Case Title: ERIC SCHOUBOE V. WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0190

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-08-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
ERIC SCHOUBOE V. WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION2010 WY 119238 P.3d 1246Case Number: NO. S-09-0190Decided: 08/19/2010
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
ERIC 
SCHOUBOE,Appellant(Petitioner),v.WYOMING DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION,Appellee(Respondent).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County

The 
Honorable Nancy J. Guthrie, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Gerard 
R. Bosch and Mark J. Longfield, of Law Offices of Jerry Bosch, LLC, Wilson, 
WY

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney 
General; Douglas J. Moench, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Kenneth J. 
Miller, Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT*, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
*Chief Justice at 
time of expedited conference.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Eric Schouboe 
appeals a hearing examiner's order upholding his implied consent 
suspension.  Schouboe contends that 
the Wyoming Department of Transportation (WYDOT) did not prove he was in actual 
physical control of his vehicle.  We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Schouboe lists 
five issues:

 
 

I.              
Did 
the Wyoming Department of Transportation (WYDOT) carry its burden to establish 
the necessary element of "actual physical control" by a preponderance of the 
evidence in [Shouboe's] Implied Consent Suspension?

II.            
Whether 
the Office of Administrative Hearing's (OAH) finding of fact that the "keys were 
not in the ignition" is supported by substantial evidence?

III.           
Whether 
the OAH's finding of fact that the "keys were not in the ignition" constitutes 
an abuse of discretion?

IV.          
Whether 
the OAH's conclusion that [Shouboe] could have awakened and driven away at any 
moment is supported by substantial evidence?

V.           
Whether 
the OAH's conclusion that [Shouboe] could have awakened and driven away at any 
moment constitutes an abuse of discretion?

 
 
The 
State rephrases the issues as follows:

 
 

I.              
Does 
substantial evidence exist to support the hearing examiner's conclusion that 
[Schouboe] had been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
upon a public street or highway?

II.            
Was 
the decision of the hearing examiner arbitrary or 
capricious?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      At 2:14 a.m. on 
March 11, 2008, two Sublette County Deputy Sheriffs approached Eric Schouboe's 
pickup truck parked in the middle of a county road.  The vehicle was not running, and Deputy 
Robert Laing observed Schouboe asleep in the driver's seat.  Deputy Laing also noticed keys on the 
center console next to Schouboe's elbow.  
After waking Schouboe, Deputy Laing opened the door of the truck, and 
noticed Schouboe smelled of alcohol.  
The deputy asked Schouboe why he was in the middle of the road, to which 
Schouboe replied, "I stopped, I don't know."  Field sobriety tests were 
administered, and Schouboe failed them all.  He was arrested for DUI, and transported 
to the Sublette County Detention Center.  
There, Schouboe refused chemical testing.

 
 
[¶4]      WYDOT notified 
Schouboe on April 2, 2008, that his driver's license would be suspended for 18 
months for refusing chemical testing.  
Schouboe requested a hearing, which was held in June of 2008.  The hearing examiner upheld the license 
suspension, and in doing so concluded that Schouboe was in "actual physical 
control of his automobile.  He could 
have awakened and driven away at any moment."  The district court affirmed the hearing 
examiner, and this appeal followed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶5]      In Bryant v. State ex. rel. Wyoming Dept. of 
Transportation, 2002 WY 140, 55 P.3d 4 (Wyo. 2002), this Court applied the 
standard of review developed in worker's compensation cases to driver's license 
suspension contested cases.  Bryant, ¶¶ 8-12, 55 P.3d  at 
8-9.  In Dale v. S&S Builders, LLC, 2008 WY 
84, 188 P.3d 554 (Wyo. 2008), we 
refined the standard of review for agency actions.  Under the plain language of Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 16-3-114(c)(ii) (LexisNexis 2009), reversal of an agency finding or 
action is required if it is not supported by substantial evidence.  Dale, ¶ 21, 188 P.3d  at 561.

 
 
[T]he 
substantial evidence standard will be applied any time we review an evidentiary 
ruling. When the burdened party prevailed before the agency, we will determine 
if substantial evidence exists to support the finding for that party by 
considering whether there is relevant evidence in the entire record which a 
reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's conclusions. If the 
hearing examiner determines that the burdened party failed to meet his burden of 
proof, we will decide whether there is substantial evidence to support the 
agency's decision to reject the evidence offered by the burdened party by 
considering whether that conclusion was contrary to the overwhelming weight of 
the evidence in the record as a whole. See, Wyo. Consumer Group v. 
Public Serv. Comm'n of Wyo., 882 P.2d 858, 860-61 (Wyo. 1994); 
Spiegel, 549 P.2d  at 1178 (discussing the definition of substantial 
evidence as "contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence"). If, in the 
course of its decision making process, the agency disregards certain evidence 
and explains its reasons for doing so based upon determinations of credibility 
or other factors contained in the record, its decision will be sustainable under 
the substantial evidence test. Importantly, our review of any particular 
decision turns not on whether we agree with the outcome, but on whether the 
agency could reasonably conclude as it did, based on all the evidence before 
it.

 
 

Dale, ¶ 22, 188 P.3d  at 
561.

 
 
[¶6]      We will apply the 
substantial evidence standard anytime we are reviewing an evidentiary 
issue.  As always, we review an 
agency's conclusions of law de novo, and "[w]e will affirm an agency's 
legal conclusion only if it is in accordance with the law." Dale, ¶ 26, 188 P.3d  at 
562.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]      Although he lists 
five issues for our consideration, Schouboe's argument can be narrowed down to 
one basic question: Was the hearing examiner's conclusion that Schouboe was in 
actual physical control of his vehicle based on substantial evidence?  We conclude that it was, and explain 
below.

 
 

[¶8]      First, we will 
address a preliminary issue submitted by Schouboe.  He contends that it was improper for 
WYDOT to rely solely upon the certified administrative record to sustain its 
burden, and that the certified administrative record does not contain facts or 
evidence to support the hearing examiner's conclusion that he was in actual 
physical control of his vehicle.  
While using the certified record to prosecute administrative suspensions 
has been recently questioned (see Hittner 
v. State, ex. rel. Wyo. DOT (In re Hittner), 2008 WY 91, 189 P.3d 872 (Wyo. 2008)), it is nonetheless a valid method still 
used by agencies and approved of by this Court in Drake v. State, 751 P.2d 1319, 1322 
(Wyo. 1988).  WYDOT has broad 
discretion to administer the implied consent laws.  Id.  We 
also note that submission of the certified record in a driver's license 
suspension contested case proceeding has traditionally been deemed sufficient to 
establish a prima facie case and to shift the burden to the petitioner to 
provide evidence to refute the prima facie case.  McDonald v. State Department of Revenue 
& Taxation, 846 P.2d 694, 697 (Wyo. 1993).

 
 
[¶9]      Turning to 
Schouboe's substantive question of whether there was substantial evidence to 
prove that he was in actual control of his vehicle, this Court has 
stated:

 
 
            
An intoxicated person seated behind the steering wheel of an automobile 
is a threat to the safety and welfare of the public.  The danger is less than that involved 
when the vehicle is actually moving; however, the danger does exist and the 
degree of danger is only slightly less than when the vehicle is moving.  As long as a person is physically or 
bodily able to assert dominion in the sense of movement by starting the car and 
driving away, then he has substantially as much control over the vehicle as he 
would if he were actually driving it.

 
 
            
We believe that the legislative intent in enacting the "actual physical 
control" portion of § 31-5-233(a), W.S 1977, is apprehending the intoxicated 
driver before he can do any harm by operating a motor 
vehicle.

 
 

Adams 
v. State, 
697 P.2d 622, 625 (Wyo. 1985).

 
 
[¶10]   The hearing examiner concluded that 
Schouboe was in actual, physical control of the vehicle and that substantial 
evidence existed to support that conclusion including: (1) the vehicle was 
registered to Schouboe; (2) the keys were on the console; (3) Schouboe admitted 
that he stopped in the middle of the road; and (4) Schouboe was, indeed, in the 
middle of the road.  Based on that 
evidence, the hearing examiner concluded that actual, physical control 
existed.

 
 
[¶11]   As the party challenging whether or 
not the agency's decision was supported by substantial evidence, Schouboe has 
the burden of showing that the decision was not supported by such evidence.  See Wheaton v. State, 2003 WY 56, ¶ 18, 68 P.3d 1167, 1175-76 (Wyo. 
2003).  Because Schouboe did not 
testify at the contested case hearing, he relies on the question that he asked 
the deputy during the standardized field sobriety tests and implies that there 
may have been another driver:  "What 
happened to the ol' boy that was with me?"  
When the deputy asked Schouboe, "What ol' boy'?" Schouboe said, "JOHN, 
that was driving this thing."  
However, no evidence in the record exists to show that Schouboe was ever 
accompanied by another person.

 
 

[¶12]   Schouboe further contends that 
there is no evidence to support the finding that he could have woken up and 
driven away at any moment, or that the keys found on the console of the vehicle 
actually operated said vehicle.  
However, Schouboe offers no evidence to explain why he was in the 
driver's seat of his vehicle when the deputy discovered him in the middle of the 
road.  Schouboe cites to Rogers v. State, 224 S.W.3d 564 (Ark. 
Ct. App. 2006), in support of his argument that keys on the console of a vehicle 
does not constitute "actual physical control."  In Rodgers, the Arkansas court found that 
sleeping in a vehicle without inserting the keys into the ignition did not 
constitute actual physical control.  
Indeed, it is the bright-line rule in Arkansas that actual physical 
control begins when the keys are located in the ignition.  We have not adopted such a rule, and 
decline to do so in this instance. Whether or not the keys were in the ignition 
does not define actual physical control in Wyoming.  Perhaps under different facts we might 
conclude differently, but here, the facts are such that Schouboe was parked in 
the middle of the road.  He was 
seated in the driver's seat, slumped over the steering wheel, in the middle of a 
Wyoming highway with keys on the console.  
Although 
the State did not establish with absolute certainty that the keys found 
in 
the vehicle matched the vehicle, it 
was certainly a fair inference for the hearing examiner to make.  "Substantial 
evidence is relevant evidence which a reasonable 
mind might accept in support of the agency's conclusions."  Dale, ¶ 11, 188 P.3d  at 558 
(quoting Newman, 
¶ 12, 49 P.3d 163, 168, quoting State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Safety & Comp. Div. v. Jensen, 2001 WY 51, ¶ 10, 24 P.3d 1133, 1136 
(Wyo. 2001)).

 
 
[¶13]   Under these facts, we conclude that 
the hearing examiner had substantial evidence to conclude that Schouboe was in 
actual physical control of his vehicle.1  Affirmed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 
  1Other courts 
have come to similar conclusions.  
See, for instance, State v. Fleck, 777 N.W.2d 233, 237 (Minn. 2010), 
where the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that a man who was found asleep 
behind the wheel of his vehicle, which was legally parked with the keys 
in the console, was in actual physical control.  The appellant had not recently driven 
the vehicle because it was "cold to the touch," the lights were not on, and it 
did not appear that the vehicle had been running.  However, the keys in 
the vehicle's console 
led the court to conclude that appellant was in actual physical 
control.