Case Title: N.C. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dana

Citation: 

Docket Number: 374PA19

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2021-12-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
2021-NCSC-161 
No. 374PA19 
Filed 17 December 2021 
NORTH CAROLINA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. 
 
 
v. 
WILLIAM THOMAS DANA, JR., INDIVIDUALLY and as ADMINISTRATOR OF 
THE ESTATE OF PAMELA MARGUERITE DANA 
 
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a unanimous decision 
of the Court of Appeals, 267 N.C. App. 42 (2019), affirming an order entered on 2 
August 2018 by Judge Eric C. Morgan in Superior Court, Forsyth County.  Heard in 
the Supreme Court on 19 May 2021. 
 
William F. Lipscomb for plaintiff-appellant. 
 
C. Douglas Maynard, Jr., for defendant-appellee. 
 
Bailey & Dixon, L.L.P., by J.T. Crook, Philip A. Collins, and David S. Coats, 
for North Carolina Association of Defense Attorneys, amicus curiae. 
 
 
ERVIN, Justice. 
 
¶ 1 
 
The issue before us in this case involves the amount of underinsured motorist 
coverage that should be distributed to defendant William Thomas Dana, Jr., 
individually and as administrator of the estate of Pamela Marguerite Dana, from the 
policy of automobile liability insurance that Ms. Dana had purchased from plaintiff 
North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, Inc., for the purpose of 
N.C. FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. V. DANA 
2021-NCSC-161 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
compensating them for the injuries that they sustained in an accident that resulted 
from the negligence of Matthew Bronson.  After careful consideration of the record in 
light of the applicable law, we conclude that the Court of Appeals erred by affirming 
an order entered by the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the Danas 
and against Farm Bureau on 2 August 2018 in reliance upon its prior decision in N.C. 
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., Inc. v. Gurley, 139 N.C. App. 178 (2000); that its decision 
in favor of the Danas should be reversed; and that this case should be remanded to 
the Court of Appeals for further remand to Superior Court, Forsyth County, for the 
entry of a judgment consistent with the principles enunciated in this opinion. 
¶ 2 
 
On 3 February 2016, Mr. Bronson, who was intoxicated, was driving in a 
southbound direction on Old Salisbury Road in Winston-Salem when the vehicle that 
he was operating entered the northbound lane and collided with a vehicle owned by 
Ms. Dana, resulting in serious injuries to Ms. Dana and Mr. Dana, who was a 
passenger in Ms. Dana’s vehicle.  The injuries that Ms. Dana sustained ultimately 
proved fatal.  Jessica Jones, a passenger in Mr. Bronson’s vehicle, was also killed in 
the accident.  A vehicle owned and operated by Joshua Ryan Jeffries was damaged in 
the accident as well. 
¶ 3 
 
At the time of the accident, Mr. Bronson’s vehicle was covered by a policy of 
automobile insurance that had been issued by Integon National Insurance Company 
which provided bodily injury liability coverage with limits of up to $50,000 per person 
N.C. FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. V. DANA 
2021-NCSC-161 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
and $100,000 per accident.  Subject to approval by the Superior Court, Integon 
proposed to apportion the full amount of the available per accident coverage as 
follows: 
William Dana 
$32,000 
Estate of Pamela Dana 
$43,750 
Estate of Jessica Jones 
$23,500 
Joshua Jeffries 
$750 
Total 
$100,000 
 
¶ 4 
 
At the time of the accident, Ms. Dana was insured under a policy of automobile 
liability insurance issued by Farm Bureau that included underinsured motorist 
coverage with limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident.  In response 
to a claim submitted by Ms. Dana’s estate, Farm Bureau offered to pay the full per-
person limit to both Mr. Dana and the Estate, less the amount that had been received 
from Integon’s liability coverage, resulting in the following distribution: 
William Dana 
$100,000 
per-person 
underinsured 
limit 
 
 
-$32,000 Integon coverage 
 
 
$68,000 total underinsured payment 
Estate of Pamela Dana 
$100,000 per-person 
 underinsured limit 
 
 
-$43,750 Integon coverage 
 
 
$56,250 total underinsured 
 payment 
N.C. FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. V. DANA 
2021-NCSC-161 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
¶ 5 
 
In response, Mr. Dana argued that he and the Estate were entitled to the full 
amount of per-accident underinsured motorist coverage set out in the policy, less the 
amount of liability coverage that had been provided by Integon and the amount that 
had already been offered by Farm Bureau.  As a result, Farm Bureau would be 
obligated to pay a total of $124,250 to the Danas under its own proposal, while it 
would be obligated to provide a total of $200,000 in underinsured motorist coverage 
to the Danas under the proposal that they submitted, which consisted of the $300,000 
per-accident limit provided under the Farm Bureau policy less the $100,000 in 
liability coverage provided by Integon.  As a result, the Danas claimed to be entitled 
to an additional $74,750 in underinsured motorist coverage over and above the 
amount that Farm Bureau had already tendered to them. 
¶ 6 
 
On 7 August 2017, Farm Bureau filed a complaint seeking a declaratory 
judgment concerning the amount of underinsured motorist coverage that it was 
required to provide to the Danas.  After both parties filed competing motions for 
summary judgment, the trial court entered an order granting summary judgment in 
favor of the Danas on 2 August 2018.  Farm Bureau noted an appeal from the trial 
court’s order to the Court of Appeals. 
¶ 7 
 
In affirming the trial court’s order, the Court of Appeals began by noting that 
it had, in Gurley, “established a straightforward analysis to determine in what 
amount, if any, [underinsured motorist] coverage is available, given both the 
N.C. FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. V. DANA 
2021-NCSC-161 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
insurance policy in question and our [underinsured motorist] statute.”  N.C. Farm 
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 42, 44 (2019) (citing Gurley, 139 N.C. App. at 180).  The Court 
of Appeals noted that, in “decid[ing] how much coverage the insured party or parties 
are entitled to, we must consider ‘(1) the number of claimants seeking coverage under 
the [underinsured motorist] policy; and (2) whether the negligent driver’s liability 
policy was exhausted pursuant to a per-person or per-accident cap.’ ”  Id. (quoting 
Gurley, 139 N.C. App. at 181).  More specifically, the Court of Appeals noted that it 
had held in Gurley that 
[W]hen more than one claimant is seeking [underinsured 
motorist] coverage, as is the case here, how the liability 
policy was exhausted will determine the applicable 
[underinsured motorist] limit.  In particular, when the 
negligent driver’s liability policy was exhausted pursuant 
to the per-person cap, the [underinsured motorist] policy’s 
per-person cap will be the applicable limit.  However, when 
the liability policy was exhausted pursuant to the per-
accident cap, the applicable [underinsured motorist] limit 
will be the [underinsured motorist] policy’s per-accident 
cap. 
Id. (quoting Gurley, 139 N.C. App. at 181).  In view of the fact that the parties had 
stipulated that the Danas were entitled to collect some amount of underinsured 
motorist coverage and the fact that “the negligent driver’s liability coverage was 
exhausted pursuant to the per-accident cap,” the Court of Appeals held that “Gurley 
mandates [that] the [Danas] are collectively entitled to receive coverage pursuant to 
the per-accident cap of $300,000.”  Id.  As a result, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
N.C. FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. V. DANA 
2021-NCSC-161 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
trial court’s order.  This Court granted Farm Bureau’s petition for discretionary 
review of the Court of Appeals’ decision. 
¶ 8 
 
Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions, answers 
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law.”  N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2019). 
Our standard of review of an appeal from summary 
judgment is de novo; such judgment is appropriate only 
when the record shows that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and that any party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law.  When considering a motion for summary 
judgment, the trial judge must view the presented evidence 
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  If the 
movant demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to 
present specific facts which establish the presence of a 
genuine factual dispute for trial.  Nevertheless, if there is 
any question as to the weight of evidence summary 
judgment should be denied. 
In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573–74 (2008) (cleaned up).  In light of the parties’ 
agreement that the present record does not reveal the existence of any material issue 
of disputed fact, the only issue that remains for our resolution in this case is whether 
one party or the other is entitled to the entry of judgment in its favor as a matter of 
law. 
¶ 9 
 
The North Carolina Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act was 
enacted to ensure that every motor vehicle operator in North Carolina has “proof of 
N.C. FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. V. DANA 
2021-NCSC-161 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
ability to be able to respond in damages for liability [ ] on account of accidents . . . 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle.”  N.C.G.S. § 20-
279.1(11) (2019).  For that reason, the Financial Responsibility Act prohibits the 
registration of any vehicle in North Carolina unless the owner maintains “proof of 
financial responsibility” in the form of a policy of liability insurance, with such 
policies being required to conform to the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 20-309(b) and to 
enable the owner to pay damages in the amount of $30,000 “because of bodily injury 
to or death of one person in any one accident, and, subject to said limit for one person, 
in the amount of” $60,000 “because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons 
in any one accident.”  N.C.G.S. § 20-279.1(11).  The Financial Responsibility Act’s 
requirement that “each automobile owner [must] carry a minimum amount of liability 
insurance providing coverage for the named insured as well as any other person using 
the automobile with the express or implied permission of the named insured” is 
written into every policy of automobile insurance that is subject to the Financial 
Responsibility Act as a matter of law.  Integon Indem. Corp. v. Universal 
Underwriters Ins. Co., 342 N.C. 166, 167 (1995) (citing N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(2)).  
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chantos, 293 N.C. 431, 441 (1977). 
¶ 10 
 
According to N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(2), a policy of automobile liability 
insurance must protect the named insured or a permissive user 
against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such 
N.C. FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. V. DANA 
2021-NCSC-161 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the [United States] . . . 
subject to limits exclusive of interest and costs, with 
respect to each motor vehicle as follows: [$30,000] because 
of bodily injury to or death of one person in any one 
accident and, subject to said limit for one person, [$60,000] 
because of bodily injury or death to two or more persons in 
any one accident, and [$25,000] because of injury to or 
destruction of property of others in any one accident. 
Although the manner in which the limitation of liability provisions of N.C.G.S. § 20-
279.21(b)(2) is intended to operate is relatively clear, this case involves underinsured 
motorist, rather than liability, coverage. 
¶ 11 
 
The underinsured motorist coverage that is made available pursuant to 
N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) applies “when, by reason of payment of judgment or 
settlement, all liability bonds or insurance policies providing coverage for bodily 
injury caused by the ownership, maintenance, or use of the underinsured vehicle have 
been exhausted.”  N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4); see also Lunsford v. Mills, 367 N.C. 618, 
626 (2014) (stating that N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21 “was passed to address circumstances 
where the tortfeasor has insurance, but his coverage is in an amount insufficient to 
compensate the injured party for his full damages”) (cleaned up).  In order to 
determine whether an injured party’s underinsured motorist coverage applies in 
accordance with the Financial Responsibility Act, a reviewing court must begin by 
ascertaining whether the tortfeasor’s vehicle was an “uninsured highway vehicle” and 
whether the tortfeasor’s liability policy has been exhausted.  N.C.G.S. § 20-
279.21(b)(4).  In this case, the parties agree that Mr. Bronson’s vehicle is an 
N.C. FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. V. DANA 
2021-NCSC-161 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
“underinsured highway vehicle” given that the sum of his limits of liability, which 
consisted of coverage in a per-person amount of $50,000 and a per-accident amount 
of $60,000, was less than the limits of underinsured motorist coverage applicable to 
Ms. Dana’s vehicle, which consisted of per-person coverage of $100,000 and per-
accident coverage of $300,000, and that Mr. Bronson’s liability was exhausted by 
Integon’s proposed distribution of the $100,000 in per-accident coverage among the 
various claimants.  Thus, since the underinsured motorist coverage available with 
respect to Ms. Dana’s vehicle applies, the next step in the required analysis is to 
calculate the amount of coverage that is available to the Danas under the Farm 
Bureau policy. 
¶ 12 
 
As we have already noted, the statutory provisions governing underinsured 
motorist coverage are contained in N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) which is, to say the 
absolute least, a lengthy and complicated statutory subsection that contains a 
considerable amount of language that seems to bear upon the proper resolution of the 
issue that is before us in this case.  Among other things, N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) 
provides that “[t]he limits of such underinsured motorist bodily injury coverage shall 
be equal to the highest limits of bodily injury coverage for any one vehicle insured 
under the policy,” subject to certain maximum limitations that are not relevant in 
this instance.  In addition, N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) provides that “the limits [of 
underinsured motorist coverage] shall be equal to the limits of uninsured motorist 
N.C. FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. V. DANA 
2021-NCSC-161 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
bodily injury coverage”; that an “underinsured highway vehicle” is one in which “the 
sum of the limits of liability under all” applicable coverage “is less than the applicable 
limits of underinsured motorist coverage for the vehicle involved in the accident” or 
“the total amount actually paid to that person . . . is less than the applicable limits of 
underinsured motorists coverage for the vehicle involved in the accident”; and that a 
“highway vehicle” is not an “underinsured motor vehicle . . . unless the owner’s policy 
insuring that vehicle provides underinsured motorist coverage with limits that are 
greater than that policy’s bodily injury liability limits.”  Furthermore, N.C.G.S. § 20-
279.21(b)(4) provides that exhaustion of the available liability coverage occurs when 
either “the limits of liability per claim have been paid upon the claim” or, “by reason 
of multiple claims, the aggregate per occurrence limit of liability has been paid.” 
¶ 13 
 
In addition to these references to the issue of the limitation of liability 
contained in those portions of the relevant statutory provision defining when a vehicle 
is an “uninsured highway vehicle,” N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) states that “the limit 
of underinsured motorist coverage applicable to any claim is determined to be the 
difference between the amount paid to the claimant under the exhausted liability 
policy or policies and the limit of underinsured motorist coverage applicable to the 
motor vehicle involved in the accident” and that, in the event that the “claimant is an 
insured under the underinsured motorist coverage on separate or additional policies, 
the limit of underinsured motorist coverage applicable to the claimant is the 
N.C. FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. V. DANA 
2021-NCSC-161 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
difference between the amount paid to the claimant under the exhausted liability 
policy or policies and the total limits of the claimant’s underinsured motorist 
coverages as determined by combining the highest limit available under each policy,” 
with “[t]he underinsured motorist limits applicable to any one motor vehicle under a 
policy [to not] be combined with or added to the limits applicable to any other motor 
vehicle under that policy.” 
¶ 14 
 
The repeated references to the issue of the limitation of liability contained in 
N.C.G.S. § 202-79.21(b)(4) prevent us from concluding that the relevant statutory 
language does not speak to the issue that is before us in this case.  In light of the fact 
that the expressions “limit of liability” and “limits of liability” appear repeatedly in 
N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4), it is difficult for us to conclude that these expressions have 
no meaning, a result that, if adopted by the Court, would allow insurers to have a 
significant degree of flexibility in drafting policies as they see fit.1  Such an outcome 
is inconsistent with the consumer protection considerations that motivated the 
enactment of N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21.  As a result, since the relevant statutory language 
is not silent, the determinative issue for purposes of this case is how the statutory 
                                            
1 Although numerous other statutory provisions that grant significant regulatory 
authority to the Commissioner of Insurance, none of them govern the manner in which the 
amount of underinsured motorist coverage is to be disbursed, a fact that reduces the 
likelihood that the General Assembly intended to remain silent with respect to the issue that 
is before us in this case. 
N.C. FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. V. DANA 
2021-NCSC-161 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
references to the limitation of liability found in N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) should be 
construed. 
¶ 15 
 
As we have already suggested, the specific statutory language concerning the 
limitation of liability contained in N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(2), which clearly 
contemplates both a per-person and a per-accident limit of liability and makes the 
per-accident limit subject to the per-person limit, is not directly incorporated into the 
relevant provisions of N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4).  On the other hand, N.C.G.S. § 20-
279.21(b)(4) clearly refers to both a “limit” and “limits” of liability.  Although the 
absence of a direct incorporation of the concept of per-person and per-accident limits 
of liability as set out in N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(2) into the relevant portions of 
N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) and the use of both singular and plural language in 
N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) prevents us from concluding that the relevant statutory 
language is clear and unambiguous, such a determination is only the first step that 
must be taken in order to resolve the specific issue that is before us in this case. 
¶ 16 
 
“Legislative intent controls the meaning of a statute.”  Brown v. Flowe, 349 
N.C. 520, 522 (1998) (quoting Shelton v. Morehead Mem’l Hosp., 318 N.C. 76, 81 
(1986)). 
The intent of the General Assembly may be found first from 
the plain language of the statute, then from legislative 
history, “the spirit of the act and what the act seeks to 
accomplish.”  If the language of the statute is clear, the 
court must implement the statute according to the plain 
meaning of its terms so long as it is reasonable to do so.” 
N.C. FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. V. DANA 
2021-NCSC-161 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
Lenox, Inc. v. Tolson, 353 N.C. 659, 664 (2001) (citation omitted) (quoting Polaroid 
Corp. v. Offerman, 349 N.C. 290, 297 (1998)).  Courts should give effect to the words 
actually used in a statute and should neither delete words that are used nor insert 
words that are not used into the relevant statutory language during the statutory 
construction process.  Lunsford v. Mills, 367 N.C. 618, 623 (2014).  “[U]ndefined words 
are accorded their plain meaning so long as it is reasonable to do so.”  Polaroid v. 
Offerman, 349 N.C. 290, 297 (1998), abrogated on other grounds by Lenox, Inc. v. 
Tolson, 353 N.C.  659 (2001).  Finally, statutes should be construed so that the 
resulting construction “harmonizes with the underlying reason and purpose of the 
statute.”  Electric Supply Co. v. Swain Elec. Co., 328 N.C. 651, 656 (1991).  “The 
purpose of this State’s compulsory motor vehicle insurance laws, of which the 
underinsured motorist provisions are a part, was and is the protection of innocent 
victims who may be injured by financially irresponsible motorists,” Proctor v. N.C. 
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 324 N.C. 221, 224 (1989), so that, in the event that the 
statutory language in which the Financial Responsibility Act is couched is 
ambiguous, the statute “will be liberally construed so that the [statute’s] beneficial 
purpose is accomplished.”  Moore v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. Grp., 270 N.C. 532, 535 
(1967). 
¶ 17 
 
The terms “limit of liability” and “limits of liability,” while not statutorily 
defined, do have well-understood meanings in insurance-related contexts, with there 
N.C. FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. V. DANA 
2021-NCSC-161 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
being no reason that we can see for departing from those well-recognized meanings 
in this case.  In addition, we are not persuaded, in light of the complexity of the 
language in which N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) is couched, that too much emphasis 
should be placed upon the General Assembly’s use of the singular, rather than the 
plural, in attempting to construe the relevant statutory language.  Our construction 
of the relevant provisions of N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) will be undertaken in light of 
these two fundamental premises. 
¶ 18 
 
A careful reading of the relevant portions of N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) satisfies 
us that the references to “limit,” stated in the singular, occur in instances in which 
the General Assembly is referring to a single limit rather than to a collection of limits, 
such as the per-person and per-accident limits of liability that appear to be standard 
in most automobile liability insurance policies.  Although one could argue that this 
language means that there is one, and only one, limit of liability that should be 
deemed applicable to any particular claim for all purposes, it seems to us that the 
relevant expression is equally, if not more, consistent with an interpretation of the 
relevant statutory language that assumes that the relevant limit of liability has 
already been determined on the basis of other considerations rather than as 
compelling the conclusion that any particular limit of liability should be deemed 
controlling for all relevant purposes.  As a result, an examination of the literal 
statutory language suggests to us that the relevant provisions in N.C.G.S. § 20-
N.C. FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. V. DANA 
2021-NCSC-161 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
279.21(b)(4) tend to incorporate, at least by implication, the traditional use of both 
per-person and per-accident liability limits that insurers, policyholders, and policy 
makers are all familiar with and that are explicitly stated in N.C.G.S. § 20-
279.21(b)(2) rather than requiring the use of a “one size fits all” rule focusing upon a 
single limit that is applicable in all situations. 
¶ 19 
 
In addition, the references to both per-person and per-accident liability limits 
in the underinsured motorist context does not seem to us to be foreclosed by the 
relevant statutory language.  The use of the singular “limit” in the sentence with 
which the second paragraph of N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) begins strikes us as a pretty 
slender reed upon which to base a conclusion that the per-person and per-accident 
limits of liability may not both be applicable in determining the amount to be paid to 
any particular claimant (as compared to determining whether a particular vehicle is 
an “underinsured highway vehicle” or as to whether the amounts paid to all 
claimants, considered in their entirety, are subject to the per-person or the per-
accident limit).  We are unable to discern any reason why the General Assembly 
would have intended to preclude the use of both per-person and per-accident liability 
limitations in determining the maximum amount of underinsured motorist coverage 
that is available for payment to any individual claimant and believe that the most 
reasonable reading of the relevant statutory language provides for a common sense 
resolution of the dispute that is before us in this case, which is that, in cases involving 
N.C. FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. V. DANA 
2021-NCSC-161 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
multiple claimants, the total amount of uninsured motorist coverage available to 
those claimants (considering both the available liability coverage and the available 
underinsured motorist coverage) is limited by the per-accident limit and that the total 
amount of coverage available to any individual claimant is constrained by the per-
person limit. 
¶ 20 
 
Although the purpose of N.C.G.S.§ 20-279.21 is, of course, to provide protection 
for innocent victims of motor vehicle negligence, that fact does not inevitably require 
that one interpret the relevant statutory language to produce the maximum possible 
recovery for persons injured as a result of motor vehicle negligence regardless of any 
other consideration.  Instead, the usual rules of statutory construction govern the 
interpretation of N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4), subject to the caveat that the relevant 
statutory language should be construed to produce the greatest possible protection 
for the innocent victims of negligent conduct permitted by a reasonable interpretation 
of the relevant statutory language.  In the absence of something in the relevant 
statutory language that otherwise compels such a result, we are unable to conclude 
that the General Assembly intended N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) to be applied in a 
manner that fails to take into account the existence of multiple limits of liability and 
places an injured party in a more favorable position than he or she would have 
occupied had the tortfeasor been fully insured.  In light of the fact that the relevant 
statutory language can be construed in such a manner as to avoid such a result, this 
N.C. FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. V. DANA 
2021-NCSC-161 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
case is appropriately resolved in such a manner as to make the total amount of 
underinsured coverage payments received by the claimants subject to per-accident 
limit of liability while limiting the amount received by any individual claimant by the 
per-person liability limit. 
¶ 21 
 
In reaching this conclusion, we do not believe that we are limited, in construing 
N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4), to the options of making the per-person limit controlling 
for all purposes, to make the per-accident limit controlling for all purposes, to adopt 
the Gurley rule, or to treat the relevant statutory language as silent.  Although a 
number of analytical approaches could conceivably be available to resolve the 
problem that this case presents for our consideration, it does not seem to us that 
treating the relevant statutory provision as silent can be squared with the numerous 
references to limits of liability that appear in N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4), which must, 
as we have already noted, be construed as meaning something.2  In addition, we see 
no reason for concluding that the question that is before us in this case must be 
resolved by using either the per-person or per-accident limits to the exclusion of the 
other in light of either the relevant statutory language or the traditional 
understanding of the manner in which issues relating to limits of liability should be 
                                            
2 Admittedly, N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) does not directly and explicitly address the 
issue that is before us in this case.  However, a statutory provision does not have to explicitly 
and directly address a particular issue in order for it to have a particular meaning.  In re 
Ernst & Young, LLP, 363 N.C. 612, 616 (2009) (stating that, even if “the statute is ambiguous 
or unclear, we must interpret the statute to give effect to the legislative intent”). 
N.C. FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. V. DANA 
2021-NCSC-161 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
resolved.  Instead, a hybrid approach of the type that we have set out above seems to 
us to be most reflective of likely legislative and shareholder expectations as to the 
amount of coverage that should be available to any particular claimant. 
¶ 22 
 
Admittedly, the decision of the Court of Appeals in Gurley, upon which the 
Court of Appeals and the Danas have relied in this case, has been on the books for 
almost two decades without having been disturbed by the General Assembly.  In 
ordinary circumstances, we would be inclined to give the General Assembly’s 
acquiescence in that decision near-controlling effect.  However, we cannot agree that 
the canon of legislative acquiescence, Young v. Woodell, 343 N.C. 459, 462–63 (1996) 
(stating that “[t]he failure of the legislature to amend a statute which has been 
interpreted by a court is some evidence that the legislature approves of the court’s 
interpretation), should be deemed controlling in this instance given that the Court of 
Appeals described the rule that it adopted in Gurley as having the effect of avoiding 
an “interpret[ation] of the statute that . . . would result in defendants receiving more 
compensation than if [the tortfeasor] had been either fully insured or uninsured 
altogether.”  Gurley, 139 N.C. App. at 182.  In view of the fact that applying the rule 
adopted in Gurley to the facts in this case would have exactly the effect that the rule 
in question was explicitly intended to avoid, it is difficult for us to afford any weight 
in the interpretive process to the General Assembly’s failure to modify the relevant 
provisions of N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) to account for the likelihood that Gurley 
N.C. FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. V. DANA 
2021-NCSC-161 
Opinion of the Court 
 
 
 
would be applied in a mechanical manner to produce a result that Gurley itself 
appears to have been intended to avoid. 
¶ 23 
 
Thus, for all of these reasons, we conclude that the Court of Appeals’ decision 
in this case should be reversed.  Although the principle enunciated in Gurley may 
well produce results that cohere with the likely legislative intent in many instances, 
the facts of this case demonstrate that its application can, in some instances, result 
in the payment of an amount that exceeds the per-person limit in cases involving 
multiple claimants.  However, the relevant statutory language most readily supports 
the use of an approach that determines the amount to be paid to any particular 
claimant by treating the per-accident amount of underinsured motorist coverage as 
the total sum that is available to all of the claimants entitled to a share of the 
available underinsured motorist coverage, subject to the caveat that the amount of 
underinsured motorist coverage that is available to any individual claimant is limited 
to the per-person amount.  As a result, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed 
and this case is remanded to Superior Court, Forsyth County, for the entry of a 
judgment declaring that the total amount of underinsured coverage made available 
to the Danas collectively is to be set at the per-accident limit, with no individual 
claimant to receive more than the per-person limit. 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice EARLS concurring. 
¶ 24 
 
I join fully in the majority’s well-reasoned examination of N.C.G.S. § 20-
279.21(b)(4) and in the conclusion that the provision incorporates “the traditional use 
of both per person and per accident liability limits that insurers, policyholders, and 
policy makers are all familiar with and that are explicitly stated in N.C.G.S. § 20-
279.21(b)(2) rather than requiring the use of a particular limit of liability in any 
particular case.” Further, I agree with the majority that although the FRA must be 
construed in light of the General Assembly’s clear intent to protect innocent victims 
of automobile accidents from financial ruin, we must determine the meaning of 
N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) by applying our longstanding principles of statutory 
interpretation. Application of these principles in this case requires us to reverse the 
decision below. I write separately only to provide further explanation as to why I 
believe the effect of this Court’s decision is to overrule a settled precedent of the Court 
of Appeals, N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gurley, 139 N.C. App. 178 (2000), and 
why I believe doing so is justified, notwithstanding the parties’ potential reliance 
interests which are implicated in departing from the rule endorsed in that case. 
¶ 25 
 
The rule as stated in Gurley was that when an insured seeks UIM benefits 
from his or her insurer after an accident caused by a negligent driver, the insured’s 
UIM benefits will be paid out up to the limit utilized by the negligent driver’s primary 
liability insurer. If the negligent driver’s primary liability insurer pays out on a per-
 
N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dana 
2021-NCSC-161 
Earls, J., concurring 
 
 
 
person basis, the insured’s UIM provider pays out on a per-person basis; if the 
negligent driver’s primary liability insurer pays out on a per-accident basis, the 
insured’s UIM provider pays out on a per-accident basis. Gurley, 139 N.C. App. at 
181. Thus, if the Gurley rule were applied in this case, the Danas would be entitled 
to collect up to the per-accident limit provided under their UIM policy, because Mr. 
Bronson’s insurer paid out on a per-accident basis. As a result, the Danas would 
receive payments in excess of the per-person limit contained in their own UIM policy.  
¶ 26 
 
As the majority correctly notes, this result plainly contravenes the purpose of 
the Gurley rule, which was crafted to avoid “giv[ing] defendants a windfall simply 
because they were involved in an accident with an underinsured motorist, as opposed 
to an insured or uninsured motorist.” 139 N.C. App. at 182–83. The approach the 
majority adopts instead subjects the Dana’s UIM claim to the per person coverage 
limit contained in their UIM policy, whether or not Mr. Bronson’s primary liability 
insurer pays out by applying the per-person or per-accident limit. Thus, even though 
it may be correct that “the principle enunciated in Gurley may well produce results 
that cohere with the likely legislative intent in many instances,” we should not hide 
from the fact that the legal rule Gurley announced has been supplanted. 
¶ 27 
 
Of course, this Court “is not bound by precedents established by the Court of 
Appeals.” N. Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Lacy J. Miller Mach. Co., Inc., 311 N.C. 62, 76 (1984). 
Regardless of what the Court of Appeals held in Gurley, Gurley does not control our 
N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dana 
2021-NCSC-161 
Earls, J., concurring 
 
 
 
disposition of the appeal presently before us. Our role when reviewing a matter “after 
a determination by the Court of Appeals . . . is to determine whether there is error of 
law[.]” N.C. R. App. P. 16. When tasked with discerning the meaning of a North 
Carolina statute, even one which has previously been interpreted by the Court of 
Appeals, we approach the task with fresh eyes, adopting the reasoning deployed and 
outcome reached by our colleagues below only to the extent we find their reasoning 
persuasive and their outcome correct. 
¶ 28 
 
Nevertheless, this Court should explain why we are overruling a lower court 
decision, rather than simply invoking our authority to do so. Although “[o]nly this 
Court may authoritatively construe the Constitution and laws of North Carolina with 
finality,” Lea Co. v. N.C. Bd. of Transp., 308 N.C. 603, 610 (1983), most legal questions 
are ably resolved in the first instance by the Court of Appeals. In many areas of the 
law, and given the way cases come to this Court, it may be a long time before this 
Court has cause to weigh in on the precise issue addressed in a decision below. During 
this intervening period after the Court of Appeals has decided an issue but before this 
Court has taken it up, the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of a state law controls, 
and parties reasonably order their affairs in accordance with the Court of Appeals’ 
disposition of the issue.  
¶ 29 
 
In my view, such circumstances are present in this case. More than twenty 
years ago, the Court of Appeals was confronted with the question now before us and 
N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dana 
2021-NCSC-161 
Earls, J., concurring 
 
 
 
concluded that “the applicable UIM limit under [N.C.G.S.] § 20–279.21(b)(4) will 
depend on two factors: (1) the number of claimants seeking coverage under the UIM 
policy; and (2) whether the negligent driver's liability policy was exhausted pursuant 
to a per-person or per-accident cap.” Gurley, 139 N.C. App. at 181. For the reasons 
incisively described by the majority, I believe the legal rule Gurley articulated is 
inconsistent with the applicable statutes and should be overruled. Still, I am 
cognizant of the potential unfairness which arises when we disturb an interpretation 
of a statutory provision that has governed for two decades, especially when the 
statutory provision being interpreted is, by law, necessarily incorporated into every 
contract for automobile insurance executed in this state. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. 
Co., Inc. v. Lunsford, 378 N.C. 181, 2021-NCSC-83, ¶ 19 (“[A]ll automobile accident 
insurance policies executed in North Carolina necessarily incorporate North 
Carolina's FRA.”).  
¶ 30 
 
“[L]aws which subsist at the time and place of the making of a contract . . . 
enter into and form a part of it, as if they were expressly referred to or incorporated 
in its terms.” N.C. Ass’n of Educators, Inc. v. State, 368 N.C. 777, 789 (2016). This 
includes interpretations of statutory provisions pronounced by the Court of Appeals 
which are not inconsistent with any decision of this Court. Cf., Lynch v. Universal 
Life Church, 775 F.2d 576, 580 (4th Cir. 1985) (“The North Carolina Court of Appeals 
is a court of statewide jurisdiction, and its decisions are binding on state trial courts 
N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dana 
2021-NCSC-161 
Earls, J., concurring 
 
 
 
in the absence of a conflicting decision by the North Carolina Supreme Court.”). When 
Farm Bureau and Ms. Dana entered into a contract for automobile insurance, the 
terms of their contract necessarily incorporated N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4), which 
until today meant what the Court of Appeals said it meant in Gurley. 
¶ 31 
 
These reliance interests alone do not displace our “duty . . . to declare what the 
law is.” S. Ry. Co. v. Cherokee Cty., 177 N.C. 86, 88 (1919). But I do believe that these 
reliance interests justify us treating the Court of Appeals’ decision, and the rationale 
behind it, as weighty. When tasked with examining a decision of the Court of Appeals 
interpreting a North Carolina statutory provision which was decided a substantial 
period of time in the past and which is not in tension with any decision of this Court 
interpreting the same provision, I would accord that decision something akin to the 
respect we accord a prior precedent of this Court under the doctrine of stare decisis.  
¶ 32 
 
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, we adhere to prior decisions of this Court 
“both out of respect for the opinions of our predecessors and because it promotes 
stability in the law and uniformity in its application.” Wiles v. Construction Co., 295 
N.C. 81, 85 (1978). When considering whether or not to depart from prior precedent, 
I reiterate my view that we should start with the factors articulated by the United 
States Supreme Court, which include “the quality of [ ] reasoning [of the precedent 
being challenged], the workability of the rule it established, its consistency with other 
related decisions, developments since the decision was handed down, and reliance on 
N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dana 
2021-NCSC-161 
Earls, J., concurring 
 
 
 
the decision.” State v. Hilton, 378 N.C. 692, 2021-NCSC-115, ¶ 78 (Earls, J., 
dissenting) (alterations in the original) (quoting Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., 
& Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478–79 (2018)). 
¶ 33 
 
Applying these factors to the present case, I would conclude that, 
notwithstanding any potential reliance interests, the rule articulated in Gurley 
should be displaced. I agree with the majority that the parties would have had cause 
to doubt that Gurley could sustain the outcome which resulted in the proceedings 
below, given the clear intent animating the Court of Appeals’ decision in that case. 
Regardless, whatever reliance interests may have existed are outweighed by the 
unmistakable fact that the Gurley rule is irreconcilable with the text, structure, and 
purpose of the FRA generally and N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) specifically, as the 
majority has persuasively explained. Therefore, I agree with the majority that the 
Court of Appeals’ decision in this case should be reversed. As a consequence, the 
interpretation of N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) offered in Gurley is no longer governing 
law and is no longer incorporated into automobile insurance contracts executed in 
this state.  
 
 
 
 
 
Justice BERGER concurring.  
¶ 34 
 
On appeal to this Court, Farm Bureau argues that the Court of Appeals erred 
when it affirmed the trial court’s determination that Mr. Dana and the Estate must 
be paid pursuant to the per accident limit in the parties’ UIM agreement.  I agree 
with the majority that the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in 
favor of Mr. Dana and the Estate, and the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed 
the trial court’s decision.   
¶ 35 
 
I disagree with the majority about the reason why the claims in this case are 
governed by the per person limitations.  The majority concedes that the North 
Carolina Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act (FRA) only “seems” 
to apply here.  In my opinion, the FRA does not address the particular question at 
issue in this case.  Because the issue here is not addressed by the FRA, but is 
specifically addressed by terms of the insurance policy at issue, the terms of the policy 
must control.  Therefore, I concur only in the result reached by the majority.   
¶ 36 
 
The FRA was enacted to ensure that every motor vehicle in the State has “proof 
of ability to respond in damages for liability[ ] on account of accidents . . . arising out 
of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle[.]”  N.C.G.S. § 20-279.1(11) 
(2019).  The FRA prohibits the registration of any automobile in North Carolina 
unless the owner maintains “proof of financial responsibility” in the form of a liability 
insurance policy.  Policies must conform with the requirements of N.C.G.S. § 20-
 
N.C. FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. CO. V. DANA 
2021-NCSC-161 
Berger, J., concurring  
 
 
 
309(b), and demonstrate the owner’s ability to pay damages in the amount of  
($30,000) because of bodily injury to or death of one person 
in any one accident, and, subject to said limit for one 
person, in the amount of . . . ($60,000) because of bodily 
injury to or death of two or more persons in any one 
accident[.]  
N.C.G.S. § 20-279.1(11) (2019) (emphasis added).  In other words, if the operator of a 
motor vehicle causes an accident, the owner’s liability policy must be able to provide 
at least $30,000 in damages to each person and at least $60,000 per accident.   
¶ 37 
 
The requirement of the FRA that “each automobile owner [is] to carry a 
minimum amount of liability insurance providing coverage for the named insured as 
well as any other person using the automobile with the express or implied permission 
of the named insured” is written into every automobile policy subject to the FRA as a 
matter of law.  Integon Indem. Corp. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 342 N.C. 166, 
168, 463 S.E.2d 389, 390–91 (1995) (citing N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(2)); Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chantos, 293 N.C. 431, 441, 238 S.E.2d 597, 604 (1977)).  Pursuant 
to N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(2), general liability coverage must insure the vehicle’s 
owner or permitted operator 
against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages 
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of such 
motor vehicle or motor vehicles within the [U.S.] . . . subject 
to limits exclusive of interest and costs, with respect to 
each such motor vehicle, as follows: [$30,000] because of 
bodily injury to or death of one person in any one accident 
and, subject to said limit for one person, [$60,000] because 
of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any 
N.C. FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. CO. V. DANA 
2021-NCSC-161 
Berger, J., concurring  
 
 
 
one accident, and [$25,000] because of injury to or 
destruction of property of others in any one accident[.] 
N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(2) (emphasis added).   
¶ 38 
 
Farm Bureau correctly contends that the “subject to said limit for one person” 
language in N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(2) prohibits an injured individual from 
recovering more than the per person limit for general liability claims.  This is true 
because recovery of two or more individuals in any one accident is limited to “said 
limit for any one person” under the plain language of the statute.  See N.C.G.S. § 20-
279.21(b)(2) ($60,000 is available “because of bodily injury to or death of two or more 
persons[.]”).  The “subject to” language of N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(2) is superfluous 
under any other reading of the statute.1   
¶ 39 
 
However, the case before us does not concern the applicable limits of Ms. 
Dana’s general liability insurance.  Rather, this case deals with her UIM policy.  UIM 
                                            
1 When construing similarly worded statutes, other jurisdictions have held that if 
recovery is not limited by the per person limit, then the per accident limit would be the only 
limit applicable, regardless of the number of injured parties.  See Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. 
v. Buckallew, 246 Mich. App. 607, 618, 633 N.W.2d 473, 479 (2001) (holding that two 
claimants were limited to the “per person” limit because of “explicit policy language making 
the per occurrence limit ‘subject to’ the per person limit”); American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Gardner, 957 S.W. 2d 367, 369 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (limiting recoveries of multiple claimants 
to the $100,000 “per person” limit because the $300,000 per occurrence limit was “subject to” 
the “per person” limit); Livingston v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Washington, 79 Wash. App. 72, 79, 
900 P.2d 575, 578 (1995) (holding that, where the $300,000 per accident UIM limit was 
“subject to” the per person limit, the “policies unambiguously limit[ed]” the two claimants’ 
recovery to $100,000 per person); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Devlin, 11 Cal. App. 4th 81, 86, 
13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 795, 798 (1992) (limiting the two claimants’ recovery to the $100,000 per 
person limit because the $300,000 per accident limit was “subject to” the per person limit). 
N.C. FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. CO. V. DANA 
2021-NCSC-161 
Berger, J., concurring  
 
 
 
coverage under N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) applies “when, by reason of payment of 
judgment or settlement, all liability bonds or insurance policies providing coverage 
for bodily injury caused by the ownership, maintenance, or use of the underinsured 
highway vehicle have been exhausted.”  N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4).  See also Lunsford 
v. Mills, 367 N.C. 618, 626, 766 S.E.2d 297, 303 (2014) (“Section 20-279.21 was passed 
to address circumstances where the tortfeasor has insurance, but his or her coverage 
is in an amount insufficient to compensate the injured party for his or her full 
damages.” (cleaned up)).  Here, because Mr. Bronson’s exhausted general liability 
insurance was insufficient to fully compensate Mr. Dana and the Estate, both 
submitted claims under Ms. Dana’s UIM policy.   
¶ 40 
 
To determine whether an injured party’s UIM coverage applies under the FRA, 
we must consider whether (1) the tortfeasor’s automobile was an “underinsured 
highway vehicle” and (2) the tortfeasor’s liability policy was exhausted.  N.C.G.S. § 
20-279.21(b)(4).  If UIM coverage is triggered, then the amount of coverage must be 
calculated by determining “the difference between the amount paid to the claimant 
under the exhausted liability policy or policies and the limit of underinsured motorist 
coverage applicable to the motor vehicle involved in the accident.”  Id.   
¶ 41 
 
An underinsured highway vehicle is “a highway vehicle with respect to the 
ownership, maintenance, or use of which, the sum of the limits of liability under all 
bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies applicable at the time of the 
N.C. FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. CO. V. DANA 
2021-NCSC-161 
Berger, J., concurring  
 
 
 
accident is less than the applicable limits of underinsured motorist coverage for the 
vehicle involved in the accident and insured under the owner’s policy.”  N.C.G.S. § 
20-279.21(b)(4).  Here, the tortfeasor’s automobile qualifies as an “underinsured 
highway vehicle” because the sum of Mr. Bronson’s limits of liability ($50,000 per 
person and $100,000 per accident) was less than the applicable limits of UIM 
coverage for Ms. Dana’s vehicle ($100,000 per person and $300,000 per accident).  
Further, the tortfeasor’s liability policy was exhausted by Integon’s proposal to 
apportion the entire $100,000 per accident limit amongst the injured parties.  
Accordingly, Ms. Dana’s UIM coverage applies, and we must calculate the amount 
available under Ms. Dana’s UIM coverage.  The question is whether the amount of 
coverage is governed by the FRA or the insurance policy.   
¶ 42 
 
“[W]hen a statute is applicable to the terms of an insurance policy, the 
provisions of the statute become a part of the policy as if written into it.”  Bray v. N.C. 
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 341 N.C. 678, 682, 462 S.E.2d 650 (1995).  Thus, the 
policy is construed in accordance with its written terms unless a binding statute, 
regulation, or order requires a different construction.  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Shelby Mut. 
Ins. Co., 269 N.C. 341, 345, 152 S.E.2d 436, 440 (1967); N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. 
Co., Inc. v. Lunsford, 2021-NCSC-83, ¶ 37, 378 N.C. 181, 196, 861 S.E.2d 705, 716 
(2021) (Barringer, J., dissenting). 
  
N.C. FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. CO. V. DANA 
2021-NCSC-161 
Berger, J., concurring  
 
 
 
¶ 43 
 
The majority concedes the FRA does not specifically address this situation.  
Thus, we should follow our precedent.  When the FRA language does not address a 
specific situation, we look to that of the policy.  “Language in a policy of insurance is 
the determining factor in resolving coverage questions unless that language is in 
conflict with applicable statutory provisions governing such coverage.”  Lanning v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 332 N.C. 309, 312, 420 S.E.2d 180, 182 (1992).  As the majority 
acknowledges, the plain language of N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) does not address 
whether the UIM per accident limit is subject to the UIM per person limit.  There is, 
therefore, no conflict, and we must turn to the language of Ms. Dana’s UIM policy to 
determine whether the UIM per accident limit is subject to the UIM per person limit.  
See Lanning, 332 N.C. at 312, 420 S.E.2d at 182 (stating that where the policy 
language does not conflict with the FRA, the “[l]anguage in a policy of insurance is 
the determining factor in resolving coverage questions[.]”).  
¶ 44 
 
N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) makes multiple references to per person and per 
accident limits.  However, the UIM subdivision does not contain the same “subject to 
. . . [per person] limit” language of N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(2).  N.C.G.S. § 20-
279.21(b)(4) provides, in relevant part, that UIM coverage is to be used “only with a 
policy that is written at limits that exceed those prescribed by subdivision (2) of this 
subsection . . . [t]he limits of such [UIM] coverage shall be equal to the highest limits 
of bodily injury liability coverage . . . the limits shall not exceed . . . ($1,000,000) per 
N.C. FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. CO. V. DANA 
2021-NCSC-161 
Berger, J., concurring  
 
 
 
person and . . . ($1,000,000) per accident[.]”  N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (emphasis 
added).  Notably, N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) provides that the limit of UIM coverage 
is “the difference between the amount paid to the claimant under the exhausted 
liability policy . . . and the limit of [UIM] coverage applicable to the motor vehicle[.]” 
N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (emphasis added).   
¶ 45 
 
Accordingly, because N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21(b)(4) does not address whether the 
UIM per accident limit is subject to the UIM per person limit, there is no conflict, and 
we must turn to the language of Ms. Dana’s UIM policy to determine whether the 
UIM per accident limit is subject to the UIM per person limit.  See Lanning, 332 N.C. 
at 312, 420 S.E.2d at 182 (stating that where the policy language does not conflict 
with the FRA, the “[l]anguage in a policy of insurance is the determining factor in 
resolving coverage questions[.]”).  
¶ 46 
 
In interpreting the language of an insurance policy, we “must enforce the policy 
as written.”  Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mabe, 342 N.C. 482, 492, 467 S.E.2d 34, 40 
(1996).  In addition, “[o]ur interpretation of an insurance policy is based on the 
fundamental principle that the plain language of the policy controls.”  N.C. Farm 
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., Inc. v. Martin, 376 N.C. 280, 286, 851 S.E.2d 891, 895 (2020).  
“[I]f a policy is not ambiguous, then the court must enforce the policy as written and 
may not remake the policy under the guise of interpreting an ambiguous provision.”  
Mabe, 342 N.C. at 492, 467 S.E.2d at 40.  However, if the language of the policy is 
N.C. FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. CO. V. DANA 
2021-NCSC-161 
Berger, J., concurring  
 
 
 
ambiguous, then “the doubts will be resolved against the insurance company and in 
favor of the policyholder.”  Woods v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 295 N.C. 500, 506, 246 
S.E.2d 773, 777 (1978); see also Lanning, 332 N.C. at 316–17, 420 S.E.2d at 184 
(concluding that where the FRA neither required nor prohibited intrapolicy stacking, 
policy language that was “clear, and capable of but one reasonable interpretation” 
controlled the outcome).   
¶ 47 
 
Here, the relevant portion of the UIM provision in Ms. Dana’s policy provides: 
Subject to [the] limit for each person, the limit of bodily 
injury liability shown in the Declarations for each accident 
for [UIM] Coverage is our maximum limit of liability for all 
damages for bodily injury resulting from any one accident.  
¶ 48 
 
The language of the UIM policy is “clear, and capable of but one reasonable 
interpretation[.]” Lanning, 332 N.C. at 317, 420 S.E.2d at 184.  The policy plainly 
states that the UIM per accident limit was subject to the UIM per person limit, and 
that the proper amount of UIM coverage available was subject to the per person limit.  
Thus, the amount of UIM coverage available to Mr. and Ms. Dana for their injuries 
was subject to the per person limit.  Because the policy language is clear, and because 
our courts may not “rewrite the contract or impose liabilities on the parties not 
bargained for[,]” Woods, 295 N.C. at 506, 246 S.E.2d at 777, the $100,000 person limit 
applies, reduced by the recovery under the tortfeasor’s policy.  Thus, under Ms. 
Dana’s UIM policy, William T. Dana is entitled to $68,000 and the Estate of Pamela 
N.C. FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. CO. V. DANA 
2021-NCSC-161 
Berger, J., concurring  
 
 
 
M. Dana is entitled to $56,250.2   
¶ 49 
 
The majority dismisses looking to the policy language by waiving the false flag 
that our analysis “would allow insurers to have a significant degree of flexibility in 
drafting policies as they see fit.”  The reality is that the insurance industry is heavily 
regulated in this state, insurance policies are virtually uniform, and policies must be 
approved by the Insurance Commission.  See N.C.G.S. § 58-2-53 (2019) (“Whenever 
any provision of this Chapter requires a person to file rates, forms, classification 
plans, plans of operation, the Safe Driver Incentive Plan, or any other item with the 
Commissioner or Department for approval, the approval or disapproval of the filing 
is an agency decision[.]”).  See also N.C.G.S. § 58-5-95 (“Deposits subject to approval 
and control of Commissioner”); N.C.G.S. § 58-7-60 (“Approval as a domestic insurer”); 
N.C.G.S. § 58-10-347 (“Provisional approval for a license”); N.C.G.S. § 58-35-45 
(“Filing and approval of forms and service charges”); N.C.G.S. § 58-36-20 
(“Disapproval; hearing order; adjustment of premium, review of filing”); N.C.G.S. § 
58-40-45 (“Disapproval of rates; interim use of rates”); N.C.G.S. § 58-45-30 (“Directors 
to submit plan of operation to Commission; review and approval; amendments; 
                                            
2 Both William T. Dana and the Estate of Pamela M. Dana are entitled to the UIM 
policy’s per person limit of $100,000, less the amount of Integon’s liability coverage ($32,000 
for William T. Dana and $43,750 for the estate of Pamela M. Dana).  See N.C.G.S. § 20-279.21 
(b)(4) (“In any event, the limit of underinsured motorist coverage applicable to any claim is 
determined to be the difference between the amount paid to the claimant under the 
exhausted liability policy or policies and the limit of underinsured motorist coverage 
applicable to the motor vehicle involved in the accident.”). 
N.C. FARM BUREAU MUT. INS. CO. V. DANA 
2021-NCSC-161 
Berger, J., concurring  
 
 
 
appeal from Commissioner to superior court”); N.C.G.S. § 58-47-65 (“Licensing; 
qualification for approval”); N.C.G.S. § 58-47-175 (“Approval of advertising”); 
N.C.G.S. § 58-50-85 (“Approval of independent review organizations”); N.C.G.S. § 58-
50-125 (“Health care plans; formation; approval; offerings”); N.C.G.S. § 58-50-131 
(“Premium rates for health benefit plans; approval authority; hearing”); N.C.G.S. § 
58-51-85 (“Group or blanket accident and health insurance; approval of forms and 
filing of rates”); N.C.G.S. § 58-51-95 (“Approval by Commissioner of forms, 
classification and rates; hearing; exceptions”); N.C.G.S. § 58-52-15 (“Forms and rate 
manuals subject to § 58-51-1; disapproval of rates”); N.C.G.S. § 58-56-21 (“Approval 
of advertising”); N.C.G.S. § 58-57-30 (“Forms to be filed with Commissioner; approval 
or disapproval by Commissioner”); N.C.G.S. § 58-58-220 (“Approval of viatical 
settlement contracts and disclosure statements”); N.C.G.S. § 58-65-132 (“Review and 
approval of conversion plan; new corporation”); N.C.G.S. § 58-72-50 (“Approval, 
acknowledgment and custody of bonds”); N.C.G.S. § 58-91-50 (“Product filing and 
approval”)   
¶ 50 
 
Because the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to Mr. Dana 
and the Estate, and the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the trial court’s 
decision, I concur in the result reached by the majority.   
Chief Justice NEWBY and Justice BARRINGER join in this concurring 
opinion.