Case Title: State of WI v. Purtell

Citation: 2014 WI 101

Docket Number: 2012AP001307-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2014-08-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
2014 WI 101 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP1307-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Jeremiah J. Purtell, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 347 Wis. 2d 550, 830 N.W.2d 723 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
August 1, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 5, 2014   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Washington 
 
JUDGE: 
James K. Muehlbauer 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissent. (Opinion 
filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 
argued by Sandra L. Tarver, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
 
For the defendant-appellant, the cause was argued by Ellen 
J. Krahn, assistant state public defender, with whom on the 
brief was Eileen A. Hirsch, assistant state public defender.  
 
 
 
2014 WI 101
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP1307-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2010CF86) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,   
 
 
v. 
 
Jeremiah J. Purtell,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant.   
FILED 
 
AUG 1, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J. This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals1  that reversed the 
judgment of the Washington County Circuit Court2 convicting 
Jeremiah 
Purtell 
of 
four 
counts 
of 
possession 
of 
child 
pornography, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.12(1m) (2009-10).3 The 
court of appeals held that the circuit court erred in denying 
Purtell's motion to suppress evidence seized from a warrantless 
                                                 
1 State v. Purtell, No. 2012AP1307-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2013).   
2 The Honorable James K. Muehlbauer presided.   
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No. 
2012AP1307-CR   
 
2 
 
search of his personal computer.  In denying Purtell's motion to 
suppress, the circuit court reasoned that the probation agent's 
search of Purtell's computer complied with Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DOC 328.21(3)(a) (Dec. 2006)4 because she had reasonable 
grounds to believe the computer, which Purtell knowingly 
possessed in violation of the terms of his probation, contained 
contraband.  The court of appeals concluded that the probation 
agent improperly searched the computer under the mistaken 
understanding that Purtell possessed images that violated the 
terms of his probation.  Because the images were not prohibited 
under the terms of Purtell's probation or otherwise illegal to 
possess, the court of appeals held the probation agent lacked 
reasonable grounds to search the computer.       
¶2 
The question presented in this case is whether the 
warrantless probation search of Purtell's computer violated his 
constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  
¶3 
 We hold the circuit court properly denied Purtell's 
motion 
to 
suppress. 
 
A 
probation 
agent's 
search 
of 
a 
probationer's property satisfies the reasonableness requirement 
of the Fourth Amendment if the probation agent has "reasonable 
grounds" 
to 
believe 
the 
probationer's 
property 
contains 
                                                 
4 Effective July 1, 2013, Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328 was 
repealed and recreated.  All subsequent citations to the 
Wisconsin Administrative Code will be to the 2006 version, which 
was the version in effect at the time of the search of Purtell's 
computer on April 9, 2007.   
No. 
2012AP1307-CR   
 
3 
 
contraband.  Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872 (1987).  
The record demonstrates that the probation agent had reasonable 
grounds to believe Purtell's computer, which Purtell knowingly 
possessed in violation of the conditions of his probation, 
contained contraband.  Accordingly, we hold the probation search 
of the contents of Purtell's computer did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article I, 
Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution and reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals.  
I. 
BACKGROUND 
¶4 
The material facts underlying this appeal stem from 
events occurring in November 2006, when Jeremiah J. Purtell pled 
guilty to two felony counts of mistreating animals in a cruel 
manner, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 951.02 (2005-06).  This 2006 
guilty plea arose from events that transpired after Purtell 
began dating a veterinary technician who he met through Myspace, 
a social-networking website.  After a few weeks of dating, 
Purtell moved into the technician's apartment which she shared 
with her two dogs, a Shetland sheepdog and a Scottish terrier.  
Over the next several weeks, Purtell tortured her two dogs, 
piercing their eyes with a needle, repeatedly throwing them 
against a wall, and holding them by their necks.  He also struck 
the Scottish terrier with a pipe and cut the Shetland sheepdog 
several times with scissors.  Purtell later admitted to 
strangling 
the 
Scottish 
terrier 
to 
death. 
 
During 
the 
investigation into the animal abuse charges, the Madison Police 
Department examined Purtell's computer and found over thirty 
No. 
2012AP1307-CR   
 
4 
 
images depicting bestiality, including sex acts between women 
and either dogs or horses.   
¶5 
On March 28, 2007, the Dane County Circuit Court5 
withheld sentence, placed Purtell on 48 months of probation, and 
imposed but stayed a sentence of 5 months and 29 days.  For 
purposes of his probation, Purtell's supervision was transferred 
from Dane to Washington County and his case was assigned to 
Probation Agent Kristine Anderson ("Agent Anderson"), who had a 
specialty 
caseload 
of 
probationers 
with 
animal 
abuse 
backgrounds.  
¶6 
Agent Anderson met with Purtell for his intake 
appointment on April 6, 2007.  At this time, Agent Anderson 
reviewed with Purtell his judgment of conviction, the general 
rules of community supervision,6 and the conditions she was 
imposing that were supplemental to those imposed by the court.7  
                                                 
5 The Honorable James Martin presided.  
 
6 "Probation, parole and extended supervision all involve 
persons under community supervision."  State v. Rowan, 2012 WI 
60, ¶10, 341 Wis. 2d 281, 814 N.W.2d 854.  The conditions of 
community supervision are enumerated in a form entitled "Rules 
of Community Supervision," which provides a standardized list of 
rules issued by the Department of Corrections that individuals 
under community supervision must follow in addition to any other 
court-ordered conditions.   
7 Probation agents have the authority to establish rules of 
probation that are supplemental to court-imposed conditions.  
Wis. Admin. Code, § DOC 328.04(2)(d).  The Rules of Community 
Supervision require the probationer to "follow any specific 
rules that may be issued by an agent to achieve the goals and 
objectives of your supervision.  The rules may be modified at 
any time, as appropriate."    
No. 
2012AP1307-CR   
 
5 
 
Purtell objected to several of these supplemental conditions, 
including the stipulation he "not purchase, possess, nor use a 
computer, software, hardware, nor a modem without prior agent 
approval."8  Beyond the condition concerning computers, Agent 
Anderson imposed several other rules based on her knowledge of 
his criminal history.  Because his underlying conviction related 
to animal cruelty and originated from using Myspace to meet the 
veterinarian technician whose dogs he had tortured, Purtell was 
"prohibited from maintaining a Myspace.com account" and from 
having any contact with animals.  Additionally, Purtell's 
presentence investigation report9 informed Agent Anderson that he 
had a preoccupation with internet pornography and befriending 
and dating underage girls.  Accordingly, Purtell was prohibited 
from having any unsupervised contact with children.       
                                                 
8 This condition supplemented a condition that had already 
been imposed by the circuit court which provided, as a condition 
of Purtell's probation, he was "not to own or possess a 
computer," but that he could use a computer "at his place of 
business or school only."   
9 The Dane County Circuit Court ordered a presentence 
investigation report in 2006 after Purtell pled guilty to the 
two counts of animal cruelty discussed above.  While this report 
is not in the record, a second presentence investigation report 
was ordered by the Washington County Circuit Court after Purtell 
was convicted by jury trial in September 2011 of four counts of 
possessing child pornography.  This 2011 report, which is in the 
record, references the 2006 report that Agent Anderson relied 
upon in assessing Purtell's treatment needs.  "The primary 
purpose of the presentence investigation report is to provide 
the sentencing court with accurate and relevant information upon 
which to base its sentencing decision."  Wis. Admin. Code 
§ DOC 328.27(1).  However, it also serves a helpful role for the 
probation 
agent 
in 
"determining 
levels 
of 
supervision, 
classification, program assignment . . . decision making[,] and 
in the overall correctional treatment" of the probationer.  Id.        
No. 
2012AP1307-CR   
 
6 
 
¶7 
During the intake meeting, Purtell disclosed to Agent 
Anderson that he had a Myspace account.  Agent Anderson reviewed 
Purtell's Myspace page.  On the opening page there was an 
animated video of a bull with audible sound declaring "the 
internet is for porn."  At the end of the video was a cartoon 
illustration of a man standing behind a cow.  In front of the 
cow was an equal sign and an image of a half cow/half man 
character.  Agent Anderson also observed a blog post on his 
Myspace 
page 
titled, 
"oops . . . I 
did 
it 
again," 
which 
indicated Purtell was pursuing a relationship with his friend's 
fifteen-year-old sister.  Purtell was directed to close his 
Myspace account by the end of the day. 
¶8 
Purtell continued to object to the 
supplemental 
conditions and stated he would not remove his computers unless 
the circuit court judge ordered him to do so.  Agent Anderson 
requested her supervisor, Correctional Field Supervisor Chad 
Frey ("CFS Frey"), to join the meeting and reinforce the need 
for the supplemental conditions.  CFS Frey informed Purtell that 
he had a right to correspond with the circuit court and his 
attorney regarding his objections, but clarified that until the 
circuit court ordered differently, Purtell was expected to 
comply with all of the rules of his probation, including those 
imposed by Agent Anderson.    
¶9 
 Purtell eventually relented and agreed to surrender 
the two computers in his possession——a laptop and desktop 
computer——to his father the next day, April 7.    
No. 
2012AP1307-CR   
 
7 
 
¶10  Later in the afternoon on April 6, Bob Adams, the 
program coordinator of the group home where Purtell resided, 
contacted Agent Anderson and reported that Purtell had returned 
from the intake meeting very disgruntled and had skipped his 
appointment for mental health counseling.  Purtell told Adams he 
had no intention of complying with the conditions of his 
probation and would keep his computers and not close down his 
Myspace account.  Purtell explained to Adams he would simply 
hide his computers during scheduled home visits.10   
¶11 On Monday, April 9, Adams called Agent Anderson and 
informed her that Purtell had not removed his computers from his 
room and had failed to report to the Washington County Jail to 
submit a DNA sample.  Further, Adams conveyed that Purtell had 
violated the group home's curfew on the evening of Saturday, 
April 7.   Agent Anderson responded that she planned to go to 
the group home with other probation agents and law enforcement 
officers to place Purtell in custody for failing to comply with 
the rules of his supervision.   
¶12 Later in the morning on April 9, the probation 
officers did, indeed, take Purtell into custody.  Agent 
Anderson, with two other probation agents, searched Purtell's 
                                                 
10 Depending on the level of supervision deemed most 
appropriate, a probation agent is typically required to make 
home visits to a probationer's home every 30 to 90 days.  See 
Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.04(4).  The level of supervision is 
generally based on the needs and risks of the probationer.  
§ DOC 328.04(1).   
No. 
2012AP1307-CR   
 
8 
 
room and confiscated, among other things, a laptop, desktop 
computer, other related computer equipment, and personal papers.   
¶13   After going back to her office, Agent Anderson 
inventoried the items confiscated in the search and found among 
Purtell's personal papers a crayon-colored picture of a kitten 
with accompanying notes that, like his Myspace activity, 
suggested Purtell was attempting to engage in a relationship 
with his friend's fifteen-year-old sister.  
¶14 Agent 
Anderson 
then 
searched 
one 
of 
Purtell's 
computers without a warrant.11  When she turned on the computer, 
several titles to images popped up on the screen that involved 
females engaged in sexual activity with animals and images of 
what appeared to be underage females.  Agent Anderson notified 
her supervisor, CFS Frey, of the images she had found on 
Purtell's computer.  They contacted local law enforcement 
officials, who subsequently obtained two search warrants which 
allowed them to search Purtell's computer equipment, including 
the hard drives of his laptop and desktop computers.12   The 
resulting search revealed several still images and videos of 
                                                 
11 The circuit court noted in its findings of fact that 
there was conflicting testimony regarding which computer was 
searched by Agent Anderson.  Agent Anderson testified she 
searched the laptop, while a police detective testified it was 
the desktop computer.  Regardless of whose recollection was 
correct, there is no dispute one of the computers was searched 
and that several images of what appeared to be child pornography 
were found.   
12 Washington County Circuit Court, the Honorable Andrew T. 
Gonring presided.  
No. 
2012AP1307-CR   
 
9 
 
children engaged in sex acts.  On March 19, 2010, based on the 
evidence acquired through the search of Purtell's computers, 
Purtell was charged with eight counts  of possession of child 
pornography, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.12(1m).  
¶15 Purtell moved to suppress the evidence seized from the 
computers, arguing that the evidence was obtained in violation 
of his Fourth Amendment rights.13  Purtell conceded that Agent 
Anderson had "reasonable grounds"14 to search Purtell's room to 
ascertain whether he had complied with the conditions of his 
probation, and that Agent Anderson lawfully seized his computers 
due to his non-compliance.  However, Purtell argued that Agent 
Anderson exceeded the permissible scope of that search by 
searching the contents of his computer.  According to Purtell, 
Agent Anderson lacked both a warrant and reasonable grounds to 
conduct the search, and the evidence subsequently seized should 
therefore be suppressed.   
¶16 The Washington County Circuit Court denied Purtell's 
motion to suppress, concluding the search was justified because 
there were reasonable grounds to believe the computer contained 
                                                 
13 Purtell's motion to suppress raised a second argument in 
the alternative.  Purtell argued that if the circuit court 
determined Agent Anderson did have reasonable grounds to search 
the computer's contents, the evidence should still be suppressed 
because a police detective had improperly viewed and catalogued 
the evidence before obtaining a search warrant.  This issue has 
not been raised on appeal.         
14 Wisconsin probation regulations permit a probation agent 
to search a probationer's property "if there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the quarters or property contain 
contraband . . . ."  Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.21(3)(a). 
No. 
2012AP1307-CR   
 
10 
 
contraband.15  On September 1, 2011, Purtell was found guilty by 
jury trial of four counts of possession of child pornography.  
¶17  Purtell appealed from the judgment of conviction and 
order denying his motion to suppress.  The court of appeals 
reversed the judgment of conviction, concluding that Agent 
Anderson did not have reasonable grounds to believe Purtell's 
computers 
contained 
contraband. 
 
State 
v. 
Purtell, 
No. 
2012AP1307-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶14 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 
2013).  The court reasoned that the State's argument centered 
"on the faulty assumption that Purtell's probation conditions 
prohibited him from possessing images depicting cruelty to 
animals or the mutilation of animals."  Id.  Because images 
depicting animal cruelty or mutilation were not prohibited under 
Purtell's rules of probation, and were not otherwise illegal, 
there was no basis on which "to affirm the circuit court's 
denial of Purtell's suppression motion."  Id.  
¶18 The State petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on November 20, 2013.  
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶19 This 
case 
requires 
us 
to 
address 
whether 
the 
warrantless search of Purtell's computer by his probation 
                                                 
15 "Contraband" is defined in the Wisconsin Administrative 
Code as "[a]ny item which the client may not possess under the 
rules or conditions of the client's supervision," Wis. Admin. 
Code § DOC 328.16(1)(a), or "any item whose possession is 
forbidden by law."  § DOC 328.16(1)(b).     
No. 
2012AP1307-CR   
 
11 
 
officer violated his Fourth Amendment rights.16  Whether evidence 
should have been suppressed as the result of a Fourth Amendment 
violation is a mixed question of law and fact.  We take the 
circuit court's findings of fact as true unless clearly 
erroneous, and "our application of constitutional principles to 
those facts is de novo."  State v. Sobczak, 2013 WI 52, ¶9, 347 
Wis. 2d 724, 833 N.W.2d 59.     
III. DISCUSSION 
¶20 The question before this court is whether Purtell's 
Fourth Amendment rights were violated when his probation officer 
searched the contents of his computer.17  The State argues that 
                                                 
16 Purtell challenges the search of his computer under both the 
United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.  This court has 
ordinarily interpreted the protections of the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution as coextensive. State v. Artic, 2010 
WI 83, ¶28, 327 Wis. 2d 392, 786 N.W.2d 430 (citing State v. 
Johnson, 2007 WI 32, ¶20, 299 Wis. 2d 675, 729 N.W.2d 182). For 
the sake of efficiency, this opinion will expressly address only 
Purtell's Fourth Amendment challenge, but we note our analysis 
applies to Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
as well.     
17 Purtell argues that this issue is not properly before 
this court because the constitutionality of the search was not 
raised by the State in its petition for review.  See Motion to 
Strike State's Brief Because It Addresses An Issue Not Raised In 
Its Petition For Review (Motion to Strike), filed Dec. 20, 2013.  
In our order granting the State's petition for review, we 
stated, "the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner may not raise or 
argue issues set forth in the petition for review unless 
otherwise ordered by this court."   
No. 
2012AP1307-CR   
 
12 
 
the probation officer had reasonable grounds to believe the 
contents of Purtell's computers contained contraband because the 
computers themselves were contraband under the conditions of his 
probation.  We conclude that the record demonstrates Agent 
Anderson had reasonable grounds to believe the computers 
contained contraband and, accordingly, hold the circuit court 
properly denied Purtell's motion to suppress.   
a. Fourth Amendment Principles in the Context of 
Probation 
¶21 The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . ." 
U.S. Const. amend. IV.  "A 'search' occurs when an expectation 
of privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable is 
infringed."  United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 
(1984). 
 
"The 
touchstone 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
is 
reasonableness," United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 
                                                                                                                                                             
Once this court has accepted review of a case, however, it 
is within our "discretion to review any substantial and 
compelling issue the case presents."  Chevron Chem. Co. v. 
Deloitte & Touche, 176 Wis. 2d 935, 945, 501 N.W.2d 15 (1993).  
Whether 
the 
search 
of 
Purtell's 
computer 
satisfied 
the 
reasonableness 
requirement 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
is 
a 
substantial issue that is dispositive to the question of whether 
the circuit court's denial of Purtell's suppression motion was 
proper.  Further, the question of whether Agent Anderson had 
reasonable grounds to believe that Purtell's computer contained 
contraband has been thoroughly argued and briefed by the parties 
at every stage of litigation in this case.  Therefore, we find 
it is appropriate to reach the underlying merits presented and 
consider whether the search of Purtell's computer violated his 
Fourth Amendment rights.       
No. 
2012AP1307-CR   
 
13 
 
(2001), and the reasonableness of any search is considered in 
the context of the individual's legitimate expectations of 
privacy.  Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1978 
(2013).   
¶22 Here, a Fourth Amendment challenge is being made by a 
probationer.  The Fourth Amendment affords protection only 
against searches that are unreasonable, and what is unreasonable 
for a probationer differs from what is unreasonable for a law-
abiding citizen.  Law-abiding citizens are entitled to the full 
panoply of rights and protections provided under the Fourth 
Amendment.  Conversely, citizens convicted of a crime and 
incarcerated 
have 
had 
their 
privacy 
interests 
largely 
"extinguished by the judgments placing them in custody."  Banks 
v. United States, 490 F.3d 1178, 1186 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, 
J., concurring)); see also United States v. Huart, 735 F.3d 972, 
975 (7th Cir. 2013) ("It is well settled that prisoners have no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the belongings they keep 
with them.").  Somewhere between these two extremes on the 
"privacy continuum," Banks, 490 F.3d at 1186, lies convicted 
felons placed on conditional release, such as probation or 
parole.  Probationers are entitled to a certain degree of 
constitutional protection under the Fourth Amendment, but their 
rights 
against 
warrantless 
searches 
and 
seizures 
are 
significantly curtailed.  See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 
843, 849-850 (2006) (noting that probationers "do not enjoy the 
absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled," and that 
No. 
2012AP1307-CR   
 
14 
 
probationers have "significantly diminished privacy interests") 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
¶23 This is so because, like incarceration, probation is 
"a form of criminal sanction imposed by a court upon an offender 
after verdict, finding, or plea of guilty."  Griffin, 483 U.S. 
at 874.  Wisconsin probationers are in the legal custody18 of the 
Wisconsin Department of Corrections, where they are subject to 
the "control of the department under conditions set by the court 
and rules and regulations established by the department . . . ." 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.10(1). 
 
Consequently, 
while 
law-abiding 
citizens enjoy the fundamental rights and liberty interests 
conferred by the constitution, probation has been characterized 
as a "conditional liberty [that is] properly dependent on 
observance of special [] restrictions."  Morrissey v. Brewer, 
408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972). 
¶24 These special restrictions are vitally important to 
the State's effective administration of its probation system.  
                                                 
18  Legal scholars have critiqued courts for deciding 
probation search cases under a "constructive custody" rationale, 
arguing that by stating in conclusory fashion a probationer is 
in "custody" while outside of prison, they create a legal 
fiction that ignores the numerous ways in which a probationer's 
life is far more akin to that of an ordinary citizen's than a 
prisoner's.  See 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, A 
Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, § 10.10(a) (5th ed. 2012).  To 
clarify, we do not use the term "legal custody" to equate the 
Fourth Amendment rights afforded to a probationer with those 
afforded a prisoner.  Instead, we merely recognize probationers 
are in the "legal custody" of the State because, unlike ordinary 
citizens, they are still subject to State supervision to ensure 
successful reintegration into the community, lawful conduct, and 
public safety.          
No. 
2012AP1307-CR   
 
15 
 
As the United States Supreme Court in Griffin explained, "A 
State's operation of a probation system . . . presents 'special 
needs' beyond normal law enforcement . . . ."  483 U.S. at 873-
74.  The restrictions inherent in the probation system are 
necessary to "assure that the probation serves as a period of 
genuine rehabilitation and that the community is not harmed by 
the probationer's being at large[]"; these dual goals of 
rehabilitation and public safety "require and justify the 
exercise of supervision to assure that the restrictions are in 
fact observed."  Id. at 875.    
¶25 The 
background 
and 
criminal 
history 
of 
each 
probationer 
is 
different, 
and 
the 
individual's 
level 
of 
supervision and corresponding privacy interests will vary.  It 
is the probation agent's responsibility to obtain necessary 
information 
about 
the 
probationer 
to 
provide 
appropriate 
supervision, evaluate their needs and security risks, determine 
their goals and objectives, and establish written supplemental 
rules of supervision.  This flexibility assists in ensuring the 
"degree of impingement upon [a probationer's] privacy" is no 
greater than necessary to support rehabilitation and safeguard 
the community from potential harm.  Id.  This case-by-case 
approach means that probation "can itself be more or less 
confining depending upon the number and severity of restrictions 
imposed," and in certain circumstances, "the probation [agent] 
must be able to act based upon a lesser degree of certainty than 
the Fourth Amendment would otherwise require in order to 
No. 
2012AP1307-CR   
 
16 
 
intervene before a probationer does damage to himself or 
society."  Id. at 874, 879.      
b. The Probation Agent Had Reasonable Grounds to Search 
Purtell's Computer. 
¶26 Wisconsin probation regulations permit a probation 
agent 
to 
search 
a 
probationer's 
property 
"if 
there 
are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the quarters or property 
contain 
contraband 
. 
. 
. 
." 
 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ DOC 
328.21(3)(a).  In Griffin v. Wisconsin, the United States 
Supreme Court upheld this regulation, concluding that it 
"satisfies the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement 
under well-established principles."  483 U.S. at 873.  Griffin 
held that the special needs of Wisconsin's probation system in 
effectively 
supervising 
probationers 
and 
protecting 
the 
community justified replacing the standard of probable cause 
with a lesser "reasonable grounds" standard.  The Court reasoned 
that probation officers must be permitted "to respond quickly to 
evidence of misconduct" and "the deterrent effect that the 
possibility of expeditious searches" creates would be unduly 
compromised by a probable cause requirement.  Id. at 876; see 
also Knights, 534 U.S. at 121 ("Although the Fourth Amendment 
ordinarily requires the degree of probability embodied in the 
term 
'probable 
cause,' 
a 
lesser 
degree 
satisfies 
the 
Constitution when the balance of governmental and private 
interests makes such a standard reasonable.").  
¶27 Purtell does not challenge the search of his residence 
(a group home) or the seizure of his computers.  He concedes 
No. 
2012AP1307-CR   
 
17 
 
Agent Anderson had reasonable grounds to search his room and 
that his computers were "contraband" under the terms of his 
probation.  Instead, Purtell argues that, while his computers 
were lawfully seized as contraband, Agent Anderson's search of 
the computer's contents constituted an independent, governmental 
search that violated his Fourth Amendment privacy interests.  
The court of appeals agreed, concluding that the State's 
argument rested on the faulty assumption that Purtell was 
prohibited from possessing images depicting cruelty to animals.  
Agent Anderson testified during the suppression hearing that she 
was concerned Purtell may have images depicting animal cruelty 
or mutilation on his computers.  Because possessing images of 
animal cruelty was not prohibited under Purtell's conditions of 
probation, and were not otherwise illegal to possess,19 the court 
of 
appeals 
concluded 
that 
Agent 
Anderson 
did 
not 
have 
"reasonable grounds" to believe Purtell's computer contained 
contraband.  Purtell, No. 2012AP1307-CR, ¶14. 
¶28 We disagree.  As a threshold matter, it is difficult 
to imagine a scenario where a probation agent would lack 
reasonable grounds to search an item the probationer is 
explicitly prohibited from possessing. Indeed, the fact that the 
computers in question were themselves contraband is critical.  
Ordinary citizens, even citizens who are subject to diminished 
                                                 
19 In United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 482 (2010), 
the United States Supreme Court held that a federal statute 
prohibiting the creation, sale, or possession of depictions of 
animal cruelty violated the First Amendment.  
No. 
2012AP1307-CR   
 
18 
 
privacy interests because they have been detained, have a 
legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of their 
electronic devices.  See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 
(2014); State v. Carroll, 2010 WI 8, ¶27, 322 Wis. 2d 299, 778 
N.W.2d 1.  This privacy interest, however, is undercut when the 
electronic device in question is contraband.20  See United States 
v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 785 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 
S. Ct. 2851 (2013) (observing that "courts have declined to 
recognize a 'legitimate' expectation of privacy in contraband 
and other items the possession of which are themselves illegal, 
such as drugs and stolen property."). 
¶29 Thus, 
Purtell's 
expectation 
of 
privacy 
in 
his 
computers was diminished, not only because he was on probation, 
but because his possession and use of the computers was 
specifically prohibited by a condition of that probation.  
                                                 
20 The dissent cites to several cases which stand for the 
proposition that the seizure of an electronic device is distinct 
from a subsequent search of its contents.  Dissent, ¶¶41-48; see 
also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (addressing the 
warrantless search of the contents of the defendant's cell phone 
following his arrest); State v. Sobczak, 2013 WI 52, 347 
Wis. 2d 724, 833 N.W.2d 59 (discussing whether a third party's 
consent for law enforcement to search the defendant's home could 
validate the officer's subsequent search of the defendant's 
laptop); State v. Carroll, 2010 WI 8, 322 Wis. 2d 299, 778 
N.W.2d 1 (reviewing the validity of a warrantless search of the 
contents of an arrestee's cell phone).  Our case involves a 
probationer——who is already subject to diminished privacy 
interests——and the search of contraband that he knowingly 
possessed in violation of the terms of his probation.  The cases 
cited by the dissent, while interesting, are of minimal 
assistance to our analysis.                                                
No. 
2012AP1307-CR   
 
19 
 
¶30 Conditions of probation are imposed for a reason.21  
So, when a condition of probation prohibits the possession of a 
certain item, and the subject of the search knowingly breaks 
that condition, in most situations a probation agent would 
presumably have reasonable grounds to search the contents of the 
item.  Regardless, whether or not a probation agent would ever 
conceivably lack reasonable grounds to believe that contraband 
in a probationer's possession contains more contraband, it is 
certainly not a close question here.  The record shows that 
Agent Anderson had reasonable grounds to conduct a probation 
search of Purtell's computer based on the factors provided in 
the Wisconsin Administrative Code.  
¶31 The Wisconsin Administrative Code sets forth a list of 
factors to be considered in determining whether there are 
reasonable grounds to believe a probationer's property contains 
contraband:   
                                                 
21 To be constitutional, conditions must be designed to 
assist "the convicted individual in conforming his or her 
conduct to the law," and not be overly broad.  Rowan, 341 Wis. 
2d at ¶10. As we explained in Rowan,   
[a] condition is reasonably related to a person's 
rehabilitation if it assists the convicted individual 
in conforming his or her conduct to the law.  It is 
also appropriate for circuit courts to consider an end 
result 
of 
encouraging 
lawful 
conduct, 
and 
thus 
increased protection of the public, when determining 
what individualized probation . . . conditions are 
appropriate for a particular person.   
Id. (citations and footnotes omitted). As previously noted, 
Purtell does not challenge the propriety of the condition that 
he not own, possess, or use a personal computer.    
No. 
2012AP1307-CR   
 
20 
 
(a) 
The observations of staff members.  
(b) 
Information provided by informants.  
(c) 
The reliability of the information provided by an informant.  In evaluating 
the reliability of the information, the field staff shall give attention to the 
detail, consistency and corroboration of the information provided by the 
informant.  
(d) 
The reliability of the informant.  In evaluating the informant's reliability, 
attention shall be given to whether the informant has supplied reliable 
information in the past and whether the informant has reason to supply 
inaccurate information.  
(e) 
The activity of the client that relates to whether the client might possess 
contraband or might have used or be under the influence of an intoxicating 
substance.  
(f) 
Information provided by the client that is relevant to whether the client has 
used, possesses or is under the influence of an intoxicating substance or 
possesses any other contraband.  
(g) 
The experience of a staff member with that client or in a similar 
circumstance.  
(h) 
Prior seizures of contraband from the client.  
(i) 
The need to verify compliance with the rules of supervision and state and 
federal law. 
Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.21(7).  As a condition of his 
probation, Purtell was "not [to] purchase, possess, nor use a 
computer, software, hardware, nor a modem without prior agent 
No. 
2012AP1307-CR   
 
21 
 
approval."22 
(Emphasis 
added.) 
 
Here, 
Agent 
Anderson 
was 
justified in ascertaining the extent of Purtell's noncompliance 
with the rules of his supervision. Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 
328.21(7)(i).  It was already established that Purtell had 
knowingly violated the condition against possessing a computer, 
and it was unquestionably Agent Anderson's prerogative to 
ascertain whether he had further violated the conditions imposed 
on his probation by using those computers.  It is irrelevant 
whether the images of animal cruelty were prohibited by 
Purtell's probationary terms or otherwise illegal to possess; 
the use of the computer was itself prohibited, and Agent 
Anderson 
had 
reasonable 
grounds 
to 
believe 
Purtell 
had 
impermissibly used them.    
¶32 Further, 
it 
is 
apparent 
from 
Agent 
Anderson's 
testimony at the suppression hearing she considered several 
factors set forth in the Wisconsin Administrative Code——which 
probation agents are instructed to consider in determining 
whether a probationer's property contains contraband——in her 
decision to search Purtell's computer:  (1) Purtell's Myspace 
page and personal papers indicated he was attempting to start a 
                                                 
22 The court of appeals misstated Purtell's condition of 
probation as prohibiting him from "own[ing] or possess[ing] a 
computer and that he could only use a computer 'at his place of 
business or school.'" Purtell, No. 2012AP1307CR, ¶2.  This 
condition, which was stated in Purtell's judgment of conviction, 
was originally imposed by the Dane County Circuit Court.  Agent 
Anderson testified at the suppression hearing that, after 
Purtell was transferred to Washington County, the circuit court 
left it to her discretion whether the condition be modified or 
removed.   
No. 
2012AP1307-CR   
 
22 
 
relationship with a fifteen-year-old girl, and Myspace is the 
same avenue he used to contact a prior victim.23  Agent Anderson 
knew of Purtell's background befriending underage girls and had 
prohibited him from being in contact with children.  She 
expressed concern that he may have other Myspace accounts or be 
using other networking sites, such as Facebook, where he would 
have access to other potential victims;24 (2) Purtell's Myspace 
page had cartoon images of human/animal hybrids, which Agent 
Anderson——having an expertise in animal cruelty cases25——felt was 
a disturbing signal of potential future violence against, not 
just animals, but also people;26 (3) Purtell did not attend his 
                                                 
23 A factor that probation agents are instructed to consider 
in determining whether to search a probationer's property is 
"[t]he activity of the client that relates to whether the client 
might possess contraband . . . ."  Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 
328.21(7)(e).    
24 Two 
additional 
factors 
that 
probation 
agents 
are 
instructed to consider prior to conducting a search are "[t]he 
experience of a staff member with that client or in a similar 
circumstance," Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.21(7)(g), and  "[t]he 
need to verify compliance with rules of supervision and state 
and federal law,"  Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.21(7)(i).   
25 Agent Anderson's expertise with animal cruelty cases 
corresponds to Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.21(7)(g), which lists 
"[t]he experience of a staff member with that client or in a 
similar circumstance," as a factor in determining whether 
reasonable grounds exist to search a probationer's belongings.   
26 The author of the 2006 presentence investigation report 
ordered by the Dane County Circuit Court expressed concern that 
Purtell viewed the two dogs he abused as "human," in that he 
believed the dogs could make a conscious decision to reject him.  
No. 
2012AP1307-CR   
 
23 
 
scheduled mental health assessment, did not submit his court-
ordered DNA sample, and failed to follow the residency rules of 
his group home by missing curfew;27 and (4) Purtell displayed 
extreme reluctance to surrender his computers28, and was even so 
bold as to inform the coordinator of his group home that he 
intended to hide them during home visits.29  Taken in the 
aggregate, and given Purtell's blatant disregard for the 
conditions of his probation, as well as Agent Anderson's 
knowledge 
of 
Purtell's 
background 
and 
those 
of 
similar 
probationers, we conclude there were reasonable grounds for 
                                                                                                                                                             
Agent Anderson was also aware that Purtell's history of 
torturing animals stemmed back to childhood.  She testified that 
she 
had 
spoken 
directly 
with 
Purtell's 
mother 
regarding 
Purtell's childhood, and was informed that Purtell, as a child, 
had "disciplined" a family pet and injured the animal to such a 
degree they never had animals in the home again.          
27 Purtell's conduct can be properly considered by Agent 
Anderson under Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.21(7)(e), describing 
"[t]he activity of the client that relates to whether the client 
might possess contraband" as a factor in determining whether 
reasonable grounds exist to justify a search.    
28 The prior seizure of Purtell's computers is a relevant 
consideration for Agent Anderson under Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 
328.21(7)(h), 
which 
provides 
that 
"[p]rior 
seizures 
of 
contraband from the client" is pertinent in establishing 
reasonable grounds for searching a probationer's property.  This 
is an especially germane fact here, given that the search of the 
seized computer's contents is at issue.   
29 Purtell's comments to the group home coordinator relate 
to three factors probation agents are instructed to consider 
prior to searching a probationer's property: "[t]he observations 
of staff members," Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.21(7)(a), "[t]he 
experience 
of 
a 
staff 
member 
with 
that 
client," 
§ DOC 
328.21(7)(g), and "the need to verify compliance with the rules 
of supervision and state and federal law,"  § DOC 328.21(7)(i).      
No. 
2012AP1307-CR   
 
24 
 
believing Purtell's computers contained contraband,30 such as 
correspondence with underage girls31 or additional Myspace 
                                                 
30 We read Agent Anderson's testimony in the suppression 
hearing as providing an ample foundation for believing the 
contents of Purtell's computers contained contraband.  However, 
to the extent Agent Anderson's subjective intent to search 
Purtell's computer was motivated by concern he might possess 
still images of animal cruelty or mutilation, which was the 
basis for the court of appeals' decision,  we conclude that 
stated 
objective 
by 
Agent 
Anderson 
does 
not 
impact 
the 
lawfulness of the search.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly held 
that a police officer's motive does not invalidate "objectively 
justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment."  Whren v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) ("[T]he fact that the 
officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by 
the reasons which provide the legal justification for the 
officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as 
the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.") 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  See also State v. Sykes, 
2005 WI 48, ¶29, 279 Wis. 2d 742, 695 N.W.2d 277 (holding the 
actual 
motivation 
of 
an 
officer 
does 
not 
determine 
the 
constitutionality of a stop).        
31 The dissent argues that "correspondence with underage 
girls" is not contraband under the terms of Purtell's probation.  
Dissent, ¶53.  Perhaps the dissent is overlooks the terms of 
Purtell's probation, which clearly provide that Purtell is 
prohibited from having any unsupervised contact with children.   
 
No. 
2012AP1307-CR   
 
25 
 
accounts.32 
In 
addition, 
Agent 
Anderson 
was 
justified 
in 
ascertaining the extent of Purtell's probation violation by 
determining whether he had used the computer in addition to 
possessing it, and if so, the degree of his use.  Accordingly, 
                                                                                                                                                             
We 
take 
issue 
with 
the 
dissent's 
constrictive 
interpretation of "item" under the statutory definition of 
contraband, Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.21.  We   fail to see a 
meaningful 
difference 
between 
a 
probation 
officer 
having 
reasonable grounds to believe property contains a tangible 
"item" establishing illegal conduct and reasonable grounds to 
believe 
property 
contains 
intangible 
evidence 
of 
illegal 
conduct.  Under the dissent's unduly narrow interpretation of 
the relevant statutes, a probation officer would not have 
reasonable grounds to search a probationer's property even if he 
or she was certain the property contained evidence of the 
probationer's non-compliance with the terms of his or her 
probation.  Such an interpretation is contrary to the dual 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment "special needs" exception, in 
that it would run the risk of endangering the public and state 
employees, as well as hinder the rehabilitation of probationers.   
32 Under the terms of his probation, Purtell was "prohibited 
from maintaining a Myspace.com account."  The dissent objects 
that 
"[t]his 
condition 
addresses 
an 
action 
rather 
than 
possession of an item.  A prohibited action does not fall within 
the definition of contraband."  Dissent, ¶54.  If possession of 
an account——whether it be a social media account, a bank 
account, a web page, or a line of credit——is prohibited by an 
individual's probationary terms, violation of that term surely 
constitutes the possession of "contraband."  The dissent's 
characterization of social media accounts fails to embrace the 
reality of our increasingly digitized modern era.  Simply 
because an "account" cannot be held in one's hand, does not mean 
it does not exist. 
The dissent also argues that Agent Anderson did not need to 
search Purtell's computer because she "could check his Myspace 
activity 'separately because she had his password and had done 
that on her own without the computers.'"  Id.  This fails to 
account for the possibility that Purtell had multiple Myspace 
accounts that had not been disclosed to his probation officer 
and would be viewable in his computer's web history. 
No. 
2012AP1307-CR   
 
26 
 
we conclude Agent Anderson's warrantless search of Purtell's 
computer complied with Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.21(3)(a) and 
did not violate Purtell's Fourth Amendment rights.   
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶33 We hold the circuit court properly denied Purtell's 
motion 
to 
suppress. 
 
A 
probation 
agent's 
search 
of 
a 
probationer's property satisfies the reasonableness requirement 
of the Fourth Amendment if the probation agent has "reasonable 
grounds" 
to 
believe 
the 
probationer's 
property 
contains 
contraband.  Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874.  The record demonstrates 
that the probation agent had reasonable grounds to believe 
Purtell's 
computer, 
which 
Purtell 
knowingly 
possessed 
in 
violation 
of 
the 
conditions 
of 
his 
probation, 
contained 
contraband.  Accordingly, we hold the probation search of the 
contents of Purtell's computer did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article I, 
Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution and reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.  
No.  2012AP1307-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶34 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).   The 
State 
of 
Wisconsin seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court 
of appeals that reversed the defendant's conviction.  In 
reinstating the defendant's conviction, the majority rides two 
analytical horses. 
 
¶35 In one, the majority frames an analysis to suggest 
that because the computer was lawfully seized as contraband, the 
contents of the computer can be searched without a warrant. 
Majority op., ¶¶28-29.  This brief discussion, set forth in a 
mere two paragraphs, is short on legal analysis but striking in 
the length of its legal reach. 
¶36 In 
its 
other 
analytical 
approach, 
the 
majority 
concludes that the record demonstrates that the agent had 
reasonable grounds to believe the computer contained contraband.  
Majority op., ¶20.  In order to reach this conclusion, the 
majority 
relies 
on 
prohibited 
actions, 
rather 
than 
the 
possession of prohibited items.  It fails to recognize that 
"actions" do not fall within the definition of "contraband."  
¶37 Like the unanimous court of appeals, I determine that 
the search of the contents of the computer was not supported by 
reasonable grounds to believe that the computer contained 
contraband.  Additionally, I conclude that a lawful seizure of a 
computer as contraband does not give license to search its 
contents without a warrant.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
dissent. 
I 
No.  2012AP1307-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
¶38  At issue in this case is a probation agent's 
warrantless search of a probationer's computer.  Purtell argues 
that although his computers were lawfully seized as contraband, 
Agent Anderson's search of the contents of one of the computers 
constituted an independent, governmental search that violated 
his 
Fourth 
Amendment 
privacy 
interests. 
 
In 
its 
first 
conclusion, the majority determines that because the computer 
was lawfully seized as contraband, its contents could be 
searched without a warrant.   
¶39 The analysis in support of this conclusion is set 
forth in a mere two paragraphs.  At the outset, the majority 
opines that "it is difficult to imagine a scenario where a 
probation agent would lack reasonable grounds to search an item 
the probationer is explicitly prohibited from possessing."  Id., 
¶28.  It ends the analysis with a conjecture and abrupt 
conclusion: if there "would ever conceivably" be such a 
scenario, it is not this case.  Id., ¶30. 
¶40  It is unclear why the majority finds it so "difficult 
to imagine such a scenario" and that it would be virtually 
inconceivable.  One need look only to one of the most legally 
debated issues of the day: whether the search of the contents of 
a legally seized computer is constitutionally permissible 
without a warrant. 
¶41 The United States Supreme Court recently weighed in on 
this issue in the context of the search of the contents of a 
cellphone.  Riley v. California, 573 U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 2473 
(2014).  In a decision that is being heralded as an important 
No.  2012AP1307-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
statement on privacy rights in the digital age, the unanimous 
court concluded that "officers must generally secure a warrant 
before conducting" a search of data on cell phones.  Id. at 
2485.   
¶42 Although Riley was decided in the context of a search 
of a cell phone, the court observed that the "term 'cell phone' 
is itself misleading shorthand; many of these devices are in 
fact minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to be 
used as a telephone."  Id. at 2489.1  Furthermore, "the possible 
intrusion on privacy is not limited in the same way" as a search 
of 
other 
physical 
objects, 
given 
their 
"immense 
storage 
capacity" which has "several interrelated consequences for 
privacy."  Id. at 2489.   
¶43 The fact that the primacy of these privacy rights has 
been recently reaffirmed, even for those with reduced privacy 
interests, makes the majority's decision all the more troubling.  
As Justice Roberts explained, Fourth Amendment rights apply also 
to those with diminished privacy rights.  The existence of 
"diminished privacy interests":  
does not mean that the Fourth Amendment falls out of 
the picture entirely.  Not every search "is acceptable 
                                                 
1 Likewise, the Seventh Circuit has acknowledged that 
cellphones are the equivalent of a computer.  United States v. 
Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d 803, 805 (7th Cir. 2012) ("Judges are 
becoming aware that a computer (and remember that a modern cell 
phone is a computer) is not just another purse or address book. 
. . . computers hold so much personal and sensitive information 
touching on many private aspects of life. . . . [T]here is a far 
greater potential for the 'intermingling' of documents and a 
consequent invasion of privacy when police execute a search for 
evidence on a computer."). 
No.  2012AP1307-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
solely because a person is in custody."  To the 
contrary, when "privacy-related concerns are weighty 
enough" 
a 
"search 
may 
require 
a 
warrant, 
notwithstanding the diminished expectations of privacy 
of the arrestee." 
Id. at 2488 (citations omitted). 
¶44 Regardless of whether the majority's analysis is 
hampered by its self-proclaimed difficulty in imagination or 
some other impediment, it is surprising that the majority gives 
the issue such short shrift. 
¶45 It bears noting that all parties agree that the search 
of Purtell's residence (the group home) was permissible.  The 
agent had reason to believe, based on communication with the 
group home, that Purtell possessed computers in violation of his 
rules of probation.  Computers were the contraband, and 
computers were seized.  The focus of this inquiry is not whether 
there were reasonable grounds to search the residence or seize 
the computers, but whether there were independent grounds to 
search the contents of one of the computers without a warrant.   
¶46 The majority glosses over this analytical distinction, 
despite our precedent establishing that under the Fourth 
Amendment, each warrantless search must be analyzed separately.  
State v. Carroll, 2010 WI 8, ¶16, 322 Wis. 2d 299, 778 N.W.2d 1 
("[W]e assess the legality under the Fourth Amendment of each 
warrantless search or seizure that produced the evidence.").2   
                                                 
2 This framework is applicable even though a different 
Fourth Amendment standard applies to searches of probationers in 
Wisconsin.  See State v. Griffin, 131 Wis. 2d 41, 57, 388 N.W. 
2d 535 (1986), aff'd, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) ("Though a probationer 
has a diminished expectation of privacy, he still has privacy 
rights that must be respected.").  
No.  2012AP1307-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
¶47 For example, in State v. Sobczak, 2013 WI 52, ¶30, 347 
Wis. 2d 724, 833 N.W.2d 59, the court determined that although a 
third party's consent provided constitutional authority for a 
warrantless entry into a home, a separate analysis was needed to 
determine whether that third party consent allowed for a search 
of a laptop in the home.  The court explained that "[t]o 
validate the search of an object within a home on consent, the 
government must satisfy the same requirements as apply to 
consent to enter."  Id., ¶31.   
¶48 This concept is also illustrated by Carroll.  In 
Carroll, a police officer handcuffed Carroll after a high-speed 
chase, and then grabbed a cell phone that Carroll had dropped. 
322 Wis. 2d 299, ¶¶5-6.   While the officer had the phone, it 
rang, and the officer answered.  The caller made a request to 
purchase cocaine.  The officer also browsed through the contents 
of the phone, including the phone's image gallery.  On appeal, 
this court addressed the question of whether the officer's 
warrantless 
search 
of 
the 
phone's 
image 
gallery 
was 
constitutional.  Id., ¶2.  The court determined that even though 
the seizure of the phone and subsequent phone calls that the 
officer answered were constitutionally permissible, browsing 
through the phone's image gallery was improper.  Id., ¶33.  
These cases demonstrate that a separate Fourth Amendment 
analysis is required to determine if a lawfully seized item can 
be searched without a warrant.   
 
¶49 Due to the personal nature of the data contained on a 
computer and the weighty privacy concerns inherent in a search 
No.  2012AP1307-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
of that data, it is particularly important that a court conduct 
a separate analysis to determine if there are reasonable grounds 
to justify the search.  By ignoring precedent and suggesting 
that once property is seized it can be searched, the majority 
greatly reduces not only the privacy rights of probationers, but 
the privacy rights of the millions of people who own cellphones, 
computers, and similar electronic devices. 
II 
  
¶50 Although the majority ultimately conducts an analysis 
of whether there were reasonable grounds to search the contents 
of the computer, after suggesting one is not necessary, its 
analysis is unconvincing.  The majority concludes that the 
probation agent in this case had "reasonable grounds for 
believing Purtell's computers contained contraband, such as 
correspondence 
with 
underage 
girls 
or 
additional 
Myspace 
accounts."  Majority op., ¶32.  In reaching this conclusion, the 
majority fails to take into account the definition of the word 
"contraband."  
¶51 Wisconsin probation regulations permit a probation 
agent 
to 
search 
a 
probationer's 
property 
"if 
there 
are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the quarters or property 
contain contraband."  Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.21 (Dec. 2006).  
"Contraband" is defined as "[a]ny item which the client may not 
possess 
under 
the 
rules 
or 
conditions 
of 
the 
client's 
supervision; or . . .  any item whose possession is forbidden by 
law."  Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.21.       
No.  2012AP1307-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
¶52 The 
majority 
lists 
the 
relevant 
conditions 
of 
Purtell's supervision as follows: 
 He could not purchase, possess, nor use a 
computer, software, hardware, nor a modem without 
prior agent approval; 
 he was prohibited from maintaining a Myspace.com 
account; 
 he was prohibited from having any contact with 
animals; and  
 he was prohibited from having any unsupervised 
contact with children. 
Majority op., ¶6.  The only item that these conditions prohibit 
Purtell from possessing is a computer. 
¶53 The majority's suggestion that the computer could 
contain "correspondence with underage girls" appears related to 
Agent Anderson's testimony that Purtell's Myspace page and 
personal 
papers 
indicated 
he 
was 
attempting 
to 
start 
a 
relationship 
with 
a 
fifteen-year-old 
girl. 
 
Id., 
¶¶6-7.  
However, this is not contraband.  Although evidence of contact 
with teenage girls could be circumstantial evidence of a 
probation violation, it is not "an item which the client may not 
possess under the rules or conditions of probation" or may not 
possess under the law.   
¶54 The other items the majority suggests could be 
contraband on Purtell's computer are "other Myspace accounts."  
Id., ¶32.  This is unpersuasive for two reasons.  First, as the 
circuit court noted, Agent Anderson could check his Myspace 
activity "separately because she had his password and had done 
that on her own without the computers."  Second, it is far from 
No.  2012AP1307-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
clear that a Myspace.com account is "an item which the client 
may not possess under the rules or conditions of probation."  
Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 328.21(3) (emphasis supplied).  It 
appears from the conditions of his probation that Purtell was 
prohibited from "maintaining a Myspace.com account."  This 
condition addresses an action rather than possession of an item.  
A prohibited action does not fall within the definition of 
contraband.     
¶55 Accordingly, 
the 
majority's 
assertions 
are 
disconnected from Purtell's actual conditions of supervision, 
and its reliance on actions that are outside the definition of 
contraband cannot provide a legal basis for the warrantless 
search.  Contrary to the majority, I conclude that the 
warrantless search of Purtell's computer after it had been 
seized was unreasonable because Agent Anderson did not have 
reasonable grounds to believe that it contained contraband.   
III 
¶56  In sum, I conclude that the warrantless search of 
Purtell's computer violated his privacy rights under the Fourth 
Amendment of the Constitution.  The majority's analysis suggests 
that any item seized can be searched and presents an erroneous 
understanding of what constitutes contraband.   
¶57 Because I disagree with the majority's conclusion that 
there were reasonable grounds to believe that Purtell's computer 
contained contraband and with its assertion that the lawful 
seizure of a computer gives license to search its contents, I 
respectfully dissent. 
No.  2012AP1307-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
¶58 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
No.  2012AP1307-CR.awb 
 
 
 
1