Case Title: Oliver v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co. Ltd. Partnership

Citation: 2009-Ohio-5030

Docket Number: 20081463

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-10-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Oliver v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co. Ltd. Partnership, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-5030.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2009-OHIO-5030 
OLIVER, ET AL., APPELLEES, v. CLEVELAND INDIANS BASEBALL COMPANY 
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ET AL.; CITY OF CLEVELAND, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Oliver v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co. Ltd. Partnership, Slip 
Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-5030.] 
Trials — Damages — R.C. 2744.05 — Cap  on noneconomic compensatory 
damages in action against a political subdivision does not violate the right 
to a jury trial or the right to equal protection under the law. 
(No. 2008-1463 — Submitted June 16, 2009 — Decided October 1, 2009.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, Nos. 89314, 89428, and 
89463, 176 Ohio App.3d 410, 2008-Ohio-2183. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
The limit on noneconomic compensatory damages in R.C. 2744.05(C)(1) does not 
violate the right to a jury trial or the right to equal protection under the 
law. 
__________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
I 
{¶ 1} This case began with the detonation of an explosive device during 
a Cleveland Indians baseball game; the explosion injured four persons.  Appellees 
Donald Krieger and Clifton Oliver were arrested at the stadium and taken into 
police custody, along with a third person with whom they had attended the game, 
on suspicion of their involvement in the explosion.1  While in custody, appellees 
suffered from poor conditions in the jail and harsh treatment by the jailers. 
{¶ 2} Although a grand jury indicted appellees on several counts of 
aggravated arson and felonious assault, these charges were later dismissed by the 
Cuyahoga County prosecuting attorney.  Appellees’ arrests and detention 
adversely impacted their jobs and mental and physical health. 
{¶ 3} Appellees successfully sued the city of Cleveland, appellant, for 
malicious prosecution, false arrest and imprisonment, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.  The jury awarded each plaintiff $400,000 in compensatory 
damages and $600,000 in punitive damages.  The trial court vacated the punitive-
damages award as impermissible against the city.  The trial court overruled the 
city’s motion, which cited the damage caps in R.C. 2744.05(C)(1), to reduce the 
compensatory-damages award to $250,000 for each plaintiff.  The court of 
appeals affirmed the award of compensatory damages, holding that R.C. 
2744.05(C)(1) is unconstitutional because it violates a plaintiff’s right to a jury 
trial and the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.  Krieger v. 
Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 176 Ohio App.3d 410, 2008-Ohio-2183, 892 
N.E.2d 461, ¶ 69.2  For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the 
                                                 
1.  The third person is Andrew Mendez, who was subsequently convicted for detonating the 
device.   
 
2.  In their memoranda to this court, appellees and their amicus have asserted that R.C. 
2744.05(C)(1) is unconstitutional on due process grounds, yet this issue was not addressed by the 
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court of appeals and hold that R.C. 2744.05(C)(1) does not violate the 
constitutional right to a jury trial or the constitutional guarantees of equal 
protection. 
II 
{¶ 4} R.C. 2744.05(C)(1) places a $250,000 limit on noneconomic 
compensatory damages (those damages that do not represent “actual loss” to an 
injured party) awarded against political subdivisions.  The city of Cleveland 
argues that the limits should apply to reduce appellees’ damage award because 
appellant is a political subdivision.  The court of appeals did not analyze R.C. 
2744.05(C)(1) but followed a previous decision of its court, Gladon v. Greater 
Cleveland Regional Transit Auth. (Mar. 10, 1994), Cuyahoga App. No. 64029,3 in 
holding R.C. 2744.05(C)(1) to be unconstitutional.  Krieger, 176 Ohio App.3d 
410, 2008-Ohio-2183, 892 N.E.2d 461, at ¶ 68. 
{¶ 5} The court of appeals did not consider the opinion of this court in 
Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 
420.  In Arbino, we reviewed a statute similar to R.C. 2744.05(C)(1), but in a 
different chapter of the Revised Code, R.C. 2315.18.  Id. at ¶ 4.  Although the 
statute at issue differs from the statute in Arbino in that R.C. 2744.05 applies to 
damage awards against political subdivisions, not private litigants, the purpose 
and effect of the statute in Arbino and the statute in this case are the same—to 
limit compensatory-damage awards for noneconomic harm.4   
                                                                                                                                     
court of appeals.  This issue was not proposed in a proposition of law, nor have we accepted such 
a proposition of law.  Accordingly, we decline to address the due process issue.   
 
3.  Although we had accepted Gladon for review, we did not address the constitutionality of R.C. 
2744.05(C) because we found a procedural error at trial and remanded the case, thereby avoiding 
an advisory opinion on the constitutional question.  Gladon v. Greater Cleveland Regional Transit 
Auth. (1996), 75 Ohio St. 3d 312, 662 N.E.2d 287, fn. 1.  In this case, the constitutional questions 
are ripe for review.   
 
4.  {¶ a} R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) reads:  
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{¶ 6} R.C. 2315.18(B) contains an exception to the limits on 
noneconomic damages for those persons who suffer “catastrophic injuries,” see 
id. at ¶ 47, but R.C. 2744.05(C) does not.  We find this difference between the 
statutes to be no obstacle to the application of the reasoning of Arbino to this case.  
The difference has no bearing on our analysis of the effect of R.C. 2744.05 on the 
constitutional right to a jury trial.  Nor does this difference affect our rational-
basis review of the statute for equal protection purposes, for the reasons explained 
below.  Therefore, we will apply the reasoning of Arbino in this case. 
A.  Right to trial by jury 
{¶ 7} In Arbino, we considered the effect of the damage caps on the right 
to a jury trial.  We founded our analysis on the principle that the fact-finding of a 
jury is inviolate for those causes for which the right is preserved.  Arbino, 116 
Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, at ¶ 35.  The right ensures that 
a jury’s fact-finding function is not invaded, ignored, or replaced.  Id. at ¶ 37.  But 
we noted that “the right to a trial by jury does not extend to the determination of 
questions of law.”  Id.  Therefore, we reasoned that while a jury determines the 
amount of damages as a matter of fact, the actual award may be reduced by the 
application of a statute as a matter of law, akin to altering awards through 
remittiturs or statutory treble damages.  Id. at ¶ 38-40.  Thus, in Arbino, we held 
that the statutory limit on noneconomic damages in R.C. 2315.18(B)(2) is applied 
                                                                                                                                     
  {¶ b} “[T]he amount of compensatory damages that represents damages for noneconomic loss 
that is recoverable in a tort action under this section to recover damages for injury or loss to person 
or property shall not exceed the greater of two hundred fifty thousand dollars or an amount that is 
equal to three times the economic loss, as determined by the trier of fact, of the plaintiff in that tort 
action to a maximum of three hundred fifty thousand dollars for each plaintiff in that tort action or 
a maximum of five hundred thousand dollars for each occurrence that is the basis of that tort 
action.” 
  {¶ c} R.C. 2744.05(C)(1) provides: 
  {¶ d} “There shall not be any limitation on compensatory damages that represent the actual loss 
of the person who is awarded the damages. However * * * damages that arise from the same cause 
of action, transaction or occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and that do not 
represent the actual loss of the person who is awarded the damages shall not exceed two hundred 
fifty thousand dollars in favor of any one person.” 
January Term, 2009 
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as a matter of law and does not intrude upon the fact-finding function of the jury.  
Id. at ¶ 40-42. 
{¶ 8} Accordingly, Arbino stands for the proposition that a court does 
not usurp the role of the jury in contravention of Section 5, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution or the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution when it applies a 
statutory limit on noneconomic damages to the facts found by the jury.  Id.  This 
proposition is true for R.C. 2744.05(C)(1) just as it was for the statute in Arbino.  
A court does not intrude into the jury’s fact-finding when applying R.C. 2744.05; 
instead, the court applies the limit as a matter of law to the facts found by the jury.  
Therefore, the limit on noneconomic damages in R.C. 2744.05(C)(1) does not 
unconstitutionally restrict the right to a jury trial under Section 5, Article I of the 
Ohio Constitution or the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
B.  Equal protection 
{¶ 9} The Ohio and federal equal protection analysis applied in Arbino is 
applicable in this case as well.  As in Arbino, there is no fundamental right or 
protected class at issue here, and R.C. 2744.05(C)(1) is facially neutral.  116 Ohio 
St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 64-66.  Therefore, we review the 
statute to determine whether it has a rational basis.  Id.  R.C. 2744.05(C)(1) will 
pass constitutional muster under the Ohio and United States Constitutions if it is 
rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.  Id. at ¶ 66. 
{¶ 10} We have upheld a different subsection of R.C. 2744.05 under the 
rational-basis standard in the equal protection context.  Menefee v. Queen City 
Metro (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 27, 29, 550 N.E.2d 181.  We held that the “state has 
a valid interest in preserving the financial soundness of its political subdivisions.”  
Id., citing Shapiro v. Thompson (1969), 394 U.S. 618, 633, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 
L.Ed.2d 600. That same state interest supports R.C. 2744.05(C).  A limit on the 
damages for which a political subdivision may be liable is rationally related to the 
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purpose of preserving the financial integrity of political subdivisions.  Therefore, 
R.C. 2744.05(C)(1) is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. 
{¶ 11} Nevertheless, appellees argue that R.C. 2744.05(C)(1) should be 
considered unconstitutional under rational-basis review because the statute is 
arbitrary and unreasonable.  This is so, according to appellees, because (1) the 
statute assigns a fixed measure of damages in all cases, thereby “impos[ing] the 
cost of the intended benefit to the public upon those most severely injured,” citing 
Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 59, citing 
Morris v. Savoy (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 684, 690-691, 576 N.E.2d 765, and State 
ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 
490, 715 N.E.2d 1062; and (2) the statute does not contain an exception for 
catastrophic injuries as does R.C. 2315.18(B).  We find these arguments 
unpersuasive. 
{¶ 12} As a preliminary matter, we note that appellees are making a facial 
challenge to R.C. 2744.05(C)(1), because they cannot claim that the lack of a 
catastrophic-injury exception in the statute impacts their lawsuit.  The 
catastrophic-injury exception in R.C. 2315.18(B)(3) is for “(a) [p]ermanent and 
substantial physical deformity, loss of use of a limb, or loss of a bodily organ 
system; [or] (b) [p]ermanent physical functional injury that permanently prevents 
the injured person from being able to independently care for self and perform life-
sustaining activities.”  We find nothing in appellees’ complaint or the record that 
would place their injuries in these categories.  Therefore, their challenge in this 
regard must be viewed as a facial challenge.5  
{¶ 13} In order for a statute to be facially unconstitutional, it must be 
unconstitutional in all applications.  Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-
6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 26, citing Harrold v. Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 2005-
                                                 
5.  Notwithstanding this conclusion, we observe that the conduct of certain employees of the 
Cleveland Police Department and in particular defendant Peachman was reprehensible.   
January Term, 2009 
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Ohio-5334, 836 N.E.2d 1165, ¶ 37, and United States v. Salerno (1987), 481 U.S. 
739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697.  In Arbino, the statute capped 
noneconomic damages for those persons who were injured but whose injuries 
were not so serious as to be excluded from the caps under R.C. 2315.18(B)(3).  
Nevertheless, we held that the statute was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.  Id. 
at ¶ 61.  Similarly, the damage limits for noneconomic harm in R.C. 
2744.05(C)(1) are neither unreasonable or arbitrary at least with regard to persons 
suffering noncatastrophic injuries.  Therefore, the statute has at least some valid 
application and will survive the facial challenge. 
{¶ 14} Moreover, we would not hold the statute unconstitutional if 
appellees had presented an as-applied challenge for arbitrariness.  The cases relied 
upon by appellees—Morris, Sheward, and Arbino—are distinguishable from this 
case.  While those cases suggest that it is arbitrary or unreasonable to impose an 
across-the-board limitation on noneconomic damages, those cases dealt only with 
lawsuits between private litigants. 
{¶ 15} R.C. 2744.05(C), however, applies only to damage awards against 
political subdivisions.  We have already held that the General Assembly could 
have prohibited all tort actions against political subdivisions.  Menefee, 49 Ohio 
St.3d at 29, 550 N.E.2d 181.  Therefore we cannot say that it is arbitrary or 
unreasonable for the General Assembly to allow some recovery in tort actions. 
{¶ 16} Accordingly, we hold that R.C. 2744.05(C)(1) does not violate the 
constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the law. 
III 
{¶ 17} We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.  The limit on 
noneconomic compensatory damages in R.C. 2744.05(C)(1) does not violate the 
right to a jury trial or the right to equal protection under the law. 
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{¶ 18} We are unable to apply the limit in R.C. 2744.05(C)(1) to the 
award based upon the record before us.  Therefore, we remand the cause to the 
trial court for further proceedings consistent with this decision. 
Judgment reversed  
and cause remanded. 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents for the reasons stated in his dissenting opinion in 
Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
Right to Trial by Jury 
{¶ 19} In Arbino v. Johnson & Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-
6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, which also addressed whether a cap on compensatory 
damages violates the right to a jury trial, I dissented and wrote, “ ‘So long as the 
trial by jury is a part of our system of jurisprudence, its constitutional integrity 
and importance should be jealously safeguarded.  The right of trial by jury should 
be as inviolate in the working of our courts as it is in the wording of our 
Constitutions.’  Gibbs v. Girard (1913), 88 Ohio St. 34, 47, 102 N.E. 299.  Instead 
of jealously safeguarding the right to trial by jury, the majority opinion in this 
case eviscerates it by holding constitutional a statute that enables courts to ‘enter 
judgments in disregard of the jury’s verdict.’  Sorrell v. Thevenir (1994), 69 Ohio 
St.3d 415, 422, 633 N.E.2d 504.  Instead of jealously safeguarding the right to 
trial by jury, the majority opinion [concludes] that juries can meaningfully 
determine only facts that do not conflict with predetermined assessments of the 
General Assembly.  Instead of jealously safeguarding the right to trial by jury, the 
majority opinion ‘cleans the scalpel for the legislature to cut away unrestrainedly 
at the whole field of tort redress.’  Meech v. Hillhaven W., Inc. (1989), 238 Mont. 
January Term, 2009 
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21, 52, 776 P.2d 488 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).”  Arbino at ¶ 163.  Today the 
majority opinion allows the cutting to continue. 
{¶ 20} Once again, a majority of this court concludes that a statute may 
amend an inviolate constitutional right, even though we have previously stated 
that “[t]he right of trial by jury, being guaranteed to all our citizens by the 
Constitution of the state, cannot be invaded or violated by either legislative act or 
judicial order or decree.”  Gibbs, 88 Ohio St. 34, 102 N.E. 299, at paragraph two 
of the syllabus.  See Section 5, Article I, Ohio Constitution (“The right of trial by 
jury shall be inviolate * * *”).  Once again, a majority of this court suggests that a 
cap on damages is nothing more than remittitur and ignores that “the sole reason 
remittitur does not violate the right to a trial by jury is that remittitur cannot be 
granted without the consent of the prevailing party.”  Arbino, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 
2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting), citing Wightman v. 
Consol. Rail Corp. (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 431, 444, 715 N.E.2d 546.  Once again, 
a majority of this court illogically suggests that because “the treble-damages 
provisions of R.C. 901.51, 1331.08, 1345.09, 2307.61, 2923.34(E), and 4905.61, 
which increase a jury award, have never been held to infringe the right to a trial 
by jury, then [decreasing] a jury award, ‘cannot logically violate that right.’ ”  Id. 
{¶ 21} And once again, I state that “a statute that authorizes a judge to 
ignore or change factual findings deprives litigants ‘of the benefits of Trial by 
Jury’ and must be declared unconstitutional.”  Id. at ¶ 169.  R.C. 2744.05(C)(1) 
unconstitutionally invades the province of the jury by replacing a damages award 
determined by a jury with a predetermined cap imposed by the General Assembly.  
I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals on this issue. 
Equal Protection 
{¶ 22} The majority opinion states that “[t]he Ohio and federal equal 
protection analysis applied in Arbino is applicable in this case as well.”  This 
conclusion ignores one basic fact:  in the Arbino case, the majority opinion was 
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working with findings of fact supplied by the General Assembly, whereas in this 
case, the General Assembly did not issue findings of facts.  Instead, the majority 
opinion supplied its own single finding of fact, and did so without commenting on 
the lack of legislative findings of fact or the creation of its own judicial finding of 
fact.  Applying the equal protection analysis in the Arbino case to this case is 
unreasonable given the lack of legislative findings of fact in this case. 
{¶ 23} I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals because the 
caps imposed by R.C. 2744.05(C)(1) violate the right to trial by jury.  I dissent. 
__________________ 
James Burke Jr., John J. Chambers, and Sean P. Allan, for appellee Clifton 
Oliver. 
John J. Spellacy and Sean P. Allan, for appellee Donald Krieger. 
Robert J. Triozzi, Director of Law, Joseph F. Scott, Chief Assistant 
Director of Law, and Jerome A. Payne Jr., Assistant Director of Law, for 
appellant. 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, Benjamin C. Mizer, Solicitor General, 
and David M. Lieberman, Deputy Solicitor, urging reversal for amicus curiae 
state of Ohio. 
Paul W. Flowers Co., L.P.A., and Paul W. Flowers, urging affirmance for 
amicus curiae Ohio Association of Justice. 
______________________