Case Title: MICHAEL THURMAN BALL V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2008-SC-000430-MR

State: kentucky

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Date: 2010-03-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76 .28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE ; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTERJANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT . OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION . MICHAEL THURMAN BALL V CIVUytemr Caurf Of 2008-SC-000430-MR ON APPEAL FROM BATH CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE BETH LEWIS MAZE, JUDGE NO . 07-CR-00077 MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING RENDERED : MARCH 18, 2010 MTO''BE 'UI~LMHED r COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE Appellant, Michael Thurman Ball, appeals from a judgment entered upon a jury verdict by the Bath Circuit Court convicting him of first-degree wanton endangerment, third-degree assault, and of being a first-degree persistent felony offender . He was sentenced to a total of 20 years to serve . He now appeals his conviction as a matter of right pursuant to Ky . Const . § 110(2)(b), raising four issues : that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search and seizure, by denying his right to present a defense, by failing to include a lesser included offense instruction, and by failing to sequester the jury after it had begun its deliberations . For the reasons stated below, we affirm . FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Ball's mother, Emily Ball, owns a small store located in Salt Lick, Bath County, Kentucky . Next to the store is a BP service station, and on the other side of the BP station is Ball's residence . At approximately 11 :00 a.m . on August 5, 2007, a call came in to dispatch reporting a disturbance at the store. Deputy Ron Allison of the Bath County Sheriff's Department responded to the call at approximately 1 :00 p.m.l Upon arriving at the area Allison found the store locked and closed . Shortly thereafter, Allison observed Ball walking across the parking lot of the BP, though he did not at the time know that the person was Ball. Allison later observed Ball on the property of his residence next to the BP station. Allison watched as Ball took a drink of something from a container, poured a little on the ground, and took another drink. Allison got back into his cruiser with the intention of leaving the area. However, as Allison drove by Ball's residence he noticed Ball sitting on his porch with a beer can beside him . According to his suppression hearing testimony, it appears that Allison believed that drinking beer on one's own porch in Bath County is illegal because Bath County is a dry county . Allison turned his cruiser around and returned to Ball's residence intending to inquire about the beer . When he returned, Ball and another individual, Chad 1 Deputy Allison was aware of a report of a similar disturbance at Emily's store the previous day. Albertson, were sitting on the porch steps of the residence. Allison exited his vehicle and began questioning the men . As Allison questioned the men, he noticed that Ball smelled of alcohol, that his speech was slurred, that he was uncooperative in answering questions, and that his answers were "nonsensical ." Based upon these factors, Allison concluded that Ball was intoxicated. Although Ball was on his own porch, according to his suppression hearing testimony, it appears that Allison believed that the appellant was in violation of the public intoxication statute, KRS 222.202 . Following a brief period of questioning, Ball asked Allison for a cigarette . Allison pointed out that there was a pack of cigarettes beside the beer can, but Ball stated that he was nevertheless going inside to get a cigarette. Allison responded, "No, I'm not done asking you questions yet, you need to wait right there."2 Allison testified that by this point he had determined that he was going to arrest Ball, though he did not inform Ball of his intention at this time . Ball ignored Allison's directive and entered the residence . Allison followed Ball into the residence and attempted to handcuff him by taking his left arm and moving it behind his back . According to his suppression hearing testimony, Allison at the same time told Ball to place his hands behind his back and informed him that he was under arrest . Ball pulled away, took a few steps back, and removed a knife from his back pocket . As 2 As noted by the Commonwealth, by directing Ball to remain on the porch, it is apparent that Allison at this point detained Ball pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and Ball was not free to leave and enter the residence . See also Strange v. Commonwealth, 269 S.W.3d 847 (Ky. 2008) . Ball attempted to open the knife it slipped from his hand . Ball then charged Allison. The momentum from the charge carried the two out the front door, off the porch, and into the yard . In the ensuing altercation, Allison suffered an injury to his jaw and a bite on his hand. He also bit his tongue during the incident . In the meantime, Ball incurred substantial injuries as a result of the struggle and was transported to the hospital . On September 27, 2007, Ball was indicted by the Bath County Grand Jury for first-degree wanton endangerment (KRS 508.060), third-degree assault (KRS 508.025), and as being a first-degree persistent felony offender (KRS 532-080) . Following the indictment Ball orally3 moved to suppress evidence surrounding the events of August 5, 2007. From arguments made at the suppression hearing, it appears that Ball's position was that he was entitled to the suppression of all evidence relating to events following Allison's entry into the residence. As grounds for the motion Ball argued that Allison had illegally entered the residence without a warrant and had attempted to illegally arrest him, and thus evidence relating to the knife, statements made by Ball following Allison's entry into the residence, and evidence concerning the altercation itself were the fruits of an illegal search and seizure . A suppression hearing was held on January 3, 2008 . The trial court initially sustained Ball's motion as to the knife and the statements made following Allison's entry into the residence, but did not address the 3 Ball did not file a written suppression motion . admissibility of the altercation itself. The Commonwealth filed a "Motion to Clarify Order" seeking additional explanation of the suppression order. The motion referenced KRS 503.060(1) and Commonwealth v. Baze, 965 S.W.2d 817 (Ky. 1997), both of which address the issue of self-defense by a suspect in the course of an arrest . Based upon these authorities, the trial court reversed itself and issued an order denying the motion to suppress . A jury trial was held on May 29 and 30, 2008, following which the jury found Ball guilty of third-degree assault. 4 In the sentencing phase the jury determined Ball to be a first-degree persistent felony offender, and recommended a total sentence of 20 years to serve. On June 5, 2008, the trial court entered a final judgment consistent with the jury's verdict and sentencing recommendation . This appeal followed . I. BALL WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A FOURTH-DEGREE ASSAULT INSTRUCTION Ball contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for a fourth-degree assault instruction . We disagree . At the conclusion of the guilt phase of the trial, Ball tendered a fourth- degree assault instruction. The instruction was based upon the "imperfect self- defense" provisions contained in KRS 503.120(1) . In summary, Ball argued that ajury could have concluded that he believed that he was entitled to exercise self-defense, but that his belief was so unreasonable so as to rise to 4 The jury deadlocked on the first-degree wanton endangerment charge and by agreement of the parties the charge was dismissed. the level of wantonness, in which case conviction would be proper under the fourth-degree assault statute, but . not the third-degree assault statute. RCr 9.54(1) provides : "It shall be the duty of the court to instruct the jury in writing on the law of the case . . . ." Under this rule, "[a] defendant is entitled to an instruction on any lawful defense which he has . Although a lesser included offense is not a defense within the technical meaning of those terms as used in the penal code, it is, in fact and principle, a defense against the higher charge." Slaven v. Commonwealth, 962 S.W.2d 845, 856 (Ky. 1997) (citations omitted) . We review a trial court's rulings regarding instructions for an abuse of discretion . Johnson v . Commonwealth, 134 S.W .3d 563, 569-70 (Ky. 2004). The third-degree assault statute, KRS 508 .025, provides, in relevant part, as follows : "(1) A person is guilty of assault in the third degree when the actor . . . (a) . . . intentionally causes or attempts to cause physical injury to . . 1 . A state, county, city, or federal peace officer . . . ." The fourth-degree assault statute, KRS 508.030, provides, in relevant part, as follows: "(1) A person is guilty of assault in the fourth degree when: (a) He intentionally or wantonly causes physical injury to another person ." The imperfect self-defense statute, KRS 503.120(1), provides, in relevant part, as follows : (1) When the defendant believes that the use of force upon or toward the person of another is necessary for any of the purposes for which such belief would establish a justification under KRS 503.050 to 503.110[5] but the defendant is wanton or reckless in 5 KRS 503.050 to KRS 503.110 address, among other things, use of force in the protection of one's self, others and property . believing the use of any force, or the degree of force used, to be necessary[,] . . . the justification afforded by those sections is unavailable in a prosecution for an offense for which wantonness or recklessness, as the case may be, suffices to establish culpability . (Emphasis added) . In summary, "[a] mistaken belief in the need to act in self-protection does not affect the privilege to act in self-protection unless the mistaken belief is so unreasonably held as to rise to the level of wantonness or recklessness with respect to the circumstance then being encountered by the defendant." Commonwealth v. Hager, 41 S.W.3d 828, 841-42 (Ky. 2001) (citing Elliott v. Commonwealth, 976 S.W.2d 416, 420 (Ky. 1998)) . Imperfect self-defense does not provide for complete exoneration, but instead allows a jury to convict a defendant for a lesser offense, one for which wantonness or recklessness is the culpable mental state . Elliott, 976 S.W.2d at 420 . follows : The above authorities, however, do not stand alone in determining whether Ball was entitled to a lesser included offense instruction . KRS 503.060(1) (improper use of physical force in self-protection) provides as Notwithstanding the provisions of KRS 503.050[6], the use of physical force by a defendant upon another person is not justifiable when: (1) The defendant is resisting an arrest by a peace officer, recognized to be acting under color of official authority and using no more force than reasonably 6 The general self-defense statute, KRS 503 .050, provides, in relevant part, as follows "(1) The use of physical force by a defendant upon another person is justifiable when the defendant believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by the other person." necessary to effect the arrest, although the arrest is unlawful[ .] An examination of KRS 503.120(1) discloses that it contains no reference to its availability when, during the course of resisting arrest, the actor uses physical force upon an officer. On the other hand, KRS 503.060(1) specifically addresses this situation . Under established rules of statutory construction, "when two statutes deal with the same subject matter, one in a broad, general way and the other specifically, the specific statute prevails." Land v. Newsome, 614 S.W .2d 948, 949 (Ky.1981) ; Commonwealth v. Phon, 17 S.W.3d 106, 107 (Ky. 2000) ; Withers v. University ofKentucky, 939 S.W.2d 340, 345 (Ky. 1997) . Because KRS 503.060(1) specifically addresses the use of force by a person against a police officer in the course of an arrest, it follows that it must prevail over the more general statute, KRS 503.120(1) . Moreover, because 503.060(1) does not contain an exception for a wantonly held belief by an arrestee that he is entitled to use self-protection against an arresting officer, the imperfect self-defense provisions contained in KRS 503.120(1) are not applicable under the circumstances described in KRS 503.060(l) . See also Baze v. Commonwealth, 965 S.W.2d 817, 822 (Ky. 1997) (holding that even though a defendant may believe that deadly physical force is necessary to protect himself against unlawful force by another, the use of such force is not justifiable when the defendant is resisting arrest by a police officer recognized to be acting under color of official authority and using no more force than reasonably necessary to effect the arrest even though the arrest is unlawful) and Stopher v. Commonwealth, 57 S .W.3d 787, 803 (Ky. 2001) ("There is no right to use self-defense during an arrest. ") . 7 In summary, the language of KRS 503.060(1) forecloses the application of KRS 503.120(1) in situations where a police officer uses no more force than reasonably necessary to arrest and the arrestee was aware that he was being placed under arrest . In the present case, the uncontradicted testimony by Allison was that after following Ball into the residence he moved Ball's left hand behind his back in preparation to cuff him, and at the same time told him to place his hands behind his back and that he was under arrest . Thus, there is no evidence that Allison used unreasonable force for an arrest under these circumstances . It follows that Ball was not entitled to a fourth-degree assault instruction based upon imperfect self-defense, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ball's request to give the instruction. II . THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED BALL'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS Ball next argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress statements made following Allison's entry into the residence and evidence that he pulled a knife at the initial stage of the altercation . As grounds for his argument, Ball alleges that Deputy Allison had no basis to 7 We note that Stopher overstates the reach of KRS 503.060(l) . The statute is operable only when the officer is "using no more force that reasonably necessary [.]" An arrestee would, under the provision, of course be privileged to defend himself during an arrest against, for example, gratuitous and unjustifiable brutality . arrest or otherwise detain him, and that the officer's warrantless entry into the residence was illegal. He thus contends that the evidence was the product of an illegal search and seizure . We begin by noting that although at the suppression hearing Ball argued that evidence concerning the altercation itself should be suppressed, he does not raise that argument on appeal . As such, the issue is deemed to be waived . Grange Mutual Insurance Co . v. Trade, 151 S.W.3d 803, 815 (Ky. 2004) . Similarly, Ball cites us to no specific statements he seeks to suppress . Nor were any specific statements referenced at the suppression hearing. It is well-settled that an appellate court will not sift through a voluminous record to try to ascertain facts when a party has failed to comply with its obligation under CR 76.12(4)(d)(iv) . See, e .g., Sharp v . Sharp, 491 S.W .2d 639, 644 (Ky. 1973) ("We will not search the thirteen volumes of testimony to find the evidence, therefore this contention is rejected.") Thus we will not undertake the task of reviewing the videotapes of Ball's trial record to determine the statements Ball alleges should be suppressed, and will not address this issue on the merits . The above dispositions leave only the issue of the trial court's failure to suppress as evidence the fact that Ball pulled a knife on Allison at the initial stage of the altercation . The Commonwealth contends that Allison's entry into the residence and the subsequent arrest were proper . However, we need not, and do not, decide the issue upon these grounds. Instead, we affirm upon grounds not addressed by the trial court. See generally Cold Republic Ins . Co . v . Ashley, 722 S.W .2d 55, 58 (Ky. App . 1986) ("[an] appellate court may affirm the judgment if the record on appeal discloses any ground on which the decision could properly have been made .") . For purposes of our review, we assume that Allison acted illegally as claimed by Ball, that is, that he illegally entered the residence and illegally attempted to arrest Ball . Nevertheless, we are unpersuaded that Ball's pulling of the knife is properly viewed as the fruit of the illegal entry and arrest . The question of whether evidence obtained after an illegal search should be suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree depends upon "`whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which . . . objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.' U.S. v. Finucan, 708 F.2d 838, 843 (1st Cir. 1983) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S . 471, 488, 83 S.Ct . 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)) . "Evidence need not be excluded if the connection between the illegal conduct and the discovery and seizure of the evidence is highly attenuated, or when evidence has been obtained by means `sufficiently distinguishable' from the initial illegality so that the evidence is `purged of the primary taint .' Wilson v. Commonwealth, 37 S .W .3d 745, 748 (Ky . 2001) (citations omitted) . Here, the seizure of the knife was not a product of Allison's exploitation of his illegal entry and arrest. Rather, separate and apart from any illegal search and seizure by Allison, Ball, of his own accord, pulled the knife from his back pocket in preparation for an altercation with the officer. As such, the knife was obtained "by means sufficiently distinguishable [so as] to be purged of the primary taint [i.e ., Allison's illegal entry and arrest] ." Accordingly, we are persuaded that the knife is not the fruit of any illegal conduct by Allison, and was therefore properly admitted at trial. III . THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT DENY BALL THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT A DEFENSE Ball next contends that the trial court violated his right to present a defense because the trial court made rulings : (1) preventing him from informing the jury that Deputy Allison's warrantless entry into Ball's home was illegal; (2) preventing him from playing the tapes of Allison's previous testimony at the preliminary hearing and suppression hearing in their entirety ; and (3) preventing him from asking whether it was legal or illegal to be drunk on his own porch . Because they raise common issues of law, we consider arguments one and three together, i .e., the arguments that the trial court erred by preventing Ball from informing the jury that Allison's warrantless entry into Ball's home was illegal and preventing him from asking Allison whether it was legal or illegal to be drunk on his own porch. Under KRE 401, evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to render the existence of any consequential fact more or less probable, however slight that tendency may be . Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W .2d 439, 449 (Ky. 1.999) ; Turner v . Commonwealth, 914 S.W.2d 343, 346 (Ky. 1996) . Relevant evidence is admissible unless excluded by some other rule . KRE 402 . Under KRE 403, relevant evidence "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence ." Whether Allison's entry into the residence was illegal and whether it was legal or illegal for Ball to have been drunk on his porch had very little, if any, relevance to Ball's guilt or innocence on the principal charges . These legal conclusions simply were not germane to whether Ball committed the offenses of wanton endangerment and/or third-degree assault in connection with the events ofAugust 5, 2007 . Given the slight, if any, relevance to the charged offenses, the evidence was properly excludable under KRE 403 on the basis that any probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, and because of the realistic possibility that the evidence would confuse or mislead the jury. It follows that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence. The remaining evidentiary issue for discussion is whether the trial court erred in overruling Ball's request to play Allison's preliminary hearing and suppression hearing testimony in their entirety . In support of his argument, Ball identifies the following alleged inconsistencies between Allison's trial testimony and his prior testimony : whether Allison saw Ball in his yard; whether Allison had previously heard of Michael Ball by name ; whether it is legal to have a beer in public view; whether Allison approached Ball at his residence because of the beer can or because of the dispatch call ; whether Allison knew the brand of beer he observed on the porch; whether the can was open or not; and whether Allison had observed cigarettes, cigars, or a pipe beside the beer can . An examination of the above alleged inconsistencies discloses that they are, upon the whole, trivial upon the issue of whether Ball committed the crimes he was on trial for. "[A]lthough there is no provision in the Kentucky Rules of Evidence prohibiting impeachment on collateral facts, we have consistently recognized that prohibition as a valid principle of evidence ." Metcalf v. Commonwealth, 158 S.W .3d 740, 745 (Ky. 2005) (citing Purcell v . Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 382, 397-98 (Ky. 2004)) . "Although a witness in a criminal case may be impeached by contradictory evidence, `such evidence is not admissible for that purpose unless it pertains to a material matter.' Chumbler v. Commonwealth, 905 S.W .2d 488, 495-496 (Ky. 1995) (quoting Nugent v. Commonwealth, 639 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Ky. 1982)) . We have no difficulty in concluding that the alleged inconsistencies listed above qualify as collateral matters, and, accordingly, the proposed impeachment of Allison was excludable as impeachment upon collateral matters . As pointed out by the Commonwealth, however, the trial court was open to permitting the impeachment if done properly . The trial court's principal basis for disallowing the impeachment was because Ball sought to play Allison's preliminary hearing and suppression hearing testimony in their entirety . KRE 613(a) provides as follows : (a) Examining witness concerning prior statement. Before other evidence can be offered of the witness having made at another time a different statement, he must be inquired of concerning it, with the circumstances of time, place, and persons present, as correctly as the examining party can present them; and, if it be in writing, it must be shown to the witness, with opportunity to explain it. The court may allow such evidence to be introduced when it is impossible to comply with this rule because of the absence at the trial or hearing of the witness sought to be contradicted, and when the court finds that the impeaching party has acted in good faith. In his effort to impeach Allison, Ball failed to follow the principles set forth in the above rule. Rather, at the conclusion of Allison's testimony Ball sought to play Allison's prior testimony from the two hearings in their entirety . Because of Ball's substantial departure from the proper technique for impeaching a witness with a prior inconsistent statement, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying his request to play Allison's preliminary hearing and suppression hearing testimony in their entirety . IV. MANIFEST ERROR DID NOT OCCUR AS A RESULT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO SEQUESTER THE JURY follows : Citing RCr 9.68, Ball contends that the trial court erred by failing to sequester the jury after they had retired to deliberate . RCr 9.68 provides as Whether the jurors in any case shall be sequestered shall be within the discretion of the court, except that in the trial of a felony charge, after the case is submitted for their verdict, they shall be sequestered unless otherwise agreed by the parties with approval of the court . After the trial had concluded and the jury retired to deliberate, the court informed the parties that it was not going to sequester the jury. Ball did not object to the trial court's proposal. The trial court called the jury back into the courtroom, admonished the venire not to discuss the case with anyone else, told them that deliberations would continue at 9:00 a.m. the next day, and sent them home for the night. Ball acknowledges that, because of his failure to object, this argument is not properly preserved for our review . He accordingly requests review pursuant to the palpable error standard contained in RCr 10 .26 . Pursuant to RCr 10 .26, an error is reversible only if a manifest injustice has resulted from the error. "That means that if, upon consideration of the whole case, a substantial possibility does not exist that the result would have been different, the error will be deemed nonprejudicial." Graves v . Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 858, 864 (Ky . 2000) (citing Jackson v . Commonwealth, 717 S.W .2d 511 (Ky. App . 1986)) . "To discover manifest injustice, a reviewing court must plumb the depths of the proceeding . . . to determine whether the defect in the proceeding was shocking or jurisprudentially intolerable ." Id. (citations omitted) . "For an error to be palpable, it must be `easily perceptible, plain, obvious and readily noticeable .' A palpable error must involve prejudice more egregious than that occurring in reversible error[.]' Brewer v. Commonwealth, 206 S .W.3d 343, 349 (Ky. 2006) (citations omitted) . Thus, the alleged error must be "so improper, prejudicial, and egregious as to have undermined the overall fairness of the proceedings ." Id. (citing Soto v. Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d 827, 873 (Ky. 2004) . For several reasons we are persuaded that no manifest injustice occurred as a result of the trial court's failure to sequester the jury. First, Ball has not identified any prejudice resulting from the failure to sequester. For example, Ball does not allege that any of the jurors communicated with one another, discussed the case with anyone else, or were otherwise exposed to extra- judicial influence so as to case doubt on the propriety of thejury verdict . Absent any of these factors, it follows that no prejudice could have resulted from the nonsequestration. Second, the trial court admonished thejury not to discuss the case with anyone else during the overnight period of nonsequestration. A jury is presumed to follow an admonition given by the trial court. Mills v. Commonwealth, 996 S.W.2d 473, 485 (Ky. 1999) . Upon application of this presumption, and absent any allegation by Ball to the contrary, we must conclude that there was no jury misconduct to affect its deliberation . Finally, the record upon the whole discloses that the evidence that Ball assaulted Deputy Allison was overwhelming . Thus, upon consideration of the whole case, a substantial possibility does not exist that the result would have been different if the jury had been sequestered. It follows that there was no manifest error, and thus, even if error did indeed occur, we are constrained to affirm upon this issue. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reason the judgment of the Bath Circuit Court is affirmed. Minton, C.J ., Abramson, Scott and Venters, JJ ., concur. Schroder, J., dissents by separate opinion in which Noble, J., joins. Noble, J ., dissents by separate opinion in which Schroder, J., joins. Cunningham, J ., not sitting. SCHRODER, J ., DISSENTING : I have a problem with a twenty-year sentence for what started as an illegal arrest for public intoxication on Ball's own front porch . I don't see the justice . This case began with Ball drinking beer with a friend on his front porch in a dry county . A passing officer noticed a beer can next to Ball, and, believing its possession illegal, stopped to question Ball. Ball retreated inside his house with the officer in pursuit . The intoxicated Ball would not submit to the arrest for public intoxication . He pulled an unopened pocket knife from his pocket, which he dropped, and then charged the officer, carrying both out the front door, off the porch, and into the yard . In the ensuing scuffle, Ball bit the officer's hand . Ball got the worst of it and ended up briefly in the hospital . Ball was convicted of third-degree assault, a felony, because the victim was a police officer. KRS 508.025(1)(a)1 . He was sentenced to four years, enhanced to twenty because of his two prior felonies . If he had assaulted someone not a peace officer, he would have received a year or less on a misdemeanor, fourth-degree assault charge . KRS 508.030 . Intoxication is currently not ajustification for resisting an illegal arrest . Likewise, twenty years for a drunken attempt to resist is hardly a punishment befitting the crime . With the cost of incarceration over $20,000 a year, we could spend over $400,000 to house a drunk. Does the sentence make us safer or feel better? I don't see the justice in this case. Noble, J., joins. NOBLE, J., DISSENTING : I respectfully dissent because I do not believe the Appellant was given a fair trial . He was entitled to have jury instructions both on the illegality of his "arrest" and on self defense. It is particularly egregious that the Appellant is now serving twenty years because he fought with a deputy who unlawfully followed him into his home, when Appellant was sitting on his own front porch, minding his own business, disturbing no one even if he was drunk, and then went into his home and shut the door to properly end the officer's questioning. The officer's lack of knowledge of the law and brashness caused the predictable results. Whatever his reasons for approaching the Appellant on his own front porch, the officer testified that he intended to arrest Appellant in his own home for being drunk even though he was not being disorderly . If legally correct, which it is not, this would no doubt come as a surprise to many of the good residents of Bath County . The facts bear repeating because the sequence of events is relevant to a proper analysis . According to the deputy sheriffs own testimony, after walking up to Appellant's front porch, he identified himself and asked Appellant his name . Appellant told the deputy, who then said Appellant was the person who was the subject of a complaint that there had been a "disturbance" in a nearby grocery store . That reported behavior, even if it was Appellant, was not an arrestable offense, being at best only a misdemeanor which did not occur in the presence of the officer. KRS431 .005(1)(d) . The deputy stated that there was no disorderly conduct at that time by the Appellant, but he continued questioning him anyway . Appellant's answers then became "belligerent ." Rudeness to a deputy also is not an arrestable offense . The deputy further testified that at one point, Appellant complained that he could not hear the deputy, and got up and went into the house to turn down the radio . The deputy allowed this, and questioned Appellant's guest while Appellant was inside . The questioning continued after Appellant returned, and the deputy concluded that Appellant was "under the influence" or "drunk." Appellant asked the deputy for a cigarette, and the deputy pointed out that there were cigars on the porch . Appellant said he did not want those, and that he was going into the house . The deputy told Appellant that he was not done talking to him, but did not tell the Appellant that he was under arrest or even merely being "detained ." Despite this, Appellant got up and went inside anyway, and closed the front door. This, too, is not an arrestable offense . Up to that point, there was no basis for the deputy to force the Appellant to continue to talk to him, let alone arrest him. He at most could have had a summons issued on the disorderly conduct claim from the grocery store . At that point, the deputy's legal right to be on the Appellant's property was limited to his right to conduct a knock and talk as this Court set forth in Quintana v. Commonwealth, 276 S .W.3d 753, 759 (Ky . 2008) ("There has been no finding of probable cause sufficient to grant a warrant, so the knock and talk is limited to only the areas which the public can reasonably expect to access .") . As Quintana establishes, police officers have the right to access the public areas of private property to ask questions of the resident . Id. However, that case also establishes that the homeowner has the right to decline to talk with an officer, and absent further legal grounds, the officer's right to be on the property ends . See id. (requiring consent for the police to enter the home) . When the Appellant went into his home and closed the door, the deputy's right to be on the property effec enter Appellant's deputy clearly ha Unfortunately, the encounter did not end there. As soon as the his home and shut his front door, the deputy opened the front door, went inside, and grabbed Appellant and twisted his left arm behind lize him. Appellant pulled away, stepping backward and, uty, reached into his pocket and brought out a closed to open but fumbled out of his hands where it landed four e room. Appellant and the deputy then engaged in fierce k them both out the front door and off the porch. During bit the deputy who finally got Appellant on his back . The ppellant in the face with his elbow and fists, breaking ouple of fingers, and his elbow, requiring that he be taken deputy had the bite wound, a sore neck, and a bruised to the hospital for treatment. This sad recitation of events would not have occurred if the deputy had not gone where he h The Commonw majority here have h officer, Appellant cou could he present testi his back to immob according to the de knife, which he trie to five feet across t grappling which to the brawl, Appellan deputy then hit the Appellant's nose, a to the hospital . The gland, and also wen ively ended. He had neither sought nor received consent to ome . That is where this case should have stopped, as the no consent and no basis for "hot pursuit" as he claimed. d no right to go. alth has argued, and the lower courts as well as the Id, that because the assault occurred against a peace d not get an instruction premised on self protection, nor ony to the jury of the illegality of his arrest to justify the 22 defense . Indeed, KRS 503.060(1) says the defense is not available if the defendant is resisting arrest by a peace officer "although the arrest is unlawful. " (Emphasis added .) . Yet KRS 503.050, the self protection statute, and KRS 503.120, the imperfect self-defense statute, do not mention any exceptions for any category of persons. The inescapable question then is, "What is the effect of KRS 503.060 when a police officer violates the law in regard to entering a home or arresting a person with force?" Under the statute, the answer appears to be that a person may not defend against such invasions, nor offer proof that he was defending himself. If he defends, or resists arrest, he will be charged with assault in the third degree . He can only argue that the officer was using excessive force and thus was not covered by KRS 503.060(1) . Regardless of the officer's lack of right to be there, the defendant can offer no proof at trial that he was defending himself, because he is not allowed to use force under any circumstances against a peace officer. The legislature has effectively given peace officers the ability to invade homes at will, however mistaken, and has required the homeowner to submit or be charged with a felony . In this statute, the legislature has equated self defense, a lawful behavior, with resisting arrest, an unlawful behavior . The net effect is to completely deny any claim of self defense, even imperfect self defense, to a defendant at his trial before the jury. However, Section 1 of the Kentucky Constitution, which is part of our Bill of Rights, expressly guarantees as the first "inherent and inalienable right" of the citizens of Kentucky the "right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties," and does not exclude anyone from having this right exercised against them, including peace officers . The right of the people of this Commonwealth to act "in defense of themselves" is further recognized in the seventh right listed in Section 1 . Yet, the statutes in question in this case purport to completely abrogate that right, even where the defendant in question faces substantial and unlawful violence, simply because the perpetrator of that violence is a police officer. Further, the legislature does not have the power to completely abrogate any right contained in the Bill of Rights pursuant to Section 26 of the Constitution which plainly states that the rights contained in our Bill of Rights are "excepted out of the general powers of government, and shall forever remain inviolate ; and all laws contrary thereto, or contrary to this Constitution, shall be void." (Emphasis added .) To the extent that KRS 503.060 completely denies self defense to a defendant in a third-degree assault charge when the peace officer was acting unlawfully, it is unconstitutional . When a peace officer is acting lawfully, there is nothing to defend against, so there is no need to act in self protection . It naturally follows, then, that self protection as a complete defense does not apply. However, our law does provide for an imperfect self defense, or subjective mistake, and when the facts warrant it, even in a lawful arrest, a mistaken belief instruction might be appropriate. But when police behavior is lawful, it does not violate the constitution to deny a claim of self defense to bar conviction . On the other hand, when police behavior is unlawful, surely police officers are not above the law any more than any other citizen, and their status cannot deprive a citizen of his constitutional guarantees . It is axiomatic that the vast majority of peace officers are trustworthy and fair . We turn to them in our times of need . It takes a special brand of person to put his or her life on the line to protect the peace . They are role models to our children. They are underpaid at any price and overworked with regularity . The law should give them every reasonable and constitutional protection it can . Yet, being human like the rest of us, peace officers make mistakes . And of all public officials, none has a higher fiduciary duty to the public it serves . It is also axiomatic that humans will protect themselves when under attack, or when they are being wrongly treated. This is so basic to our behavior that it is perceived as a fundamental right inherent in each of us in our Constitution . But as the official commentary to KRS 503.050 states, Even though a defendant believes that physical force is necessary to protect himself against unlawful force by another, the use of such force is notjustifiable in the three situations described in KRS 503.060 . Under subsection (1) of this provision, an individual is denied the privilege of using force to resist an arrest, known or believed to be unlawful, if made by a peace officer. The purpose of this limitation is to expressly eliminate the widely accepted principle which provides justification for the use of physical force to resist an unlawful arrest . It is problematic that we have a statute that not only ignores a "widely accepted principle" but also goes so far as to completely deny a citizen the right given in the Kentucky Constitution to defend himself even when an arrest is illegal. The fact that the unlawful entry and arrest in this case occurred in Appellant's home underscores the extent that police powers have been elevated over individual rights and fundamental fairness . This prohibition is also at odds with statutory mandates that have been placed on peace officers . For example, KRS 431 .025 requires an arresting person to inform the person about to be arrested of the intention to arrest him, and what he is being arrested for. That did not happen here . Though these duties go to the officer's responsibilities and not the defendant's rights, is the intent of this statute waived because KRS 503.060 allows an officer to make an unlawful arrest and deprives a defendant of the right to challenge the arrest? What incentive is there to ensure an officer's compliance? Must a defendant submit to every degree of force, or run the risk of a felony charge he cannot defend against? If he responds with self-protective force, under the current law he is guilty of third-degree assault, and must take the chance that the only way to excuse his self defense is by a court finding that the officer used excessive force . Absent a video recording such as the one in the Rodney King beating, it is the defendant's word against that of the officer. Certainly in this case, Appellant was subjected to a severe and damaging beating, which the deputy excused by saying Appellant continued to struggle, though no eye witness corroborated the deputy's version of events . KRS 503 .060(1) goes too far. The legislature can regulate protected behavior, but it cannot abrogate it . A reasonable line for the legislature to draw would be to restrict the protection of KRS 503.060 to complete self- protection claims in lawful arrests . This squarely places the burden for improperly resisting an arresting officer on the defendant. Certainly, most arrests will be lawful, and thus a defendant resists at his own peril. But in instances where an arrest is not lawful, or the defendant is being subjected to excessive force, a citizen would not be ipso facto guilty of third-degree assault because he is not allowed to prove that he was acting properly in self defense . As the statute now stands, it criminalizes constitutional behavior. It serves to make the defendant guilty for the unlawful acts of the peace officer. Consequently, I would hold that the language in KRS 503.060(1), "although the arrest is unlawful" is unconstitutional, and must be stricken from the statute . Without that language, the Appellant is clearly entitled to make his case that the deputy acted unlawfully in his attempt to arrest Appellant, and thus Appellant was entitled to act in self protection if the facts warrant it. He should have received an instruction to that effect, along with an instruction from the judge that the arrest in this case was unlawful. Thus I would reverse, and remand for a new trial. Schroder, J ., joins this dissenting opinion . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Roy Alyette Durham Il Assistant Public Advocate Department of Public Advocacy 100 Fair Oaks Lane - Suite 302 Frankfort, Kentucky 40601 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway Attorney General Stephen Bryant Humphress Assistant Attorney General Office of Criminal Appeals 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, Kentucky 40601-8204