Case Title: IN THE INTEREST OF CC, a minor child: BSC, v. NATRONA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES

Citation: 102 P.3d 890, 2004 WY 167

Docket Number: 441507

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Cite as: 2004 WY 167, 102 P.3d 890

 
 
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 
 
                                                                                                            

 
 
IN THE 
INTEREST OF CC,

a minor 
child:

 
 
BSC,

 
 
Appellant

(Respondent),

 
 
v.

 
 
NATRONA 
COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF

FAMILY 
SERVICES,

 
 
Appellee

(Petitioner).

 
 
Appeal from theDistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

BSC, 
pro se

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney 
General; Dan S. Wilde, Senior Assistant Attorney General

 
 

Guardian 
Ad Litem:

            
Wendy S. Owens, Wyoming Legal Services, Inc., Casper, Wyoming

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 
 
 
 

 

 
GOLDEN, Justice. 

 
 

[¶1]          
Pro se 
Appellant 
BSC appeals from the district court's order terminating his parental rights to 
CC.  He claims that the district 
court erred by refusing to appoint an attorney to represent him and by refusing 
to continue the termination hearing after learning that BSC had ingested 
medication which could affect his ability to defend himself.  BSC also claims Appellee Natrona County 
Department of Family Services (DFS) failed to follow its legal obligations to 
notify him when it took CC into custody.  
We conclude that clear and convincing evidence was presented at the 
hearing to support the district court's termination decision and do not find any 
errors mandating reversal in this case.  
We, therefore, affirm the district court's 
decision.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]          
BSC 
presents an unconventional list of issues on appeal:

 
 
1.         Does 
Wyoming 
recognize Right to Counsel?

 
 
2.         Are 
State Employee's [sic] above State Statutory obligations?

 
 
3.         Does 
Wyoming 
recognize father's right to familial association?

 
 
4.         Can 
D.F.S. conceal a child 7 months and fault parent for failure to 
support?

 
 
5.         Must 
Guardian ad litem comply with Statutory obligations?

 
 
6.         Do 
Wyoming Courts 
recognize medications affecting ability to defend?

 
 
7.         Can a 
Judicial officer ignore blatant violations of Due Process?

 
 
8.         Do 
Wyoming courts recognize Double Jeopardy clause 
of United 
States and Wyoming 
Constitutions?

 
 
9.         Do 
Wyoming Courts 
recognize conflicting testimony?

 
 
 DFS phrases the issues as 
follows:

 
 

I.                     
Whether 
the district court's finding that appellant's parental rights to CC should be 
terminated was established by clear and convincing 
evidence?

 
 

II.                   
Whether 
appellant's lack of counsel at the hearing of September 23, 2003, violated the 
Wyoming or 
United States Constitution?

 
 

III.                  
Whether 
the district court erred in proceeding with the termination hearing upon notice 
appellant was taking medication?

 
 

IV.               
Whether 
this appeal is without merit and is unsupported by cogent argument or pertinent 
authority? 

 
 
The 
Guardian ad Litem for CC phrased the issues as follows:

 
 

1.                  
Should 
Appellant's Appeal Be Dismissed, Or, in the Alternative, Should Sanctions be 
Imposed Against Appellant Due to Appellant's Failure to Comply With the Wyoming 
Rules of Appellate Procedure?

 
 

2.                  
Did 
the Trial Court Properly Deny Appellant's Request for 
Counsel?

 
 

3.                  
Did the State Violate Its Rules and Regulations, and if so, 
Did Such Violations Affect Appellant's Rights?

 
 

4.                  
Does a Parent's Right to Familial Association Outweigh the 
Child's Rights?

 
 

5.                  
Did the Trial Court Properly Consider Appellant's Failure 
to Pay Support?

 
 

6.                  
Does the Child's Guardian ad Litem Have a Duty to Request 
Child Support?

 
 

7.                  
Did the Trial Court Properly Proceed with Hearing on the 
State's Petition to Terminate Appellant's Parental Rights?

 
 

8.                  
Was It Error to Receive Evidence of Unsubstantiated 
Allegations of Abuse and/or Neglect in an Action for Termination of Parental 
Rights?

 
 

9.                  
Did the Trial Court Properly Weigh the Evidence?

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]          
CC was adopted by BSC and JC on May 1, 1995, when he was 
one and one-half years old.  To say the least, CC's family life with BSC 
and JC was less than idyllic.  Natrona County DFS investigated allegations 
that BSC and JC had abused or neglected CC in 1995 and 1996, although the 
allegations were not substantiated.  In 1996 or 1997, the family apparently moved 
from NatronaCounty to 
New Mexico.  New 
Mexico authorities filed a criminal action against BSC, 
charging him with sexually abusing CC's stepbrother.  BSC eventually pled 
guilty to one count of criminal sexual contact with CC's stepbrother.  The New 
Mexico conviction was actually BSC's second conviction 
for a sex crime.  He had received a deferred sentence in 
Texas for criminal sexual contact in 
1989.  JC was 
also convicted of criminal conduct associated with the New 
Mexico case.  

 
 
[¶4]      BSC placed CC with 
the MM family in Natrona 
County, Wyoming, to conceal him from New 
Mexico authorities during the pendency of his criminal 
case.  CC was 
neglected in the MM home, and DFS removed him from that home and placed him in 
protective custody.  
Although BSC and JC were reunified with CC in 1997, both parents were 
subsequently sentenced to prison in New 
Mexico for their respective crimes. Despite having 
knowledge of the problems in the MM household, BSC and JC again placed CC in 
MM's care during their terms of incarceration. 

 
 

[¶5]          
After JC was released from prison, she retrieved CC from 
the MM home.  Not surprisingly, CC suffered from a number of 
emotional and mental problems, including attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, and depressive disorder.  In January 2002, JC 
voluntarily relinquished custody of CC to DFS because she could not handle his 
behavioral problems.   DFS placed CC in foster care and 
attempted to rehabilitate JC so that the family could be reunited.  DFS's efforts 
failed, and JC agreed to a plan for CC to be adopted by other parents.  In the end, 
however, JC refused to execute a document relinquishing her parental rights 
because she was "scared to death that [BSC] could get custody of CC and there 
would be no way in hell that I could stop it."  

 
 

[¶6]          
In July 2002, DFS notified BSC by mail that CC was in its 
custody, and DFS was in the process of developing a permanency plan.  In response to that 
notification, BSC telephoned DFS.  He told the DFS employee that "he was 
disabled" and "fixing to start some pretty heavy duty medication" that had the 
potential of causing "neuropsychotic episodes."  BSC stated that he had not seen CC for more 
than four years.  DFS considered the possibility of placing CC 
with BSC in New Mexico and 
requested that New Mexico authorities 
perform a home study upon BSC under the Interstate Compact for Placement of 
Children.  The 
State of New Mexico advised DFS 
that it could not perform a home study upon BSC because their policies 
prohibited conducting studies upon anyone who has committed a sexual offense 
against a minor.  
DFS continued to work with BSC and provided BSC with opportunities to 
participate in meetings to determine CC's future, but he failed to do so.  

 
 

[¶7]          
DFS filed petitions to terminate JC's and BSC's parental 
rights to CC.  
The petition listed the following bases for termination of BSC's parental 
rights to CC:  
1)  CC 
was abused and neglected, rehabilitation efforts were unsuccessful, and the 
health and safety of CC would be seriously jeopardized by returning him to BSC 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(iii); 2) CC had been in foster care 
under the responsibility of the State of Wyoming for fifteen (15) out of the 
most recent twenty-two (22) months and BSC was unfit to have custody and control 
of CC pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a)(v);  3) CC was left in 
the care of another person without provision for the child's support and without 
communication from BSC for at least one year pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-309(a)(i); 4) other aggravating circumstances existed which indicated that 
there was little likelihood that services to the family would result in 
successful reunification pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(c)(iii).  A guardian ad litem 
was appointed to represent CC, and BSC was served with the petition on August 
11, 2003.  BSC 
filed a pro se 
response and motion to dismiss the petition.  

 
 

[¶8]          
A termination hearing commenced on September 23, 2003.  At the beginning of 
the hearing, BSC verbally asked the district court to appoint an attorney to 
represent him in the matter.  He also requested a continuance, stating that 
he was unable to participate in the hearing because he was heavily medicated. 
 The district 
court refused to appoint an attorney to represent him and denied his request for 
a continuance.  The district court heard the evidence and 
issued a decision terminating JC's and BSC's parental rights to CC.  JC did not contest 
the district court's decision, but BSC appealed from the district court's 
decision. 

 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 

[¶9]          
After reviewing the parties' briefs, we conclude that there 
are four substantive issues in this case:  1) Whether the district court erred by 
refusing to appoint counsel to represent BSC at the termination proceedings; 2) 
whether the district court erred by refusing to continue the hearing because BSC 
was taking medication; 3) whether there was substantial evidence to terminate 
BSC's parental rights; and 4) whether the state failed to follow its own rules 
and regulations and, if so, whether that failure prejudiced BSC. 

            

 
 
A.        Standard of Review

 

[¶10]      Each of these issues must be evaluated keeping in mind the 
principle that parental rights are fundamental in nature.  See, e.g., RS v. Dep't of Family Services, 2004 WY 87, ¶11, 94 P.2d 1025, ¶11 (Wyo. 2004); Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Services of Durham County, 
North Carolina, 452 U.S. 18, 27, 101 S. Ct. 2153, 2159-60, 68 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1981).  The United States 
Supreme Court has stated:

 
 
This Court's decisions have by now made plain beyond the 
need for multiple citation that a parent's desire for and right to "the 
companionship, care, custody and management of his or her children" is an 
important interest that "undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful 
countervailing interest, protection."

 
 

Lassiter, 452 U.S.  at 27, 101 S. Ct.  at 2159-60 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 
405 U.S. 645, 651, 
92 S. Ct. 1208, 1212, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972)).   

 
 
[¶11]   In recognition of the importance of the 
fundamental right of parents to associate with their children, we have adopted 
the following standard of review for parental termination actions:

 

 
Due to the tension between the fundamental liberty of 
familial association and the compelling state interest in protecting the welfare 
of children, application of statutes for termination of 
parental 
rights is a matter for strict scrutiny. TR v. 
Washakie Cty. Dep't of Pub. Assistance & Soc. Servs., 736 P.2d 712, 715 
(Wyo. 1987).  As part of this strict scrutiny standard, a 
case for termination of parental rights 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309(a) (Michie 
1997); In Interest of JG, 742 P.2d 770, 773 
(Wyo. 1987); D.S. v. 
Dep't of Pub. Assistance & Soc. Servs.,  607 P.2d 911, 919 (Wyo. 1980). Clear and 
convincing evidence is that kind of proof that would persuade a trier of fact 
that the truth of the contention is highly probable.  Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 982 
(Wyo. 1984).   Rigorous though this standard may be, 
we apply our traditional principles of evidentiary review when a party 
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination.  Matter of SYM, 924 P.2d 985, 987 
(Wyo. 1996).   Thus, we examine the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the party prevailing below, assuming all favorable 
evidence to be true while discounting conflicting evidence presented by the 
unsuccessful party.  
Id.; D.S. v. Dep't of Pub. Assistance & Soc. Servs., 
607 P.2d at 919-20; In Interest of JG, 742 P.2d  at 
733. 

 
 

SD v. Carbon Cty. Dep't of Family Servs., 2002 WY 168, ¶5, 57 P.3d 1235, ¶5 (Wyo. 
2002) (quoting In re ZKP, 979 P.2d 953, 956 (Wyo. 1999)). See also TOC v. TND, 2002 WY 76, ¶¶9, 10, 46 P.3d 863, ¶¶9, 10 (Wyo. 
2002); EBH v. Hot Springs Dep't of Family Servs., 2001 WY 100, ¶14, 33 P.3d 172, ¶14 (Wyo. 
2001). 

  

 
 
B.        Appointment of Attorney

 

[¶12]      BSC claims that the district court erred by refusing to 
appoint an attorney to represent him at the termination hearing.   Section 14-2-318(a) 
provides authority for the district court to appoint counsel for a parent in a 
termination proceeding.  That statute states, in pertinent part: "The 
court may appoint counsel for any party who is 
indigent.  
Indigency shall be established by written affidavit signed and sworn to 
by the party or sworn testimony made a part of the record of the proceedings." 
 Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 14-2-318(a) (LexisNexis 2003) (emphasis added).

 
 

[¶13]      BSC's request for counsel came at the eleventh hour -- 
after all the parties and witnesses had appeared at the district court for the 
hearing.  The 
district court reviewed the record and concluded that BSC had not filed an 
affidavit of indigency in the termination proceeding.  The court also 
noted that, although BSC had filed a response to the State's petition to 
terminate his parental rights and a motion to dismiss on his own behalf in the 
weeks prior to the hearing, he did not request an attorney.  The court then 
ruled that his request for an attorney was untimely and denied BSC's request for 
counsel.  

 
 

[¶14]      In the Interest of KMM, 957 P.2d 296 (Wyo. 
1998), addressed a similar situation.  In that case, the father complained on appeal 
about the district court's failure to appoint an attorney to represent him at 
the termination hearing.  Id. 
at 297.  We 
noted that, while pro se litigants are entitled to some leniency, "the 
proper administration of justice requires reasonable adherence to the rules and 
requirements of the court." Id. at 298.    Nevertheless, 
we ruled that, because the father in KMM did not file a proper motion for appointment of 
counsel, he could not complain about his lack of counsel.  Id.  We noted, in 
particular, that "[t]he fact that the father filed several motions in this case 
convinces us that his failure to file a motion for a court appointed attorney 
was not the result of his inability to understand the procedural 
requirement[.]"  
Id.

 
 

[¶15]      In the case at hand, BSC's request was substantively 
deficient because he did not establish his indigency by affidavit or other sworn 
testimony.  
Moreover, his request was untimely.  He had taken it upon himself to file other 
pre-trial motions and, yet, he did not request an attorney until the hearing had 
commenced.  
Thus, we are convinced in this case that BSC, like the father in KMM, was aware of 
the procedural requirements for appointment of an attorney.  The district court, 
therefore, properly exercised its discretion under § 14-2-318(a) in denying 
BSC's request for counsel.   

 
 

[¶16]      Our ruling on the statute does not, however, end our 
inquiry.  The 
question of whether or not BSC was entitled to have an attorney appointed to 
represent him at the termination hearing must also be addressed in the context 
of the constitutional rights of a parent.  "Due to the fundamental nature of the rights 
affected by a termination action, the procedures involved must satisfy due 
process."  RHF v. RMC, 774 P.2d 624, 628 
(Wyo. 1989).  See also LP v. Natrona Cty. 
Dep't of Public Assistance and Social Servs., 679 P.2d 976 (Wyo. 1984). The United States Supreme Court 
has stated that "fundamental fairness may be maintained in parental rights 
termination proceedings even when some procedures are mandated only on a 
case-by-case basis, rather than through rules of general application."  Santosky v. Kramer, 
455 U.S. 745, 757, 
102 S. Ct. 1388, 1396, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982).  

 
 

[¶17]      The United States Supreme Court specifically addressed the 
issue of whether an indigent parent is entitled to be represented by counsel at 
a termination of parental rights proceeding in Lassiter, 
supra.  
That Court ruled that, when the parent's physical personal liberty is not 
in jeopardy in a parental termination proceeding, appointment of counsel is not 
required in all instances.  Lassiter, 452 U.S.  at 26, 101 S. Ct.  at 2159.  Instead, the 
factors identified in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903, 47 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1976), must be evaluated in determining whether 
due process mandates that counsel should be appointed in a particular case.  Three elements 
should be taken into account:  "the private interests at stake, the 
government's interest, and the risk that the procedures used will lead to 
erroneous decisions."  
Lassiter, 
452 U.S.  at 27, 101 S. Ct.  at 2159.  

 
 

[¶18]      In weighing the Eldridge factors in parental termination cases, in 
general, the United States Supreme Court remarked that, because the parent-child 
relationship is fundamental in nature, termination of that relationship works "a 
unique kind of deprivation."  Lassiter, 452 U.S.  at 27, 101 S. Ct.  at 2160.  Consequently, a 
parent's interest in the accuracy and justness of the decision is "commanding." 
Id.  On the other side of 
the scale, the government has "an urgent interest in the welfare of the child, 
[and, therefore,] shares the parent's interest in an accurate and just 
decision." Id.   The Supreme 
Court recognized that the availability of appointed counsel may serve both 
interests by increasing the efficacy of the adversarial system, which presumes 
that "accurate and just results are most likely obtained through the equal 
contest of opposed interests."  Id. 
at 28, 101 S. Ct.  at 2160.  

 
 

[¶19]      The United 
States Supreme Court also recognized that the 
government has an economic interest in avoiding the expense of appointed counsel 
for the parent and "the cost of the lengthened proceedings" the appointed 
attorney may cause.  
Id.  The Supreme Court 
stated, however, that "though the State's pecuniary interest is legitimate, it 
is hardly significant enough to overcome private interests" involved in parental 
termination cases and, for that matter, the cost is de minimus compared 
to the costs of appointed counsel in criminal action.  Id.

 

[¶20]      Finally, the Supreme Court considered the risk that a 
parent could be erroneously deprived of his child because the parent was not 
represented by counsel.  Id.  In weighing 
that issue, the Court should look at the complexity of the issues involved in 
the particular parental rights termination case.  Id. 
at 30, 101 S. Ct.  at 2161.  When expert medical or psychiatric testimony 
is implicated, the need for appointed counsel is, obviously, greater. Id.  In addition, the 
sophistication of the parent must also be taken into account.  Id. The United States 
Supreme Court summarized its conclusions about an indigent parent's right to 
counsel in a parental right termination case as follows:  

 
 
the parent's interest is an extremely important one . . . ; 
the State shares with the parent an interest in a correct decision, has a 
relatively weak pecuniary interest, and in some but not all cases, has a 
possibly stronger interest in informal procedures; and the complexity of the 
proceeding and the incapacity of the uncounseled parent could be, but would not 
always be, great enough to make the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the 
parent's rights insupportably high.

 
 
If, in a given case, the parent's interests were at their 
strongest, the State's interests were at their weakest, and the risks of error 
were at their peak, it could not be said that the Eldridge factors 
did not overcome the presumption against the right to appointed counsel, and 
that due process did not therefore require the appointment of counsel.  But since the Eldridge factors 
will not always be so distributed, and since, "due process is not so rigid as to 
require that the significant interests in informality, flexibility and economy 
must always be sacrificed, Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. [778] at 788, 93 S.Ct. 
[1756] at 1762 [(1973)], neither can we say that the Constitution requires the 
appointment of counsel at every parental termination proceeding.  We, therefore, 
adopt the standard found appropriate in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, and leave the decision whether due 
process calls for the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in termination 
proceedings to be answered in the first instance by the trial court, subject, of 
course, to appellate review.  

 
 
 Lassiter, 452 U.S.  at 31-32, 101 S. Ct.  at 
2161-62.  After 
having reached the conclusion that the determination of whether an indigent 
parent is entitled to appointed counsel should be made on a case-by-case basis, 
the Supreme Court applied the Eldridge factors to the specific facts of the Lassiter case, and 
concluded that the indigent parent was not entitled to appointed counsel in that 
case.  Id. 
at 32-33, 101 S. Ct.  at 2162-63.   

 
 

[¶21]      Turning to the case at bar, we note that there is no 
indication in the record that BSC would face any new or separate criminal 
consequences as a result of his neglect or abuse of CC.  Since his personal 
liberty was not threatened, he did not have an automatic right to counsel at the 
termination hearing.  See Lassiter, 452 U.S.  at 
26, 101 S. Ct.  at 2159; Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373, 99 S. Ct. 1158, 1162, 
59 L. Ed. 2d 383 (1979).  Following the guidance of the United States 
Supreme Court in Lassiter, we must, therefore, consider the specific 
facts of the case at bar in light of the Eldridge factors to determine whether the district 
court denied BSC due process of law when it refused to appoint counsel to 
represent him at the termination hearing.   As in all parental termination 
proceedings, BSC's interests in maintaining his familial relationship with CC 
and in assuring that the decision is just and accurate are great.  On the other hand, 
the State obviously has a strong interest in CC's welfare.  Considering CC's 
special needs and the long period of time his familial status has been 
unsettled, the State had an interest in a final resolution of the matter.  If the district 
court had decided to appoint counsel for BSC, the hearing would have had to be 
continued until a later date  further delaying a permanent placement for 
CC.  

 
 

[¶22]      The matters for deliberation at the parental termination 
proceeding were not complex.  No expert testimony was offered at the 
hearing.  The 
issues relied upon by the State to justify termination of parental rights were 
fairly simple.  
They included the amount of time CC had been in foster care, the length 
of the period of non-communication between BSC and CC, and BSC's failure to 
provide financial support for CC.  The other issue considered at the termination 
hearing was BSC's fitness as a parent in light of his past treatment of CC and 
his criminal conviction for having sexual contact with a minor.  Obviously, an 
attorney may have addressed some of the more technical aspects of the evidence 
better than BSC did.  
Nevertheless, considering the relative simplicity of the issues at the 
hearing, we believe that the issues were adequately addressed at the hearing, 
even though BSC was not represented by counsel.  Weighing all of the factors together, we 
conclude that BSC's due process rights were not violated when the district court 
refused to appoint counsel to represent him at the termination proceeding.      

 
 
 
 
C.        BSC's Use of Medication

 

[¶23]      BSC  argues that the district court erred by 
refusing to continue the hearing because he was taking prescription drugs at the 
time of the hearing.  
  

 
 
"This Court has consistently held that the granting of a 
motion for continuance is within the discretion of the trial court.  The standard of 
review, therefore, is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its 
discretion by denying the continuance."

 
 

Roose v. State, 753 P.2d 574, 578 (Wyo. 1988) (quoting Gentry v. State, 724 P.2d 450, 451 
(Wyo. 1986)).  See also 
Cardenas v. State, 811 P.2d 989, 994 
(Wyo. 1991).  

 
 

[¶24]      At the beginning of the termination hearing, BSC requested 
a continuance on the basis that he was "heavily, heavily medicated for one thing 
and cannot deal with manipulation."  In response to BSC's verbal request for a 
continuation, the district court stated:  "I do want to understand exactly what kind of 
circumstances we have with respect to any kinds of inability to understand or 
comprehend these proceedings."  BSC responded:  "I have no inability to understand or 
comprehend.  I 
have a problem with being able to respond in a timely fashion.  I will remember 90 
percent of the proceeding, maybe, by the time I get to New 
Mexico."  

 
 

[¶25]      The district court reviewed the medications that BSC was 
taking and a transcript of a December 30, 2002, proceeding in a juvenile matter 
in which BSC represented himself.  The court noted that BSC had been taking the 
same medications during that prior proceeding.  The court stated:

 
 
            
Based upon the circumstances with respect to [BSC's] prescriptions and 
medications, I have reviewed the transcript from proceedings conducted in 
December 30, 2002, a time period at which time [BSC] would have been ingesting 
his prescription medication and has indicated to the Court that he has done so 
since June of 2001 in one case and September of 2001 in the other.

 
 
            
I have reviewed the transcript and particularly I have noted carefully 
the responses of [BSC] to the Court, as well as the responses to questions and 
arguments that he presented.  Based upon that transcript, it does not appear 
to this Court that he has any difficulty in understanding or comprehending or 
meaningfully participating in that proceeding; and there's no indication in that 
proceeding, at which time he was taking the medication, that he has any 
difficulty.

 
 
            
In addition, [BSC] had been aware of this proceeding well in advance of 
two weeks. Actually, specifically, the notice was sent out on September 10, 
2003.  [BSC] 
was aware of his need to take medication.  And has been familiar with the Court 
processes; and, in fact, on September 11th had filed his 
Response and Motion to Dismiss, in which he does not indicate any difficulty in 
comprehending or understanding the issues before the Court today or at that 
time.  

 
 
            
Based upon that, as well as based upon the fact that we are here to begin 
this proceeding with the State prepared to call the witnesses to support its 
petition and [BSC's] prior knowledge of his medication uses, I don't see any 
evidence to suggest to me difficulty in comprehending or participating 
meaningfully in this process.  And for those reasons, I will decline to 
continue this matter at this time. 

 
 

[¶26]      The district court conducted a comprehensive review of 
BSC's concerns about his ability to participate in the hearing in light of his 
medication use.  
BSC acknowledged that he was taking the same medication as he had been 
when he represented himself at the December 30, 2002, hearing.  BSC did not provide 
any evidence which suggested that he was suffering from greater impairment at 
the September 2003 hearing than he was as the December 2002 hearing.   

 
 

[¶27]      Moreover, the timing of BSC's request for a continuance is 
suspect.  BSC 
was aware of his purported impairment prior to the hearing, but he did not 
address the issues in his pretrial submissions.  Instead, he waited until the hearing had 
commenced to request the continuance on the basis of his medication use.  BSC's request for a 
continuance seems to have been a tactic for delaying the hearing and, 
consequently, the final determination of CC's future.  We conclude, 
therefore, that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying BSC's 
request for a continuance.

 
 
 
 
D.        Sufficiency of the Evidence

 

[¶28]      Although BSC does not present this issue in a structured 
argument, he does, in numerous places in his brief, question the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the district court's determination that his parental 
rights to CC should be terminated.  The district court found that there was clear 
and convincing evidence to terminate parental rights under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-309.   In particular, the district court ruled that 
BSC's parental rights should be terminated because:  1) CC was left in 
the care and custody of another person, without provision for the child's 
support and without communication from the absent parent for a period of least 
one year; 2) CC had been left in foster care under the responsibility of the 
State of Wyoming for at least fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months and 
that BSC was unfit to have custody and control of CC; and 3) aggravating 
circumstances existed which indicate that there was little likelihood that 
services to the family would result in successful reunification.   Although the State 
had also alleged that termination was appropriate because CC had been abused and 
neglected, the district court found it unnecessary to address that basis for 
termination in light of the fact that each of its prior rulings was sufficient 
to justify termination. 

 
 

[¶29]      Section 14-2-309 sets forth several independent bases for 
termination of parental rights.  That statute states, in pertinent part:  

 
 

(a) The parent-child legal relationship may be terminated 
if any one (1) or more of the following facts is established by clear and 
convincing evidence:

 (i) The child has been left in the care of 
another person without provision for the child's support and without 
communication from the absent parent for a period of at least one (1) year. In 
making the above determination, the court may disregard occasional 
contributions, or incidental contacts and communications;

 
 
* * * * 

 
 

            
(iii) The child has been abused or neglected by the parent and reasonable 
efforts by an authorized agency or mental health professional have been 
unsuccessful in rehabilitating the family or the family has refused 
rehabilitative treatment, and it is shown that the child's health and safety 
would be seriously jeopardized by remaining with or returning to the 
parent;

 
 
 * * * *

 
 

            
(v) The child has been in foster care under the responsibility of the 
state of Wyoming for fifteen (15) 
of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, and a showing that the parent is 
unfit to have custody and control of the child;

 
 
 * * * *

 
 

(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, 
evidence that reasonable efforts have been made to preserve and reunify the 
family is not required in any case in which the court determines by clear and 
convincing evidence that:

 
 

* * * *

 
 

(iii) Other aggravating circumstances exist indicating that 
there is little likelihood that services to the family will result in successful 
reunification.

 
 

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-309 (LexisNexis 2003).

 
 

[¶30]      BSC left CC with the MM family in February 1998 and has not 
seen him since.  
Between December of 1998 and the termination hearing, there was no 
substantive communication between BSC and CC.  In fact, even after being notified that CC was in DFS 
custody, he made only one effort to communicate with CC by sending a teddy bear 
and card.  
Thus, the 
evidence clearly showed that BSC has not had any true communication with CC in 
more than four years.   When BSC left CC with the MM family, he 
left some personal property and directed them to sell it to pay for CC's 
care.  Since 
that time, BSC has not provided any other financial support for CC.  Although BSC argued 
at the termination hearing that he informed DFS he was disabled and directed the 
agency to apply for Social Security benefits for CC, DFS denied that assertion 
and BSC did not submit any evidence to corroborate his position.  Thus, there was 
clear and convincing evidence presented at the termination hearing to support 
the district court's conclusion that, under § 14-2-309(a)(i), CC had been left in the care of 
another person without provision for his support and without communication from 
BSC for a period of at least one (1) year. 

 
 

[¶31]      Turning to subsection (a)(v), the record is clear that JC 
placed CC in foster care under the authority of the State of Wyoming in January 2002.  Therefore, at the 
time of the termination hearing, CC had been in the state's care for twenty of 
the last twenty-two months.  With regard to the question of whether BSC 
was unfit to have care and custody of CC, we agree with the district court's 
analysis and defer to its evaluation of BSC at the termination hearing:

 
 
As a preliminary matter, [BSC]'s physical condition and 
current treatment cause this Court great concern as to the ability to care for 
any child, let alone one with the needs of [CC].  [BSC] is disabled, is not known to have any 
employment and has limited income, which he could not spare for contributing to 
[CC]'s care once he learned where [CC] was.  [BSC]'s past treatment of [CC] leaving him 
with [the MM family] and failing to make any arrangements for his care and well 
being despite the initial problems in 1996, cause this Court to question his 
judgment.  Furthermore, [BSC] was convicted of sexual 
contact with a minor, [CC]'s step-brother.  In addition, while a deferred sentence, [BSC] 
was involved in similar crimes in Texas.  Given this history [BSC] is unfit to have 
custody and control of [CC].  Aside from these hard facts, the demeanor and 
observations made of [BSC] by this Court during this hearing cause me grave 
concern as to [CC]'s safety if [BSC] was given custody and control.  This, combined with 
the physical and emotional needs of [CC], demonstrate by clear and convincing 
evidence that [BSC] is unfit to have custody and control. 

 
 
Clear and convincing evidence existed, therefore, to 
support the district court's conclusion that BSC's parental rights should be 
terminated pursuant to § 14-2-309(a)(v).  

 
 

[¶32]      Although there were other reasons asserted by the State and 
considered by the district court, we do not feel compelled to belabor our 
analysis of this issue.  There is simply no question in this case that 
BSC's parental rights to CC should be terminated. 

 
 
 
 

E.  DFS Violations of Law

 

[¶33]      BSC argues that the district court's decision should be 
reversed because DFS violated Wyoming law in several ways.  In particular, he 
contends that DFS failed to comply with various Wyoming statutes and DFS rules and regulations 
by not notifying him, the district attorney, and the district court when it took 
CC into custody.  
He suggests that DFS's alleged violations of law prevented him from 
communicating with, and providing support to, CC.  

 
 

[¶34]      As we have stated in prior cases, an agency must follow 
Wyoming law and its own rules and 
regulations.  
 See, e.g., MN v. State of Wyoming, Dep't of Family Servs., 2003 WY 135, ¶35, 78 P.3d 232, ¶35 (Wyo. 
2003); DH v. Wyoming Dep't of Family Servs., 2003 WY 155, ¶25, 79 P.3d 997, ¶25 (Wyo. 
2003).  
Although BSC quotes numerous state statutes and rules, he does not 
provide cogent legal analysis to support his contentions that DFS failed to 
comply with its legal requirements.  See DH, at ¶23.  "The mere showing 
that a statute or court rule has been breached, without more, does not establish 
cause for this Court to overturn the findings and conclusions of a trial court 
after a bench trial."  
Id. 

 

[¶35]      Furthermore, BSC's complaints ring hollow when analyzed in 
the context of his actions.  Even after he was notified of CC's 
circumstances, he made only one effort to communicate with CC by sending a teddy 
bear and card.  
By the time he made that effort, CC did not have any recollection of BSC 
as either his father or as an acquaintance.  In addition, BSC did not provide any 
financial support for CC's care.  He blames DFS and the guardian ad litem for 
failing to apply for Social Security benefits for CC, but we are not impressed 
with his efforts to transfer the responsibility for his child to others.  It is the 
obligation of a parent to make sure that his children are adequately cared for 
at all times, and the fault for his failure to do so cannot be shifted to 
others.  

 
 

[¶36]      Affirmed.