Case Title: Conservatorship of Spindle, Matter of

Citation: 

Docket Number: 61933

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 1986-10-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Conservatorship of Spindle, Matter of  Conservatorship of Spindle, Matter of 1986 OK 65 733 P.2d 388 57 OBJ 2451 Case Number: 61933 Decided: 10/07/1986 Supreme Court of Oklahoma IN THE MATTER OF THE CONSERVATORSHIP OF CLEO P. SPINDLE, A PHYSICALLY DISABLED PERSON. ALLIE MAE COX, APPELLANT, v. MARY EVELYN EDWARDS, APPELLEE. Appeal from the District Court of Carter County; Thomas S. Walker, Trial Judge. ¶0 The trial court ordered a gift made from the ward of the conservatorship to the conservator to be set aside on the basis that such a gift was prohibited by Lindsay v. Gibson, 635 P.2d 331 (Okla. 1981). Appellant conservator requests this Court to reconsider its holdings in Lindsay v. Gibson to permit such a gift where the trial court has entered independent findings which would otherwise establish the validity of the gift. We now overrule Lindsay v. Gibson and reverse the trial court's decision. REVERSED AND REMANDED. Mordy & Clark, Inc. by James A. Clark and Cheri Clark, Ardmore, for appellant. Collins & Collins, Inc. by Lorenzo T. Collins, Ardmore, for appellee. LAVENDER, Justice: [733 P.2d 389] ¶1 On April 22, 1983, appellant, Allie Mae Cox, petitioned the trial court to be appointed conservator of the estate of Cleo P. Spindle and Roy Spindle, pursuant to the provisions of 58 O.S. 1981 §§ 890.1 through 890.11 . It was alleged in the petition that Cleo Spindle was the sister of appellant and that both Cleo and her husband, Roy Spindle, were physically incapacitated and unable to manage their estate. ¶2 Prior to the hearing on the petition Roy Spindle passed away. Appellant dismissed her petition as it related to the estate of Roy Spindle. ¶3 On May 17, 1983, the trial court entered its order appointing appellant as conservator of the estate of Cleo Spindle. Letters of conservatorship were then issued by the trial court to appellant. ¶4 A certificate of deposit had been purchased by Cleo Spindle and Roy Spindle and Roy Spindle's adopted daughter, appellee Mary Evelyn Edwards, on January 13, 1983. This certificate of deposit had been put in the names of these parties as joint tenants. On July 13, 1983, the maturity date of the certificate of deposit, Cleo Spindle executed a instrument directing the bank to add the name of appellant as a joint tenant in the certificate. Several months after the execution of the instrument giving appellant interest in the certificate of deposit, Cleo Spindle also passed away. Appellee, following the death of her step-mother, initiated the present action to set aside the gift of the interest in the certificate of deposit to appellant. ¶5 A hearing was held in this matter and testimony presented to the trial court to establish that Cleo Spindle, at the time of the execution of the gift, was competent and was aware of the consequences of her actions. The testimony also established that Cleo Spindle had reason to intend to benefit appellant apart from, and independent of, any influence appellant might have had over her. ¶6 The trial court found that beyond a doubt, the gift to appellant met the three requisites of validity in that Cleo Spindle was mentally competent to make the gift, had intended to make the gift and had successfully delivered the gift to appellant. The trial court, however, set aside the gift on the ground that this Court's holding in Lindsay v. Gibson, ¶7 In Lindsay v. Gibson, this Court relied upon the case of Daniel v. Tolon, ¶8 Upon reconsideration of Daniel we interpret the holding there to be that the presumption of invalidity regarding dealings between a guardian and ward continues past the time when the legal relationship may end and extends as long as the relationship of influence by the guardian and dependence by the ward continues to exist. Although the presumption is great, it does not automatically invalidate any gift [733 P.2d 390] or transaction. It is this presumption that is in operation at all times during the existence of a legal fiduciary relationship and past that time as long as residual influence continues to flow from the former relationship. ¶9 In Lindsay v. Gibson, ¶10 Under Oklahoma's statutes relating to the appointment of a conservator, ¶11 In the absence of a statute to the contrary, a person of adequate mentality has the right to give away his property to whomsoever he wishes. Upon the appointment of a conservator as herein provided, the ward shall not thereafter have the power to enter into any contract creating an obligation against his estate except for necessaries. Although this section renders the ward powerless to enter into a contract regarding the disposition of the ward's estate, without a finding of contrary legislative intent, it may not be read to prohibit the ward's ability to make gifts of that property. It is a rule of statutory construction that when the Legislature specifically sets forth a classification to which the legislation is to apply, an implication arises that it does not apply to areas outside that classification. ¶12 There remains, however, the fact that the relationship between the conservator and the ward is one of the highest confidence. In that regard, as in all other cases involving a fiduciary relationship, any transactions by the ward which benefit the conservator are to be viewed with a strong presumption against the validity of the transaction. Such presumption, however, may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence establishing the absence of the influence of the relationship in the transaction, the circumstances indicating knowledge of the ward and the good faith of the conservator, she being the party benefiting from the transaction. In the present case the evidence presented by appellant clearly met that burden. ¶13 We now take this opportunity to expressly overrule the Court's pronouncements in the case of Lindsay v. Gibson. ¶14 Accordingly the judgment of the trial court is REVERSED and the cause REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed in this opinion. ¶15 SIMMS, C.J., DOOLIN, V.C.J., and WILSON, KAUGER and SUMMERS, JJ., concur. Footnotes: 1 635 P.2d 331 (Okla. 1981).2 53 Okl. 666, 157 P. 756 (1916).3 See Cotcha v. Ferguson, 165 Okl. 295, 25 P.2d 767 (1933).4 In Crume v. Rivers, 178 Okl. 363, 61 P.2d 862 (1936), cited by appellee in this case, this Court stated that a transfer of the ward's property by the guardian to the guardian's wife was void. In doing so this Court relied on O.S. 1931 § 1314, now codified as 58 O.S. 1981 § 496 . As pointed out in Culbertson v. McCann, 664 P.2d 388 , 390 (Okla. 1983): A transaction falling under § 496 is not always void, but rather voidable at the discretion of the court if it finds the transaction is not covered by a judicial exception to § 496. . . . (footnote omitted) 5 635 P.2d at 333.6 In re Conservatorship of Wemyss, 20 Cal. App. 3d 877 , 98 Cal. Rptr. 85 (1971).7 58 O.S. 1981 §§ 890.1 through 890.11 .8 58 O.S. 1981 § 890.1 .9 See McSpadden v. Mahoney, 431 P.2d 432 (Okla. 1967).10 Amado v. Aguirre, 63 Ariz. 213, 161 P.2d 117 (1945).11 Burrell v. Burrell, 696 P.2d 157 (Alaska 1984); State v. Wood, 231 Kan. 699, 647 P.2d 1327 (1982): Queets Band of Indians v. State, 102 Wash. 2d 1 , 682 P.2d 909 (1984).12 Supra, at note 1.13 See McSpadden v. Mahoney, supra at note 9. ¶16 HODGES, J., concurring specially. ¶17 OPALA, J., with whom HARGRAVE, J., joins, dissent. I would stand by this court's pronouncement in Lindsay v. Gibson, Okl., 635 P.2d 331 (1981). HODGES, Justice, concurring specially. ¶1 I concur in that part of the majority opinion overruling the case of Lindsay v. Gibson and concur in the Court's finding that the gift by the appellant to the conservator was clearly without undue influence, nor in violation of the fiduciary relationship. ¶2 While the question was not presented to us on appeal, I write specially to address the quantum of gift the appellant can bestow. At the death of her husband, by virtue of the joint tenancy provision, appellant shared a one-half ownership in the certificate of deposit with the appellee. Unless consented to by appellee, appellant can only make a gift of her one-half interest.