Case Title: Bowing v. Board of Trustees

Citation: 534 P.2d 1365, 85 Wash. 2d 300

Docket Number: 43380

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1975-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
85 Wn.2d 300 (1975) 534 P.2d 1365 SHIRLEY BOWING, Respondent, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF GREEN RIVER COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT NO. X, Petitioner. No. 43380. The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. May 1, 1975. ROSELLINI, J. This matter is before the court upon the granting of petitions of both parties for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, Division One, in Bowing v. Board of Trustees, 11 Wn. App. 33, 521 P.2d 220 (1974). It is a suit by a tenured faculty member, alleging that she was wrongfully discharged and seeking reinstatement. The Superior Court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, holding that prescribed procedures had not been followed by the Board of Trustees of the college and that she had consequently been denied due process of law. The procedures followed are set forth in some detail in the opinion of the Court of Appeals, which reversed and remanded the case, and we will refer only to those which are involved in the issues before us. At the superior court level, a partial summary judgment was entered on May 12, 1972. That judgment left open the question of damages and the amount of reasonable attorney fees, the court stating that unless the parties could stipulate as to the amounts, the facts would have to be established in open court. Four days later a judgment was entered, setting forth the amount of damages and the attorney fees allowed. The defendant appealed within 30 days of that judgment. *302 However, the appeal was taken more than 30 days after the entry of the partial summary judgment on May 12. The plaintiff moved in the Court of Appeals to dismiss the appeal because it was not taken within 30 days after the partial summary judgment was entered, citing ROA I-33. This motion was denied without comment. She asks this court to review the Court of Appeals' refusal to dismiss, contending that that court was without jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The plaintiff's contention in this regard is grounded upon the theory that the partial summary judgment entered on May 12 was a final judgment, even though the amount of damages and attorney fees had not yet been determined. She relies upon CR 54 (b), which provides: [1] It will be seen that a partial judgment is final only when there is a final judgment upon one or more claims. The plaintiff's claim in this case was not fully adjudicated until the amount of damages had been determined, including the attorney fees, which the court awarded as an element of damages. The plaintiffs insists, however, that the defendant could have taken an appeal from the partial judgment and left the amount of damages and fees to be determined in a separate proceeding. Such a procedure would produce the very mischief which the rule was designed *303 to prevent the piecemeal trial and appeal of cases. The partial summary judgment was not a final judgment as to any claim or any party and therefore was not appealable under CR 54(b). Since the appeal was taken within 30 days after the entry of final judgment, the Court of Appeals did not err in refusing to dismiss it. Two questions which the Court of Appeals decided merit this court's attention. Error as to one of them is raised by the plaintiff, and review of the other is sought by the defendant. Both of these concern the interpretation of procedural rules involved in the administrative process. Pursuant to RCW 28B.50.863, providing for a hearing by a review committee before dismissal of a tenured faculty member, RCW 28B.50.852, requiring the Board of Trustees to establish rules implementing the tenure statutes, and Green River Community College dismissal rule B12, a hearing was conducted before a committee, which found the two charges against the plaintiff to be unsubstantiated. The matter was then heard before the board, which reviewed the written record and listened to arguments of counsel. The board concurred with the review committee that one charge had not been proven, but remanded the case for reconsideration of the second charge, in accordance with the college's rule B12, pointing out certain evidence which it felt substantiated the second charge. The review committee, after reconsideration, adhered to its original position. The board then overruled the committee's findings and dismissed the plaintiff, a disposition also authorized by rule B12. In reviewing this procedure, the Superior Court was called upon to interpret the statutes and rule referred to above. It construed these as placing exclusive fact-finding power in the review committee. The Court of Appeals reversed this holding, finding that the Board of Trustees was not bound by the review committee's findings. The plaintiff has asked this court to reinstate the judgment of the Superior Court upon this point. *304 [2] We are of the opinion that the Court of Appeals correctly construed the applicable statutes and the rule promulgated by the college. RCW 28B.50.863 provides that the review committee shall hear the evidence and shall prepare and submit recommendations to the appointing authority (the Board of Trustees). Rule B12 provides for reconsideration by the committee if the board does not agree with its recommendation and provides that only after such reconsideration should the board make a final decision overruling the review committee. RCW 28B.50.864 provides that an appeal may be taken from the final decision of the board. Furthermore, RCW 28B.50.864, which authorizes a judicial review of a board's decision to dismiss, expressly adopted (at the time of the hearings involved in this action)[1] the provisions of the administrative procedure act, RCW 34.04. RCW 34.04.110 requires that board members personally consider the record and also requires that the board (the "officials who are to render the decision") shall make findings of fact. All of these considerations were noted by the Court of Appeals in reaching the decision that the board was not bound by the findings of the review committee (which in this case were negative in nature). We find that decision to be in accord with the manifest intent of the statutes and of the rule adopted by the college. It is also in accord with the general rule. See 2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law § 438 (1962). Based upon its holding that the board had acted within its authority when it rejected the review committee's finding that the charges were not substantiated in the record, the Court of Appeals set aside the summary judgment. However, it sustained the trial court's holding that the board had failed to follow the requirements of RCW 34.04.110, and ordered the case remanded to the board with directions to afford the plaintiff an opportunity to be heard *305 after serving her with a proposal for decision, including findings of fact and conclusions of law. The defendant has asked the court to review this aspect of the decision of the Court of Appeals. It is acknowledged that our decision will not affect future proceedings in institutions of higher education, since the administrative procedure act no longer applies to them. Nevertheless, the rights of the parties in this case are affected, and amicus has urged the court to review the decision because it will have an effect upon the proceedings of many other administrative bodies. RCW 34.04.110 provides: The record shows that in this case not only did all the members of the board read the evidence which was presented to the review committee, but in addition they held a hearing and listened to arguments of counsel after they had read the record of the hearing. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff had been denied due process because her counsel was not given another opportunity to argue the case after the committee, on remand, had adhered to its original findings and recommendation with respect to the second charge. The Court of Appeals found the language of RCW 34.04.110 ambiguous and interpreted it as requiring that findings of fact, conclusions of law and a proposal for decision be submitted to the parties in any case where a majority *306 of the decision making officials have not heard the oral testimony, even though they may have read the record of that testimony. The rationale of the court is set forth in the following paragraph: Bowing v. Board of Trustees, 11 Wn. App. 33, 41, 521 P.2d 220 (1974). The court further reasoned that the statute must be read in the light of rule B12, which requires the board to return the proceedings to the committee for reconsideration if it does not agree with the committee's findings and recommendations, and can overrule the committee only after such remand. It concluded that due process required that the parties have an opportunity to reargue the matter after such a remand, in order for them to have a hearing at a meaningful time. Following this line of reasoning, it interpreted the provisions of RCW 34.04.110 not only to require that the board submit findings, conclusions and proposal for decision to the parties if it has not heard the testimony, but also to require that this be done after the board has returned the proceedings to the committee for reconsideration and has received its response. In reaching this conclusion, the court made no reference *307 to any of the authorities which have construed RCW 34.04.110. This provision, as well as most of the language of RCW 34.04, is taken from the model act proposed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association in 1946. See Model State Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 9C U.L.A. (1957), Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act (1961), 9C U.L.A. Cum. Supp. § 11 (1967). In the annotation, the provision is entitled "Examination of evidence by Agency." At page 177, the commissioners explain the purpose of this section as follows: The model act was revised in 1961. In this revision the phrase "heard or read the evidence" was changed to "heard the case or read the record." The commissioners' note declares: The plaintiff readily concedes that under this revision, the submission to the parties of findings and conclusions and proposal for decision is not necessary if the deciding officials, though not being present at the taking of oral testimony, have read the record. She maintains, however, that the revision was made with the intent to effect a substantial change in the provision. She points to no evidence that problems had arisen under the 1946 language, which made a change seem necessary and desirable, and cites no case construing the original language to mean that the deciding officials must submit findings, conclusions and proposal for decision in any case in which they have not listened to the oral testimony. *308 Militating against the plaintiff's interpretation of this revision is the absence of any language in the commissioners' note calling attention to a significant change in the wording of the provision. In the notes to other revisions in the model act, the commissioners consistently point out substantial changes. See notes to § 2, p. 145; § 3, p. 147; § 4, p. 148; § 6, p. 149; § 9, p. 151; § 10, p. 153; § 14, p. 157, and § 15, p. 159. Since it was the commissioners' practice to call attention to significant changes, it can be assumed that the changes in the wording of section 10 of the 1946 act were made for purposes of clarification rather than to manifest an intent to change the procedures required under this section. It appears that no court had construed the language as meaning anything other than that deciding officials who have not heard the testimony must either read the record of it or submit their proposed decision to the parties. See 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 11.02 (1958), stating the prevailing rule to be, even in the absence of the uniform act, that the deciding officer need not have heard the testimony if he has read or considered the evidence. See also 2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law §§ 435-39 (1962). See also 2 F. Cooper, State Administrative Law, ch. 13, § 3 (1965). At page 445 the treatise states: At page 452 the treatise declares: Discussing the approach of the revised model act, the treatise states, at pages 460-61: (Footnote omitted.) The authors of the treatise observe, at page 462, that the original model state act, with regard to the provision in question, embraces the same theory and philosophy as the revised model act. [3] We cannot conclude, upon the evidence before us, that it was the intent of the commissioners, in changing the words "heard or read the evidence" to "heard the case or read the record" to impose upon the deciding officers, if they are to avoid the necessity of submitting a proposed decision, a lighter duty than was imposed by the 1946 model act. Indeed, if anything, the burden upon the officer is greater under the new act, for the "record" includes many things which are not strictly "evidence." It contains motions, pleadings, proposed findings, exceptions, decisions, reports all of the proceedings in fact. RCW 34.04.090. The Court of Appeals appears to have overlooked this fact when it concluded that the legislature would have used the word "record" rather than the word "evidence" if it had intended to refer to a written account of the verbal testimony. A reading of the entire record was evidently not within the legislative contemplation, but rather a reading of the evidence. The two terms are not synonymous. RCW 34.04.110 phrases the requirement in the disjunctive "heard or read." The Court of Appeals construed it in the conjunctive "heard and read." Considered in the light of the realities of administrative practice and the expressed *311 intent of the drafters of the act, as well as the authorities which have discussed this subject, we cannot find that the provision is ambiguous. It is unnecessary to serve upon the parties findings, conclusions and proposal for decision if the deciding officials have either heard or read the evidence. This is the correct view of the meaning of the section according to E. Blythe Stason,[2] writing for a symposium on the Model Administrative Procedure Act in 33 Iowa L. Rev. 196, at 206 (1948). This interpretation of the provision also is consistent with the college's understanding of its duty as evidenced by its rule B12, promulgated as a part of its Policies and Procedures for Tenure and Dismissal, which were developed with faculty cooperation and approval. This rule does not provide for the board's issuance of a proposal for decision. Instead it requires the board to review the record of the hearing and to resubmit the case to the review committee, if it disagrees with its findings and recommendation, and to obtain the benefit of its reconsideration of the matters in question before making a decision to overrule the committee. The apparent purpose of this procedural step is to make sure that the board will have thoroughly explored the matter before overruling the committee. We are advised by the Attorney General, filing an amicus brief on behalf of all State agencies, that such agencies have consistently interpreted the act as giving to officials who have not heard the testimony but whose responsibility it is to decide a contested case, the option to either read the evidence or to serve their findings and conclusions and proposal for decision upon the parties and give them an opportunity to present exceptions and arguments. The plaintiff points out that this fact is not shown in the record of this case; however, she does not claim that proof exists to the contrary. In any event, we do not rest our decision *312 upon the administrative construction, but upon the plain meaning of the language contained in the provision. We also are compelled to disagree with the interpretation which the Court of Appeals placed upon the word "consider," as used in this act. That court was of the opinion that, in order to consider the record, it is necessary for a deciding official to read it. Authority for this proposition is not cited in the opinion or in the plaintiff's brief. Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. rev. 1968) gives this definition of "consider": "To fix the mind on, with a view to careful examination; to examine; to inspect." According to Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1968), to consider is "to reflect on: think about with a degree of care or caution ..." Synonyms are reflect, deliberate, ponder. According to the cases cited in 2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law § 439 (1962), the rule that the one who decides must hear by considering and appraising the evidence taken otherwise than in his presence does not preclude practical administrative procedure in obtaining the aid of assistants in the agency. They may prosecute inquiries, take evidence, and sift and analyze the same. The encyclopedia states, at page 249: (Footnotes omitted.) It is evident, therefore, that the word "consider" was *313 used advisedly in RCW 34.04.110 and was not an inadvertent substitute for the word "read." [4] Does our construction of the statute result in a denial of due process of law? We are convinced that it does not. The plaintiff's citations of authority regarding the right to procedural due process in administrative hearings establish the principle that a person may not be deprived of a protected right unless he is first given notice and an opportunity to be heard. But none of them supports the proposition that a party is entitled to a hearing at every stage of the proceedings. The United States Supreme Court has said, in Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152, 85 L. Ed. 624, 61 S. Ct. 524 (1941): Here, the plaintiff was afforded an opportunity to present evidence and arguments before the review committee, where she was represented by counsel. She was again afforded a hearing before the Board of Trustees, after all of its members had read the evidence and before they made their decision. She is now pursuing her further statutory remedy of judicial review. While she contends that she might have been able to sway the board, had she been given an opportunity to argue before it a second time, she does not point to any argument that could have been made that was not available to her or that was not, in fact, made at the hearing which was held. The plaintiff has shown no constitutional flaw in the administrative process. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, insofar as it held that the Board of Trustees had failed to comply with the requirements of RCW 34.04.110 and implied that its provisions, if otherwise construed, are unconstitutional. In all other respects, the decision is affirmed. *314 The cause is remanded to the Superior Court with directions to proceed with the review of the order of dismissal. STAFFORD, C.J., FINLEY, HUNTER, HAMILTON, WRIGHT, UTTER, and BRACHTENBACH, JJ., and HANNAN, J. Pro Tem., concur. [1] RCW 34.04 no longer applies to educational institutions of higher learning, which are now covered by the State Higher Education Administrative Procedure Act, RCW 28B.19. [2] A.B., 1913, University of Wisconsin; S.B., 1916, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; J.D., 1912, University of Michigan. Chairman of the Special Committee on the Model State Administrative Procedure Act; Member of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure. Dean and Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.