Case Title: People v. Munson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88799

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 88799-Agenda 4-November 2001.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 								JAMES MUNSON, Appellant.
Opinion filed June 20, 2002.
	 
	JUSTICE GARMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Cook County,
defendant, James Munson, was convicted of the first degree
murder of Marvin Cheeks, armed robbery, aggravated kidnapping,
and arson of the property of Cheeks. Defendant waived a jury for
sentencing and, following a bifurcated sentencing hearing, was
sentenced to death by the trial court on the first degree murder
conviction and to concurrent prison terms on the other convictions.
The trial court denied defendant's post-trial motions. This court
affirmed defendant's convictions and death sentence on direct
appeal (People v. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d 158 (1996)), and the United
States Supreme Court denied certiorari (Munson v. Illinois, 519 U.S. 880, 136 L. Ed. 2d 141, 117 S. Ct. 205 (1996)). Defendant
filed a post-conviction petition, which was dismissed by the trial
court on the State's motion. Defendant's appeal lies directly to this
court. 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(a).

BACKGROUND
	The facts of this case are set forth in this court's opinion on
direct review and will be repeated here only as necessary to
address defendant's arguments in this appeal. In December 1995,
defendant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief and
requested appointment of counsel. Post-conviction counsel filed
an amended post-conviction petition and a supplement to the
petition. Defendant filed a pro se supplemental petition. The
various petitions made many allegations, some of which have been
abandoned in this appeal. The amended post-conviction petition
advanced five claims for relief: (1) trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to properly investigate and present mitigating evidence at
the capital sentencing hearing; (2) defendant was denied equal
protection or, in the alternative, effective assistance of appellate
counsel, regarding a failure to raise a challenge pursuant to Batson
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986),
to the State's use of a peremptory challenge to venireperson
Sandra McElwee; (3) appellate counsel was ineffective for failing
to raise the issue of prosecutorial misconduct; (4) defendant was
denied due process when the trial court erroneously found
defendant's possession of a handgun when he was arrested to be
an aggravating factor at sentencing, or in the alternative, trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to produce police reports that
would have corroborated defendant's claim as to his intent in
possessing the gun; and (5) defendant's sentence is
unconstitutionally disparate to that of his codefendant, Darryl
Clemons.
	Post-conviction counsel further alleged in the supplement to
the post-conviction petition that (1) defendant's arrest was illegal;
(2) trial counsel was ineffective for (a) failing to investigate and
present independent ballistics testing and forensic analysis of the
alleged murder weapon, (b) failing to file motions to quash
defendant's arrest and adequately prepare for the suppression
motion counsel did file, (c) failing to present any defense evidence
or a coherent theory of defense at trial, and (d) presenting a
"rambling, incoherent, offensive" closing argument that conceded
defendant's guilt and attacked the victim; (3) appellate counsel
was ineffective for (a) not obtaining portions of the record relating
to Batson discussions concerning juror McElwee and the
availability of Kenneth Burks as a witness, (b) failing to raise the
admissibility of the recovered weapon, (c) failing to raise the trial
court's improper restriction of cross-examination regarding a
witness' expectation of a reward, and (c) failing to raise the issue
of disproportionality of defendant's sentence; (4) the State
withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963) in failing to
disclose criminal records of certain witnesses and the existence of
a reward offered by the victim's family for information leading to
the victim's killer; (5) the State presented perjured testimony or
failed to correct testimony it knew to be false of two witnesses; (6)
defendant's constitutional rights were violated where the
prosecutor (a) repeatedly commented in closing argument on
defendant's failure to testify at trial, and (b) made repeated
improper statements in closing argument; and (7) defendant's
constitutional rights were violated where he did not knowingly and
intelligently waive his right to a sentencing jury due to trial
counsel's misinforming and actively misleading him.
	The trial court granted the State's motion to dismiss, finding
defendant's claims to be barred by waiver and res judicata.
ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review
	The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.
(West 2000)) provides a remedy by which defendants may
challenge their convictions or sentences for violations of federal
or state constitutional law. People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 502
(1998); People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 377 (1997). A
post-conviction action is a collateral proceeding, and not an appeal
from the underlying judgment. People v. Williams, 186 Ill. 2d 55,
62 (1999), quoting People v. Ruiz, 132 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (1989). The
purpose of the proceeding is to allow inquiry into constitutional
issues relating to the conviction or sentence that were not, and
could not have been, determined on direct appeal. People v.
Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65, 72-73 (1997); People v. Mahaffey, 165 Ill. 2d 445, 452 (1995). Thus, res judicata bars consideration of issues
that were raised and decided on direct appeal, and issues that could
have been presented on direct appeal, but were not, are considered
waived. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 502-03. A defendant is not entitled
to an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition as a matter
of right. People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 427-28 (1998). Rather,
an evidentiary hearing is warranted only when the allegations of
the post-conviction petition, supported when necessary by the trial
record or accompanying affidavits, make a substantial showing
that the defendant's constitutional rights have been violated.
Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d  at 428; Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 503. In
determining whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, all
well-pleaded facts in the petition and in any accompanying
affidavits must be taken as true. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 503. A
circuit court's dismissal of a post-conviction petition without a
hearing will be reviewed de novo. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 388-89 (1998).



II. Batson Claim
	On appeal, defendant alleges that appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise a Batson claim as to the prosecutor's
use of a peremptory challenge to venireperson Sandra McElwee.
At trial, the State used peremptory challenges to exclude from the
jury McElwee and two other venirepersons, Robert Canady and
Ola Love. At the close of jury selection, trial counsel moved for a
mistrial, arguing that the prosecution had improperly used three of
its four peremptory challenges to exclude Canady, Love and
McElwee, in violation of Batson. The trial court found a prima
facie case of racial discrimination as to the exclusion of Canady
and Love. As to McElwee, although trial counsel argued that she
was clearly black, the trial court expressed doubt, noting her light
complexion and her name. In response to questioning from the
trial court, the prosecutor stated that her notes reflected that
McElwee was a Caucasian female. The trial court found this
perception to be reasonable and concluded that the prosecutor had
advanced a race-neutral explanation for excluding McElwee. The
trial court denied trial counsel's motion to subpoena McElwee to
testify concerning her race. On direct appeal, appellate counsel
raised a Batson issue as to venirepersons Canady and Love, but not
as to McElwee.
	Batson established a three-step analysis to determine whether
or not the State used its peremptory challenges to remove
venirepersons on the basis of race. First, the defendant must make
a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised
peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d  at
174; People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 425 (1993). Second, if the
defendant has made a prima facie showing, the burden then shifts
to the State to provide a race-neutral explanation for excluding
each venireperson in question. A race-neutral explanation is one
based upon something other than the race of the venireperson. In
assessing an explanation, the trial court focuses on the facial
validity of the prosecutor's explanation. The explanation need not
be persuasive, or even plausible. A legitimate reason is not a
reason that makes sense, but rather is a reason that does not deny
equal protection. Absent an inherent discriminatory intent in the
prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed
race-neutral. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 174-75. Defense counsel then
may rebut the prosecutor's reasons as being pretextual. People v.
Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d 274, 288 (1992). Third, the trial court then
weighs the evidence in light of the prima facie case, the
prosecutor's reasons for challenging the venireperson, and any
rebuttal by defense counsel. Mitchell, 152 Ill. 2d  at 288. The court
must determine whether the defendant has met his or her burden
of proving purposeful discrimination. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d  at 174.
	Defendant attached to his post-conviction petition an affidavit
of McElwee, in which she stated that she is an African-American
woman whose race has been mistaken for Hispanic, but never for
Caucasian. At the conclusion of the hearing on the State's motion
to dismiss defendant's post-conviction petition, the trial court
found that the prosecutor's perception of McElwee's race as
Caucasian at the time the peremptory challenge was exercised was
significant and that this perception was reasonable, based upon the
trial court's observation of McElwee. The court also noted that
because the victim was black and the State's principal witnesses
were black, the prosecutor would have no motive to exclude black
people from the jury.
	Defendant now argues that the trial court's finding as to the
prosecutor's perception of McElwee's race as Caucasian is
erroneous, and that it was the trial court who supplied the race-neutral explanation for McElwee's exclusion from the jury, not the
prosecutor. He argues that the prosecutor did not state that she
thought McElwee was Caucasian and that it was improper for the
trial court to rely on its own impression of McElwee, where those
impressions were stated prior to inquiry of the prosecutor as to a
race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge. According
to defendant, the prosecutor did not give a race-neutral
explanation, but merely expressed uncertainty about McElwee's
race.
	The State argues that defendant has waived this claim,
because he did not raise it in his direct appeal. As stated,
determinations made by a reviewing court on direct appeal are res
judicata as to issues actually decided. Issues that could have been
presented on direct appeal, but which were not, are deemed
waived for purposes of post-conviction review. People v. Johnson,
183 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1998); Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 502-03.
Procedural default, however, will be excused where (1)
fundamental fairness so requires; (2) the alleged waiver stems
from the incompetence of appellate counsel; or (3) the facts
relating to the claim do not appear on the face of the original
appellate record. People v. Mahaffey, 194 Ill. 2d 154, 171 (2000);
People v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 371-72 (1996). Ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel is judged under the standard set
forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674,
104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). People v. Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d 401, 412
(2000). Defendant must show that the failure to raise the Batson
issue regarding McElwee was objectively unreasonable and that,
absent this failure, defendant's conviction or sentence would have
been reversed. Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d  at 412. We note that
appellate counsel is not required to argue every conceivable issue
on appeal. People v. Tenner, 175 Ill. 2d 372, 387 (1997).
Counsel's decision as to what issues to raise and argue will not be
questioned unless that decision is patently wrong. People v.
Madej, 177 Ill. 2d 116, 159 (1997).
	The record reveals that when the trial court asked the
prosecutor her opinion of McElwee's race, she replied, "In my
opinion, female white, lab technician, attended the University of
Illinois." In a subsequent colloquy, the trial court again asked the
prosecutor her opinion as to whether McElwee was Caucasian,
Hispanic, or black. The prosecutor replied, "I-I-I'm not sure,
Judge. I wrote female white. I really didn't think that hard. I have
F.W. Looking back, I don't know, Judge."
	Defendant argues that the trial court erred in ruling that
defendant had not made a prima facie case of racial discrimination
as to McElwee on the grounds that the prosecutor's belief that
McElwee was Caucasian was reasonable, when the prosecutor did
not state that she believed McElwee was in fact Caucasian. The
trial record, however, belies this claim. Batson requires that a
defendant make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has
exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. If that
burden is satisfied, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to provide
a race-neutral explanation for excluding the particular juror. The
trial court must then determine whether the defendant has met his
burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Munson, 171 Ill. 2d 
at 174. In the instant case, we conclude that the prosecutor's
statements indicate that, at the time she exercised the peremptory
challenge to McElwee, she believed that McElwee was Caucasian.
Her later statements of uncertainty at the hearing on defendant's
Batson motion do not detract from this conclusion. The gravamen
of a Batson claim is purposeful discrimination in excluding
venirepersons from the jury on the basis of their race. See
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359-60, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395,
406, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1866 (1991).
	Defendant argues that the prosecutor did not give a race-neutral explanation for excusing McElwee, because the trial court
failed to ask for an explanation. However, no such explanation is
required unless the defendant makes a prima facie showing of
racial discrimination. The trial court's questioning of the
prosecutor was designed to assist it in determining whether
defendant had carried his burden. Once the trial court found that
the prosecutor's perception of McElwee as Caucasian was
objectively reasonable, no further inquiry was required. The trial
court did not, as defendant suggests, blindly accept the
prosecutor's statements concerning her belief that McElwee was
Caucasian. The court set forth its own observations on the record
and, based upon those observations, found the prosecutor's belief
to be reasonable. Defendant submits that a good-faith question
existed with respect to McElwee's race and that the question has
now been answered by McElwee's affidavit stating that she is
black. However, the prosecutor was not required to establish the
empirical truth of her stated belief concerning McElwee's race. It
is sufficient that the prosecutor reasonably believed that McElwee
was Caucasian at the time the peremptory challenge was exercised.
See People v. Harris, 164 Ill. 2d 322, 338 (1994).
	Accordingly, we conclude that trial counsel's Batson
challenge as to McElwee had no merit and appellate counsel was
not ineffective in failing to raise that issue on direct appeal.



III. Probable Cause for Arrest
	Defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to file a motion to quash defendant's arrest on the ground of lack
of probable cause. He further argues that the trial court erred in
denying an evidentiary hearing on this issue.
	At trial, Kenny Curry testified that the day after the murder,
he was working on his car at the home of his friend, Kenneth
Burks. Defendant came over to Burks' home and began conversing
with Burks. Curry noticed that defendant's face had burn marks
and was covered with grease. Defendant told Curry that his "thing
[was] taking [people] out of their cars." Defendant elaborated,
telling Curry that on the prior evening he set fire to an Amigo
truck because "the guy tried [him.]" He shot the man once and
then shot him a second time after the man "broke and ran" away
from him. Defendant then purchased some gasoline and returned
to the area to burn the victim's truck. In the process of burning the
truck, defendant's face was burned.
	Curry further testified that he later learned that the victim was
Marvin Cheeks, the brother of Maurice Cheeks, a professional
basketball player. Although Curry did not know Marvin Cheeks,
he and a friend (Burks) attended the funeral in anticipation of
Maurice Cheeks' presence there. Neither Curry nor Burks
immediately reported to the police what defendant had said about
the killing.
	Detectives Mike Miller and James Hanrahan were assigned to
investigate the Cheeks murder. Hanrahan testified that on October
8, 1991, he received a telephone call from a member of the Cheeks
family. He and Miller subsequently met with the Cheeks family
member, Kenneth Burks and Ricky Vivurette. After speaking with
those individuals, Hanrahan and Miller made arrangements with
Burks to conduct a mobile surveillance of Burks' car. Miller and
Hanrahan followed Burks, with whom Vivurette was riding, for a
period of time. Burks eventually parked on West Monroe Street.
A person, later identified as defendant, approached Burks' car and
began to talk to Burks. After a brief conversation, defendant
turned and ran into the building at 2020 West Monroe Street and
Burks drove off. Hanrahan and Miller stopped Burks, at which
time Burks explained that defendant had seen the detectives
parked nearby and believed them to be vice detectives. Defendant
told Burks to drive away and to come back. The surveillance
continued. Burks drove off, returned to 2020 West Monroe Street
and parked. The detectives observed defendant run out of the 2020
West Monroe Street building and enter the rear of Burks' car.
Burks then drove off with both defendant and Vivurette. The
detectives followed, eventually stopping Burks' car at North
Leavitt Street. Hanrahan first ordered Burks and Vivurette out of
the car and then defendant. While Hanrahan searched defendant,
Miller searched the backseat of the car, where he found a weapon.
At that time, Hanrahan handcuffed defendant and advised him of
his Miranda warnings. Miller drove the vehicle to a police garage
and Hanrahan transported defendant to Area 4 Violent Crimes.
	The basis for defendant's claim that his trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to file a motion to quash his arrest is that
Burks was not a reliable informant. Defendant notes that at the
time he came forward, Burks had an expectation of a reward from
the Cheeks family. Defendant also notes that Burks did not go
directly to the police, but initially contacted the Cheeks family at
the victim's funeral. The State argues that defendant has waived
review of this claim because it could have been raised on direct
review and was not. However, defendant relies on his affidavit
attached to his post-conviction petition to support his argument on
this issue. As this affidavit is dehors the record, a finding of
waiver is not appropriate. See Mahaffey, 194 Ill. 2d  at 171.
	Probable cause for a warrantless arrest exists where police
have knowledge of facts that would lead a reasonable person to
believe that a crime has been committed and that the person to be
arrested committed it. People v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 216-17
(2000). Where police are acting on an informant's tip, the totality
of the circumstances known to the officers must support their
reliance on the information provided by the informant. People v.
Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1, 23-24 (1996). The existence of probable cause
is not governed by technical legal rules, but by commonsense
considerations that are factual and practical. People v. Williams,
147 Ill. 2d 173, 209 (1991).
	Defendant argues that Burks' credibility was undermined by
the fact that he did not come forward immediately after the alleged
conversation with defendant and that he and Curry contacted the
victim's family after a reward had been publicized. Defendant also
argues that Burks knew he could ensure that defendant would have
a gun when he was arrested. Defendant alleges that Burks had
given him a gun several days earlier. During the police
surveillance of Burks' car, when Burks pulled his car over to pick
up defendant, Burks told defendant to go back in the house and get
the gun. This last allegation is made in defendant's affidavit
attached to his post-conviction petition. Defendant seeks to draw
a distinction between Burks and the ordinary citizen informant.
However, whether an informant is classified as a citizen informant
or a paid informant is unimportant; rather, courts look to the
reliability of the informant as only one factor in assessing whether
the totality of the circumstances establishes the existence of
probable cause. People v. Adams, 131 Ill. 2d 387, 397 (1989).
	Burks related to police the conversation with defendant two
days after the murder in which defendant admitted that he had
killed the victim and set fire to his car. Defendant also stated that
he had burned his face while burning the victim's car. Burks
provided a physical description of defendant and stated that the
gun used in the shooting could be found on defendant or in his
home. When police arrested defendant, it was immediately
apparent to them that defendant had recent, serious burns on his
face. Further, the police reports appended to defendant's petition
state that Burks related to officers that defendant had appeared at
Burks' home hours before the murder looking for a gun and that
Burks sold defendant a gun on credit. Although defendant now
contends that Burks set him up by telling him to go inside the
house and get the gun, there is no support in the record for this
theory. Burks told police that defendant ran into the house because
he saw the officers' car and thought they were "vice cops." We
note that the record contains no evidence that Burks sought or
received a reward from the Cheeks family. Defendant's affidavit
attached to his post-conviction petition alleges that on May 10,
1993, he had a telephone conversation with Burks in which Burks
denied receiving any reward money. Burks allegedly told
defendant that Curry received the reward. This fact, even if true,
does not support defendant's argument concerning Burks'
reliability.
	We conclude that probable cause existed for defendant's
warrantless arrest and, thus, he has failed to establish that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to quash the
arrest.



IV. Mitigation Evidence
	Defendant next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to properly investigate and present mitigating evidence
at the sentencing hearing. In making this argument, defendant
relies on matters dehors the record. In such cases, waiver does not
operate to foreclose the defendant from raising this claim in his
post-conviction petition. See People v. Holman, 164 Ill. 2d 356,
362 (1995).
	In the context of a second-stage capital sentencing hearing,
the Strickland standard for proving ineffective assistance of
counsel requires a defendant to show that (1) his attorney's
performance at the sentencing hearing was deficient, judged by
prevailing professional norms and (2) there is a reasonable
probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer would have
concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors
did not warrant death. People v. Johnson, 183 Ill. 2d 176, 195-96
(1998).
	Evidence at the sentencing hearing demonstrated that
defendant had one prior conviction for armed robbery in 1989,
committed when he was 16 years old. The State presented the
testimony of the victim of that offense, Paul Babian. He testified
that he was accosted by defendant and two other men as he sat in
his car waiting to make a right turn. Defendant pressed the barrel
of a gun to Babian's head and ordered him out of the car. Another
man got in on the passenger side with a gun drawn and a third man
stood in front of the car. Defendant demanded that Babian hand
over his wallet and a signet ring Babian was wearing. One of the
other men ripped Babian's gold chain off his neck. Babian gave
defendant his wallet, but would not take off his ring, arguing that
the ring had no value to defendant, as it had Babian's initials on it.
Defendant then placed his gun closer to Babian and said, "[D]on't
make me kill you, mother fucker, give me the ring." After Babian
gave defendant the ring, the men got into Babian's car and drove
away.
	Defense counsel called 11 witnesses in mitigation. Marlene
Wolter, one of defendant's elementary school teachers, testified
that defendant was respectful in her class and that he came to her
and expressed concern about his younger brother. Defendant knew
right from wrong. She recalled investigators coming to the school
to investigate defendant's complaint that his mother was
neglecting him and his siblings, with no food in the house and the
refrigerator locked. Wolter felt that defendant had potential that
was not developed and that he was a victim. Defendant had a
moderate learning disorder.
	Mary Munson, defendant's aunt, testified that at the time of
defendant's birth, his mother was living in a four-bedroom
apartment with nine other family members. When defendant was
approximately five years old, he and his mother moved out. When
defendant was 16 years old, he went to live with his uncle,
Roosevelt Munson. Prior to that time, defendant complained to
Mary that his mother had beaten him. Mary observed a mark on
defendant's thigh. When asked whether defendant was well cared
for by his mother, Mary replied that defendant's mother "always
kept food, shelter and clothing." Defendant had a job and used the
money to buy food. Mary was unaware of whether defendant's
mother used illegal drugs.
	According to testimony from Stephanie Munson, Roosevelt
Munson's daughter, defendant came to live with her family
because her mother believed that defendant needed a "real mother"
and a "father figure" in his life. Defendant's mother abused drugs
and was "never there" for her children. Defendant lived with them
for six months to a year and had to go back to his mother when
Stephanie's mother became ill and was hospitalized for a long
period of time. Defendant was very close to her mother while he
lived with them.
	Melvin Wilson, defendant's father, testified that he has been
continuously incarcerated since 1985 for two murder convictions
and has never contributed to defendant's support. Wilson stated
that he had neglected defendant, as had defendant's mother.
	Janie Munson, defendant's aunt, testified that defendant and
his mother lived with her family for a time in 1979 or 1980, when
his mother was evicted from "the projects." Defendant cooked and
cleaned for his siblings.
	Jamesetta Dixon testified that she lived with defendant and
his mother from 1983 to 1988. Dixon was engaged in prostitution
and defendant's mother sometimes went with her when she left the
house. Defendant cared for Dixon's children and his own siblings
while they were gone. Both she and defendant's mother used drugs
during this time.
	Renard Munson, defendant's brother, testified that defendant
was the father he never had. During the time they lived together,
defendant offered Renard advice and encouraged him in school.
Defendant sometimes talked to Renard's teachers on his behalf.
Defendant purchased Renard's school supplies and clothes.
	Frances Munson, defendant's mother, testified that she has six
children. She was never married to any of their fathers. She used
drugs while living with Jamesetta Dixon.
	Lintreatha Munson, defendant's aunt, testified that defendant
worked at a shop making leather belts and he took care of his
brother and sisters. He fed and clothed them, bought them things,
gave them a bath, put them to bed, and took them to school in the
mornings.
	James Jones testified that he formerly employed defendant at
his leather craft shop from 1981 to 1984. Defendant most often
spent his paycheck on his family. Defendant's mother would often
act as if she were using drugs. Two days prior to his arrest in this
case, defendant asked Jones to help him find a job. Jones stated
that he felt defendant was a "good kid" and that he had gone
"astray." Defendant is a "smart kid" and always liked going to
school.
	Defendant complains that the trial court was not properly
informed by this testimony about defendant's life and the effects
that his troubled childhood had on his development. Trial counsel
did not present any evidence of defendant's learning disability or
any psychological or developmental evaluations. Thus, according
to defendant, his trial counsel should have presented the testimony
of a mitigation specialist. In support of this claim, defendant has
attached to his post-conviction petition an affidavit of Caryn Platt
Tatelli, a licensed clinical forensic social worker. Tatelli stated in
her affidavit that she was formerly employed as a mitigation
specialist by the Illinois Capital Resource Center (now the Capital
Litigation Division of the Illinois State Appellate Defender's
Office). Her duties consisted of investigating, compiling, and
analyzing developmentally related materials for capital defendants.
Tatelli had completed mitigation investigations and interviews for
approximately 30 capital cases. In the preparation of her report,
Tatelli interviewed defendant and 15 relatives, friends, and others
who had significant knowledge of defendant. She also reviewed
1,000 pages of documents.
	Tatelli noted defendant's lack of a positive male role model
and indicated that a fatherless child may become parentified and
turn to gangs and other counter-culture groups. They may also, as
in defendant's case, turn to other men in the community such as
drug dealers. Tatelli concluded that defendant was a parentified
child with an abusive, neglectful, drug-addicted mother and no
father. He was forced to earn money to support his siblings and
struggled academically. When he could not earn enough money at
the leather craft shop, he delivered drugs for older men. In his
adolescence, he turned to dealing drugs to support his family.
	In addition to the lack of a father, Tatelli concluded, 
defendant was not bonded to his mother. A school psychologist's
report completed when defendant was eight years old concluded
that defendant's innate intellectual development was at least at the
average level, but he had a short attention span, shallow
concentration, and an overactive nature. Due to the wide
discrepancy between defendant's ability and his achievement, he
was placed in a severe disabled learning classroom. He was
evaluated again at age 12 and was found to have improved in his
academic subjects. Defendant was placed in a regular classroom
at age 14 and, despite exhibiting failing grades, was promoted to
ninth grade.
	In summarizing her findings, Tatelli stated that defendant's
developmental life experiences were so far out of the range of the
norm that they impacted him profoundly and "quite probably"
altered the course of his life. During a time when defendant should
have been developing close friendships and mastering many of the
basic skills of life, he was saddled with adult responsibilities in
providing and caring for his younger siblings. He was providing
for his family by dealing illegal drugs and, "as one might expect,"
spent much of his early adulthood in prison.
	In addressing the mitigation issue at the hearing on the State's
motion to dismiss defendant's petition, the trial court expressed its
doubts about whether there is such a thing as a "mitigation
expert." The court also commented at length on the question of
whether Tatelli could be qualified as an expert witness. We need
not address these questions, however, because the basis for the
trial court's ruling on the mitigation issue was that much of the
material contained in the affidavits attached to defendant's petition
was cumulative of the evidence that was presented at the
sentencing hearing. The court noted that defendant's trial counsel
investigated and presented evidence in mitigation and that counsel
consulted with mitigation specialist Jeffrey Eno. The court also
concluded that defendant had failed to establish that the
information sought to be presented is beyond the knowledge of the
ordinary person. In this context, the court noted that the fact a
hostile environment may adversely affect people is within the
knowledge of laypersons generally. The court noted that
defendant's background had been fully explored at the sentencing
hearing and that defendant had not demonstrated that presentation
of Tatelli's testimony or further testimony from other witnesses
would have prompted the court to impose a sentence of
imprisonment, rather than the death penalty.
	Counsel at a capital sentencing hearing has a duty to conduct
a reasonable investigation into potential sources of mitigating
evidence to present at the sentencing hearing, or must have a
legitimate reason for failing to do so. People v. Jackson, No.
88474, slip op. at 7 (December 21, 2001). A mitigation specialist
is not crucial to a defendant's ability to marshal evidence in
mitigation. People v. Burt, 168 Ill. 2d 49, 78 (1995). This court has
held that a trial court is not constitutionally required to appoint a
mitigation specialist, as defense counsel is capable of obtaining
and presenting such evidence. People v. Lear, 143 Ill. 2d 138, 148
(1991).
	In the instant case, defendant's trial counsel presented the
testimony of 11 witnesses in mitigation. Counsel also secured the
services of mitigation specialist Jeffrey Eno. Eno's affidavit,
attached to defendant's petition, stated that he did not prepare a
written report due to counsel's cancellation of meetings with him.
However, we note that, although Eno did not testify, he was
available to consult with counsel. The witnesses who testified
informed the trial court about defendant's troubled childhood,
including his drug-addicted, neglectful mother, the absence of his
father, and the responsibility for his family placed upon defendant
at a young age. That the abuse and neglect of a child, the absence
of a parent in the household, and the parentification of a child may
have adverse effects on that child is not within the exclusive
knowledge of a mitigation specialist. Defendant has not alleged
that he suffered from any recognized psychological impairment or
mental disability that might have required the testimony of an
expert. Accordingly, we conclude that trial counsel was not
professionally deficient in failing to secure the testimony of a
mitigation specialist. 	Defendant attached to his petition several
affidavits of potential witnesses. However, much of the content of
these affidavits is cumulative of evidence already heard by the trial
court at sentencing or adds little to the testimony heard by the
court. For example, the affidavit of Diane Faubl, one of
defendant's teachers, stated that defendant was an average student
who never got into trouble and tried to help other students and his
siblings. Marlene Wolter, one of defendant's teachers, testified at
the sentencing hearing that defendant was respectful in her class
and demonstrated concern for his siblings. Faubl's testimony
would have added nothing new to this evidence. Loretta Kindhart,
defendant's teacher in his learning disabled class, stated in her
affidavit that defendant tried to keep her from understanding how
bad things were at home and that she had several conversations
with defendant's mother, who appeared to be "high" on drugs. The
trial court heard extensive evidence at sentencing concerning
Frances Munson's drug use. Roosevelt Munson, defendant's
uncle, who testified at the sentencing hearing, provided an
affidavit that contained additional detail about defendant's life,
such as his mother's drug addiction, his lack of a father, his efforts
to support his siblings, and the family's attempts to help
defendant. The trial court heard this information from Roosevelt
and others at the sentencing hearing. Roosevelt's affidavit is
merely cumulative of that evidence. Similarly, the affidavit of
Julie Munson, defendant's cousin, is cumulative of evidence heard
at the sentencing hearing regarding defendant's difficult
childhood. We note also that many of the affidavits of potential
witnesses attached to defendant's petition stated not only facts, but
also the affiants' speculation, analyses, and opinions of the effect
defendant's difficulties had on him as he was growing up.
	Evidence of a difficult childhood or developmental problems,
we note, is not inherently mitigating. People v. Emerson, 189 Ill. 2d 436, 495 (2000). The sentencer may regard the evidence as
aggravating, especially if the evidence suggests that defendant
might pose a danger in the future. People v. Montgomery, 192 Ill. 2d 642, 673 (2000).
	 We conclude that trial counsel was not professionally
deficient for failing to call additional witnesses to testify or for
failing to elicit additional details from the witnesses who did
testify. Further, counsel was not deficient for failing to have a
mitigation specialist testify, as such testimony was unnecessary.
Since much of the proffered evidence was cumulative and may
have been viewed as aggravating, we also conclude that defendant
has failed to establish that a reasonable probability exists that the
trial court would not have imposed the death penalty had this
evidence been presented at sentencing.

V. Disparate Sentence
	Defendant argues that his death sentence is unreasonably
disparate to the 60-year prison term imposed on his codefendant,
Darryl Clemons. He contends that Clemons played an equally
active role in the crime, had a more extensive criminal history than
defendant, and had negligible rehabilitative potential.
	The State argues that this issue is foreclosed by defendant's
failure to include it in his post-sentencing motion. However, since
defendant was sentenced on June 10, 1993, and the record on
appeal shows that Clemons was sentenced on February 18, 1994,
this issue could not have been preserved for review. Appellate
counsel did not raise this issue in the direct appeal. However,
where a defendant relies on matters outside the record in support
of a post-conviction claim, we will not find waiver. Holman, 164 Ill. 2d  at 362.
	Comparative proportionality review in death penalty cases is
not required by the United States Constitution and is not a feature
of the Illinois death penalty statute. People v. Jimerson, 127 Ill. 2d 12, 54 (1989). Nonetheless, this court has the constitutional duty
to determine whether a death sentence has been imposed
arbitrarily or capriciously, or is unduly severe, considering the
circumstances of the offense and the character and rehabilitative
prospects of the defendant. To guarantee the individualized
sentencing that the eighth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. VIII)
requires, this court has compared a defendant's death sentence to
the sentence of a codefendant or an accomplice. This court has
focused on the nature of the offense, each individual's relative
involvement in the offense, his character, background, criminal
record, and his potential for rehabilitation. See, e.g., People v.
Kitchen, 159 Ill. 2d 1, 44 (1994); People v. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d 65,
134 (1990).
	Defendant had one prior conviction for armed robbery in
1989, committed when he was 16 years old. The trial court heard
details of that offense at defendant's sentencing hearing.
Following his arrest for the Babian armed robbery, defendant gave
a statement to an assistant State's Attorney in which he named
Clemons as one of the men with him during the robbery.
Defendant was sentenced to a prison term of six years. He had
been released on parole three months before the Cheeks murder.
We have allowed defendant to supplement the record on appeal
with the transcript of Clemons' sentencing hearing in the Cheeks
murder. It shows that Clemons had four prior arrests for burglary,
theft, and armed robbery. He was on home monitoring at the time
of the Cheeks murder.
	Defendant gave a series of statements to the police following
his arrest for Cheeks' murder. In his final statement given to
Detective Gene Harris and Assistant State's Attorney Charles
Burns, defendant stated that he and Clemons had staked out some
public telephones waiting for someone to rob. Cheeks pulled up to
the telephones in a black Jeep-type vehicle. He got out and used
the telephone. Defendant told Clemons that they were going to rob
Cheeks. At the time, defendant was armed with a Colt Python .357
Magnum. Defendant and Clemons approached the vehicle. Cheeks
appeared to have fallen asleep. Defendant pointed his gun at
Cheeks and told him to move over to the passenger's side of the
vehicle. Defendant got in the driver's side while Clemons entered
the backseat. They took Cheeks' coat, gold chain, watch and cash.
Eventually, defendant, Clemons, and Cheeks switched seats.
Cheeks ended up back in the driver's seat with defendant in the
backseat. While defendant held the gun on Cheeks, Clemons
instructed Cheeks to drive west on the Eisenhower Expressway.
Because the vehicle was low on gasoline, Cheeks exited the
expressway at Ashland Avenue and pulled into a gasoline station.
Clemons pumped the gasoline. Cheeks told defendant his name
and that he was a fireman. Defendant stated that at this point, he
wanted to get away, but he was afraid that Cheeks would report
the incident to police. After purchasing the gas, Clemons ordered
Cheeks to continue driving west on the expressway. Cheeks
continued on the Eisenhower, exited north onto Kostner Avenue,
and ultimately proceeded west on Van Buren Street. After passing
under a viaduct, Clemons told Cheeks to pull into a vacant lot.
Cheeks panicked and attempted to grab the gun. The gun
discharged twice. Defendant jumped into the front passenger seat,
accidently releasing Cheeks' safety belt, and Cheeks jumped from
the vehicle and ran. Defendant did not admit killing Cheeks.
Instead, defendant stated that he did not chase Cheeks and he and
Clemons started to walk away. Defendant then realized that he
might have left fingerprints inside the vehicle by which he could
be identified. Defendant then told Clemons that they had to
destroy the vehicle. The two purchased gasoline, poured it on the
dashboard of the vehicle and tried, unsuccessfully, to ignite it with
a cigarette lighter. On the second attempt, there was an explosion
that burned defendant's face.
	At Clemons' sentencing hearing, his parents testified in
mitigation. In arguing for the death penalty for Clemons, the
prosecutor noted a statement given to Harris and Burns by
Clemons in which he stated that when Cheeks ran from the car,
Clemons chased and tackled him three times. After that, defendant
shot Cheeks twice.
	In declining to impose the death penalty on Clemons, the trial
judge, who also presided over defendant's trial, found that
Clemons' situation differed from that of defendant. The court
concluded that the nature of defendant's one armed robbery
conviction was more serious than Clemons' multiple arrests. The
court found particularly aggravating the fact that defendant placed
a gun to Babian's head and threatened to kill him if he did not
cooperate. The court expressed its opinion that this act
"substantially dwarfs" Clemons' prior record of criminality. While
acknowledging that Clemons was actively involved in the Cheeks
murder, the court noted that defendant was the one who actually
shot Cheeks multiple times.
	Following defendant's sentencing hearing, the trial court
found the existence of several aggravating factors and further
explained its decision to impose the death penalty. While
acknowledging the mitigating evidence presented by trial counsel,
the court noted contradictions in the evidence. For instance,  the
court found it contradictory that the evidence showed defendant's
concern for his family, while he apparently has no feelings of
brotherhood with people outside his family. The court noted that
defendant's immediate family was in considerable disarray, but
that his extended family was caring and supportive. The court also
found it contradictory that testimony showed defendant's mother
was a prostitute and drug abuser, yet one of defendant's aunts
testified that defendant's mother provided him with food and
shelter. The court also noted that, while defendant's own father
was absent from the home, defendant had male role models in his
employer, Jones, and his uncle Roosevelt. The court found it
significant that defendant committed the Cheeks murder shortly
after being released from prison for the armed robbery of Paul
Babian. The court also noted that defendant possessed a loaded
handgun several days after the murder, demonstrating a lack of
remorse. The court referred to the murder as a "cold-blooded
planned killing." The court found that defendant's actions did not
speak well for his rehabilitative potential.
	We conclude that defendant's death sentence is not
unreasonably disparate to Clemons' 60-year prison term. Although
Clemons actively participated in the murder, defendant had the
gun and shot Cheeks four times. In addition, although Clemons
prevented Cheeks from running away, defendant had the last
chance to save Cheeks' life and, instead, chose to shoot him twice
more. See People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 176 (1998)
(codefendant not equally culpable where defendant shot the victim
repeatedly and had final opportunity to preserve victim's life when
his gun jammed); People v. St. Pierre, 146 Ill. 2d 494, 514 (1992)
(defendant's death sentence not unreasonably disparate to prison
sentence of accomplices where, although accomplices conceived
the plan to kill the victims, defendant was the one who struck one
victim in the head with a hammer repeatedly, waited for the
second victim to arrive home and did the same thing to her);
People v. Ashford, 121 Ill. 2d 55, 88-89 (1988) (death sentence not
unreasonably disparate where defendant shot all or almost all of
the victims, despite accomplice's more serious criminal
background).
	In regard to defendant's lack of remorse, we also note the
evidence at trial from Kenny Curry, to whom defendant bragged
about the murder, stating that his "thing [was] taking [people] out
of their cars." Defendant was the principal actor in the armed
robbery of Babian, for which he served prison time. The instant
offense was committed within a few months of defendant's release
from prison in which defendant again was the principal actor and
the sole shooter. In light of this evidence, we do not find
significant the fact that defendant had only one conviction, while
Clemons had four arrests and was on home monitoring at the time
of the offense. While defendant may have had a less desirable
family life than did Clemons, with the absence of one parent and
the drug addiction of the other, the trial court found the evidence
to be inconsistent in some respects. In addition, we note again that
evidence of a turbulent childhood is not inherently mitigating.
Defendant turned to drug-running and selling drugs at a young age
and, regardless of the stated reason for this, such conduct may be
viewed as indicating a propensity to commit crimes.
VI. Failure of Post-conviction Counsel to Comply With Rule
651(c)
	Defendant alleges that his post-conviction counsel failed to
comply with Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c)),
which requires the record on appeal to show that post-conviction
counsel consulted with the defendant by mail or in person to
ascertain the defendant's contentions of deprivation of
constitutional rights, examined the record of proceedings at trial,
and made any amendments to the pro se petition that were
necessary for the adequate presentation of the defendant's
contentions. Compliance with the duties set forth in this rule is
mandatory. People v. Szabo, 144 Ill. 2d 525, 532 (1991).
Defendants in post-conviction proceedings are entitled to a
"reasonable" level of assistance. Because post-conviction
proceedings derive from statute, rather than from the federal or
state constitutions, a defendant may not claim sixth amendment
ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel. People v.
Wright, 149 Ill. 2d 36, 64 (1992).
	Defendant's first argument involves ballistics testing of the
Colt revolver found in his possession when he was arrested. Police
recovered a bullet jacket from Cheeks' vehicle. At trial, the State's
ballistics expert testified that he had examined the gun and the
recovered bullet jacket and determined that the jacket could have
been fired by the gun, but he was unable to form an opinion that
the jacket was in fact fired from that particular gun. In an amended
post-conviction petition, defendant argued that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to obtain further forensic testing of the gun
in an attempt to rule out the gun as the source of the jacket found
in the Cheeks vehicle. Post-conviction counsel filed a motion for
discovery, asking the court to order the State to produce the gun
and jacket for further testing. The trial court denied the motion.
Defendant does not now claim error in the trial court's ruling.
Instead, recognizing that discovery is granted in post-conviction
proceedings only upon a showing of "good cause" (People v. Fair,
193 Ill. 2d 256, 264-65 (2000)), defendant argues that his post-conviction counsel should have supplemented the motion for
discovery with an affidavit from a ballistics expert. We allowed
defendant's motion to supplement the record on appeal with the
affidavit of Larry Hood. Hood states that he is a retired police
officer who has been qualified numerous times as an expert in the
areas of firearms and arson investigation. Hood stated that he
could not tell from the bullet jacket whether it came from a .357
Magnum or a .38 Special weapon and, without an opportunity to
examine the weapon, he could not say with certainty whether the
gun recovered from defendant was capable of firing bullets of both
calibers or only one of them. Hood also stated that further
examination of the jacket and comparison to the weapon found
during defendant's arrest "could eliminate" the possibility that the
jacket came from that weapon.
	At the trial, Robert Smith, qualified by the trial court as an
expert in firearms examination, testified that he examined the
bullet jacket found in Cheeks' vehicle and examined and test-fired
the gun taken at the time of defendant's arrest. Because the jacket
was in a mutilated condition, Smith was unable to form an opinion
that it was fired from one particular gun. The class characteristics
of the jacket would be consistent with the class characteristics of
the Colt revolver. Thus, the bullet could have been fired from that
gun. On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited testimony
from Smith that weapons of this caliber are very common and that
the jacket could have been fired from tens of thousands of other
such weapons.
	Contrary to defendant's contention, Hood's affidavit does not
establish that further analysis would have demonstrated that the
jacket was not fired from the gun found in defendant's possession.
Hood merely stated that such analysis "could" eliminate the gun
as the source of the spent jacket. It is, of course, theoretically
possible that further testing might have determined that the jacket
was not fired from the gun. On the other hand, it is equally
possible, theoretically, that such testing might determine that the
jacket was in fact fired from the gun defendant possessed. In
reality, however, with the jacket in the mutilated condition as
described by Smith, it is doubtful that further testing would have
been useful. Instead of having the gun and jacket further tested, it
is likely that trial counsel made a strategic decision to emphasize
to the jury through cross-examination of the State's expert witness
that the bullet jacket could not be tied to the gun recovered from
defendant and that the jacket could potentially have been fired by
literally thousands of other such guns. Decisions concerning what
witnesses to call and what evidence to present on a defendant's
behalf are viewed as matters of trial strategy. Such decisions are
generally immune from claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 432 (1999). Under these
circumstances, post-conviction counsel did not fail to render
reasonably effective assistance with regard to defendant's
discovery motion.
	Defendant next argues that post-conviction counsel erred in
failing to properly support with documentation defendant's claim
that his death sentence was unreasonably disparate to Clemons'
prison sentence. Defendant alleges that counsel attached only the
unpublished order of the appellate court (No. 1-94-2850
(unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23)) in Clemons'
case to the petition and, 29 days after the petition was dismissed,
filed a motion for reconsideration that included an "utterly
indecipherable" numerical printout of Clemons' criminal history,
and cover sheets for Clemons' presentence report and the
transcript of his sentencing hearing, which were asserted to be
currently unavailable.
	We need not address defendant's contention here, in light of
our determination that defendant's sentence is not unreasonably
disparate to Clemons' sentence.
	Defendant next argues that post-conviction counsel erred in
failing to raise a claim that Kenny Curry expected and received a
reward for his trial testimony. Defendant alleges that he submitted
an affidavit to his attorney stating that Kenneth Burks told him that
Curry had received the reward, but counsel failed to append the
affidavit to the petition.
	We have allowed defendant to supplement the record on
appeal with his affidavit. He states therein that on May 10, 1993,
he called his aunt, Julie Munson, gave her Burks' telephone
number and asked her to initiate a three-way call. Julie did so and
defendant then spoke to Burks. Defendant asked Burks why he
lied and cooperated with police in arresting defendant. Burks
replied that he "didn't do nothing." He said, "The other Kenny did
it. He's the one who got paid for [testifying]. He got the reward
money. I didn't do nothing."
	There is no evidence in the record on appeal showing or even
suggesting that the Cheeks family offered a reward. Nor is there
any evidence that Curry received a reward from the Cheeks family.
Defendant has filed a newspaper article which indicates that
Cheeks' father had offered a $2,500 reward. Trial counsel did not
question Curry at trial about a reward. However, on cross-examination, counsel elicited testimony that Curry knew Cheeks
had a brother who was a National Basketball Association (NBA)
player and, presumably, made a lot of money. Counsel also
questioned Curry about why he did not go to police immediately
after his conversation with defendant, when he first learned of the
victim's identity, and why he had gone to Cheeks' funeral. In
addition, counsel attempted to cross-examine a police detective
about whether Mark Cheeks told him that a reward was being
offered, but the State's objection was sustained on hearsay
grounds. Although trial counsel could have called the victim's
brother, Mark Cheeks, as a witness and questioned him concerning
whether a reward had been offered and paid, the potential results
of such an examination were unknown. By getting the issue of the
reward in front of the jury, counsel attempted to convey the
impression that a reward had been offered and that Curry expected
to be paid that reward. In his closing argument, counsel argued
that Curry had an agenda, that he knew the victim was related to
a well-paid NBA player and that he went to the Cheeks family
with the intention of collecting a reward. Post-conviction counsel
did not fail to render reasonably effective assistance by not raising
a claim that Curry received a reward for his testimony.
VII. Pro Se Arguments
	With leave of this court, defendant has filed a pro se brief in
which he raises four additional issues for our consideration.
A. Ineffectiveness of Trial Counsel at Closing Argument
	Defendant argues that his trial counsel presented a
"rambling[,] incoherent[,] offensive" closing argument at the guilt-innocence phase of the trial that conceded defendant's guilt and
attacked the victim and other witnesses. This led to a "vitriolic"
rebuttal argument by the State, which, according to defendant,
implied that counsel's tactics were further evidence of defendant's
guilt.
	We first note that defendant has waived this argument. After
trial counsel filed post-trial and post-sentencing motions,
defendant alleged ineffectiveness of counsel and asked the trial
court to appoint another attorney to argue the motions. When the
court asked defendant to specify his complaints about counsel,
defendant pointed to his waiver of a jury for sentencing and the
number of peremptory challenges that were given him, and asked
that certain impounded exhibits be returned to him. Defendant did
not voice any complaints about trial counsel's closing argument.
Further, defendant has waived this argument because his appellate
counsel could have, but did not, raise any issue about trial
counsel's closing argument in defendant's direct appeal. To
prevail on this issue, therefore, defendant must demonstrate
ineffectiveness of appellate counsel under the Strickland standard.
	In statements given to police and an assistant State's Attorney,
defendant confessed to robbing and shooting Cheeks, although he
did not admit killing him. The jury heard testimony from Curry,
describing his conversation with defendant, wherein defendant
admitted killing a man and burning his vehicle. The State
presented evidence of burns on defendant's face at the time he was
arrested. The jury heard evidence that the gun found in defendant's
possession when he was arrested could have fired the bullet jacket
found in the Cheeks vehicle. In addition, the State presented
testimony that defendant confessed to the murder to his mother
and a paramedic. Defendant did not testify at the trial and defense
counsel offered no evidence.
	Trial counsel then was presented with a difficult task in
constructing his closing argument. Contrary to defendant's
contention, counsel did not concede defendant's guilt of the
murder. Although counsel did concede that defendant was found
in possession of a gun at the time of his arrest, he could not have
credibly claimed otherwise. Counsel emphasized, however, that
the State's firearm expert could not connect the gun to the bullet
jacket found in Cheeks' vehicle and that thousands of such guns
could have fired the shots. Counsel further argued that, even
though defendant's fingerprints were found on the gun, his prints
were not found on the trigger. Counsel argued that unidentified
fingerprints on the gun may have belonged to Clemons and that it
was possible that Clemons fired the fatal shots. Counsel argued
that Curry had an "agenda" in testifying, because he expected to
receive a reward from the Cheeks family. Attempting to explain
why defendant would refuse to name Clemons as his accomplice
in his statements to police, counsel suggested that defendant had
a high regard or affection for Clemons. Counsel noted that the
evidence showed that two of Cheeks' wounds were superficial,
thus corroborating defendant's statement that the gun went off
accidentally in the vehicle when Cheeks grabbed it. Counsel
referred to Cheeks' intoxication as suggesting that Cheeks may
have acted rashly that night, precipitating the struggle over the
gun. Throughout his closing argument, trial counsel reminded the
jury that the State had the burden of proving defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.
	We conclude that trial counsel was not ineffective in his
closing argument. In fact, given the evidence against defendant,
counsel did an admirable job in attempting to create reasonable
doubt in the minds of the jurors. We also necessarily conclude that
appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this issue
in the direct appeal.

B. Prosecutor's Closing Argument
	Defendant argues that the prosecutor repeatedly commented
on defendant's failure to testify at the trial. He argues that these
comments deprived him of his constitutional right to a fair trial.
He also argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing
to raise this issue in the direct appeal. During his closing
argument, trial counsel told the jury that the State had produced no
eyewitnesses to the crime and that the State bore the burden of
establishing how the offense occurred. In rebuttal, the prosecutor
stated that defendant was an eyewitness to the crime, as well as
Clemons, and that defendant did not mention Clemons' name in
his statements to police, because he did not want Clemons to talk
to the police.
	Defense counsel did not object to these comments or include
the issue in a post-trial motion, thus waiving the issue for appellate
review. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). Appellate
counsel did not raise this issue in the direct appeal, resulting in
waiver for post-conviction review. People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 522 (1995).
	 We conclude that appellate counsel was not ineffective for
failing to raise this issue. In telling the jury that defendant was an
eyewitness to the crime, the prosecutor was responding to the
comments of defendant's trial counsel when he asserted that the
State had produced no eyewitnesses. A prosecutor may respond to
comments made by defense counsel in closing argument that
clearly invite a response. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d  at 154. That defendant
was an eyewitness was established by his own statements to
police. In making the complained-of comments to the jury, the
prosecutor merely reminded the jury that defendant had, by his
own words, placed himself at the scene of the crime. The
prosecutor did not, by doing so, comment on defendant's failure
to testify. Defendant also complains that the prosecutor
emphasized that its own witnesses had testified, specifically Curry
and Detective Harris. The prosecutor stated that Curry "came in
here, he took that witness stand and he told you what his buddy
told him." She also reminded the jury that Detective Harris
testified that, in Harris' presence, defendant told his mother that he
"killed a man and torched his truck." These statements did not
refer to defendant's failure to testify, but instead suggested to the
jury that, given the evidence, it was not necessary for the State to
produce eyewitnesses to the crime.
	Defendant also argues that the State made improper comments
regarding Clemons and asked the jury to infer that Clemons had
implicated defendant. Specifically, defendant challenges the
prosecutor's comments during her rebuttal argument that the State
could not, under the law, bring the jury the statement of Clemons
and that the jury was not to consider the involvement of Clemons
in determining defendant's guilt. Defendant claims this was a
violation of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 14 L. Ed. 2d 106,
85 S. Ct. 1229 (1965), and Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123,
20 L. Ed. 2d 476, 88 S. Ct. 1620 (1968). In Bruton, the Supreme
Court held that the admission at a joint trial of a statement by a
nontestifying codefendant that expressly implicated defendant in
the crime violates the defendant's right to confront witnesses
against him. Bruton, 391 U.S.  at 137, 20 L. Ed. 2d  at 485-86, 88 S. Ct.  at 1628. As defendant was not tried with Clemons at a joint
trial and the State did not attempt to introduce any statement of
Clemons against defendant, Bruton does not apply here. Griffin
held that it is a violation of a defendant's constitutional right
against self-incrimination (U.S. Const., amends. V, XIV) when the
prosecution comments on the defendant's failure to testify. Griffin,
380 U.S.  at 615, 14 L. Ed. 2d  at 110, 85 S. Ct.  at 1233.
	The prosecutor's comment to the jury that she could not
produce any statement of Clemons was simply an accurate
statement of the law. Moreover, this comment was invited by
defense counsel's comments in his closing argument regarding the
fact that there were no eyewitnesses to the murder of Cheeks.
Defendant further argues that the prosecutor erred in stating that
the reason defendant did not want to mention Clemons' name in
his statements was because Clemons was the other eyewitness. We
fail to see how this constitutes improper comment on defendant's
failure to testify. In his closing argument, defense counsel told the
jury that defendant refused to name Clemons because he had a
high regard or affection for Clemons. The prosecutor's comment
simply suggested another reason why defendant would not name
his accomplice. This is not improper argument. Accordingly,
defendant's appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to
raise this issue in the direct appeal. The issue was waived and, in
any event, lacked merit.

C. Brady Violation
	Defendant argues that the prosecution committed a violation
under Brady v. Maryland when it failed to disclose the criminal
records of Burks, Curry and Vivurette. He claims such information
would have been useful for impeachment and would have
supported his claim that the three men were working as
informants. He notes that this information was requested by the
defense in a discovery motion. This issue was not included in any
post-trial motion filed by defense counsel nor was it raised in
defendant's direct appeal.
	Defendant's argument is misplaced as to Burks and Vivurette,
as neither man testified at defendant's trial. Defendant has
appended to his pro se brief an abstract of Curry's criminal record.
A review of that record shows that Curry had no convictions that
could have been used to impeach his credibility under the rule of
People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510, 516-17 (1971).
Accordingly, we conclude that appellate counsel was not
ineffective for failing to raise a nonmeritorious issue on direct
appeal.

VIII. Use of Perjured Testimony
	Defendant argues that the State used false testimony or failed
to correct false testimony. Specifically, he argues that the State
failed to correct the false impression left by Curry that he did not
expect a reward for his testimony. Defendant also argues that the
State failed to correct false testimony from paramedic Terry
Merriweather that she examined defendant and he made
incriminating statements to her.
	A prosecutor's knowing use of perjured testimony in a
criminal prosecution violates due process and entitles the
defendant to a new trial. People v. Jimerson, 166 Ill. 2d 211, 223-24 (1995), quoting People v. McKinney, 31 Ill. 2d 246, 247 (1964).
This principle applies both where the prosecutor procures false
testimony and where the witness testifies falsely of his or her own
accord and the prosecutor knowingly fails to correct the falsity.
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217, 1221, 79 S. Ct. 1173, 1177 (1959).
	We note that neither Burks nor Vivurette testified at
defendant's trial. As to Curry, although defense counsel cross-examined him about his motives for revealing his conversation
with defendant, Curry did not testify regarding any expectation or
receipt of a reward. Thus, his testimony could not have directly
conveyed any impression to the jury on that issue.
	Defendant's last argument is that the State failed to correct the
perjured testimony of paramedic Terry Merriweather. At trial,
Merriweather testified that in October 1991, she was responsible
for the intake of inmates at the Cook County jail. She processed
them, performed physical examinations and drew blood. While
processing defendant, he told her that his face had been burned
five days before. Merriweather also testified that there had been
some confusion in the receiving area about defendant being the
man who killed Cheeks. She asked him if he was that man and
defendant said yes. When she asked defendant how his face
became burned, he told her that after he killed Cheeks, he tried to
torch the car and he was caught in the flames. On cross-examination, Merriweather testified that she examined defendant's
body and they discussed an old gunshot wound he had sustained
several years before. While processing defendant, Merriweather
used a form called a "bruise sheet" to write down defendant's
medical information.
	Defendant now argues that this testimony was false, because
"jail procedures and policy" prohibit examinations of prisoners by
members of the opposite sex. He submits affidavits of jail inmates
verifying this allegation. These affidavits, however, only relate the
inmates' own experiences or state that they have never seen a
female paramedic conduct a physical examination, or contain
hearsay as to what they were told by others in regard to not
undressing in front of a woman. These affidavits do not adequately
support defendant's contention that Merriweather perjured herself.
We conclude, therefore, that defendant has not made the requisite
showing that the State knowingly failed to correct perjured
testimony.

CONCLUSION
	Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's judgment
dismissing defendant's post-conviction petition without an
evidentiary hearing. The clerk of this court is directed to enter an
order setting Tuesday, November 26, 2002, as the date on which
the sentence of death entered in the circuit court of Cook County,
shall be carried out. Defendant shall be executed in the manner
provided by law (725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 2000)). The clerk of
this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate to the Director
of Corrections, to the warden of Tamms Correctional Center, and
to the warden of the institution where defendant is now confined.

Affirmed.
	The proceedings which culminated in Munson's convictions
and sentence of death were fatally flawed because they did not
comport with the new rules enacted by our court governing the
conduct of cases in which the State is seeking the death penalty.
For the reasons set forth in my dissenting opinion in People v.
Hickey, No. 87286, slip op. at 34-39 (September 27, 2001)
(Harrison, C.J., dissenting), the procedures contained in those
rules are indispensable for achieving an accurate determination of
innocence or guilt and are applicable to all capital cases now
coming before us. Because Munson was tried, convicted and
sentenced without the benefit of the new rules, his convictions and
death sentence should be vacated, and the cause should be
remanded to the circuit court for a new trial.
	Even if Munson were not entitled to the benefit of the new
rules, his sentence of death could not stand. For the reasons set
forth in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in People v.
Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty law is void
and unenforceable because it violates the eighth and fourteenth
amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const.,
amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois
Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2). Absent the new rules,
there is no basis for altering that conclusion. At a minimum,
Munson's sentence of death should therefore be vacated, and he
should be sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(j)
(West 2000).



	JUSTICE KILBRIDE, also dissenting:
	Defendant's convictions and sentence should be set aside
because the trial proceedings were not conducted in accordance
with the new supreme court rules governing capital cases. See
People v. Hickey, No. 87286, slip op. at 39-43 (September 27,
2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting), and People v. Simpson, No. 85084,
slip op. at 35-38 (September 27, 2001) (Kilbride, J., dissenting).
For the reasons expressed in my dissents in Hickey and Simpson,
I maintain that convictions and sentences obtained in capital cases
prior to this court's adoption of the new rules are inherently
unreliable because the old system did not adequately protect a
defendant's constitutional rights. The new rules were promulgated
to address these constitutional deficiencies and, as a result, must
be applied retroactively to all capital cases currently being
reviewed by this court. See People v. Hudson, 195 Ill. 2d 117, 126
(2001), citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649, 661, 107 S. Ct. 708, 716 (1987).