Case Title: ERNEST and MARTHA ANDERSON V. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF TETON COUNTY, WYOMING and ROBERT and GISELA BALTENSPERGER

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0102

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-10-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
ERNEST and MARTHA ANDERSON V. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF TETON COUNTY, WYOMING and ROBERT and GISELA BALTENSPERGER2009 WY 122217 P.3d 401Case Number: S-08-0102Decided: 10/06/2009
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
ERNEST 
and MARTHA ANDERSON,Appellants(Petitioners),

 
 
v.BOARD 
OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF TETON COUNTY, WYOMING,

Appellee(Respondent),andROBERT 
and GISELA 
BALTENSPERGER,Appellees(Intervenors).

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

Andrea 
L. Richard and Jennifer A. Golden, The Richard Law Firm, P.C., Jackson, 
Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. 
Golden.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee, Board of County Commissioners of Teton County, 
Wyoming:

James 
L. Radda, Deputy County Attorney, Teton County, Jackson, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees, Robert and Gisela Baltensperger:

William 
R. Fix, William R. Fix, P.C., Jackson, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ; WALDRIP, 
D.J.

 
 
WALDRIP, 
District Judge.

 
 
[¶1]      
Appellees/Intervenors, Robert and Gisela Baltensperger ("the 
Baltenspergers"), applied for and were granted the necessary permits allowing 
them to construct a barn/equestrian center on their property in Teton County, 
Wyoming.  Appellants, Ernest and 
Martha Anderson ("the Andersons"), objected to the construction permits and 
appealed to the Board of County Commissioners of Teton County, Wyoming ("the 
Board").  After the Board affirmed 
the grant of the permits, the Andersons petitioned the district court to review 
the final administrative action.  
The district court affirmed the Board's decision upholding the grant of 
the construction permits.  The 
Andersons now appeal the Board's decision to this Court.  We will affirm.  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      We re-phrase the 
issues presented by the Andersons as follows:

 
 
1.         
Whether Teton County's decision to approve the construction permits based 
on conclusory findings that the 6,750 square foot barn would be incidental, 
subordinate, and devoted primarily to the use of the property's existing 1,056 
square foot residence, and would not change the property character, was 
arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by substantial 
evidence.

 
 
2.         
Whether Teton County's approval of the construction permits violated the 
Teton County Land Development Regulations because Teton County previously found 
that the proposed barn/equestrian center would injure the neighborhood and 
violate private covenants, but refused to consider these factors in its final 
decision.  

 
 
 The Board and the Baltenspergers raise 
the additional issue of whether the Andersons properly raised the "conclusory 
findings" issue before the district court. 

 
 
RELEVANT 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

 
 
[¶3]      The Andersons and 
the Baltenspergers own adjacent lots in an area of Teton County known as Red Top 
Meadows.  The Baltenspergers applied 
for permission to build a barn/equestrian center on their property and the 
Andersons objected.  The 
Baltenspergers needed three separate attempts to obtain the necessary 
construction permits because their first two applications failed.  Their third attempt, however, 
succeeded.  Consequently, the 
Baltenspergers received a Building Permit and a Grading and Erosion Control 
("GEC") Permit, giving them everything necessary to construct their 
barn/equestrian center.  The 
Andersons appealed the issuance of these construction permits. 

 
 
[¶4]      The 
Baltenspergers own Lots 4A and 5 in the Country Estates Subdivision of Red Top 
Meadows.  The Andersons own and 
reside on Lot 4B.  The 
Baltenspergers initially proposed building a 9,300 square-foot barn/equestrian 
center on Lot 5.  This initial 
proposal required three variances from the Teton County Land Development 
Regulations ("LDRs").  The Country 
Estates Subdivision is in the Neighborhood Conservation-Single Family ("NC-SF") 
zoning district, which would not allow the barn/equestrian center to be the 
primary use of a lot.  Because there 
were no other buildings on Lot 5 the proposed barn/equestrian center would have 
constituted the primary use of Lot 5.  
Therefore, the Teton County Planning Department did not process the 
Baltenspergers' variance applications and the Baltenspergers withdrew that 
initial proposal.

 
 
[¶5]      Next, the 
Baltenspergers proposed a 6,900 square-foot barn/equestrian center on Lot 
4A.  The Baltenspergers trusted 
that, because there was already a residential home built upon Lot 4A, the 
primary use of that lot had already been established and it conformed to the 
NC-SF zoning requirements.  The 
barn/equestrian center would then be an "accessory use or building."  This second proposal required one 
variance because the proposed equestrian center was only set back 25 feet from 
the private road easement on the property while the LDRs require at least a 
50-feet setback.  Thus, the 
Baltenspergers requested a variance in order to build their barn/equestrian 
center closer to the private road easement than the LDRs normally allow. 

 
 
[¶6]      The LDRs require 
a variance application to be heard by the Teton County Planning Commission 
(Planning Commission) and then be considered by the Board for final 
approval.  For a variance to be 
granted, the Teton County Planning Staff (Planning Staff) must find that the 
proposed variance satisfies seven standards.  The Planning Staff was unable to find 
that the Baltenspergers' variance request satisfied two of the seven standards, 
namely that the variance was not injurious to the neighborhood and that it was 
in harmony with the LDRs.  
Therefore, the Planning Commission voted unanimously against the 
Baltenspergers' variance request.  
Rather than pursuing their requested variance in front of the Board, the 
Baltenspergers withdrew this second proposal.   

 
 
[¶7]      For the 
Baltenspergers' third proposal, they decreased the size of the barn/equestrian 
center to 6,750 square feet, thereby eliminating the need for the setback 
variance or any other variance.  On 
November 27, 2006, a Teton County Associate Planner approved the "Zoning 
Compliance Verification Checklist," which verified that the proposed 
barn/equestrian center met all pertinent standards in the LDRs.  The associate planner also imposed 
several conditions of approval, most notably that "no commercial operation 
including the boarding of horses is permitted in the single-family residential 
site without appropriate County permits."  
The associate planner's approval of the "Zoning Compliance Verification 
Checklist" authorized Teton County to issue the Building Permit to the 
Baltenspergers.  The Teton County 
Engineering Department also approved the Baltenspergers' GEC Application, which 
resulted in the issuance of the necessary GEC Permit to the Baltenspergers.  Thus, the Baltenspergers possessed all 
necessary permits to commence construction of their barn/equestrian center.   

 
 
[¶8]      The Andersons 
then appealed the issuance of both the Building Permit and the GEC Permit to the 
Board.  The Board held a contested 
case hearing on March 6, 2007, and affirmed the issuance of the two permits by 
written decision dated June 12, 2007.  
By way of summary, the Board found that the Baltenspergers' third 
proposal complied with all applicable LDRs and that whether the barn violates 
private covenants is an issue outside the purview of the LDRs and beyond the 
influence of the Board.    

 
 
[¶9]      The Andersons 
then sought judicial review of the Board's decision in the district court.  The district court affirmed the Board's 
decision in full and the Andersons appealed to this Court. 

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶10]   When reviewing an administrative 
agency's final decision on appeal from a district court, we afford no deference 
to the district court's decision.  
Instead, we review the agency's decision as if it came directly from the 
agency.  Dale v. S & S 
Builders, LLC, 2008 WY 84, ¶ 8, 188 P.3d 554, 557 (Wyo. 2008).  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) 
(LexisNexis 2007) governs our scope of review and states in pertinent 
part:

 
 
            
(c) To the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the 
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret 
constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or 
applicability of the terms of an agency action.  In making the following determinations, 
the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party 
and due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error.  The reviewing court 
shall:

. 
. . . 

                  
(ii)        
Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found 
to be:

                  
(A)             
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in 
accordance with law;

                  
(B) Contrary to constitutional 
right, power, privilege or immunity;

                  
(C)             
In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking 
statutory right;

                  
(D)             
Without observance of procedure required by law; or

                  
(E)             
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of 
an agency hearing provided by statute.

 
 
[¶11]   We set forth in detail the proper 
application of these standards for reviewing courts in Dale, ¶¶ 20-26, 188 P.3d  at 560-62.  To summarize, we will not substitute our 
judgment for that of the agency as long as the agency's decision is reasonable 
under the circumstances.  Id., ¶ 22, 188 P.3d  at 561.  We will defer to an agency's findings of 
fact if supported by substantial evidence.  
Id.  "Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions.  It is more than a 
scintilla of evidence."  Id., ¶ 11, 188 P.3d  at 558 (quoting Newman v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
and Comp. Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶ 12, 49 P.3d 163, 168 (Wyo. 
2002)).

 
 
[¶12] 
  We continue to apply the arbitrary 
and capricious standard as a "safety net" designed to "catch agency action which 
prejudices a party's substantial rights or which may be contrary to the other 
W.A.P.A. review standards yet is not easily categorized or fit to any one 
particular standard."  Id., ¶ 23, 188 P.3d  at 561 (quoting Newman, ¶ 23, 49 P.3d at 172).  However, we do not apply the arbitrary 
and capricious standard to true evidentiary questions.  Id.  As always, we review an agency's 
conclusions of law de novo, affirming 
only if it is in accordance with the law.  
Id., ¶ 26, 188 P.3d  at 
561-62.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶13]   Due to its potentially dispositive 
nature, we initially consider whether the Andersons adequately raised their 
first issue regarding "conclusory findings" before the district 
court.

 
 

1.         
Accessory Residential Structure

 
 
[¶14]   The Andersons incorporate two 
contentions in the first issue they present to this Court: 1) a procedural 
argumentthat the Board's finding that the barn/equestrian center was an 
accessory residential structure because it was incidental, subordinate and 
devoted primarily to the use of the property's residence was conclusory and not 
supported by specific findings of fact; and 2) a substantive argumentthat the 
finding that the barn/equestrian center was an accessory residential structure 
was arbitrary, capricious and not supported by substantial evidence.  The Board and the Baltenspergers contend 
that the Andersons never properly presented the procedural issue regarding the 
adequacy of the Board's findings to the district court for review.  The Andersons assert that they 
adequately raised the issue below and are not required to argue the issue in the 
exact same manner in each subsequent proceeding. 

 
 
[¶15]   In general, we do not consider 
claims raised for the first time on appeal.  See Davis v. City of Cheyenne, 2004 WY 43, ¶ 
26, 88 P.3d 481, 490 (Wyo. 2004).  
We "take[] a dim view of a litigant trying a case on one theory and 
appealing it on another. . . .  
Parties are bound by the theories which they advanced below."  WW Enterprises, Inc. v. City of 
Cheyenne, 956 P.2d 353, 356 (Wyo. 1998).  We have in the past recognized two 
exceptions to this rule: when the issue raises a jurisdictional concern or when 
the issue concerns such a fundamental nature of fairness that it must be 
considered.  Davis, ¶ 26, 88 P.3d  at 490.  

 
 
[¶16]   The Planning Commission approved 
the issuance of the Building Permit because it found the barn/equestrian center 
to be an "accessory residential structure."  The Board interpreted "accessory 
residential structure" in accordance with the definition of  "accessory building" pursuant to Division 
8300 of the LDRs, which states:

 
 

Accessory 
Use or Building.  Accessory use or building means a 
separate use or structure which: (a) is incidental, subordinate or secondary to, 
and devoted primarily to the principal use or structure served and does not 
change the character of the premises; and (b) is located on the same lot or site 
as the principal use or structure served.  
In no event shall an accessory use be construed to authorize a use not 
otherwise permitted in the zoning district in which the principal use is 
located.

 
 
The 
Board, in its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order, stated that the barn/equestrian center was an 
accessory building because "it is a separate structure which is incidental, 
subordinate or secondary to the residence on Lot 4A and devoted primarily to 
said residence and does not change the character of Lot 4A; and because (2) the 
principal use or structure served' on the Lot 4A is a residential 
structure."  (emphasis in 
original).

 
 
[¶17]   In their Petition for Review of 
Administrative Action, the Andersons set forth two issues for the district 
court's review:

 
 
1) 
        
Whether the Board's decision is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion and not in accordance with law or supported by substantial evidence, 
in that it failed to require conditions on the permits that would minimize the 
adverse effects of the barn's construction on the neighborhood and natural 
environment and on the general health, safety, and welfare of the 
county.

 
 
2)         
Whether the Board's decision is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of 
discretion and not in accordance with law or supported by substantial evidence, 
in that it approved the permits after the County had denied a variance request 
for the same project.

 
 
The 
Andersons' brief in the district court also raised a third issue concerning 
whether the classification of the barn under the LDRs was proper.  They contended that the barn did not 
qualify as either an "accessory residential unit" or an "accessory residential 
structure."  However, neither the 
Planning Staff nor the Board ever characterized the barn/equestrian center as an 
"accessory residential unit," but rather as an "accessory residential structure" 
or as an "accessory building."  

 
 
[¶18]   We first note that the inclusion of 
the additional issue within the Andersons' district court brief violates 
W.R.A.P. 12.09(a), which confines the district court's review to the record and 
"to the issues set forth in the petition and raised before the agency."  Id.  The Andersons did not present the 
procedural issue of whether the Board's findings were conclusory to the district 
court in either their petition for review or their brief.  Because the issue of the adequacy of the 
Board's findings was not raised in the district court, we agree with the 
appellees that we should follow our rule that we do not consider issues raised 
for the first time on appeal and decline to consider it.  Davis, ¶ 26, 88 P.3d  at 490; WW Enterprises, Inc., 956 P.2d  at 
356.   

 
 
[¶19]   However, in their district court 
brief, the Andersons did raise the substantive issue of whether the 
barn/equestrian center was properly classified as an accessory residential 
structure.  As noted above, the 
rules of appellate procedure limit the district court's review to the record and 
"to the issues set forth in the petition and raised before the agency."  W.R.A.P. 12.09(a) While the issue was not 
set forth in the Anderson's petition for review, it was raised at the agency 
level and in their district court brief.  
Furthermore, it does not appear that the appellees claim that the 
Andersons waived the substantive issue by failing to raise it below.  Although the better practice, obviously, 
is to clearly state all appellate issues in the petition for review, under the 
circumstances presented here where the issue was raised before the agency and 
included in the district court briefs, we will undertake our duty to review the 
entire record and consider the substantive issue of whether the Board's finding 
that the barn/equestrian center was an accessory residential structure was 
supported by the record.  

 
 
[¶20]   The Board determined that the 
barn/equestrian center was an accessory residential structure because it was 
incidental, subordinate or secondary to the residence on Lot 4A and devoted 
primarily to the residence and did not change the character of the 
premises.  The Andersons claim the 
record does not support that finding primarily because the proposed 
barn/equestrian center will be much larger at 6,750 square feet than the 
residence which is 1,056 square feet.  
The Andersons point to no provision of the LDRs or other authority which 
states that a barn/equestrian center must be smaller than the residence in order 
for its use to be considered subordinate to the residential use of the 
premises.  We think it is safe to 
note that barns are often larger than houses.  Also, the record is clear that the 
residential structure was in place when the Baltenspergers applied for the 
construction permits.  Thus, the 
nature of the premises had been established as residential.  The record, therefore, contains 
substantial evidence to support the Board's finding that the barn/equestrian 
center was an accessory residential structure because it was incidental, 
subordinate or secondary to the residential structure and that the 
barn/equestrian center would not change the character of the premises.    

 
 
2.         
Whether Approving the Construction 
Permits Violated the LDRs Because Teton County Refused to Consider Whether the 
Proposed Barn/Equestrian Center Would Injure the Neighborhood and Violate 
Private Covenants.

 
 
[¶21]   Teton County concluded that the 
LDRs preclude it from considering injury to the surrounding neighborhood when 
reviewing the permit applications at issue in the Baltenspergers' third 
proposal.  The Andersons contend 
that this conclusion was clearly erroneous.  Specifically, the Andersons argue that 
Teton County was required to impose restrictions on the Baltenspergers' 
development to minimize adverse impacts on the neighborhood.  The Andersons rely upon Section 5120.N.1 
of the LDRs to support their assertion.  
That section states:

 
 

Authority.  The Board of County Commissioners, and 
the Planning Director and County Engineer, when they are assigned authority for 
final action, may impose 
restrictions and conditions on an approved permit, the approved use, and the 
property to be developed or used pursuant to such approval, as may be necessary 
for the development to comply with the standards of these Land Development 
Regulations, to meet the general purposes, goals, and objectives of the 
Comprehensive Plan and these Land Development Regulations, and to minimize the 
adverse effects on other land in the neighborhood and on the general health, 
safety, and welfare of the County.

 
 

Id. 
(emphasis added).

 
 
[¶22]   We have repeatedly stated that the 
use of the permissive word "may" authorizes the specified action, but does not 
require it.  See, e.g., French v. Amax Coal West, 960 P.2d 1023, 
1029 (Wyo. 1998); but cf. LM v. Laramie County Dep't of Family 
Servs., 2007 WY 189, ¶ 5, 171 P.3d 1077, 1080 (Wyo. 2007) (stating that 
the word "shall" indicates mandatory compliance).  Reading the plain language of this LDR, 
we conclude that Teton County was authorized, but not required, to impose 
restrictions or conditions upon the Baltenspergers' development.  

 
 
[¶23]   The Planning Commission denied the 
Baltenspergers' variance application in their second proposal because the 
Planning Staff was unable to conclude that the variance was not injurious to the 
neighborhood and that it was in harmony with the LDRs.  The Andersons assert that Teton County 
needed to consider this finding at the Baltenspergers' third proposal and, 
consequently, should have imposed restrictions upon the construction permits 
that would "mitigate harms to the neighborhood."  The Andersons' argument is misplaced, 
however, because the Baltenspergers' third proposal did not require a 
variance.  Instead, the 
Baltenspergers' third proposal required only the Building Permit and the GEC 
Permit.  The LDRs do not require the 
Planning Commission to conclude that the proposed construction is not injurious 
to the neighborhood when considering a request for a building permit or a GEC 
permit.  The LDRs only require this 
conclusion when the Planning Commission considers a variance application.  The Planning Commission was simply not 
authorized to impose the standards for issuing a variance permit on a 
development application that did not seek a variance.

 
 
[¶24]   In sum, Section 5120.N.1 of the 
LDRs provides authority to Teton County to impose restrictions or conditions 
upon approved permits, but does not mandate it.  Additionally, the LDRs only require 
Teton County to assess potential injury to the neighborhood when considering 
applications for variances, but not when considering applications for building 
permits or GEC permits.  The 
Baltenspergers' third application for construction permits did not seek a 
variance; it only required a building permit and a GEC permit.  Consequently, we find that the approval 
of the Building Permit and GEC Permit, without the Andersons' requested 
restrictions, did not violate the LDRs and was in accordance with the 
law.

 
 
[¶25]   Finally, the Board determined that 
consideration of private covenants is not within the scope of the LDRs and that 
Teton County was correct in not imposing restrictions based upon the alleged 
violations of private covenants.  
Restrictive covenants are contractual in nature.  Vargas L.P.  v. Four "H" Ranches Architectural 
Contract Comm., 2009 WY 26, ¶ 11, 202 P.3d 1045, 1050 (Wyo. 2009).  Thus, restrictive covenants are only 
enforceable between the property owners, and potentially a homeowners' 
association, as parties in interest.  
Id., ¶ 16-17, 202 P.3d  at 
1052.  No provision in the LDRs 
requires Teton County or the Board to consider whether a proposed development 
would violate restrictive covenants.  
Indeed, neither Teton County nor the Board possesses the authority to 
demand compliance with private covenants between property owners.  We find the refusal to impose 
restrictions upon the construction permits due to potential violations of 
private covenants to be in accordance with law. 

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶26]   We will not consider the Andersons' 
claim that the approval of the construction permits was based on conclusory 
findings as that issue was not adequately raised below.  After reviewing the record, we find that 
substantial evidence exists to support the Board's finding that the 
barn/equestrian center was an accessory residential structure.  Additionally, Teton County's approval of 
the Building Permit and the GEC Permit did not violate the LDRs and was in 
accordance with law.  

 
 
[¶27]   The district court's order is 
affirmed.