Case Title: State v. Maumalanga

Citation: 976 P.2d 372

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 1998-11-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
976 P.2d 372 (1998) 90 Hawai`i 58 STATE of Hawai`i, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Malakai MAUMALANGA, Defendant-Appellant No. 20146. Supreme Court of Hawai`i. November 30, 1998. Reconsideration Denied January 12, 1999. Theodore Y.H. Chinn and Rose Ann Fletcher, Deputies Public Defender, on the briefs, for defendant-petitioner-appellant MalakaiMaumalanga. Mark Yuen, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, on the briefs, for plaintiff-respondent-appellee State of Hawai`i. MOON, C.J., KLEIN, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, and RAMIL, JJ. Opinion of the Court by LEVINSON, J. We issued a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) in State v. Maumalanga, 90 Hawai`i 96, 976 P.2d 410 (App.1998) [hereinafter, the "ICA's opinion"]. In his application for a writ of certiorari, Maumalanga asserts that (1) the ICA (a) improperly held that common-law "considerations" may be incorporated into the choice of evils defense set forth in Hawai`i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 703-302 (1993)[1] and (b) having determined *373 that an erroneous choice of evils instruction had been given, erred in holding that there was no reasonable possibility that the instruction contributed to Maumalanga's conviction of place to keep loaded firearm, and (2) the trial court committed plain error in failing to give a specific unanimity instruction pursuant to this court's holding in State v. Arceo, 84 Hawai`i 1, 928 P.2d 843 (1996). We affirm the judgment of the ICA affirming Maumalanga's conviction of place to keep loaded firearm in violation of HRS §§ 134-6(c) and (e) (1993).[2] However, with regard to the ICA's incorporation of common-law elements into the choice of evils defense, as codified at HRS § 703-302, we disagree with the ICA's majority opinion and adopt the analysis reflected in Judge Acoba's concurring and dissenting opinion. Accordingly, we hold that the elements of the choice of evils defense are set forth, in their entirety, in the express language of the aforementioned statute and do not include additional elements from the "common law" formulation as set forth in State v. Kealoha, 9 Haw.App. 115, 826 P.2d 884 (1992), and State v. DeCastro, 81 Hawai`i 147, 913 P.2d 558 (App.1996), because they were superseded by the adoption of the Hawai`i Penal Code in 1973. Maumalanga's additional points of error on appeal are without merit for the reasons set forth below. The facts are uncontroverted and adequately summarized in the ICA's opinion: ICA's opinion at 97-99, 976 P.2d at 411-13 (footnotes omitted). At trial, Maumalanga offered the following pertinent testimony on cross-examination: The prosecution, in summation, argued in relevant part as follows: (Emphasis added.) The trial court instructed the jury pertaining to the choice of evils defense as follows: Subsequently, the jury acquitted Maumalanga of four of the counts charged against himCount I (attemmpted first degree murder), Counts II and III (attempted second degree murder), and Count V (first degree terroristic threatening).[5] He was convicted of Count IV (place to keep loaded firearm). Maumalanga appealed his conviction, arguing that the circuit court had erroneously instructed the jury regarding the choice of evils defense. The ICA's majority opinion agreed that the instruction had been erroneous because "it attempt[ed] to incorporate both statutory requirements and case law considerations without distinguishing between the two." The majority opinion reasoned that ICA's opinion at 106-07, 976 P.2d at 420-21 (quoting DeCastro, 81 Hawai`i at 153-54, 913 P.2d at 564-65) (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, the majority concluded that, on the record before it, the error did not *376 require reversal of Maumalanga's conviction because, Id. at 106-07, 976 P.2d at 420-21. Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Judge Acoba disagreed with "the majority's proposed addition of common-law `considerations' to the elements of the choice of evils defense." Concurring and dissenting opinion at 107, 976 P.2d at 421. However, he concurred with the majority's conclusion that the erroneous instruction regarding the defense was harmless "because [Maumalanga] did not present any evidence to satisfy the statutory elements of the defense." Id. In his application for writ of certiorari to this court, Maumalanga asserted that Judge Acoba's analysis of the elements of the choice of evils defense was accurate. However, he maintained that both Judge Acoba and the majority had erroneously concluded that there was no reasonable possibility that the erroneous choice of evils instruction given at trial had contributed to his conviction. He also, for the first time, raised the question whether the trial court had committed plain error in failing to give a specific unanimity instruction, as required by this court's holding in Arceo whenever "separate and distinct culpable acts are subsumed within a single count ... [,] any one of which could support a conviction thereunder." Arceo, 84 Hawai`i at 32, 928 P.2d at 874. State v. Cullen, 86 Hawai`i 1, 8, 946 P.2d 955, 962 (1997). State v. Davia, 87 Hawai`i 249, 253, 953 P.2d 1347, 1351 (1998). As a preliminary matter, Maumalanga takes issue with the holding of the ICA's opinion that a jury instruction regarding the choice of evils defense should include common law "considerations" not expressly set forth within the four corners of HRS § 703-302. He urges this court to adopt Judge Acoba's dissenting position that all of the elements of the choice of evils defense are contained within the express language of HRS § 703-302 and that no common law "considerations" are grafted onto the statutory language, any such common law formulations having been superseded by the adoption of the Hawai`i Penal Code. We agree and hereby adopt Judge Acoba's reasoning as set forth in parts IV through XI of his concurring and dissenting opinion. However, Maumalanga also urges this court to reject the ICA's majority opinion, as well as Judge Acoba's concurring and dissenting opinion, to the extent that both deem the circuit court's error in instructing the jury regarding the choice of evils defense to be harmless. Here, we disagree with Maumalanga and agree with the reasoning set forth in part II of Judge Acoba's concurring and dissenting opinion, which we also hereby adopt. We write now only to address Maumalanga's new point of error: whether the trial court erred in failing to give a specific unanimity instruction to the jury. Arceo, 84 Hawai`i at 32-33, 928 P.2d at 874-75. Maumalanga argues that Maumalanga is correct that there were two episodes that could be deemed separate and distinct culpable acts: (1) the transportation of the guns from his home to his workplace; and (2) the transportation of the guns from his workplace to the gas station. His argument nevertheless fails because the record shows that, effectively, the prosecution did make an election of the specific conduct upon which it based the charge of place to keep loaded firearm. In its cross-examination of Maumalanga and in closing argument, the prosecution focused its development of the facts and its argument on Maumalanga's conduct in taking the loaded firearm with him when he left his workplace to take his friends home and when he stopped for gas. No attempt was made to question Maumalanga whether his firearms were loaded or enclosed in containers when he transported them from his home to EM Tours. Instead, he was questioned regarding the condition of the firearm at the gas station and whether he knowingly took it with him when he departed from his place of business. Similarly, in closing argument, the prosecution stated, "Defendant told you that [the gun] was in his wa[i]st[]band because, remember, when he was in the car, he remembered the gun was in his wa[i]st[]band and he told you he pulled it out," thereby clearly focusing on Maumalanga's transportation of the firearm to the gas station. Accordingly, inasmuch as no effort was made to develop the facts necessary to establish a violation of HRS § 134-6 with regard to the period in which Maumalanga transported his firearms from his home to his place of business or to argue that the aforementioned act constituted a violation, we hold, on the present record, that the prosecution made an effective election, in satisfaction of the Arceo requirements, to base its charge of place to keep loaded firearm on Maumalanga's conduct in taking the firearm from his workplace to the gas station where the shooting incident occurred.[6] For the reasons outlined above, we affirm the conviction and sentence appealed from. However, as to the elements of the choice of evils defense set forth in HRS § 703-302, we adopt Judge Acoba's analysis as the correct statement of the law. Accordingly, we hold that the elements of the choice of evils defense are limited to those enumerated by the express language of the aforementioned statute and that common law "considerations" have not been incorporated into the statutory formulation. [1] HRS § 703-302 provides in pertinent part: Choice of evils. (1) Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid an imminent harm or evil to the actor or to another is justifiable provided that: (a) The harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged; and (b) Neither the Code nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and (c) A legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear. (2) When the actor was reckless or negligent in bringing about the situation requiring a choice of harms or evils in appraising the necessity for the actor's conduct, the justification afforded by this section is unavailable in a prosecution for any offense for which recklessness or negligence, as the case may be, suffices to establish culpability. [2] HRS § 134-6 provides in pertinent part: Carrying or use of firearm in the commission of a separate felony: place to keep firearms; loaded firearms; penalty. ... (c) Except as provided in sections 134-5 and 134-9, all firearms and ammunition shall be confined to the possessor's place of business, residence, or sojourn; provided that it shall be lawful to carry unloaded firearms or ammunition or both in an enclosed container from the place of purchase to the purchaser's place of business, residence, or sojourn, or between these places upon change of place of business, residence, or sojourn, or between these places and the following: a place of repair; a target range; a licensed dealer's place of business; an organized, scheduled firearms show or exhibit; a place of formal hunter or firearm use training or instruction; or a police station. "Enclosed container" means a rigidly constructed receptacle, or a commercially manufactured gun case, or the equivalent thereof that completely encloses the firearm. ... (e) ... Any person violating this section by carrying or possessing a loaded firearm or by carrying or possessing a loaded pistol or revolver without a license issued as provided in section 134-9 shall be guilty of a class B felony.... [3] The ICA's factual summary is in error here, inasmuch as Maumalanga's trial testimony was that the car he was driving on the evening in question did not belong to him and that he had borrowed it from a co-worker. [4] As the ICA observed in a footnote, the relevant portion of defense counsel's closing argument was as follows: Let's talk about, I believe, it's Count 4, and that's the position of the gun. Actually, ... [h]e is charged with not keeping it in the right place. Now the Defense to this charge, and this is what we are asserting this choice of evils. Now [Defendant] had to have the gun, he had to have those guns for a reason. Choice of evils.... ... [The police] don't protect [Defendant]. [Defendant] calls them, and what happens, they end up harassing him because people don't want to let go of their own beliefs that [Defendant] is a gang member. Either the Pinoi-Boys either, neither the BBI or the police; so [Defendant] has no choice, he doesn't have the police to protect him. He knows the Pinoi-Boys are going after him, so he buys guns to protect himself and protect his family. He doesn't have a choice but to have those guns in his possession; but he is not charged with possession. So you have to remember that he is not charged with possession, but he is charged with place to keep; and the only reason why he takes those guns out of that house and take it down to his work place is because [his co-worker] calls him up and says, "We are going to get robbed. Can you bring some protection? Help us out." [5] The trial court granted in part Maumalanga's motion for directed verdict, thereby acquitting him of Counts VI and VII (first degree terroristic threatening). See ICA's opinion at 98, 976 P.2d at 412. [6] We reaffirm as a general proposition, however, that the prosecution and the trial courts should adhere to the Arceo requirements when the facts of the given case so require.