Case Title: Hunnicutt v. Myers

Citation: 

Docket Number: S54355

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2007-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: March 23, 2007
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
DAVID J. HUNNICUTT,
Petitioner,
v.
HARDY MYERS,
Attorney General,
State of Oregon,
Respondent.
(SC S54355)
En Banc
On petition to review ballot title.
Submitted on the record February 7, 2007.
David J. Hunnicutt, Tigard, filed the petition and reply brief pro se.
Denise G. Fjordbeck, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed the answering
memorandum for respondent.  With her on the memorandum were Hardy Myers, Attorney
General, and Mary H. Williams, Solicitor General.
KISTLER, J.
Ballot title referred to Attorney General for modification.
KISTLER, J.,
Petitioner seeks review of the Attorney General's certified ballot title for
Initiative Petition 58 (2008).  See ORS 250.085(2) (specifying requirements for seeking
review of certified ballot titles).  This court reviews the certified ballot title to determine
whether it substantially complies with ORS 250.035(2).  See ORS 250.085(5) (stating
standard of review).  For the reasons explained below, we refer the ballot title to the
Attorney General for modification.
If enacted, Initiative Petition 58 would add the following text to the Oregon
Revised Statutes:
"Section 1.  Farmland Preservation:  Laws preserving farmland for farm
uses shall be enforced, and government need not pay for compliance with
such laws.
"Section 2.  Single dwelling exception:  A property owner may build a
single family dwelling on the owner's homestead tract if that owner could
have built a single family dwelling on the homestead tract under the land
use laws in effect when the owner acquired the homestead tract.  Only one
new dwelling per property owner is authorized by this section.
"Section 3.  Definitions:  (1) 'Law' or 'laws' includes both statutes and
regulations.  (2) 'Homestead tract' means a tract as defined in ORS 215.010
owned by a property owner, as that tract existed on January 1, 2005."
The Attorney General certified the following ballot title for Initiative
Petition 58:
"REQUIRES ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS PRESERVING FARMLAND;
ALLOWS SINGLE FAMILY DWELLING IF ALLOWED WHEN LAND ACQUIRED
"RESULT OF 'YES' VOTE:  'Yes' vote requires enforcement of laws
preserving farmland for farm uses; allows single family dwelling if allowed
under laws in effect when owner acquired tract.
"RESULT OF 'NO' VOTE:  'No' vote retains current law requiring
government to pay compensation or waive laws preserving farmland to
allow any use allowed when current owner acquired tract.
"SUMMARY:  Under current law, if a land use regulation (including
a regulation preserving farmland for farm use) restricts the use to which
tract could have been put by present owner or by family member (defined)
of present owner at time that tract was acquired, and that restriction reduces
the value of the tract, the government must compensate the owner or, at its
option, waive the land use regulation to allow a use allowed when the
present owner acquired the property.  Tract is one or more contiguous lots
or parcels under same ownership.  This measure prohibits waiver of laws
protecting farmland; no compensation is required.  Allows an exception for
one new single family dwelling per tract if such dwelling was allowed when
present owner acquired.  Other provisions."
Petitioner challenges the caption, the "yes" vote result statement, the "no" vote result
statement, and the summary.
A ballot title caption must contain "not more than 15 words that reasonably
identif[y] the subject matter of the state measure."  ORS 250.035(2)(a).  Petitioner argues
that the certified caption does not comply with that requirement because it fails to identify
the full impact of the proposed measure.  Specifically, petitioner maintains that the
measure, if enacted, would partially abrogate the waiver and compensation provisions of
ORS 197.352, popularly known as Measure 37.  Under that statute, government entities
must either compensate real property owners when certain land use regulations reduce the
fair market value of their property or waive enforcement of those regulations.  See
MacPherson v. DAS, 340 Or 117, 121-22, 130 P3d 308 (2006) (explaining operation of
ORS 197.352).  Petitioner argues, and the Attorney General agrees, that, if the proposed
measure is enacted, government entities no longer will have to choose between waiver of
and compensation for land use regulations when those "[l]aws preserv[e] farmland for
farm uses."  Government entities would not need to "pay for compliance with [those]
laws."  Because the caption fails to mention that effect, petitioner argues that it is
underinclusive and thus inaccurate.  See Towers v. Myers, 341 Or 357, 361, 142 P3d 1040
(2006) (noting similar problem).  The Attorney General responds that, because few
jurisdictions have chosen to pay compensation, he need not mention that aspect of the
measure. 
We agree with petitioner that the subject matter of the proposed measure is
broader than the caption suggests.  The caption states that the measure would "requir[e]
enforcement of laws preserving farmland" but says nothing about the measure's effect on
the compensation provision of ORS 197.352.  Even if few jurisdictions have chosen to
pay compensation, the effect on that compensation provision is still a significant part of
the measure.  The caption's failure to mention that effect renders the caption
underinclusive and thus inaccurate.  See Towers, 341 Or at 361-62 (explaining that,
"[w]hen the Attorney General chooses to describe the subject matter of a proposed
measure by listing some of its effects, he runs the risk that the caption will be
underinclusive and thus inaccurate").  Accordingly, we refer the caption to the Attorney
General for modification.
Petitioner also objects to the caption because it fails to signal that the word
"farmland," found in both the caption and the proposed measure, is not defined in either
the measure or existing law.  Petitioner maintains that the word "farmland" could mean
either "high-value farmland," as that phrase is defined in ORS 215.710, "agricultural
land," as that phrase is defined in Statewide Planning Goal 3, or some other kind of land. 
Petitioner argues that, because the term is critical to the meaning of the measure and is
also undefined, the caption must signal that fact to the reader.  See Morgan v. Myers, 342
Or 165, 169, 149 P3d 1160 (2006) (noting devices that the Attorney General can use to
signal critical, undefined terms).
Petitioner's argument rests on the premise that the word "farmland" has no
clear meaning.  The word, however, commonly means "land used or suitable for
farming."  See Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 824 (unabridged ed 2002) (defining
that term).  Moreover, the proposed measure refers to "[l]aws preserving farmland for
farm uses."  Considered in context, the phrase refers to all laws that preserve farmland (of
whatever type) for farm uses.  We need not attempt to interpret the precise contours of
either the word farmland or the phrase of which it is a part to conclude that the word, in
context, is sufficiently clear that no signal of the sort that petitioner urges is necessary to
achieve substantial compliance with statutory standards.
Petitioner challenges the caption on a third ground, arguing that the phrase
"preserving farmland" is impermissibly "politically charged."  See Earls v. Myers, 330 Or
171, 176, 999 P2d 1134 (2000) (ballot title should not contain prejudicial or politically
charged terms, even if those terms are found in the proposed measure itself).  We reach a
different conclusion.  The phrase that petitioner challenges is unlike other phrases that the
court has held to be too prejudicial to include in a ballot title.  Cf. id.("freedom to
choose"); Marr v. Thornton, 237 Or 503, 504, 392 P2d 458 (1964) ("right-to-work").  The
phrase has a recognized meaning outside the measure, cf. Mabon v. Keisling, 317 Or 406,
412, 856 P2d 1023 (1993) (term "minority status" had no recognized meaning), and it is
not so favorable or unfavorable that it "tend[s] more to promote or defeat passage of the
measure than to describe its substance accurately," Dirks v. Myers, 329 Or 608, 616, 993
P2d 808 (2000).  We therefore do not accept petitioner's argument.
Petitioner also challenges the "yes" and "no" vote result statements.  ORS
250.035(2)(b) and (c) require two "simple and understandable statement[s] of not more
than 25 words" that describe the result if a state measure is approved and if it is rejected. 
As with the caption, petitioner argues that the "yes" vote result statement should identify
the proposed measure's effect on the compensation requirement of ORS 197.352.  For the
reasons stated above, we agree.  Petitioner also argues that, as with the caption, the "yes"
and "no" vote result statements should not include the phrase "preserving farmland"
because it is politically charged and that they should signal that the word "farmland" is
undefined.  For the reasons stated above, we disagree.
Finally, petitioner challenges the summary.  ORS 250.035(2)(d) requires
"[a] concise and impartial statement of not more than 125 words summarizing the state
measure and its major effect."  As with the caption and "yes" and "no" vote result
statements, petitioner argues that the summary should not include the phrase "preserving
farmland" because it is politically charged and that it should signal that the word
"farmland" is undefined.  For the reasons stated above, we disagree. (1)
Ballot title referred to Attorney General for modification.
1. We have considered other challenges that petitioner makes to the ballot title and
reject them without further discussion.