Case Title: State v. Lepsch

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2014AP002813-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2017-03-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
2017 WI 27 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP2813-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Jeffrey P. Lepsch, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 31, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 9, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
La Crosse 
 
JUDGE: 
Ramona A. Gonzalez 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J., joined by BRADLEY, A. W., J. 
(except for the first sentence of ¶90) concur 
(Opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there was a brief 
by Steven W. Zaleski, and Zaleski Law Firm, Madison, and oral 
argument by Steven W. Zaleski. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Sara 
Lynn Shaeffer, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
 
2017 WI 27
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2014AP2813-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2012CF691) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Jeffrey P. Lepsch, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
MAR 31, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals, State v. Lepsch, 
No. 2014AP2813-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 
2015) (per curiam), which affirmed the La Crosse County circuit 
court's1 judgment of conviction of defendant Jeffrey Lepsch 
("Lepsch") and order denying Lepsch's motion for postconviction 
relief.  
                                                 
1 The Honorable Ramona A. Gonzalez presided. 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
A jury found Lepsch guilty of killing two individuals 
during an armed robbery in La Crosse, Wisconsin.2  Lepsch was 
sentenced to consecutive life terms in prison.  Before this 
court, Lepsch argues he is entitled to a new trial due to 
alleged errors pertaining to jury selection and the jury Lepsch 
received. 
¶3 
More 
specifically, 
Lepsch 
presents 
the 
following 
arguments: (1) Lepsch's right to a trial by an impartial jury 
was violated because certain of the jurors in his case were 
subjectively and objectively biased; (2) Lepsch's right to due 
process of law was violated because of circumstances that 
created the likelihood or appearance of bias and because of 
alleged deficiencies in the circuit court's investigation into 
and mitigation of these circumstances; (3) Lepsch's right to be 
present at a critical stage of his proceedings, right to a 
public trial, and right to a jury properly sworn to be impartial 
were violated because the La Crosse County Clerk of Courts 
administered the oath to the prospective jurors in Lepsch's case 
                                                 
2 Lepsch was convicted of two counts of first-degree 
intentional homicide, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.01(1)(a) 
(2011-12), one count of armed robbery with use of force, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 943.32(2) (2011-12), and one count of 
possession of a firearm by a felon, contrary to 941.29(2)(a) 
(2011-12).  All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes 
are to the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
3 
 
outside of Lepsch's presence;3 and (4) Lepsch's right to receive 
the proper number of peremptory strikes, to full use of those 
strikes, and to have biased jurors removed for cause was 
violated by the circuit court. Lepsch explains that "all of the 
issues litigated in this appeal have been raised via a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel."4 
¶4 
We conclude that each of Lepsch's claims fails, and 
that he is not entitled to a new trial. Consequently, we affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals.  
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶5 
On September 15, 2012, police were dispatched to a 
store in La Crosse, WI.  The bodies of P.P. and A.P had been 
discovered by a family member at the store; each had been shot 
in the head.  There were also signs of a robbery. 
¶6 
On October 10, 2012, Lepsch was charged with two 
counts of first-degree intentional homicide, contrary to Wis. 
Stat. § 940.01(1)(a).  The following day, an amended complaint 
was filed additionally charging Lepsch with armed robbery with 
use of force, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 943.32(1)(a) and (2), and 
                                                 
3 As will be explained, this oath should not be confused 
with the oath administered to the jury Lepsch ultimately 
received prior to the commencement of his trial.  That is, 
Lepsch is challenging the administration of the oath to the 
prospective jurors prior to questioning of the prospective 
jurors by the court, the State, and Lepsch's counsel; he does 
not dispute that the jury chosen was thereafter properly sworn 
by a clerk in Lepsch's presence in court at the start of his 
trial.  
4 But see infra n.5.  
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
4 
 
possession of a firearm by a felon, contrary to 941.29(2)(a).  
On October 25, 2012, at Lepsch's arraignment, Lepsch stood mute 
and the circuit court entered pleas of not guilty on his behalf.  
A few months later, the case was set for a jury trial.  
¶7 
Jury selection in this case proceeded as follows.  
Prior to the date of jury selection, prospective jurors 
completed paper questionnaires asking dozens of questions on 
subjects ranging from the jurors' favorite television shows to 
the jurors' views on various legal propositions.  These 
questionnaires 
required 
a 
signature 
under 
the 
following 
statement: "I affirm, under penalty of perjury, that I have 
given complete and honest answers to all of the questions 
above."  The parties 
agreed to excuse about two dozen 
prospective jurors at least in part on the basis of the answers 
provided.  On July 23, 2013, jury selection itself occurred.  
Prospective jurors gathered in the "jury assembly room," where 
they were sworn by the La Crosse County Clerk of Courts.  The 
parties seem to agree that neither Lepsch nor his attorneys were 
present when the oath was administered. 
¶8 
Certain prospective jurors were then brought into the 
courtroom for individual questioning in the presence of the 
court, Lepsch, and his attorneys.  A number of prospective 
jurors were excused.  Next, remaining prospective jurors were 
brought into the courtroom as a group and questioned in the 
presence of the court, Lepsch, and his attorneys.  Finally, 
Lepsch and the State were each given six peremptory strikes and 
a panel of 15 jurors was selected. 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
5 
 
¶9 
From Wednesday, July 24, 2013, to Friday, July 26, 
2013, and from Monday, July 29, 2013, to Tuesday, July 30, 2013, 
Lepsch was tried before the jury.  There is no dispute that this 
jury was properly sworn by a clerk in Lepsch's presence in court 
at the start of his trial.  On July 30, 2013, the jury returned 
a verdict of guilty as to all counts charged.  On September 3, 
2013, the circuit court sentenced Lepsch to two life sentences 
without extended supervision for the homicide charges, a 40-year 
term of imprisonment for the armed robbery charge, and a 10-year 
term of imprisonment for the possession of a firearm by a felon 
charge, all to be served consecutively.  On September 4, 2013, 
the judgment of conviction was entered.  
¶10 On November 25, 2013, Lepsch filed a notice of intent 
to seek postconviction relief, and on July 15, 2014, Lepsch 
filed a postconviction motion for a new trial.  In his motion he 
challenged 
the 
convictions 
asserting 
that 
he 
received 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  On September 4, 2014, the 
circuit court held a Machner hearing on Lepsch's motion.  See 
State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 
1979).  On November 14, 2014, the circuit court denied Lepsch's 
motion.  
¶11 On December 2, 2014, Lepsch filed a notice of appeal.  
On November 19, 2015, the court of appeals affirmed the circuit 
court's judgment of conviction and order denying postconviction 
relief 
in 
an 
unpublished, 
per 
curiam 
opinion. 
 
Lepsch, 
unpublished slip op., ¶1. 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
6 
 
¶12 On December 4, 2015, Lepsch filed a petition for 
review in this court.  On May 11, 2016, this court granted the 
petition. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶13 "A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a 
mixed question of fact and law."  State v. Ortiz-Mondragon, 2015 
WI 73, ¶30, 364 Wis. 2d 1, 866 N.W.2d 717 (quoting State v. 
Carter, 2010 WI 40, ¶19, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 782 N.W.2d 695).  We 
review the circuit court's findings of fact under a clearly 
erroneous standard, but independently determine the legal 
question of whether counsel's assistance was ineffective.  Id. 
(quoting Carter, 324 Wis. 2d 640, ¶19).  
¶14 We "review[] constitutional questions, both state and 
federal, de novo."  State v. Lagrone, 2016 WI 26, ¶18, 368 
Wis. 2d 1, 
878 
N.W.2d 636 
(quoting 
State 
v. 
Schaefer, 
2008 WI 25, ¶17, 308 Wis. 2d 279, 746 N.W.2d 457). 
¶15 Other applicable standards will be discussed below. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶16 Lepsch's appeal focuses on his ineffective assistance 
of 
counsel 
claim.5 
 
Lepsch 
possesses 
state 
and 
federal 
                                                 
5 The nature of the arguments Lepsch raises on appeal is 
often unclear.  Although Lepsch raises numerous constitutional 
claims in his brief, it is not until page 48 of that brief that 
Lepsch states, "Due to trial counsel's failure to preserve the 
issues at trial, all of the issues litigated in this appeal have 
been raised via a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel."  
Elsewhere in his brief, however, Lepsch appears to discuss 
issues outside of the ineffective-assistance framework.  "We 
cannot serve as both advocate and court," and we will not 
develop Lepsch's claims for him.  Cemetery Servs., Inc. v. 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
7 
 
constitutional rights to the effective assistance of counsel.  
U.S. Const. amends. VI, XIV; Wis. Const. art. I, § 7;6 Strickland 
                                                                                                                                                             
Wisconsin Dep't of Regulation & Licensing, 221 Wis. 2d 817, 831, 
586 N.W.2d 191 (Ct. App. 1998).  Except where otherwise noted——
namely, where Lepsch has developed an independent claim with 
sufficient clarity——we do not address claims arising outside of 
the ineffective assistance context. 
6 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 
U.S. Const. amend. VI.  The Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution provides in part: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.  Article I, section 7 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy 
the right to be heard by himself and counsel; to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him; to meet the witnesses face to face; to have 
compulsory 
process 
to 
compel 
the 
attendance 
of 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
8 
 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); State v. Starks, 2013 
WI 69, ¶54, 349 Wis. 2d 274, 833 N.W.2d 146.  "The standard for 
determining whether counsel's assistance is effective under the 
Wisconsin Constitution is identical to that under the federal 
Constitution."  State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶18 n.7, 264 
Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305.  "First, the defendant must prove 
that counsel's performance was deficient.  Second, if counsel's 
performance was deficient, the defendant must prove that the 
deficiency prejudiced the defense."  Carter, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 
¶21 (citation omitted).  With regard to the first part of this 
test, "[c]ounsel's conduct is constitutionally deficient if it 
falls below an objective standard of reasonableness."  Thiel, 
264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶19 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).  With 
regard to the second part of this test, "the defendant must show 
that 'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'"  Id., ¶20 
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
A.  Impartial Jury  
                                                                                                                                                             
witnesses in his behalf; and in prosecutions by 
indictment, or information, to a speedy public trial 
by an impartial jury of the county or district wherein 
the offense shall have been committed; which county or 
district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law. 
Wis. Const. art. I, § 7. 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
9 
 
¶17 In Lepsch's first ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim, Lepsch argues his attorneys were ineffective in failing 
to raise jury bias issues during jury selection.  As a result, 
he claims nine of the jurors in his case were biased, which 
denied him his right to an impartial jury under the Wisconsin 
and federal constitutions.  Lepsch bases this challenge on 
various answers given in response to four questions on the pre-
trial questionnaires completed by the prospective jurors.  He 
argues that his attorneys were ineffective for "failing to 
sufficiently examine and challenge prospective jurors for 
cause." 
¶18 We now present the four questions at issue. Question 
30 of the questionnaire reads as follows: "You will be hearing 
testimony from several police officers in this case.  Do you 
think you would give police officers more credibility, less 
credibility or the same amount of credibility as other witnesses 
who were not police officers?"  The question contained spaces 
for the prospective juror to check "more credibility," "less 
credibility," 
or 
"the 
same 
credibility," 
and 
asked 
the 
prospective juror to explain his or her answer.  Seven of the 
twelve 
jurors 
who 
sat 
on 
Lepsch's 
case 
answered 
"more 
credibility."7  
¶19 Question 
35 
of 
the 
questionnaire 
contained 
the 
following questions, among others: (1) "Have you ever expressed 
                                                 
7 These seven jurors were C.R., N.N., J.A., P.H., L.K., 
D.M., and R.F.  
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
10 
 
the opinion that Mr. Lepsch was guilty?"; (2) "Do you have any 
feelings at this time that you have made up your mind as to 
Mr. Lepsch's guilt?"; and (3) "IF YES, would you have any 
difficulty putting these feelings out of your mind if you were 
chosen to be a juror?".  Each question was followed by spaces 
for the prospective juror to check "Yes" or "No."  Four of the 
twelve jurors on Lepsch's jury answered that they had expressed 
the opinion that Mr. Lepsch was guilty.8  Three of these same 
four jurors answered that they "ha[d] . . . feelings" that they 
had made up their mind as to Lepsch's guilt.9  Each of these 
three then answered that they would not have any difficulty 
putting the feelings out of their mind if they were chosen to be 
a juror. 
¶20 Question 32 asked, "Do you have any problem with the 
legal proposition that a defendant must be presumed innocent 
unless and until the prosecution can prove he or she is guilty?"  
And Question 34 asked a related question: "Do you think if the 
state goes to the trouble of bringing someone to trial, the 
person is probably guilty?"  Both questions left spaces for the 
prospective juror to check "Yes" or "No," and both questions 
asked for the prospective juror to explain his or her answer.  
One 
juror 
answered 
"No" 
to 
Question 
32 
(regarding 
the 
presumption of innocence) but then explained his answer as 
                                                 
8 These four jurors were J.T., J.A., M.F., and L.K. 
9 These three jurors were J.T., J.A., and M.F. 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
11 
 
follows: "In general, no. But I do not believe that this should 
be the case 100% of the time.  I believe that there are cases in 
which there is immediate & overwhelming evidence (i.e. physical 
evidence, audio/video evidence, confessions, etc.) should be 
presumed guilty until trial [sic]."  The same juror answered 
Question 34 (relating to whether a person brought to trial is 
probably guilty) as follows: "Probably?  Yes.  Definitely?  Not 
necessarily.  I would hope that the courts would not bring 
someone in just so they have someone to try.  I would hope there 
would at least be a fair amount of evidence or cause before 
bringing someone in."10 
¶21 Before addressing the deficiency and prejudice prongs 
of Lepsch's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we set 
forth the law governing juror bias.  "The United States 
Constitution and Wisconsin's Constitution guarantee an accused 
an impartial jury."  State v. Mendoza, 227 Wis. 2d 838, 847, 596 
N.W.2d 736 (1999) (citing U.S. Const. amends. VI and XIV; Wis. 
Const., art. I, § 7).11  "To be impartial, a juror must be 
indifferent and capable of basing his or her verdict upon the 
evidence 
developed 
at 
trial." 
 
State 
v. 
Faucher, 
227 
Wis. 2d 700, 715, 596 N.W.2d 770 (1999) (citing Irvin v. Dowd, 
366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961)).  
                                                 
10 This juror was C.R. 
11 See supra n.6. 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
12 
 
¶22 "Reviewing courts are properly resistant to second-
guessing the trial judge's estimation of a juror's impartiality, 
for that judge's appraisal is ordinarily influenced by a host of 
factors impossible to capture fully in the record——among them, 
the prospective juror's inflection, sincerity, demeanor, candor, 
body language, and apprehension of duty."  Skilling v. United 
States, 561 U.S. 358, 386 (2010).  "Prospective jurors are 
presumed impartial" and Lepsch "bears the burden of rebutting 
this presumption and proving bias."  State v. Funk, 2011 WI 62, 
¶31, 335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421 (quoting State v. Louis, 
156 Wis. 2d 470, 478, 457 N.W.2d 484 (1990)).  "We have 
recognized three types of bias: (1) statutory bias; (2) 
subjective bias; and (3) objective bias."  State v. Smith, 2006 
WI 74, ¶19, 291 Wis. 2d 569, 716 N.W.2d 482 (citing Faucher, 227 
Wis. 2d at 716).  Lepsch argues that the jurors he challenged 
were subjectively and objectively biased. 
¶23 Subjective bias refers to "bias that is revealed 
through the words and the demeanor of the prospective juror."  
Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 717.  "[T]he circuit court sits in a 
superior position to assess the demeanor and disposition of 
prospective jurors, and thus, whether they are subjectively 
biased."  Id. at 718.  Accordingly, "we will uphold the circuit 
court's factual finding that a prospective juror is or is not 
subjectively biased unless it is clearly erroneous."  Id. 
¶24 The concept of objective bias relates to the question 
of "whether [a] reasonable person in the individual prospective 
juror's position could be impartial."  Id.  
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
13 
 
Objective bias . . . is a mixed question of fact and 
law.  "[A] circuit court's findings regarding the 
facts and circumstances surrounding voir dire and the 
case will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous.  
Whether those facts fulfill the legal standard of 
objective bias is a question of law."  Although we do 
not defer to a circuit court's decision on a question 
of law, where the factual and legal determinations are 
intertwined as they are in determining objective bias, 
we 
give 
weight 
to 
the 
circuit 
court's 
legal 
conclusion.  We have said that we will reverse a 
circuit court's determination in regard to objective 
bias "only if as a matter of law a reasonable judge 
could not have reached such a conclusion." 
Funk, 335 Wis. 2d 369, ¶30 (citations omitted) (quoting Faucher, 
227 Wis. 2d at 720-21). 
¶25 In order to succeed on his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, Lepsch must prove that his attorneys acted 
deficiently during jury selection and that he was prejudiced by 
this performance.  Our review demonstrates that none of the 
jurors who sat on Lepsch's case were biased, either subjectively 
or objectively, and that Lepsch was therefore not prejudiced by 
the performance of his attorneys, even if the performance was 
deficient in some respect (a question we need not decide). 
¶26 The circuit court below explained, in denying Lepsch's 
postconviction motion:  
From the court's position of being able to best 
determine 
juror 
bias, 
the 
court 
is 
absolutely 
convinced that each juror was able to put any 
potential biases out of their minds.  The court is 
absolutely certain that Lepsch was tried by a fair and 
impartial jury who decided the case based solely on 
the evidence before them.  The court is unequivocally 
convinced that the jury agonized over its decision and 
gave Lepsch every benefit of the doubt.  
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
14 
 
¶27 Lepsch cannot establish ineffective assistance because 
he cannot prove either objective or subjective bias.  Seven of 
Lepsch's jurors stated in the questionnaire that they would give 
police officers more credibility than witnesses who were not 
police officers.12  Five of these jurors, however, were 
specifically questioned on that answer, and the lawyers and/or 
the court examined this belief and ensured that the jurors could 
decide the case impartially.  To take just one example,13 the 
court asked R.F. the following with regard to law enforcement 
officers:  
[T]he question is, once they are sitting in the seat 
you're sitting in and they are a witness, can you 
judge them, the credibility, what they say based upon 
those 
things 
that 
we 
as 
human 
beings 
use 
as 
intangibles to determine people's credibility and not 
just cut them slack because they happen to be law 
enforcement? 
R.F. responded, "Yes, Your Honor."  The court then confirmed, 
"So you can -- you can look at them as you would any other 
witness?" R.F. responded, "Yes."  Given our deference to the 
circuit court on these types of questions, we will not displace 
                                                 
12 Lepsch argues that law enforcement testimony was a 
central part of the State's case against him.  We can assume 
that this is true for purposes of this appeal. 
13 We do not provide transcript excerpts for the questioning 
of each juror.  However, questioning regarding the jurors' views 
on police credibility and the jurors' answers to the questions 
asked were substantially similar for purposes relevant to the 
issues in this case. 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
15 
 
the circuit court's conclusion that these jurors were not biased 
when they sat on Lepsch's case. 
¶28 J.A. and D.M. are the two jurors who were not 
specifically questioned on this point.  However, other aspects 
of the jury selection process provide support for the circuit 
court's rejection of Lepsch's claims of bias.  Both J.A. and 
D.M. checked "No" on their questionnaires next to the question, 
"Is there any reason why you could not be impartial in this 
case?"  And D.M. stated elsewhere on his questionnaire, "I 
believe in facts, not people."  See, e.g., Griffin v. Bell, 694 
F.3d 817, 823-24) (7th Cir. 2012) ("[Juror] Carel, of course, 
never said that she could not be fair.  At most, she indicated 
that her first inclination, if faced with conflicting stories 
from a police officer and a fourteen-year-old boy, would 'most 
likely' be to believe the officer. . . . In this case, although 
[juror] Carel expressed an initial inclination that police 
officers are more credible than teenagers, she never expressed 
an irrational or unshakeable bias that indicated an inability or 
unwillingness to faithfully and impartially apply the law."); 
United States v. Ricketts, 146 F.3d 492, 496 (7th Cir. 1998) 
("In the abstract, it is certainly not unreasonable for an 
ordinary person to say she would generally tend to believe a 
prison guard over a prison inmate.  But that certainly doesn't 
mean that in a given case, after hearing sworn testimony under 
oath and considering all the facts and circumstances, that that 
same juror would automatically believe a given guard over a 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
16 
 
given inmate. Generalized questions of the sort asked here are a 
slim basis upon which to base a challenge for cause."). 
¶29 Further, both J.A. and D.M. were present during 
questioning of the jurors as a group.  Given the general tenor 
of voir dire, the prospective jurors could not have "fail[ed] to 
recognize that bias in favor of law enforcement officials was 
inappropriate."  United States v. Lancaster, 96 F.3d 734, 742-43 
(4th Cir. 1996) (reaching this conclusion in part because the 
court had inquired about "bias in favor of law enforcement 
officials resulting from a relationship with a relative or 
friend 
in 
law 
enforcement"). 
 
The 
defense 
informed 
the 
prospective jurors, "[T]here's no wrong answers, and I want you 
guys to talk to me.  We're after an unbiased jury here, and it's 
okay to have biases.  We all have them."  Topics touched on 
during questioning by the defense were whether the police can 
make mistakes, whether it is important that law enforcement 
follow procedures, whether police "ever let bias get in the way 
of what they're looking for," whether "we tend to trust 
professionals [including police] a little more than we should 
sometimes," and how to determine whether a professional such as 
a policeman "has the right training or experience."  
¶30 Moreover, earlier in voir dire, the State explained to 
the prospective jurors, "both sides want people who are fair, 
objective," later adding: 
[B]y now you've gotten some pretty good ideas through 
the questionnaires and all the questioning of the kind 
of things we want to know about people.  Is there 
anything that anybody hasn't asked and you've just 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
17 
 
been sitting here waiting, why don't they ask me this 
because I really shouldn't be on this jury, but 
nobody's asked me why?  Is there anything that we 
haven't asked at this point, anyone who says, I should 
not be here; I can't be fair; and we just haven't 
asked the right question yet?  
There was no response.  See Lancaster, 96 F.3d at 743 ("Under 
these circumstances, the district court's final voir dire 
question——'Ladies and Gentlemen, do you know of any reason, is 
there anything at all any of you know of that would make it 
difficult for you to sit as an impartial juror in this case?'——
could not have failed to elicit an affirmative response from any 
member of the venire harboring a bias in favor of law 
enforcement officials." (citation omitted)).  Again, given the 
standard of review, we are not in a position to disturb the 
circuit court's judgment that no bias existed on Lepsch's jury 
in this regard.  Thus, even assuming Lepsch's attorneys should 
have examined this matter further during jury selection in some 
way, Lepsch has not proven that he was prejudiced by the 
performance. 
¶31 Lepsch's claims of bias regarding jurors who said they 
had expressed an opinion on Lepsch's guilt or had made up their 
mind as to Lepsch's guilt are also unpersuasive.  Each of the 
three jurors who stated "Yes" on their questionnaires when 
asked, "Do you have any feelings at this time that you have made 
up your mind as to Mr. Lepsch's guilt?" also stated "No" in 
response to the question of whether they would have any 
difficulty putting these feelings out of their minds as jurors.  
All four who stated they had "ever expressed the opinion that 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
18 
 
Mr. Lepsch was guilty" were individually questioned in some 
manner as to whether they could base their decisions on the 
evidence; each juror verified that he or she could do so.  
Lepsch has not demonstrated that the circuit court's findings 
regarding bias should be overturned as to these jurors, and he 
has 
not 
shown 
prejudice 
with 
respect 
to 
his 
attorneys' 
questioning of these jurors. 
¶32 Finally, the juror who qualified his agreement with 
the presumption of innocence and who agreed that if the State 
goes to the trouble of bringing someone to trial, the person is 
probably guilty, was informed that he would be instructed about 
the presumption of innocence and that he had to "start out with 
looking as Mr. Lepsch as he is innocent," that he is "innocent 
as he sits here today."  The juror was asked if he was "okay 
with that principle," and the juror affirmed that he was.  
Again, we see no prejudice resulting from the questioning of 
this juror. 
¶33  Before proceeding further, we note that Lepsch takes 
issue with our discussion of the law on juror impartiality, 
contending that it is contrary to federal law insofar as it does 
not require a "final, unequivocal" swearing by a juror that he 
or she can set aside his or her beliefs and opinions and decide 
the case solely on the evidence.  Lepsch relies predominantly on 
Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984), citing a passage 
explaining that in a "federal habeas corpus case in which the 
partiality of an individual juror is placed in issue," the 
question 
before 
the 
reviewing 
court 
"is 
plainly 
one 
of 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
19 
 
historical fact: did a juror swear that he could set aside any 
opinion he might hold and decide the case on the evidence, and 
should the juror's protestation of impartiality have been 
believed."  Yount, 467 U.S. at 1036.  
¶34 We disagree with Lepsch that Supreme Court case law14 
dictates that a bright-line rule be applied in cases involving a 
defendant's claim he did not receive an impartial jury.  First, 
it is important to consider the context of the single line in 
Yount cited by Lepsch.  The Supreme Court was rejecting, on 
federal habeas review, the view of the court of appeals below it 
that "the question whether jurors have opinions that disqualify 
them is a mixed question of law and fact" such that "the 
presumption of correctness due a state court's factual findings 
under" federal habeas review was inapplicable.  Id. at 1028-31, 
1036.  Its focus in that passage was not the definition of the 
substantive standard, but instead the notion that application of 
the relevant standard was "not one of mixed law and fact" and 
that "the statutory presumption of correctness" thus applied to 
the trial court's determinations.  See id. at 1036-38. 
                                                 
14 Lepsch also cites a number of decisions issued by lower 
federal courts.  We are not bound by these decisions.  See, 
e.g., Madison Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 WI 99, ¶68, 358 
Wis. 2d 1, 851 N.W.2d 337 (explaining that the Seventh Circuit's 
constitutional analysis was not binding on this court); cf. 
Johnson v. Williams, 568  U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1088, 1098 (2013) 
("[T]he views of the federal courts of appeals do not bind the 
California 
Supreme 
Court 
when 
it 
decides 
a 
federal 
constitutional question, and disagreeing with the lower federal 
courts is not the same as ignoring federal law."). 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
20 
 
¶35 And indeed, the Yount Court later restated the 
applicable inquiry on habeas review as "whether there is fair 
support in the record for the state courts' conclusion that the 
jurors here would be impartial," adding, 
Jurors . . . cannot be expected invariably to express 
themselves carefully or even consistently. Every trial 
judge understands this, and under our system it is 
that 
judge 
who 
is 
best 
situated 
to 
determine 
competency to serve impartially.  The trial judge 
properly may choose to believe those statements that 
were the most fully articulated or that appeared to 
have been least influenced by leading. 
Yount, 467 U.S. at 1038-39 (emphasis added).  This suggests an 
amount of leeway inconsistent with the rigid rule proposed by 
Lepsch.  See also id. at 1039-40 ("[I]n the case of alternate 
juror Pyott, we cannot fault the trial judge for crediting her 
earliest testimony, in which she said that she could put her 
opinion aside '[i]f [she] had to,' rather than the later 
testimony in which defense counsel persuaded her that logically 
she would need evidence to discard any opinion she might 
have."); id. at 1039 ("We think that the trial judge's decision 
to seat [juror] Hrin, despite early ambiguity in his testimony, 
was confirmed after he initially denied the challenge.  Defense 
counsel 
sought 
and 
obtained 
permission 
to 
resume 
cross-
examination.  In response to a question whether [juror] Hrin 
could set his opinion aside before entering the jury box or 
would need evidence to change his mind, the juror clearly and 
forthrightly stated: 'I think I could enter it [the jury box] 
with a very open mind. I think I could . . . very easily.  To 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
21 
 
say this is a requirement for some of the things you have to do 
every day.'"). 
¶36 Recent 
Supreme 
Court 
case 
law 
supports 
our 
understanding of Yount.  In Skilling the Supreme Court explained 
that "[n]o hard-and-fast formula dictates the necessary depth or 
breadth of voir dire," following that statement with a quotation 
from one of its earlier cases: "Impartiality is not a technical 
conception.  It is a state of mind.  For the ascertainment of 
this 
mental 
attitude 
of 
appropriate 
indifference, 
the 
Constitution lays down no particular tests and procedure is not 
chained to any ancient and artificial formula."  Skilling, 561 
U.S. at 386 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Wood, 299 
U.S. 123, 145-46 (1936)).  Finally, Lepsch does not direct us to 
any Supreme Court cases explicitly applying his interpretation 
of the putative test from Yount.  We agree with Lepsch that a 
prospective juror must be able to "set aside any opinion he 
might hold and decide the case on the evidence."  Yount, 467 
U.S. at 1036.  But, as a general matter, a circuit court need 
not use or obtain any magic words in determining whether this 
requirement has been met.   
¶37 In sum, Lepsch has not provided sufficient reason to 
upset the circuit court's determination that none of the jurors 
who sat on Lepsch's case were biased, either subjectively or 
objectively. 
 
Thus, 
even 
assuming 
that 
Lepsch's 
counsel 
performed deficiently at voir dire, Lepsch has failed to 
demonstrate that he was prejudiced by this performance and his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim must be rejected.  C.f., 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
22 
 
e.g., Peterson v. State, 154 So.3d 275, 282 (Fla. 2014) (per 
curiam) ("Peterson cannot demonstrate prejudice because no 
biased juror sat on his jury."); State v. Erickson, 227 
Wis. 2d 758, 774, 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999) ("more than rank 
speculation" is needed "to satisfy the prejudice prong"). 
¶38 Lepsch also maintains that his right to due process of 
law was denied because of "circumstances that create[d] the 
'likelihood or the appearance of bias,'" Peters v. Kiff, 407 
U.S. 493, 502 (1972) (plurality opinion), and because the 
circuit 
court 
"fail[ed] 
to 
conduct 
a 
sufficient 
inquiry 
regarding such circumstances."  Lepsch's claim is stated in 
broad terms and without adequate legal development, and we 
reject it.  As the circuit court explained:     
The court and both parties were aware that this 
case was going to be well-known in the community long 
before the trial ever began.  For that exact reason, 
the court took extra precaution to ensure an impartial 
jury, beyond what it would do for most jury trials.  
The extensive questionnaire sent out to the jurors was 
used to eliminate 24 jurors who exhibited a bias 
indicating they could not sit as objective jurors, 
before they ever reported for jury duty and by the 
agreement of both parties.  After those potential 
jurors had been eliminated, the potential jurors who 
reported were brought into the courtroom one at a 
time.  They were questioned by the court and both 
parties regarding pretrial publicity, their ability to 
decide the case only on the evidence presented, and 
about any potentially problematic answers on their 
questionnaire.  More jurors were excused during this 
process.  Then voir dire began as it normally would. 
(Footnote omitted) (citations omitted.)  The circuit court's 
careful administration of jury selection and the verbal in-
person questioning that took place cured any possibility of the 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
23 
 
"likelihood or the appearance of bias" at least as outlined in 
the arguments Lepsch has made.15  We conclude that he was not 
denied due process.16   
B.  Administration of the Oath to the Prospective Jurors 
¶39 Next, Lepsch argues that the swearing of prospective 
jurors outside of his presence by the La Crosse County Clerk of 
Courts violated his rights to be present at all critical stages 
of a criminal proceeding, to receive a public trial, and to 
receive a trial by an impartial jury.  He contends that his 
trial attorneys were ineffective in failing "to ensure that the 
                                                 
15 Lepsch makes passing reference to certain answers given 
by his alternate jurors.  These jurors were excused prior to 
deliberation.  Lepsch does not explain why these jurors are 
relevant to the inquiry, and we will not construct an argument 
for him.  See Cemetery Servs., Inc., 221 Wis. 2d at 831. 
16 It is unclear whether Lepsch means to discuss this claim 
in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel. He does not 
specifically do so (except for his general statement near the 
end of his brief that "all of the issues litigated in this 
appeal have been raised via a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel").  For example, Lepsch states, "[I]rrespective of trial 
counsel's performance and obligations, the trial court had an 
independent obligation to ensure that the voir dire in the case 
was conducted according to 6th Amendment principles . . . ."  In 
any event, if Lepsch is arguing his lawyers should have objected 
and raised the arguments Lepsch raises now, we conclude that, 
even assuming deficient performance of some kind, Lepsch was not 
prejudiced by it because there was no denial of due process. 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
24 
 
trial court properly administered the oath to the jury venire in 
Lepsch's presence."17 
¶40 To be clear, Lepsch does not dispute that the jury he 
ultimately received was properly sworn by a clerk in Lepsch's 
presence in court at the start of his trial.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 756.08 
(2013-14). 
 
Instead, 
he 
is 
asserting 
alleged 
deficiencies with regard to the administration of the oath to 
the prospective jurors prior to questioning of the prospective 
jurors by the court, the State, and Lepsch's counsel. 
¶41 Lepsch's 
briefing 
essentially 
discusses 
his 
constitutional rights at voir dire.  We are thus able to 
immediately dismiss most of Lepsch's argument because he was, in 
fact, present at voir dire.  Black's Law Dictionary defines 
"voir dire" as "[a] preliminary examination of a prospective 
juror by a judge or lawyer to decide whether the prospect is 
qualified and suitable to serve on a jury," adding that 
"[l]oosely, the term refers to the jury-selection phase of 
trial."  Voir dire, Black's Law Dictionary 1805 (10th ed. 2014).  
We decline to adopt Lepsch's more expansive conception of voir 
dire, according to which proceedings involving management of the 
                                                 
17 Other than a cursory reference to his right to be present 
"with counsel," Lepsch does not brief a distinct claim that he 
was denied the right to counsel when the prospective jurors were 
sworn, see, e.g. Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 80-81 (2004), or 
explain how we should analyze such a claim.  Instead, he 
repeatedly focuses on his own right to be present.  Thus, we do 
not address the question.  See State v. Gracia, 2013 WI 15, ¶28 
n.13, 345 Wis. 2d 488, 826 N.W.2d 87 ("[W]e do not usually 
address undeveloped arguments."). 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
25 
 
jury pool occurring prior to the entry of the prospective jurors 
into the courtroom are given constitutional significance.  
Lepsch has not sufficiently explained why voir dire encompasses 
the administration of the oath to the prospective jurors any 
more than it encompasses the completion of the questionnaires by 
the prospective jurors prior to the start of trial. 
¶42 Similarly, we reject as meritless Lepsch's contention 
that the circuit court, not a clerk, was required by statute to 
administer the oath.  Lepsch cites Wis. Stat. § 805.08(1) (2013-
14), which states that: 
The court shall examine on oath each person who is 
called as a juror to discover whether the juror is 
related by blood, marriage or adoption to any party or 
to any attorney appearing in the case, or has any 
financial interest in the case, or has expressed or 
formed any opinion, or is aware of any bias or 
prejudice in the case.  
Wis. Stat. § 805.08(1) (2013-14).  In response, the State cites 
Wis. Stat. § 756.001(5) (2013-14), which states that "[t]he 
clerk of circuit court, if delegated by and under the 
supervision of the judge responsible for administering the jury 
system, may select and manage juries under policies and rules 
established by the judges in that circuit court."  Lepsch does 
not appear to have much of a reply to this argument.  Nor does 
Lepsch explain how he was harmed by the putative error, other 
than to point to his other constitutional claims.  We dismiss 
Lepsch's argument regarding the identity of the administrator of 
the oath as undeveloped.  See State v. Gracia, 2013 WI 15, ¶28 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
26 
 
n.13, 345 Wis. 2d 488, 826 N.W.2d 87 ("[W]e do not usually 
address undeveloped arguments."). 
¶43 More generally, however, Lepsch's line of argument 
relating to the administration of the oath to the prospective 
jurors "ignores the[] day-to-day realities of courtroom life and 
undermines society's interest in the administration of criminal 
justice."  Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 119 (1983) (per 
curiam).  Clerks play a critical role in the daily functioning 
of our court systems, and the procedures challenged by Lepsch 
doubtlessly occur in courthouses throughout the State.  Were we 
to accept Lepsch's arguments, we would be casting doubt on the 
clerks' capacity to act, as clerks routinely do, in the 
summoning and preparing of prospective jurors for the circuit 
courts of the State.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 756.04(9)(a) 
(2013-14) 
("Prospective 
juror 
lists; 
number; 
how 
compiled. . . . During each year, the clerk of circuit court 
shall provide the court with a sufficient number of names of 
prospective jurors to meet the needs of the court."); § 756.05 
(2013-14) ("Jury summons, when and how issued.  At least 12 days 
before the first day on which a jury is required to be present, 
to create the jury venire, the clerk of circuit court shall 
randomly select a sufficient number of prospective jurors from 
the jury array created under s. 756.04 (9) who shall be summoned 
to appear before the court at an appropriate time for jury 
service."); 
§ 756.06(1) 
(2013-14) 
("Jury 
selection.  
(1) Whenever an issue is to be tried before a jury, the clerk of 
circuit court shall randomly select names from the jury venire 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
27 
 
until the desired number is obtained to create the jury 
panel."); § 756.07 (2013-14) ("Insufficient jurors. When a 
sufficient number of jurors cannot be obtained for a trial from 
the jury venire supplied by the clerk of circuit court, the 
court may order the sheriff to bring before the court persons in 
the 
vicinity 
for 
determination 
by 
the 
court 
of 
their 
qualification and ability to serve as jurors for the particular 
trial.").  We decline to do so today. 
¶44 Even assuming for the sake of argument that error 
existed, Lepsch still cannot succeed.  We first address Lepsch's 
putative right to be present.  Although he does not cite any 
applicable constitutional provisions, Lepsch includes a pair of 
court 
of 
appeals 
decisions 
in 
his 
brief 
containing 
the 
proposition that "[t]he right to be present at jury selection 
is . . . protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution."18  State v. Harris, 229 Wis. 2d 832, 
839, 601 N.W.2d 682 (Ct. App. 1999); see State v. Tulley, 2001 
                                                 
18 See supra n.6. 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
28 
 
WI App 236, ¶6, 248 Wis. 2d 505, 635 N.W.2d 807.19  Additionally, 
Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(c) (2013-14) states that, subject to 
certain exceptions, "the defendant shall be present: . . .  
During voir dire of the trial jury."  Wis. Stat. § 971.04(1)(c) 
(2013-14).   
¶45 We observe that the parties at times discuss this 
claim in terms of harmless error analysis. And indeed, there is 
case law supporting such an approach.  See, e.g., Tulley, 248 
Wis. 2d 505, ¶7 ("[D]eprivation of . . . the defendant's right 
to be present . . . during voir dire is reviewed on appeal for 
harmless error." (citing Harris, 229 Wis. 2d at 839-40)); Spain, 
464 U.S. at 117-18 n.2 ("right to be present during all critical 
stages of the proceedings" is "subject to harmless-error 
analysis").  Yet, without much explanation, the parties also 
address the claim as one of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
¶46 We note that under a harmless error analysis, the 
State would bear the burden of establishing that any error was 
harmless because it stands to benefit from such an error.  See, 
e.g., State v. Martin, 2012 WI 96, ¶45, 343 Wis. 2d 278, 816 
                                                 
19 The Supreme Court has explained, "The constitutional 
right to presence is rooted to a large extent in the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, but we have 
recognized that this right is protected by the Due Process 
Clause in some situations where the defendant is not actually 
confronting witnesses or evidence against him." United States v. 
Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (per curiam) (citation 
omitted); see also State v. Alexander, 2013 WI 70, ¶26, 349 
Wis. 2d 327, 833 N.W.2d 126.  The parties do not address this 
important distinction, but we need not apply it to the facts of 
this case given our holding. 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
29 
 
N.W.2d 270.  Conversely, pursuant to an ineffective assistance 
of counsel analysis, the burden would be on Lepsch to establish 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  See Carter, 324 Wis. 2d 640, 
¶21.  Nevertheless, whether the claim is addressed under 
harmless error review or under the rubric of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, Lepsch is not entitled to relief.  
¶47 Even if Lepsch had statutory and constitutional rights 
to be present at the swearing of the prospective jurors, any 
error stemming from Lepsch's absence was harmless.  The 
La Crosse County Clerk of Courts swore in an affidavit:  
I was present with prospective jurors on July 23, 2013 
in the matter of State v. Lepsch . . . in the jury 
assembly 
room 
for 
jury 
selection. . . . Prior 
to 
having the jurors transported to the courtroom via 
elevator to be individually questioned, I performed 
the oath as required with all prospective jurors.  
The circuit court below found that the prospective jurors were 
indeed given the oath.  Further, as discussed, Lepsch has not 
demonstrated that his jury was anything less than impartial. We 
agree with the State that any error was harmless, and Lepsch 
does not give us reason to conclude otherwise.  See, e.g., State 
v. Deadwiller, 2013 WI 75, ¶41, 350 Wis. 2d 138, 834 N.W.2d 362 
(quoting Martin, 343 Wis. 2d 278, ¶45) ("[A]n error is harmless 
if the beneficiary of the error proves beyond a reasonable doubt 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
30 
 
that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict 
obtained.").20   
¶48 For similar reasons, under an ineffective assistance 
of counsel analysis, we conclude that Lepsch's attorneys' 
failure to object to Lepsch's absence at the swearing of the 
prospective jurors did not prejudice21  Lepsch even if this 
failure 
constituted 
deficient 
performance. 
 
Thiel, 
264 
Wis. 2d 571, ¶20 ("In order to demonstrate that counsel's 
deficient 
performance 
is 
constitutionally 
prejudicial, 
the 
defendant must show that 'there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability 
                                                 
20 With regard to this harmless error analysis, on the last 
page of his reply brief Lepsch directs the court to his 
discussion of "actual prejudice" on page 43 of his brief-in-
chief.  However, page 43 of his brief-in-chief discusses "actual 
prejudice" with regard to his public trial argument.  As will be 
shown, these claims of prejudice fail.  They likewise do not 
establish that reversal is required under a harmless error 
analysis. 
 
State 
v. 
Deadwiller, 
2013 
WI 
75, 
¶41, 
350 
Wis. 2d 138, 834 N.W.2d 362 (quoting State v. Martin, 2012 WI 
96, ¶45, 343 Wis. 2d 278, 816 N.W.2d 270). 
21 Although Lepsch combines all of his constitutional claims 
relating to administration of the oath together for purposes of 
his argument pertaining to ineffective assistance of counsel and 
argues that "the failure to properly administer the oath to 
prospective jurors amounted to structural error," he does not 
argue that we should presume prejudice with regard to this 
specific error.  Instead, we understand Lepsch to argue that 
structural error arose with regard to violations of his rights 
to an impartial jury and to a public trial.  We discuss these 
claims elsewhere in this opinion. 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
31 
 
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.'" (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694)).22 
¶49 Second, 
we 
conclude 
that, 
contrary 
to 
Lepsch's 
contention, Lepsch has forfeited his claim that the swearing of 
prospective jurors outside of his presence violated his right to 
receive a public trial by failing to raise an objection below.  
"The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
an accused the right to a public trial . . . . The Supreme Court 
has determined that the public trial right is applicable to the 
states 
based 
on 
its 
incorporation 
into 
the 
Fourteenth 
Amendment."23  State v. Pinno, 2014 WI 74, ¶40, 356 Wis. 2d 106, 
850 N.W.2d 207 (citing Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 211-12 
(2010) (per curiam)).  In Pinno we "decline[d] to allow 
defendants who failed to object to the closure of a courtroom to 
raise that issue for the first time after the trial is over," 
and concluded that "the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial 
may be forfeited when a defendant knows that the judge has 
ordered the public to leave the courtroom but does not object."  
Pinno, 356 Wis. 2d 106, ¶63.   
¶50 Lepsch argues Pinno is inapposite because "[a]t no 
time during the proceedings did the trial court inform Lepsch 
that the oath to the prospective jurors would be administered in 
                                                 
22 We decline to address, as undeveloped, Lepsch's aside 
that the administration of the oath violated SCR ch. 71 
("Required Court Reporting").  See Gracia, 345 Wis. 2d 488, ¶28 
n.13. 
23 See supra n.6. 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
32 
 
the 'jury assembly room' by the clerk rather than the judge in 
open court." We agree with the statement of the court of 
appeals: "Clearly, Lepsch was aware at the time of the jury voir 
dire that the oath had not been administered to the jury venire 
in his presence in open court.  Lepsch has not provided any 
support for his assertion that he was unaware of the manner in 
which the oath had been administered to the jury venire at the 
time of voir dire."  Lepsch, unpublished slip op., ¶7.24  
¶51 Lepsch argues Pinno should not be applied because 
"Lepsch can show actual prejudice."  Lepsch argues that "[t]o 
the extent that the administration of the oath was defective, 
which Lepsch maintains it was, it precluded him from receiving a 
trial by an impartial jury."  It is not clear what Lepsch means 
by this line of reasoning given that Pinno's discussion of 
prejudice occurred in the ineffective assistance of counsel 
context, see Pinno, 356 Wis. 2d 106, ¶¶81-91, and Lepsch 
seemingly makes this argument independent of any ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim.  
¶52 In any event, the argument cannot succeed because the 
manner of the administration of the oath did not "preclude[] 
[Lepsch] from receiving a trial by an impartial jury."  Lepsch 
states that "[i]f a juror is not sworn or not sworn properly, 
then that juror cannot be deemed to be an 'impartial' juror for 
                                                 
24 In fact, at least before this court, Lepsch does not 
appear to specifically assert that he was unaware of the manner 
in which the oath had been administered——he simply states he 
should have been provided notice. 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
33 
 
the 6th Amendment or Article 1, Section 7 [of the Wisconsin 
Constitution]."  But this case does not involve prospective 
jurors who were not sworn, as the affidavit of the La Crosse 
County Clerk of Courts confirms.  And Lepsch does not explain 
why the two potential defects he identifies——that the oath was 
administered by a clerk rather than the circuit court and that 
Lepsch was absent at the administration of the oath——means that 
the jury was not "sworn properly" for purposes that would be 
relevant to the impartiality of his jury.  In other words, 
Lepsch's statement that the manner of administration of the oath 
meant that his jury was not impartial is simply conclusory.25  
Without more, we are unable to conclude that Lepsch's jury was 
not impartial.  Accordingly, we apply Pinno and conclude that 
Lepsch's claim is forfeited.26  
                                                 
25 If Lepsch means to suggest that other defects existed, he 
does not identify them. 
26 Lepsch adds, at the end of his argument, that "[I]n 
addition to the prejudice caused immediately to Lepsch by the 
public trial violation, prejudice also existed as to the public 
at large and the media, both of which had an obvious and 
compelling interest in maintaining an open court."  This is an 
argument that implicates the First Amendment, among other 
sources of law, see State v. Pinno, 2014 WI 74, ¶70, 356 
Wis. 2d 106, 850 N.W.2d 207, and requires greater development 
before we will consider it.  It is unclear, for instance, how 
Lepsch's statement fits into his general argument and why the 
proposition he recites would require us to determine that he had 
not forfeited his claim.  We do not address it further.  
Cemetery Servs., Inc., 221 Wis. 2d at 831 ("Constitutional 
claims are very complicated from an analytic perspective, both 
to brief and to decide.  A one or two paragraph statement that 
raises the specter of such claims is insufficient to constitute 
a valid appeal of these constitutional issues to this court."). 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
34 
 
¶53 Having 
concluded 
that 
Lepsch's 
claim 
is 
indeed 
forfeited, we proceed to Lepsch's contention that his attorneys' 
failure to "ensure that the trial court properly administered 
the oath to the jury venire in Lepsch's presence constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel."  With regard to the 
prejudice prong of the analysis, Lepsch's argument consists of 
two sentences.  First, "In terms of prejudice, Lepsch suffered 
actual prejudice in that an improperly sworn jury did not and 
could not constitute an impartial jury."  We have already 
rejected this argument.  Second, "In the alternative, this Court 
should presume prejudice given that the failure to properly 
administer the oath to prospective jurors amounted to structural 
error."  We read this vague argument to refer back to Lepsch's 
earlier argument: "[T]he improper administration of the oath 
created two different structural errors.  The first directly 
pertained to Lepsch's right to a public trial and the second 
pertained to Lepsch's right to an impartial jury."  Because we 
have concluded that Lepsch's right to an impartial jury was not 
violated by the administration of the oath by the clerk outside 
of his presence, we need only address ineffective assistance as 
it pertains to Lepsch's first claim related to his right to a 
public trial.    
¶54 In Pinno we concluded that a presumption of prejudice 
was not appropriate in cases involving "the denial of the right 
to a public voir dire."  Pinno, 356 Wis. 2d 106, ¶85.  Below, 
the court of appeals remarked that Lepsch had "not developed an 
argument distinguishing the claimed structural errors in this 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
35 
 
case from the errors in Pinno, id., ¶¶83–86, which were deemed 
not to give rise to a presumption of prejudice."  Lepsch, 
unpublished slip op., ¶8.  Lepsch has not altered his approach 
before this court.  Therefore, we reject his argument.  Finally, 
we note that Lepsch has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced 
in any other way by his attorneys' failure to object to the 
manner of the administration of the oath.  We conclude that he 
was not denied the effective assistance of counsel with regard 
to this claim.27  
C.  Peremptory Strikes 
¶55 Finally, Lepsch argues that the circuit court's 
failure to award him the proper number of peremptory strikes, 
along with its failure to strike certain jurors for cause, 
violated his rights to due process of law and to an impartial 
jury.  Lepsch argues that he was given six peremptory strikes 
rather than the seven to which he was entitled, and that he was 
forced to exhaust his strikes on jurors who should have been 
dismissed for cause, such that he was unable to dismiss the 
jurors who actually sat on his jury.  He contends that his 
attorneys were ineffective in failing to object to receiving an 
                                                 
27 Additionally, we reiterate our earlier rejection of 
Lepsch's argument that voir dire encompasses the administration 
of the oath to the prospective jurors in the first place.  He 
has not adequately explained why the administration of the oath 
to the prospective jurors in the jury assembly room, if not part 
of voir dire, would nevertheless violate his right to a public 
trial.   
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
36 
 
incorrect number of peremptory strikes and in failing to 
challenge certain jurors for cause. 
¶56 There seems to be no dispute that both Lepsch and the 
State were entitled to seven peremptory strikes under the law 
but were only given six each.  See Wis. Stat. § 972.03 (2013-
14).  Nevertheless, we conclude, again, that even if Lepsch's 
attorneys performed deficiently in not raising the appropriate 
objections and challenges, Lepsch was not prejudiced by the 
performance.  
¶57 As has been stated, Lepsch has not shown that any of 
his jurors were biased.  With regard to Lepsch's complaint that 
he was entitled to an additional peremptory strike, this case is 
therefore not unlike Erickson, where both the State and the 
defendant were granted four peremptory strikes rather than the 
seven to which they were entitled.  Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d at 
762.  Analyzing the defendant's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim, we "decline[d] to presume prejudice every time 
there [was] a denial of an equal number of peremptory strikes to 
both the defense and the prosecution" and where "[t]here [was] 
little doubt that [the defendant] was judged by an impartial 
jury." Id. at 761, 777.  We then concluded that a determination 
that actual prejudice existed was inappropriate: "In the end, we 
can do no better than speculate on what would have been the 
result of [the defendant's] trial had the circuit court not 
erred, which is also the best that Erickson can offer." Id at 
774. The same analysis applies in this case.    
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
37 
 
¶58 Second, assuming Lepsch was forced to use peremptory 
strikes on jurors who should have been challenged for cause, the 
error did not in fact result in a biased juror sitting on 
Lepsch's jury.  Consequently, the ineffective assistance claim 
Lepsch has made28 fails.  See State v. Traylor, 170 Wis. 2d 393, 
                                                 
28 For the most part, Lepsch's argument hinges on his belief 
that biased jurors sat on his jury.  However, Lepsch summarily 
remarks, citing State v. Sellhausen, 2012 WI 5, 338 Wis. 2d 286, 
809 N.W.2d 14, that "[w]here a defendant is forced to use most 
or all of his peremptory strikes to strike jurors who should 
have been properly excused by the trial court for cause, the 
error is harmful."  Sellhausen's discussion of this point in 
turn cited to State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 
629 N.W.2d 223.  See Sellhausen, 338 Wis. 2d 286, ¶¶17-18.  
However, Lepsch fails to note that Lindell examined whether 
"[t]he substantial rights of a party are . . . affected or 
impaired 
when 
a 
defendant 
chooses 
to 
exercise 
a 
single 
peremptory strike to correct a circuit court error," and stated 
it was "not called upon here to evaluate other situations."  
Lindell, 245 Wis. 2d 689, ¶113 (emphasis added); see also id., 
¶119 (noting the State's concession that "reversal might be 
appropriate when a circuit court judge . . . makes errors that 
force a defendant to use most or all of his or her peremptory 
strikes" (emphasis added)).  In other words, the extent to which 
the proposition of law cited by Lepsch is settled is not at all 
clear. 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP2813-CR   
 
38 
 
400, 489 N.W.2d 626 (Ct. App. 1992) ("Traylor cannot prove 
prejudice unless he can show that the exhaustion of peremptory 
challenges left him with a jury that included an objectionable 
or incompetent member.  Wisconsin's longstanding rule is that 
where a fair and impartial jury is impaneled, there is no basis 
for concluding that a defendant was wrongly required to use 
peremptory challenges." (citation omitted)). 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶59 We conclude that each of Lepsch's claims fails, and 
that he is not entitled to a new trial.  Consequently, we affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Despite this fact, Lepsch does not develop an argument 
discussing the application of this proposition to his case at 
all or the appropriateness of doing so, whether as an 
independent claim or within the ineffective assistance of 
counsel framework.  As stated, most of Lepsch's argument depends 
on his assumption——which we have rejected——that biased jurors 
sat on his jury.  Moreover, were we to examine a claim that 
reversal is warranted regardless of whether Lepsch's jury was 
impartial or not, we would need to determine whether the circuit 
court had indeed improperly failed to strike for cause the five 
jurors Lepsch identifies.  Yet Lepsch's discussion of the 
circuit court's putative errors in this regard is cursory.  We 
decline to construct an argument for him and delve into this 
area of law on the basis of an inadequately-developed argument.  
Thus, we do not address this claim further.  Cemetery Servs., 
Inc., 221 Wis. 2d at 831.  
No.  2014AP2813.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶60 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (concurring).  In the 
instant case, prospective jurors made statements either in their 
responses to the jury questionnaire or at voir dire or both that 
indicated they might not be impartial or that they might not be 
able to apply legal principles.  The circuit court and the 
attorneys questioned the prospective jurors to "rehabilitate" 
them to enable them to serve on the jury.  The question 
presented in the instant case is whether one or more jurors were 
biased notwithstanding the attempts at rehabilitation.1 
¶61 Lepsch's challenge to the jury is grounded on the 
ineffective assistance of his trial counsel to challenge 
prospective members of the jury.  Ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel is a two-part inquiry under Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  The burden of proof in the 
instant case is on Lepsch.  He must show (1) that his trial 
counsel performed deficiently; and (2) that the deficient 
performance prejudiced him.  Because I conclude that the jury 
was not biased, I conclude that trial counsel's performance was 
not deficient in jury selection.  I therefore do not need to 
reach the prejudicial prong of the Strickland analysis.2 
                                                 
1 Wisconsin employs a tripartite classification of juror 
bias:  statutory, subjective, and objective.  See State v. 
Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 717-19, 596 N.W.2d 770 (1999).   
The federal courts do not use this terminology but use 
analogous principles to discuss jury bias.   
2 Jury bias is a structural error: 
When concluding in our previous cases that a juror was 
biased and was erroneously impaneled, the court has 
reversed the defendant's conviction and ordered a new 
(continued) 
No.  2014AP2813.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶62 The right to an impartial jury is guaranteed by 
statute and the federal and state constitutions.  I begin with 
Wis. Stat. § 805.08(1) (2015-16),3 which requires a court to 
examine on oath each person who is called as a juror to discover 
whether the juror has expressed or formed any opinion, or is 
aware of any personal bias or prejudice in the case.  The 
statute enables any party to challenge a juror for cause and 
                                                                                                                                                             
trial without inquiry into harmless error.  These 
cases reflect the rule that juror bias taints the 
entire proceeding and requires automatic reversal. 
Juror bias is a defect affecting the framework within 
which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error 
in the trial process itself. Juror bias seriously 
affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation 
of judicial proceedings and is per se prejudicial.   
State v. Tody, 2009 WI 31, ¶44, 316 Wis. 2d 689, 764 N.W.2d 737 
(footnote omitted), abrogated on other grounds by State v. 
Sellhausen, 2012 WI 5, 338 Wis. 2d 286, 809 N.W.2d 14. 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.08(1) provides:   
Qualifications, examination. The court shall examine 
on oath each person who is called as a juror to 
discover whether the juror is related by blood, 
marriage or adoption to any party or to any attorney 
appearing in the case, or has any financial interest 
in the case, or has expressed or formed any opinion, 
or is aware of any bias or prejudice in the case.  If 
a juror is not indifferent in the case, the juror 
shall be excused.  Any party objecting for cause to a 
juror may introduce evidence in support of the 
objection.  This section shall not be construed as 
abridging in any manner the right of either party to 
supplement the court's examination of any person as to 
qualifications, but such examination shall not be 
repetitious 
or 
based 
upon 
hypothetical 
questions 
(emphasis added).   
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2014AP2813.ssa 
 
3 
 
introduce evidence in support of an objection.  It sets the 
standard for excusing a prospective juror:  "If a juror is not 
indifferent in the case, the juror shall be excused."  Several 
Wisconsin cases interpret and apply the statutory standard of 
"indifferent."4   
¶63 The 
court 
took 
this 
case 
to 
determine 
whether 
Wisconsin case law relating to juror bias is consistent with or 
in tension with the United States Supreme Court's and the 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Tody, 316 Wis. 2d 689, ¶36.  Tody addresses the 
statute as follows:  
"To be impartial, a juror must be indifferent and 
capable of basing his or her verdict upon the evidence 
developed at trial."  A juror therefore should be 
viewed as objectively biased if a reasonable person in 
the juror's position could not avoid basing his or her 
verdict upon considerations extraneous to evidence put 
before the jury at trial. 
(Quoting Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 715.) 
Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 715, addresses the statute as 
follows:  
To be impartial, a juror must be indifferent and 
capable of basing his or her verdict upon the evidence 
developed at trial.  Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 
81 S. Ct. 1639, 6 L. Ed. 2d 751 (1961).  The 
requirement that a juror be indifferent is codified in 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.08(1) (1995–96).  That statute 
requires the circuit court to examine on oath each 
person who is called as a juror to discover if he or 
she "has expressed or formed any opinion or is aware 
of any bias or prejudice in the case."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.08(1).  The statute directs that "[I]f a juror 
is not indifferent in the case, the juror shall be 
excused."  Id.  We have stated that even the 
appearance of bias should be avoided. [State v.] 
Louis, 
156 
Wis. 2d [470,] 
478, 
457 
N.W.2d 484 
[(1990)].  (Footnote omitted.) 
No.  2014AP2813.ssa 
 
4 
 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' interpretations of the Sixth 
Amendment right to trial by "an impartial jury."  Lepsch and the 
Office of the State Public Defender (which filed a non-party 
brief) request this court to clarify Wisconsin's juror bias law 
to resolve the perceived tension.5  
¶64 The majority opinion fails to address this perceived 
tension.  Instead, it merely explains in a footnote that 
Lepsch's citations to "lower federal court" decisions are 
unavailing and that this court is not bound by "lower federal 
court" decisions.  Majority op., ¶35 n.14 (citing Madison 
Teachers, Inc. v. Walker, 2014 WI 99, ¶68, 358 Wis. 2d 1, 851 
N.W.2d 337).   
¶65 I address the issue of perceived tension and conclude 
that any perceived tension arises because Wisconsin cases on 
jury bias have apparently not considered Patton v. Yount, 467 
U.S. 1025 (1984), and need to be harmonized.6  
                                                 
5 In Oswald v. Bertrand, 249 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (E.D. Wis. 
2003), the federal district court granted habeas corpus to a 
defendant convicted in a Wisconsin circuit court.  The district 
court ruled that the Wisconsin circuit court had failed to 
comply with the Seventh Circuit requirement of an "unequivocal" 
declaration by a juror.  In contrast, the federal court of 
appeals affirmed the district court but concluded that the 
inquiry the Wisconsin circuit court conducted "flunked the 
constitutional test that 
'the investigation be reasonably 
calculated to resolve the doubts raised about the juror's 
impartiality.'"  Oswald v. Bertrand, 374 F.3d 475 (7th Cir. 
2004) (quoted source omitted).   
6 For a discussion of the development of Wisconsin's juror 
bias case law and the challenges that the case law has created 
for the bench and bar, see Kurt F. Ellison, Getting Out of the 
Funk:  How Wisconsin Courts Can Protect Against the Threat to 
Impartial Jury Trials, 96 Marq. L. Rev. 953 (2013). 
No.  2014AP2813.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶66 I begin with the test set forth by the United States 
Supreme Court, the supreme law of the land, which this court is 
obliged to follow.  In Patton, 467 U.S. at 1036, 1038, 1040, the 
United States Supreme Court stated the applicable test to 
determine whether a prospective juror can suspend a belief or 
opinion calling his or her impartiality into question.  The 
Court also set forth the standard for appellate review of a 
trial 
court's 
determination 
of 
the 
prospective 
juror's 
impartiality.  This two-part test is as follows: 
Did a juror swear that he could set aside any opinion 
he might hold and decide the case on the evidence, and 
should the juror's protestation of impartiality [be] 
believed. . . . [T]he determination is essentially one 
of 
credibility, 
and 
therefore 
largely 
one 
of 
demeanor. . . . It is here that the federal court's 
deference must operate, for while the cold record 
arouses some concern, only the trial judge could tell 
which of these answers was said with the greatest 
comprehension and certainty.  
Patton, 467 U.S. at 1036, 1038, 1040.   
¶67 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, also obliged to 
follow the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, has 
stated its own construction of the applicable test to determine 
whether a prospective juror can suspend a belief calling his or 
her impartiality into question.  The Seventh Circuit has also 
set forth the standard for appellate review of a trial court's 
determination of the prospective juror's impartiality.  The 
Seventh Circuit's two-part test has been stated in the following 
formulations:  
• Marshall v. City of Chicago, 762 F.3d 573 (7th Cir. 
2014) (citing United States v. Allen, 605 F.3d 461, 
464-65 (7th Cir. 2010): 
No.  2014AP2813.ssa 
 
6 
 
The judge looks for an unwavering affirmation of 
impartiality, without which the juror should be 
excused.  The requirement is satisfied by a juror's 
affirmation, for example, that she can set aside any 
opinion she might hold, relinquish her prior beliefs, 
or lay aside her biases or her prejudicial personal 
experiences.  United States v. Allen, 605 F.3d 461, 
464-65 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted).  
Ultimately, the decision whether to excuse a juror for 
cause rests firmly within the discretion of the 
district judge, and we will reverse only where we find 
an abuse of such. . . . (abuse of discretion occurs 
only where "no reasonable person would agree with the 
trial court's ruling"). 
• United States v. Allen, 605 F.3d 461, 464-65 (7th Cir. 
2010):  
[The mandates of due process and an impartial jury] 
are satisfied, when seating a prospective juror 
despite 
a 
party's 
for-cause 
challenge, 
if 
the 
prospective 
juror 
has 
given 
final, 
unequivocal 
assurances, deemed credible by the judge, that for 
purposes of deciding the case, she can "set aside any 
opinion [she] might hold," Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 
1025, 
1036 . . . (1984), 
"relinquish 
her 
prior 
beliefs, [Thompson v. Altheimer & Gray, 248 F.3d 621, 
626], or "lay aside her biases or her prejudicial 
personal experiences, United States v. Gonzalez, 214 
F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir. 2000).  See Thompson, 248 
F.3d at 626 (collecting cases).  
The district court was within its discretion to find 
that the prospective juror gave final, unequivocal, 
and credible assurances that she could set aside any 
bias . . . and decide the case on the evidence . . . . 
Prior equivocating or wavering is hardly dispositive 
in assessing credibility, as "[j]urors . . . cannot be 
expected 
invariably 
to 
express 
themselves . . . consistently." . . . Because 
appellate judges are absent from voir dire, when a 
prospective juror fails to express herself "carefully 
or even consistently . . . it is [the trial] judge who 
No.  2014AP2813.ssa 
 
7 
 
is best situated to determine competency to serve 
impartially."  Patton, 467 U.S. at 1039 . . . .7   
¶68 Examining Marshall and Allen, two Seventh Circuit 
Cases, side-by-side, it becomes clear that Allen uses slightly 
different language than Marshall.  Lepsch and the SPD's office 
cite Allen as illustrating the tension among Patton, the Seventh 
Circuit cases, and the Wisconsin cases on jury bias.   
¶69 Language in some Wisconsin cases is similar to the 
language in Patton and to the cases from the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals.  For example, this court stated in State v. 
Kiernan, 227 Wis. 2d 736, 745, 596 N.W.2d 760 (1999), that an 
acceptable juror is 
                                                 
7 In United States v. Taylor, 777 F.3d 434, 441 (7th Cir. 
2015), 
the 
Seventh 
Circuit 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
stated 
the 
applicable test as follows: 
The requirement of an impartial jury is met when "the 
prospective 
juror 
has 
given 
final, 
unequivocal 
assurances, deemed credible by the judge, that for 
purposes of deciding the case, she can set aside any 
opinion 
[she] 
might 
hold, 
relinquish 
her 
prior 
beliefs, or lay aside her biases or her prejudicial 
personal experiences."  Allen . . . . 
A prospective juror does not come to the courtroom as 
a tabula rasa.  The important question is whether the 
juror can put aside the experiences and beliefs that 
may prejudice his view of the case and render a 
verdict based on the evidence and the law.  Although 
R.W. was initially equivocal . . . the judge's follow-
up examination cleared up the ambiguity.  The judge 
asked him if he "could be fair and impartial to both 
sides and decide this case only on the evidence 
introduced during this trial and the law that I am 
giving you."  To this question R.W. answered "yes" 
without qualification.  This unequivocal assurance——
deemed credible by the trial judge——is sufficient.   
No.  2014AP2813.ssa 
 
8 
 
a reasonable person who is sincerely willing to set 
aside any opinion or prior knowledge that the juror 
might have.  Discerning whether a juror exhibits this 
type 
of 
bias 
depends 
upon 
that 
juror's 
verbal 
responses to questions at voir dire, as well as that 
juror's demeanor in giving those responses. These 
observations are best within the province of the 
circuit court (citation omitted).8  
¶70 The United States Supreme Court cases, the Seventh 
Circuit cases, and the Kiernan case are similar in three 
important respects: (1) An individual can be seated as a juror 
if he or she can set aside an opinion or bias; (2) the trial 
judge 
must 
believe 
the 
prospective 
juror's 
statement 
of 
impartiality; and (3) appellate review is deferential because 
the trial judge is best situated to determine a prospective 
juror's ability to serve impartially.  
¶71 The difference among the three courts, according to 
Lepsch and the Public Defender, is the language in the Seventh 
Circuit cases demanding that the prospective juror give "final, 
unequivocal assurances" that he or she will set aside any bias 
and decide the case on the evidence.  This phrase, "final, 
unequivocal assurances," does not appear in Patton.  Patton 
seems to leave more room for trial court discretion in assessing 
the juror's impartiality than does the "final, unequivocal 
assurances" language.  
¶72 It is not surprising, then, that a careful reading of 
the Seventh Circuit cases shows that the "final, unequivocal 
assurances" language also leaves room for various types of 
                                                 
8 See also State v. Oswald, 2000 WI App 2, ¶19, 232 
Wis. 2d 62, 606 N.W.2d 207.  
No.  2014AP2813.ssa 
 
9 
 
responses by a prospective juror and for trial court discretion 
to evaluate those responses.  A study of the Seventh Circuit's 
applications of the "final, unequivocal assurances" language 
demonstrates that the Seventh Circuit requires the bare minimum 
of assurances.   
¶73 For example, in United States v. Allen, 605 F.3d 461, 
464–65 (7th Cir. 2010), the Seventh Circuit reviewed a district 
court's finding that a juror was not biased.  That juror 
initially submitted a juror questionnaire stating that she would 
have a hard time being fair because of a prior incident.  Upon 
questioning by the trial judge, the juror's answers reaffirmed 
this belief.  But, upon further questioning (this kind of more 
rigorous, "digging down" type of questioning is sometimes 
referred to as "rehabilitating" the prospective juror) the judge 
instructed her that "both sides are entitled to fairness" and 
asked her whether she could keep an open mind.  The juror 
replied that she could.  Upon even further questioning, the 
juror stated that she "would give [the defendant] the benefit of 
the doubt until evidence was presented."  The district court 
judge decided that this juror was not biased.  
¶74 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the 
district court.  The Seventh Circuit first set forth the 
applicable "final, unequivocal assurances" test as follows:  The 
requirement of an impartial jury is met when 
the prospective juror has given final, unequivocal 
assurances, deemed credible by the judge, that for 
purposes of deciding the case, she can set aside any 
opinion 
[she] 
might 
hold, 
relinquish 
her 
prior 
No.  2014AP2813.ssa 
 
10 
 
beliefs, or lay aside her biases or her prejudicial 
personal experiences.   
Allen, 605 F.3d at 464-65 (internal quotation marks  and 
citations omitted).   
¶75 After setting forth this test, the Allen court 
emphasized that "[p]rior equivocating or wavering is hardly 
dispositive in assessing credibility, as '[j]urors . . . cannot 
be 
expected 
invariably 
to 
express 
themselves . . . consistently.'" 
 
Allen, 
605 
F.3d 
at 
466 
(quoting Patton, 467 U.S. at 1039).   
¶76 The Allen court also emphasized that 
"[b]ecause 
appellate judges are absent from voir dire, when a prospective 
juror 
fails 
to 
express 
herself 
'carefully 
or 
even 
consistently . . . it is [the trial] judge who is best situated 
to determine competency to serve impartially.'"  Allen, 605 F.3d 
at 466 (quoting Patton, 467 U.S. at 1039).  
¶77 Although the Allen court of appeals suggested that the 
trial court could have engaged in more rigorous, explicit 
questioning of the juror, the court of appeals accepted, as an 
unequivocal statement, the juror's statement that she would give 
the defendant "the benefit of the doubt."  Allen, 605 F.3d at 
466.9  
                                                 
9 In United States v. Allen, 605 F.3d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 
2010), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district 
court's seating a juror despite her multiple equivocal and 
unequivocal comments as follows: 
We do not doubt that the trial judge's questioning of 
the prospective juror could have been more explicit in 
determining whether she would be able to "set aside 
any opinion [she] might hold," Patton, 467 U.S. at 
(continued) 
No.  2014AP2813.ssa 
 
11 
 
¶78 Thus, although the literal language in the Seventh 
Circuit cases  requires "final, unequivocal assurances" that a 
juror is impartial, that assurance can be as minimal as an 
affirmative response to a judge's question whether the juror can 
be impartial.  And, whatever the trial court's determination may 
be, it is accorded substantial deference by an appellate court 
because the trial court is in a position to judge the juror's 
credibility.  
¶79 Furthermore, cases from other federal courts of 
appeals are cited by the Seventh Circuit.  These other federal 
courts do not use the same "unequivocal" language as the Seventh 
Circuit.  These cases ask whether the prospective juror swore to 
set aside any opinion or bias and decide the case on the 
                                                                                                                                                             
1036 . . . "relinquish her prior beliefs," Thompson, 
248 F.3d at 626, or "lay aside her biases or her 
prejudicial personal experiences," Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 
at 1114.  Nevertheless——given the relatively minimal 
bias the prospective juror must have had toward 
finding this particular defendant guilty, her final 
and unequivocal statement that she would give Allen 
the benefit of the doubt until the close of trial, and 
her 
demonstrated 
ability 
to 
follow 
the 
judge's 
instructions——we hold that the district court was 
within its discretion to find that the prospective 
juror' prior experience would not impede her ability 
to decide the case fairly.  So we find no violation of 
Allen's rights to due process and to an impartial 
jury. 
No.  2014AP2813.ssa 
 
12 
 
evidence and whether the juror's protestation of impartiality 
can be believed by the trial court.10   
¶80 After considering Patton and the Seventh Circuit 
cases, I turn to the Wisconsin jury bias decisions.   
¶81 Although several of 
Wisconsin's jury cases were 
decided after Patton, few cite Patton.   
¶82 Reference to Patton appears in State v. Ferron, 219 
Wis. 2d 481, 579 N.W.2d 654 (1998), abrogated on other grounds 
by State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, 245 Wis. 2d 689, 629 
N.W.2d 223, in which the court cited Patton for the proposition 
that "[i]t is a well-settled principle of law in this state that 
a determination by a circuit court that a prospective juror can 
be impartial should be overturned only where the prospective 
                                                 
10 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 716 F.3d 851, 857 (4th 
Cir. 2013) ("Although a juror's avowal of impartiality is not 
dispositive, if a district court views juror assurances of 
continued impartiality to be credible, the court may rely upon 
such assurances in deciding whether a defendant has satisfied 
the burden of proving actual prejudice." (citation omitted)) 
(citing Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 800 (1975)); Montgomery 
v. Bobby, 654 F.3d 668, 684 (6th Cir. 2011) ("When presented 
with an allegation of bias, the question is 'did a juror swear 
that [s]he could set aside any opinion [s]he might hold and 
decide the case on the evidence, and should the juror's 
protestation of impartiality have been believed.'" (quoted 
source omitted); finding no juror bias when judge asked whether 
juror's self-reported bias would "have any effect on your 
consideration of the matter that is before the jury now?" with 
the juror responding, "No, no"); United States v. Rowe, 144 F.3d 
15 (1st Cir. 1998) (explaining that the trial court finding of 
no juror bias will be upheld unless clearly erroneous; finding 
no bias where the trial court "asked Juror A whether his concern 
would 'in any way impede or impair [his] impartial consideration 
of the case,' and the juror assured the court that his 
evaluation of the case would be impartial.") (juror's exact 
response not provided in opinion). 
No.  2014AP2813.ssa 
 
13 
 
juror's bias is 'manifest.' . . . The United States Supreme 
Court has frequently ruled to the same effect.  See, e.g., 
Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1031-32 . . . ."   
¶83 Ferron's reliance on this "manifest error" language is 
of dubious value.  Patton discussed jury bias resulting from 
pretrial publicity and explained that an amended habeas statute 
may have replaced this "manifest error" standard.  Patton, 467 
U.S. at 1032 n.7.11    
¶84 But, more importantly, as I read Wisconsin decisions 
in which I joined almost twenty years ago, I see a problem:  The 
Wisconsin 
cases 
include 
language 
that 
is 
internally 
and 
externally inconsistent; language that is hard to understand and 
apply; and language that does not conform to the Patton test. 
¶85 In State v. Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d 700, 731 n.8, 596 
N.W.2d 70 (1999), for instance, the court stated:  "We remain 
committed to our view that a prospective juror need not 
unambiguously state his or her ability to set aside a bias."  
¶86 Likewise, in State v. Erickson, 227 Wis. 2d 758, 776, 
596 N.W.2d 749 (1999), the court stated:  "[A] prospective juror 
need not respond to voir dire questions with unequivocal 
declarations of impartiality.  Indeed, we . . . fully expect a 
juror's honest answers at times to be less than unequivocal."  
                                                 
11 I do not address the question whether pretrial media 
coverage of Lepsch's case contributed to a biased jury.  The 
parties did not raise it.  Pretrial publicity cases seem to be 
analyzed somewhat differently than the question of the bias 
exhibited by an individual prospective juror.  See Skilling v. 
United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010) (a pretrial publicity case).  
No.  2014AP2813.ssa 
 
14 
 
¶87 That said, a prospective juror who equivocates and 
says, for example, that she can "probably" be fair, was declared 
biased under Wisconsin law.  This court explained in Ferron, 219 
Wis. 2d at 501, that equivocation bars a prospective juror from 
serving because equivocation is insufficient to demonstrate a 
sincere willingness to set aside a bias:  
There are no magical words that need be spoken by the 
prospective 
juror, 
and 
the 
juror 
need 
not 
affirmatively state that he or she can "definitely" 
set the bias aside.  Suffice it to say that without 
the appropriate follow-up questions by the circuit 
court, 
a 
juror's 
final 
word 
of 
"probably" 
is 
insufficient to indicate a sincere willingness to set 
aside his or her bias against parties who choose to 
exercise 
their 
constitutional 
rights. 
(Emphasis 
added). 
¶88 As 
I 
read 
these 
decisions, 
they 
are 
somewhat 
contradictory and fail to provide sufficient guidance to circuit 
courts, the court of appeals, and this court.   
¶89 I conclude, however, that the Wisconsin cases can be 
harmonized and stated in conformity with United States Supreme 
Court and Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals cases as follows:   
• An impartial juror is a "reasonable person who is 
sincerely willing to put aside an opinion or prior 
knowledge."  Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 724.   
• Although a prospective juror need not say any "magic 
words," 
the 
record 
must 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
prospective juror (who is sworn under oath)12 has 
committed or assured that he or she can set aside any 
                                                 
12 See Wis. Stat. § 805.08(1); majority op., ¶¶40-43.   
No.  2014AP2813.ssa 
 
15 
 
opinion or bias held and decide the case on the 
evidence.       
• Evaluating 
the 
subjective 
sincerity 
of 
these 
expressions of impartiality of a prospective juror is 
a matter for the circuit court.  The determination is 
essentially one of credibility.  The expressions of 
the 
prospective 
juror 
regarding 
his 
or 
her 
impartiality are not conclusive. 
• An appellate court "defers to a large extent to the 
decision of the circuit court about subjective [juror] 
bias because the circuit court is in a superior 
position to assess the demeanor and disposition of 
prospective jurors," State v. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶76, 
335 Wis. 2d 369, 799 N.W.2d 421, and an appellate 
court will reverse a circuit court's decision that a 
juror was subjectively biased only if the decision is 
"clearly erroneous."  Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 718.  
• The standard of an appellate court's review of a 
circuit court's determination of objective juror bias 
is set forth in Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 720:  An 
appellate court will reverse the circuit court's 
decision that a juror was objectively biased "only if 
No.  2014AP2813.ssa 
 
16 
 
as a matter of law a reasonable judge could not have 
reached such a conclusion."13 
• Finally, an important guiding principle to be followed 
in every case is that the circuit court should err on 
the side of striking prospective jurors when it is 
reasonable to suspect that bias is present.14 
¶90 This is a close case for me.15  In this concurrence, I 
focus on two jurors, J.A. and D.M.  Each expressed the belief, 
in answers to the questionnaire, that police officers were more 
credible than other witnesses.  Neither the circuit court nor 
either side's trial counsel sufficiently followed up with J.A. 
or D.M. regarding their bias.  See majority op., ¶¶29-31.   
                                                 
13 The prospective juror in Faucher, 227 Wis. 2d at 731-32, 
was unequivocal and unambiguous in stating he would follow the 
law; the circuit court seated the juror.  Nevertheless, this 
court concluded that the circuit court erred as a matter of law 
in seating the juror.  The court reversed the circuit court, 
concluding 
that 
under 
the 
circumstances 
of 
that 
case 
a 
reasonable judge could not have believed that the prospective 
juror could truly set aside his strongly held belief. 
14 See, e.g., State v. Sellhausen, 2012 WI 5, ¶29, 338 
Wis. 2d 286, 809 N.W.2d 14; State v. Lindell, 2001 WI 108, ¶49, 
245 Wis. 2d 689, 629 N.W.2d 223; Kanzenbach v. S.C. Johnson & 
Son, Inc., 273 Wis. 621, 627, 79 N.W.2d 249 (1956). 
This guiding principle rings true now more than ever.  The 
Sixth Amendment guarantee of an impartial jury and concern over 
systemic loss of confidence in jury verdicts have moved the 
United States Supreme Court to recently re-examine Batson claims 
and the jury "no-impeachment rule" to eliminate racial bias in 
the jury system.  See Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737 (2016); 
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, No. 15-606, 2017WL855760 (U.S. Mar. 
6, 2017).    
15 Justice Ann Walsh Bradley does not join this sentence. 
No.  2014AP2813.ssa 
 
17 
 
¶91 That said, both answered "No" on their questionnaires 
when asked whether there was any reason why they could not be 
impartial.  Additionally, both J.A. and D.M. were present during 
questioning of the jurors as a group, where questions regarding 
police credibility arose and neither restated his or her bias.  
And, finally, the State asked the group whether any prospective 
jurors could not be fair; neither J.A. nor D.M. responded.   
¶92 The circuit court and trial counsel in the instant 
case could have (and should have) asked these two jurors more 
rigorous, explicit questions to rebut their responses that 
indicated bias and to firm up their ability to set aside their 
opinions and biases and base their decision on the evidence.  
Nevertheless, the record is minimally good enough to demonstrate 
that each juror was a reasonable person who was sincerely 
willing to put aside an opinion.  Majority op., ¶¶29-31.  I 
conclude that the circuit court judge was in the best position 
to determine whether these prospective jurors were subjectively 
biased.  The circuit court's decision was not clearly erroneous.  
With regard to objective bias, I conclude that I cannot reverse 
the circuit court's conclusion, as a matter of law, on the 
ground that a reasonable judge could not have reached such a 
conclusion.  
¶93 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
¶94 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion, except for the first sentence of 
¶90. 
No.  2014AP2813.ssa 
 
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