Case Title: People v. Crane

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88454

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2001-01-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 88454-Agenda 8-September 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v. 								ANTHONY CRANE, Appellee.
Opinion filed January 19, 2001.
	JUSTICE McMORROW delivered the opinion of the court:
	We are asked to decide whether defendant Anthony Crane's
constitutional right to a speedy retrial was violated when 26
months elapsed between the time the appellate court reversed
defendant's conviction for murder and defendant filed his motion
for dismissal on speedy-retrial grounds. After balancing the
opposing interests in light of the circumstances of this case, we
conclude defendant's constitutional right to a speedy retrial was
not violated.
BACKGROUND
 	Defendant was arrested on October 31, 1989, for possession
of drugs. While in custody, he was questioned about a robbery and
arson murder which occurred at McHugh's tavern earlier that
month. On the following day, defendant gave an assistant State's
Attorney a signed, handwritten statement admitting to the arson
murder. Defendant was tried in the circuit court of Cook County
and convicted of aggravated arson and first degree murder and
sentenced to natural life imprisonment.
	On May 28, 1993, the appellate court reversed the convictions
(People v. Crane, 244 Ill. App. 3d 721 (1993)), finding that the
testimony presented at the suppression hearing failed to establish
probable cause for defendant's arrest and, consequently, that the
trial court erred when it denied defendant's motion to suppress his
confession. Defendant's convictions were overturned and the
matter was remanded for a new trial.
	The State petitioned this court for leave to appeal. We denied
the petition on October 6, 1993. People v. Crane, 152 Ill. 2d 566
(1993). The State then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with
the United States Supreme Court. The appellate court's mandate
was recalled pending resolution of the State's petition. 155 Ill. 2d
R. 368.
	On February 28, 1994, the Unites States Supreme Court
denied the State's application. Upon receiving notification of the
denial, the appellate court's mandate should have been reissued.
See 155 Ill. 2d R. 368. However, in this case the mandate was not
transmitted to the circuit court until February 2, 1995.
	After the mandate was received, the case was placed on the
circuit court docket. On March 15, 1995, defendant made his first
appearance before the trial court. On that date, defendant's
attorney was unavailable and a continuance was granted to March
21, 1995. On March 21, 1995, defendant agreed to a May 31,
1995, trial date. On May 31, 1995, defendant answered ready and
demanded trial. The case was continued on the State's motion
until July 31, 1995. On July 31, 1995, defendant moved for
dismissal of the charges against him, alleging the State violated his
constitutional right to a speedy retrial because "more than a
reasonable length of time has elapsed since cert was denied by the
U.S. Supreme Court." Defendant also alleged his statutory right to
a speedy retrial was violated because "more than 120 days has
elapsed since [his] case was remanded." On September 7, 1995,
the trial court denied defendant's motion for dismissal, giving no
explanation for its decision.
	After other pretrial issues were resolved, defendant's second
trial commenced on October 15, 1996.(1) Defendant again was
found guilty of first degree murder and aggravated arson. He later
was sentenced to a term of 75 years' imprisonment on the murder
conviction and a concurrent term of 30 years' imprisonment for
the aggravated arson.
	On appeal, the appellate court reversed defendant's
convictions. 307 Ill. App. 3d 816. Applying the balancing test set
forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972), the appellate court ruled that defendant's
constitutional right to a speedy retrial had been violated. In
assessing defendant's claim, the appellate court held: the delay in
bringing defendant to trial after his convictions were reversed-a
period of 26 months until defendant moved for dismissal-was
presumptively prejudicial; that defendant did not waive his right
to a speedy trial by his inaction; and that defendant was severely
prejudiced because he remained incarcerated during the entire 26-month period. In addition, the appellate court held the unexplained
delay of 11 months, though not a deliberate attempt to circumvent
defendant's speedy-trial rights, was unjustified. Based on this
unexcused "lengthy delay," the appellate court concluded that
defendant had been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial
and dismissed the indictment.
	We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d
R. 315(a).
ANALYSIS
	Both the United States Constitution and the Constitution of
Illinois guarantee to anyone accused of a crime the right to a
speedy trial. See U.S. Const., amend. VI ("[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial"); Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §8 ("In criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall have the right *** to have a speedy public trial
by an impartial jury"). The sixth amendment right to a speedy trial
is fundamental and, like other sixth amendment rights, is made
applicable to the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1, 87 S. Ct. 988 (1967).
	Although it had long been held that determining whether an
accused had been denied the constitutional right to a speedy trial
depended on "circumstances" (Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77,
87, 49 L. Ed. 950, 954, 25 S. Ct. 573, 576 (1905)), in Barker v.
Wingo, the United States Supreme Court recognized that there was
a need to set out "criteria by which [a constitutional] speedy trial
right is to be judged." Barker, 407 U.S.  at 516, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at
109, 92 S. Ct.  at 2185. In doing so, the Barker Court analyzed the
nature of the speedy-trial right and found it was "generically
different" from other constitutionally guaranteed protections.
Barker, 407 U.S.  at 519, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 110, 92 S. Ct.  at 2186.
One reason is because "there is a societal interest in providing a
speedy trial which exists separate from, and at times in opposition
to, the interests of the accused." Barker, 407 U.S.  at 519, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 110-11, 92 S. Ct.  at 2186. Society's interests are not served,
the Barker Court held, when delay in prosecution contributes to
court backlog, allows defendants released on bail an opportunity
to commit more crimes, prevents defendants from receiving
rehabilitation, and lengthens pretrial detention, which causes
overcrowding in jails and is costly. Barker, 407 U.S.  at 520, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 111, 92 S. Ct.  at 2187.
	The speedy-trial right also differs from other rights because
abridgment of the right to a speedy trial may, at times, work to the
advantage of the accused and against the State. Barker, 407 U.S. 
at 521, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 111, 92 S. Ct.  at 2187. Delay is often used
as a defense tactic. For this reason, the Barker Court observed,
"deprivation of the right to speedy trial does not per se prejudice
the accused's ability to defend himself." Barker, 407 U.S.  at 521,
33 L. Ed. 2d  at 112, 92 S. Ct.  at 2187.
	Finally, the Barker Court noted that the right to a speedy trial
is "a more vague concept than other procedural rules," which
makes it "impossible to determine with precision when the right
has been denied." Barker, 407 U.S.  at 521, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 112, 92 S. Ct.  at 2187. Instead, determining whether an accused's
constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated "necessitates
a functional analysis of the right in the particular context of the
case." Barker, 407 U.S.  at 522, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 112, 92 S. Ct.  at
2188. Because of the seriousness of the remedy-"a defendant who
may be guilty of a serious crime will go free, without having been
tried"-the right to a speedy trial should always be in balance, and
not inconsistent, with the rights of public justice. Barker, 407 U.S. 
at 522, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 112, 92 S. Ct.  at 2188.
	The indistinct quality of the constitutional speedy-trial right
has been recognized by this court. In People v. Henry, 47 Ill. 2d 312, 316 (1970), we held the constitutional right to a speedy trial
"cannot be defined in terms of an absolute or precise standard of
time, within which an accused must be given trial." In People v.
Bazzell, 68 Ill. 2d 177, 181 (1977), we announced that whenever
a constitutional speedy-trial claim has been raised, "[t]he record in
its totality must be examined to ascertain whether the defendant
has enjoyed the right guaranteed by the constitution."
	In an attempt to provide some structure for a court's inquiry
into whether an individual has been deprived of his constitutional
speedy-trial right, the Barker court identified four factors that may
be considered: the length of the delay; the reasons for the delay;
the prejudice, if any, to the defendant; and defendant's assertion of
his right. Barker, 407 U.S.  at 530, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 116-17, 92 S. Ct.  at 2192. Deciding whether a defendant's constitutional right to
a speedy trial has been violated requires a balancing of these four
factors. Barker, 407 U.S.  at 530, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 116-17, 92 S. Ct. 
at 2192; Bazzell, 68 Ill. 2d at 182-83; Henry, 47 Ill. 2d  at 316.
	Because of the imprecise nature of the constitutional
guarantee to a speedy trial, our legislature enacted section 103-5
of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/103-5
(West 1998)). This statute specifies certain time periods within
which a defendant must be brought to trial. The statute implements
the constitutional guarantee, but is not equivalent to, or
coextensive with, the constitutional right. People v. Staten, 159 Ill. 2d 419 (1994); Bazzell, 68 Ill. 2d  at 181. When a defendant asserts
a violation of his statutory right to a speedy trial, the statute
" 'operates to prevent the constitutional claim from arising except
in cases involving prolonged delay or novel issues.' " People v.
Anderson, 53 Ill. 2d 437, 441 (1973), quoting People v. Stuckey,
34 Ill. 2d 521, 523 (1966).
	In this appeal, the only issue presented to this court is whether
defendant's constitutional speedy-retrial right has been violated.(2)
Standard of Review
	As a preliminary matter, we address the dispute over the
proper standard for review. We have held that "[w]hether an
accused has been denied a speedy trial within the constitution is a
judicial question," unrestricted by legislative time limitations.
Bazzell, 68 Ill. 2d  at 181. However, the degree of deference to be
paid a lower court's determination on a defendant's constitutional
speedy-trial claim has never been addressed by this court.
	According to the State, a trial court faced with a constitutional
speedy-trial claim exercises discretion when it balances the four
Barker factors. For this reason, the State contends, a reviewing
court should be limited to deciding whether the trial court abused
its discretion. The State urges us to find that the appellate court
erred when it reversed the trial court's ruling because, according
to the State, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
found that defendant's constitutional right had not been violated.
	Defendant, however, contends a trial court's ruling on a
constitutional speedy-trial claim should be accorded no deference.
Defendant asserts that a reviewing court should consider a
constitutional speedy-trial claim de novo and engage in its own
balancing of the Barker factors to decide whether a constitutional
violation has been shown.
	Neither the State, nor the defendant, provide citation to case
law in support of their respective positions, and our own
independent review of state and federal case law has revealed no
definitive answer on this issue. For this reason, in resolving this
issue, we look to general principles concerning standards of
review.
	In People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 384-85 (1998), we
were asked to determine the proper standard of review to be
applied when a defendant appealed from a trial court's dismissal
of a post-conviction petition when no evidentiary hearing had been
held. We reviewed at length the various standards of review and
found that "[t]he manifestly erroneous standard represents the
typical appellate standard of review for findings of fact made by
a trial judge." We further found that the abuse of discretion
standard was " 'the most deferential standard of review
available' " and should be reserved "for those decisions of the
lower court which deserve great deference on review." Coleman,
183 Ill. 2d  at 387, quoting M. Davis, A Basic Guide to Standards
of Judicial Review, 33 S.D. L. Rev. 469, 480 (1988).
	We determined that neither standard was proper when
reviewing the summary dismissal of a post-conviction proceeding,
since at this stage no factual issues had to be decided by the trial
court. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 388. A court of review would have
the same ability as the trial court in the first instance to assess the
allegations and, thus, there would be little justification for giving
the trial court's conclusions deference. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at
388-89. Accordingly, we held "the appropriate standard for this
question is that of plenary review." Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 388-89.
	Recently, in In re G.O., 191 Ill. 2d 37 (2000), we determined
the proper standard for reviewing a trial court's ruling that a
defendant's statement was not voluntarily given and should be
suppressed. Relying on the Supreme Court's pronouncement in
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911,
920, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996), we held:
			"[I]n reviewing whether respondent's confession was
voluntary, we will accord great deference to the trial
court's factual findings, and we will reverse those
findings only if they are against the manifest weight of the
evidence. However, we will review de novo the ultimate
question of whether the confession was voluntary." In re
G.O., 191 Ill. 2d  at 50.
	We derive from our decisions in In re G.O. and Coleman a
basic principle. When a trial court rules on issues which present a
mixed question of law and fact, the reviewing court must afford
deference to a trial court's factual findings. A reviewing court,
however, remains free to engage in its own assessment of the facts
in relation to the issues presented and may draw its own
conclusions when deciding what relief should be granted.
	This is the appropriate standard to be applied here. When
resolving a constitutional speedy-trial claim, any factual
determinations made by the trial court, which are contained in the
record, shall be upheld on review unless they are against the
manifest weight of the evidence. This standard of review is already
applied to factual determinations in statutory speedy-trial cases.
See People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 115 (1998) ("trial court's
determination as to who is responsible for a delay of the trial is
entitled to much deference, and should be sustained absent a clear
showing that the trial court abused its discretion"); People v.
Turner, 128 Ill. 2d 540 (1989). However, when a trial court
performs the Barker balancing test and weighs the interests of the
State against the interests of the defendant in light of the
circumstances of the case, there is no need to afford deference to
a trial court's determination. The trial court is in no better position
than the reviewing court to balance the competing concerns. For
this reason, we conclude that the ultimate determination of
whether a defendant's constitutional speedy-trial right has been
violated is subject to de novo review.
	Having decided the proper standard of review, we now
proceed to a consideration of defendant's constitutional speedy-trial claim. As noted earlier, this necessitates our balancing the
factors set forth in Barker: the length of the delay; the reasons for
the delay; the prejudice, if any, to the defendant; and defendant's
assertion of his right. Barker, 407 U.S.  at 530, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 116-17, 92 S. Ct.  at 2192. All four factors are closely related and no
one factor is necessary or sufficient to a finding that the right to a
speedy trial has been violated. Barker, 407 U.S.  at 530-33, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 116-19, 92 S. Ct.  at 2192-93.
The Barker Factors
	When assessing a constitutional speedy-trial claim, the first
consideration is the length of the delay. Since a certain amount of
delay is "inevitable and wholly justifiable" (Doggett v. United
States, 505 U.S. 647, 656, 120 L. Ed. 2d 520, 531, 112 S. Ct. 2686, 2693 (1992)), a speedy-trial inquiry will not be triggered
unless the complained-of delay crosses the threshold from ordinary
to " 'presumptively prejudicial.' " Doggett, 505 U.S.  at 651-52,
120 L. Ed. 2d  at 528, 112 S. Ct.  at 2690-91, quoting Barker, 407 U.S.  at 530-31, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 117, 92 S. Ct.  at 2192; People v.
Singleton, 278 Ill. App. 3d 296, 299 (1996); People v. Belcher,
186 Ill. App. 3d 202, 205-06 (1989).
	In general, courts have recognized a delay approaching one
year to be "presumptively prejudicial." Barker, 407 U.S.  at 530-31, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 117, 92 S. Ct.  at 2192; People v. Lock, 266 Ill.
App. 3d 185, 191 (1994). A finding of "presumptive prejudice,"
however, does not imply that the delay will be found to have
actually prejudiced the defendant. Rather, "it simply marks the
point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to
trigger the Barker enquiry." Doggett, 505 U.S.  at 652 n.1, 120 L. Ed. 2d  at 528 n.1, 112 S. Ct.  at 2691 n.1.
	In this case, defendant moved for dismissal on speedy-trial
grounds when he had not been retried after 26 months had elapsed
since his convictions had been reversed. We find that this length
of delay is sufficient to trigger a speedy-trial analysis.
	Having decided that a speedy-trial inquiry has been triggered,
we must next consider the reason for the delay. The State bears the
burden of providing justification for any delay which has occurred.
People v. Singleton, 278 Ill. App. 3d 296, 299 (1996); People v.
Belcher, 186 Ill. App. 3d 202 (1989). Reasons which may be
offered to explain a delay are assigned different weight. Barker,
407 U.S.  at 531, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 117, 92 S. Ct.  at 2192. For
example, evidence that the State intentionally delayed prosecution
to gain some tactical advantage will weigh very heavily against the
State. Barker, 407 U.S.  at 531, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 117, 92 S. Ct.  at
2192. Other more neutral reasons, such as a crowded court docket
(People v. Wills, 153 Ill. App. 3d 328 (1987)), faulty police
procedure, negligence, or incompetence (Singleton, 278 Ill. App.
3d at 300; see Doggett, 505 U.S.  at 652, 120 L. Ed. 2d  at 528-29,
112 S. Ct. at 2691), though still charged against the State, will be
weighed less heavily. People v. Williams, 299 Ill. App. 3d 143,
148 (1998). Other reasons for delay, such as the unavailability or
inability to locate a competent witness (People v. Sanders, 86 Ill.
App. 3d 457 (1980)), or a judge's illness (People v. Dorsey, 105
Ill. App. 3d 895 (1982)), are generally held to be valid
explanations, justifying a reasonable period of delay.
	In the present case, different reasons were advanced for
different portions of the 26-month period of delay. The 26-month
delay was broken down into three segments: (1) a nine-month
period between May 28, 1993, and February 28, 1994, during
which the State sought review of the appellate court's reversal of
defendant's convictions; (2) an 11-month period between February
28, 1994, and February 2, 1995, when no action was taken on the
case because the appellate mandate was not reissued; and (3) a six-month period between February 2, 1995, when the mandate was
issued, and July 31, 1995, when defendant moved for dismissal on
speedy-trial grounds. We assess the reasons for these smaller
periods of delay separately to determine whether they constitute
justification for the delay,
1. May 28, 1993, to February 28, 1994
	Following the reversal of defendant's convictions, the State
appealed, first to this court and then to the United States Supreme
Court. Nine months were consumed by these appellate
proceedings. The appellate court, when ruling on defendant's
speedy-trial claim, found this period of delay "fully justified." We
agree.
	In United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 312, 88 L. Ed. 2d 640, 652, 106 S. Ct. 648, 654 (1986), the United States
Supreme Court considered, in a constitutional speedy-trial context,
"how to weigh the delay occasioned by an interlocutory appeal
when the defendant is subject to indictment or restraint." The Loud
Hawk court held:
		"Given the important public interests in appellate review
[citation] it hardly need be said that an interlocutory
appeal by the Government ordinarily is a valid reason that
justifies delay. In assessing the purpose and
reasonableness of such an appeal, courts may consider
several factors. These include the strength of the
Government's position on the appealed issue, the
importance of the issue in the posture of the case, and-in
some cases-the seriousness of the crime." Loud Hawk,
474 U.S.  at 315, 88 L. Ed. 2d  at 654, 106 S. Ct.  at 656.
	Although Loud Hawk discussed interlocutory appeals, the
Court observed, generally:
			"[T]here are important public interests in the process of
appellate review. The assurance that motions to suppress
evidence or to dismiss an indictment are correctly decided
through orderly appellate review safeguards both the
rights of defendants and the 'rights of public justice.' "
Loud Hawk, 474 U.S.  at 313, 88 L. Ed. 2d  at 653, 106 S. Ct.  at 655, quoting Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87,
49 L. Ed. 950, 954, 25 S. Ct. 573, 576 (1905).
	We find the reasoning in Loud Hawk applicable here.
Applying its rationale, we find the nine-month delay in the matter
at bar was justified.
	In this case, defendant's murder and arson convictions were
reversed after the appellate court, contrary to the trial court, found
the State failed to establish probable cause for defendant's arrest
and suppressed defendant's confession. A confession is a vital
piece of evidence and its suppression could compromise the
State's prosecution. Consequently, it was reasonable for the State
to seek review before proceeding to a new trial on this serious
offense. Despite the State's lack of success, we do not find the
appeal to have been frivolous or pursued in bad faith. Further, we
do not find the nine-month delay to be unduly long. We conclude,
therefore, that this period of delay was justified and should be
given no effective weight towards defendant's speedy-trial claim.
	As additional support for this determination, we note that,
under Illinois law, the State has an absolute right to appeal "from
an order or judgment the substantive effect of which results in ***
quashing an arrest or search warrant; or suppressing evidence" and
that "[t]he time during which an appeal by the State is pending is
not counted for the purpose of determining whether an accused is
entitled to discharge under section 103-5 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1963." 145 Ill. 2d Rs. 604(a)(1), (a)(4).
	Although Rule 604(a) is not directly implicated in cases
where, as here, defendant invokes his constitutional speedy-trial
rights, the rule provides support for the notion that an appeal by
the State is a valid reason which justifies delay. If the State
reasonably exercises its right to pursue an appeal, it should not
have to risk that the delay will be grounds for dismissal of the
charges it seeks to enforce.
2. February 28, 1994, to February 2, 1995
	When the United States Supreme Court denied the State's
petition for certiorari on February 28, 1994, the appeal process
was completed. The appellate court's mandate should have been
reissued within a reasonable time. However, for no apparent
reason, the mandate was not reissued until February 5, 1995-11
months later. The State claims the reason for this 11-month delay
was "administrative error." Defendant does not dispute this
explanation or contend that the delay was intentional.
	There can be no doubt that the failure of the clerk's office to
fulfill its duty to forward the mandate in a prompt and expeditious
manner constitutes negligence, which is neither reasonable nor an
acceptable cause for delay. Furthermore, since the State bears the
burden of bringing a defendant to trial, this delay cannot be
attributed to the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S.  at 527, 33 L. Ed. 2d 
at 115, 92 S. Ct.  at 2190. Consequently, as the Court proclaimed
in Doggett, "[a]lthough negligence is obviously to be weighed
more lightly than a deliberate intent to harm the accused's defense,
it still falls on the wrong side of the divide between acceptable and
unacceptable reasons for delaying a criminal prosecution once it
has begun." Doggett, 505 U.S.  at 657, 120 L. Ed. 2d  at 531-32,
112 S. Ct.  at 2693.
	We do not determine at this juncture, however, what weight
should be given this period of unjustified delay. "[T]oleration of
*** negligence varies inversely with its protractedness *** and its
consequent threat to the fairness of the accused's trial." Doggett,
505 U.S.  at 657, 120 L. Ed. 2d  at 532, 112 S. Ct.  at 2693. This
period of delay must be viewed in conjunction with the other
Barker factors before a determination can be made about its
importance to the speedy-trial analysis.
3. February 2, 1995, to July 31, 1995
	The last segment of delay consists of the six months between
the time the mandate reissued and when defendant moved for
dismissal. During this time both the State and the defendant were
preparing for trial.
	When the appellate court reviewed this period of delay it
found, "The prosecution admits its responsibility for three months
of the remaining six-month delay, but the prosecution provided an
acceptable explanation for those three months. The defendant
shares responsibility for about three months of the *** delay." 307
Ill. App. 3d at 819.
	In his brief before this court, defendant accepts responsibility
for the delay from March 15, 1995, until May 31, 1995. The
defendant does not challenge the appellate court's ruling that the
State adequately explained the remaining period of delay.
Consequently, we accept the appellate court's finding that this
period of delay was justified.
	Having considered the reasons for the delay, we consider the
third Barker factor-defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy
trial. In the present case, defendant did not demand trial until May
1995-24 months after the reversal of his first conviction. He
moved for dismissal of the indictment two months later.
	Defendant has made no attempt to explain his apparent
acquiescence to the State's inaction during the 24 months
preceding his demand for trial. Instead, he contends only that his
own inaction is not evidence that he knowingly and voluntarily
relinquished his speedy-trial right and that waiver cannot be
presumed from a silent record.
	Defendant's argument is misplaced. Although it is true that
courts may not presume a defendant's waiver of a fundamental
right from his inaction, this does not mean a defendant will be
completely absolved from all responsibility to assert his right to a
speedy trial. See Barker, 407 U.S.  at 525-30, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 114-16, 92 S. Ct.  at 2189-92. Separate from any consideration of
waiver, the Barker Court held that a defendant's conduct in
asserting, or failing to assert, his rights was a factor to be weighed
in the balancing test and that "failure to assert the right [would]
make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a
speedy trial." Barker, 407 U.S.  at 532, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 118, 92 S. Ct.  at 2193. Consequently, when assessing defendant's
constitutional speedy-trial claim, his assertion of the right may be
factored into the balancing test.
	In the case at bar, defendant was aware of the charges of
murder and arson which were pending against him. He had already
been tried and found guilty on these charges and, although his
convictions had been reversed, a new trial had been ordered.
Furthermore, since defendant remained incarcerated following the
reversal of his convictions, he had to be aware that the State
intended to retry him on those charges. Yet, defendant never
demanded trial until 24 months had passed.
	The appellate court dismissed defendant's inaction,
speculating that "until the trial court regained jurisdiction, with the
issuance of the mandate, defendant may not have recognized any
obvious forum in which he could assert his right to a speedy trial."
However, defendant's delay may be attributable to other reasons.
It is conceivable that defendant's strategy was to forgo his right to
a speedy trial in the hope that witnesses necessary to the
prosecution would be lost and the State would choose not to retry
him. Such was the case in Jackson v. State, 69 Md. App. 645, 519 A.2d 751 (1987).
	We conclude, then, that defendant's failure to assert his right
to a speedy trial should not be viewed as a completely neutral
factor. Had defendant asserted his right during the 11 months his
case was lost due to administrative error, the oversight would have
been discovered and corrected. Defendant's failure to make any
demand for trial in 24 months subsequent to the reversal of his
convictions may be considered together with the totality of the
circumstances when deciding whether a constitutional speedy-trial
violation has been shown.
	The fourth and final consideration is prejudice to the
defendant. Prejudice "should be assessed in the light of the
interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed
to protect." Barker, 407 U.S.  at 532, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 118, 92 S. Ct. 
at 2193. Those interests are: the prevention of oppressive pretrial
incarceration, the minimization of defendant's anxiety and concern
about the pending charge, and the limitation of the possibility that
the defense will be impaired by the delay. Barker, 407 U.S.  at 532,
33 L. Ed. 2d  at 118, 92 S. Ct.  at 2193; People v. Moore, 263 Ill.
App. 3d 1 (1994).
	In this case, defendant has produced no particularized
evidence that his defense was impaired by the delay. Defendant,
however, remained incarcerated through the 26-month period. The
impairment of defendant's liberty is an element of prejudice which
cannot be ignored. Detention prior to a proper adjudication is
exactly the type of prejudice that the speedy-trial clause was
intended to protect against. This prejudice weighs heavily against
the State.
Applying the Barker Balancing Test
	The four Barker factors, which we have reviewed above,
"have no talismanic qualities." Barker, 407 U.S.  at 533, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 118, 93 S. Ct.  at 2193. They are merely the criteria which
have been found relevant and useful to an evaluation of a
defendant's constitutional speedy-trial claim. As observed earlier,
the factors are interrelated and a constitutional speedy-trial
violation will not be conditioned on the presence or absence of any
single factor. Barker, 407 U.S.  at 533, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 118, 92 S. Ct.  at 2193. Once the factors have been considered, "courts must
still engage in a difficult and sensitive balancing process." Barker,
407 U.S.  at 533, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 118, 92 S. Ct.  at 2193.
	Our initial observation is that the posture of the case at bar
differs from most cases that have come before the courts on
constitutional speedy-trial claims. Generally, courts have been
concerned with prolonged delays between indictment and trial or
indictment and arrest. See Barker, 407 U.S. 514, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101,
92 S. Ct. 2182 (five years between indictment and trial, 10 months
of which defendant was incarcerated); Doggett, 505 U.S. 647, 120 L. Ed. 2d 520, 112 S. Ct. 647 (8½-year lag between indictment and
arrest); People v. Prince, 242 Ill. App. 3d 1003 (1993) (12 years
between indictment and trial); People v. Williams, 299 Ill. App. 3d
143 (1998) (six-year delay between indictment and arrest); People
v. Belcher, 186 Ill. App. 3d 202 (1989) (29 months between
indictment and arrest); People v. Yaeger, 84 Ill. App. 3d 415
(1980) (31-month delay between indictment and arrest). In several
instances, the defendants were not even aware that charges had
been brought against them.
	In this case, however, defendant received a trial and was
found guilty of murder and aggravated arson. On appeal from
those convictions, the reviewing court found that the evidence of
probable cause for defendant's arrest was lacking and, as a result,
the fruit of that arrest-defendant's confession-should not have
been admitted into evidence at his trial. Defendant's convictions
were reversed and a new trial was ordered. While awaiting retrial,
defendant remained incarcerated. A period of 24 months passed
before defendant demanded retrial and another two months passed
before he objected to the delay and sought dismissal of the charges
against him, claiming he had been denied his right to speedy
retrial.
	When the appellate court performed its balancing test, it gave
no consideration to the fact that defendant failed to assert his right
to a speedy retrial in the 26 months subsequent to the reversal of
his convictions. Consequently, once the appellate court found that
defendant had been incarcerated for an 11-month period of
unjustified delay, it found "little to balance." This is where the
appellate court erred.
	Like the appellate court, we have analyzed the 26-month delay
and found that more than half of this period of time-15
months-was justified and should not be used as the basis for
finding a denial of defendant's speedy-trial rights. The remaining
11-month period of delay was not justified, but was due to
administrative oversight. Because of the seriousness of the crime
involved, we do not find an 11-month delay extraordinary. See
Barker, 407 U.S.  at 531, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at 117, 92 S. Ct.  at 2192
("To take but one example, the delay that can be tolerated for an
ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious,
complex conspiracy charge").
	We agree with the appellate court that defendant demonstrated
prejudice because he remained incarcerated throughout the period
of delay. This factor is a significant consideration in the speedy-trial analysis since "the Speedy Trial Clause's core concern is
impairment of liberty." Loud Hawk, 474 U.S.  at 312, 88 L. Ed. 2d 
at 652, 106 S. Ct.  at 654. Nevertheless, unlike the appellate court,
we find the prejudice defendant suffered cannot be properly
assessed unless we also consider defendant's failure to assert his
speedy-trial right. Although defendant has no duty to bring himself
to trial, we merely observe that an earlier assertion of his right
could have corrected the error that occurred here and prevented
some of the delay.
	The circumstances of this case are unique. Upon the
completion of appellate proceedings, the reviewing court clerk
failed to reissue the mandate. Under the particular circumstances
of this case, dismissal of the charges is too severe a remedy for the
negligence which occurred, especially in light of the defendant's
inaction and the seriousness of the offenses involved.
	 The balancing we are required to perform here is more than
an abstract computation of individual factors. It must take into
account the rights of the defendant, but does not preclude the
rights of public justice. Barker, 407 U.S.  at 522, 33 L. Ed. 2d  at
112, 92 S. Ct.  at 2188. In our view, when balancing the competing
concerns in this case, the prejudice suffered by defendant due to
his unjustified incarceration for an 11-month period does not
warrant a finding that defendant's speedy-trial right was denied.
The indictment against defendant should not have been dismissed.
CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
is reversed. However, because that court did not address certain
alleged trial errors due to its reversal of defendant's conviction on
speedy-trial grounds, we remand this cause to the appellate court
for consideration of defendant's remaining arguments.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
cause remanded.
1.      1Despite this additional 13-month delay, the record does not show
that defendant renewed his speedy-trial claim.

2.      2In the appellate court, defendant also claimed a violation of his
statutory speedy-trial right. Although the appellate court made no
explicit finding with regard to the statutory claim, the appellate court
implicitly found no statutory violation when it ruled that defendant
shared responsibility for at least three months of the delay since the
mandate was reissued. It is well settled that, when a defendant prevails
in an Illinois court of review, a new statutory 120-day term will
commence running when the mandate issues and is docketed in the trial
court. People v. Worley, 45 Ill. 2d 96, 98 (1970). In this case the
mandate issued on February 2, 1995, and defendant moved for dismissal
almost six months later, on July 31, 1995. The appellate court's ruling
that defendant shared responsibility for at least three months of this
delay extinguished his statutory claim.