Case Title: Mun Seek Pai v. First Hawaiian Bank

Citation: 558 P.2d 479

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 1977-01-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
558 P.2d 479 (1977) MUN SEEK PAI, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FIRST HAWAIIAN BANK, Executor under the Will and of the Estate of Chung Kun Lee, Deceased, Defendant-Appellant. No. 5756. Supreme Court of Hawaii. January 7, 1977. James T. Leavitt, Jr., Honolulu (William S. Hunt, Honolulu, with him on the brief; Hart, Leavitt & Hall, Honolulu, of counsel) for defendant-appellant. Robert M. Ehrhorn, Jr., Honolulu (Okumura & Takushi, Honolulu, of counsel) for plaintiff-appellee. Before RICHARDSON, C.J., and KOBAYASHI, OGATA, MENOR and KIDWELL, JJ. KOBAYASHI, Justice. This is an appeal filed by First Hawaiian Bank, Executor under the Will and of the Estate of Chung Kun Lee, deceased (executor or defendant), from a judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of Mun Seek Pai (plaintiff or appellee) for the sum of $10,284.75, together with interest of $3,213.91, attorney's fees of $926.46, and costs of $28.00, a total of $14,453.12 for monies due and owing by the deceased to the appellee. We affirm. The appellant has alleged several issues on appeal. However, we believe that consideration of the following issue is dispositive of this appeal: Did the trial court err in its conclusion of law, 5(a), that the statute of limitations period began to run no earlier than May, 1969? The plaintiff and his mother, Bok Num Lee, wife of Chung Kun Lee, the deceased, *480 were joint owners of a parcel of real property designated as Lot 7-A. Another parcel of real property, contiguous to Lot 7-A, and designated as Lot 7-B, was jointly owned by Bok Num Lee and the deceased. On August 30, 1963, both lots were leased as a consolidated parcel through an agreement providing for payment of rental by lessee of $716.00 per month from September 1, 1963, through August 31, 1975. Mrs. Lee died on March 18, 1964, and as a result plaintiff became sole owner of Lot 7-A. Chung Kun Lee became the sole owner of Lot 7-B. Thus, each became entitled to one-half of the monthly rental of $716.00. Chung Kun Lee continued to collect all rental, as was the practice among all the above parties, and the plaintiff had no contact with the lessee in reference to any rental payment and had no direct knowledge of any rental payments by the lessee to the deceased. The plaintiff totally relied upon the deceased to collect all rentals and for the deceased to pay plaintiff his rightful share of one-half of the monthly rental payment by the lessee. Plaintiff did not receive any of his rental share until June of 1965 when he started to receive only half of his monthly one-half share of the rental. Finally, from May 1969, the plaintiff started receiving his full one-half share of $326.50 per month. Plaintiff did not pursue the deceased for the delinquent amounts due to him for the reason that the deceased pled personal financial difficulties and requested of plaintiff time until the deceased was "more-or-less financially able to pay" after paying off some other personal debts. The death of the deceased occurred in March, 1970. On October 5, 1970, plaintiff duly filed his creditor's claim with the executor. Settlement negotiations between plaintiff and the executor ensued. Plaintiff believed, for some time, that a settlement had been effectuated. However, his claim was, thereafter, abruptly rejected on December 12, 1972. Plaintiff then filed his herein complaint in assumpsit on February 9, 1973. The executor filed a motion for partial summary judgment against the plaintiff contending that any and all of plaintiff's claims of monies due and owing by the deceased on or before February 9, 1967, were barred by the statute of limitations. The plaintiff contended that there were several material facts in genuine issue and a grant of summary judgment is improper. The trial court denied the motion. Upon conclusion of the proceedings herein, the trial court rendered its findings of fact and conclusions of law. In its findings of fact, inter alia, the court found: In its conclusions of law, inter alia, the court held: In our opinion, wherein the trial court was correct in holding that the six-year statute of limitations was applicable, the trial court's conclusion of law 5(a), if correct, mutes any question relative to the statute of limitations, for the plaintiff filed his herein complaint on February 9, 1973, considerably before the expiration of the six-year limitation. The court's conclusion, in essence, held that a new conditional promise to pay was made by the decedent. The record shows the following: Direct examination of plaintiff: Cross-examination of plaintiff: Redirect examination of plaintiff: Recross-examination of plaintiff: The question is whether the facts as set forth above are sufficient to take the case out of the bar of the statute of limitations. In our opinion, from the facts herein, it can be readily inferred that the decedent made a new promise to pay to the plaintiff all current debts and new debts as they may occur prior to the occurrence of a condition. The new promise to pay all debts due and owing between 1964 and May, 1969, relative to the rental collected by decedent on behalf of plaintiff, was made prior to May, 1969, but subject to a condition. The condition was fulfilled in May, 1969. There was evidence that when the decedent commenced full payment in May, 1969, he acknowledged that he was doing so in performance of the prior promise and because the condition had been met. Action to enforce the payment of the indebtedness was filed on February 9, 1973. We agree with the trial court that the limitations period began to run no earlier than May, 1969, when decedent became financially able to pay plaintiff in full. In Maciel v. Kalua, 24 Haw. 216 (1918), this court stated at 221: This court has further held that if a promise to pay is conditional, the cause of action on the promise does not accrue until the condition is performed. In Segelken v. Hawaiian Trust Co., Ltd., 20 Haw. 225, 229 (1910), this court quoted the following from Wood on Limitations, 226, 363, with approval: See also Garner v. Garner, 31 Md. App. 641, 358 A.2d 583 (1976). Thus, the herein facts and the law applicable make clear that the plaintiff is entitled to the judgment of the trial court. [1] HRS § 657-12 reads: § 657-12 All other personal actions. All personal actions of any nature whatsoever not specifically covered by the laws of the State shall be instituted within four years after the cause of action accrued, and not after. But see Act 105 § 1(q), SLH 1972. [2] HRS § 657-1 (Supp. 1975) reads: § 657-1 Six years. The following actions shall be commenced within six years next after the cause of action accrued, and not after: (1) Actions for the recovery of any debt founded upon any contract, obligation, or liability, excepting such as are brought upon the judgment or decree of a court; (2) Actions upon judgments or decrees rendered in any court not of record in the State, or, subject to section 657-9, in any court of record in any foreign jurisdiction; (3) Actions for taking or detaining any goods or chattels, including actions in the nature of replevin; (4) Personal actions of any nature whatsoever not specifically covered by the laws of the State.