Case Title: People v. Bracamontes

Citation: 

Docket Number: S139702

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2022-04-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
MANUEL BRACAMONTES, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S139702 
 
San Diego County Superior Court 
SCD178329 
 
 
April 11, 2022 
 
Justice Corrigan authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Liu, Kruger, 
Groban, Jenkins, and Menetrez* concurred. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________ 
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate 
District, Division Two, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
S139702 
 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
A jury convicted Manuel Bracamontes of the first degree 
murder 
of 
nine-year-old 
Laura 
Arroyo, 
with 
special 
circumstances for committing the murder while engaged in 
kidnapping, lewd act on a child under 14, and oral copulation.1  
A death sentence was returned and imposed.  We affirm.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Prosecution Evidence 
Luis and Laura Arroyo lived in a San Diego apartment 
complex with their children:  Augustine, aged 11; Jose, aged 10; 
and Laura, aged 9.2  Maggie Porter lived in the same complex 
with her three children, including four-year-old Jessica and an 
infant son, Manuel Jr.  Laura and Jessica were “best friends” 
and played together almost daily.  Defendant, Manuel Jr.’s 
 
1  
Penal 
Code 
sections 
187, 
subdivision 
(a), 
190.2, 
subdivision (a)(17)(B), (17)(E), (17)(F).  The jury also found true 
an enhancement for personal deadly weapon use (Pen. Code, 
§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) and convicted defendant of assault with a 
deadly weapon on a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (c)) in 
connection with an attempt to evade arrest.  The trial court 
struck the enhancement and imposed a concurrent midterm on 
the assault count.   
2  
To avoid confusion, we will refer to the younger Laura 
Arroyo as “Laura” and her mother as “Mrs. Arroyo.”   
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
2 
father, had lived in the Porter apartment, but moved.  After his 
departure, he was often seen at the complex.   
On June 19, 1991, Laura came home from school and 
played outside with her friends, including preteens Elizabeth 
Alcarez and Leonor Gomez.  Defendant greeted the girls as he 
walked past them toward Porter’s apartment.  Defendant came 
back a second time and told Elizabeth her mother was looking 
for her.  Laura went home with Elizabeth, but her mother said 
she had not been looking for her.  The children played outside 
until just before 9:00 p.m., then Elizabeth walked Laura home 
and saw her go inside.  Luis had come home from work about 
8:30 p.m.  Laura asked if she could play a bit longer and he 
agreed.  At about the same time, a neighbor and his friend saw 
defendant walking toward the complex from his car.  They 
invited him to join them but he declined.  Defendant’s black 
Volkswagen Jetta was seen leaving the complex about 20 
minutes later.   
Once home, Laura went upstairs and watched television 
with her mother.  Five minutes later, the doorbell rang and 
Laura went downstairs to answer it.  Mrs. Arroyo heard Laura 
asking, “Who is it?” but heard nothing else.  A few minutes after 
that, Mrs. Arroyo went downstairs and noticed the front door 
and metal security door were ajar.  Thinking nothing was amiss, 
she began cooking.  When Luis and his sons came downstairs, 
Mrs. Arroyo sent one of the boys to look for Laura.  He could not 
find her, and they noticed Laura’s shoes were inside.  The entire 
family went searching for Laura.  Unsuccessful, they called 
police at 9:31 p.m.  Officers and neighbors searched for Laura 
throughout the night.   
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
3 
About 6:30 the next morning, Laura’s body was found in 
the parking lot of an industrial complex in Chula Vista, three-
and-a-half miles from her home.  She lay on her back, wearing 
pink pajamas and underwear.  She had been stabbed at least 10 
times in the upper body and torso.  The concrete beneath her 
had been chipped away at various spots, and her wounds were 
consistent with having been stabbed with a pickaxe.  Petechial 
hemorrhaging indicated strangulation.  Other injuries included 
a broken nose and chipped teeth, along with bruising and 
lacerations.  Although her genitalia bore no signs of sexual 
assault, swabs were collected from her mouth, vagina, anus, and 
neck.  An initial examination did not reveal the presence of 
sperm.   
Between July 14 and August 1, 1991, Chula Vista Police 
interviewed defendant four times.  Initially, he claimed he first 
went to the apartment complex at about 9:45 in the evening, 
only after Porter called and told him about Laura’s 
disappearance.  He said he had not been to the complex in a 
week.  He subsequently asserted he went to the complex earlier 
that day to pick up Manuel Jr. and returned that afternoon to 
drop off the baby.  He denied any involvement with Laura’s 
disappearance and insisted he never spoke to Laura or any of 
the neighborhood girls.  Defendant ultimately refused to answer 
more questions but did provide hair, blood, and saliva samples.   
On August 1, 1991, pursuant to warrant, officers searched 
defendant’s residence and car, seizing clothing and tools.  These 
items, along with evidence recovered during the autopsy, were 
sent to an FBI lab.  A blue-green fiber found on Laura’s pants 
was deemed potentially consistent with a fiber from a sweater 
found at defendant’s home and with other fibers recovered from 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
4 
his car.  At the time, no other physical evidence tied him to 
Laura’s murder.   
Police investigated other leads.  Mrs. Arroyo and three 
others reported seeing a suspicious brown car parked in a cul-
de-sac near the complex.  Neither the car nor any occupants 
were ever identified.  Officers also investigated a dispute over 
the Arroyos’ sale of their taco shop but found no link to the 
abduction.  In June 1992, approximately a year after the killing, 
police spoke again with defendant, who continued to deny any 
involvement.  No new evidence was uncovered.   
Eleven years later, the San Diego County District 
Attorney’s Office established a “cold case” unit, and the evidence 
in Laura’s case was reexamined in 2003.  Chula Vista Police also 
sought assistance from the San Diego Police crime lab.  New 
slides were prepared from the autopsy swabs using a method 
that had not been employed in 1991.  The new slides revealed 
the presence of sperm in swabs from Laura’s mouth, neck, and 
fingernails.  A DNA profile was developed and found to match 
DNA taken from defendant’s hair sample.  The probability of a 
random match was one in 2.7 trillion in the Latino population, 
one in 3.2 trillion among Caucasians, and one in nine trillion 
among African-Americans.  Laura’s pajamas were placed under 
an alternate light source which revealed biological matter.  
Tested samples from the garment confirmed the presence of 
sperm.  The resulting DNA profile matched defendant’s 
reference sample.  The likelihood of a random match was one in 
30 quadrillion.   
On October 24, 2003, more than 12 years after Laura’s 
murder, district attorney investigators Robert Marquez and 
Michael Howard went to Porter’s apartment looking for 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
5 
defendant.  Manuel Jr. said his mother was not home, but 
defendant was expected to pick him up shortly.  While the 
investigators waited in their car, defendant arrived and parked 
his Ford Explorer in front of the apartment.  As Manuel Jr. 
approached the car, the investigators drove up and stopped in 
front of the Explorer.  Marquez approached defendant and 
identified himself.  Howard drew his gun, opened the passenger 
door, and told defendant he was under arrest for murder.  
Defendant initially raised his hands but then sped off.  Howard 
fired twice toward the fleeing car.   
Early the next morning, officers saw defendant’s Explorer 
parked at a Chula Vista motel and placed a tracking device on 
it.  About 10:30 a.m., the device indicated defendant had left the 
motel.  Two officers in separate marked patrol cars found the 
Explorer parked in an alley.  After blocking either end of the 
alley, officers approached on foot.  Defendant started the engine 
and made a U-turn as officers drew their guns and ordered him 
to stop.  He sped past them and drove over a curb to escape.  
After a high-speed freeway chase, defendant lost control of his 
car, crashed, and was arrested.   
2.  Defense Evidence 
Five years after the murder and eight years before the cold 
case review, Chula Vista Police Detective Susan Rodriguez 
looked into the case.  Defendant’s Jetta, which had been sold, 
was reexamined in vain.  Latent fingerprints from the Arroyos’ 
front door did not match his.  Rodriguez also recontacted a 
psychic who had been consulted during the initial investigation.  
No new leads were developed.  Evidence from Laura’s body was 
not reexamined because Rodriguez had no reason to doubt the 
medical examiner’s conclusion ruling out sexual assault.   
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
6 
Manuel Jr. testified that when Marquez and Howard first 
approached him at the apartment they only identified 
themselves by name.3  They refused to tell defendant why he 
was being arrested and both men shot at defendant’s fleeing car.  
Several other witnesses testified about the attempted arrest.  
Defendant checked into a motel later that night using his real 
name.   
B.  Penalty Phase 
1.  Prosecution Evidence 
Laura’s parents and two brothers described the impact of 
her life and murder.  Laura wanted to be a high school 
cheerleader and then a teacher, a role she often assumed while 
playing with friends.  She was friendly with everyone and her 
mother’s constant companion.  The family trip to Disneyland 
was replaced by Laura’s funeral.  Laura was buried in the dress 
she was to wear for her first communion.  Laura’s brothers were 
afraid to go anywhere after the murder.  The family kept Laura’s 
room unchanged for six years after her death and still visited 
her grave every Sunday and on her birthday.  Mari Peterson, 
Laura’s third grade teacher, testified about the impact of 
Laura’s death on her and her class.  The jury was also shown a 
two-and-a-half minute video of an interview between Peterson 
and Laura filmed a few weeks before the crimes.   
In June 1996, Porter told defendant she wanted to end 
their relationship and he became violent.  He refused to leave, 
pushed her, and held her down by the arm and neck.  Photos 
 
3  
In rebuttal, the prosecution presented evidence of an 
audiotape of the investigators’ interaction with Manuel Jr. in 
which Marquez identified himself as being a district attorney 
investigator.   
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
7 
showed abrasions to Porter’s upper body.  Defendant pled guilty 
to inflicting corporal injury on the mother of his child.4   
2.  Defense Evidence 
Twenty-one defense witnesses testified that defendant 
was incapable of committing the murder.  Porter related she 
married defendant shortly before trial and believed he was not 
capable of killing Laura.  Porter’s ex-husband gave similar 
testimony.  Porter’s two adult children described defendant as a 
good father who never said or did anything inappropriate with 
them.  Family members described defendant’s childhood as 
normal and not marked by abuse.  He played with his siblings, 
participated in Little League, and cared for his pets.  As an 
adult, defendant was supportive of his family and a good father 
to Manuel Jr.  After his father was injured in a car accident and 
confined to bed for two years, defendant helped care for him and 
the family.  He also comforted his sister when her husband was 
fatally shot.  He never acted inappropriately with his sisters or 
nieces.  A work supervisor testified he was a hard worker who 
got along with others.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Pretrial Issues 
1.  Prefiling Delay  
While the murder occurred in June 1991, defendant was 
not charged until October 2003.  He argues the delay was 
unjustified and denied him due process because some evidence 
he could have presented, particularly schooling and employment 
 
4  
Penal Code section 273.5, subdivision (a).   
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
8 
evidence for the penalty phase, became unavailable during that 
time.  We reject the claim.   
a.  Background 
The defense argued that all charges should be dismissed 
because the prefiling delay violated due process.  The trial court 
heard from numerous witnesses, primarily related to potential 
prejudice from lost evidence.  Elementary and high school 
employees testified that, although records of enrollment are 
kept permanently, other student files are usually destroyed 
after five years.  Defendant graduated from high school in 1981, 
10 years before Laura’s murder.  Several of defendant’s 
elementary school teachers had died by the time of the 2005 
hearing; two others did not remember him.  Representatives 
from seven companies where defendant worked between 1979 
and 1993 testified as to defendant’s employment records and pay 
stubs, with most indicating that detailed records were either 
never kept or were no longer available.  The defense also 
presented evidence that three people who had a positive 
impression of defendant had passed away.  Defendant also 
suggested that evidence regarding an alarm system at his 
parents’ house and record of a U-Haul truck his sister rented for 
her move supported his alibi but had been lost.  Guadalupe 
Echeverria, whom the defense claimed was unhappy following 
her purchase of the Arroyos’ taco shop (see discussion post), had 
died in December 1991.   
In its opposition, the prosecution asserted the delay was 
justified.  It observed that the initial medical examination of the 
victim’s body in 1991 did not reveal the presence of sperm or 
injuries consistent with sexual assault, and the victim’s clothing 
was intact, leading the medical examiner to conclude no such 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
9 
assault had occurred.  Police searched defendant’s car and home 
and repeatedly interviewed him.  The blue-green fiber from the 
victim’s pajamas may have matched fibers from defendant’s car 
and clothing, but the result was inconclusive.  It was not until 
2003 that a reexamination of evidence revealed sperm on swabs 
from the victim and a subsequent DNA test linked the sperm to 
defendant.  Expert testimony explained that, in 1991, a water-
based extraction method was used to transfer evidence from a 
swab to a slide for examination.  It was later discovered that this 
method, in contrast to a detergent-based method used in 2003, 
was often ineffective and may have led to false negative results.  
Further, the restriction fragment length polymorphism DNA 
tests prevalent in 1991 required more material for testing than 
was present on the oral swabs.  Defendant’s sister Teresa also 
testified that friends and family remained available to testify 
about defendant’s life, which she described as normal and 
unaffected by childhood abuse or involvement with gangs, 
alcohol, or drugs.  A prosecution investigator testified 
defendant’s employers at the time of the murder remembered 
him and that he had been disciplined for failing to perform 
assigned duties and threatening a supervisor.   
The trial court denied defendant’s motion.  It concluded 
that the prosecution could not reasonably bring charges in 1991 
based on the uncertain state of the evidence.  The court balanced 
the justification for the delay with any potential prejudice.  It 
held the strong public interest in prosecution outweighed any 
potential prejudice.  The defense unsuccessfully renewed its 
motion to dismiss at the penalty phase, arguing the charging 
delay resulted in an “incomplete picture” of defendant being 
presented to the jury.   
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
10 
b.  There Was No Prejudicial Prefiling Delay 
“Although precharging delay does not implicate speedy 
trial rights, a defendant is not without recourse if the delay is 
unjustified and prejudicial.  ‘[T]he right of due process protects 
a criminal defendant’s interest in fair adjudication by 
preventing unjustified delays that weaken the defense through 
the dimming of memories, the death or disappearance of 
witnesses, and the loss or destruction of material physical 
evidence.’  [Citation.]  Accordingly, ‘[d]elay in prosecution that 
occurs before the accused is arrested or the complaint is filed 
may constitute a denial of the right to a fair trial and to due 
process of law under the state and federal Constitutions.  A 
defendant seeking to dismiss a charge on this ground must 
demonstrate prejudice arising from the delay.  The prosecution 
may offer justification for the delay, and the court considering a 
motion to dismiss balances the harm to the defendant against 
the justification for the delay.’ ”  (People v. Nelson (2008) 43 
Cal.4th 1242, 1250 (Nelson).)   
Nelson observed that both negligent and purposeful 
charging delay, if accompanied by a showing of prejudice, can 
violate due process.  “This does not mean, however, that whether 
the delay was purposeful or negligent is irrelevant . . . . 
[W]hether the delay was negligent or purposeful is relevant to 
the balancing process.  Purposeful delay to gain an advantage is 
totally unjustified, and a relatively weak showing of prejudice 
would suffice to tip the scales towards finding a due process 
violation.  If the delay was merely negligent, a greater showing 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
11 
of prejudice would be required to establish a due process 
violation.”5  (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1255–1256.)   
No prejudicial delay appears here.  Defendant argues the 
charging delay was unjustified because evidence of sperm on the 
victim’s clothing and, thus, defendant’s DNA, could have been 
detected sooner using technology available at the time.  We 
rejected a similar argument in Nelson, where the defendant 
argued “the DNA technology used here existed years before law 
enforcement agencies made the comparison in this case and 
that, therefore, the comparison could have, and should have, 
been made sooner than it actually was.”  (Nelson, supra, 43 
Cal.4th at p. 1256.)  We cautioned there that “[a] court may not 
find negligence by second-guessing how the state allocates its 
resources or how law enforcement agencies could have 
investigated a given case.”  (Ibid.)  Similarly here, the initial 
investigation into Laura’s killing suggested a sexual assault was 
not involved.  The medical examination of the victim’s body did 
not reveal a sexual assault.  The victim’s clothing was intact and 
her genitalia uninjured.  Swabs collected from her body did not 
reveal the presence of sperm.  The medical examiner’s 
conclusion that there had been no sexual assault, while 
reasonable, may have set back the investigation.  Not until 
sperm was discovered later during a “cold case” review and a 
 
5  
Nelson noted that state and federal constitutional 
standards regarding justification for delay differ.  (Nelson, 
supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1251; see United States v. Lovasco (1977) 
431 U.S. 783, 795–796; United States v. Marion (1971) 404 U.S. 
307, 325–326.)  Nelson, however, rested its holding on 
California’s constitution because “the law under the California 
Constitution is at least as favorable for defendant in this regard 
as the law under the United States Constitution.”  (Nelson, at p. 
1251.)  We do so here as well.   
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
12 
DNA profile was produced did physical evidence connect 
defendant to the crimes.  Indeed, defendant’s initial connection 
to the murder was inconclusive.  The only physical evidence 
linking him to the crimes was a single blue-green fiber that may 
have matched fibers found in his car and residence.  He had been 
seen 
at 
the 
apartment 
complex 
just 
before 
Laura’s 
disappearance, and he initially lied to police about being there.  
However, defendant denied involvement and no direct evidence 
linked him to the crimes.  Further, the inability to detect sperm 
on the victim’s body not only deprived investigators of DNA 
evidence but also a motive for Laura’s murder.  That his 
girlfriend’s daughter and Laura were friends did little to explain 
why defendant would have killed the child.   
Ultimately, “[t]he delay was investigative delay, nothing 
else.”  (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1256.)  As we observed in 
People v. Cordova (2015) 62 Cal.4th 104 (Cordova):  “Sometimes 
a crime simply is not solved immediately but must await some 
break in the case, a break that occurred here . . . when a cold hit 
revealed a match between defendant and the evidence samples.”  
(Id. at p. 120.)  As in Nelson:  “ ‘The delay was the result of 
insufficient evidence to identify defendant as a suspect and the 
limits of forensic technology.  [Citations.]  When the forensic 
technology became available to identify defendant as a suspect 
and to establish his guilt, the prosecution proceeded with 
promptness.’ ”  (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1257.)  There is 
no indication that prosecution here was delayed to secure any 
improper advantage.   
In any event, “if the defendant fails to meet his or her 
burden of showing prejudice, there is no need to determine 
whether the delay was justified.”  (People v. Jones (2013) 57 
Cal.4th 899, 921.)  The potential prejudice identified by 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
13 
defendant appears minimal.  As to the guilt phase, defendant 
asserts that the delay prevented adequate defense investigation 
into potential third-party culpability evidence, including the 
occupants of a brown car near the victim’s apartment complex 
and the Arroyos’ sale of a taco shop.  (See discussion post.)  Near 
the time of the crimes, several witnesses reported seeing a 
brown car, but no one could identify the car or its occupants.  
Defendant speculates that an earlier investigation would have 
identified these persons but does not suggest how the defense 
investigation was hindered.  With respect to the taco shop sale, 
Echeverria died only five months after the murder.  Defendant 
also does not suggest what evidence Echeverria would have 
provided that was not otherwise available.   
As for the penalty phase, defendant broadly contends that 
“whole categories of evidence essential to presenting the jury 
with a full picture of appellant were lost,” including school, 
employment, and medical records, as well as mitigation 
witnesses who passed away.  The record belies this claim.  
Defendant presented 21 witnesses at the penalty phase who 
testified about his childhood and adult life; positive family 
interactions, favorable experiences and opinions; and testimony 
from a work supervisor.  In light of this extensive presentation, 
any prejudice from the absence of additional similar evidence 
would appear minimal.  Defendant does not explain how 
documentary evidence regarding his education, employment, or 
medical care would have bolstered the evidence presented.  On 
this record, “the claimed prejudice is speculative” and 
“[d]efendant was able to, and did, present evidence in his 
defense . . . .”  (Cordova, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 120.)   
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
14 
2.  Shackling 
Defendant contends the trial court improperly ordered 
him to wear leg chains during trial, which prejudiced him at 
both the guilt and penalty phases.  Prejudice does not appear on 
this record.   
a.  Background 
Defendant moved to appear without physical restraints, 
pointing out that he had previously made court appearances 
without disruption.  The court tentatively indicated it would 
deny the motion but explained that “Mr. Bracamontes will 
have . . . ankle cuffs on, that they be tethered to a bolt in the 
floor.  His hands will not be shackled.  He will not be waist 
chained.  He will be free to stand, turn to talk to both counsel, 
certainly assist in his defense.  [¶] What he will be prevented 
from doing is leaving counsel table, which he isn’t allowed to do 
anyway.  [¶] We’ll make every effort to ensure that the panel is 
not aware that he is chained to the floor.”  When defense counsel 
argued defendant had been cooperative and had not been 
disruptive in the courtroom, the court noted that defendant had 
twice fled from police before being apprehended.  The court also 
inquired whether it could consider the “mere fact of the charges 
and the potential penalty in the case . . . .”  Both defense counsel 
responded that was not part of the inquiry whether there was a 
manifest need for restraints.  Although agreeing with defense 
counsel that “Mr. Bracamontes has always been very respectful 
in court” and no instances of jail disruption had been reported, 
the court denied defendant’s motion.  If defendant chose to 
testify, the court indicated he would be allowed to walk to the 
stand “unimpeded” and “when he’s excused, he’s free to walk 
back and sit down.  We’ll make those arrangements.”  Defendant 
elected not to testify so this eventuality did not arise.   
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
15 
Later, outside the presence of prospective jurors, defense 
counsel commented that, the day before, “with the table turned 
facing the audience, that the jurors that were seated in the jury 
box, at least some of them could see that Mr. Bracamontes was 
shackled to the floor . . . .  The wire was visible underneath the 
chairs at least to probably the six people that are closest to the 
bench.”  The “wire” was an apparent reference to the tether 
mentioned by the court.  The court stated it was “not going to 
get rid of the panel” but asked the bailiff if counsel table could 
be turned.  The bailiff responded, “I don’t know how I can.  
There’s more people at counsel table than expected, and there’s 
more people in the way when he stands.”  The court replied, 
“We’ll leave it the way it is,” and defense counsel addressed 
another matter.   
b.  The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion 
“ ‘In general, the “court has broad power to maintain 
courtroom security and orderly proceedings” [citation], and its 
decisions on these matters are reviewed for abuse of discretion.  
[Citation.]  However, the court’s discretion to impose physical 
restraints is constrained by constitutional principles.  Under 
California law, “a defendant cannot be subjected to physical 
restraints of any kind in the courtroom while in the jury’s 
presence, unless there is a showing of a manifest need for such 
restraints.”  [Citation.]  Similarly, the federal “Constitution 
forbids the use of visible shackles . . . unless that use is ‘justified 
by an essential state interest’ — such as the interest in 
courtroom security — specific to the defendant on trial.”  . . . ’ ”  
(People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 123 (Bell).)  “The imposition 
of physical restraints in the absence of a record showing of 
violence or a threat of violence or other nonconforming conduct 
will be deemed to constitute an abuse of discretion.”  (People v. 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
16 
Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 291 (Duran).)  “ ‘In deciding 
whether restraints are justified, the trial court may “take into 
account the factors that courts have traditionally relied on in 
gauging potential security problems and the risk of escape at 
trial.”  [Citation.]  These factors include evidence establishing 
that a defendant poses a safety risk, a flight risk, or is likely to 
disrupt the proceedings or otherwise engage in nonconforming 
behavior.’ ”  (People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 1270 
(Virgil).)   
As these authorities make clear, physical restraints are 
considered extraordinary measures.  Courts entertaining such 
action must seriously consider the question on an individualized 
basis and ensure there is an adequate record for their ruling.  
Constitutional principles “prohibit the use of physical restraints 
visible to the jury absent a trial court determination, in the 
exercise of its discretion, that they are justified by a state 
interest specific to a particular trial.”  (Deck v. Missouri (2005) 
544 U.S. 622, 629 (Deck).)  The individualized consideration 
necessary before imposing restraints would be inconsistent with 
a blanket policy of shackling defendants charged with certain 
offenses, such as capital murder.  (People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 
Cal.4th 920, 944; Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 293.)  “The mere 
facts that the defendant is an unsavory character and charged 
with a violent crime are not sufficient to support a finding of 
manifest need.”  (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 
Cal.4th 335, 389–390 (Bryant).) 
Defendant contends there was no manifest need to shackle 
him, noting the lack of any courtroom or jail incidents involving 
nonconforming behavior.  However, the record here does not 
support defendant’s assertion that the court relied primarily on 
a blanket policy to shackle capital murder defendants and failed 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
17 
to consider his particular circumstances.  The court did inquire 
at one point whether it could consider the present charges and 
commented that its prior handling of similar murder cases had 
“proved very successful in the past.”  Nonetheless, the court 
specifically cited as a relevant factor defendant’s two attempts 
to evade arrest under dangerous circumstances.   
A court’s determination that a defendant constitutes a 
flight risk may justify a finding of manifest need for restraints.  
For example, in Vigil, we concluded there was no abuse of 
discretion in shackling the defendant because he “was a genuine 
escape risk” where he used “a makeshift key to unlock another 
inmate’s handcuffs” and lied about it.  (Virgil, supra, 51 Cal.4th 
at p. 1271; see People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 988 
(Cunningham).)  Further, a defendant’s recent attempt to 
escape custody, or evidence of an intent to escape, could support 
a finding of a manifest need for restraints.  (See People v. Smith 
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 18, 44; People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 
774; People v. Condley (1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 999, 1006.)   
However, our cases teach that a mere disposition to 
violence or escape standing alone cannot justify the use of 
restraints.  “A court’s decision about the use of restraints 
involves a prediction of the likelihood of violence, escape, or 
disruption weighed against the potential burden on the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial.  Given the serious potential 
consequences on both sides of the scale, the range of factors the 
court may consider in assessing and weighing the risks should 
be broad.”  (Bryant, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 390.)  The necessary 
individualized assessment requires a determination, based on 
the totality of the circumstances, that a defendant presently 
intends to engage in nonconforming courtroom behavior, i.e., 
conduct 
that 
“ ‘would 
disrupt 
the 
judicial 
process 
if 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
18 
unrestrained.’ ”  (People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 651 (Cox), 
disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 
Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.)  “The imposition of physical restraints 
in the absence of a record showing of violence or a threat of 
violence or other nonconforming conduct will be deemed to 
constitute an abuse of discretion.”  (Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at 
p. 291; see People v. Montes (2014) 58 Cal.4th 809, 841.)   
A defendant’s prearrest attempt to evade capture, 
standing alone, would not justify the use of physical restraints.  
People v. Jacla (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 878 concluded no manifest 
need for shackling was shown where the defendant, while on 
bail, was involved in a shooting and an ensuing high-speed 
chase.  The court explained:  “We conceive Duran to hold that it 
is the defendant’s conduct in custody, now or at other times 
[citations], or his expressed intention to escape or engage in 
nonconforming conduct during the trial that should be 
considered in determining whether there is a ‘manifest need’ for 
shackles.”  (Jacla, at p. 884; see also People v. Burnett (1980) 111 
Cal.App.3d 661, 667.)  This court quoted Jacla positively in 
People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222.  With respect to the 
shackling of a witness, Allen observed that “none of the evidence 
presented by the prosecution relates to [the witness’s] present 
or past conduct in custody or in the courtroom, and most of the 
evidence seems of limited value in predicting [his] future 
conduct in the courtroom.”  (Id. at p. 1263.)   
Similarly here, although defendant attempted to evade 
capture before his eventual arrest, there was no evidence that 
defendant harbored a present intent to escape from custody or 
otherwise disrupt court proceedings.  The trial court agreed that 
defendant had “always been very respectful in court” and there 
had been no reports of misbehavior in custody.  The ultimate 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
19 
question remains whether there exists a manifest need for 
shackling or other restraint.  The need must arise from a current 
risk of flight, violence, or other disruptive behavior.  Although 
the court’s consideration is not limited solely to custodial 
conduct, it must make a determination, based on the totality of 
the circumstances, that a manifest need for restraints currently 
exists.  (See Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 651.)  The evidence was 
insufficient to justify such a determination here.  Under these 
circumstances, the court abused its discretion by ordering the 
use of restraints.   
Finally, we emphasize that the justification “in support of 
the court’s determination to impose physical restraints must 
appear as a matter of record” (Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 291).  
When restraints are requested by the prosecution, the People 
should place facts justifying their use on the record “so that the 
court may make its own determination of the nature and 
seriousness of the conduct and whether there is a manifest need 
for such restraints.”  (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 115; 
cf. People v. Miller (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1114; People v. 
Prado (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 267, 275–276.)  We note the court 
may consider imposing restraints in the absence of a 
prosecutorial request.  Further, and importantly, the court must 
ensure the record reflects both the reasons justifying the 
restraints, along with a description of “the type of restraints 
used [and] whether they were visible to the jury” (People v. 
Jackson (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1818, 1826).  Of course, “[i]t is 
settled that the use of physical restraints in the trial court 
cannot be challenged for the first time on appeal.  Defendant’s 
failure to object and make a record below waives the claim . . . .”  
(People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 583 (Tuilaepa); see 
People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 406.)  As such, if the 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
20 
defense disagrees with the trial court’s initial assessment of the 
visibility of the restraints at any point during trial, the defense 
should object so the trial court can make an appropriate record.   
c.  The Trial Record Does Not Establish Prejudice 
As the high court has stated, where a court improperly 
orders the use of visible physical restraints, “[t]he State must 
prove ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the [shackling] error 
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ”  
(Deck, supra, 544 U.S. at p. 635; see People v. Miracle (2018) 6 
Cal.5th 318, 350, fn. 6.)  Defendant contends that “the shackles 
apparently remained in the jury’s view for the duration of the 
trial.”  The record on direct appeal does not support this 
contention.  Defense counsel commented during jury selection 
that, “with the table turned facing the audience,” “at least some 
of” the prospective jurors could see the “wire,” suggesting that it 
was visible “to probably the six people that are closest to the 
bench.”  The record does not indicate whether counsel table 
remained in the same location during trial, or any of the seated 
jurors ever saw the restraints.  All that can be established is 
that, for an unspecified period of time during voir dire, some 
prospective jurors may have seen a portion of the “wire” used in 
the system.  “Brief glimpses of a defendant in restraints have 
not been deemed prejudicial.”  (Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th 
at p. 988; see Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 287, fn. 2.)   
“Even if the restraint had been glimpsed during that 
portion of voir dire by one or more of the prospective jurors who 
actually sat on the jury, the unjustified shackling was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 
745, 774.)  As we reasoned in Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th 569:  
“Strong guilt evidence in the form of eight positive eyewitness 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
21 
identifications established that defendant shot four individuals 
and killed one of them in the course of robbing people in a 
neighborhood bar.  No other guilt errors are raised on appeal or 
are evident from the record, and no prejudicial error occurred at 
the penalty phase for reasons we will explain.  Defendant 
elected not to testify in his own behalf.  Any glimpse jurors 
might have received of the restraints as defendant entered the 
courtroom could not possibly have shocked them or affected 
their assessment of the evidence.”  (Id. at pp. 584–585.)  
Similarly here, with respect to the guilt phase, strong DNA 
evidence tied defendant to the murder.  The lowest probability 
for a random match among the samples was one in 2.7 trillion 
among the Latino population.  Further, as discussed below, no 
other error appears on this record.  The court, in deciding to 
order shackling, reassured the defense that if defendant decided 
to testify, he would be allowed to walk to and from the stand 
unrestrained, and there is no assertion that the restraints 
otherwise inhibited defendant’s ability to assist in his defense.   
Even assuming some jurors may have briefly glimpsed the 
restraints, the shackling error was also harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt at the penalty phase.  During jury argument, 
the prosecutor identified only three aggravating factors:  the 
circumstances of the crime; defendant’s age at the time of the 
offenses; and defendant’s commission of a prior domestic 
violence incident.  (See Pen. Code, § 190.3, factors (a), (b), (i).)  
Of these, the prosecutor focused primarily on the circumstances 
of the offense, calling it “one of the most important factors in this 
case.”  After acknowledging that defendant’s lack of felony 
convictions constituted a mitigating factor, along with defense 
evidence regarding “any good things about [defendant’s] life” 
(see Pen. Code, § 190.3, factors (c), (k)), the prosecutor argued 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
22 
these factors were “extremely weak” compared to “the facts, 
circumstances of this case, like this one right here where her 
final resting place on that sidewalk is, it’s like comparing tons 
to ounces.”  He graphically described the scene where the victim 
was found:  “How about comparing all of those stab wounds to 
that little girl on that sidewalk, where she was impaled on that 
sidewalk, compare that to all the mitigation.  I submit it makes 
the scale on this side go all the way to the ground.  [¶] The chop 
wounds to the face and the other injuries to the face, shoulders, 
neck, each and every one of those facts, ladies and gentlemen, 
wipes out any weight, any slight weight that any of those items 
have on that mitigating side.”  The prosecutor described the 
impact of the murder on Laura’s parents, brothers, her teacher, 
and classmates, then discussed Laura’s potential future and 
how she might have experienced the crimes as they were 
happening.  Thereafter, the prosecutor argued:  “You have to put 
this now on that scale, ladies and gentlemen.  When you 
compare all of these things on this side of the scale, everything 
we just talked about, including the assault on the cop, the 
pickaxe that he used, the lewd act on the child, these are the 
special circumstances, the forced oral [copulation].  And the 
kidnapping, ladies and gentlemen, the aggravating side of this 
scale outweighs the mitigating side of the scale like the Queen 
Mary outweighs a rowboat.  Like a 6’, 220-pound male outweighs 
a 61-pound third grade girl.”  The single reference to an “assault 
on the cop” was not explained, and the prosecutor did not 
otherwise mention defendant’s flight from police during jury 
argument that spanned almost 30 pages of the reporter’s 
transcript.  Further, aside from the specific commission of a 
domestic violence incident, the prosecutor did not suggest that 
defendant had a violent background warranting the death 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
23 
penalty.  As noted, he acknowledged defendant’s lack of felony 
convictions constituted a mitigating factor.   
The defense acknowledged the prosecution’s emphasis on 
the circumstances of the offense, with counsel commenting that, 
“as expected, the prosecutor has focused on the facts of the 
crime, because in this case that’s really all that he has to talk 
about.”  Both defense counsel mentioned that defendant had no 
background of violence.  This argument dovetailed into the two 
primary defense themes:  that jurors should have a lingering 
doubt as to defendant’s guilt based on the multiple defense 
witnesses who testified that defendant was incapable of 
committing the murder; and that life imprisonment was a 
sufficient punishment for the present crimes.  Counsel discussed 
lingering doubt at length, arguing that the DNA evidence only 
linked defendant to the sexual assault and not the killing.  They 
argued evidence suggested others must be involved and that no 
physical evidence tied Laura to defendant’s car.  They urged 
defendant had no history of child molestation, no history of 
having been abused himself, and no history of mental illness or 
drug addiction.  All these facts were asserted to be inconsistent 
with defendant’s guilt.  Defense counsel suggested that DNA 
evidence may someday exonerate defendant.  They also 
emphasized that defendant would not be eligible for parole and 
there was no evidence that defendant had posed a danger to 
anyone during the two years that he spent in custody awaiting 
trial because “[t]here were no assaults on any guards or other 
inmates.”   
“[V]isible physical restraints like handcuffs or leg irons 
may erode the presumption of innocence because they suggest 
to the jury that the defendant is a dangerous person who must 
be separated from the rest of the community.”  (People v. 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
24 
Hernandez (2011) 51 Cal.4th 733, 742; cf. Deck, supra, 544 U.S. 
at pp. 632–633.)  The record on direct appeal here reveals that 
the jury convicted defendant of the gruesome murder and sexual 
assault of a nine-year-old girl who had been kidnapped from her 
home.  The prosecution’s subsequent penalty phase argument 
focused primarily on the circumstances of this horrific crime, 
which the jury had previously assessed, rather than on 
defendant’s dangerousness.  The bulk of the defense case, both 
with respect to jury argument and the evidence presented, 
emphasized a theory of lingering doubt, a factor in mitigation as 
to the circumstances of the crime.  (See Pen. Code, § 190.3, factor 
(a); People v. Holmes (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 753.)  The record 
before us only establishes that some prospective jurors may 
have seen a portion of a “wire” during voir dire over a month 
before the penalty phase began.  In light of this record, the 
unjustified shackling was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 
notwithstanding the possibility that some panel members may 
have seen some form of restraint during jury selection.6   
B.  Guilt Phase Issues 
1.  Flight Instructions 
Based on defendant’s flight from arresting officers, the 
court gave a consciousness of guilt instruction using a modified 
 
6  
If there is evidence outside of the appellate record that the 
jury’s view of defendant’s restraints was more extensive, a 
habeas corpus proceeding would allow evaluation of such 
evidence.  (Cf. People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 
266–268.)   
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
25 
version of CALJIC No. 2.52.7  (See Pen. Code, § 1127c.)  The 
defense asked for an instruction on the absence of flight to show 
he had no consciousness of guilt.  It noted that defendant had 
agreed to police interviews in 1991 and 1992 even after he had 
become the focus of the investigation.8  The trial court observed 
the defense could argue the point to the jury, but it would not 
give “a pinpoint instruction on a negative.”   
Defendant contends the court’s refusal to instruct on the 
absence of flight deprived him of a fair trial.  He argues the 
court’s refusal, coupled with its instruction on flight, led to 
“disparate treatment of the parallel inferences to be drawn from 
a defendant’s response to an accusation,” which improperly 
favored the prosecution.   
 
7  
The instruction stated here:  “The flight of a person 
immediately after the commission of a crime, or after he is 
accused of a crime and has knowledge of the accusation, is not 
sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact which, if 
proved, may be considered by you in light of all other proved 
facts in deciding whether a defendant is guilty or not guilty.  The 
weight to which this circumstance is entitled is a matter for you 
to decide.”  (Italics added.)  The italicized language was added 
after discussion with counsel.   
8  
The proposed instruction stated:  “The absence of flight of 
a person immediately after the commission of a crime, or after 
he is accused of a crime, although the person had the 
opportunity to take flight, is a fact which may be considered by 
you in light of all other proven facts, in deciding whether or not 
the defendant’s guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  The absence of flight may tend to show that the 
defendant did not have a consciousness of guilt and this fact 
alone may be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt as to 
defendant’s guilt.  The weight and significance of such 
circumstances are matters of [sic] the jury to determine.”   
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
26 
We have previously rejected this argument in the context 
of admissibility.  As People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1 observed, 
evidence regarding absence of flight is generally not admissible.  
People v. Montgomery (1879) 53 Cal. 576 concluded the trial 
court did not err by excluding evidence that an in-custody 
defendant “had an opportunity to escape from the jail, but 
declined to avail himself of it.”  (Id. at p. 577.)  Montgomery 
questioned whether an innocent inference could be made from 
the lack of escape, noting the defendant “may very naturally 
have been deterred from making an effort to escape from a fear 
that he would be recaptured, and that his fruitless attempt to 
escape would be evidence of guilt; or he may have felt so strong 
a confidence of his acquittal, for want of the requisite proof of 
his guilt, that he deemed it unnecessary to flee.”  (Id. at pp. 577–
578.)  Green clarified that “[t]he real issue here, however, is not 
whether this evidence is relevant but whether it should be 
excluded despite its relevance.”  (Green, at p. 38.)  Green 
reasoned that such evidence presented “manifest risk of 
confusion and delay” and “the absence of flight is so ambiguous, 
so laden with conflicting interpretations, that its probative 
value on the issue of innocence is slight.”  (Id. at pp. 38–39; cf. 
People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 473 [exclusion of 
evidence regarding the defendant’s offer to speak to police 
proper].)  Green concluded an instruction on the absence of flight 
was properly denied because “the instruction would have 
injected a new issue into the jury’s deliberations and invited the 
kind of speculation that the Montgomery rule seeks to avoid.”  
(Green, at p. 39.)   
We affirmed Green’s reasoning in considering the question 
of instructions.  People v. Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434, rejected 
the argument that the defense had “a ‘reciprocal’ right to an 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
27 
instruction on absence of flight, as showing lack of guilt.”  (Id. at 
p. 459.)  Staten noted Green “observed that such an instruction 
would invite speculation; there are plausible reasons why a 
guilty person might refrain from flight.  [Citation.]  Our 
conclusion therein also forecloses any federal or state 
constitutional challenge based on due process.”  (Ibid.)   
Defendant relies on Cool v. United States (1972) 409 U.S. 
100, but that case only bolsters our conclusion.  Cool was 
arrested along with her husband and one Robert Voyles.  Voyles 
had tried to pass counterfeit bills at a local store while Cool and 
her husband waited outside.  Cool testified in her own defense 
and also called Voyles as a witness.  The latter admitted his guilt 
but insisted Cool and her husband were blameless.  Over 
defense objection the court instructed in a way that clearly 
implied the jury “should disregard Voyles’ testimony unless it 
was ‘convinced it [was] true beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”  (Id. 
at p. 102.)  The high court concluded such an instruction placed 
an improper burden on the defense when an accomplice gave 
exculpatory testimony because “the effect of the judge’s 
instructions is to require the defendant to establish his 
innocence beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Id. at p. 104.)  Cool 
underscored that accomplice testimony used to exonerate a 
defendant should not be treated in the same way as testimony 
used to implicate her.  Similarly, there are valid reasons to treat 
evidence of flight differently from the absence of flight.  “[T]here 
is no fundamental unfairness in not requiring an instruction on 
the absence of flight . . . .  [U]nlike the flight of an accused from 
the scene of a crime or after accusation of a crime, the absence 
of flight presents such marginal relevance it is usually not even 
admissible.  (See People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 37.)  
Since flight and the absence of flight are not on similar logical 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
28 
or legal footings, the due process notions of fairness and 
parity . . . are inapplicable.”9  (People v. Williams (1997) 55 
Cal.App.4th 648, 653; see People v. McGowan (2008) 160 
Cal.App.4th 1099, 1105.)   
2.  Third Party Culpability 
Defendant contends the trial court improperly excluded 
third party culpability evidence and precluded him from arguing 
that someone else committed the crimes here.  There was no 
error.   
a.  Background 
The defense sought pretrial discovery of files from a 
federal drug trafficking investigation tangentially involving the 
victim’s father, Luis Arroyo.  Defense counsel explained the 
information was relevant to Luis’s possible involvement in 
Laura’s disappearance.  The court warned that if the defense 
was pursuing a third party culpability theory, and “if you are 
seeking reports that are going to suggest that some other 
specific party is involved in the murder, I thought that had to be 
the basis of a noticed motion.”  After reviewing the Drug 
Enforcement Administration records in camera, the court 
 
9  
Defendant’s reliance on Wardius v. Oregon (1973) 412 U.S. 
470 fails for similar reasons.  Wardius held that due process 
principles precluded enforcement of a rule requiring defendants 
give notice of an alibi defense “unless reciprocal discovery rights 
are given to criminal defendants” (id. at p. 472), reasoning “[i]t 
is fundamentally unfair to require a defendant to divulge the 
details of his own case while at the same time subjecting him to 
the hazard of surprise concerning refutation of the very pieces 
of evidence which he disclosed to the State” (id. at p. 476).  As 
discussed, however, evidence of flight does not stand on equal 
footing with evidence regarding absence of flight.   
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
29 
determined there was no relevant information pertaining to Mr. 
Arroyo and denied the request.   
The court thereafter took evidence on the question of 
pretrial delay.  (See discussion ante.)  During that hearing, there 
was evidence that Luis Arroyo had completed a police 
investigative questionnaire.  He listed as one of the “five most 
important causes that would have created this situation 
[involving Laura’s case]” the sale of a family-owned taco shop to 
Guadalupe Echeverria.  The defense also presented evidence of 
a letter sent by Echeverria’s lawyer alleging the Arroyos had 
made misrepresentations about the sale.  Echeverria died in 
December 1991.  Detective Maxey testified he looked into the 
taco shop transaction but did not interview Echeverria.   
At trial, Enrique Loa testified that he had seen a small 
brown car with several occupants parked in the cul-de-sac 
around 8:45 to 9:00 p.m. on the night of Laura’s disappearance.  
Loa’s sister, Teresa Thomas, testified Loa told her that night he 
had seen a brown Datsun with three men and a woman inside 
and that the occupants “squatted down to hide.”  Thomas then 
saw the car and occupants from her balcony.  Robert Vazquez, 
who was with Loa that night, told police that he had seen a 
reddish-brown car parked in the cul-de-sac, describing the 
occupants as a Filipino man, two Filipino women in their 
thirties, and a Filipino woman “about 50 to 60.”  The victim’s 
mother informed police that some friends told her that they had 
seen a small brown car with three men and a woman parked in 
the cul-de-sac between 8:50 and 9:00 p.m.  On cross-
examination, Mrs. Arroyo testified she did not remember 
hearing about a Datsun with four occupants or telling the police 
she suspected “a female from the taco shop” might have been 
involved in Laura’s disappearance.   
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
30 
During cross-examination of Detective Maxey, defense 
counsel asked whether police investigated the Arroyos’ possible 
involvement in drug activity.  The court sustained three 
prosecution objections on relevance grounds.  The questioning 
then turned to the taco shop sale.  Maxey testified that both the 
person who sold the shop to the Arroyos and a subsequent 
purchaser were “unhappy with Mr. Arroyo.”  The court excluded, 
as calling for hearsay, questions about Luis’s questionnaire 
responses, the attorney letter to the Arroyos, and the name of 
another person involved in the sale.  When defense counsel 
began to ask whether Luis had received threats at his 
workplace, the prosecutor asked for a sidebar.  The prosecutor 
objected “to apparently all these lines of questioning having to 
do with third-party culpability and trying to get it in through 
hearsay.”  The court suggested the admissibility of such 
evidence should have been raised in a noticed, pretrial motion.  
When defense counsel insisted she was not eliciting the evidence 
for its truth but only to raise doubts regarding the thoroughness 
of the police investigation, the court questioned the relevance of 
the evidence and concluded “when I see something like this, I’ll 
go ahead and make sure that it doesn’t get to the panel.”  When 
cross-examination resumed, defense counsel pursued a different 
line of questioning.   
b.  There Was No Error 
Defendant cannot demonstrate error on this record.  
Initially, although defendant suggests the court “cut off the 
defense from fully developing” his eschewed third party 
culpability theory, he makes no effort to identify what specific 
evidence the court precluded.  Through cross-examination of 
prosecution witnesses, the defense elicited that a car with up to 
four occupants had been seen parked in the cul-de-sac at the 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
31 
time of Laura’s disappearance.  Defense counsel asked Detective 
Maxey whether he investigated the taco shop sale as a possible 
motive for the crimes here.  Although the court sustained 
hearsay objections to the contents of an attorney letter about the 
sale, defendant makes no argument here that a hearsay 
exception applied or that the letter itself was otherwise 
admissible.   
Further, there was no basis for admitting the taco shop 
evidence.  The defense theory appears to have been that 
Echeverria was a disgruntled purchaser and that an older 
passenger in a “suspicious” car parked in the vicinity was a 
woman.  Whatever evidence supported this theory would have 
shown “mere motive or opportunity to commit the crime in 
another person” without providing any “direct or circumstantial 
evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of 
the crime.”  (People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 833.)  “We have 
repeatedly upheld the exclusion of third party culpability 
evidence when the third party’s link to a crime is tenuous or 
speculative.”  (People v. Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 786, 817 
(Turner).)  As we explained in Turner, “admissible evidence of 
this nature points to the culpability of a specific third party, not 
the possibility that some unidentified third party could have 
committed the crime.  [Citations.]  For the evidence to be 
relevant and admissible, ‘there must be direct or circumstantial 
evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the 
crime.’ ”  (Id. at pp. 816–817.)  Defendant’s argument here fails 
because there is no evidence linking the brown car’s occupants, 
whoever they were, to the abduction of Laura, or with 
Echeverria for that matter.  (See People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 
Cal.3d 648, 685.)  Defendant’s third party evidence argument 
rests on two layers of speculation:  1. That Echeverria was one 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
32 
of the occupants of a car seen parked near the kidnapping scene, 
and 2. that those occupants had something to do with Laura’s 
disappearance.  (See Turner, at pp. 817–818; People v. Ghobrial 
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 283–284; People v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 
742, 792–793.)  The state of the record defeats his claim.   
C.  Penalty Phase Issues 
1.  Victim Impact Evidence 
Defendant contends the trial court improperly allowed 
victim impact testimony from Laura’s third grade teacher, Mari 
Peterson.  There was no error.   
a.  Background 
Before the penalty phase, the parties discussed the 
prosecutor’s intent to offer the video of a conversation between 
Laura and her teacher.  Defense counsel noted that the teacher 
was on the prosecution’s witness list and inquired whether she 
would merely authenticate the video or give victim impact 
testimony.  The prosecutor clarified that the teacher would 
testify about the “impact of Laura’s death on her, friends, and 
community.  Her little friends and community.”  The defense 
objected to the presentation of victim impact testimony from 
someone outside the victim’s family, and the parties discussed 
relevant case authority.  The trial court overruled the objection 
but clarified that the teacher would only be allowed to discuss 
the impact of Laura’s death in the days immediately following 
the murder, excluding evidence that Laura’s classmates 
purchased a plaque in her honor two or three years later.   
Mari Peterson testified she was Laura’s third grade 
teacher in 1991 and knew Laura “very well.”  Laura was 
Peterson’s “favorite student that year” and “was the type of 
student that from the time you met her, you just wanted to love 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
33 
her.”  Laura “loved school,” was “best friends with everybody,” 
and would welcome new students.  Peterson described the 
atmosphere at school the morning after Laura disappeared.  Her 
father was passing out flyers and concerned parents were asking 
questions.  Half the students “were crying already” and “wanted 
to know where their friend was.”  When Laura’s body was 
discovered later that morning, Peterson and a psychologist 
broke the news to the students.  Peterson described the impact 
on Laura’s classmates:  “Of course, they are not going to work.  
All they want to do is they want to know things.  They want to 
know where she is.  They want her back.  Everybody wanted to 
sit at her desk.  It was terrible.”  After Laura’s death, parents 
began walking their children to and from school.  Many children 
attended Laura’s funeral, which “was packed,” and Peterson 
described how Laura’s body was in a “tiny little casket” with a 
teddy bear.  At the burial there were “just so many kids crying.”  
After Laura’s death, Peterson was unable to teach third grade 
again.  She felt guilty for missing the last day Laura attended 
class.  Peterson identified Laura’s class photo and a clip of the 
video conversation with Laura.   
b.  There Was No Error 
Defendant contends Peterson’s testimony constituted “an 
inflammatory appeal to the raw sentiments of the jurors that 
went well beyond” permissible victim impact evidence, and the 
probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by 
the probability of undue prejudice.  We reject these claims.  “The 
Eighth Amendment does not categorically bar victim impact 
evidence.  [Citation.]  To the contrary, witnesses are permitted 
to share with jurors the harm that a capital crime caused in 
their lives.”  (People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 421, 461–462.)  
“That is because ‘the effects of a capital crime are relevant . . . 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
34 
as a circumstance of the crime.’  [Citations.]  And so long as 
victim impact evidence does not invite the jury to respond in a 
purely irrational way, it is admissible.”  (People v. Mendez (2019) 
7 Cal.5th 680, 712.)  “Victim impact evidence is simply another 
form or method of informing the sentencing authority about the 
specific harm caused by the crime in question, evidence of a 
general type long considered by sentencing authorities.”  (Payne 
v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 825.)  “ ‘ “Unless it invites a 
purely irrational response from the jury, the devastating effect 
of a capital crime on loved ones and the community is relevant 
and admissible as a circumstance of the crime under section 
190.3, factor (a).”  [Citation.]  “The federal Constitution bars 
victim impact evidence only if it is ‘so unduly prejudicial’ as to 
render the trial ‘fundamentally unfair.’ ”  [Citation.]’ ”  (People 
v. Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 729, italics added 
(Westerfield).)   
Westerfield recently endorsed similar victim impact 
testimony from teachers “regarding [the victim’s] character and 
contributions, and to the effect of her murder on themselves and 
[her] classmates.”  (Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 728.)  
Westerfield reasoned:  “ ‘The purpose of victim impact evidence 
is to demonstrate the immediate harm caused by the 
defendant’s criminal conduct.’  [Citation.]  That harm is not 
limited to immediate family members.  [Citation.]  Friends, 
coworkers, classmates, and teachers, may all be affected by the 
death of the victim under the specific circumstances of a case.  
[Citations.]  Here, defendant’s shocking abduction and murder 
of seven-year-old Danielle caused emotional harm to her 
teachers and classmates.  Our review of the record does not 
persuade us that her teachers’ testimony regarding Danielle and 
those effects would invite a purely irrational response from the 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
35 
jury or that it rendered defendant’s trial fundamentally unfair 
under the circumstances.”  (Id. at p. 729.)   
Westerfield’s reasoning applies equally here.  Laura was 
very close to her teacher and classmates.  The impact of her 
death on this community was relevant to assessing the harm 
defendant caused.  “Moreover, we have repeatedly held that 
evidence related to a murder victim’s funeral is relevant and 
admissible.”  (People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 465.)  
Peterson’s descriptions of the funeral and burial were not so 
emotional as to elicit a purely irrational response from the jury.  
(See ibid. [testimony regarding victim’s funeral and family’s 
grave visits proper]; People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 579–
581 [videotape of victim’s funeral properly admitted]; see also 
People v. Dykes (2009) 46 Cal.4th 731, 780, 782; People v. 
Verdugo (2010) 50 Cal.4th 263, 296–298.)   
2.  Constitutionality of the Death Penalty Statute 
Defendant raises numerous familiar challenges to the 
constitutionality of California’s death penalty scheme.  His 
primary contention is that, when the jury returns a death 
verdict, it must conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating ones, because such 
a finding increases punishment.  Proof of that nature is not 
required.  As we have previously stated, “the only burden of 
proof applicable at the penalty phase” involves proof of the 
commission or conviction of other crimes under Penal Code 
section 190.3 factors (b) and (c).  (People v. Capers (2019) 7 
Cal.5th 989, 1015 (Capers).)  “Otherwise, our cases do not 
require that a burden of proof be applied to aggravating 
evidence.”  (Ibid.)  “We have previously held that the death 
penalty is not unconstitutional ‘ “ ‘for failing to require proof 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
36 
beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors exist, 
outweigh the mitigating factors, and render death the 
appropriate punishment.’  [Citation.]” ’  [Citation.]  We also have 
consistently held the death penalty does not constitute an 
increased sentence.  [Citation.]  And we have determined that 
these conclusions are unaltered by Apprendi v. New Jersey 
(2000) 530 U.S. 466, Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 
Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, or Cunningham v. 
California (2007) 549 U.S. 270.  [Citation.]”  (People v. Wilson 
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 259, 317 (Wilson).)  The jury’s determination 
of the appropriate sentence within the statutorily specified 
options “is ‘an inherently moral and normative function, and not 
a factual one amenable to burden of proof calculations’ [citation], 
[and] the prosecution has no obligation to bear a burden of proof 
or persuasion [citation].  Nor does the federal Constitution 
require an instruction that life is the presumptive penalty.”  
(Turner, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 828.)   
Defendant relies upon Hurst v. Florida (2016) 577 U.S. 92, 
but we have explained that case “does not alter our conclusion 
under the federal Constitution or under the Sixth Amendment 
about the burden of proof or unanimity regarding aggravating 
circumstances, the weighing of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, 
or 
the 
ultimate 
penalty 
determination.  
[Citations.]  And we have concluded that Hurst does not cause 
us to reconsider our holdings that imposition of the death 
penalty does not constitute an increased sentence within the 
meaning of Apprendi[ v. Arizona], supra, 530 U.S. 466, or that 
the imposition of the death penalty does not require factual 
findings within the meaning of Ring v. Arizona[, supra,] 536 
U.S. 584.  [Citation.]  As [defendant] acknowledges, neither Ring 
nor Hurst decided the standard of proof that applies to the 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
37 
ultimate weighing consideration.”  (People v. McDaniel (2021) 12 
Cal.5th 97, 155−156.)   
Likewise, Rauf v. State (Del. 2016) 145 A.3d 430, cited by 
defendant, does not call our prior decisions into doubt.  The 
Delaware statute at issue there, like the Florida statute in 
Hurst, required the trial court, rather than the jury, to engage 
in additional factfinding before it determined whether death 
was the appropriate sentence.  Under that statutory approach, 
the jury’s findings were merely recommendations.  (See Del. 
Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(d).)10  As we have noted with respect 
to Hurst, “[t]he California sentencing scheme is materially 
different from that in Florida, which, in contrast to our death 
penalty statutes, mandates that the trial court alone must find 
that sufficient aggravating circumstances outweigh the 
mitigating circumstances.”  (Capers, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1014.)  
 
10  
The Delaware statute states in part that “the Court, after 
considering the findings and recommendation of the jury and 
without hearing or reviewing any additional evidence, shall 
impose a sentence of death if the Court finds by a preponderance 
of the evidence, after weighing all relevant evidence in 
aggravation or mitigation which bears upon the particular 
circumstances or details of the commission of the offense and the 
character and propensities of the offender, that the aggravating 
circumstances found by the Court to exist outweigh the 
mitigating circumstances found by the Court to exist.  The jury’s 
recommendation 
concerning 
whether 
the 
aggravating 
circumstances 
found 
to 
exist 
outweigh 
the 
mitigating 
circumstances found to exist shall be given such consideration 
as deemed appropriate by the Court in light of the particular 
circumstances or details of the commission of the offense and the 
character and propensities of the offender as found to exist by 
the Court.  The jury’s recommendation shall not be binding upon 
the Court.”  (Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(1).)   
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
38 
The same is true with respect to the Delaware statute at issue 
in Rauf.   
In addition to his primary claim, defendant summarily 
asserts other challenges to the death penalty statute and related 
instructions that we have previously rejected.  He does so “in 
order to urge reconsideration and to preserve these claims for 
federal review,” but he presents no compelling argument to 
reconsider our precedents.  We reject these claims as follows: 
1.  The death penalty statute is not impermissibly 
overbroad.  It adequately narrows the class of defendants 
eligible for a death sentence.  (Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 
317; People v. Chhoun (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1, 53 (Chhoun); Bell, 
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 130; Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 
733.)   
2.  Penal Code section 190.3, factor (a), which directs the 
jury to consider the “circumstances of the crime,” is not 
overbroad.  (See People v. Scully (2021) 11 Cal.5th 542, 610 
(Scully); Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 317; Chhoun, supra, 11 
Cal.5th at p. 54; Bell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 130.)   
3.  The prosecution did not bear the burden of persuasion 
regarding proof of any aggravating factor, the weighing of 
aggravating and mitigating factors, or imposition of the death 
penalty.  There was also no requirement to instruct the jury 
regarding the lack of a burden of proof.  (Wilson, supra, 11 
Cal.5th at p. 317; Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 54; Bell, supra, 
7 Cal.5th at p. 131.)   
4.  The jury need not find individual aggravating factors 
unanimously.  (Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 317; Chhoun, 
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 54; Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 
733.)   
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
39 
5.  An instruction that the jury should determine whether 
“the 
aggravating 
circumstances 
are 
so 
substantial 
in 
comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants 
death instead of life without parole” was not impermissibly 
vague.  (See Scully, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 609; Wilson, supra, 
11 Cal.5th at p. 318.)   
6.  CALJIC No. 8.88 is not unconstitutional for directing 
the jury to determine whether the aggravating circumstances 
“warrant” death rather than that the death penalty is 
“appropriate,” or for failing to expressly state that the jury 
should return a life sentence if it finds mitigating circumstances 
outweigh aggravating ones.  (Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 318; 
Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 54; People v. Morales (2020) 10 
Cal.5th 76, 112.)   
7.  There is no presumption in favor of a life term.  (Wilson, 
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 317–318; Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 
p. 54; People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1039 (Ramirez).)   
8.  The jury need not make written findings.  (Wilson, 
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 317; Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 54; 
Bell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 131.)   
9.  The use of adjectives “extreme” and “substantial” do not 
improperly limit the jury’s consideration of certain mitigating 
factors.  (Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 318; Chhoun, supra, 11 
Cal.5th at p. 55; Bell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 130.)   
10.  There was no requirement that inapplicable 
sentencing factors be deleted.  (People v. Dworak (2021) 11 
Cal.5th 881, 917; Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 318; Chhoun, 
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 55.)   
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
40 
11.  There was no requirement to identify factors that were 
only mitigating.  (Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 55; Ramirez, 
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 1040; Bell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 130.)   
12. 
 
Intercase 
proportionality 
review 
is 
not 
constitutionally required.  (Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 318; 
Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 55; Bell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 
131; Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 734.)   
13.  The death penalty scheme does not violate equal 
protection 
principles 
“by 
providing 
significantly 
fewer 
procedural protections for persons facing a death sentence than 
are afforded persons charged with noncapital crimes.”  (Wilson, 
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 318; Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 55; 
Bell, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 131.)   
14.  The death penalty is not a “regular” punishment that 
violates international norms.  (Wilson, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 
318; Chhoun, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 55; Bell, supra, 7 Cal.5th 
at pp. 131–132.)   
D.  Cumulative Error Claim 
Defendant contends cumulative error deprived him of a 
fair trial.  The only potential error identified was defendant’s 
shackling, for which he failed to establish prejudice.  Therefore, 
there is no reversable error to accumulate.  (Bell, supra, 7 
Cal.5th at p. 132; Westerfield, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 728.)   
 
 
PEOPLE v. BRACAMONTES 
Opinion of the Court by Corrigan, J. 
 
41 
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment is affirmed.   
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
MENETREZ, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
__________________________ 
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate 
District, Division Two, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Bracamontes 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal XX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S139702 
Date Filed:  April 11, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  San Diego 
Judge:  John M. Thompson 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Mary K. McComb, State Public Defender, under appointment by 
the Supreme Court, and AJ Kutchins, Deputy State Public 
Defender, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney 
General, Holly D. Wilkens, Theodore M. Cropley and Michael T. 
Murphy, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
AJ Kutchins 
Deputy State Public Defender 
1111 Broadway, Suite 1000 
Oakland, CA 94607 
(510) 267-3300 
 
Michael T. Murphy 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 738-9211