Case Title: Duhadaway v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 202, 2010

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2010-08-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
HENRY A. DUHADAWAY,  
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
No. 202, 2010 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§ 
Court Below—Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
of the State of Delaware in and  
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§ 
for Sussex County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 0106013189A 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted:  May 27, 2010 
Decided:  August 12, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices.  
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 12th day of August 2010, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court 
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Henry A. Duhadaway, filed this appeal from the 
Superior Court’s denial of his third motion for postconviction relief pursuant 
to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”).  The appellee, State of 
Delaware, has moved to affirm the judgment of the Superior Court on the 
ground that it is manifest on the face of Duhadaway’s opening brief that the 
appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm the Superior Court’s 
judgment. 
 
2
 
(2) 
In 2001, Duhadaway was charged with twelve counts of Rape 
in the First Degree and one count each of Continuous Sexual Abuse of a 
Child, Providing Obscenity to a Minor, and Unlawful Dealing in Child 
Pornography.  In February 2002, Duhadaway pled nolo contendere to one 
count of Rape in the Second Degree and one count of Unlawful Dealing in 
Child Pornography.  In exchange for Duhadaway’s plea, the State agreed to 
dismiss the remaining charges.  Duhadaway did not file a direct appeal. 
 
(3) 
In March 2002, Duhadaway filed his first motion for 
postconviction relief.  Duhadaway alleged ineffective assistance of counsel 
and related claims of due process violations and deficiencies in the pretrial 
process.  By memorandum opinion dated June 19, 2002, the Superior Court 
denied Duhadaway’s motion on its merits.  On appeal, this Court affirmed 
the Superior Court’s judgment.1 
 
(4) 
In December 2004, Duhadaway filed his second motion for 
postconviction relief.  Duhadaway’s second motion expanded on some of the 
claims that he raised in his first postconviction motion and further argued 
that, as a result of those claims, he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty 
plea.  By order dated December 3, 2004, the Superior Court denied 
                                          
 
1 Duhadaway v. State, 2002 WL 31127536 (Del. Supr.). 
 
3
Duhadaway’s second postconviction motion as repetitive and as formerly 
adjudicated.  On appeal, this Court affirmed.2 
 
(5) 
On January 25, 2010, Duhadaway filed his third motion for 
postconviction relief.  Duhadaway’s third motion repeated some of the 
ineffective counsel allegations that he raised in his first and second 
postconviction motions and further alleged that his counsel failed to advise 
him of his right to appeal his conviction.  After obtaining a response from 
Duhadaway’s counsel, the Superior Court denied the motion as without 
merit and as procedurally barred.  This appeal followed. 
 
(6) 
It is clear to the Court that the Superior Court properly denied 
Duhadaway’s third motion for postconviction relief as procedurally barred 
and as without merit.  Simply put, in his postconviction motion and now on 
appeal, Duhadaway has not and cannot identify prejudicial error on the part 
of his counsel3 or that reconsideration of his formerly adjudicated allegations 
is warranted in the interest of justice.4 
                                          
 
2 Duhadaway v. State, 2005 WL 1469365 (Del. Supr.). 
3 On a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel within the context of a guilty plea, a 
defendant must demonstrate that, but for his counsel’s error, he would not have pleaded 
guilty but would have insisted on proceeding to trial.  Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 58-59 
(Del. 1988). 
4 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).  
 
4
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme 
Court Rule 25(a), the State’s motion to affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment 
of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice