Case Title: Commonwealth v. Oyewole

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11664

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2014-12-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11664 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  RAZAK O. OYEWOLE. 
 
 
 
December 18, 2014. 
 
 
Motor Vehicle, Operation, Operating under the influence, License 
to operate.  License.  Notice. 
 
 
 
The defendant appeals from his conviction, after a jury-
waived trial, of operating a motor vehicle after his license had 
been suspended for operating while under the influence of 
alcohol.  G. L. c. 90, § 23, third par.  In a divided published 
opinion, the Appeals Court affirmed the conviction.  
Commonwealth v. Oyewole, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 669 (2014).  We 
granted further appellate review, limited to the sufficiency of 
the evidence that Oyewole was notified of the license 
suspension.  467 Mass. 1108 (2014).  Because we conclude that 
the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove this element 
beyond a reasonable doubt, we reverse and direct the entry of 
judgment for the defendant. 
 
 
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 
(1979), we briefly state the facts, which are more fully set 
forth in the Appeals Court's opinion.  Oyewole, supra at 670-
671.  In October, 2009, the defendant admitted to sufficient 
facts to support a finding of guilty on a charge of operating 
while under the influence of liquor (OUI case).  According to 
the docket sheet from that case, his license was suspended for 
sixty days.  Less than sixty days later, a Wilmington police 
officer, observing that a motor vehicle had its headlights off 
at 12:30 A.M., stopped the vehicle.  The defendant was the 
driver and only occupant of the vehicle.  The officer requested 
the defendant's license, which the defendant produced.  The 
2 
 
officer confiscated the license and placed the defendant under 
arrest. 
 
 
As the Appeals Court stated, the Commonwealth was obligated 
to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, "(1) that the defendant 
operated a motor vehicle; (2) that at the time of that operation 
the defendant's license was revoked or suspended; (3) that the 
license suspension or revocation was pursuant to a violation of 
one of the specified statutory sections (including [OUI] in 
violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24[1][a]); and (4) that the 
defendant was notified that his license had been suspended or 
revoked."  Oyewole, supra at 672, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Deramo, 436 Mass. 40, 50 (2002).  The evidence at this brief1 
trial was sufficient to establish the first three elements, as 
it showed that the defendant operated a motor vehicle while his 
license was suspended for operating while under the influence.  
As to the fourth element, however, the evidence presented at 
trial, together with all reasonable and possible inferences that 
might properly be drawn from it, was insufficient to permit a 
reasonable fact finder to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
the defendant was notified of the license suspension.2  While the 
docket sheet from the OUI case, which was in evidence, permits 
an inference that the defendant was present when his license was 
suspended, the Commonwealth did not offer any evidence 
demonstrating that the suspension was communicated to him.  The 
docket sheet itself does not state that the defendant was 
                     
1 The transcript reflects that the presentation of evidence, 
together with motions in limine and the defendant's motion for a 
required finding of not guilty, took less than one hour.  The 
Commonwealth called two witnesses and offered two exhibits, 
namely, certain records from the registry of motor vehicles, 
which were offered solely to corroborate the defendant's 
biographical information, and the docket sheet from the case 
involving the prior charge of operating while under the 
influence of liquor.  The defendant presented no evidence. 
 
2 While an inference drawn from circumstantial evidence 
"need only be reasonable and possible and need not be necessary 
or inescapable," e.g., Commonwealth v. Casale, 381 Mass. 167, 
173 (1980), our task is to determine whether "the evidence 
presented at trial, together with all reasonable and possible 
inferences that might properly be drawn from it, was sufficient 
to permit a rational [fact finder] to find beyond a reasonable 
doubt the existence of every essential element of the crimes 
charged."  Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 442 Mass. 135, 139-140 
(2004). 
3 
 
notified of the suspension.  The Commonwealth did not present 
evidence that the judge in the OUI case announced the suspension 
in open court.3  There is no evidence in the record that the 
docket sheet was shown to the defendant or that any other 
written notification was sent to him.  Even on the assumption 
that to do so was the regular practice when accepting a plea -- 
a proposition unsupported by the record -- the Commonwealth may 
not rely on a presumption of regularity as a substitute for 
evidence proving an element of its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Giordano, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 590, 592 
n.2 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 968 (1980), and cases cited 
(in prosecution for escape, Commonwealth may not rely on 
presumption of regularity to avoid proving lawfulness of 
defendant's imprisonment).  There was also no evidence that the 
defendant acknowledged, at the time of the stop or at any other 
time, that he was aware of the suspension. 
 
 
Moreover, the evidence showed that when he was stopped, the 
defendant had his license in his possession and gave it to the 
police officer.4  When a license is suspended in connection with 
a conviction for operating while under the influence, G. L. 
c. 90, § 24D, fourth par., requires that the license be 
surrendered to the probation department.  Here, however, the 
defendant apparently did not surrender his license.  A possible 
reason for this is that nobody notified the defendant that his 
license was suspended. 
 
 
In sum, the record contains no evidence demonstrating that 
the defendant was notified of the license suspension, and some 
evidence suggesting the contrary.  The Commonwealth did not 
carry its burden of proving every element of the offense beyond 
a reasonable doubt. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finding set aside. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment for the defendant. 
 
                     
3 A transcript of the plea hearing might easily have 
established this.  However, no transcript was offered in 
evidence at trial. 
 
4 Nothing in the record suggests that this license was a 
counterfeit, a duplicate, or anything else other than the 
genuine license that had been suspended. 
4 
 
 
 
Stacy J. Silveira (George Ohlson, Jr., with her) for the 
defendant. 
 
KerryAnne Kilcoyne, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth.