Case Title: Ketchum  v. Town of Dorset

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2011-04-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
2011 VT 49













Ketchum, Saddlebrook Farm Trust and North Farm Trust v. Town
of Dorset (2010-165)
 
2011 VT 49
 
[Filed 29-Apr-2011]
 
 
ENTRY ORDER
 
2011 VT 49
 
SUPREME COURT
  DOCKET NO. 2010-165
 
NOVEMBER TERM, 2010 
 
Lisa Ketchum and Thomas Ketchum,
  Individually and as Trustees for Saddlebrook Farm Trust and North Farm Trust
  and Pauline Ketchum
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APPEALED FROM:
 
 
Bennington Superior Court
  
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    v.
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}
 
Town of Dorset
}
DOCKET NO. 475-12-08
  Bncv
 
 
 
 
 
Trial Judge: John P. Wesley
 
In the above-entitled
cause, the Clerk will enter:
 
¶ 1.            
Plaintiffs appeal the Town of Dorset's decision to reclassify a town
road from a class 3 to a class 4 highway.  Plaintiffs argue that the court
erred in reviewing the selectboard's reclassification
using a deferential standard instead of a de novo procedure involving
appointment of a panel of commissioners.  In the alternative, plaintiffs
contend that, even under a deferential standard, the court's decision is
erroneous because the findings are not supported by the evidence and they were
denied an opportunity to supplement the record on appeal.  We affirm.
¶ 2.            
Plaintiffs own property that is serviced by a town highway known as
Upper Kirby Hollow Road.  There is one residence on the road, and the
remaining properties are undeveloped.  Some of the property is under a
conservation easement and open to the public for recreational activities. 
In October 2008, the Town provided notice that it intended to consider altering
the classification of certain town highways, including a 0.55 mile section of
Kirby Hollow Road.  The selectboard made a site visit to the
property.  The Town also held a public meeting and heard from interested
parties.  Plaintiffs attended and spoke against reclassification. 
Other members of the public also opposed reclassification and questioned
whether it would have an impact on the public's ability to use the conserved
property.  The Town road foreman supported reclassification and testified
that the road is dangerous to maintain and snow plow because it is narrow and
steep.  In December 2008, the Town issued a written decision, finding,
among other things, that: the road's width is too narrow to allow two vehicles
to safely pass one another or for access for emergency vehicles; Town snow
removal vehicles have slid off the road causing danger to the vehicles and
impairing snow removal of other roads; and the cost to improve the road is
prohibitive.  The Town also found that the road services only one seasonal
residence with limited winter usage.  The Town concluded that continuing
summer maintenance and winter plowing did not serve the public good of the Town
and reclassified the road.  
¶ 3.            
Plaintiffs appealed the decision, citing Rule of Civil Procedure 74 and
19 V.S.A. § 740.  Rule 74 allows a party to appeal from a decision of a
"state board, commission, department or officer" when "any party is entitled by
statute to seek review."  Section 740 states:
 
When a person owning or interested in lands through which a highway is laid
out, altered, or resurveyed by selectboard members, objects to the necessity of
taking the land, or is dissatisfied with the laying out, altering or
resurveying of the highway, or with the compensation for damages, he or she may
appeal, in accordance with Rule 74 of the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure, to
the superior court in the same county, or in either county when the highway or
bridge is in two counties.
 
19 V.S.A. § 740(a) (Cum.
Supp. 2010).  In their notice of appeal, plaintiffs asked the
superior court to stay the selectboard's decision pending appeal and to appoint
three disinterested landowners to review the reclassification decision pursuant
to 19 V.S.A. § 741. 
¶ 4.            
The court held a hearing on the motion to stay.  At the hearing,
the court questioned the basis for its jurisdiction under Rule 74. 
Plaintiffs argued that § 740 applied to allow review under Rule 74, but, in the
alternative, requested to amend the notice of appeal and plead relief under
Rule 75 instead.  Following an off-the-record conference, the court
concluded that it would take evidence on whether to grant a stay, assuming the
appeal was made pursuant to Rule 75.  Cf. 19 V.S.A. § 743 (providing for
automatic stay upon petition of interested person of decision to lay out, alter or resurvey road).  Plaintiffs presented
testimony from four witnesses, including one of the plaintiffs, who testified
that one residence is used in the summer and for a couple of weekends a month
in the winter.  He also expressed his opinion that the road was safe for
passage and there had not been a problem with clearing the snow.  He noted
that lack of plowing would have an impact on plaintiffs' ability to reach their
properties, and have utility trucks deliver propane.  A neighboring farmer
who pastures cows on plaintiffs' property explained that the lack of
maintenance would make it difficult for him to reach his cows.  He plows
plaintiffs' driveway past the road and opined that the Town's difficulty in
plowing was due to a new, larger truck.  A forester testified that lack of
maintenance would have a negative impact on recreation and logging activity on
the conserved property.  Finally, the Town's road foreman testified
concerning the practical and safety problems with plowing the road given its
narrow width and steep incline.  He stated that the section could be
plowed by a four-wheel drive pickup truck for $50.  
¶ 5.            
The court, Judge Suntag presiding, denied the motion for stay.  The
court concluded that there was no statutory authority providing for review of
the reclassification and therefore the only jurisdiction for the appeal was
pursuant to Rule 75 in the nature of certiorari.  Applying the stay
factors, the court concluded that: plaintiffs' appeal had little likelihood of
success under this narrow standard; no irreparable injury would result from
denial of a stay; there could be injury to other parties without a stay; and
the interest of the public was not served by issuing a stay.  See Gilbert
v. Gilbert, 163 Vt. 549, 560, 664 A.2d 239, 245 (1995) (setting forth
criteria for stay).  The court also denied plaintiffs' subsequent motion
to reconsider.
¶ 6.            
Plaintiffs then moved for appointment of commissioners to review the
selectboard's decision.  Plaintiffs acknowledged that no statute
explicitly granted de novo review by commissioners of a decision to reclassify
a road from class 3 to class 4, but that "the case law and statutory history
makes clear that this is the appropriate procedure."  The court, Judge
Wesley presiding, denied the motion, concluding that without more specific
direction in the statute, its review was in the nature of certiorari pursuant
to Rule 75.  Hunt v. Vill. of Bristol, 159 Vt. 439, 439-40, 620 A.2d 1266, 1266
(1992) (explaining that review of governmental action is governed by Rule 75
when legislation is silent on method for review).  Under this standard,
the court explained that its task was to determine "whether there is any
competent evidence to justify the adjudication."  Id.
at 441, 620 A.2d  at 1267 (quotation omitted).  Thus, the court held
that it would render a decision limited solely on "the record made before the selectboard . . . [without] additional
evidence."  Following further briefing, the court issued a final decision
in the Town's favor.  The court concluded: "The record as evidenced by the
minutes of the October 21 meeting is more than adequate to uphold the Board's
determination against any charge of the arbitrary exercise of authority." 

¶ 7.            
On appeal, plaintiffs first argue that the superior court erred in
holding that the selectboard's decision was subject to deferential review under
Rule 75 when other decisions regarding the laying out, altering or resurveying
of town highways are subject to de novo review by court-appointed
commissioners. 
¶ 8.            
The necessary procedures for reclassifying a road are defined by
statute, and therefore we begin with a review of the pertinent statutory
sections.  See Sagar v. Warren Selectboard, 170 Vt. 167, 171, 744 A.2d 422, 426 (1999) (explaining that a town's duties "with respect to roads
are entirely statutory").  The process to reclassify a town highway may be
commenced by petition or at the selectboard's own initiation.  19 V.S.A. § 708(a).  After hearing from interested
parties and examining the premises, the selectboard can then reclassify upon a
finding that it is for the "public good, necessity and convenience of the
inhabitants of the municipality."  Id. § 710. 
These sections also apply to laying out or altering of
a road.  The statute further explains that if an interested party "is
dissatisfied with the laying out, altering or resurveying of the highway, or
with the compensation for damages, he or she may appeal, in accordance with
Rule 74 of the Vermont Rules of Civil Procedure, to the superior court," id.
§ 740(a), and the court shall appoint three commissioners "to inquire into
the convenience and necessity of the proposed highway, and the manner in which
it has been laid out, altered or resurveyed," id. § 741.  
¶ 9.            
On two bases, plaintiffs seek to apply the appeal and review procedures
set forth in §§ 740 and 741 to their case even though reclassification is not
enumerated in either section.  First, plaintiffs contend that
reclassification is a method of altering a road and therefore included in the
statute.  Second, according to plaintiffs, "[t]here is
no discernable rationale" for excluding reclassification from the same
processes as for laying out, altering or resurveying.* 
Therefore, plaintiffs urge us to construe the statute to apply the § 740 and §
741 procedures to a selectboard's reclassification decision to avoid what they
deem an absurd or irrational consequence of applying the statute as
written.  See Braun v. Bd. of Dental Exm'rs, 167 Vt. 110, 117, 702 A.2d 124, 128 (1997).  
¶ 10.         When
interpreting a statute, "our obligation is to effectuate the intent of the
Legislature" by first looking at the language of the statute.  Brennan v. Town of Colchester, 169 Vt. 175, 177, 730 A.2d 601, 603 (1999).  We "presume the Legislature intended the plain,
ordinary meaning of the language" and will not read language into a statute
unless "necessary."  Id. (quotations omitted).  When "the statute is unambiguous and the words have plain meaning,
we apply that meaning."  Sagar, 170 Vt. at 171, 744 A.2d  at 426. 
¶ 11.         With
this in mind, we turn to the language of the statute.  The statute sets
forth the types of decisions that are reviewable under Rule 74 and subject to
review by a panel of commissioners.  Significantly, reclassification is
not included in the list.  Therefore, a plain reading of the statute
reveals that the superior court's review is not pursuant to Rule 74 in cases
involving reclassification of a class 3 to class 4 road. 

¶ 12.         We
find no merit to plaintiffs' argument that "altered" includes reclassification.
 While the precursor statute included reclassification in the definition
of alteration, see Whitcomb v. Town of Springfield, 123 Vt. 395, 396,
189 A.2d 550, 551 (1963) (quoting former statute, which defined alteration to
include "a change in the order of a highway, as between open highways, pent
roads and trails"), when the statute was revised, the Legislature decided to
use a different definition of alter and separately defined
reclassification.  The subchapter now defines altered as "a major physical
change in the highway such as a change in width from a single lane to two
lanes."  19 V.S.A. § 701(2). 
Classification of a town highway is not a mandate about the road's physical
appearance, but about its categorization.  This is underscored by the fact
that the same subchapter now separately defines "[c]lassification" as "the
categorization of all town highways."  Id.
§ 701(3).  While plaintiffs argue that the Legislature simply
overlooked adding reclassification to the list of reviewable decisions in
§ 740 after separating it out from altering, they offer no evidence to
support this theory.  Reclassification is not included in § 740, and
therefore we must presume that the Legislature omitted it for a reason.
¶ 13.         We
also reject plaintiffs' argument that we must read the requirement into the
statute to avoid an absurd and irrational result.  We cannot say that it
is wholly irrational for the Legislature to choose to have a different standard
of review for the selectboard's decision to reclassify a town highway than for
the altering, laying out or resurveying of a highway.  All of the latter
decisions implicate a town's eminent domain power because they may require a
taking of land abutting the town highway.  In contrast, downgrading a road
does not involve a taking.  See Whitcomb, 123 Vt. at 399, 189 A.2d  at 553 (explaining that reclassifying a road to a
trail does not involve the condemnation of land).  While there may be
reasons to adopt a different procedure than the one set forth in the statute,
"we must implement the Legislature's policy choice rather than the court's."  Town of Calais v. Cnty.
Rd. Comm'rs, 173 Vt. 620, 624, 795 A.2d 1267, 1271 (2002) (mem.).
 We will not second-guess the Legislature's unambiguous direction by
inserting words into the statute.  
¶ 14.         Therefore,
because the statute in this case was "silent on the mode of review" and did not
affirmatively indicate that the selectboard's decision is final, review by
certiorari through Rule 75 provided the proper procedure for appeal to the
superior court.  Hunt, 159 Vt. at 440, 620 A.2d  at 1266.  In this posture, the court's jurisdiction is usually
confined to reviewing questions of law and consideration of evidentiary
questions is limited to determining "whether there is any competent evidence to
justify the adjudication."  Id. at 441, 620 A.2d 
at 1267 (quotation omitted).
¶ 15.         Plaintiffs
argue that even if review is pursuant to Rule 75, the court erred in denying
their request to supplement the record on appeal.  Review by certiorari
under Rule 75 ordinarily "provides only for review of legal issues," Richards
v. Town of Norwich, 169 Vt. 44, 48, 726 A.2d 81, 84 (1999), and is
therefore usually "restricted to the record" from the administrative
proceeding, Hunt, 159 Vt. at 442, 620 A.2d  at 1268.  See Burroughs
v. W. Windsor Bd. of Sch. Dirs., 141 Vt. 234, 237, 446 A.2d 377, 379-80
(1982) (review in superior court by certiorari is on-the-record and any
deficiency in the factual record requires a remand to the administrative
agency).  We have explained that there may be instances where it would be
proper to take evidence in the context of a Rule 75 appeal.  See Chapin
Hill Estates, Inc. v. Town of Stowe, 131 Vt. 10, 13, 298 A.2d 815, 817
(1972) (noting that "review in the nature of certiorari may not be limited only
to the facts as found in the record").  Generally, however, "judicial
review of administrative decision is deferential absent a clear statement of
contrary intent."  Rhoades Salvage/ABC Metals v. Town of Milton
Selectboard, 2010 VT 82, ¶ 9, 188 Vt. __, 9 A.3d 685 (mem.) (quotation omitted) (applying
deferential standard of review to selectboard's decision denying junkyard
permit to landowner).  "[O]n-the-record review is particularly appropriate
in contested cases where there has been an adjudication
in the agency and where the adjudicative body has special expertise."  Id.
(quotation omitted).  
¶ 16.         Here,
the facts and circumstances of the selectboard's decision favor on-the-record
review.  The statute is silent on the method of review, and the decision
was made following a quasi-judicial procedure by the town selectboard in which
plaintiffs freely participated.  See Hansen v. Town of Charleston,
157 Vt. 329, 335, 597 A.2d 321, 324 (1991) ("[T]he Legislature has placed the
selectmen in a quasi-judicial role to hear classification petitions . . . .").
 Consequently, we conclude that the court's role was simply to determine
if there was adequate evidence to support the selectboard's decision, and the
superior court correctly denied plaintiffs' request to supplement the record on
appeal.  
¶ 17.         Plaintiffs
argue that even under a deferential standard the court's decision is erroneous
and unsupported by the evidence.  As an initial matter, we address
plaintiffs' argument that the court erred in relying on the minutes of the
selectboard's meeting because they were never formally introduced into
evidence.  Plaintiffs have not preserved this claim for appeal because
they failed to object to the court's consideration of the minutes after the
Town appended them to their February 8, 2010 responsive memorandum.  Follo
v. Florindo, 2009 VT 11, ¶ 14, 185 Vt. 390, 970 A.2d 1230 ("In general,
issues not raised at trial are unpreserved, and this Court will not review them
on appeal.").  Further, plaintiffs do not argue that the minutes
misrepresent the evidence submitted at the hearing and therefore fail to show
any prejudice from consideration of them.  Thus, we conclude that the
superior court did not err in considering the minutes.
¶ 18.         As to
the content of the Town's decision, we conclude, like the superior court, that
it is adequately supported by the evidence.  The Town found that Upper
Kirby Hollow Road is too narrow to allow two cars to pass safely and that this
unsafe width has posed a problem for the road crew, requiring them to back down
a narrow, steep section to allow another car to pass.  In addition, the
Town found that the steep incline of the road made snow removal unsafe as
evidenced by the fact that snow removal vehicles have slid off the road. 
This situation has also caused a delay in removing snow from other town
highways.  These findings are all supported by the road foreman's
testimony.  All of these findings in turn support the Town's ultimate
conclusion that it is not in the public good, necessity or convenience to
continue to maintain the road as a class 3 highway.  Plaintiffs argue that
their opinions and evidence should have been weighed more heavily, but the
selectboard did not err in resolving the competing considerations in the manner
that it did.  The decision was within the Town's authority and not
erroneous.  
           
Affirmed.
 
 
BY THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paul L. Reiber, Chief
  Justice
 
 
  
 
 
John A. Dooley, Associate
  Justice
  
 
 
 
 
Denise R. Johnson,
  Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Brian L. Burgess, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 

* 
Plaintiffs also claim that applying a deferential standard in this case would
be inconsistent with our prior cases, which they read as condoning the de novo
procedure of appointing a panel of commissioners to a selectboard's decision
not to reclassify a class 4 to a class 3 road, Hansen v. Town of Charleston,
157 Vt. 329, 597 A.2d 321 (1991), and to reclassify a class 3 road to a trail, King
v. Town of Craftsbury, 2005 VT 86, 178 Vt. 623, 883 A.2d 771 (mem.). 
While these cases proceeded by an appeal to superior court and review by a
panel of commissioners, the issue of the proper scope of the superior court's appellate jurisdiction was not raised in either
case.  Therefore, we do not find them controlling.  Furthermore, Hansen
is distinguishable because the statute specifically explains that
reclassification of a class 4 highway is to be done "using the same procedures
as for laying out highways," 19 V.S.A. § 310(b), and the decision relied on
this language.  There is no parallel directive for reclassification of a
class 3 road.