Case Title: State ex rel. Summit Cty. Republican Party Executive Commt. v. Brunner

Citation: 2008-Ohio-1035

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2008-03-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Summit Cty. Republican Party Executive Commt. v. Brunner, 117 Ohio 
St.3d 1210, 2008-Ohio-1035.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. SUMMIT COUNTY REPUBLICAN PARTY 
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE v. BRUNNER, SECY. OF STATE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Summit Cty. Republican Party Executive Commt. v. 
Brunner, 117 Ohio St.3d 1210, 2008-Ohio-1035.] 
Motions for protective order to prevent deposition and in limine to limit 
discoverable evidence in an original action challenging secretary of 
state’s rejection of county executive 
committee’s recommended 
appointment to the board of elections — Motions denied. 
(No. 2008-0478─Submitted March 10, 2008─Decided March 10, 2008.) 
IN MANDAMUS, PROHIBITION, AND OTHER WRIT. 
ON RESPONDENT’S MOTIONS FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER AND IN LIMINE. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an original action for a writ of mandamus to compel 
respondent, Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner, to appoint Brian K. Daley to the 
Summit County Board of Elections as recommended by relator, Summit County 
Republican Party Executive Committee, and to reject the secretary’s appointment 
of Donald Varian to serve on the board of elections, a writ of prohibition to 
prevent the secretary from appointing Varian to serve on the board of elections, 
and a peremptory other writ to stay the appointment of Varian pending the 
adjudication of this case.  On March 4, 2008, we denied the committee’s motions 
for emergency writ, stay, or other immediate relief but issued an accelerated 
schedule for the presentation of evidence and briefs. 
{¶ 2} On March 7, the committee filed a notice to take the oral 
deposition of the secretary of state on March 10.  The secretary filed a motion for 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
a protective order to prevent the deposition as well as a motion in limine to limit 
the discoverable evidence in this case. 
Motion for Protective Order 
{¶ 3} The secretary claims that because she is a high-ranking 
government official, the deposition should not occur.  In applying a standard 
requiring extraordinary circumstances before permitting the depositions of high-
ranking government officials, the Supreme Courts of Vermont and West Virginia 
have held the following factors to be significant: 
{¶ 4} “[T]rial courts should weigh the necessity to depose or examine an 
executive official against, among other factors, the substantiality of the case in 
which the deposition is requested; the degree to which the witness has first-hand 
knowledge or direct involvement; the probable length of the deposition and the 
effect on government business if the official must attend the deposition; and 
whether less onerous discovery procedures provide the information sought.”  
Monti v. State (1989), 151 Vt. 609, 613, 563 A.2d 629, 632.  See also State ex rel. 
Paige v. Canady (1996), 197 W.Va. 154, 475 S.E.2d 154, paragraph four of the 
syllabus. 
{¶ 5} Application of these factors here warrants rejection of the 
secretary’s motion for a protective order.  First, this is a matter of great public 
interest involving the secretary’s decision to reject a person recommended by the 
committee to the elections board and her appointment of a different person.  The 
claim is premised upon R.C. 3501.07, which recognizes mandamus actions in this 
court under certain circumstances when the secretary rejects a recommended 
appointee. 
{¶ 6} Second, notwithstanding the secretary’s claim to the contrary, the 
committee’s claims challenge a decision of the secretary herself and not some 
lower-level employee in her office.  R.C. 3501.07 focuses on the secretary’s 
“reason to believe” whether the recommended appointee is competent.  The 
January Term, 2008 
3 
secretary’s personal knowledge and thought process in arriving at her decision 
lies at the heart of this case.  No one else can answer the questions the committee 
has a right to ask. 
{¶ 7} Third, there is no reason to believe that a deposition need take an 
inordinate amount of time.  The issues are limited, involving the secretary’s 
decisions to reject Daley’s appointment and to appoint Varian. 
{¶ 8} Fourth, because of the accelerated evidence schedule that we have 
ordered, a deposition may indeed be the least onerous way to generate the 
necessary responses.  The secretary can relate her own thought process in her own 
words, which would avoid a potentially lengthy battle over other forms of 
discovery seeking the same information.  In fact, the secretary asserts in her 
motion that the protective order should be “granted precluding her testimony in 
any form in this case.”  (Emphasis added.)  This indicates that even if the 
committee attempted less generally burdensome discovery methods, e.g., 
interrogatories, the secretary would still not respond. 
{¶ 9} Therefore, the secretary is not entitled to a protective order based 
on the fact that she is a high-ranking government official. 
{¶ 10} Nor is the secretary entitled to a protective order to prevent her 
deposition testimony based on the deliberative-process privilege.  Cf., e.g., State 
ex rel. Dann v. Taft, 110 Ohio St.3d 252, 2006-Ohio-3677, 853 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 26. 
{¶ 11} Therefore, we deny the secretary’s motion for a protective order, 
and the deposition should proceed. 
Motion in Limine 
{¶ 12} The secretary also seeks a motion in limine to limit the issue before 
the court to her reasonable belief that Daley was not competent to serve as an 
elections board member because she claims that all other evidence is irrelevant.  
We deny the motion because the parties should be able to introduce all potentially 
relevant evidence at this early stage of the case.  We will ultimately determine 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
which evidence is pertinent to the committee’s claims in resolving those claims on 
the merits. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 13} Based on the foregoing, we deny the secretary’s motions. 
Motions denied. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Grendell & Simon Co., L.P.A., and Timothy J. Grendell, for relator. 
 
Marc Dann, Attorney General, and Richard N. Coglianese, Damian W. 
Sikora, Pearl M. Chin, and Michael J. Schuler, Assistant Attorneys General, for 
respondent. 
______________________