Case Title: Kiehm v. Adams. Dissenting Opinion by J. Acoba [pdf]. ICA mem.op., filed 10/08/2003. ICA Order Granting Defendant-Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration and Vacating Memorandum Opinion, filed 10/22/2003 [pdf]. New ICA mem.op., filed 11/13/2003. ICA Order Granting Defendant-Appellant's Second Motion for Reconsideration and Vacating Memorandum Opinion, filed 12/03/2003 [pdf]. ICA Opinion, filed 04/30/2004 [pdf], 109 Haw. 278. Dissenting Opinion by J. Lim [pdf]. ICA Order of Amendment, filed 05/13/2004 [pdf]. ICA Order Denying Defendant-Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration of the Opinion filed on April 30, 2004, filed 05/13/2004 [pdf], 104 Haw. 460. S.Ct. Order Granting Application for Writ of Certiorari, filed 06/15/2004 [pdf], 105 Haw. 130. S.Ct. Order Denying Motion for Reconsideration, filed 01/19/2006 [pdf], 109 Haw. 578. S.Ct. Order of Correction, filed 02/03/2006 [pdf].

Citation: 109 Haw. 296

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2005-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
LAW UBAARY
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OP HAWAI'T

 

---000:

 

SUSAN KIEHM, Respondent /Plaintiff-Appellee, =

aayes

IAN ADAMS, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant,

and

CSO O€ 930s

DOES 1-10, Defendants.

 

No, 25411

CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CIV. NO. 02-101KN)
DECEMBER 30, 2005
LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, AND DUFFY, JJ.;
AND ACOBA, J., DISSENTING

OPINION OF THE COURT BY DUFFY, J.

this court granted the application of

MOON, C.J,

On June 15, 2004,

Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Ian Adams (Adams) for a writ of

certiorari to review the published opinion of the Intermediate

(ICA) in Kiehm v, Adams, No. 25411, slip op.

Court of Appeals
the ICA vacated the August 21,

(App. Apr. 30, 2004).! Therein,
2002 judgment and August 29, 2002 writ of ejectment of the
District Court of the Third Circuit (the court)? entered against

Adams with respect to the property of Respondent /Plaintiff-

\dge Janes $. Burne authored the opinion, joined by
‘ascoeiate Judge John SW. Lim filed a

 

5 chiet
Associate Judge Corinne Kk. Watanabe.

dissenting opinion.
‘The Honorable Joseph P. Florendo presided.

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

Appellee Susan Kiehm (Kiehm) located in Kailua-Kona, Hawai'i.
Slip op. at 18. We now reverse the ICA's decision and affirm the
judgment of the court.”

I. BACKGROUND
AL Eacts:

The following background is drawn from the court’s
undisputed findings of fact and from evidence adduced at trial.
Kieha is the owner and landlord of the subject property, a single
family residence. In or around January 2000, Tammy Ayau entered
into a oral month-to-month agreement with Kiehm to rent the
residence for $1,000 per month.

In or about Novenber 2000, Adams, Ayau’s boyfriend at
the time, moved into the residence and paid $500 per month to
Ayau toward the rent. Ayau explained that she “had to find @
roommate because [she] couldn't afford the $1,000 a month,” but.
that she did not “sublet or assign [her] lease [with Kiehm] to
[Adans].” Adans testified that he had no written or oral rental
agreement with Kiehm. He added, however, that he did have an

“agreement with [Ayau],” although he did not elaborate on the
type of agreement. During the time Ayau and Adams lived in the
residence, Ayau directly deposited both her and Adams’ rent into

Kiehn’s bank account at First Hawaiian Bank.

 

> ania court reviews writs of certiorari for “(1) grave errors of
law or of fact, or (2) obvicus inconsistencies in the decision of the
Sntermediate appellate court with that of the suprene court, federal
decisions, oF its own decision, end the magnitude of such errors or
inconsistencies cictating the nees for further appeal.” Mawai'l Revised
Statutes (HRS) § €02-29(D) (Supp. 2008)

 

 

 

 

 

 

2
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

Ayau recounted that on January 15, 2002, she delivered
a letter to Adams notifying him that “he had to be out by
February 28th, 2002,” and that “there [wa]s someone else moving
in on the Ist of April.” Adams testified that Ayau often told
him and wrote letters to him to move out, but “after the first
twenty of them, [he] just started throwing them away. [He]
wouldn't even read them.” He added, “(Ayau] was constantly
threatening to throw me out if I didn’t do what she wanted me to
do... . (The rental arrangement] was very unsecure [sic], you
know.” Adams further related that he had not seen Ayau’s
January 15, 2002 letter prior to the trial.

According to the court's undisputed finding of fact no.
7, “[Kienm] and Ayau’s month to month tenancy was terminated by
oral agreement effective March 31, 2002.” Ayau testified that
she moved out at some unspecified time prior to March 31, 2002.
After the end of the rental agreement between Ayau and Kiehm,
Adams refused to move out. Kiehm and Adams both testified that
on March 28, 2002, Kiehm told him to vacate the premises, but he

refused to le:

 

Ayau stopped the utility and cable service for the
property at the end of the rental agreement. Kiehm then
instructed the electric and cable company not to allow Adams or
anyone else to restart service without a written rental
agreenent. Kiehm also stopped vater service after the end of the

rental agreement and instructed the water company not to allow
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

Adams or anyone else to reinstate service without a written
rental agreement.
B.  Procedura] History

Kiehn filed suit against Adams on April 19, 2002
alleging that Adams was a trespasser and that he had no agreement
to be on the premises. Kiehm asked the court for a judgment
giving her possession of the property, damages equal to one
month’s rent, and a writ of possession directing a sheriff or
police officer to (1) eject Adams from the property and all
persons in possession of the property through Adams, (2) remove
all personal belongings of Adams or any other person from the
property, and (3) put Kiehm in possession of the property.

Adams counterclaimed on Nay 14, 2002 alleging that
Kiehn (1) substantially interfered with his use of the property,
(2) engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in violation
of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 480-2 (1993 & Supp. 2002),
(3) maliciously threatened to evict him illegally by stopping his
utility service, and (4) failed to disclose the identity of her
designated agent for the property pursuant to HRS § 521-43(£)
(1993), Adams sought money damages, attorneys’ fees and costs,
and further relief as the court deemed just and proper.

‘The case went to trial on June 4, 2002. At the

conclusion of the trial, Kiehm argued that the evidence showed

 

unlawful," provides, in’ relevant part, t
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or
Commerce are unlawful.”
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

that Adams had at most a “permission to remain on the property

 

[from Ayau] -- not [a] landlord-tenant agreement (with Kiem)

‘he court asked for supplemental briefs regarding “whether or not
the landlord is liable to a sublessee under a sub-lease
contract,” and scheduled a post-trial hearing on that issue for
June 25, 2002.

After hearing argunent from the parties at the post~
trial hearing, the court orally ruled in favor of Kiehm, finding
that Adans was 2 trespasser once the Kiehm-Ayau oral lease
terminated. The court entered its findings of fact (findings)
and conclusions of law (conclusions) on August 21, 2002. The
relevant findings were as follows:

tor si060\per sonth gn a eonth tevsonth eenancy) | 7” OY

feprokinat tly So and operbolt years” ao: This pas an ors)

_ + Ayau agreed to pay electric and cable.
Iiehn| agieea' eo pay for water’ service:

5. In approximately Novenber 2000, . . . Ayau entered
into an agreement sith [Adams] to rent part Of the residence
for $800 per month

6. (Kiehm) was Landlord and Ayau was the

7. _{Kienm) and Ayou's month to month tenancy was
terminated by oral agreement effective March 31, 2002

8. Ayau notified Adame thet their agreenent would end
at chat tine.

%. = Aya received cash from (Adams) and
deposited the Zent into [Kieha’s] bank account

20, After termination of the tenancy, [Adams] refused
zo move Out

21, There was no agreement between (Kiehn) and
(cane)

2 = Ayay directed termination of the electric
utility ane’ cable service on termination of her tenancy,

 

5
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(leha] then instructed the electric and cable companies not
to allow [Adams] oF anyone else without a written rental
sgreenent to turn on the utilities in their nane-

13. The water service terminated for nonpayment after
termination of the lease. [Kicha] then instructed che water
company not to allow {Adans] or anyone else without

written rental agreement to turn cn the water in their name.

14, There were no written agreements betw
(Kiona], or [Adams]

 

- + Aya.

‘The relevant conclusions were as follows:

1. A sun
term of promises:

se is 2 transfer of part of the Leasehold

 

2. There is no privity between landlord and
sublessce.

3, (Klebm) and (Adams) had no agreement.

 

A landlord hag no rights against a sublessee, and
2 sublessee has no rights against @ landlord arising ost of
3 landiora/tenant relationship.

5. when the month to month lease terminates, the
sublease terminates,

6. (Adame} was not entitled to possession upon
termination of the lease between Ayau and. [Aiehn)

7. {Adams} As not entitied to damages against [xieha]
for unfdir and deceptive trade practices.

9. (Adams) is trespassing on the property owned by
Odense) |

10. [Kiche) 1s entities to a judgment and a writ of
ejectaent against [Adame].

11. (Kuehn) Se entities to Judgment in ner favor on
11 (Adans'] ‘counterelains.

12, {Kuehn} is entitied to judgment against (Adams)
for danages of $1000 per nonth from April 1, 2002 through
fand inclusing Jone 25, 2002 (with per diem danages at the
rate of $32.87 for those days in June)

13. (Kiehm) is entities to her costs and service
fees.

14, [Adame] is not entitled to damages against
(Kienn) for [Kiehn’a] failure to disclose # local agent,

25, [Kiehm) ie not entitled to punitive damages.
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

Final judgment and the writ of ejectment were entered against
Adams on August 21 and 29, 2002, respectively.

on Septenber 20, 2002, Adams filed @ notice of appeal
from the judgment and the writ. On appeal, Adams challenged

findings no. 8 and 11 (to the extent they were conclusions of

 

law) and conclusions no. 3, 5,

 

7,9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14.
Specifically, Adams argued that (1) “the [c]ourt should have held
that there is 2 residential landlord-tenant relationship between
Adams (as tenant) and Kiehm (as landlord) governed by (HRS
chapter] $21[,]" the Residential Landlord Tenant Code
(hereinafter, the Code), and that Adams “is a month-to-month
tenant under [HRS] § 521-22(;]”5 (2) the court should have made
“[a] specific finding . . . that Adams was not given the required
notice to terminate his sublease with Ayau[?]” (3) Adams, and not
Kiehn, is “entitled to possession” inasmuch as (a) “the voluntary
termination of Ayau and Kiehn’s lease does not terminat[e]
Adams's sublease(,)” (b) by this “voluntary termination,” Adams
“beclame) the immediate tenant of Kiehm[,]” (c) “Adams is
entitled to proper notice [from Kiehm) under [HRS) § 521-71(a)*
RS § 521-22 (1993), gntitied “Tern of rental agreenent
provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he landlord and tenant may agree in

feriting te any period so the term of the rental agreement
 (Enphasis added. 1

 

was § $21-71(a) (1993) states as follows:

lien the tenancy is month-to-month, the landlord may

ten Bent, in

Anticipated termination. When the landlord provides

notification of termination, the tenant may vacate at any

Eine within the last forty-five days of the period between
‘eontinued...)

 

   
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

before his month-to-month tenancy may be terminated(,]” and (d)
“Kiehm failed to provide adequate notice to terminate Adams's
tenancy(;]” (4) Adams is entitled to damages because “Kiehm
willfully caused Adams to go without water and electricity for
eight days” in “violation(] of HRS § 521-74.5 [(1993);]"” and (5)
the “{clourt should have imposed a fine” against Kiehm for her
failure to disclose a local agent to Adams as authorized by HRS §
521-67 [(1993)].*

In response, Kiehm contended that (1) Adams had no
agreement with Kiehm when the Kiehm/Ayau month-to-month tenancy
terminated on March 28, 2002; (2) Kiehm was entitled to evict and

eject Adams under HRS § 666-1 (1993)* as a trespasser; (3) Adams’

 

-continued)
‘the notification and the termination date, but the tenant
shall notify the landlord of the date the tenant will vace
the dwelling unit and shall pay a prorated rent for that
period of eecupation.

 

 

(Emphasis added.)

+ ans § $23-74.5, entitled “Recovery of possession Limited{,)"
provides, in relevant part, that "(t]he landlord shall not recover or take
Possession of a duelling unit by the wilfel snterruption or diminution o|
Fanning water, hot water, of electric, gas, or other essential service to the
tenant contrary to the rental agreement or section 521-42, except in case of
abandonment or surrenser.”

 

 

 

+ ns § 521-67, entities “Tenant's remedy for failure by landlord to
disclose(, |” provides that "[i]f the landlord fails te comply with any
Gisclosure requirement specified in section 521-43 within ten days after
Proper denand therefor by the tenant, the landlord shall be Liable to the
Eenant for $100 plus reasonable attorney's fees.”

, entitled “Summary possession on termination or
states:

 

Wnenever any lessee or tenant of any lands or tenements, or
ny person holding under the lessee or tenant, holds
foseession of lands or tenements without right, after the
Eermination of the tenancy, either by passage of time or by
reason of any forfeiture, under the conditions or covenants
inva leat

 

 

 

 

Teontinued.

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

claims were properly dismissed inasmuch as Adams had no rights
against Kiehm under the Code; and (4) Adams’ sole recourse under
the Code, if any, would have been against Ayau, but he failed to
raise a claim against her.

In his reply brief, Adams asserted that (1) assuming
HRS § 666-1 applied, Kiehn failed to give him the ten days’ prior
notice required to evict him; (2) even if Kiehm had given proper
notice under HRS § 666-1, she failed to give him sufficient
notice under the Code and specifically HRS § 521-71(a);#* and (3)
Kiehm’s factual statements and references to the transcript of
proceedings are so replete with errors that bad faith is
suggested.

on April 30, 2004, the ICA issued a published opinion"?
in which the majority assumed without discussion that Adams was @

sublessee of Ayau”? and ruled that Adams’ rights as a tenant

 

*(. continued)
(ii least ten dave, the person entitled to the prenises may
Becrestored to the possession thereof in manner hereinafter
provided.

(Emphasis added.)

* see supra note 6.
"previously, on October 8, 2003, the TCA issued a memorandum
opinion affirming the August 21, 2002 Judgment and the August 23, 2002 writ of
ejectnent. On October 15, 2003; Adams filed a motion for reconsideration, On

October 22, 2003, the ICA issued an order granting Adams’ notion for
feconsideration and vacating the October €, 2003 memorandum opinion. On
Novenber 13, 2003, the ICA filed a second tenorandum opinion, again affirming
the court's judgment snd writ of ejectsent. On Novanber 25, 2003, Adens filed
a'notion for reconsideration. On Cecenber 3, 2003, the ICA issued an order
Granting reconsideration and vacating the ICR's second menoranum opinion.

 

 

3 the ICA dissent, however, concluded that there was no sublease and
maintained thet the lower court's decision should be affirmed on that basis
Slip oper Dissent at

 

   
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depended on whether ‘the primary lease between Ayau and Kiehn had
been surrendered or terminated. Slip op. at 14. The ICA
reasoned that if Ayau had surrendered her lease prior to
completion of a tezm, then Adams would have become the direct
tenant of Kiehm entitled to possession: if, however, Ayau and
Kiehm had agreed to terminate the lease as provided for by the
Code, then the rights of the sublessee Adams would have been
extinguished. Slip op. at 10-14. The ICA thus vacated the
judgment, the writ of ejectment, and the court’s conclusions no.

4, 5, 67,

 

, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14, and remanded the case with
instructions to the court to determine whether Kiehm and Ayau
agreed to terminate their month-to-month rental agreement
twenty-nine or more days prior to the agreed termination date,
explaining that “[\]£ the answer is yes, [(the oral agreement
occurred twenty-nine or more days prior to the agreed termination
date,)] the facts present a termination” and “[iJf the answer is
no, [(the oral agreement occurred twenty-eight or less days prior
to the agreed termination date,)) the facts present a surrender.”
Id. at 14

On May 11, 2004, Adams filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the ICA denied on May 13, 2004. on June
14, 2004, Adams made application to this court for a writ of
certiorari, arguing that the ICA gravely erred “in concluding
that an ora] agreement between @ residential landlord and tenant

to end their month-to-month lease 29 days or more later results

10
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

 

in a ‘termination.’ (Emphasis in original.) While agreeing
with the ICA’s use of the surrender-termination distinction and
the consequences of its application to the instant case, Adams
asserts that “the Opinion incorrectly concludes that the

distinction between a ‘surrender’ and a ‘termination’ depends

enly on whether or not the oral agreement was made at least 29

days before the ending of the lease, . - . disrecarding the
ment... .” We granted Adams’

application on June 15, 2004, and now reverse the ICA’s opinion,
but not for the reasons advanced by Adams.
TT. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“A trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed de
novo, under the right/wrong standard of review.” Child Support
Enforcement Agency v, Ros, 96 Hawai'i 1, 11, 25 P.3d 60, 70
(2001) (quoting State v. Ah Loo, 94 Hawai'i 207, 209, 10 P.3d
728, 730 (2000)) (internal brackets and quotation marks omitted).
Tt ig well settled, however, that the appellate court may affirm
@ lower court's decision on any ground in the record supporting
affirmance, even if not cited by the lower court." See State vs
Rosa, 69 Hawai'i 371, 378 n.4, 974 P.2d 11, 18 n.4 (2998) (“AN

appellate court may affirm a judgment of the lower court on any

the Dissent suggests that Kieha’s failure to argue that Adans was
a Licensee prevents this court from eo holding. Dissent st 2. We disegres.

he noted above, the appellate court may affirm the lower court's decision on

any ground supported in the record. "Here, the record supports the conclusion
that Sudgrent. was properly granted in Kieha’s favor on ancther ground (ig.,

that Adame was a licensee)

 

 

 
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

ground in the record that supports affirmance.”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted) .
IIT. pISCUSSION
As the ICA dissent notes, “[t]he foundation of the
{ICA’s] majority opinion is the determination that a sublease .
relationship existed between Ayau and Adams.” Slip op.,
Dissent at 1, It is undisputed that Adams was a roommate of Ayau
by agreement between those two parties, and was therefore 2
tenant as defined by the Code. See HRS § 521-8 (1993) (defining
“tenant” as any occupant under a rental agreement and “rental
agreement” as any agreement concerning the use or occupancy of a
dwelling). However, it does not necessarily follow from that
fact that the type of Adans’ tenancy was a leasehold, as the ICA
majority would have it. To the contrary, the Code and the conmon
law of this jurisdiction compel the conclusion that Adams was not
& (sub) lessee of Kiehn or Ayau, but instead a Licenses of Ayau,
as the ICA dissent suggests. Accordingly, we hold, for the
reasons set forth below, that Adams, as the holder of a license
revocable at will, became a trespasser as of the time at which
the licensor Ayau's interest in the property ceased on March 31,
2002.

A, ‘The Relationship Between Not

Sublease.
First, while it is true that HRS § 521-8 defines
“rental agreement” extremely broadly, the Code also notes that it

does not provide for all legal rights or obligations arising out

12
*** BOR PUBLICATION ***

 

of a rental agreement. HRS § $21-3(b) (1993). The logical
conclusion to be drawn from the broad definition of “rental
agreement” when juxtaposed against the Code’s acknowledgment of
rental agreements giving rise to rights not covered by the Code
is that the Code contemplates tenancies or arrangements other
than leaseholds. Indeed, the Code specifically states that it is
supplemented by the common law. See HRS § $21-3(a) (1993)
("Unless displaced by the particular provisions of [the Code],
the principles of law and equity, including the law relative to .

real property, - . - supplement [the Code’s] provisions.”).
As set forth below, the common law of landlord and tenant
provides for tenancies other than leaseholds, including licenses,
and the Code has not displaced that law with respect to the

tenancy found in the instant case.

4 The Dissent relies upon the “plain mesnine” of the term “sublet”
fas synonymous with “lease” or “rent” based on the definition found in Merriam
Nebster's Collagiate Dictionary and the general definition found in Black's
Law Dictionary. Dissent at 6-7. We believe, however, that with respect to
egal terns of art such as “lease” and “sublease,” reliance on general
Gefinitions is misplaced. Rather, (assuming for’ the monent that there is 2
heed to consult a dictionary in the first place] a more appropriate definition
fo consult would be a more specific one. the sissent characterizes the Aysu"
Adans “sublease” as @ month-to-month tenancy, Dissent at 9 leading us to
Consult the definition in Black's Law Ouetionary entitled “Month te month
Tease.” Under that header, however, the dictionary states: “Tenancy where no
Lease is involved, rent being pais monthly.°\ Slacks Law Dictionary (eth ed
4990) at 290 (emphasis added). In other words, the specific definition in
this case suggests the opposite of what the Digaent contendsy namely, the
agreenent between Aysu and Adams was got 2 lease in the legal sense.
Ultinately, however, we believe there 1s po need to consult either a general
is case law in this jurisdiction on point
the discussion immediately be 127 (1868);
K Park bre July
(hereinafter, Eapiolansl, 69 saw. 569, 751 P.2a l0z2 (1988); end Bush te
Matscn, 81 Howell 474,918 P.24 1230 (2996)

     

 

   

    

 

 

 

     
  

 

a
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At common law, a roommate is not considered 2
sublessee."* See Brewer, 3 Haw. at 140 (“It was long since

settled, that a covenant not to sub-let a tenement was not broken

 

by taking lodgers{.]") (Citation omitted.). See also 49 Am. Jur.
2d Landlord and Tenant § 1167 (1995) ("Since a rooner or ledger
is not a tenant in the strict legal sense, it has generally been
held that the taking in of rooners or lodgers by a lessee does
not constitute a violation of a covenant or provision against

subletting.”). Instead, the rule is “well settled that an

 

agreement by @ lessee with @ third person for the permissive use
by the latter of the leased premises . . . merely anounts to a
License to use the property.” Id, at § 1168 (citing cases)
(emphasis added). In contrast to a lease, a license in the law
of real property conveys no estate in land, is not assignable,
and is revocable at the will of the licensor.%* Kapiolani, 69
Bush v, Watson, @1 Hawas's at

482-83 n.11, 918 P.2d at 1138-39 n.21.

Haw. at 579, 751 P.2d at 1028~!

 

 

8 We acknowledge that the Code defines “rocner” and “boarder.” sea
HRS § $21-8 (defining rooners and boarders as tenants occupying dwelling units
ina bollding in which the landlord resides and sharing one or more major
facilities such as bathroom or kitchen). However, the Code’ s definition by
its terns applies only to traditional Bosrding houses of other buildings with
multiple discrete rooms; it does not address situations in which the landlord
fand tenant occupy the game dwelling unit. Thus section 521-8 is Snappiicable
Gn its face to the instant case and provides no basis for us to find enat the
Code displaces the common Law principles governing roommate relationships.

 

 

 

 

This court most recently defined a License with respect to reat
property in Brewer v, Weeks, 104 Hawai'i 43, 85 P.sd 180 (2004) There, we
noted that a license “denotes an interest in land in the possession of another
which (a) entities the ower of the interest tova use of the land, and (b)
arises from the consent of the one whose interest in the land used is affected
thereby, and (c) is not incident to-an estate in the land, and (d) 18 aot an
easonent."" 14. at 609.26, 85 F.3d at 175 n.28 (quoting Restatement of
Property § $i2"(1948))

 

 

 

a
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Having previously recognized the common-law distinction
between leaseholds and licenses, this court has followed the rule
that whether an agreement is a license or a lease depends on the
intention of the parties as ascertained from the nature of the
agreement.” Kapiolani, 69 Haw. at 578-9, 751 P.2d at 1028-29;
Bush, 81 Hawai'i at 486, $18 P.2d at 1142. In Kapiolani and
Bush, this court listed several factors that a court should
consider in determining whether an agreement is a lease or a

Licenst

 

(2) Most importantly, does the grantee have the right
to occupy @ distinct and separate part of the premises (ive,
definite parcel)? Bush, 81 Hawai'i at 486, 918 P.2d at 1142
(citing 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant $ 1161); Kapiolani, 69
Haw. at $79, 751 P-2d at 1029; sa@ alge 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord
and Tenant § 21 (“Exclusive possession of the leased premises is
essential to the character of a lease... . There must be a
conveyance of a definite space in order for a lease, rather, than
a license, to exist; both the extension and the location of the

Harkine

 

space within the lessor’s premises must be specified.”

% the Dissent attempts to distinguish case law cited by the majority

both within this jurisdiction (je, Kapiolani and Bush) and without (i.e,
Marking} at being factually distinguishable im that those cases dealt with
Ron-residentisl scenarios. Dissent at 3-10. A review of cases from cther
Jurisdictions persuades us, however, that the lease-License distinction is
equally applicable in a residential context. ‘ re
Mavdon, 75! N.v,8.24 456, 457 (N.¥.A.0. Let Dept. 2002) {at-will occupancy of
apartnent constitutes license rather than sublease); Har Holding Co. ¥
Feinberg, 697 N.Y.8.24 903, 904 (N.Y. Sup. 1999) (finding tnat roommate who
Fenained in the epartaent after lessee tenants had vacated was a licensee not
entitled to possession as against the landlord); Schell v, Schell, 165 F.22
G54, 656 (Cal. App. 4 1946) (lodgers in the hone of another are Ticeni

her than lessees!

 

  

 

 

 

 

as
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

vs Win Corp., 771 A.2d 1025, 1027 (D.C. 2001) (essential
distinction between roomers and tenants is whether the occupant
has exclusive possession or control of the premises);

(2) Is the grantee’s right to possession assignable
(suggesting a lease) or is it a personal privilege (suggesting a
license)? Kapiolani, 69 Haw. at 579, 751 P.2d at 1029; see also
49 Am. Jur. 2d § 21 (same); and

(3) Is the agreement for a fixed term (suggesting =
lease)? Kapiolani, 69 Haw. at 579, 751 P.2d at 1029; see also
McCandless v, John Ii Estate, 11 Haw. 777, 788-89 (1899) (same);
49 Am. Jur. 24 § 21 (same).

A consideration of these factors in the instant case
leads to the conclusion that the agreement between Ayau and Adams
was a license, not a sublease. First and foremost, as a

roommate, Adams did not have exclusive possession of the

 

property; rather, he shared possession with Ayau." With respect
to the second factor, although there is no written agreement or
other direct evidence regarding the transferability of Adams

right to use the property, the circumstantial evidence (e.g,

 

ae indicated sbove, it is in this ares that = roommate arrangenent
is most clearly distinguishebie from a (aub} lease. in he typical, sublease
Scenario, the sublessor is absent for sone period lese than the full term of

tnd thus transfers possession and her interest. for that period to
the sublessee. In contrast, 2 licensor does not cede exclusive postession or
transfer her interest, but instead shares possession See Anerican deuish
Theater vy Roundabout ‘theatre cou, ince, G10 NeisSi2d Zeer SST Roe et
Dept. 198i) (vthe nature cf the transfer of absoivte contfol and possession ie
what differentiates « lease from a License of any sther arrangement. dealing
with property rights.")7 oberts ve Livan Ice Co,, 73 NE. 523; 526 (Mass,
3905)" (question of whether an agreement Concerning use of rea property is @
lease of a license depends on whether the agreenent cedes exclusive possession
fron one party to the other). “See genetally ¢9 An. Jur.2d§ 21 (aiscussing
distinction between lease and license)

 

 

   

    

   

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previous romantic relationship; Ayau’s testimony that she did not
intend to sublease) leads us to conclude that Adams did not have
the unilateral right to assign his interest in the residence
(iue., Ayau did not grant Adams 2 right to bring in an additional
roommate or a new roommate to replace him) and thus his privilege
to use the property was personal. Third, the agreenent between
Ayau and Adams was not for a fixed term. Because each of these
factors points toward the existence of a license," we hold that

the agreement between Ayau and Adams constituted a license

 

the Dissent's argument thet the application of the Kapiolani snd
‘Bush factors here yields the conclusion that the agreement was a {cablieace it
Unpersuasive, Dissent at 7-9. First, there is no support in the record for
tthe proposition that Adame had an agreement with Ayau for gxclugive possession
of a aistinet part of the residence. sven assuming that the district court's
Finding that Adams “rent [ed] part of the residence” can be taken to imply thet
the "part" was distinct, there is no evidence, direct or circusstantiet, thi
Adams had gxclusize possession of such part (day, that Ayau was not allowed
to go into his room or part). Rather, the evidence (i.e,, prior romantic
relationship; Ayau's constant threats to throw Adane oot? Ayau"s statement
that to sublease was intended) shows that Ayau never intended to or did cede
exclusive possession or control of any part of the residence to Adams. As set
forth above, the same evidence also supports the conclusion that Adans’
License was’ not assignable:

Also, the Dissent appears to confuse the provisions of the Code
with the nature of the rental agreement When considering the term of the
Bgreenent. Dissent at 9. There is no evidence in the record that the oral
Sgreenent between Ayau and Adana vad intended to have any fixes term =~ that
Agans peid $500 per month for his license does not make it a fixed-ters
Agreenent any more thon a year-to-year license to erect a sigh prevente the
ifsenesr from removing the sign end cancelling the License av its discretion

y 18 N.B.2d 362, 364 (Mass. 1936)
rocation of a License may constitute a

 

 

   

 

 

 

See.
(holding on those facts that *Ttihe
breach of contract, and give rise to an action for danages. But it is
nonetheless effective to deprive the licenses of all justification for
Gntering or ressining upon the land.) (Citations onitted.). Although the
Dissent is correct in noting that, by operation of law, section 521-22 of the
Code specifies that the tern of a tenancy is month-to-nonth where no other
Period is specified, Dissent at 9, and thus termination by the landlord in the
Instant case may have required forty-five cays" advance written notice under
secticn 521-71(a) of the Code, Dissent at 16, that suggests only that the Code
has displaced the comon law with respect to the termination of licensing
agreenents (a possibility which we recognize, Dut dismiss 26 not pertinent to
This case, see dnfca note 21), see Olssent at 26, not the essential ature of
the agreements 35 licenses.

    

   

 

 

 

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revocable at will rather than a sublease.”

B. Adane Became 2 Trespasser when the Right to Possession of
His Licensor Avau Terminated,

From this point, the analysis is straightforward.
First, @ license is revocable at the will of the licensor. See
Bush, 61 Hawai'i at 487, 918 P.2d at 1143 (key feature of a
License is that it is revocable at the will of the licensor)
(citing 2 R. Powell and P. Rohan, Powell on Real Property § 34.25
at 34-298 through 34-301 (1995)). Second, @ License cannot
continue to exist after the licensor's own interest in the land
has been extinguished. Cf. McCandless, 11 Haw. at 789 (license
is automatically revoked by sale of the land and ceases upon the
death of either party). Here, evidence was adduced to show that
Ayau gave notice to Adams both of her intent to revoke the Ayau-
Adams agreement and of the impending termination of the Ayau-
Kiehm agreement.” Moreover, it was the undisputed finding of
the court that the Ayau-Kiehm lease agreement did in fact

terminate on March 31, 2002. Accordingly, Adams’ license

 

% This is not to say, however, that a roommate may never be 2
(sub)lessee or that parties are not free to contract out of the default
Commen-iaw rules regarding notice and teraination. We hold only that on these
facts, and in the absence of any oral or written agreements with Ayau or Kiehn
to the contrary, Adams was the holder of 2 license revocable at will.

   

     

To the extent that the Code has displaced the common law regarding
termination of Licenses and Adans did not receive adequate notice of
Fermination from Ayau, that would give Adans 2 claim only against his
Licensor/iandlord, Aysu. On the other hand, Adame would have no claim against
Kuehn Because she wag not initielly # party’ toa rental agreenent with Adans
and never becane party thereto because the doctrine of surrender is
inapplicable to licenses in that, as set forth above, @ license is tersinated
aen the iicensor’s right is extinguished ond even improper termination does
ot give the licensee a right to remain on the property. Accordingly, We need
Bot consiger the iseve further herein

   

 

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terminated no later than March 31, 2002, the last day of the
Licensor Ayau’s interest in the property. As of April 1, 2002,
therefore, Adams was a trespasser without right to possession.
As such, he was not entitled to any notice to vacate from Kiehm;
rather, it was Kiehn who was entitled to summary possession,
ejectment, or other remedy to remove Adams.** Therefore, the
judgment of the court was correct and the ICA erred in concluding
otherwise.
Iv. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the ICA’s April 30, 2004

opinion is reversed and the August 21, 2002 final judgment and

August 29, 2002 writ of ejectment of the court are affirmed.

Elizabeth B. croon

For petitioner /oefendant-

sppeblant on the writ
Bt Slallvinaen
Reset Co aeieeyrts

Cenan.e. Duddy, Gre

 

We agree with the Ich majority’

 

application of HRS § 666-2 to the
instant facts, sip op. at 16, and hold that Adams was a “person holding under
the lessee or tenant. [iuga, Ayau],” not a “tenant (of Kiehs) by parol”
entitled to ten days’ notice to quit from Kiehn.

     

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