Case Title: Pawlowski v. Pawlowski

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-10-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Pawlowski v. Pawlowski1996 WY 143925 P.2d 240Case Number: 95-275Decided: 10/22/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
Betty Lou Frances PAWLOWSKI,

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Lawrence Harry PAWLOWSKI, 

Appellee 
(Defendant).

Appeal from District 
Court, Natrona County, Dan Spangler, J.

William D. 
Hjelmstad, Casper, for Appellant.

Larry R. Clapp 
of Clapp and Associates and Keith R. Nachbar, Casper, for 
Appellee.

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN,* and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

LEHMAN, Justice.

[¶1]      In a divorce 
action filed in a multi-judge district, the parties learned of the assigned 
judge only when the case was set for trial. Four days later, appellant filed a 
motion for peremptory disqualification, which was denied by the assigned judge 
as untimely.

[¶2]      We 
reverse.

ISSUE

[¶3]      While appellant 
sets forth numerous alleged errors during the course of this divorce action and 
trial, there is but one determinative issue:

Did the court commit 
error in denying the Motion for Peremptory Disqualification of judge under 
W.R.C.P. 40.1(b)(1)?

FACTS

[¶4]      Appellant filed a 
divorce complaint in Wyoming's Seventh Judicial District, which is served by two 
district court judges. The day after the complaint was filed, one of the judges 
signed two ex parte orders based on the allegations in the verified complaint. 
Following appellee's answer being filed, the second judge signed two stipulated 
orders, as well as an order for mediation. Eventually appellant requested a 
trial setting; and, by the Notice of Setting signed by the district court's 
administrative assistant, the parties were advised which judge would preside at 
the trial. Four days later, appellant properly filed and served a Motion for 
Peremptory Disqualification pursuant to W.R.C.P. 40.1(b)(1) with a proposed 
order granting the motion.

[¶5]      The sole response 
to the Motion for Peremptory Disqualification was the judge's handwritten 
notation attached to the proposed order advising the appellant that the motion 
was "not timely." No formal order was entered until after this appeal was filed. 
Discovery continued and a trial was held. After the trial, appellant filed a 
Motion for New Trial and Motion to Amend Judgment, which was denied without 
hearing. This timely appeal followed.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶6]      The dispositive 
question for our review is whether the district court judge had subject matter 
jurisdiction after appellant filed the Motion for Peremptory Disqualification. 
We conduct a de novo review of jurisdictional questions pursuant to "the 
inherent power, and the duty, to address jurisdictional defects on appeal. . . 
." Gookin v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 826 P.2d 229, 232 (Wyo. 1992); 
see also Global Shipping & Trading, Ltd. v. Verkhnesaldincky Metallurgic 
Co., 892 P.2d 143, 146 (Wyo. 1995). If a lower court acts without jurisdiction, 
"this court will notice the defect and have jurisdiction on appeal, not on the 
merits, but merely for the purpose of correcting the error of the lower court in 
maintaining the suit." Gookin, at 232. In this case, our initial inquiry must be 
whether the requisites of W.R.C.P. 40.1(b)(1) were met and whether such 
compliance appears on the record. Id., at 234-35. If so, we must then determine 
whether appellant waived her right to invoke the rule.

DISCUSSION

[¶7]      The provision 
setting forth the mandatory procedures to exercise a peremptory disqualification 
of a judge in a civil case is W.R.C.P. 40.1(b)(1). The portions of that rule 
which govern the procedures for plaintiff (appellant herein) provide as 
follows:

(b) Change of 
judge.

(1)       Peremptory 
Disqualification. - A district judge may be peremptorily disqualified from 
acting in a case by the filing of a motion requesting that the judge be so 
disqualified. The motion designating the judge to be disqualified shall be filed 
by the plaintiff within five days after the complaint is filed; provided, that 
in multi-judge districts, the plaintiff must file the motion to disqualify 
the judge within five days after the name of the assigned judge has been 
provided by a representative of the court to counsel for plaintiff by personal 
advice at the courthouse, telephone call, or a mailed notice.

(Emphasis 
added.)

[¶8]      The undisputed 
record clearly reflects that the mandates of the rule were followed. The notice 
of setting was the first notification to the parties' counsel, by a 
representative of the court, naming the judge assigned to preside over the case. 
Just as clear is that the motion for peremptory disqualification was properly 
filed with the court within five days after the notice of trial setting and was 
served upon appellee. The position of appellee, however, is that appellant 
waived her right to peremptorily disqualify the judge both before and after 
filing her motion.

[¶9]      We first address 
the assertion that appellant's failure to comply with procedural rules after 
filing her motion constitutes a waiver of her jurisdictional claim. Appellee 
argues that appellant failed to request a hearing, pursuant to W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2) 
and "local practice," and failed to provide notice of the denial of the 
peremptory challenge pursuant to W.R.C.P. 5 and 58. Appellee further contends 
that appellant's failure to comply with W.R.A.P. 2.07(b)(2) and 7.01 precludes 
consideration of jurisdictional issues by this court. Appellee's procedural 
claims, however, do not withstand the jurisdictional reality of a motion for 
peremptory disqualification. 

[O]nce a proper motion 
for change of judge has been filed, the district judge concerning whom the 
motion is made is divested of all jurisdiction except for residual 
authority to assign the case to another district judge.

Osborne v. 
District Court of Ninth Judicial Dist., 654 P.2d 124, 127 (Wyo. 1982) (emphasis 
added). The record reflects that a proper motion for change of judge was filed. 
This is the triggering event which divested the district court of subject matter 
jurisdiction.

[¶10]   The failure by appellant to 
memorialize the district court's handwritten denial of the motion by way of 
formal order is unfortunate and would have provided a more precise record. 
However, it is well established that, unlike personal jurisdiction, subject 
matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. Cotton v. Brow, 903 P.2d 530, 531 (Wyo. 
1995); Brunsvold v. State, 864 P.2d 34, 36 (Wyo. 1993).

The first and fundamental 
question on every appeal is that of jurisdiction; this question cannot be 
waived; it is open for consideration by the reviewing court whenever it is 
raised by any party, or it may be raised by the court of its own 
motion.

Gookin, 826 P.2d  
at 232 (quoting Gardner v. Walker, 373 P.2d 598, 599 (Wyo. 1962)). Consequently, 
even though appellant's procedural omissions may be cause for comment, they did 
not confer subject matter jurisdiction on the district court judge after a 
proper motion for peremptory disqualification was filed.

[¶11]   We turn now to appellee's 
contention that appellant waived her right to file a peremptory disqualification 
when she accepted the judge's jurisdiction to sign ex parte orders immediately 
after the complaint was filed. Appellee appears to contend that once appellant 
recognized the judge's authority to act on any matter in the case, she waived 
her right to peremptorily disqualify the same judge for any other part of the 
proceeding. We perceive several problems with this argument.

[¶12]   First, appellee ignores the fact 
that the other district judge also signed several orders prior to notice of 
assignment of the case. In essence, appellee seeks approval of a rule which 
would require an attorney to speculate as to which of two judges eventually will 
be assigned to a case, and then to immediately file a motion for peremptory 
disqualification based on that speculation. This we will not do. As noted by the 
Montana supreme court: "It is for circumstances such as these that this Court 
requires that an attorney of record have knowledge of the judge assigned to the 
case . . . before the right to disqualify the judge is lost." In re 
Marriage of Peabody, 179 Mont. 98, 586 P.2d 304, 306 (1978) (emphasis added). No 
litigant has the authority to assign a judge to a case in a multi-judge 
district, and the court's failure to timely assign a judge as contemplated under 
the rule should not operate as a vehicle to deprive a litigant of a right to a 
peremptory challenge.

[¶13]   Of more interest is appellee's 
reference to the possibility of mischief when the language of W.R.C.P. 
40.1(b)(1) is applied to a litigant who has permitted, without challenge, a 
judge to hear and rule on evidence substantially material to the subsequent 
trial and then, after formal assignment, attempts to disqualify that judge on 
the basis of the prior ruling. See State v. Neil, 102 Ariz. 110, 425 P.2d 842 
(1967). In Osborne, we noted the legal principle that "a party cannot utilize a 
motion to change a judge as a means of picking and choosing between judges after 
he or she is given an impression of the court's view on the matter in dispute." 
654 P.2d  at 127. We recognize that there are legitimate concerns regarding the 
potential for abuse of the rule. Therefore, balancing these concerns with the 
realities of practice, we hold that a party may waive the right to invoke a 
peremptory disqualification before notice by the court of an assignment when a 
party allows a judge to determine substantive material issues in the case to be 
set for trial.

[¶14]   Even so, these circumstances are 
not present in this case. The record does not disclose any contested hearings 
having been held or evidence otherwise presented which resulted in a decision 
made by either judge regarding substantive material issues in the case to be set 
for trial. As result, appellant did not waive her right to invoke the peremptory 
disqualification of the district judge pursuant to W.R.C.P. 40.1(b)(1). 

CONCLUSION

[¶15]   Individualized practices in the 
assignment of judges in multi-judge districts do not alter a litigant's right to 
intelligently and knowingly exercise peremptory challenges. In this case, the 
assignment of the judge was made pursuant to the requirements of W.R.C.P. 
40.1(b)(1) when the litigants received the notice of a trial setting naming the 
presiding judge. While ex parte orders were issued by more than one judge in 
pretrial matters, none involved the consideration of evidence material to the 
issues to be determined at trial. Appellant timely filed the motion for 
peremptory disqualification within five days after learning of the judge who 
would preside at trial. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the district court 
and remand this case for disposition in accordance with our ruling.