Case Title: McMeekin v. Harry M. Stevens, Inc.

Citation: 365 Pa. Super. 580, 530 A.2d 462

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1987-08-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
365 Pa. Superior Ct. 580 (1987) 530 A.2d 462 Thomas J. McMEEKIN v. HARRY M. STEVENS, INC., Appellant, v. DOUGLAS FURNITURE CORPORATION. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued April 28, 1987. Filed August 20, 1987. *581 William P. Boyer, Canonsburg, for appellant. Stephen P. McCloskey, Washington, for Douglas, appellee. *582 BEFORE: CIRILLO, President Judge, and MONTEMURO and TAMILIA, JJ. TAMILIA, Judge: Appellant, Harry M. Stevens, Inc. (Stevens), appeals from an Order of judgment entered against him, contending the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to the application of the Comparative Negligence Act (Comparative Act), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102 et seq. In 1980, Stevens operated a restaurant facility near Harrisburg. Plaintiff, in the original action, brought suit against Stevens alleging that a chair upon which he was sitting at the establishment had collapsed. Stevens joined Douglas Furniture Corporation (Douglas), the manufacturer of the chair, as an additional defendant, on both negligence and strict liability counts. On September 9, 1985, trial proceeded against Stevens in negligence, and against Douglas on a strict liability theory only. At the close of the evidence, the court charged the jury that it could assess the percentage of causal liability between Stevens and Douglas.[1] Stevens objected, arguing that comparative apportionment applies only to situations involving multiple negligence tortfeasors; it does not apply to situations where an alleged negligence tort-feasor and an alleged strict liability tortfeasor are involved. In effect, Stevens maintains the court improperly applied the Comparative Act. On September 20, 1985, the jury returned a verdict in the amount of $355,000 against appellant/Stevens and appellee/Douglas, *583 assessing percentages of liability at seventy per cent (70%) attributable to Stevens and thirty per cent (30%) attributable to Douglas.[2] On September 30, 1985, Stevens filed a motion for post-trial relief, in which it argued that the trial court erred in giving the instruction on "comparative fault", that it had preserved this issue by way of exception to the trial court's charge and that such error warranted a new trial. Later, on November 21, 1985, Stevens and Douglas entered a stipulation and agreed the jury verdict would be paid by the two defendants at the percentages determined by the jury, but that Stevens could pursue its motion for post-trial relief. (The plaintiff is not included in this appeal.) The stipulation also said Stevens desired to shift twenty percent (20%) of the jury verdict to Douglas, leaving Stevens responsible for fifty percent (50%) instead of seventy percent (70%) and Douglas responsible for fifty percent (50%) instead of thirty percent (30%) of the damages. An appeal was timely filed with this Court. The issue before us for review is whether comparative liability may be applied so as to apportion liability between defendants where one defendant is responsible for negligent conduct and the other is responsible under a strict products liability theory and, if comparative liability is not applicable, whether the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tort-Feasors Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 8321 et seq. (Uniform Act) may be applied in such a situation. While there is no Pennsylvania case law directly addressing the first question, a careful review of the Comparative Act[3] leads us to conclude it was never the intention of our legislature to extend the scope of that Act to any actions except those grounded in negligence. 57 Am.Jur.2d § 426. We said in our recent Opinion, Krivijanski v. Union R.R. Co., 357 Pa.Super. 196, 515 A.2d 933 (1986): Id., 357 Pa.Superior Ct. at 205, 515 A.2d at 938. A review of the Comparative Act reveals the Act is aimed only at "all actions brought to recover damages for negligence" *585 (42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102(a)). Further, section 7102(b) deals with apportionment among defendants in the ratio of their "causal negligence" (42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102(b)). The legislature could have specifically included in the statute forms of conduct not considered to be negligence; they chose, however, only to provide for actions grounded in negligence. Negligence describes a specific form of conduct and, absent a clear directive from the legislature, we do not think it appropriate to expand the scope of the legislation to include conduct which is not negligent conduct. See Krivijanski, supra. Moreover, our course is dictated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's insistence upon maintaining the distinction between traditional negligence and strict products liability concepts. See Lewis v. Coffing Hoist Division, 515 Pa. ___, 528 A.2d 590 (1987); Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co., Inc., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978), and Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975). As to the second alternative before us for consideration, we find the Uniform Act[4] may properly be applied so that joint tortfeasors may obtain contribution from each other, despite the fact that the one joint tortfeasor has been found liable in negligence and the other in strict products liability. In Svetz v. Land Tool Co., 355 Pa.Super. 230, 513 A.2d 403 (1986), we addressed this identical issue and concluded *586 that of necessity, where strictly liable and negligent defendants have acted as joint tortfeasors, contribution among them can be properly awarded. In discussing the policy behind the Uniform Act, we said: Id., 355 Pa.Superior Ct. at 238, 513 A.2d at 407. Unlike the Comparative Act, the Uniform Act is not geared only toward negligence situations. In Svetz, we acknowledged, Id., 355 Pa.Superior Ct. at 238, 239, 513 A.2d at 407, 408. Allowing a tortfeasor found strictly liable to recover contribution from a negligent joint tortfeasor merely effectuates the Uniform Act's goal of achieving equity between tortfeasors without subverting policies of strict liability. Further, we determined this result is not in conflict with policy considerations which support strict liability for defective products. In discussing the purpose to be served by strict products liability, we said: Id., 355 Pa.Superior Ct. at 241, 513 A.2d at 409. Against the considerations behind strict products liability, we examined the aim of the Uniform Act: Id. Thus this court decided that the Uniform Act may properly be applied to effectuate contribution between joint tortfeasors, even where one tortfeasor is adjudged liable of negligence and the other of strict products liability. That issue having been previously decided by this Court, we find here that appellant may seek contribution from appellee, since both have been determined by the court below to be liable in tort for the same injury to the plaintiff. We are left with the final determination which has previously not been decided by an appellate court in this state; that is, whether in assessing contribution between a negligent and a strict liability tortfeasor, apportionment should be made on a pro rata[5] or comparative percentage basis. As we stated earlier, contribution is based on equitable principles. It would appear to be less than equitable to require a fifty-fifty apportionment when the facts, as determined by a jury, clearly established that one of the joint tortfeasors had greater responsibility for causing the harm than the other. Appellee refers to the dissent by Wieand, J., in Dambacher v. Mallis, 336 Pa. Super. 22, 485 A.2d 408 (1984), and a statement in Pachesky v. Getz, 353 Pa.Super. 505, 510 A.2d 776 (1986) to bolster its argument that by enacting the Comparative Act in 1976, Pennsylvania adopted a system of comparative fault apportionment. Pachesky is not relevant as it deals purely with negligence and contributory negligence between a plaintiff and defendant; in Dambacher, the majority never reaches the issue. In light of our discussion, it appears most appropriate to view this matter as one of comparative contribution once joint liability has been ascertained. As we found earlier, Svetz stands for the principle that parties found liable *589 under theories of negligence and others liable under theories of strict liability may be joint tortfeasors and one may obtain contribution from the other. While Svetz and Rabatin v. Columbus Lines Inc., 790 F.2d 22 (3d Cir. 1986) hold that the Uniform Act was applicable, neither decides the issue of apportionment. From the enactment of the Comparative Act, we can assume the legislature intended both a move away from the common law restrictions imposed by the doctrine of contributory negligence as it applied to plaintiff and tortfeasor, as well as contribution between joint tortfeasors. While we see limitations in applying the Comparative Act under the facts of this case as discussed above, we do not believe the same strictures apply to the Uniform Act. As between joint tortfeasors, no damage is done to the expressed doctrine of comparative negligence and the distinct doctrine of strict liability in applying a concept of comparative contribution as founded on a factual determination of percentage liability. It is difficult to express a concept which has so many similarities to comparative negligence that it appears to be a play on words with differences only in semantics. However, we cannot ignore the clear legislative mandate as expressed in the language of the Comparative Act, and the equally clear distinctions between "negligence" and "strict liability" expressed by our Supreme Court. See Lewis, Azzarello and Berkebile, supra. Since Svetz permits the finding of contribution between negligent and strict liability tortfeasors, there appears to be no impediment to percentage contribution if permitted by the Uniform Act. This does not conflict with Lewis, Azzarello and Berkebile, as they govern the relationship between a plaintiff and a tortfeasor, and not that between joint tortfeasors. The problem as to when and how the percentage apportionment shall be determined is rather one of procedure and practice. The Uniform Act speaks of liability in two respects common liability and pro rata share (see note 4, supra, and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8324(b), supra). Common liability would appear to mean the total responsibility to the plaintiff on the *590 part of both tortfeasors regardless of the manner of apportionment and would require that each be held jointly and severally liable. This would likely be the case where the injury was indivisible and the tortfeasor's negligence was a substantial factor in causing the harm, even if another's actions contributed to the incident. The second concept of liability contained therein is pro rata share, which necessarily means that contribution must be apportioned according to the equitable share of responsibility for the harm attributable to each. Restatement, Torts 2d 886A, Contribution Among Tortfeasors, provides: Comment h to that section states: The second method suggested in Comment h appears particularly appropriate here in light of the facts of the case. As Judge Rodgers stated in his Opinion: (Slip Op., Rodgers, J., 9/24/86, p. 9.) This factual scenario, presented to a jury, would clearly permit a finding of shared responsibility and would also provide a basis for establishing a percentage apportionment of liability. However, for reasons discussed below, we find that the charge presented to the jury by the trial court as to liability, while couched in terms of fault rather than negligence, was error and to enable a jury in this proceeding to determine a percentage degree of responsibility for contribution purposes would require a somewhat different approach. The jury should not be asked to consider the percentage of liability or fault at the close of the evidence as its primary function is to determine the liability of the negligent tortfeasor and the liability of the strict liability tortfeasor separate from each other and on two distinctly different theories. Once the jury determines if one or both parties are at fault on the separate theories, it must determine the common liability or total damages to the plaintiff. In this fashion, the jury will not confuse a trial on the respective liabilities of the tortfeasors with the right of contribution, which is a clear and distinct cause of action. See Puller v. Puller, 380 Pa. 219, 110 A.2d 175 (1955). As we stated earlier, the problem which we must resolve procedurally is the manner in which we may reach the issue of percentage share for contribution purposes before there has been a "discharge of the common liability or [one tortfeasor] has paid more than his pro rata share thereof" (42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8324(b)). It would be wasteful of judicial time and resources to require a second trial on the issue of percentage of contribution, and more difficult to make that determination at a later time, even if this was not *593 done until after settlement or payment and at the time of the action for contribution. The procedure utilized by the court to charge the jury on comparative liability at the close of the evidence is compatible with the comparative negligence theory and statute but is inappropriate to the contribution theory which we have adopted. Contribution may be involved only after discharge and not as part of the proceeding to establish liability. We believe it would be permissible for the court, after a finding of liability against the joint tortfeasors, and a determination of the amount in damages on the common liability, to have the jury determine by means of special interrogatories, the percentage share of each to satisfy counts in the complaint requesting contributions. In this manner, the court could then have the jury determine, as to the common liability, what percentage was attributable to a defect in the product and what percentage was attributable to the negligence of the joint tortfeasor. Throughout, the clear distinction between the negligent tortfeasor and strict liability tortfeasor will have been maintained. This would appear to be necessary to proceed to enforcement of the right of contribution permitted by law. As provided in the Pennsylvania Trial Guide: S. Feldman, Pennsylvania Trial Guide, Revision, Volume 2 at 16 (1978). Also, the defendant paying the judgment may *594 have the judgment marked to his use, so as to enforce contribution from the other tortfeasor. See Puller at 220, n.[*], 110 A.2d at 176 n.[*]. While somewhat more involved than the procedure utilized by the lower court, it appears unavoidable considering the restrictions contained in both the Comparative Act and the Uniform Act. The Annotation and note on Contribution, 53 A.L.R.3d 184, discuss numerous approaches and variations to this problem but do not provide a solution that we believe applicable here or under Pennsylvania law. In view of the fact that the parties have stipulated to liability, and the issue we must resolve is the percentage each is required to pay as between a 30-70 percentage or 50-50 percentage, there need be no remand for further proceedings. We have held that Pennsylvania has moved to a doctrine of comparative contribution, derivative of legislative adoption of Comparative Negligence law; that the Uniform Contribution Act permits contribution as between a negligent tortfeasor and a strict liability tortfeasor; and that uniformity and consistency require that comparative contribution be applied in determining the pro rata share of each. We, therefore, find that the 30 per cent attributable to Douglas is the amount of its share and the 70 per cent attributable to Stevens is the amount of its share. Order of the lower court is affirmed. [1] The trial judge instructed the jury: If you find that both defendants, Stevens and Douglas, are liable to the plaintiff, your award of damages should be divided between both defendants in proportion to their relative degrees of causal liability; that is, where recovery is allowed against more than one defendant, each defendant shall be liable for that proportion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages in the ratio of the amount of its causal liability to the amount of causal liability attributed to all the defendants against whom recovery is allowed. If you find that both defendants are causally liable, it is your duty to apportion the relative degree of liability between both defendants; that is, the liability of both defendants would total 100%, and you would apportion a percentage of that liability to each defendant. (T.T. 9/19/85, p. 23). [2] The court molded the jury verdict to reflect an amount for delay damages. Judgment was entered, therefore, for $501,000. The stipulation of the parties provided that the amount in controversy was about $100,000, i.e. twenty percent (20%) of the molded verdict (Slip Op., Roberts, J., 9/24/86, p. 2). [3] § 7102. Comparative negligence (a) General rule. In all actions brought to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery by the plaintiff or his legal representative where such negligence was not greater than the causal negligence of the defendant or defendants against whom recovery is sought, but any damages sustained by the plaintiff shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff. (b) Recovery against joint defendant; contribution. Where recovery is allowed against more than one defendant, each defendant shall be liable for that proportion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages in the ratio of the amount of his causal negligence to the amount of causal negligence attributed to all defendants against whom recovery is allowed. The plaintiff may recover the full amount of the allowed recovery from any defendant against whom the plaintiff is not barred from recovery. Any defendant who is so compelled to pay more than his percentage share may seek contribution. [4] The Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act provides (in pertinent part): 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8322. Definition As used in this subchapter `joint tortfeasors' means two or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to persons or property, whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or some of them. § 8324. Right of contribution (a) General rule. The right of contribution exists among joint tortfeasors. (b) Payment required. A joint tortfeasor is not entitled to a money judgment for contribution until he has by payment discharged the common liability or has paid more than his pro rata share thereof. [5] Pro rata has generally been interpreted to mean division proportionately in accordance with the number of tortfeasors. The theory is explained in comment h to the Restatement, Torts 2d 886A. See pages 589-592, infra.