Case Title: People v. DISTRICT COURT IN & FOR COUNTY OF LARIMER

Citation: 527 P.2d 50

Docket Number: 

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1974-10-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
527 P.2d 50 (1974) The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, By and Through their duly elected and appointed representatives, Stuart A. VanMEVEREN, District Attorney, and Larry R. Abrahamson, Deputy District Attorney, Eighth Judicial District, State of Colorado, Petitioners, v. The DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF LARIMER, State of Colorado, and the Honorable Conrad L. Ball, one of the judges thereof, Respondents. No. 26599. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. October 7, 1974. *51 Stuart A. VanMeveren, Dist. Atty., Larry R. Abrahamson, Deputy Dist. Atty., Fort Collins, for petitioners. Richard B. Manges, Fort Collins, for respondents. GROVES, Justice. We issued a rule to show cause in this matter, and now make the rule absolute. A defendant is charged in the respondent court with having committed a Class 4 felony, perjury in the first degree. The defendant requested leave to file an application for deferred prosecution under Colo.Sess.Laws 1972, ch. 44, 30-7-401 at 224. The respondent court granted leave to file the application over the objection of petitioners (district attorney and deputy district attorney). The application was filed and on June 11, 1974, the respondent court set the matter down for July 9, 1974, in order to give the probation department a chance to submit a report. Such a report was filed, and on July 9, 1974, the court continued the matter until July 23, 1974, to give the petitioners an opportunity to review the application and probation report. At the July 23rd hearing the petitioner Larry R. Abrahamson, deputy district attorney, was present. The following is from the transcript of that hearing: The petitioners then asked us for a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent court from requiring them to specify the reasons why they do not consider this a proper case for deferred prosecution. While he is an officer of the court as any other attorney, a district attorney is not a judicial officer not a part of the judicial branch of the government. A district attorney belongs to the executive branch. State v. Andrews, 282 Minn. 386, 165 N.W.2d 528 (1969); ABA Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and the Defense Function § 1.1(a) at 43. Cf. Newman v. United States, 127 U.S. App.D.C. 263, 382 F.2d 479 (1967). The statute relating to deferred prosecution, above cited, provides that prosecution is deferred upon order of the court "with the consent of the defendant and the prosecution." The prosecutor's consent is a matter of prosecutorial discretion just as is the choice of several possible charges to press (Myers v. District Court, Colo., 518 P.2d 836 (1974)) or the decision to move for the dismissal of a criminal charge. People v. Dennis, 164 Colo. 163, 433 P.2d 339 (1967); People v. Zobel, 54 Colo. 284, 130 P. 837 (1913); Gray v. District Court, 42 Colo. 298, 94 P. 287 (1908); and People ex rel. Carr v. District Court, 23 Colo. 466, 488 P. 500 (1897). A prosecutor's discretion in charging, deferring or requesting dismissal is limited by pragmatic factors, but not by judicial intervention. See Miller and Tiffany, Prosecutor Dominance of the Warrant Decision: A Study of Current Practices, 1964 Wash.U.Law Quarterly 1. Because of the doctrine of separation of powers and because the district attorney is a part of the executive branch, the respondent court can no more require the district attorney to give his reasons here than a court can require a Colorado Governor to give his reasons for failing to grant a pardon. We, of course, are not dealing here with criminal defendant's objection to a prosecutor's conduct which prevents a fair trial or is constitutionally impermissible. Rule made absolute.