Case Title: State ex rel. Knowlton v. Noble Cty. Bd. of Elections

Citation: 2010-Ohio-4450

Docket Number: 20101512

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-09-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Knowlton v. Noble Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-4450.] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-4450 
THE STATE EX REL. KNOWLTON v. NOBLE COUNTY BOARD  
OF ELECTIONS ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Knowlton v. Noble Cty. Bd. of Elections,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-4450.] 
Sheriffs — Qualifications for office — Postsecondary-education requirement — 
R.C. 311.01(B)(9) — Writ of prohibition to prevent certification of write-
in candidate denied. 
(No. 2010-1512 — Submitted September 16, 2010 — Decided  
September 22, 2010.) 
IN PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS. 
___________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an expedited election action for writs of prohibition and 
mandamus to prevent respondents, the Noble County Board of Elections and its 
members, from certifying Stephen S. Hannum’s write-in candidacy for the office 
of Noble County sheriff at the November 2, 2010 general election.  Because the 
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board of elections neither abused its discretion nor clearly disregarded R.C. 
311.01(B)(9) or 3513.04 by certifying Hannum’s candidacy, we deny the writ of 
prohibition.  We dismiss the mandamus claim for lack of jurisdiction. 
Facts 
Candidacy for Primary Election 
{¶ 2} In May 2009, Stephen S. Hannum was appointed Noble County 
sheriff after Landon Smith resigned.  Relator, Denny R. Knowlton Jr., a registered 
Democrat and Noble County resident, filed a protest pursuant to R.C. 3513.05 to 
prevent the board of elections and its members from placing Hannum’s name on 
the primary-election ballot.  Knowlton claimed that Hannum did not meet the 
qualifications in R.C. 311.01(B)(9) to be an eligible candidate for sheriff.  
Knowlton was the other candidate for the Democratic Party nomination for 
sheriff. 
{¶ 3} At a hearing before the board of elections on Knowlton’s protest, 
Hannum admitted that he had not served as a peace officer at the rank of corporal 
or above for the period of time specified in R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(a).  In attempting to 
satisfy 
the 
alternative 
postsecondary-education 
requirement 
in 
R.C. 
311.01(B)(9)(b), Hannum submitted two uncertified copies of his academic 
record from Washington State Community College in Marietta, Ohio.  The 
transcripts indicated that Hannum had earned a total of 92 credits, including three 
for a life-experience portfolio and the remaining 89 credits for life experience, 
with 29 of those credits for Ohio Peace Officer Training Academy (“OPOTA”) 
courses, which were designated as “OPOTA I,” “OPOTA II,” and “OPOTA III.”  
At the hearing, Hannum claimed that 72 credit hours at Washington State 
Community College were equivalent to two years of postsecondary education.  At 
the conclusion of the hearing, the board denied Knowlton’s protest against 
Hannum’s candidacy. 
Knowlton I 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
{¶ 4} Knowlton filed an expedited election action in this court for writs 
of mandamus and prohibition to prevent the board and its members from 
certifying Hannum’s candidacy for the Democratic Party nomination for Noble 
County sheriff and placing his name on the May 4, 2010 primary-election ballot. 
{¶ 5} In State ex rel. Knowlton v. Noble Cty. Bd. of Elections, 125 Ohio 
St.3d 82, 2010-Ohio-1115, 926 N.E.2d 284 (“Knowlton I”), we granted the 
requested writ of prohibition to prevent Hannum’s candidacy at the primary 
election.  We held that “the board and its members abused their discretion and 
clearly disregarded R.C. 311.01(B)(9) by denying Knowlton’s protest and 
certifying Hannum’s candidacy for sheriff at the May 4 primary election because 
Hannum did not satisfy any of the three categories in that subsection.”  Id. at ¶ 34. 
{¶ 6} More specifically, we held that Hannum had failed to satisfy the 
postsecondary-education requirement of R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b) because at least 29 
credits had been earned for ineligible peace-officer training: 
{¶ 7} “Notwithstanding the board’s suggestions to the contrary, the 
evidence before the board at the protest hearing supports the conclusion that 
Hannum has double-counted credits earned for peace-officer training contrary to 
our decision in [State ex rel.] Wellington [v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, 120 
Ohio St.3d 198, 2008-Ohio-5510, 897 N.E.2d 641].  The OPOTA courses 
specified on the transcripts that Hannum submitted refer to courses he has taken at 
the Ohio Peace Officer Training Academy.  In fact, the board and its members do 
not claim that “OPOTA” refers to anything other than academy courses.  These 
courses are manifestly for ‘peace officer training,’ which, according to 
Wellington, 120 Ohio St.3d 198, 2008-Ohio-5510, 897 N.E.2d 641, at ¶ 30, do not 
constitute course credit that can satisfy the R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b) postsecondary-
education requirement. 
{¶ 8} “Therefore, because 29 credits that Hannum earned were for 
peace-officer training, they could not be counted toward the postsecondary-
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education requirement of R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b).  Furthermore, any other ‘life-
experience’ credits related to his job as a peace officer were also ineligible for 
credit under R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b) because R.C. 311.01(B)(8) already accounts for 
Hannum’s employment as a peace officer.  A contrary holding would render R.C. 
311.01(B)(9)(b) superfluous in these circumstances and would permit 
postsecondary-education credit even though it duplicates other distinct criteria in 
R.C. 311.01(B) for qualification as a candidate for sheriff.  Thus, Hannum earned 
at most only 63 credits, which, by his own testimony at the protest hearing, is 
insufficient to satisfy the postsecondary-education requirement of R.C. 
311.01(B)(9)(b).”  Id. at ¶ 32-33. 
Candidacy for General Election 
{¶ 9} On July 26, 2010, Hannum filed a declaration of intent to be a 
write-in candidate for Noble County sheriff.  Knowlton asked the board of 
elections whether it had sought information from Hannum relating to his 
qualifications for his write-in candidacy, and the board then requested that 
Hannum “provide evidence of the qualifications he has acquired that were 
deemed lacking by the Supreme Court.” 
{¶ 10} On August 13, 2010, Knowlton filed a protest with respondent 
Noble County Board of Elections against Hannum’s candidacy.  Knowlton 
claimed that Hannum did not meet the postsecondary-education requirement of 
R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b) and that R.C. 3513.04 barred his candidacy at the general 
election after he had unsuccessfully sought the Democratic Party nomination for 
the same office at the preceding primary election.  In his protest, Knowlton 
claimed that it was filed pursuant to R.C. 3519.16. 
{¶ 11} On August 24, the board of elections held a hearing on Knowlton’s 
protest against Hannum’s write-in candidacy.  Hannum requested that Knowlton’s 
protest be denied because the protest erroneously referred to R.C. 3519.16 and 
thus failed to properly invoke the board’s authority.  The board noted the 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
objection but decided to allow the parties to address the merits of the protest and 
to decide the protest on the merits. 
{¶ 12} At the hearing, Knowlton presented no witnesses but submitted 
uncertified copies of Hannum’s transcript from Washington State Community 
College dated January 26 and February 22, 2010.  Knowlton also submitted a 
letter dated August 12, 2010, in which Michael D. Whitnable, the registrar of the 
community college, stated that “the minimum of 90 credit hours at Washington 
State Community College would be equivalent to a two year post secondary 
education.”  The registrar, however, did not indicate whether these two years of 
postsecondary education were either the minimum required for the school or for 
the R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b) postsecondary-education requirement. 
{¶ 13} Hannum submitted both testimonial and documentary evidence.  
An August 18, 2010 college transcript established that by June 2010, Hannum had 
earned 14 credits in addition to the 92 credits he had previously earned that were 
considered by the court in Knowlton I, which represented a total of 106 credits 
earned by him at Washington State Community College.  The 106 credits 
included the 29 credits for OPOTA courses that constituted peace-officer training 
and were held by the court in Knowlton I to be ineligible to be counted toward the 
postsecondary-education requirement of R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b). 
{¶ 14} In an August 19, 2010 letter from the college registrar to the board 
of elections, the registrar verified that Hannum was considered by the school to 
have completed the equivalent of two years of postsecondary education and that 
students at the school are required to carry a minimum of 12 credit hours per 
quarter to be considered full-time students: 
{¶ 15} “Please be advised that Stephen S. Hannum is considered to have 
completed the equivalent of two years post-secondary education at Washington 
State Community College.  Mr. Hannum has not completed an associate degree.  
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Students must carry a minimum of 12 credit hours per quarter to be considered 
full-time. 
{¶ 16} “Courses with the grade of L ‘Life Experience,’ are applicable 
towards a college degree just the same as if the course was graded with a letter of 
A, B, or C. 
{¶ 17} “All degree programs offered at Washington State Community 
College are approved by the Ohio Board of Regents.” 
{¶ 18} Hannum testified that if the 29 credits for OPOTA courses were 
deducted from his total of 106 credits earned from Washington State Community 
College, he would still have 77 credits, which exceeds the 72 credit hours 
required for two years of postsecondary education.  According to Hannum’s 
counsel in his argument before the board of elections at the protest hearing, this 
calculation of 72 hours is based on 12 hours per quarter to be a full-time student 
with 3 quarters per year for two years.  Hannum further testified that the life-
experience credits that he earned for criminal-justice courses came from his 
experiences before January 2007. 
{¶ 19} At the conclusion of the hearing, the board of elections denied 
Knowlton’s protest.  As detailed in a subsequent written decision, the board 
concluded that Hannum met the educational requirements of R.C. 311.01(B)(9) to 
be an eligible sheriff’s candidate and that R.C. 3513.04 did not bar his write-in 
candidacy.  More specifically, the board made the following pertinent findings: 
{¶ 20} “3.  Washington State Community College is a duly authorized and 
registered post secondary institution governed by the Ohio Board of Regents, and 
authorized to grant post secondary credit for degrees or elective course work. 
{¶ 21} “4.  Twelve credit hours per quarter is required to maintain full 
time student status, thus requiring 36 hours per year or 72 hours over the course of 
two years to qualify as two years of full time post secondary education. 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
{¶ 22} “5.  All courses for grade or by portfolio were approved by an 
instructor and defined by course syllabus. 
{¶ 23} “6.  Excluding the 29 hours of OPOTA course work, Respondent 
has completed 77 hours of post secondary education as of June 16, 2010. 
{¶ 24} “7.  The Board further finds that §3513.04 ORC is interpreted by 
the Secretary of State’s Office to incorporate not only the initial petition for 
nomination in a primary but also the submission of the candidate’s name to the 
voters for a decision.  This interpretation has been the standard interpretation of 
the Secretary of State for more than 23 years.  The Board of Elections handbook 
states that a candidate must run and lose a primary election before becoming 
ineligible to run as a write-in candidate in the general election, found in EL 24. 
{¶ 25} “8.  Respondent was not permitted to seek nomination on the 
primary ballot due to a lack of post secondary educational requirements, which 
has now been cured as of June 16, 2010.” 
Knowlton II 
{¶ 26} On August 27, Knowlton filed this action for writs of mandamus 
and prohibition to prevent the board and its members from certifying Hannum’s 
write-in candidacy for the office of Noble County sheriff at the November 2, 2010 
general election.  The board and its members filed an answer, and we granted 
Hannum’s motion to intervene.  The parties submitted evidence and briefs 
pursuant to the accelerated schedule for expedited election cases in S.Ct.Prac.R. 
10.9. 
{¶ 27} This cause is now before the court for our consideration of the 
merits. 
Legal Analysis 
Mandamus 
{¶ 28} Knowlton requests a writ of mandamus to compel the board of 
elections and its members to consider his protest in accordance with Knowlton I 
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and to sustain the protest, thus preventing Hannum’s candidacy at the general 
election. 
{¶ 29} This court lacks jurisdiction over complaints in mandamus if the 
allegations establish that the relator actually requests relief in the nature of a 
declaratory judgment and a prohibitory injunction.  State ex rel. Stewart v. Clinton 
Cty. Bd. of Elections, 124 Ohio St.3d 584, 2010-Ohio-1176, 925 N.E.2d 601, ¶ 
12.  “We have applied this jurisdictional rule to expedited election cases by 
examining the complaint to determine whether it actually seeks to prevent, rather 
than compel, official action.”  State ex rel. Evans v. Blackwell, 111 Ohio St.3d 
437, 2006-Ohio-5439, 857 N.E.2d 88, ¶ 20. 
{¶ 30} Although some of the allegations and requests contained in 
Knowlton’s complaint are couched in terms of compelling affirmative duties, he 
actually seeks (1) a declaratory judgment that the board’s denial of his protest was 
erroneous and (2) a prohibitory injunction preventing Hannum from being a 
write-in candidate for sheriff at the general election. 
{¶ 31} Therefore, as in Knowlton I, at ¶ 16, because Knowlton seeks relief 
in the nature of declaratory judgment and prohibitory injunction, we lack 
jurisdiction to consider his mandamus claim and dismiss it.  See also Stewart, 124 
Ohio St.3d 584, 2010-Ohio-1176, 925 N.E.2d 601, ¶ 14. 
Prohibition 
{¶ 32} Knowlton also requests a writ of prohibition to prevent the board 
of elections and its members from certifying Hannum’s write-in candidacy for the 
office of Noble County sheriff at the November 2, 2010 general election.  To be 
entitled to the writ, Knowlton must establish that (1) the board of elections and its 
members are about to exercise quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of that power 
is unauthorized by law, and (3) denying the writ will result in injury for which no 
other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law.  State ex rel. 
Eshleman v. Fornshell, 125 Ohio St.3d 1, 2010-Ohio-1175, 925 N.E.2d 609, ¶ 11. 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
{¶ 33} Knowlton established the first and third requirements for the writ 
because the board of elections exercised quasi-judicial authority by denying his 
protest after a hearing that included sworn testimony, and he lacks an adequate 
remedy in the ordinary course of law given the proximity of the November 2 
general election.  Id. at ¶ 12. 
{¶ 34} For the remaining requirement, Knowlton asserted in his complaint 
that the board of elections abused its discretion and clearly disregarded applicable 
law by denying his protest and certifying Knowlton’s candidacy as a write-in 
candidate for sheriff.  State ex rel. Tremmel v. Erie Cty. Bd. of Elections, 123 
Ohio St.3d 452, 2009-Ohio-5773, 917 N.E.2d 792, ¶ 15.  “An abuse of discretion 
implies an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable attitude.”  State ex rel. 
Cooker Restaurant Corp. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Elections (1997), 80 Ohio 
St.3d 302, 305, 686 N.E.2d 238. 
Protest 
{¶ 35} As a preliminary matter, Hannum asserts that the writs should be 
denied because, by citing an inapplicable statute in his protest challenging 
Hannum’s write-in candidacy for sheriff, Knowlton failed to properly invoke the 
board’s authority to rule on his protest. 
{¶ 36} In his protest, Knowlton cited R.C. 3519.16, which sets forth the 
protest procedure for statewide initiative and referendum petitions.  We have 
“consistently recognized that R.C. Chapter 3519 applies only to statewide 
initiative and referendum petitions.”  State ex rel. Sinay v. Sodders (1997), 80 
Ohio St.3d 224, 228, 685 N.E.2d 754; State ex rel. Citizen Action for Livable 
Montgomery v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 437, 2007-Ohio-
5379, 875 N.E.2d 902, ¶ 50.  Protests against write-in candidacies are instead 
governed by R.C. 3513.041. 
{¶ 37} Nevertheless, because there is no dispute that Knowlton otherwise 
met the requirements of R.C. 3513.041 to submit a written protest against 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Hannum’s write-in candidacy, the board of elections did not err in determining 
that Knowlton’s mistaken citation concerning the statutory authority for his 
protest did not divest the board of authority to address and rule on the merits of 
the protest. 
R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b) Postsecondary-Education Requirement 
{¶ 38} Knowlton first claims, as he did in his protest, that Hannum’s 
write-in candidacy should have been rejected for the same reason that his 
primary-election candidacy was rejected by this court in Knowlton I – Hannum 
failed to meet the requirements of R.C. 311.01(B)(9) to be an eligible candidate 
for sheriff.  The dispositive issue is whether Hannum satisfied the postsecondary-
education requirement of R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b), which requires a person who does 
not meet the supervisory-experience requirement of R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(a) to have 
“completed satisfactorily at least two years of post-secondary education or the 
equivalent in semester or quarter hours in a college or university authorized to 
confer degrees by the Ohio board of regents or the comparable agency of another 
state in which the college or university is located or in a school that holds a 
certificate of registration issued by the state board of career colleges and schools 
under Chapter 3332. of the Revised Code.” 
{¶ 39} At the protest hearing, Hannum presented evidence that he had 
earned 106 credits at Washington State Community College.  Based on Knowlton 
I, 29 of Hannum’s 106 credits could not be counted toward the postsecondary-
education requirement of R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b) because they were for peace-
officer training.  Knowlton I, 125 Ohio St.3d 82, 2010-Ohio-1115, 926 N.E.2d 
284, ¶ 32-33; Wellington, 120 Ohio St.3d 198, 2008-Ohio-5510, 897 N.E.2d 641, 
¶ 30.  Without these credits, Hannum earned 77 credits at the community college. 
{¶ 40} Knowlton asserts that based on the letter from the college’s 
registrar he presented at the protest hearing, a minimum of 90 credit hours were 
required for the credits to be equivalent to two years of postsecondary education, 
January Term, 2010 
11 
 
and Hannum’s total of 77 credits thus was insufficient to meet the R.C. 
311.01(B)(9)(b) requirement. 
{¶ 41} Knowlton’s claim, however, ignores the same registrar’s statement 
that students at the community college must carry a minimum of 12 credit hours 
per quarter to be considered full-time students and that Hannum was considered 
by the college to have completed the equivalent of two years of postsecondary 
education at the school.  Furthermore, Hannum testified that his total of 77 credits 
that could be counted towards the R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b) postsecondary-education 
requirement exceeds the 72 hours he testified were needed for the two years 
specified by the statute. 
{¶ 42} The board of elections concluded that Hannum satisfied the 
educational requirements of R.C. 311.01(B)(9)(b) because “[t]welve credit hours 
per quarter is required to maintain full time status, thus requiring 36 hours per 
year or 72 hours over the course of two years to qualify as two years of full time 
post secondary education.”  In Knowlton I, at ¶ 6, 33, we accepted without 
discussion Hannum’s comparable testimony at the previous board hearing that 
“72 credit hours at Washington State Community College were equivalent to two 
years of postsecondary education.” 
{¶ 43} Seventy-seven hours exceeds the 72 hours that the board of 
elections found were necessary to constitute two years of postsecondary 
education.  The board of elections thus credited Hannum’s evidence from the 
registrar and Hannum over Knowlton’s letter from the same registrar.  Based on 
the testimonial and documentary evidence submitted at the protest hearing, the 
board could reasonably do so.  And given the arguably conflicting evidence 
before the board, the court will not substitute its judgment for that of the board.  
See State ex rel. Ross v. Crawford Cty. Bd. of Elections, 125 Ohio St.3d 438, 
2010-Ohio-2167, 928 N.E.2d 1082, ¶ 41; State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Seneca 
Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 120 Ohio St.3d 372, 2008-Ohio-6253, 899 N.E.2d 961, ¶ 29 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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(absent evidence to the contrary, public boards and their members are presumed 
to have properly performed their duties). 
{¶ 44} Moreover, Knowlton has not established that the board of elections 
abused its discretion by failing to discount Hannum’s other life-experience credits 
because these credits either were for peace-officer training or related to his job as 
a peace officer.  To be sure, some of Hannum’s testimony at the protest hearing 
relied at least in part on his experience as a police officer.  But Hannum further 
testified that substantially all of his life experiences that formed the basis for his 
college credit occurred prior to January 2007 and that he did not get separate 
credit for criminal-justice courses related to his peace-officer training.  Therefore, 
under these circumstances, Hannum’s life-experience credits – other than those 
for the OPOTA courses that we ruled ineligible in Knowlton I – would not 
duplicate his training that already accounted for his peace-officer employment in 
R.C. 311.01(B)(8)(b)1 because it either predated the three-year period specified in 
R.C. 311.01(B)(8)(b) or did not represent credit for peace-officer training. 
{¶ 45} Therefore, the board and its members neither abused their 
discretion nor clearly disregarded R.C. 311.01(B)(9) by denying Knowlton’s 
protest and certifying Hannum’s write-in candidacy for sheriff at the November 2 
general election. 
R.C. 3513.04 
{¶ 46} Knowlton also claims that Hannum’s write-in candidacy should 
have been rejected by the board for an additional reason – that R.C. 3513.04 
barred Hannum’s candidacy at the general election following his unsuccessful 
attempt to become a party nominee for the same office at the preceding primary 
election. 
                                                 
1.  R.C. 311.01(B)(8)(b) requires that the person seeking to be a candidate for sheriff have “been 
employed for at least the last three years prior to the qualification date as a full-time law 
enforcement officer.” 
January Term, 2010 
13 
 
{¶ 47} R.C. 3513.04 generally prevents persons who have unsuccessfully 
sought a party nomination at a primary election from running for the same or a 
different office at the following general election: 
{¶ 48} “No person who seeks party nomination for an office or position at 
a primary election by declaration of candidacy or by declaration of intent to be a 
write-in candidate and no person who is a first choice for president of candidates 
seeking election as delegates and alternates to the national conventions of the 
different major political parties who are chosen by direct vote of the electors as 
provided in this chapter shall be permitted to become a candidate by nominating 
petition or by declaration of intent to be a write-in candidate at the following 
general election for any office other than the office of member of the state board 
of education, office of a member of a city, local, or exempted village board of 
education, office of member of a governing board of an educational service 
center, or office of township trustee.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 49} In construing this statute, “our paramount concern is the legislative 
intent” in enacting it.  State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey, 103 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004-
Ohio-4960, 815 N.E.2d 1107, ¶ 21.  To discern this intent, we must “read words 
and phrases in context according to the rules of grammar and common usage.”  
State ex rel. Lee v. Karnes, 103 Ohio St.3d 559, 2004-Ohio-5718, 817 N.E.2d 76, 
¶ 23. 
{¶ 50} In this regard, the applicable language of R.C. 3513.04 is 
somewhat ambiguous.  “Seek” means “to try to acquire or gain:  aim at” and “to 
make an attempt:  TRY.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1986) 
2055.  By filing his declaration of candidacy for the primary election, Hannum 
was manifestly seeking to be the Democratic Party nominee for Noble County 
sheriff.  But the word “seeks” is limited in the statute by the phrase “at a primary 
election,” which seems to require that the person attempting to become the party 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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nominee actually be a choice that can be selected by voters at the primary 
election. 
{¶ 51} This interpretation of R.C. 3513.04 is consistent with the 
preeminent purpose of the statute.  “The purpose of Section 3513.04, Revised 
Code, clearly is to prevent a disappointed party candidate who has failed to be 
selected as a nominee in the primary from again trying to be placed on the 
elective ballot by entering the arena as an independent candidate.”  State ex rel. 
Gottlieb v. Sulligan (1963), 175 Ohio St. 238, 241, 24 O.O.2d 383, 193 N.E.2d 
270.  In State ex rel. Brinda v. Lorain Cty. Bd. of Elections, 115 Ohio St.3d 299, 
2007-Ohio-5228, 874 N.E.2d 1205, ¶ 26, we stated that “R.C. 3513.04, the so-
called sore-loser provision, * * * generally bars a person losing in a partisan 
primary election from participating as a candidate for [the same or] another office 
in the succeeding general election.”  (Emphasis added.)  Because Hannum was 
ruled ineligible in Knowlton I to be a candidate for the Democratic Party 
nomination for Noble County Sheriff at the primary election, he did not lose in 
that election. 
{¶ 52} This interpretation is also supported by case law.  In State ex rel. 
Sweet v. Hancock Cty. Bd. of Elections (Oct. 25, 1993), Hancock App. No. 5-93-
43, 1993 WL 429838, the Third District Court of Appeals denied a writ of 
prohibition to prevent the independent candidacy of a person running for the 
office of city council at the November 2003 general election when she had 
previously been disqualified by the same court from being a Republican Party 
candidate for city council at the preceding primary election.  The court of appeals 
adopted the view of then-Secretary of State Bob Taft that R.C. 3513.04 did not 
bar the person’s independent candidacy because the term “seeks” in the statute 
was ambiguous and should be construed to apply only to those persons who had 
been on the primary-election ballot and had lost rather than to those persons 
whose candidacies had been rejected by a court due to a defect in their petitions: 
January Term, 2010 
15 
 
{¶ 53} “ ‘The public policy behind R.C. 3513.04 is to prevent a person 
who has lost an election for a party nomination from subsequently running as an 
independent candidate for either the same office or another office.  Statutes of this 
nature protect the integrity of the primary election process.  * * * The purpose of 
a primary election is to allow those voters affiliated with a political party to 
nominate their candidate for the general election.  * * * [T]he prohibition is not 
triggered where a person merely files a declaration of candidacy, but the petition 
is rejected for insufficient signatures, or other fatal defects.  In that instance, the 
individual whose candidacy is invalid is not a choice for the party voters who 
must select their candidate for the general election.’ ”  Id. at *3; see also State ex 
rel. Ernst v. Brunner, 145 Ohio Misc.2d 73, 2007-Ohio-7265, 882 N.E.2d 990, ¶ 
19-26 (holding that R.C. 3513.04 is ambiguous and construing it not to bar city 
council candidates who had run for party nominations in primary election from 
being candidates in general election for new, nonpartisan city council). 
{¶ 54} Finally, the board’s decision that R.C. 3513.04 does not bar 
Hannum’s independent candidacy for sheriff “is also consistent with our duty to 
liberally construe words limiting the right of a person to hold office in favor of 
those seeking to hold office so that the public may have the benefit of choice from 
all qualified persons.”  See State ex rel. Reese v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 
115 Ohio St.3d 126, 2007-Ohio-4588, 873 N.E.2d 1251, ¶ 34; see also Brinda, 
115 Ohio St.3d 299, 2007-Ohio-5228, 874 N.E.2d 1205, ¶ 33. 
{¶ 55} Therefore, the board of elections and its members did not abuse 
their discretion or clearly disregard R.C. 3513.04 by denying Knowlton’s protest 
and certifying Hannum’s write-in candidacy for sheriff at the November 2 general 
election. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 56} Based on the foregoing, Knowlton has not established his 
entitlement to the requested extraordinary relief.  Therefore, we deny the writ of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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prohibition to prevent the board and its members from certifying Stephen S. 
Hannum as a write-in candidate for Noble County sheriff at the November 2, 
2010 general election.  We also dismiss Knowlton’s mandamus claim for lack of 
jurisdiction. 
Judgment accordingly. 
PFEIFER, ACTING C.J., and MCMONAGLE, LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
CHRISTINE T. MCMONAGLE, J., of the Eighth Appellate District, sitting for 
BROWN, C.J. 
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McTigue & McGinnis, L.L.C., Mark A. McGinnis, Donald J. McTigue, 
and J. Corey Colombo, for relator. 
 
Clifford N. Sickler, Noble County Prosecuting Attorney, and Anthony E. 
Palmer, Special Counsel, for respondents. 
 
Gottlieb, Johnston, Beam & Dal Ponte, P.L.L., Phillip S. Phillips, and 
James R. Krischak, for intervening respondent. 
______________________