Case Title: Clouse v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89-96

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1991-04-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Clouse v. State1991 WY 56809 P.2d 791Case Number: 89-96, 89-97Decided: 04/19/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
Leonard Dean CLOUSE, 
Appellant (Defendant),

v.

STATE of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff). (Two Cases)

Appeal from the District 
Court, ParkCounty, Hunter, Patrick, 
J.

Affirmed.

Thomas, J., filed a concurring 
opinion.

Leonard D. Munker, State 
Public Defender, Steven E. Weerts, Sr. Asst. Public Defender, and David Gosar 
(argued), Appellate Counsel, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. 
Gen., Sylvia L. Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., 
Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance Program, and David J. Huss 
(argued), Student Intern, for appellee.

Before URBIGKIT, C.J., 
and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

CARDINE, Justice.

[¶1.]     eonard Dean Clouse 
challenges the sentences he received for his armed robberies to which he pled 
guilty in ParkCounty.

[¶2.]     We remand Issue I and 
affirm Issue II.

[¶3.]     Clouse raises two 
issues:

"I. Does the oral 
pronouncement of sentence control the written judgment and sentence?

"II. Is appellant 
entitled to specific performance of the `plea proposal' offered by 
ParkCounty because he pled guilty in CampbellCounty in reliance on this 
arrangement?"

[¶4.]     Clouse faced several 
charges in Campbell and Park Counties for the armed 
robberies of convenience stores located in those two counties. On June 3, 1988, 
the attorney appointed to represent Clouse against the charges filed in 
CampbellCounty telephoned the ParkCounty 
prosecutor to get an "indication of what ParkCounty would be willing to do with 
[Clouse's] assorted felony charges." The ParkCounty 
prosecutor responded with a proposal - in a letter dated June 6, 1988 - that 
offered "the possibility of concurrent sentencing" on the Campbell and ParkCounty charges. The attorney sent Clouse a 
copy of the letter he received from the ParkCounty prosecutor along with a letter 
updating Clouse on the status of his case. The proposal contained in the letter 
fell through, according to the ParkCounty prosecutor, when the Campbell 
County Attorney's office decided to keep the CampbellCounty charges separate from the ParkCounty charges.

[¶5.]     After the district 
court denied various pretrial motions filed by the defense, Clouse's attorneys 
became concerned that the case was not "defensible." There was also a concern 
over the possible severity of the sentence Clouse could receive if convicted on 
all the charges filed in CampbellCounty. The attorneys discussed these 
concerns with Clouse who agreed to accept the plea agreement offered by the 
Campbell County Attorney's office. During those plea negotiations, the attorneys 
for Clouse never mentioned the letter from the ParkCounty 
prosecutor because it "was not part of any arrangement in CampbellCounty and wasn't relevant to the plea bargain that 
was made in [CampbellCounty]." The terms of the agreement 
called for Clouse to plead guilty to one count each of armed robbery and first 
degree sexual assault in exchange for the other counts of armed robbery and 
first degree sexual assault being dismissed.1

[¶6.]     When Clouse was 
subsequently arraigned on the ParkCounty charges, a different public 
defender was appointed to represent him. Clouse, after initially pleading not 
guilty, agreed to negotiate towards a possible plea agreement. ParkCounty rejected, however, any proposal 
that required it to consent to concurrent sentences. The two sides then reached 
a tentative agreement that did not involve the issue of concurrent sentencing. 
The public defender, after discussing the proposed terms of the agreement with 
Clouse, sent a letter to the prosecution confirming the terms of that agreement. 
The public defender also sent a letter to Clouse the same day to make sure that 
the terms of the proposed agreement were acceptable to him.

[¶7.]     On January 31, 1989, 
Clouse agreed to plead guilty to two counts of armed robbery in exchange for the 
dismissal of the other charges of kidnapping, use of a firearm while committing 
a felony, and felon in possession of a firearm. After outlining the terms of the 
plea agreement, Clouse's attorney informed the district court that "[t]here has 
been no agreement as pertains to sentencing." The following exchange then took 
place between the district court and Clouse:

"THE COURT: And I take it 
that you have discussed this plea agreement with your attorney 
thoroughly?

"MR. CLOUSE: Yes, Your 
Honor.

"THE COURT: And are you 
satisfied that you understand the plea agreement that they have entered 
into?

"MR. CLOUSE: Yes, Your 
Honor.

"THE COURT: And you 
understand the nature and consequences of it?

"MR. CLOUSE: Yes, Your 
Honor."

[¶8.]     At sentencing, Clouse's 
attorney argued that the ParkCounty sentence should run concurrently 
with the CampbellCounty sentence. He argued, 
alternatively, for the ParkCounty sentences to run concurrent with 
each other. The district court in its written judgment sentenced Clouse to a 
term of 20-25 years in the state penitentiary on one count of armed robbery and, 
applying the habitual criminal statute, an enhanced sentence of 40-50 years on 
the other count of armed robbery. The district court ordered the two sentences 
to run consecutive to each other, and consecutive to the 60-75 year sentence 
Clouse was currently serving on the CampbellCounty charges, for a combined sentence of 
120-150 years.

[¶9.]     Clouse now challenges 
the sentences he received for the armed robberies he committed in ParkCounty. Clouse maintains that his decision 
to plead guilty in CampbellCounty was based, in part, on his 
belief that the June 6, 1988 letter from the ParkCounty 
prosecuting attorney offered the prospect of concurrent sentencing for the 
crimes he committed in Campbell and ParkCounties. Clouse now claims he relied to 
his detriment on the possibility of concurrent sentences when he agreed to plead 
guilty. Principles of due process therefore require, Clouse asserts, that he be 
given the opportunity to withdraw his guilty pleas in ParkCounty 
and have the terms of the letter presented to the district court in ParkCounty at a new arraignment. He frames 
this as a request for specific performance. 

[¶10.]  We granted Clouse an evidentiary hearing 
to determine whether there existed a plea agreement under which Clouse pleaded 
guilty to the CampbellCounty charges in exchange for the ParkCounty 
prosecutor consenting to concurrent sentences on the Campbell and ParkCounty charges. At the conclusion of the 
hearing, the district judge made the following findings:

"[T]hat there was not any 
plea agreement concerning the Park County charges, certainly no plea agreement 
concerning the Park County charges that he was relying upon to his detriment * * 
* when he entered his plea in Campbell County. Nor was there any such agreement 
when he entered his plea in ParkCounty.

"The way I [district 
court] take the evidence * * * is that Mr. Clouse was aware of certain talks 
that had taken place between his [first] attorney * * * and the [Park] 
CountyAttorney * * * but it's 
obvious from his testimony, from the letter, he knew there was no 
agreement.

"He was continuing to 
contest the charges in CampbellCounty. His own testimony is that he 
thought there was a good chance of concurrent sentences when he pled [guilty] in 
Park County, and his letter of October 11th certainly indicates at that time he 
didn't think there was any agreement."

[¶11.]  It is the district court - as the trier 
of fact - who must assess the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be 
given their testimony, in deciding whether there existed a valid plea agreement 
and its terms and conditions. People v. Navarroli, 121 Ill. 2d 516, 118 Ill.Dec. 
414, 416, 521 N.E.2d 891, 893 (1988). Whether a plea agreement exists dovetails 
with our own standard of review for questions of fact:

"We assume that evidence 
in favor of the successful party is true, disregarding entirely the evidence of 
the unsuccessful party in conflict therewith, and give to the evidence of the 
successful party every favorable inference which may be reasonably and fairly 
drawn from it. `So long as there exists substantial evidence supporting the 
trier of fact's determination, we will not second guess it on appeal.'" 
Richardson v. Green, 644 P.2d 778, 779 
(Wyo. 1982). 
See also Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316, 1319 
(Wyo. 
1984).

[¶12.]  The determination of the existence of a 
valid agreement between the State and the defendant is a matter for the trial 
court's determination, and its finding as to the existence of the agreement 
should not be reversed upon appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Steffen v. 
State, 267 Ark. 402, 590 S.W.2d 302, 304 
(1979).

"An abuse of discretion 
has been said to mean an error of law committed by the court under the 
circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the 
ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably conclude as it did." 
Roberts v. Vilos, 776 P.2d 216, 217 (Wyo. 1989). See also Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 
1986).

[¶13.]  The United States Supreme Court has noted 
the critical requirement for individuals mounting a constitutional challenge to 
their plea agreements:

"A plea bargain standing 
alone is without constitutional significance; in itself it is a mere executory 
agreement which, until embodied in the judgment of the court, does not deprive 
an accused of liberty or any other constitutionally protected interest. It is 
the ensuing guilty plea that implicates the Constitution. Only after respondent 
pleaded guilty was he convicted, and it is that conviction which gave rise to 
the deprivation of respondent's liberty at issue here." (footnotes omitted) 
Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507-508, 104 S. Ct. 2543, 
2546, 81 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1984).

[¶14.]  Thus it is only when "the defendant was 
not fairly apprised of its consequences can his plea be challenged under the Due 
Process Clause." Mabry, 467 U.S.  at 509, 104 S. Ct.  at 
2547.

[¶15.]  Clouse suffered no due process violation. 
The ParkCounty proposal for 
concurrent sentencing was no longer on the table when Clouse agreed to accept 
the plea agreements offered him. Simply put, Clouse knew the consequences of his 
guilty pleas when he made them. Assuming, as we must, that all of the evidence 
in favor of the State as the prevailing party is true and disregarding all the 
conflicting testimony of the defendant, there was sufficient testimony elicited 
at the evidentiary hearing to find that Clouse knew when he agreed to accept the 
Campbell and Park County plea agreements that neither of them offered an 
agreement for concurrent sentencing. One of Clouse's attorneys, when asked at 
the evidentiary hearing why he did not pursue the letter from the ParkCounty prosecutor, testified that the 
letter "wasn't a plea bargain at all." Clouse's attorney further testified that 
"[t]here was never a deal made with ParkCounty 
and CampbellCounty charges together." 
The decision to accept the CampbellCounty plea agreement, according to 
Clouse's attorney, was instead based on other considerations, such as the case 
was not "defensible."

[¶16.]  There was also testimony from the public 
defender, who negotiated the ParkCounty plea, that Clouse agreed to 
accept the ParkCounty agreement even 
though it said nothing about concurrent sentencing. At his change of plea 
hearing, the district court told Clouse that if he pled guilty to those two 
charges, the Court could impose consecutive sentences. In response, 
Clouse indicated that he understood that consecutive sentences were a 
possibility if he pled guilty to the two charges of armed robbery. The district 
court also inquired whether "[o]ther than the plea bargain that the attorneys 
have discussed, has anyone promised you anything else if you would enter guilty 
pleas to those charges?" Clouse responded that there were no other 
promises.

[¶17.]  In Santobello v. State, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S. Ct. 495, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1971), the Court stated that the "circumstances" of what is fair and 
reasonably due the defendant under a plea agreement will vary,

"but a constant factor is 
that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of 
the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or 
consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." 404 U.S.  at 262, 92 S. Ct.  at 499.

There was sufficient 
evidence to find that Clouse knew - when he voluntarily agreed to plead guilty - 
that the ParkCounty proposal had already 
been withdrawn. In its place was a new proposal that contained no agreement on 
concurrent sentencing.

[¶18.]  We hold that there was sufficient 
evidence for the district court to find that Clouse pleaded guilty knowing there 
was no plea agreement on concurrent sentencing and that there was no due process 
violation. Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in its determination of 
the questions presented.

[¶19.]  Lastly, we address Clouse's claim that 
the district court's oral pronouncement of 10-25 years on the one count of armed 
robbery controls over the written judgment and sentence of 20-25 years entered 
later on that same count. It appears that the difference between the oral 
pronouncement of 10-25 years and the written judgment/sentence of 20-25 years 
may be the result of a "clerical mistake." See W.R. Cr.P. 37, which provides: 
"Clerical mistakes in judgments * * * and errors in the record arising from 
oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time and after such 
notice, if any, as the court orders."

[¶20.]  We remand for the district court to 
correct that portion of the sentence that contains the discrepancy between the 
oral pronouncement and the written judgment/sentence to accurately reflect what 
was unambiguously pronounced at the sentencing hearing. See McGraw v. State, 770 P.2d 234 (Wyo. 
1989). The decision of the district court otherwise is

[¶21.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 The sentence Clouse 
received on the CampbellCounty charges was affirmed in Clouse v. State, 776 P.2d 1011 (Wyo. 1989).

THOMAS, Justice, 
concurring.

[¶22.]  I would not remand the case to the 
district court simply to correct the written judgment and sentence to match the 
transcript of the sentencing hearing. I would remand to the district court to 
make a determination as to which document was incorrect, the transcript or the 
judgment and sentence. If the court reporter's notes are not available, then I 
would agree that the transcript should control.

[¶23.]  On many keyboards on computers, however, 
the one (1) key is located near the two (2) key and, for me, it is conceptually 
possible that a typographical error occurred in the preparation of the 
transcript. Certainly, a sentence of twenty to twenty-five years is more 
consistent with the heft of the tome that the trial judge cast at Clouse than a 
sentence of ten to twenty-five years would be. Consequently, in my view, the 
potential of a typographical error should be investigated in the transcript as 
well as in the judgment and sentence.