Case Title: CATHCART v. MEYER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 04-32

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-05-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
CATHCART v. MEYER2004 WY 4988 P.3d 1050Case Number: 04-32, 04-33, 04-34Decided: 05/04/2004
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                                                   

 

RICH 
CATHCART, RODNEY "PETE"

ANDERSON, 
SCOTT ZIMMERMAN

and 
KEITH KENNEDY,

 

Appellants(Plaintiffs),

 

v.

 

JOSEPH 
B. MEYER, WYOMING SECRETARY

OF 
STATE, in his official capacity,

 

Appellee(Defendant),

                                                                                                

and

 

JACK 
ADSIT and U.S. TERM LIMITS

FOUNDATION,

 

Appellees(Intervenors/Defendants).

 

JOSEPH 
B. MEYER, WYOMING SECRETARY

OF 
STATE, in his official capacity,

                                                                                                

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

 

 

 

RICH 
CATHCART, RODNEY "PETE"

ANDERSON, 
SCOTT ZIMMERMAN and

KEITH 
KENNEDY,

 

Appellees(Plaintiffs).

 

JACK 
ADSIT and U.S. TERM LIMITS

FOUNDATION,

 

Appellants(Intervenors/Defendants),

 

v.

                                                                                                

RICH 
CATHCART, RODNEY "PETE"

ANDERSON, 
SCOTT ZIMMERMAN and

KEITH 
KENNEDY,

 

Appellees(Plaintiffs).

 

 

 

Representing 
Rich Cathcart, Rodney "Pete" Anderson, Scott Zimmerman and Keith 
Kennedy:

 

            
Harriet M. Hageman and Kara Brighton of Hageman & Brighton, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming; and Timothy M. Stubson of Brown, Drew & Massey, LLP, Casper, 
Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Joseph B. Meyer, Wyoming Secretary of State:

 

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Michael R. O'Donnell, Chief Deputy Attorney General; 
and Michael L. Hubbard, Deputy Attorney General, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Jack Adsit and U.S. Term Limits Foundation::

 

            
Sasha Johnston and Daniel E. White of Woodard & White, P.C. Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 

 

Bradley 
T. Cave and Lawrence J. Wolfe of Holland & Hart, LLP, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 

[¶1]     Two incumbent state legislators and two electors challenge the 
constitutionality of Wyoming's initiative-engendered term limit statute.  These cases come to us from the district 
court via W.R.A.P. 11 certified questions and W.R.C.P. 54(b) certification of an 
order rejecting affirmative defenses.  
We affirm the district court's rejection of the affirmative defenses and 
we find the term limit statute unconstitutional.

 

 

1.                  
Is 
the term limit law for state elected officials (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-5-103), 
whether adopted by initiative or legislative action, constitutional and 
enforceable, given the qualifications enumerated in Article 6, §§ 2 and 15; 
Article 3, § 2; and Article 4, §§ 2 and 11 of the Wyoming 
Constitution?

 

2.                  
Does 
the term limit law (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-5-103) violate the appellants' right to 
vote, given the provisions of Article 6, § 2 of the Wyoming 
Constitution?

 

3.                  
Do 
the reserved powers of the people under the Wyoming Constitution include the 
right to alter the government by initiative or by statute with regard to the 
time period any one person can hold any particular state office?[1]

 

4.                  
Is 
this action barred by the doctrine of laches or by a statute of 
limitations?

 

 

[¶2]      On January 7, 
2004, two Laramie County state legislators and two Laramie County residents 
(collectively "the appellants") filed a complaint in district court seeking a 
declaration that Wyoming's term limit law is unconstitutional, and asking the 
district court to enjoin the secretary of state from enforcing it.  On January 23, 2004, the secretary of 
state answered the complaint by asserting the constitutionality of the statute 
and by asserting the affirmative defenses of standing, laches, estoppel, waiver, 
adequate remedy at law (repeal), failure to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted (no justiciable controversy/political question), failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted (statute of limitations in Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-3-109 (LexisNexis 2003)), failure to state a claim upon which relief 
can be granted (statute of limitations in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-24-122 
(LexisNexis 2003)), and the constitution's reservation to the people of the 
right to reform, alter or abolish government in any manner as they may think 
proper.

 

[¶3]      On February 13, 
2004, the district court allowed a Wyoming citizen and a national research and 
education foundation dedicated to the preservation of term limit legislation to 
intervene as party defendants.  On 
the same date, the district court also entered the order rejecting affirmative 
defenses that is the subject of these consolidated appeals.  Finally, on February 20, 2004, the 
district court entered its Revised Order Certifying Questions.  On February 23, 2004, this Court entered 
its Notice of Agreement to Answer Certified Questions, Order Consolidating 
Related Appeals, Order Establishing Briefing Schedule, and Order of Setting for 
Oral Argument.  The next day, a 
Supplemental Order on Briefing of Certified Questions ordered briefing on 
certain additional constitutional provisions.  Oral arguments were heard on March 24, 
2004.

 

FACTS2

 

[¶4]      In the 1992 
general election, Wyoming voters approved an initiative that limited the number 
of terms of office that could be served by certain of its elected federal and 
state officials.3  The relevant portion of that initiative, 
as amended by the legislature in 1995, is currently found at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
22-5-103 (LexisNexis 2003):

 

§ 
22-5-103. Legislative service; limits on ballot access; state 
offices

 

            
(a)       
Notwithstanding any other provision of Wyoming law, the secretary of 
state or other authorized official shall not certify the name of any person as 
the nominee or candidate for the office sought, nor shall that person be elected 
nor serve in that office if the following will occur:

 

            
(i)         
The person, by the end of the current term of office will have served, or 
but for resignation, would have served eight (8) or more years in any sixteen 
(16) year period in the office for which the candidate is seeking nomination or 
election, except, that any time served in that particular office prior to 
January 1, 1993, shall not be counted for purposes of this term limit.  This provision shall apply to the 
offices of governor, secretary of state, state auditor, state treasurer, and 
state superintendent of public instruction;

 

            
(ii)        The 
person, by the end of the current term of office will have served, or but for 
resignation, would have served twelve (12) or more years in any twenty-four (24) 
year period as a state representative, except that any time served in the office 
of state representative prior to January 1, 1993, shall not count for purposes 
of this term limit;

 

            
(iii)       
The person, by the end of the current term of office will have served, or 
but for resignation, would have served twelve (12) or more years in any 
twenty-four (24) year period as a state senator, except that any time served as 
a state senator prior to January 1, 1993, shall not be counted for purposes of 
this term limit.

 

[¶5]      The initiative 
also contained a specific statement of "findings and 
declarations":

 

            
(a)       
The people of the state of Wyoming hereby find and declare as 
follows:

 

(i)         
State and federal representatives who remain in office for extended 
periods of time become preoccupied with their own reelection and for that reason 
devote more effort to campaigning for their office than making legislative 
decisions for the good of the people of Wyoming;

 

(ii)        State 
and federal representatives have become too closely aligned with the special 
interest groups who provide contributions and support for their reelection 
campaigns, provide special favors and intense lobbying, all of which causes 
corruption or the appearance of corruption of the legislative 
system;

 

(iii)       Entrenched 
incumbency has discouraged qualified citizens from seeking office and lead to a 
lack of competitiveness and a decline in robust debate of issues important to 
the people of Wyoming;

 

(iv)       Due to the 
appearance of corruption and the lack of competitiveness for entrenched 
incumbency seats, there has been a reduction in voter participation which is 
counter-productive in a representative democracy;

 

(v)        The 
people of the state of Wyoming have determined that the declarations and 
findings contained herein threaten their vital interest in maintaining the 
integrity of their state and federal office holders and avoiding the appearance 
of corruption and lack of response to the needs of the people of Wyoming.  It is their purpose and intent in 
enacting this law that term limitations is the best method by which to insure 
that these vital interests are guarded for the people of the 
state.

 

1992 
Initiative No. 1, § 2.

 

[¶6]      Appellant 
Cathcart is a current member of the Wyoming Senate who will have served twelve 
years by the end of this term.  
Appellant Anderson is a current member of the Wyoming House of 
Representatives who will have served twelve years by the end of this term.  Both Cathcart and Anderson meet all the 
qualifications for holding office contained in Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 2 and art. 
6, §§ 2 and 15.  Appellants 
Zimmerman and Kennedy are both residents and qualified electors of Laramie 
County who are represented in the legislature by Cathcart and Anderson.  The term limit law precludes Zimmerman 
and Kennedy from voting in the next election for Cathcart and Anderson for their 
current positions, and it precludes Cathcart and Anderson from being elected to 
the same.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶7]      When questions of 
law are certified to this court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 11, we rely entirely on the 
district court's factual determinations.  
BP America Production Co. v. Madsen, 2002 WY 135, ¶ 4, 53 P.3d 1088, 1090 (Wyo. 2002).  The question of the constitutionality of 
a statute is a question of law.  
Reiter v. State, 2001 WY 116, ¶ 7, 36 P.3d 586, 589 (Wyo. 2001) 
(quoting V-1 Oil Co. v. State, 934 P.2d 740, 742 (Wyo. 1997)).  Our standard of review in such cases has 
been described as follows:

 

"In 
reviewing a constitutionally based challenge to a statute, we presume the 
statute to be constitutional and any doubt in the matter must be resolved in 
favor of the statute's constitutionality.  
Thomson v. Wyoming In Stream Flow Committee, 651 P.2d 778, 789-90 
(Wyo.1982).  [Appellant] bears the 
burden of proving the statute is unconstitutional.  Pfeil v. Amax Coal West, Inc., 
908 P.2d 956, 961 (Wyo.1995)."

 

Reiter, 
2001 WY 116, ¶ 7, 36 P.3d at 589 (quoting V-1 Oil Co., 934 P.2d at 
742).  In Reiter, we went on to 
characterize the burden of challenging the constitutionality of a statute as 
being "heavy," in that the appellant must ""clearly and exactly show the 
unconstitutionality beyond any reasonable doubt."'"  Reiter, 2001 WY 116, ¶ 7, 36 P.3d 
at 589 (quoting Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Wyo. 1995) and Miller v. City of Laramie, 880 P.2d 594, 597 (Wyo. 
1994)).

 

DISCUSSION

 

Affirmative 
Defenses

 

            
Procedural Background

 

[¶8]      As mentioned 
above, the secretary of state raised nine affirmative defenses in his answer to 
the complaint:  standing, laches, 
estoppel, adequate remedy at law (repeal), waiver, failure to state a claim 
(justiciable controversy/political question), failure to state a claim (period 
of limitations in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-109), failure to state a claim (period 
of limitations in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-24-122), and the people's reserved right 
to reform, alter or abolish government.  
The intervenors raised the same defenses in their 
answer.

 

[¶9]      During the 
hearing on the motion to intervene, the district court summarily rejected all of 
the affirmative defenses.  A written 
order to that effect subsequently was entered, in which order the district court 
certified that the matter was final for purposes of appeal under W.R.C.P. 
54(b).4  The district court took this somewhat 
precipitous action specifically to assist in getting the entire matter before 
this Court in a timely manner.5  The rejection of the affirmative 
defenses is the subject of the appeals in Docket Nos. 04-33 and 04-34.  For some reason not made clear in the 
record or in the parties' briefs, three of those defenseslaches and the 
statutes of limitationswere also presented as a certified question under 
W.R.A.P. 11.6  We accepted that certified question, but 
we have since concluded that W.R.A.P. 11 certification is not an appropriate 
mechanism for reviewing questions of such nature that have been determined by 
the district court.  Consequently, 
we will address the affirmative defenses as they have been presented in the two 
appeals.

 

[¶10]   An additional issue concerning the 
affirmative defenses has arisen as a result of the manner in which they have or 
have not been raised before this Court.  
In the appellate brief of the secretary of state, the ninth affirmative 
defensethe reserved powers of the peopleis the primary focus of the central 
constitutional argument, and separate arguments are presented only as to laches 
and the statutes of limitations.  In 
their appellate brief, the intervenors complain generally about the district 
court's summary disposition of the affirmative defenses, but they raise separate 
arguments only in regard to laches, estoppel, and the statutes of 
limitation.  Like the secretary of 
state, the intervenors have argued the issue of the reserved powers of the 
people as part of their constitutional argument and do not make a distinct 
argument on that issue as an affirmative defense.  Despite these procedural peculiarities, 
we have concluded that the material facts are not in dispute and that this Court 
is able to address on the merits the district court's rejection of the 
affirmative defenses.

 

            
Standing

 

[¶11]   In Jolley v. State Loan and Inv. 
Board, 2002 WY 7, ¶ 6, 38 P.3d 1073, 1076 (Wyo. 2002), 
we reiterated our rules for determining whether a party has standing to bring a 
particular matter before the courts:

 

            
Standing is a legal concept designed to determine whether a party is 
sufficiently affected to insure that the court is presented with a justiciable 
controversy.  Roe v. Board of 
County Commissioners, Campbell County, 997 P.2d 1021, 1022 (Wyo.2000) 
(quoting Memorial Hospital of Laramie County v. Department of Revenue and 
Taxation of State of Wyoming, 770 P.2d 223, 226 (Wyo.1989) and Washakie 
County School District Number One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 316 
(Wyo.1980).

 

            
"The doctrine of standing is a jurisprudential rule of jurisdictional 
magnitude.  At its most elementary 
level, the standing doctrine holds that a decision-making body should refrain 
from considering issues in which the litigants have little or no interest in 
vigorously advocating.  Accordingly, 
the doctrine of standing focuses upon whether a litigant is properly situated to 
assert an issue for judicial or quasi-judicial determination.  A litigant is said to have standing when 
he has a "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy."  This personal stake requirement has been 
described in Wyoming as a "tangible interest" at stake.  The tangible interest requirement 
guarantees that a litigant is sufficiently interested in a case to present a 
justiciable controversy."

 

State 
ex rel. Bayou Liquors, Inc. v. City of Casper, 906 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Wyo.1995) (quoting Schulthess v. Carollo, 832 P.2d 552, 
556-57 (Wyo.1992) (citations omitted)).

 

Roe, 
997 P.2d  at 1022-23.

 

[¶12]   The facts of this case do not 
present a serious challenge to the standing of the appellant legislators and the 
appellant electors to bring this declaratory judgment action.7  
Without immediate judicial attention, the appellant legislators will be 
unable to seek re-election and the appellant electors will be unable to cast a 
ballot for those legislators.  The 
term limit law has an immediate and profound impact upon the appellants' 
interests.  Furthermore, we have 
relaxed the standing requirement where matters of great public interest or 
importance are involved.  Jolley, 
2002 WY 7, ¶ 9, 38 P.3d  at 1077.  No one in this controversy disputes its 
public significance.  We conclude 
that the appellants have standing to bring this action.

 

            
Laches

 

[¶13]               
[T]he doctrine of laches also applies to declaratory judgment 
actions.  See Anderson [v. 
Wyoming Dev. Co, 60 Wyo. 417], 154 P.2d 318 [(1944)].  The defense of laches is a form of 
equitable estoppel based on a[n] unreasonable delay by a party in asserting a 
right.  Laches does not depend on 
the passage of time alone; the plaintiff must be chargeable with lack of 
diligence in failing to proceed more promptly.  Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. 
Catchpole, 6 P.3d 1275, 1284 (Wyo.2000).  Laches will apply when the delay has 
worked injustice, prejudice, or disadvantage to the defendant.  Id.

 

            
We 
have said:

 

"The 
length of time during which the party neglects the assertion of his rights which 
must pass in order to show laches varies with the peculiar circumstances of each 
case, and is not, like the matter of limitations, subject to an arbitrary 
rule.  It is an equitable defense, 
controlled by equitable considerations, and the lapse of time must be so great, 
and the relations of the defendant to the rights such, that it would be 
inequitable to permit the plaintiff to now assert them."

 

Hammond 
v. Hammond, 14 P.3d 199, 201 (Wyo.2000) (quoting Anderson, 154 P.2d at 346).  Should an aggrieved party neglect the 
assertion of his rights for an amount of time that works injustice, prejudice, 
or disadvantage to the defendant, laches would apply to prevent a later 
action.

 

Cox 
v. City of Cheyenne, 2003 
WY 146, ¶¶ 32-33, 79 P.3d 500, 510 (Wyo. 2003).  "A claim of laches is comprised of two 
elementsinexcusable delay and injury, prejudice, or disadvantage to the 
defendants or others."  Dorsett 
v. Moore, 2003 WY 7, ¶ 9, 61 P.3d 1221, 1224 (Wyo. 2003).  Application of the equitable defense of 
laches depends upon the circumstances of each case and is addressed to the sound 
discretion of the district court.  
The standard of review is abuse of discretion.  Moncrief v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 
775 P.2d 1021, 1024-25 (Wyo. 1989).

 

[¶14]   The secretary of state contends 
that the appellants are guilty of unreasonable delay in bringing this action 
because they have been on notice as to its effect for twelve years, and he 
identifies the harm caused by this delay as "prejudice [to] those who left 
office on the presumptive validity of term limits."  To these contentions, the intervenors 
add the allegation that the filing of this case was purposefully delayed to 
create a "political frenzy" and to inhibit defense of the term limit 
statute.  Both of the appellees rely 
upon Cole v. State ex rel. Brown, 2002 MT 32, 308 Mont. 265, 42 P.3d 760, 
762 (Mont. 2002), 
wherein the Montana Supreme Court applied the doctrine of laches to bar two 
state legislators and two electors from challenging that state's term limit law 
nine years after it was enacted by initiative.

 

[¶15]   The appellants counter these 
arguments by reminding this Court that laches has historically been reserved 
"for those rare cases where a protracted acquiescence by plaintiff induces a 
defendant to undertake substantial activities in reliance on the 
acquiescence."  First Nat. Bank 
of Lander v. First Wyoming Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 592 P.2d 697, 702 (Wyo. 
1979).  Further, the appellants distinguish 
Cole by noting that it did not involve a challenge to the constitutional 
validity of the term limit law, but rather a challenge to the procedures by 
which the initiative was enacted.

 

[¶16]   The district court rejected 
application of laches based on its conclusion that the doctrine of "continuing 
harm" applied.8  We will find that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in rejecting laches, but we will do so upon other 
grounds revealed in the record, as we may do.  Masinter v. Markstein, 2002 WY 
64, ¶ 8, 45 P.3d 237, 241 (Wyo. 2002).  Primarily, we find that it was not 
unreasonable for the appellant legislators to bring this action only after 
deciding to seek re-election for the upcoming term of office.  When else would the action have been 
more appropriate?  Certainly, 
allegations of a lack of standing or a lack of a justiciable controversy would 
have had more force were the legislators not actually faced with a term 
limit.  Similarly, the appellant 
electors would have been unable to contend that their voting rights were being 
infringed were they not actually faced with an election where their chosen 
candidates were unable to seek re-election.  Furthermore, litigation is costly, 
time-consuming, and stressful; it was not unreasonable for the appellants to 
attempt to avoid those consequences until the time that such appeared to be 
unavoidable.  Had the term limit law 
been repealed in the interim, or had the legislators decided for other reasons 
not to run again for office, this litigation would have been 
unnecessary.

 

[¶17]   We decline to recognize any 
precedential value in Cole under the circumstances of this case.  First, Cole itself distinguishes 
a procedural attack on the method by which an initiative was adopted from a 
substantive constitutional attack, applying laches only in the former 
situation.  Cole, 2002 MT 32, 
¶ 31, 42 P.3d  at 764.  Second, we simply cannot agree with the 
Montana Supreme Court's assessment of prejudice to those who in the interim 
chose not to seek re-election:

 

            
Moreover, to consider Plaintiffs' challenge now, after CI-64 has been in 
place for nine years, would prejudice those who have relied upon its presumptive 
validity.  . . .  At least some of the executive officers 
and a large number of state legislators left office in 2000 based upon CI-64's 
presumptive validity.  These former 
officeholders, their supporters and other potential candidates who made 
decisions based on CI-64's presumptive validity would be prejudiced by 
Plaintiffs' late-filed action.

 

Id., 
2002 
MT 32, ¶ 32, 42 P.3d  at 764.  We reject this approach because we see 
no cause-and-effect relationship between the action of the appellants in filing 
this action at this particular time and any harm other potential candidates may 
have suffered from their own decisions not to seek re-election.  Those potential candidates, if any, were 
not harmed by the appellants' decision to seek redress; they were harmed, if at 
all, by their own inaction and inattention to their constitutional 
rights.9

 

            
Estoppel

 

[¶18]   In their respective answers to the 
complaint, both the secretary of state and the intervenors stated simply that 
the appellants "should be estopped from pursuing this action."  During the brief exchange in the 
district court concerning the affirmative defenses, counsel for the secretary of 
state elaborated by stating "[t]here is an estoppel argument that the 
legislature or legislators are estopped from challenging the law they 
passed."  The district court made no 
detailed ruling in rejecting estoppel.

 

[¶19]   Neither in his appellate brief nor 
in oral argument has the secretary of state made any argument supporting the 
application of estoppel in this case.  
The intervenors, however, have developed the estoppel argument by 
contending as follows:  (1) the 
legislature amended the term limit law in 1995 to equalize the temporal 
limitation for senators and representatives; (2) the appellant legislators both 
voted for this amendment; (3) the appellant legislators should be bound by their 
official acts; (4) the appellant legislators took an oath to uphold the state 
constitution; and (5) by now asserting a position inconsistent with their 
previous publicly expressed acts, the appellant legislators "invite 
scrutiny."

 

[¶20]   We decline to address this estoppel 
argument because it lacks cogent analysis and it is not supported by citation to 
pertinent legal authority.  See 
In re "H" Children, 2003 WY 155, ¶ 48, 79 P.3d 997, 1011 (Wyo. 
2003) and Garnick v. Teton County School 
Dist. No. 1, 2002 WY 18, ¶ 37, 39 P.3d 1034, 1050 (Wyo. 2002).  All that the intervenors have done is to 
analogize to the doctrine of judicial estoppel, which prohibits parties from 
maintaining inconsistent positions in judicial proceedings.  Markstein v. Countryside I, L.L.C., 
2003 WY 122, ¶ 27, 77 P.3d 389, 397 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Amoco Production 
Co. v. Board of County Com'rs of County of Sweetwater, 2002 WY 154, ¶ 17, 55 P.3d 1246 ¶ 17 (Wyo. 2002)).  We are not prepared, at least without 
more compelling guidance, to adopt a "legislative estoppel" doctrine whereby a 
legislator, in his individual capacity, is forevermore barred from challenging 
the constitutionality of a statute for which he voted in his official 
capacity.  Beyond that, it must be 
remembered that Wyoming's term limit law was adopted by initiative, not by 
legislation.  The appellant 
legislators' later vote to ameliorate some of the effects of the law is not 
necessarily inconsistent with their present position that it is 
unconstitutional.

 

            
Waiver

 

[¶21]   "A waiver is the intentional 
relinquishment of a known right that must be manifested in some unequivocal 
manner.'"  O'Donnell v. Blue 
Cross Blue Shield of Wyoming, 2003 WY 112, ¶ 12, 76 P.3d 308, 313 (Wyo. 
2003) (quoting Jensen v. Fremont Motors 
Cody, Inc., 2002 WY 173, ¶ 16, 58 P.3d 322, 327 (Wyo. 2002)).  The three elements of waiver are (1) an 
existing right; (2) knowledge of the right; and (3) an intent to relinquish 
it.  Jensen, 2002 WY 173, ¶ 
16, 58 P.3d  at 327.  "While the necessary intent for waiver 
may be implied from conduct, the conduct should speak the intent clearly.'"  Id. (quoting Murphy v. 
Stevens, 645 P.2d 82, 93 (Wyo. 1982)).  Waiver is especially difficult to prove 
where the allegation is based on silence:

 

A 
thorough explanation of "intent to waive" is given in 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel 
and Waiver § 209 (2000).  This 
section explains, "mere silence is no waiver unless there is an obligation to 
speak, or if the silence or inaction is for so long a period as to show 
intention to yield a known right."  
. . .  We cannot point to a 
single instance where we have held that mere silence and delay in asserting a 
claim without more constitutes the unequivocal 
manifestation of intent required for a claim of waiver.  To the contrary, we have held that 
simply failing to commence an action sooner does not mean that a plaintiff 
waives any right that he had.  
Flygare v. Brundage, 76 Wyo. 350, 30 P.2d 759, 764 
(1956).

 

Jensen, 
2002 
WY 173, ¶ 20, 58 P.3d  at 327-28 (emphasis in original).  Finally, waivers of statutory and 
constitutional rights are not favored.  
Id., 2002 WY 173, ¶ 22, 58 P.3d  at 328.

 

[¶22]   Despite listing waiver as an 
affirmative defense in their answers to the complaint, neither appellee has 
presented a waiver argument to this court.  
We have mentioned the elements of waiver and discussed the doctrine to a 
limited extent to demonstrate that it differs from, and was not, therefore, 
covered by the appellees' contentions in regard to laches or estoppel.  Because the appellees have presented 
neither cogent analysis nor citation to pertinent authority, we will affirm the 
district court's rejection of waiver as an affirmative 
defense.

 

            
Adequate Remedy at Law (Repeal)

 

[¶23]   The focus of the parties and both 
the district court and this Court has been upon the constitutional and 
declaratory judgment aspects of this case.  
The complaint, however, also contained a request for injunctive 
relief.  As an equitable remedy, an 
injunction is not available where there is an adequate remedy at law.  Polo Ranch Co. v. City of Cheyenne, 
2003 WY 15, ¶ 26, 61 P.3d 1255, 1264 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Weiss v. 
Pedersen, 933 P.2d 495, 498-99 (Wyo. 1997)).  We presume that this is the legal 
context within which the appellees have raised "adequate remedy at law" as an 
affirmative defense.

 

[¶24]   We decline to make any ruling on 
the injunctive aspects of this case.  
While it is true that the district court summarily rejected this 
affirmative defense along with all the others, it did not issue an injunction 
and the matter of an injunction has not been raised in this Court by any of the 
parties to this appeal.  In 
particular, neither of the appellees has attempted to demonstrate to this Court 
how the fact that the legislature could repeal a statute somehow shuts the 
courthouse door on a plaintiff who wants to assert that his constitutional 
rights are being violated by that statute.  
Without cogent analysis or citation to pertinent legal authority, we will 
not consider the matter.

 

Justiciable 
Controversy/Political Question

 

[¶25]   The full statement of this 
affirmative defense by both appellees is as follows:  "The Complaint fails to state a claim 
upon which relief may be granted as it fails to state a justiciable 
controversy' and involves a political question."  This language suggests that the defense 
is presented pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), which dictates how certain defenses 
are to be presented, but no particular issue is raised as to the application of 
that procedural rule.  At the 
outset, we will note that the lack of a justiciable controversy and the 
existence of a political question are related concepts, but not wholly 
interchangeable:

 

"Under 
the umbrella of the justiciable controversy concept stand the political 
question[s] doctrine, the administrative questions doctrine, the advisory 
opinions doctrine, the feigned and collusive cases doctrine, the doctrine of 
standing, the doctrine of ripeness, and the doctrine of mootness.'  Reiman [Corp. v. City of Cheyenne], 
838 P.2d [1182] at 1186 [(Wyo.1992)].  
These doctrines are premised upon jurisprudential principles which are 
designed to promote judicial economy and the wise exercise of judicial 
power.'  
Id."

 

In 
re SNK, 2003 
WY 141, ¶ 17, 78 P.3d 1032, 1037 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Southwestern Public 
Service Co. v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., 978 P.2d 1138, 1142-43 (Wyo. 
1999)).  The concept of a justiciable controversy 
generically describes controversies that are fit for judicial resolution, with 
the individual doctrines aimed at isolating the circumstances in which courts 
should withhold decisions.  
Reiman Corp. v. City of Cheyenne, 838 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Wyo. 
1992).  The political questions 
doctrine focuses upon those matters where there is "a textually demonstrable 
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; * * 
* or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without 
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; * * * or 
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various 
departments on one question.'"  
State ex rel. Schieck v. Hathaway, 493 P.2d 759, 762-63 (Wyo. 
1972) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 710, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962)).  See also Zancanelli v. Central Coal 
& Coke Co., 25 Wyo. 511, 173 P. 981, 984 (1918).  While the appellees have included the 
political questions doctrine as part of their affirmative defense characterized 
as the lack of a justiciable controversy, they have presented no argument or 
authority supporting application of the doctrine and we will not further 
consider it.

 

[¶26]   The existence of a justiciable 
controversy is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the presentation of a claim for 
relief under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.  White v. Board of Land Com'rs, 
595 P.2d 76, 79 (Wyo. 1979).  We previously have identified the 
elements necessary to establish a justiciable controversy under that 
Act:

 

1.         
The parties have existing and genuine, as distinguished from theoretical, 
rights or interests.

 

2.         
The controversy must be one upon which the judgment of the court may 
effectively operate, as distinguished from a debate or argument evoking a purely 
political, administrative, philosophical or academic 
conclusion.

 

3.         
It must be a controversy the judicial determination of which will have 
the force and effect of a final judgment in law or decree in equity upon the 
rights, status or other legal relationships of one or more of the real parties 
in interest, or, wanting these qualities to be of such great and overriding 
public moment as to constitute the legal equivalent of all of 
them.

 

4.         
The proceedings must be genuinely adversary in character and not a mere 
disputation, but advanced with sufficient militancy to engender a thorough 
research and analysis of the major issues.

 

Cox, 
2003 
WY 146, ¶ 10, 79 P.3d at 505 (quoting Reiman Corp., 838 P.2d at 
1186).

 

[¶27]   Citing to Anderson v. Wyoming 
Development Co., 60 Wyo. 417, 154 P.2d 318, 336 (1944), 
the appellees contend that there is no justiciable controversy presently before 
this Court because the appellants are barred from pursuing a declaratory 
judgment action by the doctrine of laches or by the applicable statutes of 
limitations.  This argument must 
fail because, elsewhere in this opinion, we have concluded that the appellants' 
action is not so barred.  
Furthermore, this Court has already recognized that the right to seek 
election to a public office for which one has proper qualifications, and the 
effect of any limitation upon that right upon the electors' right to vote, are 
so fundamental and of such great public interest and importance that the rule 
requiring the existence of a justiciable controversy should be relaxed or should 
not be followed.  Brimmer v. 
Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 578 (Wyo. 1974).

 

[¶28]   All of the elements of a 
justiciable controversy exist in these cases.  The battle is existing and real, it is 
of a truly adversarial nature, and the decision of this Court will act as a 
final determination of the rights of the parties.  Even were that not so, the matter is of 
such public import as to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the Uniform 
Declaratory Judgments Act.

 

            
Statutes of Limitations

 

[¶29]   A "statute of limitations" in a 
civil action is defined as follows:

 

A 
statute establishing a time limit for suing in a civil case, based on the date 
when the claim accrued (as when the injury occurred or was discovered).  . . .  The purpose of such a statute is to 
require diligent prosecution of known claims, thereby providing finality and 
predictability in legal affairs and ensuring that claims will be resolved while 
evidence is reasonably available and fresh.

 

Black's 
Law Dictionary 1422 
(7th ed. 1999).  There are two statutes of limitations of 
arguable application in the present caseWyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) 
(LexisNexis 2003) and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-24-122.10  
They read as follows:

 

(a)       Civil 
actions other than for the recovery of real property can only be brought within 
the following periods after the cause of action accrues:

 

. 
. .

 

(iv)       Within four 
(4) years, an action for:

 

. 
. .

 

(C)       An injury 
to the rights of the plaintiff, not arising on contract and not herein 
enumerated[.]

 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105.

 

            
Any person aggrieved by any determination made under this article, by the 
secretary of state or by the attorney general, may bring an action in the 
district court of Laramie county to have the determination reviewed by filing 
application within thirty (30) days of the date on which notice of the 
determination was given.

 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 22-24-122.

 

[¶30]   Wyoming is a "discovery state," 
which means that the statute of limitations is triggered when the plaintiff 
knows or has reason to know of the existence of a cause of action.  Amoco Production Co. v. EM Nominee 
Partnership Co., 2 P.3d 534, 542 (Wyo. 2000).  "The statute begins to run from the 
first time claimants are chargeable with information which should lead them to 
believe they have a claim."  
Rawlinson v. Cheyenne Bd. of Public Utilities, 2001 WY 6, ¶ 12, 17 P.3d 13, 16 (Wyo. 2001).  The application of a statute of 
limitations is a mixed question of law and fact, unless, as here, the material 
facts are not in dispute.  In such 
case, the question is one of law.  
McCreary v. Weast, 971 P.2d 974, 978 (Wyo. 1999) (quoting Mills 
v. Garlow, 768 P.2d 554, 555 (Wyo. 1989)).  While statutes of limitation should be 
liberally construed to effect their intention, courts may not extend a statute 
by liberal construction to claims not clearly barred thereunder.  Gustafson v. Bridger Coal Co., 
834 F. Supp. 352, 357 (D.Wyo. 1993); 
John Meier & Son, Inc. v. Horse Creek Conservation Dist. of Goshen 
County, 603 P.2d 1283, 1287 (Wyo. 1979); 
51 Am.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 54 (2000).

 

[¶31]   We will first discuss the 
thirty-day period of limitations found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-24-122.  The right of the people to adopt laws 
through the initiative process is found in Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 52.  The constitution does not contain a 
period of limitation for challenging an initiative, but it does provide that 
"[a]dditional procedures for the initiative and referendum may be prescribed by 
law."  Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 
52(f).

 

[¶32]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-24-122 is part 
of Title 22 (Elections), Chapter 24 (Initiative and Referendum).  Those statutes are the "procedures 
prescribed by law" for implementation of the constitutionally created initiative 
right.  The thirty-day period of 
limitation contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-24-122 clearly and unambiguously 
applies only to determinations made by the secretary of state or by the attorney 
general "under this article . . .."11  It just as clearly and unambiguously 
does not apply to substantive constitutional challenges to particular laws 
adopted via initiative.  No doubt, 
the period is so shortthirty daysbecause it is intended only to bar challenges 
to the election, itself, not to the law thereby adopted.  We conclude that the thirty-day period 
of limitations found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-24-122 does not act to bar 
constitutional challenges seeking declaratory and injunctive relief from a law 
adopted by the initiative process.  
This conclusion does not conflict with the plurality opinion in 
Wyoming Nat. Abortion Rights Action League v. Karpan, 881 P.2d 281, 
289-90 (Wyo. 1994), 
where the facial constitutionality of a proposed initiative was challenged as 
part of a challenge to the secretary of state's decision to place the initiative 
on the ballot.  In that case, the 
complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief was brought within the 
thirty-day period, and no other period of limitation was at issue.  See also Snell v. Johnson County 
School Dist. No. 1, 2004 WY 19, ¶¶ 14-18, 86 P.3d 248, 254-56 (Wyo. 2004) 
(constitutional claim related to bond election procedures, but not 
constitutional claim related to use of bond funds, subject to election code 
statute of limitations).

 

[¶33]   The appellees' second statute of 
limitations argument is based upon the four-year period of limitations found in 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C).  
The appellees contend that the appellants knew or had reason to know of 
the existence of their constitutional claims either in 1992 when the secretary 
of state accepted the term limit initiative for placement on the ballot, or in 
1993 when the law went into effect.  
Neither appellee cites any specific authority where a court applied a 
statute of limitations to bar a claim in a similar situation.  Rather, they rely on our general 
discovery jurisprudence.

 

[¶34]   We recently addressed the courts' 
role in enforcing statutes of limitation:

 

            
Statutes of limitations are pragmatic devices to save courts from stale 
claim litigation.  Duke v Housen, 
589 P.2d 334, 340 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 863, 100 S. Ct. 132, 
62 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1979).  Such statutes 
represent legislative and public policy controlling the right to litigate.  Id.  They are arbitrary by their very nature, 
and we must give full force to the applicable statutes without regard to the 
merits of the particular claim.  
Id.  When a 
statute of limitations is being considered, the nature and extent of the injury 
and the amount of money damages involved are only significant in the effect they 
may have on when the cause of action arose and when the time expired for 
pursuing the applicable judicial remedy.  589 P.2d  at 340.

 

Rawlinson, 
2001 
WY 6, ¶ 9, 17 P.3d at 15-16 (emphasis added).  Even though the present cases do not 
involve an injury and money damages, the emphasized language from 
Rawlinson is helpful in determining when the appellants' cause of action 
accrued in these cases.

 

[¶35]   A specific plaintiff's cause of 
action for a tort, such as a motor vehicle accident, can readily be seen to be 
discoverable at such time as that specific plaintiff realizes that he or she was 
injured by the tortious conduct.  
Similarly, a specific plaintiff's cause of action for breach of contract 
can readily be seen to be discoverable at such time as that specific plaintiff 
realizes that he or she was injured by the breach.  But what about all of the potential 
plaintiffs whose constitutional rights to seek public office or to vote may have 
been violated by the enactment of a term limit law, whether by initiative or 
legislation?  Does the statute of 
limitation begin to run for everyone alike on the day the law is adopted?  Or does it begin to run on that date 
only for those persons presently in public office?  Did it also begin to run on that date 
for persons only later elected to public office, or does it begin to run for 
those persons on the date they take office?  In answering those questions we should 
be mindful that the statute of limitations is only a tool for avoiding the 
adjudication of stale claims; it is not an end in itself.

 

[¶36]   We hold that in the context of the 
present case, the appellant legislators' causes of action did not accrue until 
they were actually faced with the reality of being foreclosed from seeking 
re-election, and that the appellant electors' causes of action did not accrue 
until they were actually faced with the reality of not being able to vote for 
their chosen candidates.  We reach 
this decision for several reasons.  
First, the fact that the term limit law impinges upon fundamental 
constitutional rights inclines us toward a restrictive application of the 
statute of limitations.  Second, 
holding that the statute begins to run upon adoption of the term limit law would 
affect the rights of not just the present litigants, but of untold numbers of 
potential future office-holders and electors who had no reason in 1992 or 1993 
to recognize the law's impact upon them ten or twenty years later.  And third, these are not stale claims in 
the sense that witnesses have disappeared, or memories have faded, or evidence 
has been lost.  The constitutional 
issues do not depend upon anything that happened in 1992.  For that reason, application of the 
statute of limitations to bar this action would not serve the statute's 
identified purpose.  We affirm the 
district court's rejection of the appellees' affirmative defenses based upon the 
statutes of limitation.

 

Constitutionality

 

[¶37]   The parties have not addressed this 
issue, but we note that the constitutionality of a statute may only be 
questioned by a party whose rights are affected thereby.  Stagner v. Wyoming State Tax Com'n, 
682 P.2d 326, 331 (Wyo. 1984); 
Alberts v. State, 642 P.2d 447, 452 (Wyo. 1982).  Likewise, a party cannot assert that a 
statute is unconstitutional as to other persons or classes of persons.  Mahaney v. Hunter Enterprises, Inc., 
426 P.2d 442, 444 (Wyo. 1967).  These precepts suggest that the 
appellant legislators cannot raise the question of the constitutionality of the 
term limit law as it affects the qualifications for governor found in Wyo. 
Const. art. 4, § 2, and for secretary of state, auditor, treasurer, and 
superintendent of public instruction found in Wyo. Const. art. 4, § 11.  Furthermore, the appellant voters have 
not alleged an inability to vote for particular candidates for the executive 
branch offices.  Accordingly, we 
will limit our holding to those constitutional provisions involving legislative 
qualifications.

 

[¶38]   We will consider several 
constitutional provisions in the ensuing discussion.  Of primary significance are the 
following:

 

            
All power is inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded 
on their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety and happiness; for 
the advancement of these ends they have at all times an inalienable and 
indefeasible right to alter, reform or abolish the government in such manner as 
they may think proper.

 

Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 1.

 

            
Since equality in the enjoyment of natural and civil rights is only made 
sure through political equality, the laws of this state affecting the political 
rights and privileges of its citizens shall be without distinction of race, 
color, sex, or any circumstance or condition whatsoever other than individual 
incompetency, or unworthiness duly ascertained by a court of competent 
jurisdiction.

 

Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 3.

 

            
Senators shall be elected for the term of four (4) years and 
representatives for the term of two (2) years.  The senators elected at the first 
election shall be divided by lot into two classes as nearly equal as may 
be.  The seats of senators of the 
first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the first two years, and of 
the second class at the expiration of four years.  No person shall be a senator who has not 
attained the age of twenty-five years, or a representative who has not attained 
the age of twenty-one years, and who is not a citizen of the United States and 
of this state and who has not, for at least twelve months next preceding his 
election resided within the county or district in which he was 
elected.

 

Wyo. 
Const. art. 3, § 2.

 

            
(a) The people may propose and enact laws by the initiative, and approve 
or reject acts of the legislature by the referendum.

 

            
. . .

 

            
(g) The initiative shall not be used to . . . enact that prohibited by 
the constitution for enactment by the legislature.

 

Wyo. 
Const. art. 3, § 52.

 

            
The rights of citizens of the State of Wyoming to vote and hold office 
shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex.  Both male and female citizens of this 
state shall equally enjoy all civil, political and religious rights and 
privileges.

 

Wyo. 
Const. art. 6, § 1.

 
            
Every citizen of the United States of the age of twenty-one years and 
upwards, who has resided in the state or territory one year and in the county 
wherein such residence is located sixty days next preceding any election, shall 
be entitled to vote at such election, except as herein otherwise 
provided.

 

Wyo. 
Const. art. 6, § 2.

 

            
No person except a qualified elector shall be elected or appointed to any 
civil or military office in the state.  
. . .

 

Wyo. 
Const. art. 6, § 15.

 

[¶39]   We have said numerous times that, 
in construing the state constitution, this Court follows the same rules that 
govern construction of a statute, and that our fundamental purpose is to 
ascertain the intent of the framers.  
Director of Office of State Lands & Investments v. Merbanco, Inc., 
2003 WY 73, ¶ 33, 70 P.3d 241, 252 (Wyo. 2003); 
Geringer v. Bebout, 10 P.3d 514, 520-21 (Wyo. 2000); 
Management Council of Wyoming Legislature v. Geringer, 953 P.2d 839, 843 
(Wyo. 1998); 
Brimmer, 521 P.2d  at 580.  We look first to the plain and 
unambiguous language to determine intent.  
Merbanco, 2003 WY 73, ¶ 33, 70 P.3d  at 252; 
Riedel v. Anderson, 2003 WY 70, ¶ 39, 70 P.3d 223, 234 (Wyo. 
2003); 
Geringer, 10 P.3d  at 521; 
Management Council, 953 P.2d  at 843.  If the language is plain and 
unambiguous, there is no need for construction, and we presume the framers 
intended what was plainly expressed.  
Geringer, 10 P.3d  at 521; 
Management Council, 953 P.2d  at 843; 
Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 50 P. 819, 821 (1897).

 

[¶40]   Every statement in the constitution 
must be interpreted in light of the entire document, with all portions thereof 
read in pari materia.12  Management Council, 953 P.2d  at 
845; 
Thomson v. Wyoming In-Stream Flow Committee, 651 P.2d 778, 790 (Wyo. 
1982).

 

Our 
cases explain that every statement in the constitution must be interpreted in 
light of the entire document, rather than as a series of sequestered 
pronouncements, and that the constitution should not be interpreted to render 
any portion of it meaningless, with all portions of it read in pari materia and 
every word, clause and sentence considered so that no part will be inoperative 
or superfluous.

 

Geringer, 
10 P.3d  at 520.  Furthermore, the rule that a statute 
that enumerates the subjects or things on which it is to operate, or the persons 
affected, or forbids certain things, is to be construed as excluding from its 
effect all those not expressly mentionedexpressio unius est exclusio 
alteriusis applicable in construing constitutional provisions.  In re West Highway Sanitary and Imp. 
Dist., 77 Wyo. 384, 317 P.2d 495, 504 (1957).  And finally, in construing 
constitutional provisions, courts will not ignore the general spirit of the 
instrument.  Thomson, 651 P.2d  at 782; 
Witzenburger v. State ex rel. Wyoming Community Development Authority, 
575 P.2d 1100, 1129 (Wyo. 1978); 
Schaefer v. Thomson, 240 F. Supp. 247, 253 (D.Wyo. 1964).

 

[¶41]   Before we apply these tenets of 
construction to the issues at hand, it is necessary that we first identify those 
issues.  The best way to do that is 
to relate the positions taken by the parties.  The appellants contend that the term 
limit law is unconstitutional because it adds qualifications for holding office 
to the exclusive qualifications found in the constitution.  The appellants further contend that the 
people cannot do through an initiative what the legislature cannot do by 
legislation.  Finally, the 
appellants argue that the constitution may only be supplemented or changed 
through the formal amendment process.13

 

[¶42]   In their appellate briefs, the 
appellees took an unqualified stance in favor of the people's "reserved" rights 
and power.  The secretary of state's 
appellate brief opened with the following passage from the Declaration of 
Independence:

 

That 
to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their 
just powers from the consent of the governed.  That whenever any Form of Government 
becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to 
abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such 
principles and organizing its power in such form, as to them shall seem most 
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.

 

After 
averring that Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 1 "echoes these words," the secretary of 
state argued that "[t]he rights reserved and retained by the people upon the 
creation of the government are superior to the rights enumerated in the 
Constitution."  The intervenors made 
a similar argument:  "As articulated 
in Article 1, § 1, the power inherent in the people provides the foundation for 
Wyoming's system of government.  If 
that system is only subject to changes and improvements originating from within, 
the people have no effective means of protecting their indefeasible 
right."

 

[¶43]   By raising these arguments, the 
appellees have brought into question the very nature of constitutional 
government.  The Declaration of 
Independence was, after all, a document intended to justify a revolution.  By ascribing the same intent to Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 1, the appellees appear to have taken the position that the 
constitution, itself, authorizes the extra-constitutional exercise of power by 
the people.14  We find that notion troublesome, given 
the function of a constitution:

 

            
As used herein, the word "constitution" means a declaration of 
fundamental laws or principles for the government of a nation or state.  A constitution represents the supreme 
written will of the people regarding the framework for their government.  Where a constitution asserts a certain 
right, or lays down a certain principle of law or procedure, it speaks for the 
entire people as their supreme law, and it is the paramount authority for all 
that is done in pursuance of its provisions.  A constitution thus embodies fundamental 
values and articulates the citizens' common aspirations for constitutional 
governance and the rule of law.  A 
state constitution is likewise the supreme written will of the people of a state 
regarding the framework for their government and is subject only to the 
limitations found in the Federal Constitution.  Although a constitution may be either 
written (as in the case of the United States) or unwritten (as in the case of 
Great Britain), the word "constitution," as applied to the organization of our 
federal and state governments, always implies a written document which is 
understood to have been enacted by the direct action of the people, providing 
for the form of their government and defining the powers of the several 
departments within it, thus creating a fundamental law which is absolute and 
unalterable except through amendment by the people from which it 
emanated.

 

16 
Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 1 (1998) (footnotes omitted); see also 1 
Thomas M. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 4 (Walter Carrington ed. 
1927).

 

[¶44]   We conclude that Wyo. Const. art. 
1, § 1 recognizes the ultimate right of the people to "alter, reform or abolish" 
government, through peaceful means or otherwise, but when read in pari 
materia with the rest of the constitution, it does not contemplate the 
adoption of laws under the existing government, whether by legislation or 
initiative, other than through constitutionally established means.  The appellees conceded as much at oral 
argument when they conceded that Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 1 is limited by Wyo. 
Const. art. 3, § 52(g).  In other 
words, the inherent and reserved powers of the people do not include, under this 
constitution, the right to enact via the initiative a law that could not be 
enacted by the legislature.  More 
than a century ago, this Court recognized that the power of the people to change 
government is controlled by the constitution:

 

The 
sovereignty resides in the people, although, by written constitutions, they have 
delegated the exercise of sovereign powers to several departments.  The people "retain in their own hands a 
power to control the governments they create as far as they have thought needful 
to do so; and the three departments are responsible to and subject to be 
ordered, directed, changed, or abolished by them.  But this control and direction must be 
exercised in the legitimate mode previously agreed upon."  Cooley, Const. Lim. 
598.

 

Rasmussen, 
50 P.  at 822.  The "legitimate mode previously agreed 
upon" is the constitutional amendment process found in Wyo. Const. art. 
20.

 

[¶45]   The conclusion that the people 
cannot do via the initiative what the legislature cannot do by legislation leads 
to the next question, which is the nature and extent of the legislature's 
authority under the Wyoming Constitution.  
We have said that a constitution is not a grant but a limitation upon 
legislative power.  Witzenburger, 
575 P.2d  at 1124; 
State v. Snyder, 31 Wyo. 333, 225 P. 1102, 1105 (1924).  Consequently, the legislature may enact 
any law not expressly or inferentially prohibited by the constitution.  Merbanco, 2003 WY 73, ¶ 45, 70 P.3d  at 256; 
Witzenburger, 575 P.2d  at 1124; 
Budge v. Board of Com'rs of Lincoln County, 29 Wyo. 35, 208 P. 874, 876 
(1922).  This plenary power of the legislature is 
the rule for all purposes of civil government, and a prohibition to exercise a 
particular power is an exception.  
State ex rel. Bennett v. Barber, 4 Wyo. 56, 32 P. 14, 16 
(1893).

 

[¶46]   Returning now to the rules of 
construction guiding this inquiry, we must first decide whether the constitution 
is ambiguous in regard to legislative qualifications.  Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 2 is certainly 
unambiguous; to be a senator, one must be at least twenty-five years of age, and 
to be a representative, one must be at least twenty-one years of age.  Both senators and representatives must 
be United States citizens and must have resided in the appropriate county or 
district for at least twelve months.  
Other constitutional provisions concerning eligibility for legislative 
office are equally unambiguous.  
Under Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 8, members of the legislature may not be 
appointed to any civil office during their respective term.  Under Wyo. Const. art. 6, § 15, only 
qualified electors may be elected or appointed to civil office.  And art. 6, § 19 prohibits anyone 
holding one of certain positions under the United States from holding a state 
office.

 

[¶47]   The precise question, of course, is 
not whether the constitution establishes unambiguous qualifications for holding 
legislative office.  Rather, the 
precise question is whether the constitutional qualifications are unambiguously 
meant to be exclusive.  The 
affirmative answer to that question lies in Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 3, where the 
framers mandated that "the laws of this state affecting the political rights and 
privileges of its citizens shall be without distinction of race, color, sex 
or any circumstance or condition whatsoever other than individual 
incompetency, or unworthiness duly ascertained by a court of competent 
jurisdiction."  (Emphasis 
added.)  The emphasized language 
leaves no doubt that no lawwhether enacted by the legislature 
through the legislative process or by the people through the initiative 
processmay condition "political rights and privileges" upon a "circumstance or 
condition" such as incumbency.  And 
Wyo. Const. art. 6, § 1 clearly identifies "holding office" as one of those 
political rights and privileges.

 

[¶48]   We must be careful not to forget 
that, where a statute or constitutional provision is unambiguous, there is no 
need to apply the various rules of construction.  In particular, the rule that statutes 
are presumed to be constitutional is a rule of construction, not an independent 
rule of law.  Courts do, indeed, 
have a duty to maintain the constitutionality of a statute where possible, but 
there is an equally imperative duty to declare a statute unconstitutional if it 
transgresses the state constitution.  
Wyoming Coalition v. Wyoming Game and Fish Com'n, 875 P.2d 729, 
732 (Wyo. 1994); 
Witzenburger, 575 P.2d  at 1114.

 

[¶49]   We must also be careful not to 
forget that this case is not about whether term limits are a good idea.  The question is simply whether it was 
the framers' intent to allow the legislature to add qualifications to those 
established in the constitution.  In 
reading the pertinent provisions in pari materia, and in light of the 
general spirit of the instrument, we have concluded there was no such 
intent.  In that regard, the leading 
commentators on the Wyoming Constitution have identified numerous constitutional 
constraints on legislative power, showing the framers' mistrust of the 
legislative process.  Robert B. 
Keiter & Tim Newcomb, The Wyoming State Constitution 6, 13 (Greenwood 
Press 1993).  This mistrust was not 
unprecedented.  One hundred years 
earlier, the framers of our federal constitution debated whether legislative 
bodies should be permitted to determine their own membership qualifications, the 
fear being that the legislative body could subvert the constitution.  State ex rel. Johnson v. Crane, 
65 Wyo. 189, 197 P.2d 864, 867 (1948) (quoting James Madison from 5 
Elliot's Debates on the Federal Constitution 404).

 

[¶50]   The appellees have cited State 
ex rel. Benham v. Cheever, 71 Wyo. 303, 257 P.2d 337, 341 (1953), 
for the proposition that "any type of initiative or referendum accorded to the 
voters by the legislature or by the Constitution is a right which should be 
liberally construed to provide the voters a right to speak."  During oral argument, counsel for the 
intervenors further argued that the fact that seventy-seven percent of the 
voters had favored term limits was "the most important thing that this court 
needs to keep in mind."  We note 
once again, however, that construction, liberal or otherwise, of unambiguous 
provisions is not only unnecessary, but is unwarranted.  Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 52(g) specifically 
denies to the people the right to use the initiative to enact "that prohibited 
by the constitution for enactment by the legislature."  The clear force and effect of that 
language is a mandate that this Court direct its attention to what the 
legislature may and may not do.  The 
fact that seventy-seven percent of the voters favored a particular measure does 
not make that measure constitutional.  
Either we live under a constitutional government or we do 
not.

 

[¶51]   Decisions from other states' courts 
may provide some guidance in the interpretation of constitutional 
provisions.  Simms v. Oedekoven, 
839 P.2d 381, 384 (Wyo. 1992).  We have read the cases cited by the 
parties, and we find them helpful in formulating an analysis, but each case is 
controlled by the specific wording of the constitutional provision, initiative 
petition, or statute at issue, or upon the nature of the issue being 
addressed.15  Some examples will suffice.  In 1995, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
found that a city charter amendment limiting terms of office for local elected 
officials violated the state constitution.  
In Minneapolis Term Limits Coalition v. Keefe, 535 N.W.2d 306, 308 
(Minn. 1995), 
the court held that, even though the constitution allowed the legislature to 
provide by law for qualifications for office, term limits were actually 
"eligibility requirements," which were fixed by the constitution.  The following year, the Nebraska Supreme 
Court, in Duggan v. Beerman, 249 Neb. 411, 544 N.W.2d 68, 71-79 
(1996), 
rejected that state's term limit initiative on completely different 
grounds.  Noting that the United 
States Supreme Court had held in United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 
514 U.S. 779, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 131 L. Ed. 2d 881 (1995) that state-imposed limits upon the terms 
for congressional offices were unconstitutional, and finding that the portion of 
the initiative relating to those congressional offices was "so interwoven" with 
the portion of the initiative relating to term limits for state offices, the 
court held that the entire initiative had to fail.  Duggan, 544 N.W.2d  at 71.  While declining to pass on the question 
of the validity of the initiative under the state constitution, the court did 
comment that "in adopting the Constitution, the people have imposed upon 
themselves limitations upon their ability to amend this fundamental law.'"  Duggan, 544 N.W.2d  at 75 
(quoting Duggan v. Beermann, 245 Neb. 907, 515 N.W.2d 788, 794 (1994) 
(Duggan I)).  In Lehman v. Bradbury, 333 Or. 
231, 37 P.3d 989 (2002), 
as in Duggan, a term limit initiative was found unconstitutional because 
the provisions establishing term limits for state elective offices were not 
closely related to the provisions establishing term limits for federal 
congressional offices, which violated a constitutional mandate that voters be 
able to vote separately on independent issues.  Id. at 
994-1000.

 

[¶52]   Two other term limit cases from 
1996 are noteworthy.  In Nevada 
Judges Ass'n v. Lau, 112 Nev. 51, 910 P.2d 898 (1996), 
the Nevada Supreme Court addressed a term limit initiative under a 
constitutional scheme whereby the initiative could be used directly to amend the 
constitution.  In finding the 
initiative constitutional against a "barrier to ballot access" challenge, the 
court held that the right to seek office is not a fundamental right, that the 
higher level of judicial review of strict scrutiny did not therefore apply, and 
that states have important election regulation interests.  Id. at 900-01.  Unlike the present case before this 
Court, however, Lau's analysis resulted from due process and equal 
protection arguments presented by the appellants. The Maine Supreme Court also 
found that state's term limits initiative constitutional in 1996.  That holding, in League of Women 
Voters v. Secretary of State, 683 A.2d 769, 771 (Me. 1996), 
was based on two principles:  that 
initiatives are to be construed liberally to facilitate the people's sovereign 
power to legislate, and that the power of the legislature is subject only to 
specific limitations found in the state and federal constitutions.  In particular, the court noted that 
nothing in Maine's constitutional debates suggests the framers intended to make 
the constitutional qualifications exclusive.  Id. at 772 n.7.16

 

[¶53]   In Citizens for Legislative 
Choice v. Miller, 144 F.3d 916 (6th Cir. 1998), 
a federal appellate court considered Michigan's term limit law in the face of a 
challenge based upon the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.  The court found that 
term limits do not create a ballot access issue, but prescribe qualifications 
for state office that do not clearly violate the federal constitution, whether 
analyzed under a balancing test or by giving deference to the state's right to 
decide how to structure its own government.  Id. at 920-25.  Miller exemplifies the difficulty 
in finding guidance in out-of-state cases.  
The question there was whether that term limit law violated particular 
federal constitutional protections, while the question in our case is whether 
Wyoming's term limit law violates particular provisions of this state's 
constitution.  Likewise, in 
Rudeen v. Cenarrusa, 136 Idaho 560, 38 P.3d 598, 601-06 
(2001), 
our neighboring state's highest court found a term limit law unconstitutional, 
but did so in the context of a challenge based upon equal protection, and in the 
context of a state constitution that authorized the legislature to prescribe 
additional qualifications.17

 

[¶54]   In Alaskans for Legislative 
Reform v. State, 887 P.2d 960, 961-64 (Alaska 1994), 
the Alaska Supreme Court found a legislative term limit initiative 
unconstitutional for several reasons, including:  (1) when the conflicting principles of 
constitutional government and the people's right to express their will conflict, 
the former must prevail; (2) the constitutional qualifications are exclusive 
even though not explicitly so; (3) and office-holding qualifications are not 
mere election regulations.  Another 
case with similar reasoning is League of Women Voters of Massachusetts v. 
Secretary of Com., 425 Mass. 424, 681 N.E.2d 842 (1997).  In finding an initiative-engendered term 
limits statute unconstitutional, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
held as follows:  (1) the 
legislature may not change qualifications for public office that are prescribed 
by the state constitution; (2) term limits are not mere election regulations, 
but are qualifications for holding office; (3) the initiative may not be used to 
accomplish what the legislature cannot accomplish; and (4) "[t]he idea that 
constitutionally prescribed qualifications may be changed only by constitutional 
amendment is intuitively sound."  
Id. at 846.  This 
holding comports with the general rule that "where the constitution establishes 
specific eligibility requirements for a particular constitutional office, the 
constitutional criteria are exclusive."  
63C Am.Jur.2d Public Officers and Employees § 51 at 494-95 
(1997); 
Annotation, Legislative Power to Prescribe Qualifications for or 
Conditions of Eligibility to Constitutional Office, 34 A.L.R.2d 155, § 6 
(1954).  See also 42 Am.Jur.2d 
Initiative and Referendum § 10 at 498 (2000) (state legislator term limits are proper 
subject of initiative unless prohibited by state constitution).  Similar holdings can be found in 
Gerberding v. Munro, 134 Wash. 2d 188, 949 P.2d 1366, 1370-74 
(1998): 
(1) the initiative is reflective of the reserved power of the people to 
legislate, but the people in their legislative capacity are subject to 
constitutional mandates; (2) non-incumbency is a qualification for office; (3) 
constitutional qualifications are exclusive; and (4) there is a strong 
presumption in favor of eligibility for office.  We agree with the reasoning and the 
conclusions of these cases.  The 
constitution recognizes the legislature's authority to "provide by law" for the 
regulation of elections, but it contains no similar recognition of legislative 
authority to amend the qualifications for holding a constitutional office.  See, for example, Wyo. Const. 
art. 6, §§ 11, 14 and 18.

 

[¶55]   The dissent in Gerberding 
relies in part on an argument that was also presented to this Court.  In assessing constitutional 
qualifications provisions, some courts have concluded that positively stated 
qualifications are exclusive, whereas negatively stated qualifications merely 
set minimums, leaving the legislature free to add additional 
qualifications.  Gerberding, 
949 P.2d at 1378-79 (Sanders, J., dissenting).  Under that theory, for instance, a 
constitutional statement that "twenty-one year old resident citizens can hold 
office" is an exclusive qualification provision, whereas "no person who is not a 
twenty-one year old resident citizen can hold office" is not an exclusive 
qualification provision.  The 
legislature, and the people by initiative, may add qualifications in the latter 
situation, but not in the former.  
See Annotation, supra, 34 A.L.R.2d 155, §§ 4, 6.

 

[¶56]   Application of this lexigraphic 
rule to Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 2 would mean that its negative wording created 
non-exclusive legislative qualifications.  
We are not persuaded, however, that the slight distinction in phraseology 
between positive wording and negative wording evinces differing intentions.  Instead, we continue to believe that 
"[i]f no person can be elected to that office who does not possess these 
qualifications, it follows by a familiar rule of interpretation that any person 
who does possess them may be elected.'"  
Crane, 197 P.2d at 870 (quoting Ekwall v. Stadelman, 146 
Ore. 439, 30 P.2d 1037, 1038 (1934)).  See also Reale v. Board of Real 
Estate Appraisers, 880 P.2d 1205-09 (Colo. 1994) and League of Women Voters, 683 A.2d  at 773 n.8.  Ekwall goes on to state that 
"[t]he very enumeration of them excludes the idea that, in the adoption of the 
Constitution, the people intended that there should be any other 
qualifications."  Ekwall, 30 P.2d  at 1038.  We agree.18  
The Supreme Court of Arkansas made this point plainly but eloquently in 
Mississippi County v. Green, 200 Ark. 204, 138 S.W.2d 377, 379 
(1940):

 

The 
qualifications fixed by the constitution to be county judge in this state 
inferentially prohibits the legislature from fixing additional 
qualifications.  Why fix them in the 
first place if the makers of the constitution did not intend to fix all the 
qualifications required, and why fix only a part of them and leave it to the 
legislature to fix other qualifications?  
There is no reasonable answer to these questions.  The makers of the constitution knew 
exactly what qualifications a county judge should have and fixed them, and of 
course, fixed all of them and not a part of them.  The makers of the constitution intended 
to cover the whole subject of the qualifications for county judge.  Had the makers of the constitution 
intended otherwise they would have created the office of the county judge with 
directions to the legislature to fix their qualifications. 

 

[¶57]   The general rule, and the 
better-reasoned rule, is that constitutionally prescribed qualifications for 
holding a constitutional office are exclusive.  Even without the assistance of that 
rule, however, the conclusion is unavoidable that Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 3one of 
the earliest sections in the Declaration of Rightsforbids the passage of any 
law making the exercise of Wyoming citizens' political rights dependent upon a 
circumstance or condition otherwise than as provided.  Incumbency is simply not "individual 
incompetency, or unworthiness duly ascertained by a court of competent 
jurisdiction."  Wyo. Const. art. 1, 
§ 3.

 

[¶58]   Lastly, we will address one final 
argument contained in the appellate brief of the secretary of 
state:

 

The 
truth of the matter is that the Wyoming Constitution is simply silent on the 
issue of the adoption of term limits for state officials.  Reading these provisions as exclusive is 
quite simply reading into the constitution something that is not 
there.

 

Restated, 
the contention is that, if the framers of the constitution had intended for term 
limits to be of constitutional, rather than statutory, stature, they would have 
provided for term limits within the constitution.  Well, interestingly enough, that is 
exactly what they did.  Prior to the 
adoption of a constitutional amendment in 1982, the state treasurer was 
constitutionally term limited:

 

There 
shall be chosen by the qualified electors of the state at the times and places 
of choosing members of the legislature, a secretary of state, auditor, 
treasurer, and superintendent of public instruction, who shall have attained the 
age of twenty-five years respectively, shall be citizens of the United States, 
and shall have the qualifications of state electors.  They shall severally hold their offices 
at the seat of government, for the term of four (4) years and until their 
successors are elected and duly qualified, but no person shall be eligible 
for the office of treasurer for four (4) years next after the expiration of the 
term for which he was elected.  
The legislature may provide for such other state officers as are deemed 
necessary.

 

(Emphasis 
added.)  Wyo. Const. art 4, § 11 
(1890) (amended 1982).  Clearly, the 
framers of the state constitution knew and used the necessary language to 
establish term limits.  That they 
did not use that language in Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 2, addressing the 
qualifications and term for legislators, is 
telling.

 

[¶59]   Our conclusion that the term limit 
law violates the unambiguous and exclusive provisions of the Wyoming 
Constitution providing eligibility requirements for membership in the state 
legislature, which conclusion incorporates a response to the separate certified 
question concerning the reserved powers of the people under Wyo. Const. art. 1, 
§ 1, makes it unnecessary and inappropriate for us to address the issue of 
whether the law also violates the appellant electors' right to vote under Wyo. 
Const. art. 6, § 2.  Umbach v. 
State, 2002 WY 42, ¶ 14, 42 P.3d 1006, 1009 (Wyo. 2002); 
In re LePage, 2001 WY 26, ¶ 18, 18 P.3d 1177, 1181 (Wyo. 
2001); 
Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67, 71 (Wyo. 1978); 
Schoeller v. Board of County Com'rs of Park County, 568 P.2d 869, 
879 (Wyo. 1977).  See also United States v. Cusumano, 
83 F.3d 1247, 1250 (10th Cir. 1996) and United States v. Santiago, 846 F. Supp. 1486, 1497 n.12 (D.Wyo. 1994).

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶60]   We answer the certified 
questions as follows:

 

            
1.         
The term limit law (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-5-103), as it applies to 
candidates for the state legislature, whether adopted by initiative or 
legislative action, is unconstitutional and unenforceable because it violates 
Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 3, and art. 3, §§ 2 and 52(g).

 

            
2.         
We decline to address the question of whether the term limit law also 
violates the appellant electors' right to vote under Wyo. Const. art. 6, § 
2.

 

            
3.         
The reserved powers of the people under the Wyoming Constitution do not 
include the right to alter the government by initiative or by statute with 
regard to the time period any one person can hold a state legislative 
office.

 

            
4.         
We decline to address the affirmative defenses of laches and the statutes 
of limitations as certified questions, but have answered them as part of the 
appeals in this matter.

 

[¶61]   Remanded to the district court for 
entry of an order consistent herewith.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1For clarity, the wording of this 
question differs slightly from its wording in our order accepting 
certification.

 

  2The facts set forth herein have been 
gleaned from the Revised Stipulation of Facts filed in the district court on 
February 13, 2004.

 

  3The question of congressional term 
limits is not presently before this Court, that matter having been decided 
against state-imposed term limits in United States Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 115 S. Ct. 1842, 131 L. Ed. 2d 881 (1995).  See Dwayne A. Vance, 
State-Imposed Congressional Term Limits:  What Would the Framers of the 
Constitution Say?, 1994 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 429 (1994) and Martin E. Latz, The 
Constitutionality of State-Passed Congressional Term Limits, 25 Akron L. 
Rev. 155 (1991).

 

  4W.R.C.P. 54(b) states, in pertinent 
part:

 

Judgment 
upon multiple claims or involving multiple parties.  
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties 
are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or 
more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express 
direction for the entry of judgment.

 

  5The filing period for these 
legislative offices is during May 2004.

 

  6W.R.A.P. 11.01 states, in pertinent 
part:

 

The 
supreme court may answer questions of law certified to it by a federal court or 
a state district court, and a district court may answer questions of law 
certified to it by a circuit court, municipal court or an administrative agency, 
if there is involved in any proceeding before the certifying court or agency a 
question of law which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the 
certifying court or agency and concerning which it appears there is no 
controlling precedent in the decisions of the supreme 
court.

 

  7Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-103 
(LexisNexis 2003) states:

 

Any 
person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings 
constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are 
affected by the Wyoming constitution or by a statute, municipal ordinance, 
contract or franchise, may have any question of construction or validity arising 
under the instrument determined and obtain a declaration of rights, status or 
other legal relations.

 

  8In their appellate briefs, the 
parties either ignored this justification for the district court's rejection of 
laches or claimed an inability to find any law on the matter.  No doubt, the district court was 
referring to the concept of "continuing injury" as it may affect application of 
the statute of limitations.  See 
Young v. Young, 709 P.2d 1254, 1259 (Wyo. 1985) and Black's Law Dictionary 789 
(7th ed. 1999).

 

  9We 
say "if any" because, unlike the situation in Cole, the record in the 
present case does not reveal any Wyoming state legislators who left office based 
upon the presumptive validity of this state's term limit law.  This is the first election since the 
law's adoption wherein the twelve-year limitation would have an 
effect.

 
  10In his answer to the complaint, the 
secretary of state actually raised as an affirmative defense the ten-year period 
of limitations found in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-109, and that is the statute 
mentioned in the certified questions.  The intervenors' answer, however, 
referred both to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-109 and to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-3-105(a)(iv)(C).  As we noted in 
Cox, 2003 WY 146, ¶ 28, 79 P.3d  at 509, the latter statute of limitations 
governs declaratory judgment actions, and that is the statute that both 
appellees have argued before this Court.

 

  11Article 1 of Chapter 24 contains 
the initiative and referendum election procedures.

 

  12In pari materia means that 
all provisions relating to the same matter are read together.  Black's Law Dictionary, 
supra, at 794.

 

  13Wyo. Const. art. 20 provides 
specific procedures whereby amendments may be proposed by the legislature and 
adopted at a general election, or may be adopted at a constitutional convention 
proposed by the legislature and approved at a general 
election.

 

  14They may not be alone in that 
contention.  In an appendix to his 
dissent in Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 275, 81 S. Ct. 1469, 6 L. Ed. 2d 782 (1961), 
Justice Douglas included the Wyoming Constitution as one of fifteen making 
"specific provision for the right of revolution . . .."

 

  15Relevant cases were recently 
collected at George L. Blum, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and 
Operation of Constitutional and Statutory "Term Limits" Provisions, 112 
A.L.R.5th 1 (2003).

 

  16We have recognized that resort may 
be had to the record of the debates from Wyoming's constitutional convention, 
but we have also noted that they are not a very reliable source of information 
when attempting to construe any particular word or provision of the 
constitution.  Merbanco, 2003 
WY 73, ¶ 40, 70 P.3d  at 254; 
Rasmussen, 50 P.  at 824.  The parties have noted some general 
statements from the debates, but nothing directly bearing upon the specific 
issue of term limits or the exclusiveness of constitutional qualifications to 
hold office.

 

  17For a negative analysis of 
Rudeen, see Daniel Roland Anderson, Note, Rudeen v. Cenarrusa: Tying a 
Bow on a Bad Day for Idaho, 38 Idaho L. Rev. 707 (2002).

 

  18Coyne v. State ex rel. Thomas, 
595 P.2d 970, 972 (Wyo. 1979) and Haskins v. State ex rel. 
Harrington, 516 P.2d 1171, 1173-74 (Wyo. 1973) are not contrary holdings inasmuch as 
they are concerned with statutory, rather than constitutional 
offices.