Case Title: Mullins v. Virginia Lutheran Homes

Citation: 

Docket Number: 960961

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1997-01-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
 
THERESA A. MULLINS 
 
v.  Record No. 960961 
OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
                                       January 10, 1997 
VIRGINIA LUTHERAN HOMES, INC. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ROANOKE 
 
Clifford R. Weckstein, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred in 
striking the plaintiff's evidence in an action alleging that she 
was unlawfully discharged from her employment for filing a 
workers' compensation claim. 
 
Theresa A. Mullins filed a motion for judgment against her 
former employer, Virginia Lutheran Homes, Inc. (the employer).  
She alleged under Code § 65.2-308
1 that the employer discharged 
her because she had filed a claim under the Virginia Workers' 
Compensation Act.  Code §§ 65.2-100 to -1310. 
 
In a jury trial, the evidence showed that Mullins was hired 
                     
     
1Code § 65.2-308 provides, in relevant part: 
 
 
 
A.  No employer or person shall discharge an 
employee solely because the employee intends to file or 
has filed a claim under this title or has testified or 
is about to testify in any proceeding under this title. 
 
 
. . . 
 
 
 
B.  The employee may bring an action in a circuit 
court having jurisdiction over the employer or person 
who allegedly discharged the employee in violation of 
this section.  The court shall have jurisdiction, for 
cause shown, to restrain violations and order 
appropriate relief, including actual damages and 
attorney's fees to successful claimants and the 
rehiring or reinstatement of the employee, with back 
pay plus interest at the judgment rate as provided in 
§ 6.1-330.54. 
 
 
 
 
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in February 1993 as a certified nursing assistant at Brandon Oaks 
Retirement Home, a facility owned by the employer.  Her daily 
duties included helping the residents bathe, dress, and eat. 
 
Mullins testified that on September 5, 1993, she entered the 
room of an elderly woman, who was attempting to hold onto the 
bathroom sink to keep from falling.  Mullins injured her left 
hand in the process of grabbing hold of the woman.  Mullins' 
supervisor, Louise Hill, told her to place ice on her hand and 
complete her shift before seeking medical attention.  After she 
finished her shift, Mullins went to a hospital emergency room 
where a doctor placed a metal splint on her hand and referred her 
to an orthopedist. 
 
Mullins testified that she reported to work two days later 
and showed Hill her splint.  According to Mullins, Hill asked, 
"Why didn't you just let her fall instead of getting hurt?"  
Mullins also testified that Rob Bianco, Brandon Oaks' 
administrator, asked her if she "made it a habit of catching 
people falling." 
 
On October 3, 1993, an orthopedist diagnosed Mullins' injury 
as a hyperextension of her left thumb, and ordered her to stop 
all work that required use of her left hand.  Mullins testified 
that when she informed Hill of her orthopedist's instruction that 
she perform only light-duty work, Hill stated that there were no 
such positions available at that time. 
 
Based on her orthopedist's instruction and the fact that 
 
 
 
 
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Brandon Oaks had no light duty positions available, Mullins 
stopped working at the end of October 1993.  The employer paid 
Mullins for approximately 48 hours of accumulated "sick and 
holiday pay" for the period from October 28, 1993 to November 5, 
1993.  The record does not show that the employer made any 
further wage payments to Mullins. 
 
Mullins filed an application for benefits with the Virginia 
Workers' Compensation Commission on November 5, 1993.  In a 
letter dated December 2, 1993, the employer advised Mullins that 
her extended medical leave would expire on December 6, 1993.  The 
letter stated that if Mullins was unable to return to work after 
this leave expired, her position would be filled by another 
applicant. 
 
On December 6, 1993, Mullins and her mother, Elizabeth 
Heppert, met with Louise Hill.  Heppert testified that Hill told 
Mullins that her job was terminated due to her injury.  Mullins 
testified that Hill told her that she was being discharged 
because her "sick" leave had expired and she was unable to return 
to work. 
 
About three months later, Mullins received medical 
authorization to return to work.  She testified that she spoke 
with Hill about returning to Brandon Oaks, but was told that 
there was no work available for her.   
 
At the conclusion of Mullins' evidence, the trial court 
granted the employer's motion to strike the evidence on the 
 
 
 
 
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unlawful discharge claim.  The court stated that it struck the 
evidence because the jury could only find that the employer 
violated Code § 65.2-308 "by speculation, by picking and choosing 
among alternative explanations that the Plaintiff has offered." 
The court later entered an order dismissing Mullins' unlawful 
discharge action.   
 
On appeal, Mullins argues that the evidence was sufficient 
to raise a jury question whether the employer discharged her 
solely because she filed a workers' compensation claim.  Mullins 
contends that the evidence of the employer's conduct was 
sufficient to support a finding by the trier of fact that her 
employment was terminated for this reason. 
 
In response, the employer asserts that Mullins' evidence did 
not show that she was fired solely because she filed a workers' 
compensation claim.  The employer contends that the evidence 
showed only that when Mullins had used all her sick leave, she 
was still unable to return to work.  We disagree with the 
employer. 
 
In reviewing the trial court's decision to strike a 
plaintiff's evidence, we must consider the evidence, and all 
reasonable inferences which can be drawn from the evidence, in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff.  Any reasonable doubt 
about the sufficiency of the evidence must be resolved in the 
plaintiff's favor.  Waters v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 246 Va. 269, 
270, 435 S.E.2d 380, 380 (1993); Artrip v. E.E. Berry Equip. Co., 
 
 
 
 
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240 Va. 354, 357, 397 S.E.2d 821, 823 (1990). 
 
An employer's motivation in discharging an employee is a 
fact ordinarily established by circumstantial, rather than 
direct, evidence.  In Charlton v. Craddock-Terry Shoe Corp., 235 
Va. 485, 369 S.E.2d 175 (1988), we addressed this aspect of 
proving an unlawful discharge claim under the Virginia Workers' 
Compensation Act.  There, the plaintiff alleged that she was 
discharged from her employment because she had incurred a job-
related injury for which she intended to file a workers' 
compensation claim.  During cross-examination, however, the 
plaintiff agreed that she was fired because she had refused to 
sign a waiver of her right to claim compensation benefits. 
 
Based on this testimony, the defendant argued that the 
plaintiff's evidence showed that she was not fired solely because 
she intended to file a workers' compensation claim, and that her 
refusal to sign the waiver constituted a separate reason for her 
dismissal.  The trial court agreed and entered final judgment for 
the defendant. 
 
We reversed the trial court's judgment, noting that the 
plaintiff did not know the actual reason for her dismissal.  We 
stated that "[h]er employer's innermost motivation was a matter 
necessarily outside the realm of her knowledge."  Id. at 489, 369 
S.E.2d at 177.  We concluded that since the plaintiff's 
testimony, considered in its entirety, presented a question of 
fact concerning the employer's motivation, the plaintiff was 
 
 
 
 
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entitled to have that evidence weighed by the jury together with 
all the other evidence in the case.  Id. at 489-90, 369 S.E.2d at 
177. 
 
These observations apply equally to the present case.  The 
employer's motivation for discharging Mullins was a question 
outside the realm of Mullins' knowledge to be resolved by the 
trier of fact.  See id. at 489, 369 S.E.2d at 177. 
 
The evidence showed that Mullins was discharged about one 
month after filing her workers' compensation claim.  Heppert 
testified that Hill told Mullins she was being discharged due to 
her job-related injury.  In addition, the comments allegedly made 
by Hill and Bianco are circumstantial evidence that the employer 
felt that avoiding employee injury claims was more important than 
providing for the safety of residents in the facility.  Viewed in 
the light most favorable to Mullins, this evidence was sufficient 
to raise a question of fact whether Mullins was discharged solely 
for filing a workers' compensation claim. 
 
The employer's articulated reasons for discharging Mullins, 
her job-related injury and the expiration of her sick leave, did 
not constitute "alternative explanations" which would require the 
jury to speculate before finding that the employer violated Code 
§ 65.2-308.  An employer's articulated reasons for discharging an 
employee are merely evidence relevant to the issue of the 
employer's motivation, which the jury is entitled to consider 
along with all the other evidence of the employer's conduct.  
 
 
 
 
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Thus, we conclude that the trial court erred in striking Mullins' 
evidence.
2  
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the trial court's 
judgment and remand this case for a new trial. 
 
Reversed and remanded.
                     
     
2On appeal, the employer argues for the first time that 
Mullins was not entitled to a jury trial on her claim that she 
was discharged in violation of Code § 65.2-308.  See Dunn v. 
Bergen Brunswig Drug Co., 848 F. Supp. 645, 649 (E.D. Va. 1994). 
 Based on this argument, the employer contends that we should 
treat the trial court's ruling on the motion to strike as "the 
constructive equivalent of a finding by the trier of fact" that 
Mullins did not prove her case by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  However, since the employer's contention is based on 
an argument not raised at trial, we do not consider the merits of 
that contention.  Rule 5:25.