Case Title: Vaupel v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-11-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Vaupel v. State1985 WY 190708 P.2d 1248Case Number: 84-246Decided: 11/19/1985VIRGIL VAUPEL, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT), 

v. 

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
VIRGIL VAUPEL, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v. 

THE 
STATE OFWYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, TetonCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

 
 
Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Martin J. McClain, Appellate Counsel, Wyoming 
Public Defender Program, Cheyenne, Gerald M. Gallivan, Director, Defender Aid 
Program, and James T. Dinneen, Student Intern, Defender Aid Program, Laramie, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, and Jon T. Dyre, Student Intern, Prosecution Assistance 
Program, Laramie, for 
appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

BROWN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Virgil Vaupel 
was convicted by a jury of embezzlement by an employee, under § 6-7-310, W.S. 
1977.1 The district court ruled at 
pretrial that Vaupel's five prior felony convictions were admissible for 
impeachment purposes under Rule 609(b), Wyoming Rules of Evidence. Vaupel did 
not testify at trial. The jury found him guilty. Vaupel now challenges the 
propriety of the trial court's pretrial ruling and raises the following 
issues:

"I. Whether Appellant, 
who elected not to testify during his trial, can preserve on appeal his 
challenge to the trial court's ruling on a motion for an order to exclude 
evidence of prior criminal convictions.

"II. Whether the trial 
court erred in ruling that Appellant's prior criminal convictions would be 
admissible for impeachment purposes, despite the fact that almost 17 years had 
passed since the Appellant was released on parole for such 
conviction."

[¶2.]     We will 
affirm.

[¶3.]     Appellant was charged 
by information filed October 4, 1983, with "embezzlement by employee," six 
counts of fraud by check, and being an habitual criminal. At the arraignment 
appellant entered a plea of not guilty to all counts. Subsequently, appellant's 
motion to dismiss the habitual criminal count was granted. At trial on May 7 and 
8, 1984, the jury found appellant guilty on the embezzlement by employee count, 
but not guilty on all of the counts of fraud by check. The judgment and sentence 
was entered August 28, 1984, wherein appellant was sentenced to one and one-half 
to two and one-half years in the penitentiary; such sentence was suspended 
subject to a two-year probation period.

[¶4.]     Appellant claims that 
the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that his seventeen year old 
criminal convictions would be admissible for impeachment purposes. Since we will 
decide the first issue against appellant, we need not address the second 
issue.

[¶5.]     In a recent case, Luce v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S. Ct. 460, 83 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1984), the court held that when a defendant does not 
testify, he cannot raise the propriety of the trial court's ruling on his motion 
in limine to exclude the introduction of his prior convictions under Rule 
609(a), Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 609(a), F.R.E., identical to our Rule 
609(a), W.R.E., states the general rule for impeachment by evidence of a 
crime:

"For the purpose of 
attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a 
crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or established by public record 
during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or 
imprisonment in excess of one (1) year under the law which he was convicted, and 
the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or 
false statement, regardless of the punishment."

[¶6.]     The rationale for the 
Supreme Court's decision in Luce is that reviewing "subtle evidentiary questions 
outside a factual context" is very difficult under Rule 609(a), F.R.E. To 
balance the probative value with the prejudicial effect of a prior conviction, 
"the court must know the precise nature of the defendant's testimony, which is 
unknowable when, as here, the defendant does not testify." Luce v. United States, supra, 105 S. Ct. 
at 463. In the case before us, Vaupel made an offer of proof to advise the court 
what his testimony would have been. In Luce the court condemned the use of an 
offer of proof, recognizing, however, the possible variation between the proffer 
and the actual testimony. It is also clear that if a defendant does not testify, 
it is speculation as to how, or if, the prior convictions would have been 
offered, especially since a trial court's preliminary ruling is subject to 
change or modification at trial.

[¶7.]     Appellant argues that 
an improper preliminary ruling prevented him from testifying. He contends the 
court's ruling "changed the course of his trial and prejudiced his defense," 
because the error forced him to make the decision not to testify. This argument 
was also addressed in Luce v. 
United 
States:

"Because an accused's 
decision whether to testify `seldom turns on the resolution of one factor,' 
[Citation.] a reviewing court cannot assume that the adverse ruling motivated a 
defendant's decision not to testify." 105 S. Ct.  at 463-464, quoting New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 
467, 99 S. Ct. 1292, 1301, 59 L. Ed. 2d 501, 515 (1979).

We agree that 
the decision whether to testify or not is complex. The mere fact that a 
defendant does not testify does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that the 
reason for his decision was an improper preliminary evidentiary ruling. Whether 
the ruling was proper or not, the defendant still has the choice of whether or 
not to testify. 

[¶8.]     Appellant argues that 
requiring a defendant to testify in order to preserve the issue on appeal 
violates his right to remain silent under the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution and Art. 1, §§ 9 and 10 of the Wyoming Constitution. 
Appellant cites Brooks v. Tennessee, 
406 U.S. 605, 92 S. Ct. 1891, 32 L. Ed. 2d 358 (1972). In that case the court held that a statute which required the 
defendant to testify before any other defense witness, violated the federal 
constitution because in order to defend at all, the defendant was required to 
testify first. However, that is not the circumstance here.

[¶9.]     The court in Luce, however, not only pointed out that 
it has never held that a ruling in limine under Rule 609(a) reaches 
constitutional dimensions, but suggested this type of ruling does not reach that 
threshold. Such a ruling can be changed and modified during the course of a 
trial for whatever reason. United 
States v. Oakes, 565 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1977). 
Thus, a ruling on a motion in limine is "essentially an advisory opinion by the 
trial court." United 
States v. Luce, 713 F.2d 1236, 1239 (6th Cir. 
1983).

[¶10.]  We recognize that the Luce case was decided under Rule 609(a), 
F.R.E., and that the present case arises under Rule 609(b), W.R.E., which deals 
with the time limit of impeachment evidence. The relevant part 
provides:

"Evidence of a conviction 
under this rule is not admissible if a period of more than ten (10) years has 
elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from 
confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the 
court determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the 
conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs 
its prejudicial effect. * *"

[¶11.]  We find the justification for the rule of 
Luce even stronger under Rule 609(b) 
than under Rule 609(a). Rule 609(a) requires an initial balancing of probative 
value and prejudicial effect. However, Rule 609(b) additionally mandates a 
second determination. Under Rule 609(b), the court must view specific facts and 
circumstances and decide not only that the probative value outweighs the 
prejudicial effect, but also that the probative value is "substantially" 
outweighed. Thus, the scale must tip further under Rule 609(b). McCormick on 
Evidence, Impeachment, § 43 (3rd ed., 1984), citing United States v. Beahm, 664 F.2d 414 
(4th Cir. 1981).

[¶12.]  The factual circumstances of a case 
necessary to properly weigh the probative value against prejudicial effect are 
even more important under Rule 609(b) than Rule 609(a). Therefore, the policy 
considerations behind Luce are 
equally, if not more, applicable to Rule 609(b), and the potential problems even 
greater.

[¶13.]  We hold that if an accused does not 
testify, he does not preserve the issue of the propriety of a ruling on his 
motion in limine for appeal. Additionally, we hold that such rulings do not 
reach nor violate the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Art. 
1, §§ 9 and 10 of the Wyoming Constitution.

[¶14.]  Affirmed.

1 The statute in effect at 
the time the crime was committed, § 6-7-310, W.S. 1977, now § 6-3-402, W.S. 1977 
(June 1983 Replacement), read:

"Every officer, agent, 
attorney, clerk, servant or employee of any person who, having access to, 
control or possession of any money, article or thing of value, to the possession 
of which his employer is entitled, shall, while in such employment, take, 
purloin, secrete or in any way whatever appropriate to his own use, or to the 
use of others, any money, coin, bills, notes, credits, choses in action, or 
other property or article of value, belonging to or deposited with, or held by 
such person, in whose employment said officer, agent, attorney, clerk, servant 
or employee may be, shall be deemed guilty of embezzlement and shall be 
imprisoned in the penitentiary for not more than fourteen (14) 
years."