Case Title: Commonwealth v. Roderick

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-13212

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2022-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-13212 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  TIMOTHY M. RODERICK. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     April 4, 2022. - September 16, 2022. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Rape.  Global Positioning System Device.  Practice, Criminal, 
Probation.  Constitutional Law, Search and seizure, 
Privacy.  Search and Seizure, Probationer, Expectation of 
privacy.  Privacy. 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on December 30, 2016. 
 
A motion to vacate a condition of probation, filed on June 
2, 2021, was heard by Jeffrey A. Locke, J. 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
Edward Crane for the defendant. 
Johanna S. Black, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
GAZIANO, J.  In Commonwealth v. Feliz, 481 Mass. 689, 690-
691 (2019), S.C., 486 Mass. 510 (2020) (Feliz I), we held that 
global positioning system (GPS) monitoring as a condition of 
2 
 
probation constitutes a search under art. 14 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution, as recognized by the United 
States Supreme Court in Grady v. North Carolina, 575 U.S. 306, 
309 (2015).  Consequently, in order for such a condition of 
probation to be constitutional, the government must establish 
that its interest in imposing GPS monitoring outweighs the 
privacy intrusion occasioned by the monitoring.  See Feliz I, 
supra at 701. 
This case requires us to determine whether GPS monitoring 
as a condition of probation is constitutional as applied to the 
defendant, a first-time offender convicted of rape.  The 
Commonwealth asserts that GPS monitoring will further its 
interests in enforcing the court-ordered exclusion zone 
surrounding the victim's home, deterring the defendant from 
engaging in criminal activity, and assisting authorities in 
investigating any future criminal activity by the defendant. 
We conclude that the Commonwealth has not established how 
the imposition of GPS monitoring in this case would further its 
interest in enforcing the exclusion zone.  Although the 
Commonwealth has demonstrated that GPS monitoring might aid in 
deterring and investigating possible future criminal activity by 
the defendant, in the circumstances here, those interests alone 
do not justify the depth of the intrusion into the defendant's 
3 
 
privacy that GPS monitoring entails.  Accordingly, the 
imposition of GPS monitoring on the defendant as a condition of 
probation would constitute an unreasonable search in violation 
of art. 14. 
1.  Background.  The victim and the defendant met and 
became friends sometime in 2016.  At that time, the victim 
primarily was living in a tent in Connecticut, but she 
periodically would visit Massachusetts and spend the night at 
the defendant's house in Wareham.  While she stayed overnight, 
the victim repeatedly made clear to the defendant that their 
friendship was strictly platonic. 
One evening in early June of 2016, the victim became 
intoxicated and fell asleep on the defendant's bedroom floor.  
When she awoke the next morning, the defendant was standing in 
the room and told her that he had "had sex with [her] body last 
night."  The victim then noticed what she believed was the 
presence of semen in her body.  Shortly thereafter, she obtained 
a sexual assault examination at a nearby hospital, which showed 
that male sperm were present in her vagina.  The defendant 
subsequently contacted police and told the investigating officer 
that he twice had had sex with the victim on the night of the 
alleged rape, but asserted that she had been conscious and 
consenting. 
4 
 
 
Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted on two 
indictments charging him with rape, G. L. c. 265, § 22 (b).1  He 
was sentenced to four years of incarceration on the first 
indictment, followed by three years of probation on the second.  
As a condition of probation, the judge ordered the defendant to 
submit to GPS monitoring pursuant to G. L. c. 265, § 47, which 
at that time required the imposition of GPS monitoring as a 
condition of probation for individuals who were convicted of 
most sex offenses, including rape.  See Commonwealth v. Guzman, 
469 Mass. 492, 496 (2014) (where defendant was convicted of 
enumerated sex offense and sentenced to probation, GPS 
monitoring was mandatory under G. L. c. 265, § 47).  The judge 
also imposed a one-half mile "exclusion zone" around the 
victim's residence and place of employment, which the defendant 
was not to enter. 
 
A few weeks before he was expected to be released from 
prison, the defendant moved to vacate the condition of GPS 
monitoring, pursuant to our decision in Feliz I, 481 Mass. 
at 701, on the ground that it constituted an unreasonable search 
in violation of art. 14.  At a hearing on the motion, the 
 
1 The defendant also was tried on three indictments charging 
indecent assault and battery, G. L. c. 265, § 13H, based on 
statements he made to police about his prior conduct.  At the 
close of the Commonwealth's case, the judge directed verdicts of 
not guilty as to those charges. 
5 
 
prosecutor stated that she had been unable to contact the 
victim, and therefore was unsure whether the victim had a 
particular domicil or home address that could be used as the 
basis of an exclusion zone. 
Concluding that GPS monitoring as a condition of probation 
was reasonable, the judge denied the defendant's motion.  The 
judge ordered the Commonwealth to continue its efforts to 
determine the victim's home address and indicated that he would 
reconsider his ruling if the Commonwealth could not create a 
"meaningful" exclusion zone.  After the hearing, but before the 
defendant was released from prison, the Commonwealth obtained 
the victim's home address and was able to configure the 
defendant's GPS device so that it would issue an alert to the 
probation department if the defendant entered that exclusion 
zone.  The defendant timely appealed from the ruling on his 
motion to vacate the condition of GPS monitoring to the Appeals 
Court, and we granted his application for direct appellate 
review. 
 
2.  Discussion.  In support of its contention that GPS 
monitoring would be appropriate here, the Commonwealth relies on 
three principal interests that it claims collectively outweigh 
the intrusion on the defendant's privacy:  enforcing the court-
ordered exclusion zone, deterring and investigating future 
crime, and punishing the defendant.  The defendant argues that 
6 
 
the Commonwealth did not establish how GPS monitoring would 
further these interests, and therefore did not satisfy its 
burden of proving the reasonableness of the search.  
Specifically, the defendant asserts that the Commonwealth did 
not satisfactorily demonstrate that an exclusion zone would be 
established, nor did it provide sufficient reason to believe 
that the defendant poses a risk of recidivating. 
 
As stated, GPS monitoring constitutes a search under 
art. 14 and the Fourth Amendment.  See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
481 Mass. 710, 718, cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 247 (2019).  See 
also Grady, 575 U.S. at 309.  Because GPS monitoring as a 
condition of probation is imposed without a warrant, such 
monitoring is "'presumptively unreasonable,' and, therefore, 
presumptively unconstitutional."  Commonwealth v. Norman, 484 
Mass. 330, 335 (2020), quoting Commonwealth v. White, 475 Mass. 
583, 588 (2016).  Nonetheless, GPS monitoring of probationers 
may be constitutional if the Commonwealth establishes that such 
a search is reasonable.  See Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, 366 
Mass. 51, 57 (1974) (Commonwealth bears burden of proving 
reasonableness of warrantless search).  See also Feliz I, 481 
Mass. at 705.  GPS monitoring is reasonable if "the government's 
interest in imposing GPS monitoring outweighs the privacy 
intrusion occasioned by GPS monitoring."  See id. at 701.  This 
7 
 
inquiry turns on a "constellation of factors," analyzed in the 
totality of the circumstances.  Id. 
 
In evaluating the privacy intrusion occasioned by GPS 
monitoring, a reviewing court considers the incremental effect 
of the search on the probationer's privacy.  See id.  To do so, 
the court first examines the "the expectation of privacy of the 
person subject to the search."  See Landry v. Attorney Gen., 429 
Mass. 336, 348 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1073 (2000).  The 
court then considers the extent to which GPS monitoring would 
intrude upon this expectation of privacy by evaluating, inter 
alia, the "nature of the [search] and its manner of execution" 
(quotations and citations omitted), see Feliz I, 481 Mass. 
at 704, as well as the character and quantity of the information 
that would be revealed by the search, see Garcia v. 
Commonwealth, 486 Mass. 341, 354 (2020). 
 
The extent of the government's interest in imposing GPS 
monitoring turns on the extent to which the search advances a 
legitimate government interest.  See Feliz I, 481 Mass. at 700.  
See also Johnson, 481 Mass. at 719.  Crucially, the Commonwealth 
must "establish how GPS monitoring, when viewed as a search, 
furthers its interests" (emphasis in original).  Feliz I, supra 
at 705.  In weighing the strength of the government's interest, 
the court considers the probationer's risk of recidivism and the 
danger posed to society should he or she reoffend; as the 
8 
 
probationer's risk of reoffense and degree of dangerousness 
increases, so too does the weight of the government's interest.  
See id. 
 
Although ordinarily we review a judge's decision on a 
motion to vacate a condition of probation for an abuse of 
discretion, see Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 458 Mass. 11, 16 
(2010), we conduct an independent review where, as here, the 
judge's decision was based on a constitutional determination, 
see Commonwealth v. Moore, 473 Mass. 481, 484 (2016).  In doing 
so, we accept findings of fact by a judge who saw and heard the 
witnesses, unless those findings are clearly erroneous, but 
consider the constitutionality of the search de novo.  See 
Commonwealth v. Feliz, 486 Mass. 510, 514 (2020). 
 
a.  Privacy interests.  Like all probationers, the 
defendant has "a significantly diminished expectation of 
privacy."  See Moore, 473 Mass. at 485.  Probationers have a 
diminished expectation of privacy compared to the general 
population; they do not enjoy the "absolute liberty" to which 
others are entitled because they "are on the continuum of 
[S]tate-imposed punishments" and are assumed to be "more likely 
than the ordinary citizen to violate the law" (quotation and 
citations omitted).  See Garcia, 486 Mass. at 351-352. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the defendant's expectation of 
privacy is further diminished because the Sex Offender Registry 
9 
 
Board (SORB) has classified him as a level two sex offender.  
Accordingly, the defendant's "registration information," 
including his name, age, physical characteristics, home and work 
addresses, and convictions, is made publicly available online.  
See G. L. c. 6, §§ 178D, 178F.  In the Commonwealth's view, the 
public dissemination of this information reduces the defendant's 
over-all expectation of privacy. 
 
The defendant indeed does have a diminished expectation of 
privacy in his registration information, given the public 
availability of such information for level two offenders.  See 
Doe v. Attorney Gen., 426 Mass. 136, 142 (1997) ("One does not 
have a constitutional right to privacy in information that is 
readily available").  It does not necessarily follow, however, 
that the defendant's expectation of privacy in his real-time 
location information is concomitantly diminished.  An individual 
may lose his or her expectation of privacy in some information, 
yet retain an expectation of privacy in separate, materially 
distinct information.  See Horsemen's Benevolent & Protective 
Ass'n, Inc. v. State Racing Comm'n, 403 Mass. 692, 703-704 
(1989) (statutory scheme requiring individuals to submit to 
searches of their person "[did] not diminish the reasonable 
expectations of privacy that all [individuals] have in urinating 
and in the chemical content of their urine").  See also Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-352 (1967) (individual in 
10 
 
public, glass telephone booth forfeited expectation of privacy 
in his physical actions, but maintained expectation of privacy 
in contents of his telephone conversation); Trujillo v. Ontario, 
428 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1103 (C.D. Cal. 2006), aff'd, 270 Fed. 
Appx. 518 (9th Cir. 2008) ("while a person may not have [a 
reasonable expectation of privacy] from one type of search, he 
or she reasonably may expect privacy with respect to another"). 
The defendant's registration information is materially 
distinct from the information produced by GPS monitoring.  See 
State v. Grady, 372 N.C. 509, 531, 537-538 (2019) (noting 
differences between sex offender registration information and 
data from GPS monitoring).  Cf. Landry, 429 Mass. at 346 
(convicted individuals have reduced expectation of privacy in 
their identity, and therefore reduced expectation of privacy in 
their deoxyribonucleic acid profile, which is used "for 
identification purposes only").  As a level two offender, the 
defendant's publicly available registration information is 
relatively static and limited; his registration information 
generally is updated only once per year and provides minimal 
insight into his personal life.2  See Commonwealth v. Cory, 454 
 
2 Level two sex offenders who are not homeless "must 
register annually in person at the local police station."  
Commonwealth v. Domino, 465 Mass. 569, 581 n.7 (2013).  See 
G. L. c. 6, §§ 178F; 178F 1/2.  Level two sex offenders who are 
homeless must appear in person at their local police station 
every thirty days to verify that their registration information 
11 
 
Mass. 559, 570 (2009).  By contrast, data from GPS monitoring is 
dynamic and extensive, revealing the defendant's minute-by-
minute movements in real time.  See Johnson, 481 Mass. at 717.  
Thus, GPS monitoring is "dramatically more intrusive and 
burdensome" than the registration requirements imposed on the 
defendant.  See Cory, supra.  Accordingly, the defendant's 
expectation of privacy in his real-time location information is 
no different from that of other probationers. 
Indeed, courts in other jurisdictions similarly have 
concluded that the publication of registration information does 
not diminish an individual's expectation of privacy in his or 
her real-time location information.  See, e.g., Park v. State, 
305 Ga. 348, 354-355 (2019) (although sex offender registration 
requirements "reveal information such as the convicted sex 
offender's address . . . this has nothing to do with State 
officials searching that individual by attaching a device to his 
 
"remains true and accurate."  See G. L. c. 6, § 178F 1/2.  
Additionally, all level two sex offenders must notify SORB of 
any changes to their home and work addresses.  Commonwealth v. 
Williamson, 462 Mass. 676, 677 (2012).  See G. L. c. 6, 
§§ 178E-178F 1/2.  This registration data is compiled by SORB 
and made available to the public via an online database.  See 
G. L. c. 6, § 178D.  This database includes a level two sex 
offender's name, home address, work address, offense of 
conviction, physical characteristics (such as the offender's 
age, sex, race, height, weight, and eye and hair color), and 
photograph, if available.  Id.  The database also includes 
whether the offender has been adjudicated a "sexually violent 
predator," as well as whether the offender is in compliance with 
his or her registration requirements.  Id. 
12 
 
body and constantly tracking that person's movements" [emphasis 
in original]); Grady, 372 N.C. at 531 (rejecting argument that 
"defendant's provision of limited information [pursuant to sex 
offender registration requirements] . . . meaningfully reduces 
his expectation of privacy in his body and in his every movement 
every day for the rest of his life," given material differences 
between publicly available registration information and 
information revealed through GPS monitoring).  But see Belleau 
v. Wall, 811 F.3d 929, 934-935 (7th Cir. 2016) (GPS monitoring 
has only slight effect on individual's privacy "given the 
decision by Wisconsin . . . to make sex offenders' criminal 
records and home addresses public"); H.R. v. New Jersey State 
Parole Bd., 242 N.J. 271, 290-291 (2020) (defendant had "a 
severely diminished expectation of privacy" in part because, as 
a "Tier III sex offender," he was required to notify certain 
members of public about his sex offender status and periodically 
to provide registration information that would be made publicly 
available). 
GPS monitoring works a significant intrusion on a 
probationer's existing, albeit diminished, expectation of 
privacy.  See Garcia, 486 Mass. at 351-352.  To effectuate GPS 
monitoring, the probation department must attach a GPS device to 
the defendant's person, in such a way that the defendant cannot 
remove the device; this significantly burdens the defendant's 
13 
 
liberty interest in bodily autonomy and integrity.  See Cory, 
454 Mass. at 570 (recognizing that act of "physically 
attach[ing] an item to a person, without consent and also 
without consideration of individual circumstances," burdens 
wearer's liberty).  See also Feliz I, 481 Mass. at 704 ("The 
physically intrusive dimensions of GPS monitoring are relevant" 
to analyzing its reasonableness).  Because of its visibility and 
cultural salience, the device serves as a "modern-day 'scarlet 
letter,'" Commonwealth v. Hanson H., 464 Mass. 807, 815-816 
(2012), that may "expos[e] the [defendant] to persecution or 
ostracism," Cory, supra at 570 n.18.  Moreover, the device 
necessarily requires some amount of maintenance, which at best 
is an inconvenience and at worst is a threat to the defendant's 
livelihood.  See, e.g., Norman, 484 Mass. at 339 (probationer 
must ensure that battery for device remains charged at all times 
and connectivity is maintained; this may require "travel[ing] to 
a location where the device can be charged," or signal can be 
found, even if doing so results in frequent absences from 
employment).  "In addition, despite an individual's best efforts 
to comply with the strictures of GPS monitoring, [maintenance] 
issues can lead to the issuance of arrest warrants, thereby 
subjecting the individual to the indignity and dangers of an 
arrest" (citations omitted).  Id. 
14 
 
 
The information exposed through GPS monitoring is uniquely 
revealing.  GPS monitoring "provides the government with a 
'detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled' log of the 
individual's movements."  Garcia, 486 Mass. at 354, quoting 
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018).  This 
"data is stored indefinitely," with little oversight as to when 
and how it may be examined.  See Feliz I, 481 Mass. at 705.  See 
also Johnson, 481 Mass. at 727 (law enforcement may review 
without warrant historical GPS location data to determine 
whether probationer was near scene of crime, even where 
probationer had completed term of probation and crime under 
investigation was unrelated to crime for which probation had 
been imposed).  Such extensive location information provides the 
government with "a highly detailed profile, not simply of where 
[the defendant] go[es], but by easy inference, of [his or her] 
associations -- political, religious, amicable and amorous, to 
name only a few -- and the pattern of [his or her] professional 
and avocational pursuits."  See Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 484 
Mass. 493, 504-505 (2020), quoting Commonwealth v. Connolly, 454 
Mass. 808, 834 (2009) (Gants, J., concurring).  This, in turn, 
"'chills associational and expressive freedoms[,]' potentially 
'alter[ing] the relationship between citizen and government in a 
way that is inimical to democratic society'" (alterations in 
original).  Garcia, supra at 354-355, quoting Commonwealth v. 
15 
 
Augustine, 467 Mass. 230, 248 n.33 (2014), S.C., 470 Mass. 837 
and 472 Mass. 448 (2015). 
 
b.  Government interest.  The Commonwealth asserts that GPS 
monitoring primarily would assist in enforcing the court-ordered 
exclusion zone around the victim's residence by notifying 
authorities should the defendant come within one-half mile of 
her address.  In this way, the Commonwealth argues, GPS 
monitoring would further its interest in protecting the public 
by ensuring the victim's "sense of safety, security and well-
being." 
 
We agree that the Commonwealth has a compelling interest in 
protecting the public by ensuring compliance with court-ordered 
exclusion zones.  See Feliz I, 481 Mass. at 702-703.  Exclusion 
zones ensure that defendants stay away from victims, thereby 
protecting victims' safety by providing them with "a safe 
haven."  See Commonwealth v. Habenstreit, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 785, 
787 (2003).  See also Cory, 454 Mass. at 572.  Thus, where the 
crime of which a defendant has been convicted was committed 
against a specific, identified victim, the Commonwealth may have 
a strong interest in enforcing exclusion zones in order to 
prevent further victimization of that individual.  Compare 
Feliz I, supra at 705 (no "geographically proximate victim" 
existed who could benefit from exclusion zone where defendant 
was convicted of offense of child pornography). 
16 
 
 
Nonetheless, GPS monitoring furthers this interest only 
where the GPS device is configured effectively to notify 
authorities should a defendant enter prohibited areas.  See id. 
at 692 n.5, 705-706 (Commonwealth did not demonstrate how 
interest in enforcing order to refrain from loitering near 
schools, parks, and day care centers would be achieved by GPS 
monitoring where defendant's device could not practically be 
configured to issue alert if he entered such locations).  When a 
device has not been, or cannot be, so configured, authorities 
would not receive alert messages notifying them that an 
individual inappropriately had entered into an exclusion zone, 
and police therefore would be unable to respond within a 
meaningful time frame.  See id. at 705.  Indeed, probation 
officers generally will not review a probationer's location 
information unless they receive an "alert" from a probationer's 
GPS device.  See id. at 695.  Accordingly, in order to rely upon 
a purported interest in enforcing an exclusion zone, the 
government must establish that the device will be configured 
effectively to contain such a zone.  See id. at 705. 
The Commonwealth maintains that it satisfied this burden by 
submitting, for the first time on appeal, documentation 
indicating that it created an exclusion zone around the victim's 
home address approximately three weeks after the hearing on the 
motion challenging the imposition of GPS monitoring.  The 
17 
 
relevant question, however, is whether the search "was justified 
at its inception," not whether it was justified post hoc.  See 
Feliz I, 481 Mass. at 708, quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 
U.S. 325, 341 (1985).  Where, as here, a search is conducted 
pursuant to a judicial order, we evaluate the reasonableness of 
the search at the time it was ordered, rather than at the time 
it was conducted.  See, e.g., Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 
85 (1987) ("Those items of evidence that emerge after the 
warrant is issued have no bearing on whether or not a warrant 
was validly issued"). 
Accordingly, we must determine whether the Commonwealth 
demonstrated that an exclusion zone would be configured in the 
defendant's GPS device based solely on the evidence before the 
motion judge.  See Johnson, 481 Mass. at 726 n.14 (declining to 
consider evidence not before motion judge).  At the motion 
hearing, the prosecutor told the motion judge that she had been 
unable to contact the victim.  The prosecutor expressed some 
doubt as to whether she had a working telephone number for the 
victim and also said that she did not know whether the victim 
had a residential address or other domicil that could be used to 
create an exclusion zone.  The judge did not explicitly find 
that the Commonwealth would be able effectively to configure an 
exclusion zone in the defendant's GPS device.  He did appear, 
however, to have assumed as much; the judge concluded that GPS 
18 
 
monitoring would further the government's interest in enforcing 
the exclusion zone and also observed that the existence of an 
exclusion zone distinguished this case from Feliz I, 481 Mass. 
at 705.  The judge ordered the prosecutor to continue her 
attempts to obtain the victim's address and said that he would 
entertain a motion to reconsider if a "meaningful" exclusion 
zone could not be configured. 
Assuming that an effective exclusion zone could and would 
be created, without making such a finding or having been 
presented with evidence to support that finding, was error.  
Judges may "not infer or assume the existence of facts that 
might justify the governmental intrusion."  See Guiney v. Police 
Comm'r of Boston, 411 Mass. 328, 332 (1991).  Nor may judges 
shift the burden of proof onto the defendant.  See 
Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. at 57.  Yet, by instructing the 
defendant to file a motion to reconsider if an exclusion zone 
could not be configured, the judge placed the burden on the 
defendant to prove the absence of facts supporting the 
reasonableness of GPS monitoring, rather than appropriately 
placing the burden on the Commonwealth to prove the existence of 
such facts.3 
 
 
3 In the circumstances here, for instance, the judge might 
have continued the hearing briefly so as to allow the 
Commonwealth additional time in which to locate the victim prior 
to the defendant's release from incarceration. 
19 
 
In any event, the evidence before the motion judge did not 
provide any basis to conclude that an exclusion zone would be, 
or even could be, configured in the defendant's GPS device.  
Given the Commonwealth's inability to contact the victim and the 
uncertainty concerning her living situation, the creation of an 
exclusion zone was simply an "unsubstantiated possibilit[y]," 
something the Commonwealth hoped, but could not demonstrate, 
that it would be able to achieve.  See Guiney, 411 Mass. at 332 
("The reasonableness of a [warrantless search] cannot fairly be 
supported by unsubstantiated possibilities").  Absent evidence 
that an effective exclusion zone would be configured in the 
defendant's GPS device, the Commonwealth could not establish how 
GPS monitoring would further its interest in enforcing the 
court-ordered exclusion zone.  See id. at 331, quoting O'Connor 
v. Police Comm'r of Boston, 408 Mass. 324, 332 (1990) (Greaney, 
J., concurring) ("the important constitutional right of privacy 
established by art. 14 should not be overruled by abstract goals 
of safety and integrity" [quotations and alteration omitted]). 
The Commonwealth asserts that, even without an effective 
exclusion zone, GPS monitoring would protect the public by 
deterring future criminal behavior by the defendant and by 
enabling law enforcement officers to investigate more 
effectively any subsequent crimes.  See Feliz I, 481 Mass. 
at 709 ("Where . . . a defendant's exclusion zones have not been 
20 
 
entered into the [GPS] monitoring system . . . , GPS 
monitoring's deterrent potential appears linked primarily to its 
possible post hoc investigative use"). 
 
We have recognized that the government has a valid interest 
in deterrence and investigation where the Commonwealth provides 
sufficient evidence that a defendant poses a demonstrable risk 
of reoffending.  See id.  The Commonwealth contends that SORB's 
classification of the defendant as a level two sex offender 
satisfies this burden.  In classifying the defendant as a 
level two sex offender, SORB necessarily found that there was a 
"moderate" risk that the defendant would commit a sex offense in 
the future.  See G. L. c. 6, § 178K (2) (b).  See also Doe, Sex 
Offender Registry Bd. No. 496501 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 
482 Mass. 643, 651 (2019) (Doe No. 496501) (SORB may classify 
individual as level two offender only after finding moderate 
risk that individual will commit new sex offense). 
The defendant concedes that a court properly could consider 
his SORB classification level as some indication that he poses a 
risk of reoffending, but he maintains that a classification 
determination "cannot be solely dispositive" of the matter.  In 
the defendant's view, treating SORB classification levels in 
such a way would be contrary to our statement in Feliz I, 481 
Mass. at 700-701, that GPS monitoring requires an 
21 
 
"individualized determination[] of reasonableness" based on "the 
totality of the circumstances (citation omitted)." 
 
We do not agree.  There is a difference between treating a 
defendant's SORB classification level that the defendant poses a 
moderate risk of reoffense as sufficient evidence to establish 
that the defendant poses at least some risk of reoffending, and 
treating the classification level as determinative of the 
reasonableness of the search.  A defendant's risk of reoffense 
is only one factor among many that reviewing courts consider in 
making ultimate determinations with respect to the 
reasonableness of a search.  See Norman, 484 Mass. at 337-338. 
Furthermore, relying on a defendant's classification level 
does not deprive the defendant of an individualized 
determination.  Indeed, SORB classifications are the product of 
individualized determinations, which must be supported by clear 
and convincing evidence, and which a defendant may challenge at 
a hearing where the defendant may cross-examine witnesses and 
introduce contrary evidence.  See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. 
No. 380316 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 473 Mass. 297, 298, 
300-303 (2015) (discussing process of challenging SORB 
classification decisions, and holding that SORB bears burden of 
proving appropriateness of its classifications by clear and 
convincing evidence); Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. 205614 v. 
Sex Offender Registry Bd., 466 Mass. 594, 596 (2013) (when 
22 
 
classifying offenders, SORB must make "individualized 
determinations of the likelihood of recidivism").  Where SORB 
already has evaluated a defendant's risk of reoffense, a judge 
need not reinvent the wheel by conducting an independent factual 
examination of the issue.  See Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. 
No. 68549 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 470 Mass. 102, 109 
(2014). 
Accordingly, SORB's determination that the defendant should 
be classified as a level two offender was sufficient to 
establish that the defendant posed some moderate risk of 
reoffending.  Thus, the Commonwealth established that GPS 
monitoring would further its interest in deterring and, if 
necessary, investigating future sex offenses.4  Cf. Feliz I, 481 
Mass. at 705-706 (Commonwealth could not rely on interest in 
deterrence and investigation where it did not "present[] 
evidence sufficient to indicate that [the] defendant pose[d] a 
threat of reoffending"). 
 
The Commonwealth also argues that GPS monitoring would 
further its interest in retribution.  Retribution is a valid 
goal of probation, see Commonwealth v. Lapointe, 435 Mass. 455, 
 
4 SORB's "determination of risk focuses solely on the risk 
of sexual recidivism, that is, the risk that the offender will 
commit a new sexual offense, not the risk that he or she will 
commit any criminal offense" (emphasis in original).  See Doe, 
Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 496501 v. Sex Offender Registry 
Bd., 482 Mass. 643, 651 (2019). 
23 
 
459 (2001), which may be achieved through GPS monitoring, see 
Cory, 454 Mass. at 579 (GPS monitoring "promote[s] the 
traditional aims of punishment," including retribution).  
Nonetheless, retribution is secondary to the principal goals of 
probation:  rehabilitation of the defendant and protection of 
the public.  See LaPointe, supra.  Indeed, probation long has 
been considered "an act of grace" more than an act of 
retribution, a means of protecting the public while sparing the 
probationer from incarceration.  See Martin v. State Bd. of 
Parole, 350 Mass. 210, 213 (1966), quoting Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 
U.S. 490, 492 (1935).  Accordingly, the government's interest in 
retribution carries only de minimis weight. 
 
c.  Assessing the balance.  We turn to the appropriate 
balancing of the interests here.  Had the Commonwealth 
satisfactorily demonstrated at the motion hearing that an 
exclusion zone would be configured in the defendant's GPS 
device, the case before us would be straightforward.  There is 
little question that the Commonwealth's interest in enforcing 
the exclusion zone around the victim's home, in conjunction with 
its interest in deterring and investigating future sex offenses, 
would have outweighed the incremental privacy intrusion 
occasioned by GPS monitoring in the instant case.  Nonetheless, 
we cannot consider interests that were not sufficiently 
established before the motion judge.  See Horsemen's Benevolent 
24 
 
& Protective Ass'n, Inc., 403 Mass. at 705 (declining to 
consider asserted interests that "are merely speculative" and 
"have no basis in the record"). 
Based on the record before the motion judge, essentially 
the only interest the Commonwealth established was an interest 
in deterring and, if necessary, investigating future sex 
offenses by the defendant.  The reasonableness of the search 
therefore rests upon whether this interest outweighed the 
concomitant intrusion upon the defendant's privacy.  See 
Feliz I, 481 Mass. at 691. 
 
The Commonwealth's interest in deterrence and investigation 
is stronger where a conviction is based on a crime of greater 
severity.  See Commonwealth v. Cruzado, 480 Mass. 275, 284 
(2018), quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 
(1985) (government interest "in solving crimes and bringing 
offenders to justice . . . is particularly strong 'in the 
context of felonies or crimes involving a threat to public 
safety'").  A defendant's risk of recidivism, even if relatively 
low, carries particular weight if reoffense would pose a 
significant threat to the public.  See Garcia, 486 Mass. at 355-
356.  The Commonwealth's interest therefore is strengthened by 
the fact that the defendant was convicted of rape, "one of the 
most serious crimes punishable by law."  See Commonwealth v. 
Sherman, 481 Mass. 464, 473 (2019).  See also Doe No. 496501, 
25 
 
482 Mass. at 659 ("contact offenders are generally more 
dangerous than noncontact offenders"). 
At the same time, the defendant has no previous history of 
sex offenses, and no prior convictions.  See Feliz I, 481 Mass. 
at 706 (considering that defendant had "no prior record of a sex 
offense" in evaluating risk of recidivism).  He successfully 
complied with all of the conditions of his pretrial release for 
the period of nineteen months pending trial, nine of which 
involved GPS monitoring.  Compare id. at 707 (defendant's 
compliance with sixteen months of conditions of pretrial 
release, including nine months of GPS monitoring, "would have 
provided no suggestion at sentencing that he would fail to 
comply with the terms of probation").  Accordingly, although the 
defendant's SORB classification level provides some reason to 
believe that he might recidivate, he has no history of doing so.  
Cf. Johnson, 481 Mass. at 718-720 (GPS monitoring was reasonable 
as applied to defendant with "lengthy criminal history" and 
record of probation violations).  The government has less of an 
interest in monitoring a potential recidivist than a proven one.  
See Garcia, 486 Mass. at 355-356 (government had "significant 
interest" in imposing GPS monitoring in light of defendant's 
"repetitive, relatively recent, and dangerous . . . criminal 
conduct," which indicated that "risk of recidivism was not 
fanciful"). 
26 
 
On the other hand, the degree of intrusion upon the 
defendant's privacy occasioned by GPS monitoring is aggravated 
by the fact that the defendant was ordered to wear a GPS device 
for three years.5  Cf. Johnson, 481 Mass. at 712 (defendant was 
subject to GPS monitoring for six months).  Because the physical 
intrusion of the device would continue for years, the resulting 
burdens upon the defendant's liberty interest are greater than 
they would be given a shorter period of monitoring.  See Garcia, 
486 Mass. at 354 (physically intrusive nature of GPS monitoring 
has impact on wearer's liberty interest).  Moreover, monitoring 
that takes place over the course of years allows the government 
to amass and indefinitely to store a staggering quantity of 
data, providing insights that would not be possible with a 
shorter term of surveillance.  See Commonwealth v. Mora, 485 
 
5 The motion judge indicated that he would "consider 
vacating [the] GPS requirement after [eighteen] months, upon 
motion by the defendant" if the defendant successfully complied 
with the conditions of probation (emphasis added).  This 
language indicates that vacatur of the GPS condition was 
discretionary, not mandatory; what ultimately was imposed was 
three years of GPS monitoring.  Compare Commonwealth v. Feliz, 
486 Mass. 510, 513 n.5 (2020) ("the language of the condition 
simply provided that the defendant could seek [early] relief," 
but did not guarantee early relief).  That the judge reserved 
the discretion to remove the condition at some future point is 
inconsequential given that judges always retain such discretion.  
See Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 458 Mass. 11, 18 (2010) ("Where a 
defendant has performed so well on probation and made such 
rehabilitative progress that the conditions imposed on him 
should be relaxed, a judge may eliminate or modify a probation 
condition . . ."). 
27 
 
Mass. 360, 373 (2020) (privacy interest turns in part on 
duration of surveillance). 
Balancing each of the established interests and their 
respective weights, we conclude that the Commonwealth did not 
meet its burden of establishing the constitutionality of the 
warrantless search. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The order denying the defendant's motion 
to vacate the condition of GPS monitoring is reversed.  The 
matter is remanded to the Superior Court for entry of a modified 
order of probation that does not include the condition of GPS 
monitoring. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.