Case Title: LASTAR ROCHELLE BALL V. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2006-SC-000369-MR

State: kentucky

Court: Kentucky Supreme Court

Date: 2007-08-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
IMPORTANT NOTICE NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE CITED OR USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER CASE IN ANY COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED OPINION THAT WOULD ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT. OPINIONS CITED FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED DECISION IN THE FILED DOCUMENT AND A COPY OF THE ENTIRE DECISION SHALL BE TENDERED ALONG WITH THE DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE ACTION . ,,SuFrrmr'Cvurf of LASTAR ROCHELLE BALL APPELLANT ON APPEAL FROM McCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE CRAIG Z . CLYMER, JUDGE 05-CR-000170 COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE 1 Ky . Const . §110(2)(b) . 2006-SC-000369-MR L MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT AFFIRMING RENDERED : AUGUST 23, 2007 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED The McCracken Circuit Court sentenced Appellant, LaStar Ball, to twenty (20) years imprisonment on convictions of second-degree robbery and of being a Persistent Felony Offender (PFO) in the first-degree . She appeals to this Court as a matter of right.' For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm Appellant's convictions . On March 26, 2005, Dana Brian, a part-time security guard for Dillard's Department Store, observed Appellant roll up several pairs of jeans and stuff them into a shopping bag . Ms. Brian approached Appellant, identified herself as a security officer, and asked Appellant to accompany her to the back of the store . Appellant refused and a scuffle ensued . In Brian's attempts to subdue Appellant, her knee popped . Ultimately, Appellant was apprehended with the assistance of an onlooker and a police officer . Appellant was indicted for first-degree robbery and for being a first-degree PFO . After a two-day trial, Appellant was found guilty of both charges. The trial court sentenced her in accordance with the jury's recommendation of twenty (20) years . Assigning several errors, Appellant appeals from her convictions . Appellant first claims that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on lesser included offenses contrary to her request that the jury be instructed only on first-degree robbery. The trial court instructed the jury on first-degree robbery, second-degree robbery, theft by unlawful taking of property of a value of $300 or more, theft by unlawful taking of property of a value less than $300, and fourth-degree assault . Appellant does not claim that the instructions were not supported by the totality of the evidence ; rather, Appellant only contends that the trial court committed reversible error by denying her request for a single jury instruction . However, this Court has long held that, "it is the duty of the trial court to instruct on such defense whether it be supported by evidence presented by the accused or introduced on behalf of the Commonwealth ."2 The trial court must instruct the jury according to the evidence presented even over objections of the defendant. As there was ample evidence presented at trial to support a conviction for each of the charges upon which the jury was instructed, we reject Appellant's contention . 2Vick v. Commonwealth , 236 Ky . 436, 33 S.W.2d 297, 299 (1930) ; Commonwealth v. Elmore , 831 S.W .2d 183,184 (Ky . 1992). 3Commonwealth v. Sanders , 685 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Ky. 1985). 4Binion v . Commonwealth , 891 S.W.2d 383, 386 (Ky. 1995). See also Parks v . Commonwealth , 192 S.W.3d 318, 327 (Ky . 2006) ("The Commonwealth would have been entitled to such an instruction, if requested, even over Appellant's objection .") . In addition, Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it allowed the introduction of incompetent evidence to prove PFO status . During the PFO phase, the Commonwealth produced photocopies of two Missouri trial court judgments, showing that Appellant had a 2001 felony conviction for stealing, third offense ; and a 1994 felony conviction for possession of a controlled substance . On the photocopy of the document reflecting the 1994 conviction, the clerk of court failed to sign and thereby certify the judgment in the place provided next to the judge's signature . However, the clerk did certify the entire record . At trial, Appellant argued that the evidence of the 1994 conviction was inadmissible because the clerk's signature was required to certify the judgment . The trial court overruled this objection and held the clerk's certification of the entire record sufficient to certify the judgment . On appeal, Appellant has abandoned the grounds for her objection at trial and now contends that the evidence used to prove PFO status was incompetent because the entire record was not attested to by a Missouri Circuit Court Judge. Thus her claim of error on appeal is unpreserved. We review unpreserved arguments for palpable error .5 We have recently held, "While the language used [in RCr 10.26] is clear enough, we further explain that the required showing is probability of a different result or error so fundamental as to threaten a defendant's entitlement to due process of law."6 Furthermore, "[t]o prevail, one must show that the error resulted in 'manifest injustice .' To discover 'manifest injustice,' a reviewing court must plumb the depths of the 5"A palpable error which affects the substantial rights of a party may be considered . . . by an appellate court on appeal, even though insufficiently raised or preserved for review, and appropriate relief may be granted upon a determination that manifest injustice has resulted from the error." RCr 10.26 . See also Pollini v. Commonwealth , 172 S.W.3d 418 (Ky. 2005) . 6Martin v. Commonwealth , 207 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky . 2006). proceeding . . . to determine whether the defect in the proceeding was shocking or jurisprudentially intolerable . ,7 The Commonwealth bears the burden of proving prior convictions for PFO purposes and must sufficiently establish the authenticity of prior judgments . As we stated in Davis v . Commonwealth, "for a court of this Commonwealth to give full faith and credit to the judgment of another state, certification by that court is required."8 When the Commonwealth is "seeking to use a prior conviction to enhance a sentence, it is, in fact, seeking full faith and credit of that prior conviction and the requirements of KRS 422.040 must be satisfied ."9 KRS 422.040 provides in part : The records and judicial proceedings of any court of any state, attested by the clerk thereof in due form, with the seal of the court annexed if there be a seal, and certified by the judge, chief justice, or presiding magistrate of the court, shall have the same faith and credit given to them in this state as they would have at the place from which the records come.' ° The Commonwealth acknowledges that its PFO evidence does not meet the requirements of KRS 422.040, Davis," or Merriweather v . Commonwealth . Yet, the Commonwealth responds that the PFO evidence was properly admitted under CR 44.01,' 3 KRE 1005,' 4 and KRE 902(4).'5 Thus, it contends, no error occurred . 7Id. $Davis v . Commonwealth , 899 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Ky . 1995), overruled on other rounds by Merriweather v. Commonwealth, 99 S.W.3d 448 (Ky . 2003) . 9Merriweather v . Commonwealth, 99 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Ky . 2003) . 10KRS 422.040 . 11 899 S .W.2d 487 . 1299 S .W.3d 448 (Ky . 2003) . 13CR 44.01 provides in part : The Commonwealth also argues that under a palpable error standard of review, Appellant must show that the Missouri judgment was not valid . We disagree . If admission of the prior Missouri convictions, flawed only by clerical error, resulted in "manifest injustice," then palpable error exists and reversal must granted . In Davis,' 6 and Merriweather,17 our decisions to reverse the PFO convictions were not solely contingent upon the requirements of KRS 422.040 . In Davis , we held, "sufficient safeguards . . . regarding proof of former convictions . . . are not present [and the PFO] An official record . . . when admissible for any purpose may be evidenced . . . by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record . . . and if the record is in the custody of an officer outside this state such attested copy shall be accompanied with a certificate that such officer has the custody . If the office in which the record is kept is within the United States . . . the certificate . . . may be made by any public officer having a seal of office and having official duties in the district or political subdivision in which the record is kept, authenticated by the seal of his office . '4KRE 1005 provides that a copy of a public record recorded with a state "may be proved by a copy, certified as correct in accordance with KRE 902." 15KRE 902(4) states : An official record . . . when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by . . . a copy attested by an official having the legal custody of the record . If the office in which the record is kept is outside the Commonwealth of Kentucky, the attested copy shall be accompanied by a certificate that the official attesting to the accuracy of the copy has the authority to do so. The certificate accompanying domestic records (those from offices within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States) may be made by a judge of a court of record of the district or political subdivision in which the record is kept, authenticated by the seal of the court, or may be made by any public officer having a seal of office and having official duties in the district or political subdivision in which the record is kept, authenticated by the seal of office . ' 6899 S .W .2d 487. 1799 S.W.3d 448. documents were not self authenticating under our rules of evidence, nor do they meet the requirements of RCr 9.44, CR 44.01, or KRS 422.040 . . . . As such, evidence of appellant's prior convictions is insufficient to support the PFO conviction . In Merriweather , we held that because the Commonwealth could not meet KRS 422.040 and because it "ignored the language" of KRE 902(1) and KRE 902(4), we reversed the PFO conviction .' 9 In the present case, the PFO evidence was properly admitted under KRE 1005 and KRE 902(4), "as the certificate was made by a public officer having a seal of office and having official duties in the district where the record was kept . ,2° While KRS 422.040 is the accepted means of obtaining full faith and credit for foreign convictions, the admission of PFO evidence in this case did not result in manifest injustice authorizing palpable error relief . Thus, there was no palpable error in the PFO conviction . Appellant next claims that the admission of prior bad acts violated her due process rights . Specifically, Appellant claims that the trial court erred by allowing the introduction of a videotape recording of a cellular phone call she made while at the police station . The trial court held that the evidence was admissible under KRE 404(b) . We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion .21 An abuse of discretion occurs '$899 S .W.2d at 489 . 1999 S.W.3d at 452-53 . 0KRE 902(4) . 21 See Woodward v. Commonwealth , 147 S .W .3d 63 (Ky . 2004); Partin v . Commonwealth , 918 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. 1996) . when, "the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles . Y)22 The evidence at issue was a videotape of Appellant engaged in a cell phone conversation with an unknown person she referred to as "Baby." Appellant was alone at the time and appears to have been unaware that her actions were being recorded by a video camera . Appellant told "Baby" that she had been "caught up," to "go home," and- to "sell the stuff to your homeboys." This evidence was admissible under KRE 801(A)(b)(1) which provides in part that, "a statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness, if the statement is offered against a party and is : (1) the party's own statement . . . .,,23 Furthermore, we have held that "any statement made by a party is admissible against that party as an admission ."24 Even though Appellant was unaware that she was being recorded, the statements presented were undoubtedly her own and were therefore admissible . While the record does not reflect that Appellant was read her rights pursuant to Miranda v . Arizona, 25 Appellant's statements to "Baby" were voluntary and were not elicited in response to questioning by the police . As the United States Supreme Court held in Miranda , "volunteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today . ,26 Finally, contrary to Appellant's 22Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co . v. Thompson , 11 S .W.3d 575, 581 (Ky . 2000), citing Commonwealth v . English , 993 S .W.2d 941, 945 (Ky . 1999). 23KRE 801(A)(b)(1) . 24Rabovsky v. Commonwealth , 973 S.W.2d 6, 10 (Ky . 1998) . 25384 U .S . 436 (1966) . 261d. at 477-78 . contention, KRE 404(b) is not implicated . KRE 801(A)(b)(1) is controlling . We will not "disturb a trial court's decision to admit evidence absent an abuse of discretion ."27 Appellant next claims that she was denied due process and equal protection when the trial court overruled her objection pursuant to Batson v . Kentucky?8 . In the present case during voir dire, the Commonwealth struck, among others, all of the three African-American jurors on the panel . Appellant objected, claiming that the Commonwealth used peremptory challenges in a manner violating the Equal Protection Clause by removing prospective jurors on the basis of race . At the Batson hearing, the trial court held that the Commonwealth stated reasonably specific, nondiscriminatory reasons for striking the potential jurors . In Batson , the United States Supreme Court held, "since the trial judge's findings . . . largely will turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference."29 Thus, unless the trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous, they must be accepted. On review, we need only address the sufficiency of the Commonwealth's explanations for exercising its peremptory challenges . Two of the African-American jurors had prior run-ins with law enforcement . The trial court accepted as reasonably specific and nondiscriminatory the Commonwealth's professed rationale that it did not want a person with a criminal record sitting on the jury . The third African-American juror was struck, according to the Commonwealth, because she went to high school with a member of Appellant's defense team . The Commonwealth's concern for partiality was 27Matthews v. Commonwealth , 163 S.W.3d 11, 19 (Ky . 2005), citing Partin , 918 S .W.3d at 222 . 28476 U .S . 79 (1986) . 29476 U .S . at 98 . also nondiscriminatory and reasonably specific . Thus, we discern no clearly erroneous ruling by the trial court. The Appellant next claims that she was substantially prejudiced and denied due process of law, a fair trial, and reliable sentencing when the security guard, Ms. Brian, testified for the Commonwealth wearing her courtroom bailiff uniform .3° This issue is unpreserved and therefore may only be reviewed for palpable error. Specifically, Appellant relies on, among other cases, Ice v . Commonwealth '31, and Brown v. Commonwealth ,32 to support her argument . Ice and its progeny are not persuasive. While Appellant correctly points out that this Court condemns the introduction of evidence where the only obvious purpose is "to engender sympathy for the victim,"33 this was not such a case . Ms . Brian was on-duty at the time of her testimony and there was no reason to compel her to change from her bailiff uniform to testify, particularly when there was no objection .34 In Brown , we held that the trial court's decision to allow a witness to testify while holding a Bible carries such a probability of prejudice as to require reversal. Yet, our holding was specifically contingent upon the fact that the "[witness's] testimony was diametrically opposed to [the defendant's, and] the jury could not believe both men's testimony . . . ."3s In the matter before us, Appellant did not introduce any evidence or 3o1n addition to being a part-time security guard, Ms . Brian was also a court bailiff . 31 667 S.W.2d 671 (Ky. 1984) . 32983 S.W.2d 513 (Ky . 1999) . 33667 S .W.2d at 675-77 . 34See Brown v. State , 269 N .E.2d 377 (Ind . 1971). 35983 S.W.2d at 516. 16ld. at 515. produce any testimony which required the jury to make a determination of fact on the basis of one witness's credibility over another's . Here, Appellant failed to produce any evidence that allowing Ms . Brian to testify in her Bailiff's uniform unduly prejudiced the jury or otherwise constituted manifest injustice . Thus, Appellant's claim of palpable error is without merit . Appellant further claims palpable error in the trial judge's failure to sua sponte recuse himself from this case because Ms. Brian was a McCracken County courtroom bailiff . This issue is unpreserved and without merit . For the final issue on appeal, Appellant claims that the Commonwealth violated her Fifth Amendment rights by improperly commenting on her failure to testify . During its closing argument of the penalty phase, the Commonwealth stated, "I haven't heard one expression from defense counsel's argument of regret . Not one." Appellant claims this was an indirect attack on her failure to testify. She objected to the Commonwealth's statement and moved for a mistrial . The trial court overruled the objection and denied the motion on the grounds that the Commonwealth's statement was not in reference to Appellant's silence . A mistrial is granted "only when there is a fundamental defect in the proceedings which will result in a manifest injustice."3' We review the trial court's ruling under an abuse of discretion standard . As we held in Ragland v . Commonwealth , "if there is another, equally plausible explanation for a statement . . . the statement will not be construed as comment on the defendant's failure to testify ."38 In this case, the trial court specifically found that the 37Gould v . Charlton Co., Inc . , 929 S .W.2d 734, 738 (Ky . 1996) . 33191 S.W .3d 569, 589-90 (Ky. 2006). 10 Commonwealth's comment was directed towards Appellant's counsel and not towards Appellant herself . We agree. No error occurred . For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the final judgment of the McCracken Circuit Court . All sitting . Lambert, CJ, and Cunningham, Minton, Noble, Schroder, and Scott, JJ., concur . COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: Donna L. Boyce Assistant Public Advocate Department of Public Advocacy Suite 302, 100 Fair Oaks Lane Frankfort, KY 40601 COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE : Gregory D. Stumbo Attorney General of Kentucky Bryan D . Morrow Assistant Attorney General Criminal Appellate Division Office of the Attorney General 1024 Capital Center Drive Frankfort, KY 40601-8204