Case Title: Linda Hagan v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC00-287

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2001-12-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
____________
No. SC00-287
____________
LINDA HAGAN, et al.,
Petitioners,
vs.
COCA-COLA BOTTLING CO., et al.,
Respondents.
[December 13, 2001]
ANSTEAD, J.
We have for review a decision from the Fifth District Court of Appeal in
which the court certified a question to be of great public importance:
SHOULD THE IMPACT RULE BE ABOLISHED OR 
AMENDED IN FLORIDA?
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Hagan, 750 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).  We have
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  Because we conclude that there was
an impact here and the impact rule does not bar the claim, we rephrase the certified
-2-
question:
DOES THE IMPACT RULE PRECLUDE A CLAIM FOR
DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CAUSED BY THE
CONSUMPTION OF A FOREIGN SUBSTANCE IN A
BEVERAGE PRODUCT WHERE THE PLAINTIFF SUFFERS NO
ACCOMPANYING PHYSICAL INJURIES?
For reasons expressed below, we answer the certified question as rephrased in the
negative and quash in part the decision below.
MATERIAL FACTS
The facts in this case are set out in the district court’s opinion.  See Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Hagan, 750 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).  Those facts
reflect that in September 1992, Linda Hagan and her sister Barbara Parker drank
from a bottle of Coke which they both agreed tasted flat.  Hagan then held the
bottle up to a light and observed what appeared to her and Parker to be a used
condom.  Both women testified at trial that the condom they saw in the Coke had
“oozy stringy stuff coming out of the top.”  Both women were distressed that they
had consumed some foreign material and Hagan immediately became nauseated. 
Because of their concerns as to what they had consumed, the women went to a
health care facility the next day and were given shots.  The medical personnel at the
facility told them they should be tested for HIV–AIDS.  They were then tested and
informed that the results were negative.  Both women were tested for HIV again six
-3-
months later and the results were again negative.  
The bottle was later delivered to Coca-Cola for testing.  Coca-Cola’s
beverage analyst, Dr. Forrest Bayer, testified at trial that he, too, initially thought the
object in the bottle was a condom.  However, upon closer examination, he
concluded that the object was a mold.  See id.  According to the court below:
At trial, Dr. Bayer produced a petre dish which he testified,
contained remnants of the mold, although there was no identifying
mark on the dish.  He explained that over time this kind of mold dries
up and shrinks in size because of its large water content.  He also
explained that this kind of mold can grow in beverages which have lost
their carbonation.  He said that given the date this particular Coke was
bottled, the heat in Florida, and other conditions which may have
occurred prior to its purchase by Hagan, it was possible for the mold
to grow in the bottle to its size and shape when discovered by Parker
and Hagan.
He concluded that, to a "scientific certainty," the item floating in
the Coke bottle was not a condom.  He admitted on cross-
examination, however, that he did not see the lab technician pour the
Coke and item into the beaker.  Parker, Hagan, and Willie Parker all
testified they were certain they had seen a used condom floating in the
Coke bottle.  In addition, enlarged photographs of the Coke bottle
with something floating in its contents, apparently taken by plaintiffs'
attorney were admitted into evidence.
Id. at 85 (footnote omitted).  At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a
verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding $75,000 each to Hagan and Parker.  The
jury also awarded $20,000 to Willie Parker, Barbara Parker’s husband, on his
consortium claim.  The trial court reduced the jury award to $25,000 each to Hagan
-4-
and Parker and reduced Willie Parker’s award to $8,000.  Both sides appealed to
the Fifth District Court of Appeal.  
The district court concluded that the conflicting evidence presented at trial
was sufficient to create a jury issue as to whether the foreign matter in the Coke
bottle was, in fact, a condom: “Although we have serious doubts that the plaintiff
established that the object in the Coke was a used condom, for purposes of this
appeal, we will assume the jury could have made that finding.”  Id. at 86.  However,
the district court reversed the jury awards and concluded that under the case law
concerning the “impact rule,” Hagan and Parker had not established a claim
because neither woman had suffered a physical injury.  
Judge Dauksch concurred in the majority opinion because he felt duty-bound
to adhere to the “impact rule.”  However, he expressed the view that the “impact
rule” should be amended or abolished and further stated that absent the rule he
would have affirmed the judgment below.  Accordingly, he, with Judge Sharp
concurring, certified the above question to this Court.  See id. at 91-92 (Dauksch,
J., specially concurring).  
ANALYSIS
Hagan and Parker (hereinafter “appellants”) assert that a person should not
be barred from recovering damages for emotional distress caused by the
1.  Other states that continue to adhere to the “impact rule” include Indiana,
see Shaumber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452 (Ind. 1991), Kansas, see Anderson v.
Scheffler, 752 P.2d 667 (Ka. 1988), and Kentucky, see Deutsch v. Shein, 597
S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1980).  For a good discussion of the history of the impact rule
and the differing treatment of the rule among the states, see Mary Donovan,
comment, Is the Injury Requirement Obsolete in a Claim for Fear of Future
Consequences?, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 1337 (1994).
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consumption of a beverage containing a foreign substance simply because she
suffered distress but did not suffer any additional physical injury at the time of
consumption.  Therefore, appellants contend that the “impact rule” should not
operate to preclude relief under the circumstances of this case.  We agree with
appellants and hold that the impact rule does not apply to cases where a plaintiff
suffers emotional distress as a direct result of the consumption of a contaminated
beverage.
Impact Rule in Florida
We begin by acknowledging that although many states have abolished the
“impact rule,” several states, including Florida, still adhere to the rule.1  This Court,
while acknowledging exceptions, has accepted the impact rule as a limitation on
certain claims as a means for “assuring the validity of claims for emotional or
psychic damages.”  R.J. v. Humana of Florida, Inc., 652 So. 2d 360, 363 (Fla.
1995); accord Tanner v. Hartog, 696 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 1997); Zell v. Meek, 665 So.
2d 1048 (Fla. 1995); Gonzalez v. Metropolitan Dade County Public Health Trust,
-6-
651 So. 2d 673, 674 (Fla. 1995); Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974). 
Generally stated, the impact rule requires that before a plaintiff may recover
damages for emotional distress, she must demonstrate that the emotional stress
suffered flowed from injuries sustained in an impact.  See R.J., 652 So. 2d at 362. 
Notwithstanding our adherence to the rule, this Court has noted several instances
where the impact rule should not preclude an otherwise viable claim.  
For example, this Court modified the impact rule in bystander cases by
excusing the lack of a physical impact.  In such cases, recovery for emotional
distress would be permitted where one person suffers “death or significant
discernible physical injury when caused by psychological trauma resulting from a
negligent injury imposed on a close family member within the sensory perception of
the physically injured person.”  Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17, 18 (Fla. 1985);
see also Zell v. Meek, 665 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 1995) (reaffirming rule in bystander
cases but rejecting temporal proximity requirement).  We also have held that the
impact rule does not apply to claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
see Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. King, 557 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 1990), wrongful birth, see
Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1992), negligence claims involving stillbirth,
see Tanner v. Hartog, 696 So. 2d 705 (Fla. 1997), and bad faith claims against an
insurance carrier, see Time Ins. Co. v. Burger, 712 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1998).   
-7-
In Tanner, the plaintiffs filed suit against their doctors and hospital for
negligence in causing the stillbirth of their child.  One of the claims sought damages
for mental pain and anguish unaccompanied by any impact or physical injury
resulting from the negligence which caused the stillbirth.  696 So. 2d at 706.  The
trial court denied the claim for emotional damages and the district court affirmed.  
On review, this Court recognized that “the primary obstacle in Florida to a
cause of action for ‘negligent stillbirth’ is the application of the impact rule.”  Id. at
707.  In our analysis, however, we compared the case to a case involving wrongful
birth wherein we had held that the impact rule does not apply.  See id. at 708 (citing
Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1992)).  In Kush v. Lloyd, we explained:
However, we are not certain that the impact doctrine ever was
intended to be applied to a tort such as wrongful birth.  Prosser and
Keeton state that the impact doctrine should not be applied where
emotional damages are an additional "parasitic" consequence of
conduct that itself is a freestanding tort apart from any emotional
injury.  W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of
Torts § 54, at 361-65 (5th ed.1984).  The American Law Institute is in
general accord.  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 47 & § 47 cmt. b
(1965).  Obviously, the Lloyds have a claim for wrongful birth even if
no emotional injuries had been alleged.
Similarly, the impact doctrine also generally is inapplicable to
recognized torts in which damages often are predominately emotional,
such as defamation or invasion of privacy.  Restatement (Second) of
Torts §§ 569, 570, 652H cmt. b (1977).  This conclusion is entirely
consistent with existing Florida law.  For example, it is well settled that
mental suffering constitutes recoverable damages in cases of negligent
defamation, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Brown, 66 So. 2d
-8-
679, 681 (Fla. 1953), or invasion of privacy.  See Cason v. Baskin,
155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944).  Accord Restatement (Second) of
Torts §§ 569, 570, 652H, cmt. b (1977).  If emotional damages are
ascertainable in these contexts, then they also are ascertainable here.
616 So. 2d at 422, quoted in Tanner, 696 So. 2d at 708.  In keeping with this
reasoning and logic, we held in Tanner:
We recognize that there is a legitimate legal argument which can
be directed against any particular theory upon which a recovery in the
instant case might be predicated and that the law does not provide a
remedy for every wrong.  Yet, it is difficult to justify the outright denial
of a claim for the mental pain and anguish which is so likely to be
experienced by parents as a result of the birth of a stillborn child
caused by the negligence of another.  As a natural evolution of the
common law, we conclude, as in Kush, that public policy dictates that
an action by the parents for negligent stillbirth should be recognized in
Florida.
696 So. 2d at 708.  To further explain our holding, we also noted Justice
Alderman’s comment in Champion v. Gray on the need for flexibility in the
application of the impact rule:  
We today modify to a limited extent our previous holdings on
the impact doctrine.  In doing so, however, we are unable to establish
a rigid hard and fast rule that would set the parameters for recovery for
psychic trauma in every case that may arise.  The outer limits of this
cause of action will be established by the courts of this state in the
traditional manner of the common law on a case-by-case basis.
Tanner, 696 So. 2d at 708 n.5 (quoting Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17, 21-22
(Fla. 1985) (Alderman, J., concurring specially)).  
-9-
We believe that public policy dictates the same result here as we reached in
Tanner, in that a cause of action for emotional distress caused by the ingestion of a
contaminated food or beverage should be recognized despite the lack of an
accompanying physical injury.  In Doyle v. Pillsbury Co., 476 So. 2d 1271 (Fla.
1985), for example, this Court observed that the impact rule would not bar a cause
of action for damages caused by the ingestion of a contaminated can of peas. 
There, the plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Doyle, opened a can of peas and observed an
insect floating on top of the contents.  Mrs. Doyle jumped back in alarm, fell over a
chair and suffered physical injuries.  The plaintiffs sued the Pillsbury Company,
Green Giant Company, and Publix Supermarkets, alleging negligence, strict liability,
and breach of warranty.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants, finding that the impact rule barred the plaintiffs’ cause of action, and
the district court affirmed.
On review, this Court approved the outcome but disapproved of the
application of the impact rule.  We initially recognized that ingestion of a food or
drink product is a necessary prerequisite to a cause of action against restaurants,
manufacturers, distributors and retailers of food.  In doing so, we impliedly found
that ingestion of a food or beverage containing a foreign substance constitutes an
“impact”:
-10-
Claims for injuries caused by foreign objects in food or drink
led to the adoption of liability predicated on an implied warranty of
fitness without regard to privity where a consumer suffers injury from
unwholesome food.  This Court first applied the breach of implied
warranty theory to food manufacturers or packers, to restaurants, and
to retailers of food products[.]  Even with these liberalized rules to
promote recovery for physical and psychic injury, the foreign object
cases all involve some ingestion of a portion of the food or drink
product.  To this extent Florida courts have required an "impact."
This ingestion requirement is grounded upon foreseeability
rather than the impact rule.  The public has become accustomed to
believing in and relying on the fact that packaged foods are fit for
consumption.  A producer or retailer of food should foresee that a
person may well become physically or mentally ill after consuming part
of a food product and then discovering a deleterious foreign object,
such as an insect or rodent, in presumably wholesome food or drink. 
The manufacturer or retailer must expect to bear the costs of the
resulting injuries.
The same foreseeability is lacking where a person simply
observes the foreign object and suffers injury after the observation. 
The mere observance of unwholesome food cannot be equated to
consuming a portion of the same.  We should not impose virtually
unlimited liability in such cases.  When a claim is based on an inert
foreign object in a food product, we continue to require ingestion of a
portion of the food before liability arises.  Because Mrs. Doyle never
ingested any portion of the canned peas, the trial court properly
granted summary judgment against the Doyles.
Id. at 1271-72 (citations and footnote omitted) (emphasis added).  Hence, we
concluded that ingestion was a critical factor in our foreseeability analysis, but the
“mere observance of unwholesome food cannot be equated to consuming a
portion of the same.”  Id. at 1272.
Coca-Cola argues that Doyle is not dispositive to the issue in this case
-11-
because (1) this Court did not discuss whether ingestion alone is sufficient to
establish liability and (2) the plaintiffs in that case suffered a physical injury upon
discovering the insect.  We disagree with Coca-Cola for two reasons.  
First, our opinion in Doyle very clearly states that the impact rule did not bar
the plaintiffs’ claim against the defendants.  Rather, their lack of ingestion stood as
the sole bar to their claims for relief.  Second, although the facts in Doyle indicate
that the plaintiffs may have suffered physical injuries upon observing the
contaminated food, nothing in Doyle suggests that to recover damages, a plaintiff
must also show physical injuries stemming from either the ingestion of the
contaminated food or beverage itself or from the emotional distress suffered as a
result of consuming the contaminated food or beverage.  Moreover, any discussion
as to the requirement for a physical injury would have been unnecessary based
upon our holding that the impact rule did not apply.  Thus, our holding in Doyle is
consistent with our conclusion today, namely, that the impact rule does not apply
to cases involving the ingestion of contaminated substances.
Other jurisdictions have reached a similar conclusion, one, in fact, involving
virtually the same facts presented here.  In Wallace v. Coca-Cola Bottling Plants,
Inc., 269 A.2d 117 (Me. 1970), the plaintiff drank from a Coke bottle which
contained an unwrapped condom.  The plaintiff became ill after he returned home
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and thought about his experience.  The Maine Supreme Court held that where the
plaintiff demonstrates a causal relationship between the negligent act and the
reasonably foreseeable mental and emotional suffering by a reasonably foreseeable
plaintiff, damages for emotional suffering are recoverable despite the lack of a
“discernable trauma from external causes.”  Id. at 121.  The court found that such
requirements had been met:
In the case at hand such proximate cause relationship was
established.  The jury found that the defendant negligently caused or
permitted a foreign object to enter a bottle of Coca-Cola it had
processed.  The foreign object was of such a loathsome nature it was
reasonably foreseeable its presence would cause nausea and mental
distress upon being discovered in the place it was by a consumer who
was in the process of drinking from the bottle.  The mental distress
was manifested by the vomiting.
Id. at 121-22.  Several years later, the Maine Supreme Court overruled Wallace to
the extent that it had required a plaintiff to demonstrate actual physical
manifestations of the mental injury.  See Culbert v. Sampson’s Supermarkets Inc.,
444 A.2d 433 (Me. 1982).  The court in Culbert reasoned:
We now reject the notion that the plaintiff must allege or prove
physical injuries or physical manifestations of the distress, as required
by Wallace, supra, as well as emotional and mental trauma, in order to
prevail.  We do so for three reasons.  First, the requirement in its
application is overinclusive since it permits recovery for demonstrably
trivial mental distress claims accompanied by physical symptoms. 
Second, it is underinclusive since serious distress is arbitrarily deemed
not compensable if not accompanied by physical symptoms.  Third,
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such a rule "encourages extravagant pleading and distorted testimony." 
Molien v. Kaiser Foundation, 27 Cal.3d 916, 929, 167 Cal.Rptr. 831,
838, 616 P.2d 813, 820 (1980).  Given the state of modern medical
science, we can safely conclude that proof of "objective
symptomatology" is no longer necessary, although it may be highly
persuasive evidence, to establish mental distress.  Sinn v. Burd, 404
A.2d at 679.
Culbert, 444 A.2d at 437.  In overruling any physical injury requirement, the court
noted that it could have permitted recovery in Wallace even under the impact rule
because the condom had come in contact with the plaintiff.  See id. at 436. 
Therefore, it viewed Wallace’s foreseeability requirement as obiter dictum.  
We find the reasoning of the Maine Supreme Court to be instructive, and
consistent with our analysis in Doyle, to the extent it concludes that a plaintiff may
recover for emotional injuries caused by the consumption of a contaminated food
or beverage despite the lack of an additional physical injury.
Florida Cases
As the district court pointed out, there have been a variety of other ingestion
cases in Florida, although none that appear to have definitively resolved the issue. 
In Food Fair Stores of Florida, Inc. v. Macurda, 93 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1957), for
example, the plaintiffs ingested a can of spinach containing worms.  Upon
discovering the worms, the plaintiffs immediately vomited and suffered nausea,
abdominal pains and diarrhea.  This Court held that the impact rule did not bar the
2.  Although the court acknowledged that it could hold that the impact rule
would not bar recovery by virtue of the fact that the plaintiff had ingested the
contents of the bottle, it chose to take the position that the case lacked impact.  See
id. at 289.
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plaintiffs’ recovery because the jury could have reasonably concluded that the
plaintiffs’ physical injuries resulted from eating the worms and not from any
psychogenic reaction to the same.  See id. at 861-62.  This Court’s decision in
Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Todd, 101 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1958), also affirmed
an award of damages which involved ingestion from a soda bottle containing a
foreign substance, but our opinion did not explicitly address the issue of emotional
or physical injuries.
In Way v. Tampa Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 260 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 2d DCA
1972), the plaintiff drank from a bottle of soda and then, upon discovering a rat in
the bottle, became nauseous and vomited.  Plaintiff sued Coca-Cola, who defended
on the basis that damages were not recoverable in the absence of a distinct physical
injury.  The Second District held that the lack of a physical impact from external
causes would not bar a cause of action for damages where there is a proximate
causal relationship between the negligent act and reasonably foreseeable emotional
suffering by a reasonably foreseeable plaintiff.2  See id. at 290.  The court reasoned
that recovery should be permitted because the evidence showed that the foreign
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substance in the bottle was loathsome, that it was reasonably foreseeable that its
presence would cause nausea and mental distress, and the mental distress was
evidenced by the vomiting.  See id.  However, the court refrained from
“express[ing] an opinion in those cases where there is neither physical impact nor
any objective physical symptom such as vomiting which is present in the instant
case.”  Id.  
Similarly, in Waddell v. Shoney’s, Inc., 664 So. 2d 1134 (Fla. 5th DCA
1995), the Fifth District upheld a jury verdict in favor of a pregnant plaintiff who
drank water contaminated with a chlorine cleaning solution.  The plaintiff became ill
and began vomiting.  The plaintiff also experienced fetal movement and
contractions and feared for the safety of the fetus.  The court affirmed the
plaintiff’s recovery and also held that the trial court properly admitted evidence that
plaintiff suffered mental distress related to the concern for the fetus.  See id. at
1136-37.  
Thus, while these decisions address a variety of circumstances arising out of
actions based on consumption of a contaminated food product, none address the
particular issue raised herein.  For this reason, none of these cases are dispositive.
CONCLUSION
As this Court recognized in Tanner, the impact rule does not apply where
3.  We decline to address any other issues not pertinent to the certified
question as posed by the District Court, or as we have rephrased it.
-16-
emotional damages are a “consequence of conduct that itself is a freestanding tort
apart from any emotional injury.”  696 So. 2d at 708 (quoting Kush, 616 So. 2d at
415).  And, of course, Doyle recognized a cause of action based on the ingestion
of a contaminated food since ingestion itself constitutes an impact.  Consistent with
our opinions and holdings in Tanner and Doyle, we hold that a plaintiff need not
prove the existence of a physical injury in order to recover damages for emotional
injuries caused by the consumption of a contaminated food or beverage.  As this
Court made clear in Doyle, those who market foodstuffs should foresee and expect
to bear responsibility for the emotional and physical harm caused by someone
consuming a food product that is contaminated by a foreign substance.   Further,
since we have concluded that there was an impact in the case at hand by the
ingestion of a contaminated substance, and the impact rule does not bar the action,
we decline to rule on the broader question posed by the district court’s certified
question.  
Based on the foregoing reasons, we quash the decision below to the extent it
holds that the impact rule precludes a claim for damages for emotional distress
caused by the ingestion of a contaminated beverage,3 and we remand to the district
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court for further proceedings consistent herewith.
It is so ordered.      
SHAW, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
HARDING, J., dissents with an opinion.
WELLS, C.J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
HARDING, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.  Neither the answer to the certified question nor the
answer to the question rephrased by the majority will be determinative of this case. 
The court below held that, regardless of the impact rule or whether physical injury
is required in order to recover for negligently inflicted emotional distress, the
petitioners failed to establish the necessary threshold for their fear of contracting
AIDS claim:
[W]e have found no case in researching all of the states, that would
permit recovery for fear of contracting AIDS--emotional distress
damages, based on a record like this one.  The fear of AIDS cases in
which recovery has been allowed for negligent infliction of emotional
distress and upset alone, require as a threshold, a showing by the
plaintiff that the fear is reasonable.  The great majority of cases say
this means the plaintiff must show that the virus was present, and that
the contact between the material containing the virus and the plaintiff
was a medically and scientifically accepted channel for the
transmission of the disease.  A minority of courts hold that actual
presence of HIV or AIDS need not be shown, if it is likely and
probable to believe the virus was present, and there was a medically
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and scientifically accepted channel shown by which the plaintiff could
have become infected.
Neither standard was met in this case.  The appellees failed to
establish that the condom and material in the Coke were contaminated
with HIV.  Nor did they show that it was likely and probable that the
virus was present.  Only a very small percentage of the general
population is HIV positive or has AIDS, and the mere presence of
semen would not be enough.  The appellees also failed to show a
medically and scientifically accepted channel for transmitting the
disease.  Without such showings or proofs, a plaintiff's fear of
contracting AIDS is unreasonable as a matter of law and not a legally
compensable injury.  As a matter of public policy, the allowance of
such lawsuits without the threshold proofs discussed above could lead
to an explosion of frivolous litigation, opening as some courts say a
"Pandora's box" of AIDS phobia claims.   
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Hagan, 750 So. 2d 83, 90-91 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)
(footnotes omitted).  By accepting this case and answering the rephrased question,
the majority is issuing an advisory opinion.  This Court may render advisory
opinions only to the Governor and the Attorney General.  See art. IV, § 1(c), art. V,
§ 3(b)(10), Fla. Const.  See also Reinish v. Clark, 765 So. 2d 197, 202 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2000) (“‘[E]very case must involve a real controversy as to the issue or
issues presented,’ so that ‘the parties must not be requesting an advisory
opinion.’” (quoting Department of Revenue v. Kuhnlein, 646 So. 2d 717, 720-21
(Fla. 1994)).
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
-19-
Great Public Importance
Fifth District - Case No. 5D98-1463 
(St. Johns County)
Donald N. Watson and Linda L. Weiksnar of Gary, Williams, Parenti, Finney, Lewis,
McManus, Watson & Sperando, P.A., Stuart, Florida; and Russell S. Bohn of
Caruso, Burlington, Bohn & Compiani, P.A., West Palm Beach, Florida,
for Petitioners
Raoul G. Cantero, III and Gregory A. Victor of Adorno & Zeder, P.A., Miami,
Florida,
for Respondents
John G. Crabtree, Key Biscayne, Florida, 
for The Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, Amicus Curiae
Tracy Raffles Gunn of Fowler, White, Gillen, Boggs, Villareal and Banker, P.A.,
Tampa, Florida,
for Florida Defense Lawyers’ Association, Amicus Curiae