Case Title: Waltman v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 661, 2006

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-03-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
WILLIAM WALTMAN,
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No. 661, 2006
Defendant Below, 
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Appellant,
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Court Below–Superior Court
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of the State of Delaware in and
v.
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for Sussex County
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STATE OF DELAWARE,
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Plaintiff Below,
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Cr. ID No. 0211004458
Appellee.
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Submitted: December 22, 2006
Decided:
March 14, 2007
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices.
O R D E R
This 14  day of March 2007, upon consideration of the opening brief
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filed by the appellant and the  motion to affirm filed by the appellee pursuant
to Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The appellant, William Waltman, appeals the Superior Court’s
denial of his pro se motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court
Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61").  The State of Delaware has moved to affirm the
judgment of the Superior Court on the ground that it is manifest on the face of
Waltman’s opening brief that this appeal is without merit.  We agree and
affirm.
Trial Tr. at 3 (Mar. 21, 2003).
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(2)
In 2002, Waltman was charged by information with several felony
offenses, including Robbery in the First Degree and Carjacking in the First
Degree.  Waltman pleaded not guilty to the charges; the Superior Court
scheduled final case review and trial for the following March 2003.
(3)
At the March 19, 2003 final case review, Waltman, through his
assistant public defender (“defense counsel”), requested a continuance to
consider a plea offer.  The presiding judge granted Waltman’s request and
continued case review for two days, that is until Friday, March 21, 2003.
(4)
At the final case review on Friday, March 21, 2003, defense
counsel requested a continuance of the trial, which was scheduled to begin the
following Monday, March 24, 2003.  Defense counsel explained that the day
before Waltman had retained a private attorney to represent him at trial;
however, the private attorney could undertake representation only if the trial
was continued.
(5)
The prosecution opposed a trial continuance, arguing that Waltman
had “had four months to figure out the counsel situation.”   The Superior Court
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denied the continuance request.
Trial Tr. at 3 (Mar. 24, 2003).
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Id. at 4.
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Waltman argued that “under the totality of the circumstances” the Superior Court’s
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refusal to grant a trial continuance was an abuse of discretion and a violation of his
constitutional right to counsel.  See Stevenson v. State, 709 A.2d 619, 630-31 (Del. 1998)
(reviewing denial of continuance on the eve of trial).
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(6)
Waltman proceeded to trial as scheduled on Monday, March 24,
2003.  That morning, Waltman’s private attorney  (“private counsel”) appeared
before the trial judge to “re-request” a continuance on Waltman’s behalf.2
Private counsel explained that a federal district court matter had prevented him
from attending final case review, but he assured the trial judge that he was
willing and able to undertake Waltman’s representation provided that the trial
was continued.  The trial judge denied private counsel’s “re-request” for a
continuance, ruling that he would not “revisit an issue that was ruled upon by
the Court two days ago.”3
(7)
Defense counsel represented Waltman at trial.  At the conclusion
of the trial, the jury found Waltman guilty of all charges except for Vehicular
Assault in the Second Degree.
(8)
Private counsel represented Waltman on direct appeal.  Waltman
argued in the direct appeal that the Superior Court erred when it denied private
counsel’s request for a trial continuance.   By order dated December 30, 2003,
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Waltman v. State, 2003 WL 23104199 (Del. Supr.).
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The opening brief consists of a photocopy of Waltman’s postconviction motion
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prefaced with a revised cover page and one “amendment” page.  The Court notes that
Waltman’s appellate arguments rely in large part on federal case law that has been
overturned.  See United States v. D’Amore, 56 F.3d 1202 (9  Cir. 1995), overruled by United
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States v. Garrett, 179 F.3d 1143 (9  Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 978 (1999).
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this Court rejected the argument and affirmed the judgment of the Superior
Court.5
(9)
In his pro se postconviction motion, Waltman once again argues
that the Superior Court erred in denying the  request for a trial continuance.  By
order dated November 28, 2006, the Superior Court denied Waltman’s claim
under the procedural bar of Rule 61(i)(4) because his claim was formerly
adjudicated in the direct appeal.  This appeal followed.
(10)
In his opening brief before this Court, Waltman continues to argue
that the denial of a trial continuance violated his constitutional rights.  We find
it manifest on the face of the opening brief that the Superior Court’s denial of
postconviction relief should be affirmed.   Waltman argued this issue on direct
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See Waltman v. State, 2003 WL 23104199 (Del. Supr.) (applying Stevenson factors
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and concluding that the denial of a continuance on eve of trial was not an abuse of
discretion).
See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4) (2007) (procedurally barring adjudicated
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claims unless reconsideration is warranted in the interest of justice).
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appeal without success  and he has not demonstrated that reconsideration of the
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claim is warranted in the interest of justice.8
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 25(a), the  motion to affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/Henry duPont Ridgely
Justice