination itself, and its 
appearance in the registry, has no independent legal signif-
icance in criminal, juvenile dependency, domestic relations, 
or other proceedings.
	
When DHS determines that a report of abuse is 
“founded,” it must notify the person identified in the report 
as the “perpetrator”3 of the person’s right to seek adminis-
trative review of that disposition and to submit information 
and documents that the person wishes to have considered in 
that review. OAR 413-010-0720(5), (8). If, after performing 
the requested review, DHS adheres to its original “founded” 
determination, that determination is a final order and may 
be challenged in court by the alleged perpetrator as an order 
“in other than [a] contested case.”
	
An order “in other than [a] contested case[ 
]” is 
reviewed, as provided in ORS 183.484(1), on a petition for 
judicial review directed to the Marion County Circuit Court 
or the circuit court for the county in which the petitioner 
resides. Review is limited to certain specified claims, one of 
which is a claim that the order is “not supported by substan-
tial evidence in the record.” ORS 183.484(5)(c). When a circuit 
	
3  A “perpetrator” under the DHS rules “means the person [that DHS] has 
reasonable cause to believe is responsible for child abuse in a founded [Child 
Protective Service] disposition.” OAR 413-010-0000(44).
Cite as 369 Or 786 (2022)	
791
court reviews an agency’s final order in other than a contested 
case under ORS 183.484(5)(c), the relevant record includes 
a record developed by the parties in a trial-like proceeding 
in the circuit court. The circuit court’s review is not limited 
to the evidence that was before the agency when it issued 
its order. Norden, 329 Or at 648-49. That arrangement— 
allowing the parties to develop the record for review in the 
circuit court—fills a gap that would otherwise put parties 
adversely affected by orders in other than contested cases at 
a disadvantage; instead, it provides them with an opportu-
nity to place evidence in the record that responds to or sup-
plements the evidence in the record before the agency that 
was basis for the agency’s decision. Id. at 647-48.
	
But the fact that the record for substantial evidence 
review under ORS 183.484(5)(c) is developed in the circuit 
court—and may, as in this case, contain evidence that was 
not before the agency when it made its decision—does not 
mean that the circuit court’s role is to determine, ab initio, 
whether a report of abuse is founded. Rather, as in other 
cases of judicial review of agency decisions, the court’s role 
is to decide whether the agency’s determination is supported 
by substantial evidence in the expanded record. As we said 
in Norden, “The court’s evaluation of the record is limited 
to whether the evidence would permit a reasonable person 
to make the determination the agency made in a particular 
case.” 329 Or at 649.
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
	
In the present case, DHS received a report that 
petitioner may have abused two of his children (“son” and 
“daughter”). The DHS caseworker who was assigned to the 
case interviewed the two children, their mother, petitioner, 
and various other persons, and referred the children to 
Child Abuse Response and Evaluation Service (CARES) for 
evaluation. Based on the CARES evaluation, the interviews, 
DHS’s records of its previous interactions with the family, 
and other materials, the caseworker determined that four 
allegations of “abuse” by petitioner were “founded”: an alle-
gation that petitioner had physically abused son; an allega-
tion that petitioner had caused a “threat” of physical harm 
to daughter; and allegations that petitioner had caused 
792	
Querbach v. Dept. of Human Services
“mental injury” to both son and daughter.4 DHS informed 
petitioner by letter of those determinations and of his right 
to seek administrative review.
	
Petitioner submitted a timely request for adminis-
trative review along with materials that he believed con-
tradicted the “founded” determinations. DHS performed 
the requested review and upheld all four of the original 
“founded” determinations, informing petitioner of its deci-
sion in a letter that it designated as its final order. Petitioner 
then sought judicial review of that order as an “order in 
other than [a] contested case,” as provided in ORS 183.484. 
He filed a petition for judicial review in the circuit court for 
the county in which he resided, ORS 183.484(1), challeng-
ing the order on one of the allowable grounds—that DHS’s 
“founded” determinations were “not supported by substan-
tial evidence in the record.” ORS 183.484(5)(c).5
	
The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing to cre-
ate the record that it would examine for substantial evidence. 
	
4  As relevant here, ORS 419B.005(1)(a) defines “abuse” to include:
	
“(A)  Any assault, as defined in ORS chapter 163, of a child and any phys-
ical injury to a child which has been caused by other than accidental means, 
including any injury which appears to be at variance with the explanation 
given of the injury.
	
“(B)  Any mental injury to a child, which shall include only observable 
and substantial impairment of the child’s mental or psychological ability to 
function caused by cruelty to the child, with due regard to the culture of the 
child.
	
“* 
* 
* 
* 
*
	
“(G)  Threatened harm to a child, which means subjecting a child to a 
substantial risk of harm to the child’s health or welfare.”
	
5  Petitioner’s initial petition for judicial review also challenged the order 
under ORS 183.484(5)(b), based on allegations that, “in its decision-making 
process, DHS * 
* 
* failed to consider exculpatory evidence” and “[g]ave inappro-
priate weight and consideration to prior involvement of the agency with * * 
* 
[p]etitioner, where such involvement resulted in ‘unfounded’ determinations.” 
Those allegations may have been directed to ORS 183.484(5)(b)(B), which pro-
vides for remand of an order in other than a contested case that is “inconsistent 
with an agency rule, an officially stated agency position, or a prior agency prac-
tice, if the inconsistency is not explained by the agency”—although petitioner did 
not identify a particular DHS rule, practice, or officially stated position that was 
violated. In any event, petitioner’s claim under ORS 183.484(5)(b) appears to no 
longer be part of the case. The trial court’s decision and petitioner’s arguments 
to the Court of Appeals and this court are directed only at petitioner’s claim that 
DHS’s founded determinations are “not supported by substantial evidence in the 
record.” ORS 183.484(5)(c).
Cite as 369 Or 786 (2022)	
793
DHS submitted material that it had gathered while inves-
tigating and evaluating the abuse reports—including the 
material that petitioner had submitted—and also presented 
the testimony of several employees who were involved 
in making or reviewing the “founded” determinations. 
Petitioner testified on his own behalf and also presented the 
testimony of his then-current wife and a babysitter, who had 
witnessed the incident that resulted in the abuse report; a 
psychologist who had evaluated petitioner and determined 
that he was unlikely to intentionally or maliciously hurt his 
children; and a forensic psychologist who suggested that 
CARES and DHS had not followed the best practices for 
evaluating accusations of child abuse, including the practice 
of examining and rejecting all alternative hypotheses about 
such an accusation before concluding that the accusation is 
true. In addition to presenting evidence, the parties argued 
about the standard of proof needed to support a “founded” 
determination, with petitioner arguing for a “probable 
cause” standard and DHS arguing for a standard that is 
more akin to “reasonable suspicion.” After the hearing, the 
circuit court issued a letter opinion that held, first, that a 
“founded” determination must be supported “to a probable 
cause standard.” The opinion then announced the court’s 
determination that the record supported DHS’s “founded” 
determinations as to mental injury caused to both son and 
daughter but did not support the “founded” determinations 
as to physical abuse of son and threat of physical abuse 
to daughter. Finally, the opinion included what appear to 
be findings regarding DHS’s investigation of the report of 
physical abuse of son by petitioner, including a finding that 
DHS’s caseworker had “analyzed interactions of petitioner 
with his children through a lens of assumed prior uncon-
trolled behavior, taking as undisputed fact that petitioner 
had such a history.” In response to DHS’s request for fur-
ther explanation, the court issued a second letter opinion 
that contained additional statements about flaws in DHS’s 
assessment process.
	
Petitioner appealed, assigning error to the circuit 
court’s determinations that two of DHS’s “founded” disposi-
tions, i.e., those pertaining to mental injury, were supported 
by substantial evidence. DHS cross-appealed, assigning 
794	
Querbach v. Dept. of Human Services
error to the circuit court’s conclusions that (1) DHS must 
use a probable cause standard to determine that a report of 
abuse is founded; and (2) DHS’s “founded” determinations 
with respect to petitioner’s physical abuse of son and threat 
of harm to daughter were not supported by substantial evi-
dence in the record.
	
In its decision on the appeal and cross-appeal, the 
Court of Appeals first addressed its own role on review, 
noting that the issue before it was the same issue that was 
before the circuit court, i.e.,
“whether substantial evidence in the record created before 
the circuit court supports the founded dispositions that 
DHS made in the final order on review. * 
* 
* ‘Substantial 
evidence exists to support a finding of fact when the record, 
viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person to 
make that finding.’ 
”
Querbach v. Dept. of Human Services, 308 Or App 131, 
134-35, 480 P3d 1030 (2020) (quoting ORS 183.484(5)(c)). 
Turning to the question of what evidentiary standard DHS 
was required to apply when determining whether a report of 
abuse is “founded,” the court noted that, under DHS’s rules, 
“ 
‘[f]ounded’ * 
* 
* means [that] there is reasonable cause to 
believe the abuse occurred.” Id. at 135 (citing OAR 413-
015-1010(2)(a)). The court observed that, in an earlier case, 
A.F. v. Oregon Dept. of Human Services, 251 Or App 576, 
284 P3d 1189 (2012), it had explained that, in the context 
of those rules, “reasonable cause” is “akin to the ‘reasonable 
suspicion’ standard of criminal law” and simply evaluates 
whether it is reasonable to suspect that a child “is at risk 
of harm from abuse or neglect by a particular individual.” 
Id. at 135-36 (quoting A.F., 251 Or App at 584). Adhering 
to that earlier holding, the Court of Appeals announced 
that, in reviewing DHS’s “founded” dispositions under ORS 
183.484(5)(c) for substantial evidence, the question before it 
was
“whether the whole record generated in the circuit court 
allows for the determination that it was reasonable for DHS 
to believe ‘under the circumstances before it’ that petitioner 
caused both his children to suffer mental injury, physically 
abused his son, and threatened harm to his daughter.”
Cite as 369 Or 786 (2022)	
795
308 Or App at 136 (quoting A.F., 251 Or App at 584). Finally, 
after noting that a detailed recitation of the evidence in the 
record would be of little benefit, the court announced its con-
clusions: That the evidence in the record would support a 
reasonable suspicion that petitioner had physically abused 
son and caused mental injury to both son and daughter, but 
that it would not support a reasonable suspicion that peti-
tioner’s conduct had placed daughter under threat of physi-
cal harm. Id. at 136-37. The court thus affirmed on petition-
er’s appeal and reversed in part on DHS’s cross-appeal.
III.  ANALYSIS
	
Petitioner now seeks review by this court, arguing 
that the Court of Appeals erred in various respects.
A.  Legal Standards
	
We first consider petitioner’s arguments regarding 
the legal rules that apply when reviewing a DHS “founded” 
determination under ORS 183.484(5)(c).
1.  The “Reasonable Cause to Believe” Standard
	
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred 
in concluding that DHS is required to use a “reasonable 
cause” or “reasonable suspicion” standard—rather than the 
higher probable cause standard used by the trial court—
in determining whether a report of child abuse is founded. 
Petitioner’s primary argument is that, while a “reasonable-
ness” standard may be appropriate when the issue is whether 
potential abuse should be reported and, thus, investigated 
by DHS, it is too lax a standard to use for determining, after 
an investigation, that a report of abuse is founded, given 
that such a determination will negatively affect the pur-
ported perpetrator of the abuse in various ways. Petitioner 
also argues that, insofar as DHS rules pertaining to inves-
tigation and assessment of child abuse reports provide that 
“the standard for determining C[hild] P[rotective] S[ervice] 
assessment dispositions is reasonable cause to believe,” OAR 
413-015-1010(1) (emphasis added), and separately define 
“reasonable cause” and “reasonable suspicion,” OAR 413-
015-0115(58), (59), “reasonable suspicion” necessarily is 
something different from “reasonable cause” and cannot be 
796	
Querbach v. Dept. of Human Services
the standard for determining “founded,” “unfounded,” and 
“unable to determine” dispositions. Petitioner then insists, 
without any substantive analysis of the DHS rules, that 
“reasonable cause to believe” in OAR 413-015-1010(1) and 
related rules is equivalent to “probable cause.”
	
Petitioner’s first argument is that a “reasonable-
ness” standard—whether of “cause to believe” or “suspicion” 
that abuse occurred—is necessarily too lax for a determi-
nation of this sort. But that argument invokes policy con-
cerns rather than legal principles. No statute, rule, or con-
stitutional provision that petitioner cites or of which we are 
aware would preclude DHS from using such a standard to 
determine, for its own internal purposes, whether to des-
ignate a report made to it by a person or entity outside the 
agency as “founded” or “unfounded.” Neither does such a 
standard seem inappropriate, given the legislative policy 
implicit in the statutory scheme discussed above. On the 
contrary, using a relatively low standard to trigger DHS’s 
obligations relating to reporting, investigation, and record-
keeping of potential instances of child abuse is consistent 
with the legislature’s stated purpose in enacting those 
 
statutes—to “facilitat[e] the use of protective social services 
to * 
* 
* safeguard and enhance the welfare of abused chil-
dren.” ORS 419B.007.
	
To the extent that petitioner is arguing that the 
legislature could not have intended that DHS use anything 
less than a “probable cause” standard because of the serious 
consequences of such a determination to the person believed 
responsible for the alleged abuse, we are not persuaded. 
Although a “founded” determination may be admissible 
as evidence in a later proceeding, standing alone it has no 
independent legal significance affecting the person’s rights. 
See Dept. of Human Services v. A. B., 362 Or 412, 423, 412 
P3d 1169 (2018) (“founded” determination “may be factor in 
further legal proceedings or determinations” but does not 
“require[ 
] a particular adverse decision or trigger[ 
] an auto-
matic prohibition.”). And, while petitioner suggests that a 
“founded” determination, and the consequent appearance of 
that determination in DHS’s registry, may ultimately affect 
him in other ways (by, for example, preventing him from 
Cite as 369 Or 786 (2022)	
797
adopting or fostering a child or volunteering in a school or 
child-oriented setting), it does not appear that any of those 
impacts are likely to occur, given that a “founded” deter-
mination would not be publicly available, OAR 413-015-
0485, would not necessarily make an alleged perpetrator 
of abuse ineligible to adopt or foster a child, OAR 413-200-
0274(1)(L)(D)(i), and, in general, would not be required 
for volunteer background checks, see, e.g., OAR 581-021-
0512 (requiring only criminal records checks for school 
 
volunteers).
	
However, petitioner’s second argument—which 
focuses on the fact that DHS’s child welfare rules separately 
define “reasonable cause” and “reasonable suspicion”—
raises a valid logical point that calls into question the Court 
of Appeals’ assumption that “reasonable cause to believe,” 
as used in OAR 413-015-1010(1), is equivalent to “reasonable 
suspicion” as that term is used in criminal law. As noted 
above, the DHS rules define “reasonable cause”—using the 
statutory definition of the term in ORS 419B.150(1)(b)—as 
“a subjectively and objectively reasonable belief, given all 
of the circumstances and based on specific and articula-
ble facts.” OAR 413-015-0115(58). But the DHS rules define 
“reasonable suspicion” differently:
“ 
‘Reasonable suspicion’ means a reasonable belief given all 
of the circumstances, based upon specific and describable 
facts, that the suspicious physical injury may be the result 
of abuse. Explanation: The belief must be subjectively and 
objectively reasonable. In other words, the person subjec-
tively believes that the injury may be the result of abuse, 
and the belief is objectively reasonable considering all of the 
circumstances. The circumstances that may give rise to a 
reasonable belief may include, but not be limited to, obser-
vations, interviews, experience, and training. The fact that 
there are possible non-abuse explanations for the injury 
does not negate reasonable suspicion.”
OAR 413-015-0115(59) (emphasis added). The first sentence 
of that definition is similar, although not identical to, the 
definition of “reasonable cause” and is not necessarily tied 
closely to the criminal law standard. The third, emphasized 
sentence describes the standard in the same way that the 
criminal law standard is described in our cases—that is, as 
798	
Querbach v. Dept. of Human Services
requiring the relevant decisionmaker to have a subjective 
belief in the specified fact and that that belief be objectively 
reasonable considering all the circumstances. See, e.g., State 
v. Belt, 325 Or 6, 10-11, 932 P2d 1177 (1997) (reasonable sus-
picion requires that “the officer subjectively believe that the 
person stopped has committed a crime” and that “the offi-
cer’s subjective belief be objectively ‘reasonable under the 
totality of the circumstances’ 
”) (quoting State v. Valdez, 277 
Or 621, 625-29, 561 P2d 1006 (1977)).
	
Perhaps a more straightforward basis for question-
ing the Court of Appeals’ assumption that the two standards 
are equivalent is the wording of the terms themselves. The 
term “reasonable suspicion” appears to assume an actual 
suspicion, while the formulation used in the applicable 
rule, OAR 413-15-1010(2)(a)—“there is reasonable cause to 
believe”—does not focus on the actual belief of any partic-
ular person, but on the reasonableness of the conclusion, 
based on all the circumstances.
	
The Court of Appeals did not explain why the “rea-
sonable cause to believe” standard in the DHS rules should 
be treated as equivalent to the “reasonable suspicion” stan-
dard of the criminal law. Its justification for doing so is that 
it had done so before—in A.F., 251 Or App 576, an opin-
ion that, on that point, relies on a somewhat conclusory 
assertion to the same effect in an earlier Court of Appeals 
opinion, Berger v. State Office for Services to Children and 
Families, 195 Or App 587, 590, 98 P3d 1127 (2004). And 
DHS does not mount a defense of the suggested equivalence. 
In response to petitioner’s point, it argues primarily that 
“reasonable cause to believe” is a “lower” standard than the 
“probable cause” standard that the trial court applied. Thus, 
we have been offered no persuasive reason for assuming 
that the “reasonable cause to believe” standard that deter-
mines whether an abuse report is “founded” is equivalent to 
the “reasonable suspicion” standard used in criminal law, 
and we see aspects of the phrase as it is used in this con-
text that suggest that the two standards are not equivalent. 
Petitioner makes a plausible argument that there is reason 
to doubt the applicability of the “reasonable suspicion” stan-
dard that the Court of Appeals applied.
Cite as 369 Or 786 (2022)	
799
	
But we need not—and do not—resolve that question 
in this case. The central issue litigated below and before this 
court is one that petitioner’s argument does not confront: 
whether the Court of Appeals nevertheless was correct to 
reject the circuit court’s application of a “probable cause” 
standard to DHS’s determinations and to instead conclude 
that “the role of the reviewing court is simply to determine 
whether a reasonable person could reach the determina-
tion that DHS made.” Querbach, 308 Or App at 136. To 
address that issue, we begin with the standard that DHS 
has assigned, by rule, to the determination that a report 
of abuse is “founded”: “reasonable cause to believe.” OAR 
413-015-1010(1), (2)(a). “Reasonable cause to believe,” on its 
face and as a textual matter, differs from “probable cause 
to believe.” The latter term refers to an array of evidence 
that would support a belief that it is probable—that is, more 
likely than not—that the specified factual circumstance 
exists,6 while the former suggests a less compelling array of 
evidence that would merely make such a belief reasonable. 
	
DHS has defined “reasonable cause,” by rule, in a 
way that is consistent with that lower standard: “ 
‘Reasonable 
cause’ as defined in ORS 419B.150 means a subjectively and 
objectively reasonable belief, given all of the circumstances 
and based on specific and articulable facts.” OAR 413-015-
0115(58).7 The relevant point here is that that definition, 
like the phrase it purports to define, appears to require only 
reasonableness, not probability.
	
If the definition of “reasonable cause” in OAR 413-
015-0115(58) is read into OAR 413-015-1010 as the standard 
for determining that a report of child abuse is “founded,” it 
	
6  See, e.g., State v. Anspach, 298 Or 375, 380-81, 692 P2d 602 (1984) (prob-
able cause requirement for issuance of a search warrant means that the facts 
upon which the warrant is premised would lead a reasonable person to believe 
that seizable things will probably be found in the location to be searched); ORS 
131.005(11) (defining “probable cause” as meaning that “there is a substantial 
objective basis for believing that more likely than not an offense has been commit-
ted and a person to be arrested has committed it”) (emphasis added).
	
7  DHS adopted OAR 413-015-0115(58), the rule defining “reasonable cause,” 
in 2020—after the circuit court reversed DHS’s final order in part, and a few 
months before the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, and reversed in part, the 
circuit court’s decision. Petitioner has not argued, for that reason or any other 
reason, that the rule is irrelevant in this review.
800	
Querbach v. Dept. of Human Services
may or may not include a requirement that the DHS deci-
sionmakers have an actual, subjective belief that the abuse 
occurred. But that interpretative question is not before us. 
Petitioner has never suggested that the DHS decisionmak-
ers here did not actually or subjectively believe that the 
reports of abuse that they determined were founded.
	
We return to the crux of the dispute between peti-
tioner and DHS: whether the “reasonable cause” standard 
requires something akin to “probable cause,” as petitioner 
contends. As discussed at length above, there is no mention 
of “probability” in any relevant statutory or regulatory defi-
nition, and the only standards that are set out there are the 
familiar standards of subjective and objective “reasonable-
ness.” Accordingly, whether or not the Court of Appeals was 
wrong to hold that DHS is to use the “reasonable suspicion” 
standard of criminal law as a proxy for “reasonable cause to 
believe” when determining whether reports of child abuse 
are founded, as petitioner argues, we conclude that it was 
correct when it rejected the trial court’s use of a “probable 
cause” standard and held that the relatively lower “reason-
able cause” standard set out in the rule applies.
2.  “Under the Circumstances Before It”
	
Petitioner observes that the Court of Appeals 
framed the “substantial evidence” issue that was before it in 
terms of whether “the whole record generated in the circuit 
court allows for a determination that it was reasonable for 
DHS to believe ‘under the circumstances before it’ 
” that the 
reported abuse had occurred. Querbach, 308 Or App at 136 
(quoting A.F., 251 Or App at 584). Petitioner maintains that 
that framing effectively undermines a principle established 
in Norden—that substantial evidence review of an order 
“in other than [a] contested case” is not limited to the evi-
dence before the agency at the time it made its decision but 
is directed at the record developed in the circuit court. See 
Norden, 329 Or at 647-49.
	
It is not entirely clear what the Court of Appeals 
meant when it used the phrase “under the circumstances 
before it.” Particularly when considered in light of other 
statements in the Court of Appeals opinion, the phrase 
Cite as 369 Or 786 (2022)	
801
might suggest an intention to look only at the evidence that 
was before DHS at the time of its “founded” determinations 
when assessing whether those determinations were sup-
ported by substantial evidence in the record. If that was what 
the Court of Appeals intended, the notion may have arisen 
out of reference to the “reasonable suspicion” standard. As 
we have explained, however, there is no clear indication that 
“reasonable cause,” as defined in DHS’s rules, is similarly 
focused on the decisionmaker’s actual beliefs at the time of 
his or her decision. In any event, Norden makes clear that 
judicial review of an order in other than a contested case, 
whether by the circuit court or an appellate court, is based 
on the entire record as developed in the circuit court and 
is conducted applying the substantial evidence standard. 
If the Court of Appeals did erroneously consider only the 
evidence that was before DHS at the time that it made its 
“founded” determinations, then that error did not cause that 
court to reach any different conclusion about the ultimate 
issue in this case than we reach when properly considering 
the entire record developed in the circuit court.
3.  Role of Factual Findings by the Circuit Court
	
Petitioner argues that this court and the Court of 
Appeals are “bound” by certain “factual findings” made by 
the circuit court—that DHS was “inappropriately biased” 
against him and “used faulty methods in its evaluation”—
because there is evidence in the record that supports those 
findings. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals 
erred in “ignoring” those findings and insists that, if it had 
given proper deference to the findings, it would have been 
compelled to reverse DHS’s “founded” determinations.
	
That argument assumes that the principle of defer-
ence to a circuit court’s factual findings—a feature of some 
other aspects of appellate review of circuit court decisions—
is applicable in an appeal from a circuit court’s decision on 
judicial review of an agency’s final order in other than a con-
tested case under ORS 183.484, when the petitioner argues 
that the agency’s order is not supported by substantial evi-
dence in the record. The present case does not require a 
definitive answer regarding the validity of that assumption. 
That is so because neither the statements that the circuit 
802	
Querbach v. Dept. of Human Services
court identified as its “findings” nor petitioner’s sometimes 
inaccurate characterization of those statements are the 
kind of factual findings that could affect whether there is 
substantial evidence to support DHS’s “founded” determina-
tions here.
	
In addition to holding that the evidence must sup-
port DHS’s “founded” determinations to a probable cause 
standard and applying that standard to conclude that the 
record did not support two of DHS’s four determinations, the 
circuit court’s initial letter opinion included a statement that 
petitioner describes as a “finding” that is binding on review. 
That statement began with an assertion that “DHS [had] 
analyzed the interactions of petitioner with his children 
through a lens of assumed prior uncontrolled conduct, taking 
as undisputed fact that petitioner had such a history” and 
then went on to assert that certain specified shortcomings in 
DHS’s analysis of the evidence might have resulted from that 
questionable assumption. In a second letter opinion, the cir-
cuit court set out certain “clarifications and additions” that 
petitioner also appears to regard as findings: that the initial 
DHS decisionmaker was aware of a certain exculpatory fact 
but “completely disregarded that in making her evaluation,” 
that “DHS’s assessment process was flawed in adopting the 
CARES report conclusions at their face value,” and that 
DHS’s “refusal” to interview certain witnesses suggested by 
petitioner was not “objective and impartial.” Petitioner sug-
gests that those statements amount to or include a factual 
finding that DHS was “biased” against him. But the trial 
court made no finding that DHS was “biased” against peti-
tioner, and none of the trial court’s statements, alone or in 
combination, constitute a finding of general bias, although 
they restate evidence that was admitted in the circuit court 
proceeding and thus became part of the record for judicial 
review. Petitioner also characterizes those statements as 
constituting a factual finding by the trial court that DHS 
had “used faulty methods in its evaluation”—although the 
statements appear to mix facts, legal conclusions, and opin-
ions. Indeed, petitioner’s characterization of the trial court 
as “finding” that DHS was “biased” against him is inconsis-
tent, at least in part, with the court’s decision upholding two 
of the four “founded” determinations.
Cite as 369 Or 786 (2022)	
803
	
The accuracy of petitioner’s characterizations aside, 
none of the trial court’s actual findings would affect the sub-
stantial evidence analysis on review, even if we were to treat 
them as binding. The asserted facts—that DHS made an 
inappropriate assumption about petitioner’s history, was 
unaware of or disregarded certain facts during its investi-
gation, and used flawed methods to evaluate the evidence—
do not affect the contents of the record that was made in 
the circuit court. When a court reviews an agency deter-
mination under ORS 183.484(5), the only issue is whether 
substantial evidence in the record “viewed as a whole” sup-
ports the agency’s determinations, and, as discussed, that 
standard is based on whether that record “would permit a 
reasonable person to make that finding.” ORS 183.484(5)(c).
	
Here, during the circuit court proceedings, peti-
tioner was able to place factual evidence in the record that 
would counter the adverse effects of what he viewed as 
“flaws” in DHS’s evaluation. Petitioner presented evidence 
that disputed that he had a history of prior uncontrolled 
behavior; he presented testimony from witnesses whom he 
had recommended to DHS and DHS had not interviewed; 
and he presented evidence about the proper way to evaluate 
a child’s accusation of abuse—all of which evidence can be 
and presumably was considered by the trial court and by the 
Court of Appeals in determining whether DHS’s “founded” 
determinations were supported by substantial evidence. 
	
Our conclusion does not mean that record evidence 
indicating significant flaws in DHS’s analysis does not have 
a role in a substantial evidence review. While the substan-
tial evidence standard of ORS 183.484(5)(c) is not a particu-
larly stringent standard of review when, as here, it is applied 
to a determination by DHS that there is “reasonable cause 
to believe” that abuse has occurred, a person in petition-
er’s position challenging such a determination might be able 
to present evidence to the circuit court that so thoroughly 
undermines the evidence that supports the determination 
that the record as a whole would not permit a reasonable 
person to conclude that DHS had reasonable cause to believe 
that the reported abuse had occurred. But evidence of flaws 
in DHS’s analysis that falls short of doing so (as does the 
804	
Querbach v. Dept. of Human Services
evidence that petitioner offered in the circuit court) is insuf-
ficient to permit reversal of the agency’s order under ORS 
183.484(5)(c).
4.   
Summary: The Standard for Reviewing DHS’s 
“Founded” Orders
	
As discussed above, DHS’s final order is an order 
in other than a contested case, and judicial review of the 
“founded” determinations in the order therefore is for “sub-
stantial evidence in the record.” Under that standard, the 
issue is whether the record developed in the circuit court, 
when viewed as a whole, would permit a reasonable person 
to make the determinations that the agency did here. See 
Norden, 329 Or at 649 (stating that standard). Also as dis-
cussed, the “founded” determinations are not determinations 
that petitioner in fact abused the children in the ways that 
were alleged, but rather that DHS had “reasonable cause to 
believe” that he had done so—meaning that, given the evi-
dence in the record, an objectively and subjectively reason-
able person could believe that petitioner had abused the two 
children in the ways alleged. Accordingly, to hold that DHS’s 
“founded” determinations are not supported by substantial 
evidence, ORS 183.484(5)(c), as petitioner claims, this court 
would have to conclude that the record developed in the cir-
cuit court would not permit a reasonable person to find that 
there is a reasonable basis for believing that the reported 
abuse had occurred. Evidence in the record suggesting that 
the information that DHS relied on in making its determi-
nation was unreliable or false (or for other reasons should be 
accorded minimal or no weight) should be considered as part 
of that analysis. But the trial court’s comments that DHS’s 
investigation and decision-making process were flawed in 
certain respects are not relevant to the issue on review, and 
even if we were to treat them as “factual findings,” they 
would not alter the conclusion that we reach here.
B.  Application to DHS’s “Founded” Determinations
	
As described above, DHS determined that four 
allegations of child abuse were “founded”—that petitioner 
had caused a “threat of harm” to daughter, had “physi-
cally abused” son, and had caused “mental injury” to both 
Cite as 369 Or 786 (2022)	
805
children. The Court of Appeals concluded that the latter 
three “founded” determinations were supported by substan-
tial evidence in the record and that the first—pertaining to 
“threat of harm” to daughter—was not. DHS has not chal-
lenged the Court of Appeals decision as to the “threat of 
harm” determination. Therefore, we need only consider the 
determinations that petitioner challenges—that the reports 
that petitioner had physically abused son and caused men-
tal injury to both son and daughter were “founded.” For each 
of those three determinations, we ask whether the record 
developed in the circuit court would permit a reasonable 
person to find that there is a reasonable basis for believing 
that the alleged abuse had occurred.
	
Like the Court of Appeals, we believe that there is 
little to be gained from setting out a detailed description 
of the evidence. Suffice it to say that, although the record 
contains evidence that could support a different disposition 
with respect to each of the allegations of abuse under review, 
we cannot say that the record as a whole would not permit a 
reasonable person to determine, as DHS did, that the alle-
gations were “founded”—that is, that there was reasonable 
cause to believe them to be true.8 Accordingly, we reject peti-
tioner’s contention that the “founded” determinations were 
not supported by substantial evidence.
	
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 
The judgment of the circuit court reversing the “founded” 
disposition for physical abuse of son is reversed but is other-
wise affirmed.
	
8  Our consideration of the record takes into account petitioner’s evidence 
that raises questions about the reliability, fairness, and comparative relevance 
of the evidence that DHS relied on. That evidence is insufficient to preclude a 
reasonable determination that the allegations are “founded.”