Case Title: Arnott v. Arnott

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-12-0089

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-12-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
JEFFREY R. ARNOTT v. PAULA a/k/a POLLY A. ARNOTT2012 WY 167Case Number: S-12-0089Decided: 12/28/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before final publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 
2012 
 
JEFFREY R. 
ARNOTT,
 
Appellant
(Defendant),
 
v.
 
PAULA a/k/a POLLY A. 
ARNOTT,
 
Appellee
(Plaintiff).
 
Appeal from the 
District Court of Teton County
The Honorable Timothy 
C. Day, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Leah K. Corrigan and 
James K. Lubing, Lubing & Corrigan, LLC, Jackson, Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Anne B. Ashley, Anne 
B. Ashley, LLC, Jackson, Wyoming.
 
Guardian Ad 
Litem:
            
Steven R. Dwyer, The Law Office of Steven R. Dwyer, LLC, Jackson, 
Wyoming.
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., HILL, VOIGT, BURKE, JJ., and GOLDEN, J., 
Retired.
BURKE, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]        
Appellant, 
Jeffrey Arnott (Father), challenges the district court’s order 
denying his petition for modification of the parties’ divorce decree, which 
granted primary physical custody of the parties’ two daughters to 
Appellee, Paula (“Polly”) Arnott (Mother).  
Father sought modification of custody after Mother gave notice of her 
intention to relocate to Virginia with the children.  Relying 
on this Court’s decision in Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608, 614 
(Wyo. 1999), the district court applied a “strong presumption in favor of the 
right of a custodial parent to relocate with her children” and determined that 
Father had failed to establish a material change in circumstances warranting an 
analysis of whether modification would be in the best interests of the children. 
 
 
[¶2]        
On appeal, Father 
contends that our decision in Watt should be overturned.  
He asserts that application of that precedent undermines his 
constitutionally protected parenting rights and the state’s interest in 
promoting the best interests of the children.  We agree and 
hold that application of a presumption favoring the relocating custodial parent 
should not be applied in determining whether there has been a material change in 
circumstances.  To the extent that our decision in Watt 
mandates application of such a presumption, it is hereby overturned.  
Because the district court applied this presumption in determining that 
Father had failed to meet his burden of proving a material change in 
circumstances, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion.  
 
ISSUES
 
[¶3]        
Father presents the 
following issues for our consideration:
 
1.    
Did the District 
Court err when it determined that this Court’s holdings in Watt 
and Resor foreclosed a determination that an 
interstate relocation can give rise to a substantial change in circumstances 
sufficient to consider a custody modification?
 
2.    
In the alternative, 
and as a matter of first impression, did the District Court’s application of 
Watt and Love violate the Father’s fundamental constitutional 
right to raise his children?
 
3.    
Also in the 
alternative, to the extent the District Court did not err in its interpretation 
of Watt, and the Watt standard is retained as constitutional, did 
the District Court exceed the bounds of reason in deciding that the Mother’s 
move of 2,140 miles still allows for reasonable visitation for 
Father?
 
Mother states the 
issues as follows:
 
1.    
Was the District 
Court correct in determining that an interstate relocation by the primary 
custodial parent, standing alone, does not constitute a material and substantial 
change in circumstances sufficient to modify custody under Wyoming 
law?
 
2.    
Did the District 
Court correctly determine that the custodial parent’s motives for relocating 
were legitimate, sincere and in good faith?
 
3.    
Did the District 
Court correctly determine that reasonable visitation is still available to the 
non custodial parent after relocation? 
 
FACTS
 
[¶4]        
The parties were 
married in 2001 and lived together in Jackson, Wyoming until their divorce in 
2010.  Their first daughter, AGA, was born on June 6, 2003, 
and their second daughter, ALA, was born on June 30, 2005.  At 
the time of their divorce, the parties agreed that they would share joint legal 
custody of the children, and that Mother would have primary physical custody, 
subject to Father’s reasonable visitation.  The parties agreed 
to “consult with each other regarding major decisions involving the children, 
including but not limited to their education, health, and other issues involving 
the children’s welfare.”  The parties agreed that Father would 
have visitation every other weekend, as well as on alternating Thursdays. 
 They also agreed to Father’s visitation on alternating 
holidays and during two two-week periods in the summer.  The 
decree of divorce required Mother to provide notice if she intended to 
relocate.
 
[¶5]        
On July 8, 2011, 
Mother filed a notice of intent to relocate, indicating that she intended to 
move with the children to Mechanicsville, Virginia on August 13, 
2011.  Ten days later, Father filed a petition for 
modification of custody alleging that Mother’s anticipated move constituted a 
material change in circumstances with respect to custody and visitation. 
 The petition also alleged that it was in the best interests 
of the children for Father to have primary residential custody.  
On Father’s motion, the court issued a temporary order enjoining Mother 
from removing the children from Wyoming pending a hearing on the merits of 
Father’s petition.
 
[¶6]        
Mother moved to 
dismiss the petition to modify custody and visitation, asserting that under this 
Court’s decision in Watt, relocation by a custodial parent, by itself, is 
not a material change in circumstances sufficient to justify a modification of 
child custody.  The district court converted the motion to 
dismiss to a motion for summary judgment after Father filed an affidavit with 
his response to the motion, and the court invited the parties to supplement 
their pleadings and provide additional evidence.  After a 
hearing, the court denied Mother’s motion, finding there were issues of material 
fact as to “whether the circumstances surrounding [Mother’s] proposed move to 
Virginia would constitute a material change of circumstances justifying a 
modification of the parties’ custody arrangement.”  A hearing 
on Father’s petition was held in early November, 2011.
 
[¶7]        
The district court 
began the hearing by noting that Watt and its progeny had established a 
presumption in favor of the custodial parent’s right to relocate with the 
children:
 
            
Whether you disagree with it or whether you agree with it and whether you 
like it or not, the law is very clear in Wyoming when it comes to considering 
whether a material and substantial change of circumstances exists sufficient to 
modify custody when a custodial parent wishes to relocate with [the] 
children.
 
            
It’s a high standard, the – there’s a strong presumption in Wyoming in 
favor of the right of a custodial parent to relocate with [the] children, 
assuming certain criteria are satisfied. . . . 
 
During the hearing, 
the court received testimony from several witnesses, including the parties, the 
children’s dual-language immersion teacher, a nurse from their pediatrician’s 
office, Mother’s sister, and a close personal friend of Father’s.  
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court issued its ruling from the 
bench.  
 
[¶8]        
The court found that 
the children had “an outstanding set of parents” and “an incredibly involved 
father whose life revolves around his relationship with his children.” 
 The court noted that both Mother and Father were exemplary 
parents, that the children were “thriving” in their current environment, and 
that the “arrangement here in Jackson has worked incredibly well.” 
 The court further commented that “If I had my wish it would 
be that Ms. Arnott would find some way to stay here or nearer so 
that the extraordinary relationship that Mr. Arnott has with his 
children could continue to blossom in a similar fashion.”  But 
the court again noted that Wyoming precedent had created a “strong presumption 
in favor of allowing the custodial parent to move with [the] children” and had 
placed a “difficult burden” on the noncustodial parent to show a material change 
in circumstances based on the custodial parent’s relocation.
 
[¶9]        
Following the 
criteria set forth in Watt, the district court determined that Mother’s 
motives for the relocation were legitimate, sincere, and in good faith. 
 The court also found that Mother’s relocation would still 
permit Father’s reasonable visitation if visitation was expanded.  
The court concluded that Father had not established that Mother’s 
relocation constituted a material change of circumstances sufficient to warrant 
consideration of a change in custody.  The court’s oral ruling 
was memorialized in a written Order Denying Defendant’s Petition for 
Modification of Custody and Visitation, issued on December 27, 2011.  
Mother moved to Virginia with the children shortly thereafter.
 
[¶10]     
After both parties 
submitted proposals for a revised visitation schedule, the court ordered a 
visitation plan for Father that increased his summer visitation to eight weeks, 
and expanded visitation during school holidays and during a week in February. 
 The visitation plan also allowed Father to visit the children 
at any time in Virginia with advance notice.  Father appeals 
from the district court’s order. 
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW
 
[¶11]     
Father contends the 
district court misapplied Wyoming law with respect to whether an interstate 
relocation constitutes a “material change in circumstances” sufficient to 
warrant modification of child custody.  This Court reviews 
questions of law de novo.  Willis v. Davis, 2010 
WY 149, ¶ 10, 243 P.3d 568, 570 (Wyo. 2010).  
Father also claims the district court’s decision abridged his 
constitutional right to raise his children, and asks this Court to overrule the 
decision in Watt.  We review constitutional issues 
de novo.  Hanson 
v. Belveal, 2012 WY 98, ¶ 12, 280 P.3d 1186, 1191 
(Wyo. 2012).      Finally, Father 
asserts that the district court exceeded “the bounds of reason” in determining 
that Mother’s relocation would still permit reasonable visitation.  
On this issue, we review for an abuse of discretion.  
“The trial court has discretion in determining custody and visitation 
issues to be in the best interests of the children: 'Custody, visitation, child 
support, and alimony are all committed to the sound discretion of the district 
court.’”  Zupan v. Zupan, 
2010 WY 59, ¶ 12, 230 P.3d 329, 333 (Wyo. 2010) (quoting Pace v. 
Pace, 2001 WY 43, ¶ 9, 22 P.3d 861, 865 (Wyo. 
2001)).
DISCUSSION
 
[¶12]     
Disputes arising from 
the relocation of a custodial parent “present some of the knottiest and most 
disturbing problems that our courts are called upon to 
resolve.”  Tropea v. Tropea, 
665 N.E.2d 145, 148 (N.Y. 1996).  As one 
commentator has noted,  
 
Relocation cases are 
“intractable problems” and the “San Andreas fault” of family law.  
When one parent attempts to move a child a significant distance from the 
other parent, the child’s relationship with each parent changes in quality and 
quantity.  These “no-win” cases are occurring with increasing 
frequency, create enormous tensions for parents and their children, and burden 
the legal system and the judges who have to decide them.  A 
potential relocation can generate conflict in cases where there had been none 
before, reopen old wounds in others, or exacerbate an already highly-conflicted 
situation.
 
Elrod, Linda D., 
National and International Momentum Builds for More Child Focus in Relocation 
Disputes, 44 Fam. L.Q. 341, 341-42 (2010).  
Unfortuantely, such cases are 
increasingly common.1  In this case, 
Father contends that Mother’s relocation to Virginia is a material change of 
circumstances warranting modification of custody.
 
[¶13]     
As a general rule, 
the provisions of a divorce decree, including those pertaining to child custody, 
are subject to the doctrine of res judicata, which bars litigation of 
issues that were or could have been determined in a prior 
proceeding.  Mentock 
v. Mentock, 638 P.2d 156, 158 (Wyo. 
1981).  Res judicata “is mandated by public 
necessity; there must be an end to litigation at some point, or else the 
legal system would become so bogged down that nothing would ever remain 
decided.”  Id.  This Court has 
recognized, however, that application of res judicata to a petition 
for modification of child custody is not appropriate where there has been a 
“material or substantial change in circumstances” with respect to the initial 
custody determination.  Id.  In that 
instance, res judicata does not apply because “[the] modification 
proceeding involves new issues framed by facts differing from those existing 
when the original decree was entered.  A new adjudication of 
the rights of the parties must be made.  For all intents and 
purposes it is a separate and distinct case from the original 
proceeding.”  Leitner v. 
Lonabaugh, 402 P.2d 713, 719 (Wyo. 1965).  
    
[¶14]     
The applicability of 
res judicata has been functionally incorporated as a threshold 
inquiry under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c) (LexisNexis 2009), enacted in 
2000, which governs modification of child custody generally.  
The statute requires a determination that there has been a material 
change in circumstances before a court may consider whether modification of 
custody is in the best interests of the children:
 
§ 20-2-204. 
Enforcement and modification.
 
. . .
 
(c) A court 
having jurisdiction may modify an order concerning the care, custody and 
visitation of the children if there is a showing by either parent of a 
material change in circumstances since the entry of the order in question 
and that the modification would be in the best interests of the children 
pursuant to W.S. 20-2-201(a).  In any proceeding 
in which a parent seeks to modify an order concerning child custody or 
visitation, proof of repeated, unreasonable failure by the custodial parent to 
allow visitation to the other parent in violation of an order may be considered 
as evidence of a material change of circumstances.
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 We have stated that, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-204(c),
 
The district court 
does not properly acquire jurisdiction to reopen an existing custody order until 
there has been a showing of “a substantial or material change of circumstances 
which outweigh society’s interest in applying the doctrine of res 
judicata” to a custody order.  In short, unless the district court 
finds a material change in circumstances, it cannot proceed to the second step — 
determining whether a modification would be in the best interests of the 
child.
 
Hanson, ¶ 18, 
280 P.3d  at 1193 (quoting In re TLJ, 2006 WY 28, ¶ 8, 
129 P.3d 874, 876 (Wyo. 2006)) (citations omitted). 
 The burden is on the party seeking modification of a custody 
order to prove, first, that there has been a material change in circumstances, 
and second, that modification would be in the best interests of the children. 
 Hanson, ¶19, 280 P.3d  at 1193.
 
[¶15]     
The present case 
relates to the threshold inquiry under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c): whether 
relocation of a custodial parent may constitute a material change in 
circumstances sufficient to warrant consideration of whether modification of 
custody is in the best interests of the children.  Because 
relocation of a custodial parent is not addressed in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204, 
or in any other provision of the domestic relations code, our analysis is guided 
by relevant case law.  Father asks us to hold, contrary to 
established precedent, that relocation of a custodial parent may constitute a 
material change in circumstances warranting the district court’s consideration 
of the best interests of the children.  In order to facilitate 
our discussion of the issues presented, we begin by setting forth a brief 
history of our precedent relating to modification of child custody based on a 
custodial parent’s relocation.
 
[¶16]     
This Court’s first 
occasion to consider modification of child custody based on the possible 
relocation of a custodial parent arose in Martin v. Martin, 
798 P.2d 321 (Wyo. 1990).  In that case, both 
parents remained in Laramie at the time of their divorce, and the divorce decree 
specified that each parent would have physical custody of the children for six 
months of the year.  Id.  The divorce 
decree further specified, however, that if either parent relocated from Laramie, 
the relocating parent would have custody for three months, and the remaining 
parent would have custody for nine months.  Id. at 
321-22.  On appeal, this Court held that inclusion of the 
provision for automatic future modification of child custody was an abuse of 
discretion, noting that child custody determinations are based on the best 
interests of the children, and that such a determination cannot be made absent 
“all facts necessary to make such a determination.”
 
            
The district court’s anticipatory conclusion that the best interest of 
the children will be served by a nine-month/three-month split in favor of the 
parent remaining in Laramie is an abuse of discretion.  As 
noted above, the test for child custody is the best interests of the children, 
and such a decision cannot be made without the district court having before it 
all facts necessary to make such a determination.  What those 
facts may be, if and when one or the other parent leaves Laramie, can only be 
pure speculation at this point in time.  Such speculation is 
not a substitute for complete analysis of all existing circumstances when and if 
a change in the established child custody arrangement becomes 
necessary.           

 
Id. at 323.
 
[¶17]     
The Court’s next 
opportunity to consider a modification of custody based on relocation was 
presented in Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283 (Wyo. 
1993).  In that case, the custody arrangement provided that 
mother would have physical custody of the parties’ two children while school was 
in session, and that father would have physical custody during the summer. 
 Id. at 1284.  The divorce decree 
incorporated a stipulation of the parties that “the residence of the children 
will not be changed to a place beyond the radius of 100 miles from the City of 
Sheridan, Wyoming, unless both parents consent thereto or unless an order . . . 
has been entered approving such change.”  Id. at 
1285.  Mother subsequently sought an order to show cause as to 
why she should not be allowed to change her residence and that of her children 
to Sioux Falls, South Dakota.  Id.  
In response, father claimed that mother’s relocation was a sufficient 
change of circumstances to warrant modification of custody. 
 Id.  The district court held a 
hearing on mother’s application for a change of residence, at which it received 
testimony from the parents and from a psychologist who expressed his opinion as 
to the custodial arrangement that would promote the best interests of the 
children.  Id.  The psychologist 
testified that the parties’ 15-year-old son was capable of making “a reasonable 
decision in his own best interest,” but that it would be in the 11-year-old 
daughter’s best interests “to have predominant contact with her 
mother.”  Id.  The district court 
determined that “the residence of the minor children of the parties may be 
changed to a place beyond the radius of 100 miles from [Sheridan, to Sioux 
Falls].”  Id. at 1286.
 
[¶18]     
On appeal, this Court 
affirmed the district court’s decision with respect to the parties’ 
daughter.  Love, 851 P.2d  at 
1291.  Because the discussion in Love provides the 
foundation for Wyoming’s jurisprudence relating to modification of child custody 
based upon relocation of a custodial parent, we set forth portions of that 
decision at length:
 
            
This court’s test to determine custody is well established. 
 We have said that the “goal to be achieved is a reasonable 
balance of the rights and affections of each of the parents, with paramount 
consideration being given to the welfare and needs of the 
children.”  Leitner v. 
Lonabaugh, 402 P.2d 713, 720 (Wyo. 1965); See 
also, Fanning v. Fanning, 717 P.2d 346, 353 (Wyo. 
1986); Bereman v. Bereman, 645 P.2d 
1155[, 1160] (Wyo. 1982); Ayling v. Ayling, 
661 P.2d 1054, [1056] (Wyo. 1983); Yates v. Yates, 
702 P.2d 1252, 1256 (Wyo. 1985).
 
. . .
 
            
Cases involving relocation of parents are fact sensitive; we would be 
remiss to attempt to define a bright line test for their determination. 
 Where the issue is relocation of one of the parties, we must 
remember that the best interests of the child standard was applied at the time 
of the initial custody award.  Therefore, our review looks 
more closely at balancing the continued rights of the parties with the best 
interests of the children as established at the time of divorce. 
 We will consider the attributes and characteristics of the 
parents and children and how the children have fared under the original custody 
and visitation arrangement.  We will consider also whether the 
relocating parent’s motives for proposing the move are legitimate, sincere, in 
good faith, and whether reasonable visitation is possible for the remaining 
parent.  See, Arquilla [v. 
Arquilla], 407 N.E.2d [948,] 950 [(Ill. App. 1980)]; 
Holder v. Polanski, 111 N.J. 344, 544 A.2d 852, 855 (N.J. 
1988).       
. . 
.       
            
The district court did not make comparisons between the children’s 
current schools and the Sioux Falls school system but concluded that the 
children “will do equally well whether they are in Sheridan or Sioux Falls, or 
probably if they were anyplace they’re going to do equally well.” 
 In this context, we agree with a Michigan court which stated: 

 
“'We live in a 
transient society.  With respect to the best interests of a 
child, state boundaries are artificial and meaningless; there is no presumption 
that bringing up a child in Michigan has any advantage (or disadvantage) over 
Missouri or Georgia, or any other state.  To conclude 
otherwise would be a meaningless generalization.  Restrictions 
upon where a custodial parent may live, in terms of geography, are not 
realistic.  In every state there are good and bad places to 
bring up a child.’” 
 
DeGrow v. 
DeGrow, 112 Mich. App. 260, 
315 N.W.2d 915, 918 (Mich. App. 1982) (quoting Hutchins v. 
Hutchins, 84 Mich. App. 236, 269 N.W.2d 539, 540 (Mich. App. 
1978) (Beasley, J., concurring)).  This statement surely 
applies to comparisons between Wyoming and South Dakota as well.  

            
The test we will utilize in relocation cases is most similar to that 
espoused in Arquilla.  We agree: 

 
It would be 
incongruous for a court, when presented with a custodial order originally based 
upon the best interests of the child, to refuse to support the efforts of the 
custodial parent to maintain and enhance their standard of living, albeit 
in another jurisdiction.  So long as the court is satisfied 
with the motives of the custodial parent in seeking the move and reasonable 
visitation is available to the remaining parent, removal should be granted. 

 
Arquilla, 
407 N.E.2d  at 
950.           

            
We acknowledge that mother’s plans at this time are speculative; she has 
not enrolled herself or her children in school, purchased a home or identified 
employment opportunities in Sioux Falls.  Her previous 
employment in Sheridan, however, was not long term, found to be unappealing and 
in less than three years her alimony support will terminate. 
 Mother has identified what she believes to be a positive 
solution to these problems: relocation to Sioux Falls.
            
To this discussion we add the consideration of whether an 
“established custodial environment continues to exist despite a change in the 
children’s domicile.”  DeGrow, 
315 N.W.2d  at 917.  This situation has been 
defined as one that 
emphasizes the 
continuity and strength of an established relationship between a custodian and a 
child.  The custodial environment is the family unit which 
cannot be destroyed by a simple change in geographic location. 
 The family unit still will be preserved in the new 
domicile.  
 
DeGrow, 
315 N.W.2d  at 
918.          

            
As the district court recognized, despite a change in residence, there is 
no reason to suggest that mother will not continue to provide a caring, 
nurturing environment for her children.  We agree that [the 
parties’ daughter] should stay with her mother.  This part of 
the district court’s decision is supported by the testimony of 
Dr. Leugers and mother who identified [the daughter’s] emotional 
needs in this 
area.           

 
            
Father also raises the issue of problematic visitation if mother is to 
move.  He stated that his weekend visitation would be 
“non-existent” because of the distance between the two towns. 
 Father’s change in visitation due to mother’s relocation 
is unfortunate, but not an unusual result of divorce. 
 Nelson v. Card, 162 Colo. 274, 425 P.2d 276, 278 (Colo. 1967).  We agree that a court 
 
should not insist 
that the advantages of the move be sacrificed and the opportunity for a better 
and more comfortable life style for the mother and children be forfeited solely 
to maintain weekly visitation by the father where reasonable alternative 
visitation is available and where the advantages of the move are substantial. 

 
D'Onofrio [v. 
D’Onofrio], 365 A.2d [27,] 30 [(N.J. 1976)]. Mother’s 
motive for wanting to relocate is legitimate, sincere and in good faith. 
 Though the details of the move have not been fleshed out, the 
district court was convinced that mother’s exceptional parenting would continue 
in another locale.  The record does not disclose whether 
either party contemplated an alternative to the current visitation arrangement. 
 However, more than inconvenience to the noncustodial parent 
must be shown to defeat the custodial parent’s right to relocate. 
 Cooper v. Cooper, 99 N.J. 42, 491 A.2d 606, 614 (N.J. 1984).  This court recently upheld a complex 
and somewhat restrictive visitation schedule for the father of two young 
children who were in the custody of their mother, living in Las Vegas. 
 In that case we underscored that establishment of visitation 
schedules is within the sound discretion of the district court. 
 Rowan v. Rowan, 786 P.2d 886, 891 (Wyo. 
1990).  Though visitation for father may be more difficult, it 
is still within the bounds of 
reason.           

. . 
.       
            
We discern no abuse of discretion by the district court in permitting 
mother to relocate with the youngest child.
 
Love, 
851 P.2d  at 1287-89 (italics in original).
 
[¶19]     
With respect to the 
district court’s decision as it pertained to the parties’ son, however, this 
Court reached a different conclusion.  We reversed the 
district court’s decision to maintain the same custodial arrangement with 
respect to the parties’ son based on the court’s failure to “acknowledge and 
give weight to his wishes” regarding geographic preference.  
Id. at 1291.
 
            
Considering the preferences of children in custody matters, we have said 
that “the preference of a child of sufficient age and maturity is a factor to be 
considered by a court in ascertaining what is in the child’s best interests.” 
Roberts [v. Vilos], 776 P.2d [216,] 218 [(Wyo. 
1989)].  Though this is one factor to consider, “such 
preference is not conclusive.”  Yates v. Yates, 
702 P.2d 1252, 1255 (Wyo. 1985).  In the few cases 
in which we have deliberated this issue, we have provided the following quote 
which still aptly applies: 
 
Such we think is the 
general rule; for, if the happiness and welfare of the infant is to be 
consulted, nothing could be more potent upon that question than the expression 
of [the child’s] preference based upon kindness or unkindness, care or want of 
care, love and affection or want thereof, and, as to the surrounding conditions, 
either with one or the other.
 
Yates, 
702 P.2d  at 1256 (quoting Tytler v. 
Tytler, 15 Wyo. 319, 338, 89 P. 1, 6 (1907)). 
 
It appears to be the 
almost universal rule that at least when a child is of sufficient age, 
intelligence, and discretion to exercise an enlightened judgment as to [the 
child’s] future welfare, based upon facts and not mere whims, [the child’s] 
wishes are one factor which may be considered by the court in determining 
custody, in doubtful cases in any event, usually not because of any legal right 
in the child to have [the child’s] wishes granted, but because the consideration 
of such wishes will aid the court in making a custodial decree which is for the 
best interests and welfare of the child.
 
Yates, 
702 P.2d  at 1256 (quoting Annotation, Child’s Wishes as a Factor 
in Awarding Custody, 4 A.L.R. 3d 1396, 1402 (1965 
& Supp. 1992)).  See also, Douglas v. 
Sheffner, 79 Wyo. 172, 331 P.2d 840, 844 (Wyo. 
1958).

Love, 
851 P.2d  at 1289-90.  Noting that an abuse of 
discretion occurs when “a material factor deserving significant weight is 
ignored,” this Court found that the district court’s failure to weigh the son’s 
geographic preference in determining which party should be awarded primary 
physical custody was an abuse of discretion.  Id. at 
1291.
 
[¶20]     
The Court took 
Wyoming’s relocation jurisprudence a step further in Watt. 
 In that case, mother was granted primary physical custody of 
the parties’ three children.  Id., 971 P.2d  
at 610.  However, the divorce decree provided for an automatic 
change in custody from mother to father if mother moved more than fifty miles 
from Upton, Wyoming, where the parties resided. 
 Id.  After mother was accepted into 
the pharmacy program at the University of Wyoming, she sought modification of 
the divorce decree in order to allow her to pursue her degree in Laramie. 
 Id.  Father opposed the modification 
and requested that custody be awarded to him based on the automatic change in 
custody provision in the divorce decree. 
 Id.  The trial court ruled that it 
had erred in providing for an automatic change of custody in the decree and 
refused to invoke it.  Id.  
Nonetheless, the district court found a material change in circumstances 
based on mother’s relocation and found that the children’s best interests would 
be served by remaining with their father in Upton.  Id. 
at 612.
 
[¶21]     
On appeal, this Court 
began its review with a discussion of Love, placing emphasis on that 
opinion’s pronouncement, in a quotation from Arquilla, that 
“So long as the court is satisfied with the motives of the custodial parent in 
seeking the move and reasonable visitation is available to the remaining parent, 
removal should be granted.” Watt, 971 P.2d  at 614 (emphasis 
omitted).  The Court pronounced that “Relocation as a 
substantial and material change in circumstances was foreclosed by the 
decision in Love.  Our decision established a 
strong presumption in favor of the right of a custodial parent to relocate with 
her children, assuming that the criteria articulated in Love are 
satisfied.”  Id. (emphasis added).  
In determining that the trial court abused its discretion in finding a 
material change in circumstances based on mother’s relocation, Watt held 
that “a relocation, by itself, is not a substantial or material change in 
circumstances sufficient to justify a change in custody order.” 
 Id.  The decision focused heavily on 
the custodial parent’s right to travel, reasoning as follows:
 
            
The constitutional question posed is whether the rights of a parent and 
the duty of the courts to adjudicate custody serve as a premise for restricting 
or inhibiting the freedom to travel of a citizen of the State of Wyoming and of 
the United States of America.  We hold this to be impossible. 
 The right of travel enjoyed by a citizen carries with it 
the right of a custodial parent to have the children move with that 
parent.  This right is not to be denied, impaired, or 
disparaged unless clear evidence before the court demonstrates another 
substantial and material change of circumstance and establishes the detrimental 
effect of the move upon the children.  See In re Marriage 
of Burgess, 13 Cal. 4th 25, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 444, 
913 P.2d 473, 480 (1996) and Matter of Marriage of Greene, 
107 Ore. App. 338, 812 P.2d 11, 11 (1991).  While 
relocation certainly may be stressful to a child, the normal anxieties of a 
change of residence and the inherent difficulties that the increase in 
geographical distance between parents imposes are not considered to be 
“detrimental” factors.  Cf. In re Marriage of 
Sheley, 78 Wash. App. 494, 895 P.2d 850, 856 (1995), 
overruled on other grounds by In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wash. 2d 39, 940 P.2d 1362, 1371 (Wash. 1997) and Janet 
M. Bowermaster, Sympathizing with Solomon: Choosing Between Parents in 
a Mobile Society, 31 U. Louisville J. Fam. Law 791, 799 
(1992-93).      
            
The sound policy reasons which support this analysis were articulated by 
the Supreme Court of California:  
 
As this case 
demonstrates, ours is an increasingly mobile 
society.  Amici curiae point out that 
approximately one American in five changes residences each year. 
 Economic necessity and remarriage account for the bulk of 
relocations.  Because of the ordinary needs for 
both parents after a marital dissolution to secure or retain 
employment, pursue educational or career opportunities, or reside in the same 
location as a new spouse or other family or friends, it is unrealistic to assume 
that divorced parents will permanently remain in the same location after 
dissolution or to exert pressure on them to do so.  It would 
also undermine the interest in minimizing costly litigation over custody and 
require the trial courts to “micromanage” family decisionmaking by 
second-guessing reasons for everyday decisions about career and 
family.
 
In re Marriage of 
Burgess, 
913 P.2d  at 480-81 (emphasis in original).  An 
inhibition upon the right to travel is never imposed upon the non-custodial 
parent who is free to move at will despite the location of the children. 
 The motives of the non-custodial parent will not be 
questioned by the court with respect to such relocation, and the 
custodial parent has no power to inhibit it.  The 
inherent inequities of such a situation stand as an additional reason that 
courts have concluded that custodial parents should be permitted to move with 
their children. In re Marriage of Francis, 919 P.2d 776, 784 
(Colo. 1996); D’Onofrio, 365 A.2d  at 
30.   
            
Mr. Watt, as the non-custodial parent in this situation, was required to 
carry the burden of demonstrating that a material and substantial change of 
circumstances had occurred, sufficient to justify the trial court in ordering a 
change in custody.  He did not meet that burden other than by 
establishing the relocation, which we hold, as a matter [of] law, is not, 
without more, a material and substantial change of circumstances for purposes of 
invoking Wyo. Stat. § 20-2-113(a) (Repl. 1994).  “'[A] party 
must show, in addition to the existence and extent of the change, that the 
change is significant in relation to the modification sought.’” 
 Stevens v. Collard, 837 P.2d 593, 596 
(Utah App. 1992), cert. denied, 862 P.2d 1356 (Utah 1993) 
(quoting Becker v. Becker, 694 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah 1984)) 
(emphasis in original).        

            
In light of our prior cases, and our concern for the protection of 
constitutional liberties of the citizens of the State of Wyoming, we hold that 
an intrastate relocation by a custodial parent, taking the children along, 
cannot by itself be considered a change in circumstances sufficiently 
substantial and material to justify reopening the question of custody. 
 In various ways, several of our sister jurisdictions have 
adopted this rule.  E.g., Jaramillo v. Jaramillo, 113 
N.M. 57, 823 P.2d 299, 304-05 (1991); Matter of Marriage of 
Duckett, 137 Ore. App. 446, 905 P.2d 1170, 1172 (1995); 
Matter of Marriage of Greene, 812 P.2d at 11-12; 
and Fossum v. Fossum, 1996 SD 38, 
545 N.W.2d 828, 832-33 (S.D. 
1996).       
 
            
This precept also applies to factors that are derivative of the 
relocation.  The custodial parent’s right to move with the 
children is constitutionally protected, and a court may not order a change in 
custody based upon that circumstance alone.  Some other change 
of circumstances, together with clear evidence of the detrimental effect of the 
other change upon the children, is required.  Such a 
circumstance necessarily would have to be sufficiently deleterious to the 
welfare of the children that by itself it would serve as a substantial and 
material change in circumstances even in the absence of a 
relocation.     
 
            
The trial judge in this case changed custody from Mrs. Watt to Mr. Watt 
based upon Mrs. Watt’s move to Laramie.  The other factors 
articulated by the trial court, such as Mrs. Watt’s alleged previous interest in 
seeing her children brought up in Upton; the relocation of the maternal 
grandparents to Upton; or Mrs. Watt’s status as a student do not, together or 
separately, constitute a material and substantial change in circumstances to 
justify the order of the trial court.  Those circumstances are 
examples of those factors, clearly related to and derivative of the relocation, 
which have no negative impact upon the welfare of the children. 
 Mrs. Watt moved to Laramie for legitimate, sincere, and good 
faith reasons, and Mr. Watt is seeking to obtain custody of his sons for 
legitimate, sincere, and good faith reasons.  No evidence in 
the record shows the move is detrimental to the children, unless it be the 
speculative suggestion by the trial court that a concern exists as to Mrs. 
Watt’s status as a student in a discipline that is a difficult undertaking and 
its detraction from her ability to rear her 
children.       
 
            
Reasonable visitation remains possible, even if that visitation 
might be less than what Mr. Watt previously enjoyed. 
 Visitation can be resolved by the appropriate exercise of the 
broad discretion of the trial court to modify orders with respect to contact and 
visitation in order to minimize the loss of contact and visitation between 
children and the non-custodial parent.  Relocation indeed is a 
ground for such a modification.  It is not a ground for 
modifying custody.  Without the presence of a material and 
substantial change in circumstance to justify a change in custody in this case, 
the trial court should not have considered the issue.
Watt, 
971 P.2d  at 615-17.
 
[¶22]     
Although Watt 
has been cited with approval in several of this Court’s subsequent decisions, 
the results reached in those cases were not dependent upon application of the 
presumption in favor of the relocating, custodial parent established in 
Watt.  See Hanson, ¶ 36, 
280 P.3d  at 1197-98 (affirming denial of father’s petition to modify 
custody after noting that “Given that Mother had returned to Wyoming by the time 
of trial and that Father did not request consideration of his own relocation, 
the parties’ respective relocations outside Wyoming were not factors for the 
district court’s consideration in determining whether there had been a material 
change in circumstances. We therefore do not give the relocations any further 
consideration.”); Zupan, ¶¶ 
35-36, 230 P.3d at 338-39; Testerman v. 
Testerman, 2008 WY 112, 193 P.3d 1141 (Wyo. 2008); 
Morris v. Morris, 2007 WY 174, 170 P.3d 86 (Wyo. 2007); 
TW v. BM, 2006 WY 68, 134 P.3d 1262 (Wyo. 
2006); Harshberger v. Harshberger, 2005 WY 99, 
117 P.3d 1244 (Wyo. 2005); and Resor v. 
Resor, 987 P.2d 146 (Wyo. 1999).
 
[¶23]     
In at least one case 
decided after Watt, we have suggested that a relocation, by itself, may 
constitute a material change in circumstances.  
In JRS v. GMS, 2004 WY 60, 90 P.3d 718 (Wyo. 2004), father was initially awarded custody of the parties’ two older 
children, and mother was awarded custody of the two younger 
children.  Father filed a petition to modify custody, 
asserting that mother’s relocation to South Dakota and her failure to cooperate 
in permitting visitation constituted a material change in circumstances. 
 Id., ¶¶ 3-5, 90 P.3d  at 719-20. 
 Father asserted that it was in the best interests 
of the younger children to be in his custody.  Id., 
¶ 5, 90 P.3d  at 720.  Mother, 
however, also sought modification of the custodial arrangement so that she would 
have custody of the parties’ two older children.  Id., 
¶ 6, 90 P.3d  at 720.  Evidence indicated that 
the children’s stepmother and mother’s fiancé had abused the children. 
 Id., ¶ 9, 90 P.3d  at 722.  
The district court denied the petitions to modify custody, finding no 
material change in circumstances.  On appeal, 
this Court reversed, concluding that a number of factors, including mother’s 
relocation, constituted a change in circumstances:
 
            
We are unable to agree with the district court that there was not a 
material change in circumstances in this case.  Mother’s 
relocation to South Dakota might well have been viewed as a material change. 
 The testimony the district court heard was that the unusual 
custody arrangements to which these parents agreed (it was not fashioned by the 
district court), worked only so long as the parents both resided in Crook County 
and were close enough to each other to make it functional.  It 
did not work once Mother was in South Dakota, sometimes without a car to 
transport the children, and Father was not free, nor was he always able, to 
travel to South Dakota to facilitate visitation.  That 
Mother’s fiancé, and her brother, were accused of sexually assaulting the 
parties’ youngest daughter also might well have been viewed as a material change 
of circumstances.  There was another potential material 
change 
when the youngest children were uprooted from Mother’s home, and sent 
to live in Sheridan County with Father’s new wife, the parties’ two other 
children, and Stepmother’s three children.  There was likely 
a material change of circumstance when all four children were taken 
from their home and placed in DFS custody (in a group home) 
as a result of Stepmother’s abusive acts against the children. 
 There were potential material changes of circumstance when 
the children were placed in the custody of Father’s mother and stepfather, and 
when Father was finally accorded full custody again, with his mother and 
stepfather providing a backup for Father.  This list of 
changes in circumstances is not meant to be exhaustive. 
 While any one of them might well have served to 
require the district court to reconsider a more suitable custodial arrangement 
for the children, the totality of these circumstances requires a remand for the 
district court to fully address the needs of these children with respect to 
custody.  For a more complete discussion, see 
George A. Locke, Change in Circumstances Justifying Modification of Child 
Custody Order, 6 POF 2d 499 (1975 and Supp. 
2001).    
            
However, a material change of circumstance does not automatically 
equate with a change in custody.  Custody must be arranged so 
as to be in the best interests of the child(ren) on an individualized 
basis.  Given all that has occurred since the divorce, the 
district court needs to reassess the wisdom of the divided custody arrangement 
in light of the material changes in circumstances that have occurred. 
 Although the parties agreed to that arrangement, they did so 
under circumstances that no longer exist.  Moreover, the 
record does not reflect that the district court assessed the advisability of the 
arrangement at the outset.  We agree that the 
district court should not have to “micro-manage” the custody arrangement. 
 The district court adopted a “PARENTAL COOPERATION” standard 
in the initial decree and, in light of the rather serious problems faced by this 
family, some additional management, as suggested by the GAL, may well be in 
order.  It is evident from the record that the juvenile 
proceedings in Sheridan County had not yet ended when the district court entered 
the order now before us.  One gap in that process appeared to 
be an assessment of Mother’s home.  It is evident that the 
children have expressed a preference as to where they want to live, and the 
district court should take that into consideration as well. 
 It also appears that by now the juvenile matter in Sheridan 
may have developed additional information that is pertinent to the most 
desirable custody arrangement for the children and it is important for the 
district court to have all that information available to it.
 
Id., ¶¶ 12-13, 
90 P.3d  at 723-24 (emphasis added).  Against this 
background, we turn to a discussion of the issues presented in this 
appeal.
 
[¶24]     
In his first issue, 
Father claims that our precedent relating to modification of custody based on a 
relocation of a custodial parent has addressed only those situations in which 
the custodial parent relocates within the state.  He suggests 
we should hold, as a matter of first impression, that an interstate, as opposed 
to an intrastate, relocation by the primary custodial parent may constitute a 
material change in circumstances sufficient to justify a modification of 
custody.  We find no merit in that suggestion.  

 
[¶25]     
As we noted in 
Love, in which the mother relocated from Sheridan, Wyoming to Sioux 
Falls, South Dakota, 
 
With respect to the 
best interests of a child, state boundaries are artificial and meaningless; 
there is no presumption that bringing up a child in Michigan has any advantage 
(or disadvantage) over Missouri or Georgia, or any other state. 
 To conclude otherwise would be a meaningless generalization. 
 Restrictions upon where a custodial parent may live, in terms 
of geography, are not realistic.  In every state there are 
good and bad places to bring up a child.
 
Id., 
851 P.2d  at 1288.  There is nothing inherent in 
the act of crossing state boundaries that informs a determination as to whether 
there has been a “material change of circumstances” warranting a modification of 
child custody.  A simple hypothetical illustration makes the 
point.  An interstate relocation from Jackson, Wyoming to 
Victor, Idaho involves a distance of 25 miles, whereas an intrastate relocation 
from Jackson to Cheyenne, Wyoming, involves a distance of over 400 
miles.  In determining whether a material change of 
circumstances has occurred the intrastate/interstate distinction is 
meaningless.  
 
[¶26]     
In his second issue, 
Father claims that our precedent, which establishes a strong presumption in 
favor of the relocating parent, does not adequately account for his 
constitutional right to raise his children.  Father asserts 
that “The clear multi-jurisdictional trend in relocation cases is one that 
favors an approach that balances the fundamental constitutional rights of the 
parties in order to arrive at a solution that respects the rights of both 
parents, but holds paramount the best interests of the children.” 
 He urges us to follow this trend, and to overrule 
Watt’s holding that a relocation cannot by itself constitute a material 
change in circumstances sufficient to warrant consideration of the best 
interests of the children.  
 
[¶27]     
Mother responds by 
asserting that Father’s constitutional claim was not raised below and, 
consequently, should not be considered on appeal.  In the 
alternative, Mother contends that we should uphold Wyoming precedent pursuant to 
the doctrine of stare decisis.  She asserts that 
“Father does not have a [c]onstitutional right to raise his children 
which is superior to Mother’s own [c]onsitutional right as the custodial 
parent,” and that “[t]he right of [M]other to associate with her children in 
their new familial configuration is important and should be respected.” 
 Mother does not dispute that most jurisdictions follow the 
rule recognizing that a relocation may constitute a material change of 
circumstances sufficient to justify a modification of custody.  
She notes, however, that “our own legislature has not adopted statutory 
presumptions for or against relocation, nor has it determined that [] a 
noncustodial parent’s rights trump those of a custodial parent.”  
As a corollary, Mother asserts that this Court “should not adopt a new 
standard based on the examples of other states and other, differing 
statutes.”
 
[¶28]     
As an initial matter, 
we will briefly address Mother’s claim that this issue should not be addressed 
because it was not raised in the district court.  Mother is 
correct that we generally do not consider issues raised for the first time on 
appeal.  Nodine v. Jackson Hole Mt. 
Resort Corp., 2012 WY 72, ¶ 19 n.2, 277 P.3d 112, 117 n.2 (Wyo. 2012).  In the present case, 
however, Father’s arguments below clearly addressed the competing parental 
interests at issue, as recognized by the district court:
 
In this case, 
[Father] presented evidence that [Mother’s] move to Virginia will undoubtedly 
change the nature of his close daily relationship with his 
daughters.  The Court is moved by, and sympathetic to, 
[Father’s] argument.  Both parties are top-shelf parents and 
[Father] appears to be an extremely loving and very participatory 
father.  The law in Wyoming at this time, however, weights 
more in favor of a custodial parent’s right to reasonably relocate, and less in 
favor of a non-custodial parent’s right to maintain the same visitation 
situation and close relationship that may be fostered in the absence of a 
move.
 
The district court’s 
order acknowledges that it is bound by Wyoming precedent, and that it was 
required to follow this Court’s existing jurisprudence establishing a 
presumption in favor of the relocating parent.  The continued 
viability of that precedent is properly raised in this appeal.  

[¶29]     
Although our 
jurisprudence recognizes a strong interest in adhering to past precedent under 
the doctrine of stare decisis, we have noted that departure from 
precedent is sometimes appropriate.  SLB 
v. JEO (In the Interest of ANO), 2006 WY 74, ¶ 6, 
136 P.3d 797, 799 (Wyo. 2006).  In considering 
whether to overrule a prior decision, 
 
            
We consider the doctrine of stare decisis to be an 
important principle which furthers the “evenhanded, predictable, and consistent 
development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and 
contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial 
process.” 
            
Nevertheless, we should be willing to depart from precedent when it is 
necessary “to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy continued 
injustice.”  When precedential decisions are no longer 
workable, or are poorly reasoned, we should not feel compelled to 
follow precedent.  Stare decisis is a 
policy doctrine and should not require automatic conformance to past 
decisions.
 
Id. (quoting Goodrich 
v. Stobbe, 908 P.2d 416, 420 (Wyo. 1995)).  
In light of Father’s contention that our precedent impinges on his 
fundamental parental rights and the rights of the state in providing for the 
best interests of the children, we will proceed to reexamine our decision in 
Watt.
 
[¶30]     
We begin our analysis 
by identifying the competing rights and interests at stake in a case involving 
modification of child custody based on the relocation of a custodial 
parent.  First, as this Court properly recognized in 
Watt, the custodial parent has a right of travel worthy of 
protection.  Id., 971 P.2d  at 615. 
 Importantly, however, the custodial parent’s right to travel 
is not the only interest deserving of protection in relocation 
cases.  The minority time parent in a shared custody 
arrangement has an equally important fundamental right of familial 
association.  Michael v. Hertzler, 
900 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Wyo. 1995).  
 
[W]e have repeatedly 
held that, “'[t]he right to associate with one’s immediate family is a 
fundamental liberty protected by the state and federal constitutions.’ . . . 
Resolution of which parent shall have custody necessarily implicates the 
fundamental right of family association.”
FML v. 
TW, 2007 WY 73, ¶ 6, 157 P.3d 455, 459 (Wyo. 2007) 
(quoting Loghry v. Loghry, 920 P.2d 664, 667 (Wyo. 1996)).  Further, just as parents have a 
fundamental right to associate with their children, “Children have as 
fundamental a right to familial association [with their] parents.”  
LM v. Laramie County Dep’t of Family Servs. (In re MN), 
2007 WY 189, ¶ 7, 171 P.3d 1077, 1081 (Wyo. 2007).  

 
[¶31]     
Additionally, the 
state has a compelling interest in promoting the best interests of the 
children.  Michael, 900 P.2d  at 
1149.  As we noted in Cosner v. 
Ridinger, 882 P.2d 1243, 1247 (Wyo. 1994), the best 
interests of the child are of “paramount concern” in decisions relating to child 
custody:
 
            
Wyoming has adopted as its public policy a paramount concern for the best 
interests of the child in connection with child support, custody, and 
visitation.  That policy is articulated in WYO. STAT. § 
20-2-113 (Cum. Supp. 1993)2, which states in 
pertinent part: 
 
(a) In granting a 
divorce or annulment of a marriage, the court may make such disposition of the 
children as appears most expedient and beneficial for the well-being of the 
children. . . . If the court finds that both parents have shown the ability to 
act in the best interest of the child, the court may order any arrangement that 
encourages parents to share in the rights and responsibilities of rearing their 
children. . . .  The court which entered the decree has 
continuing subject matter and personal jurisdiction to enforce or revise the 
decree concerning the care, custody, visitation and maintenance of the children 
as the circumstances of the parents and the benefit of the children 
requires. . . . The court shall consider evidence of spouse abuse or child 
abuse as being contrary to the best interest of the child. (Emphasis 
added.)
 
Notably, in 
Cosner, we cited Martin, 798 P.2d 321, and Love, 851 P.2d 1283, in stating that “Our cases echo 
this overriding interest in the best interests of the child in connection with 
child support and custody determinations.”  
Cosner, 882 P.2d  at 1248.  
In Basolo v. Basolo, 
907 P.2d 348, 354 (Wyo. 1995), we again emphasized that the best 
interests of the children are of overriding importance, and that they take 
precedence over the fundamental rights of parents:
 
In the wreckage of 
any marriage, . . . vindication of parental rights shall not be lavished at the 
expense of the “paramount purpose” of serving the welfare and best interests of 
the child. Laughton v. Laughton, 71 Wyo. 506, 529, 259 P.2d 1093, 1103 (1953). Recognition that parental rights are fundamental does 
not alter the cardinal rule that when the rights of a parent and the rights of a 
child collide, it is the rights of the parent which must yield. 
 Matter of MLM, 682 P.2d 982, 990 
(Wyo. 1984); Stirrett v. Stirrett, 35 Wyo. 206, 
222, 248 P. 1, 5 (1926).
 
Similarly, 
in Stonham v. Widiastuti, 2003 WY 157, ¶ 17 
n.8, 79 P.3d 1188, 1194 n.8 (Wyo. 2003), where 
mother sought to return to Indonesia with her children, we stated that 

 
Despite the factual 
differences in [custody cases involving distant relocations], there is one 
common analytical thread in virtually every case: the best interest of the child 
is paramount in any award of custody and visitation, and the trial court has a 
large measure of discretion in making that award. Whether one parent is 
moving with the children across town or across the world, the analysis remains 
the same.
 
(Emphasis 
added.)
 
[¶32]     
Despite this clear 
Wyoming authority recognizing both the minority time parent’s right to parent 
and the state’s compelling interest in promoting the best interests of the 
children in child custody cases, these interests did not receive attention or 
consideration in Watt.  As noted above, this Court’s 
holding in Watt was very explicitly, and exclusively, grounded in the 
custodial parent’s right to travel:  
 
            
The constitutional question posed is whether the rights of a parent and 
the duty of the courts to adjudicate custody serve as a premise for restricting 
or inhibiting the freedom to travel of a citizen of the State of Wyoming and of 
the United States of America.  We hold this to be impossible. 
 The right of travel enjoyed by a citizen carries with it 
the right of a custodial parent to have the children move with that parent. 
 This right is not to be denied, impaired, or disparaged 
unless clear evidence before the court demonstrates another substantial and 
material change of circumstance and establishes the detrimental effect of the 
move upon the children.  
 
Id., 
971 P.2d  at 615-16.  In Watt, we seemed to 
marginalize both a parent’s and a child’s right to familial association, as well 
as the state’s interest in the welfare of children, when we stated that “the 
normal anxieties of a change of residence and the inherent difficulties that the 
increase in geographical distance between parents imposes are not considered to 
be 'detrimental’ factors.”  Id. at 616. 

 
[¶33]     
Although Watt 
found that this Court’s decision in Love had created “a strong 
presumption in favor of the right of a custodial parent to relocate with her 
children,” we can discern no such presumption issuing from that 
decision.  Rather, in Love, 851 P.2d  at 
1287, the Court noted that the goal to be achieved in child custody cases “is a 
reasonable balance of the rights and affections of each of the parents, with 
paramount consideration being given to the welfare and needs of the 
children.”  In addition, noting that the “best interests” 
standard is applied in an initial custody determination, the Court stated that, 
in a modification case, “our review looks more closely at 
balancing the continued rights of the parties with the best 
interests of the children as established at the time of divorce.” Id., 
851 P.2d  at 1288 (emphasis added).  In describing 
this review, the Court identified additional, non-exclusive factors that 
inform a determination as to whether modification of custody is warranted, 
including “the attributes and characteristics of the parents and children and 
how the children have fared under the original custody and visitation 
arrangement,” “the relocating parent’s motives for proposing the move,” and 
“whether reasonable visitation is possible for the remaining 
parent.”  Id.  Importantly, nothing 
in that decision indicates that the custodial parent’s right to travel is 
entitled to a privileged position in “balancing the continued rights of the 
parties.”  Indeed, the Court implicitly rejected any 
presumption in favor of either parent in stating that “Cases involving 
relocation of parents are fact sensitive; we would be remiss to attempt to 
define a bright line test for their determination.”  
Id. at 1287.
 
[¶34]     
In holding that a 
relocation by the custodial parent cannot, by itself, constitute a material 
change in circumstances sufficient to warrant a best interests analysis, the 
Watt opinion cited Jaramillo, 823 P.2d 299 as 
supporting authority.  In that case, the New Mexico Supreme 
Court noted that “In New Mexico, the protection afforded the right to travel in 
the child-custody context has been explicitly recognized by both this Court and 
the court of appeals,” and found that a 
parent’s right to relocate should not be burdened by an adverse presumption 
against awarding custody to the relocating parent.  Id. 
at 305.  Importantly, however, Watt failed to recognize 
that the decision in Jaramillo proceeded immediately to state that “By 
the same token, we believe that the other parent’s right to maintain his or her 
close association and frequent contact with the child should be equally free 
from any unfavorable presumption that would place him or her under the burden of 
showing that the proposed removal of the child would be contrary to the child’s 
best interests.”  Id. at 306.  The 
court further stated that “We think that such a presumption is potentially just 
as inimical to the child’s best interests as the opposite presumption favoring 
the relocating parent,” and noted that 
 
Both presumptions are 
subject to the following criticism leveled by the United States Supreme Court 
several years ago at “procedure by presumption”: 
 
Procedure by 
presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized determination. 
 But when, as here, the procedure forecloses the determinative 
issues of competence and care, when it explicitly disdains present realities in 
deference to past formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the 
important interests of both parent and child.  It therefore 
cannot stand.
 
Stanley [v. 
Illinois], 405 U.S. [645,] 656-57, 92 S.Ct. [1208,] 1215[, 
31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972)] (citations omitted).
 
Jaramillo, 
823 P.2d  at 307.  Echoing this criticism, the 
court concluded that 
 
[W]e believe that 
allocating burdens and presumptions in this context does violence to both 
parents’ rights, jeopardizes the true goal of determining what in fact is 
in the child’s best interests, and substitutes procedural formalism for the 
admittedly difficult task of determining, on the facts, how best to 
accommodate the interests of all parties before the court, both parents and 
children.
 
Id. at 305 (emphasis in 
original).
 
[¶35]     
Watt’s reference to 
Jaramillo for support is especially confusing in light of 
Jaramillo’s conclusion that “In almost every case in which the change in 
circumstances is occasioned by one parent’s proposed relocation, the proposed 
move will establish the substantiality and materiality of the 
change.”  Id. at 309.  In a footnote 
accompanying this statement, the court noted that 
 
            
We do not hold that a proposed relocation constitutes a substantial and 
material change in circumstances as a matter of law, but it is difficult to 
imagine an instance in which a proposed relocation will not render an existing 
parenting plan or custody-and-visitation arrangement unworkable. 
 As the court of appeals noted, “a distant relocation by one 
parent will inevitably trigger a change of circumstances -- the inability of the 
parties to implement their parenting agreement.”
 
Id. at 
309 n.9 (citation omitted).  
 
[¶36]     
In 
Tropea, 665 N.E.2d 145, New York’s highest 
court also rejected the use of presumptions in relocation cases:
 
[I]t serves neither 
the interests of the children nor the ends of justice to view relocation cases 
through the prisms of presumptions and threshold tests that artificially skew 
the analysis in favor of one outcome or 
another.      . . . [I]n all 
cases, the courts should be free to consider and give appropriate weight to all 
of the factors that may be relevant to the determination. 
 These factors include, but are certainly not limited to each 
parent’s reasons for seeking or opposing the move, the quality of the 
relationships between the child and the custodial and noncustodial parents, 
the impact of the move on the quantity and quality of the child’s future contact 
with the noncustodial parent, the degree to which the custodial parent’s and 
child’s life may be enhanced economically, emotionally and educationally by the 
move, and the feasibility of preserving the relationship between the 
noncustodial parent and child through suitable visitation arrangements. 

Id., 
665 N.E.2d  at 151.  See also, Elrod, 
supra ¶ 12, at 356 (noting that “The clear trend in the United States 
seems to be to abandon presumptions and to adopt a 'best interests of the child’ 
test that requires both parents to prove that their position is in the child’s 
best interests.”).  
 
[¶37]     
The approach to 
modification of custody based on a relocation of a custodial parent taken in 
Jaramillo and echoed in Tropea was also adopted 
by the Supreme Court of Colorado in In re Marriage of 
Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135.  In 
that case, the court considered, and rejected, the approach taken in 
Watt:
 
            
[The Watt] 
approach is no different in practice than the approach in [In re Marriage 
of] Francis [, 919 P.2d 776] that we now reject because 
it effects a presumption in favor of a custodial parent seeking to relocate. 
 Furthermore, it is contrary to Colorado’s preferred state 
policy emphasizing a fact-driven approach in relocation cases. See § 
14-10-129(2)(c).  Finally, it ignores the rights of the 
minority time parent.  For these reasons, we decline to adopt 
this approach in Colorado.
 
Ciesluk, 
113 P.3d  at 143.  The court also declined to adopt 
the Minnesota approach, as set forth 
in LaChapelle v. Mitten (In re 
L.M.K.O.), 607 N.W.2d 151 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2000), which “elevate[s] the child’s welfare to a compelling state 
interest, thereby obviating the need to balance the parents’ competing 
constitutional rights.”  Ciesluk, 
113 P.3d  at 143.  
The Ciesluk court reasoned:
 
            
Though consideration of the parents’ competing constitutional interests 
is important in relocation cases, the conflict is not simply between the 
parents’ needs and desires.  See Baures v. 
Lewis, 167 N.J. 91, 770 A.2d 214, 229 (N.J. 2001). 
 Rather, the issue in relocation cases is the extent to which 
the parents’ needs and desires are intertwined with the child’s best interests. 
 See id.  Thus, relocation disputes 
present courts with a unique challenge: to promote the best interests of 
the child while affording protection equally between a majority time parent’s 
right to travel and a minority time parent’s right to parent.
 
Id., 
113 P.3d  at 142.  Watt’s 
approach to the issue of relocation, elevating the right to travel over 
competing interests, has also been criticized in Fredman 
v. Fredman, 960 So. 2d 52, 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2d Dist. 2007) (noting that Watt “fails to take into 
consideration the other parent’s fundamental right to parent”) and Braun v. 
Headley, 750 A.2d 624, 632 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (noting 
that most jurisdictions recognizing the role of the right to travel in 
relocation cases “hold that the right to travel is qualified, and must be 
subject to the state’s compelling interest in protecting the best interests of 
the child,” and that “Only one case, Watt, finds a 'best interests’ 
analysis insufficient recognition of the parental right to travel, and holds 
that the threshold requirement that a material change of circumstances exists, 
which triggers the best interest analysis, cannot be established merely 
by proving relocation of the custodial parent.”).  

 
[¶38]     
On further 
examination of Watt, we find that its exclusive focus on the custodial 
parent’s right to travel is not supported by our earlier precedent, and that the 
decision, in holding that a relocation, by itself, cannot constitute a material 
change in circumstances, unjustifiably elevates the custodial parent’s right to 
travel over the competing interests of the minority time parent and the state’s 
concern for the best interests of the child.  Although a 
custodial parent’s right to travel is entitled to protection, this interest must 
be weighed against the minority time parent’s right to maintain a close 
relationship and frequent contact with his or her children.  
Further, because the goal in custody cases is to reach an arrangement 
that promotes the best interests of the children, the rights of both parents 
must be considered only to the extent that they are consistent with that goal. 
 Ultimately, we agree with the conclusion reached in other 
jurisdictions that presumptions in favor of one parent or another are 
detrimental to the interests of all parties in cases involving modification of 
child custody based on relocation of a custodial parent.  

 
[¶39]     
We note that our 
conclusion that a relocation may constitute a material change in circumstances 
does not conflict with the proper application of res judicata in 
determining whether modification of custody is warranted.  
Clearly, a move by a custodial parent, especially when the distance from 
the remaining parent is significant, may create “new issues framed by facts 
differing from those existing when the original decree was entered,” which 
preclude the application of res judicata.  These new 
facts may include a change in the ability of the parties to maintain the 
existing parenting agreement, a change in the ability of the children to 
maintain a close relationship with the remaining parent, factors affecting 
quality of life in the new location, the child’s geographic preference, and the 
relative merits of available social and educational opportunities in the new 
location.  On this point, we agree with the Vermont Supreme 
Court, which has stated that “when childrearing and its concomitant 
decision-making are shared, relocation to a remote location by one parent 
requires at the very least a reassessment of the custodial arrangement and, 
because of the practicalities involved in shared parenting, will often 
necessitate a change in custody.”  Hoover v. Hoover, 
764 A.2d 1192, 1194 (Vt. 2000).  
 
[¶40]     
In summary, we 
conclude that Watt’s prohibition against considering relocation as a 
factor contributing to a material change in circumstances does not properly 
account for the minority time parent’s right to associate with his or her 
family, the child’s right to familial association, or the state’s “paramount 
concern” for promoting the best interests of the children. 
 With this decision, we explicitly recognize that a relocation 
by the primary physical custodian, as well as “factors that are derivative of 
the relocation” – including “the inherent difficulties that the increase in 
geographical distance between parents imposes” – may constitute a material 
change in circumstances sufficient to warrant consideration of the best 
interests of the children.  To the extent this conflicts with 
this Court’s holding in Watt, we hereby overrule Watt.
 
[¶41]     
Further, based on the 
facts of the present case, we find that Mother’s relocation to Virginia, over 
2,000 miles away from Father, constitutes a material change in 
circumstances.  As we have previously noted, however, “a 
material change of circumstance does not automatically equate with a change in 
custody.”  JRS, ¶ 13, 
90 P.3d  at 724.  We note that the district court 
was able to consider a great deal of evidence bearing on the best interests of 
the children in addressing the issue of whether there had been a material change 
in circumstances.  Our concern is that the district court 
viewed this evidence through the prism of the presumption in favor of the 
relocating, custodial parent that we created in Watt.  
In light of the district court’s emphasis on this presumption, which no 
longer applies, we are unable to determine how the absence of such a presumption 
would have impacted the district court’s decision. 
 Accordingly, we remand for further consideration of this 
issue with instructions that the district court consider all relevant facts and 
circumstances in determining a proper custodial arrangement that is in the best 
interests of the children.  Because Father is the party 
seeking the modification of the custodial arrangement, he has the evidentiary 
burden of establishing that a modification of custody is in the best interests 
of the children.3  We must 
emphasize, by this decision, we are not suggesting a particular 
result.  We are only requiring that the determination be made 
by application of the correct legal standard.  
 
[¶42]     
In light of our 
decision, we need not address Father’s third issue pertaining to 
visitation.  We reverse and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.
 
[¶43]     
FOOTNOTES
1“According to 
the U.S. Census Bureau, about 1 in 6 Americans moves each year. 
 Approximately 7 million people a year move from state to 
state.  The 'average American’ makes 11.7 moves in a lifetime. 
 Because of the ordinary needs of both parents after a marital 
dissolution to secure or retain employment, pursue educational or career 
opportunities, or reside in the same location as a new spouse or other 
family or friends, it is unrealistic to assume that divorced parents will 
permanently remain in the same location.”  In re Marriage 
of Ciesluk, 113 P.3d 135, 147 (Colo. 2005) (internal 
citations 
omitted).            

 
2Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 20-2-113 has been repealed and replaced by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201, 
et seq.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201 retains the “best 
interests of the child” standard:  “In granting a divorce, 
separation or annulment of a marriage or upon the establishment of paternity 
pursuant to W.S. 14-2-401 through 14-2-907, the court may make by 
decree or order any disposition of the children that appears most expedient and 
in the best interests of the children.”
 
3Although some 
courts have determined that both parents share equally the burden of 
demonstrating how a child’s best interests will be served in the relocation, we 
do not adopt that approach in this case. See, e.g., In re 
Marriage of Ciesluk, 
113 P.3d  at 147; Jaramillo, 823 P.2d  at 
308.