Case Title: DAVID v. DAVID

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 1969-10-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
David v. David1986 WY 173724 P.2d 1141Case Number: 86-24Decided: 09/10/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Melvin M. DAVID, 
Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

Marilyn M. DAVID, 
Appellee (Defendant).

Appeal from The District 
Court, TetonCounty, Robert B. Ranck, 
J.

David R. Hansen, 
Jackson, for appellant.

R. Michael 
Mullikin and Phelps H. Swift, Jr. of Mullikin, Larson & Swift, Jackson, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     After finding a 
property settlement agreement binding on the parties to a divorce proceeding, 
the trial judge incorporated into the resulting decree an additional provision 
that a lien be recorded to secure payments owed by the husband to the wife after 
she quitclaimed her share of their ranch real estate to him. The husband 
contends on appeal that the lien was improper and an abuse of discretion in 
modifying a property settlement separation agreement, which contention is now 
rejected as we affirm.

[¶2.]     Melvin and Marilyn 
David, married for 27 years, raised four children and acquired a ranch in 
SubletteCounty, and separated in 
1984. In March, 1985 they entered into a property settlement agreement to divide 
their real and personal property which provided that Marilyn would quitclaim her 
interest in the ranch property to Melvin, and that Melvin would assume liability 
for taxes and mortgages against the property, and pay Marilyn $111,150 in 50 
semiannual installments. The agreement was drafted by Melvin's attorney, and 
signed by Marilyn without benefit of separate counsel, even though the attorney 
had recommended that she seek independent legal advice. Pursuant to the terms of 
the settlement agreement, she executed the quitclaim deed, and while the divorce 
proceeding was pending, it was recorded.

[¶3.]     Melvin David filed a 
divorce complaint in TetonCounty and asked the trial court to 
approve the settlement agreement. Marilyn David, then represented by counsel, 
counterclaimed, contending that she had signed the property settlement agreement 
without understanding its meaning or consequences and that it constituted an 
unfair and inequitable property division. The trial judge ruled after trial 
hearing that the settlement agreement was binding and granted the divorce. The 
judge also then requested that counsel brief the issue of the trial court's 
authority to impose a lien on the property for the security benefit of the wife 
to assure the settlement agreement payments, and in the subsequent written 
decree imposed the lien to be filed in SubletteCounty on the real estate quitclaimed to 
the husband.

[¶4.]     Melvin David appealed 
and raises as issues whether the court's imposition and its recordation of a 
lien upon appellant's ranch, as transferred to him in divorce settlement 
agreement, was proper. Appellee similarly phrases the issue of the case for our 
review.

[¶5.]     It is firmly 
established that the trial court has great discretion in dividing marital 
property, Barney v. Barney, Wyo., 705 P.2d 342 (1985); Paul v. Paul, Wyo., 616 P.2d 707 (1980), and a trial court's discretion will not be disturbed except on 
clear grounds. Piper v. Piper, Wyo., 487 P.2d 1062 (1971). These rules are 
consistent with the legislature's decision that "the court shall make such 
disposition of the property of the parties as appears just and equitable." 
Section 20-2-114, W.S. 1977, 1986 Cum.Supp. This court will not adjust a 
property settlement incorporated into a divorce decree by a judge absent a clear 
abuse of discretion - such abuse as would shock the conscience of the court. 
Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, Wyo., 677 P.2d 814 (1984); Dennis v. Dennis, Wyo., 675 P.2d 265 
(1984).

[¶6.]     It is also firmly 
established that "[p]roperty settlement agreements entered into by the parties 
prior to a divorce action are generally recognized and given force and effect in 
the decree," Prentice v. Prentice, Wyo., 568 P.2d 883, 886 (1977), and that such 
agreements are favored by the courts. Clauss v. Clauss, Wyo., 459 P.2d 369 
(1969); Beard v. Beard, Wyo., 368 P.2d 953 
(1962).

[¶7.]     As a corollary of both 
rules the confluence effect is that even though property settlements are favored 
by the courts and are generally recognized in Wyoming, the parties cannot oust a 
court's statutory duty to "make such disposition of the property of the parties 
as appears just and equitable" by entering into a property settlement agreement 
which the judge cannot in good conscience approve and adopt when granting a 
divorce. Leighton v. Leighton, 81 Wis.2d 620, 261 N.W.2d 457 (1978); 24 
Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 819. This is especially true in this case, 
where the wife was not represented by separate counsel at the time she signed 
the property settlement agreement and quitclaimed her share of the ranch to her 
husband.1

[¶8.]     Appellant points out 
that this court has held that:

"* * * Agreements such as 
were entered into by defendant and plaintiff are favored by the courts * * *. 
Hence it would seem that if the agreement were entered into voluntarily and by 
competent persons and if the contract were not against public policy or against 
the best interest of the children, the only proper course for the court was to 
enforce it, or, rather, not to interfere with it." Beard v. Beard, supra, 368 P.2d  at 955.

[¶9.]     In that case the former 
Mrs. Beard was attempting to modify the decree of divorce several months after 
it had been entered - after the trial court had expressly adopted the agreement 
as being fair and equitable. In Clauss v. Clauss, supra, this court upheld two 
property settlement agreements entered into by the parties prior to commencement 
of the divorce action. But there again the court expressly decreed that the 
agreement constituted, "a true, fair and equitable distribution and division of 
the parties' property." Clauss v. Clauss, supra, 459 P.2d  at 375. See also 
Pavlica v. Pavlica, 
Wyo., 587 P.2d 639 
(1978).

[¶10.]  In Rinehart v. Rinehart, Wyo., 75 P.2d 390 (1938), this court reversed 
a trial judge who altered the alimony provision of the parties' stipulation 
prior to entering the divorce decree. The husband had defaulted and failed to 
answer the divorce complaint, assuming that the stipulation which he and his 
wife had signed would be accepted by the trial judge. When the trial judge 
refused to modify or vacate the divorce decree and allow the husband to be heard 
concerning it, the husband appealed. The holding in Rinehart appears to be that 
the husband's alimony payments should not have been increased without giving him 
an opportunity to be heard and that the husband was justified in failing to 
answer and in assuming that the stipulation would control. However, the court 
also reached the issue of whether the court had the right to ignore the parties' 
stipulation and award alimony in excess of the amount provided in the agreement. 
The court adopted the approach that:

"* * * The contract is 
presumed to be fair, just, and equitable. The burden to show it otherwise is on 
the plaintiff. The court, accordingly, should not have disregarded it in the 
absence of such showing. Still, it had the power to do so." 75 P.2d  at 
397.

[¶11.]  The case at bar is not an alimony case, 
and, unlike Rinehart, Melvin and Marilyn David were both present at trial. But 
Rinehart illustrates the weight to be placed on settlement agreements and the 
restraint which a trial judge should exercise in modifying the terms of an 
agreement. To avoid making the parties' agreement "an exercise in futility," 
Pavlica v. Pavlica, supra, 587 P.2d  at 641, the trial judge should avoid 
rewriting the entire agreement, and should make only those alterations which 
will render the parties' agreement just and equitable. However, after the decree 
of divorce is granted, modification of the property settlement agreement will 
not be allowed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 
supra.

[¶12.]  In this case, the trial judge held that 
the settlement agreement entered into by the parties prior to divorce was 
binding on them, and added in the decree the lien on the husband's ranch, to 
secure the payments due to the wife. We find that it was within the trial 
court's sound discretion to add this term to the husband's obligation. Section 
20-2-114. Since property division provisions of divorce decrees are rarely 
modified, the judge, as arbiter of what is a just and equitable property 
division, must satisfy himself that his order will continue to be fair and just 
long after the decree is entered. The trial judge in this case felt that a just 
and equitable property division should include the amendment for the additional 
security for the wife that she would be paid for property she had quitclaimed to 
her husband, in accord with the settled agreement for property division. The 
parties could have placed the deed to the wife's share of the ranch in escrow 
until the husband's payment obligations were met, but because they did not 
provide in their property settlement agreement a method of securing the 
husband's indebtedness to his wife, the judge provided that security in the 
decree.2

[¶13.]  In the decree of divorce, the trial judge 
imposed the lien on the ranch property to secure the payments due to Marilyn by 
the terms of the settlement agreement. Other courts have in similar 
circumstances granted the wife a security interest to insure that the husband's 
annual installment payments will be made. Burleigh v. Burleigh, 200 Mont. 1, 650 P.2d 753 
(1982). See also In re Marriage of Valley, Colo. App., 633 P.2d 1104 (1981); In 
re Marriage of Garst, Mont., 669 P.2d 1063 (1983); In re Marriage of Brown, 179 
Mont. 417, 587 P.2d 361 (1978); and Chrane v. Chrane, 98 N.M. 471, 649 P.2d 1384 
(1982).

[¶14.]  In Ridgway v. Ridgway, 94 N.M. 345, 610 P.2d 749 (1980), the trial judge imposed a lien on the separate property of the 
husband to secure the amount of community property due to the wife. The New 
Mexico Supreme Court agreed that the lien was proper:

"* * * [U]nder its 
inherent power, the court may, nonetheless, impose a lien on separate property 
as security for the debt owed. The trial court in no way changed the status of 
appellant's separate property nor vested title in appellee by imposition of the 
lien." 610 P.2d  at 750.

[¶15.]  We consequently determine that the 
district court can, as a matter of discretion, properly impose a lien on the 
property of one spouse to secure a debt owed to the other spouse as an adjunct 
to divorce settlement whether or not supplementary to terms of any settlement 
agreement mutually executed by the parties.

[¶16.]  The question which may remain is whether 
or not an "equitable lien," as labeled in the divorce decree, is the proper term 
for the security interest imposed. Regardless of the terminology used by the 
judge in the divorce decree, the decree gives rise to an instrument of 
encumbrance upon the ranch property of Melvin David. Upon default of any payment 
due to Marilyn, she may invoke her status as a lienholder and foreclose on her 
interest in the payments on the ranch. We would simply classify the security 
interest imposed by the trial judge as a lien whereby Marilyn David's security 
interest in the property provides her with rights akin to those of a mortgagee, 
constituting a security interest in the real estate previously owned 
jointly.

[¶17.]  Finally, appellant questions whether it 
was proper for the trial judge to provide that the divorce decree should be 
filed in the SubletteCounty real estate records. Judgments 
affecting title to real property are to be recorded in the county clerk's office 
of the county wherein the property is situated, § 1-16-301, W.S. 1977, to serve 
as notice to the world of the encumbrance. Remilong v. Crolla, Wyo., 576 P.2d 461 (1978). A significant 
purpose of the recording is to create a security interest, 53 C.J.S. Liens § 1a, 
afford notice, and establish lien priority by recording. 53 C.J.S. Liens § 
10.

[¶18.]  Finding no error which merits reversal, 
we affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1 Although an attorney 
cannot require his client's spouse to seek separate legal advice before signing 
a settlement agreement, we encourage lawyers to strongly advise the client's 
spouse to review the agreement with separate counsel before signing. Several 
rules of ethics relate to representation or advising when a conflict of interest 
relationship can be inferred in marital case representation. See Rule 20, 
Amended Rules Adopted by the Supreme Court of Wyoming Providing for the Organization and Government of 
the Bar Association of the Attorneys at Law of the State of Wyoming.

2 Since the lien is court 
ordered, amendment or modification in a subsequent proceeding for exigent 
business requirements would not be subject to the nonmodification rules for 
agreements of property division mutually settled by the parties. Ulrich v. 
Ulrich, Wyo., 366 P.2d 999 
(1961).

Obstinacy after divorce 
is ill-justified when the difficult problems of financing intervene in the cruel 
economics of present agriculture depression. Unjustified noncooperation will 
justify the stern contemplation of the divorce court serving in the mold of a 
court of continuing equity jurisdiction.