Case Title: O'BYRNE v. City of Spokane

Citation: 406 P.2d 595, 67 Wash. 2d 132

Docket Number: 

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1965-10-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
67 Wn.2d 132 (1965) 406 P.2d 595 S.J. O'BYRNE, Respondent, v. THE CITY OF SPOKANE, Appellant.[*] No. 37660. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department One. October 14, 1965. John P. Tracy, Jr., Howard A. Anderson, LeRoy C. Kinnie, Dudley L. Wilson, and Don R. Shaw, Jr., for appellant. Murphy & Merryman, by Patrick H. Murphy, for respondent. BARNETT, J.[] The facts in this case are concisely set out in the memorandum opinion of the trial court from which we quote: Section 4 provides: Section 89 of Art. 9 of the Spokane City Charter states: *135 The trial judge made findings of fact substantially as above. The court found that the proposed change would be beneficial to the city. Attention is called to finding of fact No. 7: In conclusion of law No. 1, the court stated: The court enjoined the city council from rerouting the thoroughfare as it proposed to do and rendered judgment for respondent. From this disposition the city of Spokane appeals. Counsel agree in their briefs on the main issue before the court. "We submit that the main issue before the court *136 is whether or not the usage of the alternate Thor Street route would constitute a major radical deviation...." [1] The general tenor of appellant's argument is that there is discretion in the city council to approve a rerouting. The appellant cites a Texas case, Clark v. Greer, 232 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950), wherein the court states: "It is within the discretion of the City Council of the City of Denison to say that such rerouting is an improvement to the avenues involved; ...." However, we have held just the opposite. In Hayes v. Seattle, 120 Wash. 372, 375, 207 Pac. 607 (1922), we held: In State ex rel. Traeger v. Carleton, 242 Minn. 296, 299, 64 N.W.2d 776 (1954), cited with approval in Davis v. Seattle, 56 Wn.2d 785, 355 P.2d 354 (1960), the general rule is stated as follows: Appellant relies on Davis v. Seattle, supra, for the proposition that, given good and sufficient reason for a change in route, a deviation from the bond issue may be allowed. That issue was never decided in Davis. In fact, the court expressly refrained from doing so because the issue was not necessary to the decision. Actually what was said by the majority opinion was, page 790: Clearly the inference from Davis is that if minor changes in a case, not then before the court, were to come up on appeal, the court would examine the rule. Nor is the present case one of minor changes. The project involved here was not one of several items each by itself, but one project composed of several items related to each other and endorsed and approved by the voters as a whole. The trial court found, and we agree, that the "proposed deviation ... constitutes a major deviation from the ordinance approved by the people, and is thus not within the discretion of the City Council." [2] In any event, whether or not we had agreed with the trial court, there was substantial evidence in the record to support its findings and it will not be disturbed on appeal. Thorndike v. Hesperian Orchards, Inc., 54 Wn.2d 570, 343 P.2d 183 (1959). Judgment affirmed. ROSELLINI, C.J., HILL, OTT, and HUNTER, JJ., concur. [*] Reported in 406 P.2d 595. [] Judge Barnett is serving as a judge pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to Art. 4, § 2(a) (amendment 38), state constitution.