Case Title: Maksimovic v. Tsogalis

Citation: 

Docket Number: 81493

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1997-10-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Maksimovic v. Tsogalis, No. 81493 (10/17/97) 
 
       NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days 
       after the filing of the opinion to request a rehearing. 
       Also, opinions are subject to modification, correction or 
       withdrawal at anytime prior to issuance of the mandate by 
       the Clerk of the Court. Therefore, because the following 
       slip opinion is being made available prior to the Court's 
       final action in this matter, it cannot be considered the 
       final decision of the Court. The official copy of the 
       following opinion will be published by the Supreme 
       Court's Reporter of Decisions in the Official Reports 
       advance sheets following final action by the Court. 
 
              Docket No. 81493--Agenda 18--March 1997. 
       RADA MAKSIMOVIC, Appellant, v. WILLIAM T. TSOGALIS et 
                          al., Appellees. 
                  Opinion filed October 17, 1997. 
 
          JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court: 
          Must a claim of intentional tort related to 
     allegations of sexual harassment be litigated before the 
     Illinois Human Rights Commission (the Commission), or, 
     stated differently, does the exclusive remedy provision 
     of the Illinois Human Rights Act (Act) (775 ILCS 5/8-- 
     111(C) (West 1994)) divest the circuit court of 
     jurisdiction to adjudicate such common law tort claims? 
     This court visited this question in Geise v. Phoenix Co. 
     of Chicago, Inc.,  159 Ill. 2d 507 , 517 (1994), and held 
     that where a tort claim is "inextricably linked" to 
     claims of sexual harassment such that there is "no 
     independent basis for imposing liability" apart from the 
     Act itself, those claims must be litigated before the 
     Commission--and only before the Commission. We allowed 
     the instant plaintiff leave to appeal (155 Ill. 2d R. 
     315) so that we could clarify the scope of this court's 
     holding in Geise as it regards tort claims which, though 
     related to sexual harassment, have an independent basis 
     in the common law. 
          We conclude that the plaintiff's common law tort 
     claims of assault, battery and false imprisonment are not 
     inextricably linked with claims of sexual harassment, 
     because the plaintiff has established the necessary 
     elements of each tort independent of any legal duties 
     created by the Act. The plaintiff has established a basis 
     for imposing liability on the defendant independent of 
     any statutory cause of action under the Act, and 
     therefore the circuit court does have jurisdiction to 
     adjudicate the plaintiff's common law tort claims. We 
     reverse and remand. 
 
                                I 
          This case comes to us on a grant of summary 
     judgment, so our review is de novo. McInerney v. Charter 
     Golf, Inc., 176 Ill. 2d 482, 484 (1997). From October 
     1992 until August 1993, Rada Maksimovic worked as a 
     waitress at a restaurant owned and operated by William T. 
     Tsogalis located in Des Plaines, Illinois. Maksimovic 
     quit her job after Tsogalis allegedly made repeated 
     sexual advances towards her. 
          Subsequently, Maksimovic filed a complaint with the 
     Illinois Human Rights Commission in November 1993, 
     alleging that she was the victim of sexual harassment at 
     the hands of her former manager, Tsogalis, and she sought 
     backpay and reinstatement. Several months later, 
     Maksimovic filed an action for damages in the circuit 
     court of Cook County against defendants William T. 
     Tsogalis, William T. Inc., d/b/a Tiffany's Restaurant, 
     and P.C. Partners, d/b/a Comfort Inn. In the three counts 
     of the complaint relevant to this appeal, the plaintiff 
     alleged that Tsogalis committed the intentional torts of 
     assault, battery and false imprisonment. In the assault 
     count, Maksimovic alleged that Tsogalis threatened to 
     "give her a stiff one up the ass," ordered her to perform 
     oral sex on him, made comments about her breasts and 
     accused her of being too friendly with the customers. In 
     the battery count, the plaintiff alleged that Tsogalis 
     placed his hand under her skirt and grabbed her leg, 
     grabbed her buttocks and touched her while attempting to 
     kiss her. In the false imprisonment count, the plaintiff 
     alleged that Tsogalis confined her in a walk-in cooler 
     where he made sexual advances toward her. 
          The circuit court held that it lacked subject matter 
     jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiff's case because 
     her tort claims were in the nature of sexual harassment 
     and granted summary judgment for the defendants. The 
     appellate court affirmed and held that the circuit court 
     was without jurisdiction to adjudicate claims of 
     intentional tort related to allegations of sexual 
     harassment: "Because the fundamental nature of 
     plaintiff's claims are offensive touchings of a sexual 
     nature and she cannot support a cause of action 
     independent of these allegations, her claims for assault, 
     battery, and false imprisonment are barred by the Act and 
     Geise." 282 Ill. App. 3d 576, 586. 
 
                               II 
          Our analysis of whether the Act precludes the 
     circuit court from adjudicating common law tort claims 
     related to allegations of sexual harassment naturally 
     begins with a careful reading of the statute. The Act 
     provides in relevant part: 
                    "Except as otherwise provided by law, no 
                    court of this state shall have jurisdiction 
                    over the subject of an alleged civil rights 
                    violation other than as set forth in this 
                    Act." 775 ILCS 5/8--111(C) (West 1994). 
     The Act goes on to state that it is a "civil rights 
     violation" for any employer or employee "to engage in 
     sexual harassment." 775 ILCS 5/2--102(D) (West 1994). 
     Sexual harassment is defined as: 
                    "any unwelcome sexual advances or 
                    requests for sexual favors or any conduct of a 
                    sexual nature when *** such conduct has the 
                    purpose or effect of substantially interfering 
                    with an individual's work performance or 
                    creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive 
                    working environment." 775 ILCS 5/2--101(E) 
                    (West 1994). 
     Thus, this court has held that if a common law action is 
     in essence one which seeks redress for a "civil rights 
     violation" as defined by the Act and there is no basis 
     for the action other than the Act, the circuit court 
     lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim. Geise, 159 Ill. 2d  at 516; Mein v. Masonite Corp.,  109 Ill. 2d 1 , 7 
     (1985). 
          But does the Act preclude the circuit court from 
     exercising jurisdiction over all tort claims factually 
     related to incidents of sexual harassment? Our appellate 
     court answered "yes," construing Geise as barring the 
     circuit court from hearing any claim of intentional tort 
     related to allegations of sexual harassment. 282 Ill. 
     App. 3d at 585. The appellate court's reading of Geise, 
     however, is overly broad. 
          In Geise, the plaintiff alleged that her employer 
     negligently hired and retained a manager who sexually 
     harassed the plaintiff. Geise, 159 Ill. 2d  at 511-12. 
     This court observed that, but for the Act's proscription 
     against sexual harassment, the plaintiff would have had 
     no legally cognizable claim against her employer. Geise, 
     159 Ill. 2d  at 517. Although the plaintiff in Geise 
     dressed her claims as "negligent hiring" and "negligent 
     retention," the allegations of negligence on the part of 
     the employer were premised on the allegation that the 
     employer hired and retained a manager who engaged in 
     sexual harassment. Geise, 159 Ill. 2d  at 518. Absent the 
     Act's prohibition of sexual harassment, the employer's 
     hiring and retention of an employee whose conduct created 
     a hostile work environment would not have been an 
     actionable tort. That is to say, in Geise the Act 
     furnished the legal duty that the defendant was alleged 
     to have breached. This court held that such tort claims 
     were in essence claims of a "civil rights violation" and, 
     accordingly, could only be brought before the Commission. 
     Geise, 159 Ill. 2d  at 518. The rule from Geise is not 
     that the Act precludes the circuit court from exercising 
     jurisdiction over all tort claims related to sexual 
     harassment. Rather, whether the circuit court may 
     exercise jurisdiction over a tort claim depends upon 
     whether the tort claim is inextricably linked to a civil 
     rights violation such that there is no independent basis 
     for the action apart from the Act itself. 
          The issue in this case then is whether the 
     plaintiff's claims of assault, battery and false 
     imprisonment are inextricably linked to her claim of 
     sexual harassment. Clearly under the standard of Geise 
     they are not. The sexual harassment aspect of this case 
     is merely incidental to what are otherwise ordinary 
     common law tort claims. The plaintiff here has alleged 
     facts sufficient to establish the elements of assault, 
     battery and false imprisonment. These are long-recognized 
     tort actions which exist wholly separate and apart from 
     a cause of action for sexual harassment under the Act. To 
     the extent that the plaintiff has alleged the elements of 
     each of these torts without reference to legal duties 
     created by the Act, she has established a basis for 
     imposing liability on the defendants independent of the 
     Act. Therefore, the plaintiff's tort claims are not 
     inextricably linked to a civil rights violation and the 
     circuit court may exercise jurisdiction over these tort 
     claims. 
          Our holding here, as in Geise, rests squarely on the 
     language of the Act and the policy underlying it. Common 
     law rights and remedies are in full force in this state 
     unless repealed by the legislature or modified by the 
     decision of our courts. 5 ILCS 50/1 (West 1994); People 
     v. Gersch,  135 Ill. 2d 384 , 395-97 (1990). A legislative 
     intent to abrogate the common law must be clearly and 
     plainly expressed, and such an intent will not be 
     presumed from ambiguous or doubtful language. Barthel v. 
     Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co.,  74 Ill. 2d 213 , 220-22 
     (1978). The provision of the Act at issue here--which by 
     its terms provides an exclusive remedy for "civil rights 
     violations"--makes no mention of common law actions. A 
     legislative intent to abolish all common law torts 
     factually related to sexual harassment is not apparent 
     from a plain reading of the statute. 
          An action to redress a civil rights violation has a 
     purpose distinct from a common law tort action. A civil 
     rights action under the Act is designed, in part, to 
     eradicate sexual harassment in the workplace. 775 ILCS 
     5/1--102(B) (West 1994). To achieve this goal, the 
     legislature saw fit to create a Commission vested with 
     exclusive jurisdiction over sexual harassment claims 
     amounting to civil rights violations. This grant of 
     exclusive jurisdiction was intended to promote the 
     efficient and uniform processing of state civil rights 
     claims--not common law tort claims. Assault, battery and 
     false imprisonment existed long before the legislature 
     became interested in sexual harassment and are intended 
     to redress violations of bodily integrity and personal 
     liberty. See 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *119-20, 127- 
     28. The adjudication of tort claims has traditionally 
     been within the province of our courts, and we can find 
     nothing in the language of the Act, or the policy 
     underlying it, which indicates that the legislature 
     intended to preclude the circuit court from exercising 
     jurisdiction over all tort claims related to incidents of 
     sexual harassment. 
 
                               III 
          We conclude that a common law tort claim is not 
     inextricably linked with a civil rights violation where 
     a plaintiff can establish the necessary elements of the 
     tort independent of any legal duties created by the 
     Illinois Human Rights Act. In such a case, the plaintiff 
     has established a basis for imposing liability on the 
     defendant independent of any statutory cause of action 
     under the Act, and therefore the circuit court does have 
     jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiff's common law 
     tort claim. 
          The judgments of the circuit and appellate courts 
     are reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit 
     court for further proceedings. 
 
     Judgments reversed; 
                                                  cause remanded.