Case Title: State v. Baston

Citation: 1999-Ohio-280

Docket Number: 19972204

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1999-05-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State v. Baston, 85 Ohio St.3d 418, 1999-Ohio-280.] 
 
 
 
 
 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. BASTON, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State v. Baston (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 418.] 
Criminal law — Aggravated murder — Death penalty upheld, when. 
(No. 97-2204 — Submitted January 27, 1999 — Decided May 12, 1999.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, No. L-95-087. 
 
Johnny Baston, appellant, was charged with aggravated robbery and the 
capital aggravated murder of Chong Mah.  Baston waived his right to be tried by a 
jury, and the case proceeded before a three-judge panel.  The panel found Baston 
guilty of all charges and, after a penalty hearing, sentenced him to death.  The 
court of appeals affirmed. 
 
Chong Mah and his wife, Jin-Ju Mah, owned two retail stores in Toledo.  
Chong Mah managed the couple’s downtown store, Continental Wigs N’ Things.  
In addition to wigs, the store sold team logo hats and jackets.  At approximately 
11:30 a.m. on March 21, 1994, Jin-Ju Mah telephoned her husband and spoke to 
him at the downtown store.  When Chong Mah failed to answer a later call, Jin-Ju 
Mah became concerned.  She then went to the downtown store, arriving around 
5:10-5:15 p.m.  She found the store unlocked and the lights on.  The cash register 
was open and empty.  In a rear storage room, Jin-Ju Mah found her husband’s body 
— he had been shot once through the head.  Chong Mah was pronounced dead at 
the scene. 
 
Investigators found a single .45 caliber hollow-point slug behind the wall 
paneling in the room where Chong Mah was shot.  An autopsy revealed that Chong 
Mah had been shot in the back of the head at a range of two to three inches.  
Examination of the crime scene caused investigators to believe that, in addition to 
the money in the cash register, Chong Mah’s killer had also taken team logo hats 
and “Starter” type jackets from the store. 
 
 
2
 
Also on March 21, 1994, David Smith went to downtown Toledo to meet 
with his parole officer.  Baston accompanied him, but was not permitted to stay for 
the appointment.  Records indicated that Smith met with his parole officer at 
approximately 11:30 a.m., and that the meeting lasted ten to fifteen minutes. When 
Smith left the meeting, he tried to find Baston.  He “beeped” Baston on his pager, 
but there was no response.  Smith then walked back and forth between the 
municipal building and the county jail four times, finally finding Baston in the 
vicinity of the municipal court.  Baston and another friend, Bobby Mitchell, were 
in a yellow Cadillac owned by Smith’s cousin, Michael Ridley. 
 
Mitchell first saw Baston on March 21, 1994 on River Street.  Baston was 
carrying a dark brown plastic garbage bag that appeared to have something in it.  
Mitchell passed Baston as Mitchell went to his car, before proceeding to Smith’s 
apartment, where he again saw Baston.  Mitchell was there to see Ridley, who was 
also staying at the apartment. 
 
While Mitchell was at Smith’s apartment, he noticed some sports hats lined 
up on an end table, as well as a revolver.  A short time later, Mitchell and Baston 
left the apartment in Ridley’s Cadillac to pick up Smith downtown.  When the two 
picked up Smith in front of the municipal court building, Mitchell was driving, 
Baston was in the passenger’s seat, and Smith got in the back seat.  Mitchell 
overheard Smith and Baston “mumbling” to each other, and heard Baston tell 
Smith, “I did it.”  The trio then drove back to Smith’s apartment. 
 
After news coverage of Chong Mah’s murder, an employee of a nearby 
club/bar reported to police that at approximately 11:45 a.m. on the day of the 
murder, she saw a man carrying a plastic bag walk across a parking lot near the 
wig shop.  The man caught her attention because he was heavily dressed despite it 
being unseasonably warm that day, and he was wearing a team logo jacket, and 
another jacket draped over his shoulders.  She later said the man could have been 
 
 
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Baston, but was unable to positively identify him.  A patron of the bookstore 
adjacent to or near the wig shop told police that he thought he heard a gunshot 
shortly before noon on March 21, 1994. 
 
A few days after the murder, Patricia Chininis contacted the Toledo Police.  
Patricia Chininis’s daughter, Deana, was Smith’s girlfriend.  Both women also 
knew Baston.  Patricia Chininis related that on the day before the shooting, Baston 
and Smith were at her house.  In moving Baston’s jacket, Patricia Chininis noticed 
it was unusually heavy.  She felt the jacket, realized there was a gun in it, and told 
Baston and Smith never to come back to her house with a gun.  Deana Chininis 
stated she previously saw both Smith and Baston with revolver-type guns and 
hollow-point bullets.  Furthermore, the day or so after the murder Baston offered to 
give Deana’s girlfriend a Starter jacket. 
 
After receiving this information, police obtained a search warrant for 
Smith’s apartment (where Baston was staying).  Police seized four sport logo hats 
and several Starter jackets.  A wig store employee identified these articles as being 
similar to those the store carried.  The employee, an African-American, also 
recalled that three weeks prior to the killing three African-American males were in 
the store acting suspiciously.  The employee overheard one of the three say to 
another:  “No, it’s a sister in here,” before they left.  The employee identified 
Baston as one of the three. 
 
Smith, Deana Chininis, and two other persons were at the apartment when 
police executed the search warrant.  While all four went to the police station, only 
Smith was cooperative.  After interviewing Smith, the police obtained an arrest 
warrant for Baston. 
 
Baston was arrested in Columbus, Ohio, at a church function.  He was 
carrying a .25 caliber semi-automatic pistol and had a .45 caliber semi-automatic 
revolver in his luggage.  The .45 caliber slug recovered at the crime scene matched 
 
 
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those test-fired from the .45 caliber revolver seized from Baston.  In an interview 
with Columbus police shortly after his arrest, Baston admitted participating in the 
robbery of the wig shop, but denied shooting Chong Mah.  According to Baston, an 
accomplice named “Ray” took Chong Mah into the back room and shot him.  
Baston denied any intention to kill anyone, and claimed that Ray acted without 
Baston’s prior knowledge. 
 
Baston was indicted on two counts of aggravated murder and one count of 
aggravated robbery with a firearm specification.  Each aggravated murder count 
carried a capital specification pursuant to R.C. 2929.04(A)(7).  Baston pleaded not 
guilty and elected to be tried before a three-judge panel. 
 
Baston contested that he was the principal offender in the aggravated 
murder.  William Nappins, a defense witness, testified that while on his way to an 
Alcoholics Anonymous meeting at approximately 11:45 a.m. on the morning of the 
murder, he saw a tall, dark-skinned African-American male emerge from either the 
wig store or the book store next to it.  The man was dressed in black and carrying a 
bag.  Nappins’s description of the man did not match that of Baston. 
 
The defense argued that David Smith was the Ray that Baston had  named as 
the actual triggerman during his Columbus interrogation.  The defense asserted that 
the presence of another gunman at the wig shop robbery created a reasonable doubt 
as to the capital specifications.  The panel nevertheless found appellant guilty on 
all counts and specifications. 
 
The panel sentenced Baston to death on one of the aggravated murder 
counts, and to terms of imprisonment for both the aggravated robbery and the gun 
specification.  Although it sustained three of Baston’s assignments of error, the 
court of appeals affirmed Baston’s convictions after curing the errors with its 
independent review.  The state did not file a cross-appeal.  The cause is now before 
this court upon an appeal as of right. 
 
 
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__________________ 
 
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and Craig T. Pearson, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
 
Jeffrey M. Gamso and Spiros P. Cocoves, for appellant. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J.  In this appeal, Baston has raised eight propositions of law.  
Finding none meritorious, we affirm his convictions.  In addition, we have 
independently reviewed the record, weighed the aggravating circumstance against 
the mitigating factors, and examined the proportionality of the death sentence in 
this case in comparison to the penalty imposed in similar cases.  Upon a complete 
review of the record, we affirm Baston’s convictions and sentences. 
Jury Waiver 
 
In his first proposition of law, Baston argues that a jury waiver in a capital 
case is not made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily unless the defendant is 
aware of all the implications of the waiver.  Baston cites this court’s decision in 
State v. Post (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 384, 513 N.E.2d 754, 759, which 
reaffirmed that “this court indulges ‘  * * * in the usual presumption that in a bench 
trial in a criminal case the court considered only the relevant, material, and 
competent evidence in arriving at its judgment unless it affirmatively appears to 
the contrary.’ ”  Id., quoting State v. White (1968), 15 Ohio St.2d 146, 151, 44 
O.O.2d 132, 136, 239 N.E.2d 65, 70.  Baston argues that, because of this 
presumption, the trial court was required to ensure that Baston understood that he 
was giving up the right to meaningful appellate review by choosing to have a 
three-judge panel decide the case. 
 
In State v. Jells (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 22, 559 N.E.2d 464, paragraph one of 
the syllabus, we held that “[t]here is no requirement for a trial court to interrogate a 
defendant in order to determine whether he or she is fully apprised of the right to a 
 
 
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jury trial.”  “The Criminal Rules and Revised Code are satisfied by a written 
waiver, signed by the defendant, filed with the court, and made in open court  * * 
*.”  Id. at 26, 559 N.E.2d at 468.  It is undisputed that the written waiver required 
by the Criminal Rules and Revised Code was properly executed in this case. 
 
Additionally, the presiding judge engaged in an extensive colloquy with 
Baston.  Baston argues that because that colloquy appeared thorough, but did not 
include reference to the appellate court presumption that the three-judge panel 
considered only relevant evidence, Baston was actually misinformed and 
consequently his plea was not intelligent, voluntary, and knowing.  Baston cites in 
support State v. Ruppert (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 263, 8 O.O.3d 232, 375 N.E.2d 
1250  (jury waiver held inadequate because the appellant was told that the three-
judge panel’s verdict had to be unanimous when a majority verdict would suffice).  
We find this argument meritless.  The panel did not misinform Baston and nothing 
in the panel’s colloquy suggested that it was meant to be a thorough discussion of 
all the implications of a jury waiver, including the standard of appellate review that 
would be applied in this case. 
 
Baston additionally argues that the Jells analysis fails to address the question 
of whether a jury waiver, which may satisfy R.C. 2945.05, also satisfies the federal 
and Ohio Constitutions.  There is no constitutional case law directly addressing 
what inquiries must be made when a defendant waives his right to trial by jury.  
The cases addressing waiver of fundamental constitutional rights emphasize that 
trial courts must apprise the defendant of the “relevant circumstances and likely 
consequences” to determine whether the defendant’s waiver is made freely and 
intelligently.  See, e.g., Brady v. United States (1970), 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 
1463, 1469, 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 756 (right to trial); Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 
U.S. 458, 465, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1467. 
 
 
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Here, the trial court, as a threshold matter, asked both defense counsel 
whether they had discussed with Baston “the differences in the capital context 
between a jury trial and a trial to a three-judge panel.”  Counsel related that they 
had discussed this with Baston, and that Baston “underst[ood] those differences 
and his rights in all aspects.”  Further, the trial court advised Baston that he had the 
right to have a jury trial; that this meant twelve persons would be chosen, with 
input from his counsel; that twelve persons would have to be unanimous in their 
verdict of guilt; that if the jury found him guilty, the jury would also determine the 
penalty and make a recommendation to the trial judge; that the waiver would result 
in a trial by three judges; that the three judges would have to be unanimous in their 
finding of sentence; and that if even one judge did not think that death was 
appropriate, it could not be imposed.  Although the trial court did not specifically 
refer to the standard of review that would be applied on appeal, Baston cites no 
authority requiring such reference. 
 
This proposition of law is overruled. 
Trial Phase Witness Issues 
 
In Proposition of Law No. II, Baston argues that three evidentiary rulings by 
the trial court deprived him of his constitutional rights. 
 
Coroner Testimony:  First, Baston argues that the trial court erred in 
allowing Dr. Diane Scala-Barnett, a deputy coroner in Lucas County, to provide 
expert testimony regarding (1) the distance from gunshot to wound; (2) blood 
spatter, pooling, droplet, and transfer patterns; and (3) cause of death.  Baston 
argues that she was not qualified as an expert. 
 
Evid.R. 702(B) addresses the qualifications necessary to accord a witness 
“expert” status.  Under the rule, a witness may qualify as an expert by reason of 
her knowledge, experience, skill, training, or education.  Neither special education 
nor certification is necessary to confer expert status upon a witness.  See State v. 
 
 
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Boston (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 108, 119, 545 N.E.2d 1220, 1231-1232.  The 
individual offered as an expert need not have complete knowledge of the field in 
question, as long as the knowledge she possesses will aid the trier-of-fact in 
performing its fact-finding function.  State v. D’Ambrosio (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 
185, 191, 616 N.E.2d 909, 915.  Pursuant to Evid.R. 104(A), the trial court 
determines whether an individual qualifies as an expert, and that determination will 
be overturned only for an abuse of discretion.  State v. Williams (1983), 4 Ohio 
St.3d 53, 58, 4 OBR 144, 148, 446 N.E.2d 444, 448. 
 
Since 1985, Dr. Scala-Barnett has been a forensic pathologist and a deputy 
coroner whose responsibilities include attending scene investigations and 
performing medical-legal autopsies to determine the cause and manner of death.  
The questioning concerning her education was somewhat sketchy, in that she 
stated she was licensed to practice in Ohio and Illinois, but failed to specify what 
she was licensed to practice.  She did however indicate that she was board certified 
in both pathology and forensic pathology. 
 
While the state never formally tendered Dr. Scala-Barnett as an expert, 
during the course of questioning to qualify her as an expert, defense counsel never 
objected or challenged her qualifications to testify as to the distance between the 
gun’s muzzle and the wound, and as to the cause of death. Thus, Baston waived all 
but plain error. Crim.R. 52(B); State v. Williams (1977), 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 
O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, paragraph two of the syllabus, vacated on other 
grounds, 438 U.S. 911, 98 S.Ct. 3137, 57 L.Ed.2d 1156. 
 
The state’s failure to qualify Dr. Scala-Barnett in more detail does not rise to 
the level of plain error. Her experience as a deputy coroner and her board 
certifications in pathology and forensic pathology qualify her to testify regarding 
the cause of death and the distance between the gun’s muzzle and the victim’s head 
at the time the gun was fired.  Further, some of this testimony was the same as the 
 
 
9
testimony of Joshua Franks, a senior criminalist at the Forensics Laboratory, whose 
qualifications were stipulated to by defense counsel. 
 
Defense counsel did, however, object to Dr. Scala-Barnett’s testimony as not 
being expert in blood spatter.  The court sustained defense counsel’s objection.  
When the witness returned to the subject of blood spatter, counsel did not object.  
Dr. Scala-Barnett then testified how the blood-spatter evidence led her and the 
police criminologist Detective Chad Culpert to discover the spent slug behind the 
paneling.  This testimony was similar to that of Detective Culpert, whose 
qualifications were not questioned.  See State v. Biros (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 426, 
452-453, 678 N.E.2d 891, 913 (The trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
allowing a forensic scientist to give expert testimony about blood-spatter evidence, 
as the witness had been involved in thousands of cases dealing with blood analysis 
and trace evidence; also, other evidence corroborated the testimony, so there was 
no plain error.).  Furthermore, the testimony concerning blood spatter was helpful 
to an understanding of how the victim was shot and ended up in a supine position, 
but it was not crucial to any issue in dispute in this case.  Assuming the admission 
of this evidence was error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Crim.R. 
52(A); State v. Zimmerman (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 43, 45, 18 OBR 79, 81, 479 
N.E.2d 862, 863.  There was no prejudicial error in allowing Dr. Scala-Barnett to 
testify in this case. 
 
Witness Statement:  Baston next argues that the panel abused its discretion 
when it permitted the prosecutor to question witness David Smith about the 
contents of a tape-recorded statement that the panel had just ruled inadmissible. 
 
In his taped statement Smith implicated Baston based on a prior 
conversation between them.  The state called Smith as a witness in its case-in-
chief.  Smith related information about the events of the morning of the murder, 
but when it came to information concerning his conversation with Baston, he did 
 
 
10
not recall what he had told the police concerning the conversation.  The prosecutor 
then questioned Smith about the content of the statement, and the defense objected.  
During a sidebar, the prosecutor indicated that he had doubts about Smith, and that 
on the previous Friday, Smith had told the defense investigator that he was going 
to get on the stand and say he did not remember anything.  The prosecutor asked to 
be able to play the witness’s previous statements to the witness based on surprise 
under Evid.R. 607. 
 
The court sustained the defense objection based on Evid.R. 607, but 
indicated that it would allow the statement to be used under Evid.R. 803(5), as a 
recorded recollection.  The tape was played for Smith, outside the presence of the 
panel.  When the state resumed questioning, Smith testified that he did not recall 
making the statements recorded on the tape and did not recall whether they were 
true.  Smith claimed he had blocked a lot of “stuff” out of his memory.  The 
prosecutor questioned Smith on whether his recollection was refreshed after 
listening to the tape recording, and Smith said “No.” 
 
After struggling through the questioning of Smith, the state sought to play 
the tape recording of the police interview, or to provide a transcript of the 
interview for the panel.  Defense counsel objected, arguing that the state had not 
developed the proper foundation required to play the tape.  The court sustained the 
objection, and the tape was not played, nor was a transcription provided to the 
panel. 
 
Once the court ruled that the tape could not be played, the state asked Smith 
a series of questions based on his statements to police.  In each question Smith was 
asked whether he recalled making a certain statement to the police; and each time 
he indicated he did not recall.  The prosecutor followed up by asking whether he 
heard the tape, followed the transcripts, and whether it was his voice on the tape.  
 
 
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Smith indicated he heard the tape and followed along, but that it did not refresh his 
recollection. 
 
Baston now argues that the questioning by the prosecutor allowed the state 
to get in “through the back door” what it could not get in through the front door.  
Baston relies on State v. Holmes (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 20, 22, 30 OBR 27, 29, 506 
N.E.2d 204, 207, and the Staff Note to Evid.R. 607.  Yet, the trial court here ruled 
the statement inadmissible under Evid.R. 607.  The state was allowed to refresh 
recollection and use the statement as a recorded recollection pursuant to Evid.R. 
803(5).  The witness never adopted the statement, the tape was never played for the 
panel, and neither the tape nor the transcription of the taped statement was 
admitted into evidence. 
 
Since the trial court ruled that the statement could be used pursuant to 
Evid.R. 803(5), it was not error for the state to question Smith concerning the 
statement.  Baston has not alleged that the trial court erred in allowing the use of 
the statement pursuant to Evid.R. 803(5). 
 
Further, the case was tried before a three-judge panel, and the usual 
presumption that the judges considered only relevant evidence applies.  State v. 
Post, 32 Ohio St.3d at 384, 513 N.E.2d at 759. 
 
Questioning by Three-Judge Panel:  At various times during trial, members 
of the three-judge panel questioned witnesses called to testify by the parties.  
Baston alleges error in the panel’s questioning.  He argues that the fact-finder, in 
this case the panel, should take facts as presented by the parties and should not take 
on the role of seeking facts. 
 
Baston cites four examples in the transcript; however, not once was an 
objection entered to the court’s questioning; therefore, Baston waived all but plain 
error.  State v. Williams, 51 Ohio St.2d 112, 5 O.O.3d 98, 364 N.E.2d 1364, at 
paragraph two of the syllabus; Evid.R. 614(C).  An alleged error “does not 
 
 
12
constitute a plain error * * * unless, but for the error, the outcome of the trial 
clearly would have been otherwise.”  State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 
O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804, paragraph two of the syllabus.  Here there is no error, 
plain or otherwise. 
 
Evid.R. 614(B) provides that “[t]he court may interrogate witnesses in an 
impartial manner, whether called by itself or a party.”  Baston concedes that this is 
the law, but asks this court to find the rule unconstitutional, since it interferes with 
the fundamental right to fair trial in the adversary system.  While it is possible to 
cross the line from helpful clarification to unwarranted intervention, that did not 
happen here.  See, generally, State ex rel. Wise v. Chand (1970), 21 Ohio St.2d 
113, 50 O.O.2d 322, 256 N.E.2d 613, paragraphs three and four of the syllabus; 
State v. Prokos (1993), 91 Ohio App.3d 39, 44, 631 N.E.2d 684, 687. 
 
The questioning here was limited, and consisted mostly of attempts to clarify 
the witnesses’ testimony, as is contemplated by the rule.  See State v. Lieberman 
(1961), 114 Ohio App. 339, 347, 18 O.O.2d 25, 29, 179 N.E.2d 108, 113.  The 
questioning was neither excessive nor prejudicial to the defendant.  Sandusky v. 
DeGidio (1988), 51 Ohio App.3d 202, 204, 555 N.E.2d 680, 681-682.  “In absence 
of any showing of bias, prejudice, or prodding of a witness to elicit partisan 
testimony, it will be presumed that the trial court acted with impartiality [in 
propounding to the witness questions from the bench] in attempting to ascertain a 
material fact or to develop the truth.”  Jenkins v. Clark (1982), 7 Ohio App.3d 93, 
98, 7 OBR 124, 129, 454 N.E.2d 541, 548; see, also, State v. Wade (1978), 53 
Ohio St.2d 182, 7 O.O.3d 362, 373 N.E.2d 1244, paragraph two of the syllabus, 
vacated on other grounds (1978), 438 U.S. 911, 98 S.Ct. 3138, 57 L.Ed.2d 1157.  
The questioning by the panel was not error. 
 
Since none of Baston’s arguments concerning trial phase evidentiary issues 
has merit, his second proposition of law is overruled. 
 
 
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Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
Uncharged Capital Specification:  Baston was charged with alternative 
counts of aggravated murder under R.C. 2903.01.  Attached to each count was a 
capital specification that the murder was committed while Baston was committing 
an aggravated robbery.  During the state’s closing argument in the penalty phase, 
the prosecutor argued: 
 
“[A]nd what we have to look at are the aggravating factors that were 
committed in this case * * *.  This was not  — this was not any kind of an attempt 
to do anything but eliminate a witness.” 
 
While committing an aggravated murder to escape detection is an 
aggravating circumstance under R.C. 2929.04(A)(3), that circumstance was not 
charged in Baston’s case.  Baston argues that the prosecutor effectively amended 
the indictment by arguing that the murder was committed to eliminate a witness.  
In State v. Dilley (1989), 47 Ohio St.3d 20, 546 N.E.2d 937, syllabus, we held that 
“[t]he state may not amend an indictment pursuant to Crim.R. 7(D) so as to include 
a specification contained in R.C. 2941.143 without first presenting the 
specification to the grand jury or following the other alternatives contained in R.C. 
2941.143.” 
 
The state counters that these comments by the prosecutor did not 
impermissibly amend the indictment because they were necessary to establish prior 
calculation and design for the first count of aggravated murder and the capital 
specification.  The state’s argument fails for two reasons.  First, the prosecutor’s 
remarks were made in the penalty phase, after the aggravated murder had already 
been established.  Second, the state’s theory supporting the capital specification 
was that Baston was the principal offender; therefore, the portion of the R.C. 
2929.04(A)(7) specification requiring prior calculation and design was irrelevant. 
The “killing of a witness” was not a charged aggravating circumstance.  The 
 
 
14
prosecutor should have focused on the statutory factor, which was charged and 
proven in the trial phase, and not on factors that were not charged.  State v. 
Wogenstahl (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 344, 662 N.E.2d 311, paragraph one of the 
syllabus. 
 
Because Baston’s counsel did not object to the prosecutor’s comments, we 
consider only whether these statement’s rise to the level of plain error.  State v. 
White (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 16, 22, 693 N.E.2d 772, 778.  We do not believe that 
the prosecutor’s comments made a difference in the outcome of the trial.  The 
panel found Baston guilty of only the R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) specification.  See 
Wogenstahl, 75 Ohio St.3d  at 357, 662 N.E.2d at 322. 
 
Although the trial court panel mentioned the “elimination of a potential 
witness” in its R.C. 2929.03(F) opinion, the independent appellate reweighing of 
the aggravating circumstance Baston was found guilty of committing against the 
mitigating factors presented cures this defect.  See State v. Lott (1990), 51 Ohio 
St.3d 160, 170, 555 N.E.2d 293, 304; State v. Holloway (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 239, 
242, 527 N.E.2d 831, 835. 
 
Urging the Trial Court to Refuse to Consider a Mitigating Factor:  Baston 
relied upon the mitigating factor of residual doubt in the penalty phase of his case.  
During closing argument, the prosecutor remarked: 
 
“I have attempted to figure out what residual doubt is.  It still isn’t very clear 
to me.  And if the residual doubt can be defined in this case, then I suggest to the 
Court that they allow the Supreme Court to make the determination here as to 
whether residual doubt exists.  I don’t see it.” 
 
The prosecutor’s argument here questioning the validity of residual doubt as 
a mitigating factor was prescient in that this court later rejected residual doubt as a 
mitigating factor.  State v. McGuire (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 686 N.E.2d 1112, 
syllabus.  But, we respond here only to the narrower argument of defendant that it 
 
 
15
would be misconduct for a prosecutor to urge a court simply to ignore residual 
doubt while that factor continued to be recognized in the decisional law. 
 
Baston argues that the prosecutor’s remarks urged the panel to disregard its 
statutory duty to consider residual doubt.  Baston’s counsel did not object to the 
prosecutor’s statement.  And the comments had no effect on the outcome of the 
trial because contrary to the prosecutor’s urging, the panel examined the factor of 
residual doubt. 
 
Since neither of Baston’s prosecutorial misconduct arguments provides a 
basis for vacating the death sentence, we overrule this proposition of law. 
Appellate Court Reweighing 
 
In the court of appeals, Baston raised three assignments of error addressing 
errors in the trial panel’s opinion filed pursuant to R.C. 2929.03(F):  (1) erroneous 
consideration of victim-impact statements, (2) consideration of possible future 
criminal behavior, and (3) reliance on the nature and circumstances of the offense 
as an aggravating circumstance.  The court of appeals sustained all three 
assignments of error.  Yet, the court affirmed the sentence of death after 
independently weighing the correct aggravating circumstance against mitigating 
factors. 
 
The state did not cross-appeal the court of appeals’ findings on the three 
assignments; therefore, the substance of those assignments of error is not before us.  
Baston now argues that the appellate reweighing could not cure the errors because 
the trial court’s R.C. 2929.03(F) opinion demonstrates that the panel had a “clear 
and evident bias” against Baston.  This bias, Baston asserts, denied him a fair trial 
by a neutral fact-finder.  He claims that the trial court’s opinion demonstrates 
structural error that could not be cured by independent reweighing by the appellate 
court.  State v. Esparza (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 660, 662, 660 N.E.2d 1194, 1196, 
quoting Arizona v. Fulminante (1991), 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1265, 
 
 
16
113 L.Ed.2d 302, 331 (“ ‘[T]he presence on the bench of a judge who is not 
impartial, is structural constitutional error.’ “). 
 
Baston cites excerpts from the opinion as demonstrative of the court’s bias.  
The court wrote that the victim was “a man of uncommon accomplishment, 
courage, enterprise and decency  * * * [and] a good husband, kind father, close 
brother, and warm friend.”  The panel stated that appellant’s “adult [criminal] 
record was minor in nature, owing large part to the fact that he was barely twenty 
years of age at the commission of this offense.”  And Baston cites the court’s 
reference to him as a “gun-toting, false-macho, selfish and violent mess.” 
 
When read in the context of the entire opinion, we do not find that the 
portions cited exhibit bias.  The opinion, as a whole, belies that the panel 
“display[ed] a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment 
impossible.”  Liteky v. United States (1994), 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 
1157, 127 L.Ed.2d 474, 491.  To the contrary, the panel expressly stated that it 
engaged in a “dispassionate review.”  We will not presume that the trial court acted 
with bias.  To the contrary, even without an affirmative declaration, this court 
presumes the regularity of the proceedings.  See State v. Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio 
St.3d 72, 92, 656 N.E.2d 643, 663.  Presumptions that the court acted without bias 
and prejudice are not necessary in this case because we have the assurances of the 
trial court panel. Accordingly we overrule this proposition of law. 
Constitutionality of Death Penalty 
 
Baston argues that Ohio’s capital sentencing scheme results in cruel and 
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, and violates other federal and Ohio constitutional provisions.  The 
same arguments, however, have been examined and disposed of in numerous 
cases.  See State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 15 OBR 311, 473 N.E.2d 
264; State v. Sowell (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 322, 336, 530 N.E.2d 1294, 1309; State 
 
 
17
v. Steffen (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 111, 125, 31 OBR 273, 285-286, 509 N.E.2d 383, 
396; State v. Grant (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 465, 483, 620 N.E.2d 50, 69; State v. 
Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 15 OBR 379, 473 N.E.2d 768, paragraph six of 
the syllabus; State v. Lewis (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 200, 206, 616 N.E.2d 921, 926; 
State v. Buell (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 124, 22 OBR 203, 489 N.E.2d 795; State v. 
Phillips (1995), 74 Ohio St.3d 72, 656 N.E.2d 643; State v. Coleman (1989), 45 
Ohio St.3d 298, 308, 544 N.E.2d 622, 633-634; State v. Smith (1997), 80 Ohio 
St.3d 89, 684 N.E.2d 668. 
Proportionality Review 
 
In his sixth proposition of law, Baston asks the court to revisit State v. 
Steffen, at the syllabus, concerning the universe of cases to be considered by an 
appellate court when conducting the proportionality review required by R.C. 
2929.05(A).  Baston presents no new arguments relating to this issue, and, 
therefore, based upon Steffen, this proposition is overruled. 
Independent Sentence Review 
 
In his seventh and eighth propositions of law Baston argues that his death 
sentence is not appropriate and is disproportionate to sentences imposed in similar 
cases.  We resolve these issues pursuant to our statutorily mandated independent 
review.  R.C. 2929.05(A). 
 
The trial court found that the two counts of aggravated murder were allied 
offenses, and sentenced Baston to death on Count Two, the aggravated murder of 
Chong Mah in the course of an aggravated robbery.  The evidence of record 
supports the finding that Baston committed the aggravated murder of Chong Mah, 
while Baston was committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after 
committing or attempting to commit aggravated robbery.  Moreover, the evidence 
establishes that Baston was the principal offender in the aggravated murder. 
 
 
18
 
Against this aggravating circumstance we weigh the nature and 
circumstances of the offense, the history, character, and background of the 
offender, and the applicable factors enumerated in R.C. 2929.04(B)(1)-(7).  It is 
undisputed that only R.C. 2929.04(B)(4) (youth of offender) and R.C. 
2929.04(B)(7) (other relevant factors) are implicated in this case. 
 
We find that the nature and circumstances of the offense do not offer 
mitigating value.  Baston shot Chong Mah in the back of the head at a range of two 
to three inches with a .45 caliber revolver. 
 
Several of Baston’s relatives and acquaintances testified about his history, 
character, and background.  Baston’s biological father, Edward L. Sample, testified 
that he never saw Baston until he (Baston) was about a year old.  Baston’s parents 
never married.  Baston’s father spent very little time with him.  Baston’s biological 
mother was unstable, and Baston stayed mostly with his maternal grandmother, 
although Baston lived with his father and his father’s wife for short periods of time 
when he was one or two years old.  Eventually Baston’s biological parents gave up 
their parental rights and let his father’s sister (Baston’s aunt) adopt him. 
 
Baston’s brother (through adoption), Richard R. Baston, was twelve years 
older than Baston.  Richard testified that Baston never really felt like he was a part 
of their family.  He recalled that on one occasion, while Baston was living with his 
biological father, Baston was taking a bath and was held under the water for a 
period of time by his father.  Richard also recalled that Baston was severely beaten, 
which led to Richard’s mother asking Baston’s father whether she could adopt 
Baston.  Richard felt that Baston never got over being rejected by his parents.  
Richard also felt the court system failed Baston when Baston first got into trouble 
as a juvenile. 
 
Baston participated in church activities with the Glass City Church of Christ.  
One of the youth advisors, Wayne D. Henderson, knew Baston through the church 
 
 
19
and related that Baston was very artistic.  Baston would do what he was told, and 
he never had any problems with him.  Baston interacted well with children.  The 
minister of the church, Rick Hunter, told the panel that Baston had done some 
artwork for books that Hunter was writing and that Baston was always cooperative 
and willing to help on projects.  Baston had attended church regularly prior to his 
arrest, and the minister had been meeting Baston regularly since his arrest. 
 
Baston’s high school counselor told the court that Baston had a good heart, 
but that his past would get in his way.  Baston could not get beyond the fact that 
his biological parents had deserted him. 
 
Tommie Davis, Baston’s adoptive mother, obtained custody of Baston when 
he was two.  While visiting her brother (Baston’s father), she noticed that Baston 
was treated differently than her brother’s other children, and thereupon asked for 
custody of him.  When she picked Baston up to take him home with her, he was 
wearing wet underwear and a dirty undershirt.  He had no clothes.  Tommie was 
not married at the time, but later married Leroy Davis, who never acted like a 
father toward Baston. 
 
We accord some mitigating weight to Baston’s history, character, and 
background evidence.  See State v. Spivey (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 405, 424, 692 
N.E.2d 151, 166; State v. Goff (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 123, 141, 694 N.E.2d 916, 
930. 
 
Baston made an unsworn statement in which he apologized to the Mah 
family and asked them for forgiveness.  We accord this retrospective remorse very 
little weight in mitigation.  See State v. Reynolds (1998), 80 Ohio St.3d 670, 686-
687, 687 N.E.2d 1358, 1374; State v. Raglin (1998), 83 Ohio St.3d 253, 273, 699 
N.E.2d 482, 498;  State v. Post, 32 Ohio St.3d at 394, 513 N.E.2d at 768. 
 
The parties stipulated that Baston’s date of birth was February 8, 1974, 
making him twenty years old at the time the crime was committed.  R.C. 
 
 
20
2929.04(B)(4) provides that the youth of the defendant can be considered a 
mitigating factor, and we determine this factor is entitled to some weight.  Finally, 
residual doubt is not an acceptable mitigating factor.  State v. McGuire, at syllabus; 
State v. Goff, 82 Ohio St.3d at 131, 694 N.E.2d at 923. 
 
Although appellant’s mitigation evidence is entitled to some weight, it is 
insufficient to overcome the single aggravating circumstance, murder during the 
course of an aggravated robbery, proven beyond a reasonable doubt in this case. 
 
Finally, R.C. 2929.05(A) requires that we review the sentence in this case 
and determine whether it is proportionate to the sentence imposed in similar cases.  
Since 1985, when we found the death sentence of Ernest Martin (State v. Martin 
[1985], 19 Ohio St.3d 122, 19 OBR 330, 483 N.E.2d 1157) to be appropriate and 
proportional for an aggravated murder during the course of an aggravated robbery, 
this court has reviewed a plethora of cases in which aggravated robbery is the sole 
aggravating circumstance.  See, e.g., State v. Byrd (1987), 32 Ohio St.3d 79, 512 
N.E.2d 611; State v. Dennis (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 683 N.E.2d 1096; State v. 
Greer (1988), 39 Ohio St.3d 236, 530 N.E.2d 382; State v. Jamison (1990), 49 
Ohio St.3d 182, 552 N.E.2d 180.  Baston’s case is similar in facts to those cases, 
and the mitigating factors presented do not distinguish the death sentence in his 
case as disproportionate. 
 
Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of 
appeals is hereby affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY and LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs separately. 
__________________ 
 
 
21
 
PFEIFER, J., concurring.  I concur because I disagree with the majority’s 
statement that “residual doubt is not an acceptable mitigating factor.”  For the 
reasons stated in my concurrence in State v. McGuire (1997), 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 
405-406, 686 N.E.2d 1112, 1124, I believe residual doubt to be an important 
mitigating factor in our death penalty analysis.  However, I do not believe that 
residual doubt is a factor in this case. 
APPENDIX 
 
“Proposition of Law No. 1:  A jury waiver in a capital case is not knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary unless the record indicates that the defendant is aware 
that error in the admission of evidence will be held harmless on appeal unless it is 
affirmatively shown that the three-judge panel hearing the case relied in its 
decision on the inadmissible evidence. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. 2:  Evidentiary Rulings at the guilt phase of a 
capital trial, even a trial before a three-judge panel, can deprive a defendant of his 
rights under the Constitutions of the United States and of the State of Ohio. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. 3:  A prosecutor may not argue uncharged death 
specifications during closing argument at the mitigation phase of a capital trial and 
may not urge a three-judge panel to refuse to perform its statutory duty. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. 4:  When the R.C. 2929.03(F) opinion of a three-
judge panel in a capital case explicitly indicates that the weighing of the 
aggravating circumstance against the mitigating factors was skewed by improperly 
considered victim impact statements, unwarranted speculation about the likelihood 
of future criminal behavior by the defendant, and erroneous treatment of the nature 
and circumstance of the offense as a factor to be weighed against mitigation, the 
panel has failed in its function as a gatekeeper and displayed the sort of bias 
against the defendant which makes the panel’s determination of the appropriate 
sentence a sham and required that the sentence of death be vacated. 
 
 
22
 
“Proposition of Law No. 5:  Ohio death penalty law is unconstitutional 
both in the abstract and as applied. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. 6:  Ohio’s death penalty law as applied violated 
R.C. 2929.05(A) by requiring appellate courts and the Supreme Court, in 
conducting their R.C. 2929.05(A) review of ‘similar cases’ for proportionality, to 
review only those in which a sentence of death was imposed and ignore those in 
which a sentence of life with parole eligibility after twenty full years or life with 
parole eligibility after thirty full years was imposed.  This application of R.C. 
2929.05(A) also violates the rights to fair trial and due process and results in the 
imposition of cruel and unusual punishment as set forth in the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, 
Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and in 
Sections 1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 16, and 20, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. 7:  When independent review of the death 
sentence in a capital case reveals that the aggravating circumstances do not 
outweigh the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, the sentence of death 
must be reversed. 
 
“Proposition of Law No. 8:  A death sentence is wrongly imposed and will 
be reversed when it is inappropriate and not proportional to the sentence imposed 
in similar cases.”