Case Title: SUSAN K. KRUCKENBERG and LINDA LEIF V. DING MASTERS, INC.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0084

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-04-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUSAN K. KRUCKENBERG and LINDA LEIF V. DING MASTERS, INC.2008 WY 40180 P.3d 895Case Number: S-07-0084Decided: 04/08/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
SUSAN K. 
KRUCKENBERG and LINDA LEIF,

 
 
Appellants

(Plaintiffs),

 
 
v.

 
 
DING MASTERS, 
INC.,

 
 
Appellee

(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The 
Honorable Edward L. Grant, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

Ronald G. Pretty, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Robert Carl Jarosh and Richard Grant 
Schneebeck, of Hirst & Applegate, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Jarosh.

 
 
Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, 
HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

[¶1]         
Appellants, 
Susan Kruckenberg and Linda Leif, appeal the district court's grant of summary 
judgment in Ding Masters' favor.  We 
affirm.

[¶2]         
Appellants 
present the following issues:

1.  Even if the Plaintiffs were deemed to 
have filed no response at all in opposition to summary judgment, did the trial 
court commit an error of law and/or violate the constitutional protections of 
due process by granting the motion without a hearing and without notice of 
intent to do so, thereby precluding Plaintiffs from arguing at the scheduled 
hearing, that the movant's motion and attached affidavits and depositions did 
not establish movant's right to summary judgment as a matter of 
law?

2.  Where the Plaintiffs filed their "Motion 
to Continue Motion for Summary Judgment Hearing and to Strike Affidavits" in a 
timely manner in response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, did the 
district court commit an error of law or deny Plaintiffs due process of law by 
granting summary judgment prior to the court-scheduled hearing, thereby 
precluding Plaintiffs from filing "supplemental memoranda or rebuttal 
affidavits" in opposition to summary judgment at least one day prior to the 
hearing, as allowed by W.R.C.P. Rule 6(c)?

3.  Considering only the movant's materials, 
did the trial court commit an error of law when it found that no genuine issues 
of material fact remained for trial and that Ding Masters was entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law?

[¶3]         
Ding 
Masters states the issues as follows:

1.  Does this Court lack jurisdiction over 
an appeal from an order that is not identified in Appellants' notice of appeal, 
in violation of W.R.A.P. 2.07(a)(2)?

2.  Did the district court correctly rule 
that the undisputed evidence before it warranted summary judgment in favor of 
Ding Masters?

3.  Did the district court properly exercise 
the discretion granted to it by Wyo. R. Civ. P. 56(e) by ruling on Defendant 
Ding Masters, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment without hearing oral 
arguments?

4.  Did the district court properly exercise 
its discretion by declining to treat Appellants' Motion for Continuance as a 
"response" within the meaning of Wyo. R. Civ. P. 6(c) and 
56?

[¶4]         
Ding 
Masters is an automotive paintless dent removal company based in Alabama.  Ding Masters' staff consists of its 
president, Andy Terry, its vice-president, and two full-time dent repair 
technicians.  Ding Masters operates 
from a permanent Alabama location.  Additionally, it solicits business 
nationwide, in locations where a significant hail storm has recently occurred, 
from entities that own large numbers of cars, including automobile dealerships 
and rental car companies.  If those 
businesses hire Ding Masters, the company sets up a temporary operation in the 
area where the cars are located and repairs the dents resulting from the 
hailstorm.  In order to fulfill its 
obligations at these temporary locations, Ding Masters routinely hires 
individuals on a temporary basis to perform the repairs.

[¶5]         
Cheyenne 
suffered a severe hailstorm in 2002, and Dinneen Motors and Hertz Rent-A-Car 
hired Ding Masters to repair the hail damage to their vehicles.  In turn, Ding Masters hired several 
individuals, including Isaac Gantz, to perform the repairs.  During the Cheyenne job, while 
returning a vehicle to Hertz Rent-A-Car, Mr. Gantz was involved in a collision 
with a vehicle occupied by Appellants.  
Appellants filed two separate lawsuits seeking the recovery of damages 
arising from the collision.  Mr. 
Gantz was the sole defendant in one of the lawsuits.  Hertz Rent-A-Car, Dinneen Motors, and 
Ding Masters were the named defendants in the second lawsuit.  The two cases were consolidated.  The allegations against Mr. Gantz, 
Dinneen Motors, and Hertz Rent-A-Car have been resolved.  This appeal involves only Appellants' 
claim against Ding Masters.

[¶6]         
Appellants 
contend that Ding Masters is vicariously liable for the negligence of Mr. 
Gantz.  Their claim of vicarious 
liability is premised upon their contention that Mr. Gantz was an employee of 
Ding Masters at the time of the collision.  
Ding Masters denied Appellants' claim of vicarious liability, contending 
that Mr. Gantz was an independent contractor.  On October 16, 2006, Ding Masters filed 
a motion for summary judgment.  Its 
motion was supported by depositions, affidavits, and a supporting 
memorandum.  Ding Masters also 
requested a hearing on its motion, and on October 31, 2006, the district court 
scheduled a hearing for January 5, 2007.  
Appellants did not file an affidavit or other evidence in opposition to 
the motion.

[¶7]         
Three 
days after the district court set the hearing, Appellants filed a Motion to Continue Motion for Summary 
Judgment Hearing and to Strike Affidavits.  In their motion, Appellants alleged that 
Ding Masters had interfered with Appellants' attempts to depose the two 
permanent Ding Masters' employees.  
They also contended that several affidavits and an exhibit that Ding 
Masters had attached to its motion for summary judgment should be stricken.  Appellants requested a hearing on their 
motion, but a hearing was never scheduled.1 

[¶8]         
Ding 
Masters filed a response to Appellants' motion on November 13, 2006.  The response generally denied 
Appellants' allegations of discovery misconduct and attached supporting 
exhibits.  Ding Masters also 
filedseparately from its response to Appellants' motiona Motion for Entry of Judgment.  In that motion, Ding Masters stated that 
"[n]o other arguments, evidence, or affidavits were submitted [by Appellants] or 
should be considered, and there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding 
any of the claims asserted against Ding Masters."  The district court granted summary 
judgment in Ding Masters' favor on November 17, 2006.  Appellants filed a notice of appeal from 
that order.  We dismissed that 
appeal on January 16, 2007 because Appellants' claims against Mr. Gantz, Hertz 
Rent-A-Car, and Dinneen Motors had not yet been resolved, and the order granting 
summary judgment was not a final, appealable order.  Once those remaining claims were 
resolved, Appellants filed a second notice of appeal, and we now consider that 
appeal.

[¶9]         
We first 
address Ding Masters' jurisdictional issue.  Ding Masters contends that Appellants 
failed to conform their notice of appeal to the requirements of W.R.A.P. 
2.07(a)(2), (b)(1), and (b)(2).2  As a result, it asserts, this Court does 
not have jurisdiction to hear this case pursuant to W.R.A.P. 1.03, which states 
that "[t]he timely filing of a notice of appeal, which complies with Rule 
2.07(a), is jurisdictional."

[¶10]    
The text 
of Appellants' notice of appeal is as follows:

COMES 
NOW, the Appellants, Susan E Kruckenberg and Linda Leif, by and through their 
attorney Ronald G Pretty, and does hereby give Notice of Appeal as to the Order 
of Dismissal with Prejudice entered by the First Judicial District Court on the 
15th day of February, 2007, and said appeal is to the Wyoming Supreme 
Court.

Additionally, 
we note that the caption named "ISAAC S GANTZ and HERTZ RENT-A-CAR, ET AL, 
DINGMASTER" as defendants, and the certificate of service indicates that Ding 
Masters' counsel was served with this Notice of Appeal.  The only document attached as an 
appendix is the Order of Dismissal with 
Prejudice, which dismissed Mr. Gantz and Hertz Rent-A-Car from the 
suit.

[¶11]    
Ding 
Masters asserts that Appellants' Notice 
of Appeal did not satisfy Rule 2.07(a)(2) because it identified the Order of Dismissal as the appealable 
order rather than the district court's order granting summary judgment.  An appealable order is "[a]n order 
affecting a substantial right in an action, when such order, in effect, 
determines the action and prevents a judgment."  W.R.A.P. 1.05(a).  Generally, interlocutory orders merge 
into the final order.  See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Shrader, 882 P.2d 813, 820 (Wyo. 1994).  "[A] notice of appeal that names the 
final judgment is sufficient to support review of all earlier orders that merge 
in the final judgment under the general rule that appeal from a final judgment 
supports review of all earlier interlocutory orders."  Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: 
Jurisdiction 3d § 3949.4, at 72 (1999).

[¶12]    
While 
the award of summary judgment in Ding Masters' favor certainly affected a 
substantial right, it did not "determine the action" because Appellants still 
maintained unresolved claims against several defendants.3  Because the order granting summary 
judgment in Ding Masters' favor was an interlocutory order, it merged with the 
Order of Dismissal with Prejudice, 
which was the final order in Appellants' case.  Appellants identified and attached the 
Order of Dismissal with Prejudice to 
their Notice of Appeal and satisfied 
the requirements of W.R.A.P. 2.07(a)(2).4

[¶13]    
Ding 
Masters also contends that the Notice of 
Appeal "did not identify Ding Masters as an [A]ppellee, and otherwise failed 
to put Ding Masters on notice that the appeal was directed at Ding 
Masters."  While Ding Masters is not 
mentioned in the body of the Notice, it is named in the caption.  Additionally, Ding Masters' counsel was 
served with both the premature and the timely notices of appeal, demonstrating 
Appellants' intention to appeal the summary judgment.  Furthermore, Appellants' claim against 
Ding Masters was the only claim resolved on the merits, rather than through a 
stipulated settlement.  Under the 
circumstances, it is difficult to see how Ding Masters could be unaware that it 
was the target of the appeal.

[¶14]    
Appellants 
contend that they were not afforded an opportunity to respond to Ding Masters' 
motion for summary judgment.  They 
also assert that our prior decisions interpreting W.R.C.P. 56 required the 
district court to hold a hearing or to inform Appellants, before ruling, that no 
hearing would be held.  
Interpretation of procedural rules is a question of law that we review de novo.  Olsen v. State, 2003 WY 46, ¶ 203, 67 P.3d 536, 606 (Wyo. 2003).  If the 
district court is not required to hold a hearing, we review its decision to hold 
a hearing for abuse of discretion.  
See Best v. State, 769 P.2d 385, 389 (Wyo. 
1989).

[¶15]    
Appellants 
primarily rely upon our decision in Lee 
v. Board of County Comm'rs of the County of Sweetwater, 644 P.2d 189 
(Wyo. 
1982).  Appellants quote the 
following language:

We hold 
here . . . that before motions for summary judgment can be properly 
determined, the adverse party must, 1) be advised either by court rule or order that a motion for 
summary judgment will be determined without oral hearing, and 2) be given notice 
of a cutoff date for filing materials in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment.

Lee, 644 P.2d  at 190 (emphasis added).  The 
point of this holding is that a non-moving party must be afforded a fair 
opportunity to present evidence and arguments in opposition to the summary 
judgment motion.  E.g., McKennan v. Newman, 843 P.2d 602, 604-05 
(Wyo. 1992); Cranston v. Weston County Weed and Pest 
Bd., 826 P.2d 251, 254 (Wyo. 1992); see Geear v. Boulder Community Hosp., 844 F.2d 764, 766 
(10th Cir. 1988).  In this case, the general time rules 
found in W.R.C.P. 6(c) provide both a set time period for Appellants to respond 
to Ding Masters' motion for summary judgment and notice that the motion may be 
decided without a hearing.  The 
version of W.R.C.P. 6(c) in effect at the time of these proceedings 
provided:

(1)  Unless these rules or an order of the 
court establish time limitations other than those contained herein, all motions, 
. . . together with supporting affidavits, if any, shall be served at least 10 
days before the hearing on the motion.  
. . .  [A] party affected by 
the motion may serve a response, together 
with affidavits, if any, at least three days prior to the hearing on the motion 
or within 20 days after service of the motion, whichever is earlier.  Unless the court by order permits 
service at some other time, the moving party may serve a reply, if any, at least 
one day prior to the hearing on the motion or within 15 days after service of 
the response, whichever is earlier.  
Unless the court otherwise orders, any party may serve supplemental 
memoranda or rebuttal affidavits at least one day prior to the hearing on the 
motion.

(2)  A request for hearing may be served by 
the moving party or any party affected by the motion within 30 days after 
service of the motion.  Absent a 
timely request for hearing the court may, 
in its discretion, determine the motion without a 
hearing.

(Emphasis 
added.)  The rule provides a 20-day 
period for the non-moving party to file a response in opposition to the 
motion.  Appellants did not file a 
response in opposition to the motion within the 20-day time provided.  Appellants were also notified by 
W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2) that the district court may, "in its discretion, determine the 
motion without a hearing."  In 
addition, W.R.C.P. 56(e) requires that in the absence of a response from the 
non-moving party, "summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against 
the adverse party."  In light of 
Appellants' failure to respond to Ding Masters' motion for summary judgment, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion.5

[¶16]    
Appellants 
also contend that their Motion to 
Continue Motion for Summary Judgment Hearing and to Strike Affidavits 
constituted a "response" for the purpose of allowing supplementation at least 
one day prior to a hearing pursuant to W.R.C.P. 6(c)(1).  We do not agree.  Rule 56 contemplates two actions that 
constitute responses.  First, "the 
adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, 
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial."  W.R.C.P. 56(e).  Second, Rule 56(f) allows an opposing 
party to show, by affidavit, the reasons that the party is unable to present 
opposing evidence.  In sum: "[W]hen 
the movant has met the initial burden required for the granting of a summary 
judgment, the opposing party either must establish a genuine issue for trial 
under Rule 56(e) or explain why he cannot yet do so under Rule 56(f)."  Wright, Miller, & Kane, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 2740, at 399 (1998) 
(footnotes omitted).

[¶17]    
Appellants 
in this case did neither.  Their 
motion set out no specific facts supported by affidavits or other evidence.  Indeed, their motion did not respond in 
any way to the substance of Ding Masters' summary judgment motion.  Appellants cite no authority providing 
any reason that we should regard their motion as a "response."  There was therefore nothing to 
"supplement" pursuant to W.R.C.P. 6(c)(1).

[¶18]    
To 
summarize our procedural analysis, W.R.C.P. 6(c) notified Appellants that they 
must respond to the summary judgment motion within 20 days.  Appellants failed to do so.  The rule notified Appellants that the 
district court could, in its discretion, rule on the motion without a 
hearing.  Furthermore, W.R.C.P. 
56(e) required that, in the absence of a response from the non-moving party, 
"summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse 
party."  The district court did not 
abuse its discretion in determining the motion without a 
hearing.

[¶19]    
We turn 
now to Appellants' substantive claim that Ding Masters failed to establish that 
there was no genuine issue of material fact and that Ding Masters was entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.  
Whether a district court correctly granted summary judgment is an issue 
of law that we review de novo.  Linton v. E.C. Cates Agency, Inc., 2005 
WY 63, ¶ 7, 113 P.3d 26, 28 (Wyo. 2005).  
When conducting our review, we construe the record in the light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion, affording that party the benefit of 
all reasonable inferences.  
Id.

[¶20]    
Whether 
summary judgment is proper is determined pursuant to the following 
framework:

Summary judgment is 
proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law."  
W.R.C.P. 56(c).  A genuine 
issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if proven, would establish 
or refute an essential element of a cause of action or a defense that a party 
has asserted.

Id., ¶ 6, 
113 P.3d  at 28 (citations omitted).  
"The summary judgment movant has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case with admissible 
evidence; once this is accomplished, the burden shifts to the opposing party to 
present specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material 
fact."  Sunshine Custom Paints & Body, Inc. v. 
South Douglas Hwy. Water & Sewer Dist., 2007 WY 206, ¶ 9, 173 P.3d 398, 
401 (Wyo. 2007).  The movant 
establishes a prima facie case when 
the record contains no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.  Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 337 (Wyo. 1986).

[¶21]    
The 
dispositive issue presented in Ding Masters' motion for summary judgment was 
whether Mr. Gantz was an independent contractor.  In determining whether an individual is 
an employee or independent contractor, we have previously stated 
that:

The 
overriding consideration in distinguishing between master-servant relationships 
and employer-independent contractor relationships is the employer's right to 
control the means and manner of the work. See, e.g., Stratman v. Admiral 
Beverage Corp., 760 P.2d 974, 980 (Wyo. 
1988); Cline v. State, Dep't. of Family Services, 927 P.2d 261, 263 (Wyo. 1996); Noonan v. Texaco, Inc., 713 P.2d 160, 164 (Wyo. 
1986).

Such a 
right to control is a prerequisite of the master-servant relationship. 
Conversely, the absence of such a right of control is a prerequisite of an 
independent contractor relationship. Master-servant and independent contractor 
are thus opposite sides of the same coin; one cannot be both at the same time 
with respect to the same activity; the one necessarily negatives the other, each 
depending on opposite answers to the same right of control 
inquiry.

Coates 
v. Anderson, 2004 WY 
11, ¶ 7, 84 P.3d 953, 957 (Wyo. 2004). When a worker is an independent 
contractor, the employer is typically interested only in the results of the work 
and does not direct the details of . . . how the work is performed. 
Noonan, 713 P.2d  at 166; 
Natural Gas Processing Co. v. Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Wyo. 
1994).

When an 
express contract exists between the parties, it is important evidence in 
defining the relationship, although it is not conclusive of the issue. 
Coates, ¶ 14; 
Noonan, 713 P.2d  at 164. 
Other factors which are important to the determination include: the method of 
payment, the right to terminate the relationship without incurring liability, 
the furnishing of tools and equipment, the scope of the work, and the control of 
the premises where the work is to be done. Stratman, 760 P.2d  at 980; Combined 
Insurance, 584 P.2d  at 
1043. Another factor to be considered is whether the worker devotes all of his 
efforts to the position or if he also performs work for others. Id.

With 
regard to the "method of payment" criterion, an independent contractor usually 
determines the price of his services and bills for his services on a regular 
basis. Noonan, 713 P.2d  
at 166, citing Simpson, 
770 F.2d  at 501; Combined Insurance, 584 P.2d  at 1043. On the other 
hand, when the employer determines the worker's rate of pay and takes deductions 
out of his paychecks for federal income taxes, Social Security, and Medicare 
then a master-servant relationship is indicated. Id. We have said that payment of 
workers' compensation and unemployment insurance premiums by an employer 
suggests that the worker is an employee rather than an independent contractor. 
See In re: Claims of Naylor, 723 P.2d 1237, 1240-41 (Wyo. 1986); In re Reed, 444 P.2d 329, 330 (Wyo. 1968). Similarly, 
when a worker is eligible to participate in benefit programs such as retirement 
or insurance plans, as a result of his association with the employer, it 
suggests a master-servant relationship exists. Combined Insurance, 584 P.2d  at 
1043.

Diamond 
B Svcs., Inc. v. Rohde, 2005 
WY 130, ¶¶ 28-30, 120 P.3d 1031, 1041-42 (Wyo. 2005).

[¶22]    
Ding 
Masters submitted affidavits, deposition excerpts, and other materials in 
support of its motion for summary judgment.  Appellants filed no response in 
opposition to the motion and failed to submit any affidavits or other evidence 
in opposition to the motion.  The 
district court concluded that no genuine issue of material fact existed and that 
Mr. Gantz was an independent contractor. We agree with the district court's 
conclusion.

[¶23]    
The 
undisputed facts establish that Ding Masters had only four full-time 
employees.  Mr. Gantz was not one of 
them.  Ding Masters had written 
employment agreements with the full-time employees.  It had no such agreement with Mr. 
Gantz.  The written agreement with 
the full-time employees included a non-compete provision prohibiting them from 
working for a competitor for two years.  
It is undisputed that Mr. Gantz was free to leave his employment with 
Ding Masters at any time with no restrictions on his future employment.  Mr. Gantz received nearly double the 
commission on work he performed compared to the full-time employees.  The full-time employees received 
vacation and retirement benefits.  
Mr. Gantz did not.  Ding 
Masters withheld taxes and paid for unemployment insurance for its full-time 
employees.  It did not withhold any 
taxes from Mr. Gantz's pay and Mr. Gantz was not covered by unemployment 
insurance.  Ding Masters provided 
tools for its full-time employees.  
Mr. Gantz was required to provide his own tools.  Ding Masters provided training to its 
full-time employees but provided no training to Mr. Gantz.  There is no evidence in the record 
indicating that Ding Masters controlled the manner in which Mr. Gantz performed 
the repairs on the vehicles or selected the vehicles for Mr. Gantz to 
repair.  Appellants do not cite any 
evidence in the record indicating that Ding Masters controlled, supervised, or 
even required Mr. Gantz to drive any of the repaired vehicles.  Mr. Gantz was driving the vehicle 
involved in the collision at the request of Mr. Buck Thornley, but it is 
undisputed that he was not one of the full-time employees.  When we apply the appropriate analysis 
mandated by Diamond B, we conclude 
that Ding Masters established its prima 
facie case that Mr. Gantz was an independent contractor.  Once Ding Masters had established its prima facie case that Mr. Gantz was an 
independent contractor, the burden shifted to Appellants to come forward with 
evidentiary materials creating a genuine issue of material fact.  Appellants failed to meet their burden 
and made no attempt to submit evidentiary materials in 
opposition.

[¶24]    
On 
appeal, Appellants assert that the evidentiary materials relied upon by Ding 
Masters contain information that creates a genuine issue of material fact.  Though their argument is less than 
clear, we divine it to be a contention that Ding Masters failed to establish its 
prima facie case.  We note that Appellants failed to point 
out these "facts" to the district court, and pursuant to the recently enacted 
W.R.C.P. 56.1,6 that may be fatal to their 
appeal.  Still, under case law 
applicable when the district court considered the motion for summary judgment, 
we may consider such information in the course of our de novo review.  See, e.g., Lawson v. Garcia, 912 P.2d 1136, 1138 
(Wyo. 
1996).  We will therefore consider 
Appellants' argument to the extent we understand it.

[¶25]    
In the 
fact section of their brief, Appellants provide a "bullet" list of facts 
relating loosely to the relationship between Ding Masters and 
Mr. Gantz.  Presumably these 
points are intended to demonstrate genuine issues of material fact that should 
have precluded summary judgment in favor of Ding Masters.  With the single exception discussed in 
the next paragraph, Appellants barely mention these bullet points again in the 
argument section of their brief.  
They provide no pertinent legal authority, and make no cogent argument, 
to indicate how or whether the alleged facts suggest that Mr. Gantz was an 
employee rather than a contractor.7  We therefore decline to consider these 
aspects of their argument any further.  
Schultz v. State, 2007 WY 162, 
¶ 18, 169 P.3d 81, 87 (Wyo. 2007); Rion 
v. State, 2007 WY 197, ¶ 2, 172 P.3d 734, 735-36 (Wyo. 2007).  

[¶26]    
The 
discussion section of Appellants' brief on this issue relies heavily upon one of 
the bullet points:  Ding Masters 
required Mr. Gantz to wear a Ding Masters' t-shirt at work.  This fact, Appellants urge, "by itself 
is sufficient to take this issue to a jury."  We disagree.  Appellants do not cite a single case to 
inform us whether required work apparel is more indicative of employee status or 
of contractor status.  Appellants 
have simply failed to demonstrate that the mandatory t-shirt raises a genuine 
issue of material fact regarding whether Mr. Gantz was an employee or a 
contractor.

[¶27]    
Ding 
Masters successfully presented a prima 
facie case that it was entitled to summary judgment.  Appellants did not come forward with 
evidentiary materials to counter that case, nor have they demonstrated that Ding 
Masters' own materials raised genuine issues of material fact.  We therefore uphold the district court's 
grant of summary judgment in Ding Masters' favor.

[¶28]    
Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1Appellants 
have not appealed the district court's failure to set their motion for hearing 
nor have they appealed the district court's failure to rule on their 
motion.

2W.R.A.P. 
2.07 states:

(a) The 
notice of appeal shall:

(1) 
Specify the party or parties taking the appeal;

(2) 
Identify the judgment or appealable order, or designated portion appealed; 
and

(3) Name 
the court to which the appeal is taken.

(4) Be 
accompanied by the certificate or endorsement required by Rule 
2.05.

(b) In a 
civil case, the notice of appeal shall have as an 
appendix:

(1) All 
pleadings that assert a claim for relief whether by complaint, counter-claim or 
cross-claim and all pleadings adding parties; and

(2) All 
orders or judgments disposing of claims for relief and all orders or judgments 
disposing of all claims by or against any party; and

(3) The 
judgment or final order.

(c) In a 
criminal case, the notice of appeal shall have as an appendix the judgment and 
sentence or other dispositive order.

3We note 
the contrast between this case and Merchant v. Gray, where there were no 
remaining defendants or issues, and the order granting summary judgment in the 
defendants' favor was the appealable order.  2007 WY 208, ¶¶ 5-6, 173 P.3d 410, 412 
(Wyo. 2007).  

4Ding 
Masters correctly notes that Appellants failed to satisfy W.R.A.P. 2.07(b)(1) 
and (b)(2).  Ding Masters, however, 
does not claim that the violations of W.R.A.P. 2.07(b) are jurisdictional.  Exercising our discretion, we decline to 
dismiss this appeal for those violations.  
W.R.A.P. 1.03.

5Effective 
March 1, 2007, W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2) bars decision on a motion without a hearing if 
resolution of that motion "will determine the final rights of a party in an 
action."

6W.R.C.P. 
56.1, effective July 1, 2008, states the following:

Upon any 
motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 
in addition to the materials supporting the motion, there shall be annexed to 
the motion a separate, short and concise statement of the material facts as to 
which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be 
tried.

In 
addition to the materials opposing a motion for summary judgment, there shall be 
annexed a separate, short and concise statement of material facts as to which it 
is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be 
tried.

Such 
statements shall include pinpoint citations to the specific portions of the 
record and materials relied upon in support of the parties' 
position.

7We note 
that Appellants' reply brief addressed the summary judgment issue somewhat more 
coherently than their opening brief.  
Appellants also responded to the jurisdictional question that Ding 
Masters first raised in its brief.  
We consider Appellants' reply brief only to the extent that it discusses 
the jurisdictional issue.  W.R.A.P. 
7.03; Furman v. Rural Elec. Co., 869 P.2d 136, 139 (Wyo. 1994).