Case Title: Germain v. State

Citation: 363 Md. 511

Docket Number: 82/00

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2001-04-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Jean Bernard Germain v. State of Maryland
No. 82, September Term, 2000
Headnote:
The confidentiality of a PSI is primarily directed to protect against “public
inspection.”  It is not absolute and the determination of whether the utilization
of its information during a trial is appropriate requires the trial court to utilize
sound discretion.  The Court of Special Appeals erred in not reversing
petitioner’s conviction on the ground that the trial court should not have
precluded petitioner from using a key State witness’s PSI to refresh that
witness’s recollection.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of
Special Appeals and remand with instructions to vacate the judgment of the
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County and remand the case to that court for a
new trial.
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County
Case # K-1999-0050
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 82
September Term, 2000
JEAN BERNARD GERMAIN
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Bell, C. J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
           Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Cathell, J.
Filed:    April 10, 2001
1  The Court of Special Appeals addressed two questions:
1.
Was 
the 
evidence 
sufficient 
to 
support 
[Germain’s] 
convictions,
including specifically his conviction for attempted second degree
murder?
2.
Did the trial court err in preventing [Germain] from refreshing the
victim’s recollection with statements in his pre-sentence investigation
report?
The Court of Special Appeals held that the first question was not properly preserved and
answered “no” to the second question.
Petitioner, Jean Bernard Germain, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court of Anne
Arundel County of attempted second degree murder, first degree assault, reckless
endangerment, and carrying a weapon with intent to injure.  Petitioner appealed to the Court
of Special Appeals.  In an unreported opinion filed June 12, 2001, the Court of Special Appeals
affirmed his conviction.1  Petitioner presents one question to this Court, for which we granted
certiorari:   
Did the Court of Special Appeals err in not reversing Petitioner’s
conviction on the ground that the trial court precluded Petitioner from using a
key State witness’s Pre-Sentence Investigation (PSI) for any reason including
to refresh the witness’s recollection, on the ground that PSIs are confidential
and privileged?
We answer petitioner’s question in the affirmative.  We hold that the trial court should not have
precluded petitioner from using a key State witness’s PSI to refresh that witness’s
recollection.  The confidentiality of a PSI is not absolute.  The showing of a PSI to a witness
who has a right a right to see it, in order to refresh that witness’s recollection, is not prohibited
by statute.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Special Appeals and remand
with instructions to reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County and
2  It must have actually been in late July of 1998 as the fight between the two inmates
occurred on August 1, 1998. 
-2-
remand the case to that court for a new trial.   
I.  Facts 
Petitioner and Mr. John Campbell (Campbell), two individuals incarcerated in the State
of Maryland, shared cell 205 in D building, Bravo Wing of the Maryland House of Corrections
Annex located in Jessup, Maryland.  Sergeant Carlton L. Gibson, the officer in charge of the
housing unit, testified that in early August 1998,2 petitioner and two other individuals had just
come off of temporary housing into the D Building.  Petitioner was given a choice of three bed
spaces in which to move.  Petitioner requested that he not be moved into a cell with anyone
who was a smoker.  After initially refusing the placement in the cell with Campbell, petitioner
changed his mind and accepted housing in that cell.  His decision to accept the housing was
made, at least in part, on the assurances by Sergeant Gibson that they would move him out of
the cell after a short period of time. 
Petitioner testified that soon thereafter he made numerous requests to be moved from
the cell he shared with Campbell because Campbell “smoke[d] all the time,” was HIV positive,
and had sexually propositioned petitioner.  However, Sergeant Gibson testified that “[t]he only
reason I had was — the only reason that was brought to my attention was the smoking.  Because
[petitioner] said — he stated that he had asthma and he couldn’t move in with anybody that
smoked cigarettes.”  Additionally, when asked whether petitioner ever complained about
unwanted sexual advances by his cell mate, Sergeant Gibson responded that “[s]exual advances
3  “10-10” is a numeric code used within the Maryland House of Corrections Annex
meaning that there is a fight between inmates.  
-3-
[were] never brought to my attention.”  
At approximately 11:25 p.m. on August 1, 1998, after being cell-mates for
approximately two weeks, a fight broke out between the two inmates.  The issue at petitioner’s
trial for this assault was not whether the assault occurred but whether petitioner was acting in
self-defense.  During the trial, the defense counsel argued that petitioner was acting in self-
defense by warding off an unwanted, forced homosexual assault upon him by Campbell, who
petitioner believed to be a homosexual, a convicted sex offender, and a HIV positive individual,
while the State contended that the assault was simply an unprovoked attack by petitioner.  The
two inmates’ versions of the assault are drastically different.  
Campbell testified that at approximately 11:25 p.m., he walked to the door of the cell
to smoke a cigarette.  Before Campbell could light the cigarette, petitioner jumped out of bed
and began hitting him in the back of the head.  Initially, Campbell thought that petitioner was
only punching him, but when he saw blood running down his face, he realized he was being
stabbed.  Campbell called out for a correctional officer.  Officer Barbara Leonard responded
to his call for help, called for a 10-10,3 and waited for additional correctional officers to
arrive.  During this time, petitioner “[c]ontinued stabbing [Campbell] in the neck, the shoulder,
and down the right side of [Campbell’s] back.”  Not until Officer Orice Custis arrived and
sprayed pepper spray in the cell did petitioner stop attacking Campbell.  Campbell testified and
the medical report confirmed that he had “104 stab wounds.”       
4 “CO” is short for “correctional officer.”
-4-
Contrastingly, petitioner maintained that on the night in question, he was acting in self-
defense.  He testified that Campbell, whom he believed was a homosexual, a convicted sex
offender, and HIV positive, “tried to approach [him] sexually.”  Petitioner testified that
“[Campbell] approached me about a sexual thing, and I told him that I was not a homosexual.
And after I refused, he approached me.  He tried to attack me.”  Petitioner explained that while
he was laying on his bed and Campbell was standing in the cell, Campbell began touching him
and fondling him in a sexual manner.  Petitioner testified that: 
Mr. Campbell told me that he was a known sex offender to me.  And I
knew that he had AIDS.  He was approaching me sexually, so that was an assault
on my life.  He wanted to have sex with me.  I refused.  He approached me,
touching me.  When I jumped down to try to get him to stop, he attacked me.
And we fought.
 
Petitioner then grabbed a knife, which he kept for protection, from its hiding place by the toilet
and used it in his fight with Campbell.      
Petitioner was seen hitting and stabbing Campbell by two correctional officers who
responded to Campbell’s calls.  Officer Barbara Leonard testified that at approximately 11:25
p.m. she heard someone calling “CO, CO.”4  Upon arriving at cell 205, she found that Campbell
“was bent down at the door and [petitioner] . . . was just stabbing him repeatedly.”  She
instructed petitioner to stop striking Campbell.  When he ignored her, Officer Leonard “called
the code” by reporting a “10-10 on delta bravo,” indicating that there was a fight between
inmates on the bravo wing of Building D.  Officer Orice Custis responded to her call and upon
5  The officers testified that cell 205 was located near the control room.  The distance
was described as “about six, eight feet” and “about five seconds away.”
-5-
arriving at cell 205, ordered petitioner to stop striking Campbell. 
On the evening that the fight broke out between the two inmates, Officer Custis was the
Officer in Charge of a housing unit in Building D.  He testified that when he arrived at cell 205
he saw Campbell “in the fetal position right by the door.  There was another inmate [petitioner]
on top of him stabbing him.”  Officer Custis instructed petitioner to stop striking Campbell.
When petitioner ignored him, Officer Custis went to the control center, got a chemical agent,
ran back to cell 205,5 and ordered petitioner to stop striking Campbell.  When petitioner
continued to ignore Officer Custis’s commands, Officer Custis “sprayed a short burst of
chemical agent into the cell” through a small slot in the cell door at which time petitioner
“dropped the weapon down and ran to the back of the cell.”  Officer Custis ordered petitioner
to back up to the cell door to be handcuffed but he refused to cooperate.  The two officers
waited for more officers to arrive to the scene before they opened the door, handcuffed both
petitioner and Campbell, and took them to Medical.  Officer Leonard testified that the fight
continued for approximately three minutes from the time she first responded to Campbell’s
cries for help.  She also testified that she did not witness how the fight started.
II.  The Trial
As we discussed, supra, defense counsel’s theory of the case was that petitioner was
acting in self defense by warding off an unwanted, forced sexual assault upon him by Campbell,
who petitioner believed to be a homosexual, a convicted sex offender, and a HIV positive
6  At trial, Mr. Gunning was petitioner’s defense counsel and Mr. Paone represented the
State.
-6-
individual.  On cross-examination, Campbell denied being a homosexual and stated that if he
made any sexual advances toward petitioner while they were cell mates, that he  did not
remember making them.  He further testified on cross-examination that, although he
remembered pleading guilty to two second degree sex offenses and he was serving a forty-year
sentence, he did not recall the specifics of the charges.  It was clear that whether Campbell was
a person who made sexual attacks against members of the same sex was proffered as material
to the credibility of both Campbell and the defendant.  On recross-examination, defense
counsel again tried to elicit the specifics behind Campbell’s convictions for two second degree
and one third degree sexual offense:
     BY MR. GUNNING:[6]
Q.  Mr. Campbell, the victim of your sexual offense was an 11-year-old
boy; is that correct?
     MR. PAONE: Objection.  
     MR. GUNNING: Your Honor, may we approach?
    THE COURT: No.  I am going to overrule.  He can answer the question.
You opened the door.  Go ahead.
     THE WITNESS: I don’t remember.
     BY MR. GUNNING:
Q. You don’t recall.
A.  I don’t remember nothing.
7 It was a PSI in respect to the witness, Campbell, not the defendant, Germain.
-7-
Q.  You don’t recall pleading guilty to sodomizing an 11-year-old boy.
A.  I remember pleading guilty to second degree sex offense.  That’s all
I remember.
Q. And you don’t recall the second second degree sex offense with the
same 11-year-old boy as part of that plea.
A. No.  I remember pleading guilty to two second degree sex offenses.
That was all I remember.
Q. And you also pled guilty to a third degree sex offense which entailed
fondling the penis of that little boy, correct?
. . . .
     THE WITNESS:  No.
. . . .
Q. And you just don’t remember any of that.
A.  I don’t remember none of it.
Shortly thereafter, the following discussion took place at a bench conference: 
     MR. PAONE:  Your Honor, defense counsel has just shown me a copy
of what appears to be a PSI for the defendant.[7]  I can only assume he is going
to cross-examine him about the contents of that PSI.  I am going to object
before we get into it.
     THE COURT:  What - - - 
   
   MR. GUNNING:  Initially I am going to use it to refresh his
recollection.
     MR. PAONE: A PSI is confidential.
-8-
     THE COURT: How - - - 
    MR. GUNNING: That doesn’t mean I can’t use it to refresh his
recollection.
     THE COURT: This report is for official Court use only.  It is saying
here it is confidential and protected.  Where did you get this?
     MR. GUNNING: Through subpoena.
     MR. PAONE: His base file.
     THE COURT: I think it is confidential.  It says this report --- public
inspection ---
     MR. GUNNING: All that means is that I can’t go into a courthouse and
say give me the PSI for this defendant.
 
     THE COURT: Well, you did.
     MR. GUNNING: But now that I have gotten this PSI, I should be able
to use the information in there to try to refresh his recollection.
   THE COURT: He has already --- so I am going to sustain his objection.
You have it on the record --- 
      MR. GUNNING: I could proffer to the Court that this document ---
he admitted to --- sexual offenses to an 11-year-old boy, and one would be by
sodomy and the other one would be by having oral sex with him.  He also
fondled him.  This information will be mainly to refresh his recollection.
     THE COURT: Well --- there is no need in going into the rest of it, for
several reasons.  One, it is confidential; two, it is already on --- and the only
purpose of the convictions are to show ---    
    MR. GUNNING: But, Your Honor, now we have the issue of
credibility where he says he is not a homosexual.  And if you . . . sodomize an
11-year-old boy ---
     THE COURT: If you have a conviction, you can tell them the
conviction.
8 The State failed to distinguish between the restrictions that might exist, in respect to
the facts surrounding a defendant’s past criminal record, when a defendant chooses to take the
stand, and the use of a witness’s PSI by a defendant to impeach the testimony of a State witness
in a criminal case.
-9-
      MR. PAONE: Your Honor, I am going to renew my objection to all
references to the specific facts of any case.  I can’t get into them on my cross-
examination, and neither can defense counsel. 
     Your Honor, under these circumstances there are many reasons,
psychological, psychiatric, any number of reasons, why the [witness] may not
remember what exactly happened on these occasions.  The clear implication to
the jury has been that — there has also be no indication that [petitioner] knows
any of the facts of these cases and therefore knows to be fearful of them.
     It is grossly unfair.  The State is not allowed to go into the facts of any
convictions [petitioner] may have when he takes the stand.  I think the law is very
clear that when it comes to credibility we have the conviction and the conviction
alone.  And that goes for both sides, the State and the defense.[8]       
     THE COURT: I --- it is clear that this is a confidential document, and
as part --- 
The record indicates that at this point the bench conference ended.
III.  Discussion
a.  The Confidential Nature of a PSI is Not Absolute
The question before us is simply whether the trial court erred in refusing to permit
petitioner’s defense counsel to use Campbell’s PSI to attempt to refresh his recollection on
the sole basis that PSI’s are confidential.  It is helpful to our analysis to review the nature of
PSIs and their role in the criminal justice process.  A “pre-sentence investigation” is an
“[i]nvestigation of the relevant background of a convicted offender, usually conducted by a
probation officer attached to a court, designed to act as a sentencing guide for the sentencing
9  Black’s Law Dictionary 1184 (6th ed. 1990) also provides the following definition
of “pre-sentence report”:
The report prepared from the presentence investigation, which is
designed to assist the judge in passing sentence on a convicted defendant.
Presentence reports vary in scope and focus, but typically contain at least the
following items: (1) complete description of the situation surrounding the
criminal activity; (2) offender’s educational background; (3) offender’s
employment background; (4) offender’s social history; (5) residence history of
the offender; (6) offender’s medical history; (7) information about environment
to which the offender will return; (8) information about any resources available
to assist the offender; (9) probation officer’s view of the offender’s motivations
and ambitions; (10) full description of the defendant’s criminal record; and, (11)
recommendation as to disposition.     
-10-
judge.”9  Black’s Law Dictionary 1184 (6th ed. 1990); see also 18 U.S.C.S. § 3552
(Presentence reports); Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(b) (Presentence Investigation and Report).
Generally, a PSI is a tool offered to the sentencing court to assist it in reaching its goal of
individualizing the sentence “to fit ‘the offender and not merely the crime.’” Smith v. State,
308 Md. 162, 167, 517 A.2d 1081, 1084 (1986) (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S.
241, 247, 69 S. Ct. 1079, 1083, 93 L. Ed. 2d 1337 (1949)).  “The principal function of the
presentence report is to assist the court in determining the appropriate sentence.”  United
States v. Charmer Indus. Inc., 711 F.2d 1164, 1170 (2d Cir. 1983).   
Because a PSI is a tool generally utilized by a sentencing judge, the circumstances,
which present themselves in the case sub judice, are unusual.  In this case, the State’s key
witness, Campbell, was a convicted sex offender.  During cross-examination and recross-
examination, Campbell claimed that he could not remember the specifics of the crimes for
which he had been convicted.  Defense counsel, in an effort to strengthen petitioner’s
10  Any reference to section 6-112 is a reference to Maryland Code (1999), section
6-112 of the Correctional Services Article.
11 Section 6-112(a)(3) lists those people and organizations that can receive a PSI upon
request.  It provides:
(3)  On request, a presentence investigation report shall be made available to:
(i) the defendant;
(ii) the defendant’s attorney;
(iii) the State’s Attorney;
(iv) a correctional facility;
(v) a parole, probation, or pretrial release official of this State, any other
state, or the United States;
(vi) a public or private mental health facility located in this State or any
other state if the individual who is the subject of the report has been committed,
(continued...)
-11-
testimony that Campbell had been making unwanted sexual advances, fondling him, and sexually
attacking him, attempted to utilize a PSI that was apparently prepared in respect to Campbell’s
sentencing on his convictions.  Defense counsel received the PSI through subpoena and was
attempting to use the PSI to refresh Campbell’s memory as to the nature of his past
convictions after Campbell asserted that he could not remember. 
We continue our discussion with an analysis of the relevant statutes.  Maryland Code
(1999), section 6-112 of the Correctional Services Article10 provides:  
§ 6-112. Presentence investigation report; other investigations and 
                  probationary services.
(a) In general. — 
. . . . 
     (2) Except on court order, a presentence investigation report is
confidential and is not available for public inspection.[11] [Emphasis added.]
11(...continued)
or is being evaluated for commitment, to the facility for treatment as a condition
of probation; or
(vii) a community substance abuse treatment provider located in this
State or any other state if the individual who is the subject of the report will be
treated or evaluated for treatment by the provider as a condition of probation.
The confidentiality of PSI’s is also noted in Maryland Rule 4-341, titled Sentencing —
Presentence Investigation, which provides:
Before imposing a sentence, if required by law the court shall, and in
other cases may, order a presentence investigation and report.  A copy of the
report, including any recommendation to the court, shall be mailed or otherwise
delivered to the defendant or counsel and to the State’s Attorney in sufficient
time before sentencing to afford a reasonable opportunity for the parties to
investigate the information in the report.  The presentence report, including any
recommendation to the court, is not a public record and shall be kept
confidential as provided in Code, Correctional Services Article, § 6-112.
12  During recodification, section 6-112 was moved from Maryland Code (1957, 1997
Repl. Vol.), Article 41, section 4-609 into the newly created Correctional Services Article by
1999 Maryland Laws, Chapter 54 “without substantive change.”  Prior to this recodification,
section 4-609(b) stated in relevant part, “[t]he presentence reports are confidential and not
available for public inspection except upon court order.” (emphasis added).  This language
clearly reflects the Legislature’s intent to make PSIs confidential with respect to “public
inspections.”  This language was first added by 1972 Maryland Laws, Chapter 532.  Prior to
1972, the correlating statute did not include language concerning presentencing reports or
their confidentiality from “public inspection.”    
-12-
As the wording of section 6-112 clearly indicates, the confidentiality of a PSI is not absolute.
It is confidential in that it is not available for general “public inspection,” except on an order
of a court.  It does not specifically prohibit the use of PSIs in official court proceedings —
it is primarily designed to limit “public inspections.”
12  
Some of the underlying purposes behind the PSI confidentiality requirement include:
13  For a general discussion on the underlying purposes behind PSI confidentiality,
see Baltimore Sun v. Thanos, 92 Md. App. 227, 236-37, 607 A.2d 565, 569-70 (1992) in
which a newspaper sought to gain access to a PSI for possible use in articles to be published
to the  general public.  In Thanos, the Court of Special Appeals noted “[c]learly ‘publication
of the contents of a presentence report [to third persons] would tend to discourage full
disclosure’ to the sentencer from its best sources . . . .”  Id. at 237, 607 A.2d at 570 (emphasis
added) (alteration in original).  In the case at bar, actual publication to the general public was
never an issue. 
-13-
(1) to encourage individuals, including a defendant, who have relevant information to provide
it candidly with the assurance of confidentiality, see United States v. Greathouse, 484 F.2d
805, 807 (1973); United States v. Evans, 454 F.2d 813, 820 (1972); (2) to consider the
privacy interests of the victims and their families, see Halacy v. Steen, 670 A.2d 1371, 1374
(Me. 1996); (3) to consider the privacy interests of the defendant, see United States v.
Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 236, (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 823, 112 S. Ct. 86, 116
L. Ed.2d 58 (1991); (4) to protect the anonymity of confidential sources, see United States
v. Huckaby, 43 F.3d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 1995); and (5) to consider that the report may include
irrelevant and unsupported information, see Halacy, 670 A.2d at 1374.  We recognize that
there are numerous compelling interests served by preserving the confidentiality of PSIs from
“public inspection.”
13
These valid public policy justifications for confidentiality usually factor heavily against
out-of-court disclosures to any party not involved in the sentencing or rehabilitation of the
subject of the PSI.  The United States Supreme Court stated in United States Department of
Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 108 S. Ct. 1606, 100 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1988):
[T]he courts have been very reluctant to give third parties access to the
14  In the case at bar, petitioner’s attorney received Campbell’s PSI via subpoena.
Whether such granting of Campbell’s PSI to petitioner’s attorney was appropriate is not before
this Court.  As we noted in footnote 11, section 6-112(a)(3) makes a PSI available to a
defendant (the subject of the report) upon request.  Some of the reasons for keeping a PSI
confidential would not even apply in the case at bar. 
We note, nonetheless, that the fact that we do not address the appropriateness of the
method by which defense counsel obtained the PSI in this case should not be construed as an
approval of that method by this Court, nor as any authority for obtaining such reports in this
fashion.  That issue is not before us.  We note further that, generally, administrative entities
should not release PSI reports to anyone not specifically permitted by statute or rule to receive
them, except upon an express order of court signed by a judge.  Normally, consideration by a
court may be accomplished by the administrative entity responding to a demand or request by
filing a motion to quash, the filing of responsive pleadings by the requesting party, and the
holding of any required hearings.  In the responsive pleading and in the hearing, if any, the
requesting party would have the burden of establishing a particularized need for the report, and
the trial court would need to exercise its discretion by balancing the relative interests of the
parties before arriving at its decision on whether to quash the request.  
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presentence investigation report prepared for some other individual or
individuals.  As the Government points out, one reason for this is the fear that
disclosure of the reports will have a chilling effect on the willingness of various
individuals to contribute information that will be incorporated into the report.
A second reason is the need to protect the confidentiality of the information
contained in the report. Accordingly, the courts have typically required some
showing of special need before they will allow a third party to obtain a copy of
a presentence report. [Citations omitted.]
Id. at 12, 108 S. Ct. at 1613, 100 L. Ed. 2d 1; see Charmer Indus, 711 F.2d at 1171 (noting
that “[i]n order to ensure the availability of as much information as possible to assist in
presentencing, the courts have generally determined that presentencing reports should be held
confidential.”)14
However, as we discussed, supra, despite the justifications for keeping a PSI
confidential in respect to “public inspection” (which was not the use petitioner proposed in the
15  The only “third party,” petitioner, already had the PSI.  The person to whom he
was going to show the PSI, Campbell, is specifically permitted by statute or rule to see it. 
16  The PSI was not proffered for “release” to “public inspection,” nor was it, at the time
the court ruled that it could not be used, proffered into evidence, but it was proposed, by a
person who already had it, to be shown for memory refreshing purposes to a person who had
an absolute right to see it.  
-15-
case at bar), the confidentiality of a PSI even then is not absolute.  Section 6-112(a)(2) plainly
states that a PSI is confidential from “public inspection” “[e]xcept on court order.”  Although,
the determination as to whether to permit access to a PSI should be made with utmost care, it
is still well within the authority of a court to make.  As a United States District Court stated
in 1996:  
This determination does not end the court’s inquiry, however, for a presentence
report’s presumption of confidentiality is not absolute. A third-party[15] seeking
access to a presentence report may overcome the report’s confidentiality by
demonstrating that disclosure will “serve the ends of justice,” [United States v.]
Schlette, 842 F.2d [1574,] 1579 [(9th Cir. 1988)]; [United States v.] McKnight,
771 F.2d [388,] 390 [(8th Cir. 1985)], or by establishing a “compelling,
particularized need for disclosure,” Huckaby, 43 F.3d at 138; Corbitt, 879 F.2d
at 239 [n.5.]  Applying this standard requires a fact specific inquiry in which the
need for confidentiality is balanced against the desirability of releasing a
presentence report.[16]  Huckaby, 43 F.3d at 139; Schlette, 842 F.2d at 1579,
1583; Charmer, 711 F.2d at 1173. The showing required of the party seeking
disclosure will vary with the degree to which the need for confidentiality is
present in a particular case. Schlette, 842 F.2d at 1583 (citing United States
Indus., Inc. v. United States Dist. Court, 345 F.2d 18, 21 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 814, 15 L. Ed. 2d 62, 86 S. Ct. 32 (1965)). This determination
is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reviewed for
abuse of discretion. Huckaby, 43 F.3d at 138; Schlette, 842 F.2d at 1577. 
United States v. Preate, 927 F. Supp. 163, 166-67 (M.D. Pa. 1996); see Huckaby, 43 F.3d at
138 (recognizing that no court has held that confidentiality of information contained in a PSI
must be maintained in all circumstances); Corbitt, 879 F.2d at 239-40 (noting that in some
17  In Zaal v. State, 326 Md. 54, 602 A.2d 1247 (1992), a case in which a criminal
defendant requested disclosure of his victim’s confidential educational school records in order
to impeach her credibility, we provided:  
In cases in which access to confidential and/or sensitive records is sought by a
defendant and which will be resolved based on credibility considerations,
because of which, the trial court determines the “need to inspect” threshold has
been crossed, the court may elect to review the records alone, to conduct the
review in the presence of counsel, or to permit review by counsel alone, as
officers of the court, subject to such restrictions as the court requires to protect
the records’ confidentiality.  Which option the court chooses must depend on
various factors, including the degree of sensitivity of the material to be
inspected; the strength of the showing of the “need to inspect”; whether the
information sought is readily identifiable; considerations of judicial economy,
etc.  The greater the “need to inspect” showing, i.e., as here, where it is
self-evident, and the less sensitive the information, for example, the more likely
the records will be reviewed jointly by the court and counsel or by counsel as
(continued...)
-16-
situations, a PSI may be disclosed to meet a particularized need arising out of pending or
contemplated litigation); Charmer Indus., 711 F.2d at 1175 (concluding that a court “should
not authorize disclosure of a presentence report to a third person in the absence of a compelling
demonstration that disclosure of the report is required to meet the ends of justice.”); Hancock
Bros., Inc. v. Jones, 293 F. Supp. 1229, 1233 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (“Information contained in a
presentence report should not be disclosed to third parties unless lifting confidentiality is
required to meet ends of justice.”); Halacy, 670 A.2d at 1375; State v. Bacon, 167 Vt. 88, 91,
702 A.2d 116, 119 (1997) (“[T]he confidentiality of PSIs is not absolute.”).
While the issue of what standard a trial court should use in determining whether a PSI
should be disclosed is not before us, we do note that such a determination is within the authority
of the court.17  In any such instance, the determination should be made on the facts and
17(...continued)
officers of the court.
Id. at 87, 602 A.2d at 1263-64.  This standard would be consistent with our treatment of third
party requests to breach grand jury confidentiality set out in In re Criminal Investigation No.
437, 316 Md. 66, 82-83, 557 A.2d 235, 243 (1989).
18  Maryland Code (1957, 1971 Repl. Vol., 1981 Cum. Supp.), Article 41, section
124(b) is now section 6-112(a).
19  Maryland Rule 771 is now Maryland Rule 4-341.
-17-
circumstances of that individual case.  
We addressed an impeachment issue in Hall v. State, 292 Md. 683, 441 A.2d 708
(1982), a case in which we decided whether a statement made by the accused to a probation
officer conducting a presentence investigation was admissible in a subsequent trial for the
purpose of impeachment.  We said:  
Hall’s last contention is that admitting Monk’s testimony was a violation
of Maryland Code ([1957,] 1971 [Repl. Vol.], 1981 Cum. Supp.), Art. 41, § 124
(b)[18] and Maryland Rule 771 (b).[19]  In pertinent part, section 124 (b) provides
that “presentence reports shall be confidential and not available for public
inspection except upon court order or for use by any correctional institution.”
Maryland Rule 771 (b) tracks section 124 (b) and provides that a presentence
report “is not a public record and shall be kept confidential as provided in
Article 41, § 124 (b) of the Maryland Code.”
The short answer to this contention is that the report was not introduced
nor was the substance of the report made public.  The information provided the
probation agent is the kind (such as name, age, home address) routinely and
preliminarily ascertained in any interview and is not gathered for the purpose of
incriminating the defendant.  In our view this type of information was not
intended by the Legislature to be protected by § 124 (b) and thus we find no
violation of either the spirit or the letter of § 124 (b) or Rule 771 (b).
We hold, therefore, that Monk’s testimony based on the presentence
20  Additionally, when the court is required to confront the issue of access to a PSI, an
issue not before this Court in this case, the court can limit the disclosure of the information
contained in the PSI to be only as broad as necessary.  In the case sub judice, it appears that
the defense counsel merely wanted to refresh the recollection of the witness who was the
subject of the PSI, to the specifics of the crimes he committed.  The PSI was not being
admitted into evidence.  It, so far as we can discern from the record, was not being submitted
to a jury, and the information defense counsel wanted to refresh Campbell’s memory with was
merely concerned with Campbell’s past admissions.  As stated in United States v. Schlette,
842 F.2d 1574, 1581 (9th Cir. 1988), “if the reasons for maintaining [confidentiality] do not
apply at all in a given case, or apply only to an insignificant degree, the party seeking disclosure
should not be required to demonstrate a large compelling need.” (alterations in original).  In
the case at bar, it can be argued that few, if any, of the reasons for confidentiality as to
prohibiting “public inspection” exist when the report was to be shown only to the subject of
the report to refresh his recollection. Moreover, as we have reiterated, access to the PSI was
not the issue in this case.  The defendant already had it; the witness was entitled, by statute, to
it. 
-18-
interview was admissible to impeach Hall’s statement made 
on 
direct
examination and, as limited, this testimony did not violate the confidentiality
requirements of Article 41, § 124 (b) or Rule 771 (b).
Id. at 692, 441 A.2d at 713.
In the posture of the case at bar, when the trial court denied defendant the use of the PSI,
it was not proposed that it be admitted into evidence.  It was merely to be used for recollection
refreshing purposes.  Generally, when appropriate in the first instance, there are no limitations
on the nature of the relevant documents that may be used in the refreshing of a witness’s
recollection.  Such documents are not being admitted into evidence. 20
As we have discussed, supra, in Maryland, the determination as to whether to disclose
otherwise confidential information contained within a PSI is a question committed to the
authority of the trial court.  However, this exercise of authority has little role in the use of
already obtained PSI documents to refresh recollection.  The trial court in the case sub judice
-19-
erroneously believed that it was mandatory to keep the information contained within a PSI
confidential under all circumstances, even though the PSI was already in the defendant’s
possession.  When faced with defense counsel’s assertion that he was entitled to use the
generally confidential PSI to refresh Campbell’s recollection, the trial court repeatedly relied
solely on the document’s status as “confidential” and “for official Court use only.”  The trial
court failed to recognize that the confidentiality requirement related primarily to “public
inspection” and would not apply to showing it to the subject for whom it was prepared, a person
who had the right to see it.  Additionally, the trial court failed to perceive any difference in
respect to its use in official court proceedings to refresh a witness’s recollection, and making
it available for “public inspection.”   In other words, the trial court erroneously concluded that
it had no authority to allow the disclosure of the contents of the PSI because such information
was always confidential.  That is simply incorrect.  The trial court’s failure to permit defendant
to utilize the PSI to refresh a witness’s recollection was reversible error.
b.  Refreshing Recollection
Whether a witness’s recollection may be refreshed by a writing or by other means
depends on the particular facts and circumstances of the individual case.  As we said in Oken
v. State, 327 Md. 628, 612 A.2d 258 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 931, 113 S. Ct. 1312, 122
L. Ed. 2d 700 (1993): 
 While it is true that in many circumstances, an examining attorney must
first establish that a witness’s memory is exhausted before refreshing the
recollection of that witness, see 6 L. McLain, Maryland Evidence § 612.1 (and
cases cited therein), laying such a foundation is not an absolute prerequisite.
Instead, the question of whether a witness’s recollection may be refreshed by
-20-
a writing or some other object depends upon the particular circumstances . . . .
Bankers Trust Co. v. Publicker Industries, Inc., 641 F.2d 1361, 1363 (2d
Cir.1981) (“There is no required, ritualistic formula for finding exhaustion of
memory.”)  State v. Greenlee, 72 N.C. App. 269, 324 S.E.2d 48, 51-52 (1985)
(prosecuting attorney did not improperly impeach State witness merely by
attempting to refresh her memory upon realizing that her in-court testimony was
contradictory to her prior statement); Walker v. State, 445 So.2d 955, 957 (Ala.
Crim. App.1983) (witness for State in a rape prosecution could refer to a writing
for purpose of refreshing his recollection without first, as condition precedent,
showing that it was necessary for his recollection to be refreshed);
Reproductive Health Services, Inc. v. Lee, 660 S.W.2d 330, 335-36 (Mo.
App.1983) (holding that “where witness’ testimony concerned five separate
incidents of trespassing over a period of approximately ten months, involving
various defendants, . . . trial court could, in the exercise of its discretion, permit
witness to employ written list to refresh her recollection without any specific
statement on her part that she needed the list to refresh her recollection.”);
People v. Verodi, 150 Cal. App.2d 137, 150-51[,] 309 P.2d 568, 576-77 (2d.
Dist.1957) (holding that “in murder prosecution, district attorney’s referring
witness’ attention to memorandum, previously prepared by witness, for purpose
of refreshing witness’ recollection and correcting a perfectly obvious omission
was proper, even though witness had stated prior to seeing memorandum, that
he had testified to everything which had been and that he did not need the
memorandum to refresh his recollection.”); C. McCormick, Evidence § 9 at
33-34 (4th ed. 1992) (“The witness may believe that she remembers completely
but on looking at the memorandum she would be caused to recall additional
facts.  As the Chinese proverb has it, ‘The palest ink is clearer than the best
memory.’  On the other hand, there is the ever-present danger that a suggestible
witness may think that she remembers a fact because she reads it.  It seems
eminently a matter for discretion, rather than rule.”); 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence
§ 765 at 145 (Chadbourn rev. (1965)) (“The forgoing rules [on present
recollection revived] should not be treated as dogmas of inherent efficiency.
They are merely crude rules-of-thumb, worthy of the adoption for the general
purpose. . . .  The trial court’s discretion should control.”)  6 L. McLain,
Maryland Evidence § 612.2 (under Rule 612 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
“[o]nce a witness has been asked to testify or testified to a certain matter, if the
witness’ memory appears to be incorrect or incomplete, counsel may attempt
to refresh the witness’ recollection.”).
Id. at 672-74, 612 A.2d at 279-80 (alterations in original); see also Dorsey Bros., Inc. v.
Anderson, 264 Md, 446, 453, 287 A.2d 270, 274 (1972); Butler v. State, 107 Md. App. 345,
-21-
354-55, 667 A.2d 999, 1003-04 (1995); Baker v. State, 35 Md. App. 593, 602 n.10, 371 A.2d
699, 705 n.10 (1977); see, e.g., United States v. Cody, 114 F.3d 772, 777 n.3 (8th Cir. 1997);
Perry v. Magic Valley Reg’l Med. Ctr., 995 P.2d 816, 826 (Idaho 2000); State v. Bruno, 236
Conn. 514, 534-35, 673 A.2d 1117, 1129 (1996).    
 
We also recognize the large amount of freedom that an attorney has when choosing an
object with which a witness’s recollection can be refreshed.  It is important to note the
distinction between the admission of a memorandum into evidence as past recorded
recollection and a memorandum or other item used only to revive present recollection.  The
limitations and concerns present for past recollection recorded have little bearing on present
recollection revived.  As the Court of Special Appeals has said: 
When dealing with an instance of Past Recollection Recorded, the reason
for the rigorous standards of admissibility is quite clear.  Those standards exist
to test the competence of the report or document in question.  Since the piece
of paper itself, in effect, speaks to the jury, the piece of paper must pass muster
in terms of its evidentiary competence.  
Not so with Present Recollection Revived!  By marked contrast to Past
Recollection Recorded, no such testimonial competence is demanded of a mere
stimulus to present recollection, for the stimulus itself is never evidence.
Notwithstanding the surface similarity between the two phenomena, the
difference between them could not be more basic.  It is the difference between
evidence and non-evidence.  Of such mere stimuli or memory-prods,
McCormick says, at 18, “[T]he cardinal rule is that they are not evidence, but
only aids in the giving of evidence.”  When we are dealing with an instance of
Present Recollection Revived, the only source of evidence is the testimony of
the witness himself.  The stimulus may have jogged the witness’s dormant
memory, but the stimulus itself is not received in evidence. 
Baker, 35 Md. App. at 598-599, 371 A.2d at 702-03 (footnotes omitted) (alterations in
original).  Generally, an attorney is given wide latitude with choosing the item to be used to
-22-
refresh a witness’s memory.  This is because the item is not admitted into evidence — the
memory that is triggered, and ultimately testified about, is the admitted evidence.  
In respect to notes taken of statements made by a person deceased at the time of trial,
the attorney was permitted to refresh his recollection in our early case of Waters v. Waters,
35 Md. 531 (1872), even though the notes themselves may not have been admissible.  We said:
“[I]t cannot be understood as deciding that the notes of the testimony taken by a Judge or
counsel are per se evidence.  Such notes are mere memoranda, which may be used to refresh
the memory of the witness who took them; but are not of themselves evidence . . . .”  Id. at 540;
see also Miller v. State, 251 Md. 362, 377, 247 A.2d 530, 538 (1968) (where a witness used
a written, but not signed, confession to refresh his recollection “[w]e [found] no merit in the
appellant’s contention that it was error to permit the State’s witness to refresh his
recollection.”), vacated on other grounds by, 408 U.S. 934, 92 S. Ct. 2851, 33 L. Ed. 2d 747
(1972); Askins v. State, 13 Md. App. 702, 711, 284 A.2d 626, 631 (1971) (“[T]he predominate
view today seems to be that . . . any memorandum or other object may be used as a stimulus to
present memory, without restriction by rule as to authorship, guarantee of correctness, or time
of making.”).
Judge Learned Hand noted in United States. Rappy, 157 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1946), that:
When a party uses an earlier statement of his own witness to refresh the
witness’ memory, the only evidence recognized as such is the testimony so
refreshed; and the party may not put the statement in evidence, although the
other side may do so, and apparently the jury may call for it, sua sponte . . . .
Anything may in fact revive a memory: a song, a scent, a photograph, and
allusion, even a past statement known to be false. 
-23-
Id. at 967 (footnote omitted); see State v. Souza, 708 A.2d 899, 903 (R.I. 1998) (“[A]ny
writing or object may be used in an effort to refresh a witness’s recollection.”); see also
Wilson v. State, 511 N.E.2d 1014 (Ind. 1987); Maryfield Plantation, Inc. v. Harris Gin Co.,
116 Ga. App. 744, 159 S.E.2d 125 (1967).
While we have not addressed the issue, the fact that a document used to refresh
recollection might not otherwise be admissible, or even that it was obtained improperly, has
been held by other jurisdictions to be no bar to its being used to refresh recollection.  In State
v. Poirier, 694 A.2d 448, 450 (Me. 1997), the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held: “[A]t
the very most, the notes were used to refresh the memory of the witness.  In such
circumstances, the fact that a document is not admissible does not prevent its use as a means
of refreshing the recollection of a witness. . . . [t]he only question is whether a document . . .
is generally calculated to revive the witness’s memory.”
The Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 449 A.2d 1280, 1299
(1982), aff’d in part, dismissed in part on other grounds by Carter v. Rafferty, 826 F.2d
1299 (3d Cir. 1987), permitted letters that had been obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, to be used to refresh recollection.  In respect to the defendants’ assertion that the
letters could not be used, even for memory refreshment, because they were unconstitutionally
obtained, the New Jersey court said:
This 
[the 
defendants’] 
rationale 
ignores 
the 
established 
distinction
between a document that is evidential and one used to refresh a witness’s
recollection.  Once a proper foundation has been laid, a witness may examine
any document to refresh his memory.  The oft-quoted statement of Lord
Ellenborough in Henry v. Lee, 2 Chitty, 124, 124 (1814), sets forth the general
-24-
rule:
[I]f upon looking at any document he can so far refresh his
memory as to recollect a circumstance, it is sufficient; and it makes no
difference that the memorandum is not written by himself, for it is not
the memorandum that is the evidence but the recollection of the witness.
Preliminarily the trial court must decide whether the memorandum does refresh
the witness’s recollection.  It may decline to permit its use where the danger of
undue suggestion outweighs the probable value of the evidence.  In making this
decision the trial court may consider the nature of the memorandum and the
witness’s testimony, including cross-examination, by which counsel may test the
witness’s credibility that his memory has been revived.
The admissible evidence is the recollection of the witness, and not the
extrinsic paper.  The test is whether the witness puts before the court his
independent recollection and knowledge. 
Id. at 122-23, 449 A.2d at 1299-1300 (citations omitted).
Documents, otherwise confidential, have been held to be permitted to refresh the
recollection of a witness.  The Supreme Court in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150, 231-35, 60 S. Ct. 811, 848-49, 84 L. Ed. 1129 (1940) in reference to use of
grand jury testimony to refresh recollection, said:
The Circuit Court of Appeals held that the trial court committed
prejudicial error in refusing to permit defense counsel to inspect the transcript
of grand jury testimony used to refresh the recollection of certain witnesses
called by the government . . . .
. . . .
. . . As once stated by Judge Hough, “The bald fact that the memory
refreshing words are found in the records of a grand jury is not a valid
objection.”  Normally, of course, the material so used must be shown to
opposing counsel upon demand, if it is handed to the witness. . . .  Grand jury
testimony is ordinarily confidential.  But after the grand jury’s functions are
21And see Plotkin v. Rabinowitz, 283 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1967) (taped recordings taken in
violation of wiretap statute not permitted to be used to refresh recollection during deposition).
-25-
ended, disclosure is wholly proper where the ends of justice require it. . . .
If the record showed that the refreshing material was deliberately used
for purposes not material to the issues but to arouse the passions of the jurors,
so that an objective appraisal of the evidence was unlikely, there would be
reversible error.  Likewise there would be error where under the pretext of
refreshing a witness’ recollection, the prior testimony was introduced as
evidence.  But here the grand jury testimony was used simply to refresh the
recollection on material facts . . . .  [Citations omitted.] [Emphasis added.]
But see National Dairy Products Corp. v. United States, 384 F.2d 457, 459 (8th Cir. 1967)
that places some limits on the disclosure of grand jury testimony to defendants,21 i.e., but,
nonetheless noted the Supreme Court’s statement in
United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., supra at 683 that “‘problems
concerning the use of the grand jury transcript at the trial to impeach a witness,
to refresh his recollection, to test his credibility * * *’ are ‘cases of
particularized need where the secrecy of the proceedings is lifted discretely and
limitedly.’” The Court also observed that the developments in the area of
disclosure of grand jury minutes were entirely consistent with the realization
that disclosure, rather than suppression of relevant legal materials, normally
promotes the proper administration of criminal justice.  [Some citations
omitted.]  
See also Post Houses, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 384 F.2d 463 (3d Cir. 1967);
Commonwealth v. Silva, 401 Mass. 318, 328, 516 N.E.2d 161, 168 (1987) (witness permitted
to refresh his recollection by utilizing transcripts of his grand jury testimony); State v.
Krouse, 260 Wis. 313, 50 N.W.2d 439 (1951).  
There are arguments that support that opposing counsel must be afforded an opportunity
to review even confidential documents used to refresh memory, and, in some circumstances,
-26-
such documents may be available for jury inspection.  Wigmore notes: “On a general principle
. . . the writing must be shown to him [the opponent] on request.”  3 J. Wigmore, Evidence in
Trials at Common Law, § 762 (Chadbourn rev. 1970).  Wigmore then quotes from older
opinions:
EYRE, L.C.J., in Hardy’s Trial, 24 How. St. Tr. 200, 824 (1794): It is
always usual and very reasonable, when a witness speaks from memorandums,
that the counsel should have an opportunity of looking at those memorandums,
when he is cross-examining that witness.
R. v. Ramsden, 2 Car. & P. 603 (1827) . . . .  TENTERDEN, L.C.J.: “You
put the paper into the witness’ hands to refresh his memory.  It is very usual for
the opposite counsel to see it and examine it, and I think he has a right to see it.”
KINDERSLEY, V.C., in Lord v. Colvin, 2 Drewr. 205, 208 (1854): If a
paper is put into the hands of a witness to refresh his memory, if after that
nothing comes of it, if nothing more be done, then the other party has no right
to look at it.  But if anything further is done, if the witness is asked and answers
questions about the document or the facts referred to in it, then at law the party
on the other side has a right to see the document. . . . [E]very document produced
should, I think, be shown to both sides.
Wigmore states that there are some circumstances where writings used to refresh
recollection have been required to be shown to the jury, although not admitted as evidence per
se.
§763.  Writing used to revive recollection is not part of testimony;
yet the jury may see it, to determine the propriety of its use.  It follows
from the nature of the purpose for which the paper is used . . . that it is in no
strict sense evidence.  In this respect it differs from a record of past
recollection . . . .  Nevertheless, though the witness’ party may not present it as
evidence, the same reason of precaution which allows the opponent to examine
it . . . allows the opponent to call the jury’s attention to its features, and also
allows the jurymen, if they please, to examine it for the same end.  In short, the
opponent, but not the offering party, has a right to have the jury see it . . . .
-27-
When confronted with a situation similar to that in the instant case, a cross-examiner
attempting to refresh a witness’ testimony, Wigmore says:
§764.  Cross-examiner’s use of writing to revive recollection.
Where the effort to refresh the witness’ memory comes originally from the
cross-examining party, several distinct questions may arise.
(1) Must the witness accede to the request and see if his memory is
refreshed by the paper handed him?  It seems entirely proper to require him, in
the trial judge’s discretion, to do this.
(2) When this is done, the paper so used must in fairness be shown to
opposing counsel, and read aloud or shown to the jury if he should so desire.
(3) A paper thus desired to be used will usually be one containing a prior
inconsistent statement of the witness; in this case, the rules will apply that the
inconsistent statement is not equivalent to independent testimony . . . and that
the paper containing it must (in the jurisdictions following The Queen’s Case)
first be shown to the witness before asking him upon its contents. [Some
citations omitted.] [Footnotes omitted.]
A witness’s PSI from a prior conviction, under circumstances such as those here
present, would be acceptable to refresh the witness’s recollection about the past offenses,
especially when the witness claims to have forgotten the nature of the crimes for which he has
been and is presently imprisoned, and where, as here, the issue of whether the prior assault was
against a member of the same sex was argued as being relevant and material to whether the
witness had made an unwanted sexual attack against his cell mate.  That issue was argued as
being squarely relevant to the issue of credibility, not only of the witness, but of the defendant
as well.  
IV.  Conclusion
We hold that the Court of Special Appeals erred in not reversing petitioner’s conviction
-28-
on the ground that the trial court should not have precluded petitioner from using a key State
witness’s PSI to refresh that witness’s recollection.  The confidentiality of a PSI is primarily
directed to protect against “public inspection.”  It is not absolute. Accordingly, we reverse the
decision of the Court of Special Appeals and remand with instructions to reverse the judgment
of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County and remand the case to that court for a new trial.
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
COURT 
OF 
SPECIAL
APPEALS REVERSED; CASE REMANDED TO THE
COURT 
OF 
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
WITH
INSTRUCTIONS TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF
THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR ANNE ARUNDEL
COUNTY AND TO REMAND THE CASE TO THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL; COSTS TO
BE PAID BY ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY.