Case Title: DONALD HERBERT RABUCK V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 04-194

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-03-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
DONALD HERBERT RABUCK V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2006 WY 25130 P.3d 861Case Number: 04-194Decided: 03/10/2006
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
DONALD HERBERT 
RABUCK,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).)

 
 

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Ken Koski, 
State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate 
Counsel.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick J. 
Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; Eric A. Johnson, Director, PAP.                  

            
            

Before HILL, C.J., and 
GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, J., 
delivers the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, J., files a specially concurring 
opinion.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Donald Rabuck 
pled guilty to two counts of taking immodest, immoral, or indecent liberties 
with a minor, reserving his right to appeal the district court's denial of his 
motion to dismiss the charges.  Mr. 
Rabuck asserts that the indecent liberties statute is unconstitutionally vague 
as applied to him.  We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Is the indecent 
liberties statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105(a) (LexisNexis 2003), 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to Mr. Rabuck? 

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Mr. Rabuck was 
charged with two counts of violating Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105(a) (LexisNexis 
2003)1, for taking immodest, 
immoral, or indecent liberties with two minors, JW and AL.  Following a preliminary hearing, he was 
bound over to the district court.  
Prior to trial, Mr. Rabuck filed a motion to dismiss the charges, 
claiming that there was insufficient evidence to support them, or alternatively, 
that the indecent liberties statute was unconstitutional.  The State resisted the motion and the 
district court held a hearing.  At 
the hearing, counsel for both parties stipulated to a factual record consisting 
of the affidavit of probable cause and two videotapes submitted as 
exhibits.  The stipulated record 
reveals the following facts.

 
 
[¶4]      In late 2003, 
seventeen-year-old JW was living with her mother and two younger sisters as 
tenants in Mr. Rabuck's home in Gillette.  
AL, a seventeen-year-old friend of JW, lived there as well.  JW and AL shared a bedroom.  On December 1, 2003, JW was hanging up 
clothes when she noticed a red light in the closet.  She found a small wireless video camera 
on the closet's top shelf.  There 
were no doors on the closet, and the camera was aimed into the bedroom.  From that angle, both of the girls' beds 
were visible.  There was black tape 
on the camera partially covering the red light.

 
 
[¶5]      Later that 
evening, JW, AL, and JW's mother took the video camera to 
the Gillette police station and explained the circumstances of the discovery to 
Officer Lawrence.  Additionally, 
AL described 
statements which Mr. Rabuck had made to her a few days prior which she 
considered strange.  According to 
AL, Mr. Rabuck 
had asked about her sex life and if her boyfriend was keeping her sexually 
satisfied.  Mr. Rabuck told 
AL that he knew couples who were very open 
sexually and asked if AL was as well.  He asked AL when she would turn eighteen and told her 
he believed he could keep her sexually satisfied.

 
 
[¶6]      Officer Lawrence 
contacted Detective Jim Hloucal regarding the incident.  On December 2, 2003, Detective Hloucal 
went to Mr. Rabuck's home and received permission from JW's mother to view the 
closet where the video camera had been found.  He confirmed that the camera placement 
provided a view of the girls' beds.  
Later that day Detective Hloucal contacted Mr. Rabuck, who agreed to come 
to the police station.  While at the 
station, Mr. Rabuck consented to an interview with Detective Hloucal.  Mr. Rabuck admitted purchasing the video 
equipment and placing the camera in the bedroom shared by JW and AL.  He stated that he had placed the camera 
in the girls' bedroom in early November 2003.  He admitted "the thought had crossed his 
mind" that placing the camera in the room would allow him to see the two girls 
"without their clothes on."  He also 
admitted knowing that both girls were seventeen.  Mr. Rabuck stated that he had plugged 
the receiver into the VCR he had in his bedroom, but denied that he had made any 
recordings.  He denied viewing any 
images from the camera and claimed that the system did not work.  

 
 
[¶7]      Mr. Rabuck also 
described his attempt to dispose of the receiver and related paperwork at his 
place of employment after he realized that the camera had been discovered.  According to Mr. Rabuck, he disposed of 
the equipment because he was concerned about how it would "look having placed a 
video camera in the girls' bedroom."  
When asked if he had conversations with the girls of a sexual nature, Mr. 
Rabuck stated that he had asked AL if she would be interested in an older or 
more mature man.

 
 
[¶8]      On December 3, 
2003, Detective Hloucal obtained a search warrant for Mr. Rabuck's residence and 
his vehicle.  During the search of 
the home, a box for a wireless video camera and receiver were found under Mr. 
Rabuck's bed.  A shipping invoice 
dated October 24, 2003, showing the purchase of wireless video equipment was 
also found.

 
 
[¶9]      On December 4, 
2003, Detective Hloucal was contacted by Mr. Rabuck's employer and was advised 
that a supervisor had retrieved four VHS tapes from a trash receptacle after 
observing Mr. Rabuck dispose of them the previous afternoon.  The supervisor showed Detective Hloucal 
the trash barrel where the tapes had been found.  His subsequent search of the trash 
container resulted in discovery of the video receiver.

[¶10]   On December 5, 2003, Detective 
Hloucal viewed the tapes.  Two of 
the tapes revealed images of AL and JW in their bedroom.  One of the girls was captured completely 
nude, while other images showed one or both girls partially clothed, getting 
dressed and undressed.

 
 
[¶11]   After reviewing the evidence, the 
district court denied the motion to dismiss.  In its decision letter, the district 
court found that "the trier of fact could decide that the nonconsensual filming 
of minors in a state of undress falls within the coverage of W.S. § 
14-3-105(a)."  The district court 
also determined that the statute was not unconstitutionally applied to Mr. 
Rabuck.

 
 
[¶12]   Mr. Rabuck subsequently entered a 
conditional plea of guilty to both counts, reserving his right to appeal the 
district court's adverse determination of his pretrial motion to dismiss.2  The district court sentenced Mr. Rabuck 
to two concurrent sentences of two to five years in the penitentiary and imposed 
a fine of $1000 for each count.  
This appeal followed.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶13]   Mr. Rabuck claims that the indecent 
liberties statute is unconstitutional as applied to him.  The statute at issue is Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 14-3-105(a) which provides, in pertinent part: ". . . any person knowingly taking immodest, immoral or 
indecent liberties with any child . . . is guilty of a felony."  A child, as defined by the statute, is 
"a person under the age of eighteen (18) years."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105(c) (LexisNexis 
2003).  We review Mr. 
Rabuck's constitutional challenge de 
novo.  Giles v. State, 2004 WY 101, ¶ 10, 96 P.3d 1027, 1030 (Wyo. 2004).  In 
conducting such review, we accept as true the facts evident from the stipulated 
record, affording the State every favorable inference that may be drawn 
therefrom.3  

[¶14]   Under the constitutions of 
Wyoming and the United 
States, 
our legislature may not promulgate vague or uncertain statutes.  Moore v. State, 912 P.2d 1113, 1114 
(Wyo. 
1996).  Consistent with principles 
of due process, a penal statute must "define the criminal offense with 
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement."  Griego v. State, 761 P.2d 973, 975 
(Wyo. 1988) (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, [357], 103 S. Ct. 1855, 
1858, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903 (1983)).  A 
statute may be challenged for vagueness on its face or as applied to particular 
conduct.  Griego, 761 P.2d  at 
975.

 
 
[¶15]   It is well settled that the 
indecent liberties statute is not facially unconstitutional.  "On numerous occasions this Court has 
reviewed cases challenging the indecent liberties statute based on 
void-for-vagueness grounds, and each time the statute has withstood those 
challenges."  Moe v. State, 2005 WY 58, ¶ 10, 110 P.3d 1206, 1210 (Wyo. 2005).  See also Giles, ¶ 19; Ochoa v. State, 848 P.2d 1359, 1363 
(Wyo. 1993); Griego, 761 P.2d  at 976; 
Schmidt v. State, 2001 WY 73, ¶ 28, 
29 P.3d 76, 85 (Wyo. 2001); Misenheimer 
v. State, 2001 WY 65, ¶ 15, 27 P.3d 273, 281 (Wyo. 2001); Pierson v. State, 956 P.2d 1119, 1123-24 
(Wyo. 1998); Moore, 912 P.2d  at 1116; 
Lovato v. State, 901 P.2d 408, 412 
(Wyo. 1995); Britt v. State, 752 P.2d 426, 428 (Wyo. 1988); and Sorenson v. 
State, 604 P.2d 1031, 1034-35 (Wyo. 1979).  In light of the foregoing authority, Mr. 
Rabuck, understandably, asserts only an "as applied" constitutional 
challenge.

            

[¶16]   When "a statute is challenged on an 
as applied' basis, the court examines the statute solely in light of the 
complainant's specific conduct."  Giles, ¶ 15, f.n.2.  In determining whether a statute is 
unconstitutionally vague as applied to a defendant's conduct, "we must decide 
whether the statute provides sufficient notice to a person of ordinary 
intelligence that appellant's conduct was illegal and whether the facts of the 
case demonstrate arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement."  Lovato, 901 P.2d  at 412 (citing Griego, 761 P.2d at 976).  Mr. Rabuck does not allege 
discriminatory enforcement.  He 
does, however, contend that the statute fails to provide him sufficient notice 
that his conduct would violate the terms of the statute.  In evaluating the sufficiency of the 
notice, we must consider:  (1) the 
statutory language and any prior court decisions which have placed a 
limiting construction on the statute or have applied it to specific conduct; and 
(2) whether the statute has been previously applied to conduct identical to that 
of appellant.  Giles, ¶ 23 (citing Griego, 761 P.2d at 
976).

 
 
[¶17]   Mr. Rabuck does not contend that any of 
the specific terms in the statute are "vague in [their] ordinary usage."  Alcalde v. State, 2003 WY 99, ¶ 16, 74 P.3d 1253, 1261 (Wyo. 2003).  
Indeed, we have previously considered the language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-3-105(a), and its meaning 
has been made sufficiently clear.  
The terms immoral, immodest, and indecent have been defined 
as:

 
 
"Immoral - not moral: 
inconsistent with purity or good morals: contrary to conscience or moral law: 
  * * *  broadly * * * in conflict with 
generally or traditionally held moral principles. * * *"

"Immodest - lacking 
or deficient in modesty * * * b: deficient in sexual modesty: not conforming to 
the sexual mores of a particular time or place * * *."

 
 
 "Indecent - 1. not 
decent * * * b: not conforming to generally accepted standards of morality: 
tending toward or being in fact something generally viewed as morally indelicate 
or improper or offensive: being or tending to be obscene. * * 
*"

 
 

Sorenson, 604 P.2d  at 1034, f.n.3 
(quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1968)).  We consider these three words along with 
the words "liberties" and "child."  
Read together, this language narrows and designates "with reasonable 
certainty the acts and conduct required or forbidden."  Sorenson, 604 P.2d  at 1034.  The term "indecent liberties" is 
self-defining.  Id.  "Indecent liberties" are 
actions "such as the common sense of society would regard as indecent and 
improper and a person of ordinary intelligence can weigh contemplated conduct 
against that prohibition."  Pierson, 956 P.2d  at 
1123.

 
 
[¶18]   Mr. Rabuck claims that the statute, 
as applied to him, is too vague because it requires speculation about which 
aspect of his conduct was forbidden.  
He questions whether his conduct was forbidden:  (1) because he videotaped the juveniles; 
(2) because he recorded them in a state of undress; or (3) because he did not 
erase those images.  However, we 
need not engage in this dissection and postulate whether one portion of his 
conduct, alone, would violate the statute.  
We review Mr. Rabuck's challenge to the statute as applied to him, which 
means that we consider his specific conduct in its entirety.  Because he does not challenge the facial 
validity of the statute, Mr. Rabuck lacks "standing" to assert hypothetical 
applications of the statute to support his "as applied" challenge.  Alcalde, ¶ 13.

 
 
[¶19]   Mr. Rabuck concedes that, overall, 
his conduct could be considered indecent or improper, but he argues that prior 
judicial application and construction of the indecent liberties statute does not 
support its application here.  He 
relies heavily upon the absence of any Wyoming case law involving the indecent 
liberties statute applied to similar conduct to support his claim that there was 
insufficient notice that his conduct would violate Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-3-105(a).  Mr. Rabuck is correct 
that we have not previously 
addressed the indecent liberties statute in the context of surreptitious 
videotaping.  However, the lack of 
prior cases discussing similar conduct is not determinative.  As the State aptly 
observes, the indecent liberties statute should not be subject to challenge "by 
virtue of the fact that it is broad enough to capture even innovative forms of 
sexual imposition upon minors."  The 
indecent liberties statute has been a part of Wyoming law for nearly five decades and 
we have uniformly given it broad application.  Schmidt, ¶ 27. 

 
 
[¶20]   In several instances when we have considered "novel" 
conduct in light of the application of a criminal statute, we have examined the 
defendant's consciousness of guilt in assessing whether the defendant had notice 
of the criminal prohibition.  
Sorenson, 604 P.2d  at 1035 (defendant's "inquiry to the twelve-year-old girl: you won't tell 
anybody, will you?' reflect[ed] recognition" that his act of rubbing her breasts 
and trying to unbutton her shirt violated the indecent liberties statute); Campbell v. State, 999 P.2d 649, 658 
(Wyo. 2000) (Campbell's testimony establishes she knew that her conduct was 
prohibited); Saiz v. State, 2001 WY 
76, ¶ 14, 30 P.3d 21, 26 (Wyo. 2001) (appellant recognized his actions were 
unlawful).  Here, Mr. Rabuck disposed of the video 
receiver when he learned that the camera had been discovered.  He attempted to deceive Detective 
Hloucal by telling him that he had not recorded or seen any images and that the 
system had not worked, when, in fact, he had made several recordings.  Mr. Rabuck's efforts to conceal his 
conduct indicate his understanding that his conduct was 
unlawful.

            

[¶21]   Turning to our indecent liberties cases involving 
other conduct, Mr. Rabuck argues that these cases have limited the 
application of the statute.  He 
makes several assertions that his behavior does not fall within the ambit of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105(a), as circumscribed by prior judicial 
construction.  First, he claims that 
the indecent liberties statute only prohibits conduct which affects the "morals" 
of the minor victim and cites to our decision in Pierson where we stated, "[t]he purpose 
of the indecent liberties statute is to protect the morals of a child . . . 
."  Pierson, 956 P.2d  at 1124 (citing Derksen v. State, 845 P.2d 1383, 1387 
(Wyo. 
1993)).  He argues that he did not 
"endanger the morals of the juvenile females he discreetly videotaped in a state 
of undress" because they "were not aware of the recordings until after the video 
camera was found" and he "did not encourage the females to engage in any type of 
act or conduct which could be considered immoral, immodest, or indecent."  

 
 
[¶22]   The State characterizes our 
language in Pierson as a holdover 
from the past, when sex crimes were thought to morally contaminate the 
victim.  The State suggests that, as 
used in Pierson, the word "morals" 
has served merely as convenient shorthand for the complex interests protected by 
statutes prohibiting rape and other sex crimes and that use of that language 
should not imply that victims of indecent liberties are morally 
compromised.  We agree with the 
State that a more accurate statement of the policy behind the indecent liberties 
statute is "to protect children from exploitation."  Misenheimer, ¶ 12.   Requiring a victim to realize the 
impropriety of the conduct and to feel simultaneously victimized would fail to 
protect several classes of foreseeable victims, such as unconscious or 
incapacitated victims and children too young to understand the inappropriate 
nature of the conduct. 

 
 
[¶23]   Mr. Rabuck also asserts that Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105 only applies when there is sexual contact between the 
defendant and the minor.  He points 
to our decision in Giles, arguing 
that language in that decision equates the crime of indecent liberties with 
sexual assault.  The conduct at 
issue in Giles was sexual intercourse 
with a minor, and our decision simply reflected the certitude that such conduct 
constituted indecent liberties.  Giles did not limit application of the 
indecent liberties statute to offenses amounting to sexual assault.  

 
 
[¶24]   Additionally, other decisions of 
this Court demonstrate that physical touching is not a required element of the 
crime of indecent liberties.  Schmidt, ¶¶ 4-7; Griswold v. State, 994 P.2d 920, 925 
(Wyo. 1999); See also Derksen v. 
State, 845 P.2d 1383, 1388 (Wyo. 1993) (indicating that jury's decision to 
convict defendant of taking indecent liberties could have been based upon 
evidence that he displayed lewd photographs to minor, although instructing on 
indecent liberties was error because it was not lesser included offense).  In Schmidt, we affirmed a conviction where 
the perpetrator showed Penthouse 
photos to an eleven-year-old and masturbated in front of her.  Schmidt, ¶¶ 4-7.  In Griswold, the defendant exposed himself 
to two children and forced one child to perform fellatio while the other child 
watched. We sustained Griswold's conviction of taking indecent liberties with 
the child who was forced to watch.  
Id. at 925.  

 
 
[¶25]   Mr. Rabuck attempts to distinguish 
our decisions in Schmidt and Griswold by claiming that they involved 
a type of assault -- a sexual act in the presence of the minor.  He contends that because there was no 
contact with AL or JW and no sexual act in their presence, 
he could not have committed the crime of indecent liberties.  Although not expressly addressed by Mr. 
Rabuck, we discern that his argument that presence or contact is required 
implicates the "with a minor" language in the indecent liberties statute.  Generally, "with" is a "word denoting a 
relation of proximity, contiguity, or association." Black's Law Dictionary 1602 
(6th ed. 1990).  We agree that there is a relational 
component which must be demonstrated between the immodest, immoral or indecent conduct 
and the minor victim in order to constitute the crime of indecent 
liberties.  However, we find that 
this correlation was met in this case because Mr. Rabuck was constructively 
present with AL and JW while they were undressing. 

 
 
[¶26]   We find persuasive the reasoning of 
State v. McClees, 424 S.E.2d 687 
(N.C.App. 1993) which determined that constructive presence can place a 
defendant "with a minor" in establishing the crime of indecent liberties.  In McClees, the defendant, headmaster of a 
private school, asked a fifteen-year-old female student to try on basketball 
uniforms in order to help him decide which uniform to buy for use at the 
school.  He instructed the student 
to change clothes in his office while he waited outside.  Without the student's knowledge, he had 
secretly placed a video camera on the shelf in his office and recorded her while 
she undressed.  Defendant argued 
that the State failed to show that he took an indecent liberty "with" a 
child because he was not in her actual presence.  The Court rejected that argument 
stating:

Certainly defendant's 
behavior was such as the common sense of society would regard as indecent and 
improper. Although the defendant was not actually located in the room with his 
victim, he strategically placed a camera such that she was unaware of its 
presence, thereby secretly filming the child as she changed clothes several 
times at his direction. As a result, he essentially had the same capability of 
viewing her in a state of undress as he would have had, were he physically 
present in the room. Through the forces of modern electronic technology, namely 
the video camcorder, one can constructively place himself in the "presence" of 
another. Thus we find that defendant was "constructively present" and thereby 
took immoral, improper or indecent liberties "with" the minor 
victim.

 
 

McClees, 424 S.E.2d  at 690.  

            
 

[¶27]   After briefs were submitted in this 
case, the Wyoming legislature passed a statute 
prohibiting voyeurism.4 At oral argument, Mr. Rabuck 
asserted that the recent enactment of the voyeurism statute supports his 
contention that the indecent liberties statute was not designed to cover his 
specific conduct.  He claims the 
legislature did not intend for the indecent liberties statute to be applied to 
videotaping because the concept of video voyeurism was not contemplated when it 
was adopted.  Any other 
interpretation of the indecent liberties statute, he claims, would render the 
new voyeurism statute void of any meaningful effect.  

 
 
[¶28]   We reject Mr. Rabuck's contention 
for several reasons.  First, certain 
conduct may violate more than one statute, and the existence of two applicable 
criminal statutes with different penalties is permissible.  "It is well established that when an act 
violates more than one criminal statute, the State may prosecute under either so 
long as it does not discriminate against any class of defendants."  Lovato, 901 P.2d  at 412 (citing Bueno-Hernandez v. State, 724 P.2d 1132, 
1140 (Wyo. 
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 907, 
107 S. Ct. 1353, 94 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987)).  
See also Nowack v. State, 774 P.2d 561, 565 
(Wyo. 1989) 
("[t]he fact that two statutes may provide different penalties for the same 
proscribed conduct does not constrain prosecution under either statute.").  Second, Mr. Rabuck overlooks an 
important aspect of the voyeurism statute.  
The statute also protects adults who may be victims of 
voyeurism.  

 
 
[¶29]   While video voyeurism may not have 
been contemplated when the indecent liberties statute was enacted, the statute 
was obviously drawn broadly to encompass a variety of behaviors from which 
children should be protected.  We 
have recognized that statutes designed to protect children tend to be general in 
their terms.  Campbell, 999 P.2d  at 657.  Accord State v. Kistle, 297 S.E.2d 626, 628 (N.C.App. 1982) (broad protections of indecent liberties statute " . . . 
protect children from precisely the type of activity engaged in by . . . 
defendant" where defendant took nude photos of a female child, including photo 
where child was in sexually suggestive position).  We do not find that the recent enactment 
of a voyeurism statute was intended to limit the protections afforded to minors 
by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105(a).

 
 
[¶30]   As a final point, Mr. Rabuck argues 
that he had a legitimate purpose for setting up the video surveillance system in 
his home -- to monitor and maintain security. His suggested justification does 
not impact our analysis.  Mr. 
Rabuck's constitutional challenge was raised and determined in a motion to 
dismiss based upon a stipulated factual record.  At such stage of the proceedings, the 
factual record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the State.  Based upon the stipulated record and the 
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, we are comfortable in concluding 
that sufficient evidence exists to support the district court's decision to deny 
the motion to dismiss.  

 
 
[¶31]   In evaluating the culpability of 
Mr. Rabuck's conduct, the "totality of the circumstances" must be 
considered.  Pierson, 956 P.2d  at 1125.  The record reflects 
that Mr. Rabuck engaged in clandestine efforts to video tape the girls in their 
bedroom in an attempt to obtain nude or partially nude images of them.  He obtained and preserved those 
images.  He continued to operate his 
surveillance system until it was discovered.  We have no trouble concluding that the common sense 
of society could regard such acts as violative of the statute and that a person 
of ordinary intelligence had sufficient notice that such conduct would be 
against the law.  Mr. Rabuck's 
attempts to mislead the investigating officer and dispose of the camera and 
video tapes provide evidentiary support indicating that he knew his conduct was 
unlawful.

 
 
[¶32]   We conclude that the indecent 
liberties statute was not unconstitutionally applied to Mr. Rabuck and find no 
error in the district court's denial of the motion to 
dismiss.

 
 
[¶33]   Affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105(a) 
provides:

 
 
(a) Except 
under circumstance constituting sexual assault in the first, second or third 
degree as defined by W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-304, any person knowingly taking 
immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any child or knowingly causing or 
encouraging any child to cause or encourage another child to commit with him any 
immoral or indecent act is guilty of a felony.  Except as provided by subsection (b) of 
this section, a person convicted under this section shall be fined not less than 
one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or 
imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than ten (10) years, or 
both.

 
 

2The plea was 
conditional pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2), which 
provides:

 
 
With the 
approval of the court and the consent of the attorney for the state, a defendant 
may enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving in writing 
the right, on appeal from the judgment, to seek review of the adverse 
determination of any specified pretrial motion. A defendant who prevails on 
appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.

 
 

3Mr. Rabuck's pretrial 
motion to dismiss essentially requested a finding that the State's allegations 
and the stipulated factual record were insufficient to establish a violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105(a).  When 
a defendant requests relief of this nature, we afford favorable inferences to 
the State's case against the defendant.  
E.g., Smith v. State, 959 P.2d 1193, 1197 
(Wyo. 1998) (motion to dismiss at close of prosecution's case equated to motion 
for judgment of acquittal); Gunderson v. 
State, 925 P.2d 1300, 1303 (Wyo. 1996) (in review of denial of motion for 
judgment of acquittal, "[w]e accept as true the evidence of the prosecution, 
together with all logical and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, 
leaving out entirely the evidence of the defendant in conflict.").

 
 

4The 
legislature adopted Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-4-304, effective July 1, 2005.  That statute 
provides:

 
 

(a)  A person 
is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than six (6) 
months, a fine of not more than seven hundred fifty dollars ($750.00), or both, 
if he, without the consent of the person being viewed, commits the crime of 
voyeurism by looking in a clandestine, surreptitious, prying or secretive nature 
into an enclosed area where the person being viewed has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy, including, but not limited to: 

(i)  Restrooms;

(ii)  Baths;

(iii)  Showers; 
or

(iv)  Dressing 
or fitting rooms. 

(b)  A person 
is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than two (2) 
years, a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), or both, if 
he:

(i)  Commits 
the offense specified in subsection (a) of this section by knowingly or 
intentionally capturing an image by means of a camera, a video camera or any 
other image recording device; or 

(ii)  Uses a 
camera, video camera or any other image recording device for the purpose of 
observing, viewing, photographing, filming or videotaping another person under 
the clothing being worn by the other person where that other person has not 
consented to the observing, viewing, photographing, filming or 
videotaping.

 
 

VOIGT, Justice, specially 
concurring.

 
 

[¶34]   
I concur in the result of the majority opinion out of deference to the 
doctrine of stare decisis.  See Moe v. State, 2005 WY 149, 123 P.3d 148 (Wyo. 2005); Moe v. State, 
2005 WY 58, 110 P.3d 1206 (Wyo. 2005); and Giles v. State, 2004 WY 101, 96 P.3d 1027 (Wyo. 2004).