Case Title: People v. Ramsey

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92214

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-02-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 92214–Agenda 21–November 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
DANIEL RAMSEY, Appellant.
Opinion filed February 7, 2002.
       JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
       At issue is whether the State, in defendant Daniel Ramsey’s
first trial, proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he was eligible for
the death penalty. We hold that it did.
 
BACKGROUND
       Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Hancock County,
defendant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder;
three counts of attempted first degree murder; and one count each
of aggravated criminal sexual assault, home invasion, and
residential burglary. The jury determined that defendant was
eligible for the death penalty based on the cold, calculated, and
premeditated manner of the crimes. 720 ILCS 5/9–1(b)(11) (West
1996). The jury also concluded that no mitigating factors sufficient
to preclude the death penalty existed, and the trial court sentenced
defendant to death.
       On direct appeal, defendant argued, inter alia, that he was
held to the wrong burden of proof for his insanity defense because
the public act that raised the burden of proof was passed in
violation of the single subject clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill.
Const. 1970, art. IV, §8(d)). See People v. Reedy, 186 Ill. 2d 1
(1999) (invalidating Pub. Act 89–404, eff. August 20, 1995, in its
entirety). This court agreed with defendant and reversed his
conviction and remanded the cause for a new trial. People v.
Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d 154 (2000).
       In the trial court, defendant moved to preclude the prosecution
from seeking the death penalty at retrial. Defendant argued that the
State failed during the first trial to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that he was death eligible. Thus, allowing the State a second
chance to prove his death eligibility would subject him to double
jeopardy. Specifically, defendant contended that the State failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was at least 18 years old
when he committed the crimes on July 8, 1996. See 720 ILCS
5/9–1(b) (West 2000).
       At the eligibility hearing in the first trial, the State relied on
evidence from the guilt phase of the trial to establish defendant’s
age at the time of the offenses. Defendant’s adoptive father,
Marion Ramsey, testified that defendant was born in 1978 and that
the adoption was final in 1979. Ramsey is also defendant’s
biological grandfather.
       Additionally, the State relied on the testimony of Officer
William Petentler of the Illinois State Police. Petentler interviewed
defendant after the crimes. When Pententler arrived at the crime
scene, defendant was being treated for a large, superficial gash on
the back of his head. Defendant received the wound when, after
killing his victims, he pointed a shotgun at the back of his head and
pulled the trigger.
       Petentler testified that defendant led the police to a grain bin
in which he had disposed of one of the bodies. Petentler described
defendant as being “very alert.” After defendant took the police to
the grain bin, they decided to take him to a medical clinic, although
there was no fresh blood coming through defendant’s bandage.
After defendant was treated, the police took him to the Hancock
County jail, where they read him his Miranda rights and
interviewed him. Defendant waived his rights and spoke to the
police about the incident. Petentler asked defendant his date of
birth, and defendant replied that it was March 30, 1978.
       To counter defendant’s and his adoptive father’s statements as
to defendant’s birth date, the defense presented the testimony of
John Condon, a probation officer with the Ninth Judicial Circuit.
Condon testified that he was asked to prepare a presentence
investigation report on defendant. Condon requested a criminal
history of defendant from the National Criminal Information Center
(NCIC). When Condon received the report from the NCIC, he
noticed that it had conflicting dates of birth for defendant. In one
place, it listed his birthday as March 30, 1978, and in another as
March 30, 1979. The defense argued to the jury that Condon’s
testimony created a reasonable doubt whether defendant was 18
when he committed the crimes.
       Following a hearing, the trial court determined that a rational
trier of fact could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant was 18 when he committed the crimes. Accordingly, the
court denied defendant’s motion to preclude the State from seeking
the death penalty. Defendant appealed pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 604(f) (188 Ill. 2d R. 604(f)), which allows appeals to the
appellate court from orders denying a motion to dismiss based on
former jeopardy. The State moved to have the appeal transferred
to this court, as a matter of public interest requiring our prompt
adjudication. 134 Ill. 2d R. 302(b). We granted the motion.
 
ANALYSIS
       Defendant argues that, in his first trial, the State failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was 18 when he
committed the murders. Accordingly, defendant contends, the
State is precluded under double jeopardy principles from seeking
the death penalty at his retrial.
       Once either the trial court or a court of review has determined
that the evidence was insufficient to prove the existence of a
statutory aggravating factor, the State is precluded by double
jeopardy principles from seeking the death penalty again. People
v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 447 (1999). Before a court can sentence
a defendant to death, the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was at least 18 years old when he
committed the offense. People v. Holman, 132 Ill. 2d 128, 161
(1989). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
finding of death eligibility, the standard is whether, after viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the elements necessary to
establish defendant’s death eligibility beyond a reasonable doubt.
People v. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d 436, 474-75 (2000). Determinations
of the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given their
testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
evidence are the trier of fact’s responsibility. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d 
at 475.
       Defendant apparently misunderstands our standard of review.
He explains why he believes the State’s evidence was weak and
what divergent inferences a trier of fact could draw from the
evidence. The only relevant question, however, is whether, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have concluded, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that defendant was 18 when he committed the murders.
Clearly, a rational trier of fact could so find. Defendant stated in his
interview with Petentler that he was born on March 30, 1978.
Defendant’s adoptive father, who was also his biological
grandfather, testified that defendant was born in 1978, and the
adoption was final in 1979. The only other birth date that the
defense suggests is possible is March 30, 1979, based on the
conflicting evidence in the NCIC report that Condon received.
Thus, Marion Ramsey’s testimony that defendant was born in 1978
corroborated the birth date given by defendant: March 30, 1978.
Clearly, a rational trier of fact could conclude that defendant and
his adoptive father knew defendant’s birth date, and that the
alternate birth date listed on the NCIC report was a mistake.
       Defendant’s arguments as to why the evidence was insufficient
are either misplaced or unconvincing. Defendant argues that his
grandfather’s testimony was hearsay. That testimony, however,
was procured by the defense. Marion Ramsey made the statement
while testifying as a defense witness. Where a party himself
introduces or elicits certain evidence, he cannot later complain.
Gillespie v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 135 Ill. 2d 363, 374 (1990).
Moreover, the failure to object to hearsay not only waives the issue
on appeal, but allows the evidence to be considered by the trier of
fact and to be given its natural probative effect. People v. Williams,
139 Ill. 2d 1, 15 (1990). Thus, the hearsay nature of the evidence
did not preclude the jury from inferring that defendant’s biological
grandfather and adoptive father would know when defendant was
born.
       As to defendant’s out-of-court statement that he was born on
March 30, 1978, defendant first argues that the statement was not
reliable because he gave it shortly after shooting himself in the
head. Defendant contends that the wound “could have caused
confusion when answering Officer Petentler’s questions.”
However, defendant points to no evidence in the record suggesting
that he was confused. Rather, the evidence showed that the wound
was a superficial gash, and that defendant was sufficiently alert to
take the police to where he disposed of one of his victims and to
discuss the crimes with them. Further, the jury was shown a
videotape of an interview defendant had with the police shortly
after he gave the statement, and the jury would have been able to
view defendant’s demeanor and determine if he appeared to be
suffering from any confusion. Defendant has simply not pointed to
any evidence that he was confused and did not present medical
evidence that a superficial gash to the back of one’s head would
undermine one’s ability to remember his birthday.
       Defendant also complains that his out of court statement was
hearsay. This is true, but the statement was admissible as an
admission of a party opponent. People v. Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1, 29
(1996) (“The statements at issue were all made by the defendant
and, so long as they were relevant to the case, could be introduced
against him as admissions of a party opponent”). Defendant was
given the Miranda warnings before he gave the statement, and was
thus warned that anything he said in the interview could be used
against him at trial. This court held in People v. Dalton, 91 Ill. 2d 22, 29 (1982), that an extrajudicial admission of a defendant’s age
was admissible without corroboration to establish an element of the
corpus delicti of indecent liberties with a child. Defendant has
offered no compelling reason why the same rule should not apply
here. Further, as we noted, once hearsay is properly admitted, the
trier of fact is free to give it its natural probative value. It was
within the jury’s province to conclude that defendant knew his
birthday.
       Further, the law generally presumes that a person knows his
age. As this court explained in People v. Pennell, 315 Ill. 124, 127
(1924), “[i]t is, of course, recognized in all cases where one
testifies as to his own age that in a sense his testimony is hearsay,
but that fact does not of itself affect the competency nor the weight
of that testimony.” See also Annotation, Competency of Witness to
Testify as to His Own Age, 39 A.L.R. 376, 376 (1925) (“The
general rule, from which there seems to be little dissent, recognizes
the competency of a witness to give testimony as to his own age”).
       There is no question that a rational jury could have found,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was 18 when he
committed the murders. Accordingly, seeking the death penalty
against defendant a second time would not subject him to double
jeopardy, and the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s
motion.
       We affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Hancock
County and remand the cause for further proceedings.
 
Affirmed and remanded.
 
       CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
       For the reasons set forth in my partial concurrence and partial
dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death
penalty law violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and
article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art.
I, §2). It is therefore void and unenforceable. While a majority of
my colleagues continue to dispute this view, enforcement of the
law has, in effect, been halted. Defendants are still being sentenced
to death, but executions have ceased. An indefinite moratorium has
been declared by the Governor. Since Andrew Kokoraleis’ appeal
was summarily and illegally dismissed by our court in 1999 (People
v. Kokoraleis, 189 Ill. 2d 721 (1999)), no one has actually been put
to death by the State.
       In an effort to address the fatal defects in Illinois’ system of
capital punishment, our court recently promulgated a
comprehensive set of new rules governing cases in which the State
is seeking the death penalty. Although the procedures contained in
the new rules are necessary for an accurate determination of
innocence or guilt (People v. Hickey, No. 87286, slip op. at 37
(September 27, 2001) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting)), we have yet to
ascertain whether the rules will be sufficient to cure the laws’
constitutional flaws. Until the efficacy of the new rules can be
demonstrated, until we are certain that innocent citizens are no
longer being convicted of capital offenses, imposition of the death
penalty should be prohibited. Accordingly, I would reverse the
order of the circuit court and preclude the State from seeking the
death penalty when defendant is tried again. I therefore dissent.