Case Title: Commonwealth v. Bryant

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11675

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-07-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11675 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  KYLE BRYANT. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     May 10, 2019. - July 30, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Prior misconduct, Inflammatory evidence, 
Identification.  Identification.  Practice, Criminal, 
Instructions to jury, Mistrial, Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 5, 2010. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Thomas F. McGuire, Jr., J. 
 
 
 
Alan J. Black for the defendant. 
 
Audrey Anderson, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  A jury convicted the defendant, Kyle Bryant, of 
murder in the first degree on a theory of deliberate 
premeditation for the killing of Darnell Harrison (victim).1 
  On 
                     
 
1 The defendant also was convicted of unlawful possession of 
a firearm and found not guilty of armed assault with intent to 
murder Sean Cox. 
2 
 
 
appeal, the defendant contends that the judge erred when he 
allowed the Commonwealth to introduce prior bad act evidence 
that showed the defendant was a drug dealer, denied the 
defendant's request for an eyewitness identification jury 
instruction, and denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial. 
 
For the reasons stated below, we affirm the defendant's 
convictions.  After a thorough review of the record, we also 
decline to exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to 
grant a new trial or to reduce or set aside the verdict of 
murder in the first degree. 
 
1.  Background.  We summarize the facts that the jury could 
have found, reserving pertinent facts for the discussion of the 
defendant's arguments. 
 
The defendant was a drug dealer who, along with his 
associates, Peterson Fleury and Tremaine Hampton, sold drugs 
from a bar.  Approximately two months prior to the killing, 
Fleury sold $1,200 of the defendant's drugs to Sean Cox and was 
given $1,100 in counterfeit money.2  The defendant was angry that 
                     
 
2 The Commonwealth's theory at trial, presented during their 
opening statement, was that Cox purchased the defendant's drugs 
from Peterson Fleury with counterfeit money.  The Commonwealth 
attempted to introduce this evidence through the testimony of 
Tremaine Hampton, Cox, Fleury, and a bartender at the bar, 
Robert Mantell.  However, Hampton's testimony was struck because 
it was hearsay, Cox denied he ever purchased or sold narcotics, 
Fleury denied any transaction involving counterfeit money with 
Cox, and the judge did not permit Mantell to testify to the 
identity of the individual who used counterfeit money.  Although 
3 
 
 
he had been deceived.  He told Hampton that he was "gonna get" 
the person who stole from him. 
 
On January 5, 2010, the victim and Cox were at the bar.  
Fleury, who frequented the bar, briefly talked to the victim and 
Cox and then telephoned the defendant eight times between 5:36 
P.M. and 6:07 P.M.  Fleury told the defendant that Cox and the 
victim were at the bar. 
 
At approximately 6 P.M., the victim and Cox left through 
the rear of the bar to smoke a cigarette.  Shortly thereafter, 
an individual in a dark, hooded sweatshirt approached Cox and 
the victim and shot them.  The victim stumbled back into the bar 
and collapsed.  After Fleury saw the victim lying on the floor 
of the bar, he telephoned the defendant again.  Cox survived the 
shooting, but the victim did not. 
Minutes after the shooting, the defendant arrived at the 
home of Pamela Brown, who lived in an apartment behind the bar 
and had purchased drugs from the defendant in the past.  The 
defendant banged on her door.  Brown thought that strange 
because the defendant always telephoned her before arriving at 
                     
the Commonwealth did not mention Cox as the individual who used 
counterfeit money in its closing argument, defense counsel did.  
In his brief, the defendant also acknowledged and argued against 
the Commonwealth's original theory.  Furthermore, at oral 
argument the defendant conceded that there was sufficient 
evidence presented at trial that Cox was the individual who used 
counterfeit money to purchase the defendant's drugs. 
4 
 
 
her apartment, but he did not do so that day.  Once inside, the 
defendant ran to the bathroom, where he rinsed off his 
sweatshirt and hung it on the door.  Later, he placed the 
sweatshirt in a plastic bag.  The defendant then telephoned 
Hampton and instructed him to go to the bar to see if police had 
arrived, but Hampton did not go. 
Soon after the shooting, the defendant's girlfriend arrived 
at Brown's apartment.  The defendant put the plastic bag holding 
his sweatshirt in his girlfriend's vehicle and placed an 
unidentified object under the passenger's side seat.  The 
defendant's girlfriend drove away. 
Hours later, Hampton and the defendant met in person, where 
the defendant confessed to being the shooter.  The defendant 
repeatedly asked Hampton, "Can I trust you?"  The defendant 
stated:  "[The victim] couldn't make it to the door in time.  I 
shot him and then I shot him again." 
A few weeks later, the defendant again confessed to Hampton 
about the killing.  He said that "if he knew killing was this 
easy, he would have been doing it" and "[i]t was just like 
taking candy from a baby."  The defendant also bragged that 
police would never find his cellular telephone or the gun he 
used in the killing because he had buried them. 
Police recovered three spent nine millimeter shell casings 
outside the rear of the bar, two spent nine millimeter bullets 
5 
 
 
from inside Cox, and another two nine millimeter bullets from 
the door of the bar and inside the bar.  The defendant owned two 
nine millimeter guns.  One of the defendant's guns was chrome 
colored.  A witness at the scene described the gun used in the 
shooting as being silver.  The witness also described the 
shooter as matching the defendant's general characteristics -- 
height and complexion -- and testified that he was wearing a 
dark, hooded sweatshirt.  Multiple other witnesses testified 
that they saw a man who matched the defendant's characteristics, 
and who was wearing dark clothes and a hooded sweatshirt, 
running from the area of the bar toward the area of Brown's 
house shortly after the shooting. 
A home recording surveillance system close to the bar 
captured video footage of a man walking through the area 
immediately after the shooting.  Still photographs from that 
video footage were included in evidence, and both Brown and 
Hampton identified the man in the photographs as being the 
defendant. 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Prior bad acts.  Before trial, the 
Commonwealth filed a motion in limine to allow testimony by 
Hampton and two prior drug customers of the defendant, Scott 
Rounds and Elayne Mahoney.  The Commonwealth sought to admit 
evidence of the defendant's drug distribution both before and 
after the shooting as probative evidence of the defendant's 
6 
 
 
motive to shoot Cox and the victim and as probative evidence of 
his demeanor and state of mind on the night of the killing.  The 
defendant opposed the admission of this testimony, arguing that 
it was bad character evidence and that it was more prejudicial 
than probative.  The judge allowed the admission of the 
testimony.  At trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence from 
Hampton, Rounds, and Mahoney that showed that the defendant was 
a drug dealer. 
The defendant argues that this evidence was admitted 
improperly because it showed that the defendant had a criminal 
propensity or was of bad character.  He further contends that, 
even if any of the evidence was potentially relevant, the 
evidence was more prejudicial than probative, and therefore it 
should not have been admitted.  The Commonwealth argues that the 
evidence was offered for the purposes of establishing the 
defendant's motive as well as his state of mind on the night in 
question.  We conclude that the judge did not abuse his 
discretion in admitting the evidence. 
"It is well settled that the prosecution may not introduce 
evidence that a defendant previously has misbehaved, indictably 
or not, for the purposes of showing his bad character or 
propensity to commit the crime charged, but such evidence may be 
admissible if relevant for some other purpose."  Commonwealth v. 
Helfant, 398 Mass. 214, 224 (1986).  See Mass. G. Evid. § 404(b) 
7 
 
 
(2019).  Such evidence may be admissible to show, for example, 
"a common scheme, pattern of operation, absence of accident or 
mistake, identity, intent, or motive."  Helfant, supra.  "It 
also may be used where evidence of the prior bad acts is 
inextricably intertwined with the description of events . . . of 
the killing" (quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. 
Marrero, 427 Mass. 65, 67 (1998). 
Nevertheless, even if the evidence is relevant to one of 
these other purposes, the evidence will not be admitted if its 
probative value is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice to 
the defendant.  Commonwealth v. Crayton, 470 Mass. 228, 249 
(2014).  See Mass. G. Evid. §§ 403, 404(b)(2).  "Determinations 
of the relevance, probative value, and prejudice of such 
evidence are left to the sound discretion of the judge, whose 
decision to admit such evidence will be upheld absent clear 
error" (citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Dung Van Tran, 463 
Mass. 8, 14–15 (2012).  The effectiveness of limiting 
instructions in minimizing the risk of unfair prejudice should 
be considered in balancing prejudice and probative value.  See 
Commonwealth v. Dunn, 407 Mass. 798, 807 (1990); Mass. G. Evid. 
§§ 105, 403. 
i.  Hampton.  At trial, Hampton testified that he had been 
a friend of the defendant for approximately three years prior to 
the killing.  Shortly after meeting the defendant, Hampton began 
8 
 
 
selling drugs for him.  Hampton testified that, a few months 
before the shooting, the defendant told him that someone used 
counterfeit money to steal the defendant's drugs from Fleury.  
The defendant told Hampton that he was going to "handle it" when 
he saw the person who stole the drugs. 
The evidence of the defendant's activity as a drug dealer 
was highly probative and relevant because it established his 
relationship with Hampton as a friend and drug dealing 
associate, which explained why the defendant would confide in 
Hampton and established a motive for the shooting.  See 
Commonwealth v. Copney, 468 Mass. 405, 414 (2014).  The 
Commonwealth's theory of the case was that Cox stole $1,100 
worth of drugs from the defendant.  One of the defense 
strategies was to point to another drug dealer who sometimes 
worked with the defendant, Andrew Levy, as the perpetrator of 
the killing.  "In these circumstances, it was unavoidable that 
evidence of the defendant's drug business and his interactions 
with his customers would be admitted."  Marrero, 427 Mass. at 
68. 
Moreover, the defendant's statement that he would "handle 
it" indicates the defendant's intent to get revenge for the 
theft.  See Commonwealth v. Almeida, 479 Mass. 562, 568 (2018).  
This evidence was also essential to the Commonwealth's case to 
establish premeditation.  See Commonwealth v. Pagan, 440 Mass. 
9 
 
 
84, 87–88 (2003) (prior bad act evidence admissible to show 
hostile nature toward victim and premeditation of subsequent 
killing); Marrero, 427 Mass. at 68 (evidence of involvement in 
drug dealing business admissible where relevant to motive for 
killing).  Without the evidence that the defendant was a drug 
dealer who sought revenge, "the killing could have appeared to 
the jury as an essentially inexplicable act of violence."  
Commonwealth v Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244, 269 (1982).  The 
Commonwealth is permitted to present a full picture of the 
events surrounding the crime, and the prejudice likely to be 
generated by the admission of this evidence did not outweigh its 
substantial probative value.  See id. at 269-270.  There was no 
error. 
 
ii.  Mahoney.  Mahoney testified that she bought drugs from 
the defendant "[s]ometimes daily, sometimes three or four times 
a week" for approximately ten months leading up to the night of 
the killing.  She claimed that the defendant was always a "nice 
guy," "easy going," "very polite," and punctual.  However, on 
the night of the shooting the defendant acted differently from 
his usual manner.  Mahoney testified that the defendant was late 
to the drug deal, was "anxious," and "wanted to get [the drug 
deal] done and get out of there."  The defendant told Mahoney 
that "some shit just went down" and then, after completing the 
drug deal, told her to "take your shit and go."  Mahoney also 
10 
 
 
testified that it was "[r]eal cold" that night and the defendant 
only was wearing a T-shirt. 
 
Mahoney's testimony was relevant and probative because it 
showed the defendant's state of mind in the immediate aftermath 
of the killing.  See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 427 Mass. 336, 349 
(1998) (evidence that shows defendant's state of mind is 
probative).  The defendant typically was "very polite" and 
"easy-going."  Yet, after the killing, he was anxious and rude.  
The probative value of the defendant's state of mind in the 
immediate moments following the killing is not outweighed by 
cumulative evidence of his low-level drug dealing.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rutherford, 476 Mass. 639, 649 (2017); 
Commonwealth v. Philbrook, 475 Mass. 20, 26-27 (2016). 
iii.  Rounds.  Rounds testified that he had been a customer 
of the defendant for three or four years.  He claimed that the 
defendant had paid his bail when he was incarcerated and that he 
had been incrementally paying the defendant back.  He testified 
that on the night of the shooting he telephoned the defendant 
four or five times to pay the defendant the money he owed.  
Typically, the defendant answered when Rounds telephoned him, 
but on that night, he did not answer his telephone immediately.  
When the defendant finally answered Rounds's telephone call, he 
abruptly ended it. 
11 
 
 
Although Rounds's testimony mostly was cumulative, it 
showed that the defendant was in a hurry on the night of the 
killing and not his usual self.  The judge did not abuse his 
discretion in admitting it.  This evidence was relevant to the 
defendant's state of mind on the night of the killing, and its 
probative value and cumulative nature was not outweighed by its 
potential prejudice to the defendant.  See Wilson, 427 Mass. at 
349. 
In any event, the judge took appropriate steps to minimize 
the impact of the evidence that the defendant was a drug dealer.  
See Commonwealth v. Forte, 469 Mass. 469, 480-481 (2014) (no 
error in admission of prior bad act evidence where, among other 
things, jury instructions minimized potential for prejudicial 
effect); Commonwealth v. Donahue, 430 Mass. 710, 718 (2000) 
(proper jury instructions can render potentially prejudicial 
evidence harmless); Mass. G. Evid. § 105.  During the final jury 
charge, the judge instructed that they could consider the 
evidence of the defendant's prior drug dealing "solely on the 
limited issue of motive and as an explanation of the 
relationships between various other individuals and the 
defendant."3  The jury were instructed not to use the evidence 
                     
3 The complete instruction stated: 
 
"Now, you heard evidence in the case that the defendant 
engaged in illegal drug dealing.  The defendant is not 
12 
 
 
that the defendant was a drug dealer to conclude that he also 
must be guilty of the crimes charged.  We presume that the jury 
followed the judge's instructions.  See Crayton, 470 Mass. at 
251.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Gomes, 475 Mass. 775, 785 (2016) 
(where balance between prejudice and probative value was close, 
contemporaneous limiting instructions persuaded court that bad 
acts evidence was properly admitted). 
Best practice would certainly have been to give a limiting 
instruction at the time the evidence of the defendant's drug 
dealing history was admitted.  See Commonwealth v. Facella, 478 
Mass. 393, 402 (2017).  The timing of a limiting instruction is, 
however, ultimately in the discretion of the trial judge.  See 
Commonwealth v. Carter, 475 Mass. 512, 526 (2016), citing Mass. 
                     
charged with any drug offenses.  So you may not consider 
evidence of illegal drug dealing as a substitute for proof 
that the defendant committed the crimes that are charged.  
Nor may you consider it as proof that the defendant has a 
criminal personality or bad character.  You may consider 
such evidence solely on the limited issue of motive and as 
an explanation of the relationships between various other 
individuals and the defendant.  You should not consider 
that evidence for any other purpose. 
 
"The issue for the jury to decide is whether the 
Commonwealth has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the particular crimes with which he is 
charged; that is, the murder of Darnell Harrison, armed 
assault with intent to murder Sean Cox and unlawful 
possession of a firearm.  You may not use evidence that the 
defendant engaged in illegal drug dealing to conclude that 
he must also have committed the crimes with which he's now 
charged." 
13 
 
 
R. Crim. P. 24 (b), 378 Mass. 895 (1979) (judge has broad 
discretion as to timing of limiting instructions); Commonwealth 
v. Linton, 456 Mass. 534, 551 n.12 (2010) (although "we find it 
preferable that the limiting instruction be given the same day 
as the testimony at issue, we do not find that the delay 
materially diminished the impact of the limiting instruction on 
the jury"); Mass. R. Crim. P. 24 (b) (no limitation on timing of 
instructions).  Here, the defendant did not ask for a 
contemporaneous limiting instruction at trial.  See Commonwealth 
v. Leonardi, 413 Mass. 757, 764 (1992) ("the law does not 
require a judge to give limiting jury instructions regarding the 
purpose for which evidence is offered unless so requested by the 
defendant").  Furthermore, on appeal, the defendant takes no 
issue with the judge's instruction during the final jury charge.  
Regardless, because the question whether the evidence was more 
prejudicial than probative was not particularly close, we 
conclude that there was no substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice from the failure to give a limiting 
instruction at the time the bad act evidence was admitted. 
 
b.  Identification instruction.  During the jury charge 
conference, the Commonwealth and the defendant requested 
instructions regarding the identification evidence that was 
admitted at trial.  The Commonwealth's requested instruction was 
based on the model jury instruction at the time of trial.  The 
14 
 
 
defendant sought an eyewitness instruction that aligned with the 
recent report of the Supreme Judicial Court Study Group on 
Eyewitness Evidence.  In response, the judge stated:  "[B]oth of 
[the requested] instructions . . . have to do with the subject 
of eyewitness identification.  And we don't have any eyewitness 
identification in this case.  We didn't have a witness who took 
the stand and said I saw the shooting."  Denying both the 
Commonwealth and the defendant's requested instructions, the 
judge formulated an instruction based on the type of 
identification that occurred in the case -- Brown and Hampton's 
identification of the defendant from the still images taken from 
security footage near the bar.  The defendant did not object to 
the instruction. 
 
On appeal, the defendant argues that he was prejudiced by 
the judge's decision not to give the defendant's eyewitness 
instruction.  The Commonwealth argues that the judge did not 
abuse his discretion in denying the defendant's instruction 
because there was no eyewitness identification in the case.  We 
agree with the Commonwealth. 
In Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 Mass. 352, 379-388 (2015) 
(Appendix), S.C., 478 Mass. 1025 (2018), we formulated a new 
provisional eyewitness instruction to be given to the jury where 
there was incriminating eyewitness identification testimony 
15 
 
 
offered by a witness.4  Here, not only was this case tried before 
Gomes, see Commonwealth v. Bastaldo, 472 Mass. 16, 23 (2015) 
(provisional eyewitness instruction to be given in trials that 
commence after Gomes), but there was no eyewitness 
identification.  The Commonwealth entered evidence that Brown 
and Hampton, both of whom had an extensive relationship with the 
defendant, identified him from still images taken from a 
security camera near the bar.  There was no witness that 
directly identified the defendant as the assailant.  Other 
witnesses testified to generic details about the defendant's 
height, clothing, and race.  That testimony did not convey 
"details so specific to the defendant that they essentially 
serve as a partial eyewitness identification."  Commonwealth v. 
Johnson, 470 Mass. 389, 395 n.11 (2015).  Thus, because there 
was no identification testimony that incriminated the defendant, 
the judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to give the 
defendant's requested instruction.  Id. at 396-397. 
                     
 
4 The provisional instruction in Gomes updated the 
instruction that was adopted in Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 378 
Mass. 296, 310–311 (1979) (Appendix), S.C., 378 Mass. 296 
(1979), with principles relevant to the evaluation of eyewitness 
testimony for which there is at least a near consensus in the 
relevant scientific community.  Commonwealth v. Gomes, 470 Mass. 
352, 376 (2015), S.C., 478 Mass. 1025 (2018).  We have since 
adopted the Model Jury Instructions on Eyewitness 
Identification, 473 Mass. 1051 (2015), to replace the 
provisional instruction in Gomes. 
16 
 
 
 
c.  Mistrial.  At trial, a State police trooper, Robert 
Klimas, testified on behalf of the Commonwealth.  On the night 
of the killing, Klimas reviewed video surveillance footage taken 
inside and outside the bar.  After conducting witness 
interviews, Klimas testified that there were six people outside 
the bar when the shooting occurred, "including the shooter." 
 The prosecutor asked Klimas, "Who did you identify as being 
outside at the time?"  In response, Klimas named the victim, 
Cox, several other witnesses, and the defendant.  Defense 
counsel immediately moved for a mistrial.  The judge denied the 
motion, but struck the identification testimony and gave a 
forceful curative instruction. 
 
The defendant argues that the judge erred in denying the 
defendant's motion for a mistrial.  We review the decision to 
deny a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion.  See 
Commonwealth v. Bryant, 447 Mass. 494, 503 (2006).  Where a 
party seeks a mistrial in response to the jury's exposure to 
inadmissible evidence, the judge may correctly rely on curative 
instructions as an adequate means to correct any error and to 
remedy any prejudice to the defendant.  Id., quoting 
Commonwealth v. Kilburn, 426 Mass. 31, 37–38 (1997). 
 
We see no abuse of discretion in the judge's decision to 
deny the defendant's motion for a mistrial.  Klimas's testimony, 
in which he identified the defendant as one of the six people 
17 
 
 
who were outside the bar at the time of the shooting, and 
indicated that one of the six was "the shooter," was improper.  
However, the judge immediately corrected the mistake by striking 
the testimony and giving a forceful curative instruction.  See 
Kilburn, 426 Mass. at 38 (no abuse of discretion in denying 
request for mistrial where judge immediately instructed jury to 
disregard improper testimony and there was no reference to 
improperly admitted testimony later in trial); Commonwealth v. 
Chubbuck, 384 Mass. 746, 753 (1981) ("By striking the testimony 
and promptly instructing the jury to disregard it, the judge did 
all that was necessary to cure any possible error from the 
admission of the statement").  We presume that the jurors 
followed the judge's prompt and strongly worded instruction to 
disregard Klimas's identification.  See Commonwealth v. Durand, 
475 Mass. 657, 669 (2016), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 259 (2017). 
Moreover, at the beginning of trial the judge instructed 
the jury that they were not to consider any testimony that he 
struck from the record.  In addition, at the conclusion of 
trial, the judge instructed the jury on the specific 
identification evidence that was before them.  The judge did not 
abuse his discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial. 
3.  Conclusion.  We have reviewed the record in its 
entirety and see no basis to grant extraordinary relief under 
18 
 
 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  For the above reasons, we affirm the 
defendant's convictions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.