Case Title: Roten v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 493, 2018

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2019-04-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
BEN ROTEN, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§   
§  No. 493, 2018 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§ Cr. ID No. 0907011738 
§  
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted: March 28, 2019 
Decided: 
April 3, 2019 
 
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and VAUGHN, Justices 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
After consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion to 
affirm, the supplemental submissions, and the record on appeal, the Court concludes 
that: 
(1) 
The pro se appellant, Ben Roten, filed this appeal from the Superior 
Court’s denial of his second motion for correction of an illegal sentence under 
Superior Court Criminal Rule 35(a).  The State has filed a motion to affirm the 
judgment below under Supreme Court Rule 25(a).  We agree that the appeal is 
without merit and affirm.  
(2) 
The record reflects that in January 2010 a Superior Court jury convicted 
Roten of one count of Assault in a Detention Facility.  The State moved to declare 
 
2 
Roten a habitual offender under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a).  On February 19, 2010, the 
Superior Court granted that motion and sentenced Roten to imprisonment at Level 
V supervision for twenty-five years, to be followed by six months of Level IV work 
release.  On direct appeal, Roten argued, among other issues, that the State had failed 
to establish the requisite prior convictions to qualify Roten as a habitual offender.  
This Court affirmed Roten’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal.1 
(3) 
In August 2018, Roten filed a motion for correction of illegal sentence, 
which the Superior Court denied.  Roten has appealed to this Court.  He contends 
that his North Carolina conviction for the offense of Felonious Larceny does not 
constitute a predicate felony under the habitual offender statute.2 
(4) 
The circumstances in which the Superior Court will change a sentence 
under Rule 35(a) are narrow.3  Rule 35(a) permits relief when the sentence imposed 
exceeds the statutorily-authorized limits or violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.4  
Roten does not, and could not, argue that his sentence exceeds the legal limits or 
violates double jeopardy principles.  As a habitual offender, Roten was eligible by 
                                                 
1 Roten v. State, 2010 WL 3860663 (Del. Oct. 4, 2010). 
2 In addition to several motions for postconviction relief or sentence modification, Roten 
previously filed a motion for correction of illegal sentence in which he challenged his sentencing 
as a habitual offender on the basis that, among other arguments, his prior convictions were not 
predicate felonies under the habitual offender statute.  The Superior Court denied that motion, and 
this Court affirmed.  Roten v. State, 2012 WL 3096659 (Del. July 30, 2012). 
3 Brittingham v. State, 705 A.2d 577, 578 (Del. 1998). 
4 Id. 
 
3 
statute for a sentence of up to life imprisonment.5  But the Superior Court sentenced 
him to twenty-five years’ imprisonment, the maximum term of incarceration that 
would be allowed for his conviction of Assault in a Detention Facility, whether or 
not he was a habitual offender.6  His sentence therefore did not exceed the statutory 
limits, even if he were erroneously declared to be a habitual offender. 
(5) 
In any event, the Superior Court did not err by declaring Roten to be a 
habitual offender under Section 4214(a).  The version of Section 4214(a) that was in 
effect at the time of Roten’s sentencing provided that if a defendant “has been 3 
times convicted of a felony . . . under the laws of this State, and/or any other state, 
United States or any territory of the United States, and who shall thereafter be 
convicted of a subsequent felony of this State is declared to be an habitual criminal, 
and the court in which such 4th or subsequent conviction is had, in imposing 
sentence, may in its discretion impose a sentence of up to life imprisonment upon 
the person so convicted.”7   
(6) 
Roten contends that his 1998 conviction in North Carolina for 
Felonious Larceny does not qualify as a predicate felony under Section 4214(a).8  
                                                 
5 11 Del. C. § 4214(a). 
6 See 11 Del. C. § 4205(b)(2) (providing the sentencing range of two to twenty-five years at Level 
V for a class B felony); 11 Del. C. § 1254(b) (providing that Assault in a Detention Facility is a 
Class B felony if the victim is seriously physically injured). 
7 11 Del. C. § 4214(a) (eff. July 12, 2004 through June 29, 2010). 
8 Roten does not argue that the other predicate offenses on which the State relied in seeking to 
have him declared a habitual offender—including his conviction in 2004 in Delaware for Assault 
 
4 
Under the applicable version of Section 4214(a), Felonious Larceny conviction 
constituted a predicate offense  if it was a conviction of “a felony . . . under the laws 
of . . . any other state.”9  The record reveals that, in addition to the predicate offenses 
that Roten does not challenge, Roten was convicted of larceny of goods with a value 
of $1,200, a Class H felony under North Carolina law.10  Roten therefore undeniably 
had been convicted of three prior felonies,11 and the Superior Court correctly 
declared Roten to be a habitual offender. 
(7) 
Roten’s sentence was within statutory limits whether or not he was 
correctly declared to be a habitual offender, and the Superior Court did not err by 
declaring Roten to be a habitual offender.  Accordingly, we find no error in the 
Superior Court’s denial of the motion for correction of sentence. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Leo E. Strine, Jr. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice  
 
                                                 
First Degree and his 1998 conviction in North Carolina of Felonious Breaking and Entering—do 
not qualify as predicate felonies.   
9 11 Del. C. § 4214(a) (eff. July 12, 2004 through June 29, 2010). 
10 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-72(a). 
11 Cf. Ayala v. State, 2019 WL 508797, at *10 (Del. Feb. 11, 2019) (applying the language of 
Section 4214 in the context of prior convictions for Delaware offenses that were no longer felonies 
under Delaware law at the time of the offense for which the State sought to declare the defendant 
a habitual offender).