Case Title: Morris v. Farmers Ins. Exchange

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-03-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Morris v. Farmers Ins. Exchange1989 WY 77771 P.2d 1206Case Number: 87-187Decided: 03/22/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
MARION RAY 
MORRIS, LEOPOLDO SANCHEZ AND DOROTHY SANCHEZ, APPELLANTS 
(DEFENDANTS),

 
 
v.

 
 
FARMERS 
INSURANCE EXCHANGE, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from 
the District Court, SweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

 
 
David A. 
Hampton of Honaker & Hampton, Rock Springs and 
Robert J. Reese of Reese & Mathey, Green 
River, for 
appellants.

 
 
John I. 
Henley of Vlastos, Brooks & Henley, P.C., Casper, for appellee.

 
 
Before 
CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, and 
MACY, JJ. and BROWN, J., Retired.*

* Retired 
June 30, 1988.

 
 

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1.]     Marion Morris called 
his neighbor, Leopoldo Sanchez, out into the street between their houses and, 
almost without words, shot him near dead with a .357 magnum pistol. This appeal 
is from a summary judgment in the insurance company declaratory judgment 
lawsuit, which followed an initial negligence and intentional tort injury 
action. The insurance company contested the homeowners' insurance liability and 
duty to defend coverages, and the decision was adverse to the injured party by 
application of the policy exclusion for intentional 
conduct.

 
 

[¶2.]     We 
reverse.

 
 

[¶3.]     Issues raised by 
appellants, Leopoldo and Dorothy Sanchez, in conflict with the insurance 
company, Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers Insurance) as appellee, assert that 
the district court erred in (1) denial of a duty to defend their insured Morris 
as the defendant in the liability action; and (2) granting summary judgment, 
holding that Farmers Insurance had no obligation to provide liability coverage 
under its insurance policy which would afford indemnity in the event that 
Sanchez should recover in the initial proceeding.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶4.]     On August 8, 1985, 
Sanchez, following a home Bible study meeting, saw a friend to his street curb 
parked car, and then, as the car departed, received a call from across the 
street from Morris reported as, "Hey, Leo, I want to talk to you." Sanchez 
turned across the street and walked toward Morris, who was standing in his yard. 
On approach of the two parties, Morris raised a .357 magnum pistol and shot 
Sanchez in the face.1

 
 

[¶5.]     Surviving the bullet 
wound, and then having apparently concluded that Morris had homeowner's 
insurance liability coverage, Sanchez and his wife, filed suit on May 1, 1986 
against Morris, alleging negligence and assault and battery, with additional 
claims for infliction of emotional and mental distress to both husband and wife, 
and for punitive damages. The allegations also characterized Morris' action as 
one of willful, reckless, and wanton disregard. Responsive to that first 
litigative proceeding, after undertaking the defense under a reservation of 
rights, Farmers Insurance, pursuant to the homeowners' policy, commenced this 
declaratory judgment proceeding. This second lawsuit was instituted against 
Morris as well as both Leopoldo and Dorothy Sanchez to obtain authentication of 
the intentional conduct coverage exclusion provided in the policy. Farmers 
Insurance requested in the prayer that:

 
 
[T]he Court 
declare as follows: (1) that coverage for the injuries alleged in the complaint 
and amended complaint of Leopoldo and Dorothy Sanchez does not exist under the 
insurance policy issued to Defendant Morris by Plaintiff Farmers Insurance 
Exchange; (2) that a duty to defend Defendant Morris does not exist with regard 
to the action initiated by the complaint and amended complaint of Leopoldo and 
Dorothy Sanchez; * * *.

 
 
Sanchez 
counterclaimed, with the prayer including a request that the insurance policy be 
declared to provide liability coverage and a duty to defend Morris in the 
pending liability action which they had filed.

 
 

[¶6.]     In the summary judgment 
proceeding, segments of depositions of participants and affidavits of 
psychologists were tendered by both Farmers Insurance and Sanchez.2 At factual issue was the subject of 
the implicit intention of Morris to shoot or to scare, or whether he drunkenly 
and accidentally caused the injury to his neighbor. The degree of intoxication 
of Morris was clearly in controversy, with Sanchez contending that intoxication 
existed which made Morris incapable of forming the specific intent, and Farmers 
Insurance arguing for sobriety.

 
 

[¶7.]     After review of the 
facts in detail in a fifteen page opinion letter, the trial court in dispositive 
order provided:

 
 
[P]laintiff 
be granted summary judgment against the defendants, for the reasons that there 
are no genuine issues of any material fact and that plaintiff is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.

 
 
     JUDGMENT IS THEREFORE 
entered on behalf of plaintiff, Farmers Insurance Exchange, and against 
defendants; it is declared and is the judgment of the Court that plaintiff 
herein, Farmers Insurance Exchange has no obligation or duty to either defend or 
indemnify defendant Marion Ray Morris with regard to the claims alleged and 
action initiated by the complaint and/or amended complaint of Leopoldo Sanchez 
and Dorothy Sanchez, which arose from the shooting injury to Leopoldo Sanchez, 
which occurred on or about August 8, 1985.

 
 
The Sanchez 
counterclaim was denied with prejudice.

 
 

[¶8.]     Only Leopoldo and 
Dorothy Sanchez appealed, Morris did not.

 
 
DUTY TO 
DEFEND

 
 

[¶9.]     We are cognizant that a 
controversy concerning a duty to defend may be a proper subject of a declaratory 
judgment action even if a prior suit is pending. Mathis v. Auto-Owners Insurance 
Company, 387 So. 2d 166, 168 (Ala. 1980); 
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. 
Envirodyne Engineers, Inc., 122 Ill. App.3d 301, 77 Ill.Dec. 848, 850-51, 461 N.E.2d 471, 473-74 (1983), insurer can seek a declaratory judgment to decide a 
factual issue relevant to the duty to defend, if the issue is not "crucial to 
the determination of the underlying lawsuit." Here, however, appellants argue 
that as a third-party beneficiary they can raise the issue on appeal to seek 
reversal of the summary judgment entered against Morris. Although the argument 
is academically constructed with some ingenuity, we find logic or precedent 
lacking that one litigant can appeal an opposing litigant's denied insurance 
carrier obligation for defense.3

 
 
The general 
rule is that only a person who is aggrieved by a judgment can take an appeal 
from it. * * * Essentially the rule is one of standing. Just as the requirement 
of standing requires that one have a legally recognized interest before one is 
permitted to bring suit to protect that interest, so too must a person have an 
interest adversely affected by the judgment to be able to appeal the 
judgment.

 
 
R. 
Martineau, Modern Appellate Practice, Federal and State Civil Appeals § 5.2 at 
72 (1983) (footnotes omitted). See Parr v. United 
States, 351 U.S. 513, 516, 76 S. Ct. 912, 915, 100 L. Ed. 1377, reh'g denied 352 U.S. 859, 77 S. Ct. 21, 1 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1956). 

 
 

[¶10.]  The United States Supreme Court 
enunciated in Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, ___, 108 S. Ct. 388, 392, 98 L. Ed. 2d 327, 334 (1987):

 
 
[W]e have 
consistently applied the general rule that one who is not a party or has not 
been treated as a party to a judgment has no right to appeal therefrom. 
United States ex rel. 
Louisiana v. Jack, 244 U.S. 397, 402, 
37 S. Ct. 605, 607, 61 L. Ed. 1222 (1917); Ex parte Leaf Tobacco Board of Trade, 
222 U.S. 578, 581, 32 S. Ct. 833, 56 L. Ed. 323 (1911); Ex parte Cockcroft, 104 U.S. (14 Otto) 578, 579, 26 L. Ed. 856 
(1882); Ex parte Cutting, 94 U.S. (4 Otto) 14, 20-21, 24 L. Ed. 49 
(1877).

 
 
Dispositively, 
the United States Supreme Court held that the controversy over the New Jersey moment of 
silence statute "ended when the losing party - the New Jersey Legislature - 
declined to pursue its appeal." Karcher, 108 S. Ct.  at 395.

 
 

[¶11.]  Although Morris and Sanchez were named in 
the caption of the declaratory judgment action, they were not both treated as 
parties to the judgment with respect to the duty to defend. Clearly, appellants 
are not real parties in interest on the defense-duty controversy where they are 
not adversely affected by the judgment. It is irrelevant to them who fuels 
Farmers Insurance's litigative resistance. This issue is similar to one faced by 
the Court of Appeals of Georgia in Wilmington Cabinet Co., Inc. v. Autry, 169 
Ga. App. 93, 311 S.E.2d 519 (1983). In that case, a property owner sued both the 
contractor and subcontractor for fire losses allegedly caused by improper 
installation of the kitchen vent hood. At the close of trial, the contractor was 
granted a directed verdict, and subsequently the jury returned a verdict in 
favor of the property owner. The subcontractor tried to argue that the directed 
verdict for the contractor was improper. That court held that since this was not 
a joint cause of action, the subcontractor had no standing to complain of the 
directed verdict against another defendant. Wilmington Cabinet Co., Inc., 169 
Ga. App. 93, 
311 S.E.2d  at 522. Like that case, Sanchez here has no capacity to appeal the 
summary judgment against Morris and in favor of Farmers Insurance on the duty to 
defend the claim.

 
 
INDEMNITY

 
 

[¶12.]  Appellants posture this present argument 
on two bases: procedure and substantive law. In procedural context, they contend 
that this action was premature in litigating the same issues included in the 
principal case before the first proceeding is terminated. Secondly, they claim 
that a factual issue was created relative to the application of the policy 
exclusion so that summary judgment was improvident or unjustified as a 
substantive legal decision.

 
 
1. 
Prematurity

 
 

[¶13.]  We note at the outset that a declaratory 
judgment action can be beneficial as frequently used when the effect of 
insurance contracts are questioned. Poling v. North American Life and Casualty 
Co., 593 P.2d 568 (Wyo. 1979); Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 
Inc. v. Hallmark Insurance Co., 561 P.2d 706, 711 (Wyo. 1977); Comment, The 
Declaratory Judgment and the Insurance Contract, 46 Yale L.J. 286 (1936). 
Consequently, we confine our decision to the facts of the case at hand where a 
declaratory judgment is instituted by an insurance company after the injured 
party's action was started and remains undetermined.

 
 

[¶14.]  Within policy coverage litigation, it is 
possible to differentiate in the case law those questions where the claimant is 
clearly insured and the coverage for the act is in question from disputes 
whether any insurance exists for the claimant. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. v. 
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 12 Ariz. App. 424, 471 P.2d 309, 311 (1970). In 
this second category of litigation, some facts extrinsic to the dispute of 
liability in the underlying action establishes an absence of coverage. Western 
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Teel, 391 F.2d 764, 765-66 (10th Cir. 1968); 
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 312 F. Supp. 216, 217 (W.D.Va. 1970). One example is where the insured breached the 
contract so insurer is relieved of its duties, Insurance Company of North 
America v. Waldroup, 462 F. Supp. 161, 162 (D.Ga. 1978); Barnes v. Waco 
Scaffolding and Equipment Co., 41 Colo. App. 423, 589 P.2d 505, 506 (1978); 
American Policyholders' Ins. Co. v. Cumberland Cold Storage Co., 373 A.2d 247, 
250 (Me. 1977); Employers' Fire Insurance Co. v. Beals, 103 R.I. 623, 240 A.2d 397, 402 (1968), another is that the policy simply was not in effect at the time 
of the event. See American Policyholders' Ins. Co., 373 A.2d  at 250; Connecticut 
Fire Ins. Co. v. Williams, 9 A.D.2d 461, 194 N.Y.S.2d 952, 953 (1959). Similarly 
noted is Aetna Life Insurance Co. of Hartford, Connecticut v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 57 S. Ct. 461, 81 L. Ed. 617, reh'g denied 300 U.S. 687, 57 S. Ct. 667, 81 L. Ed. 889 (1937), where the United States Supreme Court held that 
a declaratory judgment action was appropriate to determine if the policy had 
lapsed because of a failure to pay premiums.

 
 

[¶15.]  This case is dissimilar from those status 
of insurance cases because here the policy defense and applied exclusion 
presents in factual issue precisely what happened and why, which then is the 
very substance of the damage recovery claim and litigation as an act coverage 
decision.

 
 

[¶16.]  While there is a split of authority on 
what issues may be properly decided in a declaratory judgment action as long as 
the underlying suit is still pending, "[t]he majority of the most recent cases * 
* * have held that a declaratory judgment should not be entered if it depends on 
the resolution of factual disputes that are at issue in the underlying action." 
A. Windt, Insurance Claims and Disputes § 8.04 at 325 (1982). Further, see 
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 312 F. Supp at 217-18; American Policyholders' 
Ins. Co., 373 A.2d at 250-51; Town of Huntington v. Hartford Insurance Group, 69 A.D.2d 906, 415 N YS.2d 904, 905 (1979); and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
Dennis, 14 A.D.2d 188, 217 N.Y.S.2d 680, 681-82 (1961).

 
 

[¶17.]  A case amazingly on point with the 
instant one is Maryland Casualty Company v. Peppers, 64 Ill. 2d 187, 355 N.E.2d 24 (1976), modified on other grounds by Shelter Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bailey, 
160 Ill. App.3d 146, 112 Ill.Dec. 76, 513 N.E.2d 490 (1987). The Supreme Court 
of Illinois held it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to entertain 
the declaratory judgment which determined that the insured intentionally caused 
the injury when a personal-injury action had been filed more than four months 
before the declaratory judgment. Maryland Casualty Company, 355 N.E.2d  at 30. 
That court found that the question of intent was one of the ultimate facts upon 
which recovery in the underlying suit was predicated and that the declaratory 
judgment was simply an inappropriate procedure. Also see Brohawn v. Transamerica 
Insurance Company, 276 Md. 396, 347 A.2d 842, 849 (1975), where the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland found an abuse of discretion in granting a declaratory 
judgment where the issue to be resolved was the ultimate issue in the pending 
suit since the insured would be exposed to potential punitive damages if the 
insurer proved the conduct was intentional. Thus, that court noted that the 
injured person is forced into a position of not only proceeding against the 
injuring party but also defending "against the vast resources and expertise of 
her insurer who would be trying to prove that which was its contractual duty to 
disprove." Brohawn, 347 A.2d  at 849. In accord with this result, see Auto Mutual 
Indemnity Co. v. Moore, 235 Ala. 426, 179 So. 368 (1938); Burns v. 
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 157 So. 2d 84 (Fla.App. 1963); Associated 
Indemnity Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 68 Ill. App.3d 807, 25 Ill.Dec. 
258, 386 N.E.2d 529 (1979); State Automobile & Casualty Underwriters v. 
Gardiner, 189 Kan. 544, 370 P.2d 91 (1962); United States Fidelity & 
Guaranty Co. v. Kenosha Investment Co., 369 Mich. 481, 120 N.W.2d 190 (1963); 
American Home Assurance Co. v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 66 A.D.2d 269, 412 N.Y.S.2d 605 (1979); Preferred Mutual Insurance Co. v. Thompson, 
23 Ohio St.3d 78, 491 N.E.2d 688 (1986); Employers Mutual Liability Insurance 
Co. of Wisconsin v. Bluhm, 227 Or. 415, 362 P.2d 755 (1961); Employers' Fire 
Insurance Co., 240 A.2d 397; and Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
Hammond, 200 Tenn. 106, 290 S.W.2d 860 (1956).

 
 

[¶18.]  As presented here, the trial judge in 
this subsequent declaratory judgment action is now placed in the position of 
first trying the underlying case as a question of whether Morris intentionally 
shot Sanchez - the very issue at dispute in the pending tort case. Additionally, 
with both suits instituted in state court,4 there is no potential conflict 
between the federal and state court systems as might otherwise 
exist.

 
 

[¶19.]  There are six justifications for taking a 
more restrictive view of utilizing declaratory judgments under facts similar to 
the instant ones:

 
 
1. The 
declaratory judgment action was not intended to be used to force the insured to 
have a "dress rehearsal" of an issue to be tried in the main 
case

 
 
2. The 
holding in the declaratory judgment action might inappropriately collaterally 
estop the parties to the main action as to certain factual 
issues

 
 
3. Such a 
proceeding would unduly burden the insured and improperly allow the insurer to 
wrest control of the litigation from the injured party

 
 
4. Such a 
declaratory judgment would violate the principle of judicial 
economy

 
 
5. Such an 
action would constitute an unwarranted interference with another court's 
proceedings

 
 
6. To the 
extent the declaratory judgment might resolve an issue adversely to the insured, 
it would be inherently unfair to force the insured to litigate against the 
insurance company; under those circumstances, rather than obtaining the benefit 
of the company's resources and expertise in defending against the plaintiff, 
those resources, for which the insured had bargained, would be turned against 
the insured and used to help establish his or her 
liability.

 
 
A. Windt, 
supra, at 326 (footnotes omitted). The institution of the declaratory judgment 
action as in the case at bar results in a race to res judicata or at least 
collateral estoppel, which is improper. 6A Moore's Federal Practice, ¶ 57.08[5] (1987); 
Annotation, Extent to Which Principles of Res Judicata Are Applicable to 
Judgments in Actions For Declaratory Relief, 10 A.L.R.2d 782 (1950). 
Furthermore, the Wyoming legislature has expressly recognized 
the potential problem with collateral estoppel and declaratory judgment by 
providing in part:

 
 
     When declaratory 
relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any 
interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of 
persons not parties to the proceeding.

 
 
W.S. 
1-37-113 (emphasis added). For a discussion of collateral estoppel generally, 
see Texas West Oil and Gas Corporation v. First Interstate Bank of Casper, 743 P.2d 857 (1987), reconfirmed 749 P.2d 278 
(Wyo. 1988). 
Clearly, Sanchez as a named defendant could be bound on the issue of whether 
Morris intentionally shot him or not, by the determination in the declaratory 
judgment action. Thus, the filing of the declaratory judgment amounts to 
procedural fencing by the insurance company, which is an improper, distorted use 
of the procedure as a foil, 6A Moore's Federal Practice, supra at 57-207; R. 
Keeton, Basic Text on Insurance Law at 508 (1971), or as an improper use of the 
declaratory judgment to allow the insurance company to forum shop. National 
Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, 
Pa. v. Lippert 
Bros., Inc., 233 F. Supp. 650, 656 (D.Neb. 1964).

 
 

[¶20.]  Wyoming has long held that a declaratory 
judgment action should only be maintained where it would serve a useful purpose. 
Beatty v. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co., 49 Wyo. 
22, 52 P.2d 404 (1935); Holly Sugar Corporation v. Fritzler, 42 Wyo. 446, 296 P. 206, 210 (1931); Note, Basic 
Misconceptions of the Declaratory Judgment Law, 12 Wyo. L.J. 66, 71 (1957). 
Benefit in duplicate litigation is not discernable when the liability of the 
insurer remains contingent and may never materialize for indemnity payment. 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 445 F.2d 1278, 1281 
(5th Cir. 1971); Gibraltar Insurance Co. v. Varkalis, 46 Ill. 2d 481, 263 N.E.2d 823, 826 (1970); National Savings Insurance Co. v. Gaskins, 572 S.W.2d 573, 575 
(Tex. App. 
1978). Consequently, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in 
allowing the declaratory judgment action to proceed to judgment first and that 
this second action should be held in abeyance until the issues of the principal 
case are first determined, as then to be pursued, if appropriate.5

 
 
2. Summary 
Judgment

 
 

[¶21.]  Equally dispositive, is our further 
finding that summary judgment was improvidently granted.

 
 

[¶22.]  The district court found, as a question 
of law that the insurance policy exclusion applied by factual determination, 
that the tortious act was intentional.6 We have frequently re-emphasized 
the test for entry of summary judgment as whether a reasonable person could have 
found that an issue of fact existed as determinable within a reasonable doubt. 
Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625 (Wyo. 1986); 
Weaver v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Wyoming, 
609 P.2d 984, 986-87 (Wyo. 1980). A detailed reading of Morris' 
testimony reveals an actual conflict from what he said. If not confused at the 
time of the event, Morris was certainly contradictory and confused to a degree 
in his available testimony so that a clearly defined determination of his intent 
was not possible.7 

 
 

[¶23.]  With Morris' intent in dispute by his own 
statements, trial resolution is required to determine the application of the 
insurance policy exclusion.

 
 

[¶24.]  Since we give all favorable inferences to 
the party opposing the motion, Cordova, 719 P.2d  at 639; Bancroft v. Jagusch, 
611 P.2d 819 (Wyo. 1980), we find the psychological analysis of the intention 
factor as afforded by conflicting affidavits of separate psychologists also 
presented an issue of fact as at least creating a standoff between these 
forensic participants. Consequently, Farmers Insurance, the movant, did not 
prove the lack of a genuine issue of material fact concerning intent which would 
warrant summary judgment.

 
 

[¶25.]  Separately implicated in the proceeding 
is the appropriateness of the finder of fact to grant summary judgment when the 
case hinges on factual event analysis for intent conclusions. The witnesses and 
experts whose affidavits were in dispute should be presented so the trial court 
may most accurately judge the veracity of the individuals. Credibility of the 
witnesses was at the heart of this case, making summary judgment inappropriate. 
Greaser v. Williams, 703 P.2d 327, 334 (Wyo. 1985); 10A C. Wright, A. Miller and M. 
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2726 (1983). Simply put, 
"[w]hen credibility is to be tested, the witnesses should testify at trial." 
Cordova, 719 P.2d  at 639.

 
 

[¶26.]  Another problem is created by the 
intoxication factor as it relates to the capacity to form an intent necessary to 
meet the insurance policy intentional-injury exclusion.8 Parkinson v. Farmers Ins. Co., 122 
Ariz. 343, 594 P.2d 1039 (1979); Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Thrift-Mart, 
Inc., 159 Ga. App. 874, 285 S.E.2d 566 (1981); Badger Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
Murry, 54 Ill. App.3d 459, 12 Ill.Dec. 672, 370 N.E.2d 295 (1977); Burd v. 
Sussex Mutual Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 383, 267 A.2d 7 (1970); Garden State Fire & 
Casualty Co. v. Keefe, 172 N.J. Super. 53, 410 A.2d 718, certification denied 84 
N.J. 389, 420 A.2d 317 (1980); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Ins. Co. v. 
Brannan, 22 Wn. App. 341, 589 P.2d 817 (1979); Kenna v. Griffin, 4 Wn. App. 363, 
481 P.2d 450 (1971). Thus, the issue of whether Morris was too drunk to form the 
requisite intent is a material issue. This inquiry was specifically addressed by 
the Georgia Supreme Court in a very similar circumstance in reversal of summary 
judgment received by the homeowner's insurance carrier after a shooting death 
where the court considered whether intoxication may render a person incapable of 
forming an intent or expectation of injuring another.

 
 
     The question of intent 
or expectation here uniquely fits the pattern of those issues of material fact 
which are not appropriate issues for summary judgment but are decided by the 
trier of fact.

 
 
State Farm 
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Morgan, 258 Ga. 276, 368 S.E.2d 509, 510 (1988). See Note, 
The Intentional Injury Exclusion: When is There No Intent Behind the Intention?, 
11:3 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 527 (1988).

 
 

[¶27.]  Issue preclusion and factual certainty 
necessary to justify summary judgment are not demonstrable in this 
record.

 
 
RIGHT TO A 
DIFFERENT JUDGE UPON REMAND

 
 

[¶28.]  A request for change of trial judge was 
addressed in appellate brief:

 
 
Appellants 
respectfully request reversal, remand and change of judge because of the fact 
that substantial and material issues of fact exist in this case, and that the 
trial judge, in his opinion letter, clearly stated that he would rule in the 
favor of Appellee if this matter were tried before the Court. The evidence in 
the record before the Court is substantially the same evidence that would be 
presented at any trial of this matter, and it would be a miscarriage of justice 
and waste of time for the litigants and the judiciary for this case to be 
remanded to the same trial judge who would then find for Appellee in any event, 
resulting in yet another appeal.

 
 

[¶29.]  Since the initial trial judge has 
retired, continued responsibility for the case is vested in the present active 
judge, pursuant to W.S. 5-1-106(f), even though the prior judge has been 
retained on a retired-active status. It is recognized that the first trial as a 
decision on the merits may resolve any inquiry for this case. For any further 
proceedings in declaratory judgment, non-reassignment will resolve the 
constitutional and due process concerns argued by the litigants. State v. 
Haskins, 220 Mont. 199, 714 P.2d 119 
(1986).

 
 

[¶30.]  Summary judgment is reversed as to 
Leopoldo and Dorothy Sanchez and the case is remanded for further proceedings in 
accord herewith.

 
 

CARDINE, C.J., 
filed a dissenting opinion, with whom BROWN, J., Retired, 
joined.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1 The pleading 
characterization of the events is generally confirmed by eyewitness 
affidavit:

 
 
1. That on or about 
August 8, 1985, I witnessed a shooting in Green River, Sweetwater County, Wyoming.

 
 
2. That on that day, I 
was looking out my front door at 50 East Third Street, Green River, Wyoming, and 
observed the victim, a man by the name of Sanchez talking to someone in a car. 
As the car drove away, I heard the man who later fired the gun yell "Leo." At 
that time, Leo Sanchez turned and started walking toward the man who had called 
out, whose name was Morris.

 
 
3. Morris had been in 
his front yard, but after he called out, he walked toward Sanchez and at a 
distance of approximately five feet, raised his hand in which he had a gun, 
Sanchez raised his hands in front of his face and yelled "No, no," and Morris 
fired one shot, Sanchez fell, and Morris turned and walked over next to his 
wife's car and lit up a cigarette.

 
 

2 A criminal action had 
been instituted against Sanchez with undefined results except as explained in 
oral argument. The factual scenario is perceived from both the summary judgment 
record and those oral argument comments suggesting that Morris had criminally 
accused Sanchez of a sexual offense with Morris' grandchild. Lacking faith in 
the judicial process, Morris intentionally, or accidentally, or drunkenly, 
invoked self-help as personal retribution. Criminal charges against Sanchez were 
dismissed in preliminary hearing for lack of evidence, and charges of attempted 
homicide against Morris were concluded with a nolo contendere plea and a 
suspended sentence.

 
 

3 We recognize, in 
accord with general law, that the duty to defend may be more extensive than a 
requirement to indemnify, but does not substantively consider any application of 
the principal to this case where now settled in res judicata by district court 
decision and the litigant insured's failure to appeal. However, the issue seems 
to be singularly meaningless, since upon remand it is unlikely that Farmers 
Insurance would feel free to permit a default judgment to be awarded against 
their insured upon which carrier liability might thereafter be pursued on a 
litigatively finalized issue of fact and amount. Experience would portend a 
continued defense under reservation of right status. What will be determined in 
the tort case by special interrogatories or verdict, unless adverse to Sanchez, 
is problematical at this juncture of the course of 
litigation.

 
 

4 See 1 W. Anderson, 
Declaratory Judgments § 209 at 448-49 (2nd ed. 1951) for the universal rule that 
both actions must be under the same sovereignties, states, or legal 
jurisdictions, and be between the same parties involving the same issues, for 
one action to bar the other. For a discussion of situations involving pending 
state suits and the institution of a declaratory judgment in federal court, see 
Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 495, 62 S. Ct. 1173, 
1175-76, 86 L. Ed. 1620, reh'g denied 317 U.S. 704, 63 S. Ct. 23, 87 L. Ed. 562 (1942), which states:

 
 
Ordinarily it would be 
uneconomical as well as vexatious for a federal court to proceed in a 
declaratory judgment suit where another suit is pending in a state court 
presenting the same issues, not governed by federal law, between the same 
parties. Gratuitous interference with the orderly and comprehensive disposition 
of a state court litigation should be avoided.

 
 
See also Note, 
Availability of a Declaratory Judgment When Another Suit is Pending, 51 Yale 
L.J. 511 (1942) and Morrison, Application of the Federal Declaratory Judgment 
Act For Life Insurance Cases, 23 A.B.A.J. 788 (1937).

 
 

5 We do not consider 
nor address what effect on issue preclusion or collateral estoppel a decision or 
specific findings, if any, made in the first proceeding will have on this 
declaratory judgment action.

 
 

6 "Under Section II - 
Liability, accident means a sudden 
event, including continuous or repeated exposure to the same conditions, 
resulting in bodily injury or property 
damage neither expected nor intended by the insured." [Emphasis in 
original.]

 
 

7

    Q. Had you been drinking 
anything during the day -

 
 
     A. No, 
sir.

 
 
     Q. - prior to that 
time?

 
 
     A. No, 
sir.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
     Q. Did you start 
drinking after you got home?

 
 
     A. 
Probably.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
     Q. Well, you've heard 
your wife testify that you were drinking. Do you disagree with 
that?

 
 
     A. 
No.

 
 
    Q. You were drinking 
bourbon?

 
 
     A. 
Bourbon.

 
 
     Q. Do you recall what 
type of bourbon?

 
 
     A. 80 proof is all I 
could say.

 
 
     Q. When did you start 
drinking that day?

 
 
     A. I, I don't recall 
the time. After I got home.

 
 
     Q. And did you 
continue to drink pretty much up through and until the shooting incident with 
Mr. Sanchez?

 
 
     A. I 
drank.

 
 
     Q. Your wife felt that 
you were under the influence, that you were drunk. Would you disagree with 
that?

 
 
     A. I'd have to 
disagree with it.

 
 
     Q. Were you under the 
influence of alcohol to some degree?

 
 
     A. To some degree, 
yes.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
     Q. Why do you think 
you were under the influence of alcohol that evening?

 
 
     A. The way I 
understand it, if a person's drinking he's under the 
influence.

 
 
     Q. Even after just one 
drink?

 
 
     A. Even after just one 
drink.

 
 
     Q. Had you had more 
than one drink?

 
 
     A. 
Yes.

 
 
     Q. How many drinks had 
you had?

 
 
     A. I couldn't say. 
Several.

 
 
     Q. 
Several?

 
 
     A. I, I didn't care 
about counting them.

 
 
     Q. Over what time 
period would you say, an hour, two hours, before the shooting 
incident?

 
 
     A. Hour, possibly hour 
and a half.

 
 
     Q. Would you say you 
had less or more than ten drinks?

 
 
     A. Ten drinks? Well, 
what do you want to call a drink? How much is a drink?

 
 
     Q. How were you 
drinking it?

 
 
     A. 
Straight.

 
 
     Q. Out of a shot 
glass?

 
 
     A. Out of the 
bottle.

 
 
     Q. Out of the bottle. 
Well, your wife testified she thought you'd consumed a half pint. Would you 
disagree with that?

 
 
     A. It wouldn't be 
over.

 
 
     Q. It could have been 
a half a pint?

 
 
     A. It could have been 
a half. It wasn't over. I'm positive of that.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
     Q. And you think you 
might have had a half pint and you might have consumed that anywhere between an 
hour and an hour and a half?

 
 
     A. 
Yeah.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
     Q. And you've heard 
her [his wife] testify today that - she testified that you told her you were 
going to kill Mr. Sanchez. Do you remember saying that to 
her?

 
 
     A. No, I do 
not.

 
 
     Q. Well, is it 
possible that you could have made that statement and you don't remember making 
it?

 
 
     A. It's - I guess it's 
possible.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
     Q. Angry to the point 
where you wanted to harm Mr. Sanchez?

 
 
     A. At the time I had 
probably thought that there was no punishment too great. There would be no 
punishment to fit that crime.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
     Q. In your mind, at 
the time he was shot, he was guilty?

 
 
     A. 
Yes.

 
 
     Q. And in your mind he 
had committed that heinous crime?

 
 
     A. 
Yes.

 
 
     Q. And you didn't 
believe that the judicial system would work, did you?

 
 
     A. 
Right.

 
 
     Q. You thought he'd 
get off?

 
 
     A. 
Right.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
     Q. What were you 
doing?

 
 
     A. Well, it may not 
have been clear to me just what, just what I was doing.

 
 
     Q. That maybe you were 
irrational?

 
 
     A. Irrational? I don't 
- That's, that's a pretty big word. That covers a lot of 
territory.

 
 
     Q. Well, you tell me 
then what was going on in your mind during that period of time. Certainly I 
don't know.

 
 
     A. No, you wouldn't. 
You couldn't until it had happened. No one would understand what was going on in 
my mind, I guess. I guess probably I didn't understand what was going on in my 
mind. That's one of the most terrible things to happen to a 
kid.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
     Q. Do you remember 
telling your wife she had to go inside the house because he had to be 
killed?

 
 
     A. 
No.

 
 
     Q. You don't recall 
making that statement?

 
 
     A. I recall telling 
her to go in the house.

 
 
     Q. Did you indicate to 
her that you were going to harm Mr. Sanchez?

 
 
      A. I don't think 
- Consciously I didn't - I didn't want to tell her, show her - I feel that I 
didn't show her anything. I wanted her in the house.

 
 
     Q. Why did you want her to go 
in the house?

 
 
     A. I thought that was 
the place for her to be.

 
 
     Q. 
Why?

 
 
     A. I wasn't sure what 
was going to happen.

 
 
     Q. What was going on 
in your mind when you sent her into the house?

 
 
     A. Whatever did happen 
I didn't think it was necessary for her to see.

 
 
    Q. Did you know that you 
were going to try to - Did you know in your mind that you were going to try to 
kill Mr. Sanchez?

 
 
     A. (No 
response.)

 
 
     Q. If you 
know.

 
 
     A. I don't, I don't 
think I planned it.

 
 
     Q. You don't think you 
necessarily meant to fatally wound him?

 
 
     MR. REESE: Objection. 
He didn't fatally wound him.

 
 
     Q. Or near fatal 
wound.

 
 
     A. At the time I told 
her to go in the house I don't - I didn't know what might 
happen.

 
 
     Q. Well, what was 
going on inside your mind, Ray? Were you confused?

 
 
     A. Confused and 
concerned about the grandson and -

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
     A. I guess I shot 
him.

 
 
     Q. You don't remember 
shooting him?

 
 
     A. I can't - I can't - 
I can't remember the actual shot, no.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
     Q. You don't recall 
lifting a gun and shooting Mr. Sanchez?

 
 
     A. I can't - I can't 
recall lifting a gun.

 
 
     Q. Do you recall 
whether you ever - Do you recall - strike that. Do you recall wanting to hurt 
Mr. Sanchez that evening by shooting him?

 
 
     A. It - I don't - I 
don't believe it was in my mind to shoot him.

 
 
     Q. Why do you say 
that?

 
 
     A. Like you said, it's 
a terrible thing to do, to shoot a person. And a person in their right mind, 
I've always felt, wouldn't, wouldn't do that. I, I - It's a terrible step. I've 
always felt that way.

 
 
Q. In other words, you 
don't recall specifically getting a gun and wanting to shoot Mr. 
Sanchez?

 
 
     A. I'm not sure what I 
- I'm not sure.

 
 
     Q. You're not sure what was 
going on in your mind?

 
 
     A. It's a terrible 
thing to go through. I - I -

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
     Q. Do you recall 
telling the police officer that you were the one who shot Mr. 
Sanchez?

 
 
     A. Yes, I remember 
that.

 
 
     Q. So you do have - At 
that time did you have, did you have a recollection that you had shot 
him?

 
 
A. It's clear in my 
mind that I put the gun back in the pickup and went over and leaned against her 
car.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
     Q. You didn't put the 
gun in the truck so you could retrieve it and then solicit Mr. Sanchez across 
the street so you could shoot him?

 
 
     A. 
No.

 
 
     Q. That wasn't your 
plan?

 
 
     A. (Shakes 
head)

 
 
     Q. You never had a 
plan to shoot Mr. Sanchez, did you?

 
 
     A. 
No.

 
 
     Q. Is it your 
testimony that you really didn't intend to shoot Mr. 
Sanchez?

 
 
     A. I can't - At the 
time of the shooting I can't, I can't - I don't know what my intentions were. 
It's unclear to me.

 
 
     Q. You don't recall 
whether you wanted to frighten Mr. Sanchez with the use of a 
gun?

 
 
     A. It might have 
entered my mind, but hindsight says, "Hey, that's a hell of a way to frighten; a 
 loaded gun."

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
     Q. After your family 
went in the house, do you recall, is it your testimony you don't recall going to 
your truck to get a gun?

 
 
     A. No, I can't - 
That's not clear in my mind.

 
 
     Q. Has it ever been 
clear in your mind?

 
 
     A. I don't believe it 
has.

 
 
     Q. And you think that 
might have something to do with alcohol consumption that 
night?

 
 
     A. I would have to say 
that there wasn't that much consumed that night, would be my 
judgment.

 
 
* * 
* * * *

 
 
     Q. Your testimony is 
you didn't consume that much alcohol that night. I thought you just said that. 
You said not that much was consumed?

 
 
     A. My judgment is that 
I hadn't had that much to drink, to be out of control.

 
 
     Q. Well, do you think 
you were out of control?

 
 
     A. I'm sure I must 
have been to do, to do what, what I did.

 
 
     Q. Or what they say 
you did?

 
 
    A. Or what they said I did. 
However you want to put it.

 
 
     Q. Well, you don't 
actually consciously remember pulling the trigger and firing a shot at Mr. 
Sanchez?

 
 
     A. No, I can't. I 
can't.

 
 

8 The enormity of the 
absurdity of the occurrence perforce demonstrates that Morris was irrational. At 
issue, however, was capacity, competency, and conscious 
intent.

 
 

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice, dissenting, with whom BROWN, Justice, Retired, 
joins.

 
 

[¶31.]  The object of a summary judgment motion 
is to separate pretended or merely formal disputes from those which are genuine 
and substantial. Thus, the bare assertion that an issue exists with regard to 
some material fact should be insufficient to defeat such a motion. Johnson v. 
Soulis, 542 P.2d 867, 871 (Wyo. 1975). Neither should purely conclusory 
statements concerning ultimate facts suffice to raise a genuine issue for trial; 
the party resisting the motion must challenge the movant's allegations by 
setting forth specific facts which permit the fact finder to infer those 
ultimate facts. Blackmore v. Davis Oil Co., 671 P.2d 334, 336-37 (Wyo. 1983); Bancroft v. Jagusch, 611 P.2d 819, 821 
(Wyo. 
1980).

 
 

[¶32.]  Alleging that it was relieved of its 
duties to defend and indemnify by a policy provision excluding coverage for 
Morris' intentional acts, the movant insurance company set forth facts to show 
that Morris intended to assault Sanchez. Those facts indicated that such intent 
commenced prior to Morris' consumption of alcohol and continued unabated until 
the hammer fell on his magnum handgun. Sanchez offered, in response, the merely 
chimeric possibility that Morris could not form the intent to commit that 
battery because he was too drunk to have done so. While Sanchez offered evidence 
that Morris had been affected to some extent by his drinking, he offered nothing 
to show, in the face of much evidence to the contrary, that Morris was 
sufficiently intoxicated so as to destroy his ability to form the requisite 
intent. The whole purpose of a summary judgment is defeated if a party is 
permitted to transform his categorical assertion of ultimate facts into a 
genuine issue without some evidentiary support. Maxted v. Pacific Car & 
Foundry Co., 527 P.2d 832, 834 (Wyo. 1974).

 
 

[¶33.]  In order to show that a genuine and 
substantial issue exists with regard to Morris' capacity to expect or intend the 
injuries he caused, Sanchez must raise more than a metaphysical doubt that such 
capacity was present. Though he is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable 
doubt, he is not entitled to prevail by raising merely a slight doubt. See 
Cordova v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625, 636 (Wyo. 1986). He must set forth facts from which 
reasonable minds could conclude that Morris was incapable of forming a tortious 
intent. Id. at 639; Fegler v. Brodie, 574 P.2d 751, 753 (Wyo. 
1978). Because the record in this case will not support a reasonable conclusion 
that Morris' acts were unintentional, I dissent from the majority's conclusion 
that an issue of fact exists with regard to coverage under this insurance 
policy.

 
 

[¶34.]  The record establishes that, for some two 
months prior to the evening of the shooting, Morris had been distraught over his 
grandchild's molestation by Sanchez. His anguish had been aggravated that 
evening by the imminence of Sanchez's hearing in that matter and his perception 
that Sanchez would go unpunished. At some time between 4:30 and 5:30 that 
evening Morris began drinking. Over the next hour and a half he consumed roughly 
one half-pint of bourbon. During that time, but before he and his wife sat down 
for dinner at 6:45, Morris expressed doubts that Sanchez would be punished and 
suggested he would have to take that matter into his own hands. His wife became 
so alarmed she sought the assistance of their daughter to distract him from 
Sanchez.

 
 

[¶35.]  Some time after finishing his evening 
meal, Morris went outside, followed by his wife and daughter. He told his wife 
that Sanchez would have to be killed, and ordered his family to return to the 
house. His wife called the police. In the meantime, Morris took a .357 magnum 
revolver from his pickup truck, called Sanchez from his home across the street 
and, when Sanchez approached to within a distance of approximately five feet, 
shot him in the face with the revolver. Morris then returned the gun to his 
truck, leaned against his wife's car, lit a cigarette, and waited for the police 
to arrive. During all of the evening's events, witnesses observed nothing but 
minor and isolated signs of Morris' intoxication. Indeed, Morris admitted that, 
though he felt the effects of the bourbon, he was not drunk. The record clearly 
indicates that throughout his conversations with his wife, his daughter, and the 
responding police officers, Morris appeared lucid, rational and 
unimpaired.

 
 

[¶36.]  Such facts plainly show the intentional 
nature of Morris' conduct. Only by purely unbridled speculation could a 
reasonable mind conclude otherwise. Sanchez has merely shown that Morris was 
drinking. The issue of material fact which Sanchez purportedly raises is not 
whether Morris was affected by alcohol, but whether that effect was so great 
that Morris acted without the intent to do so. The undisputed facts presented on 
the summary judgment motion do not even present an issue. Morris exhibited 
neither extreme intoxication nor an inability to control his cognitive 
functions. Thus, Sanchez has suggested no reasonable grounds to conclude that 
Morris' conduct was unintentional, and he has not carried his burden with 
respect to appellee's motion. I would affirm.