Case Title: Hough v. City of Cheyenne

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0180

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-11-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
BJ HOUGH, LLC, LEO L. GARCIA, MARY D. GARCIA, FRANCIS SHIVE, RAWLEY D. MARRS, DONELLA L. MARRS, NORMAN PRING, MARY JANE PRING, KATHLEEN SHEEHAN, KENNETH J. RACINE, RENA J. RACINE v. CITY OF CHEYENNE, a Wyoming municipal corporation and SWAN RANCH, LLC2012 WY 140Case Number: S-11-0180Decided: 11/01/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume. 
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2012 
 
BJ 
HOUGH, LLC, LEO L. GARCIA, MARY D. GARCIA, FRANCIS 
SHIVE, RAWLEY D. MARRS, DONELLA L. 
MARRS. NORMAN PRING, MARY JANE PRING, KATHLEEN SHEEHAN, 
KENNETH J. RACINE, RENA J. RACINE, 
Appellants,(Petitioners),v.CITY OF CHEYENNE, a 
Wyoming municipal corporation and SWAN RANCH, 
LLC,Appellees(Respondents).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County
The 
Honorable Michael K. Davis, Judge 
 
Representing 
Appellants:
Gay V. Woodhouse and 
Teri Cassidy* of Woodhouse Roden, LLC, Cheyenne, WY.  
Argument by Ms. Woodhouse.
 
Representing 
Appellees:
Daniel E. White, City 
Attorney, for Appellee City of Cheyenne.  Argument 
by Mr. White.
No appearance entered 
for Appellee Swan Ranch.
 
*Order Allowing 
Withdrawal of Counsel entered March 14, 2012.
 
Before KITE, 
C.J., and GOLDEN**, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
**Justice Golden 
retired effective September 30, 2012.
 
HILL, Justice.
[¶1]      
After Swan Ranch was annexed by the City of Cheyenne (“the City”) in 
2009, the Appellants herein filed a declaratory judgment action against the City 
alleging that the annexation was invalid under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
15-1-402(a).  Ultimately, the district court granted the 
City’s responding summary judgment argument on two claims and conducted trial on 
the third and final claim.  Following trial, the district 
court found the annexation was proper.  This appeal 
followed.
 
ISSUE
 
[¶2]      
We restate the Appellants’ issues as a single question:  
Did the district court err in finding the annexation ordinance 
valid?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]      
In September of 2008, Swan Ranch, LLC, filed a petition to annex 
approximately 150 acres of land to the City.  Swan Ranch is 
undeveloped property and is “open space” generally used for grazing 
livestock.  The property is not serviced by the City with 
sewer, water, or sanitation.  The owner of Swan Ranch had 
agreed with an outside developer that it would apply for annexation to the 
Cheyenne City Council.  In return, the developer paid Swan 
Ranch’s annexation expenses.  On January 12, 2009, after 
public hearings and findings from the Urban Planning Director for the City, City 
Ordinance No. 3840 was adopted on January 12, 2009 annexing the Swan Ranch land 
to the City.
 
[¶4]      
In response to the annexation, neighbors to the land being annexed, 
herein the Appellants, filed an “Appeal Pursuant to W.S. 15-1-409 
and Complaint for Declaratory Judgment” against the City on March 6, 
2009.  The Appellants amended said complaint on March 18, 2009 
to add the names of two parties.  The complaint contained 
three claims for relief:  In their first and third claims, the 
Appellants alleged that a Cheyenne City ordinance constituted an exercise of 
extra-territorial jurisdiction under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-3-202(b)(ii) 
(LexisNexis 2011).
 
[¶5]      
On June 1, 2010 the City filed a motion for partial summary judgment on 
Appellants’ first and third claims, and on July 19, 2010 the Appellants filed 
their response opposing that summary judgment motion asking the court “whether 
the City exercised extraterritorial jurisdiction over lands adjacent to the 
annexed property so as to require compliance with certain notice and platting 
requirements contained in Wyoming annexation statutes” and whether the City had 
properly prepared its annexation map.  After some 
consideration, the district court granted the City’s motion for partial summary 
judgment stating in its decision letter that the City had properly given notice 
and properly prepared its map.  Thus, the first and third 
claims were disposed of, and those claims remain unchallenged on 
appeal.
 
[¶6]      
Regarding the single remaining issue – whether the City had met the 
statutory requirements for annexation under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-402 – the 
district court held a bench trial.  Following the three-day 
trial, the court found in the City’s favor stating that it had met the statutory 
requirements necessary for annexation.  This appeal 
followed.  More facts will be discussed as necessary in the 
discussion to follow.
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶7]      
Although Appellants present two claims to this Court, we see this appeal 
differently.  Viewing it through our case law and statutory 
scheme, we distinguish the issue on appeal as a single question: whether the 
district court properly found in the City’s favor that it had met the 
statutory requirements necessary for annexation or, stated another way, whether 
the district court properly decided the declaratory judgment action in 
the City’s favor as to the validity of the 
ordinance.  
 
[¶8]      
Given our limited review, the standard of review of this Court is typical 
of that of a bench trial:
 
Following 
a bench trial, this Court reviews a district court’s findings and 
conclusions using a clearly erroneous standard for the factual findings and a 
de novo standard for the conclusions of 
law.  Piroschak 
v. Whelan, 2005 WY 26, 
¶ 7, 106 P.3d 887, 890 (Wyo. 2005) 
(citing Hansuld v. Lariat Diesel Corp., 2003 WY 165, 
¶ 13, 81 P.3d 215, 218 (Wyo. 2003) 
and Rennard v. Vollmar, 977 P.2d 1277, 1279 (Wyo. 1999)). 
 
The 
factual findings of a judge are not entitled to the limited review afforded a 
jury verdict. While the findings are presumptively correct, the appellate court 
may examine all of the properly admissible evidence in the record. Due regard is 
given to the opportunity of the trial judge to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses, and our review does not entail re-weighing disputed evidence. 
Findings of fact will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. A 
finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the 
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed.
 
Piroschak, ¶ 7, 106 P.3d  at 890. Findings may not be set aside because we would 
have reached a different result. Harber v. Jensen, 2004 WY 
104, ¶ 7, 97 P.3d 57, 60 (Wyo. 2004). Further, 
 
we assume that the 
evidence of the prevailing party  below is true and give that 
party every reasonable inference that can fairly and reasonably be drawn from 
it. We do not substitute ourselves for the trial court as a finder of facts; 
instead, we defer to those findings unless they are unsupported by the record or 
erroneous as a matter of law.
 
Id. (quotation marks 
omitted) (some citations 
omitted).
 
Pennant 
Serv. Co. v. True Oil Co., LLC, 
2011 WY 40, ¶ 7, 249 P.3d 698, 702-03 (Wyo. 2011).
 
[¶9]      
To explain our result 
and our limited review on appeal, we begin with our statutes and case 
law.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
15-1-409(a) (LexisNexis 2011) provides as follows:
 
(a) If 
any landowner in the territory proposed to be annexed or any owner of real 
property in the annexing city or town, or utility is aggrieved by the acts of 
the governing body, he may appeal to the district court for a 
review of the acts or findings 
thereof. 
 [Emphasis added.]
 
(b) If 
the court determines that the action taken was capricious or arbitrary, or if it 
appears from the evidence that the landowner's right in his property is being 
unwarrantedly invaded or that the governing body abused its discretion, the 
court shall declare the annexing ordinance void. If the court determines the 
action of the governing body was proper and valid, it shall sustain the 
ordinance.
 
(c) All 
proceedings to review the findings and the decisions of the governing body or 
actions to determine the validity of the annexation ordinance pursuant to the 
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act shall be brought within sixty (60) days of the 
effective date of the annexation ordinance, and if not brought within that time 
are forever barred.
 
[¶10]   
This statute, in section (a), only provides for an appeal of 
the annexation ordinance to the district court only by aggrieved landowners 
in the territory to be annexed or within the city.  
Section (b) requires that the district court review the acts or findings 
of the city, and declare the ordinance void if it finds such to have been 
capricious, arbitrary, an unwarranted invasion of property rights, or an abuse 
of discretion.  Further reading of the same statute, in section (c), shows 
that our statutory scheme requires the above-described appeal, as well as any 
declaratory judgment actions, to be brought within 60 days of the effective date 
of the ordinance.
 
[¶11]   
Applying this statute to the facts of this case preliminarily, we can 
immediately conclude that the Appellants herein were not qualified to appeal to 
the district court the City’s decision to annex Swan Ranch, given that they are 
not landowners within the Swan Ranch boundary, nor are they landowners within 
the Cheyenne city limits.  Cox v. City of Cheyenne, 
2003 WY 146, ¶ 22, 79 P.3d 500, 508 (Wyo. 2003).  
Turning back to § 15-1-409, section (c) mentions declaratory 
judgment actions.  That section does not, however, say 
who is entitled to bring a declaratory judgment action, which 
brings us back to the term “landowner” under § 15-1-409(a) as it applies 
here.
 
[¶12]   
We therefore must consider the status of these landowners within the 
Declaratory Judgment Act, which grants jurisdiction 
to the district court to entertain an action for a declaratory judgment to review 
municipal ordinances.  Such jurisdiction is provided in 
the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-37-101 
through 1-37-115 (LexisNexis 2011). Section 1-37-102 of the 
Act gives Wyoming courts the power to “declare rights, status and other legal 
relations.”  Section 1-37-103 
provides as follows: 
 
Any 
person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings 
constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are 
affected by the Wyoming constitution or by a statute, municipal 
ordinance, contract or franchise, may have any question of 
construction or validity arising under the instrument determined and obtain a 
declaration of rights, status or other legal relations.  
[Emphasis added.]
 
As 
quoted in Smith v. City of Santa Fe, 
200-NMSC-055, ¶ 14, 171 P.3d 300, 305 (New Mexico 
2007),
 
the 
Declaratory 
Judgment Act is specifically designed to bring an action 
challenging the constitutionality or validity of local laws or ordinances. 
See, 
e.g., Balizer v. Shaver, 82 N.M 347, 349, 481 P.2d 709, 711 (Ct. App. 1971) (holding that declaratory proceedings are a proper 
avenue for testing the constitutionality of municipal ordinances); see also S. Nat'l Bank of Houston v. City of 
Austin, 582 S.W.2d 229, 237 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (finding declaratory judgment 
proper where property owners challenged city ordinance); Ind. Waste Systems, Inc. v. Bd. 
of Comm’rs of Howard County, 180 Ind. App. 385, 
389 N.E.2d 52, 56 (1979) (holding that a declaratory judgment 
action was proper to challenge the validity of a county ordinance); Kmiec v. Town of Spider Lake, 
60 Wis.2d 640, 211 N.W.2d 471, 473 (1973) (holding that a declaratory judgment 
action was a proper avenue for challenging the validity of an ordinance); Sorenson v. City of 
Bellingham, 80 Wash. 2d 547, 496 P.2d 512, 517 (1972) (“The use of declaratory judgment 
to determine rights in this matter without a course of remedy is entirely 
appropriate.”); Walker v. Los Angeles 
County, 55 Cal. 2d 626, 12 Cal. Rptr. 671, 361 P.2d 247, 253 (1961) (“The interpretation of ordinances and 
statutes are proper matters for declaratory relief.”).  See 
generally 6 Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal 
Corporations, § 20.23, at 72 (3d ed.); Bernard Schwartz, 
Administrative Law § 9.7, at 537 (2d ed. 1984) (“[T]he declaratory judgment 
has become the general-utility remedy by which the legality of an administrative 
act may be determined when there are no statutory review provisions, regardless 
of the nature of the challenged act.”).
 
[¶13]   
Thus, under our statutes, the Appellants only have standing to bring a 
declaratory judgment action under § 1-37-103, to challenge the 
validity of an annexation ordinance. (“We 
thus find that nothing in § 15-1-409(a) evidences 
a legislative intent to preclude declaratory judgment actions challenging the 
validity of an annexation ordinance. Certainly, the only parties entitled to 
challenge the merits of the governing body’s findings and decisions are those 
listed within § 15-1-409(a).”).  Cox, ¶ 27, 
79 P.3d  at 509.  Cox is further instructive 
regarding review by the district court:
 
Looking 
to subsection (b) we further see that the review afforded is for abuse of 
discretion or arbitrariness or capriciousness.  Such a review 
considers, in essence, the merits of the governing body’s actions and findings, 
not the validity of the annexation ordinance.  The review 
afforded also allows for a determination of whether “the landowner’s right in 
his property is being unwarrantedly invaded.”  Appellants, not 
being “landowners” under this section, do not have standing to make such a 
claim.  Thus, the only avenue for the protection of their 
interests is a determination of the validity of the annexation ordinance through 
a declaratory judgment.  Considering the statute as a whole 
and the context of this right of review following notice and the public hearing, 
we can see that the legislature’s purpose was to present the, named parties with 
an express right of review to challenge the merits of the governing body's 
findings and decisions.
 
Cox, ¶ 26, 
79 P.3d  at 509.  Here, the Appellants filed an 
original and an amended “Appeal Pursuant to W.S. § 15-1-409 and 
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment.”  The district court 
dismissed the first and third claims for relief found in the amended 
appeal/complaint on the ground that Cox forbade them, under the reasoning 
set forth above, as arguments as to the merits of the ordinance. 
 The district court did not, however, dismiss the second claim 
for relief, on which it held a three-day bench trial, and properly treated as a 
declaratory judgment action.
 
[¶14]   
Because the Appellants had no statutory right to appeal in the district 
court, and that the only matter before the district court was a declaratory 
judgment action as to the validity of the ordinance, that is the 
only issue before this Court.   This Court briefly 
touched on validity versus merits in Bd. of 
County Comm’rs v. City of Cheyenne, 2004 WY 16, ¶ 10, 85 P.3d 999, 
1003 (Wyo. 2004):
 
We 
can infer what the legislature intended by the word “aggrieved” by looking to 
the findings identified in the statute that would require the district court to 
void the ordinance: the act of annexation was capricious or 
arbitrary, the municipality abused its discretion, or the landowner’s right in 
his property was unwarrantedly invaded.  Wyo. Stat. Ann § 
15-1-409(b). We have characterized these findings as going to 
the merits of the annexation, not to the validity of the 
ordinance. Cox v. City of Cheyenne, 
2003 WY 146, ¶ 26, 79 P.3d 500, 509 (Wyo. 2003).
 
In this particular 
case, because a declaratory judgment action was filed and considered by the 
district court, the district court had to contemplate the validity of the 
statutes in its analysis and eventual decision.  Therefore, we turn to consider the district court’s 
analysis of the validity of the annexation ordinance as it applies to these 
facts.
 
[¶15]   
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-404(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2011) sets out 
specific procedural requirements for annexation, stating in part:
 
(a)  The 
governing body of any city or town may initiate proceedings to annex territory 
by the following procedure:
 
   (i)  Reasonable 
evidence shall be procured by the governing body indicating that a 
specific area meets the conditions and limitations of W.S. 
15-1-402[.]
 
[¶16]   
In Wyoming, the “conditions and limitations” are set forth in Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 15-1-402 (LexisNexis 2011):
 
   (a)  Before 
any territory is eligible for annexation, the governing body of any city or town 
at a hearing as provided in W.S. 15-1-405 shall find 
that:
 
   (i) An 
annexation of the area is for the protection of the health, safety and welfare 
of the persons residing in the area and in the city or town;
   (ii) The 
urban development of the area sought to be annexed would constitute a natural, 
geographical, economical and social part of the annexing city or 
town;
   (iii) The 
area sought to be annexed is a logical and feasible addition to the annexing 
city or town and the extension of basic and other services customarily available 
to residents of the city or town shall, within reason, be available to the area 
proposed to be annexed;
   (iv) The 
area sought to be annexed is contiguous with or adjacent to the annexing city or 
town, or the area meets the requirements of W.S. 
15-1-407;
   (v) If 
the city or town does not own or operate its own electric utility, its governing 
body is prepared to issue one (1) or more franchises as necessary to serve the 
annexed area pursuant to W.S. 15-1-410; and
   (vi) The 
annexing city or town, not less than twenty (20) business days prior to the 
public hearing required by W.S. 15-1-405(a), has sent by certified 
mail to all landowners and affected public utilities within the territory a 
summary of the proposed annexation report as required under subsection (c) of 
this section and notice of the time, date and location of the public hearing 
required by W.S. 15-1-405(a).
 
Ultimately, it is the 
Appellants’ burden in this instance to demonstrate that the district court was 
clearly erroneous in affirming the City Council’s decision to annex Swan 
Ranch.  The Appellants do not meet their burden.
 
[¶17]   
In making that finding, we turn to the facts of this case within the 
applicable legal framework.  The Appellants maintain that 
although the Cheyenne City Council provided several findings of fact in support 
of its decision to allow the Swan Ranch annexation, those findings remain 
“wholly unsupported by evidence and were only remotely related to the standards 
required in the statute.”  They argue that the record is 
devoid of any evidence or testimony supporting the conditions and limitations in 
§ 15-1-402(a)(i)-(iv), and they specifically contend that there was 
no evidence showing:
 
a.    
Annexation prevents 
the possible contamination of the aquifer;
b.    
The aquifer in the 
area was being overused;
c.    
Annexation prevents 
the overuse of the aquifer; 
d.    
City water service is 
available to the annexed property;
e.    
The City’s fire 
department response time will be increased;
f.     
The City’s fire 
department response will be more capable of handling emergencies;
g.    
That the annexation 
constitutes a natural, geographical and social part of the City;
h.    
That the balanced 
investment and growth of the City is desirable;
i.      
That the annexation 
offered any potential investment to the City;
j.      
That the annexation 
offered any new potential growth to the City;
k.    
That the City has 
additional capacity in its sewer mains to handle the annexation;
l.      
That the number of 
users of the sewer mains would increase after the annexation;
m.  The disputed property 
is close to existing urban development, increasing the feasibility of the City’s 
infrastructure maintenance;
n.    
That the annexed 
property will be developed;
o.    
That the degree of 
contiguity with the City is substantial.
 
[¶18]   
Under § 15-1-402(a)(i), the first requirement for annexation 
mandates that the City Council find “[a]n annexation of the area is for the 
protection of the health, safety and welfare of the persons residing in the area 
and in the city or town.”  The City presented evidence in 
support of § 15-1-402(a)(i).  As the district 
court noted, evidence was presented showing that annexation would insure no 
additional septic systems will be added to the annexed area, and city residents 
outside the annexed area will benefit by the reduction of the number of septic 
systems in the area because the potential for contamination of groundwater will 
be reduced.  Furthermore, the court noted that the Swan Ranch 
area is included in the 201 Agreement, which is intended to protect water 
quality.1  Testimony 
regarding the 201 Agreement indicated that with the annexation of Swan Ranch, 
installation of septic systems would no longer be permitted.  
Instead, City Code would require installation of City sewer mains which 
would reduce the nitrate problem associated with septic systems, thus 
contributing to the overall health and safety of the residents of the 
area.
 
[¶19]   
The Appellants’ complaint, however, is that the findings were not 
specific enough.  Yet, testimony existed to support 
§ 15-1-402(a)(i).  For instance, there was 
distinct evidence that indicated that the Swan Ranch annexation expands the 
jurisdiction of the City engineer with respect to the Clear Creek drainage 
master plan to protect against flood hazards within the city and to reduce 
levels and types of contaminants flowing into Crow Creek.
 
[¶20]   
Furthermore, testimony also showed that as a result of the annexation, 
the Cheyenne Fire and Rescue Department would be in charge of hazardous 
materials response within the annexed territory, thus enhancing the health, 
safety, and welfare of City residents.  Because of its 
location at the Interstates 25 and 80 intersection, the City of Cheyenne Fire 
Department’s capability to manage disasters of hazardous spills in the area 
proves to be greater than the Laramie County Fire District’s 
capability.  As the district court reiterated,
 
[I]t is not necessary 
for the City to show an immediate impact in this area.  Just 
as Rome was not built in a day, it takes time to fully integrate an annexed 
parcel. … The Court does not believe that the legislature intended to require a 
municipality to run water and sewer lines to undeveloped parcels before annexing 
them because such a requirement would literally put the cart before the 
horse.
 
We conclude that the 
evidence suffices to support the requirement of 
§ 15-1-402(a)(i).
 
[¶21]   
Regarding Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-402(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2011), which 
requires “[t]he urban development of the area sought to be annexed would 
constitute a natural, geographical, economical and social part of the annexing 
city or town,” the Appellants assert that substantial evidence did not exist to 
support this criterion.  However, the Appellants seem to 
suggest that urban development must have taken place before annexation or be 
imminent after annexation.  That is not so.  
The statute does not make this requirement.  
Furthermore, in support of its decision, the district court relied upon 
evidence showing that the Swan Ranch land creates a link between existing city 
limits and commercial users located at the Interstate-25 and College Drive 
interchange, which users are already being served with City sanitary services 
pursuant to outside user agreements.  The commercial 
development located at the Interstate-25 and College Drive interchange is 
characterized as “urban development.”  As the City points out, 
PlanCheyenne, the City’s comprehensive plan, addresses in extensive 
detail the vision adopted by the City and County for the Swan Ranch parcel, as 
well as its surrounding lots.  Showing a pattern of growth in 
that area, the Swan Ranch parcel creates a valid extension of the exiting City 
of Cheyenne.  Furthermore, the City projects growth to the 
south and west, and testimony indicated that further development in other 
directions would be limited by terrain, preventing the use of a gravity-operated 
sewer system.  Thus, the south and west development trend 
seems even more likely.  And though the parcel is connected by 
a relatively small but contiguous boundary, the Appellants here have by all 
accounts been a part of the community of the City of Cheyenne – thus making the 
adherence to the City even more natural.   As we noted in 
Henderson, land that is within one mile of Cheyenne’s boundaries is 
“potentially urban.”  457 P.2d  at 501 (citing to 
the statutory provision currently codified at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-411 
(LexisNexis 2011)).  We conclude that the evidence suffices to 
support the requirement of § 15-1-402(a)(ii).
 
[¶22]   
Next, as to the third criteria for annexation under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 15-1-402(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2011) – the Appellants suggest that the City 
Council should have concluded separately that the Swan Ranch parcel is a 
“logical and feasible addition” to the City and that the extension of services 
is available to the annexed area.  Our review of the record 
shows that the annexation is a logical and feasible addition to the City, and 
that the extension of services is also logical and feasible.  
The district court concluded as much.  We base our 
conclusion upon the evidence in the record and point specifically to 
the PlanCheyenne document which recommends that the Swan Ranch 
annexation be developed in accordance with Mixed-Use Residential Emphasis 
standards, the category which contemplates urban density development with urban 
services such as City water and sanitary sewer service.  The 
northern portion of the Swan Ranch annexation, in fact, is designated 
by PlanCheyenne for future use as parks and recreation 
space.  Parks and open space happens to be designated as 
appropriate uses in the Mixed-Use Residential Emphasis Category.  
Also, given that city sanitary lines exist within and immediately 
adjacent to the Swan Ranch annexation area, and that city water mains could 
feasibly be extended to the Swan Ranch parcel, the Swan Ranch annexation seems 
to provide for a logical progression of the City boundary, and the decision of 
the district court was not clearly erroneous.  We conclude 
that the evidence suffices to support the requirement of 
§ 15-1-402(a)(iii).
 
[¶23]   
Finally, though the parties agree that the Swan Ranch annexation is 
contiguous with, or adjacent to, the City of Cheyenne, the Appellants challenge 
whether the contiguity is sufficient to meet this Court’s statement that annexed 
land “must touch to some substantial degree, although there need not necessarily 
be a lengthy shared border.”  Bd. of County Comm.’s v. City 
of Cheyenne, 2004 WY 16, ¶ 31, 85 P.3d 999, 1009 (Wyo. 
2004).  Because the parties agree that Swan Ranch is 
contiguous with, or adjacent to, the City of Cheyenne, we need not resort to 
statutory construction here.  Instead, we consider what 
“substantial degree” means to this Court.
 
[¶24]   
The exact percentage related to “some substantial degree” has never been 
defined by this Court or otherwise.  Indeed, in the instant 
case many different calculations were presented to the City Council, and it 
remains unclear upon what, if any, percentage the City Council 
settled.  The district court, however, stated as 
follows:
 
… the court finds 
that the degree of contiguity if measured at the right-of-ways of the interstate 
highways is approximately 13 percent.  If measured at the 
northeast boundary of the property, the percentage of contiguity is between 6 
percent and 10 percent.  
 
[¶25]   
The district court’s findings of fact aligned with the City’s claims that 
the Swan Ranch property is approximately 13 percent contiguous.  
In regard to what substantial contact then means, we refer to this 
Court’s thorough discussion in Board of County Commissioners, 
¶¶ 20-31, 85 P.3d  at 1005-1009 (some citations and 
footnotes omitted) where we first discussed the meaning of contiguous and then 
moved toward the term “substantial contact” as a more particularly defined 
subset of the word contiguous:
 
Our 
standard rules of statutory construction require us first 
to seek the legislature’s intent by looking to the common meaning of the words 
used in the statute. Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (10th ed. 
1999) contains the following definitions, in relevant part, at page 250 and page 
14, respectively:
contiguous. . . 1 : being in actual 
contact: touching along a boundary or at a point . . .
adjacent 
. . . 1 a : not distant: nearby . . . b : having a common 
endpoint or border . . .
sin 
adjacent, adjoining, contiguous, juxtaposed mean being in close proximity. 
 Adjacent may or may not imply contact but always 
implies absence of anything of the same kind in between . . . .  
Contiguous implies having contact on all or most of one 
side .
(Some 
emphasis added.) Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1993) 
contains similar definitions at pages 492 and 26, respectively:
contiguous . . . 1 a (1): touching along 
boundaries often for considerable distances . . . b : next or adjoining 
with nothing similar intervening . . . c : nearby, close: not distant . . 
. d: continuous, unbroken, uninterrupted: touching or connected 
throughout . . . 2 a : immediately preceding or following in time or 
sequence: without intervening interval or item . . . b: near in time or 
sequence sin see adjacent
adjacent 
. . . 1 a : not distant or far off . . .: nearby but not touching . . . 
b : relatively near and having nothing of the same kind intervening: 
having a common border: abutting, touching: living nearby or sitting or standing 
relatively near or close together . . . c : immediately preceding or 
following with nothing of the same kind intervening . . .
sin 
adjoining, abutting, contiguous, conterminous, coterminous, juxtaposed: adjacent 
is sometimes merely a synonym for near or close to . 
. . Applied to things of the same type, it indicates either side-by-side 
proximity or lack of anything of the same nature intervening . .  . 
Contiguous shows variable usage but is likely to suggest touching along a 
dividing line; it may indicate an unbroken continuity . . .
 
The 
controversy in this case, although spawning hundreds of pages of legal argument, 
is simple.  The County and the Cottons contend that the 
legislature would not have used the word “contiguous,” meaning “touching,” if 
annexable land only had to be “nearby.”  The City responds 
that the legislature would not have used the word “adjacent,” meaning “nearby,” 
if annexable land had to be “touching.”  We will begin our 
resolution of the matter with the observation that use of 
these particular two words in this particular context, without defining either 
word, renders the statute ambiguous, thereby requiring 
interpretation.
 
This issue is not 
unique to Wyoming, inasmuch as many states have the same language in their 
annexation statutes.  See McQuillin Mum. 
Corp., supra, § 7.20; 56 Am.Jur.2d, supra, 
§§ 51-52; and Erwin S. Barber, Annotation, What Land is Contiguous or 
Adjacent to Municipality So As To Be Subject to Annexation, 
49 A.L.R.3d 589 (1973).  While there is not 
unanimity in defining these terms, there does seem to be a general rule as to 
their interpretation:
 
In 
many jurisdictions, territory to be annexed must be contiguous or adjacent to 
the annexing municipality.  As used in this context, the words 
“contiguous” and “adjacent” are considered to be synonymous.  
In the absence of statutory definition of these terms, it seems to be 
agreed that at a minimum the terms require that the boundaries of the annexing 
municipality and the territory must touch, with some courts indicating that 
there must be substantial physical contact between the municipality and the 
territory.  It should be noted, however, that many courts have 
recognized, either expressly or by implication that the meaning of these terms, 
as used in the annexation statutes, is flexible and may vary from case to 
case.  And, of course, these judicially manufactured 
definitions are subject to change by annexation statutes which attempt to define 
the terms “contiguous” and “adjacent.”
 
Barber, 
supra, 49 A.L.R. 3d 589, 593-94, § 2[a] 
(footnotes omitted).
 
As we will explain 
further, we conclude that, by limiting annexation to lands 
that are either contiguous or adjacent, the legislature intended to limit 
annexation to lands sharing a common boundary with the municipality or touching 
at some point, with the exception of lands that are separated from the 
municipality only by those natural or artificial “barriers” listed in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
15-1-402(b).  This conclusion is consistent 
with what appears to be the majority rule, it is consistent with what this Court 
said in  re West 
Laramie, 457 P.2d 498, 501 (Wyo. 1969) (“under our statute the 
only requirement with respect to the scope and extent of the area to be annexed 
is that it must be contiguous to the annexing city or town”), it is consistent 
with the opinion of the Attorney General of the State of Wyoming, and it is 
consistent with reason and good sense.8
 
[Footnote 
8]: 
See Wyoming Attorney General Opinion No. 83-021, 117-19 (December 19, 1983) 
(“where statutory provisions have made no attempt, as in Wyoming, to define the 
terms 'contiguous’ and 'adjacent,’ the courts have generally held such terms to 
require a touching or actual contact between the annexing municipality and the 
lands to be annexed. . . . Most courts hold contiguity is more than mere 
technical touching and requires reasonably substantial physical contact between 
the territory and the municipality. . . .  This 
concern for something more than mere physical touching is reflected in the 
multiple requirements of the Wyoming statute . . . .”).  
(Emphasis in original.)
 
In one sense, both sides in this controversy are correct; the 
legislature would not have needed both terms–“contiguous with” and “adjacent 
to”–if the terms were meant to be precisely synonymous.  
Likewise, the legislature would not have used both terms in the 
alternative if they were meant to define mutually exclusive situations.  The most likely intent of the legislature 
was that the terms were to be given their common meaning; that is, the lands to 
be annexed must geographically touch the municipality to some extent, with the 
contiguity requirement being satisfied by the slighter touching contemplated by 
the word “adjacent.”  [Footnote omitted.]
 
If 
the City’s interpretation of the statute–that lands need only be “nearby”–is 
correct, there would be no reason for the exceptions that are spelled out in 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
15-1-402(b).  If 
“nearby” lands that do not touch the municipal boundaries may be annexed, there 
is no reason specially to permit annexation of lands separated from the 
municipality by roads, rivers, and the like.  In interpreting statutes, we are to read 
related laws together and we are to give effect to all the words 
used.  In re Estate of Seeder, 2003 WY 119, ¶ 23, 
76 P.3d 1236, 1243-44 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Worcester v. 
State, 2001 WY 82, ¶ 13, 30 P.3d 47, 52 (Wyo. 
2001)).
 
We 
also note that the common dictionary definitions of both 
“contiguous” and “adjacent” incorporate the concept of there being nothing 
similar intervening.  For example, buildings are neither 
contiguous with nor adjacent to one another if there is another building between 
them.  Similarly, land is neither 
contiguous with nor adjacent to a municipality where the land is separated from 
the municipal boundaries by anything other than a road, river, or the 
like.
 
We 
interpret statutes in their context; that is, with consideration given to other 
statutes in pari materia and in the light of 
their object, purpose and public policy. Petra Energy, Inc. v. Department of 
Revenue, State of Wyo., 6 P.3d 1267, 1270 
(Wyo. 2000); Wyoming Ins. Guar. Asps’ v. Woods, 888 P.2d 192, 
197 (Wyo. 1994). We ascribe to statutes a reasonable 
intent.  Attletweedt v. State, 
684 P.2d 812, 814 (Wyo. 1984); In re Romer, 
436 P.2d 956, 958 (Wyo. 1968).  Application of 
these principles to Wyoming's annexation statutes leads us to the conclusion 
that the pervasive tone or tenor of the statutes is 
strictly to limit the ability of municipalities to annex territory.  
The statutes prescribe a carefully delineated annexation process, limited 
by numerous mandated findings.10  
The most reasonable interpretation of the words "contiguous with or 
adjacent to" in this context is that the legislature intended to limit 
annexation to lands touching a municipality’s boundaries. There is no suggestion 
in the entire statutory scheme that the legislature intended to vest 
municipalities with the discretion to determine what land is “adjacent”–meaning 
“nearby”–on a case-by-case basis. The result of such an interpretation could be 
“crazy quilt” or “leap frog” annexation that would run counter to the concerns 
expressed in the statutory mandates.
 
[Footnote 
10]:  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
15-1-402(a), for example, in addition to requiring that the 
land to be annexed be contiguous with or adjacent to the municipality, also 
requires other specific findings concerning (1) health, safety and welfare; (2) 
natural, geographical, economical and social development; (3) logical and 
feasible extension of public services; and (4) due process. Similarly, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
15-1-402(c) requires the municipality to prepare a report 
concerning proposed boundaries, infrastructure needs and timetables, and fees 
and tax estimates.
 
. . . .  

 
. . .  
The public policy behind geographically limited municipal annexation was 
well stated in [Hawks v. Town of Valdese, 299 
N.C. 1, 261 S.E.2d 90, 97 (1980)] 261 S.E.2d at 97:
 
Contiguity has always 
been viewed as synonymous with the “legal as well as the popular idea of a 
municipal corporation in this country,” which is one of “oneness, community, 
locality, vicinity; a collective body, not several bodies; a collective body of 
inhabitants–that is, a body of people collected or gathered together in 
one mass, not separated into distinct masses, and having a community of 
interest because residents of the same place, not different places. So, as to 
territorial extent, the idea of a city is one of unity, not of plurality, of 
compactness or contiguity, not separation or segregation.” 56 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations § 69, quoting City of Denver v. 
Coulehan, 20 Colo. 471, 39 P. 425 
(1894).  Contiguity, then, is an essential 
component of the traditional concept of a municipal corporation, which is 
envisioned as a governmental unit capable of providing essential governmental 
services to residents within compact borders on a scale adequate to insure “the 
protection of health, safety and welfare in areas being intensively used for 
residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and government purposes or in 
areas undergoing such development.” G.S. 
160A-33(2).
 
The 
element of contiguity helps to preserve the economic and political viability of 
municipal government. The costly package of services provided by municipal 
government can be economically maintained only within the compact boundaries 
fostered by the contiguity requirement. Conversely, the requirement of 
contiguity discourages prohibitively expensive extension of municipal services 
to noncontiguous areas where municipal services cannot be economically supplied. 
Moreover, it goes without saying that, from a political standpoint, a compact, 
contiguous area is more easily governed than one split into diverse, 
noncontiguous enclaves.  Vicinity engenders a unified sense of 
community identity which facilitates the formation of the consensus essential to 
effective government.
 
The 
function of this Court in reviewing statutes is not, of course, to determine 
public policy. Rather, our function is to interpret 
statutes so as to identify reasonable legislative intent. Application of that 
principle to a review of Wyoming's municipal annexation statutes, where the 
authority granted to municipalities is strictly limited, leads to the conclusion 
that the phrase “contiguous with or adjacent to” in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 15-1-402(a)(iv) was legislatively intended to require that the 
boundaries of the municipality and the land proposed for annexation must touch 
to some substantial degree, although there need not necessarily be a lengthy 
shared border.  [Footnote omitted.]
 
[¶26]   
The Swan Ranch land clearly includes contiguous property that is 
developable in that it touches the City “to a substantial degree.”  
We are in agreement with the district court that “the degree of contact, 
the location, and the character of the annexed parcel are sufficient” to satisfy 
this Court’s test.  We conclude that the evidence suffices to 
support the requirement of § 15-1-402(a)(iv), and the district court’s 
conclusions of law were correct.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶27]   
We 
conclude that the district court’s decision upholding the Swan Ranch annexation 
was not clearly erroneous.  There is no reason to disturb the 
decision on the basis of the evidence presented.  The district 
court’s decision upholding the validity of the annexation statute under the 
facts of this case is affirmed.
 
FOOTNOTES
 
1On April 25, 1983 the City of Cheyenne, Laramie 
County, and the South Cheyenne Water and Sewer District entered into an 
agreement called “Memorandum of Agreement: Intergovernmental Contract Agreeing 
to Participate in the Implementation of the Findings of the 201 Facilities Plan 
Final Report for the City of Cheyenne, the south Cheyenne water and Sewer 
District, and Laramie County” – commonly referred to as the “201 
Agreement.”