Case Title: In re D.B.

Citation: 2011-Ohio-2671

Docket Number: 20100240

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2011-06-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In 
re D.B., Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-2671.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-2671 
IN RE D.B. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as In re D.B., Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-2671.] 
Juvenile law — R. C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) — R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) is 
unconstitutional as applied to a child under the age of 13 who engages in 
sexual conduct with another child under 13. 
(No. 2010-0240 — Submitted February 15, 2011 — Decided June 8, 2011.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Licking County, No. 2009 CA 00024, 
2009-Ohio-6841. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) is unconstitutional as applied to a child under the age of 13 
who engages in sexual conduct with another child under 13. 
__________________ 
 
LANZINGER, J. 
{¶ 1} This appeal challenges the constitutionality of applying to a child 
under the age of 13, the statute that defines sexual activity with a child under 13 
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as rape, a first-degree felony.  R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b).  The case arises from 
incidents in which two boys under 13 years of age engaged in sexual activity.  
Because we hold that the statute is unconstitutional as applied in these 
circumstances, we reverse. 
I. Case Background 
{¶ 2} On August 1, 2007, appellee, the state of Ohio, filed a complaint in 
the Juvenile Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Licking County against 
D.B., who was then 12 years old, charging him with nine counts of rape in 
violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) arising from conduct occurring between him 
and an 11-year-old boy, M.G.  The complaint also charged D.B. with one count of 
rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) arising from conduct occurring with 
A.W., also 12 years old.  All the counts alleged that D.B. was a delinquent child 
under R.C. 2152.02(F). 
{¶ 3} D.B. filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, alleging that the state 
could not establish sufficient evidence that he was guilty of rape and that 
application of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) in this case violates his federal and state 
rights to due process and equal protection because the statute is vague and 
overbroad.  The state subsequently filed an amended complaint, which dropped 
the count related to A.W. and amended multiple counts to allege that D.B. had 
engaged in forcible sexual conduct with M.G. or had used verbal threats to get 
him to comply, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2).  The first count of the 
amended complaint alleged only that D.B. had engaged in sexual conduct with a 
person less than 13 years of age in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b).  The 
remaining eight counts alleged that D.B. had engaged in conduct with M.G. in 
violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) or R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) (forcible sexual 
conduct).  Each count also alleged that D.B. was a delinquent child under R.C. 
2152.02(F). 
January Term, 2011 
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{¶ 4} Because the court continued this matter when the complaint was 
amended, an adjudicatory hearing did not commence until January 30, 2008.  The 
court ruled that it would reserve ruling on D.B.’s motion to dismiss until the end 
of the state’s case.  During the hearing, the state called Detective Donna Berryhill, 
D.B.’s father Shawn B., and the minors, A.W. and M.G., to testify. 
{¶ 5} A.W. testified that he had observed D.B. and M.G. engage in anal 
sex.  A.W. testified that D.B. “bribed” M.G. with video games to engage in sexual 
conduct.  Both A.W. and M.G. stated that the sexual conduct was always initiated 
by D.B. and that D.B. would either bargain with, or use physical force on, M.G. to 
convince M.G. to engage in sexual conduct. 
{¶ 6} According to A.W., D.B. and M.G. did not engage in sexual 
conduct until M.G. himself agreed to the activity.  D.B.’s father testified that 
while D.B. was significantly bigger than other children his age, he was not an 
aggressive child and he never used his size to bully or intimidate other children. 
{¶ 7} Defense counsel moved for acquittal at the conclusion of the 
state’s case.  The court dismissed counts 3, 4, 5, and 6 after finding that no 
specific evidence existed to support them.  Determining that there was no basis 
for finding that D.B. had engaged in forcible sexual conduct, the court also 
dismissed those portions of counts 2, 7, and 9 that alleged forcible rape.  D.B.’s 
motion to dismiss the counts alleging a violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) was 
denied. 
{¶ 8} The hearing resumed on March 4, 2008.  Count 1, count 8, and the 
allegations of violations of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) in counts 2, 7, and 9 remained 
from the amended complaint.  Following the presentation of the defense’s case, 
the court stated that while there was “no question whatsoever” that the sexual acts 
detailed in the remaining counts took place, it could not find that D.B used force 
during any of the acts.  The court therefore adjudicated D.B. delinquent based on 
the violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) alleged in counts 1, 2, 7, 8, and 9. 
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{¶ 9} At the dispositional hearing, the court committed D.B. to the 
Department of Youth Services for a minimum of five years to the maximum 
period of his 21st birthday, suspended the commitment, and placed D.B. on 
probation for an indefinite period of time.  The court further ordered D.B. to 
attend counseling and group therapy. 
{¶ 10} On appeal to the Fifth District Court of Appeals, D.B. argued that 
application of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) violated his federal rights to due process and 
equal protection, that the juvenile court abused its discretion in adjudicating him 
delinquent for rape, and that the juvenile court erred in overruling a motion to 
suppress statements he had made to law enforcement when he was questioned in 
his bedroom and at the sheriff’s office.1  In re D.B., Licking App. No. 2009 CA 
00024, 2009-Ohio-6841, at ¶ 9-12.  The court of appeals upheld the 
constitutionality of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) as applied and held that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in adjudicating D.B. delinquent for rape for engaging 
in sexual conduct with an 11-year-old child.  Id. at ¶ 23, 28. 
{¶ 11} We accepted jurisdiction over appellant’s proposition of law, 
which states that application of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) to a child under the age of 
13 violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and 
Ohio Constitutions.2  See In re D.B., 125 Ohio St.3d 1437, 2010-Ohio-2212, 927 
N.E.2d 9. 
                                                 
1 The court of appeals held that these interviews were custodial, that the statements made by D.B. 
during these interviews should have been suppressed because he was not given any warnings 
pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, and that 
neither he nor his parents were informed of the potential for criminal charges.  In re D.B., Licking 
App. No. 2009 CA 00024, 2009-Ohio-6841, at ¶ 40-41.  The court ruled, however, that the 
admission of these statements was harmless because it did not affect the outcome of the trial.  Id. 
at ¶ 45-46.  Although the interrogation methods used in this case are troubling, this issue is not 
before us, and we thus refrain from further comment. 
 
2 Because appellant argued only a violation of his federal constitutional rights of due process and 
equal protection during his appeal to the Fifth District, we will not address his allegations 
regarding the state constitution in this opinion. 
January Term, 2011 
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II. Analysis 
{¶ 12} D.B. does not assert that R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) is unconstitutional 
on its face, meaning that it can never be applied without violating constitutional 
rights, but asserts that it is unconstitutional as applied to him. “A statute may be 
challenged as unconstitutional on the basis that it is invalid on its face or as 
applied to a particular set of facts.  See, e.g., United States v. Eichman (1990), 496 
U.S. 310, 312, 110 S.Ct. 2404, 110 L.Ed.2d 287.  In an as-applied challenge, the 
challenger ‘contends that application of the statute in the particular context in 
which he has acted, or in which he proposes to act, [is] unconstitutional.’ Ada v. 
Guam Soc. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists (1992), 506 U.S. 1011, 113 S.Ct. 
633, 121 L.Ed.2d 564 (Scalia, J., dissenting).”  State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d 507, 
2007-Ohio-606, 861 N.E.2d 512, ¶ 17.  Thus, we focus on the statute and its 
particular application in an as-applied challenge. 
{¶ 13} R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) criminalizes what is commonly known as 
“statutory rape.”  The statute holds offenders strictly liable for engaging in sexual 
conduct with children under the age of 13—force is not an element of the offense 
because a child under the age of 13 is legally presumed to be incapable of 
consenting to sexual conduct. 
{¶ 14} R.C. 2907.02(A)(1) provides: 
{¶ 15} “No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another who is not 
the spouse of the offender or who is the spouse of the offender but is living 
separate and apart from the offender, when any of the following applies:  
{¶ 16} “ * * * 
{¶ 17} “(b) The other person is less than 13 years of age, whether or not 
the offender knows the age of the other person.” 
{¶ 18} The statute furthers the state’s interest in protecting young 
children.  Indeed, the Legislature Service Commission stated that R.C. 
2907.02(A)(1)(b) was created to protect a prepubescent child from the sexual 
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advances of another because “engaging in sexual conduct with such a person 
indicates vicious behavior on the part of the offender.”  1973 Legislative Service 
Commission comments to Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511, 134 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1866. 
{¶ 19} D.B. argues that R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) is unconstitutional in two 
ways.  First, he argues that the statute is vague as applied to children under the 
age of 13, and thus violates his right to due process.  Second, he argues that the 
statute was applied in an arbitrary manner in this case in contravention of his 
constitutional right to equal protection.  This case thus asks whether a child’s 
federal constitutional rights are violated when, as a member of the class protected 
under R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), he or she is adjudicated as delinquent based upon a 
violation of this statute. 
A.  Due Process 
{¶ 20} D.B. argues that R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) is unconstitutional as 
applied to him because it fails to provide guidelines that designate which actor is 
the victim and which is the offender, resulting in arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement. 
{¶ 21} “It is fundamental that a court must ‘presume the constitutionality 
of lawfully enacted legislation.’  Arnold v. Cleveland (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 35, 
38, 616 N.E.2d 163, citing Univ. Hts. v. O'Leary (1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 130, 135, 
22 O.O.3d 372, 429 N.E.2d 148, and Hilton v. Toledo (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 394, 
396, 16 O.O.3d 430, 405 N.E.2d 1047.  * * * Accordingly, the legislation in 
question ‘will not be invalidated unless the challenger establishes that it is 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.’  Id. at 39, 616 N.E.2d 163.”  Klein v. 
Leis, 99 Ohio St.3d 537, 2003-Ohio-4779, 795 N.E.2d 633, ¶ 4. 
{¶ 22} Juvenile delinquency hearings “ ‘must measure up to the essentials 
of due process and fair treatment.’ ”  In re Gault (1967), 387 U.S. 1, 30, 87 S.Ct. 
1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, quoting Kent v. United States (1966), 383 U.S. 541, 562, 
86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84.  Due process is not satisfied if a statute is 
January Term, 2011 
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unconstitutionally vague.  Skilling v. United States (2010), __ U.S. __, 130 S.Ct. 
2896, 2928, 177 L.Ed.2d 619.  “A statute can be impermissibly vague for either of 
two independent reasons.  First, if it fails to provide people of ordinary 
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it prohibits.  
Second, if it authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement.  Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56-57, 119 S.Ct. 1849, 144 
L.Ed.2d 67 (1999).”  Hill v. Colorado (2000), 530 U.S. 703, 732, 120 S.Ct. 2480, 
147 L.Ed.2d 597. 
{¶ 23} The United States Supreme Court has identified the second reason 
as the primary concern of the vagueness doctrine:  “[T]he more important aspect 
of the vagueness doctrine ‘is not actual notice, but the other principal element of 
the doctrine – the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to 
govern law enforcement.’  Smith [v. Goguen (1974)], 415 U.S. [566, 574, 94 S.Ct. 
1242, 39 L.Ed.2d 605]. * * *  Where the legislature fails to provide such minimal 
guidelines, a criminal statute may permit ‘a standardless sweep [that] allows 
policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections.’ Id., at 
575, 94 S.Ct., at 1248.”  Kolender v. Larson (1983), 461 U.S. 352, 358, 103 S.Ct. 
1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903.  This prong of the vagueness doctrine not only upholds due 
process, but also serves to protect the separation of powers:  “It would certainly 
be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible 
offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could rightfully be 
detained, and who should be set at large.  This would, to some extent, substitute 
the judicial for the legislative department of the government.”  United States v. 
Reese (1876), 92 U.S. 214, 221, 23 L.Ed. 563. 
{¶ 24} As applied to children under the age of 13 who engage in sexual 
conduct with other children under the age of 13, R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) is 
unconstitutionally vague because the statute authorizes and encourages arbitrary 
and discriminatory enforcement.  When an adult engages in sexual conduct with a 
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child under the age of 13, it is clear which party is the offender and which is the 
victim.  But when two children under the age of 13 engage in sexual conduct with 
each other, each child is both an offender and a victim, and the distinction 
between those two terms breaks down. 
{¶ 25} The facts of this case provide an example of the temptation for 
prosecutors to label one child as the offender and the other child as the victim.  
Based apparently upon the theory that D.B. forced M.G. to engage in sexual 
conduct, the state alleged that D.B., but not M.G., had engaged in conduct that 
constituted statutory rape.  However, while the theory of D.B. as the aggressor 
was consistent with the counts alleging a violation of RC. 2907.02(A)(2), which 
proscribes rape by force, this theory is incompatible with the counts alleging a 
violation of statutory rape because anyone who engages in sexual conduct with a 
minor under the age of 13 commits statutory rape regardless of whether force was 
used.  Thus, if the facts alleged in the complaint were true, D.B. and M.G. would 
both be in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b). 
{¶ 26} The prosecutor’s choice to charge D.B. but not M.G. is the very 
definition of discriminatory enforcement.  D.B. and M.G. engaged in sexual 
conduct with each other, yet only D.B. was charged.3    The facts of this case 
demonstrate that R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) authorizes and encourages arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement when applied to offenders under the age of 13.  The 
statute is thus unconstitutionally vague as applied to this situation. 
{¶ 27} It must be emphasized that the concept of consent plays no role in 
whether a person violates R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b): children under the age of 13 are 
legally incapable of consenting to sexual conduct.  Furthermore, whether D.B. 
used force to engage in sexual conduct does not play a role in our consideration of 
R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b).  The trial court found that D.B. did not use force.  
                                                 
3 Furthermore, the initial complaint detailed sexual conduct between D.B. and A.W., yet charged 
only D.B. with rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b).   
January Term, 2011 
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Whether an offender used force is irrelevant to the determination whether the 
offender committed rape under R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b). 
{¶ 28} We note that while we hold that R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) is 
unconstitutional as applied to a child under the age of 13 who engages in sexual 
conduct with another child under the age of 13, a child under the age of 13 may be 
found guilty of rape if additional elements are shown: the offender substantially 
impairs the other person’s judgment or control, R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(a); the other 
person’s ability to resist or consent is substantially impaired because of a mental 
or physical condition or advanced age, R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c); or the offender 
compels the other person to submit by force or threat of force, R.C. 
2907.02(A)(2).  None of those additional elements was present here. 
B.  Equal Protection 
{¶ 29} Application of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) in this case also violates 
D.B.’s federal right to equal protection.  “The Equal Protection Clause directs that 
‘all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.’  F.S. Royster Guano 
Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415, 40 S.Ct. 560, 561, 64 L.Ed. 989 (1920).”  
Plyler v. Doe (1982), 457 U.S. 202, 216, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786. 
{¶ 30} The plain language of the statute makes it clear that every person 
that engages in sexual conduct with a child under the age of 13 is strictly liable for 
statutory rape, and the statute must be enforced equally and without regard to the 
particular circumstances of an individual’s situation.  R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) 
offers no prosecutorial exception to charging an offense  when every party 
involved in the sexual conduct is under the age of 13; conceivably, the principle 
of equal protection suggests that both parties could be prosecuted as identically 
situated.  Because D.B. and M.G. were both under the age of 13 at the time the 
events in this case occurred, they were both members of the class protected by the 
statute, and both could have been charged under the offense.  Application of the 
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statute in this case to a single party violates the Equal Protection Clause’s 
mandate that persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. 
{¶ 31} All three boys allegedly engaged in sexual conduct with a person 
under the age of 13; however, only D.B. was charged with a violation of R.C. 
2907.02(A)(1(b).  This arbitrary enforcement of the statute violates D.B.’s right to 
equal protection.  We accordingly hold that application of the statute in this case 
violated D.B.’s federal equal-protection rights.  The statute is unconstitutional as 
applied to him. 
III. Conclusion 
{¶ 32} R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) prohibits one from engaging in sexual 
conduct with a person under the age of 13.  As applied to offenders who are under 
the age of 13 themselves, the statute is unconstitutionally vague in violation of the 
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution because arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement is encouraged.  Application of the statute in this case 
also violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution 
because only one child was charged with being delinquent, while others similarly 
situated were not. 
{¶ 33} We thus hold that R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b) is unconstitutional as 
applied to a child under the age of 13 who engages in sexual conduct with another 
child under 13. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, and 
MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
 
CUPP, J., concurs in the judgment, syllabus, and opinion of the court on the 
basis of the due process analysis only. 
__________________ 
January Term, 2011 
11 
 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Brooke M. Burns, Assistant 
Public Defender, for appellant. 
 
Kenneth Oswalt, Licking County Prosecuting Attorney, and Christopher 
A. Reamer, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Juvenile Law Center, Marsha L. Levick, Lourdes M. Rosado, Jessica R. 
Feierman, and Riya S. Shah; National Center for Lesbian Rights, Jody 
Marksamer, and Ilona Turner; and Nadia Natasha Seeratan, urging reversal for 
amici curiae Juvenile Law Center; National Juvenile Defender Center; National 
Center for Lesbian Rights; Barton Child Law and Policy Center, Emory School of 
Law; Children and Family Justice Center, Bluhm Legal Clinic; Juvenile Justice 
Initiative of Illinois; Midwest Juvenile Defender Center; Tamar Birkhead; Jeffrey 
Fagan; Therese Glennon; Martin Guggenheim; Barry Krisberg; Elizabeth 
Letourneau; and Gail Ryan. 
 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Phillip R. 
Cummings, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, urging affirmance for amicus curiae 
Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association. 
_____________________