Case Title: Ventling v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1984-02-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Ventling v. State1984 WY 23676 P.2d 573Case Number: 83-128Decided: 02/15/1984STEVEN CLAY VENTLING, APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Supreme Court of Wyoming
STEVEN CLAY VENTLING, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, CarbonCounty, Robert A. 
Hill.

Leonard D. 
Munker, Wyoming Public Defender, and Sylvia Lee Hackl, Appellate Counsel, 
Wyoming Public Defender Program, Cheyenne, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Patrick Day, Legal Intern, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and 
CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant pled guilty 
to one count of carrying a dangerous weapon with unlawful intent in violation of 
§ 6-11-101, W.S. 1977, Cum.Supp. 19821 (this section was in effect at the 
time of this incident, but has been superseded by § 6-8-103, W.S. 1977 (June 
1983 Replacement)). He was sentenced, after a full hearing, to two to five years 
in the penitentiary. It is from this sentence and the judgment thereon that the 
appellant appeals. The sole issue on appeal, as worded by appellant, is as 
follows:

"Whether the trial court 
abused its discretion in sentencing Appellant to a term of years in the Wyoming 
State Penitentiary, rather than placing him on probation."

[¶2.]     The standard by which 
this court reviews sentences is well established and often quoted. We have 
repeatedly held that we are reluctant to review the length of a sentence imposed 
by a trial court if it is within the limits set by statute and that we will not 
disturb a sentence absent a clear abuse of discretion. Wright v. State, Wyo., 670 P.2d 1090, 1092 
(1983), reh. granted (January 19, 1984 Order, Wyoming Supreme Court); Eaton v. State, Wyo., 660 P.2d 803, 806 (1983); Taylor v. State, Wyo., 658 P.2d 1297, 1300 (1983); Daniel v. State, Wyo., 644 P.2d 172, 178 (1982); and Jones v. State, Wyo., 602 P.2d 378, 380, 
381 (1979).

[¶3.]     We have defined an 
abuse of discretion as follows:

"`A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law 
committed by the court under the circumstances. * * *'" Wright v. State, supra, 670 P.2d  at 
1092, quoting Martinez v. State, 
Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 (1980).

[¶4.]     Sentence imposition 
involves consideration of two broad categories - the crime and its 
circumstances, and the character of the criminal. The latter of these categories 
could reasonably increase or decrease the criminal's sentence. His family 
background, education, intelligence, employment record, attitude, etc., may well 
bear upon the accomplishment of the purpose of the sentence. Wright v. State, 
supra.

"* * * While the 
punishment of a wrongdoer should be equal to the measure of his sin, the modern 
philosophy of penology is that the punishment should fit the offender, and not 
merely the crime, and the belief no longer prevails that every offense in a like 
legal category calls for an identical punishment without regard to the past life 
and habits of a particular offender. Responsibility should be the basis of 
punishment, and individualization the criterion of its application." 24B C.J.S. 
Criminal Law, § 1974, p. 539.

A brief summary 
of some of the factors and philosophy involved in sentencing is included at 
length in the Wright case, supra, and will not be repeated 
here.

[¶5.]     Therefore, we must look 
both to the circumstances surrounding the crime, as well as to the background of 
the appellant. This case arose from the following factual situation. On August 
17, 1982, Judy Jackson, a teacher and librarian from Vancouver, British 
Columbia, was traveling with a bike touring group. She 
was riding her bike several miles ahead of the group when a man, wearing blue 
jeans and a ski mask and holding a gun, stepped into the road and ordered her to 
stop. She stopped and got off her bike, at which time the man took the bike into 
a culvert at the side of the road and demanded that Judy Jackson follow. He also 
at that time discharged his firearm into the air.

[¶6.]     While this was 
happening, a pickup truck came over the hill and Judy Jackson stopped it and 
asked the driver for assistance. Another vehicle also stopped at approximately 
the same time. The man with the gun fled; law enforcement personnel were 
contacted; a search was begun; and the appellant was apprehended and charged 
with three counts of carrying a dangerous weapon with unlawful intent. The 
appellant pled guilty to one count, and the others were 
dismissed.

[¶7.]     The appellant, Steven 
Clay Ventling, is a former highway patrolman. He was employed as such for the 
state of Wyoming from 1978 until September 1982, and 
was so employed at the time of the above-described incident. He was not, 
however, on duty at the time of the incident. He left the highway patrol to run 
for the office of sheriff of CarbonCounty.

[¶8.]     The sentencing judge 
ordered a presentence investigation and report, and appellant's attorney made a 
lengthy statement to the judge, asking for parole before sentence, or probation. 
The prosecuting attorney, in her statement to the court, said in 
part:

"The fact that he stood 
to lose so much and chose to commit this crime is one of the reasons the State 
requests this Court deny probation in this matter. If a man choses [sic] to 
commit a crime like this, in spite of the fact of his pride in his job as a 
highway patrolman, and his respect that he received from the community, and in 
spite of the love of a supportive family, if that isn't enough to stop him from 
committing a crime like this, I ask what good is supervised probation. * * 
*

* * * * * 
*

"The Probation and Parole 
Agent who worked with this Defendant also recommends that probation be denied. 
And on behalf of the State, I strongly recommend that probation be denied in 
this matter."

The appellant 
was given an opportunity to speak for himself, and he called witnesses to 
testify as to his character.

[¶9.]     With all of this 
information before him, the judge sentenced the appellant to a sentence of "not 
less than twenty-four months nor more than sixty months," with credit given to 
time spent in the county jail. In regard to the sentence, the judge 
noted:

"* * * You come across as 
an excellent individual, one who is attentive to the needs of your family, who 
has comported excellently in your community, yet, Mr. Ventling, the underlying 
offense for which you're before the Court is of a most serious nature and it has 
to be taken into account the position of trust that you had assumed and for 
which you were engaged in, though not on duty on that occasion, but it was your 
sworn duty to, as a law enforcement [sic] officer, protect the very person that 
you did in fact terrorize by brandishing this gun and for which you say you have 
no accountability for your actions. There's no reason that you can give for 
this. But in the process you have, as was noted by the State's counsel, with 
particular asiduous [sic] care, attempted to conceal those activities in such a 
way that had it come to pass that you might not have been discovered, if those 
had been the facts of the case, you could have very well been emboldened to 
terrorize another victim and so on and so forth. So that whether it is true or 
not, it at least comes across from the evidence that this is a Jekell-Hyde [sic] 
situation. You did not do this in any manner characteristic to your background 
to the knowledge people had of you in the community, but you did do it and what 
would have been the result if your actions had been completed would have placed 
you in a far worse position than you are today before this 
Court.

"Now, Mr. Ventling, the 
Court has taken into account, as Mr. Honaker noted the Court must in its 
sentencing standards, that you should be first of all given all consideration 
for probation. And I have given that consideration and I have weighed that 
against the proposition that you were a law enforcement officer at the time you 
committed a crime of the most base nature and that there were other factors that 
could have made it more serious, except the plea bargain agreements intervened 
to ameliorate the severity of other acts."

[¶10.]  Appellant feels that the trial judge 
erred in not granting him probation based on the lack of prior criminal history, 
his reputation for being an involved and good family man, and for being active 
in the community. We have said before that the only right which a convicted 
defendant has for probation is that his petition therefor be considered by the 
sentencing court, and such petition must be granted or denied in the exercise of 
sound legal discretion, and not based on whim or caprice nor any ground not 
sanctioned by law. Sanchez v. State, 
Wyo., 592 P.2d 1130, 1137 (1979).

[¶11.]  In a report by the President's Commission 
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free 
Society, p. 141 (1967), it was noted that:

"`There is no decision in 
the criminal process that is as complicated and difficult as the one made by the 
sentencing judge. A sentence prescribes punishment, but it also should be the 
foundation of an attempt to rehabilitate the offender, to insure that he does 
not endanger the community, and to deter others from similar crimes in the 
future. Often these objectives are mutually inconsistent, and the sentencing 
judge must choose one at the expense of the others. * * *'" 4 Wharton's Criminal 
Procedure, § 609, fn. 14, p. 207 (12th ed. 1976).

[¶12.]  In this case, the sentencing judge had 
all the pertinent information before him. He listened to the appellant, his 
attorney, and several character witnesses; he had the benefit of a presentence 
report. The statute to which appellant pled guilty allows for a sentence not to 
exceed five years. The judge sentenced appellant to a period within that 
statutory maximum and gave his reasons therefor. We cannot say that this was a 
clear abuse of discretion.

[¶13.]  We affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1 Section 6-11-101 
provides as follows:

"(a) Any person who 
knowingly possesses, manufactures, transports, repairs or sells any firearm, 
knife, dirk, club, bludgeon, chain, rock, bottle, or any other dangerous or 
deadly weapon, or any explosive or incendiary apparatus, instrument or 
materials, with the intent to unlawfully threaten the life or physical well 
being of another, to commit assault or assault and battery or to inflict bodily 
harm or injury upon the person of another is guilty of a felony and, upon 
conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not to 
exceed five (5) years.

* * * * * 
*

"(c) Nothing in this 
section shall be construed to apply to peace or law enforcement officers or to 
any other person authorized or required to carry any such weapons, while in the 
performance of their official duties."