Case Title: Dunning v. Reynolds

Citation: 570 So. 2d 668

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1990-10-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
570 So. 2d 668 (1990)
Etta E. DUNNING and Jan Judkins
v.
George REYNOLDS, as Probate Judge of Jefferson County, et al.
89-1758.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
October 10, 1990.
Cellie W. Miller of Barnes, Dunning & Miller, and Jerome Tucker, Birmingham, for appellants.
Edwin A. Strickland, Birmingham, for appellees George Reynolds and Polly Conradi.
Michael L. Edwards of Balch & Bingham, Birmingham, for appellee Jeff Germany.
Gregory H. Hawley of Maynard, Cooper, Frierson & Gale, and James L. North, Birmingham, for appellees John Baker and the Democratic Party of Alabama.
Terry McElheny, Birmingham, for appellee Sheriff Mel Bailey.
Richard F. Allen of Capell, Howard, Knabe & Cobbs, Montgomery, for amicus curiae Secretary of State Perry A. Hand.
PER CURIAM.
Etta Dunning and Jan Judkins appeal from an order dismissing their complaint seeking a declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus to have Jeff Germany's certificate of nomination revoked and his *669 name removed from the general election ballot. The trial judge dismissed the complaint ex mero motu for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm.
The complaint avers that on May 23, 1990, petitioner Jan Judkins filed a formal complaint with the Jefferson County Democratic Executive Committee challenging the qualifications of Germany. The record fails to show affirmatively that petitioner exhausted her remedies before the State Democratic Executive Committee prior to filing the instant action. Therefore, we find no error in the trial court's order of dismissal. Ex parte Skidmore, 277 Ala. 221, 168 So. 2d 483 (1964).
AFFIRMED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and JONES, ALMON, SHORES, ADAMS, HOUSTON, STEAGALL and KENNEDY, JJ., concur.
MADDOX, J., dissents.
MADDOX, Justice (dissenting).
The sole question presented in this expedited appeal is whether this Court will enforce the penalty provisions of the Fair Campaign Practices Act of 1988, relating to disclosure of contributions made after a person becomes a candidate for election.
The specific legal question presented is whether a circuit court has jurisdiction of a declaratory judgment action seeking a determination of whether a political candidate for a local office could be certified as the nominee of his party when he had failed to comply with the provisions of Ala.Code 1975, § 17-22A-4, which require that "[w]ithin five days after [a] person becomes a candidate, such person shall file with the secretary of state or judge of probate ... a statement showing the name of not less than two nor more than five persons elected to serve as the principal campaign committee for such candidate."[1]
The complaint here reads, as follows:
The trial court, apparently on its own motion, on August 2, 1990, entered the following order:
The majority, in affirming the action of the trial court, states, in part, that
I think that the complaint is sufficient to state a claim under the provisions of the Rules of Civil Procedure, because I am of the opinion that the trial court had jurisdiction of the complaint, and could have enforced the sanctions of the Fair Campaign Practices Act, without first filing a proceeding before the democratic executive committee. To vest in a political party the absolute power to enforce the sanctions, in my opinion, fails to carry out legislative intent. It is my opinion that the legislature, in adopting the Fair Campaign Practices Act, and in providing serious penalties for its violation, including the filing of criminal proceedings against a person who violates it, never intended that a political party would be able to judge whether the Act, in fact, had been violated. In this case, the plaintiffs claim that the party has illegally certified Jeff Germany as the nominee of that party. That is a justiciable controversy which a circuit court clearly has the power to resolve. I do not believe that a circuit court is powerless to order the probate judge of a county not to place the name of a defaulting candidate on the November general election ballot. This Court, by divesting the trial court of jurisdiction, in my judgment, fails to follow prior precedents of this Court, which squarely hold to the contrary. Consequently, I am compelled to dissent.
The facts of this case are not seriously disputed. The pertinent facts upon which I base my dissent are contained in the complaint of the plaintiffs which I have quoted above.[2]
My conclusion that the Court errs is based upon my interpretation of what the legislature intended when it adopted the Fair Campaign Practices Act in 1988. That Act made some major changes in the law regarding disclosures that must be made by candidates, and when they must be made. By defining when a person becomes a "candidate," the law effected a major change in the time when a candidate must file the statement which Germany allegedly failed to timely file in this case.
Ala.Code 1975, § 17-22A-21 defines "candidate" as follows:
*672 Based upon my reading of the complaint, the plaintiffs allege that Germany became a "candidate," within the meaning of the Act when he received contributions of more than $1,000.00. If those allegations are true, and as I understand the law of pleading, they must be taken as being true on a motion to dismiss, Germany failed to file the statement required by the Act. If Germany failed to file the statement timely, he was in the same boat with other candidates failing to file timely in this year's elections.[3]
Admittedly, the disclosure requirements of the Fair Campaign Practices Act are strict, and the penalty provisions of the Act are harsh, but I am totally convinced that the legislature, right or wrong, intended to make the Act tough, intended to tighten up the reporting requirements for candidates, and intended to make the penalty severe.
As the majority points out, the record does show that Dunning first filed a challenge of Germany's right to be a candidate with the Jefferson County Democratic Executive Committee, but I cannot see how that would foreclose her from insisting on her right to have Germany's nomination revoked under the provisions of § 17-22A-21, which provide:
Dunning and Judkins, in their declaratory judgment action, asked, among other things, that the judge of probate be directed not to certify Germany's name as the Democratic nominee because of Germany's failure to comply with the provisions of the Fair Campaign Practices Act.
As above stated, the trial court dismissed the declaratory judgment proceeding on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction, citing as authority for the dismissal this Court's decision in Ex parte Baxley, 496 So. 2d 688 (Ala.1986), a case in which a candidate for Governor in the Democratic primary claimed that the winner of the primary election had received illegally cast votes.
Apparently, the trial judge considered that the appellants were contesting the election in the same manner as Baxley had done in Ex parte Baxley. I think the trial court erred in this respect, but in any event, the appellants should not have their complaint dismissed. It is clear to me that they were entitled to get at least a declaration of their rights. In the past, this Court has entertained such actions and has strictly enforced provisions of law similar to those which are involved here.
Herndon v. Lee, 281 Ala. 61, 199 So. 2d 74 (1967), is just such a case. There, Thomas F. Gilmore was named as a candidate for sheriff in a mass meeting of the Greene County Freedom Organization ("The certificate had on its back a drawing which resembles a black panther"). Gilmore, like Germany, failed to file with the probate judge a statement designating a committee to receive and disburse campaign funds as required by § 274, Title 17, Code 1940, as amended. Gilmore, like Germany, later attempted to refile his declaration of candidacy and file contemporaneously therewith the required statement. The Democratic nominee for sheriff filed an action in the circuit court, just as Dunning has done here, in which he sought to have the court enjoin the probate judge from certifying the name of Gilmore as a candidate for sheriff, the same relief Dunning requested in her declaratory judgment petition.
This Court succinctly stated the law:
281 Ala. at 64-65, 199 So. 2d  at 76-77.
Thomas Gilmore was not allowed to have his name on the general election ballot in 1966. In Jones v. Phillips, 279 Ala. 354, 185 So. 2d 378 (1966), the candidate strenuously argued that the provisions of law relating to the filing of the statement required by § 274 of Title 17, Code 1940, were directory merely. This Court answered that argument as follows:
"This court has already held that the filing provisions under these statutes are mandatory before elections. In McCutcheon v. Thomas, 261 Ala. 688, 75 So. 2d 649, we said:
"As already noted, Tit. 17, §§ 274 and 275, have been the law in Alabama for fifty-one years. Thirty years ago, the same question involved here was asked of the Attorney General by the Probate Judge of Madison County, and the construction of the statute at that time was that the name of the candidate failing to comply with Sec. 274 (then Sec. 588, Code 1923) should not go on the ballot. Biennial Report of Opinions of the Attorney General, 1934-1936, p. 610. The legislature reenacted the statute in 1940, and again in 1959, with clarifying amendments *674 as to requirements of members of the legislature and the measurement of the five-day period."
279 Ala. at 357-58, 185 So. 2d  at 380-81.
Arguing pro se before this Court, Jones claimed that an affirmance of the trial court's decree, which had enforced the penalty provisions of the Corrupt Practices Act, "would mark him as being `corrupt' and that his future career might be hurt if he was always to be branded `corrupt'." This Court responded:
279 Ala. at 358, 185 So. 2d  at 381.
In Owens v. Heartsill, 279 Ala. 359, 185 So. 2d 382 (1966), Guy Owens failed to follow the requirements of law, just as Jones had done. He also was not allowed to be a candidate for the legislature.
In Jones and Owens, the court challenges appear to have been made before the primary election there, but in Herndon v. Lee, the challenge was made by the democratic nominee to keep an opponent's name off the general election ballot.
The Fair Campaign Practices Act specifically provides that a "certificate of election or nomination already issued to any person elected or nominated to state or county office ... shall be revoked." (Emphasis added). The legislature used the word "shall," and also said that an election or nomination not only could be set aside, but must be set aside. The majority errs by failing to give force to these penalty provisions of the 1988 Act.
By dissenting in this case, I should not be understood as passing judgment on the qualifications of either Mr. Germany or Ms. Dunning to serve as a county commissioner, nor to each candidate's good faith in seeking a resolution of the matter. Based upon my research, however, I believe that the plaintiffs did state a cause of action and I would not affirm the trial court's dismissal of their complaint.
Admittedly, if plaintiffs could prove their allegations, the result I would reach is harsh, but I think that the legislature intended for the result to be harsh. I must assume that the legislature, at the time it passed the Fair Campaign Practices Act, was aware of how the enforcement provisions of our prior law had been applied in Jones and Owens. In short, I think that the legislature deliberately intended to tighten up disclosure provisions of the law.[4]
There were attempts made when the Fair Campaign Practices Act was going through the legislature to amend it and lessen the harshness of the penalty provisions,[5] but the legislature refused to accept the amendment, and left intact those penalty provisions of the Act that are now contained in § 17-22A-21.
The penalty provisions of our law were enforced against Thomas Gilmore, J. Fletcher Jones, and Guy Owens not because any of them was "corrupt," but because, in each case they failed to follow, or overlooked, a mandatory requirement of law that applied to each candidacy for public office.
Justice Merrill in Jones v. Phillips, likened such failure to file to "overlook[ing] the scheduled departure of a train or plane and thereby miss[ing] his trip or connection." *675 279 Ala. at 358, 185 So. 2d  at 381. I think Mr. Germany missed his flight. I would reverse.
[1]  Section 17-22A-4 also allows a candidate to name himself or herself as the principal campaign committee.
[2]  The parties, in their briefs, have essentially agreed on other facts, but I do not need to refer to them in showing that the trial court should not have dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint.
[3]  Megginson v. Turner, 565 So. 2d 247 (Ala. 1990), represents such a challenge, and this Court did not question its jurisdiction in the case, which it clearly had a right to do ex mero motu. Also, I can take judicial notice of the fact that other candidates were also challenged for failure to follow the same provisions of the Fair Campaign Practices Act with which Germany failed to comply.
[4]  It is a matter of common knowledge that the public is interested in the source of campaign contributions to candidates for public office.

Before the adoption of the new Act, persons who were avowed candidates could campaign, receive contributions, and make disbursements without having to report them, if the contributions were made before they officially declared their candidacy. Under the old law, candidates could wait until near the last day of the qualifying period to file their declaration of candidacy and would then not have to list contributions they had received before that date. The new law changes that.
[5]  See Senate Journal, 1988 1st Extraordinary Sess., at 516-22.