Case Title: Sussex Comm. Services v. Va. Soc. for Ment. Ret. C

Citation: 

Docket Number: 950843

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1996-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present: All the Justices 
 
SUSSEX COMMUNITY SERVICES ASSOCIATION 
 
v.  Record No. 950843 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ELIZABETH B. LACY 
                                        March 1, 1996 
THE VIRGINIA SOCIETY FOR 
MENTALLY RETARDED CHILDREN, INCORPORATED 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY 
 
Buford M. Parsons, Jr., Judge 
 
 
The issue in this appeal is whether Code § 36-96.6(C) 
applies retroactively to restrictive covenants recorded in 1975. 
 
Sussex Community Services Association (Sussex) is a nonstock 
corporation whose members are the owners of lots located in the 
Sussex residential subdivision in Henrico County.  All lots in 
the subdivision are subject to restrictive covenants that were 
recorded on June 10, 1975.  One of those covenants provides that 
an owner of real property in the subdivision may not "occupy or 
use his Lot . . . for any purpose other than as a private single-
family residence." 
 
The Virginia Society for Mentally Retarded Children, Inc. 
(the Society) purchased a vacant lot in the subdivision and 
executed a contract to purchase another lot with an existing 
house in the subdivision.  The Society intends to use the 
existing house as a group home for six unrelated mentally 
retarded young adults, with a paid employee staff of two with one 
or more present at all times.  The Society plans to construct a 
house on the vacant lot and use it for the same purpose. 
 
Sussex filed a bill of complaint seeking a declaratory 
judgment that the Society's proposed use of the two lots violated 
the restrictive covenant limiting the use of lots in the 
subdivision to single-family dwellings.  The Society responded 
that the restrictive covenant was subject to Code § 36-96.6(C) 
which provides that group homes such as those proposed by the 
Society are considered "residential occupancy by a single family" 
when construing a restrictive covenant limiting occupancy to 
members of a single family.  Following a hearing and argument of 
counsel, the trial court concluded that Code § 36-96.6(C) applied 
to the restrictive covenant and entered an order holding that the 
covenant could not be enforced against the Society.  We awarded 
Sussex an appeal. 
 
In its appeal, Sussex asserts that the current version of 
Code § 36-96.6(C), as amended in 1991, cannot be applied to 
covenants recorded in 1975.  Sussex bases its position on the 
principle that statutes are generally presumed to be prospective 
in their application unless the General Assembly has manifested 
its clear intent to apply the statute retroactively.  Gloucester 
Realty Corp. v. Guthrie, 182 Va. 869, 875, 30 S.E.2d 686, 688-89 
(1944).  In this case, Sussex asserts, there is no manifestation 
of such a legislative intent.
1  
 
We begin our analysis of the issue presented by Sussex with 
an examination of the express language of Code § 36-96.6(C): 
 
A family care home, foster home, or group home in which 
physically handicapped, mentally ill, mentally 
retarded, or developmentally disabled persons reside, 
with one or more resident counselors or other staff 
persons, shall be considered for all purposes 
residential occupancy by a single family when 
                     
     
1In oral argument Sussex specifically stated that it is 
not challenging the ability of the General Assembly to apply 
Code § 36-96.6(C) retroactively, and that issue is not before 
us. 
construing any restrictive covenant which purports to 
restrict occupancy or ownership of real or leasehold 
property to members of a single family or to 
residential use or structure. 
 
The language of the section makes it applicable to "any 
restrictive covenant" restricting occupancy to members of a 
single family.  Therefore, construction of the word "any," added 
by the 1991 amendment, is pivotal in determining the intended 
application of the section. 
 
The word "any," like other unrestrictive modifiers such as 
"an" and "all," is generally considered to apply without 
limitation.  We have held that the phrase "any action" includes 
actions filed both before and after the passage of the statute in 
which the phrase was used.  Town of Danville v. Pace, 66 Va. (25 
Gratt.) 1, 4 (1874).  We have said that a provision including the 
phrase "all condominiums" was consistent with an intent that the 
provision applies to all condominiums existing at the time the 
legislation was enacted.  Harbour Gate Owners' Ass'n v. Berg, 232 
Va. 98, 103, 348 S.E.2d 252, 255 (1986).  Similarly in the 
context of the Workers' Compensation Act, Code §§ 65.2-100 
through -1310, we have held that the phrase "an award" is all-
inclusive, applying to awards made both before and after 
statutory amendment.  Buenson Div. v. McCauley, 221 Va. 430, 433, 
270 S.E.2d 734, 736 (1980); Allen v. Mottley Constr. Co., 160 Va. 
875, 889-90, 170 S.E. 412, 417 (1933).  In Allen, we noted that 
in order to apply the statute prospectively only, it would be 
necessary to judicially amend the statute, "supply[ing] words not 
found in the statute," so that the phrase would read "any award 
hereafter made."  160 Va. at 889, 170 S.E. at 417. 
 
The analysis used in Allen has continued to be a "'decisive' 
example of a situation where retrospective intent is expressed in 
legislative language."  Buenson Div. v. McCauley, 221 Va. at 435, 
270 S.E.2d at 737 (citing Duffy v. Hartsock, 187 Va. 406, 417-19, 
46 S.E.2d 570, 575-76 (1948)).  Our conclusion in Allen, that 
nothing in the phrase "an award" "confines its operations to 
either past or future awards, but both are included," 160 Va. at 
890, 170 S.E. at 417, is equally applicable to the phrase "any 
covenant" as used in Code § 36-96.6(C).  The plain meaning of the 
phrase "any covenant" encompasses all covenants of the type 
described in the statute without limitation, whether recorded 
before or after 1991. 
 
The conclusion we reach with regard to the meaning of the 
plain language of the statute is reinforced by its legislative 
history.  As originally enacted in 1986, subsection C 
specifically applied only to restrictive covenants executed after 
July 1, 1986.
2  In 1989, the General Assembly established a joint 
subcommittee to study site selection issues relating to 
                     
     
2Code § 36-91(c), the predecessor to Code § 36-96.6(C), 
provided in relevant part: 
 
 
Notwithstanding any restrictive covenant executed 
after July 1, 1986, which restricts occupancy or 
ownership of real or leasehold property to members of 
a single family or to residential use or structure, a 
family care home, foster home or group home in which 
no more than six physically handicapped, mentally 
ill, mentally retarded or developmentally disabled 
persons reside, with one or more resident counselors 
or other staff persons, shall be considered for all 
purposes residential occupancy by a single family. 
residential facilities for the mentally disabled.  In its 1990 
report, the joint subcommittee identified restrictive covenants 
as a barrier to securing housing for mentally disabled persons.  
Report of the Joint Subcommittee Studying Site Selection of 
Residential Facilities For Mentally Disabled To The Governor and 
General Assembly of Virginia, Senate Document No. 36, at 3 
(1990).  Because Code § 36-96.6(C) as it then existed did not 
apply to pre-July 1, 1986 covenants, the committee concluded that 
a segment of the available housing was excluded from 
consideration for group home residential facilities.  Id.  The 
joint subcommittee recommended that subsection C be repealed 
"because it appears to passively encourage discrimination and 
does not apply to covenants executed prior to July 1, 1986."  Id. 
at 8-9. 
 
In 1991, the General Assembly deleted language restricting 
the application of the section to restrictive covenants executed 
after July 1, 1986 and added the word "any."  These amendments 
manifest a clear intent of the General Assembly to apply 
subsection C to restrictive covenants recorded both before and 
after July 1, 1986.  To conclude otherwise and find that current 
subsection C applies only to post-1986 restrictive covenants, as 
Sussex argues, would render the 1991 amendments to the subsection 
meaningless.  That result would be contrary to the principle that 
statutory amendments are presumed purposeful and not unnecessary 
or vain.  Cape Henry Towers, Inc. v. National Gypsum Co., 229 Va. 
596, 600, 331 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1985). 
 
It is true, as Sussex points out, that the General Assembly 
often uses the phrase "heretofore or hereafter" to indicate that 
a statute is to be applied both prospectively and 
retrospectively.  Indeed that phrase is used in subsection A of 
Code § 36-96.6.  As demonstrated in the cases discussed above, 
however, we have never imposed a requirement that any specific 
word or phrase be used in order to support a finding of clear 
legislative intent of retroactive application.  See Hagen v. 
Hagen, 205 Va. 791, 796, 139 S.E.2d 821, 824 (1965).  The failure 
of the General Assembly to include this specific phrase in 
subsection C does not override the unambiguous meaning of the 
word "any" as used in the subsection and the clear import of the 
1991 amendments to the subsection. 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
 
Affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE CARRICO, with whom JUSTICE COMPTON and JUSTICE 
STEPHENSON join, dissenting. 
 
 
I must concede that, in a previous case, this court has 
given the word "any" the retrospective effect the majority 
opinion gives it in today's decision.  But it does not follow 
that the word should always be given such effect. 
 
As the Society points out on brief, this is the issue in the 
present case:  "Did the General Assembly intend that section 36-
96.6[C] apply to all restrictive covenants, or only to those 
executed after its passage?"  We ascertain legislative intent 
from the language actually used, considering not only each word 
that is employed but also how it is utilized in the context of 
the whole statutory enactment.  When the word "any" is considered 
in this context, it becomes clear, in my opinion, that the 
General Assembly did not intend that "any" should have the 
retrospective effect the majority gives it today. 
 
The word "any" is used not once but twice in § 36-96.6.  It 
appears in both subsections A and C.  Subsection A reads as 
follows: 
 
Any restrictive covenant purporting to restrict 
occupancy or ownership of property on the basis of 
race, color, religion, national origin, sex, 
elderliness, familial status, or handicap, whether  
heretofore or hereafter included in an instrument 
affecting the title to real or leasehold property, is 
declared to be void and contrary to the public policy 
of this Commonwealth.  
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
 
Subsection C reads as follows: 
 
 
A family care home, foster home, or group home in which 
physically handicapped, mentally ill, mentally 
retarded, or developmentally disabled persons reside, 
with one or more resident counselors or other staff 
persons, shall be considered for all purposes 
residential occupancy by a single family when 
construing any restrictive covenant which purports to 
restrict occupancy or ownership of real or leasehold 
property to members of a single family or to 
residential use or structure. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
If, in the enactment of § 36-96.6, it was intended that the 
word "any," standing alone, should have retrospective effect, the 
General Assembly need only have used that discrete word at the 
beginning of subsection A.  Yet, the General Assembly found it 
necessary to state expressly that the provisions of the 
subsection would apply to "[a]ny restrictive covenant . . . 
heretofore or hereafter included in an instrument affecting the 
title to real or leasehold property."  (Emphasis added.) 
 
It is obvious to me the General Assembly did not intend that 
the word "any," standing alone in subsection A, should have 
retrospective effect.  It strains credulity, therefore, after its 
careful use of "heretofore or hereafter" in subsection A, to say 
the General Assembly intended by its mere use of the word "any" 
in subsection C, that the provisions of subsection C should also 
be given retrospective effect.  Accordingly, I would reverse the 
judgment of the trial court and enter final judgment here in 
favor of Sussex.