Case Title: Shiloh Automotive, Inc. v. Levin

Citation: 2008-Ohio-68

Docket Number: 20061384

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2008-01-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Shiloh Automotive, Inc. v. Levin, 117 Ohio St.3d 4, 2008-Ohio-68.] 
 
 
SHILOH AUTOMOTIVE, INC., APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE, v. LEVIN, TAX 
COMMR., APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Shiloh Automotive, Inc. v. Levin, 117 Ohio St.3d 4, 2008-Ohio-68.] 
Personal property tax — Valuation of assets — Arm’s-length transaction — 
Standard of review. 
(No. 2006-1384 – Submitted October 17, 2007 – Decided January 16, 2008.) 
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals,  
Nos. 2004-M-380 and 2004-M-1283. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal as of right by appellant and cross-appellee, Shiloh 
Automotive, Inc. (“Shiloh Auto”), and a cross-appeal as of right by appellee and 
cross-appellant, Richard A. Levin, Tax Commissioner of Ohio, from a decision of 
the Board of Tax Appeals (“BTA”) in case Nos. 2004-M-380 and 2004-M-1283.  
The BTA consolidated the cases because Shiloh Auto raised essentially the same 
errors in each case. 
{¶ 2} The BTA’s order affirmed the commissioner’s final determination 
finding that Shiloh Auto had incorrectly valued certain personal property used in 
business on its 2001 and 2002 Ohio personal property tax returns.  The 
commissioner had found that the price paid by Shiloh Auto in 1999 for certain 
assets did not reflect the true value of those assets for personal property tax 
purposes.  Upon review, we hold that the BTA’s decision was reasonable and 
lawful, and we therefore affirm it in accordance with R.C. 5717.04.  We dismiss 
the commissioner’s cross-appeal as premature. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
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{¶ 3} Shiloh Auto is a subsidiary of Shiloh Industries, Inc., a publicly 
traded corporation.  Historically, Shiloh Industries was a Tier-II supplier of 
component parts to the automotive industry; a Tier-II supplier is one that supplies 
components to a Tier-I supplier, which in turn provides products directly to an 
automotive manufacturer such as General Motors.  Shiloh Auto was formed and 
began business in 1999 when Shiloh Industries purchased the automotive division 
of MTD Products, Inc. (“MTD”), a Tier-I supplier.  Shiloh Industries’ acquisition 
of the MTD automotive division (“MTD Auto”) is at the center of the controversy 
in this matter. 
{¶ 4} MTD, a privately held corporation, has been a shareholder of 
Shiloh Industries since the latter went public in 1993.  At that time, MTD owned 
37 percent of Shiloh Industries’ common stock.  Prior to the summer of 1998, 
members of management of Shiloh Industries and MTD would – on occasion – 
informally discuss the strategic benefits of combining the operations of Shiloh 
Industries and MTD Auto. 
{¶ 5} In July 1998, Robert L. Grissinger, who was then Shiloh 
Industries’ chairman of the board, president, and chief executive officer, and 
David J. Hessler, secretary of the board of directors of MTD and also a member 
of Shiloh Industries’ board of directors appointed by MTD, initiated formal 
discussions about combining the operations of Shiloh Industries and MTD Auto.  
In September 1998, MTD retained PricewaterhouseCoopers Securities, L.L.C. 
(“PWC”) to assist in the sale of MTD Auto.  MTD and PWC began the process of 
separating the financial records of MTD and MTD Auto.  MTD and PWC then 
prepared an offering memorandum describing MTD Auto’s business and certain 
financial information and provided the offering memorandum to Shiloh Industries 
in November 1998.  MTD did not provide the memorandum to any other potential 
buyer. 
January Term, 2008 
3 
{¶ 6} On December 10, 1998, MTD Auto made a presentation to Shiloh 
Industries’ board of directors on the potential strategic benefits of merging Shiloh 
Industries and MTD Auto.  Based on this presentation, the board of directors 
authorized its management team to commence a due-diligence review and 
evaluate the merits of acquiring MTD Auto.  To assist in the due-diligence 
review, Shiloh Industries retained Robert W. Baird & Co., Inc. (“Baird”), to act as 
financial advisor; Jones Day to act as legal advisor; and Ernst & Young, L.L.P., to 
provide financial and accounting advice. 
{¶ 7} Between December 1998 and March 1999, various meetings were 
held between Shiloh Industries and MTD representatives.  Hessler, Curtis Moll, 
and Dieter Kaesgen – Shiloh Industries directors who were also affiliated with 
MTD – abstained from the discussions and subsequent vote on the MTD Auto 
acquisition.  At a March 25, 1999 meeting, Shiloh Industries’ board of directors 
postponed a final decision on the MTD Auto acquisition due to continuing 
concerns and because the board wanted Shiloh Industries’ new president and chief 
executive officer to consider the proposed transaction. 
{¶ 8} On April 9, 1999, the trusts of Dominick and James Fanello, both 
officers and directors of Shiloh Industries, agreed to sell an aggregate one million 
shares of Shiloh Industries common stock to Summit Insurance Company of 
America, a wholly owned subsidiary of MTD.  Through this acquisition, MTD’s 
ownership interest in Shiloh Industries increased to approximately 51 percent.  As 
a result of this transaction, the Fanellos ceased to participate as board members in 
the approval process with respect to Shiloh Industries’ proposed acquisition of 
MTD Auto.  The stock sale closed on May 17, 1999. 
{¶ 9} Between April 1999 and June 17, 1999, MTD and Shiloh 
Industries negotiated an asset-purchase agreement related to the sale of MTD 
Auto.  On June 17, 1999, a special meeting was held at which Shiloh Industries’ 
“disinterested directors” – the four remaining directors who had no affiliation 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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with MTD – approved the acquisition of MTD Auto.  Shiloh Auto had been 
formed on June 16, 1999, to serve as an acquisition vehicle for the assets of MTD 
Auto. 
{¶ 10} Between June 17 and June 21, 1999, Shiloh Industries and MTD 
representatives negotiated the final terms of the agreement.  Under those terms, 
Shiloh Industries was to pay $20 million in cash and $20 million in common stock 
to acquire MTD Auto, subject to price adjustments that could either increase or 
decrease the purchase price depending on MTD Auto’s future performance.  After 
the sale, MTD controlled 56 percent of the outstanding shares of Shiloh 
Industries. 
{¶ 11} The newly formed automotive corporation, Shiloh Auto, filed its 
2001 Ohio personal property tax returns using the purchase price of MTD Auto to 
establish the value of the machinery and equipment acquired.  The commissioner 
rejected Shiloh Auto’s valuation of the assets purchased.  The commissioner 
found that Shiloh Industries’ acquisition of MTD Auto was not an arm’s-length 
transaction, and thus, the purchase price did not reflect the true value of the 
taxable assets.  The commissioner also found drastic differences between Shiloh 
Auto’s purchase-price valuation and allocation of the assets and MTD Auto’s 
historical net book value of the assets recorded before the sale.  Finally, the 
commissioner found that Shiloh Auto had failed to cooperate in supplying 
information to support its valuation and subsequent allocation. 
{¶ 12} Shiloh Auto appealed to the BTA and also challenged the value 
assessed to the same property for tax year 2002.  The BTA affirmed the 
commissioner’s final determination, agreeing that the Shiloh Industries-MTD 
Auto transaction was not at arm’s length and that the purchase price did not 
reflect the true value of the acquired assets.  The BTA also found that Shiloh 
Auto’s valuation of the assets was not supported by other competent or probative 
evidence outside the purchase price.  Further, the BTA agreed with the 
January Term, 2008 
5 
commissioner that the net book value recorded by MTD Auto six months prior to 
the sale was the best evidence of the true value of the assets. 
{¶ 13} On a separate issue, the BTA found that the commissioner had 
erred in the method that he used to assess the value of Shiloh Auto’s property.  
Accordingly, the BTA remanded the case to the commissioner to apply 
depreciation rates in accordance with MTD Auto’s acquisition history. 
{¶ 14} Shiloh Auto filed an appeal challenging the BTA’s decision that 
the purchase of MTD Auto was not an arm’s-length transaction.  The 
commissioner filed a cross-appeal seeking clarification of the appropriate 
depreciation schedule that should be applied on remand. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 15} In reviewing a decision of the BTA, this court determines whether 
it is “reasonable and lawful.”  Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino 
(2001), 90 Ohio St.3d 496, 497, 739 N.E.2d 783.  The court “will not hesitate to 
reverse a BTA decision that is based on an incorrect legal conclusion.”  Gahanna-
Jefferson Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Zaino (2001), 93 Ohio St.3d 231, 232, 
754 N.E.2d 789.  However, this court will affirm the BTA’s determinations of 
factual issues if the record contains reliable and probative evidence to support the 
BTA’s findings.  Am. Natl. Can Co. v. Tracy (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 150, 152, 648 
N.E.2d 483. 
{¶ 16} The burden rests on the taxpayer “to show the manner and extent 
of the error in the Tax Commissioner’s final determination.”  Stds. Testing 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Zaino, 100 Ohio St.3d 240, 2003-Ohio-5804, 797 N.E.2d 
1278, at ¶ 30.  The commissioner’s findings “are presumptively valid, absent a 
demonstration that those findings are clearly unreasonable or unlawful.”  
Nusseibeh v. Zaino, 98 Ohio St.3d 292, 2003-Ohio-855, 784 N.E.2d 93, at ¶ 10. 
Shiloh Auto’s Appeal 
Proposition of Law No. 1 
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{¶ 17} Shiloh Auto’s primary claim on appeal is that the purchase of 
MTD Auto was an arm’s-length transaction and, as a result, the value of the 
machinery and equipment for personal property tax purposes was established by 
the sale price. 
{¶ 18} R.C. 5711.18 provides: 
{¶ 19} “In the case of personal property used in business, the * * * 
depreciated book value shall be taken as the true value of such property, unless 
the assessor finds that such depreciated book value is greater or less than the then 
true value of such property in money.” 
{¶ 20} The best evidence of true value of tangible personal property is an 
arm’s-length transaction.  Tele-Media Co. of Addil v. Lindley (1982), 70 Ohio 
St.2d 284, 24 O.O.3d 367, 436 N.E.2d 1362, syllabus, following Conalco, Inc. v. 
Monroe Cty. Bd. of Revision (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 129, 4 O.O.3d 309, 363 
N.E.2d 722.  In Walters v. Knox Cty. Bd. of Revision (1989), 47 Ohio St.3d 23, 
546 N.E.2d 932, syllabus, this court held that an arm’s-length transaction 
possesses three primary characteristics: (1) it is voluntary, (2) it generally takes 
place in an open market, and (3) the parties act in their own interests. 
{¶ 21} In its first proposition of law, Shiloh Auto challenges both the 
commissioner’s and the BTA’s findings that the acquisition of MTD Auto was not 
an arm’s-length transaction for Ohio tax purposes. 
{¶ 22} Shiloh Auto maintains that the commissioner erred when he found 
that the transaction was not at arm’s length because it was not conducted on the 
open market.  Shiloh Auto points out that Walters defined arm’s-length 
transactions as generally occurring on the open market and, since Walters, no 
Ohio court or administrative tribunal has held that an open market is a necessary 
element of an arm’s-length sale. 
{¶ 23} While it may be true that we have never said that an open market is 
a “necessary” element to an arm’s-length transaction, we have upheld the BTA’s 
January Term, 2008 
7 
finding that a transaction was not at arm’s length in the absence of an open-
market sale.  Kroger Co. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 
145, 147, 616 N.E.2d 877.  Indeed, we reaffirmed Kroger earlier this year, 
holding that the absence of even one of the factors set forth in Walters is 
sufficient to support a finding that a transaction was not conducted at arm’s 
length.  Strongsville Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 112 Ohio St.3d 
309, 2007-Ohio-6, 859 N.E.2d 540, at ¶ 13. 
{¶ 24} In any event, contrary to Shiloh Auto’s claim, the commissioner’s 
determination did not rest solely on the absence of an open-market transaction.  
Rather, the commissioner identified other reasons for rejecting Shiloh Auto’s 
valuation of the subject property. 
{¶ 25} First, in addition to the fact that MTD had negotiated only with 
Shiloh Industries and did not solicit other potential buyers, the commissioner 
noted the “significant relationship” between MTD and Shiloh Industries.  The 
commissioner found that the Shiloh Industries-MTD Auto transaction was not 
between independent parties, because (1) MTD had controlled 51 percent of the 
outstanding shares of Shiloh Industries prior to the sale and (2) the companies’ 
boards of directors shared common members. 
{¶ 26} Second, the commissioner found that the purchase price did not 
reflect true value in light of Shiloh Auto’s subsequent allocation of the purchase 
price to the assets acquired.  Specifically, he noted that six months prior to the 
sale, MTD Auto had recorded the net book value of its assets at $77,893,938, with 
$30,980,684 attributed to property, plant, and equipment.  But Shiloh Auto 
allocated only $3,938,509 of the total purchase price to property, plant, and 
equipment assets.  And due to contingencies in the purchase agreement, the 
commissioner noted that Shiloh Auto had further reduced its allocation for these 
assets to approximately $1.3 million by the end of the 2002 fiscal year. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 27} Finally, the commissioner attempted to determine the accuracy of 
Shiloh Auto’s valuation and allocation of assets by requesting various documents, 
including (1) disposal documentation of the assets acquired, (2) Shiloh Industries’ 
due-diligence report on the MTD Auto acquisition, and (3) a breakdown of 
accounts receivables that Shiloh Auto acquired from MTD Auto as part of the 
transaction.  However, Shiloh Auto refused to cooperate in supplying this 
information. 
{¶ 28} In sum, the nature of the transaction, the discrepancies in 
valuation, and Shiloh Auto’s undocumented purchase-price allocation led the 
commissioner to conclude that Shiloh Auto’s valuation did not reflect true value.  
Thus, we reject Shiloh Auto’s challenge to the commissioner’s final 
determination. 
{¶ 29} Shiloh Auto also contends that the BTA erred when it found that, 
due to MTD’s 51 percent ownership of Shiloh Industries, the transaction was not 
at arm’s length, because Shiloh Industries and MTD were closely related parties.  
Shiloh Auto argues that we have not adopted as part of the definition of an arm’s-
length sale a requirement that the parties be unrelated – only that they act without 
compulsion or duress and in their own interests. 
{¶ 30} The BTA did not hold that related parties cannot enter into arm’s-
length transactions.  In fact, the BTA recognized that “related parties can and do 
effect transfers at fair market prices.”  However, in this instance, the BTA found 
that the evidence – including MTD’s majority ownership interest in Shiloh 
Industries and the close relationship between the companies’ directors – supported 
a determination that Shiloh Industries and MTD did not act in their individual 
interests.  Rather, the related-party aspects of the acquisition indicated that Shiloh 
Industries and MTD had acted in their collective, mutual interests.  The BTA 
additionally noted that Shiloh Auto introduced no evidence outside the purchase 
January Term, 2008 
9 
price to support its claim that the purchase price represented the true value of the 
assets acquired. 
{¶ 31} Contrary to Shiloh Auto’s assertion, the BTA’s order did not 
establish a rule of law that transactions between related companies can never be 
arm’s-length transactions.  Rather, the BTA recognized that closely related parties 
may engage in an arm’s-length transaction, but a close relationship between 
parties to a transaction is probative evidence that the parties did not act in their 
individual interests. 
{¶ 32} Shiloh Auto, as the party seeking the reduction in value, had the 
burden to show that the commissioner’s investigation and audit, and the findings 
and assessments based thereon, were incorrect.  Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 
Rike-Kumler Div. v. Lindley (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 213, 215, 5 OBR 455, 450 
N.E.2d 687.  Shiloh Auto presented evidence to the BTA in an attempt to show 
that the acquisition of MTD Auto was an arm’s-length transaction. 
{¶ 33} Shiloh Auto as Best Suitor.  Shiloh Auto first contends that MTD 
made an “informed business judgment” that no other entity would be as interested 
in acquiring MTD Auto as – or willing to pay more than – Shiloh Industries.  
Shiloh Auto offered evidence to show that the business attributes of Shiloh 
Industries and MTD Auto were complementary, while MTD Auto’s other 
potential suitors possessed attributes largely duplicating those of MTD Auto. 
{¶ 34} Evidence at the BTA hearing showed that Shiloh Industries and 
MTD had engaged in informal discussions about merging Shiloh Industries and 
MTD Auto long before formal discussions were initiated.  Formal discussions 
were initiated at the behest of Grissinger, Shiloh Industries’ chairman, president, 
and chief executive officer, and Hessler, secretary to MTD’s board who was also 
appointed by MTD to Shiloh Industries’ board.  Once formal discussions began, 
MTD negotiated only with Shiloh Industries and never solicited other potential 
buyers.  In fact, testimony indicated that MTD never specifically considered what 
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other suitors might be willing to pay for MTD Auto as compared to what Shiloh 
Industries would pay. 
{¶ 35} We will not overrule BTA findings of fact that are based upon 
sufficient probative evidence.  R.R.Z. Assoc. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision 
(1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 198, 201, 527 N.E.2d 874.  Moreover, the BTA is vested 
with wide discretion in determining the weight to be given the evidence and the 
credibility of witnesses before it.  Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Lindley (1980), 64 
Ohio St.2d 31, 32, 18 O.O.3d 212, 413 N.E.2d 1178. 
{¶ 36} The record contains sufficient evidence to support the BTA’s 
rejection of Shiloh Auto’s claim that Shiloh Industries was MTD Auto’s most 
favorable suitor.  Because MTD Auto was not offered to other potential buyers, 
Shiloh Auto’s claim and its evidence in support are largely speculative.  And 
Shiloh Auto presented no other evidence that would establish what a disinterested 
third party might have paid for MTD Auto. 
{¶ 37} Purchase Price Approved by Unrelated Parties.  Shiloh Auto 
argues that the purchase price negotiated for MTD Auto was blessed by Baird, the 
firm hired by Shiloh Industries to act as financial advisor to the transaction.  
Shiloh Auto maintains that Baird issued an opinion that the amount paid by 
Shiloh Industries was fair. 
{¶ 38} However, the Baird opinion is of little value to Shiloh Auto here.  
The opinion indicates that the transaction was fair, from a financial point of view, 
to Shiloh Industries and its shareholders.  It does not, however, conclude that the 
final purchase price – $49,483,786 after all purchase-price adjustments under the 
purchase agreement – was fair to MTD.  In fact, Baird acknowledged that Shiloh 
Industries was acquiring MTD Auto “at a significant discount to [MTD Auto’s] 
January 31, 1999 net book value of $58.2 million.” 
{¶ 39} Moreover, Baird expressly disclaims any opinion concerning the 
value of the various assets and liabilities transferred from MTD Auto to Shiloh 
January Term, 2008 
11 
Auto.  Baird did not undertake or obtain any independent evaluation or appraisal 
of the assets or liabilities of either Shiloh Industries or MTD Auto.  Nor did Baird 
physically inspect the properties of Shiloh Industries or MTD Auto.  In short, the 
Baird opinion is based solely on financial information dealing mainly with 
revenue, with no consideration of the fair market value of the assets acquired. 
{¶ 40} Shiloh Auto also claims that an MTD lender, who had prohibited 
any sale of MTD Auto at less than fair market value, specifically acknowledged 
Baird’s opinion as evidence that the MTD Auto sale was for fair market value.  
Under a provision of a loan agreement, MTD would be in breach if it had sold 
MTD Auto for less than fair market value.  The loan agreement also required that 
the buyer provide a fairness opinion from an investment banking firm acceptable 
to MTD’s lender.  Shiloh Auto claims that the Baird opinion fulfilled this 
requirement.  We disagree. 
{¶ 41} There is no evidence from MTD’s lender that it accepted the Baird 
opinion to satisfy this provision; the only evidence on this subject came not from 
the lender, but from a former MTD officer.  Moreover, as already noted, the Baird 
opinion indicates only that the transaction was financially fair to Shiloh Industries 
and does not consider whether the sale price was fair to MTD.  The opinion gave 
no consideration of the fair market value of the assets acquired. 
{¶ 42} MTD’s Ownership Interest in Shiloh Industries.  Shiloh Auto 
contends that MTD is not Shiloh Industries’ ultimate parent corporation, either 
“directly, indirectly, or any other way.”  Shiloh Auto challenges the findings of 
the BTA and the commissioner that prior to the sale, MTD owned or controlled, 
directly or indirectly, 51 percent of the shares of Shiloh Industries common stock.  
Shiloh Auto now asserts that MTD controlled only 42.8 percent of the outstanding 
shares of Shiloh Industries because 1.1 million shares – and the voting rights to 
those shares – were held in trust by MTD’s pension fund for the benefit of current 
and future retirees. 
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{¶ 43} Tellingly, Shiloh Auto raises this claim for the first time in its third 
merit brief to this court.  Until this point, Shiloh Auto had acknowledged 
repeatedly throughout the proceedings before the commissioner, the BTA, and 
this court that MTD was the majority shareholder of Shiloh Industries.  Indeed, 
the record in this case is replete with evidence of MTD’s 51 percent ownership of 
Shiloh Industries. 
{¶ 44} Admittedly, there is evidence in the record indicating that 1.1 
million shares of Shiloh Industries stock are held in trust by MTD’s pension fund.  
Yet there is no evidence regarding the actual terms and conditions concerning the 
operation of the pension fund, whether the trustee truly operates independently of 
MTD, or how the fund’s voting rights are exercised.  In contrast, Shiloh 
Industries’ proxy statement reflects that MTD intended to vote its 51 percent 
controlling interest in Shiloh Industries stock in favor of the transaction to satisfy 
the vote requirement of the National Association of Securities Dealers.  In sum, 
the evidence in the record fully supports the commissioner and BTA findings that 
MTD owned a 51 percent controlling interest in Shiloh Industries prior to the sale 
of MTD Auto, and Shiloh Auto has failed to present sufficient evidence to show 
that those findings were clearly erroneous. 
{¶ 45} The determination whether Shiloh Industries’ purchase of MTD 
Auto was an arm’s-length transaction for personal property tax purposes is 
essentially a factual one.  The proper scope of our review in true-value cases is 
not a substitution of the BTA’s judgment on factual issues, but to determine from 
the record whether the BTA decision is supported by any probative evidence.  
Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Kosydar (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 477, 481, 8 O.O.3d 459, 
377 N.E.2d 785.  We conclude that there is sufficient evidence in the record to 
support the BTA’s decision that the transaction here was not at arm’s length.  
Accordingly, we reject Shiloh Auto’s first proposition of law. 
Proposition of Law No. 2 
January Term, 2008 
13 
{¶ 46} In its second proposition of law, Shiloh Auto contends that the 
amount paid for the assets it acquired from MTD Auto was properly allocated 
among such assets under Accounting Principles Board Opinion (“APB”) No. 16.  
APB 16 describes an accounting method used when there is a purchase of assets.  
Under this method, the value of assets is allocated in order of their liquidity (i.e., 
cash, accounts receivable, inventory, fixed assets, etc.). 
{¶ 47} We decline to address this issue because Shiloh Auto’s allocation 
under APB 16 relies exclusively on the purchase price paid to acquire MTD 
Auto’s assets.  Unless the sale was at arm’s length – a proposition the BTA 
properly rejected – the purchase price cannot be used for allocation purposes 
under APB 16.  See Buckeye Internatl., Inc. v. Limbach (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 
264, 266, 595 N.E.2d 347 (the arm’s-length nature of the sale was a precondition 
for application of APB 16).  APB 16 also does not apply where, as here, a transfer 
of assets occurs between entities under common control.  See Accounting 
Research Bulletin (“ARB”) No. 51.  Accordingly, we reject Shiloh Auto’s second 
proposition of law. 
The Commissioner’s Cross-Appeal 
{¶ 48} The commissioner has filed a cross-appeal asking us to address the 
BTA’s directive to the commissioner upon remand.  After the BTA issued its 
decision in this case, the commissioner filed a motion asking the BTA to clarify 
language remanding the case to the commissioner to apply depreciation rates in 
accordance with MTD Auto’s acquisition history.  Shiloh Auto filed its appeal to 
this court before the BTA could rule on the commissioner’s motion. 
{¶ 49} The commissioner and Shiloh Auto apparently disagree as to the 
appropriate true-value schedule that should be applied on remand to the 
commissioner.  The commissioner has asked this court “to adopt, in clear and 
explicit language, what [the commissioner] believe[s] is the plain meaning and 
effect of the BTA’s directive to the Commissioner upon remand * * *.  In other 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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words, [the commissioner] ask[s] the Court to rule on whether [his] amplification 
of the BTA’s directive is reasonable and lawful.”  The commissioner claims that 
to the extent that the BTA’s directive might be read differently from the way he 
argues it should be read, it would be unlawful and unreasonable. 
{¶ 50} The cross-appeal is premature.  The BTA can decide for itself 
whether its ruling needs to be clarified in the first instance.  If either party is 
adversely affected by the commissioner’s subsequent application of the BTA’s 
order on remand, an appeal may be perfected.  The cross-appeal is, therefore, 
dismissed. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 51} Based on the foregoing, Shiloh Auto has failed to meet its burden 
of introducing sufficient, competent evidence showing that the BTA’s decision 
was unreasonable or unlawful.  Sufficient evidence exists in the record to support 
the findings of the commissioner and the BTA.  We further find that the cross-
appeal is premature. 
{¶ 52} Accordingly, we affirm the BTA’s decision as to Shiloh Auto’s 
appeal, and we dismiss the commissioner’s cross-appeal. 
Decision affirmed  
and cross-appeal dismissed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, LANZINGER, and 
CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
O’DONNELL, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
Jones Day and Charles M. Steines, for appellant and cross-appellee. 
 
Marc Dann, Attorney General, and Barton A. Hubbard, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee and cross-appellant. 
______________________