Case Title: VIRGINIA L. WALTERS v. LONNIE WALTERS

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0152

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-03-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
VIRGINIA L. WALTERS v. LONNIE WALTERS2011 WY 41Case Number: No. S-09-0152, S-10-0059Decided: 03/09/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 

VIRGINIA 
L. WALTERS,Appellant (Plaintiff),v.LONNIE 
WALTERS,Appellee (Defendant).

 
 
 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

 
 
 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kristin 
Shaun Wilkerson of Trent & Wilkerson Law Office, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming 

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Mary 
T. Parsons of Parsons & Cameron, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming 

 
 
 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The two appeals 
consolidated for decision in this opinion arise out of the divorce litigation 
between Virginia L. Walters (Mrs. Walters) and Lonnie Walters (Mr. 
Walters).  In appeal No. S-09-0152, 
Mrs. Walters challenges the district court's property distribution set forth in 
the Judgment and Decree of Divorce filed on June 3, 2009.  We affirm that judgment.  In appeal No. S-10-0059, Mrs. Walters 
appeals from the district court's order filed on January 15, 2010, in the 
post-divorce proceeding that found her in civil contempt and imposed 
sanctions.  We reverse that 
order.

 
 
APPEAL 
NO. S-09-0152

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mrs. Walters 
presents this statement of the issues:

 
 
I.          
Did the district court abuse its discretion, commit serious procedural 
error and/or violate a principle of law by finding Ms. Walters in 
contempt?

 
 
II.         
Did the district court abuse its discretion by punishing Ms. Walters 
through its distribution of property?

 
 
III.        Was 
the district court's division of marital property clearly erroneous, against the 
great weight of evidence, and/or otherwise not supported by substantial 
evidence?

 
 
Mr. 
Walters presents the issues in this way:

 
 
I.          
Whether the district court abused its discretion, committed a procedural 
error, or violated a principal of law by finding the appellant in contempt of 
court

 
 
II.         
Whether the district court's division of marital property was clearly 
erroneous, against the great weight of the evidence or otherwise not supported 
by substantial evidence

 
 
In 
her reply brief, Mrs. Walters responds with this issue 
statement:

 
 
Even 
if Appellant were properly found in civil contempt, the district court abused 
its discretion, committed a procedural error or violated a principal of law by 
not imposing a fine based on Appellee's actual loss.

 
 

FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      The parties 
married on May 5, 2006; Mrs. Walters filed her complaint for divorce on August 
6, 2008; and Mr. Walters filed his answer and counterclaim on August 14, 
2008.  No children were born to the 
parties.  The parties pursued 
discovery.  The district court 
issued mutual restraining orders that prohibited the parties from expending 
marital assets, other than for daily living expenses, until further order of the 
court.  The district court issued 
orders to show cause to both parties concerning alleged violations of those 
orders but opted to determine those alleged violations at the 
trial.

 
 
[¶4]      The trial 
consumed three full days and an hour of a fourth day, from March 24 to April 1, 
2009.  The primary contested issue 
at trial was the distribution of the marital property, although the district 
court also determined whether Mrs. Walters had violated a mutual restraining 
order as mentioned above.  The 
district court heard testimony from twelve witnesses and considered a 
substantial number of exhibits, including financial records and a real estate 
appraisal of the parties' Cheyenne property on Cox Road.  The parties' respective counsel agreed 
that the district court's determination of the marital property distribution 
would turn on the credibility of the parties.  As succinctly stated by Mrs. Walters' 
counsel in his closing argument, "this boils down to credibility.  You're the trier of fact.  You're the one who looks at the people 
in the eyes and sees their mannerisms, their rationale of the statements.  And what makes up the credibility of a 
witness is an influx of information."  

 
 
[¶5]      The trial 
concluded on April 1, 2009; the district court issued its decision letter on 
April 15, 2009; and the district court filed the Judgment and Decree of Divorce, 
which incorporated by reference its decision letter, on June 3, 2009.  In the decision letter, the district 
court explained its determination of the marital property distribution and its 
determination of Mrs. Walters' alleged violation of a mutual restraining 
order:

 
 
            
The determination of an equitable distribution of property is a more 
involved question.  [Mr. Walters] 
operated Lonnie's Roustabout Service, LLC (LRS) in Kansas for over twenty 
years.  The roustabout service was a 
Kansas limited liability company with [Mr. Walters] as the sole and controlling 
member.  [Mrs. Walters] is also 
originally from Kansas, although she lived in Cheyenne at the time the parties 
developed what might loosely be described as a romantic relationship.  Her testimony as to her earnings and 
occupation at the time of the marriage began was nebulous, and the Court gleaned 
from it only that she was trained as a paramedic and provided some form of home 
health care to an elderly woman living in Cheyenne.

 
 
            
The marriage occurred in 2006 after [Mr. Walters] asked [Mrs. Walters], 
whom he barely knew, to go to Hawaii with him for a vacation in January of that 
year.  During the vacation he 
proposed, and she accepted.  The 
marriage followed in May.

 
 
            
The story of the engagement and marriage grew more improbable as it 
developed. [Mr. Walters] had been quite successful in his business, and had 
acquired cash, real estate, and other assets.  [Mrs. Walters] had around $100,000 in 
liquid assets, a 2004 Ford pickup, and lived in a rented mobile home.  At some point before or after the 
marriage, depending upon whom one believes, [Mrs. Walters] became involved in 
[Mr. Walter's] business.

 
 
            
The business accounting of LRS did not adhere to standard practices.  Rather than reimbursing himself for 
business expenses based on credit card receipts or cash payments, Mr. Walters 
would receive checks from the business which were deposited in a personal 
account or converted to cash.  He 
does claim that he had receipts for appropriate expenses and provided them to 
his accountant, who would not expense any item not supported by a receipt for 
tax purposes. This was no doubt acceptable in a single-member LLC, since no 
owner was harmed, but it created a climate in which it became very difficult for 
the Court to analyze the transactions for purposes of the property division in 
this divorce action.  For example, 
at one point Mr. Walters testified that he had written a check on the business 
account to Mrs. Walters before the marriage for around $3,000.  The memo on the check was for mowing and 
painting.  The logical conclusion 
one would draw is that LRS paid Virginia Walters for mowing and painting.  However, Mr. Walters testified that he 
actually did the mowing and painting himself, and gave her the money to buy a 
wedding dress.  This sort of 
improbable testimony about the accounting processes of LRS emanated from both 
parties and abounded throughout the trial.

 
 
            
The Court cannot shake the notion that each party may have invented a 
story, at least in part, to justify his or her claims with regard to the 
property settlement.  We shall begin 
with Mrs. Walters.  Funds in the 
amount of $50,000 were transferred from an account controlled by Lonnie Walters 
to Lonnie Walters by wire transfer, and the day after, were used by Mr. Walters 
to purchase a lot in Cheyenne on which a metal building was constructed and then 
razed, and on which a house was also constructed, as more fully discussed 
below.  Mr. Walters' claims' 
concerning these funds are credible  he contends that he provided the funds for 
the purchase of a lot that he and Mrs. Walters had looked at and agreed upon for 
purposes of building a marital home, and that at closing, while he was in 
Kansas, she simply omitted him from the title 
intentionally.

 
 
            
Mrs. Walters claims, on the other hand, that before the marriage Mr. 
Walters asked her to help get his roustabout service in shape to sell (including 
cleaning up the books), and promised to pay her $50,000 to do so, regardless of 
whether the business sold or not.  
Mrs. Walters has no experience to speak of in accounting and none in the 
roustabout business.  There is 
nothing to corroborate this claim, and the Court rejects 
it.

 
 
            
The testimony indicated that Mrs. Walters eventually took control of the 
roustabout service books.  She paid 
herself about $80,000 in expense reimbursement, which she placed in accounts to 
which only she and her children had access.  She now claims that Mr. Walters promised 
to pay her between $80,000 and $100,000 per year for her services for the 
business (in which she performed some painting, mowing and minor bookkeeping 
services).  She testified that these 
amounts were to be in addition to her wages, which amounted to about $25.00 per 
hour, in addition to $10 per hour for her teenage son, who was not even in 
Kansas, the only place he could have been working for LRS, at certain times that 
he was receiving paychecks.  
Remarkably, the amounts of the expense checks adds up to approximately 
the $80,000 to $100,000 per year she claims to have been promised.  She and her accountant characterized 
these as draws against the business.

 
 
            
Virginia Walters never owned any interest in the roustabout service, and 
no check to her is characterized as a dividend or draw.  She wrote these checks to herself after 
persuading Mr. Walters to let her sign checks on the business account.  No logical reason for such compensation 
is evident based on the services she rendered or the prosperity of the business, 
and there is likewise no evidence which would indicate that Mr. Walters knew of 
the scope of these withdrawals.  
Testimony indicated that Mrs. Walters kept the checkbook and business 
records under lock and key.  The 
Court arrives at the inevitable conclusion that Mrs. Walters simply looted the 
business and segregated those funds in anticipation of this 
divorce.

 
 
            
In addition, the record is clear that Mrs. Walters violated a court order 
in this case.  The Court entered a 
mutual restraining order which would have prevented either party from expending 
substantial funds of the marital estate without a further order of the 
Court.  Despite this order, Mrs. 
Walters used funds to build a home on the land described above after it was 
entered.  She attempted to justify 
this action by claiming that the home had to be finished in order to protect the 
structure already in place from deterioration.  Photographic evidence proved that the 
home had only a foundation, or at most a foundation and subfloor, at the time 
the order was entered, and that it was unnecessary to finish the structure to 
protect an investment in framing, etc.  
No explanation whatsoever was given for the purchase of furnishings and 
installation of fixtures in the structure.  
Mrs. Walters never asked the Court to authorize the expenditures.  It has therefore been proven by clear 
and convincing evidence that Mrs. Walters willfully violated a court order and 
is in contempt of court.  The Court 
will take this contempt into account in formulating its decree in this matter, 
and will reserve sanctions which may be imposed in the event of failure to 
comply with any of its conditions.

 
 
            
The record is also clear that Mrs. Walters hid assets and destroyed 
business records to prevent an accurate accounting of funds which she has 
taken.  During the litigation, she 
closed accounts and a safe-deposit box in which property was to have been kept 
in an effort to make determination of the assets in her possession a moving 
target.  When the Court issued an 
order authorizing a gun safe on her property to be opened on short notice, she 
was found to be in possession of articles of property which she had denied 
having.  It is well-settled that a 
party's bad-faith withholding, destruction, or alteration of a document or other 
physical evidence relevant to proof of an issue at trial gives rise to a 
presumption or inference that the evidence would have been unfavorable to the 
party responsible for its nonproduction, destruction, or alteration.  Abraham v. Great Western Energy, LLC, 
2004 WY 145, ¶20, 101 P.3d 446, 455-456 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
            
For his part, Lonnie Walters claimed that Mrs. Walters took approximately 
$200,000 from a safe-deposit box located at a local bank.  He explained in testimony that over the 
past 20 years, in good years, he would put $10,000 in an envelope and hide the 
envelopes in a wall safe at his home in Kansas.  He claims that he brought 19 of these 
envelopes which had accumulated to Wyoming and put them in the safe deposit box, 
added another approximately thirteen thousand dollars, and then gave Mrs. 
Walters both keys to the box, effectively locking himself out, because he feared 
that he might lose the key.

 
 
            
Mr. Walters was unable to provide any corroboration of his claims 
concerning the $200,000.  No witness 
was called to substantiate its existence, and communications between counsel and 
discovery in this case did not suggest that such a sum ever existed until the 
eve of trial.  While it is not 
impossible that Mr. Walters could have owned cash in that amount, its existence 
was not proven, and the Court will not consider that amount in the property 
division.  Nagging doubts do remain, 
given Mrs. Walters' other misconduct, that she may in fact have gotten away with 
that sum of money, but doubts do not amount to proof.

 
 
            
Finally, the Court must recognize that Virginia Walters is entitled to 
equitable portion of the marital earnings for the mercifully brief duration of 
this marriage.  However, as the 
Supreme Court has observed, an equitable distribution is not necessarily equal, 
and an equitable distribution is in fact likely to be unequal.  Moss v. Moss, 2007 WY 67, ¶4, 156 P.3d 316, 318 (Wyo. 2007).  That will 
certainly be true in this case, in which Mr. Walters had far more assets at the 
beginning of this brief marriage than Mrs. Walters, and in which the excellent 
earnings which LRS enjoyed were the fruit of his sustained effort over many 
years.  The Court rejects the notion 
that Virginia Walters' efforts contributed substantially to these financial 
rewards.  On the other hand, both 
parties each bear some responsibility for the murky environment in which the 
Court must construct a property division.

 
 
            
The division of property will be as follows:

 
 
            
7902 Cox Road.  This property actually includes three 
components  the land, the funds from a steel building that was taken down, and 
the house itself.  The Court is 
convinced that Mr. Walters paid for the land from funds which he had 
accumulated, and is entitled to a credit for that expenditure.  It is also clear that LRS paid for a 
metal building which was erected in the wrong location and which was later taken 
down.  Wyoming Steel, the company 
which built the building and then removed it, paid $37,500 (less some damage to 
the steel) in settlement of claims against it for the allegedly faulty 
construction.  Lonnie Walters will 
receive these funds, less any deductions made by Wyoming Steel to the 
building.  In addition, Mr. Walters 
produced proof of payment for pouring of a concrete basement and foundation, and 
he is entitled to reimbursement for these funds.

 
 
            
Mrs. Walters was in possession of certain assets which she claims were 
used to purchase materials which went into the construction of the house itself, 
the foundation excluded, and she acted as the general contractor.  While these funds were in part the 
result of deplorable efforts to conceal assets and to steal a march on Mr. 
Walters in direct violation of a court order, the Court reluctantly concludes 
that she is entitled to some of its value.  
It appears that the home was poorly designed and constructed, but it is 
valued by appraisal at $304,000.  
The division of the home will therefore be as 
follows:

 
 
a.         
Mrs. Walters will be entitled to possession of the home and contents 
except as specifically provided herein.

 
 
b.         
Mr. Walters will be entitled to reimbursement of the 
following:

 
 
            
$50,000 purchase price of the land.

 
 
            
The amount paid by Wyoming Steel for the building.

 
 
            
The cost of erecting the foundation and basement.

 
 
c.         
Mrs. Walters will reimburse Mr. Walters for the above amounts within 180 
days of entry of a decree of divorce.  
Mr. Walters will be entitled to a judicial lien or mortgage on the 
property until this debt is satisfied.

 
 
d.         
If Mr. Walters is not paid the above amounts within 180 days of entry of 
the decree, the property will be sold and the above amounts payable to Lonnie 
Walters satisfied therefrom, with the balance of the funds remaining to be paid 
to Mrs. Walters.

 
 

2006 
Ford F-150s.  Each party shall receive the 2006 Ford 
F-150 in his or her possession at this time.  Mr. Walters claims that Mrs. Walters' 
vehicle is actually an asset of the roustabout business, but it is more likely 
that the funds to purchase it were a gift.  
A transfer of property between husband and wife or parent and child is 
presumed to be a gift. Kelsey v. 
Anderson, 421 P.2d 163, 164 (Wyo. 1966); 38 Am. Jur. Gifts §92 at page 892 (1968); 38A CJS Gifts §67 at pages 250-251 (1966).  The same rule has been applied in 
Wyoming to real property when the spouse who pays for the property deeds an 
interest to the other spouse.  See Wallop v. Wallop, 2004 WY 46, ¶27, 
88 P.2d 1022, 1030 (Wyo. 2004); Barton v. 
Barton, 996 P.2d 1, 4 (Wyo. 2000); and Tyler v. Tyler, 624 P.2d 784, 785-786 
(Wyo. 1981).

 
 
The 
evidence presented does not rebut and indeed seems to support the notion that 
the 2006 Ford F-150 was a gift from Mr. Walters through LRS to Mrs. 
Walters.  He may regret his 
generosity at this point, but the bell cannot be unrung.

 
 

2008 
Ford F-150.  This vehicle is titled in the names of 
Mrs. Walters and her son, and the son claims that it is his pickup truck.  It was paid for from an account in Mrs. 
Walters and her son's name, and which contained funds which [Mrs. Walters] 
claims were her son's wages.  The 
record supports Mrs. Walters' position on this issue.  The truck will be deemed to be owned by 
Mrs. Walters' son Bryan Akers, and the decree shall so 
state.

 
 

"Pershing" 
Account.  Banc West Account . . . contained 
approximately $850,000 at the time of trial.  The evidence established that these 
funds were premarital funds of Mr. Walters, funds from the sale of some real 
property owned by Mr. Walters, some earnings of Lonnie's Roustabout Service 
during the marriage, and some funds of which Mr. Walters was the trustee.  This account shall be awarded solely to 
Lonnie Walters.

 
 

Banc 
West Account . 
. . .  This account was funded by 
Mrs. Walters, who claims that she used the funds to build the home described 
above.  To the extent that any funds 
remain in said account, they will be awarded to Virginia 
Walters.

 
 

Kansas 
Home.  Mr. Walters owned a home in Ulysses, 
Kansas before the marriage.  It will 
be awarded to him.

 
 

Lonnie's 
Roustabout Service Business and Equipment.  Lonnie Walters shall be awarded all 
equipment listed on the depreciation schedule of LRS unless otherwise specified 
in this decision letter, including but not limited to the two tractors and 
mowing attachments and any trailers (including the PJ trailer), regardless of 
who possesses them at this time.  
Mr. Walters shall also be awarded his interest in LRS free of any claim 
by Mrs. Walters.

 
 

Lonnie's 
Soda Blasting Equipment.  To the extent that any equipment carried 
on the books of Lonnie's Soda Blasting exists, it is awarded to Lonnie Walters 
along with ownership of the LLC.

 
 

Contents 
of Safe.  As noted above, the Court authorized the 
examination of a gun safe located at the Cox road property on short notice.  The contents were photographed, and the 
photographs were made part of the court record.  Lonnie Walters shall be entitled to all 
coins contained in the safe, as well as any personal documents (including his 
passport, birth certificates pertaining to members of the Walters family, 
cancelled driver's license and any other personal documents).  Virginia Walters will be entitled to the 
firearms in the safe and anything not listed above.

 
 

Outdoors 
Etc., LLC.  The parties had an L.L.C. which produced 
certain craft-like items for sale.  
It does not appear that the business was particularly active or 
successful, but special equipment was purchased, including sewing machines, 
etc.  These will be awarded to 
Virginia Walters, along with the ownership of the L.L.C.

 
 

Attorney 
Fees.  Both parties claim substantial attorney 
fees and expenses.  Both parties 
have been left with substantial property, and the Court declines to award 
attorney fees to either.  The proven 
misconduct of Virginia Walters has been taken into account in the property 
division, and no award of attorney fees in favor of Lonnie Walters will 
therefore be made in consideration of the position in which the parties are left 
by this decision.

 
 

Miscellaneous.  

 
 
1.         
The parties shall promptly notify the Court of any significant marital 
debt or asset not disposed of by this decision letter so that the property 
division contained herein may be supplemented to address those items of 
property.

 
 
2.         
The decree shall contain provisions requiring the parties to promptly 
execute all documents necessary to effectuate the property division contained 
therein.

 
 
3.         
The Court has purposely not concluded that each party should be entitled 
to ownership of any asset in his or her possession which has not been dealt with 
in this decision letter.  If it is 
determined at any later time that substantial marital assets have been concealed 
or not disclosed by design, the discovery of those assets may justify reopening 
of this decree under Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(b).

 
 
4.         
[Mr. Walters' counsel] will prepare the decree implementing these 
decisions unless the parties otherwise agree.

 
 
5.         
The record in this case reveals misconduct which is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice. A failure on the part of either party to comply with 
the terms of the decree when entered may be punished as a civil contempt to 
compel compliance, and sanctions may include incarceration pending 
compliance.

 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]      The Wyoming 
Legislature has given our courts direction in determining the equitable 
disposition of the parties' marital property:

 
 
            
In granting a divorce, the court shall make such disposition of the 
property of the parties as appears just and equitable, having regard for the 
respective merits of the parties and the condition in which they will be left by 
the divorce, the party through whom the property was acquired and the burdens 
imposed upon the property for the benefit of either party and children.  The court may decree to either party 
reasonable alimony out of the estate of the other having regard for the other's 
ability to pay and may order so much of the other's real estate or the rents and 
profits thereof as is necessary be assigned and set out to either party for 
life, or may decree a specific sum be paid by either 
party.

 
 
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114 (LexisNexis 2009).   Our jurisprudence provides us with 
a legion of applicable precedents.  
In Sweat v. Sweat, 2003 WY 82, 
¶ 6, 72 P.3d 276, 278 (Wyo. 2003), we explained:

 
 
The 
division of marital property is within the trial court's sound discretion, and 
we will not disturb that division absent an abuse of discretion.  Carlton v. Carlton, 997 P.2d 1028, 1032 
(Wyo. 2000).  A just and equitable 
distribution is as likely as not to be unequal.  Id. We evaluate whether the trial 
court's property division is, in fact, equitable from the perspective of the 
overall distribution of marital assets and liabilities rather than from a narrow 
focus on the effects of any particular disposition.  Id. From that perspective, we afford the 
trial court considerable discretion to form a distributive scheme appropriate to 
the peculiar circumstances of each individual case, and we will not disturb such 
a scheme absent a showing that the trial court clearly abused its 
discretion.  Id. The division of property in a 
divorce case should not be disturbed except on clear grounds as the trial court 
is usually in a better position than the appellate court to judge the parties' 
respective merits and needs.  Metz v. Metz, 2003 WY 3, ¶ 6, 61 P.3d 383, ¶ 6 (Wyo. 2003).  The trial 
court is also in the best position to assess the witnesses' credibility and 
weigh their testimony.  Raymond v. Raymond, 956 P.2d 329, 332 
(Wyo. 1998).  We, therefore, give 
considerable deference to its findings.  
Id. The ultimate question in 
determining whether an abuse of discretion occurred is whether the trial court 
could reasonably conclude as it did.  
Metz, 2003 WY 3, ¶ 6. In 
answering that question, we consider only the evidence of the successful party, 
ignore the evidence of the unsuccessful party, and grant the successful party 
every favorable inference that can be drawn from the record.  Holland v. Holland, 2001 WY 113, ¶ 8, 35 P.3d 409, ¶ 8 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]      Mrs. Walters 
acknowledges that on appellate review this Court evaluates whether the district 
court's property division is equitable from the perspective of the overall 
distribution rather than from a narrow focus on the effects of any particular 
disposition.  She also states that 
no single distribution made by the district court standing alone shocks the 
conscience in this case.  Despite 
her acknowledgment and statement, however, she argues that the district court's 
treatment of the parties' coins, marital income in the Pershing account during 
the brief duration of the marriage, 4.23 acre parcel on which the parties' house 
was built, and the parties' house was "shockingly inequitable and unjust."  We reject her arguments.  

 
 
[¶8]      With respect to 
the coins, our careful review of the record shows that both parties presented 
evidence about their origin and value.  
The district court determined that Mr. Walters' testimony that they were 
his and were worth approximately $7,050 was credible.  Because we consider only Mr. Walters' 
evidence and give it every favorable inference, afford the district court 
considerable discretion, and do not focus narrowly on any particular 
disposition, we reject Mrs. Walters' argument about the coins.  

 
 
[¶9]      With respect to 
the marital income in the Pershing account, Mrs. Walters notes that she was 
awarded nothing from this account, even though a considerable sum of money was 
generated through Mr. Walters' sole proprietorship of  LRS during their two-year marriage.  Once again, our careful review of the 
record shows that the district court properly considered the parties' evidence 
concerning the Pershing account, the source of the funds in that account, and 
the brief duration of the marriage in arriving at its decision to award that 
account to Mr. Walters.  Applying 
the requirements of our standard of review, we reject Mrs. Walters' argument 
concerning this account.  

 
 
[¶10]   With respect to the parties' 4.23 
acre parcel on which the parties' house was built, Mrs. Walters claims that the 
district court erred by requiring her to reimburse Mr. Walters the sum of 
$50,000 which he transferred to her for closing on the purchase of that parcel 
in June 2006.  She argues that 
because she paid the seller from her separate account, the sales contract 
drafted by the seller lists her as the sole buyer, and the deed lists only her 
name as buyer, then the rebuttable presumption arose that the $50,000 sum was a 
gift from Mr. Walters.  Barton v. Barton, 996 P.2d 1, 4 (Wyo. 
2000).  She asserts that the record 
is silent as to whether Mr. Walters rebutted that presumption.  Mr. Walters contends that his evidence 
did rebut the presumption.  We 
agree.  Our careful review of the 
record shows that Mr. Walters was with Mrs. Walters when they called the seller 
about the parcel, both met with the seller to discuss the purchase, Mr. Walters 
made the offer to the seller and wrote the earnest money check, and Mr. Walters 
clearly expected his name to be on the deed as he expected to build a home to 
live in with his wife.  In its 
Decision Letter, the district court addressed this matter:

 
 
Mr. 
Walters' claims' concerning these funds are credible  he contends that he 
provided the funds for the purchase of a lot that he and Mrs. Walters had looked 
at and agreed upon for purposes of building a marital home, and that at closing, 
while he was in Kansas, she simply omitted him from the title 
intentionally.

 
 
It 
is clear to us that the district court found that Mr. Walters rebutted the gift 
presumption.  We 
agree.

 
 
[¶11]   Finally, with respect to the 
parties' house built on the 4.23 acre parcel which the district court awarded 
her, Mrs. Walters contends that the appraised value of $304,000 is "arguably 
inflated" and, since the true value of the house is less than that appraisal, 
she received less in the property division.  Our careful review of the record shows 
that Mr. Walters presented the testimony and report of a certified residential 
real estate appraiser.  The district 
court received the report into evidence by stipulation of counsel.  The appraiser was examined by both 
counsel and the court.  In the 
opening statement of Mrs. Walters' counsel, he stated that while Mrs. Walters 
did not agree with the exact amount of the appraisal, "it is generally in that 
ballpark" and she would stipulate to a value of $260,000.  Once again, applying our standard of 
review, we find no merit in Mrs. Walters' argument on this point.  Considering the relevant evidence 
presented by Mr. Walters and giving it every favorable and reasonable inference, 
while ignoring Mrs. Walters' evidence, we are satisfied that the district court 
could reasonably conclude as it did.

 
 
[¶12]   One final matter remains for our 
consideration concerning the divorce proceedings.  In July 2008, a month before Mrs. 
Walters filed for divorce, she began construction of the house on the 4.23 acre 
parcel mentioned above.  Once the 
divorce litigation was underway, the district court issued a mutual restraining 
order prohibiting the parties from expending marital assets, other than for 
daily living expenses, until further order of the court.  Despite this order, Mrs. Walters 
continued construction on the house.  
The district court considered this alleged violation of its restraining 
order during the trial.  The 
district court addressed the matter in its Decision 
Letter:

 
 
In 
addition, the record is clear that Mrs. Walters violated a court order in this 
case.  The Court entered a mutual 
restraining order which would have prevented either party from expending 
substantial funds of the marital estate without a further order of the 
Court.  Despite this order, Mrs. 
Walters used funds to build a home on the land described above after it was 
entered.  She attempted to justify 
this action by claiming that the home had to be finished in order to protect the 
structure already in place from deterioration.  Photographic evidence proved that the 
home had only a foundation, or at most a foundation and subfloor, at the time 
the order was entered, and that it was unnecessary to finish the structure to 
protect an investment in framing, etc.  
No explanation whatsoever was given for the purchase of furnishings and 
installation of fixtures in the structure.  
Mrs. Walters never asked the Court to authorize the expenditures.  It has therefore been proven by clear 
and convincing evidence that Mrs. Walters willfully violated a court order and 
is in contempt of court.  The Court 
will take this contempt into account in formulating its decree in this matter, 
and will reserve sanctions which may be imposed in the event of failure to 
comply with any of its conditions.

 
 
The 
district court included similar language in its Judgment and Decree of Divorce. 
In their appellate briefing, the parties provide considerable discussion to 
whether the district court found Mrs. Walters in civil or criminal 
contempt.  We conclude that it is 
unnecessary to determine that issue because, as both parties acknowledge, the 
district court did not explicitly impose a punishment or sanction on Mrs. 
Walters, but rather explicitly reserved sanctions "which may be imposed in the 
event of failure to comply with any of [the divorce decree's] conditions."  We reject Mrs. Walters' assertion that 
the district court "appears to have punished [her] contemptuous conduct by 
awarding certain undisclosed property to [Mr. Walters] in the division of 
marital property, which is arguably an abuse of discretion."  As Mr. Walters points out, Mrs. Walters 
is unable to indicate what property was awarded to him as punishment.  We afford the district court 
considerable discretion to form a distributive scheme appropriate to the 
peculiar circumstances of the individual case including the respective merits 
and credibility of the parties.  We 
have carefully evaluated the district court's property division and find it is 
equitable from the perspective of the overall distribution of marital assets and 
liabilities.  We find no reason to 
disturb that thoughtful division.

 
 
[¶13]   We affirm the Judgment and Decree 
of Divorce filed on June 3, 2009.

 
 
APPEAL 
NO. S-10-0059

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶14]   In Mrs. Walters' appeal of the 
district court's post-divorce proceeding order filed on January 15, 2010, 
finding her in civil contempt of court and awarding to Mr. Walters compensatory 
damages of $10,000, we shall state the issues as follows:

 
 
1.         
Whether Mr. Walters proved that Mrs. Walters violated court orders issued 
in the divorce proceedings.

 
 
2.         
Whether the district court abused its discretion, committed procedural 
error, or violated a principle of law by finding Mrs. Walters in civil contempt 
of court and awarding compensatory damages of $10,000.00.

 
 

FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶15]   On June 19, 2009, sixteen days 
after the district court had filed its Judgment and Decree of Divorce, Mr. 
Walters filed three separate motions for orders to show cause why Mrs. Walters 
should not be held in contempt of court for several alleged violations of the 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce.  The 
alleged violations that are pertinent to this appeal concerned Mrs. Walters' 
transferring ownership of the PJ trailer, awarded to Mr. Walters in the divorce, 
to a third party five days after the district court's decision letter was 
issued; failing to return to Mr. Walters coins awarded him in the divorce; and 
failing to return to Mr. Walters certain personal documents as ordered by the 
district court.  On June 22, 2009, 
the district court issued its show cause order; after several continuances, the 
district court heard the matter on October 2 and October 27, 2009.  

 
 
[¶16]   On October 27, at the close of the 
hearing, the district court stated that it found Mrs. Walters had committed the 
violations alleged and was, therefore, in contempt of court.  The district court then 
stated:

 
 
And 
I do note that the sanction I'm about to impose is not calculated with great 
precision because the very nature of acts which I believe to have been 
contemptuous are such as to make it impossible to calculate something resembling 
damages.  But I believe there has to be a punitive 
element in this matter.  And so 
I'm going to order this by way of contempt sanctions.  I'm going to order that as  I will 
order effective November 16, 2009, a judgment in favor of Mr. Walters against 
[Mrs. Walters] for the sum of $10,000 reflecting the contempt, sanctions for the 
contempt which I have previously indicated.

 
 
            
In addition, I will also award defendant a portion of the attorney fees 
associated with these contempt proceedings, since I didn't award anything 
related to the trailer and tractor, and I decline to hear the issues with regard 
to the bookkeeping.  I think that 
the portion of attorney fees has to be associated solely with the contempt that 
I did find in this matter, and I will award those fees.

 
 
            
I will give [Mrs. Walters] this much of an out.  If you happen to find any of the missing 
property and deliver it to counsel for the defendant before November 16, 2009, I 
would consider a request to abate that judgment in the amount  to the extent of 
the amount of some of that property, although I believe some portion of those 
sanctions would have to remain regardless, given the continuing disregard of 
this Court's orders.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  

 
 
[¶17]   On January 14, 2010, the parties 
met again with the district court to discuss the district court's concern about 
language in paragraph 10 of the proposed order approved by both counsel.  Here is the discussion that 
followed:

 
 
THE 
COURT:  Please be seated.  Court is in session.  We're here today in Walters v. Walters, 
172-327, which is a divorce case which has had some post-divorce contempt 
proceedings. And I specifically recall  I just wanted to make a record on the 
order that I have received which was approved by both counsel.  I'm not sure when I received that.  I know that I kind of envisioned that we 
could have a 15-minute phone conversation or something about this order.  And I think that maybe that was set, and 
it had to be continued because of availability of counsel.

 
 
            
And ultimately we ended up here today.  I don't know  here is my concern about 
the order.  I'm looking at Paragraph 
10 of the order, and it says  and I'll quote  "There has to be a punitive 
element in this matter.  And as 
sanctions against the plaintiff, she is ordered to pay the defendant the sum of 
$10,000 for the contempt set forth herein."

 
 
            
My reading of that if I were an appellate judge would be probably like 
that's a fine or something which would be in the nature of a criminal 
contempt.  Now, I may have used the 
term punitive in the ruling I made.  
I don't know if I did or not.  
But the intent was actually to provide some compensation to Mr. Walters 
for some of the losses that he would have sustained as a result of not getting 
his property back.  Those are very 
difficult  I think I noted on the record  to determine because the articles 
aren't here to value, so it is difficult to arrive at a 
number.

 
 
            
I also there [sic] was some element to that that related to the fact that 
Mrs. Walters went ahead and built this house.  She put a bunch of money into 
materials.  And I think the evidence 
indicated it was pretty shoddy construction.  And I originally withheld contempt 
sanctions for that, hoping that the rest of the property would be transferred; 
but that didn't happen as I feel that I ordered.

 
 
            
And so part of this was the defendant probably suffered some damages as a 
result of that, which is once again very difficult to determine.  Last, of course, there is an element to 
putting pressure on a party to pay and do the things that they are ordered to 
do, which is why I made the award.

 
 
            
So I'm not dissatisfied with the language in Paragraph 10, but I did want 
to give counsel the opportunity to redraft it and also to give you the 
opportunity to argue that it is in essence a criminal type contempt, or would 
you agree that it is a civil contempt and ask you if you had any procedural 
issues with the way the process went.  
Because obviously if it was a criminal contempt, it would have had a 
whole different set of procedures which, you know, I never made any effort to 
follow.  And I don't think the 
parties ever supplied any type of documents that would have allowed me to do 
that.  So maybe if I could just hear 
from counsel for the plaintiff first, . . .

 
 
[Mrs. 
Walters' Counsel]:      
Thank you, Your Honor.  I 
would agree that I think there is a punitive element.  The language in the order does imply 
that it is some type of a criminal contempt in that matter.  And while that was the language from the 
hearing  I believe we have copies of the transcript  and that was the language 
 I understand now, if my understanding is correct, it was your intent to 
provide compensation to the defendant for the losses that he had suffered based 
on some of these  the coins and the documents, correct?

 
 
THE 
COURT:  And also I think that I kind 
of withheld the sanctions relating to the house construction.  He probably lost something in that 
process, too.  So that was at least 
a substantial part of it in my eyes.  
I think maybe I noted on the record at the time that it was very 
difficult for me to come up with a specific number of 
damages.

 
 
[Mrs. 
Walters' Counsel]:      
And that was my question, Your Honor, with regards to the damage amount 
and specifically how you had calculated the $10,000 figure, where that figure 
came from specifically; if we are talking about a civil, you know, a civil fine 
payable to the private party as a form of compensation, where that figure came 
from.  That's more of a personal 
question of mine, just curiosity I guess, in how that was arrived 
from.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  There really wasn't any 
formula, I can tell you that.  It 
was more kind of taking the magnitude of the case; the expense the parties were 
put to; the delay; the potential value, measurable or unmeasurable, of the 
property involved.  Like, for 
example, some of the things that are just pieces of paper with sentimental value 
and how to value them, but yet there needed to be something by way of a sanction 
for not providing those.  So it's a 
very imprecise process I would certainly grant you.

 
 
[Mrs. 
Walters' Counsel]:      
I understand that.  And I 
would have one comment with regards to that, Your Honor.  And that would be it is my understanding 
 and I could be incorrect on this  but it is my understanding that under the 
law that when you provide compensation to a private party there is usually some 
kind of a damage finding or a damage hearing involved in that.  And I do think that is possible to have 
with regards to the documents.

 
 
            
I do think you can put a price on, you know, the cost to replace a birth 
certificate or a DD-214, that those actually have costs that you can associate 
with them, you know, whatever the cost is when you call Vital Records to get a 
new one issued as well as coins.  We 
have photographs that I know counsel for the defendant, . . . and I have both 
talked with a coin expert regarding those photos and have an idea what the value 
as to those coins are.  So I do 
think there is an ability to give some kind of a value to the coins and to the 
documents.  But certainly I think 
that's  those are the two areas where I do see I think we could have some kind 
of an actual damage showing.  And I 
think that's all, Your Honor.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  All right.  Thank you . . . . [Mr. Walters' 
counsel], anything that you would like to say?

 
 
[Mr. 
Walters' Counsel]:  Your Honor, I 
note that in the transcript of the hearings, the Court explicitly says that, 
"It's very difficult to evaluate or to put a value on assets that are not 
present and, as a matter of fact, have disappeared."  And you very clearly raised that at Ms. 
Walters' doorstep that these coins are no longer available to determine the 
exact amount.

 
 
            
Also, you know, Your Honor, I would point out that this trial was held 
roughly nine months ago, I believe.  
And Mr. Walters has been waiting since the entry of the judgment and 
decree of divorce to be compensated for the moneys that were awarded to him at 
that trial.  He did get partial 
compensation, but that was only due to the fact that the Wyoming Steel company 
had to pay damages on a steel building that was awarded to him in the divorce 
trial.

 
 
            
And, Your Honor, I think that $10,000 probably falls short of what Mr. 
Walters is actually due.  He's had 
now to pay for a three, three and a half, four-day trial.  He's had to pay the costs of an 
appeal.  And now here we are again 
here today.  And to say that we need 
to have a hearing on damages I think is  is asking Mr. Walters to put up even 
more legal fees that I don't believe are necessary.  I think $10,000 is probably less than 
adequate compensation for the time that he's had to wait to receive his 
judgment.

 
 
            
And, Your Honor, as far as Paragraph 10 goes, as [Mrs. Walters' counsel] 
has pointed out, I ordered a copy of the transcript and took the language from 
the transcript.  But I believe that 
that paragraph could be corrected, Your Honor, simply by deleting the 
introductory phrase and just leaving that paragraph to say, "As sanctions 
against the plaintiff, she is ordered to pay the defendant the sum of $10,000 
for the contempt set forth herein."  
That should solve the problem.

 
 
            
And I have that decree here with the original signatures on it.  I would be willing to do that today and 
get it back to the Court for review.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  All right.  [Mrs. Walters' counsel], do you have a 
problem with that if we just  

 
 
[Mrs. 
Walters' Counsel]:  Your Honor, just 
briefly, I agree with deleting the first portion of that, the punitive damages 
portion, but would ask that we put some clarification in that these are 
compensatory damages or something of that nature, the type of damages we're 
awarding here, whether it is a fine or if we're talking compensatory just to be 
clear on what this $10,000 is representing in that 
sentence.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  You know, I'm sure it could 
be any clearer to be quite frank.  
It was sort of a composite of the delay, or the taking of things that 
aren't here to be evaluated, the  I guess some of the emotional issues that go 
with having to just continue to be trying to stop someone from violating court 
orders that were entered in which another party is to my knowledge obeying.  And putting those all together, that's 
the way it came out and to some extent with an effort to compensate for things 
that can never be valued.  So I 
don't think I can get any more precise than that.

 
 
            
So I would probably just be inclined to go with [Mr. Walters' counsel's] 
solution.  I don't think it would be 
helpful to hold another hearing.  I 
know this matter is going to be appealed, and there's already an appeal pending 
in the divorce.  I think the thing 
to do is just get the orders finalized and let the Supreme Court take a look at 
it.  And, of course, whatever result 
they reach, I'll implement at their direction.

 
 
            
So I think I will  barring some other objection that I need to hear  I 
will go ahead and sign the order.  
All right.  If you can just 
bring that to me . . . I'll keep it and take it back through for 
processing.  I guess I'm not 
supposed to hand it back to the lawyers.  
We have a checklist.  It is 
supposed to go through the proper 

 
 
[Mr. 
Walters' Counsel]:  I wanted to make 
sure that Paragraph 10 didn't appear in the order part of the 

 
 
THE 
COURT:  All 
right.

 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶18]   The parties agree that the district 
court held Mrs. Walters in compensatory civil, not criminal, contempt.  It is clear that the district court 
found that Mr. Walters had proved the elements of compensatory civil contempt by 
clear and convincing evidence.  In 
this appeal, both parties accept that clear and convincing requirement, citing 
United States v. Ford, 514 F.3d 1047, 
1051 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Reliance Ins. Co. v. Mast Constr. Co., 
159 F.3d 1311, 1315 (10th Cir. 1998)).  We will accept that requirement for 
purposes of this case, cautioning that research of our jurisprudence has not 
located any decision preferring "clear and convincing" over "preponderance."1  A definitive holding on that issue must 
await another day.  We have said 
that clear and convincing evidence is that kind of proof that would persuade the 
trier of fact that the truth of the contention is highly probable.  In re JW, 2010 WY 28, ¶ 24, 226 P.3d 873, 880 (Wyo. 2010) (quoting SLJ v. 
Dep't of Family Serv., 2005 WY 3, ¶ 19, 104 P.3d 74, 80 (Wyo. 2005)).  We review the district court's factual 
findings in a bench trial with deference as they are presumptively correct and 
will be overturned only if, upon review of the entire evidence, we determine 
those factual findings to be clearly erroneous.  Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. W.N. McMurry Constr. 
Co., 2010 WY 57, ¶ 14, 230 P.3d 312, 320 (Wyo. 2010).  Factual findings are clearly erroneous 
when, although they have evidentiary support, we are left with the definite and 
firm conviction upon review of the entire evidence that the district court made 
a mistake.  Morris v. CMS Oil & Gas Co., 2010 WY 
37, ¶ 12, 227 P.3d 325, 330 (Wyo. 2010).  
We employ our de novo standard 
of review on the district court's conclusions of law.  Id.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶19]   Mrs. Walters agrees that the 
district court's mutual restraining order concerning the parties' property or 
pecuniary interests filed August 20, 2008, at the outset of the divorce 
proceedings restrained and enjoined her from directly or indirectly doing any 
act which would defeat or render less effective the parties' property rights and 
pending interests including selling, giving away, alienating or otherwise 
disposing of the parties' property until further order of the district 
court.  She agrees that the district 
court's decision letter dated April 15, 2009, incorporated into the Judgment and 
Decree of Divorce filed June 3, 2009, awarded the PJ trailer to Mr. 
Walters.  In the contempt 
proceeding, the evidence revealed that when Mrs. Walters returned the PJ trailer 
and its title to Mr. Walters on June 11, 2009, the title showed a purchase date 
of April 20, 2009, and a Mr. Dinkel as seller and Mrs. Walters as buyer.  The original title to the PJ trailer was 
issued in 2007.  It appeared obvious 
that Mrs. Walters had done something with respect to Mr. Walters' interest in 
the PJ trailer that would defeat or render less effective that interest.  Mrs. Walters' explanation was that she 
had intended to use the PJ trailer as collateral for a four thousand dollar loan 
from Mr. Dinkel; they filled out a loan agreement and presented the documents to 
the county clerk's office to have Mr. Dinkel recorded as a lienholder against 
the PJ trailer; the county clerk made a mistake and issued a new title showing 
Mr. Dinkel as the owner, not a lienholder; when that mistake was pointed out, 
the clerk issued a new and correct title; and, finally, instead of using the PJ 
trailer as collateral for Mr. Dinkel's loan, she sold him her wedding ring for 
$4,000.  Mr. Dinkel testified as to 
these occurrences and stated he never had a lien on or possession of the PJ 
trailer.

 
 
[¶20]   The district court was in the best 
position to assess the witnesses' credibility and weigh their testimony.  That court addressed the PJ trailer 
issue in these words:

 
 
            
I find [Mrs. Walters'] explanation as to how that happened completely 
improbable.  I mean, no one who has 
ever been to the county clerk's office without an adequate power of attorney and 
trying to transfer a vehicle could ever transfer property.  And somehow Mr. Dinkel and Miss Walters 
say, oh, gee, the clerk just messed it up, titled this in the wrong way; and, 
son of a gun, it had to be titled back.  
That's not convincing to me.

 
 
Having 
reviewed the entire evidence relating to this issue, we hold that the district 
court's factual findings are not clearly erroneous.

 
 
[¶21]   The judgment and divorce decree 
awarded to Mr. Walters "all coins contained in [Mrs. Walters'] safe, as well as 
any personal documents."  Mr. 
Walters testified at the contempt proceeding that Mrs. Walters failed to return 
his military DD-214 form, passport, and birth certificate.  Mrs. Walters did not explain her failure 
to return these personal documents.  
With respect to the coins, Mrs. Walters returned some coins to Mr. 
Walters on June 16, 2009; but Mr. Walters testified he did not receive four 
state-minted quarter sets, a gold double eagle coin, rolls of Eisenhower and 
Kennedy half-dollars, and Indian Head nickels.  Mr. Walters' private investigator, who 
had photographed the coins from the safe on February 27, 2009, but was not able 
to complete a detailed inventory of the coins, testified there had been several 
gallon-sized bags nearly full of coins and a hinged metal box that contained 
coins; when the coins were returned, there were only two bags of coins and a 
plastic container containing a proof set.  
Mrs. Walters testified that, before returning the coins to Mr. Walters, 
she made an itemized list and a photographic inventory of the coins returned; 
that list and inventory were offered into evidence.  She testified that the specific coins in 
the private investigator's photographs mentioned above were present in her 
photographs and list.

 
 
[¶22]   Having heard the testimony and 
considered the evidence concerning the alleged violations in not returning the 
personal documents and the coins, the district court stated its factual 
findings:

 
 
With 
regard to the contents of the safe, I believe [Mr. Walters] has proven by clear 
and convincing evidence that [Mrs. Walters] willfully failed to return the 
coins, and specifically the gold double eagle coins, the Eisenhower half 
dollars, and the Indian Head nickels.  I believe she's also willfully failed to 
return Mr. Walters' personal documents . . . .

 
 
            
I find it incredible that she offers no explanation.  Those items were photographed.  There has been testimony they haven't 
been returned.  I think she would 
probably say, and I think I hear the defense saying that, well, gee, you can't 
really say how much was taken; and that's right.  But I'll tell you what.  I think, Miss Walters, your conduct 
amounts to spoilation and destruction of evidence which makes a precise 
determination of what has been taken impossible.

 
 
            
And that has frankly been a pattern throughout this case that in my 
opinion that you've taken things, hidden things, and basically then tried to 
say, well, gee, you can't prove what I did with them now in court.  And I think you run afoul of the 
spoilation of evidence rule which says that at the point that you destroy 
things, then I can make findings with regard to based on evidence that perhaps 
it was destroyed by you, that there's an inference that is both evidentiary and 
punitive which allows the Court to award sanctions based upon this 
conduct.

 
 
            
I don't find [Mrs. Walters'] inventory of the coins credible.  I think [Mr. Walters'] photos show a 
substantial number of more coins.  I 
found the testimony of . . . Mr. Walters . . . credible as to the amounts of the 
coins.  And so I believe that it has 
been proven by clear and convincing evidence that Mrs. Walters willfully failed 
to return the contents of the safe as ordered.

 
 
[¶23]   In her appellate argument 
challenging the district court's factual findings about these violations, Mrs. 
Walters simply repeats the same argument she made below.  As that argument failed below, it also 
fails here because the district court was in the best position to assess the 
witnesses' credibility and weigh their testimony.  Having reviewed the entire evidence 
relating to this issue, we hold that the district court's factual findings are 
not clearly erroneous.  

 
 
[¶24]   That does not end our discussion, 
however, because Mrs. Walters also challenges the amount of the compensation 
awarded by the district court to Mr. Walters for these violations.  Specifically, she asserts that the 
compensatory civil contempt award must be based upon Mr. Walters' actual loss, 
and absent evidence showing the amount of that actual loss, any sum awarded is 
speculative and arbitrary and cannot stand.  United States v. United Mine Workers, 
330 U.S. 258, 303-04, 67 S. Ct. 677, 701, 91 L.Ed 884 (1947); O'Connor v. Midwest Pipe Fabrications, 
Inc., 972 F.2d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir. 
1992) (citing Allied Materials Corp. v. 
Superior Products Co., Inc., 620 F.2d 224, 227 (10th Cir. 1980)).  She claims there was no evidence of Mr. 
Walters' actual losses as to the coins and personal documents.  During the proceedings on October 27, 
2009, the district court assessed the sum of $10,000, noting that it was "not 
calculated with great precision because the very nature of the acts . . . are 
such as to make it impossible to calculate something resembling damages."  The district court and the parties 
discussed this issue again on January 14, 2010.  Mrs. Walters' counsel inquired about the 
district court's calculation of the $10,000 figure.  The district court 
answered:

 
 
There 
really wasn't any formula, I can tell you that.  It was more kind of taking the magnitude 
of the case; the expense the parties were put to; the delay; the potential 
value, measurable or unmeasurable, of the property involved.  Like, for example, some of the things 
that are just pieces of paper with sentimental value and how to value them, but 
yet there needed to be something by way of a sanction for not providing 
those.  So it's a very imprecise 
process I would certainly grant you.

 
 
Mrs. 
Walters' counsel then stated it would be possible to have a damages hearing to 
determine the costs to replace the personal documents and to determine the value 
of the coins, so that an actual damage showing was made.  Mr. Walters' counsel then commented that 
$10,000 "probably falls short of what [he] is actually due."  The district court had the final word, 
saying:

 
 
It 
was sort of a composite of the delay, of the taking of things that aren't here 
to be evaluated, the  I guess some of the emotional issues that go with having 
to just continue to be trying to stop someone from violating court orders that 
were entered in which another party is to my knowledge obeying.  And putting those all together, that's 
the way it came out and to some extent with an effort to compensate for things 
that can never be valued.  So I 
don't think I can get any more precise than that.

 
 
The 
district court then stated it would not be helpful to hold another 
hearing.

 
 
[¶25]   Having carefully considered this 
record and the authority referred to above, we must conclude that no evidence of 
Mr. Walters' actual losses was presented and, absent that, the sum of $10,000 
awarded to him is speculative and arbitrary and, reluctantly, cannot stand.  Consequently, we reverse that 
award.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1For a discussion on the burden of proof in compensatory civil contempt, 
see Doug Rendleman, Compensatory 
Contempt: Plaintiff's Remedy When a Defendant Violates An Injunction, 1980 
U.Ill. L.F. 971, 980-81 (1980).