Case Title: Crickenberger v. Hyundai

Citation: 404 Md. 37

Docket Number: 81/07

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2008-03-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Mary Susan Crickenberger v. Hyundai Motor America, No. 81, Sept. Term 2007
IMPLIED OR EXPRESS WARRANTY - MAGNUSON-MOSS WARRANTY ACT
REQUIRES SAME AS MARYLAND LAW TO PROVE BREACH OF IMPLIED OR
LIMITED WARRANTY: PLAINTIFF MUST PROVE WARRANTED ITEM DID NOT
CONFORM TO WARRANTY AT TIME OF SALE - NEED FOR EXPERT TESTIMONY
REGARDING CAUSATION
Circuit Court for How ard Cou nty
Case No. 13-C-06-064335 CN
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 81
September Term, 2007
                                                                             
MARY SUSAN CRICKENBERGER
v.
HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA
                                                                             
 
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Wilner, Alan M. (Retired,
specially assigned)
Cathell, Dale R. (Retired,
specially assigned),
JJ.
                                                                            
Opinion by Harrell, J.
Murphy, J., Concurs.
                                                                             
Filed:   March 21, 2008
I.
This appeal arises from a lawsuit, over an automobile, brought in the Circuit Court for
Howard County alleging breach of warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty–Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act and  violation of Maryland’s Consumer Protection Act.
On 20 November 2001, Mary Susan Crickenberger (Appellant) purchased from
Antwerpen/Hyundai Kia (“Antwerpen”) in Baltimore, Maryland, a 2001 Hyundai XG-300
with 8,911 miles on its odometer.  A limited warranty accompanied the sale of the vehicle,
stating an agreement to repair or replace any component displaying a defect in materials or
workmanship.  Prior to Ms. Crickenberger’s purchase, the vehicle was part of the rental car
fleet owned by the Hertz Corporation. 
The record of this case does not indicate what, if any, maintenance the Hertz
Corporation performed on the vehicle while in its ownership, or its repair record, or whether
it was in any accidents.  After Ms. Crickenberger acquired it, she claimed to have caused the
car to be serviced for maintenance purposes on several occasions.  She alleged that the
Hyundai received oil service on 10 December 2001; 11 May, an unknown date in August,
and 16 November 2002; 14 March, 24 September, and 1 November 2003; 24 February, 19
July, 12 November, and finally on 21 December 2004.  The mileage at each of these
respective intervals was 9,684; 16,251; unknown; 25,940; 31,206; 40,977; 42,760; 47,646;
54,862; 59,810; and 61,730.
Various components of the car were repaired or replaced during Ms. Crickenberger’s
ownership.  In 2001, Antwerpen replaced the fuel pump seal.  In 2002, the dealer replaced
-2-
the battery and canister close valve.  In 2003, Ms. Crickenberger was involved in an accident,
as a consequence of which the dealer repaired the front fender and a headlamp.  Also in
2003, she brought the vehicle to Antwerpen for repair of a loose windshield wiper
connection.  On 23 September 2003, the dealer discovered sludge in the engine while
investigating why the engine was knocking.  In 2004, experiencing ongoing operating
problems with the car, Ms. Crickenberger returned the vehicle to Antwerpen for replacement
of an output speed sensor, the alternator (twice), generator (twice), battery, spark plug wires,
mass air flow sensor, input speed sensor, oil filter gasket, and an airbag.  On 4 February
2005, the vehicle, with an odometer reading then of 63,700 miles, stopped working
altogether.  The dealer advised Ms. Crickenberger that the engine would have to be replaced.
Through its authorized dealer, Antwerpen, Hyundai Motor America (Appellee, hereinafter
“HMA”) declined to replace the engine under the limited warranty.
Crickenberger initiated this case in the Circuit Court on 23 January 2003, alleging that
the vehicle’s continued need for repair established defects in the vehicle and that HMA’s
failure to cure the defects resulted in a breach of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act
(Maryland Code (1975, 2000 Repl. Vol.), Commercial Law Article, §§ 13-101 to 13-501)
and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty–Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (15 U.S.C.
§§ 2301 to 2312 (2000), hereinafter the “Magnuson-Moss Act”).  As the foundation of her
Magnuson-Moss Act claims, she alleged breach of express and implied warranties under
1§ 2-313. Express warranties by affirmation, promise, description, sample
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller
to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part
of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty
that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or
promise.
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of
the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that
the goods shall conform to the description.
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis
of the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole
of the goods shall conform to the sample or model.
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that
the seller use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or
that he have a specific intention to make a warranty, but an
affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement
purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of
the goods does not create a warranty.
2§ 2-314. Implied warranty; merchantability; usage of trade
(1) Unless excluded or modified (§ 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant
with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of
food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this title
(a) In §§ 2-314 through 2-318 of this title, “seller” includes the
manufacturer, distributor, dealer, wholesaler or other middleman or the
retailer; and
(b) Any previous requirement of privity is abolished as between the
buyer and the seller in any action brought by the buyer.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) Pass without objection in the trade under the contract description;
and
(b) In the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the
description; and
(c) Are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(continued...)
-3-
Maryland Code (1975, 2002 Repl. Vol.), Commercial Law Article, §§ 2-3131 and 2-314,2
2(...continued)
(d) Run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind,
quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) Are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement
may require; and
(f) Conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the
container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (§ 2-316) other implied warranties may arise
from course of dealing or usage of trade.
(4) Subsections (1) and (2) of this section apply to a lease of goods and a
bailment for hire of goods that pass through the physical possession of and are
maintained by the lessor, sublessor, or bailor.
3“[A] consumer who is damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor, or service
contractor to comply . . . under a written warranty [or] implied warranty . . . may bring suit
for damages and other legal and equitable relief in any court of competent jurisdiction in any
State or the District of Columbia . . . .”  15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1).
Subject to requirements regarding attempts at informal dispute resolution, the Act
establishes that a consumer alleging a breach of either a full or limited warranty may
commence a civil action.  15 U.S.C. § 2310.  If a consumer prevails in the civil action, he or
she is entitled to attorney’s fees, regardless of whether the warranty was full or limited.  Id.
For a detailed discussion of informal dispute resolution under the Magnuson-Moss Act, see
Koons Ford of Baltimore, Inc. v. Lobach, 398 Md. 38, 919A.2d 722 (2007).
-4-
pursuant to § 2310(d)(1)3 of the Magnuson-Moss Act.  The Consumer Protection Act count
derived from an alleged violation of the Maryland Automotive Warranty Enforcement Act
(Maryland Code (1975, 2000 Repl. Vol.), Commercial Law Article, § 14-1501 to 14-1504)
because, as plead, a violation of the latter also was a violation of the former.  
In discovery, Ms. Crickenberger designated an expert, James E. Lewis, and indicated
that he would testify at trial as to the Hyundai’s repair history and loss in value as a result of
the alleged defects.  HMA filed a motion in limine to exclude Lewis’s opinions on the
grounds that they lacked an adequate factual basis, were unreliable, and constituted
-5-
inadmissible speculation in violation of Maryland’s requirements for the admissibility of
expert witness testimony.  Prior to the hearing on HMA’s motion in limine, Crickenberger
withdrew her designation of Mr. Lewis as her expert.  No other expert witness was advanced
by her on the issues of causation or damages.
HMA filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting that Crickenberger could not
prevail on her breach of warranty (Magnuson-Moss Act) claims because, without expert
testimony, she could not prove the existence of a defect attributable to the manufacturer at
the time of sale, HMA’s failure to correct alleged defects in violation of warranty, or the
amount of damages caused by a defect.  HMA also argued that Ms. Crickenberger could not
prevail on her Maryland Consumer Protection Act claim as it was derivative of a violation
of the Automotive Warranty Enforcement Act, which was inapplicable because the Hyundai
was owned previously at the time she purchased it.  As to her Consumer Protection Act
count, Crickenberger did not contest its inapplicability and conceded as much.  As to HMA’s
Motion concerning the Magnuson-Moss Act, she filed an opposition alleging that proof of
a violation of the Act does not require expert testimony or proof of a specific defect.  The
Circuit Court, after a hearing, granted HMA’s motion, finding that expert testimony would
be required to prove causation and damages before Ms. Crickenberger could recover under
the Act.  Because no such expert was identified, the court determined HMA was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
Crickenberger appealed to the Court of Special Appeals.  In her brief filed in the
-6-
intermediate appellate court, she framed three arguments: (1) in breach of limited or implied
warranty claims under the Magnuson-M oss Act, expert testimony is not required to prove a
product contained a defect existing at the time of sale; (2) a consumer does not bear the
burden of proving a specific defect to prevail on breach of limited or implied warranty claims
under the Act; and (3) expert testimony is unnecessary to prove damages under the Act.  We
issued a writ of certiorari, on our own initiative, while the appeal was pending before that
court.  Crickenberger v. Hyundai, 402 Md. 36, 935 A.2d 406 (2007).
III.
 Ms. Crickenberger offers two principal arguments to support her main thesis that
expert testimony is unnecessary in order to link her Hyundai’s malfunctions with a defect in
the vehicle attributable to the manufacturer.  First, she argues that, under the Magnuson-Moss
Act, a consumer need not prove a specific defect to prevail, even if the derivative state law
would require such proof.  Second, she argues that Maryland law does not require expert
testimony where, as here, the particular product required so many repairs.  Crickenberger
asserts that the alleged circumstantial evidence of a defect (her record of service and repairs
in this case) sufficiently raised triable questions of fact as to causation and defect.  Where
circumstantial evidence is relied on, she concludes, expert testimony “is one of the factors,
but not the only factor, to be considered in determining whether a defect may be inferred .
. . .”  In other words, the record of repairs she proposed to submit as evidence is
circumstantial evidence of a breach of a limited or implied warranty sufficient, standing
-7-
alone, to raise triable questions of fact under the Magnuson-Moss Act and Maryland law.
A.
We review the trial court’s grant of HMA’s Motion for Summary Judgment de novo
as to the law and in a light most favorable to Ms. Crickenberger, the non-moving party.  Hill
v. Cross Country Settlements, LLC,  402 Md. 281, 294, 936 A.2d 343, 350-51 (2007).
“Summary judgment is appropriate where ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact’
and ‘the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”
Id. (quoting Maryland Rule 2-501(f)).  “[T]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
support of the plaintiffs’ claim is insufficient to preclude the grant of summary judgment;
there must be evidence upon which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.”  Beatty
v. Trailmaster Prods., Inc., 330 Md. 726, 738-39, 625 A.2d 1005, 1011 (1993) (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202
(1986)).  “[W]hile a court must resolve all inferences in favor of the party opposing summary
judgment, ‘those inferences must be reasonable ones.’”  Beatty,  330 Md. at 739, 625 A.2d
at 1011 (1993) (quoting Clea v. City of Balt., 312 Md. 662, 678, 541 A.2d 1303, 1310
(1988)).
B.
In 1975, Congress enacted the Magnuson-Moss Act to improve the “clarity, truth, and
strength of consumer product warranties.”  1 DAVID G. OWEN ET AL., MADDEN AND OWEN
ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY 3d. § 4.23 (2000) (hereinafter MADDEN AND OWEN).  Sellers who
-8-
issue warranties or provide service contracts for consumer products, such as vehicles, are
under certain obligations standardized by the Federal Law.  Id.  Written warranties must be
labeled “full” or “limited,” and terms of the warranty must be “fully, conspicuously, and
clearly disclosed” in order to prevent deception.  Id.; 15 U.S.C. §§ 2302, 2303.  Additionally,
the Act prohibits manufacturers from disclaiming implied warranties on consumer products,
such as vehicles, in their entirety when a full warranty is supplied and for the duration of a
limited warranty.  M ADDEN AND OWEN § 4:23; 15 U.S.C. §§ 2304, 2308. 
Though little discussed in reported Maryland cases, it is well established that the
Magnuson-Moss Act supplements State law with regard to its limited and implied warranty
provisions.  Champion Ford Sales, Inc. v. Levine, 49 Md. App. 547, 563, 433 A.2d 1218,
1227 (1981) (“The Act . . . permits recovery of attorneys’ fees by a consumer who prevails
in an action against the seller for breach of an implied warranty under state law . . . .”); Hood
v. Ryobi N.A., Inc., 17 F. Supp. 2d 448, 450 (D. Md. 1998) (describing plaintiff’s express and
implied warranty claims under state law and its “derivative” claim under the Magnuson-Moss
Act); 2 BARKLEY CLARK & CHRISTOPHER SMITH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT WARRANTIES § 14:1
(1984) (“The Warranty Act does not provide a complete body of law for private actions; it
supplements rather than supplants state warranty actions.”).  As Ms. Crickenberger admits
“[c]laims made pursuant to the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act . . . are substantively state law
claims under breach of warranty provisions of the Maryland Commercial Law . . . .”
The Act defines warranties first by categorizing them as “implied warranties” or
4To meet the minimum federal standards, a full warranty warrants, under 15 U.S.C.
§ 2304, that:
(1) such warrantor must as a minimum remedy such consumer
product within a reasonable time and without charge, in the case
of a defect, malfunction, or failure to conform with such written
warranty;
(2) notwithstanding section 2308(b) of this title, such warrantor
may not impose any limitation on the duration of any implied
(continued...)
-9-
“written warranties.”  An “implied warranty” is defined, for purposes of the Act, as “an
implied warranty under state law.”  15 U.S.C. § 2301.  As mentioned earlier, for implied
warranties, the Act uniformly sets duration and disclaimer restrictions supplemental to state
law requirements.  
“Written warranty” is defined in the Magnuson-Moss Act as:
any written affirmation of fact or written promise made in
connection with the sale of a consumer product by a supplier to
a buyer which relates to the nature of the material or
workmanship and affirms or promises that such material or
workmanship is defect free or will meet a specified level of
performance over a specified period of time, or any undertaking
in writing in connection with the sale by a supplier of a
consumer product to refund, repair, replace, or take other
remedial action with respect to such product in the event that
such product fails to meet the specifications set forth in the
undertaking, which written affirmation, promise, or undertaking
becomes part of the basis of the bargain between a supplier and
a buyer for purposes other than resale of such product.
15 U.S.C. § 2301(6).  Written warranties are divided into full warranties and limited
warranties.  15 U.S.C. § 2303(a).  A “full warranty” must be labeled as such and meet
minimum standards outlined by the Act.4  Id. §§ 2303, 2304. 
A “limited warranty,” on the
(...continued)
warranty on the product;
(3) such warrantor may not exclude or limit consequential
damages for breach of any written or implied warranty on such
product, unless such exclusion or limitation conspicuously
appears on the face of the warranty; and
(4) if the product (or a component part thereof) contains a defect
or malfunction after a reasonable number of attempts by the
warrantor to remedy defects or malfunctions in such product,
such warrantor must permit the consumer to elect either a refund
for, or replacement without charge of, such product or part (as
the case may be). The Commission may by rule specify for
purposes of this paragraph, what constitutes a reasonable
number of attempts to remedy particular kinds of defects or
malfunctions under different circumstances. If the warrantor
replaces a component part of a consumer product, such
replacement shall include installing the part in the product
without charge.
-10-
other hand, is defined by what it lacks; it is a warranty that does not meet the minimum
requirements for a “full warranty” under the Act.  Id. § 2303.  Accordingly, limited
warrantors are not subject to the Magnuson-Moss Act’s full warranty minimum requirement
that a “warrantor must as a minimum remedy [a] consumer product within a reasonable time
and without charge, in the case of a defect, malfunction, or failure to conform with such
warranty.”  Id. 
C.
Ms. Crickenberger, relying on the full warranty minimum requirement, alleges that
a majority of courts  have held that a consumer does not bear the burden of proving a specific
defect to prevail on a breach of limited or implied warranty action, regardless of whether a
-11-
specific defect must be proved in order to prevail under state law.  She offers no Maryland
case in support of the contention that the Magnuson-Moss Act does not require proof of a
specific defect in order to show a breach of an implied or limited warranty.  The out-of-state
cases offered to us by Ms. Crickenberger as persuasive, however, are easily distinguishable.
Three of those cases, Mason v. Porsche Cars of North America, Inc., 688 So.2d 361 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Universal Motors, Inc. v. Waldock, 719 P.2d 254 (Alaska 1986); and
Cline v. DaimlerChrysler Co., 114 P.3d 468 (Okla. Civ. App. 2005), rely on the minimum
standard requirements for a full warranty in 15 U.S.C. § 2304.  Mason, 688 So.2d at 366-67
(“Porsche’s warranty conformed to [section 2304].” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2304)); Waldock,
719 P.2d at 256 (“The relevant section of the Magnuson-Moss Act [is] 15 U.S.C. § 2304 .
. . .  (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 2304)); Cline, 114 P.3d at 477 (“The Alaska court noted the
specific language of 15 U.S.C. § 2304(c) ‘places the burden of proving owner abuse squarely
on the warrantor.’” (quoting Waldock, 719 P.2d at 256)).  Inasmuch as these cases apply full
warranty requirements to limited warranties, in dissonance with state law, we decline to
follow them.  
The other cases Crickenberger cites, Osburn v. Bendix Home Sys., Inc., 613 P.2d 445
(Okla. 1980); Genetti v. Caterpillar, Inc., 621 N.W.2d 529 (Neb. 2001); and Vernon v. Lake
Motors, 488 P.2d 302 (Utah 1971), support the notion that direct evidence is not required
when there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to support an inference that a defect exists
attributable to the manufacturer.  Osburn, 613 P.2d at 448 (“Identification of an existing
-12-
defect is not essential to recovery upon express warranty.  It is sufficient if, as here, the
evidence shows, either directly or by permissible inference, that the goods were defective in
their performance or function or that they otherwise failed to conform to the warranty.”);
Genetti, 621 N.W.2d at 542 (“Although expert testimony pointing to a specific defect would
be the best means of proving the existence of a defect in some cases, proof that the warranted
product is defective may be circumstantial in nature and may be inferred from the
evidence.”); Vernon, 488 P.2d at 306 (“[C]ircumstantial evidence is adequate as proof if its
quality is such that the jury believes that the greater probability of truth lies therein.”).  These
holdings, however, do not support the proposition that the Magnuson-Moss Act lowers the
burden of proof a plaintiff must bear to establish a breach of a limited or implied warranty.
Furthermore, these cases are entirely consistent with Maryland law (discussed infra).   
D.
The burden Crickenberger carries to establish a breach of an implied or limited
warranty in Maryland is well established.  In Hacker v. Schofer, 251 Md. 672, 676-77, 248
A.2d 351, 354 (1968), this Court declared, “[i]t is undoubtedly the settled law that to recover
on an express warranty the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish that the article sold
did not at the time of the sale conform to the representations of the warranty.  This rule of
law applies with equal force to an implied warranty.”  In Ford Motor Co. v. General Accident
Insurance Co., 365 Md. 321, 334, 779 A.2d 362, 370 (2001), we declared, “‘to allow the jury
to decide whether there was a breach of warranty, there must be some evidence beyond mere
5The burden on the plaintiff was established conclusively in Ford Motor Co. v.
General Accident Insurance Co., 365 Md. 321, 779 A.2d 362 (2001).  In that case, a 1995
Ford F-350 base chassis cab truck, converted to a tow truck (as was customary with these
vehicles), caught fire during an attempted tow.  Id. at 323, 779 A.2d at 362.  An expert
testified at trial that the fire was caused by a defect in the vehicle.  Id. at 328, 779 A.2d at
366.  General Accident Insurance Co. (General Accident) argued that Ford Motor Co. (Ford)
breached express and implied warranties due to the alleged defect.  Id. at 323, 779 A.2d at
362.  When the trial court entered judgment in favor of Ford on all claims, General Accident
appealed.  Id. at 329-30, 779 A.2d at 367.  As to the express warranty offered by Ford, which
provided protection against “parts . . . that are defective in factory-supplied materials or
workmanship,” the intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court, noting that to
succeed on the claim, General Accident had to prove the alleged defect.  Int’l Motors, Inc.
v. Ford Motor Co., 133 Md. App. 269, 275, 754 A.2d 1115, 1118 (2000), rev’d on other
grounds by sub nom. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 365 Md. 321, 779 A.2d 362.  As to the implied
warranty claims, this Court conclusively affirmed the trial court, finding that “a plaintiff must
prove the existence of a defect at the time the product leaves the manufacturer to recover on
an implied warranty claim.”  Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 365 Md. at 334, 779 A.2d at 369. 
-13-
speculation which would enable the jury to rationally decide it is more probable than not that
the defect existed at the time of sale . . . .’” (quoting Giant Food, Inc. v. Wash. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., Inc., 273 Md. 592, 608-09, 332 A.2d 1, 10 (1975)). 5  Stated another way, the
plaintiff in a breach of  warranty claim must establish “three product litigation basics”: the
existence of a defect, attribution of the defect to the seller, and a causal relationship between
the defect and plaintiff’s damages.  Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 365 Md. at 335, 779 A.2d at 370
(citing Harrison v. Bill Cairns Pontiac, 77 Md. App. 41, 50, 549 A.2d 385, 390 (1988)).
The nature and circumstances of an accident or malfunction may support an inference
of a defect attributable to the manufacturer of the product “where circumstantial evidence
tends to eliminate other causes, such as product misuse or alteration.”  Gen. Accident Ins.
-14-
Co., 365 Md. at 337, 779 A.2d 371 (quoting Harrison, 77 Md. App. at 51, 549 A.2d at 390).
For example, it is beyond cavil that when a new vehicle malfunctions, a reasonable inference
of a defect may be drawn from the circumstances.  See Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278
Md. 337, 345-46, 363 A.2d 955, 959 (1976) (“[T]he steering mechanism of a new automobile
should not cause the car to swerve off the road . . . ; the drive shaft of a new automobile
should not separate from the vehicle when it is driven in a normal manner . . . ; the brakes
of a new automobile should not suddenly fail . . . ; and the accelerator of a new automobile
should not stick without warning, causing the vehicle suddenly to accelerate.  Conditions like
these, even if resulting from the design of the products, are defective and unreasonably
dangerous . . . .” (Internal citations omitted)).  
Ms. Crickenberger principally relies on Virgil v. Kash N’ Karry Service Corp., 61 Md.
App. 23, 484 A.2d 652 (1984), to support her contention that expert testimony is not
necessary in the present case to show that her Hyundai malfunctioned because it was
defective at the time it left HMA’s control.  In that case, the Virgils (plaintiffs) sued two
corporations for breach of warranty because a thermos imploded.  Virgil, 61 Md. App. at 27,
484 A.2d at 654.  The Circuit Court for Howard County entered a directed verdict in favor
of the defendants for the reason that the plaintiffs proffered no evidence that the thermos was
defective when purchased.  Id. at 28, 484 A.2d at 654.  The Court of Special Appeals
reversed.  Id. at 28, 484 A.2d at 654-55.  The court noted “[a]n inference of a defect may be
drawn from the happening of an accident, where circumstantial evidence tends to eliminate
-15-
other causes, such as product misuse or alteration.”  Id. at 32, 484 A.2d at 657 (citing 51
A.L.R.3d § 2[b]).  The court held that “Mrs. Virgil’s testimony, if believed by the trier of
fact, tended to eliminate any likelihood that the defect that caused the implosion was created
after Mrs. Virgil purchased the thermos.”  Virgil, 61 Md. App. at 33, 484 A.2d at 657.  The
court excused Mrs. Virgil from supplying expert testimony to establish an inference that the
thermos was defective at the time it left the manufacturer’s control, noting that such evidence
is necessary only when the subject of the inference “is beyond the ken of the average
layman.”  Id. at 31, 484 A.2d at 656.  The court also found, in light of Mrs. Virgil’s
testimony, that a two or three month interval between the time of purchase and the implosion,
although a factor to be considered, did not bar the possibility of recovery as a matter of law.
Id.
Virgil contrasts nicely with Harrison, 77 Md. App. 41, 549 A.2d 385, where the
plaintiffs alleged a breach of warranty due to a product defect in a five-year old vehicle with
over 58,000 miles on its odometer.  The trial court in Harrison granted summary judgment
to the manufacturer-defendant.  Harrison, 77 Md. App. at 43, 549 A.2d at 386.  The Court
of Special Appeals affirmed, finding, in part, that a product defect in the well-used vehicle
may not be inferred based on evidence of a malfunction (an electrical short) and expert
testimony that the fire normally would not result in the absence of a product defect.  Id. at
51-53, 549 A.2d at 390-91.  The court noted, “‘proof of a defect must arise above surmise,
conjecture, or speculation . . . ; and one’s right to recovery may not rest on any presumption
-16-
from the happening of an accident.’”  Id. (quoting Jensen v. Am. Motor Corp., 50 Md. App.
226, 232, 437 A.2d 242, 245 (1981)).  
The facts alleged by Crickenberger, even viewed in a light most favorable to her, are
more analogous to those in Harrison than to Virgil.  As in Harrison, Ms. Crickenberger’s
Hyundai was neither new, nor temporally near-to-new, when its engine ceased running (at
63,700 driven miles) or during the times of her ownership when electrical problems were
experienced.  Ms. Crickenberger’s proffered testimony did not tend to eliminate the
likelihood that the vehicle’s malfunction was caused by circumstances not in the control of
HMA.  Although Virgil may support the premise that expert testimony is unnecessary if the
average layman might discern a defect from lay circumstantial evidence, the record here does
not tend to establish a particular defect.  The repairs and replacements Ms. Crickenberger’s
Hyundai required ran a gamut of problems and occurred over several years and thousands of
miles.  She failed to marshal any potential evidence as to the state of care of the vehicle by
the Hertz Corporation prior to her purchase.  Also, in proffering service records for the
vehicle, Ms. Crickenberger established that the engine oil services she obtained were
erratically obtained and failed generally to conform to HMA’s frequency of oil change
recommendations.  Moreover, the vehicle was involved in an accident while in her
possession.  This evidence does not tend “to eliminate any likelihood that the defect that
caused [the Hyundai to malfunction] was created after [the vehicle left HMA’s control].”
Virgil, 61 Md. App. at 33, 484 A.2d at 657.
-17-
IV.
Ms. Crickenberger did not generate a genuine issue of material fact.  The Magnuson-
Moss Act requires no less than Maryland Law in order to establish a breach of a limited or
implied warranty as to a consumer product.  Under Maryland law, she failed to present
sufficient circumstantial evidence tending to create an inference that her Hyundai
malfunctioned as a result of a defect existing at the time it left HMA’s control.  Without
expert testimony, Ms. Crickenberger’s allegations of a defect in this case amount to “mere
speculation.”  As such, the trial court properly granted HM A’s motion for summary
judgment.  Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 365 Md. at 334, 779 A.2d at 370 (“[T]o allow the jury to
decide whether there was a breach of warranty, there must be some evidence beyond mere
speculation which would enable the jury to rationally decide it is more probable than not that
the defect existed at the time of sale . . . .” (internal citations omitted)).  Given this
conclusion, it is unnecessary to reach and decide whether expert testimony would have been
required also in this case to establish her alleged damages.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR HOWARD COUNTY AFFIRMED.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
Circuit Court for How ard Cou nty
Case No. 13-C-06-064335 CN
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 81
September Term, 2007
                                                                             
MARY SUSAN CRICKENBERGER
v.
HYUNDAI MOTOR AMERICA
                                                                             
 
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
Murphy
Wilner, Alan M. (Retired,
specially assigned)
Cathell, Dale R. (Retired,
specially assigned)
JJ.
                                                                             
Concurring Opinion by Murphy, J.
                                                                             
Filed:   March 21, 2008
-1-
I agree that, on the facts of the case at bar, “the trial court properly granted HMA’s
motion for summary judgment.”  I am persuaded that there are two reasons why Mrs.
Crickenberger needed expert testimony to generate a jury question on the issue of whether
HMA was in breach of warranty: (1) “[t]he record of this case does not indicate what, if any,
maintenance the Hertz Corporation performed on the vehicle while in its ownership, or its
repair record, or whether it was in any accidents[,]” and (2) “in proffering service records for
the vehicle, Ms. Crickenberger established that the engine oil services she obtained were
erratically obtained and failed generally to conform to HMA’s frequency of oil change
recommendations.”  Under these circumstances, expert testimony was necessary “to create
an inference that her Hyundai malfunctioned as a result of a defect existing at the time it left
HMA’s control.”  I write separately, however, out of concern that the majority opinion will
be cited as authority for the incorrect propositions that -- in every breach of warranty action --
the defendant is entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff produces expert testimony
on the issues of (1) whether the product was defective, and (2) the precise nature of the
defect.  
To resolve the issue of when expert testimony is needed in a warranty action, it may
be helpful to hypothesize an implied warranty action asserted against an automobile
manufacturer by a plaintiff who testifies that, “I bought the car new, it’s still under warranty,
it hasn’t been involved in a fire, it hasn’t been involved in a flood, it hasn’t been stolen or
broken into, I have complied with all of the manufacturer’s maintenance recommendations,
-2-
2
I have made no modifications to the car, but it won’t go more than 15 miles per hour.”  Must
this plaintiff produce expert testimony to generate a jury question on the issue of whether the
manufacturer is in breach of warranty?  I am persuaded that, under Maryland law, the answer
to this question is “no.”  
I agree with the majority that, under Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363
A.2d 955 (1976), “it is beyond cavil that when a new vehicle malfunctions, a reasonable
inference of a defect may be drawn from the circumstances.”  In Phipps, while answering
two questions of law certified by the United States District Court for the District of Maryland
as a result of warranty and strict liability claims asserted in that court as a result of an
accident that allegedly occurred when the accelerator of a Pontiac “became stuck without
warning, causing the automobile to accelerate suddenly at a high rate of speed and leave the
road,” this Court stated:  
For example, the steering mechanism of a new automobile
should not cause the car to swerve off the road, Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., supra; the drive shaft of a new
automobile should not separate from the vehicle when it is
driven in a normal manner, Elmore v. American Motors,
Corporation, 70 Cal.2d 578, 75 Cal.Rptr. 652, 451 P.2d 84, 33
A.L.R.3d 406 (1969); the brakes of a new automobile should not
suddenly fail, Sharp v. Chrysler Corporation, 432 S.W.2d 131
(Tex.Civ.App.1968); and the accelerator of a new automobile
should not stick without warning, causing the vehicle suddenly
to accelerate. 
Id. at 345-46, 336 A.2d at 959.  The same conclusions should be applicable to not-so-new
automobiles that have been (1) properly used, (2) properly  maintained, (3) not modified,
-3-
3
and (4) not involved in an event that might reasonably explain the malfunction.  
In a breach of warranty action asserted by a plaintiff/owner whose no longer “new”
car has malfunctioned while still under warranty, the plaintiff can generate a jury question
on the issue of whether the manufacturer is in breach of the warranty by producing evidence
that the car (1) has been maintained in compliance with the manufacturer’s maintenance
recommendations, (2) has not been subjected to abnormal use, (3) has not been modified,
and (4) has not been involved in any event that might reasonably explain the malfunction.
The first element of proof is required by the majority opinion in the case at bar.  The other
elements of proof are required by Ford v. General Accident, 365 Md. 321, 779 A.2d 362
(2001), in which this Court reinstated a judgment entered in favor of the manufacturer of
a chassis cab that (1) was sold to a purchaser who converted the cab into a tow truck, and
(2) caught fire while being used as a tow truck, on the ground that “[t]he Court of Special
Appeals improperly shifted the plaintiff’s burden of proof onto the manufacturer to
demonstrate that the event causing injury or property damage was not caused by any defect
that originated with the manufacturer.”  Id. at 333, 779 A.2d at 369.  If all four elements of
proof are satisfied, the plaintiff has produced evidence that would permit a reasonable
inference of a defect to be drawn from the circumstances, and therefore judgment should not
be entered against the plaintiff on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to produce expert
testimony.  
As to the issue of whether the plaintiff must produce evidence identifying the specific
1 Other cases that have also come to this conclusion include: Spain v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 872 So.2d 101, 111 (Ala. 2003); Evans v. Evans, 569 S.E.2d 303,
307 (N.C. App. 2002); DeWitt v. Eveready Battery Co., Inc., 565 S.E.2d 140, 151 (2002);
Alvarez v. American Isuzu Motors, 749 N.E.2d 16, 23 (Ill. App. 2001); Plas-Tex, Inc. v. U.S.
Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442, 444-45 (Tex.1989).
-4-
4
flaw that caused the product to be defective, in Eaton Corp. v. Wright, 281 Md. 80, 375
A.2d 1122 (1977), while reinstating a circuit court judgment entered in favor of the
distributor of a fuel canister that exploded while in the process of being attached to a
propane torch, this Court rejected the distributor’s argument that “the plaintiffs [who
asserted strict liability and breach of implied warranty claims] have failed to establish the
exact nature of the defect and are therefore precluded from recovery.”  Id. at 88, 375 A.2d
at 1126.  In that case, the plaintiffs did present expert testimony, but this Court made it clear
that they were not required to do so.1  Writing for a unanimous Court, Judge Eldridge stated:
The plaintiffs in this case, by their own testimony,
presented sufficient evidence to support the judgments in their
favor based on the theory of strict liability. Their testimony
shows that the canister was used within one hour of purchase,
without any unusual handling or alterations, and according to the
instructions on the label. A standard torch head, which the
canister was designed to accept, was used in conjunction with
the canister. When the torch head was removed from the
canister, as recommended by the manufacturer, highly
flammable gas continued to be released from the canister. There
can be little doubt that a propane canister, used immediately
after purchase according to instructions on the label, which
continues to allow gas to be released after an appliance has
been removed, is defective and unreasonably dangerous.
Under circumstances such as these, the plaintiffs presented
a prima facie case. There was no necessity for them to show
-5-
5
more concerning the precise nature of the defect. See Phipps
v. General Motors Corp., supra, 278 Md. at 345-346, 363 A.2d
955; Giant Food, Inc. v. Wash. Coca-Cola, 273 Md. 592, 609,
332 A.2d 1 (1975); Powell and Hill, Proof of a Defect or
Defectiveness, 5 U.Balt.L.Rev. 77, 89-90 (1975). 
* * *
Also, we think that it could be reasonably inferred from
these facts that the canister was in the defective condition and
unreasonably dangerous when sold by [the distributor] to the
retailer....  As previously pointed out, the testimony of the
plaintiffs themselves supported an inference of no consumer
misuse.
Id. at 89-90, 375 A.2d at 1127 (emphasis supplied).  
I recognize that in Ford v. General Accident, supra, this Court also stated:
The Court of Special Appeals erred in holding that proof
of a specific product defect is not required to maintain a claim
for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability.  This
Court long has held that a plaintiff asserting a breach of the
implied warranty of merchantability must prove that the product
was defective.
Id. at 333, 779 A.2d at 369.  In an implied warranty action arising out of the malfunction of
an automobile (that swerved off the road, that had a drive shaft that separated from the
vehicle, that had an accelerator that stuck without warning, that caught fire and is no longer
operable) the “product” is the automobile rather than the component of the automobile that
has caused the malfunction.  Therefore, the second of the above quoted sentences is correct.
A careless reading of the first quoted sentence, however, would suggest that Eaton Corp. v.
Wright has been overruled and a warranty plaintiff must now prove “the precise nature of the
-6-
6
defect.”  For this reason, it is important to emphasize that, because “specific product defect”
is not synonymous with “precise nature of the defect,” Ford v. General Accident did not
overrule Eaton Corp. v. Wright.  
In the above hypothetical, the “specific product defect” is the fact that the car “won’t
go faster than 15 miles per hour,” a condition that renders the car unfit for the ordinary
purposes for which a car is used.  This defect can be established by the testimony of the
plaintiff, who would be entitled to the following jury instruction:
When products are sold, there is an implied warranty, or
a promise that the products are fit for ordinary purposes for
which such products are used.  
In order to find in favor of the Plaintiff on his claim that
the defendant breached its implied warranty of merchantability,
you must find by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the
defect about which the Plaintiff complains -- that his car cannot
go faster than 15 miles per hour -- is a defect that made the car
unfit for the ordinary purpose for which a car is used; and (2)
this defect existed when it left the Defendant’s control.  You
may find that the defect existed when it left the Defendant’s
control if you are persuaded that the defect is not the result of
abnormal use or another independent cause.  
In an implied warranty of merchantability action based
upon product defect, the plaintiff need not prove the precise
nature of the defect, or any specific act of negligence on the part
of the Defendant, as the focus is not on the conduct of the
manufacturer, but upon the product itself.
The first paragraph of this instruction is adapted from MPJI-Cv 26:7.  The second
paragraph is adapted from Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction, Civil No. 185.05 (2007), the
Comment to which makes it expressly clear that the “Plaintiff may prove that the product was
2 This observation has been expressly stated in the following cases: Haglund v. Philip
Morris Inc., 847 N.E.2d 315, 321-22 (Mass. 2006); Alvarez v. American Isuzu Motors, 749
N.E.2d 16, 23 n.2 (Ill. App. 2001); Hyundai Motor Co. v. Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez, 995
S.W.2d 661, 664-66 (Tex. 1999); Wainwright v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority, 903 F.Supp. 133, 140 (D.D.C. 1995); Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417,
427 (2d Cir. 1969); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 126 (9th Cir. 1968).
-7-
7
defective and that the defect existed when it left defendant’s control either through expert
testimony or by excluding abnormal use and reasonable secondary causes for the problems
with the product.”  The third paragraph is adapted from MPJI-Cv 26:11 and Eaton Corp. v.
Wright, supra.  
Although MPJI-Cv 26:11 was drafted for use in “Strict Liability In Tort” actions, this
instruction can be modified for use in warranty actions because a breach of implied warranty
of merchantability action against a manufacturer is the functional equivalent of a strict
liability action,2 the only essential difference being that (1) in a strict liability action, the
plaintiff must prove that the defect in the product renders the product “unreasonably
dangerous,” while (2) in an implied warranty of merchantability action, the plaintiff must
prove that the defect in the product renders the product “unfit for the ordinary purposes for
which the product is used.”  In either of these actions, however, the plaintiff is not required
to present expert testimony on the “precise nature of the defect.”  
-8-
8