Case Title: Sumner v. Sumner

Citation: 176 Vt. 452, 2004 VT 45, 852 A.2d 611

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2004-05-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Sumner v. Sumner (2003-267); 176 Vt. 452; 852 A.2d 611

2004 VT 45

[Filed 07-May-2004]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2004 VT 45

                                No. 2003-267

  Christine Sumner	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
       v.	                                 Chittenden Family Court

  John C. Sumner	                         October Term, 2003

  
  Linda Levitt, J.
  

  Mary P. Kehoe of Lisman, Webster, Kirkpatrick & Leckerling, P.C.,
    Burlington, for  Plaintiff-Appellee.

  Todd C. Hartsuff, Burlington, for Defendant-Appellant.

  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Johnson, Skoglund and Reiber, JJ.

       ¶ 1.  DOOLEY, J.   Appellant, John C. Sumner [husband], appeals an
  order by the Chittenden Family Court directing  him to execute a quitclaim
  deed in favor of his ex-wife, appellee Christine Sumner [wife], to
  implement a provision of their 1998 divorce decree granting her title to
  the marital home.  Husband argues that the order fails to provide him
  security in the home to implement another provision of the divorce order
  requiring wife to pay him $21,455 for his interest in the home when the
  home is sold or the youngest child of the parties graduates from high
  school or turns 20 years of age.  We affirm.
   
       ¶  2.  The parties were divorced on February 10, 1998; at that time
  they had three minor children.  The final order and decree that is the
  subject of this dispute was based on a stipulation and was issued on May
  10, 1998.  Relevant here, Paragraphs 15 and 16 provide:

    15.  The dwelling house of the parties located in Colchester,
    Vermont shall become the sole and separate property of [wife]. 
    She shall be responsible for all costs thereto, including but not
    limited to mortgage, taxes, insurance and maintenance since June
    1, 1995 and hold [husband] harmless therefrom.

    16. [Wife] shall pay [husband] the sum of $21,455.00 for his
    marital interest in said dwelling house.  Said sum shall be paid
    upon sale of the house or at such time as the youngest child
    graduates high school or turns 20, whichever event happens first. 
    The sum owed by [wife to husband] shall accrue simple interest at
    the rate of 4% per annum.*

    *The sum shall be adjusted by deducting from [husband's] share at
    the time of payment, reasonable expenses and costs of sale
    (exclusive of commission), if any . . .

  To date, none of the events in Paragraph 16 has occurred.  

       ¶  3.  In March 2003, wife attempted to refinance the house to pay for
  the oldest child's college tuition.  Her lender requested that husband
  execute a quitclaim deed evidencing a transfer of all his rights to the
  property.  Wife forwarded this request to husband, and proposed that in
  exchange for his execution of the quitclaim deed she would execute a
  promissory note and mortgage deed  (with a subordination clause for future
  refinancing) in his favor.  Husband refused to sign the quitclaim deed, and
  on April 16, 2003 wife filed an emergency motion to enforce to compel
  husband to sign the quitclaim deed.  This motion was filed while husband's
  counsel was out of town and with a request for service by mail; husband did
  not receive notice before the motion was decided.
   
       ¶  4.  The trial court granted wife's motion to enforce ex parte,
  but stated "15 V.S.A. 754 seems to make a certified copy of the judgment
  the equivalent of a deed, when the judgment is recorded in the land
  records."  When he received notice of the court's decision, husband
  recorded a certified copy of the divorce decree in the Colchester land
  records.  Through correspondence, husband notified wife of the recording,
  claiming that the filing fully implemented the court's order,  and informed
  her that he would not execute the quitclaim deed because he believed he had
  rights in the property that would be extinguished if he did so.  Husband
  further explained that he would execute the quitclaim deed only if it was
  redrafted with language stating it was subject to the terms of the divorce
  decree.

       ¶  5.  Although the decree was promptly filed, the lender refused to
  accept it as verification that wife held clear title, and wife filed a
  motion to reconsider her request that husband be ordered to provide a
  quitclaim deed.  This motion reiterated the lender's request and argued
  that the divorce decree did not give husband any rights in the property to
  secure wife's eventual payment obligation.  The court granted the motion
  and ordered husband "to quitclaim his interest in the home to [wife] in
  order to effectuate the terms of the Final Order."  Again, the motion was
  granted before husband received notice that it was filed.

       ¶  6.  After the motion was granted, husband's counsel entered an
  appearance and filed a response to wife's emergency motion to enforce and
  motion to reconsider.  The trial court denied husband's motion stating,
  "The court's order stands."  Despite the order, husband has never signed
  and delivered the quitclaim deed to wife.  He has appealed to this Court. 
   
       ¶  7.  On appeal husband argues the following: (1) the lender must
  accept the recorded divorce decree as evidence of clear title; (2) the
  divorce decree, alone or in combination with 15 V.S.A. § 754 or 12 V.S.A. §
  2901, created an encumbrance on the house in favor of husband, and his
  execution of a quitclaim deed would extinguish his rights granted in the
  decree; (3) the family court improperly modified the divorce decree by
  compelling husband to commit an act not specified in the decree; and (4)
  the court erred and abused its discretion when it granted wife's motions ex
  parte.

       ¶  8.  We first address husband's second point because it is central
  to the issues on appeal.  On this point, the fundamental disagreement
  between the parties is the effect of Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the 1998
  divorce decree.  Citing Paragraph 16, husband argues that the decree
  necessarily gave him some kind of security interest in the property to
  secure wife's eventual obligation to pay him for his share of the value of
  the marital home.  Citing Paragraph 15, wife argues that the decree gave
  husband no interest in the property to secure the debt.
   
       ¶  9.  We have used contract principles to construe divorce decrees
  based on stipulations.  See Kim v. Kim, 173 Vt. 525, 525,