Case Title: In re Richman

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87562

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-04-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 87562-Agenda 22-September 1999.
In re FRED ALLEN RICHMAN, Attorney, Petitioner.
Opinion filed April 20, 2000.
JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:
The petitioner, Fred Allen Richman, was disbarred on consent in 1990. In 1997 
he filed the present petition, seeking reinstatement to the roll of attorneys 
admitted to practice law in Illinois. Both the Hearing Board and the Review 
Board recommended that the petition be allowed. The Administrator of the 
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission has filed exceptions to that 
recommendation. We now deny the petition.
The petitioner was licensed to practice law in Illinois in 1959. At the time 
of the misconduct relevant here, the petitioner and another lawyer operated a 
firm that concentrated in personal injury and worker's compensation cases. In 
October 1984, an elderly man, Herbert Bluhm, fell at the Tinley Park Plaza 
shopping center. Bluhm's family retained the petitioner and his firm to 
represent him in the matter. Wausau Insurance Company insured Tinley Park Plaza. 
In December 1985, a paralegal at the petitioner's law firm contacted Michael 
Wachala, a claims adjuster for Wausau. The paralegal offered to pay Wachala 
money in exchange for Wachala's assistance. Wachala reported this conversation 
to his supervisor at Wausau. In January 1986 Wachala met with the paralegal at 
the law firm's office. The paralegal said that Wachala could receive 5% of the 
amount for which the Bluhm case settled, and the paralegal reduced the demand in 
the case from $50,000 to $40,000 to make Wachala look good. The paralegal said 
that when the case was settled Wachala would receive his payment from the 
petitioner. The paralegal then introduced Wachala to the petitioner, who told 
Wachala that Wachala was going to have to use his imagination on the case and 
that he did not need to tell everyone what they were doing. Wachala returned to 
the law firm several weeks later. He gave the paralegal a check from Wausau for 
$40,000 in settlement of the Bluhm case, and Wachala received $2,000 in 
cash.
Working with federal postal inspectors, Wachala later contacted the 
petitioner regarding a fictitious Structural Work Act case. Wachala and the 
petitioner discussed the case several times between May and July 1986. Wachala 
told the petitioner about the case. When the petitioner expressed interest in 
representing the fictitious claimant, referred to as Don Williams, Wachala asked 
if he could receive money in advance. The petitioner replied that he could. The 
petitioner later met with and was retained by the person who he believed was 
Williams. At a later meeting at which Wachala and the petitioner discussed the 
case and its prospects, the petitioner said that he would give Wachala "a few 
grand" that day and additional money once the case was settled. After asking the 
firm's bookkeeper for $3,000, the petitioner gave Wachala that sum in cash. The 
petitioner again told Wachala not to talk about the matter. Wachala asked if he 
would receive additional money for his work on the case in the future, and the 
petitioner assured Wachala that he would, with the amount calculated as a 
percentage of the settlement.
The petitioner was indicted in federal court in November 1988 on eight counts 
of mail fraud and two counts of wire fraud, based on his dealings with Wachala 
in the two cases. In February 1990 he was convicted on those 10 counts after a 
jury trial. An additional count, charging obstruction of justice, was dismissed 
prior to trial. The petitioner was later sentenced to concurrent terms of five 
years' imprisonment on counts I through IX and to a consecutive term of five 
years' probation on count X. The petitioner was also ordered to pay $40,000 in 
restitution to Wausau. The court of appeals affirmed the petitioner's 
convictions. United States v. Richman, 944 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1991). 
After serving a total of 15 months in prison, the petitioner was paroled to a 
halfway house, where he spent another five months. The petitioner was released 
from the halfway house on November 24, 1991; his parole ended on November 24, 
1993, and his probation ended on February 1, 1995.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 762 (134 Ill. 2d R. 762(a)), the petitioner 
moved to have his name stricken from the roll of attorneys admitted to practice 
law in Illinois in May 1990. In June 1993, he filed the first of what would 
eventually total three petitions for reinstatement. During the hearing on the 
initial petition, the petitioner admitted that on three or four occasions while 
practicing law he had paid $300 to adjusters for State Farm Insurance Company in 
an effort to expedite the processing of clients' claims. The Hearing Board 
recommended that reinstatement be denied. In support of that recommendation the 
Hearing Board noted that the petitioner's offenses were serious, that the 
petitioner had used illegal drugs, that the offenses were relatively recent, and 
that the petitioner had not yet completed his term of probation. The Hearing 
Board further recommended that the petitioner make restitution for the bribes he 
had paid to the State Farm adjusters. Rather than seek review of the Hearing 
Board's adverse decision, the petitioner withdrew his petition for 
reinstatement.
The petitioner filed a second petition for reinstatement in November 1995. 
The Hearing Board again recommended that the petition be denied, basing its 
decision on concerns similar to those that underlay its decision on the 
petitioner's initial request. The Hearing Board also noted that the petitioner 
had failed to make restitution for the State Farm bribes and that he had not 
performed any charitable work. The petitioner again withdrew his petition rather 
than seek review of the Hearing Board's unfavorable decision.
The petitioner filed the present petition for reinstatement on October 10, 
1997. The Administrator filed objections to the petition. In the proceedings 
before the Hearing Board, the petitioner described his activities since his 
release from prison, in 1991. The petitioner stated that he now does collection 
work, collecting money owed by patients to medical providers. Some of the 
medical providers he works for are those to whom he referred business when he 
practiced law. Two of the providers have been named as defendants in a federal 
suit brought by State Farm over allegedly deceptive billing practices.
The petitioner also testified that in February 1998 he paid $1,200 to the 
Illinois Bar Foundation in compensation for his bribes to the State Farm 
adjusters. The petitioner stated that since December 1996 he has volunteered at 
a local hospital. He acknowledged that he used cocaine in the 1980s but 
testified that he has not done so since 1990. The petitioner also said that he 
spends a substantial amount of time and energy caring for his wife and for one 
of his sons, who are mentally ill. The petitioner expressed remorse and regret 
for his misconduct, and he insisted that he will not engage in similar 
misconduct in the future.
The Hearing Board, with one member dissenting, recommended that the 
petitioner be reinstated. The majority believed that the passage of time since 
the petitioner's misconduct and evidence of the petitioner's rehabilitation 
during the intervening years warranted reinstatement, even though the misconduct 
was serious. The majority observed that the petitioner had acknowledged the 
nature and seriousness of his misconduct and that he had made a contribution to 
the Illinois Bar Foundation in an amount equal to his admitted bribes to the 
State Farm adjusters. Finally, the majority believed that the petitioner had 
been candid in his testimony before the Board and thought that the petitioner's 
professional, civic, and family activities since his disbarment constituted 
strong proof of his rehabilitation. The dissenting member of the Hearing Board 
believed that the petitioner's request for reinstatement should be denied. The 
dissenting member focused on the seriousness of the petitioner's misconduct, his 
failure to recognize the nature of his offenses, and his continuing 
relationships with many of the same medical providers with whom he had 
previously worked as a lawyer.
The Review Board unanimously affirmed the Hearing Board's recommendation that 
the petitioner be reinstated. The Review Board concluded that none of the 
Hearing Board's factual findings were against the manifest weight of the 
evidence. We allowed the Administrator to submit exceptions to the Review 
Board's report and recommendation. 166 Ill. 2d R. 753(e). The petitioner filed 
an answer to the Administrator's exceptions.
A lawyer who has been disbarred on consent must wait at least three years 
from the date of the order allowing his or disbarment before filing a petition 
for reinstatement. 134 Ill. 2d R. 767(a). In addition, a lawyer who has 
withdrawn a previously filed petition for reinstatement must wait at least one 
year after the withdrawal of the previous petition before filing a new petition. 
134 Ill. 2d R. 767(a). A disbarred lawyer who seeks to resume the practice of 
law has the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that he or she 
should be reinstated. In re Fleischman, 135 Ill. 2d 488, 495 (1990); 
In re Anglin, 122 Ill. 2d 531, 539 (1988); In re Berkley, 96 Ill. 2d 404, 410 (1983). Supreme Court Rule 767(f) sets forth the following 
guidelines for use in deciding whether a petition for reinstatement should be 
granted:
Given the seriousness of the misconduct committed by the petitioner, his age 
and experience at the time of the wrongdoing, his lengthy delay in making 
restitution for the additional bribes to the State Farm adjusters, and his 
continued and anticipated employment in an area of law related to his original 
field of practice, we believe that the present petition for reinstatement should 
be denied.
First, the misconduct that led to the petitioner's disbarment on consent was 
serious. As noted earlier, in February 1990, the petitioner was convicted in 
federal court on eight counts of mail fraud and two counts of wire fraud for his 
role in bribing a claims adjuster employed by Wausau Insurance Company in 1985 
and 1986. The petitioner's offenses revealed a person who thought nothing of 
violating the most basic rules of our legal system. The petitioner was disbarred 
on consent prior to the initiation and resolution of any disciplinary 
proceedings stemming from his federal convictions. That misconduct, however, 
would have doubtless resulted in a severe sanction had the petitioner not first 
pursued his own disbarment. The fraudulent conduct by the petitioner in the two 
cases that led to his federal convictions struck at the core of our legal system 
and was antithetical to our society's most basic principles. "The seriousness of 
a petitioner's past misconduct is unquestionably an important consideration 
[citations] which cannot be minimized by subsequent exemplary conduct." In 
re Berkley, 96 Ill. 2d 404, 410 (1983).
Moreover, the petitioner has committed other misconduct as well. During the 
proceedings on the petitioner's first petition for reinstatement, the petitioner 
admitted that he had paid a total of $1,200 in bribes to claims adjusters 
employed by State Farm Insurance Company to speed up the processing of cases. In 
addition, the petitioner said that he had regularly used cocaine from the 
mid-1980s to the day preceding his federal incarceration, in 1990. Although the 
petitioner's additional bribes and illegal drug use did not result in criminal 
prosecution, we should consider this additional misconduct in assessing the 
seriousness of the petitioner's history of wrongdoing. In re 
Rothenberg, 108 Ill. 2d 313, 324-25 (1985). The petitioner was admitted to 
the Illinois bar in 1959, and he began practicing law in 1960. Thus, at the time 
of these events the petitioner had been a lawyer for more than 25 years. We 
believe that his misconduct must be considered particularly egregious in light 
of his lengthy experience as a lawyer.
One circumstance further weighing against reinstatement is the petitioner's 
delay in making restitution for the additional bribes to the State Farm 
adjusters. The petitioner did not make restitution for these additional bribes 
until February 1998, several months after he filed the present petition for 
reinstatement-his third request for that relief-and a number of years after the 
Hearing Board had initially suggested restitution. In denying the petitioner's 
first petition for reinstatement, in August 1994, the hearing panel recommended 
that the petitioner make a payment in restitution of the additional bribes. The 
petitioner did not do so, however. Two years later, the hearing panel again 
spoke of the need for restitution when it denied the petitioner's second 
petition for reinstatement. It was not until several months after the petitioner 
submitted the present request for reinstatement that he saw fit to pay 
restitution, choosing then to make a charitable contribution in an amount equal 
to his admitted bribes. See In re Fleischman, 135 Ill. 2d 488, 498 
(1990) (ordering restitution in an amount equal to the sum of the petitioner's 
bribes to officials, in the absence of specific evidence of the value of the 
benefit received by the petitioner in making the bribes).
Finally, the petitioner has failed to remove himself from the milieu that 
fostered his earlier misconduct. He currently performs collection work for a 
number of different medical providers; he had referred clients to some of these 
providers while he was still in practice. Moreover, two of the employers the 
petitioner worked for at the time he filed his reinstatement petition have been 
sued by State Farm Insurance Company for fraud.
Recommendations of the Hearing and Review Boards are only advisory and are 
not binding on this court. In re Polito, 132 Ill. 2d 294, 300 (1989); 
In re Alexander, 128 Ill. 2d 524, 534 (1989); In re Anglin, 
122 Ill. 2d 531, 538 (1988). As a general matter, we defer to the Hearing Board 
and its assessment of the testimony presented in that forum. As the 
Administrator notes in her exceptions, however, the Hearing Board made several 
negative findings under the criteria listed in Rule 767 yet went on to explain 
that each adverse finding by itself was insufficient to bar the petitioner's 
reinstatement. Perhaps the principal justification for the favorable 
recommendations by the Hearing and Review Boards arises from the passage of time 
since the petitioner's misconduct and the perception that no amount of 
wrongdoing should, by itself, forever preclude a lawyer's reinstatement. A 
majority of the Hearing Board gave voice to these notions in recommending the 
petitioner's reinstatement. Both of these propositions are false, 
however. "[T]he mere passage of time is not a sufficient ground for 
reinstatement ***." In re Thomas, 76 Ill. 2d 185, 193 (1979). Moreover, 
this court has stated that some misconduct will be sufficient to forever bar a 
lawyer from reinstatement. "Clearly, there are certain infractions that are so 
serious that the attorney committing them should never be readmitted to the 
practice of law." In re Rothenberg, 108 Ill. 2d 313, 326 (1985). In 
short, there is no presumption in favor of reinstatement, and here the burden 
remains on the petitioner to demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, that 
he should be reinstated to the practice of law. He has not done so.
For the reasons stated, the petition for reinstatement is denied.
Petition denied.
JUSTICE BILANDIC took no part in the consideration or decision of this 
case.
JUSTICE McMORROW, dissenting:
Although, as the majority observes, this court is not bound by the 
recommendations of the Hearing and Review Boards in deciding the disposition of 
a petition for reinstatement (see In re Parker, 149 Ill. 2d 222, 233 
(1992)), the factual findings of the Hearing Board are entitled to deference 
because the Board "is able to observe the demeanor of witnesses, judge their 
credibility and evaluate conflicting testimony" (In re Fleischman, 135 Ill. 2d 488, 496 (1990)). Based on the Hearing Board's factual findings with 
respect to the Rule 767(f) factors in this case, I cannot agree with the 
majority's rejection of the Hearing and Review Boards' recommendations that 
petitioner be reinstated to the practice of law.
In my view, the majority fails to afford the proper deference to the factual 
findings of the Hearing Board. In support of its decision to deny petitioner's 
request for reinstatement, the majority relies on petitioner's "delay in making 
restitution for the additional bribes to the State Farm adjusters" and his 
"failure to remove himself from the milieu that fostered his earlier 
misconduct." The majority's use of these facts to support denial of the petition 
for reinstatement is at odds with the Hearing Board's findings.
The Hearing Board found no delay in petitioner's payment of restitution to 
Wausau. He paid Wausau $40,000 in 1992. Also, although petitioner waited until 
1998 to donate $1,200 to charity as compensation for his bribes to State Farm 
adjusters, the Hearing Board found that this $1,200 was not restitution in a 
"strict sense" and that petitioner was not required to pay this amount until 
after August 1996. Moreover, petitioner testified that he did not pay the $1,200 
sooner because he was unsure to whom to make payment. The Hearing Board found 
petitioner's testimony "honest, sincere and credible."
Similarly, the Hearing Board found no impropriety associated with 
petitioner's present employment relationship with medical providers to whom he 
had previously referred business. According to the Hearing Board, these 
relationships were unrelated to petitioner's previous misconduct, and petitioner 
provided these medical providers with a legitimate collection service. In light 
of these findings by the Hearing Board, the majority's reliance on the delay in 
petitioner's payment of restitution and his relationships with certain medical 
providers as reasons to deny the reinstatement petition is not appropriate. See 
In re Silvern, 92 Ill. 2d 188, 194-95 (1982) (delay in payment of 
restitution should not be used to defeat petition for reinstatement where delay 
caused in part by petitioner's inability to remember identity of insurance 
companies affected by his fraudulent activity).
I also believe that the majority fails to give adequate consideration to the 
Rule 767(f) factors that show petitioner's good character and rehabilitation. 
The Hearing Board found that the petitioner's misconduct was extremely serious 
and that he was an experienced attorney when it occurred. These two Rule 767(f) 
factors are unfavorable to petitioner's request for reinstatement. However, the 
Hearing Board's findings with respect to the remaining four factors indicate 
that reinstatement is nevertheless appropriate.
The Hearing Board determined that the petitioner was credible, had recognized 
the nature and seriousness of his misconduct, and had expressed remorse for his 
actions. In addition, the Hearing Board found that the petitioner had made 
restitution by paying Wausau $40,000 and by giving $1,200 to a charity. 
According to the findings of the Hearing Board, the petitioner also had been 
candid and forthright in presenting evidence in support of his petition, and his 
conduct since his disbarment demonstrated his good character. He had overcome 
his drug addiction and had not used illegal drugs since 1990, he had been 
gainfully employed since his release from prison, he had performed charitable 
work, and he had provided extensive care and support for his mentally ill wife 
and son.
Although petitioner's misconduct was indeed serious, the Hearing Board's 
findings demonstrate that petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence of 
his good character and rehabilitation. Accordingly, reinstatement is 
appropriate. See, e.g., Fleischman, 135 Ill. 2d  at 497 
(finding sufficient proof of rehabilitation despite the petitioner's bribery of 
public officials and 20 years of experience as an attorney); In re 
Berkley, 96 Ill. 2d 404, 410-11 (1983) (finding sufficient proof of 
rehabilitation even though the Hearing Board had characterized the petitioner's 
misconduct as "so bad that it could scarcely be worse"). I would grant the 
petition for reinstatement and respectfully dissent from the majority's refusal 
to do so.
JUSTICE FREEMAN joins in this dissent.