Case Title: State v. Watkins

Citation: 463 N.W.2d 15

Docket Number: 89-1302

State: iowa

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Date: 1990-11-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
463 N.W.2d 15 (1990) STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Charles D. WATKINS, Appellant. No. 89-1302. Supreme Court of Iowa. November 21, 1990. *16 Raymond E. Rogers, Appellate Defender, and Linda Del Gallo and Andi S. Lipman, Asst. Appellate Defenders, for appellant. Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Ann E. Brenden, Asst. Atty. Gen., James Smith, County Atty., and Melodee Hanes, Asst. County Atty., for appellee. Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and LARSON, SCHULTZ, CARTER, and NEUMAN, JJ. LARSON, Justice. After the jury had deliberated for over two hours in the robbery trial of Charles D. Watkins, the court amended the instructions by inserting an alternative means of committing the offense. Watkins was found guilty and appealed, claiming error in the trial court's giving of the supplemental instruction. When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, it reveals that the victim of the robbery was working alone in a Des Moines store when the defendant entered, asked her about a dress, and browsed for a while. He then asked about a necklace. While the victim was picking up the necklace, Watkins grabbed her and said: "That's a holdup." He tied her hands, gagged her, shoved her to the floor, and sat on her. While Watkins was looking through the victim's purse, she was able to free herself and run. The court charged the jury, in Instruction 11, that the State must prove the following elements for first-degree robbery: In instructing on the lesser-included offense of second-degree robbery, the court gave the same instruction but omitted the element that the defendant was armed. Neither party objected to these instructions. After the jury had deliberated for over two hours, the prosecutor approached the judge and for the first time claimed that several of the instructions were erroneous. The court ordered the jurors to suspend their deliberations and await further instructions. Over the defendant's objection, the trial court amended the marshaling instructions by adding assault as an alternative means of committing the offense. The new instruction on first-degree robbery stated: (Emphasis added.) The court also changed the marshaling instruction on second-degree robbery by adding the assault alternative. After the amended instructions were given, the jury recommenced deliberations and eventually found the defendant guilty of second-degree robbery. The trial court has the duty to instruct the jury as to the law on all material issues supported by the evidence, Iowa R.Civ.P. 196; Iowa R.Crim.P. 18(5)(f), even without a request, State v. Thomas, 262 N.W.2d 607, 612 (Iowa 1978). The issue is whether the court had authority to give these supplemental instructions under these circumstances where there is no request by the jury, the jury had been deliberating for over two hours, and the amendments in effect changed, rather than modified, the instructions. Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(5)(g) provides: This rule leaves open the question whether the court may provide an additional instruction without a request by the jury. However, Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 197, made applicable to criminal proceedings through Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(5)(f), provides: (Emphasis added.) The comment to rule 197 notes that the trial court may give additional instructions sua sponte. It states: (Emphasis added.) Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure 18(5)(f) and (g), together with Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 197, lead us to conclude that the district court has discretion to give supplemental instructions on its own motion in criminal cases as well as in civil cases. This is necessarily subject, however, to the caveat that it must not prejudice the defendant. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island has stated: State v. Pignolet, 465 A.2d 176, 184 (R.I. 1983) (citations omitted). As we have stated, Sheer Constr., Inc. v. W. Hodgman & Sons, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 328, 334 (Iowa 1982); see also Rowen v. LeMars Mut. Ins. Co., 357 N.W.2d 579, 583 (Iowa 1984). The problem here was not the sufficiency of the evidence of assault; there was abundant evidence of that. The problem is prejudice. The prejudice lies primarily in that Watkins was not permitted to address this critical matter of law in his closing argument. Under rule of criminal procedure 18(5)(f), it is the duty of the district court to instruct in a criminal case in the same manner as in civil cases. Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 196 requires that the instruction be submitted to counsel in final form prior to the arguments. Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(5)(f) makes the same procedure applicable in criminal trials. The effect of these rules is to allow the attorneys to argue the application of the law to the facts of the case. At that time, it is necessary that counsel be informed by the court as to the legal issues being submitted to the jury. Here, Watkins was denied that opportunity. The supplemental instructions on the alternative means of committing these offenses injected a critical matter into the case without an opportunity for Watkins to meet it. While the State contends that any error was harmless because identity was the main line of Watkins' defense, he nevertheless should have been permitted to address the question of assault if he had known it was to be in the case. The proper time for the State to ask for the assault alternative was at the time the instructions were submitted to counsel for their comments and objections prior to argument, see Iowa R.Crim.P. 18(5)(f); Iowa R.Civ.P. 196, not after the arguments. We also believe there is merit in Watkins' argument that the procedure used in this case had the effect of overemphasizing the assault aspect of the State's case. We reverse and remand for a new trial. REVERSED AND REMANDED.