Case Title: Boiselle v. Boiselle

Citation: 162 Vt. 240, 648 A.2d 388

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1994-06-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
BOISELLE_V_BOISELLE.90-321; 162 Vt. 240; 648 A.2d 388

[Opinion Filed June 24, 1994]


 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 90-321


 Roberta A. Boisselle                         Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Chittenden Superior Court

 Raymond N. Boisselle                         November Term, 1992


 Alden T. Bryan, J.

 Paul R. Morwood, South Burlington, for plaintiff-appellee

 Mary P. Kehoe and Deborah Weiss of Saxer, Anderson, Wolinsky & Sunshine,
   Burlington, for defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      DOOLEY, J.   On motion to modify by plaintiff, Roberta Boisselle, the
 Chittenden Superior Court modified a divorce decree to amend a provision
 dealing with the disposition of the family residence.  Defendant, Raymond
 Boisselle, appeals arguing that the court did not have the power to modify
 the preexisting property award.  We agree and reverse.
      The parties were divorced on October 25, 1984.  The court's order,
 which was based on a stipulation, gave custody of the parties' minor child
 to plaintiff and required defendant to pay $75 per week in child support,
 with a cost of living adjustment provision.  The provision critical to this
 case gave plaintiff exclusive use and possession of the family home on North
 Avenue in Burlington during the minority of the child.  The order went on to
 require that the property be sold when the child reached her eighteenth

 

 birthday, with the proceeds to be split equally by the parties, and to
 require that the parties share certain maintenance costs.  The order also
 distributed the available personal property and provided that neither party
 would be entitled to alimony "now or permanently in the future."
      Plaintiff moved to modify the order in June 1988, some three years
 before the child was to turn eighteen.  Some time after the divorce,
 plaintiff developed a severe case of multiple sclerosis, which rendered her
 unable to work.  As a result, plaintiff's income fell to $680 per month that
 she received from Social Security and a disability insurance policy.
 Plaintiff requested that the order be changed to allow her to remain in
 possession of the house, which she had modified to accommodate her
 disability, throughout her life.  At the time the court addressed the
 modification question, the house was worth approximately $90,000, with an
 outstanding mortgage balance of $17,000 and a monthly mortgage payment was
 $202 per month.
      Reasoning that V.R.C.P. 60(b)(5) allowed the court to prospectively
 modify a judgment in proper circumstances and that changing the date of sale
 of a house is a prospective modification, the court granted the motion and
 postponed the sale until plaintiff's condition "requires her to live
 elsewhere."  The court justified its order on the unforeseen deterioration
 of plaintiff's health and the absence of hardship on defendant.  Defendant
 appeals arguing that the court's order was an improper modification of a
 final property award.  We agree.
      As the trial court found, Vermont law is clear that the court cannot
 modify the property disposition aspects of a divorce decree absent
 circumstances, such as fraud or coercion, that would warrant relief from a

 

 judgment generally.  See Viskup v. Viskup, 149 Vt. 89, 90,