Case Title: P. v. Stevens

Citation: 

Docket Number: S034704

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2007-06-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 6/4/07 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S034704 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
CHARLES STEVENS, 
) 
 
) 
Alameda County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. 102962 
___________________________________ ) 
 
A jury convicted Charles Stevens of four first degree murders and six 
attempted murders.1  A lying-in-wait special circumstance was found true as to 
one murder.2  A special circumstance allegation of multiple murder, and personal 
firearm use allegations as to all counts, were also found true.3  The jury set the 
punishment at death.   
The case is before us on defendant’s automatic appeal.4  For the reasons that 
follow, we affirm the judgment. 
                                              
 
1  Penal Code sections 187, subdivision (a), former section 189, former 
section 664.  All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.   
 
2  Section 190.2, former subdivision (a)(15), as enacted by initiative, 
November 7, 1978. 
 
3  Section 190.2, subdivision (a)(3); former sections 1203.06, 12022.5.  
 
4  California Constitution, article VI, section 11, section 1239, 
subdivision (b).   
 
2
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Prosecution Evidence 
Defendant challenges the sufficiency of proof only as to one murder, one 
attempted murder, and the lying-in-wait special circumstance.  Thus, we discuss 
the facts in summary, except as necessary.  Between April 3 and July 27, 1989, 
defendant engaged in a series of random attacks, by shooting at people on or near 
Interstate 580 in Oakland.  All but one of the victims were in cars when attacked.  
Defendant succeeded in killing Leslie Ann Noyer, Lori Anne Rochon, Laquann 
Sloan, and Raymond August.  He attempted to kill Karen Alice Anderson, Janell 
Lee, Julia Peters, Paul Fenn, Upendra de Silva, and Rodney Stokes.  Defendant 
was charged alone as to all the offenses, except Noyer’s murder.  As to this 
murder, Richard Clark was tried as a codefendant.  The jury deadlocked on the 
murder charge against Clark, and the trial court declared a mistrial.   
Defendant was apprehended near the scene of his final murder.  On July 27, 
at 1:15 a.m., Rodney Stokes was driving home from work at 45 miles per hour on 
Interstate 580.  Defendant, driving a white Mazda, pulled up alongside him and 
both vehicles slowed down.  Stokes lowered his passenger window, and looked 
over to see if he knew the driver.  Defendant motioned as though trying to get 
Stokes’s attention, and smiled at him.  Stokes had never seen defendant before, but 
thought perhaps he had a passenger who “was a friend from work getting a ride 
and trying to slow me down for whatever reasons.”  Stokes had often seen 
coworkers on the freeway.  Just as Stokes realized there was no passenger, 
defendant shot at him.   
Stokes lay down on the seat and turned off his headlights, losing control of 
the vehicle briefly.  At this point he was traveling approximately 30 miles per 
hour.  When Stokes regained control and looked up, the Mazda was in front of 
 
3
him.  Defendant “was sitting there waiting, basically, still coasting in front of me 
and then [defendant] fired” twice more.  Stokes was approximately three-quarters 
of a mile away from the 35th Avenue overpass.  Defendant pulled away, and 
Stokes began flicking his lights on and off to attract police attention.  He also sped 
up to catch defendant.   
As he drove, Stokes saw defendant slow down and pull alongside Raymond 
August’s car.  They were the only two vehicles in front of him on the road.  Stokes 
testified defendant “g[o]t the attention of the other driver” because both sets of 
brake lights came on.  Stokes lost sight of the cars for a brief moment, which he 
characterized as “the snap of a finger.”  After rounding a slight turn, Stokes saw 
the cars again, and heard at least two gunshots.  Defendant rapidly drove to the 
35th Avenue off-ramp, left the freeway, and drove onto another on-ramp that 
entered the freeway going the opposite direction.   
Stokes drove to August’s car, which had crashed into a pillar under the 35th 
Avenue overpass.  He saw August and “[a]n awful lot of blood.”  He looked 
across the freeway, saw the Mazda parked on the shoulder of the on-ramp, and 
called 911. 
When the first police officer arrived, defendant was still parked on the on-
ramp, looking “at the scene underneath the freeway.”  When the officer ordered 
him out of the vehicle, defendant appeared startled, and began to drive away.  He 
then got out of the car with his hands in the air, walked backwards, and fled on 
foot toward a retaining wall.  The officer grabbed defendant at the wall.  As he did 
so, the officer heard a heavy metallic object hit the ground; it was a loaded .357 
magnum Desert Eagle semiautomatic pistol.  Defendant was carrying a loaded 
magazine and a loose bullet.  Stokes subsequently arrived and identified 
defendant.   
 
4
Defendant told police he had possessed the weapon for the last three to four 
months, since “[a]bout . . . March.”  Ballistics evidence indicated defendant’s 
weapon was either a match to or consistent with the gun used in all of the crimes 
except for the attempted murder of Stokes.  The piece of lead slug recovered from 
Stokes’ vehicle was insufficient to make any comparison.   
A search of defendant’s room revealed a box and an operator’s manual for 
the weapon, a canvas gun case, gun cleaning equipment, a .357 magnum cartridge 
and magazine, trays of bullets, and practice targets.  He also had a collection of 
Oakland newspapers containing articles about the shootings, and an envelope with 
handwritten references to what appeared to be various Penal and Vehicle Code 
sections including those regarding murder, assault, vehicle theft, and weapons 
offenses.5  Defendant’s palm print was found on victim Noyer’s vehicle.   
During an unrecorded interview, police asked defendant what type of person 
would commit random shootings on a freeway.  He replied the “only reason would 
be mental, or loneliness, some lonely mother fucker.”  When asked how such a 
person would be caught, he said, “The guy would get caught if somebody told on 
him or if he pulled over like I did.”   
2.  Defense Evidence 
Defendant presented evidence only as to the murder of 16-year-old Laquann 
Sloan, a conviction not challenged on appeal.  Sloan was shot in the head as he 
walked down the street.  Three witnesses testified about events before and after the 
shooting, but none witnessed the shooting itself.   
                                              
 
5  The references included: “245(A, 2)-10+” (punishment for assault with a 
firearm); “12020-20+” (prohibited weapons); “187-4” (murder) and “10851-32+” 
(vehicle theft).   
 
5
Codefendant Clark testified regarding the Noyer and Rochon murders.  Clark 
had given police various accounts of the Noyer murder.  In his last statement, he 
claimed he had shot Noyer under duress because defendant threatened to shoot 
him.  At trial, Clark denied being present at the murder scene, and said he made up 
the story using details from the police.   
As to the Rochon murder, Clark testified that early on the morning of July 6, 
he and defendant were in a stolen car.  As defendant drove, he started rocking 
back and forth, and said in an urgent tone, “ ‘Man, I got to shoot somebody.’ ”  
Defendant pulled alongside a car, but Clark asked why he was going to shoot this 
person.  Defendant said, “Okay.  I’m not going to shoot this guy.  I’ll shoot 
somebody white.”  Defendant subsequently pulled next to Lori Rochon’s car, and 
rolled down his side window, telling Clark he thought Rochon was a “white 
dude,” and fired at her.  Clark’s sister testified that in July 1989, Clark asked her 
to tell him when the news came on because defendant had shot someone on the 
freeway.  The news report stated that the woman’s name was “Lori,” and she was 
shot on Interstate 580.  When Clark saw a July 18 article about the assaults on 
Fenn, Peters, and de Silva, he called defendant and asked if he had done the 
shooting.  Defendant said, “ ‘Man, don’t say that over the phone.’ ”  
 
B.  Penalty Phase 
 
1.  Prosecution evidence 
The parties stipulated that defendant was convicted in 1989 of three counts of 
felony auto theft.  (Former Veh. Code, § 10851.)   
Randall Shumpert described an incident in June 1987.  At 10:00 p.m., 
defendant and a passenger drove by the BART station where Shumpert was 
standing.  The passenger yelled something at Shumpert, and angry words were 
exchanged.  Defendant drove off, but returned a few minutes later with his 
 
6
headlights off.  Defendant leaned from the car window, shot at Shumpert, and 
drove away.   
On November 30, 1988, Sheriff’s Deputy William Borland and Sergeant 
Steve Wilson responded to a disturbance in the county jail mess hall.  Defendant 
threw a carton of milk at Wilson, swore, and urged other inmates to throw objects 
at the officers.  Defendant picked up his metal tray as though to throw that, but 
complied when ordered to put it down.   
On March 18, 1993 Sherriff’s Deputy Timothy Durbin was transporting 
defendant from jail to court during the guilt phase of this case.  He heard 
defendant tell another inmate in hushed tones, “You know that fuckin’ Clark is 
fucking me over.  He snitched me off five times now.  If I get the chance, I’m 
going to do him . . . . I’m going to kill that mother fucker, even if I did make him 
do some of that shit, he’s trying to fuck me over.”   
Eight witnesses provided victim impact testimony regarding the 
accomplishments of their loved ones, and the effect of the murders on their own 
lives.   
 
2.  Defense evidence 
Psychiatrist Harry Kormos testified about defendant’s childhood and the 
results of psychological testing.  Dr. Kormos met with defendant approximately 10 
times for three hours each over a period of four to five months.  He concluded 
defendant had an unspecified personality disorder with schizoid and borderline 
personality traits.  Dr. Kormos had diagnosed several dozen people with such a 
disorder, but could not recall any of them committing murder.  Although 
defendant manifested this disorder, he suffered from no mental illness.  Physical 
and psychological testing revealed no organic brain illness, tumors, or 
malformations.  Defendant’s mother stopped drinking about five years before 
 
7
defendant was born, and defendant did not have fetal alcohol syndrome.  
Defendant’s intelligence quotient of 80 to 90 revealed below-average intelligence, 
but he was not mentally retarded.  Defendant was of mixed racial heritage:  his 
mother was Native American, and his father Caucasian and Black.  While 
defendant said “that he never had any difficulty” along these lines, Dr. Kormos 
nevertheless opined that “[t]his kind of racial confusion makes it even harder than 
it is already in our society to deal with racial issues.”   
Defendant was well cared for by his parents in Oakland until he was 11 or 12 
years old.  Defendant’s mother was a devout Jehovah’s Witness, and defendant 
was active in the church.  About age 12, defendant moved with his mother and 
older sister to an Indian reservation.  Defendant suffered several seizures, and an 
EEG showed abnormality.  In a 1993 EEG, however, there were no abnormalities.  
His mother resumed drinking, stopped practicing her religion, and became both 
verbally and physically violent.  She was charged with child abuse for beating 
defendant’s older sister.  Defendant reported that in two incidents a few days 
apart, he attempted suicide to get his mother’s attention.  There were no medical 
reports about the suicides, and he bore no scars, although he said he cut his wrists 
in the second attempt.   
When defendant was 13, the family was reunited in Oakland.  Defendant’s 
mother was arrested on several occasions for drunk driving, and spent a year in 
jail.  At one point she was committed to Highland Hospital for threatening to 
throw defendant out a window and kill his sister.  She drank until her death in 
March 1986.   
Defendant’s brother was convicted of murder in 1978.  Dr. Kormos said the 
brother, 17 years older than defendant, was only a distant figure to defendant, and 
he discerned no relevant “emotional” material in these factors.   
 
8
Defendant was twice suspended for disruptive behavior in middle school.  He 
had to repeat the ninth grade for academic reasons, but won several trophies in 
bike racing.  He tried marijuana when he was 12, but did not use drugs.  He did, 
however, sell cocaine in high school to get money for clothes and jewelry.  He was 
fired from a pawnshop job for stealing a gun.  He cared for his father, who was 
working full-time, which Dr. Kormos opined demonstrated defendant was capable 
of altruistic action.   
Dr. Kormos was not “able to come up with a clear diagnosis as to why” 
defendant murdered four people and attempted to kill six others.  Defendant never 
denied committing the capital crimes, but reported he could not remember 
committing most of them.  He did have a patchy recollection of the August killing.  
Dr. Kormos opined that at some level defendant wanted to be caught.  He found 
no indication that defendant derived pleasure or satisfaction from the killings.   
Jerry Enomoto, a former Director of the Department of Corrections, testified 
defendant would be no more than a nuisance inmate in prison.  Three deputy 
sheriffs testified regarding defendant’s good conduct while in jail, although one 
noted defendant had lost a job assignment for misconduct.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Pretrial  
 
Alleged Wheeler Error 
Defendant brought four Wheeler motions asserting the prosecutor was 
improperly exercising his peremptory challenges to excuse African-Americans.  
(People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler).)  All four motions were 
denied.  Here, defendant challenges only the ruling on the first motion.  The trial 
court expressly found a prima facie case of discrimination in connection with this 
motion, and asked the prosecutor to state reasons for his challenges.  The jury as 
sworn contained one Black juror and one Black alternate.   
 
9
In Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, we held “ ‘that the use of peremptory 
challenges by a prosecutor to strike prospective jurors on the basis of group 
membership violates the right of a criminal defendant to trial by a jury drawn from 
a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16, of the 
California Constitution.  Subsequently, in Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 
84-89 [Batson] . . . the United States Supreme Court held that such a practice 
violates, inter alia, the defendant’s right to equal protection of the laws under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.’ ”   (People v. Catlin 
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 116 (Catlin).)  “[T]he ultimate burden of persuasion 
regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the 
strike.” (Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 768; Batson, at p. 93.)  
Relying on People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, defendant asserts the 
prosecutor’s reasons for challenging Prospective Jurors L.F., H.H., and J.C., all of 
whom were involved in the first Wheeler motion, were not supported by the 
record, and that the trial court erred in failing to question the prosecutor about 
these discrepancies.  In Silva, we observed that a trial judge is required to make a 
“sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate each stated reason as applied to each 
challenged juror.  [Citations.]  When the prosecutor’s stated reasons are both 
inherently plausible and supported by the record, the trial court need not question 
the prosecutor or make detailed findings.  But when the prosecutor’s stated 
reasons are either unsupported by the record, inherently implausible, or both, more 
is required of the trial court than a global finding that the reasons appear 
sufficient.”  (Silva, at p. 386.)   
The record reveals that defendant’s claim lacks merit.  Regarding all three 
prospective jurors, the prosecutor stated, “The basis for the challenges are the 
same as for all of the people that I have challenged, and that is on the basis that the 
People didn’t feel they would get a fair trial with those jurors . . . .  [W]ith regard 
 
10
to all [three] of the jurors, I indicated in one way or another at the very least an 
ambivalence and the lack of commitment, at least in my mind, of their willingness 
to impose the death penalty.  That there was a vacillation that they reflected and a 
situation that I felt I could not take the chance of them hanging this should we get 
to the point of . . . a penalty phase. . . . [I]t was not just merely the words that they 
spoke or what they had written on the questionnaire, but also the manner in which 
they responded to my questions, and specifically, their ability to carry it out, and 
reading not only what they said, but also how they responded physically to the 
question itself.”   
The prosecutor also noted “the bulk of the victims in my case are in fact of 
Afro-American [descent], and I would like to have that represented on the jury.  It 
is, just in my view and my experience, that I didn’t feel that these people had the 
personal fortitude to in fact impose a death penalty verdict, if it should get 
there . . . I would also like to have that point of view reflected on this jury but, 
unfortunately, these jurors, I don’t believe, have the ability, the internal fortitude 
to say to Mr. Stevens ‘death’ if we should get there.”   
As to Prospective Juror L.F. specifically, the prosecutor stated he “reflected 
an ambivalence” regarding the death penalty, while in his questionnaire “he 
indicated he was moderately for it.  When it came down to whether or not he 
would vote for it if the issue were on the ballot, he said, ‘I honestly don’t know.’  
And in talking with him, he said, ‘Well, I’ll follow the law with regard to whatever 
the Judge tells me.’  And when you put it in terms that, well, the law doesn’t 
mandate that you have to impose the death penalty, that’s something that’s up to 
you.  He indicated, again, just an ambivalence in his ability and showed a lack of 
commitment in the ability to impose the death penalty.”   
Defendant asserts that Prospective Juror L.F. did not say he honestly did not 
know when asked if he would vote for the death penalty if an advisory measure 
 
11
were on the ballot.  During voir dire, L.F. said he would vote “Yes,” because the 
penalty was a “deterrent,” and on his juror questionnaire, L.F. said he was 
“[m]oderately in favor” of the death penalty.  However, when asked on the 
questionnaire, “If the issue of whether California should have a death penalty law 
was to be on the ballot in this coming election, how would you vote,” he checked, 
“[n]ot sure,” and wrote, “I honestly do not know.”  The record supports the 
prosecutor’s stated reason.   
Defendant also points out that L.F. said he could supply the twelfth vote to 
make a death verdict unanimous “if it was called for.”  L.F. also said, “At one time 
I thought that way, I really . . . didn’t like the death penalty.  But I find I can 
follow—if the law says that’s what it is, I can follow the law.  I’d do what the law 
says and if it—if—if the law says this man gets the death penalty, this man 
doesn’t, I could do that.”  These various responses do not undermine the 
prosecutor’s stated reason.   
As to Prospective Juror H.H., the prosecutor stated, “he kept on bouncing 
around, at least in terms of a certain amount of ambivalence that he reflected, 
always falling back, ‘Can you do it?’ And the answer is, ‘Well, I’ll take a look at 
all the information.  I need all the information before I could make a decision.’  At 
one level that may be understandable.  At another level . . . ., it appeared to be 
more of an ambivalence.”  The prosecutor also noted, “As I was talking with him, 
I could smell a very strong odor of alcohol on him, and he admits in his 
questionnaire that he is an alcoholic and that alcohol has gotten him into trouble.  
And I’m always concerned about someone who’s drinking in the middle of the 
day . . . and who admits that he’s got an alcohol problem and he’s still drinking.”  
H.H. admitted a conviction for driving under the influence a year and a half 
earlier.   
 
12
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor “misrepresented” Prospective Juror 
H.H. “as falling back on needing all the evidence, [when he] in fact said that only 
in the context of affirming that he could and would vote for death if the evidence 
led him there.”   
On his questionnaire, Prospective Juror H.H. stated he was “neutral” 
regarding the penalty, and noted, “I feel that it is ineffective due to [the] fact . . . it 
can be delayed any number of times by any one convicted.  Also it has not shown 
to be a [deterrent] for anyone committing crimes.”  On voir dire, he repeatedly 
asserted he would not make a decision without “all” the “information,” “facts,” or 
“evidence.”  In response to the court’s question regarding whether he would be 
open to imposing either penalty, he said, “I’m the type of person, you know, that I 
cannot pass whatever type of judgment, whatever, or anything without having all 
the facts.  I prefer to have all the facts before I make any kind of judgment on 
anything.  If you don’t have the facts, you tend to make mistakes, and I’m one 
who tends to try to have all the facts before me before I make any kind of 
decision.”  In response to the prosecutor’s question as to whether he had thought 
about whether he could vote for a death penalty verdict, H.H. said, “Not really 
because, you know, like as I stated before, you have to take into consideration all 
of the information that’s going to be presented, I mean, you know, you just cannot 
preformulate any kind of idea of what’s going to happen without the information 
being available and being presented.  I mean, you know, I’ll put it like this, I’m an 
information junkie, that’s one thing I live for is information. . . . I don’t tend to 
pass any kind of judgment or anything like this without taking into consideration 
all of the information that’s pertaining to what I’m trying to find out . . . .”  In sum, 
the record supports the prosecutor’s stated reasons.   
Regarding Prospective Juror J.C., the prosecutor said she “was in a like 
situation of indicating, ‘I think I could do it,’ but reflecting, again, a lack of 
 
13
conviction in her ability to do it, which gave me a great deal of concern as to 
whether I could afford to take the chance.”  Defendant contends “this ignored her 
many answers affirmatively supporting her ability and willingness to impose the 
death penalty.”   
On her questionnaire, Prospective Juror J.C. stated she was “neutral” on the 
death penalty, and said, “I have not made up my mind on the death penalty[.]  It 
would depend upon the extent of the crime[.]  I cannot answer [until] I had all the 
facts.”  She was “[n]ot sure” how she would vote “[i]f the issue of whether 
California should have a death penalty law was to be on the ballot in this coming 
election,” because “[n]ot all crime deserve[s] [the] death penalty.”   
On voir dire, when asked how she would vote if the death penalty were on 
the ballot, J.C. said, “I think I would vote for it. . . .  I say it depends on the crime 
and—it depends.  The penalty should fit the crime, depending on the 
circumstances of what happened.  I think at this time the way I feel right now I 
think I would vote for it.  But I would have to wait until it actually happened 
before I make up my mind finally.”  When the prosecutor described how 
defendant would be executed, and then asked, “Now, could you cast that vote and 
sign that jury verdict form,” Prospective Juror J.C. responded, “Since you put it 
like that, it’s kind of hard. . . .  It’s hard, yeah.”  Thus, while J.C. made other 
statements that indicated she could vote for the death penalty, the record supports 
the prosecutor’s statement that Prospective Juror J.C. was ambivalent.   
Defendant further asserts that the prosecutor’s pretext is demonstrated by 
comparing the voir dire answers of Prospective Jurors H.H., L.F., and J.C. with 
those of seated Jurors D.M., J.C., M.F., and V.W.  Defendant did not perform a 
comparative juror analysis in the trial court, and acknowledges that we have 
disapproved of such comparative analysis for the first time on appeal.  (People v. 
Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1220-1221.)  To the extent Johnson may have 
 
14
been called into question by Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231, we perform 
a comparative juror analysis to facilitate this review.  (Compare with People v.  
Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 600-601 [Miller-El does not require comparative juror 
review in a first stage Wheeler case, or when no prima facie case is found].)  We 
do not hereby express an opinion that such a comparison is compelled.  The record 
fails to demonstrate purposeful discrimination.   
In comparison to Prospective Juror H.H., seated Jurors J.C., M.F., and V.W. 
had not suffered any prior convictions.  Juror D.M. had suffered a conviction for 
driving under the influence approximately eight years earlier.  However, H.H. had 
a substantially more recent conviction, and smelled of alcohol during voir dire.   
Nor do these seated jurors demonstrate such a striking similarity in 
ambivalence regarding the death penalty that a finding of pretext is warranted.  
(See People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 271, 273 (Schmeck).)  On her 
questionnaire, Juror V.W. “[a]greed with the decision” to remove Chief Justice 
Bird.  She voted for, and was moderately in favor of, the death penalty.  If the 
issue of whether California should have a death penalty was on the ballot, she 
would vote for it since, “[s]ome crimes really seem to justify the penalty.”   
On voir dire, when asked whether she could be in the situation of ending 
another person’s life, V.W. answered, “You know, at this point, I guess so.  I 
really don’t know.”  However, when in his next question the prosecutor described 
the execution process and asked her if she could cast the twelfth vote for a death 
penalty verdict, Juror V.W. said, “Yes.”   
On her questionnaire, Juror D.M. stated, “I believe the death penalty is 
justified in certain cases.”  She was moderately in favor of the death penalty.  She 
would vote for it if it were on the ballot because, “I think there are some crimes 
[heinous] enough to warrant the death penalty.”   
 
15
On voir dire, when asked by the prosecutor whether she could envision 
herself voting for the death penalty in this type of case, D.M. said in part, “to me, 
murder is a heinous crime so that is about the only way I can answer that for you.  
I would think, depending on the circumstances and depending on the instructions 
that we’ve been given as to what would make that penalty phase come into effect, 
that I am—I would be prepared to make that vote . . . if the aggravating . . . 
circumstances, warranted that the death penalty be in this case, then I could vote 
for it if I felt that way.”  In response to the prosecutor’s question about casting the 
twelfth vote for a death penalty verdict, D.M. said, “If I felt it were appropriate 
based on what I said before, I would have to.”  When asked if she would give 
serious consideration to defendant’s mitigating evidence and the penalty of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole, she said, “I think I would have to 
be so convinced that . . . the death penalty was the only thing that I could vote for 
before I voted for it.  In other words, I think I would try to give every possibility to 
not asking for the death penalty, unless I just could not, in my own mind, think 
that anything less would be appropriate. . . .  I would weigh every possibility of the 
death penalty not being the verdict, unless I felt very convinced that that was the 
only appropriate verdict that I would have to vote for it, so yes, I think I would 
keep an open mind to anything that might sway [me] in that direction.”  In 
response to defense counsel questioning, she said, “I believe that there are certain 
cases for which the death penalty is appropriate.  I am not so sure I can say 
without hearing evidence that this case falls into that category.”  These responses 
indicate an appreciation that voting for a death verdict is a grave decision, not 
ambivalence regarding the death penalty.   
Juror J.C. stated on his questionnaire, “I believe that the death penalty is 
needed because it gives criminals (persons) something to think about when they 
commit the crimes and kill somebody either by firearms or bodily harm.”  He was 
 
16
neutral on the death penalty, and not sure if he would vote for it on the ballot.  “I 
would read the issue first and come to a conclusion before I voted on this issue.  I 
want to [find] out the good and bad points of this issue.”   
On voir dire, the court asked, “could you cast a vote as a juror for either 
of . . . these penalties if you felt it was the appropriate penalty . . .?”  Juror J.C. 
answered “Yes, sir.”  In response to the prosecution question regarding “[s]hould 
we have a death penalty in the state of California,” Juror J.C. said “Yes, we should 
if . . . the crime is serious enough.”  Unlike Prospective Juror J.C., when the 
prosecutor described the execution process and asked, “Knowing those 
consequences, could you cast that twelfth vote,” Juror J.C. answered, “I would—I 
believe that if in my truthful mind that everything points to the death penalty, 
that’s the way I would go.”   
Juror M.F. wrote on her questionnaire, “I feel that the death penalty should 
be looked at on a case-by-case basis.”  She was neutral on the death penalty.  She 
was not sure if she would vote for it on the ballot because “I am not entirely 
convinced that the death penalty deters criminals.”   
On voir dire, when the court asked if she could cast a vote for either penalty, 
M.F. said “Yes.”  In response to the prosecutor’s question regarding casting the 
twelfth vote for a death penalty verdict, she said, “Yes, sir, I could.”   
In sum, nothing in these jurors’ questionnaire or voir dire answers indicates 
such striking similarity to the challenged prospective jurors’ responses that pretext 
is evident.  Moreover, as with any situation involving alleged bias, we defer to the 
trial court’s credibility determination.  (Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98, fn. 21; 
Schmeck, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 275.)  The best evidence of whether a race-
neutral reason should be believed is often “the demeanor of the attorney who 
exercises the challenge,” and “evaluation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based 
on demeanor and credibility lies ‘peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.’ ”  
 
17
(Hernandez v. New York (1991) 500 U.S. 352, 365.)  In addition, the prosecutor 
expressly stated he was basing his challenges not only on the prospective jurors’ 
words, but their nonverbal behavior as well.  The trial court could evaluate the 
nonverbal conduct on which the prosecutor relied.  We cannot.  Indeed, in denying 
the Wheeler motion, the trial court noted it was relying not only on “an analysis of 
the proferred reasons,” but also “the court’s own observations.”  Defendant has 
failed to demonstrate purposeful racial discrimination against prospective jurors.   
 
B.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Alleged Crawford Error 
Codefendant Clark’s statement to police was redacted to delete any reference 
to another person.  Defendant contends that admission of the statement was 
erroneous under Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 (Crawford).  In 
Crawford, at pages 53-54, 68, and Davis v. Washington (2006) ___ U.S. __ 
[126 S.Ct. 2266, 2276], the high court held that admission of testimonial hearsay 
statements against a defendant violates the Sixth Amendment confrontation clause 
when the declarant is not, and has not previously been, subject to cross-
examination.   
This claim is waived.  Defendant’s counsel expressly stated his satisfaction 
with the redacted statement because there was “no reference to [defendant] 
directly or indirectly.”  He withdrew his Aranda/Bruton6 objection and motion to 
sever based on the redacted statement.  
                                              
 
6  In People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518, this court “adopted ‘judicially 
declared rules of practice’ for all cases in which the prosecution proposed to 
introduce in evidence an extrajudicial statement of one defendant that implicated a 
codefendant.”  (People v. Fletcher (1996) 13 Cal.4th 451, 460, see also p. 465.)  In 
Bruton, the high court held that “because jurors cannot be expected to ignore one 
defendant’s confession that is ‘powerfully incriminating’ as to a second defendant 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
18
Moreover, the claim lacks merit.  Crawford addressed the introduction of 
testimonial hearsay statements against a defendant.  Clark’s redacted statement 
contained no evidence against defendant.  (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at pp. 39-
40, 68.)  Thus, it cannot implicate the confrontation clause.  (Richardson v. Marsh 
(1987) 481 U.S. 200, 211; People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1046-1047.)  
The same redaction that “prevents Bruton error also serves to prevent Crawford 
error.”  (United States v. Chen (2d Cir. 2004) 393 F.3d 139, 150.)   
Defendant further asserts that because Clark’s redacted statement was 
admitted, Clark testified at trial.  Had Clark not testified, defendant argues, the 
jury would not have heard incriminating evidence about defendant’s involvement 
in the Noyer and Rochon murders, and there would have been no modus operandi 
regarding freeway murders.  The Sixth Amendment confrontation clause does not 
bar hearsay statements of a witness who testifies at trial and is subject to cross-
examination.  (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 59, fn. 9.)  Here, defendant 
received what the confrontation clause requires: a full opportunity to confront and 
cross-examine Clark.   
2.  Challenge to Denial of Section 1118.1 Motion 
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously denied his motion to dismiss 
the counts regarding the murder of Lori Rochon, and the attempted murder of Paul 
Fenn.7  (§ 1118.1.)8  As for Rochon’s murder, defendant argues that when the 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
when determining the latter’s guilt, admission of such a confession at a joint trial 
generally violates the confrontation rights of the nondeclarant.  (Bruton v. United 
States (1968) 391 U.S. 123, 126–137.)”  (Fletcher, at p. 455.)   
7  Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 
his conviction for the attempted murder of Julia Peters, who was in the van with 
Fenn.   
 
19
motion was argued, Clark had not testified.  Hence, the evidence was insufficient 
as to the perpetrator’s identity.   
“The standard applied by a trial court in ruling upon a motion for judgment 
of acquittal pursuant to section 1118.1 is the same as the standard applied by an 
appellate court in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a 
conviction, that is, ‘whether from the evidence, including all reasonable inferences 
to be drawn therefrom, there is any substantial evidence of the existence of each 
element of the offense charged.’ ”  (People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 139, 
fn. 13.)  “The purpose of a motion under section 1118.1 is to weed out as soon as 
possible those few instances in which the prosecution fails to make even a prima 
facie case.”  (People v. Shirley (1982) 31 Cal.3d 18, 70; People v. Ainsworth 
(1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1022.)  The question “is simply whether the prosecution has 
presented sufficient evidence to present the matter to the jury for its 
determination.”  (Ainsworth, at p. 1024.)  The sufficiency of the evidence is tested 
at the point the motion is made.  (§ 1118.1; Shirley, at pp. 70-71; see People v. 
Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1213.)  The question is one of law, subject to 
independent review.  (Cole, at p. 1213.) 
The prosecution’s evidence showed Rochon was shot while driving on 
Interstate 580 on July 6, 1989.  Between April 3 and July 16, eight people, 
including Rochon and Fenn, were shot at within a few miles of each other on or 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
 
8  Section 1118.1 provides in relevant part: “In a case tried before a jury, 
the court on motion of the defendant or on its own motion, at the close of the 
evidence on either side and before the case is submitted to the jury for decision, 
shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one or more of the offenses 
charged in the accusatory pleading if the evidence then before the court is 
insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses on appeal.” 
 
20
near that freeway.  Rochon was also shot during the early morning; all of the nine 
other assaults in this case occurred between approximately midnight and 3:00 a.m.  
The bullet removed from Rochon’s body had polygonal markings and was fired 
from a Desert Eagle pistol, a fairly unusual weapon.  The Desert Eagle is the only 
.357 magnum pistol with polygonal rifling.  Before the Noyer murder on April 3, 
Lansing Lee, an Oakland Police Department criminalist and firearms identification 
expert, had never seen a .357 magnum slug with polygonal rifling.  After August’s 
murder on July 27, Lee never again saw another such slug.  Defendant was 
arrested in possession of a Desert Eagle, and admitted having it in his possession 
for several months.  Defendant’s Desert Eagle was used to kill Noyer, Sloan, and 
August, and to shoot at Anderson, Lee, and de Silva.  A newspaper article 
regarding the Rochon murder was found in defendant’s bedroom.  This evidence 
supports a prima facie case that defendant was the perpetrator.   
Defendant further contends that whether considered at the time of the motion 
to dismiss or following the defense case, there is insufficient evidence connecting 
him to the attempted murder of Paul Fenn.  Not so.  Fenn was shot at while driving 
on Interstate 580 early on the morning of July 16.  Copper bullet jackets found in 
his van were from a Desert Eagle.  Minutes after the assault on Fenn, and only 
several hundred yards away, de Silva was wounded by a shot from defendant’s 
Desert Eagle.  When Clark saw a newspaper article about the assaults on Fenn and 
de Silva, he called defendant and asked if he had done the shooting.  Defendant 
said, “ ‘Man, don’t say that over the phone.’ ”  An article about the Fenn and de 
Silva assaults was found in defendant’s bedroom.  The evidence was sufficient 
regarding defendant’s identity as Fenn’s attempted murderer.   
 
 
21
3.  Sufficiency of Evidence of Lying-in-wait Special Circumstance 
Defendant contends there was insufficient evidence of an adequate period of 
watching and waiting to support the lying-in-wait special-circumstance finding for 
Raymond August’s murder.9  We conclude the evidence was sufficient.   
A sufficiency of evidence challenge to a special circumstance finding is 
reviewed under the same test applied to a conviction.  (People v. Mayfield (1997) 
14 Cal.4th 668, 790.)  Reviewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, the 
record must contain reasonable and credible evidence of solid value, “such that a 
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.) 
The prosecution relied solely on a theory of premeditation for the underlying 
murder of August.  The jury convicted defendant of first degree murder, and he 
does not challenge that conclusion.  Evidence of lying in wait was provided 
primarily by Rodney Stokes, at whom defendant shot just before murdering 
August.  (See ante, pp. 2-3.)   
At the time of the capital crimes, the elements of the lying-in-wait special 
circumstance required an intentional killing, committed under circumstances that 
included a physical concealment or concealment of purpose; a substantial period 
of watching and waiting for an opportune time to act; and, immediately thereafter, 
a surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage.10  
                                              
 
9  The jury found not true the lying-in-wait special-circumstance allegation 
regarding Noyer’s murder.   
 
10  Here, the jury was instructed that in order to find the special 
circumstance true, defendant must have intentionally killed the victim and done so 
while lying in wait.  Lying in wait was defined as “waiting and watching for an 
opportune time to act, together with a concealment by ambush or by some other 
secret design to take the other person by surprise even though the victim is aware 
of the murderer’s presence.  The lying in wait need not continue for any particular 
period of time provided that its duration is such as to show a state of mind 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
22
(Section 190.2, former subd. (a)(15); People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 
554-555, 557 (Morales).)  The purpose of the watching and waiting element is to 
distinguish those cases in which a defendant acts insidiously from those in which 
he acts out of rash impulse.  (See People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 24 (Moon).)  
This period need not continue for any particular length “ ‘of time provided that its 
duration is such as to show a state of mind equivalent to premeditation or 
deliberation.’ ”11  (Sims, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 433-434.)  “ ‘ “The element of 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
equivalent to premeditation or deliberation.  Thus, for a killing to be perpetrated 
while lying in wait, both the concealment and watchful waiting as well as the 
killing must occur during the same time period, or in an uninterrupted attack 
commencing no later than the moment concealment ends.  If there is a clear 
interruption separating the period of lying in wait from the period during which 
the killing takes place, so that there is neither an immediate killing nor a 
continuous flow of the uninterrupted lethal events, the special circumstance is not 
proved.  A mere concealment of purpose is not sufficient to meet the requirement 
of concealment set forth in this special circumstance.  However, when a defendant 
intentionally murders another person, under circumstances which include (1) a 
concealment of purpose, (2) a substantial period of watching and waiting for an 
opportune time to act, and (3) immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on an 
unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage, the special circumstance of 
murder while lying in wait has been established.”   
 
11  Contrary to Justice Kennard’s concurring and dissenting opinion, 
nothing in the language of section 190.2, former subdivision (a)(15), which 
provides that “[t]he defendant intentionally killed the victim while lying in wait,” 
indicates that the durational element of “lying-in-wait” is defined differently for 
the special circumstance than it is for first degree murder.  (Conc. & dis. opn. of 
Kennard, J., post, at p. 2.)  Nor does anything we said in Morales, supra, 48 
Cal.3d 527, indicate we were so interpreting the special circumstance.  (Conc. & 
dis. opn. of Kennard, J., post, at p. 2.)  At the time of the capital crimes, the only 
differences between lying in wait murder and the special circumstance did not 
touch on the durational element of lying in wait.  Rather, first degree murder by 
lying in wait does not require an intent to kill while the special circumstance based 
on that theory does.  (People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 448 (Webster); 
People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1140, fn. 2 (Ceja).)  In addition, the first 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
23
concealment is satisfied by a showing that a defendant’s true intent and purpose 
were concealed by his actions or conduct.  It is not required that he be literally 
concealed from view before he attacks the victim.” ’ ” ’ ”  (People v. Hillhouse 
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 500 (Hillhouse).)  The factors of concealing murderous 
intent, and striking from a position of advantage and surprise, “are the hallmark of 
a murder by lying in wait.”  (People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 164.)    
Defendant here was convicted of August’s premeditated murder.  In order to 
convict him of first degree murder, the jury was instructed it had to find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant’s intentional killing was willful, deliberate and 
premeditated.   
The facts of this case and the jury’s conclusion that defendant acted with 
deliberation and premeditation dispel any inference that he killed as a result of 
rash impulse.  Even a short period of watching and waiting can negate such an 
inference.  (Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 24.)  The facts here are more than 
sufficient to establish that after the assault on Stokes, defendant turned his 
attention to a new target.  He selected August, the driver of the only other nearby 
car on the road ahead of him, as his next victim.  He approached and concealed his 
deadly purpose by pulling up alongside of August and induced him to slow down.  
August did so, just as Stokes had.  This process may not have taken an extended 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
degree murder formulation refers to “by means of” lying in wait and the special 
circumstance referred to “while” lying in wait.  Neither difference changes the 
principle that for a murder conviction and for a special circumstance finding the 
lying in wait need not continue for any particular period of time provided that its 
duration is such as to show a state of mind equivalent to premeditation or 
deliberation.  (Ceja, at p. 1139; People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 433-434 
(Sims).)   
 
24
period, because defendant did not have to wait long until his next target became 
available.  But there is no indication of rash impulse.  To the contrary, it was 
reasonable for the jury to conclude that defendant acted to implement his plan of 
luring a victim of opportunity into a vulnerable position by creating or exploiting a 
false sense of security.  The jury could also reasonably conclude that August was 
taken by surprise.  He did not flee, but slowed down and drove side-by-side with 
defendant, just as Stokes had done.  Once the intended victim slowed down, the 
time to act became opportune.  Defendant stopped watching and started shooting.  
Such behavior is completely consistent with, and provides substantial evidence 
for, the watching and waiting element of the lying-in-wait special circumstance. 
4.  Alleged Unconstitutionality of Lying-in-wait Special-circumstance 
Instruction 
Defendant contends the lying-in-wait special-circumstance instruction was 
confusing and constitutionally flawed in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, and California Constitution article I, section 16.12  In particular, he 
contends that “[i]f the temporal element is . . . equivalent to that of first-degree 
murder, then the statute loses all claim to performing a rational narrowing 
function.”  It is not clear whether he means first degree murder on a theory of 
premeditation and deliberation, or lying in wait, but in either case the claim fails.  
In distinction with premeditated first degree murder, the lying-in-wait special 
circumstance requires a physical concealment or concealment of purpose and a 
surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage.  
(Section 190.2, former subd. (a)(15); Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 554-555, 
557.)  Thus, any overlap between the premeditation element of first degree murder 
                                              
12  While defendant states he is challenging the instructions “as applied in 
this case,” the entire challenge is to the language of the instruction.   
 
25
and the durational element of the lying in wait special circumstance does not 
undermine the narrowing function of the special circumstance.  (Sims, supra, 5 
Cal.4th at p. 434.)  Moreover, contrary to Justice Moreno’s concurring and 
dissenting opinion, concealment of purpose inhibits detection, defeats self-
defense, and may betray at least some level of trust, making it more blameworthy 
than premeditated murder that does not involve surprise.  (See Catlin, supra, 26 
Cal.4th at p. 159 [poison murder]; conc. & dis. opn. of Moreno, J, post, at p. 13.)   
A similar narrowing distinction is discernible between the lying-in-wait 
special circumstance and lying-in-wait murder because the former requires an 
intent to kill, while the latter does not.  (Ceja, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1140, fn. 2; 
Webster, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 448.)  Thus, any overlap between the elements of 
lying in wait in both contexts does not undermine the narrowing function of the 
special circumstance.  (See Sims, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 434; see also Catlin, supra, 
26 Cal.4th at pp. 158-159.)   
Defendant further contends that “[i]f the temporal element is . . . equivalent 
to that of first degree murder,” the “requirement of a ‘substantial period of 
watching and waiting’ is a confusing, contradictory and unnecessary addition to 
the instruction,” making the instruction “incorrect on a material point,” and results 
in the concept of lying in wait being defined in the instruction in materially 
different ways.  We disagree with these assertions, and conclude the instruction is 
internally consistent.  The instruction requires a period of time long enough to 
show a “state of mind equivalent to premeditation or deliberation.”  (See ante, p. 
21, fn. 10.)  This formulation describes the durational requirement of the special 
circumstance, which is demonstrated by a substantial period of watching and 
waiting during which the defendant is physically concealed or conceals his 
purpose.   
 
26
5.  Alleged prosecutorial misconduct 
Defendant alleges the prosecutor committed misconduct when he tried to 
prevent the jury from returning second degree murder convictions.  During voir 
dire, the trial court explained that the jury would only reach a penalty phase if it 
found that defendant was guilty of first degree murder and that a special 
circumstance was true.  Prospective jurors were also told that while deliberating in 
the guilt phase, they could not consider or discuss the subject of punishment in any 
way.   
In his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor addressed defense counsel’s 
contention that the August murder was no more than second degree.  After 
discussing the relevant legal principles, and the evidence showing that defendant 
premeditated and deliberated, the prosecutor said, “Now, why go through all of 
this?  The court is going to instruct you you’re not to consider penalty in this phase 
of the trial.  I mean, in the back of your heads you all know if we do certain things, 
we might be talking about whether he should live or die, and you’re not supposed 
to consider that in deciding whether he’s guilty of any of these crimes.  In any of 
the special circumstance clauses, you’re supposed to separate that and you all said 
you could do it.  And while you’re not supposed to consider penalty and 
punishment, [defense counsel] and [defendant] certainly are thinking about it.  
And what happens when you say these are all murders?  No doubt about it.  All of 
the attempted murders, they’re all attempted murders, no doubt about it.  Yeah, but 
they’re only second degree murders.  What happens if they’re second degree 
murders?  You can never find him guilty of the special circumstance.  And they 
save his life or at least save --”   
Following defense counsel’s objection, the trial court said, “Ladies and 
gentlemen, as I’ve indicated to you previously, the statements of the attorneys and 
argument are not evidence as you know with regard to the law.  At the conclusion 
 
27
of the arguments I will be instructing you as to the law that is applicable to this 
case.  With regard to the last comment, I will direct you to disregard it.”  The jury 
was subsequently instructed not to consider penalty or punishment in its 
deliberations.   
There is no reasonable likelihood the remark misled the jury as to whether it 
could consider punishment in its guilt deliberations.  (People v. Samayoa (1997) 
15 Cal.4th 795, 842-843 (Samayoa).)  As the high court has stated, “arguments of 
counsel generally carry less weight with a jury than do instructions from the court.  
The former are usually billed in advance to the jury as matters of argument, not 
evidence [citation], and are likely viewed as the statements of advocates; the latter, 
we have often recognized, are viewed as definitive and binding statements of the 
law.”  (Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 384 (Boyde).)   
Moreover, while defendant relies on People v. Holt (1984) 37 Cal.3d 436 
(Holt), to assert the reference to punishment was prejudicial, Holt is 
distinguishable.  There, the trial court did not immediately admonish the jury 
following the prosecutor’s remark that accepting defendant’s theory would 
guarantee Holt a parole date.  (Id. at pp. 457-458.)  Rather than disapproving the 
argument, it said, “ ‘I wouldn’t talk any more about that.’ ”  (Id. at p. 458.)  Here, 
in addition to the court’s immediate intervention and disapproval, the jury had 
already been properly informed that a penalty phase would follow only if 
defendant was convicted of first degree murder and a special circumstance was 
found true.  Nothing in Holt indicates that the jury there had been similarly 
informed.  Moreover, the Holt court did not find prejudice based solely on the 
prosecutor’s argument.  Rather, it reversed for cumulative prejudice based on 
several errors including the objectionable argument.  (Id. at pp. 458-459.)   
In addition to these factors which distinguish this case from Holt, after 
argument the jury here was instructed, as was the jury in Holt,  “In your 
 
28
deliberations the subject of penalty or punishment is not to be discussed or 
considered by you.  That is a matter which must not in any way affect your verdict 
or affect your finding as to the special circumstance[s] charged in this case.”  
(Holt, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 458, fn. 16.)  We presume the jury followed that 
instruction.  (See, e.g., People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 684.)   
 
C.  Penalty Phase 
 
1.  Alleged Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Defendant also alleges numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct at the 
penalty phase.  There was no prejudicial misconduct either as to individual claims 
or collectively. 
First, defendant contends the prosecutor ignored the trial court’s ruling on the 
scope of victim impact evidence.  The trial court directed that August’s girlfriend, 
Linda Leach, not mention “feelings of personal guilt.”   
Defendant objects to Leach’s testimony in response to the prosecutor’s 
question “When did you last see him?”  Leach said she and August saw each other 
every day.  She had a company function on the night August was murdered, and 
he had not felt comfortable leaving without knowing Linda arrived home safely.  
These statements do not violate the trial court’s order, and certainly the 
prosecutor’s question would not be expected to elicit inappropriate testimony.   
The trial court sustained objections to and struck Leach’s volunteered 
testimony that “I still feel a lot of guilt about the fact that he was leaving my 
house” and “we should have followed the news stories.  We should have known 
that he should not have been on the road.”  We need not consider the correctness 
of the trial court’s ruling regarding reference to feelings of personal guilt.  Neither 
of Leach’s statements were elicited by the prosecutor, and the jury was told to 
disregard them.   
 
29
Defendant asserts without elaboration that “[a] similar pattern occurred with 
Laquann Sloan’s mother,” and defense counsel was “forced to object 
repeatedly . . ., as he was again with Lori Rochon’s sister, Karen Adams . . . .”  We 
have examined the questioning of these witnesses, and see no misconduct.   
Next, defendant asserts prosecutorial misconduct when Leslie Noyer’s 
mother picked up and kissed a photograph of her daughter as she left the witness 
stand.  Defendant moved for a mistrial.  The prosecutor said that the incident “was 
totally, from my perspective, spontaneous.  It was something that I did not 
anticipate occurring at all. . . . [T]he act of the kissing of the photograph was 
something that took us all by surprise.”  Defense counsel said, “He knows or 
didn’t know.  I would assume he didn’t know it was going to happen. . . .  I don’t 
think that’s an issue . . . I’m not alleging any kind of misconduct.”   
The court denied the motion.  It found that counsel had acted in good faith.  It 
noted that the photograph “was in a position that was out of the line of sight of the 
witness as she was being examined by [the prosecutor], and it’s a location in the 
structure of this courtroom where exhibits throughout the course of this trial over 
the many weeks have been placed when they have not been utilized by a particular 
witness.”   
By expressly asserting below he was not alleging “any kind of misconduct,” 
defendant clearly has waived any challenge on appeal.  Moreover, no misconduct 
is demonstrated.  Nor, to the extent defendant asserts the claim, did the trial court 
err in denying the mistrial motion.  The case law is clear that victim-impact 
testimony is relevant and admissible.  When family and friends of murder victims 
are asked to come into court to testify about their bereavement, the situation is an 
emotionally charged one.  The mother’s grief at losing her daughter was a normal 
human emotion the jury would assume she experienced.  Kissing her daughter’s 
photograph, while not appropriate, gave the jury no new or impermissible 
 
30
information, and was not so inflammatory it would “divert the jury’s attention 
from its proper role” or invite a purely irrational response.  (People v. Taylor 
(2001) 26 Cal.4th 1155, 1172.)   
Next, defendant contends the prosecutor tried to undermine the trial court’s 
ruling regarding what the prosecution asserted was defendant’s “scorecard.”  The 
court admitted an envelope with handwritten references apparently to Penal and 
Vehicle Code sections, with numbers next to these sections.  (See ante, p. 4.)  The 
court excluded a notation on the envelope to “190  Ø.”  The prosecution’s theory 
was that this was a reference to section 190, delineating punishment for murder, 
and in his view indicated a plan to kill a police officer.   
During his cross-examination of Dr. Kormos regarding the envelope, the 
prosecutor said, “Let’s assume if there is another element on that score card . . . 
that indicated an intent to murder a police officer—”  The court sustained defense 
counsel’s objection, and subsequently stated, “There’s been no answer to the 
question.  The question is to go out.  The jury is to disregard it.”   
Even assuming the prosecutor’s question was improper, there is no 
reasonable likelihood it misled the jury as to evidence of defendant’s intent to 
murder a police officer.  (Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 842-843.)  No 
evidence of such a plan or attempt was introduced.  Indeed, the prosecutor never 
finished the question, so the jury had no idea what point he was trying to make.  In 
addition, the jury was promptly reminded the question had not been answered, and 
they were to disregard it.  For these reasons, and to the extent defendant raises the 
claim, the trial court did not err in denying his subsequent motion for mistrial 
based on this aborted and stricken question.   
Next, defendant contends the prosecutor engaged in several instances of 
misconduct during closing argument.  The prosecutor said, “The difficulty in this 
case is not whether the death penalty is justified and warranted here.  The 
 
31
difficulty is whether all 12 of you have the internal fortitude to impose the death 
penalty on that man over there.  It’s not easy.  It’s not easy.  And as [defense 
counsel] in his opening statement alluded to, all it takes is one, one of you to block 
a death verdict in this jury.  And that’s what he wants, just one of you, because we 
have to have a unanimous verdict for a death verdict.  All 12 of you have to agree 
on that.  And if you don’t and you hang, we do it again with another jury.”  
Defense counsel objected, and the jury was told to disregard “the last comment.”   
While defendant notes he objected to and brought an unsuccessful mistrial 
motion regarding the last comment, he challenges on appeal only the “internal 
fortitude” aspect of the prosecutor’s statement.  This claim is forfeited because 
defendant did not object on this ground at trial.  It is also meritless.   
Relying on United States v. Young (1985) 470 U.S. 1, 18, defendant contends 
that statements regarding the jury’s “internal fortitude” were improper.  Young 
involved the guilt, not penalty, phase of a criminal trial.  (Id. at pp. 3-6.)  
Moreover, the high court found that, in context, the prosecutor’s comment that the 
jury “ ‘do its job,’ ” while misconduct, did not influence the jury “to stray from its 
responsibility to be fair and unbiased.”  (Id. at p. 18, fn. omitted.)  Here, the 
prosecutor’s argument merely acknowledged the inherent difficulty in sentencing 
to death a person sitting in front of the jury.  The argument was proper.  (People v. 
Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 185.)   
Without further elaboration, defendant next contends the prosecutor “went 
too far” when he said, “When we talk about this personality disorder, what is the 
one thing we know we can say for sure?  Just the testimony and the work of Dr. 
Kormos tallies up to $14,250.  And what do you get for your money?  Nothing.  
Nothing.  Not one ounce of it explains why he’s where he is today.  Not one piece 
of it gives you anything about his character or his background that causes you any 
sympathy, to lend out any compassion to give a grant of mercy and spare his life.  
 
32
$14,250, and that’s just Dr. Kormos.  What have the other doctors cost?  Gretchen 
White?  We know that she saw him a number of times.  Dr. Kaufman and 
Shonkoff, they saw him in April of 1991, saw him three times.  What do they 
cost?”  Defense counsel objected, and the court told the jury it would be 
instructing it as to the law at the conclusion of argument.   
Shortly after the challenged comment, the prosecutor said without objection, 
“the significance of the amount of money involved here illustrates that when the 
man’s life is on the line, we are not going to be stingy, we’ll give them those 
resources.  See if you can find something.  We’ll give them to you.  You need 
some bucks, $14,000 for Dr. Kormos?  Fine, go ahead.  You need some tests 
done?  Fine, go ahead.  We are not going to deny somebody a test that might 
provide something that might cause sympathy, compassion for him.  But when all 
is said and done, it still comes up to a big zero.”  In context, the comment simply 
reflects permissible argument that, despite being given significant resources, 
defendant’s psychiatric consultants were unable to marshal any credible reason to 
explain or mitigate defendant’s murderous behavior.  Moreover, the trial court’s 
later instructions made clear what factors the jury could consider.   
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct when he said, 
“Now, who haven’t you heard from?  Who are some people that you would have 
expected to have heard from that you haven’t heard from?  [Defense counsel], in 
his opening statement to you, said the defendant doesn’t have any family.  He’s an 
orphan.  He doesn’t have anyone to speak for him.  Well, that’s not correct.  We 
know that his father died last summer.  We know that.  But you know, . . . there 
are ways of preserving the testimony of witnesses who are ill, and who are elderly.  
You videotape their testimony and present it here.  The defendant’s father could 
have spoken to you.”  Defense counsel objected, stating in part, “Counsel knows I 
made a motion trying to do that and he was not in any condition to do that.”  The 
 
33
prosecutor responded, “Well, I disagree with that.  And counsel says he doesn’t 
like to speak, but that’s a total lie.”  The trial court instructed the jury to disregard 
the prosecutor’s last comment, and said, “I’ve told you repeatedly that with regard 
to the arguments of counsel, the arguments of counsel are not evidence in this 
case.”   
Defendant concedes the reasons why the examination of defendant’s father 
“was apparently not done are not readily discernible from the record.”  The fact 
that he did not appear, and was an obvious witness to rebut the People’s or 
corroborate defendant’s penalty case, was fair comment on the evidence by the 
prosecutor.  (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 670 (Lewis).)   
Relying on People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, defendant also 
asserts that the prosecutor’s argument was a violation of the work product 
privilege.  Coddington held that a “party’s decision that an expert who has been 
consulted should not be called to testify is within the privilege.”  (Id. at p. 606.)  
Whatever the continuing efficacy of Coddington in the context of expert witnesses 
(see People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 238 (conc. opn. of Baxter, J.); id. at p. 
238 (conc. opn. of Chin, J.), it has long been established that a prosecutor may 
comment on the absence of logical witnesses to rebut the People’s or corroborate 
defendant’s case.  (People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 403; Lewis, supra, 
25 Cal.4th at p. 670; People v. Szeto (1981) 29 Cal.3d 20, 34; People v. Vargas 
(1973) 9 Cal.3d 470, 475; see People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 552-553.)  
Nor, as defendant contends, was he “sentenced to death ‘on the basis of 
information which he had no opportunity to explain or deny.’ ”  Indeed, defense 
counsel gave an explanation in his objection to the prosecutor’s argument.   
Defendant next objects to the prosecutor’s related comment regarding 
defendant’s sister and half sister, “And why weren’t Gina and Sylvia called?  Two 
logical inferences.  One, they didn’t want to testify to why—”  The trial court 
 
34
sustained defense counsel’s objection “as to the beginning of that last part.”  The 
prosecutor continued, “If they had anything positive, constructive to say to wring 
from you compassion and show you a basis of having sympathy and a basis for 
mercy to be given to this man, you would have heard it.”  The trial court overruled 
defense counsel’s ensuing objection.   
As to the first comment, the record does not reflect what the comment would 
have been.  Even assuming it was inappropriate, the objection operated precisely 
as it was supposed to, and the jury never heard the comment.  We reject 
defendant’s assertion the second comment was misconduct for the same reasons it 
was not misconduct to comment on the absence of defendant’s father.   
Defendant asserts misconduct in the prosecutor’s statement, “You know, I 
wonder if Dr. Kormos had the misfortune of having a loved one who violated the 
law—”  Defense counsel objected, and the trial court said, “All right.  Move into 
another argument . . . .”  This claim is forfeited for failure to seek an admonition.  
It is also meritless.  Other than quoting the statement, defendant provides no 
reason why it was improper or how he was prejudiced.  It is not even clear what 
the prosecutor was attempting to say.  No misconduct is apparent.   
Finally, defendant challenges the prosecutor’s comment, “[T]his is my last 
chance to talk to you.  And I was wondering what Leslie, Lori, Laquann, and 
Raymond would say to you if they had the chance to tell you what happened to 
them.  And maybe I’ve been in this case too long, but I felt last night that I did 
have a conversation with them.  And in that conversation, Leslie said to me, ‘You 
know, his attorney --’ ”  The trial court sustained defense counsel’s objection.   
The claim is waived on appeal by the failure to request an admonition.  
Moreover, the line of questioning was ended by defense objection, and defendant 
makes no attempt to explain how the partial statement was improper or prejudicial.   
 
 
35
2.  Constitutionality of Death Penalty Statute 
Defendant makes numerous claims that the death statute violates the United 
States Constitution.  We conclude they are not individually, or cumulatively, 
meritorious.   
Section 190.2 is not impermissibly broad in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.  In particular here, the multiple-murder and 
lying-in-wait special circumstances adequately narrow the class of murderers 
subject to the death penalty.  (People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 127; People 
v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1217 (Box).)   
Section 190.3, factor (a), which allows the jury to consider “[t]he 
circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present 
proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true 
pursuant to Section 190.1,” does not violate due process and the Eighth 
Amendment because those circumstances differ from case to case.  (Tuilaepa v. 
California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975-976; Schmeck, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 304.)   
The death statute does not allow for arbitrary and capricious sentencing, or 
deprive a defendant of the right to a jury trial on each element of a capital crime, 
in violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.  In particular, these 
constitutional provisions are not violated when a jury is not required to find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors, 
that death is the appropriate sentence, or that an aggravating factor (except for 
other crimes) is true.  (People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 971-972 (Cox).)   
Nor is there merit to defendant’s alternative claim that a preponderance of the 
evidence standard of proof is compelled for the findings that an aggravating factor 
exists, that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, and that death 
is the appropriate sentence.  The jury was instructed that “[t]o return a judgment of 
death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so 
 
36
substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death 
instead of life without parole.”  That instruction is sufficient.  (Tuilaepa v. 
California, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 979; Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1216.)  “Unlike 
the guilt determination, ‘the sentencing function is inherently moral and 
normative, not factual’ [citation] and, hence, not susceptible to a burden-of-proof 
quantification.”  (People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 79.)   
The Constitution does not require that a jury make written findings regarding 
aggravating factors, or reach unanimity as to which aggravating evidence is true.  
Nothing in Cunningham v. California (2007) __ U.S. __ [127 S. Ct. 856], 
Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, or Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 
584, affects our conclusions in this regard.  (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 
1121, 1297-1298; Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 971-972; People v. Prieto (2003) 
30 Cal.4th 226, 263, 275.)   
The death statute does not violate defendant’s right to due process or his state 
or federal right to equal protection.  “[C]apital and noncapital defendants are not 
similarly situated and therefore may be treated differently without violating 
constitutional guarantees of equal protection of the laws or due process of law.”  
(People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 590 (Manriquez).) 
The failure to require intercase proportionality does not guarantee “arbitrary, 
discriminatory, or disproportionate impositions of the death penalty,” or violate 
the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.  (Pulley v. Harris (1984) 
465 U.S. 37, 50-51; Cox, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 970.)  Contrary to defendant’s 
claim, “use of unadjudicated criminal activity during the penalty phase is 
permissible,” and does not violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  (Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1217.)  The trial court is not required 
to delineate which factors are mitigating or aggravating.  (Manriquez, supra, 37 
Cal.4th at p. 590.)   
 
37
The use of the words “extreme” in section 190.3, factors (d) and (g), and 
“substantial” in factor (g), does not render these factors unconstitutionally vague, 
arbitrary, or capricious, act as a barrier to the consideration of mitigating evidence, 
or violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.  Factor (k), as 
expanded in the instructions here pursuant to People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 
858, allowed consideration of “any other circumstance which extenuates the 
gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime and any 
sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s character or record that the 
defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to 
the offense for which he is on trial.”  (Id. at p. 878, fn. 10; Schmeck, supra, 37 
Cal.4th at p. 305; see Ayers v. Belmontes (2006) __ U.S. __ [127 S.Ct. 469, 475]; 
Boyde, supra, 494 U.S. at pp. 381-382.)   
We reject defendant’s argument that the death penalty statute is contrary to 
international norms of humanity and decency, and therefore violates the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments.  Defendant points to no authority that “prohibit[s] a 
sentence of death rendered in accordance with state and federal constitutional and 
statutory requirements.”  (Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 511.) 
 
38
III. DISPOSITION 
The judgment is affirmed. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J. 
 
Like Justice Moreno, who dissents from affirmance of the lying-in-wait 
special-circumstance finding (conc. & dis. opn. of Moreno, J., post), I am 
concerned at the potential breadth of that special circumstance.  In light of our 
holdings that the special circumstance (set out in Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. 
(a)(15)) does not require physical concealment but only “concealment of purpose, 
coupled with a surprise attack from a position of advantage” (People v. Morales 
(1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 556), and that the period of watchful waiting involved need 
be only so long “ ‘as to show a state of mind equivalent to premeditation or 
deliberation’ ” (People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 433-434), the concept of 
lying in wait threatens to become so expansive as to eliminate any meaningful 
distinction between defendants rendered eligible for the death penalty by the 
special circumstance and those who have “merely” committed first degree 
premeditated murder. 
I do not believe, however, the special circumstance must or should be 
construed so broadly as to pose a constitutional problem.  In order to find the 
evidence of lying in wait sufficient in this case, particularly, we need not 
understand concealment of purpose to mean simply that defendant did not 
announce his intent before killing the victim.  This case, like Morales, involves 
active deceit as to purpose—a misrepresentation or ruse that lulls the victim into a 
false sense of security.  In Morales, one of the murderers lured the victim into his 
 
2 
car on the pretext of a shopping trip.  (People v. Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at 
p. 554; see also People v. Sims, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 433 [sufficient evidence to 
support lying-in-wait special circumstance where murderers lured pizza delivery 
man to motel room by pretext of ordering pizza].)  In the case at bench, defendant 
similarly employed a ruse—gesturing and smiling as he pulled alongside the 
victim, Raymond August—to induce August to slow his vehicle so that defendant 
could shoot him.  (Or so the jury could infer from the testimony of eyewitness 
Rodney Stokes.)  Defendant’s conduct was distinct from ordinary premeditated 
murder not merely because he did not warn the victim of his murderous intent, but 
because he actively concealed it by his deceitful behavior. 
In my view, this is a meaningful distinction, one on which the voters could 
have reasonably relied in approving the special circumstance law.  Those who 
conceal from the victim their intent to kill by deceit or ruse could reasonably be 
regarded as more culpable than those who do not do so; deceitful behavior is 
traditionally and rationally condemned.  Perhaps more to the point, an aspiring 
murderer who lures his victim into a vulnerable position and then launches a 
surprise attack is particularly likely to succeed, and hence is particularly 
dangerous.  As the penal law is meant to deter, the special circumstance is not 
irrational in selecting especially dangerous behavior for special punishment. 
Considering defendant’s employment of a ruse, moreover, sufficient 
evidence supports the finding that he watched and waited for his opportunity to 
kill August for a substantial period.  Though he took only a few seconds to 
prepare to shoot August, defendant used that time, as the majority explains, “to 
implement his plan of luring a victim of opportunity into a vulnerable position by 
creating . . . a false sense of security.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 23.)  Brief though it 
was, the period of watching and waiting here was substantial in that it allowed 
defendant to implement a critical step in his plan of attack. 
 
3 
Wary as I am of affirming a finding on an overbroad lying-in-wait special 
circumstance, therefore, I conclude that here, without adopting an unconstitutional 
construction, the majority properly holds the finding supported by substantial 
evidence.   
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J.   
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY KENNARD, J. 
 
 
The concurring and dissenting opinion by Justice Moreno concludes that 
the lying-in-wait special circumstance, as this court has construed it, does not 
perform the narrowing function required by the federal Constitution’s Eighth 
Amendment to distinguish from other murders those killings that are so heinous as 
to warrant the death penalty.  At one time I expressed similar concerns.  (People 
v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1146-1147 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.).)  Since 
then, however, I have come to the conclusion that the lying-in-wait special 
circumstance does not violate the federal Constitution.  (People v. Jurado (2006) 
38 Cal.4th 72, 145-147 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.).)  On this point, therefore, I 
disagree with Justice Moreno.  But I share his view that the trial court in this case 
erred in instructing the jury that to find true the special circumstance allegation of 
lying in wait, it need only find that the lying in wait continued for the length of 
time necessary “to show a state of mind equivalent to premeditation or 
deliberation.”  Because that error was prejudicial, this court should vacate the 
lying-in-wait special circumstance found by the jury in this case. 
Under California’s death penalty law, murder intentionally committed by 
lying in wait is a special circumstance warranting the death penalty, but those who 
commit premeditated and deliberate murder are not subject to the death penalty 
unless there is also a special circumstance finding.  This distinction suggests that 
when the voters in 1978, through the power of initiative, enacted California’s 
 
2 
death penalty law, they regarded murder by lying in wait as more heinous than 
premeditated murder, and they intended to define murder by lying in wait in a 
manner that differed significantly from premeditated murder.  To give effect to 
that distinction, this court in People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, held that the 
lying-in-wait special circumstance requires “a substantial period of watching and 
waiting for an opportune time to act.”  (Id. at p. 557, italics added.)  A murder 
committed after a substantial period of watchful waiting demonstrates a degree of 
callousness and coldbloodedness exceeding that of an “ordinary” premeditated 
killing, where the murderer’s requisite reflection and consideration of 
consequences may occur in a very short time.  (See People v. Lenart (2004) 32 
Cal.4th 1107, 1127 [“Premeditation and deliberation do not require much time 
[citation], for ‘ “[t]houghts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, 
calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly.” ’ ”].) 
Thereafter, in People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, this court upheld a jury 
instruction stating that the waiting period required for the lying-in-wait special 
circumstance “need not continue for any particular period of time provided that its 
duration is such as to show a state of mind equivalent to premeditation or 
deliberation.”  (Id. at pp. 433-434.)  As Justice Moreno’s concurring and 
dissenting opinion in this case points out, Sims undercuts this court’s earlier 
requirement in People v. Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at page 557, that the period of 
watchful waiting be “substantial.”  (Conc. & dis. opn. of Moreno, J., post, at p. 6.)   
In Sims, I wrote separately, disagreeing with the majority’s discussion of 
three issues unrelated to lying in wait, a topic that my separate opinion in Sims did 
not address.  (People v. Sims, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 467-471.)  On reflection, I 
now conclude that the Sims majority was also wrong in departing from this court’s 
earlier holding in People v. Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at page 557, that the lying-
in-wait special circumstance requires a “substantial” period of watchful waiting.  I 
 
3 
therefore agree with Justice Moreno (conc. & dis. opn. of Moreno, J., post, at 
pp. 13-14) that the trial court here erred by giving the same jury instruction that 
this court upheld in Sims:  that to find the lying-in-wait special circumstance true, 
the jury need only find that the defendant waited for a period of time sufficient to 
show “a state of mind equivalent to premeditation or deliberation.”  I hasten to add 
that the giving of that jury instruction in this case was understandable in light of its 
express approval by the majority in Sims.  For the reasons given by Justice 
Moreno (conc. & dis. opn. of Moreno, J., post, at pp. 14-15), the error requires 
reversal of the jury’s special circumstance finding of lying in wait, but it does not 
require reversal of the judgment of death because the jury found the existence of 
another special circumstance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY MORENO, J. 
 
 
I agree that defendant Charles Stevens’s death judgment should be 
affirmed.  I would, however, reverse the lying-in-wait special circumstance 
because the imposition on defendant of that circumstance, as interpreted by this 
court and applied in this case, violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  Unfortunately, the meaning and significance of this circumstance 
has not been interpreted with sufficient intellectual rigor, notwithstanding the fact 
that its application in a given case may mean the difference between life and 
death. 
I. 
The jury found true the lying-in-wait special circumstance in connection with 
the Raymond August murder.  As recounted in the majority opinion, defendant, 
driving a white Mazda on Interstate 580 in Oakland, first pulled alongside Rodney 
Stokes, prompting Stokes to slow down and lower his window to see if he knew 
the driver.  Defendant motioned as though trying to get Stokes’s attention, and 
smiled at him.  Defendant then shot at Stokes several times, but missed him.  After 
that, Stokes saw defendant catch up to another car on the freeway and appear to 
essentially repeat the same modus operandi:  “Stokes testified defendant ‘g[o]t the 
attention of the other driver’ because both sets of brake lights came on.  Stokes 
lost sight of the cars for a brief moment, which he characterized as ‘the snap of a 
finger.’  After rounding a slight turn, Stokes saw the cars again, and heard at least 
 
2 
two gunshots.  Defendant rapidly drove to the 35th Avenue off-ramp, left the 
freeway, and drove onto another on-ramp that entered the freeway going the 
opposite direction.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 3.) 
In denying defendant’s claim that there was insufficient evidence of the 
lying-in-wait special circumstance, the majority first clarified its conception of the 
requirement for proving such a crime.  “At the time of the capital crimes, the 
elements of the lying-in-wait special circumstance required an intentional murder; 
committed under circumstances that included a concealment of purpose; a 
substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time to act; and, 
immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim from a position 
of advantage.  (Former Pen. Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(15);[1] People v. Morales 
(1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 557.)  The purpose of the watching and waiting element is 
to distinguish those cases in which a defendant acts insidiously from those in 
which he acts out of rash impulse.  (See People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 24 
(Moon).)”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 21-22, fn. omitted.) 
Applying this definition of the lying-in-wait special circumstance to the 
present case, the majority states: “The facts of this case and the jury’s conclusion 
that defendant acted with deliberation and premeditation dispel any inference that 
he killed as a result of rash impulse.  Even a short period of watching and waiting 
can negate such an inference.  (Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 24.)  The facts here 
are more than sufficient to establish that after the assault on Stokes, defendant 
turned his attention to a new target.  He selected August, the driver of the only 
other nearby car on the road ahead of him, as his next victim.  He approached and 
concealed his deadly purpose by pulling up along side of August and induced him 
                                              
1 
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated. 
 
3 
to slow down.  August did so, just as Stokes had.  This process may not have taken 
an extended period, because defendant did not have to wait long until his next 
target became available.  But there is no indication of rash impulse.  To the 
contrary, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that defendant acted to 
implement his plan of luring a victim of opportunity into a vulnerable position by 
creating or exploiting a false sense of security.  The jury could also reasonably 
conclude that August was taken by surprise.  He did not flee, but slowed down and 
drove side-by-side with defendant, just as Stokes had done.  Once the intended 
victim slowed down, the time to act became opportune.  Defendant stopped 
watching and started shooting.  Such behavior is completely consistent with, and 
provides substantial evidence for, the watching and waiting element of the lying-
in-wait special circumstance.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 23-24.) 
II. 
Lying in wait, as a principle in criminal law, began as a 14th century statute 
denying to the Crown the right to pardon any person who killed “while lying in 
wait” for his victim.  This statute apparently arose as a reaction by the Norman 
conquerors of England against the subjugated Anglo-Saxons’ practice of killing 
the Normans by ambush.  (Note, Criminal Law: Homicide: Murder Committed by 
Lying in Wait (1954) 42 Cal. L.Rev. 337.)  It evolved into a form of first degree 
murder, incorporated into Penal Code section 189, and, as explained below, was 
used as an alternative means of proving that the defendant premeditated or 
deliberated before the murder.  (Note, supra, at pp. 340-341; see People v. Thomas 
(1953) 41 Cal.2d 470, 481 (conc. opn. of Traynor, J.).) 
Lying in wait took on a different use when it was incorporated as a special 
circumstance into the 1978 death penalty statute together with other forms of first 
degree murder in existence at the time, such as murder by torture or by a 
destructive device.  This death penalty statute provided that a defendant must be 
 
4 
sentenced to death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole if the 
“defendant intentionally killed the victim while lying in wait.”  (§ 190.2, subd. 
(a)(15), as added by Prop. 7, approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978).)  “In 
this setting, lying in wait is not a means of proving premeditation in order to show 
the murder is one of the first degree.  To the contrary, the murder must already 
have been found to be first degree before the jury reaches the question of special 
circumstance.  [¶]  Instead, the special circumstance of lying in wait serves — and 
to be constitutional, must serve — a different purpose: it must provide a 
‘ “ ‘meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] 
is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.’ ” ’  (Godfrey v. Georgia (1980) 
446 U.S. 420, 427.)”  (People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 465 (conc. & dis. 
opn. of Broussard, J.).) 
This court has failed to interpret the lying-in-wait special circumstance to 
serve that narrowing function.  In People v. Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d 527, 555 
(Morales), we made clear that lying in wait within the meaning of the special 
circumstance statute did not require actual physical concealment, but only 
concealment of purpose.  At the same time, the Morales court rejected a 
constitutional challenge to this interpretation of the lying-in-wait special-
circumstance statute.  “[W]e do not mean to suggest that a mere concealment of 
purpose is sufficient to establish lying in wait — many ‘routine’ murders are 
accomplished by such means, and the constitutional considerations raised by 
defendant might well prevent treating the commission of such murders as a special 
circumstance justifying the death penalty.  But we believe that an intentional 
murder, committed under circumstances which include (1) a concealment of 
purpose, (2) a substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time to 
act, and (3) immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim 
from a position of advantage, presents a factual matrix sufficiently distinct from 
 
5 
‘ordinary’ premeditated murder to justify treating it as a special circumstance.”  
(Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 557.) 
Although the court acknowledged that concealment of purpose alone would 
not distinguish lying-in-wait murder from ordinary murder, it quickly became 
clear that the second requirement of the lying-in-wait special circumstance, the 
substantial period of watching and waiting, also did not distinguish it from 
“ordinary” premeditated murder.  We subsequently approved the lying-in-wait 
special-circumstance instruction that included the following, taken from the lying-
in-wait murder instruction: “ ‘The lying in wait need not continue for any 
particular period of time provided that its duration is such as to show a state of 
mind equivalent to premeditation or deliberation . . . .”  (People v. Sims (1993) 5 
Cal.4th 405, 433-434.)  As the majority affirms in the present case, “[t]he purpose 
of the watching and waiting element is to distinguish those cases in which a 
defendant acts insidiously from those in which he acts out of rash impulse.”  (Maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 22.) 
This dictum that the lying-in-wait period be equivalent to premeditation and 
deliberation apparently entered the jury instruction on lying-in-wait murder via 
Justice Traynor’s concurring opinion in People v. Thomas, supra, 41 Cal.2d 470, 
475.)  Justice Traynor viewed as erroneous the then current lying-in-wait murder 
instruction, which stated that “ ‘Where the killing is by “lying in wait,” and the act 
causing death was intentional, it is murder of the first degree, whether the killing 
was intentional or unintentional, as in such case it is not necessary that there exist 
in the mind of the perpetrator an intent to kill.’ ”  (Id., at p. 476.)  His concern was 
that a jury receiving the above instruction could convict someone who had 
unintentionally killed a person after a period of lying in wait, even though the 
person’s actions would not rise to the level of murder, as in the case of the person 
who lies in wait merely intending to surprise a person who then has a heart attack.  
 
6 
(Thomas, supra, 41 Cal.2d at pp. 478-479.)  Because section 189 provides that 
first degree murder will be found for murder perpetuated by various means, 
including lying in wait “ ‘or any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated 
killing’ ” (41 Cal.2d at p. 477), Justice Traynor concluded:  “There must . . . be 
substantial evidence of a long enough period of waiting and watching in 
concealment to show a state of mind equivalent to premeditation and deliberation 
before the court can properly give an instruction on lying in wait. . . . . Otherwise a 
killing that was the result of a rash impulse would be converted into first degree 
murder.”  (Id. at p. 481 (conc. opn. of Traynor, J.).) 
Thus, the language in the lying-in-wait special-circumstance jury 
instruction equating the period of lying in wait with a period of premeditation and 
deliberation was designed to ensure that the person lying in wait was guilty of 
murder.  Morales’s dictum that there must be a “substantial period of watching 
and waiting” was intended to differentiate lying-in-wait special-circumstance 
murder from “ ‘ordinary’ ” premeditated murder.  (Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at 
p. 557.)  The two instructions thus pull in different directions, with the former 
modifying and cancelling out the latter, so that the “substantial period of watching 
and waiting” as interpreted in Morales has become no more than the watching and 
waiting needed to establish the premeditation and deliberation required in 
“ordinary” premeditated murder.2 
What then is left of lying in wait if neither Morales’s factor (1), 
concealment of purpose, nor factor (2), a substantial period of watching and 
waiting, actually distinguishes lying in wait from ordinary first degree murder?  
                                              
2 
I note that the jury was instructed in the present case that “[t]he lying in 
wait need not continue for any particular period of time provided that its duration 
is such as to show a state of mind equivalent to premeditation or deliberation.”  
 
7 
The third factor is to initiate, immediately after the watching and waiting, “a 
surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage.”  
(Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 557.)  But concealing murderous intent and 
launching a surprise attack from a position of advantage are not two distinct 
factors distinguishing lying-in-wait murder, but one circumstance — almost 
invariably, one conceals a murderous intent in order to gain advantage over the 
victim.  According to this court’s jurisprudence, then, the lying-in-wait special 
circumstance, which requires neither lying nor waiting, is nothing more than 
murder by surprise, and I will refer to it as such for the duration of the discussion. 
Is murder by surprise a constitutionally valid special circumstance? Since 
Morales, this court has routinely rejected the notion that the lying-in-wait special 
circumstance is unconstitutional, relying on cases that ultimately can be traced 
back to Morales (see, e.g., Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 44), not acknowledging 
that Morales’s constitutional justification for that special circumstance is built on 
sand.  The single most comprehensive judicial effort to constitutionally defend the 
lying-in-wait special circumstance is to be found in Morales v. Woodford (9th Cir. 
2004) 388 F.3d 1159.  In that case, the Ninth Circuit panel, over a vigorous 
dissent, upheld a facial challenge to the special circumstance.  The majority 
opinion in that case proceeded with the following syllogism.  Its major premise 
was that “a circumstance that makes one eligible for the death penalty must meet 
two requirements to satisfy the Eighth Amendment” (id. at p. 1174) and then 
quoted the United States Supreme Court in Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 
967, 972 (Tuilaepa):  “ ‘First, the circumstance may not apply to every defendant 
convicted of a murder; it must apply only to a sub-class of defendants convicted of 
murder.  Second, the aggravating circumstance may not be unconstitutionally 
vague.’ ” 
 
8 
Next, in establishing its minor premise, the Ninth Circuit majority reasoned 
that lying in wait applies only to a subclass of defendants convicted of murder and 
that it is not unconstitutionally vague.  As to the former point, it stated:  “To 
illustrate a non-lying-in-wait murder:  a sadistic person who wants the victim to 
know what is coming, and who has no doubt of his ability to accomplish the 
crime, may confront the victim face to face, say ‘I’m going to kill you,’ and do so.  
Or a person intending to kill another may threaten the victim, travel armed, and 
when he spots his intended victim by chance, approach him and shoot him face to 
face.  Or, not uncommonly, the loser of a bar fight may say ‘I’m going to kill you,’ 
go to his car or his home and get a gun, come back to the bar, confront the victim 
saying ‘now I’m going to kill you,’ and do so.  Even under the California Supreme 
Court’s liberal interpretations of lying in wait, these hypothetical first-degree 
murders would not merit the special circumstance.”  (Morales v. Woodford, supra, 
388 F.3d at p. 1175.)  Moreover, relying on a previous case, Houston v. Roe (9th 
Cir. 1999) 177 F.3d 901, 907-908, the court held that the special circumstance was 
not unconstitutionally vague because it “ ‘created a thin but meaningfully 
distinguishable line between first degree murder lying in wait and special 
circumstances lying in wait.’ ”  (Morales v. Woodford, supra, 388 F.3d at 
p. 1174.) 
Having thus proceeded from major premise to minor premise, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the lying-in-wait circumstance does not violate the Eighth 
Amendment.  (Morales v. Woodford, supra, 388 F.3d at p. 1176.) 
I disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s major premise that, in order to establish 
the constitutionality of a special circumstance, one need only determine that the 
special circumstance applies to a subclass of first degree murderers and is not 
unconstitutionally vague.  Although the Ninth Circuit relies on Tuilaepa, supra, 
512 U.S. 967, for this proposition, I do not understand Tuilaepa to have repudiated 
 
9 
the basic tenets of the United States Supreme Court’s modern Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence that, as the court reiterated in the same term and the same month as 
Tuilaepa, “ ‘to pass constitutional muster, a capital sentencing scheme must 
“genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must 
reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant 
compared to others found guilty of murder.” ’ ”  (Romano v. Oklahoma (1994) 512 
U.S. 1, 7, italics added.)  Nor was it repudiating its often quoted formulation in 
Godfrey v. Georgia, supra, 446 U.S. at page 427, that death penalty eligibility 
criteria must provide “a meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which 
the penalty is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.” 
Moreover, Tuilaepa did not consider the validity of any special 
circumstance, but rather addressed the constitutionality of California’s penalty 
phase provisions under section 190.3.  To support its dictum that an aggravating 
circumstance that would make a defendant eligible for death “must apply only to a 
sub-class of defendants convicted of murder,” the Tuilaepa court cited Arave v. 
Creech (1993) 507 U.S. 463.  Arave concerned a challenge to an Idaho death 
penalty statute that had as one of its aggravating or special circumstances that 
“[b]y the murder, or circumstances surrounding its commission, defendant 
exhibited utter disregard for human life.”  (Id. at p. 465.)  The court stated: “When 
the purpose of a statutory aggravating circumstance is to enable the sentencer to 
distinguish those who deserve capital punishment from those who do not, the 
circumstance must provide a principled basis for doing so.”  (Id. at p. 474, italics 
added.)  In considering the case at hand, the court noted that the Idaho Supreme 
Court had given the circumstance at issue a limiting construction, referring to a 
“ ‘cold-blooded, pitiless slayer.’ ”  (Id. at p. 469.)  The court concluded that the 
circumstance as so construed genuinely narrowed the class of first degree 
murderers “because some within the broad class of first-degree murderers do 
 
10 
exhibit feeling.  Some, for example, kill with anger, jealousy, revenge, or a variety 
of other emotions.  In Walton [v. Arizona (1990) 497 U.S. 639] we held that 
Arizona could treat capital defendants who take pleasure in killing as more 
deserving of the death penalty than those who do not.  Idaho similarly has 
identified the subclass of defendants who kill without feeling or sympathy as more 
deserving of death.  By doing so, it has narrowed in a meaningful way the category 
of defendants upon whom capital punishment may be imposed.”  (Arave v. 
Creech, supra, 507 U.S. at p. 476, italics omitted and added.) 
It is a truism therefore, that to be consistent with the Eighth Amendment, a 
special circumstance that makes a defendant eligible for the death penalty must not 
only narrow the class of murderers, but must do so in a principled and meaningful 
way to “ ‘ “reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the 
defendant compared to others found guilty of murder” ’ ” (Romano v. Oklahoma, 
supra, 512 U.S. at p. 7), and to identify a subclass of defendants “as more 
deserving of death.”  (Arave v. Creech, supra, 507 U.S. at p. 476.)  Special 
circumstances based on moral trivialities would therefore not pass constitutional 
muster.  A “foul language” special circumstance, for example — using foul 
language while committing the murder — would not survive an Eighth 
Amendment challenge. 
Most of California’s many special circumstances fulfill the function of 
identifying the subclass of murderers more deserving of death.  When someone 
not only commits first degree murder, but tortures the victim (§ 190.2, subd. 
(a)(18)), or murders by an especially destructive device that is a danger to the 
general public (id., subd. (a)(4)), or kills a peace officer (id., subd. (a)(7)), the 
moral justification for the greater penalty is clear.  Not so with murder by surprise.  
The lying-in-wait special circumstance as interpreted by this court declares in 
effect:  “The defendant deserves a greater punishment than the ordinary first 
 
11 
degree murderer because not only did he commit first degree murder, but he failed 
to let the person know he was going to murder him before he did.”  How can we 
make sense of this kind of special circumstance?  Not only is surprise a common 
feature of murder — since murderers usually want their killings to succeed, and 
victims usually don’t want to be murdered — but it is not at all obvious that a 
murderer who does not conceal his purpose before murdering the victim is less 
culpable than one who does.  One of the examples of murder without the lying-in-
wait special circumstance furnished by the Ninth Circuit, is “a sadistic person who 
wants the victim to know what is coming, and who has no doubt of his ability to 
accomplish the crime, [and who] confront[s] the victim face to face, say[ing] ‘I’m 
going to kill you’ ” (Morales v. Woodford, supra, 388 F.3d at p. 1175).  How is 
this murderer less culpable and less deserving of the death penalty, by any 
conventional standard of morality, than someone who conceals his purpose before 
murdering?  To put it another way, because a murderer must gain an advantage 
over his victim, why is it at all morally significant that he gained the advantage 
through surprise rather than through overpowering, or that he murders right after 
the surprise rather than sadistically toying with the victim?  And how is the 
murderer who announces his intention to murder just before carrying it out against 
a defenseless person less culpable than one who maintains surprise? 
The closest this court has come to a principled defense of lying in wait as a 
special circumstance is the comment in People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 
983, 1023, that “[m]urder committed by lying in wait has been ‘anciently regarded 
. . . as a particularly heinous and repugnant crime.’  (Note, Murder Committed by 
Lying in Wait (1954) 42 Cal. L.Rev. 337.)”  The cited article, as noted above 
(ante, at p. 3), in fact explains that English law regarded lying in wait as 
particularly heinous because in the period following the Norman conquest in the 
11th century, Anglo-Saxons would lie in wait to assassinate their Norman 
 
12 
conquerors.  Whether we still share with the medieval Normans that special 
repugnance for lying-in-wait murder as originally conceived — an ambush 
assassination that involves physical concealment and a substantial period of 
watching and waiting — there is nothing to indicate that ordinary murder by 
surprise, the lying-in-wait special circumstance as construed by this court, has 
been historically, or is regarded currently, as an especially heinous form of 
murder.3 
In defense of the lying-in-wait special circumstance, the majority states: 
“The special circumstance requires an intent to kill, which lying-in-wait murder 
does not.  [Citation.][4]  This difference alone means that any overlap between the 
                                              
3  
Other justifications for the lying-in-wait special circumstance were 
considered and rejected by Justice Broussard in his cogent concurring and 
dissenting opinion in People v. Webster, supra, 54 Cal.3d 411, 467:  “In Richards 
v. Superior Court [(1983)] 146 Cal.App.3d 306, 314, footnote 5, the court 
speculated that ‘[o]ne supposes that [lying in wait] is perceived as a particularly 
cowardly form of murder — hence the opprobrium heaped on the western villain 
who killed from ambush.  And in earlier, more religious times, special scorn was 
reserved for those who murdered victims in a fashion intended to deprive them of 
the opportunity for reflection and contrition.  Thus, the piteous complaint of 
Hamlet’s father that he was murdered “in the blossoms of my sin/ Unhousel’d, 
disappointed, unanel’d/ No reckoning made, but sent to my account/ With all my 
imperfections on my head . . . .”  (Hamlet, act I, scene v., line 66ff.)’   [¶] I do not 
believe the drafters and voters in 1978 included the lying-in-wait special 
circumstance because of a 400-year-old notion that an honorable killer allows the 
victim time to confess his sins, or even a 100-year-old notion that an honorable 
killer waits until the victim has a chance to draw first.  In any case, the lying-in-
wait special circumstance, as construed in Morales, embodied neither notion. To 
the contrary, Morales specifically rejected the contention that the special 
circumstance only applies if the killer ambushes the victim.”  I agree. 
4  
Lying-in-wait murder requires “ ‘an intentional infliction upon the person 
killed of bodily harm involving a high degree of probability that it will result in 
death and which shows a wanton disregard for human life.’ ”  (People v. Ruiz 
(1988) 44 Cal.3d 589, 614, fn. 3.) 
 
13 
premeditation element of first degree murder and the duration element of lying in 
wait does not undermine the narrowing function of the special circumstance.”  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 24.)  But  intent to kill is required in ordinary first degree 
premeditated murder.  (See Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 29.)  The majority fails 
to explain how premeditated murder by surprise is more deserving of the death 
penalty or life without possibility of parole than premeditated murder that does not 
involve surprise. 
Because, as discussed above, lying in wait was originally conceived as a 
type of first degree murder and not a special circumstance, it was not particularly 
designed to do what the Eighth Amendment requires — provide a principled basis 
for determining which murderers are especially culpable and therefore eligible for 
the death penalty.  I do not assert that the court cannot give the special 
circumstance a reasonable limiting construction that would survive an Eighth 
Amendment challenge.  But it has failed to do so. 
III. 
In the present case, as noted, the jury was instructed on a definition of the 
lying-in-wait special circumstance that “ ‘[t]he lying in wait need not continue for 
any particular period of time provided that its duration is such as to show a state of 
mind equivalent to premeditation or deliberation.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 22, 
fn. 10.)  Although the jury was also instructed that the lying in wait must 
constitute “a substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time to 
act,” the instruction regarding the duration of the lying in wait makes it reasonable 
for the jury to interpret the word “substantial” to simply mean that time necessary 
for deliberation, as this court has done.  (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 22, fn. 10; see 
also People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 823.)  Because the lying-in-wait 
special circumstance, as set forth by this instruction, does not provide a principled 
basis for dividing first degree murderers eligible for the death penalty from those 
 
14 
who are not, and is therefore not consistent with the Eighth Amendment, I would 
hold that the instruction is in error. 
For purposes of assessing the prejudicial effect of this instructional error, I 
will assume that the above erroneous jury instruction could have been cured by 
omitting the words “The lying in wait need not continue for any particular period 
of time provided that its duration is such as to show a state of mind equivalent to 
premeditation or deliberation.”  With this omission, the jury is at least left with the 
unalloyed instruction that the lying-in-wait special circumstance requires a 
substantial watching and waiting period; it would not necessarily have to equate 
watching and waiting with the time required to premeditate and deliberate, but the 
term “substantial” would connote something closer to the classic ambush situation, 
in which the murderer not only deliberates but, while watching and waiting, holds 
fast to a concealed, murderous purpose for a sustained period.  The evidence does 
not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found a 
substantial period in the present case.  (See People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 
503-504 [instructional error not reversible when the evidence at trial establishes 
the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt].)  The evidence showed that 
defendant became aware of August, and pursued him, for only a few moments, 
and it is not clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a properly instructed jury would 
have found this to be a substantial period of watching and waiting.  Indeed, there 
is insufficient evidence in the record that defendant engaged in a substantial period 
of watching and waiting before murdering August.5 
                                              
5  
Justice Werdegar proposes that the lying-in-wait special circumstance be 
interpeted to require not simply concealment of purpose but “active deceit . . . — a 
misrepresentation or ruse that lulls the victim into a false sense of security” (conc. 
opn. of Werdegar, J., ante, at p. 1), and that such limiting construction would 
insulate that special circumstance from a constitutional challenge.  Assuming she 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
15 
I do not deny that defendant’s murder of August alone — a random, callous 
act of killing — could under some theory be viewed as a particularly heinous 
murder making defendant eligible for the death penalty.  But lying in wait is not 
what made that murder heinous.  I would therefore reverse the lying-in-wait 
special circumstance as to the August murder, but would otherwise uphold 
defendant’s capital sentence based on the multiple-murder special circumstance 
and the fact that the jury could still properly consider the aggravated 
circumstances of the August murder at the penalty phase of the trial.  (See Brown 
v. Sanders (2006) 546 U.S. 212, __ [126 S.Ct. 884, 893-894].) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
is correct, such construction would not save the lying-in-wait finding in the 
present case.  The jury was not instructed on active deceit, and although some 
parts of the instruction could lead jurors to believe that active deceit was required, 
the part of the instruction incorporating Morales makes clear that concealment of 
purpose alone, together with the two other factors discussed above, would suffice 
to find lying in wait.  (See Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 555.)  Nor is it clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found active deceit in the 
present case had it been instructed in that requirement.  Defendant’s act of pulling 
up alongside Stokes, and briefly motioning at and smiling at him, is hardly 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt of an active deceit that is distinguishable from 
mere concealment of purpose.  (Cf. People v. Sims, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 433 
[lying-in-wait special circumstance found where murderers lured pizza delivery 
man to motel room by ordering pizza].) 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Stevens 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S034704 
Date Filed: June 4, 2007 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Alameda 
Judge: William R. McGuiness 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Richard I. Targow, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Ronald S. Matthias, Dane R. Gillette and Seth K. 
Schalit, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Richard I. Targow 
Post Office Box 1143 
Sebastopol, CA  95473 
(707) 829-5190 
 
Seth K. Schalit 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5866