Case Title: State ex rel. Marrero v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 2010-Ohio-3755

Docket Number: 20091666

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-08-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Marrero v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3755.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-3755 
THE STATE EX REL. MARRERO, APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Marrero v. Indus. Comm.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3755.] 
Workers’ compensation — Wage-loss compensation — Good-faith job search is a 
prerequisite — Judgment affirmed. 
(No. 2009-1666 — Submitted July 6, 2010 — Decided August 18, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 08AP-922,  
2009-Ohio-4382. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} At issue is appellant Maria Marrero’s request for wage-loss 
compensation.  Marrero was injured in the course of her employment with 
Oakridge Home, a nursing facility owned by appellee Life Care Centers of 
America, Inc.  While the injury prevented a return to her former position of 
employment as a nurse’s aide, it did not prevent her from doing light-duty work. 
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{¶ 2} Marrero soon began working a light-duty job at Oakridge.  Over 
the next several months, Marrero rarely worked a 40-hour week, resulting in a 
weekly income that was less than it was before her injury.  Based on her 
diminished earnings, Marrero sought to make up the difference and applied for 
wage-loss compensation. 
{¶ 3} The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation granted Marrero’s 
application, and Life Care appealed to appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio.  
The commission denied wage-loss compensation because Marrero did not 
perform a good-faith job search, and the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, in 
mandamus, upheld that decision. State ex rel. Marrero v. Indus. Comm., Franklin 
App. No. 08AP-922, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 4} Marrero now appeals as of right to this court. 
{¶ 5} R.C. 4123.56(B)(1) wage-loss compensation is intended for 
claimants who are medically unable to return to their former positions of 
employment but who can do other work. State ex rel. Ellis Super Valu, Inc. v. 
Indus. Comm., 115 Ohio St.3d 224, 2007-Ohio-4920, 874 N.E.2d 780, ¶ 11.  It 
encourages a return to the workforce by paying a percentage of the difference 
between preinjury and postinjury wages in the event that the claimant’s postinjury 
earnings are less than before due to the injury. Id. 
{¶ 6} Under Ohio Adm.Code 4125-1-01(D)(1)(c), claimants who are 
seeking working-wage-loss compensation must show proof of a good-faith search 
for work within his or her medical and vocational capabilities that has pay 
comparable to that of the former position of employment.  Marrero concedes that 
she did not perform a job search.  She insists, however, that her failure to do so is 
excused by Life Care’s failure to act in good faith.  Marrero alleges that Life Care 
offered her full-time, light-duty employment, which she accepted.  She then 
accuses Life Care of effectively reneging on its offer through selective scheduling 
that gave her only part-time hours.  Marrero argues that Life Care’s selective 
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scheduling not only limited her income, but prevented her from seeking other 
work. 
{¶ 7} For a writ of mandamus to issue, Marrero must demonstrate that 
she has a clear legal right to the relief sought. State ex rel. Teece v. Indus. Comm. 
(1981), 68 Ohio St.2d 165, 167, 22 O.O. 3d 400, 429 N.E.2d 433.  In this case, 
Marrero’s allegation of bad faith is not supported by the record.  First, there is no 
evidence that Life Care offered Marrero full-time, light-duty work.  There is no 
written job offer of record, and we do not find that Marrero’s handwritten record 
of hours worked constitutes evidence of an offer of full-time, light-duty work.  
That document simply corroborates other evidence that Marrero worked less than 
full time.  We note, moreover, a February 8, 2008 letter to Marrero from Oakridge 
that specifically states, “[W]e do not have permanent ‘light duty’ assignments * * 
*.”  Lacking any evidence of misrepresentation on Life Care’s part, we decline to 
find that Life Care misled Marrero into forgoing a job search. 
{¶ 8} Equally untenable is Marrero’s claim that her schedule prevented a 
search for other work.  Marrero alleges that she could be added to or removed 
from the daily schedule without warning, a circumstance that prevented her from 
committing to an additional part-time job that could ameliorate her wage loss.  
This situation, she contends, rendered a job search pointless.  Her argument, 
however, assumes that the only way to diminish her wage loss was by taking a 
second part-time job.  It ignores the possibility that had Marrero done a job 
search, she might have found more satisfactory full-time work elsewhere.  And 
because she worked third shift, any assertion that her hours — erratic or otherwise 
— prevented her from effectively looking for other work is baseless. 
{¶ 9} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
BROWN, C.J., and PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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__________________ 
 
BROWN, C.J., dissenting. 
{¶ 10} I respectfully dissent.  Consistent with the opinion of the court of 
appeals’ magistrate I would remand this case to the Industrial Commission for 
reevaluation of Marrero’s application for wage-loss compensation. 
{¶ 11} In my view, the Industrial Commission abused its discretion in 
denying in its entirety Marrero’s working-wage-loss compensation application. 
The commission denied the application on the sole basis that “there is no evidence 
that the Injured Worker engaged in a good faith job search for alternate work 
consistent with her physical restrictions in order to mitigate her wage loss.” 
{¶ 12} Marrero argues that her employer had led her to believe she would 
be provided full-time, light-duty employment at the same rate of pay she received 
prior to her injury.  She provided supporting evidence of that fact, and the 
employer provided no evidence to the contrary. Her evidence demonstrated that 
during the month of March 2007, her employer originally scheduled her to work 
full-time hours, but thereafter sent her home twice, took her off the schedule five 
times, and cut short her hours on three other occasions.  With the exception of one 
day in July 2007, Marrero worked a full-time light duty schedule that entire 
month.  It was not until the end of August 2007 that Marrero noted that her 
employer was “no longer giving [her a] full time 5 days a week schedule.”  While 
it is true that the employer sent Marrero a letter specifically stating that it had no 
“permanent ‘light duty’ assignments,” that letter was not sent until February 
2008—nearly a year after her return to work. 
{¶ 13} The employer concedes that Marrero “apparently worked all hours 
available and offered to her” but nevertheless argues that she alone “has the 
burden to insure the presentation and preservation of evidence in the record as to 
the reasons she did not have full time work.”  In effect, it is the position of 
Marrero’s employer that an employer may lead a returning worker to the 
January Term, 2010 
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reasonable belief that she has a full-time job consistent with her postinjury 
limitations at the same rate of pay—then, in the event that the employer fails to 
provide the expected work and the worker subsequently applies for wage-loss 
compensation, fault the worker for not looking for a different full-time job. 
{¶ 14} In denying Marrero’s claim, the commission improperly made 
evidence of a “good faith effort to search for suitable employment which is 
comparably paying work,” Ohio Adm.Code 4125-1-01(D)(1)I, a sine qua non of 
an award of wage-loss compensation—even in circumstances in which the worker 
reasonably believes she already has secured comparably paying work.  Not the 
text of R.C. 4123.56 (the wage-loss-compensation statute), nor Ohio Adm.Code 
4125-1-01, nor this court’s precedent justifies that conclusion. 
{¶ 15} R.C. 4123.56 does not expressly impose on a wage-loss claimant 
the duty to engage in a job search.  It simply provides that an employee with an 
allowed worker’s compensation claim who “suffers a wage loss as a result of 
returning to employment other than the employee’s former position of 
employment due to an injury or occupational disease” shall receive wage-loss 
compensation for up to 200 weeks. (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 4123.56(B)(1).  An 
award of wage-loss compensation thus requires a causal relationship between the 
wage loss and the allowed injury. The implementing regulation, Ohio Adm.Code 
4125-1-01(D)(1)(c)—not the statute—provides that in giving consideration to a 
claimant’s search for suitable employment, a “good faith effort to search for 
suitable employment which is comparably paying work is required * * *.” 
(Emphasis added.)  In my view, this provision is consistent with R.C. 4123.56, 
and therefore valid and enforceable, only to the extent that a failure to undertake a 
job search demonstrates that the wage loss is not causally related to the allowed 
injury, i.e., that the wage loss is the result of a separate and independent reason. 
{¶ 16} Accordingly, this court has held that it is the responsibility of the 
commission to view “the claimant’s employment situation broadly” to determine 
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whether a worker who works part-time hours without looking for a full-time 
position has voluntarily limited her income. State ex rel. Brinkman v. Indus. 
Comm. (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 171, 174, 718 N.E.2d 897.  In that event, the wage 
loss is not causally related to the allowed injury, as required by R.C. 4123.56.  In 
recognizing exceptions to the good-faith job- search requirement of Ohio 
Adm.Code 4125-1-01(D)(1)I, this court has held that it is inconsistent with the 
wage-loss-compensation statute to require a good-faith job search in every wage-
loss compensation case.  See, e.g., Brinkman, id.; State ex rel. Timken Co. v. 
Kovach, 99 Ohio St.3d 21, 2003-Ohio-2450, 788 N.E.2d 1037, ¶ 22. I support the 
conclusion of the Tenth District Court of Appeals that “the analysis discussed in 
Brinkman should be applied to all situations in which an injured employee obtains 
post-injury part-time employment to determine whether, under the totality of that 
individual employee’s circumstances, the limitation of income was voluntary.”  
State ex rel. Borden, Inc. v. Martin, Franklin App. No. 03AP-257, 2004-Ohio-
4647, ¶ 12. 
{¶ 17} In my view, this case should be remanded for adjudication of the 
point in time at which Marrero reasonably should have recognized that her 
employer was not going to provide her with full-time work. Until that time, her 
failure to look for other full-time light-duty work should not bar an award of 
wage-loss compensation. A worker should not be required to undertake a good-
faith job search if she reasonably believes that she already has a job providing 
equivalent pay.  I would therefore expressly recognize an exception to the good-
faith job-search requirement of  Ohio Adm.Code 4125-1-01(D)(1)I when an 
employer leads an injured worker to the reasonable belief that full-time, 
comparably-paid working hours will be offered, but thereafter fails to provide that 
work. 
{¶ 18} Accordingly, and consistent with the reasoning of the magistrate in 
the court of appeals, I would issue a writ of mandamus ordering the commission 
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to consider the facts and circumstances surrounding  Marrero’s employment 
situation prior to either granting or denying Marrero’s wage-loss-compensation 
claim. Only then will the commission be able to make an informed determination 
as to whether the claimant voluntarily limited her compensation to preclude an 
award of wage-loss compensation and, if so, determine the date at which 
Marrero’s acceptance of part-time work may be deemed voluntary so as to 
thereafter bar an award of wage-loss compensation. 
 
PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
__________________ 
Shapiro, Shapiro and Shapiro Co., L.P.A., Leah P. VanderKaay, and 
Daniel L. Shapiro, for appellant. 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, and Elise Porter, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
 
Deborah Sesak, for appellee Life Care Centers of America, Inc. 
______________________