Case Title: Complete Cash Holdings, LLC v. Powell

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1150536

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2017-04-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: 04/21/2017
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2016-2017
____________________
1150536
____________________
Complete Cash Holdings, LLC
v.
Lola Mae Powell
Appeal from Barbour Circuit Court
(CV-14-900025)
PARKER, Justice.
Complete Cash Holdings, LLC ("Complete Cash"), appeals a
judgment entered by the Barbour Circuit Court on a jury
verdict in favor of Lola Mae Powell.
Facts and Procedural History
1150536
This case arises out of Complete Cash's repossession of
Powell's 2002 Chevrolet Avalanche truck based on a forged
title-pawn agreement.  Complete Cash lends money to consumers
by the use of deferred-presentment agreements and vehicle
title pawns.  Complete Cash is also a pawnbroker, as that term
is defined in Ala. Code 1975, § 5-19A-2(4), which states, in
pertinent part:
"Any person engaged in the business of lending money
on the security of pledged goods left in pawn, or in
the 
business 
of 
purchasing 
tangible 
personal
property to be left in pawn on the condition that it
may be redeemed or repurchased by the seller for a
fixed price within a fixed period of time."
On 
October 
1, 
2011, 
Vakeela 
Brown, 
Powell's
granddaughter, went to a Complete Cash storefront in Eufaula. 
Brown, without Powell's knowledge or permission, forged
Powell's signature on two deferred-presentment agreements to
borrow a total of $300 ($150 under each of the deferred-
presentment agreements).  Renata Green, an employee of
Complete Cash and the manager of the Complete Cash store in
Eufaula, signed the deferred-presentment agreements on behalf
of Complete Cash.  Under the terms of each of the deferred-
presentment agreements, Complete Cash agreed to lend "Powell"
$150 ($300 total) on October 1, 2011, and, in exchange,
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1150536
"Powell" agreed to present to Complete Cash two personal
checks, each in the amount of $176.25 ($352.50 total), which
Complete Cash would hold until the presentment date of October
31, 2011.1  On the presentment date, Complete Cash would cash
Powell's personal checks, which would satisfy "Powell's"
obligation to Complete Cash.  In order to satisfy this
condition of the deferred-presentment agreements, Brown stole
two personal checks from Powell and forged Powell's signature
on those checks.  Of course, Powell was not obligated to make
repayment 
under 
the 
deferred-presentment 
agreements 
because 
it
is undisputed that Brown forged Powell's signature on the
deferred-presentment agreements and on the personal checks
given to Complete Cash.
In addition to being the manager of the Complete Cash
store, Green was also a friend of Brown's and knew Powell
personally.  Green knew that Brown had forged Powell's
signature on the deferred-presentment agreements and on
Powell's personal checks.  Brown testified that, at some time
thereafter, she and Green decided to pawn the title to
1The $176.25 payment represented $150 in principal and
$26.25 in interest.  The annual percentage rate on the loans
under the deferred-presentment agreements was 212.92%.
3
1150536
Powell's truck and to split the money procured from pawning
the title.  As a result, Brown testified that she and Green
stole the title to Powell's truck to pawn it.
On October 27, 2011, Brown went to the Complete Cash
store and forged Powell's signature on an agreement with
Complete Cash entitled "Alabama Pawn Ticket" ("the title-pawn
agreement").  Green signed the title-pawn agreement on behalf
of Complete Cash.  Under the terms of the title-pawn
agreement, Complete Cash agreed to lend "Powell" $2,352.50,
and "Powell" agreed to give Complete Cash a security interest
in the title to the truck as collateral securing the amount
borrowed.  Powell also agreed to repay the amount borrowed
plus a "finance charge" of $294.06, for a total repayment of
$2,646.56, on November 26, 2011.2  The title-pawn agreement
also permitted the repayment period to be extended for 30-day
periods.  The title-pawn agreement stated that the truck would
become the property of Complete Cash if "Powell" failed to
2The annual percentage rate on the loan under the title-
pawn agreement was 150%.
4
1150536
repay the amount owed under the terms of the title-pawn
agreement.3
Brown testified that Green satisfied the deferred-
presentment agreements using some of the money Brown and Green
had procured under the title-pawn agreement.
After the title-pawn agreement was executed, from October
27, 2011, until August 24, 2013, 19 payments were made on the
title-pawn agreement totaling $2,133.75; the amount of the
payments varied from $5 to $450.  Ashley Newman, an employee
of Complete Cash and Green's supervisor, testified that such
a repayment history was not unusual for accounts held by
Complete Cash.  Brown testified that she "may have come in [to
the Complete Cash store] and did [sic] one or two [of the
payments], but the other[ payments] were made by [Green]." 
However, Green's employment with Complete Cash was terminated
in August 2013 based on Green's failure to "collect a certain
percentage a month."  Newman testified that 
Green's employment
was terminated because Green was "not doing her job."  Newman
further testified that the termination of Green's employment
3Brown 
also 
forged 
Powell's 
signature on 
all 
the 
necessary
paperwork for Complete Cash to legally obtain and record its
security interest in Powell's truck.
5
1150536
was not related to her fraudulent activity in regard to
Powell; in fact, Newman testified that Complete Cash had no
knowledge that Green had been engaged in any fraudulent
activity at the time her employment was terminated.  After
Green's employment with Complete Cash was terminated, Green
quit making payments on the title-pawn agreement; no payments
were made on the title-pawn agreement after August 24, 2013.
On September 23, 2013, based on the fact that Powell had
defaulted on the title-pawn agreement, Complete Cash sent its
repossession agent, D&T Custom Automotive, LLC ("D&T"), a
"repossession packet" requesting that D&T repossess Powell's
truck.
On January 27, 2014, D&T repossessed Powell's truck.  The
same day, Jerome Anthony Rogers, Powell’s nephew, drove Powell
to the Complete Cash store to understand why Complete Cash had
repossessed Powell's truck.  Upon arriving at the Complete
Cash store, Powell and Rogers spoke with April Scott, an
employee of Complete Cash and the manager of the Complete Cash
store who had been hired to replace Green.  Scott agreed to
speak with her supervisor about the matter.
6
1150536
Newman was Scott's supervisor.  Newman testified that
Scott spoke with her about Powell's account.  Newman testified
that, upon learning that Powell alleged that the title-pawn
agreement had been created fraudulently, she thoroughly
reviewed Powell's account.  Newman testified that she found no
signs of fraud with the title-pawn agreement.  Specifically,
Newman testified that the fact that Complete Cash actually had
the title to Powell's truck naming Complete Cash as a
lienholder and the payment history on the account indicated to
her that the title-pawn agreement was not the result of
fraudulent activity.
On February 18, 2014, Powell's counsel sent Complete Cash
a letter demanding that Powell's truck be returned to Powell. 
In the demand letter, Powell's trial counsel informed Complete
Cash that Powell's signature had been forged by Brown on the
title-pawn agreement.  Powell's trial counsel also requested
that someone from Complete Cash contact him to discuss the
matter further.
A few days after Powell's counsel sent the demand letter,
Brandi Jackson, the manager of Complete Cash's legal
department, telephoned Powell's counsel.  Jackson testified
7
1150536
that she informed Powell's counsel that Complete Cash had
investigated Powell's account and determined that there was 
no
fraudulent activity concerning the title-pawn agreement.
On February 27, 2014, Powell sued Complete Cash asserting
claims 
of 
replevin, 
detinue, 
trespass 
to 
chattels, conversion,
negligence, and wantonness.4  On June 4, 2014, Powell filed an
amended complaint, adding D&T and Green as defendants and
asserting numerous claims against Complete Cash, D&T, and
Green.  In addition to the claims Powell asserted against
Complete Cash in her original complaint, Powell asserted that
Complete Cash had violated the Alabama Pawnshop Act, § 5-19A-1
et seq., Ala. Code 1975, that Complete Cash had violated the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, § 8-19-1 et seq., Ala. Code
1975 ("the DTPA"), that Complete Cash had violated 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692f(6) of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15
4Powell also filed, contemporaneously with her complaint,
an "ex parte motion for emergency preliminary relief or
temporary restraining order" in which Powell requested
immediate possession of her truck during the pendency of the
lawsuit.  On March 3, 2014, the trial court granted Powell's
request for immediate possession of the truck.  The trial
court later converted its order to a preliminary injunction. 
Pursuant to the trial court's order, Complete Cash returned
the truck to Powell on March 14, 2014.  On June 19, 2014,
Powell "received the vehicle title [to her truck] from
Complete Cash."
8
1150536
U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. ("the FDCPA"), and asserted claims of
fraudulent suppression and civil conspiracy.  Powell asserted
against D&T and Green claims of conversion, negligence,
wantonness, fraudulent suppression, and civil conspiracy.
On June 18, 2014, Complete Cash filed an answer to
Powell's first amended complaint, cross-claims against Green,
and a third-party complaint against Brown.
On October 16, 2014, Complete Cash filed motions for
default judgments against Brown and Green based on their
failure to respond to the claims asserted against them by
Complete Cash.  On October 20, 2014, the trial court granted
Complete Cash's motions for default judgments against Brown
and Green but did not assess damages.
On July 17, 2015, Powell filed a motion for a summary
judgment.  On the same day, Complete Cash also filed a motion
for a summary judgment or, in the alternative, for a partial
summary judgment.  On August 5, 2015, Complete Cash filed an
amended motion for a summary judgment.
On August 17, 2015, just before the trial began, the
trial court heard oral argument on the parties' summary-
judgment motions.  The trial court entered a summary judgment
9
1150536
for Complete Cash on Powell's fraudulent-suppression and
civil-conspiracy claims.  The trial then commenced on the
remaining claims against Complete Cash.5
At the close of Powell's case-in-chief, Complete Cash
filed a motion for a judgment as a matter of law ("JML") as to
Powell's remaining claims, challenging each claim with
specificity.  Concerning Powell's claim that Complete Cash had
violated § 1692f(6), Complete Cash argued that the FDCPA did
not apply because, it argued, Complete Cash was not a "debt
collector" as that term is defined in the FDCPA.  The trial
court entered a JML for Complete Cash on Powell's claims of
detinue, trespass, violation of the Alabama Pawnshop Act, and
Powell's claim that Complete Cash had violated the DTPA; the
trial court denied Complete Cash's motion as to all other
claims, including the claim asserting a violation of the
FDCPA.  The case was then submitted to the jury.  The jury
returned a verdict in favor of Powell.
On September 15, 2015, the trial court entered the
following judgment on the jury's verdict:
5On August 15, 2015, Powell and D&T filed a joint
stipulation dismissing D&T as a party, which the trial court
granted.
10
1150536
"Issue having been joined, this matter came on
for trial commencing on August 17, 2015 at the
Barbour County Courthouse in Eufaula, Alabama.
Thereupon came a jury of good and lawful citizens,
to wit: Scotty Smith and eleven others, who being
duly impaneled, sworn, and charged by the court
according to law, before whom the trial of this
cause was entered upon and continued from day to day
and from time to time, and upon the 18th day of
August, 2015, said jurors upon their oath did say:
"'We, the Jury, find in favor of the
Plaintiff, Lola Mae Powell, and against the
Defendants, Complete Cash, LLC, et al[.],
and 
assess 
damages 
as 
follows: 
Compensatory
damages: 
Fifty 
Thousand 
Dollars
($50,000.00) Punitive damages: One Hundred
Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00).'
"SPECIAL INTERROGATORY
"'1. Is the jury reasonably satisfied from
the evidence in this case that the
Defendant, 
Complete 
Cash, is a debt
collector as defined by the Fair Debt
Collection 
Practices 
Act 
and 
took
non-judicial 
action 
to 
effect 
dispossession
or disablement of property when there was
no present right to possession of the
property?
"'Check One _____ Yes _____ No (The 'Yes'
boxed was checked on the verdict form by
the jury foreman.)'
"Therefore, judgment is entered in favor of the
Plaintiff, Lola Mae Powell."
On September 17, 2015, Complete Cash filed a renewed
motion for a JML or, in the alternative, for a new trial. 
11
1150536
Complete Cash adopted the arguments it had asserted in its
original motion for a JML as to those claims submitted to the
jury.  Complete Cash did provide additional analysis of its
argument that the FDCPA did not apply because, it argued,
Complete Cash was not a "debt collector" as that term is
defined in the FDCPA.  Complete Cash further argued that, if
the trial court found convincing Complete Cash's argument that
the FDCPA did not apply, the judgment entered on the jury's
general verdict had to be reversed because a "bad count" had
been submitted to the jury.
On January 13, 2016, the trial court entered an order
denying Complete Cash's renewed motion for a JML or for a new
trial and assessing damages against Brown and Green.  The
trial court's order stated that Brown and Green "are hereby
jointly and severely [sic] liable for the damages assessed
[against Complete Cash] by the jury."
On February 3, 2016, Powell filed an "application for
assessment of fees and costs" requesting attorney fees in the
amount of $114,480 and costs in the amount of $3,114.56, which
12
1150536
the trial court granted.  On February 19, 2016, Complete Cash
filed its notice of appeal.6
Standard of Review
"We review as follows a trial court's ruling on a
motion for a JML made after a verdict has been
returned:
"'The standard of review applicable to
a ruling on a [renewed] motion for [a JML]
is identical to the standard used by the
trial court in granting or denying a motion
for [a JML]. Thus, in reviewing the trial
court's ruling on the motion, we review the
6We note that the issue of costs and attorney fees
remained pending when Complete Cash filed its notice of
appeal.  In Wolfe v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 142 So. 3d
697, 698-99 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013), the Court of Civil Appeals
stated:
"'[A] decision on the merits' of the claims asserted
by the parties is a '"final decision"' even when
'there remains for adjudication a request for
attorney's fees attributable to the case.' Budinich
v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 202–03, 108
S. Ct. 1717, 100 L. Ed. 2d 178 (1988); see also In
re Porto, 645 F.3d 1294, 1299 (11th Cir. 2011)
('[T]he Supreme Court has established a bright line
rule that the issue of attorney's fees is always
collateral to the merits, and a decision on the
merits, even if the attorney's fees issue remains
unresolved, is immediately appealable....'); and
State Bd. of Educ. v. Waldrop, 840 So. 2d 893, 899
(Ala. 2002) ('[A] decision on the merits disposing
of all claims is a final decision from which an
appeal must be timely taken, whether a request for
attorney fees remains for adjudication.')."
(Footnote omitted.)
13
1150536
evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmovant, and we determine whether the
party with the burden of proof has produced
sufficient evidence to require a jury
determination.
"'....
"'... In ruling on a [renewed] motion
for a [JML], the trial court is called upon
to determine whether the evidence was
sufficient to submit a question of fact to
the jury; for the court to determine that
it was, there must have been "substantial
evidence" before the jury to create a
question of fact. "[S]ubstantial evidence
is evidence of such weight and quality that
fair-minded persons in the exercise of
impartial 
judgment 
can 
reasonably 
infer 
the
existence of the fact sought to be
proved."'
"American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 624 So. 2d
1362, 1366–67 (Ala. 1993) (citations omitted)."
Lee v. Houser, 148 So. 3d 406, 414 (Ala. 2013).
Discussion
Complete Cash argues that the trial court erred in
denying its renewed motion for a JML as to Powell's claim that
Complete Cash violated § 1692f(6) of the FDCPA.  Complete Cash
argues that the FDCPA does not apply because, it argues,
Complete Cash is not a "debt collector" as that term is
defined under the FDCPA.  The United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit stated the following concerning the
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1150536
definition of "debt collector" under the FDCPA for purposes of
a claim brought under § 1692f(6):
"The 
FDCPA 
imposes 
liability 
on 
'debt
collectors' who fail to comply with its provisions
when collecting a 'debt.' 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. The
FDCPA's 
restrictions 
apply 
only 
to 
'debt
collectors.' ... A 'debt collector' is defined, for
the purposes of § 1692f(6), as 'any person who uses
any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the
mails in any business the principal purpose of which
is the collection of any debts [or the enforcement
of security interests], or who regularly collects or
attempts to collect ... debts [owed or due or
asserted to be owed or] due another....' Id. §
1692a(6); see Harris v. Liberty Cmty. Mgmt., Inc.,
702 F.3d 1298, 1302 (11th Cir. 2012)."
Lodge v. Kondaur Capital Corp., 750 F.3d 1263, 1273 (11th Cir.
2014)(first bracketed language in original).  See also
Davidson v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., 797 F.3d 1309, 1313
(11th Cir. 2015) (noting that the definitions of "debt
collector" set forth in 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) are alternative).
Complete Cash argues that it does not satisfy either
definition of "debt collector" in 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)
because, it says, its principal purpose of business is not the
collection of debts or the enforcement of security interests
and because Complete Cash does not collect debts owed to third
15
1150536
party or enforce security interests held by a third party.7 
7Powell argues that Complete Cash has waived any argument
pertaining to her claim asserted under the FDCPA because
Complete Cash did not object to the trial court's jury
instruction on Powell's FDCPA claim or to the inclusion of the
special interrogatory on the jury's verdict form.  Powell
relies only upon Cochran v. Ward, 935 So. 2d 1169 (Ala. 2006),
in making this argument.  The portion of Cochran relied upon
by Powell concerns the preservation for appellate review of an
alleged error in a verdict form submitted to the jury in that
case.  This Court held that, under Rule 51, Ala. R. Civ. P.,
a party must state the matter objected to and the grounds of
the objection in order to preserve any alleged errors for
appellate review.  However, in the present case, Complete Cash
has not alleged that there was error in the trial court's jury
instructions or verdict form.  Instead, Complete Cash argues
that it was entitled to a JML under Rule 50, Ala. R. Civ. P. 
"To preserve its argument, [Complete Cash] was required to
follow the mandates of Rule 50, Ala. R. Civ. P., which governs
a JML. Contrary to [Powell's] contention, preservation of
[Complete Cash's] argument does not require following the
mandates of Rule 51, Ala. R. Civ. P., which governs objections
to jury instructions."  Cook's Pest Control, Inc. v. Rebar, 28
So. 3d 716, 722 (Ala. 2009).  This Court specifically stated
in Cook's that it is not necessary for purposes of
preservation for a party seeking to appeal a trial court's
denial of that party's motion for a JML "to object to the
trial court's jury instructions on the same grounds as set
forth in its motions for a JML."  28 So. 3d at 723.  Complete
Cash did not waive any argument concerning Powell's FDCPA
claim.  As Complete Cash explains in its reply brief, Complete
Cash filed a motion for a JML concerning Powell's FDCPA claim,
but the trial court denied Complete Cash's motion.  Complete
Cash states that it did, indeed, agree to the special
interrogatory because "it was important for Complete Cash to
understand how significant that claim was, and whether the
jury's general verdict was due to a finding that Complete Cash
is a debt collector as defined by the FDCPA."  Complete Cash's
reply brief, at p. 7.  Throughout the course of these
proceedings, Complete Cash has maintained the consistent
position that it is entitled to a JML as to Powell's claim
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Instead, Complete Cash argues that the parties stipulated to
the fact that "Complete Cash is in the business of lending
money to consumers by way of deferred presentment agreements
and title pawns."  Complete Cash's brief, at pp. 27-28. 
Essentially, Complete Cash is arguing that it is a "creditor"
under the FDCPA, not a debt collector.8  Complete Cash is
correct.
In Davidson, the Eleventh Circuit stated that, "[u]nlike
debt collectors, creditors typically are not subject to the
FDCPA. See, e.g., Pollice v. Nat'l Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d
379, 403 (3d Cir. 2000). A 'creditor' is 'any person who
offers or extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is
owed.' [15 U.S.C.] § 1692a(4)."  797 F.3d at 1313.  In Pollice
v. National Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379 (3d Cir. 2000),
that Complete Cash violated § 1692f(6).  Based on the above-
quoted portions of Cook's, we conclude that Complete Cash did
not waive any argument concerning this issue by not objecting
to the trial court's jury instruction on the FDCPA or by
agreeing to have the special interrogatory included on the
jury's verdict form.
8As set forth above, the term "debt collector" is a
statutorily defined term.  Section 1692a(6) includes within
the definition of "debt collector" one whose primary business
is the collection of debts and/or the enforcement of security
interests.  Any reference throughout this opinion to the term
"debt collector" contemplates one who enforces security
interests.
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the case relied upon by the Eleventh Circuit in Davidson, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit stated:
"The FDCPA's provisions generally apply only to
'debt collectors.' Pettit v. Retrieval Masters
Creditors Bureau, Inc., 211 F.3d 1057, 1059 (7th
Cir. 2000). Creditors -- as opposed to 'debt
collectors' -- generally are not subject to the
FDCPA. See Aubert v. American Gen. Fin., Inc., 137
F.3d 976, 978 (7th Cir. 1998) ('Creditors who
collect in their own name and whose principal
business is not debt collection ... are not subject
to the [FDCPA].... Because creditors are generally
presumed to restrain their abusive collection
practices out of a desire to protect their corporate
goodwill, their debt collection activities are not
subject to the [FDCPA] unless they collect under a
name other than their own.'); Staub[ v. Harris], 626
F.2d [275,] 277 [(3d Cir. 1980)] ('The [FDCPA] does
not apply to persons or businesses collecting debts
on their own behalf.'); Hon. D. Duff McKee,
Liability of Debt Collector to Debtor under the
Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 41 Am.
Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 159, at § 3 (1997) ...
('[I]nterestingly, the term "debt collector" does
not include the creditor collecting its own
debt.')."
225 F.3d at 403.  In Perry v. Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d
1197, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985), the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit stated the above proposition even more
definitively: "The legislative history of section 1692a(6)
indicates conclusively that a debt collector does not include
the consumer's creditors.... See S. Rep. No. 95–382, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
18
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News 1695, 1698."  See also Montgomery v. Huntington Bank, 346
F.3d 693, 698 (6th Cir. 2003)(quoting Perry with approval for
the same proposition); Wadlington v. Credit Acceptance Corp.,
76 F.3d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1996)(same); and McCrimmon v.
Mariner Fin. North Carolina, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 3d 256, 258
(M.D. N.C. 2016)("'[C]rediting institutions, such as banks,
are not debt collectors under section 1692a(6)(A) because they
collect their own debts and are in the business of lending
money to consumers.' Davis v. Dillard Nat'l Bank, No.
1:02–cv–546 (M.D. N.C. June 4, 2003) (unpublished)." (citing
Thomasson v. Bank One, Louisiana, N.A., 137 F. Supp. 2d 721,
724 (E.D. La. 2001), and Meads v. Citicorp Credit Servs.,
Inc., 686 F. Supp. 330, 333 (S.D. Ga. 1988))).
Complete Cash is a "creditor" under the FDCPA because it
"offers or extends credit creating a debt."  15 U.S.C. §
1692a(4).  Complete Cash's business is to extend credit to
borrowers, which places those borrowers in debt.  Complete
Cash is Powell's creditor.9  Powell put on extensive evidence
9Of course, we recognize that the contract establishing
the relationship between Powell and Complete Cash was
fraudulently created; Complete Cash makes no assertion that
Powell is liable under the title-pawn agreement.  We state
that Complete Cash is Powell's creditor solely for purposes of
analyzing Powell's FDCPA claim, which requires us to look to
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proving this fact.  Further, Complete Cash collects its own
debts and enforces its own security interests; Powell has not
presented any evidence indicating that Complete Cash collects
debt owed to others, enforces security interests held by
others, or collects its own debt in a name other than its own.
Powell has offered no argument opposing Complete Cash's 
position that it is a creditor under § 1692a(4) of the FDCPA. 
Instead, Powell argues that,
"[w]hile an original creditor is generally not
considered a debt collector per the FDCPA, there are
instances in which an original creditor may still be
liable as a debt collector under the FDCPA, if the
creditor is shown to be in violation of the FDCPA,
15 U.S.C. § 1692f(6) as to enforcement of security
interests."
Powell's brief, at p. 25.  However, Powell has not cited any
authority in support of her argument that a creditor may
nevertheless be liable as a debt collector under the FDCPA "as
to the enforcement of security interests."  In order for a
party to be liable under the FDCPA it must be demonstrated
that the party is a debt collector under § 1692a(6).  Powell
has failed to demonstrate that Complete Cash is a debt
collector.  Further, after extensive research, we have not
the nature of Complete Cash's business and the relationship
between Powell and Complete Cash.
20
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found any authority with similar facts explaining an instance
where a creditor, like Complete Cash, has been held liable as
a debt collector.
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Powell, as
we must, we conclude that there is no evidence, let alone
substantial evidence, indicating that Complete Cash is a debt
collector under the FDCPA.  Instead, the evidence establishes
that Complete Cash is a creditor.  Thus, as Powell's creditor,
Complete Cash is not included within the definition of "debt
collector" in the FDCPA.  In Birster v. American Home Mortgage
Servicing, Inc., 481 F. App'x 579, 582 (11th Cir. 2012)(not
selected for publication in the Federal Reporter), a case
relied upon by Powell, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit stated:
"[W]hether an individual or entity is a 'debt collector' is
determinative of liability under the FDCPA."  The evidence is
conclusive that Complete Cash is Powell's creditor, not a debt
collector, which determines the issue of liability.  Based on
the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court erred in
denying Complete Cash's renewed motion for a JML as to
Powell's claim that Complete Cash violated 15 U.S.C. §
1692f(6).
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Next, Complete Cash argues that "[t]he entire jury
verdict is improper since the 'bad' count regarding the FDCPA
went to the jury, and the jury found in favor of Powell by a
general verdict."  Complete Cash's brief, at p. 32.  Complete
Cash notes that, in answering the special interrogatory on the
jury's verdict form in the affirmative, the jury expressly
concluded that Complete Cash is a debt collector under the
FDCPA.  This demonstrates, Complete Cash argues, that the
jury's verdict was based, at least in part, on Powell's claim
that Complete Cash violated § 1692f(6), which, Complete Cash
argues, is a "bad count" in that it is not supported by
substantial evidence.  Complete Cash is correct.
In Larrimore v. Dubose, 827 So. 2d 60, 62-63 (Ala. 2001),
this Court set forth the following applicable law concerning
a "good count/bad count" situation, like that presented in
this case:
"In Aspinwall v. Gowens, 405 So. 2d 134, 138 (Ala.
1981)(opinion on rehearing), this Court stated:
"'On 
reconsideration, we 
believe 
the 
better
view to be that if a complaint has more
than one count and the defendant believes
that the evidence is not sufficient to
support one or more of these counts, he
must challenge this by motion for [JML],
specifying the count which is not supported
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by evidence and detailing with specificity
the grounds upon which the particular count
is not supported by the evidence. If this
is not done and all counts go to the jury
and a general verdict is returned, the
court will presume that the verdict was
returned on a valid count.'
"Furthermore, in Alfa Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Roush, 723 So. 2d 1250, 1257 (Ala. 1998), this Court
stated what occurs when a properly presented motion
for a JML preserves a challenge to a 'bad count':
"'When a jury returns a general verdict
upon two or more claims, as it did here, it
is not possible for this Court to determine
which of the claims the jury found to be
meritorious. Therefore, when the trial
court submits to the jury a "good count" --
one that is supported by the evidence --
and a "bad count" -- one that is not
supported by the evidence -- and the jury
returns a general verdict, this Court
cannot presume that the verdict 
was
returned on the good count. In such a case,
a judgment entered upon the verdict must be
reversed.'
"See also Ex parte Grand Manor, Inc., 778 So. 2d 173
(Ala. 2000); St. Clair Fed. Sav. Bank v. Rozelle,
653 So. 2d 986 (Ala. 1995); and South Cent. Bell
Tel. Co. v. Branum, 568 So. 2d 795 (Ala. 1990)."
Powell argues that Complete Cash failed to adequately
challenge in its motions for a JML, as required by Aspinwall
v. Gowens, 405 So. 2d 134 (Ala. 1981), Powell's claim that
Complete Cash violated § 1692f(6).  Powell's argument is not
persuasive.  Complete Cash moved for a JML at the close of
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Powell's case, which coincided with the close of all the
evidence.  Complete Cash argued that it was entitled to a JML
on all of Powell's claims.  With regard to Powell's claim that
Complete Cash violated § 1692f(6), Complete Cash specifically
argued that the FDCPA did not apply because Complete Cash was
not a debt collector.  Although the trial court granted
Complete Cash's motions for a JML as to some of Powell's
claims against Complete Cash, the trial court allowed the
remainder of the claims, including Powell's claim under the
FDCPA, to be submitted to the jury.  The jury then returned a
general verdict for Powell, awarding her compensatory damages
and punitive damages.  The jury's verdict was general, but it
also included a special interrogatory indicating that the 
jury
specifically found that Complete Cash was a debt collector
under the FDCPA.  After the trial court entered a judgment on
the jury's verdict, Complete Cash, in a renewed motion for a
JML, renewed its arguments that there was insufficient
evidence from which to conclude that Complete Cash was a debt
collector under the FDCPA.  Based on these facts, we conclude
that Complete Cash adequately challenged Powell's FDCPA claim
under Aspinwall.
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We also conclude, based on the jury's express finding
that Complete Cash was a debt collector under the FDCPA, that
the jury's award of compensatory damages was based, at least
in part, on Powell's claim that Complete Cash had violated §
1692f(6).  Accordingly, there is no question that the jury's
verdict was based on a "bad count."  Of course, because the
FDCPA does not provide for the award of punitive damages, we
can also safely assume that the jury's verdict was based in
part on Powell's claims of conversion or wantonness.10  This,
however, does not save the jury's verdict because we know,
based on the special interrogatory, that the jury based its
general verdict in part on a bad count.  For this reason, we
must reverse the entirety of the compensatory-damages award.
Further, our reversal of the jury's compensatory-damages
award mandates that we also reverse the jury's punitive-
damages award.  This Court stated in Ex parte Third
Generation, Inc., 855 So. 2d 489, 491 (Ala. 2003), "that in
order to be consistent with due process, 'a jury's verdict
10We note that Complete Cash argues on appeal that the
trial court erred in denying its renewed motion for a JML as
to Powell's wantonness claim; however, as further explained
below, we need not address this argument because we have
already determined that the jury's general verdict was based
on a bad count.
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[must] specifically award either compensatory damages or
nominal damages in order for an award of punitive damages to
be upheld.' [Life Ins. Co. of Georgia v. Smith,] 719 So. 2d
[797,] 806 [(Ala. 1998)] (citing BMW of North America v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 134 L. Ed. 2d 809 (1996))." 
See also Jenelle Mims Marsh, Alabama Law of Damages § 4:1 (6th
ed. 2012)("There also must be a finding by the jury of either
compensatory or nominal damages before an award of punitive
damages will be upheld.").  The jury's compensatory-damages
award having been reversed, there is no basis upon which the
jury's punitive-damages award may be upheld.  Therefore, the
trial court's judgment must be reversed in its entirety and
the cause remanded for a new trial.  Because we are reversing
on this issue, we pretermit consideration of all other issues
raised on appeal.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Stuart, Shaw, Main, and Wise, JJ., concur.
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