Case Title: People v. Torres

Citation: 2012 IL 111302

Docket Number: 111302

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2012-02-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
2012 IL 111302
IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS
(Docket No. 111302)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellant, v.
ENCARNACION TORRES, Appellee.
Opinion filed February 2, 2012.
JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Chief Justice Kilbride and Justices Freeman, Thomas, Garman,
Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶ 1
Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook County,
defendant, Encarnacion Torres, was found guilty of first degree
murder and sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment. On appeal,
defendant contended that the trial court violated his constitutional
right to confront the witnesses against him when it permitted the State
to introduce into evidence the preliminary hearing testimony of the
State’s key and unavailable witness, Leopoldo Pena. The defendant
also argued that he was denied his constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to file a motion to
dismiss the indictment on the ground that the defendant was denied
his constitutional right to a speedy trial. The appellate court rejected
defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance, but reversed and
remanded, finding that Pena’s preliminary hearing testimony was
improperly admitted and the error could not be considered harmless.
No. 1-08-3254 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
We allowed the State’s petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315
(eff. Feb. 26, 2010)), and now affirm the judgment of the appellate
court.
¶ 2
BACKGROUND
¶ 3
Pretrial Proceedings
¶ 4
On July 31, 1983, the defendant was arrested for the shooting
death of the victim, Diego Cisneros. The following day, the defendant
was charged with murder pursuant to section 9-1 of the Criminal
Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 38, ¶ 9-1). 
¶ 5
On August 16, 1983, a preliminary hearing was held to determine
whether there was probable cause to support the prosecution of
defendant for Cisneros’ murder. At that hearing, the defendant was
represented by attorney Robert Grossman. Two witnesses testified:
Leopoldo Pena and detective David Kristovic. Only Pena’s testimony
is relevant to the issues in this appeal.
¶ 6
In order to provide some context for the circumstances under
which Pena was questioned, we quote from the principals’ colloquy
immediately preceding Pena’s testimony:
“MS. MARTIN [assistant State’s Attorney]: Judge, I have
made that amendment on the face of the complaint.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. GROSSMAN [defense counsel]: Waive reswearing
and reexecution. 
THE COURT: Very good. State’s motion granted. 
MS. MARTIN: Ready to proceed.
MR. GROSSMAN: Motion to exclude witnesses.
THE COURT: Ready to proceed right now?
MS. MARTIN: Yes.
THE COURT: You are putting me in a funny position.
MS. MARTIN: Are you through your call yet? 
THE COURT: You have to be kidding. Both ready?
MR. GROSSMAN: Yes.
THE COURT: Let’s proceed.
MR. GROSSMAN: All right.
MS. MARTIN: I would be using an interpreter. We would
have to have the interpreter sworn.”
-2-
The interpreter was sworn, then the witness, and the preliminary
hearing commenced amidst an obviously crowded docket, before a
trial judge who had expressed some reluctance to immediately
proceed with the hearing.
¶ 7
Upon direct examination, Pena testified that he worked as a
bartender at a tavern located at 1752 West 47th Street in Chicago.
According to Pena, at about 6 p.m., on July 30, 1983, he was in the
tavern with the victim, Diego Cisneros, when the defendant walked
in and asked for two six-packs of beer. The victim then told Pena that
he and the defendant were from the same part of Mexico. As Pena
was looking for the beers, he overheard parts of the conversation
between the defendant and the victim. According to Pena, Cisneros
asked the defendant what problems he had with his father; defendant
purportedly responded, if he had any problems with Cisneros’ father,
“he wouldn’t have to deal with him.” 
¶ 8
Pena testified that he gave the two six-packs of beer to defendant,
and defendant placed the bag on a bar stool. However, the bag broke
and a bottle of beer fell on the floor. Pena picked up the glass, put the
beer in another bag, and then went to the back of the bar to get a mop
to clean the floor. After Pena mopped the floor, he returned to the
back of the bar to wash out the mop. He testified, at that point, he
heard a gunshot. When Pena emerged from the back room, he saw the
victim lying on the floor. Pena said he went to the door and “saw the
person running.” Pena then called the police. Pena testified that he
observed the victim’s body face up on the floor. He denied seeing a
weapon in Cisneros’ hand or in the area around his body. 
¶ 9
Subsumed within Pena’s preliminary hearing testimony was a
very brief cross-examination of Pena by defense counsel. During that
cross-examination, Pena stated he knew the victim “because he
frequented the place.” Defense counsel next attempted to ask Pena
whether Pena knew the victim’s father, but the court sustained the
State’s objection to that question. After defense counsel explained,
“I’m going to go into bias or prejudice,” the court told counsel to “go
ahead.” Defense counsel repeated the question, and Pena responded
that he did not know the victim’s father. Defense counsel then
abandoned that line of inquiry altogether and never asked another
question designed to probe for possible bias or prejudice. 
¶ 10
Counsel turned to questions directed to Pena’s observations and
recall. On further cross-examination, Pena admitted that he never
observed the defendant with a gun, and he did not see the defendant
-3-
shooting or standing over the victim. He said he was in the back room
of the tavern for “no more than one or two minutes,” when he heard
the shot. Pena stated that the back room of the bar was about 10 to 15
feet away from the bar itself. He acknowledged, from his vantage
point in the back room, he could not see what was going on in the
bar; however, he stated, prior to the shot, he could hear the defendant
and Cisneros “speaking in normal tones.” Pena admitted he could not
hear what was being said because “he had the water running.” He
testified, with certainty, that he did not hear “an argument” or any
raising of voices.
¶ 11
In the course of—and as it turned out, the conclusion of—this
brief cross-examination, defense counsel asked: “What day of the
week was this?” The State objected and the court sustained the
objection. Defense counsel querulously inquired: “How is that
objectionable?” The court responded by simply reiterating:
“Sustained.” With that, defense counsel decided he had “[n]othing
further of this witness.”
¶ 12
Based on the testimony of Pena and Kristovic, the circuit court
found probable cause and set the case for further proceedings. 
¶ 13
Defendant subsequently failed to appear on the date set for his
arraignment, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. Several months
later, as a result of a countywide conversion of the circuit court’s
warrant recording system, several warrants, including defendant’s,
were accidentally purged from the system. According to allegations
in a motion in limine subsequently filed by the State in 2007, the
State’s key witness, Leopoldo Pena, was deported to Mexico in
October of 1984. No further details were provided regarding the
circumstances that led to Pena’s deportation. 
¶ 14
During the period from 1983 to 2007, the defendant successfully
avoided recognition by the authorities, despite at least three
encounters with the Las Vegas police department in 1995 and 1996.
In two instances, he identified himself as “David Quiroz.” In the third
encounter he identified himself as “Florentino Morado, Jr.” Although
defendant was fingerprinted on these occasions, his fingerprints did
not trigger a search/recognition by the Chicago police department’s
computer system because of the accidental 1983 purge of the
defendant’s warrant from that system. 
¶ 15
On July 26, 2006, the Chicago police department received a tip
from a man identifying himself as the victim’s cousin and claiming
that he had just seen “his cousin’s killer.” After an investigation, the
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police discovered that the defendant’s warrant and fingerprints had
been accidentally deleted from the Chicago police department
computer system. The police reentered the warrant and prints in the
computer system and, after using the appropriate search engine,
subsequently located the defendant at 8108 South Lorel in Burbank,
Illinois. Defendant was arrested on January 3, 2007.
¶ 16
Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine, requesting that it
be permitted to introduce the preliminary hearing testimony of
Leopoldo Pena at trial. The State represented that Pena had been
deported to Mexico in 1984 and was no longer available as a witness.
As noted, the State provided no details as to the circumstances
leading to Pena’s deportation, and the defense apparently did not
inquire. No testimony or evidence was presented at the hearing.
¶ 17
 During the hearing on the State’s motion, defense counsel argued
that Pena’s preliminary hearing testimony should not be admitted
because by their very nature preliminary hearings occur prior to
discovery. Counsel noted that attorney Grossman had been without
certain material information, namely police reports, which included
Pena’s statements to police, and thus Grossman had been unable to
adequately cross-examine Pena. In the course of his argument,
defense counsel referenced several statements Pena purportedly made
to police officers, statements that were inconsistent with Pena’s
preliminary hearing testimony and which were unavailable to counsel
at the time of the preliminary hearing. According to defense counsel:
(1) Pena told police that Cisneros had arrived at the tavern at 3:30
p.m., whereas he testified at the preliminary hearing that Cisneros
arrived around 5 p.m.; (2) Pena told police that the defendant bought
Cisneros a beer, something he failed to state at the preliminary
hearing; and (3) Pena told the officers that Cisneros, while in the
tavern, had tried to kiss a girl, who became angry and left with
another man. Counsel also mentioned that the defendant, in his
statement to police, insisted that he had acted in self-defense, and that
they should “ask Pena, because he was present the entire time.” 
¶ 18
After hearing arguments by both parties, the circuit court granted
the State’s request to admit Pena’s preliminary hearing testimony.
The court acknowledged the difficulties defense counsel might
encounter in impeaching Pena’s preliminary hearing testimony with
his inconsistent statements to police, and the court suggested that it
would allow defense counsel to bring those statements out at
defendant’s trial without having to lay a foundation, either by way of
-5-
cross-examination of the police officers who had made the relevant
police reports or through a stipulation by the parties. 
¶ 19
Defendant’s Trial
¶ 20
At defendant’s bench trial, the State called Roberto Martinez, who
was 16 years old at the time of the shooting in 1983. Martinez
testified that on July 30, 1983, he was at the house of his friend,
Francisco Saldivar, located at 4738 South Hermitage Street. At about
6 p.m., Martinez was on the front porch when he observed a man
come from the rear of the building through the gangway. The man
walked “kind of angerly” [sic] past Martinez, “jumped” into a car,
and moved it up the block. Martinez stated that the man had come
from the coach house behind the building and that prior to observing
him, Martinez had heard an “argument” between “a lady and
gentleman” at the rear of the building. According to Martinez, after
moving the car, the man returned to the coach house, but reappeared
later, this time with a silver handgun tucked into the back of his pants.
Martinez saw the man enter his car a second time and drive away.
When asked to describe the man, Martinez stated the man had a
birthmark on his left eyebrow, an area of white discoloration. 
¶ 21
Martinez stated, about 30 minutes later, he was still on the front
porch when he observed the same man running southbound down the
alley toward him, holding a brown paper bag and a gun in his hand.
Martinez said soon thereafter he heard sirens, and he walked with
Saldivar in the direction of the sirens to see what was going on.
Martinez observed police cars parked in front of a tavern about a
block away at the corner of 47th Street and Hermitage Street. 
¶ 22
Martinez said he spoke to several officers at the scene and, later
that night, went to the police station where he viewed a lineup. From
that lineup, Martinez identified the defendant as the man he had
observed with the gun. However, Martinez was unable to make an in-
court identification of the defendant at trial. 
¶ 23
On cross-examination, Martinez acknowledged that when he
identified the defendant in the 1983 lineup, he qualified his
identification, stating that he was “90 percent sure” defendant was the
same person he had seen with the gun. He further admitted that when
he observed defendant enter his car with a gun and drive off, he did
not contact the police. Moreover, Martinez conceded on cross-
examination that when he was initially interviewed by the police on
July 30 and 31, 1983, he never stated that he saw defendant running
-6-
back to the coach house with a gun in his hand; he had told them only
that defendant was carrying a brown paper bag. 
¶ 24
The State also called Francisco Saldivar as a witness. Saldivar
testified he was 16 years old in 1983 and lived at 4738 South
Hermitage Street. Saldivar stated that on July 30, 1983, at
approximately 6 p.m., he was standing in front of his house with
Martinez when a man walked in front of him with a gun in the
waistband of his pants. The man walked through the gangway of the
building and proceeded to the coach house in back. 
¶ 25
Saldivar testified that he and Martinez thereafter “went for a
walk” and noticed several police cars at Hermitage Street and 47th
Street. After determining why the police cars were there, Saldivar
approached a police officer and told him that he had just seen a man
with a gun. Saldivar testified that later the same day he went to the
police station to view a lineup. In that lineup, he identified defendant
as the man he had seen with the gun. Saldivar was not asked to make
an in-court identification of the defendant. 
¶ 26
On cross-examination, Saldivar admitted that when he observed
the man with the gun, the man was not running, but merely walked
past him. Saldivar denied having described the gun to police as a
silver .22-caliber revolver. 
¶ 27
After Saldivar’s testimony, several stipulations were entered of
record in order to serve as the foundation for admission of Pena’s
testimony at the preliminary hearing. Those stipulations concerned
testimony that would have been given by the assistant State’s
Attorney who questioned Pena at the preliminary hearing, the person
who served as a Spanish interpreter for Pena, and the court reporter
who prepared the preliminary hearing transcript. Following those
stipulations, and over defense counsel’s objection on grounds
previously noted, Pena’s testimony from the preliminary hearing was
read into evidence.
¶ 28
Thereafter, the State called Chicago police detective David
Golubiak. Golubiak testified that he investigated the Cisneros
homicide on the evening of July 30, 1983. Upon his arrival at the
scene, he proceeded into the tavern and observed the victim’s body
on the floor with a pool of blood next to the victim’s head. Golubiak
stated that the tavern and the victim’s body were searched for a gun,
but no weapon was found. Golubiak identified three witnesses who
were interviewed by police at the scene: Martinez, Saldivar and Pena.
Next door to the tavern, Golubiak discovered a parked car that was
-7-
later identified as bearing an Illinois license plate registered to the
defendant. The car was subsequently dusted for fingerprints, and two
prints were found matching those of the defendant. 
¶ 29
Golubiak further testified that, later on the night of the shooting,
he spoke with Joel Rodriguez, who identified himself as the
defendant’s brother. After that conversation, the police proceeded to
5043 South Winchester Avenue, where they found defendant and
placed him under arrest. After defendant’s arrest, the police went to
the coach house at 4738 South Hermitage Street, where they retrieved
a silver .38-caliber revolver. The weapon was subsequently examined
by the State’s forensic scientist and firearm expert, but the parties
stipulated that the examiner could not conclusively determine whether
the bullet recovered from the victim’s body was fired from that gun.
¶ 30
On cross-examination, Golubiak acknowledged that at the time he
retrieved the gun from the coach house at 4738 South Hermitage
Street, he had no reason to think that the defendant resided there.
Further, Golubiak admitted that when he interviewed Martinez at the
scene of the crime, Martinez never told him that Martinez had
observed the defendant with a gun in his hand. When interviewed at
the scene, Martinez only said that the defendant was carrying a brown
paper bag. When Martinez later made reference to a gun, he told
Golubiak the gun he observed in the man’s pants was a .22-caliber
handgun. 
¶ 31
Next to testify was former Chicago police detective Roy Kwilos.
Kwilos testified that he participated in this homicide investigation
and, pursuant thereto, he conducted two lineups on July 31, 1983. He
identified People’s Exhibit No. 3 as a photograph of the two lineups
in which defendant was a participant. According to Kwilos, Martinez
identified defendant as the man he observed with a handgun. Saldivar
identified defendant as the man he observed with a handgun in his
waistband. 
¶ 32
The State next offered evidence with respect to the defendant’s
whereabouts and/or flight from the police after the incident in 1983.
In this regard, it was stipulated that defendant had contact with a
North Las Vegas police officer in April of 1996 at which time
defendant identified himself as “David Quiroz.” 
¶ 33
The State then called Chicago police detective Thomas Cepeda,
who testified that on July 26, 2006, as part of his duties in the cold
case squad, he received a telephone call from an individual
identifying himself as the victim’s cousin and stating that he had seen
-8-
his cousin’s killer. As a result of this conversation, Cepeda retrieved
the cold case file from the police warehouse. After reviewing the file,
Cepeda discovered that even though a warrant had been issued for
defendant’s arrest in 1983 after he skipped bond, there was no
outstanding warrant in the computer system. Cepeda learned that
defendant’s warrant was among those accidentally purged from the
circuit court’s computer system when the system was upgraded.
Cepeda reentered the warrant into the system, and used the system to
cross-check names that defendant had used in the past. Cepeda then
learned about defendant’s three prior arrests in North Las Vegas, as
well as his contemporaneous whereabouts. 
¶ 34
Cepeda testified that, as a result of this search, he proceeded to
defendant’s house in Burbank, Illinois, in the early morning hours of
January 3, 2007, with the fugitive apprehension team. When
defendant walked out of the house, and the officers asked his name,
defendant initially gave the police two different names, “Florentine
Morado and David Perros,” but after he was shown his 1983 Chicago
police photograph and asked to identify the person in the photograph,
he admitted he was the person in the photograph. 
¶ 35
The parties finally stipulated that, if called to testify, Cook County
medical examiner Dr. Yuskel Konacki would state that he performed
the autopsy on the victim on July 31, 1983, and that the autopsy
revealed the victim died as a result of a gunshot wound to the right
side of his forehead, and the manner of death was homicide. Konacki
would also state that the toxicology report revealed that the victim’s
blood-alcohol content was 0.249. 
¶ 36
On this evidence, the trial court found defendant guilty of the
murder of Diego Cisneros. 
¶ 37
Posttrial Proceedings
¶ 38
On April 28, 2008, newly retained attorney Daniel Coyne
appeared on behalf of the defendant and filed a motion for judgment
of acquittal or, in the alternative, a new trial. In that motion, the
defendant claimed, essentially, that the State had failed to prove him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and that trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance, without further specification. On July 24, 2008,
a third attorney, Stephen Richards, appeared on behalf of the
defendant seeking leave to replace Daniel Coyne as defense counsel.
After the substitution, Richards filed an amended motion for a new
trial adding new contentions. First, the amended motion alleged that
-9-
the defendant was denied his constitutional right to the effective
assistance of trial counsel because: (1) counsel failed to file a motion
to dismiss based upon a speedy-trial violation and (2) counsel failed
to file, investigate or advise the defendant to testify in support of a
defense of self-defense. In addition, the amended motion alleged that
the trial court erred “by granting the State’s motion in limine and
allowing the State to use a transcript of a witness’s preliminary
hearing testimony to convict the defendant.” 
¶ 39
On August 6, 2008, the defendant filed a pro se posttrial motion
alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel on several grounds,
including, inter alia, (1) that trial counsel failed to properly
investigate the case; and (2) that defendant repeatedly told trial
counsel he wanted to testify, but trial counsel refused to permit him
to do so. 
¶ 40
On October 16, 2008, the trial court heard arguments on the
posttrial motions. Pertinent, and related, to the issue now before this
court, attorney Richards argued, inter alia, that the use of the
preliminary hearing transcript at trial constituted a “confrontation
clause” violation. Richards suggested that attorney Grossman did not
have “a full and fair opportunity” to cross-examine Pena at the
preliminary hearing because he was “not possessed of the same
documents and materials that he would have been possessed [of] at
a true trial.” The circuit court denied defendant’s motions. 
¶ 41
On appeal, the defendant argued: (1) the circuit court violated his
right to confrontation under the sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution by permitting the State to introduce into evidence Pena’s
preliminary hearing testimony; and (2) he was denied his
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel when
counsel failed to file a motion to dismiss the indictment on the
grounds that the defendant was denied his right to a speedy trial. 
¶ 42
Citing this court’s admonishment in In re E.H., 224 Ill. 2d 172,
179 (2006), that constitutional questions should be addressed only
after resolving any threshold issues of admissibility in favor of
admission, the appellate court purported to first consider whether the
admission of Pena’s preliminary hearing testimony “pass[ed] muster
as an evidentiary matter.” No. 1-08-3254 (unpublished order under
Supreme Court Rule 23). Quoting this court, the appellate court
identified the requisites for admission of former testimony:
“[T]estimony of a witness at a prior hearing is admissible in evidence
at trial where the witness is unavailable and when ample opportunity
-10-
to cross-examine existed at the prior hearing.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) No. 1-08-3254 (unpublished order under Supreme
Court Rule 23) (quoting People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 273
(2006), quoting People v. Rice, 166 Ill. 2d 35, 39 (1995)). After a
discussion of this court’s precedent, the appellate court concluded
attorney Grossman did not have the requisite opportunity to
effectively cross-examine Pena at the preliminary hearing and thus
Pena’s testimony from that hearing should not have been admitted as
evidence at trial. The court determined its inability to find the error
harmless warranted reversal and remand. The appellate court
characterized its holding as merely evidentiary in nature, insisting that
it would not reach the merits of defendant’s confrontation claim, as
it was unnecessary to do so. No. 1-08-3254 (unpublished order under
Supreme Court Rule 23).
¶ 43
Though the appellate court’s restraint is exemplary, in this
instance, the evidentiary and constitutional considerations are not so
readily divorced. 
¶ 44
ANALYSIS 
¶ 45
In this appeal, the State, as the appellant, argues that the appellate
court “improperly applied the motive and focus test for gauging the
sufficiency of defendant’s opportunity to cross[-]examine the witness
at the preliminary hearing, and in so doing, wrongly held that the
former sworn testimony of an unavailable eyewitness was
inadmissible at trial.” Predictably, the defendant contends that the
appellate court “properly applied existing Illinois law” in holding the
prior testimony inadmissible. 
¶ 46
The parties’ disagreement extends to the proper standard of
review. The State, quoting People v. Boclair, 129 Ill. 2d 458, 476
(1989), submits that “[e]videntiary rulings are within the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on review unless
the trial court has abused its discretion.” Relying upon People v. Hall,
195 Ill. 2d 1, 21 (2000) (citing People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365,
369 (1999)), the defendant suggests, where, as here, admissibility
turns on a question of law, the standard of review is de novo. This
court has held that a trial court’s ruling on the admission of former
testimony is to be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Sutherland,
223 Ill. 2d at 272-73. Under either standard of review, the outcome
in this case would be the same.
-11-
¶ 47
As a preliminary matter, we note, although the appellate court
characterized its analysis and holding as “evidentiary” in nature, an
examination of People v. Tennant, 65 Ill. 2d 401, 408-12 (1976), and
People v. Horton, 65 Ill. 2d 413, 415 (1976)—two of this court’s
seminal cases—and the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 57-58 (2004), reveals that
constitutional considerations are inextricably intertwined with the
question of admissibility. 
¶ 48
In Tennant, the State was allowed, over defendant’s objection, to
introduce at trial the preliminary hearing testimony of a witness who
had died prior to trial. Like the defendant in this case, Tennant argued
that the State’s use of that testimony denied him due process of law
and the right, under the federal and state constitutions, to confront
witnesses against him. As the deceased witness in Tennant was
obviously “unavailable” to testify at trial—the first requisite for the
admission of former testimony (see Tennant, 65 Ill. 2d at 409 (citing
2 Spencer A. Gard, Jones on Evidence § 6:41 (6th ed. 1972))—the
Tennant court focused on the prior opportunity for cross-
examination—the second requirement for admission (Tennant, 65 Ill.
2d at 409 (quoting 2 Spencer A. Gard, Jones on Evidence § 6:41 (6th
ed. 1972)), and one meant to ensure the right to confrontation as well
(see Tennant, 65 Ill. 2d at 408 (“ ‘The main and essential purpose of
confrontation is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of
cross-examination.’ ” (emphasis in original) (quoting 5 James H.
Wigmore, Evidence § 1395 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974)). 
¶ 49
The Tennant court observed that this court, as long ago as Barnett
v. People, 54 Ill. 325 (1870), had upheld the admission at trial of
preliminary hearing testimony of a witness who died prior to trial. As
noted in Tennant, the Barnett court rejected “ ‘the supposed
constitutional objection *** to such evidence, as the witness was
confronted with the accused, and he was afforded an opportunity of
cross examination in the examining court.’ ” (Emphasis added.)
Tennant, 65 Ill. 2d at 410 (quoting Barnett, 54 Ill. at 330). This court,
in Tennant, observed that no United States Supreme Court decision
had held the preliminary hearing testimony of a deceased witness
automatically admissible “so long as the witness was cross-
examined,” but it noted there was “persuasive language” in several
opinions, citing, inter alia, Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237,
241 (1895). Just before the Tennant court concluded its analysis of
the issue, finding that defendant had had an adequate opportunity for
-12-
cross-examination at the preliminary hearing, and that the testimony
therefrom was, consequently, admissible at trial, the court left no
doubt as to the significance of the requirement, for admission, of an
“adequate opportunity for cross-examination.” Tennant, 65 Ill. 2d at
411. Quoting from Wigmore, this court observed, “ ‘if the accused
has had the benefit of cross-examination, he has had the very
privilege secured to him by the Constitution.’ ” (Emphasis added.)
Tennant, 65 Ill. 2d at 411 (quoting 5 James H. Wigmore, Evidence
§ 1397, at 158 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974)). 
¶ 50
In Horton, too, this court was confronted with a contention that
the admission of former testimony from a preliminary hearing denied
defendants their “constitutional right to confront witnesses.” Horton,
65 Ill. 2d at 415. At the outset of its analysis, this court acknowledged
that the question of “admissibility” necessarily involved a
constitutional question when the court quoted, with added emphasis,
this tentative assessment from Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725-26
(1968): “ ‘[T]here may be some justification for holding that the
opportunity for cross-examination of a witness at a preliminary
hearing satisfies the demands of the confrontation clause where the
witness is shown to be actually unavailable ***.’ ” (Emphasis in
original.) Horton, 65 Ill.2d at 416.
¶ 51
The United States Supreme Court’s discussion of former
testimony in Crawford also makes clear that, in addition to the
requirement of unavailability, there is the prerequisite of “an adequate
opportunity to cross-examine” (Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57) and that
requirement has a constitutional genesis. Quoting from Mattox—the
same case this court referenced in Tennant—the Court stated: “The
substance of the constitutional protection is preserved to the prisoner
in the advantage he has once had of seeing the witness face to face,
and of subjecting him to the ordeal of cross-examination. This, the
law says, he shall under no circumstances be deprived of ... .’ ”
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57 (quoting Mattox, 156 U.S. at 244). The
Court summarized its discussion of precedent with this observation:
“Our cases have thus remained faithful to the Framers’
understanding: Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial
have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only
where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.”
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59.
¶ 52
Clearly, as this court and the Supreme Court have recognized, the
requirement of a prior, “adequate opportunity to cross-examine” the
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absent witness is at once both an evidentiary and constitutional
requisite for admission of former testimony. This is not, as the
appellate court suggests, strictly an evidentiary matter. With that
clarification, we address the question of whether Pena’s preliminary
hearing testimony was properly admitted, given the facts of this case. 
¶ 53
As noted, the requirements for admission of former testimony are
twofold: the witness from the prior hearing must be unavailable at
trial and the defendant must have had an adequate opportunity to
effectively cross-examine the witness at the prior hearing. Sutherland,
223 Ill. 2d at 273; Rice, 166 Ill. 2d at 41. These are time-honored
requisites for admission. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54 (“[T]he
Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial statements
of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to
testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination. The text of the Sixth Amendment does not suggest any
open-ended exceptions from the confrontation requirement to be
developed by the courts.”). As this court and the Supreme Court have
recognized, prior testimony from a preliminary hearing may be
admissible at a subsequent trial so long as the two requirements for
admission are met. See Tennant, 65 Ill. 2d at 411; Horton, 65 Ill. 2d
at 417; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 (citing approvingly Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56 (1980), overruled on other grounds by Crawford). This
court has indicated that determination is undertaken on a case-by-case
basis. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d at 273; Horton, 65 Ill. 2d at 416. As in
any other instance, the proponent of evidence bears the burden of
proving the necessary elements for admissibility. See People v.
Cookson, 215 Ill. 2d 194, 204 (2005). 
¶ 54
“Unavailability,” the first requirement for admission, has been
described by this court as “a narrow concept, subject to a rigorous
standard.” People v. Johnson, 118 Ill. 2d 501, 509 (1987). “[T]he
prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of,
the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Bowen, 183 Ill. 2d 103,
118 (1998) (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 814 (1990),
quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65). In Roberts, the Supreme Court
explained:
“The basic litmus of Sixth Amendment unavailability is
established : ‘[A] witness is not “unavailable” for purposes of
the ... exception to the confrontation requirement unless the
prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to
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obtain his presence at trial.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Roberts,
448 U.S. at 74 (quoting Barber, 390 U.S. at 724-25).
The Court continued: 
“Although it might be said that the Court’s prior cases
provide no further refinement of this statement of the rule,
certain general propositions safely emerge. The law does not
require the doing of a futile act. Thus, if no possibility of
procuring the witness exists (as, for example, the witness’
intervening death), ‘good faith’ demands nothing of the
prosecution. But if there is a possibility, albeit remote, that
affirmative measures might produce the declarant, the
obligation of good faith may demand their effectuation. ‘The
lengths to which the prosecution must go to produce a witness
... is a question of reasonableness.’ [Citation.] The ultimate
question is whether the witness is unavailable despite good-
faith efforts undertaken prior to trial to locate and present that
witness. As with other evidentiary proponents, the
prosecution bears the burden of establishing this predicate.”
(Emphasis added.) Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74-75. 
¶ 55
In this case, the State alleged, in its motion in limine, that Pena
was no longer available to testify because he had been deported to
Mexico in 1984. In defendant’s response to the State’s motion, he,
too, states that Pena was deported to Mexico. The State presented no
evidence in support of that allegation. The reason for, and
circumstances surrounding, Pena’s deportation—assuming he was in
fact deported—are not explained in the record. The appellate court
does describe Pena as an “illegal” alien, but we find nothing in the
record to substantiate that status. We note, the fact of deportation
does not necessarily establish that Pena was an “illegal” alien,
because even a “legal” alien may be subject to deportation. See
generally People v. Huante, 143 Ill. 2d 61, 64 (1991). However, at
this juncture, only the fact of deportation would have been
indisputably significant, though evidence of what the prosecution
might, or might not, have done to secure the witness’ presence at
defendant’s trial might also have been relevant, had the defendant
actually contested the element of unavailability at trial. As the
California Supreme Court’s well-reasoned and scholarly opinion in
People v. Herrera, 232 P.3d 710, 716-21 (Cal. 2010), amply
demonstrates, simply establishing the fact of deportation, in support
of unavailability, may no longer be enough to establish that requisite
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for admission. See also United States v. Yida, 498 F.3d 945, 952-61
(9th Cir. 2007). 
¶ 56
In any event, that question is academic as far as this case is
concerned. We view the parties’ agreement regarding Pena’s 1984
deportation as the equivalent of a stipulation to that fact. A stipulation
has been defined as “[a] voluntary agreement between opposing
parties concerning some relevant point.” Black’s Law Dictionary
1550 (9th ed. 2009). Apart from that, whether the State took
reasonable steps in an attempt to procure Pena’s attendance at trial,
or whether it was obligated to do anything at all, are not matters
properly before us, as the defense appears to have conceded,
throughout these proceedings, that the first requirement for
admission—unavailability of the witness—is met. If not conceded,
the defense has forfeited any challenge to admission on the basis of
unavailability. In his response to the State’s motion in limine, the
defendant recognized that the State was required to “establish [the]
witness is unavailable,” to show “diligent good faith to procure the
witness,” and to demonstrate that “the accused had ample opportunity
to cross-examine the witness” at the preliminary hearing. Defendant
concluded that “[t]he state may be able to satisfy the first two prongs
but it fails miserably in satisfying the third prong.” If not a concession
with respect to the first two prongs of proof, defendant’s failure to
challenge admission on the basis of unavailability qualifies as
forfeiture. See People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 470-75 (2005);
People v. Akis, 63 Ill. 2d 296, 299 (1976).
¶ 57
Thus, we consider whether the second requirement for admission
of Pena’s preliminary hearing testimony is met, i.e., whether
defendant had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Pena at that
hearing. 
¶ 58
In Rice and Sutherland, in the course of considering whether an
adequate opportunity existed for cross-examination of the witness at
the prior proceeding, this court looked, inter alia, to the “motive and
focus” of the examination conducted at the first proceeding, and that
which would have been conducted at the second. In Sutherland, this
court quoted from Rice: 
“For an opportunity to cross-examine to be considered
meaningful, and therefore adequate and effective, the motive
and focus of the cross-examination at the time of the initial
proceeding must be the same or similar to that which guides
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the cross-examination during the subsequent proceeding.”
Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d at 273 (quoting Rice, 166 Ill. 2d at 41). 
¶ 59
The State argues that defense counsel’s cross-examination of Pena
at the preliminary hearing partook of the same “motive and focus”as
would a similar cross-examination at trial. We agree. In each
instance, the focus of questioning is whether the evidence supports a
finding that the defendant committed the charged crime. To the extent
a witness testifies to facts supporting such a finding, the defense has
a motive in questioning that witness to test the witness’ credibility,
powers of observation, and recall, and, if possible, undermine that
testimony in the eyes of the factfinder.
¶ 60
However, the motive-and-focus test cannot be our sole guide to
a resolution in this instance. It could be in Sutherland because the
witness in that case was “subject to unlimited cross-examination” at
the first trial, by which time defendant had full discovery, and the
motive and focus in one trial was clearly the same as that in the other
trial. See Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d at 273. It could be in Rice because
the motive and focus of the State’s questioning of Rice’s codefendant
at the suppression hearing was so obviously not the same as it would
have been at trial. As this court explained:
“In the present case, the question presented at codefendant’s
suppression hearing dealt with whether Officer Drozd saw
codefendant tuck a brown paper bag into his pants after
defendant’s car was stopped, giving the officer probable cause
to search codefendant. The focus of the cross-examination of
codefendant at the suppression hearing therefore was the
conduct of codefendant just prior to the search, his
self-interest in testifying falsely at the suppression hearing,
and the issues presented by the motion to suppress. At trial
however, the State’s focus would be on the guilt or innocence
of defendant—a much different issue than that presented at
the suppression hearing—and any motive codefendant might
have in making exculpatory statements on behalf of
defendant. The issues at the suppression hearing and the
purpose for which codefendant’s testimony was later offered
at defendant’s trial are not so similar that we may say that the
State had a meaningful opportunity to effectively
cross-examine codefendant on the occasion his testimony was
given.” Rice, 166 Ill. 2d at 41-42.
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Though motive and focus have been identified as pertinent
considerations by this court, two other factors have also been cited as
relevant to the question of admission.
¶ 61
We have already alluded to one pertinent consideration when we
observed that the defendant in Sutherland had the benefit of
“unlimited cross-examination” at the prior proceeding. Sutherland,
223 Ill. 2d at 273; see also Tennant, 65 Ill. 2d at 404 (the witness at
the preliminary hearing “had been cross-examined by counsel for
defendant without limitation”). Fairness, and indeed defendant’s right
to confrontation, demand an opportunity for adequate cross-
examination of the witness at the preliminary hearing if that
testimony is to be subsequently admitted against the defendant at trial.
¶ 62
Beyond the freedom to fully question the witness regarding
critical areas of observation and recall, to test him for any bias and
prejudice, and to otherwise probe for matters affecting his credibility,
what counsel knows while conducting the cross-examination may, in
a given case, impact counsel’s ability and opportunity to effectively
cross-examine the witness at the prior hearing. This court suggested
as much in Horton:
“In the absence of discovery procedures and in view of the
limited nature of the evidence which may be introduced at a
preliminary hearing, the question whether adequate
opportunity to cross-examine had existed at the preliminary
hearing (see People v. Tennant, 65 Ill. 2d 401) may not
depend in its entirety on what transpired at that hearing.
Adequate opportunity to cross-examine means an opportunity
to effectively cross-examine, and merely providing an
opportunity to cross-examine at the preliminary hearing is not
per se adequate opportunity.” Horton, 65 Ill. 2d at 417.
Pertinent to that inquiry, this court went on to observe that the prior
testimony of the unavailable witness was cumulative of the testimony
of other witnesses, and noted, “[d]efendants have not suggested, nor
do we perceive, in what manner additional cross-examination would
benefit them.” Horton, 65 Ill. 2d at 417.
¶ 63
This defendant has. It is apparently undisputed that defense
counsel, at the preliminary hearing, was not privy to the inconsistent
statements Pena gave to police, statements that counsel might have
used to confront Pena and see if further changes in Pena’s version of
events might be forthcoming. In addition, counsel apparently did not
know about Pena’s status as an alien, or the circumstances of his
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departure from this country. Defendant suggests—and we agree—that
the looming threat of deportation might have furnished a formidable
incentive for Pena to curry favor with the State. Moreover, Pena’s
testimony was not cumulative of any other witnesses; only his
testimony placed defendant in the bar at the time of the shooting. 
¶ 64
In conjunction with the foregoing circumstances, we consider the
restrictions—overt and covert—on defense counsel’s cross-
examination of Pena. In this regard, we believe the remarks made by
the court prior to the commencement of the hearing are relevant
insofar as they evince the atmosphere in which counsel’s cross-
examination was conducted. It is clear from these remarks that the
court was not enthusiastic about proceeding immediately with the
preliminary hearing, a fact of which defense counsel must have been
aware. In that context, during the course of counsel’s cross-
examination of Pena, the trial court sustained two objections. The
first objection was sustained when defense counsel attempted to
inquire whether Pena knew the victim’s father. Although the court
told defense counsel he could “go ahead” when counsel explained he
was “going to go into bias or prejudice,” after counsel received the
answer to that question, counsel abandoned that line of inquiry
altogether and never asked another question designed to probe for
possible bias or prejudice. It seems unlikely that counsel could
formulate no more questions in that vein. When the second objection
was sustained, defense counsel became argumentative with the court,
asking: “How is that objectionable?” The court’s curt
response—“Sustained”—seems to have sent the message to counsel
to wrap it up, and counsel did just that. We think it is clear from the
record that counsel would have done more with the witness at the
preliminary hearing if he had felt free to do so. Viewing the cross-
examination in its totality, we cannot say that counsel was afforded
an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Pena.
¶ 65
In view of these limitations and the pertinent information of
which counsel was not apprised, we believe the circuit court erred in
allowing admission of Pena’s preliminary hearing testimony. Like the
appellate court, we are unable to say this error was harmless, as
Pena’s testimony was the only trial evidence to put defendant in the
bar at or near the time of the shooting.
¶ 66
 As we noted in Horton, a preliminary hearing is not intended to
be a discovery proceeding; however, for the preliminary hearing
testimony of an unavailable witness to be subsequently admissible at
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trial, the trial court must have allowed defense counsel to fully
explore the highly relevant areas of the witness’ opportunity to
observe, interest, bias, prejudice, and motive. While defense counsel
may not, at that stage, have all the information at his or her disposal
that discovery may later disclose, if the preliminary hearing testimony
is to be admissible at trial, defense counsel must have had a fair
opportunity to effectively inquire into those areas. Lacking that, it is
error to admit such testimony at trial, and it is prejudicial error if it
would affect the outcome of the trial.
¶ 67
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate
court. 
¶ 68
Affirmed.
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