Case Title: Rambo v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 254, 2007

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-12-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
ALYSSA RAMBO, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 254, 2007 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Family Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for Sussex County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Case No. 0611020162 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  September 19, 2007 
Decided:  December 13, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Family Court.  REVERSED and REMANDED. 
 
 
Tasha Marie Stevens, Fuqua and Yori, PA, Georgetown, Delaware for 
appellant. 
 
 
James T. Wakley, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware for 
appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice: 
 
2
Defendant-Appellant 
Alyssa 
Rambo 
appeals 
her 
adjudications 
of 
delinquency in Family Court for Attempted Murder First Degree, Robbery First 
Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, and 
Conspiracy Second Degree.  She argues that her convictions must be reversed 
because the police did not comply with Miranda1 when taking her statement and 
thus it should have been suppressed.  She also argues that her conviction for 
Attempted Murder First Degree should be reversed because the trial judge found 
her guilty based on the elements of felony murder.  The State agrees with Rambo 
that the trial judge erred because “attempted” felony murder is not a recognized 
offense in Delaware. 
We hold that Rambo’s statements should have been suppressed as it is not 
clear from the record that she knowingly and voluntarily waived her rights.  We 
also agree with Rambo and the State that the trial judge erred by finding her guilty 
of attempted first degree murder after incorrectly applying the elements of felony 
murder.  Delaware does not recognize attempted felony murder as a crime.  
Accordingly, we reverse her convictions and remand to the Family Court for a new 
delinquency hearing without her suppressed statement. 
                                                 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
3
FACTS 
On November 24, 2006, 15 year old Rambo called 32 year old Antonio 
Mollack and asked him to pick her up from the Coverdale Crossroads playground.  
Mollack picked Rambo up as planned.  While they sat in his vehicle, Rambo 
reached over, turned off the car, and removed Mollack’s keys from the ignition.  At 
about that time, two masked men approached both sides of the car.  While holding 
a gun to Mollack’s head, one of the men demanded money and fired shots toward 
Mollack at close range.  After the shooting, the two masked men and Rambo fled 
the scene. 
Unharmed, Mollack called 911 and reported the incident.  Delaware State 
Police Detective Timothy Conway arrived at the scene to investigate.  That 
evening Detective Conway contacted Rambo at her primary residence, her 
grandparents’ home.  In the presence of her grandparents and another family 
member, Rambo denied any involvement in the incident, but identified a possible 
suspect. 
Four days later, on November 28, 2006, Conway contacted Rambo’s family 
and requested that they bring her to the police station for an interview and possible 
arrest.  Rambo’s grandmother and a 23 year old family friend, Shika Cannon, 
accompanied her to the police station.  Conway advised them that only one adult 
 
4
would be allowed to accompany Rambo into the interview room.  Cannon sat in on 
Conway’s tape-recorded interview of Rambo. 
During the interview, Conway read Rambo her Miranda rights and then 
stated:  
Conway: Ok do you guys the both of you, do you understand your 
rights?  Ok and having these rights in mind, ok do you wish to talk? 
 
Voice:  Yes  
 
Conway:  Just remember you can stop, you don’t feel comfortable 
answering a question, you don’t have to. 
 
The State later charged Rambo with first degree attempted murder, first 
degree robbery, first degree conspiracy, and possession of a firearm during the 
commission of a felony.  On April 12, 2007, a Family Court judge conducted a 
suppression hearing focused on Rambo’s statement at her November 28th 
interview with Conway.  On direct examination, Conway acknowledged that the 
recording was not clear on Rambo’s or Cannon’s response when he asked both 
whether they understood Rambo’s rights.  He also testified that Rambo appeared to 
understand what he asked and indicated “non-verbally” that she understood. 
The Family Court judge denied the motion to suppress and admitted the 
statements based on an implied waiver theory.  At the end of Rambo’s delinquency 
hearing, the trial judge found her delinquent on the charges of first degree robbery, 
second degree conspiracy, and possession of a firearm.  The trial judge reserved his 
 
5
decision on the attempted first degree murder charge, but later adjudicated her 
delinquent on that charge as well. 
DISCUSSION 
I. 
Miranda Violation 
Rambo first contends that the trial judge incorrectly denied her motion to 
suppress and relied on her statements taken in violation of Miranda to convict her 
on four criminal charges.  A ruling on a motion to suppress is reviewed for abuse 
of discretion.2  We review an alleged constitutional violation relating to a trial 
judge’s evidentiary ruling de novo.3  A juvenile defendant’s confession must 
receive “special scrutiny.”4  The State bears the burden of proving the necessary 
voluntariness, understanding, and waiver of Miranda rights.5 
The judicial inquiry into waiver has two distinct dimensions: (1) “the 
relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the 
product of free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or 
deception;” and (2) “the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both 
the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to 
                                                 
2 Lilly v. State, 649 A.2d 1055, 1059 (Del. 1994). 
 
3 Flonnory v. State, 893 A.2d 507, 515 (Del. 2006). 
 
4 Smith v. State, 918 A.2d 1144, 1149 (Del. 2007) (citing Haug v. State, 406 A.2d 38, 43 (Del. 
1979)). 
 
5 See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169 (1986); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 
(1972). 
 
6
abandon it.”6  The second part of the inquiry requires a “totality of the 
circumstances” standard that evaluates “the juvenile’s age, experience, education, 
background, and intelligence, and . . . whether he has the capacity to understand 
the warnings given to him, the nature of his . . . rights, and the consequences of 
waiving those rights.”7   
Conway could not testify that Rambo herself said “yes” when asked if she 
wished to talk after he read her Miranda rights.  Upon review of the audiotape 
recording of the detective’s interview with Rambo and Cannon, we conclude that 
Rambo did not explicitly waive her rights.  The detective breezed through reading 
the Miranda rights quickly, followed quickly by the question, “Do you want to 
talk?”  Conway also mentioned that he had explained Rambo’s rights to her 
grandfather before the initial meeting at her home.  While an audible “yes” is heard 
on the tape, the detective, without clarifying who responded, continued with more 
introductory statements.  After listening to the entire audiotape, we conclude that 
Cannon, not Rambo, responded “yes,” (that Rambo wanted to talk) presumably 
waiving Rambo’s Miranda rights.  Rambo’s young voice, so distinctive that it 
could not be mistaken for that of her family friend, did not respond independently 
of Cannon.  Rambo did not say at any time that she understood her rights or that 
                                                 
6 Smith, 918 A.2d at 1149 (quoting Marine v. State, 607 A.2d 1185, 1195 (Del. 1992)). 
 
7 Id. (quoting Fare v. Michael, 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979)). 
 
7
she voluntarily wished to speak to Conway and waive those rights by doing so.  
After Conway finished his prefatory remarks, Cannon suggested that Rambo 
should cooperate.  The conversation continues between Rambo and Conway with 
frequent reminders from Conway that Rambo should tell the truth.  Nowhere did 
Rambo explicitly waive her Miranda rights. 
In the clear absence of an express waiver, the validity of Rambo’s alleged 
waiver of her Miranda rights depends on a “totality of the circumstances” test to 
determine whether there was an “implied” waiver.  After noting at the outset that it 
was a very difficult decision, the trial judge found facts that could support an 
implied waiver.  He found that Rambo cooperated and responded to questions in 
the interview, and that despite her age, Rambo was street smart, intelligent, and 
familiar with the criminal justice system.  The trial judge noted that despite the 
speed at which they were recited, Conway did read Rambo the Miranda warnings, 
the words of which were understandable on the audiotape.  Conway also testified 
that Rambo shook her head (implying in the affirmative without explicitly saying 
so) throughout the interview and that Rambo never gave him the feeling that she 
did not understand what he was saying. 
Yet the record also supports a finding that only Cannon waived Rambo’s 
Miranda rights and not Rambo herself.  Stricter scrutiny must be applied to the 
facts testing the voluntariness of a confession in any case where a juvenile is 
 
8
involved.  Conway hurriedly read the Miranda warnings, mentioning that he had 
already explained them to Rambo’s grandfather, accepted the “yes” he received, 
and went quickly into his lengthy prefatory remarks.  The record is not clear that 
Rambo affirmatively waived her rights or even was shaking her head affirmatively 
in response to Conway’s remarks.  After considering those weaknesses in light of 
the strict scrutiny accorded to juvenile confessions, we cannot conclude under the 
“totality of the circumstances” test that Rambo knowingly and voluntarily waived 
her rights on an implied waiver theory. 
It is a well-settled principle in Delaware law that if a defendant attempts to 
invoke her Miranda rights, the interrogating officer has an obligation under 
Delaware law to clear up any confusion before continuing to ask questions.8  In 
this respect, the Delaware Constitution offers more protection to defendants than 
does federal law.  While Rambo did not attempt to invoke her Miranda rights, 
distinguishing these circumstances from previous cases, nevertheless there was 
confusion over whether Rambo herself had indeed waived her Miranda rights.  
When one combines stricter scrutiny of juvenile confessions with the police’s 
obligation to clear up confusion about a suspect’s invocation of Miranda rights in 
all circumstances, we believe that Delaware case law supports the conclusion that 
                                                 
8 See, e.g., Garvey v. State, 873 A.2d 291, 296-97 (Del. 2004); Norcross v. State, 816 A.2d 757, 
762 (Del. 2003); Draper v. State, 2002 Del. LEXIS 51 (Del. 2002); Crawford v. State, 580 A.2d 
571, 577 (1990). 
 
 
9
where there is any ambiguity about whether a juvenile defendant has herself 
waived her Miranda rights voluntarily and knowingly, the interrogating officer has 
an obligation to clarify the ambiguity contemporaneously on the record before 
continuing with the interview.9  In this case, Conway may have easily cured the 
issue of Rambo’s voluntary and knowing waiver of her Miranda rights by taking 
the time to ask Rambo herself to reply and noting her reply in the taped record.  
The trial judge highlighted the same weaknesses in his ruling from the bench on 
the motion to suppress.  He even suggested that in the future Conway read the 
warnings more slowly, get a signed waiver, and orally acknowledge on the 
audiotape exactly who replied, even though, in the trial judge’s view, those steps 
are not explicitly required by law.  While the trial judge, to be fair, correctly noted 
no specific case so holding before today, under the totality of the circumstances 
here and a fair reading after cases cited in footnotes 4 and 8, supra, the Motion to 
Suppress should have been granted. 
II. 
Attempted First Degree Murder Charge 
The parties agree that the attempted first degree murder charge should be 
vacated because the trial judge found Rambo guilty based on an analysis of the 
elements of felony murder.  The State charged Rambo with attempted intentional 
                                                 
9 Id.; see supra note 4. 
 
 
10
murder under 11 Del. C. § 636(a)(1).10  The trial judge acknowledged that there 
was no proof that Rambo intended to kill the victim, but nevertheless went on to 
find that it was reasonably foreseeable for Rambo to think that an attempted 
murder would have been committed during the commission of the robbery.  Thus, 
the trial judge found her guilty based on the elements of felony murder in 11 Del. 
C. § 636(a)(2), which states that “[w]hile engaged in the commission of, or attempt 
to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit any felony, the 
person recklessly causes the death of another person.”11 
Under Delaware law, a person may be found to have attempted to engage in 
a crime if the person: 
(1) 
Intentionally engages in conduct which would constitute the 
 
crime if the attendant circumstances were as the person believes 
 
them to be; or 
 
(2)  
Intentionally does or omits to do anything which, under the 
 
circumstances as the person believes them to be, is a substantial 
 
step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in the 
 
commission of the crime by the person.12 
 
Attempt requires intent and as the Criminal Code Commentary succinctly 
points out, “one cannot be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime which may 
                                                 
10 11 Del C. § 636(a)(1). 
 
11 11 Del C. § 636(a)(2). 
 
12 11 Del. C. § 531. 
 
 
11
only be committed recklessly.”13  Attempted felony murder is not recognized to be 
a crime in Delaware and thus Rambo’s adjudication of delinquency for attempted 
first degree murder must be vacated. 
After reviewing the record, we remand for a new delinquency hearing 
without the suppressed statement on the remaining three charges.  Although the 
trial judge noted that the statement did weigh significantly into his decision, the 
State did offer other physical and testamentary evidence in its case against Rambo.  
There are many notations of “inaudible” throughout the transcript of the 
delinquency hearing, particularly during Rambo’s testimony.  Without a complete 
and accurate representation of the evidence presented, we cannot conclude whether 
or not the State proved Rambo’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.14  Therefore we 
remand to the Family Court for a new hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE Rambo’s adjudication of 
delinquency for Attempted Murder First Degree, and REVERSE and REMAND to 
the Family Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion on the 
remaining charges. 
                                                 
13 DELAWARE CRIMINAL CODE WITH COMMENTARY 153 (1973). 
 
14 In passing, we note the advisability of Family Court securing a more accurate and reliable 
reporting system for serious charges of delinquency such as “attempted intentional murder” – 
which most assuredly will be appealed on a finding of delinquency and where a reliable record is 
a must for appropriate review.