Case Title: Commonwealth v. Miller

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11696

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-10-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11696 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  LAQUAN MILLER. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     April 6, 2020. - October 22, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ.1 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel, Waiver of 
constitutional rights by juvenile, Admissions and 
confessions, Voluntariness of statement.  Evidence, 
Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement.  
Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Assistance of counsel, 
Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, 
Motion to suppress, Verdict. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 28, 2011. 
 
 
Pretrial motions to suppress evidence were heard by Charles 
J. Hely, J., and the cases were tried before Carol S. Ball, J. 
 
 
John J. Barter for the defendant. 
Ian MacLean, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
                                                 
 
1 Chief Justice Gants participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to his death. 
2 
 
 
KAFKER, J.  On June 6, 2013, the defendant was found guilty 
of murder in the first degree by deliberate premeditation of 
Wilfredo Martinez and assault with intent to murder Kareem 
Dowling.  On appeal, the defendant argues that the motion judge 
erred in denying his motion to suppress statements made to 
police after he was arrested, and that the jury returned 
inconsistent verdicts when acquitting him of the charge of 
unlicensed possession of a firearm, yet convicting him of both 
murder and assault with intent to murder.  We affirm the 
defendant's convictions and conclude that he is not entitled to 
relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
1.  Background.  At the time of the shooting, around 10 
P.M. on June 5, 2011, Martinez and Dowling were sitting near the 
basketball court on the back stoop of an apartment building  in 
the Archdale housing development (Archdale) in the Roslindale 
section of Boston.  They were speaking with their friend, Chris 
Colon, who was standing to the side of the stairs.  After 
Martinez and Dowling had been sitting on the stoop and talking 
for about fifteen minutes, the back door to the apartment 
building burst open, and Martinez and Dowling were both shot. 
Martinez was shot multiple times:  one bullet struck him in 
the head, and three bullets struck him in the back.  Dowling 
also suffered multiple gunshot wounds to his back.  Colon fled 
the area when the shots began and was not injured. 
3 
 
Dowling, who survived the shooting, testified that while he 
was sitting on the steps of the apartment building, "[t]he door 
kicked open and I got shot in my back."  He heard the sound of 
multiple gunshots.  Dowling never saw who shot him or Martinez.  
None of the witnesses in the area saw who fired the shots.  When 
police arrived, they found Martinez's body on the stairs of the 
apartment building.  Martinez was pronounced dead at the scene.  
Dowling was still breathing, and police and first responders 
engaged in conversations with him to keep him alert. 
One witness, Harold Hernandez, who lived in the apartment 
building, heard the gunshots and looked outside within seconds 
of hearing them.  He saw the two victims on the doorsteps, as 
well as another individual in the middle of the parking lot 
wearing a black hooded sweatshirt.  It looked as if the person 
had a gun in his hands.  Hernandez did not see the individual's 
face, and testified that he would not be able to identify him.  
The person wearing the black hooded sweatshirt ran up Brookstone 
Street toward Washington Street, where he met another person.  
The two people then turned right and went down Washington Street 
together.  Police arrived in the area shortly thereafter. 
Another eyewitness, Wanda Iglesias, lived across the street 
from the house where the defendant and his friend Elvis Sanchez 
4 
 
lived in separate apartments on Washington Street.2  At 
approximately 10 P.M., she got into her car to go to a coffee 
shop.  She saw two people, whom she ultimately identified as 
Sanchez and the defendant, coming out of the house across the 
street.  They walked toward Archdale.  Video surveillance 
footage also shows that the defendant left his apartment about 
fifteen minutes before the shooting occurred, headed toward the 
apartment building. 
Several minutes later, Iglesias returned to the same 
parking spot in front of her house and heard three gunshots.  
The shots came from the area of a nearby basketball court.  She 
got out of her car and went toward her house.  She saw the 
defendant coming from the area of the basketball court.  She 
also saw Sanchez.  Iglesias testified that she saw a silver gun 
in the defendant's hand at the time. 
Another eyewitness also testified to seeing Sanchez with 
the defendant after hearing four or five gun shots around 10 
P.M. that night.  That eyewitness similarly testified to seeing 
what looked like a gun in the defendant's hand. 
The defendant's mother testified that the defendant had 
left the house sometime after 9 P.M. with Sanchez.  At about 10 
P.M., she heard gunshots.  She went outside to see where the 
                                                 
2 Sanchez died in a separate shooting incident several weeks 
after the defendant's arrest. 
5 
 
defendant was, walking to the corner of Washington Street and 
Brookstone Street.  She saw the defendant running up Brookstone 
Street toward Washington Street.  She saw Sanchez coming from 
Washington Street, as if he were coming from Archdale Road.  She 
did not look at the defendant's hands when he first came onto 
Washington Street, but she did not see a gun in his hands as he 
passed her and went to the house. 
The defendant's father testified that, shortly after the 
defendant entered the apartment, the defendant said he knew the 
individual who had been shot.  This took place approximately 
thirty minutes after the gunshots were fired. 
Police canvassed the area for evidence, finding shell 
casings in the first-floor hallway of the apartment building, 
near the entry where the shooting victims had been found.  Other 
ballistics evidence, including bullets and fragments collected 
from the two victims, were sent with the shell casings to the 
firearms analysis unit of the Boston police department.  No 
firearms were found the night of the shooting. 
On June 7, 2011, a search of an empty apartment in the 
apartment building uncovered two firearms:  a Marlin .45 caliber 
semiautomatic rifle and a Smith and Wesson .357 caliber 
revolver.  Neither of the guns matched the shell casings, 
bullets, or fragments recovered from the crime scene.  Two 
prints on the Marlin rifle were sufficient for comparison.  One 
6 
 
was a match for Sanchez.  Neither Sanchez nor the defendant 
could be excluded as matches for the other print.  Two prints 
from the revolver were suitable for comparison, but neither 
matched the defendant or Sanchez.  Boston police ballisticians 
concluded that the crime was committed with two firearms:  a .45 
caliber semiautomatic and either a .38 caliber or .357 caliber 
revolver.  Neither type of weapon was ever found. 
The defendant was arrested on July 24, 2011.  On September 
28, 2011, a grand jury returned indictments charging the 
defendant with murder, armed assault with intent to murder, and 
possession of a firearm without a license.  The defendant filed 
motions to suppress his statements to detectives during two 
interviews conducted on July 24, the same day he was arrested.  
During those two interviews, the defendant gave conflicting 
accounts of his whereabouts on the evening of the shooting.  As 
explained in more detail infra, the defendant first claimed that 
he was at home the entire evening.  In the second interview, he 
admitted to being at the apartment building when the shooting 
occurred, but said he was not involved.  After an evidentiary 
hearing, the motion judge denied the defendant's motions.  The 
jury heard a redacted version of both these interviews, and thus 
both versions of the defendant's story. 
On June 6, 2013, the jury convicted the defendant of murder 
in the first degree and armed assault with the intent to murder, 
7 
 
but acquitted the defendant of unlicensed possession of a 
firearm.  Because the defendant was under eighteen years old at 
the time of the shooting, he was sentenced to life imprisonment 
with the possibility of parole after fifteen years for murder in 
the first degree, see Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 
(2012), and a concurrent term of from eighteen to twenty years 
imprisonment for armed assault with the intent to murder.  The 
defendant appealed from his convictions. 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  Generally, "[i]n 
reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept the 
[motion] judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error 
but conduct an independent review of his ultimate findings and 
conclusions of law" (quotation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Clarke, 461 Mass. 336, 340 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 646 (2004).  It is then "[o]ur duty . . . 
to make an independent determination of the correctness of the 
[motion] judge's application of constitutional principles to the 
facts as found."  Clarke, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Bostock, 450 Mass. 616, 619 (2008). 
Where the motion judge's findings of fact are premised on 
documentary evidence, however, "this court stands in the same 
position as did the [motion] judge, and reaches its own 
conclusion unaffected by the findings made by the [motion] 
judge."  Clarke, 461 Mass. at 341, quoting Commonwealth v. Novo, 
8 
 
442 Mass. 262, 266 (2004).  "To the extent the motion judge made 
credibility determinations relevant to his subsidiary findings 
of fact, we adhere to the normal standard of review," affording 
such findings substantial deference and accepting them "unless 
not warranted by the evidence" (citation omitted).  Clarke, 
supra. 
b.  Motion to suppress.  The defendant argues that the 
motion judge erred in denying his motion to suppress for two 
closely related reasons.  First, the defendant argues that the 
detectives did not scrupulously honor his right to counsel after 
he invoked this right by saying:  "Do I get a lawyer tonight?"  
Second, the defendant argues that his waiver of his Miranda 
rights was not intelligent, knowing, or voluntary and that his 
statements were not voluntary, due to what he characterizes as 
"now or never" interrogation tactics that overcame his ability 
to make a voluntary waiver.  We will address each argument in 
turn, but first recite the relevant facts as found by the motion 
judge. 
i.  Key facts found by the motion judge.  Detectives Frank 
McLaughlin and Gloria Kinkead of the Boston police department 
testified at the evidentiary hearing.  The motion judge issued a 
written ruling denying the defendant's motion to suppress.3  The 
                                                 
 
3 After independently reviewing both the transcripts and 
audio and video recordings of the defendant's interviews with 
9 
 
judge found that, during the two interviews on July 24, the 
defendant made an intelligent, knowing, and voluntary waiver of 
his Miranda rights and that his statements were voluntary.  The 
motion judge found that the defendant invoked his right to 
counsel after the first interview on July 24, but then 
voluntarily reinitiated discussions with the police before the 
second interview the same day. 
In regard to the first interview on July 24, the motion 
judge found: 
"Officers took the defendant to the Homicide Unit at 
Headquarters.  Detectives Frank McLaughlin and Brian Black 
interviewed the defendant there beginning at about 8:28 
P.M.  This interview was video recorded.  The interview 
lasted about twenty-five minutes, not including periods 
when the detectives stepped out of the room and when they 
assisted the defendant in making telephone calls to his 
family. . . . 
 
"At the beginning of the interview, a detective read 
complete Miranda warnings to the defendant one-by-one.  He 
gave the defendant a Miranda warnings form and had the 
defendant read along as the detective read the warnings 
aloud.  The defendant initialed each warning on the form 
after the detective read it to him.  The detective and the 
warnings form also gave the defendant an additional 
warning.  They told him:  'If you decide to answer now, you 
will still have the right to stop answering questions at 
any time.'  The defendant acknowledged that he understood 
the warnings.  He signed the Miranda warnings form under 
the line that states:  'I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTOOD THE 
ABOVE RIGHTS AS EXPLAINED TO ME.'" 
 
                                                 
police, we conclude that the motion judge's factual findings 
discussed infra are amply supported by the record. 
10 
 
During the first interview with the detectives, the 
defendant claimed that he was playing video games at home with 
his brother when he heard the gunshots.4  He claimed he did not 
learn who had been shot until the next morning.  The motion 
judge found: 
"The detectives told the defendant that they did not 
believe his statement that he was in his apartment when the 
shooting happened.  They told him that they had witnesses 
telling them that the defendant was outside at the time of 
the shooting.  Throughout this interview, the defendant did 
not budge from his version that he was inside his family's 
apartment playing a video game with his brother when he 
heard the shots. 
 
"When they finished asking the defendant questions about 
the shooting, a detective asked the defendant if he wanted 
to call someone to let them know where he was.  The 
defendant said, 'I want to leave if I'm not under arrest.'  
The detective told the defendant that he was going to be 
under arrest and that's why he wanted him to call his 
mother and father to let them know.  The detectives then 
spent several minutes in and out of the interview room 
making calls to the defendant's family and helping the 
defendant call his family. 
 
"A detective told the defendant that he would be charged 
with the murder of Wilfredo Martinez, assault with intent 
to murder Kareem Dowling and possession of a firearm.  The 
detective explained to the defendant that he would be 
arraigned in West Roxbury court first thing in the morning.  
He told him that he would have major case photographs and 
fingerprints taken and then he would be brought to District 
5.  The detective told the defendant, '[i]f there's 
something you want to change, we're available.'  The 
defendant said, '[d]o I get a lawyer tonight?'  The 
detectives explained that he would get a lawyer first thing 
in the morning unless there was a lawyer he knew that he 
                                                 
4 As the motion judge outlines in his findings, the 
defendant first told this version of the story in an interview 
with police on June 7, 2011 -- an interview that is not the 
subject of the defendant's motion to suppress. 
11 
 
wanted to call.  The defendant made a telephone call to a 
family member and said that he needed a lawyer.  The 
interview ended at this point."  (Citations omitted.) 
 
The judge made the following additional findings of fact 
regarding the first July 24 interview: 
"The detectives spoke to the defendant in calm, 
businesslike tones.  The Miranda warnings were carefully 
stated to the defendant.  The defendant agreed that he 
understood the warnings.  He signed the warnings form 
stating that he read the warnings and understood them. 
 
"The defendant remained outwardly calm and in control 
during the interview.  Although he was seventeen, the 
defendant was capable of making and did make rational, 
voluntary decisions about whether to speak with the 
detectives and what to tell them.  The detectives told the 
defendant that they did not believe his version about 
remaining in his apartment at the time of the shooting.  
The defendant persisted with this version despite the 
continuing questioning.  There was no questioning of the 
defendant after he asked about a lawyer." 
 
The motion judge also found that the defendant invoked his right 
to a lawyer when asking:  "Do I get a lawyer tonight?" 
The motion judge made the following findings of fact 
regarding the second interview on July 24: 
"The defendant was taken to the Boston Police station in 
West Roxbury.  The defendant was booked at the West Roxbury 
station at approximately 9:40 P.M. on July 24.  The booking 
took about twenty to thirty minutes.  During the booking, 
Officer Daniel Smith gave the defendant Miranda warnings.  
The defendant signed a booking Miranda warnings form under 
the phrase, 'Yes, I understand.' 
 
"Detective Gloria Kinkead was on duty in the West Roxbury 
station that night, but she was not involved in 
investigating the shooting incident that the defendant is 
charged with.  She knew the defendant.  Detective Kinkead's 
district included the Archdale project in Roslindale.  It 
is one of her primary beats.  She made a point of speaking 
12 
 
with and getting to know the young men in this project with 
the hope of keeping them out of trouble.  Detective Kinkead 
had known the defendant for five or six months. 
 
"Detective Kinkead noticed the defendant while he was being 
booked at the West Roxbury station.  She was surprised to 
see him.  She did not know that the defendant had been 
arrested and charged with the Archdale homicide and 
shooting.  She said to the defendant, 'what are you doing 
here?'  This remark was an expression of Detective 
Kinkead's surprise and personal concern for the defendant.  
It was not interrogation.  The defendant continued 
answering the routine booking questions presented by the 
booking officer.  He did not reply to Detective Kinkead.  
The detective did not interrupt the booking.  She continued 
with her other duties elsewhere in the station. 
 
"Later that night, Detective Kinkead was walking by the 
cell area of the station while working on matters unrelated 
to this case.  The defendant saw her.  He called out to 
her:  'Hey, hey, hey, come here for a minute.'  Detective 
Kinkead went to put her firearm in a secure area.  She then 
returned to the cell area and entered the cell block.  She 
spoke to the defendant from outside of his cell.  Detective 
Kinkead said, 'what are you doing here?'  The defendant 
said, 'They got me in here on some bullshit murder tip.'  
Detective Kinkead said, 'what are you talking about?'  The 
defendant said, 'I talked to detectives earlier.  I want to 
talk to them again.'  Detective Kinkead did not know what 
homicide the defendant was talking about, although she did 
know that there had been a homicide in the Archdale project 
area." 
 
The motion judge credited Kinkead's testimony that she then left 
the defendant to call Sergeant Detective John Brown, whom she 
knew to be a homicide detective, and that she had no further 
conversation with the defendant.  The motion judge found: 
"Detective McLaughlin and Sergeant Detective Brown went to 
the West Roxbury station to talk with the defendant.  They 
began a sound-recorded interview with him at 11:20 P.M. on 
July 24.  The interview lasted one hour and fifty-one 
minutes. It ended at 1:11 A.M. on July 25. 
 
13 
 
"Detective McLaughlin again read to the defendant complete 
Miranda warnings and the right to stop answering questions 
at any time.  He read the warnings one at a time from a 
warnings form.  Detective McLaughlin again had the 
defendant read along from a printed Miranda warnings form.  
After each warning, the defendant agreed that he 
understood.  The defendant initialed each warning on the 
form.  He signed the warnings form, a form that was 
identical to the one he signed in [the] first interview 
earlier that night. 
 
"Detective McLaughlin told the defendant that Detective 
Kinkead had called them and said that he wanted to speak 
with them.  He asked the defendant if that was correct.  
The defendant said, 'yeah.' Detective McLaughlin reminded 
the defendant that the recorder was on.  He then said to 
the defendant, 'we'll just let you go ahead and talk.' 
 
"The defendant gave an account that was different from the 
one he had given in the first interview that night.  He 
said that he and a friend named [Sharif] Jackson had been 
upstairs in a vacant apartment, an 'empty crib.'  There was 
a party there.  After the party, he and [Jackson] were 
taking apart some stereo equipment and cleaning up food.  
The defendant said that [Jackson] had a BB gun that he was 
going to sell.  The defendant said that he heard ten or 
more gunshots as they were walking down from the second 
floor.  They dropped the stereo system and ran through the 
back of the Archdale Community Center on a pathway.  The 
defendant said he walked through the basketball court and 
he met his mother right there at the corner.  His mother 
told him to go upstairs and he did so. 
 
"The defendant told the detectives that [Jackson] gave him 
the BB gun and he put it in his hoodie to take it home.  He 
said that he gave the BB gun back to [Jackson], and he sold 
it to his cousin. 
 
"Detective McLaughlin told the defendant that he thought 
the defendant was not telling the truth.  He told the 
defendant that he thought that he had shot the two men from 
the hallway while they were sitting on the stoop.  The 
defendant continued to deny shooting anyone.  He said, 
'[Martinez] and me was too close for me to even do anything 
like that.'  The defendant said that 'the word is Elvis was 
supposed to have did this for an inside job.'  He said that 
14 
 
he heard that Elvis got paid for doing it, '[b]ut I didn't 
see it with my own eyes.' 
 
"The detectives continued to question the defendant and 
urge him to tell the truth.  About halfway through the 
interview, the defendant said, 'All right. . . .  I was 
there, but I was not the one who pulled the trigger.'  The 
defendant said that he was coming down the steps and did 
not see the shooting.  He said that Elvis told him the next 
morning that he did it and he got paid $500 for it.  The 
defendant said that Elvis told him that Dariel did it with 
him and that they were going to get $500 each for it." 
 
The motion judge further found:  "The second interview was 
conducted in a professional manner. . . .  Again there was no 
coercion or threats by the detectives."  Finally, the judge 
found that Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484–485 (1981), was 
not violated when the detectives conducted the second interview 
on July 24, as "[i]t was the defendant who initiated the second 
interview when he said, 'I talked to detectives earlier.  I want 
to talk to them again.'" 
 
ii.  Invoking the right to counsel.  "When an accused has 
invoked his right to counsel during a custodial interrogation, 
the police must stop the interrogation until counsel has been 
made available to the defendant, unless the accused himself 
initiates further conversation with the police."  Commonwealth 
v. Morganti, 455 Mass. 388, 396 (2009), S.C., 467 Mass. 96 
(2014), citing Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484–485.  A defendant's 
decision to terminate questioning must be scrupulously honored.  
Commonwealth v. Obershaw, 435 Mass. 794, 800 (2002).  The 
15 
 
invocation of the right to counsel, however, must be 
unambiguous.  Morganti, supra at 396-397.  See Davis v. United 
States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).  "[I]f a suspect makes a 
reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that 
a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have 
understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to 
counsel," the police need not cease their questioning.  Davis, 
supra.  See Obershaw, supra ("We have repeatedly held that 
equivocal statements and musings concerning the need for an 
attorney do not constitute such an affirmative request").  To 
invoke the right to counsel, the suspect "must articulate his 
desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a 
reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand 
the statement to be a request for an attorney."  Davis, supra. 
We hold that the evidence supports the motion judge's 
conclusion that the defendant's statement was a clear invocation 
of his right to counsel.  As the motion judge found, after the 
defendant asked whether he was entitled to an attorney, the 
detective told him:  "You'll get a lawyer first thing in the 
morning, unless there's a lawyer you know you want to call.  You 
have a name and number for a lawyer or something you want to 
call[?]"  When the defendant answered, "No," the detective asked 
him if he wanted to call his mother again and have her bring an 
attorney, which the defendant proceeded to do. 
16 
 
This exchange during the first interview on July 24 shows 
that the detectives reasonably understood the statement to 
invoke the defendant's right to counsel, as they helped the 
defendant telephone his mother to call an attorney and also 
stopped the interrogation.  Contrast Commonwealth v. Corriveau, 
396 Mass. 319, 324, 331 (1985) (no affirmative request to speak 
with attorney when defendant stated:  "It's beginning to sound 
like I need a lawyer"; police responded, "You may use the 
telephone to call a lawyer and you may leave at any time if you 
wish to do so"; and defendant replied, "I don't want to leave 
and I don't want a lawyer"). 
The defendant also argues that the detectives impermissibly 
continued questioning after the defendant invoked his right to 
counsel by making two statements:  "If something were to change, 
if there's something we need to know, please make sure that we 
do, okay?" and "You all set, bro?  Is there anything else you 
want to tell us?  You all good?"  The defendant is correct that 
the motion judge did not make any findings or otherwise discuss 
these statements.  As they undisputedly appear in the transcript 
and tapes of the interviews of the defendants, we independently 
review their legal significance in the context of the entire 
evidence.  Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 480 Mass. 645, 654-655 
(2018).  We conclude that these statements are not legally 
significant for the reasons discussed infra. 
17 
 
The transcript of the interview states as follows: 
 
The interviewer:  "You want to call your mother again and 
have her bring a lawyer?  Okay.  That's fine." 
 
The interviewer:  "We're trying to be fair with you, you 
know that, right?" 
 
The defendant:  "Yeah." 
 
The interviewer:  "If you want to just dial the last 
number, just press that." 
 
The interviewer:  "If something were to change, if there's 
something we need to know, please make sure that we do, 
okay?" 
 
The defendant then spoke with his mother on the telephone.  When 
he hung up, the interview then ended as follows: 
The interviewer:  You all set? 
 
The defendant:  [No audible response]. 
 
The interviewer:  "What did she say?" 
 
The defendant:  "She's on her way."  
 
The interviewer:  "She's on her way.  All right.  You all 
set, bro?  Is there anything else you want to tell us?  You 
all good?" 
 
The defendant:  "Yeah." 
 
The interviewer:  "Like I said, we're going to take you 
downstairs and process you and just kind of move through 
the system here, all right, bro?" 
 
We conclude that the two brief, somewhat ambiguous 
questions posed by the detectives do not constitute an improper 
interrogation after the defendant had invoked his right to 
counsel.  See Commonwealth v. Torres, 424 Mass. 792, 798 (1997), 
18 
 
quoting United States v. Taylor, 985 F.2d 3, 8 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 508 U.S. 944 (1993) ("the mere fact that a police 
officer may be aware that there is a 'possibility' that a 
suspect may make an incriminating statement is insufficient to 
establish the functional equivalent of interrogation"). 
The statements must be understood in context.  The 
interview was ending, and the defendant was attempting with some 
difficulty to reach his mother on the telephone.  The officers 
then said to the defendant, "just dial the last number," and 
asked him to let them know "[i]f something were to change, if 
there is something we need to know."  In this context, this 
brief statement is not an improper resumption of questioning, 
but rather an attempt to facilitate the telephone call, finish 
the interview, and move the booking process along.  This is also 
true of the words, "You all set, bro?  Is there anything else 
you want to tell us?  You all good?"  These statements came 
directly after the defendant had ended the telephone call with 
his mother, and similarly acknowledged the end of the interview 
and the transition to bringing the defendant to Boston's 
district five police station for the defendant to be processed.  
To the extent the officer asked if there was anything else the 
defendant wanted to tell police, this was directly followed with 
a seemingly rhetorical "You all good?" to ensure the defendant 
was finished using the telephone and ready to go downstairs.  
19 
 
Most importantly, the defendant did not say anything in response 
to these two remarks by the detectives and did not make any 
statements relevant to the shooting until the second interview 
that evening began hours later, after the defendant voluntarily 
reinitiated discussions when encountering another officer that 
he knew from the neighborhood. 
We also discern no error in the motion judge's conclusions 
that the defendant himself reinitiated discussions with the 
police, waived his Miranda rights, and made the statements 
voluntarily.  As the motion judge found, the defendant 
voluntarily reinitiated contact when he called out to Kinkead 
from the cell area where he was being held the night of July 24 
and told her, "I talked to detectives earlier.  I want to talk 
to them again."  We agree that Kinkead did not violate the 
defendant's rights when she asked the defendant what he was 
doing at the station, as this question was one of personal 
concern for the defendant -- whom she knew and was surprised to 
see -- and not an interrogation likely to elicit an 
incriminating response.  See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 
291, 300-302 (1980); Commonwealth v. Colon, 483 Mass. 378, 393 
(2019).  Kinkead did not say anything to convince the defendant 
to talk to the detectives again; this request came solely from 
the defendant.  See Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 476 Mass. 725, 739-
740 (2017) (where, after invoking right to counsel one day 
20 
 
earlier, defendant told officer walking by his cell he wanted to 
speak to detectives, police did not initiate conversation and 
there was no violation of defendant's invocation of his right to 
counsel).  We therefore agree with the motion judge's 
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. 
The defendant seeks to suppress the statements made in the 
second July 24 interview based on various other grounds, arguing 
for a bright line rule that, once a minor has invoked his or her 
right to counsel, he or she cannot reinitiate discussions.  The 
defendant also argues that confusing statements made about his 
right to counsel supported a conclusion that he did not waive 
his Miranda rights intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily, 
and that "now or never" tactics by the detectives rendered the 
statements involuntary.  Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 460 Mass. 
199, 206 (2011) (even where there has been valid waiver of 
Miranda rights, we must consider voluntariness of defendant's 
statement, as "a confession or an admission is admissible in 
evidence only if it is made voluntarily"). 
We decline to adopt the bright line rule advanced by the 
defendant, who argues that police must always decline to 
reengage with any minors who have invoked the right to counsel 
regardless of whether the minor reinitiates contact with the 
police.  Age is already a factor in our analysis when we 
determine whether a defendant has voluntarily waived his or her 
21 
 
rights.  See Colon, 483 Mass. at 390; Commonwealth v. Libby, 472 
Mass. 37, 41-42 (2015).   The motion judge properly took the 
defendant's age of seventeen years into account here, but 
nonetheless concluded that the defendant had voluntarily 
reinitiated discussions, waived his Miranda rights, and made the 
statements themselves voluntarily.  We need not recite all of 
these detailed findings again, which are clearly supported by 
the record.  We do address separately the defendant's arguments 
that the police misinformed him about his right to counsel and 
his right to speak to the police later if he terminated 
questioning. 
We disagree with the defendant's characterization of the 
detectives' explanation of his right to counsel as "confusing," 
thus rendering any waiver unknowing and involuntary.  The 
detectives did not mislead the defendant in regard to his rights 
and, by contrast, gave the defendant accurate information 
concerning his right to an attorney.  When the defendant asked a 
question about whether he was entitled to an attorney that 
evening, the detectives accurately responded:  "You'll get a 
lawyer first thing in the morning, unless there's a lawyer you 
know you want to call."  Detectives offered to have the 
defendant call his mother again to have her bring an attorney, 
thus taking active steps to help the defendant realize his right 
to counsel.  This is far different from the misrepresentations 
22 
 
made in other cases that rendered defendants' waivers 
involuntary.  See Libby, 472 Mass. at 54 (officers "effectively 
precluded [the defendant] from understanding his ability to 
exercise his right to counsel" when they told defendant that 
attorneys "don't just come running out and sit in an 
interview"); Commonwealth v. Hoyt, 461 Mass. 143, 154 (2011) 
(concluding defendant's waiver was not voluntary where "the 
officers did not correct the defendant's manifest 
misunderstanding of his right to appointed counsel").  We 
therefore conclude that the defendant knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily waived his rights when reinitiating contact with 
the detectives. 
We likewise reject the argument that the detectives used a 
"now or never" theme in their questioning.  Before the defendant 
invoked his right to counsel, the detectives said to the 
defendant: 
"Sometimes there's reasons for things that we can't uncover 
in our investigation without someone telling us.  We don't 
know.  We're giving you that opportunity, so this is your 
chance.  It might be your only chance to actually sit and 
tell us, so it's up to you what you want to do here.  The 
ball is in your court."5 
 
                                                 
5 The motion judge did not discuss this statement in his 
findings of fact when denying the defendant's motion to 
suppress, but the statement is in the transcript of the 
detectives' first interview with the defendant on July 24. 
23 
 
We have previously concluded that "now or never" 
interrogation tactics that lead a defendant to believe that the 
conversation with police will be his or her sole opportunity to 
tell his or her story render a statement involuntary.  In Novo, 
442 Mass. at 264, detectives falsely and repeatedly told the 
defendant that, if he did not answer their questions and present 
his side of the story to the detectives, the defendant would 
never get a chance to present his side of the story to the jury:  
"if you don't give us a reason . . . right now why you did this, 
a jury's never going to hear a reason."  The detectives echoed 
this theme over eighteen times throughout the interview, and at 
least twelve of those times "explicitly made reference to the 
jury never hearing [the defendant's] story unless he told it to 
the officers."  Id. at 264 n.2.  "Once introduced, this now-or-
never theme persisted up to and through [the defendant's] 
confession."  Id. at 267.  We concluded: 
"The misrepresentation of [the defendant's] right to defend 
himself at trial, repeated incessantly, is a particularly 
egregious intrusion on rights that art. 12 [of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights] declares to be 
fundamental.  It is different in degree from false 
statements regarding the strength or existence of 
incriminating evidence, which we have criticized, see, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Jackson, 377 Mass. 319, 328 n.8 
(1979), but not always found to be determinative of 
voluntariness, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Edwards, 420 
Mass. 666, 671 (1995).  It is conduct that casts 
substantial doubt on the voluntariness of a subsequent 
confession and on the integrity of the interrogation 
process leading up to it.  This doubt would be extremely 
24 
 
difficult for the Commonwealth to overcome in any case, and 
it has not done so here."  (Footnote omitted.) 
 
Id. at 268-269. 
 
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Thomas, 469 Mass. 531, 542 
(2014), we held that the defendant's statements to detectives 
after invoking her right to counsel were involuntary due to 
detectives' use of a "last chance" tactic to imply that the 
defendant would no longer have a chance to tell her side of the 
story to police.  After the defendant invoked her right to 
counsel, detectives told her, "You had your chance, you just 
lawyered up," implying she could no longer speak to police, and 
chastising her for invoking that right.  Id. at 537, 552c n.18.  
We further reasoned that statements like this that are made 
after the right to counsel has been invoked were improper, as 
"[t]here is nothing that would bar a suspect, after consulting 
with counsel, from deciding to speak with the police, and there 
is no sound reason why the police would refuse such a request."  
Id. at 542. 
Novo and Thomas are readily distinguishable from this case.  
The statements the officers made here were more nuanced and not 
misstatements of the law.  In contrast to Novo and Thomas, the 
officers here did not state that it was the defendant's last 
chance, but only that this "might" be his last chance.  During 
25 
 
the second interview, this point was also more fully explained.  
After the defendant had invoked his right, the detectives said: 
"Your right to counsel, once you're arraigned -- 
[e]verything has to go through your attorney.  Which we can 
still talk to you, but it has to go through your attorney.  
You won't be able to contact us anymore.  Once we end this 
conversation here, that's pretty much it for your 
opportunity to talk to us as we're talking right now.  
Tomorrow clearly if you say to your attorney, 'I want to 
talk to them,' your attorney hopefully will listen to you 
and get in touch with us.  But we can't contact you and 
say, 'Hey, we want to talk to you again.'" 
 
This is not a misstatement of the law.  The defendant was also 
not chastised for invoking his right to counsel or misinformed 
about his ability to testify at trial.  In sum, the police here 
did not employ the "now or never" tactics that we condemned in 
Novo and Thomas. 
 
c.  Inconsistent verdicts.  The next issue is whether the 
jury returned inconsistent verdicts when convicting the 
defendant of murder in the first degree and assault with the 
intent to murder, but acquitting him of the unlicensed 
possession of a firearm.6 
"While legally inconsistent verdicts may not stand, 
factually inconsistent verdicts may."  Commonwealth v. Resende, 
                                                 
6 The defendant also contends that he should have been 
entitled to a special verdict slip so the jury could indicate 
whether they were unanimous that the defendant was the principal 
or the joint venturer, a distinction that this court eliminated 
in Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 454 Mass. 449, 464, 467 (2009).  The 
defendant asks that we revisit Zanetti, which we decline to do. 
26 
 
476 Mass. 141, 147 (2017).  Verdicts are legally inconsistent 
when they involve mutually exclusive crimes, most notably where 
one purported coconspirator is convicted and all other 
coconspirators were acquitted at the same trial.  Id.  See 
Commonwealth v. Fluellen, 456 Mass. 517, 520 (2010) (verdicts 
are legally inconsistent where crime is charged that, by its 
nature, requires combination of individuals; there is single 
trial of all participants in that crime; and all but one of 
participants is acquitted).  Verdicts are factually inconsistent 
when, "considered together, [the verdicts] suggest inconsistent 
interpretations of the evidence presented at trial" (citation 
omitted).  Resende, supra.  Factual inconsistencies in verdicts 
"do not afford a ground for setting aside a conviction as long 
as the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction on the 
count on which the guilty verdict was reached" (citation 
omitted).  Id.  That is because such guilty verdicts "can result 
from any number of factors having nothing to do with the 
defendant's actual guilt," such as acquittal out of compromise 
or compassion.  Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 411 Mass. 313, 324 
(1991), quoting Commonwealth v. Cerveny, 387 Mass. 280, 285 
(1982). 
In Hamilton, 411 Mass. at 324, we concluded that the 
defendant could be convicted of armed robbery and murder in the 
first degree even though the same jury found him not guilty of 
27 
 
carrying the shotgun used in the murder.  Much like the 
defendant in this case, the defendant in Hamilton argued the 
inconsistent verdicts "demonstrate[d] that the jury rejected the 
factual theory on which the cases were submitted to them," since 
"all of the evidence presented by the prosecution identified the 
defendant as having a shotgun at the scene."  Id. at 323-324.  
It followed, the defendant argued, "that the jury's disbelief of 
his possession of a shotgun undermines the prosecutor's entire 
case and is manifestly inconsistent with their guilty verdicts."  
Id. at 324.  We disagreed, concluding that "[t]he rule is well 
established in criminal cases that mere inconsistency in 
verdicts, one of which is an acquittal, will not render the 
verdict of guilty erroneous even though such inconsistency may 
have indicated the possibility of compromise on the part of the 
jury."  Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Scott, 355 Mass. 471, 475 
(1969). 
Here, the defendant makes the same argument we rejected in 
Hamilton.  He contends that, since the jury concluded that the 
Commonwealth failed to establish that he possessed a firearm, 
"[i]t stands to reason that the Commonwealth failed to establish 
that [the defendant] had a gun or that he shot a gun that 
night," which "invites analysis of whether there was sufficient 
evidence that [he] knowingly participated in the crime charged 
with the required intent" (quotation and citation omitted). 
28 
 
In making this argument, the defendant partly relies on the 
question submitted by the jury on the second day of 
deliberations.  The jury sent a note asking:  "For the 
possession of a firearm charge we are assuming the charge refers 
to the weapons kept in the empty . . . apartment, correct?"  The 
judge responded "no," and then gave the jury a more thorough 
instruction:  "in response to your question about Count 3 which 
is the possession of a firearm charge, the allegations in Count 
3 involve any weapon used in the shooting of Wilfredo Martinez 
and/or Kareem Dowling.  There are no charges pending against 
[the defendant] related to the guns found in the empty apartment 
. . . on June 7, 2011."7 
Regardless of the question, there is ample evidence in the 
record to support the defendant's convictions of murder in the 
first degree and assault with intent to murder.  The defendant 
lived on Washington Street, close to where the shooting took 
place.  Video footage confirmed that the defendant left the 
apartment and went toward the apartment building about fifteen 
minutes before the murder.  One witness saw the defendant 
wearing a dark hooded sweatshirt and holding what appeared to be 
a gun after hearing gunshots.  That witness testified that the 
                                                 
7 As discussed supra, neither of the guns found in the empty 
apartment on June 7 matched the shell casings, bullets, or 
fragments recovered from the crime scene. 
29 
 
same individual left the area and headed up Brookstone Street 
toward Washington Street.  He met someone at the corner, and 
they together continued toward Washington Street.  The 
defendant's own mother testified that she saw him running up 
Brookstone Street toward Washington Street with Sanchez coming 
from Washington Street at the same time.  Two other witnesses 
saw the defendant moments later on Washington Street, wearing a 
dark hooded sweatshirt and carrying a silver gun.  The defendant 
told his father that he knew who had been killed less than 
thirty minutes after the murder took place.  The defendant's 
multiple inconsistent stories also reflect consciousness of 
guilt. 
Further, the story the defendant told the detectives during 
the second interview on July 24 was contradicted by at least 
three witnesses.  The defendant claimed that Da'Nasia 
Pocowatchit was one of the people who attended the party in the 
vacant apartment.  However, Pocowatchit testified at trial and 
denied having been in the vacant apartment that day.  The 
defendant also claimed that Jackson helped him move stereo 
equipment and also gave him a BB gun to sell that evening.  
Jackson testified at trial and denied helping the defendant move 
stereo equipment, owning a BB gun, or giving one to the 
defendant.  The defendant claimed he dropped stereo speakers in 
a yard near a fence as he was running from the apartment 
30 
 
building, and that Dariel Mejia acquired the speakers later.  
Mejia testified at trial and denied ever assisting the defendant 
with any stereo equipment, or even being with the defendant on 
that night. 
We therefore conclude that the evidence was sufficient to 
support convictions on the counts on which the guilty verdicts 
were reached, such that the factual inconsistencies in the 
verdicts provide no grounds to set aside the defendant's 
convictions.  Resende, 476 Mass. at 147. 
3.  Conclusion.  We affirm the motion judge's ruling on the 
defendant's motion to suppress.  Although the defendant 
unambiguously invoked his right to counsel, he voluntarily 
reinitiated contact with the detectives.  His waiver of his 
Miranda rights was intelligent, knowing, and voluntary, and the 
detectives did not engage in any misleading or deceptive conduct 
to overbear the defendant's will or inaccurately explain the 
defendant's rights.  The factually inconsistent verdicts are no 
grounds to set aside the defendant's convictions of murder in 
the first degree and assault with the intent to murder, as ample 
evidence supports both convictions.  Given the foregoing, and 
upon review of the entire record, we conclude that the verdict 
of murder in the first degree is consonant with justice, and we 
decline to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
31 
 
order a new trial or direct the entry of a verdict of a lesser 
degree of guilt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.