Case Title: Casey v. Oliver

Citation: 577 So. 2d 453

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1991-03-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
577 So. 2d 453 (1991)
Marty CASEY, as father and next friend of Felicia Nell Casey, a minor
v.
Ethel M. OLIVER.
89-1356.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
March 15, 1991.
J. Robert Bentley, Oneonta, for appellant.
W.J. McDaniel and John F. McDaniel of McDaniel, Hall, Conerly & Lusk, Birmingham, for appellee.
MADDOX, Justice.
This appeal presents a question of the liability of the defendant for injuries suffered by her 22-month-old great-granddaughter, when the child ingested tranquilizers that the defendant had left on a shelf *454 over the bed in which the child was to sleep.
The trial court directed a verdict for the great-grandmother on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to prove, by substantial evidence, that the great-grandmother had been guilty of willfulness or wantonness.
The basic facts giving rise to the action are that in May 1988, the infant, Felicia Casey, and her parents spent the night at the home of the infant's great-grandmother, Ethel Oliver, who was the grandmother of Felicia's mother, Melissa Casey.
The sleeping arrangements were that Felicia and her mother, Melissa, were to sleep in Ms. Oliver's bed, and Marty, Felicia's father, was going to sleep in a back bedroom. Ms. Oliver was going to sleep in another bedroom in the house. Even though when she left her own bedroom Ms. Oliver took with her a bag containing her medicine, it is undisputed that a sample bottle containing Sinequan, a trade name for the generic drug Doxepin, was left on a small wicker shelf about 12 inches above Ms. Oliver's bed, in which Felicia was to sleep with her mother.
Just before the family went to bed, Melissa was in the bathroom and Marty was in the back bedroom. Ms. Oliver was in the front bedroom preparing for bed. Upon entering Ms. Oliver's bedroom, Melissa saw Felicia with five pills in her hand and an open medicine bottle on the bed. Melissa examined Felicia's mouth and throat but found nothing. She then summoned Marty and Ms. Oliver to come into the room. When Melissa asked Ms. Oliver how many pills had been in the bottle, Ms. Oliver said that she had two sample bottles, and that each bottle contained five pills, that she had combined the two bottles, and had taken a total of five pills, which would have left five pills in the bottle. Ms. Oliver also told Melissa that "it wouldn't hurt her if she had taken it [the medication] ... [i]t was just cold medicine, and she knew there was only five pills in the bottle." Melissa and Marty discussed taking Felicia to the emergency room or to the poison control center. Ms. Oliver said, according to the record, "there is no reason to [take Felicia to the emergency room or poison control center] because there were only five pills in the bottle, and even if she had taken any, it won't hurt her." Melissa and Marty claimed that they relied upon these statements and did not take Felicia to receive any emergency treatment at that time. After her parents talked to Felicia and checked her mouth, everyone went to bed.
The next morning, Felicia could not be awakened. She was rushed to the emergency room at Guntersville Hospital where she was treated for a drug overdose. After Felicia had a grand mal seizure, she was transported to the pediatric intensive care unit at Children's Hospital in Birmingham, where she was treated further for Sinequan ingestion. There was evidence presented that, based on tests, Felicia could have swallowed as many as four of the Sinequan pills.
In his complaint, Marty Casey, as next friend of Felicia, alleged that Ms. Oliver had "negligently left the [Sinequan] out where the two (2) year old guest could easily get it"; that after the child had swallowed the pills, she represented to the parents that "she knew how many pills had been in the medicine bottle and that the minor had not swallowed any"; and that the parents had relied on this representation and had delayed seeking medical assistance for several hours.
It is apparent from the record that the trial judge, based on the evidence, was of the opinion that the plaintiff had failed to show, by substantial evidence, that Ms. Oliver was guilty of willfulness or wantonness. He, therefore, directed a verdict in favor of Ms. Oliver.
On appeal, Casey argues that "the trial judge probably would not have granted the Defendant's motion for a directed verdict had he used a standard of care which required simple negligence." Our examination of the record convinces us that this statement in Casey's brief is probably true. Consequently, our review must be based upon the law as it applies to children of tender years who are licensees.
We begin our review by stating the law concerning the quantum of proof required *455 in order for a party to defeat a motion for a directed verdict. Our law provides that "[i]n all civil actions ... proof by substantial evidence shall be required to submit an issue of fact to the trier of fact." Ala.Code 1975, § 12-21-12; see Ala.R.Civ.P. 50; Ex parte Oliver, 532 So. 2d 627 (Ala.1988).
We begin our analysis of the directed verdict by stating that all of the parties agree that the child was a social guest and had the status of a licensee. In view of this fact, the only question presented is whether there was substantial evidence that Ms. Oliver had breached a duty owed to the infant licensee.
In order to decide this issue, we must examine, once again, the principles of law dealing with a premises owner's duty to a child of tender years who is on the premises. This Court, in Tolbert v. Gulsby, 333 So. 2d 129, 131 (Ala.1976), set out the principle of law to be applied, as follows:
Based on these principles of law, Ms. Oliver's owed to Felicia the duty "not [to] willfully or wantonly injure her, or not to allow her to be negligently injured after becoming aware of her peril." Raney v. Roger Downs Ins. Agency, 525 So. 2d 1384 (Ala.1988). See also Copeland v. Pike Liberal Arts School, 553 So. 2d 100 (Ala.1989).
In Raney, a child of tender years had gone with her parents to the offices of an insurance agency that her parents had contracted to clean over the weekend. While using the bathroom in the offices, the child found an open container of lye on the bottom shelf of the bathroom and, mistakingly thinking it was sugar, put a spoonful of it in her mouth, and was injured. In that case, this Court, pointing out that the defendant had no knowledge that the child would be on the premises, held that the trial court correctly entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendant insurance agency. The Court noted that "plaintiffs' second cause of action was based upon the theory that the lye constituted a dangerous instrumentality" and that "[t]he standard of care that the defendants owed with respect to storage of lye was to exercise care commensurate with the risk of injury," but that "[t]he storage of the container of lye within locked offices, presumably not accessible to children, [met] that standard."
In Raney, this Court also mentioned the doctrine of "attractive nuisance" discussed by this Court in Tolbert v. Gulsby, and, quoting from Republic Steel Corp. v. Tillery, 261 Ala. 34, 38, 72 So. 2d 719 (1954), stated:
525 So. 2d  at 1388. (Citation omitted.)
In Raney, this Court quoted a definition of "wantonness" in a context of liability to *456 licensees that was contained in a previous case:
525 So. 2d  at 1387.
There is yet another reason why a directed verdict was inappropriate in this case. There was evidence that after Ms. Oliver knew that the child had opened the bottle containing the medication, she told the child's parents that "it wouldn't hurt her if she had taken it [the medication] ... [i]t was just cold medicine, and [that] she knew there was only five pills in the bottle." Casey claims that this evidence shows that Ms. Oliver was guilty of "active negligence," which would remove this case from the standard of care generally used with licensee cases, and place it under the standard set out in Orr v. Turney, 535 So. 2d 150, 152 (Ala.1988):
In Orr the plaintiff, a 15-month-old boy visiting the home of the defendant, was playing outside with some other children at the bottom of the steps that led out of the defendant's kitchen. While the defendant was cooking, a pan of grease caught on fire. The defendant grabbed the pan and flung open the kitchen door. The pan apparently became too hot to hold, and the defendant dropped it, splattering hot grease on the plaintiff and burning him severely.
This Court held that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant, because the evidence indicated that she committed an affirmative act, which would have increased her duty to act with reasonable care, and "the jury could conclude that [the defendant's] acts were done consciously with reckless indifference for their consequences." Id.
The distinction between liability based upon the affirmative conduct of the premises owner (Orr) and the liability of an owner for a condition of the premises (Raney) is somewhat blurred. In Raney, this Court stated that the landowner owes to the licensee a duty "not to allow [the licensee] to be *457 negligently injured after becoming aware of [the licensee's] peril." 525 So. 2d  at 1387. The facts of this case, we find, require the application of the principles of law set out in Raney. The facts are somewhat similar, in that a condition was created and a child came in contact with it and was injured. In that case, of course, there was no evidence that the defendants had any knowledge, either actual or constructive, that the minor plaintiff was on the premises. In this case, the jury could infer from the evidence that the premises owner had knowledge that the pills were on the shelf over the bed in which the child would be sleeping and knew that if the child came in contact with them, the child would likely or probably be injured as a result. The jury could further infer that the premises owner, after becoming aware that the child had possibly ingested some of the pills and was in a position of peril, was negligent in representing to the child's parents that immediate medical attention was unnecessary.
Therefore, we hold that the trial court committed reversible error when it directed a verdict for Ms. Oliver on Casey's claims of negligence. The judgment of the trial court is, therefore, reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
HORNSBY, C.J., and ALMON, SHORES, ADAMS, HOUSTON, STEAGALL, KENNEDY and INGRAM, JJ., concur.