Case Title: State ex rel. Davis v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd.

Citation: 2006-Ohio-5339

Docket Number: 20052426

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-11-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Davis v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd., 111 Ohio St.3d 118, 2006-Ohio-
5339.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. DAVIS ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 
RETIREMENT BOARD ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Davis v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Bd., 
 111 Ohio St.3d 118, 2006-Ohio-5339.] 
Civil procedure — Class action — Civ.R. 23 — Trial court did not act 
unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably in denying motion for class 
certification. 
(No. 2005-2426 ─ Submitted July 18, 2006 ─ Decided November 1, 2006.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 04AP-1293, 2005-Ohio-6612. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment denying a motion for class 
certification in a mandamus case.1 
Historical Background 
{¶ 2} In 1976, the General Assembly enacted R.C. Chapter 120, the 
Public Defenders Act, which established the Ohio Public Defender Commission 
and authorized counties to create county and joint-county public-defender 
commissions.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 164, 136 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1868.  Pursuant to 
these provisions, appellee Franklin County Board of Commissioners established 
appellee Franklin County Public Defender Commission to provide legal 
representation to indigent persons as required by law, and the commission 
appointed the Franklin County Public Defender. 
                                                 
1.   Unless otherwise noted, these preliminary facts are taken from State ex rel. Van Dyke v. Pub. 
Emps. Retirement Bd., 99 Ohio St.3d 430, 2003-Ohio-4123, 793 N.E.2d 438. 
 
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{¶ 3} The public defender then hired attorneys and support personnel to 
form the Franklin County Public Defender’s Office (“FCPDO”).  The FCPDO 
operated as if it were a private, unincorporated association, and both FCPDO and 
its employees paid Social Security taxes on their wages. 
{¶ 4} In 1984, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 120.14(F), which 
authorized county and joint-county public-defender commissions to contract with 
nonprofit organizations to provide representation to indigent criminal defendants.  
Am.Sub.S.B.No. 271, 140 Ohio Laws, Part I, 949, 956-957.  The Franklin County 
Public Defender Commission then contracted with the Franklin County Board of 
Commissioners and the city of Columbus to provide legal representation for 
indigent criminal defendants in Franklin County, and the commission 
subcontracted with the newly incorporated FCPDO to provide these services. 
{¶ 5} In June 1998, we granted a writ of mandamus ordering appellee 
Public Employees Retirement Board (“PERB”) to credit a former FCPDO 
employee for her years of service as an attorney and law clerk with FCPDO from 
1978 to 1980 and from 1982 to 1994.  State ex rel. Mallory v. Pub. Emps. 
Retirement Bd. (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 235, 694 N.E.2d 1356.  We held that pre-
1984 FCPDO attorneys were public employees during their employment with 
FCPDO and that after the 1984 enactment of R.C. 120.14(F) and the 
incorporation of FCPDO as a nonprofit organization, FCPDO attorneys who 
continued to represent indigent criminal defendants were entitled to continuing 
service credit with the Public Employees Retirement System (“PERS”) under 
R.C. 145.01(A)(2).  Id. at 241, 245, 694 N.E.2d 1356. 
{¶ 6} Effective January 1, 1999, appellee Franklin County Public 
Defender replaced the FCPDO, and its employees were treated as public 
employees subject to PERS. 
{¶ 7} In August 2003, we held that a former FCPDO attorney was not 
entitled to PERS service credit when she was rehired by FCPDO after its 1984 
January Term, 2006 
3 
incorporation as a nonprofit corporation.  Van Dyke, 99 Ohio St.3d 430, 2003-
Ohio-4123, 793 N.E.2d 438.  We concluded that when the attorney “was 
reemployed by FCPDO in April 1986, she was not ‘continuing’ her employment 
with a private contractor that was taking over a previously publicly operated 
function.  Instead, in April 1986, she was beginning a term of employment with a 
private contractor that years before had taken over the publicly operated 
function.”  Id. at ¶ 29. 
Administrative Proceedings 
{¶ 8} In 2001, appellants, 12 present and former Franklin County 
Assistant Public Defenders and support personnel, and 39 other FCPDO attorneys 
and support staff employed from January 1, 1985, through December 31, 1998, 
requested a determination from PERS that they were public employees eligible 
for PERS membership and service credit during the specified period.  In 
September 2003, PERS staff determined that based on this court’s decision in Van 
Dyke, 99 Ohio St.3d 430, 2003-Ohio-4123, 793 N.E.2d 438, the 51 claimants 
were working for a private, nonprofit corporation from January 1, 1985, through 
December 31, 1998, rather than a public employer during the pertinent period and 
that they were thus not entitled to PERS service credit. 
{¶ 9} The 51 claimants appealed the PERS staff determination.  On 
August 25, 2004, after an administrative hearing, PERB accepted a report and 
recommendation that had affirmed the staff decision.  PERB concluded that 
FCPDO had acted as a private contractor rather than as a public employer from 
January 1, 1985, through December 31, 1998, and thus denied claimants’ request 
for PERS service credit for that time period. 
{¶ 10} On December 3, 2004, appellants filed a complaint in the Court of 
Appeals for Franklin County for a writ of mandamus to compel appellee PERB to 
vacate its August 25, 2004 determination and to retroactively credit appellants’ 
and the proposed class members’ accounts with all appropriate years of service 
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for PERS and to compel appellees Franklin County Board of Commissioners, 
Franklin County Public Defender Commission, Franklin County and Columbus 
Public Defender Yeura Venters, and the Franklin County Public Defender to remit 
employer and employee contributions to PERB for the years appellants and the 
class members served as eligible employees but were wrongfully excluded from 
participation in PERS. 
{¶ 11} On May 2, 2005, appellants filed a motion to certify their 
mandamus case as a class action.  Appellants described the proposed class as “all 
persons who were hired as Assistant Franklin County Public Defenders and all 
personnel necessary to support them and the Franklin County Public Defender 
between January 1, 1985 and December 31, 1998,” excluding appellees Franklin 
County Public Defender and Columbus Public Defender.  Appellants claimed that 
the class action met the requirements of either Civ.R. 23(B)(1)(a), (1)(b), and/or 
(3).  Appellees filed memoranda in opposition to appellants’ motion for class 
certification. 
{¶ 12} On July 8, 2005, a court of appeals magistrate recommended that 
appellants’ motion for class certification be denied.  The magistrate concluded 
that appellants had failed to meet the Civ.R. 23(A)(1) numerosity prerequisite 
because joinder of the 39 other potential claimants who had participated with the 
12 appellants in the administrative proceedings before PERB was not 
impracticable and any other potential class members had not exhausted their 
administrative remedies.  Civ.R. 23(A)(1) requires that the class be “so numerous 
that joinder of all members is impracticable.”  The magistrate declined to address 
whether appellants could meet one of the Civ.R. 23(B) requirements. 
{¶ 13} Appellants filed objections to the magistrate’s decision, and on 
December 15, 2005, the court of appeals overruled appellants’ objections and 
adopted the magistrate’s decision, with the exception of the analysis regarding 
numerosity.  The court of appeals instead relied on precedent to hold that a class 
January Term, 2006 
5 
action was not appropriate because “a determination in favor of [appellants] 
would automatically accrue to the benefit of others similarly situated” without the 
unnecessary step of certifying a class. 
{¶ 14} This cause is now before the court upon appellants’ appeal as of 
right from the judgment denying their motion for class certification. 
Oral Argument 
{¶ 15} Appellants request oral argument.  Oral argument is not required in 
this appeal.  S.Ct.Prac.R. IX(1).  Nevertheless, we have discretion to grant oral 
argument pursuant to S.Ct.Prac.R. IX(2)(A), and in exercising this discretion, we 
consider whether the case involves a matter of great public importance, complex 
issues of law or fact, a substantial constitutional issue, or a conflict among courts 
of appeals.  See, e.g., State ex rel. United Auto., Aerospace & Agricultural 
Implement Workers of Am. v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp., 108 Ohio St.3d 432, 
2006-Ohio-1327, 844 N.E.2d 335, ¶ 25-26. 
{¶ 16} Appellants request oral argument because they believe that the 
case presents a “significant public policy question” as well as complex facts.  The 
parties’ briefs, however, are sufficient to resolve the issues raised, and this case 
does not involve a substantial constitutional issue, conflict among courts of 
appeals, or complex factual issues.  State ex rel. Physicians Commt. for 
Responsible Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 108 Ohio St.3d 288, 
2006-Ohio-903, 843 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 5.  Therefore, we deny appellants’ request and 
proceed to consider the merits. 
Class Actions:  Standard of Review 
{¶ 17} Appellants assert that this court’s review of the court of appeals’ 
decision denying the motion for class certification is plenary.  Appellants are 
mistaken. 
{¶ 18} We have consistently held that a “trial judge has broad discretion 
in determining whether a class action may be maintained and that determination 
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will not be disturbed absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.”  Marks v. C.P. 
Chem. Co. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 200, 31 OBR 398, 509 N.E.2d 1249, syllabus; 
see, also, Howland v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 104 Ohio St.3d 584, 2004-Ohio-6552, 
821 N.E.2d 141, ¶ 17.  In rejecting a de novo standard of review urged in an 
appeal from a decision based only on a written record that denied class 
certification, we noted that “appellate courts overwhelmingly, if not universally, 
give trial courts broad discretion in deciding whether to certify a class” and that 
“the appropriateness of applying the abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing 
class action determinations is grounded not in credibility assessment, but in the 
trial court’s special expertise and familiarity with case-management problems and 
its inherent power to manage its own docket.”  Hamilton v. Ohio Sav. Bank 
(1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 67, 70, 694 N.E.2d 442; see, also, Baughman v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (2000), 88 Ohio St.3d 480, 483, 727 N.E.2d 1265. 
{¶ 19} Therefore, “while a trial court’s determination concerning class 
certification is subject to appellate review on an abuse-of-discretion standard, due 
deference must be given to the trial court’s decision” and any “finding of abuse of 
discretion, particularly if the trial court has refused to certify, should be made 
cautiously.”  Marks, 31 Ohio St.3d at 201, 31 OBR 398, 509 N.E.2d 1249.  A 
finding of an abuse of discretion requires “a finding that the trial court’s decision 
was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.”  Wilson v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 
103 Ohio St.3d 538, 2004-Ohio-5847, 817 N.E.2d 59, ¶ 30. 
Civ.R. 23 Requirements in General 
{¶ 20} With the foregoing abuse-of-discretion standard guiding our 
review of the court of appeals’ decision, we also recognize that “the trial court’s 
discretion in deciding whether to certify a class action is not unlimited, and indeed 
is bounded by and must be exercised within the framework of Civ.R. 23.  The trial 
court is required to carefully apply the class action requirements and conduct a 
January Term, 2006 
7 
rigorous analysis into whether the prerequisites of Civ.R. 23 have been satisfied.”  
Hamilton, 82 Ohio St.3d at 70, 694 N.E.2d 442. 
{¶ 21} The parties seeking class certification must establish the following 
seven requirements before an action may be maintained as a class action under 
Civ.R. 23:  “(1) an identifiable class must exist and the definition of the class 
must be unambiguous; (2) the named representatives must be members of the 
class; (3) the class must be so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable; (4) there must be questions of law or fact common to the class; (5) 
the claims or defenses of the representative parties must be typical of the claims 
or defenses of the class; (6)   the representative parties must fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class; and (7) one of the three Civ.R. 23(B) 
requirements must be met.”  Id. at 71, 694 N.E.2d 442; see, also, Howland, 104 
Ohio St.3d 584, 2004-Ohio-6552, 821 N.E.2d 141, ¶ 19 (in addition to the six 
threshold requirements, parties seeking class certification must show that the 
action can be maintained under Civ.R. 23(B)). 
Court of Appeals’ Rationale 
{¶ 22} In analyzing appellants’ motion for class certification, the court of 
appeals relied on precedent to deny the motion because “a determination in favor 
of [appellants] would automatically accrue to the benefit of others similarly 
situated.”  2005-Ohio-6612, ¶ 16-18. 
{¶ 23} In State ex rel. Horvath v. State Teachers Retirement Bd. (Mar. 31, 
1995), Franklin App. No. 94APE07-988, the Court of Appeals for Franklin 
County held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for 
class certification of an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief that 
challenged the constitutionality of a statute, because a decision as to 
constitutionality would provide the same relief to the relator and to the proposed 
class. 
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{¶ 24} In Smith v. State Teachers Retirement Bd. (Feb. 5, 1998), Franklin 
App. No. 97APE07-943, the court of appeals relied on Horvath to affirm a trial 
court’s denial of class certification in an action for declaratory judgment and 
injunctive relief that challenged the retirement board’s formula for calculating 
monthly retirement benefits.  The court reasoned that a class certification was not 
necessary because the action could be certified to the Ohio Supreme Court if 
different courts reached different conclusions.  The court also found that after all 
the appeals had been exhausted, the decision of the highest prevailing court would 
be implemented consistently with regard to all the members and beneficiaries of 
the proposed class. 
{¶ 25} Finally, in Frisch’s Restaurant, Inc. v. Conrad, Franklin App. No. 
05AP-412, 2005-Ohio-5426, the court of appeals relied on Horvath and Smith in 
an action by employers who had participated in a retrospectively rated workers’ 
compensation program to recover dividend credits on premiums that they had 
paid.  The court of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying class certification, because a decision in the case “would automatically 
benefit any organization in the same position” as the named parties.  Id. at ¶ 26. 
{¶ 26} Appellants assert that the court of appeals erred in relying on 
Horvath, Smith, and Frisch’s to deny their motion for class certification, because 
those opinions hinged on a requirement not specified in Civ.R. 23.  In resolving 
appellants’ claim, it is significant that appellants have sought class certification 
only under Civ.R. 23(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(b), or (B)(3).  Appellees counter that none 
of these subsections apply. 
Civ.R. 23(B)(3) 
{¶ 27} In order to certify a class under Civ.R. 23(B)(3), the following 
findings must be made by the trial court.  “First, it must find that questions of law 
or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members; and second, the court must find that a class 
January Term, 2006 
9 
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication 
of the controversy.”  In re Consol. Mtge. Satisfaction Cases, 97 Ohio St.3d 465, 
2002-Ohio-6720, 780 N.E.2d 556, ¶ 7. 
{¶ 28} “For common questions of law or fact to predominate, it is not 
sufficient that such questions merely exist; rather, they must present a significant 
aspect of the case.  Furthermore, they must be capable of resolution for all 
members in a single adjudication.”  Marks, 31 Ohio St.3d at 204, 31 OBR 398, 
509 N.E.2d 1249.  “And, in determining whether a class action is a superior 
method of adjudication, the court must make a comparative evaluation of the 
other procedures available to determine whether a class action is sufficiently 
effective to justify the expenditure of judicial time and energy involved therein.”  
Schmidt v. Avco Corp. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 310, 313, 15 OBR 439, 473 N.E.2d 
822.  Civ.R. 23(B)(3) lists the matters pertinent to the finding that questions of 
law or fact common to the class members predominate over questions that affect 
only individual members:  “(a) the interest of members of the class in individually 
controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (b) the extent and 
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or 
against members of the class; (c) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating 
the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (d) the difficulties likely to be 
encountered in the management of a class action.”  The list in the rule is not 
exhaustive, so other pertinent factors may be considered.  7AA Wright, Miller & 
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure (3d Ed.2005) 118, Section 1777 (“this list is 
not meant to be exhaustive and the court has discretion to consider whatever other 
factors it deems relevant to the determination”), and Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor (1997), 521 U.S. 591, 615, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689 
(Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3) “includes a nonexhaustive list of factors pertinent to a 
court’s ‘close look’ at the predominance and superiority criteria” for class 
certification).  Civ.R. 23(A) and (B) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a) and (b), the federal 
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rule governing class actions, are identical.  Under Marks v. C.P. Chem. Co., Inc., 
31 Ohio St.3d at 200, 201, 31 OBR 398, 509 N.E.2d 1249, “federal authority is an 
appropriate aid to interpretation of the Ohio rule.”  This court has also recognized 
that some pertinent requirements in a class-certification determination are not 
expressly set forth in the text of the rule.  Howland, 104 Ohio St.3d 584, 2004-
Ohio-6552, 821 N.E.2d 141, ¶ 18. 
{¶ 29} In State v. Buckley Powder Co. (Colo.1997), 945 P.2d 841, the 
Colorado Supreme Court held that consideration of the need for a class action was 
appropriate in determining whether to certify a class pursuant to Colo.R.Civ.P. 
23(b)(3), Colorado’s version of Civ.R. 23(B)(3): 
{¶ 30} “Turning to the issue of class certification under [Colo.R.Civ.P.] 
23(b)(3) the trial court has broad discretion under that rule to determine whether 
certification of a class is the superior means to adjudicate the case.  Need is one of 
many factors which the trial court may consider in making that decision.”  
Buckley Powder Co., 945 P.2d at 845. 
{¶ 31} Similarly, in Wilcox v. Commerce Bank of Kansas City (C.A.10, 
1973), 474 F.2d 336, 346, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit rejected a contention that a court determining whether to certify a class 
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3) could not consider whether there was a need for 
a class action: 
{¶ 32} “Appellants have cited Fujishima v. Board of Education, 460 F.2d 
1355 (7th Cir.1972), in support of their contention that the court may not deny 
class status because there is no ‘need’ for it if the prerequisites and conditions of 
the Federal Rules are met.  The interpretation of that case, which involved 
subdivision (b)(2) of the Rule, is an oversimplification as applied to (b)(3) cases 
such as this.  Within the criteria of the Rule, the ‘need’ for class action treatment 
in a sense may be considered a vital, if not determinative, consideration as need 
inevitably relates to the problems of superiority, fairness and efficiency.  These 
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latter considerations may not be applied mechanically without a consideration of 
relative needs or necessities.” 
{¶ 33} Therefore, in applying Civ.R. 23(B)(3), the court of appeals did not 
abuse its discretion in considering the need, or whether appellants’ action would 
accomplish the same result without the additional burden and expense of a class 
action, even though necessity is not specifically listed as a factor in the rule.  See, 
generally, 7AA Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, at 370-
372, Section 1785 (“The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to 
certify a class action and its decision will be reversed only if an abuse of 
discretion is shown.  This discretion includes the power of the court to take 
account of considerations not expressly dealt with in the rule in reaching a 
certification decision.”)  (Footnotes omitted).  Need is a relevant factor to 
determine whether the class action is “superior to other available methods for the 
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy,” as required for certification 
pursuant to Civ.R. 23(B)(3). 
{¶ 34} Moreover, the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion when 
determining that class certification is unnecessary for appellants’ mandamus 
claim by relying on PERB’s representations that it will comply with any judgment 
regarding the public-employment status of the employees in the proposed class.  
See, e.g., 2 Conte and Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions (4th Ed.2002) 135, 
Section 4:19 (courts have denied class certification when a defendant had agreed 
to apply the judgment to all class members, or had given assurance that it would 
comply with a judgment for injunctive relief, or had already taken corrective 
measures after the institution of the action); see, also, Galvan v. Levine (C.A.2, 
1973), 490 F.2d 1255, 1261 (affirming denial of class-certification in a 
government-benefits case when the state made clear that it understood that the 
judgment would apply to all claimants); Ruhe v. Block (E.D.Va.1981), 507 
F.Supp. 1290, 1295 (denying class certification when it was the defendants’ 
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position that relief would be applied by them to any eligible persons in the 
proposed class if final declaratory and injunctive relief were to be entered against 
them); Ruiz v. Blum (S.D.N.Y.1982), 549 F.Supp. 871, 878 (denying class 
certification because the court assumed that the defendants, as government 
officials, would respect its judgment, and there was no indication that the decree 
entered in plaintiffs’ favor would not be honored by the defendants as to those 
similarly situated). 
{¶ 35} PERB has consistently represented that it and PERS must and will 
uniformly apply any ultimate court ruling to all PERS members, including those 
who are not parties to this action.  As PERB acknowledges, various statutes 
require this uniform application.  See R.C. 145.01(A)(3), 145.03(A), and 145.483. 
{¶ 36} In fact, PERB and PERS previously applied the court’s ruling in 
Mallory, 82 Ohio St.3d 235, 694 N.E.2d 1356, to all employees of FCPDO by 
crediting them with years of service in accordance with R.C. 145.01(A)(2) even 
though Mallory was a mandamus case that was not brought as a class action.  See 
Van Dyke, 99 Ohio St.3d 430, 2003-Ohio-4123, 793 N.E.2d 438, ¶ 10.  There is 
no indication that PERB and PERS would not similarly comply with an adverse 
court of appeals judgment in appellants’ mandamus action. 
{¶ 37} Appellants contend that the court of appeals’ rationale justifies a 
class action based upon the predominance requirement in Civ.R. 23(B)(3).  But 
this contention in effect concedes that appellants did not establish the superiority 
requirement of Civ.R. 23(B)(3).  Ultimately, appellants admitted just that in their 
reply brief filed in this court. 
{¶ 38} Therefore, the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in 
denying appellants’ motion for certification of a class pursuant to Civ.R. 23(B)(3).  
The court reasonably concluded that because a ruling in the mandamus case 
would be uniformly applied by appellees to similarly situated persons, a class 
action would not be a superior method for adjudicating the controversy. 
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The Need Requirement in General 
{¶ 39} There is much conflict regarding the propriety of a need 
requirement in the context of determining whether to certify a class action.  That 
conflict, however, is generally confined to motions to certify based upon Civ.R. 
23(B)(2), which permits a class action if the requirements of Civ.R. 23(A) are met 
and “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally 
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or 
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole.”  See 2 
Conte and Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions, at 133, Section 4:19 (“Several 
courts have considered the need for a class action in determining whether to 
certify a [Fed.R.Civ.P.] 23(b)(2) class seeking declaratory or injunctive relief.  
While this factor, which lies outside the scope of Rule 23, and 23(b)(2) in 
particular, is frequently raised by the defendant in opposition to the class, several 
courts have invoked this consideration on a sua sponte basis, usually as a prelude 
to class denial”); 7AA Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, at 
428, Section 1785.2 (“One common non-rule factor that courts have considered in 
actions brought under [Fed.R.Civ.P.] 23(b)(2) for injunctive or declaratory relief 
is whether there is a need for class relief”). 
{¶ 40} The use of this factor in Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2) class determinations 
has been criticized.  See, e.g., 2 Conte and Newberg, Newberg on Class Actions, 
at 144, Section 4:19 (“a need requirement finds no support in [Fed.R.Civ.P.] 23 
and, if applied, would entirely negate any proper class certifications under 
[Fed.R.Civ.P.] 23(b), a result hardly intended by the Rules Advisory 
Committee”). 
{¶ 41} Nevertheless, this does not establish that the court of appeals 
abused its discretion in denying class certification of appellants’ mandamus 
action.  Appellants never sought certification under Civ.R. 23(B)(2).  In addition, 
although some courts have rejected the use of a need requirement in actions 
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brought under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(B)(2), see, e.g., Brown v. Scott (C.A.7, 1979), 602 
F.2d 791, “the vast majority of courts have not felt so constrained, and the need 
requirement now seems well-accepted as an appropriate consideration when 
certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) action.”  7AA Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice 
and Procedure, at 429, Section 1785.2.  The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit has followed this majority view.  Craft v. Memphis Light, Gas & 
Water Div. (C.A.6, 1976), 534 F.2d 684, 686.  In this regard, appellants’ 
contention that the Court of Appeals for Franklin County is the only court that 
applies a need requirement in determining whether to certify a class is manifestly 
erroneous.  See 7AA Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, at 
429, Section 1785.2; Craft, 534 F.2d at 686; Gottlieb v. S. Euclid, 157 Ohio 
App.3d 250, 2004-Ohio-2705, 810 N.E.2d 970, ¶ 33; Krawczyk v. Wharram (July 
14, 1989), Lucas App. No. L-88-243. 
 
{¶ 42} The application of a need requirement by the court of appeals in 
determining appellants’ motion for class certification advances the purpose of a 
class action, which is “to simplify the resolution of complex litigation, not 
complicate it.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Warner, 36 Ohio St.3d at 97, 521 N.E.2d 1091.  
In a comparable situation, we held that a state entity did not err in refusing to treat 
a ratepayer’s complaint as a class action when the entity “would have been 
obligated to adjust rates for the remaining ratepayers, accomplishing the same 
purpose as a class action” if the complainant ratepayer prevailed.  Weiss v. Pub. 
Util. Comm. (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 15, 19, 734 N.E.2d 775. 
Civ.R. 23(B)(1) 
{¶ 43} Appellants also sought certification of a class for their mandamus 
action pursuant to Civ.R. 23(B)(1), which provides that an action may be 
maintained as a class action if the requirements of Civ.R. 23(A) are established 
and: 
January Term, 2006 
15 
{¶ 44} “(1) [T]he prosecution of separate actions by or against individual 
members of the class would create a risk of 
{¶ 45} “(a) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual 
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct 
for the party opposing the class; or 
{¶ 46} “(b) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class 
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other 
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their 
ability to protect their interests.” 
{¶ 47} “Civ.R. 23(B)(1)(a) will permit class certification if separate 
actions would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to 
individual members of the class that would establish incompatible standards of 
conduct for the party opposing the class.”  Warner v. Waste Mgt., Inc. (1988), 36 
Ohio St.3d 91, 95, 521 N.E.2d 1091.  In order to fall within Civ.R. 23(B)(1)(a), 
there “must be a risk that separate actions will in fact be brought if a class action 
is not permitted” and that “allowing the members to proceed on their own will 
expose the party [opposing the class certification] to a serious risk of being put 
into a ‘conflicted position.’ ”  (Emphasis added.)  7AA Wright, Miller & Kane, 
Federal Practice and Procedure, at 11, 13, Section 1773 (construing Fed.R.Civ.P. 
23(b)(1)(A)). 
{¶ 48} Here, however, because of appellees’ assurance that they will 
comply with any final ruling, it is unlikely that they have a serious risk of being 
subjected to incompatible standards of conduct.  See, e.g., Horvath, Franklin App. 
No. 94APE07-988, citing Doe v. Commonwealth’s Atty. for City of Richmond 
(E.D.Va.1975), 403 F.Supp. 1199 (concluding, in denying a motion to certify a 
class pursuant to Civ.R. 23(B)(1)(a), that “after all appeals have been exhausted, 
the [State Teachers Retirement System] will implement the decision of the highest 
prevailing court consistently to all STRS members and beneficiaries”).  Therefore, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
the court of appeals did not abuse its discretion in denying certification pursuant 
to Civ.R. 23(B)(1)(a). 
{¶ 49} “Subsection (B)(1)(b) [of Civ.R. 23] will permit certification if 
separate actions would create a risk of adjudications that would as a practical 
matter be dispositive of the claims of non-parties or substantially impair or 
impede their ability to protect their interests.”  Warner, 36 Ohio St.3d at 95, 521 
N.E.2d 1091.  “The most common example of the type of action to which Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) is applicable is one in which the class members have claims against a 
fund that may prove insufficient to satisfy all of them.”  7AA Wright, Miller & 
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, at 30, Section 1774; see, e.g., Warner, 36 
Ohio St.3d at 95, 521 N.E.2d 1091; Gottlieb, 157 Ohio App.3d 250, 2004-Ohio-
2705, 810 N.E.2d 970, ¶ 40 (Civ.R.23(B)(1)(b) “applies where only a limited 
amount of money is available and there is a risk that separate actions would 
deplete the fund before all deserving parties could make a claim”). 
{¶ 50} This case, however, does not involve a limited fund ─ a ruling in 
favor of appellants on their mandamus claim will not limit the recoveries of 
nonparty individuals who are similarly situated.  And “[n]either the stare decisis 
consequences of an individual action nor the possibility of false reliance upon the 
improper initiation of a class action can supply either the practical disposition of 
the rights of the class, or the substantial impairments of those rights, at least one 
of which is required by [Fed.R.Civ.P.] 23(b)(1)(B).”  La Mar v. H & B Novelty & 
Loan Co. (C.A.9, 1973), 489 F.2d 461, 465.  In fact, “class-wide accrual of 
benefits is characteristic of virtually all class action lawsuits and cannot be 
sufficient to warrant certification under sub-section (b)(1)(B).”  Daly v. Harris 
(D.Hawaii 2002), 209 F.R.D. 180, 192.  Appellants’ argument to the contrary 
would “enable any action, with the possibility that it might be one of multiple 
actions, to be certified pursuant to” Civ.R. 23(B)(1)(b).  In re Dennis Greenman 
Secs. Litigation (C.A.11, 1987), 829 F.2d 1539, 1546.  This unreasonable result 
January Term, 2006 
17 
could not have been intended by the drafters of the rule.  Therefore, the court of 
appeals did not err in denying certification under Civ.R. 23(B)(1)(b). 
Conclusion 
{¶ 51} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals did not act in an 
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable manner in denying appellants’ motion 
for class certification.  The court of appeals did not abuse its discretion by 
determining that appellants had not established that a class action was warranted 
under Civ.R. 23(B)(1)(a), (B)(1)(b), or (B)(3).  Accordingly, we affirm the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Buckley King, L.P.A., James E. Melle and John Hallbauer, for appellants. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General; Jones Day, Michael R. Gladman and Kerstin 
Sjoberg-Witt, for appellee Public Employees Retirement Board. 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Nick Soulas, 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney; and Adams, Babner & Rasmussen, L.L.C., and 
Teri G. Rasmussen, for appellees Franklin County Board of County 
Commissioners, Franklin County Public Defender Commission, Franklin County 
Public Defender, and Yeura Venters. 
 
Scheuer, Mackin & Breslin, L.L.C., and Robert S. Corker; and Strauss & 
Troy, Richard S. Wayne, and John M. Levy, urging reversal for amici curiae, 
Frisch’s Restaurants, Inc., United Dairy Farmers, Inc., J.W. Harris Co., Inc., and 
Peck, Hannaford & Briggs. 
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