Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Mazer

Citation: 1999-Ohio-156

Docket Number: 19982659

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-07-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Mazer, 86 Ohio St.3d 185, 1999-Ohio-156.] 
 
 
 
 
 
OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. MAZER. 
[Cite as Disciplinary Counsel v. Mazer (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 185.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — Six-month suspension — Continuing multiple 
employment if independent professional judgment on behalf of a client is 
likely to be adversely affected by representation of another client — 
Representing two or more clients in the making of an aggregate settlement 
of the claims of or against those clients — Previous violation of a 
comparable Disciplinary Rule. 
(No. 98-2659 — Submitted May 4, 1999 — Decided July 21, 1999.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 97-62. 
 
In 1996, we found that respondent, Bernard D. Mazer of Dublin, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0037775, had violated several Disciplinary Rules and 
suspended him from the practice of law for six months, with the suspension stayed.  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Mazer (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 481, 668 N.E.2d 478.  We 
concluded that respondent had violated, among other rules, DR 5-105(A) (refusing 
to decline proffered employment if attorney’s professional judgment on behalf of 
client is likely to be adversely affected).  76 Ohio St.3d at 483, 668 N.E.2d at 480. 
 
On June 16, 1997, relator, Office of Disciplinary Counsel, filed a complaint 
charging respondent with violating several Disciplinary Rules.  After respondent 
answered, the matter was heard by a panel of the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court (“board”). 
 
Based on the evidence, the panel found that in 1990, Karl Demmler and John 
Crites, owners of Concrete Designers, Inc. (“CDI”), sold their stock in the 
company to Ralph Hazelbaker for cash and secured promissory notes from 
Hazelbaker and the company.  When the notes became due in 1991, Hazelbaker 
 
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and CDI filed lawsuits in Franklin County Common Pleas Court against Crites and 
Demmler, claiming the sellers had undisclosed liabilities at the time of sale.  Crites 
and Demmler answered and filed counterclaims either to recover control of the 
company or be paid on the promissory notes.  The cases were consolidated. 
Attorney Michael P. Vasco represented Crites in common pleas court; attorney 
Steve Brown represented Demmler.  Just before these lawsuits were to be tried, 
CDI filed a Chapter 11 petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
Southern District of Ohio. 
 
In January 1993, Demmler and Crites hired respondent, who had formerly 
represented Demmler in tax matters, to represent both of them in a dispute with the 
Internal Revenue Service regarding the tax liability that arose because of the CDI 
sale.  At the time Demmler and Crites retained respondent, respondent wrote each 
a letter requesting consent to his representation of both despite “potential conflicts 
of interest” that could arise, and the letter emphasized that respondent’s 
representation was specifically limited to tax refund litigation.  Both Demmler and 
Crites consented to these terms. 
 
In August 1993, respondent wrote to Vasco, the attorney representing Crites 
in the common pleas court action, to address some of respondent’s concerns about 
Vasco’s representation of Crites in the common pleas court litigation.  In the letter, 
respondent specified: 
 
“After the filing of the bankruptcy by Concrete Designers, Inc., it appears 
that Mr. Crites and Mr. Demmler have many similar interests in this matter, but 
there are some very clear and distinct differences in their respective positions.  * * 
* [W]ith the bankruptcy filing, the eventual ownership of Concrete Designers, Inc., 
and its assets may follow different paths and Mr. Crites and Mr. Demmler may not 
be on the same path.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
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In May 1994, after the bankruptcy court agreed to allow the common pleas 
court lawsuit to continue, Crites discharged Vasco and hired respondent to 
represent him in the state court litigation and the Chapter 11 matter. 
 
A month later, in June 1994, Demmler, Crites, and Hugh Richards retained 
respondent to form a limited liability company, Asset Acquisition Company, Ltd., 
to reacquire the assets of CDI in the Chapter 11 case.  At that time, respondent 
advised each of these individuals by letter of potential conflicts of interest and 
requested their individual consent to his joint representation.  Respondent specified 
in his letter that his representation of Demmler, Crites, and Richards was limited to 
their acquisition of CDI assets.  The letter did not mention the objective of 
obtaining money due Demmler and Crites from the sale of CDI to Hazelbaker.  
Demmler, Crites, and Richards each consented to these terms. 
 
In September 1994, Demmler hired respondent to represent him in the 
common pleas court litigation.  Although respondent then was representing both 
Demmler and Crites in the common pleas court action, he did not obtain written 
consent of either party to such multiple representation in that action, insofar as the 
parties requested money from CDI and Hazelbaker.  In November 1994, Crites 
gave respondent a $75,000 promissory note for the payment of legal fees he had 
incurred and would incur with respondent. 
 
In early January 1995, the parties settled the state court litigation.  The 
settlement agreement provided for two different plans, with the second option, 
which ultimately applied here, providing that CDI and Hazelbaker pay $900,000 to 
the court for distribution to Demmler and Crites.  Demmler and Crites agreed that 
Crites would receive $400,000 and that Demmler would receive $500,000 of the 
$900,000.  At the settlement hearing, the common pleas court judge stated that 
“[i]f there is a falling out between Mr. Demmler and Mr. Crites as to how the 
money is to be divided, it then will also be paid into escrow to the court, and the 
 
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court will work with the parties in resolving that issue by resolution or litigation  * 
* *.”  On several occasions during the settlement process, the court advised the 
parties of the potential conflict.  Crites subsequently disagreed with Demmler 
about the timing of the settlement payments. 
 
In February 1995, Crites fired respondent as his attorney in the common 
pleas litigation and again hired Vasco.  After being fired, respondent sued Crites on 
the $75,000 note, and respondent continued to represent Demmler in the state court 
action.  Demmler and Crites ultimately resolved their dispute concerning the 
timing and distribution of their respective portions of the state court settlement 
proceeds. 
 
Based on these facts, the panel concluded that respondent’s conduct violated 
DR 5-105(B) (continuing multiple employment if independent professional 
judgment in behalf of a client is likely to be adversely affected by representation of 
another client) and 5-106(A) (representing two or more clients in the making of an 
aggregate settlement of the claims of or against those clients).  The panel 
recommended that respondent be publicly reprimanded.  The board adopted the 
findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the panel. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Kenneth R. Donchatz, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
James Caruso, for respondent. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  We adopt the findings and conclusions of the board.  For the 
following reasons, however, we believe that a more severe sanction is warranted.  
DR 5-105(B) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if 
the exercise of his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be 
or is likely to be adversely affected by his representation of another client, except to 
 
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the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).”  (Emphasis added.)  DR 5-105(C) 
permits an attorney to represent multiple clients “if it is obvious that he can 
adequately represent the interest of each  and if each consents to the representation 
after full disclosure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of 
his independent professional judgment on behalf of each.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Here, respondent himself acknowledged in 1993 to Crites’s then-attorney in 
the state court litigation that the interests of Demmler and Crites contained “clear 
and distinct differences.”  The common pleas court subsequently determined these 
concerns to be substantial enough to merit  including a provision in the settlement 
agreement to settle any dispute between Demmler and Crites regarding the 
distribution of the settlement proceeds.  On the day that Crites fired respondent, 
Crites sent respondent a facsimile transmission that referred to disagreements 
between himself and Demmler. 
 
Based on this evidence, it was “likely” that respondent’s continued 
representation of both Demmler and Crites in the state court litigation would 
adversely affect his clients and it was far from “obvious” that he could adequately 
represent both Demmler’s and Crites’s interests.  DR 5-105(B) and (C).  In 
addition, neither of the written consents to representation of multiple clients 
executed by Demmler and Crites applied to the state court litigation’s $900,000 
settlement option.  Therefore, respondent’s conduct manifestly violated DR 5-
105(B). 
 
We further concur in the board’s conclusion that respondent violated DR 5-
106(A). 
 
In sum, “[a] lawyer should never represent in litigation multiple clients with 
differing interests; and there are few situations in which he would be justified in 
representing in litigation multiple clients with potentially differing interests.”  
(Emphasis added.)  EC 5-15.  Respondent’s continued representation of Demmler 
 
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and Crites, whom he had previously noted to have “clear and distinct” interests, is 
not one of those few justifiable situations.  Regardless of whether respondent’s 
conduct created an actual conflict of interest, it created a potential conflict of 
interest, which is sufficient to violate DR 5-105(B).  See, e.g., Kentucky Bar Assn. 
v. Roberts (Ky.1979), 579 S.W.2d 107, 109. 
 
In considering respondent’s violations of DR 5-105(B) and 5-106(A) and his 
previous violation of a comparable Disciplinary Rule, we find that a six-month 
suspension is appropriate.  See Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Schmelzer (1999), 84 
Ohio St.3d 382, 704 N.E.2d 243; Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Podor (1995), 72 Ohio 
St.3d 40, 647 N.E.2d 470; and Columbus Bar Assn. v. Ewing (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 
377, 588 N.E.2d 783, where we imposed a similar sanction for comparable 
violations of DR 5-105; see, also, Toledo Bar Assn. v. Westmeyer (1991), 58 Ohio 
St.3d 38, 40, 567 N.E.2d 1016, 1018 (“[R]espondent’s prior misconduct, based on 
similar charges, is relevant to the choice of sanction.”).  Respondent is hereby 
suspended from the practice of law for six months.  Costs taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY, COOK and HOFFMAN, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents and would publicly reprimand respondent. 
 
DOUGLAS and PETREE, JJ., dissent and would dismiss the cause against 
respondent. 
 
CHARLES R. PETREE, J., of the Tenth Appellate District, sitting for RESNICK, 
J. 
 
WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN, J., of the Fifth Appellate District, sitting for 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J.