Case Title: CLARK v. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
CLARK v. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION2001 WY 13236 P.3d 1145Case Number: 01-26Decided: 12/21/2001
 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

 

HENRY 
CLARK, 

Appellant(Petitioner),

 

v.

 

STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING

WORKERS' 
SAFETY AND COMPENSATION

DIVISION, 

Appellee(Respondent).

 

 

 

Representing 
Appellant: 

            
Donald L. Painter, Casper, Wyoming.

 Representing 
Appellee: 

            
Gay Woodhouse, Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, Senior Assistant 
Attorney General; and David L. Delicath, Assistant Attorney General, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

  

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

  

            
VOIGT, Justice. 

[¶1]      In February 1999, 
appellant, Henry Clark, was injured in a work-related accident.  The Wyoming Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Division (the Division) paid appellant benefits for an injury to 
his left foot, but denied benefits for a claimed back injury.  Following a hearing, the hearing 
examiner found that appellant was not a credible witness, that any back injury 
was pre-existing at the time of appellant's accident, and that appellant failed 
to prove that his employment materially aggravated such injury.  Appellant petitioned the district court 
to review the hearing examiner's findings.  
In a December 2000, order, the district court affirmed the hearing 
examiner's determination and this appeal followed.  We affirm.

 

ISSUE

 

[¶2]      Appellant raises 
a single issue on appeal:

 

Whether 
the evidence and law support the Hearing Examiner's finding that Appellant's 
back condition was due to a pre-existing condition that began before this 
employment and that there had been no material aggravation of that pre-existing 
condition resulting in a new injury.

 

The 
Division, as appellee, phrases the issue in substantially the same 
manner.

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]      Appellant began 
his employment with Western Technology Services, Inc. (WOTCO) in 1974.  In February 1999, appellant was employed 
as a saw operator; as such, he carried twenty-foot long steel "bar stock," 
weighing approximately 210 pounds, from its rack to a saw two hundred feet or so 
away.  He then used the saw to cut 
the bar stock to a specified length.  
Appellant testified that at 8:00 a.m. on February 22, 1999, as he reached 
down to grab the last bar, the "bar came right back off that balance point, 
right down on my foot."  Appellant 
claimed that he then fell backwards or "stacked up" onto his "posterior" and 
then his back, and landed on some steel plates, where he lost his hard hat.  After lying on the ground for five 
minutes, appellant slowly "got up" and called the foreman.  His foot was red, but "not bruised.  It wasn't broke and it wasn't 
bleeding."  He experienced 
"excruciating" left leg pain, but no back pain.  According to appellant, he had 
experienced right leg pain for a year prior to February 22, 1999, but not pain 
in his left leg.

 

[¶4]      Appellant filled 
out an accident report dated March 1, 1999, stating that the "bar rolled off the 
rack and bounced off my left foot," but did not mention falling on his posterior 
or back.  Appellant testified that 
he did not "put it down" because he did "a lot of falling backwards" and, 
despite including the term "over" and continuing his handwritten account on an 
additional sheet of paper that remained three-quarters blank, claimed not to 
have had "enough space to write all that story in there."  The report also states that appellant 
experienced pain in the back of his left leg and, toward the end of the day, the 
small of appellant's back began to hurt and he could "barely 
walk."

 

[¶5]      Appellant's 
treating physician was Dr. Johnny Tooke.  
Dr. Tooke's September, October, and November 1994 records indicate that 
appellant was experiencing left knee and left leg pain.  His February 4, 1998, and February 2 and 
12, 1999, notations state appellant had cramps in his "legs."  The records note that appellant was seen 
February 22, 1999,1 for back pain and further indicate 
that on February 26, 1999, appellant complained of periodic "sciatica" down the 
left leg and back pain, was unable to bend over, and could "hardly walk."  Appellant was scheduled to undergo a 
lumbar spine MRI on March 4, 1999.  
It was not until March 12, 1999, that Dr. Tooke's records note 
appellant's accident at work, stating that appellant continued to experience leg 
pain with "lifting minimum weight," refer to a "disc prob in Back" and that 
appellant "picked up heavy Bar @ work & that was when Back began 
working."  Dr. Tooke referred 
appellant to Dr. Robert Narotzky, a neurosurgeon.

 

[¶6]      Appellant saw Dr. 
Narotzky on March 17, 1999.  Dr. 
Narotzky noted in the "history" section of his dictation that appellant was 
referred for

 

evaluation 
of left leg pain.  He has had 
difficulty for the past year.  This 
began while he was at work at WOTCO, Inc. when he was lifting steel bars.  These weigh anywhere from 2 pounds to 
close to 100 pounds.  He has 
continued with pain that radiates from his lower back into his left buttock, 
posterior thigh and calf.

 

The 
doctor testified in a deposition that he understood "difficulty for the past 
year" to mean that appellant had experienced lower back and "leg" symptoms for 
the prior year.  According to Dr. 
Narotzky, appellant did not mention falling onto his posterior or back after the 
bar fell on his left foot.

 

[¶7]      After reviewing 
the findings from the MRI and a subsequent myelogram, Dr. Narotzky ultimately 
opined that appellant suffered from stenosis (narrowing of the spinal canal) at 
the L4-5 and "L6-S1" level, as well as a disk protrusion at the L5-6 level.  According to the doctor, the stenosis 
was caused by degenerative conditions such as normal wear and tear, arthritis in 
appellant's back, and thickening ligaments, in conjunction with the protruding 
disk.  Dr. Narotzky further 
testified as follows:

 

            
Q.  [Appellant's 
counsel]  Okay.  I'm going to give you a hypothetical set 
of facts here for these next couple questions.  Mr. Clark tells me that he had not had 
any previous injury or problem with his low back until February of this year, 
when he  and it was at the steel mill where he works, the fabrication 
shop.  And a steel bar fell toward 
him, and in an effort to get himself out of the way, he fell backward on his 
butt.  And from then on, he had the 
symptoms that he reported to you.

 

            
With that history, do you have an opinion on the relationship, if any, 
between the fall as I've described it to you and the surgical  the condition 
for which you did the surgery in March  or May?  I'm sorry.

 

            
A.        I 
don't think the fall caused the degenerative problems in his low back.  I think it may well have caused the disk 
protrusion which, combined with the degenerative changes, resulted in spinal 
stenosis.

 

            
Q.        
Okay.  Is there any 
particular cause for stenosis, or is that just one of the degenerative changes 
you're talking about?

 

            
A.        It's 
wear and tear changes.  But other 
things can contribute to it, like a disk protrusion.

 

            
Q.        When 
you  in any of the times you've met with or taken care of Mr. Clark, have you 
seen any evidence that any of this low back problem was pre-existing as far as  
and I know these degenerative changes come on for years.  But 

 

            
A.        Not 
by what Mr. Clark related to me; no.

 

He could 
not ascertain when appellant's disk protrusion occurred.

 

[¶8]      Dr. Narotzky 
successfully performed a decompressive lumbar laminectomy in May 1999, from 
which appellant appears to have fully recovered.  The doctor did not feel it was necessary 
to remove appellant's protruding disk during the surgery.  Appellant informed Dr. Narotzky that, 
following the surgery, his "legs" felt "better than they have in 
years."

 

[¶9]      On September 1, 
1999, appellant returned to work with lifting restrictions.  On September 28, 1999, appellant retired 
from his employment with WOTCO.

 

[¶10]   The Division paid benefits for 
appellant's foot injury, but denied benefits for the claimed back injury because 
(1) it did not arise out of and in the course of employment (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi) (Michie Supp. 1998)); (2) it was a pre-existing injury or 
condition at the time of employment (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(F)); and 
(3) it resulted from the natural aging process or the normal activities of 
day-to-day living (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(G)).

 

[¶11]   Following a contested case hearing, 
the hearing examiner first concluded that appellant was not a credible witness 
because his accident report did not mention a fall as described in appellant's 
testimony and neither Dr. Tooke's nor Dr. Narotzky's medical records referred to 
such a fall.  The hearing examiner 
additionally found that, based on the records and testimony regarding 
appellant's degenerative back condition, appellant had a "pre-existing lower 
back condition at the time of the injury" and had not presented sufficient 
evidence that he "suffered a material aggravation" of that condition by virtue 
of the accident.

 

[¶12]   Appellant petitioned the district 
court to review the hearing examiner's determination.  The district court affirmed the hearing 
examiner's decision, and this appeal followed.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶13]   We accord no special deference to 
the district court's decision and will consider the case as if it came directly 
from the agency.  In re 
Jensen, 2001 WY 51, ¶ 9, 24 P.3d 1133, 1136 (Wyo. 2001).  Our review is limited to a determination 
of the factors specified in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 
2001).  The reviewing court 
shall:

 

Hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

 

            
(A)  Arbitrary, capricious, 
an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

 

            
* * *

 

            
(E)  Unsupported by 
substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing 
provided by statute.

 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(A) and (E).

 

[¶14]   The interpretation and correct 
application of the provisions of the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act are a 
question of law over which our review authority is plenary.  In re Jensen, 2001 WY 51, ¶ 10, 
24 P.3d  at 1136.  We affirm an administrative agency's 
conclusions of law only if they are in accord with the law.  We do not afford any deference to the 
agency's determination, and we will correct any error made by the agency in 
either interpreting or applying the law.  
Id.

 

[¶15]   In reviewing findings of fact, we 
examine the entire record to determine whether there is substantial evidence to 
support an agency's findings.  
Id.  If the agency's 
decision is supported by substantial evidence, we cannot properly substitute our 
judgment for that of the agency and must uphold the findings on appeal.  Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusion.  It is more than a 
scintilla of evidence.  
Id.

 

[¶16]   The findings of fact may include 
determinations of witness credibility, as the hearing examiner is charged with 
determining the credibility of the witnesses.  Roberts v. R&S Well 
Service, 2001 WY 117, ¶ 10, ___ 
P.3d ___, ___, slip op. at 4, 2001 WL 1552641 (Wyo. 2001) (No. 00-304, published 
12/6/01) (quoting 
Carrillo v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation 
Div., 
987 P.2d 690, 692-93 (Wyo. 1999)).  That "judgment is given deference in the 
reviewing court."  Pederson 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 
939 P.2d 740, 742 (Wyo. 1997); 
Matter 
of Corman, 
909 P.2d 966, 971 (Wyo. 1996).  Indeed, we will not overturn the hearing 
examiner's determinations regarding witness credibility unless they are clearly 
contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.  Roberts, 
2001 WY 117, ¶ 10, ___ P.3d at ___, slip op. at 4 (quoting 
Carrillo, 
987 P.2d at 692-93).  Demonstrating evidentiary contradictions 
in the record does not establish the irrationality of the ruling, but we do 
examine conflicting evidence to determine if the agency reasonably could have 
made its finding and order based upon all of the evidence before it.  Ikenberry 
v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 
5 P.3d 799, 802 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting 
Pederson, 
939 P.2d at 742).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶17]   Appellant argues that, especially 
considering Dr. Narotzky's testimony, there is no evidence to support the 
hearing examiner's finding that appellant's back injury was a pre-existing 
condition.  Appellant further argues 
that even assuming that his back injury was a pre-existing condition, Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(F) mandates that the condition exist at the "time of 
employment."  According to 
appellant, there is no evidence that his back injury existed in 1974 when his 
employment commenced, and he therefore need not demonstrate that his employment 
materially aggravated the condition.

 

[¶18]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi) 
defines "injury" as

 

any 
harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging and includes damage 
to or loss of any artificial replacement and death, arising 
out of and in the course of employment while at work 
in or about the premises occupied, used or controlled by the employer and 
incurred while at work in places where the employer's business requires an 
employee's presence and which subjects the employee to extrahazardous duties 
incident to the business.  "Injury" 
does not include:

 

                        
* * *

 

            
(F)  Any injury or condition 
preexisting at the time of employment with the employer against whom a claim is 
made;[2]

 

            
(G)  Any injury resulting 
primarily from the natural aging process or from the normal activities of 
day-to-day living, as established by medical evidence supported by objective 
findings[.]

 

(Emphasis 
added.)

 

[¶19]   A claimant for worker's 
compensation benefits has the burden of proving all the essential elements of 
the claim by a preponderance of the evidence, including that the claimed injury 
arose out of and in the course of employment.  Roberts, 
2001 WY 117, ¶ 11, ___ P.3d at ___, slip op. at 4.  We note that there were apparently no 
eyewitnesses to appellant's accident.  
The testimony of "an injured worker alone is sufficient to prove an 
accident if there is nothing to impeach or discredit the worker's testimony and 
the worker's statements are corroborated by surrounding circumstances."  Ikenberry, 
5 P.3d  at 803.  "Moreover, the occurrence of injuries 
resulting from accidents to which there are no eyewitnesses does not prevent 
fair inferences from being drawn and findings of facts from being made."  Id.

 

[¶20]   The cause of appellant's claimed 
back injury is premised on his testimony as to how the accident occurred, as is 
Dr. Narotzky's deposition opinion testimony.  Indeed, appellant's counsel stated at 
the contested case hearing that "[o]ur position is that . . . the fall caused a 
disc protrusion which with degenerative changes caused the spinal stenosis 
. . .."  The hearing 
examiner found that appellant was not a credible witness in this respect, in 
essence finding that appellant's claimed back injury did not "[arise] out of and 
in the course of [his] employment while at work" as the statute 
requires.

 

[¶21]   Appellant testified that, after a 
bar fell on his foot, he fell backwards onto his posterior and back, and landed 
on some steel plates.  The first 
time this particular version of appellant's accident appears in the record 
firsthand is his testimony at the contested case hearing held January 18, 
2000.3  Appellant did not include these details 
in his handwritten account of the accident contained in the report he filed soon 
after the accident.  His explanation 
for not doing so was that, despite the additional page that admittedly remained 
three-quarters blank, he did not have "enough space to write all that story in 
there."  In the weeks after the 
accident, appellant did not inform Dr. Narotzky of any such fall or a foot 
injury, and Dr. Tooke's records do not refer to a fall or a foot injury.  Rather, Dr. Narotzky's dictation refers 
to appellant "lifting steel bars" and Dr. Tooke's notes refer to appellant 
picking up a "heavy" bar.  The 
report from appellant's MRI similarly references a "lifting injury."  It was not until March 12, 1999, after 
at least two or three visits to Dr. Tooke's office and a lumbar spine MRI, that 
appellant's medical records refer to a work-related accident.4

 

[¶22]   Dr. Narotzky opined that appellant 
suffered from stenosis due to a degenerative back condition in conjunction with 
a protruding disk, which necessitated the decompressive lumbar laminectomy.  In a hypothetical question, appellant's 
counsel then asked Dr. Narotzky to assume appellant had fallen backwards on his 
posterior and to render an opinion regarding the relationship of the fall to 
appellant's claimed back injury.  
The doctor responded that a fall "may" have caused the disk protrusion, 
but did not cause the degenerative condition.  The doctor could not determine when the 
disk protrusion occurred.  Absent 
credible testimony from appellant, or some corroboration from the surrounding 
circumstances, regarding such a fall, Dr. Narotzky's opinion as to the cause of 
appellant's protruding disk is meaningless in proving that the disk protrusion 
arose out of and in the course of appellant's employment.

 

[¶23]   In Pederson, 
939 P.2d  at 741, 
Della Pederson, a seventeen-year employee of the Sheridan County School 
District, testified that she injured her foot when her ankle "snapped" while 
moving a loaded mixing bowl.  
Pederson did not state in her accident report5 that her ankle snapped, nor did she 
mention it to the podiatrist she saw the next day.  Id. 
at 741-42.  The podiatrist diagnosed 
Pederson as having a progressive foot condition related to her diabetes, and 
Pederson had seen the podiatrist for symptoms in the same foot three days prior 
to the claimed accident.  Id.  Pederson also had been treated two years 
before the claimed accident for foot problems, and had fallen on the same foot 
the previous spring.  Id.

 

[¶24]   The hearing examiner found that, 
despite her testimony, Pederson did not suffer any "snap" or trauma to her foot 
at work.  Id. 
at 742.  On appeal, Pederson argued 
that no evidence was presented to show that she suffered an injury other than at 
work.  We concluded that Pederson's 
"failure to tell her doctor about the claimed injury and her failure to set it 
forth on her Report of Injury, both events occurring within days of the claimed 
incident, provided a rational basis for the hearing officer to disbelieve her 
later testimony."  Id.

 

[¶25]   As in Pederson, 
we find that the referenced evidence provided a rational basis for the hearing 
examiner to disbelieve appellant's testimony and that, based on the state of the 
particular record before us, such a finding was not clearly contrary to the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence.  
It would be "improper for us to re-weigh the evidence under the 
circumstances" or substitute our judgment for that of the hearing examiner, 
especially considering the applicable standard of review.  Id. 
at 742-43.  See also 
Carrillo, 
987 P.2d  at 693-94.  We affirm the hearing examiner's denial 
of benefits on this basis.

 

 

FOOTNOTES

  1The notation is 
handwritten, initialed "KF," and appears next to notations dated March 12, 
1999.  There are no notations in the 
medical records for February 22, 1999.  
Appellant testified that he did not see Dr. Tooke on February 22, 1999, 
but saw the doctor for the first time February 26, 1999.  Appellant's accident report states that 
he saw Dr. Tooke on February 26, 1999.  
Appellant apparently also saw someone in Dr. Tooke's office on March 1, 
1999.

  2A pre-existing 
condition may be compensable if the employment aggravated, accelerated, or 
combined with the pre-existing condition to produce the disability for which the 
employee is seeking benefits.  
Bright v. Sheehan Pipeline, 960 P.2d 1009, 1010 (Wyo. 
1998).  The burden remains on the claimant to 
prove that the injury is compensable.  
Brees v. Gulley Enterprises, Inc., 6 P.3d 128, 131 (Wyo. 
2000).

  3A May 11, 1999, 
letter from Dr. Tooke addressed to the Division states merely that appellant's 
most recent injury was "his lower back resulting from a fall on February 22, 
1999."  The letter, dated nearly 
three months after the accident, contains no further detail, and does not refer 
to the source of this information.  
A handwritten notation states "letter to Henry" and "not sent to 
comp."

 

            
The only other references include a September 27, 1999, deposition 
wherein appellant's counsel first asked Dr. Narotzky whether appellant had 
informed him of the alleged fall, to which the doctor replied "not that I have 
recorded in my record; no," and later posed the hypothetical question asking Dr. 
Narotzky to assume appellant "fell backward on his butt" to "get himself out of 
the way" as a "steel bar fell toward him," and a September 30, 1999, disclosure 
statement.

  4Appellant 
testified that he had not ever had left leg pain prior to February 22, 1999, and 
appeared to indicate that he similarly did not experience back pain immediately 
prior to that date.  According to 
Dr. Narotzky, appellant stated that he had lower back and leg symptoms for a 
year prior to the accident, and Dr. Tooke's records reflect that appellant had 
cramps in his "legs" immediately prior to February 22, 1999.  Appellant informed Dr. Narotzky that, 
after the surgery, his "legs" felt better than they had in 
years.

 

            
In addition, appellant testified that he did not experience back pain on 
February 22, 1999.  However, the 
accident report states that by the end of that day, the small of appellant's 
back began to hurt and he could barely walk.

  5Pederson's 
accident report stated that "I went to work.  My foot hurt some.  As morning progressed, my foot got 
extremely bad.  I could not handle 
pain and I had to go home."  
Pederson, 939 P.2d  at 741.