Case Title: State v. Mattox

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015AP000158-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2017-02-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
2017 WI 9 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP158-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Rozerick E. Mattox, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 14, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 26, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha 
 
JUDGE: 
Jennifer Dorow 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, J., joined by BRADLEY, A. W., J. 
dissent (Opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief and oral 
argument by Leon W. Todd, assistant state public defender. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Luke 
N. Berg, deputy solicitor general, with whom on the brief was 
Misha Tseytlin, solicitor general and Brad D. Schimel, attorney 
general. 
 
 
 
 
 
2017 WI 9
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP158-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2013CF471) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Rozerick E. Mattox, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 14, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Waukesha 
County, Jennifer Dorow, Judge.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   The court of appeals 
certified this case to the court to determine whether the 
admission of a toxicology report through a medical examiner's 
testimony violated Rozerick E. Mattox's Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation.  After a bench trial,1 Mattox was convicted of 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Jennifer R. Dorow of Waukesha County 
presided. 
No. 
2015AP158-CR 
 
2 
 
first-degree reckless homicide for delivering heroin that caused 
S.L.'s death.2  Specifically, the certified question asks: 
Does it violate a defendant's rights under the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution for the State to introduce 
at trial a toxicology report identifying certain drugs 
in a deceased victim's system and/or testimony of a 
medical examiner basing his/her cause-of-death opinion 
in part on the information set forth in such a report, 
if the author of the report does not testify and is 
not otherwise made available for examination by the 
defendant? 
¶2 
The certification explains that two recent court of 
appeals 
decisions 
reached 
opposite 
conclusions 
in 
heroin 
overdose homicide cases involving toxicology reports.  See State 
v. Heine, 2014 WI App 32, 354 Wis. 2d 1, 844 N.W.2d 409; State 
v. VanDyke, 2015 WI App 30, 361 Wis. 2d 738, 863 N.W.2d 626. 
During the underlying trials in both Heine and VanDyke, the 
toxicology reports were used during testimony by the medical 
examiners who performed the autopsies and relied on the 
toxicology reports to determine the cause of death in each case.  
The lab analyst who signed the toxicology reports did not 
testify.  In Heine, the court of appeals held the toxicology 
report could be used without violating the confrontation right.  
Id., 354 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶1, 15.  But in VanDyke, it held the 
                                                 
2 Mattox was convicted under Wis. Stat. § 940.02(2)(a)(2011-
12), which defines first-degree reckless homicide in pertinent 
part 
as: 
"Whoever 
causes 
the 
death 
of 
another 
human 
being . . . [b]y 
manufacture, 
distribution 
or 
delivery, 
in 
violation of s. 961.41, of a controlled substance . . . if 
another human being uses the controlled substance . . . and dies 
as a result of that use." 
No. 
2015AP158-CR 
 
3 
 
toxicology report was "testimonial"; therefore, according to the 
court of appeals, the report's admission through the medical 
examiner's testimony violated the Confrontation Clause under 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (admission of 
"testimonial" out-of-court statements without affording the 
defendant 
the 
opportunity 
to 
cross-examine 
the 
declarant 
violates the Confrontation Clause).  VanDyke, 361 Wis. 2d 738, 
¶¶14-17.  The certification notes that neither Heine nor VanDyke 
sought review in this court but that "a supreme court decision 
could lay this issue to rest for the bench and bar." 
¶3 
We answer the certified question in the negative and 
therefore overrule VanDyke.  Admitting this type of toxicology 
report and the medical examiner's related testimony does not 
violate a defendant's confrontation right because the toxicology 
report was not "testimonial" under the primary purpose test 
recently set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. 
Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015).  Under that test, when the 
statement's primary purpose is something other than to "creat[e] 
an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony" its admission 
does not implicate the Confrontation Clause.  Id. at 2180, 2183 
(quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011)). 
¶4 
The primary purpose of the toxicology report in this 
case was to assist the medical examiner in determining the cause 
of death.  All objective indicators show the report was not 
created for an evidentiary purpose:  (1) the medical examiner 
testified she requested the toxicology analysis as a part of her 
autopsy protocol; (2) the toxicology report was not sworn, 
No. 
2015AP158-CR 
 
4 
 
certified, or in the form of an affidavit and it comprised only 
numerals quantifying the concentration of substances contained 
in S.L.'s blood, urine, and tissue samples without any analysis 
or interpretation of those numbers; (3) the police were not 
involved in the autopsy or toxicology requests; (4) the report 
was not requested by or reported directly to law enforcement; 
(5) according to the record, the analyst who signed the report 
had no knowledge the report related to a crime; and (6) the 
report did not give an opinion on the cause of death or any 
element of the crime for which Mattox was charged.  Accordingly, 
the admission and use at trial of this toxicology report did not 
violate Mattox's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.3  We 
affirm the judgment convicting Mattox. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶5 
At about 2:30 a.m. on February 15, 2013, S.L.'s 
roommate wanted to talk to S.L. and tried to get S.L. to open 
his locked bedroom door.  After receiving no response, the 
roommate broke open the door to the bedroom, where he found S.L. 
deceased. 
¶6 
City of Waukesha police and a Waukesha County deputy 
medical examiner came to the apartment.  They found S.L. hunched 
over on the bedroom floor with drug paraphernalia on a chair 
nearby.  They also found some non-prescription ibuprofen and 
                                                 
3 Mattox does not raise any other ground for possible 
exclusion of the toxicology report; thus, our review is limited 
to whether its admission violated the Confrontation Clause. 
No. 
2015AP158-CR 
 
5 
 
prescription 
Clonazepam, 
a 
drug 
used 
to 
treat 
anxiety.   
Waukesha County Deputy Medical Examiner, Nichol Wayd, spoke with 
police at the scene to get background facts, took pictures, and 
transported S.L.'s body to the morgue for an autopsy. 
¶7 
After the body was removed from the scene, the police, 
under the supervision of City of Waukesha Detective Thomas 
Casey, collected the drug paraphernalia from S.L.'s room, 
including multiple syringes (one of which had been used 
recently), a small metal cooker, a tourniquet, and some cotton 
balls.  These items were submitted to the State Crime Lab for 
analysis. 
¶8 
On February 15, 2013, Dr. Zelda Okia, an associate 
medical examiner for Waukesha County, performed the autopsy on 
S.L.'s body in order to determine the cause of death.  The 
autopsy protocol included examining the body and collecting and 
sending biological samples to a toxicology lab.  The Waukesha 
County Medical Examiner's Office used the St. Louis University 
toxicology lab because a board certified toxicologist runs the 
lab and Waukesha County does not have the equipment to conduct 
its own toxicology tests.  During the autopsy, Dr. Okia noted 
pulmonary edema, cerebral edema, 13 recent needle puncture marks 
in S.L.'s arms, and elevation in the weight of his lungs——all 
signs indicating death caused by drug overdose.  Dr. Okia 
collected samples of S.L.'s blood, urine, and tissue near the 
injection sites, as well as one control tissue sample.  She sent 
these 
samples 
to 
the 
toxicology 
lab 
with 
the 
following 
information:  (1) S.L.'s name, age, weight, and race; (2) a 
No. 
2015AP158-CR 
 
6 
 
history reading "Found unresponsive at Home"; (3) a listing of 
medications available as "Clonazepam, Ibuprofen"; and (4) a 
request to "Please test all above specimens" for "Alcohol" and 
"General Unknown."  The lab received the specimens on February 
19, 2013, and the toxicology report was completed on March 13, 
2013. 
¶9 
The toxicology report, which is attached in the 
Appendix, lists the substances for which each sample was tested, 
as well as either the word "negative" or "positive."  A number 
appears next to any substance identified within the sample.  As 
pertinent here, the toxicology report indicates the following: 
The blood sample contained: 
 "0.61 MICROGRAMS/ML" of total morphine;  
 "LESS THAN 0.05 MICROGRAMS/ML" of "6-MONOACETYLMORPHINE"; 
and 
 "0.27 MICROGRAMS/ML" of free morphine.   
The urine sample contained: 
 "0.74 MICROGRAMS/ML" of codeine; 
 "GREATER THAN 4 MICROGRAMS/ML" of morphine; 
 "2.5 MICROGRAMS/ML" of "6-MONOACETYLMORPHINE"; and 
 "0.13 MICROGRAMS/ML" of hydromorphone. 
The tissue samples, including the control sample, all contained 
measurable amounts of morphine: 
 "0.28 MICROGRAMS/GM" in "Antecubital vein and fat"; 
 "0.14 MICROGRAMS/GM" in "Right anterior forearm vein and 
fat"; 
No. 
2015AP158-CR 
 
7 
 
 "0.16 MICROGRAMS/GM" in "Right ventral forearm vein and 
fat"; 
 "0.11 MIRCROGRAMS/GM" in "Right anterior forearm vein and 
fat"; and  
 "0.14 MIRCROGRAMS/GM" in "Left antecubital vein and fat."  
Dr. Christopher Long signed the toxicology report but the report 
was not sworn or certified and does not contain any affidavit-
like assertions.  The report does not explain the significance 
of any of the numbers nor does it provide an interpretation of 
the chemical levels. 
¶10 Upon 
receiving 
the 
toxicology 
report, 
Dr. 
Okia 
completed her autopsy report.  Although the autopsy report is 
not dated, it must have been completed after March 13, 2013, 
because it lists the blood sample morphine quantities from the 
toxicology report.  Dr. Okia's autopsy report concludes that 
S.L.'s cause of death was "Acute Heroin Intoxication."  The 
autopsy report does not indicate any police involvement with the 
autopsy or the toxicology lab.  The police were not involved in 
requesting, sending, or receiving the biological samples from or 
to the toxicology lab. 
¶11 The 
City 
of 
Waukesha 
Police 
investigation 
into   
S.L.'s death proceeded independently from the county medical 
examiner's office.  The only connection in this record between 
the medical examiner's office and the police is the fact that 
both responded to the scene and together notified S.L.'s next of 
kin of his death.  Dr. Wayd also sent to police her 
investigative 
report, 
which 
is 
required 
in 
all 
State 
No. 
2015AP158-CR 
 
8 
 
investigations and routinely produced.  The report contains a 
summary of the medical examiner's observations from the scene 
and it documents the notification of S.L.'s next of kin 
regarding his death. 
¶12 The independent police investigation resulted in a 
conclusion by law enforcement that S.L. died from an overdose of 
heroin supplied by Mattox.  The State Crime Lab certified, in an 
October 2013 report, that the recently used syringe and metal 
cooker police collected from S.L.'s apartment tested positive 
for the presence of heroin.  Cell phone and financial records, 
bank video surveillance, and interviews with S.L.'s family and 
friends enabled police to retrace S.L.'s steps the day before 
his death.  This led police to S.L.'s friend, Terry Tibbits.  
Ten days after S.L.'s death, the police spoke with Tibbits, who 
admitted he helped S.L. buy heroin from Mattox mid-morning on 
February 14, 2013.  Video surveillance from a bank ATM confirmed 
Tibbits' report that the two withdrew $100 from S.L.'s bank 
account shortly before meeting with Mattox.  Tibbits told police 
he gave $80 of S.L.'s ATM withdrawal to Mattox in exchange for a 
half gram of heroin.  After the heroin purchase, Tibbits and 
S.L. immediately used 25 percent of the half gram, and S.L. kept 
the rest.  The police learned from Tibbits that he regularly 
bought heroin from Mattox, a fact police confirmed when Tibbits 
arranged for a controlled buy of heroin from Mattox on March 8, 
2013.  After the controlled buy, police arrested Mattox for 
selling heroin.  During police questioning, Mattox admitted he 
sold Tibbits heroin two to three times a week, but claimed he 
No. 
2015AP158-CR 
 
9 
 
did not remember whether Tibbits bought heroin from him on 
February 14, 2013. 
¶13 The police obtained cell phone records for Tibbits, 
Mattox, and S.L., which supported the details Tibbits told 
police.  From additional interviews with S.L.'s family and 
friends, police learned that S.L. was a heroin addict, had been 
arrested for heroin possession earlier that month, and had a 
court appearance related to that arrest the afternoon of 
February 14, 2013.  Police also learned that S.L.'s regular 
heroin supplier was in jail and S.L. had been trying to stop 
using heroin. 
¶14 After being charged in April 2013 with reckless 
homicide for S.L.'s death, Mattox pled not guilty and the case 
was tried to the court.  At trial, Mattox did not deny that he 
regularly sold heroin to Tibbits, but he insisted he had not 
done so on February 14, 2013.  He did not dispute that S.L. died 
from ingesting heroin; rather, he argued that S.L. bought the 
deadly heroin from some other heroin dealer. 
¶15 At trial, Dr. Okia explained the autopsy procedure in 
a suspected overdose situation where the cause of death is 
unknown.  The procedure requires collecting biological specimens 
to be sent to the toxicology lab for analysis.  When the 
prosecutor asked Dr. Okia about the toxicology report, Mattox 
objected to its admission on the grounds that it violated his 
No. 
2015AP158-CR 
 
10 
 
right to confrontation.4  The circuit court overruled the 
objection, holding that the toxicology report was admissible 
under Wis. Stat. § 907.03 (2011-12)5 as a basis for expert 
opinion testimony and because it was not being admitted for its 
truth or to prove an element of the crime.  The circuit court 
limited the admission of the report accordingly. 
¶16 Dr. 
Okia 
testified 
that 
her 
cause 
of 
death 
determination was based on her observations made during the 
autopsy as well as the toxicology results she reviewed.  She 
testified: 
 0.61 micrograms per milliliters of morphine in the blood 
is a fatal amount; although the toxicology report did not 
state this, she knew it from her training and experience. 
 Less 
than 
0.05 
micrograms 
per 
milliliters 
of 
6-
monoacetylmorphine (6-MAM for short) in the blood is 
specific for heroin; it means the morphine in the blood 
came from heroin and could not have come from any other 
substance. 
                                                 
4 Mattox did not object to the admission of the lab reports 
finding the presence of heroin on the drug paraphernalia 
collected from S.L.'s bedroom and finding that the substance 
seized during the March 8, 2013 controlled drug buy was heroin.  
He stipulated to the admission of those Wisconsin State Crime 
Lab reports without requiring the lab analysts to testify at 
trial. 
5 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2015AP158-CR 
 
11 
 
 0.27 micrograms per milliliters of free morphine in the 
blood is "actual active morphine" and is a fatal amount; 
the toxicology report did not explain this but she knew 
it from her training and experience. 
¶17 Dr. Okia also testified about the other numbers in the 
toxicology report.  She explained that the codeine in S.L.'s 
urine is a contaminant often found in heroin cases because 
codeine is used to manufacture heroin.  She further explained, 
however, that substances detected in urine indicate the presence 
of the substances but cannot be used to determine the cause of 
death because "urine typically concentrates the drugs."  She 
looks only for "active drugs in the blood" in assessing cause of 
death. 
¶18 The circuit court found Mattox guilty.  He appealed to 
the court of appeals, claiming that admission of the toxicology 
report, without testimony at trial by the analyst who signed it, 
violated his right to confrontation.  The court of appeals 
certified the case to this court, and we accepted it for review. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶19 Whether the admission of the toxicology report and the 
medical examiner's testimony based upon it violates Mattox's 
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation is a question of 
constitutional law subject to independent review.  See State v. 
Williams, 2002 WI 58, ¶7, 253 Wis. 2d 99, 644 N.W.2d 919. 
¶20 Both 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution and the Wisconsin Constitution guarantee a criminal 
No. 
2015AP158-CR 
 
12 
 
defendant the right to confront witnesses who testify against 
the defendant at trial.  See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Wis. Const. 
art. 1, § 7.6  "We generally apply United States Supreme Court 
precedent when interpreting these clauses."  State v. Jensen, 
2007 WI 26, ¶13, 299 Wis. 2d 267, 727 N.W.2d 518 (2007). 
B.  Precedent 
¶21 This case presents an issue of first impression that 
neither this court nor the United States Supreme Court has 
directly addressed.  Since the Supreme Court decided Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), we have issued only two opinions 
involving the application of the Confrontation Clause to 
forensic lab reports, and neither opinion involved a toxicology 
report requested by the medical examiner as a part of an autopsy 
to determine the cause of death where a crime had not yet been 
uncovered.  See State v. Griep, 2015 WI 40, 361 Wis. 2d 657, 863 
N.W.2d 567; State v. Deadwiller, 2013 WI 75, 350 Wis. 2d 138, 
834 N.W.2d 362. 
¶22 Griep involved a drunk-driving prosecution where an 
expert witness relied on a blood alcohol lab report certified by 
an analyst who was not available to testify at trial.  The 
report was not admitted, but an expert witness reviewed the lab 
                                                 
6 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides:  "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him . . . ."  Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution states:  "In all criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall enjoy the right . . . to meet the witnesses face to 
face . . . ." 
No. 
2015AP158-CR 
 
13 
 
report and testified about the blood alcohol result it reported.  
We held Griep's confrontation right was not violated because the 
expert merely reviewed the lab report to form an independent 
opinion to which the expert testified.  See Griep, 361 
Wis. 2d 657, ¶¶1-3.  The holding in Griep did not depend on 
whether the report itself was testimonial because the report was 
not admitted into evidence. 
¶23 Deadwiller involved a sexual assault prosecution where 
an expert witness used a DNA profile created by an out-of-state 
lab using vaginal and cervical swabs from the victim to form an 
independent conclusion.  Deadwiller, 350 Wis. 2d 138, ¶¶1, 40.  
Deadwiller challenged the testimony of the State Crime Lab 
analyst who entered the DNA profile into the DNA database and 
found it matched Deadwiller.  Id., ¶40.  Relying on Williams v. 
Illinois, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012), a plurality 
opinion 
with 
facts 
substantially 
identical 
to 
those 
in 
Deadwiller, we determined no confrontation violation occurred.  
Deadwiller, 
360 
Wis. 2d 138, 
¶¶1-2. 
 
Significantly, 
the 
defendant in Deadwiller did not contest the very fact supported 
by the DNA profile——that he had intercourse with the victims——
rather, the defendant testified that the victims consented.  
Id., ¶36.  Neither Griep nor Deadwiller is squarely on point 
here. 
¶24 Likewise, the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the 
issue presented in this case.  Unquestionably, the Court 
substantially 
changed 
confrontation 
jurisprudence 
when 
it 
decided Crawford in 2004.  See Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2179.  The 
No. 
2015AP158-CR 
 
14 
 
Crawford 
Court 
overruled 
the 
Confrontation 
Clause 
test 
articulated in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), which had 
allowed 
admission 
of 
out-of-court 
statements 
exhibiting 
"adequate indicia of reliability" if the statement either fell 
"within 
a 
firmly 
rooted 
hearsay 
exception" 
or 
bore 
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."  See Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 40; Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2179 (quoting Roberts, 448 
U.S. at 66).  Crawford returned confrontation law to its 
original meaning and held a defendant's right to confrontation 
is violated if the trial court receives into evidence out-of-
court statements by someone who does not testify at the trial if 
those statements are "testimonial" and the defendant has not had 
"a 
prior 
opportunity" 
to 
cross-examine 
the 
out-of-court 
declarant.  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.  The Crawford Court did 
not provide a comprehensive definition of "testimonial," but it 
concluded that, "at a minimum," "testimonial" statements include 
"prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, 
or at a former trial and . . . police interrogations" because 
these are the types of evidence "at which the Confrontation 
Clause 
was 
directed." 
 
Id. 
 
Crawford's 
definition 
of 
"testimonial" required the statement to have some degree of 
formality.  See id. at 51.  Post-Crawford, confrontation 
challenges begin with an analysis of whether the out-of-court 
statements used against a defendant are "testimonial."  If the 
statements are not testimonial, the Confrontation Clause is not 
implicated. 
No. 
2015AP158-CR 
 
15 
 
¶25 Since Crawford, the Supreme Court decided several 
confrontation cases in a variety of contexts and further defined 
whether statements are or are not "testimonial."  See Davis v. 
Washington, 
547 
U.S. 
813, 
822 
(2006) 
(establishing 
that 
statements 
"are 
nontestimonial 
when 
made . . . under 
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of 
the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an 
ongoing 
emergency" 
(emphasis 
added)); 
Melendez-Diaz 
v. 
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310-11 (2009) (concluding that 
affidavit-like 
certifications, 
which 
proved 
the 
fact 
in 
question——that a seized substance was cocaine——were testimonial 
because they were "functionally identical to live, in-court 
testimony, doing 'precisely what a witness does on direct 
examination'" (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 830)); Michigan v. 
Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 377-78 (2011) (holding that statements 
made by a dying shooting victim were nontestimonial where 
informal nature of police questioning demonstrated officers' 
primary purpose of assessing the situation and responding to 
ongoing emergency); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 664-
65 (2011) (treating a lab report regarding defendant's blood-
alcohol content as testimonial because, despite the absence of 
notarization, the author's certification was a formal, signed 
report "created solely for an 'evidentiary purpose' . . . [and] 
made in aid of a police investigation" (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 
557 U.S. at 311)); Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. ___, 132 S. 
Ct. 2221, 2243 (2012) (plurality opinion) (concluding that DNA 
profile generated from sexual assault victim's vaginal swabs was 
No. 
2015AP158-CR 
 
16 
 
not testimonial because its "primary purpose . . . was not to 
accuse [the suspect] or to create evidence for use at trial"); 
Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2181 (2015) (determining that 
child abuse victim's statements to teacher were not testimonial 
because the informal questions at a school were asked with a 
primary purpose as a "concerned citizen . . . talk[ing] to a 
child who might be the victim of abuse," not "to gather evidence 
for . . . prosecution"). 
C.  Application 
¶26 Three of these Supreme Court cases discussed the 
Confrontation Clause within the context of forensic lab reports:  
Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming, and Williams.  Melendez-Diaz involved 
cocaine drug dealing where the challenged evidence comprised 
"affidavits reporting the results of forensic analysis which 
showed that material seized by the police and connected to the 
defendant was cocaine."  Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 307-08.  
Bullcoming involved a drunk-driving arrest where the forensic 
lab report was created at the request of and for the "aid of a 
police investigation," "solely for an 'evidentiary purpose.'"  
Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 651, 664 (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 551 
U.S. at 311).  The lab report certified Bullcoming's blood-
alcohol concentration, the chain of custody of the blood sample, 
the qualifications of the analyst, the lab procedures, and that 
all procedures had been followed.  Id. at 653.  The Court held 
both lab reports were testimonial and their admission, without 
the opportunity to cross-examine the authors, violated the 
No. 
2015AP158-CR 
 
17 
 
Confrontation Clause.  See Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311; 
Bullcoming, 564 U.S at 663-65. 
¶27 Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming do not control here 
because the lab report and its evidentiary use in Mattox's case 
bear no resemblance to the reports or their use in Melendez-Diaz 
or Bullcoming.  First, the forensic reports in Melendez-Diaz and 
Bullcoming were requested by police following the seizure of 
evidence from a criminal suspect, and the lab reports were 
specifically created for use against the suspects in criminal 
prosecutions. 
 
See 
Melendez-Diaz, 
557 
U.S. 
at 
310-11; 
Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 651, 664-65.  Second, the Melendez-Diaz 
and Bullcoming reports satisfied the formality factor because 
each report was affidavit-like or certified——providing the 
functional equivalent of trial testimony——significantly, about 
an element of the crime in each case.  In Melendez-Diaz, the 
Supreme Court concluded that "[t]he Sixth Amendment does not 
permit the prosecution to prove its case via ex parte out-of 
court affidavits."  Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 329. 
¶28 Here, the medical examiner took biological samples 
during an autopsy of a decedent who died of unknown causes.   
The police did not seize the tested evidence from Mattox, who 
was not suspected of committing a crime when the samples were 
taken.  The toxicology report was not requested by the police or 
solicited for the purpose of generating evidence against Mattox.  
At the time the medical examiner sent the samples for testing, 
there was no defendant against whom to generate evidence because 
there was no known crime.  The medical examiner was simply 
No. 
2015AP158-CR 
 
18 
 
looking for information to determine the cause of death and 
submitted the biological samples to the toxicology lab pursuant 
to autopsy protocols.  The police were not involved in sending 
the samples to the lab or generating evidence against a 
defendant with respect to the autopsy, and the record is devoid 
of any suggestion that the medical examiner was working as an 
agent of the police in an active criminal investigation to 
develop evidence for use in a criminal prosecution. 
¶29 Further, the toxicology report in this case lists the 
concentration of the various substances present in S.L.'s 
biological samples sent for testing.  The numbers in the report 
relate to S.L., not Mattox.  Unlike in Melendez-Diaz and 
Bullcoming, the analyst who signed the report was not acting as 
a witness against Mattox and was not offering testimony with the 
primary purpose of saying that the heroin Mattox sold to S.L. 
killed him.  The toxicology report does not even contain the 
word "heroin," and the report does not accuse Mattox of 
anything.  Based on these significant differences, Melendez-Diaz 
and Bullcoming are easily distinguishable. 
¶30 Williams is the third Supreme Court case addressing 
confrontation rights where a forensic lab report was used at 
trial without the testimony of the author of the report.  The 
Williams case involved a sexual assault where the defendant 
claimed that use of a DNA profile violated his confrontation 
rights.  See Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2227.  A four-Justice 
plurality concluded the DNA report was not testimonial because 
it had been prepared not "for the primary purpose of accusing a 
No. 
2015AP158-CR 
 
19 
 
targeted individual" but to "catch a dangerous rapist who was 
still at large."  Id. at 2243.  Because Williams does not have 
precedential value except in a case with substantially similar 
facts, it does not apply here.  See Griep, 361 Wis. 2d 657, ¶39. 
¶31 Thus, none of the Supreme Court's confrontation cases 
specifically discuss the Confrontation Clause within the context 
of the issue presented here:  whether a toxicology report——
prepared at the medical examiner's request as a part of the 
autopsy protocol in a drug overdose death——constitutes testimony 
in a homicide prosecution against the dealer who supplied the 
heroin responsible for the fatal overdose. 
¶32 Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, guides our review.  
Although Clark did not involve a toxicology report prepared as a 
part of an autopsy, it pronounces the controlling principles in 
determining whether an out-of-court statement is "testimonial" 
and therefore subject to the Confrontation Clause.  Clark 
reaffirms the primary purpose test:  the dispositive "question 
is 
whether, 
in 
light 
of 
all 
the 
circumstances, 
viewed 
objectively, 
the 
'primary 
purpose' 
of 
the 
[out-of-court 
statement] was to creat[e] an out-of-court substitute for trial 
testimony."  Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2180 (quoting Bryant, 562 U.S. 
at 358).  The primary purpose test decides whether the declarant 
is acting as a witness against the defendant, see Clark, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2185 (Scalia, J., concurring), by considering whether the 
primary purpose of the out-of-court statement "was to gather 
evidence for [the defendant's] prosecution."  Id. at 2181.  
Clark instructs that some factors relevant in the primary 
No. 
2015AP158-CR 
 
20 
 
purpose analysis include:  (1) the formality/informality of the 
situation producing the out-of-court statement; (2) whether the 
statement is given to law enforcement or a non-law enforcement 
individual; (3) the age of the declarant7 and (4) the context in 
which the statement was given.  Id. at 2180-82. 
¶33 In order to decide whether the declarant in this case—
—the analyst who signed the toxicology report——was acting as a 
witness against Mattox, we must apply the primary purpose test. 
We start by examining the purpose of the toxicology report.  Dr. 
Okia testified that, as a routine part of her autopsy protocol 
in suspected overdose cases, she collects biological specimens 
and sends them to the toxicology lab for testing to determine 
what substances, if any, are present in a decedent's blood, 
urine, and tissue.  The reason for the testing is to inform the 
medical examiner's opinion as to the cause of death.  Thus, the 
primary purpose of the toxicology report here was to provide 
information to the medical examiner as part of the autopsy 
protocol, not to establish certain toxicology levels in order to 
prove an element of a criminal charge.  Indeed, no charges were 
pending or contemplated against Mattox at the time the medical 
examiner 
requested 
this 
toxicology 
report. 
 
Because 
the 
toxicology report was not intended to substitute for testimony 
                                                 
7 This factor, though pertinent in Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 
2173, 2181 (2015), is not applicable here and will not be 
discussed. 
No. 
2015AP158-CR 
 
21 
 
in a criminal prosecution, the report's primary purpose very 
clearly is not testimonial. 
¶34 Another factor to consider in making the primary 
purpose determination is the "informality of the situation."  
Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2180 (quoting Bryant, 562 U.S. at 377).  A 
formal out-of-court statement is considered more likely to be 
testimonial, and an informal one is considered less likely to be 
testimonial.  As a part of this analysis, Clark looked at 
whether the statements at issue were given to law enforcement 
officers or non-law enforcement individuals.  Id. at 2181.  
Clark stopped short of adopting a "categorical rule" that 
statements 
to 
non-law 
enforcement 
individuals 
will 
never 
implicate the Confrontation Clause, but the Court held that 
statements to persons other than law enforcement officers were 
"much less likely to be testimonial than statements to law 
enforcement officers."  Id.  The toxicology report at issue in 
Mattox's case was not prepared for or given to law enforcement, 
making it much less likely to be testimonial.  Although the 
toxicology report is "formal" in the sense that it is 
typewritten, titled, and signed, this slight formality does not 
imply a testimonial purpose in a way that traditionally formal 
attestations, such as notarization or certification, might. 
¶35 The facts in the record provide additional context, 
which Clark teaches is "highly relevant" to the primary purpose 
analysis in confrontation cases.  See Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2182.  
The declarant created the report at the request of the medical 
examiner, not the police, to provide the medical examiner with 
No. 
2015AP158-CR 
 
22 
 
the numerical concentration of substances, if any, present in 
the decedent's biological samples.  The report was generated to 
help the medical examiner determine S.L.'s cause of death, not 
to help the police produce evidence for a criminal prosecution.  
Nothing in the record suggests the declarant knew that the 
police were conducting a simultaneous investigation into S.L.'s 
death or that the police would eventually conclude that a crime 
occurred.  To the contrary, the information provided to the 
toxicology lab declarant gave no indication that S.L.'s death 
would prompt a homicide prosecution or that police were involved 
in any way.  The specimens came from the medical examiner's 
office with information that S.L. was found "unresponsive at 
home" with Clonazepam and ibuprofen nearby.  Under Wis. Stat. 
§§ 979.02 and 979.04, a medical examiner has broad, independent 
discretion to conduct an autopsy "for the purpose of inquiring 
how the person died" if there are "unexplained or suspicious 
circumstances" accompanying the death, see also Scarpaci v. 
Milwaukee Cty., 96 Wis. 2d 663, 684, 292 N.W.2d 816 (1980), and, 
as the State points out, homicides account for "less than one 
percent" of the 1300 deaths the Waukesha County Medical 
Examiner's Office investigates each year. 
¶36 Context shows the primary purpose of the toxicology 
report was to provide the medical examiner with the results of 
tests performed on the biological specimens of an individual who 
died for unknown reasons.  It was not to aid police in a 
criminal investigation or to prove an element of a later-charged 
crime; it was not created as a substitute for out-of-court 
No. 
2015AP158-CR 
 
23 
 
testimony to prove Mattox killed S.L.  Mattox did not dispute 
any fact conveyed by the toxicology report, instead basing his 
defense on the theory that S.L. bought the heroin that killed 
him from another dealer.  A toxicology report used as a partial 
foundation 
for 
a 
medical 
examiner's 
cause 
of 
death 
determination——a report lacking any accusation or basis therefor 
against the defendant——is not the type of evidence "at which the 
Confrontation Clause was directed."  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 
68. 
¶37 Applying all the pertinent Clark factors in this case 
results in a single conclusion:  the toxicology report in this 
case was not "testimonial" because its primary purpose was to 
identify 
the 
concentration 
of 
the 
tested 
substances 
in 
biological samples sent by the medical examiner as a part of her 
autopsy to determine the cause of death——not to create a 
substitute for out-of-court testimony or to gather evidence 
against Mattox for prosecution.  Use of this toxicology report 
during trial did not infringe Mattox's confrontation right. 
D.  General Declaration on Autopsies and Toxicology Reports 
¶38 The State asks this court to declare that, in general, 
admitting autopsy reports and any underlying toxicology reports 
will not violate a defendant's confrontation right because these 
types of reports do not generate testimonial evidence.  The 
State asserts this is so because the primary purpose of 
autopsies is to determine cause of death and not to generate 
evidence against a criminal defendant.  Although the Supreme 
Court has not declared this to be the law, the State cites a 
No. 
2015AP158-CR 
 
24 
 
variety of court decisions supporting its proposition.  See 
United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 87-102 (2d Cir. 2013) 
("autopsy report was not testimonial because it was not prepared 
primarily to create a record for use at a criminal trial"); 
People v. Leach, 2012 IL 111534, ¶¶76-138, 980 N.E.2d 570 
(autopsy report not testimonial because it was not "prepared for 
the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual" or for 
"providing evidence in a criminal case" (citations omitted)); 
State v. Maxwell, 2014-Ohio-1019, ¶¶54-65, 9 N.E.3d 930 (autopsy 
reports are not testimonial because "they are created 'for the 
primary purpose of documenting cause of death for public records 
and public health'" (quoting Carolyn Zabrycki, Comment, Toward a 
Definition of "Testimonial": How Autopsy Reports Do Not Embody 
the Qualities of a Testimonial Statement, 96 Calif. L. Rev. 
1093, 1130 (2008))).  The State acknowledges that some courts 
have held autopsies "testimonial," but the State asserts this 
occurred only under special circumstances, such as when law 
enforcement is physically present at the autopsy or leans 
heavily on the medical examiner to produce reports favoring 
prosecution against a criminal defendant.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30, 73 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (ruling 
autopsy report testimonial where police "observed the autopsies" 
and "participated in the creation of reports"); State v. 
Navarette, 294 P.3d 435, 440 (N.M. 2013) (ruling autopsy report 
testimonial where "two police officers attended the autopsy"). 
¶39 We decline the State's request.  The medical examiner 
who performed the autopsy in this case testified at trial, 
No. 
2015AP158-CR 
 
25 
 
eliminating any confrontation argument with respect to the 
autopsy report itself.  A declaration on autopsies is not 
presented under the circumstances in this case. 
¶40 We do declare a general rule with respect to the type 
of toxicology report at issue here.  When a medical examiner——
unilaterally and not in conjunction with law enforcement——
requests a toxicology report while performing an autopsy to 
determine the cause of death, admitting the toxicology report 
generally will not violate the Confrontation Clause when the 
toxicology report contains solely a numerical account of the 
concentration of substances within a decedent's blood, urine, 
and tissue.  The primary purpose of toxicology reports generated 
and used under circumstances similar to those presented in this 
case is not to generate evidence against a defendant in a 
criminal prosecution but to assist the medical examiner in 
determining the cause of death.  Because admission of this type 
of toxicology report bears no "resemblance to the historical 
practices that the Confrontation Clause aimed to eliminate,"8 
such reports generally will not be "testimonial" and therefore 
will not trigger confrontation concerns. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶41 This case presented an issue of first impression:  
whether an out-of-state toxicology report requested by a medical 
examiner as a part of the routine autopsy protocol in a drug 
                                                 
8 Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 379 (2011) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
No. 
2015AP158-CR 
 
26 
 
overdose death constitutes testimonial evidence in the resulting 
homicide prosecution against the drug dealer who supplied the 
heroin responsible for the fatal overdose.  Guided by the 
Supreme Court's most recent confrontation case, Ohio v. Clark, 
135 S. Ct. 2173, which requires application of the "primary 
purpose" test, we conclude the toxicology report here is not 
"testimonial" and its use at trial therefore did not infringe 
upon Mattox's confrontation right.  We overrule the court of 
appeals' decision in State v. VanDyke, 361 Wis. 2d 738, because 
the court of appeals erroneously held a substantially similar 
toxicology report to be "testimonial."  Id., ¶17. 
¶42 We decline the State's request to declare all autopsy 
reports, absent special circumstances, to be non-testimonial 
because that is not the issue presented here.  We do, however, 
hold that all toxicology reports similar to the one here——solely 
identifying 
the 
concentration 
of 
substances 
present 
in 
biological samples sent by the medical examiner as a part of an 
autopsy protocol——are generally non-testimonial when requested 
by a medical examiner and not at the impetus of law enforcement.  
The primary purpose of these toxicology reports is not to create 
evidence against a defendant in a criminal prosecution; rather, 
the principal purpose is to provide information to the medical 
examiner searching for the cause of death. Because there was 
nothing "testimonial" about the toxicology report used during 
Mattox's trial, the confrontation rights of the defendant were 
not infringed. 
No. 
2015AP158-CR 
 
27 
 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is 
affirmed. 
No. 
2015AP158-CR 
 
28 
 
 
APPENDIX 
No. 
2015AP158-CR 
 
29 
 
 
 
No. 
2015AP158-CR 
 
30 
 
 
No.  2015AP158-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶43 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   (dissenting).  Circuit 
courts 
across 
the 
state 
frequently 
address 
the 
question 
presented in the instant case:  "How does the Confrontation 
Clause apply to the panoply of crime laboratory reports and 
underlying technical statements written by (or otherwise made 
by) laboratory technicians?"1   
¶44 This 
question 
lies 
at 
the 
intersection 
of 
the 
Confrontation Clause and the rules of evidence.  Answering the 
question requires the application of the Confrontation Clause to 
numerous types of laboratory reports and witnesses testifying 
about or relying on reports they did not produce.2 
¶45 "Testimonial 
statements 
of 
witnesses 
absent 
from 
trial" violate a defendant's confrontation right unless "the 
declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a 
prior opportunity to cross-examine."  Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004).  Crawford substantially changed 
confrontation law.   
¶46 Since Crawford, the United State Supreme Court has 
progressively 
defined 
whether 
out-of-court 
statements 
of 
different types and in different contexts are testimonial. Some 
might say that the United States Supreme Court cases defining 
testimonial are in disarray, and this disarray is reflected in 
opinions being rendered across the country. 
                                                 
1 State v. Deadwiller, 2013 WI 75, ¶47, 350 Wis. 2d 138, 834 
N.W.2d 362 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). 
2 Deadwiller, 
350 
Wis. 2d 138, 
¶51 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
concurring). 
No.  2015AP158-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
¶47 The instant case involves an autopsy report and a  
toxicology report. The autopsy report was admitted in evidence.  
The medical examiner who produced the report testified and was 
subject to examination and cross-examination about the autopsy 
report.  The admission of the autopsy report in evidence does 
not present a confrontation issue. 
¶48 By contrast, the toxicology report was admitted into 
evidence by the circuit court, which stated that the toxicology 
report was not being "offered to prove any element that is at 
issue in this particular case in terms of what substance was 
delivered."  The toxicology report was prepared at the request 
of 
the 
medical 
examiner 
by 
an 
independent, 
out-of-state 
laboratory.  No witness testified about the preparation of the 
toxicology report.  The medical examiner referred to the 
toxicology report in her testimony about the autopsy and her 
opinion about the cause of death.3  
¶49 On appeal, however, the parties, the certification by 
the court of appeals, and the majority opinion apparently are  
inconsistent in how they characterize the admission of the 
toxicology report in evidence.  Although the majority opinion 
mentions that the circuit court did not admit the toxicology 
report for its truth, majority op., ¶15, the majority opinion is 
                                                 
3 See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) 
(plurality opinion) (No Sixth Amendment violation exists when 
"[a]n expert witness referred to the report not to prove the 
truth of the matter asserted in the report, i.e., that the 
report contained an accurate profile of the perpetrator's DNA, 
but only to establish that the report contained a DNA profile 
that matched the DNA profile deduced from petitioner's blood."). 
No.  2015AP158-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
not clear in how it treats the admission of the toxicology 
report.  Compare majority op., ¶15 ("[T]he toxicology report 
"was admissible under Wis. Stat. § 907.03 (2011-12) as a basis 
for expert opinion testimony . . . ."), ¶19 ("Whether the 
admission of the toxicology report and the medical examiner's 
testimony based upon it violates Mattox's Sixth Amendment right 
to confrontation . . . .); ¶41 ("[W]e conclude the toxicology 
report here is not 'testimonial' and its use at trial therefore 
did not infringe upon Mattox's confrontation right.").  
¶50 What is clear in the majority opinion is that it 
adopts a primary purpose test for determining whether the 
toxicology report, a forensic report, is testimonial under the 
confrontation clause. 
¶51 The majority opinion at ¶32 (emphasis added and 
internal 
citations 
omitted) 
asserts 
that 
it 
takes 
its 
formulation of the primary purpose test from Ohio v. Clark, 135 
S. Ct. 2173 (2015), and states the test as follows:  
[T]he dispositive "question is whether, in light of 
all 
the 
circumstances, 
viewed 
objectively, 
the 
"primary purpose" of the [out-of-court statement] was 
to creat[e] an out-of-court substitute for trial 
testimony." . . .  The primary purpose test decides 
whether the declarant is acting as a witness against 
the defendant . . . by considering whether the primary 
purpose of the out-of-court statement "was to gather 
evidence for [the defendant's] prosecution."4  
                                                 
4 Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173 (2015), involves a 
traditional out-of-court declarant's statement.  It does not 
address forensic reports.   
(continued) 
No.  2015AP158-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶52 The 
majority 
opinion's 
approach 
presents 
two 
difficulties, however——difficulties the majority opinion masks.   
• Although the majority opinion states that 
Clark 
"pronounces the controlling principles in determining 
whether an out-of-court statement is 'testimonial,'" 
majority op., ¶32, the majority opinion's statement of 
Clark's primary purpose test is not fully faithful to 
Clark.  The majority opinion, without explanation, 
cherry-picks what might be characterized as the 
narrowest formulation of Clark's primary purpose test 
and severely limits the definition of "testimonial" 
for purposes of the confrontation clause. 
                                                                                                                                                             
In Clark, the United States Supreme Court held that a 
child's statement to her teacher, which asserted that her 
mother's boyfriend was abusing her, was nontestimonial.  The 
statement was nontestimonial because the child was too young to 
have the primary purpose to accuse the defendant and made the 
statements in the context of an ongoing emergency (his mother's 
boyfriend's abuse).  Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2184 (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
Justice Scalia, who wrote Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36 (2004), beginning a new era in confrontation law, concurred 
in Clark, declaring that the majority in the United States 
Supreme Court is "shoveling fresh dirt upon the Sixth Amendment 
right of confrontation so recently rescued from the grave in 
Crawford v. Washington . . . ."  Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2184 
(2015) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
The majority opinion also gleans from the Clark opinion the 
following factors relevant in the primary purpose analysis:  
"(1) The formality/informality of the situation producing the 
out-of-court statement; (2) whether the statement is given to 
law enforcement or a non-law enforcement individual; (3) the age 
of the declarant and (4) the context in which the statement was 
given."  Majority op., ¶32 (footnote omitted). 
No.  2015AP158-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
• Although all nine justices of the United States 
Supreme Court (as of the Court's last forays into 
defining "testimonial") agree that whether an out of 
court statement is testimonial depends (at least to an 
extent) on the primary purpose of the out-of-court 
statement, the United States Supreme Court justices 
have not uniformly or consistently formulated the 
primary purpose test.  Different primary purpose tests 
are set forth by different justices in different 
contexts.  Slight differences in the formulation of 
the primary purpose test can lead a court to a 
different conclusion regarding the testimonial nature 
of out-of-court statements.         
¶53 The majority opinion is not fully faithful to Clark 
because it does not reveal or apply a primary purpose test that 
Clark derives from confrontation cases.  Clark declares that 
"[statements] are testimonial when the circumstances objectively 
indicate . . . that the primary purpose of the interrogation is 
to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later 
criminal prosecution."  Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2180 (quoting Davis 
v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006)).  I refer to this 
formulation of the primary purpose test as the "potentially 
relevant" test. 
¶54 The United States Supreme Court cases demonstrate that 
the justices are not necessarily in agreement about the 
formulation of the primary purpose test.  I therefore examine 
the Court's confrontation cases to set forth the various 
No.  2015AP158-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
formulations 
of 
the 
primary 
purpose 
test, 
including 
the 
"potentially relevant" test. 
¶55 I 
begin 
with 
the 
Crawford 
case, 
the 
seminal 
confrontation clause case.5     
¶56 Although 
Crawford 
did 
not 
conclusively 
define 
"testimonial," the Court did set forth three "formulations of 
[the] core class of testimonial' statements," which appear to 
have influenced later formulations of the primary purpose test:  
[E]x parte 
in-court testimony or its functional 
equivalent——that is, . . . pretrial statements that 
declarants 
would 
reasonably 
expect 
to 
be 
used 
prosecutorially.  
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (quoting Brief for Petitioner Michael 
Crawford). 
[E]xtrajudicial 
statements . . . contained 
in 
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, 
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions. 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 
346, 365 (Thomas, J., concurring in part & concurring in 
judgment). 
[S]tatements that were made under circumstances which 
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe 
that the statement would be available for use at a 
later trial.  
                                                 
5 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), involved an 
assault and attempted murder case.  At trial, the State 
introduced an incriminating recorded statement made by the 
defendant's wife (she did not testify because of marital 
privilege).  The Court held that the State's use of the recorded 
statement violated the Confrontation Clause. 
No.  2015AP158-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 (quoting Brief for Amicus Curiae 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers).6   
¶57 Then, in Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 
(2006),7 Justice Scalia stated the primary purpose test as 
follows: 
[Statements] are testimonial when the circumstances 
objectively indicate . . . that the primary purpose of 
the interrogation is to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. 
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.    
¶58 In Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011),8 the 
primary purpose inquiry was described using Justice Scalia's 
"potentially relevant" formulation of the primary purpose test 
as follows: 
[Statements] are testimonial when the circumstances 
objectively 
indicate 
that . . . the 
primary 
                                                 
6 See State v. Manuel, 2005 WI 75, ¶37, 281 Wis. 2d 554, 697 
N.W.2d 811 (stating these three formulations). 
7 Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006), involved 
two cases consolidated on appeal.  Each involved out-of-court 
statements made by domestic abuse victims and then used at 
trial.  One case (Davis v. Washington) held nontestimonial a 
domestic abuse victim's statements made to a 911 operator during 
an altercation with her boyfriend.  The second case (Hammon v. 
Indiana) held testimonial an affidavit written by a domestic 
abuse victim with the assistance of law enforcement.     
8 Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, involved a statement 
made to law enforcement by a shooting victim lying mortally 
wounded in a parking lot.  The victim died shortly thereafter, 
but his statement was later used at trial; the petitioner was 
convicted of second-degree murder at trial.  The Court held that 
the statement identifying, describing, and locating the shooter 
were not testimonial statements because they had a "primary 
purpose . . . to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency."  Bryant, 562 U.S. at 349.           
No.  2015AP158-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
purpose . . . is to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.  
Bryant, 562 U.S. at 356 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).  
Justice Sotomayor, writing for the majority in Bryant, stated 
the test as follows:  
When, 
as 
in 
Davis, 
the 
primary 
purpose 
of 
an 
interrogation is to respond to an "ongoing emergency," 
its purpose is not to create a record for trial and 
thus is not within the scope of the Clause.  But there 
may 
be 
other 
circumstances, 
aside 
from 
ongoing 
emergencies, when a statement is not procured with a 
primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute 
for trial testimony.  
Bryant, 562 U.S. at 358. 
¶59 In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 
(2009),9 the Court considered the testimonial nature of forensic 
reports for the first time since Crawford.  Melendez-Diaz stated 
the primary purpose test as follows: 
[Statements 
are 
testimonial 
when] 
"made 
under 
circumstances which would lead an objective witness 
reasonably to believe that the statement would be 
available for use at a later trial."  
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 
52). 
                                                 
9 In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310 
(2009), the trial court admitted certificates of state crime 
laboratory analysis that concluded that the drugs seized were 
cocaine.  The Court held that admission of these certificates 
without 
in-person 
testimony 
by 
the 
analyst 
violated 
the 
defendant's confrontation right.  
No.  2015AP158-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
¶60 In Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011),10 
another case involving a forensic report, the primary purpose 
inquiry was described in "potentially relevant" terms as 
follows:    
To rank as "testimonial," a statement must have a 
"primary purpose" of "establish[ing] or prov[ing] past 
events 
potentially 
relevant 
to 
later 
criminal 
prosecution."  
Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 659 n.6 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 
822).11  Concurring in Bullcoming, Justice Sotomayor stated the 
primary purpose test as follows:  
                                                 
10 Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011), involved a 
forensic laboratory report certifying that the defendant had a 
blood-alcohol concentration that was above the legal limit.  The 
analyst who prepared the report was on unpaid leave, so the 
State attempted to use the testimony of another analyst to 
validate the report.  Over the petitioner's objection, the trial 
court admitted the report into evidence.  The Court held that 
admitting this report violated the defendant's confrontation 
rights because the preparing analyst did not testify.  
11 The Bullcoming court explicitly rejected the argument 
that the report of the forensic lab analyst is nontestimonial 
because the analysts are "mere scriveners" who transcribe 
results 
from 
machines 
but 
do 
not 
interpret 
or 
exercise 
independent judgment.  Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 659.  Instead, 
Justice Ginsburg explained:  
[The analyst] certified [in the report] that he 
received Bullcoming's blood sample intact with the 
seal unbroken, that he checked to make sure that the 
forensic 
report 
number 
and 
the 
sample 
number 
"correspond[ed]," 
and 
that 
he 
performed 
on 
Bullcoming's sample a particular test, adhering to a 
precise protocol.  He further represented, by leaving 
the "[r]emarks" section of the report blank, that no 
"circumstance 
or 
condition. . . affect[ed] 
the 
integrity of the sample or . . . the validity of the 
analysis."  These representations, relating to past 
events and human actions not revealed in raw, machine-
produced data, are meet for cross-examination.  
(continued) 
No.  2015AP158-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
To determine if a statement is testimonial, we must 
decide whether it has "a primary purpose of creating 
an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony."  
Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 669 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting 
Bryant, 562 U.S. at 357). 
¶61 In Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012)12, the 
Court's third case involving a forensic report, the primary 
purpose was described as follows: 
In identifying the primary purpose of an out-of-court 
statement, we apply an objective test.  We look for 
the primary purpose that a reasonable person would 
have ascribed to the statement, taking into account 
all of the surrounding circumstances. 
 
. . . . 
 
Here, the primary purpose of the . . . report, viewed 
objectively, was not to accuse petitioner or to create 
evidence for use at trial.  
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2243.  
¶62 The dissent in Williams criticized this formulation of 
the primary purpose test as devoid of support in either the text 
                                                                                                                                                             
Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 660 (internal citations omitted). 
The Court also noted that "the comparative reliability of 
an analyst's testimonial report drawn from machine-produced data 
does not overcome the Sixth Amendment bar."  Bullcoming, 564 
U.S. at 661 (2011). 
Finally, the Bullcoming Court reiterated that the Sixth 
Amendment confrontation right could not be diminished for the 
sake of administrative or prosecutorial convenience. 
12 Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012), involved a 
bench trial for rape.  A forensic specialist testified that a 
sample of petitioner's blood matched a DNA profile collected 
through 
a 
vaginal 
swab 
and 
analyzed 
by 
an 
independent 
laboratory.  
No.  2015AP158-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
or the history of the Sixth Amendment's confrontation right. 
Justice Kagan wrote that no case has ever suggested that the 
statement must be meant to accuse a previously identified 
individual.  
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2273 (Kagan, J., 
dissenting).  Justice Kagan reiterated that the primary purpose 
test using the "potentially relevant" standard is proper as 
follows:  
We have previously asked whether a statement was made 
for the primary purpose of establishing "past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution"——
in 
other 
words, 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
providing 
evidence. . . . None of our cases has ever suggested 
that, in addition, the statement must be meant to 
accuse a previously identified individual . . . .  
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2273-74 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822; citing Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2716–
17; Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1157, 1165; Melendez–Diaz, 557 U.S. at 
310-11; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52) 
¶63 These several formulations of the primary purpose test 
are informative and illustrate that the U.S. Supreme Court has 
not adopted a single, definitive formulation of the primary 
purpose test.  
¶64 The "potentially relevant" test, however, is the most 
prevalent in the Court's cases,13 and is helpful in the instant 
                                                 
13 See People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 490 (Cal. 2012) (Liu, 
J., dissenting) (the "potentially relevant" formulation of the 
primary purpose test is the "most faithful to the high court's 
authoritative pronouncements in prior cases going back to 
Crawford."). 
For a discussion of hearsay, constitutional confrontation, 
and due process, see 2 McCormick on Evidence § 252 (Kenneth S. 
Broun ed., 7th ed. 2013 & Supp. 2016). 
No.  2015AP158-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
case:  "To rank as 'testimonial,' a statement must have a 
'primary purpose' of 'establish[ing] or prov[ing] past events 
potentially 
relevant 
to 
later 
criminal 
prosecution."  
Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 659, n.6 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 
822. 
¶65 In applying the various formulations of the primary 
purpose test, I would look first and foremost to the three 
United States Supreme Court cases involving forensic reports: 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), Bullcoming 
v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011), and Williams v. Illinois, 
132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012).  
¶66 In the first two of these three cases, the United 
States Supreme Court concluded that the forensic reports were 
testimonial and did bear a resemblance to the historical 
practices that the confrontation clause aims to eliminate.  The 
third case did not produce a majority opinion and has been 
subject to a variety of interpretations, but may hold no 
precedential value except in cases with identical facts. See 
majority op., ¶30 (explaining the limited precedential value of 
Williams v. Illinois).  
¶67 Clark involves a traditional out-of-court declarant's 
statement, not a forensic report.  Clark does not address these 
three prior Supreme Court cases involving the confrontation 
clause 
and 
forensic 
reports.14 
 
The 
majority 
opinion's 
                                                 
14 The three United States Supreme Court forensic report 
cases, however, are lost along the way as Clark does not cite 
Bullcoming, Melendez-Diaz, or Williams and does not address 
forensic reports. 
No.  2015AP158-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
application of the primary purpose test fails to consider the 
guidance that these prior three cases dealing with forensic 
reports offer.   
¶68 The 
"potentially 
relevant" 
test 
was 
used 
in 
Bullcoming, which involves a forensic report, as does the 
instant case. The forensic report in the instant case is similar 
to the forensic tests used to determine whether a substance is a 
controlled substance.  See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. 305 
(holding testimonial an analyst's report that substance was 
cocaine).   
¶69 With little success, the majority opinion attempts to 
distinguish Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming because the toxicology 
report in the instant case "lists the concentrations of the 
various substances present in S.L.'s biological samples sent for 
testing," so "the analyst who signed the report was not acting 
as a witness against Mattox . . . ."  Majority op., ¶29.   
¶70 This argument appears to be similar to the "mere 
scrivener" 
argument 
already 
rejected 
in 
Bullcoming. 
The 
Bullcoming court explicitly rejected the argument that forensic 
lab analysts' reports are nontestimonial because the analysts 
are "mere scriveners" who transcribe results from machines but 
do not interpret or exercise independent judgment.  Bullcoming, 
564 U.S. at 659.15   
                                                 
15 Justice Ginsburg explained:  
[The analyst] certified [in the report] that he 
received Bullcoming's blood sample intact with the 
seal unbroken, that he checked to make sure that the 
forensic 
report 
number 
and 
the 
sample 
number 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP158-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
¶71 The "potentially relevant" test seems in keeping with 
the purpose of the confrontation clause:  "[T]he Clause's 
ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence . . . by 
testing in the crucible of cross-examination."  Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 61.  And the "principal evil at which the Clause was 
directed . . . [was] use of ex parte examinations as evidence 
against the accused."  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50.  In the instant 
case, the toxicology report is a form of ex parte examination 
insofar as the report was prepared outside of the circuit court 
or the defendant's presence.  Because the State used the 
toxicology report as evidence against the defendant, he had the 
right to test the reliability of the report through cross-
examination.   
¶72 Furthermore, the "potentially relevant" formulation of 
primary purpose seems to fit the circumstances of the instant 
case.  "None of [the Court's] cases has ever suggested 
that . . . the statement must be meant to accuse a previously 
                                                                                                                                                             
"correspond[ed]," 
and 
that 
he 
performed 
on 
Bullcoming's sample a particular test, adhering to a 
precise protocol.  He further represented, by leaving 
the "[r]emarks" section of the report blank, that no 
"circumstance 
or 
condition . . . affect[ed] 
the 
integrity of the sample or . . . the validity of the 
analysis." These representations, relating to past 
events and human actions not revealed in raw, machine-
produced data, are meet for cross-examination. 
Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 660 (internal citations omitted). 
The Court also noted that "the comparative reliability of 
an analyst's testimonial report drawn from machine-produced data 
does not overcome the Sixth Amendment bar."  Bullcoming, 564 
U.S. at 661.  
No.  2015AP158-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
identified individual . . . ."  Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2274 
(Kagan, J., dissenting).  Even though the toxicology report was 
not about Mattox, it could be (and was) used against Mattox.    
¶73 The majority opinion does not explain why it ignores 
the "potentially relevant" formulation of the primary purpose 
test and how the "potentially relevant" formulation would apply 
in the instant case.  Instead, the majority states and applies a 
primary 
purpose 
test 
that 
limits 
"testimonial" 
to 
those 
statements that create "an out-of-court substitute for trial 
testimony" in which the declarant "act[s] as a witness against 
the defendant."  The majority opinion looks to whether the 
"primary purpose of the out-of-court statement was to gather 
evidence for the defendant's prosecution."  Majority op., ¶32 
(emphasis added).16   
                                                 
16 Although the majority says that Clark "pronounces the 
controlling principles in determining whether an out-of-court 
statement is 'testimonial,'" majority op., ¶32, the majority's 
restatement of the primarily purpose test is not fully faithful 
to Clark.  Clark actually uses the language "the primary purpose 
of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution."  Clark, 135 
S. Ct. at 2180 (emphasis added).   
Because Clark uses "potentially relevant," I do the same.  
The majority's language, "to create an out-of-court substitute 
for trial testimony," implies a higher Sixth Amendment bar.       
No.  2015AP158-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
¶74 The question is whether this formulation of the 
primary purpose test comports with the bulk of the Court's 
confrontation cases.  It does not.17 
¶75 The majority opinion should refocus its inquiry to 
include as a primary purpose whether the toxicology report had a 
primary 
purpose 
of 
establishing 
"past 
events 
potentially 
relevant to later criminal prosecution."  Davis, 547 U.S. at 
822.  
¶76 Applying the "potentially relevant" formulation in the 
instant case, as well as the other formulations of the primary 
purpose test, I conclude that the toxicology report's primary 
purpose was to establish whether S.L. died of a heroin overdose, 
a fact that was "potentially relevant to later prosecution."    
¶77 When the Waukesha Medical Examiner's Office requested 
a toxicology report conducted with samples taken from S.L., the 
report's primary purpose was to aid in determining the cause of 
S.L.'s 
death——a 
fact 
"potentially 
relevant" 
to 
a 
later 
prosecution.  While external signs at the scene of the death, as 
well as those discovered during the autopsy, suggested an 
overdose, the toxicology report was needed to determine what 
type of drug caused the overdose.  When the circumstances 
surrounding the report are considered, the "primary purpose" of 
                                                 
17 "None of our cases has ever suggested that, in addition, 
the statement must be meant to accuse a previously identified 
individual; indeed, in Melendez–Diaz, we rejected a related 
argument 
that 
laboratory 
'analysts 
are 
not 
subject 
to 
confrontation because they are not "accusatory" witnesses.'"  
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2274 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 313.   
No.  2015AP158-CR.ssa 
 
17 
 
the toxicology report was arguably to "establish or prove past 
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution."  
Clark, 135 S. Ct. at 2179-80 (emphasis added).   
¶78 The report was "made for the purpose of establishing 
or proving some fact," Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310-11, and 
that 
fact 
was 
"potentially 
relevant 
to 
later 
criminal 
prosecution."  Clark, 135 S. Ct at 2180.  That fact being, of 
course, that S.L.'s death was caused by an overdose of heroin——a 
fact that, at that time, Dr. Okia surely considered to be 
relevant to a later criminal prosecution.   
¶79 Remember, S.L.'s death was the subject of a law 
enforcement investigation from the outset.  When Dr. Okia's 
colleague, Deputy Medical Examiner Nichol Wayd,18 arrived at the 
scene of S.L.'s death in the predawn hours of February 2, 2013, 
after being called to the scene by law enforcement, she was 
briefed by law enforcement before investigating the death.  Wayd 
also had to wait for a detective to arrive before touching 
anything at the scene of the death.  At trial, the prosecutor 
asked about what Wayd does with death-related evidence when she 
investigates a death.  Wayd responded:  
                                                 
18 Nichol Wayd was a "deputy medical examiner/investigator 
for the Waukesha County Medical Examiner's Office."  She 
testified at Mattox's trial.  Part of her testimony involved her 
qualifications and her qualification as an expert "in the field 
of crime scene investigations" (emphasis added).  Significantly, 
she 
has 
special 
training 
"in 
the 
area 
of 
crime 
scene 
investigations involving drug overdoses" and is a "diplomate" of 
and 
member 
of 
"the 
American 
Board 
of 
Medicolegal 
Death 
Investigators."  In addition to testifying at trial, Wayd 
prepared an "Investigative Report" that was admitted at trial.   
No.  2015AP158-CR.ssa 
 
18 
 
It 
depends 
on 
the 
circumstances. 
 
In 
this 
circumstance, I was asked to wait for the detectives 
to arrive before I touched anything that could 
potentially 
need 
to 
be 
preserved, 
so 
in 
this 
situation, I did not touch any evidence in the room or 
even in the residence for that matter, so I stood by, 
waited for the detectives to arrive . . . .   
Once the detective arrived, the detective and the deputy medical 
examiner investigated S.L.'s room and the deputy medical 
examiner did a preliminary examination of the body before 
transporting it to the morgue.  Even at this early stage, the 
detective's 
presence 
indicates 
that 
law 
enforcement 
were 
conducting a law enforcement investigation of S.L.'s death.   
¶80 Dr. Okia performed an autopsy the next morning.  
Before conducting the autopsy of S.L.'s body, Dr. Okia would 
presumably 
have 
reviewed 
the 
deputy 
medical 
examiner's 
"Investigative Report" or another document to apprise herself of 
the situation surrounding S.L.'s death.  She must have noted 
that S.L.'s death occurred under suspicious circumstances (he 
was, after all, an apparently healthy 27-year-old found dead), 
suggesting that the death may have been the result of a crime.   
¶81 By her examination of the body (and review of the 
report's discussion of the evidence obtained in S.L.'s room, 
such as syringes), Dr. Okia must have suspected that S.L. died 
because of a drug overdose and that there might be a homicide 
charge against the deliverer of a controlled substance.  Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 940.02(2)(a). 
 
Therefore, 
when 
she 
ordered 
the 
toxicology report, her primary purpose was to determine whether 
an illegal drug caused an overdose.    
No.  2015AP158-CR.ssa 
 
19 
 
¶82 Ultimately, Dr. Okia would use the toxicology report 
as a basis for her conclusion that S.L. died of a heroin 
overdose.  Establishing that S.L. died from heroin was essential 
to the prosecution's charge against Mattox:  homicide by 
distribution of a controlled substance.  Dr. Okia testified that 
the signs of overdose discovered through her examination were 
consistent 
with 
the 
signs 
of 
an 
over-the-counter 
opiate 
overdose.        
¶83 Surely, under these facts, the toxicology report was 
"prepared in connection with a criminal investigation or 
prosecution . . . [and] therefore within the compass of the 
Confrontation Clause."  Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 658-59.   
¶84 It bears repeating that law enforcement and the 
Waukesha Medical Examiner's Office worked together from the 
beginning.  
¶85 The 
close 
legal 
relationship 
between 
medical 
examiners, law enforcement, and district attorneys in Wisconsin 
also evidences a testimonial purpose.    
¶86 In 
Wisconsin, 
medical 
examiners 
work 
in 
close 
conjunction with law enforcement pursuant to Wis. Stat. ch. 979 
when investigating deaths and their duties overlap with those of 
law enforcement.  By statute, police must immediately notify the 
medical examiner when a death occurs under a variety of 
No.  2015AP158-CR.ssa 
 
20 
 
circumstances, including suspected homicides or other suspicious 
circumstances.  Wis. Stat. § 979.01(1g).19   
¶87 Furthermore, the resulting toxicology report helped to 
prove a fact (cause of death) that was "potentially relevant" to 
a future prosecution, even if not yet commenced.  Clark, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2179.     
                                                 
19 Medical examiners (or district attorneys) may order 
autopsies "in cases where an inquest might be had as provided in 
s. 979.04 . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 979.02.  Inquests may be 
ordered if  
there is reason to believe from the circumstances 
surrounding the death that felony murder, first−degree 
or 2nd−degree intentional homicide, first−degree or 
2nd−degree reckless homicide, homicide by negligent 
handling of dangerous weapon, explosives or fire, 
homicide by negligent operation of vehicle, homicide 
resulting from negligent control of a vicious animal 
or homicide by intoxicated user of a vehicle or 
firearm may have been committed, or that death may 
have been due to suicide or unexplained or suspicious 
circumstances . . . .   
Wis. Stat. § 979.04(2) (emphasis added). 
See Olejnik v. England, 147 F. Supp. 3d 763 (W.D. Wis. 
2015):  
[A] medical examiner acts outside his jurisdiction 
when he orders or conducts an autopsy either without 
having made a subjective determination that there is 
any reason to believe that any of the statutory 
circumstances justifying an autopsy exists or having 
made a subjective determination that there is no 
reason 
to 
believe 
that 
any 
of 
the 
statutory 
circumstances justifying an autopsy exists. 
Olejnik, 147 F. Supp. 3d at 775 (quoting Scarpaci v. Milwaukee 
Cty., 96 Wis. 2d 663, 292 N.W.2d 816 (1980)). 
No.  2015AP158-CR.ssa 
 
21 
 
¶88 I turn from the majority opinion's analysis of primary 
purpose 
to 
additional 
factors 
set 
forth 
in 
Clark 
that 
demonstrate that the toxicology report is nontestimonial.  See 
majority op., ¶¶32, 35-37.   
¶89 In the instant case, the pertinent factors are the 
statement's 
context 
and 
formality, 
including 
whether 
the 
statement was given to law enforcement.  Because I have already 
discussed context as part of my application of the primary 
purpose test——which the majority seems to do, as well, majority 
op., ¶¶33, 35, 36——I consider the formality of the toxicology 
report.    
¶90 Although the majority tries to downplay the formality 
of the toxicology report, see majority op., ¶34, the toxicology 
report's formality is functionally equivalent to that of the 
forensic report in Bullcoming.   
¶91 The toxicology "report" is a "signed document[s] 
providing the results of forensic testing designed to "'prove[e] 
some fact' in a criminal proceeding."  Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 
2266 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (discussing Bullcoming).  And like 
the report in Bullcoming, the toxicology report's formal 
certification is limited to a signature by the analyst on a 
formal document entitled "St. Louis University Toxicology 
Laboratory Report."  Although Waukesha County did not have to 
produce at trial "everyone who laid hands on the evidence," 
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2532, n.1, the defendant Mattox had 
a right to confront someone who helped produce the toxicology 
report or could give an independent opinion of the report. 
No.  2015AP158-CR.ssa 
 
22 
 
¶92 The analyst's signature on this sort of document is an 
important indicium of formality because it certifies a constant 
chain of custody, integrity of the processes used by the St. 
Louis University Laboratory, and, overall, the accuracy of the 
report's 
contents——that 
is, 
the 
signature 
certifies 
the 
assertions contained in the report regarding levels of toxicity 
contained in S.L.'s blood and tissue samples.  See Bullcoming, 
564 U.S. at 661-62.   
¶93 I conclude that the majority opinion erroneously 
classifies the report as non-testimonial.  Dr. Okia ordered the 
toxicology report in circumstances indicating that the autopsy 
she was conducting might be potentially relevant to a later 
criminal prosecution.  Indeed, she ordered the toxicology report 
pursuant to the quasi-law enforcement role set forth for medical 
examiners in Wis. Stat. § 979.04(2).   
¶94 Finally, like in Bullcoming and Melendez-Diaz, the 
problem with the toxicology report's admission was that it was 
used to prove a fact at trial, but no one was able to testify 
about the processes used at the testing facility.             
¶95 The majority opinion's flawed application of the 
primary purpose test has not provided a "Crawford boundary," 
where courts may find a "logical stopping place between 
requiring the prosecution to call as a witness one of the 
laboratory experts who worked on the matter and requiring the 
prosecution to call all of the laboratory experts who did so."  
Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2246, 2248 (Breyer, J., concurring).   
No.  2015AP158-CR.ssa 
 
23 
 
¶96 Moreover, the majority opinion goes further than 
applying the primary purpose test and other factors to the facts 
of the instant case.  It sets forth a general rule:  Toxicology 
reports ordered in circumstances similar to those presented in 
the instant case are non-testimonial.  Majority op., ¶¶40, 42.   
¶97 The majority opinion's general rule is unwarranted.  
The primary purpose test is necessarily fact-specific.  The 
majority opinion should not attempt to issue a bright-line rule 
covering all cases under the auspices of a fact-driven test.  
Future cases will differ from the instant case in one aspect or 
another, but the majority opinion's bright-line rule may not 
respect these differences.  
¶98 Finally, although this court has declared that "we 
believe a broad definition of testimonial is required to 
guarantee that the right to confrontation is preserved," State 
v. Jensen, 2007 WI 26, ¶24, 299 Wis. 2d 267, 284, 727 
N.W.2d 518, 527, the majority opinion provides, instead, a broad 
definition of "nontestimonial."    
¶99 The demands of the Confrontation Clause were not 
satisfied in the instant case.  No witness was available for 
cross-examination who could testify to the means by which the 
toxicology report was produced or could give his or her 
independent opinion of the data.  See State v. Griep, 2015 WI 
40, 361 Wis. 2d 657, 863 N.W.2d 567; State v. VanDyke, 2015 WI 
App 30, 361 Wis. 2d 738, 863 N.W.2d 919.   
¶100 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.  
No.  2015AP158-CR.ssa 
 
24 
 
¶101 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this dissenting opinion. 
No.  2015AP158-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
1