Case Title: County of Albemarle v. Keswick Club

Citation: 

Docket Number: 091590

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2010-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Koontz, Kinser, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, JJ., and 
Russell and Lacy, S.JJ.  
 
 
COUNTY OF ALBEMARLE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 091590      
       JUSTICE S. BERNARD GOODWYN 
 
 September 16, 2010 
KESWICK CLUB, L.P. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALBEMARLE COUNTY 
James A. Luke, Judge Designate 
 
 
In this appeal, a county challenges the circuit court’s 
reduction of an assessment, for the 2003 and 2004 tax years, of 
the fair market value of real estate owned by a taxpayer.  We 
consider whether the circuit court erred in finding the 
county’s assessment erroneous and reducing the assessment. 
This case was previously remanded to the Circuit Court of 
Albemarle County for reconsideration of an assessment made by 
the County of Albemarle (the County) of the fair market value 
of the Keswick Club.  Keswick Club, L.P. v. County of 
Albemarle, 273 Va. 128, 639 S.E.2d 243 (2007).  This Court 
instructed the circuit court, on remand, to apply the proper, 
less stringent standard of review, applicable under the facts 
of this particular case, in determining whether the County’s 
assessment was erroneous.  Id. at 141, 639 S.E.2d at 250.  
Facts 
In 2003, Keswick Club, L.P. (the taxpayer), the owner of 
Keswick Club, an approximately 153-acre private recreational 
 
2
club in Albemarle County, challenged a judgment upholding the 
County’s assessment of the fair market value of the Keswick 
Club real property for the 2003 and 2004 tax years.  The County 
issued a notice of reassessment to the taxpayer that valued 
Keswick Club’s real estate at a fair market value of 
$12,771,500.1  The taxpayer disputed the assessment value and 
filed an application in the circuit court, pursuant to Code 
§ 58.1-3984, to correct the erroneous assessment.  
At the bench trial, David J. Sangree was qualified, 
without objection, as an expert real estate appraiser and 
hospitality consultant and testified on behalf of the taxpayer.  
He was licensed in Ohio and had a temporary appraisal license 
in Virginia.  Sangree stated that he had conducted a recent 
appraisal of the Keswick Club real estate in preparation for 
the tax appeal.  He further stated that the income approach to 
valuation was the most appropriate because a potential buyer of 
a golf course looks primarily at its profitability.  Sangree 
also conducted an appraisal using the sales comparison approach 
and included in his appraisal purportedly representative sales 
of golf courses in Virginia and South Carolina, as well as the 
2002 sale of the Keswick Club.  Using both valuation 
approaches, Sangree valued the property at $2.9 million.  
                     
1 The 2003 notice of reassessment stated that the previous 
assessment of the property was $11,318,900. 
 
3
Sangree did not use the cost approach, stating that it was more 
relevant for a proposed property or a new construction 
property. 
The county assessor, Bruce M. Woodzell, testified that he 
utilized the cost approach in assessing the value of the 
property because it rendered the “most accurate appraisal of 
the property” and is “appropriate when you have a special-use 
property” such as a golf course.  Woodzell stated that he 
rejected the income approach because he had not received any 
income statements or other financial information from the 
taxpayer.  However, he had not requested such information.  
Woodzell also stated that he could not develop an appraisal 
based on the sales approach because there was only one 
comparable sale in Albemarle County.  
Ivo H. Romenesko, a licensed appraiser, also testified for 
the County.  He stated that he did not use the income approach 
because projecting future profits would require an inordinate 
amount of speculation since Keswick Club had been operating at 
a loss.  Romenesko used both the sales and cost approaches to 
evaluate the property.  Using the cost approach, Romenesko 
valued the property at $12,950,000.  Using the sales approach, 
Romenesko valued the property at $12 million.  His final 
appraised value for the property was $12.5 million. 
 
4
At the conclusion of the trial, the circuit court found 
that the taxpayer failed to prove that the County “committed 
manifest error in its evaluation,” and affirmed the County’s 
assessment.  The taxpayer appealed to this Court.  We held that 
the circuit court had erred in upholding the County’s 
assessment because the assessment was not entitled to a 
presumption of correctness, and therefore the taxpayer was not 
required to establish that, in making its assessment, the 
County committed “manifest error.”  Keswick Club, 273 Va. at 
141, 639 S.E.2d at 250.  Rather, to prevail, the taxpayer was 
required only to show that the assessment was erroneous.  Id.  
Accordingly, we remanded the case for the circuit court to 
evaluate the County’s assessment, applying the proper and less 
stringent standard of review applicable under the facts of this 
case.  Id. 
On remand, over the objection of the taxpayer, the circuit 
court allowed the County to present additional evidence.  
Romenesko testified that he had analyzed the fair market value 
of the property using the income approach and found that using 
that approach resulted in a fair market value of $9.9 million.  
However, he discounted the accuracy of the income approach, in 
this instance, stating that it required considerable 
speculation.  Therefore, he discarded the valuation he found 
using the income approach, and testified that he still believed 
 
5
that his previous appraisal valuing the property at $12.5 
million was accurate because the sales and cost valuation 
approaches were better measures of value.  
In response, the taxpayer sought to introduce additional 
testimony from Sangree, critiquing the income approach 
valuation done by Romenesko.  The County objected to Sangree’s 
testimony because Sangree did not hold a Virginia real estate 
appraiser license, his previous Virginia temporary appraiser 
license having expired.  The taxpayer argued that Sangree was 
solely testifying in rebuttal to Romenesko’s testimony about 
the appraisal process.  The circuit court overruled the 
County’s objection on the basis that Sangree had not done a new 
appraisal.  Further, the court stated that because it was a 
continuing proceeding and Sangree was fully qualified and 
accepted without objection as an expert appraiser earlier in 
the proceeding, the court could allow Sangree to testify 
pursuant to Code § 54.1-2010(B).  
Sangree testified that the methodology used by Romenesko 
in applying the income approach to value the property was 
flawed.  Sangree also pointed out various mathematical errors 
and errors in the figures Romenesko used to calculate both the 
possible sale price and potential income of the property.  
Also, two additional witnesses testified concerning the 
discrepancy between the assumptions made by Romenesko in doing 
 
6
his income approach analysis and how the Keswick Club property 
was actually operated or could be operated. 
The circuit court issued its ruling by way of a letter 
opinion.  The circuit court stated that “in effect, the Supreme 
Court stated that based on its review of the record, the 
[County’s] assessment was erroneous, on the ground that the 
County used an improper methodology.”  It also stated that the 
County, on remand, had reasserted its previous value and that 
the taxpayer also reaffirmed that it was relying upon the same 
appraisal as asserted at trial.  “Thus, the evidence before the 
Court at present is substantially similar to the evidence 
before the Court at trial.”  The circuit court stated that it 
had analyzed the evidence presented to it and “the Court, in 
applying the less stringent standard of review set forth by the 
Supreme Court, concludes that Keswick has proven that the 
County’s assessment was erroneous and sets aside the 
assessment.”   
The circuit court also found that neither the County nor 
the taxpayer had arrived at a correct fair market value figure 
for the property, and concluded that the correct fair market 
value of the property was somewhere between the parties’ 
valuations.  The circuit court set the value of the property at 
$7 million, a value figure that had been testified to by 
Michael Pownall, Keswick Club’s general manager, in the initial 
 
7
trial.  That valuation amount was also admitted into evidence 
in a letter from Pownall to the Board of Equalization.  The 
County appeals.   
Analysis 
 
The County argues that the circuit court erred in stating 
that this Court, in its prior opinion, found the County’s 
assessment erroneous, when this Court only addressed the 
County’s assessment methods.  The County also asserts that the 
circuit court erred in finding that the assessment was 
erroneous, in reducing the assessment to $7 million, and in 
allowing Sangree’s testimony on remand. 
 
Code § 58.1-3984(A) provides that a taxpayer seeking to 
set aside an assessment as erroneous has the burden of 
establishing that the property was “valued at more than its 
fair market value or that the assessment is not uniform in its 
application, or that the assessment is otherwise invalid or 
illegal.”  Further, a taxing authority’s assessment of a 
property’s fair market value is entitled to a presumption of 
correctness which can be overcome by showing that the taxing 
authority committed manifest error.  Board of Supervisors v. 
HCA Health Servs., 260 Va. 317, 329, 535 S.E.2d 163, 169 
(2000).  However, if the taxpayer establishes that the taxing 
authority has committed manifest error, the assessment is not 
entitled to a presumption of correctness and the taxpayer is 
 
8
required to show only that the assessment was erroneous.  See 
id. at 330, 535 S.E.2d at 170.  
In our prior opinion regarding this matter, we held that 
the County’s assessment was not entitled to a presumption of 
validity and that the taxpayer was only required to show that 
the County’s assessment was erroneous, “not that the county 
committed manifest error or disregarded controlling evidence in 
making its assessment.”  Keswick, 273 Va. at 140-41, 639 S.E.2d 
at 250.  Under those circumstances, the taxpayer can show an 
assessment is erroneous if, as set out in Code § 58.1-3984(A), 
the taxpayer establishes that the property is assessed at more 
than its fair market value.  We concluded that the circuit 
court applied an incorrect standard of review.  Id. at 141, 639 
S.E.2d at 250.  The case was remanded to allow the circuit 
court to apply the correct standard of review in determining 
whether the County’s assessment was erroneous.  Id.  That is 
the posture in which this case was presented to the circuit 
court following our remand. 
While the circuit court erred in stating that this Court 
had already determined that the County’s assessment was 
erroneous, the circuit court nevertheless applied the correct 
standard on remand when considering whether the County’s 
assessment was erroneous.  The circuit court, as recited in its 
opinion letter, recognized that to prevail in this case, that 
 
9
is, to establish that the assessment was erroneous, the 
taxpayer had the burden of proof “to show that the property in 
question is valued at more than its fair market value” pursuant 
to Code § 58.1-3984(A).  The circuit court specifically noted 
that the taxpayer presented “evidence as to what it believes is 
the fair market value of the property.”  The circuit court 
concluded that this evidence met the taxpayer’s proof burden.  
Therefore, the determinative assignment of error argued by the 
County is whether in applying the less stringent standard of 
review mandated by this Court to be used on remand, the circuit 
court erred in finding that the assessment was erroneous and 
reducing the assessment to $7 million.   
The County argues that the circuit court should have 
accepted the County’s assessment, which was supported by 
Romenesko’s appraisal.  The taxpayer asserts that the circuit 
court was correct in finding that the County’s assessment was 
erroneous.  The taxpayer argues that the circuit court, as the 
fact finder, was entitled not to accept the expert testimony 
presented to it and that the circuit court’s determination of 
fair market value is supported by evidence presented at trial.   
A taxpayer seeking relief from an allegedly erroneous 
assessment has the burden to show that the assessment exceeds 
fair market value.  Code § 58.1-3984; see Shoosmith Bros. v. 
County of Chesterfield, 268 Va. 241, 245, 601 S.E.2d 641, 643 
 
10
(2004); Board of Supervisors v. HCA Health Servs., 260 Va. 317, 
329-30, 535 S.E.2d 163, 169-70 (2000); Tidewater Psychiatric 
Inst. v. City of Virginia Beach, 256 Va. 136, 140-41, 501 
S.E.2d 761, 763 (1998).  In this case, the taxpayer was 
required to show that the County’s assessment exceeded fair 
market value.   
The parties’ expert valuations differed greatly.  In cases 
where the circuit court is presented with such conflicting 
testimony, we “will defer to the circuit court’s judgment of 
the weight and credibility to be given [the witness’] 
testimony.”  HCA Health Servs., 260 Va. at 332, 535 S.E.2d at 
171.  Keswick’s evidence concerning the value of the property 
was sufficient to demonstrate that the County’s assessment 
exceeded fair market value.  Accordingly, we hold that there is 
evidence to support the circuit court’s finding that the County 
committed error in its assessment.  See Arlington County Board 
v. Ginsberg, 228 Va. 633, 641, 325 S.E.2d 348, 352 (1985).  
Further, because the circuit court on remand properly 
determined that the assessment was erroneous, it was empowered 
to set the assessment pursuant to Code § 58.1-3987. 
Code § 58.1-3987 states that a circuit court, when 
considering the reduction or increase of an assessment, has 
“all the powers and duties of the authority which made the 
assessment complained of, as of the time when such assessment 
 
11
was made, and all the powers and duties conferred by law upon 
such authority between the time such assessment was made and 
the time such application is heard.”  We have interpreted this 
Code section to mean that a circuit court may fix the 
assessment in accordance with the evidence, as it retains all 
the powers of the taxing authority.  Ginsberg, 228 Va. at 640, 
325 S.E.2d at 352. 
After a circuit court has found an assessment erroneous, 
it is “not bound by the values argued by the parties or those 
fixed by witnesses.”  Id. at 643, 325 S.E.2d at 353.  Instead, 
the circuit court may, pursuant to Code § 58.1-3987, “weigh the 
evidence and establish a value accordingly” and where the 
circuit court has “selected a value supported by the evidence, 
it has acted within the statutory grant of authority.”  Id. at 
643, 325 S.E.2d at 354.  We then review the circuit court’s 
factual finding for clear error and we will not overturn the 
circuit court’s ruling unless it was plainly wrong or without 
evidence to support it.  Board of Supervisors v. Donatelli & 
Klein, Inc., 228 Va. 620, 627-28, 325 S.E.2d 342, 345 (1985). 
The circuit court reviewed the evidence presented at trial 
and allowed the parties to present new evidence on remand.  
Instead of relying on the County’s expert testimony, or the 
taxpayer’s rebuttal, the circuit court correctly stated that in 
accordance with Code § 58.1-3987, it was empowered to “arrive 
 
12
at its own assessment value of the property.”  The circuit 
court stated that it considered and relied on the evidence 
presented to it in ruling that $7 million was the proper 
assessment of the fair market value of the property.  We hold 
that the circuit court’s ruling as to the proper value for the 
taxpayer’s property is not erroneous because it is not plainly 
wrong or without evidence to support it. 
The County also argues that the circuit court erred in 
allowing the admission of Sangree’s testimony on remand.  The 
County argues that Sangree should not have been permitted to 
testify because at that time he was not licensed by the 
Commonwealth as a real estate appraiser as required under Code 
§ 54.1-2011.  The County also argues that even if Sangree’s 
testimony was admissible, it was inherently unreliable.  The 
taxpayer argues that the circuit court, without objection, 
previously in the same proceeding qualified Sangree as an 
expert appraiser and accepted his expert testimony, and under 
Code § 54.1-2010(B), the circuit court retains the ability to 
allow that person to provide additional testimony.  In 
addition, the taxpayer argues that Sangree’s testimony on 
remand was not an appraisal since he did not conduct an 
analysis of the property, and thus Code § 54.1-2011 would not 
prevent Sangree from providing such testimony.  
 
13
The purpose of Sangree’s testimony on remand was to 
challenge Romenesko’s testimony on remand.  On remand, 
Romenesko testified that the income approach resulted in an 
appraised value for the Keswick Club real property of $9.9 
million.  Sangree’s testimony on remand was critical of 
Romenesko’s assumptions and the methodology he used in 
appraising the property using the income approach.  Two other 
witnesses also testified concerning the accuracy of the 
assumptions Romenesko made in using the income approach.  
However, Romenesko stated that as a result of the 
inappropriateness of using the income approach in this 
instance, he would discard the result he found using the income 
approach in appraising the property, and he did so.  Romenesko 
testified that he still believed his initial appraisal was 
correct, and he reasserted the correctness of his previous 
valuation of $12.5 million, which was made at the initial 
trial. 
The circuit court relied upon the appraisals presented to 
it to determine whether the County’s assessment was erroneous.  
Romenesko did not change his appraisal on remand.  Therefore, 
it is clear that Sangree’s testimony on remand could not have 
affected the result.  Thus, to the extent the circuit court 
erred in admitting Sangree’s testimony into evidence, such 
error was harmless. 
 
14
Conclusion 
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, we will affirm the 
circuit court’s ruling. 
Affirmed. 
JUSTICE KINSER, dissenting. 
 
The County of Albemarle (the County) asserts in assignment 
of error number one that "[t]he trial court erred in concluding 
that this Court had already found the County's assessment 
erroneous when this Court had faulted only the manner in which 
the assessment method was chosen."  With regard to this issue, 
the majority holds that, despite "err[ing] in stating that this 
Court had already determined that the County's assessment was 
erroneous, the circuit court nevertheless applied the correct 
standard on remand" from Keswick Club, L.P. v. County of 
Albemarle (Keswick I), 273 Va. 128, 639 S.E.2d 243 (2007).  I 
do not agree and conclude instead that the circuit court failed 
to determine, using the less stringent standard of review, 
whether Keswick Club, L.P. (Keswick Club) proved that the 
assessed value of its real property exceeded the property's 
fair market value.  Therefore, I respectfully dissent. 
Before addressing our holding in Keswick I and the circuit 
court's decision in this case, I must reiterate some well-
established principles.  The Constitution of Virginia commands 
that "[a]ll assessments of real estate . . . shall be at their 
 
15
fair market value."  Va. Const. art. X, § 2.  "A taxing 
authority's assessment is presumed to be correct, and a 
taxpayer has the burden to rebut that presumption by 
establishing that the real property in question is assessed at 
more than fair market value or that the assessment is not 
uniform in its application."  West Creek Assocs., LLC v. County 
of Goochland, 276 Va. 393, 409, 665 S.E.2d 834, 842-43 (2008) 
(citing Code § 58.1-3984(A)) ("[E]ven if the assessor is unable 
to come forward with evidence to prove the correctness of the 
assessment[,] this does not impeach it since the taxpayer has 
the burden of proving the assessment erroneous." (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  To rebut the presumption of 
correctness, "a taxpayer must show by a clear preponderance of 
the evidence that the taxing authority committed manifest error 
or totally disregarded controlling evidence in making the 
assessment."  West Creek, 276 Va. at 409, 665 S.E.2d at 843; 
accord Tidewater Psychiatric Inst., Inc. v. City of Virginia 
Beach, 256 Va. 136, 140-41, 501 S.E.2d 761, 763 (1998). 
A taxpayer may demonstrate manifest error by proving that 
the taxing authority employed an improper methodology in 
arriving at a property's assessed value or by establishing "a 
significant disparity between fair market value and assessed 
value . . . 'so long as the assessment [does not] come[] within 
the range of a reasonable difference of opinion, . . . when 
 
16
considered in light of the presumption in its favor.'"  West 
Creek, 276 Va. at 414, 655 S.E.2d at 845 (quoting City of 
Norfolk v. Synder, 161 Va. 288, 293, 170 S.E. 721, 723 (1933)).  
When the taxpayer proves, as Keswick Club did in this case, see 
Keswick I, 273 Va. at 137, 139-40, 639 S.E.2d at 248-50, use of 
an improper methodology by establishing that the taxing 
authority failed to "consider[] and properly reject[] other 
methods of calculating" a property's fair market value, 
Tidewater, 256 Va. at 142, 501 S.E.2d at 764; accord Board of 
Supervisors v. HCA Health Servs. of Virginia, Inc., 260 Va. 
317, 330, 535 S.E.2d 163, 169-70 (2000), the presumption of 
validity is rebutted.  Keswick I, 273 Va. at 140-41, 639 S.E.2d 
at 250; see HCA Health Servs., 260 Va. at 330, 535 S.E.2d at 
170.  Then, the taxpayer needs to prove only that the assessed 
value is erroneous, not "manifest[ly]" so, to be afforded 
relief from an erroneous tax assessment.  Keswick I, 273 Va. at 
140-41, 639 S.E.2d at 250; see Code § 58.1-3984(A); HCA Health 
Servs., 260 Va. at 330, 535 S.E.2d at 170. 
In Keswick I, the issue was "whether the [C]ounty failed 
to properly consider the income and sales approaches to 
valuation before basing its assessment solely on the cost 
approach."  Keswick I, 273 Va. at 132, 140, 639 S.E.2d at 244, 
250 (emphasis added).  This Court held that the County's 
"categorical application of the cost approach to the valuation 
 
17
of all golf courses resulted in a failure by the [C]ounty to 
consider and properly reject the income and sales approaches 
before solely utilizing the cost approach in assessing the fair 
market value" of Keswick Club's real property and, therefore, 
the County's 2003 and 2004 assessments were "not entitled to a 
presumption of validity."  Id. at 140, 639 S.E.2d at 250.  In 
Keswick I, we did not decide whether the County assessed 
Keswick Club's real property at more than its fair market 
value, but only that the County's refusal to consider and 
properly reject certain valuation methods rendered its assessed 
value of the property no longer presumptively correct.  
Accordingly, the Court remanded the case "so that the circuit 
court [could] apply the proper and less stringent standard of 
review," meaning the taxpayer only had "to show that the 
[C]ounty's assessment was erroneous, not that the [C]ounty 
committed manifest error or disregarded controlling evidence in 
making its assessment."  Id. at 141, 639 S.E.2d at 250. 
Yet, as the majority acknowledges, the circuit court 
mistakenly interpreted Keswick I's holding.  After summarizing 
the controlling law, the circuit court stated that Keswick Club 
"seeks to show that the assessment was erroneous by proving 
that the County used an improper methodology in setting the 
assessment value."  In a footnote, the court presumed that the 
"methods of proving manifest error would also satisfy the 
 
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erroneousness standard."  The circuit court next quoted this 
Court's holding in Keswick I, i.e., that the County had failed 
" 'to consider and properly reject the income and sales 
approaches before solely utilizing the cost approach,' " 
Keswick I, 273 Va. at 140, 639 S.E.2d at 250, and then 
concluded that this Court, in Keswick I, held that "the 
[County's] assessment was erroneous, on the ground that the 
County used an improper methodology."  (Emphasis omitted.) 
After drawing that conclusion about the decision in 
Keswick I, the circuit court summarized the evidence from the 
initial hearing as well the evidence presented after this 
Court's remand of the case.  The circuit court stated: 
 [A]fter the remand and over Keswick [Club's] 
objection, the [c]ourt gave the parties an 
opportunity to produce additional evidence.  The 
only evidence the County presented at this time 
was the testimony of Ivo Romenesko.  The County 
failed to show consideration and proper 
rejection of the income and sales approaches, 
instead reasserting its previous value, which 
was based on the cost approach.  Keswick [Club] 
again presented evidence through Mr. Sangree, 
who reached the same appraisal value as he did 
at trial.  Thus, the evidence before the [c]ourt 
at present is substantially similar to the 
evidence before the [c]ourt at trial. 
 
The circuit court then held, "[b]ased on all the evidence 
presented at trial and after remand," and "applying the less 
stringent standard of review set forth by the Supreme Court, 
. . . that Keswick [Club] ha[d] proven that the County's 
 
19
assessment was erroneous."  This conclusion, read in the 
context of its prior discussion and mistaken understanding of 
the Keswick I decision, demonstrates that the circuit court 
concluded that the County once again "failed to show 
consideration and proper rejection of the income and sales 
approaches" and, for that reason, held the assessment 
erroneous.  But, the issue on remand was not whether the County 
had used an improper methodology when it failed to consider and 
properly reject the sales and income approaches before 
assessing the fair market value of Keswick Club's real property 
by using only the cost approach.  We decided that issue in 
Keswick I.  273 Va. at 140, 639 S.E.2d at 250.  In doing so, we 
did not, however, determine whether the County's assessment was 
erroneous, but only that it no longer was entitled to the 
presumption of validity.  Because we did not decide that issue, 
we remanded the case to the circuit court to review the facts 
under the less stringent standard of review.  Id.   But, the 
circuit court apparently believed that rebutting the 
presumption of validity by showing a failure to consider and 
properly reject certain valuation methods was ipso facto proof 
of an erroneous assessment. 
I recognize that, after it concluded the County's 
assessment was erroneous, the circuit court then found that 
"neither the County nor Keswick [Club had] arrived at a correct 
 
20
figure."  At that point in its analysis, however, the circuit 
court, having decided the County's assessment was erroneous, 
was setting the assessed value of Keswick Club's real property.  
See Code § 58.1-3987; HCA Health Servs., 260 Va. at 329, 535 
S.E.2d at 169 (stating that "[o]nce a trial court finds that a 
taxing authority committed manifest error in determining an 
assessment, the court is authorized to correct the assessment 
based on the evidence").  It had before it the testimony of the 
County's expert witness, Ivo H. Romenesko, and that of David J. 
Sangree, the expert real estate appraiser who testified for 
Keswick Club.  As the majority notes, the circuit court 
rejected both experts' testimony and set the assessed value 
based on information furnished by an employee of Keswick Club 
to the Board of Equalization.  Because the circuit court 
expressly rejected the evidence presented by Keswick Club, I 
cannot accept the majority's conclusion that "Keswick [Club's] 
evidence concerning the value of the property was sufficient to 
demonstrate that the County's assessment exceeded fair market 
value." 
Furthermore, the majority's view that the circuit court 
both misunderstood Keswick I's holding and properly evaluated 
the evidence under the less stringent standard of review does 
not square with the "mandate rule," a principle requiring a 
trial court to follow the decision and mandate from an 
 
21
appellate court.  See Powell v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 107, 127, 
590 S.E.2d 537, 549 (2004).  The circuit court could not 
conclude that this Court already had held the assessment 
erroneous but nevertheless proceed to decide whether the 
County's assessment exceeded fair market value and was 
therefore erroneous without flouting what it perceived to be 
this Court's mandate in Keswick I.  Cf. id. at 127-28, 590 
S.E.2d at 549-50 (" 'A trial court has no discretion to 
disregard [a] lawful mandate.' ") (alteration in original) 
(quoting Rowe v. Rowe, 33 Va. App. 250, 257-58, 532 S.E.2d 908, 
912 (2000)).  I am unwilling to ascribe such action to the 
circuit court.  Because the circuit court believed that this 
Court already had held the County's assessment to be erroneous, 
it necessarily also believed itself bound by judicial duty to 
rule accordingly.  See Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 
161, 168 (1939) (noting the "indisputab[ility]" of the "general 
proposition" that lower courts are "bound to carry the mandate 
of the upper court into execution and [cannot] consider the 
questions which the mandate laid to rest").  Therefore, the 
circuit court cannot be presumed to have analyzed the evidence 
under the less stringent standard of review to determine if the 
assessment exceeded the fair market value of Keswick Club's 
real property. 
 
22
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.  I would 
reverse the circuit court's judgment and remand for further 
proceedings in accordance with the holding in Keswick I.∗∗ 
                     
∗∗ In light of my view, I do not need to address the 
County's remaining assignments of error.