Case Title: In re Children of Amber L.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2018 ME 55

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2018-04-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2018 ME 55 
Docket: 
Yor-17-423 
Submitted 
On Briefs: April 10, 2018 
Decided: 
April 24, 2018 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CHILDREN OF AMBER L. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  The mother and the father appeal1 from a judgment of the District 
Court (Springvale, Janelle, J.) terminating their parental rights to their two 
children pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(ii) 
(2017), as to the father, and 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(A)(1)(a) and (B)(2)(a), 
(b)(i)-(ii), (iv) (2017), as to the mother.  The father challenges the sufficiency 
of the evidence supporting the court’s findings of unfitness as well as the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s finding that termination is in 
the best interests of the children.  He also argues that the court’s termination of 
his parental rights constituted an abuse of discretion because it failed to take 
                                         
1  Pursuant to the procedure outlined in In re M.C., 2014 ME 128, ¶ 7, 104 A.3d 139, counsel for 
the mother filed a brief indicating that there are no arguable issues of merit for appeal.  We entered 
an order permitting the mother to file a supplemental brief on or before December 28, 2017, but the 
mother did not do so.   
 
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into account “the negative consequences” of termination.2  We affirm the 
judgment.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  The court made the following supported findings of fact pertaining 
to the parents’ fitness to parent their children:  
The children lived with their parents in New Hampshire from 
the time of their births to 2008.  In April of 2008, they were 
removed from their parents’ care and placed in New Hampshire 
Division of Children, Youth and Families (hereinafter “DCYF”) 
custody. . . .  It is not completely clear why the children were 
removed from their parents’ home.  [The mother] testified that the 
children were removed because of domestic violence between her 
and [the father].  There was also testimony that [the mother] had a 
substance abuse problem at one time.  The children remained in 
foster care until February 2012, when they were returned to their 
parents’ custody.   
 
[The parents] were separated when the children were 
returned to them.  [The mother] remained living in New Hampshire 
and [the father] had relocated to Maine, where he currently resides.  
From 2012 to 2015, the children went back and forth between their 
parents’ homes.  Although it is not known how much time they 
spent in each home, the girls were living in [southern Maine with 
the father], his girlfriend, . . . and another roommate . . . when the 
Department formally became involved with the family in the 
summer of 2015.    
                                         
2  Although the father additionally argues that the court’s acceptance of the Department’s 
proposed findings of fact constitutes a failure by the court to exercise its independent judgment, we 
do not entertain that argument because the father failed to request further findings of fact, pursuant 
to M.R. Civ. P. 52(b), after the court entered its judgment.  See In re Caleb M., 2017 ME 66, ¶ 15, 
159 A.3d 345 (“[W]e will no longer entertain a challenge to the trial court’s independent judgment 
based on the court’s adoption of a party’s proposed order, absent a parent’s motion for further or 
clarified findings pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 52(b).”). 
 
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. . . . 
 
As of this date, [the parents] have had twenty months to 
engage in the services outlined in their reunification plans to 
alleviate jeopardy and to prove to the girls that they are now safe 
and reliable caregivers.  Neither parent has alleviated jeopardy or 
arrived at the point where they can meet these girls’ needs.  [The 
mother] fails to acknowledge that her past issues have anything to 
do with the children’s current struggles.  She testified that her 
substance abuse, domestic violence and mental health issues are in 
the past and have nothing to do with what is going on now, and 
[that she] does not need any mental health treatments.  [She] has 
refused counseling.  She has not attended any parenting sessions, 
even though she maintains this is the only service that she had to 
do.  [She] lacks sensitivity around the girls’ attachment issues, as 
evidenced by her telling [the younger child] that [her] foster 
mother is just a care giver . . . .  [She] has visited the children a total 
of three times . . . .  [She] cited her work schedule, distance and car 
trouble as reasons for her failure to see her children.  However, the 
Department offered transportation assistance and [a counseling 
agency] made changes to the visitation schedule based on [the 
mother’s] reported changes in her work schedule.  This past April, 
[the mother’s] schedule changed and she was asked to contact [the 
counseling agency] to set up visits, however, this did not occur.   
 
[The mother] has all but abandoned [the children].  Her 
failure to visit does nothing to show [the children] that she is a 
reliable caregiver and can provide a safe, stable and, nurturing 
environment.   
 
Neither is [the father] in a position to parent the girls, but not 
for lack of contact with the girls or the Department.  While [the 
father] has not yet found new housing, he has engaged in the other 
services and responsibilities outlined in his reunification plan.  [He] 
continues to live with [his girlfriend and roommate], who he agrees 
cannot be around his children. . . .  Despite [the father’s efforts, he] 
continues to lack insight into the impact of his substance abuse 
issues on his parenting and does not know how to communicate 
 
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with the girls who have significant attachment issues. . . .  [The 
father] continues to believe that the girls need to respect him and 
their behaviors need to change before they will be ready to return 
home.  In other words, [the father] blames the girls for the fact that 
they are in foster care.  At his last visit with the girls this past May, 
[the father] became angry when [the younger child] would not eat 
the food that he brought and told her that he was going to tell the 
Department that he did not want to see her again.  Whatever the 
reason for the remark, it could not have assured [the child] that her 
father will always be there for her. . . .   
 
(Footnotes omitted) (quotation marks omitted).   
 
 
[¶3]  The court also made the following supported findings regarding the 
extensive needs of the children, both of whom are on the cusp of their teenage 
years:  
When the children entered the Department’s custody, they 
were placed in separate therapeutic foster homes supported by [a 
counseling agency]. . . .  The Department’s caseworker sought 
therapeutic placements in southern Maine, but was unable to 
locate families that could meet the girls’ needs in the area.   
 
Although the [foster family of the older child has] struggled 
with [her] behaviors in their home, [she] remains in their care and 
there are no plans for [her] to leave their home.  However, they are 
not a pre-adoptive family as they do not feel they will be able to 
meet [the child’s] needs without support from the Department and 
other agencies.  [Her] behaviors in the home have included verbal 
aggression and property destruction. . . .   
 
 
While [the older child] has been fortunate to have been in 
one placement over the last twenty months, [the younger child] has 
not been so lucky.  [One family] asked the Department to move 
[her] because they could not handle her behaviors, as [she] was 
verbally aggressive toward members of the . . . household.  She was 
 
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also physically aggressive and had a great deal of difficulty 
regulating herself. . . .  
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
As with her other placements, [she] has been a challenge for 
[her current foster parents].  Although she loves [them] and wants 
to stay in their home, she is physically and verbally abusive (fiery 
and explosive) to everyone in the household. . . .  Some of her 
behaviors raise safety concerns for herself and others. . . .  [The 
foster mother] has taken [her] for crisis assessments and has 
developed protocols with [the counseling agency] for when [her] 
behaviors escalate.  [The foster parents] are committed to keeping 
[her] for the long term, but do not believe they can adopt [her] for 
the same reasons given by [her sister’s] foster parents.   
 
 
At hearing, the children’s therapists spoke about the girls’ 
treatment plans but admitted that they have not been able to get 
very far in treatment because they are so busy “putting out fires.”  
Both counselors testified that it is important for the girls to find 
their permanent homes and achieve stability so they can process 
their trauma histories.  It is very important for the girls to know 
that they are with safe, reliable caregivers.  The counselors are 
concerned that if they cannot work on the girls’ trauma sooner 
rather than later, there is a high probability that they will struggle 
with poor mental health in adulthood.   
 
 
Both counselors also addressed whether it would be 
beneficial for [the children] to engage in family counseling with 
their parents.  If the parents are able to acknowledge that they 
neglected or abused the girls, and are ready to prove to them that 
they are now safe and reliable caregivers, family therapy may work.  
But, if the parents are not able to acknowledge the abuse and its 
impact on the children, family therapy could do more harm than 
good.   
 
 
 
. . . .  
 
 
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Although the children are not in pre-adoptive placements, 
they are in stable, long-term placements with safe, reliable 
caregivers who are doing their best to maintain the girls in their 
homes and make sure the girls are engaged in appropriate services.  
It is vital for the girls to achieve some level of permanency at this 
time, even if the only permanency the Court can provide right now 
is to let them know they will not be returning to their parents and 
to free them for adoption. . . .  [The younger child] has been clear 
throughout this case that she does not want to return to her parents 
and [the older child] has recently told the Guardian ad Litem that 
she does not want to go back either.  Although the girls are young, 
the Court takes their wishes into consideration to determine what 
is in the best interest[s] of the children.   
 
(Footnotes omitted.) 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶4]  These findings are sufficient to support the court’s determination 
that both parents are (1) unwilling or unable to protect the children from 
jeopardy and that these circumstances are unlikely to change within a time 
which is reasonably calculated to meet the children’s needs, and (2) unwilling 
or unable to take responsibility for the children within a time which is 
reasonably 
calculated 
to 
meet 
their 
needs. 
 
See 
22 
M.R.S. 
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(i)-(ii); see also In re Meena H., 2018 ME 13, ¶ 3, 177 A.3d 
1276.  They are also sufficient to support the court’s finding that the mother has 
failed to make a good faith effort to rehabilitate and reunify with the children, 
see 22 M.R.S. §§ 4041(1-A)(B), 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(iv) (2017), and that 
 
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termination of both parents’ rights is in the children’s best interests.  See 
22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a).   
[¶5]  The father also argues that the court’s ultimate termination of his 
parental rights constituted an abuse of discretion because termination at this 
point, when the current foster families are not immediately ready to adopt the 
girls, fails to establish permanency for the children.  The father is correct that 
there is no one-size-fits-all answer when it comes to permanency.  We have 
therefore frequently stated that the concept of permanency is a dynamic one, 
and permanency in a particular case “must be fashioned from the actual 
circumstances and needs of the . . . children before the court.”  In re Marcus S., 
2007 ME 24, ¶ 10, 916 A.2d 225.  And “permanency planning for [children] in 
foster care and the best interest[s] determination to be made in a termination 
proceeding are distinct from the question of who should adopt the child[ren].”  
In re Kenneth S., 2017 ME 45, ¶ 6, 157 A.3d 244 (citations omitted).  Based on 
the record before us, the court did not abuse its discretion when it determined 
that termination is in the best interests of these two children when the parents 
have demonstrated that they are unable to offer the children any semblance of 
 
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permanency, due to their failure to alleviate jeopardy over a twenty-month 
period of time even with ample support from the Department.   
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rory A. McNamara, Esq., Drake Law, LLC, Berwick, for appellant father 
 
Caitlin Ross Wahrer, Esq., Chester & Vestal, P.A., Portland, for appellant mother 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office of 
the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
Springvale District Court docket number PC-2015-41 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY