Case Title: LUKE MICKELSON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-03-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
LUKE MICKELSON V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 29178 P.3d 1080Case Number: 06-156Decided: 03/17/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
LUKE 
MICKELSON,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Robert 
T. Moxley of Robert T. Moxley, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming. 

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Leda M. Pojman, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Pojman.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and BURKE, JJ, and JAMES, 
DJ.

 
 

VOIGT, 
C.J., 
delivers the opinion of the Court; JAMES, DJ, files a dissenting 
opinion.

 
 

VOIGT, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Luke 
Mickelson, was convicted of one count of possession of a deadly weapon with 
unlawful intent under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-103 (LexisNexis 2007) and was 
simultaneously acquitted of a charge of aggravated assault under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-2-502(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2007).  
Appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his 
conviction, that there was a fatal variance between the charging document and 
his eventual conviction, and that the verdict was inconsistent.  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Although they 
phrase them somewhat differently, the parties agree that the issues1 in this case are as 
follows:

 
 
1.    Was sufficient evidence 
presented at trial to support Appellant's conviction for possession as well as 
transport of a weapon with unlawful intent under Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-8-103?

 
 
2.    Were Appellant's 
constitutional rights violated because of a variance between the charging 
documents and the verdict form and instructions presented to the 
jury?

 
 
3.    Was the verdict 
inconsistent?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Appellant and the 
victim in this case have a history of confrontations over Appellant's attempts 
to enter the Buckhorn Bar, from which Appellant is banned.  On March 20, 2005, the victim was riding 
with a friend when they decided to stop for coffee.  The two men left their vehicle blocking 
an alley behind the coffee shop and went inside.  Some time later the victim exited the 
coffee shop to move the vehicle.  
Appellant was seated in his car, blocked in by the vehicle. The victim 
testified at trial that Appellant pointed a revolver at him and told him to move 
his car or he would "get some of this."  
Appellant, on the other hand, maintained that the revolver (a family 
heirloom) was on a bag on the seat of the car next to him, though his hand was 
on it, and that he never showed it to the victim.  A chase ensued around town, ending with 
the victim and his friend seeking protection at the police station and reporting 
the matter to authorities.  
Appellant admitted at trial that, whatever happened in the alley, he did 
pursue the victim and his friend, in his words, to "f . . . with 
them."

 
 
[¶4]      Upon receiving 
the victim's complaint, the police went to the Buckhorn Bar, where Appellant's 
vehicle had been spotted.  Appellant 
refused to comply with police commands, refused to relinquish the gun, yelled 
that the gun was not loaded, and for the officers to shoot him.  The police finally utilized a taser to 
immobilize Appellant so they could arrest him.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶5]      The first two 
issues in this appeal relate to a single incident that occurred at trial.  Appellant was charged under Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 6-8-103, which reads as follows:

 
 
Possession, 
manufacture or disposition of deadly weapon with unlawful intent; 
penalties.

 
 
            
A person who knowingly possesses, manufactures, transports, repairs or 
sells a deadly weapon with intent to unlawfully threaten the life or physical 
well-being of another or to commit assault or inflict bodily injury on another 
is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than five (5) 
years, a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or 
both.

 
 
[¶6]      The second 
Amended Information charged Appellant with "possession, manufacture or disposition of 
deadly weapon with unlawful intent" and recited:

 
 

THE 
ESSENTIAL FACTS ARE that on or about the 20th day of March 2005, 
while in the North alley, located in the 100 block of Grand Avenue, in the City 
of Laramie, County of Albany, the Defendant, LUKE EDWARD MICKELSON, did 
intentionally or knowingly possess a deadly weapon, to wit: Colt revolver, with 
the intent to unlawfully threaten the life or physical well-being of [the 
victim].

 
 
[¶7]      Appellant and the 
State each submitted proposed jury instructions two weeks before trial.  Appellant did not propose a jury 
instruction on the elements of the weapons offense.  The State requested a jury instruction 
that read in pertinent part:

 
 
The 
elements of the crime of Possession of a Deadly Weapon with Unlawful Intent, as 
charged in this case, are:

1.    On or about the 
20th day of March 2005;

2.    In Albany County, Wyoming;

3.    The Defendant, Luke Edward 
Mickelson;

4.    Knowingly possessed or 
transported a deadly weapon;

5.    With intent to unlawfully 
threaten the life or physical well-being of another.

 
 
[¶8]      It appears that 
the district court removed the word "transported" from that instruction before 
it presented the instructions to counsel at trial because the following exchange 
occurred during the jury instruction conference:

 
 
[Defense Counsel]:  May I suggest a change, perhaps?  Just to -- I mean, we never did 
particulars -- or anything is charged as possession or transportation of a 
deadly weapon with unlawful intent.  
I -- because one of the things I'm going to argue on that is, Hey, 
though, look.  He had no idea -- a) 
that he never threatened [the victim], but he had no idea he was going to be 
down there at the alley and he definitely didn't transport it with any 
intent.

 
 

The 
Court:  Well, then if we are going to do that, 
we should change the instruction on No. 4 as well to be consistent, because No. 
4 is just possession with unlawful intent.

 
 
[Defense Counsel]:  Oh, okay.  On the -- sure.  Yeah.

 
 

The 
Court:  And I think the charge is possession or 
transportation, isn't it, Richard?

 
 
[Prosecutor]:  Well, that's the name of the 
statute.[2]  

 
 

The 
Court:  Okay.  Well, it is not an unreasonable 
request.  I will add that in No. 
4.

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 
[Defense Counsel]:  Something dawned on me, Judge.  Are we going to have a Tanner problem with Count No. I is 
whether or not they were able to find him guilty of possession or transport?[3]

 
 

The 
Court:  Does it matter?  I don't think so.

 
 
[Defense Counsel]:  I thought I would bring it 
up.

 
 

The 
Court:  Yeah, I know what you are saying but -- 
no, I don't think it matters.

 
 
[Defense Counsel]:  Okay.  I just thought I would bring it up in 
case.  

 
 

The 
Court:  I'll think on that but I don't think it 
does.  And I know what you are 
saying.  So okay, I'll make that 
change on the verdict form, also. . . .

 
 
[¶9]      Appellant claims 
two reversible errors based on this series of events.  His first claim is based on our 
decisions in Bush v. State, 908 P.2d 963 (Wyo. 
1995) and its progeny.  We made it 
quite clear in Bush that, when the 
state presents the jury with alternative methods of committing the crime but the 
verdict form does not allow us to determine the method upon which the jury based 
its conviction, there must be sufficient evidence in the record to support 
conviction for each method that appears in the instructions.  Id. 
at 967.  This problem should never 
arise, as it is easily remedied with a special verdict form that requires the 
jury to identify the basis on which it convicted the defendant.  Unfortunately, the jurors in this case 
were only asked to return a general verdict of guilt or innocence as to the 
charge, which they did.  

 
 
[¶10]   We must first address the fact that 
Appellant invited the error of which he now complains.  "As applied to jury instructions, the 
invited error doctrine provides that use of an instruction proposed by the 
appellant may not be grounds for reversal unless the instruction was necessarily 
prejudicial."  Bromley v. State, 2007 WY 20, ¶ 35, 150 P.3d 1202, 1213 (Wyo. 2007).  A 
mistake in jury instructions that interferes with the jury's ability properly to 
understand or examine the separate elements of each crime charged is necessarily 
prejudicial.  See Vigil v. State, 859 P.2d 659, 664 
(Wyo. 1993); Gabbert v. State, 2006 
WY 108, ¶ 11 n.5, 141 P.3d 690, 695 n.5 (Wyo. 2006).  Here, the jury instruction led the jury 
to consider two methods of committing an offense, where only one was originally 
charged.  That is only a prejudicial 
error, however, if the evidence is not sufficient separately to support 
conviction based on each method.  Tanner v. State, 2002 WY 170, ¶ 10, 57 P.3d 1242, 1245 (Wyo. 2002).  It is 
not a necessarily prejudicial 
error.  

 
 
[¶11]   In this case, the error was 
certainly not prejudicial, as the record reflects that the prosecution presented 
evidence that Appellant transported the gun from the alley and on the subsequent 
chase through town,4 with the intent to threaten his 
victim.  Appellant himself admitted 
that he did, at some point in the chase, intend to "f . . . with" the men he was 
following.  The jury could easily 
have inferred that he intended physically to threaten the welfare of the victim 
when he chased him out of the alley both in possession of and transporting the 
deadly weapon.  

 
 
[¶12]   Appellant's second claim is that a 
fatal variance occurred between the charging document, and the charge ultimately 
presented to the jury.  

 
 
A 
variance arises when the evidence presented at trial establishes facts that are 
different from those alleged in the indictment.  Similarly, a shift in the government's 
theory from the one set out in the indictment to that presented at trial may 
also constitute a prejudicial variance.  
We will not reverse unless the variance affects the defendant's 
substantial rights.  Even in cases 
where an appellate court determines the existence of a variance, such a variance 
'is not fatal unless the defendant could not have anticipated from the 
indictment what evidence would be presented at trial or unless the conviction 
based on an indictment would not bar a subsequent prosecution.  

 
 

Rawle v. 
State, 2007 
WY 59, ¶ 11, 155 P.3d 1024, 1027 (Wyo. 2007) (citations and quotation marks 
omitted).

 
 
[¶13]   Once again, Appellant complains of 
an error of his own making.  The 
State charged Appellant with possessing a deadly weapon.  The verdict form and jury instructions 
were in accordance with that charge until Appellant insisted that the additional 
"transport" wording be added.  See supra ¶ 8.  The rule against such variance is 
intended to ensure that a defendant has adequate notice to prepare for his own 
defense.  Barker v. State, 2006 WY 104, ¶ 29, 141 P.3d 106, 116 (Wyo. 2006).  As noted 
above, a variance of that sort is not necessarily prejudicial, but is only 
fatal if "the defendant could not have anticipated from the indictment what 
evidence would be presented at trial[.]"  
Rawle, 2007 WY 59, ¶ 11, 155 P.3d  at 1027.  See supra ¶ 10.  The portions of the record we have 
quoted in this opinion clearly show that Appellant assumed (however incorrectly) 
that he was charged with transporting as well as with possession, and crafted 
his arguments at trial accordingly.  
Appellant invited the error, which was not necessarily prejudicial, and, 
therefore, he cannot be heard to complain of it on appeal.  

 
 
[¶14]   Appellant's final argument is that 
the jury's finding of guilt for possession of a deadly weapon with unlawful 
intent is necessarily inconsistent with the acquittal for assault with a deadly 
weapon.  This argument fails 
because, as we have repeatedly stated, consistency is not a requirement for a 
valid jury verdict in a criminal trial.  
Moore v. State, 2003 WY 153, ¶ 16, 80 P.3d 191, 196 (Wyo. 2003). 

 
 
In a 
case in which there are multiple counts, each one is treated as if it were a 
separate indictment.  The verdict on 
the various counts need not be consistent.  
An acquittal on one count does not prevent conviction on another, even 
though the evidence is the same and defendant could not have committed one crime 
without committing both, so long as the evidence is sufficient to support 
conviction on the count on which a guilty verdict was 
reached.

 
 
3 
Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 514 at 14-16 (1982).

 
 

Id.

 
 
[¶15]   We have already addressed the issue 
of sufficiency of the evidence above and decline to repeat the analysis 
here.  See supra ¶ 9.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶16]   The doctrine of invited error 
precludes a finding for Appellant either on sufficiency of the evidence or on 
the variance between the initial charges and the eventual verdict returned by 
the jury.  There is no need for 
consistency in a criminal jury verdict as long as sufficient evidence was 
presented to support each conviction.  
We affirm.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1After 
oral argument, we asked the parties to brief an additional issue.  The Felony Information filed in circuit 
court charged the appellant only with aggravated assault and battery.  He received a preliminary examination 
and was bound over for trial in district court solely on that charge.  However, he was arraigned in district 
court on a second Amended Information that charged two counts:  aggravated assault and battery, and 
possession, manufacture or disposition of a deadly weapon with unlawful 
intent.  We were concerned about 
this unexplained discrepancy, because Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-8-105 (LexisNexis 2007), Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-9-132(b) 
(LexisNexis 2007), W.R.Cr.P. 3(c), 
and W.R.Cr.P. 5(c) contain clear requirements for a preliminary examination, and 
allow amendment of an information only in limited circumstances.  The additional briefing revealed that, 
while the appellant did not, on the record, waive his right to a preliminary 
examination on the second charge, he and his attorney were aware before the 
district court arraignment that the information had been amended, and agreed to 
proceed on that amended information.  
Furthermore,

 
 
"the time 
to object to defects in the preliminary hearing is before arraignment and trial, 
and unless some reason is shown why counsel could not have discovered and 
challenged the defect before trial, it will generally be assumed that any 
objections to the preliminary proceedings were considered and waived, and no 
post-conviction remedies will be available.'"

 
 

Trujillo 
v. State, 880 P.2d 575, 582-83 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Blue v. United States, 342 F.2d 894, 
900-01 (D.C. Cir. 1964)).  The gist 
of these statutes and rules, and the Trujillo opinion, 
is that neither the preliminary examination requirement, nor the amendment 
process is jurisdictional, inasmuch as both can be waived by failure to raise 
the issue before trial.  
Nevertheless, we urge counsel and the district courts to exercise caution 
in this regard; it should be a rare occasion that someone is tried for a crime 
for which he was not bound over for trial.

 
 

2Though we 
fail to see how it would affect our analysis here, the word "transport" does 
not, in fact, appear in the title of the statute.  See supra ¶ 5.

 
 

3Appellant 
attempts to cast this portion of the exchange as a preservation of his objection 
to this instruction such that the plain error standard would not apply.  As we do not reach the question of plain 
error in this case, we will decline to address the less-than-compelling argument 
that Appellant somehow preserved an objection to the jury instruction he himself 
proposed.

 
 

4Appellant 
claims that the jury should not have been allowed to consider the evidence of 
the chase around town because the charging documents only mentioned the alley as 
the location of the crime.  However, 
Appellant did not object to the admission of that evidence, does not make a 
coherent argument on appeal that the evidence was improperly admitted, and never 
requested a limiting instruction as to the relevance of the evidence (i.e., that 
the evidence was admissible only for the purpose of showing Appellant's state of 
mind and not for direct consideration as an element of the crime.)  

 
 
It is 
obvious from the transcript of the pretrial motion hearing that both the State 
and Appellant treated the entire chase as part of a single transaction beginning 
in the alley:  

 
 
[Defense counsel]:  I think that the alleged actions of 
[Appellant], following around [victim and friend], I can't dispute the relevance 
of that.  Now, I would dispute that 
there was one continual situation, because there was a break when [victim and 
friend] went to the -- broke contact with [Appellant] and then went to the 
police station.

 
 
[Prosecutor]: I guess the thing that I 
do want to be clear on -- and I've written this on three different sheets of 
paper it is so important to me, Your Honor -- [Defense Counsel] has conceded 
this.  We didn't put it down as a 
notice of 404(b) evidence because it is my belief -- and I believe that [Defense 
Counsel] has advised the Court that he agrees with this in response to questions 
from the Court -- but this car chase where [Appellant] chases [victim and 
friend] for several blocks.  They 
were running red lights, going the wrong way down the street out here and all 
that -- we don't consider that to be 404(b).  We certainly will have testimony about 
that because it is the State's position that's all part of ongoing assault.  That's part of the threatening conduct 
associated with the firearm.

 
 

The 
Court:  Let me ask because that -- frankly, that 
seems to me as an element of the part of the charges here, rather than 
404(b).  Do you agree with that, 
[Defense Counsel]?

 
 
[Defense Counsel]: We do agree that, if 
true, would -- and we are not conceding whether or not anything is true -- . . . 
that, if he did follow him around and what's been characterized as a chase, we 
would concede relevance of that.  
And if it's a matter of proof, we'll just have to contradict in 
trial.

 
 
Defense 
counsel conceded the relevance of the evidence relating to the chase and then 
failed to request any sort of instruction limiting the jury's consideration of 
that evidence.  Because of this, 
there was evidence before the jury that Appellant both possessed and transported 
a weapon with the intent to threaten another.

 
 

JAMES, 
District 
Judge, dissenting.

 
 
[¶17]   I respectfully dissent because I do 
not believe the district court has jurisdiction over a case where the defendant 
has not had a preliminary hearing in circuit court and has not properly waived 
his right to that hearing under the rules.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-8-105 (LexisNexis 2007) entitled "Right to preliminary 
hearing" states, "In all cases triable in district court, except upon 
indictment, the defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-9-132(b) 
(LexisNexis 2007) states, 
"Preliminary examinations for persons charged with a felony shall be conducted by the circuit court 
judge or magistrate."  (Emphasis 
added.)  W.R.Cr.P. 5.1, Preliminary 
examination, sets forth the procedures for fulfilling those statutory 
requirements as follows:

 
 
(a) Right. - In all cases required to be 
tried in the district court, except upon indictment, the defendant shall be entitled to a 
preliminary examination in the circuit court.  The defendant may waive preliminary 
examination but the waiver must be written or on the record.  If the preliminary examination is waived, 
the case shall be transferred to district court for further proceedings.

 
 
(b) Probable cause finding. - If from the 
evidence it appears that there is probable cause to believe that the charged 
offense or lesser included offense has been committed and that the defendant 
committed it, the judicial officer shall 
enter an order so finding and the case shall be transferred to the 
district court for further proceedings. . . .

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
[¶18]   Reading these rules together, it is 
clear that a preliminary hearing is not only a right of every defendant, but 
also the mechanism by which the circuit court transfers jurisdiction to the 
appropriate district court.  The 
rule allows the circuit court to accept adequate waiver of the right to a 
preliminary hearing as an alternate way for the case properly to be transferred 
to the district court.  The record 
in this case shows that Appellant did not waive his right to a preliminary 
hearing in circuit court in writing or on the record.  There is no evidence that Appellant was 
even informed of his right to a preliminary hearing on the charge for which he 
was eventually convicted.  In fact, 
the record shows that the charge for which Appellant was convicted never went 
through circuit court at all, and so was never properly transferred to a 
district court for trial.  The 
Trujillo case 
cited by the majority was a challenge involving alleged defects in the 
preliminary hearing.  Trujillo v. State, 880 P.2d 575, 581-82 
(Wyo. 
1994).  That case determined that 
defects in a hearing were waived if not raised before trial, but did not address 
a total lack of such a hearing.  
Id. at 582.  It is that important procedural defect 
that raises jurisdictional concerns here.  

 
 
[¶19]   The purpose of a preliminary 
hearing is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the 
charged offense, or some lesser included offense, has been committed, and that 
the defendant committed the offense.  
W.R.Cr.P. 5.1.  This standard 
must be met in order to justify a trial on the merits.  The burden of establishing the propriety 
of bind-over for a trial is on the prosecution.  Garcia v. State, 667 P.2d 1148, 1154 
(Wyo. 
1983).  The circuit court's 
determination of probable cause must be reviewed from the information available 
at the time of the hearing, and not from events or facts that come to light 
afterward.  "The question of 
probable cause must be determined as of the time that the prosecution was 
instituted.  It depends upon the 
facts as they apparently existed at that time, and not upon the ultimate 
determination of the facts."  Henning v. Miller, 44 Wyo. 114, 8 P.2d 825, 829 
(1932).  Henning was a malicious prosecution case 
but the same principle is evident in our manner of review of other 
determinations of probable cause in criminal law.  See, e.g., Holzheuser v. State, 2007 WY 
160, ¶ 6, 169 P.3d 68, 74 (Wyo. 2007) (only affidavit in front of court at time 
of determination may be considered in review of probable cause); Mascarenas v. State, 2003 WY 124, ¶ 10, 
76 P.3d 1258, 1262 (Wyo. 2003) (probable cause to be viewed "from the vantage 
point of a prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer on the scene at the time 
of the arrest") (emphasis added, citation omitted).  

 
 
[¶20]   In light of the above-quoted 
precedent, I find the logic adopted by this Court in Trujillo 
unpersuasive.  See supra ¶ 19.  The reasoning in Trujillo is that 
a guilty verdict somehow "cures" the failure to find probable cause to bind a 
defendant over to trial.  Trujillo, 880 P.2d  at 582-83.  By that logic, a 
search based on a faulty warrant would be upheld as long as it yielded evidence, 
because the fact that evidence was present would "cure" the lack of probable 
cause for the underlying search warrant.  
That is inconsistent with basic constitutional principles, as well as our 
own jurisprudence on the issue of probable cause.  I would dismiss this case for lack of 
jurisdiction, because this Court cannot have jurisdiction over an appeal where 
the district court never acquired jurisdiction over the 
matter.