Case Title: MARRIAGE OF BURLEIGH

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1982-08-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 81-395 I N THE S U P R E M E COURT O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1982 I N RE THE MARRIAGE O F MARTHA H. BURLEIGH, P e t i t i o n e r and Respondent, -vs- C. WARD BURLEIGH, Respondent and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of t h e Tenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Fergus, The Honorable N a t Allen, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Robert L. Johnson, Lewistown, Montana For Respondent : Anderson, Edwards & blolloy, B i l l i n g s , Montana Amicus Curiae : Jardine, Stephenson, Blewett & Weaver, Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted on B r i e f s : J u l y 9 , 1982 Decided: Adgust 1 9 , 1982 Mr. Chief Justice Frank I . Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. Husband appeals from a judgment entered by the District Court of the Tenth Judicial District, Fergus County, which awarded the wife child support and custody of the children and required the husband to make a lump sum payment plus twenty annual payments of $11,116 to the wife. We aff irm. Husband and wife were married on January 8, 1966, in Fort Collins, Colorado. Husband was completing his studies for a Doctor of Veterinary Medicine degree, and wife was in her senior year of undergraduate school studying history. The couple then made several moves for the husband's employ- ment, first to Utah where the husband was employed at a private veterinary clinic and the wife worked part-time as a receptionist. The parties then moved to Lewistown and, during the first months of 1967, lived with the husband's parents on Burleigh Angus Ranch and shared ranch and house- hold duties. In March 1967 they moved to Miles City, where husband was employed as a deputy state veterinarian and wife attended school, received her bachelor's degree and did some substitute teaching. In September of 1968, husband accepted employment with a private veterinarian in Sidney, and wife taught school from October to the end of the school year. In the summer of 1969 the parties moved back to Lewistown where husband was employed by a private veter ina- rian and wife taught school. Both parties helped on the ranch part-time. In 1970 and 1971, wife experienced child- bearing problems requiring out-of-state chemotherapy which prevented her from contributing to the home and marriage as much as she previously had. In 1972 the husband gave up his veterinary practice, and the parties moved into the main ranch house on Burleigh Angus Ranch. Part of the wife's duties included keeping records on the Angus cattle and operating a public dumpyard acquired by the ranch. In September 1973, the parties adopted a three-month- old son, Theran. Husband's parents gifted thirty shares of stock to the husband during this year. On February 10, 1975, all shareholders entered a buy and sell agreement which contained provisions which disallowed any encumbering or disposing of the stock without the consent of the remain- ing shareholders and statements to the effect that a stock- holder may not dispose of any shares without first offering them to the corporation. This agreement has been twice amended. In July 1975 the parties had a child of their own, Sarah. During 1975 husband's parents gave him twenty more shares of stock in the corporation and gave wife twenty shares also. On April 1, 1978, husband contracted to buy 274 treasury shares of the corporation and also contracted to buy 230 shares from his parents. He had been gifted forty- six shares prior to marriage. After the parties moved to Lewistown, the wife was active in working with horses, in raising and selling dogs and in continuing to take educa- tional courses. In September 1979 the parties separated, and on October 29, 1979, wife filed a complaint seeking dissolution of the marriage. On January 10, 1980, on oral stipulation of the parties, the District Court dissolved the marriage, awarding temporary custody of the children to the wife. Both p a r t i e s s u b s e q u e n t l y r e m a r r i e d . On August 4, 1981, t h e District Court awarded p e r - manent c u s t o d y t o t h e w i f e w i t h r i g h t s of v i s i t a t i o n t o t h e husband and gave t h e w i f e $400 p e r month i n c h i l d s u p p o r t . The D i s t r i c t Court a l s o found t h a t t h e w i f e ' s s h a r e of t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e was $247,320.26, w i t h $25,000 t o b e p a i d w i t h i n s i x t y days of t h e d a t e of judgment and t h e b a l a n c e t o be p a i d i n twenty a n n u a l i n s t a l l m e n t s of a p p r o x i m a t e l y $11,116 each. The c o u r t g r a n t e d t h e wife a s e c u r i t y i n t e r - e s t i n t h e h u s b a n d ' s s t o c k u n t i l f u l l payment was made a t which t i m e t h e w i f e would convey h e r twenty s h a r e s t o t h e husband. Husband a p p e a l s and p r e s e n t s s e v e r a l i s s u e s which can be s t a t e d as f o l l o w s : 1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r i n awarding c u s t o d y of t h e c h i l d r e n t o t h e w i f e ? 2. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r i n making its award of c h i l d s u p p o r t ? 3. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n d i s t r i b u t i n g t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e ? Both p a r t i e s c i t e C o r b e t t v. C o r b e t t ( 1 9 8 1 ) , - Mont. - , 635 P.2d 1319, 38 St.Rep. 1852, as s e t t i n g o u r s t a n d a r d of review on t h e f i r s t i s s u e . I n C o r b e t t w e s t a t e d : " T h i s Court h a s s a i d many times r e g a r d i n g t h e d i s c r e t i o n of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n c h i l d c u s t o d y cases t h a t : " ' I n reviewing o r d e r s which a f f e c t t h e cus- tody of t h e c h i l d , t h i s C o u r t is mindful t h a t t h e primary d u t y of d e c i d i n g t h e p r o p e r cus- tody of c h i l d r e n is a t a s k of t h e D i s t r i c t Court. Thus, a l l r e a s o n a b l e presumptions as t o c o r r e c t n e s s of t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n w i l l b e made. No r u l i n g w i l l be d i s t u r b e d a b s e n t a c l e a r showing t h a t t h e District C o u r t ' s d i s - c r e t i o n was abused. Foss v. L e i f e r ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 170 Mont. 97, 550 P.2d 1309, 1311." 635 P.2d S e c t i o n 40-4-212, MCA, is t h e c o n t r o l l i n g s t a t u t e h e r e and s t a t e s a s f o l l o w s : " B e s t i n t e r e s t o f c h i l d . The c o u r t s h a l l d e t e r m i n e c u s t o d y i n accordance w i t h t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e c h i l d . The c o u r t s h a l l con- s i d e r a l l r e l e v a n t f a c t o r s i n c l u d i n g : " ( 1 ) t h e wishes of t h e c h i l d ' s p a r e n t or p a r e n t s a s t o h i s custody; " ( 2 ) t h e w i s h e s of t h e c h i l d a s t o h i s c u s t o d i a n ; " ( 3 ) t h e i n t e r a c t i o n and i n t e r r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h e c h i l d w i t h h i s p a r e n t o r p a r e n t s , h i s s i b l i n g s , and any o t h e r p e r s o n who may s i g n i - f i c a n t l y a f f e c t t h e c h i l d ' s b e s t i n t e r e s t ; " ( 4 ) t h e c h i l d ' s a d j u s t m e n t t o h i s home, s c h o o l and community; and " ( 5 ) t h e mental and p h y s i c a l h e a l t h of a l l i n d i v i d u a l s involved. I' The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f i n d i n g i n t h i s r e g a r d s t a t e d t h u s : "The Court f i n d s t h a t both p a r t i e s a r e f i t and proper p a r e n t s , and f u r t h e r f i n d s t h a t t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e minor c h i l d r e n r e q u i r e t h a t t h e y be p l a c e d i n t h e c a r e , c u s t o d y and c o n t r o l of t h e i r mother. The Court c o n s i d e r s t h e f o l l o w i n g r e l e v a n t i n making t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n : " 1 ) That n e i t h e r c h i l d h a s reached an age where h i s w i s h e s a r e r e l e v a n t i n t h i s d e t e r - m i n a t i o n , f u r t h e r , both p a r e n t s expressed a s t r o n g d e s i r e t o a c q u i r e custody; accord- i n g l y , t h e d e s i r e s of t h e p a r t i e s and t h e c h i l d r e n do n o t e n t e r i n t o t h i s d e c i s i o n ; " 2 ) The t e s t i m o n y e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e mother is, and h a s been, t h e primary p e r s o n involved i n t h e c a r e , e d u c a t i o n and r e a r i n g of t h e c h i l d r e n s i n c e t h e i r b i r t h . The mother I s p r e s e n t l i v i n g s i t u a t i o n is such t h a t it f a c i l i t a t e s t h e kind of c a r e and a t t e n t i o n r e q u i r e d by c h i l d r e n of t h i s age. The e v i - dence e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t t h e c h i l d r e n a r e w e l l s e t t l e d t o t h e c u r r e n t l i v i n g s i t u a t i o n and t h e i r p r o g r e s s i n s c h o o l is s a t i s f a c t o r y ; " 3 ) The mental and p h y s i c a l h e a l t h of a l l i n d i v i d u a l s is s a t i s f a c t o r y ; " 4 ) I n summary, t h e Court f i n d s no e v i d e n c e of p o s i t i v e v a l u e s t o be g a i n e d by changing t h e i r c u s t o d y f r o m t h e c u r r e n t s t a t u s , wherein t h e i r primary c u s t o d y and c a r e r e s t s w i t h t h e i r mother. To t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e C o u r t f i n d s t h a t t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t s of t h e c h i l d r e n r e q u i r e t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n of t h e c u r r e n t c u s t o d y s t a t u s w i t h t h e mother." A p p e l l a n t c h a r g e s t h a t t h e c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s d o n o t p r o p e r l y a d d r e s s t h e c h i l d r e n ' s i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h o t h e r p e o p l e i n t h e m o t h e r ' s home i n c l u d i n g r e s p o n d e n t ' s new husband. A p p e l l a n t a l s o c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e husband s h o u l d have been awarded c u s t o d y because he f u l f i l l e d a l l t h e c r i t e r i a of s e c t i o n 40-4-212, MCA, based l a r g e l y on h i s t e s t i m o n y and t h a t of a s o c i a l worker who v i s i t e d t h e husband's home. W e d i s a g r e e . Montana law s t a t e s t h a t t h e f i n d i n g s d o n o t need t o be i n any p a r t i c u l a r form i f t h e r e is s u b s t a n - t i a l c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e t r i a l j u d g e ' s judgment on t h e m e r i t s . I n Re Marriage of Barron ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 177 Mont. 161, 580 P.2d 936. There is s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d t o s u p p o r t t h e c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n h e r e . The two c h i l d r e n had l i v e d w i t h t h e mother s i n c e t h e s e p a r a t i o n i n September 1979, and t h e husband t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e w i f e was a s a t i s f a c t o r y motner. Furthermore, t h e s o c i a l worker had o n l y v i s i t e d t h e husband's home, and n o t t h e w i f e ' s , s o could n o t t e s t i f y t h a t t h e w i f e ' s home was n o t a s u i t a b l e home f o r t h e c h i l d r e n . While w e may sympathize w i t h t h e h u s b a n d ' s wishes t o have a more d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e on t h e r e a r i n g of h i s c h i l d r e n , w e do n o t f i n d any abuse o f d i s c r e t i o n which would w a r r a n t a r e v e r s a l . C o r b e t t , s u p r a . With r e g a r d t o t h e second i s s u e , a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e r e is no f i n d i n g t o s u g g e s t t h a t t h e c o u r t c o n s i d e r e d t h e s t a t u t o r y c r i t e r i a set f o r t h i n s e c t i o n 40-4-204, MCA, in awarding the wife child support payments of $200 a month per child. Husband further argues that the requirements of the District Court's judgment obligate him to pay out far more each year than he has ever received in income. Section 40-4-204, MCA, provides: "Child support. In a proceeding for dissolu- tion of marriage, legal separation, mainten- ance, or child support, the court may order either or both parents owing a duty of sup- port to a child to pay an amount reasonable or necessary for his support, without regard to marital misconduct, after considering all relevant factors including: "(1) the financial resources of the child; "(2) the financial resources of the custodial parent; "(3) the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dis- solved ; " (4) the physical and emotional condition of the child and his educational needs; and "(5) the financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent." Here the District Court judge had before him the wife's testimony regarding the financial needs of her children, which included housing, groceries and transporta- tion. The wife testified that she needed $600 per month for two children, and, in our view, an award of $400 per month is not excessive in any way. Nor are we persuaded that the District Court's judg- ment will so strap the husband that he cannot make the pay- ments. Both the husband and the ranch accountant testified that the corporation pays and provides nearly all the hus- band's living expenses, including his house, food, utilities and transportation. The corporate salaries are adjusted a c c o r d i n g t o t h e income r e c e i v e d each y e a r . The h u s b a n d ' s s a l a r y i n 1978 was $22,850 and i n 1979 was $27,866. There is ample e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t an award o f $400 p e r month i n c h i l d s u p p o r t . A p p e l l a n t ' s t h i r d i s s u e r e l a t e s t o t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e m a r i t a l estate. A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e f i n d i n g s s h o u l d n o t have i n c l u d e d i n t h e marital e s t a t e t h e 120 s h a r e s g i f t e d t o t h e husband a f t e r t h e m a r r i a g e . A p p e l l a n t a l s o c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e husband s h o u l d have been c r e d i t e d f o r t h e n e a r l y $25,000 t h a t h e p a i d t o t h e w i f e a f t e r t h e i r s e p a r a t i o n and p r i o r t o h e r r e m a r r i a g e . B o t h a p p e l l a n t ' s b r i e f a n d t h e a m i c u s b r i e f ( r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e o t h e r s h a r e h o l d e r s ) a r g u e t h a t t h e c o u r t ' s v a l u a t i o n o f t h e s h a r e s was improper and t h a t t h e g r a n t i n g of a s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t was c o n t r a r y t o t h e v a r i o u s a g r e e - ments o f t h e s h a r e h o l d e r s . I n Montana w e pay a g r e a t amount of d e f e r e n c e t o t h e judgment of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t r e g a r d i n g p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n s , i.e. , our s t a n d a r d of review is whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t a c t e d a r b i t r a r i l y w i t h o u t employment of c o n s c i e n t i o u s judg- ment, o r exceeded t h e bounds of r e a s o n i n view of a l l t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Zell v. Zell ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 174 Mont. 216, 570 P.2d 3 3 . I n I n R e Marriage of J o r g e n s e n ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 180 Mont. 294, 590 P.2d 606, t h i s C o u r t c o n s i d e r e d t h e v a l u a t i o n of s t o c k of a c l o s e l y h e l d c o r p o r a t i o n where t h e s h a r e s c o u l d o n l y be s o l d t o o t h e r s h a r e h o l d e r s o r t o t h e company. A s h a r e h o l d e r agreement set t h e p r i c e o f e a c h s h a r e a t $750, and w e found t h a t t h e District C o u r t d i d n o t abuse its d i s c r e t i o n i n v a l u i n g t h e s h a r e s a t $750. Here, under t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e buy and s e l l agreement and amendments t h e r e t o , t h e p r i c e of each s h a r e s h a l l be book v a l u e (as shown by t h e b a l a n c e s h e e t a t t h e c l o s e of t h e p r e c e d i n g t a x y e a r ) o r a d i f f e r e n t v a l u a t i o n can be e s t a b l i s h e d by an independent a p p r a i s e r . Under t h e book v a l u e method, each s h a r e of B u r l e i g h Angus Ranch would be worth $158.37 which, i n view of t h e e v i d e n c e , is u n r e a l i s t i c a l l y low. Husband e s t i m a t e d t h a t e a c h s h a r e was worth a b o u t $500. The District C o u r t v a l u e d each a t $1,009.72, a f i g u r e reached by d i v i d i n g t h e v a l u e o f t o t a l assets less l i a b i l i t i e s by t h e number of o u t s t a n d i n g and i s s u e d s h a r e s . W e c a n n o t s a y t h a t t h e District C o u r t a c t e d a r b i t r a r i l y o r t h a t t h e method employed exceeded t h e bounds of r e a s o n i n view of t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , Zell, s u p r a , and w e uphold it h e r e . W e can s i m i l a r l y d i s p o s e of t h e h u s b a n d ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t s h o u l d have made a d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e s t o c k i n k i n d , i.e., t h a t t h e w i f e s h o u l d have been g i v e n some of t h e s h a r e s i n s t e a d of t h e r i g h t t o a n n u a l payments. Simply because t h i s o p t i o n was open t o t h e c o u r t is no r e a s o n t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t judge had t o select it. Under t h e c i r c u m s c r i b e d s t a n d a r d of review e s t a b l i s h e d by Zell and numerous o t h e r cases, t h e r e was no e r r o r i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s f a i l u r e t o d i s t r i b u t e t h e p r o p e r t y i n kind. Furthermore, w e n o t e t h a t t h e District C o u r t d i d n o t award t h e w i f e 50 p e r c e n t of t h e n e t m a r i t a l estate, b u t o n l y 38 p e r c e n t because of t h e g i f t s t h e husband had r e c e i v e d b e f o r e and d u r i n g t h e m a r r i a g e . Nor do we p r e d i c a t e e r r o r on t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s g r a n t i n g t h e w i f e a s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t i n t h e 720 s h a r e s of t h e h u s b a n d ' s s t o c k . She needs some p r o t e c t i o n t o i n s u r e t h a t t h e annual payments w i l l be made, and t h e p r o s p e c t of f o r e c l o s u r e on t h o s e s h a r e s should p r o v i d e a s u f f i c i e n t i n c e n t i v e f o r t h e husband t o make t h e i n s t a l l m e n t payments. W e have p r e v i o u s l y approved t h e g r a n t i n g of a s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t f o r t h e w i f e ' s p r o t e c t i o n i n o t h e r c a s e s , I n R e Marriage of Brown ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 179 Mont. 417, 587 P.2d 361. W e a l s o n o t e t h a t , under t h e terms of t h e D i s t r i c t Court d e c r e e , t h e w i f e cannot unreasonably w i t h h o l d c o n s e n t t o t h e husband's encumbering h i s s t o c k o r s e l l i n g c o r p o r a t e l a n d . The p a r t i e s h e r e d i s a g r e e on whether t h e husband h a s t h e v o t i n g r i g h t s t o a m a j o r i t y of t h e s t o c k i n t h e c o r p o r a t i o n . There a r e 1,479 o u t s t a n d i n g s h a r e s , and it is u n c o n t e s t e d h e h a s v o t i n g r i g h t s t o 510 s h a r e s . The bone of c o n t e n t i o n h e r e is whether t h e husband h a s t h e v o t i n g r i g h t s t o t h e 230 s h a r e s being s o l d t o him by h i s p a r e n t s , which would make him a m a j o r i t y s h a r e h o l d e r . A p p e l l a n t and t h e amicus b r i e f a r g u e t h a t s i n c e t h e c e r t i f i c a t e s a r e s t i l l i n t h e p a r e n t s ' names, t h e y r e t a i n t h e v o t i n g r i g h t s . Based on t h e r e c o r d b e f o r e us, w e cannot a g r e e . The c r u c i a l language i n t h e c o n t r a c t wherein t h e husband is buying t h e s t o c k from h i s p a r e n t s is a s f o l l o w s : ". . . Purchaser s h a l l have t h e r i g h t t o e n j o y a l l r i g h t s and i n c i d e n t s o f ownership of t h e 230 s h a r e s o f s t o c k , s u b j e c t o n l y t o s u c h r e s t r i c t i o n s a s h a v e b e e n p l a c e d upon t h e P u r c h a s e r by t h e S e l l e r s under t h e terms of t h i s agreement." (Emphasis added.) Nowhere i n t h e c o n t r a c t do w e f i n d any r e s e r v a t i o n of v o t i n g r i g h t s by t h e p a r e n t s , and w e t h u s conclude t h a t t h e husband h a s t h e r i g h t t o v o t e a m a j o r i t y of t h e s t o c k of t h e corpor- a t i o n . The s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t g r a n t e d t o t h e w i f e w i l l h e l p e n s u r e t h a t t h e husband d o e s n o t u s e h i s c o r p o r a t e c o n t r o l t o j e o p a r d i z e h e r i n t e r e s t . F i n a l l y , husband a r g u e s he s h o u l d have been g i v e n c r e d i t f o r t h e a p p r o x i m a t e l y $25,000 t h a t he p a i d t o t h e w i f e a f t e r t h e i r s e p a r a t i o n and b e f o r e h e r r e m a r r i a g e . W e d i s a g r e e . W e have p r e v i o u s l y h e l d t h a t l i v i n g e x p e n s e s o f t h e w i f e need n o t be c r e d i t e d t o t h e husband i n t h e d i s t r i - b u t i o n and computation of t h e marital estate, I n R e M a r r i a g e o f C a p r i c e ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 178 Mont. 455, 585 P.2d 641, and w e s o f i n d h e r e . Affirmed. @ & . , uxag Chief J u s t i c e