Case Title: Patterson v. Wyoming

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0246

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-06-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
MICHAEL PATTERSON v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2012 WY 90Case Number: S-11-0246Decided: 06/26/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
MICHAEL 
PATTERSON,
 
Appellant 
(Defendant),
 
v.
 
THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,
 
Appellee 
(Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County
The 
Honorable Michael K. Davis, Judge
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Diane M. Lozano, 
State Public Defender; David E. Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate 
Counsel.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory A. Phillips, 
Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General.
 
Before KITE, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]        
Michael Patterson 
claims that the sentence he is serving for a conviction of accessory to second 
degree murder is illegal.  We 
agree.  We will reverse the district 
court’s decision and remand for resentencing.
 
ISSUE
 
[¶2]      
Mr. Patterson 
presents a single issue:  Did the 
district court err by reinstituting an illegal sentence?  The State raises a different issue:  Is Mr. Patterson’s claim barred from 
review under the doctrine of res 
judicata?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]        
Mr. Patterson was 
convicted in 2006 as an accessory before the fact to second degree murder.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-104 
(LexisNexis 2005) imposes a minimum sentence of 20 years for this crime.  During the sentencing hearing, the State 
asked for a sentence of 20-25 years, while the defense argued for 
probation.  Citing the statutory 
minimum sentence, the district court said, “I feel my hands are somewhat tied,” 
and imposed a sentence of 20-22 years.  
A written Judgment and Sentence was entered on August 24, 
2006.
 
[¶4]        
Less than a month 
later, the State filed a “Motion for Correction of Sentence” in Mr. Patterson’s 
case.  The motion cited Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-13-201, which requires that the minimum sentence be no greater 
than 90% of the maximum.  It asked 
to change the original sentence of 20-22 years to a sentence of 240-267 months, 
adding three months to the maximum sentence.  The district court granted the motion 
the day after it was filed, and imposed a new sentence of 240-267 
months.
 
[¶5]        
The State’s motion 
did not include a certificate of service.  
Handwriting at the bottom of the district court’s order suggests that a 
copy was sent to Mr. Patterson’s trial counsel.  However, the next document in the record 
is a copy of the order stapled to an envelope addressed to Mr. Patterson’s trial 
counsel.  The envelope is stamped 
“NOT DELIVERABLE AS ADDRESSED UNABLE TO FORWARD RETURN TO WRITER.”  Mr. Patterson’s trial counsel had 
moved to withdraw as counsel by this time, and indicated that the appeal would 
be handled by the Public Defender’s Office.  There is, however, no indication that 
either the motion or the order was sent to the Public Defender. 

 
[¶6]        
Approximately a year 
and a half after Mr. Patterson was sentenced, the Defender Aid Program of the 
University of Wyoming Law School filed a motion to reduce his sentence.  The motion cited Mr. Patterson’s 
lack of prior criminal history and his exemplary behavior in prison.  The motion requested that the remainder 
of Mr. Patterson’s 20-22 year sentence be suspended in favor of 
probation.  On the basis that more 
than a year had passed since sentencing, the district court denied the motion as 
untimely under W.R.Cr.P. 35(b).
 
[¶7]        
Approximately one 
year later, the Defender Aid Program filed another motion to reduce Mr. 
Patterson’s sentence.  It presented 
essentially the same arguments as the first motion, and again asked to suspend 
the remainder of Mr. Patterson’s 20-22 year sentence in favor of 
probation.  By this time, the 
district court judge who originally sentenced Mr. Patterson had left the 
bench.  The new district court judge 
found that this motion was timely because it was filed less than one year after 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Mr. Patterson’s appeal, ­Patterson v. State, 2008 WY 33, 179 P.3d 863 (Wyo. 2008).  The district court 
nonetheless denied the motion to reduce Mr. Patterson’s 
sentence.
 
[¶8]        
A year and a half 
later, Mr. Patterson filed a pro se 
Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence.  
He contended that a sentence of 20-22 years was illegal because it 
violated the requirement of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-201 that the minimum be 
no more than 90% of the maximum.  He 
asserted that his sentence could not be legally increased after he had begun 
serving it, and proposed a new sentence of 19-22 years.  
 
[¶9]        
Four months later, 
Mr. Patterson filed an Amended Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence.  All of the previous post-sentencing 
pleadings filed by or on behalf of Mr. Patterson had recited that his 
sentence was 20-22 years.  This 
amended motion was the first to recognize that his sentence had been increased 
to 240-267 months.  Mr. Patterson argued that the 
increase in his sentence violated his rights against double jeopardy, and 
further, violated his rights to due process because the sentence was increased 
without notice to him and without an opportunity for a 
hearing.
 
[¶10]     
The Public Defender’s 
Office was appointed to represent Mr. Patterson, and it filed a supplemental 
motion and brief on his behalf.  
This motion presented essentially the same arguments as Mr. Patterson, 
but added that when the district court originally sentenced Mr. Patterson, it 
failed to state that it had considered probation as a potential sentence.  The motion asserted that this violated 
the rule announced in Trumbull v. 
State, 2009 WY 103, ¶ 16, 214 P.3d 978, 982 (Wyo. 
2009).
 
[¶11]     
After a hearing, the 
district court set aside the previous order increasing Mr. Patterson’s 
sentence from 20-22 years to 240-267 months, and reinstated the original 
sentence of 20-22 years.  Although 
the written order does not explain the decision, the district court provided an 
oral explanation during the hearing:
 
I think that the 
order correcting sentence to increase Mr. Patterson’s sentence [by] three 
months was absolutely improper.  I 
don’t think that there is any justification for that whatsoever.  You can’t just on a motion enter a 
corrected sentence and increase someone’s period of incarceration for all kinds 
of reasons:  Due process concerns, 
double jeopardy, et cetera.
 
Now, the way it was 
done is what concerns me the most at this point in time; but I think it is 
void.  And I think that particular 
order just has to be set aside.  So 
then I think that drops you back to the 20- to 22-year sentence which he 
originally imposed.
 
The district court 
acknowledged that this original sentence was technically illegal because the 
minimum exceeded 90% of the maximum.  
It noted, however, that the minimum sentence was only “90.09 percent 
rather than 90 or less” of the maximum sentence.  The district court characterized this as 
a “small deviation,” and concluded that “the original sentence was not illegal 
because it substantially complied” with the statute.  Mr. Patterson appealed the district 
court’s order.
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW
 
[¶12]     
We apply the standard 
of review set forth in Endris v. 
State, 2010 WY 73, ¶ 13, 233 P.3d 578, 581 (Wyo. 2010), quoting from Jackson v. State, 2009 WY 82, ¶ 6, 
209 P.3d 897, 898-99 (Wyo. 2009):
 
Sentencing decisions 
are normally within the discretion of the trial court.  Bitz v. State, 2003 WY 140, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 257, 259 (Wyo. 2003).  “Such 
discretion is limited, however, inasmuch as a court may not enter an illegal 
sentence. A sentence is illegal if it violates the constitution or other law.” 
 In re CT, 2006 WY 101, ¶ 8, 140 P.3d 643, 646 (Wyo. 2006) (internal case citation omitted).  Whether a sentence is illegal is a 
question of law, which we review de 
novo.  Manes v. State, 2007 WY 6, ¶ 7, 150 P.3d 179, 181 (Wyo. 2007).  
DISCUSSION
 
[¶13]     
There are two 
distinct parts of the district court’s order now under review.  First is its setting aside of 
Mr. Patterson’s second sentence of 240-267 months.  Second is its reimposition of a sentence 
of 20-22 years.  We will address 
each part in turn.
 
[¶14]     
The order increasing 
Mr. Patterson’s sentence from 20-22 years to 240-267 months was entered 
without notice to Mr. Patterson, and without an opportunity for him to be 
heard.  
 
Both the United 
States and Wyoming constitutions provide that no person may be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law.  U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Wyo. Const. 
art. 1, § 6.  To be constitutionally 
valid, the court issuing the order must have acted in a manner consistent with 
due process.  Due process 
requires that the litigants be afforded both notice and a meaningful opportunity 
to be heard.  Murray v. Murray, 894 P.2d 607, 608 
(Wyo. 1995) (citing Sandstrom v. 
Sandstrom, 880 P.2d 103, 106 (Wyo. 1994)).
 
Joyner 
v. State, 
2002 WY 174, ¶ 9, 58 P.3d 331, 335 (Wyo. 2002).  
 
[¶15]     
The record in this 
case makes it plain that Mr. Patterson did not receive notice of the State’s 
motion to change his sentence.  The 
State’s motion did not include a certificate of service.  There is no indication that it was 
served on Mr. Patterson, his trial counsel (who had already filed a motion 
to withdraw), or the Public Defender’s Office (which represented 
Mr. Patterson on appeal).  
Although there was an attempt to serve the order on Mr. Patterson’s trial 
counsel, that attempt failed.  
Furthermore, the district court granted the State’s motion one day after 
it was filed, without holding a hearing.  
Even if Mr. Patterson or one of his counsel had received notice of 
the motion, there was no meaningful opportunity for him to be heard in response 
to the motion.
 
[¶16]     
A sentence is illegal 
if it violates the constitution.  In re CT, ¶ 8, 140 P.3d  at 
646.  Mr. Patterson’s sentence of 
240-267 months was illegal because it was imposed without notice or an 
opportunity for hearing.1  The district court was correct in 
setting it aside.  See Endris, ¶ 22, 233 P.3d  at 
583.
 
[¶17]     
The second part of 
the district court’s order is its reinstatement of the original sentence of 
20-22 years.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 7-13-201 provides as follows:
 
Except where a term 
of life is required by law, or as otherwise provided by W.S. 7-13-101, when a 
person is sentenced for the commission of a felony, the court imposing the 
sentence shall not fix a definite term of imprisonment but shall establish a 
maximum and minimum term within the limits authorized for the statute 
violated.  The maximum term shall 
not be greater than the maximum provided by law for the statute violated, and 
the minimum term shall not be less than the minimum provided by law for the 
statute violated, nor greater than ninety percent (90%) of the maximum term 
imposed.
 
Mr. Patterson’s 
minimum term of 20 years is greater than ninety percent of his maximum term of 
22 years.  This violates the 
statute, and the sentence is illegal.  In re CT, ¶ 8, 140 P.3d  at 
646.
 
[¶18]     
The district court 
reasoned that Mr. Patterson’s sentence “substantially complied” with the statute 
because 20 years is “90.09 percent” of 22 years, just barely exceeding the 
statute’s ninety percent mandate.  
However, the statute is clear and unambiguous, and “we are bound by the 
plain language of the statute.”  Plymale v. Donnelly, 2007 WY 77, 
¶ 25, 157 P.3d 933, 939 (Wyo. 2007).  
Because Mr. Patterson’s sentence of 20-22 years does not comply with 
the statute, it must be set aside.
 
[¶19]     
We have set aside the 
sentence of 240-267 months because it was imposed without notice or opportunity 
for hearing.  We have also rejected 
the 20-22 year sentence as contrary to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-201.  There remains no valid sentence in 
Mr. Patterson’s case, and we must therefore remand to the district court so 
that Mr. Patterson may be sentenced anew.
 
[¶20]     
Mr. Patterson also 
contends on appeal that the district court’s original sentencing order did not 
state that probation was considered.  
He claims that this was contrary to the requirement set forth in Trumbull, ¶ 16, 214 P.3d at 
982:
 
The rule we adopt 
today requires that the district court meaningfully adhere to the requirement 
that probation be considered as an alternative sentence in accordance with the 
governing rule and our many precedents on that subject (excepting cases 
punishable by death, life without parole, or a life sentence). Failure to 
express that plainly in the written sentence will result in reversal of the 
sentence.
 
Because we have 
already determined that Mr. Patterson’s original sentence was illegal, we 
do not need to resolve this contention.  
We mention it only to point out that the Trumbull rule will apply when Mr. 
Patterson is resentenced.  We also 
observe that Mr. Patterson remains subject to the minimum twenty-year 
sentence mandated by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-104, but that Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 7-13-302 allows probation in all cases “except crimes punishable by death 
or life imprisonment.”2  On resentencing, the district court may 
consider probation for Mr. Patterson, and under Trumbull, must state that it has done 
so.  
 
[¶21]     
Finally, we turn to 
the State’s position in this case.  
The State does not dispute that Mr. Patterson’s original sentence of 
20-22 years was illegal.  In fact, 
the State cited noncompliance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-201 as the basis 
for its original motion to correct Mr. Patterson’s sentence.  The State also concedes that Mr. 
Patterson’s second sentence was entered without notice or an opportunity for 
hearing.  The State’s sole 
contention on appeal is that res 
judicata precludes Mr. Patterson from challenging the legality of his 
sentence.
 
[¶22]     
The State recognizes 
that W.R.Cr.P. 35(a) allows a court to “correct an illegal sentence at any 
time.”  It asserts, however, that 
claims of an illegal sentence remain subject to the doctrine of res judicata.
 
We have repeatedly 
held that claims brought pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 35(a) are subject to the 
principles of res judicata.  McCarty v. State, 929 P.2d 524, 525 
(Wyo. 1996); Lacey v. State, 2003 WY 
148, ¶ 11, 79 P.3d 493, 495 (Wyo. 2003); Dolence v. State, 2005 WY 27, ¶ 6, 
107 P.3d 176, 178 (Wyo. 2005); Amin v. 
State, 2006 WY 84, ¶ 5, 138 P.3d 1143, 1144 (Wyo. 2006).  We have also repeatedly held that the res judicata doctrine applies when a 
defendant could have raised such an issue in an earlier appeal or motion for 
sentence reduction but did not do so.  
Hamill v. State, 948 P.2d 1356, 1358-59 (Wyo. 1997); Mead v. 
State, 2 P.3d 564, 566 (Wyo. 2000); Gould [v. State, 2006 WY 157], ¶ 16, 151 
P.3d [261,] 266 [(Wyo. 2006)].
 
McDaniel 
[v. State,] 2007 WY 125, ¶ 9, 163 
P.3d [836,] 838 [(Wyo. 2007)].  If a 
party fails to “show good cause why the issue was not raised at an earlier 
opportunity, the court may decline to consider the issue.”  Hamill v. State, 948 P.2d 1356, 1358 
(Wyo. 1997).
 
Cooper v. 
State, 2010 WY 22, 
¶ 6, 225 P.3d 1070, 1072 (Wyo. 2010).  
The State points out that Mr. Patterson could have challenged his 
sentence in his first appeal, but did not do so.  Patterson, 179 P.3d 863.  It claims that res judicata therefore precludes him 
from challenging his sentence now.
 
[¶23]     
We conclude that Mr. 
Patterson’s appeal is not barred by res 
judicata.  He appealed the 
reimposed sentence of 20-22 years in a timely manner.  Res judicata does not bar that 
claim.  He did not appeal the 
corrected sentence of 240-267 months.  
He had no notice of that sentence, however, and we are satisfied that 
this lack of notice constituted “good cause” for failing to challenge it.  He did not appeal his original sentence 
of 20-22 years.  However, that 
sentence had been amended and was not in effect during the time of Mr. 
Patterson’s direct appeal.  As 
stated in Cooper, when res judicata applies, “the court may decline to consider the 
issue.”  Id., ¶ 6, 225 P.3d  at 1072 (emphasis 
added).  We may also exercise our 
discretion to consider the issue in an appropriate case.  This is such a 
case.
 
CONCLUSION
 
We agree with the 
district court that Mr. Patterson’s sentence of 240-267 months was illegal and 
must be set aside.  We also conclude 
that the reinstituted sentence of 20-22 years is illegal, and must set it aside 
as well.  We therefore reverse the 
district court’s decision and remand to the district court so that 
Mr. Patterson may be resentenced. 
FOOTNOTES
1Mr. 
Patterson also asserts a violation of his rights against double jeopardy because 
the sentence was increased after he had already begun serving it.  We recently rejected this same argument 
in Moronese v. State, 2012 WY 34, 271 P.3d 1011 (Wyo. 2012), and decline to reconsider it now.
 
2We have held “that 
probation may be granted for crimes which have a minimum term of 
less than life imprisonment.”  State v. Knapp, 739 P.2d 1229, 1230 
(Wyo. 1987) (emphasis added).  Although the maximum penalty for second 
degree murder is life imprisonment, the minimum term is twenty years, so a 
person convicted of second degree murder is eligible for 
probation.