Case Title: People v. Gomez

Citation: 

Docket Number: S087773

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2018-11-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
RUBEN PEREZ GOMEZ, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S087773 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BA156930 
 
 
November 29, 2018 
 
Justice Liu filed the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice 
Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Chin, Corrigan, Cuéllar, Kruger, 
and Lui concurred. 
 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
S087773 
 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
Defendant Ruben Perez Gomez was sentenced to death in 
2000 for the first degree murders of Rajendra Patel and Raul 
Luna, Jr.  He was also sentenced to life in prison without the 
possibility of parole for the double murder of Robert Acosta and 
Robert Dunton.  This appeal is automatic.  (Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b); all undesignated statutory references are to this code.)  
We affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
I. 
FACTS 
In an amended information filed on July 7, 1998, in Los 
Angeles County Superior Court, the district attorney charged 
Gomez with five counts of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), 
six counts of second degree robbery (§ 211), and one count of 
kidnapping (§ 207).  The amended information alleged personal 
firearm use enhancements in connection with each count.  
(Former §§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1), 12022.5, subd. (a).)  The 
amended information also alleged multiple-murder, robbery, 
and kidnapping special circumstances.  (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3), 
(17).) 
The prosecution withdrew one of the robbery counts before 
trial, and the trial court dismissed one of the five remaining 
counts of robbery during trial.  A jury convicted Gomez of four 
counts of first degree murder, two counts of second degree 
robbery, and one count of kidnapping.  The jury found true the 
special circumstance allegation of multiple murder as well as 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
2 
the special circumstance allegations of robbery and kidnapping 
in connection with the Patel murder.  Although the jury 
convicted Gomez of the first degree murder of Luna, it acquitted 
him of the robbery of Luna and the associated robbery special 
circumstance and personal firearm use enhancement.  The jury 
was unable to reach a verdict on the murder and robbery counts 
relating to the separate killing of Jesus Escareno; the trial court 
declared a mistrial on these counts, which the prosecution 
subsequently dismissed pursuant to section 1385. 
The penalty phase took place before the same jury.  After 
two days of deliberations, the jury returned a verdict of death 
for the murders of Luna and Patel, and of life without parole for 
the murders of Acosta and Dunton. 
A. Guilt Phase 
1. Prosecution Evidence 
a. The Salcedo Robbery  
 
Gomez and Xavier Salcedo knew each other from “growing 
up.”  Salcedo testified that Gomez came to his home sometime 
in February 1997 and told Salcedo that he was out of jail and 
asked for money.  Salcedo denied having any money.  About two 
weeks later, around 11:00 p.m. on February 25, Gomez returned 
with two other men.  Salcedo, his girlfriend, Silvia, and their 
three children were home.  Salcedo had about $10,000 in cash in 
his bedroom closet. 
 
Salcedo testified that he heard someone knock on the back 
door and that he told them to come around to the front.  When 
Salcedo opened the front door, Gomez and a second man forced 
their way into the house while a third man remained standing 
in the open doorway.  Gomez told Salcedo, “I want to talk to you, 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
3 
sit the fuck down.”  Gomez sat on the couch next to Salcedo, and 
the second man stood facing them about four feet away.  Gomez’s 
two confederates held their hands in their pockets, giving 
Salcedo the impression that they had guns.  Gomez had a gun 
tucked into his waistband. 
 
Gomez said that Salcedo had “disrespected him” when he 
came to Salcedo’s house two weeks earlier to borrow money.  
Gomez pulled the gun from his waistband, pointed it at Salcedo, 
and told Salcedo to take off his jewelry.  Salcedo handed over his 
gold bracelet, necklace, ring, and watch.  Gomez told Salcedo to 
close the bedroom door so they could talk.  Salcedo went to close 
the door and told Silvia, who was in the bedroom, that he was 
being robbed.  Silvia testified that she called 911 from the 
bedroom. 
 
Salcedo further testified that he went back to the living 
room, where Gomez told him to “sit down” and to “shut up.”  
Gomez pointed the gun at Salcedo, asked if he had any money, 
and told him to “go get it.”  Salcedo went to his bedroom, grabbed 
about $5,000, handed a gun to Silvia, and told her “if they come 
in here, protect yourself.”  Salcedo returned to the hallway, gave 
Gomez the money, and the two went back into the living room.  
Salcedo pleaded with Gomez to give back the jewelry because it 
had been a gift from his parents.  Gomez handed his gun to 
Salcedo while the second man in the living room looked on, but 
Salcedo handed it back and said, “I don’t want any problems.”  
Gomez gave back the jewelry, and the three men left with the 
cash.  Salcedo locked the door, turned off the lights, and went 
back into the bedroom where Silvia was still on the phone with 
a 911 operator. 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
4 
 
Salcedo told Silvia to “grab the kids and let’s go,” but the 
three men returned before Salcedo and his family could leave.  
The men demanded that Salcedo open the door or they would 
shoot though the walls.  Silvia called 911 a second time from the 
bedroom.  Salcedo looked out the window and saw a friend walk 
up to the house.  The friend spoke with the three men.  The men 
started knocking on the door again, and Gomez threatened to 
shoot through the walls.  The police arrived; Gomez and the 
others ran off around the back. 
b. The Patel Murder 
In the early morning of May 27, 1997, Detective Sal La 
Barbera received an assignment to investigate the “northbound 
Terminal Island Freeway on-ramp between Anaheim and PCH.”  
When La Barbera arrived, the scene was already contained by 
police officers, who had found a body on the shoulder of the on-
ramp, apparently shot and stabbed.  Officers found blood about 
75 feet north of the victim’s body.  Two days later, after 
recovering a missing persons flier on a telephone pole in 
Torrance, La Barbera identified the victim as Rajendra Patel.  
The officer spoke with Patel’s family and then verified Patel’s 
identity by checking his thumb print against the victim’s. 
A county medical examiner testified that Patel was shot 
once in the back of his head at close range, with the tip of the 
gun barrel making contact with his head.  The medical examiner 
also testified that Patel received stab wounds in the face and 
neck, and one particularly deep stab wound in the chest.  The 
medical examiner attributed Patel’s death to the gunshot wound 
and the deep stab wound.  He further opined that Patel would 
have been able to walk or run 75 to 90 feet after receiving the 
deep stab wound, but not after receiving the gunshot wound. 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
5 
 
Patel was last seen on May 25, 1997, around 9:00 p.m. at 
his home in La Palma.  The victim’s son testified that his father 
left home in his white Toyota Camry, wearing a bracelet, a gold 
watch, and a chain.  On May 28, 1997, a police officer discovered 
Patel’s car after being directed via radio call to locate a stolen 
vehicle in an alley in San Pedro.  The interior of the car was 
found burned.  A police department criminalist compared DNA 
extracted from blood found in the trunk of the Camry to Patel’s 
DNA and testified that the blood “could have come from Mr. 
Patel or any other individual with the same combination of 
genetic marker types.”  The criminalist further testified that the 
relevant combination of genetic marker types “occurs 
approximately one in 60,000 individuals, so it’s fairly rare in the 
general population.” 
 
Witness No. 1 testified that Gomez had asked him to burn 
the white Camry.  (Before trial, the prosecutor asked that 
Witness No. 1 and three other witnesses not be named in the 
record, although their real names were used during the 
proceedings.  We likewise refer to these witnesses without 
naming them.)  Witness No. 1 complied with Gomez’s request 
because they “were tight.”  He took the car to an alley and then 
poured alcohol on the upholstery so that the vehicle’s interior 
would ignite when he threw a lit rag into the car.  Witness No. 
1 believed the car was a “murder car” because Gomez had told 
him to “check the trunk good to make sure there wasn’t no blood 
in it.”  Witness No. 1 also testified that three or four days before 
Gomez asked him to burn the car, Gomez said, “I hated to kill 
that guy because he had balls.  He said ‘if you’re going to do it, 
go ahead and shoot me, motherfucker.’ ”  According to Witness 
No. 1, Gomez later put “a hit” out on him “for not burning the 
white car completely” because Gomez “was worried about his 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
6 
fingerprints.”  Witness No. 1 testified that Gomez brought 
Patel’s watch and bracelet to Robert Dunton’s house at least one 
or two days before he burned Patel’s car.  
 
Witness No. 3 testified that Gomez brought Patel’s jewelry 
to Witness No. 3’s residence in Wilmington, where her husband 
traded narcotics for the jewelry.  During the transaction, Gomez 
told Witness No. 3 and her husband that the jewelry was “from 
this Mexican man I have in the trunk of the car I just killed.”  
Witness No. 3 observed that a white car was parked in the 
driveway while Gomez was at her home.  Witness No. 3 later 
pawned the watch and bracelet in Las Vegas, Nevada, on June 
5, 1997.  The police collected Witness No. 3’s pawn slip when she 
was arrested for an unrelated crime on July 2, 1997.  Police 
investigators subsequently recovered Patel’s jewelry from the 
Las Vegas pawn shop. 
The police also found three expended .40-caliber cartridge 
casings when investigating the crime scene on May 27, 1997.  
One of the cartridges was located between 90 and 100 feet from 
the body, the second “just a few feet shorter . . . probably only a 
three or four foot difference,” and the third within three feet of 
the body.  These casings were later matched to a Smith and 
Wesson .40-caliber stainless steel semiautomatic handgun given 
to a police officer by Angel Rodriguez on June 8, 1997.  During 
trial, a firearm examiner testified that his forensic analysis of 
the .40-caliber handgun revealed that it was the source of the 
expended casings found near Patel’s body.  Witness No. 1 later 
identified the same handgun as the one Gomez carried “when he 
first started coming around [Dunton’s] house.” 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
7 
c. The Escareno Murder  
 
On the morning of June 9, 1997, Detective Debra Winter 
and her partner arrived at a shopping center on Western Avenue 
in San Pedro to investigate a homicide.  Winter testified that she 
saw the “body of a male Hispanic, approximately 30 years of age, 
lying face down” in an alcove behind the shopping center.  The 
body had been discovered by a maintenance worker earlier that 
morning.  The maintenance worker testified that “there was no 
body” when he arrived for his shift at 5:30 a.m., but that he 
discovered the body when he returned to the area between 7:30 
and 8:00 a.m. 
 
There was brain tissue on the victim’s suit and on the 
ground immediately surrounding the body.  A fragment of glass 
was also recovered from the victim’s hair at the crime scene.  A 
county medical examiner testified that the victim had been 
killed by a shotgun blast to the head from a distance of about 
one or two feet. 
No jewelry was found on the victim’s body, but there were 
indentations on the victim’s fingers where he had been wearing 
rings.  One of the victim’s pockets was turned out, and Winter 
concluded that someone had rifled through it.  Although there 
was no wallet or identification upon the victim’s person, the 
police discovered a business card for the restaurant Los Tres 
Cochinitos in the victim’s right front pocket.  Workers at Los 
Tres Cochinitos examined a photograph of the victim and 
identified him as a regular customer who bussed tables at 
another restaurant.  Upon visiting the victim’s workplace, 
Winter was able to identify the victim as Jesus Escareno. 
 
On June 11, 1997, two days after Escareno’s body was 
discovered, his car was found in San Pedro.  Winter testified that 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
8 
the car’s roof was dented from pellets that had been shot into 
the vehicle.  Blood and brain matter were found between the 
passenger seat and the passenger side door.  A vanity mirror in 
the visor had been shattered by a shotgun blast, which was 
consistent with the glass found in Escareno’s hair at the crime 
scene.  Winter testified that in her opinion Escareno’s death did 
not occur where the car was found and that someone had driven 
the car following Escareno’s homicide. 
 
Diana Paul, a criminalist with the Los Angeles Police 
Department, performed a “bullet path determination” analysis 
on Escareno’s car.  Paul examined the vehicle and found 
projectiles “consistent with a type of shot shell pellet known as 
double aught buck . . . typical of a 12 gauge shotgun.”  Paul 
testified as to his finding that the projectiles traveled “upward 
and from the driver’s side toward the passenger side.”  Paul 
further testified that this finding was consistent with a shotgun 
having been fired through the open driver’s side window and 
that her findings “could be consistent with only one shot” having 
been fired from the shotgun. 
 
Maria Rosales, Escareno’s sister, lived in Wilmington with 
her husband, her children, and Escareno.  According to Rosales, 
Escareno normally worked as a busboy until 10:30 p.m. on 
Sundays.  After work, he typically went out to Los Tres 
Cochinitos “to chat with his friends.”  Escareno always carried a 
wallet.  Rosales testified that on Sunday, June 8, 1997, Escareno 
came home after work, “slept for a while at home,” then went 
out.  Teresa Nava, a waitress at Los Tres Cochinitos, confirmed 
that Escareno had been at the restaurant on June 9 and that he 
left the establishment around 4:10 a.m.  That morning, Rosales 
“awoke with the sound of a gunshot,” which “coincided with the 
time [Escareno] usually arrived” at home.  
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
9 
 
Deanna Gallardo lived in the apartment directly upstairs 
from Escareno and Rosales.  Gallardo was sleeping in bed when 
a gunshot sounded from “right in front of the apartment 
complex” at 4:42 a.m. on June 9.  Gallardo and her husband ran 
to the front window where she saw “the red glare of the brakes” 
and heard “the skidding of a car.”  Pero Hererra, who lived about 
four houses down from Escareno, was in his kitchen early that 
morning getting a drink of water when he also heard a gunshot.  
In an interview with Winter on July 2, 1997, Hererra said that 
from his kitchen window he had seen a car park alongside what 
looked like his neighbor’s car, that he saw a flash “coming from 
inside,” and that he heard a blast from a large gun or shotgun. 
 
Around this time, Witness No. 1 was living in San Pedro 
at Robert Dunton’s house.  Witness No. 1 met Gomez through 
Dunton.  Witness No. 1 and Gomez became friends and were 
“pretty tight for a while.”  Witness No. 1 testified that he was 
driving Gomez around one evening and that Gomez “was looking 
for somebody to rob.”  Gomez had in his possession a cut-down, 
break-open shotgun nicknamed “shorty” that belonged to 
Witness No. 1 and Dunton.  They drove from San Pedro to 
Wilmington.  
 
Upon passing a bar, Gomez asked Witness No. 1, “Did you 
see that guy, with all them rings on his finger[s]?”  The man with 
the rings drove off in a Ford Thunderbird; Witness No. 1 and 
Gomez followed him.  After losing track of the car, the pair 
located it in front of an apartment complex in Wilmington.  They 
pulled up next to the Thunderbird, and Gomez started talking 
to the driver in Spanish.  
 
According to Witness No. 1, the driver of the Thunderbird 
seemed tipsy because he was laughing a lot.  Gomez told him, “I 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
10 
got mucho huevos and mucho corazon.”  Witness No. 1 explained 
this meant he had a lot of balls and a lot of heart.  As the driver 
of the Thunderbird laughed, Gomez lifted the shotgun and fired 
one shot.  Witness No. 1 testified that the driver “suddenly 
disappeared.”  Gomez then told Witness No. 1 to drive the 
Thunderbird back to San Pedro so they could remove the rings 
from the victim’s fingers.  When Witness No. 1 entered the 
driver’s side of the Thunderbird, he noticed that the victim’s 
head was over by the passenger door and his left foot was up 
behind the steering wheel.  Gomez drove off while Witness No. 
1 moved the victim’s foot from behind the steering wheel.  
Witness No. 1 drove the Thunderbird a couple of blocks to a 
hamburger stand, parked it in a dirt lot, took the man’s wallet, 
and walked back to Dunton’s house in San Pedro.  Witness No. 
1 spent $10 of the victim’s money on heroin before he arrived at 
Dunton’s house.  When Dunton learned of this, he told Witness 
No. 1 that he “didn’t follow orders.”  Witness No. 1 gave Gomez 
the victim’s remaining money, about $70. 
 
Witness No. 1 went back to the car; the body and keys were 
still inside.  He drove the Thunderbird to an alley in San Pedro 
about a half block from Dunton’s house.  Witness No. 1 returned 
to the house, and Gomez ordered him to retrieve the dead man’s 
jewelry.  Witness No. 1 took rings and two watches off the body 
and brought them to Gomez.  Gomez gave the items to Dunton, 
who told him that the items were costume jewelry.  The jewelry 
was thrown away. 
 
Gomez subsequently told Witness No. 1 to dispose of the 
car and the body.  Witness No. 1 testified that he drove the 
Thunderbird to the Park Plaza shopping center and left the body 
near two dumpsters “where somebody could find him.”  He then 
drove the car back to an open garage in an alley near Dunton’s 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
11 
house.  Witness No. 1 parked the car, walked down the alley, 
took his blood-stained shirt off and threw it in a garbage can, 
and walked back to Dunton’s house. 
 
Later, after Gomez had been taken into custody, Winter 
and her partner paid him a visit “to determine the tattoos that 
he had.”  Winter testified that she asked Gomez some routine 
questions as part of the booking procedure.  According to Winter, 
Gomez made several statements that were not responsive to her 
questions.  For example, he opined that the police “must be very 
busy” because “things were crazy” in the Harbor area lately.  
Gomez “talked about a guy up on Western, his head being shot 
off,” and he mentioned “a couple of guys that were shot and 
brains were splattered all over the place.”  Gomez said these 
individuals couldn’t be identified and that their wallets were 
missing.  Winter further testified that she had not released 
information to the press about Escareno’s wallet being missing. 
d. The Luna Murder  
At approximately 1:20 a.m. on June 10, 1997, Detective 
Jeffrey Lancaster was dispatched to a shooting at a residence in 
Torrance.  Lancaster arrived to find the body of Raul Luna, Jr. 
“laying adjacent to a walkway that runs from the sidewalk to 
the front porch” of the house.  He observed a gunshot wound on 
the left rear portion of Luna’s head but no other wounds.  A live, 
12-gauge shotgun cartridge was found about 15 feet east of 
Luna’s body.  Officers also located “a clear plastic baggie with a 
kind of white brown substance” near Luna’s knee, which was 
later identified as methamphetamine.  Upon searching the 
residence, officers discovered more methamphetamine, an 
assault rifle, money, and “some other ammunition, .45 caliber.”  
Raul’s father later testified that Raul sold illegal drugs. 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
12 
A county medical examiner performed an autopsy on 
Luna’s body and determined that the cause of death was a 
gunshot wound to the head fired from about six to 12 inches 
away.  During trial, another medical examiner testified that 
photos of the decedent revealed a circular wound with tearing 
into and behind the left ear.  The medical examiner described 
“fully burnt gunpowder” scattered around the skin near the 
shotgun wound hole and noted damage to the skin in the same 
area from the burnt gunpowder. 
Rudy Luna, Raul’s brother, testified that at approximately 
midnight on June 9, 1997, he arrived at the home he shared with 
Raul, another brother named Andy, his sister-in-law Alice, and 
his nephew Andrew.  Rudy lay down to go to bed at 12:06 a.m.  
A 
few 
minutes 
later, 
he 
heard 
a 
“loud, 
muffled 
engine . . . sounding rough like a truck” before hearing a car pull 
up to the middle of the street directly in front of the Luna 
residence.  Approximately three to five minutes later, Rudy 
heard “rustle noises” in front of his bedroom window, so he 
looked out.  Rudy explained that he “didn’t see anything, so [he] 
laid back down, and then a minute after that [he] heard someone 
say, ‘there’s somebody in there, there’s someone in there.’ ”  After 
a couple minutes, Rudy heard the same voice say “he’s here”; he 
then heard his brother Raul say “oh, shit.”  Rudy next heard a 
gunshot and immediately lay down onto his bedroom floor.  
Eventually, Rudy walked to his kitchen window, which faces the 
front of the house.  He did not see anybody but heard “a muffled 
garbled cough” and walked outside to find Raul “lying flat on his 
back bleeding from the head.” 
Charles Orr lived on the same street as the Luna family.  
On the night in question, Orr was working on his computer 
shortly after midnight when he heard “what sounded like an 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
13 
explosion.”  Orr assumed that the sound was a malfunctioning 
electrical transformer at the school down the street.  “All of a 
sudden,” Orr heard running and “a kind of rattling noise,” so he 
looked out of his window to see someone “about [Orr’s] size” 
running eastbound in a “heavy footed” way.  Orr left his house 
and walked down the street to follow the runner but did not see 
anyone. 
 
Around the same time, William Owens, a federal customs 
officer, was smoking a cigar across the street from his 
apartment, less than a mile east of the Luna residence.  That 
night, Owens saw a man running eastbound toward him.  The 
man asked Owens to “give him a ride to his girlfriend’s,” but 
Owens declined.  The man continued to run eastbound.  Owens 
soon called the Torrance Police Department and reported 
“hearing [a] gunshot about 1:00 a.m.”  During the trial, Owens 
identified the running man as Ruben Gomez. 
 
Officer Steve Fletcher testified that upon canvassing the 
crime scene for possible witnesses, he spotted a silvery white 
and black Oldsmobile from the mid-1980s parked about a 
hundred yards south of the Luna residence.  Fletcher noticed 
that the car windows were rolled down, the keys were still in the 
ignition, the hood was warm to the touch, and the tires were wet, 
“appearing as they just had been driven up through the water 
that was in the gutter.”  Officers found a radio and a white 
plastic bag containing seven live 12-gauge shotgun rounds in the 
backseat of the vehicle. 
 
The vehicle was towed to an impound yard later that day, 
where Officer Brooke Mc Millan took additional photographs of 
the vehicle’s interior.  Mc Millan fingerprinted both the interior 
and exterior of the car and collected 34 lifts.  Two prints lifted 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
14 
from the exterior surface of the passenger door belonged to a 
woman named Maria Baca.  One print lifted from the rearview 
mirror matched Baca while the other matched another woman 
named Sandra Ruvalcaba.  Seven prints from the driver’s 
window exterior matched Gomez and one matched Ruvalcaba.  
Finally, three prints from the driver’s door exterior matched 
Gomez. 
 
While the investigation into Luna’s death was ongoing, 
officers investigating the murders of Robert Acosta and Robert 
Dunton recovered a cellphone at Dunton’s house in San Pedro.  
Witness No. 1 testified that Gomez had brought the phone into 
Dunton’s house.  The police were unable to identify fingerprints 
from the lifts taken from the cellular phone.  But when 
Lancaster asked Luna’s father to identify the phone, he 
successfully matched the phone’s serial number with the serial 
number found on the phone’s packaging, which was stored at the 
Lunas’ residence. 
 
At trial, a custodian of records for AirTouch Cellular 
testified about 10 phone calls made after midnight from the 
telephone number registered to Raul Luna.  Four calls were 
made to unknown numbers.  Two calls were made to cab 
companies, one to a hotel in Wilmington, and one to Dunton.  As 
discussed further below, Gomez had been staying at Dunton’s 
home “off and on for about a month.” 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
15 
e. The Acosta and Dunton Murders  
Around 3:48 a.m. on July 1, 1997, police officers responded 
to a 911 call regarding a possible assault with a deadly weapon 
at 332 West O’Farrell Street in San Pedro.  After knocking on 
the front door and receiving no response, and after trying 
unsuccessfully to open the front door, the officers accessed the 
home through a back door and discovered dead bodies inside. 
Detective Olivia Joya and her partner Detective Scott 
Masterson were assigned to investigate the matter around 4:20 
a.m.  They found the body of Robert Acosta on the living room 
floor and the body of Robert Dunton on a living room sofa.  
Masterson testified that Acosta’s head was a “very short 
distance” from the front door.  Joya testified that four spent 
Remington shotgun shell casings, a bag of shotgun shells, the 
sawed-off wood stock of a shotgun, a metal tube, drugs and drug 
paraphernalia, and a cellphone were all recovered from the 
scene.  As noted above, the cellphone was later traced to Raul 
Luna.  
An autopsy of Acosta’s body determined that he had been 
killed by a single shotgun wound to the neck and that the 
shotgun had been placed “at the throat in some contact” with 
the neck.  Dunton’s autopsy revealed that he had been killed by 
a shotgun wound to the back of the head, although Dunton 
received three shotgun wounds in total. 
Manuel 
Hernandez, 
who 
lived 
in 
the 
residence 
immediately to the west of Dunton’s home, told investigators 
that he heard what sounded like three gunshots at about 3:15 
a.m. on July 1, 1997.  When he peeked outside of his window, 
Hernandez saw that Dunton’s house was dark and that one man 
came out of the back door and ran down a walkway toward 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
16 
O’Farrell Street.  The man was between five feet, six inches to 
five feet, eight inches tall; the parties stipulated that Gomez is 
six feet, two inches tall and that Arthur Grajeda, Gomez’s 
codefendant as to the Acosta and Dunton charges, is five feet, 
eight inches to five feet, ten inches tall.  Hernandez then heard 
a car start nearby.  He subsequently noticed someone turn on 
the lights in the Dunton residence and say “oh, my god” before 
leaving the house through the back door. 
 
Witness No. 1 testified that he was present in the home 
when Acosta and Dunton were shot and that he was the person 
who placed the 911 call.  Witness No. 1 had known Acosta and 
Dunton since approximately 1975.  For several months prior to 
the killings, Witness No. 1 lived with Dunton at Dunton’s 
residence on O’Farrell Street.  Witness No. 1 paid Dunton some 
rent and helped him by “working the door” and letting people 
into the home to buy drugs from Dunton.  Dunton weighed 
around 500 pounds and had difficulty getting up from the couch 
to answer the door.  Witness No. 1 first met Gomez about a 
month before Acosta and Dunton were killed, when Gomez came 
to the house to buy drugs.  Gomez and Dunton became friends, 
and Gomez began napping and showering at Dunton’s house 
within a week or two of his first visit. 
During the week before Acosta and Dunton were shot, a 
man who went by “Boxer” came to Dunton’s house two days in a 
row.  On the first visit, Boxer complained, “You ain’t paying your 
taxes and they’re getting on me because I’m not doing my job.”  
The next day, Boxer returned with his girlfriend and another 
person.  He threatened Gomez with a machete while the other 
two held him back.  He then took $100 and a small chrome 
handgun from Gomez.  When Gomez complained about the gun, 
Boxer said, “Well, I’ll give it back to you.”  Gomez then called 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
17 
someone in Wilmington and said he “need[ed] a gun, any kind of 
gun” and insisted that it was a matter of “life or death.”  
Someone brought over a shotgun, and Gomez and Witness No. 1 
cut six inches from the barrel and cut the stock off to make it 
easier to conceal. 
The night before Acosta and Dunton’s murder, Witness 
No. 1 and Gomez drove to a location in Wilmington known as 
“the third world” or “the junk yard” where drug dealing took 
place.  Witness No. 1 flashed some money and offered to buy 
crack cocaine from a drug dealer.  When the dealer presented 
the drugs, Gomez drew the cut-down shotgun and took the drugs 
without paying.  
Gomez and Witness No. 1 subsequently drove back to 
Dunton’s house.  Gomez said to Witness No. 1, “They sent 
somebody to fuck [Dunton] and [Acosta] up.”  Upon entering 
Dunton’s house, the pair found Acosta, Dunton, and Grajeda 
seated inside.  Gomez and Witness No. 1 sat down at a table; the 
cut-down shotgun was placed on the table.  Grajeda was seated 
on a small couch facing Dunton and held a different 
shotgun — the weapon that Witness No. 1 and Dunton referred 
to as “shorty.”  Dunton sat on a large couch facing the door, and 
Acosta was standing near the door.  Witness No. 1 subsequently 
left the room to prepare some crystal methamphetamine in his 
bedroom. 
 
From his bedroom, Witness No. 1 heard Dunton say, “If I 
got to go, I’m going to go like a man.”  Grajeda said, “You know 
the rules,” and Gomez added, “Yeah, forward and backward.”  
Gomez then said, “Don’t point that at me.  I don’t like people 
pointing things at me.”  Thereafter, Witness No. 1 heard about 
four gunshots, running footsteps, and a bump against the 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
18 
washing machine near the back door.  Witness No. 1 went into 
the living room and saw Acosta lying by the front door and 
Dunton seated on the couch with his head to the side. 
Witness No. 1 went out the back door and rode his bicycle 
toward a convenience store to call 911.  On the way, he passed a 
business where his friend worked, and he went in and called 
911.  He then continued to the convenience store.  Witness No. 
1 testified that he was afraid to go back to Dunton’s house 
because he “figured they would . . . come back and get me.”  But 
during an interview with Detective Joya and Detective 
Masterson on July 2, 1997, Witness No. 1 said that he had gone 
out to get something to eat and had come home to find the 
bodies.  In court, Witness No. 1 acknowledged this discrepancy 
and explained:  “Because both of them was gone and I was 
there . . . I was afraid it might look like I did it.” 
 
Witness No. 2 testified that he had known Grajeda, who 
was dating Witness No. 2’s niece, for about four to five years.  
Witness No. 2 had also known Dunton and Acosta for about 30 
years; Dunton lived behind Witness No. 2’s mother’s house.  The 
day before Acosta and Dunton were shot, Witness No. 2 went to 
Donald Jauez’s house around 3:30 or 4:00 p.m.  Grajeda was 
already there, along with four to six other people, having drinks.  
Witness No. 2 testified that he heard Grajeda say that Gomez 
was supposed to be collecting taxes for the Mexican Mafia and 
that “[Dunton] wasn’t paying up, [Gomez] wasn’t paying up.”  
Witness No. 2 recalled Grajeda saying he would “go over there 
and take care of [Gomez].” 
 
Grajeda then asked Witness No. 2 to drive him to Dunton’s 
house because Grajeda “wanted to go check out the place.”  
Witness No. 2 complied.  They arrived at Dunton’s house around 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
19 
4:30 or 5:00 p.m.  Gomez answered the door and they went 
inside.  Witness No. 1, Witness No. 2, Gomez, Grajeda, and 
Dunton were all present.  Witness No. 2 and Grajeda stayed 20 
or 30 minutes and made small talk.  Gomez was “nervous” and 
“was walking back and forth.”  Witness No. 2, suspecting that 
another person may have been in the bedroom, said to Grajeda, 
“Let’s get out of here.  It don’t look right.” 
 
Grajeda and Gomez walked outside, followed by Witness 
No. 2.  Grajeda and Gomez went over to a vehicle and talked for 
a few minutes.  Acosta arrived, greeted them, and went inside 
the house.  Witness No. 2 drove Grajeda back to Jauez’s house 
and dropped him off around 5:30 p.m.  During the drive, Grajeda 
asked Witness No. 2 to come back at 8:00 p.m. to pick him up 
and drive him back to Dunton’s house.  Grajeda told Witness No. 
2 that he intended to kill Gomez and possibly Dunton if Dunton 
“didn’t pay up his taxes.”  Witness No. 2 agreed to return at 8:00 
p.m.   
 
Around 6:00 p.m., Witness No. 2 went to his mother’s 
apartment.  He told his girlfriend that Grajeda was going to call 
and instructed her to say that Witness No. 2 was asleep and that 
she would not wake him.  Witness No. 2 did not see Grajeda 
again until about two days after Acosta and Dunton had been 
killed.  Witness No. 2 told Grajeda that “[Acosta] and [Dunton] 
got killed,” and Grajeda said that he “did it.” 
 
Witness No. 4, Gomez’s cousin, testified that she saw 
Gomez on July 2, 1997, for the first time in about eight years.  
Sometime in the late afternoon, Gomez knocked on the door to 
her home in Long Beach and said that he needed a place to stay.  
He was carrying a bag and “kind of a big gun” that resembled 
the shotgun that he and Witness No. 1 had cut down and 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
20 
removed the stock from.  Witness No. 4 subsequently left Gomez 
in her house and walked to her friend’s house, where she 
eventually called the police.   
Around 3:00 or 3:30 a.m., Gomez was arrested at Witness 
No. 4’s home without incident.  Upon searching the residence, 
officers discovered the cut-down shotgun.  Three of four 
fingerprints lifted from the shotgun matched Gomez.  Daniel 
Rubin, a criminalist with the Los Angeles Police Department’s 
Firearms Analyst Unit, testified that four spent cartridges 
discovered at Dunton’s house were fired by the shotgun 
confiscated from Gomez during his arrest, and that one live 
round recovered from Dunton’s house was “the type of shot 
cartridge that could be loaded in and fired by” the shotgun.  
Rubin further noted that a metal tube found at Dunton’s 
residence “could have been a part of the barrel of [the] shotgun.”  
On July 7, 1997, detectives acting on information provided by 
Witness No. 1 recovered a cut-off shotgun stock from a trashcan 
in Dunton’s kitchen. 
 
Witness No. 5, Acosta’s wife, testified that Gomez called 
her after his arrest and asked her to come visit him at the county 
jail.  At the jail, Gomez denied killing Acosta and Dunton, and 
told Witness No. 5 that he knew “that he had left fingerprints 
all over the house and even fingerprints on [Dunton’s] face, and 
he even kissed him.”  Gomez also acknowledged that he was “the 
last person there” when Acosta and Dunton were killed. 
Witness No. 5 further testified that she found a note 
between the pages of a Bible five days after Acosta’s death.  The 
handwritten note was signed by Acosta in his full name and his 
street name “Spider.”  She testified that she and Acosta “always” 
left notes for each other, but that Acosta had never left a note 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
21 
for her signed with his full name.  Witness No. 5 said that the 
note “meant something serious,” so she turned it over to the 
detectives investigating Acosta’s death.  The note read as 
follows:  “6-30.97 [¶] Tuesday morning [¶] Monday nite 1.20 [¶] 
Went to meet [¶] Shady La Rana [¶] don’t like the [¶] meeting 
at Big Huero [¶] Robert Acosta [¶] Spider.”  (“Shady La Rana” 
was Grajeda’s nickname, and “Big Huero” referred to Dunton.)   
 
 The prosecution also presented expert testimony from 
Sergeant Richard Valdemar about the history and practices of 
the Mexican Mafia.  Valdemar recounted some of his 
observations from surveilling Mexican Mafia meetings, 
including the fact that murder was a primary topic of 
conversation.  He further stated that the Mexican Mafia had a 
“reputation for seeking out witnesses and killing them” and that 
loyal Mexican Mafia members “would use any means possible to 
delay, obstruct or reverse any kind of a criminal prosecution 
against its members.”  Moreover, after viewing Gomez’s tattoos, 
Valdemar testified that Gomez was “a member of the East Side 
Wilmas gang, Ghost Town Locos, which is a subset, and 
surrenos.”  He had previously stated “[t]hat members of the East 
Side Wilmas gang . . . align themselves with the Mexican 
Mafia.”  
Valdemar also explained that individuals can be placed 
“on a green light list” and that “gang members have a green light 
or the authorization to assault and murder whoever is on that 
list.”  Valdemar noted that “all dope dealers who operate in the 
area controlled by the street gangs that are controlled by [the 
Mexican Mafia] pay taxes,” and agreed with the prosecution 
that a “Hispanic street gang member who by reason of his 
tattoos was professing allegiance to [the Mexican Mafia]” and 
“was robbing dope dealers in San Pedro and Wilmington and not 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
22 
turning over those proceeds to [the Mexican Mafia]” would likely 
be placed on the green light list and specifically designated to be 
killed.  He further explained that someone on the green light list 
might be given an assignment for a “suicide run” where the 
individual murders someone else on behalf of the Mexican Mafia 
so as to be removed from the list.  Valdemar also noted that the 
Mexican Mafia often “used someone close to the victim to either 
approach them or actually carry out the murder.” 
During a break in Valdemar’s testimony, one of the jurors 
sent a note to the trial court judge, that read as follows:  “Judge, 
I have a question!  What about jury members.  Are we at risk?”  
Additionally, at the end of guilt phase deliberations, the jury 
sent a note signed by the foreperson to the court, stating that 
the jurors were “concerned about possible harassment or 
problems after we are dismissed once the verdicts are read.”  The 
trial court subsequently rearranged the jurors’ parking and 
provided for them to be escorted to their cars. 
2. Defense Evidence 
a. The Patel Murder 
 
When Gomez was arrested on July 2, 1997, the police did 
not find any .40-caliber pistols on his person.  Nor did the police 
recover such handguns at the crime scenes of the Luna, 
Escareno, or Acosta and Dunton murders.  Besides the three 
shell casings of the .40-caliber pistol found near Patel’s body, 
officers also discovered a disposable lighter from which no prints 
of Gomez were recovered. 
During the investigation, Detective La Barbera had 
experts take foot impressions from the ground.  La Barbera 
testified that after having learned that officers from Long Beach 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
23 
and the California Highway Patrol had already been to the 
crime scene, he originally chose not to have the castings 
analyzed, believing the prints belonged to the police officers 
present at the scene.  La Barbera later had the plaster casts and 
photographs of the shoe prints at the crime scene compared to 
boots confiscated from Gomez during his arrest even though 
“these boots . . . did not or could not have made the shoe or boot 
impressions located at the scene.” 
Additionally, La Barbera had requested fingerprint, 
serology, and arson experts to conduct an investigation of Patel’s 
car.  None of the fingerprints lifted from the vehicle were linked 
to Gomez.  The serologist was unable to match the blood in 
Patel’s car to Gomez.  Officers also recovered various personal 
items from the car, including a flashlight that did not belong to 
Patel and other “trace evidence” such as a rope and bungee 
cords, none of which “c[a]me back to Ruben Gomez.”  The police 
did not find knives, scissors, or shears in the trunk of Patel’s car. 
b. The Escareno Murder 
 
The defense introduced a local newspaper article on the 
Patel murder, dated May 27, 1997, indicating that no 
identification was found on the body.  Detective Winter 
confirmed that the Escareno murder was also “covered in their 
local paper.”  The defense also introduced two newspaper 
articles concerning the Escareno homicide that were included in 
the murder book prepared by the detectives that investigated 
Escareno’s murder.  Defense Exhibit L, dated June 18, 1997, and 
entitled “A Gruesome Discovery in SP Alley,” recounted the 
discovery of Escareno’s car and described the blood and brain 
matter found in the car.  Defense Exhibit M, dated June 10, 
1997, and entitled “Man Found Slain at SP Shopping Center,” 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
24 
stated that a victim was found with a massive gunshot wound 
to the head in a shopping center on Western Avenue, that 
jewelry had been taken from both hands, and that robbery 
appeared to be a motive.  The article also stated that the victim 
was killed at the shopping center.  
The defense recalled Detective Winter, who testified that 
she had interviewed Witness No. 1 on July 24, 1997.  During the 
interview, Witness No. 1 said that Gomez “always drove.”  
Witness No. 1 would ask Gomez for permission to carry the 
shotgun because Gomez was driving, and sometimes Gomez 
would let him.  Witness No. 1 also told Winter that Dunton 
would give “some of the jewelry that would come into the house” 
to “some of the females that would come around.”  Witness No. 
1 described jewelry that Dunton had given to some girls, and 
Winter indicated in her testimony that the description sounded 
like Escareno’s jewelry.  He also indicated that Gomez had 
several guns, including a single shot 12-gauge shotgun and a 
pump shotgun.  Winter also interviewed Witness No. 1 on 
August 20, 1997.  Witness No. 1 told Winter that he had been 
involved in the Escareno murder and that he was with Gomez 
at the time.  
c. The Luna Murder 
During trial, Rudy Luna testified that he did not recognize 
the voice he heard outside his bedroom window.  Rudy 
acknowledged that he personally knew Gomez prior to Raul’s 
death. 
 
Detective Lancaster later directed officers to compare the 
boots taken from Gomez to the plaster shoe casts made at the 
Luna crime scene.  There was “no similarity at all” between the 
boots and the casts, which appeared to have been made by an 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
25 
“athletic type of shoe.”  Nor did the casts taken from the crime 
scene produce any evidence significant to the investigation. 
 
Charles Orr, one of the prosecution’s witnesses, described 
the man he saw running shortly after the shooting as “dark-
skinned but not Black.”  During trial, Orr did not characterize 
Gomez as having dark skin. 
William Owens, another one of the prosecution’s witnesses 
who had “five or six seconds” of interaction with the running 
man, testified that the man seemed Central American and had 
“a deep heavy Spanish or Hispanic accent.”  Owens estimated 
that the man stood around “five-nine, five-ten,” weighed “maybe 
180, 200” pounds, had a “light complexion” and “a facial 
structure . . . from [the] Central America region,” and spoke 
with a “heavy Spanish or Hispanic accent.”  Owens further 
reported that the running man wore jeans and a red and blue 
nylon jacket.  Owens did not notice any tattoo markings but 
described the runner’s hairstyle as a “marine-type” “crewcut” 
and said that the runner had a trimmed, “medium mustache.” 
 
Lancaster showed Owens a six-pack of photos that 
contained a picture of Gomez.  Lancaster did not have Owens 
circle, date, and sign the photograph, as he customarily did to 
verify the identification because Lancaster did not feel Owens 
had accurately identified the individual who had committed the 
crime.  Lancaster testified that Owens “never conclusively 
indicated that [the photograph] was [of] the suspect,” only that 
Owens indicated “he somewhat resembled the suspect.”  Owens 
claimed to have identified the runner with “75 to 85 percent 
accuracy.”  During trial, Owens pointed to Gomez in the 
courtroom when asked to identify the running man. 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
26 
 
Wilcox testified that Gomez’s prints did not match the 
latent prints lifted from the Oldsmobile at the crime scene.  
Wilcox further testified that it is generally impossible to “put a 
time date as to the appearance of that fingerprint on that 
particular object . . . unless there is some type of outside specific 
force that acts on that fingerprint.”  Further, all six of the 
fingerprint lifts taken from the cellphone recovered by the police 
were “badly smeared or basically not of sufficient quality to do 
the latent print comparison.”  Wilcox was not directed to 
perform fingerprint analysis on lifts taken from other surfaces 
besides the vehicle and cellphone. 
At trial, Lancaster testified that the Oldsmobile was not 
registered to Gomez.  He also acknowledged that prints lifted 
from the radio found inside the vehicle, prints from the baggie 
found near Luna’s body, prints from an ATM card found near 
Luna’s body, and prints lifted from a gold chain and cross 
around Luna’s neck did not match Gomez’s prints.  
d. The Acosta and Dunton Murders  
 
The defense recalled Detective Joya, who testified that the 
cut-off barrel and wood stock of the shotgun linked to the Acosta 
and Dunton murders were sent to the crime lab, but she could 
not recall if any of the prints matched Gomez.  Joya also testified 
that she interviewed Witness No. 1 on July 15, 1997, and August 
20, 1997.  During the July 15 interview, Witness No. 1 told Joya 
“[Gomez] had told him that they’re going to send someone over 
to fuck up [Dunton] and [Acosta].”  In the interview on August 
20, Witness No. 1 told Joya “that [Gomez] told him that 
they — that they have their orders for [Dunton] and [Acosta].”  
Witness No. 1 did not indicate to Joya that by using the term 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
27 
“they,” Gomez was referring to himself.  Joya further testified 
that “they” was a reference to a group of people. 
The defense also recalled Detective Winter, who testified 
that she interviewed Witness No. 1 on July 24, 1997.  During 
the interview, Witness No. 1 said that Gomez “always drove.”  
Witness No. 1 would ask Gomez for permission to carry the 
shotgun, because Gomez was driving, and that sometimes 
Gomez would let him.  During this same interview, Witness No. 
1 told Winter that Dunton asked him to get rid of Boxer. 
B. Penalty Phase                  
1. Prosecution Evidence 
The prosecution’s aggravation case consisted of testimony 
concerning Gomez’s prior felony convictions and violent criminal 
activity.  The prosecution first presented evidence that Gomez 
had been convicted of a 1991 robbery.  The victim, Jorge Lucho, 
testified that Gomez approached him when he was walking 
home late at night.  Gomez threatened Lucho with a pointed 
screwdriver and demanded his wallet.  Lucho turned over the 
wallet, which contained only one dollar; Gomez said Lucho 
“surely was carrying more money and that [Lucho] should go 
with him to the alley to try and get some more.”  At that point, 
Lucho was able to run away, but he heard Gomez threaten to 
kill him if he didn’t give any more money.  Police officers 
thereafter discovered Gomez hiding behind a mattress in a 
metal shed in the backyard of a house several blocks from where 
he had confronted Lucho.  Upon arresting Gomez, the police 
officers found a “homemade metal sharp object” on Gomez’s 
person.  The arresting officer testified that Gomez “had a 
bewildered look, eyes wide open.”  Gomez was transported to the 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
28 
general hospital, where he was diagnosed as being under the 
influence of an opiate. 
The prosecution next introduced evidence that while 
incarcerated for the 1991 robbery and a separate drug charge, 
Gomez was convicted of assault and possession of a deadly 
weapon. 
Finally, the prosecution presented evidence relating to 
several violent incidents that occurred when Gomez was in 
custody awaiting trial in the instant case.  Deputy Sheriff Chad 
Millan testified that in June 1998, he escorted Gomez to the 
hallway to search him for hidden contraband or weapons.  
Gomez “was instructed to strip out of his underwear,” was then 
“waist chained,” and “asked to do a squat down and a cough too 
and release anything that might be secreted in his anus.”  
Gomez initially did not comply and then pulled an object from 
“between his buttocks.”  Fearing that the object was a weapon, 
Gomez was ordered to drop the object; when Gomez refused to 
do so, Millan sprayed him with pepper spray.  Gomez turned 
away, began peeling paper “covering off what seemed like the 
blade,” and ran down the hallway.  Millan followed him and 
confronted him, kicking him in the back of the head.  Gomez 
turned around, said “fuck you, punk,” and stabbed Millan three 
times in the rib and knee with a shank. 
Deputy Sheriff Timothy Vanderleek testified that he 
responded to a disturbance in Gomez’s cell in November 1999.  
When he entered the cell, he had liquid that smelled like urine 
thrown on his face.  Deputy Sheriff Frank Montoya testified that 
he had several violent interactions with Gomez in December 
1999, while Gomez was jailed during his trial.  Montoya 
encountered Gomez walking back from court carrying a large 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
29 
bag of candy, which was not authorized because Gomez had been 
placed in the “high security discipline” cell.  Montoya confronted 
Gomez and advised him that he could not possess the candy 
until he “gets out of discipline”; this caused Gomez to get angry 
and start shouting profanities.  When Montoya attempted to 
grab the bag, Gomez turned around and head butted him.  After 
Gomez was brought to the ground, Gomez said, “You fucked up, 
Montoya.  You fucked up.  I’m going to kill you.  I’m going to kill 
you and I’m going to kill every deputy here.” 
The next day, Montoya let Gomez out of the locked shower 
area and asked him to show Montoya his hands.  Montoya 
testified that Gomez “thrust” his hand “through the bars toward 
[Montoya’s] office,” and that Gomez was holding “a plastic 
handled comb with the teeth cut out, and there was a razor fixed 
to it, like a slashing instrument.”  Gomez was unable to reach 
Montoya with his weapon, so he “started breaking the razor and 
the plastic comb into little pieces and threw it down the shower 
drain.”  As he did that, Gomez said, “fuck you . . . I’m going to 
kill you.  I might have missed you this time, or I’ll get you later 
or I’ll get some other deputy that’s slower.”  Montoya testified at 
trial that he maintained daily contact with Gomez after these 
two incidents; although Gomez continued to threaten Montoya, 
he did not try to attack him physically again.  Another deputy 
at the jail, Keith Holly, testified that he went to Gomez’s cell to 
inform Gomez that he had been found guilty of various offenses 
in violation of jail disciplinary rules, and that Gomez would 
therefore lose various privileges for 30 days.  Gomez responded, 
“Fuck this discipline time.  I should have fucking slashed 
Montoya’s throat when I had a chance. . . .  Just wait until those 
fucking deputies take me to court and I’ll slash one of those 
fuckers.”  
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
30 
2. Defense Evidence 
The defense first offered the testimony of Michael Pickett, 
a regional administrator for the Department of Corrections.  
Pickett testified that a defendant like Gomez “can only be 
assigned to a Level 4 institution” and would most likely be sent 
to the most secure classification of facility, known as a “Security 
Housing Unit” or “SHU.”  Pickett explained that “it’s not a 
perfect world at a Level 4 prison” despite the high security and 
that homicides as well as assaults occurred at such facilities.  
Based on what he knew about Gomez, Pickett predicted that 
Gomez would be moved to the Corcoran SHU facility or the 
Pelican Bay State Prison SHU facility, where he would be 
confined to a cell for roughly 23 hours per day.  He would leave 
his cell only for exercise in a yard adjacent to the SHU or for 
medical and legal visits, during which he would be shackled and 
escorted by a guard.  Pickett also testified that all visits with a 
Level 4 SHU inmate are “non-contact,” meaning there would be 
a Plexiglas partition between the inmate and the visitor.  On 
cross-examination, Pickett detailed a race-related riot that 
occurred at Pelican Bay State Prison the previous morning.  
Pickett also opined that there is a higher level of violence at the 
more highly secured prison facilities because the inmates in 
such facilities are more violent.  Pickett further testified that 
murders and violent assaults have been ordered by prison gang 
members in the SHUs against prisoners in the general 
population. 
 
The defense also presented the testimony of Gomez’s 
sister, Mercedes Sanabria.  She testified that Gomez has three 
children under the age of 12 and that she has brought the 
children to visit Gomez at the county jail.  Sanabria further 
testified that the children love their father and that she loves 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
31 
her brother.  She said to the jury “that despite what my brother 
has done, we are real sorry, but we all love him, and we just 
don’t want him to be executed.” 
II. 
PRETRIAL ISSUES 
A. Preemptive Denial of Gomez’s Right to Self-
Representation 
Nine months before jury selection, Gomez invoked his 
right to represent himself under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 
U.S. 806.  At that time, the court warned him, “[Y]ou can’t go 
back and forth on this.  If you want to represent yourself, that’s 
fine.  That’s going to cause a delay in the proceedings, and you 
just can’t keep switching back and forth between being 
represented by counsel and representing yourself.”  After 
determining that Gomez’s waiver of the right to counsel was 
knowing and intelligent, the court granted Gomez pro se status.  
But two weeks later, Gomez expressed his desire to “relinquish” 
his pro se status and asked that the court reappoint counsel.  
The following colloquy ensued: 
“THE COURT: 
Is that what you want to do, Mr. Gomez? 
“GOMEZ:  
Yes. 
“THE COURT: 
I told you before you can’t switch back 
and forth. 
“GOMEZ:  
I know that. 
“THE COURT: 
I’m going to hold you to this kind of a 
change.  I think it’s a good change for 
you.  I think you’re doing the right thing.  
All I’m saying is I’m not going to let you 
bounce back and forth.  You have a right 
to represent yourself, I recognize that 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
32 
and gave that to you, and as of this 
moment you do represent yourself.  And 
it’s better for you and it’s better for me 
as well to have an attorney who knows 
the rules and will effectively represent 
you to do that for you.  So at this point 
you understand that if I’m going to 
change back, this is a final change. 
“GOMEZ: 
I understand that, yeah. 
“THE COURT: 
And that’s what you want to do? 
“GOMEZ: 
Yes, sir. 
“THE COURT: 
Okay.  Mr. Nardoni is appointed then.” 
Gomez argues that this colloquy amounted to a 
preemptive denial of Gomez’s constitutional right to self-
representation.  Quoting People v. Windham (1977) 19 Cal.3d 
121, 128, he contends that when “ ‘a motion to proceed pro se is 
timely interposed, a trial court must permit a defendant to 
represent himself upon ascertaining that he has voluntarily and 
intelligently elected to do so, irrespective of how unwise such a 
choice might appear to be.’ ”  Because the court gave Gomez the 
impression that he could not ask to represent himself, he argues, 
he never had the opportunity to invoke such a right, even if such 
requests had been timely.  But because Gomez never re-invoked 
his Faretta right, he cites to our decisions in People v. Dent 
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 213 (Dent) and People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 
Cal.4th 50, 69–70 (Lancaster) as precedent for the proposition 
that where the court entirely forecloses the possibility of future 
self-representation, Faretta is violated. 
In Dent, the defendant’s appointed counsel failed to show 
up on time for the first day of trial.  (Dent, supra, 30 Cal.4th at 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
33 
p. 216.)  After “delineat[ing] the history of defense counsel’s 
requests for continuances and failure to appear on the record,” 
the trial judge indicated that he would continue the trial once 
again and relieved the defendant’s attorneys as counsel of 
record.  (Ibid.)  He then advised the defendant that he “ ‘must 
be represented by attorneys that are senior trial attorneys.  And 
you have got to have people here to represent you.  You cannot 
represent yourself in this matter.’ ”  (Ibid.)  When the defendant 
asked to say something in response, the trial judge prevented 
him from doing so without attorneys present.  (Ibid.)  Later, 
after the defendant suggested that he would prefer to represent 
himself rather than receive new counsel, the trial judge flatly 
stated that he was “ ‘not going to let him proceed pro. per. . . .  
Not in a death penalty murder trial.’ ”  (Id. at p. 217.)  The trial 
court proceeded to appoint new counsel, and the defendant did 
not renew his Faretta motion.  (Dent, at p. 217.)  On this record, 
we held that “the trial court’s response was not only legally 
erroneous but also unequivocal, and foreclosed any realistic 
possibility defendant would perceive self-representation as an 
available option.”  (Id. at p. 219.) 
Lancaster distinguished Dent on the ground that Dent 
“involved 
[an] 
outright 
denial 
of 
the 
right 
[to 
self-
representation].”  (Lancaster, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 70.)  In 
Lancaster, as here, the defendant had vacillated between self-
representation and the right to counsel.  After the fourth such 
change of heart, the court similarly admonished the defendant:  
“ ‘I do need to advise Mr. Lancaster that you cannot continue to 
change between representing yourself and having appointed 
counsel represent you.  The reason for it is that we’ve got to move 
forward, and that doesn’t allow us to do that.  [¶] I think it’s a 
very wise move on your part, as I said. . . .  But having originally 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
34 
had an attorney, gone pro per, had an attorney, gone pro per, 
now you’re back to an attorney, I can’t let you continue to change 
from one to the other.  It has to be a permanent decision on your 
part.  [¶] Even if at some point you have some disagreement with 
what Mr. Rothman is doing, you can’t just say now I’m back pro 
per.  That’s a decision for the court to make, and it probably 
would not be in your favor.’ ”  (Id. at p. 69.)   
We rejected the defendant’s argument that the court’s 
comments were “a ‘preemptive denial’ of his Faretta right,” 
noting that in light of “the court’s protracted grappling with the 
logistics of providing defendant with discovery materials and 
access to legal resources, the court’s concern with his repeated 
alternation between self-representation and the services of 
counsel was warranted.”  (Lancaster, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 69.)  
We held that “[t]he court’s reference to the need for a ‘permanent 
decision’ . . . did not entirely foreclose the possibility of 
defendant’s future self-representation.”  (Ibid.)  Rather, “it told 
him it would make a decision on any renewed application, 
though the request would probably not be viewed with favor.”  
(Ibid.) 
The instant case is more similar to Lancaster than Dent.  
In Lancaster, the court warned the defendant that “ ‘you cannot 
continue to change’ ” because “ ‘we’ve got to move forward,’ ” 
although the decision to request counsel was “ ‘wise.’ ”  
(Lancaster, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 69.)  Here, the court said, “I’m 
going to hold you to this kind of change,” and “it’s a good change 
for you.”  When Gomez first asked to represent himself, the court 
had already warned Gomez that he could not “go back and forth 
on this” because “[t]hat’s going to cause a delay in the 
proceedings.”  But, unlike in Dent, the court expressly told 
Gomez that “[y]ou have the right to represent yourself if you 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
35 
make a knowing and intelligent waiver of your right to counsel” 
and “[i]f you want to represent yourself, that’s fine,” and the 
court granted Gomez’s initial request to proceed in propia 
persona. 
Gomez seizes on subtle distinctions in wording to argue 
that while the court in Lancaster “did not entirely foreclose the 
possibility of defendant’s future self-representation” (Lancaster, 
supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 69), here the court told him unequivocally 
that future requests for self-representation would be denied.  
But this misunderstands the import of Lancaster, which held 
that the trial court’s comments, taken in context, could not be 
characterized as a preemptive denial of the defendant’s Faretta 
right.  (Lancaster, at p. 69.)  Lancaster did not hold that had the 
trial court’s comments been phrased in more certain terms, such 
comments would have amounted to reversible error.  Instead, 
we commented that the trial court’s reference to a “permanent” 
decision may have been “precipitous” due to the fact that trial 
was not imminent, but “the impropriety was slight” and did not 
cause fundamental error.  (Id. at pp. 69–70.)  As we explained, 
these admonitions are generally inadvisable but also reflect “the 
difficulties posed by [a] defendant’s intermittent assumptions of 
his own defense” and thus constitute an understandable 
“attempt to discourage defendant from perpetuating those 
difficulties.”  (Id. at p. 70.) 
That a trial court may directly deny a Faretta request 
when it is designed “to frustrate the orderly administration of 
justice” (People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 23) suggests 
that courts are not foreclosed from preemptively discouraging 
such requests when it identifies a pattern of vacillation that, 
over time, will harm the progress of trial and the defendant’s 
ability to put on a defense.  When considered in context, the trial 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
36 
court’s statement that “this is a final change” did not 
“unequivocal[ly] . . . foreclose[] any realistic possibility [Gomez] 
would perceive self-representation as an available option”  
(Dent, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 219).  Therefore, the trial court’s 
warning, while inadvisable in its assertion that any chance 
would be “final,” was not erroneous. 
B. Trial Court’s Hypothetical During Voir Dire 
Regarding Credibility of Accomplice Testimony 
During jury selection, the prosecution was interested in 
probing prospective jurors’ feelings regarding the propriety of 
exchanging testimony against another for prosecutorial 
leniency.  Page 12 of the jury questionnaire asked:  “How do you 
feel about the situation in which the prosecution decides not to 
prosecute one person in exchange for that person’s testimony 
against another person?”  The court asked follow-up questions 
of those who expressed hesitation or distaste for such practices, 
and pressed jurors to explicate their feelings in greater detail. 
When a juror did not understand the question, the court 
offered the following hypothetical as “an example of the kind of 
thing which [the court] think[s] makes some sense to people at 
least.  [¶] That is say there’s a bank robbery situation.  There 
are two people involved, one stands outside as a lookout.  The 
other bank robber actually goes in to rob the bank, and in the 
process kills somebody.  [¶] We’ve got good evidence supposedly 
in this hypothetical as to the person standing outside.  We know 
that person is a lookout and can be convicted for participating 
in the bank robbery and is actually responsible under the law 
for the robbery and the killing that occurred in the bank.  But 
the real person that pulled the trigger is the second person, and 
law enforcement is more concerned about that person than the 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
37 
one that stood outside.  [¶] Do you see a problem with the idea 
of granting some lenience to this person that stood outside as a 
lookout, saying that that person is either going to agree to a 
lesser penalty or perhaps even be immunized entirely in order 
to get that person’s testimony against the actual bank robber?”  
Gomez argues that the trial court’s attempts to elucidate 
the significance of the questionnaire’s inquiry into accomplice 
testimony “improperly informed jurors that the prosecution 
would only grant leniency to the less culpable party involved in 
a crime.”  Although counsel did not object to this hypothetical 
during voir dire, Gomez argues that the relevant exchanges 
between the court and prospective jurors amounted to 
instructional error.  (People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 
929–930 [“[W]e do not deem forfeited any claim of instructional 
error affecting a defendant’s substantial rights.”].)  We disagree.  
The trial court’s hypothetical was clearly meant to expand upon 
and explain the significance of the questionnaire’s inquiry.  To 
the extent that the hypothetical may have suggested that the 
trial court had personal confidence in the prosecutor’s choice 
with respect to whom to prosecute, counsel could have objected.  
But counsel did not.  Accordingly, Gomez has forfeited this 
claim.  (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 653 [“[A] 
defendant may not challenge on appeal alleged shortcomings in 
the trial court’s voir dire of the prospective jurors when the 
defendant, having had the opportunity to alert the trial court to 
the supposed problem, failed to do so.”].) 
On the merits, the trial court did not err.  By describing 
the underlying logic for why a prosecutor might exercise 
leniency with respect to one accomplice in exchange for 
testimony, the trial court’s manifest intention was to add 
greater granularity to the questionnaire.  Each time the trial 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
38 
court engaged a prospective juror with the hypothetical, it was 
expressly framed in relation to page 12 of the voir dire 
questionnaire.  The court described the hypothetical as an 
“example” that “makes some sense to people,” suggesting that 
the trial court did not personally hold the views that it 
described.  Its evident purpose was to draw out the prospective 
jurors’ views as to the propriety of exchanging testimony for 
prosecutorial leniency, not to personally vouch for the 
prosecution’s choice of defendant.  Moreover, the trial court later 
instructed the jury about evaluating witness credibility in the 
instant case, which further clarified that any views suggested 
by the hypothetical were irrelevant. 
C. Motion for Severance of Counts and Separate 
Trials 
Gomez argues that the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying his motion to sever his trial from his codefendant’s trial 
and his motion to sever his charges.  Gomez claims that these 
alleged errors, “both alone and in combination,” violated his 
rights to due process, a fair trial, a reliable guilt and penalty 
determination, and his right to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment under both the federal and state Constitutions. 
Before trial, Gomez first moved to sever his trial for the 
murders of Robert Acosta and Robert Dunton from that of 
codefendant Arthur Grajeda.  Gomez then moved to sever his 
counts, seeking a joint trial on the charges arising from the 
Acosta and Dunton murders and the Jesus Escareno murder, 
and separate trials for the Xavier Salcedo robbery, the Rajendra 
Patel murder, and the Raul Luna murder. 
The trial court considered Gomez’s motions together and 
denied them both.  After stating that it was “obvious . . . that the 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
39 
defendants should be tried together on [the Acosta and Dunton 
counts],” the court found that the counts against Gomez were 
“tied closely together in time and to some extent in location” as 
well as “in the manner in which the executions took place”; the 
same witness would testify in the Escareno case and the Acosta 
and Dunton case; the robbery charges involved similar items; 
the Luna and Escareno homicides involved cars; and Luna’s 
stolen cellphone was used to call Dunton’s house, where Gomez 
occasionally stayed.  Although the court expressed concern with 
the number of crimes that Gomez was charged with, it 
ultimately concluded that the crimes “are so well tied together 
that . . . they should be tried together.” 
1. Motion to Sever Trial from Codefendant’s Trial 
We 
have 
frequently 
recognized 
the 
Legislature’s 
preference for joint trials.  (E.g., People v. Souza (2012) 54 
Cal.4th 90, 109; see § 1098 [“When two or more defendants are 
jointly charged with any public offense . . . they must be tried 
jointly, unless the court order[s] separate trials.”].)  Factors that 
may bear on a trial court’s decision to order separate trials 
include “ ‘an incriminating confession, prejudicial association 
with codefendants, likely confusion resulting from evidence on 
multiple counts, conflicting defenses, or the possibility that at a 
separate 
trial 
a 
codefendant 
would 
give 
exonerating 
testimony.’ ”  (People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 
1, 40, quoting People v. Massie (1967) 66 Cal.2d 899, 917.)  
Severance may also be appropriate where “ ‘there is a serious 
risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of 
one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable 
judgment about guilt or innocence.’ ”  (People v. Lewis (2008) 43 
Cal.4th 415, 452, quoting Zafiro v. United States (1993) 506 U.S. 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
40 
534, 539.)  “If we conclude the trial court abused its discretion, 
reversal is required only if it is reasonably probable the 
defendant would have obtained a more favorable result at a 
separate trial.”  (People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 237.)  
But, “[e]ven if a trial court’s severance or joinder ruling is correct 
at the time it was made, a reviewing court must reverse the 
judgment if the ‘defendant shows that joinder actually resulted 
in “gross unfairness” amounting to a denial of due process.’ ”  
(People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 162, quoting People v. 
Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 127.) 
Gomez argues that he should have been tried separately 
from Grajeda because Grajeda sought to blame the Acosta and 
Dunton murders on Gomez, whom Grajeda characterized as 
“violent, paranoid and drug crazed.”  But, as Gomez 
acknowledges, “ ‘[a]ntagonistic defenses do not per se require 
severance, even if the defendants are hostile or attempt to cast 
the blame on each other.’ ”  (People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 Cal.4th 
147, 162 (Tafoya); see also Zafiro v. United States, supra, 506 
U.S. at pp. 538–539.)  And we have previously suggested that 
antagonistic defenses require severance only where “ ‘ “the 
conflict is so prejudicial that [the] defenses are irreconcilable, 
and the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone 
demonstrates that both [defendants] are guilty.” ’ ”  (People v. 
Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1297–1298, quoting People v. 
Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 168.)   
Gomez does not contend that such a conflict exists here.  
Rather, he claims that Grajeda received an inherent 
“advantage” as “a ‘lesser’ participant” in the crime.  Such an 
advantage, Gomez argues, necessarily “work[s] to the 
disadvantage of a ‘greater’ participant, and indeed the very 
existence of such advantages and disadvantages undermines 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
41 
the principle of individual guilt.”  But this argument merely 
homes in on one aspect of Grajeda’s antagonistic defense, i.e., 
that Grajeda played a lesser role than Gomez in murdering 
Acosta and Dunton.  And “ ‘[i]f the fact of conflicting or 
antagonistic defenses alone required separate trials, it would 
negate the legislative preference for joint trials and separate 
trials “would appear to be mandatory in almost every case.” ’ ”  
(People v. Thompson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1043, 1081.) 
Gomez also claims that he was prejudiced during the 
penalty phase because the jury knew that the prosecution had 
sought the death penalty for him but not for Grajeda.  We have 
previously rejected this argument (Tafoya, supra, 42 Cal.4th at 
pp. 163–164), and Gomez offers no reason why we should revisit 
our precedent here.  Accordingly, we reject Gomez’s claims that 
the trial court should have severed his trial from Grajeda’s. 
2. Motion to Sever Counts 
Section 954 allows for the joint trial of “two or more 
different offenses connected together in their commission . . . or 
two or more different offenses of the same class of crimes or 
offenses.”  Where joinder is proper under section 954, “[t]he 
burden is on the party seeking severance to clearly establish 
that there is a substantial danger of prejudice requiring that the 
charges be separately tried.”  (People v. Soper (2009) 45 Cal.4th 
759, 773.)  In determining whether a court abused its discretion 
in declining to sever properly joined charges, we first consider 
“the cross-admissibility of the evidence in hypothetical separate 
trials.”  (Id. at p. 774.)  If the evidence is cross-admissible, then 
this “is normally sufficient to dispel any suggestion of prejudice 
and to justify a trial court’s refusal to sever properly joined 
charges.”  (Id. at pp. 774–775.)  If not, then we also consider 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
42 
“(1) whether some of the charges are particularly likely to 
inflame the jury against the defendant; (2) whether a weak case 
has been joined with a strong case or another weak case so that 
the totality of the evidence may alter the outcome as to some or 
all of the charges; or (3) whether one of the charges (but not 
another) is a capital offense, or the joinder of the charges 
converts the matter into a capital case.”  (Id. at p. 775.)  
Moreover, “[e]ven if a defendant fails to demonstrate the trial 
court’s joinder ruling was an abuse of discretion when it was 
made, reversal may nonetheless be required if the defendant can 
demonstrate that ‘the joint trial resulted in such gross 
unfairness as to amount to a due process violation.’ ”  (People v. 
Landry (2016) 2 Cal.5th 52, 77.) 
Gomez concedes that all of his counts were properly joined 
under section 954 and that he should have been tried for the 
Acosta, Dunton, and Escareno murders in the same proceeding.  
But he contends that each of the remaining cases should have 
been tried separately because the evidence underlying those 
cases was not cross-admissible; the Acosta, Dunton, and 
Escareno murders were particularly inflammatory; the evidence 
linking Gomez to the Luna and Patel murders was weaker than 
the evidence linking him to the other crimes; and the Luna 
murder did not initially involve a capital crime, whereas the 
other murders did. 
In denying Gomez’s motion for discretionary severance, 
the trial court noted that a shotgun was used in the Acosta, 
Dunton, Escareno, and Luna murders; Witness No. 1 was a 
witness to the Acosta, Dunton, and Escareno murders; and 
Luna’s cell phone was used to call Dunton’s house, where 
“Gomez was at least a part time resident.”  The trial court was 
also aware that the prosecution planned to tie the Salcedo 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
43 
robbery to its broader theory that “Gomez was ripping off dope 
dealers in the Harbor area.” 
Even if cross-admissibility alone did not justify the trial 
court’s denial of Gomez’s severance motion, the balance of the 
remaining factors does not show that the trial court abused its 
discretion.  (See People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 123 
(Simon) [“Although cross-admissibility of evidence is often an 
independently sufficient condition justifying a trial court’s 
denial of severance, it is not a necessary one.”].)  First, neither 
the Acosta and Dunton double homicide nor the Escareno 
homicide was more inflammatory than the other crimes.  
Although evidence of gang membership can be particularly 
inflammatory (see, e.g., People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 
153, 193) and the prosecution’s theory of the Acosta and Dunton 
murders was that they were gang related, we do not agree that 
the jury would have been more inflamed by that crime than the 
murder of Patel, who appeared to be unknown to Gomez, or the 
murder of Luna, who was murdered at the home that he shared 
with his family.  And although the Salcedo robbery did not 
involve a murder, “the animating concern underlying this factor 
is not merely whether evidence from one offense is repulsive,” 
but “ ‘ “whether strong evidence of a lesser but inflammatory 
crime might be used to bolster a weak prosecution case’ on 
another crime.” ’ ” (Simon, at p. 124.)  The Salcedo robbery does 
not raise such a concern because, as Gomez acknowledges, the 
trial court was aware that the victim’s testimony would be 
offered in that case.  
Second, the Luna and Patel cases were not so weak as to 
risk prejudicial joinder.  Although the other cases may have 
been supported by eyewitness testimony, more substantial 
forensic evidence, or both, “a mere imbalance in the evidence 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
44 
between the joined crimes does not signal a risk that one charge 
will be prejudicially bolstered.”  (People v. Johnson (2015) 61 
Cal.4th 734, 752.)  And the trial court was aware that 
substantial evidence linked Gomez to the Luna and Patel 
murders, including evidence showing that Gomez was near 
Luna’s home around the time of his murder and that Gomez had 
possession of Patel’s jewelry and car. 
Third, although the Luna murder was not initially 
charged as a capital crime, this factor does not carry substantial 
weight in favor of finding prejudice.  Even if the Luna murder 
had been tried separately, Gomez still would have faced the 
death penalty based on the other murders.  Thus, joining 
Gomez’s charges “neither converted the entire matter into a 
capital case nor bolstered the possibility of [Gomez] receiving a 
death sentence.”  (Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 128.) 
We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Gomez’s motion for four separate trials.  
Moreover, upon reviewing “events after the court’s ruling,” we 
do not find that “joinder actually resulted in ‘gross unfairness’ 
amounting to a denial of [Gomez’s] constitutional right to fair 
trial or due process of law.”  (People v. Merriman (2014) 60 
Cal.4th 1, 46.)  Despite the trial’s relative length and complexity, 
and even if the prosecution’s closing arguments occasionally 
“encouraged the jury to aggregate the evidence,” the record does 
not suggest that the jury was unable to decide each count 
separately as it was specifically instructed to do.  Indeed, 
although an “error in denying severance cannot be saved by the 
fact that the jury was unable to agree on a verdict as to 
[improperly joined charges]” (People v. Smallwood (1986) 42 
Cal.3d 415, 433), the fact that the jury acquitted Gomez of the 
charge that he robbed Luna and could not reach a verdict on the 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
45 
Escareno charges does tend to show that “the jury was capable 
of, and did, differentiate among [Gomez’s] crimes” (People v. 
Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th 899, 927; see Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at 
p. 130). 
Accordingly, we are not convinced it was “ ‘reasonably 
probable that the jury was influenced [by the joinder] in its 
verdict of guilt.’ ”  (People v. Merriman, supra, 60 Cal.4th at 
p. 49.)  Nor are we convinced by Gomez’s unsupported claim that 
his right to a reliable penalty phase determination was violated. 
III. 
GUILT PHASE ISSUES 
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence 
1. The Luna Murder  
Gomez argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict 
him of the murder of Raul Luna.  In his view, the evidence at 
best showed that two people were present in Raul Luna’s front 
yard when he was murdered but did not show Gomez shot Luna.  
“When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 
conviction is challenged on appeal, we review the entire record 
in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine 
whether it contains evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of 
solid value from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (People v. Elliott 
(2013) 53 Cal.4th 535, 585 (Elliott).)  Our review must “presume 
in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury 
could reasonably have deduced from the evidence.”  (People v. 
Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87.)  Even where, as here, the 
evidence of guilt is largely circumstantial, our task is not to 
resolve credibility issues or evidentiary conflicts, nor is it to 
inquire whether the evidence might “ ‘be reasonably reconciled 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
46 
with the defendant’s innocence.’ ”  (Id. at p. 92; see People v. 
Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403.)  The relevant inquiry is 
whether, in light of all the evidence, a reasonable trier of fact 
could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  (People v. Towler (1982) 31 Cal.3d 105, 117–118.) 
Gomez argues that “there was no evidence at all that 
Gomez shot Luna.”  The evidence showed that a car pulled up to 
Raul Luna’s residence and then drove away.  Rudy Luna 
testified that he then heard two men talking to one another 
immediately before the murder and that one of the accomplices 
identified Raul Luna before shooting him in the head.  This 
evidence suggests that Luna was murdered through a joint 
undertaking of two accomplices.  That they were speaking to one 
another at the time of the murder indicated that they were 
working together.  And that one of the accomplices specifically 
identified Raul Luna immediately before he was murdered 
suggests that he was the intended target of the coperpetrators’ 
criminal objectives.  So even without indicating who was the 
shooter, substantial evidence suggested that the two worked 
together to deliberately murder Raul Luna according to a 
predetermined plan. 
To prove that a defendant is an accomplice  the 
prosecution must show that the defendant acted “with 
knowledge of the criminal purpose of the perpetrator and with 
an intent or purpose either of committing, or of encouraging or 
facilitating commission of, the offense. ”  (People v. Beeman 
(1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 560.)  “The aider and abettor doctrine 
merely makes aiders and abettors liable for their accomplices’ 
actions as well as their own.  It obviates the necessity to decide 
who was the aider and abettor and who the direct perpetrator or 
to what extent each played which role.”  (People v. McCoy (2001) 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
47 
25 Cal.4th 1111, 1120.)  Here, the jury need not have 
unanimously agreed on which accomplice personally shot Luna 
and which aided or abetted the murder.  (See People v. 
Santamaria (1994) 8 Cal.4th 903, 918 [“[A]s long as each juror 
is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant is guilty 
of murder as that offense is defined by statute, it need not decide 
unanimously by which theory he is guilty. [Citations.]  More 
specifically, the jury need not decide unanimously whether 
defendant was guilty as the aider and abettor or as the direct 
perpetrator.”].)  
The sole issue in dispute as to Gomez’s sufficiency 
challenge is whether Gomez was one of the two accomplices, and 
substantial evidence places Gomez at the crime scene at the 
time of the murder.  The evidence connected Gomez to both the 
Oldsmobile that was likely used as part of the murder’s 
commission and the surrounding area of Luna’s residence 
immediately after the murder.  First, investigators found 
Gomez’s fingerprints on an Oldsmobile parked about 150 to 200 
yards from the crime scene.  The car was conspicuously parked 
with the windows down, key in the ignition, with a warm engine, 
and with wet tires — all evidence suggesting the car had been 
recently driven.  Seven unspent 12-gauge shotgun shells, which 
matched the unspent shotgun shell discovered near Luna’s 
body, were found in the back of the car and connected the vehicle 
to the murder.  And Luna’s neighbor, William Owens, testified 
that he saw Gomez running down the street around the time of 
Luna’s murder. 
Further, the evidence tended to show that Gomez used 
Luna’s cell phone immediately after Luna’s murder.  Over the 
course of five hours after Luna’s death, 10 calls were made from 
Luna’s cell phone; the last call was made to Dunton’s house, 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
48 
where Gomez occasionally stayed, suggesting that Gomez used 
Luna’s phone to call home.  And Witness No. 1 testified that 
Gomez had brought Luna’s phone to Dunton’s apartment. 
In sum, the record contains substantial evidence that 
Luna’s murder was the object of a joint criminal effort 
perpetrated by two men working in concert.  Substantial 
evidence showed that Gomez was one of these men and therefore 
could properly be convicted of first degree murder without a 
specific finding that he personally was the shooter.  The jury’s 
verdict — finding Gomez guilty of first degree murder but 
declining to convict him of the firearm enhancement — is 
supported by substantial evidence. 
2. The Patel Murder 
Gomez argues that “[n]o physical or forensic evidence 
linked Gomez to the Patel killing” and that “[t]he only evidence 
connecting [him] to the crimes against Patel . . . was the highly 
unreliable testimony of Witnesses #1 and #3,” which Gomez 
argues is “incredible as a matter of law.”  He seizes upon Witness 
No. 1’s checkered past, highlighting his prolonged drug 
addiction and regular association with drug traffickers, as well 
as his apparent readiness to lie to authorities during the course 
of their investigations.  He adds that the government gave 
Witness No. 1 a $30 per diem during the trial, despite his 
admissions outside of the presence of the jury that he was 
willing to feign hallucinations in order to collect Social Security 
benefits for mental disability, a fact that would tend to show 
that Witness No. 1 would not hesitate to lie in exchange for 
government benefits. 
“In deciding the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing 
court resolves neither credibility issues nor evidentiary 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
49 
conflicts.”  (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181 
(Young).)  Witness No. 1 may not have been an ideal witness for 
the prosecution, but his testimony indicated that Gomez 
possessed Patel’s car after his murder and that Gomez believed 
he needed to destroy inculpatory evidence of Patel’s murder that 
could be found within.  Moreover, Witness No. 1 testified that 
Gomez admitted to murdering Patel, stating that he “hated to 
kill that guy.”  Nothing about this testimony is “physically 
impossible or inherently improbable” (Young, at p. 1181), nor 
can Witness No. 1’s story be discounted without resort to 
“ ‘ “ ‘inferences or deductions’ ” ’ ” about his motivations to 
perjure himself (People v. Thompson (2010) 49 Cal.4th 79, 124).  
His “testimony [could have been] vulnerable to impeachment for 
numerous reasons” (People v. Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th 86, 105), 
such as his hallucinations (whether real or fabricated) and his 
role as an accomplice after the fact of the crime.  But these 
“ ‘doubts about the credibility of the in-court witness should be 
left for the jury’s resolution.’ ”  (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 
Cal.4th 983, 996.)   
Gomez also argues that the testimony of Witness No. 1 and 
Witness No. 3 “contradicted each other in significant respects” 
such that neither could be believed.  He points out that while 
Witness No. 3’s testimony suggested that Gomez exchanged 
Patel’s jewelry for drugs the same night of the murder, Witness 
No. 1 testified that Gomez brought the jewelry to Dunton’s 
house and left it there overnight.  In essence, Gomez argues that 
because Witness No. 1 and Witness No. 3 gave conflicting 
accounts of the time that Gomez possessed Patel’s jewelry, we 
must conclude that their testimony was “physically impossible.”  
But “[r]esolution of conflicts and inconsistencies in the 
testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact” (Young, 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
50 
supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1181) in the “absence of patent falsity, 
inherent improbability, or other reason to question [the 
testimony’s] validity” (People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 90). 
Despite the various reasons for discounting Witness No. 
1’s credibility and the minor conflicts between Witness No. 1’s 
and Witness No. 3’s testimony, sufficient evidence supported the 
jury’s determination of guilt.  Patel’s body was discovered near 
the Terminal Island Freeway on-ramp without his white Camry 
or jewelry.  Investigators found a trail of blood stretching 75 feet 
from Patel’s body, which was consistent with the county medical 
examiner’s testimony that Patel could have walked or run 75 
feet after receiving his stab wounds, but not after receiving the 
gunshot wound to the head, as well as with the spent shell 
casings found both near Patel’s body and around 90 to 100 feet 
away.  Although the precise timeline of when Gomez arrived at 
Witness No. 3’s home is unclear, she did testify that she saw a 
white car parked in the driveway while Gomez was there.  
Moreover, Witness No. 1 testified that Gomez eventually asked 
him to burn the car in an apparent attempt to destroy evidence 
that would inculpate Gomez.  Witness No. 1 was instructed to 
inspect the trunk “to make sure there wasn’t no blood in it,” and 
Dunton testified that Gomez was worried about his fingerprints.  
As noted, Witness No. 1 testified that before Gomez asked him 
to burn the car, Gomez expressed that he had “hated to kill that 
guy.”  Two days after investigators found Patel’s body, they 
found his car with its interior burnt. 
In sum, a rational jury could have credited Witness No. 1’s 
and Witness No. 3’s testimony that Gomez admitted to the 
crimes against Patel, despite their inconsistencies, and could 
also rationally conclude that Gomez possessed the car 
immediately after Patel’s murder and attempted to destroy 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
51 
evidence of the crimes.  Substantial evidence supports the jury’s 
finding that Gomez is guilty of kidnapping, robbing, and 
murdering Patel. 
3. The Acosta and Dunton Murders 
Gomez argues that although the evidence presented 
supported the jury’s finding that Gomez used a shotgun to kill 
Acosta and Dunton, there is insufficient evidence to support a 
jury’s finding of premeditation and deliberation.  The thrust of 
the prosecution’s case for premeditation was that Grajeda and 
Gomez’s Mexican Mafia ties required them to kill Acosta and 
Dunton for their failure to pay “taxes” to the gang.  But Gomez 
argues that it was he who was marked for violent retaliation, 
undermining the possibility that he cooperated with Grajeda to 
execute Acosta and Dunton.  Rather than coldly following the 
dictates of the Mexican Mafia’s rules, Gomez argues that he 
acted rashly out of fear those rules would be turned upon him. 
First degree murder “has the additional elements of 
willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation which trigger a 
heightened penalty.”  (People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155, 
166.)  These elements require “more than a showing of intent to 
kill; the killer must act deliberately, carefully weighing the 
considerations for and against a choice to kill before he or she 
completes the acts that caused the death.”  (Ibid.)  “ ‘ “The true 
test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the 
reflection.  Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity 
and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly.” ’ ”  
(People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1080, citing People v. 
Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 767.)  We have previously noted 
that evidence of planning, motive, and manner of killing is often 
relevant to this inquiry.  (People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42 Cal.4th 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
52 
379, 419–420 (Halvorsen), citing People v. Anderson (1968) 70 
Cal.2d 15, 26–27; accord People v. Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 
394, 424.) 
The evidence supported the conclusion that Gomez was at 
least aware of a calculated plan to execute Acosta and Dunton.  
Witness No. 2 observed Gomez and Grajeda having a private 
conversation the day before the murder.  As Witness No. 1 and 
Gomez approached the apartment, Gomez stated that “they sent 
somebody to fuck [Dunton] and [Acosta] up.”  And the moments 
immediately preceding the murders strongly suggested that 
Gomez was part of this calculated plan and that he intended to 
enforce Mexican Mafia rules.  Witness No. 1 testified that 
Gomez was sitting at the dining room table with a pump shotgun 
in front of him, while Grajeda held the shotgun belonging to 
Dunton and Witness No. 1.  Grajeda said “[y]ou know the rules,” 
to which Gomez added “[y]eah, forward and backward.”  Dunton 
responded, “if I got to go, I’m going to go like a man.”  Witness 
No. 1 then heard four shots and footsteps as Grajeda and Gomez 
fled the scene. 
There was also evidence of motive.  Both Gomez and 
Grajeda had ties to the Mexican Mafia.  Sergeant Valdemar 
testified that someone who was placed on a “green light list,” i.e., 
marked for assault or murder by the Mexican Mafia, could 
remove him or herself from the list by carrying out a murder on 
the Mexican Mafia’s behalf.  Witness No. 2 testified that on the 
evening before Acosta and Dunton’s murder, Grajeda told him 
that he wanted to take care of Gomez for failing to pay taxes to 
the gang.  Witness No. 2 and Grajeda then went to Dunton’s 
house, where Witness No. 2 noticed that Gomez was “nervous” 
and “walking back and forth,” and as noted, Gomez and Grajeda 
had a private conversation.  When Witness No. 2 and Grajeda 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
53 
drove away, Grajeda again stated that he wanted to kill Gomez 
and possibly Dunton if he didn’t pay his taxes.  This evidence is 
consistent with the prosecution’s theory that Gomez killed 
Acosta and Dunton on behalf of the Mexican Mafia in order to 
remove himself from the green light list discussed by Valdemar. 
Finally, the manner of killing tended to show that Gomez 
acted with premeditation and deliberation:  Acosta and Dunton 
were shot from close range in the head or neck.  (See Halvorsen, 
supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 422 [victims “were shot in the head or 
neck from within a few feet, a method of killing sufficiently 
‘ “particular and exacting” ’ to permit an inference that 
defendant was ‘acting according to a preconceived design’ ”].) 
As for Gomez’s claim that his role in the Acosta and 
Dunton murders was an instant reaction to being targeted for 
violent retaliation, the tenor of the conversation between 
Acosta, Dunton, Grajeda, and Gomez was suggestive of a 
situation over which Grajeda and Gomez had control.  Dunton’s 
words that “if I got to go, I’m going to go like a man” indicated 
resignation to a death he believed to be imminent due to the 
circumstances, an inference that would not have been lost on 
Gomez.  Grajeda’s reference to the “rules” requiring the killing 
of Acosta and Dunton was affirmed and adopted by Gomez, 
indicating that he had undertaken to apply Mexican Mafia rules 
in concert with Grajeda.  These facts are inconsistent with the 
notion that Gomez acted rashly out of fear that he was about to 
be executed.  There is also little indication that Acosta and 
Dunton attempted to fire upon Gomez first, even though Acosta 
was armed at the time of his death.  Since our task is not to 
“resolve[] . . . credibility 
issues 
[or] 
evidentiary 
conflicts”  
(Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1181), and because we consider 
the evidence in the “light most favorable to the judgment” 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
54 
(Elliott, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 585), we conclude there was 
sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of premeditation 
and deliberation.    
B. Gomez’s Refusal to Appear in Court 
One morning of trial, Gomez refused to come to court, 
eventually causing a 38-minute delay in the day’s proceedings.  
The court required presentation of evidence concerning Gomez’s 
refusal to attend the proceedings and instructed the jury that it 
could consider this evidence as tending to prove consciousness 
of guilt.  Gomez argues that the trial court’s instruction and 
admission of the evidence not only constituted an abuse of 
discretion, but also violated his federal and state constitutional 
rights.  He further claims that the trial court failed to act as a 
neutral arbiter, thus violating his constitutional rights to due 
process. 
1. Background 
On December 14, 1999, the second day of his trial, Gomez 
refused to go to court for trial.  The guard assigned to his cell 
block alerted the court, which issued an extraction order.  Upon 
hearing of the order, Gomez got up and voluntarily came to 
court.  As a result of his delay, that day’s proceedings started 38 
minutes late. 
Before the jury was seated, the trial judge apprised the 
parties of the situation and then said, “At some point this is 
probably information that is going to go to the jury.”  He 
continued, “It’s now 40 minutes after the starting time was set, 
so I’m not sure what the options are, but it does seem to me that 
at least it will come out eventually in the penalty phase.”  When 
the jurors were seated, he informed them that “the reason for 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
55 
the delay may well be presented to you later during the trial.  If 
you’re frustrated by it, you’re no less frustrated than I was.” 
At the next break, defense counsel moved for a mistrial.  
He argued:  “The court informed the jury that the reason for the 
delay may be brought out in trial at some later time.  The 
inference that the court gave, and I think improperly gave to 
this jury, was that it was a result of one of these two 
defendants.”  Even “if a delay was caused by Ruben Gomez,” 
counsel continued, “I can’t think of a reason how that would be 
admissible in the guilt phase of trial unless perhaps he were to 
testify.”  The court disagreed and said that “[i]t does show a 
consciousness of guilt that Mr. Gomez . . . refused to come to 
court as the court had ordered, so the jury will find out about it 
one way or another through evidence.”  The court then said it 
would “do even more than that if this happens again,” noting “I 
can call my own witnesses.”  The court subsequently denied the 
motion for a mistrial. 
The next day, before the jury was seated, the trial court 
elaborated on its previous comments.  “[T]he first point,” the 
court said, “is that a defendant in a capital trial has no right to 
be absent.”  The court then explained that its research suggested 
that “evidence of conduct inconsistent with innocence may show 
consciousness of guilt.”  Finally, it noted that “the court on its 
own motion may call witnesses and interrogate them under 
Evidence Code Section 775.”  In sum, the court explained, “my 
concern is that I think it does show a consciousness of guilt that 
a defendant refuses to come to court . . . .  [¶] Someone who is 
innocent will stay for trial in order to clear his name.” 
Defense counsel objected, distinguishing the cases cited by 
the court as concerning defendants escaping from custody or 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
56 
skipping bail.  The trial court interjected:  “No.  The point is the 
refusal to come to court . . . .  Someone who is guilty . . . has a 
reason not to come to court . . . .  [¶] A person who is innocent 
will stay for trial in order to clear his name and win lawful 
liberty.”  The court continued:  “You may have another solution 
to this, but I don’t plan to let it go.  I don’t plan to let either 
defendant play with the court and the jury and say I’m going to 
come when I’m ready. . . .  I was here until 8 o’clock last night 
doing research on the computer trying to find a case exactly in 
point, and I didn’t find one.  So I’m going to be a pioneer.”  The 
court added:  “We’re going to have witnesses testify . . .  [¶] what 
we will have is evidence on the subject, and the jury then can 
draw its own conclusion as to why a defendant refuses to come 
to court.” 
The court then held a hearing regarding the admissibility 
of the proposed testimony outside the presence of the jury under 
Evidence Code section 402.  The prosecution and the defense 
examined Deputy Sheriff John Ganarial, who had been assigned 
to take Gomez to court on the morning of December 14, 1999.  
Ganarial testified that Gomez said “fuck court” several times 
when Ganarial asked him to get ready for court around 5:50 a.m.  
After Ganarial told him several more times to get ready, Gomez 
responded, “They bring me back whenever they want, I’ll go to 
court whenever I want.”  Ganarial testified that Gomez was 
ultimately escorted from the cell to court around 9:00 a.m. that 
morning.  Ganarial further testified that Gomez had otherwise 
been “cooperative as far as being transported . . . to the court for 
purposes of trial.”  After Ganarial’s testimony, the court said, “I 
do think that the initial incident that we were talking about on 
December 14th showed a consciousness of guilt.”  Defense 
counsel then repeated his objection to the evidence and argued 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
57 
that no precedent holds that the jury may infer consciousness of 
guilt from an in-custody defendant’s refusal to attend trial.  At 
the end of the hearing, the trial court ruled that Ganarial’s 
testimony was admissible to show consciousness of guilt. 
 
On the sixth day of trial, the prosecution called Ganarial 
to testify before the jury about Gomez’s delay.  Ganarial 
explained that on the morning in question, he attempted several 
times to get Gomez to leave his cell for court to no avail.  
Ganarial then notified the court bailiff of Gomez’s refusal; the 
bailiff subsequently informed him that there was an extraction 
order for Gomez.  Soon after being informed of this order, Gomez 
voluntarily came to court.  In the course of his testimony, 
Ganarial also said that Gomez was housed in a disciplinary unit 
of the jail, that he was waist-chained and handled by a 
“movement team” when he was transported to court, that he was 
fed through a slot in his cell door, and that on the morning in 
question, he responded to Ganarial’s wake-up calls with “fuck 
court” multiple times.  After the court excused Ganarial, the 
defense moved to strike the testimony as irrelevant, which the 
court denied. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the judge gave the following 
instruction to the jury:  “If you find that the defendant Gomez 
voluntarily absented himself from this trial by refusing to come 
to court, you may consider that as a circumstance tending to 
prove a consciousness of guilt.  That conduct, however, is not 
sufficient by itself to prove guilt, and its weight and significance, 
if any, are for you to decide.” 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
58 
2. Improper Instruction and Admission of Evidence 
as to Gomez’s Consciousness of Guilt 
a. Forfeiture 
Reviewing courts will generally not consider a challenge 
to the admissibility of evidence unless there was a “ ‘ “specific 
and timely objection  in the trial court on the same grounds 
sought to be urged on appeal.” ’ ”  (People v. Champion (1995) 9 
Cal.4th 879, 918, quoting People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 
892; see Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).) The Attorney General 
contends that Gomez objected only under Evidence Code section 
352, thus forfeiting any other challenges to the admission of 
evidence regarding Gomez’s refusal to come to court. 
We disagree.  The record shows that counsel argued 
repeatedly and at length that the admission of the evidence 
would constitute state-law error.  First, in moving for a mistrial 
on the basis of the trial court’s initial statements to the jury, 
defense counsel argued, “If a delay was caused by Ruben Gomez, 
I can’t think of how that would be admissible in the guilt phase 
of trial.”  Then, after the court initially expressed its intention 
to introduce evidence of Gomez’s delay, defense counsel 
responded, “I’d ask the court to reconsider its legal analysis of 
the situation,” and began to argue that the delay could not 
support an inference of consciousness of guilt before being cut 
off by the court.  And after the section 402 hearing, defense 
counsel had another extended argument over whether Gomez’s 
delay showed a consciousness of guilt.  At that point, defense 
counsel also raised the issue of character evidence, noting that 
the evidence was “prejudicial because it’s another form . . . of 
the court or the prosecution putting on character evidence when 
you can’t really do that.”  Finally, after Ganarial’s testimony 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
59 
before the jury, counsel moved to “strike his testimony as being 
irrelevant to the charges for what Gomez is presently on trial.” 
But even if these objections were not specific enough to be 
preserved for appeal, Gomez’s claims would still be reviewable.  
“Reviewing courts have traditionally excused parties for failing 
to raise an issue at trial where an objection would have been 
futile . . . .”  (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237.)  Here, 
the record suggests that the trial court would have rejected any 
objection to the testimony.  During the initial argument, the 
court told defense counsel, “You may have another solution to 
this, but I don’t plan to let it go,” and explained that even if it 
could not “find a case exactly in point,” it was “going to be a 
pioneer.”  The trial court added:  “I’m not going to let this go.  
I’m not going to let the defendants control the court.”  Then, 
after hearing Ganarial’s testimony at the section 402 hearing, 
the court told defense counsel, “I have no doubt but what it 
shows a consciousness of guilt.”  It was reasonable for defense 
counsel to believe, based on the trial court’s statements, that any 
further objections regarding the admission of the evidence 
would be futile.  For this reason too, Gomez’s evidentiary claims 
are not forfeited. 
Neither is Gomez’s challenge to the jury instruction 
forfeited.  We have held that objections at trial are not necessary 
to 
preserve 
appellate 
review 
of 
allegedly 
erroneous 
consciousness of guilt instructions.  (See People v. Hannon 
(1977) 19 Cal.3d 588, 600; § 1259.)  In any case, defense counsel 
argued at length that no authority supported the trial court’s 
conclusion that Gomez’s refusal to come to court possibly 
indicated consciousness of guilt. 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
60 
Finally, Gomez has not forfeited his constitutional claims.  
In People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, we explained that, 
although a defendant is barred from bringing due process claims 
on grounds distinct from those raised at trial, “defendant may 
argue an additional legal consequence of the asserted 
error . . . is a violation of due process.”  (Id. at p. 438.)  The 
defendant in Partida had unsuccessfully objected at trial to the 
admission of evidence under section 352.  On appeal, he argued 
that the trial court’s rejection of this argument violated his due 
process rights; this Court held that his claim was not forfeited.  
(Partida, at pp. 438–439.)  Here, Gomez argued at trial that the 
consciousness of guilt instruction was unsupportable by 
evidence of his delay and that this evidence was irrelevant, more 
prejudicial than probative, and impermissible character 
evidence.  On appeal, he argues that the trial judge’s rejection 
of these arguments violated his due process rights — that is, he 
argues that “an additional legal consequence of the asserted 
error” was a violation of his due process rights.  (Id. at p. 438.)  
As in Partida, “[t]his he may do.”  (Id. at p. 439.)   
b. Merits 
“ ‘It is an elementary principle of law that before a jury can 
be instructed that it may draw a particular inference, evidence 
must appear in the record which, if believed by the jury, will 
support the suggested inference.’ ”  (People v. Alexander (2010) 
49 Cal.4th 846, 920–921.)  “No evidence is admissible except 
relevant evidence” (Evid. Code, § 350), and “relevant evidence” 
is defined as “evidence . . . having any tendency in reason to 
prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action” (id., § 210).  “The most common 
evidentiary device” is the “permissive inference,” “which 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
61 
allows — but does not require — the trier of fact to infer the 
elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one and 
which places no burden of any kind on the defendant.”  (County 
Court of Ulster County, N.Y. v. Allen (1979) 442 U.S. 140, 157 
(Ulster County).) 
We have not before considered whether a defendant’s brief 
refusal to attend trial proceedings may give rise to an inference 
of consciousness of guilt.  But, as the Attorney General points 
out, we have previously held in different circumstances that a 
defendant’s absence from trial can support such an inference.  In 
People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, we held that evidence 
concerning a defendant’s escape from prison after being arrested 
and charged was admissible as indicating a consciousness of 
guilt.  (Id. at pp. 313–314; see People v. Schafter (1911) 161 Cal. 
573 [evidence of a plan to escape prison while awaiting trial was 
admissible as showing a consciousness of guilt].)  And in People 
v. Snyder (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 195, the Court of Appeal 
concluded that after the defendant skipped bail and missed the 
guilt phase of his trial, the trial court properly instructed the 
jury that it could consider the defendant’s absence in 
determining his guilt.  (Id. at p. 199; see People v. Sherren (1979) 
89 Cal.App.3d 752 [finding no error in the trial court taking 
judicial notice that the out-of-custody defendant missed two 
pretrial hearings and instructing the jury that flight can show a 
consciousness of guilt].)  These holdings are reflected in the 
pattern jury instruction that says flight, attempted flight, 
escape, or attempted escape after the commission of a crime 
“may be considered . . . in deciding whether a defendant is guilty 
or not guilty.”  (CALJIC No. 2.52.) 
Gomez argues that his temporary refusal to attend trial is 
analogous to other situations in which we have indicated that a 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
62 
jury should not be permitted to consider a defendant’s absence.  
In People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, the defendant yelled at 
jurors after they found him guilty of murder and he informed 
the court that he would continue to disrupt the proceedings if he 
were present.  (Id. at p. 1238.)  The court subsequently allowed 
the defendant to be absent from the penalty phase, which 
resulted in a capital sentence.  (Id. at p. 1240.)  On appeal, we 
held that although the trial court informed the jury that the 
defendant was voluntarily absent, “[a]n instruction to disregard 
defendant’s absence would have been proper on defendant’s 
timely request.”  (Id. at p. 1241.)   
We reaffirmed Sully and extended its holding to the guilt 
phase of trial in People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694.  There, 
the defendant was disruptive during his murder trial’s guilt 
phase and was allowed to leave; he chose to remain absent for 
the duration of the guilt and penalty phases of the trial.  (Id. at 
p. 737.)  On appeal, he argued that the court on its own initiative 
should have instructed the jury to disregard his absence.  (Id. at 
p. 739.)  Citing Sully, we held that the trial court had no duty to 
instruct the jury to disregard the defendant’s absence but 
suggested that such an instruction would have been proper if 
requested.  (Id. at p. 740.)   
We conclude that this case has more in common with the 
Sully line of cases than the cases cited by the Attorney General 
involving prison escapes and skipping bail.  Unlike the absences 
in Carrera or Snyder, Gomez’s brief refusal to attend court was 
not an attempt to elude prosecution or punishment.  Ganarial’s 
testimony suggests that Gomez intended merely to disrupt the 
proceedings temporarily.  Ganarial recounts Gomez saying, 
“They bring me back whenever they want, I’ll go to court 
whenever I want.”  This disruptive intent is further supported 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
63 
by the obscenities that Gomez repeatedly directed at the court 
during the delay. 
The Attorney General presents two additional theories for 
why evidence of Gomez’s delay could support a permissive 
inference of consciousness of guilt.  First, he cites several cases 
that have held that in-custody defendants’ efforts to prevent the 
production of evidence could support an inference of 
consciousness of guilt.  (See, e.g., People v. Watkins (2012) 55 
Cal.4th 999, 1027 [defendant’s refusal to participate in a lineup 
could indicate consciousness of guilt]; People v. Farnam (2002) 
28 Cal.4th 107, 164 [defendant’s refusal to provide a hair or 
blood sample]; People v. Ellis (1966) 65 Cal.2d 529, 536–539 
[defendant’s refusal to provide a voice sample].)  These cases are 
supported by a series of pattern jury instructions regarding 
efforts to fabricate or suppress evidence.  (See CALJIC No. 2.03 
[making false or misleading statements about the charged crime 
can support an inference of consciousness of guilt]; CALJIC No. 
2.04 [trying to fabricate evidence or induce false testimony can 
support an inference of consciousness of guilt]; CALJIC No. 2.05 
[authorizing someone else to fabricate evidence can support an 
inference of consciousness of guilt]; CALJIC No. 2.06 
[attempting to suppress adverse evidence can support an 
inference of consciousness of guilt].)  
These cases and jury instructions concern situations in 
which a defendant seeks to interfere with evidence, presumably 
out of fear that it would incriminate them.  Here, by contrast, 
Gomez attempted neither to thwart the production of evidence 
nor to fabricate false evidence.   
The Attorney General also urges that we apply a line of 
cases upholding permissive inferences where the prosecution 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
64 
presented evidence of defendants acting in ways that innocent 
people would not.  For example, we upheld a permissive 
inference of consciousness of guilt based on the fact that the 
defendant had tattooed the number “187,” the Penal Code 
section defining murder, on his forehead after the alleged 
murder was committed because “it would be unlikely that an 
innocent person would so advertise his connection to murder.”  
(People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 438, abrogated on 
another point as recognized in People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 
1269, 1306; see also People v. Hartsch (2010) 49 Cal.4th 472, 
505.)  But this case presents a different scenario; there is no 
reason to think Gomez’s refusal to come to court was indicative 
of his consciousness of guilt.  He may simply have been tired; as 
Ganarial testified, inmates on trial are woken before 6:00 a.m.  
Or he may have been frustrated by the trial process and wanted 
to assert more control over it.  Cases like Ochoa do not support 
the Attorney General’s argument that evidence of Gomez’s delay 
was 
properly 
admissible 
to 
support 
an 
inference 
of 
consciousness of guilt. 
In sum, the evidence concerning Gomez’s brief refusal did 
not have a “tendency in reason to prove” consciousness of guilt; 
it therefore should have been excluded as irrelevant.  (Evid. 
Code, § 210.) 
For the same reasons, the admission of this evidence and 
the jury instruction violated Gomez’s rights to due process.  “The 
due process clauses of the federal Constitution . . . require a 
relationship between the permissively inferred fact and the 
proven fact on which it depends.”  (People v. Mendoza, supra, 24 
Cal.4th at p. 180.)  Permissive inferences are therefore 
constitutionally suspect when, “under the facts of the case, there 
is no rational way the trier could make the connection permitted 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
65 
by the inference.”  (Ulster County, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 157.)  In 
other words, “ ‘[a] permissive inference violates the Due Process 
Clause only if the suggested conclusion is not one that reason 
and common sense justify in light of the proven facts before the 
jury.’ ”  (People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 131, quoting 
Francis v. Franklin (1985) 471 U.S. 307, 314–315.)  Here, the 
trial court’s proposed inference—that Gomez’s brief refusal to 
attend trial proceedings reflected consciousness of guilt—was 
“ ‘not one that reason and common sense justify in light of the 
proven facts before the jury.’ ”  (Ibid.)  Thus, the trial court’s 
decision to admit evidence regarding Gomez’s refusal to attend 
court and its jury instruction on consciousness of guilt violated 
Gomez’s constitutional rights to due process. 
c. Prejudice 
Although the trial court erred in allowing the jury to 
consider the circumstances of Gomez’s brief absence, we 
conclude that the errors were harmless under the applicable 
state and federal standards.  (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 
818, 836 (Watson); People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 447–
448 (Brown); Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 
(Chapman).)  Gomez contends that the trial court’s errors, “by 
[their] nature, provided an all-purpose rejoinder . . . to jurors’ 
doubts about Gomez’s guilt” and “invited jurors [at the penalty 
phase] to assuage any lingering doubts about Gomez’s guilt with 
the thought that if Gomez himself knew he was guilty, he must 
be.”  Gomez also argues that Deputy Sheriff Ganarial’s 
testimony regarding the manner by which Gomez was held in 
custody and brought to court was inherently prejudicial. 
But the fact that the jury did not find Gomez guilty on all 
counts suggests that the trial court’s errors did not have the 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
66 
sweeping effect that Gomez contends.  Moreover, the 
prosecution did not rely significantly on Gomez’s absence or the 
circumstances surrounding that absence and made no mention 
of the episode during its closing argument. 
Further, in light of the considerable evidence presented 
over the months-long trial, we conclude that the trial court’s 
errors did not carry material weight at the guilt phase.  Salcedo 
himself testified that Gomez robbed him at his home.  Forensic 
evidence gathered from a nearby car placed Gomez in the area 
of Raul Luna’s house around the time of his murder, as did the 
testimony of Luna’s neighbor, William Owens.  Luna’s cellphone 
was used to call Robert Dunton’s house, where Gomez had been 
staying, and Witness No. 1 testified that Gomez brought the 
phone to Dunton’s house, where it was later recovered by the 
police.  Moreover, both Witness No. 1 and Witness No. 3 testified 
as to Gomez’s role in the crimes against Rajendra Patel, and 
their accounts were consistent with the forensic evidence 
gathered on the freeway on-ramp and from Patel’s car.  Witness 
No. 1 also testified that Gomez was present at the murders of 
Acosta and Dunton, and the testimony of Witness No. 1, Witness 
No. 2, and Sergeant Valdemar tended to show that Gomez killed 
Acosta and Dunton on behalf of the Mexican Mafia.  Detective 
Winter also testified that in the course of investigating the 
murder of Jesus Escareno, Gomez mentioned “a couple of guys 
that were shot and brains were splattered all over the place,” 
which matched the description of the Acosta and Dunton 
murders.  And Gomez’s fingerprints were found on a shotgun 
that matched the spent cartridges found at the Acosta and 
Dunton murder scene. 
We are also not convinced that the trial court’s errors 
influenced the jury’s decision at the penalty phase.  Gomez was 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
67 
accused of committing five murders in less than two months, 
and the jury convicted him of committing four of those murders.  
The prosecution also offered substantial evidence concerning 
additional violent acts committed by Gomez, both before the 
crimes at issue here and while in jail awaiting trial for those 
crimes, none of which Gomez disputed.  In contrast, the defense 
presented relatively little mitigation evidence, consisting solely 
of expert testimony regarding high security state prisons and 
the testimony of his sister. 
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court’s 
errors did not affect the jury’s verdicts in this case.  (Watson, 
supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836; Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 447–
448; Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.) 
3. Claim of Trial Court Bias 
Gomez claims that the trial court not only erred in 
admitting the evidence regarding his brief refusal to attend trial 
and permitting the jury to infer consciousness of guilt from it, 
but also demonstrated improper judicial bias in violation of his 
constitutional rights.   
As with Gomez’s other claims, the Attorney General 
argues that Gomez’s failure to raise the trial court’s bias below 
precludes us from considering it on appeal.  But we have held 
that a defendant’s failure to object to judicial bias “does not 
preclude review . . . when objecting would be futile.”  (People v. 
Sturm (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1218, 1237.)  In particular, we reasoned 
in Sturm that “the evident hostility between the trial judge and 
defense counsel” left defense counsel in the fundamentally 
unfair position of either objecting to the judicial misconduct and 
risking retaliation against his client or sacrificing the claim on 
review.  (Ibid.)   
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
68 
The record reveals a similarly unfair choice for defense 
counsel here.  As described above, the trial judge was clear in 
his intent to present the evidence concerning Gomez’s refusal to 
attend court.  In response to defense counsel’s argument that 
the brief absence was irrelevant to Gomez’s consciousness of 
guilt, the trial judge referred to a time he had jailed a lawyer 
after trial on contempt charges and then said, “All I’m saying is 
that you challenged me, and I’m responding to the challenge.”  
He continued, “You did move for a mistrial making it a major 
issue . . . .  This is what I’m doing.”  Given the trial court’s 
expressed intentions, it is reasonable to believe that any 
objection concerning judicial bias would have futile.  Thus, 
Gomez has not forfeited his claim that the trial court failed to 
serve as a neutral arbiter. 
Nevertheless, we reject the claim on its merits.  We have 
explained that trial judges violate due process when they 
“ ‘officiously and unnecessarily usurp[] the duties of the 
prosecutor’ ” 
and 
appear 
to 
be 
“ ‘allying . . . with 
the 
prosecution.’ ” (People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 143 (Clark), 
quoting People v. Campbell (1958) 162 Cal.App.2d 776, 787.)  
But in reviewing such claims, our role “ ‘is not to determine 
whether the trial judge’s conduct left something to be desired, 
or even whether some comments would have been better left 
unsaid.  Rather, we must determine whether the judge’s 
behavior was so prejudicial that it denied [the defendant] a fair, 
as opposed to a perfect, trial.’ ” (People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 
43, 78.) 
Although we are troubled by the trial judge’s insistence on 
being “a pioneer” and his encouragement of Ganarial’s 
testimony, his actions do not amount to a constitutional 
violation.  To be sure, the trial judge might have “ ‘officiously 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
69 
and unnecessarily usurp[ed] the duties of the prosecutor’ ” if he 
had introduced evidence as to Gomez’s delay on behalf of the 
court, as originally discussed.  (Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th at 
p. 143.)  But the judge did not do so here.  Indeed, he recognized 
the problems that would arise if the court called Ganarial, so the 
prosecution agreed to call Ganarial to testify before the jury as 
a prosecution witness. 
We also disagree with Gomez’s claim that the trial court 
improperly arranged for the presentation of Ganarial’s 
testimony “in an effort to punish Gomez for his disrespect to the 
court.”  We cannot say, based on this record, that the trial court 
admitted the evidence and instructed the jury on consciousness 
of guilt out of a desire to harm or disadvantage Gomez.  Rather, 
the trial court appears to have acted pursuant to its duty to 
control the trial proceedings (§ 1044) and under the erroneous 
but honest belief that a defendant’s refusal to attend trial was 
relevant evidence as to a defendant’s consciousness of guilt. 
In sum, we reject Gomez’s claim that the trial court failed 
to serve as a neutral arbiter.  In so doing, we emphasize that 
although Evidence Code section 775 permits trial courts to call 
witnesses and interrogate them on its own motion, judges 
should resort to this power only where they “ ‘ “believe[] that 
[they] may fairly aid in eliciting the truth, in preventing 
misunderstanding, in clarifying the testimony or covering 
omissions, in allowing a witness his right of explanation, and in 
eliciting facts material to a just determination of the cause.” ’ ”  
(People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 948.)  Although 
“ ‘[s]ection 1044 . . . vests the trial court with broad discretion to 
control the conduct of a criminal trial’ ” (People v. Bryant, Smith 
and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 386, quoting People v. 
Calderon (1994) 9 Cal.4th 69, 74–75), such discretion must be 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
70 
exercised 
impartially 
in 
order 
to 
protect 
defendants’ 
constitutional rights to due process and to a fair trial.  Trial 
courts may employ different methods in order to ensure that a 
disruptive defendant does not derail a trial; for example, as it 
did here, the court may impose a standing extraction order to 
compel a defendant to attend proceedings.  What a trial court 
cannot do is permit the jury to infer guilt in a manner not 
countenanced by law. 
C. Admission of Expert Testimony on the Mexican 
Mafia  
Gomez challenges the expert testimony of Sergeant 
Richard Valdemar regarding the Mexican Mafia as more 
prejudicial than probative, and as violative of his constitutional 
rights to due process and a fair trial.  Although Gomez concedes 
that “some gang evidence may have probative value where a 
crime is alleged to be gang-related and the gang evidence is 
offered to prove motive,” he claims that Valdemar’s “testimony 
about the Mexican Mafia and about shocking crimes committed 
on its behalf . . . ranged far beyond any proper purpose, serving 
only to instill fear [among the jurors].”  As evidence of the 
testimony’s inflammatory nature, Gomez points to notes passed 
by members of the jury to the trial court asking whether the 
jurors were “at risk” of gang violence and expressing “concern[] 
about possible harassment or problems after [the jurors] are 
dismissed once the verdicts are read.” 
We have previously noted that “[e]vidence of the 
defendant’s gang affiliation — including evidence of the gang’s 
territory, membership, signs, symbols, beliefs and practices, 
criminal enterprises, rivalries, and the like — can help prove 
identity, motive, modus operandi, specific intent, means of 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
71 
applying force or fear, or other issues pertinent to guilt of the 
charged crime.  [Citations.]”  (People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 
Cal.4th 1040, 1049.)  But, “even where gang membership is 
relevant, because it may have a highly inflammatory impact on 
the jury trial courts should carefully scrutinize such evidence 
before admitting it.”  (People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at 
p. 193.)  On appeal, Gomez does not argue that the trial court 
should have excluded Valdemar’s testimony in its entirety.  
Rather, Gomez contends that portions of the testimony were not 
relevant to establish Valdemar’s expertise or to prove the 
prosecution’s theory that Gomez killed Acosta and Dunton on 
the Mexican Mafia’s behalf. 
Assuming Gomez did not forfeit his claims by failing to 
make more timely or specific objections below (see People v. 
Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 129, fn. 30 [“ ‘Because the question 
whether defendants have preserved their right to raise this 
issue on appeal is close and difficult, we assume [they] have 
preserved their right, and proceed to the merits.’ ”]), we conclude 
that portions of Valdemar’s testimony should have been 
excluded as irrelevant, but that the admission of this testimony 
did not affect the verdicts. 
First, we agree with Gomez that parts of Valdemar’s 
testimony offered to prove Valdemar’s “expertise” on gangs were 
more prejudicial than probative, and should have been excluded.  
Gomez points specifically to Valdemar’s testimony that “just 
about every crime that you can imagine that’s committed on the 
outside in some way was committed [by gang members] on the 
inside of the [county] jail facility,” including “assaults, battery, 
murder, the making of contraband weapons, the transportation, 
sales and use of narcotics, robbery, extortion and rape.”  Gomez 
further challenges Valdemar’s statement that “a small minority, 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
72 
normally members of hard core gangs were creating much of the 
problems that we were experiencing, so by isolating these people 
and placing them in special units, we eliminated a lot of the 
assaults that were going on.”   
This evidence went well beyond its stated purpose of 
demonstrating that Valdemar had “contact with gang members 
in the [county] jail,” which had already been established by 
Valdemar’s earlier testimony describing the nature of his work 
and his “interaction with gang members in the county jail while 
[he was] a deputy assigned to the county jail.”  Moreover, to the 
extent that the Attorney General contends this evidence was 
necessary to help the jury “understand the complex rules of the 
Mexican Mafia” and to “explain why [Gomez] would comply with 
Mexican Mafia orders,” we disagree that these portions of 
Valdemar’s testimony were more than “tangentially relevant” 
(People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 660, disapproved of on other 
grounds by People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22) 
to that purpose.   This portion of Valdemar’s testimony discussed 
general gang activity in county jails rather than the specific 
activity of the Mexican Mafia outside of those jails. 
We further agree with Gomez that Valdemar’s testimony 
regarding “the history of the Mexican Mafia, in particular where 
and when it started and how it started,” as well as Valdemar’s 
statement that a certain movie “fairly accurately depicts the 
early years of the Mexican Mafia,” were not “ ‘necessary to 
furnish the jury a context for understanding [the prosecution’s] 
theory’ ” (People v. Masters (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1019, 1063, 
quoting People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 299) regarding 
the Acosta and Dunton murders.  That the prosecution believed 
that Gomez murdered Acosta and Dunton on behalf of the 
Mexican Mafia did not open the door to any and all evidence 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
73 
regarding the gang.  (Cf. Masters at p. 1064 [finding no abuse of 
discretion where the trial court admitted gang-related evidence 
pertinent to a particular crime but “made a painstaking effort to 
exclude [irrelevant or unduly prejudicial] evidence”].)  In the 
absence of any apparent connection between the testimony 
regarding the early history of the Mexican Mafia and the Acosta 
and Dunton murders several decades later, and in light of the 
generally inflammatory nature of this gang-related evidence, 
the challenged testimony should have been excluded. 
But we decline to find that the trial court erred by 
admitting the other portions of Valdemar’s testimony that 
Gomez challenges on appeal.  The testimony indicating that 
murder was the primary topic of conversation at Mexican Mafia 
meetings surveilled by Valdemar, and the testimony suggesting 
that there have been “several instances . . . in the history of the 
Mexican Mafia” of “a brother kill[ing] another,” was relevant to 
explain why Gomez would kill Acosta and Dunton, with whom 
he occasionally lived.  Moreover, in light of our conclusion in 
People v. Gonzales (2006) 38 Cal.4th 932, 944–947 (Gonzales), 
that the trial court did not err by admitting expert testimony 
opining generally on the possibility that gang members may 
intimidate witnesses and commit perjury, we similarly find no 
error in the trial court’s admission of testimony suggesting that 
“people will come into court and lie for [a Mexican Mafia] 
associate or . . . member” and “that the [Mexican Mafia] expects 
that loyal gang members would use any means possible to delay, 
obstruct or reverse any kind of a criminal prosecution against 
its members.”  Much like the expert who testified in Gonzales, 
the expert here did not opine about any individual witness’s 
credibility, but rather focused his testimony on the Mexican 
Mafia’s general reputation. 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
74 
In any event, we also disagree with Gomez that the 
admission of any of the challenged testimony affected the 
outcome of the case.  Gomez argues that the jury relied on the 
testimony as impermissible character evidence and that the 
testimony caused the jurors to decide the entire case, including 
Gomez’s punishment, based on fear.  But, as Gomez concedes, 
the court properly admitted evidence suggesting that Gomez 
killed Acosta and Dunton on behalf of the Mexican Mafia, so the 
jury would have learned about the gang and at least one of its 
violent practices even if the challenged testimony had been 
excluded.  As for Gomez’s contention that the testimony created 
an “atmosphere of fear” among the jurors such that they acted 
out of “concern for their own safety,” Gomez fails to explain how 
the jurors’ deliberations or verdicts at the guilt phase or the 
penalty phase were influenced by fear or purported safety 
concerns, and we cannot readily discern how the outcome was 
affected ourselves.  In light as well of the substantial evidence 
presented during both the guilt and the penalty phase (see ante, 
at pp. 67–68), we conclude that the trial court’s error does not 
warrant reversal.  (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 836; 
Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.) 
D. Admission of Acosta Note 
Gomez claims that the trial court’s admission of the note 
left by Acosta to his wife violated Gomez’s rights under the 
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the federal 
Constitution.  (Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 38 
(Crawford).)  In his closing argument, the prosecutor described 
this note as “the testimony of Robert Acosta from his grave” and 
argued that Acosta wrote it to inform the reader that he was 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
75 
going to Dunton’s apartment for a meeting with Grajeda, “a 
known Mexican Mafia associate.” 
The Attorney General argues that Gomez forfeited his 
confrontation clause claim because he objected only on hearsay 
grounds, relying primarily on People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 
Cal.4th 758, 827, fn. 33.  But we overruled Riccardi on this point 
in People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192 (Rangel), where we 
held that a defendant in a case tried before Crawford, like 
Gomez, “does not forfeit a Crawford challenge by failing to raise 
a confrontation clause objection at trial.”  (Rangel, at p. 1215; 
see People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 563.) 
In Crawford, the high court held that the Sixth 
Amendment prohibits the admission of a witness’s “testimonial” 
out-of-court statements offered for their truth unless the 
witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior 
opportunity for cross-examination.  (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 
at pp. 59–60.)  There is no dispute that Acosta was unavailable 
at trial and that Gomez had no prior opportunity to cross-
examine him.  Accordingly, Gomez’s confrontation clause claim 
turns solely on the question whether the Acosta note was 
testimonial. 
As we recently observed, “[t]hroughout its evolution of the 
Crawford doctrine, the high court has offered various 
formulations of what makes a statement testimonial but has yet 
to provide a definition of that term of art upon which a majority 
of justices agree.”  (People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 
687.)  Nevertheless, “we have discerned two requirements.  
First, ‘the out-of-court statement must have been made with 
some degree of formality or solemnity.’  [Citation.]  Second, the 
primary purpose of the statement must ‘pertain[] . . . in some 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
76 
fashion to a criminal prosecution.’ [Citations.]”  (People v. Leon 
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 569, 603, quoting People v. Lopez (2012) 55 
Cal.4th 569, 581–582.)  More specifically, the primary purpose 
test asks whether the statements at issue “are given in the 
course of an interrogation or other conversation whose 
‘ “primary purpose . . . is to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” ’  (Rangel, 
supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1214.)  In its most recent application of 
the primary purpose test, the high court cautioned that 
“[s]tatements made to someone who is not principally charged 
with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are 
significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given 
to law enforcement officers.”  (Ohio v. Clark (2015) __ U.S. __ 
[135 S.Ct. 2173, 2182]; see also Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at 
p. 694, fn. 19.) 
We conclude that the Acosta note was not testimonial 
because the record does not establish that Acosta left the note 
for his wife for purposes of criminal investigation or prosecution.  
According to Gomez, the fact that Acosta left the note in a Bible, 
memorialized the date and time, and signed the note with his 
full name supports a finding that the statements in the note 
were testimonial “because they were made with the intent that 
they would be communicated to law enforcement and used in 
court.”  But there are equally plausible alternative explanations 
that do not suggest a testimonial intent.  Acosta may have 
simply wanted his wife to know what had happened if he did not 
return from the meeting, or he may have wanted her to pass the 
note along to associates who could retaliate against Gomez and 
Grajeda.  That the note referred to Grajeda and Dunton by their 
“street names” rather than their full names is an additional 
reason to believe that the note was not specifically intended for 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
77 
law enforcement.  This is not a scenario where the evidence 
clearly indicates that the recipient was merely a conduit for 
conveying the declarant’s statements to the police.  (Cf. State v. 
Jensen (2007) 299 Wis.2d 267, 286 [a letter addressed to police 
and given to a friend with directions to send to police if 
“ ‘anything happen[ed]’ ” to her was testimonial].)  In view of the 
high court’s guidance that statements “made to someone who is 
not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting 
criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial” 
(Ohio v. Clark, supra, 135 S.Ct. at p. 2182), we conclude that the 
Acosta note was not testimonial and therefore reject Gomez’s 
confrontation clause claim.   
Even if the Acosta note were testimonial, any error was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  (Delaware v. Van Arsdall 
(1986) 475 U.S. 673, 680; Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.)  
The note does not mention Gomez, and there is no dispute that 
Gomez participated in the killing of Acosta and Dunton.  
Nevertheless, Gomez contends that the Acosta note was the only 
evidence corroborating Witness No. 1’s testimony that Grajeda 
was present at Dunton’s apartment; without this evidence, 
Gomez continues, the prosecution’s theory that Gomez 
committed a premeditated and deliberate killing at the behest of 
Grajeda would have been severely undermined.  But, as 
explained above (see ante, at pp. 53–54), there is significant 
evidence showing that Gomez murdered Acosta and Dunton as 
part of a calculated plan on behalf of the Mexican Mafia, none of 
which relies on the Acosta note.  By contrast, little if any 
evidence indicates that Acosta and Dunton attempted to attack 
Gomez first and that Gomez shot them out of fear.  Gomez 
suffered no prejudice even assuming that the admission of the 
Acosta note was error under Crawford. 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
78 
E. Griffin Error 
In his closing argument, the prosecutor discussed evidence 
that corroborated Witness No. 1’s testimony implicating Gomez 
in the Escareno murder.  In particular, the prosecutor pointed 
to Detective Winter’s trial testimony that Gomez “knew facts of 
the case which had not been revealed to the press” — namely, 
that the victims’ “wallets were missing.”  He noted that the 
defense had presented only a couple of news articles and that 
“those articles don’t give Ruben Gomez enough information to 
have told this to Detective Winter.”  The prosecutor then said 
“there’s something even more important”:  “There is absolutely 
no evidence that Ruben Gomez saw those articles.  There is 
absolutely no evidence that Ruben Gomez read those articles.  
There is absolutely no evidence that Ruben Gomez reads any 
newspaper.” 
Gomez contends that the prosecutor’s comments violated 
Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 (Griffin).  Griffin held 
that “the prosecution may not comment upon a defendant’s 
failure to testify on his or her own behalf.  Its holding does not, 
however, extend to bar prosecution comments based upon the 
state of the evidence or upon the failure of the defense to 
introduce material evidence or to call anticipated witnesses.”  
(People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1339 (Bradford); see 
People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 565–566.)  At the same 
time, “we have held that a prosecutor may commit Griffin error 
if he or she argues to the jury that certain testimony or evidence 
is uncontradicted, if such contradiction or denial could be 
provided only by the defendant, who therefore would be required 
to take the witness stand.”  (Bradford, at p. 1339.) 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
79 
The prosecutor’s comments do not amount to Griffin error.  
The prosecutor did not refer to Gomez’s decision not to testify.  
Rather, the prosecutor commented that the defense had failed 
“to introduce material evidence” — that is, evidence that Gomez 
had read about the Escareno murder in the newspaper.  
(Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1339.)  Although Gomez 
argues that only his own testimony could have contradicted the 
prosecutor’s claim that Gomez did not read the articles or 
newspapers in general, Gomez could have presented other 
evidence to that effect.  As the trial court explained, “[t]here 
could, for example, have been evidence that [Gomez] subscribed 
to the San Pedro Pilot, that he was an avid reader and others 
around him, anyone associated with him knew that he read the 
paper and commented to others about reading.”  Accordingly, 
the prosecutor did not violate Griffin by referring to Gomez’s 
failure to introduce such evidence. 
F. Admonitions Regarding Notetaking and Read-
back of Testimony 
Gomez argues that by sternly advising the jury against 
“not taking enough notes,” the trial court “elevated the 
importance of juror notetaking over observation of the 
witnesses” and therefore interfered with the jury’s “unique and 
exclusive responsibility and power to evaluate the credibility of 
witnesses.”  Gomez highlights a number of admonitions by the 
trial judge, including that he would be “very discouraged” to “see 
jurors just sitting there with their notes in their laps . . . and it 
won’t be recorded in your memories because you aren’t trying to 
take those notes”; that the “thing that infuriates [the trial court] 
the most about jurors is when they first go in to deliberations 
and the first hour or two [the court] get[s] a note sent out saying 
[the jury] want[s] a reread of the testimony . . . ”; that jurors 
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80 
should “take a lot of notes”; and that taking notes was part of 
their “job in recording the information.”  He also suggests that 
the trial court tried to discourage the read-back of testimony by 
not only failing to state expressly that the jury had a right to 
rehear testimony, but also noting that any such requests could 
not be accommodated immediately.  Gomez says the trial court’s 
actions violated section 1138 as well as the right to due process, 
the right to a fair trial, the right to present a defense, the right 
to counsel, the right to a jury trial, the right to confront 
witnesses against him, and the right to a reliable and 
unanimous verdict in a capital case. 
We begin by noting that because Gomez did not object to 
the trial court’s admonitions or request a clarifying instruction 
at trial, his claims are forfeited on appeal.  (People v. Livingston 
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1168–1169.)  In any case, the trial 
court’s various statements about the importance of taking notes 
and about the read-back of testimony did not amount to error.   
Although section 1137 approves of the practice of juror 
notetaking, we have cautioned that notetaking implicates 
certain risks, namely, that “ ‘more significance will be placed by 
the jurors on their notes . . . than on their own independent 
recollection.  The notes may accentuate irrelevancies and ignore 
more substantial issues and evidence. . . .  [T]he juror with the 
best notes will unduly influence and possibly mislead the other 
jurors.’  [Citation.]  Furthermore, note-taking may ‘distract the 
jurors’ attention from the proceedings. . . .  While taking notes, 
the jurors may also not pay sufficient attention to the behavior 
of witnesses and may thus be unable to properly assess their 
credibility.’ ”  (People v. Whitt (1984) 36 Cal.3d 724, 746, quoting 
People v. DiLuca (1982) 85 App.Div.2d 439, 444–445 [448 
N.Y.S.2d 730, 734].)  In Whitt, we acknowledged that other 
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81 
jurisdictions “found error in [a court’s] failure to give [a] 
cautionary instruction” regarding the risks of note taking, but 
we merely opined that giving such an instruction is “the better 
practice.”  (Whitt, at p. 747.) 
We have since held that the trial court is not required to 
give such an instruction.  (People v. Marquez (1992) 1 Cal.4th 
553, 578.)  Here the trial court’s warnings, in context, could not 
have been understood as an instruction that jurors should 
prioritize notetaking at the expense of their duty to make 
credibility determinations.  To the contrary, the trial court 
emphasized that the purpose of notetaking was to “refresh your 
own recollections of what goes on during the trial” and to help 
the jury “keep all of this organized in your minds.”  It also 
“caution[ed]” that jurors should “not . . . take so many notes that 
[they]’re not watching and listening as the evidence is being 
presented,” that they “should watch the witness while they’re 
testifying as well,” and that they should not “have [their] head[s] 
buried in [their] notes all the time.” 
The court’s emphasis on notetaking did not direct the jury 
to elevate notetaking over observing the witnesses and evidence, 
but rather served to caution the jury that notetaking can 
supplement credibility determinations and ensure that jury 
deliberations would not be impeded by needless requests for the 
read-back of testimony.  Nor do we read the court’s statements 
as discouraging the read-back of testimony; there was no risk 
that the jurors were unaware that they could request the read-
back of testimony if they decided that they needed it.  The trial 
court did not err. 
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G. Alleged Instructional Errors 
1. Instructions on Deciding Degree of Murder 
The trial court instructed the jury that if it found Gomez 
guilty of murder, it had to determine whether the murder was 
of the first or second degree.  The trial court then instructed the 
jury with the 1996 version of CALJIC No. 8.71 as follows:  “If 
you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt and unanimously 
agree that the crime of murder has been committed by a 
defendant, but you unanimously agree that you have a 
reasonable doubt whether the murder was of the first or of the 
second degree, you must give the defendant the benefit of that 
doubt and return a verdict fixing the murder as of the second 
degree.” 
Gomez claims that the trial court unconstitutionally 
skewed the jurors’ deliberations toward first degree murder by 
giving this instruction because it presents first degree murder 
as “the default verdict . . . unless the jurors unanimously agree[] 
that they ha[ve] a reasonable doubt about the degree of murder.”  
He argues that this error was compounded by the trial court’s 
failure to give CALJIC No. 17.11, which instructs the jury that 
if you “have a reasonable doubt as to whether [the crime] is of 
the first or second degree, you must find [the defendant] guilty 
of that crime in the second degree.”   
In People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, we said “the 
better practice is not to use the 1996 revised version[] of CALJIC 
[No.] 8.71 . . . , as the instruction[] carr[ies] at least some 
potential for confusing jurors about the role of their individual 
judgments in deciding between first and second degree murder.”  
(Id. at p. 411.)  But “[w]e did not hold in Moore that the 1996 
revised version[] of CALJIC [No.] 8.71 . . . [was] erroneous.”  
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(People v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 246 (Salazar).)  Rather, 
we declined to address the merits of defendant’s claim because 
we concluded any error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  (Moore, at p. 412.)   
More recently, we rejected a defendant’s challenge to the 
use of the 1996 version of CALJIC No. 8.71, concluding that “[n]o 
logical reading of the instructions leads to a compelled verdict of 
first degree murder.”  (Salazar, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 247.)  We 
noted that the jury was also given CALJIC No. 17.40, which 
states that each juror has a duty to decide the case for herself, 
and CALJIC No. 8.74, which provides:  “ ‘Before you may return 
a verdict in this case, you must agree unanimously not only as 
to whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty, but also if you 
should find him guilty of an unlawful killing, you must agree 
unanimously as to whether he was guilty of murder of the first 
degree, 
murder 
of 
the 
second 
degree, 
or 
voluntary 
manslaughter.’ ”  (Salazar, at p. 247.)  Thus, even if the 
language in CALJIC No. 8.71 was confusing standing alone, we 
held that “the instructions were not erroneous in this case when 
considered with the rest of the charge to the jury.”  (Id. at 
p. 248.)  
For similar reasons, we conclude that no such 
instructional error occurred here.  As in Salazar, the trial court’s 
other instructions dispelled any potential confusion that may be 
present in CALJIC No. 8.71.  (See People v. Delgado (2017) 2 
Cal.5th 544, 573–574 [“We have long held that ‘the correctness 
of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of 
the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or 
from a particular instruction.’ ”].)  In this case, the trial court 
instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 17.40, which emphasizes 
that individual jurors should not “decide any question in a 
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84 
particular way because a majority of the jurors or any of them 
favor that decision.”  And the jury was also instructed with 
CALJIC No. 8.74, which makes clear that the jury must “agree 
unanimously” as to the degree of murder before returning a 
verdict.  We thus reject Gomez’s claim. 
2. CALJIC No. 17.41.1 
Gomez argues that the trial court should not have 
instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 17.41.1 because doing so 
violated his federal constitutional rights.  The instruction 
provided:  “The integrity of a trial requires that jurors at all 
times during their deliberations conduct themselves as required 
by these instructions.  Accordingly should it occur that any juror 
refuses to deliberate or expresses an intention to disregard the 
law or to decide the case based on penalty or punishment or any 
other improper basis, it is the obligation of the other jurors to 
immediately advise the court of the situation.” 
Gomez concedes that although we disapproved the use of 
CALJIC No. 17.41.1 in future trials in 2002 (see People v. 
Engelman (2002) 28 Cal.4th 436, 449), we have repeatedly held 
“that giving the instruction, although ill-advised, does not 
violate a defendant’s constitutional rights” (People v. Souza, 
supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 121; see also People v. Nelson (2016) 1 
Cal.5th 513, 553–555; People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 
587; People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 805–806).  Gomez 
provides no persuasive reason for us to revisit that precedent 
here. 
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85 
3. Series of Guilt Phase Instructions that Allegedly 
Undermine the Requirement of Proof Beyond a 
Reasonable Doubt 
Gomez contends that a series of standard guilt phase 
instructions (CALJIC Nos. 2.01, 2.21.2, 2.22, 2.27, 2.51, 8.20, 
8.83) 
unconstitutionally 
undermined 
and 
diluted 
the 
requirement 
of 
proof 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt.  
Acknowledging that we have previously rejected such claims, 
Gomez invites us to reconsider our prior holdings.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Whalen (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 70; People v. Friend (2009) 
47 Cal.4th 1, 53; People v. Howard (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1000, 1024–
1026.)  We decline to do so.  As we have explained, “[e]ach of 
these instructions ‘is unobjectionable when, as here, it is 
accompanied by the usual instructions on reasonable doubt, the 
presumption of innocence, and the People’s burden of proof.’ ”  
(People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 792, quoting People v. 
Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 715.) 
4. Kidnapping Instruction 
The jury convicted Gomez of kidnapping Patel and found 
true the kidnapping special circumstance.  Gomez argues that 
the trial court provided an erroneous instruction regarding the 
element of asportation, violating his constitutional rights to due 
process.   
Section 207, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part:  
“[e]very person who forcibly . . . steals or takes, or holds, 
detains, or arrests any person in this state, and carries the 
person . . . into another part of the same county is guilty of 
kidnapping.”  (See People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 605 
(Morgan).)  Although the kidnapping statute does not specify 
any minimum distance that the victim must be carried, we have 
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interpreted it to require movement of a “substantial distance” 
(id. at p. 606), not “a distance that is ‘trivial’ ” (People v. 
Stanworth (1974) 11 Cal.3d 588, 601).  
Before 1999, this “asportation standard [was] exclusively 
dependent on the distance involved.”  (People v. Martinez (1999) 
20 Cal.4th 225, 233; see People v. Caudillo (1978) 21 Cal.3d 562, 
572–574, overruled by Martinez, at p. 229.)  But in Martinez, we 
held that the jury should instead consider the “totality of the 
circumstances” in determining whether the victim was moved 
for a “substantial distance,” including factors like “whether that 
movement increased the risk of harm above that which existed 
prior to the asportation, decreased the likelihood of detection, 
and increased both the danger inherent in a victim’s foreseeable 
attempts to escape and the attacker’s enhanced opportunity to 
commit additional crimes.”  (Martinez, at p. 237; see also People 
v. Castaneda (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1292, 1319.)  We further held 
that the Martinez standard “could not be applied retroactively, 
because it effected an unforeseeable enlargement of the factual 
basis for determining what constitutes a ‘substantial distance’ 
under the kidnapping statute, and the defendant did not have 
fair warning of the enlargement.”  (Castaneda, at p. 1319.) 
Although the kidnapping here occurred in 1997, the trial 
court instructed the jury with the 1999 version of CALJIC No. 
9.50, which incorporates the Martinez asportation standard.  As 
the Attorney General concedes, this was error.  Nevertheless, we 
agree with the Attorney General that the error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Whether Patel had been moved a 
substantial distance while he was alive was never in dispute at 
trial; the only disputed question was the identity of the 
kidnapper.  After the close of evidence, the prosecutor “invite[d] 
the defense to concede that Patel was kidnapped so that you 
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87 
don’t have to spend any appreciable time on that issue.  That 
would leave only the issue of who was the kidnapper for you to 
decide.”  In his argument, defense counsel said, “I will concede 
there was a robbery, I will concede it was a murder, and I will 
concede it was a kidnapping. . . .  The issue, as I believe [the 
prosecutor] concedes himself, is whether or not [Gomez] is the 
person that committed the murder, committed a robbery and 
committed the kidnapping of Mr. Patel.”  
Moreover, defense counsel’s concession was reasonable in 
light of the evidence:  Patel had been locked in the trunk of his 
car, and his body was found on a freeway on-ramp that was not 
easily accessible on foot.  The medical examiner testified that 
Patel would have been able to walk or run 75 to 90 feet after 
receiving the deep stab wound to his chest, but not after 
receiving the gunshot wound to his head; consistent with this 
testimony, the police found a trail of blood extending 75 feet 
from Patel’s body, as well as spent shell casings as close as three 
feet from Patel’s body and as far as 90 to 100 feet away from his 
body.  In contrast, there is no evidence tending to show that 
Patel encountered his killer on the freeway on-ramp, as Gomez 
suggests.  We thus conclude that the trial court’s instructional 
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
5. Alleged Vagueness of Definition of Simple 
Kidnapping 
As noted above, we have interpreted section 207 to require 
movement of a “substantial distance” (Morgan, supra, 42 
Cal.4th at p. 606), not “a distance that is ‘trivial’ ” (id. at p. 607).  
The jury here was thus instructed that, in order to find Gomez 
guilty of kidnapping, it must find that “[t]he movement of the 
other person in distance was substantial in character.” 
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88 
Gomez claims that this “substantial distance” element 
was unconstitutionally vague and thus warrants reversal of his 
conviction and sentence.  Gomez admits that we rejected this 
precise argument in Morgan, and we do so again here.  As we 
explained in Morgan, “case law in effect at the time of 
defendant’s offense provided adequate guidance as to what 
distances would be considered ‘substantial’ under the simple 
kidnapping statute.”  (Morgan, supra, 42 Cal. 4th at p. 607, 
citing People v. Caudillo (1978) 21 Cal.3d 562, 573–574; People 
v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 67; People v. Stender (1975) 47 
Cal.App.3d 413, 423.)  Because Gomez “had fair notice of what 
was and what was not proscribed under our statute for simple 
kidnapping at the time of his offense,” his vagueness claim fails.  
(Morgan, at p. 607.) 
IV. 
PENALTY PHASE ISSUES 
A. Jury’s Consideration of Evidence Relating to the 
Escareno Murder 
After the close of the prosecution’s case at the guilt phase, 
the defense moved to dismiss the Escareno charges for 
insufficient evidence and enter a judgment of acquittal pursuant 
to section 1181.1.  The trial court denied the motion.  After the 
jury deadlocked on the Escareno counts, the trial court declared 
a mistrial as to those counts.  (The prosecution ultimately 
dismissed the Escareno counts at the conclusion of the trial.  
(See § 1385.))  
Before the penalty phase closing arguments, the trial 
court told the jury that it wanted “to mention something special 
about counts 6 and 7, or 6 in particular, the allegation of the 
murder of Jesus Escareno.  One thing I want to make clear to 
you in advance is that that is no longer one of the circumstances 
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89 
of the crime.”  The trial court continued:  “[T]hose jurors who 
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was 
guilty of the murder of Mr. Escareno are permitted to consider 
that as an aggravating factor under factor (b), prior acts of 
violence.  The other jurors that did not find that to be true 
beyond a reasonable doubt cannot consider that as an 
aggravating factor.  [¶] So as you discuss aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances, those of you that believe that the 
evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Gomez 
murdered Jesus Escareno can consider that as an aggravating 
factor.  You cannot require or insist or suggest that jurors that 
did not reach that conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt can 
consider that as an aggravating factor.”  (See § 190.3, subd. (b).) 
During his penalty phase closing argument, the 
prosecutor said:  “I respectfully submit to you that in considering 
the circumstances of the crime that bear on what penalty 
[Gomez] should receive, look at the frequency with which he 
killed.  He killed five people in 37 days. . . .  [¶] You must agree 
unanimously on the penalty, but not on which aggravating 
circumstances are true.  [¶] And therefore as the court already 
pointed out, for those of you who do not — did not believe that 
we proved Escareno’s murder beyond a reasonable doubt, then 
you may not consider that he killed five people in 37 days, you 
are limited to considering that he killed four people in 37 days.  
Those of you who believe that we did prove Ruben Gomez 
murdered Jesus Escareno beyond a reasonable doubt, you may 
consider as an aggravating circumstance that he killed five 
people in 37 days.”  Defense counsel did not refer to the Escareno 
killing in his closing argument. 
In its final written penalty phase instructions, the court 
instructed the jury:  “Evidence has been introduced for the 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
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purpose of showing that the defendant has committed the 
following 
criminal 
acts: 
 
[¶] . . . Murder 
of 
Mr. 
Escareno . . . Before a juror may consider any criminal acts as 
an aggravating circumstance in this case, a juror must first be 
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did, in 
fact, commit the criminal acts.  A juror must — may not consider 
any evidence of any other criminal acts as an aggravating 
circumstance.  [¶] It is not necessary for all jurors to agree.  If 
any juror is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
criminal activity occurred, that juror may consider that activity 
as a fact in aggravation.  If a juror is not so convinced, that juror 
must not consider that evidence for any purpose.  [¶] As to the 
unadjudicated criminal acts [¶] . . . The defendant is presumed 
to be innocent until the contrary is proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.” 
Gomez advances two claims arising out of the trial court’s 
decision to permit individual jurors to consider evidence relating 
to the Escareno murder at the penalty phase.  First, he claims 
the trial court erred in denying his section 1118.1 motion to 
dismiss the Escareno charges for insufficient evidence.  If the 
trial court had properly granted that motion, Gomez argues, no 
jurors could have considered the Escareno evidence when 
determining whether to impose the death penalty.  Second, he 
claims that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the penalty 
phase jurors that they could not consider the Escareno murder 
as an aggravating factor unless they found that the accomplice 
testimony was corroborated by independent evidence.  We 
address each claim in turn. 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
91 
1. Denial of Section 1118.1 Motion 
Section 1118.1 provides that in a criminal jury trial, “the 
court on motion of the defendant or on its own motion, at the 
close of the evidence on either side and before the case is 
submitted to the jury for decision, shall order the entry of a 
judgment of acquittal of one or more of the offenses 
charged . . . if the evidence then before the court is insufficient 
to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses on appeal.”  
“ ‘The standard applied by a trial court in ruling upon a motion 
for judgment of acquittal pursuant to section 1118.1 is the same 
as the standard applied by an appellate court in reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, that is, 
“whether from the evidence, including all reasonable inferences 
to be drawn therefrom, there is any substantial evidence of the 
existence of each element of the offense charged.” ’ ”  (People v. 
Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 200, quoting People v. Crittenden 
(1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 139, fn. 13.)  We review the denial of a 
section 1181.1 motion de novo.  (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 
1158, 1213.) 
Again, Gomez contends that the evidence was insufficient 
to support a conviction on the Escareno charges, such that no 
reasonable juror could have been convinced of the truth of such 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.  In particular, Gomez 
argues that the prosecution failed to sufficiently corroborate the 
testimony of Witness No. 1, his alleged accomplice, which was 
the centerpiece of the prosecution’s case as to the Escareno 
murder.   
Section 1111 provides:  “A conviction can not be had upon 
the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such 
other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the 
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commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient 
if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the 
circumstances thereof.”  An “accomplice” is “one who is liable to 
prosecution for the identical offense charged against the 
defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of the 
accomplice is given.”  (Ibid.)  In order for the jury to rely on an 
accomplice’s testimony, “ ‘[t]he corroborating evidence may be 
circumstantial or slight and entitled to little consideration when 
standing alone, and it must tend to implicate the defendant by 
relating to an act that is an element of the crime.  The 
corroborating evidence need not by itself establish every 
element of the crime, but it must, without aid from the 
accomplice’s testimony, tend to connect the defendant with the 
crime.’ ”  (People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 505.) 
It is undisputed that with respect to the Escareno murder, 
Witness No. 1 was an “accomplice” within the meaning of section 
1111, and Witness No. 1’s testimony identified Gomez as 
Escareno’s killer.  Thus, the only question is whether the 
prosecution presented to the jury sufficient corroborating 
evidence connecting Gomez with the Escareno murder. 
 
Although the evidence of corroboration presented by the 
prosecution was not overwhelming, we find it sufficient for 
purposes of section 1118.1.  The primary corroboration evidence 
presented at trial was Detective Winter’s testimony indicating 
that Gomez knew details about the murder that were not public 
knowledge.  Winter testified that after Gomez was arrested 
regarding the Acosta and Dunton murders, she questioned him 
at Harbor Jail about matters unrelated to the Escareno murder.  
According to Winter, Gomez then volunteered that he had heard 
“about a guy up on Western, his head being shot off, a female 
that had been killed and wrapped and disposed in a dumpster, 
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93 
a couple of guys that were shot and brains were splattered all 
over the place and that these individuals couldn’t be identified.”  
Winter further testified that Gomez then said “that when he had 
talked about the individuals not being identified, their wallets 
were missing,” although no information had yet been released 
to the press that Escareno’s wallet had been stolen.  This 
statement 
to 
Winter, 
the 
Attorney 
General 
argues, 
“corroborated [Witness No. 1’s] testimony that [Gomez] killed 
Escareno.” 
 
The 
Attorney 
General 
also 
identifies 
as 
corroborating evidence the fact that some of the victims of the 
other murders Gomez allegedly committed were also shot with 
a 12-gauge shotgun, and that all the alleged killings occurred in 
the same general area during a month-long period. 
Gomez argues on appeal that the Winter statement is 
insufficient for our present purposes because Gomez did not 
specifically identify the Escareno murder when discussing the 
missing wallets; it is common knowledge that homicide victims 
are usually robbed; Witness No. 1 did not testify that he told 
Gomez he had taken Escareno’s wallet; and the defense 
introduced evidence of newspaper articles indicating that it was 
public knowledge that the murder victim had no identification.  
But these arguments simply present one interpretation of the 
evidence; they do not suggest that it would be unreasonable to 
draw the opposite inference from the evidence, as the Attorney 
General urges.  When reviewing whether “substantial evidence” 
supports the trial court’s decision to allow individual jurors to 
consider the Escareno murder at the penalty phase, the 
“relevant inquiry . . . remains whether any reasonable trier of 
fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  (People v. Towler, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 118.)  Gomez’s 
alternative argument that the evidence was insufficient because 
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Witness No. 1 was not a credible witness similarly fails because 
“[i]n deciding the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing court 
resolves neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts.”  
(Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1181.)   
Mindful of the standard of review here, we find that 
Winter’s statement, along with the evidence regarding the 
similar murders, sufficiently corroborated Witness No. 1’s 
testimony.  The trial court did not err in denying Gomez’s 
section 1118.1 motion as to the Escareno murder or in allowing 
jurors to consider that crime at the penalty phase on the limited 
basis it described.  
2. Instructional Error 
Alternatively, Gomez claims that the trial court erred in 
failing to reinstruct the jurors at the penalty phase on the 
requirement that independent evidence must corroborate 
accomplice testimony.  Gomez contends that this error was 
compounded by the trial court’s admonition that the jurors 
should disregard guilt phase instructions that were not repeated 
at the penalty phase. 
We have held that “the general rules requiring accomplice 
instructions apply at the penalty phase as well as the guilt 
phase of a capital trial.”  (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 
153, 275; see People v. Nelson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 217 [“The 
accomplice corroboration requirement applies to the penalty 
phase as well.”].)  Although the Attorney General does not 
dispute that the trial court failed to provide specific instructions 
concerning the accomplice corroboration requirement during the 
penalty phase, he nonetheless contends that this failure does 
not constitute error because the court “clearly told the jury [that] 
only those jurors who already found appellant guilty of the 
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Escareno murder at the guilt phase, necessarily based on the 
proper accomplice instructions given at the guilt phase, could 
consider these crimes as aggravating evidence.” 
We hold that any error was harmless here.  (Brown, supra, 
46 Cal.3d at pp. 447–448; Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24.)  
Gomez argues that “[t]he Escareno murder was the single most 
aggravating circumstance relied on at the penalty phase.”  But 
the Escareno murder was just one of five murders offered as 
aggravation evidence at the penalty phase, and the jury had 
unanimously agreed that Gomez was guilty of four of those 
murders.  Further, although Gomez contends that the details 
regarding the Escareno murder were especially prejudicial, the 
prosecutor did not focus on this incident in his closing argument; 
rather, he primarily discussed the Patel murder and Gomez’s 
violent behavior against jail guards and other inmates.  
Moreover, both the prosecutor and the trial court told the jury 
that only those jurors who had found beyond a reasonable doubt 
that Gomez murdered Escareno could consider the Escareno 
murder as an aggravating factor.  Finally, as discussed further 
above (see ante, at p. 68), the prosecution offered substantial 
evidence concerning other violent acts committed by Gomez, and 
the defense presented relatively little mitigation evidence.  We 
find no reasonable possibility that the instructional error 
affected the jury’s penalty determination. 
B. Admission of Evidence of Jail Guards’ Ethnic 
Background 
 
As noted, Deputy Sheriff Millan testified, as part of the 
prosecution’s penalty phase case, that Gomez stabbed him with 
a shank while in custody.  At the end of its direct examination, 
the prosecutor asked Millan, “What is your ancestry?”  Millan 
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replied that he was “Mexican American.”  The prosecutor asked 
Deputy Sheriff Montoya the same question, who likewise 
responded that he was “Mexican American.”  During his penalty 
phase closing argument, the prosecutor said, “We’ve shown this 
man’s history of past violence, and we’ve shown that this man’s 
conduct while in custody is not the result of a racial or ethnic 
conduct, because his conduct, his violent behavior was not 
directed just at Vanderleek but also against Montoya and 
Millan, so that has nothing to do with it.”  
 
Gomez claims that the admission of evidence concerning 
the two jail guards’ ethnic backgrounds allowed the jury to 
improperly consider race at the sentencing phase, thus violating 
his federal and state constitutional rights.  By contrast, the 
Attorney General argues that the deputies’ ancestry was 
relevant to Gomez’s future dangerousness.  (See People v. 
Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th 1, 53 [holding that a 
prosecutor may argue “that a defendant will be dangerous in the 
future based on evidence admitted under factors (a)-(c)” of 
section 190.3].)  According to the Attorney General, “[t]he 
prosecutor in no way asked the jury to consider appellant’s race 
to determine the penalty” but “merely argued that appellant 
was dangerous and would attack jail staff and inmates without 
regard to their race or ethnicity.” 
 
As the high court has said, the race of the defendant is 
“totally irrelevant to the sentencing process,” and the jury’s 
consideration of race as a factor in favor of the death penalty is 
“constitutionally impermissible.”  (Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 
U.S. 862, 885; see People v. Bacigalupo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 457, 
477.)  Similarly, “[t]he Constitution prohibits racially biased 
prosecutorial arguments.”  (McCleskey v. Kemp (1987) 481 U.S. 
279, 309, fn. 30; see People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 625 
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(Cudjo) [“Prosecutorial argument that includes racial references 
appealing to or likely to incite racial prejudice violates the due 
process and equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the federal Constitution.”].) 
 
We conclude that the trial court’s admission of the 
evidence regarding the guards’ ethnicities, as well as the 
prosecutor’s argument relating to it, was improper.  The 
Attorney General claims that the jury here was not asked to 
consider race because the prosecutor argued that Gomez lacked 
racial animus in attacking jail guards — that is, that Gomez 
attacked jail guards who shared his ethnic background as well 
as those who did not.  But the prosecutor’s argument 
nonetheless suggested that the jury could or should engage in 
the following race-based reasoning:  Gomez posed a greater risk 
of future danger, and thus was more deserving of the death 
penalty, because he was willing to attack other Mexican 
Americans.  Indeed, the objectionable implication of this line of 
argument is that the evidence concerning Gomez’s jailhouse 
attacks would have been less aggravating if he had only 
attacked individuals who did not share his ethnicity.  In any 
case, “[b]ecause racial prejudice can strongly compromise a 
juror’s impartiality [citations], even neutral, nonderogatory 
references to race are improper absent compelling justification.”  
(Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 625–626; see McFarland v. Smith 
(2d Cir. 1979) 611 F.2d 414, 417 [“To raise the issue of race is to 
draw the jury’s attention to a characteristic that the 
Constitution generally commands us to ignore.  Even a reference 
that is not derogatory may carry impermissible connotations, or 
may trigger prejudiced responses in the listeners that the 
speaker might neither have predicted nor intended.”]; State v. 
Varner (Minn. 2002) 643 N.W.2d 298, 305 [“Even statements 
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made without a biased intent may have a negative effect when 
it comes to issues of race.”].) 
 
Although we find no justification for the prosecutor’s 
argument concerning the jail guards’ ethnic backgrounds, we 
conclude that the admission of this evidence did not prejudice 
Gomez.  As in Cudjo, the racial reference here “was a brief and 
isolated remark,” and “there was no continued effort by the 
prosecutor to call attention to defendant’s race or to prejudice 
the jury against him on account of race.”  (Cudjo, supra, 6 
Cal.4th at p. 626.)  Further, Gomez did not dispute the evidence 
establishing that he had violently attacked jail guards on 
numerous occasions, not to mention evidence of previous violent 
felony convictions.  And, again, Gomez’s mitigation evidence 
consisted solely of expert testimony regarding the security 
environment at high security state prisons and his sister’s plea 
for mercy.  We are thus persuaded that any error is harmless.  
(Brown, supra, at pp. 447–448; Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at 
p. 24.) 
C. Instructional Error Concerning “Biblical 
References” 
Immediately after the defense’s penalty phase closing 
argument, the trial court gave the jury the following instruction:  
“I do want to emphasize again as I’ve done before that you’re not 
to bring anything to the deliberation process.  Jurors are 
sometimes tempted in this phase of the case to refer to biblical 
references.  Don’t bring the Bible and, don’t refer to those.  You’ll 
be guided by your own conscience and the law.”  Gomez claims 
the trial court violated his federal constitutional rights by 
forbidding the jury from “referring to biblical references” when 
considering whether to impose the death sentence. 
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Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
99 
Gomez did not object to the instruction in the trial court.  
But, as the Attorney General acknowledges, the forfeiture rule 
“does not apply when . . . the trial court gives an instruction that 
is an incorrect statement of the law.”  (People v. Hudson (2006) 
38 Cal.4th 1002, 1012.)  Because that is what Gomez contends 
happened here, we turn to the merits of his claim. 
“ ‘The jury system is an institution that is legally 
fundamental but also fundamentally human.  Jurors bring to 
their deliberations knowledge and beliefs about general matters 
of law and fact that find their source in everyday life and 
experience.’ ”  (People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1219.)  
“That jurors may consider their religious beliefs during penalty 
deliberations,” we have said, “is also to be expected.”  (People v. 
Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 389.)  “At the penalty phase, jurors 
are asked to make a normative determination — one which 
necessarily 
includes 
moral 
and 
ethical 
considerations — designed 
to 
reflect 
community 
values.”  
(People v. Danks (2004) 32 Cal.4th 269, 311 (Danks).)  In sum, it 
is not improper for a juror to consider “personal religious, 
philosophical, or secular normative values” during penalty 
deliberations.  (Ibid.) 
At the same time, we have made clear that “[p]enalty 
determinations are to be based on the evidence presented by the 
parties and the legal instructions given by the court. . . . not by 
recourse to extraneous authority.”  (People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 
Cal.4th 155, 194.)  “[R]eliance on religious authority as 
supporting 
or 
opposing 
the 
death 
penalty” 
is 
thus 
impermissible.  (Ibid.)  Accordingly, we have held that “bringing 
biblical passages into the jury room and reading them aloud 
during deliberation constitutes misconduct.”  (People v. 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
100 
Williams (2006) 40 Cal.4th 287, 333; Danks, supra, 32 Cal.4th 
at p. 308; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 466–467.) 
Gomez admits that the court’s instruction that jurors not 
“bring the Bible” into deliberations was correct.  But he contends 
that the instructions went too far by forbidding jurors from even 
considering “biblical references,” which erroneously suggested 
that jurors who “engaged in moral reasoning illustrated by or 
rooted in Biblical passages would be committing misconduct.”  
Gomez argues the error is particularly prejudicial because it 
undermined the defense’s closing argument emphasizing the 
moral decision before the jury, which counsel suggested would 
be “better expressed to you by a priest, a rabbi or a minister or 
even a philosopher.” 
The trial court’s instructions are not a model of clarity.  
But we agree with the Attorney General that the court’s 
prohibition on “refer[ing] to biblical references,” understood in 
context, precluded only the use of biblical texts during 
deliberations; it did not preclude the jury from relying on 
personal religious beliefs.  The instructions thus correctly stated 
the law. 
“ ‘When an appellate court addresses a claim of jury 
misinstruction, it must assess the instructions as a whole, 
viewing the challenged instruction in context with other 
instructions, in order to determine if there was a reasonable 
likelihood the jury applied the challenged instruction in an 
impermissible manner.’ ”  (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 
616, 677, quoting People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 803–
804.)  The trial court’s prohibition on “biblical references” 
followed its instruction that “you’re not to bring anything to the 
deliberation process,” suggesting that the jury understood the 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
101 
instruction as a whole as forbidding extrinsic sources of law or 
evidence — of which biblical references were merely an 
example — during deliberations.  This conclusion is supported 
by the trial court’s statement that he wanted to “emphasize 
again as I’ve done before.”  The jury was likely to understand 
this statement as a reference to the court’s guilt phase 
instruction that the jury “cannot refer to” “a religious text of 
some kind, a bible or something like that” because it is “outside 
information.” 
The court also gave a number of instructions that made 
clear that jurors could rely on their personal conscience and 
moral values when considering whether to impose the death 
penalty.  Immediately after the challenged instruction, the trial 
court said:  “You’ll be guided by your own conscience and the 
law.”  The court later instructed the jury that “[a] mitigating 
circumstance is any fact, condition or event which does not 
constitute a justification or excuse for the crime in question, but 
may be considered as an extenuating circumstance in 
determining the appropriateness of the death penalty.”  The 
court then said that, in weighing the aggravating and mitigating 
factors, “[y]ou are free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic 
value you deem appropriate to each and all of the factors you are 
permitted to consider.”  Gomez argues that this general 
instruction concerning moral values did not cure the court’s 
error in giving the specific instruction regarding biblical 
references.  But that argument presupposes that the latter 
instruction referred to biblical reasoning instead of biblical 
texts, an argument we have rejected.   
In any case, it is not reasonably likely that the jury 
understood the trial court’s brief statement regarding “biblical 
references” to mean that they could not rely on their personal 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
102 
religious beliefs during deliberations.  We thus conclude that no 
instructional error occurred here.  Nevertheless, we caution that 
trial courts, in prohibiting jurors from bringing religious texts 
to penalty phase deliberations, should be careful to ensure that 
they are not improperly interfering with the jurors’ ability to 
consider their religious and other personal beliefs and values. 
D. Challenges to the Death Penalty 
Gomez argues that a death sentence cannot be imposed 
unless the jury finds the defendant guilty “beyond all possible 
doubt.”  But, as Gomez acknowledges, we have previously 
rejected the argument that “evidence of guilt must be stronger 
in a capital case than in a noncapital case.”  (People v. Lewis 
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1290, fn. 23.)  He offers no compelling 
reason for us to revisit that conclusion. 
We likewise reject Gomez’s argument that his death 
sentence violates the Eighth Amendment because the robbery 
and special circumstances in this case permitted the jury to 
impose the sentence for an accidental or unforeseeable killing.  
As Gomez recognizes, we have “repeatedly held that, consistent 
with Eighth Amendment principles, neither intent to kill nor 
reckless indifference to life is a required element of the felony-
murder special circumstance when the defendant is the actual 
killer.”  (People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 661; see, e.g., 
People v. Watkins (2012) 55 Cal.4th 999, 1033; People v. 
Martinez (2010) 47 Cal.4th 911, 966–967; Young, supra, 34 
Cal.4th at p. 1204.) 
Gomez raises additional constitutional challenges to 
California’s capital sentencing scheme, all of which we have 
previously considered and rejected.  Gomez provides no 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
103 
persuasive reason to revisit our decisions, and we thus reject his 
challenges in accordance with the following precedent: 
We have held that section 190.2 “ ‘ “adequately narrows 
the class of murderers subject to the death penalty” ’ ” and thus 
does not violate the Eighth Amendment.  (People v. Masters, 
supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1077 (Masters); People v. Cunningham 
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 671; People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 
494, 532–533.) 
Both this court and the high court have held that the 
current application of section 190.3, factor (a), is constitutional.  
(Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 976; People v. 
Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 655; People v. Rountree (2013) 
56 Cal.4th 823, 860.) 
“ ‘Nothing in the federal Constitution requires the penalty 
phase jury to make written findings of the factors it finds in 
aggravation and mitigation; agree unanimously that a 
particular aggravating circumstance exists; find all aggravating 
factors proved beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance 
of the evidence; find that aggravation outweighs mitigation 
beyond a reasonable doubt; or conclude beyond a reasonable 
doubt that death is the appropriate penalty.’ ”  (People v. 
Williams (2013) 58 Cal.4th 197, 295 (Williams); see People v. 
Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 373 (Jackson); Masters, supra, 62 
Cal.4th at p. 1076; People v. D’Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257, 308.) 
Likewise, “ ‘[w]e have repeatedly held that “CALJIC No. 
8.88 provides constitutionally sufficient guidance to the jury on 
the 
weighing 
of 
aggravating 
and 
mitigating 
factors.”  
[Citations.]  We have rejected the claim that the instruction 
unconstitutionally fails to inform the jury that, in order to 
impose the death penalty, it must find that aggravating 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
104 
circumstances outweigh mitigating ones beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  [Citation.]  Under our precedent, “the trial court need 
not and should not instruct the jury as to any burden of proof or 
persuasion at the penalty phase.”  [Citation.]’ ”  (Masters, supra, 
62 Cal.4th at p. 1076; People v. Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 
769–770; Williams, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 295.)  We have also 
held “the phrase ‘so substantial’ [in CALJIC No. 8.88] is not 
impermissibly vague.”  (People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 
595; see Jackson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 373.) 
 “ ‘Defendant was not entitled to an instruction regarding 
a presumption of life.’  [Citation.]” (People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 
Cal.4th 79, 150; see Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1078.) 
“ ‘The use of certain adjectives such as “extreme” and 
“substantial” in the list of mitigating factors in section 190.3 
does not render the statute unconstitutional.’ ”  (Jackson, supra, 
1 Cal.5th at pp. 372–373; Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1077; 
People v. Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th 924, 971 (Carrasco).) 
“ ‘CALJIC No. 8.85 is both correct and adequate.’  
[Citation]  The sentencing factors set out in CALJIC No. 8.85 
are not unconstitutionally vague or arbitrary, and the trial court 
is not required to delete inapplicable sentencing factors from the 
instruction.”  (Jackson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 372, quoting 
People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 309 and citing People 
v. Famalaro (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1, 43.) 
We have held that a trial court may refuse to instruct the 
jury not to consider the deterrent or nondeterrent effect of the 
death penalty “where ‘neither party raise[s] the issue of either 
the cost or the deterrent effect of the death penalty . . . .’ ”  
(People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 371, quoting People v. 
Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 566.) 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
105 
“Neither intercase proportionality nor disparate sentence 
review is constitutionally compelled.”  (Jackson, supra, 1 Cal.5th 
at p. 373; People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1207; People 
v. Eubanks (2011) 53 Cal.4th 110, 154.)  “Moreover, ‘capital and 
noncapital defendants are not similarly situated and therefore 
may be treated differently without violating’ a defendant’s right 
to equal protection of the laws, due process of law, or freedom 
from cruel and unusual punishment.”  (Carrasco, supra, 59 
Cal.4th at p. 971, quoting People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 
547, 590.) 
“ ‘The alleged inconsistency between regular imposition of 
the death penalty and international norms of human decency 
does not render that penalty cruel and unusual punishment 
under the Eighth Amendment [citation]; nor does “regular” 
imposition of the death penalty violate the Eighth Amendment 
on the ground that “ ‘[i]nternational law is a part of our law’ ” 
[citation].  To the extent defendant contends the errors . . . that 
occurred at his trial also violate international law, his claim fails 
because we have found no such errors . . . .  International law 
does not prohibit a sentence of death rendered in accordance 
with 
state 
and 
federal 
constitutional 
and 
statutory 
requirements. [Citations.]’ ”  (Masters, supra, 62 Cal.4th at 
pp. 1077–1078, quoting People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 
654.) 
E. Cumulative Error 
Gomez contends that the cumulative effect of the trial 
court’s errors deprived him of his due process rights under the 
federal and state Constitutions and therefore warrant reversal.  
Although we have concluded that the trial court committed a 
number of harmless errors, we conclude there is no reasonable 
PEOPLE v. GOMEZ 
Opinion of the Court by Liu, J. 
 
106 
possibility that these errors, considered cumulatively, affected 
the jury’s verdicts. 
 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LIU, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
LUI, J.* 
 
                                        
* Administrative Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, 
Second Appellate District, Division Two assigned by the Chief 
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 
Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Gomez 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S087773 
Date Filed: November 29, 2018 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: William R. Pounders 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Lynne S. Coffin and Laura S. Kelly, under appointments by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and 
Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette and Gerald A. Engler, Chief 
Assistant Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Jaime L. Fuster and David A. 
Voet, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Laura S. Kelly 
4521 Campus Drive, #175 
Irvine, CA  92612 
(949) 737-2042 
 
David A. Voet 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1700 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 576-1338