Case Title: Brown County v. Shannon R.

Citation: 2005 WI 160

Docket Number: 2004AP001305

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2005-11-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
2005 WI 160 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights  
to Daniel R.S. , a Person Under the Age  
of 18: 
 
Brown County,  
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Shannon R.,  
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights  
to Darell S.S. , a Person Under the Age  
of 18: 
 
Brown County,  
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Shannon R.,  
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  277 Wis. 2d 876, 690 N.W.2d 886 
(Ct. App. 2004-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 30, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 8, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Brown   
 
JUDGE: 
John D. McKay   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
WILCOX and PROSSER, J.J., join the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
2
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Brian C. Findley, assistant state public 
defender. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument 
by 
Christopher 
C. 
Paquet, 
assistant 
corporation 
counsel. 
 
 
 
2005 WI 160
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306  
(L.C. No. 
03TP34, 03TP72) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights  
to Daniel R.S., a Person Under the Age  
of 18: 
 
Brown County,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Shannon R.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 30, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
In re the Termination of Parental Rights  
to Darell S.S., a Person Under the Age of  
18: 
 
Brown County,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Shannon R.,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.   
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
2 
 
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished decision of the court of appeals1 affirming the order 
of the circuit court for Brown County, J.D. McKay, Judge, 
terminating the parental rights of petitioner Shannon R., the 
mother.  The court of appeals affirmed the order of termination.  
We reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
¶2 
Several issues were presented to this court.  Shannon 
R. contends that the circuit court lost competency to hear the 
termination by failing to meet the time limits imposed by 
Wis. Stat. § 48.422.2  
¶3 
Shannon R. also argues that the instructions presented 
to the jury relating to state law elements for termination of 
parental rights overlapped elements under the Indian Child 
Welfare Act and that the circuit court improperly instructed the 
jury that the state law elements must be proven only by clear 
and convincing evidence.  We will discuss these arguments 
because they may arise on retrial.3 
                                                 
1 Brown County v. Shannon R., Nos. 2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2004). 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
2004 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 Shannon R. further contends that the evidence presented by 
Brown County was insufficient to sustain a jury finding, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, that returning custody of the children to 
her is likely to result in their serious emotional or physical 
damage.  We do not address this issue. 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
3 
 
¶4 
The issue upon which we decide this case is as 
follows:  Did the circuit court err by excluding opinion 
testimony 
of 
Shannon 
R.'s 
expert 
witness 
regarding 
the 
substantial likelihood that Shannon R. is able to meet the 
conditions established for the safe return of her children to 
the home within the 12-month period following the fact-finding 
hearing under Wis. Stat. § 48.424?  If the circuit court erred 
in excluding the testimony, we must determine whether the error 
was reversible error.  
¶5 
We conclude that the constitutional guarantee of due 
process (fundamental fairness) requires the conclusion that by 
excluding Shannon R.'s only expert opinion testimony, which was 
clearly central to her defense against termination of parental 
rights, 
the 
circuit 
court 
committed 
reversible 
error.4  
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
remand the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion. 
¶6 
In so holding, we give full effect to the important 
legislative policy considerations embodied in the Children's 
Code.  The legislature directs that the best interest of the 
child remains of paramount concern when deciding cases under the 
Children's Code.  The Children's Code also recognizes the 
importance of preserving family unity and of assuring fair 
                                                 
4 The phrase "due process" expresses a requirement of 
"fundamental fairness."  Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 
U.S. 18, 24 (1981). 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
4 
 
hearings and the protection of the constitutional rights of all 
parties involved.5   
¶7 
The legislature has recognized that when reunification 
of the family is not possible, parental rights should be 
terminated at the earliest feasible time.  If court proceedings 
are viewed through the eyes of a child, several weeks or months 
of delay (which may seem a short time to an adult) are 
                                                 
5 Section 48.01 states the legislative purpose of the 
Children's Code as follows: 
(1) . . . In construing [the Children's Code], the 
best interests of the child or unborn child shall 
always be of paramount consideration. This chapter 
shall 
be 
liberally 
construed 
to 
effectuate 
the 
following express legislative purposes: 
(a) While recognizing that the paramount goal of this 
chapter is to protect children and unborn children, to 
preserve 
the 
unity 
of 
the 
family, 
whenever 
appropriate, by strengthening family life through 
assisting parents and the expectant mothers of unborn 
children, whenever appropriate, in fulfilling their 
responsibilities as parents or expectant mothers. 
 . . . The courts and agencies responsible for child 
welfare should also recognize that instability and 
impermanence in family relationships are contrary to 
the welfare of children and should therefore recognize 
the importance of eliminating the need for children to 
wait unreasonable periods of time for their parents to 
correct the conditions that prevent their safe return 
to the family. 
(ad) To provide judicial and other procedures through 
which children and all other interested parties are 
assured fair hearings and their constitutional and 
other legal rights are recognized and enforced, while 
protecting the public safety. 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
5 
 
extraordinarily long for children.  Depriving a child of a 
permanent home deprives the child of his or her childhood.6  
¶8 
Considering the legislative policy in the Children's 
Code, we are reluctant to delay the permanent placement of the 
boys in the present case.  Nevertheless, we must take into 
account not only the children's interest in the earliest 
feasible 
permanent 
placement 
but 
also 
Shannon 
R.'s 
constitutional 
rights 
and 
the 
possibility 
that 
permanent 
placement with Shannon R. may, indeed, be in the children's best 
interests.   
I 
¶9 
The undisputed facts are as follows.  Shannon R. is 
the mother of two sons: Darell S.S., born June 24, 2001, and 
Daniel R.S., born May 26, 2002.  Darell was removed from Shannon 
R.'s care on July 17, 2001.  Daniel was removed immediately upon 
                                                 
6 For a discussion of the importance of a child-centered 
view of time in the legal context, see National Council of 
Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Adoption and Permanency 
Guidelines: Improving Court Practice in Child Abuse and Neglect 
Cases 5, 26-27, 34-35 (2000). 
The 
United 
States 
Congress 
has 
also 
expressed 
its 
preference for quick and safe adoption of children by enacting 
the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA), Pub. L. No. 
105-89, 111 Stat. 2115.  For discussions of ASFA, see Thomas J. 
Walsh, The Clock Is Ticking: Do the Time Limits in Wisconsin's 
Termination of Parental Rights Cases Serve the Best Interests of 
Children?, 83 Marq. L. Rev. 743 (2000); Madelyn Freundlich, 
Expediting Termination of Parental Rights: Solving a Problem or 
Sowing the Seeds of a New Predicament?, 28 Cap. U.L. Rev. 97 
(1999); Stephanie Jill Gendell, In Search of Permanency: A 
Reflection on the First 3 Years of the Adoption and Safe 
Families Act Implementation, 39 Fam. Ct. Rev. 25 (2001). 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
6 
 
birth.  The father of both children is a member of the Bad River 
Band of the Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians.  Both 
children are eligible for enrollment in the Bad River Band.  The 
father has voluntarily terminated his parental rights.   
¶10 Each child was removed from the mother under a child 
in need of protection or services (CHIPS) order.  The reasons 
for removal under the CHIPS order are not before this court.7  
The conditions for return of the children in the CHIPS order 
are, however, important for the present case.  The most 
significant conditions, based on the evidence presented at the 
fact-finding hearing in the termination proceeding, are that 
Shannon R. "obtain and maintain suitable housing for a minimum 
period of three months[,]" including keeping the environment in 
a condition safe and sanitary for a child; "obtain suitable 
employment for a 3-month period of time[;]" meet regularly with 
                                                 
7 The record in this case reveals the following basis for 
the CHIPS petition.  On July 10, 2001, Tianna R., one of Shannon 
R.'s older children, was found dead in her bedroom from 
dehydration and hyperthermia.  The room temperature where Tianna 
was found was 98 degrees and the temperature on the thermostat 
was turned up.  Further, the only contact Shannon R. and Darell 
S. (Tianna's father) had with Tianna for 17 hours prior to her 
death was to observe her from her bedroom door. 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
7 
 
the Brown County Human Services Department; and cooperate with 
her probation agent.8  
¶11 Brown County's petition for termination of parental 
rights alleged, as the ground for termination under Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.415(2)(a)3., that the children had been outside the home 
for a cumulative total period of six months or longer pursuant 
to a CHIPS order, that Shannon R. failed to meet the conditions 
established for the safe return of the children to the home, and 
that there is a substantial likelihood that she will not meet 
these conditions within the 12-month period following the fact-
finding hearing.9  The last element, that is, that Shannon R. 
will not meet these conditions, is at issue here. 
                                                 
8 Shannon R. was also required to "participate in individual 
counseling" to deal with childhood issues and issues created by 
past relationships; participate in a psychological evaluation to 
determine her personality characteristics, her diagnosis, and 
different modes of treatment; participate in budget counseling 
and demonstrate her ability to provide for her own and her 
children's needs; comply with her schedule for visitation with 
the children; participate in a "wraparound" program to help keep 
the children in the home once returned; and have no further law 
violations. 
9 Section 
48.415(2)(a)3. 
sets 
forth 
the 
ground 
for 
termination of parental rights at issue in the present case as 
follows: 
That the child has been outside the home for a 
cumulative total period of 6 months or longer pursuant 
to such orders not including time spent outside the 
home as an unborn child; and that the parent has 
failed to meet the conditions established for the safe 
return of the child to the home and there is a 
substantial likelihood that the parent will not meet 
these conditions within the 12-month period following 
the fact-finding hearing under s. 48.424. 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
8 
 
¶12 In regard to this last element, the circuit court 
asked the jury to answer special verdict question 4, namely: "Is 
there a substantial likelihood that Shannon R[.] will not meet 
these conditions within the twelve-month period following the 
conclusion of this hearing?" (Emphasis added.)  The circuit 
court instructed the jury that Brown County had the burden of 
convincing the jury to a reasonable certainty by evidence that 
is clear, satisfactory, and convincing that the answer to that 
question should be yes.  
¶13 The jury was instructed (in accordance with pattern 
instruction Wis JI-Children 324) on special verdict question 4 
as follows: 
Brown County Human Services Department must prove the 
following four elements to a reasonable certainty by 
evidence that is clear, satisfactory, and convincing.  
 . . . Fourth: That there is a substantial likelihood 
that Shannon R[.] will not meet the conditions for the 
safe return of Darell and Daniel [] within the twelve-
month period following the conclusion of this hearing.  
Substantial likelihood means that there is a real and 
significant probability rather than a mere possibility 
that Shannon R[.] will not meet the conditions for the 
safe return within that time period.  Question four of 
the special verdict addresses this element. 
In answering question four, you may consider all 
evidence bearing on that question, including evidence 
of events and conduct occurring since the filing of 
the respective petitions.  Your answer must be [sic] 
reflect your findings as of today's date in each 
instance. 
In determining whether Shannon R[.] failed to meet the 
conditions established for the safe return of Darell 
and Daniel to the home or whether there is a 
substantial likelihood that Shannon R[.] will not meet 
the conditions for the safe return of Darell and 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
9 
 
Daniel within the twelve-month period following the 
conclusion of this hearing, you may consider the 
following: 
The length of time Darell and Daniel have been in 
placement outside the home; the number of times Darell 
and Daniel have been removed from the home; the 
parent's performance in meeting the conditions for 
return of the children; the parent's cooperation with 
the social service agency; parental conduct during 
periods in which Darell and Daniel had contact with 
Shannon R[.]; and all other evidence presented during 
this 
hearing 
which 
assists 
in 
making 
those 
determinations. (Emphasis added.) 
¶14 Apparently to assist the jury in answering special 
verdict question 4, Brown County presented two expert witnesses.  
Each witness testified that, in his or her opinion, Shannon R. 
is not able to meet the conditions for return within a 12-month 
period after the hearing.  The testimony that Shannon R. is not 
able to meet the conditions for return of the children within 
the time period was apparently proffered to assist the jury in 
determining whether, as required by the statutes, she will not 
meet the conditions in the statutory time period.10   
¶15 The circuit court precluded, however, Shannon R.'s 
expert, Dr. Gerald G. Wellens, from testifying about his opinion 
whether Shannon R. is able to meet the conditions for return of 
the children.  
¶16 The confusion of the concepts "is able to meet" and 
"will meet" permeates the circuit court's exclusion of Shannon 
R.'s expert witness's opinion testimony, as is evident from the 
                                                 
10 No Brown County witness was asked to testify whether, in 
his or her opinion, Shannon R. will or will not meet the 
conditions for return within 12 months.   
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
10 
 
testimony of Brown County's experts, the objection to Dr. 
Wellens's expert opinion testimony, and the circuit court's 
explanation of the ruling excluding Dr. Wellens's testimony.11   
¶17 Brown County's first expert witness was Tribal Judge 
Alton Smart of the Bad River Band of Ojibway Indians.  On direct 
examination, Brown County asked Tribal Judge Smart, without any 
objection, for his opinion about the substantial likelihood that 
Shannon R. would be able to complete the conditions for return 
within one year of the hearing.  He testified that, on the basis 
of her past behavior, he did not think there would be any 
significant behavioral change within one year's time.  The 
exchange went like this: 
Q: [I]s your opinion to the substantial likelihood 
that . . . Miss R[.] would be able to complete her 
conditions [for return] within one year of today's 
date? 
A:  . . . [T]he best indicator of change is past 
behavior.  Has she demonstrated significant amount of 
change, that she was making progress or making 
                                                 
11 The court of appeals also confused these two concepts in 
reviewing the circuit court's exclusion of Dr. Wellens's expert 
opinion.  It declared that the circuit court "only precluded 
[Dr. Wellens] from opining on the likelihood of Shannon's 
compliance, not her ability to comply."  Contrary to this 
pronouncement of the court of appeals, the circuit court did not 
preclude Dr. Wellens from opining on the likelihood of Shannon 
R.'s compliance because Dr. Wellens was never asked his opinion 
about whether Shannon R. will comply with the conditions for 
return of the children.  Furthermore, contrary to the court of 
appeals' conclusion, the circuit court did preclude Dr. Wellens 
from opining on whether Shannon R. is able to comply with the 
conditions of return.  See Brown County v. Shannon R., Nos. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306, unpublished slip op., ¶37 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Nov. 3, 2004). 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
11 
 
specific changes, and I was unable to see that 
happening there. . . . It is my opinion that I hadn't 
seen enough change there that would warrant that there 
was going to be significant change in the future, 
within a year's time. 
¶18 Judge Smart was qualified by the circuit court as an 
expert witness.  His primary employment, at the time of his 
testimony, was as a professor of social work at the University 
of Wisconsin—Stevens Point.  He holds a master's degree in 
social work, has conducted some post-graduate study in family 
therapy and family studies, and has received training from the 
National Judicial Tribal Judge Association and various other 
judicial training programs.  He never interviewed nor observed 
Shannon R. or the children. 
¶19 Brown County's second expert was one of Shannon R.'s 
social workers, Kay Reynolds, who testified that in her opinion, 
there was not a substantial likelihood that Shannon R. would be 
able to meet the conditions for return of the children within 12 
months of the fact-finding hearing.  Her opinion reflected her 
view that the past was the best predictor of future behavior.   
¶20 On direct examination, Ms. Reynolds gave her opinion, 
without any objection, as follows: 
Q: In your opinion, if given a year from today to 
complete the conditions [for return], would she be 
able to satisfy these conditions? 
A: No, I don't believe she would be able to. 
Q: Specifically, what leads you to that conclusion? 
A: Shannon has had a working relationship with us for 
the past two-and-a-half years.  And it's my opinion 
that if after that length of time, when she has been 
given the amount of support from our agency and from 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
12 
 
the service providers that have been working with her, 
if she's still not been able to be successful to show 
some stability in her lifestyle and, most importantly, 
to 
provide . . . for 
her 
own 
needs . . . I 
feel 
strongly that it is not going to happen. 
Q: But she has completed some of the conditions, 
correct? 
A: The [Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse] condition that 
was set for her is a condition that wasn't applicable.  
The parenting program, yes, Shannon did complete the 
Ruth Helf Family Center program.  But the second part 
of her condition states that she needs to demonstrate 
a 
desire 
and 
an 
ability 
to 
parent 
her 
kids, 
and . . . I don't believe that missing a significant 
amount of visits, I don't believe that continuing to 
be unemployed, to have some dishonesty with myself and 
with Melissa Blom, to continue to be without her own 
housing are examples of her showing some stability in 
her lifestyle that she would be able to . . . be 
successful with the court order. 
Q: What about her activities over the past few months, 
does that change your opinion? 
A: That hasn't changed my opinion, no.   
¶21 Ms. Reynolds's qualifications included her employment 
as a child protection social worker for the Brown County Human 
Services Department for six and one-half years.  She has a 
license to practice social work, which requires 30 hours of 
continued training biannually.  Ms. Reynolds worked with Shannon 
R. for two and one-half years.   
¶22 To rebut Brown County's expert opinion evidence about 
the substantial likelihood of Shannon R. being able to meet the 
conditions for return of the children to the home within the 12-
month period, Shannon R. testified and presented one expert 
witness.   
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
13 
 
¶23 In her testimony, Shannon R. admitted that she had 
made mistakes in the past but asserted that she loved her 
children and that she is able to meet the conditions in the 
future.  Shannon R. testified as follows: 
Q: Ms. R[.], I just have one question for you this 
morning.  You've listened to all of the testimony, and 
I'm asking you now, what assurances do you have or why 
do you think that you can complete your conditions 
within the next twelve months? 
A: I've made mistakes in the past two-and-a-half 
years.  I've paid for the mistakes I've made.  In 
March of this year I was told from the department that 
they were going to file a petition to terminate my 
rights and that there was nothing that I could do to 
get my kids back.  I didn't listen to them.  I got a 
job, I got my apartment, I started doing my counseling 
even though they told me I still didn't have a chance, 
but I wanted to prove to them that I could do my 
conditions to get my kids back. And then I made 
another mistake and cut off my [electronic monitoring] 
bracelet.   
 
I love my kids, and they're everything to me.  And I 
know if I'm given one more opportunity, I can prove 
that I can complete the conditions they want me to do 
to get my kids back.  I don't know how I'd be able to 
live my life without them. 
¶24 The disposition of this matter does not depend on 
whether Shannon R. loves her children.  We have no doubt that 
she does.  Nor do we doubt that her children love her.12  
                                                 
12 Dr. 
Wellens 
testified 
that 
both 
boys 
were 
very 
affectionate with their mother, as was she toward them, and that 
Darell was strongly bonded with her.  Another witness testified 
that Shannon R. successfully completed a six-month parenting 
class, and Dr. Wellens testified that during a supervised visit 
in January 2004, Shannon R. was able to direct the boys' 
behavior, take them to the toilet without incident, and properly 
discipline Darell when he acted aggressively toward Daniel. 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
14 
 
¶25 Shannon R.'s expert witness, Dr. Wellens, attempted to 
testify regarding his opinion about the likelihood that Shannon 
R. is able to meet the conditions for return of her children 
within the applicable time period.  
¶26 Twice 
Shannon 
R.'s 
attorney 
asked 
Dr. 
Wellens 
substantially the same question Brown County's attorney asked 
Tribal Judge Smart and Ms. Reynolds; namely, whether in his 
opinion there is a substantial likelihood that Shannon R. is 
able to meet the conditions for return within 12 months.  Each 
time, upon objection by the children's guardian ad litem (and 
over the protestations of Shannon R.'s attorney), the circuit 
court barred Dr. Wellens from answering the question on the 
ground that Shannon R.'s counsel failed to lay a proper 
foundation of expertise for Dr. Wellens to answer the question.   
¶27 The circuit court was presented with the following 
foundation regarding Dr. Wellens's qualifications.  Dr. Wellens 
holds a Ph.D. in clinical psychology and two master's degrees, 
one 
in 
counseling 
psychology 
and 
the 
other 
in 
public 
administration.  In Dr. Wellens's private practice, he has 
extensive experience counseling both adults and children.  He 
conducts approximately two psychological evaluations each week.  
He regularly conducts psychological evaluations for commitment 
and competency proceedings on behalf of Brown County and 
Marinette County.  
¶28 Dr. Wellens met with Shannon R. for about two hours, 
reviewed her case history and records, and gave her a battery of 
psychological tests to help determine her psychological status 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
15 
 
and whether she is able to meet the conditions for return.  He 
testified that "the purpose of the psychological testing, along 
with training and experience of a psychologist, [is] to make 
some predictions of future conduct." 
¶29 The circuit court ruled that "Dr. Wellens is an expert 
for purposes of these proceedings in psychology."  Nevertheless, 
the circuit court ruled that Dr. Wellens was not qualified to 
answer the same question asked of the two Brown County expert 
witnesses.  According to the circuit court, Dr. Wellens was 
qualified to testify only about whether, in his professional 
opinion, no psychological impediment existed to prevent Shannon 
R. from completing all the conditions for return of her 
children, including her ability to get stable employment and 
housing.   
¶30 The pertinent parts of the lengthy exchange among 
counsel 
and 
the 
circuit 
court, 
as 
Shannon 
R.'s 
counsel 
repeatedly attempted to lay a foundation for her questions and 
the circuit court repeatedly sustained objections to the 
question, are as follows: 
MS. SCHMIEDER [attorney for Shannon R.]: Understanding 
what Shannon's conditions are at this time, do you 
believe there exists a likelihood that she will be 
able to complete those that have not yet been 
completed within the next twelve months? 
MS. PLEGER [guardian ad litem for the children]: 
Objection, Your Honor.  I think this is outside of his 
expertise.  I don't think there's foundation been laid 
regarding 
the 
court-ordered 
conditions 
in 
the 
dispositional order. 
. . . . 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
16 
 
THE COURT: Based on his training he can have an 
opinion, but it can't be as an expert on those 
conditions . . . . Lay a foundation that he has an 
understanding of those conditions and we'll go from 
there. 
¶31 Shannon R.'s attorney proceeded to ask Dr. Wellens a 
series of questions establishing that he had reviewed Shannon 
R.'s case history and was familiar with the conditions in the 
CHIPS order.  The exchange and the circuit court's explanation 
of the ruling continued as follows: 
MS. SCHMIEDER: Based upon your years of experience as 
a psychologist, based upon your review of the three 
volumes of materials, based upon your interview with 
my client, and based upon the four psychological 
instruments that you have utilized to test her, are 
you able to a reasonable degree of psychological 
certainty to reach an opinion as to the likelihood of 
her ability to complete these conditions as they now 
stand within the next twelve months? 
MS. PLEGER: I have to renew that same objection, Your 
Honor.  I don't think adequate foundation has been 
laid.  I think it's clear that Dr. Wellens can testify 
and has presented himself as an expert as to whether 
or not Ms. R[.] has an Axis I or Axis II diagnosis, 
but I don't think there's been ample foundation laid 
other than the fact that he read a lot of material 
that would support his expertise in the area of these 
conditions as outlined in the dispositional order. 
MS. SCHMIEDER: Your Honor, I'm not saying he's an 
expert on the conditions.  But what I am trying to 
elicit . . . is whether after testing my client he has 
reached a decision about can she do this in the 
future. 
. . . . 
THE COURT: . . . The doctor is in a position to make 
and offer opinions regarding his expertise and the 
relationship of his expertise to what he's tested and 
interviewed 
and 
discussed 
with 
Ms. 
R[.], 
but . . . you've asked the question . . . in such a 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
17 
 
way that I can't allow him to answer it in the format 
that it's been asked. 
. . . . 
MS. SCHMIEDER: With regards to the testing that you've 
done and the condition to evaluate her personality 
characteristics, 
did 
you 
find 
any 
personality 
characteristics that will present a bar to her 
completing the conditions in the next twelve months? 
MS. PLEGER: Same objection, Your Honor.  I don't think 
sufficient foundation has been laid to determine 
if . . . the results of her psychological evaluation 
can . . . present a bar to some of those other 
conditions 
that 
clearly 
fall 
outside 
the 
scope 
of . . . psychiatry. 
THE COURT: Sustained. . . . I'm going to allow you to 
ask 
questions . . . as 
to 
whether 
or 
not 
the . . . testing [Dr. Wellens] undertook and the 
conclusions 
that 
he's 
reached . . . regarding 
her 
personality and psychological traits will be a bar to 
anything. . . . But you 
keep making a 
hurdle to 
whether that prevents her from doing the conditions 
within the next twelve months, and he can't answer 
that.  He can't make that leap.  He can tell you 
whether his test results and his evaluation present 
any bars to her, but he can't conclude that . . . she 
will 
finish 
those 
conditions 
in 
twelve 
months . . . because that opinion is not part——or, the 
basis for that opinion is not part of what he's done. 
MS. SCHMIEDER: . . . Dr. Wellens has looked at all the 
same information that Kay [Reynolds] and [social 
worker] Melissa [Blom] have had at their disposal, and 
they were allowed to reach a predictive opinion as 
social workers about whether or not my client can 
complete something in the future.  Dr. Wellens after 
conducting psychological tests and looking at all the 
same stuff they've looked at should be able to render 
the same type of predictive opinion.  They didn't say 
she would or wouldn't.  They said we don't think she 
will.  He ought to be able to say, I think she will.  
And I-- 
THE 
COURT: 
Don't 
you 
see 
the 
difference, 
Ms. 
Schmieder? 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
18 
 
MS. SCHMIEDER: No, Your Honor, I don't. 
THE COURT:  Well, I'm sorry, but the difference is 
that the basis for his testing is that he can assess 
whether she has the capability for [meeting the 
conditions for return].  There is no foundation that 
he has any understanding or expertise in whether she 
can actually do it.  The social workers, on the other 
hand, have worked with her in the field on those very 
subjects, and that's why they're entitled to make that 
opinion.  
He can express an opinion . . . but it has to be 
on whether or not his expertise and the results of the 
test that he performed in any way bar her from doing 
it. . . . [H]e has every right to testify as to 
whether or not his testing has evidenced any bars or 
prohibitions to her completing the conditions.   
. . . Quite honestly, there is a substantial 
difference, I believe, between asking whether or not 
she can complete the condition as opposed to asking 
whether or not he sees any bar based on his expertise 
to her completing the condition.  I see that as a 
substantially 
different 
consideration. 
(Emphasis 
added.) 
¶32 Shannon R.'s counsel insisted that she had laid the 
proper foundation for the question about the substantial 
likelihood that Shannon R. is able to meet the conditions within 
the 12-month period, and that Dr. Wellens was as qualified to 
give his opinion on this question as Tribal Judge Smart and Ms. 
Reynolds were to give their opinions. 
 
¶33 We turn now to the legal analysis of the correctness 
of 
the 
circuit 
court's 
evidentiary 
ruling 
excluding 
Dr. 
Wellens's expert opinion testimony. 
II 
¶34 The first issue presented is whether the circuit court 
erred in barring Dr. Wellens from giving his expert opinion 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
19 
 
regarding the substantial likelihood that Shannon R. is able to 
meet the conditions established for the safe return of the 
children to the home within the 12-month period following the 
fact-finding hearing under Wis. Stat. § 48.424.  We begin our 
discussion by examining the applicable rules of evidence.   
¶35 Admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Wis. 
Stat. § 907.02, which permits expert testimony if the witness 
possesses specialized knowledge relevant to a specific question 
and the testimony will assist the trier of fact in understanding 
the evidence or determining a fact in issue.13  Section 907.02 on 
expert 
witnesses 
"'continues 
the 
tradition 
of 
liberally 
admitting expert testimony' in Wisconsin."14   
¶36 An expert witness is qualified if "he or she has 
superior knowledge in the area in which the precise question 
lies."15  An expert witness, though qualified to testify, may not 
be qualified to testify with regard to a particular question.16 
                                                 
13 Wisconsin Stat. § 907.02 reads in full: "If scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the 
form of an opinion or otherwise." 
14 State v. St. George, 2002 WI 50, ¶39, 252 Wis. 2d 499, 
643 N.W.2d 777 (quoting 7 Daniel Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: 
Wisconsin Evidence § 702.202 at 478 (2d ed. 2001)).  
15 St. George, 252 Wis. 2d 499, ¶40 (quoting Tanner v. 
Shoupe, 228 Wis. 2d 357, 370, 596 N.W.2d 805 (Ct. App. 1999)).  
16 St. George, 252 Wis. 2d 499, ¶¶40-48; Martindale v. Ripp, 
2001 WI 113, ¶¶44, 52, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 N.W.2d 698; 7 Blinka, 
supra note 14, § 702.4 at 489. 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
20 
 
¶37 Admissibility of expert testimony is generally within 
the discretion of the circuit court.17  The circuit court's 
determination about an expert's qualifications to testify is 
ordinarily a discretionary determination entitled to substantial 
deference.  But "even evidentiary rulings may be held to 
account."18 
 
The 
circuit 
court's 
ruling 
regarding 
the 
admissibility of Dr. Wellens's expert opinion will not be 
disturbed unless it is an erroneous exercise of discretion.19  A 
circuit court erroneously exercises its discretion if it does 
not examine the relevant facts, applies the wrong legal 
standard, or fails to use a demonstrated rational process to 
reach a reasonable conclusion.20    
¶38 The 
issue, 
then, 
is 
whether 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously exercised its discretion in ruling that Shannon R. 
had not laid a proper foundation qualifying Dr. Wellens as an 
expert to testify as to whether Shannon R. is likely to be able 
to meet the conditions for return of her children within the 12-
month period.  We conclude that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in barring Dr. Wellens's testimony.   
                                                 
17 St. 
George, 
252 
Wis. 2d 499, 
¶37; 
Martindale, 
246 
Wis. 2d 67, ¶28; State v. Watson, 227 Wis. 2d 167, 186, 595 
N.W.2d 403 (1999). 
18 Martindale, 246 Wis. 2d 67, ¶45. 
19 Id. ¶28; State v. Pharr, 115 Wis. 2d 334, 342, 340 
N.W.2d 498 (1983). 
20 Martindale, 246 Wis. 2d 67, ¶45; Morden v. Cont'l AG, 
2000 WI 51, ¶81, 235 Wis. 2d 325, 611 N.W.2d 659.  
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
21 
 
¶39 The circuit court erred by not considering all the 
relevant facts; by applying the wrong legal standard; and by 
failing to demonstrate a rational process to reach a reasonable 
conclusion.   
¶40 In deciding the issue of foundation, the circuit court 
seemed fixated on the psychological tests that Dr. Wellens 
administered and did not consider the psychologist's experience, 
training, 
interview 
with 
Shannon 
R., 
and 
review 
of 
the 
voluminous case history.  Thus the circuit court did not 
consider all the relevant facts.  
¶41 Dr. Wellens could address Shannon R.'s abilities and 
her future behavior based not only on his training and review of 
her voluminous case history but also on his personal interview 
with and testing of Shannon R. and from listening to the 
opinions of others.  His expert opinion on the substantial 
likelihood that she is able to meet the conditions for return 
within the time period would have been based on a psychologist's 
training to understand human behavior and the information he 
personally had about Shannon R. and the conditions for the 
return of the children.  His training and the information he 
personally 
acquired 
about 
Shannon 
R. 
from 
testing 
and 
interviewing her provided a foundation for his opinion about not 
only whether any psychological bar exists to Shannon R.'s 
completing the conditions for return of the children, but also 
whether Shannon R. is able to meet the conditions.  
¶42 The circuit court erred by not applying the proper 
legal standard.  It failed to recognize that courts ordinarily 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
22 
 
allow psychologists to opine about the future behavior of an 
individual.  The United States Supreme Court and this court have 
recognized that, although it is not easy to predict future 
behavior and psychiatrists and psychologists are not infallible, 
they can opine about future behavior.  Such testimony predicting 
behavior has been introduced in Wisconsin in numerous types of 
cases.21  In the context of predicting future violent behavior by 
a sexual predator, this court stated: "[A]lthough predictions of 
future dangerousness may be difficult, they are still an 
attainable, in fact essential, part of our judicial process."22  
¶43 The circuit court concluded that "[t]here is no 
foundation that he has any understanding or expertise in whether 
she can actually do it.  The social workers, on the other hand, 
have worked with her in the field on those very subjects, and 
that's why they're entitled to make that opinion."  The circuit 
court seemed to be saying that only those experienced or trained 
in social work have the expertise to testify in termination of 
parental rights cases about the substantial likelihood of a 
parent's meeting the conditions for return of a child within the 
12-month time period.  Such a ruling is an error of law.  Thus 
the circuit court erred as a matter of law in declaring that Dr. 
                                                 
21 See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896-903 
(1983)(dangerousness), superceded by statute on other grounds as 
stated in United States v. Monroe, 974 F. Supp. 1472 (N.D. Ga. 
1997), quoted with approval in State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 
312, 541 N.W.2d 115 (1995) (ch. 980 case). 
22 State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 312, 541 N.W.2d 115 
(1995) (citing Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 897). 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
23 
 
Wellens, a psychologist, would know so little about the subject 
that he should not be permitted to give his opinion.  Dr. 
Wellens was qualified to state whether in his opinion it is 
likely that Shannon R. is able to meet the conditions for return 
within the 12-month period.   
¶44 Furthermore, it is difficult to understand the circuit 
court's reasoning in excluding Dr. Wellens's opinion.  We 
identify 
several 
reasons 
why 
the 
circuit 
court 
did 
not 
demonstrate a rational process to reach a reasonable conclusion. 
¶45 First, the circuit court's analysis is demonstrably 
inconsistent with the question asked of Dr. Wellens.  Shannon 
R.'s attorney asked Dr. Wellens to assess the "likelihood that 
[Shannon R.] will be able to complete" the conditions for return 
in 12 months.  The circuit court's analysis, however, emphasizes 
that Dr. Wellens lacked foundation to testify that Shannon R. 
"will finish those conditions in twelve months." 
¶46 Second, the circuit court sustained an objection to 
the predictive question it later discussed approvingly.  When 
Shannon R.'s attorney asked Dr. Wellens if he could identify 
"any personality characteristics that will present a bar to 
[Shannon R.'s] completing the conditions in the next twelve 
months[,]" the circuit court sustained the guardian ad litem's 
objection on lack of foundation.  However, soon after sustaining 
this objection, the circuit court stated that Dr. Wellens could 
testify "whether or not his testing has evidenced any bars or 
prohibitions to her completing the conditions."   Dr. Wellens 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
24 
 
ultimately testified that there is no bar to Shannon R. meeting 
the conditions but she would need help.  
¶47 The circuit court saw a difference between asking Dr. 
Wellens whether or not Shannon R. "can complete the condition as 
opposed to asking whether or not he sees any bar based on his 
expertise to her completing the condition."23 
¶48 Third, as Shannon R.'s attorney correctly explained in 
the circuit court and here, the foundation for Dr. Wellens's 
offering a predictive opinion was as good or better than the 
foundation set forth for Brown County's two witnesses who 
offered their opinions.  Brown County's two expert witnesses, 
Tribal 
Judge 
Smart 
and 
Ms. 
Reynolds, 
testified, 
without 
objection, that it was their opinion that no substantial 
likelihood exists that Shannon R. is able to meet the conditions 
for return within 12 months of the hearing.24   
                                                 
23 The court of appeals improperly conflated Dr. Wellens's 
excluded expert opinion testimony that Shannon R. has the 
capacity to meet the conditions with the admitted expert opinion 
testimony that she has no psychological impediments that would 
prevent her from meeting those conditions.  Brown County v. 
Shannon R., Nos. 2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306, unpublished slip op., 
¶33 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2004).   
24 In her briefs, Shannon R. suggests that Melissa Blom, a 
social worker, testified that Shannon R. is unable to meet her 
conditions of return within one year.  Brief of Respondent-
Appellant-Petitioner at 18-23.  In fact, Ms. Blom testified only 
about her own interactions with Shannon R., that Brown County 
had met its obligations under the Indian Child Welfare Act 
(ICWA), that Shannon R. had not yet met the conditions of 
return, and that she thought the children would be unsafe in 
Shannon R.'s care.  Ms. Blom was not asked to state her opinion 
whether Shannon R. is able to meet the conditions of return.  
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
25 
 
¶49 Yet Tribal Judge Smart did not interview Shannon R. or 
the children, and he did not conduct any tests.  He relied on 
the case history and his qualifications in social work.  In 
light of Tribal Judge Smart's qualifications, it was not 
reasonable for the circuit court to bar Dr. Wellens's testimony 
on the ground that Dr. Wellens had not "worked with her in the 
field."     
¶50 Ms. Reynolds relied on her personal interaction with 
Shannon 
R., 
her 
review 
of 
the 
case 
history, 
and 
her 
qualifications as a social worker.  Dr. Wellens also had 
personal interaction with Shannon R., although of significantly 
shorter duration than Ms. Reynolds's.   
¶51 Dr. 
Wellens's 
training 
and 
experience 
is 
as 
a 
psychologist.  His background, tests, interview, and review of 
the case history provides an expertise comparable to the 
training of Ms. Reynolds for purposes of qualifying him as an 
expert witness in the present case.   
¶52 Thus, we conclude that a proper foundation was laid 
for Dr. Wellens's proffered testimony regarding whether Shannon 
R. is able to meet the conditions for return within the 12-month 
period and that the circuit court erroneously exercised its 
discretion by excluding Dr. Wellens's expert opinion. 
III 
¶53 The next question we must address is whether the 
circuit court's erroneous exercise of discretion in excluding 
Dr. Wellens's expert opinion was prejudicial, reversible error.  
The circuit court's erroneous exercise of discretion to exclude 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
26 
 
Dr. Wellens's expert opinion testimony is reversible error if it 
interfered with Shannon R.'s due process right to present 
admissible evidence central to her defense.25   
¶54 Shannon R. argued in the court of appeals and in this 
court that it was fundamentally unfair to preclude Dr. Wellens's 
expert opinion testimony.  She argued in each court that it was 
especially unfair that Brown County's experts' opinions were 
admitted but the expert opinion testimony of Shannon R.'s expert 
was not.   
¶55 The court of appeals addressed the fairness issue and 
simply 
stated 
that 
fundamental 
fairness 
did 
not 
require 
admitting Dr. Wellens's testimony.26       
¶56 The due process protections of the 14th Amendment27 
apply in termination of parental rights cases.28  When the State 
                                                 
25 See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) ("A 
fundamental requirement of due process is 'the opportunity to be 
heard.'  It is an opportunity which must be granted at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." (quoted source 
omitted)). 
 
See 
also 
St. 
George, 
252 
Wis. 2d 499, 
¶52 
("[E]xclusion of evidence is 'unconstitutionally arbitrary or 
disproportionate only where it has infringed upon a weighty 
interest of the accused.'  The weighty interest of the defendant 
is to present 'fundamental elements' of his defense." (quoted 
source omitted)). 
26 Brown County v. Shannon R., Nos. 2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306, 
unpublished slip op., ¶37 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2004) 
("'Fundamental fairness' does not require that Wellens be 
allowed to testify to the ultimate issue merely because Smart's 
unobjected-to testimony encompassed the issue.").    
27 "No 
State 
shall . . . deprive 
any 
person 
of 
life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." 
28 Santosky 
v. 
Kramer, 
455 
U.S. 
745, 
754-70 
(1982); 
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27-32. 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
27 
 
seeks to terminate familial bonds, it must provide a fair 
procedure to the parents, even when the parents have been 
derelict in their parental duties.29         
¶57 The nature and extent of the process due to a party 
depends on the nature of the case and is influenced by the 
grievousness of the loss which may be suffered.  Determining 
what due process requires in any particular case must begin with 
an analysis of the government function involved and the private 
interest affected by the governmental action.30  A court balances 
the private interests, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of 
the interests through the procedures used, and the government 
interests in determining the process due.  The factors to be 
weighed are set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-
35 (1976), as follows: 
[F]irst, the private interest that will be affected by 
the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of such interest through the procedures 
used, and the probative value, if any, of additional 
or substituted procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government's interest, including the function involved 
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail. 
¶58 A parent's private interest in a termination of 
parental rights proceeding is a grievous loss, namely the 
permanent deprivation of a legal relationship with his or her 
                                                 
29 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753-54; Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27-
32. 
30 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560 (1974); Morrissey 
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
28 
 
child.  Termination "work[s] a unique kind of deprivation."31 
"[T]he removal of a child from the parent is a penalty as great 
[as], if not greater, than a criminal penalty . . . ."32    
¶59 Although they are civil proceedings,33 termination of 
parental 
rights 
proceedings 
deserve 
heightened 
protections 
because they implicate a parent's fundamental liberty interest.34  
Parents have a fundamental, constitutionally protected liberty 
interest in the "companionship, care, custody, and management" 
of their children.35  The United States Supreme Court has 
repeatedly declared that "personal choice in matters of family 
life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment."36  "[A] parent's desire for and right to 
'the companionship, care, custody and management of his or her 
                                                 
31 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 127-28 (1996); see 
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27. 
32 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-1386, 
at 22 (1978)). 
33 See M.W. v. Monroe County Dep't of Human Servs., 116 
Wis. 2d 432, 442, 342 N.W.2d 410 (1984). 
34 See Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110, ¶¶20-21, 246 
Wis. 2d 1, 629 N.W.2d 768; L.K. v. B.B., 113 Wis. 2d 429, 441, 
335 N.W.2d 846 (1983) (citing Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769); In re 
J.L.W., 102 Wis. 2d 118, 132, 306 N.W.2d 46 (1981). 
35 In re D.L.S., 112 Wis. 2d 180, 184, 332 N.W.2d 293 
(1983). 
36 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753; see Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 24-
32; Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 59-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see 
also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Smith v. 
Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977); Moore v. City 
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion).   
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
29 
 
children' is an important interest that 'undeniably warrants 
deference 
and, absent 
a 
powerful 
countervailing 
interest, 
protection.'"37  "Terminations of parental rights affect some of 
parents' most fundamental human rights.'"38   
¶60 The State has an urgent interest in a termination of 
parental rights proceeding to protect the welfare of the 
children.39  An important aspect of a child's welfare is a 
parent's relationship with the child. 
¶61 Accordingly, the State and parent share an interest in 
the accuracy and justice of the decision to terminate parental 
rights.40      
¶62 The protection of a parent's interests in termination 
of parental rights proceedings is particularly important in 
light of the "vast disparity in an involuntary termination case 
between the ability of the state to prosecute and the ability of 
the parent to defend."41  The United States Supreme Court has 
described the formidable task a parent faces in defending 
                                                 
37 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 
405 U.S. 645, 691 (1972)). 
38 Evelyn 
C.R., 
246 
Wis. 2d 1, 
¶20; 
see 
D.L.S., 
112 
Wis. 2d at 184; Minguey v. Brookens, 100 Wis. 2d 681, 689, 303 
N.W.2d 581 (1981). 
39 Lassiter, 452  U.S. at 27. 
40 Id.; D.L.S., 112 Wis. 2d at 185. 
41 A.S. v. State, 163 Wis. 2d 687, 704, 472 N.W.2d 819 (Ct. 
App. 1991) (Sundby, J., dissenting), cited with approval in A.S. 
v. State, 168 Wis. 2d 995, 1003, 485 N.W.2d 52 (1992).  
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
30 
 
herself against the involuntary termination of parental rights 
as follows:  
The State's ability to assemble its case almost 
inevitably dwarfs the parents' ability to mount a 
defense.  No predetermined limits restrict the sums an 
agency may spend in prosecuting a given termination 
proceeding.  The State's attorney usually will be 
expert on the issues contested and the procedures 
employed at the fact-finding hearing, and enjoys full 
access to all public records concerning the family.  
The State may call on experts in family relations, 
psychology, 
and 
medicine 
to 
bolster 
its 
case.  
Furthermore, the primary witnesses at the hearing will 
be the agency's own professional caseworkers whom the 
State has empowered both to investigate the family 
situation and to testify against the parents.  Indeed, 
because the child is already in agency custody, the 
State even has the power to shape the historical 
events that form the basis for termination.42 
¶63 Considering that the process due depends on the 
fundamental liberty interests of the parent, the State's urgent 
interest in the welfare of children and in the accuracy of a 
decision terminating parental rights, and the disparity between 
the ability of the State to prosecute and the ability of a 
parent to defend in termination proceedings, we now must 
determine what process was due in this termination of parental 
rights case regarding the admission of Dr. Wellens's expert 
opinion. 
¶64 A fundamental guarantee of due process of law is the 
opportunity to be heard43 "at a meaningful time and in a 
                                                 
42 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 763. 
43 Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (civil case). 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
31 
 
meaningful manner."44  "The right to be heard before being 
condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind, even though it 
may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal 
conviction, is a principle basic to our society."45  
¶65 The opportunity to be heard includes the right to 
"present a complete defense."46  The right to present a complete 
defense, in turn, includes the right to offer the testimony of 
witnesses.47  The constitutional right to be heard is not so 
broad as to preclude the State from establishing rules of 
evidence and procedure that impose limits on a party's ability 
to present evidence, including limits on the testimony of expert 
witnesses.48   
¶66 Here, the rules of evidence did not limit Shannon R.'s 
ability to be heard or present evidence.  Rather, the circuit 
court's erroneous application of an evidentiary rule interfered 
with Shannon R.'s ability to be heard by preventing her from 
putting forth her defense through Dr. Wellens's expert opinion. 
                                                 
44 Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 552 (civil case). 
45 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 
123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (civil case). 
46 California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984); see 
United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998); State v. 
Pulizzano 155 Wis. 2d 633, 645, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990). 
47 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967). 
48 United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308, 316 (1998); 
St. George, 252 Wis. 2d 499, ¶49. 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
32 
 
¶67 To summarize: The parent's interest and the State's 
interest in termination of parental rights proceedings are both 
extremely important; the State and parent share an interest in 
an accurate decision; due process guarantees a parent the 
opportunity to be heard and present a defense; and the State has 
no interest in depriving a parent of the right to be heard when 
the evidence presented is admissible under the rules of 
evidence.  
¶68 The question then is whether Shannon R. was given the 
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner when the circuit court erroneously excluded Dr. Wellens's 
expert 
opinion 
evidence. 
 
The 
circuit 
court's 
erroneous 
exclusion of Dr. Wellens's opinion testimony violates basic 
concepts of due process if the circuit court denied Shannon R. 
the opportunity to be heard, that is, if it denied her the 
ability to present a defense on whether she will meet the 
conditions for the return of her children, a central issue of 
the case.  Shannon R.'s interest was to present a defense in 
regard to the "fundamental elements" justifying termination.49   
                                                 
49 St. George, 252 Wis. 2d 499, ¶52 (quoting Scheffer, 523 
U.S. at 315 (internal quotation marks omitted)); see St. George, 
252 Wis. 2d 499, ¶81 (Sykes, J., concurring) ("If it were not so 
central to the defendant's case, the decision whether to qualify 
the defense expert under Wis. Stat. § 907.02 could have gone 
either way and been upheld."). 
In St. George, in the context of the Sixth Amendment right 
to present a defense, we set out the following factors to 
determine whether the right to present a defense has been 
violated: 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
33 
 
¶69 A proper foundation was laid for Dr. Wellens's 
testimony.  His testimony met the standards of Wis. Stat. 
§ 907.02; it was relevant to a material issue, that is, the 
substantial likelihood that Shannon R. will meet the conditions 
for the return of the children within the 12-month period. His 
testimony would have assisted the jury; it was necessary to 
Shannon R.'s case; and admission of the testimony had no 
prejudicial effect on the State.  
¶70 Besides Shannon R. herself, Dr. Wellens was one of 
only two witnesses Shannon R. called.  Dr. Wellens was the only 
expert Shannon R. called to testify that she is able to meet the 
conditions for return within the 12-month period.  Because Dr. 
Wellens's expert opinion testimony was excluded, the jury heard 
no direct testimony contravening Brown County's witnesses' 
opinions that Shannon R. is not able to meet the conditions for 
                                                                                                                                                             
1) 
The 
expert 
witness's 
testimony 
meets 
the 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 907.02 for the admission 
of expert testimony; 
2) The expert witness's testimony is clearly relevant 
to a material issue in this case; 
3) The expert witness's testimony is necessary to the 
defendant's case; and 
4) The probative value of the testimony is not 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 
 
St. George, 252 Wis. 2d 499, ¶54.  Although St. George does 
not control cases decided under the due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, it informs our discussion in the present 
case. 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
34 
 
return within 12 months.  Preventing a parent from presenting 
expert opinion testimony on an issue central to the defense when 
the State presents the testimony of two experts deprives the 
parent "of a level playing field,"50 especially when a vast 
disparity already exists between the State's and the parent's 
resources.  "If one side is to introduce testimony by a 
psychological expert who has examined the victim, the other side 
must also be able to request such an opportunity in order to 
level the playing field."51   
¶71 The State's interest in terminating parental rights 
promptly does not outweigh the requirements of fundamental 
fairness and Shannon R.'s constitutionally protected due process 
right to be heard in a meaningful manner.  It would have imposed 
no burden on the State to allow Shannon R. to present her 
qualified expert witnesses. 
¶72  In light of the important constitutional right at 
stake, the State's interest in an accurate decision, the 
fundamental fairness of giving a party the opportunity to 
defend, and Shannon R.'s inability to present evidence on an 
issue central to the outcome of the case, we hold that the 
circuit court's erroneous preclusion of Dr. Wellens's expert 
opinion testimony (the only expert opinion testimony Shannon R. 
proffered on an issue central to her defense) denied her the due 
                                                 
50 State v. Maday, 179 Wis. 2d 346, 507 N.W.2d 365 (Ct. App. 
1993).   
51 State v. Rizzo, 2002 WI 20, ¶26, 250 Wis. 2d 407, 640 
N.W.2d 93. 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
35 
 
process right to present a defense and goes to the fundamental 
fairness of the proceeding.  We therefore hold that the circuit 
court committed prejudicial, reversible error. 
IV 
¶73 Because we remand this cause, we discuss two issues 
that might arise on retrial.  
A 
¶74 Shannon R. contends that the circuit court lost 
competence to decide the termination proceeding because it 
failed to hold the initial appearance within 30 days as required 
by Wis. Stat. § 48.422(1).   
¶75 The dates at which various events occurred are as 
follows. 
¶76 On May 29, 2003, a petition for termination of 
parental rights as to Daniel, the younger child, was filed in 
Brown County.  That case was assigned to Judge Sue Bischel.  The 
initial appearance was held within the time requirements of Wis. 
Stat. § 48.422.   
¶77 On September 2, 2003, Brown County filed a petition 
for the termination of parental rights as to Darell, the older 
child.  This case was assigned to Judge Richard J. Dietz.  
¶78 On September 4, 2003, Brown County petitioned to 
consolidate the two cases.  Judge Bischel held a hearing on the 
consolidation petition on September 18, 2003, granted the 
consolidation on September 26, 2003, and assigned the case to 
Judge Dietz.   
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
36 
 
¶79 On September 29, 2003, Judge Dietz declared that he 
would ask the district court administrator to reassign the 
consolidated 
cases 
because, 
with 
four 
other 
involuntary 
termination of parental rights proceedings on his calendar, he 
would be unable to meet the statutory time period requirements 
for this TPR proceeding.  
¶80 The application for judicial reassignment was dated 
September 30, and the order assigning the proceedings to Judge 
McKay was filed October 1.  Both the application and the order 
cited "congestion" as the reason for the reassignment.  The 
initial appearance for the consolidated matter began on October 
23 and continued on October 27.   
¶81 In view of our decision that the circuit court 
erroneously excluded Dr. Wellens's expert opinion, we need not 
determine whether the time period was extended under § 48.315 
and whether the circuit court complied with the 30-day time 
requirement.  
¶82 Rather, we take this opportunity to reiterate the 
admonition set forth in Sheboygan County Department of Social 
Services v. Matthew S., 2005 WI 84, 282 Wis. 2d 150, 698 
N.W.2d 631, that "'[t]he legislative history of the Children's 
Code shows that the legislature considers that strict time 
limits between critical stages within the adjudication process 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
37 
 
are necessary to protect the due process rights of children and 
parents.'"52  
¶83 Of particular import here is that the motion for 
consolidation was made on September 4, 2003, and was not granted 
until 22 days later, on September 26.  A reasonable delay for 
the purposes of consolidation is excluded, under Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.315 (1)(g), in computing the time requirements.   
¶84 Daniel and Darell's termination cases passed between 
two judges and finally were consolidated by assignment to a 
third judge because of docket congestion.  Assignment of the 
case to the final judge was effected on October 1, five days 
after the consolidation.     
¶85 Neither the circuit court nor the court of appeals 
determined the reasonableness of the 22 days (or any part 
thereof) that elapsed before the motion for consolidation was 
decided.  Rather, both courts resolved the question of whether 
the 30-day time period was met by declaring that reassignment of 
a judge because of docket congestion was a disqualification of 
the judge under Wis. Stat. § 48.315(1)(c).53    
                                                 
52 Sheboygan County Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Matthew S., 2005 
WI 84, ¶17, 282 Wis. 2d 150, 698 N.W.2d 631 (quoting In re R.H., 
147 Wis. 2d 22, 33, 433 N.W.2d 16 (Ct. App. 1988), aff'd by 
equally divided court, 150 Wis. 2d 432, 441 N.W.2d 233 (1989)).  
For a discussion of the legislative history of the Children's 
Code, see, e.g., In re R.H., 147 Wis. 2d 22, 31, 433 N.W.2d 16 
(Ct. App. 1988).  
53 Wisconsin Stat. § 48.315(1)(c) provides in part as 
follows: 
(1) The following time period shall be excluded in 
computing time requirements in this chapter: 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
38 
 
¶86 The court of appeals relied on State v. Joshua M.W., 
179 Wis. 2d 335, 341, 507 N.W.2d  141 (Ct. App. 1993), for the 
proposition that reassignment of a judge because of docket 
congestion amounts to disqualification of a judge under Wis. 
Stat. § 48.315(1)(c).  Joshua M.W. does not support this broad 
reading of § 48.315(1)(c).  In Joshua M.W., the juvenile 
requested a substitution of judge and conceded that the time 
period from the date of the request to the date of assignment of 
a substitute judge was excluded from the applicable time 
computation as a disqualification of a judge.  Under the 
statutes, when a motion to substitute a judge is properly filed, 
the named judge "has no further jurisdiction."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 801.58. 
 
A 
substitution 
may 
therefore 
be 
viewed 
as 
disqualification of a judge.  This case does not involve 
substitution of a judge.    
¶87 Nor does this case involve any of the statutory 
grounds for disqualification of a judge.  Docket congestion is 
not a ground for disqualification under Wis. Stat. § 757.19 
governing disqualification of judges. 
¶88 The parties cite no support for the conclusion that 
disqualification of a judge under Wis. Stat. 48.315(1)(c) 
includes 
the 
reassignment 
of 
a 
judge 
because 
of 
docket 
congestion, and we have found none. 
                                                                                                                                                             
. . . . 
(c) Any period of delay caused by the disqualification 
of a judge. 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
39 
 
¶89 Furthermore, 
if 
we 
were 
to 
read 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.315(1)(c) to allow reassignment of a judge because of 
docket congestion to constitute disqualification of a judge, 
then termination of parental rights proceedings could be passed 
between circuit courts simply because of congestion.  This court 
understands well the docket pressures in the circuit courts.  
Such pressures do not, however, relieve circuit courts of their 
responsibility to follow the strict time limits prescribed in 
the Children's Code and the legislative requirement that these 
matters be handled within these time limits.  We do not 
determine whether the statutory time limits were met in the 
present case.  Nor do we consider whether the record in the 
present case relating to congestion supports good cause for not 
holding the initial appearance within 30 days as required by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 48.422(1). 
 
We 
do 
conclude, 
however, 
that 
reassignment of a case to a different judge because of docket 
congestion does not constitute disqualification of a judge under 
Wis. Stat. § 48.315(1)(c). 
B 
¶90 A second issue we address relates to the Indian Child 
Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963.  
¶91 The ICWA governs proceedings involving Indian children 
as defined in the act.  The parties, the circuit court, and the 
court of appeals agree that the ICWA applies in the present 
case.   
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
40 
 
¶92 Shannon R. argues that the circuit court erroneously 
instructed the jury about Brown County's burden of proof on the 
special verdict questions.      
¶93  The circuit court directed the jury in the present 
case to apply two different burdens of proof to the two sets of 
special verdict questions.  As to the first four special verdict 
questions embodying state law, the circuit court instructed the 
jury to answer the questions "yes" if Brown County proved those 
elements to a reasonable certainty by evidence that is clear, 
satisfactory, and convincing.54  As to the last three special 
verdict 
questions 
embodying 
the 
ICWA, 
the 
circuit 
court 
                                                 
54 The first four special verdict questions are: (1) "Has 
the child . . . been adjudicated to be in need of protection or 
services and placed outside the home for a cumulative total 
period of six (6) months or longer pursuant to one or more court 
orders containing the termination of parental rights notice 
required by law?[;]" (2) "Did the Brown County Human Services 
Department and/or the Bad River Tribal Nation Social Services 
make a reasonable effort to provide the services ordered by the 
Court?[;]" (3) "Has Shannon R[.] failed to meet the conditions 
established for the safe return of the child to the home?[;]" 
and (4) "Is there a substantial likelihood that Shannon R[.] 
will not meet these conditions within the twelve-month period 
following the conclusion of this hearing?" 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
41 
 
instructed the jury to answer "yes" if Brown County proved those 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt.55   
¶94 The first four special verdict questions incorporate  
state law requirements.  The burden of proof under the Wisconsin 
Children's Code (Chapter 48 of the Statutes) to terminate 
parental rights is clear and convincing evidence (the middle 
burden).56     
¶95 The last three special verdict questions incorporate 
federal law requirements under the ICWA.  Special verdict 
questions 5 and 6 incorporate the requirements set forth in 25 
U.S.C. § 1912(d); section 1912(d) does not, however, provide an 
applicable burden of proof.57  Special verdict question 7 
incorporates the requirement set forth in § 1912(f). Section 
                                                 
55 The last three special verdict questions are: (5) "Have 
the Brown County Human Services [sic] and/or the Bad River Tribe 
of Indians of Wisconsin, through its Social Services Department, 
made 
active 
efforts 
to 
provide 
remedial 
services 
and 
rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the 
Indian family?[;]" (6) "Have the efforts of the Brown County 
Human Services Department and/or the Bad River Tribal Nation 
Social 
Services 
[sic] 
to 
provide 
remedial 
services 
and 
rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the 
Indian family proven unsuccessful?[;]" and (7) "Would the return 
of custody of the child to Shannon R[.] likely result in serious 
emotional or physical damage to the child?" 
56 Wis. Stat. § 48.31(1). 
57 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) provides:  "Any party seeking to 
effect a foster child placement of, or termination of parental 
rights to, an Indian child under State law shall satisfy the 
court that active efforts have been made to provide remedial 
services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the 
breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved 
unsuccessful." 
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
42 
 
1912(f) provides that the burden of proof for this element is 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" (the highest burden).58   
¶96 Our court has held that the ICWA does not preempt the 
Wisconsin Children's Code;59 that the different burdens of proof 
under the state law and under the ICWA (25 U.S.C. § 1912(f)) can 
be harmonized with the middle burden of proof applied to state 
law requirements for termination and the highest burden of proof 
applied to requirements set forth in 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f);60 and 
that "the ICWA expressly calls for the use of state law rather 
than the ICWA if the state law 'provides a higher standard of 
protection' than that accorded by the ICWA."61  These holdings 
comport with the case law of several other states.62   
                                                 
58 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) provides:   
No termination of parental rights may be ordered in 
such proceedings in the absence of a determination 
supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, 
including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, 
that the continued custody of the child by the parent 
or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious 
emotional or physical damage to the child.  
59 In re D.S.P., 166 Wis. 2d 464, 473, 480 N.W.2d 234 
(1992). 
60 Id. at 474. 
61 Id. at 473. 
62 For state courts adopting a dual burden of proof in ICWA 
cases, see, e.g., K.N. v. State, 856 P.2d 468, 476-77 (Alaska 
1993); In re J.R.B. & T.W.G., 715 P.2d 1170, 1171 (Alaska 1986); 
In re H.A.M., 961 P.2d 716, 719 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998); In re 
Denice F., 658 A.2d 1070, 1072-73 (Me. 1995); Elliott v. Boyd, 
554 N.W.2d 32, 38 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996); In re Bluebird, 411 
S.E. 2d 820, 823 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992); K.E. v. State, 912 P.2d 
1002, 1005 (Utah Ct. App. 1996); In re Dependency of Roberts, 
732 P.2d 528, 531 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987).   
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
43 
 
 
¶97 Shannon R. argues that the state law grounds are not 
distinct from the ICWA grounds and that therefore the circuit 
court erred as a matter of law in instructing the jury to apply 
the middle burden of proof.  More specifically, Shannon R. 
argues that special verdict questions 2 and 3 are essentially 
the same as special verdict questions 5 and 6 and that the 
circuit court should have instructed the jury that Brown 
County's burden of proof for special verdict questions 2 and 3 
was beyond a reasonable doubt. 
¶98 The court of appeals addressed this argument under 
ineffective assistance of counsel because Shannon R.'s counsel 
did not object to the jury instructions.  Without deciding 
whether counsel's performance was deficient, the court of 
appeals concluded that Shannon R. failed to show that the 
instructions were prejudicial.  
¶99 We are not persuaded by Shannon R.'s arguments that 
these special verdict questions are functionally equivalent.  We 
                                                                                                                                                             
In contrast, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has adopted the 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard for both the state law 
requirements and the requirements in 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f).  The 
Introductory Note to the Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions for 
Juvenile Cases, In re Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions for 
Juvenile Cases, 116 P.3d 119, 163 (Okla. 2005), explains its 
reasons for adopting the single beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard as follows: the prevailing practice in Oklahoma trial 
courts has been to use the reasonable doubt standard for both 
the state law requirements for termination of parental rights 
and the requirements in 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f); a single standard 
is less confusing for the jury than a dual standard; and the 
higher standard gives greatest effect to the ICWA and is less 
likely to result in reversal.  
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
44 
 
conclude that the state law grounds embodied in the first four 
special verdict questions are sufficiently distinct from the 
ICWA grounds embodied in the last three special verdict 
questions.  Although the jury may consider the same evidence to 
answer the several special verdict questions, the critical 
questions asked and the ultimate findings required by the jury 
are not precisely the same.  
¶100 We identify two distinctions between the ultimate 
findings required of the jury by these questions.  First, the 
type of efforts to be provided may be different.  Special 
verdict question 2 requires reasonable effort be made to provide 
the services "ordered by the Court" in the CHIPS proceeding to 
make the home safe for the child.  Special verdict question 5, 
on the other hand, requires active efforts to provide "remedial 
services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the 
breakup of the Indian family."   
¶101 Second, 
the 
special 
verdict 
questions 
identify 
different goals.  Although one of the goals of Chapter 48 is "to 
preserve the unity of the family," special verdict question 3 
focused on Shannon R. meeting the conditions for the safe return 
of the children to the home.  Special verdict questions 5 and 6 
relating to the remedial and rehabilitative services focused on 
preventing the breakup of the Indian family and whether the 
efforts of the remedial services and rehabilitative programs 
designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family have proven 
unsuccessful.   
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
45 
 
¶102 Thus, we conclude that special verdict questions 2 and 
3 are analytically distinct from special verdict questions 5 and 
6.   
¶103 Neither party briefed whether the ICWA requires Brown 
County to prove special verdict questions 5 and 6, which 
incorporate 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d), beyond a reasonable doubt.  
Special verdict question 7 (incorporating 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f)) 
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  Section 1912(d), 
unlike § 1912(f), does not set forth an applicable burden of 
proof.  The parties and court of appeals assumed that the beyond 
a reasonable doubt burden applicable to special verdict question 
7 applied to special verdict questions 5 and 6.   
¶104 We do not address or decide, however, whether special 
verdict questions 5 and 6 (incorporating 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d)) 
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  We merely point out 
that state courts have divided about the appropriate burden of 
proof to be applied to special verdict questions incorporating 
§ 1912(d).63   
                                                 
63 See In re Michael G., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 642 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1998) (holding the ICWA beyond a reasonable doubt standard 
applies only to a special verdict question (here special verdict 
question 7) relating to whether the return of custody of the 
child to the parent is likely to result in serious emotional or 
physical damage to the child); In the Interest of D.G., 679 
N.W.2d 497 (S.D. 2004) (following the same rule as Michael G.); 
In re Baby Boy Doe, 902 P.2d 477 (Idaho 1995) (same); In re 
Annette P., 589 A.2d 924 (Me. 1991) (same).   
No. 
2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306   
 
46 
 
* * * * 
¶105 In sum, we conclude that the constitutional guarantee 
of due process (fundamental fairness) requires the conclusion 
that by excluding Shannon R.'s only expert opinion testimony, 
which was clearly central to her defense against termination of 
her parental rights, the circuit court committed reversible 
error.  We therefore reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause remanded. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
But see Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Lawless, 384 N.W.2d 843 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (applying beyond a reasonable doubt burden 
to 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (the source of special verdict questions 
5 and 6 in the present case); In re L.N.W., 457 N.W.2d 17 (Iowa 
Ct. App. 1990) (same); In re M.S.S., 465 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1991) (same); In re G.S., 59 P.3d 1063 (Mont. 2002) (same). 
No.  2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶106 PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
J. 
(dissenting).   The 
majority opinion overturns the termination of Shannon R.'s 
parental rights to Darell and Daniel, both of whom have been out 
of her home for more than three years.  The majority bases its 
decision on an evidentiary ruling that prevented Shannon from 
obtaining one answer to one question from one person over the 
course of a three-day jury trial.  In order to achieve a 
reversal, the majority converts the evidentiary question that 
was presented into a constitutional issue.  Majority op., ¶¶65-
66.  It does so by constructing a rationale that was never 
presented to the circuit court and by ignoring the need that two 
young boys have for a permanent home.   
¶107 I conclude that the circuit court did not err in its 
evidentiary ruling, and even if it erred, it was harmless error; 
that the majority opinion's analysis of the constitutional issue 
it constructs is flawed; and that the majority opinion ignores 
the legislature's explicit direction that the best interests of 
the 
child 
are 
to 
be 
paramount 
in 
ch. 
48 
proceedings.  
Accordingly, I would affirm the court of appeals and I 
respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶108 Shannon R. is the mother of Darell, a four-year-old 
boy, and Daniel, a three-year-old boy.  Darell was removed from 
Shannon's care less than one month after his birth.  He has 
resided in foster care since that time.  Daniel was removed from 
Shannon's care at birth.  He has never resided with Shannon.  
The record shows that the precipitating event for Darell's 
No.  2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306.pdr 
 
2 
 
removal from Shannon's custody was the death of his sister, 
Tianna.  She was found dead in her crib due to hyperthermia and 
dehydration.  The record revealed that neither Shannon nor the 
father of Tianna, both of whom lived in the same residence, had 
had any physical contact with her for 17 hours prior to her 
death.   
¶109 Since October 25, 2001, a dispositional order has been 
in place setting out those tasks that Shannon must do in order 
to regain custody of Darell.  A similar order has been in place 
with regard to regaining custody of Daniel since August 5, 2002.  
Notice was given to Shannon when the orders were issued that if 
she did not meet the conditions necessary for the safe return of 
the boys, her parental rights could be terminated.64 
¶110 After a three-day jury trial in which eight witnesses, 
including Shannon, testified, the jury found that Shannon had 
failed to meet the conditions necessary for the safe return of 
the children to her home and that there was a "substantial 
likelihood" that Shannon would not meet the conditions within 
the 12-month period following the conclusion of the jury trial.  
The jury also found that the return of the boys to Shannon's 
custody would "likely result in serious emotional or physical 
damage to the [children]." 
                                                 
64 Shannon repeatedly testified to her understanding that 
failing to meet the conditions necessary for the safe return of 
the boys to her home could result in the termination of her 
parental rights. 
No.  2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306.pdr 
 
3 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶111 We review the evidentiary decisions of the circuit 
court 
to 
determine 
whether 
it 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion.  Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 
N.W.2d 175 (1982).  We will sustain an evidentiary ruling if the 
circuit court considered the relevant facts, applied the correct 
rule of law and came to a conclusion that a reasonable judge 
could reach.  State v. Cofield, 2000 WI App 196, ¶7, 238 Wis. 2d 
467, 618 N.W.2d 214.  We determine as a question of law whether 
a defendant has been denied the constitutional right to make a 
defense.  See State v. St. George, 2002 WI 50, ¶49, 252 Wis. 2d 
499, 643 N.W.2d 777.    
B. 
Evidentiary Rulings 
 
1. 
Expert testimony 
¶112 Dr. Gerald Wellens is a licensed psychologist whom 
Shannon retained for trial.  He interviewed Shannon for two 
hours, conducted four types of psychological tests, read the 
reports of her parole agent, that of a counselor and those of 
the social workers, as well as the record of past court 
proceedings involving Darell and Daniel.  Based on that 
foundation, Shannon proposed to offer Wellens's expert opinion 
on special verdict question 4, which read:  "Is there a 
substantial likelihood that Shannon R[.] will not meet [the 
conditions for the safe return of the children to her home] 
within the twelve-month period following the conclusion of this 
hearing?"  The jury answered the question, "Yes." 
No.  2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306.pdr 
 
4 
 
¶113 The question put to Wellens to which the circuit court 
sustained an objection based on a lack of foundation was:   
Based upon your years of experience as a psychologist, 
based upon your review of the three volumes of 
materials, based upon your interview with [Shannon], 
and based upon the four psychological instruments that 
you have utilized to test her, are you able to a 
reasonable degree of psychological certainty to reach 
an opinion as to the likelihood of her ability to 
complete these conditions as they now stand within the 
next twelve months? 
The problem the court had with the foundation that counsel had 
laid for the question was in part a temporal one, i.e., whether 
Shannon would meet the conditions for the safe return of the 
children within the 12 months after the trial.  The court 
concluded that nothing in Wellens's prior testimony established 
that 
he 
had 
expertise 
in 
predicting 
what 
Shannon 
would 
accomplish within that 12-month period.  However, the court 
patiently explained the type of questions that would be 
permitted:  
I'm going to allow you to ask questions, if you choose 
to do so, as to whether or not the counseling——excuse 
me——the testing that he undertook and the conclusions 
that he's reached as a result of that regarding her 
personality and psychological traits will be a bar to 
anything.  You can ask those.  But you keep making a 
hurdle to whether that prevents her from doing the 
conditions within the next twelve months, and he can't 
answer that.  He can't make that leap.  He can tell 
you whether his test results and his evaluation 
present any bars to her, but he can't conclude that 
i.e., therefore, she will finish those conditions in 
twelve months.  (Emphasis added.)   
¶114 The guardian ad litem also tried to explain a question 
that could be asked and to which she would make no objection. 
She posed the following question:  "Is there anything that has 
No.  2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306.pdr 
 
5 
 
come out of these testings that would——as you said, Your Honor——
that would pose as a bar to her completing these conditions? I 
won't object to that question."  The court tried repeatedly to 
explain why Wellens's testing, two hours of interview time and 
reading the reports of others did not form a foundation for him 
to opine what Shannon actually would do in the next 12 months, 
and counsel tried valiantly to understand the court's concern.  
However, the record is clear that the court and counsel were 
talking past each other.  Nonetheless, following a lengthy 
colloquy among counsel, the guardian ad litem and the court, 
these questions and answers were presented before the jury: 
Q 
Is there anything in the testing results that you 
performed in your professional capacity and the 
conclusions you reached in your professional 
capacity that lead you to believe that there is a 
bar 
or——inability 
or 
bar 
to 
Miss 
Shannon 
obtaining stable and suitable housing in the 
future for herself and her children?  
A 
I don't believe that there is a bar.  . . . 
Q 
Was 
there 
anything 
in 
your 
testing 
or 
professional conclusions that led you to believe 
that there is a bar to Miss R[.] obtaining stable 
employment in the future?  
A 
No.  . . . 
Q 
Well, 
rather 
than 
go 
through 
all 
of 
her 
conditions one by one in each court order, are 
there any psychological impediments that prevent 
her from completing any of the conditions that 
are listed? 
A 
No. 
From the questions and answers above, the jury could have 
inferred that it was substantially likely that Shannon would 
No.  2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306.pdr 
 
6 
 
meet the conditions necessary for the children to return to her 
home safely, but it did not do so. 
¶115 Wellens's expert opinion was also offered on special 
verdict question 7, which read:  "Would the return of custody of 
the [children] to Shannon R[.] likely result in serious 
emotional or physical damage to the [children]?"  The jury also 
answered this question, "Yes."  There was no objection to the 
testimony counsel elicited from Wellens in regard to special 
verdict question 7.  Shannon's question was asked and answered 
as follows: 
Q 
What is your expert opinion as to whether or not 
the return of Daniel and Darell to the custody of 
their mother, Shannon, is likely to result in 
serious emotional or physical damage to the 
children . . .? 
A 
As a psychologist I——in evaluating Shannon, I——
she strives to be a good mother.  She's making 
progress, in my opinion, psychologically, and I 
don't see that there would be a likelihood that 
there would be damage to these children from what 
I've read in the notes and evaluating her. 
 
2. 
Exercise of discretion 
¶116 Expert testimony generally is admitted if it is 
relevant to the issue to be decided and will assist the trier of 
fact in coming to a decision.  Wis. Stat. §§ 904.01 and 907.02 
(2003-04).65  However, expert testimony is required on an issue 
only if the issue that the jury must decide is "beyond the 
general knowledge and experience of the average juror."  State 
v. Whitaker, 167 Wis. 2d 247, 255, 481 N.W.2d 649 (Ct. App. 
                                                 
65 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No.  2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306.pdr 
 
7 
 
1992).  Additionally, an expert may testify only "within the 
areas in which he or she is qualified."  Herman v. Milwaukee 
Children's Hosp., 121 Wis. 2d 531, 551, 361 N.W.2d 297 (Ct. App. 
1984). 
¶117 Before ruling, the circuit court considered that 
Wellens had limited exposure to Shannon's past noncompliance 
with the court-ordered conditions for the return of Darell and 
Daniel, except for reading the records made by others.  In 
deciding whether the testimony would aid the trier of fact, the 
court understood that Shannon's tests showed she had the ability 
to meet the county's conditions for the return of the children.  
However, the court found that was not necessarily transferable 
into a reliable opinion that Shannon would actually meet the 
conditions in the next 12 months.   
¶118 I conclude that the rationale the circuit court 
applied was reasonable, given that if the opposite were true, 
i.e., because Shannon had the ability to meet the conditions, 
she would do so in the next 12 months, Shannon would have met 
those conditions in the more than 25 months that both boys had 
been in the custody of the county.  And while it may be true 
that some judges may have let in the testimony as counsel 
initially phrased the question, that is not the legal test we 
use when examining an evidentiary ruling.  State v. McConnohie, 
113 Wis. 2d 362, 370, 334 N.W.2d 903 (1983) (concluding that a 
discretionary ruling that is made on the facts and the correct 
law must be upheld, even though the reviewing court does not 
necessarily agree with the ruling). 
No.  2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306.pdr 
 
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¶119 Further, Shannon never argued that if the court 
refused to permit her to phrase the question as she chose, it 
would deny her constitutional right to present a defense, so the 
circuit court did not address that contention.  Accordingly, 
because the circuit court considered the relevant facts, applied 
a correct standard of law and reached a conclusion that a 
reasonable judge could have reached, there was no erroneous 
exercise of discretion.  Cofield, 238 Wis. 2d 467, ¶7. 
 
3. 
Harmless error 
¶120 If I were to assume, arguendo, that the circuit court 
erred by sustaining the objection to the question, the error was 
harmless because the questions that were asked and answered 
differed little in regard to their phrasing and import from that 
which was not permitted.  See Teasdale v. Teasdale, 264 Wis. 1, 
7, 58 N.W.2d 404 (1953) (concluding that the opinion of trustees 
that had been rejected on a prior appeal was not improved by the 
document offered because the document did not differ in 
character and import from that which had been presented 
previously).  Furthermore, Wellens was not the only witness who 
testified on Shannon's behalf relative to whether she would meet 
the conditions for the safe return of the children to her home.  
Shannon, herself, took the stand and explained that she would 
meet those conditions in the next 12 months.  
¶121 In addition, it is not clear to me that the jury 
needed expert testimony in order to answer special verdict 
question 4.  Generally, expert testimony will assist the jury 
when the issue to be decided is based on an analysis that would 
No.  2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306.pdr 
 
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be difficult for the ordinary person in the community to apply.  
State v. Blair, 164 Wis. 2d 64, 74-75, 473 N.W.2d 566 (Ct. App. 
1991).  However, expert testimony is not always required in 
those cases; "expert testimony is required only if the issue to 
be decided by the jury is beyond the general knowledge and 
experience of the average juror."  Whitaker, 167 Wis. 2d at 255. 
¶122 Here, special verdict question 4 inquired whether 
there was a substantial likelihood that Shannon would not meet 
the conditions necessary for the safe return of the boys to her 
custody in the next 12 months.  Special verdict question 3 asked 
whether Shannon previously had failed to meet those same 
conditions.  The jury answered this question, "Yes," too.  The 
testimony showed she had repeatedly failed to attend scheduled 
visitations with the boys; she did not continue in counseling; 
she continued to commit crimes; she failed to maintain stable 
housing; and she repeatedly failed to be employed over a period 
of 25 months.   
¶123 Nothing in Shannon's testimony showed a change in 
circumstances that would indicate that her performance in the 
next 12 months would be different from what it had been in the 
previous 25 months.  It is within the common experience of 
mankind that past performance is a good indicator of future 
performance.  It is that kind of common knowledge that we 
recognize as "reputation."  For example, the past experiences of 
a community with an individual may give that person a reputation 
for being honest and kind, or for being deceitful and cruel.  
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Therefore, in my view, expert testimony was not needed to answer 
special verdict question 4.66    
C. 
Constitutional Right to Present a Defense 
¶124 A defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional 
right to present a defense to the charges against him.  State v. 
Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 645, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990).  This 
right is "grounded in the confrontation and compulsory process 
clauses of Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution 
and the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution."  Id.  
While the constitutions of the state and federal governments 
guarantee a defendant a fair trial, what is required to achieve 
a fair trial is defined in the several provisions of Article I, 
Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution and the Sixth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution.  St. George, 252 Wis. 2d at 
¶14 n.8 (citing United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 329-30 
n.16 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
¶125 Shannon is a parent in a proceeding to terminate her 
parental 
rights, 
not 
a 
criminal 
defendant 
subject 
to 
                                                 
66 The 
majority 
opinion 
makes 
much 
of 
the 
county's 
presentation of opinion testimony by the social workers assigned 
to Shannon and Tribal Judge Smart, and contends that permitting 
their testimony while refusing to permit Wellens to testify in 
the way Shannon proposed is an error of law.  Majority op., ¶43.  
This assertion is an erroneous statement of law, and it sets up 
a complete red herring, which the majority opinion repeats and 
repeats and repeats.  Majority op., ¶¶49, 50, 54, 70, 71.  The 
testimony came in, at least in part, because Shannon did not 
object to any of the social workers' or Tribal Judge Smart's 
testimony.  It is black letter law that the circuit court does 
not err by permitting testimony to which no objection was made.  
State v. Heredia, 172 Wis. 2d 479, 482 n.1, 493 N.W.2d 404 (Ct. 
App. 1992) (concluding that unobjected-to hearsay is admissible 
for the truth of the matter asserted). 
No.  2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306.pdr 
 
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prosecution.  No Wisconsin case has held that the Pulizzano line 
of cases67 applies in termination of parental rights proceedings, 
perhaps because Article I, Section 7 and the Sixth Amendment, 
upon which Pulizzano is based, describe rights for defendants in 
criminal trials.  A termination of parental rights proceeding is 
a civil proceeding.  See Door County DHFS v. Scott S., 230 
Wis. 2d 460, 465, 602 N.W.2d 167 (Ct. App. 1999).   
¶126 The majority opinion raises a whole host of new 
problems in ruling on evidentiary issues.  For example, if the 
constitutional right to present a defense is now to be applied 
in a civil context, on what clauses in the state and federal 
constitutions is it based?  Does it apply to plaintiffs in a 
civil trial, as well as to defendants?  Will the circuit court 
err if it does not consider this right, even though the party 
who now asserts it did not raise it before the circuit court, as 
the majority opinion concludes here?  The majority opinion does 
not analyze the rationale of St. George; it simply assumes that 
it applies to this civil proceeding, without a word about why it 
should be precedent for a civil case.  Majority op., ¶53 n.25. 
¶127 However, even assuming, for the sake of discussion, 
that St. George does apply to termination of parental rights 
proceedings, Shannon does not contend that her right to present 
a defense was denied by the circuit court's action.  She does 
not cite to Pulizzano or to St. George, as supporting a 
                                                 
67 See, e.g., State v. St. George, 2002 WI 50, 252 Wis. 2d 
499, 643 N.W.2d 777; State v. Head, 2002 WI 99, 255 Wis. 2d 194, 
648 N.W.2d 413; State v. Ruszkiewicz, 2000 WI App 125, 237 
Wis. 2d 441, 613 N.W.2d 893.   
No.  2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306.pdr 
 
12 
 
contention that there was a complete bar to her presentation of 
evidence of a certain type.  Instead, she argues by analogy from 
State v. Maday, 179 Wis. 2d 346, 507 N.W.2d 365 (Ct. App. 1993), 
claiming she was denied a "level playing field" because Tribal 
Judge Smart and her two social workers testified without 
objection, while there was a sustained objection to one question 
she wanted to ask.   
¶128 Maday involved "whether a defendant in a sexual 
assault prosecution is entitled to a pretrial psychological 
examination of the victim when the state gives notice that it 
intends to introduce evidence generated by a psychological 
examination of the victim by the state's experts."  Maday, 179 
Wis. 2d at 349.  In concluding that the trial court did have the 
discretion to order such discovery, the court of appeals 
explained: 
Before the trial court may grant such a request, the 
defendant must have presented evidence of a compelling 
need or reason for the psychological examination and 
the trial court must balance the rights of the 
defendant against the interests of the victim. 
Id.  Therefore, even in a criminal trial, the right to present 
evidence that supports a defendant's defense is subject to 
limitation.  See also State v. David J.K., 190 Wis. 2d 726, 734, 
528 N.W.2d 434 (Ct. App. 1994). 
¶129 The majority opinion relies mainly on St. George.  
Majority op., ¶35-37 n.14-17, ¶53 n.25, ¶68 n.49.  St. George, 
in part, involved the exclusion of an expert witness's opinion 
about the scientific limitations on the use of recantations of 
prior claims of sexual abuse.  St. George, 252 Wis. 2d 499, ¶35.  
No.  2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306.pdr 
 
13 
 
St. George had argued to the circuit court that the preclusion 
of his expert's testimony would violate his constitutional right 
to present a defense.  Id., ¶38.  To consider his contention, in 
St. George we set up a three-step analysis.  First, the 
defendant must offer testimony that is admissible under the 
evidentiary rules.  Id., ¶39.  In this step, relevancy, Wis. 
Stat. § 904.01, and assistance to the trier of fact by one 
qualified to give such opinions, Wis. Stat. § 907.02, must be 
evaluated.  Id.  If the defendant satisfies those criteria, the 
defendant must make an offer of proof sufficient to show that 
the testimony is "necessary" to his or her defense.  Id., ¶54.  
If that criterion is satisfied, the defendant must show that the 
probative value of the testimony is not outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect.  Id.   
¶130 The 
majority 
opinion 
did 
not 
analyze 
Wellens's 
testimony under the three-step test established in St. George, 
but if it had, it would have concluded that Shannon had not 
carried her burden.  First, as explained above, the circuit 
court's analysis that Wellens had insufficient knowledge to form 
the requisite foundation to answer the question posed is 
reasonable.  Second, the excluded question was not necessary to 
Shannon's case in regard to special verdict question 4 because:  
(1) the questions that were permitted, as quoted in ¶9 above, 
allowed the jury to make the same inference in deciding on an 
answer to special verdict question 4, as did the question to 
which an objection was sustained; (2) Wellens testified that it 
was his opinion that returning the children to Shannon's custody 
No.  2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306.pdr 
 
14 
 
would not likely result in serious emotional or physical damage 
to the children; and (3) Shannon testified that she would meet 
the conditions for the safe return of the children to her home 
in the following 12-month period.  Applying the St. George 
analysis to the proceedings before the circuit court, I conclude 
that if Shannon had a constitutional right to present a defense, 
the circuit court did not deny her that right.  
D. 
The Best Interests of the Child 
¶131 The legislature has mandated that the judicial branch 
of government in its interpretation and application of the 
provisions of ch. 48 shall always consider how its decisions 
will affect the best of interests of the children to which they 
are applied. 
 Wis. Stat. 
§ 48.01. 
 
In 
§ 48.01(1), the 
legislature plainly said: 
This chapter may be cited as "The Children's Code."  
In construing this chapter, the best interests of the 
child or unborn child shall always be of paramount 
consideration.   
This policy choice was made by those who were elected by the 
citizens of Wisconsin to establish public policy.  In a tri-
partite system of government, the courts are not free to ignore 
policies established by the legislature.  
¶132 The majority opinion is careful to talk as if it were 
recognizing the will of the legislature that places the best 
interest of the child as the highest concern in ch. 48 
proceedings.  Majority op., ¶6.  However, those are hollow words 
that are belied by the lack of any reasoning that explains why 
Darell's and Daniel's best interests will be served by the 
possibility of an eventual return to Shannon at some unspecified 
No.  2004AP1305 & 2004AP1306.pdr 
 
15 
 
time, rather than by a permanent home now where each little boy 
will have a chance to develop to his fullest potential.  
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶133 I conclude that the circuit court did not err in its 
evidentiary ruling, and even if it erred, it was harmless error; 
that the majority opinion's analysis of the constitutional issue 
it constructs is flawed; and that the majority opinion ignores 
the legislature's explicit direction that the best interests of 
the 
child 
are 
to 
be 
paramount 
in 
ch. 
48 
proceedings.  
Accordingly, I would affirm the court of appeals and I 
respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.  
¶134 I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX 
and DAVID T. PROSSER join this dissent. 
 
 
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