Case Title: Blankenship v. Bartlett

Citation: 363 N.C. 518

Docket Number: 455PA06-2

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2009-08-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
BRIAN L. BLANKENSHIP, THOMAS J. DIMMOCK, and FRANK D. JOHNSON v.
GARY BARTLETT, as Executive Director of the North Carolina State
Board of Elections; ROY COOPER, as Attorney General of the State
of North Carolina; and NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS
No. 455PA06-2
FILED: 28 AUGUST 2009
1.
Elections–judicial--districts–equal protection–intermediate scrutiny
A state constitutional equal protection challenge to Wake County Superior Court
judicial election districts was remanded for further consideration where plaintiffs demonstrated
gross disparity in voting power between similarly situated residents of Wake County.  The Equal
Protection clause of the North Carolina Constitution requires a degree of population
proportionality in superior court districts and a heightened level of scrutiny is required, but the
presence of a tension between elections and the judicial role means that the appropriate standard
of review is between strict scrutiny and rational basis.  Judicial districts will be sustained if the
legislature’s formulations advance important government interests unrelated to vote dilution and
do not weaken voter strength necessary to further those interests.  If a violation of state equal
protection is found, the trial court should defer initially to the General Assembly.
2.
Evidence–public records–elections–Justice Department preclearance
submissions–admissibility
The trial court did not err in a judicial elections case in its admission of
Administrative Office of the Courts records concerning  U.S. Justice Department preclearance.  
These records clearly fall within N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 803(8) as public records and there is no
inherent error in admitting the evidence and then making findings based on the material the court
considers trustworthy.  
Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON dissenting.
Chief Justice PARKER and Justice HUDSON join in the dissenting opinion.
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of
a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 184 N.C. App. 327,
646 S.E.2d 584 (2007), reversing and vacating a judgment and
order entered on 8 February 2006 by Judge Donald L. Smith in
Superior Court, Wake County.  Heard in the Supreme Court 23
February 2009.
Akins/Hunt, P.C., by Donald G. Hunt, Jr., for
plaintiff-appellants.
Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Alexander McC. Peters,
Special Deputy Attorney General, for defendant-
appellees.
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BRADY, Justice.
Wake County voters are divided into four districts for
purposes of exercising their constitutional right to elect
superior court judges.  However, the General Assembly gives
residents in Superior Court District 10C approximately one-fifth,
or only 20%, of the voting power of residents in Superior Court
District 10A.  Likewise, residents of Superior Court Districts
10B and 10D have approximately one-fourth, or 25% of the voting
power of residents in Superior Court District 10A.
In this case we consider whether the Equal Protection
Clause of the North Carolina Constitution applies to the General
Assembly’s creation of an additional judgeship in Superior Court
District 10A.  We determine that the Equal Protection Clause
applies to the legislature’s actions and accordingly reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Both parties stipulated before the trial court as to
the factual basis of this matter.  According to the 2000 United
States Census, Superior Court District 10A has a total population
of 64,398 residents; District 10B has a total of 281,493
residents; District 10C has a total of 158,812 residents; and
District 10D has a total of 123,143 residents.  In 1987, pursuant
to the then current version of N.C.G.S. § 7A-41, Districts 10A,
10C, and 10D each elected one superior court judge, while
District 10B elected two superior court judges.  However, in 1993
the General Assembly amended N.C.G.S. § 7A-41 to provide for the
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election of another superior court judge from District 10A,
establishing the current districts as follows:
Superior Court
District
Residents
Number of
Superior Court
Judges
Residents per
Superior Court
Judge
10A
64,398
2
32,199
10B
281,493
2
140,747
10C
158,812
1
158,812
10D
123,143
1
123,143
Plaintiffs Brian L. Blankenship and Thomas J. Dimmock
are licensed attorneys who are qualified to run for the office of
superior court judge in their respective districts, 10B and 10C. 
Plaintiff Frank D. Johnson is a citizen, taxpayer, and registered
voter who resides in Superior Court District 10D.  On 5 December
2005, by the filing of a complaint and the issuance of a civil
summons, plaintiffs commenced suit against the North Carolina
State Board of Elections; Gary Bartlett, in his official capacity
as Executive Director of the State Board of Elections; and Roy
Cooper, in his official capacity as Attorney General of North
Carolina.  In their complaint, plaintiffs allege that the 1993
amendment to N.C.G.S. § 7A-41 unconstitutionally created an
additional superior court judgeship in Wake County’s District
10A.  On 9 December 2005, then Chief Justice I. Beverly Lake, Jr.
designated this case as “exceptional” under Rule 2.1 of the
General Rules of Practice and assigned an emergency superior
court judge, the Honorable Donald L. Smith, to hear the matter.  
The trial court expedited the discovery and motions
process and on 8 February 2006, following a two day bench trial,
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entered a judgment and order in favor of plaintiffs.  The trial
court concluded that the General Assembly acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in creating “the judicial districts for superior
court judges assigned to Wake County” and that “[t]he current
districting plan for the election of superior court judges
allocated to Wake County, North Carolina creates unequal weighing
of votes.”  Based on the factual findings, the trial court
concluded as a matter of law that N.C.G.S. § 7A-41 “as it applies
to Wake County, North Carolina, is unconstitutional” because it
“denies plaintiffs equal protection of the law under N.C. Const.
Article I, § 16.”  The trial court stayed its order and judgment
pending appeal.  
Defendants appealed the trial court’s judgment and
order to the Court of Appeals, which held that there is no
requirement of population proportionality in state judicial
elections, that the trial court failed to consider evidence
properly submitted by defendants, and that the trial court erred
in finding that the General Assembly acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in establishing the superior court districts at
issue.  This Court allowed plaintiffs’ petition for discretionary
review on 9 October 2008. 
ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs’ Equal Protection Challenge
[1] We must first determine whether the Equal
Protection Clause of Article I, Section 19 of the North Carolina
Constitution requires any degree of population proportionality in
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the districts drawn for the election of superior court judges. 
We conclude that it does.
The Equal Protection Clause of Article I, Section 19 of
the State Constitution “prohibits the State from denying any
person the equal protection of the laws.”  Stephenson v.
Bartlett, 355 N.C. 354, 377, 562 S.E.2d 377, 393 (2002).  Equal
protection “requires that all persons similarly situated be
treated alike.”  Richardson v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr., 345 N.C. 128,
134, 478 S.E.2d 501, 505 (1996) (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202, 216 (1982)).  The Equal Protection Clause necessarily
operates as a restraint on certain activities of the State that
either create classifications of persons or interfere with a
legally recognized right.  See White v. Pate, 308 N.C. 759, 766-
67, 304 S.E.2d 199, 204 (1983) (detailing the levels of scrutiny
applied in equal protection analysis depending upon the type of
classification or the right allegedly infringed).  This Court’s
analysis of the State Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause
generally follows the analysis of the Supreme Court of the United
States in interpreting the corresponding federal clause. 
“However, in the construction of the provision of the State
Constitution, the meaning given by the Supreme Court of the
United States to even an identical term in the Constitution of
the United States is, though highly persuasive, not binding upon
this Court.”  Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distribs. of N.
Wilkesboro, Inc., 285 N.C. 467, 474, 206 S.E.2d 141, 146 (1974)
(citing State v. Barnes, 264 N.C. 517, 520, 142 S.E.2d 344, 346
(1965)).
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The right to vote is one of the most cherished rights
in our system of government, enshrined in both our Federal and
State Constitutions.  See U.S. Const. amend. XV; N.C. Const. art.
I, §§ 9, 10, 11.  “No right is more precious in a free country
than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the
laws under which, as good citizens, we must live.”  Wesberry v.
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964).  The right to vote on equal terms
in representative elections--a one-person, one-vote standard--is
a fundamental right.   Northampton Cty. Drainage Dist. No. One v.
Bailey, 326 N.C. 742, 747, 392 S.E.2d 352, 356 (1990). 
Although federal courts have articulated that the “one-
person, one-vote” standard is inapplicable to state judicial
elections, there is considerable tension in the jurisprudence, as
clearly illustrated by Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991). 
Chisom first reaffirms that the one-person, one-vote
constitutional standard used in legislative and executive branch
elections does not apply to judicial elections.  Id. at 402
(“[W]e have held the one-person, one-vote rule inapplicable to
judicial elections . . . .” (citing Wells v. Edwards, 409 U.S.
1095 (1973))).  When the Supreme Court first held the rule
inapplicable, it summarily affirmed a district court decision
based on the rationale that “‘[j]udges do not represent people,
they serve people.’”  Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453, 455
(M.D. La. 1972) (quoting Buchanan v. Rhodes, 249 F. Supp. 860,
865 (N.D. Ohio), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 3 (1966), judgment
vacated per curiam, 400 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1968)), aff’d mem.,
409 U.S. 1095 (1973).  Yet, even in Chisom, the Supreme Court
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observed that judges were “representatives” for purposes of the
Federal Voting Rights Act.  501 U.S. at 401 (“[I]t seems both
reasonable and realistic to characterize the winners [of judicial
elections] as representatives of that [judicial] district.”). 
Moreover, in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, the Supreme
Court rejected the notion that elected members of the judiciary
are separate “from the enterprise of ‘representative
government.’”  536 U.S. 765, 784 (2002).  Thus, the Supreme Court
has indicated both that judges are representatives and that they
do not represent people.  
The presence of this seeming contradiction is not
surprising.  Judges are “often called upon to disregard, or even
to defy, popular sentiment,” creating a “fundamental tension
between the ideal character of the judicial office and the real
world of electoral politics.”  Chisom, 501 U.S. at 400.  That
fundamental tension is manifested in the dueling conclusions that
judges both are and are not representatives of the people.  We
agree with the Supreme Court that this tension “cannot be
resolved by crediting judges with total indifference to the
popular will while simultaneously requiring them to run for
elected office.”  Id. at 400-01.  Rather than wholly ignoring
that tension, this Court acknowledges it by holding that our
State’s Equal Protection Clause requires a heightened level of
scrutiny of judicial election districts.
At the same time, we readily recognize that many
important interests are relevant to the crafting of judicial
districts aside from mere population numbers.  For instance,
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“[c]onvenience is an essential factor in arranging an effective
judicial system, since it is often necessary for a judge to hear
emergency measures.”  Buchanan, 249 F. Supp. at 864.  The
importance of this interest is reflected by the language used in
our State Constitution requiring the legislature to divide the
State into a “convenient number” of judicial districts.  N.C.
Const. art. IV, § 9.  Further, there may be “diversity in [the]
type and number of cases . . . in various localities” and
“varying abilities of judges and prosecutors to dispatch the
business of the courts.”  Stokes v. Fortson, 234 F. Supp. 575,
577 (N.D. Ga. 1964).  The General Assembly has recognized the
importance of the convenience of the people when traveling to
county courthouses.  While superior court sessions are generally
held in the convenient, centralized location of the county seat,
the General Assembly has allowed sessions of superior court to be
held in larger cities that are not county seats.  See N.C.G.S. §
7A-42 (2007).  Because there are many important policy interests
to be weighed in addition to population, we agree with the
Supreme Court that strict scrutiny according to the one-person,
one-vote rule is inappropriate here.  See Chisom, 501 U.S. at
402-03.
We conclude that judicial elections have a component
that implicates the fundamental right to vote and a separate
component that is ordinarily the province of the legislature,
subject only to review for rationality by the courts.  The right
to vote on equal terms for representatives triggers heightened
scrutiny, see Stephenson, 355 N.C. at 377-78, 562 S.E.2d at 393,
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even as the nonrepresentative aspects inherent in the role of the
judiciary preclude strict scrutiny on a one-person, one-vote
standard.  Thus, neither rational basis nor strict scrutiny is an
appropriate standard of review.  Rather, we conclude the
applicable standard lies somewhere in between.  
Federal equal protection analysis provides us with
another framework under which plaintiffs’ claims should be
decided.  Federal courts have applied intermediate scrutiny in
cases involving semisuspect classes, such as distinctions based
upon gender, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (majority), 210-11
(Powell, J., concurring) (1976); undocumented alien children,
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223-24, 230; and nonmarital children, Clark
v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).  In Plyler, the Supreme Court
determined the constitutionality of a Texas statute and school
district policy that excluded funding for children who were not
“legally admitted” into the United States and also authorized
local school districts to deny enrollment of such students in the
public schools.  457 U.S. at 205.  The Court noted that illegal
immigrants are not a suspect class and public education is not a
fundamental right guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 
Id. at 223.  After asserting that public education is not a
“right,” the Court stated:  “But neither is it merely some
governmental ‘benefit’ indistinguishable from other forms of
social welfare legislation.”  Id. at 221.  Thus, considering the
importance of education and how the statute at issue “imposes a
lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable
for their disabling status,” id. at 223, the Court held that the
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statute “can hardly be considered rational unless it furthers
some substantial goal of the state,”  id. at 224.  
The dissenting opinion in Plyler recognized that the
Court had “patch[ed] together bits and pieces of what might be
termed [a] quasi-suspect-class and quasi-fundamental-rights
analysis.”  Id. at 244 (Berger, C.J., dissenting).  Other federal
courts have recognized that “quasi-fundamental rights” are
subject to a higher level of scrutiny than rational basis and a
lower level of scrutiny than strict scrutiny.  See United States
v. Harding, 971 F.2d 410, 412 n.1 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that
the Supreme Court in Plyler “recognized that infringements on
certain ‘quasi-fundamental’ rights, like access to public
education, also mandate a heightened level of scrutiny”), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 1070 (1993); Lowrie v. Goldenhersh, 716 F.2d
401, 411 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that intermediate level review
is “limited to cases involving quasi-fundamental rights or quasi-
suspect classes” (citing John E. Nowak, Realigning the Standards
of Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee--Prohibited,
Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 Geo. L.J. 1071, 1082
(1974))); Alma Soc’y Inc. v. Mellon, 601 F.2d 1225, 1234 n.18 (2d
Cir.) (noting that quasi-fundamental interests are subject to
intermediate scrutiny), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979); Sam v.
United States, 682 F.2d 925, 935 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (stating that
rational basis is the proper standard when neither fundamental
nor quasi-fundamental rights are at stake), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1146 (1983); Houk v. Furman, 613 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 n.3 (D.
Me. 1985) (stating that commentators have noted that the
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application of intermediate scrutiny is limited “to cases
involving ‘a quasi-fundamental right or an “almost” suspect
classification’” (quoting Martin H. Redish, Legislative Response
to the Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional
Implications, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 759, 773 (1977))); Felix v.
Milliken, 463 F. Supp. 1360, 1370 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (recognizing
that the Supreme Court in Craig v. Boren “arguably put
legislatures on notice that a substantially closer relationship
between the means chosen and the goals sought to be promoted by
virtue of those means would be required in the future, at least
where ‘quasi-suspect’ or ‘quasi-fundamental’ rights were
affected”); Frederick L. v. Thomas, 408 F. Supp. 832, 836 (E.D.
Pa. 1976) (recognizing that education is a “quasi-fundamental
interest”).     
The North Carolina Constitution calls for the election
of superior court judges and thus guarantees an individual right
of the people to vote in those elections.  N.C. Const. art. IV, §
9.  “[A] constitution cannot be in violation of itself, and []
all constitutional provisions must be read in pari materia[.]” 
Stephenson, 355 N.C. at 378, 562 S.E.2d at 394 (internal
citations omitted).  Thus, although North Carolina is under no
mandate to give its citizens the right to vote for superior court
judges, once it has done so in its constitution, that provision
must be construed in conjunction with the Equal Protection Clause
to prevent internal conflict.  See id.  Stated simply, once the
legal right to vote has been established, equal protection
requires that the right be administered equally.  See Barbier v.
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Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885) (stating that “equal protection
and security should be given to all under like circumstances in
the enjoyment of their personal and civil rights”).  The dual
nature of the nonrepresentative and representative aspects of
elected superior court judges and the tensions inherent in any
attempt to reconcile the right of the people to vote for superior
court judges, the right to equal protection, and the
legislature’s duty to draw convenient districts prevent us from
declaring the right asserted by plaintiffs to be fundamental and
entitled to strict scrutiny.  However, the right asserted by
plaintiffs is literally enshrined in the North Carolina
Constitution and, as such, is distinguishable from other
citizenship privileges that receive rational basis review.  See
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221, 230 (majority).  Accordingly, we hold
that the right to vote in superior court elections on
substantially equal terms is a quasi-fundamental right which is
subject to a heightened level of scrutiny.  
Federal jurisprudence offers an analogous situation in
the realm of free speech.  Individuals have challenged laws on
the theory that regulation of certain types of conduct
impermissibly restricts the First Amendment right to free speech. 
See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 370, 376-77
(1968) (upholding a statute banning destruction of selective
service cards when defendant asserted First Amendment right to
protest the draft by doing so).  Acts of symbolic speech, or
expressive conduct, combine speech and nonspeech elements in the
same course of conduct.  See id. at 376.  The restriction on
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speech implicates fundamental First Amendment rights, even though
regulation of nonspeech conduct is ordinarily subject only to
rational basis review.  
The Supreme Court held that when protected speech is
combined with generally unprotected conduct, “a sufficiently
important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment
freedoms.”  Id.  The Court then stated the level of scrutiny to
be applied:
[W]e think it clear that a government
regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the
Government; if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
391 U.S. at 377.  The Supreme Court has referred to this
formulation as intermediate scrutiny.  See Turner Broad. Sys.,
Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 185 (1997).  In Turner, the Supreme
Court, citing O’Brien, stated succinctly that an act reviewed
under intermediate scrutiny “will be sustained under the First
Amendment if it advances important governmental interests
unrelated to the suppression of free speech and does not burden
substantially more speech than necessary to further those
interests.”  Id. at 189 (citing O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).  
Expressive conduct, which combines elements of a
fundamental right with conduct generally subject to regulation
reviewed only for a rational basis, is analogous to judicial
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elections, in that such elections combine representative and
nonrepresentative aspects.  We therefore apply a similar standard
of intermediate scrutiny when considering equal protection
challenges to judicial districts.  Judicial districts will be
sustained if the legislature’s formulations advance important
governmental interests unrelated to vote dilution and do not
weaken voter strength substantially more than necessary to
further those interests.   
We have already noted several important governmental
interests, but decline to fashion an exhaustive list.  In
addition to compliance with federal voting rights laws, see
Chisom, 501 U.S. at 404, legitimate factors for the legislature’s
consideration include geography, population density, convenience,
number of citizens in the district eligible to be judges, and
number and types of legal proceedings in a given area.  On
remand, the parties are free to present other interests.  
 We emphasize that a plaintiff must make a prima facie
showing of considerable disparity between similarly situated
districts in order to trigger constitutional review.  In the
instant case, plaintiffs have demonstrated gross disparity in
voting power between similarly situated residents of Wake County. 
In Superior Court District 10A, the voters elect one judge for
every 32,199 residents, while the voters of the other districts
in Wake County, 10B, 10C, and 10D, elect one judge per every
140,747 residents, 158,812 residents, and 123,143 residents,
respectively.  Thus, residents of District 10A have a voting
power roughly five times greater than residents of District 10C,
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  This information is based on data contained in a document
1
in the record entitled “Plan Statistics—Plan: Superior Courts
2005.”  The document does not include population numbers from
District 12 or District 14.
four and a half times greater than residents of District 10B, and
four times greater than residents of District 10D.  No other
subdivided district in the State comes close to the degree of
disproportionality found in District 10.  Even comparing District
10A with dissimilar districts throughout the State, the voting
strength disparity between District 10A and the other
subdivisions of District 10 is unique.  According to documents
filed with this Court, District 10A has the lowest resident-to-
judge ratio of any district in the State, while District 10C has
the second highest resident-to-judge ratio.   No other districts
1
that divide a county have a voting strength disparity among the
districts remotely approaching the ratios found in District 10. 
In order to make a prima facie showing of significant voting
strength disparity, a plaintiff must demonstrate a disparity in
voting power closely approaching the gross disparity in District
10 as divided into its four election districts, a phenomenon not
currently present in any other judicial district in the State, as
evinced by the record before us.   
In sum, plaintiffs have made the required prima facie
showing, triggering the State’s duty to demonstrate significant
interests that justify the legislature’s subdivisions within
District 10 and to show that the disparity in voter strength is
not substantially greater than necessary to accommodate those
interests.  In the event the trial court finds a violation of
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 The affidavit also noted that not all of the approximately
2
250 page session law was included, but only those portions
relevant to the pending litigation.  
state equal protection law, it should defer initially to the
General Assembly for resolution.  See, e.g., Hoke Cty. Bd. of
Educ. v. State, 358 N.C. 605, 599 S.E.2d 365, 395 (2004)
(recognizing “our limitations in providing specific remedies for
[constitutional] violations committed by other government
branches in service to a subject matter . . . that is within
their primary domain”).
Accordingly, we remand this case to the Court of
Appeals for further remand to the trial court with orders to hold
a new hearing and determine whether the State can meet its burden
as set forth in this opinion.
Admission of the Reinhartsen Affidavit and Exhibits
[2] Defendants filed the affidavit of Paul Reinhartsen,
a Research Specialist for Legal Services for the Administrative
Office of the Courts, with the trial court in support of their
position.  This affidavit states that Reinhartsen “maintain[s]
and ha[s] access to previous submissions of the Administrative
Office of the Courts” to the United States Department of Justice
for preclearance under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 
Attached to Reinhartsen’s affidavit was what is described in the
affidavit as “a true and accurate copy of the preclearance
submission of 1993 Sess. Laws C. 321, §§ 200.4, 200.5 and 200.6,”
along with “related responses from the United States Department
of Justice.”2
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The Court of Appeals held that the exhibits attached to
Reinhartsen’s affidavit were admissible under Rule 803(8) of the
North Carolina Rules of Evidence, and we agree.  Rule 803(8)
provides:
Public Records and Reports.-- Records,
reports, statements, or data compilations, in
any form, of public offices or agencies,
setting forth (A) the activities of the
office or agency, or (B) matters observed
pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which
matters there was a duty to report,
excluding, however, in criminal cases matters
observed by police officers and other
law-enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil
actions and proceedings and against the State
in criminal cases, factual findings resulting
from an investigation made pursuant to
authority granted by law, unless the sources
of information or other circumstances
indicate lack of trustworthiness.
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 803(8) (2007).  It is undisputed that the
General Assembly has required the Administrative Office of the
Courts to submit to the Attorney General of the United States
“all acts of the General Assembly that amend, delete, add to,
modify or repeal any provision of Chapter 7A of the General
Statutes of North Carolina which constitutes a ‘change affecting
voting’ under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.”  Id. §
120-30.9C (2007).
Thus, the records kept by the Administrative Office of
the Courts concerning its submissions to the United States
Department of Justice clearly fall within the purview of Rule of
Evidence 803(8) as public records.  Accordingly, the records are
admissible insofar as they are relevant.  See id. § 8C-1, Rule
402 (2007) (“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by
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the Constitution of North Carolina, by Act of Congress, by Act of
the General Assembly or by these rules.”).
After concluding the affidavit and exhibits were
admissible under Rule 803(8), the Court of Appeals further
determined that the trial court erred by admitting Exhibit A to
the affidavit “on only a limited basis.”  Blankenship, 184 N.C.
App. at 334, 646 S.E.2d at 589.  On this point, we disagree
because the trial court transcript does not provide adequate
support for this determination.
The transcript reflects that plaintiffs moved the trial
court to strike the affidavit and attached exhibits on the
grounds that the documents were hearsay and many statements
contained in the exhibits were opinions expressed without the
declarant’s personal knowledge of matters underlying those
opinions.  Throughout the conversation with counsel for both
parties regarding the affidavit and attached exhibits, the trial
court indicated at least three times that it was admitting the
evidence.  On one of those occasions, the trial court stated: 
“I’m going to let it in, but I’m going to be very careful, and I
want both of you [(referring to counsel)] to make sure I base no
findings on anything contained in there that is hearsay or is
made without personal knowledge.” 
Notably, the trial court’s ultimate ruling was that the
evidence at issue was admitted.  In expressing caution over some
of the material, the trial court did not admit the evidence only
on a limited basis.  Rather, the trial court recognized nothing
more than what Rule 803(8) acknowledges already in its closing
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phrase--some “sources of information or other circumstances” may
“indicate [a] lack of trustworthiness” in certain public records
and reports.  N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 803(8) (2007); id. cmt.
(stating that “[t]he phrase ‘unless the sources of information or
other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness’ applies to
all three parts of the [Rule 803(8)] exception”).  Pursuant to
the last phrase of Rule 803(8), a trial court may decide in its
discretion to exclude a public record or report altogether for
“lack of trustworthiness.”  Instead, the trial court in the case
sub judice admitted the evidence at issue in its discretion and
then apparently made findings of fact based on what it considered
trustworthy information.  There is no inherent error in taking
that course of action.
Defendants seem to argue that Rule 803(8) required the
trial court to admit the evidence and that the admitted evidence
then inexorably compelled the trial court to make findings of
fact consistent with defendants’ interpretation of that evidence. 
 We disagree.  Defendants may attack the trial court’s findings
of fact as being unsupported by competent evidence or challenge
whether those factual findings in turn support the trial court’s
ultimate conclusions of law, see, e.g., State v. Williams, 362
N.C. 628, 632, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (citations omitted);
however, defendants’ insistence that the trial court improperly
admitted evidence only on a limited basis mischaracterizes the
transcript before us.
CONCLUSION
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Because the Equal Protection Clause of the North
Carolina Constitution requires intermediate scrutiny of districts
drawn for the election of superior court judges and because we
find that the trial court properly considered the evidence before
it, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand
the case to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the trial
court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON dissenting.
Because I conclude that the election of superior court
judges does not implicate the equal protection principle of “one
person, one vote,” I would hold that the judicial districting
plan for Wake County set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7A-41 does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the North Carolina
Constitution.  I therefore respectfully dissent.
It should first be noted “that ‘this Court gives acts
of the General Assembly great deference, and a statute will not
be declared unconstitutional under our Constitution unless the
Constitution clearly prohibits that statute.’”  Rhyne v. K-Mart
Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 167, 594 S.E.2d 1, 7 (2004) (quoting In re
Spivey, 345 N.C. 404, 413, 480 S.E.2d 693, 698 (1997)). 
“Accordingly, there is a strong presumption that the statute at
issue is constitutional.”  Id. at 168, 594 S.E.2d at 7 (citing
Stephenson v. Bartlett, 355 N.C. 354, 362, 562 S.E.2d 377, 384
(2002)); see also Pender County v. Bartlett, 361 N.C. 491, 497,
649 S.E.2d 364, 368 (2007) (“An act of the General Assembly is
-21-
accorded a ‘strong presumption of constitutionality’ and is
‘presumed valid unless it conflicts with the Constitution.’” 
(emphasis in original)(quoting Pope v. Easley, 354 N.C. 544, 546,
556 S.E.2d 265, 267 (2001) (per curiam))). 
The majority determines that the Equal Protection
Clause of the North Carolina Constitution requires population
proportionality in superior court districts.  I disagree on
several grounds.
First and foremost, superior court judges do not serve
in a representative capacity, and their election therefore does
not implicate the “one person, one vote” principle of equal
protection.  Population proportionality is important in
legislative elections as it allows all voters to “enjoy the same
representational influence or ‘clout.’”  Stephenson, 355 N.C. at
377, 562 S.E.2d at 393.  Legislators use their influence to
represent voters in a greater legislative body.  Accordingly,
voters from a district that elects three legislators have more
influence than voters in districts with only two representatives. 
But judges have no similar representational function.  Voters do
not elect a judge to “represent” them--that is, to serve as their
voice in government and advance their interests.  See, e.g., New
York State Ass’n of Trial Lawyers v. Rockefeller, 267 F. Supp.
148, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (“The state judiciary, unlike the
legislature, is not the organ responsible for achieving
representative government.”).  Rather, judges serve the public as
a whole.  See Holshouser v. Scott, 335 F. Supp. 928, 932
(M.D.N.C. 1971) (Judges “do not govern nor represent people nor
-22-
espouse the cause of a particular constituency.  They must decide
cases exclusively on the basis of law and justice and not upon
the popular view prevailing at the time.”), aff’d mem., 409 U.S.
807, 34 L. Ed. 2d 68 (1972).  The number of judges that voters
elect in a given district does not affect the voters’ political
influences in the state legislature or in the courtroom, nor is a
voter guaranteed of appearing before any particular judge.
Because judges serve the general public in a
nonrepresentative capacity, there is no unequal protection among
the voters of different districts that would trigger equal
protection concerns: 
“[T]he one man-one vote doctrine,
applicable as it now is to
selection of legislative and
executive officials, does not
extend to the judiciary.
Manifestly, judges and prosecutors
are not representatives in the same
sense as are legislators or the
executive.  Their function is to
administer the law, not to espouse
the cause of a particular
constituency.  Moreover there is no
way to harmonize selection of these
officials on a pure population
standard with the diversity in type
and number of cases which will
arise in various localities, or
with the varying abilities of
judges and prosecutors to dispatch
the business of the courts.  An
effort to apply a population
standard to the judiciary would, in
the end, fall of its own weight.”
Holshouser, 335 F. Supp. at 931 (quoting Stokes v. Fortson, 234
F. Supp. 575, 577 (N.D. Ga. 1964)).  
The second ground upon which I dissent is that the
plain language of our Constitution, which expressly provides for
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flexibility in fashioning judicial districts, supports the
judicial districting plan set forth in N.C.G.S. § 7A-41.  Article
IV, section 9 of the North Carolina Constitution provides:  “The
General Assembly shall, from time to time, divide the State into
a convenient number of Superior Court judicial districts and
shall provide for the election of one or more Superior Court
Judges for each district.”  N.C. Const. art. IV, § 9(1) (emphasis
added).  As this Court stated in State ex rel. Martin v. Preston,
325 N.C. 438, 460-61, 385 S.E.2d 473, 485 (1989): 
Our Constitution anticipates that
the needs of the state will change
over time.  It specifically
provides that “[t]he General
Assembly shall, from time to time,
divide the State into a convenient
number of Superior Court judicial
districts . . . .”  N.C. Const.
art. IV, § 9(1) (emphasis added). 
Contrary to the plaintiff’s
argument, there is no prohibition
in our Constitution against the
splitting of counties when creating
superior court districts.  Instead,
our Constitution only requires that
any division of the state into
judicial districts be “convenient.” 
In contrast to the flexibility granted under Article
IV, the language in our Constitution regarding the election of
representatives and senators is much more specific, see N.C.
Const. art. II, §§ 3 and 5.  Redistricting of legislative
elections occurs “at the first regular session convening after
the return of every decennial census of population taken by order
of Congress,” id., as opposed to the general guide of “from time
to time,” id. art. IV, § 9, for the election of superior court
judges.  The specificity with which the population
-24-
proportionality is required by our Constitution (“Each
[legislator] shall represent, as nearly as may be, an equal
number of inhabitants, the number of inhabitants that each
[legislator] represents being determined for this purpose by
dividing the population of the district that he represents by the
number of [legislators] apportioned to that district . . . .” id.
art. II, §§ 3(1) and 5(1) (emphasis added)) stands in sharp
contrast to the guidelines for creating a “convenient” number of
districts within the state for judicial elections.  Id. art. IV,
§ 9.
I must also note that the superior court division is a
single unified court, having statewide jurisdiction, see id. art.
IV, § 2, and that under our Constitution, rotation of superior
court judges among the districts “shall be observed.”  Id. art.
IV, § 11.  Thus, requiring proportional representation in this
case has the potential to affect other judicial districts in the
state.  See New York Ass’n of Trial Lawyers, 267 F. Supp. at 153
(“Nor can the direction that state legislative districts be
substantially equal in population be converted into a requirement
that a state distribute its judges on a per capita basis.”).
Finally, the majority’s determination that principles
of equal protection require population proportionality in
judicial districts is contrary to every other jurisdiction that
has considered this issue.
The numerous courts which have been
presented with judicial election
cases are in rare unanimity on this
point.  Judicial officers are not
subject to the one person-one vote
principle and therefore a state’s
-25-
choice regarding the method of
electing its judiciary is not
subject to an equal protection
challenge. 
In re Objections to Nomination Petition of Cavanaugh, 65 Pa.
Commw. 620, 638, 444 A.2d 1308, 1312 (1982); see also Holshouser,
335 F. Supp. at 930 (“We find no case where the Supreme Court, a
Circuit Court, or a District Court has applied the ‘one man, one
vote’ principle or rule to the judiciary.”).  The refusal of
every other jurisdiction to apply population proportionality to
judicial elections, including--as the majority acknowledges--the
United States Supreme Court, should be highly persuasive to this
Court.  See State v. Warren, 252 N.C. 690, 696, 114 S.E.2d 660,
666 (1960) (“We are not bound by the decisions of the Courts of
the other States, but should this Court hold the Act
unconstitutional, North Carolina would be the only State to
maintain this position.  Such overwhelming authority is highly
persuasive.”).  The majority offers little persuasive authority
to support or explain why this Court should deviate from the
reasoning of every other court in the country, particularly in
light of the express flexibility in fashioning judicial districts
granted under our Constitution.  Instead, the majority engineers
an imaginary “tension” and “contradiction” in the jurisprudence
in order to disavow the unanimous authority contrary to its
position.  See, e.g., In re Cavanaugh, 65 Pa. Commw. at 638, 444
A.2d at 1312 (noting the “rare unanimity” among the “numerous
courts which have been presented with judicial election cases”
and citing those cases).  The majority then selects from an
assortment of constitutional analyses to cobble together its own
-26-
novel approach to the issue of judicial districting.  Such
strained creativity by the majority is revealing.  Moreover, how
such an analysis is to be applied in future cases is unsettling. 
Given the lack of equal protection concern and the
well-established presumption in favor of the constitutionality of
legislative acts, I would hold that N.C.G.S. § 7A-41 does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause of the North Carolina
Constitution and would affirm the Court of Appeals.  As I
conclude the trial court erred in declaring N.C.G.S. § 7A-41
unconstitutional, I need not address whether the trial court
properly excluded evidence.  I respectfully dissent.
Chief Justice PARKER and Justice HUDSON join in this
dissenting opinion.