Case Title: Sue Davidson, P.C. v. Naranjo

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-10-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
Sue Davidson, P.C. v. Naranjo1995 WY 172904 P.2d 354Case Number: 94-178Decided: 10/13/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
 

SUE DAVIDSON, P.C., 

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Lou Ann NARANJO, 

Appellee 
(Defendant).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

Sue Davidson, 
P.C., Appellant pro se.

No appearance 
for Appellee.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Sue 
Davidson, an attorney, attached an attorney lien on child support payments paid 
to her client, appellee Lou Ann Naranjo, in an attempt to recover attorney fees 
and costs rendered on the client's behalf. Davidson appeals the district court's 
order dismissing the action to have the funds paid to her.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUE

[¶3]      Davidson presents 
one issue:

Does Wyoming's Attorney 
Lien Statute, Wyo. Stat. § 29-1-102(a)(ii) (1981) which states that an attorney 
shall have a lien for compensation due and that the lien thereby attaches upon 
money due the client from an adverse party, authorize an attorney's charging 
lien attachment upon a nonpaying client's child support award where the award is 
the direct result of the efforts and services of the attorney; and, where the 
attorney has exhausted other means of collection?

[¶4]      No opposing brief 
was submitted by Naranjo.

BACKGROUND

[¶5]      Davidson 
represented Naranjo in an action to recover unpaid child support payments from 
Naranjo's ex-husband and to modify the divorce decree to increase the amount of 
the child support obligation. In an effort to recover fees and costs for her 
services, Davidson attached an attorney lien pursuant to W.S. 29-1-102(a)(ii) 
(1981 Rpl.) on the child support payments which were received by the clerk of 
the district court and filed a Motion to Pay Funds to Counsel. The district 
court dismissed Davidson's action, ruling that attorney liens cannot attach to 
child support monies. Davidson timely appealed.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶6]      Under our 
well-established rules of statutory construction, we "endeavor to interpret 
statutes in accordance with the Legislature's intent." Halpern v. Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562, 564 (Wyo. 1995); State Dep't of Revenue & Taxation v. Pacificorp, 
872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo. 1994). "`[T]he initial step in arriving at a correct 
interpretation * * * is an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning 
of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection.'" Parker 
Land & Cattle Co. v. Game & Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993) 
(quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)). "`[W]e 
give effect to every word, clause and sentence and construe all components of a 
statute in pari materia.'" Parker Land & Cattle, at 1042 (quoting City of 
Laramie v. Facer, 814 P.2d 268, 270 (Wyo. 1991)). We must first determine 
whether a statute is clear or ambiguous. A statute is unambiguous if its wording 
is such that reasonable persons are able to agree as to its meaning with 
consistency and predictability. A statute is ambiguous only if it is found to be 
vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations. Halpern, at 564-65. 
Whether an ambiguity exists in a statute is a matter of law to be determined by 
the court. Id., at 565; Parker Land & Cattle, at 1043. If the language of 
the statute is plain and unambiguous, we apply its plain meaning and need not 
consult the numerous rules of statutory construction. Houghton v. Franscell, 870 P.2d 1050, 1054 (Wyo. 1994).

DISCUSSION

[¶7]      Davidson claims 
she is entitled to have an attorney lien attach upon the child support payments 
because the lien falls within the scope of Wyoming's attorney lien statute. The 
attorney lien statute, W.S. 29-1-102, states in pertinent 
part:

(a) For professional 
services performed on behalf of a client, an attorney shall have a lien for 
compensation due him from the time of giving notice of the lien. The attorney's 
lien attaches upon:

* * * * * 
*

(ii) Money due his client 
and in the possession of an adverse party.

[¶8]      We find W.S. 
29-1-102(a)(ii) to be clear and unambiguous. The purpose of the attorney lien 
statute is to enable an attorney to place a lien on funds that belong to their 
client but are in the hands of an adverse party in order to pay for services 
rendered by the attorney. Thus, the statute is analogous to any other 
creditor-debtor situation where the creditor attaches a lien to property in 
which the debtor has an ownership interest to secure or pay off a debt owed by 
the debtor. It is a basic tenet of creditor-debtor law that, before a creditor 
may attach a lien to property, such property interest must be owned by the 
debtor. See 51 Am.Jur.2d Liens § 16 (1970); 6 Am.Jur.2d Attachment and 
Garnishment § 92 (1963); and 53 C.J.S. Liens §§ 2, 11 (1987). We hold, 
therefore, that, for a client to be "due" money under § 29-1-102(a)(ii), the 
client must have a possessory, ownership interest in that 
money.

[¶9]      The dispositive 
issue in this case is whether a custodial parent of a child has a possessory, 
ownership interest in child support payments made by the non-custodial, payor 
parent. The district court ruled that Davidson's attorney lien could not attach 
to the child support payments because those payments were monies judicially 
determined to be necessary for the adequate support and maintenance of the 
children, paid to the custodian as trustee, and an attorney lien would thwart 
important public policy considerations regarding child support. We have stated 
before that child support payments are the children's 
monies:

Often misunderstood by 
parents embittered by divorce, "child support" represents a legal obligation of 
the parents to the children. "[C]hild support is for the benefit of the children 
as [a parent's] obligation to contribute to the upbringing of [the] children. 
A support payment is the children's money administered in trust by [the 
custodial parent] for their benefit."

Cranston v. 
Cranston, 879 P.2d 345, 349 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Macy v. Macy, 714 P.2d 774, 777 
(Wyo. 1986)) (emphasis added). We reaffirmed this concept recently in the case 
of Smith v. Smith, 895 P.2d 37, 42 (Wyo. 1995), wherein we stated that "child 
support is a legal obligation [parents] owe to their 
children."

[¶10]   Child support stands in a unique 
and special position in law. The district court determines the amount of money 
the children need to support their upbringing and provide for their welfare, 
taking into account the parent's ability to pay. Child support is indeed the 
children's money, for their exclusive benefit. See Broyles v. Broyles, 
711 P.2d 1119, 1125 (Wyo. 1985). However, because the children are minors, the 
district court, pursuant to W.S. 20-2-113(g), orders that the support amount be 
paid to the clerk of the district court, and the clerk thereafter delivers the 
support payment to the custodial parent. See also W.S. 20-6-304(a). The 
custodial parent stands in the shoes of a trustee, administering the money to 
the children based upon their needs and welfare. See In re Marriage of Watkins, 
42 Wn. App. 371, 710 P.2d 819, 821 (1985) ("A child's custodian receives support 
money as a trustee and not in his or her own right"); Fuqua v. Fuqua, 88 Wn.2d 100, 558 P.2d 801, 804-05 (1977); Brake v. Sanchez-Lopez, 452 So. 2d 1071, 1072 
(Fla. App. 1984); Law Office of Tony Center v. Baker, 185 Ga. App. 809, 366 S.E.2d 167, 168-69 (1988) (when alimony is awarded for the support of minor 
children, the mother acquires no interest in the funds; and when they are paid 
to her, she is a mere trustee charged with the duty of seeing that they are 
applied solely for the benefit of the children). Indeed, the child support 
payment is not treated as income earned, and, thus, is not includable in the 
custodial parent's federal income tax return - in contrast to alimony which is 
the parent's money and is treated as income earned.

[¶11]   We agree with the district court 
that an attorney lien may not attach to monies received for child support. See 
Fuqua, 558 P.2d  at 805 ("statutory attorney's liens may not be asserted against 
monies which represent payments for child support"); Hubbard v. Ellithorpe, 135 
Iowa 259, 112 N.W. 796, 797-98 (1907) (temporary alimony and support not subject 
to a charging lien); Indell v. Tabor, 185 N.Y.S. 873, 874-75 (1920) (attorney 
not entitled to reach client's alimony to satisfy his judgment for attorney 
fees); Johnson v. Gerald, 216 Ala. 581, 113 So. 447, 449 (1927) (attorney lien 
inapplicable to a divorce suit when allowance is made to the wife); Bucknam v. 
Bucknam, 347 Mo. 1039, 151 S.W.2d 1097, 1100 (1941) (an attorney is entitled to 
a lien on alimony for his services, but only to the extent of attorney fees and 
costs taxed and included in the allowance of alimony; he cannot enforce any lien 
against the remainder of the allowance); Schelter v. Schelter, 206 A.D.2d 865, 
614 N.Y.S.2d 853, 854 (1994) ("[f]unds held in escrow or in a custodial capacity 
are not subject to an attorney's retaining lien"; "[w]e note that, even if the 
funds were treated as payments for child support, we would conclude that such 
payments are not subject to an attorney's retaining lien"); Law Office of Tony 
Center, 366 S.E.2d  at 168 (attorney's charging lien is not enforceable against 
child support payments); Minor Child of Zentack v. Strong, 83 Ohio App.3d 332, 
614 N.E.2d 1106, 1109 (1992) ("we side with the majority [of courts] and hold as 
did the Fuqua court that, `as a matter of public policy, statutory attorney's 
liens may not be asserted against monies which represent payments for child 
support'"); Brake, 452 So. 2d  at 1072 (attorney's charging lien is not 
enforceable against child support payments); Glickman v. Scherer, 566 So. 2d 574, 
575 (Fla.App. 1990) (child support is not subject to an attorney's charging 
lien); Sanner v. Sanner, 46 S.W.2d 936, 937-38 (Mo. App. 1932) (alimony and 
child's support not subject to attorney's lien); Hilleary v. Hilleary, 189 Mo. 
App. 704, 175 S.W. 282, 283-84 (1915) (allowance of alimony for maintenance and 
support is not such a judgment as is contemplated by the attorney lien statute, 
there can be no lien on alimony awarded for maintenance and support). In Fuqua, 
558 P.2d  at 804-05, the Washington Supreme Court stated:

A child's custodian 
receives support money as a trustee and not in his or her own 
right.

 * * *

* * * * * 
*

* * * [T]o allow an 
attorney's lien to be asserted against child support would necessarily result in 
counsel for the custodian taking from the children involved, monies which the 
court has determined to be necessary to assure their adequate support. It is 
impractical to assume that the trial court can consider possible liability for 
attorney's fees in ascertaining a support figure. * * * If the assertion of 
liens such as these became commonplace, the court's function in providing for 
the adequate support of minor children, the innocent parties to these actions, 
would be wholly frustrated. "Equity, which creates the fund, will not suffer its 
purpose to be nullified." Turner v. Woolworth, 221 N.Y. 425, 430, 117 N.E. 814, 
816 (1917). We therefore hold that, as a matter of public policy, statutory 
attorney's liens may not be asserted against monies which represent payments for 
child support. Any effort to assert such a lien is void, whether it be against 
funds in the hands of the clerk, the lawful custodian of the children, or an 
attorney.

Similarly, in 
Law Office of Tony Center, 366 S.E.2d  at 168-69, the Georgia Court of Appeals 
stated:

"Child support," 
denominated alimony (OCGA § 19-6-19(a)), occupies a special niche in our law. 
"When alimony is awarded for the support of minor children, the mother acquires 
no interest in the funds, and when they are paid to her she is a mere trustee 
charged with the duty of seeing that they are applied solely for the benefit of 
the children. She can not consent to a reduction or remission of the alimony, 
and ordinarily her conduct can not relieve the father of paying the same as 
directed by the court." * * *

* * * "Where an award is 
made in favor of a wife for permanent alimony in a final decree, to be paid to 
her by the husband for the maintenance and support of their minor child who is 
in the wife's custody, upon receipt of each payment she should use the same 
solely for the benefit of the child. In the receipt and use of such money, she 
acts as a trustee or guardian of the minor child * * *. [T]he mother has no 
power or authority to make a contract with an attorney at law whereby she agrees 
to pay him one-half of whatever sums he collects from the father by virtue of 
the decree. Such an agreement, being contrary to the policy of the law, is void, 
and a court of equity will not aid the attorney in attempting to require the 
mother to account to him for payments she has received from the father * * * or 
as to any future payments." Hence, sums representing child support are held in 
trust by intervening parties and the party holding such child support payments 
cannot consent, in law, to a portion being used for payment of attorney fees in 
their collection.

Our holding is consistent 
with the general law on this issue, i.e., "to allow an attorney's lien to be 
asserted against child support would necessarily result in counsel for the 
custodian taking from the children involved, monies the court has determined to 
be necessary to assure their adequate support." Fuqua v. Fuqua, 88 Wn.2d 100, 
558 P.2d 801 (1977) * * *. Child support cases follow the general law that an 
attorney's charging lien does not attach to alimony. * * *

* * * * * 
*

* * * Accordingly, we 
find that an attorney's charging lien should not be "allowed to nullify an award 
determined to be necessary to assure the support of a child" and "is not 
enforceable against child support payments."

We find the 
reasoning of these cases persuasive and a correct assessment of what child 
support payments represent, negating the attorney lien attachment to such 
payments.

[¶12]   The Wyoming Legislature has 
articulated public policy that innocent children will not be penalized for the 
payor parent's failure to pay the court ordered child support payments. The 
burden of paying for enforcement and collection of child support may be placed 
upon the delinquent payor parent. Wyoming Statute 20-2-113(a) (1994 Rpl.) 
states, in pertinent part:

A court having 
jurisdiction under this subsection or under subsection (j) of this section may, 
upon appropriate motion of either parent, require a parent to appear before the 
court and show just cause why the parent should not be held in contempt, upon a 
showing that the parent has willfully violated the decree as to the care, 
custody, visitation and maintenance of the children. The court may, in 
addition to any assessment it may impose upon a finding that the parent is in 
contempt of court, award attorney's fees, costs, and such other and further 
relief as the court may deem necessary under the circumstances, to the parent 
aggrieved by the violation of the decree, in order to enforce and require future 
compliance with the decree.

(Emphasis 
added.) Similarly, under the Wyoming Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, the 
obligor (payor parent) must pay all fees and costs for the enforcement 
proceeding (W.S. 20-4-115), and the responding court can punish the obligor 
under its contempt powers for violation of the court order (W.S. 
20-4-126).

CONCLUSION

[¶13]   We hold, as a matter of public 
policy, that statutory attorney liens may not be asserted against monies which 
represent payments for child support because the custodial parent does not own 
the child support payments received from the clerk of court, but rather such 
support payments belong to the minor children, and because the custodial parent, 
rather than the children, owes a debt to the attorney.

[¶14]   Affirmed.

MACY, 
J., 
files a dissenting opinion.

MACY, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶15]   I dissent. I agree with the 
majority that the attorney's lien statute is clear and unambiguous. The statute 
clearly states that the lien attaches upon money which is due to the client. The 
money in this case was due and ordered to be paid to the attorney's client 
through the clerk of the district court. The Legislature did not provide an 
exception to the statute by stating that the client must have a "possessory, 
ownership interest in that money" before the lien can attach, and this Court 
should not create such an exception by judicial fiat. See Voss v. Ralston, 550 P.2d 481, 485 (Wyo. 1976); Eiselein v. K-Mart, Inc., 868 P.2d 893, 900 (Wyo. 
1994) (Macy, C.J., specially concurring).

[¶16]   The majority has decided as a 
matter of public policy that an attorney's statutory lien cannot attach to child 
support money; however, we should consider the public policy of the state only 
when we are construing an ambiguous statute. Amoco Production Company v. State, 
751 P.2d 379, 384 (Wyo. 1988). "`[Q]uestions regarding public policy should be 
determined by the legislature, not the courts.'" West v. Wyoming State 
Treasurer, 822 P.2d 1269, 1274 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting Martinez v. Ashland Oil, 
Inc., 132 Wis.2d 11, 390 N.W.2d 72, 74 (Ct.App. 1986)).

[¶17]   In any event, I question whether it 
is in the children's best interest for this Court to structure a policy which 
dictates that it is the responsibility of the custodial parent or the legal 
profession to bear the expense for collecting child support payments. It is 
incongruous to expect custodial parents who cannot afford to support their 
children to pay attorneys to collect court ordered child support payments. It is 
also unreasonable to expect attorneys to act pro bono in such instances, 
especially when they are constantly being criticized by the general public for 
continually promoting litigation.