Case Title: State v. Gary L. Gordon

Citation: 2003 WI 69

Docket Number: 2001AP001679-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-06-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 69 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-1679-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Gary L. Gordon,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2002 WI App 53 
Reported at:  250 Wis. 2d 702, 641 N.W.2d 183 
(Ct. App. 2002-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 27, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 15, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Richard J. Sankovitz   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by James M. Friemuth, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief and oral 
argument by Steven P. Weiss, assistant state public defender. 
 
 
2003 WI 69 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-1679-CR  
(L.C. No. 
99 CF 5375) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Gary L. Gordon,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 27, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.     
 
¶1 
DIANE S. SYKES, J.  Gary Gordon was charged with three 
criminal counts arising out of a domestic dispute: violating a 
domestic abuse injunction, disorderly conduct while armed, and 
second-degree recklessly endangering safety.  He testified in 
his own defense and admitted to facts constituting the enhanced 
disorderly conduct count, to wit, that when the police arrived 
in response to the domestic violence dispatch, he grabbed two 
knives to hold the officers at bay while he attempted to evade 
arrest, and remained armed with those knives while the police 
pursued him on foot through the neighborhood. 
No. 
01-1679-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2  During closing argument, Gordon's trial counsel argued 
for acquittal on the two more serious charges.  As to the 
disorderly conduct count, however, Gordon's attorney conceded 
that "obviously running around the neighborhood with two knives 
is disorderly conduct and it is disorderly conduct while armed."  
The jury returned verdicts of guilty all three counts. 
¶3  On appeal, Gordon argued that his trial counsel's 
closing argument concession of guilt on the disorderly conduct 
while armed count constituted ineffective assistance of counsel 
of a type that is conclusively presumed to be prejudicial, 
automatically 
requiring 
a 
new 
trial. 
 
He 
also 
claimed 
instructional error: the jury instruction for the "while armed" 
penalty enhancer on the disorderly conduct charge did not 
include the Peete "nexus" instruction, which is required when 
the defendant is charged with committing the underlying crime 
"while possessing a dangerous weapon."  See State v. Peete, 185 
Wis. 2d 4, 9, 517 N.W.2d 149 (1994); Wis. Stat. § 939.63 (2001-
2002).1  Because the penalty enhancer is an element of the 
offense, Gordon contended that his trial counsel's failure to 
object to this error was per se prejudicial and therefore 
automatically reversible. 
¶4  The court of appeals agreed, concluding that the 
attorney's concession was the functional equivalent of a guilty 
plea, which is a constitutional prerogative of the accused, not 
                                                 
1 All subsequent statutory references are to the 2001-2002 
version of the Wisconsin Statutes. 
No. 
01-1679-CR   
 
3 
 
his lawyer.  State v. Gordon, 2002 WI App 53, ¶25, 250 Wis. 2d 
702, 641 N.W.2d 183.  The court of appeals also concluded that 
the failure to object to the erroneous jury instruction was per 
se prejudicial.  Id., ¶¶32-38. 
¶5  We reverse.  The concession by counsel was not the 
functional equivalent of a guilty plea under the circumstances 
of this case, where it came in closing argument, on one count in 
a multiple-count case, after full adversarial testing of the 
State's case and after the defendant had admitted on the witness 
stand the facts constituting the offense.  In addition, the 
omission of the Peete instruction is subject to harmless error 
analysis under Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), and 
State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189.  
Therefore, the failure to object to the omission was not per se 
prejudicial for purposes of ineffective assistance of counsel 
analysis.  We reverse State v. Howard, 211 Wis. 2d 269, 290-95, 
564 N.W.2d 753 (1997), State v. Avila, 92 Wis. 2d 870, 891-93A, 
532 N.W.2d 423 (1995), and State v. Krueger, 240 Wis. 2d 644, 
649-51, 632 N.W.2d 211 (Ct. App. 2000), to the extent that those 
cases established a rule of automatic reversal where a jury 
instruction omits an element of the offense. 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶6 
Margaret Wilder obtained a domestic abuse injunction 
against Gary Gordon on October 29, 1998.  Gordon was Wilder's 
sometime boyfriend of 12 years who occasionally lived with her, 
though his drug and alcohol use strained the relationship.  
Despite the injunction, Wilder allowed Gordon to live with her 
No. 
01-1679-CR   
 
4 
 
and her six-year-old grandson in their Milwaukee apartment 
beginning 
sometime 
during 
the 
late 
spring 
of 
1999, 
and 
continuing into the fall of that year.  Wilder was wheelchair-
bound and testified at trial that she had allowed Gordon to live 
with her to help care for her; Gordon testified that he was 
unaware when he resumed living with Wilder that the injunction 
was still in effect.   
¶7 
On the evening of October 1, 1999, Gordon was at 
Wilder's apartment and had nearly finished off a 32-ounce bottle 
of beer when he and Wilder got into an argument.  Wilder 
testified that Gordon was "agitated" and "verbally abusive."  
She also feared that Gordon had been "doing drugs," based upon 
certain behaviors and characteristics that she had observed in 
him when he had previously done so.   
¶8 
Wilder called the police to come to her apartment and 
enforce the injunction against Gordon.  Officers Matthew Bongard 
and John Amberg were dispatched, and when they arrived outside 
the apartment, Gordon realized they were there for him and 
decided to attempt to "escape" by arming himself with two 
knives.  He testified that he picked up the first knife because 
he "didn't want to go to jail," and then grabbed a second knife.   
¶9 
Wilder's 
grandson 
let 
Officer 
Bongard 
into 
the 
apartment.  From her wheelchair in the living room, Wilder 
shouted, "He's right there and he has some knives," referring to 
Gordon, who was standing in an interior hallway.   
¶10 Officer Bongard drew and pointed his gun at Gordon, 
ordering him to drop the knives.  Officer Amberg then ran inside 
No. 
01-1679-CR   
 
5 
 
to help.  Gordon continually refused the officer's commands to 
drop the knives, saying that he "wasn't going to drop no fucking 
knives," and telling the officers, "I ain't going to no jail."  
The officers radioed for backup.  Officer Amberg described the 
knives as a "butcher style knife" and a "steak knife." 
¶11 Still armed with the knives, Gordon fled to a back 
bedroom and closed the door.  Because this room had a door to 
the backyard, Officer Amberg went outside intending to secure 
the area.  A neighbor had seen Gordon run outside and hide in 
some bushes, and alerted Officer Amberg. 
¶12 Officer Bongard joined the search outside and spotted 
Gordon in the hedges, a few houses away from Wilder's apartment.  
Gordon was still clutching the knives.  Officer Bongard drew his 
gun, yelled for Gordon to drop the knives, and ordered him to 
"freeze."  Gordon did not comply, and the officer, at least one 
more time, ordered him to drop the knives.  Gordon then stepped 
towards Officer Bongard and started to raise the knives.  Gordon 
testified that he was attempting to surrender the knives.  
Interpreting Gordon's movement as an imminent attack rather than 
a surrender, Officer Bongard fired two shots at Gordon in quick 
succession.  Gordon was hit in the arm and the stomach.  The 
officers immediately summoned medical help. 
¶13 Gordon was charged in Milwaukee County Circuit Court 
with three crimes:  violation of a domestic abuse injunction, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. § 813.12(8)(a); disorderly conduct while 
armed, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 947.01 and 939.63; and second-
degree recklessly endangering safety, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 
No. 
01-1679-CR   
 
6 
 
941.30(2).  At trial, he testified that when he first saw that 
police officers had arrived at the apartment, he armed himself 
with two knives in order to set in motion his escape:  "Well, 
when I seen them coming I got up and I walked up and he came in.  
And then that's when, you know, I picked up the knife because I 
didn't want to go to jail.  I ain't going to jail.  You know 
what I'm saying?"  He repeatedly testified that the reason he 
armed himself with the knives was to avoid going to jail:   
Q:  And you testified, sir, while you were being asked 
by your attorney these questions right in front of the 
jury here that you grabbed the knives when you 
realized that the officers were coming in because, 
quote, I am not going to jail.  Is this correct?  Is 
this what you told us? 
A:  Yeah.  I said, "I'm not fitting to go to jail."  
They [the officers] told me that I was going to jail.  
I said, "I'm not going to go to no jail." 
Q: 
That's why you grabbed the knife? 
A:  Yes. 
Q:   Did you grab both knives at the same time? 
A:  I grabbed one, then I grabbed the other one off 
the counter. 
. . . .  
Q:  So, the presence of these two knives you armed 
yourself with in the kitchen of this apartment was for 
the purposes of deterring these officers from grabbing 
you so you wouldn't go to jail, is that right? 
A:   Well, you could say so, yes. 
 
¶14  Regarding the confrontation with the police outside 
the apartment, Gordon testified: 
No. 
01-1679-CR   
 
7 
 
A:  Yeah, he [the officer] seen me.  We both like met 
up on each other as he came through the yard.  We 
caught each other's eye and he turned to me and told 
me to freeze. 
Q:  Did he . . . tell you repeatedly to drop the 
knives? 
A:  Twice he said, "Drop the knives, drop the fucking 
knives."  Pardon my language.  That is the exact words 
he said.  
¶15 In closing argument, Gordon's trial counsel focused on 
disputing Gordon's guilt on the felony charge of second-degree 
recklessly endangering safety and the misdemeanor charge of 
violating the domestic abuse injunction.  He said little, 
however, about the misdemeanor charge of disorderly conduct 
while armed, save for the following: 
But I want to be very clear there is no doubt, there 
is no question that at the moment when Officer Bongard 
shot Mr. Gordon, Mr. Gordon was subject to arrest for 
disorderly conduct while armed.  Obviously running 
around the neighborhood with two knives is disorderly 
conduct and it is disorderly conduct while armed.  But 
in and of itself that conduct does not create an 
unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great 
bodily harm. . . . Walking around the neighborhood 
with two knives doesn't create that kind of risk to 
anyone. 
¶16 Gordon's trial counsel assailed the State's case on 
the first and third counts (violation of a domestic abuse 
injunction and second-degree recklessly endangering safety), 
contrasting the weight of the evidence on the disorderly conduct 
charge with the lack of evidence on the other two more serious 
No. 
01-1679-CR   
 
8 
 
charges.2  He concluded his argument by saying:  "I'm asking you 
folks to acquit Mr. Gordon on the first and third charges 
[violating 
a 
domestic 
abuse 
injunction 
and 
second-degree 
recklessly endangering safety]."  He said nothing more of the 
enhanced disorderly conduct charge stemming from Gordon's use of 
the knives as part of his attempt to escape arrest.   
¶17 The 
jury 
was 
instructed 
on 
the 
"while 
armed" 
enhancement element of the disorderly conduct charge as follows: 
[C]ount 
2 
alleges 
not 
only 
that 
the 
defendant 
committed the crime of disorderly conduct, but also 
that he did so while possessing, using, or threatening 
to use a dangerous weapon.  If you find the defendant 
guilty of the charge in count 2, you must answer the 
following question:  Did the defendant commit the 
crime of disorderly conduct while possessing, using or 
threatening to use a dangerous weapon? 
(emphasis added); see also Wis. Stat. § 939.63 and Wis JI——
Criminal 990.  In order to be found guilty of the "possession" 
form of a "while armed" enhanced crime under § 939.63, a 
defendant must be found to have possessed the weapon to 
"facilitate" the underlying crime.  See Peete, 185 Wis. 2d at 9.  
Here, however, while all three statutory alternatives for 
enhancement——"possessing, 
using 
or 
threatening 
to 
use 
a 
                                                 
2 Wilder testified that she had allowed Gordon to live with 
her and to help care for her.  Gordon testified that, based upon 
this, he did not believe the injunction was still in effect. 
No. 
01-1679-CR   
 
9 
 
dangerous weapon"——were given, the Peete "nexus" instruction was 
omitted.3  Gordon's attorney did not object to the omission. 
¶18 The jury found Gordon guilty on all three counts, and 
the circuit court, the Honorable Richard J. Sankovitz, imposed 
consecutive sentences: two years on the felony second-degree 
recklessly endangering safety conviction, nine months on the 
misdemeanor domestic abuse injunction violation, and six months 
on the disorderly conduct while armed conviction.  Gordon filed 
a 
post-conviction 
motion 
alleging, 
among 
other 
things, 
ineffective assistance of counsel stemming from the closing 
argument concession and the failure to object to the omission of 
the Peete instruction.  The circuit court denied the motion by 
written decision, without a hearing, concluding that there was 
no prejudice. 
¶19 Gordon appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed 
Gordon's conviction for second-degree recklessly endangering 
safety, but reversed his convictions for violating a domestic 
                                                 
3 A Peete "nexus" instruction is not necessary where the 
enhancer is charged on the basis of the defendant's use or 
threat to use a dangerous weapon, because in such cases a nexus 
exists as a primary matter.  See State v. Peete, 185 Wis. 2d 4, 
18, 517 N.W.2d 149 (1994)("If a defendant commits a crime while 
using or threatening to use a dangerous weapon, a nexus is 
established.").   
No. 
01-1679-CR   
 
10 
 
abuse injunction and for disorderly conduct while armed.4   State 
v. Gordon, 2002 WI App 53, 250 Wis. 2d 702, 641 N.W.2d 183.  The 
court of appeals concluded that the closing argument concession 
by Gordon's attorney was the functional equivalent of a guilty 
plea, a fundamental decision which the accused, not his lawyer, 
has the ultimate authority to make.  Id., ¶¶25-27.  The court 
remanded for a Machner hearing to determine whether Gordon had 
consented to the closing argument concession.  Id., ¶31 (citing 
State v. Curtis, 218 Wis. 2d 550, 554-55, 582 N.W.2d 409 (Ct. 
App. 1998)(holding that a Machner hearing is a prerequisite to a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel)).  The court of 
appeals 
also 
concluded 
that 
the 
omission 
of 
the 
Peete 
instruction was per se prejudicial and automatically reversible 
under Krueger.  See id., ¶38 (citing Krueger, 240 Wis. 2d 644, 
¶¶12, 15).  We accepted review, 2002 WI 48, 252 Wis. 2d 148, 644 
N.W.2d 685, and now reverse. 
II.  DEFENSE COUNSEL'S CLOSING ARGUMENT CONCESSION 
¶20 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel 
                                                 
4 The reversal of the conviction for violating a domestic 
abuse injunction is not before us on this review.  Subsequent to 
the court of appeals decision, this court decided State v. 
Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶35, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189, and 
State v. Tomlinson, 2002 WI 91, ¶¶58-59, 254 Wis. 2d 502, 648 
N.W.2d 367, adopting and applying Neder v. United States, 527 
U.S. 1 (1999), and holding that harmless error analysis is 
appropriate in a case of an erroneous jury instruction, 
including one that omits an element of an offense.   
No. 
01-1679-CR   
 
11 
 
for his defence."  U.S. Const., amend. VI; see also Wis. Const. 
art. I, § 7. 
¶21 The decision to plead guilty is one of several 
"fundamental decisions regarding the case" over which the 
accused, not his lawyer, has the "ultimate authority."  Jones v. 
Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983)(citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 
U.S. 72, 93 n.1 (1977)(Burger, C.J., concurring)).  However, 
counsel is entrusted with the authority to make "tactical" 
decisions regarding trial strategy.  See, e.g., Faretta v. 
California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975). 
¶22  Gordon's attack on his trial counsel's closing 
argument concession of guilt on the disorderly conduct count is 
made in the context of a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, which is "squarely governed" by the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668 (1984).5  See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000).  
The 
familiar 
Strickland 
formulation 
of 
constitutional 
ineffectiveness is: 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's 
performance was deficient. This requires showing that 
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant 
by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must 
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
                                                 
 
5 The dissent contends that this ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim is not governed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984), citing a dissent in Haynes v. Cain, 298 F.3d 
375, 385 (5th Cir. 2002)(Parker, J., dissenting).  Dissent, ¶71 
n.30.  We know of no authority for the assertion that ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims are not governed by Strickland's 
two-pronged analysis of deficient performance and prejudice.    
  
No. 
01-1679-CR   
 
12 
 
defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors 
were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial, a trial whose result is reliable.  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  Under Strickland, "counsel is 
strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made 
all 
significant 
decisions 
in 
the 
exercise 
of 
reasonable 
professional judgment."  Id. at 690. 
¶23 "To establish ineffectiveness, a 'defendant must show 
that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard 
of reasonableness.'"  Williams, 529 U.S. at 390-391 (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688).  "To establish prejudice he 'must 
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'" 
Id. at 391 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
¶24  The court of appeals held that the defense attorney's 
closing argument concession on the disorderly conduct while 
armed count was the functional equivalent of a guilty plea, 
improper if done without Gordon's consent, and conclusively 
presumed to be prejudicial.  Gordon, 250 Wis. 2d 702, ¶25.  We 
disagree.  A guilty plea waives trial, cross-examination of 
witnesses, the right to testify and call witnesses in one's own 
defense, and the right to a unanimous jury verdict of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  The concession in this case had none 
of these effects.  Gordon had a jury trial, cross-examined the 
State's witnesses, testified in his own defense, and was 
adjudged guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by a unanimous jury. 
No. 
01-1679-CR   
 
13 
 
¶25  Gordon's own testimony conceded the facts constituting 
the disorderly conduct while armed count.  In summary, he 
admitted the following: that he had been drinking and had been 
involved in a domestic dispute with Wilder; that when the police 
arrived, he armed himself with two knives to facilitate his 
escape; that he refused the officer's commands to drop the 
knives; that he fled the apartment while still armed with the 
knives and was pursued through the neighborhood by the two 
police officers; that when the officers caught up with him they 
twice commanded him to drop the knives; that he initially 
refused to do so; and that when he changed his mind and started 
to surrender the knives, the police shot him in the arm and the 
stomach. 
¶26 Under 
these 
circumstances 
it 
was 
not 
deficient 
performance for Gordon's attorney to concede the overwhelming 
weight of the evidence on the misdemeanor disorderly conduct 
count and focus his closing argument on the more serious charges 
in the case, which, unlike the disorderly conduct count, 
remained contestable after Gordon's testimony.  While conceding 
that the facts out of Gordon's own mouth amounted to disorderly 
conduct while armed, Gordon's attorney argued vigorously for 
acquittal on the more serious felony and misdemeanor counts.  
This was a reasonable tactical approach under the circumstances, 
plainly calculated to maintain credibility with the jury and 
enhance the prospects of acquittal on the two more serious 
charges.  Gordon's attorney did not concede anything that Gordon 
had not admitted as a factual matter on the witness stand; the 
No. 
01-1679-CR   
 
14 
 
concession, therefore, did not conflict with Gordon's own 
testimonial admissions.  Accordingly, the defense attorney's 
conduct in this regard did not fall below an objective standard 
of reasonableness, nor was it prejudicial. 
¶27 Gordon cites a number of cases that have held an 
attorney's concession of guilt during trial to be the functional 
equivalent of a guilty plea, and presumptively prejudicial if 
done without the defendant's consent, but each of these cases is 
factually distinguishable from this case, because each is 
characterized by one or more of the following: 1) a concession 
to all the charges (or the only charge) in the case; 2) a 
concession made in opening statement before any adversarial or 
evidentiary testing had occurred; 3) a concession made in the 
presence of a contemporaneous objection from the defendant; or 
4) a concession made in direct conflict with the defendant's 
testimony.6  
                                                 
6 See Haines v. Cain, 272 F.3d 757, 762 (5th Cir. 2001); 
United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 1991); 
United States v. Simone, 931 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1991); Francis 
v. Spraggins, 720 F.2d 1190, 1193 (11th Cir. 1983); Wiley v. 
Sowders, 647 F.2d 642 (6th Cir. 1981); Brown v. Rice, 693 
F.Supp. 381, 395-97 (W.D.N.C. 1988); Nixon v. Singletary, 758 
So.2d 618 (Fla. 2000); Childers v. State, 782 So. 2d 513, 517 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); People v. Hattery, 488 N.E.2d 513 
(Ill. 1985); State v. Carter, 14 P.3d 1138, 1141, 1148 (Kan. 
2000); State v. Arnold, 706 So. 2d 578, 584-86 (La. Ct. App. 
1998); People v. Fisher, 326 N.W.2d 537, 53-40 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1982); State v. Moore, 458 N.W.2d 90, 95-96 (Minn. 1990); Wiley 
v. State, 517 So.2d 1373, 1381-82 (Miss. 1987); Jones v. State, 
877 P.2d 1052, 1056-57 (Nev. 1994); State v. Anaya, 592 A.2d 
1142, 1145-47 (N.H. 1991); State v. Harbison, 337 S.E.2d 504, 
506 (N.C. 1985).  
No. 
01-1679-CR   
 
15 
 
¶28 The more analogous cases hold that where counsel 
concedes guilt on a lesser count in a multiple-count case, in 
light of overwhelming evidence on that count and in an effort to 
gain credibility and win acquittal on the other charges, the 
concession is a reasonable tactical decision and counsel is not 
deemed to have been constitutionally ineffective.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Gomes, 177 F.3d 76, 83-83 (1st Cir. 1999), 
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 911 (1999); United States v. Wilks, 46 
F.2d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Tabares, 951 
F.2d 405, 409 (1st Cir. 1991); Underwood v. Clark, 939 F.2d 473, 
474 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Simone, 931 F.2d 1186, 
1194-97 (7th Cir. 1991);7 McClain v. Hill, 52 F.Supp. 2d 1133, 
1143 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Ramirez v. United States, 17 F.Supp. 2d 
63, 67-68 (D.R.I. 1998); United States v. Pledger, 887 F.Supp. 
1400, 1406-07 (D. Kan. 1995); Williams v. State, 791 So.2d 895, 
899-900 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Silva, 24 P.3d 477, 483 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2001); Richardson v. United States, 698 A.2d 
442, 444-45 (D.C. Ct. App. 1997).    
¶29 Underwood is one of the leading cases in this area: 
[The 
defendant] 
argues 
that 
it 
is 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel per se for a lawyer to concede 
his client's guilt without the client's consent.  What 
is true, although it really has nothing to do with 
ineffective assistance, is that a defendant cannot be 
                                                 
 
7    The dissent's citation and quotation from United States 
v. Simone, 931 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1991), is misleading.  
Dissent, ¶61 n.23.  Simone says this: "But when the admissions 
concern only some of the charges to be proven, or when they do 
not actually concede guilt, counsel's concessions have been 
treated as tactical retreats and deemed to be effective 
assistance."  Simone, 931 F.2d at 1196. 
  
No. 
01-1679-CR   
 
16 
 
made to plead guilty against his wishes, however wise 
such a plea would be.  And if his lawyer told the jury 
in closing argument, "my client has decided to plead 
guilty," that would be a forced plea, and would 
deprive the defendant of his right to put the 
prosecution to its proof of guilt.  It is otherwise if 
in closing argument counsel acknowledges what the 
course of the trial has made undeniable——that on a 
particular 
count 
the 
evidence 
of 
guilt 
is 
overwhelming.   Such acknowledgment can be a sound 
tactic when the evidence is indeed overwhelming (and 
there is no reason to suppose that any juror doubts 
this) and when the count in question is a lesser 
count, so that there is an advantage to be gained by 
winning the confidence of the jury.   Such was this 
case . . . . [T]here was no way in the world that the 
jury was going to acquit [the defendant] of [the 
lesser charge].   The lawyer did not plead [the 
defendant] guilty; he merely acknowledged the weight 
of the evidence of [the lesser charge] in order to 
contrast it with the lack of direct evidence [on the 
more 
serious 
charge]. 
The 
lawyer's 
tactic 
was 
reasonable, and though . . . we cannot say that it had 
the consent of the client, a lawyer is not required to 
consult with his client on tactical moves. 
Underwood, 939 F.2d at 474 (7th Cir. 1991)(internal citations 
omitted). 
¶30 We reach the same conclusion here.  The circumstances 
of this case do not warrant a rule of per se ineffectiveness.  
Defense 
counsel's 
closing 
argument 
concession 
was 
not 
constitutionally deficient, i.e., it did not fall below an 
objective standard of reasonableness within the meaning of 
Strickland.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.  Beyond that, Gordon 
was not prejudiced.  He has not demonstrated a reasonable 
probability that the result of the proceeding would have been 
different without the attorney's concession.  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 694.  After Gordon's testimony, "there was no way in the 
No. 
01-1679-CR   
 
17 
 
world that the jury was going to acquit" on the disorderly 
conduct while armed count.  Underwood, 939 F.2d at 474.  The 
closing argument concession did not constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel.   
III.  THE PEETE ERROR 
 
¶31 As we have noted, the circuit court instructed the 
jury on all three statutory alternatives for commission of 
disorderly conduct while armed for purposes of the "while armed" 
penalty enhancer: 1) possession; 2) use; and 3) threat of use of 
a dangerous weapon.  Wis. Stat. § 939.63(1).  Ordinarily, where 
the State alleges that the defendant possessed a dangerous 
weapon in the commission of a crime for purposes of the "while 
armed" penalty enhancer, a Peete nexus instruction is required.  
Peete, 185 Wis. 2d at 9.  The nexus instruction explains that in 
order to be found guilty of "possessing" a dangerous weapon in 
the commission of the underlying crime, the defendant must have 
possessed the dangerous weapon to "facilitate" the underlying 
crime.  Id.  Here, the Peete nexus instruction on the possession 
alternative was omitted.   
¶32 In contrast, where a defendant uses or threatens to 
use a dangerous weapon in the commission of a crime, a nexus 
exists for purposes of the penalty enhancer as a matter of law.8  
                                                 
8 Peete, 185 Wis. 2d at 18:  
If a defendant commits a crime while using or 
threatening to use a dangerous weapon, a nexus is 
established. The defendant's use or threat to use a 
dangerous weapon puts the crime victim in fear, 
No. 
01-1679-CR   
 
18 
 
Here, the evidence fully supports a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
conclusion that Gordon used the knives in the commission of the 
crime of disorderly conduct.  Indeed, the knives were part and 
parcel of the disorderly conduct itself; Gordon's possession of 
the knives in his effort to escape arrest was largely what made 
his conduct disorderly in the first place.  Nevertheless, the 
jury was instructed on the possession alternative, absent a 
Peete nexus instruction, and this was error.  There was no 
objection, however; therefore, the error has been challenged in 
the context of Gordon's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
¶33 Here, too, the court of appeals followed a rule of per 
se prejudice, citing Krueger.  See Gordon, 250 Wis. 2d 702, ¶38.  
Krueger held that where defense counsel fails to object to a 
jury instruction that omits an essential element of the crime, 
prejudice under Strickland is conclusively presumed and reversal 
is automatic.  Krueger, 240 Wis. 2d 644, ¶¶6-15.  Krueger relied 
on two cases from this court, Howard and Avila, which held that 
harmless error analysis does not apply to an erroneous jury 
instruction that omits an element of the offense.  Id., ¶¶11-12 
                                                                                                                                                             
protects the defendant, and protects any contraband in 
the defendant's possession.  These effects of the use 
or threat to use a weapon facilitate commission of the 
predicate offense. Thus the nexus requirement we 
establish, that a defendant possess the weapon to 
facilitate commission of the predicate offense, makes 
the language "while possessing" in § 939.63 parallel 
in 
meaning 
to 
"while 
. . . using" 
or 
"while 
. . . threatening to use."   
Id. at 18 (emphasis added, ellipses in original).    
No. 
01-1679-CR   
 
19 
 
(citing Howard, 211 Wis. 2d at 292, and Avila, 192 Wis. 2d at 
893a). 
 ¶34  Krueger, Howard, and Avila cannot survive our 
decision last term in Harvey, in which we applied harmless error 
analysis to an erroneous jury instruction that operated as a 
mandatory conclusive presumption on an element of a penalty 
enhancer.  Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶¶47-49.  Harvey adopted the 
United States Supreme Court's harmless error analysis in Neder, 
which reaffirmed and refined the harmless error test of Chapman 
v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).  Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 
¶¶44-46; see also State v. Tomlinson, 2002 WI 91, 254 Wis. 2d 
502, 648 N.W.2d 367. 
¶35 In Harvey, we began by citing Neder's basic premise: 
that while a "limited class of errors" is deemed "structural," 
requiring automatic reversal regardless of any effect on the 
outcome (i.e., complete denial of counsel; a biased trial judge; 
racial discrimination in the selection of a grand jury; denial 
of self-representation at trial; denial of public trial; or a 
defective reasonable doubt instruction), most errors, including 
constitutional ones, are reviewed for harmlessness.  Harvey, 254 
Wis. 2d, ¶37 (citing Neder, 527 U.S. at 7).   
¶36  We went on to note Neder's reaffirmation of the 
Chapman test for harmless error: "'That test . . . is whether it 
appears "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of 
did not contribute to the verdict obtained."'"  Harvey, 254 
Wis. 2d 442, ¶44 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 15-16, quoting in 
turn Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24).  We also observed that in 
No. 
01-1679-CR   
 
20 
 
applying the Chapman test to the instructional error at issue in 
the case, the Supreme Court in Neder used "somewhat different 
language": "'Is it clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the 
error?'"  Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶46 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. 
at 18). 
¶37 
This 
difference 
in 
language, 
we 
said, 
did 
not 
constitute 
an 
abandonment 
of 
the 
Chapman 
test, 
but 
a 
clarification by the Court of "what it takes to meet the test; 
that is, that in order to conclude that an error 'did not 
contribute to the verdict' within the meaning of Chapman, a 
court must be able to conclude 'beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the 
error.'"  Id., ¶48 n.14 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 18).  
Ultimately, the Court in Neder held that "where a reviewing 
court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted 
element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, 
such that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the 
error, the erroneous instruction is properly found to be 
harmless."   Neder, 527 U.S. at 17. 
¶38 Gordon 
argues 
that 
Neder 
is 
"completely 
irreconcilable" with the Supreme Court's more recent decision in 
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and suggests that 
"Neder's force is suspect" by virtue of the Court's decision in 
No. 
01-1679-CR   
 
21 
 
Apprendi.9  The cases are not inconsistent, and Apprendi has not 
undermined Neder. 
¶39 Apprendi did not involve instructional error, but, 
rather, was a facial challenge to that portion of the New Jersey 
hate crimes law that committed to the judge rather than the 
jury, by a mere preponderance of the evidence, the elements of 
the hate crimes penalty enhancer.  See Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 
468-69 (2000).  In any event, federal and state appellate courts 
have had no difficulty reconciling the two cases.  Neder's 
harmless error analysis has been applied to Apprendi-type errors 
in every single federal appellate circuit.10  In addition, 
several state appellate courts have also applied Neder to 
                                                 
9 We note that the Neder dissent (were it the law) would not 
help Gordon here, for it declared that reversal is appropriate 
only where a defendant has made a timely objection.  Neder, 527 
U.S. at 34-35 n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part)("[J]ust as the absolute right to trial by jury can be 
waived, so also the failure to object to its deprivation at the 
point where the deprivation can be remedied will preclude 
automatic reversal" because "[i]t is a universally acknowledged 
principle of law that one who sleeps on his rights——even 
fundamental rights——may lose them.").  As we have noted, Gordon 
did not make a timely objection to the erroneous instruction.    
10 See United States v. Bailey, 270 F.3d 83 (1st Cir. 2001); 
United States v. Joyner, 313 F.3d 40 (2nd Cir. 2002); United 
States v. Vazquez, 271 F.3d 93 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. 
Stewart, 256 F.3d 231 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. 
Matthews, 312 F.3d 652 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Zidell, 
323 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Nance, 236 F.3d 
820 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Wheat, 278 F.3d 722 (8th 
Cir. 2001); United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664 
(9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Prentiss, 273 F.3d 1277 (10th 
Cir. 2001); United States v. Candelario, 240 F.3d 1300 (11th 
Cir. 2001); United States v. Samuel, 296 F.3d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 
2002). 
No. 
01-1679-CR   
 
22 
 
Apprendi-type 
errors.11 
 
Contrary 
to 
Gordon's 
argument, 
acceptance of Neder, and its application in the context of 
Apprendi-type errors, appears to be practically universal.12 
¶40 
There 
is 
no 
meaningful 
way 
to 
distinguish 
the 
instructional error in Harvey——an instruction that contained a 
mandatory conclusive presumption——from an instruction that omits 
an element of the offense.  Neder itself involved an instruction 
that erroneously omitted an element of the offense.  Neder, 527 
U.S. at 15.  Both types of instructional error are reviewed 
under harmless error analysis, pursuant to Neder and Harvey.  We 
overrule Howard and Avila to the extent that those cases 
established 
a 
rule 
of 
automatic 
reversal 
where 
a 
jury 
instruction omits an element of the offense.  The holding in 
Krueger was based on Howard and Avila; Krueger is also 
overruled.  Wisconsin harmless error law (including Howard, 
Avila, and, by implication, Krueger) has followed federal 
harmless error law.  Harvey's adoption of Neder and its 
reaffirmation of the Chapman-based harmless error analysis 
                                                 
11 See State v. Ring, 65 P.3d 915, 935 (Ariz. 2003); State 
v. Garcia, 28 P.3d 327, 331 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001); People v. 
Scott, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 318, 328-29 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); State 
v. Price, 767 A.2d 107, 113 (Conn. 2001); State v. Davis, 772 
A.2d 559, 568 (Conn. 2001); People v. Thurow, __ N.E.2d __, 203 
Ill.2d 352 (2003); State v. Burdick, 782 A.2d 319, 328 (Me. 
2001). See also Bellamy v. United States, 810 A.2d 401 (D.C. 
2002). 
12 We are able to locate only one case finding structural 
error, Esparza v. Mitchell, 310 F.3d 414, 421 (6th Cir. 2002), a 
capital case involving a challenge under the Eighth Amendment 
rather than the Sixth Amendment.  
No. 
01-1679-CR   
 
23 
 
requires that we overrule the automatic reversal rule of 
Krueger, Howard, and Avila.   
¶41  The removal of the automatic reversal rule returns 
this issue to the realm of Strickland's prejudice analysis, 
because Gordon's attorney did not object to the omission of the 
Peete "nexus" instruction.  We can confidently say that there is 
no reasonable probability of a different outcome had counsel 
alerted the circuit court to the missing Peete instruction. 
¶42 Gordon testified that he armed himself with two knives 
during a heated confrontation with the police that spilled out 
from Wilder's apartment into the surrounding neighborhood, all 
in order to escape arrest.  Under these circumstances, Gordon's 
possession of the knives not only "facilitated" the disorderly 
conduct, it was what made his conduct disorderly in the first 
place.  It is patently obvious, based on Gordon's own testimony, 
that the knives were not merely possessed in the commission of 
the underlying crime but were actually used to commit the 
underlying crime. 
¶43 In conclusion, we hold that the closing argument 
concession by Gordon's counsel was not the functional equivalent 
of a guilty plea on the disorderly conduct while armed count, 
but, rather, was a reasonable tactical decision under the 
circumstances of this case.  The concession did not constitute 
deficient performance, and it was not prejudicial.  Nor was the 
failure to object to the absence of a Peete nexus instruction 
prejudicial, because Gordon has not demonstrated a reasonable 
No. 
01-1679-CR   
 
24 
 
probability of a different result had the instruction been 
given. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
No.  01-1679-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶44 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting).  
The defendant pled not guilty to three counts and asked for a 
jury trial.  During trial, defense counsel conceded the 
defendant's guilt to one of the counts——disorderly conduct while 
armed with a dangerous weapon——and failed to object to jury 
instructions that omitted an element of this crime.13  The mere 
statement of these simple, undisputed facts illustrates the 
flaws in the majority decision.   
¶45 The Constitution provides that the decision to plead 
guilty rests with the defendant alone.  The due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment protects against defense counsel's 
usurping that decision.14  No trial can thus be considered 
constitutionally fair when an attorney overrides the accused's 
wishes to hold the government to its burden of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt on each criminal charge.15   
¶46 I would therefore affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals.  I would conclude, as did the court of appeals, that a 
clear rule should be established that defense counsel may never 
concede guilt to any charged offense without the defendant's 
                                                 
13 The circuit court found that defense counsel's remarks 
during closing argument amounted to a concession of the 
defendant's guilt.  The court of appeals concluded that this 
finding was not clearly erroneous. 
14 Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 9 (1966) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
15 See Haynes v. Cain, 298 F.3d 375, 387 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(Parker, J., dissenting). 
No.  01-1679-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
consent.16  I would therefore remand the cause to the circuit 
court, as did the court of appeals, for an evidentiary hearing 
to determine whether the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently consented to defense counsel's concession of 
guilt.17 
¶47 I would further hold, as did the court of appeals, 
that defense counsel's failure to object to the circuit court's 
omission in instructing the jury on the nexus element was 
prejudicial error.  No trial can be considered constitutionally 
fair when a defendant who pleads not guilty is convicted without 
a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on each element of 
the crime charged.  The burden of proving guilt beyond a 
                                                 
16 See 
State 
v. 
Gordon, 
2002 
WI 
App 
53, 
¶27, 
250 
Wis. 2d 702, 641 N.W.2d 183 ("[A] defense attorney may not admit 
his client's guilt, which is contrary to his client's plea of 
not guilty, unless the defendant unequivocally understands and 
consents to the admission."); see also Heidi H. Woessner, 
Criminal Law——The Crucible of Adversarial Testing: Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel and Unauthorized Concessions of Client's 
Guilt, 24 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 315, 340 (2002) (a clear rule 
establishing that it is never reasonable for defense counsel to 
concede guilt or the absence of any reasonable doubt as to any 
charged offense without the defendant's consent is supported by 
existing notions of the collaborative nature of the attorney-
client relationship and constitutional protections surrounding 
the 
entry 
of 
guilty 
pleas; 
a 
clear 
rule 
would 
reduce 
litigation). 
17 See State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 804, 285 N.W.2d 904 
(Ct. App. 1979). 
If the defendant did not consent to defense counsel's 
concession of guilt, the court of appeals further directed the 
circuit court to give the State the opportunity to conduct a new 
trial solely on the charge of the proscribed "while armed" 
conduct or allow for resentencing without the enhancer.  Gordon, 
250 Wis. 2d 702, ¶39. 
No.  01-1679-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
reasonable doubt rests with the State and the determination of 
whether this burden has been met rests with the jury.  A 
conviction following the complete failure to instruct a jury on 
an 
essential 
element 
of 
a 
crime 
violates 
the 
accused's 
constitutional rights to due process and a jury trial, and 
cannot stand. 
I 
 
¶48 This court must adopt a clear rule that defense 
counsel may not concede a defendant's guilt to a charged offense 
without the defendant's consent.  As I will show, (A) the 
decision to plead guilty is a fundamental choice that belongs to 
the defendant alone, and because defense counsel's concession of 
guilt at trial operates as the functional equivalent of a guilty 
plea, the defendant's consent to the concession is necessary; 
(B) the majority's attempts to distinguish the concession of 
guilt in the present case from concessions of guilt that serve 
as the functional equivalent of a guilty plea do not withstand 
scrutiny; and (C) properly understood, this case is not about 
ineffective assistance of counsel, but rather, the due process 
violation that occurs when defense counsel usurps the right of a 
defendant to plead guilty personally. 
A 
¶49 The decision to plead guilty is one of the fundamental 
choices that remain squarely in the hands of the defendant at 
No.  01-1679-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
all times.18  In Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983), the 
United States Supreme Court recognized that an accused has the 
ultimate 
authority 
to 
make 
certain 
fundamental 
decisions 
regarding his case, including the decision to plead guilty.  
Moreover, in State v. Albright, 96 Wis. 2d 122, 129-30, 291 
N.W.2d 487 
(1980), 
this 
court 
explained, 
"[C]ertain 
constitutional rights of a criminal defendant are so fundamental 
that they are deemed to be personal rights which must be waived 
personally by the defendant.  In this category of personal 
rights is found the decision whether to plead guilty."19 
¶50 An accused's right to make these fundamental decisions 
personally is not abolished, diminished, or otherwise affected 
by an accused's constitutional right to counsel.  In Faretta v. 
California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975), the Supreme Court 
explained that the right to counsel is predicated on respect for 
the individual's liberty to make his own choices as to his 
defense, because ultimately, it is the individual himself who 
must bear the consequences of those choices.  "[T]he function of 
                                                 
18 Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983); Wainwright v. 
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n.1 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring); 
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).  See also 3 
Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 11.6(a) at 598 (2d 
ed. 1999) ("The Supreme Court has stated, in dictum or holding, 
that it is for the defendant to decide whether to take each of 
the following steps: plead guilty or take action tantamount to 
entering a guilty plea . . . ."). 
19 See also State v. Burns, 226 Wis. 2d 762, 771, 594 
N.W.2d 799 (1999); SCR 20:1.2(a) ("In a criminal case or any 
proceeding that could result in deprivation of liberty, the 
lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation 
with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive 
jury trial and whether the client will testify."). 
No.  01-1679-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
counsel under the Sixth Amendment is to protect the dignity and 
autonomy of a person on trial by assisting him in making choices 
that are his to make, not to make choices for him . . . ."20  
¶51 The decision to concede guilt in statements that 
amount to the functional equivalent of a guilty plea, therefore, 
must be made by the accused personally.21  Regardless of the 
strategic wisdom of conceding guilt, a defense attorney may not 
concede his client's guilt without the client's consent; an 
accused's constitutional right to plead guilty personally cannot 
                                                 
20 Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. at 759 (1983) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
21 See, e.g., Francis v. Spraggins, 720 F.2d 1190 (11th Cir. 
1983) (counsel may not concede guilt without client's consent to 
maintain credibility for the sentencing phase); Cox v. Hutto, 
589 F.2d 394, 395, 396 (8th Cir. 1979) (a defense attorney's 
stipulating to an accused's prior convictions at a jury trial on 
a habitual offender charge amounts to a waiver of the accused's 
right to have the State prove the prior offenses and the 
accused's right to rebut the State's evidence and cannot be 
accepted without consent of the defendant); People v. Hattery, 
488 N.E.2d 513 (Ill. 1986) (counsel may not concede client's 
guilt without client's consent in the hope of obtaining a more 
lenient sentence where a plea of not guilty has been entered); 
State v. Carter, 14 P.3d 1138 (Kan. 2000) (counsel's concession 
of defendant's guilt to a robbery charge is equivalent to 
entering a guilty plea and cannot be made over defendant's 
objection); State v. Moore, 458 N.W.2d 90 (Minn. 1990) (new 
trial ordered when the defense attorney's concession amounted to 
an admission that the accused "was guilty of heat-of-passion 
manslaughter" without the consent or acquiescence of the 
accused); State v. Wiplinger, 343 N.W.2d 858, 860, 861 (Minn. 
1984) (a defense attorney who indirectly admits an accused's 
guilt by asking questions of witnesses that imply that one of 
two crimes charged was, in fact, committed by the accused, 
admits guilt rising to the level of a guilty plea and requires a 
client's consent); Jones v. State, 877 P.2d 1052, 1059 (Nev. 
1994) (new trial was ordered when counsel conceded guilt during 
the 
guilt/innocence 
phase 
of 
the 
trial 
without 
client's 
consent). 
No.  01-1679-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
be stripped away in the name of trial strategy.  Under the 
Constitution, an accused's right to plead guilty personally 
trumps a defense attorney's ability to determine trial strategy. 
¶52 The majority does not deny that the decision to plead 
guilty is a fundamental choice that remains squarely in the 
hands of the defendant, not of his counsel.  The majority even 
acknowledges that defense counsel in this case conceded guilt to 
the charge of disorderly conduct while armed.22  The majority, 
however, rejects the defendant's claim that the concession of 
guilt amounted to the functional equivalent of a guilty plea.  
According to the majority, the concession of guilt here was 
merely a "reasonable tactical approach"23 and therefore the 
defendant's consent was unnecessary.24    
¶53 Defense counsel need not utter the words "the accused 
pleads guilty" and then cease to participate further in the 
trial in order for his words or actions to serve as the 
"functional equivalent of a guilty plea."  Rather, words or 
actions by defense counsel amount to the functional equivalent 
of a guilty plea when they effectively undermine those rights 
                                                 
22 Majority op., ¶26. 
23 Id. 
24 The Wisconsin Rules of Professional Conduct make it clear 
that even those strategic or tactical decisions that are within 
the province of an attorney are to be made after consultation 
with the client.  See SCR 20:1.2 (a lawyer shall abide by a 
client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation 
and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they 
are pursued); SCR 20:1.4(b) (a lawyer shall explain a matter to 
the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make 
informed decisions regarding the representation).  
No.  01-1679-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
that are asserted when a defendant pleads not guilty and elects 
to be tried before a jury.25   
¶54 When the defendant here pled not guilty, he exercised 
his right to make a statement in open court that he intended to 
hold the State to the strict standard of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt as to each of the offenses charged.26  Moreover, 
when the defendant pled not guilty and also asserted his right 
to a jury trial, he exercised his right to have a unanimous jury 
verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on each of the 
offenses charged.27  
¶55 Despite the defendant's not guilty plea in the present 
case, defense counsel said to the jury, "[T]here is no doubt, 
there is no question" that at the moment the defendant was shot 
his conduct provided sufficient grounds to arrest him for 
disorderly conduct while armed.  Defense counsel continued: 
"Obviously, running around the neighborhood with two knives is 
disorderly conduct and it is disorderly conduct while armed."  
Moreover, defense counsel concluded his closing argument at 
                                                 
25 See, e.g., Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 7 (1966) (defense 
counsel's decision to agree to a prima facie trial, in which the 
State's burden of proof is lowered and the defense is not 
allowed to present evidence or cross-examine witnesses, held to 
be the functional equivalent of a guilty plea); Wiley v. 
Sowders, 647 F.2d 642, 649-50 (6th Cir. 1981) (counsel's 
admission of guilt in closing argument constituted a surrender 
of the sword and cannot be overlooked as trial strategy). 
26 Nixon v. Singletary, 758 So. 2d 618, 623 (Fla. 2000) 
(citing Byrd v. United States, 342 F.2d 939, 941 (D.C. Cir. 
1965)). 
27 State v. Lomagro, 113 Wis. 2d 582, 588-89, 335 N.W.2d 583 
(1983). 
No.  01-1679-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
trial, in which his client was charged with three crimes, by 
stating, "I'm asking you folks to acquit [the defendant] on the 
first and the third charges.  Thank you."  The charge on which 
defense counsel did not ask for an acquittal was disorderly 
conduct while armed. 
¶56 Defense counsel, by stating that the defendant was, in 
fact, running around the neighborhood with knives and that his 
actions "obviously" constituted disorderly conduct while armed, 
essentially told the jurors that he was agreeing with the State 
that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged.  Moreover, 
defense counsel drove the point home when he requested that the 
jury acquit the defendant on two charges, but not on the charge 
of disorderly conduct. 
¶57 The only logical conclusion that can be drawn from 
this concession is that it served as the functional equivalent 
of a guilty plea.  Defense counsel's concession of guilt toppled 
the defendant's plea of not guilty.28  Defense counsel folded up 
the tents and waved the white flag to the disorderly conduct 
while armed charge, signaling to the jury that the State had met 
its burden of proof and the defendant was in fact guilty.  
Defense counsel's complete concession of the defendant's guilt 
thereby compromised the adversarial process and nullified the 
defendant's right to a jury trial,29 eradicating the State's 
                                                 
28 See 
Wiley, 
647 
F.2d 
at 
650 
("Unquestionably, 
the 
constitutional right of a criminal defendant to plead 'not 
guilty,' or perhaps more accurately not to plead guilty, entails 
the obligation of his attorney to structure the trial of the 
case around his client's plea."). 
29 Wiley, 647 F.2d at 650. 
No.  01-1679-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the 
disorderly conduct while armed charge.30  The effect of the 
concession was substantially the same as the effect of a guilty 
plea would have been.  Indeed, at the State's closing rebuttal 
argument, after the concession was made, the State made no 
mention of the disorderly conduct charge and focused only on the 
other two charges.   
B 
¶58 The majority concludes, in a single paragraph, that 
the concession in this case did not amount to the functional 
equivalent of a guilty plea because it did not serve to waive 
any of the rights that are sacrificed by a typical guilty plea.  
According to the majority, the concession of guilt had no effect 
on the defendant's right to a jury trial, his right to cross-
examine the State's witnesses, his right to testify in his own 
defense, and his right to have a unanimous jury verdict of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.31   
¶59 The majority is simply wrong in its conclusion.  A 
defendant cannot be considered to have exercised these rights 
when defense counsel concedes the defendant's guilt.   
                                                 
30 See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984) 
("The right to the effective assistance of counsel is thus the 
right of the accused to require the prosecution's case to 
survive 
the 
crucible 
of 
meaningful 
adversarial 
testing . . . [I]f 
the 
process 
loses 
its 
character 
as 
a 
confrontation between adversaries, the constitutional guarantee 
is violated."); see also Nixon, 758 So. 2d at 623 (an attorney's 
statement amounted to the functional equivalent of a guilty plea 
because it removed the strict burden on the State to prove the 
accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt). 
31 Majority op., ¶24. 
No.  01-1679-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
¶60 The defendant's not guilty plea entitled the defendant 
to have the issue of his guilt presented to the jury as an 
adversarial issue in which the State bears the burden of proving 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.32  Without an adversarial 
process in which guilt is actually contested, the role of the 
jury is perfunctory; deliberations become a charade.  There is 
simply no way to know in this case whether the jury's 
determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt resulted from 
the weight of the evidence presented or from the concession 
itself.33  It seems safe to conclude, however, that regardless of 
the evidence, no rational jury would reach a not guilty verdict 
when both parties agree that the defendant is guilty.  If a 
defendant cannot convince his own attorney to argue his 
innocence at trial, there is virtually no likelihood that a jury 
would find him not guilty.  The concession of guilt rendered the 
unanimous verdict of guilt to the charge of disorderly conduct 
while armed a foregone conclusion.  
¶61 The majority further concludes that the concession in 
this case does not amount to the functional equivalent of a 
guilty plea because (1) it was made with regard to only one of 
                                                 
32 See Nixon, 758 So. 2d at 625 ("In every criminal case, a 
defense attorney can, at the very least, hold the State to its 
burden of proof by clearly articulating to the jury or fact-
finder that the State must establish each element of the crime 
charged and that a conviction can only be based upon proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt."). 
33 See Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 85 (1983)("An 
erroneous presumption on a disputed element of the crime renders 
irrelevant the evidence on the issue because the jury may have 
relied upon the presumption rather than upon evidence."). 
No.  01-1679-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
three charges the defendant faced, not all of the charges; (2) 
the 
concession 
was 
made 
during 
closing 
argument 
after 
adversarial 
testing 
of 
the 
evidence, 
not 
during 
opening 
argument; (3) the defendant did not contemporaneously object to 
the concession; and (4) the defendant's testimony did not 
conflict with the concession.34  In at least one of these four 
ways, asserts the majority, this case is different from other 
cases in which a defense counsel's concession of guilt was held 
to amount to the functional equivalent of a guilty plea.35 
¶62 These reasons, however, do not withstand scrutiny.   
First, the fact that defense counsel conceded guilt to only one 
of many charges is irrelevant.  The Constitution does not grant 
an accused the right to plead guilty only to all or none of the 
charges he or she faces.  Rather, the right to plead is personal 
                                                 
34 Majority op., ¶27. 
35 Id.  But see United States v. Simone, 931 F.2d 1186, 1197 
(7th Cir. 1991), in which the court stated:  
We do not approve of a defense counsel's deliberate, 
explicit admission that a jury should find his client 
guilty of a charge in the absence of any suggestion 
that the defendant concurred in the decision to 
proceed in such a manner.  However, in the case before 
us, 
[the 
defendant's] 
attorney 
intentionally 
stipulated facts and conceded those charges for which 
there 
was 
unrefutable 
evidence and no 
mandatory 
sentences, but forcefully argued [the defendant's] 
innocence on the charges with heavier penalties, as 
part of a trial strategy.  It was a reasonable plan 
that was evident from the beginning of the trial.  At 
no time did the defendant object to it; in fact, we 
believe he chose or at least condoned the tactics.  
Our position was reinforced by [the defendant's] post-
trial letter to the sentencing judge which provided 
ample evidence of his approval of the strategy. 
No.  01-1679-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
to the accused as to each charge.  Defense counsel, in this 
case, admitted guilt on one criminal charge.  The State was thus 
not put to its burden of proof with respect to that charge as 
the defendant's plea of not guilty required.   
¶63 Second, the fact that defense counsel conceded guilt 
during closing argument and not opening argument is also 
irrelevant.  The Constitution does not restrict when an accused 
may plead guilty.  An accused does not lose his "ultimate 
authority" over the decision to plead guilty simply because a 
jury has been impaneled. 
¶64 The majority might be suggesting that a concession 
during closing argument is different than a concession during 
opening argument because the defendant has exercised some of his 
trial rights, such as the right to cross-examine witnesses, call 
witnesses on his own behalf, and if he so chooses, testify in 
his own defense.  The ability to exercise some rights, however, 
does not make up for the fact that other rights were violated.  
The fact remains that the effect of the concession at either 
time is to take away the defendant's right to a jury trial, 
whereby his guilt is decided through an adversarial process in 
which the State bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and his right to a unanimous jury verdict. 
¶65 In making the distinction between a concession of 
guilt to all charges as opposed to only one of many charges and 
between a concession of guilt during opening argument as opposed 
to closing argument, the majority mistakes reasons why it may be 
strategically wise to concede guilt for reasons why a concession 
No.  01-1679-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
of guilt should not be considered the functional equivalent of a 
guilty plea.  It might make very good tactical sense to concede 
guilt to the least serious of many charges in order to maintain 
credibility with the jury and enhance the prospects of acquittal 
on the more serious charges, and it might make even better sense 
to wait to concede guilt until all of the evidence has been 
presented and challenged before deciding whether it appears 
overwhelming.  That a concession would be strategically wise, 
however, does not make it a "tactical" decision that may be made 
without the defendant's consent.36   
¶66 It may be strategically wise to plead guilty following 
a preliminary hearing at which the State produces an airtight 
confession and corroborating physical evidence, but it still 
remains the decision of the accused alone whether to go to 
trial.  The right to make that decision does not disappear just 
because the State successfully introduces that confession and 
physical evidence during trial and defense counsel realizes that 
there is no legitimate defense to be made.  
¶67 The other two distinctions drawn by the majority are 
also irrelevant.  The fact that the defendant did not object to 
the concession and that the defendant's testimony comported with 
the concession address only whether the defendant consented to 
                                                 
36 See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656 n.19 ("If there is no bona 
fide defense to the charge, counsel may disserve the interests 
of his client by attempting a useless charade.  At the same 
time, even when no theory of defense is available, if the 
decision to stand trial has been made, counsel must hold the 
prosecution to its heavy burden of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt.") (citations omitted). 
No.  01-1679-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
defense counsel's concession, not whether the concession amounts 
to the functional equivalent of a guilty plea.  Moreover, an 
accused's consent cannot be inferred from his failure to object 
to counsel's concession of guilt or from his own testimony.     
¶68 The defendant's failure to stand up at trial and 
object to defense counsel's closing argument is insufficient to 
constitute consent to defense counsel's conduct.  Courts must 
"indulge 
every 
reasonable 
presumption 
against 
waiver 
of 
fundamental constitutional rights" and should not "presume 
acquiescence in the loss" of those rights.37  The Constitution 
requires that there must be an affirmative showing, or an 
"allegation and evidence which shows," that a guilty plea was 
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made.38  Thus, a silent 
record cannot form the basis upon which we determine whether a 
guilty plea is knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made.39   
¶69 Similarly, the defendant's testimony stating facts 
that support a finding of disorderly conduct while armed does 
                                                 
37 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (citations 
omitted). 
38 State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 257, 389 N.W.2d 12 
(1986) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969)). 
39 See, e.g., Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-43 (extending Carnley 
v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962), to hold that a silent 
record is insufficient to determine whether a guilty plea is 
knowingly and voluntarily made); State v. Armstrong, 223 
Wis. 2d 331, 348, 588 N.W.2d 606 (1999) ("This court has always 
set high standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional 
rights, . . . "); 
State 
v. 
Albright, 
96 
Wis. 2d 122, 
291 
N.W.2d 487 (1980) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (waiver should 
not be presumed from silence as it is unrealistic to expect a 
defendant to stand and openly oppose counsel over decision on 
whether to testify). 
No.  01-1679-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
not amount to consent to defense counsel's concession of guilt.  
The defendant told his story after pleading not guilty.  He 
never changed his plea, and it is absurd to conclude that 
factual 
admissions 
made 
under 
cross-examination 
by 
the 
prosecutor amounted to a change of plea.  The Constitution does 
not permit a directed verdict of guilty, even when the 
prosecution's evidence is uncontradicted or the evidence is 
overwhelming, since to do so improperly invades the province of 
the jury.40  Therefore, the Constitution cannot consider a 
defendant to have waived his right to a jury trial and his right 
to a unanimous verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt simply 
by testifying to facts that support a finding of guilt. 
C 
¶70 Because the majority erroneously characterizes the 
concession of guilt as a mere tactical decision left to defense 
counsel, not the defendant, it subjects defense counsel's 
actions to the test for ineffective assistance of counsel 
announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  The 
majority concludes that the tactical decision was reasonable in 
light of the defendant's own testimony and therefore did not 
constitute 
deficient 
performance. 
 
Moreover, 
writes 
the 
majority, even if the attorney's performance was deficient, the 
                                                 
40 See Edwards v. United States, 286 F.2d 681, 683 (5th Cir. 
1960) ("No matter how conclusive the evidence, a court may not 
direct a verdict of guilt."); see also State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 
93, ¶20, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189 ("[A] judge 'may not 
direct a verdict for the State, no matter how overwhelming the 
evidence.'") (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 
(1993)). 
No.  01-1679-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
defendant suffered no prejudice since there was "no way in the 
world that the jury was going to acquit" on the disorderly 
conduct while armed count.41 
¶71 Questions 
of 
deficient 
performance, 
however, 
are 
irrelevant to our inquiry.  "Strickland does not provide the 
appropriate framework for analyzing this case. . . . [T]his case 
raises a much broader concern that goes to the very core of what 
the Sixth Amendment means and asks us to address important 
questions involving due process and the right to a fair trial."42   
¶72 A defense attorney's concession of guilt to one of 
many charges may be the smartest, best, and most effective trial 
strategy possible, and the defense attorney's performance, in 
that sense, may not be deficient.43  Yet the question presented 
in this case is one of due process and fair trial:  Who has the 
                                                 
41 Majority op., ¶30.  Of course, "no way the jury would 
acquit" is not the standard to be applied.  As the majority 
opinion explains, the test is whether the "result is reliable," 
majority op., ¶22 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687 (1984)), that is, whether the attorney's deficient 
performance "undermine[s] confidence in the outcome."  Majority 
op., ¶23 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390-91).  
The test is not simply whether an appellate court weighing the 
evidence in hindsight determines that the jury would have 
convicted the defendant regardless of the error.  
42 Haynes, 298 F.3d at 385 (Parker, J., dissenting). 
43 See, e.g., 
Haynes, 
298 
F.3d 
at 387 
(Parker, J., 
dissenting) ("Trial counsel's decision to concede Haynes' guilt 
on the second degree murder charge was probably a wise move.  
However, this point is absolutely irrelevant to the issue before 
us.  The Constitution mandates that the decision to concede 
guilt on a lesser charge must be made by the accused, not his 
attorney, regardless of how difficult it may be for the attorney 
to mount a defense on all charges."). 
No.  01-1679-CR.ssa 
 
17 
 
right to decide whether to concede guilt and effectively remove 
the State's burden to convince a jury to unanimously find guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused or the accused's lawyer?  
¶73 When the question is presented in this way, stripped 
down to its essentials and basics, the answer is well-settled 
constitutional law.  As we explained previously and as the 
majority opinion concedes, the due process clause guarantees 
that only an accused, not defense counsel, has the right to 
enter a guilty plea.44  Only an accused has the right to decide 
whether to make concessions in open court that amount to the 
functional equivalent of a guilty plea.  And if the defense 
attorney does so without the accused's consent, the conviction 
must be vacated for a violation of due process.   
¶74 The Constitution does not forbid a defense attorney 
from strategically conceding guilt to a charge at trial.  The 
Constitution does require, however, that a defense attorney 
obtain the consent of his client before conceding guilt in terms 
that amount to the functional equivalent of a guilty plea. 
II 
¶75 The defendant in the present case was not once, but 
twice denied his right to a constitutionally fair trial on the 
charge of disorderly conduct while armed.  As the majority 
explains, when an accused is alleged to have possessed a 
                                                 
44 Nixon, 758 So. 2d at 625 ("Although the attorney can make 
some tactical decisions, the ultimate choice as to which 
direction to sail is left up to the defendant.  The question is 
not whether the route taken was correct; rather, the question is 
whether [the defendant] approved of the course."). 
No.  01-1679-CR.ssa 
 
18 
 
dangerous weapon in the commission of a crime for purposes of 
the "while armed" penalty enhancer, the circuit court is 
required to give a Peete nexus instruction, instructing the jury 
that it must find that the dangerous weapon facilitated the 
underling crime.45  In the present case, however, after defense 
counsel conceded the defendant's guilt to disorderly conduct 
while armed, the circuit court failed to give the Peete nexus 
instruction for the State's charge of disorderly conduct while 
armed and defense counsel did not object. 
¶76 It is clear that an accused's constitutional rights 
are violated if a jury has not been instructed on every element 
of an offense.46  The Due Process Clause demands that no criminal 
defendant be convicted at trial except upon proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime 
with which he or she is charged.47  The burden of proving each 
and every element rests on the State; the determination as to 
whether this burden has been met as to each and every element 
rests with the jury.  Therefore, a "proper jury instruction is a 
crucial component of the fact-finding process."48 
                                                 
45 Majority op., ¶31. 
46 State v. Tomlinson, 2002 WI 91, ¶¶56-57, 254 Wis. 2d 502, 
648 N.W.2d 367; Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶¶18-23, 29; State v. 
Perkins, 2001 WI 46, ¶40, 243 Wis. 2d 141, 626 N.W.2d 762; State 
v. Howard, 211 Wis. 2d 269, ¶47, 564 N.W.2d 753 (1997); State v. 
Avila, 192 Wis. 2d 870, ¶9, 532 N.W.2d 423 (1995). 
47 Howard, 211 Wis. 2d 269, ¶45 (citing In re Winship, 397 
U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). 
48 Id., ¶46 (citing State v. Schultz, 102 Wis. 2d 423, 426, 
307 N.W.2d 151 (1981)). 
No.  01-1679-CR.ssa 
 
19 
 
¶77 It is also clear under Wisconsin law that harmless 
error analysis does not apply to an erroneous jury instruction 
that 
omits 
an 
element 
of 
the 
offense. 
This 
court 
has 
consistently held that a circuit court's failure to instruct a 
jury on an essential element of a crime is fundamentally unfair 
and cannot be harmless error.  See State v. Perkins, 2001 WI 46, 
243 
Wis. 2d 141, 
626 
N.W.2d 762, 
State 
v. 
Howard, 
211 
Wis. 2d 269, 564 N.W.2d 753 (1997), and State v. Avila, 192 
Wis. 2d 870, 532 N.W.2d 423 (1995).49 
¶78 The majority acknowledges that the jury instruction in 
the present case was error.50  The majority overrules clear 
Wisconsin precedent, however, and concludes that the failure to 
instruct the jury on an essential element of the crime is 
                                                 
49 Perkins, 243 Wis. 2d 141, ¶53 (Wilcox, J., concurring, 
joined by Crooks, J.) ("[W]here jury instructions are devoid of 
explanation regarding an element of an alleged offense, the 
instructions effectively preclude the jury from rendering a 
verdict on that element.  In such circumstances, there can be no 
jury verdict on that particular element and, therefore, harmless 
error analysis——which analyzes cases in terms of the jury 
verdict——is 
inapplicable."); 
Howard, 
211 
Wis. 2d 269, 
¶51 
(follows Avila in holding that when a court fails to instruct a 
jury on an essential element of a crime there is an automatic 
reversal of the verdict); Avila, 192 Wis. 2d at 893a (concludes 
that "[w]hen a jury does not make a finding of guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt on an element of the crime, a court cannot 
conclude that a deficient jury instruction with regard to that 
element is harmless error"). 
50 Majority op., ¶32. 
No.  01-1679-CR.ssa 
 
20 
 
subject to harmless error review.51  According to the majority, 
this court's decisions in Howard and Avila "cannot survive our 
decision last term in Harvey."52   
¶79 In Harvey, as the majority points out, this court 
applied 
harmless 
error 
review 
to 
a 
particular 
type 
of 
instructional error in which the jury instruction improperly 
operated as a mandatory conclusive presumption on an element of 
a penalty enhancer.  Yet the majority concludes that Harvey 
nonetheless governs this case as well since there is "no 
meaningful way" to distinguish an instruction that erroneously 
includes a mandatory conclusive presumption from an instruction 
that erroneously omits an element of the offense.53   
¶80 I disagree that there is no meaningful distinction 
between the instructional error at issue in Harvey and the 
instructional error at issue in the present case.  Harvey, its 
companion case, State v. Tomlinson, 2002 WI 91, 254 Wis. 2d 502, 
648 N.W.2d 367, and the federal case on which it relied, Neder 
v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999), all involved fact patterns 
                                                 
51 Id., ¶34.  When discussing the harmless error standard, 
the majority simply repeats verbatim its discussion in Harvey 
without taking into account the nuances of that standard that 
have been expressed in recent opinions of this court.  See, 
e.g., 
State 
v. 
Vanmanivong, 
2003 
WI 
41, 
¶¶41-49, 
261 
Wis. 2d 202, 661 N.W.2d 76; State v. Carlson, 2003 WI 40, ¶¶85-
87, 261 Wis. 2d 97, 661 N.W.2d 51 (Sykes, J., dissenting); id., 
¶51 n.1 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).  
52 Majority op., ¶34 (referring to Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442).  
The majority also overturns, without admitting as much, Perkins, 
243 Wis. 2d 141.  
53 Majority op., ¶40. 
No.  01-1679-CR.ssa 
 
21 
 
in which the trial court found for itself an element of the 
crime, erroneously taking the element away from the jury.  In 
the present case, by contrast, the jury received no instruction 
whatsoever on an essential element of the crime, and the circuit 
court made no finding on the element either. 
¶81 In Neder, the accused was charged with violating 
federal criminal statutes penalizing fraud.  Among the elements 
of the crimes with which he was charged was that any false 
statements made had to be material to the perpetration of fraud.  
Instead of instructing the jury on materiality, the trial court 
told the jurors that the question of materiality was not a 
question for the jury to decide.54  The trial court explained to 
the jury that "it 'need not consider' the materiality of any 
false statements 'even though that language is used in the 
indictment.'"55  The Neder jury was aware that materiality was 
necessary for a finding of guilt.  The jury simply was led to 
believe that the trial court would make the finding at a 
subsequent stage of the trial.56 
                                                 
54 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 6 (1999). 
55 Id. 
56 The trial court did ultimately make that finding.  Neder, 
527 U.S. at 6 ("The court . . . subsequently found, outside the 
presence of the jury, that the evidence established the 
materiality of all the false statements at issue.").   
The conclusions of law made in Neder are, at times, stated 
more broadly than its facts.  For example, despite addressing an 
instruction that took an element away from the jury, the Neder 
decision states that the "conclusion that the omission of an 
element is subject to harmless-error analysis is consistent 
with" prior case law.  Neder, 527 U.S. at 10. 
No.  01-1679-CR.ssa 
 
22 
 
¶82 In both Harvey and Tomlinson, the circuit court 
improperly told the jurors that one of the elements of the crime 
had already been decided for them and then offered that element 
to the jury for inclusion in its deliberations as a mandatory 
conclusive presumption.  As in Neder, the jurors knew about the 
element and knew that the trial court had, in effect, made a 
finding that the evidence satisfied the element. 
¶83 By contrast, in the case at hand, no instruction on 
the nexus element was given at all, and neither the court nor 
the jury was ever expressly asked to decide the nexus element.  
The jurors remained unaware throughout their deliberations that 
for the defendant to be convicted of disorderly conduct while 
armed, the knives must have facilitated his disorderly conduct.  
The defendant in the present case was convicted of the 
"dangerous weapon" penalty enhancer without any finding by 
either a court or a jury that each of the elements of that crime 
was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
¶84 Wisconsin harmless error law clearly distinguishes 
between an erroneous instruction, as in Neder, Harvey, and 
Tomlinson, and an instruction that omits an essential element, 
as in Avila, Howard, and Perkins.  Harmless error analysis 
applies to an erroneous instruction but does not apply to the 
complete absence of an essential instruction.  The Howard court 
explained: 
[I]f the circuit court fails to instruct a jury about 
an essential element of the crime and the jury must 
find that element beyond a reasonable doubt, there is 
an automatic reversal of the verdict.  If, however, 
there is some instruction on that element, albeit 
No.  01-1679-CR.ssa 
 
23 
 
erroneous, and the jury is told that the element must 
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then the analysis 
is one of harmless error.57 
¶85 In short, Harvey does not demand that we overturn 
well-established Wisconsin law.  Moreover, the majority does not 
offer any other reason for overturning Avila, Howard, and 
Perkins.  This court does not overturn precedent unless there is 
strong 
justification, 
namely 
when 
precedent 
has 
become 
detrimental to coherence and consistency in the law.58  Avila, 
Howard, and Perkins have served Wisconsin well and remain 
coherent and consistent with the Constitution.  As Justice 
Wilcox explained in Perkins, if a court were to uphold a 
conviction when the jury was not instructed on an essential 
element of the charge, it would "in effect" be "upholding a 
directed verdict in favor of the State" and "to do so would 
violate [the accused's] constitutional rights to due process and 
a jury trial . . . a result [that] is strictly forbidden."59  
¶86 For the reasons set forth, I dissent. 
                                                 
57 Howard, 
211 
Wis. 2d 269, 
¶51 
(citing 
Avila, 
192 
Wis. 2d at 893a). 
58 State v. Outagamie County Bd. of Adjustment, 2001 WI 78, 
¶29, 
244 
Wis. 2d 613, 
628 
N.W.2d 376 
(internal 
citations 
omitted). 
59 Perkins, 243 Wis. 2d 141, ¶58. 
No.  01-1679-CR.ssa 
 
24 
 
¶87 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissent.  
 
 
 
 
 
No.  01-1679-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1