Case Title: Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America v. McGee

Citation: 356 S.W.2d 666

Docket Number: A-8747

State: texas

Court: Texas Supreme Court

Date: 1962-04-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
356 S.W.2d 666 (1962) INDEMNITY INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, Petitioner, v. C. R. McGEE, Respondent. No. A-8747. Supreme Court of Texas. April 4, 1962. Rehearing Denied May 16, 1962. Barnes & Barnes, Beaumont, for petitioner. Stephenson, Stephenson & Thompson, Orange, for respondent. HAMILTON, Justice. This is a suit brought by plaintiff (respondent here) under the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act to set aside an award of the Industrial Accident Board. The trial court set aside the award and entered judgment for the plaintiff finding him totally and permanently disabled and awarding compensation of $13,651.55. The insurance carrier appealed to the Tenth Court of Civil Appeals, and the judgment of the trial court was affirmed. 351 S.W.2d 359. The plaintiff's injury resulted from his slipping or jumping off a crane while he was working on a construction job. The evidence is disputed as to whether this slip or fall caused only a hernia or a combination hernia and back injury. These facts, however, are immaterial, as this opinion turns on defendant's (petitioner's) first point of error, which is: The facts pertinent to this point of error were brought out in a hearing on motion for new trial. The record shows that the plaintiff hired Woodson E. Dryden to represent him in this case. Mr. Dryden appeared in behalf of the plaintiff before the Industrial Accident Board and he also filed plaintiff's original petition in the 128th Judicial District Court, Orange County, Texas. At this point in the proceedings Mr. Dryden employed Mr. Ward Stephenson to handle the case. It is an undisputed fact that Ward Stephenson and the trial judge are related within the third degree of consanguinity, as they are first cousins. Mr. Stephenson filed the first, second and third amended original petitions for the plaintiff. Mr. Stephenson and his law partner, Mr. Marlin Thompson, conducted the plaintiff's case before the trial judge. However, the final judgment awarded one-fourth of plaintiff's recovery to Mr. Woodson Dryden only. In the hearing on motion for new trial, Mr. Stephenson testified that there was no specific agreement between Mr. Dryden and himself as to fees. However, he indicated he would submit a statement of his fee to Mr. Dryden when the case was completed. He stated, "* * * [W]hatever charges I made is the way we customarily do, to take into consideration the success, likewise, of the litigation and if we are successful in any case, we feel that we would be in a position to take that into consideration in assessing our charges." The issue to be decided in this case is whether plaintiff's attorney, Ward Stephenson, is a "party" to this suit within the meaning of Article V, Sec. 11, Constitution of Texas, Vernon's Ann.St., and Article 15, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes. Article 15 states: This Court held in the case of Postal Mutual Indemnity Co. v. Ellis, 140 Tex. 570, 169 S.W.2d 482, that the plaintiff's attorney in a workmen's compensation case is a party to the suit. This decision was reached primarily because of the provision in Article 8306, § 7d, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes, which requires the judge to award the attorney's fees out of the plaintiff's recovery. That opinion said: See also Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Scroggins, Tex.Civ.App., 326 S.W.2d 606 (no writ hist.). The Court of Civil Appeals does not quarrel with this reasoning, but in essence holds that Ward Stephenson was not a party to this suit because he was not the plaintiff's attorney. Rather, the Court of Civil Appeals looked upon Mr. Stephenson as an employee of Mr. Woodson E. Dryden, plaintiff's original attorney. It overruled the point of error now before us because it felt the evidence in the record reflected that Dryden employed Stephenson for a fee based on work performed, and that the final judgment awarded one-fourth of the recovery to Dryden and not Stephenson. Thus, *668 the court reasoned that Stephenson was not a party to the suit. Paragraph 9 of Plaintiff's Third Amended Original Petition on which this suit was tried states: These pleadings and the actual trying of the lawsuit by Ward Stephenson made it conclusive that he was the attorney for the plaintiff, and a party to the suit. It is not material that the trial court's judgment did not award attorney's fees to Ward Stephenson. What is material is that under the pleadings it was within the power of the trial judge, but for his disqualification, to have entered judgment awarding attorney's fees to Ward Stephenson. By this holding we do not intend to cast a shadow upon the trial judge. We have no doubt that the trial judge's integrity is of the highest. However, as Chief Justice Willie stated in the case of Hodde v. Susan, 58 Tex. 389, 394, "It was the object of the Constitution to place judicial officers beyond the temptation which such circumstances would throw in their way." The judiciary must not only attempt to give all parties a fair trial, but it must also try to maintain the trust and confidence of the public at a high level. Article 15 is one aid in accomplishing these aims. This is aptly expressed in the case of Newcome v. Light, 58 Tex. 141, 145, where this court quotes from the New York Court of Appeals case of Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3 Comst. 547, which says: It is our opinion that Ward Stephenson is plaintiff's attorney in this workmen's compensation case and is a party to this suit as contemplated in Article 15, Vernon's Texas Civil Statutes. Therefore, the *669 judge of the trial court was disqualified to hear this cause. The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is reversed, and the cause is remanded for new trial. SMITH, Justice (concurring). The trial judge was disqualified. The judgment he entered in this case was void. Postal Mutual Indemnity Co. v. Ellis, 140 Tex. 570, 169 S.W.2d 482. This being true, all proceedings were a nullity. Any judgment rendered, regardless of whether for the plaintiff or defendant, should have been set aside and held for naught. The judgment cannot be void as to one party and only voidable as to the other.