Case Title: State v. Dardar

Citation: 353 So. 2d 713

Docket Number: 

State: louisiana

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Date: 1977-12-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
353 So. 2d 713 (1977) STATE of Louisiana v. Delvin DARDAR. No. 59932. Supreme Court of Louisiana. December 19, 1977. *714 Charley J. Schrader, Jr., Houma, for defendant-appellant. William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Norval J. Rhodes, Dist. Atty., Alexander L. Doyle, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee. SANDERS, Chief Justice. The State charged the defendant, Delvin Dardar, with three counts of simple burglary, violations of LSA-R.S. 14:62. A jury found him guilty as charged on Count 2 and guilty of attempted simple burglary on Counts 1 and 3. The court respectively sentenced him to four, six, and four years imprisonment, running concurrently. The defendant appeals, relying on two assignments of error. As we find reversible merit in Assignment of Error No. 1, we pretermit treatment of Assignment of Error No. 2. We adduce the following context facts: The defendant suggested to three juveniles that they take a boat ride to some Bayou Travis fishing camps. En route, the defendant committed attempted simple burglary of a boat (Count 3). While at two camps, he kicked the doors down and committed simple burglary of one (Count 2), and attempted simple burglary of the other (Count 1). The defendant complains of that portion of the jury charge concerning the intent necessary for a simple burglary conviction. The relevant sections of that charge are as follows: "* * * "`Simple burglary is the unauthorized entering of any dwelling, vehicle, watercraft or other structure, movable or immovable, with the intent to commit a felony or any theft therein other than as set forth in Article 60.' . .. Article 60 dealing with aggravated burglary with which we are not concerned.' "* * * "`Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed consequences to follow his act or failure to act.' "* * * The defense asserts: The thrust of this argument is that the charge relieved the State of proving an essential element of the crime, specific intent. In reviewing an objection made to a jury charge, we must consider the charge as a whole and construe particular expressions in context. This Court will not disturb a trial judge's ruling unless the disputed portion, when viewed in light of the entire instruction, is erroneous and prejudicial. State v. George, La., 346 So. 2d 694 (1977); State v. Walker, 204 La. 523, 15 So. 2d 874 (1943); State v. Davis, 154 La. 295, 97 So. 449 (1923). One guilty of simple burglary must have had "the intent to commit a felony or any theft therein [a structure]." LSA-R.S. 14:62. The requisite intent is specific intent. State v. Anderson, La., 343 So. 2d 135 (1977); State v. Walker, La., 328 So. 2d 87 (1976); State v. Lewis, La., 288 So. 2d 348 (1974). Specific criminal intent exists when the defendant "actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act. . .." Whereas, general criminal intent exists when the defendant, "in the ordinary course of human experience, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result from his act . . . ." LSA-R.S. 14:10. [Emphasis supplied.] In State v. Elzie, La., 343 So. 2d 712 (1977), we stated: Initially, the trial judge properly gave the statutory definition of simple burglary. See LSA-R.S. 14:62. In addition, he correctly explained that specific intent exists when one actively desires the prescribed consequences, and that intent may be inferred from the circumstances. LSA-R.S. 14:10(1), 15:445; State v. Elzie, supra. Ultimately, however, the trial judge diluted these instructions so as to require only that the defendant voluntarily and knowingly did the act and that the act was intentional, rather than unintentional, or accidental. In State v. Anderson, La., supra, we affirmed a burglary conviction despite the fact that the trial judge included a definition of both general intent and specific intent in his charge to the jury. See also State v. George, La., 346 So. 2d 694 (1977). Here, however, rather than having an alternate instruction on general intent, the instruction misstated the meaning of specific intent. Moreover, in the present case, the defendant introduced evidence of intoxication to negate specific intent, thus increasing the importance of a correct instruction. See LSA-R.S. 14:15; State v. Anderson, supra. We hold that the instruction as to specific intent is fatally defective and prejudicial to the defendant. For the reasons assigned, the convictions and sentences are reversed. The case is remanded to the district court for a new trial in accordance with law and the views herein expressed.