Case Title: State of New Jersey v. James Badessa

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-94-04

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2005-11-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). On July 20, 2003, the Ventnor City Police Department established a sobriety checkpoint. The supervisor of the checkpoint directed his officers to stop any vehicle making a turn within the checkpoint zone. The defendant here, James Badessa, passed the sign that read, DWI Checkpoint, made a left turn, and was stopped. The officer who stopped Badessa observed that his eyes were glassy and his speech slurred. Badessa said he had two glasses of wine. Badessa then failed two of three psycho-physical tests and was arrested for driving while under the influence (DWI). At police headquarters, Badessa refused to take the breathalyzer test and was issued summonses for DWI and refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test. The municipal court judge denied Badessa s motion to suppress based on the claim of an illegal stop, acquitted Badessa of DWI , and convicted him of refusal to take the breathalyzer test. The Law Division upheld Badessa s refusal conviction. On further appeal, the Appellate Division held that the DWI checkpoint zone failed to provide adequate warning to motorists that a turn would provide cause for a stop but that Badessa s refusal to submit to the breathalyzer test was an independent act free of any taint from the invalid stop and affirmed Badessa s refusal conviction. This Court granted Badessa s petition for certification. The State did not cross-petition to contest the Appellate Division s finding that the police unconstitutionally stopped the car. HELD: The police officer s observations at the scene of the illegal stop were necessary to prove an essential element of refusal to take the breathalyzer test. Because the evidence must be suppressed, the State cannot prove a violation of the refusal statute. 1. The Appellate Division determined that the stop of the car was unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution. To ensure that motorists are informed of what is expected of them when entering into a DWI checkpoint zone spanning intersecting roads, we suggest that police post signs that instruct motorists that they must proceed to the checkpoint, for example: PROCEED TO CHECKPOINT; NO TURNS PERMITTED. The finding that the stop of the car was unconstitutional has not been challenged in this appeal. We decide solely whether the evidence gathered by the police after the invalid stop was properly admitted. (p.8) 2. Even evidence indirectly acquired by the police through a constitutional violation is subject to suppression. However, the exclusionary rule will not apply when the connection between the unconstitutional police action and the evidence becomes so attenuated as to dissipate the taint from unlawful conduct. (p.10) 3. To determine whether there is sufficient attenuation to purge the unconstitutional taint from evidence offered by the State, we look to three factors: (1) the temporal proximity between the illegal conduct and the challenged evidence; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the police misconduct. In a breathalyzer refusal trial, the State must establish (1) the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that defendant had been operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol; (2) defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated; and (3) defendant refused to submit to a breathalyzer test. (pp. 11-12) 4. Here, the challenged evidence sprang directly from the illegal stop. It was immediately after the unconstitutional stop that the officer made his observations of Badessa s glassy eyes, slurred speech, and unsteady gait; that he smelled an odor of alcohol; and that he learned from Badessa that he had been drinking. That information was a direct fruit of the constitutional violation. The officer s testimony was necessary to prove an essential element of the refusal statute. We cannot subscribe to the State s position that a breathalyzer refusal and DWI are distinct for the purposes of an exclusionary rule analysis. DWI and refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test are part of a comprehensive statutory scheme and may be viewed as two sides of the same statutory coin. The facts necessary to prosecute those two offenses are inextricably intertwined. (pp. 12-13) 5. The Appellate Division found that because the exclusionary rule does not apply to resisting arrest or eluding the police following an illegal search or detention, the rule should not apply to a refusal charge. We do not find comparable this refusal case and a case involving the commission of a new crime that directly threatens public safety, such as resisting arrest or eluding the police. (pp. 14-15) 6. In conclusion, the police officer s observations at the scene of the illegal stop were necessary to prove an essential element of refusal to take the breathalyzer test. Because that evidence must be suppressed, the State cannot prove a violation of the refusal statute. (p.16). The judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter REMANDED to the Law Division for the entry of an order consistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and ASSOCIATE JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, WALLACE and RIVERA-SOTO join in JUSTICE ALBIN s opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 94 September Term 2004 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JAMES BADESSA, Defendant-Appellant. Argued September 13, 2005 Decided November 10, 2005 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 373 N.J. Super. 84 (2004). Louis M. Barbone argued the cause for appellant (Jacobs & Barbone, attorneys). Boris Moczula, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Peter C. Harvey, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue before us is whether evidence gathered by the police after an unconstitutional motor vehicle stop should have been excluded in a prosecution for refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test. In this case, after the unlawful stop, a police officer made observations that gave him probable cause to believe the car s driver was under the influence of alcohol. Based on those observations, the officer requested that the driver submit to the breathalyzer test. The driver refused to take the test and was charged under the refusal statute, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a. He then moved to suppress all evidence, including the officer s observations, obtained following the motor vehicle stop. At a municipal court trial and again at a trial de novo in the Superior Court, Law Division, the driver s suppression motions were denied, the evidence was admitted, and the driver convicted of refusing to submit to the breathalyzer test. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, concluding that the exclusionary rule did not require suppressing evidence garnered from the unconstitutional stop. We disagree and therefore reverse. [N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a.] Thus, the State must establish that (1) the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that defendant had been operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol; (2) defendant was arrested for driving while intoxicated; and (3) defendant refused to submit to a breathalyzer test. State v. Wright, 107 N.J. 488, 490 (1987). Recently, we decided that the State must prove the statutory elements of a defendant s refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test beyond a reasonable doubt, which is the standard governing other quasi-criminal offenses prosecuted in municipal court. State v. Cummings, 184 N.J. 84, 94-96 (2005). The State concedes that evidence obtained as a result of an unconstitutional vehicular stop must be suppressed in a DWI prosecution. The State allows that in such a case the police officer s observations as well as the breathalyzer results would not be admissible to prove that a defendant was under the influence. The State, however, would permit the police observations suppressed in a DWI trial to be admitted in a refusal trial to prove that the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that defendant had been operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. Wright, supra, 107 N.J. at 490. When dealing with DWI and refusal prosecutions, we fail to see the consistency in that approach. Here, in both time and place, the challenged evidence sprang directly from the illegal conduct. See Johnson, supra, 118 N.J. at 653. It was immediately after the unconstitutional stop that Officer O Neill made his observations of defendant s glassy eyes, slurred speech, and unsteady gait; that he smelled an odor of alcohol; and that he learned from defendant that he had been drinking. The acquisition of that information was a direct fruit of the constitutional violation. Officer O Neill s testimony on that forbidden subject was necessary to prove an essential element of the refusal statute. Because that testimony should not have been admissible in the refusal trial, the State could not prove its case. Under the present circumstances, we cannot subscribe to the State s position that a breathalyzer refusal and DWI are distinct for purposes of an exclusionary rule analysis. DWI and refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test are part of a comprehensive statutory scheme contained in N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 to -51, and may be viewed as two sides of the same statutory coin. The facts necessary to prosecute those two offenses are inextricably intertwined. After all, to secure a refusal conviction, the State must prove that the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that the person had been driving while under the influence and was placed under arrest for DWI. N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a. The principal purpose of a police officer advising a driver about the penalties that flow from refusing to take the breathalyzer test is to impel the driver to take the test so that the State will have the evidence necessary to prosecute a DWI charge. See Wright, supra, 107 N.J. at 504 ( The purpose of the refusal statute is to encourage all suspected drunk drivers to take the breathalyzer test. ); see also State v. Conners, 125 N.J. Super. 500, 510 (Cty. Ct. 1973) ( The purpose of the sanction portion of the [refusal] statute was to persuade every driver to submit to the test to eliminate any guesswork in determining the degree of intoxication. (citing Public Hearings on Senate Bills Nos. 8 & 9, vol. II at 18a (1966))), aff d, 129 N.J. Super. 476 (App. Div. 1974). Accordingly, the refusal statute and its severe penalties are directly related to the enforcement of the DWI statute. The State accepts that had defendant taken the breathalyzer test, the exclusionary rule would have compelled suppression of the test results. Thus, defendant s refusal to take the test did not deprive the State of evidence that might have been used in a DWI case. The State concedes that under the law the loss of the DWI prosecution is a necessary cost and consequence of the exclusionary rule. We do not see why the same logic and outcome should not apply to the refusal prosecution. The Appellate Division found that because the exclusionary rule does not apply to resisting arrest or eluding the police following an illegal search or detention, the rule should not apply to a refusal charge. We do not find comparable this refusal case and a case involving the commission of a new crime that directly threatens public safety, such as resisting arrest or eluding the police. See State v. Casimono, 250 N.J. Super. 173, 182-85 (App. Div. 1991) (resisting arrest), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 558 (1992), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 924, 112 S. Ct. 1978, 118 L. Ed. 2d 577 (1992); State v. Seymour, 289 N.J. Super. 80, 86-87 (App. Div. 1996) (eluding police). Here, the act of refusal in no way endangered the safety of the police officer. Unlike this case, in State v. Casimono, supra, the defendant s improper detention by the State Police did not warrant the exclusion of evidence of his resisting arrest because the defendant had committed an entirely new crime that placed the officers in physical danger. 250 N.J. Super. at 183-84. In Casimono, supra, the defendant s physical confrontation with the troopers created a high potential for causing injury to the officers, leading the court to conclude that the need to protect the troopers safety outweighed whatever marginal deterrent to police misconduct might be provided by immunizing defendant s actions from criminal liability. Id. at 184. In those circumstances, the commission of a new crime was an intervening act that marked the point at which the detrimental consequences of illegal police action [became] so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifie[d] its cost. Id. at 185 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Seymour, supra, 289 N.J. Super. at 86-87 (holding that even if police did not have reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop defendant s vehicle, endangering public by eluding police at high speeds was sufficient intervening act to purge taint of earlier unconstitutional action). In conclusion, in the present matter the police officer s observations at the scene of the illegal stop of defendant s car were necessary to prove an essential element of refusal to take the breathalyzer test. Because that evidence must be suppressed, the State cannot prove a violation of the refusal statute. We see no reason to make an exception to the exclusionary rule in this case when the facts and policy concerns are sufficiently distinct from those in Casimono, supra, and Seymour, supra. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and ASSOCIATE JUSTICES LONG, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, WALLACE and RIVERA-SOTO join in JUSTICE ALBIN s opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY NO. A-94 SEPTEMBER TERM 2004 ON CERTIFICATION TO Appellate Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JAMES BADESSA, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED November 10, 2005 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Albin CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINIONS BY DISSENTING OPINION BY