Case Title: State v. King

Citation: 110 Ariz. 36, 514 P.2d 1032

Docket Number: 

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1973-10-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
110 Ariz. 36 (1973) 514 P.2d 1032 The STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Abraham Lincoln KING, Appellant. No. 2448. Supreme Court of Arizona, In Division. October 9, 1973. Rehearing Denied November 6, 1973. *38 Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen. by William P. Dixon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Phoenix, for appellee. Ross P. Lee, Maricopa County Public Defender by Anne Kappes, Deputy Public Defender, Phoenix, for appellant. CAMERON, Vice Chief Justice. This is an appeal by the defendant, Abraham Lincoln King, from jury verdicts and judgments of guilt to the crimes of second degree rape, § 13-611, subsec. B A.R.S., and lewd and lascivious acts, § 13-652 A.R.S. Imposition of sentence was suspended for a period of five years. We are asked to consider the following questions on appeal: The facts necessary for a determination of the issues raised on this appeal are as follows. On 18 May 1971, Wanda and Mary, aged 16 and 15 respectively, complained to the police that their stepfather, Abraham Lincoln King, had forcibly raped both of them and that he was also guilty of lewd and lascivious acts. Those original charges were eventually dismissed, and King was finally charged with two counts of second degree rape as to Wanda and Mary and one count of lewd and lascivious acts with the prosecutrix Wanda. It is unnecessary to set forth in detail the testimony of Wanda and Mary concerning the nature of the acts to which they were subjected. It is sufficient to state that both girls described specific occasions on which they had submitted to sexual intercourse with their stepfather, and both testified that they had regularly had intercourse with the defendant over a period of about two years. In addition, Wanda testified that King had performed cunnilingus with her and that she had been forced to perform acts of fellatio with him. The testimony of both girls with respect to acts of intercourse was corroborated by the girls' mother and their brother. Defendant, who testified on his own behalf, denied the accusations of his step-daughters and sought to establish motives *39 for their alleged perjury. On cross-examination, the defendant admitted a prior 11 year old conviction for burglary. IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR CONVICTION Defendant argues that an eleven year old conviction for burglary is too remote to have any probative value for impeachment purposes, and that it was error for the court to have allowed the county attorney to cross-examine him as to this prior conviction. A witness's credibility may be impeached by a prior felony conviction. State v. Owen, 101 Ariz. 156, 416 P.2d 589 (1966); State v. Harris, 73 Ariz. 138, 238 P.2d 957 (1951). The prior conviction cannot, however, be so remote as to have reasonably lost all relevancy with respect to the purpose for which it is introduced. State v. Harvill, 89 Ariz. 340, 362 P.2d 633 (1961). Thus, for example, this court has held that a thirty year old conviction is not a valid impeachment device, Sibley v. Jeffreys, 76 Ariz. 340, 264 P.2d 831 (1953), and that, likewise, a nineteen year old conviction for manslaughter does not reasonably reflect upon one's credibility. State v. Ross, 107 Ariz. 240, 485 P.2d 810 (1971). There is, however, no mechanical formula for determining remoteness. Admissibility of a prior conviction for impeachment purposes is generally left to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Phillips, 102 Ariz. 377, 430 P.2d 139 (1967). In determining whether a prior conviction is too remote to be probative of a witness's veracity the court should take into account such factors as the length of time which has elapsed, the length of the former imprisonment, subsequent conduct and present age of the witness, intervening circumstances and the nature of the prior offense. State v. Ross, supra; Sibley v. Jeffreys, supra. In the case before us eleven years had elapsed since the defendant's burglary conviction. The record does not reveal the length of imprisonment served for that particular offense, but it does appear that the burglary conviction was not defendant's only prior felony, and that he had, in fact, spent at least 15 of his 44 years in jail. On the other hand, at the time these most recent charges were brought against him, defendant had maintained a steady job and had stayed out of trouble for a period of seven years. If subsequent good conduct were the only factor to be considered in determining the value of a prior conviction as an impeachment device, we would agree with the defendant. In light of all the other factors, however, we are not prepared to say that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the impeachment. IS IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR CONVICTIONS UNCONSTITUTIONAL? Although he was not himself dissuaded from testifying on his own behalf, defendant nevertheless urges that the rule which allows impeachment by prior convictions denies due process in that it places an undue burden on a defendant's right to testify. A defendant in a criminal case has the right to testify on his own behalf, or not, whichever strategy he considers would be most beneficial to his case. However, the right of a criminal defendant to take the stand and speak on his own behalf does not include the unqualified right to have brought out on cross-examination only those facts which are favorable to his case. We reaffirm our previous position that the rule which allows impeachment by prior felony convictions is not constitutionally defective. State v. Reeden, 106 Ariz. 409, 477 P.2d 240 (1970); State v. Fields, 104 Ariz. 486, 455 P.2d 964 (1969). FAILURE TO INSTRUCT AS TO PENETRATION This court has many times held that it is reversible error for the trial *40 court to fail to instruct the jury as to an essential element of the crime with which the defendant is charged unless that element is covered completely by other instructions. State v. Brock, 101 Ariz. 168, 416 P.2d 601 (1966); State v. Elias, 74 Ariz. 374, 249 P.2d 941 (1952); State v. Singleton, 66 Ariz. 49, 182 P.2d 920 (1947). Although the essence of the crime of rape is the outrage to the person and feelings of the victim, § 13-612 A.R.S., there can nevertheless be no rape without some penetration, however slight. State v. Torres, 105 Ariz. 361, 464 P.2d 953 (1970). The court properly instructed the jury as to the statutory definition of the crime of second degree rape but was not requested and did not give an instruction on penetration. We note at the outset that the record amply supports the fact of penetration. The victim Wanda testified as follows: The victim Mary testified similarly: No request for an instruction having been made by the defendant, we will not reverse unless the failure to give the instruction was, under the facts in the instant case, fundamental error. Where the fact of penetration is in doubt, it may be reversible error for the court to omit instructions as to the necessity of penetration. But where, as here, the testimony of the victims establishes penetration beyond a reasonable doubt, we will not consider the failure to give an instruction on penetration fundamental error. We have stated: IMPROPER COMMENT BY THE COUNTY ATTORNEY Defendant's last claim is that comments made by the county attorney during closing argument went beyond the realm of permissible argument and that their cumulative effect was to tilt the scale in a closely *41 balanced case in favor of the prosecution. The following are excerpts which defendant cites as examples of improper expressions of the county attorney's personal belief in the defendant's guilt, affirmations of the veracity of the State's witnesses, misstatements of fact, or insults to opposing counsel: In addition to having sustained defense counsel's objections, the court further countered the county attorney's argument by instructing the jury as follows: During closing arguments counsel are allowed to draw inferences from and to appraise the evidence which was adduced during the trial. State v. Gonzales, 105 Ariz. 434, 466 P.2d 388 (1970); State v. Stephens, 66 Ariz. 219, 186 P.2d 346 (1947). It is improper, however, for an advocate to express his personal opinion as to a defendant's guilt or innocence, State v. Abney, 103 Ariz. 294, 440 P.2d 914 (1968), or to argue matters which were not or could not have been introduced as evidence. State v. Gonzales, supra. In assessing whether a counsel's transgression beyond the boundaries of permissible argument was so unduly prejudicial *43 as to have amounted to a denial of a fair trial, it is necessary to determine whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the remarks of counsel were likely to have influenced the jury in reaching a verdict. Sullivan v. State, 47 Ariz. 224, 55 P.2d 312 (1936). It does not necessarily follow from the fact of improper argument that the jury was improperly influenced. Thus, for example, a proper cautionary instruction to the jury may sufficiently mitigate the effects of impermissible argument, State v. Stephens, supra; Blackburn v. State, 31 Ariz. 427, 254 P. 467 (1927) as may the court's sustaining of opposing counsel's objections. In the case before us there is admittedly no doubt that many portions of the county attorney's closing argument were improper. The county attorney did, as defendant suggests, express his personal opinion as to the defendant's guilt, over repeated objections. He avouched the credibility of the State's witnesses and he misstated certain testimony to his own advantage. Under the facts of this particular case, however, we do not feel that the closing argument was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a reversal. The court did caution the jury not to treat comments of counsel as evidence and to disregard those comments which had no basis in the evidence; and every objection defense counsel interposed was, without exception, sustained. There may, of course, be circumstances under which comments of counsel are so inflammatory, offensive, and prejudicial that even cautionary instructions and the sustaining of objections would fail to cure the defect, see United States v. Haynes, 466 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir.1972), but such are not the circumstances of this case. Judgments affirmed. STRUCKMEYER, and HOLOHAN, JJ., concur.