Case Title: Yoneda v. Tom. S.Ct. Order Denying Defendant-Appellee Sport Shinko

Citation: 110 Haw. 367

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2006-04-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAT'T

00 =--

 

 

RYAN YONEDA, Plaintiff-Appellant,

ANDREW TOM and SPORTS SHINKO (MILILANI) CO., LID.,
Defendante-Appellees,

and
JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES 1-10; DOB PARTNERSHIPS 1-10;
DOE CORPORATIONS 1-10; ROE “NON-PROFIT”

CORPORATIONS 1-10; and ROE GOVERNMENTAL
ENTITIES 1-10, Defendants.

No. 26271

 

(CIV. No. 01-1-2359-08 DDD)
APRIL 28, 2006
MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY MOON, C.J.
Plaintit¢-appellant Ryan Yoneda appeals from the
circuit Court of the First Circuit's! November 14, 2003 first
amended judgnent, entered pursuant to orders granting summary
judgment in favor of defendants-appellees Andrew Tom and Sports

Shinko (Mililani) Co., Ltd. (Sports Shinko) {hereinafter,

‘The Honorable Dexter D. Del Rosario presided over this matter,

ae
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SS

collectively, the defendants]. Briefly stated, this perscnal
injury action arose out of an accident involving Yoneda, who was
struck in the left eye by an errant golf ball that was hit by
Tom. At the time of the accident, both Yoneda and Tom were
golfing, in separate groups, at the Mililani Golf Course, owned
and operated by Sports Shinko. Essentially, Yoneda contends that
the circuit court erred in granting the defendants’ motions for
summary judgment by (1) applying the assumption of risk doctrine
to bar his negligence claim against Tom and (2) applying the
assumption of risk doctrine to bar his negligence, product
liability, and breach of warranty clains against sports Shinko.

For the reasons more fully discussed infra, we vacate
that portion of the circuit court’s November 14, 2003 first
amended final judgment entered in favor of Sports Shinko and
remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We affirm that portion of the amended final judgment
entered in favor of Tom.

1. BACKGROUND

A. Eactual Backaround

On August 20, 1999, Yoneda was playing golf with his

Prior to the

 

four companions at the Mililani Golf Course,
incident, Yoneda and his group were finishing their play on the

green of the fifth hole. Upon completing their play, Yoneda and
hie group walked to their golf carts at the edge of the green and

drove toward the sixth hole tee-off area, staying on the

 
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designated cart path. Yoneda was a passenger in one of the golf
carts.

‘The Mililani Golf Course rules required all golf carts
to stay on the designated paved-cart paths while heading from the
green to the next tee-off area. According to the description in
the record, the cart path from the fifth hole green to the sixth
hole tee box looped in a "U-turn" behind a restroom building.
After emerging from behind the restroom area, the cart path
becane a straight-away leading to the sixth hole tee off area.

Tom, who was playing in a foursone inmediately behind
the Yoneda group, had apparently teed-off from the fifth tee, and
wae waiting in the fairway for Yoneda’s group to clear the fifth

1 area before continuing to play. Tom was about 175

 

hole gr
yards away from the hole when he hit his approach shot to the

fifth hole green. The ball, however, took flight in an

 

unintended direction. The ball hit the left side of the fairway,
bounced into the rough, bounced again on the dirt area, then
bounced onto the cart path, sending the ball towards the golf
cart in which Yoneda was seated.” Yoneda was struck in the left
eye as his golf cart emerged from behind the restroom building.
Yoneda testified that he did not hear any warning
before he was hit. Tom admitted that he never yelled “fore** or

otherwise gave any warning to Yoneda, nor to anyone else, that he

+ it appears to be common knowledge enong golfers that golf etiquette
requires that a player shove "fore" aa a warning when his or ber shot may
Ghdanger another player-

 

 

 
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had hit an errant shot. He also testified that, because the golf
course's design (i.e., carts being routed behind the restroom
building) prevented him from seeing the cart, he did not yell any
warning of the errant shot.

Yoneda was subsequently rushed to Saint Francis Medical
Center West for emergency medical treatment. Ae a result of the
incident, Yoneda allegedly sustained serious personal injuries to
his left eye, including permanent loss of peripheral vision,
permanent pupil dilation, blurred vision, difficulty focusing,
angel recision glaucoma, traumatic ecchymosis, and retinal edena.
B. Procedural Background

On August 10, 2001, Yoneda filed a complaint against
the defendants, alleging that the acts or omissions of the
defendants caused injury to him. A first amended complaint,
however, was filed on January 29, 2002, apparently to correct
defendant Tom’s name from "Albert Tom" to “Andrew Tom.” Yoneda’ s
complaint alleged: (1) negligence, gross negligence, breach of
express or implied warranties and/or strict liability (count 1);
(2) premises liability (Count 11); and (3) negligent failure “to
Provide safe rental carte for use on the premises as designed,
maintained, and controlled" (Count III). The complaint was
unclear as to whom the claims were asserted against. During his
deposition, however, Yoneda admitted that his only claim against
‘Tom was negligence in failing to make sure the landing area was

clear before hitting the ball and in failing to give a warning of

 
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the errant shot. As to Sports Shinko, Yoneda alleged that Sports
Shinko: (1) is atrictly liable for the defective design of its
golf course, which (a) required golfers, following the 1aid-out
cart path, to face oncoming shots without adequate or reasonable
protection and (b) prevented Tom from seeing anyone near or
approaching the vicinity of hia errant shot; (2) negligently
failed to provide safe rental carts for use on the premises by
failing to equip them with windshields; and (3) had a special
relationship with Yoneda, as an invitee, and, thus, was required
to take greater care by placing warning signs or safety netting
to minimize the risk that golfers will be hit by golf balls.

Tom and Sports Shinko answered the complaint and filed

 

claims against each other. By November 4, 2002, all

parties had filed their pretrial statements. on October 24

 

2002, Tom filed a motion for summary judgment, requesting
dismissal of all clains based on the assumption of risk defense.
Thereafter, on December 20, 2002, Sporta Shinko filed a
substantive joinder to Tom's motion for summary judgnent, seeking
Aismissal of all claims on the grounds that: (a) Yoneda
voluntarily asauned the risk by participating in golfing

activities; (b) Sports Shinko was not grossly negligent; and

 

(c) there is no evidence that Sports Shinko’s golf course or golf
carts were defectively designed. The defendants essentially
contended that, because the negligence claims involved a sport-

related accident, the implied assumption of risk completely

 
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barred Yoneda’s claims, relying upon Foronda v. Hawai’.

International Boxing Club, 96 Hawai'i 51, 25 P.3d 826 (App.
2001), cert, denied, 96 Hawai'i 51, 25 P.3d 626 (2001).

Yoneda filed oppositions to both Ton's motion and
Sports Shinko’s substantive joinder on December 30, 2002 and
January 6, 2003, respectively. Yoneda argued that the implied
assumption of risk was abolished as a defense by this court in
Laxsen_v. Pacesetter Systems, Inc., 74 Haw. 1, 837 P.2d 1273
(1992). He further maintained that the following were disputed
questions of fact that could not be decided as a matter of law:

(2) whether being struck by a golf ball was an “inherent risk" of

 

golf; (2) whether Tom increased the risk of injury by his
conscious and reckless failure to warn Yoneda of his errant shot;
and (3) whether sports Shinko increased the risk of injury by ite
defective designs of the golf course and golf cart. Yoneda,

relying upon Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A (1965), quoted

infxa, also argued that, because sports Shinko, as possessor of

, it cannot

 

land, has a special relationship with him, as invit

evade the higher duty of care it owned to him by relying on the

 

jumption of risk defen
A hearing was held on January 8, 2003, wherein the
circuit court entertained both motions for sumary judgment. At

the conclusion of the hearing, the court indicated that:

 
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with respect to defendant Tom, the court is in
agreement with (Ton'a] position and persuaded by the pointe
ang authorities cited in [ene] memorandum. For that
feason[,] the court ie going to grant ene notion for summary
judgment.

With respect to Sports Shinko’s motion, the court is
going to take that under advisement. And after our
Feceas[,] 1 would like to have an opportunity to meet with
Counsel in chanbers regarding thie matter.

 

Ultimately, the circuit court, on January 21, and 22, 2003,
iesued its written orders granting summary judgment in favor of
‘Tom and Sports Shinko, respectively.

on April 1, 2003, Yoneda appealed the March 3, 2003
judgment. ‘This court, however, dismiased the appeal on August 5,
2003 for lack of appellate jurisdiction because the final
judgment “failfed] to state that the judgment in favor of

defendant Sports shinko is a judgment on all of [Yoneda’s] claims

 

against Sports Shinko.* A first amended final judgment was then

entered on November 14, 2003. Therein, the circuit court entered
judgment in favor of the defendants and dismissed the defendants’
eross-claims ag moot. On December 9, 2003, Yoneda timely filed
his notice of appeal in the instant case.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
‘The standard of review regarding a grant of summary
judgment is well established:

[s)ummary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with affidaviea, if aay, show that there ia
no genuine isaue as to any material fact and that the moving
Party ie entitled to judgment as a matter of lav. A fact ie
Baterial 1f proof of that fact would have the effect of
feablighing or refuting one of the
cause of action or defense asserted by the parties. The
evidence mist be viewed in the Light most favorable to the
hon-noving party.” In other words, we must view all of the
evidence ang the interferences drawa therefron in the Light
host favorable to the party opposing the motion.

 

 

   

 
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Querubin v, Thronas, 107 Hawai'i 48, 56, 109 P.3d 689, 697 (2005)
(citations omitted) (brackets in original). ‘We review an award

of sunmary judgment under the same standard applied by the
circuit court." Amfac, Inc, v. Waikiki Beachcomber Inv. Co., 74
Haw. 85, 104, €39 P.2d 10, 22 (1992). We, therefore, review the
record de nove. Yamagata v, State Farm Mut, Auto Ins, Co., 107
Hawai'i 227, 229, 112 P.3d 713, 715 (2005) (*We review the
circuit court’s grant or denial of summary judgment de nove.”
(Citation omitted.)). Under the de novo standard, “we examine
the facts and answer the question without being required to give
any weight to the trial court’s answer to it." Chun v, ad. of
‘Tra. of Employees’ Ret. Sys., 92 Hawai'i 432, 439, 992 P.2d 127,

134 (2000) (internal quotation marke and citations omitted) .
TIT, pIscUSsION
‘The parties do not dispute the essential facts of this

with respect to the circumstances that led to Yoneda’s

 

injury. The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the
assumption of risk doctrine applies and, if so, whether Yoneda’s
claims against the defendants are barred as a matter of law.
A, The Agsumption of Risk Doctrine
1. An Overview of the Doctrine
raen v. Pai ne., 74 Haw. 1, 837

P.2d 1273 (1992),? this court delineated two components of the

 

‘tion brought by the recipient of a

‘as a result of complications due to

‘Sventually renoved from the recipient
(continued. <-)

+ uargen is a product Liability
heart pacenaker against the manutactu:
potsible malfunction. The pacemaker wi

 

    

 
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assumption of risk doctrine, i.c., express" and “implied”

assumption of risk. Id. at 35, 837 P.2d at 1290. Express

 

assumption of risk involves an express waiver or release, as by
contract or written waiver. Id. Inasmuch as the instant case
does not involve any express waiver or release, our discussion is

focused upon the second component -- implied assumption of risk.

 

In Larsen, this court state:

implied assumption of risk has been used in the
context of negligence cases £0 describe two distinct
theories under waien a defendant may avoid lability. The
Sprimary" sense of implied assumption of risk eserged, along
with the global doctrine itself, cut of the common law
ction of a servant agsinet hie waster. Used in ite primary
Sense, assumption of risk describes the act of a plaintift,
iho has entered voluntarily and reasonably into some
Telation with a defendant, which plaintiff knows to involve
the risk. It ie an alternative expression of the
proposition that a defendant owes no duty toa
plaintife.

 

 

  

 

 

 

Tn its “secondary” sense, implied assumption of risk
focuses on a plaintiff's conduct, and describes a situation
where plaintif® knows of the danger presented by

 

Getendant’s negligence and proceeds voluntarily and
Unreasonably te encounter df. A plaintiff's assunption of
Fisk le unreasonable, and a form of contributory negligence,
inere the kaows risk of harm is great relative to the
Ueitiey of plaintift’s conduct. Te ie implied assumption of
‘lek in this secondary sense, i.e.[.] unreasonable
‘sumption of risk, that has been merged with comparative
igence by the decisions of this court in products
Liapiliey cas

We conclude that exprese assumption of risk survive
the merger with comparative negligence in products Liability
asen and hold that express assumption of risk is available
So's separate defense that may DaY plaintiff's recovery in
fort and warranty strict proddcts liability actions
Express assumption of risk is essentially contractual in
hature and does not conflict with the basic concept of
apportionment under comparative fault involving negligence.

 

 

      

   

 

 

 

 

 

Id. at 35-36, 837 P.2d at 1290-91 (bold emphases added)
(citations and other emphasis omitted). With respect to implied
assumption of risk, however, this court noted that the

2(. ,scontinued)
when it waa recalled by the manufacturer

 
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application of primary implied assumption of risk is absurd in

the context of ‘implied warranty and strict products liability

tort actions":

 

‘The concept of reasonable primary implied assumption of risk
makes sense in the products liability context under one set
Of circumstances "- where plaiacifé Ye injured while |
Feasonably using a product that is not dafectiva,

plaintiff bas reasouably assumed the Fisk of being cut while
Using an ordinary knife. However, a6 applied to a

product, the concept is absurd; if a plaintiff ia injured
While reasonably using a defective product, a defendant
Should not be relieved of iiability.  Indecd, a detective
product is one that causes injury wien it is used ina
Feasonable manner, and the tort and implied warranty.
doctrines of products Liabiliey were designed to compensate
plaintiffs for these very injuries. We therefore decline to

 

 

 

 

   

fly duplicates the
‘F potent ial to gene

 

fe confusion

   

Id. at 38, 837 P.2d at 1292 (emphases in original). The Larsen

 

court then concluded that secondary implied assumption of risk
was subsumed in, and therefore merged with, the concept of

comparative negligence:

‘To the extent that there may be unreasonable primary implied
assumption of risk, we find that the policy it represents --
the notion that no duty ia owed ~- has been rendered invalid
by the merger of comparative negligence and implies

jumption of risk. We consequentiy hold that in implied
warranty and strict products liability tort actions, the
Concept of primary implied assumption of risk is abolished,
and [secondary] implied agsumption of risk provides
defense to Liability only when plaintiff's “assumption of
Fisk" La a form of contributory negligence.

 

 

 

 

 

Ad, at 38-39, 837 P.2d at 1292 (emphasis added) (footnote and
citations omitted). Thus, by its declaration in Larsen, this

court has joined

those courts that have abolished primary inplied aseuaption
of rik i

actions for personal injury and have retained secondary

implied assumption of risk solely as a form of contributory
negligence to be compared against defendant's fault.

 

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Id. at 37, 637 P.2d at 1291 (emphasis added). Inasmuch as the

case before us involves an action for personal injury resulting
from being hit in the eye by an errant golf ball, we next examine
the implied assumption of risk doctrine in the context of
recreational sports in general and golfing in particular.

2. Recreational sporting Events and the Implied
Assumption of Risk Doctrine

a. await aw
In Foronda v. Hawai'i International Boxing Club, 96

Hawai'i 51, 25 P.3d 826 (App. 2001), the Intermediate Court of
Appeals (ICA) recognized that Larsen’s “cabined rationale and
holding" essentially “eliminated primary implied assumption of
risk as a discrete defense only in the product liability
context." Id, at 60, 25 P.3d at 835 (emphasis added). The ICA
further noted that Larsen clearly acknowledged that primary
implied assumption of risk has been seen ina "case in which a
plaintiff has been injured as a natural incident of engaging in a
contact sport. Tt may also be seen in the act of a spectator
entering a baseball park, thereby consenting that the players
proceed without taking precautions to protect her from being hit
by the ball,” id. at 59, 25 P.3d at 834 (quoting Larsen, 74 Haw.

at 36-37, 837 P.2d at 1291), and that such reference “indicates

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that the doctrine retains its essential vitality there.*t id. at
60, 25 P.3d at 835

In Foronda, a boxer, while sparring, fell through the
ropes of the boxing ring to the concrete flooring, striking his
head, and died. Id, at 54-55, 25 P.3d at 829-30. Consequently,
the parents of the deceased boxer filed a complaint against an
amateur boxing club and the boxing xing’s owner and operator for
causing their son’s death. The parents alleged that their son's
death was the result of negligent construction, maintenance, and
lack of supervision of the boxing ring. The court held that
jumption of risk is a discrete and complete
defense where the defendant’s conduct at issue is an inherent
riok of the sports activity.” Id. at 66, 25 P.3d at 835, 841

@ added) (footnote omitted). The ICA explained that:

 

“(plrimary implied

 

(empha:

 

“The oronds court further explained that:

Shortly after Larsen wae decided, the United states
(plistrict [Clourt for tne (D]istrict of Hawaii, in

 

Tanerediv. Dive Yakal Guaxtera, 623 7. supp. 77— (0. Hal.)
i953),

Haw[-] 1995), a diving fatality case,
Concluded that
eased imal on of Fisk

 

F.Supp. 120 (D.
Giscussed Larsen and

 

vide at 788
(footnote oaitted). Secauge It was eittang in diversity,
the federal court exercised its “best judgment in
predicting" that “the Havai'i Supreme Court vould allow the
Gefense [of prinary implied ascurption of risk] in an
appropriate sports-related case.” Jd. (citation and
‘internal quotation marke omitted) -

 

 

Ad. at 60, 25 7.34 at 635 (some brackete in original) (emphasis added).

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‘the doctrine has been divided into several categories
but ae the ters applies to sporting evente it involves what
Comentators call primary" assumption of risk. Risks in
thie category are incidental to a relationship of fr
‘Seociation petween the defendant and the plaintitt
Sense that either party i

 

 

     

a
ise be
crivi ath aa pi
eye fete ais ry
St
rt Ween thus analyzed

ini applied, assunption of risk is not an absolute defense
but avmearure of the defendant's duty of care(.1

Id. at 62, 25 P.3d at 637 (quoting Turcotte v, Fell, 502 N.B.24
964, 968 (N.Y. 1986)) (emphasis added). The inquiry into what
constitutes an inherent risk "is an objective one, and must be,
for the vagaries of prior knowledge or perception of risk would

undermine the doctrine:

 

underlying policy{] that the law should
not place unreasonable burdens on the free and vigorous
participation in eports(.J* Id. at 67, 25 P.3d 842 (emphasis
added) (internal quotation marke and citation omitted) .

“(T]he defense applies to those injury-causing events

which are known, apparent or reasonably foreseeable consequences

 

of the participation[,] except for acts which are reckless or

intentional." Id, at 62, 25 P.3d at 837 (citation and internal

quotation marke omitted) (some brackets in original).

In determining whether the defendant's conduct is an
Inherent risk of the eporte activity, we consider the nature
af the activity. the relationship of the defendant to the
i 7 defendant £0
eat suntenancing Fisk: 7

in Ewa iisbie for reckless
Batten activity tavolved in the-sport, but liability

Should aot place Unreasonable burdens oa the free and
Vigorous participation of the sport.

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OO

Id. at 66, 25 P.3d at 841 (emphasis added). applying the above

 

standard to the defendant boxing ring owner and operator, the
Foronda court determined, inter alia, that (1) the risk of
falling between boxing ring ropes was an inherent risk of the
sport of amateur boxing and (2) the evidence was insufficient to
show that the owner or operator had increased the risk of the

sport beyond the inherent risk, With respect to the alleged

 

defective ring, -- that is, the fact that two “spacer ties" were
looped around the ropes and taped rather than tied, as well ai
the lack of padding on the floor outside the ring, -- the court
noted, inter alia, that “(t]he undisputed evidence before the
circuit court showed that no specific standards existed for
amateur sparring or practice sessions[,]* and it appeared that,
in renovating and maintaining the ring, the defendant reduced

rather than increased the risks inherent in the sport. Id. at

 

68, 25 P.3d at 843. Accordingly, the court concluded that the
looping and taping of the spacer ties and the lack of padding on
the floor outside the ring, ‘whether negligent or not, did not
create a new risk or increase the inherent risk of sparring, and
hence, cannot negate [the defense of) assumption of risk.” Id.
at 69, 25 P.3d at 644 (emphasis added)

Clearly, Yoneda’s contention that (1) Larsen abolished
the defense as to all types of cases, including negligence cases
and that, therefore, (2) the circuit court erred in agreeing with

the defendants that Foronda took precedence over Larsen where the

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negligence clains involved a sport related action is unfounded.
‘The expressed narrow holding of Larsen and the ICA's ruling in
Foronda that “primary implied assumption of risk remains a
discrete and conplete defense in sports injury cases{,]" 96
Hawai'i at 61, 25 P.3d at 636, are controlling.

increasing the inherent risk: California

case law

 

In the absence of Hawai'i case law, the court in
Foronda examined the law in other jurisdictions, including
california, addressing the application of the doctrine of
assumption of risk in the context of recreational sports. See
Foronda, 96 Hawai‘ at 58-66, 25 P.3d at 833-41, We believe that
a discussion of some of the cases relied upon by the ICA in
Foronda, as well as other California cases, is warranted here.

We begin with the general rule that a business owner
owes a duty to an invitee to exercise ordinary care for the
invitee’s safety and protection. See Doe v, Grosvenor Props.
Jiiawai'i) Lt., 73 Haw. 158, 162-65, 829 P.2d 512, 514-16 (1992);
Wolak v, State, 68 Haw. 299, 301, 711 P.2d 1300, 1301 (1986).

 

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A (1965) provide:

(2) A common carrier is under a duty to ite
passengers to take reasonable action
Ts) to protect then against unreasonable risk of
physical harm, and
co) 2'Give chen firet aid after ir knows or has
reason to know that they are 111 or injured, and
fo care for then until chey can be cared for by

 

 

others
(2) an dankeper da under @ similar duty to his
guests
in
wublic is und =. Tie wt

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(a). one who is required by law to take or who
voluntarily takes the custody of another under circumstances
Such ae to deprive the other of his normal opportunities for
protection is under a similar duty to the other.

 

 

(Emphasis added.)* A business owner's duty includes a duty to
warn an invitee of latent or concealed defects, of which the

owner knows or should have knowledge. Kole v, ANFAC, Inc., 69

owner is not

 

Haw. 530, 533, 750 P.2d 929, 931 (1988). A busines

safety, but does have a duty to

 

an insurer of the inviti
exercise reasonable care to protect against unreasonable risks of
ble harm. Gelber v, Sheraton-iawaii Corp., 49 Haw. 327,

329, 417 P.2d 638, 639 (1966).

Fores

 

In a sports context, however, conditions or conduct
that otherwise might be interpreted as unreasonably dangerous are
often an integral part of the aporting activity, ive, an
inherent risk. See Bundechu v ah, 768 N.B.24 1215, 1222
(ohio ct. App. 2002) (an errant golf ball deflected back into the
participant's playing field on a golf driving range is considered
part of the inherent risks of the sport). For example, the

California Supreme Court in its leading, well-regarded opinion in

Knight v, Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992), observed that,

tion 314A(3), izes, the
festatenent (Second) of Torts

 

+ the "special relationship" set forth ine
“invitee exception,” is further explained by the
332, (1965) as follows:

 

 

 

(2) An invitee Le either a public invitee or a busin
visitor.
(2) A public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or
remain on land as a menber.of the public for a purpose for
which the land is held open to the public

(2). A business visitor ta a peraon who io invited to enter
or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly
Connected with business dealings With the possessor of the

sna

 

 

 

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“although moguls[, which ae “bump[s] or mound[s] of hard snow,”
‘The Random House College Dictionary 858 (1979 rev. ed.),] ona
ski run pose a risk of harm to skiers that might not exist were
these configurations removed, the challenge and risks posed by
the moguls are part of the sport of skiing, and @ ski resort has
no duty to eliminate them." Id, at 708 (citation omitted)
‘Thus, “(elven where the plaintiff, who falls while skiing over a
mogul, is a total novice and lacks any knowledge of skiing
whatsoever, the aki resort would not be liable for his or her
injuries.” Id. at 709. In thie respect, the nature of a sport
is highly relevant in defining the duty of care owed by the
particular defendant-owner. The Knight court further explained
chat:

Although defendants generally have po legal duty to

eliminate (oF protect a plaineit® against) risks inherent in
the aport iteelf, it is well eetablished that defendante
senerally éo-have 9 duty to ume due care not to increase the
Hicks toa participant over and above those innérent in the
Sport, Thos, sithough a ski resort has no duty to renove
Regula from a ski run, it clearly does have a duty to use
ue care to maintain ite towropes [(used in the operation of
{ee ski iigee)) in a safe, working condition #0 a not £0
expose akiera to an increased risk of harm. The cases

ibidah that the Latter type of risk, posed by « ski
Yesort's negligence, clearly is not a risk inherent in the
port) chat ie assumed by a participant

 

 

 

 

 

 

Xd, at 708 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, ‘even
where the plaintiff actually is aware that a particular ski
resort on occasion has been negligent in maintaining its
towropes, that knowledge would not preclude the skier from
recovering if he or she were injured as a result of the resort’s
repetition of such deficient conduct.” Id. at 709. tn other
words, although the plaintiff may have acted with the knowledge

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of the potential negligence, he or she did not consent to such
negligent conduct or agree to excuse the resort from liability in
the event of such negligence. Accordingly, the Kniaht court held
that, *[elather than being dependent on the knowledge or consent

of the particular plaintiff, resolution of the question of the

legal duty to avoid such conduct or to protect the plaintiff
against a particular risk of harm." Id. (emphasis added).

Nevertheless, because Knight dealt with a defendant who
was a participant in a touch football game in which the plaintiff
was engaged at the time of her injury, the court went further to
determine the liability between co-participants. The court
concluded that it was improper to hold a sports participant
Liable to a co-participant for ordinary careless conduct
committed during the sport, but that liability properly may be
imposed on a participant when he or she intentionally injures

in reckless conduct that is totally

 

another player or enga

 

outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport.
Ed. at 710. ‘The court explained that,

in the heat of an activi
football,

 
    
 

Chilled sf legal liability were to be imposed on a
participane on the basis of his or her ordinary carelé
conduct... (I]n such a sport, even when a participant's
Conduct violates a rule of the game and may subject the
Violator to internal sanctions prescribed by the spore
itself, imposition of legal Liability for auch conduct might
well alter fundamentally the nature of the sport by
Geterring participants from vigorously engaging in activity.
that falle close to, but on the permigsible side of, a
prescribed rule.

 

 

 

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*** FOR PUBLICATION *** .

 

Id. (emphasie in original). Consequently, the court concluded
that inherent in an “active” sport, such as touch football or

baseball, ie a risk one player will injure another through

 

or negligent play and that those risks are subsumed

 

care:
under primary assumption of risk.

eral years after Knight, the California Court of

 

Appeals had occasion to flesh out the theory of primary implied
assumption of risk in Bushnell v, Japanese-American Religious and
Cultural ctr., 50 Cal. Rptr, 24 671 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). In
Bushnell, a student of judo (the plaintiff) was practicing a

routine with his instructor at a judo club. After running

the

 

through the routine two dozen times at increasing speed:
student, with the instructor as his partner, tripped and broke
his leg. The plaintiff sued the judo club, claiming that it was
liable for the negligence of its instructor. He alleged that the
speed with which he was led through the routine was excessive.
Because the judo club was named as a defendant, the
Bushnell court had the opportunity to revisit Knight -- a case
decided only with respect to co-participants in the sport and not
sport facility owners. In so doing, the court enunciated a
general rule applicable in all cases and to all defendants:

[z]a all cases{,] the nature of the activity, the
relationship of the defendant to the activity and the
Felationship of the defendant to the plaintiff must be

 

cxanines,
serivi Zengant
uct s = wvity uch
ies
sabiliey attac! eh defendant’
condue iaherent inthe activieye

-1s-
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es rt charged wit wv to take

Ghilliag effect on the nature of the activicy.
Id. at 674 (emphasis added). Thus, the Bushnell court held that

repetitive training at increasing speed is an inherent part of

the sport such as judo. The court explained that:

 

Instruction in an activity such as judo necessarily requires
Pushing a student to move wore quickly, attempt a new nove,

br take gone other action that the student previously may
ot have attempted. That an instructor might ask a student
fo do more than the student can manage is an inherent risk
Of the activity. absent evidence of recklesanes®, of other

Tisk-inckeasing conduct, Liability should not be ieponed
Eimply because an inetricror asked the student £0 take

action bevend what. with hindeicht. is found to have been
‘Hie _atadent’s abilities. To hold cthemise vould discourace
‘instructors tron requiring students to stretch. and thus to

‘port as a whole:
Id. at 675 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the California court

 

 

 

of Appeals has adhered to the principle that *[a] risk is
inherent in a sport if its elimination (1) would chill vigorous
participation in the sport (] and (2) would alter the fundamental
nature of the activity.” Sanchez v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 128
Cal. Rptr. 24 529, 536 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Ferrari v.
ges ies, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 65, 67-8 (Cal. Ct. App.
1935))

In the context of the sport of golf, the California
Court of Appeals, in Dilger v, Moyles, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 591 (Cal.

Ce. App. 1997), specifically explained that

 

yysically denanding as other
Retball or football, risk
inherent in the sport. Hitting a golf ball
aba bish cate of aneed involves the very reat -ponsihl
‘fiat-the bail will take tlicht in an unintended erection

ore? in the sport of shots go awry 1

 
 

 

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Holding participants liable for sissed hits vould only

‘sncourade jawiuite and deter plavera trom enioving the
fbert. Golf oftere any healthful advantages to both the
Golfer and the community. the physical exercise in the
fresh air with the smell of the pines and eucalyptus renews
the spirit and refreshes the body. The sport offers an
Spportunity for recreation with friends and the chance to
Sect other citizens with like interests. A foursone can be
Divery social event, relieving each golfer of the str
Se"Bubsnese and everyday urban lif

by the scenic green belts golf brings to their communities
and wild Lite enjoy and flourish in'a friendly habitat.
Social policy dictates that the law should not discourage
participation in such an activity whose benefit to the
Pheividual player and to the community at large are so
great

Id. at 593 (footnote omitted) (emphases added); see algo Am. Golf
Corp. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d
683 (cal. Ct. App. 2000); Bundachu v. Naffah, 768 N.B.2d 1215
(onic Ct. App. 2002); Neumann v. Shlansky, 294 N.¥.S.2d 628, 635

(v.¥, 1968) (declaring that ‘a golf ball is a dangerous missile

      

 

capable of inflicting grievous harm no matter who hits it”).

Additionally, a year before Bushnell, the California
court of Appeale had an opportunity to apply the Knight
principles to golfing activities and, in particular, to the owner
and operator of a golf course. The court in Morgan v, Puii
Country USA, Inc,, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 249 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995),
declared that the duty owed by a golf course owner to a golfer is
to provide a reasonably safe golf course. Id, at 253. This duty
requires the golf course owner

to mininize the risk that players will be hit by golf balls,

faa, by che way the various Cees, fairways and greens are

Stighed or separated. in certain areas of « golf course,

Because of the slignnent or separation of the tee(s),

fairway (a) and/or ar
have # cuty to provic

with golf baile where the greatest danger existe and where
Such an occurrence is reasonably to be expectedl.]

 

   

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*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

4d. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, as
the court in Knight held, sport facility owners/operators
“generally have no legal duty to eliminate (or protect a
{participant} against) risks inherent in the sport itself .
fut] do have a duty to use due care not to increase the risks to
@ participant over and above those inherent in the sport.”
Knight, 834 P.2d at 708.

In Morgan, the plaintiff-golfer was a member of the
defendant -golf course and golfed two to three times per week.
The plaintiff asserted that he observed (1) golf balls hit from
the fourth tee fly over the large pine tree (located near the
area of the fifth tee) and land on either the fifth tee or the
adjacent fifth green and (2) many times balls hit from the fourth
tee get caught in the boughs of the tree. He testified that, to
protect himself from flying golf balls, he “would routinely stand
underneath this particular (large pine] tree if other golfers
ahead of him had not yet cleared the fifth tee area." 1d, at
250. A few months prior to plaintiff’s accident, the golf course

owner removed the tree because it became diseased. After the

 

removal of the tree, the plaintiff testified that he saw at least
four golf balls hit from the fourth tee alnost strike golfers who
were standing on the fifth tee box. He stated that ‘the balls
hit from the fourth tee traveled farther after [the defendant]
renoved the tree[,]* presumably because golf balls would

previously have been deflected or caught in the branches. Id.

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*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

on the day of the accident, the plaintiff walked from the fifth
tee box to a bench alongside the cart path to return to his golf
cart and bag after he had finished his turn. While putting away
his club, the plaintiff was hit on the head by an errant golf
ball hit from the fourth tee. The ball had bounced on the cart
path before hitting the plaintiff. when the ball hit the
plaintiff, he was standing on the cart path in front of the bench
where he had left his golf bag, which was located near the fifth
tee

Subsequently, the plaintiff sued the golf course for
damages on the grounds of negligence, as well as premises and
landowner’s Liability. ‘The trial court granted sunmary judgment
in favor of the golf course on the basis that primary assumption

claims. on

 

of riek operated as a complete bar to the plaintiff
appeal, the California Court of Appeals reversed the trial

was one involving

 

court's order, concluding that the c:
secondary assumption of risk. Id, at 253 (noting, however, that
“if the relationship between the parties was one of co-
participants, i.e., if the defendant here were the golfer who hit
the errant ball, this would clearly be a primary assumption of
the risk case under Knight and the defendant would have no
Liability towards [the plaintiff] because there is an inherent
risk that the defendant would hit an errant ball"). The court
determined that the evidence that the area of the fifth tee was a

particularly dangerous place, due to the design of the fourth and

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fifth tees and the removal of the diseased tree, could support a
finding that the golf course owner breached the duty of care owed
to the plaintiff. Id.; see also Saffro v. Elite Racing, inc.,
319 Cal. Rptr. 24 497 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that
secondary assumption of risk applies to a suit between a marathon
runner, who suffered epileptic seizure after a race, and the race
organizer, who had a duty to minimize the risks of dehydration
and hyponatremia by providing adequate water and electrolyte
fluids along the 26-mile course).

Similarly, the California Court of Appeals in Branco v.
Kearny Moto Bark, Inc., 43 Cal. Rptr. 24 392 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995), applied the secondary assumption of risk doctrine to
preclude sunmary judgment in favor of the owners of a bicycle
moto cross (BMX) course, which consists of bumps, jumps, turns,
straight-aways, and obstacles. tn that case, a bicycle racer
(the plaintiff) sought damages from a corporation and its
officers, which owned the property used for the BMX course, for
injuries incurred while executing a jump.

The court first noted that:

rt 18 not unreasonable to expect 2 BMX course to
refrain from utilizing jumps which by design create an
Gxtrene risk of injury. Certainly the jumps, and falle, are
inherent’ to the sport, and(,) under the doctrine of prinary
assumption of risk, there ss no duty to eliminate the jumps
entirely, and no duty to protect from injury arising from
reasonably desisned junpe.

Id. at 398. However, the court held that:

   

 

‘uty not to urilize

Recordingly. premised on ti
falle under the

dangerously designed jumps, this cal

   

 

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lcondary assumption of risk category, and issues pertaining
fo the plaintit#'a] comparative fault are for the trier of
Eact to decide. [The plaintiff's) expert's opinions
Eegarding the deaign of the jump create a triable issue of
aterial fact vhether’ [the jump) was designed in such a way
fe to create an extreme risk of injury.

 

     

 

Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) .

More recently, the California Court of Appeals has

stated that:
If the plaintiff fails to show any increase in the inherent
‘igke. orif the trial court determines that the only riak
‘f:neoullbered were inherest_in the sport, the defendant
Brevaiis baled of primary assumotion of risk. It the tury,
Broperly instructed on the scope of the defendants duty.
ion of Fisk 36 etlte's

rmination of duty,
fourt's determination
by defining

‘Somparative fauie, This second a
Rowever, still hinges upon the tri
of the question of duty in the #4
the risa inherent in the sport at i

 

    

Vine v, Bear v. 13 Cal. Rptr. 34 370, 362 (cal. ct.
App. 2004) (citations, internal quotation marks, and footnote
omitted) (emphasis added); see, e.g., Am. Golf Corp., 93 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 683 (rejecting the plaintiff's contention that his
case fell under the secondary assumption of risk doctrine,
thereby, entitling him to a jury trial on the issue of
comparative fault, where the plaintiff had not proved that the
golf course owner’s placement of yardage markers increased the
inherent risk of players being struck by a golf ball that
vicocheted off a marker). Thus, although primary assumption of

after all,

 

risk operates as a complete bar to liability
without duty, there can be no liability -- secondary assumption
of risk is simply part of the comparative negligence doctrine, in

which “both a defendant's breach of a legal duty to the plaintiff

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and the plaintiffs voluntary decision to engage in an unusually
risky sport" are weighed by the jury to reach an equitable
apportionment of fault. Knight, 834 P.2d at 707; Vine, 13 cal.
Rptr. 3d at 384. Keeping these foregoing principles in mind, we
now turn to the dispositive issues presented by this appeal
B. The Grant of the Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judament

As previously indicated, the specific inquiries before
this court are: (1) whether being hit by a golf ball is an
inherent risk of recreational golf; and (2) whether the
assumption of risk doctrine bars (a) Yoneda’s negligence claim
against Tom and (b) Yoneda’s negligence, product liability, and
breach of warranty claims against Sports Shinko so as to warrant
summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

1. ‘The Inherent Risk in Golf

Whether a duty exiete depends on whether the activity
in question was an “inherent risk" in the sport. Based on our
discussion supra, we hold that there is an inherent risk that
golf participants will be hit by errant shots. See Dilaer, 63
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 593; Am. Golf Corp., 93 Cal. Rptr. 24 at 689;
Bundschu, 768 N.5.2d at 1222.

2. Assumption of Risk as Applied to Tom
Although Foronda was not a co-participant case, the ICA

recognized the reasoning of the Knight court that

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‘a participant in an active sport breaches a legal duty of
Gare to other participants -- Lie,, engages in conduct that
Sroperiy may subject him or her to financial Liability

 

 

   

ope fEhae eck

‘Suiside the range of the ordinary activity in the spoxt.
Foronda, 96 Hawai'i at 65, 25 P.3d at 940 (quoting Knisht, 624

 

P.2d at 711). In applying the principle of Knight, the
California courts have specifically adopted different standards
for the co-participant as opposed to the owner of a recreational
facility. The co-participant is liable only for intentional or

reckless conduct. Dilger, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 594 (applying the

 

recklessness or intentional conduct standard of care to golf);

 

 

Mark v. Moser, 746 N.E.2d 410 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (applying the
standard to a triathlon); Ritchie-Gamester v, City of Berkley,
597 N.W.2d 517 (Mich. 1999) (applying the standard to an ice
skating collision); Thompson v, McNeil, 559.N.&. 24 705 (Ohio

Potzler v, Tuttle, 449

 

1990) (applying the standard to golf!
N.W.2d 774 (Web. 1990) (applying the standard to a pick-up
Connell v, Payne, 814 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. App.

1991) (applying the standard to a polo match).

basketball game!

 

Two important considerations support the decision to
apply a standard of care that exceeds negligence, that is, the
reckless and intentional conduct standard of care: (1) the
promotion of vigorous participation in athletic activities; and
(2) the avoidance of a flood of litigation generated by

participation in recreational games and sports. See Mark, 746

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N.E.2d at 419, As the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Schick v.

Ferolite, 767 A.2d 962 (N.J. 2001), explained:

our conclusion that a recklessness standard is the
appropriate one te apply in the aporte context is founded on
more than s concern fora court's abilicy to discern
[dequately what constitutes reasonable conduct under the
highly varied circumstances of informal sporte activity”

‘The heightened standard will more likely result in affixing
Lispiliey for conduct that ie" clearly unreasonable and
unacceptable fron the perspective of those engaged in the
‘port yet leaving free the supervision of the law the risk-
Iaden Conduct that is inherent in sports and more often than
‘not aesumed to he “part of the game.”

‘One might well conclude that something ie terribly
wrong with a society in which the nose comoniy-necapted
Aspects of play ~~ « traditional source of a community's
conviviality and cohesion -- spurs litigation. The
heightened recklessness standard recognizes « commonsense
distinction between excessively harmful conduct and the more
routine rough-and-tunble of sports that should occur freely
on the playing fields and should not be gecond-guessea in

 

 

 

 

 

Id. at 965 (citation omitted).
Accordingly, absent intentional or reckless conduct,
the doctrine of primary assumption of risk is a bar to an action
by one participant against another participant if the action
involved an inherent risk of the activity. In other words, a
participant owes no duty to a co-participant for actions
involving an inherent risk, unless he or she intentionally
injures another player or his or her conduct was sufficiently

recklesa to be outside the normal or ordinary part of the game.‘

 

© We note that, although the circuit court apparently grounded ite
conclusion upon the incorrect inquiry as to whether the co-participant’
Alleged negligent conduct increased the risk of injury to anather participant,
we, nevertheless, reach the same conclusion aa did the clreuit court whet
Epplying the recklessness or intentional conduct standard to this case.

 

     

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ee

Here, Yoneda was not in the line of Tom’s play; nor was
Yoneda in a location where any one could reasonably believe that
he was in danger of being struck by a ball being hit from the
fairway towards the green of the fifth hole. It was not until
after the ball was hit and bounced several times in the direction
that it did, just as Yoneda came around the restroom building,
that any one thought it necessary to shout a warning, by which
time it was too late. Tom admitted that he did not see Yoneda
until after Yoneda emerged from behind the restroom building and
that, by then, he could not timely warn Yoneda of the errant

shot, Inasmuch aa Yoneda adduced no evidence that Tom

 

intentionally injured him or acted recklessly beyond the ordinary

activities of golf, the doctrine of primary assumption of risk

 

applies, and Yoneda’s action against Tom is barred. Moreover,
based on the evidence presented, Tom's failure to yell “fore”
when he hit the errant shot cannot be said to have been
intentional or reckless conduct that falls outside the range of
the ordinary activities involved in golfing. see Dilger, 63 cal.

Rptr. 24 at 594 (holding that golf etiquette, i.e., yelling

 

“fore* to warn others of errant shots, “does not necessarily rise
to the level of a duty").

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that, (1) by his
participation in the sport of golfing, Yoneda assumed all of the

ordinary dangers incident to the game, i.e, the inherent risks;

 

(2) as a co-participant, Tom's errant shot was neither

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intentional nor reckless, and (3) Tom had no duty to warn Yoneda
of the errant ball. Indeed, it is common knowledge that not
every shot played by a golfer goes exactly where he intends it to
go. As the Dilger court observed, “[i]f every ball behaved as
the golfer wished, there would be little ‘sport’ in the sport of
golf." 63 cal. Rptr. at 593. Accordingly, we hold that primary
implied assumption of risk applies and that the circuit court did
not err in applying the doctrine so as to bar Yoneda’s claim
against Tom.”

Assumption of Risk as Applied to Sports Shinko

 

First, Yoneda argues that, inasmuch as two of hie
claims involved breach of implied warranty and defective product

jumption of risk was

 

claims, summary judgment based upon a
improper in light of Larsen’s specific abolition of the doctrine

.ct_to hia negligence

 

as to these claims. Second, with re
claim, Yoneda contends that there was a disputed question of fact

whether Sports Shinko increased the inherent risk that Yoneda

 

would get hit by an errant golf ball. In particular, he argues:

7 tn ao holding, this court need not address Yoneda’s argument that

“edhe trial court in actuality applied the doctrine of secondary arsumtion
‘to bar {hie] negligence ia: (Baphasis in original.) However, ve
note that the circuit coure clearly indicated that it was persuaded by he
points and authorities cited* by Tos, who did not base his contentions ‘on the
Secondary assumption of risk, but rather on the primary sense of che defense,

      

   

 

 

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If [sports Shinko) exercised reasonable care and routed the
Cart path ip front of the restroom, erected ey
fetting. installed plexiglass windehields on tt

and/or placed warning signe for golfers headed to the 6th
eee, "tne risk of (Yoneda) being ait by « golf ball and
Seriously injured would have been greatly minimized or
Siininaced, thelr failure to exercise this reasonable care
Consequently increased the risk of being hit, sullifying the
Gpplication of primary assueption of risk defense against
(woneda’s} negligence claims.

 

    

    

 

 

Although Yoneda sets forth in his complaint three
counts against Sports Shinko, Yoneda’s breach of implied warranty
and defective product claims essentially fall under the category
of creating or increasing risks beyond those inherent in the
sport. We, therefore, consider them as factors advanced by
Yoneda to support his argument that Sports Shinko created or
increased the inherent rik of being struck by an errant golf
ball, thereby, causing his injuries.

As previously stated, Sports Shinko, as the owner of @
golf course, “ha(s] a duty to use due care not to increase the
risks to a participant over and above those inherent in the
sport." Knight, @34 P.2d at 708; see also Foronda, 96 Hawai‘i at
66, 25 P.3d at 841. In that regard, Sports Shinko “has an
obligation to design a golf course to minimize the risk that
players will be hit by golf balls, e.g., by the way the various
tees, fairways and greens are aligned or separated." Morgan, 40
cal. Rptr. 24 at 253 (citation omitted). Moreover, “because of
the alignment or separation of the tee(s], fairway(s] and/or
greens” at the Mililani Golf Course, Sports Shinko “may also have

a duty to provide protection for players from being hit with golf

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* FOR PUBLICATION ***

balls where the greatest danger exists and where such an
occurrence is reasonably to be expected[.]” Id, (citation
omitted). We recognize, however, that,
(IE a risk Le Inherent in a sport, the fact that 2
detendant had feasible means to tenedy the danger does not
Impote a duty to dogo.” A duty 1s not crested because safer

aterials are available to remedy the danger. The standards
in the industry che nature of the sport.

Am. Golf Corp., 93 Cal. Rptr. 24 at 688 (citations omitted)
(emphasis added) .

 

     

 

In the instant case, Yoneda contends that the circuit
court erred in granting Sports Shinko’s motion for summary
judgment inasmuch as “there was a disputed question of fact
whether [Sports Shinko’s] increased the risk that [Yoneda] and
other golfers would get hit [by errant balls].” (Emphasis in
original.) In support of his position, Yoneda points to the
evidence that, in his view, establishes the existence of a
question of fact: (1) his affidavit that golfers heading to the
sixth tee were required to follow the cart path behind a restroom
building, obscuring them from the sight of golfers approaching
the fifth hole green; and (2) Tom's testimony that he did not see
the cart approaching the sixth tee box from behind the restroom
and, thus, did not yell “fore* and that the carts did not have
windshielde. Yoneda maintains that the question whether Sports
Shinko's failure to route the cart path in front of the restroom,

stall plexiglass windshields on the

 

erect safety netting,
carts, and/or place warning signe for golfers headed to the sixth

tee increased the inherent risk that he would be struck by a golf

232-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

ball is for the jury to decide and is not subject to summary
judgnent. In essence, Yoneda urges this court to consider this
case as one under the secondary assumption of risk doctrine
because Sports Shinko owed a duty of care to Yoneda in the design
and maintenance of its golf course and golf cart.

Conversely, Sports Shinko maintains that Yoneda’s
claims are barred by the doctrine of primary assumption of risk,
arguing that there is no evidence that it increased the inherent
risk of engaging in the aport. Specifically, Sport shinko
argues that Yoneda’s contention that sports Shinko increased the
inherent risk of getting struck by an errant golf ball by not
taking additional protective measures, such as installing

netting, redesigning the golf course, posting signs or equipping

 

its carts with protective plexiglass windshields, is ‘actually
charging that Sporte Shinko breached an obligation to decrease
the inherent risk[.]* (Emphases in original.) Further, Sports

shinko argues that Yoneda hi

 

failed to introduce any admissible
evidence that ite design of the golf course (and/or failure to

erect safety netting or supply golf carts with windshields) fell

 

below the applicable standard of care (thereby increasing the

 

inherent risks), asserting that

Yoneda’s affidavit, consisting entirely of his ow, seit-
Serving, personal opinions on What Sports shinko could have
see to reduce the chance that’ he would have been struck by
Gn errant golf ball, without any background in golf course
Or golf cart design, or any other showing of competence to
Restify ae to the standard of care of golf course owers, is
Eantanount to pure speculation and sere argument. As such,
[I Yoneda's personal opinions were inadmissible and
Incapable of creating & justiciable dispute as to whether or
not Sporte shinko breached « duty of ca

 

 

 

 

233+
*** FOR PUBLICATION *** .

 

(amphases in original.)
With respect to Sports Shinko’s position that Yoneda’s
non-expert/lay testimony was insufficient, the Intermediate Court
of Appeals’ (ICA) opinion in Nielsen v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 92
Hawai"i 180, 989 P.2d 264 (App. 1999), is enlightening.
In Nieleen, the plaintiff-driver filed a complaint

the manufacturer and distributor of

 

against the defendants
Honda automobiles -- for injuries sustained when the driver's
automobile air bag failed to deploy ina collision. The
complaint, inter alia, alleged that the defendants were strictly
liable for selling a vehicle which was “defective and dangerous

to the user and consumer in that [its] air bag failed to inflate

 

as it should have on impact; [and] breached their implied
warranty of merchantability by selling the car that was unfit,
defective, and unsafe[.]" Id. at 182, 989 P.2d at 266 (internal

quotation marke and ellipsis omitted). Thereafter, the

 

defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming that there was no
defect in the subject vehicle and, therefore, no genuine issues
of material fact for trial. In support of their motion, the
defendants offered expert testimony, attempting to establish,
Amter alia, that: (1) the damage to the car was the result of a
minor front end collision and was of an “insufficient magnitude
and duration to cause the air bag to deployl,]* id. at 183, 989
P.2d at 267 (internal quotation marks omitted); (2) the air bag

system was not defective; and (3) the air bag system met “all

o34-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***
Oe
Honda specifications.” Id. In response, the plaintiff provided
his affidavit, wherein he represented himself as an expert on air
bag systems and opined that the defendants’ expert’s evaluation
did not include appropriate tests, such as an examination of the
sensors and a clock spring in the steering wheel. He further

stated that he had reviewed the Honda air bag specifications,

 

which indicated air bag deployment would occur at a 20-miles-p.
hour impact. He then recounted that, at the time of the impact,
hie vehicle was moving at least 30 miles per hour when it
collided with another vehicle and that the air bag system did not
deploy. Id.

‘The circuit court granted the defendants’ sunmary
judgment motion, finding no genuine issues of material fact, and
dismissed the plaintiff’s claims. In the circuit court’s view,
the plaintift’s affidavit lacked sufficient facts to establish
that he was competent to testify. Id, at 184, 989 P.2d at 268.
on appeal, the ICA vacated the circuit court's order. In 80
doing, the ICA first recognized that:

[tlhe use of expert teatimony!'] in summary Judgment
proceedings seens counterintuitive. ‘After all, sumary
Jugnentovare only proper when no factual disputes exist,
Ane’che stock-in-trade of the expert witness is venturing

     

 

 

+ Mawai't Rules of Bvidence (MRE) Rule 702 (1993) provides that:

If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will agaist the trier of fact to understand the
Gvidence or to determine a fact in issue, 2 witm
GRalified ae an expert by knowledge, skiil, experience,
Hining, or education may testify thereto in the form of an
Opinion or otherwise, in determining the issue of
Setistance co the trier of fact, the court may consider the
Erustworthiness and validity of the scientific technique or
ose of analysis enployed by the proffered expert.

  

 

 

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opinions on the issues of fact." 8. Brunet,

a2 0, ¢
Davi L. Rev. 93, 93, (1988). indeed, the very presence of
fan expert implies that issues of fact exist. However,
Contemporary decisions allow experts to testify in
generalized terns and often grant summary judgeent for the
‘movant on the basis of such testimony. Another reason is
Chat summary judguent say be used as a docket clearing
Gevice which teste the issues of a case and exposes
frivolous claisa:

 

court has recognized that the majority of
Sllow expert a¢fadavite at summary judgment.
That such afFidavite should be scrutinized ie
Sound, we consider our trial and appellate courts capable of
sitting facta from opinion in an expert's affidavits and of
Getermining the effect to be given such affidavit within the
Present franevork for deciding summary judgwent motions.

    

 

 

Id. (citations, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted) .
Second, the ICA concluded that the plaintiff's affidavit
qualified him to testify as an expert witness pursuant to ERE
Rule 702 because he had 20 years of experience as a licensed auto
mechanic, he was certified as a mechanic by a national
organization, and that, in his profession. he had worked on Honda
automobiles. Id, at 183, 188-89, 989 P.24 at 267, 272-73 (noting
that ‘a witness should not be disqualified as an expert if
summary judgnent papers demonstrate a HRE Rule 702 basis for
qualification; any purported deficiency in expertise should go to
the weight of the witness’ {] testimony at trial*).
Notwithatanding the above conclusion, the ICA nevertheles:
believed that a lay person may render opinions pursuant to ERE
Rule 701 (1993), quoted infra, sufficient to raise a triable

issue, thereby precluding summary judgment:

 

‘The court's rejection of Plaintiff's affidavit wi
sceningly premised on ite jaundiced view of his
qualifications as an expert. While ve believe the court
erred in this regard, gee discussion infra, we coneider

 

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Exiable issues based on hie lav opinion alone. Pleintite’s
Affidavit contained hie personal observations to the effect
that (2) the air bag failea to inflate (2) in a collision,

Shen (3) Plaintiff's vesicle was traveling at least thirty

Giles per hour at inpact. According to him, the impact wa

 

Substantial enoagh co cause (4) the other vehicle involved

fo roll onto ita roof and to travel fifty feet,

 

na (8)

[njuriee to Plaintize as a result of the collision. These

fee aes “sagan evel

Id, at 186, 989 P.2d at 270 (emphases added) (footnote omitted) .

Here, neither Yoneda nor Sports Shinko offered any

‘expert testimony. Rather, as previously stated, Sports Shinko

maintained that there is no evidence in the record that it

increased the inherent risk of golf. Yoneda, however,

his own affidavit, attesting in relevant part that:

 

submitted

fe na tst

eer ea pasaesaer ii act deiven by Albert
Sart ere Bit by bofesdant na

F | nad inet completed plaving the sth hole and was

éaging_towata the eth Bole-tee off while traveling on the
stroos headed straight to the a

Ry group had been adv

 

9d by Milsiani Golf Course that

Eee
Ehe ‘carte had co renain on the cart path at all times chat

day.

27° ad the cart path been routed in front of the restroom
building (relative to the golfers approaching the sth hole
Green), Our carts would have been Visible to the approaching
Golfers at all tines while in the vieinity of the errant

Olt shot
Bo “the cart path, as routed, required our cart to
Gieappesr from the view of golfers approaching the sth hole

 

 

green
Defendant Andrew Tom. This routing vas dangerously

prevented me from sighting the golf ball hit by

Gefective a2 t greatly increased the risk of being struck
by an errant golf shot hit toward the Sth hole green, which

wae mediately adjacent to the restroos.

 

Br) "f'r'nad sighted or received a waraing that a golf
Ball was heading coward my direction, I would have taken
Simediate evasive or protective action, including covering

my head and face
7, TT have played at Mililani Golf Course on prior

Occasions and personally sav a safety netting installed

 

Between the approach area for the 9th gr

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*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

 

 

off and fairway. ad auch safety netting been installed
Detween the cart pathe on the Sth and th holes in the
vicinity of the restroom, 1 would aot have been hit by
Defendant Tom's golf ball. (sports Shinko's) failure to
provide this protection greatly increased the risk of my
being struck by Defendant Tom's golf ball and sa an inherent
Gefect in the course design.

Gr have played at courses where the golf carts were
‘equipped with plexiglass windshields. included among these
fre the municipal Pali Golf Course.” Having carte with such
Windshields does not impair my ability to participate in the
ane of golf.

5. Carte with plexiglass windshields provide me with a
Greater measure of protection from golf balla hit toward my
face waile riding in sald cart

io. “tind the golf cart that I was riding in at the time of
the accident of august 20, 1999 been equipped with

Plexiglass windshield, T would not have been etruck in the
Gye by Defendant Tom's golf ball.

SE! “assed on the route of the cart path from the sth hole
Green to the éth hole tee off, and the fallure to provide
Additional safety measures such as a safety netting,
Mililani Golf Course should have equipped their carte with
( plexigiass wingehield(e)-

 

 

 

   
     

 

(Emphases added.) Yoneda also referred to Tom's testimony,

wherein he testified that the course’s design (i.e., routing

 

carts behind the restroom) prevented him from seeing the carts.
Tom claimed that he could not see the carts emerging from behind
the restroom building and, thus, failed to yell any warning of
the errant shot. In response, Sports Shinko argued that Yoneda’s
affidavit was inadmissible because testimony as to the design of
the golf course or cart required an expert witness.

Preliminary, we reiterate that this court *reviewis] a
circuit court's grant or denial of summary judgment de novo under
the same standard applied by the circuit court.” Hawai'i Cnty,
Fed, Credit Union v. Keka, 94 Hawai'i 213, 221, 11 P.3a2, 9

(2000) (brackets and citation omitted). In considering a motion
for summary judgment, evidence mist be viewed in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party. City & County of Honolulu v.

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Sherman, 110 Hawai'i 39, 48-49, 129 P.3d 542, 551-52 (2006).

‘Thus, the court must view all of the evidence and the inferences
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing

the motion. Coon v. City & County of Honolulu, 98 Hawai'i 233,
244-45, 47 P.3d 248, 359-60 (2002). Further, this court has
indicated that:

‘The burden is on the party moving for summary judgment
(moving party) £0 show the absence of any genuine issue
{nT Rteriar facts, which, under applicable principles of
Substantive law, entities the moving party to Judgment as a
fatter of law. ‘This burden has two components.

   

Piree,
lai a om mater
Za rt sured
when. tists nies
- ene ar

 

fmecitic facta, at opposed to
resent @ genuine issue vorthy of trial
‘Second, the moving party bears the ultimate burden of
persuasion. ‘This burden always remains with the moving
Barey and requires the moving party to convince the court
Phat’ne genuine iesve of material fact exists and the moving
pars(y) ie entities to summary judgeent asa matter of law.

 

Les ty. Ass’n, 109 Hawai'i 561, 567, 126 P.3d 674,
880 (2006) (quoting French v. Hawai'i Pizza Hut, Inc, 105 Hawai'i

462, 470, 99 P.3d 1046, 1054 (2004)) (underscored emphasis in

original) (bold emphasis added). Moreover,

 

 

Iolace the moving party has met (his or her] burden, the
iveree, or non-moving party(,] sust set forth specific
facts showing that there as inet

Enial. Th so Going, the adverse party may not rest on mere
STlegatione, denials or unsupported aggertions, but suet,
through affidavite or otherwise, provide evidence of
Gensine dispute. In other words, the non-moving party mst
Show more than |. sone netapnysical doubt as to the
futerial facte, for the mere existence of a scintilla of
Gvidence in support of his [or her] position is insufficient
fo survive summary judgeent..

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Springwall, Inc. v. Timeless Bedding, Inc., 207 F. supp. 2d 410,

416 (M.D.N.C. 2002) (emphasis added) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Although there is no doubt that Yoneda’s affidavit is

/eart

 

insufficient to qualify him as an expert in golf cour:
design, we believe that, similar to Nielsen, Yoneda’s affidavit
and Tom's testimony, viewed in the light most favorable to Yoneda
ae the non-moving party, are sufficient to raise at least one
triable issue, ice., whether sports Shinko increased the inherent
risk by routing the cart path behind the subject restroom.

RE Rule 702 provides that:

‘opinion testimony by lay testimony. If the witness se
Pifying sa an expert, the witness’ testimony in the
‘opinions or inferences ie limited to those opinions
oF inferences waich are (1) rationally baeed on
perception of the witness, and (2) helpful toe clear

fanding of the witness’ teatinony or the determination
of a fact in issue.

 

 

   

 

 

‘The commentary to HRE Rule 701 states that the rule “retains the
common-law requirement that lay opinion be based upon firsthand
knowledge[.]* See also State v. Jenkins, 93 Hawai'i 87, 105, 997

P.2d 13, 31 (2000). Thus, for opinion testimony to be admissible

 

under ERE Rule 701, “the witness must have personal knowledge of
[the] matter tha[t] forns the basis of testimony of opinion; the
testimony must be based rationally upon the perception of the
witness; and[,] of course, the opinion must be helpful to the
jury." State v, Tovomura, 80 Hawai'i 8, 25, 904 P.2d 893, 910
(4995) (quoting 1 J. strong, McCormick on Evidence § 11, at 45-46
(aen ea, 1992)).

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Like the plaintiff’ affidavit in Nielsen, Yoneda’s
affidavit contained personal observations, essentially, that:
(a) he was following the cart path, which looped behind a
restroom building; and (2) as he emerged from behind the
building, he was struck in the eye by an errant golf ball.
Yoneda’s testimony as to the events leading up to the accident
and his observations regarding the location of the restroom
building and the route of the cart path did not require
‘scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” such that

expert testimony would have been required pursuant to HRE Rule

 

702, nee supra note 8. Nor was it necessary to proffer expert
testinony to establish Tom's statement that the restroom building
prevented him from seeing Yoneda. These facts are admissible and

Yoneda and Tom, as persons present and

 

competent evidence becau:
involved in the accident, were eyewitnesses and had personal
knowledge of the facts related.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, Yoneda’s opinion

 

(as well as Tom‘a testimony) as to the location of the restroom

 

lay opinions under

 

building and the cart path are admissible
HRE Rule 701 supporting Yoneda’s contention that a genuine issue
of material fact existe. Clearly, Sports Shinko failed to carry
its burden of proof and persuasion that it is entitled to summary

judgment as a matter of law. Sports Shinko did not challenge

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Yoneda's or Tom's statements with contrary facts; it merely
points out that Yoneda is not a golf course design expert and
that Yoneda did not retain such an expert. As discussed supra,
nothing in the law requires that the opinion of a design expert
is required to prove circumstances of an accident. we,
therefore, believe that the circuit court erroneously granted
summary judgment in favor of Sports Shinko because Yoneda raised
at least one genuine issue of fact as to whether Sports Shinko
increased the risk of being struck by errant shots by its golf
course design, that is, by routing the cart path behind the
restroom building. See Springwall, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d at 416;
sce also Williams v, Pennsylvania State Police-Bureau of Liquor
Gontrol Enforcement, 108 F. Supp. 24 460, 468 n.7 (B.D. Pa. 2000)

(holding that, ‘as one genuine issue of material fact is

 

sufficient to defeat summary judgment on this claim, [the court]

need not search for additional issues of fact*).°

 

 

care or duty an omer or operator
owed to participants, ‘Yoneda’s final contention that
Special © as invitee, and Sports Shinko, ae
the posse: co a duty to protect Yoneda against being
nit by errant shots

Having

   
 
 

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IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, we vacate that portion of the

First Circuit Court’s November 14, 2003 first amended final
judgment entered in favor of Sports Shinko and remand this case
We affirm

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

that portion of the amended final judgment entered in favor of

James Y. Agena and 4 :
Scott E. Kubota (of Ui Rrrare—

Koshiba, Agena & Kubota),
for plaintiff-appellant Ruwer CN eee yONO-

Lorrin A, Kau, for
defendant -appellee
Andrew Tom (a

Sidney K. Ayabe, Zale T.
Okazaki, and Steven L.
Goto (of Ayabe, Chong,
Nishimoto, Sia'&
Nakamura), for defendant -
appellee Sports shinko
(Mililani) Co., utd.

Tom.

on the brief:

 

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