Case Title: O'BRIEN v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-04-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
O'BRIEN v. STATE2002 WY 6345 P.3d 225Case Number: 00-135Decided: 04/24/2002

APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                            

DAVID 
O'BRIEN,

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price II, Judge 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Sylvia 
Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. Domonkos.

 Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, 
Director, and Tammy L. Farmer, Student Intern, of the Prosecution Assistance 
Program.  Argument by Ms. 
Farmer.

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

  

GOLDEN, 
Justice. 

[¶1]           
In this 
appeal, we primarily consider the instruction a jury should receive when 
considering whether the elements of aggravated assault and battery are met.  Appellant David Wayne O'Brien contends 
that the trial court improperly defined the term "recklessly under circumstances 
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life."  We agree that this language requires 
that the State prove that a defendant's conduct exhibited more than 
recklessness, but we determine that sufficient evidence supported O'Brien's 
conviction on one count of aggravated assault and battery in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i).  On this 
issue and others presented by O'Brien, we find no reversible error and affirm 
his conviction.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]           
The 
parties agree that the following issues are presented for our 
review:

 

I.  Whether plain error occurred when the 
jury was erroneously instructed regarding the recklessly under circumstances 
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life component of 
aggravated assault and battery?

 

II. 
Whether there was insufficient evidence to convict O'Brien of aggravated assault 
under W.S. § 6-2-502(a)(i)?

 

III. 
Whether Nurse Krininger's testimony eliciting statements made by Mr. Foster was 
improper hearsay under W.R.E. 803(4)?

 

IV. Whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred during the 
State's closing argument and in the State's case in chief?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]           
On the evening of August 21, 1999, twenty-two year old 
Jordan Foster reported to two friends that, as he drove around in Gillette, 
Wyoming, he had been "bothered" by some people in a red Ford Probe.  Foster was 
"cruising," or driving around town, which is an activity many young people in 
Gillette engage in to meet with friends and visit.  Later, Foster was a 
passenger in a pickup truck driven by his friend, Chris Weber, age 18.  Weber's girlfriend, 
Amanda Jameson, age 17, was also a passenger.  The three drove around Gillette and soon 
encountered the red Ford Probe, which was driven by Shawn Lewis, age 20, with 
Shelly Lane, age 16, occupying the front seat passenger side, and O'Brien seated 
in the back.  
This party was also cruising.  O'Brien is Lewis' uncle and is 30 years 
old.  As the 
two vehicles drove next to each other, the Probe's occupants began calling out 
insults to the occupants of the pickup truck. The Probe parked in a bank parking 
lot, and Foster and his friends also pulled into the lot and parked.  Weber testified 
that Foster's demeanor was curious and not angry. 

 

[¶4]           
O'Brien, however, emerged from the Probe's back seat 
appearing angry and stating that he hated cowboys.  Weber testified 
that O'Brien had a bigger build and appeared much older.  Foster got out of 
the pickup truck and walked over to O'Brien to see if there was a problem.  O'Brien placed a 
beer that he had been drinking on the hood of the pickup truck and asked if 
Foster was scared of him.  After Foster asked if he should be, O'Brien 
punched Foster near the left eye knocking him to the ground. Foster reported 
that he had been knocked unconscious, and eyewitnesses testified that he did not 
fight back.   
Falling on him, O'Brien hit Foster in the head "pretty quick and hard" 
and about ten or eleven times.   O'Brien then stood up, jumped up and 
down and said, "I am the greatest," repeatedly.  

 

[¶5]           
Lane apologized to Jameson, and all three Probe occupants 
returned to it and left.  Weber and Jameson placed Foster in their 
pickup truck and drove him to the Campbell County Memorial Hospital emergency 
room in Gillette.  
An emergency room nurse, Patty Krininger, testified that Foster was pale, 
nauseated, in need of stitches, and had a broken jaw, a combination that could 
cause him to stop breathing.  Foster was transported by ambulance to the 
hospital in Casper to undergo surgery.  Dr. Donald Greer, a plastic surgeon, observed 
a severely fractured and displaced jaw, a condylar fracture, a concussion, and a 
laceration on the forehead.  He testified that the broken jaw did not 
allow Foster to control his tongue, which could fall back and block his 
airway.  A 
permanent titanium plate was inserted across Foster's fractured jawbone and 
wires and bands used to set the jaw. 

 

[¶6]           
Afterwards, Foster's memory of the incident was impaired, 
and he could not identify O'Brien.  Lane identified O'Brien to police.  O'Brien was charged 
with aggravated assault and battery in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-502(a)(i), convicted by a jury, and sentenced to three to eight years.   This appeal 
followed.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Jury Instructions

 

[¶7]           
In his first issue, O'Brien contends that the trial court 
committed plain error when it improperly provided the jury with the definition 
of the term "recklessly" rather than providing the jury with a definition of the 
term "recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the 
value of human life" found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i).1  O'Brien contends 
that this term required the jury to find a degree of culpability beyond mere 
recklessness, and the instruction defining the term  "reckless" was an 
inaccurate statement of the law and misleading.  

 

[¶8]           
No objection to the instruction was made at trial; and 
under a plain error review, O'Brien must show that the record clearly shows an 
error that transgressed a clear and unequivocal rule of law which adversely 
affected a substantial right.  Taylor v. State, 
2001 WY 13, ¶16, 17 P.3d 715, ¶16 (Wyo. 2001).   Prejudicial error must be demonstrated 
by appellant, and prejudice will not be demonstrated unless the instruction 
confused or misled the jury with respect to the proper principles of law.  Collins v. State, 854 P.2d 688, 700 (Wyo. 1993); Lowseth v. State, 875 P.2d 725, 729 (Wyo. 1994).  Failure to instruct 
properly on an element of a crime does not constitute plain error where that 
element is not contested at trial or where evidence of the defendant's guilt is 
overwhelming.  
Miller v. State, 904 P.2d 344, 349 (Wyo. 
1995).

 

[¶9]           
The jury received the following instructions on the 
elements of aggravated assault:

 

Instruction No. 4

 

The elements of the crime of Aggravated Assault and 
Battery, as charged in this case, are:

1. The events occurred on or about August 22, 1999.

2. They occurred in Campbell County, Wyoming;

3. The Defendant, David Wayne O'Brien caused serious bodily 
injury to Jordan Foster; and

4. Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under 
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence 
that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
should find the defendant guilty.

If, on the other hand, you find from your consideration of 
all the evidence that each of these elements has not been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty.

 

 

Instruction No. 5

 

"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury which creates 
substantial risk of death or which causes severe disfigurement or impairment of 
the function of any bodily member or organ.

 

 

 

Instruction No. 6

 

An act is "knowingly" or "intentionally" done if it is done 
voluntarily and purposely; not accidentally, because of a mistake or for some 
other innocent reason.  The State must prove that the defendant's acts were done knowingly or intentionally, but the 
State is not required to prove that the defendant intended the consequences which may have resulted from the doing of 
those acts.

            
Whether acts were knowingly or intentionally done must be determined or 
inferred from all of the evidence in the case.  In making that finding you may consider the 
acts themselves, the manner in which they were done, the means used, and all the 
circumstances surrounding the acts.

 

 

Instruction No. 7

            

            
Recklessly is different from knowingly or intentionally.  Recklessness does 
not require proof of an intent or purpose to do harm.  It is, instead, an 
utter unconcern about the consequences of one's acts.  Recklessness is 
rash and careless conduct.  A person is reckless when he consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustified risk that his acts will cause serious 
harm.  The risk 
must be of such a nature and degree that disregarding it constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe 
under the circumstances.  

 

 

[¶10]       The State contends that a clear and unequivocal rule of law 
was not violated because it is not necessary to define a term which is used in 
the sense of its ordinary meaning, has no distinguishable technical legal 
meaning, and when no specific statutory definition of the term exists.  The State asserts 
that it is self-evident that more than recklessness is required, and the jury 
was properly instructed in Instruction No. 4 to find not only that O'Brien acted 
recklessly but that he did so "under circumstances manifesting extreme 
indifference to the value of human life." 

 

[¶11]       In this case, to determine whether the jury was properly 
instructed, it is necessary to interpret the meaning of the phrase "recklessly 
under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human 
life."  "The 
accuracy of an instruction to the jury is purely a question of law which we 
review de novo.   If the instruction fails to correctly 
state the law, reversible error exists."  Paugh v. State, 9 P.3d 973, 975-76 (Wyo. 2000).

 

[¶12]       The aggravated 
assault and battery statute is the only Wyoming statute using the term 
"recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of 
human life," and the Wyoming legislature has not defined that term.  Before 1982, the 
offense of aggravated assault and battery without a dangerous weapon carried a 
maximum one year county jail term when one was convicted for "unlawfully and 
maliciously" inflicting upon another person any "grievous bodily harm." Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-4-506 (Michie 1977).  In 1982, however, Wyoming enacted a 
comprehensive criminal code based upon the Model Penal Code, and the aggravated 
assault and battery statute in its present form was passed using the term at 
issue in this case.  
That term was derived from the Model Penal Code.  Theodore E. Lauer, 
Goodbye 3-Card 
Monte:  The 
Wyoming Criminal Code of 1982, 19 Land & 
Water L. Rev. 107, 132 (1984).  Before it was placed in the statute, the term 
had not been used in Wyoming.  

 

[¶13]   In many other states, the "extreme 
indifference" language was preceded by the "depraved heart" and "implied malice" 
terms to distinguish between homicides such as second degree murder and 
involuntary manslaughter, and each term was recognized to mean that it 
contemplated circumstances which make a defendant more blameworthy than 
recklessness alone.  
State v. 
Boone, 661 P.2d 917, 920-21 (Or. 1983).  Wyoming, however, 
has no previous decisions on the meaning of "extreme indifference" or "depraved 
heart."  Second 
degree murder was established when a defendant killed "purposely and 
maliciously, but without premeditation;" involuntary manslaughter existed when a 
defendant killed by any "culpable neglect or criminal carelessness." Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 6-4-104; 6-4-107 (Michie 1977).   In addressing other issues, it was 
noted that Wyoming juries were instructed that "culpable neglect" and "criminal 
carelessness," were defined to mean conduct of a "gross or flagrant character, 
such as would show wantonness or recklessness, and would demonstrate a reckless 
disregard of human life or the safety of others, or an indifference to 
consequences equivalent to criminal intent."  State v. Sodergren, 686 P.2d 521, 
529 (Wyo. 1984) (Thomas, J., specially concurring).  Sodergren declared that 
the distinction between "culpable neglect or criminal carelessness," "reckless 
disregard for the safety of others," "conscious disregard for the safety of 
others," "gross negligence," "disregard of consequences which may ensue," 
"wantonness," "indifference to the rights of others that is equivalent to 
criminal intent," "evincing a reckless disregard of human life or bodily 
injury," is de minimus for the purpose of defining a criminal act.  Id. at 528.  This precedent 
clarifies that this Court interpreted the term "reckless" when used in a 
homicide as synonymous with the state of mind necessary to convict for 
involuntary manslaughter, i.e., conduct 
equivalent to criminal intent.  Id.

 

[¶14]       In 1982, the Legislature revamped Wyoming's assault and 
battery provisions and provided that bodily injury caused by "recklessness" 
sufficed for a misdemeanor conviction.  The definition for the term "recklessness" 
appears to have been borrowed from the Model Penal Code.  Lauer, supra, at 131.  The Model Penal Code distinguishes between 
"reckless" and "recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference 
to the value of human life."  The Legislature appears to have revised its 
assault and battery statutory scheme by adopting the language used for these 
offenses in the Model Penal Code rather than attempting to follow definitions 
provided by our judicial decision, and we therefore examine the Model Penal 
Code's definitions of these terms to ascertain legislative intent.

 

[¶15]       "Recklessly" is defined by the Model Penal Code in 
basically the same terms as it is in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-104(a)(ix) 
(LexisNexis 2001):2

 

A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element 
of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable 
risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.  The risk must be of 
such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor's 
conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross 
deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe 
in the actor's situation.

 

Model Penal Code, § 2.02(2)(c), at 226  (Official draft 
1962).

 

[¶16]       In discussing the term "recklessly under circumstances 
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life," the Commentary to 
the Model Penal Code states that this is a "special character" of recklessness 
required to elevate assault or battery to aggravated assault or battery and is 
adopted from the definition of murder found in Section 210.2(1)(b) of the 
Code.  § 
211.1(2)(a) cmt. 4, at 189.  That discussion states that criminal homicide 
constitutes murder when it is committed "recklessly under circumstances 
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life."  § 210.2(1)(b) cmt. 
4, at 21. That Commentary goes on to state that this term is intended to reflect 
the judgment that there is a kind of reckless homicide that cannot fairly be 
distinguished in grading terms from homicides committed purposely or 
knowingly.  Id. Stating that conduct amounting to a "gross 
deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe 
in the actor's situation" is "ordinary recklessness" that would justify a 
manslaughter conviction, the Commentary observes that 

 

[i]n a prosecution for murder, however, the Code calls for 
the further judgment whether the actor's conscious disregard of the risk, under 
the circumstances, manifests extreme indifference to the value of human 
life.  The 
significance of purpose or knowledge as a standard of culpability is that, cases 
of provocation or other mitigation apart, purposeful or knowing homicide 
demonstrates precisely such indifference to the value of human life.  Whether 
recklessness is so extreme that it demonstrates similar indifference is not a 
question, it is submitted, that can be further clarified.  It must be left 
directly to the trier of fact under instructions which make it clear that 
recklessness that can fairly be assimilated to purpose or knowledge should be 
treated as murder and that less extreme recklessness should be punished as 
manslaughter.

 

Id. at 21-22.  The Commentary then notes that this type of 
extreme recklessness, formerly known as the so-called "depraved heart" conduct 
that allowed murder convictions when a defendant killed his friend playing 
Russian roulette, killed by firing into occupied homes, or killed when he 
intended to shoot over the head of the victim but missed, would permit a jury to 
reach the same conclusion under the Code's language.  Id. at 22-23.  It warns, however, that negligent creation of 
risk of death, regardless of its extravagance or unjustification, cannot be 
punished as murder.  
Under Section 210.2(1)(b), the actor must perceive and consciously 
disregard the risk of death to another before the conclusion of extreme 
recklessness can be drawn.  Id. at 27-28.

 

[¶17]       The Commentaries addressing aggravated assault and battery 
state that this special character of recklessness, or extreme recklessness, is 
designed to more severely punish battery where the defendant's state of mind 
would have justified a murder conviction had his victim not fortuitously 
lived.  § 
211.1(2)(a) cmt. 4, at 189.  By adopting the Model Penal Code's term, 
"recklessly," to justify a lesser punishment for assault and battery, the 
Wyoming Legislature plainly intended to distinguish between "recklessly" and 
"recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of 
human life" in the same manner as had the Model Penal Code.   We, 
therefore, determine that O'Brien correctly asserts that the jury was not 
properly instructed when it was provided with the statutory definition of 
"recklessly" without further proper instruction.

 

[¶18]       In O'Brien's case, a jury instruction defined recklessness 
in accordance with the statutory definition which, as we now see, is the 
"ordinary" recklessness that would warrant a simple battery conviction.  The question, thus, 
is whether the jury was properly instructed when it was provided this definition 
along with Instruction No. 4 which told the jury that it must find that it was 
recklessness "under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value 
of human life."  

 

[¶19]       O'Brien contends that the trial court erred in presenting 
all three states of mind to the jury without a special verdict instructing them 
to identify the applicable state of mind.  Accordingly, he contends that if his conduct 
was not extreme recklessness, then the rule of Bush v. 
State, 908 P.2d 963 (Wyo. 1995), is invoked.  That rule states that the verdict must be set 
aside in cases where the verdict is supportable on one ground, but not on 
another, and it is impossible to tell which ground the jury selected.  Id. at 967.  

 

[¶20]       The Model Penal Code provides that when recklessness 
suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a person 
acts purposely or knowingly.  § 2.02(5) at 226.  The Explanatory 
Note to this Code explains that this rule makes it unnecessary to state in the 
definition of an offense that the defendant can be convicted if it is proved 
that he was more culpable than the definition of the 
offense requires.  
Thus, if the crime can be committed recklessly, it is no less committed 
if the actor acted purposely.  Id. at 228.  In other words, if 
the evidence supports finding that a reasonable jury could have concluded that 
O'Brien intentionally or knowingly caused serious bodily injury to Jordan 
Foster, then this special character recklessness is established.  In that respect 
then, O'Brien is not correct that the trial court should have instructed on only 
one state of mind.  
We hold that it was harmless error for the jury to be instructed with all 
three states of mind, i.e., intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to 
the value of human life.

 

[¶21]       O'Brien asserts that the statutory definition of 
recklessness should not be given in an aggravated assault and battery jury 
trial, but the jury should instead be given an instruction defining the term 
"reckless under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of 
life" so that the jury will understand that it is required to determine whether 
the defendant perceived and consciously disregarded the risk of death to his 
victim before the conclusion of recklessness can be drawn.  A Commentary to the 
Code states that "[g]iven the Model Code definition of recklessness, the point 
involved is put adequately and succinctly by asking whether the recklessness 
rises to the level of extreme indifference to the value of human life.'  As has been 
observed, it seems undesirable to suggest a more specific formulation."  § 210.2 cmt. 4, at 
25.  We hold, 
therefore, that, in an aggravated assault and battery trial, the jury should be 
given an instruction defining "reckless under circumstances manifesting extreme 
indifference to the value of human life" rather than just "reckless" as happened 
in O'Brien's trial.  
That definition will provide the statutory definition of reckless but 
must include language explaining that if the jury determines the defendant acted 
recklessly, the jury must then determine whether that recklessness rose to the 
level of "extreme indifference to the value of human life."  Although this more 
precise instruction was not given in O'Brien's case, the failure to do so is not 
plain error because the evidence supports finding that O'Brien intentionally and 
knowingly seriously injured Jordan Foster.   

 

 

Sufficient Evidence

 

[¶22]       In his second issue, O'Brien contends that the evidence was 
insufficient to convict him of causing serious bodily injury recklessly under 
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.  He again points out 
that the jury's general verdict makes it impossible to determine under which 
state of mind standard he was convicted, and he examines whether the evidence 
was sufficient to find that he had acted "recklessly under circumstances 
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life." 

 

[¶23]       We again point out that the statutory intent behind the 
language "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances 
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life" is to establish an 
equivalent state of mind before conviction is justified.  O'Brien contends 
that, although he was reckless in causing the serious bodily injury to Foster, 
his conduct, while criminal, did not amount to acts that were "only one step 
short of murder" or the "functional equivalent of a murder in which, for some 
reason, death fails to occur." O'Brien cites to a series of Pennsylvania cases 
reversing aggravated assault and battery convictions after finding that the acts 
were insufficient to convict.  In the first, he states that the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court found insufficient evidence to support convicting a defendant who 
ran a red light while driving intoxicated and hit another vehicle resulting in 
serious bodily injury.  Commonwealth v. 
O'Hanlon, 653 A.2d 616, 618 (Pa. 1995).   He next notes that Pennsylvania also 
reversed a conviction for a defendant who came up behind an officer handcuffing 
his brother, grabbed the officer by the shirt and pants, picked him up and threw 
him forward into some nearby concrete steps causing him to fracture his collar 
bone.  Commonwealth v. Magnelli, 502 A.2d 241, 243 (Pa. Super. 
1985).  
Finally, he provides us with a decision from the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court that determined there was insufficient evidence to convict a defendant who 
had crashed into a bus stand, killing one individual and severely injuring 
another.  That 
defendant had consumed several beers and become somewhat intoxicated, had then 
ingested muscle relaxers and driven away at an excessive speed from a party on 
his way to a bar, rubbed against the curb, left the roadway, crashed into a bus 
stand and finally smashed into a brick wall leaving no skid marks.  The Court ruled 
that this evidence of recklessness was insufficient to establish the threshold 
standard for recklessness under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference 
to the value of human life, and concluded "[w]hile Appellant's actions are 
clearly criminal, they do not constitute aggravated assault."  Commonwealth v. Comer, 716 A.2d 593, 596 (Pa. 
1998).  O'Brien 
notes that, since these decisions, a statute has been enacted that allows for an 
aggravated assault by vehicle conviction when driving under the influence.

 

[¶24]       O'Brien distinguishes our decision in Trujillo v. State, 750 P.2d 1334, 1336-38 (Wyo. 1988), 
where this Court found sufficient evidence to convict the appellant of 
aggravated assault and battery under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-502(a)(i).  In that case, 
O'Brien notes that the appellant had punched and broken the victim's jaw, but 
importantly, the evidence revealed that the appellant had been the aggressor in 
a fight an hour earlier; had ignored then an earlier warning by police officers 
to depart from the bar and go home; and the appellant was a trained boxer who 
knew that he could inflict serious injury with his fists.  In comparison, 
O'Brien asserts that the facts in this case demonstrated a fight between two 
individuals where one bested the other.

 

[¶25]       We appreciate O'Brien's contention that aggravated assault 
is not an appropriate offense to be charged for the average mutual fight between 
similarly matched combatants.  We do find, however, that it is an 
appropriate offense to be charged under the particular facts of this case.  Here, although much 
older and bigger, O'Brien attacked without provocation another person, viciously 
beat him when the victim was unconscious and not responding; O'Brien celebrated 
triumphantly over the body, and then left the scene.  These facts show 
the jury found that O'Brien intentionally acted, and the issue then was whether 
he had caused serious bodily injury as defined under the statute.  The jury was 
instructed:

 

"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury which creates 
substantial risk of death or which causes severe disfigurement or impairment of 
the function of any bodily member or organ.

 

The State contends that Foster was beaten so savagely that 
his life was endangered, and that the broken jaw was a bodily injury which 
created a substantial risk of death.  In support, it provided medical testimony 
that it is rare to see a jaw broken at the back of the joint as the result of a 
blow from a fist, and the broken jaw resulted in trauma that required surgery to 
prevent Foster's tongue from blocking his airways.  The evidence 
supports the jury's determination that O'Brien acted intentionally and caused 
serious bodily injury.

 

 

Hearsay

 

[¶26]       During her testimony, Nurse Krininger testified that she 
could not determine from her examination how Foster had sustained his broken jaw 
and therefore asked Foster if he had provoked somebody.  Defense counsel 
objected on grounds that it was hearsay and a denial of confrontation.  The trial court 
ruled that the nurse could answer because it was for medical diagnosis.  The prosecutor then 
asked the following:

 

Q. Now, what did he tell you again about his actions as far 
as starting a fight?

A.  He said he didn't do anything.  He said he didn't 
know why he had been hit.

Q. How many times did he say this?  Quite 
frequently?

A. Yes. 

 

On appeal, O'Brien contends that these questions were asked 
to establish that the fight was unprovoked, not for purposes of medical 
treatment or diagnosis, and violated the hearsay rule.  The State contends 
that the testimony was admitted properly under an exception to the hearsay rule, 
W.R.E. 803(4).   

 

[¶27]       Our review of rulings by a trial court, admitting or 
excluding evidence, is premised upon deference to the trial court, and we do not 
reverse a case because of evidentiary rulings unless an abuse of discretion is 
demonstrated.  
Horton v. State, 764 P.2d 674, 676-77 (Wyo. 
1988).  
"Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously."  Vaughn v. State, 
962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998).  

 

[¶28]       Hearsay evidence generally is excluded by W.R.E. 802, which 
provides, "[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by 
other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Wyoming or by statute."  The definition of 
hearsay is found in W.R.E. 801(c):  " Hearsay' is a statement, other than 
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."  Twenty-three 
specific exceptions to the hearsay rule, together with a catch-all exception, 
are set forth in W.R.E. 803 which permits testimony on evidence that W.R.E. 802 
otherwise would exclude.  Oldman v. State, 
998 P.2d 957, 960-61 (Wyo. 2000).  Rule 803(4) provides: 

 

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even 
though the declarant is available as a witness:

            

* * *

(4) Statements for Purposes of 
Medical Diagnosis or Treatment.--  Statements made for purposes of medical 
diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present 
symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the 
cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or 
treatment.

 

 

[¶29]       We have held that "[s]tatements which attribute fault or 
causation generally are not relevant to diagnosis or treatment" and are usually 
inadmissible under W.R.E. 803(4).   Stephens v. 
State, 774 P.2d 60, 72 (Wyo. 1989).  We have determined, however, that this 
exception permits admitting a child's statement identifying her sexual 
abuser.  Blake v. State, 933 P.2d 474, 477 (Wyo. 1997). The State asserts that Nurse Krininger testified to 
the cause of Foster's injuries as allowed under the exception and did not 
testify O'Brien was guilty of causing those injuries.            

 

[¶30]       Ordinarily, we use a two-part test3 for invoking 
this exception; however, although we believe that the trial court properly 
allowed Krininger's answer under the exception, the questions and answers that 
followed that decision were hearsay and were not properly admitted.  Erroneous 
evidentiary rulings will not be disturbed on appeal if the error is 
harmless.  Warner v. State, 2001 WY 67, ¶29, 28 P.3d 21, ¶29 (Wyo. 
2001).   
Generally, if other evidence properly established the defendant's guilt 
then we will find the error harmless.  Id. at ¶30.  Here, Krininger's 
hearsay testimony, that Foster had stated that the attack had been unprovoked, 
was in addition to testimony provided by eyewitnesses to the actual attack who 
described the attack as unprovoked and who also identified O'Brien as the 
attacker.  The 
State did not refer to these statements of the nurse in its closing, and we find 
that the jury verdict would not have been different had this testimony been 
excluded.  The 
error, therefore, is harmless and does not require reversal for a new 
trial.  

  

Prosecutorial Misconduct

 

[¶31]       The prosecutor made the following statement during closing 
argument:

 

And what you need to do here is find Mr. O'Brien guilty and 
send a message to him and to people that might be like him or might have the 
same idea that they are not going to get away with this.  And I think that 
you will do that, ladies and gentlemen.  And I will ask you to do that. 

 

This Court has explicitly disapproved such arguments, 
finding "the fear in allowing such appeals is that the accused will be convicted 
for reasons wholly irrelevant to her guilt or innocence." Trujillo v. State, 2002 WY 51, ¶9, 2002 WL 523156, ¶9 
(Wyo. 2002) (quoting Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 
861 (Wyo. 1998)).  
"Jurors may be persuaded by such appeals to believe that, by convicting a 
defendant, they will assist in the solution of some pressing social 
problem.  The 
amelioration of society's woes is far too heavy a burden for the individual 
criminal defendant to bear."  Id.  

 

Similarly, "send a message" arguments by prosecutors to 
juries are universally condemned.  The Mississippi Supreme Court in Williams v. State, 522 So. 2d 201, 209 (Miss. 1988), 
simply yet colorfully explained the problem with these arguments:

 

The jurors are representative of the community in one 
sense, but they are not to vote in a representative 
capacity.  
Each juror is to apply the law to the evidence and vote accordingly. 
The issue which each juror must resolve is not whether or not he or she wishes 
to "send a message" but whether or not he or she believes that the evidence 
showed the defendant to be guilty of the crime charged.  The jury is an arm 
of the State but it is not an arm of the prosecution.  The State includes 
both the prosecution and the accused.  The function of the jury is to weigh the 
evidence and determine the facts. When the prosecution wishes to send a message 
they should employ Western Union.  Mississippi jurors are not messenger 
boys.

 

Trujillo at ¶9 (emphasis in 
Trujillo).

 

[¶32]       We notice that no objection to these remarks was made at 
O'Brien's trial; therefore, the error must rise to the level of plain 
error.  "Plain 
error exists when 1) the record is clear about the incident alleged as error; 2) 
there was a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the 
party claiming the error was denied a substantial right which materially 
prejudiced him."   Mazurek v. 
State, 10 P.3d 531, 535 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Yetter 
v. State, 987 P.2d 666, 668 (Wyo. 1999)).  We agree with the State that O'Brien was not 
convicted for reasons wholly irrelevant to his guilt or innocence.  This argument was 
not so prejudicial that it constitutes plain error.  

 

[¶33]       Finally, O'Brien contends that the prosecutor committed 
misconduct when, during trial in violation of a pretrial ruling, he engaged in a 
line of questioning that the trial judge had ruled would be prohibited.  Lewis, the driver 
of the car occupied by O'Brien, was subpoenaed to testify.  Lewis was facing 
criminal charges of accessory after the fact for his conduct during the police 
investigation of O'Brien's attack on Foster. Defense counsel advised the trial 
court that in order to avoid Lewis' refusal to testify based upon Fifth 
Amendment rights, the prosecutor and defense counsel had reached an agreement 
with Lewis limiting his testimony to events leading up to the incident, that he 
would identify O'Brien, and no questions would be asked regarding what occurred 
after Lewis left the parking lot.  In response to the prosecution's concern that 
Lewis might testify that mutual combat had occurred, the trial court determined 
that the agreement limited both the prosecution and defense to identification 
only.  The 
trial court refused the prosecution's request that it be allowed to impeach 
Lewis with statements that he made afterwards for which he was now charged. 

 

[¶34]       The prosecutor called Lewis to the stand, and the trial 
court sustained objections by both the prosecution and defense counsel that the 
other side was questioning on matters beyond the agreement.  Despite a record 
showing that Lewis did not testify concerning any subject other than 
identification, O'Brien contends that, in violation of W.R.E. 608, the 
prosecution then questioned Shelly Lane in an attempt to go beyond the trial 
court's ruling by erroneously impeaching the testimony of Lewis.  The prosecution 
asked Lane the following:

 

Q.                
What was Shawn Lewis in jail for?

A.                 
Lying to the cops.

Q.                
Lying to the cops about what?

A.        I don't 
know.  
Something about accessory after the fact. I think that's when they put 
him in jail.

Q.                
Accessory after the fact?  

A.                 
(Nods head.)

Q.                
Accessory after the fact of what?

A.                 
I don't know.

Defense Counsel:  Objection, Your honor, as irrelevant.

The Court:  Sustained.

Q.                
Okay.  But he was in jail for lying to the 
police?

A.                 
I think so, yeah.

Q.                
Do you know what he lied to the police about?

A.                 
No.

Q.        Well, do 
you know what the police questioned him about?

Defense Counsel:  Objection, Your Honor.  It's irrelevant and 
no foundation of her knowledge.

The Court:  Sustained.

Q.                
Well, do you know yourself if  whether or not Mr. Shawn 
Lewis ever lied to the police?

Defense Counsel:  Objection.  It's irrelevant.

The Court:  Sustained.

Q.                
Do you know if he ever lied to the police about beating up 
 David O'Brien beating up Jordan Foster?

Defense Counsel:  Objection.  It's irrelevant and no foundation. 

The Court:  Sustained.

Q.                
Did you ever hear of a person called Terry Perry?

A.                 
Yeah. Yes.

Defense Counsel:  Objection, Your Honor.  It's 
irrelevant.  No 
showing.  I 
don't know where they're at.

The Court:  Will Counsel approach the bench.

 

The record shows that defense counsel objected to each of 
these questions, and the trial court sustained these objections.  The trial judge 
then called counsel to the bench and admonished the prosecutor to discontinue 
this line of questioning.  The question presented is whether this 
conduct requires reversal upon appeal.  

 

[¶35]       Prosecutorial misconduct "has always been condemned in this 
state."  Earll v. State, 2001 WY 66, ¶9, 29 P.3d 787, ¶9 (Wyo. 
2001) (quoting Valerio v. State, 527 P.2d 154, 156 
(Wyo. 1974)).  
Whether such misconduct has been reviewed on the basis of harmless error, 
W.R.Cr.P. 52(a) and W.R.A.P. 9.04, or on the basis of plain error, W.R.Cr.P. 
52(b) and W.R.A.P. 9.05, this Court has focused on whether such error affected 
the accused's "substantial rights."  Id.  "The accused's right 
to a fair trial is a substantial right. Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 6, 9, and 10; and see, e.g., Jones v. State, 580 P.2d 1150, 1154 (Wyo. 1978)."  Id.   "Before we hold that an error has 
affected an accused's substantial right, thus requiring reversal of a 
conviction, we must conclude that, based on the entire record, a reasonable 
possibility exists that, in the absence of the error, the verdict might have 
been more favorable to the accused."  Id.; Warner, ¶18.

  

[¶36]       In this case, the State's witnesses established that 
O'Brien had attacked Foster without provocation and severely beaten him.  O'Brien contended 
that Foster was a mutual combatant because he confronted O'Brien.  The jury had to 
determine whether this attack was unprovoked and whether the injuries inflicted 
were a serious bodily injury as that term is defined in the statute.  The prosecutor's 
violation of the trial court's pretrial ruling was appropriately dealt with by 
the trial court.  
Based on the entire record, a reasonable possibility does not exist that, 
in the absence of the prosecutor's misconduct, the verdict might have been more 
favorable to the accused.  

 

[¶37]       The conviction is affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-502(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2001) states: 

(a) A person is guilty of aggravated assault and battery if 
he:

(i) Causes serious bodily injury to another 
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme 
indifference to the value of human life[.]

2"Recklessly' is defined 
as the following conduct:  A person acts recklessly when he consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the harm he is accused of 
causing will occur, and the harm results.  The risk shall be of such nature and degree 
that disregarding it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct 
that a reasonable person would observe in the situation[.]"  

3"[F]irst, the 
declarant's motive in making the statement must be consistent with the purposes 
of promoting treatment [or diagnosis];  and second, the content of the statement must 
be such as is reasonably relied on by a physician in treatment or 
diagnosis."  Stephens, 774 P.2d  at 72.