Case Title: Daniel C. Costarell v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC04-1429

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2005-11-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
 
   
____________ 
 
No. SC04-1429 
____________ 
 
DANIEL C. COSTARELL, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
FLORIDA UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
 
[November 23, 2005] 
 
ANSTEAD, J. 
 
We have for review the decision in Costarell v. Unemployment Appeals 
Commission, 874 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), based upon certified conflict with 
the decision in Dines v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Commission, 730 So. 2d 
378 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).  We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.  We 
quash the decision in Costarell and approve the decision in Dines.   
Proceedings to Date 
 
The legal issue to be resolved in this appeal can best be understood by first 
considering the decisions rendered by the Third District Court of Appeal in three 
 
 
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cases: Savage v. Macy’s East, Inc., 708 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (Savage I); 
Savage v. Macy’s East, Inc., 719 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), review denied, 
729 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1999) (Savage II); and Dines v. Florida Unemployment 
Appeals Commission, 730 So. 2d 378 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999). 
 
In Savage I, the Third District ruled that the Florida Unemployment Appeals 
Commission had wrongfully determined that the claimant, Savage, was not 
qualified to receive compensation.  708 So. 2d at 689.  When the Commission 
failed to honor the court’s mandate, the district court issued a subsequent opinion 
On Motion to Enforce Mandate in Savage II.  719 So. 2d at 1208.  In Savage II, 
Chief Judge Schwartz, in an opinion for a unanimous court, rejected the 
Commission’s claim that the claimant could not receive benefits even though she 
won her appeal because she failed to continue to file weekly claims for benefits 
after she had been declared ineligible for such benefits and had filed an appeal.  Id. 
at 1209.  Chief Judge Schwartz explained that the Commission had no authority to 
deviate from the Third District’s mandate directing that the claimant receive 
benefits now that she had been determined to be properly eligible.  Id.   
 
In addition, in Savage II, the Third District expressly rejected the 
Commission’s claim that the claimant, having been ruled ineligible by the 
Commission, was required to continue to file weekly claims even in the face of the 
adverse Commission ruling on her eligibility: 
 
 
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(Virtually as an aside, moreover, we note the lack of substance in the 
[Commission’s] present position both because ordering continuing 
claims to a tribunal which has already rejected the claimant’s 
eligibility amounts to the prohibited requirement of performing a 
series of useless acts, C.U. Assocs. v. R.B. Grove, Inc., 472 So. 2d 
1177 (Fla. 1985); Haimovitz v. Robb, 130 Fla. 844, 178 So. 827 
(1937); Hoshaw v. State, 533 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), and 
because the failure formally to make the claims was an entirely 
harmless technicality in light of the indisputable evidence of Ms. 
Savage’s eligibility for those benefits.  See Griffin v. Workman, 73 
So. 2d 844 (Fla. 1954); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Martin, 399 So. 
2d 536, 537 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), review denied, 408 So. 2d 1094 
(Fla. 1981).) 
Id. at 1209-10 (footnote omitted).  To be sure, the Third District expressed its 
concerns for the Commission’s disregard of the district court’s prior rulings and 
the rulings of other courts: 
In several respects, the circumstances of this case raise serious 
concerns about the Commission’s and the Department’s conduct in 
the administration and adjudication of these claims.  First, we are told 
that, in several of the many prior cases in which determinations of 
ineligibility have been reversed by the courts of appeal, the 
Department has improperly enforced its present contentions as to 
claimants who are typically unrepresented by counsel and are both 
unaware of and are not told of their rights under the law.  
Furthermore, and possibly even worse, the Commission, after being 
reversed on the misconduct issue in literally scores of cases by every 
district court of appeal, see Berry v. Scotty’s, Inc., 711 So. 2d 575 
(Fla. 2d DCA 1998); Hall v. Florida Unemployment Appeals 
Comm’n, 700 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), and cases cited; Pion 
v. Miami Paper & Plastic, Inc., 698 So. 2d 1379 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); 
Betancourt v. Sun Bank Miami, N.A., 672 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1996), and cases cited; Phanco v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 
639 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Cooks v. Unemployment 
Appeals Comm’n, 670 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); cases 
collected at 15 Fla. Stat. Ann. 443.101 nn. 33-55, at 139-155, and at 
24 (Supp. 1998), has virtually contemnatiously continued to ignore its 
 
 
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duty to follow the established law, even if it disagrees, by repeatedly 
doing so to the prejudice not only of those who bring their cases 
before us but, very likely, of many unrepresented claimants who have 
failed to perfect their appellate rights.  See also Wright v. Florida 
Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 512 So. 2d 333, 335 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1987) (Pearson, J. concurring; condemning Commission’s refusal 
even to recognize controlling law).  In our view, these patterns of 
behavior may well justify further inquiry by the legislature, by the 
executive branch of our state government or by the Secretary of Labor 
under 42 U.S.C. § 503(b). 
Id. at 1209 n.2.  Hence, the Third District left no doubt as to the meaning of its 
rulings in Savage I and Savage II and its emphatic rejection of the Commission’s 
interpretation of the statutory scheme.   
Dines 
 
Subsequent to its decisions in Savage I and Savage II, the Third District 
again was presented with the issue of whether a claimant who had been determined 
by the Commission to be ineligible to receive benefits must nevertheless continue 
to file weekly claims during the pendency of any appeal of the adverse ineligibility 
decision.  Dines, 730 So. 2d at 379.   
 
In Dines, Chief Judge Schwartz again authored the opinion of a unanimous 
court rejecting the Commission’s position: 
 
We now hold, as we said in dictum in Savage v. Macy’s East, 
Inc., 719 So. 2d 1208, 1209-10 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998), review denied, 
(Fla. Feb. 11, 1999), that the denial of benefits on this ground is 
entirely erroneous 
 
[b]oth because ordering continuing claims to a tribunal 
which has already rejected the claimant’s eligibility 
 
 
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amounts to the prohibited requirement of performing a 
series of useless acts, C.U. Assocs. v. R.B. Grove, Inc., 
472 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 1985); Haimovitz v. Robb, 130 
Fla. 844, 178 So. 827 (1937); Hoshaw v. State, 533 So. 
2d 886 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), and because the failure 
formally to make the claims was an entirely harmless 
technicality in light of the indisputable evidence of Ms. 
Savage’s eligibility for those benefits.  See Griffin v. 
Workman, 73 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 1954); Lumbermens Mut. 
Cas. Co. v. Martin, 399 So. 2d 536, 537 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1981), review denied, 408 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 1981). 
Savage, 719 So. 2d at 1209-10. 
Because 
 
no rights are at stake, Reid v. Southern Development Co., 
52 Fla. 595, 42 So. 206 (1906), and only a non-essential 
mode of proceeding is prescribed, Fraser v. Willey, 2 Fla. 
116 (1848), 
Allied Fidelity Ins. Co. v. State, 415 So. 2d 109, 111 (Fla. 3d DCA 
1982), it is apparent that, in this context, the statutory requirement for 
the filing of weekly reports must be deemed to be advisory or 
directory only.  Allied, 415 So. 2d at 111.  In the admitted absence of 
any prejudice to the Commission or the employer, therefore, the 
failure to make them cannot result in the forfeiture of benefits to 
which the unemployed applicant is otherwise entitled by law.  See 
Department of Bus. Regulation, Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering v. 
Hyman, 417 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1982) (applying principle of 
administrative harmless error); Ewing v. Kaplan, 474 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 
3d DCA 1985), and cases cited, review denied, 486 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 
1986). 
For those reasons, the order of the Unemployment Commission is 
reversed and the cause remanded with directions to afford Dines 
unemployment compensation benefits for August 12, 1996, through 
September 27, 1996. 
 
 
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Dines, 730 So. 2d at 379.  The net effect of the three decisions of the Third District 
was a clear and unambiguous legal mandate to the Florida Unemployment 
Compensation Commission and the Division of Unemployment Compensation 
rejecting the Commission’s position as to any continuing requirement of claimants 
to file weekly claims after the claimants had been determined to be ineligible to 
receive benefits or while an appeal was pending. 
Costarell 
 
The decisions of the Third District in the Savage II case and in Dines 
remained the prevailing law on the issue at the time the claimant Daniel C. 
Costarell found himself in the same position as the claimants in those cases.  
Costarell, 874 So. 2d at 44.  That is, despite Costarell being successful in 
overturning on appeal a decision declaring him ineligible for benefits, as was the 
case with claimants Savage and Dines, the Commission ignored the Third District 
rulings and denied Costarell benefits because he failed to file weekly claims during 
the pendency of his appeal.  Id.  It is apparent that despite having been a direct 
party in the Savage and Dines appeals, and obviously aware of the holdings in 
those cases, the Commission ignored those legal rulings, and, as it had done in 
those cases, denied Mr. Costarell’s claim because he did not continue to file 
 
 
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weekly claims after being declared ineligible for benefits.  Id.1  Thereafter, in a pro 
se appeal filed by Mr. Costarell, the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the 
Commission’s action.  Id. at 45.  When Mr. Costarell sought review in this Court, 
he was appointed counsel to represent him. 
Rule of Law and Statutory Scheme 
 
Without any attempt to explain its actions in ignoring the rule of law 
established by the Third District in Savage and Dines, the Commission now repeats 
the same arguments considered and rejected by the Third District in those cases.  
Like the Third District, we also reject those arguments.  In addition, we caution the 
Commission and its counsel that it too is bound by the rule of law, and we express 
dismay that an official agency of the State of Florida and its counsel would show 
so little regard for the controlling holdings of an appellate court of the State of 
Florida.2 
                                          
 
 
1.  No issue has been raised in these proceedings as to Mr. Costarell’s 
entitlement to benefits other than his failure to continue to file claims weekly 
pending his initial appeal.  Hence, we resolve that issue only in this review. 
 
 
2.  As the Fifth District observed in Mikolsky v. Unemployment Appeals 
Commission, 721 So. 2d 738, 740 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (one footnote omitted): 
 
 
An agency of this state, such as the Commission, must follow 
the interpretations of statutes as interpreted by the courts of the 
state.[n.2]  Like trial courts, if there is a controlling interpretation by a 
district court of appeal in this state, the Commission must follow it, 
even if the court of appeal is located outside the district of the trial 
court.[n.3]  If there is a conflict between interpretations by different 
 
 
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The statutory scheme relied upon by the Commission is contained in section 
443.091(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2002), and, at the time Mr. Costarell sought relief, 
remained unchanged since the time of Savage and Dines.  Indeed, that section does 
require claimants to file claims on a weekly basis.  However, nowhere in that 
section is there any mention of the continuing nature of this requirement once a 
claimant has been determined to be ineligible for benefits.  Neither does the section 
mention any obligation to continue these filings if the claimant should file an 
appeal.  Like the Third District in the Savage cases and in Dines, we conclude that 
                                                                                                                                        
courts of appeal, that may provide a basis to reach the supreme court 
for a final interpretation.  Thereafter, the supreme court’s 
interpretation of the statute must prevail, barring future legislative 
changes to the statute. 
 
[n.2]  The fact that interpreting the law is a 
uniquely judicial function has been firmly established 
since at least 1803 when Chief Justice Marshall 
explained:  “It is emphatically the province and duty of 
the judicial department to say what the law is.”  Marbury 
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L. Ed. 60 
(1803). 
 
[n.3]  Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1992) 
(in the absence of interdistrict conflict, district court 
decisions bind all Florida trial courts); State v. Sanchez, 
642 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (all judges within 
district must follow the ruling unless a contrary ruling 
has issued from their district court). 
While we concur in the Fifth District’s observations, we note that this does not 
restrict other parties to administrative proceedings from seeking review, restrict the 
Commission from seeking the certification of important issues to this Court for 
resolution, nor restrict the Commission from seeking legislative changes, as it 
apparently did in this instance.   
 
 
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a claimant who has been told he or she is ineligible to receive benefits would 
ordinarily and reasonably believe it would be a useless act to continue to file 
weekly claims.  In other words, having been told she is ineligible, why continue to 
file claims that the claimant knows will be rejected?  Similarly, without an express 
statutory directive to do so we wonder why an ineligible claimant would file 
continuing claims during an appeal of the adverse ruling on eligibility.  We agree 
with the construction of these statutory requirements advanced by Mr. Costarell 
and as interpreted by the Third District.  That is, that yes, in the normal course, an 
otherwise eligible claimant is required by the statutory scheme to file weekly in 
order to receive benefits.  But that is simply not the case when claimants have been 
declared ineligible or have sought an appeal of that eligibility ruling. 
Statutory Amendment 
 
We also believe that the Legislature knows how to provide for the unusual 
situation of a claimant filing an appeal after having been declared ineligible by the 
same agency now seeking continued filings pending appeal.  In 2003, the 
Legislature amended the statutory scheme, apparently at the urging of the 
Commission and the Commission’s dissatisfaction with the Third District rulings 
in Savage and Dines, to expressly provide for continued filings by claimants while 
their appeals are pending.  Ch. 2003-36, § 23, at 282, Laws of Fla.; see also id. § 
25, at 292 (amending § 443.111(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2002)).  However, those 
 
 
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amendments do not affect Mr. Costarell.  Nor do they change the state of the law 
that was controlling when Mr. Costarell filed his appeal from the Commission’s 
ruling declaring him ineligible. 
Conclusion 
 
Because we agree with the holdings of the Third District in Savage and 
Dines, and disagree with the Second District’s decision in Costarell, we quash the 
decision under review and remand for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. 
WELLS, J., concurs specially with an opinion. 
BELL, J., dissents with an opinion, in which CANTERO, J., concurs. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
WELLS, J., concurring specially. 
 
I concur with the majority’s decision because I believe that the Commission 
was required to respect the law of the Third District’s cases.  It was the settled law 
at the time of the Commission’s decision in this case.  I believe that this is the 
important principle of this case in view of the Legislature having now amended the 
law. 
 
BELL, J., dissenting. 
 
 
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I respectfully dissent.  I would approve the decision of the Second District 
below and disapprove Dines v. Florida  Unemployment Appeals Commission, 730 
So. 2d 378 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999).  As the Second District observed, the statutory 
requirements necessary for one to receive benefits with respect to each week for 
which an unemployment compensation (UC) claim is made are quite clear, and 
these requirements serve a vital purpose in the unemployment compensation 
system.  Without an estoppel argument by the appellant or the concession of “no 
prejudice” by the appellee, the majority’s abrogation of these unambiguous 
statutory requirements during the pendency of an appeal is improper. 
 
The primary statutory provisions at issue are sections 443.091 and 443.111, 
Florida Statutes (2000).  Titled “Benefit Eligibility Conditions,” section 443.091 
provides that an unemployed individual shall be eligible for benefits only if she or 
he (1) has made a claim for benefits with respect to such week; (2) with limited 
exception, has registered for work at, and thereafter continued to report at the 
Unemployment Appeals Commission; and (c) is able to work and available to 
work. 
 
If a claimant satisfies these benefit eligibility conditions, payment of benefits 
is made in the manner set forth in section 443.111.  This section expressly provides 
that payment of UC benefits is dependent upon the claimant satisfying two 
conditions.  Every UC claimant must (1) report at least biweekly; and (2) “attest to 
 
 
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the fact that she or he is able and available for work, has not refused suitable work, 
and is seeking work and, if she or he has worked, to report earnings from such 
work.”  § 443.111(1)(b). 
 
Quite simply, for the weeks in question, Mr. Costarell failed to meet these 
express, unambiguous statutory conditions for the receipt of UC benefits.  He 
never made a claim for benefits for these weeks; thus, he did not satisfy the benefit 
eligibility conditions of section 443.091.  He also failed to report at least biweekly 
and to make the requisite four-part attestation; therefore, not only was he not 
entitled to payment, the Division of Unemployment Compensation was not 
statutorily authorized to make payment.  Consequently, given the absence of an 
estoppel argument that would legally excuse his noncompliance, Mr. Costarell 
does not qualify for the UC benefits in question.3  Consequently, as the Second 
District held, the decision of the UAC should be affirmed.   
 
Mr. Costarell’s failure to comply with these statutes was not, as the majority 
asserts, a “useless act.”  See majority op. at 9.  Regular filings and reporting 
provide the Commission with the evidence that the claimant remained eligible for 
                                          
 
 
3.  I recognize that Mr. Costarell appeared pro se before the lower appellate 
court, and that he made allegations that phone calls from a claims adjuster caused 
him to stop filing.  However, there is no indication that these allegations were 
legally sufficient to establish equitable estoppel.  Additionally, his pro se status 
was not relevant to the district court’s opinion, and the counsel appointed to 
represent him in the proceedings before this Court did not raise an argument of 
waiver or estoppel in either of the two briefs filed.   
 
 
 
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UC benefits during the entire appeals process.  Indeed, under the majority’s 
decision, a claimant could collect benefits accumulated during the entire time the 
appeal was pending, regardless of whether he or she was eligible to collect them at 
the time they accrued.  Claimants who secure employment while their appeal is 
pending, or even those who stop looking for work altogether, would be able to 
recover compensation during the time their case was appealed.  This contradicts 
the plain language and the intent of the statute.   
 
Moreover, unlike in Dines, the appellee has not conceded the absence of 
prejudice in this case.  In Dines, the Third District’s reasoning justifying its 
opinion was an “admitted absence of any prejudice to the Commission or the 
employer.”  Dines, 730 So. 2d at 379.  There is no such admitted absence of 
prejudice in the case before us. 
In light of the unambiguous statutory provisions discussed above, the 
absence of an estoppel argument by the appellant, as well as the absence of a 
concession by the appellee of “no prejudice,” I find the majority decision 
unsupportable.  The necessity of continuous, biweekly reporting and the filing of 
the four-part attestation for each such biweekly period that an individual seeks 
unemployment compensation benefits seem to be critical to both the integrity and 
efficacy of the unemployment compensation program.  I find insufficient reasons 
 
 
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on the record before us to justify the judicial abrogation of these unambiguous 
conditions precedent to the eligibility for and payment of these benefits. 
CANTERO, J., concurs. 
 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified 
Direct Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Second District - Case No. 2D03-3858 
 
Harvey J. Sepler, Hollywood, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
John D. Maher, Deputy General Counsel, Unemployment Appeals Commission, 
Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent