Case Title: Dickens v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 278, 2009

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2010-08-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
KEVIN L. DICKENS,   
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 278, 2009 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0807041493 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: July 9, 2010 
 
 
 
 
   Decided: August 11, 2010 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and JACOBS, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 11th day of August 2010, upon consideration of the briefs on 
appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
On January 23, 2009, the defendant-appellant, Kevin L. 
Dickens, acting pro se, was found guilty by a Superior Court jury of nine 
counts of Assault in a Detention Facility.  He was sentenced to fifty-four 
years of Level V imprisonment, to be suspended after twenty-one years for 
probation.  This is Dickens’ direct appeal.   
 
(2) 
The following evidence was presented at trial.  In 2008, 
Dickens was an inmate in the Secure Housing Unit (“SHU”) at the James T. 
Vaughn Correctional Center in Smyrna, Delaware.  On May 6, 2008, 
 
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Dickens was removed from his cell so that correctional officers could collect 
a disposable razor that he had refused to return to them.  He told the officers 
that he would return the razor only after the lights had been turned off.  
Dickens allowed himself to be handcuffed behind his back before leaving 
the cell, in accordance with procedure at the SHU.  He was then escorted to 
an interview room, where he was given his lunch.  While being escorted to 
the interview room, Dickens became unruly and started yelling in the face of 
one of the correctional officers.  After entering the interview room, Dickens 
was shackled to the bottom of a table.  One of his hands was uncuffed so that 
he could be re-cuffed with his hands in front of him to permit him to eat his 
lunch.  Dickens snatched his hand away and began to eat, with the handcuff 
and the handcuff key dangling from his wrist.  After one of the correctional 
officers demanded that he return the handcuff key, Dickens threw juice from 
his cup into the officer’s face.  He then began punching one of the other 
officers in the face.  The officers were unable to subdue Dickens until they 
sprayed him with pepper spray.  The officers sustained bruises, swelling, and 
lacerations in the incident.   
 
(3) 
On May 11, 2008, another incident involving Dickens occurred.  
He told a correctional officer that he would not return his lunch tray until the 
lights had been turned off.  After Dickens repeatedly refused to obey the 
 
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officer’s orders to return the tray, the quick response team (“QRT”), 
consisting of six officers in protective gear, was assembled.  When Dickens 
continued to refuse to hand over his tray and refused to come to the door to 
be cuffed, one of the officers sprayed pepper spray into the cell.  Dickens 
then threw a mixture of feces and urine at the officer.  After apparently 
successfully subduing Dickens with the pepper spray, the QRT entered the 
cell, at which point Dickens threw more of the mixture at them and covered 
himself with feces.  During the struggle to subdue Dickens, the QRT 
members were covered with the feces/urine mixture and sustained physical 
injuries such as lacerations and bruising.  Dickens sustained cuts to his ear 
and feet.   
 
(4) 
In this appeal, Dickens claims that a) the assault in a detention 
facility statute, Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §1254, is unconstitutional because it 
violates equal protection; b) the Superior Court’s denial of his request for a 
trial continuance to obtain a mental health evaluation was an abuse of 
discretion; c) he was denied his constitutional right to the assistance of 
counsel; and d) the Superior Court judges involved in his case were biased 
against him. 
 
(5) 
Dickens’ first claim is that the Delaware assault in a detention 
facility statute is unconstitutional because it violates equal protection 
 
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principles by treating prisoners differently from non-prisoners.  This issue 
was raised by Dickens in a previous appeal in this Court.1  In the Order 
deciding that appeal, we reasoned that, in order for statutory discrimination 
to be unconstitutional, the distinction drawn must be “patently arbitrary and 
bear no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.”2  We 
concluded that, because the statutory distinction between prisoners and non-
prisoners is rationally related to the legitimate state purpose of protecting 
correctional officers and other employees in detention facilities, there was no 
violation of equal protection.3  Dickens’ first claim raises an issue that was 
previously raised by Dickens in another appeal and decided squarely against 
him by this Court.  As such, the claim is without merit.  
 
(6) 
Dickens’ second claim is that the Superior Court’s denial of his 
request for a trial continuance so that he could obtain a mental health 
evaluation was an abuse of discretion.  The record reflects that Dickens’ 
motion was presented to the Superior Court approximately one week prior to 
the date his trial was scheduled to commence.  On the morning of trial, the 
Superior Court considered all pre-trial motions, including Dickens’ motion 
for a mental health evaluation.  The judge afforded Dickens ample 
                                                 
1 Dickens v. State, Del. Supr., No. 472, 2008, Jacobs, J. (July 23, 2010). 
2 Id. (citing Hughes v. State, 653 A.2d 241, 247 (Del. 1994)). 
3 Id.  
 
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opportunity to argue the basis of his motion.  In denying the motion, the 
judge found that Dickens already had been afforded a mental health 
evaluation in 2008, four months prior to the incidents in this case, and, 
moreover, that Dickens was unable to articulate why a new evaluation was 
necessary.  The record reflects no abuse of discretion on the part of the 
Superior Court in denying Dickens’ request for a new mental health 
evaluation.  As such, we conclude that Dickens’ second claim is without 
merit.         
 
(7) 
Dickens’ third claim is that he was denied his constitutional 
right to the assistance of counsel.  The record reflects that, prior to trial, 
Dickens voluntarily waived his right to counsel and decided to represent 
himself.4  The record also reflects that, in light of the motion judge’s denial 
of his request for a mental health evaluation, Dickens told the trial judge that 
he wanted to be excused from the trial and tried in absentia.  After 
conducting an extensive colloquy with Dickens to ascertain that his decision 
was voluntary, the trial judge had standby counsel participate in jury 
selection and then sit as a bystander throughout the trial in case Dickens 
changed his mind and decided to participate.  The trial judge also arranged 
for Dickens to watch the trial from another location.  Dickens, at his request, 
                                                 
4 Snowden v. State, 672 A.2d 1017, 1020 (Del. 1996). 
 
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made a closing statement to the jury.  In accordance with Dickens’ wishes, 
the trial judge ruled that his standby counsel would not be representing him 
at trial.  The record reflects that the trial judge properly permitted Dickens to 
be tried in absentia, but did not impinge upon his right to self-
representation.5  Taking all of the above into consideration, we conclude that 
Dickens’ claim of a constitutional denial of his right to counsel is without 
any factual foundation and is completely without merit. 
 
(8) 
Dickens’ fourth, and final, claim is that the Superior Court 
judges who dealt with his case throughout the trial process were biased 
against him.  The sole basis for this claim appears to be the fact that the 
motion and trial judges made rulings adverse to him.  However, a judge’s 
adverse rulings, standing alone, do not constitute a valid basis for the judge’s 
disqualification on the ground of bias.6  In the absence of any factual basis 
for Dickens’ fourth claim, we conclude that it, too, is without merit. 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the 
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice 
          
                                                 
5 Id. 
6 Petition of Wittrock, 649 A.2d 1053, 1054 (Del. 1994).