Case Title: Harris v. Wyoming State Tax Com'n

Citation: 

Docket Number: 85-68

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-04-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Harris v. Wyoming State Tax Com'n1986 WY 102718 P.2d 49Case Number: 85-68Decided: 04/25/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Alden HARRIS, 
Petitioner,

v.

WYOMING STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent.

Appeal from District 
Court, FremontCounty, Elizabeth A. Kail, 
J.

Andrew W. 
Baldwin, Wind River Legal Services, Inc., Ft.Washakie, for petitioner.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Peter J. Mulvaney, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Robert J. Walters, Asst. 
Atty. Gen., for 
respondent.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and ROSE,* BROWN, CARDINE, and ROONEY,[fn**] 
JJ.

* Retired November 1, 
1985.

[fn**] Retired 
November 30, 1985.

THOMAS, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The question which we 
must answer in this case is whether the Wyoming State Tax Commission (Tax 
Commission) can rely upon a conviction for driving while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor which was obtained in an Indian tribal court for purposes of 
suspending Harris' driver's license. A threshold question is presented as to 
whether the order of the Tax Commission sufficiently complied with this court's 
construction of the requirements of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act to 
permit judicial review. The case was certified to this court by the district 
court for review pursuant to Rule 12.09, W.R.A.P. We conclude that the 
conviction in tribal court could not be relied upon by the Tax Commission for 
purposes of suspension of Harris' driver's license, and the order of the Tax 
Commission is reversed.

[¶2.]     The statutes upon which 
the Tax Commission relied provide as follows:

"Upon conviction under 
W.S. 31-5-233 or other law prohibiting driving while under the influence, the 
division shall * * *.

* * * * * 
*

"(iii) For three (3) or 
more convictions under W.S. 31-5-233 or other law prohibiting driving while 
under the influence occurring within a five (5) year period preceding the date 
of the most recent offense, revoke the license for three (3) 
years."

§ 31-7-127(d)(iii), W.S. 
1977 (1984 Pamphlet)

Section 
31-7-102(a)(xx), W.S. 1977 (1984 Pamphlet) [now § 31-7-102(a)(xiv), W.S. 1977 
(May 1985 Cum.Supp.)], provides:

"Other law prohibiting 
driving while under the influence means a statute of another state, the United 
States, a territory or district of the United States or an ordinance of a 
governmental entity of this or another state which prohibits driving while under 
the influence of intoxicating liquor, alcohol, controlled substances or 
drugs."

These statutes 
were effective April 1, 1984. Session Laws 1984, Ch. 41, § 
6.

[¶3.]     The parties have 
stipulated to the undisputed fact that Harris was convicted of driving while 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor in the Indian Offenses Court at 
FortWashakie on the Wind River 
Indian Reservation. It is conceded that Tribal Ordinance 2.7 in the Wind River 
Court of Indian Offenses is substantially similar to § 31-5-233, W.S. 1977, and 
does prohibit driving while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor.

[¶4.]     The order of the Tax 
Commission reads in pertinent part:

"THIS MATTER having come 
before the Tax Commission on September 24, 1984, in the matter of the driver 
license revocation of Alden Harris and the Commission having completely reviewed 
the motor vehicle file and Memorandum in Opposition find:

"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
that the Order issued by the Motor Vehicle Division revoking the driver's 
license of Alden Harris be and is hereby upheld."

[¶5.]     In his brief Harris 
sets forth the following issues:

"1. Whether the Tax 
Commission's failure to provide conclusions of law invalidates the revocation of 
Appellant/Petitioner's driver's license.

"2. Whether the State 
Hearing Examiner or the Tax Commission has the authority to revoke 
Appellant/Petitioner's driver's license on the basis of his conviction under 
Tribal Ordinance 2.7 in the Wind River Court of Indian 
Offenses."

The Tax 
Commission states the issues to be resolved differently in its 
brief:

"I. WAS THE TAX 
COMMISSION REQUIRED TO PROVIDE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW SINCE THE FACTS WERE 
UNDISPUTED AND THE DECISION WAS BASED ON AN INTERPRETATION OF THE PERTINENT 
STATUTES?

"II. DID THE STATE 
HEARING EXAMINER AND THE TAX COMMISSION PROPERLY CONCLUDE THAT THE RELEVANT 
STATUTES SHOULD BE INTERPRETED TO INCLUDE CONVICTIONS OF TRIBAL ORDINANCES IN 
THE WINDRIVER COURT OF INDIAN 
OFFENSES?"

[¶6.]     It is clear from the 
record that the sole question presented for decision by the Tax Commission was 
whether Tribal Ordinance 2.7 in the Wind River Court of Indian Offenses under 
which Harris was convicted is an "other law prohibiting driving while under the 
influence" within the meaning of § 31-7-127(d)(iii), W.S. 1977 (1984 Pamphlet). 
Harris' position before the Tax Commission was that the tribal ordinance did not 
meet this definition. The driver's license division responded before the Tax 
Commission that the word "territory" found in § 31-7-102(a)(xx), W.S. 1977 (1984 
Pamphlet) alludes to a geographical area, which does include an Indian 
reservation, that the word "statute" in the same subdivision encompasses the 
tribal ordinances in effect on an Indian reservation, that the policy 
represented by the statute is to remove drunk drivers from the highways, and 
that a strict construction of the statute is not required because statutes 
providing for the revocation of driver's licenses are civil in tenor. Harris 
responded that the words of the statute should be given their legal meaning, not 
their ordinary meaning, and he there cited authority for the proposition that an 
Indian reservation is neither a territory nor a state. It was Harris' conclusion 
before the Tax Commission that the legislature meant to exclude tribal 
ordinances because the statute did not include a reference to an Indian tribe or 
reservation.

[¶7.]     We conclude that the 
order of the Tax Commission is reviewable even though Harris contends that we 
should remand it because it does not encompass conclusions of law as required by 
§ 16-3-110, W.S. 1977. That statute does require that a final decision in a 
contested case "shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law separately 
stated," and this court previously has held that it is the order of the Tax 
Commission which is the final order in cases involving the suspension of 
driver's licenses. State, Department of Revenue & Taxation, Motor Vehicle 
Department v. Andrews, Wyo., 671 P.2d 1239 (1983). This order does 
not encompass findings of fact and conclusions of law separately stated. Harris 
makes no complaint about the absence of findings of fact, and we assume that in 
the light of Foremost Life Insurance Company v. Langdon, Wyo., 633 P.2d 938 
(1981), in which we held that the question of whether the findings of fact were 
insufficient was irrelevant because the parties had stipulated to the facts, 
Harris chose not to raise this issue. The cases which the court has decided in 
construing § 16-3-110, W.S. 1977, hold that the thrust of the language in the 
statute is to require the articulation of basic facts from which ultimate 
findings of fact are determined in order to facilitate judicial review. Pan 
American Petroleum Corporation v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 
Wyo., 446 P.2d 550, 555 (1968); Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public Service 
Commission of Wyoming, Wyo., 662 P.2d 878, 887 (1983); Powell v. Board of 
Trustees of Crook County School District No. 1, Crook County, Wyo., 550 P.2d 1112, 1118 (1976). See also Regan v. City of Casper, Wyo., 494 P.2d 933 (1972) (court declined to 
examine possible latent defects in order because petition for review not timely 
filed).

[¶8.]     In this instance a 
limited question was presented for the Tax Commission for decision, and the 
failure to separately state any conclusions of law does not in any way inhibit 
our review. The obvious question before the Tax Commission, which is the same 
question we are asked to address, is whether a conviction in tribal court for 
driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor may be invoked by the 
driver's license commission in order to revoke Harris' driving privileges 
pursuant to §§ 31-7-102(a)(xx) and 31-7-127(d), W.S. 1977 (1984 Pamphlet). Under 
the circumstances we will not rely upon the technicality of omission of 
conclusions of law separately stated to set aside the agency action and order on 
the asserted ground that it was made without following the procedure required by 
law pursuant to § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(D), W.S. 1977.

[¶9.]     Addressing the question 
raised on the merits we hold that the statutory language does not encompass a 
conviction for driving while under the influence which occurs in a tribal court 
for violation of a tribal ordinance. The amendments to the statutes which are 
quoted above would seem to have been adopted in response to the decision of this 
court in State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Division v. Holtz, Wyo., 674 P.2d 732 
(1983). Previously § 31-7-127(d), W.S. 1977, had provided for revocation of 
driver's licenses "upon conviction under W.S. 31-5-233." This court said in 
State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Division v. Holtz, supra, 674 P.2d at 
743:

"Unless and until changed 
by the legislature, only prior convictions under § 31-5-233, supra, may be 
considered * * * by the Division in suspending and revoking drivers' 
licenses."

In construing 
the statute involved we also said in that case:

"If the language is 
sufficiently clear, there is no need to resort to rules of construction. When 
the language is not clear or is ambiguous, the court must look to the mischief 
the statute was intended to cure, the historical setting surrounding its 
enactment, the public policy of the state, the conclusions of law, and other 
prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances, making use of the accepted 
rules of construction to ascertain a legislative intent that is reasonable and 
consistent. [Citations omitted.]" State ex rel Motor Vehicle Division v. Holtz, 
supra, 674 P.2d  at 736.

[¶10.]  In instances in which the statutory 
language is plain this court will not extend the language to embrace "matters 
not falling within its express provisions." State, Department of Revenue and 
Taxation, Motor Vehicle Division v. Andrews, supra, 671 P.2d  at 1246; Foremost 
Life Insurance Company v. Langdon, supra, 633 P.2d  at 940. In Town of Pine 
Bluffs v. State Board of Equalization, 79 Wyo. 262, 333 P.2d 700, 708 (1958), 
the "familiar rule of `Expressio unius est exclusio alterius,'" was followed, 
and we held that a statute enumerating publicly owned property exempted from 
taxation must be construed to mean that property not enumerated was not 
exempt.

[¶11.]  Harris, citing authority for the 
propositions that an Indian tribe is not a state, a territory or district of the 
United States, a possession of the United States nor a governmental entity of a 
state, argues that his conviction is not included within the statutory 
definition of "conviction under W.S. 31-5-233 or other law prohibiting driving 
while under the influence * * *." The Tax Commission 
concedes:

"Appellee agrees that an 
Indian tribe generally has not been construed to be a `state' or a `territory of 
the United 
States' and that the Shoshone and Arapahoe of 
the Wind River Indian Reservation are a federally recognized Indian 
tribe."

The Tax 
Commission argues, however, that this court should read "Indian tribe" into the 
definition of "other law prohibiting driving while under the influence" in 
accordance with the obvious legislative intent, objects and purposes: "* * * to 
remove driving privileges from a person who presents a threat to public 
safety."

[¶12.]  We hold that applying the principles of 
law which we invoked in State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Division v. Holtz, supra, 
and the other cases cited above we cannot extend the reach of the statute as the 
Tax Commission urges. We have no question that the legislature intended to 
broaden the authority of the driver's license division to suspend and revoke the 
licenses of habitual drunk drivers, and that the statutory language in question 
would change the specific result in State ex rel. Motor Vehicle Division v. 
Holtz, supra. The definition in § 31-7-102(a)(xx), W.S. 1977 (1984 Pamphlet) 
does not, however, encompass within its listing of other laws a tribal 
ordinance, and none of the entities listed there are appropriate to describe an 
Indian tribe or its ordinances. Our statement in State ex rel. Motor Vehicle 
Division v. Holtz, supra, 674 P.2d  at 742, still is apt:

"Until the legislature 
sees fit to change the express wording of these statutes, only convictions under 
the indicated [laws] can be counted as prior convictions for * * * suspension 
and revocation of drivers' licenses."

The conviction 
of Harris for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in the 
tribal court pursuant to a tribal ordinance is not to be counted by the Tax 
Commission for purposes of revocation of Harris' driver's license. 

[¶13.]  The order of the Tax Commission is 
reversed.