Case Title: Cheryl Makos v. Wisconsin Masons Health Care Fund

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1996AP000174

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1997-06-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-0174 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Estate of Cheryl Makos, by the Personal  
Representative, Calvin Makos and Calvin Makos  
Individually, Amanda Makos, Cody Makos and  
Ashley Makos, by their Guardian Ad Litem, Gary  
R. Weidner, Esq.,   
        Plaintiffs-Appellants,  
         v.  
Wisconsin Masons Health Care Fund, Associates  
In Pathology, S.C., Dr. Steven E. Bodemer and  
Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund,   
        Defendants-Respondents,  
ABC Insurance Company and DEF Insurance  
Company,   
        Defendant.  
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 20, 1997 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
March 6, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Marinette 
 
JUDGE: 
Charles D. Heath 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Bablitch, J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
 
   Wilcox, J., joins 
 
 
Crooks, J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
Dissented: 
Bradley, J. dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
   Abrahamson, C.J., joins dissent. 
 
Not Participating: Geske, J., did not participate 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there were briefs 
(in the Supreme Court) by Timothy J. Aiken, Kelly L. Centofanti 
and Aiken & Scoptur, S.C., Milwaukee and oral argument by Timothy 
J. Aiken. 
 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief 
(in the Supreme Court) by Samuel J. Leib, Christine A. Koehler 
and Leib and Associates, S.C., Milwaukee and oral argument by 
Samuel J. Leib. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by David M. 
Skoglind, Edward E. Robinson and Warshafsky, Rotter, Tarnoff, 
Reinhardt, & Bloch, S.C.,, Milwaukee for the Wisconsin Academy of 
Trial Lawyers. 
 
 
 
 
No.  96-0174 
 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing 
and modification.  The final version will 
appear in the bound volume of the official 
reports. 
 
 
No. 96-0174 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Estate of Cheryl Makos, by the Personal 
Representative, Calvin Makos and Calvin 
Makos Individually, Amanda Makos, Cody 
Makos and Ashley Makos, by their Guardian 
Ad Litem, Gary R. Weidner, Esq.,  
         
        Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
          
        v. 
 
Wisconsin Masons Health Care Fund, 
Associates In Pathology, S.C., Dr. Steven 
E. Bodemer and Wisconsin Patients 
Compensation Fund,  
         
        Defendants-Respondents, 
 
ABC Insurance Company and DEF Insurance 
Company,  
         
        Defendant. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 20, 1997 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
Appeal from an order and judgment of the Circuit Court for 
Marinette County, Charles D. Heath, Circuit Court Judge.  
Reversed and cause remanded. 
¶1 
DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.  The issue in this case is 
whether Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b),
1 a statute of repose that bars 
                     
1 Wis. Stat. § 893.55 provides, in relevant part, as 
follows:  
 
 
No.  96-0174 
 
 
2 
medical malpractice actions commenced more than five years from 
the date of the alleged act or omission without regard to the 
date of discovery, is constitutional.  We hold that this statute 
is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt as applied in this 
case because it was in violation of procedural due process as 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution
2 and in violation of the right to remedy provision 
of Article I, § 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution
3 to eliminate 
Cheryl Makos' claim for injury before she knew or had the 
opportunity to know that she was injured.   
¶2 
The relevant facts in this case are undisputed.  
Cheryl Makos ("Makos" or "Cheryl Makos estate") had a growth on 
her left leg biopsied on February 13, 1985.  Dr. Steven E. 
                                                                  
(1)[A]n action to recover damages for injury 
arising from any treatment or operation performed by, 
or from any omission by, a person who is a health care 
provider, . . . shall be commenced within the later 
of: 
(b) One year from the date the injury was 
discovered or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence 
should have been discovered, except that an action may 
not be commenced under this paragraph more than 5 
years from the date of the act or omission. 
2 The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides in relevant part that "No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. Amend. 
XIV.  
 
3 Article I, §  9 of the Wisconsin Constitution guarantees 
every person a remedy for wrongs committed against him or her.  
It provides as follows: 
Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the 
laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive 
in his person, property, or character; he ought to 
obtain justice freely, and without being obliged to 
purchase it, completely and without denial, promptly 
and without delay, conformably to the laws. 
Wis. Const. Art. 1, sec. 9.   
 
 
No.  96-0174 
 
 
3 
Bodemer of Associates in Pathology examined the growth and 
diagnosed it as non-malignant.  Cheryl Makos was later diagnosed 
with metastatic malignant melanoma on May 27, 1994.  At this 
time, the growth that was biopsied in 1985 was re-examined and 
found to be malignant.   
¶3 
Cheryl Makos filed this medical malpractice action in 
the Circuit Court for Marinette County against Dr. Bodemer and 
others on May 3, 1995.  The action was filed within the one-year 
discovery rule set forth in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b), but more 
than five years after the expiration of the five-year statute of 
repose set forth in that section.  Cheryl Makos died on May 19, 
1995, due to illness and disease.  Her estate and her family 
continue as parties in this action. 
¶4 
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint 
on the grounds that the statute of limitations had expired.  The 
Circuit Court for Marinette County, Judge Charles D. Heath, 
granted the motion to dismiss on November 6, 1995.  A judgment 
for the defendants was entered on December 11, 1995.  The 
plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal on January 12, 1996, and 
the court of appeals certified the appeal to this court on July 
30, 1996.  We accepted the certification, and we now reverse the 
order and judgment of the trial court and remand for a trial.   
¶5 
We address the single issue of whether Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(1)(b) 
is 
constitutional. 
 
Whether 
a 
statute 
is 
constitutional is a question of law that this court reviews de 
novo.  Association of State Prosecutors v. Milwaukee County, 199 
Wis. 2d 549, 557, 544 N.W.2d 888 (1996) (citation omitted).  
Statutes are presumed to be constitutional; therefore, "[w]hen 
 
 
No.  96-0174 
 
 
4 
attacking the constitutionality of a statute, the contesting 
party must prove the unconstitutionality of the statute beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  Id. (citations omitted).   
¶6 
Makos 
asserts that 
Wis. 
Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) is 
unconstitutional because it violates, inter alia, her procedural 
due process rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment 
because she was never given her day in court.  In State ex rel. 
Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978), 
this court explained as follows the right that every person has 
to his or her day in court: 
 
Whatever the precise status of the right of access to 
the courts, it is clear that due process is satisfied 
if the statutory procedures provide an opportunity to 
be heard in court at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner.  Due process is flexible and 
requires only such procedural protections as the 
particular situation demands. 
Id. at 512, citing Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 
(1976).
4   
¶7 
As quoted above, this court has consistently held that 
procedural due process requires that an individual who has life, 
liberty, or property at stake must be afforded the "opportunity 
to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."  
See, e.g., State v. Achterberg, 201 Wis. 2d 291, 300, 548 N.W.2d 
515 (1996); State v. Nordness, 128 Wis. 2d 15, 34, 381 N.W.2d 
300 (1986); In Interest of S.D.R., 109 Wis. 2d 567, 572, 326 
                     
4 The court in State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 
2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978), relied on the guarantee of due 
process of law provided by the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and Article 1, section 1 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution. All mention of due process hereinafter 
shall be understood to refer to both the United States and 
Wisconsin Constitutions.   
 
 
No.  96-0174 
 
 
5 
N.W.2d 762 (1982); Mid-Plains Telephone, Inc. v. Public Service 
Commission, 56 Wis. 2d 780, 785-86, 202 N.W.2d 907 (1973).  This 
opportunity to be heard, this day in court, is essential to the 
principles of fundamental fairness that are behind the Due 
Process Clause.  See generally Martin v. Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 
156, 197-98, 531 N.W.2d 70 (1995)(retroactive cap on damages 
with little notice to potential plaintiffs violates due process 
when notions of fundamental fairness are considered);
5 State v. 
Heft, 185 Wis. 2d 288, 302-03, 517 N.W.2d 494 (1994) (Due 
Process Clause requires that "prevailing notions of fundamental 
fairness" be considered).  The question in the case at bar is 
whether, in keeping with the prevailing notions of fundamental 
fairness,  Cheryl Makos was provided with a full and fair 
opportunity to be heard after she discovered that she had been 
injured.
6 
¶8 
The fundamental fairness approach was recently taken 
by this court in another medical malpractice case, Martin v. 
Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156.  In Martin, a jury found that a 
physician negligently failed to inform the parents of a minor 
patient of the existence of alternate forms of care and 
                     
5 While Martin v. Richards involved substantive, not 
procedural, due process issues, we rely on it here for its 
discussion of general notions of fundamental fairness. 
6 
Relying 
on 
Matthews 
v. 
Eldridge, 
424 
U.S. 
319 
(1975)(statutorily conferred right to Social Security benefits 
requires 
adequate 
procedural 
protections) 
and 
Martin 
v. 
Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 198, 531 N.W.2d 70 (1995)(statutorily 
conferred "right to unlimited damages" violated by retroactive 
legislation), we conclude that the plaintiff, Makos, had a 
statutorily conferred property right to file a claim against a 
health care provider who committed a wrong against her.    
 
 
No.  96-0174 
 
 
6 
treatment. The jury awarded the parents almost $5 million in 
damages.  However, during the time period after the injury to 
the minor and before her parents filed suit, the legislature 
published a law that took effect only one day later.  This law 
provided for a cap on noneconomic damages and was written so as 
to apply retroactively.  This court found the retroactive 
application of the cap to be in violation of due process partly 
because 
such 
application 
offended 
notions 
of 
fundamental 
fairness.  See Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 197-98. 
¶9 
In Martin, this court found the one-day time limit in 
which the plaintiffs had to file their action so as not to lose 
their right to unlimited damages "inherently unfair."  Id. at 
209.  In this case, Cheryl Makos was allowed zero days to file 
her action.  Consistent with the holding in Martin, we find this 
to be fundamentally unfair and in violation of principles of due 
process.  Cheryl Makos' estate is entitled to an opportunity to 
be heard.                 
¶10 On February 13, 1985, Cheryl Makos was told by Dr. 
Bodemer that the growth on her leg that had been biopsied was 
not malignant.  Over nine years later, in May of 1994, she was 
diagnosed with metastatic malignant melanoma.  It was not until 
this time when the growth from 1985 was re-examined that Cheryl 
Makos learned of Dr. Bodemer's initial misdiagnosis of her 
growth.  Under the medical malpractice statute at issue in this 
case, Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b), the statute of repose for 
filing an action against Dr. Bodemer for the misdiagnosis in 
1985 expired in February of 1990.  This was over four years 
before Cheryl Makos was injured by the alleged negligence 
 
 
No.  96-0174 
 
 
7 
(leaving untreated malignancy in her system) or could have 
proven an injury.  She did not and could not have discovered the 
alleged negligence of Dr. Bodemer within the five-year statutory 
limit.   
¶11 We find that to preclude this action was in violation 
of Cheryl Makos' procedural due process rights.  There is no 
basic fairness to eliminate her claim for injury before she knew 
or could have known that she was injured.  The operation of the 
statute 
of 
repose 
effectively 
denied 
Cheryl 
Makos 
her 
opportunity to be heard because the doors of the courtroom were 
closed before she was even injured.  Because her procedural due 
process rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment were 
violated, 
we 
find 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.55(1)(b) 
to 
be 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt as applied in this 
case.
7   
¶12 The defendants cite to two court of appeals' cases in 
which 
challenges 
to 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 893.55(1)(b) failed, Miller v. Kretz, 191 Wis. 2d 573, 531 
N.W.2d 93 (Ct. App. 1995) and Halverson v. Tydrich, 156 Wis. 2d 
202, 456 N.W.2d 852 (Ct. App. 1990), in support of their 
argument that Makos' claim should be barred by the statute of 
                     
7 Makos' situation is unique, and one that will likely arise 
only in rare situations.  According to Staff Paper #10 found in 
the legislative drafting file for this statute, 98.9 percent of 
all adults and 95 percent of all minors alleging medical 
malpractice file claims within five years of the occurrence of 
the incident—the act or omission by the health care provider.  
Wisconsin Legislative Council, Malpractice Committee, Analysis 
of Statistical Data and Recent Wisconsin Cases on Statutes of 
Limitation, at 2 (1976). 
 
 
No.  96-0174 
 
 
8 
repose.  We find that the reasoning in these cases is not 
applicable to the case at bar.  
¶13 In Halverson, the court of appeals held that Wis. 
Stat. §§  893.55(1) and 893.56 were constitutional "as applied 
to Halverson."  Halverson, 156 Wis. 2d at 206 (emphasis added). 
 Halverson claimed that the statutes as applied to him violated 
his equal protection and due process rights because of his 
status as 
a 
minor.  The 
court 
disagreed, 
finding 
that 
"Halverson's minority is irrelevant under the facts of this 
case."  Id. at 215.  The court explained that "Halverson is 
identically situated with the adult who fails within five years 
to discover an injury caused by medical malpractice."  Id.  
Consequently, 
Halverson's 
constitutional 
challenges 
to 
the 
statute failed.   
¶14 In Miller, the plaintiff claimed that Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(1)(b) was unconstitutional because it violated the 
Equal Protection Clauses of the Wisconsin and United States 
Constitutions.  The court of appeals declined to find the 
statute unconstitutional in its entirety based on the equal 
protection argument because the legislature was effectuating a 
rational purpose in enacting the statute.  The court explained 
that "[t]he classification of health care providers and the 
connected 
statutes 
of 
limitation 
are 
not 
irrational 
or 
arbitrary, but based on rational, reasonable criteria."  Miller, 
191 Wis. 2d at 585.  
¶15 Neither the reasoning of the court of appeals in 
Halverson nor that in Miller applies to the situation in the 
case of Cheryl Makos.  We are not invalidating the statute on 
 
 
No.  96-0174 
 
 
9 
its face as suggested by the plaintiff in Miller.  We do not 
speak to whether different classes of plaintiffs or defendants 
are treated differently as asserted in both Halverson and 
Miller.  Instead, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) is 
unconstitutional as it is applied to Cheryl Makos in this case 
because her procedural due process rights and notions of 
fundamental fairness were violated by closing the doors of the 
courtroom to Cheryl Makos before she was even injured by the 
alleged act or omission.  
¶16 The defendants in this action further contend that in 
order for Makos to prevail, this court must overrule its own 
recent precedent from CLL Associates v. Arrowhead Pacific Corp., 
174 Wis. 2d 604, 497 N.W.2d 115 (1993).  We disagree.  CLL 
involved the question of when a contract cause of action accrues 
under Wis. Stat. § 893.43, Wisconsin's six-year statute of 
limitations for contract actions.  This court held "that under 
sec. 893.43, a contract cause of action accrues at the moment 
the contract is breached, regardless of whether the injured 
party knew or should have known that the breach occurred."  Id. 
at 607.  At first glance, it may seem that CLL would indeed 
preclude Cheryl Makos' medical malpractice action.  However, CLL 
involved a statute of limitations while this case involves a 
statute of repose.  These are distinct legal concepts that 
deserve to be treated as such.
8  Because we recognize the legal 
                     
8 Black's Law Dictionary explains the distinctions as 
follows: 
Statute 
of 
repose. 
 
"Statutes 
of 
limitations" 
extinguish, after period of time, right to prosecute 
accrued cause of action; "statute of repose," by 
contrast, limits potential liability by limiting time 
during which cause of action can arise. . . . It is 
 
 
No.  96-0174 
 
 
10
distinction between a statute of limitations and a statute of 
repose, we find CLL inapplicable to the case at bar. 
¶17 In addition to violating the due process guarantees of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, we hold that Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) 
as applied to Cheryl Makos in this action violates Article 1, 
§ 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Article 1, § 9 guarantees 
that every person shall be afforded a remedy for wrongs 
committed against his or her "person, property, or character."
9  
This court has long held that the "certain remedy" clause of 
this provision, while not guaranteeing to litigants the exact 
remedy they desire, entitles Wisconsin residents "to their day 
in court."  Metzger v. Department of Taxation, 35 Wis. 2d 119, 
129, 150 N.W.2d 431 (1967), citing New York Life Ins. Co. v. 
State, 192 Wis. 404, 412, 211 N.W. 288, 212 N.W. 801 (1927).  
See also Neuhaus v. Clark County, 14 Wis. 2d 222, 111 N.W.2d 180 
                                                                  
distinguishable from statute of limitations, in that 
statute of repose cuts off right of action after 
specified time measured from delivery of product or 
completion of work, regardless of time of accrual . . 
.  
Black's Law Dictionary 1411 (6th ed. 1990)(citations omitted). 
9 An increasing number of states are applying their own 
state 
constitution's 
"right 
to 
remedy" 
or 
"open 
courts" 
provisions to situations involving statutes of repose.  For a 
detailed discussion of medical malpractice statutes of repose in 
relation to "right to remedy" provisions, see Christopher J. 
Trombeth, 
The 
Unconstitutionality 
of 
Medical 
Malpractice 
Statutes of Repose: Judicial Conscience Versus Legislative Will, 
34 Vill. L. Rev. 397 (1989).  Trombeth spells out the 
differences between statutes of limitation and statutes of 
repose.  He also provides a history of statutes of repose and a 
summary of trends in recent years with respect to medical 
malpractice statutes of repose and their treatment in state 
courts.  See also David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 Temp. 
L. 
Rev. 
1197 
(1992); 
Daniel 
W. 
Lewis, 
Utah's 
Emerging 
Constitutional Weapon—The Open Courts Provision: Condemain v. 
University Hospital, 1990 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1107. 
 
 
No.  96-0174 
 
 
11
(1961).   If there is a statutory foundation for a lawsuit, a 
plaintiff has the right to his or her day in court.  See Oliver 
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 103 Wis. 2d 644, 309 N.W.2d 383 (Ct. App. 
1981). 
¶18 In Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 
382, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975), this court found unconstitutional 
Wis. Stat. § 893.155, a six-year statute of repose covering 
improvements to real property.  In addition to invalidating the 
statute on its face for improper classifications, this court 
noted that the statute would foreclose redress by plaintiffs 
because it expired long before any injury actually occurred to 
them.  Consequently, this court found that because "the statute 
deprives a plaintiff of a remedy for a wrong that is recognized 
by 
the 
laws 
of 
the 
state," 
it 
is 
"therefore 
also 
unconstitutional under art. I, sec. 9, of the Wisconsin 
Constitution."  Id. at 384.   
¶19 The situation of Cheryl Makos is similar to that of 
the plaintiffs in Kallas.  In the case at bar, the Wisconsin 
Statutes provide that anyone who is injured by an act or 
omission of a health care provider shall have a right to recover 
damages.  See Wis. Stat. Ch. 655.  However, under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(1)(b), the statute of repose expired over four years 
before Cheryl Makos knew or should have known that she was 
allegedly injured by the misdiagnosis in February of 1985.  Like 
the court in Kallas, we find that the application of this 
statute to Cheryl Makos violates Article I, § 9 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution by depriving her of a remedy for a wrong that is 
clearly recognized by the laws of this state--a wrong that she 
 
 
No.  96-0174 
 
 
12
did not discover until after her claim was barred by the statute 
of repose.
10 
¶20 In conclusion, we hold that Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) 
is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt as applied to 
Cheryl Makos under these particular facts.  It violates both her 
procedural due process rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and her right to a 
remedy as guaranteed by Article I, § 9 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution
11 because it is fundamentally unfair to have closed 
the doors of the courtroom on Cheryl Makos before she was even 
injured by the act or omission alleged.  
¶21 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order of the 
trial court granting the defendants' motion to dismiss and 
                     
10 As the amicus curiae Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers 
notes, other states have struck down statutes of repose for 
medical negligence claims as violative of their own state 
constitutions' "right to remedy" or "open courts" provisions.  
See McCollum v. Sisters of Charity of Nazareth Health Corp., 799 
S.W.2d 15, 19 (Ky. 1990)(five-year statute of repose for claims 
of negligence or malpractice against physicians, surgeons, 
dentists, or hospitals violates open courts provision of 
Kentucky Constitution); Hardy v. VerMeulen, 512 N.E.2d 626, 629 
(Ohio 1987)(four-year statute of repose, as applied to medical 
malpractice claims, violates the right-to-a-remedy provision of 
the Ohio Constitution); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 923 
(Tex. 1984)(two-year statute of repose for medical malpractice 
actions 
violates 
open 
courts 
provision 
of 
the 
Texas 
Constitution). 
 
See 
also 
Christopher 
J. 
Trombeth, 
The 
Unconstitutionality of Medical Malpractice Statutes of Repose: 
Judicial Conscience Versus Legislative Will, 34 Vill. L. Rev. 
397 (1989).      
11 Makos raises several other challenges to Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.55(1)(b), including the assertions that it violates equal 
protection and substantive due process.  However, because we 
find the statute unconstitutional as applied under the facts of 
this case, we decline to reach these other issues. 
 
 
No.  96-0174 
 
 
13
remand for a trial on the issue of the alleged medical 
malpractice committed by Dr. Bodemer. 
By the Court.—Reversed and cause remanded. 
 
 
¶22 Justice Janine P. Geske did not participate.   
No. 96-0174.wab 
 
1 
¶23 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. (Concurring).    I concur 
in the mandate reversing and remanding this case for a 
trial on the issue of the alleged medical malpractice 
committed by Dr. Bodemar.  I cannot join its rationale.  
¶24 I frame the issue as follows:  whether a 
diagnosis is a “treatment,” “operation,” or “omission” 
within the meaning of the statute.  It is fundamental that 
this 
court 
does 
not 
reach 
constitutional 
issues 
unnecessarily.  Here, I conclude that the statute itself 
resolves the issue of whether a diagnosis comes within the 
terms of Wis. Stat. § 893.55: it does not.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully concur. 
¶25 The relevant facts are undisputed.  Cheryl Makos 
had a growth on her left leg biopsied on February 13, 1985. 
 Dr. Steven Bodemer examined the biopsied tissue.  His 
diagnosis was that the growth was not malignant.  That 
diagnosis was later found to be incorrect:  it was 
malignant. 
 
Unfortunately 
for 
Cheryl 
Makos, 
the 
misdiagnosis was not discovered until the five year statute 
of repose had run.  Even more tragically, it killed her.  
She died on May 19, 1995. 
¶26 The statute, in relevant part, states:  “[A]n 
action to recover damages for injury arising from any 
treatment or operation performed by, or from any omission 
by, a person who is a health care provider . . . shall be 
commenced within . . . (b) . . . five years from the date 
of the act or omission.” 
No. 96-0174.wab 
 
2 
¶27 A diagnosis is neither an operation nor an 
omission.  Thus, the only issue is whether a diagnosis is a 
“treatment” within the meaning of the statute. 
¶28 The statutes are replete with instances in which 
the legislature indicates that there is a difference 
between “diagnosis” and “treatment.”  See Wis. Stats. 
§ 448.01(8)(“’Podiatry’ or ‘podiatric medicine and surgery’ 
means that branch or system of treating the sick which is 
limited to the diagnosis, or mechanical, medical or 
surgical treatment or treatment by the use of drugs, of the 
feet”)(emphasis added); § 448.01(9)(“’Practice of medicine 
and surgery’ means: . . . (b) [t]o apply principles or 
techniques 
of 
medical 
sciences 
in 
the 
diagnosis 
or 
prevention of any of the conditions described in par. (a) 
and in sub. (2)”)(emphasis added); § 448.08 (“’Hospital’ 
means an institution . . . which is primarily engaged in 
providing 
facilities 
for 
diagnostic 
and 
therapeutic 
services for the surgical and medical diagnosis, treatment 
and care . . .”)(emphasis added); § 655.02(1)(i)(“[T]his 
chapter applies to . . . [a]n entity operated in this state 
that is an affiliate of a hospital and that provides 
diagnosis or treatment of, or care for”)(emphasis added); 
§ 655.27(3)(b)(2)(”With respect to fees paid by physicians, 
the rule shall provide for not more than 4 payment 
classifications, based upon the amount of surgery performed 
and the risk of diagnostic and therapeutic services 
provided or procedures performed.”)(emphasis added).  In 
No. 96-0174.wab 
 
3 
addition, when defining the “practice of medicine and 
surgery,” 
the 
legislature 
refers 
separately 
to 
the 
“exam[ination] into the fact, condition or cause of human 
health or disease,” i.e., diagnosis, and the treatment of 
human health or disease: “or, to treat, operate, prescribe 
or advise for the same.”  Wis. Stat. § 448.01(9)(a).  
Accordingly, it can safely be said that the legislature 
does distinguish the terms, and uses the term “treatment” 
when it means treatment, not diagnosis.  Its failure to use 
the 
term 
diagnosis 
in 
this 
statute 
is, 
I 
believe, 
conclusive on the issue of whether the legislature intended 
to include diagnosis within the term treatment.  It did 
not.  Had the legislature so intended, it would have used 
both, as it did many times in treating the same general 
subject 
matter 
of 
medical 
practice 
and 
health 
care 
liability.   
¶29 Counsel for the plaintiff did not raise this 
statutory construction argument in its brief.  When asked 
why at oral argument, plaintiff’s counsel considered it and 
seemingly without benefit of research or reflection, opined 
that it might be inconsistent with Martin to hold that the 
term treatment in this statute of repose does not include 
diagnosis.  Counsel’s concerns are without merit. 
¶30 In Martin v. Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 531 
N.W.2d 70 (1995), the statute under scrutiny was the 
informed consent statute, Wis. Stat. § 448.30.  That 
statute was rich with legislative and case law history.  
No. 96-0174.wab 
 
4 
Specifically, we noted that in adopting § 448.30, the 
Wisconsin legislature codified the standard articulated in 
Scaria v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 68 Wis. 2d 1, 
227 N.W.2d 647 (1975).  Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 174.  We 
cited to the Analysis by the Legislative Reference Bureau, 
1981 A.B. 941:  “This bill places in the statutes the 
standard of care that physicians are required to meet under 
Scaria.”  Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 174.  In that case, the 
plaintiff’s injuries resulted from complications associated 
with an aortogram, a diagnostic procedure.   
¶31 We took care to point out that only with respect 
to the informed consent statute was there no difference: 
“The distinction between diagnostic and medical treatments 
is not in and of itself significant to an analysis of 
informed consent.”  Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 175(emphasis 
added).   Throughout the case, we went to great lengths to 
distinguish the two terms:  “We are not dealing primarily 
with the professional competence nor the quality of the 
services 
rendered 
by 
a 
doctor 
in 
his 
diagnosis 
or 
treatment.”  Id. at 173 (emphasis added).  “[W]hat is 
reasonably necessary for a reasonable person to make an 
intelligent decision with respect to the choices of 
treatment or diagnosis.”  Id. at 174 (emphasis added).  
Also see, Id. at 175 (“with respect to the choices of 
treatment or diagnosis”); Id. at 176 (“the existence of any 
methods of diagnosis or treatment”); Id. (“with respect to 
the choices of treatment or diagnosis”); Id. (“to treat a 
No. 96-0174.wab 
 
5 
patient or attempt to diagnose a medical problem”); Id. 
(“to 
request 
an 
alternative 
treatment 
or 
method 
of 
diagnosis”); Id. at 182 (“the choices of treatment or 
diagnosis, a reasonable person . . . would have wanted to 
know.”)(emphasis added). 
¶32 Thus, in Martin, the history of the informed 
consent statute compelled the result.  Here, in construing 
this statute of repose, Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b), we have 
no such history.  We have the words of the statute before 
us, and the words do not include the term “diagnosis.”  
When faced with the task of construing this limiting 
statute, we must interpret the statute strictly:  
 
[T]his 
court, 
in 
accordance 
with 
generally 
accepted 
standards 
of 
jurisprudence, 
has 
interpreted statutes of limitation so that no 
person’s cause of action will be barred unless 
clearly mandated by the legislature. . . .  In 
accordance 
with 
that 
general 
philosophy 
of 
insuring that litigants shall have their day in 
court unless clearly barred, words of doubtful or 
ambivalent import have been construed by this 
court to bar only those actions the legislature 
intended to extinguish. 
Saunders v. DEC International, Inc., 85 Wis. 2d 70, 
74, 270 N.W.2d 176 (1978).   
¶33 This statute fails to show a clear mandate to 
include diagnosis within its ban.  The legislature has 
shown by repeated example it knows the difference between 
“treatment” and “diagnosis.”  Had the legislature intended 
that diagnosis be part of the statute, it could have easily 
done so as it had in numerous instances.  It did not. 
No. 96-0174.wab 
 
6 
¶34 I would prefer that we request further briefs 
from the parties on the issue as I have framed it.  Failing 
that, I join the mandate of the lead opinion but not its 
rationale.  I would hold that a misdiagnosis as occurred 
here does not come within the meaning of the statute.  I 
concur.
12 
¶35 I am authorized to state that Justice Jon P. 
Wilcox joins this concurring opinion.    
                     
12 
The 
dissent 
raises 
the 
possibility 
that 
the 
rationale 
of 
this 
concurring 
opinion 
raises 
equal 
protection concerns.  I disagree.  The statute is presumed 
constitutional. 
 
Milwaukee 
Brewers 
Baseball 
Club 
v. 
Wisconsin Dep’t. of Health & Social Services, 130 Wis. 2d 
79, 98-99, 375 N.W.2d 220 (1986).  It is presumed the 
legislature 
had 
a 
rational 
basis 
for 
distinguishing 
diagnosis from treatment.  Id.  One can easily conclude 
that the legislature perceived that differences such as 
frequency of claims, amounts of claims, or a myriad of 
other differences justified the distinction. 
 
No. 96-0174.npc 
 
1 
¶36 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J. (Concurring).  Due to the 
application of the statute of repose contained in Wis. 
Stat. § 893.55(1)(b), neither Cheryl Makos nor her Estate 
(collectively "Makos") have any possibility of recovery 
even though a legal wrong may have been committed.  
Furthermore, it is undisputed that Makos could not have 
discovered the injury until after the statute of repose had 
run; therefore, the statute of repose has completely denied 
Makos the right to bring a medical malpractice claim.  
Under 
these 
circumstances, 
and 
based 
on 
the 
legal 
principles discussed herein, I conclude that the statute of 
repose is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  It 
deprives Makos of the right to a remedy in violation of 
Article I, Section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  I 
therefore join that portion of the lead opinion written by 
Justice Steinmetz which involves art. I, § 9.  However, 
since Makos prevails on this basis, I do not reach the 
issues of procedural due process, substantive due process, 
or equal protection.  In addition, although I agree with 
the rationale set forth in the lead opinion regarding art. 
I, § 9, I write separately to further explain my reasons 
for concluding that Makos has been deprived of the right to 
a remedy in violation of art. I, § 9, and to suggest a 
framework for future cases.
13  Accordingly, I join the 
                     
13  I do not attempt to analyze prior cases of this 
court on the basis of the framework suggested herein. 
No. 96-0174.npc 
 
2 
majority in reversing the circuit court's order and 
judgment, and remanding this cause for a trial. 
¶37 Article 
I, 
Section 9 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Constitution, commonly referred to as the "remedy for 
wrongs" provision, provides: 
 
Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in 
the laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may 
receive in his person, property, or character;  
he ought to obtain justice freely, and without 
being obliged to purchase it, completely and 
without 
denial, 
promptly 
and 
without 
delay, 
conformably to the laws. 
This 
provision, 
and 
thirty-eight 
similar 
state 
constitutional 
provisions,
14 
originally 
derive 
from  
Chapter 40 of the Magna Carta, in which King John promised: 
 "To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or 
delay, right or justice."  David Schuman, The Right to a 
Remedy, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 1197, 1199 (1992); see also Mulder 
v. Acme-Cleveland Corp., 95 Wis. 2d 173, 189-90 n.3, 290 
N.W.2d 
276 
(1980) 
(quoting 
Christianson 
v. 
Pioneer 
Furniture Co., 101 Wis. 343, 347-48, 77 N.W. 174, 77 N.W. 
917 (1898)).  This promise was intended to prevent the 
practice of selling writs, which were bribes "demanded and 
taken to procure the benefits of the laws."  Mulder, 95 
Wis. 2d at 189-90 n.3; see also Schuman, supra, at 1199.  
Subsequently, in his commentaries on the Magna Carta, Sir 
                     
14 See David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 Temp. 
L. Rev. 1197, 1201-02 (1992) (thirty-nine states have a 
right to remedy provision in their respective state 
constitutions).  David Schuman is an Associate Professor 
and Associate Dean at the University of Oregon Law School. 
No. 96-0174.npc 
 
3 
Edward Coke interpreted King John's promise as follows:  
"[E]very subject . . . may take his remedy by the course of 
the law and have justice and right for the injury done to 
him, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and 
speedily without delay."  See Mulder, 95 Wis. 2d at 189-90 
n.3; Schuman, supra, at 1199-1200.  By interpreting Chapter 
40 in this manner, Coke was attempting to address problems 
involving judicial corruption that had persisted since the 
days of the Magna Carta, such as interference with the 
courts by the king.  Jonathan M. Hoffman, 74 Or. L. Rev. 
1279, 1293-95 (1995).  Thus, Coke used Chapter 40 to 
support his position that the judiciary should be a branch 
independent from the king.  Id. at 1293-95, 1308, 1311-12. 
¶38 Early framers of state constitutions took the 
language of their respective right to remedy provisions 
from Coke's restatement, and subsequent constitutional 
framers likewise borrowed such language from previously-
enacted state constitutions.  Id. at 1284.  However, as 
Professor David Schuman has determined, the purpose behind 
such provisions was not to protect against judicial 
corruption, as it had been during the time of Coke or King 
John. Schuman, supra at 1200-01.  As Professor Schuman 
explains:  "By the last quarter of the eighteenth century, 
during which the American remedy guarantees first appeared, 
the focus of popular distrust had shifted from the King's 
courts to the people's representatives."  Id.  Thus, state 
right to remedy provisions were intended to address the 
No. 96-0174.npc 
 
4 
problems of "renegade legislatures" by "vesting increased 
power in the judiciary."  Id.  
¶39 Consistent with this historical purpose, this 
court has determined that art. I, § 9 "is primarily 
addressed to the right of persons to have access to the 
courts and to obtain justice on the basis of the law as it 
in fact exists."  Mulder, 95 Wis. 2d at 189.  However, art. 
I, § 9, in and of itself, confers no rights.  Id.  
Accordingly, art. I, § 9 "does not guarantee a remedy for 
every species of injury, but only such as results from an 
invasion or an infringement of a legal right or a failure 
to discharge a legal duty."  Scholberg v. Itnyre, 264 Wis. 
211, 
213, 
58 
N.W.2d 
698 
(1953) 
(quoting 
16 
C.J.S. 
Constitutional Law § 709).  Thus, in order for art. I, § 9 
to have possible application, "it must first be established 
that plaintiff has suffered a legal injury or wrong by 
reason of defendant's conduct."  Id.  Such a legal injury 
or wrong exists where an individual has an independent 
legislatively-recognized right, see Mulder, 95 Wis. 2d at 
189-90 n.3; Kallas Millwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 
2d 382, 384, 393, 225 N.W.2d 454 (1975), or common-law 
right to bring a cause of action, see Collins v. Eli Lilly 
Co., 116 Wis. 2d 166, 181-82, 342 N.W.2d 37, cert. denied 
sub nom. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Collins, 469 U.S. 826 
(1984).  
¶40 In Wisconsin, an individual has a common-law 
right to bring a medical malpractice action.  See, e.g., 
No. 96-0174.npc 
 
5 
Skinner v. American Bible Soc'y, 92 Wis. 209, 65 N.W. 1037 
(1896); Nelson v. Harrington, 72 Wis. 591, 40 N.W. 228 
(1888); Gates v. Fleischer, 67 Wis. 504, 30 N.W. 674 
(1886); Quinn v. Higgins, 63 Wis. 664, 24 N.W. 482 (1885); 
Reynolds v. Graves, 3 Wis. 371 (1854).   Moreover, the 
legislature modified this common-law right in 1975 when it 
enacted ch. 655, which established an exclusive procedure 
for bringing a medical malpractice action.  See State ex 
rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 499, 261 N.W.2d 
434 491 (1978).   Consequently, the right to bring a 
medical malpractice action, subject to the applicable 
conditions of ch. 655, is also a legislatively-recognized 
right.  See Martin v. Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 206-09, 
531 N.W.2d 70 (1995). 
¶41 However, my inquiry does not end here, because 
even where an independent common-law or legislatively-
recognized right to bring a cause of action exists, the 
legislature may modify, reduce, or eliminate this right 
under certain circumstances without violating art. I, § 9. 
 See Von Baumbach v. Bade, 9 Wis. 510, 514 (1859) (art. I, 
§ 9 "is complied with, whatever changes may be made in the 
remedy, whenever a 'certain remedy' of a substantial 
character is left").  The Supreme Court of Florida has 
determined that, in situations like this, the following 
principles should be utilized to determine whether the 
remedy for wrongs provision has been violated: 
 
No. 96-0174.npc 
 
6 
[W]here a right of access to the courts for 
redress for a particular injury has been provided 
by statutory law predating the adoption of the 
Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the 
State of Florida, or where such right has become 
part of the common law of the State pursuant to 
Fla. Stat. s. 2.01, F.S.A., the Legislature is 
without power to abolish such a right without 
providing a reasonable alternative to protect the 
rights of the people of the State to redress for 
injuries, unless the Legislature can show an 
overpowering public necessity for the abolishment 
of such right, and no alternative method of 
meeting such public necessity can be shown. 
Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973).  Professor 
Schuman has characterized the Kluger court's approach as 
involving the following "three-step combination of rules 
and balances":  (1) the legislature may freely modify, 
reduce or eliminate post-constitutional causes of action 
created by the legislature itself; (2) the legislature may 
modify, 
reduce, 
or 
eliminate 
common-law 
or 
pre-
constitutional statutory causes of action if it provides a 
reasonable alternative; and (3) the legislature may modify, 
reduce, or eliminate common law or pre-constitutional 
statutory causes of action if it establishes that no 
reasonable alternatives exist and that "an overpowering 
public necessity for the abolishment of such right" exists. 
 Schuman, supra, at 1216-17.  I conclude that these 
principles should be adopted in Wisconsin.  
¶42 Applying these principles to the case at hand, I 
conclude that the legislature cannot eliminate Makos' right 
to bring a medical malpractice action under any of these 
three principles.  First, the right to bring a medical 
malpractice action existed at common law; therefore, the 
No. 96-0174.npc 
 
7 
legislature cannot freely eliminate Makos' right to bring 
such a claim.  Second, the legislature did not provide a 
reasonable alternative to protect Makos' right to a remedy 
for her injuries; rather, it completely barred her from 
seeking any remedy.  Third, as expressly indicated by the 
legislature, in 1975 it enacted ch. 655 in order to address 
the medical malpractice crisis of the 1970's.  Wis. Stat. 
Ann. Ch. 655 (West 1995) (Historical and Statutory Notes). 
 Accordingly, by the time the legislature enacted Wis. 
Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) in 1979-80, it had already addressed 
the problems created by this crisis in another manner.  
Therefore, it is clear that there was a reasonable 
alternative for meeting the public necessity created by the 
medical malpractice crisis, and it is further clear that 
the legislature consequently did not have an "overpowering 
public necessity" for the elimination of Makos' right.  
Thus, because Makos has a common-law and legislatively-
recognized right to bring a medical malpractice action, and 
because the legislature may not eliminate this right under 
any of the above-explained principles, I conclude that the 
statute of repose denies Makos the right to a remedy in 
violation of art. I, § 9.   
¶43 This conclusion is consistent with the historical 
purpose of art. I, § 9, see Schuman, supra, at 1200-01, as 
well as Wisconsin precedent, see Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 
181-82; Mulder, 95 Wis. 2d at 189-90 n.3; Kallas, 66 Wis. 
2d at 384, 393; see also Rod v. Farrell, 96 Wis. 2d 349, 
No. 96-0174.npc 
 
8 
356, 291 N.W.2d 568 (1980) (discussing possible application 
of art. I, § 9), overruled on other grounds, Hansen v. A.H. 
Robins, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983); 
Rosenthal v. Kurtz, 62 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 213 N.W.2d 741, 216 
N.W.2d 252 (1974) (discussing possible application of art. 
I, § 9).  In addition, this conclusion is supported by 
decisions from other jurisdictions, in which courts have 
determined that a medical malpractice statute of repose 
violates the right to remedy provision of their respective 
state constitutions.  See McCollum v. Sisters of Charity of 
Nazareth Health Corp., 799 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. 1990); Hardy v. 
VerMeulen, 512 N.E.2d 626 (Ohio 1987), cert. denied, 484 
U.S. 1066 (1988); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 
1984).  
¶44 Furthermore, this conclusion does not conflict 
with CLL Associates, Ltd. v. Arrowhead Pacific Corp., 174 
Wis. 2d 604, 497 N.W.2d 115 (1993).
15  See dissenting op. at 
16-20, 23-25.  As the CLL court explained, tort actions are 
significantly distinct from contract actions.  Id. at 609-
13.  Therefore, although a tort statute of limitation 
begins to run when an injured party discovers or reasonably 
                     
15  Although CLL involved a statute of limitations, 
application of the statute of limitations had the same 
effect as application of the statute of repose in this 
case:  it barred CLL from bringing a contract cause of 
action before it even discovered its injury.  See CLL 
Associates, Ltd. v. Arrowhead Pacific Corp., 174 Wis. 2d 
604, 614, 497 N.W.2d 115 (1993). 
No. 96-0174.npc 
 
9 
should have discovered the injury, the same is not true in 
a contract cause of action.  Id. 609-17.  Accordingly, the 
court has recognized that different principles of law apply 
when considering a contract statute of limitations as 
opposed to a tort statute of limitations.  See id.  Thus, 
although it may not violate art. I, § 9 to bar a contract 
claim before the injured party knew or should have known of 
the injury, see id. at 614-15, the same reasoning does not 
necessarily apply to a tort cause of action.  For this 
reason, I conclude that CLL is inapplicable in the present 
case.   
¶45 Moreover, 
this 
court 
has 
recognized 
that 
"[m]edical malpractice actions are substantially distinct 
from other tort actions."  Strykowski, 81 Wis. 2d at 509.  
Consequently, the same principles of law regarding a 
medical malpractice statute of repose may not apply when 
considering statutes of repose in other areas of tort law. 
 Consequently, because medical malpractice actions are 
distinct from other types of actions, I do not conclude 
that all statutes of repose are unconstitutional.  See 
dissenting op. at 18-21.  I also do not conclude that the 
statute of repose at issue here is unconstitutional on its 
face, because only in rare situations, such as we have 
here, will it completely deny an individual the right to 
bring a malpractice action.  See Lead op. at 7 n.7.  
¶46 In short, I conclude that courts should consider 
the following three principles, along with the nature of 
No. 96-0174.npc 
 
10
the cause of action, in determining whether an individual 
has been denied the right to a remedy in violation of art. 
I, § 9 through the legislature's modification, reduction, 
or elimination of a right to bring a cause of action:  
(1) whether 
the 
legislature 
modified, 
reduced, 
or 
eliminated a post-constitutional cause of action created by 
the 
legislature 
itself; 
(2) 
whether 
the 
legislature 
modified, reduced, or eliminated a common law or pre-
constitutional statutory cause of action and provided a 
reasonable alternative; and (3) whether, if the legislature 
did 
not 
provide 
a 
reasonable 
alternative, 
it 
has 
established that an overpowering public necessity for the 
abolishment of such right exists, and that no reasonable 
alternative exists.  As previously explained, based on 
these three principles, along with the unique nature of 
medical malpractice actions, I conclude that the statute of 
repose contained in Wis. Stat. § 893.55(1)(b) deprives 
Makos of the right to a remedy in violation of art. I, § 9. 
 Thus, I concur in the holding set forth in the lead 
opinion that, under these circumstances, the statute of 
repose is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Accordingly, I join the majority in reversing the circuit 
court's order and judgment, and remanding the cause for a 
trial. 
No.96-0174.awb 
 
1 
¶47 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (Dissenting).    I dissent. 
 The certified issue in this case is the constitutionality 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
893.55(1)(b), 
which 
bars 
medical 
malpractice actions commenced more than five years after 
the date of the alleged act or omission, without regard to 
the date of discovery.  While I believe that the statute 
produces a regrettably harsh result in this case, I 
nevertheless conclude that the plaintiffs have failed to 
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that § 893.55(1)(b): 
1) 
deprives 
the 
plaintiffs 
of 
their 
procedural 
or 
substantive due process rights; 2) deprives the plaintiffs 
of equal protection of the laws; or 3) violates Article I, 
§ 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  I also reject the 
assertion in Justice Bablitch's concurrence that § 893.55 
does not apply to negligent diagnosis claims.  Accordingly, 
I would affirm the decision of the circuit court. 
I.  Due Process 
¶48 I begin by addressing due process because the 
lead opinion relies primarily on a procedural due process 
analysis in reaching its conclusion that § 893.55(1)(b) is 
unconstitutional "as applied."  A court must assess the 
following three factors when measuring the sufficiency of 
the procedural protections provided by the State: 1) the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of the property interest 
through the procedure used; 2) the probable value of 
additional procedural safeguards; and 3) the governmental 
interest, including the function involved and physical, 
No.96-0174.awb 
 
2 
administrative, 
and 
fiscal 
burdens 
that 
additional 
procedural requirements would entail.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
¶49 The lead opinion errs at the very outset of its 
due process analysis by assuming that the plaintiffs have a 
constitutionally 
recognized 
and 
protected 
property 
interest.  In this case, Cheryl Makos and her family did 
not 
discover 
that 
they 
were 
injured 
by 
the 
1985 
misdiagnosis until after the original biopsy was re-
examined in 1994 and found to be malignant.  As such, the 
discovery rule delayed the accrual of the plaintiffs’ cause 
of action until after they discovered, or in the exercise 
of 
reasonable 
diligence 
should 
have 
discovered, 
the 
existence of their injury and that the defendant, Dr. 
Bodemer, probably caused their injury.  See, e.g., Clark v. 
Erdmann, 161 Wis. 2d 428, 445-46, 468 N.W.2d 18 (1991).  
There is no dispute that § 893.55(1)(b) extinguished the 
plaintiffs' claims in 1990, well before the plaintiffs' 
discovery would have triggered the accrual of a cause of 
action, and possibly before the plaintiffs were even 
injured. 
 
Thus, 
the 
statute 
at 
issue 
deprived 
the 
plaintiffs of an as yet unaccrued cause of action against 
the defendants. 
¶50 Neither the United States Supreme Court nor this 
court has ever held that an unaccrued cause of action is a 
constitutionally protected property interest.  In fact, 
case law demonstrates that the Due Process Clause takes no 
No.96-0174.awb 
 
3 
notice when a legislature alters or extinguishes an 
unaccrued cause of action.  Where a cause of action has yet 
to accrue, the Supreme Court has held that due process 
principles do not prevent the creation of new causes of 
action or the abolition of old ones to attain proper 
legislative objectives.  Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 
122 (1929).  
¶51 In Martin v. Richards, 192 Wis. 2d 156, 531 
N.W.2d 70 (1995), this court used a substantive due process 
analysis 
to 
invalidate 
legislation 
which 
created 
a 
retroactive 
cap 
on 
medical 
malpractice 
liability.
16  
However, before doing so, the court established that the 
claimants' cause of action had accrued prior to the 
effective date of the liability cap.  On that basis, the 
Martin court concluded that the claimants had a substantive 
right 
to 
the 
                     
16 The lead opinion concedes that Martin v. Richards, 
192 Wis. 2d 156, 531 N.W.2d 70 (1995), involved a 
substantive due process analysis.  Lead op. at 5.  However, 
reliance on substantive due process requires the lead 
opinion to inquire whether the legislation has a proper 
purpose, and whether the statutory means of effectuation 
bear a rational relationship to the purpose.  Szarzynski v. 
YMCA, Camp Minikani, 184 Wis. 2d 875, 889, 517 N.W.2d 135 
(1994).  Because the lead opinion has declined to engage in 
such an inquiry, its substantive due process "analysis" 
begins 
and 
ends 
with 
the 
conclusory 
statement 
that 
§ 893.55(1)(b) is "fundamentally unfair."  
No.96-0174.awb 
 
4 
unlimited damages allowed under state law at the time that 
their cause of action accrued.  Id. at 199, 206.   The 
Martin court considered accrual a condition precedent to 
the recognition of a cause of action as a constitutionally 
protected property right.  See also Hunter v. School Dist. 
of Gale-Ettrick-Trempealeau, 97 Wis. 2d 435, 445-46, 293 
N.W.2d 515 (1980)(collecting cases establishing that a 
cause of action is a vested property right entitled to due 
process protection only if it has accrued); Mathis v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., 719 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1983)("In tort 
claims, there is no cause of action and therefore no vested 
property right in the claimant upon which to base a due 
process challenge until injury occurs").  
¶52 In this case, § 893.55(1)(b) extinguishes an 
unaccrued cause of action, which is a nonvested property 
right.  Hunter, 97 Wis. 2d at 446.  Because their unaccrued 
cause of action was extinguished before it ever became a 
property right, the plaintiffs have no basis upon which to 
rest a due process challenge. 
¶53 Even if I were to assume that the plaintiffs' 
unaccrued cause of action was a property right warranting 
constitutional protection, which I do not, the United 
States Supreme Court has already held that procedural due 
process considerations generally will not invalidate State-
created substantive defenses: 
 
Of course, the State remains free to create 
substantive defenses or immunities for use in 
No.96-0174.awb 
 
5 
adjudication . . . .  The Court held as much 
[when] . . . it upheld a California statute 
granting officials immunity from certain types of 
state tort claims.  We acknowledged that the 
grant of immunity 
arguably 
did 
deprive 
the 
plaintiffs of a protected property interest.  But 
they were not 
thereby 
deprived 
of 
property 
without due process, just as a welfare recipient 
is 
not 
deprived 
of 
due 
process 
when 
the 
legislature adjusts benefit levels.  In each 
case, the legislative determination provides all 
the process that is due[, for] it remain[s] true 
that the State's interest in fashioning its own 
rules of tort law is paramount to any discernible 
federal interest, except perhaps an interest in 
protecting the individual citizen from state 
action that is wholly arbitrary or irrational. . 
. .  [I]t may well be that a substantive immunity 
defense, like an element of the tort claim 
itself, is merely one aspect of the State's 
definition of that property interest. 
 
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432-33 
(1982) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
The due process guarantees under the Wisconsin Constitution 
track those under the Federal Constitution.  Reginald D. v. 
State, 193 Wis. 2d 299, 307, 533 N.W.2d 181 (1995).  The 
procedural component of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due 
Process Clause does not require any more process than the 
legislature has given in enacting § 893.55(1)(b).  I 
therefore conclude that the statute in no way abridges the 
plaintiffs' procedural due process rights. 
¶54 In truth, this case has little to do with 
procedural due process.  As I read the lead opinion, no 
number 
of 
hearings 
or 
other 
additional 
procedural 
safeguards would save the statute at issue in this case.  
Rather, the lead opinion's quarrel with the statute is 
No.96-0174.awb 
 
6 
ultimately rooted in a disagreement with the legislature 
over the propriety of immunizing health care providers from 
the "long tail" liability associated with certain types of 
medical malpractice.  Essentially, the lead opinion objects 
on "fundamental fairness" grounds to any time period 
limitation on the discovery rule.  However, "fundamental 
fairness" is a hollow invocation when it is unaccompanied 
by 
an 
analysis 
of 
the 
substantive 
due 
process 
considerations underpinning the phrase.  
¶55 This court is 
generally 
ill-equipped as 
an 
institution to second guess a legislative grant of immunity 
which attempts to address economic threats to services 
important to the public.  As a rule, such a legislative 
enactment "does not violate substantive due process if it 
bears a rational relationship to the underlying legislative 
purpose."  Szarzynski v. YMCA, Camp Minikani, 184 Wis. 2d 
875, 889, 517 N.W.2d 135 (1994); see also Duke Power Co. v. 
Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 83-4 
(1978)(holding that "legislative effort[s] to structure and 
accommodate the burdens and benefits of economic life" do 
not violate due process unless "the legislature has acted 
in 
an 
arbitrary 
or 
irrational 
manner")(citation 
and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
¶56 There are at least three reasons for concluding 
that § 893.55(1)(b) does, in fact, vindicate legitimate 
legislative 
goals. 
 
First, 
the 
statute 
encourages 
participation in the health care profession by giving 
No.96-0174.awb 
 
7 
finality to health care providers who would otherwise face 
prolonged and uncertain liability.  Second, by limiting 
certain types of "long tail" liability, § 893.55(1)(b) 
enhances 
the 
insurability 
of 
health 
care 
providers.  
Finally, by encouraging participation in the health care 
profession and reducing "long tail" liability, the statute 
secures affordable, quality health care for the citizens of 
Wisconsin. 
¶57 I cannot conclude that the legislature has acted 
"arbitrarily" or "irrationally" in placing a five-year 
limit on the accrual of a medical malpractice cause of 
action.  The legislature created § 893.55 in response to 
the medical malpractice crisis of the 1970's.  See Redish, 
Legislative Response to the Medical Malpractice Insurance 
Crisis: Constitutional Implications, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 759, 
759-60 (1977).  As the lead opinion notes, the 1976 staff 
paper prepared for the Malpractice Committee of the 
Wisconsin Legislative Council estimated that 98.9% of adult 
claimants 
and 
95% 
of 
child 
claimants 
file 
medical 
malpractice claims within five years of the occurrence of 
the alleged negligence.  Lead op. at 7 n. 7. 
¶58 The staff report suggests that the five-year 
limit on commencement of a suit would negatively affect 
only a small percentage of malpractice claims.  The 
legislature had to balance the interests of that small 
percentage of claimants against the interests served by the 
enactment of the five-year statute of repose.  In balancing 
No.96-0174.awb 
 
8 
the interests, the legislature apparently concluded that 
public policy was best served by cutting off medical 
malpractice claims not commenced within five years of the 
act giving rise to the claim.  While such a decision may be 
disagreeable and even harsh, it is rationally related to 
the legitimate goal of relieving health care providers of 
perpetual malpractice liability.   
¶59 In summary, because the plaintiffs' unaccrued 
cause of action is not a vested property right, there is no 
due 
process 
basis 
for 
challenging 
§ 893.55(1)(b).  
Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that the plaintiffs' 
unaccrued cause of action does constitute a property right 
warranting due process protection, I conclude that the 
plaintiffs are owed no more procedural protections than the 
legislature 
has 
given 
in 
determining 
to 
enact 
§ 893.55(1)(b), and that the statute is rationally related 
to a legitimate legislative purpose.  I therefore find that 
§ 893.55(1)(b) does not violate the plaintiffs' due process 
rights. 
II.  Equal Protection
17 
                     
17 The equal protection provisions of the Wisconsin 
Constitution parallel those guaranteed under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  Reginald D. 
v. State, 193 Wis. 2d 299, 307, 533 N.W.2d 181 (1995).  The 
plaintiffs 
make 
the 
argument 
that 
§ 893.55(1)(b) 
constitutes "special privilege legislation."  Because equal 
protection analysis subsumes the question of whether a 
statute impermissibly confers special privileges on a 
class, I treat both issues under equal protection.  See 
Christoph v. Chilton, 205 Wis. 418, 421, 237 N.W. 134 
(1931). 
No.96-0174.awb 
 
9 
¶60 I also reject the plaintiffs' assertion that 
§ 893.55(1)(b) denies them equal protection of the laws.  
Because the statute does not implicate "fundamental rights" 
or "suspect classifications," the rational basis test 
applies.  See Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 495, 436 
N.W.2d 568 (1989).  The statute "must be sustained unless 
it is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship 
to a legitimate government interest."  State v. McManus, 
152 Wis. 2d 113, 131, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
¶61 Substantive due process and equal protection 
analysis have much in common.  I have already determined 
under 
a 
substantive 
due 
process 
analysis 
that 
§ 893.55(1)(b) 
bears 
a 
rational 
relationship 
to 
the 
eminently reasonable legislative goal of maintaining the 
continued quality of health care and the economic vitality 
of the health care industry.  Under equal protection 
analysis, there must be a rational relationship between the 
disparity in treatment resulting under a statute and a 
legitimate governmental objective.  See State v. Post, 197 
Wis. 2d 279, 319, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995).   
¶62 Under 
the 
rational 
basis 
test, 
the 
classifications achieved by a statute are scrutinized under 
"a relatively relaxed standard reflecting the Court's 
awareness 
that 
the 
drawing 
of 
lines 
that 
create 
                                                             
 
No.96-0174.awb 
 
10
distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an 
unavoidable one.  Perfection in making the necessary 
classification 
is 
neither 
possible 
nor 
necessary."  
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 
314 (1976).  A statute does not violate equal protection 
merely because its classifications are "imperfect," lack 
"mathematical nicety," or "result[] in some inequity." 
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 234 (1981).  As long as 
the 
classification 
scheme 
chosen 
by 
our 
legislature 
rationally advances a proper objective, "we must disregard 
the existence of other methods of allocation that we, as 
individuals, perhaps would have preferred."  Id. 
¶63 The "health care provider" classification is a 
reasonable one.  This court has already determined that 
legislative 
action 
affecting 
medical 
malpractice 
is 
justified by the distinct nature of the field.  State ex 
rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 509, 261 N.W.2d 
434 (1978).  It follows that the "health care provider" 
classification, composed of medical malpractice defendants, 
is reasonably constituted.  Additionally, the class is 
susceptible to expansion as circumstantially warranted.  
See, e.g., Clark, 161 Wis. 2d at 439 (holding that a 
podiatrist is a "health care provider" under § 893.55); 
Ritt v. Dental Care Associates, S.C., 199 Wis. 2d 48, 543 
N.W.2d 852 (Ct. App. 1995)(holding that a dentist is a 
"health care provider" under § 893.55). 
No.96-0174.awb 
 
11
¶64 Unlike 
the 
plaintiffs, 
I 
do 
not 
find 
it 
constitutionally significant that the term "health care 
provider" omits blood banks and pharmaceutical and medical 
device companies.  See Doe v. American Nat'l Red Cross, 176 
Wis. 2d 610, 616-17, 500 N.W.2d 264 (1993).  Section 
893.55(1)(b) is addressed to a crisis affecting the 
provision of health care, and provides a degree of immunity 
from tort claims to those who diagnose, treat, or care for 
patients. 
 
As 
we 
noted 
in 
Doe, 
blood 
banks 
and 
pharmaceutical and medical device companies take no part in 
diagnosing, treating, or caring for patients.  Id.  They 
are therefore not part of the crisis that § 893.55(1)(b) 
was intended to partially ameliorate.  This distinction, 
recognized by this court in Doe, is rationally related to 
the goal of limiting the "long tail" liability of those who 
actually provide health care to patients.   
¶65 Section 
§ 893.55(1)(b) 
does 
not 
suffer 
the 
classification infirmities recognized in Kallas Millwork 
Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wis. 2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454 
(1975), and Funk v. Wollin Silo & Equipment, Inc., 148 Wis. 
2d 59, 435 N.W.2d 244 (1989).  In both Kallas and Funk, 
this 
court 
invalidated 
on 
equal 
protection 
grounds 
limitations statutes dealing with actions arising from 
improvements 
to 
real 
estate. 
 
Funk 
described 
the 
fundamental flaw in both versions of the statute: 
 
Much of our decision herein is a matter of stare 
decisis based on Kallas.  We invalidated the 
No.96-0174.awb 
 
12
predecessor of this statute because no reasonable 
distinction could be found between the builders 
in 
the 
protected 
class 
and 
others 
like 
materialmen and owners who were not protected by 
the statute.  As pointed out above, furnishers of 
materials and land 
surveyors have now 
been 
included in the protected class.  No doubt, this 
reduces the under-inclusiveness of the statute, 
but owners or occupants who may be liable to suit 
by third parties as the result of design defects 
or construction errors or omission are not in the 
protected class.   
     
148 Wis. 2d at 73.  Thus, the statutes at issue in 
Kallas and Funk violated equal protection by granting, 
without a rational basis, the benefit of a limitation 
period to one group while denying the same benefit to a 
similarly situated group.   
¶66 The 
under-inclusiveness 
problems 
present 
in 
Kallas and Funk are absent in the instant case.  No such 
defect exists in this case, because, with one notable 
exception, § 893.55(1)(b) applies across the board to those 
providing health care to patients.
18  I therefore conclude 
that the statute's classification of medical malpractice 
defendants does not violate equal protection. 
                     
18 As the plaintiffs note, § 893.55(3) removes the 
five-year limit on discovery of foreign objects that have 
been left in a patient's body.  However, this is hardly an 
arbitrary subclassification of health care providers, for 
it is reasonable that § 893.55 would carve out exceptions 
to the five-year period of repose for those acts or 
omissions 
that 
the 
legislature 
has 
determined 
are 
particularly egregious.  See also § 893.55(2)(providing an 
exception to the five-year repose period when a health care 
provider conceals his or her injurious act or omission). 
No.96-0174.awb 
 
13
¶67 The plaintiffs next argue that the classification 
of medical malpractice claimants is not rational.  For 
example, they note that two victims of identical negligent 
acts are treated differently under the statute, since the 
one who commences a suit within five years of the negligent 
act will be allowed to proceed, while the other will be 
barred if he or she commences a suit after the five-year 
period. 
 
I 
cannot 
conclude 
that 
such 
a 
time-based 
classification is irrational, since by their nature, every 
statute of limitations and statute of repose must make such 
a distinction.  I conclude that the statute at issue makes 
a rational distinction between claimants commencing an 
action within five years and those filing after five years. 
¶68 I also reject the plaintiffs' assertion that 
treating medical malpractice claimants differently from 
other tort claimants violates equal protection.  This court 
No.96-0174.awb 
 
14
has previously considered and rejected such an argument, 
Strykowski, 81 Wis. 2d at 507-9, and I see no reason to 
depart from precedent. 
¶69 In 
sum, 
the 
distinctions 
created 
by 
§ 893.55(1)(b) do not suffer classification infirmities, 
and are rationally related to a legitimate legislative 
objective.  I therefore conclude that § 893.55(1)(b) does 
not 
violate 
the 
constitutional 
guarantee 
of 
equal 
protection of the laws. 
 III.  Article I, § 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
The Lead Opinion 
¶70 The plaintiffs assert, and the lead opinion 
concludes, that § 893.55(1)(b) violates the "remedy for 
wrongs" section of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Citing 
Kallas, 66 Wis. 2d at 384, 393.  Article I, § 9 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution provides: 
 
Remedy for wrongs.  Section 9.  Every person is 
entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all 
injuries, or wrongs which he may receive in his 
person, property, or character; he ought to 
obtain justice freely, and without being obliged 
to purchase it, completely and without denial, 
promptly and without delay, conformably to the 
laws. 
I 
conclude 
that 
precedent 
establishes 
that 
§ 893.55(1)(b) does not violate Wis. Const. art. I, § 9. 
¶71 This court has previously elucidated the meaning 
of the "remedy for wrongs" clause: 
That section, though of great importance in our 
jurisprudence, is primarily addressed to the 
right of persons to have access to the courts and 
to obtain justice on the basis of the law as it 
No.96-0174.awb 
 
15
in fact exists.  No legal rights are conferred by 
this portion of the Constitution. 
 
Mulder v. Acme-Cleveland Corp., 95 Wis. 2d 173, 189, 
290 N.W.2d 276 (1980)(footnote omitted).  The Mulder court 
emphasized that its prior Wis. Const. art. I, § 9 analysis 
in Kallas stood for no more than the proposition that the 
"remedy 
for 
wrongs" 
section 
 
might 
have 
"possible 
application . . . where a remedy is sought for a 
'legislatively recognized right.'"  Mulder, 95 Wis. 2d at 
189-90 n.3 (emphasis in original). 
¶72 In the present case, the lead opinion presumably 
acknowledges that the legislature does not recognize a 
right to commence a medical malpractice action more than 
five years after a health care provider's allegedly 
negligent act or omission.  Undaunted, the lead opinion 
nevertheless concludes that Wis. Const. art. I, § 9 
invalidates § 893.55(1)(b). 
¶73 The 
lead 
opinion 
attempts, 
but 
fails, 
to 
distinguish this court's decision in CLL Assocs. v. 
Arrowhead Pacific Corp., 174 Wis. 2d 604, 497 N.W.2d 115 
(1993).  In CLL, we held that § 893.43, the six-year 
statute of limitations for contract actions, does not 
violate Wis. Const. art. I, § 9.  Under § 893.43, a 
contract cause of action accrues at the moment of breach, 
rather than at the moment that the injured party discovers 
the breach.  CLL, 174 Wis. 2d at 607.  The plaintiff in CLL 
complained that the effect of the statute was to cut off a 
No.96-0174.awb 
 
16
cause of action before the plaintiff could have discovered 
the underlying injury, in violation of the right to a 
remedy under Wis. Const. art. I, § 9.  This court rejected 
the 
plaintiff's 
Wis. 
Const. 
art. 
I, 
§ 9 
challenge, 
concluding that the "remedy for wrongs" provision was not 
violated merely "because the limitations period expired 
before CLL discovered its injury."  CLL, 174 Wis. 2d at 
614. 
¶74 In 
the 
lead 
opinion's 
view, 
CLL 
is 
distinguishable on the following basis: 
 
CLL involved a statute of limitations while this 
case involves a statute of repose.  These are 
distinct 
legal concepts 
that deserve 
to 
be 
treated as such.  Because we recognize the legal 
distinction between a statute of limitations and 
a statute of repose, we find CLL inapplicable to 
the case at bar. 
 
Lead op. at 9-10 (footnote omitted).  However, CLL 
itself demonstrates that the lead opinion's distinction 
between statutes of limitations and repose for purposes of 
Wis. Const. art. I, § 9, is infirm. 
¶75 The CLL court concluded that § 893.43, a statute 
of limitations, does not violate Wis. Const. art. I, § 9, 
by extinguishing a claimant's cause of action before the 
claimant discovers the injury.  As support for its 
conclusion, the CLL court cited Halverson v. Tydrich, 156 
Wis. 2d 202, 456 N.W.2d 852 (Ct. App. 1990), which held 
that § 893.55(1)(b), the very statute of repose at issue in 
this case, also does not violate Wis. Const. art. I, § 9.  
No.96-0174.awb 
 
17
CLL, 174 Wis. 2d at 614.  Indeed, CLL unequivocally 
endorsed the Halverson analysis of Wis. Const. art. I, § 9. 
 Id. at 616 ("The reasoning in Halverson applies to the 
instant case").   
¶76 Under the CLL analysis, this court considers 
statutes of limitations and repose to be interchangeable 
for purposes of Wis. Const. art. I, § 9.  The lead opinion 
in this case must disown its own reasoning and citations to 
authority in CLL in order to achieve the desired result in 
this case.  The effect is a sub silentio overruling of this 
court's decision in CLL and the court of appeals' decision 
in Halverson.  I conclude that the reasoning of CLL and 
Halverson is sound and applies in the instant case. 
¶77 As I understand the lead opinion, a statute of 
repose is unconstitutional if it places any time period 
limitation on the accrual of a cause of action, because it 
is unfair to "close the doors of the courtroom" before a 
claimant could reasonably discover his or her injury.  
Since all statutes of repose create such a time limitation 
on accrual, it appears that the lead opinion would 
invalidate all statutes of repose.  Furthermore, because 
the 
lead 
opinion's 
distinction 
between 
statutes 
of 
limitations and repose is hollow, today's decision carries 
grave implications for any statute which places any time 
limit on the discovery rule.   
No.96-0174.awb 
 
18
¶78 Under 
CLL, 
§ 893.51(1)
19 
is 
presumably 
constitutional, since "[d]etermining when a cause of action 
accrues for statute of limitations purposes is a policy 
decision, not an issue of constitutional dimension."  CLL, 
174 Wis. 2d at 614.  Yet, the effect on a claimant under 
§ 893.51(1) is no different than under § 893.55(1)(b)--the 
claimant loses the ability to bring a cause of action that 
he or she has no reason to know existed.  Under the lead 
opinion's reasoning, this fact would appear to render 
§ 893.51(1) unconstitutional.   
¶79 I do not believe that constitutional guarantees 
rise or fall on empty legal distinctions.  Whether it is 
labeled a statute of limitations or repose, the result is 
the same in both cases--the ability to commence an action 
is  extinguished before the claimant could reasonably 
discover his or her injury.  For that reason, consistent 
with CLL and Halverson, I conclude that Wis. Const. art. I, 
§ 9, does not prevent the legislature from enacting 
legislation which extinguishes an unaccrued cause of action 
for medical malpractice. 
                     
19 Wis. Stat. § 893.51(1) states that actions for the 
wrongful taking of personal property must be commenced 
within six years after a cause of action accrues.  The 
statute also provides that such a cause of action accrues 
at the time that the property is taken.  The Judicial 
Council Committee note accompanying the statute makes 
explicit the legislature's intent that the cause of action 
accrue without regard to a claimant's knowledge of the 
wrongful taking. 
No.96-0174.awb 
 
19
¶80 It is crucial to note that the lead opinion's 
repeated 
statement 
that 
§ 893.55(1)(b) 
is 
only 
unconstitutional "as applied" disguises the true scope of  
its decision.  If the lead opinion's reasoning were 
correct, there is no possible conclusion other than that 
the statute of repose is unconstitutional on its face.  
This is so because the reasoning of the lead opinion would 
require 
that 
the 
statute 
of 
repose 
be 
found 
unconstitutional 
in 
every 
case 
in 
which 
a 
claimant 
discovers a cause of action more than five years after the 
negligent act or omission.  See United States v. Salerno, 
481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987) (noting that a statute is facially 
unconstitutional when "no set of circumstances exists under 
which the [statute] would be valid").  The lead opinion's 
reasoning renders unconstitutional this statute of repose, 
and arguably renders unconstitutional all statutes of 
repose.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 893.37, 893.59, 893.66(1).  If 
this is what the lead opinion intends to do, then it should 
be acknowledged and clearly stated.   
Justice Crooks' Concurrence 
¶81 Justice Crooks' concurrence, which is premised 
solely on Wis. Const. art. I, § 9, merely expands on the 
lead 
opinion's 
erroneous 
analysis 
of 
the 
same 
constitutional provision.  Essentially, the concurrence 
concludes that § 893.55(1)(b) violates Wis. Const. art. I, 
§ 9 because: 1) a remedy for medical malpractice existed at 
common law; 2) the legislature barred Makos' medical 
No.96-0174.awb 
 
20
malpractice 
claim 
without 
providing 
a 
"reasonable 
alternative"; and 3) no "overpowering public necessity" 
justified the legislature's action, because the medical 
malpractice crisis ended when the legislature enacted 
Chapter 655.  Justice Crooks' concurrence at 6-7.  I 
disagree. 
¶82 I do not believe that Wis. Const. art. I, § 9 
stands as an obstacle to the legislative alteration or 
abolition of common law rights of action.  One commentator 
on the subject is worth quoting at length, for he amply 
refutes the notion that Wis. Const. art. I, § 9 exists as 
anything more than a constitutional guarantee of judicial 
independence: 
 
The historical origins of the open courts clause 
do not support the proposition that it was 
intended to be a "remedies" clause, as that term 
is used today.  Courts which seek to prohibit 
legislatures 
from 
limiting 
existing 
remedies 
through duly enacted legislation must find the 
source of their authority somewhere other than 
the 
open 
courts 
clause 
of 
their 
state 
constitutions. 
 
An open courts clause analysis consistent with 
the origins of the provision should focus not on 
whether the legislature has abolished a "remedy" 
but on whether the challenged action compromises 
the 
judiciary 
as 
an 
independent 
branch 
of 
government. . . .  [W]hen the legislature clearly 
expresses its desire 
to limit 
the 
remedies 
available, 
the 
court 
should 
be 
especially 
cautious before striking down such a law, lest 
the open courts clause be used to undermine the 
very separation of powers which the provision was 
intended to foster. . . .  
 
The common law has always evolved to meet 
changing circumstances and should continue to do 
so.  It is quite another thing to suggest that 
No.96-0174.awb 
 
21
the open courts clause requires a remedy for 
every right or, put another way, that it forbids 
the legislature from altering or even abolishing 
remedies through duly enacted legislation. 
 
Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law: The 
Origins of the Open Courts Clause of State Constitutions, 
74 Or. L. Rev. 1279, 1316-17 (1995) (emphasis in original) 
(hereinafter Origins of the Open Courts Clause).   
 
¶83 The concurrence apparently believes that the 
statute of repose was not aimed at the medical malpractice 
crisis of the 1970s because it was created four years after 
the enactment of Chapter 655.  Justice Crooks' concurrence 
at 7.  I am not sure what relevance the chronology of the 
two statutory enactments has to the legislative purpose 
underlying 
them. 
 
However, 
I 
am 
certain 
that 
the 
legislature was not required to address every facet of the 
medical malpractice crisis with Chapter 655.   
 
¶84 The 
medical 
malpractice 
crisis 
was 
not 
created in a day, and the legislature was not required to 
solve it all at once in Chapter 655.  Indeed, the medical 
malpractice crisis did not vanish overnight with the 
enactment of Chapter 655.  I therefore conclude that the 
concurrence lacks a basis for implying that § 893.55 was 
not justified by the "overpowering public necessity" of 
addressing the medical malpractice crisis.   
 
¶85 I 
also 
do 
not 
find 
illuminative 
the 
concurrence's citation to foreign jurisdictions which have 
struck down medical malpractice statutes of repose under 
No.96-0174.awb 
 
22
state constitutional provisions analogous to Wis. Const. 
art. I, § 9.  Justice Crooks' concurrence at 8.  The case 
law dealing with "open courts" clauses similar to Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 9 is in a state of "total disarray."  
Origins of the Open Courts Clause, 74 Or. L. Rev. at 1282 
(citing David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 Temp. L. 
Rev. 1197, 1203 (1992)).  I see no need to wade into the 
morass. 
 
¶86 In his concurrence, Justice Crooks repeats 
the lead opinion's error by attempting to distinguish CLL. 
 The concurrence states that "although it may not violate 
art. I, § 9 to bar a contract claim before the injured 
party knew or should have known of the injury . . . the 
same reasoning does not necessarily apply to a tort cause 
of action."  Justice Crooks' concurrence at 9 (citation 
omitted).  This contrived distinction between contract and 
tort actions, which was flatly rejected by CLL, destroys 
any merit that the concurrence's three-step Wis. Const. 
art. I, § 9 analysis might have possessed.   
 
¶87 The 
common 
law recognized 
a breach 
of 
contract cause of action; the statute at issue in CLL, 
§ 893.43, extinguished an undiscovered breach of contract 
claim without providing any "reasonable alternative"; and 
no "overpowering public necessity" was even asserted in CLL 
for 
the 
legislature's 
action. 
 
Thus, 
under 
the 
concurrence's own analysis, the statute at issue in CLL 
should have been declared violative of Wis. Const. art. I, 
No.96-0174.awb 
 
23
§ 9.  There is simply no principled basis for concluding on 
the one hand that the CLL statute does not violate Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 9, but on the other hand that the statute 
at issue here does.  The two statutes must stand or fall 
together because their effect is identical.   
 
¶88 The 
CLL 
court 
did 
not 
recognize 
a 
contract/tort distinction for purposes of its Wis. Const. 
art. I, § 9 analysis.  It concluded that § 893.43 does not 
violate Wis. Const. art. I, § 9 by extinguishing an 
undiscovered contract cause of action.  In marshaling 
authority 
for 
its 
conclusion, 
the 
CLL 
court 
cited 
Halverson.  In Halverson, the court of appeals held that 
the very statute at issue in this case did not violate Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 9 by extinguishing a tort claim for 
medical malpractice.  The CLL court also cited Yotvat v. 
Roth, 95 Wis. 2d 357, 369-70 (Ct. App. 1980), which 
involved an action for wrongful death resulting from 
negligent diagnosis.  Consistent with the CLL court's 
citation to Halverson and Yotvat, I conclude that the Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 9 analysis is the same for both contract 
and tort causes of action. 
 
¶89 The concurrence makes a further baseless 
distinction.  Citing Strykowski, 81 Wis. 2d at 509, the 
concurrence determines that Wis. Const. art. I, § 9 is not 
only more solicitous of tort actions than of contract 
actions, but it is particularly concerned with tort claims 
alleging medical malpractice.  Justice Crooks' concurrence 
No.96-0174.awb 
 
24
at 9.  The concurrence's reliance on Strykowski is 
misplaced, however, because Strykowski stands for the 
proposition that the unique nature of medical malpractice 
claims makes them amenable to legislative alteration, 
whereas the concurrence believes that the nature of medical 
malpractice claims prevents the legislature from altering 
them.  
 
¶90 For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that 
the concurrence, like the lead opinion, has erroneously 
determined that § 893.55(1)(b) violates Wis. Const. art. I, 
§ 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution. 
IV.  Negligent Diagnosis Claims Under § 893.55 
 
¶91 In 
his 
concurrence, 
Justice 
Bablitch 
concludes that a negligent diagnosis is not treatment for 
purposes of § 893.55, and that the statute is therefore 
inapplicable to this case.  The concurrence's determination 
is flawed for several reasons.   
 
¶92 First, recent decisions of this court have 
rejected the distinction relied upon by Justice Bablitch.  
For example, in Doe, 176 Wis. 2d  at 616-17, this court 
determined that blood banks are not "health care providers" 
for purposes of invoking § 893.55.  A unanimous court 
stated that: 
 
The Red Cross is not involved in the diagnosis, 
treatment or care of patients as are podiatrists. 
The Red Cross is not licensed to practice 
medicine by the state of Wisconsin or any medical 
examining board. . . .  [W]e reject the Red 
Cross' argument that this case is similar to 
claims against radiologists or pathologists who 
No.96-0174.awb 
 
25
have no direct patient contact but fall within 
the scope of sec. 893.55.  The Red Cross is not 
involved in diagnosing and recommending treatment 
for 
patients 
as 
are 
radiologists 
and 
pathologists. 
Id.  I submit that Justice Bablitch's view that diagnosing 
physicians fall outside of § 893.55 is utterly at odds with 
Doe. 
¶93 Furthermore, this court concluded only two terms 
ago that misdiagnosis and treatment are indistinguishable 
for purposes of the informed consent statute: 
 
Certainly, procedures which are purely diagnostic 
in nature are not excluded from sec. 448.30's 
reach. . . . The distinction between diagnostic 
and medical treatments is not in and of itself 
significant to an analysis of informed consent. 
 
See Martin, 192 Wis. 2d at 175.  Indeed, both parties 
agreed at oral argument that it would be inconsistent with 
Martin to hold in this case that § 893.55 does not cover 
negligent diagnosis.  I find unpersuasive the concurrence's 
attempt to distinguish Martin.  
 
¶94 Second, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
squarely 
addressed this issue just last year: 
 
The 
standard 
medical 
malpractice 
jury 
instruction, 
WIS 
JI-CIVIL 
1023, 
does 
not 
specifically instruct as to negligent diagnosis. 
 However, 
diagnosis 
is 
considered 
"care 
and 
treatment." 
Finley v. Culligan, 201 Wis. 2d 611, 622, 548 N.W.2d 854 
(Ct. App. 1996) (citing Miller v. Kim, 191 Wis. 2d 187, 
198, 528 N.W.2d 72 (Ct. App. 1995).   
No.96-0174.awb 
 
26
¶95 Third, by removing diagnosing physicians from the 
protection of § 893.55, the concurrence would create a 
statutory classification scheme which may violate equal 
protection.  It is difficult to discern a rational basis 
for treating diagnosing health care providers differently 
from other health care providers.  The concurrence makes no 
attempt to justify the disparate treatment of health care 
providers achieved under its reading of § 893.55.  In 
avoiding the constitutional basis for the lead opinion's 
decision, the concurrence would merely substitute a real 
constitutional problem for the one imagined by the lead 
opinion, and would overrule three recent cases in the 
process. 
¶96 Finally, 
while 
the 
concurrence 
finds 
the 
legislative 
history 
of 
the 
informed 
consent 
statute 
significant, it takes no notice of the Judicial Council 
Committee note accompanying Wis. Stat. § 893.55.  The note 
states without limitation that: 
 
This section has been created to precisely set 
out the time periods within which an action to 
recover damages for medical malpractice must be 
commenced.  The time provisions apply to any 
health care provider in Wisconsin.   
 
 
Sub. 
(1) 
contains 
the 
general 
time 
limitations for commencing a malpractice action. 
 The subsection requires that such an action be 
commenced not later than 3 years from the event 
constituting the malpractice or not more than one 
year from the time the malpractice is discovered 
by the patient or should have been discovered by 
the patient.  The patient has either the 3-year 
general time period or the one-year time period 
from the date of discovery, whichever is later.  
Subsection (1) further provides that in no event 
No.96-0174.awb 
 
27
may a malpractice action be commenced later than 
6 [5] years from the date of the alleged act or 
omission. 
¶97 As is apparent from the committee note, the 
legislative history supports the proposition that the 
legislature intended that § 893.55 apply generally to 
medical malpractice claims, with no exception for medical 
malpractice actions predicated on negligent diagnosis.  
¶98 For all of these reasons, I conclude that 
negligent diagnosis is treatment for purposes of § 893.55.  
Conclusion 
¶99 I conclude that the plaintiffs have failed to 
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that § 893.55(1)(b) 
is unconstitutional.  The lead opinion believes that it is 
unfair to the plaintiffs to extinguish a cause of action 
before it even arises.  I agree.  The lead opinion is of 
the opinion that it is bad public policy to do so.  I 
agree.  However, I disagree with the lead opinion because 
it fails to provide an analysis which can sustain a 
conclusion that the statute is unconstitutional.  We are 
left, therefore, with the lead opinion's determination of 
what 
constitutes 
good 
public 
policy 
versus 
the 
legislature's determination of what constitutes good public 
policy. 
¶100 The institutional legitimacy of the judiciary is 
at a low ebb when a court errs by substituting its "better" 
public 
policy 
vision 
for 
the 
one 
enacted 
by 
the 
legislature.  The lead opinion has committed such an error 
No.96-0174.awb 
 
28
by mistaking its conception of sound public policy for a 
constitutional mandate.   
¶101 In addition, the lead opinion and the concurrence 
by 
Justice 
Crooks 
have 
erred 
in 
determining 
that 
§ 893.55(1)(b) violates Wis. Const. art. I, § 9.  Prior 
case law demonstrates that Wis. Const. art. I, § 9 creates 
no rights and does not preclude the legislature from 
altering or extinguishing an undiscovered cause of action. 
 For purposes of Wis. Const. art. I, § 9 analysis, the 
distinctions made by the concurrence between contract, 
tort, and medical malpractice claims are baseless.  The 
concurrence also lacks a basis for asserting that because 
the legislature enacted laws in 1975 in an attempt to 
address the medical malpractice crisis, it could not have 
been similarly motivated four years later when it enacted 
the § 893.55(1)(b) statute of repose.  I conclude that Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 9 does not prevent the legislature from 
setting a five-year time limit on the commencement of 
medical malpractice actions. 
¶102 Finally, 
I 
conclude 
that 
Justice 
Bablitch's 
concurrence is premised on a legal theory not raised in 
either the circuit court, the court of appeals, the 
petition for review, or the briefs to this court.  The 
theory was rejected by both parties at oral argument before 
this court, and is contrary to precedent, the language of 
the statute, and the statute's legislative history.  I 
therefore also reject it. 
No.96-0174.awb 
 
29
¶103 For 
the 
foregoing 
reasons, 
I 
respectfully 
dissent. 
¶104 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice 
Shirley S. Abrahamson joins this opinion.