Case Title: Tibbetts v. Michaelides

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2010-349

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2011-05-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
2011 VT 52













Tibbetts v. Michaelides
and Waibel (2010-349)
 
2011 VT 52
 
[Filed 16-May-2011]
 
ENTRY ORDER
 
2011 VT 52
 
SUPREME COURT
  DOCKET NO. 2010-349
 
FEBRUARY TERM, 2011
 
Jonathan Tibbetts
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APPEALED FROM:
 
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     v.
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Superior Court, Chittenden Unit,
  
 
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Civil Division
Demetrios
  Michaelides, Alexandria Michaelides,
  Erwin Waibel and 
Ramona Waibel 
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}
}
 
 
DOCKET NO. S1201-06 CnC
 
 
 
 
 
Trial Judge:  Helen M. Toor
 
In the above-entitled
cause, the Clerk will enter:
 
¶ 1.     
In this dispute between neighboring landowners, defendants appeal from a
superior court order rejecting their claim that plaintiffs violated a deed
restriction limiting the number of houses to be constructed on the
property.  Among other claims, defendants contend the trial court erred in
concluding that they lacked standing to enforce the restriction.  We
affirm.
¶ 2.     
The undisputed material facts may be summarized as follows.  In December
1977, Lydia Lowell and several related owners (hereafter "Lowell") conveyed two
parcels of land totaling five acres  to J. Peter Trono.  The deed described Parcel I as consisting of
4.70 acres with an eastern border along Brigham Road, which is located in the Bartletts Bay area of the City of South Burlington. 
Parcel II was described as containing 0.3 acres situated on the opposite side
of Brigham Road from Parcel I.  The deed recited that the conveyance was
subject to certain "rights in favor others," notably a right-of-way over a
footpath for the use of other Camp Bartlett property owners to access Lake
Champlain, and granted certain other rights, specifically use of the "aforesaid
footpath" to the lake as well the use, in common with others, of a strip of
land along the lake "for purposes of bathing and the storage of one
dinghy."  In addition, the deed provided: 
It
is a condition of this conveyance that the style and design of houses
constructed upon the lands hereby conveyed shall be compatible and harmonious
with the style and design of present houses in the general area and that no
more than five single-family houses shall be constructed upon the lands hereby
conveyed, this being the maximum number of houses
permitted by the South Burlington zoning ordinance presently in effect.  
           
¶ 3.      In July 1978, Trono conveyed the two parcels by quitclaim deed to his
construction company, Trono Construction, Inc., which
obtained approval for a five-lot residential subdivision on the west side of
Brigham road.  Trono subsequently sold all five
lots for the construction of homes, including two to defendants (hereafter
"neighbors").  Trono failed to pay property
taxes on the small parcel located on the east side of Brigham Road, and it was
sold at a tax sale to Ronald Charlebois.  In
July 2002, Charlebois conveyed the property to
plaintiffs, who then applied to the City for a variance to allow them to
construct a house on the lot that was otherwise too small to meet setback
requirements.  The City granted the variance, and plaintiffs constructed a
house on the property in 2003.  
           
¶ 4.      When plaintiffs
attempted to sell the property in 2005, however, the potential buyers
discovered the five-house restriction in the Lowell-to-Trono
deed and required consent of the owners of the five other houses as a condition
of the sale.  Neighbors refused to consent, and plaintiffs thereupon filed
this declaratory judgment action to clear the property of the restriction and
obtain marketable title.  Neighbors answered and counterclaimed for a
declaration that plaintiffs' residence violated the deed restriction, and an
injunction requiring its removal.  
           
¶ 5.      The parties filed
cross-motions for summary judgment.  In March 2010, the trial court issued
a written ruling in favor of plaintiffs.  The court concluded that the
five-house restriction in the Lowell-to-Trono deed
was intended to benefit the land retained by Lowell, not the land conveyed to Trono or his subsequent successors and assigns, and that neighbors
therefore lacked standing to enforce it.  The court issued a final
judgment order in May 2010, and denied a motion for reconsideration the
following July.  This appeal followed.  
                   
           
¶ 6.      The essential
question presented, as the trial court recognized, is which estate the parties
to the Lowell-to-Trono deed intended to benefit from
the five-house restriction.  It is axiomatic that "[t]he intent of the
parties determines which estates or servitude interests are burdened or
benefited by a servitude" and that such intent may be
either express or "inferred from the circumstances."  Restatement (Third)
Prop.: Servitudes § 2.5 cmt. a
(2000); see Madkour v. Zoltak,
2007 VT 14, ¶14, 181 Vt. 347, 924 A.2d 11 ("To determine which property is
burdened by the restrictive covenant. . . we must look to the language of the
deed itself and consider [the grantor's] intent in the context within which she
conveyed the property.").  We review the trial court's construction of the
deed de novo.  Cameron's Run, LLP v. Frohock,
2010 VT 60, ¶ 12, ___ Vt. ___, 9 A.3d 664 (mem.).
¶ 7.     
Construing the deed as a whole and the circumstances of its making, the trial
court here concluded that the restriction was intended solely to benefit the land
retained by Lowell, so that defendants had no standing to enforce it.  We
agree.  Although the deed does not expressly identify the restriction's
intended beneficiary, there was no dispute that, as the trial court found,
Lowell retained substantial property "surrounding the five-acre parcel." 
As the court further observed, a basic interpretive rule is thatabsent
evidence of an intent to the contrarya restriction relating to the use of a
portion of land sold by a grantor is generally presumed to be intended for the
benefit of the land that the grantor has retained.  See, e.g., Contegni v. Payne, 557 A.2d 122, 125 (Conn.
App. Ct. 1989) (reaffirming principle that covenant exacted from grantee must
be viewed as "presumptively . . . for the benefit and protection of his
adjoining land which [the grantor] retaine[d]"
(quotation omitted)); Sofran Peachtree
City, LLC v. Peachtree City Holdings, LLC, 550 S.E.2d 429, 432 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2001) (holding that evidence failed to "rebut the presumption that the . .
. restriction was imposed for the benefit of the land retained by [grantor]
after the sale"); see generally Maurice T. Brunner, Who May Enforce
Restrictive Covenant or Agreement as to Use of Real Property, 51 A.L.R.3d
556, 595 (1973) ("Where the owner of realty sells a portion thereof, imposing
on his vendee restrictions relating to the use of the estate conveyed, there is
a presumption, in the absence of any facts and circumstances showing a contrary
intent, that the restriction is imposed for the benefit of the land
retained."); see also Chimney Hill Owners' Ass'n,
Inc. v. Antignani, 136 Vt. 446, 452, 392 A.2d 423, 427 (1978) (holding that developer's retention of common lands showed that
"the intent of the [assessment] covenant was to benefit" developer and not "the
lot owners in [general]" who therefore lacked authority to enforce it). 
 
¶ 8.     
The trial court also correctly rejected neighbors' assertion that the
five-house restriction was intended to benefit the land conveyed to Trono as part of a general development scheme, so that any
of Trono's subsequent granteesincluding
neighborscould enforce it against any other.  See Creed v. Clogston, 2004 VT 34, ¶ 20, 176 Vt. 436, 852 A.2d 577
(noting that under general plan development "individually owned lots or units
are burdened by a servitude imposed to effectuate a plan of land-use controls
for the benefit of the property owners in the development or neighborhood"
(quotation omitted)).  The deed itself gave no indication that it was
intended to benefit the land conveyed as opposed to the land retained; it
merely stated that the five-house restriction reflected the maximum number of
houses allowed under the existing zoning regulations.  Furthermore, the
grantor, Lowell, recorded no declaration of covenants and restrictions
applicable to the tract as a whole, which we have identified as a formal
prerequisite to finding a general plan development.  Patch
v. Springfield School Dist., 2009 VT 117, ¶ 11, 187 Vt. 21, 989 A.2d 500.
 The deed did provide, to be sure, that the "style and design" of the
houses to be constructed on the parcel "shall be compatible and harmonious"
with that of "present houses in the general area."  Standing alone,
however, this proviso falls well short of demonstrating an
intent to create a common improvement scheme for the implied benefit all
of the subsequent grantees.  Indeed, the provision is more generally
consistent with an intent to benefit Lowell by
ensuring that any new houses built were compatible with the design and style of
the existing "present houses" in her neighborhood and the balance of the
property that she owned and retained.  
¶ 9.     
Nor did the Lowell-to-Trono deed require that all
subsequent conveyances include the five-house limitation, and none of the later
conveyances expressly referenced the restriction.  Cf. Rogers v. Watson,
156 Vt. 483, 488, 594 A.2d 409, 412 (1991) (observing that "inclusion of the
restriction in most, if not all, other deeds from the [grantor] shows an intent
to create a common development scheme"); Welch v. Barrows, 125 Vt. 500,
503, 218 A.2d 698, 702 (1966) (holding that record showed grantor's intent to
benefit all purchasers of shore lots "by the inclusion of the covenants in the
several subsequent deeds").  The deed to the Waibels
incorporated "all those rights which were conveyed to J. Peter Trono from Lydia Lowell" without any specification of the
"rights" contemplated.  That the rights they had in mind, however, were
solely those associated with beach access is strongly indicated by the slightly
later deed to the Michaelides, in which the only
reference to the Lowell deed is a provision specifically granting the Michaelides "in common with others certain beach rights
conveyed to the grantor by warranty deed of Lydia B. Lowell."    
¶ 10.    In reaching
its decision the trial court also relied on the affidavit of J. Peter Trono, the original grantee, in which he stated his
"understanding as purchaser" that the five-house restriction "did not reflect a
plan or scheme of development intended to create reciprocal negative easements
on the lands conveyed to me by Lowell."  While the affidavit can speak
only to Trono's understanding of the parties'
intentions, it is strongly persuasive to that extent and neighbors adduced no
equivalent evidence of a contrary intention on the part of Lowell.  A
second Trono affidavit provided at neighbors' request
confirms his understanding that plaintiffs' lot was not buildable under a State
land use permit issued in August 1978, but does not speak to or contradict his
understanding that there was no intent to create mutual or reciprocal
obligations enforceable by subsequent grantees.  Accordingly, we find no
basis to disturb the judgment that neighbors were not benefitted by the
restriction, and therefore lacked standing to enforce it.   
¶ 11.    Neighbors'
remaining claims require no extended discussion.  They assert that the
trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction "to collaterally review" the
municipal zoning permit limiting the development to five houses. 
Neighbors neither clearly raised this claim below nor introduced the relevant
evidence relating to the permit in the trial record.  Accordingly, even if
exempt from the usual preservation requirement under the rule that
subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, Bischoff v. Bletz, 2008 VT 16, ¶ 15, 183 Vt. 235, 949 A.2d 420, the
record is simply insufficient to review the claim.* 

¶ 12.    Neighbors
also contend they are entitled to a declaratory judgment that plaintiffs do not
enjoy the same rights and benefits relating to beach access as neighbors and
the other home owners in the area.   The trial court properly
declined to address the issue, however, noting that it was not raised in
neighbors' answer or counterclaim and was mentioned only briefly for the first
time in their cross-motion for summary judgment.  See Progressive Ins.
Co. v. Brown, 2008 VT 103, ¶ 8, 184 Vt. 388, 966 A.2d 666 (holding that
proper preservation of issue requires that it be presented with "specificity
and clarity" to ensure that trial court is given adequate opportunity to render
informed decision).  For the same reason, we reject neighbors' assertion
that they are entitled to a remand for the trial court to consider whether plaintiffs'
house violates the State subdivision permit.  The issue was not raised
below, and is not cognizable on appeal.  Id.  We thus discern
no basis to disturb the judgment.  
Affirmed. 
 
BY THE COURT:
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Paul L. Reiber,
  Chief Justice
 
 
  
 
 
John A. Dooley, Associate
  Justice
  
 
 
 
 
Denise R. Johnson,
  Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
Brian L. Burgess, Associate
  Justice
 
 
 

*  There is
record evidence of the Town's desire to limit development of the parcel to five
houses.  As noted, this is reflected in the original deed's reference to
the zoning limitations then in effect, as well as an August 1978 letter from Trono's attorney to the City's planning administrator
suggestingapparently as the Town's requestthat lots 1A and 1B might be sold
together subject to a covenant to run with the land prohibiting the
construction of a residence on the smaller lot.  There is no evidence that
this covenant was placed in any deed, nor any record evidence that it was
reflected in any zoning permit.