Case Title: State v. Holt

Citation: 

Docket Number: 105854

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2013-12-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 105,854 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
STANTON HOLT, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
An appellate court reviews a district court's decision on a motion for new trial for 
an abuse of discretion. 
 
2. 
Statutory interpretation and construction are subject to unlimited appellate review. 
 
3. 
The fundamental rule to which all other rules are subordinate is that the intent of 
the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. When language is plain and 
unambiguous, there is no need to resort to statutory construction. An appellate court 
merely interprets the language as it appears; it is not free to speculate and cannot read 
into the statute language not readily found there. 
 
4. 
The following factors are among those to be considered in determining whether 
the legislature's use of the word "shall" makes a particular provision mandatory or 
directory: (1) legislative context and history; (2) substantive effect on a party's rights 
2 
 
versus merely form or procedural effect; (3) the existence or nonexistence of 
consequences for noncompliance; and (4) the subject matter of the statutory provision. 
 
5. 
The 14-day time limit set forth in K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3501(1) for motions for 
new trial based on grounds other than newly discovered evidence is mandatory, not 
discretionary. 
 
6. 
A motion for new trial may be granted in the interest of justice, but only if the 
motion is timely filed. 
 
7. 
Mislabeled pro se motions for new trial under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3501 may be 
considered as K.S.A. 60-1507 motions. 
 
8. 
To avoid the 1-year time limit for filing a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, the movant 
must show that an extension of time is necessary to prevent a manifest injustice. 
"Manifest injustice" has been described as meaning obviously unfair or shocking to the 
conscience. 
 
9. 
Issues not presented to the trial court generally will not be considered for the first 
time on appeal. 
 
Appeal from Geary District Court; MARITZA SEGARRA, judge. Opinion filed December 6, 2013. 
Affirmed. 
 
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Sam S. Kepfield, of Hutchinson, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant. 
 
Steven L. Opat, county attorney, argued the cause, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, was with 
him on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
 
NUSS, C.J.:  Stanton Holt directly appeals the district court's summary dismissal of 
his motion for new trial filed 16 years after his convictions. Because we agree the motion 
was untimely, we affirm. Our jurisdiction is under K.S.A. 22-3601(b) (convicted of Class 
A felony; maximum sentence of life imprisonment imposed). 
 
FACTS 
 
In 1994, Holt was convicted by a jury of more than 60 offenses, including two 
counts of first-degree murder that arose out of a series of burglaries and related offenses 
in Junction City, Kansas. His controlling sentence is life plus 123 to 355 years. On direct 
appeal, Holt claimed jury instruction errors, insufficient evidence, and double jeopardy 
violations. This court affirmed in State v. Holt (Holt I), 260 Kan. 33, 917 P.2d 1332 
(1996). 
 
Holt has pursued many avenues of postconviction relief in Geary County District 
Court. He has filed four pro se habeas corpus motions under K.S.A. 60-1507; two pro se 
motions to correct an illegal sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504; a letter to the district court, 
which was treated as a motion for reconsideration; and the motion for new trial under 
K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 22-3501 (republished without amendment as K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-
3501 and hereafter K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3501), which is the subject of this appeal. He 
has also filed two habeas corpus motions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in United States District 
Court for the District of Kansas. Each of these motions was denied and affirmed on 
4 
 
appeal, except for one motion to correct an illegal sentence that was granted by the 
Kansas Court of Appeals for one count that did not affect Holt's controlling sentence. See 
Holt v. State (Holt III), No. 89,273, 2003 WL 22990148, at *1 (Kan. App. 2003) 
(unpublished opinion). 
 
Holt filed his first 60-1507 motion in 1997. It raised several issues, including 
defective and multiplicitous complaint/information, prosecutorial misconduct, and 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The district court appointed counsel and set an 
evidentiary hearing. Before the hearing, the State filed a motion to dismiss, which Holt's 
attorney acquiesced to and the district court granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 
dismissal, noting: "In the opinion of Holt's lawyer and the district court, the 60-1507 
petition failed to raise substantial issues of law or triable issues of fact. On appeal, Holt 
cites nothing in the record to support his petition." Holt v. State (Holt II), No. 81,489, 
unpublished opinion filed January 29, 1999 (Kan. App.), slip op. at 2. 
 
Holt's second 60-1507 motion raised issues similar to the first, including defective 
and multiplicitous complaint/information, biased jury foreman, and ineffective assistance 
of counsel. Specifically, Holt claimed his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to prosecutorial misconduct, which denied him due process. The Court of Appeals 
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the motion, stating that the ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims raised in Holt's second 60-1507 motion were "a variation of issues Holt 
previously raised either in his direct appeal or in his initial 1507 motion." Holt III, 2003 
WL 22990148, at *3. It further noted that the juror bias claim could have been raised on 
direct appeal or in his first 60-1507 motion. 
 
Holt's third 60-1507 motion raised issues similar to both prior 60-1507 motions, 
including prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After 
noting that the issues were resolved in Holt's direct appeal and two prior 60-1507 
motions, the district court dismissed Holt's third motion as successive and an abuse of 
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remedy. The Court of Appeals affirmed in Holt v. State (Holt IV), No. 96,270, 2007 WL 
1413131, at *2-4 (Kan. App. 2007) (unpublished opinion). 
 
When Holt filed his third 60-1507 motion, he also filed a motion to correct illegal 
sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504. It also raised issues similar to those contained in his 
direct appeal and prior 60-1507 motions, including defective and multiplicitous 
complaint/information, prosecutorial misconduct, biased jury foreman, and ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel. The district court summarily denied the motion, and the Court 
of Appeals affirmed. State v. Holt (Holt V), No. 96,169, 2007 WL 1309615, at *2-4 (Kan. 
App. 2007) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 284 Kan. 948 (2007). 
 
Holt's fourth 60-1507 motion reprised several of his prior claims, including DNA 
inconsistencies, prosecutorial misconduct, biased jury foreman, and ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel. The district court dismissed this motion as successive. It also barred Holt 
from filing any more 60-1507 or similar motions. We agreed the motion was successive 
but also held that the district court exceeded its authority by issuing a blanket prohibitory 
order. We remanded to that court, authorizing the imposition of reasonable filing 
restrictions but requiring that Holt receive some level of notice and opportunity to be 
heard. Holt v. State (Holt VI), 290 Kan. 491, 501, 232 P.3d 848 (2010). The record on 
appeal does not reveal whether any such conditions were ever imposed. But this is the 
backdrop against which Holt filed his motion for new trial in August 2010. 
 
After the district court summarily dismissed Holt's motion as successive and 
untimely, he directly appealed to this court. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
Holt's motion for new trial raises several issues. But on appeal he claims only that 
the district court abused its discretion in its summary dismissal. Accordingly, this court 
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declines to address the other issues as unpreserved. See State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, 
709, 245 P.3d 1030 (2011) (issues not briefed are deemed waived or abandoned) (citing 
State v. Richmond, 289 Kan. 419, 437, 212 P.3d 165 [2009]). 
 
Holt makes three arguments to support his claim of abuse of discretion. First, he 
contends that his motion for new trial was not untimely because the time-limiting 
language in K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3501(1) is merely directory, not mandatory. In the 
alternative, Holt next argues that the court should have treated the motion as one for 
habeas relief under K.S.A. 60-1507. Finally, Holt claims—for the first time on appeal—
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his first 60-1507 motion hearing in 
1997. This ineffectiveness in turn allegedly deprived him of any meaningful review of his 
convictions. The State agrees with the district court, arguing that the motion was 
untimely and successive and that dismissal was not an abuse of discretion. 
 
Standard of review 
 
This court reviews a district court's decision on a motion for new trial for abuse of 
discretion. State v. Rojas-Marceleno, 295 Kan. 525, 539, 285 P.3d 361 (2012). This 
standard includes a review to determine if the "judicial action . . . is based on an error of 
law, i.e., if the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion." State v. Ward, 292 
Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 3, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012). 
 
Issue 1:  The time limit set out in K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3501(1) for motions for new trial 
based on grounds other than newly discovered evidence is mandatory. 
 
The version of K.S.A. 22-3501(1) in effect at the time of Holt's August 2010 
motion allows a court to grant a new trial "if required in the interest of justice." But it 
limits the time in which a defendant may file depending on the particular grounds 
supporting the motion: 
 
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"[a] A motion for a new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be 
made within two years after final judgment . . . . [b] A motion for a new trial based on 
any other grounds shall be made within 14 days after the verdict or finding of guilty or 
within such further time as the court may fix during the 14-day period." K.S.A. 2012 
Supp. 22-3501(1). 
 
Holt's motion for new trial is not based on newly discovered evidence but instead 
reprises many of his previous claims. Accordingly, it is subject to the 14-day time limit 
imposed by the statute for motions "based on any other grounds." But Holt argues that the 
statutory language—declaring that a motion based on grounds other than newly 
discovered evidence "shall be made within 14 days after the verdict or finding of 
guilty"—is directory, not mandatory. (Emphasis added.) 
 
Standard of review 
 
Statutory interpretation is a question of law over which this court has unlimited 
review. State v. Jolly, 291 Kan. 842, 845-46, 249 P.3d 421 (2011) (citing State v. Ballard, 
289 Kan. 1000, 1010, 218 P.3d 432 [2009]). We have held that 
 
 
"'[T]he fundamental rule to which all other rules are subordinate is that the intent 
of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. When language is plain and 
unambiguous, there is no need to resort to statutory construction. An appellate court 
merely interprets the language as it appears; it is not free to speculate and cannot read 
into the statute language not readily found there.' Zimmerman v. Board of Wabaunsee 
County Comm'rs, 289 Kan. 926, Syl. ¶ 3, 218 P.3d 400 (2009)." State v. Hopkins, 295 
Kan. 579, 581, 285 P.3d 1021 (2012). 
 
But when the legislative intent cannot be derived from the plain language of the statute, 
this court may look to legislative history or employ other methods of statutory 
construction. See State v. Raschke, 289 Kan. 911, 914, 219 P.3d 481 (2009). 
 
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Discussion 
 
Holt correctly observes that this court has sometimes interpreted "shall" to be 
directory. See, e.g., State v. McDaniel, 292 Kan. 443, Syl. ¶ 1, 254 P.3d 534 (2011); 
Raschke, 289 Kan. at 914-15. So its meaning is not necessarily plain. 
 
In Raschke, this court articulated four factors to consider in determining whether 
the legislature's use of "shall" makes a statutory provision mandatory or directory: "(1) 
legislative context and history; (2) substantive effect on a party's rights versus merely 
form or procedural effect; (3) the existence or nonexistence of consequences for 
noncompliance; and (4) the subject matter of the statutory provision . . . ." 289 Kan. at 
921. While these factors are considered below, we start our analysis by reviewing the pre-
Raschke case of State v. Bradley, 246 Kan. 316, 787 P.2d 706 (1990). 
 
Bradley sought a new trial based on newly discovered evidence under K.S.A. 22-
3501(1) (Ensley 1988), arguing that the statutory 2-year period of limitation for this 
ground was "'discretionary and advisory.'" 246 Kan. at 317. The statute then provided, as 
it does now, that "'[a] motion for a new trial based on the ground of newly discovered 
evidence may be made within two years after final judgment.'" (Emphasis added.) 246 
Kan. at 317. And it further provided, similar to now, that a motion "'based on any other 
grounds shall be made within 10 days after the verdict.'" (Emphasis added.) 246 Kan. at 
317. 
 
The Bradley court observed that K.S.A. 22-3501(1) was modeled after Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, which at that time provided: "'A motion for a new trial 
based on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be made only before or within 
two years after final judgment.'" 246 Kan. at 317. The court acknowledged that "[t]he 
italicized words do not appear in K.S.A. 22-3501(1)." 246 Kan. at 317. Nevertheless, like 
the decision of the court it cited, the Bradley court held that the intent of the 2-year 
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limitation was "to terminate questions of guilt or innocence at a specific time after trial." 
246 Kan. at 318 (citing United States v. White, 557 F.2d 1249, 1251 [8th Cir.], cert. 
denied 434 U.S. 870 [1977]). As a result, the court concluded the limitation imposed by 
K.S.A. 22-3501(1) was final, which meant the district court properly found Bradley's 
motion was time-barred, as it was filed almost 7 years after his convictions were affirmed 
on appeal. Bradley, 246 Kan. at 318-19. 
 
The Bradley court essentially interpreted K.S.A. 22-3501(1)'s "may be made 
within two years" language as mandatory, not directory. (Emphasis added.). Using 
Bradley's analysis and holding as precedent, a fortiori this court should also interpret 
K.S.A.  2012 Supp. 22-3501(1)'s "shall be made within 14 days" language as mandatory. 
(Emphasis added.) Cf. State v. Andrews, 228 Kan. 368, 375, 614 P.2d 447 (1980) 
(characterizing a K.S.A. 22-3501(1) motion for new trial based on grounds other than 
newly discovered evidence as "the customary motion for a new trial which must be filed 
within ten days") [emphasis added]). 
 
Moreover, this Bradley-based result stands up to the Raschke factors analysis. 
 
 
Factor 1:  Legislative context and history 
 
The legislature clearly intended to establish different timelines for new trial 
motions, distinguishing between those based on (a) newly discovered evidence and (b) 
any other grounds. The former has a generous deadline of "two years after final 
judgment"—a period that would generally begin when the appellate mandate is issued. 
See K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3501(1),  cf. Baker v. State, 297 Kan. 486, 491-92, 303 P.3d 
675 (2013) (1-year period to file a motion under K.S.A. 60-1507 begins the date the 
mandate is issued in the underlying appeal when the movant is in custody under 
sentence). By contrast, the latter has a much shorter deadline of "14 days after the verdict 
10 
 
or finding of guilty or within such further time as the court may fix during the 14-day 
period." K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3501(1). 
 
Irrespective of the Bradley decision, if the 14-day deadline is merely directory, as 
Holt contends, then there would appear to be no legislative need to craft these careful 
distinctions between deadlines. Similarly, if the 14-day deadline is only directory, there 
would appear to be no real purpose behind the legislature's extension of the deadline from 
10 to 14 days in 2010. See Hawley v. Kansas Dept. of Agriculture, 281 Kan. 603, 631, 
132 P.3d 870 (2006) (There is a presumption that the legislature does not intend to enact 
useless or meaningless legislation.). So this Raschke factor strongly supports a holding 
that "shall be made" in K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3501(1) be read as mandatory. 
 
Factors 2 and 3:  Substantive effect on a party's rights versus merely form 
or procedural effect and consequences for noncompliance 
 
Holt argues that K.S.A. 22-3501(1)'s "shall be made" language is directory under 
the 
 
"general rule that where strict compliance with the provision is essential to the 
preservation of the rights of parties affected and to the validity of the proceeding, the 
provision is mandatory, but where the provision fixes a mode of proceeding and a time 
within which an official act is to be done, and is intended to secure order, system, and 
dispatch of the public business, the provision is directory." State v. Deavers, 252 Kan. 
149, 167, 843 P.2d 695 (1992). 
 
 
Holt implies that the time limit should be read as directory because it does not 
have a substantive effect on the rights of the parties. Instead it simply fixes a time within 
which an official act may be accomplished.  
 
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We have held that a principal purpose of a motion for new trial filed on grounds 
other than newly discovered evidence is to call alleged trial errors to the attention of the 
trial court. See State v. Jackson, 255 Kan. 455, 460, 874 P.2d 1138 (1994) (quoting 
Andrews, 228 Kan. at 375). This allows errors to be addressed and possibly cured by the 
lower court—or preserved for later review by the appellate courts. 
 
It is therefore logical for the legislature to set a deadline to serve this purpose and, 
for the same reason, to make the deadline for soon after a verdict or judgment. But 
reading the 14-day deadline of K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3501(1) as anything but mandatory 
jeopardizes the preservation of the rights of the parties affected. More specifically, if a 
defendant waits long enough to raise errors for the first time in a motion for new trial—
here, 14 years after the convictions were affirmed on appeal—the ability of the trial court 
to effectively address the errors is lost. Also lost is the defendant's right to have raised 
those errors on the direct appeal of the convictions. We reach this conclusion because 
generally "[a] point not raised in the district court cannot be raised for the first time on 
appeal." State v. Bledsoe, 272 Kan. 1350, 1362, 39 P.3d 38 (2002) (citing State v. 
McDaniel, 255 Kan. 756, 765, 877 P.2d 961 [1994]). And if the right to have raised the 
errors on direct appeal is lost, it logically follows that the right should also be lost on any 
later-filed motion for new trial. Cf. State v. Burgess, 245 Kan. 481, 488, 781 P.2d 694 
(1989) (defendant failed to preserve for appellate review his claim that trial court erred in 
refusing to have the testimony read back to jury when he failed to raise the issue in his 
motion for a new trial). 
 
Additionally, a "merely directory" interpretation imperils the validity of the post-
trial proceeding. More specifically, K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3608(c) provides that "the 
defendant shall have 14 days after the judgment of the district court to appeal." Allowing 
a motion for new trial to be brought past the 14-day deadline in K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-
3501(1) would therefore appear to confusingly mix trial and appellate court jurisdiction. 
See State v. Gibbons, 256 Kan. 951, Syl. ¶ 10, 889 P.2d 772 (1995) ("When a criminal 
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appeal is docketed, the trial court's jurisdiction ends and the sentence may then be 
modified only after the mandate from the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals is returned, 
or by motion to remand temporarily for modification of sentence. The filing of a notice of 
appeal divests the district court of jurisdiction to hear a motion to modify a sentence."). 
 
We conclude the second and third factors of Raschke also support a reading that 
"shall be made" is mandatory. 
 
 
Factor 4:  Subject matter of the statutory provision 
 
The Bradley court concluded that motions for new trial regarding newly 
discovered evidence must be filed within the 2-year time limit set out in the statute. As 
mentioned, this conclusion easily supports a similar interpretation of the statutory 14-day 
limitation for new trial motions based on other grounds. Furthermore, a motion for new 
trial is one of several often filed in efforts to obtain postconviction relief. In addition to a 
motion for new trial under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3501, it is not uncommon for a 
defendant to file, e.g., a motion to arrest judgment under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3502, a 
motion to withdraw a plea under K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3210, or a habeas motion under 
K.S.A. 60-1507. 
 
K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3502, K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3210, and K.S.A. 60-1507 
establish time limits for bringing their respective motions, which have been held by this 
court to be finite. See State v. McCoin, 278 Kan. 465, 467, 101 P.3d 1204 (2004) (K.S.A. 
22-3502 (Furse) stated that "[t]he motion for arrest of judgment shall be made within 10 
days" after a plea "or within such further time as the court may fix during the 10-day 
period"; motion filed 2 years after entering plea was untimely); State v. Moses, 296 Kan. 
1126, 1128, 297 P.3d 1174 (2013) (K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 22-3210[e] stated that action to 
withdraw plea "must be brought within one year" of certain events, subject to extension 
upon showing of excusable neglect by defendant; motion filed 16 years after sentencing 
13 
 
was untimely); State v. Kelly, 291 Kan. 868, 873, 248 P.3d 1282 (2011) (K.S.A. 60-
1507[f] states that a habeas motion "must be brought within one year" of certain events, 
subject to extension to prevent manifest injustice; motion filed 16 years after sentencing 
was untimely). 
 
While these latter two statutes articulate "must be brought" standards, they 
nevertheless contain parallels with the "shall be made" standards of K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 
22-3501(1) and K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3502. Simply put, motions under all four statutes 
can potentially provide relief through granting of a trial or retrial. Given their similar 
relief, it is doubtful the legislature would make the deadlines for these two particular 
motions for relief mandatory, while similar motions for relief—e.g., under K.S.A. 2012 
Supp. 22-3501—would be merely directory. This conclusion is particularly true when 
considering that the McCoin court ruled a motion to arrest judgment under K.S.A. 22-
3502 (Furse) filed 2 years after the plea was untimely and the statutory language was 
identical to K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3501(1)'s: "shall be made." 
 
In short, this Rashke factor, like the other three, supports a conclusion that the 
language of K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3501(1) regarding motions for new trial based on 
grounds other than newly discovered evidence should be read as mandatory. 
 
Finally, Holt is not entitled to an extension under the statute. K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 
22-3501(1) provides that "[a] motion for new trial based on any other grounds shall be 
made within 14 days after the verdict or finding of guilty or within such further time as 
the court may fix during the 14-day period." (Emphasis added.) A plain reading of this 
language requires that any extension be granted within the 14-day period following the 
verdict or finding of guilty. Though K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3501(1) provides that a new 
trial may be granted in the interest of justice, the "interest of justice" clause has no 
bearing on the statutory time limit. See Bradley, 246 Kan. at 318. 
 
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We conclude that Holt's motion for new trial filed 14 years after his convictions 
were affirmed on appeal was untimely under the language of the statute. So the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in summarily dismissing it as untimely. See Ward, 292 
Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 3 (discretion abused if it is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion). 
 
Issue 2:  Holt's motion for new trial could be considered as a motion for habeas relief 
under K.S.A.60-1507, but it was also untimely filed under that provision and is therefore 
procedurally barred. 
 
Holt filed his pro se motion for new trial only a few months after this court issued 
its opinion authorizing the district court to restrict his future 60-1507 filings. See Holt VI, 
290 Kan. at 503. Instead of raising any new issues, the motion for new trial simply 
repeats many of the claims raised by Holt in previous motions for postconviction relief. 
In light of this background, Holt's motion is fairly characterized as an attempt to avoid 
any habeas filing restrictions we previously authorized the district court to impose but 
upon which the record on appeal is silent. So it will be treated as a 60-1507 motion. 
 
This court has a long history of converting mislabeled motions for postconviction 
relief into 60-1507 motions. See, e.g., Kelly, 291 Kan. at 872 (treating a motion to 
withdraw pleas as a 60-1507 motion); State v. Randall, 257 Kan. 482, Syl. ¶ 1, 894 P.2d 
196 (1995) (motion to convert sentence); Bradley, 246 Kan. at 318 (motion for new trial). 
But even when treated as a 60-1507 claim, Holt's motion is still untimely. 
 
K.S.A. 60-1507(f) sets forth the time limitation for bringing those motions: 
 
 
"(f) Time limitations. (1) Any action under this section must be brought within 
one year of: (i) The final order of the last appellate court in this state to exercise 
jurisdiction on a direct appeal or the termination of such appellate jurisdiction . . . . 
 
 
"(2) The time limitation herein may be extended by the court only to prevent a 
manifest injustice." 
15 
 
 
Holt is well beyond the time limit prescribed in K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(1)(i). So he 
must demonstrate that an extension is necessary to "prevent a manifest injustice." See 
K.S.A. 60-1507(f)(2); Kelly, 291 Kan. at 873 (movant has burden to show manifest 
injustice). "'Manifest injustice' has been described in other contexts as meaning 
'obviously unfair' or 'shocking to the conscience.'" 291 Kan. at 873 (quoting Ludlow v. 
State, 37 Kan. App. 2d 676, 686, 157 P.3d 631 [2007]). 
 
For Holt's claim of a defective and multiplicitous information/complaint, he pled: 
"Manifest injustice . . . as a result of Fundamental Unfairness of Substantial and Injurious 
Effect from Prejudicial Conspiracy of Judicial Official Capacity, U.S. v. Harris, 997 F.2d 
812, 819 (10th Cir. 1993)." But he did not point to any specific facts that support his 
claim. He therefore failed to meet his burden to demonstrate entitlement to an extension. 
So we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Holt's motion as untimely. 
Because dismissal of the motion was proper due to its untimely filing, we need not 
address the district court's additional holding that the motion was successive. 
 
Finally, we do not consider Holt's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at his 
first 60-1507 motion hearing in 1997 because he raises it for the first time on appeal. See 
Bledsoe, 272 Kan. at 1362. And he does not assert any reason for us to make an exception 
to this rule. 
 
Affirmed.