Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Taylor

Citation: 2024-Ohio-1082

Docket Number: 2023-0743

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2024-03-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Taylor, Slip Opinion No. 2024-Ohio-1082.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2024-OHIO-1082 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. TAYLOR. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Taylor, Slip Opinion No.  
2024-Ohio-1082.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) for failing to provide 
truthful answers to questions on license application—Conditionally stayed 
six-month suspension. 
(No. 2023-0743—Submitted July 18, 2023—Decided March 27, 2024.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2022-048. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, John Taylor, of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney Registration 
No. 0065693, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1995 under his birth 
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name, Dean Maynard Boland.  Through the Cuyahoga County Probate Court, he 
legally changed his name to Jack Boland in 2016 and to John Taylor in 2019.1 
{¶ 2} In a December 2022 complaint, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged 
Taylor with a single count of professional misconduct based on his failure to give 
truthful answers to questions on an application he submitted to the State Medical 
Board of Ohio to obtain a physician-assistant license regarding his identity, whether 
he had had allegations made against him or investigations concerning him, and 
whether he had had lawsuits filed against him.  The parties jointly submitted 
stipulations of fact and misconduct along with 67 stipulated exhibits. 
{¶ 3} Taylor testified at a hearing before a three-member panel of the Board 
of Professional Conduct.  The panel issued a report in which it made findings of 
fact, misconduct, and aggravating and mitigating factors and recommended that we 
impose a fully stayed six-month suspension for Taylor’s misconduct.  The board 
adopted the panel’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended 
sanction.  No objections have been filed. 
{¶ 4} We adopt the board’s findings of misconduct and recommended 
sanction. 
BACKGROUND 
{¶ 5} In April 2004, respondent testified as an expert witness on behalf of a 
defendant who was charged with knowingly possessing or attempting to possess 
computer images containing sexually explicit depictions of minors.  United States 
v. Shreck, N.D. Oklahoma No. 03-CR-0043-CVE, 2006 WL 7067888 (May 23, 
2006).  In a motion for an evidentiary hearing in that matter, the defendant asserted 
that his expert witness, Taylor, would testify that “it is now impossible for any 
individual to know from a mere viewing of digital images on a computer whether 
 
1. During his disciplinary hearing, Taylor testified that the name changes were precipitated by acts 
of domestic violence committed against him by a former spouse.  For ease of discussion, we refer 
to respondent as Taylor throughout this opinion, though the actions described may have been taken 
under one of his prior names. 
January Term, 2024 
 
3 
or not those images portray actual children.”  During his testimony in that case, 
Taylor presented innocent images of several children that he had obtained from the 
Internet and altered to depict the children engaging in sexually explicit conduct with 
adults.  At the conclusion of that hearing, the court directed that the exhibits “be 
purged from [Taylor’s] hard drive” once they had been preserved for the court’s 
record.  The parties have stipulated that Taylor deleted the images from his 
computer and that he then mailed the computer’s hard drive from Oklahoma to 
Ohio. 
{¶ 6} In May 2004, the Cleveland office of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (“FBI”) began investigating Taylor’s conduct related to the sexually 
explicit images he had created.  The FBI obtained a search warrant for Taylor’s 
home and seized devices containing several electronic files.  On April 5, 2007, 
Taylor executed a pretrial diversion agreement with the United States Attorney’s 
Office, under which the office agreed to forego criminal prosecution of Taylor for 
“knowingly possess[ing] a computer * * * that contained images of child 
pornography, * * * [which] was produced using materials that had been shipped 
and transported in interstate and foreign commerce by any means including by 
computer,” namely, the exhibits he created and used solely in his capacity as a 
witness and/or defense attorney in Oklahoma and Ohio. 
{¶ 7} On September 14, 2007, two minors, whose images were used in two 
of the digitally manipulated images that Taylor presented as court exhibits, filed a 
civil action against Taylor in the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio, Eastern Division, seeking compensation for damages they suffered 
as a result of his conduct.  After a discovery dispute arose, the federal district court 
ordered Taylor to appear at the FBI’s Cleveland office to review documents and 
provide answers to the plaintiffs’ discovery requests; Taylor complied with that 
order.  The court initially granted summary judgment in Taylor’s favor.  However, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed that judgment and 
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4 
remanded the matter to the district court.  On remand, the district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the two minors and ordered Taylor to pay each of 
them the statutory-minimum damages of $150,000.  The court later ordered Taylor 
to pay the minors $43,214.11 in attorney fees.  In partial satisfaction of those 
judgments, the minors garnished a $70,000 payment Taylor was owed by the state 
of Ohio. 
{¶ 8} In January 2016, Taylor filed a bankruptcy petition in the Bankruptcy 
Court for the Northern District of Ohio, seeking to discharge the civil judgments 
entered against him.  Although he was initially successful in that endeavor, the 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed the bankruptcy court’s 
judgment, determining that Taylor’s actions in using the images of the two minors 
was “malicious” and that therefore the judgments in their favor could not be 
discharged in bankruptcy.  In re Boland, 596 B.R. 532 (6th Cir. BAP 2019).  As of 
April 11, 2023, the $70,000 garnishment was Taylor’s only payment toward the 
judgments against him. 
{¶ 9} In August 2011, relator informed Taylor that he was investigating 
Taylor’s conduct related to his pretrial diversion agreement with the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office, but it closed that investigation in October 2013 without filing a 
formal complaint against him. 
MISCONDUCT 
{¶ 10} On April 8, 2019, under the name Jack Boland, Taylor electronically 
submitted an application to the State Medical Board of Ohio for a physician-
assistant license.  The medical board approved Taylor’s application and issued a 
physician-assistant license to him, effective June 12, 2019. 
{¶ 11} On his application, Taylor failed to answer or provided inaccurate 
responses to four questions.  Taylor provided no response to the question, “Do you 
have other aliases?”  He also answered, “No,” to the following questions: (1) “Have 
you ever been requested to appear before any board, bureau, department, agency, 
January Term, 2024 
 
5 
or other body, including those in Ohio, concerning allegations against you?”; (2) 
“Have you ever been notified of any investigation concerning you by any board, 
bureau, department, agency, or other body, including those in Ohio, with respect to 
a professional license, certificate, or registration?”; and (3) “Have you ever 
forfeited collateral, bail, or bond for breach or violation of any law, police 
regulation, or ordinance other than for a minor traffic violation; been summoned 
into court as a defendant or had any lawsuit * * * filed against you?”  Above the 
place for the applicant’s electronic signature, the application bore the following 
attestation:  
 
I hereby certify and attest that I am the person named in this 
application, that all statements I have or shall make with respect 
thereto are true. 
I acknowledge that I have read and understand this 
application and have answered all questions contained in this 
application truthfully and completely.  I further acknowledge that 
failure on my part to answer questions truthfully and completely 
may lead to my being prosecuted under appropriate federal and state 
laws. 
* * * 
I understand that my failure to answer questions contained 
in this application truthfully and completely may lead to denial, 
revocation, or other disciplinary sanction of the credential for which 
I have applied. 
 
{¶ 12} In August 2019 the Cuyahoga County probate court granted Jack 
Boland’s application to change his name to John Taylor.  On November 5, 2019, 
Taylor filed a license-renewal application with the medical board to change the 
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legal name on his physician-assistant license.  With that application, Taylor 
submitted a certified copy of the August 2019 probate-court entry granting his name 
change from Jack Boland to John Taylor, which also referenced his 2016 name 
change from Dean Maynard Boland to Jack Boland. 
{¶ 13} The medical board’s chief investigator later interviewed Taylor 
about his name changes and his response on his initial application to the question 
asking whether he had ever been summoned into court as a defendant or had any 
lawsuit filed against him.  In October 2021, the medical board informed Taylor of 
the results of its investigation—including its findings regarding his answers to three 
of the four questions at issue in this case—and offered him the opportunity to 
request a hearing before the board acted on his license-renewal application.  On 
January 31, 2022, Taylor consented to the permanent surrender of his physician-
assistant license. 
{¶ 14} Taylor has stipulated that his answers to the foregoing questions on 
his initial application for a physician-assistant license were false in that he failed to 
disclose that he (1) had legally changed his name from “Dean Maynard Boland” to 
“Jack Boland” in 2016, (2) had been previously ordered to appear at the offices of 
the FBI to view evidence as part of a discovery dispute in the above-described civil 
action, (3) had been named as a defendant in that civil action, and (4) had been 
investigated by relator in 2011 for the conduct underlying his pretrial diversion 
agreement with the U.S. Attorney’s Office. 
{¶ 15} Despite those stipulations, at his April 11, 2023 attorney-disciplinary 
hearing, Taylor attempted to explain why some of those answers were not 
inaccurate or misleading.  For example, Taylor testified that when he had completed 
the initial application for a physician-assistant license, he believed that the first 
question regarding aliases did not ask for his “prior names.”  He also asserted that 
it was an “optional” question and that his failure to answer it “[did not] have a truth 
value or a false value.” 
January Term, 2024 
 
7 
{¶ 16} Taylor also explained that with respect to the third question—
whether he had ever been notified of any investigation with respect to a professional 
license—he recalled having received a letter from disciplinary counsel in the past, 
but because he was unsure whether the letter had used the word “investigation” and 
he could not find a copy of it, he answered, “No.”  With respect to the fourth 
question—whether he had been summoned into court as a defendant or had had any 
lawsuit filed against him—Taylor claimed that he had read the semicolon in the 
question as an “and.”  He explained that based on this reading of the question, he 
may have answered it in the negative because the part of the question regarding 
forfeiture of collateral, bail, or bond did not apply to him. 
{¶ 17} The board found that the thrust of Taylor’s defense was that he 
misunderstood or misinterpreted the four questions on his initial application for a 
physician-assistant license and that he consequently responded with what he now 
concedes in his stipulations are false answers.  At his disciplinary hearing, rather 
than unequivocally acknowledging that he provided false answers on his 
application, he blamed the medical board for using ambiguous language and 
punctuation in the application.  The board rejected Taylor’s explanations, finding 
that the questions on the application were plainly stated and that Taylor’s answers 
were false. 
{¶ 18} Furthermore, the board noted that during his disciplinary hearing, in 
response to a member of the panel asking if he was still practicing law as of the 
date of the hearing, Taylor responded, “I am not.”  In response to a question about 
when he had last done any legal work, Taylor answered, “[A]ctually putting my 
name on a pleading and filing it in the court would have—could have been five 
years ago maybe.  Four or five years ago.”  And when asked about whether he had 
held himself out as a practicing attorney, he stated that he considered the use of the 
term “Esquire” on his resume to be holding himself out as an attorney, but that he 
did not have an office or solicit clients. 
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8 
{¶ 19} Two days after his disciplinary hearing, Taylor filed a motion to 
correct his testimony.  In that motion, Taylor stated that when he had responded to 
the panel’s questions about his practice of law, he “neglected to remember that [he] 
had recently offered to assist a friend who was facing a deadline to file in the Eighth 
District and had lost his counsel.”  Taylor then disclosed, “On April 3, 2023[,] I 
filed a notice of appearance and extension of time to file on behalf of his LLC.  I 
am not being paid nor am I holding myself out accepting clients nor do I intend to.” 
{¶ 20} The board found by clear and convincing evidence that Taylor’s 
conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).  We adopt that 
finding of misconduct. 
SANCTION 
{¶ 21} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions 
imposed in similar cases. 
{¶ 22} The board found that two aggravating factors are present in this case: 
Taylor acted with a dishonest or selfish motive and refused to acknowledge the 
wrongful nature of his misconduct.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2) and (7).  As for 
mitigating factors, the board found that Taylor had a clean disciplinary record and 
had other penalties or sanctions imposed for his misconduct in that he had 
permanently surrendered his physician-assistant license.  See Gov.Bar R. 
V(13)(C)(1) and (6). 
{¶ 23} In his closing argument before the panel, relator noted that there is a 
presumption that an actual suspension from the practice of law is required when an 
attorney has been found to have violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c).  We have held that 
“[w]hen an attorney engages in a course of conduct that [violates an ethical rule 
prohibiting dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation], the attorney will be 
January Term, 2024 
 
9 
actually suspended from the practice of law for an appropriate period of time.”  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh, 74 Ohio St.3d 187, 658 N.E.2d 237 (1995), 
syllabus.  In Fowerbaugh, we imposed a six-month suspension on an attorney who 
lied to a client about the status of her case, created a false document to convince 
the client that he had filed her case after the court rejected his filing, and perpetuated 
his dishonesty by telling the client that a hearing had been scheduled and later that 
it had been canceled.  Id. at 187-188, 191.  But we have since recognized that the 
presumption of an actual suspension established in Fowerbaugh may be overcome 
by “an abundance of mitigating evidence.”  See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Markijohn, 99 Ohio St.3d 489, 2003-Ohio-4129, 794 N.E.2d 24, ¶ 8, citing Dayton 
Bar Assn. v. Kinney, 89 Ohio St.3d 77, 728 N.E.2d 1052 (2000). 
{¶ 24} In this case, relator conceded at Taylor’s disciplinary hearing that an 
actual suspension is not required and argued that the appropriate sanction for 
Taylor’s misconduct is a fully stayed six-month suspension. 
{¶ 25} In determining the appropriate sanction to recommend for Taylor’s 
misconduct, the board considered six cases in which we imposed a range of 
sanctions on attorneys who engaged in dishonest conduct.  In two of those cases, 
we publicly reprimanded attorneys who engaged in isolated incidents of falsifying 
documents when significant mitigating factors but no aggravating factors were 
present.  In Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Thompson, 129 Ohio St.3d 127, 2011-Ohio-
3095, 950 N.E.2d 550, the attorney was found to have violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) 
after he notarized two unsigned documents, but he had had a clean disciplinary 
record, self-reported his misconduct, cooperated in the disciplinary proceedings, 
and submitted evidence of his good character and reputation. 
{¶ 26} Similarly, in Warren Cty. Bar Assn. v. Clifton, 147 Ohio St.3d 399, 
2016-Ohio-5587, 66 N.E.3d 713, the attorney altered a client’s will after the client 
died but before filing the will in probate court by adding an inadvertently omitted 
descendant though his alteration did not change the outcome of the probate 
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proceedings.  Mitigating factors included the attorney’s cooperation in the 
disciplinary proceeding and his expressed remorse.  The board in this case also 
noted that we have accepted a consent-to-discipline agreement and publicly 
reprimanded an attorney in another disciplinary action involving circumstances 
similar to those in Thompson and Clifton.  See Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. 
Grendel, 163 Ohio St.3d 1442, 2021-Ohio-1896, 168 N.E.3d 1212.  The board, 
however, expressed its belief that because Taylor has not fully and unequivocally 
acknowledged the wrongful nature of his misconduct, his misconduct warrants a 
sanction greater than a public reprimand. 
{¶ 27} The board also considered two other cases imposing actual time off 
from the practice of law for attorneys who, like Taylor, made false statements on 
government applications. 
{¶ 28} In Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. DiMartino, 124 Ohio St.3d 360, 
2010-Ohio-247, 922 N.E.2d 220, an attorney engaged in dishonest conduct by 
falsely representing on an out-of-state marriage application that he had never been 
married, although his Ohio divorce case was pending at that time.  Because he had 
twice been disciplined for neglecting client matters and was serving a one-year 
stayed suspension for his second offense when he engaged in this dishonest 
conduct, we reinstated his one-year suspension from the previous disciplinary case 
and sanctioned him with a concurrent six-month suspension for his dishonesty.  
DiMartino at ¶ 1, 16. 
{¶ 29} And in Disciplinary Counsel v. Fuhry, 151 Ohio St.3d 549, 2017-
Ohio-8813, 90 N.E.3d 933, ¶ 5, 12-13, we found that an attorney violated five 
ethical rules by continuing to practice law while her license was suspended for 
registration and continuing-legal-education violations and for falsely attesting on a 
government form for securities-industry registration that her law license had never 
been revoked or suspended.  Fuhry also lied to her employer about her suspension 
and later to relator in the initial stages of the disciplinary investigation.  Id. at ¶ 12.  
January Term, 2024 
 
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Aggravating factors consisted of Fuhry’s prior discipline, selfish or dishonest 
motive, multiple offenses, and submission of false statements during the 
disciplinary investigation.  Id. at ¶ 8.  As for mitigating factors, Fuhry eventually 
cooperated fully in the disciplinary proceedings and had other sanctions imposed 
for her misconduct—namely, the termination of her employment.  Id.  We imposed 
a two-year suspension with six months conditionally stayed for Fuhry’s 
misconduct.  Id. at ¶ 14. 
{¶ 30} Finally, the board considered Disciplinary Counsel v. Jarvis, 169 
Ohio St.3d 430, 2022-Ohio-3936, 205 N.E.3d 499.  There, the attorney engaged in 
multiple acts of dishonesty while representing a married couple in an estate-
planning matter.  The attorney falsely notarized multiple legal documents and 
backdated some of them.  Jarvis at ¶ 12, 14, 17.  He signed other legal documents 
as a witness even though he was not present when the documents were signed by 
his clients.  The attorney also attested that one of his clients appeared to be of sound 
mind when the client signed two legal documents even though the attorney was 
aware that that client had been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease and he had 
never personally communicated with that client.  Id. at ¶ 7, 12, 14.  We found that 
the attorney violated six ethical rules, including Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c).  Id. at ¶ 27.  
Aggravating factors included the attorney’s engaging in a pattern of misconduct, 
committing multiple offenses, and harming vulnerable victims.  But as mitigating 
factors, he had no prior discipline, made full and free disclosure to the board, 
exhibited a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, and had a 
related professional-malpractice action pending against him at the time of his 
disciplinary hearing.  Although the attorney engaged in a pattern of dishonesty over 
a period of approximately ten months, we found that the mitigating factors in his 
case were sufficient to rebut the presumption of an actual suspension from the 
practice of law, and we imposed an 18-month conditionally stayed suspension for 
his misconduct.  Id. at ¶ 40. 
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{¶ 31} The board concluded that the mitigating evidence in this case—
including Taylor’s clean disciplinary record and the penalty imposed by the loss of 
his physician-assistant license—was sufficient to depart from the presumption of 
an actual suspension from the practice of law for a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c).  
Further, the board noted that Taylor’s misconduct caused no harm to any clients or 
the public. 
{¶ 32} The evidence shows that Taylor made false statements on an 
application to obtain a physician-assistant license in Ohio.  His false answers 
concealed relevant and highly prejudicial information regarding his background 
that had the potential to negatively affect the outcome of his application.  He did 
not, however, engage in a course of conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation like the attorneys in Fowerbaugh, 74 Ohio St.3d 187, 658 N.E.2d 
237, Fuhry, 151 Ohio St.3d 549, 2017-Ohio-8813, 90 N.E.3d 933, and Jarvis.  Nor 
did Taylor have a history of prior discipline comparable to the attorney in 
DiMartino, 124 Ohio St.3d 360, 2010-Ohio-247, 922 N.E.2d 220, that would 
warrant a greater sanction.  Rather, Taylor’s misrepresentations occurred on a 
single occasion.  And when the medical board questioned him about his application, 
he provided detailed information about his past.  On these facts, we accept the 
board’s recommendation that the appropriate sanction for Taylor’s misconduct is a 
fully stayed six-month suspension. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 33} Accordingly, John Taylor is suspended from the practice of law in 
Ohio for six months with the suspension stayed in its entirety on the condition that 
he engage in no further misconduct.  If Taylor fails to comply with the condition of 
the stay, the stay will be revoked and he will serve the full six-month suspension.  
Costs are taxed to Taylor. 
Judgment accordingly. 
DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, and DETERS, JJ., concur. 
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KENNEDY, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion. 
FISCHER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion. 
BRUNNER, J., not participating. 
_________________ 
KENNEDY, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 34} “The primary purpose of attorney discipline ‘is not to punish the 
offender, but to protect the public.’ ”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Nowicki, __ Ohio 
St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-3079, __ N.E.3d __, ¶ 82 (Kennedy, C.J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part), quoting Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 
204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286, ¶ 53.  “ ‘Protecting the public * * * is not 
strictly limited to protecting clients from a specific attorney’s potential misconduct.  
Imposing attorney-discipline sanctions also protects the public by demonstrating to 
the bar and the public that this type of conduct will not be tolerated.’ ”  (Ellipses 
added in Nowicki.)  Id. at ¶ 83 (Kennedy, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part), quoting Disciplinary Counsel v. Schuman, 152 Ohio St.3d 47, 2017-Ohio-
8800, 92 N.E.3d 850, ¶ 17.  Consequently, if we fail to appropriately sanction 
attorneys for their deceitful conduct, then “[w]e cannot expect citizens to trust that 
lawyers are honest,” Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh, 74 Ohio St.3d 187, 190, 
658 N.E.2d 237 (1995). 
{¶ 35} Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.  When an attorney 
violates Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c), a presumption exists that “the attorney will be actually 
suspended from the practice of law for an appropriate period of time.”  Fowerbaugh 
at 190.  This presumption may be overcome only when there is “an abundance of 
mitigating evidence.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Markijohn, 99 Ohio St.3d 489, 
2003-Ohio-4129, 794 N.E.2d 1052, ¶ 8.  In this case, there is not an abundance of 
mitigating factors.  While I agree with the majority that Taylor violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c), as found by the board, I disagree with the majority’s 
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determination that an abundance of mitigating evidence is present in this case and 
weighs in favor of this court’s departing from the presumption that an actual 
suspension should be imposed.  I would reject the board’s recommended sanction, 
and I would suspend Taylor from the practice of law in Ohio for one year with six 
months stayed.  Because the majority does otherwise, I dissent. 
Lack of Abundance of Mitigating Factors 
{¶ 36} “ 
‘Each 
disciplinary 
case 
involves 
unique 
facts 
and  
circumstances.’ ”  Nowicki at ¶ 35 (Kennedy, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part), quoting Gov.Bar R. V(13)(A).  Therefore, to make a sanction 
recommendation, “the board shall consider aggravating and mitigating factors.”  Id. 
at ¶ 58 (Kennedy, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  “Aggravating 
factors weigh in favor of ‘recommending a more severe sanction.’ ”  Id., quoting 
Gov.Bar. R. V(13)(B).  “Mitigating factors weigh in favor of ‘recommending a less 
severe sanction.’ ”  Id., quoting Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C).  As previously stated, an 
abundance of mitigating factors must be present for this court to impose a stayed-
suspension sanction when an attorney violates Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c). 
{¶ 37} “Abundance” means a “great quantity or amount,” “large number,” 
or “plentiful supply.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 8 (2002).  In 
this case, two mitigating factors and two aggravating factors are present.  The 
mitigating factors are: (1) Taylor has no prior discipline and (2) he has already been 
subjected to the imposition of penalties and sanctions by the revocation of his 
physician-assistant license.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1) and (6).  The aggravating 
factors are: (1) Taylor acted with a dishonest or selfish motive and (2) he refused 
to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2) 
and (7).  In my view, two mitigating factors do not constitute a great quantity, large 
number, or plentiful supply when an equal number of aggravating factors is also 
present; therefore, an abundance of mitigating factors is not present in this case. 
January Term, 2024 
 
15 
{¶ 38} In the cases relied on by the majority to show instances in which 
we have overcome the presumption of an actual suspension, the number of 
mitigating factors outweighed the number of aggravating factors.  For example, in 
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Thompson, 129 Ohio St.3d 127, 2011-Ohio-3095, 950 
N.E.2d 550, the board found four mitigating factors—the attorney had no prior 
discipline, self-reported his misconduct, cooperated in the disciplinary proceedings, 
and presented evidence of his good character—and no aggravating factors.  
Similarly, in Warren Cty. Bar Assn. v. Clifton, 147 Ohio St.3d 399, 2016-Ohio-
5587, 66 N.E.3d 713, the board found four mitigating factors—the attorney had no 
prior discipline, made a good-faith effort to rectify the consequences of his 
misconduct, made a full disclosure of his misconduct to the board during 
disciplinary proceedings, and presented evidence of his good character—and no 
aggravating factors.  In Disciplinary Counsel v. Jarvis, 169 Ohio St.3d 430, 2022-
Ohio-3936, 205 N.E.3d 499, we imposed a stayed-suspension sanction where more 
mitigating factors than aggravating factors were present—the board found that four 
mitigating factors were present in comparison to three aggravating factors.  Unlike 
in those cases, here an equal number of mitigating and aggravating factors is 
present, so there cannot be an abundance of mitigating factors. 
Weight of Mitigating Versus Aggravating Factors 
{¶ 39} In addition to the number of mitigating factors present, we must also 
consider their weight.  The “importance or weight of a mitigating or aggravating 
factor depends on the facts of the case.”  Nowicki, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2023-Ohio-
3079, __ N.E.3d __, at ¶ 59 (Kennedy, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).  Considering the facts in this case, the mitigating factors should be afforded 
less weight and the aggravating factors should be afforded more weight than the 
majority assigns them. 
{¶ 40} Despite stipulating that the answers he provided in response to 
questions on his physician-assistant-license application were false, Taylor refused 
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to acknowledge the wrongfulness of his conduct at his disciplinary hearing.  As the 
majority aptly states, “rather than unequivocally acknowledging that he provided 
false answers on his application, [Taylor] blamed the medical board for using 
ambiguous language and punctuation in the application.”  Majority opinion, ¶ 17.  
In addition, the board determined that Taylor repeatedly referred to his false 
answers as merely responses to “four questions,” which was no cause to suffer 
sanctions.  Contrary to this assertion, the four questions to which Taylor provided 
false answers present us with cause to impose sanctions because several of the 
answers that Taylor provided operated to conceal his past misconduct and deceitful 
acts.  On his application for a physician-assistant license, Taylor failed to disclose 
that he had been requested to appear before the Federal Bureau of Investigation for 
a discovery dispute in a civil action, that he was named as a defendant in a civil 
action, and that he had been previously investigated by the board.  See majority 
opinion at ¶ 14.  Therefore, in my view, the facts of this case support assigning 
greater weight to the aggravating factors and less weight to the mitigating factors. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 41} In Taylor’s case, a fully stayed suspension “does not send a ‘strong 
message’ to attorneys across Ohio.”  Nowicki at ¶ 84 (Kennedy, C.J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part), quoting Nowicki at ¶ 31 (majority opinion).  Given the 
scarcity of mitigating factors in this case and considering Taylor’s failure to 
unequivocally acknowledge the deceitfulness of his conduct, a fully stayed 
suspension is insufficient to protect the public and preserve public confidence in 
Ohio’s attorneys.  To do this, we should impose an actual suspension in this case.  
Therefore, I dissent from the majority opinion because I would suspend Taylor from 
the practice of law in Ohio for one year with six months stayed. 
_________________ 
 
 
January Term, 2024 
 
17 
FISCHER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 42} The majority opinion and the first opinion concurring in part and 
dissenting in part both epitomize an obvious problem with Ohio’s system of lawyer 
discipline and, more specifically, the type of sanctions available to this court. 
{¶ 43} This court may discipline a lawyer by imposing one of the following 
sanctions: a public reprimand, a six-months-to-two-year suspension (which may be 
stayed in whole or in part), an indefinite suspension (with credit or no credit for 
time served), or a permanent disbarment.  Gov.Bar R. V(12)(A)(1) through (3) and 
(5).  We may also impose a probation period but “only in conjunction with a [six-
months-to-two-year suspension].”  Gov.Bar R. V(12)(A)(4).  The sanctions 
available under Gov.Bar R. V(12)(A) limit this court’s ability to fully protect the 
public from the various types of misconduct that may be committed by a lawyer or 
judge. 
{¶ 44} Other states have additional sanctions to impose on lawyers for 
misconduct.  For example, private reprimands are available in some states, 
including our neighboring states of Indiana, see Indiana Admission and Discipline 
Rule 23(I)(3)(a)(5), and Pennsylvania, see Pennsylvania Disciplinary Board Rule 
85.8(a)(6).  Many states also permit the imposition of suspensions of less than six 
months, including our neighboring states of Indiana, see Indiana Admission and 
Discipline Rule 23(I)(3)(a)(3) (providing for suspensions of less than 180 days), 
Michigan, see MCR Rule 9.106(2) (providing for suspensions of 30 days or more), 
and Pennsylvania, see Pennsylvania Disciplinary Board Rule 85.8(a)(2) (providing 
for suspensions not exceeding five years).  This court should have more options 
available, as do our neighboring states and many others, by which to discipline and 
impose sanctions on lawyers who have committed misconduct. 
{¶ 45} This case presents an excellent example of the issues caused by our 
limited available sanctions.  Here, the majority properly castigates respondent, John 
Taylor, for engaging in lawyer misconduct.  See majority opinion, ¶ 32.  However, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
the sanction imposed by the majority is a fully stayed six-month suspension.  Id.  
Although a lawyer on whom a fully stayed suspension has been imposed faces the 
threat of the stay being revoked if the lawyer fails to comply with the conditions of 
the stay, in my experience that rarely occurs and the lawyer never serves an actual 
suspension.  In reality then, how is a fully stayed six-month suspension different 
from a public reprimand?  The only possible difference is that under our rules, a 
probation period may be added to a suspension but not to a public reprimand.  A 
probation period has not been imposed in this case.  So in effect, the fully stayed 
six-month suspension imposed on Taylor is really no different than a public 
reprimand. 
{¶ 46} The first concurring-and-dissenting opinion correctly points out that 
given the deceitful nature of Taylor’s conduct, an actual suspension is needed here 
to protect the public.  See opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part of 
Kennedy, C.J., ¶ 39-41.  Meanwhile, a majority of this court does not believe that 
Taylor needs any “time off.”  However, if this court were to permit the imposition 
of a six-month suspension, with three months stayed, and impose that sanction here, 
then Taylor would be required to “close down” for an appropriate period that would 
protect the public but not create an unwarranted long-term negative impact on his 
future legal career. 
{¶ 47} Admittedly, closing an office for three months would entail 
notifying clients of the closing and the lawyer’s inability to represent those clients 
during that period.  See Gov.Bar R. V(22)(A)(1) (suspended lawyers shall notify 
all clients of a suspension and consequent disqualification to act as a lawyer).  This 
is a good thing—and I agree with this rule—because a lawyer who is publicly 
reprimanded or receives a fully stayed suspension is not required to notify his or 
her clients of the sanction imposed since the sanction would not affect the lawyer’s 
representation of clients. 
January Term, 2024 
 
19 
{¶ 48} Similarly, there are numerous investigations by disciplinary counsel, 
the Ohio State Bar Association, and local grievance committees into lawyer 
misconduct that ultimately result in no further action being taken.  A private 
reprimand would act as a wake-up call for some lawyers and may prevent a 
continuation of any potential unlawful or unethical behavior without harming the 
lawyer’s practice.  And as I propose we do here, by allowing the imposition of a 
six-month suspension, with three months stayed, lawyers may be proportionately 
disciplined for their misconduct without the sanction’s being exceedingly harsh. 
{¶ 49} There is no reason for us to tie our hands behind our backs and 
unnecessarily limit our ability to impose appropriate sanctions in attorney-
discipline cases.  Each of the different sanctions I have discussed in this opinion—
namely, the imposition of a private reprimand and a three-month actual 
suspension—should be examined and considered by this court after input from the 
bench, bar, and public.  Taylor’s attorney-discipline case is ideal for illustrating 
how an alternative suspension—for example, a six-month suspension with three 
months stayed—would be proper for the type of lawyer misconduct presented here. 
{¶ 50} For these reasons, I respectfully dissent in part.  I would suspend 
Taylor from the practice of law in Ohio for six months with three months stayed. 
_________________ 
Joseph M. Caligiuri, Disciplinary Counsel, and Matthew A. Kanai, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
John Taylor, pro se. 
_________________