Case Title: Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Briggs

Citation: 2000-Ohio-441

Docket Number: 19991576

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2000-05-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Briggs, 89 Ohio St.3d 74, 2000-Ohio-441.] 
 
 
 
 
 
CLEVELAND BAR ASSOCIATION v. BRIGGS. 
[Cite as Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Briggs (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 74.] 
Attorneys at law — Misconduct — One-year suspension stayed, with probation 
and monitoring — Engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, 
or misrepresentation — Failing to act competently in a legal matter. 
(No. 99-1576 — Submitted January 11, 2000 — Decided May 24, 2000.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners and Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 98-34. 
 
On June 8, 1998, relator, Cleveland Bar Association, filed a complaint 
charging respondent, Beverly M. Briggs of Bedford, Ohio, Attorney Registration 
No. 0022754, with several violations of the Disciplinary Rules.  Respondent 
answered and the matter was submitted on joint stipulations to a panel of the Board 
of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court (“board”). 
 
The panel found that in November 1991, respondent, who was a friend of the 
Conte family, became trustee of the Ralph W. Conte Trust (“trust”), an inter vivos 
trust with Ralph Conte’s wife, Mary Jane (known as “Sharon”), and his children, 
Nichole and Ralph, Jr., as beneficiaries.  In August 1993, respondent, at the 
insistence of Sharon, filed incorporation papers for a company called Raphael’s 
Inc., and named herself as the sole incorporator and the statutory agent.  Around 
 
 
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the same time, Sharon executed a power of attorney in favor of respondent.  In 
September 1993, Sharon, Cathy Turay, Raphael’s Inc., and respondent, in her 
individual capacity, agreed to purchase real estate in Garfield Heights, Ohio, 
together with a restaurant and tavern located on the premises. 
 
In March 1994, the trust received $425,000 as a result of the liquidation of 
Florida real estate, and in May 1994, respondent caused Raphael’s Inc. to issue one 
hundred shares of common stock, fifty of which were distributed to Cathy Turay, 
twenty-five to respondent in her individual capacity, and twenty-five to the trust.  
On behalf of the trust, respondent paid $18,138.69 to Raphael’s Inc.  Respondent 
also paid $85,719.12 to Raphael’s Inc. from trust funds, noting that this latter 
payment was a “distribution” to Sharon. 
 
Respondent claimed that at all times she held stock and made investments, 
not in her own name, but on behalf of Sharon in order to prevent Sharon’s creditors 
from attaching Sharon’s property.  Nonetheless, the Probate Court of Cuyahoga 
County, in removing respondent as trustee and awarding damages against her, 
found that respondent had engaged in self-dealing and so violated her fiduciary 
duty as trustee. 
 
The panel concluded that in signing documents personally and in filing them 
with the Secretary of State indicating that she was the sole incorporator of 
Raphael’s Inc., respondent violated DR 1-102(A)(4) (engaging in conduct 
 
 
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involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) and 6-101(A)(1) 
(handling a legal matter which she knows she is not competent to handle). 
 
The panel heard substantial mitigating evidence to the effect that respondent 
did not profit from her conduct, that respondent was acting not for her own 
personal gain but as a friend to Sharon to whom she could not say “no,” and that 
respondent had a long and honorable career as an attorney and as a person active in 
political, cultural, and charitable events in her community.  Nevertheless, the panel 
found that respondent’s conduct relating to Raphael’s Inc., and her attempt to 
shield Sharon from the claims of  creditors, warranted an actual suspension from 
the practice of law for six months. 
 
The board adopted the findings and conclusions of the panel, but 
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year, 
with six months of the year stayed, and then be placed on probation. 
__________________ 
 
Leon A. Weiss and Patti Jo Malnar, for relator. 
 
John J. Montello, for respondent. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  We adopt the findings and conclusions of the board.  As we 
said in Warren Cty. Bar Assn. v. Bunce (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 112, 115, 689 
N.E.2d 566, 568,  “When imposing a sanction, we will consider not only the duty 
 
 
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violated, but the lawyer’s mental state, the actual injury caused, and whether 
mitigating factors exist.”   Based on our review of the record and noting that 
respondent has already been censured by the probate court, we suspend respondent 
from the practice of law for one year, with the entire year stayed.  During the year 
of stayed suspension respondent shall be on probation and her legal practice 
monitored by an attorney selected by and reporting regularly to the relator.  Costs 
are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., 
concur. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and COOK, J., dissent. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J., dissenting.  I agree with the majority that suspension is the 
appropriate sanction here, but I respectfully depart from the majority’s decision to 
stay the entire suspension in favor of supervised probation. 
 
The majority’s decision to suspend respondent finds support in the ABA 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.1  When respondent filed documents 
with the Secretary of State indicating that she was the sole incorporator of 
Raphael’s Inc., she engaged in conduct involving fraud, dishonesty, deceit, or 
misrepresentation.  Respondent also handled a legal matter that she knew she was 
 
 
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not competent to handle.  The ABA Standards provide that “[i]n order to protect 
the public, a suspension should be imposed in cases when a lawyer engages in 
practice areas in which a lawyer knows that he or she is not competent.”  Standard 
4.52, Commentary. 
 
Citing “substantial” mitigating evidence, the majority chooses to depart from 
the board’s recommendation and to stay respondent’s entire suspension.  I agree 
that respondent’s lack of a dishonest or selfish motive, cooperative attitude toward 
the disciplinary proceedings, censure by the probate court, and honorable 
reputation are mitigating factors that reflect the board’s own recently proposed 
Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.2  And due to these mitigating factors, I 
would stay six months of respondent’s suspension.  Nevertheless, I concur with the 
panel’s recommendation that “any sanction which [does] not include some actual 
suspension from the practice of law would send the wrong message to the rest of 
the Bar and to the public in general.”  The panel’s approach reflects the ABA’s 
position that “[i]f a lawyer’s misconduct is serious enough to warrant a suspension 
from practice, the lawyer should not be reinstated until rehabilitation can be 
established. * * * [I]t is preferable to suspend a lawyer for at least six months in 
order to ensure effective demonstration of rehabilitation.”  Standard 2.3, 
Commentary. 
 
 
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Because I believe that the board’s recommended one-year suspension with 
six months stayed is the appropriate sanction in this case, I respectfully dissent. 
 
MOYER, C.J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
FOOTNOTES: 
 
1. 
See ABA Center for Professional Responsibility, Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991 & Amend.1992). 
 
2. 
See Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline, Proposed 
Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings, Sections 
10(B)(2), (4), (5), and (6), Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.