Case Title: Perry v. State

Citation: 354 So. 2d 1385

Docket Number: 

State: louisiana

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Date: 1978-02-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Perry v. State1996 WY 148927 P.2d 1158Case Number: 95-158Decided: 11/15/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
Robert Lee PERRY, Sr.,

 Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Uinta County, John D. Troughton, J.

Sylvia Lee 
Hackl, State Public Defender; Deborah Cornia, Assistant Public Defender; Gerald 
M. Gallivan, Director, Wyoming Defender Aid Program; Jason Bachlet and Barb 
Parnell, Student Interns, for Appellant.

William U. Hill, 
Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, Assistant 
Attorney General; Prosecution Assistance Program, Theodore E. Lauer, Director, 
and David C. Holtz, Student Intern, for Appellee.

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN,* and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      The issues in 
this case evolve from a pat-down search of Robert L. Perry, Sr. (Perry) on the 
occasion of the arrest of his son, Robert L. Perry, Jr. (Perry, Jr.), for 
driving with a suspended driver's license. The pat-down search resulted in the 
seizure of three hypodermic needles and Perry's arrest for possession of drug 
paraphernalia. After he was arrested, the vehicle he had been driving was 
impounded, and an inventory search of the vehicle was conducted. In the course 
of this search, a fanny pack was discovered, and further examination of the 
fanny pack disclosed a ziplock bag containing three or four ounces of marijuana. 
Perry was charged with the felony of possession of marijuana with intent to 
deliver, and he challenged the searches by a motion to suppress the evidence. 
When the district court ruled against him, Perry entered a conditional plea of 
guilty, reserving the right to challenge the court's ruling on his motion to 
suppress the evidence. Perry claims the initial pat-down search was unlawful, 
thus, tainting all evidence discovered following that search, and he also 
contends the inventory search of the vehicle was unlawful for reasons 
independent of the pat-down search. We hold the challenged searches were lawful, 
specifically adopting the "automatic companion" rule as justifying the initial 
pat-down search. The decision of the trial court denying Perry's motion to 
suppress the evidence is affirmed in all respects, and the Judgment and Sentence 
is affirmed.

[¶2]      In his Brief of 
Appellant, Perry lists a statement of the issues as:

Argument I:

I.             
Whether Officer Kirby had a reasonable suspicion Mr. Perry was involved 
in criminal activity prior to initiating the Terry stop?

II.             
Whether Officer Kirby had a reasonable suspicion Mr. Perry was armed and 
dangerous prior to conducting a frisk for weapons?

III.             
Whether Officer Kirby reasonably believed the object felt during the pat 
down could be a weapon threatening officers at the scene of the 
detention?

IV.             
Whether the contraband nature of the object felt during the pat down for 
weapons was immediately apparent to Officer Kirby and therefore falls within the 
plain feel exception to the warrant requirement?

Argument II:

I.             
Whether the inventory search conducted by the police officers in this 
case was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and Article I, § 4 of the Wyoming State Constitution.

In the State of 
Wyoming's Brief of Appellee, the issues are stated as:

I.             
Was Officer Kirby's pat-down weapons search of Appellant justified 
pursuant to the right of a police officer to search the outer clothing of a 
companion of a person subjected to a lawful arrest? 

II.             
Was the inventory search in this case reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution or Article I, Section 4 of the 
Wyoming State Constitution?

[¶3]      When Officer 
Kirby started the midnight shift on October 24, 1994, he was advised by officers 
from the afternoon shift, who were going off duty, to be on the lookout for a 
vehicle possibly driven by Perry, Jr. Officer Kirby was told, if Perry, Jr. was 
driving the vehicle, he was driving it illegally because his driver's license 
had been suspended.

[¶4]            
Around midnight, Officer Jones radioed Officer Kirby and advised him he 
was heading east on the interstate following a car he suspected Perry, Jr. of 
driving. Officer Jones wanted to be certain Perry, Jr. was the driver and, after 
the vehicles had turned off the interstate, Officer Kirby drove past the 
vehicle. At that time, the car was following another vehicle driven by 
Perry.

[¶5]      Officer Kirby saw 
a younger person driving the second car, but he was not able to identify him as 
Perry, Jr. He did, however, identify the passenger as Paul Eddie (Eddie), a man 
whom he knew had a felony warrant for kidnapping outstanding against him in the 
state of Washington. Officer Kirby also knew Eddie allegedly had been involved 
in a shooting incident some six weeks previously.

[¶6]      When Officer 
Kirby passed them, both of the Perry vehicles turned into a Texaco station, and 
Officer Jones followed them into the parking lot. Officer Kirby turned his 
vehicle around and returned to the Texaco parking lot, arriving as Officer Jones 
got out of his car to speak with the occupants of the car driven by Perry, Jr. 
Perry, Jr. got out of the driver's side of his vehicle and went to the rear of 
the passenger side, where he met Officer Jones. The passenger, Eddie, got out of 
the right side of the vehicle and stood by the car door. Perry also got out of 
his vehicle and walked to the front passenger side of Perry, Jr.'s 
vehicle.

[¶7]      Officer Kirby 
heard Officer Jones ask Perry, Jr. for his driver's license, and he also heard 
Officer Jones tell Perry, Jr. that he was aware his driver's license had been 
suspended. Upon questioning, Perry, Jr. furnished Officer Jones an alias, 
stating his name was not Robert Perry, Jr. At this juncture, Officer Kirby 
approached Perry and asked him who he was. Perry furnished his correct name, 
Robert Perry, Sr., but, when asked, he said that Perry, Jr. was not his son. 
Officer Kirby then invited Perry to walk around the corner with him where Kirby 
said to Perry: "He has a suspended license. If you don't want to say anything to 
me don't say anything to me but don't lie about it." Perry's general response 
was that he did not want to get his son into any trouble.

[¶8]      When Perry and 
Officer Kirby returned to the car where the others were, Officer Smith also had 
arrived and was out of his car. Perry, Jr. was not cooperating with Officer 
Jones, and it appeared he was under the influence of alcohol. Officer Kirby 
surmised Officer Jones was about to place Perry, Jr. under arrest, so he started 
to assist Jones. As Kirby walked along the driver's side of Perry, Jr.'s car, he 
shined his flashlight in the car's window and observed a gun protruding from 
under the driver's seat. He informed the other two officers there was a gun in 
the car and, at approximately the same time, Officer Jones told Perry, Jr. he 
was going to jail for driving while his license was suspended.

[¶9]            
Concerned for his safety and that of the other officers, Officer Kirby 
then patted down Perry's outer clothing to determine whether he had any weapons, 
while Officer Smith did the same to Eddie. Kirby's concern for safety was 
prompted by his knowledge of warrants issued in Utah for the arrest of Perry, 
Jr. for the manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance; prior anonymous 
tips that Perry, Jr. and Perry were involved in drug trafficking; a general 
observation that drug dealers often carry weapons; Eddie's alleged involvement 
in shooting and kidnapping incidents; and the discovery of the gun under the 
driver's seat in Perry, Jr.'s car. During the pat-down of Eddie, a knife was 
discovered, and controlled substances were found on both Eddie and Perry, Jr. 
Kirby wanted to be certain none of the three had any other weapons besides the 
gun in Perry, Jr.'s car. 

[¶10]   In the course of Perry's pat-down 
search, Officer Kirby felt a hard item in Perry's front pocket. It was 
approximately five inches long and three-quarters of an inch wide. Kirby asked 
Perry what was in the pocket, and Perry replied it was an item he had just 
found. Kirby reached into Perry's pocket and pulled out three hypodermic 
needles. Perry was arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia. Officer Kirby 
took the gun from Perry, Jr.'s car, emptied out the shells, and placed the gun 
in his patrol car. In a search conducted incidental to Perry's arrest, Kirby 
also found a vial of amphetamines on Perry's person.

[¶11]   When Officer Kirby arrested Perry, 
he asked what Perry wanted to do with his vehicle. Perry stated the car belonged 
to someone else, and that person would need to make the decision regarding the 
vehicle because Perry did not want to make that decision. Officer Kirby 
conferred with another officer and learned the license plates on the vehicle 
Perry had been driving were Perry's, but the plates did not belong on the car. 
Kirby also discovered the vehicle was not properly registered and was not 
insured. When a check of the vehicle identification number was accomplished, the 
owner of the car was determined to be a woman from either Hunter or Huntington, 
Utah.

[¶12]            
Following this investigation, Officer Kirby decided to impound Perry's 
car. His decision was based upon a number of factors: it was after midnight; 
Perry had been arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia; the car did not 
have proper registration or insurance; even if the owner of the vehicle could be 
located, she could not legally drive the car away; Perry had been warned two 
weeks previously that he should remedy the registration and insurance problems; 
and the owners of the parking lot preferred the car not be left in their lot 
overnight.

[¶13]   At the suppression hearing, the 
administrative sergeant for the police department, Sergeant Williams, summarized 
the standard, though unwritten, policy used to impound a vehicle. He 
testified:

Those factors that 
Officer Kirby related very articulately are taken into consideration concerning 
the vehicle, whether it can be safely moved from the premises; if it is on a 
street; if it's in a private parking lot; if there is another person that can 
legally take responsibility for the vehicle; if it is legally able to be 
operated on the city streets.

The sergeant 
also related the reasons for impounding a vehicle pursuant to the departmental 
policy, testifying:

If the vehicle is in 
violation of the law where the officer determines that the vehicle requires 
impoundment, such as an improper registration, no valid license plates, no 
insurance, driving while under the influence, driving while under suspension, 
those kinds of things.

[¶14]   Having arrested Perry and made the 
decision to impound the vehicle, Officer Kirby commenced an inventory of the 
contents of the car, also in accordance with departmental policy. This inventory 
was initiated prior to the arrival of the tow truck driver, whose job it was to 
remove the car from the scene. The policy behind the inventory, according to 
Officer Kirby, "is to protect people's property and to protect us from 
liabilities." At the suppression hearing, Sergeant Williams also testified 
concerning the procedure and policy with respect to the inventory of impounded 
vehicles:

Very succinctly, if you 
have to impound a vehicle, if nobody takes custody and control of the vehicle, 
that it will be inventoried.

*           
*           
*           
*           
*           
*

The officers are 
instructed to open all areas that they can get into to inventory, to look for 
valuables, to reduce liability factors for themselves, the City of Evanston, the 
Police Department, and to protect the personal property of the people who own 
the vehicle or those people that are in the vehicle, as well as getting into 
different areas of the vehicle. If there are closed containers within the 
vehicle, they are to open those and inventory those to protect, again, the City, 
the Department, themselves and the owners.

The officer who 
performs the inventory completes a departmental inventory form setting forth the 
contents of the vehicle. 

[¶15]   During his inventory of the 
contents of the vehicle, Officer Kirby discovered a gray fanny pack. He opened 
the fanny pack to determine if there were any valuables that should be listed on 
the inventory form, and he found a ziplock bag containing three or four ounces 
of marijuana; a sandwich bag purporting to contain methamphetamine; a 
calculator, a decimal fraction conversion chart; a set of hand scales; some note 
paper and a pen; and more sandwich bags. After these items had been discovered, 
another officer on the scene completed the inventory of the contents of the 
vehicle and also the balance of the inventory form.

[¶16]   The discovery of the marijuana led 
to a charge against Perry of possession with intent to deliver a controlled 
substance in violation of WYO. STAT. §§ 35-7-1031(a)(ii) and 35-7-1014(d)(xiii) 
(1994). The charge was filed on October 25, 1994 and, after a preliminary 
hearing, Perry was bound over to the district court on November 28, 1994. At his 
arraignment on December 7, 1994, Perry entered a plea of not guilty. That was 
followed by a motion to suppress Perry's statements and any evidence obtained 
from the search of his person and the car he had been driving before he was 
arrested. Perry asserted this evidence was acquired through unlawful detention; 
an unlawful frisk; and an unlawful search of the vehicle in violation of his 
rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the 
United States1 and under Article 1, §§ 4, 6, 7, 
and 34 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming.

[¶17]   A hearing was held on Perry's 
motion to suppress on January 31, 1995 and, on February 15, 1995, the district 
court denied the motion. The district court ruled the frisk of Perry was 
reasonable to protect the officers, and the impoundment and inventory search of 
the car were reasonable and conducted in accordance with standard departmental 
procedures and policies. The final order denying Perry's motion to suppress was 
entered on March 3, 1995. Perry then changed his plea on April 19, 1995, by 
entering a conditional plea of guilty to possessing marijuana with intent to 
deliver while reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
suppress. On June 8, 1995, Perry was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not 
less than one and one-half, nor more than three, years. His sentence was 
suspended, and he was placed on supervised probation for a period of three 
years. Perry appeals the denial of his motion to suppress.

[¶18]   In his first contention of trial 
court error, Perry complains Officer Kirby lacked reasonable suspicion of 
Perry's involvement in criminal activity prior to initiating a Terry stop. The 
reference is, of course, to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). This claim of error is an obvious attempt to categorize this case 
erroneously. There was no stop of the kind discussed in Terry. At the time the 
officers approached the vehicle driven by Perry, Jr., they had probable cause to 
arrest Perry, Jr. because he was driving while his driver's license was 
suspended. The contact between Perry, Jr., Eddie, and the officers was initiated 
by approaching their vehicle after Perry, Jr. had voluntarily turned into the 
Texaco parking lot. Officer Jones' decision to initiate interrogation of Perry, 
Jr. and Eddie was premised upon adequate probable cause to arrest both. 
Previously, Officer Kirby had advised Officer Jones of the existence of an 
outstanding felony warrant against Eddie in Utah. Both Kirby and Jones believed 
Perry, Jr. was unlawfully driving his car while his driver's license was 
suspended. Furthermore, Kirby was aware Utah had warrants outstanding for the 
arrest of Perry, Jr. for the manufacture or delivery of a controlled 
substance.

[¶19]            
Obviously Perry's situation was different. He voluntarily placed himself 
at the scene, got out of his car, and stood near the passenger side of Perry, 
Jr.'s car. The officers had no concrete information with respect to any criminal 
activities in which Perry had been involved. They had no reason to be concerned 
with Perry, nor the car he was driving, until he interjected himself into the 
scenario involving the officers, Eddie, and Perry, Jr. 

[¶20]   In Collins v. State, 854 P.2d 688, 
691-92 (Wyo. 1993), we adopted the three tiers of police encounters from the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit:

In our view, this area of 
the law is persuasively summarized by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit in United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 591 (5th Cir. 
1982):

We conclude, therefore, 
that Supreme Court holdings sculpt out, at least theoretically, three tiers of 
police-citizen encounters: communication between police and citizens involving 
no coercion or detention and therefore without the compass of the Fourth 
Amendment, brief "seizures" that must be supported by reasonable suspicion, and 
full-scale arrests that must be supported by probable cause. See, eg., United 
States v. Setzer, 654 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1041 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 910, 100 S. Ct. 2998, 64 L. Ed. 2d 861 (1980).

Perry's initial 
contact with the officers fits the first tier. In Collins, we held it is not 
necessary for police officers to have a reasonable suspicion or probable cause 
to arrest in order to initiate contact with a citizen at the first tier. 
Collins, 854 P.2d  at 695.

[¶21]   Perry voluntarily approached and 
stood by Perry, Jr.'s car, where he listened and watched as the encounter with 
his son unfolded. He interjected himself into the scenario by positioning 
himself in and around the police officers and the occupants of Perry, Jr.'s 
vehicle. Upon being questioned by Officer Kirby, Perry initially denied the 
driver of the other vehicle was his son. After the private dialogue with Kirby, 
Perry then admitted the driver of the other vehicle was his son, stating 
generally he simply did not want to get his son into any trouble. Because of 
Perry's voluntary involvement, it became clear he was there as a companion of 
Eddie and Perry, Jr., even though Perry was in a different vehicle.

[¶22]   It was soon after this dialogue 
with Perry that Kirby discovered the gun in Perry, Jr.'s car. The three men 
apparently were there together. Kirby was aware of felony warrants outstanding 
against the son and Eddie; rumors of a prior shooting incident involving Eddie; 
the illegal driving by Perry, Jr. because his driver's license was suspended; 
prior anonymous tips Perry and Perry, Jr. were involved in drug trafficking; the 
fact drug dealers frequently carry weapons; and the actual discovery of a weapon 
under the car seat in Perry, Jr.'s car. As the trial court properly ruled, 
Officer Kirby had compelling reasons to be concerned about his safety and that 
of the other two officers, feeling they all could be in serious 
jeopardy.

[¶23]   This justifiable concern for 
officer safety in the context of a lawful arrest of Perry, Jr. leads to our 
holding that Officer Kirby's frisk of Perry was lawful under the "automatic 
companion" rule. As adopted in the United States Courts of Appeals for the 
Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, the "automatic companion" 
rule affords an officer the right to frisk companions of an arrestee for the 
possible concealment of weapons. See United States v. Vigo, 487 F.2d 295 (2d 
Cir. 1973) (holding a search of the purse of a companion of the arrested person 
is reasonable); United States v. Poms, 484 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1973) (upholding 
frisk of companion who arrived on the scene during the arrest); United States v. 
Tharpe, 536 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1976) (upholding a weapons frisk of two 
passengers in the vehicle driven by the person arrested), overruled on other 
grounds by United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987); United States 
v. Simmons, 567 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding scope of search not 
necessarily limited to a pat-down search); United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir. 1971) (upholding a search for weapons in the arrestee's wife's 
handbag). Other state courts have adopted the rule. See People v. Santoro, 192 
Ill. App.3d 895, 140 Ill.Dec. 57, 549 N.E.2d 708 (1989) (allowing a companion to 
be frisked where a weapon, which turned out to be a toy gun, was found under the 
passenger's seat); State v. Clevidence, 153 Ariz. 295, 736 P.2d 379 (Ct.App. 
1987) (upholding a pat-down search of a robbery suspect's companion where police 
found a gun under the suspect's car seat); Commonwealth v. Hook, 313 Pa. Super. 
1, 459 A.2d 379 (1983) (allowing a weapons pat-down search where a gun was found 
on the companion, even though no probable cause existed for companion's arrest); 
and State v. Dougherty, 8 Or. App. 267, 493 P.2d 1383 (1972) (allowing weapons 
search of companions pursuant to an arrest in a hotel room).

[¶24]   Perry was a companion of Perry, Jr. 
and Eddie, both of whom were arrested at the scene. At the suppression hearing, 
Officer Kirby articulated his concern about safety when he decided to do the 
pat-down search of Perry:

And there are three 
persons [Perry, Eddie and the son] there. These persons are, obviously, 
associated with each other. It's also because I have information that some of 
these people are involved with drugs and the drug trade. It is the fact that 
there is a gun in the vehicle. It's a combination of everything that makes me 
feel that for the safety of myself and the other officers there that we ought to 
make sure there is no weapons on these people.

In Terry, the 
Supreme Court of the United States forcefully relied upon the necessity to 
preserve officer safety in potentially explosive situations:

In addition [to the 
government's interest in investigating crime], there is the more immediate 
interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person 
with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and 
fatally be used against him. Certainly it would be unreasonable to require 
that police officers take unnecessary risks in the performance of their 
duties.

Terry, 392 U.S. 
at 23, 88 S. Ct.  at 1881 (emphasis added).

[¶25]   In Berryhill, 445 F.2d  at 1193, the 
Court expanded on the need for officers to protect themselves from companions of 
a criminal suspect in potentially violent situations:

We think that Terry 
recognizes and common sense dictates that the legality of such a limited 
intrusion [pat-down or frisk for weapons] into a citizen's personal privacy 
extends to a criminal's companions at the time of arrest. It is inconceivable 
that a peace officer effecting a lawful arrest of an occupant of a vehicle must 
expose himself to a shot in the back from defendant's associate because he 
cannot, on the spot, make the nice distinction between whether the other is a 
companion in crime or a social acquaintance. All companions of the arrestee 
within the immediate vicinity, capable of accomplishing a harmful assault on the 
officer, are constitutionally subjected to the cursory "pat-down" reasonably 
necessary to give assurance that they are unarmed.

The concern of 
these courts for officer safety is a compelling justification. We hold Officer 
Kirby acted as a reasonably prudent police officer when he patted down Perry's 
outer clothing to preserve his safety and that of the other two officers present 
at the scene. See Goettl v. State, 842 P.2d 549 (Wyo. 1992); Terry. Officer 
Kirby was entitled to do the pat-down search under the automatic companion 
rule.

[¶26]   Other than his inappropriate 
reliance upon Terry, Perry does not argue that the initial pat-down search was 
conducted improperly. Instead, Perry argues the object felt by Officer Kirby 
during the frisk was inconsistent with the size and shape of a weapon. It 
follows, according to Perry, that the officer had no right to remove it from 
Perry's pocket. When Officer Kirby first patted down Perry's outer clothing, he 
encountered a hard object, approximately five inches long and three-quarters of 
an inch wide. At the suppression hearing, Kirby testified he "didn't know if 
this [the object] was a weapon." He did state, however:

But I'm not going to have 
him pull it out and then - if it's a weapon, my - my stress is going to go up 
and his stress is going to go up. So I'm going to pull that out myself and check 
on it.

[¶27]   In Terry, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that a pat-down search necessitates a limited intrusion extending to 
"the officer the power to take necessary measures to determine whether the 
person is in fact carrying a weapon and to neutralize the threat of physical 
harm." Terry, 392 U.S.  at 24, 88 S. Ct.  at 1881. The pat-down search itself, 
however, must "be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to 
discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the 
police officer." Terry, 392 U.S.  at 29, 88 S. Ct.  at 1884.

[¶28]   The law does not require the 
officer to be absolutely certain the object felt is a weapon. A leading treatise 
sets out the appropriate standard.

Under the better view, 
then, a search is not permissible when the object felt is soft in nature. If the 
object felt is hard, then the question is whether its "size or density" is such 
that it might be a weapon. But because "weapons are not always of an easily 
discernible shape," it is not inevitably essential that the officer feel the 
outline of a pistol or something of that nature. Somewhat more leeway must be 
allowed upon "the feeling of a hard object of substantial size, the precise 
shape or nature of which is not discernible through outer clothing," * * 
*.

WAYNE R. LAFAVE 
& JEROLD H. ISRAEL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.5(c) (3d ed. 1996).

[¶29]   The three hypodermic syringes Kirby 
took from Perry's pocket can be described correctly as "other hidden 
instruments" which were not "soft in nature." Terry; SEARCH AND SEIZURE. 
Exercising the requisite leeway, Officer Kirby felt "a hard object of 
substantial size" which had an imprecise "shape or nature * * * not discernible 
through outer clothing." The object Officer Kirby encountered reasonably could 
have been a weapon, and he was justified in determining whether it was or was 
not. This justification is particularly pertinent in light of other decisions 
that acknowledge syringes or their needles can be deadly weapons like guns, 
knives or clubs. See State v. Hunter, 615 So. 2d 727 (Fla.Ct.App. 1993), review 
denied, 626 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 1993); People v. Autry, 232 Cal. App. 3d 365, 283 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1991); see also State v. Griffin, 520 So. 2d 1206 (La. Ct. App. 1988); 
Napier v. State, 473 So. 2d 644 (Ala.Crim.Ct.App. 1985). In light of the facts of 
this case, United States v. Del Toro, 464 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1972), is peculiarly 
significant. In a protective frisk situation, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit upheld the seizure of a folded $10 bill containing a 
small amount of cocaine on the basis of the arresting officer's testimony that 
he feared the presence of a knife or razor blade. Because of concern for his 
safety under the circumstances, Officer Kirby had reasonable justification to 
believe what he felt was a weapon, and he was entitled to remove it from Perry's 
pocket and examine it.2

[¶30]   Upon discovering the three 
syringes, Officer Kirby's contact with Perry moved to the third tier of 
communication between the police and citizens. Collins. Officer Kirby then had 
probable cause to arrest Perry for possession of drug paraphernalia, and he did 
arrest him. Kirby impounded the vehicle Perry had been driving and commenced his 
inventory of the car's contents. The inventory was completed by another officer 
after Kirby found marijuana in a fanny pack in the car.

[¶31]   Perry claims error with respect to 
the impoundment of the vehicle and the resulting inventory search. Perry argues 
this was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States and Article 1, § 4 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming 
because neither was accomplished pursuant to standard police procedures. As an 
ancillary claim, Perry asserts the marijuana and other evidence seized during 
the inventory should be excluded because the procedures were not in 
writing.

[¶32]   We have not required that standard 
police procedures with respect to impoundment and inventory searches be in 
writing. Instead, we have accepted testimony by police officers of the standards 
and their testimony that the appropriate procedures were followed in a 
particular situation. See Vargas-Rocha v. State, 891 P.2d 763 (Wyo. 1995); 
Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879 (Wyo. 1990). The Supreme Court of the United 
States also accepts the testimony of an officer to establish the standard 
procedures in protecting owners' property while impounded and to protect police 
from possible assaults with weapons. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 107 S. Ct. 738, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1987). Other courts hold written procedures are not 
mandatory in order to justify a lawful impoundment and inventory search of a 
vehicle. State v. Weide, 155 Wis.2d 537, 455 N.W.2d 899 (1990); United States v. 
Kornegay, 885 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 935, 110 S. Ct. 2179, 109 L. Ed. 2d 508 (1990); United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1095, 109 S. Ct. 2442, 104 L. Ed. 2d 998 (1989); 
Madison v. United States, 512 A.2d 279 (D.C.Ct.App. 1986). While standard 
procedures are necessary to protect citizens from the potential of uncontrolled 
discretion on the part of police officers, there is no requirement the standards 
be in writing. We said in Vargas-Rocha, 891 P.2d at 767: "An inventory search of 
an impounded automobile is not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment when it 
is conducted pursuant to standardized police procedure." See also Bertine; South 
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1976); 
Bennett.

[¶33]   Perry's vehicle was not properly 
registered and was not insured, and the license plates did not match the 
vehicle. At the suppression hearing, Sergeant Williams testified the standard 
procedure is to impound a vehicle if it is in violation of some law. There can 
be no question several laws were violated in this instance. In addition, 
Sergeant Williams testified the policy is to impound the vehicle if there is no 
one available to take custody and control of the car. In this instance, Perry, 
Perry, Jr., and Eddie were arrested; the record owner of the car was out of 
state and unavailable; and no one was left at the scene who could drive the car 
from the private parking lot. Impoundment was appropriate and necessary 
according to the policy of the department, and that policy was followed in the 
correct manner.

[¶34]            
Furthermore, Sergeant Williams testified the standard procedure is to 
inventory the vehicle once it has been impounded. In Berryhill, 445 F.2d  at 
1192, the court articulated the scope of a lawful search following 
arrest:

The law seems to be well 
settled that when the driver of a motor vehicle is lawfully arrested in the 
vehicle, the arresting officer has the right to search the vehicle 
contemporaneously with and as an incident to the lawful arrest, the vehicle 
being a thing "under the accused's immediate control." Preston v. United States, 
376 U.S. 364, 367, 84 S. Ct. 881, 883, 11 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1963). The contemporaneous 
search may be for weapons or for fruits or implements of the crime, Preston, 
supra, at 367, 84 S. Ct.  at 883, 11 L. Ed. 2d 777, or for evidence relevant to the 
crime.

[¶35]   As a final matter, Sergeant 
Williams testified the standard procedure during any inventory was to open 
closed containers and to get into all different areas within the vehicle "to 
look for valuables, to reduce liability factors, * * * and to protect the 
personal property of the people who own the vehicle or those people that are in 
the vehicle." Officer Kirby followed this procedure when he opened the fanny 
pack located in the Perry vehicle and discovered marijuana. The standard 
procedure for inventorying the contents of the car produced "implements of the 
crime." Berryhill. We hold the impoundment and inventory search of the car Perry 
drove were reasonable since they were accomplished in accordance with 
standardized policies and procedures of the police department. We adopt the 
automatic companion rule justifying pat-down searches of companions of arrested 
persons and uphold the pat-down search of Perry and the seizure of the 
hypodermic needles.

[¶36]   The decision of the district court 
in denying the motion to suppress is affirmed in all respects.

LEHMAN, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶37]   I respectfully dissent. I believe 
the "automatic companion" rule is inconsistent with the narrow scope of the 
Terry exception to the warrant requirement and thus lacks constitutional 
muster.

[¶38]            
Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable. The burden 
falls on the State to show that a search and seizure is valid or that an 
exception to the rule foreclosing warrantless searches and seizures is 
applicable. Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 610-11 (Wyo. 1992). The United 
States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio recognized an exception for a protective 
pat-down search for weapons based on specific and articulable facts from which 
an officer could reasonably infer a suspect is armed and dangerous. 392 U.S. 1, 
27, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). In United States v. Berryhill, 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit expressed its view that 
Terry extends to an arrestee's companions: "All companions of the arrestee 
within the immediate vicinity, capable of accomplishing a harmful assault on the 
officer, are constitutionally subjected to the cursory `pat-down' reasonably 
necessary to give assurance that they are unarmed." 445 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th 
Cir. 1971).

[¶39]   The Supreme Court has not directly 
addressed the applicability of the Terry exception to a search of the companion 
of an arrestee. United States v. Flett, 806 F.2d 823, 826 (8th Cir. 1986). 
However, the Court has observed that "[b]ecause Terry involved an exception to 
the general rule requiring probable cause, [the] Court has been careful to 
maintain its narrow scope." Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210, 99 S. Ct. 2248, 2255, 60 L. Ed. 2d 824 (1979). And the Court refused to uphold a protective 
frisk of a patron in a bar based only on that person's presence during a search 
of the premises pursuant to a valid search warrant. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93, 100 S. Ct. 338, 343, 62 L. Ed. 2d 238 (1979). These decisions lead me to 
conclude that the rule, based not on reasonable suspicion but on a person's 
"unfortunate choice of associates," impermissibly extends the Terry exception in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Bell, 762 F.2d 495, 499 (6th 
Cir. 1985); see also Flett, 806 F.2d  at 826-28.

[¶40]   I am not persuaded otherwise by the 
cases the majority cites to support the adoption of the automatic companion 
rule. Despite the fact that several of the federal circuit cases cited Berryhill 
with apparent approval, none involved a situation where a search of a companion 
was found reasonable solely because of that person's association with and 
proximity to an arrestee. Rather, those cases involved particular, specific 
facts which justified the search at issue. See, e.g., United States v. Simmons, 
567 F.2d 314, 318-20 (7th Cir. 1977) (search of items within immediate control 
of a person present during custodial arrest of companion for a recent crime in 
which guns were used held reasonable because objective probability of danger to 
law enforcement existed under the circumstances); United States v. Vigo, 487 F.2d 295, 298 (2d Cir. 1973) (search of a passenger's purse proper given the 
fact that a loaded concealed gun had just been found on the driver); United 
States v. Poms, 484 F.2d 919, 921-22 (4th Cir. 1973) (search of defendant's bag 
justified where officers had information from reliable informant that Poms 
always carried a weapon in his shoulder bag, defendant identified himself as 
Poms and then reached for the bag).

[¶41]   The majority argues that Perry 
mischaracterized the case because there was no Terry stop involved. I agree that 
the initial contact with Perry began as a "first-tier" encounter, involving no 
coercion or detention and therefore not implicating the Fourth Amendment. See 
Collins v. State, 854 P.2d 688, 691-92 (Wyo. 1993); United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 591 (5th Cir. 1982). However, once Officer Kirby decided to conduct a 
pat-down search of Perry, the encounter moved into the second tier and Fourth 
Amendment requirements came into play. At that point the predicate to the search 
was a reasonable belief, based on particular facts, that Perry was armed and 
dangerous. Terry, 392 U.S.  at 27, 88 S. Ct.  at 1883; see also Collins, 854 P.2d  
at 695; Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64, 88 S. Ct. 1889, 1903, 20 L. Ed. 2d 917 
(1968).

[¶42]   The automatic companion rule 
replaces the fine line of the Terry reasonable suspicion requirement with a 
broad brush, rendering virtually any search of an arrestee's companions 
reasonable, regardless of the circumstances. In my view, the rule is unwarranted 
and unconstitutional, and I believe the court went too far in adopting it. 
Therefore, I dissent. 

 FOOTNOTES

1 Perry also cited the 
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, but that 
constitutional protection does not relate to detention, frisk, or 
search.

2 Because Officer Kirby's 
justification was his reasonable suspicion that the object in Perry's pocket 
could have been a weapon, we need not, nor do we, analyze whether Officer Kirby 
would have been justified in removing the object under the plain feel exception 
to the warrant requirement if it had not been suspected of being a 
weapon.