Case Title: Roitz v. Kidman

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-03-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Roitz v. Kidman1996 WY 39913 P.2d 431Case Number: 95-186Decided: 03/15/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
 

BARBARA SCHWARTZ ROITZ and Rex SCHWARTZ, 
individually, and in their capacity as Personal Representatives and on behalf of 
the Estate of KRISTOPHER ALLEN SCHWARTZ, Appellants (Plaintiffs),

 

v. 

 

ROBERT WILLIAM KIDMAN, individually; GEORGE ROBERT 
EYRE, individually; BRAD EYRE, individually; KIRK EYRE, individually; MARK 
POWERS, individually; BRAD VERCIMAK, individually; and JOHN DOES I-X, Doe 
Partnerships I-X, and Doe Corporations I-X, Appellees (Defendants).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Uinta County, JOHN D. Troughton, 
Judge.

 

Representing 
Appellants: 

Dennis W. Lancaster of Phillips & Lancaster, 
P.C., Evanston.

Representing Appellee 
Robert Kidman: 

Robert J. Reese of Reese & Mathey, Green River, 
for Appellee Robert Kidman. 

Representing Appellee 
George Eyre, Brad Eyre, Kirk Eyre, and Mark Powers:

Rebecca A. Lewis of Lewis & Associates, P.C., 
Laramie.

 

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ. 

MACY, Justice. 

[¶1]      Appellants 
Barbara Roitz and Rex Schwartz, the parents of Kristopher Schwartz, (the 
parents) appeal from the district court's orders which granted a partial summary 
judgment in favor of Appellee Robert Kidman (Kidman) on the parents' 
negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim and a summary judgment in favor 
of Appellees George Eyre, Brad Eyre, Kirk Eyre and Mark Powers (the ranchers) on 
the parents' negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress and wrongful-death 
claims.

 

[¶2]      We affirm in 
part, reverse in part, and remand.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      The parents 
present the following issues for our review:

 

1) 
Whether the district court's order granting Appellees' George Eyre, Brad Eyre, 
Kirk Eyre and Mark Powers[ ] motion for summary judgment against [the parents] 
on [their] claims for negligence and emotional distress[ ] and the district 
court's related findings are supported by the facts, the record and the 
law.

 

2) Whether the district court's order granting 
Appellee Robert William Kidman's motion for partial summary judgment against 
[the parents] on [their] claims for infliction of emotional distress [ ] and the 
district court's related findings are supported by the facts, the record and the 
law.

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      At approximately 
nine o'clock in the evening of September 24, 1993, Kidman was driving a car east 
on Uinta County Road 254 near Lyman at a rate of speed which significantly 
exceeded the 35-mile-per-hour speed limit. Kristopher Schwartz was a passenger 
in the car. Kidman saw two head of cattle in his lane of traffic, and, in an 
attempt to avoid hitting those cattle, he swerved and collided with some other 
cattle. Three cows and one calf were killed as a result of the accident. George 
Eyre owned the calf and two of the cows; Powers owned the third 
cow.

 

[¶5]      Kristopher was 
thrown out of the car when it collided with the cattle. An ambulance, which was 
summoned to the accident scene, transported Kristopher to the Evanston hospital. 
Shortly thereafter, the parents arrived at the Evanston hospital. Kristopher was 
later transferred to a hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah, where he died as a 
result of the injuries he sustained in the accident.

 

[¶6]      On July 29, 1994, 
the parents filed a complaint in the district court, seeking relief from Kidman 
and the ranchers. The parents, as the personal representatives of Kristopher's 
estate, presented a wrongful-death claim and, as individuals, presented claims 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The ranchers requested that a 
summary judgment be entered in their favor on the parents' claims against them. 
Kidman admitted liability to the parents on the wrongful-death claim, but he 
filed a motion, asking that a partial summary judgment be entered in his favor 
on the parents' claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The 
district court held a hearing and granted the motions. After the district court 
certified that its summary judgments were final, appealable orders, the parents 
appealed to this Court.

 

DISCUSSION

 

A. Standard of Review

 

[¶7]      Summary judgment 
is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and when the 
prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. Fowler v. Westair Enterprises, Inc., 906 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Wyo. 1995); see also 
W.R.C.P. 56(c). A genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if 
it were proven, would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential 
element of a cause of action or defense which has been asserted by the parties. 
Adkins v. Lawson, 892 P.2d 128, 130 
(Wyo. 1995). We examine the record from the vantage point most favorable to the 
party who opposed the motion, and we give that party the benefit of all 
favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the record. Fowler, 906 P.2d  at 1055. We do not 
favor the granting of a summary judgment in a negligence action; therefore, the 
summary judgment is subject to more exacting scrutiny. Duncan v. Town of Jackson, 903 P.2d 548, 551 (Wyo. 1995).

 

B. Negligent-Infliction-of-Emotional-Distress 
Claims

 

[¶8]      Each parent 
presented a claim against the appellees for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. The district court granted summary judgments in favor of the 
appellees, finding that, since the parents did not observe their son being 
injured and they were not at the accident scene, the immediacy requirement of 
the negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress tort had not been 
satisfied.

 

[¶9]      A plaintiff can 
recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress only "`if he observed the 
infliction of serious bodily harm or death, or if he observed the serious bodily 
harm or death shortly after its occurrence but without material change in the 
condition and location of the victim.'" R.D. v. W.H., 875 P.2d 26, 34 (Wyo. 
1994) (quoting Gates v. Richardson, 
719 P.2d 193, 199 (Wyo. 1986)). In Contreras By and Through Contreras v. Carbon 
County School District # 1, 843 P.2d 589, 593 (Wyo. 1992), we 
stated:

 

Our immediacy test allows some time to elapse between 
the time of injury and the time of observation. Once the victim's condition or 
location has materially changed, however, the moment of crisis for which 
recovery is allowed is deemed to have passed, regardless of the brevity of time 
which has elapsed since the accident. Shock or emotional distress may occur 
after this point, but it is no longer compensable.

 

In that case, we stated that 
a plaintiff may not recover on a negligent-infliction-of-emotional-distress 
claim if he does not see the victim until after the victim has been transported 
to a hospital. 843 P.2d  at 594.

 

[¶10]   The parents in this case rely upon 
our decision in R.D. as being support 
for their argument that the immediacy requirement was satisfied. In R.D., we considered a special situation 
wherein the negligent act was separated in time from the injury. 875 P.2d  at 34. 
In that case, we held that the plaintiffs stated a claim for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress when they asserted in their complaint that they 
had viewed the immediate aftermath of the decedent's suicide even though they 
had not witnessed the negligent acts which resulted in the suicide. 875 P.2d  at 
34-35.

 

[¶11]   The special circumstances in the R.D. case were not present in this case. 
Unlike the plaintiffs in R.D., the 
parents here did not see the victim immediately after he was injured. Kristopher 
had been transported to the hospital before his parents saw him. While the 
parents were understandably shocked when they saw their son in an injured 
condition, their emotional distress was not compensable under the facts of this 
case. See Contreras By and Through 
Contreras, 843 P.2d  at 593-94.

 

C. Wrongful-Death Claim

 

[¶12]   The parents asserted a claim for 
wrongful death against the ranchers, contending that the ranchers were negligent 
in failing to keep their cattle off the road and that their negligence was a 
proximate cause of Kristopher's death. The ranchers moved for a summary 
judgment, and the district court granted their motion, finding that they were 
not negligent and were not liable to the parents under the provisions of WYO. 
STAT. § 11-24-108 (1981). The district court also found that the undisputed 
facts placed the case within the "drifting livestock" exception delineated in § 
11-24-108(b). Section 11-24-108 provides in pertinent part as 
follows:

 

(a) No owner or person having custody or charge of 
livestock shall permit the livestock to run at large in any fenced public 
highways in Wyoming. . . .

 

(b) Any person or corporation violating this section 
shall be fined not less than fifty dollars ($50.00) nor more than seven hundred 
fifty dollars ($750.00) and in addition shall pay all damage done by the 
livestock. The provisions of this section do not apply to livestock drifting 
into lanes or fenced roads in going to or returning from their accustomed 
ranges.

 

[¶13]   The parents contest the district 
court's conclusions and maintain that genuine issues of material fact existed as 
to whether the cattle were running at large or whether they were drifting. They 
also contend that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the 
ranchers were negligent in how they cared for their 
cattle.

 

[¶14]   The Legislature passed the original 
version of § 11-24-108 in 1919, and, on a number of occasions, this Court has 
considered cases which have required that this statute be applied. See Nylen v. Dayton, 770 P.2d 1112 
(Wyo. 1989); Gilliland v. 
Steinhoefel, 521 P.2d 1350 (Wyo. 1974); Ellsworth Brothers, Inc. v. Crook, 406 P.2d 520 (Wyo. 1965); Chicago and North 
Western Railway Company v. Bishop, 390 P.2d 731 (Wyo. 1964); Hinkle v. Siltamaki, 361 P.2d 37 (Wyo. 
1961). The Nylen decision reviewed 
the prior cases in which we interpreted this statute. 770 P.2d  at 1115-16. The 
Court concluded that, by using the term "permit" in the statute, the Legislature 
required a plaintiff to show that a defendant was negligent in permitting his 
livestock to run at large on the public highway. 770 P.2d  at 1115-17. A 
defendant is entitled to have a summary judgment granted in his favor when the 
plaintiff has failed to make a prima facie showing that the defendant was 
negligent. Id.

 

[¶15]   When we consider the record in the 
light most favorable to the parents, we discover the following facts which 
pertain to the wrongful-death claim. County Road 254, an east-west road, is a 
paved road west of its intersection with County Road 253, a north-south road, 
and is a dirt road east of the intersection. Fences run along both sides of the 
road. County Road 254 has a cattle guard across it just east of its intersection 
with County Road 253, and a gate (the lower gate) is located next to the cattle 
guard. Another cattle guard is located approximately 1.8 miles east of the lower 
gate and cattle guard. A gate (the upper gate) is located next to the second 
cattle guard and connects the ranchers' summer grazing pastures with the 
enclosed portion of the dirt road. In order for cattle to access the paved 
portion of the road from the summer range, they have to travel through the two 
gates.

 

[¶16]   Each rancher was either an owner or 
a custodian of the cattle. The car collided with the cattle on the paved portion 
of County Road 254.

 

[¶17]   The upper gate was apparently open 
on the night that the accident occurred, allowing the cattle to travel from the 
summer range into the fenced portion of the dirt road between the two cattle 
guards. A dispute existed in the record as to whether or not the ranchers 
allowed the upper gate to remain open. Powers testified in his deposition that 
he did not care if the upper gate remained open because he wanted the cattle to 
gather in the fenced area of the dirt roadway between the upper and lower cattle 
guards. Similarly, Kirk Eyre testified that he did not worry about whether the 
upper gate was closed. In contrast, George Eyre and Brad Eyre testified that it 
was their practice to keep the upper gate closed.

 

[¶18]   The ranchers testified that they 
routinely checked the fenced dirt roadway between the upper and lower cattle 
guards and generally removed the cattle which had gathered in that area. The 
ranchers also testified, however, that on occasion they would leave cattle in 
the fenced roadway overnight. Powers and Kirk Eyre testified that the area was 
checked in the afternoon and early evening before the accident occurred and that 
no cattle were gathered in there.

 

[¶19]   The lower gate was open on the 
night that the accident occurred, and the cattle, therefore, had access to the 
paved portion of the road. The ranchers testified that they generally kept the 
lower gate closed and that they checked it regularly during the fall of the year 
to make sure it remained closed. Powers and Kirk Eyre testified that they 
checked the lower gate in the afternoon and early evening on the day of the 
accident and that it was closed. George Eyre testified that, although he usually 
checked the lower gate each night to be sure it was closed, he did not check the 
gate on the night of the accident.

 

[¶20]   Taking these facts into account, we 
conclude that genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the ranchers 
were negligent. A jury should determine what type of precautions the ranchers, 
as reasonable persons under all the circumstances, should have taken to keep 
their cattle off the roadway. See Hill v. 
Park County By and Through Board of County Commissioners, 856 P.2d 456, 459 
(Wyo. 1993). For example, should the ranchers have kept the gates closed, and, 
if so, what actions should they have taken to ensure that the gates remained 
closed? A jury must also determine from the conflicting evidence what 
precautions were actually taken by the ranchers to ensure that their cattle were 
not running at large on the roadway. Genuine issues of material fact also 
existed as to whether the cattle were drifting from their summer pastures since 
the record suggested that the ranchers may have been using the fenced roadway 
between the upper and lower gates as a catchpen or a corral for their 
cattle.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶21]   We agree with the district court 
that no genuine issue of material fact existed on the parents' claims for 
negligent infliction of emotional distress and, therefore, affirm the summary 
judgments which were granted in favor of the appellees on those claims. We hold, 
however, that genuine issues of material fact did exist with regard to the 
parents' wrongful-death claim and, therefore, reverse that portion of the 
district court's order which granted a summary judgment in favor of the ranchers 
on that claim.

 

[¶22]   Affirmed in part, reversed in part, 
and remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings.