Case Title: Dill v. Kroger Limited Partnership I

Citation: 

Docket Number: 200823

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2021-07-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
SHIRLEY DILL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 200823 
 
 
 
         JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
  
    JULY 8, 2021 
KROGER LIMITED PARTNERSHIP I, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF STAUNTON 
Charles L. Ricketts, III, Judge Designate 
In this appeal, we consider whether the circuit court erred in granting a motion to strike 
claims of malicious prosecution and false imprisonment, which were brought by a person who 
was mistakenly identified, charged, and prosecuted as a shoplifter. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Shirley Dill (Dill) is a 70-year-old woman who resides in Staunton, Virginia.  Dill 
frequents a Kroger supermarket, located in Staunton and operated by Kroger Limited Partnership 
I (Kroger). 
On February 22, 2017, Sarah Lynch (Lynch), one of the managers for the Kroger 
supermarket, was performing routine tasks around the store when she paused by the checkout 
counters because she saw a shopper place an unscanned package of strawberries into a shopping 
bag.  Lynch, who asserts that she believed the shopper was named Shirley Dill, told the shopper 
that she did not think the strawberries had been scanned.  The shopper scanned the package of 
strawberries. 
Following the incident, Lynch sent an e-mail to one of Kroger’s asset protection 
specialists, Gina Harrison (Harrison).  The subject line of the e-mail read “Shirley Dill,” and the 
message stated “I caught her trying to put a box of strawberries in her bag without paying for 
them.  I should have let her leave and got her for stealing, but could you look on camera and see 
if she got us for anything?” 
 
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Harrison investigated the incident and discovered that the Kroger supermarket shopper 
card (the Plus Card) used for the transaction witnessed by Lynch was registered to Susan 
Rosenmeier (Rosenmeier), not Dill.  When this fact was brought to Lynch’s attention, Lynch 
suggested that Dill must have borrowed and used a relative’s Plus Card, because she knew that 
the shopper she saw was Shirley Dill.  Harrison believed Lynch.  Harrison continued to 
investigate by looking through other transactions linked to Rosenmeier’s Plus Card.  She found 
two video recordings of the same shopper stealing roughly $40 worth of items from Kroger. 
Harrison reported the incidents to the Staunton Police Department, and she showed the 
videos to Staunton Police Investigator Stewart Green (Investigator Green), the police officer who 
responded to her report.  Harrison, based upon her discussions with Lynch, identified the shopper 
in the video as Shirley Dill.  She told Investigator Green that a Kroger manager knew the 
shopper and verified the shopper’s identity.  Investigator Green returned to the police station and 
ran a criminal history check on Dill.  That same afternoon, relying on Harrison’s report and 
Lynch’s identification of the shopper, Investigator Green applied for and obtained two petty 
larceny misdemeanor warrants for shoplifting against Dill. 
After obtaining the warrants of arrest, Investigator Green called Dill to inform her that he 
had two warrants for her arrest for shoplifting at the Kroger store.  Dill denied stealing from 
Kroger and protested that she was innocent.  She stated that she had a Plus Card registered in her 
name and asserted that she used that card to shop at the Kroger store.  According to Dill, 
Investigator Green responded that Kroger did not make mistakes when reporting theft and that 
Kroger had a videotape of her stealing on two different occasions.  Investigator Green ordered 
Dill to report to the police station the next day. 
 
 
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On March 1, 2017, Dill reported to the police station, as instructed, and she was taken 
before a magistrate, who placed her on bond, ordered her to remain in the Commonwealth, and 
prohibited her from visiting the Kroger store.  Dill borrowed money and eventually engaged a 
lawyer to defend her on the charges.  The criminal trial was continued multiple times over 
several months.  Shortly before the scheduled criminal trial, in May, her lawyer viewed the 
Kroger supermarket surveillance video at the Commonwealth’s attorney’s office.  As soon as 
Dill’s lawyer saw the shopper in the video, he told the Commonwealth’s attorney that “you 
would have to be blind to think that that was Shirley Dill.”  The Commonwealth’s attorney 
agreed and moved to dismiss the charges on the day of trial; the trial court dismissed, with 
prejudice, the charges against Dill. 
In June 2017, another shoplifting incident occurred at the Kroger supermarket, and it 
involved the same shopper whom Lynch had previously identified as Dill.  This time, however, 
Harrison apprehended the shoplifter at the time of the incident.  When Harrison asked for the 
shopper’s driver’s license, she saw that the name on the license was Susan Rosenmeier, which 
was also the name associated with the Plus Card that Harrison used to investigate the thefts for 
which Dill was charged.  Harrison called Investigator Green and told him of the mistake 
previously made in identifying the purported shoplifter.  Investigator Green informed Harrison 
that Dill had already been charged and that the trial court had already dismissed the cases 
because it was obvious that Dill had been misidentified. 
On January 8, 2018, Dill filed a complaint against Kroger and Lynch in the Circuit Court 
of the City of Staunton, asserting claims of malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and defamation.  In response, Kroger and Lynch 
together filed a single responsive pleading, which contained their grounds for demurrer and an 
 
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answer.  The circuit court denied Kroger and Lynch’s demurrers, and on February 12, 2020, the 
circuit court began a jury trial on Dill’s claims. 
At trial, during Dill’s case-in-chief, Lynch agreed that it was Rosenmeier whom she saw 
with the unscanned package of strawberries at the checkout counter.  She explained that she 
mistakenly thought that Rosenmeier was named Shirley Dill because, in the past, prior to the 
incident involving the strawberries, a third party—she did not remember who—had told her that 
the person now known to be Rosenmeier, was named Shirley Dill.  She did not identify the third 
party or recount the time frame or circumstances surrounding why she had previously asked 
about the customer’s name.  Lynch said that she regularly saw Rosenmeier at the Kroger 
supermarket and had been referring to her as “Shirley.”  She stated that she had never seen 
Rosenmeier behave suspiciously, except for that time when she saw Rosenmeier place 
unscanned strawberries into a shopping bag.  Lynch testified that when she saw Rosenmeier take 
the unscanned strawberries, she had called out, “Shirley,” at which point Rosenmeier looked up 
at Lynch, who then told Rosenmeier that the strawberries had not been scanned. 
Lynch admitted that she oversaw two earlier investigations concerning incidents, at or 
around the Kroger store, involving Dill.  The first incident occurred in September 2015 when 
Dill was injured in the Kroger supermarket parking lot.  Lynch wrote the incident report for 
Kroger and spoke with Dill to ask for Dill’s identifying information.  In that incident report, 
Lynch recorded that she believed Dill was “out for something” because Dill’s statements were 
inconsistent.  When asked why she thought Rosenmeier was Dill, although she had previously 
met Dill, Lynch stated that she had no recollection of this prior meeting with Dill and was 
reminded about the incident report only when it was brought to her attention during the 
discovery process undertaken in the instant case.  The second incident report that Lynch wrote 
 
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involving Dill concerned a Dr. Pepper sales agent’s allegation that Dill was stalking him and had 
stolen his jacket.  Lynch testified that she did not believe the sales agent’s claims, nonetheless 
she conducted an investigation to determine if the sales agent’s jacket had been stolen by Dill.  
Lynch stated that she determined that the jacket had not been taken by Dill, but she did not 
discuss the issue with Dill face to face. 
Despite the two prior incidents she investigated and reported on involving Dill, Lynch 
claimed that she did not know Dill and would not have recognized her prior to the instant case.  
She insisted that she had no “ax[e] to grind” against Dill. 
Harrison testified that when she received Lynch’s e-mail, she recognized the name 
Shirley Dill.  She admitted that she was familiar with the name Shirley Dill because of the 
incident involving the Dr. Pepper sales agent’s claim that Dill was stalking him and had stolen 
from him.  She conceded that, unlike Lynch who had met Dill and spoken with her face to face, 
Harrison had never seen Dill prior to the instant proceedings. 
Investigator Green testified that after his meeting with Harrison, he was no longer trying 
to confirm the identity of the shopper caught on the video surveillance.  He stated that Harrison 
had given no indication that Kroger was uncertain about the shoplifter’s identity.  He asserted 
that Harrison reported that a store manager, i.e., Lynch, knew the shoplifter and identified the 
shoplifter as Shirley Dill.  Investigator Green explained that, based on the video surveillance 
evidence provided by Harrison and the positive identification made by Lynch, he believed he had 
probable cause to apply for Dill’s arrest.  He added that the magistrate, who reviewed his 
application for the warrants of arrest, evidently agreed with him because the magistrate issued 
two warrants for Dill’s arrest. 
 
 
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After Dill rested her case, Kroger and Lynch moved to strike Dill’s case-in-chief, arguing 
that this was a case of simple mistaken identity.  As to the malicious prosecution claim, Kroger 
and Lynch argued that Harrison and Lynch had probable cause to report Dill to law enforcement 
because they knew that a person had shoplifted from the Kroger supermarket, and “they thought 
at that time that they had the correct person.”  They averred that the evidence indicated that 
Harrison and Lynch did not act maliciously; their identification of Dill as the perpetrator was a 
simple mistake.  Regarding the false imprisonment claim, Kroger and Lynch argued that a false 
arrest is the act of the arresting officer; the arrest is not the act of the informant, even if the 
informant gave wrong information. 
Dill responded that the language in Lynch’s incident report concerning the parking lot 
incident and the language in Lynch’s e-mail to Harrison concerning the strawberry incident, both 
of which besmirched Dill, were evidence that Lynch had a vendetta against Dill.  Dill added that 
a reasonably prudent person would not have positively identified Dill by name as the perpetrator 
based upon the evidence known to Lynch and Harrison at the time they reported the incident to 
Investigator Green.  Concerning the false imprisonment claim, Dill responded that, regardless of 
who actually apprehends the suspect, a person who provides a false report to law enforcement 
officers, which results in an arrest, should be held liable for false imprisonment. 
The circuit court granted Kroger and Lynch’s motion to strike as to all of Dill’s claims, 
holding that “this is a mistake case.”  As regards the malicious prosecution claim, the circuit 
court held that Dill presented no evidence that Kroger and Lynch acted with malice because 
there was no evidence that Lynch had any “motive other than . . . a desire to see justice done to 
enforce the law and to punish the guilty.”  With regard to the false imprisonment claim, the 
circuit court held that Dill did not present any evidence that Kroger and Lynch participated in 
 
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Dill’s false arrest.  The circuit court observed that even though Lynch, Harrison, and Investigator 
Green were mistaken about the shopper’s identity, they still had probable cause to believe that 
“the person they saw on the video” stole items from the Kroger supermarket.  The circuit court 
also granted the motion to strike as regards the intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
defamation claims, holding that there was no evidence to show that Lynch acted with the specific 
purpose and intent to either cause Dill emotional distress or to defame Dill. 
The circuit court entered a final order memorializing its grant of Kroger and Lynch’s 
motion to strike.  Dill appeals.  Three assignments of error have been granted: 
1. The Circuit Court of the City of Staunton erred in granting Defendants’ motion to strike 
Plaintiff’s case at the close of Plaintiff’s case in chief by failing to properly apply the 
applicable standard of review as it failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the Plaintiff, improperly assessed the weight and credibility of the evidence, and 
rejected reasonable inferences supported by the evidence, thereby denying Plaintiff a trial 
by jury. 
 
2. The Circuit Court of the City of Staunton erred in granting Defendants’ motion to strike 
Plaintiff’s claim of malicious prosecution at the conclusion of Plaintiff’s case in chief, 
when it found Defendants had no malicious intent. 
 
3. The Circuit Court of the City of Staunton erred in granting Defendants’ motion to strike 
Plaintiff’s claim of false imprisonment at the conclusion of Plaintiff’s case in chief, when 
it found Defendants had no malicious intent and did not participate in Plaintiff’s arrest. 
 
II.  ANALYSIS 
We review a circuit court’s decision on a motion to strike in the light most favorable to 
the non-moving party, and the non-moving party “must be given the benefit of all substantial 
conflict in the evidence, and all fair inferences that may be drawn therefrom.”  Egan v. Butler, 
290 Va. 62, 73 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
A circuit court must rule on a motion to strike based on the presumption that the jury will 
believe all the evidence favorable to the plaintiff, as well as all reasonable inferences that a jury 
might draw therefrom in favor of the plaintiff.  Tahboub v. Thiagarajah, 298 Va. 366, 371 
 
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(2020); Green v. Ingram, 269 Va. 281, 290 (2005).  When evaluating a motion to strike, the 
circuit court must not judge the weight or credibility of evidence, because to do so “would 
invade the province of the jury.”  Tahboub, 298 Va. at 371; see Green, 269 Va. at 290.  We 
granted Dill’s assignments of error concerning her claims that the circuit court erred in granting 
the motions to strike her malicious prosecution and false imprisonment claims. 
A.  Malicious Prosecution 
To prevail in an action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove that the 
prosecution was “(1) malicious; (2) instituted by or with the cooperation of the defendant; 
(3) without probable cause; and (4) terminated in a manner not unfavorable to the plaintiff.”  
Lewis v. Kei, 281 Va. 715, 722 (2011).  The parties in this case put in issue only the first and 
third elements.  “Actions for malicious prosecution arising from criminal proceedings are not 
favored in Virginia and the requirements for maintaining such actions are more stringent than 
those applied to other tort cases to ensure that criminal prosecutions are brought in appropriate 
cases without fear of reprisal by civil actions.”  Id. at 722-23. 
Dill contends it was the jury’s role to determine if her evidence was sufficient to prove 
the elements of malice and lack of probable cause necessary to support her claim of malicious 
prosecution.  She argues that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that Kroger and 
Lynch did not have probable cause to believe that Dill was the purported shoplifter, and therefore 
that the jury could properly find that they acted with legal malice in making that claim to the 
police. 
Kroger and Lynch argue that Dill presented no direct evidence that Kroger and Lynch 
intended to act maliciously, thus the witnesses’ testimony asserting the absence of malice was 
binding upon Dill.  Kroger and Lynch add that malice cannot be inferred from their actions when 
 
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they acted with probable cause in reporting a theft, which indisputably occurred; they argue it 
was not their fault that the police officer did not confirm the shoplifter’s identity before charging 
Dill.  We find Kroger and Lynch’s arguments unpersuasive. 
1.  Lack of Probable Cause 
“We have defined probable cause as knowledge of such facts and circumstances as excite 
the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on such facts and circumstances, that the plaintiff is guilty 
of the crime of which he is suspected.”  Lewis, 281 Va. at 723 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The lack of probable cause is an essential element of the tort of malicious prosecution.  
Reilly v. Shepherd, 273 Va. 728, 734 (2007).  Accordingly, it is appropriate to begin our analysis 
by considering whether the evidence presented in Dill’s case-in-chief, viewed in the light most 
favorable to Dill, supports the circuit court’s granting of the motion to strike, upon it concluding 
that probable cause to charge Dill with shoplifting existed, as a matter of law. 
When there is a conflict of evidence concerning probable cause, the issue of whether 
probable cause existed is a question reserved for the jury’s determination.  Giant of Va., Inc. v. 
Pigg, 207 Va. 679, 684 (1967); O’Connor v. Tice, 281 Va. 1, 9 (2011). 
In this instance, there is undoubted probable cause to believe that the thefts occurred.  
However, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Dill, there is conflict in the 
evidence concerning probable cause to believe that Dill was the shoplifter seen in Kroger’s store.  
The Plus Card used by the perpetrator was registered to Rosenmeier.  Harrison uncovered 
incidents of theft by pulling up videos connected to transactions using Rosenmeier’s Plus Card.  
Undisputedly, the person on the video did not resemble Dill.  There was no physical or videotape 
evidence connecting Dill to the thefts. 
 
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Lynch claims that she identified Dill as the thief because some unidentified third person 
had, at some point in the past, told Lynch that Rosenmeier, the person Lynch saw shoplifting, 
was Shirley Dill.  However, there is documentary evidence that Lynch had previously met and 
talked to the real Dill, and that Lynch had also written another report for Kroger concerning Dill, 
before the shoplifting allegations.  Based upon the conflicting evidence and the inferences which 
could be drawn from that evidence, it was for a jury to determine whether probable cause existed 
for Lynch and Kroger to believe that it was Dill who actually perpetrated the crimes using 
Rosenmeier’s Plus Card.  In evaluating Kroger and Lynch’s motion to strike, viewing the 
evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to Dill, there was a conflict 
in the evidence concerning probable cause, and the circuit court should have determined that 
whether probable cause existed was a question for the jury to decide. 
2.  Malice 
In the context of malicious prosecution actions, malice is “any controlling motive other 
than a good faith desire to further the ends of justice, enforce obedience to the criminal laws, 
suppress crime, or see that the guilty are punished.”  Hudson v. Lanier, 255 Va. 330, 333 (1998).  
“It is not necessary to prove actual spite, hatred, ill will, or grudge against or desire to injure the 
person charged with the crime.”  Freezer v. Miller, 163 Va. 180, 202, 207 (1934).  We have 
previously held that an individual acts maliciously if she initiates a criminal prosecution “upon 
no or such slight grounds of suspicion as to indicate a general disregard of [others].”  Id.  In other 
words, an individual pursues a criminal prosecution maliciously if her basis for suspecting a 
defendant is so tenuous that the prosecution can be said to have been “directed by chance” 
against the defendant.  Id. 
 
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A jury may infer malice from a history of animosity between the parties because the 
determination of malice is based on the parties’ entire course of conduct towards each other.  
Pallas v. Zaharopoulos, 219 Va. 751, 755, 757 (1979).  Additionally, a jury may infer malice 
from a lack of probable cause, thus evidence showing lack of probable cause is always 
admissible to prove malice.  Reilly, 273 Va. at 733; Freezer, 163 Va. at 204.  In previous 
instances when we have inferred malice from the lack of probable cause, we have sometimes 
referred to such malice as “legal malice.”  See Giant of Va., Inc., 207 Va. at 685. 
“The existence of malice ‘is always a question for the jury under all the circumstances of 
the case,’” if there is sufficient evidence to make it a jury question.  See id. (quoting Clinchfield 
Coal Corp. v. Redd, 123 Va. 420, 443, 444 (1918)).  Similarly, the inference of malice from a 
lack of probable cause is usually a question reserved for the jury’s determination.  Clinchfield 
Coal Corp., 123 Va. at 443.  Further, while in an action for malicious prosecution, malice may 
be inferred from lack of probable cause if the circumstances warrant that inference, the inference 
may be repelled by other circumstances, despite the lack of probable cause for the prosecution.  
See id. at 446; Southern Ry. Co. v. Mosby, 112 Va. 169, 179-80 (1911). 
In the instant case, there is evidence which supports a finding of malice because Kroger 
and Lynch reported Dill, by name, to the police as the perpetrator of two crimes, despite video 
evidence that the crime was perpetrated by someone else who bore no physical resemblance to 
Dill, and who used her own Kroger Plus Card while perpetrating the crimes.  The Plus Card used 
in the transactions was registered to Rosenmeier; inexplicably neither Lynch nor Harrison 
investigated their conjecture that Dill was the user of the card and that she was somehow related 
to Rosenmeier and that Dill used Rosenmeier’s Plus Card.  Dill provided evidence that Lynch 
had previously encountered Dill and had a history of heightened suspicion against Dill, as 
 
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illustrated in the incident report prepared by Lynch when Dill complained of an injury sustained 
in the Kroger parking lot.  Lynch had also been tasked with investigating another reported 
incident concerning Dill in the Kroger store.  Although Lynch’s professed motive for sending 
Harrison an e-mail, which requested further investigation of Dill as the thief, after the incident 
involving the strawberries, could have been solely to “suppress crime,” inferences to the contrary 
may be drawn from the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to Dill. 
Dill argues that the circuit court did not apply the proper evidentiary standard to the 
defendants’ motion to strike, which required the circuit court to examine the evidence in the light 
most favorable to Dill.  Instead, the circuit court weighed the evidence and improperly made 
findings of fact; it accepted some testimony, disregarded other testimony, and after having done 
so concluded that in its “view of the case, this is a mistake case.”  We agree with Dill that the 
circuit court did not view the evidence in the light most favorable to Dill, in ruling upon the 
motion to strike, and thus, applied an improper evidentiary standard in ruling upon Kroger and 
Lynch’s motion to strike Dill’s malicious prosecution claim. 
The circuit court erred in granting Kroger and Lynch’s motion to strike Dill’s malicious 
prosecution claim because it ignored the evidence that was favorable to Dill when it made a 
finding of fact, based upon Lynch’s testimony, that Lynch had honestly mistaken Rosenmeier for 
Dill and bore no ill will against Dill.  In the present case, Dill presented sufficient evidence to 
raise a jury question as to whether there was probable cause to believe that the shoplifter was 
Dill, and it was the jury’s role to determine if malice could be inferred from the evidence 
presented.  See Lane v. Scott, 220 Va. 578, 582 (1979) (“Where the evidence fairly supports 
multiple inferences, a trial judge ruling on a motion to strike must adopt those inferences most 
 
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favorable to the party whose evidence is challenged, even though he may believe 
different inferences are more probable.”). 
B.  False Imprisonment 
Dill argues that the circuit court erred in granting Kroger and Lynch’s motion to strike 
her false imprisonment claim because Kroger and Lynch instigated and caused Dill’s arrest.  She 
contends that she presented sufficient evidence for a jury to determine that Kroger acted 
maliciously in causing her arrest because Harrison reported to the police that Dill perpetrated the 
two incidents of theft. 
Kroger and Lynch respond that a person cannot be falsely imprisoned pursuant to a 
lawful arrest and highlight that Dill did not contest the lawfulness of her arrest.  They also argue 
that a third party reporting a crime cannot be responsible for a police officer’s subsequent arrest 
of a suspect, unless the third party ordered the officer to arrest the suspect unlawfully.  We agree 
with Kroger and Lynch that a person cannot be falsely imprisoned if her liberty was restrained 
pursuant to a lawful arrest. 
To prevail in an action for false imprisonment, a plaintiff must prove that her liberty was 
restrained, either by words or acts that she would fear to disregard, and that there was no 
sufficient legal excuse to justify the restraint.  Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Wickline, 188 Va. 
485, 489 (1948); Lewis, 281 Va. at 724.  “False imprisonment is restraint of one’s liberty without 
any sufficient cause therefor[; it is not essential that a person is] confined in jail or in the custody 
of an officer.”  Zayre of Va., Inc. v. Gowdy, 207 Va. 47, 50-51 (1966).  “If a person is under a 
reasonable apprehension that force will be used unless he willingly submits, and he does submit 
to the extent that he is denied freedom of action, this, in legal contemplation, constitutes false 
imprisonment.”  Id. at 51. 
 
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However, in no case may a person prevail on a claim of false imprisonment if her arrest 
was lawful.  Lewis, 281 Va. at 724.  “The gist of [false imprisonment] is the illegal detention of 
the person, without lawful process, or the unlawful execution of lawful process.”  Montgomery 
Ward & Co., 188 Va. at 489 (quoting Kress & Co. v. Roberts, 143 Va. 71, 75 (1925)).  
Accordingly, a plaintiff cannot maintain an action for false imprisonment because of an arrest 
pursuant to a regular and valid warrant; that is, if the imprisonment results from her being “taken 
in due course to the magistrate and there admitted to bail or imprisoned regularly upon due order 
of commitment from him.”  Lewis, 281 Va. at 724 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Notably, unlike in an action for malicious prosecution, neither malice nor the lack of 
probable cause is an element of the tort of false imprisonment.  Montgomery Ward & Co., 188 
Va. at 489-90; Zayre of Va. Inc., 207 Va. at 51. 
In this case, after the warrants were issued, Dill reported to the police department, as 
instructed by Investigator Green.  She was taken before a magistrate who placed her on bond, 
ordered her to remain in the Commonwealth, and prohibited her from visiting the Kroger store.  
The circuit court did not err in striking Dill’s false imprisonment claim because Dill was 
detained pursuant to lawful process, which was lawfully executed.  Even presuming that there is 
sufficient evidence in the record for a jury to find that Kroger and Lynch instigated Dill’s arrest, 
there was no evidence to show that Dill was illegally detained without lawful process.  Even if 
the actions of Kroger and Lynch were malicious, and their allegations were not supported by 
probable cause, Dill’s arrest was lawful because it was a consequence of proper legal process.  
Therefore, the circuit court did not err in granting Kroger and Lynch’s motion to strike Dill’s 
false imprisonment claim. 
 
 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the circuit court erred in granting Kroger and 
Lynch’s motion to strike Dill’s malicious prosecution claim; it did not err in granting Kroger and 
Lynch’s motion to strike Dill’s other claims.  We will therefore reverse the judgment of the 
circuit court, in part, and remand this case to the circuit court for trial proceedings in accordance 
with this opinion. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
and remanded.