Case Title: Commonwealth v. Shifflett

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1999-01-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
v.  Record No. 980187 
 
VERNON LEROY SHIFFLETT 
OPINION BY JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON 
                                     January 8, 1999 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
v.  Record No. 980188 
 
EMMITT LARON TAYLOR 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
These two criminal appeals, involving findings of guilty in 
noncapital felony prosecutions, present a common issue:  Did the 
Court of Appeals of Virginia err in reversing the respective 
circuit courts, which limited evidence the defendants sought to 
introduce during the sentencing proceedings conducted as part of 
the bifurcated jury trials? 
 
Code § 19.2-295.1 sets forth the procedure in such cases.  
It provides, in part, that after the prosecution has had the 
opportunity to present evidence of the defendant's prior 
convictions, "the defendant may introduce relevant, admissible 
evidence related to punishment."  We are concerned here with the 
meaning of the statutory term "relevant." 
 
At the outset, we issue a caveat.  We shall adhere strictly 
to the content of the records made in the respective trial 
courts, a practice not followed in either of these cases by the 
Court of Appeals, as we shall demonstrate. 
 
In one case, appellee Vernon Leroy Shifflett was found 
guilty by a jury in the Circuit Court of Albemarle County of 
operating a motor vehicle on a public highway in January 1995 
after having been adjudicated an habitual offender, it being a 
second or subsequent offense. 
 
Prior to commencement of the sentencing proceeding, the 
trial court and counsel discussed "what's relevant" with 
reference to punishment.  The attorney for the defendant 
represented to the court, "I do intend to put on mitigating 
testimony about his employment, his family responsibilities." 
 
Responding, the court mentioned "factors" that may be 
relevant to punishment, "range of punishment established by 
legislature, injury to the victim, use of weapon, extent of 
offender's participation, the offense, offender's motive in 
committing the offense, prior record and rehabilitative efforts, 
drug and alcohol use, age, health and education."  The 
prosecutor then stated, "Why he did it . . . is relevant . . . .  
But not his job responsibilities and his family responsibilities 
and the fact that impliedly the common law wife and the children 
are going to have to make it without him for a while.  That has 
no relevance to it."  Defense counsel responded, "I think it 
does, I think it does." 
 
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The trial judge then ruled he would limit the defendant's 
evidence to the applicable factors previously mentioned and 
said, "one of them isn't how the family is affected by it."  The 
prosecutor and the court then agreed with defense counsel that 
"defendant's motive for committing the offense" was admissible.  
Defendant's girlfriend, and mother of his two small children, 
claimed she had become ill while driving defendant home from 
work, necessitating defendant becoming the operator of the 
vehicle and resulting in his arrest. 
 
Continuing, defense counsel argued to the trial court that 
he wished to present evidence of the girlfriend's participation 
in the offense "and what happened that day and the mitigating 
factor that led him to be behind the wheel [and] testimony from 
her about his support of the children, his income -- the income 
that the family has that he brings in and support for her 
position that she did have those spells and the doctor is here 
now to testify on the treatment that she's had, to verify what 
she says and that goes to why he took the wheel, the offender's 
motive for committing the offense."  Responding, the court 
stated that evidence of defendant's "motive to commit the 
offense" would be admissible. 
 
The prosecutor then stated he did not object to testimony 
from the girlfriend's physician but said, "I do object to her 
getting on the stand and saying I only make so much money and I 
 
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have to take care of the kids and all those other things."  
Defense counsel answered, "I think that should come in."  The 
court ruled, "And that's what I'm ruling is not coming in." 
 
During presentation of the evidence during the sentencing 
phase, the court adhered to its prior rulings that were based on 
defendant's arguments presented to the court.  The girlfriend 
testified she became dizzy, could no longer operate the vehicle 
safely, and was forced to allow the defendant to drive.  The 
girlfriend's physician testified he had been treating her for 
vertigo.  The defendant's employer, a painter, testified 
defendant worked for him but the trial court refused to allow 
testimony about "defendant's present employment," the trial 
judge stating he was being consistent with his prior ruling. 
 
After the jury retired to deliberate punishment, defense 
counsel stated to the court that "with regard to Mr. Leroy 
Shifflett's employment, Your Honor, that was certainly relevant 
in terms of where he worked, how he got back and forth to work, 
what he made in his employment, credentials and how good a 
worker he was.  That's certainly all very relevant."  The court 
responded that "employment" was not among the "factors" 
discussed earlier that was relevant to punishment. 
 
The jury fixed defendant's punishment to confinement in the 
penitentiary for three years.  After the jury was discharged and 
before the court sentenced defendant, he presented testimony of 
 
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his employer.  He stated that he had employed defendant for four 
months, that defendant was an "excellent" worker, that he (the 
employer) "need[s]" defendant because he had "a lot of . . . 
work lined up in the future," and that defendant had been able 
to find persons to drive him to work.  The court sentenced 
defendant in accordance with the verdict in a September 1995 
judgment order. 
 
Upon appeal, a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals, 
one judge dissenting, affirmed the conviction and sentence.  
Shifflett v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 538, 484 S.E.2d 134 
(1997).  The court stated that defendant contended on appeal 
"the trial court erred in preventing him from eliciting 
testimony at the sentencing phase of his trial concerning the 
impact of his incarceration upon his family and his employment."  
Id. at 540, 484 S.E.2d at 135 (emphasis added).  The court held 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 
allow defendant "to elicit testimony from his girlfriend and 
employer concerning the financial impact his incarceration would 
have on his family and employer."  Id. at 543, 484 S.E.2d at 
136.  That testimony, the court said, was "not relevant evidence 
related to punishment for consideration by the jury under 
Virginia law."  Id., 484 S.E.2d at 137. 
 
Upon rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals, in a 6-3 
decision, reversed the case and remanded it for a new sentencing 
 
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proceeding.  Shifflett v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 254, 261, 
494 S.E.2d 163, 167 (1997).  The court stated that the 
"employer's testimony regarding Shifflett's success at work and 
his efforts to maintain a commuting schedule that obviated his 
need to drive reflects on Shifflett's 'character and 
propensities,'" which are relevant to sentencing.  Id. at 260, 
494 S.E.2d at 166.  The court further stated that the 
girlfriend's testimony "was not offered merely to prove the 
family's apparent need for his income.  Her testimony would have 
proved that Shifflett was a responsible father who worked 
earnestly to provide for his children.  Certainly, evidence that 
a defendant has contributed positively to his family situation 
is a relevant circumstance."  Id. at 261, 494 S.E.2d at 166.  We 
awarded the Commonwealth this appeal from that judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. 
 
In the other case, appellee Emmitt Laron Taylor was found 
guilty by a jury in the Circuit Court of Arlington County of 
conspiring to distribute five or more pounds of marijuana, 
possessing with the intent to distribute the same amount of the 
drug, and transporting the same amount of the drug into Virginia 
with the intent to sell or distribute it.  The defendant was 
arrested on October 10, 1995 on the premises of Washington 
National Airport. 
 
6
 
During the sentencing proceeding, the Commonwealth 
presented evidence that defendant, 22 years of age at the time 
of the February 1996 trial, had been convicted in California in 
1990 of armed robbery and in 1994 of a violation of California's 
narcotics laws. 
 
Following presentation of this evidence, the defendant took 
the witness stand and was asked by his attorney to "tell the 
jury about your family."  After defendant stated he had an older 
brother, an older sister, and a younger brother, and that the 
younger brother had been "killed" because "they had a grudge 
against him," the trial court sustained the prosecutor's 
objection to the testimony.  A discussion followed among the 
court and counsel about what evidence was relevant to punishment 
under the applicable statute. 
 
Defense counsel argued that "who Emmitt Taylor is is 
certainly a relevant issue."  Responding to the court's 
question, "What do you propose to have him testify to," defense 
counsel responded, "About his life."  The court interjected, 
"Life story?" and counsel responded, "Yes." 
 
The court ruled that evidence "just relating the whole 
story" was inadmissible and not relevant to sentencing.  After 
defense counsel said, "Note my objection, Your Honor," the court 
stated:  "Now, the statute that permits relevant and admissible 
evidence from the Defendant on the sentencing phase of the case 
 
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is limited to that, and I don't want to limit you anymore than 
that; but it does not permit just a complete open door telling 
of everything."  Defense counsel responded, "All right, Your 
Honor." 
 
The sentencing phase continued with the defendant 
testifying that he was 17 years of age at the time of the armed 
robbery conviction and that he pled guilty to the narcotics 
charge because he was told it "was a juvenile matter and would 
be sealed."  Responding to further questions, defendant 
testified that he had completed the 11th grade in school, and 
that he had worked as a gardener, a cook, and at a fish market. 
 
The jury fixed defendant's punishment to confinement in the 
penitentiary for 18 years on each of the conspiracy and 
distribution charges and to confinement for 20 years and an 
$80,000 fine on the transporting charge.  After the jury was 
discharged, the trial court granted defendant's request for a 
presentence report. 
 
Six days after the jury had been discharged, the trial 
court granted defendant's request, made the day after trial, to 
have inserted in the record a proffer of testimony.  Stating 
that the trial court's ruling on evidence dealing with 
punishment was "overly narrow," defense counsel offered "some 
proof of what my client would have testified to." 
 
8
 
During the post-trial hearing, defendant testified, for 
example, that when he was age nine, his father was robbed and 
killed; that he had no "male role models growing up"; that his 
mother is a heavy drug user; that his younger half-brother was 
killed by gunshots after an argument with his assailants; that 
he had no fixed home prior to coming to Virginia; and that he 
received no "instruction as to discipline" from his family. 
 
Following argument of counsel, the trial court made two 
rulings in denying what it treated as a motion to "reopen the 
case" to permit presentation of additional evidence.  First, the 
court ruled that the proffer was untimely.  The court stated 
that "the proffer should be made at the moment of the exclusion 
in order to give the trial court the opportunity to admit the 
evidence in the event its ruling to exclude would be deemed to 
be in error."  The court continued:  "However, here, the motion 
that is being made now is not timely.  And that is one of the 
reasons . . . assigned for its denial."  Second, the trial court 
ruled the evidence presented in the proffer was not relevant to 
sentencing. 
 
In judgments of conviction entered in June 1996, the trial 
court suspended execution of the conspiracy and distribution 
sentences and imposed the transporting sentence. 
 
Upon appeal, a panel of the Court of Appeals, in an 
unpublished opinion dated the same day as the Shifflett en banc 
 
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opinion, reversed the trial court judgments and remanded for a 
resentencing hearing.  Reciting only the facts presented during 
the proffer, ruled untimely by the trial court, the Court of 
Appeals said the case was controlled by the Shifflett en banc 
decision.  The court held:  "The excluded evidence in this case 
clearly was relevant to appellant's background and family 
situation at the time of the earlier conviction and was also 
probative of his current situation."  We awarded the 
Commonwealth this appeal from that judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
 
The crucial question in these appeals is what did the 
General Assembly mean when it provided in Code § 19.2-295.1 that 
during the punishment phase of a bifurcated noncapital jury 
trial, where the defendant has been found guilty, "the defendant 
may introduce relevant . . . evidence related to punishment"?  
This statute was enacted in 1994 when Virginia changed the 
procedure in such cases from unitary to bifurcated trials.  See 
Acts 1994, ch. 828, 860, 881. 
 
The law extant in the Commonwealth in 1994 relating to 
punishment in felony cases included the provisions of Code 
§ 19.2-264.4(B), dealing with capital murder cases, and the 
decision in Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 257 S.E.2d 797 
(1979), interpreting that statute.  When Coppola was decided, as 
now, the statute provided that in capital murder cases tried by 
 
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jury, "evidence may be presented as to any matter which the 
court deems relevant to sentence."  The statute goes on to 
provide that evidence that may be "admissible, subject to the 
rules of evidence governing admissibility," may include certain 
facts.  Those are "circumstances surrounding the offense, the 
history and background of the defendant, and any other facts in 
mitigation of the offense." 
 
Continuing, the statute provided that facts in mitigation 
may include, but shall not be limited to, the following:  "(i) 
The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal 
activity, or (ii) the capital felony was committed while the 
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance or (iii) the victim was a participant in the 
defendant's conduct or consented to the act, or (iv) at the time 
of the commission of the capital felony, the capacity of the 
defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly 
impaired; or (v) the age of the defendant at the time of the 
commission of the capital offense." 
 
In Coppola, a capital murder prosecution tried by jury, the 
defendant complained the trial court erroneously excluded the 
proffered testimony of his former wife about the adverse effect 
upon their two young sons of defendant's arrest and prosecution.  
In finding no error, the Court said "discretion is vested in the 
 
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trial court to determine, subject to the rules of evidence 
governing admissibility, the evidence which may be adduced in 
mitigation of the offense."  Coppola, 220 Va. at 253, 257 S.E.2d 
at 804. 
 
The Court stated that the proffered evidence "is irrelevant 
on the issue of mitigation.  It is not analogous to any of the 
evidence specifically approved in the statute.  The kind of 
evidence therein contemplated bears upon the record of the 
defendant and the atrociousness of his crime.  Evidence of a 
good previous record, and extenuating circumstances tending to 
explain, but not excuse, his commission of the crime, is 
admissible mitigating evidence . . . .  But the effect of his 
incarceration upon relatives is not a mitigating circumstance 
for the jury to consider."  Id. at 253-54, 257 S.E.2d at 804. 
 
Against this background, which delineated the types of 
factors considered "relevant" in capital cases, the General 
Assembly crafted the statute in issue dealing with noncapital 
cases.  The same standard, relevant admissible evidence related 
to punishment, was included.  We perceive no sound reason why 
the factors that may be considered by a jury in capital murder 
cases should not likewise be available for consideration by a 
jury in noncapital cases under § 19.2-295.1.  The goal of having 
an informed jury assess appropriate punishment should be no less 
essential merely because a noncapital offense is involved. 
 
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But this is not a one-way street extending only in the 
defendant's direction.  The statute also permits the 
Commonwealth to introduce "relevant, admissible evidence in 
rebuttal" to that offered by the defendant. 
 
Therefore, we hold that a trial court, in determining what 
evidence is relevant to punishment under Code § 19.2-295.1 may 
be guided in the exercise of its discretion, subject to the 
rules of evidence governing admissibility, by the factors set 
forth in Code § 19.2-264.4(B), as interpreted in Coppola.  The 
kind of evidence contemplated by § 19.2-295.1 bears upon the 
record of the defendant and the nature of his crime.  Evidence 
of a good previous record, and extenuating circumstances tending 
to explain, but not excuse, the commission of the noncapital 
crime is admissible mitigating evidence.*  And, a trial court's 
discretionary ruling on this issue should not be disturbed on 
appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.  Coe v. Commonwealth, 
231 Va. 83, 87, 340 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1986). 
                     
* In support of his contention that § 19.2-295.1 should be 
interpreted in a restrictive manner, the Attorney General has 
advised us that the 1995 General Assembly refused to enact House 
Bill No. 2212, which would have added language to the statute 
specifically permitting introduction of evidence about "the 
history and background of the defendant and any other facts in 
mitigation or aggravation of the offense."  We are not persuaded 
by this information; the legislature may well have determined 
that such amendment was unnecessary because the statutory and 
case law already so provided. 
 
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We shall now apply the foregoing principles to the present 
cases.  Initially, we observe that an appellate court ought to 
decide cases based on the record made in the court below.  The 
appellate court, in fairness to the trial judge, should not 
recast the evidence and put a different twist on a question that 
is at odds with the question presented to the trial court. 
 
Shifflett is an example of this incorrect technique.  The 
issue presented to the trial court by the defendant, as we have 
demonstrated in our summary of the record, was whether he was 
entitled to adduce testimony concerning the impact of his 
incarceration upon his family and his employment.  Yet, the 
Court of Appeals said the girlfriend's testimony was offered to 
prove "that Shifflett was a responsible father who worked 
earnestly to provide for his children."  Shifflett, 26 Va. App. 
at 261, 494 S.E.2d at 166.  Also, the Court of Appeals said the 
employer's testimony was offered to show defendant's "character 
and propensities."  Id. at 260, 494 S.E.2d at 166.  Neither of 
these bases for admission of the girlfriend's and the employer's 
testimony was urged upon the trial court prior to submission of 
the case to the jury to assess punishment, and we shall not use 
those grounds to decide this appeal. 
 
Instead, we hold that the trial court, consistent with 
Coppola, did not clearly abuse its discretion by refusing to 
allow evidence concerning the impact of defendant's 
 
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incarceration upon his family and his employment, and the Court 
of Appeals erred in ruling to the contrary. 
 
The Court of Appeals' decision in Taylor presents a similar 
problem.  It addressed exclusively the facts presented in the 
proffer, which the trial court explicitly refused to consider 
because it was untimely.  The fact that the trial court, in an 
alternative ruling, may have erred by deciding the proffered 
material was not relevant is beside the point.  The record made 
in the trial court, before defendant's sentencing was presented 
to the jury, was a request by defendant to adduce evidence about 
his "life story" that amounted to "a complete open door telling 
of everything." 
 
Yet, the Court of Appeals did not address this request made 
by defendant before the jury retired.  Rather, the appellate 
court said the proffered evidence "clearly was relevant to 
appellant's background and family situation."  We shall not use 
the proffered evidence to decide this appeal. 
 
We cannot say that the trial court clearly abused its 
discretion by refusing to admit evidence about the defendant's 
life history when the defendant made a broad, unrestricted, and 
nonparticularized request for "just relating the whole story" 
and for "just a complete open door telling of everything," and 
the Court of Appeals erred in ruling to the contrary. 
 
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Consequently, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals in Shifflett, and will enter final judgment here 
reinstating the sentencing order of the Circuit Court of 
Albemarle County.  Likewise, we will reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals in Taylor, and will enter final judgment here 
reinstating the sentencing orders of the Circuit Court of 
Arlington County. 
Record No. 980187 — Reversed and final judgment. 
Record No. 980188 — Reversed and final judgment. 
 
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