Case Title: MATTER OF DEWAR

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-04-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13115 I N THE S U P R E M E C O I J R T O F THE STATE O F M O N T A N A 19 7 5 I n the Matter of: C H A R G E S AGAINST R O B E R T D e W A R , Police Officer. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of the Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable LeRoy L. McKinnon, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : John M. McCarvel argued, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondent: Larsen and Gliko, Great F a l l s , Montana David V. Gliko argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Swanberg, Koby, Swanberg & Matteucci, Great F a l l s , Montana A. G. Matteucci argued, Great F a l l s , Montana Filed : kph ; - & ? 6 Submitted: November 10, 1975 Decided :@R 1976 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. This is a n appeal from a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Cascade County. The judgment d i r e c t e d t h a t t h e p o l i c e commission of t h e c i t y of Great F a l l s proceed with i t s hearing of charges a g a i n s t Robert D e w a r , a Great F a l l s c i t y p o l i c e o f f i c e r , without r e q u i r i n g t h e d i s c l o s u r e of t h e i d e n t i t y of an informant. O f f i c e r D e w a r appeals from t h a t judgment. Robert D e w a r , a p o l i c e o f f i c e r with t h e c i t y of G r e a t F a l l s , is charged with t h e t h e f t of two b i c y c l e s from t h e Great Falls p o l i c e department s t o r a g e garage during t h e month of Octo- ber 1974. Charges were brought under s e c t i o n 11-1806, R.C.M. 1947, before t h e p o l i c e commission of t h e c i t y of G r e a t F a l l s and D e w a r w a s suspended from h i s d u t i e s on December 26, 1974. A hearing commenced before t h e p o l i c e commission on February 19, 1975. A t t h e hearing, Sergeant James Cook of t h e Great F a l l s p o l i c e department t e s t i f i e d t h a t he f i r s t i n i t i a t e d h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n of O f f i c e r Dewar when an u n i d e n t i f i e d p o l i c e o f f i c e r t o l d him t h a t t h e r e was rumor O f f i c e r Dewar had s t o l e n some bicycles. Subsequently, Sgt. Cook's i n v e s t i g a t i o n l e d him t o interview s e v e r a l o t h e r p o l i c e o f f i c e r s , one of whom admitbed s t e a l i n g a bicycle from t h e p o l i c e s t o r a g e garage and implicated Officer Dewar. The names of t h e interviewed p o l i c e o f f i c e r s were revealed. During t h e questioning of Sgt. Cook by defense counsel f o r Robert Dewar, Cook refused t o i d e n t i f y t h e unnamed p o l i c e o f f i c e r who o r i g i n a l l y r e l a t e d t h e rumor. The p o l i c e commission ordered Sgt. Cook t o r e v e a l t h e i d e n t i t y of t h e in- former. A motion w a s made by t h e c i t y a t t o r n e y t o continue t h e hearing t o a l a t e r d a t e and submission of b r i e f s was ordered by t h e p o l i c e commission as t o whether t h e i d e n t i t y of t h e informer had t o be disclosed. O n March 10, 1975, t h e hearing reconvened. Sgt. Cook was again ordered by t h e p o l i c e commission t o respond and d i s c l o s e t h e i d e n t i t y of t h e informant, he refused. Upon motion of t h e c i t y a t t o r n e y , t h e p o l i c e commission granted a r e c e s s t o allow t h e c i t y a t t o r n e y t o secure a determination from t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t a s t o whether t h e p o l i c e commission had t h e a u t h o r i t y t o order a witness t o answer a question propounded t o him. The c i t y then made a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t , Cascade County, f o r a w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i o r o t h e r a p p r o p r i a t e w r i t , on March 19, 1975. The c o u r t granted leave t o f i l e t h e a f f i d a v i t f o r a w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i o r o t h e r a p p r o p r i a t e w r i t and ordered t h e p o l i c e commission t o show cause why such w r i t should not i s s u e . The hearing on t h e order t o show cause w a s set f o r A p r i l 9 , 1975, before t h e Hon. LeRoy L. McKinnon. B r i e f s were f i l e d i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t by t h e c i t y , O f f i c e r Dewar, and an amicus c u r i a e b r i e f on behalf of Sgt.Cook. A motion t o quash t h e order t o show cause and t o dismiss t h e a p p l i c a t i o n f o r t h e w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i was f i l e d by O f f i c e r Dewar. A hearing was held on t h e order t o show cause and t h e motion t o quash. The c o u r t took t h e matter under advisement. O n May 21, 1975, t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t deemed "declaratory judgment t h e more appropriate remedy" and issued f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of l a w , wherein t h e c o u r t concluded: 1. That t h e only i s s u e properly before t h e c o u r t w a s t h a t of d i s c l o s u r e o r nondisclosure of t h e i d e n t i t y of an i n f o r - mant o r t i p s t e r . 2. That under t h e circumstances of t h e case, t h e i d e n t i t y of t h e informant o r t i p s t e r was i r r e l e v a n t and immaterial, and t h e o b j e c t i o n t o d i s c l o s u r e should be sustained. O f f i c e r Dewar appeals from t h e d e c l a r a t o r y judgment. The matters j u s t r e l a t e d appear i n i t i a l l y t o be deceptively simple but on f u r t h e r examination w e have a multitude of l e g a l problems which go t o t h e very h e a r t and t h e i n t e g r i t y of t h e p o l i c e commission proceedings, a s set o u t i n s e c t i o n 11-1801, e t . seq., R.C.M. 1947. F i r s t , t h e i n i t i a l i s s u e taken t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t from t h e commission was never r u l e d upon but has been r a i s e d a s an i s s u e on appeal t o t h i s Court. The question r u l e d upon by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t was not r a i s e d a s an i s s u e by a p p e l l a n t , but was b r i e f e d and argued by t h e c i t y and amicus c u r i a e . The i s s u e s t h i s Court w i l l consider r e l a t e t o (1) t h e power of t h e p o l i c e commission t o compel a witness t o t e s t i f y ; and (2) whether a w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i o r a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment properly lies i n t h i s proceeding. The p o l i c e commission i s a c r e a t u r e of s t a t u t e promulgated by t h e l e g i s l a t i v e branch of t h e government and d i r e c t e d t o t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e branch of government; t o be administered by t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o r executive branch i n connection with t h e operation of municipal p o l i c e departments. The f a c t t h a t t h e p o l i c e com- mission performs a so-called q u a s i - j u d i c i a l function does n o t change t h e c h a r a c t e r of t h e body o r i t s proceedings o r place it within t h e j u d i c i a l branch. Nor is t h e r e a review o r appeal by o r t o t h e j u d i c i a l branch of government, unless provided by l e g i s l a t i v e enactment. S t a t e ex r e l . Holt v. D i s t r i c t Court, 103 Mont. 438, 63 P.2d 1026. The code s e c t i o n of t h e Metropolitan P o l i c e Law which bears on t h i s controversy is s e c t i o n 11-1806, R.C.M. 1947. The p e r t i n e n t p a r t s of t h a t s e c t i o n read: " (1) The p o l i c e commission s h a l l have t h e j u r i s - d i c t i o n , and it s h a l l be i t s duty t o hear, t r y and decide a l l charges brought by any person o r persons a g a i n s t any member o r o f f i c e r of t h e p o l i c e department * * *. " ( 3 ) It i s t h e duty of t h e p o l i c e commission a t t h e time set f o r hearing a charge a g a i n s t a p o l i c e o f f i c e r , t o forthwith proceed t o hear, t r y and determine t h e charqe accordinq t o t h e r u l e s of evidence a p p l i c a b l e t o c o u r t s of record i n t h e s t a t e of Montana. * * * " ( 4 ) The chairman, o r a c t i n g chairman, of t h e p o l i c e commission, s h a l l have power t o i s s u e subpoenas, a t t e s t e d i n its name, t o compel t h e attendance of witnesses a t t h e hearing and any person duly served with a subpoena is bound t o a t t e n d i n obedience t h e r e t o , and t h e p o l i c e commission s h a l l have t h e same a u t h o r i t y t o enforce obedience t o t h e subpoena, and t o puni t h e disobedience t h e r e o f , a s is possessed by a judqe of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n l i k e cases, provided, however, t h a t punishment f o r disobed ience i s s u b j e c t t o review by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of t h e proper county. " (6) Such a c t i o n of t h e p o l i c e commission s h a l l , however, be s u b j e c t t o modification o r v e t o by t h e mayor, made i n w r i t i n g , giving reasons t h e r e f o r , which s h a l l become a permanent record of t h e p o l i c e commission, provided, however, t h a t where and when t h e p o l i c e commission decides t h e charge n o t proven t h e d e c i s i o n is n o t s u b j e c t t o modification o r veto by t h e mayor nor s u b j e c t t o any review but is f i n a l and conclusive. "Where t h e p o l i c e commission decides t h e charge proven, t h e mayor, within f i v e (5) days from t h e d a t e of t h e f i l i n g of such f i n d i n g s and d e c i s i o n with t h e c i t y c l e r k , may modify o r v e t o such find- ings and d e c i s i o n . " ( 7 ) When a charge a g a i n s t a member of t h e p o l i c e f o r c e i s found proven by t h e board, and i s not vetoed by t h e mayor, t h e mayor must make an o r d e r enforcing t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e board, o r i f modified by t h e mayor, then such d e c i s i o n as modified, and such d e c i s i o n o r order s h a l l be s u b j e c t t o review by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of t h e proper county on a l l questions of f a c t and a l l questions of l a w . " ( 8 ) The d i s t r i c t c o u r t of t h e proper county s h a l l have j u r i s d i c t i o n t o review a l l questions of f a c t and a l l questions of law i n a s u i t brought by any o f f i c e r o r member of t h e p o l i c e f o r c e , but no s u i t t o review such hearing o r t r i a l o r f o r r e i n s t a t e - ment t o o f f i c e s h a l l be maintained u n l e s s t h e s a m e i s begun within a period of s i x t y (60) days a f t e r t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e p o l i c e commission o r order of t h e mayor has been f i l e d with t h e c i t y c l e r k . " (Emphasis added. ) A s noted i n subsection ( 7 ) , s e c t i o n 11-1806, t h e f i n a l d e c i s i o n of t h e p o l i c e commission i s s u b j e c t t o review by t h e mayor o r head of t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o r executive branch of t h e municipality. The mayor has been given t h e a u t h o r i t y t o veto, amend o r a f f i r m t h e a c t i o n s of t h e p o l i c e commission, unless t h e p o l i c e o f f i c e r i s a c q u i t t e d of t h e charges brought a g a i n s t him. This seems t o be t h e termination of t h e review process. Subsection ( 8 ) , s e c t i o n 11-1806, provides a remedy f o r t h e policeman i f he is d i s s a t i s f i e d with t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e process of review by t h e mayor. H e i s authorized t o f i l e h i s - s e p a r a t e a c t i o n i n t h e appropriate d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r a review of t h e f a c t s and t h e l a w . Subsection ( 3 ) , s e c t i o n 11-1806, provides t h e commission s h a l l proceed according t o t h e r u l e s of evidence a p p l i c a b l e t o c o u r t s of record. Subsection ( 4 ) , provides t h e a u t h o r i t y f o r t h e chairman t o i s s u e subpoenas, t o compel t h e attendance of witnesses a t a hearing and t o punish disobedience with t h e same a u t h o r i t y a s possessed by a judge of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n l i k e cases. However, punishment f o r disobedience is s u b j e c t t o d i s t r i c t c o u r t review. Therefore, we have an independent a d m i n i s t r a t i v e commis- s i o n with exclusive j u r i s d i c t i o n t o hear and determine charges brought a g a i n s t municipal p o l i c e o f f i c e r s , which i s a quasi- j u d i c i a l function; S t a t e ex rel. Mueller v. D i s t r i c t Court, 87 Mont. 108, 285 P. 928. The g r a n t of powers by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e t o t h e commission i n subsections ( 3 ) and ( 4 ) , s e c t i o n 11-1806, would be meaningless without t h e corresponding power t o compel testimony once a r e l u c t a n t witness has been brought before t h e commission; we f i n d t h i s t o be t h e i n t e n t of t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . The power t o compel testimony must a l s o be s u b j e c t t o t h e same r e s t r i c t i o n s as those t h a t guide a d i s t r i c t c o u r t i n t h e t r i a l of l i k e cases. The holding i n Holt and s i m i l a r c a s e s would i n d i c a t e t h e judiciary generally should be less inclined t o i n j e c t them- selves i n t o administrative proceedings d i r e c t l y by w r i t o r d e c l a r a t i o n and p a r t i c u l a r l y those i n progress, unless t h e r e appears t o be c l e a r l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t y t o intervene. I n t e r - vention i n a f f a i r s of t h e executive branch should be c a r e f u l l y considered i n any case and much more c a r e f u l l y than those matters s o l e l y within t h e j u d i c i a l branch. I n S t a t e ex rel. Johnston v. D i s t r i c t Court, 93 Mont. 439, 4 4 4 , 19 P.2d 220, t h i s Court set o u t t h r e e r e q u i s i t e s t o be met i n t h e consideration of an application f o r a w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i : (1) Excess of j u r i s d i c t i o n i n t h e c o u r t making t h e order complained of; ( 2 ) absence of t h e r i g h t of appeal; and ( 3 ) lack of any p l a i n , speedy and adequate remedy other than t h e w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i . There does not appear t o be any showing t h a t t h e commission acted i n excess of i t s j u r i s d i c t i o n i n t h i s matter and t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t seems t o agree inasmuch a s t h e c o u r t avoided t h e w r i t and entered its findings and conclusions a s a declaratory judgment. W e f i n d no reason t o burden t h i s opinion with a f u r t h e r discussion of o t h e r considerations involved i n t h e granting of a w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i , except t o comment t h a t i n any case t h i s procedure is n o t proper where t h e proceedings t o be reviewed a r e pending o r undetermined. S t a t e ex r e l . Johnston v. D i s t r i c t Court, supra; 1 4 C.J.S. C e r t i o r a r i 820a. The declaratory judgment which w a s issued i n t h e matter seems t o be a product of p r a c t i c a l i t y i n an e f f o r t t o render some kind of guidance t o an administrative body boggled i n a tempest blown somewhat o u t of proportion t o i t s o v e r a l l value t o t h e proceedings then under consideration. There i s no Montana law on t h i s p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n be- cause it is generally conceded i n t h e law t h a t t h i s i s not t h e o f f i c e of a declaratory judgment. Declaratory judgment is a remedy t h a t d e c l a r e s t h e r i g h t s and d u t i e s of t h e p a r t i e s . The purpose of d e c l a r a t o r y r e l i e f i s t o l i q u i d a t e un- c e r t a i n t i e s and c o n t r o v e r s i e s which might r e s u l t i n f u t u r e l i t i g a t i o n and t o a d j u d i c a t e r i g h t s of p a r t i e s who have n o t otherwise been given an opportunity t o have those r i g h t s d e t e r - mined. However, it is n o t t h e t r u e purpose of t h e d e c l a r a t o r y judgment t o provide a s u b s t i t u t e f o r o t h e r r e g u l a r a c t i o n s . 22 Am J u r 2d, Declaratory Judgment § § 1, 2, 6. Other j u r i s d i c t i o n s have denied t h e remedy of d e c l a r a - t o r y judgment where appeal by s t a t u t e o r otherwise from t h e a c t i o n s of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e bodies e x i s t s . Board of County Com- missioners v. Buch, 190 Md. 394, 58 A.2d 672, and c a s e s c i t e d t h e r e i n . S i m i l a r l y i n F l o r i d a it i s w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d ( C i t y of Miami v. Eldredge, F l a . , 1 2 6 S.2d 169, 170) t h a t t h e d e c l a r a t o r y judgment s t a t u t e : " * * * i s no s u b s t i t u t e f o r an e s t a b l i s h e d procedure f o r appeal o r review of d e c i s i o n s of j u d i c i a l t r i b u n a l s , o r of boards o r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o f f i c i a l s e x e r c i s i n g j u d i c i a l o r q u a s i - j u d i c i a l powers." N o j u r i s d i c t i o n s t h a t could be found considered, much less approved, t h e d e c l a r a t o r y judgment a s a v e h i c l e t o o b t a i n r e l i e f from r u l i n g s w i t h i n t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e bodies o r commissions i n t h e process of e x e r c i s i n g t h e i r quasi- j u d i c i a l f u n c t i o n s and/or powers. The d e c l a r a t o r y judgment i n t h i s m a t t e r was improperly issued and is hereby vacated and of no e f f e c t . The matter of t h e i d e n t i t y of t h e o r i g i n a l informer who spoke t o Sgt. Cook i s n o t squarely before t h i s Court, even though t h e law on d i s c l o s u r e w a s presented t o g e t h e r w i t h o t h e r arguments. The question was n o t accepted o r a d e c i s i o n given by t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t a s a matter of law. Rather t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t r u l e d t h e matter i r r e l e v a n t a s a matter of f a c t . The l a w has been b r i e f e d t o t h e commission and t h e following statement i n Roviaro v. United S t a t e s , 353 U.S. 53, 62, 77 S.Ct. 623, 628, 1 L ed 2d 639, c i t e d i n S t a t e ex r e l . Offerdahl v. D i s t r i c t Court, 156 Mont. 432, 436, 481 P.2d 338, seems t o f u r n i s h s u f f i c i e n t guidance i n t h i s matter: "'We believe t h a t no fixed r u l e with r e s p e c t t o d i s c l o s u r e is j u s t i f i a b l e . The problem is one t h a t calls f o r balancing t h e p u b l i c i n t e r e s t i n p r o t e c t i n g t h e flow of information a g a i n s t t h e i n d i v i d u a l ' s r i g h t t o prepare h i s defense. Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on t h e p a r t i c u l a r circum- stances of each c a s e , taking i n t o consideration t h e c r i m e charged, t h e p o s s i b l e defenses, t h e p o s s i b l e s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e informer's testi- mony, and o t h e r r e l e v a n t f a c t o r s . ' " A n examination of t h e t r a n s c r i p t of t h e proceedings before t h i s Court d i s c l o s e s no f a c t s upon which a proper r u l i n g could be made a s t o relevance. The s h o r t exchange between t h e c i t y a t t o r n e y and defense a t t o r n e y only contains t h e conclusion of counsel on t h e one hand t h a t it would be damaging t o t h e department i f t h e i d e n t i t y was revealed. Counsel f o r O f f i c e r D e w a r a s s e r t e d t h a t t h e answer by Sgt. Cook would determine i f any f u r t h e r witnesses would be c a l l e d by t h e defense and u n t i l t h e matter w a s s e t t l e d t h e defense could not proceed. The d e c l a r a t o r y judgment of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s vacated. The p o l i c e commission is d i r e c t e d t o e s t a b l i s h t h e f a c t s upon which t h e p a r t i e s r e l y t o support t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e p o s i t i o n s by o f f e r of proof o r memorandum, and based on t h e f a c t s received and r u l i n g case l a w f o r guidance p r conclusion. / i i I P J u s t i c e s