Case Title: PHILIP WHITE and KATHLEEN D. WHITE V. WILLARD M. WOODS and CYNTHIA S. WOODS; JOHN D. ADAMSON V. WILLARD M. WOODS and CYNTHIA S. WOODS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-04-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
PHILIP WHITE and KATHLEEN D. WHITE V. WILLARD M. WOODS and CYNTHIA S. WOODS; JOHN D. ADAMSON V. WILLARD M. WOODS and CYNTHIA S. WOODS2009 WY 29208 P.3d *Case Number: S-08-0078, S-08-0085Decided: 04/02/2009This opinion replaces 2009 WY 29 which was withdrawn March 31, 2009. Cite this opinion as 2009 WY 29A.


OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
PHILIP WHITE and 
KATHLEEN D. WHITE,

 
 
Appellants

(Defendants),

 
 
v.

 
 
WILLARD M. WOODS and 
CYNTHIA S. WOODS,

 
 
Appellees

(Plaintiffs).

 
 
JOHN D. 
ADAMSON,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
WILLARD M. WOODS and 
CYNTHIA S. WOODS,

 
 
Appellees

(Plaintiffs).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Albany County

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants, Philip White and Kathleen White:

Philip 
White, Jr., Attorney at Law, Laramie, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellant, John Adamson:

John 
D. Adamson, pro se.

 
 
Representing 
Appellees:

            
Frank J. Jones, Attorney at Law, 
Wheatland, Wyoming.

 
 
Before VOIGT, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

[¶1]        
Willard and Cynthia 
Woods filed suit in district court seeking to quiet their title to several small 
pieces of property located in the interior of their ranch property.  Among the defendants were John Adamson 
and Philip and Kathleen White.  The 
district court entered summary judgment against Mr. Adamson and the 
Whites.  Their separate appeals have 
been consolidated before this Court.  
We will reverse, having concluded that the Woods did not establish the 
facts needed to support their motions for summary judgment. 

 
 
ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]        
We consider these 
three issues:

 
 
1.         
Do genuine issues of material fact exist that preclude summary 
judgment?

 
 
2.         
Did the Woods have standing to challenge the tax 
deeds?

 
 
3.         
Are the Woods' claims barred by the applicable statutes of 
limitation?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
Ralph and Eva Kent 
owned a ranch in a remote and sparsely populated part of Albany County, Wyoming, 
encompassing nearly four thousand acres of deeded land and leased public 
land.  On May 20, 1971, the Kents 
conveyed approximately 320 acres of their property to Glenco Development 
Company, Inc., a Missouri corporation.  
Less than a month later, Glenco filed and recorded with the Albany County 
Clerk the plat of a subdivision, called the Te-Ke-Ki Subdivision, covering 13.52 
acres of the property they had acquired from the Kents.

 
 

[¶4]        
The Te-Ke-Ki 
Subdivision has a number of notable features.  Because it is completely surrounded by 
the ranch property, there is no public access to the subdivision.  There are eighty lots on 13.52 acres, 
making the average lot roughly 7,000 square feet in size.  The lots are burdened by protective 
covenants that declare Glenco's intention "to maintain the said real property as 
a first class condominium complex development."  Among many other restrictions, the 
covenants prohibit all construction until after Glenco establishes water and 
sewer systems for the subdivision.  
Glenco has not established these systems, so construction remains 
prohibited.  Apparently, Glenco no 
longer exists, and the Woods hold title to almost all of the lots,1 so the situation is unlikely to 
change.

 
 

[¶5]        
On July 21, 1971, 
approximately forty days after filing the subdivision plat, Glenco conveyed back 
to Mr. Kent all of the 320 acres Glenco had acquired from the Kents, including 
the 13.52 acres covered by the subdivision.  That reconveyance was not filed with the 
Albany County Clerk until September 1, 1972.  In the interim, and despite the 
reconveyance to Mr. Kent, Glenco sold several lots in the Te-Ke-Ki Subdivision 
to third parties.  Among other 
transactions, on September 11, 1971, Glenco sold lot 80 to Jerry and Candace 
Maynard.  On November 15, 1971, it 
sold lot 8 to Don and Margaret Holton.  
On February 15, 1972, it sold the west half of lot 66 to Delmar and Donna 
Miley.  All of these deeds were 
filed and recorded on May 22, 1972, nearly three and a half months before 
Glenco's reconveyance to Mr. Kent was filed and recorded.

 
 

[¶6]        
The very next year, 
the Maynards, the Holtons, and the Mileys did not pay the property taxes due on 
their lots.  On September 5, 1974, 
the properties were sold2 by the Albany County Treasurer at a 
tax sale.  Philip and Kathleen 
White, appellants in Case No. S-08-0078, purchased the west half of lot 66 with 
a bid of four dollars and forty-three cents.  John Adamson, the appellant in Case No. 
S-08-0085, purchased Lots 8 and 80 for a total of ten dollars and twenty-five 
cents.  Mr. Adamson and the 
Whites received certificates of purchase following the tax sale in 1974, and 
apparently continued to pay taxes on the lots in subsequent years.  They applied for tax deeds to their 
respective lots in 1979, and received them from the County Treasurer on 
January 16, 1980. 

 
 

[¶7]        
After the tax sale, 
but before Mr. Adamson and the Whites received their tax deeds, the Kents 
obtained judgment in a quiet title action involving these lots.3  The Maynards, the Holtons, and the Mileys 
were among the seventy named defendants.  
Mr. Adamson and the Whites were not.  On April 3, 1975, the district 
court entered its judgment, ruling for some defendants and against others.  It ruled in favor of the Maynards and 
Holtons (predecessors to Mr. Adamson), and quieted their respective titles 
to Lots 8 and 80.  It ruled against 
the Mileys (predecessors to the Whites), and quieted title to the west half of 
Lot 66 in the Kents.  The 
judgment was filed and recorded with the Albany County 
Clerk.

 
 

[¶8]        
The Woods acquired 
the ranch in 1992.  On June 17, 
2005, they filed an action in district court seeking to quiet their title to 
twenty of the lots in the subdivision.  
Among the nearly fifty defendants named were Mr. Adamson and the 
Whites.  More than half of the 
defendants failed to respond to the complaint, and the district court entered 
default judgments against them.  The 
Woods then moved for summary judgment against the remaining defendants.  The Woods' primary argument was that 
they had acquired title through adverse possession.4  The district court granted the Woods' 
summary judgment motions against five defendants, including Mr. Adamson and 
the Whites, not based on the adverse possession claim, but on the basis that 
these defendants' tax deeds were invalid because of failure to comply with 
various statutory requirements.  
Mr. Adamson and the Whites are the only ones who appealed the 
district court's decisions. 

 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

 
 

[¶9]        
As 
we have said many times:  

 
 
Summary 
judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  W.R.C.P. 56(c); Metz Beverage Co. v. Wyoming Beverages, 
Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1051, 1055 (Wyo. 2002).  "A genuine issue of material fact exists 
when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would establish or refute an essential 
element of a cause of action or a defense that the parties have asserted."  Id.  Because summary judgment involves a 
purely legal determination, we undertake de novo review of a trial court's 
summary judgment decision.  Glenn v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 2008 WY 
16, ¶ 6, 176 P.3d 640, 642 (Wyo. 2008).  

 
 

Jacobs 
Ranch Coal Co. v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., LLC, 
2008 WY 101, ¶ 8, 191 P.3d 125, 128-29 (Wyo. 2008).  
We review a summary judgment decision using the same materials and 
following the same standards as the district court.  Mathisen v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., LLC, 
2007 WY 161, ¶ 9, 169 P.3d 61, 64 (Wyo. 2007).  We view the record from the vantage 
point most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, and give that party 
the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the 
record.  Id.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Background:  Tax deeds in 
Wyoming

 
 

[¶10]     
To understand the 
appeals under consideration here, it is useful to place them in context.  The Wyoming statutory provisions for 
obtaining, protecting, and defending tax deeds are now mostly codified in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 39-13-108 (LexisNexis 2007).  There are many specific and detailed 
requirements applicable to tax sales and tax deeds.  Of particular relevance here are 
requirements that, upon applying for a tax deed, notice must be provided in a 
specified manner to the person in whose name the taxes were assessed, to the 
person in actual possession or occupancy of the property, to the record owner, 
and to mortgagees.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 39-13-108(e)(v)(B).  Further, 
after receiving a tax deed, the tax-sale purchaser must file the notices and 
proofs of service "to be recorded as other instruments affecting the conveyance 
of real property."  Id. 
§ 39-13-108(e)(v)(D).

  

[¶11]     
Over the years, 
Wyoming courts have required strict compliance with these statutory 
requirements, and have declared tax deeds invalid for relatively minor 
deviations from the requirements.  
Barrett 
v. Barrett, 
46 Wyo. 84, 92-93, 23 P.2d 857, 860 (1933); Davis v. Minnesota Baptist Convention, 
45 Wyo. 148, 156, 16 P.2d 48, 50 (1932).  
It has been observed that a "review of tax 
title litigation in Wyoming reveals a host of problems and uncertainties for 
those persons who have claimed land under tax deeds."  Robert G. Berger, Comment, Marketable Title Legislation:  Tax Deeds in Wyoming, XI Land & 
Water L. Rev. 2, 419 (1976). The problems facing tax deed purchasers are due, at 
least in part, to a strong policy of protecting the former owner's rights to 
redeem and recover his property.  
See, 
e.g., Barrett, 46 Wyo. at 97, 23 P.2d  at 861 
(Statutes "are to be regarded favorably and construed liberally in favor of the 
redemptioner."); Hackett v. Linch, 57 
Wyo. 289, 297, 116 P.2d 868, 870 (1941).

 
 

[¶12]     
Tempering 
this policy of protecting former owners, the legislature enacted provisions in 
1975 meant to promote more stability and better marketability for tax 
deeds.  Codified as Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 34-2-131 through -134, this act expressly sets forth a policy of 
"confirming and clarifying [tax] titles of persons in possession," of providing 
"means of correcting procedural and jurisdictional defects," and of "rendering 
tax titles marketable and protecting purchasers thereof against remote 
claims."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 34-2-134.  

 
 

[¶13]     
These competing 
policies bear on the appeals before us now.  Mr. Adamson and the Whites purchased 
their lots at a tax sale thirty-five years ago, and have, apparently, paid the 
property taxes on those lots every year since then.  They obtained their tax deeds nearly 
thirty years ago.  After this length 
of time, it may seem that their tax titles should be protected "against remote 
claims."  On the other hand, as 
detailed below, Mr. Adamson and 
the Whites have never taken possession of their lots or put them to any 
practical use.  Under the 
legislature's 1975 enactment, challenges to tax deeds can be cut off after only 
two years if the tax deed owner has been in possession for six months during 
that period.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 34-2-132.  (See infra ¶ 32.)  Because Mr. Adamson and the Whites 
did not take possession of their lots, they cannot take advantage of the 
provisions by which the legislature offered protection to their tax 
deeds.

 
 

[¶14]     
In contrast, for the 
past seventeen years the Woods have used these lots as part of their ranch.  Their principle claim in district court 
was that they had acquired title by adverse possession.5  It is understandable that they want to 
avoid disruption and consolidate their property holdings by quieting their title 
to these lots.  On the other hand, 
when the Woods acquired their ranch in 1992, these tax deeds were of 
record.  The Woods had constructive 
notice, at the very least, that Mr. Adamson and the Whites claimed interests in 
the property.  And because the Woods 
did not own the ranch when the lots were sold for taxes, it is not clear that 
they should benefit from the policy favoring former owners and their rights to 
redeem and recover property.

 
 
The Woods' claims 
against Mr. Adamson and the Whites

 
 

[¶15]     
On June 17, 2005, the 
Woods filed their complaint in this matter.  It listed almost fifty defendants, but 
contained only three paragraphs of allegations:  that this was an action to quiet title 
to real property located in Albany County, Wyoming; that the Woods were the 
owners in fee simple and in possession of the listed property; and that the 
defendants claimed an estate or interest adverse to the Woods.  The complaint did not reveal the legal 
theories or facts underlying the Woods' claims.  Answers from Mr. Adamson and the 
Whites generally denied the Woods' claim to title.

 
 

[¶16]     
On February 13, 2007, 
the Woods filed motions for summary judgment against several of the defendants, 
including Mr. Adamson and the Whites.  
Each motion was supported by an affidavit from Mr. Woods, and each 
affidavit contained essentially identical information.  Mr. Woods stated that he and Mrs. 
Woods had acquired the property by deed on November 25, 1992.  Attached were copies of deeds6 by which Israel Roter, Charles C. 
Lukoff, and Rose Cartoon (as Trustee of the Leo Cartoon Decedent Trust) conveyed 
the property to the Woods.  The 
affidavits further stated that the Woods took possession of the lots on the date 
of purchase, that the lots have never been fenced off from the rest of the ranch 
property, and that the Woods have harvested hay from the lots, grazed cattle on 
them, and "generally utilized [them] as a portion of our ranch."  The Woods' summary judgment motions also 
incorporated copies of the depositions of all defendants who had been 
deposed.

 
 

[¶17]     
The Woods' summary 
judgment motion against the Whites also incorporated a set of documents, which 
were:  (1) the subdivision 
plat; (2) the declaration of protective covenants; (3) a copy of the 
1971 deed by which the Kents conveyed the property to Glenco; (4) a copy of 
the 1971 reconveyance from Glenco to the Kents; (5) a copy of the 1972 deed 
from Glenco to the Mileys for the west half of Lot 66; (6) a copy of the 
1975 judgment in the Kents' quiet title action; (7) a copy of the Whites' 1974 
Certificate of Purchase for the west half of Lot 66 from the tax sale; 
(8) a copy of the Whites' 1980 tax deed for the half lot; and (9) a 
copy of the recorded notice the Whites had published in 1979 before applying for 
their tax deed.  The Woods' summary 
judgment motion against Mr. Adamson incorporated a similar set of 
materials, except that they related to Lots 8 and 80, and there was no copy of 
any recorded notice.

 
 

[¶18]     
When considering 
these materials, we keep in mind that the party moving for summary judgment 
bears "the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case with admissible 
evidence."  Kruckenberg v. Ding Masters, Inc., 2008 
WY 40, ¶ 20, 180 P.3d 895, 901 (Wyo. 2008).  To establish a prima facie case, the moving party must 
demonstrate "the absence of a genuine 
issue of material fact."  Knapp v. Landex Corp., 2006 WY 36, ¶ 10, 
130 P.3d 924, 927 (Wyo. 2006) (emphasis in original).  The "evidence that is relied upon to 
sustain or defeat a motion for summary judgment must be such as would be 
admissible at trial" and "it should be as carefully tailored and professionally 
correct as any evidence which would be presented to the court at the time of 
trial."  Equality Bank of Evansville v. Suomi, 
836 P.2d 325, 330 (Wyo. 1992).  We 
must determine whether the Woods carried this burden of establishing the absence 
of genuine issues of material fact in their summary judgment motions against 
Mr. Adamson and the Whites.

 
 

[¶19]     
The question of 
whether summary judgment was precluded by the existence of genuine issues of 
material fact is intertwined with the issue of standing.  The Woods challenge these tax deeds on 
the basis of noncompliance with the statutory requirements for providing notice 
to interested parties.  It 
is undisputed that the Woods did not own or claim an interest in the property in 
1974 when the lots were sold at the tax sale, or in 1979 when Mr. Adamson and 
the Whites applied for their tax deeds, but the Woods appear to claim that they 
are entitled to challenge the tax deeds as successors to the Kents.  Mr. Adamson and the Whites contend 
that, on two bases, the Woods lack standing to maintain these claims.  First, Mr. Adamson and the Whites 
contend that the Woods have not provided the facts needed to show that the Kents 
were entitled to notice of the pending tax deeds.  Second, even if the Kents might have 
been entitled to notice, the 
Woods provided "no evidence in the record that the Woods are successors in 
interest to [the] Kents."

 
 

[¶20]     
Standing, 
in broad terms, refers to a "party's right to make a legal claim or seek 
judicial enforcement of a duty or right."  
Black's Law Dictionary 1442 
(8th ed. 2004).  As stated by the United States Supreme 
Court:

 
 
Over 
the years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional 
minimum of standing contains three elements.  First, the plaintiff must have suffered 
an injury in fact. . . .  
Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the 
conduct complained of. . . .  Third, it must be likely, as opposed to 
merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 
decision.

 
 

Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992) (internal 
citations and punctuation omitted).  

 
 

[¶21]     
We 
have established similar standing requirements for a party challenging the 
validity of a tax deed.  With regard 
to injury in fact, "the burden is cast 
upon the party seeking to invalidate the tax deed to show that he was prejudiced 
or injured by non-compliance with statutes before the tax deed will be declared 
void."  Barlow v. Lonabaugh, 61 Wyo. 118, 132, 
156 P.2d 289, 294 (1945), citing Andrews 
v. North Side Canal Co., 52 Idaho 117, 126, 12 P.2d 263, 267 (1932).  With regard to whether the injury will 
be redressed, we have said that "[t]he 
validity of a tax title or of a tax sale can be assailed only by one who can 
show that he or those under whom he claims had some title to or interest in the 
property at the time of the sale."  
Hudson v. Erickson, 67 Wyo. 
167, 185-86, 216 P.2d 379, 385 (1950), quoting 51 Am. Jur. 979.  

 
 

[¶22]     
Where a tax deed is 
challenged by a former owner, it seems apparent that improper notice caused 
prejudice or injury by denying or interfering with the former owner's 
opportunity to redeem the property.  
See, e.g., State ex rel. Bishop v. Bramblette, 43 
Wyo. 470, 478, 5 P.2d 279, 282 (1931) ("The purpose of notice in either event is 
to bring to the person entitled to redeem knowledge that the land has been sold 
for taxes and within what time the same may be redeemed from such sale," quoting 
Burns v. State, 25 Wyo. 491, 501, 173 P. 55, 57 (1918).).  Where the claim 
is more remote  that is, where a tax deed is challenged by someone other than 
the former owner  then prejudice and injury are less apparent, and it is less 
likely that a favorable decision could provide redress.  The Woods were not the owners at the 
time of the tax sale or tax deed, so we must review the record to determine 
whether, in support of their summary judgment motions, they submitted facts 
adequate to show that they were prejudiced or injured, and that a favorable 
court decision would provide them redress.

 
 

[¶23]     
The Whites claim 
title to the west half of Lot 66.  
In 1971, the Kents conveyed this property to Glenco.  Glenco conveyed the same property twice, 
first to Mr. Kent in 1971, then to the Mileys in 1972.  Because 
the Mileys' conveyance was the "first duly recorded," Mr. Kent's 
later-filed conveyance is "void, as against" the Mileys.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-120.  When the Mileys did not pay their taxes, 
the Whites purchased the property at the tax sale in 1974.  In 1975, the Kents obtained a quiet 
title judgment against the Mileys, and filed and recorded that judgment.  This judgment, in effect, conveyed all 
of the Mileys' interest in the property to the Kents.  The judgment did not affect the Whites' 
interest, however, because the Whites were not defendants in the suit.  In 1979, the Whites applied for a tax 
deed to the property.  The record 
indicates that the Whites provided notice to the Mileys.  It does not indicate that notice was 
provided to the Kents.  The Whites 
received their tax deed in 1980.

 
 

[¶24]     
The Woods assert that 
the Kents were the record owners in 1979, and were therefore entitled to notice 
under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-13-108(e)(v)(B)(III).  On the basis of this defect, the Woods 
contend that the Whites' tax deed is invalid.  However, the facts in this record fail 
to establish that the Kents were the record owners in 1979.  They actually suggest the contrary.  The property was conveyed to Roter, 
Lukoff, and Cartoon in 1973.  They 
conveyed it to the Woods in 1992.  
If Roter, Lukoff, and Cartoon owned the property continuously from 1973 
to 1992, then they were the record owners in 1979 when the Whites applied for 
their tax deed.7  If there are other conveyances 
indicating that the Kents were the record owners in 1979, they are absent from 
this record.  The question of who 
was the record owner in 1979 remains a genuine issue of material fact, and the 
Woods' summary judgment motion against the Whites should not have been 
granted.

 
 

[¶25]     
Next, the Woods 
apparently claim to be the Kents' successors, and on that basis contend that 
they are entitled to challenge the Whites' tax deed.  The record is, however, devoid of any 
facts establishing that the Woods are the successors in interest to the Kents.8  The record contains 1992 deeds by which 
the Woods obtained the property from Roter, Lukoff, and Cartoon.  It contains a 1973 deed by which Roter, 
Lukoff, and Cartoon obtained the property from the Medicine Bow Land and Cattle 
Company.  The chain stops 
there.  There is no deed or other 
evidence indicating how, when, or from whom Medicine Bow obtained its interest 
in the property.  No connection is 
established between Medicine Bow and the Kents, and so no connection is 
established between the Woods and the Kents.  Even in his affidavit, Mr. Woods 
does not state that the Woods derived their title from the Kents.  There remains a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the Woods are successors in interest to the Kents, 
and summary judgment was granted in error.

 
 

[¶26]     
Mr. Adamson claims 
title to Lots 8 and 80.  In 1971, 
the Kents conveyed the property to Glenco.  
Glenco conveyed the property back to Mr. Kent in 1971.  Glenco also conveyed Lot 8 to the 
Holtons, and Lot 80 to the Maynards.  
The Holtons and the Maynards filed and recorded their conveyances before 
Mr. Kent filed and recorded his, so Mr. Kent's 
later-filed conveyance is "void, as against" the Holtons and the Maynards.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 34-1-120.  When the Holtons and the Maynards did 
not pay their taxes, Mr. Adamson purchased the lots at the tax sale in 
1974.  He applied for the tax deeds 
in 1979, and obtained them in 1980.

 
 

[¶27]     
Again, the Woods 
appear to contend that the Kents were the record owners of Lots 8 and 80 when 
Mr. Adamson applied for his tax deed in 1979.  The Woods further contend, and 
Mr. Adamson concedes, that he did not file his notice as required by Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 39-13-108(e)(v)(D).  
On the basis of this defect, the Woods contend that Mr. Adamson's 
tax deed is invalid.  However, as in 
the Whites' case, the Woods have not provided the facts needed to show they are 
the successors to the Kents.  This 
genuine issue of material fact should have precluded summary judgment against 
Mr. Adamson.

 
 

[¶28]     
In Mr. Adamson's 
case, however, the analysis must be taken a step further.  In the Whites' case, the Woods failed to 
provide facts establishing that the Kents were the record owners of the west 
half of Lot 66 in 1979.  In Mr. 
Adamson's case, in contrast, the Woods provided facts establishing that the 
Kents were not the record owners of Lots 8 and 
80 in 1979.  The Kents were 
unsuccessful in their 1975 quiet title action against the Holtons and the 
Maynards.  The quiet title judgment, 
in effect, confirmed the Holtons' and the Maynards' interests in the 
property.  These facts establish 
that the Kents were not the record owners in 1979, because the Holtons and the 
Maynards were.  On the record before 
us, there is no genuine issue of material fact on this issue, but as explained 
next, it was Mr. Adamson who was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this 
claim.

 
 

[¶29]     
In the Idaho case of 
Harris v. Rasmussen, 106 Idaho 322, 
678 P.2d 114 (1984), the Clarks had conveyed a one-acre parcel of land to Ms. 
Cazier in 1974.  Ms. Cazier did 
not pay the property taxes, and the property was sold at a tax sale to the 
Harrises, who recorded their deed in 1980.  
Later that same year, the Clarks conveyed a larger parcel of property, 
including the one-acre parcel at issue, to the Rasmussens.  The Rasmussens sought to quiet title 
against the Harrises.  The Idaho 
court determined that the Rasmussens could not challenge the validity of the 
Harrises' tax deed, with this explanation:

 
 
As noted above, the 
facts demonstrate that Marie Cazier was the record owner of the parcel, that the 
county took a tax deed because of her failure to pay the property taxes due, and 
that the Harrises purchased the parcel from the county. The Rasmussens, on the 
other hand, trace their title to Marie Cazier's predecessor in interest, the 
Clarks. . . .  The record, however, 
does not show that the Clarks owned any interest in the one-acre parcel when 
they purported to convey it as a part of the larger tract sold to the 
Rasmussens. . . .

 
 
Here, the Rasmussens 
have no valid claim to the property.  
Even if the tax deed were to be declared void, there is nothing in the 
record to indicate they would benefit.  
All of the benefit would inure to Marie Cazier or her successors in 
interest.  Nor is there any 
indication that the Rasmussens have been injured in any way by the ruling 
upholding the county's procedure in taking the tax deed.

 
 

Id. at 323-24, 678 P.2d  
at 115-116.  

 
 


      
      Glenco
       
       
      Holtons &      
      Kents
      Maynards
       
                  
                  
      ???
       
      Adamson       
      Woods
       
       


      
      Clark
       
       
       
              
      Cazier
       
       
       
              
      Harris   
      Rasmussen

Glenco
 
 
 
 
Holtons &      
      Kents

Maynards

 
 
            
                  
      ???

 
 
Adamson       
      Woods
 
 
 
 

Clark

 
 
 
 
 
 
        
      Cazier
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
      Harris   
      Rasmussen

[¶30]     
As illustrated above, 
Mr. Adamson's case is strikingly similar.  
Glenco conveyed the disputed lots to the Holtons and the Maynards.  It also conveyed the lots, as part of a 
larger parcel, to the Kents.  The 
Holtons and the Maynards recorded their conveyances first, so the Kents' 
conveyance is void as to them.  When 
the Holtons and the Maynards did not pay the property taxes, their lots were 
sold at a tax sale to Mr. Adamson.  
The Woods contend that Mr. Adamson's tax deed is invalid.  But even if Mr. Adamson's tax deed is 
invalid, the Woods still have no valid claim to the property.  The benefits would inure to the Maynards 
and the Holtons, or to their successors.  
The benefits would not inure to Glenco, the Kents, or the Woods.9  Even a court decision in their favor 
could not vest title in the Woods or otherwise redress their alleged 
injury.

 
 

[¶31]     
Nor is there any 
indication that Glenco, the Kents, or the Woods suffered any prejudice or injury 
due to any defect in Mr. Adamson's notice.  
Notice was required to be given to the record owners, who were the 
Holtons and the Maynards.  If the 
Kents were not entitled to notice, then they suffered no prejudice, and suffered 
no injury.  Because the Kents could 
not challenge these tax deeds, neither can their alleged successors, the 
Woods.  Based on the record before 
us, it was error to grant summary judgment against Mr. Adamson, and taking 
it a step further, Mr. Adamson would be entitled to judgment in his favor on 
this claim.

 
 
Remaining 
issues

 
 

Statutes 
of limitation

 
 

[¶32]     
Though we have 
already determined that the district court's summary judgment decisions must be 
reversed, we will address these additional issues that seem likely to arise 
again on remand.  The parties have 
disputed whether two different statutes of limitation bar the Woods' challenge 
to the tax deeds.  The first is Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 34-2-132(a), which provides that:

 
 
No action, suit or 
other proceeding shall be commenced by the former owner to set aside, declare 
invalid or redeem from a tax deed or the sale, forfeiture, foreclosure or other 
proceeding upon which it is based or to recover possession, quiet title or 
otherwise litigate or contest the title of the grantee, 
if:

 
 
            
(i)         
Two (2) years or more have elapsed after the date of recording the deed 
in the office of the county clerk and ex officio register of deeds for the 
county in which the real estate described in the deed is situated; 
and

 
 
            
(ii)        The 
grantee has been in possession of the real estate continuously for a period of 
at least six (6) months, at any time after one (1) year and six (6) months have 
elapsed since the date of recording of the tax deed.

 
 
By its plain 
language, this statute applies only if the grantee has been in possession of the 
property for at least six months.  
The record demonstrates that the Whites have never been in possession of 
the west half of Lot 66.  In his 
deposition, Mr. White stated as follows:

 
 
Q.        After 
you purchased this property in 1980, Mr. White, have you ever visited the site 
of the Te-ke-ki Subdivision?

 
 
A.        [by 
Mr. White]  Yes, I 
did.

 
 
Q.        And 
when did you first go to the area?

 
 
A.        Well, 
best I can recall, it was like in the mid 80s.

 
 
Q.        Would 
you tell us the circumstances and the reason that you were making the 
visit?

 
 
A.        Just 
to see where it was located. . . .  
I, of course, couldn't tell exactly where my lot was.  But I drove out there.  I went to the farm house there, the 
ranch house.  Nobody was home.  I looked around the house, trying to see 
if anybody was around.  I didn't see 
anybody.  And I think I  I don't 
know whether I drove or walked kind of up to the  a little road that went up to 
the north of the ranch house, over toward where I thought the property was.  I did have a topo map that I'd sort of 
marked out where it was.  And I  
seems to me there was a gate there.  
And I didn't actually go through the gate.  I just looked at it from the fence. . . 
.

 
 
Q.        And 
were you there more than one time?

 
 
A.        
No.  That was it. . . 
.

 
 
Q.        Since 
that time, have you, or anyone on your behalf, made any use of the west half  

 
 
A.        
No.

 
 
Q.         of 
Lot 66?

 
 
A.        
No.

 
 
Q.        Do 
you know if anyone has been on the  physically on the property, on your behalf, 
since the mid 80s?

 
 
A.        No.10

 
 

[¶33]     
Since 
purchasing the lot at the 1974 tax sale, Mr. White visited the approximate 
location of the subdivision only once.11  He cannot say that he ever set foot on 
the half-lot he claims.  The Whites 
have never taken possession of the lot, and because they have not been in 
possession for any period of at least six months, the statute of limitation 
quoted above does not apply.

 
 

[¶34]     
The 
Whites claim constructive possession, citing Ohio Oil Co. v. Wyoming Agency, 63 Wyo. 
187, 208, 179 P.2d 773, 779 (1947) for the proposition that "[i]f the land is 
not occupied by any one, the plaintiff having title may sue to have his title 
quieted, either because the remedy exists independent of the statute, or because 
his title gives him constructive possession."  (Citations omitted.)  Ohio Oil involved a dispute over an 
undeveloped mineral estate, where neither party owned the surface estate.  The concept of constructive possession 
has been applied to surface interests as well.  See Goodrich v. Stobbe, 908 P.2d 416, 419-20 
(Wyo. 1995) ("We agree with the principle of law that, when the lands are not 
occupied after tax sales, the holders of the tax deeds have constructive 
possession of the properties and the statute of limitations commences to 
run.").

 
 
[¶35]   These cases may not apply here, 
because there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the west half of Lot 
66 was unoccupied.  In his 
affidavit, Mr. Woods stated that they took possession of the lands on the date 
of purchase, and had been in possession continuously since then.  Mr. Woods further detailed that they had 
"harvested hay from the property," "grazed cattle on the property," and 
"generally utilized it as a portion of our ranch."  These assertions were not disputed, and 
Mr. Adamson tended to confirm them in his deposition, testifying that "It 
appeared maybe that grass was cut out there.  It wasn't just growing wild."  Given the character and location of this 
property, the Woods' use of it for grazing and haying constitutes occupation and 
possession.  See Davis v. Chadwick, 2002 WY 157, 
¶ 13, 55 P.3d 1267, 1272 (Wyo. 2002) (Because "the land was suitable for 
grazing, we can only conclude that grazing activities on the disputed parcel 
were an appropriate use sufficient to assert dominion over the land.").  The Woods' actual possession precludes 
the Whites' claim to constructive possession during this period.  However, there is no factual basis for 
determining whether the Whites had constructive possession during the period 
beginning with the 1974 tax sale and ending with the Woods' 1992 purchase.  The record contains no evidence 
indicating that the property was unoccupied during this 
period.

 
 

[¶36]     
The 
second statute of limitation cited is Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 39-13-108(e)(vii)(D):

No 
action for the recovery of real property sold for the nonpayment of taxes shall 
be maintained unless commenced within six (6) years after the date of sale for 
taxes.

The 
key to this statute is that it is a limitation on actions for the recovery of real property.  Many years ago, we observed that:  

 
 
One 
in actual possession of property has no reason for trying to recover it.  He cannot maintain an action for that 
purpose, and a law requiring him to institute one would be absurd.  The duty to bring an action to recover 
the property is on the person who is not in possession. . . .  [Therefore,] the 
statute does not start to run in favor of the tax-purchaser until he takes 
possession.

  

Electrolytic 
Copper Co. v. Rambler Consol. Mines Corp., 
34 Wyo. 304, 314, 243 P. 126, 129 (1926) (emphasis added), overruled on other grounds by Goodrich v. Stobbe, 908 P.2d 416 (Wyo. 
1995).  Later, in Denny v. Stevens, 52 Wyo. 253, 260, 73 P.2d 308, 310 (1938), we reconfirmed that "this statute would not commence to 
run in favor of the purchaser of a tax title until he takes possession."  The Woods' action in this case is not 
one to recover the property.  The Woods are in possession, and have no 
need to recover it.  The Whites have 
never been in possession, and this statute of limitation never commenced to run 
in favor of the Whites.  It does not 
bar the Woods' quiet title action.

 
 
            
Payment of property 
taxes

 
 

[¶37]     
Although 
not stated as a separate issue, the Whites assert that they have paid the 
property taxes on this lot ever since the tax sale, and insist that the payment 
of taxes must "mean something to the law."  
The legislature has provided remedies for tax purchasers whose tax deeds 
are discovered or adjudged to be invalid.  
See Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 39-13-108(e)(viii); Thompson-Green 
v. Estate of Drobish, 2006 WY 126, ¶ 20, 143 P.3d 897, 904 (Wyo. 
2006).

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶38]   We have determined 
that the district court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Woods in their challenges to the tax deeds of Mr. Adamson and the Whites.  We therefore remand to the district 
court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
Woods inform us that, as a result of this litigation and other efforts, they 
have acquired undisputed title to seventy-six of the eighty lots in the 
subdivision.  Albany County owns one 
and a half lots.  The remaining two 
and a half lots are the subject of these appeals.

 
 

2It 
may be that the county does not sell "the properties" at a tax sale, but only a 
defeasible right to the property that may be extinguished if the former owner 
redeems.  However, applicable 
statutory provisions, including Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-13-108(e)(ii), contain 
phrases like the "sale of real property" and "the real property to be 
sold."  The tax sale purchasers in 
this case received "Certificate[s] of Purchase of Real Estate for Taxes," 
declaring them "purchaser of the above described lands."  We adopt the terminology in this opinion 
without comment on its legal significance. 

3The 
record does not show when this quiet title action commenced, only when judgment 
was entered.  Also, the listed 
plaintiffs in this quiet title action were the Kents and Mr. Bowen.  The record does not disclose how 
Mr. Bowen obtained his interest in the property.  For brevity, this opinion will use "the 
Kents" to refer to all three collectively.

 
 

4The 
district court denied the Woods' motion for summary judgment against five of the 
defendants, not including Mr. Adamson or the Whites, ruling that there were 
genuine issues of material fact relating to the Woods' claim of adverse 
possession.  Prior to trial, the 
Woods reached settlements with these defendants, and the district court entered 
judgment quieting the Woods' title to these defendants' 
lots.

5As 
discussed below, the district court granted summary judgment against Mr. Adamson 
and the Whites on the basis of invalid tax deeds.  It did not reach a decision on the 
adverse possession claims against Mr. Adamson and the Whites, and it 
appears that the Woods' summary judgment motion on the adverse possession claim 
will remain before the district court on remand.  

6There 
are two such deeds, one a quit claim deed conveying the lots subject to the 
subdivision plat, and the other a warranty deed conveying, as far as we can 
tell, the rest of the ranch property.  
The parties do not suggest that the different deed types have any 
significance in these appeals, so we will generally overlook the distinction in 
this opinion.

7In 
addition, if Roter, Lukoff, and Cartoon were the record owners from 1973 to 
1992, it seems curious that the Kents were plaintiffs in the 1975 quiet title 
action.  

8For 
that reason, it is premature for us to consider the Woods' legal argument that, 
as successors to the Kents, they may exert the Kents' right to challenge the 
Whites' tax deed.  In addition, the 
parties have not addressed or briefed this question. 

9For 
purposes of this paragraph and the next, it makes no difference whether the 
Woods are in fact the successors to the Kents.

10Mr. 
Adamson provided very similar deposition testimony, stating that he went to the 
approximate location of the subdivision in the early 1980's, and walked through 
the area where he "thought approximately the lots are located."  

11The 
circumstances here are even more extreme than those we faced in Trefren v. Lewis, 852 P.2d 323, 328 
(Wyo. 1993), where we remarked that,

 
 
Considering 
that the tax deed grantees paid the delinquent taxes and obtained a certificate 
of sale in 1984, they demonstrated a remarkable lack of curiosity about the lots 
for the next six years.  By their 
own testimony, they did not locate and view the property until about a week 
before they made application for the tax deed.