Case Title: Johnson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-02-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Johnson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div1996 WY 24911 P.2d 1054Case Number: 95-125Decided: 02/22/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming

In 
the Matter of the Workers' Compensation Case of SUSAN Y. JOHNSON, Surviving 
Spouse of STEPHEN R. Johnson, individually and on behalf of KIMBERLEY JOHNSON 
and SHIRLEY JOHNSON, minor children,

Appellants (Petitioners), 

 

v. 

 

STATE of WYOMING, ex rel. Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Division, 

Appellee (Respondent).

 

Certification from the District Court of Campbell 
County; 

Terrence 
L. O'Brien, Judge.

 

Representing 
Appellants: 

C. John Cotton of Wolfe and Cotton, L.L.C., 
Gillette.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

William U. Hill, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, 
Deputy Attorney General; and Jennifer A. Evans, Assistant Attorney General, 
Cheyenne.

 

Before THOMAS, MACY, 
TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ., and ROGERS, District Judge.

ROGERS, District 
Judge. 

[¶1]      The hearing 
examiner denied Appellant Susan Y. Johnson's claim for worker's compensation 
benefits on behalf of herself and her two minor children. Appellants filed a 
petition for review of the hearing examiner's decision with the district court, 
and that court certified the case to the Wyoming Supreme Court pursuant to 
WYO.R.APP.P. 12.09(b).

 

[¶2]      We affirm the 
hearing examiner's decision.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      In their brief, 
Appellants present this statement of the issues:

 

A. Can the Division meet its burden of proof 
regarding intoxication through reliance on evidence which does not meet the 
required "reasonable degree of medical probability standard" and which is 
elicited from an expert who has already testified that he is not able to express 
an opinion and admits that he is not qualified to do so?

 

B. Can the OAH improperly shift the burden of proof 
on intoxication to the employee by making lack of intoxication a part of the 
employee's burden on scope of employment, when the undisputed facts and 
applicable law demonstrate that the employee was within the scope of 
employment?

 

C. Was blood sample evidence admitted and relied upon 
in violation of statutory and constitutional requirements?

 

[¶4]      Appellee Wyoming 
Workers' Compensation Division (Division) states the issues as 
follows:

 

A. Whether the hearing examiner's determination that 
the employee's death did not arise out of and in the course of his employment is 
supported by substantial evidence and in accordance with 
law.

 

B. Whether blood samples taken by the county coroner, 
without the knowledge and consent of the deceased's family, were properly 
admitted as evidence in the contested case proceeding.

 

C. Whether the record contains substantial evidence 
to support the hearing examiner's determination that employee was intoxicated at 
the time of his accident and that employee's intoxication caused his accident 
and death.

 

D. Whether the record contains substantial evidence 
to support the hearing examiner's determination that employee's culpable 
negligence was the sole cause of his accident and death.

 

FACTS

 

[¶5]      The decedent, 
Steven R. Johnson (Johnson), lived in Gillette and was employed as a Senior 
Public Defender with the State of Wyoming, Public Defender's Office. At 
approximately 1:30 p.m. on June 2, 1994, Johnson left his home in Gillette to 
travel to the annual public defender seminar in Saratoga. Prior to embarking on 
his trip, Johnson purchased food, camping supplies, a case of beer and a fifth 
of schnapps. Johnson arrived in Encampment some time before 9:00 p.m. on June 2, 
1994 and shortly after 9:00 p.m. phoned his wife, Appellant Susan Johnson, to 
inform her that he had arrived safely.

 

[¶6]      At approximately 
12:30 a.m. on June 3, 1994, Johnson's vehicle and body were discovered on 
Highway 70 approximately .3 of a mile south of Encampment and .2 of a mile south 
of the turnoff to a campground where Mr. Johnson's belongings were found at a 
campsite he had established. The entrance to the campground was between the 
accident site and Encampment.

 

[¶7]      An investigation 
revealed that Johnson's vehicle had crossed the center line and had gone off the 
left edge of the highway, then returned to the roadway, over-corrected to the 
left, causing the vehicle to roll up to three times. The vehicle came to rest 
upright. Johnson was ejected from the vehicle during the accident and either the 
vehicle or one of its tires rolled over his chest. Johnson's body was found 
lying face down in the roadway near his vehicle, his body was cold, his color 
was pale to bluish and blood from abrasions on his hand was dry. Johnson was 
taken by ambulance to the Carbon County Hospital in Rawlins, where he was 
pronounced dead by Dr. Young, an emergency room physician, at approximately 2:45 
a.m. on June 3, 1994.

 

[¶8]      At approximately 
4:00 a.m. on June 3, 1994, the Carbon County Coroner, Curtis Rostad, drew a 
blood sample from Johnson's jugular vein. Coroner Rostad took two tubes of blood 
using a State of Wyoming Chemical Testing Program Blood Alcohol Analysis kit. 
The blood samples were obtained without the knowledge or consent of Johnson's 
family, and the samples were not obtained at the request or direction of a peace 
officer. No autopsy was performed on Johnson. A subsequent chemical analysis of 
Johnson's blood by the Wyoming Chemical Testing Program revealed a blood alcohol 
concentration of .23 percent.

 

[¶9]      A contested 
hearing was held before the Office of Administrative Hearings. The hearing 
examiner found that Johnson was not acting within the course and scope of his 
employment at the time of his accident and death; Johnson's accident and death 
were proximately caused by intoxication; and Johnson's accident and death do not 
fit the definition of "injury" as set forth in WYO. STAT. § 27-14-102(a)(xii) 
because of his ingestion of alcohol to a point of intoxication and his choice to 
drive a vehicle in that condition, which constituted culpable negligence. The 
hearing examiner, therefore, denied Appellants' request for worker's 
compensation death benefits. Appellants petitioned for review by the district 
court and the district court certified the matter to this 
court.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶10]   WYO.R.APP.P. 12.09 provides that a 
judicial review of administrative decisions is limited to a determination of the 
matters which are specified in WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c)(ii) (1990), which 
provides in pertinent part:

 

(c) . . . [T]he reviewing court shall decide all 
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, 
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action. In 
making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole record or 
those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of the rule of 
prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:

 

. . . . .

 

(ii) Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings and conclusions found to be:

 

(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or 
otherwise not in accordance with law;

 

. . . . .

 

(E) Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case 
reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by 
statute.

 

[¶11]   Whether an employee's injury 
occurred in the course of his employment, and whether an employee's injury was 
caused by his intoxication or culpable negligence are questions of fact. Latimer v. Rissler & McMurry Co., 
902 P.2d 706, 708 (Wyo. 1995); Hepp v. 
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Comp.Div., 881 P.2d 1076, 1077 (Wyo. 1994). 
We review an administrative agency's findings of fact by applying the 
substantial evidence standard. WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(E) (1990). This 
court is required to examine the entire record to determine whether substantial 
evidence supported the hearing examiners's findings. Romero v. Davy McKee Corp., 854 P.2d 59, 
61 (Wyo. 1993). We will not substitute our judgment for that of the hearing 
examiner when substantial evidence supports his decision. Bearden v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Comp., 868 P.2d 268, 269 (Wyo. 1994). Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions. Jackson v. J.W. Williams, 
Inc., 886 P.2d 601, 603 (Wyo. 1994).

 

DISCUSSION

 

1. BURDEN OF PROOF

 

[¶12]   A claimant in a worker's 
compensation case has the burden of proof and, unless a statute dictates 
otherwise, the claimant has the burden of establishing every essential element 
of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Alco of Wyoming v. Baker, 651 P.2d 266, 
267 (Wyo. 1982). The burden is upon a worker's compensation claimant to prove 
that he is entitled to an award of compensation. Gifford v. Cook-McCann Concrete, Inc., 
526 P.2d 1197, 1199 (Wyo. 1974).

 

[¶13]   In this case Appellants had the 
burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the decedent suffered an 
injury which was compensable by the Workers' Compensation Division. "Injury" is 
defined as being

 

any harmful change in the human organism other than 
normal aging and includes damage to or loss of any artificial replacement and 
death, arising out of and in the course of employment while at work in or about 
the premises occupied, used or controlled by the employer and incurred while at 
work in places where the employer's business requires an employee's presence and 
which subjects the employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the 
business.

 

WYO. STAT. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi) (1991).

 

"Injury" does not include:

 

(B) Injury caused by:

 

(I) The fact the employee is intoxicated or under the 
influence of a controlled substance, or both, except any prescribed drug taken 
as directed by an authorized health care provider; or

 

. . . .

 

(C) 
Injury due solely to the culpable negligence of the injured employee; . . . 
.

 

WYO. STAT. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi) (1991).

 

2. STANDARD FOR MEDICAL 
EVIDENCE

 

[¶14]   Appellants challenge the 
admissibility of the testimony of Dr. Goldstein, a toxicologist, called as an 
expert witness on behalf of the Division, whose testimony was admitted by the 
hearing examiner. Appellants contend that Dr. Goldstein's opinions were not 
stated to a "reasonable degree of medical probability" in accordance with Hashimoto v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 767 P.2d 158, 161 (Wyo. 1989). In Hashimoto the trial court instructed the 
jury that damages must be susceptible of ascertainment with "a reasonable degree 
of certainty" to be recoverable. This instruction was challenged on appeal. We 
found the instruction to be in error in that it imposed a standard of proof 
which was too high, but we further held that Hashimoto did not demonstrate 
prejudicial error in that he was awarded damages by the jury. Hashimoto, 767 P.2d  at 
166-67.

 

[¶15]   In Hashimoto the appellant challenged the 
jury instruction which imposed a burden of proof on damages to a "reasonable 
certainty" and thus a higher standard. There was a lengthy discussion by this 
court of the use of the terms "reasonable certainty" and "reasonable 
probability." We held that "reasonable certainty" connotes freedom from doubt, 
and we further said:

 

Since none of us can see into the future, it appears 
quite illogical to attach such a standard [reasonable certainty] to proving 
future pain and suffering in a personal injury case. The law is encumbered by 
human infirmities and thus should not reflect a standard that can only be met by 
a mind reader. Therefore, we find error in the standard of proof [reasonable 
certainty] utilized in the jury instructions. . . .

 

Hashimoto, 767 P.2d  at 167. In the case presently before this 
court, Appellants are challenging the medical proof as having fallen below the 
standard of "reasonable probability."

 

[¶16]   An examination of the record 
reflects that Dr. Goldstein did not state his opinions to a "reasonable 
probability." Dr. Goldstein did state: "I believe that I do have a reasonable 
clinical basis for my opinion, and I would be happy to elaborate on it." Counsel 
for Appellants objected to this testimony on the basis that the witness did not 
have sufficient expertise, that the evidence was improper, without foundation 
and should be stricken. No mention was made in the objection of the fact that 
the opinion was not stated to a reasonable degree of medical 
probability.

 

[¶17]   Dr. Goldstein was not talking about 
damages for future pain and suffering in a personal injury case. He was stating 
his opinion as to the cause of death and when the death was likely to have 
occurred in the sequence of events. While Dr. Goldstein did not use the specific 
terminology that his opinion was to a degree of "reasonable probability," the 
fact that he stated that there was a "reasonable clinical basis" for his opinion 
was sufficient foundation for the admissibility of the opinion which was 
received by the hearing examiner.

 

[¶18]   We therefore reject Appellants 
argument that the Division had failed to meet its burden of proof regarding 
intoxication through reliance on evidence which was not stated to a reasonable 
degree of medical probability standard. We hold that so long as there is a 
sufficient foundation for medical testimony regarding cause of death, extent of 
injuries and the like, that the witness is not required to use the words 
"reasonable probability" in stating the opinion. We do not, however, depart from 
our holding in Hashimoto that future 
pain and suffering in personal injury cases must be proven to a "reasonable 
probability."

 

3. BLOOD SAMPLE EVIDENCE

 

[¶19]   The hearing examiner found that a 
chemist completed two different blood alcohol analyses of part of the sample of 
Johnson's blood using a gas chromatograph method of analysis. The tests revealed 
conclusively that the blood alcohol sample from Johnson's body had an average 
alcohol concentration of 0.23 percent ethyl alcohol.

 

[¶20]   County coroners are elected 
officials in the state of Wyoming whose duties are prescribed by statute. A 
"coroner's case" is a case involving a death which may involve any of the 
following conditions:

 

(A) Violent or criminal action;

 

. 
. . .

 

(C) Accident;

 

(D) Apparent drug or chemical overdose or 
toxicity;

 

(E) The deceased was unattended or had not seen a 
physician within six (6) months prior to death;

 

. 
. . .

 

(H) If the cause is unknown.

 

WYO. STAT. § 7-4-104 
(1995).

 

[¶21]   A county coroner becomes involved 
in a case:

 

(a) When any person is found dead and the death 
appears to have occurred under circumstances indicating the death is a coroner's 
case, the person who discovers the death shall report it immediately to law 
enforcement authorities who shall in turn notify the coroner. . . 
.

 

(b) When the coroner is notified that the dead body 
of any person has been found within the limits of the county or that the death 
resulted from injury sustained within the county and he suspects that the death 
is a coroner's case, he shall conduct an investigation which may 
include:

 

(i) An examination of the body and an investigation 
into the medical history of the case; 

 

(ii) The appointment of a qualified physician to 
assist in determining the cause of death;

 

(iii) An autopsy if the physician appointed to assist 
the coroner under this subsection determines an autopsy is 
necessary;

 

(iv) An inquest; or

 

(v) Any other reasonable procedure which may be 
necessary to determine the cause of death.

. . . .

 

(f) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the 
contrary, the coroner may inspect medical and psychological data relating to the 
person whose death is being investigated if the coroner determines the 
information is relevant and necessary to the 
investigation.

 

WYO. STAT. § 7-4-201 (1995). 
This statute gives the coroner broad authority in investigating deaths which 
properly come under his purview.

 

[¶22]   In this case Johnson died a violent 
death which appeared to be an accident. It was by definition a "coroner's case." 
Under such circumstances the coroner was mandated by statute to conduct an 
investigation which included an examination of the body and other reasonable 
procedures which may be necessary to determine the cause of 
death.

 

[¶23]   The coroner was completely within 
his statutory duties and authority in this case in withdrawing blood samples 
from the decedent's body. Permission was not required of anyone for the coroner 
to conduct the taking of such samples. Under the circumstances of this case, the 
coroner would have been remiss if he had not done so. The coroner had a routine 
practice of taking blood samples from all individuals who die in motor vehicle 
accidents. This is a commendable procedure which is helpful in determining 
whether or not alcohol or drugs are involved in such 
deaths.

 

4. APPLICABILITY OF IMPLIED CONSENT 
STATUTE

 

[¶24]   Dr. Goldstein further testified at 
the hearing that based on the evidence he had reviewed, there was a proper and 
complete chain of custody for the blood sample taken from Mr. Johnson on June 3, 
1994. There is no evidence in the record to dispute this nor is there any 
indication in the record that tests were not properly performed and that the 
blood alcohol content of Johnson's blood at the time of his death was not 0.23 
percent.

 

[¶25]   Appellants contend that the implied 
consent statute precludes the use of evidence of Johnson's blood alcohol 
concentration in this worker's compensation proceeding. The implied consent 
statute provides in part:

 

(a) If arrested for an offense as defined by W.S. 
31-5-233 [driving while under the influence]:

 

(i) Any person who drives or is in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway in this state is 
deemed to have given consent, subject to the provisions of this act, to a 
chemical test or tests of his blood, breath or urine for the purpose of 
determining the alcohol concentration or controlled substance content of his 
blood. The test or tests shall be:

 

(A) Incidental to a lawful 
arrest;

 

. . . .

 

WYO. STAT. § 31-6-102 
(1994).

 

[¶26]   Johnson had not been arrested for 
driving while under the influence and the test was not taken incidental to a 
lawful arrest. By its own terms, the implied consent statute cannot apply to 
this case.

 

5. INTOXICATION

 

[¶27]   In Wyoming it is an affirmative 
defense to a claim for worker's compensation benefits that the employee's injury 
was caused by intoxication. WYO. STAT. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(B)(I) (1991 & 
Cum.Supp. 1995). In other states when intoxication is a defense to a claim for 
worker's compensation benefits, the burden of proof is on the employer or the 
division to prove that the intoxication was the cause of the employee's injury. 
See Estate of Mitchum v. Triple S 
Trucking, 113 N.M. 85, 89, 823 P.2d 327, 331 (Ct.App. 1991), cert. denied, 113 N.M. 16, 820 P.2d 1330 
(1991); Salazar v. City of Santa Fe, 
102 N.M. 172, 178, 692 P.2d 1321, 1327 (Ct.App. 1983), cert. quashed, 102 N.M. 225, 693 P.2d 591 (1985); Hatley v. Lewiston Grain 
Growers, Inc., 97 Idaho 719, 722, 552 P.2d 482, 485 (1976); Kindel v. Ferco Rental, Inc., 258 Kan. 
272, 899 P.2d 1058, 1067 (1995). We hold that in the state of Wyoming the burden 
is on the employer or the Division to prove that the employee's injury was 
caused by intoxication. We have previously defined legal causation 
as:

 

[T]hat conduct which is a substantial factor in 
bringing about the injuries identified in the complaint.

 

Allmaras v. Mudge, 820 P.2d 533, 542 (Wyo. 1991) (quoting Buckley v. Bell, 703 P.2d 1089, 
1091-1092 (Wyo. 1985)).

 

[¶28]   Appellants argue that there was not 
sufficient evidence for the hearing examiner to conclude that Johnson was 
intoxicated and that his intoxication caused his injury. Appellants argue that 
the exact time of death was not established; death occurred sometime between 
9:06 p.m. and 12:30 a.m. when Johnson's body was found on the highway; Johnson 
could have consumed most of the alcohol shortly before the wreck occurred; 
Johnson did not die immediately in the wreck; and his blood alcohol level 
increased substantially after the wreck but before his 
death.

 

[¶29]   Dr. Goldstein testified that the 
blood alcohol test result of 0.23 percent accurately reflected Johnson's blood 
alcohol level at the time of his accident. Dr. Goldstein reached that conclusion 
after thoroughly considering the possibility of delay between Johnson's accident 
and his death and the delay between his death and the drawing of the blood 
sample. Dr. Goldstein concluded that Johnson died instantly or nearly instantly 
following the accident and the delay between the time of his death and the blood 
sampling had no appreciable effect on the accuracy of the blood alcohol content. 
Dr. Goldstein further testified that details about the appearance of the body at 
the scene of the accident, the lack of extensive bleeding, no indication of 
agonal events, and no appearance of any attempt to move on the part of Johnson 
led to the conclusion that Johnson basically hit the road and remained in that 
position until found and that death was likely to have been instantaneous or 
nearly so from the time of the accident.

 

[¶30]   There is substantial evidence in 
the record to show that Johnson left Gillette with a case of beer and a fifth of 
schnapps. Nine cans of beer and one-third of a "fifth" sized bottle of schnapps 
were unaccounted for after the accident. Highway Patrolman Jones who 
investigated the accident testified that, in his opinion, alcohol played a major 
part in Johnson's accident. This opinion was based upon Jones' experience with 
accidents, upon the road conditions, upon the lack of evidence that Johnson took 
evasive actions to avoid an object in the road, and upon the blood alcohol test 
results.

 

[¶31]   We have held that the finder of 
fact is in the best position to judge the weight to be given to the medical 
evidence. Padilla v. Lovern's, Inc., 
883 P.2d 351, 355 (Wyo. 1994). Even though there may have been a conflict in the 
testimony between Dr. Goldstein, the toxicologist, and Dr. Young, the emergency 
room physician, with regard to the time of death and other issues in this case, 
the hearing examiner accepted the testimony of Dr. Goldstein. This court will 
not substitute its judgment for that of the hearing examiner as far as the 
credibility of witnesses is concerned.

 

[¶32]   The hearing examiner's conclusion 
that Johnson's injury was caused by intoxication is supported by substantial 
evidence.

 

[¶33]   Appellants argue that in this case, 
the burden of proof on intoxication was shifted to the employee [Appellants] by 
making him [them] prove lack of intoxication. In Casper Iron & Metal v. Unemp. Ins. 
Comm'n, 845 P.2d 387, 393 (Wyo. 1993), we held that burden of proof, as part 
of the substantive law of evidence, is complex and often confusing, citing 1 D. 
Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal 
Evidence § 65 (1977). In Casper 
Iron we further said:

 

The general term, burden of proof, identifies two 
separate legal doctrines: the burden of persuasion; and the burden of 
production, also termed the burden of producing evidence or the burden of going 
forward with the evidence. Louisell & Mueller, supra, § 66. The burden of persuasion is 
attached to the party who "runs the risk of nonpersuasion." Id. During a trial, this means if the 
"party with the burden of persuasion has not sustained it by a fair 
preponderance of the evidence - if the evidence is in equipoise or the opposing 
party's preponderates - the party with the burden must fail." Id. The burden of producing evidence is 
"the obligation of the party to present at the appropriate time . . . evidence 
on the issue involved of sufficient substance to permit the fact finder to act 
upon it." Id. The burden of producing 
evidence shifts during the presentation of evidence. Id. The burden of persuasion, which 
generally does not shift unless by the operation of a legal presumption, becomes 
operative only after all the evidence is submitted. Id.

 

Casper Iron, 845 P.2d  at 393.

 

[¶34]   In this case the Division had the 
burden of proof of intoxication. Once the Division met its burden by producing 
evidence of intoxication, the burden of producing evidence to the contrary 
shifted to Appellants. The Division still ran the risk of nonpersuasion on the 
issue of intoxication. There was no improper shifting of the burden of proof in 
this case.

 

6. SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT, CULPABLE 
NEGLIGENCE

 

[¶35]   Because we have sustained the 
hearing examiner's finding that Johnson's injury was caused by his intoxication, 
we need not consider the issues of whether Johnson's death arose out of and in 
the course of his employment or whether Johnson's death was caused by his 
culpable negligence.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶36]   We hold that the hearing examiner's 
decision that Johnson's injury was caused by his intoxication was supported by 
substantial evidence.

 

[¶37]   
Affirmed.