Case Title: Ex Parte Chemical Lime of Alabama, Inc.

Citation: 916 So. 2d 594

Docket Number: 1040428

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2005-04-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
916 So. 2d 594 (2005)
Ex parte CHEMICAL LIME OF ALABAMA, INC.
(In re Freda Sorah, etc.
v.
Jim Walter Resources, Inc., et al.[1])
1040428.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
April 29, 2005.
Rehearing Denied June 17, 2005.
*595 Frank L. Parker, Jr., Christina M. Adcock, and Robert B. McGinley, Jr., of Alford, Clausen & McDonald, LLC, Mobile, for petitioner.
C. Whit Drake of Drake & Shaw, Birmingham, for respondents.
STUART, Justice.
Chemical Lime of Alabama, Inc., a defendant in 18 consolidated actions pending in the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court, petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the judge of the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court to grant its motions for a summary judgment.[2] Chemical Lime argues that the plaintiffs failed to exercise due diligence in not substituting Chemical Lime for a fictitiously named defendant in these cases until after the applicable two-year statutory periods of limitations, §§ 6-2-38 *596 and 6-5-410, Ala.Code 1975, had expired as to the plaintiffs' claims asserting wrongful death and personal injury.
On September 23, 2001, two explosions occurred at mine # 5, a coal mine owned and operated by Jim Walter Resources, Inc., in Brookwood. Thirteen miners were killed and several miners were injured in the explosions. The injured miners and the administrators of the estates of the 13 deceased miners (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the plaintiffs") sued Jim Walter Resources, Inc., and fictitiously named defendants, alleging breach of implied warranty of merchantability, failure to warn, negligence and wantonness, and claims based on the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine.[3]
On April 2, 2004, the plaintiffs moved to amend the complaints to add Chemical Lime as an additional defendant. Chemical Lime manufactures limestone rock dust, which is applied to areas of a coal mine where coal dust can become suspended in the air, in order to neutralize the highly explosive characteristic of floating coal dust. Although Georgia Marble Company, another provider of limestone rock dust to mine # 5, was named as a defendant within the two-year limitations period, Chemical Lime was not named as a defendant until almost seven months after the expiration of the two-year limitations period.
Chemical Lime moved to dismiss certain of the claims against it on the ground that the statute of limitations for all claims asserted in the wrongful-death cases, with the exception of the claims of the surviving plaintiffs alleging breach of implied warranty of merchantability, clearly expired on September 23, 2003. The trial court denied Chemical Lime's motion.
Chemical Lime petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment for Chemical Lime on those claims as to which the statute of limitations is two years.
Ex parte Alloy Wheels Int'l, Ltd., 882 So. 2d 819, 821-22 (Ala.2003). One of the "narrow exceptions" to the general rule that a ruling on a summary-judgment motion is not reviewable by a petition for a writ of mandamus is the denial of a summary-judgment motion when "the undisputed evidence shows that the plaintiff failed to act with due diligence in identifying the fictitiously named defendant as the *597 party the plaintiff intended to sue." Ex parte Snow, 764 So. 2d 531, 537 (Ala.1999). In reviewing the grant or denial of a summary-judgment motion,
Ex parte Alloy Wheels, 882 So. 2d  at 822.
Chemical Lime argues that it is entitled to a summary judgment on those claims asserted against it that are governed by a two-year statute of limitations because the plaintiffs did not amend their complaints to substitute Chemical Lime for a fictitiously named defendant until the two-year limitations period had expired. Chemical Lime contends that the plaintiffs have clearly not met their burden of invoking the relation-back principle of Rule 15(c)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., applicable to fictitious-party practice under Rule 9(h), Ala. R. Civ. P. According to Chemical Lime, the plaintiffs have failed to act with the required due diligence in identifying Chemical Lime as one of the fictitiously named defendants in their complaints.
Rule 9(h), Ala. R. Civ. P., states:
Rule 15(c)(4) provides that "[a]n amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when ... relation back is permitted by principles applicable to fictitious party practice pursuant to Rule 9(h)." This Court has explained:
Fulmer v. Clark Equip. Co., 654 So. 2d 45, 46 (Ala.1995). See also Pearson v. Brooks, 883 So. 2d 185 (Ala.2003).
Chemical Lime maintains that the plaintiffs did not exercise due diligence because, it argues, the plaintiffs knew or should have known its identity in December 2002, or soon thereafter. According to Chemical Line, the plaintiffs had knowledge of two extensive reports on these explosions, one released by the United States Department of Labor Mine Safety and Health Administration on December 11, 2002, and the other released by United Mine Workers of America (hereinafter "the UMWA") on January 22, 2003. Both reports were culminations of an enormous amount of research and investigation done by the UMWA and the federal government and provide detailed analyses and discussions about the explosions. The UMWA report stated that Jim Walter Resources purchased rock dust for mine # 5 from several suppliers and that the "bulk" rock dust purchased was not satisfactory. The report further identified Chemical Lime as a provider of bulk limestone rock dust at mine # 5, specifically stating that Chemical Lime had provided 1,360 tons of bulk rock dust in the months immediately preceding the explosions. Additionally, Chemical Lime states that the UMWA report included specific criticisms of the quantity and quality of bulk rock dust used at mine # 5. Chemical Lime maintains that because the plaintiffs' counsel had access to this report immediately after it was published, the plaintiffs had at least eight months before the expiration of the limitations period to substitute Chemical Lime for one of the fictitiously named defendants in the complaints. Consequently, Chemical Lime asserts that the plaintiffs' lack of diligence is clear, that the relation-back doctrine clearly does not apply, and that Chemical Lime should be dismissed from the actions with regard to all claims except the surviving plaintiffs' claims of breach of warranty of merchantability.
Chemical Lime submitted sufficient evidence indicating that the plaintiffs had knowledge of the UMWA report detailing the problems with the bulk rock dust and identifying Chemical Lime as a supplier of bulk rock dust at least eight months before the limitations period expired. The burden then shifted to the plaintiffs to present evidence to establish that they had exercised due diligence in identifying Chemical Lime as the defendant described fictitiously in the complaints.
The evidence presented by the plaintiffs does not establish that they exercised due diligence in attempting to discover that Chemical Lime was a supplier of bulk rock dust at mine # 5. In their answer to Chemical Lime's petition, the plaintiffs do not deny that they had knowledge of the UMWA report, and they admit that the report detailed a problem with the bulk rock dust supplied for mine # 5 and referenced Chemical Lime as a supplier of the rock dust. While the plaintiffs maintain that in light of the volumes of documents that were produced during discovery, it was understandable that they did not identify Chemical Lime as one of the fictitiously named parties, the plaintiffs do not present evidence to establish that they did not know or should not have known that Chemical Lime was in fact a supplier of bulk rock dust described fictitiously in the *599 complaints. Indeed, the plaintiffs do not present evidence to establish that they asked Jim Walters Resources to identify its supplier of bulk rock dust and that Jim Walters Resources refused to answer. Additionally, the plaintiffs do not present a timeline as to how they diligently sought to identify Chemical Lime as the supplier of the bulk rock dust and one of the fictitiously named defendants. Cf. Oliver v. Woodward, 824 So. 2d 693 (Ala.2001)(detailing the diligence the plaintiff took to identify the appropriate fictitiously named defendants). Therefore, the plaintiffs do not present evidence to refute the evidence that, within the limitations period, they had knowledge of the UMWA report and that the report unequivocally identified a problem with the bulk rock dust and identified Chemical Lime as a supplier of the rock dust. Therefore, the plaintiffs do not establish that they exercised due diligence (i.e., that they should not have known or were not on notice) in identifying Chemical Lime as a supplier of bulk rock dust to mine # 5 and in substituting Chemical Lime for a fictitiously named defendant. As we reminded in Ex parte Snow:
764 So. 2d  at 537-38 (quoting Marsh v. Wenzel, 732 So. 2d 985, 990 (Ala.1998)).
Chemical Lime has clearly demonstrated that the plaintiffs did not exercise due diligence in naming it in place of a fictitious defendant; therefore, the relation-back doctrine does not apply. Thus, Chemical Lime has shown a clear legal right to mandamus relief and is entitled to dismissal on those claims asserted against it that were not asserted within the two-year limitations period. "A writ of mandamus is proper in a case such as this if the undisputed evidence shows that the plaintiff failed to act with due diligence in identifying the fictitiously named defendant as the party the plaintiff intended to sue. See Ex parte Stover, 663 So. 2d 948, 952 (Ala.1995); Ex parte FMC Corp., 599 So. 2d 592, 595 (Ala.1992)." Ex parte Snow, 764 So. 2d  at 537.
The petition for the writ of mandamus is granted. The trial judge is directed to vacate his order denying Chemical Lime's motion and to enter a summary judgment for Chemical Lime on those claims against it not asserted within the two-year limitations period.
*600 PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
NABERS, C.J., and SEE, LYONS, HARWOOD, WOODALL, SMITH, and PARKER, JJ., concur.
BOLIN, J., concurs in the result.
[1]  Freda Sorah, etc. v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., et al. (CV-01-1298) is one of 18 cases pending in the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court involving the same defendants. The other 17 cases are: (1) Al Vreeland, etc. v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., et al. (CV-01-1323); (2) Betty Ann Riggs, etc. v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., et al. (CV-02-281); (3) Skip Palmer v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., et al. (CV-02-291); (4) Michael Kent McIe v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., et al. (CV-02-292); (5) Kathy Bishop Ashworth, etc. v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., et al. (CV-02-785); (6) Delores Ann Stewart, etc. v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., et al. (CV-02-1237); (7) Wanda Kay Blevins, etc. v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., et al. (CV-02-351); (8) Rhonda Collier, etc. v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., et al. (CV-03-1180); (9) Janice Nail, etc. v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., et al. (CV-03-1308); (10) Bettye Jean Banks, etc. v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., et al. (CV-03-1495)(we note that in Chemical Lime's petition this action is referenced as CV-04-1018); (11) Chris Key v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., et al. (CV-03-1501); (12) Linda D. Mobley, etc. v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., et al. (CV-03-1887); (13) Teresa Boyd, etc. v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., et al. (CV-04-358); (14) Jacqueline Knox, etc. v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., et al. (CV-04-579); (15) Rickey Rose v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., et al. (CV-04-580); (16) Janet E. Johnson, etc. v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., et al. (CV-04-692); and (17) George Michael Corbin, etc. v. Jim Walter Resources, Inc., et al. (CV-04-1158). Chemical Lime's petition for a writ of mandamus does not reference the civil actions brought by Chris Key or Rickey Rose, although its motion to dismiss and the trial court's order denying that motion do reference these actions.
[2]  Although Chemical Lime's pleading was styled as a "motion to dismiss," the trial court considered matters outside the pleadings; therefore, the motion to dismiss was converted into a motion for a summary judgment. See Phillips v. AmSouth Bank, 833 So. 2d 29, 31 (Ala.2002)("`[W]here matters outside the pleadings are considered on a motion to dismiss, the motion is converted into a motion for summary judgment ... regardless of its denomination and treatment by the trial court.'" (quoting Boles v. Blackstock, 484 So. 2d 1077, 1079 (Ala.1986))).
[3]  It appears that at least some of the plaintiffs have alleged breach-of-warranty claims for injuries suffered after the explosions and before their deaths. See generally Benefield v. Aquaslide`n'Dive, 406 So. 2d 873 (Ala.1981). Those claims are governed by a four-year statute of limitations. § 7-2-725, Ala.Code 1975. Chemical Lime requested relief in its petition only for the claims governed by a two-year statute of limitations; therefore, our holding is limited to the relief requested for the claims of the plaintiffs having a two-year limitations period.