Case Title: State v. Carr

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2022-01-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
 
No. 90,044 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
REGINALD DEXTER CARR JR., 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law.  
 
2.  
Section 1 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights states, "All men are possessed 
of equal and inalienable natural rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness." The rights guaranteed under section 1 are judicially enforceable against 
governmental action that does not meet constitutional standards. 
 
3. 
The court applies a two-part framework to determine whether an asserted right or 
declared interest under section 1 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights is judicially 
enforceable. First, the court determines whether the asserted right or declared interest is 
included within the guarantees or protections of section 1. Under this step, the court 
begins by carefully describing the asserted right. Then, it determines whether that 
asserted right or declared interest is protected under section 1 by looking to the language 
of the Kansas Constitution. When the words themselves do not make the drafters' intent 
 
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clear, courts look to the historical record, remembering the polestar is the intention of 
the makers and adopters. If the asserted right or declared interest is established under 
section 1, the court proceeds to the second part of the framework—exploring whether the 
governmental action impairs the right and, if so, whether such governmental action 
satisfies constitutional scrutiny.  
 
4. 
 
The historical record reflects the framers did not intend the term "inalienable" in 
section 1 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights to be construed as "absolute" and 
"nonforfeitable." Instead, a careful reading of section 1, coupled with the transcripts of 
the convention debate, demonstrates that the term "inalienable" refers only to one's ability 
to transfer his or her right or interest to another person. Though inalienable, the framers 
viewed the natural rights guaranteed within this section to be forfeitable in civil society. 
So construed, the framers did not intend for section 1 to impede or limit the State's 
authority to punish individuals for their criminal conduct.  
 
5. 
Section 1 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights acknowledges a person's 
inalienable right to life, but that right is not absolute or nonforfeitable. Once a defendant 
has been convicted of capital murder beyond reasonable doubt, the defendant forfeits his 
or her natural rights under section 1 ("among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness") and the state may impose punishment for that crime pursuant to the 
provisions of Kansas' capital sentencing scheme.  
 
6. 
 
Once a defendant has been lawfully convicted of capital murder, the imposition of 
a capital sentence does not implicate section 1. However, other constitutional guarantees, 
including those contained in sections 9 and 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, 
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continue to regulate the state's authority to punish and guard against arbitrary applications 
of such authority. 
7. 
Section 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, which provides that "[t]he 
right of trial by jury shall be inviolate," preserves the jury trial right as it historically 
existed at common law when our state's Constitution came into existence. 
8. 
In ascertaining the meaning of a constitutional provision, the primary duty of the 
courts is to look to the intention of the makers and adopters of that provision. A 
constitutional provision is not to be narrowly or technically construed, but its language 
should be interpreted to mean what the words imply to persons of common 
understanding. 
9. 
As used in section 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, the term "jury" 
denotes a legally selected group of persons sworn to determine issues of fact and return a 
decision based on the evidence and in accordance with the law as instructed. 
10. 
The process of death qualification under K.S.A. 22-3410 removes only those 
prospective jurors who are excluded from the constitutional definition of a "jury," and 
therefore neither the statute nor the process of death qualifying the jury implicate any 
right protected under section 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. 
 
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11. 
 
Section 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights does not require that juror 
qualification or selection standards enacted by the Legislature be affirmatively authorized 
by the common law. Rather, that provision merely preserves the right to jury trial as it 
existed at common law when the Kansas Constitution was adopted.  
 
12. 
 
When reviewing the legal propriety of penalty phase instructions addressing 
mitigating circumstances, the court must consider whether the instructions, considered 
together as a whole, fairly and accurately state the applicable law, and whether a jury 
could have been misled into not considering certain mitigating circumstances that, by 
law, should have been considered. 
 
13. 
 
K.S.A. 21-4624(e), now codified as K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6617(e), does not 
require a jury to be instructed on the burden of proof for mitigating circumstances in the 
penalty phase of capital sentencing proceedings, overturning the holding in State v. 
Cheever, 306 Kan. 760, Syl. ¶ 5, 402 P.3d 1126 (2017). 
 
14. 
 
Under the law of the case doctrine, when a second appeal is brought to this court 
in the same case, the first decision is the settled law of the case on all questions involved 
in the first appeal, and reconsideration will not normally be given to such questions. 
 
 
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15. 
State law error during the penalty phase of a capital murder trial may be deemed 
harmless where the party benefitting from the error shows there is no reasonable 
probability the error affected the jury's ultimate conclusion regarding the death sentence 
verdict. 
 
16. 
 
The avoidance-of-arrest statutory aggravating circumstance, K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 
21-6624(e), effectively channels the discretion of the sentencer and is not facially 
overbroad. 
 
17. 
 
In Kansas capital sentencing proceedings, the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution applies only to testimonial hearsay relevant 
to the jury's eligibility decision, i.e., evidence relevant to the existence of one or more 
statutory aggravating circumstances. A defendant's confrontation rights do not extend to, 
and are not implicated by, testimonial hearsay offered to impeach or rebut defendant's 
mitigation witnesses. 
 
18. 
 
An expert's reliance on testimonial hearsay does not constitute a violation of the 
Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution per se. 
Instead, the controlling question is whether the expert is testifying as a witness in his or 
her own right or testifying as a mere "conduit" for the testimonial hearsay. The 
Confrontation Clause forecloses the expert's opinion testimony only in the latter situation. 
The problem of expert-as-conduit is not the amplification of multiple experts' opinions 
but the fact that the so-called expert is not actually giving expert testimony.  
 
 
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19. 
 
Under the facts of the case, the State's expert witness was not a mere conduit for 
the opinions of others and thus his testimony did not violate the Confrontation Clause in 
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; although the expert witness 
vaguely asserted that other experts agreed with him, he offered an independent opinion 
and interpretation of PET (positron emission tomography) scans based on his own 
synthesis of the evidence. 
 
20. 
 
During the penalty phase of a capital murder trial, any error that arises solely 
under state law may be deemed harmless if the court is persuaded there is no reasonable 
probability the error affected the jury's ultimate conclusion regarding the weight of the 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, i.e., the death sentence verdict.  
 
21.  
The court applies a four-step analysis to review jury instruction challenges. It first 
considers the reviewability of the issue, which is then followed by reviewing whether the 
instruction was legally and factually appropriate. If the court concludes there is error, it 
then turns to reversibility. Where a death penalty defendant fails to request or object to an 
instruction, the court applies the clearly erroneous standard of review and determines 
whether it is firmly convinced that the jury would have reached a different verdict had the 
instruction error not occurred.  
 
22. 
 
Under the facts of the case, the jury instructions and verdict forms, viewed 
together as a whole, made clear that "the crime" referenced in the aggravating 
circumstances instruction was capital murder.  
 
 
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23. 
 
Under the facts of the case, the jury instruction describing the verdict forms, which 
improperly used a double negative in the grammatical structure of the sentence describing 
the statutory weighing equation under Kansas' capital sentencing scheme, was not clearly 
erroneous because the error was not readily noticeable and the jury's use of Verdict Form 
1 on all counts indicated that jurors employed the proper statutory weighing equation and 
determined beyond reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances existed and 
outweighed mitigating circumstances, thereby warranting a sentence of death.  
 
24. 
 
The district court's failure to instruct the jury that it must find the defendant was at 
least 18 years old at the time of the offense, as a condition precedent to imposing the 
death penalty, constitutes error. But such error is subject to a harmless error analysis.  
 
25. 
 
Under the facts of the case, the district court's failure to instruct the jury that it 
must find defendant was at least 18 years old at the time of the offense in order to impose 
capital punishment was harmless because the issue was not contested and the undisputed 
evidence established that the defendant was 23 years old when the crime occurred.  
 
26. 
 
The district court's refusal to instruct the jury that "[y]ou must not draw any 
inference of guilt from the fact that the defendant did not testify, and you must not 
consider this fact in arriving at your verdict," as requested by the defendant, was not 
erroneous; although the requested instruction was appropriate for the guilt phase, it was 
not legally appropriate in the penalty phase after guilt had been adjudicated.  
 
 
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27. 
 
The court applies a two-step framework in analyzing claims of prosecutorial error. 
Under the first step, the court considers whether prosecutorial error occurred by 
determining whether the prosecutorial acts complained of fall outside the wide latitude 
afforded prosecutors to argue the State's case and attempt to obtain a verdict in a manner 
that does not offend the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. If error is found, the 
court advances to the second step and determines whether the error prejudiced the 
defendant's due process right to a fair trial. 
 
28. 
 
When analyzing prosecutorial error claims that implicate both constitutional and 
nonconstitutional claims of error, the court need only address the more demanding 
federal constitutional error standard. Under the federal constitutional error standard, 
prosecutorial error is harmless if the State demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt the 
error complained of did not affect the trial's outcome in light of the entire record, i.e., 
when there is no reasonable possibility the error contributed to the verdict.  
 
29. 
 
In analyzing claims of prosecutorial error in the penalty phase of capital 
proceedings, the overwhelming nature of evidence is to be considered, but its impact is 
limited. To the extent there was constitutional error, the question is not what effect the 
error might generally be expected to have upon a reasonable jury but what effect it had 
upon the actual verdict in the case at hand. The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, 
in a trial that occurred without the error, a verdict for death would surely have been 
rendered, but whether the death verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely 
unattributable to the error. If more than one prosecutorial error occurred in the 
proceedings, the court considers the net prejudicial effect of those errors using the same 
federal constitutional error standard applied to the individual errors. 
 
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30. 
 
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a capital 
defendant a right to an individualized sentencing determination, meaning the sentencer 
may not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's 
character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers 
as a basis for a sentence less than death. It does not matter whether the barrier to the 
sentencer's consideration of all mitigating evidence is interposed by statute, by a trial 
court's evidentiary ruling, by jury instructions, or by prosecutorial argument. 
 
31. 
 
A capital sentencing jury must consider all relevant mitigating evidence, and such 
evidence need not excuse or justify the crime or in fact relate to the defendant's 
culpability as long as it serves as a basis for a sentence less than death. But the State has a 
competing interest in challenging whether a circumstance is mitigating at all and to 
contest the weight the jury should give to a mitigating circumstance.  
 
32. 
 
It is improper for a prosecutor to argue that certain circumstances should not be 
considered as mitigating circumstances because they do not excuse or justify the crime. 
Mitigating circumstances are those which in fairness may be considered as extenuating or 
reducing the degree of moral culpability or blame or which justify a sentence of less than 
death, even though they do not justify or excuse the offense. A prosecutor who argues 
that mitigating circumstances must excuse or justify the crime improperly states the law.  
 
33. 
 
A prosecutor's argument concerning mitigation evidence violates requirements 
under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution when the State cuts off in 
 
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an absolute manner the sentencer's consideration of such evidence. But comments that the 
defendant's mitigating evidence is entitled to little or no weight based on the 
circumstances of the case are constitutionally permissible. 
 
34. 
 
A prosecutor may properly argue a defendant is undeserving of mercy, so long as 
there is no contention the jury's exercise of mercy is prohibited.  
 
35. 
 
Under the facts of the case, the prosecutors' argument did not misstate the law 
concerning mitigating circumstances where the prosecutor never argued or implied the 
jury could not consider the mitigation evidence unless it excused or justified the murders; 
while the prosecutor questioned whether that mitigation justified the defendant's conduct, 
this was consistently argued in the context of whether the circumstance reduced the 
defendants' moral culpability or blame in a way that supported a sentence less than death; 
and the defendants first suggested a relationship between the crimes and the mitigation 
evidence by arguing a variety of medical, genetic, familial, environmental, societal, and 
situational circumstances caused the defendants to commit the crime.  
 
36. 
 
Generally, a prosecutor is precluded from offering personal opinions about witness 
credibility, and the court has applied the same rule in capital sentencing proceedings.  
 
37. 
 
Under the facts of the case, the prosecutor's statement "when the truth comes out" 
was an impermissible expression of opinion intended to bolster the credibility of the 
State's expert witness, but the death penalty verdict was surely unattributable to this 
 
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isolated comment, which was a clumsy effort to turn a phrase more than a definitive 
statement about the "truth." 
 
38. 
 
In the penalty phase of a capital murder trial, a prosecutor may argue that a 
defendant deserves no mercy because he or she showed none to the victims, as long as 
the prosecutor does not argue the jury is precluded from considering mercy in its 
sentencing decision.  
 
39. 
 
Generally, a prosecutor has wide latitude in crafting arguments. Nevertheless, the 
arguments must accurately reflect the evidence, accurately state the law, and cannot be 
intended to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury or to divert the jury from its 
duty to decide the case based on the evidence and the controlling law. 
 
40. 
 
A "golden rule" argument is the suggestion by counsel that jurors should place 
themselves in the position of a party, a victim, or the victim's family members. Such 
arguments are generally improper and may constitute reversible error. The reason 
"golden rule" arguments are not permitted is because they encourage the jury to depart 
from neutrality and to decide the case on the improper basis of personal interest and bias. 
 
41. 
 
Under the facts of the case, the prosecutor did not make an improper "golden rule" 
argument by referencing the murder victims' inability to form relationships where the 
argument did not place the jury in the victims' shoes, but instead responded directly to the 
defendant's argument about his ability to form relationships or attachments if sentenced 
to life imprisonment and implied that the jury should give little weight to this evidence.  
 
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42. 
 
The wide latitude permitted a prosecutor in discussing the evidence during closing 
argument in a criminal case includes at least limited room for rhetoric and persuasion, 
even for eloquence and modest spectacle. It is not opening statement; it is not confined to 
a dry recitation of the evidence presented. 
 
43. 
 
Generally, a prosecutor's argument that implies the jury may violate its sworn oath 
has more force and carries greater potential for unfair prejudice than an argument that the 
facts and applicable law compel a death sentence. 
 
44. 
 
Cumulative error analysis aggregates all errors and assesses whether their 
cumulative effect is such that they cannot be determined to be harmless, even though 
individually those errors are harmless. In assessing cumulative error in the penalty phase 
of a capital trial, the errors aggregated include any errors in the guilt-phase proceedings 
the court determines must be considered in conjunction with the penalty-phase errors. In 
addition, the errors aggregated include those penalty-phase errors assumed by the court. 
And they include penalty-phase jury instruction errors not raised in the district court that 
are not clearly erroneous standing alone. 
 
45. 
 
When reviewing cumulative error in a capital penalty-phase proceeding, the 
court's focus is on the errors' cumulative effect on the jury's ultimate conclusion 
regarding the weight of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. In other words, we 
are looking for the errors' effect in their aggregate, recognizing errors can differ in their 
individual or cumulative effect. This task is undoubtedly more subtle than simply 
 
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counting up the number of errors discovered. Ultimately, the court must determine 
whether the errors' cumulative effect, viewed in the light of the record as a whole, had 
little, if any, likelihood of changing the jury's conclusion. When any errors being 
aggregated in a cumulative error analysis are constitutional in nature, the cumulative 
error must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; PAUL W. CLARK, judge. Opinion on remand filed January 
21, 2022. Affirmed. 
 
Debra J. Wilson, of Capital Appeals and Conflicts Office, argued the cause, and Reid T. Nelson, 
of the same office, was with her on the briefs for appellant. 
 
David Lowden, special appointed prosecutor, argued the cause, and Marc Bennett, district 
attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were with him on the briefs for appellee. 
 
Sharon Brett, of ACLU Foundation of Kansas, of Overland Park, and Cassandra Stubbs, pro hac 
vice, and Brian W. Stull, pro hac vice, of American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, of Durham, North 
Carolina, were on the brief for amici curiae Concerned Conservatives About the Death Penalty, Kansas 
Coalition Against the Death Penalty, Dalton Glasscock, Steve Becker, Al Terwelp, Bob Weeks, Carolyn 
Zimmerman, Celeste Dixon, Bill Lucero, Msgr. Stuart Swetland, Catholic Mobilizing Network, 
Dominican Sisters and Associates of Peace of the Roman Catholic Church, Mount St. Scholastica, Sisters 
of Charity of Leavenworth Office of Justice, Peace, and Integrity of Creation, Sister Christina Meyer, 
Bishop Ruben Saenz Jr., Robert Sanders, Michael Birzer, and the American Civil Liberties Union and 
ACLU of Kansas. 
 
Alice Craig, of Lawrence, was on the brief for amicus curiae Midwest Innocence Project, joined 
by Witness to Innocence and Floyd Bledsoe. 
 
Elizabeth Cateforis, Clinical Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law, of 
Lawrence, and Alexis J. Hoag, pro hac vice, Lecturer and Associate Research Scholar, Columbia Law 
School, of New York, New York, were on the brief for amici curiae group of law professors and scholars. 
 
 
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The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
WALL, J.:  In State v. Carr, 300 Kan. 1, 331 P.3d 544 (2014) (R. Carr), rev'd and 
remanded sub nom. Kansas v. Carr, 577 U.S. 108, 136 S. Ct. 633, 193 L. Ed. 2d 535 
(2016) (Carr), our court affirmed one of Reginald Dexter Carr Jr.'s capital murder 
convictions but vacated the death sentence after concluding the failure to sever the 
penalty phase violated R. Carr's right to an individualized sentencing determination under 
the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. However, in Carr, the United 
States Supreme Court held the failure to sever the defendants' penalty phase neither 
implicated the Eighth Amendment nor offended protections afforded to R. Carr under the 
Due Process Clause.  
 
On remand, we now turn our attention to the penalty phase issues that remain 
unresolved following the decision of the United States Supreme Court. In analyzing these 
issues, we remain mindful that "given the myriad safeguards provided to assure a fair 
trial, and taking into account the reality of the human fallibility of the participants, there 
can be no such thing as an error-free, perfect trial, and that the Constitution does not 
guarantee such a trial." United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-09, 103 S. Ct. 1974, 
76 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1983); see Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 
89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986). While some of R. Carr's remaining issues demonstrate that his 
trial was less than perfect, none suggest he received anything other than a fair trial. 
Accordingly, we affirm Reginald Carr Jr.'s death sentence and hold this sentence was not 
"imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor." K.S.A. 
2020 Supp. 21-6619(c)(1). 
 
 
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
As noted, in its previous decision, our court affirmed one of R. Carr's capital 
murder convictions but vacated his death sentence, concluding his Eighth Amendment 
right to an individualized sentencing determination was violated when the district court 
refused to sever the penalty phase from that of his codefendant brother, Jonathan Carr. 
See R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 315. In a companion decision, this court also vacated J. Carr's 
death sentence for failure to sever the penalty phase. State v. Carr, 300 Kan. 340, 371, 
329 P.3d 1195 (2014) (J. Carr), rev'd and remanded Carr, 577 U.S. 108. 
 
The court's disposition at that time made it unnecessary to complete a full review 
of the alleged penalty phase errors, although it considered some for guidance on remand. 
Among those considered, the court noted the same Eighth Amendment individualized 
sentencing concerns were implicated when the district court failed to instruct the jury 
that mitigating circumstances need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. That 
question proved dispositive in this court's decision to vacate the death sentence imposed 
in another death penalty case. See State v. Gleason, 299 Kan. 1127, 329 P.3d 1102 (2014) 
(Gleason I), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Carr, 577 U.S. 108. 
 
The United States Supreme Court granted the State's petition for writ of certiorari 
on the two Eighth Amendment issues in R. Carr, J. Carr, and Gleason I. It disagreed 
with our court's Eighth Amendment analysis on both issues. The Court held the joint 
sentencing proceedings neither implicated the Carrs' Eighth Amendment rights nor 
violated their rights under the Due Process Clause. It also concluded that the Eighth 
Amendment does not require Kansas penalty-phase juries to be instructed that mitigating 
factors need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Carr, 577 U.S. at 122, 126. 
 
 
16 
 
Shortly after that decision, but before the United States Supreme Court issued its 
mandate, R. Carr filed a motion with our court arguing that the alleged instructional error 
(the district court's failure to instruct jurors that the existence of mitigating factors need 
not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt) required his death sentence to be vacated under 
state law. After the high Court issued its mandate, R. Carr filed another motion arguing 
that cumulative error required this court to vacate his death sentence. In his separate 
appeal, J. Carr also requested this court rule on the instructional issue as a matter of state 
law. On the same day, he asked for additional briefing on penalty phase issues left 
undecided in our prior decision. The State filed responses. 
 
Our court ordered supplemental briefing addressing the remaining penalty phase 
issues, including cumulative error. Two extensions to the briefing schedule occurred at 
the State's request and were granted pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 5.02 (2021 Kan. S. 
Ct. R. 32). The parties' supplemental briefs were filed simultaneously on November 7, 
2016. The court heard oral argument in both cases on May 4, 2017. 
 
In April 2019, this court filed its opinion in Hodes & Nauser, MDs v. Schmidt, 309 
Kan. 610, 638, 440 P.3d 461 (2019), holding that "section 1 [of the Kansas Constitution 
Bill of Rights] establishes the judicial enforceability of rights that are broader than and 
distinct from the rights described in the Fourteenth Amendment." In response to that legal 
development, the defendants in all the then-pending capital appeals sought leave to raise 
and brief a new issue challenging the constitutionality of the death penalty under section 
1 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. R. Carr and J. Carr each made this request in 
motions filed on May 7, 2019.  
 
On June 19, 2019, after having received responses from the State, we granted the 
defendants, including R. Carr and J. Carr, leave to file supplemental briefing to address 
"what effect, if any, the decision in Hodes & Nauser v. Schmidt . . . has on the issue of 
 
17 
 
whether the Kansas death penalty is unconstitutional under § 1 of the Kansas Constitution 
Bill of Rights."  
 
R. Carr and J. Carr each filed supplemental briefs on August 16, 2019. In each 
case, the State filed its brief in response on October 15, 2019. J. Carr filed a reply brief on 
November 7, 2019, and R. Carr followed suit the next day.  
 
On February 18, 2021, we scheduled both R. Carr's and J. Carr's cases for oral 
argument on the May 24, 2021 docket. Various amici curiae sought and were granted 
permission to file briefs.  
 
In addition, the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF) sought 
leave to participate in J. Carr's oral argument as a separately represented amicus curiae. In 
its amicus brief, the LDF argued Kansas' death-sentencing scheme violates the right to 
trial by jury under section 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. We denied the 
LDF's motion to participate in oral argument but ordered the parties in J. Carr's case to be 
prepared to address the issue at oral argument. On July 29, 2021, after oral argument had 
concluded, R. Carr filed a motion requesting the court consider the same section 5 
challenge in his appeal.  
 
As with our previous decisions, this case necessarily covers many issues we must 
also decide in J. Carr's case. We provide the reasoning for our decisions here. To the 
extent possible, we retain the numbering applied to the issues in our previous decision, 
although some are taken up in different order. See R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 255-58. 
 
The facts were set forth fully in this court's original decision. 300 Kan. at 17-44, 
258-75. In the "Discussion" section to follow, we highlight those facts as necessary to 
resolve the issues we consider today. 
 
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DISCUSSION 
 
For purposes of clarity and organization, we first address the constitutional 
challenges R. Carr and J. Carr asserted under section 1 and section 5 of the Kansas 
Constitution Bill of Rights. Then, we address R. Carr's motion to apply state law to the 
burden-of-proof instruction for mitigating circumstances. Finally, we examine the 
remaining claims of penalty phase error, including cumulative error.  
 
I. 
Kansas' Capital Sentencing Scheme Does Not Violate Section 1 of the Kansas 
Constitution Bill of Rights 
 
While R. Carr's and J. Carr's appeals were pending, this court released its decision 
in Hodes. In Hodes, the court held that section 1 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights 
protects a broader range of rights than the United States Constitution. 309 Kan. 610, 
Syl. ¶ 6. Based on that decision, R. Carr and J. Carr claim that Kansas' statutory scheme 
authorizing capital punishment is unconstitutional under section 1. More specifically, 
R. Carr and J. Carr contend section 1 protects the right to life, and Kansas' capital 
sentencing scheme unconstitutionally infringes upon this right.  
 
 
A. Legal Framework and Standard of Review 
 
"'Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law.'" Hilburn v. Enerpipe 
Ltd., 309 Kan. 1127, 1132, 442 P.3d 509 (2019). Historically, this court presumed 
statutes to be constitutional and required alleged constitutional violations to be clearly 
established in order to overcome this presumption. 309 Kan. at 1132 (quoting Board of 
Johnson County Comm'rs v. Jordan, 303 Kan. 844, 858, 370 P.3d 1170 [2016]). But in 
Hodes, a majority of the court rejected this presumption of constitutionality when the 
interests protected by the Kansas Constitution are deemed "fundamental interests." 309 
 
19 
 
Kan. at 673-74 ("Section 1 protects an inalienable natural right of personal autonomy, 
which [is] fundamental. Presuming that any state action alleged to infringe that right is 
constitutional dilutes the protections established by our Constitution."). Other members 
of our court have repudiated the presumption altogether. See In re A.B., 313 Kan. 135, 
147-48, 484 P.3d 226 (2021) (Stegall, J., concurring; Wall, J., joining concurring 
opinion). Regardless, based on established precedent, we apply no such presumption to 
this section 1 challenge.  
 
Section 1 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights states, "All men are possessed 
of equal and inalienable natural rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness." The rights guaranteed under section 1 are "judicially enforceable against 
governmental action that does not meet constitutional standards." Hodes, 309 Kan. 610, 
Syl. ¶ 7. 
 
We apply a two-part framework to determine whether an asserted right or declared 
interest is judicially enforceable under section 1—exploring whether the right itself is 
protected by the constitutional provision and, if so, determining whether governmental 
action unconstitutionally infringes upon that right. 309 Kan. at 620. Under the first part of 
this analysis, we determine whether the asserted right or declared interest falls within the 
purview of rights protected by section 1. 309 Kan. at 620. "'[T]he doctrine of judicial 
self-restraint'" requires us to begin with "'a careful description of the asserted right.'" 
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302, 113 S. Ct. 1439, 123 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1993) (in 
substantive due process analysis the court carefully defines the nature of the interest to 
determine whether it is properly characterized as fundamental). Doing so ensures a 
proper nexus exists between the asserted right or declared interest and its constitutional 
foundation within section 1. Once properly defined, we examine whether that asserted 
right or declared interest is protected under section 1 by looking to the language of the 
Kansas Constitution. State v. Albano, 313 Kan. 638, 644-45, 487 P.3d 750 (2021). 
 
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When the words themselves do not make the drafters' intent clear, we look to the 
historical record, remembering "'"the polestar . . . is the intention of the makers and 
adopters."'" 313 Kan. at 645 (quoting Hunt v. Eddy, 150 Kan. 1, 5, 90 P.2d 747 [1939]).  
 
Second, if the asserted right or declared interest is protected under section 1, we 
determine whether the challenged governmental action unconstitutionally infringes upon 
it. See Hodes, 309 Kan. at 660. This requires the court to first determine whether the 
governmental action impairs the right. See 309 Kan. at 672. If so, the court scrutinizes the 
governmental action to determine whether it passes constitutional muster. See 309 Kan. 
at 662-63.  
 
 
Ultimately, we conclude that R. Carr's and J. Carr's section 1 challenge fails at the 
first step of this two-part framework. Their asserted right to, or declared interest in, an 
absolute, nonforfeitable right to life is not included in or part of the guarantees or 
protections of section 1. Instead, the natural right to life is forfeitable, and the state's 
imposition of the death penalty under Kansas' capital sentencing scheme does not 
infringe upon the "inalienable" right to life protected under section 1. To reach this 
conclusion, we first construe the meaning of an "inalienable" right to life under section 1. 
Then, we demonstrate how this construction forecloses defendants' section 1 challenge.  
 
B. The Framers Intended the Inalienable Right to Life to Be Forfeitable, Not 
Absolute 
 
R. Carr argues section 1 guarantees a right to life that necessarily precludes the 
state from imposing capital punishment. We have no hesitation recognizing a right to life 
under section 1. Unlike the implicit right to personal autonomy recognized in Hodes, 
which found its source in the explicit rights of liberty and the pursuit of happiness, a 
natural right to life is explicitly enumerated as one of the natural rights protected by 
section 1.  
 
21 
 
 
But R. Carr defines this right broadly to preclude capital punishment, even where 
a jury has convicted a defendant of capital murder and determined beyond reasonable 
doubt that one or more statutory aggravating circumstances exist and outweigh mitigating 
circumstances, as prescribed under Kansas' capital sentencing scheme. R. Carr's argument 
is premised on the assumption that the right to life guaranteed within section 1 is 
absolute, meaning the law cannot limit or infringe upon this right in any circumstance. 
See Merriam-Webster.com Legal Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/legal/absolute%20right (defining "absolute right" as "a legally enforceable 
right to take some action or to refrain from acting at the sole discretion of the person 
having the right").  
 
Whether the framers intended the right to life to be absolute cannot be ascertained 
solely from the text of section 1 because the plain language does not define the scope and 
contours of the natural rights guaranteed therein. As such, we must also turn to the 
historical record to glean insight into the scope of this right as intended by the framers. 
See Hunt, 150 Kan. at 5. We do so by first exploring the comments and remarks of the 
framers during the Wyandotte Constitutional Convention debates. Additionally, we 
analyze the theory of natural rights as developed through the writings of John Locke and 
William Blackstone, given their historic significance in the development of American 
constitutional frameworks and jurisprudence. Cf. Hodes, 309 Kan. at 639-41 (discussing 
Locke's and Blackstone's influence on Kansas' founding documents). 
 
1. The Wyandotte Convention Debates 
 
"[T]he territorial legislature of 1859 approved a fourth and final constitutional 
convention" for the Kansas Territory. See Kansapedia, Kansas Historical Society, 
"Wyandotte Constitutional Convention," https://www.kshs.org/kansapedia/wyandotte-
 
22 
 
constitutional-convention/17884. On June 17, 1859, 52 delegates were elected to gather 
in Wyandotte, Kansas, on July 5 for this constitutional convention. See Simpson, The 
Wyandotte Constitutional Convention, reprinted in Kansas Constitutional Convention 
652 (1920) (hereinafter Convention).  
 
While vigorous debate over specific language was the exception, delegates did 
engage in extensive discussions regarding section 1. See Perdue, Address Before the 
Kansas State Historical Society:  The Sources of the Constitution of Kansas, in 7 Kansas 
Historical Collections 130, 134 (1902). The initial proposal for section 1, developed by 
the Preamble and Bill of Rights Committee, provided:   
 
"'SECTION 1. All men are by nature equally free and independent, and have 
certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending their lives 
and liberties, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and of seeking and obtaining 
happiness and safety, and the right of all men to the control of their persons, exists prior 
to law and is inalienable.'" Convention, at 271. 
 
After initial proposed amendments to this section were soundly rejected, including 
one disreputable attempt to exclude "negroes and mulattoes" from the phrase "all men," 
one of the proslavery delegates challenged the use of the term "inalienable" in section 1. 
Convention, at 271. Delegate William McDowell suggested the language in proposed 
section 1 created a hierarchy of laws that rendered natural rights absolute and subject to 
no limitation under the law:   
 
"MR. MCDOWELL. I think the language of this section is an enunciation of the 
higher law principle, that 'the control of a man's person is above and prior to all law and 
inalienable.' It is a provision I do not want to see go into any Constitution which we shall 
adopt; for if this doctrine is correct, you cannot make a man amenable to any criminal 
law." (Emphasis added.) Convention, at 272. 
 
 
23 
 
Another proslavery delegate, Benjamin Wrigley, professed similar concern:   
 
"I believe that this section, as it now reads, as remarked by the gentleman from 
Leavenworth (Mr. McDowell) does embrace the 'higher law' doctrine, and is mischievous 
in its character. I believe it was intended to set at defiance, and that it does in fact set at 
defiance, the fugitive slave law as a law of the land." Convention, at 274. 
 
As Wrigley's comment illustrated, the subtext of the discussion was primarily 
motivated by proslavery delegates' concern that characterizing natural rights as 
"inalienable" could preclude enforcement of criminal law, particularly the fugitive slave 
law, within Kansas. Therefore, one of the first proposed amendments to section 1—
offered by Wrigley—included the following clause to address concerns that section 1's 
text created a hierarchy of law with "absolute" natural rights at the apex.  
 
 
"'Provided that nothing herein contained shall be construed to apply to any 
person lawfully held to or owing service under the Constitution of the United States or 
the Constitution and Laws of any other State, or to any person under indictment, or 
lawfully under arrest or in custody, or lawfully imprisoned.'" Convention, at 273. 
 
Without this clarifying language, Wrigley claimed section 1 would ensure that "no person 
can forfeit his right to liberty under any circumstances." Convention, at 274.  
 
"It matters not how great a criminal a man may be, or how lawfully he may have been 
arrested, retained in custody, or arraigned under indictment for a grave offense, you 
propose to have here an organic declaration, that this criminal's right to control of his 
person is above all law, prior to all law, and inalienable. Now, sir, I contend, that the right 
to the control of a man's person is not above the law, prior to law and inalienable. He may 
forfeit that right by the commission of crime—and all must agree, that, under such 
circumstances, he may be lawfully held in custody, and the control of his person 
rightfully and legally taken away from him. Adopt this declaration here, and at once you 
abolish the criminal law, and open all your jails." (Emphasis added.) Convention, at 274. 
 
24 
 
 
McDowell added to the objection, believing the original proposal could lead to an 
absurd result—impairing the State's authority to punish crimes:   
 
"[I]f adopted as it now stands, [the original proposal] will simply place us in the attitude 
of the commission of this solecism; recognizing somewhere the right and power to punish 
crime, yet in the Bill of Rights doing away with every provision of that kind, by asserting 
that the control of the person is above, beyond, [and] anterior to all law. . . . Whatever 
their notions may be on these questions in relation to the fugitive slave law, let us be 
careful, at least, to avoid placing ourselves in an absurd position." Convention, at 276. 
 
Another delegate also offered support for language to avoid this result. See Convention, 
at 275.  
 
Consistent with these remarks, Dr. James Blunt offered the following substitute 
amendment to modify the natural rights preserved within section 1:  "'Except in cases 
where the party is charged with crime, or has been convicted thereof.'" Convention, at 
276. According to Blunt, the substitute amendment would "remove all doubtful and 
dangerous construction that might be put upon the section," though he acknowledged this 
would not appease those seeking to protect the fugitive slave law. Convention, at 276-77.  
 
After Blunt's speech, other delegates weighed in on the issue. Delegate William 
Griffith explained the term "inalienable" means only that the right cannot be transferred 
or assigned, and that the language did not create a hierarchy of law that prevented 
punishment for criminal conduct. Griffith explained:   
 
"It seems to me, sir, that this discussion and both amendments are unnecessary, and that 
they result from a misconception of the clause in question. I see nothing of any higher-
law doctrine in this section. If it is there, I confess that I have not penetration enough to 
discover it. The proposition is, 'that the right of all men to the control of their persons 
 
25 
 
exists prior to law, and is inalienable.' It does not propose that the authority of the State 
shall not hold the persons of men if they have committed crime, but simply that this right 
exists prior to law, and is inalienable by the person holding it—that is, he cannot sell it or 
dispossess himself of it. But, sir, the law of the land regulates this matter entirely." 
(Emphasis added.) Convention, at 279-80. 
 
The discussion continued with delegates expressing opposing views as to the 
nature and scope of natural rights as set forth in proposed section 1. Convention, at 280-
82. Eventually, Wrigley's proposed amendment was put to a vote and approved. But 
immediately thereafter, President James Winchell offered the following substitute: 
 
"'All men are by nature free and equal and possessed of certain rights inalienable by law, 
except for the commission of crime, among which rights are life, liberty, the pursuit of 
happiness and the acquirement, possession and protection of property.'" Convention, at 
282.  
 
Winchell offered the substitute provision as a compromise, believing "there is some 
foundation for the arguments . . . if we declare in the fundamental law, that men have 
certain rights that are inalienable, we must mean that those rights are inalienable by law." 
Convention, at 282.  
 
At this juncture, Samuel Austin Kingman, a delegate who later served as one of 
the original members of the Kansas Supreme Court following statehood in 1861 and 
Chief Justice from 1867 to 1876, offered the version of section 1 ultimately adopted by 
the convention and ratified by electors. See Convention, at 282-85; see also Samuel 
Austin Kingman, Kansapedia:  Kansas Historical Society, 
https://www.kshs.org/kansapedia/samuel-austin-kingman/17072 (professional biography 
of Kingman). In advancing what would become the final version of section 1, Kingman 
made clear the term "inalienable" has an established legal meaning—referring to a right 
or interest that cannot be disposed of by sale or assignment to another but which can be 
 
26 
 
forfeited. In this regard, Kingman explained that inalienable natural rights would not 
impair the State's ability to punish individuals for criminal conduct:   
 
"Mr. President, I do not propose to argue this question. I would be willing to vote 
for the section as it stands, but I prefer the language of the substitute just offered. But I 
hold in my hand a section which I prefer to both of them. I do not propose at this time to 
offer it. But I hold that this use of the word 'inalienable,' is misunderstood and 
misinterpreted in this House. A man's right to his life is inalienable in law under all 
circumstances. He has no right to sell or give it away—no right to dispose of it at all. But 
the word 'inalienable' has a fixed meaning in law. And when in the common use of the 
word we say, that a man cannot alienate his property, none would suppose we mean to 
say, he cannot forfeit his property. We propose, at the proper time, to propose in this 
Constitution, that there shall be a homestead set apart to each settler in the State, which 
shall be inalienable, but we do not propose to ordain that it shall not be forfeited for debts 
due to the State, and so on. I do not like to see this doctrine impinged. I do not like to 
depart from old, established usage. Therefore I hope the section which I hold in my hand 
will be adopted. By the leave of the Convention I will read it: 
 
'All men are possessed of equal and inalienable natural rights, among which are 
those of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.' 
 
"These terms, Mr. President, are fixed in the minds of the American people—
they have become traditional. And I offer to strike out and insert this, that the American 
feeling might appear in this section. We all cling to old truths, and I love the very forms 
of expression in which old truths have been presented. I dislike to change any old truth 
from the forms of language to which I have been accustomed. I dislike to see them taken 
from the habiliments in which I have so often seen them clothed and put into new and 
doubtful phraseology; and our national Declaration of Independence is of this class of 
truth. That Declaration of Rights forms a part of our political creed, from which no man 
can extricate himself; and I do not wish to change the clothing of these ideas. It is this 
feeling that makes a man who has long read one book—as the Bible or Blackstone—
value it a hundred fold above its intrinsic value. This makes a man like to read the 
sentiments he cherishes in their original style of expression—makes him like to dwell on 
 
27 
 
the very words that cover the principles he holds closest to his heart. And we should 
express these sentiments in few words—sufficient to cover their views and carry their 
original force, and whatever goes beyond that is injurious to the sense. I say again, sir, I 
love these old forms. They are, it seems to me, as the political Bible of every citizen of 
the United States. If you change their language, you mar their beauties—carry the mind 
away from the sense, and send it off into reflections on the phraseology and meaning of 
these new terms. I think the amendment I have read, in these old terms, is broad enough. 
It will show no man's prejudices, and it is broad enough for all to stand upon." (Emphases 
added.) Convention, at 282-83.  
 
Kingman's explanation proved to be persuasive, and the convention passed his substitute 
proposal by a margin of 42 to 6. Convention, at 285. 
 
This historical record indicates the drafters of section 1 never intended the term 
"inalienable" to be construed as "absolute" or "nonforfeitable." Instead, a careful reading 
of section 1, coupled with the transcripts of the convention debate, establishes that the 
term "inalienable" refers only to one's ability to transfer his or her right or interest to 
another person. This construction is consistent with the legal meaning ascribed to the 
term "inalienable." See Black's Law Dictionary 683 (5th ed. 1978) (defining "inalienable" 
as "[n]ot subject to alienation; the characteristic of those things which cannot be bought 
or sold or transferred from one person to another, such as rivers and public highways, and 
certain personal rights; e.g., liberty"). Though inalienable, the framers viewed these 
natural rights as forfeitable in civil society. So construed, the framers were confident 
section 1 could not be used as a device to impede or limit the state's authority to punish 
individuals for their criminal conduct.  
 
2. Natural Rights Theory According to Locke and Blackstone 
 
During the Wyandotte Convention debates, the chairman of the Preamble and Bill 
of Rights Committee, William Hutchinson, explained that section 1 is designed to declare 
 
28 
 
and protect the "natural rights" of all persons. See Convention, at 281-82. Based on the 
established historical record, we have held the framers intended section 1 to incorporate 
the "broad concept of natural rights." Hodes, 309 Kan. at 629 ("In short, the drafters . . . 
incorporated the broad concept of natural rights" in adopting section 1.).  
 
a. John Locke 
 
The theory of "natural rights" traces its lineage from the writings of John Locke 
through the Declaration of Independence, written by Thomas Jefferson, and the Virginia 
Declaration of Rights of 1776, written by George Mason. 309 Kan. at 639. Thus, 
"Locke's views on natural rights are significant" and offer insight into the framers' intent 
in adopting section 1. 309 Kan. at 639. 
 
Locke's theory describes the inherent rights of persons in nature before consenting 
to civil governance. According to Locke, in nature all persons are in "a State of perfect 
Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they 
think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without asking leave, or depending 
upon the Will of any other Man." Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Bk. II, § 4 
(1698). And consistent with such uninhibited personal freedom, the state of nature is also 
a state of "Equality, wherein all the Power and Jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having 
more than another." Locke, Bk II, § 4.  
 
In this perfect state of nature, these inherent rights are to be exercised according to 
each person's free will and should not be impaired, unless the exercise of these rights 
would place another's natural rights in peril:   
 
"The State of Nature, has a Law of Nature to govern it which obliges every one, and 
Reason, which is that Law, teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it; That being 
all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, 
 
29 
 
or Possessions; . . . [E]very one as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit 
his Station wilfully, so by the like reason when his own Preservation comes not in 
competition, ought he as much as he can to preserve the rest of Mankind, and not 
unless it be to do Justice on an Offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends 
to the Preservation of the Life, the Liberty, Health, Limb or Goods of another." Locke, 
Bk. II, § 6. 
 
"Locke's contention that man is endowed with free will means, however, that the 
law of nature, though known by reason, is not necessarily universally obeyed." Suess, 
Punishment in the State of Nature:  John Locke and Criminal Punishment in the United 
States of America, 7 Wash. U. Jur. Rev. 367, 377 (2015). Given this reality, "to uphold 
natural law . . . the rational man has the right to punish criminals. For if no one had such a 
right the law of nature would be in vain." 7 Wash. U. Jur. Rev. at 377. 
 
 
Locke's justification for punishment in nature was that the offender, by infringing 
the natural rights of another, had "declare[d] himself to live by another Rule, than that of 
reason and common Equity." Locke, Bk. II, § 8. Such transgressions are "a trespass 
against the whole Species." Locke, Bk. II, § 8. Thus, all persons "may restrain, or where 
it is necessary, destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one, 
who hath transgressed that Law, as may make him repent the doing of it, and thereby 
deter him, and by his Example others, from doing the like mischief." Locke, Bk. II, § 8.  
 
Without question Locke viewed the act of murder as a transgression of natural 
law, warranting punishment up to and including capital punishment.  
 
"The damnified Person has this Power of appropriating to himself, the Goods or Service 
of the Offender, by Right of Self-preservation, as every Man has a Power to punish the 
Crime, to prevent its being committed again, by the Right he has of Preserving all 
Mankind, and doing all reasonable things he can in order to that end:  And thus it is, that 
every Man in the State of Nature, has a Power to kill a Murderer, both to deter others 
 
30 
 
from doing the like Injury, which no Reparation can compensate, by the Example of the 
punishment that attends it from every body, and also to secure Men from the attempts of 
a Criminal, who having renounced Reason, the common Rule and Measure God hath 
given to Mankind, hath by the unjust Violence and Slaughter he hath committed upon 
one, declared War against all Mankind, and therefore may be destroyed as a Lion or a 
Tyger, one of those wild Savage Beasts, with whom Men can have no Society nor 
Security." Locke, Bk. II, § 11. 
 
According to Locke, individuals who commit capital offenses forfeit their own 
natural rights, including the right to life, through their offensive conduct.  
 
"Indeed having, by his fault, forfeited his own Life, by some Act that deserves Death; he, 
to whom he has forfeited it, may (when he has him in his Power) delay to take it, and 
make use of him to his own Service, and he does him no injury by it. For, whenever he 
finds the hardship of his Slavery out-weigh the value of his Life, 'tis in his Power, by 
resisting the Will of his Master, to draw on himself the Death he desires." (Emphasis 
added.) Locke, Bk. II, § 23. 
 
This concept of "forfeiture" enables Locke to philosophically justify notions of 
punishment that result in the deprivation of the perpetrator's own rights as they would 
have existed in nature. 
 
 
Interestingly, for Locke, the right to life gave rise to a reciprocal duty for a person 
to preserve his or her own life. Notwithstanding the vast freedom enjoyed by individuals 
in nature, Locke did not believe such freedom granted individuals the power to end one's 
own life. Locke, Bk. II, § 23. As a corollary, a person could not alienate that right to 
another person because a person did not "hav[e] the Power of his own Life" in the first 
place. Locke, Bk. II, § 23. Thus, a person "cannot, by Compact, or his own Consent, 
enslave himself to any one, nor put himself under the Absolute, Arbitrary Power of 
another, to take away his Life, when he pleases." Locke, Bk. II, § 23. "No body can give 
 
31 
 
more Power than he has himself; and he that cannot take away his own Life, cannot give 
another power over it." Locke, Bk. II, § 23.  
 
Consistent with delegate Kingman's commentary regarding the intended scope of 
section 1, Locke's natural rights theory recognizes the right to life to be inalienable, 
meaning it cannot be sold, transferred, or assigned to another. But the right is not 
absolute, as it may be forfeited through acts of criminal conduct that give rise to the 
power of punishment.  
 
Even so, Locke's philosophical justification for punishment based on notions of 
forfeiture leads to an obvious question:  who should impose punishment? Locke observed 
"it is unreasonable for Men to be Judges in their own Cases, that Self-love will make Men 
partial to themselves and their Friends. And on the other side, that Ill Nature, Passion and 
Revenge will carry them to far in punishing others." Locke, Bk. II, § 13. Therefore, 
Locke concluded that "Civil Government is the proper Remedy for the Inconveniences of 
the State of Nature." Locke, Bk. II, § 13. 
 
According to Locke, individuals do not relinquish their natural rights of life, 
liberty, and property merely by entering civil society. Locke, Bk. II, § 87. Instead, they 
consent to the same power of punishment that existed in nature. But instead of being 
meted out by the victim, punishment (including the death penalty) as it exists in the state 
of nature is transferred to, and imposed by, the civil society itself. Locke, Bk. II, § 87. 
 
 
"Man being born, as has been proved, with a Title to perfect Freedom, and an 
uncontrouled enjoyment of all the Rights and Privileges of the Law of Nature, equally 
with any other Man, or Number of Men in the World, hath by Nature a Power, not only to 
preserve his Property, that is, his Life, Liberty and Estate, against the Injuries and 
Attempts of other Men; but to judge of, and punish the breaches of that Law in others, as 
he is persuaded the Offence deserves, even with Death it self, in Crimes where the 
heinousness of the Fact, in his Opinion, requires it. But because no Political Society can 
 
32 
 
be, nor subsist without having in it self the Power to preserve the Property, and in order 
thereunto punish the Offences of all those of that Society: There, and there only is 
Political Society, where every one of the Members hath quitted this natural Power, 
resign'd it up into the hands of the Community in all cases that exclude him not from 
appealing for Protection to the Law established by it. And thus all private judgement of 
every particular Member being excluded, the Community comes to be Umpire, by settled 
standing Rules; indifferent, and the same to all Parties: And by Men having Authority 
from the Community for the execution of those Rules, decides all the differences that 
may happen between any Members of that Society, concerning any matter of right, and 
punishes those Offences, which any Member hath committed against the Society with 
such Penalties as the Law has established; whereby it is easie to discern who are, and 
who are not, in Political Society together." (Emphasis added.) Locke, Bk. II, § 87. 
 
b. William Blackstone 
 
Though philosophically consistent with Locke, William Blackstone provided a 
more complete description of the contours of natural rights, particularly the right to life, 
in his Commentaries on the Laws of England. See Bedau, The Right to Life, 52(4) The 
Monist 550, 553 (1968) ("If we were to look for the one thinker from the past whose 
writings, in virtue of their antiquity, detail, and influence, have no peer as a source of the 
classic doctrine of the right to life, we would have to choose, not Hobbes, Locke, 
Rousseau, or Paine, but Sir William Blackstone.").  
 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized Blackstone's influence on the 
framers of the United States Constitution:   
 
"Blackstone's Commentaries are accepted as the most satisfactory exposition of 
the common law of England. At the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution, it 
had been published about twenty years, and it has been said that more copies of the work 
had been sold in this country than in England; so that undoubtedly, the framers of the 
 
33 
 
Constitution were familiar with it." Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 69, 24 S. Ct. 
826, 49 L. Ed. 99 (1904).  
 
Likewise, members of the early state constitutional conventions were so immersed in the 
common law as expounded by Blackstone that the language of these constitutions cannot 
be well understood without reference to his teachings. See Bader, Some Thoughts on 
Blackstone, Precedent, and Originalism, 19 Vt. L. Rev. 5, 7-8 (1994). 
 
Blackstone divided individual rights into two categories:  absolute and relative. 
1 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England at 119 (1765). It is important to 
recognize Blackstone did not define "absolute" rights in a way that established a higher 
order of law (where "absolute" rights would be free from any limitation or infringement, 
thereby limiting the authority of the government to exercise the power of criminal 
punishment). Instead, his definition of "absolute" rights was consistent with Locke's 
characterization of natural rights—those that "appertain and belong to particular men, 
merely as individuals or single persons," whereas relative rights "are incident to them as 
members of society, and standing in various relations to each other." 1 Blackstone, at 
119. "For the most part, the purpose of 'relative' rights (including the right of access to the 
courts, the right to petition for the redress of grievances and the right to bear arms) was to 
preserve or implement 'absolute' rights in organized communities." Alschuler, 
Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 28 (1996).  
 
In other words, under Blackstone's terminology, absolute rights are those naturally 
endowed to persons by the creator: 
 
"The absolute rights of man, considered as a free agent, endowed with 
discernment to know good from evil, and with power of choosing those measures which 
appear to him to be most desirable, are usually summed up in one general appellation, 
and denominated the natural liberty of mankind. This natural liberty consists properly in a 
power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, unless by the law of 
 
34 
 
nature; being a right inherent in us by birth, and one of the gifts of God to man at his 
creation, when he endued him with the faculty of freewill." 1 Blackstone, at 121.  
 
For Blackstone, political or civil liberty—"which is that of a member of society"—
"is no other than natural liberty so far restrained by human laws (and no farther) as is 
necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the public." 1 Blackstone, at 121. 
Moreover, the purpose of society, and thus government, "is to protect individuals in the 
enjoyment of those absolute rights, which were vested in them by the immutable laws of 
nature; but which could not be preserved in peace without that mutual assistance and 
intercourse which is gained by the institution of friendly and social communities." 
1 Blackstone, at 120.  
 
Blackstone "reduced" these natural rights "to three principal or primary articles; 
the right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right of private 
property." 1 Blackstone, at 125. He included the right to life under the umbrella of the 
right of personal security:  "The right of personal security consists in a person's legal and 
uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation." 
1 Blackstone, at 125.  
 
Indeed, foremost in Blackstone's right of personal security was the right to life. 
1 Blackstone, at 125. A person's life and limbs were "of such high value," "that it pardons 
even homicide if committed se defendendo, or in order to preserve them." 1 Blackstone, 
at 126. Whatever a person might do to save life or limb, "is looked upon as done upon the 
highest necessity and compulsion." 1 Blackstone, at 126.  
 
Like Locke, and consistent with delegate Kingman's interpretation of section 1, 
Blackstone recognized the right to life is not alienable, meaning it cannot be assigned or 
transferred to another, but it can be forfeited when a person's criminal conduct 
necessitates punishment, up to and including capital punishment, in civil society.  
 
35 
 
 
"This natural life, being, as was before observed, the immediate donation of the 
great creator, cannot legally be disposed of or destroyed by any individual, neither by the 
person himself nor by any other of his fellow-creatures, merely upon their own authority. 
Yet nevertheless it may, by the divine permission, be frequently forfeited for the breach 
of those laws of society, which are enforced by the sanction of capital punishments; of 
the nature, restrictions, expedience, and legality of which, we may hereafter more 
conveniently enquire in the concluding book of these commentaries. At present, I shall 
only observe, that whenever the constitution of a state vests in any man, or body of men, 
a power of destroying at pleasure, without the direction of laws, the lives or members of 
the subject, such constitution is in the highest degree tyrannical: and that, whenever any 
laws direct such destruction for light and trivial causes, such laws are likewise tyrannical, 
though in an inferior degree; because here the subject is aware of the danger he is 
exposed to, and may by prudent caution provide against it. The statute law of England 
does therefore very seldom, and the common law does never, inflict any punishment 
extending to life or limb, unless upon the highest necessity; and the constitution is an 
utter stranger to any arbitrary power of killing or maiming the subject without the express 
warrant of law." (Emphasis added.) 1 Blackstone, at 129.  
 
Commentators interpreting Blackstone and, by extension, Locke have confirmed 
this interpretation of inalienable natural rights, i.e., recognizing that inalienable natural 
rights may still be forfeited through criminal conduct warranting punishment:   
 
"(a) If punishments of death are necessary for social defense, then the plea of absolute 
individual rights will not bar the justifiable imposition of death penalties. But the death 
penalty may be justifiably imposed only if the criminal's (right to) life is forfeit for his 
crime (sc. one is excused for killing in self-defense because the aggressor forfeits his 
right to life). (b) Whenever a person commits a crime, he violates the rights of another. 
This in turn entails forfeiture by the criminal of those rights which he violated in his 
victim. '[T]he offender, by violating the life or liberty or property of another, has lost his 
own right to have his life, liberty, or property respected . . .' The result of (a) and (b) is a 
justification of the forfeiture of the absolute right to life." 52(4) The Monist at 568. 
 
36 
 
 
While Bedau critiques this conclusion, it is, nonetheless, the conclusion that both 
Blackstone and Locke reached in formulating their concept of natural rights.  
 
 
In his discussion of crimes and punishments in Book IV, Blackstone reasons that 
in the state of nature, the power or right of punishment is vested in every individual. See 
4 Blackstone, at 7.  
 
"It is clear, that the right of punishing crimes against the law of nature, as murder and the 
like, is, in a state of mere nature vested in every individual. For it must be vested in 
somebody; otherwise the laws of nature would be vain and fruitless, if none were 
empowered to put them in execution:  and if that power is vested in any one, it must also 
be vested in all mankind, since all are by nature equal." 4 Blackstone, at 7.  
 
Blackstone, like Locke, concludes that upon entering civil society, "this right is 
transferred from individuals to the sovereign power." 4 Blackstone, at 8.  
 
 
Blackstone also recognized a distinction between crimes that are mala in se—
wrong or evil in itself—and those that are mala prohibita—"offences of human 
institution." 4 Blackstone, at 9. For Blackstone, it was apparent that civil society could 
impose capital punishment for crimes that are mala in se.  
 
"With regard to offences mala in se, capital punishments are in some instances inflicted 
by the immediate command of God himself to all mankind; as, in the case of murder, by 
the precept delivered to Noah, their common ancestor and representative, 'whoso 
sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed.'" 4 Blackstone, at 9.  
 
 
37 
 
 
But for crimes mala prohibita, capital punishment is only justified  
 
"'when offences grow enormous, frequent, and dangerous to a kingdom or state, 
destructive or highly pernicious to civil societies, and to the great insecurity and danger 
of the kingdom or its inhabitants, severe punishment and even death itself is necessary to 
be annexed to laws in many cases by the prudence of lawgivers.'" 4 Blackstone, at 9.  
 
It was not only the frequency or difficulty in preventing a particular mala prohibita crime 
that might warrant a penalty of capital punishment, but also its "enormity, or dangerous 
tendency" that "alone" might warrant putting the offender to death. 4 Blackstone, at 9.  
 
In sum, both Locke and Blackstone characterized inalienable natural rights, 
including the right to life, as forfeitable when criminal conduct warrants punishment, up 
to and including death, in civil society. See Locke, Bk. II, § 23; 1 Blackstone, at 129. 
This conclusion is consistent with the record of the Wyandotte Convention debates, 
where the framers made clear that the natural rights in section 1 are forfeitable in civil 
society and cannot impair the state's ability to punish individuals for their criminal 
conduct. And both (the teachings of Locke/Blackstone and the record of the Wyandotte 
Convention debates) are consistent with the legal definition of the term "inalienable" as 
used in section 1.  
 
C. Kansas' Capital Sentencing Scheme Does Not Infringe Upon the Inalienable 
Right to Life in Section 1  
 
 
As noted above, R. Carr claims that section 1 affords him an absolute, 
nonforfeitable right to life that precludes capital punishment. However, as discussed more 
fully below, our construction of section 1 forecloses this argument. The text and relevant 
historical record demonstrate the framers intended section 1's inalienable right to life to 
be subject to forfeiture through criminal conduct. Accordingly, R. Carr's and J. Carr's 
asserted right to or declared interest in an absolute, nonforfeitable right to life does not 
 
38 
 
fall within the purview of rights protected by section 1. Instead, when a person is 
convicted of capital murder beyond reasonable doubt, he or she forfeits the inalienable 
right to life under section 1 and the state may impose lawful punishment for that crime.  
 
We adopted a similar rationale in Kleypas I, albeit under a substantially different 
legal framework that predated this court's decision in Hodes. See State v. Kleypas, 272 
Kan. 894, 136, 40 P.3d 139 (2001) (Kleypas I), cert. denied 537 U.S. 834 (2002), 
overruled on other grounds by Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 165 L. 
Ed. 2d 429 (2006). There, Kleypas attempted to distinguish section 1 from the Fourteenth 
Amendment by highlighting the fact that the text of section 1 does not contain any 
limiting language or exception authorizing governmental infringement of natural rights 
upon satisfaction of due process requirements. Kleypas I, 272 Kan. at 1051.  
 
"Kleypas argues that, unlike the federal version which does not allow the taking 
of life without due process of law, the above language in our state constitution simply 
does not contemplate the taking of a life by the State under any circumstances. He 
contends that the Kansas Constitution confers upon him an absolute right to life." 272 
Kan. at 1051. 
 
The court rejected Kleypas' argument without much discussion. It quoted from the 
same constitutional convention debates discussed above in concluding that the right to 
life under section 1 does not limit the state's power to impose punishments for crimes. 
272 Kan. at 1051-52. The court characterized the argument as "somewhat novel" but 
listed a variety of cases from other state courts that had "soundly rejected" similar 
challenges. 272 Kan. at 1052 (citing Ruiz v. Arkansas, 299 Ark. 144, 152-53, 772 S.W.2d 
297 [1989]; Missouri v. Newlon, 627 S.W.2d 606, 612-13 [Mo. 1982]; Slaughter v. 
Oklahoma, 950 P.2d 839, 861-62 [Okla. Crim. App. 1997]). Ultimately, the court decided 
Kleypas' argument stretched "the meaning of the venerable words in § 1 of the state Bill 
 
39 
 
of Rights far beyond their intended purpose. This we decline to do." Kleypas I, 272 Kan. 
at 1052.  
 
It is no surprise the Kleypas I court focused on the framers' discussion of 
"inalienability" in rejecting the section 1 challenge. The delegates' remarks reflect the 
framers' intent to construe the term "inalienable" within section 1 consistent with its legal 
meaning—a right or interest that cannot be transferred or assigned to another person. 
Though inalienable, i.e., nontransferable, an individual may forfeit his or her natural 
rights by engaging in criminal conduct that is subject to punishment in civil society. 
Therefore, delegate Kingman believed his proposed language for section 1 (which was 
ultimately adopted by the convention) would establish the existence of natural rights that 
were forfeitable, thereby authorizing the state to impose punishment for criminal conduct 
without offense to section 1.  
 
Locke and Blackstone, whose teachings greatly influenced the development of 
both federal and state constitutions alike, recognized a similar construction of 
"inalienable" natural rights, i.e., that they were subject to forfeiture. Natural rights 
theorists generally posited a state of nature that included within it a set of rights that 
every individual possessed in that state of nature. But when humans enter civil society, 
they relinquish certain powers and rights to the sovereign or government. As discussed 
above, the right to impose punishment, up to and including capital punishment, was one 
of the rights transferred from the individual to the sovereign. Thus, according to Locke, 
Blackstone, and the drafters of the Kansas Constitution, an individual who commits a 
crime warranting punishment in civil society forfeits his or her natural rights, thereby 
enabling the state to impose just punishment.  
 
After careful examination of the text of section 1, the historical record, and the 
documents and writings that inspired the drafters of the Kansas Constitution, we conclude 
 
40 
 
that section 1 recognizes an inalienable right to life, but that right is not absolute or 
nonforfeitable. We hold that once a defendant has been convicted of capital murder 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant forfeits his or her natural rights under section 1 
("among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness") and the state may impose 
punishment for that crime pursuant to Kansas' capital sentencing scheme.  
 
In so holding, we do not mean to suggest the state's power to punish is unabated 
upon a defendant's forfeiture of natural rights under section 1. To the contrary, a 
defendant is entitled to due process of law throughout the penalty phase proceedings. See, 
e.g., Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, § 10. Additionally, the punishment imposed may not be 
"cruel or unusual." See, e.g., Kan. Const. Bill of Rights, § 9. But these protections do not 
arise under section 1. In fact, where a defendant has been lawfully convicted of capital 
murder, the imposition of the capital sentence no longer implicates his or her inalienable 
natural rights under section 1. However, other constitutional guarantees, including but not 
limited to those contained in sections 9 and 10, continue to regulate the state's authority 
to punish and guard against arbitrary applications of such authority. Cf. Chapman v. 
United States, 500 U.S. 453, 465, 111 S. Ct. 1919, 114 L. Ed. 2d 524 (1991) 
(fundamental right to liberty limits government power to punish prior to jury's verdict of 
guilt; thereafter a person "is eligible for, and the court may impose, whatever punishment 
is authorized by statute for his offense, so long as that penalty is not cruel and unusual").  
 
For these reasons, R. Carr's and J. Carr's asserted right to, or declared interest in, 
an absolute, nonforfeitable right to life is not included within or part of the guarantees 
or protections of section 1. Instead, the natural right to life is forfeitable, and the 
government's imposition of the death penalty pursuant to Kansas' capital sentencing 
scheme does not impair the "inalienable" right to life protected under section 1. 
Accordingly, the jury's capital sentencing verdicts in R. Carr's and J. Carr's cases do not 
implicate section 1 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights.  
 
41 
 
 
II. Death Qualification of Jurors Under K.S.A. 22-3410 Does Not Violate Section 5 
of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights 
 
In an amicus brief filed in J. Carr's case, the NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF) raises a state constitutional challenge to the practice of 
"death qualifying" juries in Kansas—the process of removing prospective jurors for 
cause, pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3410, when their conscientious objection to capital 
punishment substantially impairs their ability to fulfill the oath and obligations of a juror. 
Though not raised by R. Carr, the LDF and the State briefed the issue to the court, and we 
advised J. Carr and the State to be prepared to address the issue at oral argument.  
 
After oral argument concluded, R. Carr filed a motion requesting the court 
consider this section 5 challenge in his appeal. We deny R. Carr's motion because it is an 
improper procedural vehicle for advancing this new, state constitutional challenge. See 
State v. Cheever, 306 Kan. 760, 774, 402 P.3d 1126 (2017) (Cheever II) (denying similar 
motion on instruction issue); State v. Gleason, 305 Kan. 794, 798, 388 P.3d 101 (2017) 
(Gleason II) (same). Nevertheless, we address the merits of the claim given our statutory 
obligation in capital appeals to both consider "the question of sentence" and "notice 
unassigned errors appearing of record if the ends of justice would be served thereby." 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6619(b); Cheever II, 306 Kan. at 774 (electing to reach merits of 
similar issue "[u]nder the unique circumstances of [the] case and in the interest of judicial 
economy"); Gleason II, 305 Kan. at 798-99 (same).  
 
Kansas statute authorizes a district judge to remove prospective jurors for cause 
where their "state of mind with reference to the case or any of the parties is such that the 
court determines there is doubt that [the prospective juror] can act impartially and 
without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party." K.S.A. 22-3410(2)(i). Under this 
provision, parties in a capital case may successfully challenge prospective jurors for 
 
42 
 
cause if their views on the death penalty prevent or substantially impair the performance 
of their duties as jurors. See R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 113-14. The statute is designed to 
balance a defendant's due process and jury trial rights with the State's strong interest in 
seating jurors who can apply the sentence of capital punishment according to the 
framework provided by law. 300 Kan. at 113. Nevertheless, the LDF contends the State's 
removal of prospective jurors under this statute violates the right to trial by jury preserved 
in section 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights.  
 
A. Standard of Review and Legal Framework 
 
As previously noted, constitutional challenges raise questions of law over which 
appellate courts have unlimited review. State v. Coleman, 312 Kan. 114, 117, 472 P.3d 
85 (2020). To the extent resolution of this issue requires us to interpret the language of 
section 5, our review is likewise unlimited. 312 Kan. at 117. 
 
Section 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights provides that "[t]he right of 
trial by jury shall be inviolate." This court has consistently held that section 5 "'"preserves 
the jury trial right as it historically existed at common law when our state's constitution 
came into existence"'" in 1859. Albano, 313 Kan. at 641. A section 5 analysis generally 
involves two inquiries:  (1) "In what types of cases is a party entitled to a jury as a matter 
of right?" and (2) "[W]hen such a right exists, what does the right protect?" State v. Love, 
305 Kan. 716, 735, 387 P.3d 820 (2017). "Prosecutions for violations of state criminal 
statutes unquestionably implicate Section 5." 305 Kan. at 736. Therefore, our analysis 
focuses on the scope of that right—that is, does section 5 foreclose death qualification of 
jurors under K.S.A. 22-3410?  
 
 
43 
 
B. The Plain Meaning of the Term "Jury" and the Historical Record Demonstrate 
that "Death-Qualification" Under K.S.A. 22-3410 Is Beyond the Scope of 
Section 5 
 
To determine the scope of the jury trial right under the Kansas Constitution, it is 
first instructive to explore the meaning of the term "jury" as used in section 5. In doing 
so, we rely on established rules of constitutional construction:   
 
"In ascertaining the meaning of a constitutional provision, the primary duty of the 
courts is to look to the intention of the makers . . . and the adopters . . . of that provision. 
A constitutional provision is not to be narrowly or technically construed, but its language 
should be interpreted to mean what the words imply to persons of common 
understanding. Words in common usage are to be given their natural and ordinary 
meaning in arriving at a proper construction. [Citations omitted.]" Board of Leavenworth 
County Com'rs v. McGraw Fertilizer Serv., Inc., 261 Kan. 901, 905, 933 P.2d 698 (1997).  
 
When the words themselves do not make the drafters' intent clear, courts look to the 
historical record, remembering "'the polestar . . . is the intention of the makers and 
adopters.'" Hunt, 150 Kan. at 5; see State ex rel. Stephan v. Finney, 254 Kan. 632, 655, 
867 P.2d 1034 (1994). Here, both the plain meaning of the term "jury" and the historical 
record each undermine this section 5 challenge. 
 
To ascertain the meaning of the term "jury" under section 5, we first look to the 
common, ordinary meaning of this term. Dictionary definitions provide a reliable source 
for that meaning. Midwest Crane & Rigging, LLC v. Kansas Corporation Comm'n, 306 
Kan. 845, 851, 397 P.3d 1205 (2017). Black's Law Dictionary defines a "jury" as "[a] 
group of persons selected according to law and given the power to decide questions of 
fact and return a verdict in the case submitted to them." Black's Law Dictionary 1024 
(11th ed. 2019). Similarly, the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 
defines "jury" as "[a] body of persons selected to decide a verdict in a legal case, based 
 
44 
 
upon the evidence presented, after being given instructions on the applicable law." The 
American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 953 (5th ed. 2011); see also 
Webster's New World College Dictionary 790 (5th ed. 2014) (defining "jury" as "a group 
of people sworn to hear the evidence and inquire into the facts in a law case, and to give a 
decision in accordance with their findings").  
 
Thus, we construe the term "jury," as used in section 5, to denote a legally selected 
group of persons sworn to determine issues of fact and return a verdict based on the 
evidence and the law as instructed. This construction is also in accord with our precedent 
defining the traditional function and duty of a Kansas jury. See State v. McClanahan, 212 
Kan. 208, 217, 510 P.2d 153 (1973) ("[I]t is the proper function and duty of a jury to 
accept the rules of law given to it in the instructions by the court, apply those rules of law 
in determining what facts are proven and render a verdict based thereon."); see also State 
v. Boeschling, 311 Kan. 124, 130, 458 P.3d 234 (2020) (recognizing same traditional 
functions and duties of jury).  
 
Under this plain meaning interpretation, section 5's right to trial by jury does not 
prohibit the state from death qualifying juries. Importantly, K.S.A. 22-3410 does not 
permit the removal of any or all prospective jurors who have conscientious objections to 
the death penalty. The death qualification process is constrained by the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which prohibits the state from excluding 
jurors in capital trials "simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty 
or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction." Witherspoon v. 
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522, 88 S. Ct. 1770, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1968). Instead, the State 
may only remove those prospective jurors whose opposition to the death penalty "would 
'prevent or substantially impair the performance of [their] duties as [jurors] in accordance 
with [their] instructions and [their] oath[s].'" Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 
S. Ct. 844, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1985).  
 
45 
 
 
In other words, death qualification eliminates only those prospective jurors who 
cannot decide issues of fact and reach a decision based on the evidence presented and the 
law as instructed—i.e., those persons who are unable to fulfill the traditional functions 
and duties of a Kansas jury. And, as established above, the plain meaning of the term 
"jury," as used in section 5, excludes these types of prospective jurors from its definition. 
In this regard, the process of death qualification under K.S.A. 22-3410 facilitates the very 
trial by "jury" that section 5 guarantees. 
 
C. Death Qualification Does Not Implicate Section 5 Because the Common Law 
Did Not Prohibit the Practice When the Kansas Constitution Was Adopted in 
1859  
 
Furthermore, the LDF concedes that when our state Constitution was adopted, the 
common law permitted a trial judge to remove individuals whose conscientious scruples 
against the death penalty would substantially impair their ability to perform the oath and 
duties of a juror. However, the LDF asserts this common-law rule arose from 
circumstances peculiar to the structure of capital trials at the time.  
 
Historically, neither the jury nor the trial judge possessed sentencing discretion in 
capital trials—once convicted, a judge sentenced the defendant to death as a matter of 
law. See Novak, The Role of Legal Advocates in Transnational Judicial Dialogue:  The 
Abolition of the Mandatory Death Penalty and the Evolution of International Law, 25 
Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 179, 210 (2017) ("At common law, the mandatory death 
penalty shifted sentencing discretion from a trial judge to a clemency authority."). Thus, a 
death-scrupled juror could only circumvent the death penalty by acquitting a defendant, 
regardless of what the evidence established or the law required. The LDF speculates that 
death-scrupled jurors were thus disqualified at common law for a very narrow reason—
the need to ensure the fair adjudication of the defendant's guilt. The LDF contends this 
 
46 
 
rationale no longer applies to Kansas' modern capital sentencing scheme, which requires 
a bifurcated trial with separate guilt and sentencing phases. As such, the LDF concludes 
that section 5 no longer authorizes death qualification under K.S.A. 22-3410.  
 
We question the LDF's narrow characterization of the rationale behind the 
common-law rule and the dubious assertion it has no application to Kansas' current 
capital sentencing scheme. More fundamentally, however, the LDF's argument fails to 
demonstrate how death qualification under K.S.A. 22-3410 offends any jury trial right 
protected under section 5. Instead, the LDF's argument is founded on the mistaken 
premise that section 5 authorizes the Legislature to create or modify juror qualification 
and selection standards only if such legislation is affirmatively authorized by common 
law (and the original rationale underlying it). But there is no support for this proposition. 
In fact, the premise is simply incorrect. 
 
Section 5 does not define the constitutional scope of legislative power. Instead, 
such powers are defined in article 2 of the Kansas Constitution. State ex rel. Morrison v. 
Sebelius, 285 Kan. 875, 898, 179 P.3d 366 (2008) ("Article 2 of the Kansas Constitution 
gives the legislature the exclusive power to pass, amend, and repeal statutes."). Section 5 
limits the Legislature's exercise of article 2 powers only when an act conflicts with or 
limits a jury trial right that existed at common law when the Kansas Constitution was 
adopted in 1859. See Jansky v. Baldwin, 120 Kan. 332, 334, 243 P. 302 (1926) ("Since 
the people have all governmental power, and exercise it through the legislative branch 
of the government, the legislature is free to act except as it is restricted by the state 
constitution."); Atchison Street Rly. Co. v. Mo. Pac. Rly. Co., 31 Kan. 660, 665, 3 P. 284 
(1884) (Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights limits legislative power where act "trenches 
upon the rights guaranteed by them, or which conflicts with any limitation expressed in 
them."); see also Love, 305 Kan. at 735 (rejecting defendant's argument that "because 
 
47 
 
juries were instructed on lesser included offenses at common law, the practice was frozen 
for all time" as "an overbroad interpretation of Section 5 and its protections").  
 
As established above, the parties agree that the prevailing common law in 1859 
permitted death qualification, and Kansas' territorial laws were consistent with this 
common-law rule. Kan. Terr. Stat. 1859, ch. 27, § 179. The LDF fails to identify any 
common-law rule in Kansas that prohibited death qualification at the time our 
Constitution was adopted in 1859. See Prouty v. Stover, 11 Kan. 235, 256 (1873) ("The 
mere silence of the constitution on any subject cannot be turned into a prohibition."). 
Therefore, death qualification under K.S.A. 22-3410 does not violate section 5. See 
Kimball and others v. Connor, Starks and others, 3 Kan. 414, 432 (1866) ("Trial by jury 
is guaranteed only in those cases where that right existed at common law."). 
 
Quoting State v. Peterson, No. 116,931, 2018 WL 4840468, at *1 (Kan. App. 
2018) (unpublished opinion), the LDF asserts that "'citizens called for jury duty have a 
constitutional right to serve if they are otherwise qualified.'" (Emphasis added.) This 
unpublished Court of Appeals decision fails to advance the LDF's section 5 claim. 
Peterson addressed a challenge brought under the Equal Protection Clause of the United 
States Constitution, not section 5. Also, Peterson does not identify any common-law right 
incorporated into section 5 that would prohibit death qualification pursuant to K.S.A. 22-
3410. Moreover, Peterson acknowledges that potential jurors must still be qualified to 
serve—that is, jurors must be able to fulfill the traditional functions and duties of a 
Kansas jury. 2018 WL 4840468, at *1. And, as established above, the term "jury," as 
used in section 5, excludes potential jurors who cannot fulfill these traditional functions 
due to their conscientious objection to the death penalty.  
 
 
48 
 
D. The Lack of Factual Findings Forecloses Our Review of the Disparate Impact 
Challenge  
 
Finally, the LDF claims death qualification disparately impacts the racial 
composition and biases of juries in capital sentencing proceedings, contrary to R. Carr's 
section 5 right to trial by jury. Specifically, the LDF argues death qualification 
disproportionately excludes Black venirepersons and produces a jury with higher levels 
of implicit and explicit racial bias; and such juries are "'disproportionately guilt-prone 
and death-prone.'" 
 
These allegations most certainly warrant careful analysis and scrutiny. But the 
issue—whether death qualification disparately impacts the racial composition of the jury 
or its propensity to convict and sentence a defendant—raises a question of fact. Indeed, 
the LDF cites several empirical studies to support its claims.  
 
However, the issue was not raised or developed at trial. As a result, the district 
court made no factual findings related to the LDF's claim. "'[A]ppellate courts do not 
make factual findings but review those made by district courts.'" State v. Reed, 300 Kan. 
494, 513, 332 P.3d 172 (2014). And the absence of such findings precludes us from 
conducting any meaningful review of this issue. See State v. Wright, 305 Kan. 1176, 
1179, 390 P.3d 899 (2017) (lack of factual findings precluded meaningful review of 
harmless error analysis of constitutional challenge).  
 
This holding is bolstered by our previous decision in R. Carr, where we affirmed 
the district court's rulings on the for-cause challenges R. Carr had raised on appeal. In 
other words, we previously determined that substantial competent evidence supported the 
district court's conclusion that the individuals empaneled as members of R. Carr's jury 
were impartial and qualified. R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 114-24. This holding, which is now the 
law of the case, further suggests the sentence of death was not imposed under the 
 
49 
 
influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, including the State's ability 
to death qualify jurors under K.S.A. 22-3140. See K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6619(c)(1) 
(requiring court to determine whether sentence was imposed under such improper 
circumstances).  
 
In sum, both the plain meaning and historical record confirm that a "jury" is 
defined as a group comprised of persons who will determine issues of fact and return a 
decision based on the evidence and in accordance with the law as instructed. Death 
qualification under K.S.A. 22-3410, as limited by the Eighth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, removes only those prospective jurors who cannot fulfill these 
obligations due to conscientious objection to the death penalty, i.e., the statute authorizes 
removal of those prospective jurors excluded from the constitutional definition of a 
"jury." Thus, death qualification facilitates the very jury trial right guaranteed by section 
5. Moreover, when the Kansas Constitution was adopted in 1859, the common law did 
not preclude, and in fact authorized, this procedure. For these reasons, we hold that death 
qualification under K.S.A. 22-3410 does not violate section 5.  
 
III. The Motion and State Law Challenge to the Mitigating Circumstances Instruction 
 
Having resolved the challenges raised under the Kansas Constitution, we next 
address R. Carr's pending motion to apply state law to the burden-of-proof jury 
instruction for mitigating circumstances. This equivalent federal constitutional issue 
was designated P10 in our earlier decision. R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 256, 302-03. 
 
We deny the motion but reach the claim's merits. We hold that an instruction on 
the burden of proof for mitigating circumstances is not required under state law, 
overturning the holding in Cheever II, 306 Kan. 760, Syl. ¶ 5, that K.S.A. 21-4624(e), 
now codified as K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6617(e), requires such an instruction.  
 
50 
 
 
A. Standard of Review and Legal Framework 
 
We apply a four-step analysis to review jury instruction challenges: 
 
"(1) First, the appellate court should consider the reviewability of the issue from both 
jurisdiction and preservation viewpoints, exercising an unlimited standard of review; 
(2) next, the court should use an unlimited review to determine whether the instruction 
was legally appropriate; (3) then, the court should determine whether there was sufficient 
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant or the requesting party, that 
would have supported the instruction; and (4) finally, if the district court erred, the 
appellate court must determine whether the error was harmless, utilizing the test and 
degree of certainty set forth in [State v. ]Ward." State v. Plummer, 295 Kan. 156, 163, 
283 P.3d 202 (2012). 
 
To the extent the legal appropriateness of the instruction requires statutory interpretation 
of K.S.A. 21-4624(e), we review that issue de novo. See State v. Harris, 311 Kan. 816, 
821, 467 P.3d 504 (2020).  
 
B. Discussion of the Motion and Underlying Merits 
 
In its earlier decision, the court relied on Gleason I, 299 Kan. at 1196-98, to 
provide guidance for the burden-of-proof instruction issue on remand. The court advised 
that a district judge in Kansas must instruct a penalty-phase jury that the existence of 
mitigating factors need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 
302-03. The court noted further that the failure to give this instruction would have 
required it to vacate R. Carr's death sentence on Eighth Amendment grounds, were it not 
already doing so because of the failure to sever. 300 Kan. at 303. 
 
 
51 
 
In Kansas v. Carr, the United States Supreme Court held the Eighth Amendment 
does not require the instruction. 577 U.S. at 122. Thereafter, R. Carr filed his motion with 
our court, arguing the instruction is compulsory under state law and the district court's 
failure to give it was reversible error. R. Carr claimed we had effectively made that state 
law determination in Gleason I and nothing in the United States Supreme Court's opinion 
prevented this holding under state law. He also argued the instructions created a 
"reasonable likelihood" the jurors applied a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard to his 
proffered mitigation evidence when considered as a whole.  
 
We deny R. Carr's motion because it is an inappropriate procedural vehicle to 
advance this new, state-law instructional issue. See Cheever II, 306 Kan. at 774 (denying 
similar motion on same instruction issue); Gleason II, 305 Kan. at 798 (same). 
Nevertheless, we address the merits of the claim given our statutory obligation in capital 
appeals to both consider "the question of sentence" and "notice unassigned errors 
appearing of record if the ends of justice would be served thereby." K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 
21-6619(b); Cheever II, 306 Kan. at 774 (electing to reach merits of similar issue 
"[u]nder the unique circumstances of [the] case and in the interest of judicial economy"); 
Gleason II, 305 Kan. at 798-99 (same). 
 
Turning to the merits, we conclude the failure to give the instruction was not error 
under Kansas law. Granted, under the first component of the four-part framework, both 
R. Carr and J. Carr preserved this challenge by requesting the mitigating circumstances 
burden-of-proof instruction at trial. See State v. Perez, 306 Kan. 655, 667-68, 396 P.3d 
78 (2017) (holding first step satisfied when defendant challenged on appeal district 
court's failure to give requested instruction). 
 
 
52 
 
But our resolution of the issue turns on whether step two is also satisfied—i.e., 
whether the instruction as given is legally appropriate. State v. Pabst, 273 Kan. 658, 659, 
44 P.3d 1230 (2002) (focusing analysis on whether instruction given fairly and accurately 
stated the law as applied to the facts of the case where requested instruction denied). In 
Cheever II, a majority of the court held that K.S.A. 21-4624(e) "provides greater 
protection to a death-eligible defendant than required by the federal Constitution. In 
Kansas, a capital jury must be instructed that mitigating circumstances need not be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 306 Kan. 760, Syl. ¶ 5. Although this court had not 
previously addressed the burden-of-proof issue as a matter of state law, the Cheever II 
court concluded that pronouncements in Kleypas I, although dicta, had recognized a 
construction of the statute that requires a capital sentencing jury be instructed that 
mitigating circumstances need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Cheever II, 
306 Kan. at 784; see Kleypas I, 272 Kan. at 1078. The court acknowledged that the 
earlier rulings had been framed in the context of federal constitutional claims (claims that 
were subsequently rejected by the Kansas v. Carr Court), but nonetheless concluded that 
state statute independently required such an instruction. The court reiterated this position 
in Gleason II, 305 Kan. at 798-806. 
 
Despite this court's previous pronouncements, we revisit the issue today, and we 
conclude that the district judge's instructions to R. Carr and J. Carr's jury correctly stated 
the law. We recognize "[t]he doctrine of stare decisis provides that 'points of law 
established by a court are generally followed by the same court and courts of lower rank 
in later cases in which the same legal issue is raised.'" State v. Clark, 313 Kan. 556, 565, 
486 P.3d 591 (2021). Application of the doctrine promotes stability within the legal 
system, and "'we do not lightly disapprove of precedent.'" 313 Kan. at 565. But "'"stare 
decisis is not an inexorable command."'" 313 Kan. at 565 (quoting State v. Hambright, 
310 Kan. 408, 416, 447 P.3d 972 [2019]). Where, as here, we are convinced that the 
original holding is neither sound nor firmly entrenched, it is incumbent on the court to 
 
53 
 
correct it. See McCullough v. Wilson, 308 Kan. 1025, 1036, 426 P.3d 494 (2018) 
(acknowledging this court's authority to overturn precedent where rule of law erroneous 
or no longer sound).  
 
The challenged instruction provides: 
 
"The State has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there are one 
or more aggravating circumstances and that they outweigh mitigating circumstances 
found to exist."  
 
The jury was also instructed that each member can decide what circumstances are 
mitigating and that unanimity is not required in that regard:   
 
"The determination of what are mitigating circumstances is for you as jurors to 
decide under the facts and circumstances of the case. Mitigating circumstances are to be 
determined by each individual juror when deciding whether the State has proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the death penalty should be imposed. The same mitigating 
circumstances do not need to be found by all members of the jury in order to be 
considered by an individual juror in arriving at his or her sentencing decision."  
 
Similarly, the instruction describing the verdict forms reiterated these basic points.  
 
"When considering an individual defendant, if you find unanimously beyond a 
reasonable doubt that there are one or more aggravating circumstances and that they 
outweigh mitigating circumstances found to exist, then you shall impose a sentence of 
death. If you sentence the particular defendant to death, you must designate upon the 
appropriate verdict form with particularity the aggravating circumstances which you 
unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt. That is Verdict Form (1). 
 
 
54 
 
"If you find that the evidence does not prove any of the claimed aggravating 
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, your presiding juror should mark the 
appropriate verdict form. That is Verdict Form (2). The court will fix a proper sentence 
for the particular defendant. 
 
"If one or more jurors is not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that 
aggravating circumstances exist or that those found to exist do not outweigh mitigating 
circumstances, then you should sign the appropriate alternative verdict form indicating 
the jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict sentencing the defendant to death. That is 
Verdict Form (3). In that event, the court will fix a proper sentence for the particular 
defendant."  
 
When reviewing the legal propriety of penalty phase instructions addressing 
mitigating circumstances, we must consider whether the instructions, considered together 
as a whole, fairly and accurately state the applicable law and "whether a jury could have 
been misled into not considering certain mitigating circumstances that, by law, should 
have been considered." Gleason II, 305 Kan. at 820 (Stegall, J., concurring); see also 
In re Care and Treatment of Quillen, 312 Kan. 841, 849, 481 P.3d 791 (2021) ("When 
reviewing jury instruction challenges, we consider '''jury instructions as a whole . . . to 
determine whether they properly and fairly state the applicable law or whether it is 
reasonable to conclude that they could have misled the jury."'").  
 
K.S.A. 21-4624(e) establishes the law governing the jury's consideration of 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances during the penalty phase:   
 
"If, by unanimous vote, the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that one or 
more of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in K.S.A. 21-4625 and amendments 
thereto exist and, further, that the existence of such aggravating circumstances is not 
outweighed by any mitigating circumstances which are found to exist, the defendant shall 
be sentenced to death; otherwise, the defendant shall be sentenced to life without the 
possibility of parole. The jury, if its verdict is a unanimous recommendation of a sentence 
 
55 
 
of death, shall designate in writing, signed by the foreman of the jury, the statutory 
aggravating circumstances which it found beyond a reasonable doubt. If, after a 
reasonable time for deliberation, the jury is unable to reach a verdict, the judge shall 
dismiss the jury and impose a sentence of imprisonment of life without the possibility of 
parole and shall commit the defendant to the custody of the secretary of corrections. In 
nonjury cases, the court shall follow the requirements of this subsection in determining 
the sentence to be imposed." K.S.A. 21-4624(e); see also K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6617(e) 
(same). 
 
The challenged instruction was patterned after this court's then-controlling interpretation 
of K.S.A. 21-4624(e). See Kleypas I, 272 Kan. 894, Syl. ¶¶ 45-58 (holding equipoise 
weighing equation favoring State unconstitutional, reformulating language to require 
aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances), overruled by Marsh, 278 
Kan. at 544-45. Thus, the instruction properly and fairly stated the law governing 
mitigating circumstances in Kansas. Cf. State v. Woods, 222 Kan. 179, 183, 563 P.2d 
1061 (1977) (generally, "an instruction patterned after the statute is valid").  
 
Furthermore, there is no reasonable likelihood the instruction misled jurors and 
prevented them from considering relevant mitigating evidence as required under K.S.A. 
21-4624(e). As the United States Supreme Court observed:   
 
"The instruction makes clear that both the existence of aggravating circumstances and the 
conclusion that they outweigh mitigating circumstances must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt; mitigating circumstances themselves, on the other hand, must merely 
be 'found to exist.' . . . 'Found to exist' certainly does not suggest proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt. . . . Not once do the instructions say that defense counsel bears the 
burden of proving the facts constituting a mitigating circumstance beyond a reasonable 
doubt—nor would that make much sense, since one of the mitigating circumstances is 
(curiously) 'mercy,' which simply is not a factual determination." Carr, 577 U.S. at 121. 
 
 
56 
 
For these reasons, "no juror would reasonably have speculated that mitigating 
circumstances must be proved by any particular standard, let alone beyond a reasonable 
doubt." 577 U.S. at 122. Under the same logic, the challenged instruction did not impede 
jurors from considering appropriate mitigation under K.S.A. 21-4624(e). Although 
R. Carr's proposed instruction might also be legally correct, it is not an indispensable part 
of communicating to the jury the process by which it should carry out its deliberations 
under state law. 
 
The instructions viewed together as a whole correctly and clearly informed the 
jurors of the law governing their consideration of mitigating circumstances. Accordingly, 
we find no error in the instructions as given. See State v. McDaniel, 306 Kan. 595, 616, 
395 P.3d 429 (2017) ("The trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury with the 
additional language [defendant] request[ed] because the instruction given fairly and 
accurately stated the law and accordingly was legally appropriate."). 
 
IV. The Remaining Penalty Phase Issues 
 
Having resolved R. Carr's state constitutional challenge and his motion to consider 
the instructional challenge under state law, our analysis turns to the remaining penalty 
phase issues raised by the defendants.  
 
A. P1/21—Severance  
 
In the court's previous decision, it considered whether the district court should 
have severed the trial's guilt phase under Kansas law. R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 93-94 (citing 
K.S.A. 22-3202[3]; K.S.A. 22-3204; State v. Davis, 277 Kan. 231, 239, 83 P.3d 182 
[2004] [listing five factors employed to determine whether prejudice sufficient to 
mandate severance]). It concluded the district court erred in denying defendants' repeated 
 
57 
 
requests to sever. R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 95-97 (defendants had antagonistic defenses; 
evidence in favor of one defendant admissible in separate trial not allowed in joint trial). 
But a majority held the error was harmless in the guilt phase due to the overwhelming 
strength of the evidence against the defendants. 300 Kan. at 100-01; J. Carr, 300 Kan. at 
356. 
 
The court separately analyzed whether the failure to sever penalty-phase 
proceedings violated R. Carr's right to an individualized capital sentencing determination 
under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 275-
82. Utilizing factors similar to those relied on for the guilt-phase severance analysis 
(antagonistic nature of mitigation cases, admission of evidence by one defendant not 
likely to have been admitted in severed trial), it concluded that the failure to sever the 
penalty-phase proceedings violated the Eighth Amendment. The court vacated the death 
sentences and remanded the case to the district court because it was unable to find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of changing the 
jury's ultimate conclusion regarding the weight of the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, in light of the record as a whole. 300 Kan. at 281-82; J. Carr, 300 Kan. 
at 371. 
 
The United States Supreme Court rejected our court's Eighth Amendment analysis 
in favor of a due process framework: 
 
"As we held in Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1 (1994), it is not the role of the Eighth 
Amendment to establish a special 'federal code of evidence' governing 'the admissibility 
of evidence at capital sentencing proceedings.' Id., at 11-12. Rather, it is the Due Process 
Clause that wards off the introduction of 'unduly prejudicial' evidence that would 
'rende[r] the trial fundamentally unfair.' Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991); 
see also Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212 (2006)." Carr, 577 U.S. at 123. 
 
 
58 
 
And it concluded without reservation that the district court's failure to sever did not 
violate the defendants' constitutional protections under the Due Process Clause: 
 
"In light of all the evidence presented at the guilt and penalty phases relevant to 
the jury's sentencing determination, the contention that the admission of mitigating 
evidence by one brother could have 'so infected' the jury's consideration of the other's 
sentence as to amount to a denial of due process is beyond the pale." 577 U.S. at 124. 
 
With the federal question answered, on remand we invited the parties to address 
whether state law required the district court to sever the penalty-phase proceedings. We 
directed them to designate the severance issue as P21, even though it was designated P1 
in our previous decision. 
 
R. Carr contends this court already decided the penalty-phase severance issue 
under state law by applying the state-law severance standard to reach its Eighth 
Amendment conclusion. The State urges us to reevaluate that conclusion in light of the 
United States Supreme Court's unequivocal assessment that "[o]nly the most extravagant 
speculation would lead to the conclusion that the supposedly prejudicial evidence 
rendered the Carr brothers' joint sentencing proceeding fundamentally unfair." 577 U.S. 
at 126. The State submits the same logic applies under state law. Like R. Carr, the State 
treats the state-law penalty phase severance question as an issue distinct from the guilt-
phase severance issue.  
 
J. Carr takes a different tack and suggests the question on remand is whether 
the state law-based failure to sever during the guilt phase resulted in prejudice in the 
sentencing phase. Or, as J. Carr puts it, "there is no basis in state law for this Court to 
hold that the district court's failure to sever the trials ceased to be an error once the 
sentencing phase of trial began."  
 
 
59 
 
We agree with J. Carr's framing of the issue. This court previously held that the 
trial court's refusal to sever the defendants' trials during the guilt phase constituted error 
under Kansas law. R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 97. This holding was not disturbed by the United 
States Supreme Court's subsequent opinion in Kansas v. Carr. As such, this holding is 
now the law of the case for purposes of this appeal. State v. Cheeks, 313 Kan. 60, 66, 482 
P.3d 1129 (2021) (Under the law of the case doctrine, when a second appeal is brought to 
this court in the same case, the first decision is the settled law of the case on all questions 
involved in the first appeal, and reconsideration will not normally be given to such 
questions.). The improper joinder of the defendants did not cease to be error at the 
commencement of the penalty phase.  
 
Accordingly, we hold today that this error continued into the penalty phase. That 
said, the error does not require reversal of R. Carr's death sentence. We conclude there is 
no reasonable probability this error affected the death sentence verdict. State v. Ward, 
292 Kan. 541, 565, 256 P.3d 801 (2011). 
 
As an error carried over from the trial's guilt phase, our penalty-phase harmless 
error analysis necessarily begins with reviewing what circumstances caused us to 
conclude there was error. In R. Carr, we held a state-law error occurred when the district 
judge abused his discretion by refusing to sever the guilt phase trials. Reviewing the 
factors supporting severance, we noted only two cut in defendants' favors. The first was 
the defendants' antagonistic defenses that emphasized the strength of the evidence against 
the other. We described this as "[e]ach . . . [doing] his best to deflect attention from 
himself on the Birchwood crimes by assisting in the prosecution of the other." R. Carr, 
300 Kan. at 95. The second was the conclusion that the joint trial resulted in the exclusion 
of evidence each defendant could have used to bolster his antagonistic identity defense. 
See 300 Kan. at 97. 
 
 
60 
 
In deciding the district judge abused his discretion in denying severance, our court 
cited two mistakes of law:  failing to perform the necessary analysis when ruling on the 
issue at a pretrial hearing; and ruling based on an incorrect view that defendants' 
incriminating statements, inadmissible during the joint guilt-phase trial, would also be 
inadmissible during separate trials. 300 Kan. at 97-98. We also observed 
 
"an abuse of discretion in the dearth of record support for Judge Clark's virtually 
indistinguishable, nearly completely unexplained rulings over time, even though the 
conflict between the defendant's theories became more and more clear and the pile of 
evidence that would be excluded because of the joint trial grew ever taller. Given Judge 
Clark's continuing duty to carefully consider severance to avoid prejudice to a defendant, 
and the overriding status of the defendant's right to fair trial, Judge Clark's decisions were 
progressively unreasonable." 300 Kan. at 98. 
 
But we held the error did not require reversal. "Although its path to R. Carr's 
convictions was made somewhat smoother and straighter by the judge's related guilt 
phase errors on severance and on third-party evidence and hearsay, the State presented 
compelling evidence of R. Carr's guilt, all of which would have been admissible in a 
severed trial." 300 Kan. at 100-01. Like the finding of error itself, this court's holding—
that the failure to sever did not contribute to the jury's guilt-phase verdict—is also settled 
law for purposes of this appeal under the law of the case doctrine.  
 
Therefore, today, we must determine whether this error, which was harmless in 
the guilt phase, so prejudiced defendants in the penalty phase that we must vacate their 
capital sentences. We place the burden of demonstrating harmlessness on the party 
benefitting from the error, i.e., the State. 300 Kan. at 95 (evolving caselaw generally 
places burden demonstrating harmlessness on party benefitting from error). Because 
the error arises under state law, the State's burden is to show there is no reasonable 
probability the error affected the jury's ultimate conclusion regarding the death sentence 
verdict. See K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-261; Ward, 292 Kan. at 569.  
 
61 
 
 
Though we now consider the severance issue under state law, the United States 
Supreme Court's assessment of this issue under federal law remains instructive and 
continues to inform our reversibility analysis. The higher Court concluded that the 
brothers did not even raise an Eighth Amendment problem by arguing they were 
prejudiced by mitigation evidence that would have been inadmissible in severed 
proceedings. Instead, their argument is subject to due process analysis because "it is the 
Due Process Clause that wards off the introduction of 'unduly prejudicial' evidence that 
would 'rende[r] the trial fundamentally unfair.'" Carr, 577 U.S. at 123. Thus, the proper 
question was not whether the "right to an individualized sentencing determination was 
fatally impaired" by the failure to sever, but "whether the evidence 'so infected the 
sentencing proceeding with unfairness as to render the jury's imposition of the death 
penalty a denial of due process.'" 577 U.S. at 123-24; see R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 281.  
 
Notably, "[t]he mere admission of evidence that might not otherwise have been 
admitted in a severed proceeding does not demand the automatic vacatur of a death 
sentence." Carr, 577 U.S. at 124. Although the higher Court focused on the question of 
error rather than harmlessness, its analysis leaves little room to conclude the failure to 
sever requires reversal now as a state-law error. The higher Court rejected all notion that 
the failure to sever had any impact on the jury's penalty-phase verdict. See 577 U.S. at 
126 (holding "[i]t is beyond reason to think that the jury's death verdicts were caused by" 
allegedly prejudicial evidence in light of the evidence of the "almost inconceivable 
cruelty and depravity" of the defendants' acts). Indeed, it essentially concluded the 
defendants' argument was so weak that even assuming witness statements found in police 
reports had been erroneously admitted without opportunity for confrontation, "We are 
confident that [allowing defendants] cross-examination regarding these police reports 
would not have had the slightest effect upon the sentences." 577 U.S. at 126. For us to 
conclude that there is a reasonable probability the antagonistic evidence affected the 
 
62 
 
jury's death sentence verdict, we would have to reject the higher Court's assessment that 
even such a possibility was "beyond reason." Neither the record nor the parties briefing 
offer any basis for our court to question the conclusion of the United States Supreme 
Court. 
 
The United States Supreme Court's assessment, coupled with the strength of the 
State's penalty-phase evidence (discussed more fully below in our cumulative error 
analysis), demonstrates that the state-law severance error was harmless. 
 
B. P2—Notice of Aggravating Circumstances 
 
R. Carr next alleges the State failed to give him constitutionally sufficient notice 
of the aggravating factors it intended to rely on to seek the death penalty, despite 
complying with K.S.A. 21-4624(a)'s notice requirements. In its previous decision, the 
court rejected the argument under its established precedent. R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 282; see 
State v. Scott, 286 Kan. 54, 101-02, 183 P.3d 801 (2008) (holding statutorily compliant 
notice of intent to seek death penalty is sufficient to give defendant meaningful 
opportunity to respond to statutory aggravating factors).  
 
Neither R. Carr nor J. Carr submit any additional authority causing us to 
reconsider that decision. Under the law of the case, we continue to hold that R. Carr had 
constitutionally sufficient notice of the aggravating factors the State intended to pursue. 
See Cheeks, 313 Kan. at 66. 
 
C. P3—Channeling of Jury's Discretion 
 
J. Carr originally challenged whether the four aggravating circumstances asserted 
by the State adequately channeled the jury's discretion in arriving at the death sentence. 
 
63 
 
The constitutional overbreadth challenge was noticed as an unassigned error in R. Carr's 
appeal under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6619(b).  
 
We rejected the challenge, explaining:   
 
"We have rejected the defense arguments advanced here on each of the four 
aggravators, when those arguments were made on behalf of other death penalty 
defendants. See State v. Scott, 286 Kan. at 108-10 (rejecting argument on multiple 
murder, monetary gain); State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. at 1025 (rejecting argument on 
avoidance of arrest; especially heinous, atrocious, cruel). The defense has not given us 
cause to revisit these holdings in this case." R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 283. 
 
The parties submitted no new authority addressing any of the four aggravators. Thus, we 
affirm this holding as the law of the case. See Cheeks, 313 Kan. at 66.  
 
However, one point of clarification is in order. In its earlier decision, the court 
correctly observed that our precedent had previously rejected overbreadth challenges to 
the "multiple murder," "monetary gain," and "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" 
aggravators. R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 282-83. However, the statement about the "avoidance 
of arrest" aggravator warrants additional discussion based on the original holding in 
Kleypas I. 
 
The Kleypas I court recognized the defendant had challenged this aggravator for 
vagueness and overbreadth. 272 Kan. at 1019 (noting arguments on sufficiency of 
evidence to support aggravator, aggravator's violation of federal and state constitutional 
provisions by failure to narrow class of persons eligible for death penalty). It maintained 
"[o]ther courts have determined that the avoid arrest aggravator on its face is not 
unconstitutionally vague or overbroad." 272 Kan. at 1023. And it concluded there was 
 
64 
 
sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of the aggravating circumstance. 
However, it did not expressly rule on the constitutional challenge. 272 Kan. at 1024-25. 
 
Today we take the step not quite articulated in Kleypas I by simply stating the 
avoidance-of-arrest aggravator, K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6624(e), effectively channels the 
discretion of the sentencer and is not facially overbroad. Cf. Coulter v. State, 304 Ark. 
527, 533, 804 S.W.2d 348 (1991); Wiley v. State, 750 So. 2d 1193, 1207 (Miss. 1999); 
Castro v. State, 844 P.2d 159, 175 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992). With today's clarification 
and additional holding, we reject this challenge. 
 
D. P4—Unavailability of Transcript of Jury View 
 
In its earlier decision, this court concluded R. Carr failed to establish that a 
constitutional violation arose from the failure to have a court reporter present at the jury 
view. R. Carr was provided a reasonably accurate and complete record of the proceedings 
against him, which was all he was entitled to under the United States Constitution. 
R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 284. Moreover, there was no substantive claim left unreviewable 
because of the lack of transcript. See 300 Kan. at 283. We reached the same decision in 
J. Carr's case. J. Carr, 300 Kan. at 368.  
 
The parties submitted no additional authority to persuade us to reconsider these 
holdings. Under the law of the case, no error occurred. 
 
E. P5—Constitutional Challenges to K.S.A. 21-4624(c) 
 
R. Carr claims hearsay admitted under K.S.A. 21-4624(c)'s relaxed evidentiary 
standard during his penalty-phase trial violated both the Eighth Amendment's heightened 
reliability standard and the Confrontation Clause. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
 
65 
 
36, 59, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004) (testimonial out-of-court statements by 
witness barred under Confrontation Clause unless witness unavailable, defendant had 
prior opportunity to cross-examine). The statute's language and our standard of review 
were previously set out. 
 
"K.S.A. 21-4624(c) provides for a relaxed evidentiary standard during the 
penalty phase of a capital proceeding: 
 
'In the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be presented 
concerning any matter that the court deems relevant to the question of 
sentence and shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating 
circumstances enumerated in K.S.A. 21-4625 and amendments thereto 
and any mitigating circumstances. Any such evidence which the court 
deems to have probative value may be received regardless of its 
admissibility under the rules of evidence, provided that the defendant is 
accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements. Only such 
evidence of aggravating circumstances as the state has made known to 
the defendant prior to the sentencing proceeding shall be admissible, and 
no evidence secured in violation of the constitution of the United States 
or of the state of Kansas shall be admissible.' 
 
"'When the application of a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, this 
court exercises an unlimited, de novo standard of review.' State v. Cook, 286 Kan. 766, 
768, 187 P.3d 1283 (2008) (citing State v. Myers, 260 Kan. 669, 676, 923 P.2d 1024 
[1996], cert. denied 521 U.S. 1118 [1997]). 
 
"'"The constitutionality of a statute is presumed. All doubts must 
be resolved in favor of its validity, and before the act may be stricken 
down it must clearly appear that the statute violates the constitution. In 
determining constitutionality, it is the court's duty to uphold a statute 
under attack rather than defeat it. If there is any reasonable way to 
construe the statute as constitutionally valid, that should be done. A 
statute should not be stricken down unless the infringement of the 
 
66 
 
superior law is clear beyond reasonable doubt. [Citations omitted.]"' 
State v. Brown, 280 Kan. 898, 899, 127 P.3d 257 (2006)." R. Carr, 300 
Kan. at 285. 
 
1. K.S.A. 21-4624(c) Does Not Violate Heightened Reliability 
Requirements of the Eighth Amendment 
 
In R. Carr, the court unanimously rejected the argument that K.S.A. 21-4624(c) 
offends the heightened reliability standard based on the court's previous denial of a due 
process challenge to the statute in Scott, 286 Kan. at 99-101. R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 286-87. 
The Scott court had concluded the statute was consistent with the United States Supreme 
Court's "'all relevant evidence' doctrine"—a doctrine that encourages jurors to have all 
possible relevant information about the individual defendant because heightened 
reliability in sentencing is achieved by including more evidence on the presence or 
absence of aggravating and mitigating factors. 300 Kan. at 286-87; see also Scott, 286 
Kan. at 100 (citing Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276, 96 S. Ct. 2950, 49 L. Ed. 2d 929 
[1976]; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 204, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 [1976]; 
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944 [1976]). 
 
The parties cite no new authority to question this holding. Applying the law of the 
case, we continue to reject R. Carr's heightened reliability challenge. 
 
2. The Confrontation Clause Challenge Does Not Warrant Reversal of 
the Jury's Death Verdict 
 
R. Carr also contends his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights were violated 
when the district court allowed prosecutors to reference out of court witness statements 
(recorded in police reports) during cross-examination of several defense witnesses. See 
R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 288. In its previous decision, this court did not reach a holding on 
the question of error or reversibility concerning this issue. See 300 Kan. at 288. 
 
67 
 
 
However, this court declared in general fashion that 
 
"Kansas now holds that the Sixth Amendment applies in the [penalty-phase] proceeding 
and that out-of-court testimonial hearsay may not be placed before the jury without a 
prior opportunity for the defendant to cross-examine the declarant. This includes any 
testimonial hearsay referenced in questions posed by counsel." 300 Kan. at 288. 
 
We apply our previous rationale to R. Carr's challenge and assume that it was 
constitutional error for the State to incorporate hearsay statements from police reports 
into its cross-examination questions propounded to defense witnesses.  
 
However, before turning to the question of reversibility, we first qualify our 
previous declaration that the Sixth Amendment applies in the penalty phase of a capital 
murder trial. We continue to hold that the Confrontation Clause applies during the 
penalty phase, but its application is limited to evidence relevant to the jury's "eligibility" 
decision, i.e., evidence relevant to the existence of one or more statutory aggravating 
circumstances.  
 
 
a. In Kansas Capital Sentencing Proceedings, the Confrontation 
Clause Applies Only to Evidence Relevant to the Jury's Eligibility 
Decision 
 
In R. Carr, this court acknowledged a split in authority from jurisdictions 
addressing the Confrontation Clause's application during the penalty phase of a capital 
trial. See 300 Kan. at 287-88. Federal circuits addressing the issue have generally rejected 
defendants' claims that the Confrontation Clause universally applies to all evidence 
admitted during the penalty phase. See, e.g., United States v. Umana, 750 F.3d 320, 
347 (4th Cir. 2014); Muhammad v. Secretary, Florida Dept., 733 F.3d 1065, 1073-77 
(11th Cir. 2013); United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 324-338 (5th Cir. 2007). Since 
 
68 
 
our previous decision, the Eighth Circuit has also joined the list of federal circuits so 
holding. See United States v. Coonce, 932 F.3d 623, 640-41 (8th Cir. 2019), petition for 
cert. filed February 28, 2020. 
 
Generally, these federal circuits treat Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 
S. Ct. 1079, 93 L. Ed. 1337 (1949), as controlling precedent. Williams held that when 
imposing a sentence, the Due Process Clause does not limit a trial judge's ability to 
consider out-of-court sources of information admitted without the opportunity for cross-
examination. 337 U.S. at 251-52. 
 
However, these federal circuits have not uniformly determined whether Williams 
applies to evidence related to both the "eligibility" and "selection" decisions Kansas 
juries must make during the penalty phase before imposing a sentence of death. As 
detailed below, the distinction between the eligibility decision and the selection decision 
is one with constitutional significance, and this distinction largely defines the scope of a 
defendant's confrontation rights under Kansas' capital sentencing scheme.  
 
Before delving into that analysis, however, it is helpful to clarify the meaning of 
the "eligibility" and "selection" decisions in penalty-phase proceedings. "Our capital 
punishment cases under the Eighth Amendment address two different aspects of the 
capital decision-making process:  the eligibility decision and the selection decision. To be 
eligible for the death penalty, the defendant must be convicted of a crime for which the 
death penalty is a proportionate punishment." (Emphasis added.) Tuilaepa v. California, 
512 U.S. 967, 971, 114 S. Ct. 2630, 129 L. Ed. 2d 750 (1994). In Kansas, a defendant 
who has been convicted of capital murder becomes eligible for a sentence of death when 
the State establishes the existence of "one or more of the aggravating circumstances 
enumerated" by statute. See K.S.A. 21-4624(e), now codified as K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-
 
69 
 
6617(e). The "eligibility" decision arises from the Eighth Amendment requirement to 
narrow the class of individuals who may be lawfully sentenced to death. 512 U.S. at 972.  
 
In the "selection" stage, the jury decides "whether a defendant eligible for the 
death penalty should in fact receive that sentence." 512 U.S. at 972. Kansas juries make 
their selection decision by applying the statutory weighing equation that pits aggravating 
circumstances against mitigating circumstances. See K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6617(e). The 
selection decision is not influenced by any constitutional narrowing requirement. "What 
is important at the selection stage is an individualized determination on the basis of the 
character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime." Zant v. Stephens, 462 
U.S. 862, 879, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1983).  
 
Thus, the eligibility decision and the selection decision are influenced by separate 
constitutional objectives within the Eighth Amendment. These distinct constitutional 
objectives were largely created through significant developments in the United States 
Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence beginning in the 1970s, years after 
Williams. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346 
(1972); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189; Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 601-05, 98 S. Ct. 2954, 
57 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1978); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428-33, 100 S. Ct. 1759, 64 
L. Ed. 2d 398 (1980).  
 
Further, more recent decisions in Apprendi, Ring, and Alleyne have incrementally 
applied Sixth Amendment protections to the sentencing process, while substantially 
altering the framework for the eligibility decision in capital proceedings. See Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000); Ring v. Arizona, 
536 U.S. 584, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556 (2002); Alleyne v. United States, 570 
U.S. 99, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013). In Apprendi, the Court held that 
"[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
 
70 
 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. In Ring, the Court held that 
statutory aggravating circumstances are the functional equivalent of an element of the 
greater offense and concluded the Sixth Amendment required a jury to determine the 
presence or absence of such aggravators. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609. In Alleyne, the Court 
extended the Apprendi rule to facts that increase mandatory minimum sentences. Alleyne, 
570 U.S. at 116. 
 
The development of this precedent subsequent to Williams strongly suggests the 
Confrontation Clause applies to the "eligibility" decision in Kansas penalty phase 
proceedings. As noted above, under Kansas' capital sentencing scheme, the State must 
establish a defendant's "eligibility" for a sentence of death in the penalty phase by 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more statutory aggravating circumstances 
exist. These statutory factors restrict the class of death-eligible defendants in our state. In 
Ring, the Court held that these types of statutory aggravators are effectively elements of a 
greater offense for federal constitutional purposes and "subject to the procedural 
requirements the Constitution attaches to trial of elements." Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 
U.S. 348, 354, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 159 L. Ed. 2d 442 (2004); see United States v. Fell, 531 
F.3d 197, 239 (2d Cir. 2008) (Ring and its progeny suggest statutory aggravating factors 
should be proven to a jury in the same manner as the other elements of the crime.). At the 
time Williams was decided, "capital-sentencing proceedings were understood to be just 
that:  sentencing proceedings." Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 110, 123 S. Ct. 
732, 154 L. Ed. 2d 588 (2003). But with the developments in Apprendi/Ring/Alleyne, the 
statutory factors that make a defendant eligible for a death sentence are now deemed the 
"'functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense.'" 537 U.S. at 111.  
 
The logical corollary of the Apprendi/Ring/Alleyne rule is that the defendant 
should also be afforded the Sixth Amendment's confrontation rights as well—at least to 
 
71 
 
the extent evidence is relevant to the jury's determination of aggravating circumstances, 
i.e., the eligibility decision. Even amongst those federal circuits that have applied 
Williams to foreclose a defendant's Confrontation Clause challenge, several have 
suggested Williams does not extend to evidence offered in connection with the jury's 
eligibility decision.  
 
For example, in Fields, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that after Apprendi and 
Ring, "there is a stronger argument to be made for the attachment of the confrontation 
right where the government is attempting to establish eligibility-triggering factors:  
Though labeled as 'sentencing factors,' those factors are more appropriately considered as 
elements of a capital offense." Fields, 483 F.3d at 331 n.18. But in Fields, the defendant 
had challenged only "evidence that the government introduced relevant to the jury's 
ultimate selection decision," and the court declined to resolve whether the Confrontation 
Clause applies to "eligibility-triggering factors." 483 F.3d at 331 n.18.  
 
Likewise, in Umana, the Fourth Circuit held that the "Confrontation Clause does 
not preclude the introduction of hearsay statements during the sentence selection phase 
of capital sentencing." (Emphasis added.) 750 F.3d at 348. It rejected the defendant's 
contention that the Apprendi/Ring/Alleyne rule compelled the extension of the 
Confrontation Clause "to every fact that the jury finds, even during the sentence selection 
phase." (Emphases added.) 750 F.3d at 347. The Fourth Circuit explained that under the 
Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA), "the jury finds the facts necessary to support the 
imposition of the death penalty in the guilt and eligibility phases of trial. . . . It is only 
during these phases that the jury makes 'constitutionally significant' factual findings." 750 
F.3d at 347-48. However, the defendant in Umana had challenged hearsay evidence 
introduced only in the selection phase. As such, the jury considered this evidence "to 
assist it in exercising its discretion to select the appropriate sentence" only after finding 
defendant was eligible to receive the death penalty. 750 F.3d at 348.  
 
72 
 
 
Interestingly, in FDPA proceedings, federal courts commonly bifurcate the 
sentencing phase  
 
"(or, as some have phrased it, 'trifurcate' the entire trial) into an 'eligibility phase,' limited 
to evidence relevant to mental state and to the existence of one or more statutory 
aggravating factors, and, if the defendant is found eligible, a 'selection phase,' at which 
evidence relevant to mitigating factors and non-statutory aggravating factors such as 
victim impact and other crimes is received and weighed by the jury." United States v. 
Bolden, 545 F.3d 609, 618 (8th Cir. 2008).  
 
See Fell, 531 F.3d at 239 ("[A] number of district courts have 'trifurcated' capital 
proceedings by splitting the sentencing phase into two separate hearings:  one for the 
eligibility phase and one for the selection phase."). The Second Circuit has explained 
this procedure enables the court to "delineate clearly between the applications of the 
Confrontation Clause in the eligibility and selection phases." Fell, 531 F.3d at 239. This 
rationale implicitly acknowledges that the Confrontation Clause extends to evidence 
relevant to the eligibility determination (i.e., the existence of one or more statutory 
aggravating circumstances) but not the selection decision.  
 
Utilizing this procedure, many federal courts since Crawford have held that 
"confrontation rights persist through the eligibility phase." United States v. Fackrell, 
No. 1:16-CR-26(2), 2018 WL 7822173, at *2 (E.D. Tex. 2018) (unpublished opinion); 
see also United States v. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2006) ("a 
defendant's Sixth Amendment trial rights extend at least to the eligibility phase of capital 
sentencing, where a jury is required to find facts that make the defendant eligible for the 
death penalty"); United States v. Jordan, 357 F. Supp. 2d 889, 903-04 (E.D. Va. 2005) 
(Confrontation Clause applies "at least in the eligibility stage"); United States v. Con-ui, 
No. 3:13-CR-123, 2017 WL 783437, at *26-27 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (unpublished opinion) 
 
73 
 
("[the Confrontation] Clause is fully operative at the eligibility phase" and "is 
inapplicable only at the selection phase"); United States v. Lujan, No. CR 05-0924RB, 
2011 WL 13210246, at *8 (D.N.M. 2011) (unpublished opinion) ("If the penalty phase is 
reached, the Confrontation Clause would apply in the eligibility stage due to Ring [v. 
Arizona's, 536 U.S. 584,] requirement that facts necessary to expose [the defendant] to a 
death sentence must be found by a jury"; however, "[i]f [the defendant] is found eligible 
for death, the trial would proceed to the selection stage and the general rule allowing 
hearsay at sentencing would apply.").  
 
With the foregoing in mind, we qualify this court's general pronouncement in 
R. Carr (that the Confrontation Clause applies during the penalty phase) by clarifying 
that in Kansas capital sentencing proceedings, the Confrontation Clause applies only to 
evidence relevant to the jury's eligibility decision. A defendant's confrontation rights do 
not extend to evidence relevant to the jury's selection decision.  
 
While Kansas' capital sentencing scheme does not contemplate bifurcated penalty-
phase proceedings (only the guilt phase and penalty phase are bifurcated), district court 
judges are still well-positioned to delineate between evidence relevant to eligibility and 
other evidence relevant to selection. Going forward, trial courts in Kansas should apply 
the Confrontation Clause when the State introduces evidence relevant to the existence of 
one or more statutory aggravating circumstances. However, when the State introduces or 
relies on testimonial hearsay during its rebuttal and cross-examination for purposes of 
controverting or impeaching the testimony of a capital defendant's mitigation witnesses—
provided such evidence does not bolster an aggravating circumstance—the Confrontation 
Clause shall not apply to such evidence. See State v. McGill, 213 Ariz. 147, 159, 140 
P.3d 930 (2006) (recognizing a distinction between "hearsay used to establish an 
aggravating factor, to which the Confrontation Clause applies, and hearsay used to rebut 
mitigation, to which the Confrontation Clause does not apply"). 
 
74 
 
 
b. Any Confrontation Clause Violation Was Harmless 
 
Despite the foregoing qualification, we will assume the contested evidence in this 
case is subject to the Confrontation Clause based on the statements and rationale set forth 
in the court's prior decision. On the facts of the case, however, we hold any Confrontation 
Clause violation was harmless because there is no reasonable possibility the assumed 
error affected the jury's ultimate conclusion regarding the weight of the aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, i.e., the death sentence verdict. See Ward, 292 Kan. at 565 
(providing degree of certainty in outcome required to hold an error that implicates federal 
constitutional rights was harmless).  
 
In its petitions for writ of certiorari filed with the United States Supreme Court, 
the State sought a ruling on this issue, but the Court declined review. See Carr, 575 U.S. 
934 (2015) (No. 14-450) (grant of petition for certiorari limited to questions 1 and 3); 575 
U.S. 934 (2015) (No. 14-449) (same); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kansas v. Carr, 
2014 WL 5337864, at *i (2014) (No. 14-450) ("Whether the Confrontation Clause, as 
interpreted in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 [2004], and Davis v. Washington, 
547 U.S. 813 [2006], applies to the 'selection' phase of capital sentencing proceedings, as 
the Kansas Supreme Court held here . . . . "); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Kansas v. 
Carr, 2014 WL 5337863, at *i (2014) (No. 14-449) (same). Nevertheless, the Court 
opined that any cross-examination regarding such hearsay statements "would not have 
had the slightest effect upon the sentences." Carr, 577 U.S. at 126. 
 
We agree the hearsay statements forming the basis of the prosecutor's cross-
examination questions were innocuous, and the same or similar information was first 
introduced by defendants in their mitigation cases. Therefore, even if we assume error 
because R. Carr did not have a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarants, such 
 
75 
 
error alone does not require us to vacate the death sentence. The jury learned little, if 
anything, it did not already know about R. Carr from the challenged declarations. 
 
F. P6—Exclusion of Mitigating Evidence 
 
Under the law of the case, we reiterate our previous conclusion that the district 
judge did not abuse his discretion by excluding R. Carr's evidence about the likelihood 
of being paroled, if not sentenced to death. As more fully explained in R. Carr, that 
evidence lacked probative value. The district court correctly ruled it was irrelevant. 
R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 291-92; see State v. Prine, 287 Kan. 713, 725, 200 P.3d 1 (2009) 
(evidence failing to meet probative value or materiality element of relevance test is 
inadmissible). 
 
R. Carr also complained about the district court's decision to exclude as irrelevant 
his sister's testimony about what she wanted the jury to do regarding his sentence and 
how she would be affected if he were executed. R. Carr did not proffer the excluded 
testimony. In its previous decision, the court said, "[A]ny admitted testimony of this 
nature needs to have some bearing on the material question of the defendant's character, 
i.e., be probative on that material fact." 300 Kan. at 292.  
 
The failure to proffer leaves behind a record devoid of the information necessary 
to conduct a meaningful review of the relevancy determination. See State v. Hudgins, 301 
Kan. 629, 651, 346 P.3d 1062 (2015) (failure to proffer excluded evidence precludes 
appellate review); R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 292-93 (holding that failure to proffer excluded 
testimony precluded meaningful review of admissibility). Under the law of the case, we 
find no error. 
 
 
76 
 
G. P7—Agreement of Other Experts 
 
R. Carr next contends the State elicited expert opinion testimony that violated 
the Confrontation Clause. To fully analyze R. Carr's various challenges to the expert 
witness testimony and to promote clarity in our discussion, it is helpful to first highlight 
additional factual background relevant to these issues. See Issues P8 (surrebuttal 
testimony); P18 (prosecutorial error); P22 (cumulative error). 
 
"Dueling PET Scan Experts and Denial of Continuance for Surrebuttal 
 
"The defense presented testimony from Dr. David Preston, a specialist in nuclear 
medicine who was qualified as an expert for the defense at the penalty phase regarding 
PET imaging and its use as a diagnostic technique. Preston said that a PET scan of a 
person's brain is not accepted to predict or explain criminal behavior, but he did identify 
what he said were abnormalities in both R. Carr's and J. Carr's scans. Specifically, he said 
images of their temporal lobes demonstrated marked deficits in metabolism in the regions 
of the hippocampus and amygdala. 
 
"Preston testified that Exhibit A-39, an image of R. Carr's brain, and Exhibit JC-
2, an image of J. Carr's brain, displayed images that were higher in back and lower in 
front to give a larger view of their temporal lobes. He also admitted on direct examination 
that he had mistakenly classified Exhibit A-40 as a PET scan of a normal young male for 
comparison purposes. In fact, it was an image of a 50-year old male with a memory 
problem. 
 
"Preston further testified that, in patients he has seen in the past, a closed head 
injury would be the first thing he would suspect as a cause of the type of deficits he 
observed in the defendants' scans. But he said that no history of closed head injuries was 
provided to him in this case. 
 
 
77 
 
"The State called Dr. Norman Pay, a neuroradiologist, in rebuttal to Preston. On 
direct examination, Pay testified that he consulted with the person at Via Christi Medical 
Center who performed the PET scans on the defendants, the doctor in charge of PET 
scans at Via Christi, and a neurologist at Via Christi. The State had Pay identify these 
colleagues, who were in the courtroom, and asked each of them to raise a hand, which 
they did. Pay said all three were in agreement with him that Exhibits A-39 and JC-2 were 
skewed in color and were manipulated so that the anterior portion of the temporal lobe, 
which includes the amygdala, would not appear in the images. When the prosecutor 
asked Pay if the manipulated images were 'by design,' he responded, 'We were told.' 
 
"Pay further testified that, looking at all of the PET images, he and the others he 
consulted had reached the opinion that the scans showed normal metabolism in both 
defendants' brains. 
 
"J. Carr's counsel objected to admission of opinions from Pay's colleagues in the 
courtroom, but the objection was overruled. 
 
"On cross-examination, Pay admitted that he normally does not read PET scans, 
despite being asked to do so in this case. He said that the difference between JC-2 and 
State's Exhibit 912, another of J. Carr's PET scan images on which he was relying to give 
his opinion, might be the presence of 'scatter' in 912. Scatter can produce a halo effect 
that can be eliminated by reducing the background color. 
 
"When asked if he could tell whether Preston had manipulated the images so that 
they would be higher in back and lower in front, Pay responded, 'You know, we have to 
have Dr. Preston here to testify because I don't really know what he did.' Pay agreed that 
if two dots in one of the images were indicative of J. Carr's eyes, it might necessarily 
involve the area of the hippocampus and amygdala. He also testified on cross-
examination that he did not attempt to contact Preston to ask him how he arrived at his 
conclusions and that he was not there to cast any aspersions on Preston's integrity or 
competence. 
 
 
78 
 
"The defense requested a continuance to confer with Preston and recall him as a 
witness in surrebuttal. Counsel argued that he must be permitted to address the State's 
allegation that he manipulated the PET images 'by design.' 
 
"Judge Clark characterized the disagreement between Preston and Pay as 'a fact 
question for the jury . . . between experts' and said that Preston 'would be repeating what 
he had said in direct.' He denied the motion for continuance. 
 
"In closing argument, one of the prosecutors argued that the 'truth' as revealed by 
the 'doctors' showed that Preston's 'slick' PET scan images and related testimony were 
'hocus pocus.' The prosecutor said that the 'foundation of the [defendants'] sympathy and 
abuse excuse and blame' had come 'crashing down' and that they were simply dragging 
their 'laundry' into court." R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 272-75. 
 
R. Carr complains the State's rebuttal expert (Dr. Norman Pay) should not have 
been allowed to testify that other experts agreed with his opinions about the positron 
emission tomography (PET) scans. We set out this challenged testimony in our earlier 
decision. 300 Kan. at 293-95. Considering the question only for guidance on remand, we 
concluded the controlling question was whether the out-of-court statements qualified as 
testimonial hearsay under the Sixth Amendment and Crawford. Our clarification today 
concerning the application of the Confrontation Clause to Kansas penalty phase 
proceedings—that confrontation rights apply only to evidence relevant to the jury's 
eligibility determination, i.e., the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances—
potentially calls into question the framing of this issue prospectively. But for today's 
purposes, in the spirit of the doctrine of the law of the case, we will continue to frame the 
issue in this fashion. 
 
Now, presented with this question, we must first examine whether the statements 
made by Pay's colleagues were testimonial. We have previously noted that the inquiry 
into what constitutes testimonial hearsay "should generally seek to identify statements 
 
79 
 
that are by nature substituting for trial testimony." State v. Williams, 306 Kan. 175, 197, 
392 P.3d 1267 (2017); see also United States v. Katso, 74 M.J. 273, 279 (C.A.A.F. 2015) 
("'[A] statement is testimonial if "made under circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a 
later trial."'"), cert. denied 136 S. Ct. 1512 (2016). 
 
In this case, the statements made by Pay's colleagues were testimonial in nature in 
that they were made specifically in preparing for trial testimony. But that does not end the 
inquiry. An expert's reliance on testimonial hearsay is not a per se Confrontation Clause 
violation. Cf. Katso, 74 M.J. at 282 ("[T]he admissibility of the expert's opinion hinges 
on the degree of independent analysis the expert undertook in order to arrive at that 
opinion."). The question becomes whether the expert is testifying as a witness in his or 
her own right or testifying as a mere "conduit" for the testimonial hearsay. See United 
States v. Pablo, 696 F.3d 1280, 1288 (10th Cir. 2012) (if expert "simply parrots" another 
person's out-of-court statements rather than conveying independent judgment, expert 
effectively disclosing statement for substantive truth; "the expert thereby becomes little 
more than a backdoor conduit for an otherwise inadmissible statement"). The 
Confrontation Clause forecloses the expert's opinion testimony only in the latter instance. 
United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 635 (4th Cir. 2009) ("An expert witness's 
reliance on evidence that Crawford would bar if offered directly only becomes a problem 
where the witness is used as little more than a conduit or transmitter for testimonial 
hearsay, rather than as a true expert whose considered opinion sheds light on some 
specialized factual situation."). 
 
The expert-as-conduit problem may become especially problematic in federal 
gang-related cases in which the nature or existence of a gang is a material issue. See, e.g., 
United States v. Vera, 770 F.3d 1232, 1238 (9th Cir. 2014) ("This testimony was directly 
relevant to several material issues in the case, including whether MS13 was an enterprise, 
 
80 
 
had an effect on interstate or foreign commerce or engaged in narcotics trafficking."). In 
such cases, a gang expert's testimony may just be a recitation of otherwise inadmissible 
evidence to establish material facts rather than a presentation of "information to explain a 
bona fide expert opinion." 770 F.3d at 1238.  
 
The Ninth Circuit illustrated the characteristics common to this expert-as-conduit 
problem in Vera: 
 
"Most problematically, the agent's drug tax testimony 'was based directly on statements 
made by an MS-13 member in custody (during the course of this very investigation).' Id. 
(emphasis omitted). To form his drug tax opinion, therefore, the agent did not have to 
conduct a 'synthesis of various source materials' or apply any of 'his extensive experience 
[or] a reliable methodology.' Id. at 197 (quoting Dukagjini, 326 F.3d at 58) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Instead, the agent 'communicated out-of-court testimonial 
statements of cooperating witnesses and confidential informants directly to the jury in the 
guise of an expert opinion.'" 770 F.3d at 1238. 
 
Similar issues may arise in the context of expert testimony related to laboratory testing or 
autopsies. See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 78, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 183 L. Ed. 2d 
89 (2012) (plurality opinion) (discussing "legitimate nonhearsay purpose of illuminating 
the expert's thought process"). 
 
These decisions illustrate "that the extent to which an expert witness may disclose 
to a jury an otherwise inadmissible out-of-court statement without implicating a 
defendant's confrontation rights is a question of degree." Pablo, 696 F.3d at 1288 (citing 
Johnson, 587 F.3d at 635). We note that in situations such as those described in Vera, the 
problem of expert-as-conduit is not the amplification of multiple experts' opinions but the 
fact that the so-called expert is not actually giving expert testimony.  
 
 
81 
 
Thus, the question of whether Pay's testimony violated the Confrontation Clause 
turns on whether Pay was testifying as a witness himself based on an independent 
analysis of the evidence or merely as a conduit for the opinions of his colleagues. The 
record confirms that Pay was not merely regurgitating the opinion of others. He formed 
an independent opinion by synthesizing the scans Dr. David Preston had relied on and 
analyzing that information based on his expertise in the field. 
 
Pay's initial testimony identifying his colleagues coincided with the prosecutors 
asking various persons in the courtroom to stand and raise their hands. Pay's testimony at 
that point was that he had conferred with these people in reaching a conclusion, and that 
these individuals had also reviewed the images. Merely informing the jury that he had 
consulted with colleagues in reaching his opinion does not violate the Confrontation 
Clause, as Pay did not relate any of his colleagues' conclusions. Cf. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 
60-458 ("The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or 
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert. If of a type reasonably 
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the 
subject, the facts or data need not be admissible into evidence in order for the opinion or 
inference to be admitted."); State v. Sauerbry, 447 S.W.3d 780, 785 (Mo. App. 2014) 
(testifying medical examiner may properly testify to his or her own opinions and 
conclusions, even if relying upon absent examiner's report, without violating 
Confrontation Clause, so long as testifying examiner does not discuss the absent 
examiner's opinions or conclusions, and absent examiner's report is not admitted into 
evidence). 
 
Thereafter, the State asked Pay specific questions about the scans and how he 
interpreted them. In other words, Pay's personal conclusions were based on his synthesis 
of the available information, utilizing his expertise in the field.  
 
 
82 
 
The more problematic statements occur later in Pay's testimony. Specifically, the 
State's compound question asking whether Pay had conferred with colleagues and then 
whether "there [is] a conclusion as to the function of Jonathan Carr's brain." At that point, 
there was an objection to the introduction of other's opinions, but the objection was 
overruled. Pay was then asked if the "consensus" was that the brain in the scans was 
"normal." Pay agreed with that conclusion. He then confirmed that neither he nor any of 
his colleagues had a "quarrel" with that conclusion. Pay answered similar questions in a 
similar manner for R. Carr's scans. 
 
But this testimony added nothing substantive to what the jury already heard. It 
merely added weight to that evidence. It is speculative to suggest this testimony added 
substantial weight to his opinion given the extraordinarily vague reference to the other 
experts Pay consulted. And such speculation is unrealistic given that the defense's own 
expert conceded the PET scans were not reliable tools to predict or explain criminal 
behavior.  
 
Although hearsay testimony about a colleague's opinion and conclusion may 
violate the Confrontation Clause in some instances, here Pay offered an independent 
opinion and interpretation of the PET scans based on his synthesis of the evidence. 
Accordingly, Pay was not merely a conduit for the expert opinions of others. See Rector 
v. State, 285 Ga. 714, 715, 681 S.E.2d 157 (2009) (holding Confrontation Clause not 
violated when toxicologist who testified at trial had reviewed the work of the doctor who 
had originally prepared the report and reached the same conclusion that the victim's blood 
sample tested negative for cocaine; "[r]ather than being a mere conduit for [the doctor's] 
findings, [the toxicologist] reviewed the data and testing procedures to determine the 
accuracy of [the] report. An expert may base [his] opinions on data gathered by others."); 
People v. McAdams, 170 A.D.3d 549, 550, 94 N.Y.S.3d 841 (expert was not merely a 
conduit for conclusions of other experts where testimony demonstrated she conducted her 
 
83 
 
own independent analysis of the raw data to make DNA comparison opinion), leave to 
appeal denied 33 N.Y.3d 1033 (2019); State v. Griep, 361 Wis. 2d 657, 682, 863 N.W.2d 
567 (2015) (If the expert witness reviewed data created by the nontestifying analyst and 
formed an independent opinion, the expert's testimony does not violate the Confrontation 
Clause.). 
 
In sum, although we assume the Confrontation Clause applied to Pay's testimony, 
his vague assertions that other experts agreed with him did not transform Pay into a mere 
conduit for the opinions of others. Thus, his testimony did not violate defendants' rights 
under the Confrontation Clause. 
 
H. P8—Denial of Surrebuttal Testimony 
 
In its earlier decision, this court determined the district judge abused his discretion 
in denying a continuance so that the defense's mitigation expert witness, Preston, could 
be present during Pay's rebuttal testimony and then testify in surrebuttal. We held the 
district court relied on a mistaken view that Preston could testify in surrebuttal only if he 
had something new to say in response to Pay's critique of his work. R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 
296-98. We said: 
 
"It is hard to imagine a situation in which the allowance of surrebuttal would be more 
sensible and its denial more arbitrary. Judge Clark also abused his discretion because no 
reasonable person presiding over a death penalty case that had been in court for more 
than 2 months would have agreed with his decision to disallow surrebuttal requiring a 
delay of, at most, a couple of hours." 300 Kan. at 298. 
 
Under the law of the case, the question of error is settled, so we must now consider 
whether it was harmless. 
 
 
84 
 
J. Carr argues the State, through Pay's testimony, was allowed to gut a major 
component of his mitigation case immediately before the penalty phase closed, and the 
district court deprived him of the right to rehabilitate his expert, Preston. He claims this 
significantly impaired his right to a fair trial. Therefore, J. Carr argues, the constitutional 
harmless error test applies. We are unpersuaded by this argument. 
 
The error—Judge Clark's abuse of discretion—arose out of his misunderstanding 
of state evidentiary law, and it was labeled arbitrary under our state law standard for 
analyzing abuse of discretion claims. See Ward, 292 Kan. at 550 (setting out three ways 
discretion may be abused [citing State v. Gonzalez, 290 Kan. 747, 755-56, 234 P.3d 1 
(2010)]); State v. Martin, 237 Kan. 285, 291-92, 699 P.2d 486 (1985) (setting out state 
law governing rebuttal). That said, we recognize an error arising out of state law may 
nevertheless implicate a criminal defendant's federal due process right to a fair trial. See 
State v. Sherman, 305 Kan. 88, 98, 378 P.3d 1060 (2016) (recognizing prosecutorial error 
may violate federal constitutional due process right).  
 
Regardless, we conclude the district court's refusal to let Preston testify in 
surrebuttal was harmless under either standard. The district court gave defense counsel an 
opportunity to interview Pay before cross-examination, and defense counsel effectively 
cross-examined Pay on issues relevant to Preston's credibility. Moreover, Preston's 
opinion was limited to his interpretation of the PET scans, and he readily acknowledged 
these scans were not reliable tools to predict criminal behavior. In the end, the 
defendants' mitigation cases were not materially impacted by Pay's testimony and the 
district court's error was harmless beyond reasonable doubt.  
 
 
85 
 
I. 
P9—Sentencing on Noncapital Convictions 
 
Defendants requested the district court instruct the jury on the number of years 
defendants would be required to serve in prison if not sentenced to death. The court 
informed the jury the defendants would not be eligible for parole for between 50 and 268 
years. On appeal, R. Carr argued the district court's failure to communicate the specific 
term of incarceration under an alternative sentence violated his Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights and section 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights. R. Carr, 300 
Kan. at 298-99.  
 
In its previous decision, our court unanimously concluded the Constitution did not 
demand more precision in the district court's instruction. 300 Kan. at 301. We adopt this 
holding under the law of the case. 
 
However, the court also acknowledged that Kleypas I required the district court, 
upon request, to instruct a jury on the number of years a defendant would be required to 
serve in prison if not sentenced to death, including the possible prison terms for each 
noncapital charge and the possibility the sentences could be served either consecutively 
or concurrently. In R. Carr's case, we concluded the instruction deviated from the 
Kleypas I requirements in failing to specify the possible prison terms for each noncapital 
charge and failing to inform jurors that the judge would decide whether such sentences 
would run consecutive or concurrent. But we did not regard this technical error as 
particularly serious. 300 Kan. at 302. The parties have not submitted additional argument 
on this issue. 
 
To the extent these deviations constitute error, it was error under state law. 
Accordingly, to hold the error harmless we must be persuaded there is no reasonable 
probability the error affected the jury's ultimate conclusion regarding the weight of the 
 
86 
 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, i.e., the death sentence verdict. See Ward, 292 
Kan. at 565. 
 
As explained in our earlier decision, the court informed the jury about the shortest 
sentence possible in lieu of death, and R. Carr's counsel was able to argue a term of 
imprisonment was sufficient to protect the public. R. Carr was not deprived of the 
opportunity to argue this mitigating factor. R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 300-01. To the extent the 
district court erred, there is no reasonable probability such error alone affected the jury's 
verdict. 
 
J. P11—"The Crime" in Aggravating Circumstances Instruction  
 
Penalty phase Instruction No. 5 told the jury it could find aggravating 
circumstances existed if defendants committed "the crime" for monetary gain, to evade 
arrest, or in a heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. R. Carr argues the phrase "the crime" 
allowed the jury to rely on his conviction of a crime other than capital murder to find the 
existence of an aggravating circumstance. This claim of jury instruction error was raised  
for the first time on appeal. In its earlier decision, this court addressed the claim for 
purposes of providing direction on remand but did not resolve the challenge. See 300 
Kan. at 306. 
 
As previously noted, we apply a four-step analysis to review jury instruction 
challenges. We first consider the reviewability of the issue and then determine whether 
the instruction was legally and factually appropriate. If we conclude there is error, we 
turn to reversibility in the final step. Plummer, 295 Kan. at 163. Where, as here, the 
defendant fails to raise the instruction issue at the penalty phase trial, the clearly 
erroneous standard applies to the reversibility inquiry. State v. Kleypas, 305 Kan. 224, 
306, 382 P.3d 373 (2016) (Kleypas II). 
 
87 
 
 
J. Carr claims this court, in its previous decision, determined the instruction was 
erroneous. We do not agree. While this court suggested it may be inadvisable to use the 
phrase "the crime" in lieu of "capital murder" when examining the instruction in 
isolation, it did not squarely address and reach a holding on the question of error. R. Carr, 
300 Kan. at 306.  
 
To the contrary, we hold the instructions, read together as a whole, were legally 
appropriate. Instruction No. 5 defined the four aggravating circumstances advanced by 
the State in the penalty phase, including that "the crime" was committed for monetary 
gain, to evade arrest, or in a heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. This instruction is 
patterned after language the Legislature used to define aggravating circumstances under 
K.S.A. 21-4636. See State v. Robinson, 303 Kan. 11, 332-33, 363 P.3d 875 (2015) 
(finding penalty phase instruction based on the language of the statute was legally 
appropriate), disapproved of on other grounds by Cheever II, 306 Kan. 760.  
 
Additionally, in his remarks introducing these instructions to the jury, the district 
judge clarified:   
 
"As you know, our focus here is on the first four counts, those are the capital murder 
counts.  
 
"It is the responsibility of the jury to decide the proper sentence for the individual 
defendants in those four counts. . . . It is my responsibility to decide on the proper 
sentence for the individual defendant on all other counts in which you returned a verdict 
of guilty."  
 
Consistent with these remarks, Instruction No. 1 informed jurors that the sentencing 
proceeding was being conducted because the defendants had been found "guilty of capital 
murder." In Instruction No. 9, the trial judge instructed the jury to sign the appropriate 
 
88 
 
verdict form that coincided with its sentencing decision. This instruction clarified that 
jurors had "been provided verdict forms which provide for three alternative verdicts in 
each of the four counts of Capital Murder." (Emphasis added.) In turn, each verdict form 
explicitly referenced the capital murder counts and made no mention of any other 
charged offenses.  
 
Viewed together, the jury instructions made clear "the crime" in question was 
capital murder. See State v. Williams, 308 Kan. 1439, 1453, 430 P.3d 448 (2018) (stating 
general rule that jury instructions must be considered as a whole, with no instruction 
considered in isolation). Accordingly, we find no error.  
 
K. P12—Instruction on the Role of Mercy 
 
R. Carr argued the district court erroneously instructed the jury that "'[t]he 
appropriateness of exercising mercy can itself be a mitigating factor in determining 
whether the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the death penalty should be 
imposed.'" R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 307. In its earlier decision, the court "adhere[d] to [its] 
precedent rejecting the argument that equating mercy to a mitigating factor is error at all." 
300 Kan. at 307.  
 
The parties offer no basis to revisit this previous determination or the underlying 
precedent supporting it. Under the law of the case, we find no error.  
 
L. P13—Verdict Forms Instruction 
 
The district court provided the jury with three verdict forms, each encompassing 
one of three possible verdicts:  unanimously recommending death; unanimously finding 
no aggravators existed; or failing to unanimously agree either that aggravators existed or 
 
89 
 
upon a death verdict. Instruction No. 10 explained how to use those forms. The third 
paragraph of Instruction No. 10 was intended to correspond to Verdict Form (3) if jurors 
arrived at the third possible verdict option, but a disparity existed between the instruction 
and the verdict form. Neither defendant objected to the instruction at trial. 
 
J. Carr raised this issue in his separate appeal, and we noticed it in our earlier 
decision as an unassigned error for R. Carr under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6619(b). We 
follow that route to the merits here as well. 
 
As the court decided in its previous opinion, the verdict forms provided the proper 
standard under the controlling law at the time. See Kleypas II, 305 Kan. at 293-94 
(discussing interpretation history of K.S.A. 21-4624). But Instruction No. 10 garbled this 
standard by introducing an extra "not" into the sentence:  it instructed the jury to reject 
the death penalty if "one or more jurors is not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that 
aggravating circumstances . . . do not outweigh mitigating circumstances . . . ." R. Carr, 
300 Kan. at 310-11. Because the instruction's language conflicted with the law, as 
correctly stated in the verdict form, there was error. 300 Kan. at 311.  
 
As previously noted, the court applies the clearly erroneous standard to 
unpreserved instructional error in capital sentencing proceedings. Kleypas II, 305 Kan. at 
302. We now consider whether this instructional error standing alone is clearly erroneous. 
 
The State cites no additional authority but characterizes the error as "nuanced" and 
one "not readily noticeable." The State contends the error was "harmless under any test," 
yet asserts there was "no reasonable likelihood that the jury applied Instruction 10 in a 
way that prevented consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence." J. Carr asserts 
the discrepancy within the instruction is akin to structural error that compels the vacation 
of his capital sentence. 
 
90 
 
 
We reject J. Carr's characterization of the error and hold that the clearly erroneous 
standard applies but is unmet. The jury used Verdict Form (1) on all counts, meaning it 
unanimously determined beyond reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances existed 
and outweighed mitigating circumstances. On this record, we are not firmly convinced 
the error in Instruction No. 10 played any role in the jury's sentencing determination—
much less that it "would have reached a different verdict had the instruction error not 
occurred." 305 Kan. at 302. 
 
M.  P14—Defendant's Age at the Time of the Capital Crime 
 
The district court did not instruct the jury to find R. Carr and J. Carr were at least 
18 years old at the time of the murders. This was error. See State v. Cheever, 295 Kan. 
229, 265, 284 P.3d 1007 (2012) (Cheever I) (fact defendant was at least 18 years old at 
time of capital crime necessary to subject defendant to death penalty, within scope of 
Sixth Amendment protection), vacated and remanded 571 U.S. 87, 134 S. Ct. 596, 187 L. 
Ed. 2d 519 (2013). Such error is subject to harmless error analysis. See Cheever II, 306 
Kan. at 796. "When a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the 
jury verdict would have been the same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is 
properly found to be harmless." State v. Reyna, 290 Kan. 666, Syl. ¶ 10, 234 P.3d 761 
(2010). 
 
The undisputed evidence at trial established that R. Carr was 23 years old when 
the capital crimes occurred. A Wichita police officer, R. Carr's family members, and his 
expert witnesses provided testimony from which his age at the time of the crimes could 
be determined. Likewise, testimony concerning J. Carr from his mother and sister, as well 
as an expert witness, established he was over the age of 18 when the crime occurred. 
 
91 
 
 
The omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence. 
We conclude beyond a reasonable doubt the jury verdict would have been the same 
absent the error. See Cheever II, 306 Kan. at 796 ("Because the record did not contain 
evidence that could rationally lead a jury to find that Cheever was under the age of 18 at 
the time of the offense, any error in failing to have the jury find his age was harmless."). 
 
N. P15—The Requested No-Adverse-Inference Instruction 
 
During the penalty-phase instructions conference, R. Carr's counsel orally 
requested PIK Crim. 3d 52.13. It provides:  "A defendant in a criminal trial has a 
constitutional right not to be compelled to testify. You must not draw any inference of 
guilt from the fact that the defendant did not testify, and you must not consider this fact in 
arriving at your verdict." Counsel argued this instruction applied in the penalty phase 
because R. Carr did not testify. J. Carr's counsel objected to this instruction. The district 
court did not give the instruction. 
 
Any error arising from that decision was invited by J. Carr. See State v. Sasser, 
305 Kan. 1231, 1235, 391 P.3d 698 (2017) (defendant cannot complain on appeal about a 
claimed error that was invited). Therefore, this issue applies only in R. Carr's separate 
appeal. 
 
In its earlier decision, our court acknowledged the United States Supreme Court 
has held that a rule requiring a no-adverse-inference instruction on request is not clearly 
established by its precedent. See White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 420-21, 134 S. Ct. 
1697, 188 L. Ed. 2d 698 (2014) (state court's refusal to give no-adverse-inference 
instruction did not warrant federal habeas relief under Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996; Act requires showing of unreasonable application of Supreme Court 
 
92 
 
precedent; discussing earlier cases holding court may not draw adverse inference from 
defendant's silence when determining facts about crime that bear on severity of sentence). 
But we also recognized "[t]he giving of such an instruction, if requested in a penalty 
phase, has been required in at least three of our sister jurisdictions and has been described 
as the wisest course in a fourth." R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 312 (citing State v. Storey, 986 
S.W.2d 462, 463-64 [Mo.1999] [en banc]; State v. Munn, 56 S.W.3d 486, 501-02 [Tenn. 
2001]; Burns v. State, 699 So. 2d 646, 651 [Fla. 1997]; State v. Arther, 290 S.C. 291, 298, 
350 S.E.2d 187 [1986]). But see White v. Commonwealth, 544 S.W.3d 125, 146-47 
(Ky. 2017) (holding no error when prosecutor argued during penalty phase proceedings 
that jury "'never heard one word or witnessed one action of any remorse from the 
defendant'" because argument germane to sentencing and, in court's view, Woodall Court 
held instruction not required during penalty phase). 
 
Our court did not reach the merits of this challenge because it was unlikely to arise 
on the anticipated remand. Now, the merits are squarely before us. The issue is subject to 
the traditional legal standard applied to preserved instructional issues, as set out in 
Plummer, 295 Kan. 156, Syl. ¶ 1 (appellate review of instructional issues first considers 
reviewability; next determines de novo whether instruction legally appropriate; then 
whether instruction supported by evidence viewed in light most favorable to defendant or 
requesting party; and, finally, whether any error was harmless). 
 
Whether the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution compels a district 
court to provide a requested no-adverse-inference instruction during the penalty phase of 
a capital trial remains an open question that the United States Supreme Court has yet to 
resolve. And persuasive authority from other state and federal courts remains divided. 
Regardless, we need not answer this open question to resolve R. Carr's challenge because 
the instruction he proffered was not legally appropriate. Thus, the district court's failure 
to give it was not error. 
 
93 
 
 
R. Carr's requested instruction would have informed the jury, "You must not draw 
any inference of guilt from the fact that the defendant did not testify, and you must not 
consider this fact in arriving at your verdict." (Emphasis added.) Although an appropriate 
guilt phase instruction, this language is inappropriate in the penalty phase. A defendant's 
guilt during the sentencing phase of a capital trial has already been established, mooting 
any inference—positive or negative—a juror might make about the defendant's silence 
during the penalty phase. In essence, such an instruction would be an oblique and 
confusing invocation of the notion of residual doubt. 
 
Even those courts that have found error in the failure to give a sentencing phase 
no-adverse-inference instruction have endorsed a modified guilt phase instruction that 
removes any mention of inferences of guilt. See Storey, 986 S.W.2d at 463 (requested 
instruction:  "'Under the law, a defendant has the right not to testify. No presumption may 
be raised and no inference of any kind may be drawn from the fact that the defendant did 
not testify.'"); Burns, 699 So. 2d at 651 (requested instruction:  "'A defendant in a 
criminal case has a constitutional right not to testify at any stage of the proceedings. You 
must not draw any inference from the fact that a defendant does not testify.'").  
 
Having concluded that R. Carr's requested instruction was not legally appropriate, 
we need not address harmlessness. But we note that the absence of a no-adverse-
inference instruction in any form would have been harmless error, if it was error at all.  
 
Were we to apply the Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. 
Ed. 2d 705 (1967), harmless error standard to the facts before us, we are convinced there 
is no reasonable possibility the omitted instruction affected the jury's ultimate conclusion 
regarding the weight of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, i.e., the death 
sentence verdict. Based on the amount and quality of guilt-phase evidence, which the 
 
94 
 
State relied on to support aggravating circumstances during the penalty phase, there is no 
reasonable possibility jurors made adverse inferences from R. Carr's silence which then 
contributed to the jury's finding that the aggravating circumstances were proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  
 
Nor does the record, viewed in its entirety, lend any support to the conclusion that 
the jury made inferences from R. Carr's silence that adversely impacted its consideration 
of the mitigation evidence. During the penalty phase, both defendants were allowed to 
present a complete presentation of their mitigation theories. Defendants offered evidence 
of trauma they experienced during their childhoods, head injuries, suicide attempts, and 
other traumatic events in their lives. Jurors were properly instructed on the definition of 
mitigating circumstances and informed they could consider sympathy for a defendant and 
that the appropriateness of exercising mercy can itself be a mitigating factor. The district 
court clarified that each juror could consider as a mitigating circumstance any factor he or 
she found to be a basis for imposing a sentence less than death. The instructions also 
made clear jurors need not be unanimous as to which factors each deems to be mitigating 
in arriving at his or her sentencing decision. See State v. Race, 293 Kan. 69, 77, 259 P.3d 
707 (2011) ("We generally presume jurors follow the instructions given them in the 
district court."). Given this record, any claim that the jury might have drawn improper, 
adverse inferences from R. Carr's decision not to testify is, at best, purely speculative.  
 
For these reasons, we hold the district court did not err in declining the instruction 
R. Carr proffered, and even if that decision could be construed as error, it was harmless.  
 
O. P16—Capital Punishment for Aider and Abettor Under K.S.A. 21-3205 
 
For the reasons stated in the court's previous decision, we do not reach the merits 
of this claim. R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 257, 313. 
 
95 
 
 
P.  P17—Capital Punishment for Aider and Abettor Under Section 9 
 
For the reasons stated in the court's previous decision, we do not reach the merits 
of this claim. 300 Kan. at 257, 313-14. 
 
Q. P18—Prosecutorial Error 
 
In their original appellate briefs, R. Carr and J. Carr alleged numerous instances 
of prosecutorial error and argued them under the framework established in State v. Tosh, 
278 Kan. 83, 91 P.3d 1204 (2004), overruled by Sherman, 305 Kan. 88 (2016). Since 
then, that framework was refashioned in Sherman. 305 Kan. at 107. In Kleypas II, this 
court first applied Sherman to a capital penalty-phase trial. Kleypas II, 305 Kan. at 316-
24. But, because the parties in Kleypas II briefed the issue under Tosh and oral argument 
occurred before our Sherman decision, we applied both frameworks to the prosecutorial 
error claims. Here, the parties addressed Sherman in their supplemental briefs and at oral 
argument. Consequently, we apply only the Sherman analysis. 
 
Sherman dictates a two-step process. Under the first step, we consider whether 
prosecutorial error occurred by determining "whether the prosecutorial acts complained 
of fall outside the wide latitude afforded prosecutors to conduct the State's case and 
attempt to obtain a conviction in a manner that does not offend the defendant's 
constitutional right to a fair trial." Sherman, 305 Kan. at 109; see Kleypas II, 305 Kan. 
at 316. If error is found, we advance to the second step and determine whether the error 
prejudiced the defendant's due process right to a fair trial. Kleypas II, 305 Kan. at 316; 
Sherman, 305 Kan. 88, Syl. ¶¶ 6-7. 
 
 
96 
 
In evaluating prejudice, we apply the constitutional harmlessness test in Chapman, 
386 U.S. at 24. Although we continue to acknowledge the K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 60-261 
statutory harmlessness test also applies, when analyzing both constitutional and 
nonconstitutional error we need only address the more demanding federal constitutional 
error standard. See Sherman, 305 Kan. 88, Syl. ¶ 9. Under that standard, prosecutorial 
error is harmless if the State demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt the error 
complained of did not affect the trial's outcome in light of the entire record, i.e., when 
there is no reasonable possibility the error contributed to the verdict. 305 Kan. 88, 
Syl. ¶ 8. 
 
We are also mindful of the United State Supreme Court's discussion of the "subtle 
difference" in the way harmlessness of prosecutorial error should be evaluated in death 
penalty cases. The overwhelming nature of evidence is to be considered, but its impact is 
limited. To the extent there was constitutional error, the question is not what effect the 
error might generally be expected to have upon a reasonable jury but what effect it had 
upon the actual verdict in the case at hand.  
 
"'The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a 
[verdict for death] would surely have been rendered, but whether the [death verdict] 
actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.' [Sullivan v. 
Louisiana,] 508 U.S. [275,] 279 [(1993)]." Kleypas II, 305 Kan. at 274. 
 
Consistent with how we have described the specific penalty phase Chapman 
inquiry elsewhere in this decision, prosecutorial error in the penalty phase of a capital 
trial is harmless when there is no reasonable possibility the error affected the jury's 
ultimate conclusion regarding the weight of the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, i.e., the death sentence verdict. See Kleypas II, 305 Kan. at 316. And 
if more than one prosecutorial error occurred, we consider the net prejudicial effect of 
those errors using the same Chapman inquiry applied to the individual errors. 
 
97 
 
 
Both R. Carr and J. Carr quote extensively from the record and categorize their 
challenges, sometimes placing a prosecutor's statement in more than one category. Many, 
but not all, of the categories overlap. In addition, J. Carr challenges the district court's 
failure to grant his request for a mistrial after one alleged prosecutorial error. He bases a 
constitutional due process complaint on another. 
 
We have reordered and grouped these error claims for clarity. We isolate those 
applying only to J. Carr and address them in our separate decision in his case filed this 
day. The remaining claims apply to both defendants, and we consider them potential 
errors in both appeals regardless of who originally raised them. See K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 
21-6619(b). Although we do not repeat every quote or allegation raised, we have 
thoroughly reviewed each. 
 
1. Arguments and Witness Examinations Addressing Mitigating 
Circumstances  
 
Both defendants allege the State misstated the law on mitigation and discouraged 
individualized sentencing determinations. This was accomplished, they say, by 
prosecutorial arguments and conduct that deterred the jury from considering mitigating 
evidence and suggested the defendants did not deserve mercy. They also allege the State 
improperly denigrated and ridiculed their mitigating evidence. Defendants further 
challenge a prosecutor's statement that, in their view, suggested impeachment of Preston 
and undermined all mitigation evidence. They also contend the prosecutor expressed 
personal opinions regarding the credibility of defense mitigation experts. And, finally, 
they argue the prosecutor improperly denigrated the concept of mercy.  
 
 
98 
 
a. The Prosecutors Did Not Discourage Consideration of 
Mitigating Evidence or Suggest Defendants Did Not Deserve 
Mitigation 
 
In Lockett the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment 
guarantees a capital defendant a right to an individualized sentencing determination, 
meaning the sentencer may not be precluded "from considering, as a mitigating factor, 
any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the 
offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." 438 U.S. 
at 604. It does not matter "'whether the barrier to the sentencer's consideration of all 
mitigating evidence is interposed by statute,' by a trial court's evidentiary ruling, by jury 
instructions, or by prosecutorial argument." Cheever I, 295 Kan. at 269 (quoting Mills v. 
Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 375, 108 S. Ct. 1860, 100 L. Ed. 2d 384 [1988]); see also 
Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 259 n.21, 127 S. Ct. 1654, 167 L. Ed. 2d 585 
(2007) (recognizing prosecutorial argument that prohibits a jury from considering 
relevant mitigating evidence can violate the Eighth Amendment). 
 
Then, in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S. Ct. 869, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1 
(1982), the United States Supreme Court vacated a death sentence when the district judge 
refused to consider certain evidence in mitigation because, in the judge's view, it did not 
excuse the crime. The United States Supreme Court found the exclusion impermissible: 
 
"Just as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any 
mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any 
relevant mitigating evidence. In this instance, it was as if the trial judge had instructed a 
jury to disregard the mitigating evidence Eddings proffered on his behalf. The sentencer, 
and the Court of Criminal Appeals on review, may determine the weight to be given 
relevant mitigating evidence. But they may not give it no weight by excluding such 
evidence from their consideration." 455 U.S. at 113-15. 
 
 
99 
 
Eddings established that a capital sentencing jury must consider all relevant 
mitigating evidence, even if the evidence did not suggest "an absence of responsibility for 
the crime of murder." 455 U.S. at 116; see Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4-5, 
106 S. Ct. 1669, 90 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1986) (vacating death sentence because trial court 
refused to allow defendant to present testimony regarding his conduct while in jail 
awaiting trial, from which jury could have drawn favorable inferences about his character 
and probable future conduct if sentenced to life in prison; "[a]lthough it is true that any 
such inferences would not relate specifically to petitioner's culpability for the crime he 
committed, . . . there is no question but that such inferences would be 'mitigating' in the 
sense that they might serve 'as a basis for a sentence less than death'"). 
 
Kleypas I endorsed these principles from Lockett, Eddings, and Skipper. It 
explained these decisions "make it clear that the sentencer must be allowed to consider all 
relevant mitigating evidence and that such evidence need not excuse or justify the crime 
or in fact relate to the defendant's culpability as long as it serves as a basis for a sentence 
less than death." Kleypas I, 272 Kan. at 1102. At the same time, the State has a 
competing interest in challenging whether a circumstance is mitigating at all and to 
contest the weight the jury should give to a mitigating circumstance. 272 Kan. at 1103 
("[I]t is proper for a prosecutor to argue that certain circumstances not be considered as 
mitigating circumstances."); cf. Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 976-77 (discussing "dilemma" 
posed to sentencer when considering defendant's age at time of crime; noting competing 
arguments from prosecution and defense "bring perspective to a problem, and thus serve 
to promote a more reasoned decision"). 
 
To strike an appropriate balance, Kleypas I identified the following standard for 
challenging mitigation evidence consistent with the Eighth Amendment: 
 
"[I]t is improper for a prosecutor to argue that certain circumstances should not be 
considered as mitigating circumstances because they do not excuse or justify the crime. 
 
100 
 
'Mitigating circumstances are those which in fairness may be considered as extenuating 
or reducing the degree of moral culpability or blame or which justify a sentence of less 
than death, even though they do not justify or excuse the offense.' A prosecutor who 
argues that mitigating circumstances must excuse or justify the crime improperly states 
the law. [Citation omitted.]" 272 Kan. at 1103. 
 
In Cheever I, this court further clarified that a Lockett-based constitutional violation 
occurs only when the State "'"cut[s] off in an absolute manner"' the sentencer's 
consideration of mitigating evidence." 295 Kan. at 270 (citing Kleypas I, 272 Kan. at 
1074). 
 
With this framework in mind, we turn to the alleged errors. During closing 
argument, after a prosecutor referenced the district court's aggravating circumstances 
instruction, she began her mitigation discussion: 
 
"And the question is what mitigates punishment? Something for the jury to 
decide. What is it that should lessen or alleviate or diminish or decrease the responsibility 
of Jonathan and Reginald Carr for the punishment that fits this crime that's set forth by 
the laws of the State of Kansas. This isn't something that was made up yesterday. This is 
the law. And when you think about mitigation, think about mitigation of the execution of 
[H.M.] and [A.S.] and [B.H.] and [J.B.]. Think about no PowerPoints in that field. There 
were no psychologists debating the issues. There weren't any brain scans that were done 
before they were executed. Judge Clark wasn't there. No prosecutors. No defense. There 
wasn't any witness chair that was set up in the snow where family members of [B.H.] and 
[J.B.], and [A.S.] and [H.M.] could come and say, [']Show mercy to my child. She has led 
a good and exemplary life.['] There was no person from [J.B.'s] family to say, [']Please, 
spare this punishment, show mercy.['] There wasn't any witness called for [A.S.]. There 
wasn't any witness called for [B.H.] or [A.S.] or [H.M.]. There was no consideration of 
mitigation for the execution, their punishment that occurred on that field. And there 
wasn't any play-by-play analysis. And the only reason that we know what we know today 
is because there was one survivor, certainly not by plan or design of Reginald Carr or 
Jonathan Carr." 
 
101 
 
 
R. Carr asserts the prosecutor was arguing he had no right to offer mitigating 
evidence and, rather than consider it, the jury should be angry and insulted. J. Carr argues 
this passage "implore[d] the jury not to consider any mitigating circumstances relating to 
the character and record of the defendants because the victims did not have a chance to 
have their characters and records considered in mitigation." The State contends this was a 
proper appeal for a just sentence. 
 
Reasonable minds could probably differ on whether this rises to prosecutorial 
error. On the one hand, there is a theme implicit in this argument that the jury should not 
even consider mitigators because the defendants denied that same opportunity to their 
victims. So construed, that argument would be improper. 
 
But this court has acknowledged that the State has an interest in challenging the 
defendant's mitigation case. Kleypas I, 272 Kan. at 1103. Here, in the quoted passage's 
first two sentences, the prosecutor properly informed the jury it ultimately would decide 
what, if any, circumstance, qualified as valid mitigation. The latter portion of the 
argument questions why the jury should show mercy or decide a circumstance is 
mitigating (particularly in light of the weight of the State's aggravating circumstances) 
when the defendants did not show mercy. As discussed below, this court has held a 
prosecutor may properly argue that a jury should show a perpetrator the same degree of 
mercy showed to a victim. The prosecutor's argument here makes a similar appeal. 
 
Furthermore, the State cites other jurisdictions in which similar statements were 
considered legitimate and proper appeals to the jury for justice. For example, in Gentry v. 
State, 689 So. 2d 894 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994), rev'd on other grounds 689 So. 2d 916 
(Ala. 1996), the court held that similar themes constituted legitimate argument: 
 
 
102 
 
"The appellant contends that the following comments by the prosecutor in 
closing argument constituted an improper appeal to the jury to have sympathy for the 
victim:  '[n]obody went out and empaneled a jury for Kim Hill'; '[y]ou can look at Ward 
Gentry, but you cannot look at Kim Hill'; 'nobody went out and got a judge for Kim'; 
'nobody went out and got two lawyers for Kim'; and '[h]e was her judge, and her jury, and 
her executioner.' He argues that these comments 'impermissibly influenced the jury to 
disregard [its] legal duties and render a guilty verdict because of [its] sympathy for the 
deceased.' We do not agree. We view the comments as a call for justice, not sympathy, 
and, thus conclude that they are within the latitude allowed prosecutors in their 
exhortation to the jury to discharge its duties. The comment that Gentry was 'her judge, 
and her jury, and her executioner' was the prosecutor's impression and opinion derived 
from the evidence in the case, which he could legitimately argue. [Citations omitted.]" 
689 So. 2d at 906. 
 
See also Newton v. State, 78 So. 3d 458, 478-79 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009) (prosecutor's 
argument that victim never given opportunity to make case for life is an appropriate 
appeal for justice). 
 
These decisions are consistent with Scott, where we held that a prosecutor may 
properly argue a defendant is undeserving of mercy, so long as there is no contention the 
jury's exercise of mercy is prohibited. 286 Kan. at 116. We follow this authority here and 
hold this passage from the prosecution's closing was not error. 
 
R. Carr also argues the State erroneously encouraged the jury to reject his 
mitigators because they did not excuse or justify the crimes. He quotes several pages of 
the penalty-phase transcript in which the prosecution attempted to discredit mitigation 
witnesses on cross-examination by illustrating that the social conditions they testified 
to—such as a poor home environment, familial history of mental illness, diminished brain 
activity, and damaging social history—did not cause either defendant to commit the 
crimes. R. Carr admits there were no objections to the prosecutor's questions but asserts 
 
103 
 
they set the stage for the prosecutor's later, improper argument that other people with 
backgrounds similar to the defendants did not commit capital murder, so the jury should 
reject these conditions and events as mitigating factors. 
 
Ordinarily, we require objections to a prosecutor's questions to consider whether 
they constitute error on appeal. See State v. King, 288 Kan. 333, 349, 204 P.3d 585 
(2009). But that preservation rule is relaxed in death penalty cases. See K.S.A. 2020 
Supp. 21-6619(b) (court shall consider any errors asserted in review and appeal). 
 
R. Carr takes issue with the prosecutor's questioning of several mitigation 
witnesses. He highlights the cross-examination of his mother, Janice Harding, when 
the prosecutor asked whether any other family members who grew up with defendants 
in a similar environment committed murder. Then, during Preston's voir dire, the 
prosecutor challenged his qualification to give an opinion on predictive criminal 
behavior, suggesting PET scan interpretation was not a reliable or accepted methodology 
in the scientific community to "predict or explain criminal behavior." And, during 
Preston's cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned whether PET scans could predict 
or explain why a person commits a crime. The prosecutor also attempted to establish 
through another mitigation expert, Dr. Thomas Reidy, that Reidy could not reliably 
predict criminal behavior through his mode of analysis. And, as with Harding, the 
prosecutor inquired whether similarly situated individuals had committed murder. R. Carr 
contends this questioning suggested to the jury it could not consider the testimony of 
these mitigation witnesses because it did not excuse or justify the crime. 
 
He also challenges the following passages from the State's closing argument, 
which, he believes, were founded on this questioning: 
 
• 
"But you can't continue to blame your parents for things that go wrong in your life. 
Around the population of the United States, people get divorced every single day. 
 
104 
 
We try very hard to feed our kids vegetables because they are good for them. I am 
sure a lot of kids are holding their nose and eating broccoli but they don't turn out to 
be individuals who commit capital murder. Children are disciplined. All right, some 
people might not agree with every form of discipline. In fact, you heard Dr. Phyllis 
Harding say, [']You know, at my age when I grew up, there was a certain discipline 
that was accepted and they carry forward that kind of discipline because that's what 
their parents did.[']" 
 
• 
"They beg one of you for sympathy. They want to get that sympathy by suggesting 
that their excuse is to deflect the responsibility. They want to beg you for sympathy 
because of that rough childhood. Because of some abuses, which are primarily based 
on the evidence, the requirement to eat noodles with Miracle Whip, vegetables, pasta 
salad. And to be spanked with a belt while their legs are held down. Is that an insult 
to children who have been placed in bathtubs until their whole bodies have been 
burned? Is that an insult to the children who have been beaten and bruised on their 
whole body by their parents? Is that an insult to children who wished they had a roof 
over their head? Is that an insult to children who feel like they are starving in all 
parts of the world? To suggest that gives them a license to kill?" 
 
J. Carr also points to several remarks made in closing that he characterizes as 
improper for similar reasons. He asserts prosecutors not only told the jury not to consider 
any mitigating circumstances but also to disregard defendants' mitigation evidence as 
truly mitigating because it could not excuse or justify the crimes or was not causally 
related to them. J. Carr places the following comments in this category:   
 
• 
"And I certainly ask you to reflect on the abilities of these two gentlemen here. 
These two individuals, their acts. These were kids who drug their laundry here in 
Court. Put their mother on the witness stand, criticized her. Gave her despicable 
commentary. . . . But you can't continue to blame your parents for things that go 
wrong in your life. Around the population [of the] United States, people get divorced 
every single day. We try very hard to feed our kids vegetables because they are good 
 
105 
 
for them. I am sure a lot of kids are holding their nose and eating broccoli but they 
don't turn out to be individuals who commit capital murder." 
 
• 
"[I]t wasn't the system that failed and it wasn't Jani[ce] Harding that failed. It was 
the defendants who failed to abide by the law and it was by their choice. We hear all 
the time the comment that says guns don't kill people. People kill people. That's 
right. And in this case they chose the Lorcin .380 as the messenger and their 
message was loud and clear." 
 
• 
"They want to blame you that perhaps if you follow the law that somehow you are 
doing something wrong. Passing blame to Mommas and Daddies, society, and 
taking none upon themselves." 
 
• 
"If [defense counsel] had been at Birchwood, would he be pleased to represent 
Jonathan Carr? Sympathetic to a man who tried to kill himself three years before 
this, before these acts. Three years before, drank antifreeze like his dogs that 
somehow got it. Suggests that this isn't about sympathy. But it is because if you 
look—if you look at mitigation, you have to look at what mitigation is defined as, 
reducing culpability. Because someone attempted suicide by drinking antifreeze 
three years before, three years later." 
 
And, finally, J. Carr claims it was improper for the prosecution to say:  "[J. Carr's] 
attempted suicide[ ] that he is seeking your sympathy about, did not stop him from 
making that choice that day" and "[a]nything that would reduce culpability has not been 
presented here." J. Carr describes these statements as "squarely" arguing that mitigating 
evidence is limited to evidence legally justifying or excusing the defendant's participation 
in the crimes committed. 
 
Our handling of similar claims in Kleypas I, Scott, and Cheever I informs our 
analysis of whether the State went too far in tying worthy mitigation to excuse or 
justification of the defendants' crimes. 
 
106 
 
 
In Kleypas I, the prosecutor crossed the line by arguing mitigating circumstances 
must excuse or justify the crime: 
 
"During closing argument, the prosecutor made several references to the fact that 
Kleypas' claimed mitigating circumstances did not excuse or justify the crime. The 
prosecutor first stated that although the defendant claimed brain damage as a mitigator, 
the defendant's expert 'couldn't say' that the brain damage caused either C.W.'s murder or 
the previous murder of Bessie Lawrence. Defense counsel objected but was overruled. 
Next, the prosecutor noted Kleypas' claim of alcohol use as a mitigator and stated:  'A 
pint bottle of Canadian Mist did not cause this murder.' Defense counsel did not object to 
this statement. Regarding the claimed mitigator that Kleypas did well in prison, the 
prosecutor stated:  'Does the fact that he did well in prison make the murder of [the 
victim] less severe?' No objection was lodged to this statement. The prosecutor then 
referenced Kleypas' claim that his paraphilia was a mitigator, stating:  'The defendant's 
paraphilia did not kill [the victim].' There was no objection to this comment. The 
prosecutor went on to ask the jury that even if Kleypas had schizophrenia which he 
claimed to be a mitigating circumstance, 'Does that lessen what he did?' Defense counsel 
did not object to this statement. 
 
"These statements by the prosecutor were clearly improper and reflect a complete 
lack of understanding of the concept of mitigating circumstances. By these statements, 
the prosecutor argued to the jury that mitigating evidence should not be considered unless 
it excused or justified the crime; this was an erroneous standard of law." Kleypas I, 272 
Kan. at 1103. 
 
In Scott, the defendant lodged a similar challenge, based on the following 
argument:   
 
"'Several of the mitigators cite his mental illness and brain damage. Interestingly 
enough, remember something that Dr. Cunningham said. His congenital brain damage is 
consistent with other murderers. He tested like a murderer. Is it surprising then that he 
 
107 
 
has these problems? Could anyone who commits two premeditated murders for the 
purpose of obtaining things be mentally normal? Does depression or reactive attachment 
disorder, any of those things or their treatability reduce Scott's moral culpability for this 
crime? 
 
"'His blame, his mental state did not prevent him from committing these two 
premeditated murders, did not keep him from placing those kids in danger, did not keep 
him from lying to the Sheriff about it. 
 
"'Besides, remember Dr. Cunningham. He described Gavin as a poor historian. 
Remember how well this poor historian described the layout of the Brittain residence for 
Holtz and Oliver, how he drew it out in excruciating detail. This is a man who is in 
command of all of his senses on September 13, 1996. He was in the Brittain home long 
enough to commit the layout to memory. He may have mental problems, but they weigh 
little compared to the weight of the aggravating circumstances.'" (Emphasis added.) Scott, 
286 Kan. at 117. 
 
While acknowledging some statements suggested the defendant's evidence was not 
mitigating because it did not excuse or justify the crimes, we held this argument was 
proper when viewed in its totality: 
 
"In the case at hand, however, the prosecutor did not argue Scott's mental illness 
should not be considered because it did not excuse or justify the crime. Read in context, 
the argument was that Scott's mental illness was not as severe as he made it out to be, 
because it did not 'prevent' him from committing the crimes. Granted, there is some 
suggestion in the statement that Scott's mental illness did not excuse his culpability. 
However, taken in context, these statements did not contravene the 'considerable latitude' 
prosecutors are allowed in commenting on the evidence." 286 Kan. at 118 (citing Kleypas 
I, 272 Kan. at 1084). 
 
 
108 
 
Finally, in Cheever I, this court examined two penalty-phase closing argument 
statements. The first addressed the defendant's claim that drug use in the home mitigated 
his culpability: 
 
"'Now, perhaps there was marijuana use at the home. We don't contend there wasn't. But 
what it boils down to, ladies and gentlemen, is that a mitigator, is that a mitigator which 
is sufficient to outweigh the aggravating factors we put before you? Marijuana use in the 
home, that's a bad thing. No question about it. But does that, as [defense counsel] say[s], 
excuse what he did? Is that—does that outweigh the aggravating factors? We contend it 
does not and it cannot.'" Cheever I, 295 Kan. at 271. 
 
The prosecutor then addressed the defendant's methamphetamine addiction as a 
mitigating circumstance: 
 
"'The defendant tells us he was addicted to methamphetamine, and that's the 
reason, that's a mitigator. Well, tell that to Robert Sanders 'cause he wasn't on 
methamphetamine that night. Now, you've already decided methamphetamine did not 
play a role in the capital murder of Matt Samuels. And you should reject it now, too.'" 
295 Kan. at 271. 
 
In Cheever I, this court explained that "[t]he difference between the outcomes in 
Kleypas [I] and Scott lies in the distinction recognized in Eddings:  comments that cut off 
in an absolute manner the jury's consideration of certain mitigating evidence run afoul of 
Lockett, but comments that the defendant's mitigating evidence is entitled to little or no 
weight based on the circumstances of the case are constitutionally permissible." 295 Kan. 
at 271 (citing Kleypas I, 272 Kan. at 1074). Applying this Eddings distinction to the 
challenged arguments in Cheever I, this court held the prosecutor's argument about drug 
use in the home was proper: 
 
 
109 
 
"Addressing the 'excuse' comment first, we find the comment, considered in 
context, was permissible. As with the comments in Scott, there is some suggestion in the 
remark that marijuana use in the home did not excuse Cheever's culpability. That remark, 
however, was followed with:  '[D]oes that outweigh the aggravating factors? We contend 
it does not and it cannot.' Viewed in context, the prosecutor's comments did not tell the 
jury that to be considered in mitigation, evidence of the marijuana use in the home had 
to excuse or justify the crime as a matter of law. Instead, the remarks were directed at 
the weight the jury should give that evidence in deciding whether the mitigating 
circumstances outweigh the aggravating factors. [Citation omitted.]" Cheever I, 295 
Kan. at 272. 
 
We also held the second statement addressing methamphetamine addiction as a mitigator 
was appropriate:  "Viewed in context, the comment was part of the [prosecutor's] 
argument addressing evidence concerning a specific mitigating circumstance:  that 
Cheever was under the influence of methamphetamine at the time of crime." 295 Kan. 
at 272. 
 
When we compare these holdings to the facts here, the prosecutor's challenged 
statements are more akin to those in Scott and Cheever I than Kleypas I. As in Scott and 
Cheever I, the Eddings distinction is determinative. The prosecutor never argued or 
implied the jury could not consider the mitigation evidence unless it excused or justified 
the murders. And while the prosecutor questioned whether that mitigation justified the 
defendants' conduct, this was consistently argued in the context of whether the 
circumstance reduced the defendants' moral culpability or blame in a way that supported 
a sentence less than death. 
 
For example, the prosecutor's rhetorical inquiry whether R. Carr's and J. Carr's 
upbringing gave them "a license to kill" occurred during a broader argument questioning 
whether the defendants' evidence lessened their moral culpability in a way that justified a 
sentence other than death. The prosecutor explained: 
 
110 
 
 
"Mitigating circumstances under the law as you remember are those that reduce 
the degree of moral culpability. How has anything that they have said done that? Under 
the law, the Legislature said these things may be considered. That they have no 
significant history of prior criminal activity. Is that what you heard? That this crime was 
committed when the defendants were under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance. The foundation of all, if any, this brain trauma. The foundation of all their 
experts, all the evidence that you heard . . . was based on a manipulated picture, an 
altered picture. A picture of a PET scan that does not accurately reflect, does not 
accurately reflect their brains and this picture does not accurately reflect who they are. 
 
. . . . 
 
"You heard the evidence regarding what was reviewed. You heard in this penalty 
phase much information about hearsay evidence. The bravado that was taken from each 
other in order to fulfill the task that allowed them to take all this property from the 
[victims]. Their premeditation, their intent. Did they act under the supreme duress, the 
stress or substantial domination of another? There's no evidence of that.  
 
"Ask the question regarding their age. They're adult males, ages 20 and 23 when 
these offenses were committed. We send individuals into war at 18. Are they 
responsible? Are they morally culpable for their acts? In this instance, they have lived 
away from home. They were living away from home. They were totally emancipated. 
They had individuals repeatedly trying to help them, coaches, teachers, SRS workers, all 
this time through this rough childhood that they had, which they ignored, and made their 
choices to continue in the acts that they did.  
 
"Is a term of imprisonment sufficient to defend and protect [ ] the people's safety 
from the defendants? There is no evidence to suggest it is. In fact, the evidence from the 
defense indicates that these individuals have no remorse, care not, opportunistic, 
remorseless. How does that defend?" 
 
 
111 
 
There is a similar theme present in all the challenged statements. Viewed in 
context, they reflect the prosecutor's argument that the claimed mitigating circumstances 
did not, in fact, lessen their moral culpability or did not do so to the extent they 
outweighed the aggravating circumstances, thereby warranting a sentence other than 
death. This argument was not error. 
 
We also see no error in the prosecution's cross-examination questions challenging 
defendants' evidence. J. Carr argues that while evidence of a tumultuous childhood, 
parental absence, physical and sexual abuse and aberration, family history of mental 
illness, learning disabilities, and suicide attempts may not excuse or justify the crime, it 
was relevant to his moral culpability, which means it was important for the jury to 
consider in making an individualized sentencing decision. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 
(fundamental respect for humanity underlying Eighth Amendment requires consideration 
of character and record of individual offender, circumstances of particular offense as 
constitutionally indispensable part of process of inflicting death). 
 
This may be true in general, but while evidence of such matters is relevant to the 
jury's decision, it is not mitigating as a matter of law. If a juror believes the evidence, that 
juror must then individually determine whether the facts proven are mitigating. Without 
question, it is proper for a prosecutor to argue jurors should not consider such facts to be 
mitigating. See Cheever I, 295 Kan. 229, Syl. ¶ 19 (permissible for prosecutor to argue, 
based on the circumstances of the case, defendant's mitigating evidence is entitled to little 
or no weight).  
 
Further, defendants' arguments overlook a crucial point highlighted by the record:  
it was the defendants, not the prosecution, who first suggested a relationship between the 
crimes and the mitigation evidence by arguing a variety of medical, genetic, familial, 
environmental, societal, and situational circumstances correlate to violent behavior. Both 
 
112 
 
defendants argued during the penalty-phase proceeding that the "crime was committed 
while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance" 
and that "[t]he defendant acted under extreme distress or under the substantial domination 
of another person." 
 
Mitigation witnesses testified that numerous factors, incidents, and variables 
contributed to the defendants' decision to kill the Birchwood victims. For example, 
R. Carr's counsel argued the PET scan reviewed by Preston detected brain abnormalities 
and that certain brain abnormalities affect behavior. Similarly, Reidy and Cunningham 
testified that if certain risk factors were present, they raised the probability or likelihood 
of criminal behavior. And, during penalty-phase closing argument, R. Carr's counsel 
attempted to draw a causal connection between the evidence advanced in mitigation and 
the crimes: 
 
"But you needed to know that because something happened to these kids. Something 
happened to them that damaged them to cause them to act this way.  
 
"This is what these doctors were here to tell you about. That's why Dr. Reidy was 
here to tell you about this. That's why Dr. [Mitchel] Woltersdorf was here to tell about 
that. That's why Dr. Preston came down here and did that PET scan. . . . 
 
 
. . . . 
 
"We are not making excuses here. We are telling how these kids' lives were 
shaped and how they came to make the decisions that resulted in this horrible crime. The 
accident Reggie had when he was in West Virginia, on the bicycle, hit his head, had loss 
of memory, indicative of brain injury. All the fights he had that [were] too numerous to 
mention. Those are all important factors in the development of Reggie's brain. And if you 
believe what the doctors tell us, a brain even today is not completely formed. . . .  
 
 
. . . . 
 
113 
 
 
"After we have talked about all the bad things that happened in Reggie's life, I 
mean, you didn't see any witnesses from the State of Kansas come in here and say I grew 
up and I lived next to these guys, they had a wonderful home. Reginald, Sr., and Janis 
didn't ever get in any fights, no domestic violence, kids well cared for. You didn't see a 
forensic psychologist come in here and say the studies from the Department of Justice 
and the Surgeon General's Office and the FBI, they really apply in this particular case 
because those are all different. You didn't see anybody come in here and do that. What 
you saw is people that really took a look at what is going on in this guy's life and try to 
give you some insight on how he got to the field on December 15th of the year 2000 and 
how he was able to perpetrate the crimes for which he has been convicted in that horrible 
manner." (Emphases added.) 
 
Given this defense strategy, it was neither surprising nor error for the prosecution 
to test the extent to which the murders were acts of free will, suggesting the greatest 
degree of moral culpability, as opposed to acts attributable in some measure to extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance, brain injury, or other circumstances in defendants' 
upbringing. Accordingly, the prosecutors' questions and argument were within the 
latitude afforded the State and did not constitute error. 
 
b. Prosecutors Did Not Improperly Denigrate and Ridicule 
Mitigating Circumstances 
 
R. Carr argues the State repeatedly denigrated and ridiculed his mitigating 
evidence and criticized counsel for admitting and relying on it. He points to seven 
statements the prosecutor made during closing. 
 
The first comment was addressed above. 
 
"And when you think about mitigation, think about mitigation, think about mitigation of 
the execution of [H.M.] and [A.S.] and [B.H.] and [J.B.]. Think about no PowerPoints in 
 
114 
 
that field. There were no psychologists debating the issues. There weren't any brain scans 
that were done before they were executed. Judge Clark wasn't there. No prosecutors. No 
defense. There wasn't any witness chair that was set up in the snow where family 
members of [B.H.] and [J.B.], and [A.S.] and [H.M.] could come and say, [']Show mercy 
to my child. She had led a good and exemplary life.['] There was no person from the 
[J.B.'s] family to say, [']Please, spare this punishment, show mercy.['] There wasn't any 
witness called for [A.S]. There wasn't any witness called for [B.H.] or [A.S.] or [H.M.]. 
There was no consideration of mitigation for the execution, their punishment that 
occurred on that field. And there wasn't any play-by-play analysis." 
 
We concluded above this argument was consistent with Scott, in which we held a 
prosecutor may properly argue a defendant does not deserve mercy, so long as there is no 
contention the jury's exercise of mercy is prohibited. 286 Kan. at 116. Similarly, we agree 
the prosecutor here was within the latitude afforded the State. 
 
The second and third comments responded to R. Carr's and J. Carr's claims that 
their dysfunctional home life was a mitigating circumstance and a contributing factor in 
their crimes. 
 
• 
"And it's a tragedy, a tragedy that [their mother] tried to make them responsible by 
making them eat vegetables. That's a tragedy. So we have to hear about this today, to 
mitigate the punishment in this case. That the death penalty should not be imposed, 
Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, the defendants had to eat broccoli." 
 
• 
"We are not responsible or we should be given mercy and sympathy because, golly 
gee whillikers, look at the miserable childhood that we had." 
 
It is obvious these passages capture sarcasm, and we have been critical of 
prosecutorial sarcasm in the past. See State v. Longoria, 301 Kan. 489, 525-26, 343 P.3d 
1128 (2015) (sarcasm as rhetorical device discouraged but not disallowed). But these 
 
115 
 
arguments are also based on reasonable inferences that could be drawn from testimony. 
They fall within the wide latitude prosecutors are given to discuss the evidence. 
 
The fourth comment alleged to be error is: 
 
"Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, when you are disabled, you want to think of yourself 
as capable, not disabled. When you think of yourself as someone who is truly, truly 
emotionally disturbed, they don't want sympathy. They want to be understood for what 
they are trying to do. Whether it was Michael Harding who seemed to be emotionally 
disturbed, truly lacking the facility to make life work for him. And it is shameful to try 
and throw yourself in a category of individuals who are emotionally disturbed and in 
some way less because of this sham. And to rely on this to say excuse me, please, I have 
an abnormal brain and therefore, I had a lousy childhood." 
 
Although the prosecutor was not particularly clear, it appears the intention was 
to draw an unflattering comparison between defendants, who wished to rely on a 
neurological or psychological abnormality as a mitigator, and a hypothetical disabled 
person who would be too proud to call attention to such a problem. Had the prosecutor 
more effectively communicated this idea, we would share the view this was error, not 
because it denigrated or ridiculed mitigation evidence but because it appears to have 
relied on at least one fact not in evidence, i.e., the attitudes of another disabled person. 
See State v. Carter, 278 Kan. 74, 80, 91 P.3d 1162 (2004) ("'No rule governing oral 
argument is more fundamental than that requiring counsel to confine remarks to matters 
in evidence.'"). But in this instance, lack of clarity prevents us from labeling this error. 
 
The fifth, sixth, and seventh comments R. Carr challenges as denigrating or 
ridiculing his mitigation evidence were: 
 
• 
"These were kids who drug their laundry here in Court. Put their mother on the 
witness stand, criticized her. Gave her despicable commentary. Got into her private 
 
116 
 
possessions. Talked about seeing naked pictures of her. Maybe they weren't meant 
for Reginald Carr's eyes." 
 
• 
"[T]hey even stand here before you here today and of all the blame games that have 
been made, they want to blame you. They want to blame you that perhaps if you 
follow the law that somehow you are doing something wrong. Passing blame to 
Mommas and Daddies, society, and taking none upon themselves." 
 
• 
"They beg one of you for sympathy. They want to get that sympathy by suggesting 
that their excuse is to deflect the responsibility. They want to beg you for sympathy 
because of that rough childhood. Because of some abuses, which are primarily based 
on the evidence, the requirement to eat noodles with Miracle Whip, vegetables, pasta 
salad. And to be spanked with a belt while their legs are held down. Is that an insult 
to children who have been placed in bathtubs until their whole bodies have been 
burned? Is that an insult to the children who have been beaten and bruised on their 
whole body by their parents? Is that an insult to children who wished they had a roof 
over their head? Is that an insult to children who feel like they are starving in all 
parts of the world? To suggest that gives them a license to kill?" 
 
In a case with so much truly abhorrent behavior to focus upon, it is difficult to 
understand why the prosecutor chose to characterize as "despicable" the defendants' use 
of information about their mother for mitigation. Capital defendants are entitled to 
attempt to persuade the penalty-phase jury that something in their personal history 
exerted such a negative influence that they do not deserve to be put to death. This is a 
constitutional and statutory right. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115 (sentencer may not refuse to 
consider relevant mitigating evidence, including turbulent family history, beatings by 
parent, severe emotional disturbance, as a matter of law); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604; see 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6617(c) (evidence in sentencing proceeding shall include matters 
relating to any mitigating circumstances). 
 
 
117 
 
We agree with R. Carr that seasoned prosecutors such as those who tried this case 
should be able to avoid expressing disgust for this common and frequently necessary 
defense tactic. That said, the prosecutor's one-word departure from a more clinical 
recitation of the evidence about potentially harmful behavior by defendants' mother does 
not rise to error. 
 
Regarding the prosecutor's comments about the defendants' mitigation case 
attempting to shift blame for their crimes, R. Carr relies on Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 
411, 422 n.14 (Fla. 1998), and Butler v. State, 120 Nev. 879, 898-99, 102 P.3d 71 (2004), 
to support his argument for reversible error. 
 
In Urbin, the Florida Supreme Court observed, "The transcript reflects that the 
prosecutor improperly denigrated the evidence of mitigation throughout his argument and 
repeatedly labeled the mitigation as 'excuses,' employing the pejorative term no less than 
eleven times." 714 So. 2d at 422 n.14. It concluded the argument was improper, given the 
absence of rebutting evidence. But the court's comments were relegated to a footnote, 
compared to other egregious examples of improper argument that received extensive 
discussion. Taken together, the errors compelled the court to vacate the death sentence. 
714 So. 2d at 422. 
 
In Butler, the prosecutor "used many adjectives and analogies in . . . remarks that 
portrayed Butler's presentation of mitigating evidence and defense tactics as a dirty 
technique in an attempt to fool and distract the jury, implying that Butler's counsel acted 
unethically in his defense." 120 Nev. at 898. The Nevada Supreme Court held this 
approach improperly disparaged counsel. The court explained the defendant not only had 
a legal right to present the evidence, but his counsel had an ethical duty to present all 
evidence in mitigation. The court said:  "[P]resentation of mitigating evidence during the 
penalty phase is essentially the heart of a defense," and the prosecutor committed 
 
118 
 
misconduct by disparaging defense counsel and defense tactics "through the use of 
cleverly crafted rhetoric." 120 Nev. at 898-99. When viewed in conjunction with other 
instructional and trial errors, the court could not conclude the prosecutorial misconduct 
was harmless. 120 Nev. at 900. 
 
The State urges us to distinguish Urbin and Butler. In Urbin, the State notes the 
prosecutor used sarcastic and pejorative terms to describe the mitigating circumstances 
evidence continually and demeaned it without ever rebutting it. Here, the State argues, 
the prosecution rarely employed cynicism or insult and vigorously challenged the 
defendants' evidence. Butler is distinguishable in the State's view because the prosecutor 
in this case did not repeatedly challenge opposing counsel's ethics or integrity. 
 
The State also relies on decisions which held a prosecutor committed no error by 
describing mitigation as merely an excuse or blame game. For example, in People v. 
Rundle, 43 Cal. 4th 76, 195, 180 P.3d 224 (2008), disapproved of on other grounds by 
People v. Doolin, 45 Cal. 4th 390, 198 P.3d 11 (2009), the defendant argued the 
prosecutor engaged in misconduct by claiming "'the entire defense in this case is to blame 
others,' by calling the [mitigation defense theory] 'penalty phase madness,' and by 
referring to defendant as a 'snitch' in discussing his assistance to the authorities at the 
jail." The court rejected the prosecutorial error claim, saying there was "nothing 
deceptive or reprehensible about these comments, and they did not, individually or 
cumulatively, improperly denigrate defendant's evidence in mitigation." 43 Cal. 4th at 
195; see also People v. Cole, 172 Ill. 2d 85, 112, 665 N.E.2d 1275 (1996) (prosecutor's 
brief references to mitigation as "excuse" could not reasonably have prevented jury from 
considering evidence). 
 
119 
 
 
We are persuaded that the infrequency of the "passing blame" comments, the tone 
of most of the rhetoric, and the existence of evidence rebutting the mitigation prevent us 
from characterizing the prosecutor's arguments as error. The fact these comments did not 
cast aspersions on defense counsel's ethics or integrity weighs heavily in our decision. 
 
But we caution that the prosecutor's comparison of the defendants' evidence to 
cases of extreme child abuse, if not ameliorated by more temperate, evidence-based 
context, at a minimum would have grazed the error line by needlessly injecting 
inflammatory material into the argument. See Sherman, 305 Kan. at 117 (argument may 
have scuffed outside edge of wide latitude afforded prosecutors); State v. Crawford, 
300 Kan. 740, 755, 334 P.3d 311 (2014) (differences in wording can move conclusion 
that prosecutor scuffed line of misconduct to conclusion that prosecutor crossed line); 
State v. Stevenson, 297 Kan. 49, 55, 298 P.3d 303 (2013) (prosecutor's comments scuffed 
misconduct line). 
 
c. The State's Argument that Preston's Impeachment Undermined 
All Mitigation Was Properly Supported by the Record  
 
J. Carr argues the prosecutor implied all mitigation evidence should be ignored 
based on the State's impeachment of defense expert Preston. During closing, the 
prosecutor argued the PET scans and Preston's testimony about them were "hocus pocus" 
and "manipulated." And, once aware of these facts, the jury should see the "foundation of 
this sympathy and abuse excuse and blame" came "crashing down." 
 
Whether the phrase "hocus pocus" was improper is addressed in the next section 
of our prosecutorial error analysis. But the underlying argument, i.e., the State's 
impeachment of Preston undermined the whole mitigation case, was properly founded on 
reasonable inferences from testimony admitted into evidence. Several defense mitigation 
 
120 
 
experts tied or reconciled their opinions to Preston's findings. And the State's rebuttal 
expert, Pay, opined that the PET scans showed both R. Carr and J. Carr had sound brain 
function and criticized the methods Preston used to obtain the images. This gave 
prosecutors an evidentiary basis to argue that Pay's testimony undercut not only Preston's 
testimony but that of the other defense witnesses. We hold there is no error on this basis. 
 
d. Prosecutors Did Not Commit Reversible Error by Expressing 
Personal Opinion About the Credibility of Mitigation Experts  
 
As discussed above, Preston concluded the defendants' PET scans evidenced 
abnormal, marked deficits in metabolism in the regions of the hippocampus and 
amygdala. Pay reviewed those PET scans and testified the images used an atypical color 
scale. He also said the scans did not capture the brain's anatomical regions relevant to 
Preston's opinion. Pay concluded the scans evidenced normal metabolic functioning, and 
Preston's contrary conclusions were based on the manipulated color scale and improper 
anatomical alignment. During closing, the prosecutor referenced the competing expert 
testimony: 
 
"Yeah, these colored picture[s] are pretty slick. They are. They are really slick. 
Better than those old X-ray kinds of things, you know, just black and white. But, you 
know, it all depends on who is looking and it all depends on what they are doing with 
these documents, these digital pictures. There's no doubt these two guys had PET scans. 
And they presented them to you as abnormal. The foundation of their lack of culpability. 
We are not responsible or we should be given mercy and sympathy because, golly gee 
whillikers, look at the miserable childhood that we had. And look at our brain because 
our brains support that I got hit with a BB, or I got hit with the trash can and it may still 
be there, oh, look at it. 
 
 
121 
 
"But when the truth comes out and the doctors come and say, well, you know, 
these aren't right. In fact the statement was it was wrong to show you these. Because 
these show nothing. The hocus pocus of all of this was not right. It was manipulated. The 
color background. The slice where it came from. The coloration from one to the other." 
 
R. Carr and J. Carr argue these statements—particularly the words "manipulated," 
"slick," "hocus pocus," "doctors," and "truth"—constituted the prosecutor's improper 
personal opinion on the credibility of Preston and Pay. 
 
Generally, a prosecutor is precluded from offering personal opinions about witness 
credibility. State v. Pabst, 268 Kan. 501, 510, 996 P.2d 321 (2000) ("The point of not 
allowing a prosecutor to comment on the credibility of a witness is that expressions of 
personal opinion by the prosecutor are a form of unsworn, unchecked testimony, not 
commentary on the evidence of the case."). We have applied the same rule in capital 
sentencing proceedings. Kleypas I, 272 Kan. at 1105 ("A prosecutor should not express 
his or her personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence 
or the guilt of the defendant."). 
 
The prosecutor's use of "manipulated" in reference to the scans was consistent 
with Pay's testimony and fell within the wide latitude prosecutors have in discussing the 
evidence. Similarly, the use of "slick" to describe the images and the phrase "hocus 
pocus" to characterize Preston's methodology do not constitute error. See State v. Pribble, 
304 Kan. 824, 835-36, 375 P.3d 966 (2016) (describing defense arguments as "red 
herrings," involving "rabbit holes" permissible); State v. Albright, 283 Kan. 418, 429-30, 
153 P.3d 497 (2007) (colorful analogies, including "smoke and mirrors," permissible 
when discussing evidence, defense theory of case); State v. Duke, 256 Kan. 703, 719-20, 
887 P.2d 110 (1994) (prosecutor "may use picturesque language as long as he or she 
introduces no facts not disclosed by the evidence"). But see Scott, 286 Kan. at 117 
(prosecutor improperly expressed opinion when characterizing defendant's purported 
 
122 
 
remorse as "phantom"). The prosecutor's picturesque rhetoric was undergirded by 
evidentiary support, which kept the comment within permissible bounds. 
 
We also hold that the use of "doctors" was not error. J. Carr highlights it but does 
not explain why it was objectionable. Granted, each person who reviewed the scans with 
Pay and to whom the prosecutor was referring may not have been a doctor, but the gist 
was that Pay—a doctor—and his colleagues reviewed the scans. That possible slight 
overgeneralization does not amount to error. 
 
But the prosecutor's reference to the "truth" in stating "when the truth comes out" 
constituted an impermissible expression of opinion that attempted to bolster Pay's 
credibility. This was error. Kleypas I, 272 Kan. at 1105. But this isolated instance was 
not egregious and appears to be just a clumsy effort to turn a phrase rather than a 
definitive statement about what the "truth" of the case was. We are confident this was 
harmless standing alone. Kleypas II, 305 Kan. at 316; Sherman, 305 Kan. 88, Syl. ¶¶ 6-8. 
In the words of the United States Supreme Court in Sullivan, the death penalty verdict 
"actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error." Sullivan v. 
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 124 L. Ed. 2d 182 (1993). 
 
e. Prosecutors Did Not Improperly Denigrate the Concept of 
"Mercy" 
 
R. Carr and J. Carr argue the prosecutor improperly denigrated the concept of 
mercy by making the following argument: 
 
"And, ladies and gentlemen, as [the defendants] sit there, the Court has told 
you[,] you can consider sympathy and you can consider mercy for these two defendants. 
That's in here. And, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, as District Attorney of this 
jurisdiction, I seek the death penalty. And, ladies and gentlemen of this jury, I ask you 
 
123 
 
to show Jonathan and Reginald Carr the same mercy that they showed to [J.B.], and 
[H.M.], and [B.H.], and [A.S.]. No mercy." 
 
In Kleypas I, we held a prosecutor may argue that a defendant deserves no mercy 
because he or she showed none to the victims, as long as the prosecutor does not argue 
the jury is precluded from considering mercy in its sentencing decision: 
 
"In a capital case, it is important for the jury to be able to evaluate whether a 
defendant is deserving of mercy. As part of the same concept, however, it is clearly 
proper for a prosecutor to argue against the granting of mercy. We hold that it is proper 
for the prosecutor to argue that the defendant is not deserving of the jury's mercy because 
of the defendant's actions, as long as the prosecutor does not improperly state the law by 
arguing to the jury that it is prohibited from granting mercy to the defendant because the 
defendant showed none to the victim." Kleypas I, 272 Kan. at 1110-11. 
 
The prosecutor's statement in Kleypas I did not suggest the jury could not apply 
mercy and was within the latitude afforded the prosecution. 272 Kan. at 1111. We 
reached the same conclusion in Scott when the prosecutor suggested the jury should show 
no mercy because the defendant showed none to his victims. We explained: 
 
"At no time did the prosecutor argue the jury was prohibited from showing Scott mercy. 
Rather, the prosecutor explicitly told the jury that granting mercy would be an 'act of 
grace.' Further, the prosecutor requested that when the jurors were considering Scott's 
plea for mercy, they also consider moral culpability. As a result, these comments were 
not improper." Scott, 286 Kan. at 116. 
 
R. Carr and J. Carr contend the prosecutor's closing is distinguishable from 
Kleypas I because she expressly argued they deserved no mercy rather than merely 
implying it. But nothing in Kleypas I or Scott suggests a reasonable basis to distinguish 
implicit from explicit arguments when communicating the same message. Instead, these 
decisions make clear the argument is proper, provided the prosecutor does not tell jurors 
 
124 
 
they cannot consider mercy. The prosecutor's argument here was within the latitude 
afforded the State. 
 
2. Arguments Did Not Improperly Inflame Jury's Emotion 
 
J. Carr contends the prosecutor improperly inflamed the jurors' emotions on two 
occasions. He argues the prosecutor erroneously:  (1) argued the victims would never 
have the opportunity to form attachments with future children; and (2) shared an 
improper quote minimizing the concept of mitigation. The State argues these comments 
were invited by the defense and otherwise proper. 
 
"Generally, a prosecutor has wide latitude in crafting arguments. Nevertheless, 
the arguments 'must accurately reflect the evidence, accurately state the law, and cannot 
be "intended to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury or to divert the jury from its 
duty to decide the case based on the evidence and the controlling law."'" State v. 
Armstrong, 299 Kan. 405, 416, 324 P.3d 1052 (2014). 
 
Regarding the victims' ability to form or maintain personal attachments with 
others, the prosecutor said:   
 
"They talk to you—[R. Carr's attorney] talked to you—the audacity to talk [to 
you] about the victims and about how Reginald Carr will never be able to form 
attachments, never be able to form relationships. [A.S.], [J.B.], [H.M.], and [B.H.] will 
form no more attachments. They don't continue their attachment to their fathers, their 
mothers, or their siblings, or anyone else for that matter, any future children that they 
might have had." 
 
J. Carr classifies this as an impermissible "golden rule" argument that invited 
jurors to step into the victims' shoes. But this misses the mark. 
 
 
125 
 
"A 'golden rule' argument is the suggestion by counsel that jurors should place 
themselves in the position of a party, a victim, or the victim's family members. Such 
arguments are generally improper and may constitute reversible error. See Walters v. 
Hitchcock, 237 Kan. 31, 33, 697 P.2d 847 (1985). The reason 'golden rule' arguments are 
not permitted is because they encourage the jury to depart from neutrality and to decide 
the case on the improper basis of personal interest and bias." State v. McHenry, 276 Kan. 
513, 523, 78 P.3d 403 (2003), disapproved of on other grounds by State v. Gunby, 282 
Kan. 39, 144 P.3d 647 (2006). 
 
The prosecutor did not ask the jury to assume the victims' points of view. At most, 
this resembled victim impact argument, which is relevant to the jury's sentencing 
determination. See Scott, 286 Kan. at 118-19 (no constitutional bar to victim impact 
evidence; evidence admissible under K.S.A. 21-4624[c] if relevant to question of 
sentence).  
 
Moreover, as the State observes, the statements mirrored and were intended to 
respond directly to R. Carr's closing argument, during which defense counsel discussed 
what impact a life sentence would have on R. Carr's relationships: 
 
"We are talking about things you need to consider. Reggie is going to be 
incarcerated. He will be put in prison basically forever. . . . Any attachment that he gets 
with any guards who are going to be supervising him [is] necessarily going to fade away 
because nobody works for 50 years. The people he is going to develop his attachment 
with will be transferred, will retire, will quit, will go someplace else. His mother will die 
while he is in the penitentiary. His father will die while he is in the penitentiary. By the 
time he is first eligible to see the parole board, if he gets the minimum sentence he can 
possibly get, his oldest son will be older than [defense counsel] over there. That's how 
long he is going to be in the penitentiary. He is actually going to be in there forever. He is 
never going to be able to walk out and get in his car and drive off somewhere and go visit 
friends. Never going to do any of that stuff that he enjoyed for the brief time that he 
wasn't incarcerated." 
 
 
126 
 
In context, the prosecutor's argument merely urged the jury to give little weight to 
R. Carr's assertion that he would never form relationships or attachments with others if 
sentenced to life imprisonment instead of death. See Scott, 286 Kan. at 120 (statement 
that capital murder defendant "destroyed the [victim's] family" permissible in response to 
defendant's asserted mitigating circumstance regarding relationships with his family). We 
conclude there was no error in this passage. 
 
Second, J. Carr challenges the prosecutor's commentary attributed to a quote from 
Dr. Willard Gatlin, who was not a witness. The prosecutor stated:   
 
"I want to read to you something that was said by a doctor in New York. Dr. 
Willard Gatlin is a medical doctor, about a murder in New York. And he says this. When 
one person kills another, there is an immediate revulsion at the nature of the crime. But in 
a time so short as to seem indecent to the members of the personal family, the dead 
person ceases to exist as an identifiable person. To those individuals and in the 
community who have good will, who have sympathy and empathy and warmth and 
compassion, only one of the characters in the drama remains with whom they can 
commiserate and that is the defendants. The dead person ceases to exist in our everyday 
reality and become part of a historic event. So we turn away from the past toward the 
reality because of our natures. And we look at the defendant and sympathize with him. 
And when that happens, the defendant usurps the compassion that is justly the victims'. 
And they will steal their victim[s'] moral constituency today with you in the same way 
that they stole their lives.  
 
"Ladies and gentlemen, don't let that happen."  
 
J. Carr argues the prosecutor's Gatlin quote was improper for three reasons. First, 
he contends it was inflammatory and distracted the jury from its sentencing 
responsibility. Second, he asserts the comment implied any defendant convicted of 
murder usurps the compassion belonging to victims and "improperly told the jury there 
was no need to treat Jonathan Carr as a 'uniquely individual human being' in determining 
 
127 
 
the appropriate punishment, because he is part of a 'faceless, undifferentiated mass' of 
murderers who have . . . usurped the compassion that should belong to the victims." 
Third, he argues it diverted the jury from deciding the case based only on the evidence 
and controlling law. The State contends the commentary was an appropriate appeal to 
remember the victims, arguing the prosecutor tied it to the defendants in a way that did 
not prevent the jury from giving individualized consideration.  
 
The State is correct that the prosecutor tied this commentary to J. Carr and R. Carr. 
Immediately after quoting Gatlin, the prosecutor closed her argument, stating: 
 
"Reginald Carr and Jonathan Carr, they do not deserve your sympathy. They don't 
deserve your pity, and they don't deserve your warmth. They don't deserve your mercy 
because they gave no mercy. Not even on, as you remember, the request, the verbal 
request of [A.S.], did not cause them to give mercy. It did not cause whichever brother 
was not the shooter to jump on the other's back to help stop this horrific murder. They 
don't deserve your mercy and they don't deserve your leniency. Deliver a verdict that the 
law requires under the evidence that you have heard." 
 
We previously acknowledged the prosecutor's right to employ dramatic delivery 
during closing argument in the guilt phase. R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 249. On that topic we 
said: 
 
"The wide latitude permitted a prosecutor in discussing the evidence during 
closing argument in a criminal case includes at least limited room for rhetoric and 
persuasion, even for eloquence and modest spectacle. It is not opening statement; it is not 
confined to a dry recitation of the evidence presented. Compare State v. Hilt, 299 Kan. 
176, Syl. ¶ 9, 322 P.3d 367 (2014) ('A prosecutor may use analogies, similes, allusions, 
and other rhetorical devices in an attempt to bring order to the facts presented at trial, 
place them in a meaningful context, and construct the whole of a case. Within sensible 
limits set by similarity and dissimilarity to the facts of a case, a prosecutor's appropriate 
 
128 
 
rhetorical devices may include film allusions and comparisons or be otherwise 
theatrical.')." 300 Kan. at 250. 
 
Consistent with this holding, we conclude the commentary in the penalty-phase 
closing was within the latitude afforded to prosecutors.  
 
3. Argument Regarding Prison Conditions Fell Within Wide Latitude 
Afforded  
 
R. Carr claims the prosecutor improperly suggested life in prison would be 
pleasant. The State contends the prosecutor instead properly rebutted R. Carr's counsel, 
who argued: 
 
"We are talking about things you need to consider. Reggie is going to be 
incarcerated. He will be put in prison basically forever. He is going to be caged up. And 
Reggie needs to be caged up with the lions in the penitentiary, so all of us rabbits will be 
safe. That's not going to be a problem with us. Reggie is not going to have a good time in 
prison. Reggie is never going to be able to determine again when he gets up in the 
morning or when he gets to go to bed at night. He is never going to be able to determine 
the food he gets to eat or clothes he is going to wear. He is never going to be able to 
determine who . . . he is going to see and when he gets to see them or the circumstances 
of those visitations, if they occur." 
 
The prosecutor responded to these remarks, stating:  "They talked to you about, well, they 
will be locked up for a long time in a cage. A cage with access to books, library, 
basketball, daily exercise, TV." 
 
R. Carr relies on Kleypas I to challenge this remark on prison conditions. In 
Kleypas I this court concluded a prosecutor's questions eliciting privileges enjoyed by 
prisoners constituted error. 272 Kan. at 1098-99. The district court granted a defense 
motion in limine and ordered the parties not to introduce evidence regarding prison 
 
129 
 
conditions. 272 Kan. 1097. Yet, during a prison official's cross-examination, the 
prosecutor inquired about the forbidden subject. 
 
"The prosecutor's cross-examination of Haggard was a violation of the trial 
court's order and constituted prosecutorial misconduct. The cross-examination was an 
attempt to prejudice the jury by improperly suggesting to them that prison was an easy 
environment, and the prosecutor admitted as much. Such evidence was clearly irrelevant, 
inadmissible, and prejudicial to the defendant. We are greatly disturbed by the 
prosecutor's conduct, especially considering the nature of this case." 272 Kan. at 1099. 
 
Here, there was no order preventing counsel from exploring this topic. And the 
prosecutor's remark responded to R. Carr's closing that had alluded to the harsh reality of 
life imprisonment. Other courts examining similar statements have recognized that 
"living conditions at prisons are to some extent common knowledge" and a prosecutor's 
reference to privileges such as regular meals, clean clothes, television, visitation, and 
other conditions incident to incarceration are unlikely to be prejudicial. See, e.g., State v. 
Scales, 655 So. 2d 1326, 1334 (La. 1995). In this case, this brief reference was within the 
prosecutor's wide latitude. 
 
4. The Prosecutors Did Not Misstate Parental Neglect Evidence 
 
R. Carr argues the prosecutor mischaracterized the defendants' parental neglect 
evidence offered to support mitigation. Specifically, he asserts this evidence 
demonstrated his mother punished him and his siblings on one occasion by refusing to 
cook or feed them for weeks on end. During closing, the prosecutor minimized this 
incident as one in which the mother forced her children to eat their vegetables. 
 
There was conflicting testimony regarding the nature, extent, and duration of this 
event. In cross-examination, the mother testified she made her three children cook their 
 
130 
 
own meals for a couple of weeks, using food available in the home, as punishment for 
their wasteful consumption. She testified there was plenty of food in the house and, when 
the supplies dwindled, she purchased more. 
 
R. Carr's argument is based on the prosecutor's refusal to adopt the defense's more 
disturbing version of this event. But the prosecutor's description was reasonably founded 
on the mother's testimony and within the prosecutor's wide latitude. 
 
5. The Prosecutor Did Not Improperly Argue the Law Required a Death 
Verdict and Statements During Opening Did Not Constitute Reversible 
Error  
 
R. Carr's final prosecutorial error challenge asserts the prosecutor improperly 
argued the law required the jury to impose the death penalty. He points to the prosecutor's 
opening penalty-phase statement that "[t]here is no equivocation. The sentence shall be 
death. Ladies and gentlemen, that is the law." (Emphasis added.) He also points to other 
occasions when the prosecutor said, "[I]t is your job and your privilege as jurors to do 
this duty and to continue to bring a just penalty." The State contends there was no error 
when the selected statements are placed in proper context. 
 
We agree R. Carr has not placed the challenged statements in context. Before 
stating the "sentence shall be death," the prosecutor argued: 
 
"Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, we look at the incidents of the year 2000. We 
look at what happened in the scope of the evidence that has been presented. You look at 
whether or not the State has met its burden in proving that those aggravating factors 
outweigh any mitigation that could be presented. And will. But you need to recall all that 
you know and remember to the time that you listened to this Court instruct you as to the 
charge to this jury, that if you should find the aggravating factors are outweighed by the 
mitigating factors, then the sentence shall be death. 
 
 
131 
 
"There is no equivocation. The sentence shall be death. Ladies and gentlemen, 
that is the law." 
 
R. Carr considers the challenged statement to be comparable to one disapproved in 
Scott, in which the prosecutor told jurors they needed to honor their oath and return a 
guilty verdict, implicitly suggesting that to do otherwise would violate their duty. 286 
Kan. at 79. A prosecutor's argument that implies the jury may violate its sworn oath has 
more force and carries greater potential for unfair prejudice than an argument that the 
facts and applicable law compel a death sentence. Especially when considered in 
combination with other statements recognizing the jury's authority and discretion to 
conduct the statutory weighing, the argument here is distinguishable from the "violation 
of sworn oath" argument in Scott. See Strouth v. Colson, 680 F.3d 596, 606 (6th Cir. 
2012) (prosecutors may argue jury has duty to impose death sentence when supported by 
the facts and law). 
 
We also note the "equivocation" argument, even when considered in isolation, was 
consistent with K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6617(e), which sets out the standard for the jury's 
verdict. 
 
"If, by unanimous vote, the jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that one or 
more of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6624, and 
amendments thereto, exist and, further, that the existence of such aggravating 
circumstances is not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances which are found to 
exist, the defendant shall be sentenced to death; otherwise, the defendant shall be 
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole." 
 
But there is another problem with this passage, which no party appears to have 
noticed. We address this as unassigned error under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 22-6619(b). 
 
 
132 
 
When the prosecutor said "[y]ou listened to this Court instruct you as to the charge 
to this jury, that if you should find the aggravating factors are outweighed by the 
mitigating factors, then the sentence shall be death," she clearly misstated the law under 
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6617(e). (Emphasis added.) Such a misstatement is prosecutorial 
error. 
 
That said, the erroneous statement was isolated; the prosecutor's argument 
correctly described the weighing process elsewhere, as did the judge's instructions. There 
is no reasonable possibility the misstatement standing alone affected the jury's ultimate 
conclusion regarding the weight of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, i.e., 
the death sentence verdict. See Kleypas II, 305 Kan. at 316; Sherman, 305 Kan. 88, Syl. 
¶¶ 6-8. 
 
6. Cumulative Prosecutorial Error  
 
We have identified two prosecutorial errors that could potentially affect both 
R. Carr's and J. Carr's death sentences—the prosecutor's endorsement of Pay's credibility 
(referring to the "truth") and her misstatement of the K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6617(e) 
weighing formula during opening statements. Although we held each error harmless 
standing alone, we consider their cumulative impact. Kleypas II, 305 Kan. at 315. 
 
Given the enormity of the State's evidence supporting aggravating circumstances, 
the isolated nature of the comments in question, and the correcting influence of the jury 
instructions, we cannot see any reasonable possibility these two errors affected the jury's 
ultimate conclusion regarding the weight of the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, i.e., the death sentence verdict. Sherman, 305 Kan. 88, Syl. ¶¶ 6-8. 
 
 
133 
 
R. P19—Double Jeopardy 
 
For the reasons stated in the court's previous decision, we do not reach the merits 
of this claim. R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 258, 314. 
 
S. P20—Execution Protocol 
 
For the reasons stated in the court's previous decision, we do not reach the merits 
of this claim. 300 Kan. at 258, 314-15. 
 
T. P22—Cumulative Error 
 
 
No penalty-phase error independently requires R. Carr's death sentence to be 
vacated. But both R. Carr and J. Carr assert they are entitled to relief because their 
penalty phase was infected by cumulative error. We disagree and hold that cumulative 
penalty-phase error does not require reversal of the death sentences. 
 
1. Standard of Review and Legal Framework 
 
Cumulative error analysis aggregates all errors and assesses whether their 
cumulative effect is such that they cannot be determined to be harmless, even though 
individually those errors are harmless. State v. Tully, 293 Kan. 176, Syl. ¶ 16, 262 P.3d 
314 (2011). In assessing cumulative error in the penalty phase of a capital trial, the errors 
aggregated include any errors in the guilt-phase proceedings we determine must be 
considered in conjunction with the penalty-phase errors. See Kleypas II, 305 Kan. at 346. 
In addition, the errors aggregated include those penalty-phase errors assumed by the 
court. See State v. Sean, 306 Kan. 963, 993-94, 399 P.3d 168 (2017). And they include 
penalty-phase jury instruction errors not raised in the district court that are not clearly 
 
134 
 
erroneous. See State v. Seba, 305 Kan. 185, 215-16, 380 P.3d 209 (2016) (including jury 
instruction error in cumulative error analysis when claim of error was raised for first time 
on appeal and court merely assumed error occurred); State v. Parks, 294 Kan. 785, 804, 
280 P.3d 766 (2012). 
 
When reviewing cumulative error in a capital penalty-phase proceeding, our focus 
is on the errors' cumulative effect on "'the jury's ultimate conclusion regarding the weight 
of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.'" Cheever II, 306 Kan. at 799 (quoting 
Kleypas I, 272 Kan. at 1087). In other words, we are looking for the errors' effect in their 
aggregate, recognizing errors can differ in their individual or cumulative effect. See, e.g., 
Gleason II, 305 Kan. at 816 (while identifying two instructional errors, the court did not 
"perceive they had the effect of intensifying one another"); Kleypas II, 305 Kan. at 346-
47 ("As to errors in the penalty phase, we have found several but concluded none 
individually require us to vacate the penalty verdict. . . . Turning to the cumulative effect 
of these errors, none of these incidents were related, so none had the effect of intensifying 
another."). "This 'task is undoubtedly more subtle than simply counting up the number of 
errors discovered.'" R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 251. 
 
Ultimately, we must determine whether the errors' cumulative effect, "viewed in 
the light of the record as a whole, had little, if any, likelihood of changing" the jury's 
conclusion. Cheever II, 306 Kan. at 799. The phrase "little, if any, likelihood" reflects a 
level of certainty akin to the Chapman harmless-error standard that courts apply to 
constitutional errors. Ward, 292 Kan. at 561-62; see Kleypas II, 305 Kan. at 272 ("[I]n 
using the 'little, if any, likelihood' language in our past cases we intended to apply the 
constitutional harmless error standard of Chapman."). But as we most recently said in 
Cheever II, the degree of certainty required to deem error harmless depends on whether a 
right guaranteed by the United States Constitution has been infringed: 
 
 
135 
 
"The degree of certainty by which we must be persuaded turns on whether any of the 
errors infringe upon a right guaranteed by the United States Constitution. See State v. 
Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 6, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied [565 U.S. 1221] (2012). 
The overwhelming nature of the evidence is a factor to be considered, but its impact is 
limited. As with the prosecutorial-misconduct analysis, the question before this court is 
not what effect the error might generally be expected to have upon a reasonable jury but, 
rather, what effect it had upon the actual sentencing determination in the case on review. 
See Kleypas [I], 272 Kan. at 1088." Cheever II, 306 Kan. at 800. 
 
The Cheever II court nonetheless framed its analysis and conclusion as whether 
there was "little, if any, likelihood of changing the jury's ultimate conclusion that death 
was the appropriate sentence." 306 Kan. at 802. But it did so expressly because two 
errors "implicate[d] constitutional rights . . . ." 306 Kan. at 801. 
 
Cheever II's rule that the applicable Ward standard guides our cumulative error 
analysis is consistent with our earlier holding that state-law penalty-phase errors do not 
automatically require Chapman harmless-error review. It is also consistent with our 
decisions applying different harmless-error standards in cumulative error review outside 
the death penalty context, depending on the nature of the errors accumulated. See, e.g., 
State v. Solis, 305 Kan. 55, 71, 378 P.3d 532 (2016) (concluding two unpreserved jury 
instruction errors did not deprive defendant of fair trial because court was "firmly 
convinced that, under the totality of the circumstances, the manner in which the district 
court instructed the jury did not affect the outcome of the trial"); State v. Gilliland, 294 
Kan. 519, 550, 276 P.3d 165 (2012) ("Where, as here, the errors found by this court are 
not constitutional in nature, we examine whether there is a reasonable probability the 
aggregated errors would have affected the outcome of the trial. Ward, 292 Kan. at 569-
70."). But see State v. Smith-Parker, 301 Kan. 132, 168, 340 P.3d 485 (2014) (holding 
cumulative error required reversal because "[t]he combination of the overall weakness 
of the evidence . . . and multiple serious procedural defects tainting the process mean[t] 
 
136 
 
[defendant] was substantially prejudiced under the totality of the circumstances and 
denied a fair trial"). 
 
Constitutional errors are present here. And we have previously said that, when any 
errors being aggregated in a cumulative error analysis are constitutional in nature, the 
cumulative error must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Cheever II, 306 Kan. 
at 800-01; Tully, 293 Kan. at 205 (citing United States v. Toles, 297 F.3d 959, 972 [10th 
Cir. 2002]). But see Hagans v. United States, 96 A.3d 1, 44 (D.C. 2014) ("This court has 
never addressed how to evaluate the cumulative impact of such a mixed bag of 
[constitutional and nonconstitutional] errors, and there is little pertinent authority 
elsewhere. The Supreme Court has yet to confront the issue. As for the federal appellate 
courts, it appears that only the Tenth Circuit has delved into the question."). 
 
Applying this rule, we will conduct a Chapman harmless-error review. We clarify 
that when conducting a Chapman harmless-error review of multiple errors in a capital 
penalty-phase proceeding, we ask whether we are persuaded there is no reasonable 
possibility the errors' cumulative effect, viewed in light of the record as a whole, affected 
the jury's ultimate conclusion regarding the weight of the aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, i.e., the death sentence verdict. See Cheever II, 306 Kan. at 800-01. 
 
2. Summary of Trial Errors 
 
Defendants' trial was infected with the following guilt-phase errors:  (1) the 
severance error, which continued into the penalty phase as discussed above; (2) reverse-
Batson error in the denial of defendants' peremptory challenge of W.B., R. Carr, 300 
Kan. at 129; (3) erroneous admission of Linda Ann Walenta's statements through law 
enforcement testimony, 300 Kan. at 143-44; (4) erroneous application of Kansas' third-
party evidence and hearsay rules, which prevented R. Carr from pursuing his defense to 
 
137 
 
the Birchwood crimes, 300 Kan. at 209-10; (5) erroneous instruction on the sex-crime-
based capital murder counts, 300 Kan. at 162-63; (6) three of the multiple-homicide-
based capital murder convictions were multiplicitous with the first, 300 Kan. at 165; 
(7) lack of subject matter jurisdiction over any sex crime charges based on coerced 
victim-on-victim sex acts, 300 Kan. at 171-72; (8) one conviction for rape of H.G. was 
multiplicitous with the other, 300 Kan. at 179; (9) erroneous exclusion of expert 
testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications, 300 Kan. at 226; (10) error in 
instructing the jury to consider an eyewitness' degree of certainty, 300 Kan. at 235-36; 
and (11) error in giving an aiding and abetting instruction that discussed foreseeable 
crimes, 300 Kan. at 239. See Kleypas II, 305 Kan. at 346. These errors are put into the 
same "error pot" as the penalty-phase errors when, as here, the same jury heard both the 
guilt and penalty phase. 305 Kan. at 346 (denying considering the error of the guilt-phase 
proceedings because a different jury heard the penalty phase). 
 
We have also identified the following penalty-phase errors or assumed errors:  
(1) denying defendants a continuance to consult with Preston about Pay's testimony and 
to recall Preston for surrebuttal; (2) prosecutorial error in commenting that the "truth" 
about defendants' PET scans came out; (3) instructing the jury to reject the death penalty 
if it was not convinced the aggravating circumstances did not outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances; (4) prosecutorial error in telling the jury to impose the death penalty if the 
aggravating factors were outweighed by the mitigating factors; (5) failing to instruct the 
jury it had to find defendants were at least 18 years old at the time of the murders to 
impose the death penalty; and (6) the technical, assumed error in failing to instruct the 
jury on possible sentences for each noncapital crime and the district court's discretion to 
run the sentences concurrent or consecutive.  
 
 
138 
 
In addition, R. Carr's penalty-phase trial was affected by one error, recognized 
under the law of the case doctrine, we will not consider in J. Carr's appeal:  the State's use 
of testimonial hearsay statements (taken from police reports) in its questions propounded 
to defendants' mitigation witnesses, where R. Carr was not afforded a prior opportunity to 
cross-examine the declarants. 
 
3. Cumulative Error Analysis 
 
In the penalty-phase proceeding, the State relied on its guilt-phase evidence to 
support the following four aggravating circumstances: 
 
"Defendants knowingly or purposely killed or created a great risk of death to more than 
one person; defendants committed the crimes for themselves or another for the purpose of 
receiving money or any other thing of monetary value; defendants committed the crimes 
in order to prevent a lawful arrest or prosecution; and defendants committed the crimes in 
an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner." R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 258-59. 
 
The guilt-phase evidence supporting each alleged aggravating circumstance was 
profound. This is a factor we must consider, albeit not a dispositive one. See Kleypas II, 
305 Kan. at 347. 
 
Although we found state-law error in the district court's failure to sever the trials 
during the guilt phase—an error that carried over into the penalty phase—it does not add 
any weight to the other errors' cumulative effect. This court previously found this error 
was reversible on Eighth Amendment grounds, but the United States Supreme Court's 
emphatic conclusion to the contrary convinces us the error, while a defect in the 
proceedings, was harmless. Although all penalty-phase errors occurred within the joint 
trial, they did not amplify the severance problem. No error tended to favor one defendant 
 
139 
 
more than the other. In other words, the fact the errors occurred in a joint trial did not 
make them more damaging than they would have been in separate proceedings. 
 
Most remaining errors operated independently such that the whole of these errors 
was no greater than the sum of its parts. But within this group are two sub-groups related 
to one another. These are the PET scan errors and the errors conveying incorrect 
weighing equations to the jury. 
 
The PET scan errors—prosecutorial error and denying Preston's surrebuttal—
relate to one another in that they affected the defendants' mitigation claim related to those 
PET scans. But we conclude there is no reasonable possibility these two errors, even 
considered as a unit, had any effect on the jury's ultimate conclusion regarding the weight 
of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, i.e., the death sentence verdict. And that 
unit is not intertwined with other errors in a way that magnifies their prejudicial effect. 
 
Preston's testimony was of questionable value given his concession that PET scans 
are not accepted as reliable tools to predict or explain criminal behavior. While 
surrebuttal might have been used to defend against any suggestion that Preston 
deliberately misled the jury, whether his flawed methodology was deliberate does not 
bear on this evidence's underlying lack of persuasive force. 
 
As we concluded above, reasonable inferences from the evidence supported the 
prosecutor's claim that Preston's impeachment undermined the remaining mitigation case 
because other defense mitigation experts tied or reconciled their opinions to Preston's 
findings. Although the claim was within the bounds of permissible argument, it does not 
necessarily mean the claim was convincing. 
 
 
140 
 
Defendants' attorneys pointed this out to the jury in closing arguments. R. Carr's 
attorney said "it doesn't matter" whether the jury believed Preston or Pay because the 
PET scan was just a confirmatory test to buttress the psychological findings. He noted, 
"[W]e do confirmatory tests all the time. Sometimes they do [confirm psychological 
findings], sometimes they don't. That's all the PET scan was . . . ." J. Carr's attorney 
directly addressed and dismissed the prosecutor's claim that the PET scan evidence was 
"the foundation of the mitigation." He noted Preston testified "a lot of people" have the 
same brain injury as J. Carr. He also observed Preston did not say the injury caused 
J. Carr to commit the crimes, and that, as something that "affects certain parts of the brain 
that might involve [J. Carr's] thought processes," the jury should know about it. 
 
Our review of the record reflects Preston's testimony about the defendants' brain 
metabolism was only a small component of their mitigation cases, which otherwise 
focused on the theme that defendants' tumultuous upbringing and psychological profiles 
placed them on a path leading to capital murder. Two expert witnesses called by R. Carr 
linked these latter two mitigation components by opining R. Carr suffered from antisocial 
personality disorder likely stemming from childhood traumas. And an expert called by 
J. Carr, who conducted a comprehensive family and social history investigation, also 
linked those components. He opined that J. Carr's family situation involving physical and 
sexual abuse, emotional detachment, and a genetic predisposition to emotional instability 
contributed to him being emotionally disturbed from early childhood. 
 
In short, there was ample evidence, apart from the PET scan evidence, suggesting 
that circumstances beyond defendants' control set them down a path toward their crimes 
(which was the central theme of the defendants' mitigation case). We are confident there 
is no reasonable possibility the errors tending to decrease the PET scan evidence's 
potency affected the jury's ultimate conclusion regarding the weight of the aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances, i.e., the death sentence verdict. 
 
141 
 
 
The prosecutorial error concerning the jury's weighing equation and the error on 
the verdict forms instruction are related in that they both recited incorrect standards for 
determining how the relative weight of aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
impacted its verdict. The prosecutor told the jury to impose the death penalty if 
aggravating factors were outweighed by mitigating factors. The instruction told the jury 
to use a verdict form rejecting a sentence of death if one or more jurors was not 
convinced the aggravating circumstances did not outweigh the mitigating circumstances. 
 
Though these errors are related, unlike the PET scan errors, they do not magnify 
one another because they misstated the law in different ways. Their import is that they 
might raise the possibility the jury did not apply the correct weighing equation. This 
possibility is dispelled by the verdict forms, which clearly and accurately led the jurors 
through the necessary findings to reach their verdict. 
 
The remaining errors do not amplify the prejudicial effect of the errors taken as a 
whole. The district court's other instructional errors—the failure to instruct the jury that it 
had to find defendants were at least 18 years old at the time of the crime and the failure to 
fully instruct the jury on the possible sentences for each noncapital crime—are distinct 
enough they cannot possibly result in prejudice when combined with any other errors. 
 
The remaining penalty phase error—permitting the cross-examination of 
mitigation witnesses using hearsay—is unique to R. Carr's case. It also does not amplify 
the other errors. 
 
We must also consider the impact of the guilt phase errors the court identified in 
its earlier decision. They tend to not amplify or interact with any other penalty phase 
error. Instead, they contribute to the idea of residual doubt. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 
 
142 
 
U.S. 374, 386-87, 390, 125 S. Ct. 2456, 162 L. Ed. 2d 360 (2005) (discussing use of 
residual doubt as defense strategy in penalty phase of capital trial). Specifically, Judge 
Clark's error in applying the third-party evidence rule and hearsay exceptions, which may 
have deterred R. Carr from testifying on his own behalf, arguably lessened the chance a 
juror would have possessed residual doubt of R. Carr's guilt during the penalty phase. See 
R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 186-87, 209-10.  
 
However, when addressing whether this guilt phase error required reversal of his 
capital conviction, we noted the "remarkable strength of the State's case against R. Carr" 
in concluding that "there was no impact on the trial's outcome from the exclusion of 
R. Carr's proffered testimony." (Emphasis added.) 300 Kan. at 212. In reaching that 
conclusion, we favorably quoted the State's summation of its case against R. Carr.  
 
"'[H.G.'s] identification of Reginald, both immediately following the attack and 
at trial, as one of the two black males responsible for the crimes perpetrated against her 
and her friends. [H.G.'s] identification was buttressed by multiple scientific sources, 
including the mitochondrial DNA analysis, which revealed that of the four hairs collected 
from the Birchwood scene and submitted for analysis only two were of African–
American lineage and defendant could not be excluded as the donor of either one; the 
nuclear DNA test results, which demonstrated defendant also could not be excluded as 
the donor of the DNA evidence recovered from [H.G.'s] inner thigh and which identified 
the blood on defendant's shirt and underwear as that of [H.M.]; and the medical evidence, 
which demonstrated that a few short months after the attack [H.G.] developed the same 
sexually transmitted disease that defendant carried.' 
 
"'Additional evidence to support the identification included footwear impressions 
taken from a Voicestream box and tarp at the Birchwood residence and determined to 
match the size, shape, and character of the "B-Boots" Reginald wore. A cigar-type ash, 
. . . matched the diameter of the cigar recovered from Reginald's coat pocket. Both pieces 
of evidence supported [H.G.'s] assertion that Reginald played an active role in the 
commission of the offenses. 
 
143 
 
 
"'Further, the court heard evidence that it was Reginald who was in possession of 
a vast majority of the property taken from the Birchwood residence, given that it was 
recovered from both the apartment where he was staying and his Plymouth vehicle. That 
property included a big screen TV, various electronics, bedding, luggage, a vast amount 
of clothing, and numerous personal items belonging to each victim—including 
checkbooks, wallets, credit cards, drivers' licenses, sets of keys, gas cards, watches, and 
day planners—as well as numerous ATM receipts and just under $1000.00 in cash, a 
particularly notable fact given that Reginald was unemployed. Moreover, Reginald was 
stopped by law enforcement officers after driving by the Birchwood residence at 
approximately 4:00 a.m. on the morning of the killings. 
 
"'Finally, at the time of the proffer the court was aware of the evidence that 
highlighted Reginald's link to the Lorcin handgun used in the commission of the murders 
and that, despite his efforts to dispose of the gun, it was ultimately recovered and tested, 
revealing that each bullet and cartridge was fired from that gun.'" R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 
211-12. 
 
The strength of the evidence establishing R. Carr's role and culpability in perpetrating 
these crimes left no room for any meaningful amount of residual doubt, even if the guilt 
and penalty phase errors had not occurred.  
 
In the final analysis, the State's aggravation case—which rested entirely on its 
guilt-phase evidence—was formidable. This evidence overwhelmingly established that 
defendants knowingly killed more than one person, for the purpose of receiving money or 
items of monetary value and to prevent arrest or prosecution, and that they did so in an 
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. 
 
Following the jury's guilt-phase verdicts, the penalty-phase proceeding consisted 
almost entirely of defense witnesses who testified over the course of nearly two weeks 
about the defendants' upbringing, psychological profiles, and other mitigating 
 
144 
 
circumstances. R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 259-75. After giving due consideration to this 
evidence, the jury unanimously found beyond reasonable doubt that all four aggravating 
circumstances were present and outweighed mitigating circumstances, thereby warranting 
a death sentence verdict.  
 
Under these circumstances, we are convinced there is no reasonable possibility the 
identified errors, deemed harmless in isolation, cumulatively affected the jury's ultimate 
conclusion regarding the weight of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, i.e., the 
death sentence verdict. To borrow again from the United States Supreme Court, given the 
State's evidence "[n]one of that mattered." 577 U.S. at 126. We are satisfied the jury 
correctly understood its charge and was not swayed by the aggregate impact of these 
identified defects. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
After careful review and consideration of the entire record, we conclude that "the 
evidence supports the findings that" one or more aggravating circumstances "existed 
and that any mitigating circumstances were insufficient to outweigh the aggravating 
circumstances." K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6619(c)(2). Having confirmed that Reginald 
Dexter Carr Jr. received a fair trial and the jury's sentence was not "imposed under the 
influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor," K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-
6619(c)(1), we affirm Reginald Dexter Carr Jr.'s death sentence for the capital murder of 
H.M., J.B., B.H., and A.S. 
 
* * * 
 
BILES, J., concurring:  I concur in the majority result and rationale with one 
exception because I find much of the majority's section 1 analysis unnecessary. State v. 
 
145 
 
Carr, 314 Kan. ___ (R. Carr II), slip op. at 20-40. My reasoning harkens back to what I 
wrote in Hodes & Nauser, MDs v. Schmidt, 309 Kan. 610, 706, 440 P.3d 461 (2019) 
(Biles, J., concurring) ("I hope those reviewing my colleagues' history lessons will accept 
the exercise for what it obviously is—hard working judges trying to honestly answer the 
questions presented in good faith. But for me, an originalism search gets us only so far 
when divining meaning for words with such obvious open-ended qualities as 'liberty' or 
'inalienable natural rights.' The historical back-and-forth really just boils down to how 
much weight is given one selected fact over another.").  
 
The Carr defendants contend section 1 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights 
"protects the right to life, and Kansas' capital sentencing scheme unconstitutionally 
infringes upon this right." R. Carr II, 314 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 18. But as the majority 
acknowledges, that was decided more than 20 years ago. See State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 
894, 1051-52, 40 P.3d 139 (2001) (Kleypas I) ("We conclude that Kansas' death penalty 
scheme does not violate the spirit or the letter of § 1."), overruled on other grounds by 
Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 165 L. Ed. 2d 429 (2006).  
 
I appreciate the Carr defendants seized on the recent decision in Hodes & Nauser 
to animate what amounts to an old—previously decided—issue. But Kleypas I effectively 
disposed of their essential argument. So aside from some additional discussion about the 
historical context of section 1 from the Wyandotte Convention, I would end the analysis 
there, relying on Kleypas I and the relevant cases it recited, including Slaughter v. State, 
950 P.2d 839, 861-62 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997) ("Surely killing a person infringes on that 
same right [to life]. Appellant has presented nothing to this Court showing that the 
Legislature's ability to establish a punishment of death for first degree murder in any way 
violates his 'inherent' right to life[, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the enjoyment of 
the gains of their own industry]."). 
 
 
146 
 
* * * 
 
STEGALL, J., concurring:  I join the majority's decision to affirm. But I do so with 
deep doubts and reluctance because this court's section 1 jurisprudence—begun in Hodes 
& Nauser, MDs v. Schmidt, 309 Kan. 610, 440 P.3d 461 (2019), and continued today—is 
a gross constitutional error. I continue to dissent from that error. See generally Hodes, 
309 Kan. at 707-78 (Stegall, J., dissenting).  
 
I write to explain those doubts and to emphasize that today's decision adds both 
clarity and dreadful effect to the egregious consequences of the Hodes decision. When, in 
Hodes, we abandoned our longstanding interpretation of section 1 as a limit on state 
police power in favor of an ephemeral scheme of limited and judicially pronounced 
rights, we stripped all citizens of their "first rights of republican self-rule" including the 
right to be "free from arbitrary, irrational, or discriminatory regulation that bears no 
reasonable relationship to the common welfare." 309 Kan. at 753, 766 (Stegall, J., 
dissenting). 
 
Indeed, having eliminated the substantive first right of a free and self-governing 
people, the Hodes court "only magnifie[d] the State and its near-limitless power." 309 
Kan. at 745 (Stegall, J., dissenting). And the outcome of this fundamental change in 
constitutional structure is manifest anew in today's decision which reads our Constitution 
as giving the state nearly limitless power to punish citizens—unencumbered from any 
substantive check and limited only by the familiar panoply of procedural guarantees 
explicitly enumerated in the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights.  
 
It may be tempting to adopt a dismissive shrug at this outcome given the gruesome 
outrage of the underlying events. It would be understandable if one felt ambivalent about 
this magnification of state power given that the impact today falls only on two of the 
 
147 
 
most brutal and coldblooded killers in the history of Kansas. But if substantive guarantees 
are not afforded to every single citizen—and rigorously defended no matter the 
circumstances—the people will not long be free.  
 
Over the course of this court's vigorous disagreements concerning the meaning 
of section 1, the Hodes majority rather breathlessly suggested that "the dissent appears 
to maintain that upon becoming pregnant, women relinquish virtually all rights of 
personal sovereignty in favor of the Legislature's determination," and that I wanted "a 
constitutional prerogative to invade the autonomy of pregnant women and exclude them 
from our state Constitution's Bill of Rights." Hodes, 309 Kan. at 650. 
 
Far from a one-off of excessive hyperbole, the Hodes majority made this its 
thematic criticism of my articulation of our longstanding and traditional view of section 1 
as a restriction on state police power. Because I interpret section 1 as a substantive due 
process provision—that is, as a substantive limit on the power of the government rather 
than a discreet-rights granting provision—the majority argued I was "dismissive" of the 
rights of citizens. 309 Kan. at 637. My colleagues suggested my description of section 1's 
limits on the state's police power set "too low a bar" and would "allow[] the State to . . . 
intrude into all decisions." 309 Kan. at 671. According to the Hodes majority, I desired to 
leave "naked and defenseless" citizens with no recourse against the "unrestrained" power 
of the state which had "no practical limits" and would "intrude with impunity" against the 
individual. 309 Kan. at 679-80. 
 
Of course this was a "fabrication so flimsy it makes run-of-the-mill straw men 
appear as fairy tale knights by comparison." 309 Kan. at 768 (Stegall, J., dissenting). At 
the time Hodes was decided, however, the majority could get away with this faulty-but-
effective rhetoric because it viewed itself as standing nobly between an aggressively 
paternalist government and the rights of women. It has taken today's case—and likely 
 
148 
 
future cases as well—to clarify what was really going on. So, I resurrect this old squabble 
not to pick at closed wounds, but because today's decision shines the disinfectant of 
sunlight on the rhetorical posture of the Hodes majority.  
 
Without the benefit of that rhetorical posture, the essential effect of the Hodes 
decision is revealed to be what I explained it to be at the time—that "it fundamentally 
alters the structure of our government to magnify the power of the state." 309 Kan. at 707 
(Stegall, J., dissenting). That shift—the magnification of state power—is enacted today as 
we hold that a citizen's limited section 1 rights are "forfeited when a person's criminal 
conduct necessitates punishment." State v. Carr, 314 Kan. ___ (R. Carr II), slip op. at 34. 
Thus, the majority makes it explicit that a criminal defendant has no section 1 protections 
at all. Indeed, according to the majority, "the state's power to punish" is limited only by 
"due process" and "cruel or unusual" provisions which "do not arise under section 1." 
R. Carr II, 314 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 40.  
 
It turns out that in reality, it is the majority's interpretation of section 1 (not mine) 
that ends up with some citizens "relinquish[ing] virtually all rights of personal 
sovereignty in favor of the Legislature's determination," and "exclude[d]" from 
substantive constitutional protections against state exercises of power. Hodes, 309 Kan. at 
650. If, however, section 1 is a substantive check on state power rather than a 
fundamental-rights-that-might-be-forfeited provision, it will always and everywhere 
provide the same protection to all people regardless of circumstances. And that is exactly 
the test I proposed in my Hodes dissent—a test demanded by the overwhelming weight of 
text, history, and longstanding judicial precedent. 
 
I articulated that test like this: 
 
"In sum, section 1 demands this 'rational basis with bite' judicial inquiry. In order 
to be a constitutional exercise of power, every act of our Legislature must be rationally 
 
149 
 
related to the furtherance or protection of the commonwealth. The lodestar of this test is, 
'"what have [the people] authorized to be done?"' Nemaha, 7 Kan. at 557 (Brewer, J., 
dissenting). The people have not authorized the State to act in arbitrary, irrational, or 
discriminatory ways. Applying the necessary deference, a court must examine the actual 
legislative record to determine the real purpose behind any law in question before it can 
conclude the law is within the limited constitutional grant of power possessed by the 
State." Hodes, 309 Kan. at 767 (Stegall, J., dissenting). 
 
This is the test we should now apply to the death penalty as enacted by the Kansas 
Legislature. I have no preconceived idea about how such an inquiry would play out. And 
it is one of the great misfortunes of the Hodes decision that we now will never know. The 
lower courts have not inquired into the subject, the parties have not briefed the issue, and 
this court has declined to take it up. 
 
Given this uncertainty, and the monumental consequences of the State's exercise 
of this most final, most irreversible, and most grave use of power—killing a human 
person—I am left with a profound and unshakable disquiet about our court's blessing 
upon these procedures. As a consequence, if the issue had been joined, I would be 
inclined, as in Hodes, to remand this matter for a review of  
 
"whether the legislative act is reasonably related to the furtherance or protection of the 
common welfare. The Legislature has wide latitude to define for itself the substantive 
content of the common good, circumscribed by the traditional police power limit that a 
law cannot be arbitrary, irrational, or involve a class-based form of discrimination." 
Hodes, 309 Kan. at 769 (Stegall, J., dissenting).  
 
But this review would demand a real judicial inquiry into "the legislative record" to 
determine whether it "reveals evidence of a discriminatory intent or some other arbitrary 
or irrational purpose behind the law" and a consideration of "the possibility that the act 
 
150 
 
was not actually intended to further the common welfare." 309 Kan. at 770 (Stegall, J., 
dissenting).  
 
I have previously explained why our constitutional structure, properly understood, 
does not permit a "presumption of constitutionality" to attach to legislative acts. Hilburn 
v. Enerpipe Ltd., 309 Kan. 1127, 1158, 442 P.3d 509 (2019) (Stegall, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in judgment). But neither may a court presume unconstitutionality, 
and I will not presume our death penalty is not reasonably related to the furtherance or 
protection of the common good—or that it is otherwise arbitrary, irrational, or 
discriminatory. A party challenging an exercise of state power as exceeding the proper 
bounds of the police power has the burden to present that claim for adjudication. Because 
that has not happened here, I am left with no option other than to concur in the judgment.  
 
* * * 
 
LUCKERT, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part:  In this appeal, we review 
a trial riddled by error that led to a verdict imposing the death penalty. The ultimate 
question before us is whether there is a reasonable possibility the cumulative effect of all 
errors might have affected even one juror's decision to impose the death penalty. See 
R. Carr II, 314 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 136 (citing State v. Cheever, 306 Kan. 760, 799-
801, 402 P.3d 1126 [2017]). Given the nature and volume of errors, I cannot eliminate 
the possibility that at least one juror would have decided mitigating factors or mercy 
outweighed the aggravating factors put forward as reasons to sentence Reginald Carr 
(R. Carr) to death. I therefore dissent from the majority's determination that these many 
errors did not affect the jury verdict. I also dissent from some of the majority's holdings 
about error. I have listed and discussed these points below. I otherwise agree with most 
other holdings and the rationales supporting them discussed by the majority including 
those relating to section 1 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights.  
 
151 
 
 
My research reveals no other Kansas appellate case affirming a verdict in the face 
of so many mostly interlocking errors. In State v. Carr, 300 Kan. 1, 331 P.3d 544 (2014) 
(R. Carr I), rev'd and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Kansas v. Carr, 577 U.S. 
108, 136 S. Ct. 633, 193 L. Ed. 2d 535 (2016) (Carr), this court found 11 errors in the 
guilt phase of R. Carr's trial. 300 Kan. at 44-48, 251-52 (summarizing holdings). I joined 
a concurring and dissenting opinion that found two additional errors and that would have 
held cumulative error required reversing the jury verdicts. See 300 Kan. at 315-21. The 
errors found by a majority of the court included:  
 
1. The trial judge erred in refusing to allow R. Carr to exercise a peremptory 
challenge;  
2. The trial judge erred in refusing to sever R. Carr's trial from Jonathan Carr's 
(J. Carr's) trial;  
3. The trial judge erred in admitting Linda Ann Walenta's statements through law 
enforcement testimony;  
4. The trial judge erred in interpreting and applying the third-party evidence rule 
and the hearsay rule, preventing R. Carr from pursuing his defense to some of 
the charged crimes; 
5. The trial judge gave a faulty instruction on the sex-crime-based capital 
murders; 
6. Three of the multiple-homicide-based capital murder convictions were 
multiplicitous with the first; 
7. The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over any sex crime charges 
based on coerced victim-on-victim sex acts; 
8. One of R. Carr's convictions for rape of one victim was multiplicitous with his 
other rape conviction relating to the same victim; 
 
152 
 
9. The trial judge erred by automatically excluding testimony from an expert on 
the reliability of eyewitness identifications; 
10. The trial judge erred in instructing the jury to consider an eyewitness' degree of 
certainty; and 
11. The trial judge erred by giving an aiding and abetting instruction that discussed 
foreseeable crimes. 300 Kan. at 251-52. 
 
The two additional errors I would have found were:  
 
12. The evidence was insufficient to support R. Carr's conviction of attempted 
aggravated robbery underlying his felony-murder conviction of Walenta; and  
13. The evidence was insufficient to support R. Carr's conviction of aiding and 
abetting J. Carr's rape of one victim through digital self-penetration. See 300 
Kan. at 320-21. 
 
Considering the cumulative effect of these errors, I joined others in saying: 
 
"I readily acknowledge that the evidence against R. Carr on the Andrew 
Schreiber and Birchwood incidents was unusually strong. But it was not inevitably 
invincible, particularly if the governing rules had shifted in the directions the majority 
holds that they should have. My colleagues and I simply cannot know with the degree 
of comfort generally required in a death penalty case, see State v. Marsh, 278 Kan. 520, 
525, 102 P.3d 445 (2004), rev'd and remanded, 548 U.S. 163, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 165 L. 
Ed. 2d 429 (2006), and vacated in part, 282 Kan. 38, 144 P.3d 48 (2006) (heightened 
scrutiny applies to review of capital trial proceedings) (citing Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 
625, 637-38, 100 S. Ct. 2382, 65 L. Ed. 2d 392 [1980]), that the contours of a severed 
guilt phase with no reverse Batson error and in which R. Carr was permitted to defend 
himself under a correct application of the third-party evidence and hearsay rules would 
have differed so little as to be insignificant. Any anticipated change in perspective could 
have intensified, had expert testimony on modern research on eyewitness identification 
been permitted, or had the aiding and abetting and eyewitness instructions contained no 
 
153 
 
error." R. Carr I, 300 Kan. at 319-20 (Beier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).  
 
Nothing has changed that conclusion about the cumulative impact of those errors. 
While the United States Supreme Court rejected the constitutional basis for finding some 
errors, it did not consider the state law basis for those same errors. Plus, it considered 
only a small fraction of many errors we must consider, and it thus did not consider the 
effect of the multiple, interlocking errors.  
 
As, the majority observes, we must put all these errors "into the same 'error pot' as 
the penalty phase errors when, as here, the same jury heard both the guilt and penalty 
phase." R. Carr II, 314 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 137. 
 
Two of these errors heavily tainted the penalty phase of the trial, which is the 
focus of today's majority decision.  
 
As to one of those errors, this court unanimously held that the trial judge 
committed error by seating a juror after defendants exercised a peremptory challenge to 
the juror—that is, after R. Carr asked to strike a juror from the jury panel using a 
challenge allowed under Kansas law. See R. Carr, 300 Kan. at 45, 124-39. The State 
objected, and the trial judge sustained the objection and did not allow R. Carr to exercise 
his peremptory challenge. On appeal from that holding, the United States Supreme Court 
did not address this error, and it stands as the law of this case. R. Carr II, 314 Kan. at 
___, slip op. at 136. 
 
The trial judge's error in refusing R. Carr's request to strike a juror permeates and 
taints all aspects of the trial because "[t]he proper use of the peremptory challenge is vital 
to the conduct of a criminal defendant's defense. . . . Although it may seem minimal, the 
deprivation of even one valid peremptory challenge is prejudicial to a defendant and may 
 
154 
 
skew the jury process." State v. Foust, 18 Kan. App. 2d 617, 624, 857 P.2d 1368 (1993). 
When this court first decided R. Carr's guilt phase issues, 16 of our sister states had held 
such an error demands automatic reversal. See R. Carr I, 300 Kan. at 135-36 (discussing 
cases); 300 Kan. at 318 (Beier, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (same). I need 
not decide whether I would join the reasoning of those courts. Even applying our 
traditional tests to determine whether an error requires reversal, I cannot say the trial 
court's error did not impact the jury's verdict. See State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 6, 
256 P.3d 801 (2011) (stating harmless error standards for constitutional and statutory 
errors).  
 
The trial judge often "provided venire persons with the magic words" that led to a 
challenge for cause of those with misgivings about the death penalty and "passing for 
cause those jurors who were predisposed to finding the defendant guilty and/or were 
mitigation-impaired with respect to the death penalty." R. Carr I, 300 Kan. at 325-26 
(Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "Instead of uncovering 
disqualifying bias and prejudice, the voir dire questioning in this case too often served to 
camouflage it." 300 Kan. at 326 (Johnson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
Given this record, denying R. Carr the ability to use a peremptory strike deprived him of 
"one of the very purposes of peremptory challenges[, which is] to enable the defendant to 
correct judicial error." United States v. Martinez-Salazar, 528 U.S. 304, 319, 120 S. Ct. 
774, 145 L. Ed. 2d 792 (2000) (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring). Plus, "[p]eremptory 
challenges, by enabling each side to exclude those jurors it believes will be most partial 
toward the other side, are a means of 'eliminat[ing] extremes of partiality on both sides,' 
. . . thereby 'assuring the selection of a qualified and unbiased jury.'" Holland v. Illinois, 
493 U.S. 474, 484, 110 S. Ct. 803, 107 L. Ed. 2d 905 (1990) (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 79, 91, 98, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 [1986]). Here, we have no such 
assurance. 
 
 
155 
 
Simply put, denying fair use of R. Carr's right to exercise a peremptory challenge 
creates a reasonable possibility, and even a reasonable probability, that a properly 
selected juror untainted by an erroneous voir dire process could have decided not to 
impose the death penalty. See Ward, 292 Kan. 541, Syl. ¶ 6 (stating harmlessness tests in 
terms of reasonable possibilities for constitutional harmless error and probabilities for 
other errors).  
 
As to the second error with a significant effect on the penalty phase, this court held 
the trial judge erred in refusing to grant R. Carr and J. Carr separate trials. R. Carr I, 300 
Kan. at 45, 97. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held the failure to sever the 
trial did not implicate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or offend 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
Carr, 577 U.S. at 122-26. But that holding did not directly disturb this court's ruling that 
the trial judge committed error under Kansas law when he refused to grant the request for 
separate trials. R. Carr II, 314 Kan. ___, slip op. at 58-59. Today, the majority recognizes 
the state law holding remains the law of the case, and it holds that "[t]he improper joinder 
of the defendants did not cease to be error at the commencement of the penalty phase." 
314 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 59.  
 
Indeed, it did not. The attorneys for J. Carr warned the trial court they would be a 
second prosecutor against R. Carr. While this was evident at many points during the guilt 
phase when J. Carr introduced evidence prejudicial to R. Carr as he pursued a defense 
antagonistic to R. Carr's, the antagonistic nature of the codefendants' cases became even 
more prejudicial during the penalty phase of the trial. For example, J. Carr's attorney 
elicited testimony that R. Carr confessed to shooting the victims. J. Carr thus joined the 
State in presenting evidence that pointed the finger directly at R. Carr as the actual 
shooter. This finger pointing dominated J. Carr's mitigation defense which consisted of 
evidence, supported by expert testimony, that R. Carr badgered and pushed his brother to 
 
156 
 
commit criminal acts. Kansas law protects a defendant from having to counter the case of 
a codefendant as well as that of the State. State v. Martin, 234 Kan. 548, 673 P.2d 104 
(1983); I agree with the result of Martin and other cases that have found this type of 
antagonistic finger pointing to be prejudicial error. See, e.g., United States v. Breinig, 
70 F.3d 850 (6th Cir. 1995); Foster v. Commonwealth, 827 S.W.2d 670 (Ky. 1992).  
 
While I find these two errors, along with the cumulative effect of the other guilt 
phase issues, to be sufficient for reversal, today, focusing on the penalty phase of the 
trial, this court unanimously held six more errors occurred or would be assumed:   
 
1. The trial judge erred in denying the defendants a continuance to consult with 
Dr. David Preston about Dr. Norman Pay's testimony and to recall Preston for 
surrebuttal; 
2. The prosecutor committed error in commenting that the "truth" about 
defendants' PET scans came out;  
3. The trial judge erred in instructing the jury to reject the death penalty if it was 
not convinced the aggravating circumstances did not outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances; 
4. The prosecutor erred in telling the jury to impose the death penalty if the 
aggravating factors were outweighed by the mitigating factors;  
5. The trial judge erred in failing to instruct the jury it had to find defendants 
were at least 18 years old at the time of the murders to impose the death 
penalty; and  
6. Assumed error occurred as a result of the trial judge failing to instruct the jury 
on possible sentences for each noncapital crime and the judge's discretion to 
run the sentences concurrent or consecutive. R. Carr II, 314 Kan. at ___, slip 
op. at 137. 
 
 
157 
 
I would add a seventh error to the list. Under the law that existed at the time of 
R. Carr's trial, the trial judge should have informed the jury that mitigating factors need 
not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In 2001, this court directed trial judges to tell 
the jury that mitigating circumstances  
 
"(1) . . . need to be proved only to the satisfaction of the individual juror in the juror's 
sentencing decision and not beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) mitigating circumstances 
do not need to be found by all members of the jury in order to be considered in an 
individual juror's sentencing decision." State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894, 1078, 40 P.3d 139 
(2001).  
 
R. Carr asked the trial judge to comply with this direction, but the judge failed to do so.  
 
In part, the Kleypas rationale for requiring this instruction depended on 
constitutional interpretation rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Carr, 
577 U.S. at 122. But the Kleypas rationale also depended on state law. As this court 
explained in State v. Scott, 286 Kan. 54, 106-07, 183 P.3d 801 (2008), without an 
instruction as directed by the Kleypas court, the instructions could have confused the 
jury. That confusion, the Scott court held, required reversal. In reversing, this court 
applied the standard we use when an error does not implicate the Constitution:  
 
"Read together, the instructions repeatedly emphasize the need for unanimity as to any 
aggravating circumstances found to exist. Conversely, the trial court's instructions do not 
inform the jury as to a contrary standard for determining mitigating circumstances. The 
jury is left to speculate as to the correct standard. Under these circumstances, we 
conclude there is a substantial probability reasonable jurors could have believed 
unanimity was required to find mitigating circumstances." 286 Kan. at 107.  
 
 
158 
 
The Scott court's application of the substantial probability standard for harmless 
error suggests that it was not finding constitutional error. See Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 
Syl. ¶ 6 (stating constitutional harmless error test); see also 292 Kan. at 564 (noting that 
cases before Ward inconsistently stated the standard). Rather, the court looked at the 
potential for juror confusion. Although today's majority does not discuss Scott, it notes 
that this court explicitly recognized that Kleypas' directive rested, in part, on state law 
and thus remained the law despite the Supreme Court clarifying the holding could not rest 
on Eighth Amendment grounds. See R. Carr II, 314 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 51-52 
(discussing State v. Gleason, 305 Kan. 794, 798-806, 388 P.3d 101 [2017]; State v. 
Cheever, 306 Kan. 760, 784, 402 P.3d 1126 [2017]). But the majority abandons the 
Kleypas directive and holds that the trial judge did not err when he refused to give an 
instruction directed by this court. R. Carr II, 314 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 56. 
 
To the contrary, in my view, for a trial court to simply ignore that a directive of 
this court is itself error. See State v. Clark, 313 Kan. 556, 565, 486 P.3d 591 (2021) 
("'[P]oints of law established by a court are generally followed by the same court and 
courts of lower rank in later cases in which the same legal issue is raised.'"). And the 
majority does not hold the directed instruction would misstate the law. Instead, it 
determines "[t]he instructions viewed together as a whole correctly and clearly informed 
the jurors of the law governing their consideration of mitigating circumstances." R. Carr 
II, 314 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 56. Granted, we often hold a court does not err when it 
refuses to give a requested instruction that provides additional information to a jury even 
if the instruction would properly explain the law. But we often tell trial judges that giving 
the jury added information would be a better practice. See, e.g., State v. Barlett, 308 Kan. 
78, 86, 418 P.3d 1253 (2018). And in Kleypas, 272 Kan. at 1078, this court took the 
added step of directing judges to give the instruction. 
 
 
159 
 
Those with legal training may find the jury instructions clear. But jurors usually 
lack legal training and familiarity with concepts like burden of proof and weighing 
equations. I, like the many justices of the Kansas Supreme Court who have considered 
these instructions many times over the last several decades, discern ambiguity that could 
confuse and mislead jurors as they perform the important task of weighing aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances. That confusion was rampant in this trial, including among 
the law trained. The majority agrees the trial judge erred in instructing the jury to reject 
the death penalty if it was not convinced the aggravating circumstances did not outweigh 
the mitigating circumstances. It also held the prosecutor erred in telling the jury to 
impose the death penalty if the aggravating circumstances were outweighed by the 
mitigating circumstances. The weighing equation and the way it is to be applied can be 
confusing. We should recognize that reality and direct our trial courts to provide as much 
clarity as possible rather than to cloak decisions about death in ambiguity.  
 
Yet the majority quickly dismisses the effect of these errors. Although it notes 
"these errors are related," it concludes "they do not magnify one another because they 
misstated the law in different ways." R. Carr II, 314 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 141. But 
differing statements simply magnify the potential confusion. Which of all the options is 
correct? The majority defaults to the written word found on the verdict form. R. Carr II, 
314 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 141. But we have another written instruction that is wrong. 
Which written word controls? We should not tolerate this level of confusion when 
sentencing someone to death. 
 
When I consider the penalty phase errors together with the guilt phase errors, I am 
convinced the threshold for vacation of the defendant's capital sentence has been reached 
under the cumulative error doctrine. We consider here horrible and tragic criminal acts. 
And the evidence against R. Carr was strong. But as said in Justice Beier's prior 
concurrence and dissent, which I joined, "it was not inevitably invincible." R. Carr I, 300 
 
160 
 
Kan. at 319. And, especially as to the penalty phase, I cannot ignore the reasonable 
possibility a properly selected jury—actually two properly selected juries—might have 
reached a different verdict. 
 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the outcome reached by a majority of 
this court.