Case Title: Anthony Floyd Wainwright v. State Of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC02-1342

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2004-11-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
____________ 
Nos. SC02-1342 & SC02-2021 
____________ 
ANTHONY FLOYD WAINWRIGHT, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
____________ 
ANTHONY FLOYD WAINWRIGHT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JAMES V. CROSBY, JR., etc., 
Respondent. 
 
[November 24, 2004] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
Anthony Floyd Wainwright, an inmate under sentence of death, appeals an 
order denying his motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 3.850 and petitions for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  
 
 
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See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.  For the reasons stated below, we affirm the 
denial of Wainwright’s motion and deny the petition. 
I.  FACTS 
Wainwright was convicted of first-degree murder, armed robbery, armed 
kidnapping, and armed sexual battery.  He was sentenced to death.  The facts of 
Wainwright’s crimes are discussed in this Court’s opinion in Wainwright v. State, 
704 So. 2d 511, 512-13 (Fla. 1997).  We briefly restate them. 
Wainwright and his co-defendant, Richard Hamilton, escaped from a North 
Carolina prison and made their way to Florida in a stolen car.  In April 1994, when 
the car overheated in Lake City, Florida, the men abducted at gunpoint Carmen 
Gayheart, a young mother of two, as she loaded groceries into her Ford Bronco.  
They stole the Bronco and drove north on Interstate 75.  The men raped, strangled, 
and executed Gayheart by shooting her twice in the back of the head.  They were 
arrested the next day in Mississippi following a shootout with a trooper.  
Wainwright and Hamilton were tried in a single trial with separate juries. 
This Court affirmed Wainwright’s convictions and sentence on direct 
appeal.  Wainwright, 704 So. 2d at 512.  Wainwright later filed a motion for 
postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, raising 14 
 
 
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issues.1  After a Huff2 hearing, the trial court granted an evidentiary hearing on 
claims 4, 7, 10, 12, and 14.  After the evidentiary hearing, the court denied relief 
on all claims. 
II.  3.850 APPEAL 
On appeal, Wainwright raises eight issues.  We affirm the trial court’s denial 
of relief as to all the issues raised.  Only three issues merit extended discussion: (1) 
whether trial counsel was ineffective regarding the admission of additional DNA 
evidence; (2) whether trial counsel was ineffective regarding Wainwright’s 
                                        
1.  Wainwright’s motion argued:  (1) trial counsel was ineffective regarding 
the admission of additional DNA evidence; (2) trial counsel was ineffective 
regarding Wainwright’s statements and admissions; (3) trial counsel was 
ineffective regarding evidence of Wainwright’s out of state crimes; (4) trial 
counsel was ineffective regarding a microphone discovered in Wainwright’s cell; 
(5) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the penalty phase 
instructions on the aggravators; (6) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
object to the prosecutor’s argument at the guilt and penalty phases; (7) trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to maintain a proper attorney-client relationship, failing 
to ensure that Wainwright received adequate mental health evaluations and failing 
to investigate and present additional mitigating evidence; (8) trial counsel was 
ineffective for allowing the victim’s family to testify at sentencing; (9) trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to an alleged Caldwell v. Mississippi, 
472 U.S. 320 (1985), error; (10) initial counsel, Victor Africano, was ineffective in 
his pretrial representation of Wainwright; (11) trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to be prepared for trial; (12) trial counsel was ineffective for introducing 
statements of the codefendant; (13) trial counsel was ineffective for committing an 
alleged discovery violation; (14) trial counsel’s illness during trial rendered him 
ineffective.   
2.  See Huff v. State, 622 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla. 1993) (requiring the trial 
court to hold a hearing on postconviction motions in death penalty cases to 
“determin[e] whether an evidentiary hearing is required and to hear legal argument 
relating to the motion”).   
 
 
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statements and admissions; and (3) whether initial counsel was ineffective in his 
pretrial representation of Wainwright. 
To prevail on a claim that defense counsel provided ineffective assistance, a 
defendant must demonstrate specific acts or omissions of counsel that are “so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant 
by the Sixth Amendment.”  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
The defendant must also demonstrate prejudice by “show[ing] that there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id. at 694.  Ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims present mixed questions of law and fact subject to 
plenary review.  This Court independently reviews the trial court’s legal 
conclusions, while giving deference to the trial court’s factual findings.  Occhicone 
v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1045 (Fla. 2000). 
A.  Additional DNA Evidence 
Wainwright first claims that trial counsel was ineffective with respect to 
additional DNA evidence the State introduced after opening statements.  At the 
time of trial, the State had provided the defense with three genetic loci on the 
sperm sample from the back seat of the victim’s car.  At the end of the day 
following opening statements, the State informed trial counsel that new test results 
 
 
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revealed three additional genetic loci, making a total of six, and that odds against 
the donor being anyone but Wainwright were now astronomical.  Wainwright, 704 
So. 2d at 514.  On day eight of the proceedings (opening statements occurred on 
day four), trial counsel filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude the additional 
DNA evidence.  The trial court heard arguments on the motion, denied it, and gave 
the defense 24 hours to prepare for the conclusion of the testing.  On direct appeal, 
this Court held the trial court did not err in admitting the additional evidence.  
Wainwright, 704 So. 2d at 514-15.  This Court noted that trial counsel made no 
subsequent objection after the twenty-four hour continuance.  Id. at 515. 
Wainwright now claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
preserve the issue and for failing to raise the issue of prosecutorial misconduct or 
discovery violation.  The trial court denied this claim without an evidentiary 
hearing, finding it procedurally barred. 
“[A] defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction relief 
motion unless (1) the motion, files, and records in the case conclusively show that 
the prisoner is entitled to no relief, or (2) the motion or a particular claim is legally 
insufficient.”  Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1061 (Fla. 2000).  Where the 
motion lacks sufficient factual allegations, or where alleged facts do not render the 
judgment vulnerable to collateral attack, the motion may be summarily denied.  
Ragsdale v. State, 720 So. 2d 203, 207 (Fla. 1998).  However, in cases where there 
 
 
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has been no evidentiary hearing, this Court must accept the factual allegations 
made by the defendant to the extent that they are not refuted by the record.  See 
Peede v. State, 748 So. 2d 253, 257 (Fla. 1999).  In other words, this Court must 
examine each claim to determine if it is legally sufficient, and if so, determine 
whether or not the claim is refuted by the record.  Atwater v. State, 788 So. 2d 223, 
229 (Fla. 2001). 
The trial court properly denied this claim because it is refuted by the record.  
The record demonstrates that trial counsel did preserve the issue; trial counsel filed 
a motion in limine seeking to exclude the DNA evidence and argued the motion to 
the trial court.  In fact, this Court addressed the issue of the admissibility of the 
evidence on direct appeal, which demonstrates that the issue was preserved.  Also, 
during the arguments on the motion, trial counsel argued that the defense was 
prejudiced by the discovery being provided after opening statements.  The 
defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel if he alleges specific “facts which are not conclusively rebutted by the 
record and which demonstrate a deficiency in performance that prejudiced the 
defendant.”  Gaskin v. State, 737 So. 2d 509, 516 (Fla. 1999) (quoting Roberts v. 
State, 568 So. 2d 1255, 1259 (Fla. 1990)). 
Even if counsel’s performance were deficient, Wainwright has failed to 
demonstrate any prejudice.  During trial, several witnesses testified that 
 
 
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Wainwright admitted to sexually assaulting the victim.  Thus, no reasonable 
probability exists that, but for counsel’s alleged unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different.  The jury was well aware that the sperm 
samples found in the victim’s car were from Wainwright because Wainwright 
admitted as much. 
B.  Wainwright’s Statements and Admissions 
Wainwright alleges trial counsel was ineffective with respect to 
incriminating statements Wainwright made to law enforcement officers between 
May 9 and May 20, 1994.  On direct appeal, Wainwright claimed the trial court 
erred in denying his motion to suppress these statements, and this Court noted the 
facts specific to this claim: 
[Wainwright] was arrested in Mississippi and voluntarily returned to 
Florida.  On his return, officers reached an agreement with 
Wainwright and his lawyer3 whereby the State would not seek the 
death penalty if Wainwright met three conditions:  (1) He did not 
contribute to Gayheart’s death; (2) he was truthful in his conversations 
with police; and (3) he passed a lie detector test.  Pursuant to this 
agreement, Wainwright made a number of incriminating statements 
from May 9 to May 20, 1994, and assisted officers in recovering 
evidence of the crime.  When he was transported to the State 
Attorney’s office on May 20, however, he conferred with his lawyer, 
admitted for the first time that had [sic] sexually assaulted Gayheart, 
and refused to take the lie detector test.  Police had no further contact 
with Wainwright after that point. 
                                        
3.  This lawyer was initial counsel Victor Africano.   
 
 
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Wainwright, 704 So. 2d at 513.  This Court upheld the trial court’s denial of the 
motion to suppress, finding that by the time Wainwright made the incriminating 
statements, “the agreement between the parties was a fait accompli.  There was no 
need for ‘free and open discussions,’ i.e., privileged discussions, since the deal 
already had been sealed.  No public policy would be furthered by suppressing such 
statements.”  Id. at 514. 
As his postconviction claim, Wainwright first argued that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to preserve this issue for appeal.  The trial court denied this 
claim without an evidentiary hearing, finding that the issue was procedurally 
barred and that the allegation of ineffectiveness is insufficient to overcome the 
procedural bar. 
The trial court properly denied this claim.  The record rebuts Wainwright’s 
allegation.  During trial, trial counsel filed a motion to suppress the statements 
Wainwright made on May 9, 11, and 20.  The trial court heard arguments on the 
motion and denied the motion, and this Court addressed the issue on direct appeal. 
To the extent Wainwright argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to move for a Richardson4 hearing on Wainwright’s May 10 statement, the trial 
                                        
4.  Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771, 776 (Fla. 1971) (“[W]hen it is 
brought to the attention of the trial court during the course of the proceedings that 
the State has failed to comply with the [discovery] Rule the Court has a discretion 
to determine if such failure has prejudiced the defendant on trial . . . [b]ut . . . the 
 
 
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court properly denied the claim on that basis as well.  Although trial counsel did 
not specifically move for a Richardson hearing, the matter of the May 10 statement 
was extensively discussed at trial in response to a defense motion to suppress the 
statement.  The following explains what occurred at trial. 
Sheriff Reid, a law enforcement officer involved in the investigation, was 
deposed by the defense and testified to Wainwright’s May 11 statement.  After the 
deposition, Sheriff Reid informed the State that Wainwright had made another 
statement on May 10.  The prosecutor stated he did not disclose it “because I was 
not aware of the fact that, really, that had not been brought out in the deposition.”  
When the prosecutor reviewed the deposition, it became apparent to him that the 
defense was not put on notice of the May 10 statement, and he informed trial 
counsel of the statement and alerted the trial court to the inadvertent discovery 
violation.  In response, trial counsel argued that the defense was prejudiced by the 
statement and that the State had committed a discovery violation.  The trial court 
ruled that it would allow the statement “and find that it is a procedural technical 
violation, which does not deprive the Defense of any other opportunities they 
would have had to rebut or confront such testimony.” 
Wainwright has demonstrated neither deficient performance nor prejudice.  
Trial counsel properly preserved the issue for review, filed motions to suppress the 
                                                                                                                              
trial court’s discretion can be properly exercised only after the court has made an 
adequate inquiry into all of the surrounding circumstances.”).   
 
 
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statements, and argued the merits of those motions.  At trial, counsel thoroughly 
cross-examined Sheriff Reid about the statements. 
Wainwright has also failed to demonstrate prejudice.  No reasonable 
probability exists that, but for counsel’s alleged errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.  In addition to Wainwright’s incriminating statements, 
the State presented Wainwright’s confessions to fellow inmates Robert Murphy 
and Gary Gunter, as well as DNA evidence linking him to the crime.  The trial 
court properly denied this claim. 
C.  Initial Plea Negotiations 
Upon Wainwright’s arrival in Florida after his arrest in Mississippi, Victor 
Africano was assigned to represent him.  Africano sought to negotiate a plea 
bargain with the State.  The conditions of the plea were that Wainwright was to 
fully cooperate with the police and pass a polygraph examination proving that he 
was not the person who killed Gayheart.  Shortly after Wainwright refused to take 
the polygraph examination, Africano filed a motion to withdraw from the case. 
Wainwright claims that Africano was ineffective for failing to have the plea 
agreement reduced to writing, failing to explain the plea, and allowing Wainwright 
to speak to law enforcement officers alone.  The trial court denied this claim after 
an evidentiary hearing, finding: 
[Wainwright] testified on this claim at the evidentiary hearing and 
stated that he would have taken a polygraph examination at the State 
 
 
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Attorney’s Office on May 20, 1994, but for the lack of a written plea 
agreement.  Mr. Africano was terminally ill at the time of the hearing, 
and the parties stipulated that he was unavailable.  The State 
introduced testimony from Sheriff Harrell Reid and State Attorney 
Jerry Blair.  Both stated that the Defendant refused to take the 
polygraph test after confessing that he both raped and killed the 
victim.  Mr. Blair testified that a written plea agreement was never 
requested. 
At the hearing the Defendant also denied raping and killing the 
victim and stated that he was willing to take the polygraph 
examination on May 20, 1994 and would have passed it.  This is 
contradicted by testimony at the trial and at the hearing.  The Court 
finds the Defendant’s testimony at the hearing to be incredible.  It is 
obvious that the plea negotiations were terminated because the 
Defendant could not meet the conditions of the agreement, i.e., he 
could not pass a polygraph test to demonstrate that he did not rape and 
kill the victim. 
Mr. Africano was an experienced trial lawyer, and counsel must 
be presumed to have acted in a reasonable manner.  That the plea 
negotiations failed was due to the Defendant’s inability to meet the 
conditions of the plea agreement, not to anything Mr. Africano did or 
did not do. 
With the exception of the emphasized sentence above, the trial court’s factual 
findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record.5  Africano 
did not testify at the evidentiary hearing.6  Wainwright, Sheriff Reid, State 
Attorney Jerry Blair, and trial counsel did. 
                                        
5.  Contrary to the trial court’s finding, neither Sheriff Reid nor State 
Attorney Blair testified that Wainwright refused to take the polygraph after 
confessing that he both killed and raped the victim; according to them, he 
confessed only to raping her. 
6.  At the evidentiary hearing, the parties stipulated that Africano was 
unavailable to testify.  The stipulation noted that Africano was confined to a 
wheelchair, in excruciating pain, and taking pain medication which may have 
affected his memory and ability to relate.   
 
 
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Wainwright testified that upon his arrival in Florida, he met with Africano 
for about 25 to 30 minutes.  He said Africano told him about the following plea 
bargain: if he cooperated and he passed a polygraph examination that showed he 
did not participate in the rape or murder, he would receive a life sentence.  After 
speaking with Africano, Wainwright met with Sheriff Reid and others, but during 
this meeting, no mention was made of the plea bargain.  Also, the bargain was 
never reduced to writing and Africano never talked to Wainwright about a written 
agreement.  Wainwright then went on two outings with law enforcement officers to 
gather evidence.  Finally, some days later, Wainwright was transported to the state 
attorney’s office, where he refused to take the polygraph.  Wainwright explained 
that he refused to take the polygraph “because I had asked him [Sheriff Reid] while 
we were down in the state attorney’s office could I get something in writing 
regarding our deal.  He said he didn’t know nothing about no deal.”  Wainwright 
testified that when he asked Africano about the deal, “He didn’t say nothing.”  
Finally, Wainwright stated he was still willing to take the polygraph, and would 
have cooperated further had there been a written agreement. 
Sheriff Reid, the sheriff of Hamilton County, testified that when Wainwright 
was first transported to Florida, Reid spoke with Africano and explained that law 
enforcement officers were interested in determining who actually killed the victim, 
and that if Wainwright could prove that he was not involved in the murder, then 
 
 
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“we were willing to offer him a chance at life without parole and not seek the death 
penalty.  Not me personally, but through negotiations.”  Sheriff Reid testified that 
he had discussed the deal with State Attorney Jerry Blair.  Sheriff Reid explained 
that before the polygraph was to be taken, Africano alerted the Sheriff that 
Wainwright had a statement to make.  “At that point, I went into the conference 
room where he and Mr. Africano were and Mr. Wainwright told me that he had 
raped and had sex with Ms. Gayheart.”  Wainwright then declined to take the 
polygraph.  Finally, Sheriff Reid testified that he did not recall Wainwright stating 
he would not take the polygraph unless he had a written agreement. 
State Attorney Jerry Blair, who prosecuted Wainwright at trial, testified that 
he informed Africano that if Wainwright could pass a polygraph test showing that 
he was not the “triggerman,” then the State would accept a guilty plea in exchange 
for a life sentence if Wainwright testified against the codefendant.  Blair also 
testified that his office used a substantial assistance form that recited the terms of a 
plea agreement, and had a request been made to put this deal in writing, that form 
would have been available and the deal would have been reduced to writing.  Like 
Sheriff Reid, Blair testified that after stating that he had raped the victim, 
Wainwright refused to take the polygraph.  Blair testified that the State was willing 
to go through with the deal despite Wainwright’s admission about the rape. 
 
 
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Finally, trial counsel testified that he spoke to Africano, as best as he could 
recall, on two occasions.  Trial counsel explained that they discussed the plea 
bargain and in response to a question about why the polygraph did not occur, 
Africano told him that the negotiations had broken down.  Africano never 
commented to him about Wainwright’s desire to have the plea agreement reduced 
to writing. 
Wainwright has failed to demonstrate that Africano rendered ineffective 
assistance.  Wainwright testified that if the deal had been in writing, he would have 
taken the polygraph examination.  The evidence established, however, that 
Wainwright refused to take the polygraph after admitting he had raped the victim.  
No testimony, other than Wainwright’s, indicates that Wainwright was interested 
in having the plea reduced to writing at the time of the negotiations.  The trial court 
found Wainwright’s testimony at the hearing not credible.  It further found that the 
plea negotiations were terminated because Wainwright could not meet the 
conditions of the agreement, i.e., he could not pass a polygraph test to demonstrate 
that he did not rape and kill the victim. 
Also, Africano did not allow Wainwright to speak to law enforcement 
officers alone, as Wainwright alleges.  Although there were instances during the 
investigation when Africano was not present, as part of the plea bargain 
 
 
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Wainwright was required to fully cooperate and freely give statements to the 
police. 
Even if Africano’s performance had been deficient in some way, 
Wainwright has failed to demonstrate prejudice.  He alleges that because of 
Africano’s deficient performance, he was sentenced to death even though he had 
been promised a life sentence if he took a polygraph test and passed it.  This 
argument assumes that Wainwright would have passed the test, a contention which 
the testimony and evidence at trial rebuts.  Thus, Wainwright has failed to 
demonstrate that a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel’s alleged 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  The 
trial court properly denied this claim. 
D.  Other Issues 
We find the remaining issues Wainwright raises also without merit.  We 
address them only briefly. 
First, Wainwright argued that trial counsel was ineffective concerning the 
collateral crime evidence introduced at trial.  This claim is procedurally barred 
because it was raised and addressed in Wainwright’s direct appeal.  See 
Wainwright, 704 So. 2d at 516 n.9.  To the extent Wainwright re-characterizes his 
argument as ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming that trial counsel failed to 
 
 
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preserve the issue, the record rebuts the claim.  Trial counsel raised the issue with 
the trial court in a motion in limine. 
Next, Wainwright claims trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move for 
a mistrial when a microphone was discovered in Wainwright’s cell.  This claim is 
without merit because it fails to meet the standard established in Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  To the extent Wainwright argues that the 
presence of the microphone violated his constitutional rights, or that the trial court 
engaged in ex parte communication, this claim is procedurally barred because it 
could have been raised on direct appeal.  See, e.g., Harvey v. Dugger, 656 So. 2d 
1253 (Fla. 1995). 
Wainwright’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve 
issues relating to jury instructions, prosecutorial misconduct, and aggravating 
factors, for failing to maintain a proper attorney-client relationship, and for failing 
to investigate and present additional mitigating evidence, all fail under Strickland. 
Finally, Wainwright’s claim that trial counsel was ineffective for introducing 
statements of the codefendant is without merit because trial counsel’s decision to 
introduce this information was consistent with his trial strategy and theory of 
defense.  Trial counsel’s decision was reasonable under the norms of professional 
conduct.  See Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 1037, 1048-49 (Fla. 2000) (“The 
issue is not what present counsel or this Court might now view as the best strategy, 
 
 
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but rather whether the strategy was within the broad range of discretion afforded to 
counsel actually responsible for the defense.”). 
III.  PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
Wainwright’s petition for writ of habeas corpus raises four issues.  These 
claims are either procedurally barred or lack merit.  Only one issue merits 
discussion.7  Wainwright contends that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme is 
unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), and Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  We first rejected this claim in Bottoson v. 
Moore, 833 So. 2d 693 (Fla.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1070 (2002), and have 
rejected it many times since.  See, e.g., Rivera v. State, 859 So. 2d 495, 508 (Fla. 
2003); Jones v. State, 855 So. 2d 611, 619 (Fla. 2003); Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 
930, 959 (Fla. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1855 (2004); McCoy v. State, 853 So. 
2d 396, 409 (Fla. 2003); Owen v. Crosby, 854 So. 2d 182, 193 (Fla. 2003); Fennie 
v. State, 855 So. 2d 597, 607 n.10 (Fla. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1877 (2004); 
                                        
7.  Wainwright’s second issue alleges that trial counsel failed to raise an 
issue involving the felony murder jury instruction.  The claim as stated is 
conclusory and insufficiently pled, failing even to state the standard of review for 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and thus is denied.  Wainwright’s third 
and fourth issues allege that the trial court erred by failing to make specific 
findings before requiring Wainwright to wear a stun belt at trial and by failing to 
conduct a Koon v. Dugger, 619 So. 2d 246 (Fla. 1993), inquiry.  These claims are 
procedurally barred.  See, e.g., Parker v. Dugger, 550 So. 2d 459, 460 (Fla. 1989) 
(finding that “habeas corpus petitions are not to be used for additional appeals on 
questions which could have been, should have been, or were raised on appeal or in 
a rule 3.850 motion, or on matters that were not objected to at trial”). 
 
 
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Caballero v. State, 851 So. 2d 655, 663-64 (Fla. 2003); Belcher v. State, 851 So. 2d 
678, 685 (Fla.), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 816 (2003); Allen v. State, 854 So. 2d 
1255, 1262 (Fla. 2003).  We deny Wainwright’s claim as well.  We note that one 
of the aggravators the jury found was that Wainwright had a prior violent felony 
conviction, a factor which under Ring and Apprendi need not be found by the jury.  
See Jones v. State, 855 So. 2d 611, 619 (Fla. 2003) (denying claim based on Ring 
v. Arizona where the aggravating circumstances the jury found included a prior 
violent felony). 
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Wainwright’s motion for 
postconviction relief, and we deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
It is so ordered. 
 
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., 
concur. 
ANSTEAD, J., concurs in result only. 
 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Hamilton County,  
E. Vernon Douglas, Judge - Case No. 94-150-CF-2 
 
and an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
 
 
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Joseph T. Hobson of McFarland, Gould, Lyons, Sullivan and Hogan, P.A., 
Clearwater, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Cassandra K. Dolgin, Meredith Charbula 
and Charmaine M. Millsaps, Assistants Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent