Case Title: Thomas v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 130/11

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2012-10-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Konnyack A. Thomas v. State of Maryland, No. 130, Sept. Term 2011.
CRIMINAL LAW – FIFTH AMENDMENT – MIRANDA WARNINGS –
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
The Court of Appeals held that Thomas, who had driven himself to a police station after
being asked to come by the police, was told he was not under arrest, and was questioned in
an unlocked room, was not “in custody,” so that Miranda warnings were not necessary and
Thomas’s confession was admissible at trial.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 130
September Term, 2011
KONNYACK A. THOMAS
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
Barbera
McDonald,
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Bell, C.J., dissents.
Adkins, J., concurs and dissents.
Filed: October 26, 2012
1
 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
Under Miranda,  police are required, prior to any custodial interrogation, to inform a suspect
that he or she has a right to remain silent, that any statement he or she does make can be used
as evidence against him or her, and that he or she has the right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed.  Id. at 467-69, 86 S. Ct. at 1624-25, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 720-21.
2
Section 12-302(c) provides, in relevant part:
(c) Criminal case. – In a criminal case, the State may appeal as
(continued...)
In this case, we review the issue of the admissibility of a confession given in the
absence of Miranda warnings.1  
Konnyack Thomas, Petitioner, having been contacted by police, agreed to speak with
the officers at the station.  Prior to his arrival, he spoke with his estranged wife who informed
Thomas that the police wanted to speak to him about accusations of sexual abuse made by
their daughter against Thomas.  When he arrived at the station, Thomas met with two
detectives and spoke with them for approximately an hour and a half, during which he
confessed to touching his daughter inappropriately and having intercourse with her.  Thomas
was arrested approximately twenty minutes after the interview concluded and was charged
in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County with one count of sexually abusing a minor, two
counts of second degree rape, and six counts of second degree sexual offense.
Prior to trial, Thomas filed a motion to suppress all of the statements he had made and
argued that he had not been given Miranda warnings at the time he arrived at the police
station, although he should have been.  The circuit court judge agreed and suppressed the
statements.  The State appealed, pursuant to Section 12-302(c)(3)(i) of the Courts & Judicial
Proceedings Article of the Maryland Code (1973, 2006  Repl. Vol.),2
2(...continued)
provided in this subsection.
   * * * 
(3) (i) In a case involving a crime of violence as defined in § 14-
101 of the Criminal Law Article, and in cases under §§ 5-602
through 5-609 and §§ 5-612 through 5-614 of the Criminal Law
Article, the State may appeal from a decision of a trial court that
excludes evidence offered by the State or requires the return of
property alleged to have been seized in violation of the
Constitution of the United States, the Maryland Constitution, or
the Maryland Declaration of Rights.
    (ii) The appeal shall be made before jeopardy attaches to the
defendant. However, in all cases the appeal shall be taken no
more than 15 days after the decision has been rendered and shall
be diligently prosecuted.
    (iii) Before taking the appeal, the State shall certify to the
court that the appeal is not taken for purposes of delay and that
the evidence excluded or the property required to be returned is
substantial proof of a material fact in the proceeding. The appeal
shall be heard and the decision rendered within 120 days of the
time that the record on appeal is filed in the appellate court.
Otherwise, the decision of the trial court shall be final.
    (iv) Except in a homicide case, if the State appeals on the
basis of this paragraph, and if on final appeal the decision of the
trial court is affirmed, the charges against the defendant shall be
dismissed in the case from which the appeal was taken. In that
case, the State may not prosecute the defendant on those specific
charges or on any other related charges arising out of the same
incident.
   (v) 1. Except as provided in subsubparagraph 2 of this
subparagraph, pending the prosecution and determination of an
appeal taken under paragraph (1) or (3) of this subsection, the
defendant shall be released on personal recognizance bail. If the
defendant fails to appear as required by the terms of the
recognizance bail, the trial court shall subject the defendant to
the penalties provided in § 5-211 of the Criminal Procedure
Article.
         2. A. Pending the prosecution and determination of an
(continued...)
2
2(...continued)
appeal taken under paragraph (1) or (3) of this subsection, in a
case in which the defendant is charged with a crime of violence,
as defined in § 14-101 of the Criminal Law Article, the court
may release the defendant on any terms and conditions that the
court considers appropriate or may order the defendant
remanded to custody pending the outcome of the appeal.
             B. The determination and enforcement of any terms and
conditions of release shall be in accordance with the provisions
of Title 5 of the Criminal Procedure Article.
      (vi) If the State loses the appeal, the jurisdiction shall pay all
the costs related to the appeal, including reasonable attorney’s
fees incurred by the defendant as a result of the appeal.
3
Thomas, in his brief before the Court of Special Appeals, also raised the issue
of whether his statements should have been suppressed because they were made in reliance
on a promise and were, thus, made involuntarily.  The Court of Special Appeals declined to
address this issue, however, because, “with no factual findings by the circuit court on the
issue of voluntariness, the record is not adequate for review of the issue by this Court.”  State
v. Thomas, 202 Md. App. 545, 581, 33 A.3d 494, 515 (2011).  This issue was not presented
in Thomas’s Petition for Certiorari and we do not consider it.
3
and the Court of Special Appeals reversed in a reported opinion, State v. Thomas, 202 Md.
App. 545, 33 A.3d 494 (2011), because they determined that Thomas was not in custody at
the time he gave the statements at issue.3  We granted Thomas’s Petition for Certiorari, 425
Md. 227, 40 A.3d 39 (2012), to consider the following questions:
1. Is a person in custody for purposes of Miranda if, prior to
questioning inside a police station, police have sufficient
evidence to make an arrest and the person knows this, even if
the police also tell the person “you are not under arrest”?
2. Did the Court of Special Appeals err when it found that
petitioner was not in custody even though at the time petitioner
was interrogated by police inside a police station he knew that
4
We, like our colleagues on the Court of Special Appeals, shall refer to the
minor victim only by her first initial, C.
4
his wife and daughter had told police that he had been sexually
assaulting his daughter, police confronted him with this
information, petitioner was noticeably having a “difficult time”
prior to questioning, and police never told petitioner he was free
to leave or that he did not have to cooperate with them and only
told him he was not under arrest after petitioner was alone with
two detectives in a closed room inside a police station?
We shall hold that a belief held by a suspect that police may have probable cause to
arrest him or her is not sufficient to render the individual in custody for Miranda purposes.
We shall further hold that the motion to suppress Thomas’s statements should have been
denied because, given the totality of the circumstances, Thomas was not in custody at the
time he made the statements.
During the suppression hearing, the judge viewed a video, as well as admitted its
transcript, of the police interrogation and Thomas’s statements and heard testimony from
Detective Kristie Thorpe, one of the detectives who interrogated Thomas; Thomas also
testified on his own behalf.  Thereafter, the judge made the following factual findings related
to the events preceding Thomas’s arrival at the police station:4
The facts are in this case as this Court finds them are that
the detectives are, called the defendant to the station not to talk
about the situation with his daughter.  Notwithstanding, very
good detective work initially, told him that he was invited down
to the police station.  Such invitations generally mean trouble,
and this one did.
On the way to the police station the Court finds that the
defendant’s wife talked with him on the phone and gave him
more information about what this really was about and this was
5
The dissent authored by Chief Judge Bell makes much of the fact that both
parties, in their briefs, state that the outer door to the area in which the interrogation rooms
were located had to have been opened with a key card when the detectives walked with
Thomas into the interrogation room.  Essentially, that dissent is arguing that Thomas was,
in fact, locked in the interrogation room because one needed a key to exit the outer door,
even if the door to the actual interrogation room was unlocked.  This is problematic for two
reasons.  First, neither party asserts that a key card was needed to exit the outer door.  More
importantly, however, the trial judge’s findings of fact are completely devoid of any mention
of the outer door being locked, and the only statements regarding doors made by that judge
were that they were unlocked.
5
about their daughter [C.] and his alleged sexual abuse of her.
The defendant in this motions hearing took the stand and said
that he thought initially that it might be about a runaway son
until his wife informed him that it wasn’t.
Now it’s relevant in this case that the defendant, Mr.
Thomas, is a sergeant in the United States Army.  I think it’s a
reasonable inference that if the police want to talk to you about
your children, and particularly when he finds out that it’s about
his daughter, that a sergeant who is a supervisor in the United
States Armed Forces does not want police detectives coming on
the base to talk to him about sexually abusing his daughter.  I
think it’s a reasonable inference.
So, certainly, he was going to go down to the police
station to talk to them, as opposed to having them come to him.
With respect to what occurred when Thomas arrived at the police station, the judge
found that the officers informed Thomas that he was not under arrest and the door was
unlocked,5 but did not tell Thomas he was free to leave:  
Now, he gets to the police station and the detective tells
him the following things.  They greet him and they tell him it is
a police station.  It “doesn’t look like” one, but it’s a police
station.
They tell him, “You are not under arrest,” and that the
door is unlocked.  Now what does that mean?  You’re not under
arrest and the door is unlocked.
If he was free to leave and he could get up and walk out
6
if he wanted to, why didn’t they just say that?  Why stop by
telling him, after telling him the door is unlocked?
Now for the record, the Court asked the State’s Attorney,
and she complied with the request, showed a portion of the CD
of the interview.  The Court observed that during the course of
the interview the defendant is sitting on a sofa and he has two
detectives sitting in front of him, the one asking most of the
questions, Detective Thorpe, who testified here today; and
Detective Birch, a male detective, is sitting also in front of him,
but just a short, a great, a little further away.
They’re polite.  They’re courteous.  They’re very
respectful.  They are detectives wearing plain clothes.  But the
detective never told him that he was free to leave.
The court then identified the “totality of the circumstances” test used to determine
whether an individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda and explained that it requires
an objective analysis of all the facts particular to the case at hand:
Now the State argues that the defendant was free to leave
and the Court raises the question what reasonable person in a
police interrogation room thinks that they can just get up and
walk out?  The Court, the issue is not whether they could, but
whether a reasonable person would believe they could.  And it’s
an objective standard as the Court said.
Now in an interview of one suspected of a crime by the
police will have coercive aspects to it simply by virtue of the
fact that they’re the police and they’re in the law enforcement
system.  And the Court said that in a case cited by the State,
Abeokuto v. State, at 391 Md. 289.  You know, inherently, if
you’re being interviewed by the police, and particularly in a
police station, there is some coercive aspect to it.
The Court, in deciding whether an interrogation is
custodial, must consider the totality of the circumstances on a
case-by-case basis.  Now, obviously, the State wants to argue
the facts the way they see them.  The Defense argues the facts
the way he sees them and, but the Court must decide what the
facts are as the apply, as the law applies to him in this case.  And
the Court considers all of the facts, not just the facts that the
State wants the Court to consider or just the facts that the
7
Defense wants the Court to consider.
The judge then considered the nature of interrogations that occur at police stations and
stated that, although he did not believe the detectives intended to do anything inappropriate,
“a system of subterfuge has developed in the law enforcement community with respect to
interrogation techniques” and further opined that interrogations occurring at a police station
are “inherently custodial” and professed disbelief that a person could confess to a serious
crime such as murder or sexual assault and be allowed to leave:
The Court does not find that there was any intention by
the detectives to do anything improper.  However, a system of
subterfuge has developed in the law enforcement community
with respect to interrogation techniques.
The defendant was not at the station for a social visit.
The detectives wanted to make this prosecution.  They told the
defendant he was not under arrest and the door was unlocked.
It’s a scary thought to think that in this community a citizen can
walk into a police station, confess to a violent crime and then
they are free to leave.
The State argues that a man who goes in and says that I
was, I sexually abused my daughter can just leave.  And that
flies in the face of reason that you could go in and confess to a
murder and just walk out of the station, you’re not under arrest
and you’re not, and you’re not in custody.
Now interrogations in police stations are inherently
custodial whether they are coercively so or whether it’s to the
extent that it’s violative of the requirements of Miranda is what
these cases are all about.  And that’s why the Court must
consider each factual situation on its own legs.
Each of the cases cited by counsel, both the State and the
Defense, if you look at the facts, they’re all different and that’s
why the cases are at the Appellate Court and that’s why the
opinions read as the way they do, read the way they do.  Each
case is different and this one is also.
Now interrogations of suspects in police stations are
distinguishable from police encounters on the street.  And there
8
is a number of cases where police officers have encountered
people on the sidewalk, say “can I talk to you” or want to
question an individual and the individual keeps walking and
says “I don’t have to talk to you” or something of this nature.
I don’t know of any cases, as I said earlier, where a
person just gets up and just walks out of a police station or feels
that he can.  What reasonable person would think that?
The judge then made additional findings of fact with respect to the interview room and
the nature of the questions being asked, finding, specifically, that there were two detectives
in the room, that the door was unlocked, that Thomas was told he was not under arrest but
was not told he was free to leave, and that the questioning was designed to gather evidence
rather than “to find out what happened”:
Now, the Court considers the facts in this case further as
follows.  The defendant was being interviewed in the police
station.  The defendant was in a police interview room with two
detectives, notwithstanding the fact that the door was unlocked
as the defendant was told.  He was also told that he was not
under arrest.  He was not told that he was free to leave.
The Court also considers that the questions that were
being asked were specific not so much as to find out what
happened.  These questions weren’t to find out what happened,
simply to find out what happened.  These questions were being
asked to gather evidence.  That’s what the detectives were
doing, they were gathering evidence.
What did you do?  Where was she touched?  When did it
start?  How many times did you do it?  And the argument is that
Miranda warnings should not have been given?
Parenthetically maybe a lawyer could have helped this
family and this case, the State and the community.  Given the
facts in this case, that the State believes and it appears are strong
facts, given the facts in this case, maybe a lawyer would have
worked out a reasonable plea bargain for the defendant and
maybe this entire family would have been helped.
The judge then expressed skepticism regarding the State’s arguments supporting the
9
introduction of the statements, indicating that the detectives wanted to “get this guy for
committing a horrible crime and they used this technique.”  The court noted that it believed
Miranda warnings are frequently not given because those being interviewed request an
attorney after being advised of their rights and police are prevented from getting further
information:
The State claims that what they want to do is help the
family.  Well, maybe the family could have been helped by the
legal community as opposed to, unfortunately we all know, and
it’s not necessary for me to go into it, what happened to this
family and what will happen to this family after that, close
parentheses.
The State has the burden to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that this was not a custodial interrogation, that
those things that the State argues were accurate, that the
defendant was free to leave and this was just a nice little
conversation sitting on a nice, looks like soft, comfortable sofa
sitting back just talking.  They weren’t sitting back just talking.
They were building a case.
And they weren’t trying to find out – This wasn’t a
whodunit.  This was “You did it,” we want to know what you
did, when you did it, how many times you did it.  Now law
enforcement in this case would have been better served if the
defendant had been read his Miranda rights and the court talks
about that in Argueta v. State, which is at 136 Md. App. 273.
  At the end of the day, this query remains, what is wrong
with giving people their Miranda rights?  And I’ll tell you
what’s wrong with it.  As soon as defendants are given their
Miranda warnings, they often lawyer up.  And when they lawyer
up, they don’t get the information that the detectives want to get.
As I said before, I don’t find that there was any intention
by these detectives to do anything improper.  They were, they
wanted to do what detectives do and what, you know,
prosecutions in the system does.  They wanted to get this guy for
committing a horrible crime and they used this technique.
If they weren’t going to give him, tell him completely
what was going on, why did they tell him partially?
10
Now when the officer took the stand, and this was very
telling, and I don’t want to misquote her, but there was some
suggestion in the beginning that she told him some certain
things that she didn’t tell him.
Mr. Gambrill argues that they probably usually tell them
that they are free to leave, but she didn’t do it this time.  She just
told him that the door was unlocked and why do that?  Why say
the door is unlocked if he’s – why not just say “You’re free to
go, you’re not in custody”?
The court then granted the Motion to Suppress, reasoning that no reasonable person
would feel free to leave the room after confessing:
Well, at the end of the day, guess what?  He was in
custody.  He was placed under arrest.  And he was placed under
arrest based upon the information that he had given to them
without the benefit of Miranda warnings and he was in custody.
This was a custodial interrogation.  That no reasonable person
would have thought they could get up and walk out of that room
after they confessed to committing a violent crime.
That is just completely unreasonable to think that
anybody would think they could go into a police station, sit
down in an interrogation room, admit a violent crime and
they’re free to leave.
And I don’t think any lawyer in this room really believes
that a person can go in a police station and confess to a violent
crime and say, “I’ll see you later.”  That just isn’t going to
happen.  It doesn’t happen in the real world.  And the technique
of doing that ought to be stopped and this message is sent.  The
motion to suppress that statement is granted.
Our review of a grant or denial of a motion to suppress is limited 
to the record of the suppression hearing.  The first-level factual
findings of the suppression court and the court’s conclusions
regarding the credibility of testimony must be accepted by this
Court unless clearly erroneous.  The evidence is to be viewed in
the light most favorable to the prevailing party.  We “undertake
our own independent constitutional appraisal of the record by
reviewing the law and applying it to the facts of the present
11
case.” 
 
State v. Tolbert, 381 Md. 539, 548, 850 A.2d 1192, 1197 (2004) (internal citations omitted).
In its landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L.
Ed. 2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court held that an individual in custody must be informed
of certain rights prior to being interrogated so that he or she is not compelled into
incriminating himself or herself in violation of the Fifth Amendment.  Id. at 467-68, 86 S.
Ct. at 1624-25, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 720-21; see also J.D.B. v. North Carolina, __ U.S. __, 131
S. Ct. 2394, 180 L. Ed. 2d 310 (2011); Whitfield v. State, 287 Md. 124, 131, 411 A.2d 415,
420 (1980) (“In this regard, we observe that statements which are obtained from a defendant
during questioning conducted without the benefit of Miranda warnings, as concededly
occurred here, need only be excluded from evidence if they ‘flow from a custodial
interrogation within the meaning of Miranda,’” quoting Vines v. State, 285 Md. 369, 374,
402 A.2d 900, 903 (1979)).
In analyzing whether an individual is in custody for Miranda purposes, we ask, under
the “totality of the circumstances” of the particular interrogation, “would a reasonable person
have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.”  Thompson v.
Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 116 S. Ct. 457, 465, 133 L. Ed. 2d 383, 394 (1995); see also
Owens v. State, 399 Md. 388, 428, 924 A.2d, 1072, 1095 (2007); Whitfield, 287 Md. at 141,
411 A.2d at 425.  The “totality of the circumstances test” requires a court to examine the
events and circumstances before, during, and after the interrogation took place.  Owens, 399
Md. at 428-29, 924 A.2d at 1095-96; Whitfield, 287 Md. at 140-41, 411 A.2d at 425.  A
6
Much of Thomas’s brief is devoted to the type of parsing out that is
inappropriate in utilizing the “totality of the circumstances” test.  Thomas, for example,
refers to Alvarado v. Hickman, 316 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2002) to argue that his being
interviewed as a suspect indicates he was in custody, but he does not analyze the totality of
the circumstances in Hickman; rather, he focuses exclusively on the issue of whether the
person being interviewed was a suspect.   
12
court, however, does not parse out individual aspects so that each circumstance is treated as
its own totality in the application of the law.  Rather, when doing a constitutional analysis,
a court must look at the circumstances as a whole.  Ransome v. State, 373 Md. 99, 104, 816
A.2d 901, 904 (2003) (stating that a court conducting a “totality of the circumstances test”
must not “parse out each individual circumstance for separate consideration”).6
In Owens v. State, 399 Md. 388, 924 A.2d 1072 (2007), one of our recent cases, we
relied on our decision in Whitfield v. State, 287 Md. 124, 411 A.2d 415 (1980), in which we
explicitly delineated those facts and events that are often relevant to this analysis.  We noted
that a court should consider the length and location of the interview, the number of police
involved, restraint on the suspect, how the defendant got to the interview, and whether the
suspect was arrested after the interview concluded:
when and where it occurred, how long it lasted, how many
police were present, what the officers and the defendant said and
did, the presence of actual physical restraint on the defendant or
things equivalent to actual restraint such as drawn weapons or
a guard stationed at the door, and whether the defendant was
being questioned as a suspect or as a witness.  Facts pertaining
to events before the interrogation are also relevant, especially
how the defendant got to the place of questioning whether he
came completely on his own, in response to a police request or
escorted by police officers.  Finally, what happened after the
interrogation whether the defendant left freely, was detained or
13
arrested may assist the court in determining whether the
defendant, as a reasonable person, would have felt free to break
off the questioning.  
Owens, 399 Md. at 429, 924 A.2d at 1095-96, quoting Whitfield, 287 Md. at 141, 411 A.2d
at 425.  These facts, of course, are not exhaustive, but do give a roadmap for a court to
follow.
The suppression judge, however, while acknowledging the totality test, did not follow
the roadmap provided in Whitfield and Owens.  Rather, the judge based his conclusion that
Thomas was initially in custody on the bases that Thomas was at the police station and that
he later confessed.  If confession is the trigger for custody, however, then each person who
confesses in a police station must have been given Miranda warnings per se, which is
without basis in Miranda jurisprudence.  See United States v. Chee, 514 F.3d 1106, 1114
(10th Cir. 2008) (stating, in the course of considering whether Chee’s confession at a police
station rendered him in custody, that “[n]o Supreme Court case supports [the] contention that
admission to a crime transforms an interview by the police into a custodial interrogation”
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); see also Locke v. Cattell, 476 F.3d 46, 53
(1st Cir. 2007) (stating that a confession does not automatically turn an interview into a
custodial interrogation, when considering whether Locke was in custody after he confessed
to a robbery while being interviewed at the police station); Commonwealth v. Hilton, 823
N.E.2d 383, 397 (Mass. 2005) (stating that the defendant, who had confessed while at a
police station being interviewed, was not in custody thereafter, because there was no
“fundamental transformation in the atmosphere” of the interview) (internal quotations and
14
citations omitted); State v. Oney, 989 A.2d 995, 999-1000 (Vt. 2009) (“A non-custodial
situation does not become custodial automatically because the interviewee has confessed to
a crime. . . .  A confession is just one of the circumstances to consider in evaluating whether
a reasonable person would feel free to leave.”).  
In the present case, the trial court’s fact-finding was severely truncated by the judge’s
impressions of the context of the interview and the confession.  Whitfield, however, dictates
that fact-finding, in Miranda circumstances, should follow the formula applied by the Court
of Special Appeals in the instant case.  With respect to what occurred before the interview
began, our intermediate appellate court found that Thomas had driven himself to the police
station:
Here, a police officer called [Thomas] and asked if he
could “come down to the [police] station,” telling him that it had
to do with one of his children. [Thomas] agreed and drove
himself to the police station.  Although the police initiated the
contact, the record reflects that the police requested [Thomas]’s
presence rather than demanded it, and [Thomas] drove himself
to the police station.  These facts do not suggest police coercion
or restraint.  Indeed, by driving himself, [Thomas] had the
ability to drive himself home if he had decided to end the
interview and leave.  The circumstances preceding the interview
weigh against a finding of custody.
Thomas, 202 Md. App. at 570, 33 A.3d at 509.  With respect to nature of the interrogation
room, the Court of Special Appeals also noted that Thomas was interviewed in the police
station, and that the interview room was adorned with children’s toys and a couch:
[T]hat the questioning of [Thomas] occurred in a police
station is a factor to consider, but it is not determinative.
Moreover, we note that the interview here occurred in a child
7
Chief Judge Bell, in his dissent, argues that the officer’s conduct during the
interview somehow contradicts their statements that Thomas was not under arrest, because
“the petitioner was told that going free was not an option.”  That dissent, however,
mischaracterizes the interaction between the detective and Thomas in an attempt to shoehorn
the facts of this case into its theory.  After finishing writing his letter to his daughter, Thomas
asked, “So how long before it officially happens?”  The officer replied, “Let me ask you a
(continued...)
15
interview room, with teddy bears and a couch.  This room,
which Detective Thorpe characterized as one that did “not look
like a police facility,” was not, by itself, intimidating. 
Id. at 571-72, 33 A.3d at 510.
Our brethren further found that there were only two officers present, both of whom
were not in uniform, did not have weapons, and were “polite,” “courteous,” and “respectful:”
We turn next to the manner in which the interview was
conducted.  The trial court found, and the record reflects, that
the officers were “polite,” “courteous,” and “respectful.”  This
weighs in favor of a finding that [Thomas] was not in custody.
See State v. Smith, 546 N.W.2d 916, 924 (Iowa 1996) (court
looks to “whether a confrontational and aggressive style is
utilized in questioning, or whether the circumstances seem more
relaxed and investigatory in nature”).  Only two officers were
present during the questioning, and they both were unarmed and
dressed in plain clothes.  These facts weigh against a finding
that the questioning was conducted in a coercive manner.  See
id. (noting cases finding custody where numerous officers were
present and some visibly armed, but no custody where only two
officers were present).
Thomas, 202 Md. App. at 572, 33 A.3d at 510.
 
With respect to the level of restraint involved in the interview, the intermediate
appellate court found that Thomas was never physically restrained and the officer repeatedly
told him he was not under arrest,7 even after he confessed: 
(...continued)
question.  If you went out of here tonight and you went home, are you going to be okay?
Yeah, I don’t think so.”  Thomas responded, “I don’t think so.”  The officer then asked
Thomas, “Would you prefer to just get this over with?”  Thomas answered, “No, what I
prefer is for it not to happen, I know that’s not an option,” to which the officer replied, “No,
it’s not.”
Contrary to Chief Judge Bell’s dissent, this exchange does not contradict the officers’
earlier statements that Thomas was not under arrest.  The officer asked Thomas whether he
would prefer to be arrested that night or not.  Thomas stated that he would prefer that he
never be arrested, to which the officer replied that was not going to happen.  All this
exchange indicates is that Thomas would be arrested at some point in the future.  It does not
indicate that he was to be immediately taken into custody.  Regardless of the distinction,
however, the above-quoted exchange happened, even by the dissent’s admission, at the end
of the interview, after he had confessed, both orally and in writing.  Even if we were to
accept the dissent’s view that this interaction was an objective circumstance that would
indicate to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to leave, and thus render Thomas
in custody, it would not mandate the suppression of any evidence, as the exchange occurred
after the incriminating statements were given.
16
With respect to whether there was “the presence of actual
physical restraint . . . or things equivalent to actual restraint,”
Owens, 399 Md. at 429, 924 A.2d 1072 (quoting Whitfield, 287
Md. at 141, 411 A.2d 415), that factor also weighs against a
custody finding. [Thomas] was never physically restrained, and
there was no armed guard at the door.  Although the two officers
sat between [Thomas] and the door, the officers were unarmed
and never indicated that they would stop [Thomas] from leaving.
In fact, they specifically advised that the door was unlocked.  
Moreover, [Thomas] was told, on several occasions, that
he was not under arrest.  Detective Thorpe so advised [Thomas]
at the beginning of the questioning.  Toward the end of the
questioning, when [Thomas] sought to clarify that he was not
under arrest, but he was going to jail, Detective Thorpe stated:
“I don’t like to lie to people, so what I will tell you is that you’re
not going to jail tonight.  Is there a possibility that you will in
the near future?  There is a possibility.”
Thomas, 202 Md. App. at 572-73, 33 A.3d at 510.  
With respect to whether Thomas “was being questioned as a suspect or a witness,”
17
Owens, 399 Md. at 429, 924 A.2d at 1096, the court noted that Thomas was informed by his
wife before he got to the police station that he was under investigation for sexual abuse, and
thus was aware he was a suspect, but the court did not make a determination as to whether
this weighed for, weighed against, or was not relevant to a custody determination: 
Another factor to consider in the custody analysis is
“‘whether the defendant was being questioned as a suspect or as
a witness.’”  Owens, 399 Md. at 429, 924 A.2d 1072 (quoting
Whitfield, 287 Md. at 141, 411 A.2d 415).  This factor is
relevant, however, only if it is communicated to the suspect
because “custody depends on the objective circumstances of the
interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the
interrogating officers or the person being questioned.”
Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323, 325, 144 S. Ct. 1526.
* * * 
Here, [Thomas] knew, before arriving at the police
station, based on his conversation with his wife, that he was
being investigated for sexually abusing his daughter.  At the
beginning of the interview, [Thomas] advised the officers that
he knew he was there to talk about his daughter, stating that it
was “kind of hard to talk about.”  Detective Thorpe told
[Thomas] that they had spoken with C., and she told them “some
things that have been going on for quite some time between you
and her.” [Thomas] then admitted to touching and abusing his
daughter.
Thomas, 202 Md. App at 573-574, 33 A.3d at 511.
Our brethren also noted that Thomas admitted to sexually abusing his daughter, and
that the trial court found this factor to be of great importance:
The circuit court considered as a strong factor in favor of
finding custody that [Thomas] not only knew he was a suspect,
but he actually admitted sexually abusing his daughter.  The
court stated that  “no reasonable person would have thought they
could get up and walk out of that room after they confessed to
committing a violent crime.”  
18
Thomas, 202 Md. App. at 575, 33 A.3d at 511.  
The court noted that some appellate courts take the position that a confession does not
automatically convert an non-custodial interview into a custodial one, stating that a
confession was a factor to be considered, but it was not dispositive.  Thomas, 202 Md. App.
at 575-76, 33 A.3d at 512-13.  With respect to the instant case, the court determined that,
since there was no change in the atmosphere of the interrogation after Thomas confessed, and
“none of the objective circumstances of the interrogation changed,” Thomas’s confession did
not render him in custody:  
Here, early on in the interview, [Thomas] admitted to
engaging in sexual conduct with his 14-year-old daughter.
Although this was an admission to a serious crime, none of the
objective circumstances of the interrogation changed as a result
of [Thomas]’s inculpatory remarks. [Thomas]’s incriminating
statements did not render the interrogation custodial.
Id. at 577, 33 A.3d at 513.
Finally, with respect to what occurred after the interview concluded, the Court of
Special Appeals noted that Detective Thorpe did not intend to place Thomas under arrest at
the beginning of the interview, but her intention changed and Thomas was arrested twenty
minutes after the questioning was concluded:
In this case, [Thomas] was arrested twenty minutes after
the questioning was concluded.  As explained below, however,
this did not transform the questioning into custodial
interrogation.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut has stated that,
although the failure to arrest a suspect supports a finding of no
custody, the reverse may not be true; that the defendant was
arrested after the interrogation does not necessarily mean that he
19
or she was in custody during the interrogation.  State v. Pinder,
250 Conn. 385, 736 A.2d 857, 876 (1999).
* * * 
Detective Thorpe testified, without contradiction, that
when she began the interview, she did not intend to place
[Thomas] under arrest.  Her intentions changed “toward the end
of the interview,” when [Thomas] told her that he “wasn’t
coping well,” and she “became concerned about his safety.”
Although Detective Thorpe’s subjective intent is not a factor, it
is consistent with the manner of the questioning here.
[Thomas]’s arrest under the facts of this case should be given
neutral status; it does not weigh in favor of or against a finding
of custody.
Thomas, 202 Md. App. at 577-78, 33 A.3d at 513.
Turning, now, to the questions as hand, we note that, initially, Thomas asks that we
adopt a presumption that an individual is in custody when “police have sufficient evidence
to make an arrest prior to questioning; the person knows this before being questioned; and
the questioning then takes place away from public view inside a police station.”  Essentially,
he is stating that he was in custody because he believed that police had enough evidence to
arrest him. 
The State responds by noting that the presumption of custody Thomas is requesting
would be akin to a categorical rule that every suspect who believes police have enough
evident to arrest him or her is in custody.  The State argues that the Supreme Court explicitly
rejected a categorical rule in Howes v. Fields, __U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 182 L.Ed. 2d 17
(2012), in which the Court reiterated that a trial court should have considered all the facts
surrounding an interrogation of a prison inmate to determine if the interrogation was
custodial or not.  
20
With respect to the first issue presented by the presumption Thomas requests, it is
clear that his assumptions regarding the state of the evidence against him is irrelevant in a
Miranda analysis.  Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293
(1994) (per curiam).  In Stansbury, the Supreme Court considered whether it was appropriate
for the California Supreme Court to have considered the interrogating officer’s subjective
beliefs regarding Stansbury’s culpability.  The Supreme Court held that it was not, stating
that, “[o]ur decisions make clear that the initial determination of custody depends on the
objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either
the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.”  Id. at 323, 114 S. Ct. at 1529, 128
L. Ed. 2d at 298 (emphasis added).  See also United States v. Moya, 74 F.3d 1117, 1119 (11th
Cir. 1996) (“The test is objective: the actual, subjective beliefs of the defendant and the
interviewing officer on whether the defendant was free to leave are irrelevant.”).
The instant case is, however, even more attenuated than whether Thomas’s assumed
there was enough evidence against him – he presumed that the officers believed they had
probable cause to arrest him.  Even assuming that Thomas’s assumption was relevant, his
belief was predicated upon uncommunicated thoughts, which cannot form the basis for
requiring Miranda warnings, as the Supreme Court recognized in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U.S. 420, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984).  In Berkemer, the Court was concerned
with whether the roadside detention and questioning of a driver violated Miranda.  The Court
held that it was irrelevant that the officer “apparently decided as soon as [McCarty] stepped
out of his car that he would be taken into custody and charged with a traffic offense,”
21
because the officer never communicated the decision to the defendant. Id. at 442, 104 S. Ct.
at 3151, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 336.  The Court explicitly rejected McCarty’s argument that once
the officer had probable cause to arrest him, he was in custody, stating that, 
[t]he threat to a citizen’s Fifth Amendment rights that Miranda
was designed to neutralize has little to do with the strength of an
interrogating officer’s suspicions.  And, by requiring a
policeman conversing with a motorist to constantly monitor the
information available to him to determine when it becomes
sufficient to establish probable cause, would be extremely
difficult to administer.  
Id. at 435 n.22, 104 S. Ct. at 3148 n.22, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 331 n.22.  The same holds true in the
present case.  Whether police officers have sufficient evidence to arrest, or believe they do,
is irrelevant to a Miranda determination.  United States v. Woods, 720 F.2d 1022, 1031 (9th
Cir. 1983) (“[W]hether or not the police have probable cause for arresting the suspect, has
no relevance as to when the person’s right to receive warnings attaches.” (internal citation
and quotation marks omitted)).   
Thomas, nevertheless, asserts, in his second question, that an analysis of all the factors
surrounding his interrogation supports that he was subjected to custodial interrogation as
soon as he entered the police station: 
key factors that point to petitioner being in custody include: 1)
prior to questioning, petitioner was aware that the police had
been told by his wife and daughter that he had been sexually
assaulting his daughter, thus he knew they had sufficient
evidence to arrest him before he even said one word; 2)
petitioner was questioned inside a police station interview room
with two detectives seated between himself and a closed door;
3) the detectives never once told petitioner he was free to leave
or did not have to cooperate; 4) police confronted petitioner with
22
the evidence they had against him, his daughter’s own words to
them; and 5) he was actually placed under arrest shortly after the
interrogation ended.
The State counters that the Court of Special Appeals correctly determined that Thomas was
not in custody for the duration of his interview, highlighting that Thomas voluntarily came
to the police station, was told he was not under arrest, was told the door was unlocked, was
confronted with officers who were not in uniform or armed, and was left alone for a period
of time. 
A custody determination for Miranda purposes is factually intensive, given that the
facts and circumstances surrounding each interrogation a court is asked to analyze will vary
from case to case.  Whitfield, 287 Md. at 139, 411 A.2d at 424.  Rarely will one fact pattern
be replicated from case to case, but analyses of similar factual patterns may provide the
fodder for informed discussion.
One case with a factual pattern similar to the instant case is that of United States v.
Chee, 514 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 2008), in which the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
considered whether Chee was in custody when he voluntarily came to the police station to
discuss a firearm that he had found in a car he bought at a government auction; the police,
however, quickly began asking him about an alleged sexual assault they believed he
committed.  Id. at 1110-11.  Chee was lead by two investigators into an office, the door to
which had been closed but not locked, to be questioned and was repeatedly told he was not
under arrest and could go.  The officers were not dressed in uniform, did not have guns or
handcuffs visible, and never physically restrained Chee.  The tone of the questioning was
8
Neither the Circuit Court, United States v. Chee, 514 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir.
2008), nor the District Court, United States v. Chee, 2:05 CR 773 (D. Utah August 15, 2006)
identified precisely how much time elapsed between Chee’s interview and his arrest.
23
calm and polite and did not change after he confessed to raping a woman.  Id. at 1114.  The
interview lasted approximately an hour, during which Chee also wrote a letter of apology to
the victim, at the investigators’ suggestion, and provided a DNA sample.  Id. at 1111.  Chee
was allowed to leave the police station after the interview concluded, but was, thereafter,
arrested8 and charged with aggravated sexual abuse while in Indian country, Sections 1153(a)
and 2241(a)(1) of Title 18 of the United States Code, and subsequently was convicted, after
having unsuccessfully moved to suppress his statements.  Id.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Chee was not in custody when he
confessed because the tone of the interview was non-confrontational, the interview was
relatively short, and he had voluntarily come to the station.  That court also discounted
Chee’s argument that once he confessed, he was in custody, stating, “‘[n]o Supreme Court
case supports [the] contention that admission to a crime transforms an interview by the police
into a custodial interrogation.’” Id. at 1114, quoting Locke v. Cattell, 476 F.3d 46, 53 (1st
Cir. 2007).
Likewise, in State v. Isaac, Greene App. no. 2003-CA-91, 2004 Ohio 4683, the Ohio
intermediate appellate court also applied the totality of the circumstances test to facts similar
to those now before us and determined that Isaac was not in custody when he confessed.  In
the case, Isaac had driven himself to the interview at the police station, which lasted about
24
two hours and was conducted by two detectives.  Isaac was seated in an interrogation room,
but was not restrained in any way, and the door, although it was closed, was not locked.  The
detectives told Isaac he was not under arrest and was free to go, the tone of the interview was
relaxed and non-confrontational, and Isaac was left alone for periods of time.  Isaac, 2004
Ohio 4683, at P23-P24.  While speaking with the detectives, Isaac confessed to having sexual
contact with a ten-year-old child, and he was arrested following interrogation.  After
unsuccessfully moving to suppress the statements he made at the police station as violative
of his Miranda rights, he plead no contest to three counts of forcibly raping a child under ten
years of age and was sentenced to three concurrent life sentences.  Id. at P3-P5.
On appeal, the Ohio intermediate appellate court, inter alia, affirmed the denial of his
motion to suppress.  The court held that the aforementioned facts dictated a finding that Isaac
was not in custody, stating that, “a reasonable person in Defendant’s position during this
police interview would have understood he was free to walk away from the questioning by
police and leave, despite being at the police station.”  Isaac, 2004 Ohio 4683 at P25.
Moreover, that court rejected Isaac’s assertion that once he confessed, he was in custody,
stating, “[t]he mere fact that Defendant confessed to the crime during the interview, leading
to his arrest at the conclusion of the interview, does not convert a non-custodial interview
into one which is custodial.”  Isaac, 2004 Ohio 4683 at P26. 
The courts in both Chee and Isaac analyzed the introduction of the defendants’
statements from the outset of the interviews and then again when they confessed.  In the
present case, Thomas, however, only argues that he was in custody when he arrived at the
25
police station, the salient facts of which are: that Thomas drove himself to the interrogation;
that the interrogation took place at the police station; that the questioning was conducted in
a small room filled with children’s toys, a couch, and two chairs by two officers who were
unarmed and not in uniform; that Thomas was seated, unrestrained, on the couch and was
informed that the door to the room was unlocked, even though it was kept closed; and that
the police told him numerous times that he was not under arrest, including at the outset of the
interview. 
Given these facts, even when viewed in the light most favorable to Thomas, a
reasonable person in Thomas’s situation would have felt free to end the encounter and leave.
To be sure, the police never told Thomas “you are free to go.”  They did, however, tell him
he was not under arrest, repeatedly, and that the door to the room was unlocked.  Thomas
also came to the police station of his own volition, even after being told the true nature of the
conversation that was to occur.  He was not physically restrained, nor did the detectives
interfere with Thomas’s movements, although they were seated between him and the door.
When all these factors are considered, we conclude, along with our brethren on the Court of
Special Appeals, that, although the police never uttered the talismanic words “you are free
to go,” that Circuit Court judge erred in granting the Motion to Suppress.
Were Thomas to be asserting that his confession to inappropriate touching rendered
him in custody, which he apparently does not, his arguments would still be disposed of under
the rationale of Chee and Isaac.  In addition to the fact that a confession does not, per se,
render an individual in custody, once Thomas confessed the atmosphere in the room never
26
changed, as was noted by the Court of Special Appeals.  See Commonwealth v. Hilton, 823
N.E. 2d 383, 397 (Mass. 2005) (stating that the important inquiry concerning confessions and
Miranda is whether there was a “fundamental transformation in the atmosphere” of the
interview).  Thomas’s admission to sexual offense involving his daughter did not render him
in custody, just as Chee’s admission to rape and Isaac’s admission to forcible child rape did
not render them in custody. 
Thomas, however, cites Buck v. State, 181 Md. App 585, 956 A.2d 884 (2008), to
support his argument that he was in custody.  In Buck, police officers wanted to question
Buck regarding a murder that had occurred.  Id. at 597, 956 A.2d at 891.  They met him on
the street and spoke with him about the murder, and one officer called his supervisor and
informed him that “I think we got him.”  Id.  The police came to Buck’s house several days
after this encounter on the street and asked him to come with them to the police station, but
told him that he was not under arrest and was free to go.  Id. at 598, 956 A.2d at 891-92.
Buck agreed to accompany them to the station house and, upon arriving, was lead to a secure
part of the building for questioning.  Id. at 599, 956 A.2d at 892.  Buck was not permitted to
walk around unescorted and was placed in an interrogation room containing only two chairs
and a table.  His interview lasted for five hours; when he asked to take a cigarette break,
Buck  was accompanied by an officer.  Id.  After his break, Buck agreed to give a DNA
sample and, shortly thereafter, confessed to the murder.  Id. at 600-01, 956 A.2d at 893.
The Court of Special Appeals held that Buck’s statements at the police station should
have been suppressed because Buck was in custody and Miranda warnings were not given
27
to him.  The court based this determination on the length of the interview, that the police
confronted Buck with their suspicions that he was the murderer, that the police told him he
was a suspect in the murder, and that he had been taken to the police station by the police.
Id. at 624-25, 956 A.2d at 907-08. 
Buck is distinguishable from the instant case for many reasons, but certainly on the
bases that five hours elapsed before Buck’s confession and Buck’s conduct was controlled
by the officers even before he arrived at the police station.  Here, Thomas says as soon as he
walked in to the police station he was in custody, requiring Miranda warnings.  He was not.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED.
PETITIONER TO PAY COSTS IN
THIS COURT AND THE COURT OF
SPECIAL APPEALS.
Argued: June 12, 2012 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 130
September Term, 2011
KONNYACK A. THOMAS
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.,
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
Barbera
McDonald,
                        JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Bell, C.J.,    
   which Greene, J., joins.
Filed:   October 26, 2012
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
2 As we shall see, the police told the petitioner on at least 2 occasions that the door to the
interview room was not locked.  The inference to be drawn from those assertions is that the
petitioner was free to go.  Such an inference does not replace, and certainly does not
undermine, the importance, to the determination, objectively, of a defendant’s state of mind,
of a direct and express statement.
Correctly asserting that a showing that police officers merely in possession of
sufficient evidence to arrest does not establish custody or even a presumption of custody for
Miranda1 purposes, the majority supposes, and therefore holds, that a reasonable person in
the petitioner’s position would understand that, during a police interrogation, he could
terminate that interrogation and freely leave at any time before the police officers announce
that he is under arrest.  The majority does so by relying heavily on the facts that the
petitioner: came to the police station for the interrogation unaccompanied by, albeit at the
request of, the police; was not handcuffed during the interrogation; was told by the officers
on more than one occasion that he was not under arrest; and was treated civilly, politely.  
The majority arrives at this conclusion in spite of other, more damning facts: that
when the petitioner arrived at the police station, he was fully aware of the purpose for which
the police wished to speak to him, to inquire into the sexual, therefore incestuous,
relationship between his daughter and himself; that during the interrogation, which lasted at
least one hour, the petitioner was locked in the interview area; that the officers were, at their
election and direction, between the petitioner and the door; that, at no time, either before or
during the interrogation, was the petitioner told he was, or would be, free to leave;2 that,
during the interrogation, the petitioner was subjected to a barrage of accusatory questions and
2
confronted with evidence of his own guilt, resulting in his confession to having committed
incestuous criminal acts with, and to  having pornographically photographed and videotaped,
his daughter;  and that, prior to signing a written confession, he was told  that he would be
arrested at the conclusion of the interrogation. Therefore, the majority is wrong to assert that
the petitioner should, and a reasonable person in his position would, have understood that he
could end the interrogation at will. In fact, it is because the petitioner was subjected to a
custodial interrogation without being apprised of his Miranda rights that I respectfully
dissent. 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966),
concerned about “the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is
subjected to custodial police interrogation,” the Supreme Court recognized “the necessity for
procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself.” Id. at 439, 86
S. Ct. at 1609, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 704.  The Court framed the issue as follows:
“The constitutional issue we decide in each of these cases is the
admissibility of statements obtained from a defendant questioned while in
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
In each, the defendant was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a
prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside world.
In none of these cases was the defendant given a full and effective warning of
his rights at the outset of the interrogation process. In all the cases, the
questioning elicited oral admissions, and in three of them, signed statements
as well which were admitted at their trials. They all thus share salient features
-- incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated
atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full warnings
of constitutional rights.”
Id. at 445, 86 S. Ct. at 1612, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 707. Although the Court acknowledged that
police interrogations serve an important social function, it also recognized that police-
dominated environments, where individuals were isolated from third parties, fostered
coerced testimony. Id. at 458, 86 S. Ct. at 1619, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 694. Thus, the Court
3 The Court further explained its rationale and solution, thusly:
“Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege
is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons
in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant
way from being compelled to incriminate themselves. We have concluded that
without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons
suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which
work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak
where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to combat these pressures
and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-
incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his
rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.
“It is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for
protecting the privilege which might be devised by Congress or the States in
the exercise of their creative rule-making capacities. Therefore we cannot say
that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular solution
for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process as it is presently
conducted.  Our decision in no way creates a constitutional straitjacket which
will handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this effect. We
encourage Congress and the States to continue their laudable search for
increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual while
promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws. However, unless we are
shown other procedures which are at least as effective in apprising accused
persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to
exercise it, the following safeguards must be observed. 
“At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation,
he  must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right
to remain silent. For those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed
simply to make them aware of it -- the threshold requirement for an intelligent
decision as to its exercise. More important, such a warning is an absolute
3
observed:
“It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose
other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. This
atmosphere carries its own badge of intimidation. To be sure, this is not
physical intimidation, but it is equally destructive of human dignity. The
current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our
Nation's most cherished principles -- that the individual may not be compelled
to incriminate himself. Unless adequate protective devices are employed to
dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement
obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.”
Id. at 457-58, 86 S. Ct. at 1619, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 722. To minimize the risk of tainted
confessions,3 the Miranda Court mandated that, prior to any custodial interrogation, an
prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation
atmosphere. It is not just the subnormal or woefully ignorant who succumb to
an interrogator's imprecations, whether implied or expressly stated, that the
interrogation will continue until a confession is obtained or that silence in the
face of accusation is itself damning and will bode ill when presented to a jury.
Further, the warning will show the individual that his interrogators are
prepared to recognize his privilege should he choose to exercise it.”
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-68, 86 S. Ct. at 1624-25, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 720.
4
individual be provided with notice and the opportunity to exercise his or her Fifth
Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. The Court held: 
“[A]n individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has the
right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during
interrogation under the system for protecting the privilege we delineate today.
As with the warnings of the right to remain silent and that anything stated can
be used in evidence against him, this warning is an absolute prerequisite to
interrogation. No amount of circumstantial evidence that the person may have
been aware of this right will suffice to stand in its stead. Only through such a
warning is there ascertainable assurance that the accused was aware of this
right.” 
Id. at 471-72, 86 S. Ct. 1626, 16 L. Ed. at 722. The Miranda Court reasoned that without this
prophylaxis, police interrogation practices would reduce the Fifth Amendment right against
compelled self-incrimination to a mere “form of words.” Id. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612,  16 L.
Ed. 2d at 706 (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40 S.
Ct. 182, 183, 64 L. Ed. 319, 321 (1920)).
In the years following Miranda, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized that
the Miranda rule is triggered wherever the elements of police custody and interrogation
coexist. See, e.g., J. D. B. v. North Carolina, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2401, 180 L. Ed.
2d 310 (2011) (observing that Miranda warnings are triggered in the context of a custodial
interrogation); Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 116 S. Ct. 457, 133 L. Ed. 2d 383,
395 (1996) (same); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 64 L. Ed. 2d
4 As Judge Posner, writing for an unanimous panel  of the United States Court of Appeals for
the 7th Circuit, has pointed out, “[c]ustody for Miranda purposes is a state of mind. When
police create a situation in which a suspect reasonably does not believe that he is free to
escape their clutches, he is in custody and, regardless of their intentions . . ., entitled to the
Miranda warnings.”  United States v. Slaight, 620 F.3d 816, 820 (7th Cir. 2010).
5
297 (1980) (same).  That also has been the case in Maryland. See e.g., State v. Rucker, 374
Md. 199, 210, 821 A.2d 439, 446 (2003) (observing that an individual must be provided
Miranda warning prior to any custodial interrogation); Crosby v. State, 366 Md. 518, 528,
784 A.2d 1102, 1108 (2001) (same).
In this case, there is no dispute as to one of the Miranda requirements, interrogation.
Everyone, the parties, the majority and the dissent, agree that the petitioner was interrogated.
They do not agree, and thus the remaining question, as to whether the petitioner was in
custody when he was interrogated. 
Whether a defendant was in custody when he or she was interrogated is a
determination that is made on an objective basis, Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323,
114 S. Ct. 1526, 1529, 128 L. Ed. 293, 298-99 (1994), and involves assessing the
interviewee’s state of mind from the perspective of a reasonable person in his or her
position.4 See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 336, 104 S.  Ct.
3138, 3151 (1984).  In making that determination, this Court inquires whether, under the
totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in the position of the interviewee would
believe that he or she was, or would have believed that he or she would have been, free to
leave. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112, 116 S. Ct. 457, 133 L. Ed. 2d 383, 395
(1996).  
Factors that inform the determination of whether, under a specific factual scenario,
5 Interestingly, the suppression court had a different take on this matter:
“Now it’s relevant in this case that the defendant, Mr. Thomas, is a sergeant in the
United States Army.  I think it’s a reasonable inference that if the police want to
talk to you about your children, and particularly when he finds out that it’s about
his daughter, that a sergeant who is a supervisor in the United States Armed Forces
does not want police detectives coming on the base to talk to him about sexually
abusing his daughter.  I think it’s a reasonable inference.
“So, certainly, he was going to go down to the police station to talk to them, as
opposed to having them come to him.”
6
there is police custody have been identified, see Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 441,
104 S. Ct. 3138, 3151, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 335-36 (holding that the duration and location of
the interrogation are relevant factors); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 50 L. Ed.
2d 714, 719, 97 S. Ct. 711, 714 (holding whether the suspect came to the interrogation
voluntarily is relevant factor); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 325, 128 L. Ed.
2d 293, 298, 300, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1528, 1530 (holding that whether the interviewee was
questioned as a suspect can be a relevant factor); JDB v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394,
2396, 180 L. Ed. 2d 310, 316 (holding that the interviewee’s apparent age can be a relevant
factor), and, as is the case in Maryland, see Owens v. State, 399 Md. 388, 428, 924 A.2d,
1072, 1095 (2007); Whitfield v. State, 287 Md. 124, 141, 411 A.2d 415 (1980), are well-
settled.  In Whitfield, this Court made clear what those factors are and include:
“when and where it occurred, how long it lasted, how many police officers
were present, what the officers and the defendant said and did, the presence of
actual physical restraint on the defendant or things equivalent to actual
restraint such as drawn weapons or a guard stationed at the door, and whether
the defendant was being questioned as a suspect or as a witness.  Facts
pertaining to events before the interrogation are also relevant, especially how
the defendant got to the place of questioning -- whether he came completely
on his own, in response to a police request, or escorted by police officers.5
Finally, what happened after the interrogation whether the defendant left
freely, was detained or arrested may assist the court in determining whether the
defendant, as a reasonable person, would have felt free to break off the
questioning.” 
Id. at 141, 411 A. 2d at 425 (quoting Hunter v. State, 590 P.2d 888, 895 (1979). As this list
7
makes clear, events occurring before and after the interrogation may be relevant factors.
There is, to be sure, no exhaustive list of what factors or circumstances are dispositive of the
issue of custody, see Whitfield v. State, 287 Md. 124, 139-40, 411 A. 2d 415, 424-425
(1980); however, the Miranda Court’s emphasis on avoiding the effects of isolated police-
dominated environs, a continuing and consistent theme in the Miranda jurisprudence, must
always be considered. See e.g. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 429, 120 S. Ct.
2326, 2329, 147 L. Ed. 2d. 405 (2000) (declining to overrule Miranda and recognizing that
the concerns underlying Miranda are still present in modern interrogations). 
  The majority correctly states the test for determining whether a defendant was in
custody and, therefore, was required to receive the Miranda warnings, ___ Md. at ___, ___
A. 2d at ___ [slip op. 11-12]; however, it misapplies the test, just as it accuses the trial court
of having done.   Reasoning “[i]f confession is the trigger for custody . . . then each person
who confesses in a police station must have been given Miranda warnings per se, which is
without basis in Miranda jurisprudence,” the majority faults the suppression judge for having
been influenced by his impressions of the context of the interview and the confession and of
basing his conclusion that the petitioner was initially in custody on the fact that the petitioner
was at the police station and that he later confessed.  Id. at ___, ___ at ___ [slip op. at 12-13].
For its part, in order to arrive at the result it reaches, the majority inflates the value of some
of the factors, while omitting or under-valuing others.   Thus, the majority gives great weight
to the following facts: 
“that Thomas drove himself to the interrogation; that the interrogation took
place at the police station; that the questioning was conducted in a small room
filled with children’s toys, a couch, and two chairs by two officers who were
unarmed and not in uniform; that Thomas was seated, unrestrained, on the
couch and was informed that the door to the room was unlocked, even though
6 The suppression court found, and the record supports, that the door to the interview room
in which the petitioner was interrogated, though closed, was unlocked and that, on more than
one occasion, the petitioner was so advised. ___ Md. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. 24].
Nevertheless, there is reason to suspect, and evidence supporting such a conclusion, that the
petitioner was locked in the interview area for the entire duration of his interrogation and,
thus, could not escape the police officers’ control.  The interview room in which the
petitioner was interrogated was a part of a larger interview area, access to which was
controlled by another door. The door that provided access to the area where the “small”
interview rooms were located, Detective Thorpe, who conducted the majority of the
interrogation, testified, was locked and could only be opened by a keycard, which was
possessed by the detectives. Viewing this fact in the light most favorable to the petitioner,
as we must, it is clear that rather than supporting the State’s contention that the petitioner was
not in custody, it tended to show that the petitioner’s freedom was significantly curtailed
because at no point during the interrogation could the petitioner have left of his own accord.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966)
(holding that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination is available
to all persons in any setting in which their freedom of action is significantly curtailed in any
significant way). 
8
it was kept closed;6 and that the police told him numerous times that he was
not under arrest, including at the outset of the interview.”
Id. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. at 23-24].    If the majority’s  analysis is correct, if it has
properly applied the custody determination test, then the prophylactic purpose and effect of
Miranda is effectively eviscerated; indeed, as the custody analysis is applied by the majority,
9
a gaping loophole has been provided that renders Miranda virtually useless.
I do not agree with the majority that the suppression court’s reason for suppressing
the statement was limited to the fact that the petitioner confessed.  Indeed, the majority’s
analysis of the trial court’s analysis suffers from the same flaw it attributes to the trial court:
its impression of the context of the court’s opinion. Also, it seems to require a certain
formulaic fact-finding, which it says, inaccurately, in my view, Whitfield dictates. ___ Md.
at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. 14]. The majority’s interpretation of the trial judge’s ruling
is belied by the trial judge’s opinion, which the majority has reproduced at ___ Md. at ___,
___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. 4-10].  To be sure, the Circuit Court did focus on, and emphasize,
the folly and lack of reality of a defendant being able to leave a police interrogation after he
or she has confessed to a serious, violent crime; however, its comments also addressed the
nature of the interrogation at its outset.  For example, the judge commented that “a system
of subterfuge has developed in the law enforcement community with respect to interrogation
techniques,” ___ Md. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. 7], after which he observed: “[t]he
defendant was not at the station for a social visit. The detectives wanted to make this
prosecution.  They told the defendant he was not under arrest and the door was unlocked.”
Id.  Recognizing the difference between station house interrogations and sidewalk encounters
with suspects, the court further observed:
“Now interrogations in police stations are inherently custodial whether they
are coercively so or whether it’s to the extent that it’s violative of the
requirements of Miranda is what these cases are all about.  And that’s why the
Court must consider each factual situation on its own legs,”
___ Md. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. 7], concluding:
“I don’t know of any cases, as I said earlier, where a person just gets up
and just walks out of a police station or feels that he can.  What reasonable
person would think that?”
___ Md. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. 7].  Thereafter, the court addressed the factors our
10
cases have identified as necessary to the custody determination.  Tellingly, he found
significant that the petitioner was not told that he was free to go and concluded that the
petitioner was questioned as a suspect, not as a witness:
“The Court also considers that the questions that were being asked were
specific not so much as to find out what happened.  These questions weren’t
to find out what happened -- simply to find out what happened.  These
questions were being asked to gather evidence.  That’s what the detectives
were doing, they were gathering evidence.
“What did you do?  Where was she touched?  When did it start?  How
many times did you do it?  And the argument is that Miranda warnings should
not have been given?”
___ Md. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. 8].
  
I do not agree with the majority’s custody analysis.  In fact, I am not at all sure that
the majority even, and at any rate properly, applied the objective test.  That test, as we have
seen, looks, for guidance, to a reasonable person in the position of the defendant and it asks
what that person would do, given the same knowledge and circumstances as the defendant.
 The nature and perception of the crime of which the defendant is suspected is a relevant and
an important consideration.  Sexual child abuse, especially that involving incest, is a most
serious crime, see Walker v. State, 206 Md. App. 13, 41-42, 47 A.3d 590, 606-607 (2012),
and is treated as such. See id.  Indeed, our laws are designed, by penalty and procedure, to
protect our children from such heinous and reprehensible behavior. Md. Code (2002, 2012,
repl. vol.) § 3-602 of the Criminal Law Article makes it a felony to sexually molest or exploit
a minor and prescribes the penalty for its violation:  imprisonment of up to 25 years.  Md.
Code. Crim. Law. § 3-602(c).  Sexual abuse of a child falls under “seriousness fine” category
II in the Code of Maryland Regulations (“COMAR”) sentencing policy.  COMAR MD ADC
14.22.02.02.   This is the same as attempted 1st degree murder and actual 2nd degree murder.
See id. 
7 When the defendant confesses, following an interrogation, to committing the exact crime
of which  he or she was suspected and which prompted the interrogation, I believe it is
logical to assume, and illogical to conclude otherwise, that the interrogation was custodial.
I am aware of United States v. Chee, 514 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 2008) and State v. Isaac, 2004
Ohio 4683 (Ohio App. 2004), which reached a different result.  Although each is
distinguishable -- in both cases the interviewee was informed that he was free to leave -- I
am not persuaded by the courts’ reasoning.  These cases pay only lip service to the totality
of the circumstances test, applying it in a strained manner, and failing to apply it using
common sense.
11
To the extent that the suppression court focused on the confession,7 I believe it was
an appropriate application of the test.   The court simply recognized what is common sense,
that a reasonable person, aware that he or she is suspected of committing an heinous crime
will not expect to be able to just walk away.  That is especially the case when the
interrogation has confirmed that he, in fact, committed the act or acts of which he was
suspected.  As the suppression judge put it:
“It’s a scary thought to think that in this community a citizen could
walk into a police station, confess to a violent crime, and then they are free to
leave. The State argues that a man who goes in and says that I was, I sexually
abused my daughter can just leave.  And that flies in the face of reason that
you could go in and confess to a murder and just walk out of the station, you’re
not under arrest and you’re not, and you’re not in custody.”
The majority finds relevant to the application of the objective test that the detectives
did not communicate certain of their intentions, or the level of their knowledge, to the
petitioner.  Because it is an objective test, I fail to see how what was not communicated could
inform the petitioner’s state of mind.  If it does, it would seem to be taking on the contours
of a subjective test -- but from the perspective of the State.  That would be a total departure
12
from our jurisprudence on the subject. 
Moreover, the majority gives short shrift to the failure of the officers to advise the
petitioner that he was free to go at any time, a finding the trial court made and reiterated, ___
Md. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. 8], by referencing and crediting their statements to him
that he was not under arrest and informing him that the door to the interview room was
closed but not locked.  Id.  That the police were positioned between him and the door is
explained by the fact that the officers did not use any restraint to restrict the petitioner’s
movement. ___ Md. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. 15, 21].  Also of significance to the
majority is its belief that the petitioner focuses his custody argument on when he arrived at
the police station.  
The test to be applied to the review of a ruling on a motion to suppress a defendant’s
statement was clearly stated in Riddick v. State, 319 Md. 180, 183, 571 A. 2d 1239, 1240
(1990):
“When the question is whether a constitutional right, such as the one
here, has been violated, we make our own independent constitutional appraisal.
We make the appraisal by reviewing the law and applying it to the peculiar
facts of the particular case. State v. Gee, 298 Md. 565, 571, 471 A.2d 712, cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1244, 104 S.Ct. 3519, 82 L.Ed.2d 827 (1984). When the facts
are in dispute, we accept them as found by the trial judge unless he is clearly
erroneous in his judgment on the evidence before him. In ascertaining whether
he is clearly erroneous, we give "due regard to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses," as commanded by Md.Rule 8-
131(c).”
When the motion has been granted, we consider the facts, limited to those adduced at the
suppression hearing, in the light most favorable to the defendant.  Cartnail v. State, 359 Md.
272, 282, 753 A.2d 519, 525 (2000) (holding that prevailing party on the motion to suppress
at trial is entitled to all reasonable inferences from the facts).  That the detectives were seated
between the petitioner and the interview room door is not disputed.  Nor is it disputed how
this came about.  Immediately upon entering the interview room, Detective Thorpe directed
13
the petitioner to sit on a couch against the wall farthest away from the interview room door,
although there were other seats in the room.  The detectives then placed themselves between
the interview room door and the petitioner.  Rather than being the result of a voluntary
choice, the petitioner’s place in the interview room was dictated by the detectives.  This, I
submit, is highly relevant and telling with regard to how these undisputed facts ought to be
interpreted in conducting our constitutional appraisal.  Being directed where to sit, rather
than being allowed to find his own place, would suggest to, and further buttress the very
common sense belief of, any reasonable person in the position of the petitioner that he was
not free to leave. See Bond v. State, 142 Md. App. 219, 234, 788 A.2d 705, 713 (2002)
(holding the interviewee was subject to a custodial interrogation where three officers blocked
the interviewee access to the nearest door).
In addition to conducting the interrogation in an interview area accessible only
through a locked door and directing the petitioner’s seating in the interview room so that his
access to the door was “blocked” by the detectives, who positioned themselves between him
and the door, the detectives never told the petitioner that he was, or would be, free to leave,
or that he could terminate the interrogation at any time.  See United States v. Griffin, 922
F.2d 1343, 1349 (8th Cir. 1990) (opining that the most obvious and effective way to
demonstrate that a suspect is not in custody is to tell the suspect he is not under arrest, free
to leave, and capable of terminating the interview at will).  As we have seen, the majority
counters that the detectives told the petitioner, at least twice during the interview, that he was
not under arrest. ___ Md. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___ [slip op. 15, 24].  While this is a relevant
factor, it is not a substitute for informing a defendant that he or she is not required to
participate in the interrogation and can withdraw at any time.  Telling a defendant that he is
not under arrest does not convey the message that he may stop “playing” whenever he
14
wishes. 
In any event, this factor does not support the majority’s analysis.  It is contradicted,
and negated, by what transpired later.  See United States v. Craighead, 539 F.3d 1073, 1088
(9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that informing a suspect he is not under arrest does not make an
interrogation non-custodial; the reviewing court must consider the “statements within the
context of the scene as a whole”). Not only did the detectives, by their actions, undermine
these statements during the interrogation, but they contradicted them in fact.  Nearly one hour
into the interview, the detectives suggested to the petitioner that he provide a written
confession in the form of an “apology letter” to his daughter so that she would know the
sexual acts committed against her were not her fault.  The detectives left the room for
approximately twenty minutes to allow the petitioner to do so. When, prior to signing the
“apology letter,” the petitioner told the detectives that he would rather not be arrested, the
petitioner was told that going free was not an option. The detectives immediately thereafter,
in effect, instructed the petitioner to sign his confession. The detectives’ statements, in short,
both contradicted earlier assertions that he was not under arrest and demonstrated that the
petitioner was under the control of police at the time he signed his own confession.
Moreover, the defendant was arrested in fact at the conclusion of the interrogation.
See Whitfield v. State, 287 Md. 124, 141, 411 A.2d 415 (1980) (observing that arrest at the
conclusion of an interrogation is indicative of police custody during an interrogation). The
majority omits this factor from its list of “salient facts,” ___ Md. at ___, ___ A. 2d at ___
[slip op. 24], despite the abundant authority, including our cases, holding that the arrest of
an interviewee at the conclusion of his interrogation is an indicia of custody. See id; see also
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S. Ct. 711, 50 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1977) (per curiam)
(determining that the defendant was not in custody on the basis that he allowed to leave
15
following the interrogation); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 103 S. Ct. 3517, 77 L. Ed.
2d 1275 (1983) (per curiam) (same).  
The majority notes that Detective Thorpe only decided to arrest the defendant because
she became concerned with his safety near the end of the interrogation. ___ Md. at ___, ___
A. 2d at ___ [slip op. 17].  This is simply a statement of the officer’s intent and, therefore,
if relevant to the custody analysis at all, cannot be dispositive.   See State v. Rucker, 374 Md.
199, 210, 821 A.2d 439, 445 (2003) (observing that the only relevant inquiry is how a
reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood his situation); Whitfield
v. State, 287 Md. 124, 143, 411 A.2d 415, 426 (1980) (holding that the subjective intent of
police officer is irrelevant to the Miranda custody determination); see also Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317 (1984) (holding that an officer’s
unarticulated thoughts have no bearing on the custody analysis). The fact is, the petitioner
was arrested following his interrogation.  Consistent with our cases and Miranda
jurisprudence, this indicates that the petitioner was in custody during his interrogation, the
detectives’ change of heart to the contrary notwithstanding. See id.
Equally problematic to the majority’s custody analysis is its failure to acknowledge,
and give weight to, the fact that the petitioner was interrogated as a suspect (as opposed to
a witness) who committed several heinous crimes. See Whitfield v. State, 287 Md. 124, 141,
411 A.2d 415 (1980) (observing that whether the interviewee is questioned as a witness or
suspect is a relevant factor to the custody analysis).  The majority asserts that the knowledge
that the petitioner had that led him to believe that he was a suspect is irrelevant unless it
constitutes an objective fact within the totality of the circumstances. ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.
2d at ___ [slip op. 19-20].  Stated differently, the majority states that any belief that the
petitioner had that he was a suspect is irrelevant since it must have derived from his
16
subjective knowledge. Id.  
Aside from the fact that the petitioner’s knowledge was confirmed both by the police
request that he come to the station and by the preliminary discussions leading to the
interrogation and, therefore, was objective, the majority does not negate, nor can it, the fact
that the interrogation itself demonstrated that the petitioner was interviewed as a suspect.
This is what our past cases teach, see e.g., Whitfield v. State, 287 Md. 124, 141, 411 A.2d
415 (1980), and what the Supreme Court held in Stansbury v. California 511 U.S. 318, 325,
114 S.Ct. 1526, 1530 (1994), that “[a]n officer's knowledge or beliefs may bear upon the
custody issue if they are conveyed, by word or deed, to the individual being questioned.”  In
this case, the detectives’ questions and assertions, from the beginning of the interrogation,
provided ample indication to the petitioner, and would have to a reasonable person, that he
was suspected of committing several serious crimes involving his daughter. To be sure, the
detectives did not explicitly mention sexual acts until after the petitioner made the first of
several incriminating statements.  The interviewing detectives instead referred to the sexual
acts between the petitioner and his daughter as “some things" going on between the petitioner
and his daughter (Ex. “She told us about some things going on between you and her”), or as
simply “incidents” (Ex. “When did the incidents start?”).  Whether the detectives confronted
the petitioner at the outset with veiled references, such as “incidents” or “some things”,
instead of explicit references to touching genitalia or anal sex makes no difference as to
whether the petitioner was questioned as a suspect.  The petitioner is entitled to the benefit
of all inferences reasonably to be drawn from the facts.  Cartnail v. State, 359 Md. 272, 282,
753 A.2d 519, 525 (2000) (holding that prevailing party on the motion to suppress at trial is
entitled to all reasonable inferences from the facts).  A reasonable person in the position of
the petitioner could, and I submit would, infer from the content of the conversation that he
17
was being interviewed as a suspect to several atrocious crimes and therefore was subject to
the police’s control. 
The majority’s approach overlooks, if not deliberately disregards, the fact that the
petitioner was confronted with allegations that he had sexually assaulted his daughter
through a series of accusatory statements and questions. See Stansbury v. California 511 U.S.
318, 325, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1530 (1994) (explaining that an officer’s communicated
suspicions are relevant to the extent “they would affect how a reasonable person in the
position of the individual being questioned would gauge the breadth of his or her ‘freedom
of action.’”) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty 468 U.S. 420, 435, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3150
(1984)). Early in the interrogation, Detective Thorpe told the petitioner that he was called in
to speak with the Family Crimes detectives because of “some things” going on with his
daughter.  Detective Thorpe then informed the petitioner that his daughter told the detectives
about “some things” going on between her father, the petitioner, and her. Detective Thorpe
further implicated the petitioner in these incidents when he then asked, “When did it start?”
After the petitioner admitted that the incidents began shortly before the family moved
to Maryland, the detectives’ questions became more direct and explicit.  The detectives asked
for personal details that implicated the petitioner in criminal sexual acts: “Did you start
penetrating her vagina to get her prepared for you?” The detectives asked leading questions
premised on, and containing, inculpatory facts: “And then you put your penis inside her
vagina, correct?” The detectives revealed information to the petitioner obtained from the
victim: “There were times [the touching] was under the clothing as well.”  If the detectives
did not receive direct answers, their questions became more threatening and accusatory:
“You want me to tell you what she told me?”  Several other questions included whether the
victim had pubic hair at the time of the incidents, whether the petitioner had used his fingers,
18
penis, or tongue in conducting anal/vaginal penetration, whether there was mutual touching
of genitalia, whether pornography was used, whether the petitioner had stored pornographic
photos and videos of his daughter on his computer, whether acts of oral sex were performed
between the petitioner and his daughter.  The detectives also requested addresses where
pornographic photos and videos of the petitioner’s daughter might be stored, and a
confession in the form of an apology letter addressed to the petitioner’s daughter.
This was not an investigatory chat with a witness.  As the suppression court
concluded, the detectives’ inquiries were designed to elicit admissions of guilt.  Setting aside
whether the information he received from his wife that the police suspected him of child
abuse rose to the level of objective fact, the statements and inquiries by the police themselves
were direct, personal, and accusatory enough to indicate to a reasonable person that he was
a suspect  in several heinous crimes. The majority’s analysis does not extend to the nature,
form or contents of the detectives’ inquiry.  This is curious given that we are to assess
whether a reasonable person in the position of the petitioner would understand that he could
terminate the interrogation and walk away. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 662,
124 S. Ct. 2140, 2155, 158 L. Ed. 2d 938 (2004) (citing Berkemer v. McCarty 468 U.S. 420,
440, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3150 (1984)). It strains the imagination to accept, as the majority does,
that a reasonable person with knowledge, confirmed by the police via their interrogation, that
he not only was suspected of committing child sexual abuse, but that the police had witness
evidence of his culpability, would entertain any belief that he remained a free agent.  It is
even more unreasonable and unrealistic to believe that any such person would believe that
he could admit to committing these horrific acts and think that he could freely walk away
from a police station.
I dissent.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 130
September Term, 2011
KONNYACK A. THOMAS
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Adkins
Barbera
McDonald,
               JJ.
Concurring and Dissenting 
Opinion by Adkins, J. 
Filed: October 26, 2012
1The record does not show whether this door was locked from the inside as well.
Adkins, J., concurring and dissenting.
Petitioner Konnyack Thomas was invited to a police station by a phone call from a
police officer, regarding one of his children. The officer did not name which child.  Once at
the station, Petitioner was led through a locked door, which could only be opened with a
passkey.1  He was then taken through a second door and into a small room, where the door
was closed behind him.  The officers in that room physically placed themselves between
Petitioner and the exit door told Petitioner twice at the very beginning of an hour-long
session that the door to that interview room was unlocked.  These officers never told
Petitioner that he could leave.
I agree with the Majority that these circumstances—by themselves—do not mandate
custody.  Yet, I would find that this lack of custody does not remain constant throughout the
encounter.  Within minutes of his arrival, Petitioner was being asked serious questions about
sexual encounters with his daughter:
Detective Thorpe:
Okay. What exactly started in          
                                          Georgia?
Mr. Thomas:
Just touching.
Detective Thorpe: 
Touching? Mutual or just you
touching her?
Mr. Thomas:
Just touching.
Detective Thorpe:  
Touching? What is touching to you?
Because touching can be her
masturbating you, touching can be
you fingering her.
Mr. Thomas:
Just touching.
Detective Thorpe: 
Was it both?
Mr. Thomas:
No.
Detective Thorpe: 
Okay.
2Throughout the transcription of the interrogation, Sergeant Birch is either referred
to as “Detective Burch,” “Detective Birch,” or his proper title and name, “Sergeant
Birch.” In the interest of clarity, the correct name is used here. 
-2-
Sergeant Birch 2: 
Were you touching her?
Mr. Thomas:
Yes.
Sergeant Birch: 
All right, where were you touching
her?
Mr. Thomas:
Private areas.
Sergeant Birch: 
Were you touching her breasts?
Mr. Thomas:
Yes.
Sergeant Birch: 
Were you touching her vagina?
Mr. Thomas:
Yes.
Sergeant Birch: 
Touching her butt?
Mr. Thomas:
No.
Sergeant Birch: 
Okay. When you touched the vagina
and the breasts, was it above the
clothing?
Mr. Thomas:
Yes.
Sergeant Birch: 
And there were times that it was
under the clothing as well, correct?
Mr. Thomas:
Yes.
Sergeant Birch: 
When you touched under the
clothing and touched her vagina,
other than rubbing, did you make
penetration with your fingers?
Mr. Thomas:
No.
Sergeant Birch: 
Just rubbing it with your hands on
top of it?
Mr. Thomas:
Yes.
Sergeant Birch: 
How old was she when it first
started?  Approximately how old was
she?  Was she developing yet?
Mr. Thomas:
A little.
Sergeant Birch:  
All right. Did she have any pubic
hair? I’m trying to get an age. 
Mr. Thomas:
I don’t know.
Sergeant Birch: 
You don’t remember? So it started
with the touching?
Mr. Thomas:
Yes.
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Sergeant Birch:
I know it’s difficult for you to talk
about it . . . .
Mr. Thomas:
I mean, I know where this is going.
The questions eventually elicit damning confessions to multiple crimes.  As the
interaction ended, the officers had Petitioner write and sign a confession.  Then, he was
arrested.  
To me, the moment Petitioner admitted that he touched his daughter inappropriately,
the officers no longer had any reason to question the basic truth of the story provided them
by the daughter.  Thus, the officers had stopped investigating a possible crime and started
gathering evidence.  Therefore, the moment Petitioner admitted the touching was in his
daughter’s “[p]rivate areas,” he was in custody and required the safeguards of Miranda. 
Whether a suspect is in custody is a question of fact, properly decided by the trial
court and only disturbed if clearly erroneous.  McAvoy v. State, 314 Md. 509, 515, 551 A.2d
875, 877–78 (1989) (“Armed with the facts properly found by the trial judge, we must,
however, make an independent constitutional appraisal of the record to determine the
correctness of the trial judge’s decision concerning custody.”) (citation omitted).  The trial
judge here had no difficulty finding that Petitioner was in custody: “This was a custodial
interrogation.  [N]o reasonable person would have thought they could get up and walk out
of that room after they confessed to committing a violent crime.” 
Also important is the trial judge’s determination that the officers were not
investigating a crime.  Rather, they were gathering evidence to be used against Petitioner.
While it appears that the trial judge considered the situation custodial from the moment
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Petitioner walked into the station, his primary rationale was that Petitioner never felt free to
leave:  “I don’t know of any cases . . . where a person just gets up and just walks out of a
police station or feels that he can.  What reasonable person would think that?”
Nothing in the record indicates error in his finding.  The Majority finds fault with the
trial court for not “follow[ing] the roadmap provided by Whitfield [v. State, 287 Md. 124, 411
A.2d 415 (1980), overruled in part by N.Y. v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984)]
and Owens [v. State, 399 Md. 388, 924 A.2d 1072 (2007)].” ___ Md. at ___, ___ A.2d at ___
[Maj. Slip Op. at 13].  I submit that the trial court did follow the direction established in these
cases.  When ruling, the trial court explained where and when the interview occurred, how
many officers were present, how Petitioner was summoned, how he physically arrived, that
Petitioner was being questioned as a suspect, and that he was arrested at the conclusion of
the interrogation.  These are a majority of the factors listed in both Whitfield and Owens.  See
Whitfield, 287 Md. at 141, 411 A.2d at 425; Owens, 399 Md. at 429, 924 A.2d at 1095–97.
The Supreme Court, post-Miranda, has worked to clarify the concept and definition
of custody.  See, e.g., Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 114 S. Ct. 1526 (1994);
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 124 S. Ct. 2140 (2004); Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S.
Ct. 1213, 175 L. Ed. 2d 1045 (2010).  Accordingly, we have done the same.  See, e.g,
Whitfield, 287 Md. at 124, 411 A.2d at 415; Wiener v. State, 290 Md. 425, 430 A.2d 588
(1981); McAvoy, 314 Md. at 509, 551 A.2d at 875; Reynolds v. State, 327 Md. 494, 610 A.2d
782 (1992); Owens, 389 Md. at 388, 924 A.2d 1072.  The custody analysis requires
examination of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.  The ultimate determination
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of custody depends on whether a reasonable person would feel at liberty to end the
interrogation and leave.  E.g., Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 662, 124 S. Ct. at 2148.  
I agree with the trial court and Chief Judge Bell that there was custody, although I
disagree that the encounter necessarily began as custodial.  I would find that—after Petitioner
admitted to inappropriate touching—he could not have felt that he was at liberty to end the
interrogation.  He was aware that the officers knew the intimate details of his crimes, which
were confirmed by his own admissions.  He was never told he could leave.  His only route
of egress was partially blocked by two law enforcement officers.  An exterior door was
locked with a passkey.  
I am not alone in thinking that a police interview that does not start as custodial can
end as such.  Courts of other jurisdictions have arrived at the same conclusion.  For example,
the Colorado supreme court has held that a suspect’s initially voluntary appearance may
become custodial once the suspect no longer feels free to leave.  People v. Algien, 180 Colo.
1 (1972).  The defendant in Algien was suspected of arson at a construction project where he
worked.  Id. at 3.  At the insistence of his employer, he agreed to go to the police station to
take a polygraph test, which he failed three times.  Id. at 5.  When a police officer confronted
Algien with the test results and questioned him about the incident, Algien broke down and
confessed to setting the fire.  The trial court found that “the arson investigation . . . reached
the accusatory stage when Officer Johnson concluded from the polygraph examination that
defendant was not telling the truth, at which time the suspicion of guilt focused on him.”  It
was at that moment that Algien’s appearance became custodial, and Miranda warnings were
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in order.  Id.  The Supreme Court of Colorado agreed, holding that “[u]nder such compelling
circumstances, a reasonable person would with logic conclude that he could not leave the
premises of his own free will but would be detained for formal arrest.”  Id. at 7.   
The Indiana Court of Appeals has also observed that a change in the expected subject
matter of the interview may trigger a change of voluntary appearance to custody as it “would
most probably lead a reasonable person to feel much less likely to be permitted to simply
walk out of the police station.”  Bean v. State, 973 N.E.2d 35, 43 (Ind. 2012).  Like
Petitioner, defendant Bean believed he was summoned to the police station for one reason,
but was questioned about sexual crimes involving his daughter and niece, and was not
allowed to return home following confession.  Id. at 37–39.  Although unlike Petitioner, Bean
rode to the station with officers and was given notice of his Miranda rights, id. at 38, other
factors were important in the court’s custody analysis as well.  For instance, the court
emphasized the “bait and switch” approach, where the police invited Bean to come to the
station to talk about one suspected crime but questioned him instead about a much more
serious one.  Id. at 43.  Additionally, like in this case, the questioning was lengthy and ended
with an arrest.  Id. at 43–44.  The fact that Bean came to the police station voluntarily and
was told more than once that he was free to leave was not determinative. 
Another example of a case where a noncustodial event transformed into a custodial
interrogation is State v. Muntean, 12 A.3d  518 (Vt. 2010).  Muntean was suspected of
sexually abusing his daughters when they were children and of more recently sexually
abusing his grandsons.  Id. at 520.  Exactly as in Petitioner’s case, the investigating detective
3Unlike here, defendant mentioned the need to have a lawyer before answering
questions and asked about his Miranda rights.  State v. Muntean, 12 A.3d  518, 521 (Vt.
2010).     
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called Muntean and told him he would like to speak with him, but did not tell him the subject
matter.  Id.  Muntean drove himself to the station, entered through the lobby, and was
escorted into a secured part of the police station, where he was interrogated by a plainclothes
officer in a small, windowless room, behind a closed door.  Id.  As here, Muntean was asked
if he knew why he was at the station, and answered that he did.3  Id.  During a one-hour
interview, he continued to deny inappropriate contact with his grandsons but admitted that
there had been intimate  “touching” of his daughters.  Id.  The Supreme Court of Vermont
found that “a reasonable person would not feel at liberty to terminate a police interview after
being confronted with” evidence of his own guilt.  Id. at 528 (emphasis added).  The court
also considered important the isolating nature of the interview, “where defendant was in a
secure part of the building and therefore would not have been permitted to walk outside the
room freely without police accompaniment.”  Id. at 526.  Additionally, the detective never
told Muntean that he was free to end the interview at any time.  Id.  The court observed: “the
fact that one goes to the police station voluntarily does not necessarily mean that he or she
can also leave voluntarily, for at some point the words and conduct of the interrogating
officers may transform that which once was a noncustodial, ‘voluntary’ event into a custodial
interrogation.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Because Muntean’s
freedom of movement was “curtailed to the degree of formal arrest for effectively  the entire
-8-
interview, and a reasonable person in [that] situation would not have felt free to discontinue
the questioning, the detective was obligated” to provide Miranda warnings.  Id. at 529
(citation omitted).  Therefore, the suppression of the statements by the lower court was
affirmed. 
The same should occur here, but only as to the statements Petitioner made after first
admitting he had “touched” his daughter inappropriately.  The accusations being leveled
against Petitioner by his young daughter were of a grave nature.  Young children, by their
very substance, are wildly imaginative and can be ignorant of the consequences of their
actions.  It was the police officers’s responsibility to determine if there was truth to the
daughter’s story.  Once Petitioner began corroborating the details given to police by his
daughter—that he had touched his daughter criminally, starting in Georgia—then he was in
custody, and Miranda warnings were necessary. 
Although the overarching test of custody is the totality of the circumstances, the
following factors can be used to aid in determining whether or not a suspect is in Miranda
custody in Maryland: 
(1) the location and duration of the session, (2) how many police
were present, (3) what was said and done, (4) whether the
defendant was placed under actual physical restraint or whether
there were “things equivalent” to actual restraint, such as drawn
weapons or a guard at the door, (5) the manner in which the
defendant arrived at the interview, and (6) whether he was
detained or arrested or, instead, permitted to leave after the
interview.
4Once Petitioner told the officers that he knew he was there to discuss his daughter,
Detective Thorpe said “I did speak with [her]. And she told me about some things that
have been going on for quite some time between you and her.  You want me to tell you
what she told me?” (Tr. 5, 1-4) 
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Clark v. State, 140 Md. App. 540, 569, 781 A.2d 913, 930 (2001) (citing Whitfield, 287 Md.
at 141, 411 A.2d at 425).  “All of these factors are relevant to ascertaining the determinative
factor, i.e., whether the defendant, as a reasonable person, would have felt free to break off
the questioning.”  Id. 
In Petitioner’s case, these factors would indicate custody.  The officers took Petitioner
through a locked door at a police station and into an examination room.  They suggested to
Petitioner that they believed he was guilty of the crimes and that his daughter had provided
them with details.4  A reasonable person in Petitioner’s position would perceive that his
freedom to leave the station was curtailed.  When we add Petitioner’s admission to the
officers that he touched his daughter inappropriately, we could not expect Petitioner to
believe he could just walk out of the door, even with the minimal physical restraint present.
The confrontation by the officers with the details of his crime, the questioning that lasted for
an hour, and the overall sense of defeat pervading the entire interaction support the trial
court’s conclusion that Petitioner was not going to be leaving the police station under his own
volition.
To be sure, not all interviews conducted at police stations are automatically custodial
and require Miranda warnings.  Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S. Ct. 711, 714
(1977).  But when a suspect, who is never told he is free to leave, begins detailing his
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involvement in a series of heinous crimes at the prompting of officers, is encouraged to write
and sign a confession, and is then arrested on the spot, he is in custody and requires Miranda
protections.
Accordingly, I would reverse the Court of Special Appeals and remand the case to the
Circuit Court for Montgomery County for further proceedings, at which Petitioner’s
statements following the words “private areas” would be suppressed.