Case Title: State v. Trammell

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017AP001206-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2019-05-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
2019 WI 59 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP1206-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Emmanuel Earl Trammell, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 382 Wis. 2d 832,917 N.W.2d 233 
(2018 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 31, 2019 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
      
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 26, 2019 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Jeffrey A. Wagner 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
DALLET, J. concurs, joined by A.W. BRADLEY, J. 
(opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ABRAHAMSON, J. did not participate.     
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Urszula Tempska and Law Office of U. Tempska, 
Shorewood. There was an oral argument by Urszula Tempska. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Tiffany M. Winter, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief is Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Tiffany M. Winter. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers by Ellen Henak and Henak 
Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee.  
 
 
2
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
State Public Defender by Jefren E. Olsen, assistant state public 
defender, with whom on the brief was Kelli S. Thompson, state 
public defender.  
 
 
 
2019 WI 59
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP1206-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2015CF3109) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Emmanuel Earl Trammell, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 31, 2019 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished, per curiam decision of the court of appeals, State 
v. Trammell, No. 2017AP1206-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. 
App. May 8, 2018), affirming a jury verdict convicting Emmanuel 
Earl Trammell ("Trammell") on one count of armed robbery and one 
count of operating a vehicle without the owner's consent, and 
affirming the Milwaukee County circuit court's order denying 
Trammell's motion for postconviction relief.1  Though he failed 
to object at the jury instruction and verdict conference as 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Jeffrey A. Wagner presided. 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
2 
 
required by Wis. Stat. § 805.13(3) (2015–16),2 Trammell claims 
that Wis JI—Criminal 140 (2017)3 unconstitutionally reduced the 
State's burden of proof, and confused and misled the jury such 
that he should be entitled to a new trial.  Lastly, Trammell 
alternatively claims that discretionary reversal is warranted 
under Wis. Stat. § 751.06. 
¶2 
We conclude that Trammell waived his right to object 
to the use of Wis JI—Criminal 140 by failing to object to its 
use at the jury instruction and verdict conference, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 805.13(3).  On that basis, the court of appeals 
properly denied Trammell's appeal and correctly concluded that 
it could not consider whether Wis JI—Criminal 140 misstates the 
law, confuses the jury, and reduces the State's burden.  
However, unlike the court of appeals, this court may nonetheless 
consider the instruction under its discretionary power of 
review.  State v. Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d 388, 409–10, 424 
N.W.2d 672 (1988).  We exercise that power here.  The 
constitutional question with which we are presented is whether 
there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the 
instructions to allow a conviction based upon insufficient 
proof.  We conclude that Wis JI—Criminal 140 does not 
unconstitutionally reduce the State's burden of proof below the 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2015–16 version, unless otherwise indicated. 
3 All subsequent references to Wis JI–Criminal 140 are to 
the 2017 version, unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
3 
 
reasonable 
doubt 
standard. 
 
Lastly, 
we 
conclude 
that 
discretionary 
reversal 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 751.06 
is 
not 
warranted.  We therefore affirm the court of appeals. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶3 
Trammell was arrested on July 8, 2015, after stealing 
a car from a convenience store parking lot while armed.  On 
July 10, 2015, the State charged Trammell with one count of 
armed robbery and one count of operating a motor vehicle without 
the owner's consent.  Trammell entered a plea of not guilty. 
¶4 
Prior to trial, Trammell submitted a list of proposed 
jury instructions pursuant to the circuit court's scheduling 
order.  Included in the list of proposed jury instructions was 
Wis JI—Criminal 140 titled, "Burden of Proof and the Presumption 
of Innocence."4 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin JI–Criminal 140 states as follows: 
 
In reaching your verdict, examine the evidence 
with care and caution.  Act with judgment, reason, and 
prudence.  
Presumption of Innocence 
 
Defendants are not required to prove their 
innocence.  The law presumes every person charged with 
the commission of an offense to be innocent.  This 
presumption requires a finding of not guilty unless in 
your deliberations, you find it is overcome by 
evidence which satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant is guilty.  
State's Burden of Proof 
 
The burden of establishing every fact necessary 
to constitute guilt is upon the State.  Before you can 
return a verdict of guilty, the evidence must satisfy 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
4 
 
¶5 
A two-day jury trial commenced on April 4, 2016.  
During testimony, the victim identified Trammell in court and 
testified that on July 8, 2015, the victim and his girlfriend 
drove to a convenience store in his mother's Buick Regal.  The 
victim testified that he went into the store while his 
girlfriend waited in the Buick.  He testified that while he was 
in the store, Trammell approached him and patted him down, 
telling the victim that he was looking for a gun.  The victim 
                                                                                                                                                             
you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is 
guilty.  
Reasonable Hypothesis 
 
If you can reconcile the evidence upon any 
reasonable hypothesis consistent with the defendant's 
innocence, you should do so and return a verdict of 
not guilty.  
Meaning of Reasonable Doubt 
 
The term "reasonable doubt" means a doubt based 
upon reason and common sense.  It is a doubt for which 
a reason can be given, arising from a fair and 
rational consideration of the evidence or lack of 
evidence.  It means such a doubt as would cause a 
person of ordinary prudence to pause or hesitate when 
called upon to act in the most important affairs of 
life.  
 
A reasonable doubt is not a doubt which is based 
on mere guesswork or speculation.  A doubt which 
arises merely from sympathy or from fear to return a 
verdict of guilt is not a reasonable doubt.  A 
reasonable doubt is not a doubt such as may be used to 
escape the responsibility of a decision.  
 
While it is your duty to give the defendant the 
benefit of every reasonable doubt, you are not to 
search for doubt. You are to search for the truth. 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
5 
 
stated that after not finding a gun, Trammell snatched money 
from the victim and asked him whose car he came in.  The victim 
testified that he told Trammell the Buick belonged to his 
mother.  The victim tried to stop Trammell but Trammell 
brandished a gun, got in the driver's seat of the Buick, and 
drove away.  The other two individuals with Trammell drove away 
in 
another 
car. 
 
The 
victim's 
girlfriend's 
testimony 
corroborated the victim's recollection of events. 
¶6 
The State also called Officer Steven Strasser of the 
Milwaukee Police Department ("Officer Strasser") to testify.  
Officer Strasser testified that he heard a dispatch that OnStar5 
had located the Buick and that police were pursuing it.  Officer 
Strasser stated that he joined the pursuit, and that the Buick 
was ultimately stopped when police requested OnStar to cut off 
the ignition in the vehicle.  He testified that three 
individuals exited and were arrested.  He stated that police 
identified the driver as Gabarie Silas ("Silas"), and that 
Trammell was nowhere to be found. 
¶7 
The State also called Silas, who had entered into a 
plea agreement, to testify.  Silas testified that on July 8, 
2015, he rode to the convenience store in a Dodge Stratus with 
                                                 
5 "OnStar" is a General Motors product that provides 
customers with subscription-based services, including emergency 
services, roadside assistance, navigation, remote diagnostics, 
and in-vehicle security features.  See OnStar, Plans and 
Pricing, 
https://www.onstar.com/us/en/plans-pricing/compare-
plans/ (last accessed Apr. 24, 2019). 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
6 
 
Trammell and another individual.  Silas also corroborated the 
victim's testimony regarding what transpired at the convenience 
store.  He stated that once the victim's girlfriend was out of 
the car, Trammell threw Silas the keys to the Dodge.  Silas 
drove away in the Dodge as Trammell took the Buick.  Silas 
testified that he and Trammell later switched cars.  He further 
testified that he understood the incident involved a gun that 
Trammell provided to the victim but for which the victim never 
paid Trammell.  Silas said that Trammell intended to return the 
car to the victim once Trammell and the victim settled the 
outstanding debt. 
¶8 
Officer 
Eric 
Draeger 
of 
the 
Milwaukee 
Police 
Department ("Officer Draeger") also testified for the State.  
Officer Draeger stated that he monitors all jail telephone 
calls, and that on January 6, 2016, he listened to a call 
Trammell made to a friend, during which Trammell asked her to 
offer false testimony at Trammell's trial. 
¶9 
Moreover, pursuant to a stipulation with Trammell's 
trial counsel, the State informed the jury that a forensic 
examiner identified two fingerprints lifted from the Buick as 
Trammell's left index finger and Silas's left middle finger.  
Trammell chose not to testify at trial. 
¶10 At the close of evidence, the parties and the circuit 
court conducted a jury instruction and verdict conference as 
required by Wis. Stat. § 805.13(3).  The circuit court indicated 
that 
it 
intended 
to 
give 
the 
standard 
burden-of-proof 
instruction, 
Wis 
JI—Criminal 
140, 
which 
Trammell 
had 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
7 
 
specifically requested.  Trammell did not object to the 
instruction, nor did he request that the instruction be modified 
in any way.  Prior to closing arguments, the circuit court 
instructed the jury on the burden of proof using Wis JI—Criminal 
140. 
¶11 The jury convicted Trammell of both armed robbery, 
party to a crime, and operating a motor vehicle without the 
owner's consent, party to a crime.  On May 17, 2016, Trammell 
was sentenced to 12 years in prison and 8 years of extended 
supervision on count one.  He was further sentenced to 15 months 
in prison and 15 months of extended supervision on count two, 
running concurrently with the sentence on count one. 
¶12 On April 10, 2017, Trammell filed a motion for 
postconviction relief in the circuit court.  Trammell claimed 
that Wis JI—Criminal 140 "misstated the law, confused the 
jurors, and caused Trammell to be convicted based on a burden of 
proof 
lower 
than 
the 
constitutionally-required 
'beyond 
reasonable doubt' standard."  In support of his position, 
Trammell cited two law review articles written by the same two 
authors——one 
which 
was 
released 
shortly 
after 
Trammell's 
conviction, and one which was, at the time, set to be released 
in 2017.6  Each law review article was based on separate but 
similar studies which the authors conducted.  The authors opined 
                                                 
6 Michael D. Cicchini & Lawrence T. White, Truth or Doubt?  
An Empirical Test of Criminal Jury Instructions, 50 U. Richmond 
L. Rev. 1139 (2016); Michael D. Cicchini & Lawrence T. White, 
Testing the Impact of Criminal Jury Instructions on Verdicts:  A 
Conceptual Replication, 117 Columbia L. Rev. Online 22 (2017). 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
8 
 
that 
when 
jurors 
are 
instructed 
to 
"search 
for 
truth," 
significantly 
higher 
conviction 
rates 
result. 
 
Trammell 
acknowledged that "[t]he jury instructions given in this case 
were subject to a jury instructions conference and were given 
with both parties' agreement and no objections."  While this 
would seemingly constitute waiver under Wis. Stat. § 805.13(3), 
Trammell nevertheless sought a new trial both in the interest of 
justice and due to plain error.  The State argued that Trammell 
waived his right to object to the jury instruction by operation 
of § 805.13(3), and that the jury instruction did not mislead or 
confuse the jury or reduce the State's burden of proof. 
¶13 On April 14, 2017, the circuit court issued a written 
order denying Trammell's motion for postconviction relief.  The 
circuit court noted that Wis JI—Criminal 140 "was formulated and 
approved by Wisconsin's Jury Instruction Committee," and stated 
that "[a]lthough the studies performed by Cicchini and White 
make for interesting reading, the court is bound by the standard 
jury instruction implemented by the Jury Instruction Committee 
which has been accepted for years by Wisconsin's appellate 
courts."  The circuit court therefore declined to grant Trammell 
a new trial due to any purported plain error and rejected 
Trammell's argument that Wis JI—Criminal 140 "prevented the true 
controversy from being fully tried."7 
                                                 
7 The circuit court did not address whether Trammell waived 
his objection to the use of Wis JI—Criminal 140 due to his 
failure to object at the jury instruction and verdict conference 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 805.13(3). 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
9 
 
¶14 Trammell appealed.  On May 8, 2018, the court of 
appeals issued a per curiam opinion affirming the circuit court.  
The court of appeals first concluded that Trammell waived his 
right to object to the jury instruction pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.13(3) by failing to object at the jury instruction and 
verdict conference, and that the court of appeals lacked 
authority to disregard waiver of a jury instruction objection.  
Trammell, No. 2017AP1206-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶¶11–13.  
Second, the court of appeals concluded that even if it could 
overlook 
Trammell's 
failure 
to 
object, 
the 
outcome 
was 
controlled by this court's holding that Wis JI—Criminal 140 was 
constitutional 
in 
State 
v. 
Avila, 
192 
Wis. 2d 870, 
532 
N.W.2d 423 (1995) overruled on other grounds by State v. Gordon, 
2003 WI 69, 262 Wis. 2d 380, 663 N.W.2d 765.  Trammell, No. 
2017AP1206-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶¶14–17.  Third, the court 
of appeals rejected Trammell's arguments that a new trial was 
warranted in the interest of justice or due to plain error.  
Id., ¶¶18–20. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶15 We will address four issues:  (1) whether Trammell 
waived his challenge to the use of Wis JI—Criminal 140; (2) 
whether Wis JI—Criminal 140 misstates the law so to confuse and 
mislead the jury thus requiring us to overrule Avila; (3) 
whether Wis JI—Criminal 140 is otherwise constitutionally 
infirm; and (4) whether discretionary reversal is warranted 
under Wis. Stat. § 751.06.   
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
10 
 
¶16 This court reviews questions of waiver de novo.  State 
v. Kelty, 2006 WI 101, ¶13, 294 Wis. 2d 62, 716 N.W.2d 886.  
Additionally, "[w]hether a jury instruction from the circuit 
court deprives a defendant of his right to due process is a 
question of law, which we review de novo."  State v. Tomlinson, 
2002 WI 91, ¶53, 254 Wis. 2d 502, 648 N.W.2d 367 (citing State 
v. Kuntz, 160 Wis. 2d 722, 735, 467 N.W.2d 531 (1991)).  Lastly, 
"[u]nder Wis. Stat. § 751.06, we have independent discretionary 
authority to reverse a conviction and order a new trial where 
'it appears from the record that the real controversy has not 
been fully tried, or that it is probable that justice has for 
any reason miscarried.'"  State v. Langlois, 2018 WI 73, ¶55, 
382 Wis. 2d 414, 913 N.W.2d 812 (quoting § 751.06).  "The 
interpretation and application of a statute present questions of 
law that we review de novo."  Id. (citing Estate of Miller v. 
Storey, 2017 WI 99, ¶25, 378 Wis. 2d 358, 903 N.W.2d 759). 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Waiver Under Wis. Stat. § 805.13(3) 
¶17 We first address whether Trammell waived his objection 
to the use of Wis JI—Criminal 140 by failing to object to it at 
the jury instruction and verdict conference, as required by Wis. 
Stat. § 805.13(3).  We begin with the language of § 805.13.  
State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 2004 WI 58, 
¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  Section 805.13 provides, 
in pertinent part, as follows: 
At the close of the evidence and before arguments to 
the jury, the court shall conduct a conference with 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
11 
 
counsel outside the presence of the jury. At the 
conference, or at such earlier time as the court 
reasonably directs, counsel may file written motions 
that the court instruct the jury on the law, and 
submit verdict questions, as set forth in the motions. 
The court shall inform counsel on the record of its 
proposed action on the motions and of the instructions 
and verdict it proposes to submit. Counsel may object 
to the proposed instructions or verdict on the grounds 
of incompleteness or other error, stating the grounds 
for objection with particularity on the record. 
Failure to object at the conference constitutes a 
waiver of any error in the proposed instructions or 
verdict. 
§ 805.13(3).  Section 805.13(3) provides no exceptions to the 
requirement that any objection be made at the jury instruction 
conference. 
¶18 Here, it is undisputed that Trammell's trial counsel 
listed Wis JI—Criminal 140 as one of Trammell's proposed jury 
instructions submitted to the circuit court prior to trial.  It 
is further undisputed that the circuit court properly held the 
jury instruction and verdict conference at the close of evidence 
and prior to closing arguments.  Although circuit courts can and 
do modify jury instructions, Trammell concedes that at no point 
did his trial counsel object to the use of Wis JI—Criminal 140 
as part of the instructions the circuit court would read to the 
jury.  Trammell also concedes that his trial counsel did not 
request that Wis JI—Criminal 140 be altered in any way.  The 
circuit court instructed the jury using the pattern instruction.  
Trammell's objection to the use of Wis JI—Criminal 140 did not 
arise until over a year after his conviction, when he filed his 
motion for postconviction relief on April 10, 2017. 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
12 
 
¶19 Applying Wis. Stat. § 805.13(3), the circuit court 
properly followed the requisite procedure, and Trammell's trial 
counsel did not timely object as required by § 805.13(3).8  A 
straightforward application of § 805.13(3) thus leads to the 
conclusion that Trammell failed to properly object to Wis JI—
Criminal 140.  
¶20 Trammell attempts to avoid the plain language of Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 805.13(3) 
by 
asserting 
that 
his 
objection 
was 
"unknowable" at the time of the jury instruction and verdict 
conference.  Specifically, Trammell asserts that the two law 
review articles by Cicchini and White, on which Trammell's 
objection is based, were not published until after Trammell's 
conviction.  Citing State v. Howard, 211 Wis. 2d 269, 287–88, 
564 N.W.2d 753 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Gordon, 262 
Wis. 2d 380, Trammell claims that since he could not have known 
about the articles until after his conviction, he could not 
possibly have made any objection during the jury instruction and 
verdict conference. 
¶21 We are not persuaded.  In Howard the defendant was 
charged with, "inter alia, aiding and abetting the unlawful 
delivery of a controlled substance (cocaine) while possessing a 
                                                 
8 We note that Trammell does not assert an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim regarding his trial counsel's 
failure to timely object at the jury instruction and verdict 
conference.  We therefore will not address whether Trammell's 
trial counsel was ineffective under the standard set forth in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
13 
 
dangerous weapon, in violation of Wis. Stat. §§ 161.41(1)(c)2, 
939.05, 939.63(1)(a)3 and 2 (1987–88)."  Howard, 211 Wis. 2d at 
272.  Howard failed to object to the use of two jury 
instructions during the jury instruction and verdict conference.  
Id. at 273.  Howard was convicted and sentenced on March 23, 
1990.  Id. at 274.  On June 22, 1994, this court issued its 
decision in State v. Peete, 185 Wis. 2d 4, 18–19, 517 N.W.2d 149 
(1994), 
in 
which 
this 
court 
interpreted 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.63(1)(a) (1989–90) differently than it had previously been 
interpreted by incorporating a new element.  Because this 
court's interpretation of § 939.63(1)(a) (1989–90) incorporated 
a new element that was not part of the jury instructions read to 
the jury in Howard, unlike Trammell, Howard did not waive his 
objection because he could not have known about the Peete 
holding at the time the jury instruction and verdict conference 
occurred.  Howard, 211 Wis. 2d at 275–76. 
¶22 This court concluded that Howard did not waive his 
objection to the two jury instructions, holding that he could 
only waive objections "which he knew or should have known" at 
the time of the jury instruction and verdict conference.  Id. at 
289.  Citing Wis. Stat. § 805.13(3) (1989–90), this court stated 
as follows: 
Here, Howard and his counsel in 1990 had no way 
to know how this court would construe Wis. Stat. 
§ 939.63 [1989–90] by the time it decided Peete in 
1994. 
 
We 
agree 
that 
Howard's 
counsel 
had 
an 
obligation to object at the instructions conference 
based on incompleteness or other error about which he 
knew or should have known.  We cannot agree that 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
14 
 
Howard's counsel could have stated grounds for an 
objection "with particularity," based on the absence 
of a nexus element and corresponding instruction.  
Howard has not waived this issue. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
¶23 Howard is distinguishable from this case.  Here, we 
are not confronted with a subsequent case which changed the 
elements of the crime with which Trammell was charged.  Instead, 
Trammell's argument is based purely on law review articles which 
incorporate the authors' non-peer-reviewed "scientific" studies.  
In fact, the arguments Trammell makes are indeed known as they 
are referenced in the jury instruction comments to  Wis JI—
Criminal 140.  The circuit court has the authority to modify the 
language, and the comment to the jury instruction even provides 
optional language.  State v. Burris, 2011 WI 32, ¶24, 333 
Wis. 2d 87, 797 N.W.2d 430 (citing Nommensen v. Am. Cont'l Ins. 
Co., 2001 WI 112, ¶50, 246 Wis. 2d 132, 629 N.W.2d 301; State v. 
Lohmeier, 205 Wis. 2d 183, 194, 556 N.W.2d 90 (1996)) ("We 
examine the challenged jury instructions in light of the 
proceedings as a whole, keeping in mind that circuit courts have 
broad discretion in deciding which instructions to give."); Wis 
JI—Criminal 140, cmt. at 5.  But no one requested any such 
modification and the circuit court was not required to modify 
the instruction.   
¶24 Unlike Howard, Trammel's post-conviction challenge to 
the reasonable doubt jury instruction could have been made at 
trial.  While the two law review articles Trammell claims 
support his position were published after his conviction, that 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
15 
 
fact alone does not render his objection "unknowable" at the 
time of the conference.  The language now in question has been 
used, in its current form, for decades and has been the subject 
of constitutional challenges in the past.  See Wis JI—Criminal 
140, cmt. at 2–5.  We therefore conclude that Trammell waived 
his objection to the use of Wis JI—Criminal 140 by failing to 
object at the jury instruction and verdict conference, as 
required by Wis. Stat. § 805.13(3).  
¶25 While the court of appeals correctly concluded that 
its analysis ended with Trammell's waiver of his objection to 
Wis JI—Criminal 140, we choose to continue our analysis.  As 
this court has stated, the court of appeals has no power to 
reach an unobjected-to jury instruction because the court of 
appeals lacks a discretionary power of review.  Schumacher, 144 
Wis. 2d 
at 
409–10. 
 
However, 
this 
court 
possesses 
a 
discretionary power of review that it may exercise when a matter 
is properly before this court.  Id. at 410 (citing State v. 
Strege, 116 Wis. 2d 477, 492, 343 N.W.2d 100 (1984)).  While we 
only exercise our discretionary power of review in rare 
circumstances, there is no dispute that this matter is properly 
before us, and as this court exercised its discretionary power 
of review in Schumacher to examine the constitutionality of an 
unobjected-to jury instruction, see id. at 409–10, we do so 
here. 
B.  Wisconsin JI–Criminal 140 
¶26 We address Trammell's arguments regarding Wis JI—
Criminal 140.  We begin by discussing the history of the 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
16 
 
instruction.  We then examine whether this court should overrule 
Avila, and finally address Trammell's contention that various 
parts of Wis JI—Criminal 140 unconstitutionally reduced the 
State's burden of proof below the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
standard.  We decline to overrule Avila and conclude that Wis 
JI—Criminal 140 does not unconstitutionally reduce the State's 
burden of proof so to deprive Trammell of Due Process. 
1.  History of Wis JI–Criminal 140 
¶27 Wisconsin JI–Criminal 140 was originally published by 
the Wisconsin Judicial Conference Criminal Jury Instructions 
Committee9 (the "Committee") in 1962.  The original version was 
similar in all material respects to the current version, and the 
instruction has undergone only minor revisions in 1983, 1986, 
1987, 1991, and 1994.  Wis JI—Criminal 140, cmt. at 2.  It was 
republished in 2000 without any substantive change.  Id.  In 
light of numerous United States Supreme Court and Wisconsin 
cases 
addressing 
the 
substance 
of 
reasonable 
doubt 
jury 
instructions, the Committee "has carefully reviewed Wis JI—
Criminal 140 several times."  Id.  It has also reviewed other 
pattern jury instructions such as those published by the Federal 
Judicial Center, and has concluded that Wis JI—Criminal 140, as 
it has appeared for decades, correctly states the law.  Id. at 
                                                 
9 The Criminal Jury Instructions Committee is comprised of a 
number 
of 
Wisconsin 
judges 
from 
across 
the 
state 
and 
representatives from the Wisconsin Attorney General's office, 
the State Public Defender's office, and the University of 
Wisconsin Law School. 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
17 
 
3–4.  The Committee noted that "several parts of the instruction 
have been approved by the appellate courts," and that "[r]ather 
than risk creating appellate issues by significantly changing 
the instruction, the Committee decided it was better to retain 
the original version."  Id. at 2–3. 
¶28 In addition, the Committee has considered the two law 
review articles by Cicchini and White that Trammell relies on in 
this case.  Id. at 5.  The Committee stated that it "received 
several inquiries about the phrase 'you are to search for the 
truth,'" based on the law review articles, and that "[a]fter 
careful consideration, the Committee decided not to change the 
text of the instruction."  Id.  In deciding not to alter Wis JI—
Criminal 140, the Committee relied in large part on this court's 
holding in Avila, noting that "[c]hallenges to including 'search 
for the truth' in the reasonable doubt instruction have been 
rejected by Wisconsin appellate courts."10  Id.  Nonetheless, 
                                                 
10 The Committee also stated the following with regard to 
the language of Wis JI—Criminal 140: 
 
If an addition to the text [of Wis JI—Criminal 
140] 
is 
desired, 
the 
Committee 
recommends 
the 
following, which is modeled on the 1962 version of Wis 
JI—Criminal 140: 
 
You are to search for the truth and give the 
defendant the benefit of any reasonable doubt that 
remains after carefully considering all the evidence 
in the case. 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
18 
 
circuit courts are endowed with the authority to appropriately 
tailor jury instructions. 
2.  State v. Avila 
¶29 Trammell asks this court to overrule Avila.  We 
address Avila separately because Trammell's arguments regarding 
Avila seem to differ from his arguments regarding the specific 
language of the instruction itself.  For example, Trammell asks 
us to invoke the Wisconsin Constitution and provide greater 
protection than the United States Constitution, arguing that the 
studies he cites provide ample basis for us to overrule Avila, 
and further asserting that Avila is contrary to United States 
Supreme Court precedent. 
¶30 In Avila this court considered, inter alia, a starkly 
similar challenge to the one Trammell brings here——that Wis JI—
Criminal 140 (1991), and its final two sentences in particular, 
"improperly dilutes the State's burden of proof and as such is 
constitutionally infirm."  Avila, 192 Wis. 2d at 887.  The at-
issue instruction was substantially the same as it appears 
today.  See id. at 888.  In Avila this court concluded that Wis 
JI—Criminal 140 (1991) was constitutional and did not dilute the 
State's burden of proof.  Id. at 890.  Specifically, this court 
considered the jury instruction as a whole, and determined "that 
                                                                                                                                                             
Wis JI—Criminal 140, cmt. at 5.  As we conclude that the current 
version of Wis JI—Criminal 140 correctly states the law and does 
not unconstitutionally confuse the jury, we decline to express 
any opinion regarding the Committee's proffered alternative 
wording. 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
19 
 
it is not reasonably likely that the jury understood Wis JI—
Criminal 140 (1991), to allow conviction based on proof below 
the [In re] Winship [397 U.S. 358 (1970)] reasonable doubt 
standard."  Id. at 889.  This court further concluded that the 
instruction consistently reinforced the presumption of the 
defendant's innocence and the State's burden to prove the 
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 889.  
Additionally, this court explained that Wis JI—Criminal 140 
properly defined reasonable doubt and emphasized the jury's 
"'duty to give the defendant the benefit of every reasonable 
doubt,'" and to search for the truth instead of doubt.  Id. at 
890 (quoting Wis JI—Criminal 140 (1991)).  As a result, this 
court held that "[t]he instruction as a whole emphasizes with 
great clarity" the State's burden and the presumption of the 
defendant's innocence, and does not "dilute the State's burden 
of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."  Id.   
¶31 Trammell 
largely 
argues 
that 
Avila 
should 
be 
overturned because it is refuted by reliable, empirical evidence 
from two research studies which are now cited in two law review 
articles.  He argues that the language commanding the jurors (1) 
"not to search for doubt," but instead (2) "to search for the 
truth" is an impermissible "dual directive."  He argues that 
these dual directives cause some jurors to conclude that they 
may properly vote guilty even when reasonable doubt exists, that 
the two studies demonstrate that jurors convict at significantly 
higher rates when dual directive instructions are given, and 
that the dual directives effectively reduce the prosecution's 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
20 
 
burden from beyond a reasonable doubt to preponderance of the 
evidence.   
¶32 Trammell argues that the Avila court, without the 
benefit of this research, upheld Wis JI—Criminal 140, and that 
the two studies demonstrate that Avila must be overturned.  In 
doing so, Trammell urges this court to follow State v. Dubose, 
2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582, and rely on the 
studies that he cites.  He asserts that this court utilized 
social science research to alter the test for what constitutes 
an admissible out-of-court identification in Dubose, and that 
this court should similarly do so here.   
¶33 Trammell is correct that in Dubose this court relied 
in part on social science to hold that Article I, section 8 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution contained a broader due process right 
than that under the United States Constitution with respect to 
an out-of-court identification procedure known as a "showup."  
Id., ¶¶41, 45.  Our holding in Dubose did indeed consider 
several studies, see id., ¶29, but this court's conclusion was 
based upon the Wisconsin Constitution and its decision to 
"interpret our constitution to provide greater protections than 
its federal counterpart."  Id., ¶41.  Significantly, Dubose 
relied on the Due Process Clause of the Wisconsin Constitution 
to afford greater protection than that provided by the Due 
Process Clause of the United States Constitution.  Today, we 
decline to provide greater constitutional protection to Trammell 
utilizing our state constitution.  In fact, since Dubose was 
decided, this court has recognized that Dubose "did not create a 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
21 
 
precedential sea change."  State v. Luedtke, 2015 WI 42, ¶¶48–
49, 362 Wis. 2d 1, 863 N.W.2d 592.  Rather, this court viewed 
Dubose narrowly in the context of "showups," and we have 
declined to extend Dubose beyond its limited scope.  See id. 
¶34 Moreover, Dubose differs significantly from this case, 
where 
Trammell 
asks 
us 
to 
declare 
Wis 
JI—Criminal 
140 
unconstitutional based on the two law review articles which rely 
entirely on studies conducted by the two law review authors.11  
We are unpersuaded by Trammell's invocation of Dubose and 
similarly decline to rely on the two law review articles and the 
                                                 
11 We note the potential reliability concerns each study 
exhibits.  Neither study was peer-reviewed by social scientists, 
as both appeared in law reviews.  Further, as Cicchini and White 
concede in both articles, there are concerns regarding the 
studies' respective methodologies.  The participants in neither 
study engaged in an actual trial setting, instead individually 
reading 
a 
case 
summary 
providing 
the 
elements 
of 
the 
hypothetical crime, a transcript of witness testimony, and the 
lawyers' closing arguments, and providing their "verdict" 
without any deliberations.  Cicchini & White, supra n.5, 50 U. 
Richmond L. Rev. at 1160–61.  Moreover, the studies were limited 
in that they each utilized only one fact pattern, meaning that 
the outcome is unknown under different hypothetical scenarios 
than the two collective scenarios presented in the studies.  See 
id. at 1161–62.  Additionally, the participants engaged in the 
studies independently and without monitoring, meaning they may 
have devoted inadequate attention to the studies.  See id. at 
1163–64.  Lastly, in the first study, there was no procedure to 
screen participants for potential bias, which occurs in a real-
world trial setting during voir dire.  See id. at 1164–65.  
While Cicchini and White altered their second study by providing 
an entirely different fact pattern, screening out participants 
who spent less than three minutes on completing the entire 
study, such alterations do little to allay the inherent concerns 
with either study.  See Cicchini & White, supra note 6, 117 
Columbia L. Rev. Online at 34–35. 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
22 
 
studies cited therein.  We decline to rely on Dubose to 
implement a sea change here, upending a jury instruction that 
has existed substantially in the same form for decades and has 
been 
previously 
upheld 
under 
constitutional 
challenges.  
Accordingly, we conclude that Wis JI—Criminal 140, as given, did 
not cause the jurors to unconstitutionally apply a lower burden 
of proof to convict Trammell.  We decline to overrule Avila, and 
thus hold that the use of Wis JI—Criminal 140 at trial did not 
deprive Trammell of due process. 
¶35 Additionally, Trammell argues that Avila is contrary 
to United States Supreme Court precedent and thus must be 
overturned.  Specifically, Trammell cites two United States 
Supreme Court cases——Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), 
and Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam)——in 
support of his position.  Both cases, however, are readily 
distinguishable.  Sullivan and Cage were based on a Louisiana 
pattern jury instruction that defined "reasonable doubt" as 
"such doubt as would give rise to a grave uncertainty," and "an 
actual substantial doubt."  Cage, 498 U.S. at 40; Sullivan, 508 
U.S. at 277.  The Court in Cage held that "a reasonable juror 
could have interpreted the instruction to allow a finding of 
guilt based on a degree of proof below that required by the Due 
Process Clause."  Cage, 498 U.S. at 41.  In Sullivan, the Court 
recognized Cage and accepted it as controlling despite its per 
curiam status.  Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 278. 
¶36 The jury instruction language at issue in Sullivan and 
Cage was not the language used in Wis JI—Criminal 140.  The 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
23 
 
Supreme Court in Sullivan and Cage concluded that the Louisiana 
jury instruction misstated the state's burden by defining 
"reasonable doubt" and as a "grave uncertainty."  Neither phrase 
is used in Wis JI—Criminal 140 and neither Sullivan nor Cage 
addressed the specific language Trammell challenges.  Therefore, 
neither case supports Trammell's position that Wis JI—Criminal 
140 inaccurately states the law or reduces the State's burden so 
to require reversal of Avila. 
¶37 We next consider Trammell's interrelated argument that 
Wis JI—Criminal 140 misleads, confuses, or misdirects the jury.  
We conclude that Wis JI—Criminal 140 does not.  We instead agree 
with the State's arguments that:  (1) the two law review 
articles Trammell cites are simply speculation based upon 
hypothetical scenarios, and (2) reviewing Wis JI—Criminal 140 in 
light of the entire proceeding leads to a conclusion that the 
instruction is not reasonably likely to confuse jurors into 
applying an unconstitutional reasonable doubt standard.  The 
State urges this court to afford no weight to the studies 
featured in the law review articles, as this court is to 
determine issues of law, and as the studies are superfluous and 
rely on assertions of fact and reliability "that have not been 
tested in any court."12   
¶38 Considering Wis JI—Criminal 140 in light of the entire 
proceedings, nothing indicates a reasonable probability that the 
                                                 
12 See discussion, supra, note 11. 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
24 
 
jury was misled, confused, or misdirected into applying the 
reasonable doubt standard.  We therefore decline to overrule 
Avila. 
3.  Constitutionality of Wis JI—Criminal 140 
¶39 Next we address Trammell's argument that Wis JI—
Criminal 140 is "constitutionally crippled for being blighted by 
multiple compounding burden-reducing errors and confusing and 
mis-directing the jury."  In short, he argues that the 
reasonable doubt instruction allowed a "finding of guilt based 
on a degree of proof below that which is constitutionally 
required."  Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 2 (1994).  The 
question is not "whether the instruction 'could have' been 
applied unconstitutionally, but whether there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury did so apply it."  Id. (citing Estelle 
v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 & n. 4 (1991)).   
¶40 Trammell argues that Wis JI—Criminal 140 violated his 
due process rights because of what he terms:  (1) The 
"'important affairs of life' analogy"; (2) "'The alternative 
hypothesis' flaw"; (3) "The unsavory 'unreasonable doubt' flaw"; 
and (4) "The truth-focus flaw."  Trammell surmises that the 
"multiple flaws of [Wis JI—Criminal 140] compound to make it 
'possibly the worst jury instruction on reasonable doubt in the 
nation'" requesting that this court overrule Avila and grant him 
specific relief.  Thus, we are called upon to determine whether 
the standard reasonable doubt jury instruction given here 
created a "reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
25 
 
instructions to allow conviction based on proof insufficient to 
meet the Winship standard."  Victor, 511 U.S. at 6.  
¶41 It is true that the State must prove Trammell 
committed each element of the offenses charged before Trammell 
can be found guilty.  We know that the jury was so instructed.13  
The 
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
standard 
is 
not 
expressly 
referenced in the United States Constitution or the Wisconsin 
Constitution but has been deemed a requirement of due process.  
However, no specific words are constitutionally required when 
defining reasonable doubt.14  See Victor, 511 U.S. at 5.  While 
                                                 
13 See Wis JI–Criminal 400 (2005) (defining "party to a 
crime" and "aiding and abetting"), Wis JI—Criminal 1464 (2007) 
(addressing count two in this case——taking and driving a vehicle 
without owner's consent), and Wis JI—Criminal 1480 (2016) 
(addressing count one in this case——armed robbery), all of which 
were read to the jury prior to deliberations.  
14 Indeed, various federal circuits have defined "reasonable 
doubt" in different ways in their respective pattern criminal 
jury instructions.  See Judicial Council of the United States 
Third Judicial Circuit, Pattern (Criminal) Jury Instructions, 
1.13 (2012) (defining "reasonable doubt" as "a fair doubt based 
on reason, logic, common sense, or experience," and one "that 
would cause an ordinary reasonable person to hesitate to act in 
matters of importance in his or her own life"; further defining 
it as not meaning "proof beyond all possible doubt or to a 
mathematical certainty"); United States Fifth Circuit District 
Judges Association, Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal Cases), 
1.05 (2015) (defining "reasonable doubt" as "a doubt based upon 
reason and common sense" and based on "proof of such a 
convincing character that you would be willing to rely and act 
upon it without hesitation in making the most important 
decisions of your own affairs"); Sixth Circuit Committee on 
Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, Pattern Criminal Jury 
Instructions, 1.03 (2019) (defining "reasonable doubt" as "a 
doubt based on reason and common sense," and based on "proof 
which is so convincing that you would not hesitate to rely and 
act on it in making the most important decisions in your own 
(continued) 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
26 
 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not 
expressly address the application of the reasonable doubt 
standard in criminal proceedings, the United States Supreme 
Court in Winship held "that the Due Process Clause protects the 
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which 
he is charged."  Winship, 397 U.S. at 364.  In so holding, the 
Court explained as follows: 
[T]he Court said in Brinegar v. United States, [338 
U.S. 160, 174 (1949)], that "[g]uilt in a criminal 
case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and by 
                                                                                                                                                             
lives"); Judicial Committee on Model Jury Instructions for the 
Eighth Circuit, Model Jury Instructions, 3.11 (2017 ed.) 
(defining "reasonable doubt" as "doubt based upon reason and 
common 
sense" 
that 
"leaves 
you 
firmly 
convinced 
of 
the 
defendant's guilt," and based on "proof of such a convincing 
character that a reasonable person, after careful consideration, 
would not hesitate to rely and act upon that proof in life's 
most important decisions"); Ninth Circuit Jury Instructions 
Committee, Model Criminal Jury Instructions, 3.5 (2010 ed.) 
(defining "reasonable doubt" as "proof that leaves you firmly 
convinced the defendant is guilty" and "based upon reason and 
common sense"); Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction Committee of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 
Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions, 1.05 (2011 ed.) (defining 
"reasonable doubt" as "proof that leaves you firmly convinced of 
the defendant's guilt . . . based on reason and common sense"); 
Judicial Council of the United States Eleventh Judicial Circuit, 
Criminal 
Pattern 
Jury 
Instructions, 
B3 
(2019) 
(defining 
"reasonable doubt" as "a real doubt" and based on "proof so 
convincing that you would be willing to rely and act on it 
without hesitation in the most important of your own affairs").  
The Seventh Circuit has chosen not to define reasonable doubt in 
its pattern criminal jury instruction.  See Committee on Pattern 
Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit, Pattern Criminal Jury 
Instructions of the Seventh Circuit, 1.04 (2012 ed.) (stating, 
"[No instruction.]").    
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
27 
 
evidence confined to that which long experience in the 
common-law tradition, to some extent embodied in the 
Constitution, has crystallized into rules of evidence 
consistent with that standard.  These rules are 
historically grounded rights of our system, developed 
to safeguard men from dubious and unjust convictions, 
with resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and 
property."  Davis v. United States, [160 U.S. 469, 488 
(1895)], stated that the requirement is implicit in 
"constitutions . . . [which] recognize the fundamental 
principles 
that 
are 
deemed 
essential 
for 
the 
protection of life and liberty." 
Id. at 362. 
¶42 We therefore address this jury instruction challenge 
as a matter of constitutional law arising under due process.  In 
evaluating 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
a 
challenged 
jury 
instruction, courts look not only to the at-issue instruction 
itself, but also to other instructions given and the proceedings 
as a whole.  See Victor, 511 U.S. at 15–16 (considering the 
constitutionality of a reasonable doubt instruction using the 
phrase "moral certainty" in light of the entire instructions 
given to the jury); State v. Hubbard, 2008 WI 92, ¶27, 313 
Wis. 2d 1, 752 N.W.2d 839 ("Jury instructions are not to be 
judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the 
context of the overall charge.").  This court has stated that 
there are two types of challenges to jury instructions:  (1) 
"those challenging the legal accuracy of the instructions"; and 
(2) 
"those 
alleging 
that 
a 
legally 
accurate 
instruction 
unconstitutionally misled the jury."  Burris, 333 Wis. 2d 87, 
¶44.  Trammell appears to assert both challenges.  This 
constitutional challenge, however, must be based upon more than 
conjecture.  Such a challenge must demonstrate a reasonable 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
28 
 
likelihood that the jury understood that the instructions 
allowed a conviction based upon insufficient proof.  See id., 
¶49 ("'Wisconsin courts should not reverse a conviction simply 
because the jury possibly could have been misled; rather a new 
trial should be ordered only if there is a reasonable likelihood 
that the jury was misled and therefore applied potentially 
confusing 
instructions 
in 
an 
unconstitutional 
manner.'") 
(quoting Lohmeier, 205 Wis. 2d at 193-94); see also Victor, 511 
U.S. at 6 ("The constitutional question . . . is whether there 
is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the 
instructions to allow conviction based on proof insufficient to 
meet 
the 
Winship 
standard."); 
Winship, 
397 
U.S. 
at 
367 
(requiring sufficient proof beyond a reasonable doubt with 
juveniles as with adults when they are charged with a violation 
of criminal law). 
¶43 Specifically, Trammell argues that the "'important 
affairs of life' analogy" in the jury instruction has burden-
reducing effects.  He argues that instructing that beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt determinations be made based upon the important 
affairs of one's life demonstrates a lower burden in that such 
determinations are largely intuitive, full of bias, based on 
variances, imperfect, and unique to personal experience.  He 
surmises that such decisions generally involve considerable 
uncertainty and risk-taking.  Specifically, the section of the 
instruction to which he objects states:   
 
The term "reasonable doubt" means a doubt based 
upon reason and common sense.  It is a doubt for which 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
29 
 
a reason can be given, arising from a fair and 
rational consideration of the evidence or lack of 
evidence.  It means such a doubt as would cause a 
person of ordinary prudence to pause or hesitate when 
called upon to act in the most important affairs of 
life. 
Wis JI—Criminal 140 at 1.  Trammell's selection of portions of 
this instruction to advance his argument have been previously 
considered and deemed constitutionally satisfactory.  See 
Victor, 511 U.S. at 20-21 (citing Holland v. United States, 348 
U.S. 121, 139–40 (1954)).  
¶44 In support of his position, Trammell cites United 
States v. Jaramillo-Suarez, 950 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1991), and 
People v. Johnson, 115 Cal. App. 4th 1169 (2004).  In Jaramillo-
Suarez, the Ninth Circuit indicated that it preferred federal 
district courts avoid using a jury instruction which instructed 
a jury to find the defendant guilty if "you find the evidence so 
convincing that an ordinary person would be willing to make the 
most important decisions in his or her own life on the basis of 
such evidence."  Jaramillo-Suarez, 950 F.2d at 1386.  However, 
the Court also held that reversal was not required, as "the 
reasonable doubt instruction, taken in context with all of the 
other instructions, did not detract from the heavy burden 
suggested by the use of the term 'reasonable doubt' standing 
alone."  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
¶45 In Johnson, the at-issue jury instruction——which the 
court held improperly amplified the reasonable doubt standard—— 
bore no real resemblance to Wis JI—Criminal 140.  There, the 
court defined "reasonable doubt" by stating that people engage 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
30 
 
in activities such as flying on airplanes and taking vacations 
"because we have a belief beyond a reasonable doubt that we will 
be here tomorrow."  Johnson, 115 Ca. App. 4th at 1171.  Neither 
Jaramillo-Suarez nor Johnson are persuasive and taking Wis JI—
Criminal 140 as a whole, "reasonable doubt" is correctly 
defined. 
 
Moreover, 
as 
discussed 
previously, 
the 
jury 
instructions in their entirety reinforce the proper definition 
of "reasonable doubt," further establishing that the portion of 
Wis JI—Criminal 140 discussing "the most important affairs of 
life" did not misstate the law.  Trammell's arguments are 
unpersuasive, 
and 
we 
conclude 
that 
this 
portion 
of 
the 
instruction is not constitutionally infirm. 
¶46  Trammell's 
next 
objection 
is 
framed 
as 
"the 
alternative hypothesis" flaw.  This passage immediately precedes 
the important affairs of life language to which Trammell 
objects.  The instruction states in relevant part:  "If you can 
reconcile the evidence upon any reasonable hypothesis consistent 
with the defendant's innocence, you should do so and return a 
verdict of not guilty."  Wis JI—Criminal 140 at 1.  Trammell 
argues that this reasonable hypothesis language creates two 
problems.  First, Trammell claims that it puts a defendant who 
presents evidence and the theory of the defense in a competing 
position, requiring the jury to balance the two competing 
theories and thus effectuating a preponderance-of-the-evidence 
standard instead of a beyond a reasonable doubt standard.   
Second, he argues that the reasonable hypothesis verbiage shifts 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
31 
 
the burden to the defense by focusing on the defendant's ability 
to produce alternatives to the government's case.   
¶47 In support of his position, Trammell cites United 
States v. Khan, 821 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987).  Khan provides 
Trammell 
no 
support. 
 
There, 
the 
court 
considered 
the 
constitutionality of a jury instruction which stated, "So, if 
the jury views the evidence in the case as reasonably permitting 
either of two conclusions, one of innocence, the other of guilt, 
you, the jury, should, of course, adopt the conclusion of 
innocence."  Id. at 92.  While the court expressed distaste for 
the language used, it considered the jury instructions as a 
whole and concluded that the court "properly instruct[ed] the 
jury on reasonable doubt."  Id. at 92–93.  If anything, the 
court's holding in Khan provides support for the State. 
¶48 Moreover, the language used here does not have the 
same effect as the 'either-or' language used in Khan.  Rather, 
it echoes the reasonable doubt standard stating, "If you can 
reconcile the evidence upon any reasonable hypothesis consistent 
with the defendant's innocence, you should do so and return a 
verdict of not guilty."  Wis JI—Criminal 140 at 1.  Further, Wis 
JI—Criminal 140 as a whole clearly and repeatedly places the 
burden of proof on the State, and the remainder of the jury 
instructions provided to the jury further engender a proper 
understanding of the reasonable doubt standard and the State's 
burden.  The "reasonable hypothesis" language in Wis JI—Criminal 
140 does not lead to a conclusion that the instruction 
incorrectly states the law.  The objected-to language instead 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
32 
 
informs the jurors to engage in consideration of a reasonable 
hypothesis consistent with the defendant's innocence and focuses 
on the defendant's innocence.  It instructs the jury to return a 
not guilty verdict if there is such a reasonable theory.  We 
therefore disagree with Trammell's contention that this section 
of the instruction is unconstitutional. 
¶49 Turning to Trammell's next argument, he asserts that 
the jury instruction language referencing sympathy and the fear 
to return a verdict of guilt creates a purported "unreasonable 
doubt flaw."  Trammell argues that the negative definition of 
reasonable doubt provided discourages acquittals based on pro-
defense biases, but that it does not discourage convictions on 
pro-prosecution biases. 
¶50 Trammell cites no case addressing the issue, and his 
argument is unpersuasive.  The circuit court instructed the 
jury, "A reasonable doubt is not a doubt which is based upon 
mere guesswork or speculation.  A doubt which arises merely from 
sympathy or from fear to return a verdict of guilt is not a 
reasonable doubt."  See Wis JI—Criminal 140 at 2.  That portion 
of the jury instruction merely reinforces the idea that jurors 
are to fairly and rationally consider the evidence, which is 
assuredly not a misstatement of the law.  We therefore conclude 
that the portion of the instruction referring to sympathy and 
the fear of returning a guilty verdict is constitutional. 
¶51 Trammell next argues that there is a "truth focus 
flaw" in the burden of proof jury instruction.  Again, Trammell 
harkens back to the dual directives analogy from the two law 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
33 
 
review articles and the studies relied upon therein.  He takes 
issue with the jury instruction language, "[Y]ou are not to 
search for doubt.  You are to search for the truth."  Id.  He 
argues that this phrase puts criminal juries in the position of 
civil juries to determine which narrative is more true.  
Trammell argues that weighing truth narratives is not the jury's 
task.  He argues that as a whole and as the studies have shown, 
this jury instruction confused the jury and misdirected the jury 
such that his conviction must be overturned.  As previously 
discussed, we disagree and reaffirm that Avila correctly 
concluded that the instruction survives constitutional scrutiny.  
The search for the truth language does not lower the burden for 
the State.   
¶52 Trammell finally argues that as the studies have 
shown, this jury instruction as a whole confused and misdirected 
the jury such that his conviction must be overturned.  Avila 
answers this in the negative.  However, we further address the 
standard jury instructions and why, as a whole, they dispel 
Trammell's catch-all argument. 
¶53 In the opening instructions given to the jury, the 
jury is routinely told: 
Regardless of any opinion you may have about what the 
law is or ought to be, you must base your verdict on 
the law I give you in these instructions.  Apply that 
law to the facts in the case which have been properly 
proven by the evidence.  Consider only the evidence 
received during this trial and the law as given to you 
by these instructions and from these alone, guided by 
your soundest reason and best judgment, reach your 
verdict. 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
34 
 
Wis JI—Criminal 100 (2000).  The jury is told to consider only 
the evidence received during trial.  Wis JI–Criminal 103 (2000).  
They are instructed to use their sound reason and best judgment.  
Wis JI–Criminal 100 (2000).  In Wis JI—Criminal 101 (2001), the 
jurors are advised that the lawyers' remarks are not evidence.  
The instructions define evidence as the sworn testimony of the 
witnesses, the exhibits, and any stipulated or agreed to facts.  
Wis JI—Criminal 103 (2000).  The jurors are admonished not to 
rely on anything they have seen or heard outside the courtroom 
and that they "are to decide the case solely on the evidence 
offered and received at trial." Id.  They are cautioned that the 
legal charging document is not evidence and is not to be 
considered in any way as evidence against the defendant.  Wis 
JI—Criminal 145 (2000).  They are admonished to disregard 
entirely any question the circuit court did not allow to be 
answered and not to draw any conclusions from the lawyers' 
objections.  Wis JI—Criminal 147 (2000).  They are told not to 
draw any conclusions from objections made or court rulings on 
them and that they "are the sole judges of the credibility of 
the witnesses and the weight of the evidence."  Wis JI—Criminal 
148 (2000).  They are advised "[w]hether evidence is direct or 
circumstantial, it must satisfy you beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the offense before you may find the 
defendant guilty."  Wis JI—Criminal 170 (2000).   
¶54 Repeatedly, the jury is told that it is endowed with 
the responsibility to determine how much weight, if any, to give 
the evidence, testimony and witnesses.  Wis JI—Criminal 190 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
35 
 
(2000), Wis JI—Criminal 300 (2000).  The jury is instructed that 
it is their duty to scrutinize and weigh the testimony of the 
witnesses and to determine the effect of the evidence as a 
whole.  Wis. JI–Criminal 300 (2000).  The jury is told, "You are 
the sole judges of the credibility, that is, the believability, 
of the witnesses and of the weight to be given to their 
testimony."  Id.  The jury is given various factors to consider 
and then to "give the testimony of each witness the weight you 
believe it should receive."  Id.  They are to decide who to 
believe or disbelieve, what portion of the testimony to accept 
or not, and what weight to attach to the evidence and testimony.  
Id.  They are to determine the truth based upon the evidence 
presented and then apply the law as instructed to the evidence.  
They are instructed that "[i]n weighing the evidence, you may 
take into account matters of your common knowledge and your 
observations and experience in the affairs of life."  Wis JI–
Criminal 195 (2000). 
¶55 The reasonable doubt instruction does not stand alone.  
We emphasize that for each count with which the defendant is 
charged, the jury is advised of the State's burden of proof:  
"Before you may find the defendant guilty of the offense, the 
state must prove by evidence that satisfies you beyond a 
reasonable 
doubt 
that 
the 
following . . . elements 
were 
present."  With respect to each count, the jury is again advised 
regarding its decision and told, "If you are satisfied beyond a 
reasonable doubt that all . . . elements . . . have been proved, 
you should find the defendant guilty.  If you are not so 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
36 
 
satisfied, you must find the defendant not guilty."  The jury is 
never instructed that it must find the defendant guilty.  
Rather, with the consideration of guilt, the word "should" is 
used.  Regarding when they are not so satisfied that the State 
has met its burden to prove each element beyond a reasonable 
doubt, they are directed that they "must" find the defendant not 
guilty. 
 
Again, 
this 
instruction 
is 
consistent 
with 
a 
presumption 
of 
innocence 
and 
the 
"reasonable 
hypothesis" 
language. 
¶56 The reasonable doubt instruction given in the case at 
issue, which also is the standard instruction in Wis JI—Criminal 
140, advises the jury to examine the evidence with care and 
caution.  It tells the jury to act with judgment, reason, and 
prudence.  Wis JI—Criminal 140 at 1.  The very first thing the 
jury is advised with respect to the burden of proof is the 
presumption of innocence.  Id.  The jurors are told: 
 
Defendants are not required to prove their 
innocence.  The law presumes every person charged with 
the commission of an offense to be innocent.  This 
presumption requires a finding of not guilty unless in 
your deliberations you find it is overcome by evidence 
which satisfies you beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant is guilty. 
Id. 
¶57 The very next section speaks of the burden being on 
the State and reflects that, "The burden of establishing every 
fact necessary to constitute guilt is upon the state.  Before 
you can return a verdict of guilty, the evidence must satisfy 
you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty."  
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
37 
 
Id.  The following section advises the jury that if they can 
reconcile the evidence upon any reasonable hypothesis consistent 
with the defendant's innocence, they should return a verdict of 
not guilty.  Id.  The next section read describes reasonable 
doubt based upon reason and common sense: 
It is a doubt for which a reason can be given, arising 
from a fair and rational consideration of the evidence 
or lack of evidence.  It means such a doubt as would 
cause a person of ordinary prudence to pause or 
hesitate when called upon to act in the most important 
affairs of life.   
A reasonable doubt is not a doubt based on mere 
guesswork or speculation.  A doubt which arises merely 
from sympathy or from fear to return a verdict of 
guilt is not a reasonable doubt.  A reasonable doubt 
is not a doubt such as may be used to escape the 
responsibility of a decision. 
Id. at 1–2.  
¶58 Finally, the jury is advised, "While it is your duty 
to give the defendant the benefit of every reasonable doubt, you 
are not to search for doubt.  You are to search for the truth."  
Id. at 2.  While picking and choosing various phrases or words 
from the instructions makes for an interesting argument, the 
instructions as a whole direct the jury to understand the 
presumption of innocence due to the defendant, remind it of the 
State's high burden, instructs that the defendant is due the 
benefit of the doubt and to soberly weigh and consider the 
evidence, testimony and witnesses presented at trial, and apply 
the law to the facts, reaching a sound conclusion based only on 
the facts and the law.  
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
38 
 
¶59 As a whole, the jury is clearly instructed regarding 
the presumption of innocence.  To parse out certain phrases from 
the reasonable doubt instruction and as the defense would have 
us do, conclude that those words in a vacuum diminish the 
State's burden of proof, would also require us to conclude that 
the jury did not properly follow the other instructions and 
repeated admonitions regarding the State's requirement to meet 
its burden of proof as to each element.  Here, there is not a 
"reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions 
to allow conviction based on proof insufficient to meet the 
Winship standard."  Victor, 511 U.S. at 6.  Trammell's argument 
fails as it would not cause a jury to understand those phrases 
to mean "something less than the very high level of probability 
required by the Constitution in criminal cases."  Id. at 14.  In 
fact, the instructions explicitly tell the jurors to base their 
conclusions on the evidence in the case and the law as 
instructed, holding the State to its burden to prove each 
element beyond a reasonable doubt. 
C.  Discretionary Reversal 
¶60 Trammell lastly contends that discretionary reversal 
is warranted under Wis. Stat. § 751.06.  Trammell asserts that 
the circuit court's use of Wis JI—Criminal 140 warrants 
discretionary reversal, and thus a new trial, under Wis. Stat. 
§ 751.06 "because the instruction confused the jury in a manner 
that went to the integrity of the fact-finding process," and "by 
mis-stating the prosecution's burden."  He further argues that 
the 
use 
of 
the 
jury 
instruction 
"prevented 
the 
real 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
39 
 
controversy . . . from being fully tried according to the 
requisite standard of proof/persuasion."  "In applying § 751.06, 
we exercise our discretion infrequently, judiciously, and only 
in exceptional cases."  Langlois, 382 Wis. 2d 414, ¶55 (citing 
State v. Avery, 2013 WI 13, ¶38, 345 Wis. 2d 407, 826 
N.W.2d 60).  Since we conclude that Wis JI—Criminal 140 does not 
misstate the law, does not likely confuse the jury, and does not 
reduce the State's burden, and as there is substantial evidence 
to support the jury's verdict, we conclude that this is not an 
exceptional 
case 
warranting 
discretionary 
reversal 
under 
§ 751.06. 
¶61 Though Trammell waived his objection to Wis JI—
Criminal 140, this court may nevertheless consider whether 
Trammell is entitled to relief under Wis. Stat. § 751.06.  See 
Clark v. Leisure Vehicles, Inc., 96 Wis. 2d 607, 616–17, 292 
N.W.2d 630 (1980) (concluding that the plaintiff waived his 
objection to a verdict form under Wis. Stat. § 805.13(3) (1979-
80), but stating that "the failure to make a timely assertion of 
error does not preclude this court from considering the issue of 
the defect in the verdict" under § 751.06 (1979-80)).   
¶62 Wisconsin Stat. § 751.06 states as follows: 
In an appeal in the supreme court, if it appears from 
the record that the real controversy has not been 
fully tried, or that it is probable that justice has 
for any reason miscarried, the court may reverse the 
judgment or order appealed from, regardless of whether 
the proper motion or objection appears in the record, 
and may direct the entry of the proper judgment or 
remit the case to the trial court for the entry of the 
proper judgment or for a new trial, and direct the 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
40 
 
making of such amendments in the pleadings and the 
adoption 
of 
such 
procedure 
in 
that 
court, 
not 
inconsistent with statutes or rules, as are necessary 
to accomplish the ends of justice. 
Thus, this court may order a new trial under one of two 
disjunctive prongs:  "(1) whenever the real controversy has not 
been fully tried; or (2) whenever it is probable that justice 
has 
for 
any 
reason 
miscarried." 
 
State 
v. 
Hicks, 
202 
Wis. 2d 150, 159–60, 549 N.W.2d 435 (1996) (citing State v. 
Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 735, 370 N.W.2d 745 (1985)).   
¶63 This court has stated that the real controversy has 
not been fully tried under Wis. Stat. § 751.06 in two 
situations: 
(1) when the jury was erroneously not given the 
opportunity to hear important testimony that bore on 
an important issue of the case; and (2) when the jury 
had before it evidence not properly admitted which so 
clouded a crucial issue it may be fairly said that the 
real controversy was not fully tried. 
Id. at 160.  Regarding the miscarriage of justice prong, this 
court has explained that justice is only miscarried if "there 
would be a substantial probability that a different result would 
be likely on retrial."  Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d at 401 (citing 
Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 740-41).  "As such, the defendant must meet 
a higher threshold in order for this court to grant a new trial 
under the second prong."  State v. Maloney, 2006 WI 15, ¶14 n.4, 
288 Wis. 2d 551, 709 N.W.2d 436.   
¶64 Here, 
the 
record 
demonstrates 
that 
nothing 
in 
Trammell's trial prevented the real controversy from being fully 
tried, nor was there a miscarriage of justice.  Examining the 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
41 
 
first prong, the real controversy here was fully tried.  
Trammell does not bring an evidentiary challenge, instead 
claiming that under State v. Perkins, 2001 WI 46, 243 
Wis. 2d 141, 626 N.W.2d 762, the use of the at-issue jury 
instruction in Perkins warrants a new trial under the first 
prong.  Like Trammell, Perkins waived his right to object to the 
use of a jury instruction by failing to object at the jury 
instruction 
and 
verdict 
conference, 
but 
claimed 
that 
discretionary reversal was warranted under Wis. Stat. § 751.06.  
Id., ¶11–12.  This court agreed, concluding that the at-issue 
jury instruction in Perkins failed to define what would 
constitute a "threat[] to cause bodily harm," and that as a 
result, Perkins was entitled to a new trial because the real 
controversy was not fully tried.  Id., ¶¶33–37, 49. 
¶65 Perkins is inapposite to this case.  In Perkins this 
court concluded that the real controversy was not fully tried 
because the at-issue jury instruction gave an incomplete 
statement of the law by failing to define a threat to cause 
bodily harm.  Here, Wis JI—Criminal 140 does not provide an 
incomplete statement of the law as did the jury instruction in 
Perkins.  Indeed, it discusses the reasonable doubt standard at 
length and with specificity.  Moreover, as discussed at length 
previously, Wis JI—Criminal 140 as a whole does not misstate the 
law or serve to reduce the State's burden of proof, nor does it 
likely confuse the jury.  Accordingly, we conclude that the real 
controversy at issue here has been fully tried. 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
42 
 
¶66 Turning to the second prong, we conclude that there is 
not a substantial probability that a different result would be 
likely on retrial.  At trial, the State presented a wealth of 
evidence supporting Trammell's conviction on both counts.  The 
State 
presented 
testimony 
from 
the 
victim, 
the 
victim's 
girlfriend, and Trammell's accomplice Silas, all of whom 
corroborated one another and clearly implicated Trammell in the 
armed theft of the Buick.  Officer Strasser's testimony further 
corroborated the State's theory of the case, and Officer 
Draeger's testimony indicated that Trammell tried to convince 
another individual to lie on his behalf at trial.  In addition 
to 
the 
testimony 
offered 
at 
trial, 
the 
State 
presented 
fingerprints from the Buick that matched Trammell's left index 
finger and Silas's right index finger.  Given the overwhelming 
amount of evidence supporting Trammell's guilt, we conclude that 
there is not a substantial probability that a different result 
would occur if the matter were to be retried.  As the real 
controversy has been fully tried and there is no substantial 
probability of a different result if a retrial occurred, 
discretionary reversal under Wis. Stat. § 751.06 is unwarranted. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶67 We conclude that Trammell waived his right to object 
to the use of Wis JI—Criminal 140 by failing to object to its 
use at the jury instruction and verdict conference, pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 805.13(3).  On that basis, the court of appeals 
properly denied Trammell's appeal and correctly concluded that 
it could not consider whether Wis JI—Criminal 140 misstates the 
No. 
2017AP1206-CR   
 
43 
 
law, confuses the jury, and reduces the State's burden.  
However, unlike the court of appeals, this court may nonetheless 
consider the instruction under its discretionary power of 
review.  Schumacher, 144 Wis. 2d at 409–10.  We exercise that 
power here.  The constitutional question with which we are 
presented is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
jury understood the instructions to allow a conviction based 
upon insufficient proof.  We conclude that Wis JI—Criminal 140 
does not unconstitutionally reduce the State's burden of proof 
below the reasonable doubt standard.  Lastly, we conclude that 
discretionary 
reversal 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 751.06 
is 
not 
warranted.  We therefore affirm the court of appeals. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶68 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
J., 
withdrew 
from 
participation. 
 
No.  2017AP1206-CR.rfd 
 
1 
 
¶69 REBECCA FRANK DALLET, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority opinion that the two law review articles cited by 
Trammell do not provide the overwhelming evidence necessary to 
conclude that Wis JI——Criminal 140 (2017) unconstitutionally 
reduces the State's burden of proof below the reasonable doubt 
standard or to warrant discretionary reversal.  Notwithstanding, 
I write separately for two reasons:  First, to respond to the 
majority opinion's denigration of this court's holding in State 
v. Dubose, 2005 WI 126, 285 Wis. 2d 143, 699 N.W.2d 582; and 
second, to encourage the Wisconsin Criminal Jury Instructions 
Committee to revise Wis JI——Criminal 140 in the interest of 
justice in light of the arguments made in the amicus curiae 
brief of the Wisconsin State Public Defender.  
¶70 In Dubose, we recognized extensive social science 
studies over a ten-year period demonstrating the unreliability 
of eyewitness testimony and, based upon that overwhelming 
evidence, we adopted new standards for the admissibility of out-
of-court identification procedures.  Id., ¶¶29-33.  Dubose 
stands for the principle that prior decisions of this court may 
become unsound when they are based upon principles that are no 
longer valid.  See id., ¶¶31-33.  Dubose further upholds this 
court's right to interpret the Wisconsin Constitution to provide 
greater protections than the United States Constitution.  Id., 
¶41.  
¶71 Although the majority opinion acknowledges that the 
Dubose court considered several studies, it minimizes the impact 
of the studies when it summarily concludes that the court's 
No.  2017AP1206-CR.rfd 
 
2 
 
holding was instead based upon the Wisconsin Constitution.  
Majority op., ¶33.  The majority opinion seemingly calls into 
question this court's ability to consider social science 
evidence in constitutional cases.  While I agree that two law 
review articles alone do not provide the type of extensive new 
research like the studies we relied upon in Dubose, the Dubose 
case was "not the first to result in a change in principles 
based on extensive new studies completed after a court decision 
that 
was 
premised 
on 
constitutional 
interpretation 
and 
application."  Dubose, 285 Wis. 2d 143, ¶43.  For example, in 
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 & n.11 (1954), 
the United States Supreme Court overturned the "separate but 
equal" 
doctrine 
and 
provided 
an 
important 
shift 
in 
constitutional law based on recent studies that demonstrated the 
negative effects of segregation in public education.  The United 
States Supreme Court stated:  "We must consider public education 
in light of its full development and its present place in 
American life throughout the Nation."  Id. at 492-93.  In 
addition to desegregation of schools, other examples of cases 
where social science research has formed the basis for the 
United States Supreme Court to abrogate previous decisions 
include:  the regulation of women's working hours in Muller v. 
State of Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); criminalization of 
consensual same sex intimate conduct in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558 (2003); and imposition of the death penalty on the 
mentally ill and juveniles in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 
(2002), and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).  The majority 
No.  2017AP1206-CR.rfd 
 
3 
 
opinion cannot possibly be suggesting that this court can no 
longer be informed by current research that measures the effects 
of previous court decisions on an evolving society. 
¶72 In its effort to limit Dubose, the majority also 
challenges our ability to interpret the Wisconsin Constitution 
more broadly than the United States Constitution.  This court 
has stated: 
This 
court . . . will 
not 
be 
bound 
by 
the 
minimums which are imposed by the Supreme Court of the 
United States if it is the judgment of this court that 
the Constitution of Wisconsin and the laws of this 
state require that greater protection of citizens' 
liberties ought to be afforded . . . . 
 
State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161, 172, 254 N.W.2d 210 (1977). 
¶73 In Dubose, 285 Wis. 2d 143, ¶41, we emphasized that 
even though Article I, Section 8 includes language similar to 
that 
of 
the 
Due 
Process 
Clause 
of 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution, "we retain the right to interpret our constitution 
to provide greater protections than its federal counterpart."  
We clarified in State v. Luedtke, 2015 WI 42, ¶50, 362 
Wis. 2d 1, 863 N.W.2d 592, that the Due Process Clause of the 
Wisconsin Constitution provides greater protection in one 
identification procedure, the showup.  This court does not 
forfeit to the federal judiciary its power to interpret our 
constitution.  See State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶60, 285 Wis. 2d 
86, 700 N.W.2d 899 ("While textual similarity or identity is 
important 
when 
determining 
when 
to 
depart 
from 
federal 
constitutional jurisprudence, it cannot be conclusive . . . .  
The people of this state shaped our constitution, and it is our 
No.  2017AP1206-CR.rfd 
 
4 
 
solemn responsibility to interpret it.")  The Dubose case 
remains an example of this court's ability to consider social 
science evidence in constitutional cases and to interpret our 
constitution more broadly than its federal counterpart.  
¶74 Although I agree that there is currently insufficient 
evidence that Wis JI——Criminal 140 unconstitutionally reduces 
the State's burden of proof below the "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" standard, I nonetheless respectfully request that the 
Wisconsin Criminal Jury Instructions Committee review the 
instruction again in the interest of justice in light of the 
arguments made in the amicus curiae brief of the Wisconsin State 
Public Defender.  I believe that the combination of two 
deficiencies in the instruction could potentially dilute the 
burden of proof in Wis JI——Criminal 140 and thus warrants 
further consideration.  
¶75 First, Wis JI——Criminal 140 fails to define "beyond a 
reasonable doubt."1  The United States Supreme Court has 
described the standard of proof of "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
as "a subjective state of near certitude of the guilt of the 
accused" that symbolizes the significance our society attaches 
to liberty.  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979); see 
also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (declaring proof 
                                                 
1 The majority repeatedly refers to the standard of proof as 
"reasonable doubt" instead of "beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Majority op., ¶¶2, 41, 48, 65, 67.  The majority opinion 
likewise provides examples of definitions of "reasonable doubt" 
from other jurisdictions, but fails to acknowledge the failure 
of Wis JI——Criminal 140 to define "beyond a reasonable doubt."  
See majority op., ¶41 n.14. 
No.  2017AP1206-CR.rfd 
 
5 
 
beyond a reasonable doubt to be equivalent to proof to an 
"utmost certainty").  While the United States Supreme Court has 
declined to require specific language to describe this burden of 
proof, we may look to other states for guidance.  
¶76 Some states convey the requisite level of proof by 
instructing jurors that they must be "firmly convinced" of the 
defendant's guilt.  See, e.g., Revised Arizona JI——Criminal 20 
("Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you 
firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt."); Delaware Pattern 
Criminal Jury Instructions § 2.6 ("proof that leaves you firmly 
convinced of the defendant's guilt"); Indiana Criminal Pattern 
Jury Instruction No. 1.1500 ("Reasonable doubt exists when you 
are not firmly convinced of the Defendant's guilt . . ."); 17 
La. 
Civ. 
L. 
Treatise, 
Criminal 
Jury 
Instructions 
§ 3.3 
("Reasonable 
doubt . . . is 
present 
when, 
after 
you 
have 
carefully considered all the evidence, you cannot say that you 
are firmly convinced of the truth of the charge."); New Jersey 
Model Criminal Jury Charges Non 2C Charges ("proof . . . that 
leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt"); North 
Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions § 101.10 ("proof that fully 
satisfies or entirely convinces you of the defendant's guilt"); 
2 CR Ohio Jury Instructions § 405.07 ("'Reasonable doubt' is 
present when the jurors . . . cannot say they are firmly 
convinced of the truth of the charge."); Model Utah Jury 
Instructions, Second Edition CR103 ("Proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the 
defendant's guilt.").   
No.  2017AP1206-CR.rfd 
 
6 
 
¶77 Other states have described the level of certainty 
required as "an abiding conviction" of guilt or a "moral 
certainty."  See 1-1 Arkansas Model Jury Instructions——Criminal 
AMCI 2d 110 ("A juror is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt if 
after an impartial consideration of all the evidence he has an 
abiding conviction of the truth of the charge."); Judicial 
Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions No. 103 ("proof 
that leaves you with an abiding conviction that the charge is 
true"); Florida Standard Jury Instructions § 3.7 ("if, after 
carefully considering, comparing and weighing all the evidence, 
there is not an abiding conviction of guilt, or, if, having a 
conviction, it is one which is not stable but one which wavers 
and vacillates, then the charge is not proved beyond every 
reasonable doubt"); Massachusetts Criminal Jury Instructions No. 
2.180 ("you have in your minds an abiding conviction, to a moral 
certainty, that the charge is true"); Nevada Revised Statutes 
Annotated § 175.211 ("If the minds of the jurors . . . are in 
such a condition that they can say they feel an abiding 
conviction of the truth of the charge, there is not a reasonable 
doubt."); North Dakota Pattern Criminal Instructions 2017 
§ K-1.10 ("You should find the Defendant guilty only if you have 
a firm and abiding conviction of the Defendant's guilt . . ."); 
7 Tenn. Prac. Pattern Jury Instr. T.P.I.-Crim. 2.03 ("moral 
certainty is required"). 
¶78 In contrast, Wis JI——Criminal 140 describes what a 
"reasonable doubt" is:  "a doubt based upon reason and common 
sense," "a doubt for which a reason can be given," and "a doubt 
No.  2017AP1206-CR.rfd 
 
7 
 
as would cause a person of ordinary prudence to pause or 
hesitate when called upon to act in the most important affairs 
of life."  The instruction further describes what a "reasonable 
doubt" is not:  "a doubt which is based on mere guesswork or 
speculation," "[a] doubt which arises merely from sympathy or 
from fear to return a verdict of guilt," and "a doubt such as 
may be used to escape the responsibility of a decision."  Yet 
nowhere in Wis JI——Criminal 140 is the jury told the required 
level of certitude they must reach to convict.   
¶79 Second, the instruction could exacerbate the risk that 
the jury will convict based upon a lesser level of certainty 
than beyond a reasonable doubt when, after only defining 
"reasonable doubt," the jury is told not to search for doubt, 
but to search for "the truth."  See Brief of Amicus Curiae 
Wisconsin State Public Defender at 8.  While the adversary 
system as a whole involves a search for the truth, a juror's 
duty is to decide whether the State has proven its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt by examining only the evidence introduced at 
trial.  Oftentimes the evidence seen by a juror is constrained 
for various reasons including:  evidentiary and constitutional 
rulings 
made 
by 
the 
circuit 
court, 
the 
availability 
of 
witnesses, and strategic decisions of counsel.  Instructing 
jurors to search for the truth but not instructing them that the 
evidence at trial must convince them to a degree of near 
certainty may encourage jurors to believe that the truth lies 
outside of the courtroom.  There is no way to accurately "test," 
and thus we will never know, the impact on jurors of the 
No.  2017AP1206-CR.rfd 
 
8 
 
following words given at the end of Wis JI——Criminal 140:  
"While it is your duty to give the defendant the benefit of 
every reasonable doubt, you are not to search for doubt.  You 
are to search for the truth."  
¶80 The majority opinion dismisses Trammell's challenges 
to Wis JI——Criminal 140 based upon the recent consideration 
given to the instruction by the Criminal Jury Instructions 
Committee and this court's decision in Avila, where we held that 
"it is not reasonably likely that the jury understood Wis JI—
Criminal 140[], to allow conviction based on proof below the 
Winship reasonable doubt standard."  State v. Avila, 192 Wis. 2d 
870, 889, 535 N.W.2d 440 (1995), overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Gordon, 2003 WI 69, 262 Wis. 2d 380, 663 N.W.2d 765.  
The majority rightfully places great weight on the Criminal Jury 
Instructions Committee's examination of Wis JI——Criminal 140 in 
light of the two recent law review articles and its subsequent 
decision not to change the text of the instruction.  Majority 
op., ¶27.  As we have previously recognized, the criminal jury 
instructions "'are the product of painstaking effort of an 
eminently qualified committee of trial judges, lawyers, and 
legal scholars, designed to accurately state the law and afford 
a means of uniformity of instructions throughout the state.'"  
State v. Gilbert, 115 Wis. 2d 371, 379, 340 N.W.2d 511 (1983) 
(quoting State v. Genova, 77 Wis. 2d 141, 150-51, 252 N.W.2d 380 
(1977)).  I know the Criminal Jury Instructions Committee has 
diligently considered whether to change the text of Wis JI——
Criminal 140 in the past.  I urge them to now consider the 
No.  2017AP1206-CR.rfd 
 
9 
 
argument that is made here:  the interaction of the lack of 
explanation of the quantum of certainty combined with the 
directive not to search for doubt but to search for "the truth" 
potentially confuses and misleads jurors regarding the level of 
certainty required to convict.   
¶81 I therefore encourage the Wisconsin Criminal Jury 
Instructions Committee to review Wis JI——Criminal 140 in light 
of this particular challenge and revise Wis JI——Criminal 140 in 
the interest of justice.  For the foregoing reasons, I concur.   
¶82 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence. 
 
 
No.  2017AP1206-CR.rfd 
 
1