Case Title: Cody v. Lewis & West Transit Mix

Citation: 186 Kan. 437, 351 P.2d 4

Docket Number: 41,707

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1960-04-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
186 Kan. 437 (1960)
351 P.2d 4
HARRY FRANK CODY, Appellee and Cross Appellant,
v.
LEWIS & WEST TRANSIT MIX (Construction Co.), U.S. FIDELITY & GUARANTY COMPANY, Appellants and Cross Appellees.
No. 41,707

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed April 9, 1960.
Robert N. Partridge, of Wichita, argued the cause, and W.A. Kahrs, Robert H. Nelson, Patrick F. Kelly, and H.W. Fanning, all of Wichita, were with him on the briefs for the appellants and cross appellees.
Fred R. Vieux, of Augusta, argued the cause and was on the briefs for the appellee and cross appellant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PARKER, C.J.:
This is a workmen's compensation case brought by Harry Frank Cody (hereinafter referred to as the claimant) against Lewis & West Transit Mix (Construction Co.) (hereinafter referred to as the respondent) and its insurance carrier, U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company.
The facts are complicated and must be detailed at length in order to insure a proper understanding of the appellate issues involved.
The Commissioner's findings disclose many of the essential facts. So far as here pertinent such findings read:
After making the foregoing findings, the Commissioner entered an award accordingly in favor of the claimant and against the respondent and its insurance carrier.
The claimant appealed from the Commissioner's award.
Thereafter the district court found that the Commissioner's findings should be adopted in certain particulars and made additional findings which, so far as here pertinent, read:
Thereupon the court rendered a judgment which increased the award of the Commissioner. It reads:
The claimant, the respondent and the insurance carrier have perfected appeals from the judgment to this court wherein they raise questions to which we shall now give our attention.
Boiled down and stripped of excess verbiage the burden of all contentions briefed and argued in this court by respondent with respect to error in the involved judgment is that in computing the amount of compensation to be paid to claimant, who was disabled and drew compensation for a prior accidental back injury under the provisions of the workmen's compensation act before the accident for which he now claims compensation, the trial court was required to apportion the compensation to be allowed for a back injury received in a subsequent accident, percentage-wise, according to the proportion of disability caused by the respective *440 injuries; and that as to the involved nonscheduled disability conceded to fall within the scope of G.S. 1957 Supp., 44-510 (3) (c) (24), now G.S. 1959 Supp., 44-510 (3) (c) (24), such method of computation is required by the provisions of G.S. 1957 Supp., 44-511 (4), now G.S. 1959 Supp., 44-511 (4), which read:
We find nothing in the provisions of the section of the statute just quoted (44-511[4]) to uphold respondent's position on the point now under consideration. Indeed our view is that, when applied to existing facts and circumstances, such section clearly indicates that since claimant had suffered a previous disability, the trial court in determining average earnings, as a basis for compensation for his later injury, had the right and duty to fix such amount as would reasonably represent his earning capacity at the time of the later injury in the employment in which he was then working. It appears from the record that, based on evidence disclosing claimant was fully and satisfactorily performing all duties of the full time job to which he had been assigned at a weekly wage of $85.69, the trial court properly concluded such amount reasonably represented his earning capacity and used it as a basis for computing his compensation for the involved injury.
Support for what has just been stated and held, particularly our conclusion respondent's position that the statute (44-511[4]) is to be construed as requiring the trial court to apportion the compensation to be allowed for claimant's second injury according to the proportion of disability caused by his respective injuries cannot be upheld, is to be found in Johnson v. Skelly Oil Co., 181 Kan. 655, 312 P.2d 1076, where, in connection with a somewhat similar contention, it is said:
See, also, Kronig v. Nolan Motor Co. (No. 41,864, this day decided, 186 Kan. 534, 351 P.2d 1, where it is held:
And in the opinion said:
Mindful that we are here concerned with a nonscheduled disability and that the provisions of G.S. 1957 Supp., 44-510 (3) (c) (24) must be given consideration along with the provisions of 44-511 (4), supra, in any determination of the amount of compensation to which claimant may be entitled, we believe further support for the conclusion to which we have just referred is to be found in Davis v. Braun, 170 Kan. 177, 223 P.2d 958, where it is said:
See, also, Daugherty v. National Gypsum Co., 182 Kan. 197, 318 P.2d 1012, which reads:
We are not disturbed by respondent's suggestion that our construction may ofttimes lead to disproportionate or unjust results. Much could be said on that subject but we are not disposed to labor it. Conceding the point, without deciding it, the respondent's remedy is by appeal to the legislature not to this court. Long ago in Anderson v. Oil & Refining Co., 111 Kan. 314, 206 Pac. 900, we said:
The foregoing statement has been repeatedly quoted and directly applied to more recent enactments of the compensation act. See Rogers v. Board of Public Utilities, 158 Kan. 693, 149 P.2d 632; Riggan v. Coleman Co., 166 Kan. 234, 200 P.2d 271, and Marquiss v. Bilwil Mining Co., 166 Kan. 420, 202 P.2d 194.
Nor are we impressed with arguments to the effect that the legislature in enacting 44-511(4), supra, must have intended its terms should be construed as respondent contends. Resort to G.S. 1957 Supp., 44-510 (3) (c) (26), which provides "If a workman has suffered a previous disability and received a later injury, the effects of which together with the previous disability shall result in total permanent disability, then and in that event the compensation *443 due said workman shall be the difference between the amount provided in the schedule of this section for prior injury and the total sum which would be due said employee for such total disability computed as provided in section 44-511 of the General Statutes Supplement of 1955 and any amendments thereto, ...," is all that is required to fully demonstrate that the legislature is perfectly capable of directing apportionment of a compensation award according to the contribution of pre-existing injuries or disabilities when it desires to do so. Therefore it would be improper for us to write something into 44-511(4), supra, that body did not see fit to put there and we are not inclined to do so.
The essence of all claims advanced by claimant in support of his cross-appeal is that instead of rendering an award in his favor for thirty-five percent permanent partial disability the trial court should have granted him an award for total permanent disability.
In our determination of the question thus raised two rules, so well-established in this jurisdiction as to hardly require reference to the decisions supporting them, must be kept in mind. One is that it is the function of the trial court to pass upon the facts in a compensation case and that under the provisions of G.S. 1957 Supp., 44-556, and prior enactments, this court is limited on appellate review to "questions of law" which, in final analysis, simply means that its duty is to determine whether the trial court's findings are supported by any substantial competent evidence. (Holler v. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 157 Kan. 355, 139 P.2d 846; Walker v. Arrow Well Servicing Co., 163 Kan. 776, 186 P.2d 104; Conner v. M. & M. Packing Co., 166 Kan. 98, 101, 199 P.2d 458; Alexander v. Chrysler Motor Parts Corp., 167 Kan. 711, 207 P.2d 1179; McDonald v. Rader, 177 Kan. 249, 277 P.2d 652; LaRue v. Sierra Petroleum Co., 183 Kan. 153, 156, 325 P.2d 59; Weimer v. Sauder Tank Co., 184 Kan. 422, 425, 337 P.2d 672; West's Kansas Digest, Workmen's Compensation, §§ 1939, 1940, 1969.) The other is that the existence, the extent and the duration of an injured workman's incapacity is a question of fact for the trial court to determine. (Brewer v. Vinegar Hill Zinc Co., 119 Kan. 355, 239 Pac. 762; Voiles v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 141 Kan. 451, 41 P.2d 723; Mihoover v. Winter Livestock Commission Co., 155 Kan. 432, 125 P.2d 363; Cowan v. Kerford Quarry Co., 146 Kan. 682, 685, 72 P.2d 999; Alexander v. Chrysler Motor Parts Corp., 714, supra; West's Kansas Digest, Workmen's Compensation, §§ 1939, 1940, 1969.)
*444 Nothing would be gained and we are not disposed to prolong this opinion by further reference to the evidence adduced by the parties. It suffices to say, that after an extended examination of the entire record, we are convinced it discloses controverted but nevertheless sufficient competent evidence on which the trial court, as was its province, could base its finding that claimant had sustained a thirty-five percent permanent partial disability as claimed by him. That, under the decisions to which we have just referred, means such finding cannot be disturbed and must be upheld.
We have given careful consideration to all other contentions advanced by the parties, some of which have been found to be inapplicable under the facts, and others without substantial merit, and fail to find any error in this case warranting a reversal of the judgment. Therefore it must be and is affirmed.