Case Title: State v. Wetherbee

Citation: 177 Vt. 274, 2004 VT 101, 866 A.2d 527

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2004-10-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Wetherbee (2003-160); 177 Vt. 274; 866 A.2d 527

2004 VT 101

[Filed 01-Oct.-2004]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2004 VT 101

                                No. 2003-160

                                                 Supreme Court
  State of Vermont
                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 District Court of Vermont,
                                                 Unit No. 3, Caledonia Circuit

  Adam W. Wetherbee	                         March Term, 2004

                                   
  Mark J. Keller, J.

  William H. Sorrell, Attorney General, and John Treadwell and David Tartter,
    Assistant Attorneys General, Montpelier, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

  David J. Williams of Sleigh & Williams, St. Johnsbury, for
    Defendant-Appellant.

  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., (FN1) Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Reiber, JJ.

        
       ¶  1.  JOHNSON, J.   Adam Wetherbee appeals the Caledonia
  District Court's denial of his V.R.Cr.P. 41(e) motion for return of money
  that the Vermont State Police illegally seized from him, and subsequently
  transferred to federal authorities prior to the commencement of state
  proceedings in Vermont.  The district court ruled that it lacked
  jurisdiction over the property because it was in the possession of federal
  agents.  Wetherbee appealed the district court's decision to this Court
  notwithstanding the fact that the criminal case against him was dismissed
  before trial.  The State has moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of
  jurisdiction because Wetherbee's claim does not arise from a final judgment
  against him in the criminal case and is not in compliance with the rules
  that otherwise permit interlocutory appeals.  We deny the State's motion to
  dismiss, but affirm the district court's jurisdictional ruling on
  Wetherbee's Rule 41(e) motion.  

       ¶  2.  On October 31, 2002, a Vermont state trooper stopped Wetherbee
  for speeding in Danville, Vermont.  The trooper got Wetherbee to sign a
  consent form authorizing him to search the vehicle without first obtaining
  a search warrant.  During the search, the trooper discovered currency
  totaling $30,629.50 together with a small amount of narcotics. 

       ¶  3.  On November 1, 2002, the Caledonia County State's Attorney
  filed two informations  charging Wetherbee with misdemeanor possession of
  marijuana and cocaine.  Also on November 1, 2002, the Caledonia County
  State's Attorney notified the trooper that it would not seek forfeiture of
  the seized money.  Later that day, an agent assigned to the U.S. Drug
  Enforcement Agency (DEA) notified the trooper that the federal government
  would seek forfeiture of the money.   

       ¶  4.  On November 4, 2002, the state transferred the money to a DEA
  agent.  Later that day, after Wetherbee had been arraigned, he filed a
  motion to suppress evidence under Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure
  12(b)(3) and to return property pursuant to Rule  41(e).  On February 4,
  2003, the trial court held a  hearing on Wetherbee's motion for return of
  property.  On March 18, 2003, the court denied Wetherbee's motion, stating
  that Vermont lacked jurisdiction over the currency because the State had
  transferred it to federal agents before Wetherbee filed his motion.  
   
       ¶  5.  On April 1, 2003, the district court held a hearing on
  Wetherbee's motion to suppress.  The district court granted the motion, and
  the State dismissed all charges against Wetherbee.  On April 2, 2003,
  Wetherbee filed a Notice of Appeal informing the district court of his
  intent to appeal its order denying the Rule 41(e) motion for return of
  property. 

                         I.  Appellate Jurisdiction

       ¶  6.  Preliminarily, the State  moved to dismiss the appeal for
  lack of jurisdiction, and we delayed ruling on its motion until now.  The
  basis of our appellate  jurisdiction depends on the origin of the ruling
  that the appellant wants reviewed - in this case a Rule 41(e) motion for
  return of property filed by defendant Wetherbee at a time when a criminal
  prosecution was pending against him in the court where he filed the motion.  

       ¶  7.  Rule 41(e) provides a means by which persons can seek the
  return of property that the State has seized.  The rule provides that:

    A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the
    court to which the warrant was returned or the court in the county
    . . . where property has been seized without warrant for the
    return of the property on the ground that he is entitled to lawful
    possession of the property which was illegally seized.  The judge
    shall receive evidence on any issue of fact necessary to the
    decision of the motion.  If the motion is granted the property
    shall be restored and it shall not be admissible in evidence at
    any hearing or trial.  After an indictment or information is
    filed, a motion for return of property shall be made or heard only
    in the county or territorial unit of trial and shall be treated as
    a motion to suppress under Rule 12(b)(3).

  V.R.Cr.P. 41(e).  
   
       ¶  8.  "When criminal proceedings against the moving party are not
  yet pending or have transpired, the [Rule 41(e)] motion is treated as a
  civil equitable proceeding."  State v. Kornell, 169 Vt. 637, 638,