Case Title: KORT KINSTLER V. RTB SOUTH GREELEY, LTD. LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 06-218

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-06-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
KORT KINSTLER V. RTB SOUTH GREELEY, LTD. LLC2007 WY 98160 P.3d 1125Case Number: 06-218Decided: 06/19/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 

KORT 
KINSTLER,Appellant(Defendant),v.RTB SOUTH GREELEY, 
LTD. LLC,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofLaramieCounty

The Honorable Nicholas G. 
Kalokathis, Judge

 
 
Representing Appellant:

 
 
Kort 
Kinstler, pro se.

 
 
Representing Appellee:

 
 
Dale W. 
Cottam and Lindsay Ann Woznick, Hirst & Applegate, PC, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Kort 
Kinstler, appeals from a judgment entered in favor of RTB South Greeley, LTD., 
LLC ("RTB"), arising from a failure to pay rent for premises leased from RTB.1  Mr. Kinstler contends that the failure 
to pay rent was excused by RTB's material breach of the lease agreement 
("Lease").  The district court 
rejected Mr. Kinstler's claim, finding that Mr. Kinstler had failed to provide 
RTB with written notice of the default and the opportunity to cure the default 
as required by the Lease.  We 
affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Kinstler's 
brief raises twenty issues.  We will 
focus on the one issue we find dispositive.

 
 
I.          
Did the district court err in its finding of fact that Mr. Kinstler had 
not complied with the Lease's requirement to notify RTB of the alleged default, 
or in its conclusion of law that Mr. Kinstler could not rely on the alleged 
default as a material breach that excused him from paying 
rent?

 
 
RTB lists two additional 
issues that we will also address.

 
 
I.          
Should the district court's decision be summarily affirmed, or Mr. 
Kinstler sanctioned, because of his failure to comply with the Wyoming Rules of 
Appellate Procedure? 

 
 
II.         
Does the Lease entitle RTB to an award of attorney's fees against Mr. 
Kinstler?  

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 
[¶3]      We review a 
district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law using a clearly 
erroneous standard for the factual findings and a de novo standard for the conclusions of 
law.  Belden v. Thorkildsen, 2007 WY 68, ¶ 11, 
156 P.3d 320, 323 (Wyo. 2007).  When 
a district court hears a case without a jury, the clearly erroneous standard is 
varied slightly:

 
 
The factual findings of a 
judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a jury verdict. While the 
findings are presumptively correct, the appellate court may examine all of the 
properly admissible evidence in the record. Due regard is given to the 
opportunity of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and 
our review does not entail re-weighing disputed evidence. Findings of fact will 
not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly 
erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing 
court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been committed.

Id. 

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶4]      On November 11, 
2003, Mr. Kinstler and RTB entered into a commercial lease for office space 
located at 120 North Greeley 
Highway in Cheyenne, Wyoming.  
Pursuant to the terms of the Lease, Mr. Kinstler was obligated to pay 
$1,000 per month for rent plus operating expenses from December 15, 2003, 
through April 30, 2005.  The Lease 
incorporated a document called a Landlord Work Letter that provided, "In the 
spring of 2004, Landlord to landscape the area next to the east windows of the 
north office."  The Lease also 
provided that, "In the event of any alleged default on the part of Landlord, 
Tenant shall give notice to Landlord and afford Landlord a reasonable 
opportunity to cure such default."  
The Lease further stated that, "All notices or other communications 
required or desired to be given to Landlord must be in writing."  

 
 
[¶5]      RTB failed to 
complete the landscaping work as required.  
In response, Mr. Kinstler stopped paying rent in the summer of 2004.  RTB evicted Mr. Kinstler from the 
premises in the fall of 2004.  

 
 
[¶6]      In April 2005, 
RTB filed a complaint in district court seeking to recover the rents due through 
April 30, 2005, the expiration date of the Lease.  Mr. Kinstler denied liability and 
affirmatively asserted, inter alia, 
that RTB's failure to provide the landscaping was a material breach of the Lease 
that excused him from paying rent.  
After a hearing, the district court found in favor of RTB.  The court interpreted the Lease as 
requiring Mr. Kinstler to provide RTB with written notice of any alleged 
default, and with a reasonable opportunity to cure that default.  The district court found that 
Mr. Kinstler had not complied with the Lease's notice requirement, and 
concluded that Mr. Kinstler could not rely upon the alleged default as a 
material breach that excused the payment of rent.  The district court entered judgment in 
favor of RTB in the amount of $26,411.52, which included sums for past due rent, 
late fees, interest, attorney's fees, and costs.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
            
I.          
Material breach

 

[¶7]      Mr. Kinstler 
contends that RTB's failure to provide the required landscaping was a material 
breach of the Lease.  He argues that 
this material breach excused him from paying rent. Mr. Kinstler argues correctly 
that, under some circumstances, one party's material breach of an agreement may 
excuse the other party's performance under that agreement.  See, e.g., Williams v. Collins Communications, 720 P.2d 880, 891 (Wyo. 1986).  In this case, however, the district 
court found that Mr. Kinstler was not entitled to rely on any alleged breach by 
RTB because he had not complied with the Lease's requirement to provide notice 
of an alleged default.  The district 
court explained its rationale as follows:  

 
 
The Defense argues that 
this contract is not enforceable because there was a material breach.  I think that Item 21  Paragraph 21 
requires that notice be in writing because of Paragraph 28.2.  28.2 says "Notice as to the landlord 
must all be in writing."  So, 
therefore, it says, "In the event"  this is Paragraph 21  "In the event of any 
alleged default on the part of the landlord, tenant shall give notice and afford 
landlord  and afford landlord a reasonable opportunity to cure."  

 
 
Now, I've looked through 
these exhibits to see if any such notice was given.  The only thing that comes close, 
arguably close, is Exhibit Number J, but I don't believe it has any language in 
there calculated to meet the requirements of Paragraph 21.  There was no opportunity to cure 
language in this particular correspondence. . . .

 
 
[¶8]      The notice 
requirement contained in the Lease is clear and unambiguous and must be enforced 
as written.  Sinclair 
Oil Corp. v. Republic Ins. Co., 929 P.2d 535, 539 (Wyo. 1996); Prudential 
Preferred Props. v. J & J Ventures, 859 P.2d 1267, 1271 (Wyo. 1993).  Pursuant to these clear and unambiguous 
terms, Mr. Kinstler was required to provide RTB with written notice of any 
alleged default and provide RTB an opportunity to cure it.  When a party fails to provide notice of 
a material breach, if required by the terms of the lease, reliance on that 
breach to excuse contractual performance is improper.  See Brown v. Johnston, 2004 WY 17, ¶ 32, 85 P.3d 422, 431 (Wyo. 2004) (Lessor could not rely on material breach because he 
did not give notice of the alleged breach as required.).  The district court found that Mr. 
Kinstler did not provide the required notice.  In this appeal, Mr. Kinstler has not 
identified any evidence in the record establishing that the required notice was 
given.  In the absence of such 
evidence, we cannot find the district court's decision clearly 
erroneous.

 
 
[¶9]      In reaching this 
result, we also resolve most of the other issues raised by Mr. Kinstler.  For example, Mr. Kinstler argues that 
RTB's obligation to do the landscaping work was a term specifically negotiated 
for this Lease.  Because it was such 
a significant term of the Lease, he contends that its breach was necessarily a 
material breach.  However, whether 
or not the breach was material, the district court correctly concluded that 
Mr. Kinstler could not rely on it because he failed to comply with the 
Lease's notice requirement.

 
 
[¶10]   The only other issues raised by Mr. 
Kinstler were presented without cogent argument or pertinent authority.  Our rules of appellate procedure require 
that arguments be supported with "citations to the authorities, statutes and 
parts of the record relied on."  
W.R.A.P. 7.01(f)(1).  When a 
party fails to comply with the rules of appellate procedure, we may refuse to 
consider that party's contentions.  
W.R.A.P. 1.03; Rodriguez v. State 
ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety & Comp. Div., 2006 
WY 146, ¶ 4, 146 P.3d 487, 488 (Wyo. 2006).  "We have consistently 
refused to address claims not supported by cogent argument or citation to 
pertinent authority whether a pro se litigant or counsel files the brief."  Odegard v. Odegard, 2003 WY 67, ¶ 29, 69 P.3d 917, 925 
(Wyo. 2003).  Because 
Mr. Kinstler failed to comply with our appellate rules, we will not consider his 
remaining issues.

 
 

II.                  
Summary affirmation or 
additional sanctions

 
 
[¶11]   RTB asserts that Mr. Kinstler's 
brief fails to meet the requirements of W.R.A.P. 7.01 in several respects, 
including the lack of a statement of the issues, and the failure to support 
claims with cogent argument or pertinent authority.  On that basis, RTB urges us to affirm 
the district court's decision summarily, or to impose additional sanctions 
against Mr. Kinstler.  We 
decline to do so.

 
 
[¶12]   Reasonable compliance with 
applicable procedural rules and requirements is mandatory, but we afford pro se litigants some leniency from the 
stringent standards applied to formal pleadings drafted by attorneys.  White v. Table Mt. Ranches Owners Ass'n, 
Inc., 2006 
WY 2, ¶ 8, 125 P.3d 1019, 1021 (Wyo. 2006), quoting Young v. State, 2002 WY 68, ¶ 9, 46 P.3d 295, 297 (Wyo. 2002).  
Mr. Kinstler's brief presented at least one issue with sufficient 
support and clarity to allow meaningful review.  We have declined to consider those 
issues that were not supported by cogent argument or pertinent authority.  Because the technical violations of the 
appellate rules did not preclude meaningful review, we will not impose 
additional sanctions.  See Furman v. Rural Elec. Co., 869 P.2d 136, 139 
(Wyo. 
1994).  

 
 

III.        
Attorney's fees

 
 
[¶13]   RTB also asserts that it is 
entitled to an award of its attorney's fees on appeal.  Attorney's fees are recoverable if 
expressly provided for by statute or contract.  Ahearn v. Tri-County Federal Savings 
Bank, 954 P.2d 1371, 1373 (Wyo. 1998).  Where a contract allows the award of 
attorney's fees, that includes fees incurred on appeal.  Cline v. Rocky Mountain, Inc., 998 P.2d 946 953 (Wyo. 2000); Ahearn, 954 P.2d  at 1373; DeWitt v. Balben, 718 P.2d 854, 865 
(Wyo. 
1986).  

 
 
[¶14]   The Lease in this case provides 
that, "If any suit is brought because of an alleged breach of this Lease, the 
prevailing party is also entitled to recover from the other party all reasonable 
attorney['s] fees and costs incurred in connection therewith."  RTB is the prevailing party, and is 
therefore entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees incurred on this 
appeal.  Shepard v. Beck, 2007 WY 53, ¶ 17, 154 P.3d 982, 989 (Wyo. 2007); see also 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-14-126(b) (LexisNexis 2005).  We will determine the appropriate sum to 
be awarded after counsel submits proper documentation.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶15]   We do not find the district court's 
decision to be clearly erroneous.  
Mr. Kinstler failed to comply with the Lease's requirement to notify RTB 
of an alleged default and, as a result, Mr. Kinstler cannot rely on it as a 
material breach that excused him from paying rent.  Mr. Kinstler's technical violations of 
the rules of appellate procedure did not preclude meaningful review.  We therefore decline the invitation to 
summarily affirm or impose other sanctions.  Under the terms of the Lease, RTB is, 
however, entitled to an award of reasonable appellate attorney's fees.  This amount shall be determined after 
submission of proper documentation by counsel.

 
 
[¶16]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1In addition 
to Kort Kinstler, the Lease lists Liberty Tax Service #2837 ("Liberty") and Kyle Kinstler 
as tenants "jointly, severally and individually."  The district court entered judgment 
"jointly and severally" against Liberty, Kyle Kinstler, and Kort Kinstler.  Only Kort Kinstler appealed from the 
district court's ruling.  In 
discussing the Lease and the duties under the Lease, our references to Mr. 
Kinstler include all tenants.