Case Title: Moore v. Virginia International Terminals

Citation: 

Docket Number: 961500

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1997-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Stephenson, Lacy, Hassell, and 
Keenan, JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice 
 
MELVIN C. MOORE, JR. 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR. 
v. Record No. 961500 
                                   June 6, 1997 
VIRGINIA INTERNATIONAL TERMINALS, INC. 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the Court of 
Appeals erred in ruling that Code § 65.2-520 (a part of the 
Virginia Workers' Compensation Act, Code § 65.2-100 et seq. (the 
Virginia Act)) grants an employer a "dollar-for-dollar," as 
opposed to a "week-for-week," credit for benefits paid to an 
injured employee under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' 
Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (the Longshore Act), 
which exceeded the employer's obligations under the Virginia Act. 
 
The facts are undisputed.  On November 10, 1986, Melvin C. 
Moore, Jr., sustained injuries to both wrists while working as a 
longshoreman with Virginia International Terminals, Inc. (VIT).  
It is conceded that Moore's injury was compensable under both the 
Longshore Act and the Virginia Act.   
 
Moore initially sought disability benefits under the 
Longshore Act.  As a result of his injuries, Moore received 
temporary total disability benefits under the Longshore Act from 
November 11, 1986, through April 7, 1987; from April 14, 1987, 
through November 22, 1987; and from November 25, 1987, through 
February 15, 1988.  Moore also received temporary partial 
disability benefits from February 16, 1988, through April 17, 
1988; temporary total disability benefits from April 18, 1988, 
 
 
 
 
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through July 27, 1988; and permanent partial disability benefits 
from July 28, 1988, through August 31, 1990.  In addition, Moore 
received temporary total disability benefits from June 7, 1993, 
through October 11, 1993. 
 
On May 5, 1988, while receiving temporary total disability 
benefits under the Longshore Act, Moore filed an application for 
benefits with the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission (the 
Commission).  Moore sought temporary total disability benefits 
beginning September 1, 1990. 
 
The parties stipulated that VIT was entitled to a credit for 
compensation it paid to Moore under the Longshore Act during the 
periods of Moore's disability through November 19, 1989, and from 
June 7, 1993, to August 18, 1993.  The parties disagreed, 
however, regarding the method of calculating the credit pursuant 
to Code § 65.2-520.   
 
VIT paid a total of $128,578.60 to Moore under the Longshore 
Act, and it contended that it is entitled to a "dollar-for-
dollar" credit in the amount of $16,062.06; i.e., that portion of 
the sum it paid which exceeds its obligation under the Virginia 
Act.  Moore contended, on the other hand, that VIT is entitled to 
credit on a "week-for-week" basis, whereby credit is awarded 
based upon the number of weeks during which benefits were paid by 
VIT under the Longshore Act. 
 
The Commission, affirming its Deputy Commissioner, adopted 
Moore's "week-for-week" contention.  Specifically, the Commission 
 
 
 
 
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held that VIT "is entitled to set off the number of weeks that 
benefits were paid under [the Longshore Act] rather than the 
total amount . . . of compensation paid under [the Longshore 
Act]."  Thus, any weekly amounts VIT paid to Moore under the 
Longshore Act which exceeded what was due under the Virginia Act 
were not credited against VIT's liability under the Virginia Act. 
 
The Court of Appeals reversed that part of the Commission's 
order relating to the amount of the credit.  The Court held that 
"the [C]ommission erred in concluding that [VIT] was not entitled 
to credit for the amount [VIT] paid under the [Longshore Act] 
that exceeded its obligation under the Virginia Act."  Virginia 
Intern. Terminals v. Moore, 22 Va. App. 396, 405-06, 470 S.E.2d 
574, 579 (1996).  We awarded Moore an appeal, having determined 
that the Court of Appeals' decision involves a matter of 
significant precedential value.  Code § 17-116.07(B). 
 
Where, as here, a worker is covered by both the federal 
Longshore Act and a state workers' compensation statute, 
concurrent jurisdiction exists, and the injured worker may 
proceed under either or both statutes.  The claimant, however, is 
entitled to only a single recovery for his injuries.  Calbeck v. 
Travelers Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 131 (1962); accord American 
Foods v. Ford, 221 Va. 557, 561, 272 S.E.2d 187, 190 (1980). 
 
In Calbeck, an employer contended that its employee's 
acceptance of benefits under a state compensation act constituted 
an election of remedies which barred prosecution of his claim 
 
 
 
 
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under the Longshore Act.  The Supreme Court held that the injured 
employee's acceptance of state disability benefits did not 
constitute an election of remedies under state law that would 
preclude recovery under the Longshore Act.  In so holding, the 
Supreme Court noted that, in the commissioner's order directing 
payment of compensation under the Longshore Act, "the full amount 
of all payments made by the employer [under the state act] was 
credited against the [Longshore Act] award, and no impermissible 
double recovery is possible."  370 U.S. at 131.  Consistent with 
Calbeck, the Supreme Court, in Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 
447 U.S. 715, 725 n.8 (1980), concluded that "there is no danger 
of double recovery under concurrent jurisdiction since employers' 
awards under one compensation scheme would be credited against 
any recovery under the second scheme." 
 
In American Foods, we considered the issue of concurrent 
jurisdiction and stated that "both the federal and the state 
governments are constitutionally competent to provide [workers'] 
compensation remedies to [workers] who are killed or injured on 
navigable waters in Virginia."  221 Va. at 561, 272 S.E.2d at 
190.  We also stated that "[d]ouble recovery under concurrent 
jurisdiction will not be allowed, because an employer receives 
credit for prior state compensation awards in any subsequent 
award under [the Longshore Act]."  Id. 
 
The Code section at issue in the present case, Code § 65.2-
520, entitled "Voluntary payment by employer," reads as follows: 
 
 
Any payments made by the employer to the injured 
 
 
 
 
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employee during the period of his disability, or to his 
dependents, which by the terms of this title were not 
due and payable when made, may, subject to the approval 
of the Commission, be deducted from the amount to be 
paid as compensation provided that, in the case of 
disability, such deductions shall be made by shortening 
the period during which compensation must be paid and 
not by reducing the amount of the weekly payment. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
 
We think, in enacting Code § 65.2-520, the General Assembly 
intended that an employer should be given a "dollar-for-dollar" 
credit.  Indeed, the statute states that "[a]ny payments . . . 
may . . . be deducted from the amount to be paid as 
compensation."  Payments are made in dollars, and compensation is 
paid in dollars.  Any other reading of Code § 65.2-520 would 
allow a double recovery by an injured employee, and, as we said 
in American Foods, "[d]ouble recovery under concurrent 
jurisdiction will not be allowed."  221 Va. at 561, 272 S.E.2d at 
190.  Moreover, had the General Assembly intended a "week-for-
week" credit, the directive against "reducing the amount of the 
weekly payment" would have been unnecessary. 
 
Moore correctly points out that the Commission in a number 
of cases has uniformly interpreted and applied the credit 
provision of Code § 65.2-520 "to provide for credit measured by 
the period of disability and corresponding payments, as opposed 
to offsetting the total dollar amount paid against the dollar 
amount to which the claimant would otherwise be entitled under 
the Virginia Act."  Moore also correctly states that "[a] basic 
tenet of interpretation and application of the Virginia Act is 
 
 
 
 
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that the construction given to the Act by the . . . Commission is 
to be accorded great weight."  Nevertheless, when the 
Commission's interpretation of a statute runs counter to what we 
perceive to be the clear intent of the General Assembly as well 
as our decisions, the former must yield.  This is such a case. 
 
Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals.  In accordance with the Court of Appeals' opinion, the 
case will be remanded to the Court of Appeals, with direction 
that it remand the case to the Commission for a determination 
consistent with this opinion. 
 
Affirmed.