Case Title: CATERPILLAR TRACTOR v DEPT OF RE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1981-08-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 80-307 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 CATERPILLAR TRACTOR COMPANY, Inc., a Corporation, Petitioner and Respondent, THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF THE STATE OF MONTANA, Respondent and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the First Judicial District, In and for the County of Lewis and Clark. Honorable Gordon Bennett, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Terry B . Cosgrove, Special Assistant Attorney General, argued, Helena, Montana For Respondent: Hughes, Bennett, Kellner & Sullivan, Helena, Montana George T. Bennett argued, , Montana Submitted: June 17, 1981 Decided : AUG 6 - 1981 Filed: A U G 6 - 1 9 m Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This is an appeal from a declaratory judgment of the District Court of the First Judicial District, County of Lewis and Clark, determining that the two-year statute of limitations in section 27-2-211, MCA, applied to the assessment of corporate license tax for corporations which failed to file a return. Caterpillar Tractor Co., Inc., respondent, appealed to the State Tax Appeal Board (STAB) from a determination made by the Montana Department of Revenue, appellant, in December 1978, that respondent had been doing business in Montana for tax purposes for the years 1959 through 1971. Respondent alleged that appellant did not have statutory authority to assess any delinquent tax for a portion of the years under audit because such action would be barred by the applicable statute of limitations. While the matter was pending before STAB, the parties jointly petitioned the District Court for an interlocutory adjudication of the applicable statute of limitations. The District Court accepted jurisdiction for the purpose of determining that single legal issue. The court, in an original memorandum and supplemental memorandum amending opinion, held that the two-year statute of limitations contained in section 27-2-211, MCA, applies and controls the assessment of any corporation license tax. The result of that finding prohibits the assessment of any additional tax by appellant. From this judgment the Department of Revenue appeals. Respondent, an Illinois corporation, had business activities in Montana for the years 1959 through 1971. A p p e l l a n t a l l e g e s t h e b u s i n e s s a c t i v i t i e s c o n s i s t e d o f s e l l i n g equipment through independent d e a l e r s o p e r a t i n g i n Montana. Respondent contends it was n o t engaged i n b u s i n e s s f o r t h e y e a r s i n q u e s t i o n w i t h i n t h e meaning of t h e Montana C o r p o r a t i o n License Tax A c t and, t h e r e f o r e , was n o t s u b j e c t t o t h e t a x . I n December 1978, a p p e l l a n t n o t i f i e d respondent t h a t it had determined t h a t it was doing b u s i n e s s f o r t a x purposes i n Montana f o r t h e y e a r s i n q u e s t i o n and demanded t h a t r e s p o n d e n t f i l e c o r p o r a t i o n l i c e n s e t a x r e t u r n s t o g e t h e r w i t h t a x and i n t e r e s t due f o r t h e c o r p o r a t i o n ' s c a l e n d a r y e a r s December 31, 1959, through December 31, 1971. Respondent appealed t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o STAB and l a t e r t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t by t h e i n t e r l o c u t o r y a d j u d i c a t i o n . The D i s t r i c t Court h e l d t h a t a p p e l l a n t is l i m i t e d t o a p e r i o d of two y e a r s t o a s s e s s o r c o l l e c t any t a x a g a i n s t a taxpayer who h a s f a i l e d t o f i l e a r e t u r n and is l i m i t e d t o a p e r i o d of f i v e y e a r s t o c o l l e c t a t a x d e f i c i e n c y assessment from any c o r p o r a t i o n which h a s f i l e d a r e t u r n . The f o l l o w i n g chronology of s t a t u t o r y enactments, amendments, r e p e a l s and r e v i v a l s , and Supreme C o u r t d e c i s i o n s is n e c e s s a r y t o determine t h i s c a s e . Not a l l of t h e s e s t a t u t e s a r e c o d i f i e d i n t h e Montana Code Annotated; t h e r e f o r e , use of Revised Codes of Montana c i t a t i o n s is n e c e s s a r y . The Montana Corporation License Tax A c t ( t h e A c t ) w a s adopted i n 1917. S e c t i o n 5, Chapter 79, Laws of 1917, c o d i f i e d a s s e c t i o n 2300, R.C.M. 1 9 2 1 , was t h e s o l e p r o v i s i o n which allowed t h e s t a t e t o a s s e s s a d d i t i o n a l t a x . I t provided: " I n c a s e s of r e f u s a l or n e g l e c t t o make such r e t u r n , and i n c a s e s of e r r o n e o u s , f a l s e , or f r a u d u l e n t r e t u r n s , t h e s t a t e t r e a s u r e r s h a l l , upon t h e d i s c o v e r y t h e r e o f a t any time w i t h i n t h r e e y e a r s a f t e r s a i d r e t u r n is due, make a r e t u r n upon i n f o r m a t i o n o b t a i n e d a s provided f o r i n t h i s a c t , and t h e assessment made by him s h a l l be p a i d by such c o r p o r a t i o n immediately upon n o t i f i c a t i o n of t h e amount of such assessment . . ." That p o r t i o n of t h e Act was amended f i v e t i m e s between 1917 and 1963: I n 1923 t h e c o r p o r a t i o n t a x s t a t u t e was amended i n S e c t i o n 2 , Chapter 146, Laws of 1923, t o s u b s t i t u t e t h e S t a t e Board of E q u a l i z a t i o n i n a l l i n s t a n c e s where r e f e r e n c e had been made t o t h e s t a t e t r e a s u r e r . I n 1933 a s e p a r a t e and d i f f e r e n t s t a t u t e was enacted which g r a n t e d t o t h e Board of E q u a l i z a t i o n t h e a u t h o r i t y a t any t i m e t o a s s e r t d e f i c i e n c y assessment of t a x where no r e t u r n was f i l e d : " I n t h e c a s e of a f a l s e or f r a u d u l e n t r e t u r n w i t h i n t e n t t o evade t a x or of a f a i l u r e t o f i l e a r e t u r n t h e t a x may be a s s e s s e d , or a proceeding i n Court f o r t h e c o l l e c t i o n of such t a x may be begun w i t h o u t assessment a t any time." S e c t i o n 9 , Chapter 166, Laws of 1 9 3 3 , c o d i f i e d a s s e c t i o n 2303.5, R . C . M . 1935. I n 1945 t h e p e r i o d f o r a s s e s s i n g t h e a d d i t i o n a l t a x was changed from t h r e e t o f i v e y e a r s along with some o t h e r u n r e l a t e d amendments, Chapter 209, Laws of 1945, c o d i f i e d a s s e c t i o n 84-1505, R.C.M. 1947: "Assessment of Tax--Payment-Lien of Tax. A l l assessments s h a l l be made by t h e s t a t e board of e q u a l i z a t i o n , and t h e seieral c o r p o r a t i o n s s h a l l be n o t i f i e d of t h e amounts f o r which t h e y a r e r e s p e c t i v e l y l i a b l e , on o r b e f o r e t h e f i r s t day of J u n e of each s u c c e s s i v e y e a r . Payment of t h e t a x a s s e s s e d s h a l l be made by c o r p o r a t i o n s r e p o r t i n g on a c a l e n d a r year b a s i s , on or b e f o r e t h e f i f t e e n t h day of June following t h e assessment of t h e t a x . Payment o f s a i d t a x s h a l l b e made by c o r p o r a t i o n s o p e r a t i n g on a f i s c a l year b a s i s on or before the fifteenth day of the sixth month following the close of said corporation's fiscal year. In cases of refusal or neglect to make such return, and in cases of erroneous, false, or fraudulent returns, the state board of equalization shall, upon the discovery thereof at any time within five (5) years after said return is due, make a return upon information obtained as provided for in this act, and the assessment made by the state board of equalization shall be paid by such corporation immediately upon notification of the amount of such assessment . . ." In 1960 this Court, in State v. King Colony Ranch (1960), 137 Mont. 145, 350 P.2d 841, held that the 1945 statute, section 84-1505, superseded the 1933 enactment, section 84-1513, in determining which time limitation the state board would use in assessing taxes. This Court did not expressly mention that the 1933 statute was "repealed by implication" or any other legal rationale on that point. Not addressing the particulars of repeal, the Court said the 1945 enactment was later and, therefore, the later statute applied. At the next legislative session, the 37th Legisla.tive Assembly in Chapter 102, Laws of 1961, reenacted section 84-1505, R.C.M. 1947, which placed a five-year limitation upon the Board's authority to assess deficiencies in all instances and repealed all acts or parts of acts in conflict therewith: "(1) Assessment of tax--payment--lien of tax. All assessments shall be made by the state board of equalization, and the several corporations shall be notified of the amounts for which they are respectively liable, on or before the first day of June of each successive year. Payment of the tax assessed shall be made by corporations reporting on a calendar year basis, on or before the fifteenth day of June following the assessment of the tax. Payment of said tax shall be made by corporations operating on a fiscal year basis on or before the f i f t e e n t h day of t h e s i x t h month following t h e c l o s e of s a i d c o r p o r a t i o n s ' s f i s c a l y e a r . I n c a s e s of r e f u s a l o r n e g l e c t t o make such r e t u r n , and i n c a s e s of e r r o n e o u s , f a l s e , or f r a u d u l e n t r e t u r n s , t h e s t a t e b o a r d o f e q u a l i z a t i o n s h a l l , upon t h e d i s c o v e r y t h e r e o f a t any time w i t h i n f i v e ( 5 ) y e a r s a f t e r s a i d r e t u r n is d u e , make a r e t u r n upon i n f o r m a t i o n o b t a i n e d a s provided f o r i n t h i s a c t , and t h e assessment made by t h e s t a t e board of e q u a l i z a t i o n s h a l l be p a i d by such c o r p o r a t i o n immediately upon n o t i f i c a t i o n of t h e amount of such assessment . . ." I n 1963 t h e 38th L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly, by Chapter 186, Laws of 1963, s u b s t a n t i a l l y r e v i s e d t h e C o r p o r a t i o n License Tax Act and made t h e c o r p o r a t i o n l i c e n s e t a x s e l f - a s s e s s i n g . The taxpayer was r e q u i r e d t o a s s e s s t h e t a x i n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e , whereas p r e v i o u s l y t h e s t a t e board had determined t h e t a x i n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e based upon r e t u r n s . Among t h e changes made by t h e 1963 L e g i s l a t u r e was t h e r e v i s i o n of s e c t i o n 84-1505, R.C.M. 1947, p r o v i d i n g t h a t no l o n g e r d i d t h e D e p a r t m e n t have t h e a u t h o r i t y t o make d e f i c i e n c y assessments. I n a d d i t i o n , S e c t i o n 2 , Chapter 186, Laws of 1963, c o d i f i e d a s s e c t i o n 84-1508.2, R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 , provided t h a t a l l d e f i c i e n c y a s s e s s m e n t s f o r corpora- t i o n l i c e n s e t a x purposes were r e q u i r e d t o be made w i t h i n f i v e y e a r s from t h e d a t e t h e r e t u r n was f i l e d "except a s o t h e r w i s e provided i n s e c t i o n 84-1513," R.C.M. 1947. The p a r t i a l t e x t provided: " ( 1 ) Except a s o t h e r w i s e provided i n s e c t i o n 84-1513, no d e f i c i e n c y s h a l l be a s s e s s e d or c o l l e c t e d w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e year f o r which a r e t u r n i s f i l e d u n l e s s t h e n o t i c e o f a d d i t i o n a l t a x proposed t o be a s s e s s e d is mailed w i t h i n f i v e ( 5 ) y e a r s from t h e d a t e t h e r e t u r n was f i l e d . " The i s s u e p r e s e n t e d h e r e is whether t h e 1963 L e g i s l a - t u r e , i n adopting Chapter 186, Laws of 1963, intended t o p l a c e a comprehensive five-year s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s on t h e Department's i n i t i a t i o n of d e f i c i e n c y a c t i o n s o r whether it intended t o impose a five-year l i m i t o n l y on t h o s e c a s e s where a r e t u r n had been f i l e d and t o p l a c e no l i m i t on c a s e s where t h e r e had been no f i l i n g a t a l l . A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e amendment t o s e c t i o n 84-1505 adopted a s p a r t of t h e Laws of 1945 d i d n o t i m p l i e d l y r e p e a l s e c t i o n 84-1513; and, t h e r e f o r e , s e c t i o n 84-1513 was i n f u l l f o r c e and e f f e c t when t h e 1 9 6 3 L e g i s l a t u r e adopted t h a t s e c t i o n by r e f e r e n c e . A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l 1917 Act was amended by t h e 1933 Act and, t h e r e f o r e , t h e 1945 amendment t o t h e o r i g i n a l 1917 Act d i d n o t r e p e a l t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e 1933 A c t or r e s t o r e t h e r e p e a l e d and superseded p r o v i s i o n s of t h e 1917 Act. Any a t t e m p t t o r e s t o r e t h e 1917 A c t by t h e 1945 Act was e r r o r . Appellant f u r t h e r a r g u e s t h a t t h i s Court e r r e d i n its d e c i s i o n i n S t a t e v. King Colony Ranch, s u p r a , and t h e o p i n i o n should be r e v e r s e d . The 1933 A c t i m p l i e d l y r e p e a l e d t h e 1917 A c t , and t h e a t t e m p t t o amend t h e o r i g i n a l (1917) A c t by t h e 1945 amendment was c o n t r a r y t o t h e law because of t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e 1933 A c t . A p p e l l a n t argues t h a t s e c t i o n 84-1513 was adopted by r e f e r e n c e by t h e enactment i n 1963 of s e c t i o n 84-1508.2. A p p e l l a n t contends t h a t s e c t i o n 84-1513 ( a r e p e a l e d a c t ) may be r e e n a c t e d by r e f e r e n c e . A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t G r e a t Western Sugar Co. v. M i t c h e l l ( 1 9 4 6 ) , 119 Mont. 328, 174 P.2d 817, a l l o w s t h e l e g i s l a t u r e t o adopt by r e f e r e n c e a r e p e a l e d a c t i f t h e r e is a showing of c l e a r l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t . The l e g i s l a t u r e d i d n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y e x p r e s s t h e i n t e n t t o r e v i v e because, a p p e l l a n t p o i n t s o u t , of t h e c o n f u s i o n of t h e Kinq Colony Ranch c a s e . According t o a p p e l l a n t , t h e " i n t e n t " was "obvious"--to have one s t a t u t e f o r c o r p o r a t i o n s which f i l e and one f o r c o r p o r a t i o n s which do n o t f i l e . P r i o r t o 1963, under t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e former s e c t i o n 84-1505, t h e Department had t o a c t w i t h i n f i v e y e a r s from t h e d a t e t h e r e t u r n was due t o c o l l e c t a d e f i c i e n c y . The 1963 amendment made a s i g n i f i c a n t change p r o v i d i n g f o r f i v e y e a r s from t h e d a t e t h e r e t u r n was f i l e d t o c o l l e c t a d e f i c i e n c y . A p p e l l a n t contends from 1963 forward, t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s w i l l n o t begin t o run u n t i l a taxpayer a c t u a l l y f i l e s a t a x r e t u r n . The p e r i o d b e g i n s t o run o n l y when t h e taxpayer t a k e s t h e a f f i r m a t i v e a c t o f f i l i n g t h e r e t u r n . There was o n l y one s t a t u t e d e a l i n g w i t h d e f i c i e n c y assessments i n 1963, s e c t i o n 84-1508.2, R.C.M. 1947, and it a p p l i e s t o c o r p o r a t i o n s . The s t a t u t e p r o v i d e s f o r f i v e y e a r s from t h e t i m e t h e r e t u r n i s f i l e d f o r a l l c o r p o r a t i o n s , and u n t i l t h e r e t u r n is a c t u a l l y f i l e d , t h e p e r i o d does n o t begin t o r u n . Respondent a r g u e s t h a t t h i s C o u r t , i n S t a t e v . King Colony Ranch, s u p r a , h e l d t h a t by l a t e r e n a c t i n g s e c t i o n 84-1505 i n 1945, t h e l e g i s l a t u r e had l i m i t e d t h e Department o f Revenue i n a l l i n s t a n c e s i n c l u d i n g t h e n o n f i l i n g s i t u a t i o n t o a f i v e - y e a r p e r i o d f o r assessment. S e c t i o n 84-1505 c o n t r o l l e d , and s e c t i o n 84-1513 was n o t an e f f e c t i v e and v i a b l e p r o v i s i o n upon which t h e Department could r e l y . T h i s , respondent c o n t e n d s , is c l e a r l y a holding of r e p e a l by i m p l i c a t i o n . The holding i n Kinq Colony Ranch could be based o n l y upon a f i n d i n g and holding t h a t t h e l a t e r enactment was so i n c o n s i s t e n t a s t o i m p l i e d l y r e p e a l t h e f i r s t . R e s p o n d e n t a l s o a r g u e s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o r r e c t l y held t h a t s e c t i o n 84-1513 was n o t r e v i v e d or r e e n a c t e d by r e f e r e n c e . A p p e l l a n t ' s p o s i t i o n is t h a t mere r e f e r e n c e r e e n a c t e d t h e r e p e a l e d s e c t i o n 84-1513. However, respondent a r g u e s t h e r e is a d i s t i n c t d i f f e r e n c e between " i n c o r p o r a t i o n by r e f e r e n c e " and " r e v i v a l by r e f e r e n c e . " What t h e Montana l e g i s l a t u r e d i d i n 1963 was t o assume ( i n c o r r e c t l y ) t h a t s e c t i o n 84-1513 was still a v a l i d and e x i s t i n g p r o v i s i o n and c o u l d t h u s b e i n c o r p o r a t e d by r e f e r e n c e . T h i s is f a r d i f f e r e n t from t h e l e g i s l a t u r e e x p r e s s i n g an i n t e n t t o r e e n a c t a p r o v i s i o n , by r e f e r e n c e , which it knew had been r e p e a l e d . There were i n t h e 1963 A c t no e x p r e s s words and no language of r e v i v a l or reenactment. I t seems c l e a r t h a t t h e 1963 l e g i s l a t o r s were o b l i v i o u s t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s Court had concluded t h a t t h e 1933 A c t had been r e p e a l e d o r s u p e r s e d e d by t h e 1945 A c t and b e l i e v e d t h e y c o u l d i n c o r p o r a t e t h a t A c t by r e f e r e n c e . There was no v i s i b l e a t t e m p t and, i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , no i n t e n t i o n t o r e v i v e t h e 1933 A c t because t h e q u e s t i o n a p p a r e n t l y never a r o s e . F i n a l l y , respondent contends t h e D i s t r i c t Court was c o r r e c t i n holding t h a t s e c t i o n 84-1508.2 h a s no a p p l i c a t i o n where a r e t u r n is f i l e d . Thus, t h i s c a s e is c o n t r o l l e d by t h e g e n e r a l s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s , s e c t i o n 27-2-211, MCA. A p p e l l a n t ' s argument t h a t p r i o r t o 1963 it had f i v e y e a r s i n which t o a s s e s s i n t h i s c a s e t h e n o n f i l i n g r e t u r n and t h a t t h e 1963 amendment removed t h a t l i m i t a t i o n would b r i n g i n t o p l a y t h e g e n e r a l s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s . S e c t i o n 25-1-102, MCA ( f o r m e r l y s e c t i o n 93-2401, R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 ) , p r o v i d e s t h a t c i v i l a c t i o n s must be commenced w i t h i n t h e p e r i o d s p r e s c r i b e d i n t h e s t a t u t e s of l i m i t a t i o n s a f t e r t h e cause of a c t i o n s h a l l have accrued e x c e p t where i n s p e c i a l c a s e s a d i f f e r e n t l i m i t a t i o n i s p r e s c r i b e d by s t a t u t e . T h i s same s e c t i o n d e s c r i b e s t h e term " a c t i o n " a s i n c l u d i n g " a s p e c i a l proceeding of a c i v i l n a t u r e . " The a c t i o n o f a p p e l l a n t i n a s s e r t i n g l i a b i l i t y a g a i n s t a taxpayer by way of d e f i c i e n c y assessment c o n s t i t u t e s "a s p e c i a l proceeding of a c i v i l n a t u r e . " S e c t i o n 27-2-211(c), MCA, p r o v i d e s a two-year s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s f o r "a l i a b i l i t y c r e a t e d by s t a t u t e o t h e r t h a n a p e n a l t y o r f o r f e i t u r e . " S e c t i o n 27-2-103, MCA ( f o r m e r l y s e c t i o n 93-2615, R.C.M. 1 9 4 7 ) , p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e s t a t u t e s of l i m i t a t i o n s a r e a p p l i c a b l e t o t h e S t a t e of Montana. Respondent contends t h e Montana c o r p o r a t i o n l i c e n s e t a x is a l i a b i l i t y imposed by s t a t u t e and, i n t h e absence of a s p e c i a l g r a n t of a u t h o r i t y p u r s u a n t t o s e c t i o n 25-1-102, MCA, t o t h e S t a t e of Montana g r a n t i n g a longer p e r i o d of l i m i t a t i o n , t h e g e n e r i c s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s , which is two y e a r s , would a p p l y . Two c a s e s of t h i s Court c o n t r o l our d e c i s i o n i n t h i s case: S t a t e v. King Colony Ranch ( 1 9 6 0 ) , 137 Mont. 145, 350 P.2d 841, and G r e a t Western Sugar Co. v. M i t c h e l l ( 1 9 4 6 ) , 119 Mont. 328, 174 P.2d 817. I n G r e a t Western Suqar Co. t h i s Court considered a c o r p o r a t i o n l i c e n s e f e e , p a i d under p r o t e s t by t h e sugar company. The company f i l e d its p a p e r s of i n c o r p o r a t i o n w i t h t h e S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e i n 1916 and p a i d a f e e f o r f i l i n g t h e r e o f a s p r e s c r i b e d by S e c t i o n 1, Chapter 37, Laws of 1915. The f e e under t h e 1915 Act was based on t h e p r o p o r t i o n of t h e f o r e i g n c o r p o r a t i o n ' s c a p i t a l s t o c k r e p r e s e n t e d by its p r o p e r t y and b u s i n e s s i n t h i s s t a t e . I n 1 9 2 3 t h e l e g i s l a t u r e e n a c t e d C h a p t e r 1 3 2 . S e c t i o n 4 of t h a t A c t doubled t h e f e e and r e p e a l e d a l l c o n f l i c t i n g a c t s . T h i s A c t was r e e n a c t e d by a s t a t u t e passed by t h e 1925 L e g i s l a t u r e t o p r o v i d e t h a t t h e f e e was t o be c a l c u l a t e d on t h e " a u t h o r i z e d c a p i t a l s t o c k " i n s t e a d of on t h e " i s s u e d c a p i t a l s t o c k . " T h i s Court found t h a t t h e Act, i n basing t h e f e e upon a u t h o r i z e d c a p i t a l s t o c k , a l a r g e p o r t i o n of which remained u n i s s u e d , offended both t h e commerce and due p r o c e s s c l a u s e s of t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and was i n v a l i d . The Court f u r t h e r found t h a t where t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n e n a c t i n g a new s t a t u t e t o t a k e t h e p l a c e of t h e former one, r e l a t e d t o a given s u b j e c t , intended t o c o n t i n u e t h e p o l i c y t h e r e t o f o r e pursued, where t h e new A c t would s u p p l a n t t h e former one o n l y i n c a s e t h e new Act should become o p e r a t i v e , and where such new Act is d e c l a r e d u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , t h e r e p e a l i n g c l a u s e t h e r e i n c o n t a i n e d f a l l s w i t h it. The new A c t must be deemed a s though never e n a c t e d , and t h e one sought t o be r e p e a l e d remains i n f u l l f o r c e and e f f e c t , c i t i n g Chicago, M . , S t . P . & P. R. Co. v. Harmon ( 1 9 3 1 ) , 89 Mont. 1, 295 P. 762, 764. G r e a t Western Sugar Co. went on t o hold t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e could adopt a s t a t u t e by r e f e r e n c e . Gustafson v . Hammond I r r i g a t i o n D i s t . ( 1 9 3 0 ) , 87 Mont. 217, 287 P. 640. Considering whether t h e l e g i s l a t u r e could adopt a r e p e a l e d a c t , a q u e s t i o n which was n o t b e f o r e t h e C o u r t , it s a i d : " I f we assume t h a t t h i s may be done ( s e e 59 C . J . 6 1 8 ) , b e f o r e it may be a c c o m p l i s h e d t h e r e m u s t b e a c l e a r l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t t o do s o . (50 Am.Jur. 574 n. 1 2 ) There is no language i n Chapter 169 [Laws of 19311 t h a t i n d i c a t e s any such l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t . " G r e a t Western Sugar Co., 174 P.2d a t 821. A p p e l l a n t i n c o r r e c t l y r e l i e s on G r e a t Western Sugar Co. - f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t a r e p e a l e d s t a t u t e may be revived by r e f e r e n c e . That c a s e , a s noted above, d i d n o t d e c i d e t h a t i s s u e , a s it was n o t b e f o r e t h e Court. I t h e l d t h a t , i f it could be done, t h e r e had t o be a c l e a r l e q i s l a t i v e i n t e n t t o do s o . While a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e r e was a c l e a r l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t t o r e v i v e s e c t i o n 84-1513, R.C.M., 1947, we hold t h a t because of no such e x p r e s s i o n i n t h e A c t s e c t i o n 84-1513 was n o t r e v i v e d . The n e x t c a s e f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n is S t a t e v. King Colony Ranch, s u p r a , decided i n 1960, which brought about t h e l e g i s l a t i v e enactment of Chapter 186, Laws o f 1963. That c a s e c a l l e d f o r t h i s Court t o i n t e r p r e t what t h e l e g i s l a t u r e had done i n 1933 and 1945. T h i s Court h e l d w i t h r e s p e c t t o a l l t a x p a y e r s t h a t t h e Department of Revenue had f i v e y e a r s from t h e due d a t e of t h e r e t u r n , i n which t o a s s e r t a d e f i c i e n c y judgment. T h i s was t h e s t a t e o f t h e l a w when t h e 1 9 6 3 l e g i s l a t u r e enacted Chapter 186, Laws of 1963, seemingly i n t o t a l ignorance of t h e s t a t e of t h e law it had c r e a t e d by its 1933 and 1945 enactments. The D i s t r i c t Court comments i n its memorandum: "There were i n t h e 1963 A c t no e x p r e s s words and no language of r e v i v a l o r reenactment. I t seems p e r f e c t l y c l e a r t h a t t h e 1 9 6 3 l e g i s l a t o r s were o b l i v i o u s t o t h e f a c t our Supreme Court had concluded t h a t t h e 1933 Act had been r e p e a l e d o r superseded by t h e 1945 A c t and b e l i e v e d t h e y could i n c o r p o r a t e t h a t A c t by r e f e r e n c e . There was no v i s i b l e a t t e m p t and, i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , no i n t e n t i o n t o r e v i v e t h e 1933 A c t because t h e q u e s t i o n a p p a r e n t l y n e v e r a r o s e . " I n v i e w o f t h e f a c t t h e r e is no e x p r e s s i n t e n t t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i n t e n d e d t o r e v e r s e o r r e e n a c t t h e s t a t u t e i n t h e 1963 A c t , w e h o l d t h e e x c e p t i o n t h e r e i n s e t f o r t h is u n e n f o r c e a b l e . S t a t e v . King Colony Ranch, s u p r a . W e f u r t h e r h o l d t h a t s e c t i o n 27-2-211, MCA, t h e g e n e r a l s t a t u t e o f l i m i t a t i o n s o n a l i a b i l i t y c r e a t e d by s t a t u t e , is t h e c o n t r o l l i n g s t a t u t e i n t h i s case and t h a t a p p e l l a n t c a n n o t e n f o r c e t h e t a x s t a t u t e a n y t i m e t h e r e a f t e r . The judgment is a f f i r m e d . Justice We concur: