Case Title: State Bd. of Equalization v. City of Lander

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1994-10-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
State Bd. of Equalization v. City of Lander1994 WY 95882 P.2d 844Case Number: 93-211Decided: 10/03/1994Supreme Court of Wyoming
The 
STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION for the State of Wyoming,

Appellant 
(Respondent),

v.

The 
CITY OF LANDER, a Municipal Corporation,

Appellee 
(Petitioner).

Appeal 
from District Court, Fremont County, D. Terry Rogers, 
J.

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., and Michael L. Hubbard, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., 
Cheyenne.

Representing 
Appellee:

Rick 
L. Sollars, Lander City Atty., and John T. Pappas, Lander.

 

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE,* MACY,** 
and TAYLOR, JJ.

* 
Retired July 6, 1994.

** 
Chief Justice at time of oral argument.

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The Constitution 
and laws of the State of Wyoming exempt from taxation property which is used 
"primarily" for a "governmental purpose." In this appeal, we are asked to 
determine if property owned by one governmental entity that is partially leased 
to another governmental entity is subject to taxation. The State Board of 
Equalization found that the leased portion of the property was subject to 
taxation by a third governmental entity. On appeal, the district court disagreed 
and determined the property was exempt from taxation.

[¶2]      Although our 
rationale differs, we affirm the district court's ruling.

I. 
ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant, the 
State Board of Equalization for the State of Wyoming, presents a single 
issue:

Is 
property owned by the City of Lander and leased to the Wyoming Department of 
Environmental Quality reasonably necessary or essential to the efficient 
operation and maintenance of the City of Lander and therefore exempt from 
Wyoming property taxes?

[¶4]      Appellee, the 
City of Lander, restates the issue as:

Is 
the portion of the Lander City Hall, which is owned by the City of Lander and 
leased to the State of Wyoming for use as offices by the Department of 
Environmental Quality used primarily for a government purpose and therefore 
exempt from Wyoming property taxation?

II. 
FACTS

[¶5]      In 1991, Fremont 
County, Wyoming (County) issued a property tax assessment to the City of Lander 
(City). The assessment notice stated market and assessed values for a portion of 
the Lander City Hall (City Hall). A year earlier, the City leased approximately 
one-half of the office space in the newly acquired City Hall to the Department 
of Environmental Quality of the State of Wyoming (DEQ). The assessment notice 
declared that the leased portion of the City Hall was subject to taxation. The 
City contested the property tax assessment.

[¶6]      In a contested 
case hearing before the Fremont County Board of Equalization, the County 
Assessor maintained the City was required to pay property taxes because a 
portion of City Hall was being leased to DEQ "for profit" by the City. The City 
Clerk/Treasurer explained the City was not earning a profit from the lease 
because all City Hall rents were assigned to the State of Wyoming Farm Loan 
Board under terms of a loan agreement which was used to finance the purchase of 
the building. The City insisted that property of cities used primarily for a 
governmental purpose is exempt from taxation. The Fremont County Board of 
Equalization denied the tax protest.

[¶7]      The City filed an 
appeal with the State Board of Equalization (Board). The Board determined that 
the City Hall office space leased to DEQ was taxable. The Board agreed that 
property used primarily for a governmental purpose was exempt from taxation. 
However, the Board found that to be exempt, the property must be used to fulfill 
a purpose that comes within the duties of the governmental entity seeking the 
exemption. The Board determined that the portion of the City Hall leased to DEQ 
was taxable because it was "not reasonably necessary nor an essential facility 
to the operation" by the City of a City Hall.

[¶8]      After exhausting 
its administrative remedies, the City filed an appeal in district court. The 
district court found that the City Hall was being used solely for a governmental 
purpose, either by the City or by DEQ, and was exempt from taxation. The Board 
filed this appeal to challenge the district court's 
decision.

III. 
DISCUSSION

[¶9]      Administrative 
decisions of the Board are subject to judicial review. Wyo. Stat. § 39-1-306 
(1994). The scope of review is directed by the Wyoming Administrative Procedure 
Act, which provides, in pertinent part:

(c) 
To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the 
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret 
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or 
applicability of the terms of an agency action. In making the following 
determinations, the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it 
cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial 
error. The reviewing court shall:

(i) 
Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and

(ii) 
Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

* 
* * * * *

(B) 
Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;

* 
* * * * *

(E) 
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute.

Wyo. 
Stat. § 16-3-114(c) (1990) (emphasis added). Agency conclusions of law are 
affirmed when the agency acts in accord with the law; if not, the conclusion of 
law is corrected. Barcon, Inc. v. Wyoming State Bd. of Equalization, 845 P.2d 373, 376 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting Employment Sec. Com'n of Wyoming v. 
Western Gas Processors, Ltd., 786 P.2d 866, 871 (Wyo. 1990)). We accord no 
special deference to the district court's decision; instead, appellate review is 
conducted as if the matter had come directly to us from the agency. Casper 
Iron & Metal, Inc. v. Unemployment Ins. Com'n of Dept. of Employment of 
State of Wyo., 845 P.2d 387, 392 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶10]   Generally, all property in Wyoming 
is subject to taxation based upon a system of uniform 
valuation:

(a) 
All property, except as in this constitution otherwise provided, shall be 
uniformly valued at its full value as defined by the legislature, in three (3) 
classes as follows:

(i) 
Gross production of minerals and mine products in lieu of taxes on the land 
where produced;

(ii) 
Property used for industrial purposes as defined by the legislature; 
and

(iii) 
All other property, real and personal.

Wyo. 
Const. art. 15, § 11 (emphasis added). The legislature has affirmed its intent 
to make all property subject to taxation, unless prohibited by law or expressly 
exempted:

All 
property within Wyoming is subject to taxation as provided by this act except as 
prohibited by the United States or Wyoming constitutions or expressly exempted 
by W.S. 39-1-201.

Wyo. 
Stat. § 39-1-102 (1994).

[¶11]   The Constitution of the State of 
Wyoming states a general exemption to taxation when property is owned by a 
governmental entity and used "primarily" for a "governmental 
purpose:"

The 
property of 
the United States, the state, counties, cities, towns, school districts and 
municipal corporations, when used primarily for a governmental 
purpose, and public libraries, lots with the buildings thereon used 
exclusively for religious worship, church parsonages, church schools and public 
cemeteries, shall be exempt from taxation, and such other property 
as the legislature may by general law provide.

Wyo. 
Const. art. 15, § 12 (emphasis added). The legislature has chosen to expressly 
exempt from taxation certain property of cities and towns. The exemptions are 
stated in Wyo. Stat. § 39-1-201(a)(v)(C) (1994), which provides, in pertinent 
part:

(a) 
The following property is exempt from property taxation:

* 
* * * * *

(v) 
Property of Wyoming cities and towns owned and used primarily for a 
governmental purpose including:

* 
* * * * *

(C) 
City or town halls, police stations and equipment, traffic control 
equipment, garbage collection and disposal equipment and lands and buildings 
used to service and repair the halls, stations or 
equipment[.]

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶12]   The Board and the City present 
differing interpretations of the language of these governing provisions. The 
Board advocates the view that exemption from taxation depends upon proof that 
the use by DEQ of the property is reasonably necessary or essential to the 
efficient operation and maintenance of the City Hall. The City argues that the 
law permits the consideration of "stacked" governmental purposes. In the City's 
view, the City Hall is being partially utilized for a municipal governmental 
purpose and partially utilized for a state governmental purpose. Therefore, the 
property is exempt from taxation because no nongovernmental activities are 
taking place on the property owned by the City. The Board and the City both find 
support for their positions in prior decisions of this court. However, we are 
unable to agree that mandatory precedent supports either of the interpretations 
offered by the parties because the parties ignore the importance of using a 
property "primarily" for a "governmental purpose."

[¶13]   In City of Cheyenne v. Sims, 
521 P.2d 1347, 1348-49 (Wyo. 1974), we noted that municipal property is not 
automatically exempt from taxation under our Constitution and laws. The taxable 
status of property owned by a governmental entity must be determined as a 
question of fact by the use made of the property. Id. at 1349. The 
property will be found to be exempt only "when used primarily for a governmental 
purpose." Id.

[¶14]   In City of Cheyenne v. Board of 
County Com'rs of Laramie County, 484 P.2d 706, 707 (Wyo. 1971), Laramie 
County sought to collect property taxes for several buildings owned by the City 
of Cheyenne at its municipal airport and leased to private corporations or 
individuals. Writing for the court, Justice Gray began by noting that our 
Constitution had been amended in 1957 to eliminate automatic exemptions from 
taxation based on ownership of property by a governmental entity. Id. The 
amendment limited the power of the legislature to exempt municipal property from 
taxation by inserting the requirement that exempt property must be "used 
primarily for a governmental purpose." Id. at 708. "The problem then gets 
down to a determination of just what is meant by use of the word `primarily' and 
what is meant by the term `governmental purpose' in the first clause of the 
constitution." Id. This court determined that the construction given to 
these terms should apply the general rule that where the established policy is 
to exempt publicly owned property from taxation, the Constitution and statutes 
should not be strictly construed in favor of taxation. Id. at 708-09. 
This is consistent with the rule that strict construction of exemption statutes 
applies to exemptions for property held in private ownership but not to 
exemptions for public property where exemption is the rule and taxation the 
exception. 2 Thomas M. Cooley, The Law of Taxation, § 673 at 1414-15 (4th 
ed. 1924).

[¶15]   In City of Cheyenne, 484 P.2d  at 708, this court applied a test derived from tort law to determine if 
governmental or proprietary functions were being performed at the airport 
buildings. We first determined that the fact that a city accomplishes a 
governmental function through a lessee or receives rent is not controlling. 
Id. at 709. This court also refused to recognize a blanket rule that the 
mere renting of buildings to a lessee engaged in a for profit activity 
represents a nongovernmental use. Id. Instead, we held that the 
individual circumstances must determine whether the use is "primarily" for a 
"governmental purpose." Id. Therefore, this court concluded that a 
specific test could be applied to determine if the airport buildings were being 
used for a "governmental purpose." The test inquired whether the buildings "were 
primarily used and being so used as reasonably necessary or essential facilities 
to the efficient operation and maintenance of the airport." 
Id.

[¶16]   Applying this standard, this court 
first considered whether three buildings leased to fixed base operators at the 
Cheyenne airport were taxable. Id. This court held that the district 
court had erred in attempting to apportion the amount of governmental use for 
each building. Id. Instead, we ruled that each building was exempt from 
taxation because the buildings were being used "primarily" for a "governmental 
purpose." Id. It is significant that this court held no part of the three 
buildings could be taxed, despite the fact that only one-half of one of the 
buildings was used for a fixed base operator and the fixed base operators were 
all using the buildings for some non-governmental functions. Id. Next, 
this court determined that two other buildings, one leased to a private company 
and the other leased to the Cheyenne Ambulance Service, were taxable. Id. 
at 709-10. This court held that neither building was being used to supply 
necessary services for the airport.

[¶17]   Town of Pine Bluffs v. State Bd. 
of Equalization, 79 Wyo. 262, 333 P.2d 700, 703-04, 707 (1958) presented the 
first opportunity for this court to construe the meaning of the amended language 
of Wyo. Const. art. 15, § 12 and the amended language of the predecessor of Wyo. 
Stat. § 39-1-201(a)(v)(C). The Town of Pine Bluffs operated an electric power 
plant which sold electricity to customers as well as providing electricity for 
municipal services such as lighting city streets and buildings. Id. 333 P.2d  at 703. This court ruled that the sale of electricity was generally a 
proprietary function and the facilities were subject to taxation. Id. 333 P.2d  at 710. However, furnishing electricity for municipal purposes, such as 
lighting streets and municipal buildings, was exempt from taxation as a 
governmental function. Id. 333 P.2d  at 711. Therefore, the court held 
that only the proportional value of the power plant property which was used to 
supply electricity to ratepayers was subject to ad valorem taxation. 
Id. 333 P.2d  at 712.

[¶18]   At least one commentator has 
pointed to a seeming inconsistency between our decision in City of 
Cheyenne and our decision in Town of Pine Bluffs. E. George Rudolph, 
Wyoming Local Government Law, § 7.2 at 213 (1985). However, both 
decisions rely upon the primary use of the property owned by a governmental 
entity to determine whether it is subject to taxation.

[¶19]   Our analysis of these precedents 
discloses that the Board and the City have both misconstrued the meaning of the 
phrase "when used primarily for a governmental purpose," Wyo. Const. art. 15, § 
12, and the similar language of Wyo. Stat. § 39-1-201(a)(v)(C). The Board and 
the City concede that use of property owned by the City for a City Hall is for a 
"governmental purpose." However, the parties disagree whether additional use of 
the same property, at least partially, defeats the express tax exemption for a 
city hall. Wyo. Stat. § 39-1-201(a)(v)(C). Accordingly, the dispute centers on 
the meaning of the term "primarily."

[¶20]   Issues of statutory interpretation 
require this court to apply a carefully considered review 
process.

We 
read the text of the statute and pay attention to its internal structure and the 
functional relationship between the parts and the whole. We make the 
determination as to meaning, that is, whether the statute's meaning is subject 
to varying interpretations. If we determine that the meaning is not subject to 
varying interpretations, that may end the exercise, although we may resort to 
extrinsic aids of interpretation, such as legislative history if available and 
rules of construction, to confirm the determination. On the other hand, if we 
determine that the meaning is subject to varying interpretations, we must resort 
to available extrinsic aids. If an ambiguous statute has been construed by an 
agency charged with administering it, we will accord deference to, but are not 
bound by, that construction. After all, the final construction of an ambiguous 
statute is a question for the court.

Parker 
Land and Cattle Co. v. Wyoming Game and Fish Com'n, 
845 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶21]   The language of the Constitution is 
general, the property of a city "when used primarily for a governmental purpose 
* * * shall be exempt from taxation * * *." Wyo. Const. art. 15, § 12. The 
statutory language is more specific by exempting from taxation "[p]roperty of 
wyoming cities * * * owned and used primarily for a governmental purpose 
including [c]ity * * * halls[.]" Wyo. Stat. § 39-1-201(a)(v)(C). Both provisions 
state a presumption that the property belonging to a governmental entity is 
exempt from taxation when used "primarily" for a "governmental purpose." Town 
of Pine Bluffs, 333 P.2d  at 710. Wyo. Stat. § 39-1-201(a)(v)(C) extends the 
presumption to an express exemption for property of a city owned and used 
"primarily" as a city hall. 

[¶22]   The term "primarily" has an 
ordinary and obvious meaning in the law. "Primarily" means "of first importance" 
or "principally." Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 572, 86 S. Ct. 1030, 
1032, 16 L. Ed. 2d 102 (1966). Accord Hibernian Soc. v. Thomas, 282 S.C. 
465, 319 S.E.2d 339, 342-43 (1984) (applying this definition to ad valorem tax 
exemption statute). The term "primarily" may also be synonymous with 
"essentially" or "fundamentally" in some circumstances. Board of Governors v. 
Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 446, 67 S. Ct. 411, 414, 91 L. Ed. 408 (1947); Brennan 
v. Harrison County, Mississippi, 505 F.2d 901, 903 (5th Cir. 
1975).

[¶23]   The language used in the relevant 
portions of Wyo. Const. art. 15, § 12 and Wyo. Stat. § 39-1-201(a)(v)(C) is 
unambiguous. The intent, to exempt from taxation property of a governmental 
entity "when used primarily for a governmental purpose," is stated in such a 
manner that reasonable persons are able to agree on its meaning with consistency 
and predictability. Allied Signal, Inc. v. Wyoming State Bd. of 
Equalization, 813 P.2d 214, 220 (Wyo. 1991). The purpose of such an 
exemption is to prevent an escalating spiral of unnecessary taxation and 
administrative costs with no benefit to the public. 16 Eugene McQuillin, The 
Law of Municipal Corporations, § 44.57 at 206 (3rd ed. 1994). If one 
governmental entity chooses to tax the property of another governmental entity, 
the governmental entity forced to pay taxes may have to levy and collect new 
taxes to meet the demands of the tax. 2 Cooley, supra, § 621 at 1313. The 
effect of such a tax spiral is that the public would be taxing itself to raise 
money to pay itself. Id. The only benefit of such a system is that it 
satisfies a bureaucratic desire for exactitude by taking money out of one pocket 
and putting it in another. Id. at 1317.

[¶24]   As we noted in City of 
Cheyenne, 484 P.2d  at 709, the individual circumstances must determine 
whether a use is "primarily" for a "governmental purpose." We are satisfied that 
the Board's conclusions are "`clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence on record'" and must be reversed. Mekss v. Wyoming Girls' School, 
State of Wyo., 813 P.2d 185, 201 (Wyo. 1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. 
___, 112 S. Ct. 872, 116 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1992) (quoting State ex rel. Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Div. v. Brown, 805 P.2d 830, 833 (Wyo. 1991)). 
Instead, substantial evidence in the record supports a finding that the City 
uses the property which the County contends is subject to taxation "primarily" 
as a City Hall. The City Clerk/Treasurer testified that the City purchased the 
City Hall property because the former building could no longer serve the needs 
of the City and construction costs for a new building were prohibitive. The 
acquisition of the City Hall property has resulted in greater efficiency and 
productivity in City government. The reason for the City to own and use the City 
Hall property was "principally" or "of first importance" to have a building to 
house municipal government functions.

[¶25]   The fact that approximately 
one-half of the building is leased to DEQ is secondary. The City Hall is being 
used "primarily" for the expressly exempt purpose of a city hall. Wyo. Stat. § 
39-1-201(a)(v)(C). As we concluded in City of Cheyenne, 484 P.2d  at 709, 
once a property is being used "primarily" for a "governmental purpose," the fact 
that the property is being used for other purposes does not obviate an express 
statutory exemption from taxation. Therefore, the use of three airport buildings 
for some nongovernmental functions did not eliminate the exemption from 
taxation. Id. Similarly, the use of the City Hall for some functions not 
related to the municipal government of the City does not alter the exemption 
from taxation stated in Wyo. Stat. § 39-1-201(a)(v)(C).

[¶26]   The collection of rent by the City 
for the office space DEQ occupies in City Hall does not destroy the exemption 
from taxation. "Where the primary and principal use to which property is put is 
public, the mere fact that an income is incidentally derived from it does not 
affect its character as property devoted to a public use, so as to prevent its 
being exempt from taxation." 2 Cooley, supra, § 640 at 1343. Accord 
Johnson City v. Booth, 37 Tenn. App. 231, 261 S.W.2d 820, 823 (1953) 
(holding that municipal water system was exempt from taxation by county despite 
the fact that some revenue was derived from the sale of water to non-residents 
of the municipality). Therefore, in City of Cheyenne, 484 P.2d  at 708, 
the rent received from fixed base operators at the Cheyenne airport was not 
controlling as to whether the use of the property was "primarily" for a 
"governmental purpose."

[¶27]   The Board argues that this court's 
decision in Commissioners of Cambria Park v. Board of Com'rs of Weston 
County, 62 Wyo. 446, 174 P.2d 402 (1946), directs a different outcome. We 
disagree. In that case, a Wyoming corporation leased its property to a religious 
association for use as a school. Id. 174 P.2d  at 403-04. The governing 
law required either exclusive use of the property for religious purposes or use 
of property for schools so long as the property was "not used for private 
profit." Id. 174 P.2d  at 405. This court first determined that use of the 
property for religious services incidental to the school did not entitle the 
religious association to an exemption from taxation. Id. This court then 
considered the Wyoming corporation's claim that the property was exempt from 
taxation. We held the property was not exempt because the Wyoming corporation 
leased the property and derived profit from the lease. Id. 174 P.2d  at 
409-10.

[¶28]   The present language of Wyo. Const. 
art. 15, § 12 and Wyo. Stat. § 39-1-201(a)(v)(C) requires only use of a property 
"primarily" for a "governmental purpose." Therefore, the City's lease to DEQ of 
some but not all of the office space in the building does not destroy the 
exemption for the property as a whole. "If part of a building is exempt and the 
rest taxable, a tax imposed on all the building is uncollectible in toto." 2 
Cooley, supra, § 732 at 1534. Under Commissioners of Cambria Park, 
if the City had leased the entire property to DEQ, a different outcome would be 
in order, but it must be remembered that the City only leased a portion of the 
City Hall property to DEQ.

[¶29]   Finally, the Board erred in 
attempting to apportion the amount of governmental use by the City of the City 
Hall. Without statutory or regulatory authority, the Board contends that a 
property in which the City held an undivided interest could be spatially 
apportioned between exempt governmental use and non-exempt use. We specifically 
declined to permit apportionment in City of Cheyenne, 484 P.2d  at 709, 
when we held that the district court erred in attempting to apportion the 
governmental use for the three buildings leased to the fixed base 
operators.

[¶30]   If the constitutional and statutory 
requirement is for use "primarily" for a "governmental purpose," then the 
property is exempt from taxation. Spacial apportionment would require express 
authority in the Constitution or our statutes. See, e.g., City of Nome v. 
Catholic Bishop of Northern Alaska, 707 P.2d 870, 881 (Alaska 1985) (holding 
special apportionment of property is permitted in Alaska by state constitutional 
language referring to exemption from taxation for "[a]ll, or any portion of," 
property used exclusively for nonprofit religious activities) and Ocean 
County v. Dover Tp., 3 N.J. Tax 434, 438 (1981) (holding special appointment 
of property is permitted because the New Jersey legislature specifically 
provided that portions of buildings leased to a for-profit organization would be 
taxed and remaining portion used by a non-profit organization would be 
exempt).

[¶31]   We did order apportionment of ad 
valorem taxation in Town of Pine Bluffs, 333 P.2d  at 712. This decision, 
however, must be limited to its unique facts. The use of the property in Town of 
Pine Bluffs was proprietary because the sale of electricity was not a 
traditional governmental function. However, exemption from taxation was 
permitted for the proportion of the property needed to supply electricity for 
municipal purposes. Id. 333 P.2d  at 711. Apportionment in that 
circumstance prevented unfair taxation of resources used for a legitimate 
"governmental purpose" where the primary use was 
proprietary.

[¶32]   Public policy and reality must 
impose restrictions on absolutists. The City is using its City Hall property 
"primarily" for a tax exempt purpose. The leasing of a portion of the office 
space in that property to the state to house an agency of state government, DEQ, 
results in a payment of money from the state to the City for performing this 
service. However, this rental payment does not entitle the County and the Board 
to authorize special apportionment of the City Hall property and to tax the 
City. The assessment of taxes provides a means for a governmental entity to 
raise revenues to provide essential services to the public. If one governmental 
entity is permitted to tax another governmental entity which is using its 
property "primarily" for a "governmental purpose," the public does not benefit. 
Administrative costs are increased for the sole purpose of moving money from one 
governmental entity to another. Government efficiency does not begin by taxing 
other governmental entities whose actions are in compliance with the 
law.

IV. 
CONCLUSION

[¶33]   Property which is used "primarily" 
for a "governmental purpose" is exempt from taxation. The City is "primarily" 
using the property the County wants to partially tax for the express 
"governmental purpose" of a City Hall. Permitting the County to tax the 
secondary use of the property would impose a burden on the people of this state 
which the specific language of our Constitution and laws 
prohibit.

[¶34]   We affirm.

MACY, 
Justice, specially concurring.

[¶35]   I agree with the result reached by 
the majority in this case but for different reasons from those which have been 
expressed in the majority opinion. I believe that the majority opinion 
unnecessarily strains the meaning of the constitutional and statutory language 
"used primarily for" and "a governmental purpose" to reach a result which could 
be achieved by applying the plain meaning of that language. The phrase "used 
primarily for" does not have the same meaning as the individual word 
"primarily." I believe that the Legislature intended for the exemption to apply 
to property which is used predominantly for a "governmental purpose." The plain 
meaning of "governmental purpose" is any governmental purpose. Our constitution 
and statutes do not specify that, in order to qualify for the exemption, the 
governmental entity which owns the property must be the same entity which makes 
use of the property.

[¶36]   In my opinion, the phrase "used 
primarily for a governmental purpose" means that, when the property is used 
predominantly for a governmental purpose by any governmental entity, it is 
exempt from taxation. When the property is not used predominantly for a 
governmental purpose, it is subject to taxation. When this reading of the plain 
language of the constitution and the statutes is applied to the facts of this 
case, it becomes clear that the City of Lander's property was exempt from 
taxation. The property was owned by the City of Lander and was used entirely for 
a governmental purpose - one half as a city hall and one half as office space 
for a state agency. No evidence existed which suggested that any nongovernmental 
activities were being conducted on the premises. The county board of 
equalization's decision was contrary to law.

[¶37]   For these reasons, I agree that the 
district court's ruling should be affirmed.