Case Title: Ex parte State of Alabama. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS (In re: Rodericus Antonio Heard v. State of Alabama)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1041265

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2007-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel:01/12/07heard
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
242-4621), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
 OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
_________________________
1041265
_________________________
Ex parte State of Alabama
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Rodericus Antonio Heard
v.
State of Alabama)
(Chambers Circuit Court: CC-00-72;
Court of Criminal Appeals: CR-01-1810)
BOLIN, Justice.
Rodericus Antonio Heard was indicted on two counts of
capital murder resulting from the killing of Betty Weaver.
1041265
2
Count I of the indictment alleged that Heard murdered Weaver
during the course of a robbery in the first degree, § 13A-5-
40(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975.  Count II alleged that Heard
murdered Weaver  "by or through the use of a deadly weapon
fired or otherwise used from outside a dwelling while the
victim is in a dwelling," §  13A-5-40(a)(16), Ala. Code 1975.
Following a jury trial, Heard was convicted of felony murder
as a lesser-included offense to the offense charged in Count
I, and of capital murder under Count II.
The jury recommended by a vote of 9-3 that Heard be
sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole on the capital-murder conviction. The trial court
accepted this recommendation, sentencing Heard to life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the
capital-murder conviction.  The trial court sentenced Heard to
life imprisonment on the felony-murder conviction.  
1041265
The Court of Criminal Appeals originally dismissed
1
Heard's appeal on the grounds that the notice of appeal was
untimely.  Heard v. State, [Ms. CR-01-1810, August 9, 2002] 
    So. 2d     (Ala. Crim. App. 2002).  This Court held that
Heard's motion to extend the trial court's time to decide his
motion for a new trial, which stated that counsel for the
State had consented to the extension, constituted the
appearance in the record of the consent of both parties to the
extension of time, and, therefore, the appeal was timely.  Ex
parte Heard, [Ms. 1020241, December 19, 2003]     So. 2d    
(Ala. 2003).   
3
Heard appealed,  and on March 18, 2005, the Court of
1
Criminal Appeals reversed Heard's capital-murder conviction
and sentence based on Ex parte Dorsey, 881 So. 2d 533 (Ala.
2003).  The Court of Criminal Appeals also concluded that
remand to the trial court was necessary to conduct an
evidentiary hearing as to whether Heard's counsel at trial had
rendered ineffective assistance.  Heard v. State, [Ms. CR-01-
1810, March 18, 2005] __ So. 2d __ (Ala. Crim. App. 2005).
The State petitioned this Court for the writ of certiorari; we
granted certiorari to review the Court of Criminal Appeals'
reversal of Heard's capital-murder conviction.
I. Ex parte Dorsey. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals' decision relied on Ex
parte Dorsey, supra. Dorsey was charged with three counts of
capital murder for the death of three individuals -- Richard
1041265
4
Cary, Scott Williams, and Timothy Crane.  Count 1 of the
indictment charged Dorsey with murder made capital because the
murders were committed during the course of a robbery, § 13A-
5-40(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975.  Count 2 charged Dorsey with
murder made capital because "two or more persons [were]
murdered by the defendant by one act or pursuant to one scheme
or course of conduct," § 13A-5-40(a)(10), Ala. Code 1975.
Count 3 charged Dorsey with the murder of one of the victims,
Crane, made capital because the victim was less than 14 years
of age, § 13A-5-40(a)(15), Ala. Code 1975.  
This Court stated in Dorsey: 
"At the conclusion of the guilt phase of
Dorsey's trial, the trial court instructed the jury
on the capital offenses charged in the indictment,
as well as certain lesser non-capital offenses
included within the capital offenses:
"'With respect to Count One, the trial
court instructed the jury on the capital
offense of intentional murder during the
course of a robbery.  The court also
instructed the jury on the lesser-included,
non-capital 
offenses 
of 
intentional 
murder,
felony murder, and robbery in the first
degree.  Each of the murder charges was
potentially applicable to each murder
victim: Cary, Williams, and/or Crane.
"'As for Count Two, the trial court
instructed the jury on the intentional
murder of two or more persons by one act or
1041265
The State did not object to the trial court's including,
2
nor did the State argue that the trial court erred by
including, felony murder as a lesser-included offense to the
capital-murder offense charged in Count 3 -- intentional
murder of a victim less than 14 years of age.  This Court
assumed for the purposes of Dorsey's appeal that the trial
court's instructions were correct.   
5
pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct
–- a capital offense.  The court also
instructed the jury on two lesser-included,
non-capital offenses: (1) the intentional
murder of Cary, Williams, and/or Crane; and
(2) the felony murder of Cary, Williams,
and/or Crane.
"'Finally, as to Count Three, the
court 
instructed 
the 
jury 
on 
the
intentional murder of a victim less than
fourteen years of age (Timothy Crane) --
again, a capital offense.  The court
instructed the jury that it could also find
Dorsey guilty of the lesser-included, non-
capital offense of felony murder of Timothy
Crane.[ ]'
2
"State's brief, at 13-14 (citations to reporter's
transcript omitted).
"Unlike capital murder and intentional murder,
as defined in § 13A-6-2(a)(1), the crime of
'[f]elony murder requires no intent to kill, but
only the intent to commit the underlying felony.'
Dorsey [v. State], 881 So. 2d [460], 511 [(Ala.
Crim. App. 2001)].  Under § 13A-6-2(a)(3), Ala. Code
1975, '[a] person commits the crime of [felony]
murder if ... [h]e commits ... robbery in any
degree, ... and, in the course of and in furtherance
of the crime ... or in immediate flight therefrom,
he, or another participant if there be any, causes
the death of any person.'   
1041265
6
"The jury returned 
verdicts 
convicting 
Dorsey 
of
the felony murder of Cary under count 1, the felony
murder of Williams under count 2, and the capital
murder of Crane under count 3.  At this point,
concerned that the verdicts were inconsistent and/or
incomplete, the trial court decided to reinstruct
the jury with respect only to some of the charges
embraced within count 1. ...
"When the trial court reinstructed the jury with
regard to Cary and Williams, it limited its
instructions to the lesser-included offenses of
felony murder and first-degree robbery.  However,
with respect to Crane, the trial court charged the
jury with regard to both intentional murder and
felony murder.
"After it deliberated a second time, the jury
returned verdicts convicting Dorsey of the felony
murders of Cary, Williams, and Crane, as well as
robbery in the first degree.  Dorsey's counsel urged
the trial court to accept those verdicts.  However,
those verdicts did not end the trial.  Instead, the
trial court decided to instruct the jury a third
time 
regarding 
the 
charge 
that 
Dorsey 
had
intentionally murdered Crane.
"In its third instructions, the trial court
stated, in part:
"'I would like for you to go back to the
jury room, deliberate and come back and
tell me this one question: Do you find the
defendant guilty of intentional murder of
Timothy Bryan Crane under Count 1 of the
indictment, do you find the defendant
guilty of felony murder of Timothy Bryan
Crane under Count 1 of the indictment or do
you find the defendant not guilty of any
murder at all of Timothy Bryan Crane under
Count 1 of the indictment?' 
1041265
7
"The trial court later told the jury 'to go back,
deliberate and tell me whether or not you find the
State has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the defendant intentionally killed Timothy Bryan
Crane.' The jury then returned, stating its 'finding
[of intentional murder] with regard to the death of
Timothy Bryan Crane.'
"The trial court ultimately accepted verdicts
convicting Dorsey of the felony murder of Cary, the
felony murder of Williams, robbery, and the capital
murder of Crane as charged in count 3 of the
indictment."
881 So. 2d at 536-37.
This Court held that after the jury was instructed the
second time and returned a verdict of felony murder for each
of the victims, the conviction of the lesser-included offense
of felony murder for the killing of Crane, who was under 14
years of age, necessarily acquitted Dorsey of the greater
offense of capital murder of Crane.  Dorsey, 881 So. 2d at
538.  Therefore, this Court concluded that the trial judge
erred 
and 
violated 
double-jeopardy principles when it
instructed the jury the third time.  881 So. 2d at 538-39.
This Court's decision in Dorsey has led to confusion in
the lower courts.  We take this opportunity to attempt to
dispel some of this confusion. In Dorsey, we ultimately held
that a conviction for a lesser-included offense was an implied
1041265
8
acquittal of the greater offense, as discussed in Jeffers v.
United States, 432 U.S. 137 (1977).  831 So. 2d at 538.  In
applying this rule to the facts in Dorsey, we held that
Dorsey's conviction for the lesser-included offense of the
felony murder of Crane impliedly acquitted him of the capital-
murder charge regarding Crane, who was less than 14 years of
age.
In the present case, the Court of Criminal Appeals
applied our holding in Dorsey.  However, the convoluted
circumstances surrounding Dorsey have made the holding in that
case difficult to apply.  First, Dorsey began with a
duplicitous indictment.  Count 1 of the indictment charged
Dorsey with three distinct capital offenses in one count of
the indictment.  Dorsey should have been indicted for three
different counts of capital murder committed during a robbery
because there were three victims.  Although this defect in the
indictment did not render the indictment void, it is obvious
that the jury was confused when it originally returned
verdicts convicting Dorsey of the felony murder of Cary under
Count 1, the felony murder of Williams under Count 2, and the
capital murder of Crane under Count 3.  Essentially, the jury
1041265
9
attempted to apply each count of the indictment to one victim
when it returned its verdicts the first time.  Furthermore,
the jury eventually returned three sets of verdicts, which
resulted in additional confusion.  
Second, the trial court in Dorsey originally instructed
the jury that felony murder was a lesser-included  offense to
the capital offense of intentional murder of a victim less
than 14 years of age.  As this Court noted in Dorsey, the
State did not object to this jury instructions.  This Court
assumed for purposes of the appeal in Dorsey that the
instructions were correct.  However, under the particular
facts of Dorsey, felony murder was not a lesser-included
offense of capital murder of a victim less than 14 years of
age because there was no underlying felony.  Although the
trial court correctly charged the jury that felony murder
based on the underlying offense of robbery was a lesser-
included offense of the capital offense of murder during a
robbery under § 13A-5-40(a)(2), robbery was not a lesser-
included offense to capital murder of a victim less than 14
years of age because a lesser-included offense is one that
does not require proof of elements beyond those required to
1041265
We note that § 13A-6-2(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975, provides
3
that a person commits felony murder if:
"(3) He or she commits or attempts to commit
arson in the first degree, burglary in the first or
second 
degree, 
escape 
in 
the 
first 
degree,
kidnapping in the first degree, rape in the first
degree, robbery in any degree, sodomy in the first
degree, any other felony clearly dangerous to human
life and, in the course of and in furtherance of the
crime that he or she is committing or attempting to
commit, or in immediate flight therefrom, he or she,
or another participant if there be any, causes the
death of any person."
There may be a felony "clearly dangerous to human life" that
is a lesser offense included within the offense of capital
murder of victim less than 14 years of age.  However, that
question is not currently before this Court.
10
prove the greater offense.  One need not prove robbery in
order to prove the capital murder of a victim less than 14
years of age.   In the present case, the trial court did not
3
improperly instruct the jury; therefore, this Court is not
burdened with the problem of an incorrect jury instruction.
Third, Dorsey involved multiple victims, whereas in the
present case, the jury returned two convictions against Heard
for the death of one victim.
Therefore, the peculiar factual circumstances in Dorsey
have led to confusion in the law; the circumstances here are
1041265
11
less convoluted. Heard was found guilty of more than one
offense based on crimes against one victim.
II.  Analysis to be applied when a single defendant is charged
with multiple offenses.
Because the decision in Dorsey does not apply to the
present case, we must determine what the correct analysis is
under a case such as this one: What is the proper procedure
for a trial court to follow when a jury returns verdicts
finding a defendant guilty of more than one offense based on
a crime against one victim?
The special writings in Dorsey and the Court of Criminal
Appeals' decision in Heard, as well as the briefs from both
parties in Heard, discuss the important issues this Court must
address in a case such as this: Whether the verdicts here were
inconsistent verdicts or mutually exclusive verdicts.  We must
also address whether the guilty verdicts against Heard for
capital murder and felony murder violated double-jeopardy
principles.
A. Inconsistent verdicts and mutually exclusive verdicts
The caselaw concerning inconsistent verdicts has its
underpinnings in Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 (1932).
1041265
12
In Dunn, the United States Supreme Court addressed whether
consistency in a verdict is necessary.  The defendant in Dunn
was charged in a three-count indictment with (1) maintaining
a common nuisance by keeping for sale at a specified place
intoxicating liquor, (2) unlawful possession of intoxicating
liquor, and (3) unlawful sale of such liquor.  The jury
convicted the defendant of maintaining a nuisance by keeping
alcohol for sale at a specified place, but acquitted him of
the predicate offenses of unlawful possession and unlawful
sale of liquor.  The Supreme Court held:
"Consistency in the verdict is not necessary.
Each count in an indictment is regarded as if it was
a separate indictment. ...  If separate indictments
had been presented against the defendant for
possession and for maintenance of a nuisance, and
had been separately tried, the same evidence being
offered in support of each, an acquittal on one
could not be pleaded as res judicata of the other.
Where the offenses are separately charged in the
counts of a single indictment the same rule must
hold.  As was said in Steckler v. United States, 7
F.2d 59, 60 [(2d Cir. 1925)]:
"'The most that can be said about such
cases is that the verdict shows that either
in the acquittal or the conviction the jury
did not speak their real conclusions, but
that does not show that they were not
convinced of the defendant's guilt.  We
interpret the acquittal as not more than
their assumption of power which they had no
1041265
13
right to exercise, but to which they were
disposed through lenity.'
"....
  
"That the verdict may have been the result of
compromise, or of a mistake on the part of jury, is
possible. 
But 
verdicts 
cannot 
be 
upset 
by
speculation or inquiry into such matters."
284 U.S. at 393-94.     
In United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984), the
United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that
inconsistent verdicts are acceptable. The defendant in Powell
was charged with multiple counts of violating the federal
narcotics law, along with conspiracy, illegal possession of
firearms, and making false statements.  A jury acquitted the
defendant of conspiring with her husband, son, and others to
intentionally 
possessing 
cocaine 
with 
an 
intent 
to 
distribute.
The jury also acquitted her on a count of possessing a
specific quantity of cocaine with an intent to distribute it.
However, the same jury convicted the defendant on three counts
of the compound offense of using the telephone in "'committing
and in causing and facilitating' certain felonies --
'conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and
1041265
14
possession with intent to distribute cocaine.'" 469 U.S. at
60.  
The defendant in Powell argued that Dunn, supra, was an
incorrect statement of the law and that the principles of res
judicata or collateral estoppel should apply to verdicts
rendered by a single jury to preclude acceptance of a guilty
verdict on a telephone-facilitation count where the jury
acquits the defendant on the predicate felony.  The Supreme
Court stated:
"We believe the Dunn rule rests on a sound
rationale that is independent of its theories of res
judicata, and that it therefore survives an attack
based upon its presently erroneous reliance on such
theories.  As the Dunn Court noted, where truly
inconsistent verdicts have been reached, '[t]he most
that can be said ... is that the verdict shows that
either in the acquittal or the conviction the jury
did not speak their real conclusions, but that does
not show that they were not convinced of the
defendant's guilt.'  Dunn, supra, at 393. The rule
that the defendant may not upset such a verdict
embodies a prudent acknowledgment of a number of
factors.  First, as the above quote suggests,
inconsistent verdicts -- even verdicts that acquit
on a predicate offense while convicting on the
compound offense -- should not necessarily be
interpreted as a windfall to the Government at the
defendant's expense.  It is equally possible that
the jury reached its conclusion on the compound
offense, and then through mistake, compromise, or
lenity, arrived at an inconsistent conclusion on the
lesser offense.  But in such situations the
Government has no recourse if it wishes to correct
1041265
15
the jury's error; the Government is precluded from
appealing or otherwise upsetting such acquittal by
the Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause.  See
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957);
Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 130, 133
(1904).
"Inconsistent verdicts therefore present a
situation where 'error,' in the sense that the jury
has not followed the court's instructions, most
certainly has occurred, but it is unclear whose ox
has been gored.  Given this uncertainty, and the
fact 
that 
the 
Government 
is 
precluded 
from
challenging the acquittal, it is hardly satisfactory
to allow the defendant to receive a new trial on the
conviction as a matter of course.  Harris v. Rivera,
[454 U.S. 339 (1981)], indicates that nothing in the
Constitution would require such a protection, and we
therefore address the problem only under our
supervisory 
powers 
over 
the 
federal 
criminal
process. 
For 
us, 
the 
possibility 
that 
the
inconsistent 
verdicts 
may 
favor 
the 
criminal
defendant as well as the Government militates
against 
review 
of 
such 
convictions 
at 
the
defendant's behest.  This possibility is a premise
of Dunn's alternative rationale -- that such
inconsistencies often are a product of jury lenity.
Thus, Dunn has been explained by both courts and
commentators as a recognition of the jury's historic
function, in criminal trials, as a check against
arbitrary or oppressive exercises of power by the
Executive Branch.  See, e.g., United States v.
Maybury, 274 F.2d 899, 902 (CA2 1960)(Friendly, J.);
Bickel, Judge and Jury--Inconsistent Verdicts in the
Federal Courts, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 649, 652 (1950).
Cf.  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-156
(1968).
"The burden of the exercise of lenity falls only
on the Government, and it has been suggested that
such an alternative should be available for the
difficult cases where the jury wishes to avoid an
1041265
16
all-or-nothing verdict.  See Bickel, supra, at 652.
Such an act is, as the Dunn Court recognized, an
'assumption of a power which [the jury has] no right
to exercise,' but the illegality alone does not mean
that such a collective judgment should be subject to
review.  The fact that the inconsistency may be the
result of lenity, coupled with the Government's
inability 
to 
invoke 
review, 
suggests 
that
inconsistent verdicts should not be reviewable."
469 U.S. at 64-66 (footnote omitted). 
The Powell Court refused to allow a defendant to
challenge inconsistent verdicts on the 
ground 
that 
the verdict
in the case was not the product of lenity, but instead was an
error that worked against them.  The Supreme Court abandoned
that portion of its reasoning in Dunn based on a res judicata
analysis.  469 U.S. at 64, 66.  The Powell Court noted that a
defendant 
is 
afforded 
protection 
against 
jury 
irrationality 
or
error by the review of the sufficiency of the evidence:  
"Sufficiency-of-the-evidence 
review 
involves
assessment by the courts of whether the evidence
adduced at trial could support any rational
determination of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
... This review should be independent of the jury's
determination that evidence on another count was
insufficient.  The Government must convince the jury
with its proof, and must also satisfy the courts
that given this proof the jury could rationally have
reached a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.  We do not believe that further safeguards
against jury irrationality are necessary."
469 U.S. at 67.  
1041265
17
The Powell Court noted that nothing in the opinion was
intended to resolve the question that occurs when a defendant
is convicted of two crimes, and a guilty verdict on one
logically excludes a finding of guilt on the other crime.  469
U.S. at 69 n. 8.  The Supreme Court cited United States v.
Daigle, 149 F. Supp. 409 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd, 248 F.2d 608
(1957), as such an example.  In Daigle, the trial court
instructed the jury that it could not return verdicts of
guilty as to both larceny and embezzlement.  149 F. Supp. at
414.  Despite the trial court's instructions, the jury found
the defendant guilty of both, and the court held that the
verdicts were absolutely inconsistent stating: "[W]here a
guilty verdict on one count negatives some fact essential to
a finding of guilty on a second count, two guilty verdicts may
not stand." 149 F. Supp. at 414. The trial court entered a
judgment of acquittal on the greater offense of larceny,
allowed the lesser offense of embezzlement to stand, and
denied the defendant's motion for a new trial. 
Confusion exists throughout Alabama courts over the
difference 
between 
inconsistent 
verdicts 
and 
mutually
exclusive verdicts.  "The general rule is that there need be
1041265
18
no rational compatibility between the verdicts on the several
counts of an indictment.  The exception to this rule is where
the jury returns multiple convictions as to crimes which are
mutually exclusive of each other.  Conway v. State, 489 So. 2d
641, 642 (Ala. Cr. App. 1986) ...."  Grikis v. State, 552 So.
2d 187, 187 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989).  This seemingly
straightforward rule has been somewhat difficult to apply
because 
of 
confusion 
over 
the 
meaning 
of 
the 
terms
"inconsistent verdicts" and "mutually exclusive verdicts." 
This confusion was heightened by our decision in Dorsey.
In Dorsey, the majority opinion never expressly stated that
the two verdicts that concerned 13-year-old Crane -- felony
murder and capital murder -- were mutually exclusive.  See
Dorsey, 881 So. 2d 533.  However, Justice Stuart's dissent in
Dorsey seemed to interpret the majority's decision as holding
that the two were mutually exclusive.  881 So. 2d at 540-41.
Therefore, we will attempt to clarify the difference between
inconsistent verdicts and mutually exclusive verdicts and
state the appropriate analysis for each.
Alabama appellate court cases have consistently held that
inconsistent verdicts are permissible.  See Hammond v. State,
1041265
19
497 So. 2d 558 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); McClellan v. State, 484
So. 2d 1150 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985); Bradham v. State, 27 Ala.
App. 225, 170 So. 222 (1936).  As early as 1936, the Court of
Appeals in Bradham held that inconsistency in verdicts was a
jury matter.  In Bradham, the jury convicted the defendant of
carnal knowledge of a girl under 12, but acquitted him of the
offense of rape. The Court of Appeals stated: 
"[I]f the jury disbelieved the testimony which
supported the first count of the indictment, there
was no basis for their verdict finding appellant
guilty under the second.  But, for all we can say,
they may have believed in the requisite way this
testimony, and, in their province, simply have
chosen to ground their verdict on the charge
contained in the second count; the same testimony
sufficing.  It was strictly a jury matter."
27 Ala. App. at 226, 170 So. at 222.
The Court of Criminal Appeals has also based subsequent
decisions on the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Dunn, supra.  McClellan, 484 So. 2d at 1152-53.  In McClellan,
the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the verdicts of guilty
for possession of burglar's tools and of not guilty of
burglary in the third degree were inconsistent because, it
reasoned, the jury's acquittal of burglary negated the
"intent" element that was also required for the possession
1041265
20
charge. 684 So. 2d at 1153. However, based on Dunn, the court
held that the inconsistency could have been based on jury
compromise or a decision that the defendant did not actually
commit the burglary. 484 So. 2d at 1152.  "At any rate, we are
unable to conclude that the two verdicts are so irreconcilably
inconsistent with, or repugnant to, each other as to justify
a reversal of the judgment of conviction of the crime charged
by the first count of the indictment." 484 So. 2d at 1153. 
The Court of Criminal Appeals has also upheld jury
verdicts in other cases where the verdicts were inconsistent.
See Hammond, supra (upholding a jury verdict convicting the
defendant of robbery, but acquitting him of felony murder when
such a verdict was inconsistent based on the facts); Hill v.
State, 651 So. 2d 1128 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) (upholding a
jury verdict acquitting the defendant of theft and convicting
him of a violation of the ethics act, where the two charges
were related to the same act).
In Conway v. State, 489 So. 2d 641, 642 (Ala. Crim. App.
1986), the Court of Criminal Appeals stated: 
"There 
is 
an 
exception 
to 
this 
rule 
[that
consistency in verdicts is not necessary].  'The
general rule dispensing with the necessity for
consistency as between the acquittals and guilty
1041265
21
verdicts 
under 
a 
multicount 
indictment 
or
information is not ordinarily applied where the jury
returns multiple convictions as to crimes which are
mutually exclusive of each other.' 18 A.L.R.3d at
283."  
The jury in Conway had returned verdicts of not guilty of
first-degree 
kidnapping, 
but 
guilty 
of 
second-degree
kidnapping, and guilty of felony murder based on the
underlying felony of first-degree kidnapping. 489 So. 2d at
641-42. The Court of Criminal Appeals explained mutually
exclusive verdicts, stating: 
"Here, the jury's verdicts of not guilty of
kidnapping in the first degree and guilty of felony-
murder were mutually exclusive because, by statutory
definition, felony murder involves causing a death
during the commission or attempt to commit certain
specific felonies including kidnapping in the first
degree.  Alabama Code 1975, § 13A-6-2(a)(3).
Because of the very definition of the offenses, the
defendant could not be guilty of felony-murder if he
only committed kidnapping in the second degree.
Conversely, if the defendant was guilty of felony-
murder, he could not have been guilty of kidnapping
in the second degree, but must have been guilty of
kidnapping in the first degree." 
489 So. 2d at 642.
Since Conway, there has been confusion over what
verdicts 
are 
mutually 
exclusive 
and 
what 
are 
merely
inconsistent.  Decisions from other jurisdictions, which this
Court finds persuasive, may be helpful in distinguishing
1041265
22
between the two types of verdicts.  We note that federal
courts and a majority of state courts follow United States v.
Powell in the area of inconsistent verdicts.  Eric J. Muller,
The Hobgoblin of Little Minds? Our Foolish Law of Inconsistent
Verdicts, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 771, 787 (1998)(citing cases from
jurisdictions  addressing inconsistent verdicts of guilty and
not guilty against a single defendant); see also 5 Wayne R.
LaFave, Jerold H. Israel, and Nancy J. King, Criminal
Procedure § 24.10(b)(2d ed. 1999)(noting that most state
courts 
have 
followed 
Dunn 
and 
Powell); 
Annotation,
Inconsistency of Criminal Verdict as Between Different Counts
of Indictment or Information, 18 A.L.R. 3d. 259 §§ 2-3
(1968)(citing cases addressing the view that contrary verdicts
convicting on some counts and acquitting on others need not be
consistent).  "The states have been free to develop their own
responses to the problem of inconsistent criminal jury
verdicts because the Supreme Court found no constitutional
dimension to the problem.  See Powell, 469 U.S. at 65."
Muller, 111 Harv. L. Rev. at 774 n. 7. 
There have been numerous Georgia cases concerning
inconsistent verdicts and mutually exclusive verdicts.  In
1041265
23
Milam v. State, 255 Ga. 560, 341 S.E.2d 216 (1986), the
Supreme Court of Georgia adopted the reasoning of the United
States Supreme Court in Powell, supra, and abolished the rule
in Georgia against inconsistent verdicts in criminal cases.
In Milam, the defendant was charged with two murders, which
were  committed at the same time.  The jury returned a verdict
of not guilty by reason of insanity as to one murder and
guilty but mentally ill as to the other murder.  The Georgia
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and the acquittal,
ruling that there was no error inherent in the inconsistency.
The holding in Milam stands for the proposition that a
defendant cannot challenge as inconsistent a guilty verdict on
one count and a not-guilty verdict on another count because it
is not generally within the trial court's power to make
inquiries into the jury's deliberations or to speculate as to
the reasons for an inconsistency in the jury's verdict.   
However, in Thomas v. State, 199 Ga. App. 586, 405 S.E.
2d 512 (1991), rev'd on other grounds, 261 Ga. 854, 413 S.E.2d
196 (1992), the Court of Appeals of Georgia noted that the
"'general rule dispensing with the necessity for consistency
as between the acquittals and guilty verdicts under a
1041265
24
multicount indictment or information is not ordinarily applied
where the jury returns multiple convictions as to crimes which
are mutually exclusive of each other'" (quoting W. E. Shipley,
Annotation, Inconsistency of Criminal Verdicts as Between
Different Counts of Indictment Information, 18 A.L.R. 3d 259,
283 (1968)). In Thomas, the defendant was found guilty of both
armed robbery of a car and theft by receiving stolen property
relating to the same car.  The Georgia Court of Appeals noted
that "[a]n essential element of the crime of theft by
receiving is 'that the goods had been stolen by some person
other than the accused.'" 199 Ga. App. at 586, 405 S.E.2d at
514 (quoting Austin v. State, 89 Ga. App. 866, 868, 81 S.E.2d
508, 510 (1954).  The two verdicts required the defendant to
have stolen the car and not to have stolen the car; therefore,
the verdicts were mutually exclusive.  Thomas.
Dumas v. State, 266 Ga. 797, 471 S.E.2d 508 (1996),
presents another example of mutually exclusive verdicts.  In
Dumas, the defendant was charged with malice murder, felony
murder, vehicular homicide, and driving under the influence.
At trial, the jury found the defendant guilty of malice
murder, vehicular homicide, and driving under the influence.
1041265
25
In Georgia, malice murder is defined as "the killing of
another 'with malice aforethought, either expressed or
implied.'" 266 Ga. at 799, 471 S.E.2d at 511 (quoting Ga. Code
Ann. § 16-5-1(a)(1968))(emphasis added; footnote omitted).
Vehicular homicide is defined as "killing another while
operating a car, 'without malice aforethought' and 'without an
intention to do so.'" Id. (quoting Ga. Code Ann. § 40-6-393(a)
and (b)(1968))(emphasis added; footnote omitted).  Because the
crime of malice murder required malice aforethought and
vehicular homicide was defined as a killing without malice,
the Georgia Supreme Court held that these two verdicts were
mutually exclusive, "killing both with and without an
intention to do so." 266 Ga. at 799, 471 S.E.2d at 511.
In Kimble v. State, 236 Ga. App. 391, 512 S.E.2d 306
(1999), the Court of Appeals of Georgia stated that in light
of the abolition of the inconsistent-verdict rule (which
applies to inconsistencies between verdicts of acquittal and
verdicts of conviction), it was not necessary to vacate a
conviction because of an acquittal on the predicate offense.
"[T]he issue is not whether an acquittal on one charge would
logically necessitate acquittal on another charge on which the
1041265
26
jury convicted the defendant; rather the sole question is
whether the evidence viewed in favor of the conviction was
sufficient to support the guilty verdict."  236 Ga. App. at
395, 512 S.E.2d at 309.
In Jackson v. State, 276 Ga. 408, 577 S.E. 2d 570 (2003),
the Supreme Court of Georgia offered an explanation of
mutually exclusive verdicts.  In that case, the defendant was
convicted of felony murder based on aggravated assault and of
involuntary manslaughter based on reckless conduct arising out
of the death of the same victim.  The Georgia Supreme Court
held that the two verdicts –- finding the defendant guilty of
felony murder and of involuntary manslaughter -- were not
mutually exclusive as a matter of law because felony murder,
like involuntary manslaughter, does not require proof of a
criminal intent to murder to support a conviction.  276 Ga. at
410, 577 S.E.2d at 573-74.  The court explained that this,
however, does not end the inquiry because both felony murder
and  involuntary manslaughter are predicated upon the
commission or omission of another offense or act:  
"[A] mutually exclusive verdict may be rendered in
a particular case where the offenses or acts alleged
in the indictment as underlying the felony murder
and involuntary manslaughter counts reflect that the
1041265
27
jury, in order to find the defendant guilty on both
counts, necessarily reached 'two positive findings
of fact that cannot logically mutually exist.'
Strong v. State, 223 Ga. App. 434, 436, 477 S.E.2d
866 (1996)(Beasley, C.J., dissenting), rev'd in
Kimble v.State, 236 Ga. App. 391(1), 512 S.E.2d 306
(1999).  To determine whether this occurred, the
alleged 
underlying 
offenses 
or 
acts 
must 
be
carefully scrutinized."
276 Ga. at 410-11, 577 S.E.2d at 574.
       
The Georgia Supreme Court ultimately found these two
verdicts 
mutually 
exclusive, 
stating, 
"[v]erdicts 
are 
mutually
exclusive 'where a guilty verdict on one count logically
excludes a finding of guilt on the other. [Cits.]' United
States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 69 fn. 8."  Jackson, 276 Ga. at
410, 577 S.E.2d at 573.  In a footnote, the court further
clarified the difference between mutually exclusive verdicts
and inconsistent verdicts, stating: 
"[M]utually exclusive verdicts, which cannot both
stand, result in two positive findings of fact which
cannot logically mutually exist.  Inconsistent
verdicts, which do not introduce invalidity, bespeak
a positive finding of fact as to one charge and the
failure to make a positive finding of fact as to the
other.  The latter, which results in an acquittal,
does not constitute a negative finding of fact but
may be explained as compromise, mistake, or lenity.
We can neither speculate nor inquire."
276 Ga. at 410, 577 S.E.2d at 574 n. 3 (emphasis added).
1041265
28
Because aggravated assault, on which the felony-murder
verdict in Jackson was based, required intentional infliction
of injury, the requisite criminal negligence for involuntary
manslaughter based on reckless conduct is precluded.  Thus,
"[a] finding of guilt on the essential element of criminal
intent for aggravated assault based on [the statute] thus
excludes a finding of guilt based on the essential element of
criminal negligence for reckless conduct."  276 Ga. at 412,
577 S.E.2d at 575 (footnote omitted).  Therefore, the two
verdicts were mutually exclusive.  
The Georgia Supreme Court has addressed cases where the
jury returns mutually exclusive verdicts in two different
settings: before the jury has been dismissed and after the
jury has been dismissed.  Where the jury returns mutually
exclusive verdicts at trial, the trial court should refuse to
accept the mutually exclusive verdicts and instruct the jury
to continue deliberating.  In Dumas, supra, the court held,
"the trial court was absolutely correct when it refused to
accept the verdicts and sent the jury back to continue its
deliberations."  266 Ga. at 799, 471 S.E.2d at 511. 
1041265
29
If the judge did not send the jury back to resolve its
mutually exclusive verdicts before the jurors were dismissed,
the Georgia Supreme Court, citing Thomas and Dumas, held:
"'[W]here 
there 
are 
mutually 
exclusive
convictions, it is insufficient for an appellate
court merely to set aside the lesser verdict,
because to do so is to speculate about what the jury
might have done if properly instructed, and to usurp
the functions of both the jury and the trial court.'
(Footnote omitted) [Dumas, 266 Ga. at 799, 471
S.E.2d at 511]. Thus, where, as here, it was both
legally and logically impossible to convict Jackson
of both felony murder and involuntary manslaughter,
we must reverse both mutually exclusive convictions
and order a new trial."  
Jackson, 276 Ga. at 413, 577 S.E.2d at 575 (citations
omitted).
The rationale in Powell is based upon a guilty verdict
and a not-guilty verdict.  In a majority of courts, including
Alabama's, a guilty verdict and a not-guilty verdict against
a single defendant in the same trial does not entitle the
defendant to relief.  The resulting inconsistent verdict may
arise from mistake or confusion, compromise, or lenity on the
part of the jury. The defendant is afforded protection against
jury irrationality or error by its review of the sufficiency
of the evidence presented at trial and whether that evidence
could support a rational determination of guilty beyond a
1041265
30
reasonable doubt.  As the Powell Court stated, this review is
independent of the jury's determination that evidence on
another count was insufficient to support a guilty verdict on
that count.
We noted earlier that the Powell Court indicated that
nothing in that opinion was intended to resolve the question
in a case in which a defendant is found guilty of two crimes
and a guilty verdict as to one crime logically excludes a
finding of guilt as to the other crime.  We agree with the
Georgia courts; mutually exclusive verdicts are the result of
two positive findings of fact that cannot logically coexist.
In other words, it is legally impossible for the State to
prove the elements of both crimes.  In order to determine
whether the guilty verdicts are mutually exclusive as a matter
of law, the alleged underlying offenses or acts must be
carefully scrutinized.  The two guilty verdicts are not
mutually exclusive if no element of one crime necessarily
negates an element of the other.
Mutually exclusive verdicts exist when a guilty verdict
on one count logically excludes a guilty verdict on another
count.  In contrast, inconsistent verdicts can exist where
1041265
31
there is a verdict of guilty and another of not guilty, as
when there are two guilty verdicts that are not mutually
exclusive.  Inconsistent criminal verdicts are permissible;
mutually exclusive verdicts are not.
There has been much confusion as to whether the verdicts
returned against Heard were mutually exclusive or merely
inconsistent.  Heard was convicted of both capital murder and
felony murder.  According to Alabama law, a defendant must
have the intent to kill in order to be found guilty of a
capital offense.  § 13A-5-40(b), Ala. Code 1975; Ex parte
Woodall, 730 So. 2d 652, 657 (Ala. 1998)("No defendant can be
found guilty of a capital offense unless he had an intent to
kill, and that intent to kill cannot be supplied by the
felony-murder doctrine.").  Felony murder, on the other hand,
does not require the specific intent to kill; it requires only
the intent to commit the underlying felony.  § 13A-6-2(a)(3),
Ala. Code 1975; Mitchell v. State, 706 So. 2d 787 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1997).  The absence of an intent to kill, however, is not
necessarily an element of felony murder, as contrasted with
the intent to kill, which is an element of capital murder.  
1041265
The briefs in this case addressed the question of when
4
the issue of mutually exclusive verdicts must be raised.
Because the verdicts here are not mutually exclusive, however,
we need not address that issue.
32
In other words, a felony-murder conviction does not
require proof that the defendant unintentionally killed the
victim, only that the defendant intended to commit the
underlying felony.  Therefore, it is possible that a defendant
intended to kill the victim (the element necessary for the
capital conviction) while at the same time intending to commit
an underlying felony (the element necessary for the felony-
murder conviction).  Therefore, the most that can be said of
the verdicts finding Heard guilty both of capital murder and
of felony murder is that they may be merely inconsistent.
These two verdicts are not mutually exclusive; they do not
contain mutually exclusive essential elements.
Because these verdicts are not mutually exclusive, the
verdicts should stand; "[t]hat the verdict may have been the
result of compromise, or of a mistake on the part of the jury,
is possible.  But verdicts cannot be upset by speculation of
inquiry into such matters."  Dunn, 284 U.S. at 394.4
We recognize that the Court of Criminal Appeals has held
that a verdict of felony murder and a verdict of capital
1041265
33
murder of the same victim are legally inconsistent because one
murder cannot be both unintended and intended, Dorsey v.
State, 881 So. 2d 461 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002), and this Court
approved that rationale in Ex parte Dorsey.  However, to the
extent Dorsey conflicts with the rationale in the present case
that verdicts finding the defendant guilty of felony murder
and capital murder are not mutually exclusive, it is hereby
overruled. Although neither party has asked this Court to
overrule that holding in Dorsey and it is this Court's
practice not to address issues not presented to us, the Court
has a duty to resolve the conflict in the law to ensure that
similarly situated defendants are treated in a like manner. 
B. Double-jeopardy issues
1.  Waiver
The first issue raised concerning double jeopardy is the
timeliness of Heard's claim that the convictions violated his
protection against being twice put in jeopardy.  The State
argues that in accordance with Ex parte Ziglar, 669 So. 2d
133, 135 (Ala. 1995), double-jeopardy claims are waived unless
they are timely raised in the trial court (State's brief at
8).  However, this Court recently decided a similar issue in
1041265
34
Ex parte Benefield, 932 So. 2d 92 (Ala. 2005). In Benefield,
the defendant argued
"that his convictions for first-degree rape and
first-degree sexual abuse arose 'from a single
transaction involving the same victim,' and that,
therefore, the convictions violated his double
jeopardy rights.  Thus, he argued, 'the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate and sentence [him]
as guilty of both charges.'"
932 So. 2d at 92.  This Court held that the decision of the
Court of Criminal Appeals in its unpublished memorandum in
Benefield v. State (No. CR-04-1017, May 20, 2005), 926 So. 2d
1090 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005)(table), conflicted with precedent
established by Rolling v. State, 673 So. 2d 812 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1995), and Ex Parte Robey, 920 So. 2d 1069, 1071-72 (Ala.
2004), holding that violations of double-jeopardy rights raise
questions of the trial court's jurisdiction to enter a
verdict. We held therefore that because Benefield's double-
jeopardy claims raised a jurisdictional issue, they could not
be waived and thus can be raised at any time.
The special concurrence in Benefield further clarified
the standard to be applied when determining whether a
defendant has waived double-jeopardy claims. In her special
concurrence, Justice Stuart stated: 
1041265
35
"Additionally, I note that today's holding
should not be interpreted as establishing that all
double jeopardy claims are jurisdictional.  For
example, if a double jeopardy claim is viable before
trial, then the defendant must object by pretrial
motion, or the double jeopardy claim is foreclosed.
Rolling v. State, 673 So. 2d 812, 815 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1995).  Judge Shaw recognized the consistent
application 
of 
this 
distinction 
between
jurisdictional 
and 
nonjurisdictional 
double-jeopardy
claims in Straughn v. State, 876 So. 2d 492, 508-09
(Ala. Crim. App. 2003), stating: 
"'Since the decision in Rolling [v.
State, 673 So. 2d 812 (Ala. Crim. App.
1998)], this Court has continued to hold
that 
certain 
double 
jeopardy 
claims
implicate the jurisdiction of the trial
court and, therefore, are not subject to
waiver. [Citations omitted.]  Like Rolling,
most 
of 
those 
decisions 
involved
simultaneous convictions for both a greater
and a lesser-included offense.  
"'However, caselaw from both this
Court 
and 
the 
Alabama 
Supreme 
Court
recognize[s] that generally other double-
jeopardy 
claims 
are 
singularly
constitutional 
in 
nature 
and 
are,
therefore, subject to waiver.'" 
932 So. 2d at 94-95.
Therefore, because, like Rolling, this case concerns
simultaneous 
convictions 
involving 
greater 
and 
lesser-included
offenses, 
like 
Rolling, 
Heard's 
double-jeopardy 
claim
implicates the jurisdiction of the trial court and cannot be
waived.  The defendant can raise this claim at any time.
1041265
36
2.  Merits of the double-jeopardy claim
The next issue is whether Heard's protection from twice
being put in jeopardy for the same crime has been violated.
"[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three distinct
abuses: a second prosecution for the same offense after
acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction; and multiple punishments for the same offense."
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440 (1989), overruled
on other grounds, Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997).
Here, we are concerned with the third abuse protected by the
Double Jeopardy Clause –- prohibiting the State from
"'"punishing twice or attempting a second time to punish
criminally for the same offense.''"  United States v. Ursery,
518 U.S. 267, 273 (1996)(quoting Witte v. United States, 515
U.S. 389, 396 (1995) (quoting in turn Helvering v. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391, 399 (1938) (emphasis omitted)). 
The test for determining whether two offenses are the
same 
for 
double-jeopardy 
purposes 
was 
established 
in
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).  "The
applicable rule is that, where the same act or transaction
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions,
1041265
37
the test to be applied to determine whether there are two
offenses or only one is whether each provision requires proof
of an additional fact which the other does not."  Blockburger,
284 U.S. at 304.
This Court applied Blockburger in Ex parte Haney, 603 So.
2d 412 (Ala. 1992), in holding that the two convictions
against Haney did not violate her protection against double
jeopardy.  Haney was convicted of two counts of capital
murder: murder for hire, § 13A-5-40(a)(7), Ala. Code 1975, and
murder committed during the course of a robbery, § 13A5-
40(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975.  Both counts were based on the
killing of one victim -- her husband.  This Court held that,
"because each crime contains an element not contained in the
other, there was no violation of the prohibition against
double 
jeopardy." 
Haney, 
603 
So. 
2d 
at 
419 
(citing
Blockburger).
Likewise, in Ex parte Peraita, 897 So. 2d 1227 (Ala.
2004), this Court decided an issue concerning two capital-
murder convictions.  In that case, the defendant argued that
his two capital-murder convictions for the death of one victim
violated the Blockburger test.  In Count I the defendant was
1041265
38
charged with murder made capital because the murder was
committed while he  was under a sentence of life imprisonment,
§ 13A-5-40(a)(6), and in Count II he was charged with murder
made capital because the murder was committed by a defendant
who had been convicted of another murder in the 20 years
preceding the crime, § 13A-5-40(a)(13).  He was convicted on
both counts. On appeal, this Court held that the two capital-
murder convictions were for separate offenses and did not
violate Blockburger.  
In numerous cases, the Court of Criminal Appeals has also
held that two capital-murder convictions resulting from the
death of one victim do not violate the Blockburger test
because of the requirement of different elements in the two
crimes.  See Powell v. State, 631 So. 2d 289 (Ala. Crim. App.
1993) (two convictions for capital murder of one victim
because murder occurred during the course of a robbery and
during the course of a burglary did not violate double-
jeopardy principles because each offense contained an element
not present in the other);  Flowers v. State, 922 So. 2d 938
(Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (two convictions for capital murder of
one victim because murder occurred during a robbery and
1041265
39
during 
a 
kidnapping 
did 
not 
violate 
double-jeopardy
principles); Jackson v. State, 516 So. 2d 726 (Ala. Crim. App.
1985)(convictions for murder made capital because it was
committed during the course of a robbery and during one or a
series of acts, when the crimes were based on the death of one
of the same 
victims, did not violate double-jeopardy
principles); Stewart v. State, 601 So. 2d 491 (Ala. Crim. App.
1992), overruled on other grounds, Ex parte Gentry, 689 So. 2d
916 (Ala. 1996)(two convictions for capital murder, based on
one murder, because murder was committed during the course of
a robbery and during the course of a kidnapping passed the
Blockburger test).
The 
Court 
of 
Criminal 
Appeals 
also 
applied 
the
Blockburger test in Borden v. State, 711 So. 2d 498 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1997), affirmed, 711 So. 2d 506 (Ala. 1998).  In
Borden, the defendant was charged with two counts of murder:
Count I, capital murder wherein two or more persons are
murdered by one act or pursuant to one course of conduct,
§ 13A-5-40(a)(10), and Count II, capital murder committed by
using a deadly weapon fired from outside a dwelling while the
victim was inside the dwelling, § 13A-5-40(a)(16).  The jury
1041265
40
returned verdicts finding the defendant guilty of capital
murder as charged in Count I and guilty of the lesser-included
offense of intentional murder as to Count II.
In a footnote, the Court of Criminal Appeals discussed
the application of Blockburger to the facts in Borden:  
"Here, Count I and Count II of the indictment were
based partly on the same act: the intentional
killing of Roland Harris.  However, each count
charged a crime containing a statutory element not
contained in the other.  In this case, each capital
offense charged required proof of an element that
the other did not.  Proof of the double murder
charge in Count I required proof of more than one
murder and proof that the multiple murders were
committed by one act or pursuant to one scheme or
course of conduct, which the firing-a-deadly-weapon-
into-a-dwelling murder charge in Count II did not
require.  Proof of the firing-a-deadly-weapon-into-
a-dwelling murder charge required proof that the
defendant murdered the victim by firing a deadly
weapon from outside a dwelling while the victim was
inside a dwelling, which the double murder charge
did not require.  Under the Blockburger test, the
appellant could properly be indicted and convicted
for two separate and distinct capital offenses
'notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof
offered to establish the crimes.' The indictment was
not multiplicitous and the separate counts, as
alleged in the indictment, did not facially violate
the Double Jeopardy clause." 
Borden, 711 So. 2d at 501-02 n. 2 (citations omitted).  
The Court of Criminal Appeals held, though, that
'[a]lthough the indictment returned against the appellant was
1041265
41
facially valid, we find that the trial court was without
jurisdiction to adjudge the appellant guilty of both capital
murder for the double murder [of the victims] ... and guilty
of the intentional murder [with regard to one of the
victims]."   Borden, 711 So. 2d at 502.  The court based its
reasoning on § 13A-1-8(b), Ala. Code 1975, which provides, in
pertinent part, as follows: 
"When the same conduct of a defendant may establish
the commission of more than one offense, the
defendant may be prosecuted for each such offense.
He may not, however, be convicted of more than one
offense if:
"(1) One offense is included in the
other, as defined in section 13A-1-9 ...."
Section 13A-1-9(a)(1), provides: 
"A defendant may be convicted of an offense included
in an offense charged.  An offense is an included
one if: 
"(1) It is established by proof of the
same or fewer than all the facts required
to establish the commission of the offense
charged ...."
In other words, § 13A-1-8(b) does not bar multiple convictions
when a single criminal act results in multiple offenses,
except, for example, under § 13A-1-9, where one offense is a
lesser-included offense of the other.  
1041265
42
The Court of Criminal Appeals in Borden, therefore, held
that because intentional murder, defined in § 13A-6-2(a)(1),
is an element that must be proven of the capital offense of
which 
the 
defendant 
was convicted, § 13A-5-40(a)(10),
intentional murder is a lesser-included offense of this
capital-murder 
charge. 
Therefore, 
the 
two 
convictions 
violated
double jeopardy, and the Court of Criminal Appeals ordered
that the conviction for the lesser-included offense be
vacated.  This Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of
Criminal Appeals. Ex parte Borden, 711 So. 2d 506.
The Court of Criminal Appeals has also applied § 13A-1-8
in other cases.  In Cooper v. State, 912 So. 2d 1150 (Ala.
Crim. App. 2005), the Court of Criminal Appeals applied the
statute to two convictions for the murder of one victim; the
defendant was convicted under Count I for intentional murder
(based on the capital charge of murder during the course of a
robbery) and under Count II for capital murder committed
during the course of a burglary.  The Court of Criminal
Appeals held that the two convictions violated § 13A-1-8(b),
because intentional murder, even though it was based under
another count, was a lesser-included offense of the offense of
1041265
The capital-murder charges under Count I were dismissed
5
by the State at trial.
43
capital murder committed during the course of a robbery.
Therefore, the conviction for the lesser-included offense
should be vacated because it violated the defendant's
protection against double jeopardy. 
Likewise, in Simmons v. State, 797 So. 2d 1134 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1999), two verdicts were held to violate double-
jeopardy principles and § 13A-1-8(b) because one found the
defendant guilty of a lesser-included offense of another.  In
Simmons, there was one victim and the defendant was convicted
under Count III (capital murder committed during the course of
sexual abuse) and under Count II (intentional murder committed
during a robbery).   Again, because intentional murder was
5
also a lesser-included offense under Count III, the defendant
could not be convicted of both; the conviction of the lesser-
included offense was ordered vacated. 
A defendant can be convicted of two or more capital
murders for the death of one victim, so long as those
convictions are in accordance with Blockburger, i.e., so long
as each conviction required an element not required in the
other convictions.  However, when a jury returns a verdict
1041265
44
finding a defendant guilty of capital murder on one count and
guilty of a lesser-included offense of another count, if that
lesser-included offense is also a lesser-included offense of
the offense resulting in the capital-murder conviction, under
§ 13A-1-8(b) and § 13A-1-9, Ala. Code 1975, the conviction for
the lesser-included cannot stand.
In the present case, Heard was charged in Count I with
murder made capital because it was committed during the course
of a robbery, § 13A-5-40(a)(2), and in Count II with murder
made capital because it was committed through the use of a
deadly weapon fired from outside a dwelling while the victim
was inside the dwelling, § 13A-5-40(a)(16). A conviction on
Count I required proof that Heard intended to commit a
robbery; this was not an element of the offense charged in
Count II.  To convict under Count II, the State had to prove
that Heard fired into a dwelling; this is not an element of
the offense charged in Count I.  Therefore, the indictment
does not facially violate the Blockburger test.
If the jury had returned verdicts of guilty on both
counts of capital murder, those two convictions would have
been permissible.  However, the jury returned verdicts
1041265
45
convicting Heard of the lesser-included offense of felony
murder under Count I and of capital murder under Count II.
Therefore, we must determine whether the felony-murder
conviction is considered a lesser-included offense of the
offense resulting in the capital-murder conviction on Count
II.
Section 13A-1-9(a), Ala. Code 1975, states:
"An offense is an included one if: 
"(1) It is established by proof of the same or
fewer than all the facts required to establish the
commission of the offense charged; or
"(2) It consists of an attempt or solicitation
to commit the offense charged or to commit a lesser
included offense; or
"(3) It is specifically designated by statute as
a lesser degree of the offense charged; or
"(4) If differs from the offense charged only in
the respect that a less serious injury or risk of
injury to the same person, property or public
interests, or a lesser kind of culpability suffices
to establish its commission."
Based on this definition of a lesser-included offense,
the only category under which this case could fall would be §
13A-1-9(a)(1).  However, felony murder for a killing that
occurs during the course of a robbery is not established by
proof of the same or fewer than all the facts required to
1041265
We note that the trial court charged the jury on
6
intentional murder as a lesser-included offense under both
Count I and Count II.  Had the jury found Heard guilty of
intentional murder as a lesser-included offense of capital
murder (instead of convicting Heard of felony murder under
Count I), then intentional murder would have been a lesser-
included offense of capital murder under Count II and thereby
a conviction for intentional murder would have been precluded
under § 13A-8-1 and § 13A-9-1. 
46
establish the commission of capital murder for firing a gun
into an occupied dwelling.  Felony murder requires the intent
to commit the underlying felony (robbery), while the offense
resulting in the capital-murder conviction requires the intent
to discharge a firearm into a home.  Therefore, felony murder
based on the felony of robbery is not a lesser-included
offense of the offense of capital murder based on firing a gun
into an occupied dwelling.6
Because the conviction under Count I is not for a lesser-
included offense to the offense charged in Count II, § 13A-1-
8(b) does not apply to this case.  Because the indictment
passed the Blockburger test and § 13A-1-8(b) does not apply,
these convictions do not violate Heard's protection from
double jeopardy.
III. Conclusion
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47
As stated earlier, mutually exclusive verdicts occur
where a guilty verdict on one count logically excludes a
guilty verdict on another count.  In contrast, inconsistent
verdicts can occur where there is a verdict of guilty and
another of not guilty, as well when there are two guilty
verdicts that are not mutually exclusive. Inconsistent
criminal 
verdicts 
are 
permissible; 
mutually 
exclusive 
verdicts
are not.
The verdicts in this case were not mutually exclusive,
and 
they 
did 
not 
violate 
double-jeopardy 
principles.
Accordingly, the convictions should be upheld. The judgment of
the Court of Criminal Appeals is reversed and the cause
remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Nabers, C.J., and See, Lyons, Harwood, Woodall, Stuart,
Smith, and Parker, JJ., concur.