Case Title: Ford Motor Company v. Jones

Citation: 

Docket Number: 030008

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2003-10-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
FORD MOTOR COMPANY 
 
OPINION BY CHIEF JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
 
 
                     October 31, 2003 
v.  Record No. 030008 
 
MARGARET JONES 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Jane M. Roush, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a plaintiff may take 
a voluntary nonsuit pursuant to Code § 8.01-380(A) after a 
judgment that confirmed a jury verdict had been reversed, and 
the case had been remanded to the circuit court for a new 
trial. 
 
Plaintiff, Margaret Jones, initially filed her motion for 
judgment against Ford Motor Company (Ford) and Cherner Lincoln 
Mercury-Annandale, Inc. (Cherner Lincoln Mercury).  She 
alleged that she and her husband purchased a 1991 Lincoln Town 
Car, manufactured by Ford, from Cherner Lincoln Mercury's 
predecessor in interest.  Plaintiff also alleged that she was 
injured when a defect in the car's cruise control system made 
the car accelerate suddenly without warning, causing the car 
to travel out of control and crash into a concrete stanchion. 
 
Plaintiff dismissed her cause of action against Cherner 
Lincoln Mercury.  The jury considered plaintiff's claims and 
returned a verdict in favor of Ford.  The circuit court 
entered a judgment confirming the verdict, and we granted 
plaintiff an appeal. 
 
Upon appeal, we held that the circuit court erred because 
it refused to permit plaintiff to introduce certain evidence 
and the court failed to properly instruct the jury.  We 
affirmed the judgment of the circuit court in part, reversed 
in part, and remanded the case for a new trial consistent with 
the views expressed in our opinion.  Jones v. Ford Motor 
Company, 263 Va. 237, 263-64, 559 S.E.2d 592, 606 (2002). 
 
After this case had been remanded to the circuit court, 
but prior to the start of the new trial, plaintiff requested a 
nonsuit pursuant to Code § 8.01-380(A), which states in 
pertinent part: 
 
"A party shall not be allowed to suffer a 
nonsuit as to any cause of action or claim, or any 
other party to the proceeding, unless he does so 
before a motion to strike the evidence has been 
sustained or before the jury retires from the bar or 
before the action has been submitted to the court 
for decision." 
 
Ford objected to plaintiff's nonsuit.  The circuit court 
overruled the objection and entered an order that permitted 
plaintiff to nonsuit her amended motion for judgment.  Ford 
appeals. 
 
Ford argues that Code § 8.01-380(A) does not permit 
plaintiff to take a voluntary nonsuit because, during the 
first trial, plaintiff's claims had been submitted to the jury 
 
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which retired and rendered a verdict.  Continuing, Ford argues 
that this Court's mandate that reversed and annulled the 
circuit court's judgment confirming the verdict has no effect 
upon the plaintiff's statutory right to take a nonsuit, and 
this Court's mandate is "immaterial to the operation of the 
nonsuit statute."*  Responding, plaintiff contends that after 
the case had been remanded for a new trial, she was entitled 
to take a nonsuit pursuant to Code § 8.01-380(A) because a new 
trial had not taken place and, therefore, no evidence had been 
presented, and the case had not been submitted to a jury or to 
a court for decision. 
 
Code § 8.01-380 permits a plaintiff to take one nonsuit 
as a matter of right.  A plaintiff's right to take a nonsuit, 
however, is not unlimited.  Dalloul v. Agbey, 255 Va. 511, 
514, 499 S.E.2d 279, 281 (1998); Bremer v. Doctor's Building 
Partnership, 251 Va. 74, 81, 465 S.E.2d 787, 791 (1996); Trout 
v. Commonwealth Transp. Commissioner, 241 Va. 69, 73, 400 
S.E.2d 172, 174 (1991); Khanna v. Dominion Bank, 237 Va. 242, 
                     
* Upon remand to the circuit court, plaintiff, over the 
objection of defendant, was permitted to file an amended 
motion for judgment that included certain claims that the 
circuit court dismissed during the first trial of this case, 
and those claims were not the subject of the first appeal.  
Ford does not challenge with an assignment of error in this 
appeal whether plaintiff can nonsuit claims that were 
dismissed during the first trial and, therefore, that issue is 
not before this Court. 
 
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245-46, 377 S.E.2d 378, 380-81 (1989).  We stated in Dalloul, 
255 Va. 511 at 514, 499 S.E.2d at 281: 
 
"The language of Code § 8.01-380 allows a 
plaintiff, among other things, the right to take one 
nonsuit of any cause of action or claim that has not 
been struck from the case or submitted to the trier 
of fact for decision . . . ." 
 
After a reversal of a circuit court's judgment and remand 
for a new trial, the litigants are restored to their original 
rights as though no previous trial had occurred, including the 
right to dismiss or nonsuit a case.  Nassif v. The Board of 
Supervisors, 231 Va. 472, 480, 345 S.E.2d 520, 525 (1986).  Of 
course, this principle does not apply to issues which, under 
the "law of the case" doctrine, are not subject to 
relitigation, see Lockheed Info. Mgmt. Systems v. Maximus, 
Inc., 259 Va. 92, 108, 524 S.E.2d 420, 429 (2000), or to 
parties and claims already dismissed with prejudice, or 
otherwise eliminated from a case, prior to a nonsuit, see 
Dalloul, 255 Va. at 514, 499 S.E.2d at 281. 
 
Even though plaintiff's claims of negligence and breach 
of implied warranties against Ford had been submitted to the 
jury during the first trial, we reversed the circuit court's 
judgment that confirmed that verdict.  Therefore, the jury's 
verdict in that trial had no legal efficacy and, thus, 
plaintiff's submission of her case to that jury cannot have 
 
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any effect upon the viability of her claims in the present 
proceeding and her right to take a nonsuit. 
 
As we held in Dalloul, Code § 8.01-380(A) permits a 
plaintiff to take a voluntary nonsuit of viable claims pending 
in the court at the time the nonsuit is taken.  Clearly, 
plaintiff took her nonsuit in this case after remand to the 
circuit court so none of the statutory restrictions upon 
plaintiff's right to a nonsuit existed.  Plaintiff's case had 
not been submitted to a jury, a motion to strike had not been 
sustained, and the case had not been submitted to the circuit 
court for decision.  Therefore, we hold that plaintiff was 
entitled to take a voluntary nonsuit, and the circuit court 
did not err in granting her motion. 
 
In view of our holding, we need not consider the 
litigants' remaining arguments.  We will affirm the judgment 
of the circuit court. 
Affirmed. 
 
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