Case Title: Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. City of West Linn

Citation: 

Docket Number: S51504

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2005-05-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  May 5, 2005
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

Petitioner on Review,
v.
CITY OF WEST LINN,
Respondent on Review,
and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Intervenor on Judicial Review,
and
ROBERT FULTON, 

SUSAN FULTON, GREGG CRAWFORD, HOLLY CRAWFORD,

WALTER SWANSON, KATHI SWANSON, DALE KRUG, 

COLLEEN KRUG AND STEVEN WILKES,

Intervenor-Respondents at LUBA.

(LUBA No. 2002-155; CA A122194; SC S51504)
En Banc
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted January 11, 2005.
I. Franklin Hunsaker, of Bullivant Houser Bailey, PC,
Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on
review.  With him on the briefs were James H. Bean, of Lindsay
Hart Neil & Weigler, LLP, Portland, and Von G. Keetch and Matthew
K. Richards, of Kirton & McConkie, Salt Lake City.
Timothy V. Ramis, of Ramis, Crew, Corrigan & Bachrach, LLP,
Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for respondent on
review.
Lowell V. Sturgill, Jr., Appellate Staff, Department of
Justice, Washington, D.C., argued the cause and filed the brief
for Intervenor on Judicial Review United States of America.  With
him on the brief were Peter D. Keisler, Assistant Attorney
General, Herbert C. Sundby, Attorney, Department of Justice, and
Mark Stern, Attorney, Appellate Staff, Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C..
Wendie L. Kellington, Lake Oswego, filed the brief for

amicus curiae The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty.  With her on
the brief were Roman P. Storzer, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., and
Derek L. Gaubatz, Washington, D.C.
Barry Adamson, Lake Oswego, filed the 
amicus curiae 
brief
for himself.
BALMER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The case
is remanded to the Land Use Board of Appeals for further
proceedings.
*Judicial Review from Land Use Board of Appeals.

192 Or App 567, 86 P3d 1140 (2004).






BALMER, J.

In this land use dispute, the Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints (the church) challenges the City of West Linn's (the
city's) denial of a conditional use permit (CUP) to build a new
meetinghouse.  The church argues that the denial constituted a
"substantial burden" on religious exercise as that term is used
in the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of
2000 (RLUIPA), 42 USC §§ 2000cc - 2000cc-5 (2000); which prohibits a
government entity from implementing a land use regulation that
imposes such a burden unless imposing that burden furthers a
compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive
means of achieving that interest.  On review of the city's
decision, the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA) agreed with the
church in part.  The city sought judicial review, and the Court
of Appeals reversed, holding that the city's decision did not
violate RLUIPA.  Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. City of West Linn,
192 Or App 567, 86 P3d 1140 (2004).
  We allowed the church's
petition for review.  For reasons that we explain below, we
affirm the Court of Appeals.

We take the facts from the Court of Appeals' decision
and the record.  The church has no meetinghouse in West Linn, and
many of its congregants who live in West Linn travel to Lake
Oswego to attend church.  The Lake Oswego congregation has grown,
and the meetinghouse there is crowded.  To relieve the crowding,
the church sought to construct a meetinghouse in West Linn on a
5.64-acre tract that was zoned Single Family Residential (R1). 
The tract is bordered on the north by undeveloped property, on
the south by Rosemont Road (a local arterial), on the east by
Shannon Lane (a local street), and on the west by Miles Drive, a
dead-end street.  The area surrounding the site is developed
mainly with single-family homes.  

The city allows the construction of religious buildings
in R1 zones if the owner obtains a CUP.  The church applied for a
CUP and submitted a site plan proposing to build the meetinghouse
on a 3.85-acre parcel that it would create by subdividing the
existing 5.64-acre tract.  That parcel would consist 
of the
eastern approximately 
two-thirds of the existing tract.  The
church planned to divide the remaining 1.79 acres into two
parcels:  a parcel in the northwest corner containing an existing
home with a yard, and a parcel on the southwest that would be
used to extend Miles Drive and connect it with Rosemont Road. 
The plan contemplated a single-story meetinghouse, 16,558 square
feet in area and 28 feet tall, surrounded by parking lots on
three sides.  Together, the meetinghouse and parking lot would
cover 2.02 of the 3.85 acres, and the plan contemplated that a
drainage swale and landscaping would occupy the remainder.  At
the most narrow points, the plan allowed 26 feet between the
parking lot and the northern property line and 30 feet between
the eastern side parking lot and Shannon Lane.

The city planning staff worked with the church to
refine the plan and recommended that the city planning commission
approve a revised plan that included more vegetation to screen
the parking lot from Shannon Lane.  The church agreed to the
revisions and submitted a revised plan.  The planning commission
held hearings at which it heard witnesses for and against the
church's proposal and evaluated the proposal in light of the
city's Community Development Code (CDC).  The CDC provisions
include the following:

"60.070 APPROVAL STANDARDS AND CONDITIONS

"A. The Planning Commission shall approve, approve
with conditions, or deny an application for a
conditional use * * * based on findings of fact with
respect to each of the following criteria:

"1.  The site size and dimensions provide:

"* * * * *

"b.  Adequate area for aesthetic design treatment
to mitigate any possible adverse effect from the use on
surrounding properties and uses.

"2.  The characteristics of the site are suitable
for the proposed use considering size, shape, location,
topography, and natural features.

"* * * * * 

"4.  All required public facilities have adequate
capacity to serve the proposal."

The CDC also provides, for all development proposals in the city,
that 

"[t]he proposed structure(s) scale shall be compatible
with the existing structure(s) on site and on adjoining
sites.  Contextual design is required.  Contextual
design means respecting and incorporating prominent
architectural styles, building lines, roof forms,
rhythm of windows, building scale and massing,
materials and colors of surrounding buildings in the
proposed structure."  

CDC 55.100(B)(6)(b).

Ultimately, the commission voted unanimously to deny
the application.  Its written decision stated that (1) the
application did not satisfy CDC 60.070(A)(1)(b) because the size
and dimensions of the lot did not allow for adequate buffering to
mitigate the aural and visual impacts on the neighborhood that a
meetinghouse of that size would create; (2) the application did
not satisfy CDC 60.070(A)(2) because the meetinghouse would be
"heavily used" and was therefore unsuitable for a residential
neighborhood; (3) the application did not satisfy CDC
60.070(A)(4) because the roads in the proposed location were
insufficient to handle the traffic that the meetinghouse would
generate; and (4) the application did not satisfy CDC
55.100(B)(6)(b) because the scale of the proposed meetinghouse
was "nearly five times the size" of the average building in the
area.  The commission also rejected the church's claim that
RLUIPA prohibited the denial, because it concluded that the
denial did not impose a substantial burden on religious exercise.

The church appealed to the city council, which held its
own hearings and accepted additions to the written record.  The
council then rejected the application, primarily because it found
that the lot was too small for a facility the size of the
proposed meetinghouse.  That inadequacy, it concluded, created
detrimental impacts that could not be reconciled with the CDC
criteria.  In particular, the council found that there was not
enough space for buffers to mitigate the aural and visual impact
of the building on the neighborhood (CDC 60.070(A)(1)(b)) and
that the small lot with minimal buffering rendered the proposed
use unsuitable for a residential area (CDC 60.070(A)(2)). 
Regarding CDC 55.100(B)(6)(b), the council concluded that,
although the scale of the proposed meetinghouse was incompatible
with the residential neighborhood, compatibility is not required
if the building is "adequately separated from other buildings by
distance, screening, [or] grade variations, or is part of a
development site that is large enough to set its own style of
architecture."  CDC 55.100(B)(6)(d).
 

Although the council rejected the application primarily
because the parcel was too small to accommodate the buffers of
vegetation and distance that the CDC required for a meetinghouse
of that size and in that residential location, the council noted
that it could approve a site plan that included a building of the
same size on a larger lot with adequate buffering.  The council
found that there was no apparent obstacle to the church's using
more than the 3.85 acres that the plan contemplated. (1)  Based
on those facts, the council concluded that RLUIPA did not prevent
it from denying the application, because there was no substantial
burden on the church's religious exercise and because, even if
the denial had imposed a substantial burden, the city's interest
in maintaining the quality of residential neighborhoods was
sufficiently compelling to allow denial. (2)

The church appealed to LUBA, claiming that RLUIPA
required the city to state conditions of approval rather than
deny the application.  LUBA concluded that there was substantial
evidence in the record to support the city's findings that the
application failed to comply with each of the CDC provisions that
it had cited and that the church had failed to include the proper
documentation for the noise study.   However, LUBA ruled against
the city on RLUIPA grounds, holding that the city's denial of the
CUP had violated the church's rights under RLUIPA.  
Corporation
Presiding Bishop v. City of West Linn, 45 Or LUBA 77 (2003).  

LUBA stated that, in general, federal courts had
defined a "substantial burden" as a burden that "forces adherents
of a religion to refrain from religiously motivated conduct." 

Id. at 105 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In LUBA's view,
the city's denial of a CUP had imposed a burden on the church and
its members by impairing the church's ability to build a
meetinghouse.  
Id. at 105-06.  LUBA concluded that that
impairment constituted a substantial burden on the church's
religious exercise under RLUIPA.  
Id. at 106.  LUBA then
determined that, even if the city had the compelling governmental
interest that it had asserted, denying the CUP was not the least
restrictive means of serving that interest.  
Id. at 108-10. 
Finally, LUBA rejected the city's argument that RLUIPA violated
the First Amendment to the federal constitution.  
Id. at 112,
114.  LUBA therefore reversed the decision of the city council
and remanded to the city with instructions to consider whether
the application could be approved with "reasonable conditions of
approval."  
Id. at 116.

As noted, the city appealed and the Court of Appeals
reversed.  The court rejected LUBA's determination that the city
had imposed an impermissible "burden" on the church by impairing
its ability to build a meetinghouse.  Instead, the relevant
"burden" for RLUIPA purposes, the court held, was "the burden of
being prevented from implementing the particular design proposal
at issue plus, logically, the burden of submitting a new
application for a modified proposal."  
Corp. of Presiding Bishop,
192 Or App at 587.  

The court then reviewed United States Supreme Court and
lower federal court cases interpreting the meaning of
"substantial burden" under the First Amendment's Free Exercise
Clause; under RLUIPA's predecessor, the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 USC §§ 2000bb - 2000bb-4 (2000); and under
RLUIPA itself.  The court concluded that the burden on the church
was not substantial because its members were not turned away from
services at locations outside West Linn, because there was no
reason to believe that the city would not approve a reconfigured
application for a CUP, and because there was no evidence that the
city was biased against the church.  
Id. at 597-99.  In the
court's view, that result was consistent with the federal cases
that it had described.
 Because it found no substantial burden
under RLUIPA, the Court of Appeals did not consider whether the
city had a compelling governmental interest, whether it had used
the least restrictive means of implementing its interest, or
whether RLUIPA violated the First Amendment.  
Id. at 599.

Having described the facts of this case and the
procedural steps that brought it to this court, we now turn to
the merits of the church's RLUIPA claim, beginning with an
overview of RLUIPA and its complicated history.  In a series of
cases prior to 1990, the United States Supreme Court analyzed
Free Exercise Clause (3) claims by asking whether the
challenged statute or regulation imposed a substantial burden on
religious exercise; if so, the regulation passed constitutional
muster only if it furthered a "compelling governmental interest." 

See, 
e.g., 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 US 398, 403-08, 83 S Ct 1790,
10 L Ed 2d 965 (1963) (applying that test).  In 1990, the Court
held, however, that government enforcement of "valid and neutral
law[s] of general applicability" that incidentally restrict
religious exercise did not violate the Free Exercise Clause even
if they burden religious exercise.  
Employment Division, Dep't of
Human Resources v. Smith, 494 US 872, 879-82, 110 S Ct 1595, 108
L Ed 2d 876 (1990).

In response to 
Smith, Congress in 1993 enacted RFRA,
which purported to restore the pre-
Smith test.  RFRA, however,
was short-lived.  In 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 US 507, 117 S
Ct 2157, 138 L Ed 2d 624 (1997), the Court struck down RFRA
holding that Congress had exceeded its power under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment by enacting that statute.  
City of
Boerne, 521 US at 536.  The Court based its decision, in part, on
the absence of congressional findings showing the level of
discrimination against religious exercise that would justify
congressional action to protect that right.  
Id. at 530-31. 
Congress responded to 
City of Boerne by enacting RLUIPA, which
generally requires application of the 
Sherbert substantial burden
test to statutes and regulations involving religious exercise in
two specific areas:  land use and institutionalized persons. 
Congress developed a record in which it documented discrimination
against religious exercise in those areas and identified the need
for a federal statute to protect religious exercise. (4) 

We now turn to the provisions of RLUIPA that are
relevant in this case.  Section 1(a) of RLUIPA, 42 USC
§ 2000cc(1)(a), provides, in part:  

"(a) Substantial burdens 

"(1) General rule 

"No government shall impose or implement a land
use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial
burden on the religious exercise of a person, including
a religious assembly or institution, unless the
government demonstrates that imposition of the burden
on that person, assembly, or institution-- 

"(A) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and 

"(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling governmental interest."

The structure of this provision requires a person who
contends that a land use regulation is invalid because it
violates RLUIPA to demonstrate that a government actor has
implemented the land use regulation in a manner that imposes a
"substantial burden" on the proponent's "religious exercise." 
Where that is shown, the land use regulation must yield, unless
the record shows that it furthers a compelling governmental
interest and does so in the least restrictive manner possible.  

RLUIPA defines "religious exercise" as follows:

"(A) In general 

"The term 'religious exercise' includes any
exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or
central to, a system of religious belief. 

"(B) Rule 

"The use, building, or conversion of real property
for the purpose of religious exercise shall be
considered to be religious exercise of the person or
entity that uses or intends to use the property for
that purpose."

42 USC § 2000cc-5(7).

The threshold--and, we conclude, the dispositive--issue in this case is whether, under RLUIPA, the city's denial of
the CUP imposed a substantial burden on religious exercise. (5) 


When this court construes a federal statute such as
RLUIPA, we follow the methodology prescribed by the federal
courts.  Hagan v. Gemstate Manufacturing, Inc., 328 Or 535, 545,
982 P2d 1108 (1999).  Federal courts generally determine the
meaning of a statute by examining its text and structure and, if
necessary, its legislative history.  
See, e.g.,
Dep't of Rev. v.
ACF Indus., Inc., 510 US 332, 339-46, 114 S Ct 843, 127 L Ed 2d
165 (1994) (examining text, structure, and legislative history of
federal statute).  

As noted, RLUIPA prohibits only land use regulations
that impose a "substantial burden" on religious exercise, but, in
contrast to certain other terms in the statute, RLUIPA provides
no special definition of "substantial burden."  However, it is
apparent from the sequence of court decisions and congressional
enactments discussed above that Congress used the term
"substantial burden" because that was the term that the Court had
used in 
Sherbert and other Free Exercise cases decided before

Smith.  The Court has noted that, when Congress enacts statutes
using terms of art that the Court previously has interpreted,
Congress intends that those terms have the same meaning. 

McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 US 337, 342, 111 S Ct 807,
112 L Ed 2d 866 (1991) (interpreting Congress's use of "seaman"
in Jones Act consistently with Court's pre-Act interpretations). 
Indeed, we are particularly certain of Congress's intent here
because Senators Hatch and Kennedy issued a joint statement
summarizing the congressional findings on which RLUIPA was based
and noting that RLUIPA "does not include a definition of the term
'substantial burden' because * * * that term * * * should be
interpreted by reference to Supreme Court jurisprudence."  146
Cong Rec S7774 (daily ed July 27, 2000) (joint statement of
Senator Hatch and Senator Kennedy).  

Based on the foregoing--and like the federal courts
that previously have construed RLUIPA--we turn first to the
Supreme Court's Free Exercise Clause cases to determine what
constitutes a substantial burden on religious exercise.  We then
consider several federal cases construing the provisions of
RLUIPA that relate to land use regulations.  This summary of
federal case law will provide an understanding of the term
"substantial burden" that we can then apply to assess whether
denial of the CUP imposed an impermissible burden on the church
or its members in this case.

In 
Sherbert,
Thomas v. Review Board, 450 US 707, 101 S
Ct 1425, 67 L Ed 2d 624 (1981), and 
Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Comm'n, 480 US 136, 107 S Ct 1046, 94 L Ed 2d 190 (1987),
the Court reviewed the claims of plaintiffs who had left their
jobs for religious reasons and subsequently had been denied
unemployment compensation on the grounds that they had not had
"good cause" to stop working. (6)  In all three of those cases,
the Court held that the denial of unemployment benefits
constituted a substantial burden on the free exercise of religion
because it had "pressure[d]" a religious adherent to choose
between an article of faith and a government benefit.  
Sherbert,
374 US at 404; 
Thomas, 450 US at 717-18; 
Hobbie, 480 US at 140-41.  In other words, in the unemployment cases, a "substantial
burden" was one that pressured someone to forgo or modify the
expression of a religious belief. (7)

Since the passage of RLUIPA, lower federal courts have
decided several cases that we find instructive because of their
similarity to this case.  In 
Westchester Day School v. Village of
Mamaroneck, 386 F3d 183 (2d Cir 2004), a religiously affiliated
school challenged, on RLUIPA grounds, the village's denial of a
permit that would allow the school to construct a new building
and renovate others.  The Second Circuit found that the denial
did not create a substantial burden on the school's religious
exercise because the village 


"did not purport to pronounce the death knell of the
School's proposed renovations in their entirety, but
rather to deny only the application submitted, leaving
open the possibility that a modification of the
proposal, coupled with the submission of satisfactory
data found to have been lacking in the earlier
proceedings, would result in approval."


Id. at 188.  The court noted that the denial of a specific
proposal may constitute a substantial burden when the denial
seems disingenuous, when curing the problems that formed the
basis for the denial "would impose so great an economic burden as
to make amendment unworkable," or when the cure itself affected
religious exercise directly.  
Id. at 188 n 3.  However, the court
found that in that case a mere denial, without more, did not
constitute a substantial burden.

In 
San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill,
360 F3d 1024 (9th Cir 2004), the Ninth Circuit considered a
religious college's challenge to the city's denial of its
application for a zoning variance that would have allowed an
educational facility in an area zoned for hospitals.  The
application's estimates of the number of students that would use
the facility were inconsistent, and the city requested additional
information.  The college did not provide the requested
information, and the city denied the college's application.  The
court determined that the city's requirement did not impose a
substantial burden because the city's action "merely require[d
the] College to submit a 
complete application, as is required of
all applicants."  
Id. at 1035 (emphasis in original).  The court
noted that "[s]hould [the] College comply with this request, it
is not at all apparent that its re-zoning application will be
denied."  
Id.

In Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F3d
1214 (11th Cir 2004), 
cert den, 125 S Ct 1295 (2005), the city
sought to enjoin synagogues from holding services in a hotel
meeting room and a conference room leased from a bank.  The
injunction would have required the synagogues to relocate farther
away from their congregants.  The synagogues argued that the
injunction would constitute a substantial burden because the
religious beliefs of the congregants required them to walk to
synagogue.  The Eleventh Circuit held that requiring the
congregants to walk the extra blocks did not constitute a
substantial burden.  
Id. at 1228. 

We agree with the reasoning of the cases discussed
above, and, on that basis, we conclude that a government
regulation imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise
only if it "pressures" or "forces" a choice between following
religious precepts and forfeiting certain benefits, on the one
hand, and abandoning one or more of those precepts in order to
obtain the benefits, on the other.  
See 
Sherbert, 374 US at 404
(stating that test).  With that understanding, we now return to
the facts of this case.

As noted, the church urges us to conclude that the
city's denial of the CUP in the present case was a substantial
burden on religious exercise.  We agree with the church that the
denial of the CUP has several adverse consequences for the
church's effort to build a meetinghouse.  The city's decision
requires the church to submit a new permit application that
reflects the use of a greater portion of an available lot,
provides for additional buffering, and includes all of the
required noise studies.  That resubmission necessarily will
impose additional expenses on the church.  It also will create
delay, during which church members will continue to face crowded
conditions at their Lake Oswego meetinghouse and the longer drive
required to get there.  

Those hardships, however, do not constitute
"substantial burden[s]" under RLUIPA.  The church already has
indicated that it would be possible to acquire more land to
provide the necessary buffering space between the parking lot and
Shannon Lane that the city has requested.  The expenses
associated with submitting a new application do not constitute a
substantial burden in and of themselves,
nor does the requirement
of submitting the application.  The siting of a large building
often involves multiple applications by the builder, changes
requested by a city planning commission or city council based on
zoning and similar requirements, and related legal,
architectural, and engineering costs.  The city gave specific
reasons for denying the first application, and nothing in the
record indicates that the city would not approve a revised
application that met its concerns. There is no evidence in the
record to suggest that the crowded conditions at the meetinghouse
have forced the church to turn away anyone who wished to attend
church or to eliminate or reduce church activities.  Nor is there
any evidence in the record to suggest that the city's denial was
motivated by religious animus. In short, nothing in the record
suggests that requiring the church to submit a new application
would pressure the church to forgo or modify the expression of a
religious belief, as described in 
Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie. 
Moreover, the hardships imposed on the church are likely to be
relatively short-lived.


Because we conclude that the city's denial of the CUP
does not constitute a substantial burden on religious exercise by
the church or its members, we do not consider whether a
compelling government interest supported that denial or whether
that denial is the least restrictive means to further that
interest.  And, because we conclude that the city's actions do
not violate RLUIPA, we need not determine whether RLUIPA violates
the First Amendment. (8)


The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.  The
case is remanded to the Land Use Board of Appeals for further
proceedings.
1. In fact, the church had notified the city that it had
"already arranged" to acquire more of the existing 5.64-acre
tract if necessary. 
2. 
In addition to its other conclusions, the city noted
that the church's application was incomplete because it did not
include data to show that the proposed use would comply with the
city's noise regulations, but it determined that it would not be
difficult for the church to present a complete noise study. 
 The
council also disagreed with the planning commission that the
traffic impact of the proposed meetinghouse was unacceptable
under CDC 60.070(A)(4).  
3. 
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the
federal constitution provides that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof[.]"
4. 
The Court has not addressed the constitutionality
of RLUIPA.  However, on March 21, 2005, it heard oral argument in

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F3d 257 (6th Cir 2003), 
cert granted,
125 S Ct 308 (2004), in which a prisoner
 challenged the
constitutionality of RLUIPA's "institutionalized persons"
provisions. 
5. 
RLUIPA also provides that the substantial burden
provision of 42 USC § 2000cc(1)(a) applies only when 
42 USC § 2000cc(a)(2)(C).
The city asserted before the Court of Appeals that
RLUIPA's substantial burden provision does not apply to its land
use decision because the CDC provisions are "rules of general
applicability," not "individualized assessments" as described in
42 USC § 2000cc(a)(2)(C).  The Court of Appeals disagreed,
holding that the city's decision in this case constitutes an
individual assessment.  Corp. of Presiding Bishop, 192 Or App at
584.  Because neither party sought review of the Court of Appeals
decision on that issue, we decline to address it.  ORAP 9.20(2). 
For the purposes of this opinion, we assume without deciding that
the city's denial of the CUP constituted an individualized
assessment as that term is used in 42 USC § 2000cc(a)(2)(C).
6. 

The plaintiffs in 
Sherbert and 
Hobbie were fired
because they were Seventh-Day Adventists whose faith required
them to observe a Saturday Sabbath.  In 
Thomas, the plaintiff
quit because his job required him to manufacture war materials in
violation of his beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness.
7. The church asserts that the "test" that the Court
articulated in 
Sherbert was whether the government action had a
"tendency to inhibit" religious exercise.  That overstates the
Court's holding in 
Sherbert and later cases, which instead
focused on whether the government action at issue had a coercive
effect, as we describe above.  The 
Sherbert decision only used
the words "tendency to inhibit" in one footnote in which it gave
examples of government actions that had been held to violate the
Free Exercise Clause.  374 US at 404 n 6.  More importantly, the
Court did not adopt a "tendency to inhibit" test in 
Sherbert or
use that test to decide 
Sherbert or any other case.
8. We also do not address the church's argument that ORS
197.522 requires a local governmental entity to approve
applications or impose conditions of approval on them.  The Court
of Appeals noted that neither party had raised that argument
below, Corp. of Presiding Bishop, 192 Or App at 587 n 13, and we
agree.