Case Title: Joseph Kelly v. State Of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC06-842

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2007-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC06-842 
____________ 
 
JOSEPH KELLY,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[June 28, 2007] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal in Kelly v. State, 924 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).  On motion 
for rehearing, the district court certified that its decision is in direct conflict with 
the decisions of the Second District Court of Appeal in Johnson v. State, 695 So. 
2d 861 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), and Frazier v. State, 630 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 2d DCA 
1994), and the First District Court of Appeal in Vickery v. State, 515 So. 2d 396 
(Fla. 1st DCA 1987).  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  
Because we conclude that the Legislature intended that the mandatory minimum 
sentences for the two crimes in question in this case could be imposed 
consecutively, we approve the decision of the district court below denying Kelly’s 
motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Kelly pled guilty to conspiracy to traffic in 
cocaine and trafficking in cocaine of more than 400 grams.  Kelley [sic] v. State, 
821 So. 2d 1255, 1256 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (Kelly I).  He then violated his plea 
agreement and was sentenced to twenty years in prison with a fifteen-year 
mandatory minimum provision, consisting of two concurrent fifteen-year 
mandatory minimum sentences.  Id.  In sentencing Kelly, the judge explained that 
she had no discretion to deviate below the statutorily mandated minimum sentence 
of fifteen years for the trafficking charge without the prosecutor’s waiver.  Id.  
Kelly filed a Motion to Correct Sentencing Error pursuant to Florida Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 3.800(b), arguing that the judge should have exercised 
discretion to sentence him to less than the mandatory minimum since he intended 
to purchase only an ounce of cocaine but ultimately purchased a kilogram due to 
police entrapment and inducement.  Id.  This motion was denied, and Kelly then 
appealed his sentence to the Fourth District, again arguing that the sentencing 
judge had the discretion to depart below the mandatory minimum sentence since 
Kelly was induced by the police into buying the larger amount of cocaine.  Id. at 
1256-57.  The Fourth District affirmed Kelly’s sentence.  Id. at 1258.   
 
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Kelly then filed a rule 3.850 motion for postconviction relief, subject of the 
instant case, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for advising him that he was 
potentially facing a thirty-year mandatory prison term, consisting of stacked 
fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentences, one each for the trafficking charge and 
for the conspiracy to traffic charge.  Kelly, 924 So. 2d at 69 (Kelly II).  Kelly 
argued that since the mandatory minimums for these two crimes could only run 
concurrently under governing case law, he was actually only faced with a fifteen-
year mandatory term.  Id. at 70.  Kelly alleged that but for this bad advice 
regarding a possible thirty-year mandatory term, he would not have taken the 
State’s plea agreement.  Id.  The trial court summarily denied the 3.850 motion, 
and Kelly appealed this summary denial to the Fourth District, arguing that he set 
forth a legally sufficient claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  Id. at 69.     
In affirming the trial court’s denial of relief, the Fourth District concluded 
that there was no misadvice, because the trial court could properly have imposed 
the mandatory minimum terms consecutively.  Id.  First, the court below looked to 
the exact language of the governing statute, section 893.135, Florida Statutes, 
which reads in pertinent part: 
(1) Except as authorized in this chapter or in chapter 499 and 
notwithstanding the provisions of s. 893.13: 
. . . . 
(b)1. Any person who knowingly sells, purchases, manufactures, 
delivers, or brings into this state, or who is knowingly in actual or 
constructive possession of, 28 grams or more of cocaine, as described 
 
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in s. 893.03(2)(a)4., or of any mixture containing cocaine, but less 
than 150 kilograms of cocaine or any such mixture, commits a felony 
of the first degree, which felony shall be known as “trafficking in 
cocaine,” punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 
775.084. If the quantity involved: 
. . . . 
c. Is 400 grams or more, but less than 150 kilograms, such person 
shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 
15 calendar years and pay a fine of $250,000. 
 
. . . . 
(5) Any person who agrees, conspires, combines, or confederates with 
another person to commit any act prohibited by subsection (1) 
commits a felony of the first degree and is punishable as if he or she 
had actually committed such prohibited act.  Nothing in this 
subsection shall be construed to prohibit separate convictions and 
sentences for a violation of this subsection and any violation of 
subsection (1). 
 
Kelly II, 924 So. 2d at 70 (quoting § 893.135(1), (5), Fla. Stat. (2005)).  The lower 
court concluded that the statute clearly “authorizes convictions and sentences, with 
mandatory minimums for both the trafficking and conspiracy, even though they 
may arise out of the same transaction.”  Id.  The Fourth District then turned to two 
opinions from this Court, Daniels v. State, 595 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 1992), and Hale v. 
State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1993), to determine whether the mandatory minimum 
terms could be imposed consecutively.  Kelly II, 924 So. 2d at 70-71.  Utilizing to 
the “Daniels/Hale analysis,” the court below held that trial counsel correctly 
advised Kelly that his sentences could be stacked because the statute specifically 
requires a mandatory minimum sentence for each separate crime.  Id. at 71.  
“Paraphrasing Daniels, because the statute prescribing the penalty for [Kelly’s] 
 
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offenses does contain a provision for a minimum mandatory sentence, Kelly’s 
minimum mandatory sentences imposed for the crimes he committed arising out of 
the same criminal episode may be imposed consecutively.”  Id.  
The lower court acknowledged that its holding was in conflict with case law 
from other districts courts establishing that sentences for trafficking and conspiracy 
to traffic in the same cocaine on the same day cannot be stacked.  Id. However, the 
Fourth District reasoned that Vickery, the primary case in conflict, was superseded 
by Daniels and Hale.  Kelly II, 924 So. 2d at 71.  Thus, the Fourth District held that 
the trial court was correct in denying Kelly’s motion for postconviction relief since 
he was not misadvised regarding the trial court’s ability to order consecutive 
mandatory minimum sentences for his two crimes.  Id. at 71-72. 
ANALYSIS 
 
Kelly argues on appeal that the Fourth District incorrectly concluded that the 
mandatory minimum prison terms for trafficking and conspiracy to traffic in the 
same cocaine could be imposed consecutively.  We disagree.  We begin our 
analysis by noting that the intent of the Legislature as expressed in the plain 
language of the applicable sentencing statutes guides our decision as to whether the 
trial judge could have imposed consecutive mandatory minimum prison terms in 
Kelly’s case.  See State v. Sousa, 903 So. 2d 923, 928 (Fla. 2005) (“The 
 
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fundamental rule of construction in determining legislative intent is to first give 
effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used by the Legislature.”).   
 
Kelly asserts that the Fourth District’s conclusion below runs contrary to the 
weight of authority from other district courts, where a number of cases have held 
that sentences for trafficking and conspiracy to traffic in the same narcotic cannot 
be stacked when they arise out of the same criminal episode.  Notably, in Vickery, 
the First District clearly held that mandatory minimum sentences imposed for 
trafficking and conspiracy to traffic in cocaine pursuant to section 893.135 could 
only be imposed concurrently, not consecutively.  515 So. 2d at 397.  In reaching 
this conclusion, that court held that the cocaine offenses “constituted a single 
criminal episode and were neither separate nor distinct,” and thus the mandatory 
sentences could not be imposed consecutively for each offense.  Id.  The “single 
criminal episode” reasoning evidenced in Vickery has been followed by a number 
of other district courts,1 including the Second District in Frazier, which the court 
                                          
 
 
1.  See, e.g., Peoples v. State, 576 So. 2d 783, 789 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) 
(“Consecutive minimum mandatory sentences are not appropriate when the 
multiple offenses for which sentences are imposed are committed during a single 
continuous episode.  This rationale is applicable to sentences imposed pursuant to 
section 893.135.” (citing to Vickery and Palmer v. State, 438 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1983))) 
approved in result, 612 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 1992); Short v. State, 572 So. 2d 1007, 
1007 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (reversing consecutive mandatory minimum sentences 
for conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and trafficking in cocaine and holding 
“[b]ecause the offenses of trafficking and conspiracy to traffic in cocaine arose 
from a single criminal episode involving the same contraband, the offenses were 
 
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below also certified as conflicting with the instant case.  In that case, again 
involving convictions for trafficking in cocaine and conspiracy to traffic in 
cocaine, as well as possession of marijuana, the court analogized to Vickery in 
concluding that the mandatory minimum sentences were improperly stacked 
“[b]ecause of the similarity in time, place and amounts of cocaine, the facts show 
the same criminal episode.”  Frazier, 630 So. 2d at 1237.  The Second District 
again employed the “same criminal episode” analysis in Johnson when it held, 
“Consecutive minimum mandatory sentences may not be imposed for trafficking in 
cocaine and conspiracy to traffic in cocaine, when those offenses arise out of the 
same criminal episode and involve the same contraband.”  695 So. 2d at 861.  
Thus, Kelly correctly asserts that the lower district courts have consistently held 
that sentences for trafficking and conspiracy to traffic in the same substance must 
be imposed concurrently. 
 
However, we believe that more recent precedent from this Court better 
resolves the instant question, as it focuses our inquiry on the Legislature’s intent as 
expressed in the applicable sentencing statutes.  In Daniels, we answered a 
certified question of great public importance from the First District regarding a 
trial judge’s decision to impose three consecutive mandatory minimum sentences 
for first-degree felonies committed by a habitual violent felony offender.  595 So. 
                                                                                                                                        
‘not sufficiently distinct to permit consecutive mandatory sentences.’ ” (quoting 
Vickery, 515 So. 2d at 397)). 
 
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2d at 952-53.  The defendant in Daniels was convicted of burglary while armed, 
sexual battery with a deadly weapon, and armed robbery, all arising out of a single 
criminal episode.  Id. at 953.  He was sentenced to three fifteen-year mandatory 
minimum sentences, designated to run consecutively.  Id.  The consecutive 
mandatory minimum sentences, however, were predicated on Daniels’ status as a 
habitual violent felony offender under statutory enhancement provisions; the 
applicable statutes prescribing the individual punishments for the underlying 
felonies contained no authorization for mandatory minimum penalties.  Id. at 953-
54.  We therefore analogized to Palmer v. State, 438 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1983),2 in 
holding, “[Daniels’] minimum mandatory sentences imposed for the crimes he 
committed arising out of the same criminal episode may only be imposed 
                                          
 
 
2.  In Palmer, defendant Palmer was convicted of thirteen counts of robbery, 
one count of aggravated assault, and one count of carrying a concealed firearm 
after robbing mourners at a funeral parlor during a wake.  438 So. 2d at 2.  In 
addition to the other sentences for other charges, the trial court sentenced him to a 
mandatory minimum sentence of three years for each robbery for a total of thirty-
nine years mandatory time on the robbery charges.  Id.  The statutory authority for 
the mandatory minimums was apparently derived from a firearm enhancement 
statute, section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (1981); another statute, section 
775.021(4), Florida Statutes (1981), provided that trial judges were allowed to 
issue consecutive prison sentences for separate offenses occurring during the same 
criminal episode.  438 So. 2d at 3.  Thus, since Palmer robbed thirteen individuals 
at gunpoint at the funeral home in one criminal episode, the trial judge imposed 
thirteen consecutive three-year mandatory terms for the robberies.  Id.  We 
reversed, however, ruling that the applicable firearm enhancement sentencing 
statute did not authorize a trial court to deny a defendant the eligibility for parole 
for a period greater than three calendar years, and accordingly the robbery 
sentences could only be imposed concurrently.  Id. at 3-4.   
 
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concurrently and not consecutively.”  595 So. 2d at 954.  Thus, in Daniels, we 
were not persuaded to stack mandatory minimum sentences when the underlying 
felony statute contained no authorization for a mandatory term.     
In Hale, we relied upon Daniels in deciding whether sentences for the sale of 
cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to sell could be imposed 
consecutively.  630 So. 2d at 524.  The defendant in Hale was also designated a 
habitual violent felony offender, allowing the trial judge to sentence him to 
consecutive ten-year mandatory terms for each count.  Id. at 522-23.  Addressing 
whether the trial court erred in imposing the sentences consecutively in light of our 
recent decision in Daniels, we held that Hale’s consecutive sentences had to be 
reversed since his mandatory terms were likewise the result of an enhancement 
statute and were not expressly provided for in the statute.  Id. at 524.   
In [Daniels] we distinguished statutory sentences in which the 
legislature had included a minimum mandatory sentence . . . from 
sentences in which there is no minimum mandatory penalty although 
one may be provided as an enhancement through the habitual violent 
offender statute. . . .  We find that the same principle applies in the 
instant case.  None of the statutes under which Hale was sentenced 
contain a provision for a minimum mandatory sentence.   
 
Id.  While the trial court was permitted to impose separate consecutive sentences 
for the possession of the cocaine and for the sale of the cocaine, we held that it was 
not allowed to first enhance Hale’s sentence as a violent offender and then make 
 
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the enhanced sentence for each charge run consecutively without specific 
legislative authority.  Id. at 525.   
 
Turning to the instant case, it is our view that the plain language of the 
statutes permit the prescribed mandatory minimum sentences for conspiracy to 
traffic and trafficking in the same cocaine to be stacked.  As quoted above, the 
conspiracy to traffic statute, section 893.135(5), provides that “[a]ny person who 
agrees, conspires, combines, or confederates with another person to commit any 
act prohibited by [the trafficking statute] commits a felony of the first degree and is 
punishable as if he or she had actually committed such prohibited act.”  § 
893.135(5), Fla. Stat. (2005).  By the plain wording of the statute, the Legislature 
provides that the punishment for a conspiracy to traffic offense should mirror that 
for an actual trafficking offense; the penalty for trafficking as prescribed in the 
applicable statute requires a mandatory minimum prison term of fifteen years.  See 
§ 893.135(1)(b)1.c.  The conspiracy statute then specifically provides that 
“[n]othing in this [conspiracy] subsection shall be construed to prohibit separate 
convictions and sentences for a violation of this subsection and any violation of 
[the trafficking statute].”  § 893.135(5).  Thus, the governing statutes provide that a 
defendant is to be sentenced separately for conspiracy and for trafficking, with 
each crime requiring a mandatory minimum prison term.  Accordingly, we find 
that the Fourth District was correct in concluding that Kelly’s minimum mandatory 
 
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sentences for conspiracy to traffic and trafficking in cocaine could have been 
imposed consecutively.   
CONCLUSION 
 
Since section 893.135, Florida Statutes, prescribes a separate fifteen-year 
mandatory minimum sentence for conspiracy to traffic in cocaine and for 
trafficking in cocaine, we agree with the Fourth District’s conclusion that the trial 
court could have imposed these mandatory minimum sentences consecutively.  
Kelly’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was properly denied, as trial 
counsel did not misadvise Kelly that he was potentially facing a thirty-year 
mandatory term.  We disapprove of the decisions in Johnson, Frazier and Vickery 
to the contrary.  The Fourth District’s decision herein is approved.   
 
It is so ordered. 
LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANTERO, and 
BELL, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
Fourth District - Case No. 4D04-4009 
 
 
(Broward County) 
 
 
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Fred Haddad, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Celia A. Terenzio, Bureau 
Chief, and Diane F. Medley, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, 
Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent