Case Title: J. D. PETERSON V. WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, DRIVERS' LICENSE DIVISION

Citation: 

Docket Number: 06-209

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-05-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
J. D. PETERSON V. WYOMING DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, DRIVERS' LICENSE DIVISION2007 WY 90158 P.3d 706Case Number: 06-209Decided: 05/30/2007
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
J. D. 
PETERSON,

 
 
Appellant

(Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 
WYOMING 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, DRIVERS' LICENSE DIVISION,

 
 
Appellee

(Respondent).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofUintaCounty

The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Mike 
Cornia, Evanston, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General; and Douglas J. Moench, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      After being 
arrested for driving while under the influence, the Wyoming Department of 
Transportation (WYDOT) notified appellant J.D. Peterson (Peterson) that his 
driver's license would be suspended.  
Peterson requested a contested case hearing before the Office of 
Administrative Hearings (OAH).  The 
hearing officer upheld the suspension, as did the district court.  Peterson now appeals.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Peterson presents 
the following issue:

 
 
Was the 
decision of the hearing officer arbitrary and capricious and contrary to the 
law?

 
 
The 
State phrases the issue another way:

Whether 
the hearing examiner acted arbitrarily and capriciously in considering the 
breath test results?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      In the early 
morning hours of December 5, 2004, Officer Kenneth Pearson observed a vehicle 
crossing the center lane markers and weaving in and out of its primary lane of 
travel.  Officer Pearson stopped the 
vehicle and identified the driver as J.D. Peterson.  While speaking with Peterson, the 
officer became suspicious that Peterson had been drinking.  He detected a strong odor of alcohol on 
Peterson's breath, noticed that his eyes were watery, and discerned that his 
speech was slurred.  Also, Peterson 
admitted to drinking "a few beers" earlier that evening.

 
 
[¶4]      Peterson agreed 
to submit to field sobriety tests, although he notified the officer that he had 
recently undergone knee replacement.  
Peterson failed all four sobriety tests administered: the Horizontal Gaze 
Nystagmus, the Finger Count, Counting Numbers Backwards, and Reciting the 
Alphabet.  After administering a 
portable breath test, which registered Peterson's blood alcohol content at .32, 
four times the legal limit, the officer placed Peterson under arrest for driving 
while under the influence.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-233(b)(i) (LexisNexis 
2005).

 
 
[¶5]      Upon having his 
blood drawn at the EvanstonRegionalHospital, Peterson was then transported to 
the Uinta County Jail.  Officer 
Pearson read Peterson his Implied Consent advisement, after which Peterson 
agreed to provide breath samples for analysis of his blood alcohol content.  In accordance with Department of Health 
Rules and Regulations, and according to the Sobriety Examination Report, the 
arresting officer observed Peterson for a minimum of fifteen minutes before 
administering the test, from 1:25 a.m. to 1:40 a.m.  During the observation period, however, 
the officer's notes substantiated that the Intoximeter EC/IR machine was started 
at 1:39 a.m.  Another officer 
entered Peterson's pertinent information into the machine.  Officer Pearson then calibrated the 
machine, and finally he performed Peterson's breath tests.  Consequently, the first test was 
recorded at 1:45 a.m., with a result of 0.299%, with the second and final test 
being conducted at 1:47 a.m., with a result of 
0.283%.

 
 
[¶6]      Peterson was 
notified that WYDOT recommended suspension of his driver's license for ninety 
days in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102 (LexisNexis 2005).  On December 9, 2004, Peterson requested 
a contested case hearing, which was eventually held on March 22, 2005.  While Peterson did not appear personally 
at the hearing, he was represented by counsel, who argued on his behalf that 
although the fifteen-minute observation period was properly executed, it was 
improper that another five minutes elapsed prior to the test being 
administered.  Said another way, 
Peterson believed that there was a non-observation period of five minutes which 
negated the results of the test.  
The hearing officer disagreed, and issued an order in which he concluded 
that Peterson's suspension should be upheld, and that the five-minute period was 
allowable.

 
 
[¶7]      Peterson appealed 
to the district court, seeking review of whether or not the breathalyzer test 
was performed in accordance with Department of Health regulations.  Particularly, Peterson argued that the 
five-minute gap between the requisite observation period and the actual 
administration of the test was improper.  
Concluding that the five-minute gap was proper, the district court 
affirmed, and this appeal followed. 

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      This Court 
affords no special deference to district court decisions when it reviews matters 
initiated before an administrative agency.  
Rather, we review the case as if it came directly from the administrative 
agency.  Bradshaw v. Wyoming Dept. of Transp., 
Drivers' License Div., 2006 WY 70, ¶ 10, 135 P.3d 612, 615 (Wyo. 
2006).  The scope of our review is 
defined by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2005), which provides as 
follows: 

 
 
§ 
16-3-114.  Judicial review of agency 
actions; district courts.

                                    
. . . .

(c)  To 
the extent necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court 
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of 
an agency action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review 
the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be 
taken of the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court 
shall:

(i)  Compel 
agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and

(ii)  Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A)  Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

(B)  Contrary 
to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

(C)  In 
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

(D)  Without 
observance of procedure required by law; or

(E)  Unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

 
 

[¶9]      Where both 
parties present evidence at an administrative hearing, we review the entire 
record to determine if the agency findings are supported by substantial 
evidence.  Bush v. State ex rel. 
Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 2005 WY 120, ¶ 5, 120 P.3d 176, 179 (Wyo. 
2005).  Substantial evidence in this 
context is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate 
to support a conclusion. Id. Findings of fact are supported by 
substantial evidence if, from the evidence preserved in the record, we can 
conclude a reasonable mind might accept the evidence as adequate to support the 
agency findings.  Id.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   In his only argument, Peterson 
contends that because he was not strictly observed for fifteen minutes prior to 
having his breath analyzed for alcohol content, the hearing examiner should have 
excluded the breathalyzer test conducted at the police station.  Peterson believes that there should be 
strict compliance with Department of Health Rules and Regulations for purposes 
of conducting station-house breathalyzer tests.  The State disagrees, and believes that 
Peterson was properly observed prior to the administration of the test, thus 
justifying the hearing examiner's reliance on the test 
results.

 
 
[¶11]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-105(a) 
(LexisNexis 2005) sets forth the exclusive means and the mandatory procedure for 
determining an arrested suspect's blood alcohol level.

 
 

§ 
31-6-105.  Method of performing 
chemical analysis; persons permitted to draw blood; request by arrested person 
for test; information made available; 
evidence of refusal to take test.

(a)  Chemical 
analysis of the person's blood, breath or urine to be considered valid under 
this section, shall be performed according to methods approved by the department 
of health and by an individual possessing a valid permit to conduct the 
analysis.  Permits shall be issued 
by the department of health for this purpose.  The department of health may promulgate 
and approve satisfactory methods in order to ascertain the qualifications of 
individuals permitted to conduct the analysis and shall issue to qualified 
individuals permits which are subject to termination or revocation by the 
department of health.

 
 

Also see 
Nellis v. Wyoming Dep't of Transportation, 932 P.2d 741, 745 (Wyo. 1997).

 
 
[¶12]   Specifically, the Department of 
Health Rules and Regulations provide in pertinent part:

 
 
Section 
1. Procedural controls.

 
 
(a)  Analytical 
procedures for breath alcohol analysis should include the following controls in 
conjunction with the testing of each subject:

 
 
(i)  Subject 
must be observed for a minimum of fifteen (15) minutes prior to testing to 
prevent residual mouth alcohol. All foreign material (except dentures) must be 
removed from the mouth at the start of observation period and subject must not 
be allowed to smoke, eat, drink, or place anything in their oral cavity etc. If 
the subject vomits or regurgitates, the observation period must be restarted 
after rinsing the mouth with water. A dry burp or belch will not affect the 
test; therefore, the observation time can continue.

 
 

Department 
of Health, Rules and Regulations for Chemical Analysis for Alcohol 
Testing, Chapter 
III, § 1(a)(i) (2004).  The 
purpose of the Department of Health's Rules is "[t]o insure scientific validity 
and uniform standards of practice for chemical analysis of alcohol."  Id. at Chapter I, 
§ 2.

 
 
[¶13]   Here, Peterson admits, and the 
record clearly shows, that in compliance with the above-stated rule, the officer 
began observing Peterson at 1:25 a.m. and continued to do so until at least 1:40 
a.m., fulfilling the fifteen-minute requirement noted.  However, because Peterson's first breath 
test occurred at 1:45 a.m., a full twenty minutes after the observation period 
began, Peterson contends that he was not observed in accordance with the rules, 
thus the test was invalid and cannot serve as a basis for suspending his 
driver's license.

 
 
[¶14]   Unfortunately, we are without the 
benefit of live testimony in this case.  
However, we are comfortable that the record on appeal sufficiently 
establishes that Peterson was observed for the required amount of time, and 
comfortable too that the subsequent five minutes did not invalidate the test. 
 Here, the Intoximeter EC/IR machine 
was turned on at 1:39 a.m. by Officer Pearson.  Another officer then typed Peterson's 
relevant information into the machine, e.g., name, gender, date of birth, and 
driver's license number.  The 
machine was also calibrated prior to Peterson's first breath test at 1:45 a.m. 
by turning out two blank readouts.  
There is no indication on the record that Officer Pearson did not 
continue to observe Peterson while readying the Intoximeter EC/IR machine, nor 
is there any indication on the record that any change of positioning took place 
by either Peterson or Officer Pearson, allowing this Court to infer that the 
same conditions of observance existed for the full twenty-minute time 
period.

 
 
[¶15]   Compliance with observation rules 
does not require an officer to fix his stare on the subject.  In Glasmann v. State, Dept. of 
Revenue, Motor Vehicle Div., 719 P.2d 1096, 1097 (Colo. App. Ct. 1986), the 
court interpreted a regulation requiring that an officer "closely and 
continuously observe the subject" for twenty minutes prior to the administration 
of a breath test.  The officer in 
Glasmann, during the twenty-two minutes directly preceding the breath 
test, completed a custody report, a summons, and a notice of revocation in front 
of the defendant.  The court 
concluded that the officer had complied with the regulation's requirement of 
close and continuous observation and held that the regulation did not require in 
all cases that the officer "stare fixedly" at a test subject for twenty minutes. 
 Id.

 
 
[¶16]   Also, in State v. Smith, 547 A.2d 69, 73 (Conn. Ct. App. 1988), the court held that a regulation requiring 
"continuous observation" must be interpreted with reference to the purpose of 
the regulation.  The court 
stated:

 
 
The 
regulation, read it its entirety, indicates that the purpose is to determine 
whether the subject to be tested has ingested food, beverages, regurgitated or 
smoked.  These activities adversely 
affect the accuracy of alcohol breath analysis.  They are activities which do not require 
observation without cessation in order to determine if they have 
occurred.

. . . 
.

In light 
of the regulation's purpose, we do not interpret [it] to require that an officer 
fix his unswerving gaze upon a subject during each fifteen minute interval prior 
to administration of a breath test. Such an interpretation would not only be 
practically impossible to perform but would allow a subject to thwart compliance 
with the regulation simply by turning his head away from the observing officer. 
Where, as here, evidence shows that a defendant was in an officer's presence for 
at least a period of fifteen minutes and that the defendant did not ingest food 
or beverages, regurgitate or smoke, the requirement of "continuous observation" 
. . . has been complied with.

 
 

Smith, 547 A.2d  at 73 (citations omitted).

 
 
[¶17]   Especially similar to the present 
case is, In re Ramos, 508 N.E.2d 484 (Ill.App. 4 Dist. 1987), in which 
the defendant claimed that his breath test results should have been suppressed 
because, for the six minutes directly prior to administration of the test, the 
trooper was resetting the breath-test machine.  The court refused to strike the results, 
stating that "the six minutes where the trooper was concentrating on resetting 
the machine rather than simply standing and staring at the defendant do not 
indicate a serious failure to comply with the required standards and 
procedures."  Id., at 486. 

 
 
[¶18]   Here, as in Ramos, there was compliance with 
required standards and procedures.  
There is no indication from the officer's report that he stopped 
observing Peterson during the time preceding his breath test.  The officer had observed Peterson for a 
minimum of fifteen minutes before the test and had another officer enter 
Peterson's information into the breath machine.  The fact that the officer may not have 
stared at Peterson the entire time does not render his compliance with the 
mandatory observation period invalid.

 
 
[¶19]   Peterson encourages this Court to 
adopt a "strict compliance" policy with the rules governing the administration 
of alcohol tests.  Indeed, we agree 
that without compliance with the Rules, there can be no uniformity.  However, in this case, we do not and 
cannot read into the rule stated above that an extra five-minute period 
immediately following the requisite fifteen-minute observation period renders 
the subsequent breathalyzer test invalid.  
Furthermore, we are reticent to state a strict compliance policy due to 
the variable nature of these types of cases.  Instead, compliance is a question of 
fact to be decided under the circumstances of each case.  In this particular case, the State's 
prima facie showing of compliance with the regulation is sufficient.  Williford v. State, 683 S.W.2d 228 (Ark. 
1985) (holding), and Glasmann, 
719 P.2d  at 1097.

 
 
[¶20]   We conclude that substantial 
evidence supported the hearing officer's conclusion that the five minutes in 
question were allowable "to prepare the machine," and that the proposed 
suspension should be upheld.  The 
order of the district court affirming the decision made by OAH is affirmed in 
all respects.