Case Title: STEVEN ACE SAM V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0057

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-03-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
STEVEN ACE SAM V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 25177 P.3d 1173Case Number: S-07-0057Decided: 03/06/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
STEVEN 
ACE SAM,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofParkCounty

The 
Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Tina N. 
Kerin, Appellate Counsel, WyomingState Public Defender 
Program.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Elizabeth C. Gagen, 
Chief Deputy Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
J., 
delivers the opinion of the Court.  
VOIGT, C.J., files a 
dissenting opinion, in which GOLDEN, 
J., joins.

 
 
HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Steven 
Ace Sam (Sam), entered a plea of guilty to possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to deliver.  That plea 
was part of a negotiated plea bargain wherein he reserved his right to challenge 
the constitutionality of the search of his motor vehicle, which uncovered the 
evidence that incriminated him.  The 
district court conducted a hearing in response to Sam's motion to suppress the 
fruits of that search, which the State justified on the basis that it was 
conducted incident to his arrest for violation of a protection order and for 
driving while his license was suspended.  
The search at issue did not uncover any evidence associated with the 
crimes for which he was arrested, but rather evidence of drug crimes.  The district court concluded that the 
search was proper under the governing law and, thus, did not suppress the 
incriminating evidence.  We hold 
that the district court did not err in declining to suppress the evidence at 
issue and, therefore, we affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Sam raises this 
issue:

 
 
Did the 
district court err in denying [Sam's] motion to suppress evidence, as his 
vehicle was improperly searched "incident to arrest" in violation of the Wyoming 
Constitution?

 
 
The 
State identifies the issue in only slightly different 
words:

 
 
Did the 
district court properly deny [Sam's] motion to suppress upon concluding officers 
were entitled to search under the front seat of his vehicle incident to his 
arrest?

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      Sam presented his 
issue to the district court properly supported by cogent argument and pertinent 
authority.  The State, of course, 
had the initial burden to demonstrate that the search was reasonable because it 
was conducted without the benefit of a warrant.  The State called the arresting officer, 
Police Sergeant Jonathan Christopher Beck of the Cody Police Department, as the 
only witness in support of the search at issue here.

 
 
[¶4]      The district 
court denied the motion to suppress in a terse order that included no written 
findings.  At the conclusion of the 
suppression hearing, the district court made these 
findings:

 
 
            
I find that as of the date of the arrest Officer Beck knew that the 
protection order had been issued, and he had received evidence that the 
defendant had violated the order.  
He had also received a report that the defendant's driver's license was 
suspended.  He then recognized the 
defendant and the vehicle he was in.

            
Accordingly, the defendant was legally placed under arrest for driving 
while under suspension and for violation of the protective order.  The officer then was entitled to conduct 
a search incident to the arrest, including a search of the defendant and the 
vehicle of which he had been an occupant.  
Pursuant to that search of the vehicle, the evidence in question was 
seized.  Therefore, the search was 
legal and the motion to suppress is denied.

 
 
[¶5]      The facts that 
were available to the district court, and which support the factual prong of the 
issue we are called upon to resolve, can be found in Sergeant Beck's testimony 
at the suppression hearing.

 
 

[¶6]      On 
August 2, 2005, Sergeant Beck of the Cody Police Department became aware of an 
order of protection in favor of Candie Hinton, as well as her daughter Casandra 
Hinton.  That order protected them 
from Sam and, inter alia, prohibited Sam from calling them on the phone.  Although the protection order does not 
appear in the record, the parties do not dispute that this was one of the terms 
of the protection order.    
Beck was aware that the Hintons had complained of phone harassment by Sam 
on August 2-3, 2005.  On August 5, 
2005, Sergeant Beck received information that Sam had violated the terms of the 
protection order again by calling Candie Hinton on her cell phone.  Based upon this information, Beck was preparing to seek a warrant for 
Sam's arrest.  Sergeant Beck was 
also aware that he was authorized to make a warrantless arrest if he was aware 
of a specific instance of a violation of the protection 
order.

 
 
[¶7]      However, before 
Beck was able to obtain an arrest warrant, he was contacted by the Crisis 
Intervention office and told that both Candie and Casandra Hinton were there and 
that Sam had been calling Casandra's cell phone.  Candie also advised that while she was 
at the Crisis Intervention office, she had seen Sam drive by.  Candie was able to describe that car and 
its occupants.  While the Hintons 
were waiting for Sergeant Beck to arrive, the Hintons observed Sam drive by the 
Crisis Intervention office again.  
Sergeant Beck related in his testimony:

 
 
I went 
to Crisis Intervention, and I spoke to Casandra and to Candie Hinton myself, 
where I reviewed the protection order a second time.  And they related the same story to me, 
that Mr. Sam had called Casandra, that she  I mean that they had lived with Mr. 
Sam for several years before the break-up and the domestic violence protection 
order.  Casandra related to me that 
she knew Mr. Sam's voice and that she had spoke to him on the phone, and that he 
continued to call her, and that they both recognized the female passenger to be 
a Kayla, that it definitely was Steve Sam that had followed them to Crisis 
Intervention, and that he had drove by a second time.

 
 
After 
these initial confrontations, Sergeant Beck stayed in the area of Crisis 
Intervention and he observed Sam drive by for a third time.  At that point Beck stopped 
Sam:

 
 
When I 
stopped him, I walked up to the vehicle, and I explained to him why I had 
stopped him, confirmed who he was, to be Mr. Steve Sam.  And I asked him at that point in time if 
he had made phone calls to Casandra, and he said yes.  I also asked him if he would confirm his 
cell phone number, which he did.  I 
don't recall the exact number now.  
It was a Montana number. But if I remember correctly, 
he said it was 861-ouch, which was what was on my initial report from when he 
had been calling Candie on the 2nd and the 3rd of August.

 
 

[¶8]      Based on Sam's 
statements that he had called both Candie and Casandra, Sergeant Beck concluded 
that Sam had violated the protection order, and he arrested him on that 
basis.  Beck also determined that 
Sam was driving with a suspended driver's license, and he was arrested for that 
reason as well.  Incident to the 
arrest for violation of the protection order, Officer Beck searched Sam's car 
for evidence relating to his violation of the protection order.  The search of that car produced 
methamphetamine and crystal methamphetamine in significant quantities, although 
it did not produce any evidence of Sam's violation of the protection 
order.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶9]      In this instance, 
the district court conducted a hearing and took evidence concerning the search 
and seizure at issue.  In reviewing 
a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we do not interfere 
with the trial court's findings of fact unless the findings are clearly 
erroneous.  We view the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the trial court's determination because the trial 
court has an opportunity at the evidentiary hearing to assess the credibility of 
the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary inferences, 
deductions, and conclusions.  The 
constitutionality of a particular search is a question of law that we review de novo.  Fenton v. State, 2007 WY 51, ¶ 5, 
154 P.3d 974, 976 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting Pe±a v. State, 2004 WY 115, ¶ 25, 
98 P.3d 857, 869 Wyo. 2004)).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   Our review is disadvantaged by the 
district court's very limited findings.  
The issue at hand is one that is very fact sensitive, and the district 
court's findings are the most significant single factor in the analysis of such 
cases.  However, in this case the 
operative facts are amply established by Sergeant Beck's testimony at the 
hearing on the motion to suppress.

 
 
[¶11]   The resolution of this case turns 
on the application of our decision in Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 488-89 
(Wyo. 
1999):

 
 
These 
past decisions establish that Article 1, 
§ 4 allows searches incident to arrest and can be said to allow automobile 
searches because arrestees had possession of it, and the arrest authorizes law 
enforcement to search it for evidence related to the crime.  Wiggin, 28 Wyo. at 491, 206 P.  at 
376.  The provision requires, 
however, that searches be reasonable 
under all of the circumstances.  
Kelly, 38 Wyo. at 460, 268 P.  at 
572.

 
 
            
In the case of Vasquez, his erratic driving permitted an investigatory 
stop, and the strong smell of alcohol and failure of field sobriety tests 
authorized an arrest for driving while under the influence based upon probable 
cause.  Munger, 43 Wyo. at 408-09, 4 P.2d  at 
1095.  The characteristics of a driving while 
under the influence arrest for suspected alcohol intoxication permit a search of 
the passenger compartment of the vehicle for any intoxicant, alcohol or 
narcotic, as evidence related to the crime of driving while under the 
influence.

 
 
            
We have not considered whether, under the state provision, the 
permissible scope of a search incident to arrest for automobiles includes 
containers, and the specific question before us is whether the search of the 
fuse box for evidence related to the crime was reasonable under all of the 
circumstances.  The State contends 
that Belton should be adopted as the 
rule under the state provision.  Belton was formulated in answer to the 
specific question whether any privacy right existed for a vehicle occupant after 
arrest which justified limiting the permissible scope of a warrantless 
automobile search and which outweighed the need for national uniformity in a 
clear set of rules that would aid police.  
Belton clearly offers minimal protection 
against an unreasonable search and seizure in order to effectively apply to the 
vast, national citizenry with which the United States Supreme Court must be 
concerned.  Our earliest 
decisions reveal our willingness to recognize exceptions to the warrant 
requirement for homes, automobiles, and other property, and implicitly recognize 
a Belton-type search without 
discussion of privacy interests or other rationale, but Belton's national citizenry rationale 
does not apply in Wyoming.

 
 
            
The United States Supreme Court and other jurisdictions recognize that 
the rationale for permitting searches incident to arrest is to prevent the 
arrestee from reaching weapons or concealing or destroying evidence.  See White, 669 A.2d  at 905.  A search incident to arrest under our 
state provision for these reasons is reasonable.  The inherent mobility of automobiles in 
combination with officer and public safety concerns created when a driver or a 
passenger is arrested are exigent circumstances weighing in favor of not 
restricting the scope, timing, or intensity of such a search.  In Vasquez's case, as the officers 
approached the vehicle with two passengers seated in it, shell casings in the 
back alerted them to the possibility of a small handgun, and an officer 
testified it was the possibility of the presence of this weapon which led to the 
search of the vehicle and the fuse box.  The shell casings and the presence of two 
adult passengers presented an officer safety and a public safety concern which 
permitted a search incident to arrest although Vasquez's arrest had been 
accomplished and he was secure inside a patrol car.  It appears from the record that the 
passengers were also arrested and, although we are not told, it would seem their 
arrest created the need for the officers to secure the vehicle if left on the 
roadside.  In this particular case, 
we believe that the arrest justified a search of the passenger compartment of 
the vehicle and all containers in it, open or closed, locked or unlocked, for 
evidence related to the crime and for weapons or contraband which presented an 
officer or a public safety concern.

 
 
            
Is this result a narrower application than Belton?   We think so.  This result eschews a bright-line rule 
and maintains a standard that requires a 
search be reasonable under all of the circumstances as determined by the 
judiciary, in light of the historical intent of our search and seizure 
provision.  Peterson, 27 Wyo. at 204, 194 P.  at 
345.   It will not be common 
that a search of an automobile incident to arrest will violate that provision, 
and our decision should not raise new concerns for law enforcement.  [Emphases added.]

 
 

Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 488-89.

 
 
[¶12]   Recently, we applied Vasquez, for the first time, as the 
basis for reversing a district court's order denying a motion to suppress.  Pierce v. State, 2007 WY 182, 171 P.3d 525 (Wyo. 2007).  The circumstances 
of this case, as set out above, differ markedly from those in Pierce.  In the proceedings below, and in the 
briefs in this appeal, both parties discuss several of the "exceptions" to the 
essential rule established by Vasquez.  Those exceptions include:  (1) That an officer may search the area 
immediately available to an arrested person for weapons or other contraband that 
might pose a threat to officer and/or public safety; (2) that the presence of a 
second passenger in the car who could present a threat to officer or public 
safety may justify a search; (3) the possible need to secure an arrestee's 
automobile may justify a search; and (4) that in such circumstances an 
automobile may be searched for evidence 
related to the crime which justified the arrest.

 
 
[¶13]   Because it is dispositive of this 
appeal, we will limit our consideration only to that exception which sanctions a 
search of the automobile for evidence which might relate to the crime for which 
Sam was arrested.  Sam was arrested 
for multiple reasons, but the record is clear that the initial stop and the 
initial arrest were for violations of a protection order.  Our careful review of the record 
convinces us that Beck's search of Sam's car was reasonable under all of the 
circumstances detailed above.  That the cursory search of the car's 
interior uncovered evidence of the possession with intent to deliver proscribed 
narcotics, rather than evidence of the violation of the protection order, does 
not negate the admissibility of that evidence under our Vasquez rule.  We do not think it is a requirement that 
a police officer be able to recite a specific list of what sorts of evidence 
might be relevant in such a circumstance, but some items identified were cell 
phones (which Sam used to make harassing calls), or writings of any sort that 
indicated what Sam's intentions were with respect to the individuals protected 
by the protection order.  Other 
examples of evidence that might be pertinent would include instrumentalities 
that might be used to harass, harm or threaten protected individuals.  See deShazer v. State, 2003 WY 98, 
¶¶ 5-11, 74 P.3d 1240, 1243-44 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶14]   In the instant case, the officer 
who conducted the search was aware that Sam was the subject of an order of 
protection and that he had violated that order of protection several times over 
the preceding few days and, more importantly, he had done so in the hours and 
minutes just before the stop of Sam's vehicle and the effectuation of his 
arrest.  The record suggests that it 
was more a pattern of violating the protection order, than just "a 
violation."  The victims of Sam's 
aggression complained of receiving repeated cell phone calls from Sam on August 
2-3, 2005.  Sam was to have no 
contact whatever with his victims.  
The police officer was aware that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-21-104(b) 
(LexisNexis 2007) provided:  "An 
order of protection issued under this section shall contain a notice that 
willful violation of any provision of the order constitutes a crime as defined 
by W.S. 6-4-404, can result in immediate arrest and may result in further 
punishment."  In addition, although 
the specifics of Sam's past violence were not detailed at the suppression 
hearing, in order for such an order to issue, the following sorts of behaviors 
must be proved:

 
 
(iii)  "Domestic 
abuse" means the occurrence of one (1) or more of the following acts by a 
household member but does not include acts of self 
defense:

(A)  Physically 
abusing, threatening to physically abuse, attempting to cause or causing 
physical harm or acts which unreasonably restrain the personal liberty of any 
household member;

(B)  Placing 
a household member in reasonable fear of imminent physical harm; 
or

(C)  Causing 
a household member to engage involuntarily in sexual activity by force, threat 
of force or duress.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 35-21-102(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2007).

 
 
[¶15]   In addition to the phone calls of 
August 2-3, 2005, Sam's victims went to the Crisis Intervention office on August 
5, 2005, because Sam was again calling them repeatedly.  Sam and a second occupant of Sam's car 
were seen driving by the crisis center by his victims, and this was reported to 
the police.  While the victims 
waited for the police to arrive at the crisis center, Sam and his companion 
drove by a second time.  Later that 
same afternoon, the police officer spotted Sam and his companion and stopped 
them.  The police officer searched 
Sam's person incident to arresting him for violation of the order of 
protection.  In Vasquez we said that a drunk driving 
stop justified the search of the vehicle's passenger compartment for intoxicants 
that could serve as evidence to sustain that crime.  Here, it seems equally apt that there be 
a search for evidence which might serve to sustain Sam's prosecution for 
violation of the protection order and/or that he might have been an imminent and 
serious danger to his victims, given his behavior over the preceding several 
days.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶16]   The district court's order denying 
the motion to suppress was not erroneous.  
Therefore, we affirm Sam's Judgment Upon Plea of Guilty and his sentence 
in all respects.

  
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice, dissenting, in which GOLDEN, Justice, 
joins.

 
 
[¶17]   I respectfully dissent.  In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 
460-461, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2864, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1981), the United States Supreme 
Court held that, under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
an officer arresting the driver of a vehicle may contemporaneously search the 
passenger compartment of that vehicle, incident to that arrest.  In Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 480-89 
(Wyo. 1999), 
we rejected the minimal protection that Belton's "bright line rule" provides, 
and we held that Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution provides greater 
protection.  Specifically, we 
announced that Article 1, § 4 requires the search of an arrestee's vehicle to be 
"reasonable under all of the circumstances."  Id. 
at 489.  See also Pierce v. State, 2007 WY 182, ¶ 
13, 171 P.3d 525, 531 (Wyo. 2007), and 
O'Boyle v. State, 2005 WY 83, ¶ 30, 117 P.3d 401, 410 (Wyo. 2005).  Yet, in the instant case, both the 
officer and the district court relied solely upon Belton's "search incident to arrest" to 
justify the search of the appellant's vehicle.

 
 
[¶18]   The majority lists four 
circumstances that it identifies as "exceptions" to the rule of Vasquez.  I take that to mean that, in the 
majority's view, the search does not have to be reasonable under all of the 
circumstances in the following instances:  
(1) an officer may search the area immediately available to an arrested 
person for weapons or other contraband that might pose a threat to officer 
and/or public safety; (2) the presence of a second passenger in the car who 
could present a threat to officer or public safety may justify a search; (3) the 
possible need to secure an arrestee's automobile may justify a search; and (4) 
"that in such circumstances an automobile may be searched for evidence related to the crime which 
justified the arrest." (Emphasis in original.)  In my view, however, these are not 
exceptions to the Vasquez rule; 
rather, they are simply some of the circumstances that should be reviewed in 
determining whether the vehicle search was reasonable "under all of the 
circumstances."  Most troubling to 
me is the idea that the arresting officer may always search the vehicle for 
evidence of the crime for which the driver was arrested.  If that is the rule, then Vasquez has no meaning, and the vehicle 
may always be searched, because an arrested driver has always been arrested for 
the alleged commission of some crime.

 
 
[¶19]   The officer did not claim to have 
probable cause to search the vehicle, nor did he claim to have a reasonable 
suspicion of anything when he searched it.  
The district court did not find that the officer had probable cause to 
search the vehicle, nor did it find that the officer had a reasonable suspicion 
of anything when he searched it.  
Rather, the officer said, "I searched it incident to arrest," and the 
district court said, "that is good enough."  There was not even an attempt to 
enunciate what could have been the basis for reasonable suspicion until the 
State filed its brief in this Court, in which it speculated as to types of 
evidence that might have been in the car (the cell phone, a copy of the 
protective order, diaries or notes the appellant may have taken of the victims' 
whereabouts, photographs of the victims, or anything else which could show that 
appellant was violating the protection order).  At the time of the arrest, however, the 
officer did not have a reasonable suspicion that those items were in the 
vehicle.  Subsequent speculation 
does not make a search reasonable under all the 
circumstances.

 
 
[¶20]   It is important not to confuse the 
concepts of searching an automobile under the automobile exception to the 
constitutional warrant requirement, and searching an automobile as an extension 
of the search of the person of the arrestee, incident to arrest.  All warrantless searches are 
unreasonable per se, and therefore 
unconstitutional, unless the State proves one of the following exceptions to the 
warrant requirement:

 
 

·         
search 
of an arrested suspect and the area within his control;

 
 

·         
search 
conducted while in pursuit of a fleeing suspect;

 
 

·         
search 
and/or seizure to prevent the imminent destruction of 
evidence;

 
 

·         
search 
and/or seizure of an automobile upon probable cause;

 
 

·         
search 
and/or seizure under the plain view doctrine; and

 
 

·         
search 
resulting from entry into a dwelling in order to prevent loss of life or 
property.

 
 

Pe±a v. 
State, 2004 
WY 115, ¶ 29, 98 P.3d 857, 870 (Wyo. 2004).  Belton and Vasquez do not concern themselves with 
the probable cause search of an automobile.  Rather, they concern themselves with the 
first exception listedthe search of an arrestee and areas within his 
control.  Belton says an officer arresting the 
driver of a car may always search the passenger compartment of the car 
(including containers therein); Vasquez says an officer arresting the 
driver of a car may only search the passenger compartment of the car if the 
search is reasonable under all the circumstances.  

 
 
[¶21]   I do not disagree with the 
proposition that factors such as officer safety and the presence of evidence may 
justify the search of an arrested person's vehicle.  There simply was no showing in this 
case, at the suppression hearing, that those or similar factors existed.  Article 1, § 4 of the Wyoming 
Constitution forbids the search of a vehicle incident to the arrest of its 
driver unless such search is reasonable under all of the circumstances.  The car search in this case, being 
purely a search incident to arrest, without justification under all the 
circumstances, was unlawful.  The 
motion to suppress should have been granted, and the appellant should have been 
allowed to withdraw his guilty plea.