Case Title: Yanowitz v. LÂ’Oreal

Citation: 

Docket Number: S115154

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 8/11/05 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
ELYSA J. YANOWITZ, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
 
 
) 
S115154 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/5 A095474 
L’OREAL USA, INC., 
) 
 
 
) 
San Francisco County 
 
Defendant and Respondent. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 304908 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Plaintiff Elysa J. Yanowitz was a regional sales manager employed by 
defendant L’Oreal USA, Inc. (L’Oreal), a prominent cosmetics and fragrance 
company.  Yanowitz alleges that after she refused to carry out an order from a 
male supervisor to terminate the employment of a female sales associate who, in 
the supervisor’s view, was not sufficiently sexually attractive or “hot,” she was 
subjected to heightened scrutiny and increasingly hostile adverse treatment that 
undermined her relationship with the employees she supervised and caused severe 
emotional distress that led her to leave her position.  In bringing this action against 
L’Oreal, Yanowitz contended, among other matters, that L’Oreal’s actions toward 
her constituted unlawful retaliation in violation of the provisions of Government 
Code section 12940, subdivision (h) (section 12940(h)), which forbids employers 
from retaliating against employees who have acted to protect the rights afforded 
 
 
2
by the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 
12900 et. seq).1  
Section 12940(h) makes it an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer “to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate against any person 
because the person has opposed any practices forbidden under this part or because 
the person has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this 
part.”  In this case, we are presented with an array of issues regarding the proper 
legal standards to apply in determining whether an allegedly retaliatory action by 
an employer is actionable under section 12940(h).  First, we must decide whether 
an employee’s refusal to follow a supervisor’s order (to discharge a subordinate) 
that the employee reasonably believes to be discriminatory constitutes “protected 
activity” under the FEHA for which the employee may not properly be subjected 
to retaliation, when the employee objects to the supervisor’s order but does not 
explicitly tell the supervisor or the employer that she (the employee) believes the 
order violates the FEHA or is otherwise discriminatory.  Second, we must decide 
how the term “adverse employment action” — a term of art that generally is used 
as a shorthand description of the kind of adverse treatment imposed upon an 
employee that will support a cause of action under an employment discrimination 
statute — should be defined for purposes of a retaliation claim under the FEHA, 
and whether, in evaluating whether or not an employee was subjected to an 
adverse employment action under the appropriate standard, each individual 
sanction or punitive measure to which the employee was subjected must be 
evaluated separately or instead collectively through consideration of the totality of 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Government Code, unless 
otherwise indicated. 
 
 
3
the circumstances.  On a related point, we must decide whether a plaintiff may 
invoke the continuing violations doctrine to rely upon allegedly retaliatory acts 
that occurred outside the limitations period when such acts are related to acts that 
occur within the limitations period prescribed by the FEHA.  Finally, in light of 
our conclusions on the foregoing issues, we must determine whether, under the 
circumstances disclosed by the record in this case, the Court of Appeal properly 
concluded that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the 
employer. 
For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that an employee’s refusal to 
follow a supervisor’s order that she reasonably believes to be discriminatory 
constitutes protected activity under the FEHA and that an employer may not 
retaliate against an employee on the basis of such conduct when the employer, in 
light of all the circumstances, knows that the employee believes the order to be 
discriminatory, even when the employee does not explicitly state to her supervisor 
or employer that she believes the order to be discriminatory.  Second, we conclude 
that the proper standard for defining an adverse employment action is the 
“materiality” test, a standard that requires an employer’s adverse action to 
materially affect the terms and conditions of employment (see Akers v. County of 
San Diego (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1454-1457), rather than the arguably 
broader “deterrence” test adopted by the Court of Appeal in the present case.  We 
further conclude that in determining whether an employee has been subjected to 
treatment that materially affects the terms and conditions of employment, it is 
appropriate to consider the totality of the circumstances and to apply the 
“continuing violation” doctrine that we recently adopted in Richards v. CH2M 
Hill, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798 (Richards).  Finally, applying these general 
principles to the record that was before the trial court on the summary judgment 
 
 
4
motion, we conclude the Court of Appeal properly determined that the trial court 
erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the employer. 
Accordingly, we shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which 
reversed the summary judgment entered in favor of defendant. 
I. 
A 
Because this case comes before us after the trial court granted a motion for 
summary judgment, we take the facts from the record that was before the trial 
court when it ruled on that motion.  (State Department of Health Services v. 
Superior Court (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1026, 1034-35.)  “We review the trial court’s 
decision de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and 
opposing papers except that to which objections were made and sustained.”  (Id. at 
p. 1035.)  We liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing 
summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that 
party. (Wiener v. Southcoast Childcare Centers, Inc. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1138, 
1142.) 
Yanowitz began her employment with the predecessor of L’Oreal as a sales 
representative in 19812 and was promoted to regional sales manager for Northern 
California and the Pacific Northwest in 1986.  As regional sales manager, 
Yanowitz was responsible for managing L’Oreal’s sales team and dealing with the 
department and specialty stores that sold L’Oreal’s fragrances.  From 1986 to 
1996, Yanowitz's performance as a regional sales manager consistently was 
judged as “Above Expectation” and in some instances fell close to “Outstanding,” 
                                              
2  
L’Oreal formerly was known as Cosmair, Inc.  We refer to defendant as 
L’Oreal throughout. 
 
 
5
the highest possible rating, although her reviews over this period also consistently 
contained some criticism of her “listening” and “communication” skills.   
In early 1997, Yanowitz was named L’Oreal’s regional sales manager of 
the year (for 1996).  She received a Cartier watch and a congratulatory note from 
human resources manager Jane Sears praising her leadership, loyalty, motivation, 
and ability to inspire team spirit.  Yanowitz’s bonuses for the years 1996 and 1997 
were the highest paid to any regional sales manager in her division. 
Beginning in 1996, Yanowitz’s immediate supervisor was Richard 
Roderick, the vice-president of sales for the designer fragrance division.  Roderick 
reported directly to Jack Wiswall, the general manager of the designer fragrance 
division. Roderick and Wiswall worked out of New York, and Yanowitz was 
based in San Francisco. 
In June 1997, Roderick wrote a memorandum to Yanowitz’s personnel file 
in which he criticized Yanowitz’s listening skills and characterized her attitude as 
“negative.”  He also noted that he had received complaints about Yanowitz’s 
attitude from several retailers.  In August 1997, Roderick wrote a memorandum to 
Sears, L’Oreal’s human resources manager, in which he again criticized Yanowitz 
for her listening skills and her “negative” attitude, noting that several accounts 
also had complained about Yanowitz’s attitude.  Roderick stated in this 
memorandum that “Elysa does a terrific job as a regional manager, however, she 
must become a better listener and she must not put a gun to the heads of the 
retailers in order to get them to do what needs to be done.” 
In the fall of 1997, L’Oreal restructured the designer fragrance division, 
merging the division with the Ralph Lauren fragrance division.  Although some 
regional sales managers were laid off after the restructuring, L’Oreal retained 
Yanowitz and increased her responsibilities.  After the merger and restructuring, 
Yanowitz was assigned to supervise the personnel who formerly worked for the 
 
 
6
Ralph Lauren division, and to supervise the marketing of Ralph Lauren fragrances 
in her region.   
Shortly after Yanowitz assumed responsibility for the Ralph Lauren sales 
force and marketing campaigns in the fall of 1997, Wiswall and Yanowitz toured 
the Ralph Lauren Polo installation at Macy's in the Valley Fair Shopping Center in 
San Jose.  After the tour, Wiswall instructed Yanowitz to terminate the 
employment of a dark-skinned female sales associate because he did not find the 
woman to be sufficiently physically attractive.  Wiswall expressed a preference for 
fair-skinned blondes and directed Yanowitz to “[g]et me somebody hot,” or words 
to that effect.  On a return trip to the store, Wiswall discovered that the sales 
associate had not been dismissed.  He reiterated to Yanowitz that he wanted the 
associate terminated and complained that Yanowitz had failed to do so.  He passed 
“a young attractive blonde girl, very sexy,” on his way out, turned to Yanowitz, 
and told her, “God damn it, get me one that looks like that.”  Yanowitz asked 
Wiswall for an adequate justification before she would terminate the associate. On 
several subsequent occasions, Wiswall asked Yanowitz whether the associate had 
been dismissed.  On each occasion, Yanowitz asked Wiswall to provide adequate 
justification for dismissing the associate.  In March 1998, in the midst of 
Yanowitz’s conversations with Wiswall regarding the termination of the sales 
associate, Yanowitz learned that the sales associate in question was among the top 
sellers of men’s fragrances in the Macy’s West chain. Ultimately, Yanowitz 
refused to carry out Wiswall’s order and did not terminate the sales associate.  She 
never complained to her immediate supervisor or to the human resources 
department that Wiswall was pressuring her to fire the sales associate, however, 
nor did she explicitly tell Wiswall that she believed his order was discriminatory. 
In April 1998, Roderick began soliciting negative information about 
Yanowitz from her subordinates.  Roderick called Christine DeGracia, who 
 
 
7
reported to Yanowitz, and asked her about any “frustrations” she had with 
Yanowitz.  When DeGracia said she had had some, Roderick asked her to hold her 
thoughts so that the matter could be discussed with human resources.  Roderick 
and Sears then called back DeGracia to discuss those issues.  When Roderick 
asked DeGracia whether any other persons were having problems with Yanowitz, 
DeGracia did not provide any names.  Two weeks later, Roderick called DeGracia 
again and told her it was urgent that she help him persuade individuals to come 
forward with their problems concerning Yanowitz.  In early June 1998, Roderick 
again asked DeGracia to notify him of negative incidents involving Yanowitz and 
other account executives. 
On May 13, 1998, Roderick summoned Yanowitz to L’Oreal’s home office 
in New York.  Roderick opened the meeting by asking whether she thought she 
had been brought in to be terminated, then criticized Yanowitz for her “dictatorial” 
management style with regard to two account executives.  He closed the meeting 
by saying, “It would be a shame to end an eighteen-year career this way.”  During 
May and June 1998, Roderick and Wiswall obtained Yanowitz’s travel and 
expense reports and audited them.   
On June 19, 1998, a representative for Macy’s West, one of Yanowitz’s 
accounts, wrote to Roderick to complain about the handling of a Polo Sport 
promotion, which Yanowitz’s team was responsible for coordinating.  In June 
1998, Yanowitz met with Wiswall, Roderick, and various account executives and 
regional sales managers responsible for the Macy’s account.  Wiswall screamed at 
Yanowitz in front of her staff, told her he was “sick and tired of all the fuckups” 
on the Macy’s account, and said that Yanowitz could not get it right.  In July 
1998, the Macy’s account executive wrote to Roderick and again complained 
about the handling of a different promotion by Yanowitz’s team. 
 
 
8
On June 22, 1998, Yanowitz wrote Roderick, advising him that her Macy’s 
West team was disturbed about certain issues.  Wiswall, who had been sent a 
copy, wrote a note to Roderick on Yanowitz’s memo:  “Dick — She is writing 
everything! Are you!!!???”  One week after Wiswall’s note, Roderick prepared 
three memos to human resources documenting the meeting with Yanowitz on May 
13, 1998, a conversation with DeGracia on June 4, 1998, and a visit to Yanowitz’s 
market area in early June 1998.  These memos were critical of Yanowitz; the 
memo discussing the May 13 meeting criticized her for being too assertive. 
On July 16, 1998, Roderick prepared a more elaborate memorandum and 
delivered it to Yanowitz.  The memorandum criticized Yanowitz’s handling of a 
Polo Sport promotion, a Picasso promotion, coordination of advertising with 
others, handling of the Sacramento market, and the length and substance of a 
March 1998 business trip to Hawaii.  Roderick closed, “I have yet to see evidence 
that you took [the May 13] conversation seriously and made the necessary style 
modifications.  Elysa, I am quite surprised that a person with so many years of 
experience and so many years with Cosmair could become so ineffective so 
quickly. [¶]  Our business is changing daily and we all must learn to adapt to those 
changes or we will fail as individuals and as a company. Your changes must start 
immediately.  [¶]  I expect a reply to this memo within one week of receipt.” 
Yanowitz viewed the memorandum as an expression of intent to develop 
pretextual grounds and then terminate her.  She suggested the parties meet to 
discuss a severance package, but also indicated she first wanted to prepare her 
written response to the July 16, 1998, memorandum.  
Carol Giustino, Sears’s replacement as human resources director, set up a 
meeting for July 22 and rejected Yanowitz’s request that the meeting be 
postponed.  Giustino also denied Yanowitz’s request to have Yanowitz’s attorney-
husband present at the meeting, citing company policy.  During the July 22 
 
 
9
meeting, Roderick and Giustino questioned Yanowitz about the accusations in the 
July 16 memorandum without reading her written response.  Yanowitz, who was 
being treated for nervous anxiety allegedly brought on by the situation at work, 
broke down in tears.  During the meeting, Roderick imposed a new travel schedule 
on Yanowitz, a schedule that regulated precisely how often she should visit each 
market in her territory.  Two days after the meeting, Yanowitz departed on 
disability leave due to stress.  She did not return, and L’Oreal replaced her in 
November 1998. 
B 
Yanowitz filed a discrimination charge with the Department of Fair 
Employment and Housing (DFEH) on June 25, 1999.  She alleged that L'Oreal 
had discriminated against her on the basis of sex, age (Yanowitz was 53), and 
religion (Yanowitz is Jewish).  She also alleged that L’Oreal had retaliated against 
her for refusing to terminate the female employee whom Wiswall considered 
unattractive. 
After receiving a right-to-sue letter from the DFEH, Yanowitz brought this 
action against L’Oreal in superior court.  The first amended complaint, filed on 
September 13, 1999, included claims for age and religious discrimination and 
retaliation under the FEHA, violation of the unfair competition law (UCL), and 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  The second amended 
complaint, filed July 21, 2000, added a cause of action for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress. 
L’Oreal filed two separate motions for summary adjudication.  The first 
motion challenged Yanowitz’s claims under the FEHA and for emotional distress, 
each of which was based upon L’Oreal's conduct toward Yanowitz in 1998.  The 
second motion challenged Yanowitz’s UCL and good faith and fair dealing 
claims, which arose from L’Oreal’s unrelated practice of selling products to 
 
 
10
distributors other than its primary distributors ⎯ high-end department stores and 
specialty stores.  Each motion for summary adjudication ultimately was granted, 
and judgment was entered in favor of L’Oreal on April 25, 2001.3   
With respect to the retaliation claim, the trial court granted summary 
judgment in favor of L’Oreal, finding Yanowitz had not engaged in any protected 
activity.  The Court of Appeal reversed this aspect of the trial court’s judgment, 
holding that:  (1) Yanowitz’s refusal to obey Wiswall’s sexually discriminatory 
order was protected activity under the FEHA; (2) Yanowitz was not required to 
give L’Oreal notice that Wiswall’s order was discriminatory; (3) Yanowitz was 
not precluded from relying on L’Oreal’s acts that occurred prior to the date of the 
alleged adverse action shown in the administrative complaint; (4) L’Oreal’s 
conduct constituted adverse employment action; (5) a genuine issue of material 
fact remained as to whether L’Oreal’s ostensibly nonretaliatory reasons for the 
adverse employment action were pretextual; (6) a workers’ compensation 
exclusivity requirement did not bar Yanowitz’s claim for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress derivative of her FEHA claim; and (7) L’Oreal's intentional acts 
could not provide a basis for establishing negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
The appellate court accordingly concluded that the trial court erred in granting 
summary judgment in favor of L’Oreal with regard to Yanowitz’s retaliation claim 
and reversed the judgment, remanding the matter to the superior court to permit 
the retaliation claim to proceed to trial. 
L’Oreal petitioned for review, contending (1) with regard to the “protected 
conduct” issue, that the Court of Appeal had erred in concluding that Yanowitz’s 
                                              
3 
Originally, Yanowitz prevailed on a single theory underlying her UCL 
claim.  She dismissed that portion of her suit with prejudice, however, so that a 
final, appealable judgment could be entered. 
 
 
11
acts properly could be considered protected conduct even though Yanowitz had 
not specifically notified any supervisor that she believed Wiswall’s order was 
discriminatory, and (2) with regard to the “adverse employment action” issue, that 
the Court of Appeal had erred (a) in adopting an improper standard for evaluating 
whether an adverse employment action was imposed upon an employee, (b) in 
aggregating discrete employment actions and considering L’Oreal’s conduct under 
a totality of the circumstances approach, and (c) in applying the continuing 
violation doctrine to consider adverse actions that occurred outside the statute of 
limitations period.  Finally, L’Oreal maintained that even if the Court of Appeal 
properly found that Yanowitz had established a prima facie case of retaliation, that 
court erred in finding that she had presented sufficient evidence to create a triable 
issue of fact regarding whether L’Oreal’s ostensible nondiscriminatory reasons for 
its actions were pretextual. 
In light of the importance of a number of these issues, particularly the 
proper standard for determining whether an employee has been subjected to an 
adverse employment action, we granted review. 
II. 
Past California cases hold that in order to establish a prima facie case of 
retaliation under the FEHA, a plaintiff must show (1) he or she engaged in a 
“protected activity,” (2) the employer subjected the employee to an adverse 
employment action, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity 
and the employer’s action.  (Iwekaogwu v. City of Los Angeles (1999) 75 
Cal.App.4th 803, 814-815; Flait v. North American Watch Corp. (1992) 3 
Cal.App.4th 467, 476 [adopting the title VII (Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e et seq.) burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 
(1973) 411 U.S. 792, 802-805].)  Once an employee establishes a prima facie case, 
the employer is required to offer a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse 
 
 
12
employment action.  (Morgan v. Regents of University of California (2000) 88 
Cal.App.4th 52, 68.)  If the employer produces a legitimate reason for the adverse 
employment action, the presumption of retaliation “drops out of the picture,” and 
the burden shifts back to the employee to prove intentional retaliation.  (Ibid.)  
A 
We first must determine whether Yanowitz’s refusal to follow Wiswall’s 
order to terminate the sales associate because he found the associate sexually 
unattractive was protected activity for which she could not be subjected to 
retaliation.  The statutory language of section 12940(h) indicates that protected 
conduct can take many forms.  Specifically, section 12940(h) makes it an unlawful 
employment practice “[f]or any employer . . . to discharge, expel, or otherwise 
discriminate against any person because the person has opposed any practices 
forbidden under this part or because the person has filed a complaint, testified, or 
assisted in any proceeding under this part.”  (Italics added.)  The question here is 
whether Yanowitz’s refusal to follow Wiswall’s directive qualifies under the first 
category ⎯ that is, whether by refusing the directive, Yanowitz “opposed any 
practices forbidden under this part.”  
As a threshold matter, L’Oreal does not dispute that an employee’s conduct 
may constitute protected activity for purposes of the antiretaliation provision of 
the FEHA not only when the employee opposes conduct that ultimately is 
determined to be unlawfully discriminatory under the FEHA, but also when the 
employee opposes conduct that the employee reasonably and in good faith 
believes to be discriminatory, whether or not the challenged conduct is ultimately 
found to violate the FEHA.  It is well established that a retaliation claim may be 
brought by an employee who has complained of or opposed conduct that the 
employee reasonably believes to be discriminatory, even when a court later 
determines the conduct was not actually prohibited by the FEHA.  (See, e.g., 
 
 
13
Miller v. Department of Corrections (July 18, 2005, S114097) ___ Cal.4th ___ [p. 
35]; Flait v. North American Watch Corp., supra, 3 Cal.App.4th at p. 477; Moyo 
v. Gomez (9th Cir. 1994) 40 F.3d 982, 985; Gifford v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa 
Fe Ry. Co. (9th Cir. 1982) 685 F.2d 1149, 1157).) 4  
Strong policy considerations support this rule.  Employees often are legally 
unsophisticated and will not be in a position to make an informed judgment as to 
whether a particular practice or conduct actually violates the governing 
antidiscrimination statute.  A rule that permits an employer to retaliate against an 
employee with impunity whenever the employee’s reasonable belief turns out to 
be incorrect would significantly deter employees from opposing conduct they 
believe to be discriminatory.  (See, e.g., Gifford v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe 
Ry. Co., supra, 685 F.2d at p.1157; Moyo, supra, 40 F.3d at p. 985.)  As the 
United States Supreme Court recently emphasized in the context of title IX of the 
Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.), “[r]eporting incidents of 
discrimination is integral to Title IX enforcement and would be discouraged if 
retaliation against those who report went unpunished.  Indeed, if retaliation were 
not prohibited, Title IX’s enforcement scheme would unravel.”  (Jackson v. 
Birmingham Board of Education (2005) __ U.S. __ [125 S.Ct. 1497, 1508].)  By 
the same token, a rule that would allow retaliation against an employee for 
opposing conduct the employee reasonably and in good faith believed was 
                                              
4 
As the Seventh Circuit observed with regard to title VII, “[t]he mistake 
must, of course, be a sincere one; and presumably it must be reasonable . . . for it 
seems unlikely that the framers of Title VII would have wanted to encourage the 
filing of utterly baseless charges by preventing employers from disciplining the 
employees who made them.  But it is good faith and reasonableness, not the fact 
of discrimination, that is the critical inquiry in a retaliation case.”  (Rucker v. 
Higher Educational Aids Bd. (7th Cir. 1982) 669 F.2d 1179, 1182, italics added.) 
 
 
14
discriminatory, whenever the conduct subsequently was found not to violate the 
FEHA, would significantly discourage employees from opposing incidents of 
discrimination, thereby undermining the fundamental purposes of the 
antidiscrimination statutes.   
In the present case, in her opposition to L’Oreal’s motion for summary 
judgment, Yanowitz presented evidence that she reasonably believed that 
Wiswall’s order constituted unlawful sex discrimination, because she thought the 
order represented the application of a different standard for female sales associates 
than for male sales associates. Yanowitz stated in this regard that she had hired 
and supervised both male and female sales associates for a number of years, and 
never had been asked to fire a male sales associate because he was not sufficiently 
attractive.  Because a trier of fact could find from this evidence that Yanowitz 
believed Wiswall’s order was discriminatory as reflecting an instance of disparate 
treatment on the basis of sex, we have no occasion in this case to determine 
whether a gender-neutral requirement that a cosmetic sales associate be physically 
or sexually attractive would itself be violative of the FEHA or could reasonably be 
viewed by an employee as unlawfully discriminatory.  Courts in other jurisdictions 
have uniformly held that an appearance standard that imposes more stringent 
appearance requirements on employees of one sex than on employees of the other 
sex constitutes unlawful sexual discrimination unless such differential treatment 
can be justified as a bona fide occupational qualification.  (Frank v. United 
Airlines, Inc. (9th Cir. 2000) 216 F.3d 845, 854-855; Gerdom v. Continental 
Airlines, Inc. (9th Cir. 1982) 692 F.2d 602, 608 [in bank]; Association of Flight 
Attendants v. Ozark Air Lines (N.D. Ill. 1979) 470 F.Supp. 1132, 1135; Laffey v. 
Northwest Airlines, Inc. (D.D.C. 1973) 366 F.Supp. 763, 790.)  We believe it is 
clear that such unjustified disparate treatment also would constitute unlawful sex 
discrimination under the FEHA.  
 
 
15
L’Oreal does not claim that such disparate treatment on the basis of sex is 
permissible under the FEHA, but maintains that the evidence presented at the 
summary judgment motion was insufficient to support a reasonable belief that 
Wiswall’s order represented an instance of impermissible disparate treatment on 
the basis of sex.  We disagree.  Yanowitz presented evidence that Wiswall ordered 
her to terminate a female sales associate simply because he felt the associate was 
“not good looking enough,” and directed her to “[g]et me someone hot.”  On a 
subsequent visit to the Macy’s store, when Wiswall discovered Yanowitz had not 
terminated the sales associate, he pointed out a young attractive blonde woman 
and stated, “God damn it, get me one that looks like that.”  Although Yanowitz 
repeatedly requested that Wiswall provide her with “adequate justification” for the 
dismissal, he failed to respond to the request.  As noted, Yanowitz additionally 
stated that she had hired and supervised both male and female sales associates for 
a number of years, and never had been asked to fire a male sales associate because 
he was not sufficiently attractive. 5   
Moreover, L’Oreal failed to present any evidence in the summary judgment 
proceedings to counter the claim that Wiswall’s order constituted an instance of 
disparate treatment on the basis of sex.  It introduced no evidence suggesting that 
Wiswall’s order was based upon the particular sales associate’s performance or 
sales record, or, indeed, that Wiswall had any knowledge of such matters.  In 
addition, L’Oreal did not establish that the company maintained a general policy 
                                              
5 
Additionally, Yanowitz presented evidence that at the time of Wiswall’s 
directive, she was supervising male employees and, notably, that there was a male 
sales associate working in a Ralph Lauren installation at another Macy’s store in 
Yanowitz’s region. 
 
 
16
requiring cosmetic sales associates to be physically or sexually attractive, or that 
such a policy was routinely applied to both male and female sales associates.6   
L’Oreal additionally asserts that Yanowitz’s evidence is insufficient to 
support a reasonable belief that Wiswall’s order was discriminatory, because her 
belief rests solely on her own subjective experience.  Inasmuch as Yanowitz had 
been a regional sales manager for many years and presumably was familiar with 
the company’s job requirements for sales associates, we believe that a trier of fact 
properly could find that, in light of Yanowitz’s experience, her assessment that 
Wiswall’s order represented disparate treatment on the basis of the sex of the sales 
associate was reasonable.  Accordingly, on this record, we conclude that a 
reasonable trier of fact could find that Yanowitz reasonably believed that 
Wiswall’s order constituted sexual discrimination. 
L’Oreal argues, however, that even if Yanowitz refused to follow 
Wiswall’s order because she reasonably believed it was discriminatory, the papers 
before the trial court on the summary judgment motion failed to demonstrate that 
                                              
6 
Such evidence clearly would have been relevant to the question at issue.  
For instance, evidence that Wiswall’s directive implemented an established 
company policy or course of conduct would have a bearing both on the 
reasonableness of Yanowitz’s belief that discrimination had occurred and on 
Wiswall’s understanding that Yanowitz’s refusal to implement his directive was 
based on that belief.  Had L’Oreal presented evidence that physical attractiveness 
was a bona fide occupational qualification for cosmetics sales associates, or that 
L’Oreal sales managers were routinely, or even occasionally, required to make 
employment decisions on the basis of physical attractiveness, the reasonableness 
of Yanowitz’s belief that Wiswall’s order was discriminatory might be 
questionable.  Moreover, evidence of past practice would bear on Wiswall’s 
knowledge, in that it would be unlikely that a reasonable trier of fact would find 
that an executive ordering an employee to implement an established, generally 
applied and gender-neutral company policy would know that the employee’s 
refusal to follow that order was based on a belief that the order was 
discriminatory.   
 
 
17
Yanowitz engaged in protected activity, because the materials failed to 
demonstrate that she ever made L’Oreal aware that her refusal to terminate the 
sales associate on the basis of her appearance amounted to a protest against 
unlawful discrimination.  L’Oreal’s position is that Yanowitz cannot be found to 
have “opposed” a practice forbidden by the FEHA, within the meaning of 
12940(h), because Yanowitz never notified or advised either Wiswall or any other 
supervisor that she was refusing to obey the order because she believed the order 
violated the FEHA.   
By contrast, although Yanowitz acknowledges that she never explicitly 
stated to Wiswall that she believed his order was discriminatory, she contends that 
in light of the nature of the order and her repeated requests that Wiswall provide 
“adequate justification” for that order, there is sufficient evidence from which a 
trier of fact could find that Wiswall knew that she had declined to follow the order 
because she believed it to be discriminatory, and that under such circumstances 
retaliation on the basis of her conduct was forbidden, even if she did not explicitly 
tell Wiswall, in so many words, that the order was discriminatory.   
We agree with Yanowitz that when the circumstances surrounding an 
employee’s conduct are sufficient to establish that an employer knew that an 
employee’s refusal to comply with an order was based on the employee’s 
reasonable belief that the order is discriminatory, an employer may not avoid the 
reach of the FEHA’s antiretaliation provision by relying on the circumstance that 
the employee did not explicitly inform the employer that she believed the order 
was discriminatory.  The relevant portion of section 12940(h) states simply that an 
employer may not discriminate against an employee “because the person has 
opposed any practices forbidden under this part.”  When an employer knows that 
the employee’s actions rest on such a basis, the purpose of the antiretaliation 
provision is applicable, whether or not the employee has told her employer 
 
 
18
explicitly and directly that she believes an order is discriminatory.  (See Miller v. 
Department of Corrections, supra, ___ Cal.4th ___ [pp. 35-39].) 
Standing alone, an employee’s unarticulated belief that an employer is 
engaging in discrimination will not suffice to establish protected conduct for the 
purposes of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation, where there is no 
evidence the employer knew that the employee’s opposition was based upon a 
reasonable belief that the employer was engaging in discrimination.  (See, e.g., 
Garcia-Paz v. Swift Textiles, Inc. (D.Kan. 1995) 873 F.Supp. 547, 559-560 
(Garcia-Paz) [holding that employee who champions cause of older worker is not 
engaged in protected activity under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 
even where employee acts out of “an unarticulated belief that the employer is 
discriminating on the basis of age. . . unless the activity in question advances 
beyond advocacy and into recognizable opposition to an employment practice that 
the claimant reasonably believes to be unlawful”].)  Although an employee need 
not formally file a charge in order to qualify as being engaged in protected 
opposing activity, 7 such activity must oppose activity the employee reasonably 
believes constitutes unlawful discrimination, and complaints about personal 
grievances or vague or conclusory remarks that fail to put an employer on notice 
as to what conduct it should investigate will not suffice to establish protected 
                                              
7 
Courts consistently have recognized that in enacting anti-retaliation 
provisions, legislators sought to protect a wide range of activity in addition to the 
filing of a formal complaint. (See, e.g., EEOC v. Crown Zellerbach Corp. (9th Cir. 
1983) 720 F.2d 1008, 1012-1014 [writing letter to customer of employer 
complaining about inadequacies in employer’s affirmative action program]; Payne 
v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores (5th Cir. 1981) 654 F.2d 1130, 1136-
1137 [boycotting and picketing of store]; Coleman v. Wayne State University 
(E.D.Mich. 1987) 664 F.Supp. 1082, 1092 & fn. 5 [stating repeatedly in public 
and private that university engaged in discriminatory employment practices].   
 
 
19
conduct.  (See Garcia-Paz at p. 560 [“Employees often do not speak with the 
clarity or precision of lawyers.  At the same time, however, employers need not 
approach every employee’s comment as a riddle, puzzling over the possibility that 
it contains a cloaked complaint of discrimination”]; Booker v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Co., (6th Cir. 1989) 879 F.2d 1304, 1313-14 [affirming 
district court’s determination that an allegation of “ethnocism” was too vague to 
constitute protected opposition under Michigan’s antidiscrimination statute].)   
Nonetheless, we believe it is clear that “an employee is not required to use 
legal terms or buzzwords when opposing discrimination. The court will find 
opposing activity if the employee's comments, when read in their totality, oppose 
discrimination.” (Wirtz v. Kansas Farm Bureau Services, Inc. (D.Kan. 2003) 274 
F.Supp.2d 1198, 1212, fn. omitted.)  It is not difficult to envision circumstances in 
which a subordinate employee may wish to avoid directly confronting a supervisor 
with a charge of discrimination and the employee engages in subtler or more 
indirect means in order to avoid furthering or engaging in discriminatory conduct.  
As the court explained in Garcia-Paz, in such circumstances “the thrust of 
inartful, subtle, or circumspect remarks nevertheless may be perfectly clear to the 
employer, and [there is] no evidence that Congress intended to protect only the 
impudent or articulate.  The relevant question . . . is not whether a formal 
accusation of discrimination is made but whether the employee’s communications 
to the employer sufficiently convey the employee’s reasonable concerns that the 
employer has acted or is acting in an unlawful discriminatory manner.”  (Garcia-
Paz, supra, 873 F.Supp. at p. 560.)   
Thus, in the present case we must determine whether, on the record before 
the trial court on the motion for summary adjudication, a trier of fact properly 
could find that Wiswall knew that Yanowitz was objecting repeatedly to the order 
because she believed in good faith that it was discriminatory.  As noted above, 
 
 
20
Wiswall on multiple occasions directed Yanowitz to fire a sales associate he 
believed was insufficiently attractive, and on one occasion pointed to an attractive 
blonde woman while indicating his preference for  hiring a sales associate who 
looked like her.  Yanowitz refused to implement Wiswall’s directive and 
repeatedly asked for “adequate justification” for that order. There is no evidence in 
the record that Wiswall ever asked Yanowitz to explain her numerous requests for 
“adequate justification,” and L’Oreal failed to present any evidence regarding 
Wiswall’s understanding or knowledge of Yanowitz’s reasons for refusing to 
follow his directive or for demanding “adequate justification” for that directive.  
We conclude that, on this record, a trier of fact properly could find that 
Wiswall knew that Yanowitz’s refusal to comply with his order to fire the sales 
associate was based on Yanowitz’s belief that Wiswall’s order constituted 
discrimination on the basis of sex — that is, the application of a different standard 
to a female employee than that applied to male employees — and that her 
opposition to the directive thus was not merely an unexplained insubordinate act 
bearing no relation to suspected discrimination.  (See Nelson v. Kansas (D.Kan. 
2001) 2001 WL 584436 at p.*7 [fact that plaintiff used the words 
“unprofessional” and “disappointing” rather than “discrimination” or “sexual 
harassment” in incident report detailing the circumstances of a sexual joke or 
conversation “does not alter the fact that the incident report sufficiently conveyed 
plaintiff's reasonable concern that defendant engaged in sexual harassment”].)  A 
trier of fact properly could find that by repeatedly refusing to implement the 
directive unless Wiswall provided “adequate justification,” Yanowitz sufficiently 
conveyed to Wiswall that she considered the order to be discriminatory and put 
him on notice that he should reconsider the order because of its apparent 
discriminatory nature.   
 
 
21
In sum, we conclude that the evidence presented by Yanowitz would 
permit — although it certainly would not compel — a reasonable trier of fact to 
find that, in view of the nature of Wiswall’s order, Yanowitz’s refusal to 
implement the order, coupled with her multiple requests for “adequate 
justification,” sufficiently communicated to Wiswall that she believed that his 
order was discriminatory.  (See Truskoski v. ESPN, Inc. (D.Conn. 1993) 823 
F.Supp. 1007, 1012 [holding that complaints about disparate impact of staffing 
policy (which had “overtones of gender bias and discrimination”) constituted 
protected opposition].)  Thus, we conclude that Yanowitz presented sufficient 
evidence to satisfy the protected activity element of her prima facie case.  
(Mathieu v. Norrell Corp. (2004) 115 Cal. App. 4th 1174, 1187 [triable issue of 
fact existed as to whether defendant reasonably understood plaintiff’s complaints 
to raise an issue of sexual harassment, thus constituting protected activity under 
FEHA].) 
B 
We turn next to an issue that generally is referred to in the employment 
discrimination cases and literature under the rubric of “adverse employment 
action.”  This term does not appear in the language of the FEHA or in title VII, but 
has become a familiar shorthand expression referring to the kind, nature, or degree 
of adverse action against an employee that will support a cause of action under a 
relevant provision of an employment discrimination statute.  (See Power v. 
Summers (7th Cir. 2000) 226 F.3d 815, 820.)  In the present case, the issue before 
us is the appropriate standard for determining whether an employee has been 
subjected to an adverse employment action for purposes of a retaliation claim 
under the FEHA. 
 
We begin with the relevant statutory language.  As already indicated, 
section 12940(h) provides in relevant part that it is an unlawful employment 
 
 
22
practice for an “employer . . . to discharge, expel, or otherwise discriminate 
against any person because the person has opposed any practices forbidden under 
this part or because the person has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any 
proceeding under this part.”  (Italics added.)  The FEHA does not expressly define 
“discriminate” or “otherwise discriminate” as used in section 12940(h), but section 
12940, subdivision (a) (hereafter section 12940(a)) — the initial and basic 
antidiscrimination provision of the FEHA applicable to employers — provides in 
somewhat similar fashion that it is an unlawful employment practice for an 
“employer, because of the race, religious creed, color, national origin, ancestry, 
physical handicap, medical condition, marital status, or sex of any person, to 
refuse to hire or employ the person or to refuse to select the person for a training 
program leading to employment, or to bar or to discharge the person from 
employment or from a training program leading to employment, or to discriminate 
against the person in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of 
employment.”  (Italics added.) 
 
L’Oreal contends that the language “or otherwise discriminate” in section 
12940(h) reasonably should be interpreted to refer to the same category of adverse 
employment measures or sanctions that are set forth in section 12940(a) — that is, 
in general terms, discrimination in the “terms, conditions or privileges of 
employment.”  L’Oreal maintains in this regard that it is most reasonable to 
conclude that the Legislature intended to provide a comparable level of protection 
to those employees who are discriminated against in retaliation for their opposition 
to discriminatory practices as is afforded to those employees who are directly 
discriminated against on the basis, for example, of their race or sex, and employed 
the term “otherwise discriminate” in section 12940(h) to refer to the category of 
discriminatory adverse employment actions set forth in section 12940(a). 
 
 
23
 
In contrast, Yanowitz, embracing the position adopted by the Court of 
Appeal’s decision in the present case, asserts that because the “otherwise 
discriminate” language in section 12940(h) does not contain the descriptive or 
limiting language that appears in section 12940(a) referring specifically to 
discrimination “in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” section 
12940(h) properly should be interpreted to protect employees against a range of 
adverse employment actions broader than those that fall within the reach of section 
12940(a).  Yanowitz urges this court to adopt the standard set forth by the Court of 
Appeal, under which an employee may prevail in an action against an employer 
for improper retaliation not only when the employee has been subjected to the type 
of discrimination in the “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” that 
would support a cause of action under section 12940(a), but also when he or she 
has been subjected to any other action “that is reasonably likely to deter 
employees from engaging in protected activities” ⎯ that is, activities protected by 
section 12940(h). 
 
The standard adopted by the Court of Appeal — the “deterrence 
standard” — does not appear unreasonable when one focuses on the purpose or 
objective of section 12940(h) viewed in isolation.8  When the provisions of 
section 12940 are viewed as a whole, however, we believe it is more reasonable to 
                                              
8  
Under the deterrence standard, a sanction or adverse measure to which an 
employee is subjected in retaliation for protected conduct is actionable so long as 
the employer’s action is “reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in 
protected activity.” (Ray v. Henderson (9th Cir. 2000) 217 F.3d 1234, 1243) 
[adopting the definition of adverse employment action propounded in the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) Compliance Manual, which 
interprets an adverse employment action as “ ‘any adverse treatment that is based 
on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter the charging party or 
others from engaging in protected activity.’ ”].)  
 
 
24
conclude that the Legislature intended to extend a comparable degree of protection 
both to employees who are subject to the types of basic forms of discrimination at 
which the FEHA is directed — that is, for example, discrimination on the basis of 
race or sex — and to employees who are discriminated against in retaliation for 
opposing such discrimination, rather than to interpret the statutory scheme as 
affording a greater degree of protection against improper retaliation than is 
afforded against direct discrimination.  (Accord, e.g., Von Gunten v. Maryland 
(4th Cir. 2001) 243 F.3d 858, 863, fn. 1 [“ ‘Congress has not expressed a stronger 
preference for preventing retaliation under § 2000e-3 than for preventing actual 
discrimination under § 2000e-1,’ and ‘[i]n the absence of strong contrary policy 
considerations, conformity between the provisions of Title VII is to be 
preferred’ ”]; (Richardson v. N.Y. Dep’t of Corr. Serv. (2d Cir. 1999) 180 F.3d 
426, 446; Brown v. Brody (D.C. Cir. 1999) 199 F.3d 446, 458.)  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the term “otherwise discriminate” in section 12940(h) should be 
interpreted to refer to and encompass the same forms of adverse employment 
activity that is actionable under section 12940(a).9  Although the federal courts’ 
interpretation of the comparable provisions of title VII is not determinative of the 
proper interpretation of the provisions of the FEHA, we note in this regard that the 
overwhelming majority of federal courts that have addressed the issue similarly 
have concluded that in order to maintain an action under the antiretaliation 
provision of title VII, an employee must demonstrate that he or she has been 
                                              
9 
Courts adopting this approach have held that, to be actionable, an 
employer’s adverse conduct must materially affect the terms and conditions of 
employment.  (See Akers v. County of San Diego, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at 
pp.1454-1457;  Thomas v. Department of Corrections (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 507, 
510-512. ) 
 
 
25
subjected to an adverse employment action that materially affects the terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, rather than simply that the employee has 
been subjected to an adverse action or treatment that reasonably would deter an 
employee from engaging in the protected activity.10  
                                              
10  
The Court of Appeal’s adoption of the deterrence test in the present case 
created a conflict with Thomas v. Department of Correction , supra, 77 
Cal.App.4th 507, and Akers v. County of San Diego, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th 1441.  
The conflict among our Courts of Appeal mirrors the conflict in the federal courts. 
(See generally Wiles, Defining Adverse Employment Action In Title VII Claims 
For Employer Retaliation: Determining The Most Appropriate Standard (2001) 
27 U. Dayton L. Rev. 217). 
 
The most stringent test, embraced by the Fifth and Eight Circuits, holds that 
only “ultimate employment decisions,” such as demotion or discharge, can be the 
basis for retaliation claims (Dollis v. Rubin (5th Cir. 1995) 77 F.3d 777, 781-782  
[holding that “Title VII was designed to address ultimate employment decisions, 
not to address every decision made by employers that arguably might have some 
tangential effect upon those ultimate decisions”]; Ledergerber v. Stangler (8th 
Cir.1997) 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 [holding that only adverse employment actions 
that “rise to the level of an ultimate employment decision [are] intended to be 
actionable under Title VII”].) 
 
At the other end of the spectrum is the “deterrence test” adopted by the 
Court of Appeal here.  As previously noted, this test defines an adverse action as 
one that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter the 
charging party or others from engaging in protected activity.  The Ninth Circuit is 
the only federal Court of Appeals to adopt this standard.  (See Ray v. Henderson, 
supra, 217 F.3d 1234, 1243.) 
 
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits generally have avoided adopting a 
uniform standard and instead utilize a case-by-case approach that takes into 
account all relevant circumstances in a given case.  (See, e.g., Jeffries v. Kansas 
(10th Cir. 1998) 147 F.3d 1220, 1232 [explicitly stating that the Tenth Circuit 
takes a case-by-case approach to what constitutes adverse employment action, and 
expressly rejecting any requirement that an employer’s action be “material” to the 
terms and conditions of employment in order to be actionable]; Wideman v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. (11th Cir. 1998) 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 [finding that written 
reprimands, an employer’s solicitation of negative comments by coworkers, and a 
one-day suspension constituted adverse employment actions].) 
 
Courts in the First and Third Circuits also have taken a broad view of the 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
 
26
Although Yanowitz argues that our adoption of the foregoing conclusion — 
that is, interpreting section 12940(h) as affording those employees who engage in 
protected activities protection against only the same range of adverse employment 
actions that are prohibited by section 12940(a) — will leave such employees with 
an inadequate degree of protection and vulnerable to a broad range of retaliatory 
measures, we believe this argument rests, at least in part, on an unduly narrow 
view of the type of adverse employment actions that are forbidden by section 
12940(a).  Retaliation claims are inherently fact specific, and the impact of an 
employer’s action in a particular case must be evaluated in context.  Accordingly, 
although an adverse employment action must materially affect the terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment to be actionable, the determination of 
whether a particular action or course of conduct rises to the level of actionable 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
type of activity that constitutes adverse employment action but have required that 
the adverse action alter the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.  (See, 
e.g., Randlett v. Shalala (1st Cir. 1997) 118 F.3d 857, 862 [incorporating by 
reference the “terms, conditions and privileges of employment” qualifier in title 
VII’s general discrimination provision into the adverse action determination in a 
title VII retaliation claim]; Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh (3d Cir.1997)120 F.3d 
1286, 1300 [“retaliatory conduct must be serious and tangible enough to alter an 
employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment . . . to 
constitute [an] ‘adverse employment action.’ ”) 
 
Finally, the remaining circuits expressly have adopted the materiality 
standard, which holds that a retaliation claim lies only for an employment action 
that materially affects the terms and conditions of employment.  (See, e.g., Torres 
v. Pisano (2nd Cir.1997)116 F.3d 625, 640 [to show an adverse employment 
action employee must demonstrate “a materially adverse change in the terms and 
conditions of employment”]; Nguyen v. Cleveland (6th Cir. 2000) 229 F.3d 559, 
566; Von Gunten v. Maryland, supra, 243 F.3d 858; Ribando v. United Airlines, 
Inc. (7th Cir. 1999) 200 F.3d 507, 510-511; Brown v. Brody, supra, 199 F.3d at 
p. 457.)  
 
 
27
conduct should take into account the unique circumstances of the affected 
employee as well as the workplace context of the claim.11   
As the United States Supreme Court recognized in interpreting and 
applying the provisions of title VII in Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. (1993) 510 U.S. 
17, the statutory language protecting employees against racial or sexual 
discrimination in compensation or in the terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment is not limited to adverse employment actions that impose an 
economic detriment or inflict a tangible psychological injury upon an employee.  
In Harris (a sexual harassment case), after quoting the language of title VII (42 
U.S.C. 2000e-§ 2(a)(1)) making it an unlawful employment practice “ ‘to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment,’ ” the high court went on to explain that 
“this language ‘is not limited to “economic” or “tangible” discrimination.  The 
phrase “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” evinces a congressional 
intent “to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women” 
in employment,’ which includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily 
hostile or abusive environment.  [Citations.]  When the workplace is permeated 
with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult’ [citation] that is 
‘sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment 
and create an abusive working environment’ [citation], Title VII is violated.  This 
standard, which we reaffirm today, takes a middle path between making 
actionable any conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause 
a tangible psychological injury.  As we pointed out in Meritor [Sav. Bank, FSB v. 
                                              
11 
Moreover, as we discuss in detail, post, considering an employer’s actions 
in context comports with our conclusion that it is appropriate to consider 
plaintiff’s allegations collectively under a totality of the circumstances approach.   
 
 
28
Vinson (1986) 477 U.S. 57, 67], ‘mere utterance of an . . . epithet which engenders 
offensive feelings in an employee,’ . . . does not sufficiently affect the conditions 
of employment to implicate Title VII. . . .   [¶]  But Title VII comes into play 
before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown.  A discriminatorily 
abusive work environment, even one that does not seriously affect employees’ 
psychological well-being, can and often will detract from employees’ job 
performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from 
advancing in their careers. . . . [¶]  . . .  Certainly Title VII bars conduct that 
would seriously affect a reasonable person’s psychological well-being, but the 
statute is not limited to such conduct.  So long as the environment would 
reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive [citation], there is 
no need for it also to be psychologically injurious.  [¶]  This is not, and by its 
nature cannot be, a mathematically precise test.  We need not answer today all the 
potential questions it raises . . . .  But we can say that whether an environment is 
‘hostile’ or ‘abusive’ can be determined only by looking at all the circumstances.  
These may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; 
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; 
and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.  
The effect on the employee’s well-being is, of course, relevant to determining 
whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive.  But while 
psychological harm, like any other relevant factor, may be taken into account, no 
single factor is required.”  (Harris, supra, 510 U.S. at pp. 21-23, fns. omitted, 
italics added.) 
As the high court concluded in Harris with respect to the comparable 
language embodied in Title VII, we believe that the language in section 12940(a) 
making it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate 
against an employee on the basis of race, sex, or the other enumerated 
 
 
29
characteristics “in compensation or in the terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment” properly must be interpreted broadly to further the fundamental 
antidiscrimination purposes of the FEHA.12  Appropriately viewed, this provision 
protects an employee against unlawful discrimination with respect not only to so-
called “ultimate employment actions” such as termination or demotion, but also 
the entire spectrum of employment actions that are reasonably likely to adversely 
and materially affect an employee’s job performance or opportunity for 
advancement in his or her career.  Although a mere offensive utterance or even a 
pattern of social slights by either the employer or co-employees cannot properly 
be viewed as materially affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment for purposes of section 12940(a) (or give rise to a claim under section 
12940(h)),13 the phrase “terms, conditions, or privileges” of employment must be 
                                              
12 
Although Harris was a sexual harassment case, the high court’s reasoning 
applies with equal vigor in the retaliation context.  Indeed, in Noviello v. City of 
Boston (1st Cir. 2005) 398 F.3d 76, the First Circuit recently concluded that a 
hostile work environment can constitute a retaliatory adverse employment action 
under both title VII and under analogous Massachusetts state law.  (Id. at p. 89).  
The court characterized this approach as the “majority view” under federal law. 
(See ibid. and cases cited therein.)  
13  
See, e.g., Torres v. Pisano, supra, 116 F.3d at p. 640 (fact that acts left 
employee feeling “frightened” and “humiliated” failed to establish that employee 
suffered an adverse employment action); Ruggieri v. Harrington (E.D.N.Y. 2001) 
146 F.Supp.2d 202, 216 (circumstance that plaintiff was embarrassed by 
employer’s actions inadequate to demonstrate adverse employment action); 
Flaherty v. Gas Research Inst. (7th Cir. 1994) 31 F.3d 451, 457 (plaintiff’s 
“bruised ego” as a result of transfer that plaintiff found “personally humiliating” 
insufficient to constitute adverse employment action); Welsh v. Derwinski (1st Cir. 
1994)14 F.3d 85, 86 (recognizing that “not every unpleasant matter . . . creates a 
cause of action” under title VII); Brooks v. City of San Mateo (9th Cir. 2000) 229 
F.3d 917, 929 (“[b]ecause an employer cannot force employees to socialize with 
one another, ostracism suffered at the hands of coworkers cannot constitute an 
adverse employment action”); Strother v. Southern Cal. Permanente Medical 
 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
 
 
30
interpreted liberally and with a reasonable appreciation of the realities of the 
workplace in order to afford employees the appropriate and generous protection 
against employment discrimination that the FEHA was intended to provide.14 
As the high court recognized in Harris, the determination of what type of 
adverse treatment properly should be considered discrimination in the terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment is not, by its nature, susceptible to a 
mathematically precise test, and the significance of particular types of adverse 
actions must be evaluated by taking into account the legitimate interests of both 
the employer and the employee.  Minor or relatively trivial adverse actions or 
conduct by employers or fellow employees that, from an objective perspective, are 
reasonably likely to do no more than anger or upset an employee cannot properly 
be viewed as materially affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment and are not actionable, but adverse treatment that is reasonably likely 
to impair a reasonable employee’s job performance or prospects for advancement 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
 
Group (9th Cir. 1996) 79 F.3d 859, 869 (mere ostracism in the workplace is 
insufficient to establish an adverse employment decision). 
14  
The FEHA advances the fundamental public policy of eliminating 
discrimination in the workplace, and the provisions of the act are to be construed 
broadly and liberally in order to accomplish its purposes.  (§ 12933, subd. (a)).  
Indeed, as we have stated, a “policy that promotes the right to seek and hold 
employment free of prejudice is fundamental.  Job discrimination ‘foments 
domestic strife and unrest, deprives the state of the fullest utilization of its 
capacities for development and advance, and substantially and adversely affects 
the interest of employees, employers, and the public in general.’  [Quoting 
§ 12920.]  The statute’s aim is to provide effective remedies against this evil.”  
(Commodore Home Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County 
(1982) 32 Cal.3d 211, 220) 
 
 
31
or promotion falls within the reach of the antidiscrimination provisions of sections 
12940(a) and 12940(h).15  
III. 
In light of the foregoing conclusions, we turn to the specific employer acts 
here at issue.  Yanowitz contends that the following activity constitutes adverse 
employment actions for purposes of her prima facie claim:  (1) unwarranted 
negative performance evaluations (specifically, Roderick’s July 16, 1998 memo 
criticizing Yanowitz); (2) L’Oreal’s refusal to allow Yanowitz to respond to the 
allegedly unwarranted criticism, by insisting on the July 22, 1998 meeting despite 
Yanowitz’s request to postpone the meeting to allow her to prepare a defense to 
the charges; (3) unwarranted criticism voiced by Roderick in the presence of 
Yanowitz’s associates and other employees on May 13, 1998, and the 
“humiliating” public reprobation by Wiswall on June 11, 1998; (4) refusing 
Yanowitz’s request to provide necessary resources and assistance to Christine 
DeGracia (sometime after May 13, 1998), thereby allegedly fueling the employee 
resentment for which Yanowitz was chastised in her performance reviews; and 
(5) Roderick’s solicitation of negative feedback from Yanowitz’s staff in April 
1998. 
As a threshold matter, we need not and do not decide whether each alleged 
retaliatory act constitutes an adverse employment action in and of itself.  Yanowitz 
                                              
15 
See, e.g., Wyatt v. City of Boston (1st Cir. 1994) 35 F.3d 13, 15-16 (stating 
that actions other than discharge are covered by title VII’s antiretaliation provision 
and listing, as examples, “employer actions such as demotions, disadvantageous 
transfers or assignments, refusals to promote, unwarranted negative job 
evaluations and toleration of harassment by other employees”); Wideman v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., supra, 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (finding that written reprimands, an 
employer’s solicitation of negative comments by co-workers, and a one-day 
suspension constituted adverse employment actions). 
 
 
32
has alleged that L’Oreal’s actions formed a pattern of systematic retaliation for her 
opposition to Wiswall’s discriminatory directive.  Contrary to L’Oreal’s assertion 
that it is improper to consider collectively the alleged retaliatory acts, there is no 
requirement that an employer’s retaliatory acts constitute one swift blow, rather 
than a series of subtle, yet damaging, injuries.  (See, e.g., Bass v. Board of County 
Com'rs, Orange County, Fla. (11th Cir. 2001) 256 F.3d 1095, 1118 [retaliatory 
actions that did not deprive plaintiff of compensation and may not have 
individually constituted adverse employment actions were, when viewed 
collectively, actionable];  Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., supra, 141 F.3d at 
p. 1456 [“It is enough to conclude, as we do, that the actions about which 
Wideman complains considered collectively are sufficient to constitute prohibited 
[retaliation]. We need not and do not decide whether anything less than the totality 
of the alleged reprisals would be sufficient”].)  Enforcing a requirement that each 
act separately constitute an adverse employment action would subvert the purpose 
and intent of the statute.16   
                                              
16 
Nor is there any merit in L’Oreal’s contention that viewing the allegedly 
retaliatory acts collectively is improper because such an approach conflates the 
difference between discrimination or retaliation claims and hostile environment 
claims.  (See Kim v. Nash Finch Co. (8th Cir. 1997) 123 F.3d 1046, 1060 [holding 
that reduction of duties, disciplinary action, and negative personnel reports, as 
well as required remedial training, constituted adverse employment actions and 
refusing to decide whether each alleged retaliatory act by itself constituted adverse 
action, because plaintiff “essentially claimed that [his employer] had 
systematically retaliated against him ⎯ that is, that all the acts were taken in 
response to his filing the employment discrimination charge and thus were 
connected to one another”].) Moreover, “workplace harassment, if sufficiently 
severe or pervasive, may in and of itself constitute an adverse employment action 
sufficient to satisfy the second prong of the prima facie case for . . . retaliation 
cases.”  (Noviello v. City of Boston, supra, 398 F.3d at p. 90.) 
 
 
33
It is therefore appropriate that we consider plaintiff’s allegations 
collectively.  L’Oreal additionally argues, however, that in any event we may not 
consider the full range of acts, because only acts that occurred within one year 
prior to the filing of Yanowitz’s claim with the DFEH — that is, within one year 
prior to June 25, 1999 — are actionable and the remaining acts are barred by the 
statute of limitations.  L’Oreal urges us to apply the statute of limitations strictly 
and limit Yanowitz’s claims to only those acts that occurred one year or less 
before she filed her DFEH claim ⎯ namely, Roderick’s July 16, 1998 
memorandum, the refusal to give Yanowitz additional time to respond to that 
memorandum, and the July 22, 1998 meeting.  Conversely, Yanowitz urges us to 
apply the continuing violation doctrine we recently discussed in Richards, supra, 
26 Cal.4th 798.  Under that doctrine, an employer is liable for actions that take 
place outside the limitations period if these actions are sufficiently linked to 
unlawful conduct that occurred within the limitations period.  (Id. at p.812). 
In Richards, we applied the continuing violation doctrine to a plaintiff’s 
disability accommodation and disability harassment claims under the FEHA, 
reasoning that the FEHA statute of limitations should not be interpreted to force 
upon a disabled employee engaged in the process of seeking reasonable 
accommodation or ending disability harassment the unappealing choice of 
resigning at the first sign of discrimination or, on the other hand, persisting in the 
reconciliation process and possibly forfeiting a valid claim should that process 
prove unsuccessful.  (Id. at p. 821).  Thus, we held that when an employer 
unlawfully refuses reasonable accommodation of a disabled employee or engages 
in disability harassment, the statute of limitations begins to run either “when the 
course of conduct is brought to an end, as by the employer’s cessation of such 
conduct or by the employee’s resignation, or when the employee is on notice that 
further efforts to end the unlawful conduct will be in vain.”  (Id. at p. 823). 
 
 
34
Subsequent to our decision in Richards, the United States Supreme Court 
decided National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan (2002) 536 U.S. 101 
(Morgan), where the court held that, with regard to the applicability of the 
continuing violations doctrine, a distinction should be drawn between 
discrimination and retaliation claims on the one hand, and hostile work 
environment claims on the other hand.  The court in Morgan reasoned that 
because title VII’s definition of “unlawful employment practices” includes many 
discrete acts but does not indicate that the term “practice” converts related discrete 
acts into a single unlawful practice for timely filing purposes, discrete 
discriminatory acts are not actionable if time-barred, even when they are related to 
acts alleged in timely filed charges.  (Id. at pp. 110-113).  The court further stated 
that hostile work environment claims, by contrast, by their very nature involve 
repeated conduct and thus cannot be said to occur on any particular day.  Because 
a harassment claim is composed of a series of separate acts that collectively 
constitute one “unlawful employment practice,” the court in Morgan concluded 
that it does not matter that some of the component parts fall outside the statutory 
time period.  (Id. at pp. 116-118).  
L’Oreal urges us to adopt Morgan’s reasoning and limit the continuing 
violation doctrine to only harassment claims, thus excluding discrimination and 
retaliation claims.  A rule categorically barring application of the continuing 
violation doctrine in retaliation cases, however, would mark a significant 
departure from the reasoning and underlying policy rationale of our previous cases 
interpreting the FEHA statute of limitations.  In Richards, we recognized that such 
a strict approach to the statute of limitations could encourage early litigation, and 
that in order to minimize the filing of unripe lawsuits and to promote the 
conciliatory resolution of claims, the FEHA statute of limitations should be 
interpreted liberally to allow employers and employees an opportunity to resolve 
 
 
35
disputes informally.  (See Richards, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p.819, citing Romano v. 
Rockwell Internat. Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 479, 493-494 (Romano)).  In our earlier 
decision in Romano, supra, these same policy concerns critically informed our 
decision that a FEHA action for discriminatory discharge does not commence until 
the actual discharge, not the time the employee was notified that he or she would 
be discharged.  (Romano, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp.494-495.)  
Nothing in Richards or Romano limited application of these principles to 
only harassment claims, rather than discrimination or retaliation claims.  (See 
Birschtein v. New United Motor Mfg., Inc. (2002) 92 Cal.App.4th 994, 1004 
[remarking that in Richards, the “foundation of the court’s rationale supporting 
application of the continuing violation doctrine in FEHA discrimination litigation 
is not so much accommodation itself as a process of conciliation”].)  Indeed, in 
Richards, we expressly applied the continuing violation doctrine to the plaintiff’s 
disability discrimination claim, as well as to her disability harassment claim.  
Thus, we already have recognized that when the requisite showing of a temporally 
related and continuous course of conduct has been established, it is appropriate to 
apply the continuing violations doctrine to disability accommodation claims, as 
well as to harassment claims.17   
Indeed, an examination of the facts of the instant case illustrates why a 
categorical bar on the application of the continuing violations doctrine in the 
                                              
17 
Moreover, as we previously have stressed, the liberal construction 
mandated by the FEHA extends to interpretations of the FEHA’s statute of 
limitations:  “In order to carry out the purpose of the FEHA to safeguard the 
employee’s right to hold employment without experiencing discrimination, the 
limitations period set out in the FEHA should be interpreted so as to promote the 
resolution of potentially meritorious claims on the merits.”  (Richards, supra, 26 
Cal.4th at p. 819, citing Romano, supra, 14 Cal.4th at pp. 493-494.) 
 
 
36
retaliation context is incompatible with our previous pronouncements in this area.  
Here, the plaintiff alleges a retaliatory course of conduct rather than a discrete act 
of retaliation, and as we concluded above, a series of separate retaliatory acts 
collectively may constitute an “adverse employment action” even if some or all of 
the component acts might not be individually actionable.  If, however, we were to 
foreclose application of the continuing violations doctrine as a matter of law in 
retaliation cases, the statute of limitations would start running upon the happening 
of the first act of retaliation, even if that act would not be actionable standing 
alone.  A rule that would force employees to bring actions for “discrete acts” of 
retaliation that have not yet become ripe for adjudication, and that the employee 
may not yet recognize as part of a pattern of retaliation, is fundamentally 
incompatible with the twin policy goals of encouraging informal resolution of 
disputes and avoiding premature lawsuits that critically informed our analysis in 
Richards and Romano.18 
                                              
18 
To the extent Morgan holds otherwise, we decline to adopt its reasoning.  
Unlike our cases, Morgan appears to give no weight to the impact of a statute of 
limitations on informal conciliation processes.  Moreover, we note that the factual 
posture of the present case demonstrates a flaw in the reasoning of Morgan, which 
barred application of the continuing violations doctrine for discrimination and 
retaliation claims because those claims were founded on “discrete acts.”  As noted 
above, here Yanowitz alleges a retaliatory course of conduct premised on a series 
of interrelated retaliatory acts that, when considered collectively, constitute an 
adverse employment action.  Morgan concluded that because a harassment claim 
is composed of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one “unlawful 
employment practice,” a plaintiff may assert individual components from the pre-
limitations period as part of the continuing violation.  (Morgan, supra, 536 U.S. at 
pp. 116-118.)  Thus, because the facts alleged here, like the harassment claims 
discussed in Morgan, collectively constitute an unlawful employment practice, the 
analytical distinction that Morgan purported to draw between retaliation and 
harassment claims is unpersuasive.   
 
 
37
Accordingly, foreclosing the application of the continuing violation 
doctrine in a case such as this one, where the plaintiff alleges a retaliatory course 
of conduct rather than a discrete act of retaliation, would undermine the 
fundamental purpose of the FEHA by encouraging early litigation and the 
adjudication of unripe claims.  We believe the better rule is to allow application of 
the continuing violations doctrine in retaliation cases if the requisite showing of a 
continuing course of conduct has been made.  Thus, we reiterate that in a 
retaliation case, as in a disability accommodation or harassment case, the FEHA 
statute of limitations begins to run when an alleged adverse employment action 
acquires some degree of permanence or finality. (Richards, supra, 26 Cal.4th at 
p. 823.)   
Turning to the applicability of the doctrine in the present case, we apply the 
factors outlined in Richards.  Specifically, we consider whether “the employer’s 
actions were (1) sufficiently similar in kind ⎯ recognizing, as this case illustrates, 
that similar kinds of unlawful employer conduct, such as acts of harassment or 
failures to reasonably accommodate disability, may take a number of different 
forms [Citation]; (2) have occurred with reasonable frequency; (3) and have not 
acquired a degree of permanence.”  (Richards, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 823.)19  
Here, Yanowitz contends that in retaliation for her refusal to follow Wiswall’s 
discriminatory directives in the fall of 1997, L’Oreal began a campaign of 
retaliation that commenced with the solicitation of negative feedback from 
                                              
19 
We also noted that “permanence” properly should be understood to mean 
“that an employer’s statements and actions make clear to a reasonable employee 
that any further efforts at informal conciliation to obtain reasonable 
accommodation or end harassment will be futile.”  (Richards, supra, 26 Cal.4th at 
p. 823.) 
 
 
38
Yanowitz’s subordinates in April 1998, continued with a refusal to accommodate 
those employees’ administrative needs in May 1998, the presentation of 
unwarranted criticism and humiliation in the presence of these employees in June 
1998, and an unwarranted negative written evaluation in a July 16, 1998 
memorandum, and finally culminated with L’Oreal’s refusal, after the transmittal 
of the July 16 memorandum, to allow Yanowitz time to respond to the charges 
leveled against her.   
In sum, Yanowitz alleges that in the course of these actions, L’Oreal 
solicited or fabricated negative information about Yanowitz and then used this 
information to intimidate, disempower, and punish Yanowitz.  We conclude that a 
reasonable trier of fact could find that the solicitation of negative information from 
subordinates, the criticism of Yanowitz both verbally and in written memos based 
in part on the negative information obtained from her subordinates, and the 
subsequent refusal to allow Yanowitz to answer the charges leveled against her, 
were similar in kind and occurred with sufficient frequency to constitute a 
continuous and temporally related course of conduct. Moreover, a reasonable trier 
of fact could conclude Yanowitz was not on notice that further conciliatory efforts 
would be futile, until her final attempts to meet with company representatives to 
discuss the criticism directed at her were finally rebuffed.  Accordingly, in light of 
the evidence submitted by the parties at the summary adjudication stage, we 
cannot determine that the continuing violation doctrine is inapplicable as a matter 
of law.  (Richards, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 823.)   
Furthermore, with regard to the question whether L’Oreal’s alleged acts of 
retaliation, considered collectively, constitute a sufficient adverse employment 
action under the relevant standard (materially affecting the terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment), we conclude that Yanowitz has met her burden of 
establishing an adverse employment action for purposes of her prima facie case.  
 
 
39
The record establishes that prior to the period relevant here, Yanowitz had been a 
highly rated and honored employee of L’Oreal for 18 years.  In April 1998, 
however, her supervisors Roderick and Wiswall began to actively solicit negative 
information about her and then employed this information to criticize Yanowitz 
both in the presence of her subordinates and in written memoranda.  These 
supervisors refused to review her response to these charges and employed the 
negative information received to justify new, restrictive directives regarding her 
future performance and to impair her effectiveness with her staff.  
These actions constituted more than mere inconveniences or insignificant 
changes in job responsibilities.  Months of unwarranted and public criticism of a 
previously honored employee, an implied threat of termination, contacts with 
subordinates that only could have the effect of undermining a manager’s 
effectiveness, and new regulation of the manner in which the manager oversaw her 
territory did more than inconvenience Yanowitz.  Such actions, which for 
purposes of this discussion we must assume were unjustified and were meant to 
punish Yanowitz for her failure to carry out her supervisor’s order, placed her 
career in jeopardy.  Indeed, Roderick so much as told Yanowitz that unless there 
were immediate changes, her career at L’Oreal was over.  Actions that threaten to 
derail an employee’s career are objectively adverse, and the evidence presented 
here creates a factual dispute that cannot be resolved at the summary judgment 
stage. (See Noviello v. City of Boston, supra, 398 F.3d 76 [analysis of effect of 
retaliatory conduct should include “the relative ubiquity of the retaliatory conduct, 
its severity, its natural tendency to humiliate . . . a reasonable person, and its 
capacity to interfere with the plaintiff’s work performance.”].)  
Contrary to L’Oreal’s assertion, this is not a case in which the plaintiff 
alleges merely commonplace indignities typical of the workplace.  Yanowitz 
alleges a pattern of systematic retaliation, and numerous cases recognize that 
 
 
40
adverse employment action includes treatment similar to that here at issue.  (See, 
e.g., Wyatt v. City of Boston, supra, 35 F.3d at pp. 15-16  [stating that actions 
other than discharge are covered by title VII’s antiretaliation provision, and listing 
as examples “employer actions such as demotions, disadvantageous transfers or 
assignments, refusals to promote, unwarranted negative job evaluations and 
toleration of harassment by other employees”]; Gunnell v. Utah Valley State 
College (10th Cir.1998) 152 F.3d 1253, 1264 [holding that coworker hostility or 
retaliatory harassment, if sufficiently severe, can constitute adverse employment 
action for purposes of a title VII retaliation claim]; Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., supra, 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 [finding that written reprimands, an employer’s 
solicitation of negative comments by coworkers, and a one-day suspension 
constituted adverse employment actions]; Corneveaux v. CUNA Mut. Ins. Group 
(10th Cir. 1997) 76 F.3d 1498, 1507-1508 [holding that an adverse employment 
action occurred when an employee was required to “go through several hoops” in 
order to obtain severance benefits]; Yartzoff v. Thomas (9th Cir. 1987) 809 F.2d 
1371, 1376 [“[t]ransfers of job duties and undeserved performance ratings, if 
proven, would constitute ‘adverse employment decisions’ ”].)  
We emphasize that we do not determine that the alleged adverse action 
occurred, or that it was not justified by bona fide concerns on the part of L’Oreal 
with regard to Yanowitz’s general performance at work that might yet be proved 
at trial. We hold only that, at the summary adjudication stage, Yanowitz's evidence 
was sufficient to satisfy the adverse action element of her prima facie case. It 
remains for the trier of fact to decide whether Yanowitz’s allegations are true. 
IV. 
Finally, L’Oreal argues that the Court of Appeal erred in holding that 
Yanowitz met her burden of establishing that L’Oreal’s stated nonretaliatory 
grounds for taking the actions against her were pretextual.  L’Oreal points to an 
 
 
41
August 5, 1997 memo from Roderick to Sears — written months before the 
incident with Wiswall — that severely criticized Yanowitz for deficiencies in her 
“listening” skills and her “attitude,” and to Yanowitz’s admission that the 
November 1997 merger created problems in her department and left her with 
additional job responsibilities that may have had an impact on her performance.  
L’Oreal additionally proffered evidence that it had received complaints about 
Yanowitz from customers before and after the incidents with Wiswall and that 
these complaints expressed negative feedback about Yanowitz, including an 
expressed desire by certain corporate customers not to work with Yanowitz again. 
The evidence proffered by L’Oreal does indicate that there were problems 
with Yanowitz’s performance both before and after the incident with Wiswall, but 
such evidence is not sufficient in itself to support the trial court’s grant of 
summary judgment in L’Oreal’s favor.  The record reflects that many of the 
problems identified in the negative performance reviews had been associated with 
Yanowitz in a number of performance reviews conducted between 1987 and 1996.  
Despite these criticisms, however, these same performance reviews consistently 
rated Yanowitz “above expectation,” and in 1997 ⎯ the year before the incidents 
here at issue ⎯ Yanowitz was awarded the sales manager of the year award.  
Moreover, there is no evidence that at the time of these earlier negative 
evaluations, L’Oreal actively solicited negative feedback about Yanowitz, berated 
her in the presence of her staff, or threatened to terminate her unless her 
performance improved.  Roderick’s active solicitation of negative information 
concerning Yanowitz in the spring of 1998 strongly suggests the possibility that 
her employer was engaged in a search for a pretextual basis for discipline, which 
in turn suggests that the subsequent discipline imposed was for purposes of 
retaliation.  (See Lindemann & Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law (3d 
ed. 1996) 674-675.)  
 
 
42
Thus, we conclude that the record reveals triable issues of fact as to 
whether L’Oreal’s heightened response to Yanowitz’s allegedly poor 
performance ⎯ after she refused to follow Wiswall’s directive ⎯ was retaliation 
for her protected activity under the FEHA.  (Hairston v. The Gainesville Sun 
Publishing Co. (11th Cir. 1993) 9 F.3d 913, 921 [reversing summary judgment on 
the ground of pretext and finding that when the plaintiff presented evidence of 
above average performance evaluations before the filing of a complaint, and 
unfavorable performance evaluations immediately before and after the filing of a 
complaint, incidents of increased scrutiny and harassment bear on the pretext 
issue].)  Taking into account all of the evidence submitted in support of and in 
opposition to the summary judgment motion, there exists a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether L’Oreal’s articulated, nonretaliatory reasons for its 
actions were pretextual.  Therefore, the Court of Appeal properly held that the trial 
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of L’Oreal cannot be sustained on this 
ground.   
V. 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the Court of Appeal’s decision 
reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of L’Oreal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISSENTING OPINION BY CHIN, J. 
 
 
I dissent. 
Plaintiff alleges she was subjected to adverse employment actions due to 
her opposition to a personnel order that, she now claims, she believed constituted 
unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex.  She seeks the protection of a statute 
that prohibits retaliation against a person who opposes a forbidden employment 
practice.  However, until after she filed this lawsuit, she never communicated to 
her employer her alleged belief that the order was sexually discriminatory or, 
indeed, unlawful in any way.  This case thus presents the question whether a 
person can be a whistleblower without blowing the whistle.  At least in this case, 
where the personnel order was not clearly unlawful, I would say no. 
The majority concludes that plaintiff may recover damages from her 
employer for retaliating against her because she failed to carry out a personnel 
order that she reasonably believed violated the California Fair Employment and 
Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) even if (1) the order did not, in 
fact, violate the FEHA; and (2) she never related her belief to her employer.  I 
disagree.  The whole point behind giving whistleblowers special protection is to 
encourage them to speak out to try to prevent employment discrimination before it 
takes place or to expose it after it occurs.  It makes no sense to give this special 
protection to someone, like plaintiff here, who did nothing (until after she filed a 
 
2 
lawsuit) to communicate to her employer that she opposed what she believed to be 
a discriminatory act. 
The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant. 
I.  SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Plaintiff Elysa J. Yanowitz alleges the following.  She was a regional sales 
manager based in San Francisco for defendant L’Oreal USA, Inc. (L’Oreal).  
Sometime during the fall of 1997, Jack Wiswall, the New York-based general 
manager of L’Oreal’s designer fragrance division and one of Yanowitz’s superiors 
within the company, ordered her to terminate a female salesperson because he 
thought she was “not good looking enough.”  In her declaration, plaintiff 
described the salesperson as a “dark-skinned woman” who she believed was “of 
Iranian descent.”  Wiswall told her something like, “Get me somebody hot.” 
Plaintiff did not carry out the order because she believed it was unlawful.  
In a declaration that she prepared for this litigation, she explained the reasons for 
her belief:  “This was the first time in all of my years as Regional Sales Manager 
that anybody had ever asked me to make a final employment decision based upon 
the physical appearance, much less the subjective physical appearance, of an 
employee.  And there never was any suggestion that any of the males who were 
under my supervision should be hired, evaluated, promoted, or fired because of 
their physical appearances.  At the time that Wiswall gave the instruction, there 
was a male sales associate in Cosmair’s [L’Oreal’s former name] Ralph Lauren 
installation in Macy’s San Francisco Union Square Branch.  I also had a male 
account executive in Seattle, Washington, and until recently, or conceivably even 
at that time, I had a male coordinator in Macy’s San Francisco Union Square 
Branch.  In earlier years, I had had two other male account executives.  I had hired 
one of these individuals as a coordinator and later promoted him to an account 
executive.  And shortly before I went out on disability leave, I had made a job 
 
3 
offer to another male for a coordinator’s position, as I recall, in Macy’s Union 
Square Branch.”  Because of these facts, she “believed that it was contrary to both 
federal and state sex discrimination laws to terminate a female employee who was 
performing satisfactorily and who presented herself in a businesslike fashion 
because of the subjective belief of a male corporate officer that the woman did not 
fit his notions of physical attractiveness, when opinions as to the physical 
attractiveness of male employees never were taken into consideration in 
connection with any employment decisions.” 
Sometime later, when Wiswall learned that the employee had not been 
dismissed, he told plaintiff something like, “Didn’t I tell you to get rid of her, I 
want her out of here.”  He observed a “young attractive blonde girl, very sexy,” 
and told plaintiff to “get me one that looks that.”  She responded, “Jack, you’ve 
got to give me adequate reasons or justification for dismissing her.”  In her 
declaration, plaintiff states, “After the initial directive, Wiswall persisted in 
questioning me whether [the salesperson] had been terminated or when I would 
terminate her.  I protested to Wiswall on a number of occasions that he had to give 
me a justifiable reason to terminate this employee.  The matter became particularly 
difficult when . . . in March 1998, I learned that [the salesperson] was one of the 
top performers in the men’s fragrance department throughout the entire chain.”  
When asked specific questions during her deposition regarding the number of 
times she spoke with Wiswall on this subject, she could remember only the initial 
directive and a single follow-up conversation.  She could not specifically 
remember additional conversations with Wiswall on the subject. 
Plaintiff did not say anything to Wiswall to convey that she felt the order 
was discriminatory other than asking him to give her “adequate grounds to dismiss 
her.”  She does not allege that she told Wiswall that the salesperson in question 
was a top performer.  She never reported to Richard Roderick, her immediate 
 
4 
supervisor within the company, or anyone else within the company, including the 
human resources department, that she believed she had received a discriminatory 
order from Wiswall.  She explained in her declaration that she said nothing to 
Roderick about her concerns because she “did not have any confidence that 
Roderick would say, much less do, anything.  I found Roderick to be totally 
ineffectual and lacking independence.”  Moreover, she “did not report Wiswall to 
or seek assistance from [the] Human Resources Department, because I did not 
have any confidence that that Department would provide any assistance in dealing 
with Wiswall.  That Department did not have the reputation of assisting lower 
level employees or even middle management personnel in disputes involving 
upper management.” 
Ultimately, plaintiff did not terminate the salesperson and, apparently, no 
one else did either.  L’Oreal also did not terminate or demote plaintiff, but she 
alleges that, as a result of her not terminating the salesperson, she was subjected to 
other adverse employment actions.  She eventually departed the company on 
disability leave due to stress. 
In this action, plaintiff alleged, among other things, that she was the victim 
of discriminatory retaliation due to her refusal to carry out the order to fire the 
female employee, an order that, she believed, would have violated “the prohibition 
against discrimination by sex established in the” FEHA.  The trial court granted 
L’Oreal’s motion for summary judgment, but the Court of Appeal reversed as to 
the retaliation cause of action.  We granted L’Oreal’s petition for review and must 
now decide whether the facts of this case state a valid cause of action for unlawful 
retaliation under the FEHA. 
 
5 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Prima Facie Case of Retaliation 
Plaintiff claims L’Oreal illegally retaliated against her in violation of 
Government Code section 12940, subdivision (h) (section 12940(h)), part of the 
FEHA, which makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 
“discriminate against any person because the person has opposed any practices 
forbidden under” the FEHA.  She claims L’Oreal retaliated against her because 
she opposed Wiswall’s order to fire the female sales representative.  She alleges 
this retaliation constituted unlawful discrimination because she reasonably 
believed the order itself unlawfully discriminated on the basis of sex.  But this 
allegation encounters a problem at the outset.  Plaintiff did not tell L’Oreal of her 
alleged belief.  She never told anyone within the company that she believed the 
order to terminate the salesperson constituted sex discrimination or, indeed, was 
unlawful for any reason. 
The majority and I agree on the broad principles applicable to retaliation 
claims.  “Lawsuits claiming retaliatory employment termination in violation of 
CFEHA are analogous to federal ‘title VII’ claims (Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; hereafter title VII), and are evaluated 
under federal law interpreting title VII cases.”  (Flait v. North American Watch 
Corp. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 467, 475-476.)  To establish a prima facie case of 
retaliation, “the plaintiff must show that he engaged in a protected activity, his 
employer subjected him to adverse employment action, and there is a causal link 
between the protected activity and the employer’s action.”  (Id. at p. 476.)  As I 
explain, plaintiff’s action founders on the first and third of these requirements; she 
engaged in no protected activity, and there is no causal link between the 
employer’s action and the nonexistent protected activity.  Because of this, I need 
 
6 
not consider whether L’Oreal subjected plaintiff to any adverse employment 
action. 
We recently explained the “need to protect whistleblowers,” like plaintiff 
claims to be.  (Miller v. Department of Corrections (July 18, 2005, S114097) ___ 
Cal.4th ___ [p. 38] (Miller).)  Section 12940(h) “aids enforcement of the FEHA 
and promotes communication and informal dispute resolution in the workplace.”  
(Miller, supra, at p. ___ [p. 33], italics added.)  “The FEHA’s stricture against 
retaliation serves the salutary purpose of encouraging open communication 
between employees and employers so that employers can take voluntary steps to 
remedy FEHA violations [citation], a result that will be achieved only if 
employees feel free to make complaints without fear of retaliation.  The FEHA 
should be liberally construed to deter employers from taking actions that would 
discourage employees from bringing complaints that they believe to be well 
founded.”  (Id. at p. ___ [pp. 37-38], italics added.)  We also explained that the 
United States Supreme Court recently expressed similar concerns in holding that 
“title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (Title 
IX)) provides the whistleblower with a private right of action for retaliation.”  (Id. 
at p. ___ [p. 38], citing Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ. (2005) ___ U.S. ___ 
[125 S.Ct. 1497].) 
These policy concerns are valid.  Employees should be able to complain 
about what they believe to be unlawful employment practices without fear of 
retaliation.  But it makes no sense to extend whistleblower protection to someone, 
like plaintiff, who did not make any complaint, did not engage in any meaningful 
communication, did not seek any informal dispute resolution in the workplace, and 
did nothing to try to cause L’Oreal to take voluntary steps to avoid or remedy a 
perceived FEHA violation. 
 
7 
Although section 12940(h)’s language requires the person seeking its 
protection to oppose “any practices forbidden under” the FEHA—which seems to 
require that the practices actually be forbidden—courts have expanded the statute 
beyond its language to permit a retaliation claim by an employee “who has 
complained of or opposed conduct that the employee reasonably believes to be 
discriminatory, even when a court later determines the conduct was not actually 
prohibited by the FEHA.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 12, citing Miller, supra, ___ 
Cal.4th at p. ___ [p. 35].)  I agree with this expansion and the policy behind it.  
But if we are to interpret the statute as not requiring conduct that was actually 
illegal but merely conduct the employee believes to be illegal, then surely we must 
require that the plaintiff communicate this belief to the employer.  It makes no 
sense to hold both that the conduct need not be unlawful and that the plaintiff need 
not complain of it. 
A multitude of federal cases interpreting the analogous federal retaliation 
law supports this conclusion.  An oft-cited case is Booker v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Co., Inc. (6th Cir. 1989) 879 F.2d 1304 (Booker).)  In that case, the 
plaintiff alleged that he had been illegally demoted due to a letter he had written to 
the company’s human resources department that, he claimed, opposed racial 
discrimination.  The court disagreed that the letter constituted opposition to 
unlawful discrimination.  “An examination of the letter indicates that it is not in 
opposition to a violation of the Act.  Booker was not contesting any unlawful 
employment practice; he was contesting the correctness of a decision made by his 
employer.”  (Id. at p. 1313.)  The letter in question did claim the plaintiff was the 
victim of “ethnocism,” a word the court could not locate in any dictionary.  About 
this claim, the court said, “Assuming that Booker intended discrimination, we hold 
that a vague charge of discrimination in an internal letter or memorandum is 
insufficient to constitute opposition to an unlawful employment practice.  An 
 
8 
employee may not invoke the protections of the Act by making a vague charge of 
discrimination.  Otherwise, every adverse employment decision by an employer 
would be subject to challenge under either state or federal civil rights legislation 
simply by an employee inserting a charge of discrimination.”  (Ibid.) 
Other cases are to similar effect.  “In order to engage in a protected 
opposition activity . . . , a plaintiff must make an overt stand against suspected 
illegal discriminatory action.”  (Minnis v. McDonnell Douglas Technical Services 
Co. (E.D.Mich. 2001) 162 F.Supp.2d 718, 739, italics added, citing Booker; see 
also Maynard v. City of San Jose (9th Cir. 1994) 37 F.3d 1396, 1405 [evidence did 
not support a retaliation claim when the plaintiff framed his complaint in terms of 
a “violation of the Department’s hiring practices, not in terms of racial 
discrimination”]; Allen v. Denver Public School Bd. (10th Cir. 1991) 928 F.2d 
978, 985 [a grievance was not “protected opposition to discrimination” when there 
was “nothing on the face of the document to alert the reader that discrimination is 
being alleged”]; Pieszak v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center (C.D. Cal. 2000) 
112 F.Supp.2d 970, 993-994 [plaintiff did not “point to any involvement in a 
protected activity” because her “complaining about Lopez’ harassment does not 
mean that she was complaining about sexual harassment”]; Reynolds v. Golden 
Corral Corp. (M.D.Ala. 1999) 106 F.Supp.2d 1243, 1252 [“If plaintiff intended to 
complain to Barnes about sexual harassment, she had an obligation to tell him so 
or, at least, to give him sufficient facts from which he could conclude that 
plaintiff’s problem involved conduct directed at her because of her sex”]; id. at p. 
1253 [no valid retaliation claim because “plaintiff does not claim to have reported 
the alleged sexual harassment to any of Gibson’s superiors other than Barnes,” and 
even as to Barnes, “plaintiff did not oppose, discuss or suggest unlawful sex 
discrimination during that conversation”]; id. at p. 1254, citing Booker; Beeck v. 
Federal Exp. Corp. (D.D.C. 2000) 81 F.Supp.2d 48, 55 [no case law suggests that 
 
9 
“protected ‘opposition’ extends beyond open allegations of discrimination to the 
sort of stoic, silent endurance plaintiff alleges here”]; Primes v. Reno (N.D.Ohio 
1998) 999 F.Supp. 1007, 1016, citing Booker [concluding that a “vague 
suggestion of racism”  is “not sufficient to constitute ‘opposition’ under Title VII 
and cannot form the basis for a retaliation claim”]; Crumpton v. St. Vincent’s 
Hosp. (N.D.Ala. 1997) 963 F.Supp. 1104, 1119 [“In order to be protected activity, 
plaintiff must present evidence showing that [the defendant’s] management knew 
that her concern or complaints related in some way to race and a claim of being 
discriminated against on that basis”; merely “complaining about a supervisor’s 
conduct” not sufficient]; Garcia-Paz v. Swift Textiles, Inc. (D.Kan. 1995) 873 
F.Supp. 547, 559 [the statute does not protect “persons who simply champion the 
cause of an older worker, even if the advocate acts out of an unarticulated belief 
that the employer is discriminating on the basis of age.  Thus, liability will not 
attach unless the activity in question advances beyond advocacy and into 
recognizable opposition to an employment practice that the claimant reasonably 
believes to be unlawful”]; id. at p. 560, citing Booker; Aldridge v. Tougaloo 
College (S.D.Miss. 1994) 847 F.Supp. 480, 484 [plaintiff’s grievance was not 
protected expression because it did not “protest any form of sex discrimination”]; 
id. at p. 485, citing Booker.) 
I agree with the majority that courts should not parse an employee’s 
complaint technically.  “We do not believe employees should be required to 
elaborate to their employer on the legal theory underlying the complaints they are 
making, in order to be protected by the FEHA.”  (Miller, supra, ___ Cal.4th at p. 
___ [p. 36].)  I further agree that “[a]n employee is not required to use legal terms 
or buzzwords when opposing discrimination.  The court will find opposing 
activity if the employee’s comments, when read in their totality, oppose 
discrimination.”  (Wirtz v. Kansas Farm Bureau Services, Inc. (D.Kan. 2003) 274 
 
10 
F.Supp.2d 1198, 1212, and quoted in maj. opn., ante, at p. 19.)  The problem here 
is that plaintiff did not use any words to inform her employer she thought the order 
was unlawful sex discrimination.  Her words, in their totality, only asked for 
justification; they did not hint at a concern that the personnel order constituted sex 
discrimination. 
The court in Garcia-Paz v. Swift Textiles, Inc., supra, 873 F.Supp. 547, 
discussed how articulate an employee must be in complaining about perceived 
unlawful employment practices.  “While some courts have indicated that vague 
references to unspecified discrimination are not protected, no clear rule has 
emerged as to the level of specificity required, and the standard employed by most 
courts is not exacting.  [Citations.]  [¶]  Employees often do not speak with the 
clarity or precision of lawyers.  At the same time, however, employers need not 
approach every employee’s comment as a riddle, puzzling over the possibility that 
it contains a cloaked complaint of discrimination.  But the thrust of inartful, subtle, 
or circumspect remarks nevertheless may be perfectly clear to the employer, and 
the Court discerns no evidence that Congress intended to protect only the 
impudent or articulate.  The relevant question, then, is not whether a formal 
accusation of discrimination is made but whether the employee’s communications 
to the employer sufficiently convey the employee’s reasonable concerns that the 
employer has acted or is acting in an unlawful discriminatory manner.”  (Id. at p. 
560.) 
Here, plaintiff’s complaint of sex discrimination was not merely “inartful” 
or “subtle” or “circumspect,” but nonexistent.  Although, ironically, as the 
majority recognizes (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 4-5), plaintiff’s performance reviews 
within the company have long and consistently criticized her “communication” 
skills, surely she was capable of communicating in some fashion her belief that 
Wiswall’s order was unlawful sex discrimination.  She never mentioned to anyone 
 
11 
within the company that she felt the order was discriminatory.  She never 
explained, or even alluded to, what she articulated in her declaration—that “[t]his 
was the first time in all of my years as Regional Sales Manager that anybody had 
ever asked me to make a final employment decision based upon the physical 
appearance, much less the subjective physical appearance, of an employee.”  She 
kept her belief, and all of the reasons she allegedly had for that belief, entirely to 
herself.1 
The majority claims that plaintiff’s statement to Wiswall that she needed 
justification presents a prima facie case that she complained of unlawful sex 
discrimination.  This statement, however, was not a claim of discrimination at all, 
much less sex discrimination.  As L’Oreal aptly points out, “a manager’s request 
for ‘adequate justification’ from a superior could convey reservations about the 
wisdom or soundness of the superior’s directive from a business standpoint—why 
seek the removal of a salesperson who (the manager believes) is doing a good job?  
Why needlessly risk antagonizing the important account employing the 
salesperson?  The manager may simply be reluctant to carry out an unpleasant task 
directed at a person the manager personally likes or respects.  Or perhaps she 
simply thinks the directive is ‘unfair.’ ” 
All of these are very logical possibilities that have nothing to do with sex 
discrimination—or discrimination of any kind.  Indeed, plaintiff herself indicates 
in her declaration she believed the order was a bad business decision because the 
                                              
1  
The majority states that besides requesting justification for the order, 
plaintiff “additionally stated that she had hired and supervised both male and 
female sales associates for a number of years, and never had been asked to fire a 
male sales associate because he was not sufficiently attractive.”  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at p. 15.)  She did so state in a declaration that she prepared for purposes of this 
litigation, but she never said this to anyone within L’Oreal before the lawsuit. 
 
12 
salesperson in question was a top performer—information that she also apparently 
kept to herself.  Plaintiff’s mere request for justification is even further removed 
from a complaint of discrimination than those found too vague in the cases cited 
above.  She did not come close to making “an overt stand against suspected illegal 
discriminatory action.”  (Minnis v. McDonnell Douglas Technical Services Co., 
supra, 162 F.Supp.2d at p. 739.)  Nor did she even give Wiswall, or anyone within 
L’Oreal, “sufficient facts from which he could conclude that plaintiff’s problem 
involved” sex discrimination.  (Reynolds v. Golden Corral Corp., supra, 106 
F.Supp.2d at p. 1252.)  At most, she “was contesting the correctness of a decision 
made by [her] employer,” which is insufficient.  (Booker, supra, 879 F.2d at p. 
1313.) 
The majority suggests that the employer should have investigated what 
plaintiff meant on the off chance that she held some undisclosed belief that the 
order was unlawful.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 20.)  But “employers need not 
approach every employee’s comment as a riddle, puzzling over the possibility that 
it contains a cloaked complaint of discrimination.”  (Garcia-Paz v. Swift Textiles, 
Inc., supra, 873 F.Supp. at p. 560.)  The purpose behind providing whistleblowers 
with special protection against retaliation is to encourage “open communication 
between employees and employers so that employers can take voluntary steps to 
remedy FEHA violations . . . .”  (Miller, supra, ___ Cal.4th at p. ___ [pp. 37-38].)  
This purpose is furthered only by requiring, as the law does, that employees 
overtly oppose what they believe is unlawful discrimination.  Placing the onus on 
employers to try to find out whether an employee believes an action is 
discriminatory and for some reason has chosen not to speak out, does not further 
this purpose. 
Moreover, plaintiff did not say anything—not even to seek a justification—
to anyone within the company other than Wiswall.  L’Oreal, her employer, is a 
 
13 
large company.  The purpose behind the retaliation statue is to encourage internal 
communication so the employer can avoid unlawful acts or take prompt corrective 
action.  In order to further this purpose, arguably a plaintiff should have to 
complain to someone within the company other than the person who ordered the 
suspected unlawful conduct—someone who might be able to judge the matter 
objectively and take any necessary corrective action.  Plaintiff alleges that she said 
nothing to anyone else within L’Oreal, not even the human resources department, 
because she did not have confidence in them.  But the special protection against 
retaliation does not extend “to the sort of stoic, silent endurance plaintiff alleges 
here.”  (Beeck v. Federal Exp. Corp., supra, 81 F.Supp.2d at p. 55.) 
The contrast between this case and the cases the majority relies on that do 
find a prima facie case of protected activity could hardly be greater.  In Miller, 
supra, ___ Cal.4th at page ___ [pp. 33-34] (see maj. opn., ante, at p. 18), the 
plaintiffs complained repeatedly to several persons, including a “sex harassment 
advisor” and “Internal Affairs” about the alleged harassment.  In Wirtz v. Kansas 
Farm Bureau Services, Inc., supra, 274 F.Supp.2d at page 1213 (see maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 19), the plaintiff  “repeatedly discussed his concerns . . . with his direct 
supervisor” and made “three formal complaints to the defendant’s management.”  
In Truskoski v. ESPN, Inc. (D.Conn. 1993) 823 F.Supp. 1007, 1012 (see maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 21), the plaintiff’s complaint of the disparate impact of a staffing policy 
“had definite overtones of gender bias and discrimination.”  And in Mathieu v. 
Norrell Corp. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1187 (see maj. opn., ante, at p. 21), 
the plaintiff “presented evidence she told Dunn ‘everything’ about [the 
complained of] conduct and that ‘such treatment, being directed to her as a 
[woman], constitutes sexual harassment.’ ”  Here, by contrast, plaintiff said 
nothing that had even an overtone of sex discrimination. 
 
14 
I do not doubt that a personnel order might be so blatantly discriminatory—
for example, an order to fire all African-American employees—that any employer 
would know that it was unlawful and would further know that an employee’s 
failure to carry it out was due to the belief (actually knowledge) that it was 
discriminatory.  This is not that case, and the majority does not appear to claim it 
is; indeed, the majority stresses that the order need not actually have been 
discriminatory at all for plaintiff to prevail.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 12-13.)  
Wiswall ordered the salesperson’s termination due to her appearance.  Plaintiff has 
never claimed she believed the order was unlawful discrimination on the basis of 
appearance (a ground not explicitly covered by the FEHA; see maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 14), but instead she claims she believed it was sex discrimination. She based 
this belief on a chain of reasoning grounded on several facts, which she kept to 
herself.  Whether she was correct or not, the order, by itself, was not so blatantly 
discriminatory on the basis of sex as to place L’Oreal on notice that plaintiff was 
opposing an act of sex discrimination. 
Plaintiff has also shown no causal link between any protected activity and 
the alleged adverse employment actions.  First, as I have explained, she engaged in 
no protected activity.  Second, even if she had done so, no evidence exists that 
L’Oreal knew she was engaging in such activity.  “ ‘Essential to a causal link is 
evidence that the employer was aware that the plaintiff had engaged in the 
protected activity.’ ”  (Morgan v. Regents of University of California (2000) 88 
Cal.App.4th 52, 70, quoting Cohen v. Fred Meyer, Inc. (9th Cir. 1982) 686 F.2d 
793, 796; see also Mulhall v. Ashcroft (6th Cir. 2002) 287 F.3d 543, 551 [plaintiff 
“failed to produce any direct or circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable 
jury could infer that Metcalfe and Ray knew or were aware of his protected 
activity”].)  A person cannot retaliate against someone for activity the person does 
not know about.  To prevail on the claim, plaintiff would have to show that 
 
15 
L’Oreal “retaliated against [her] because [she] complained of sex discrimination.”  
(Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 
1510].)  This she cannot do.  Plaintiff does not claim that anyone within L’Oreal 
other than Wiswall knew of her protected activity, for she said nothing whatever 
to anyone else.  Even as to Wiswall, no evidence, direct or circumstantial, exists 
that he knew of plaintiff’s alleged belief.  The reason for this conclusion is simple.  
Plaintiff kept her belief, and the reasons for it, a secret from her employer. 
B.  Statute of Limitations 
While my conclusion that plaintiff has failed to state a prima facie case of 
retaliation makes further discussion unnecessary, I comment briefly on another 
aspect of the majority’s analysis.  Four years ago, in Richards v. CH2M Hill, Inc. 
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 798, I joined a majority to conclude that where an employer’s 
course of conduct constitutes a “continuing violation” of an employee’s rights 
under the FEHA, the statute of limitations begins to run only when the course of 
conduct ends, or when the employee is on notice that further informal efforts to 
end it will be futile.  (Id. at p. 823.)  More recently, the United States Supreme 
Court has determined, for purposes of analogous federal antidiscrimination laws, 
that one cannot recover for “discrete acts” of discrimination or retaliation falling 
outside the applicable limitations period.  On the other hand, the high court held, 
where a “hostile work environment” claim is presented, and any of the acts 
contributing to the hostile environment took place within the limitations period, 
the employer’s related earlier behavior may also be considered for the purpose of 
assessing liability.  (National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan (2002) 
536 U.S. 101, 105.) 
In concluding here that L’Oreal’s hostile acts may be considered 
collectively, though some occurred more than one year before plaintiff filed her 
 
16 
FEHA claim, the majority seems to feel it must choose between Richards and 
Morgan, and it elects to repudiate Morgan and adhere to Richards.  I see no need 
for this approach.  On the instant facts, Morgan itself supports the majority’s 
statute of limitations conclusions. 
Thus, plaintiff did not frame her FEHA retaliation claim in terms of 
discrete, individually forbidden acts occurring both within and without the 
limitations period.  Instead, she alleged explicitly that the employer’s retribution 
took the form of harassment arising from an ongoing hostile work environment.  
The majority so analyzes the claim, insisting that it “need not and do[es] not 
decide whether each alleged retaliatory act constitutes an adverse employment 
action in and of itself,” because plaintiff “has alleged that L’Oreal’s actions 
formed a pattern of systematic retaliation for her opposition to Wiswall’s 
discriminatory directive.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 31-32.)  As the majority notes, 
such a theory of retaliation is valid; “there is no requirement that an employer’s 
retaliatory acts constitute one swift blow, rather than a series of subtle, yet 
damaging, injuries.  [Citations.]”  (Id. at p. 32.) 
The majority does not contravene Morgan by acknowledging that the entire 
course of L’Oreal’s allegedly retaliatory conduct, both before and during the 
applicable limitations period, may be considered in assessing L’Oreal’s FEHA 
liability.  Thus, were it necessary for me to reach the issue, I would agree with the 
majority that the statute of limitations does not bar collective consideration of this 
conduct.  In doing so, however, I would avoid deciding whether Richards should 
survive Morgan to the extent the two decisions disagree. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
As the United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, retaliation claims 
serve a valuable purpose by protecting whistleblowers.  (Jackson v. Birmingham 
Bd. of Educ., supra, ___ U.S. ___ [125 S.Ct. 1497].)  The objective of protecting 
 
17 
against discriminatory practices ‘ “would be difficult, if not impossible, to achieve 
if persons who complain about sex discrimination did not have effective protection 
against retaliation.’ ”  (Id. at p. ___ [125 S.Ct. at p. 1508].)  But the majority 
distorts the retaliation cause of action beyond all recognition.  It now says 
plaintiffs claiming illegal retaliation need not complain of what they believe to be 
an unlawful employment practice until after they file the lawsuit.  But it makes no 
sense to extend this special protection to a person who did not communicate to the 
employer—in any way, shape, or form—the belief that unlawful sex 
discrimination was occurring before filing a lawsuit for retaliation.  Section 
12940(h) protects opposition to unlawful employment practices, not merely the 
failure to obey a personnel order because of an undisclosed belief the order is 
discriminatory for reasons also undisclosed.  The FEHA’s purpose is to prevent 
discrimination, not to encourage employees to generate lawsuits quietly.  The 
majority encourages the generation of stealth lawsuits but does nothing to further 
the purpose of the retaliation cause of action or the FEHA itself. 
To receive the special protection that section 12940(h) gives to 
whistleblowers, one must blow the whistle—not in any technical way, but in some 
way.  Plaintiff did not do so.  Hence, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeal, which reversed summary judgment in defendant’s favor. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
I CONCUR: 
BAXTER, J. 
 
 
1
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 106 Cal.App.4th 1036 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S115154 
Date Filed: August 11, 2005 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Francisco 
Judge: Ronald Evans Quidachay and A. James Robertson II 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Herbert W. Yanowitz and Joseph R. Grodin for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
William R. Tamayo, Eric S. Dreiband, Lorraine C. Davis, Vincent Blackwood and Elizabeth E. Theran for 
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Law Offices of Jeffrey K. Winikow and Jeffrey K. Winikow for California Employment Lawyers 
Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Charlotte E. Fishman for Equal Rights Advocates, Asian Law Caucus, California Women’s Law Center, 
Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund, Inc., The Impact Fund, The Legal Aid Society-
Employment Law Center, Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund, The National Women’s 
Law Center and Women’s Employment Rights Clinic as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Morgenstein & Jubelirer, William J. Carroll and David H. Bromfield for Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Mitchell Silberberg & Knupp, Lawrence A. Michaels and Suzanne M. Steinke for California Employment 
Law Council as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Ballard, Rosenberg, Golper & Savitt, Linda Miller Savitt, John J. Manier and Christine T. Hoeffner as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
Pillsbury Winthrop, George S. Howard, Jr., and Brian L. Johnson for Employers Group as Amicus Curiae 
on behalf of Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
2
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Joseph R. Grodin 
2926 Avalon Avenue 
Berkeley, CA  94705 
(510) 841-9194 
 
William J. Carroll 
Morgenstein & Jubelirer 
One Market, Spear Street Tower 
Thirty-Second Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94105 
(415) 901-8700