Case Title: Michigan v. Wilder (Opinion on Application)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 154814

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2018-06-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
PEOPLE v WILDER 
 
Docket No. 154814.  Argued on application for leave to appeal January 11, 2018.  
Decided June 15, 2018. 
 
 
Darrell J. Wilder was tried before a jury in the Wayne Circuit Court on charges of 
carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 750.227; being a felon in possession of a firearm (felon-in-
possession), MCL 750.224f; and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-
firearm), third offense, MCL 750.227b, after police officers saw defendant standing near a car in 
a vacant lot with what appeared to be the handle of a handgun sticking out of his pants pocket.  
The officers saw defendant move the object from his pocket into the trunk of the car, and when 
the officers opened the trunk, they found a handgun.  At trial, defense counsel called defendant’s 
wife, Tameachi Wilder, as a witness.  On direct examination, Wilder testified that she had not 
seen defendant with a gun when he left the house on the date in question, that to her knowledge 
he did not own a gun, and that she did not have any weapons in the house.  She was not asked 
about and did not offer any other information about defendant’s history with guns.  On cross-
examination, the prosecutor did not question the witness about defendant’s possession and 
ownership of weapons on the day of the crime but instead asked three times whether the witness 
knew defendant to carry guns.  The witness responded “no” to each question.  Over defendant’s 
objection, the trial court, Qiana D. Lillard, J., then permitted the prosecutor to question the 
witness about defendant’s prior weapons convictions.  The jury found defendant guilty of both 
felon-in-possession and felony-firearm, but acquitted him of carrying a concealed weapon.  
Defendant was sentenced by Judge Lawrence S. Talon to five years’ probation for the felon-in-
possession charge and 10 years’ imprisonment for the third-offense felony-firearm charge.  The 
Court of Appeals, BORRELLO, P.J., and MARKEY and RIORDAN, JJ., affirmed in an unpublished 
per curiam opinion issued September 27, 2016 (Docket No. 327491), holding that the trial court 
had not erred by allowing the prosecution’s questions.  Defendant applied for leave to appeal in 
the Supreme Court, which ordered and heard oral argument on whether to grant the application 
or take other peremptory action.  500 Mich 997 (2017). 
 
 
In an opinion by Justice VIVIANO, joined by Justices MCCORMACK, BERNSTEIN, and 
CLEMENT, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, held: 
 
 
The prosecutor’s attempt to impeach a defense witness with evidence of defendant’s prior 
convictions violated several basic tenets of the rules of evidence.  Therefore, the portion of the 
Court of Appeals judgment holding that it was not error to have allowed the cross-examination 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Syllabus 
 
Chief Justice: 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Kurtis T. Wilder 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
This syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been  
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 
Reporter of Decisions: 
Kathryn L. Loomis 
of that witness concerning her knowledge of defendant’s weapons-carrying proclivities and his 
prior weapons convictions was reversed and the case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to 
consider whether the error was harmless. 
 
 
1.  The prosecutor’s attempt to impeach a defense witness with evidence of defendant’s 
prior convictions was not governed by MRE 609, which applies when a party seeks to impeach a 
witness’s general credibility with evidence that the witness himself or herself has committed a 
crime.  The evidence also was not governed by MRE 608, because it was not opinion or 
reputation evidence concerning the witness’s character for untruthfulness and it did not concern 
specific instances of the conduct of the witness.   
 
 
2.  MRE 404(b)(1) provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith, but 
it may be admissible for other purposes.  Generally speaking, impeachment by contradiction can 
be a proper purpose for the admission of other-acts evidence.  Impeachment of this kind usually 
occurs when a prosecutor seeks to cross-examine a defendant about prior convictions in order to 
impeach a defendant’s blanket denial on direct examination of ever engaging in conduct similar 
to the charged conduct.  In this case, the prosecutor’s initial questions were not logically relevant 
to a proper purpose under MRE 404(b) because they were not designed to elicit an answer 
contradicting any statements made by the witness on direct examination.  As it pertained to 
weapons, the witness’s direct testimony was limited to whether defendant owned a gun or 
possessed one on the date in question.  This testimony would not have been contradicted even if 
the witness had acknowledged knowing that defendant generally carried weapons.  Therefore, 
although the prosecutor articulated a proper purpose under MRE 404(b)—impeachment by 
contradiction—the prosecutor did not establish that the questions asked were logically relevant to 
impeachment.   
 
 
3.  Absent a proper purpose, evidence of defendant’s other acts was inadmissible under 
MRE 404(a) unless defendant opened the door by introducing evidence of his good character, 
which he did not do.  The prosecutor’s tactic of shifting the focus from the pertinent facts to 
which the witness testified on direct examination to a broader inquiry about defendant’s general 
weapons proclivities was an impermissible attempt by the prosecutor to open the subject of 
defendant’s character.  When a defendant has not offered character evidence, a prosecutor’s 
attempt to elicit character evidence regarding the defendant on cross-examination of another 
witness is not permitted by MRE 404(a)(1).  Although the prosecutor maintained that her second 
set of questions regarding defendant’s prior firearm convictions was appropriate to impeach the 
witness’s response to the first set of improper questions, a party cannot seek to elicit inadmissible 
character evidence on cross-examination when the opposing party has not opened the door and 
then claim the right to impeach the elicited denial as a subterfuge to elicit even more 
inadmissible character evidence.  Any other conclusion would eviscerate MRE 404.   
 
 
Court of Appeals judgment reversed in part; case remanded to the Court of Appeals for 
further proceedings. 
 
 
Justice ZAHRA, joined by Chief Justice MARKMAN and Justice WILDER, dissenting, 
disagreed with the majority’s interpretation and application of MRE 404(b), which he stated 
unduly restricted the discretion of the trial judge.  He would have held that the testimony that the 
witness did not know defendant to carry firearms did not implicate MRE 404(b) because it 
constituted not other-acts evidence but rather evidence of defendant not performing an act, that 
defendant’s prior convictions were admissible for the noncharacter purpose of impeachment 
under MRE 404(b), and that the prosecutor’s questions about the witness’s knowledge of 
defendant served a valid nonpropensity purpose considering the totality of the circumstances, 
namely, to rebut the inference that the witness was a credible source of information about 
defendant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©2018 State of Michigan 
 
FILED  June 15, 2018 
 
 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No. 154814 
 
DARRELL JOHN WILDER, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
 
VIVIANO, J. 
This case presents the issue of how and when it is appropriate to impeach by 
contradiction using other-acts evidence.  Because the prosecutor’s tactics and questions 
violated several basic tenets of our rules of evidence, we reverse that part of the Court of 
Appeals’ judgment holding that the cross-examination of defense witness Tameachi 
Wilder concerning whether she knew of defendant to carry guns and her knowledge of 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
OPINION 
 
Chief Justice: 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
 
Justices: 
Brian K. Zahra 
Bridget M. McCormack 
David F. Viviano 
Richard H. Bernstein 
Kurtis T. Wilder 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
 
 
2 
defendant’s prior weapons convictions was not error, and we remand this case to the 
Court of Appeals to consider whether the error was harmless.   
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
During defendant’s trial on charges of carrying a concealed weapon, MCL 
750.227; being a felon in possession of a firearm (felon-in-possession), MCL 750.224f; 
and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 
750.227b, he called his wife, Tameachi Wilder, as a witness.  On direct examination, the 
witness testified that she did not see defendant with a gun when he left the house on the 
date in question, that to her knowledge he did not own a gun, and that she did not have 
any weapons in the house.  She was not asked about and did not offer any other 
information about defendant’s history with guns. 
On cross-examination, the prosecutor did not question the witness about 
defendant’s possession and ownership of weapons on the day of the crime but instead 
asked three times whether the witness knew of defendant to carry guns.  The witness 
responded “no” to each question.1  Over defendant’s objection, the trial court—which 
                                              
1 The precise exchange was as follows: 
Q.  Do you know of Mr. Wilder to carry weapons? 
A.  No. 
Q.  Do you know of him to carry guns? 
A.  No. 
Q.  You’ve been with him for nine years and you don’t know of him to 
carry guns? 
A.  No. 
3 
mischaracterized both the evidence on direct examination and the witness (referring to 
her as a character witness rather than a fact witness)—then permitted the prosecutor to 
question the witness about defendant’s prior weapons convictions.2  At the conclusion of 
trial, the jury found defendant guilty of both felon-in-possession and felony-firearm, but 
acquitted him of carrying a concealed weapon.  The Court of Appeals affirmed 
defendant’s convictions, concluding, among other things, that the trial court had not erred 
                                              
2 The precise exchange concerning the first prior conviction was as follows: 
Q.  And you know that he was convicted of carrying a weapon back then, 
correct? 
A.  Yes. 
Q.  So you knew that he carried weapons, right? 
A.  No.  I didn’t know but he was convicted. 
Q.  Okay. You didn’t know that he—you didn’t see a weapon in your 
house? 
A.  No. 
Q.  Do you know the circumstances behind that? 
A.  No. 
The prosecutor then asked about the second prior conviction, as follows: 
Q.  And you know that he was convicted of having a weapon back in 
August of 2010 too, right? 
A.  Yes. 
Q.  Was that gun in your home? 
A.  No. 
4 
by allowing the prosecutor’s questions.3  After defendant sought leave to appeal in our 
Court, we ordered oral argument on the application, directing the parties to address, 
among other things, whether the prosecutor’s cross-examination of the witness was 
proper.4 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion.  Preliminary questions of law, including whether a rule of evidence precludes 
the admission of evidence, are reviewed de novo.”  People v Burns, 494 Mich 104, 110; 
832 NW2d 738 (2013) (citation omitted). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The prosecutor sought to impeach a defense witness with evidence of defendant’s 
prior convictions.  This tactic was unusual, to put it mildly.  In a more typical situation, a 
party seeks to impeach a witness’s general credibility with evidence that the witness 
himself or herself has committed a crime, and the admissibility of such evidence is 
governed by MRE 609.5  That is not the situation here.6  The evidence also does not fit 
                                              
3 People v Wilder, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued 
September 27, 2016 (Docket No. 327491). 
4 People v Wilder, 500 Mich 997 (2017). 
5 MRE 609(a) provides for the admission of a witness’s prior crimes “contain[ing] an 
element of dishonesty or false statement” or certain crimes “contain[ing] an element of 
theft” for the purpose of impeaching that witness. 
6 Notably, even if MRE 609 applied, which it clearly does not, defendant’s prior weapons 
offenses are not the type of offenses that the rule contemplates because they do not 
involve an element of dishonesty, false statement, or theft and thus would not be 
admissible to attack the witness’s credibility. 
5 
under MRE 608, because it is not opinion or reputation evidence concerning the witness’s 
character for untruthfulness and it does not concern specific instances of the conduct of 
the witness.7  Therefore, neither of those rules is applicable.  That leaves MRE 404 as the 
rule governing the admission of evidence of defendant’s prior acts and convictions.  
However, for the reasons below, it is abundantly clear that this evidence is also not 
admissible under Rule 404. 
MRE 404(b)(1) provides that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith.  It may, however, be admissible for other purposes . . . .”8  Generally speaking, 
                                              
7 MRE 608(a) provides for the admission of opinion or reputation testimony regarding a 
witness’s “character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.”  MRE 608(b) provides that a 
witness may be questioned regarding prior specific instances of conduct on cross-
examination, but only if the prior instances of conduct are probative of “the witness’ 
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness” or “the character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined 
has testified.” 
8 Importantly, MRE 404(b) generally requires the prosecutor to give notice before trial 
that he or she intends to introduce other-acts evidence: 
The prosecution in a criminal case shall provide written notice at 
least 14 days in advance of trial, or orally on the record later if the court 
excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any 
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial and the rationale, whether or 
not mentioned in subparagraph (b)(1), for admitting the evidence.  [MRE 
404(b)(2).] 
Therefore, in most cases, a trial court’s decision whether to admit other-acts evidence 
should be “far removed from the heat of trial,” to use the dissent’s phrasing.  Post at 1.  In 
this case, even though the prosecutor did not provide the required notice in advance of 
trial (or explain why pretrial notice should be excused), the trial judge had ample 
opportunity to consider the question of admissibility of the evidence when the topic came 
up, and defense counsel objected to its admission, both outside the presence of the jury 
before its admission and subsequently when defendant moved for a mistrial. 
6 
impeachment by contradiction can be a proper purpose for the admission of other-acts 
evidence.  See United States v Copelin, 302 US App DC 113, 116; 996 F2d 379 (1993) 
(“Although it is not one of the listed permissible purposes, an attempt to impeach through 
contradiction a defendant acting as a witness is indisputably a legitimate reason to 
introduce evidence of other crimes or wrongs.”), overruled on other grounds by United 
States v Rhodes, 314 US App DC 117 (1995); see also People v Taylor, 422 Mich 407, 
414-415; 373 NW2d 579 (1985).9  Impeachment of this kind usually occurs when a 
prosecutor seeks to cross-examine a defendant about prior convictions in order to 
impeach a defendant’s blanket denial on direct examination of ever engaging in conduct 
similar to the charged conduct.  See, e.g., United States v Gilmore, 553 F3d 266, 271-272 
(CA 3, 2009) (and cases cited).   
In this case, the prosecutor’s initial questions were not logically relevant10 to a 
proper purpose under MRE 404(b) because they were not designed to elicit an answer 
contradicting any statements made by the witness on direct examination.  See People v 
Denson, 500 Mich 385, 402; 902 NW2d 306 (2017).11  As it pertained to weapons, the 
                                              
9 Although this Court in Taylor cited MRE 404(b) in passing, it did not rely on that rule 
in concluding that evidence of prior convictions is admissible to rebut specific testimony 
of the defendant at trial.  We believe that Taylor reached the correct result, but we take 
this opportunity to clarify that the admissibility of defendant’s prior convictions to 
impeach by contradiction a witness’ testimony is governed by MRE 404(b). 
10 See MRE 401 (“ ‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”).   
11 In Denson, 500 Mich at 401, we said that logical relevance has two components: 
materiality and probative value.  Other-acts evidence offered to impeach specific 
testimony satisfies the materiality component of logical relevance because witness 
credibility is “of consequence” to the action.  MRE 401.  However, the other-acts 
7 
witness’s direct testimony was limited to whether defendant owned a gun or possessed 
one on the date in question.  This testimony would not have been contradicted even if the 
witness had acknowledged “know[ing] of” defendant to more generally carry weapons.12  
Thus, although the prosecutor articulated a proper purpose under MRE 404(b)—
impeachment by contradiction—the prosecutor did not establish that the questions asked 
were logically relevant to impeachment.13  The prosecutor’s broad and repeated questions 
                                              
 
evidence must still be probative to the purpose for which it was offered.  Denson, 500 
Mich at 402 (stating that “the proffered evidence truly must be probative of something 
other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime”) (quotation marks, citation, 
and emphasis omitted).  For the reasons discussed above, the testimony elicited was not 
probative with regard to impeachment. 
12 The dissent argues that we have failed to show that the prosecutor’s initial questions 
were improper under MRE 611 because the questions were within the scope of cross-
examination.  That is a straw man.  We have nowhere stated that the questions were 
improper under MRE 611 or not within the scope of cross-examination.  As explained 
further below, however, the questions concerned other acts and were not offered for a 
proper purpose under MRE 404(b).  A question may be within the scope of cross-
examination under MRE 611 and still run afoul of another evidentiary rule, such as MRE 
404(b).  See MRE 402 (“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise 
provided by the Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State of 
Michigan, these rules, or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court.”); Old Chief v 
United States, 519 US 172, 181; 117 S Ct 644; 136 L Ed 2d 574 (1997) (“ ‘Although . . . 
“propensity evidence” is relevant, the risk that a jury will convict for crimes other than 
those charged—or that, uncertain of guilt, it will convict anyway because a bad person 
deserves punishment—creates a prejudicial effect that outweighs ordinary relevance.’ ”), 
quoting United States v Moccia, 681 F2d 61, 63 (CA 1, 1982).  The dissent recognizes 
this principle elsewhere, see post at 13 n 23, but ignores it here. 
13 See Denson, 500 Mich at 400 (“In other words, merely reciting a proper purpose does 
not actually demonstrate the existence of a proper purpose for the particular other-acts 
evidence at issue and does not automatically render the evidence admissible.  Rather, in 
order to determine whether an articulated purpose is, in fact, merely a front for the 
improper admission of other-acts evidence, the trial court must closely scrutinize the 
logical relevance of the evidence under the second prong of the VanderVliet test.”); 
People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 74; 508 NW2d 114 (1993). 
8 
about defendant’s weapons-carrying proclivities were simply an attempt to elicit 
propensity evidence.14 
Absent a proper purpose, evidence of defendant’s other acts was inadmissible 
under MRE 404(a) unless defendant opened the door by introducing evidence of his good 
character.  See MRE 404(a)(1) (prohibiting the prosecution from offering character 
evidence of an accused to prove action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, 
except on rebuttal if the accused has first offered evidence of his or her good character).  
Defendant in this case, however, never opened the door by eliciting testimony as to his 
good character from the defense witness on direct examination.  The prosecutor’s 
tactic—i.e., shifting the focus from the pertinent facts to which the witness testified on 
direct examination to a broader inquiry about defendant’s general weapons proclivities—
was an impermissible attempt by the prosecutor to open the subject of defendant’s 
character.15  Where, as here, the defendant does not offer character evidence, a 
                                              
14 Although we need not reach the issue, we also question whether the prosecutor’s use of 
defendant’s prior convictions to impeach a separate witness could pass muster under Rule 
403, which provides that “evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.”  See VanderVliet, 444 Mich at 74-75 
(identifying the MRE 403 balancing test as one of the four prongs of the test for 
admissibility under MRE 404(b)).   
15 Questions designed to elicit character evidence are generally inappropriate even when 
asked of the defendant on cross-examination.  As a leading treatise notes: 
 When the defendant is asked on cross-examination about his 
criminal tendencies, forcing him to object to the initial question would once 
again raise a red flag (he must be a crook, if he cannot give a straight 
answer to such a question), and if the question gets by without objection or 
he answers quickly, the prosecutor should not be allowed to contradict 
whatever he says (“no, I’m not involved in crime”) by proving prior crimes.  
[3 Mueller & Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence (4th ed), § 6:90, p 570.] 
9 
prosecutor’s attempt to elicit character evidence regarding the defendant on cross-
examination of another witness is not permitted by MRE 404(a)(1).16 
                                              
 
That is why, unlike the dissent, see post at 11 n 18, we would not penalize defendant for 
his counsel’s failure to object to the initial improper question.   
The questions are even more indefensible (and unusual) in this case, since the 
prosecutor attempted to open the subject of defendant’s character on cross-examination 
of a witness other than defendant.  Like courts from other jurisdictions, we firmly reject 
this tactic.  See Smith v State, 763 SW2d 836, 843 (Tex App, 1988) (“Further, the State 
may not, on cross-examination, transform appellant’s fact witness into a character 
witness in order to impeach with otherwise admissible ‘have you heard’ questions.”); 
People v Jones, 278 App Div 2d 246, 247; 717 NYS2d 270 (2000) (“The Supreme Court 
erred in permitting the prosecutor to cross-examine the fiancée about the defendant’s 
previous convictions.  Although such cross-examination may be permissible if the 
defendant ‘opens the door’ by offering evidence which tends to mislead the jury, in this 
case, the Supreme Court’s ruling permitted the People to ‘open the door’ and then step 
through it[.]”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also State v Gowan, 302 Mont 
127, 131; 2000 MT 277; 13 P3d 376 (2000) (“We conclude that although a defendant can 
open the door with statements made during either direct or cross-examination, and a 
defense witness can open the door on direct-examination, a defense witness cannot 
inadvertently open the door on cross-examination.  Under [Montana Rule of Evidence 
404(a)(1)], only the accused can ‘open the door’ for the prosecution to introduce rebuttal 
character evidence.”).  
16 The dissent argues there can be no violation of MRE 404 since the prosecutor’s initial 
questions failed to elicit other-acts evidence from the witness.  The dissent’s assertion 
misses the marks for two reasons.  First, it is beyond dispute—or should be—that 
questions designed to elicit other-acts evidence, absent a proper purpose, violate MRE 
404(b) and are objectionable for that reason.  See 1 McCormick, Evidence (7th ed), 
§ 190, p 1030 n 5 (“The [404(b)] rule of exclusion encompasses questions which, though 
answered negatively, insinuate that the accused committed other crimes.”).  That is why 
attorneys typically object before the witness provides an answer to the question.  3 
Michigan Pleading & Practice (2d ed), § 35:36, p 593 (“An objection to a question should 
be made before the answer.”).  Second, the dissent’s argument is blithely indifferent to 
the most problematic aspect of this case—that the prosecutor was allowed to use an 
improper question to elicit a denial that the prosecutor then was allowed to impeach with 
defendant’s prior criminal history. 
10 
Despite the analysis above, the prosecutor maintains that her second set of 
questions regarding defendant’s prior firearm convictions was appropriate to impeach the 
witness’s response to the first set of improper questions.  However, it should almost go 
without saying that a party cannot seek to elicit inadmissible character evidence on cross-
examination when the opposing party has not opened the door and then claim the right to 
impeach the elicited denial as a subterfuge to elicit even more inadmissible character 
evidence.  See generally People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 693; 521 NW2d 557 (1994) 
(“[A] prosecutor may not use an elicited denial as a springboard for introducing 
[otherwise inadmissible] substantive evidence under the guise of rebutting the denial.”) 
(citation omitted).  See also Jones v Southern Pac R, 962 F2d 447, 450 (CA 5, 1992) 
(“[A] party cannot delve into collateral matters on its own initiative and then claim a right 
to impeach that testimony with contradictory evidence.  This would be a mere subterfuge 
to get before the jury evidence not otherwise admissible.”) (quotation marks and citations 
omitted).17  Any other conclusion would eviscerate Rule 404.18  
                                              
17 It is rather facile to think, as the dissent apparently does, that the prosecutor questioned 
the witness on defendant’s prior gun convictions in order to spread doubt among the jury 
members about whether she really had knowledge of defendant generally.  While the 
prosecutor may have intended to impeach the witness’s specific testimony regarding 
defendant’s wardrobe preferences and dominant hand, it is hard to see how the prosecutor 
would make much headway showing the witness did not have “knowledge of defendant 
generally,” given that they were married for nine years and the witness had “been with 
him for sixteen years.”   
18 If we looked approvingly on the prosecutor’s stratagem in this case, one might expect 
prosecutors to ask improper propensity questions in every case if nothing more were 
needed to lay the groundwork for the admission of otherwise inadmissible other-acts 
evidence.  Indeed, under the dissent’s analysis, a prosecutor would have a foolproof way 
of admitting a defendant’s prior crimes.  Simply ask, “Do you know of defendant to 
engage in [insert criminal activity].”  If the witness answers no, then no violation has 
occurred, and the prosecutor can then impeach the denial with defendant’s criminal 
11 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, we reverse that part of the Court of Appeals’ judgment 
holding that the cross-examination of defense witness Tameachi Wilder concerning 
whether she knew of defendant to carry guns and her knowledge of the defendant’s prior 
weapons convictions was not error, and remand this case to the Court of Appeals to 
consider whether the error was harmless.19   
 
 
David F. Viviano 
 
Bridget M. McCormack 
 
Richard H. Bernstein 
 
Elizabeth T. Clement 
                                              
 
record.  Taken a step further, a prosecutor could ask a defendant, “Do you commit 
crimes?”  If no, then the prosecutor may impeach with the defendant’s entire criminal 
history.  Viewed in this light, the prosecutor’s tactic is not merely a “novelty,” post at 1, 
but an end run around a safeguard “deeply rooted in our jurisprudence,” People v 
Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 383-384; 582 NW2d 785 (1998) (“Far from being a mere 
technicality, the rule reflects and gives meaning to the central precept of our system of 
criminal justice, the presumption of innocence.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
19 In all other respects, leave to appeal is denied because we are not persuaded that the 
remaining question presented should be reviewed by the Court.   
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No. 154814 
 
DARRELL JOHN WILDER, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
ZAHRA, J. (dissenting). 
The Court concludes that the prosecutor’s use of defendant’s convictions for 
possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm) to impeach a 
defense witness’s prior testimony on cross-examination was improper under Michigan 
Rule of Evidence 404(b).  As more fully explained below, I disagree with the majority’s 
interpretation and application of Rule 404(b).1  While the manner in which defendant’s 
prior convictions were used in this case was undoubtedly atypical, novelty alone is no 
reason to misconstrue the plain language of the rules of evidence.  In my view, the Court, 
with the benefit of hindsight and far removed from the heat of trial, has unduly restricted 
the discretion of the trial judge with regard to the admission of evidence.  Accordingly, I 
dissent. 
                                              
1 I agree with the majority that neither Rule 608 nor Rule 609 is applicable in this case. 
 
 
 
 
2
I.  FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Darrell J. Wilder was charged with carrying a concealed weapon, being 
a felon in possession of a firearm (felon-in-possession), and felony-firearm after two 
Detroit police officers saw defendant pull a hand-held firearm with his right hand from 
his right pants pocket and place it in the trunk of a vehicle located in a vacant lot.  One of 
the officers testified that defendant was wearing “corduroy or pants similar” to corduroy 
on the night in question.   
During trial, defendant called several witnesses, one of whom was his wife, 
Tameachi Wilder.  This witness testified that she and defendant had been married for 
nine years and, although there were occasions during their marriage when they had been 
separated, the two of them were living together on May 16, 2014, the date of the offense.  
She also testified that, to her knowledge, defendant did not wear or even own corduroys, 
and that he is left-handed.  When asked how she knew that defendant was left-handed, 
she responded, “[b]ecause I’ve been with him for sixteen years.” 
According to the witness, she was with defendant on the afternoon in question 
when he received a call from his brother, Carlos Wilder.  The witness testified that 
defendant left with Carlos and that she did not know where they were going.  The 
following exchange then took place between defense counsel and the witness on direct 
examination: 
Q.  Okay.  And when you see your husband leave the house did you 
see him with a gun? 
A.  No. 
Q.  To your knowledge, do [sic] he own a gun? 
A.  No. 
 
 
 
 
3
Q.  Do you have any weapons in your house? 
A.  No. 
During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked the witness the following 
questions: 
Q.  Now you were asked whether or not Mr. Wilder had a weapon 
with him on that day? 
A.  Yes. 
Q.  Okay.  You don’t know where he went?  You didn’t see where 
he went after he left your apartment on the eastside of Detroit, did you? 
A.  No. 
Q.  Do you know of Mr. Wilder to carry weapons? 
A.  No. 
Q.  Do you know of him to carry guns? 
A.  No. 
Q.  You’ve been with him for nine years and you don’t know of him 
to carry guns? 
A.  No. 
At this point, the prosecutor asked to approach the bench and the jury was 
excused.  Outside the presence of the jury, the following discussion occurred: 
[The Prosecutor]: Your Honor, Mrs. Wilder testified that she’s 
known him for sixteen years and has been married to him for nine years and 
now is testifying that she did not know him to carry a weapon.  He has a 
Felony[-]Firearm conviction on August of 2010, another Felony-Firearm 
conviction on June of 2007, and I think that it is relevant and I think that I 
should be able to ask her about those convictions. 
[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, the Prosecutor is simply trying to 
back-door and get in convictions that she knows that she can’t get in, and 
 
 
 
 
4
the fact that Mr. Wilder had been convicted, these aren’t crimes involving 
theft, dishonesty or false statements, and then it presumes that Ms. Wilder 
knows something.  Again, she says they’ve had an on and off again 
relationship.  I don’t think it’s relevant and it’s simply a way of them trying 
to back-door and get in convictions that they know aren’t relevant. 
[The Court]: Well I’m going to allow and that’s what happens when 
you put witnesses on the stand and open the door.  I mean she got on the 
stand, and you asked her on direct examination if she’s ever seen with a 
gun [sic], if there were any guns in the house, if he owned any weapons and 
if he had a gun that day, so that doesn’t mean that once on cross-
examination, and you talked about the length of their relationship.  That 
doesn’t mean that on cross-examination that she can’t challenge that, 
challenge the voracity [sic] of him.  In essence she becomes like a character 
witness and so I believe you’ve opened the door and I’m going to allow it.  
Your objection is overruled.  Your objection is preserved for the record. 
During further cross-examination, the prosecutor then asked the following 
questions: 
Q.  Ms. Wilder, you were with him in 2007, correct? 
A.  Yes. 
Q.  And you know that he was convicted of carrying a weapon back 
then, correct? 
A.  Yes. 
Q.  So you knew that he carried weapons, right? 
A.  No.  I didn’t know but he was convicted. 
Q.  Okay.  You didn’t know that he—you didn’t see a weapon in 
your house? 
A.  No. 
Q.  Do you know the circumstances behind that? 
A.  No. 
 
 
 
 
5
Regarding defendant’s second felony-firearm conviction, the prosecutor asked the 
following questions: 
Q.  And you know that he was convicted of having a weapon back in 
August of 2010 too, right? 
A.  Yes. 
Q.  Was that gun in your home? 
A.  No. 
Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel moved for a mistrial on grounds 
that the prosecutor’s questioning of the witness was “inadmissible” and “unfairly 
prejudicial.”  Defense counsel argued that she had not opened the door for character 
evidence because her questions of the witness concerned whether defendant possessed a 
firearm on the day of the incident and that it had been the prosecutor who questioned the 
witness about whether she knew defendant to possess a firearm.  The trial court denied 
the motion.  The jury subsequently returned a verdict of guilty for the felon-in-possession 
and felony-firearm charges, but acquitted defendant of carrying a concealed weapon. 
Defendant appealed by right, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court erred by 
allowing cross-examination of the witness about defendant’s prior felony-firearm 
convictions and denying the subsequent motion for a mistrial.  The Court of Appeals 
disagreed, concluding that the trial court had not abused its discretion by denying 
defendant’s motion for a mistrial because the trial court had not erred by admitting 
evidence of defendant’s prior convictions.2  In reaching this conclusion, the Court of 
                                              
2 People v Wilder, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued 
September 27, 2016 (Docket No. 327491). 
 
 
 
 
6
Appeals held that the impeachment evidence was admissible under Rule 404(b) because 
the prosecutor sought to introduce the prior convictions to challenge the credibility of the 
witness relative to the assertion that defendant did not own or carry firearms. 
Defendant applied for leave to appeal in this Court.  This Court directed the Clerk 
to schedule oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other action.3  
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The decision to admit evidence is within the trial court’s discretion and will not be 
disturbed unless that decision fell “ ‘outside the range of principled outcomes.’ ”4  We 
review de novo preliminary questions of law, however, which include whether a rule of 
evidence prohibits the admission of particular evidence, and a trial court abuses its 
discretion if it admits evidence that is inadmissible as a matter of law.5 
III.  ANALYSIS 
It is important to keep in mind the two discrete sets of questions at issue in this 
case, as well as the testimonial evidence those questions elicited.  The first set of 
questions concerned whether the witness knew defendant “to carry weapons . . . [or] 
guns,” and the witness’s responses of “no.”  The second set of questions concerned 
whether the witness had knowledge of defendant’s prior felony-firearm convictions, to 
                                              
3 People v Wilder, 500 Mich 997 (2017). 
4 People v Douglas, 496 Mich 557, 565; 852 NW2d 587 (2014), quoting People v 
Musser, 494 Mich 337, 348; 835 NW2d 319 (2013). 
5 People v Bynum, 496 Mich 610, 623; 852 NW2d 570 (2014), citing People v McDaniel, 
469 Mich 409, 412; 670 NW2d 659 (2003). 
 
 
 
 
7
which the witness responded in the affirmative.  The admissibility of the witness’s 
testimony (which is evidence) and the questions that elicited it (which are not evidence) 
will be addressed in turn. 
A.  TESTIMONY THAT THE WITNESS DID NOT KNOW DEFENDANT TO 
CARRY FIREARMS IS NOT “OTHER ACTS” EVIDENCE UNDER RULE 404(b) 
To begin, the majority posits that the prosecutor’s initial questions relating to 
whether the witness knew defendant to carry “weapons” or “guns” were improper under 
Rule 404(b) because the witness only testified on direct examination as to whether 
defendant owned or possessed a firearm on May 16, 2014, and because the questions 
were not logically relevant to a proper purpose under that rule.  I disagree with the 
majority on both accounts. 
First, restricting a party’s cross-examination of a witness to the precise temporal 
confinements of direct examination would, in the words of the majority, violate a “basic 
tenet[] of our rules of evidence”6 that, under Rule 611, a “witness may be cross-examined 
on any matter relevant to any issue in the case . . . .”7  When it comes to “matters not 
                                              
6 Ante at 1. 
7 MRE 611(c) (emphasis added); see also People v Layher, 464 Mich 756, 761; 631 
NW2d 281 (2001) (stating that a trial court has discretion in determining relevance and 
considering the possibility of unfair prejudice when ruling on the propriety of questions 
asked on cross-examination).  Notably, evidence that falls under 404(b), even if 
inadmissible, is often “relevant” to an issue in a case.  See Old Chief v United States, 519 
US 172, 181; 117 S Ct 644; 136 L Ed 2d 574 (1997) (“The inquiry [into one’s character] 
is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too 
much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general 
record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge.”) (quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  Therefore, nothing in Rule 611 prohibits a prosecutor from 
cross-examining a witness regarding 404(b) evidence. 
 
 
 
 
8
testified to on direct examination,” it falls within the trial court’s discretion to permit or 
limit cross-examination,8 and a trial court’s decision on a close evidentiary question will 
ordinarily not be an abuse of discretion.9 
In this case, the witness’s testimony on direct examination touched upon her 
knowledge of defendant owning or possessing a firearm earlier in the day on May 16, 
2014.10  It also touched upon her knowledge of defendant as it related to his dominant 
hand and his ownership of corduroy pants.  The prosecutor’s cross-examination expanded 
the temporal scope of the former issue by addressing the witness’s knowledge of 
defendant’s ownership or possession of a firearm beyond the date of the offense.  
Permitting this line of questioning was certainly within the range of principled outcomes 
                                              
8 MRE 611(c); see also Wischmeyer v Schanz, 449 Mich 469, 474-475; 536 NW2d 760 
(1995) (“The scope and duration of cross-examination is in the trial court’s sound 
discretion; we will not reverse absent a clear showing of abuse.”), citing Wilson v Stilwill, 
411 Mich 587, 599; 309 NW2d 898 (1981); People v Watson, 307 Mich 596, 607-608; 12 
NW2d 476 (1943) (“[C]ross-examination on matters relevant to the issue is a matter of 
right and . . . the extent of it is a matter that rests in the sound discretion of the trial 
judge.”); accord Heshelman v Lombardi, 183 Mich App 72, 84; 454 NW2d 603 (1990) 
(“The scope of cross-examination, like the admission of evidence, is a matter within the 
trial court’s discretion, and the court’s determination should not be reversed absent an 
abuse of that discretion.”). 
9 People v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 67; 614 NW2d 888 (2000); see also 
Layher, 464 Mich at 761, citing People v Golochowicz, 413 Mich 298, 322; 319 NW2d 
518 (1982). 
10 Because the witness did not accompany defendant when he left the apartment, she had 
no actual knowledge as to whether defendant was in possession of a firearm while he was 
in the vacant lot.  Accordingly, the relevancy of her testimony that she did not observe 
defendant in possession of a firearm while he was present in the apartment was 
presumably to show that it was more probable than not that he did not possess the firearm 
later in the day. 
 
 
 
 
9
and not an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.  The majority, however, 
provides no explanation for why there is a clear showing that the trial court abused its 
discretion by permitting these questions under Rule 611 or this Court’s jurisprudence.  
More importantly, neither does defendant. 
Second, the majority claims that these “initial questions were not logically relevant 
to a proper purpose under MRE 404(b) because they were not designed to elicit an 
answer contradicting any statements made by the witness on direct examination.”11  The 
majority, however, fails to explain why this line of questioning, and the “no” responses it 
produced, implicates Rule 404(b) in the first place.   
Rule 404(b) provides that “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith.”12  Even assuming that the prosecutor’s questions “elicit[ed] propensity 
evidence” regarding defendant’s “weapons-carrying proclivities,”13 as the majority 
suggests, it is axiomatic that these questions, by themselves, were not evidence.14  Rather, 
                                              
11 Ante at 6 (citation omitted). 
12 MRE 404(b)(1). 
13 Ante at 8. 
14 People v Mesik (On Reconsideration), 285 Mich App 535, 541; 775 NW2d 857 (2009); 
see also M Crim JI 3.5(2) (“Evidence includes only the sworn testimony of witnesses[, 
the exhibits admitted into evidence, and anything else I told you to consider as 
evidence].”); M Crim JI 2.7 (“The questions the lawyers ask the witnesses are not 
evidence.  Only the answers are evidence.  You should not think that something is true 
just because one of the lawyers asks questions that assume or suggest that it is.”); M Crim 
JI 3.5(5) (“The lawyers’ statements and arguments [and any commentary] are not 
evidence.  They are only meant to help you understand the evidence and each side’s legal 
theories.  You should only accept things the lawyers say that are supported by the 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
it is the sworn testimony of the witness in response to those questions that constituted 
evidence; the prosecutor’s questioning could be used only to give meaning to the 
witness’s responses.15   
In this case, the testimonial evidence adduced during cross-examination was that 
the witness did not know defendant to carry firearms.  But by answering in the negative, 
how exactly does the witness’s testimony of defendant not performing an act amount to 
evidence of defendant’s “other acts” to implicate Rule 404(b)?  The majority provides no 
answer to this question.16  That is because, in my opinion, there is none.17  It goes without 
                                              
evidence or by your own common sense and general knowledge.  The lawyers’ questions 
to the witnesses [, your questions to the witnesses,] and my questions to the witnesses are 
also not evidence.  You should consider these questions only as they give meaning to the 
witnesses’ answers.”). 
15 Mesik, 285 Mich App at 541. 
16 The majority similarly states later in its opinion that “a prosecutor’s attempt to elicit 
character evidence regarding the defendant on cross-examination of another witness is 
not permitted by MRE 404(a)(1).”  Ante at 8-9.  Rule 404(a)(1) provides: 
Evidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is not admissible for 
the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular 
occasion, except . . . [e]vidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by 
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; or if evidence of a trait 
of character of the alleged victim of the crime is offered by the accused and 
admitted under subdivision (a)(2), evidence of a trait of character for 
aggression of the accused offered by the prosecution[.] 
Again, the majority is mistaking questions with testimony when it comes to 
inadmissible evidence under Rule 404(a)(1). 
17 See, e.g., Mesik, 285 Mich App at 540-541 (“Had defendant confirmed, as a witness 
from the stand, any of the assertions by the prosecutor, those confirmations would have 
constituted evidence.  But defendant only denied any recollection of the matters about 
which he was asked.  Although the prosecutor’s questions were, as noted, misleading and 
improper, the prosecutor’s questions are not evidence and therefore cannot be hearsay.”). 
 
 
 
 
11 
saying that without evidence of defendant’s other crimes, wrongs, or acts, Rule 404(b) 
cannot be applied for purposes of determining admissibility.18   
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting this evidence 
because that decision fell within the range of principled outcomes and the witness’s 
testimony was not inadmissible as a matter of law. 
B.  DEFENDANT’S PRIOR CONVICTIONS WERE ADMISSIBLE FOR THE 
NONCHARACTER PURPOSE OF IMPEACHMENT UNDER RULE 404(b) 
After responding that she did not know defendant to carry firearms, the prosecutor 
sought to impeach this testimony by asking the witness whether she knew of defendant’s 
prior felony-firearm convictions from 2007 and 2010.  The theory underlying this line of 
questioning was that if the witness knew of defendant’s prior convictions for carrying a 
firearm, then she knew that defendant had previously carried firearms, which would be 
inconsistent with her prior testimony that she did not know defendant to carry firearms.  
Moreover, these questions sought to undermine the witness’s credibility and knowledge 
of defendant generally, which she relied upon when testifying that defendant was left-
handed and did not own or wear corduroy pants.  So it goes, the witness responded to the 
prosecutor’s questions in the affirmative.19 
                                              
18 The majority is correct that a question designed to elicit inadmissible evidence is 
objectionable.  Thus, at most, the majority has provided an ample explanation for why 
defense counsel would have been justified in objecting to the prosecutor’s initial 
questions.  Counsel, however, did not object to these questions, and the witness did not 
testify about defendant’s other acts.  On the other hand, had the witness responded that 
she did know defendant to carry firearms, perhaps then the majority would be correct that 
such testimony was inadmissible under Rule 404(b).  But that is not the case here. 
19 The distinction the witness drew in her testimony between knowing of defendant’s 
prior felony-firearm convictions but not knowing that he, in fact, carried a firearm, while 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
Although this testimonial evidence regarding defendant’s prior convictions would 
be inadmissible “to prove the character of [defendant] in order to show action in 
conformity therewith,” Rule 404(b) provides that such evidence may be admitted for a 
purpose other than to show defendant’s propensity to commit the crimes charged.20  In 
this case, defendant’s prior convictions were offered for a noncharacter purpose—
impeachment.21   
By seeking to introduce evidence of defendant’s prior convictions in this case, the 
prosecutor was not attempting to solely establish either that defendant had a propensity 
for committing firearms-related crimes or that the prior convictions made it more likely 
                                              
epistemologically interesting, does not negate the fact that the prosecutor had a good-
faith purpose under Rule 404(b)(1) to seek to introduce testimonial evidence of 
defendant’s prior convictions to impeach the witness and challenge her credibility. 
20 MRE 404(b)(1) (“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts . . . may . . . be admissible 
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme, 
plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident 
when the same is material, whether such other crimes, wrongs, or acts are 
contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the conduct at issue in the case.”).  
Because this rule favors the inclusion of evidence over its omission, we often refer to it as 
an inclusionary rule.  See, e.g., People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 64; 508 NW2d 114 
(1993) (“ ‘Put simply, [Rule 404(b)] is inclusionary rather than exclusionary.’ ”), quoting 
People v Engelman, 434 Mich 204, 213; 453 NW2d 656 (1990).  Accordingly, 
“[e]vidence relevant to a noncharacter purpose is admissible under MRE 404(b) even if it 
also reflects on a defendant’s character.  Evidence is inadmissible under this rule only if it 
is relevant solely to the defendant’s character or criminal propensity.”  People v Mardlin, 
487 Mich 609, 615-616; 790 NW2d 607 (2010).  In other words, evidence susceptible to 
a prohibited propensity inference can still be admitted despite the rule, if it serves a valid 
purpose.  Rock v Crocker, 499 Mich 247, 257; 884 NW2d 227 (2016); Mardlin, 487 
Mich at 616. 
21 Although impeachment is not expressly listed as one of the examples in Rule 
404(b)(1), this Court has repeatedly held that this list is nonexhaustive in nature.  See 
People v Jackson, 498 Mich 246, 259; 869 NW2d 253 (2015). 
 
 
 
 
13 
that defendant committed the crimes for which he was on trial.  Instead, this evidence 
was used to impeach the witness’s prior testimony that she did not know defendant to 
carry firearms.  For this reason alone, defendant’s prior convictions were admissible 
under Rule 404(b). 
Again, this use of defendant’s prior convictions may have been unusual, but it was 
still permissible under Rule 404(b).  Although the majority looks disapprovingly upon the 
prosecutor’s tactic and believes this conclusion would somehow “eviscerate Rule 404,”22 
it is the correct outcome given the plain language of that rule.23 
C.  THE PROSECUTOR’S QUESTIONS SERVED A VALID NONPROPENSITY 
PURPOSE WHEN CONSIDERING THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
A broader and more general point bears discussion as well.  Impeachment need not 
be as obvious as using a single question to point out an inconsistency.  It can be as subtle 
as showing that evidence, apparently credible, is actually anything but when all the facts 
are laid before the jury.24  The prosecutor’s questions, regardless of whether they were or 
were not evidence, were clearly designed to impeach the witness’s credibility and 
                                              
22 Ante at 10. 
23 This is not to say that defendant’s prior convictions could not have been found to be 
inadmissible under another rule of evidence.  For instance, Rule 403 provides that 
relevant “evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .”  MRE 403.  But defendant failed to provide any 
meaningful analysis in either his application for leave to appeal in this Court or his 
supplemental brief to explain why the impeachment evidence in this case is unfairly 
prejudicial and how that prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value. 
24 See generally Behler v Hanlon, 199 FRD 553, 556 (D Md, 2001) (observing the 
multitude of ways to impeach a witness and that the rules of evidence were not designed 
to narrow the range of permissible methods). 
 
 
 
 
14 
veracity, particularly when they are viewed in the context of the witness’s entire 
testimony. 
Throughout direct examination, defense counsel elicited more from the witness 
than simply whether defendant left the house with a gun on the day in question; counsel 
also implied that this witness was a credible source of this information by tacitly 
suggesting that the jury could trust this witness with regard to what defendant did or did 
not have in his possession: 
Q.  . . . Ms. Wilder, do you know somebody named Darrell Wilder? 
A.  Yes. 
Q.  And how do you know him? 
A.  He’s my husband. 
Q.  And how long have you been married? 
A.  We’ve been married nine years. . . .  
Q. And back on May 16, 2014 [the date in question], what was the 
status of your relationship with Mr. Wilder? 
A.  Married still. 
Q.  Okay. And were you living together on that day? 
A.  Yes. 
Q.  And on that day was Mr. Wilder at the house with you? 
A.  Yes. 
*   *   * 
Q.  Okay.  And when you see your husband leave the house did you 
see him with a gun? 
A.  No. 
 
 
 
 
15 
Q.  To your knowledge, do[es] he own a gun? 
A.  No. 
Q.  Do you have any weapons in your house? 
A.  No . . .  
Q.  And Mr.—your husband, do you know whether he’s left-handed 
or right handed . . .  
A.  He’s left. 
Q.  How do you know? 
A.  Because I’ve been with him for sixteen years. 
There was nothing wrong with defense counsel’s approach; it is elemental to 
present the witness in a favorable light to make her testimony appear more truthful than 
not.  Counsel’s approach, however, was built on an incomplete presentation of the facts.  
The prosecutor knew this, which is why, on cross-examination, she understandably 
sought to rebut the inference: 
Q.  All right.  You’ve been married to him for nine years; is that 
correct? 
A.  Yes. 
Q.  Would you agree with me that you have an off and on type 
relationship, right? 
A.  Yes. 
Q.  In fact, he has other children by other women, correct? 
[Defense counsel].  Relevance, you[r] Honor? Objection, 
relevance. 
[The Court].  How is that relevant? 
[Prosecutor].  Well, Judge, it’s my position that he doesn’t 
always stay with her that at the apartment that she testified 
 
 
 
 
16 
that she lives in so she doesn’t know what he may be doing or 
what type of weapon he may possess. 
[The Court].  Overruled. 
*   *   * 
Q.  And how long before May—had Mr. Wilder been living with 
you for a period of time before May 16th? 
A.  Yes.  Like it’s been off and on because we were trying to work 
on our marriage. 
Q.  Okay.  When you say off and on, how long had he been living at 
your apartment on the eastside of Detroit? 
A.  For about a month. 
Q.  And you’d agree with me that he didn’t have all his things at 
your home, correct? 
A.  No.  He had most of them, yeah.  He had most of them. 
*   *   * 
Q.  Now you were asked whether or not Mr. Wilder had a weapon 
with him on that day? 
A.  Yes. 
Q.  Okay.  You don’t know where he went?  You didn’t see where 
he went after he left your apartment on the eastside of Detroit, did you? 
A.  No. 
Q.  Do you know of Mr. Wilder to carry weapons? 
A.  No. 
Q.  Do you know of him to carry guns? 
A.  No. 
Q.  You’ve been with him for nine years and you don’t know of him 
to carry guns? 
A.  No. 
 
 
 
 
17 
Evident from this line of questioning was the prosecutor’s tactic of trying to rebut 
an inference that the witness was a credible source of information about defendant and, 
therefore, it served the valid purpose of impeaching the witness’s credibility in general.  
Because this case turned on the issue of whether defendant carried or possessed the hand-
held firearm before placing it in the trunk of the car, the purported relevance of the 
witness’s testimony that she did not observe defendant leave the house with a firearm was 
that it made this crucial fact at trial less likely.  Because defense counsel’s questioning 
inferentially portrayed the witness as a credible source of this information, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the jury would have been more likely to believe the witness. 
But if defendant kept other houses and their marriage was often on the rocks, then 
perhaps the witness did not know as much as she suggested by her testimony on direct 
examination.  Moreover, if the witness knew that defendant typically carried firearms, the 
witness’s blanket denial that defendant even possessed a firearm, coupled with these 
other omitted facts, would appear to be disingenuous, perhaps even dishonest.  This is 
precisely what the prosecutor’s questions were attempting to demonstrate: that, through 
the witness’s testimony, defense counsel was portraying half-truths as the complete 
factual circumstances.25 
This calculus does not change merely because the prosecutor was attempting to 
impeach an inference rather than direct testimony.  Indirect inferences can be as probative 
                                              
25 Contra ante at 6 (suggesting that the prosecutor’s questions were only logically 
relevant if they were designed to elicit an answer directly contradicting statements made 
by the witness during direct examination).   
 
 
 
 
18 
and reliable as direct evidence.26  Parties are even free to build inferences upon inferences 
for the jury to consider, if they are logically relevant.27  Accordingly, where testimony is 
given by a witness on direct examination from which an inference arises favorable to the 
producing party, surely anything within the knowledge of the witness tending to rebut 
that inference is admissible.  This is the very essence of impeachment.28 
Because the prosecutor’s questions served a valid nonpropensity purpose, Rule 
404(b) did not bar the witness’s testimony concerning defendant’s prior convictions.  
And because the witness continued to deny knowing whether defendant ever carried 
firearms, the prosecutor was entitled to ask the trial court whether she could impeach the 
witness with questions about defendant’s prior convictions.  That is not to say that the 
prosecutor’s initial questions did not carry with them a risk that the jury would consider 
the witness’s answers as proof of defendant’s alleged criminal tendencies.  That risk was 
                                              
26 See Matras v Amoco Oil Co, 424 Mich 675, 683; 385 NW2d 586 (1986). 
27 People v Hardiman, 466 Mich 417, 428; 646 NW2d 158 (2002); see also VanderVliet, 
444 Mich at 61 (noting disagreement with the idea that an inference could not be based 
on another inference).   
28 Nor is there anything revolutionary about this statement.  See Campau v Dewey, 9 
Mich 381, 414 (1861) (“By this course of inquiry, the plaintiffs had made the identity of 
all the reservees a question in some degree pertinent to the case, if indeed it were not so 
before; and opened this whole field of inquiry to cross-examination by the defendants; 
for, if the plaintiffs could inquire into the names and family connections of the various 
reservees, for the purpose of strengthening the inference of identity, and to gain a higher 
degree of credit for their witness, by showing extensive familiarity with, and a clear 
memory of the facts, the defendants must be allowed to cross-examine him at large upon 
the same general subjects, for the purpose of weakening the inference from his direct 
evidence, and to diminish the credit otherwise due to his testimony, by exposing the 
imperfection of his knowledge and the confusion of his memory.”). 
 
 
 
 
19 
very real.  But Rule 404(b) does not apply simply because evidence carries a risk of 
propensity reasoning.  Rather, it only applies when evidence is offered that has no other 
valid purpose.29 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, I believe the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the 
defense witness’s testimonial evidence concerning her knowledge of defendant’s prior 
weapons convictions was admissible under Rule 404(b).  Because there is no need to 
remand this case to the Court of Appeals to conduct a harmless-error analysis, I 
respectfully dissent. 
 
 
Brian K. Zahra 
 
Stephen J. Markman 
 
Kurtis T. Wilder 
 
                                              
29 Rock, 499 Mich at 257; Mardlin, 487 Mich at 616.