Case Title: Mintun v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-09-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Mintun v. State1998 WY 121966 P.2d 954Case Number: 97-101Decided: 09/25/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

Eric L. 
MINTUN, Appellant (Defendant),

 

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

Appeal from the District Court, 
Sweetwater County, Ryckman, J.

 

Sylvia L. Hackl, State 
Public Defender; and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel, for 
Appellant.

William U. Hill, Attorney 
General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; Kimberly A. 
Baker-Musick, Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director, 
Prosecution Assistance Program; and S. Decker Cannon, Student Intern, 
Appellee.

 

Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and 
TAYLOR,* JJ.

 * Chief Justice at time of oral 
argument.

 

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

 [¶1] After a deadly car accident claimed the life of 
Charles Pennington and left Eric Mintun seriously injured, with no recollection 
of the accident or prior events, Eric Mintun was charged with aggravated 
homicide by vehicle in violation of Wyo. Stat. § 6-2-106(b)(i) (1997). Both 
Charles Pennington and Eric Mintun were ejected from the vehicle during the 
accident; thus, the only issue at trial was who was driving the car when it 
crashed. The jury determined Eric Mintun was driving, leading to a guilty 
verdict. We affirm.

 

                                          
   I. 
ISSUES

 

[¶2] Appellant, Eric L. 
Mintun (Mintun), raises four issues:

 

ISSUE I.

 

Was the Appellant denied a fair trial when the court 
allowed the admission of a computerized recreation of the accident into evidence 
over objection?

 

ISSUE II.

 

Was the Appellant denied a fair trial when the State 
had a second expert witness give cumulative testimony for the purpose of 
bolstering the credibility of its main witness, Sergeant 
Kourbelas?

 

ISSUE III.

 

Was the Appellant denied a fair trial as guaranteed 
by the due process clauses of the United States and Wyoming Constitutions 
because of prosecutorial misconduct during the closing 
argument?

 

 ISSUE 
IV.

 

Was the Appellant denied a fair trial when the trial 
court allowed the State's expert witness to impeach the Appellant's expert 
witness before he testified?

 

[¶3] The State phrases the 
issues as:

 

I. Did the district court properly admit a computer 
animation of the automobile crash that killed the victim?

 

II. Did the district court err in permitting the 
State's expert witness, John Kwasnoski, to testify over Appellant's objection 
that the testimony was cumulative?

 

III. Did counsel for the State commit prosecutorial 
misconduct in closing argument?

 

IV. Did the district court properly permit the 
State's expert witness, during the State's case-in-chief, to comment upon the 
conclusions made by Appellant's expert witness in his oral pre-trial 
report?

 

                                             
II. FACTS

 

[¶4] After a night of heavy 
drinking, Mintun and two of his friends, Charles Pennington (Pennington) and 
Brian Chapman (Chapman), decided to go hunting. Around 5:00 a.m. on October 8, 
1995, the three friends stopped at Mintun's home where he traded his pickup for 
his girlfriend's car. They left Mintun's home with Mintun driving, Chapman in 
the back seat, and Pennington asleep in the front passenger's seat. A few 
minutes later, they stopped at the home of one of Chapman's friends, Charlotte 
Mudd. Concerned that the men were too intoxicated to hunt safely, Ms. Mudd tried 
to persuade them to stay at her home and "sleep it off." Making perhaps the 
wisest decision of his life, Chapman agreed to stay. Mintun became angry at 
Chapman, and drove off "like a bat out of hell."  Pennington remained asleep in the car 
during this visit to Ms. Mudd's residence, and was still sleeping when they 
left.

 

[¶5] Sometime prior to 7:20 
a.m., the car failed to negotiate a curve. Traveling at approximately forty 
miles per hour, the car jumped the curb, struck a street sign, and collided with 
a light pole. The car rolled and turned, eventually coming to a stop on its top 
and facing the direction from which it had come. Both Pennington and Mintun were 
ejected from the car, with Mintun landing in the street and Pennington next to 
the car's final stopping place. Pennington died at the scene and Mintun 
sustained serious life-threatening injuries. Police were notified of the crash 
at 7:20 a.m., and arrived shortly thereafter.

 

[¶6] Sergeant Neil Kourbelas 
investigated the accident. None of those who stopped to assist had seen the 
crash occur and Mintun's injuries left him unable to recall the accident.1 Thus, Sergeant Kourbelas had no 
witness accounts of how the crash occurred or who was driving. Using his 
education and experience in accident reconstruction, Sergeant Kourbelas 
attempted to reconstruct the accident from the evidence he collected at the 
site, coming to the conclusion that Mintun had been 
driving.

 

[¶7] At trial, Sergeant 
Kourbelas testified as to his investigation and reconstruction of the accident. 
The State also presented John Kwasnoski (Kwasnoski), a physics professor who 
also specializes in accident reconstruction. Using Sergeant Kourbelas' 
investigation results and his own personal observation of the damaged vehicle, 
Kwasnoski did his own reconstruction of the accident.  He too came to the conclusion that 
Mintun had been driving. Kwasnoski testified that his reconstruction depended 
upon mathematical computations and the laws of physics, differing from Sergeant 
Kourbelas' reconstruction which was based upon experience. Over Mintun's 
objection, Kwasnoski was also allowed to compare his conclusions with those of 
Milo Beaver (Beaver), the expert hired by Mintun. Although Mintun's expert had 
not yet testified, Kwasnoski refuted the conclusions Beaver had stated prior to 
trial.

 

[¶8] The State also offered 
the testimony of Nathaniel Huff (Huff), an eyewitness to the accident who did 
not come forward until shortly before trial. Huff explained his location at the 
time of the accident, and related his version of what had occurred. Huff 
testified that he saw Mintun ejected from the vehicle. Huff's calculation of 
Mintun's point of ejection was the same point at which Kwasnoski had calculated 
Mintun's ejection was most likely. However, Huff also testified that Mintun was 
ejected from the passenger's side of the car, and that he had seen Pennington 
gripping the steering wheel while the accident was in 
progress.

 

[¶9] Finally, the State used 
a computer-generated video animation of the accident as a demonstrative exhibit 
during Sergeant Kourbelas' testimony. The animation showed the accident from 
three different vantage points: a top, or helicopter, view; a side view; and 
what was termed the witness view. Marvin Larsen, the animator responsible for 
this exhibit's creation, testified he used measurements and other information 
provided by Sergeant Kourbelas, and the animation was intended to present 
Sergeant Kourbelas' reconstruction of the accident from the three different 
vantage points. Sergeant Kourbelas affirmed this intent, and specifically 
testified the "witness view" was intended to present what he believed an 
eyewitness would have seen from Huff's vantage point, not what Huff claimed to 
have actually seen. The witness view was inconsistent with Huff's testimony, 
showing the car spinning before Mintun was ejected. Sergeant Kourbelas explained 
his theory that, although Huff accurately placed the point and time of ejection, 
Mintun was actually ejected from the driver's side after the car had spun 
around.

 

[¶10] In his defense, Mintun 
called Beaver, a mechanical engineer who is also an accident reconstructionist. 
Beaver testified he used Sergeant Kourbelas' investigation results along with 
his own measurements and observations of the vehicle and accident site in 
reconstructing the accident. It was Beaver's opinion that Pennington was driving 
the car when the accident occurred.

 

[¶11] During closing 
arguments, Mintun objected to references by the State's attorney to a lack of 
evidence supporting the defense theories. The prosecutor also used the phrases 
"I think" twice and "I believe" once during his rebuttal 
closing.

 

[¶12] The jury found Mintun 
guilty. He was sentenced to not less than three nor more than eight years in the 
Wyoming State Penitentiary.

 

                                      
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

[¶13] Mintun claims as error 
the admission into evidence of the computer-generated animation showing Sergeant 
Kourbelas' reconstruction of the accident, and also contends various additional 
errors in the admission of expert testimony. Admission of expert testimony, 
rulings on the scope and manner of the expert's examination, and questions 
regarding the cumulative nature and relevancy of the testimony are all within 
the discretion of the district court. Witt v. State, 892 P.2d 132, 137 (Wyo. 
1995); Lindsey v. State, 725 P.2d 649, 656 (Wyo. 1986).

 

"Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, 
among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound 
judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and 
without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. * * *"

 

Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 
1986)).

 

[¶14] Mintun also contends 
the prosecutor made inappropriate comments during closing arguments, denying him 
a fair trial.

 

Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are settled by 
reference to the entire record and hinge on whether a defendant's case has been 
so prejudiced as to constitute denial of a fair trial. * * * Similarly, the 
propriety of any comment within a closing argument is measured in the context of 
the entire argument. * * * A trial court's rulings as to the scope of 
permissible argument will not be disturbed absent a "clear or patent" abuse of 
discretion. * * * Even then, reversal is not warranted unless a reasonable 
probability exists, absent the error, that the appellant may have enjoyed a more 
favorable verdict. * * * Failing to timely object to an improper closing 
argument, the appellate threshold for reversal is "a substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice."

 

Arevalo v. State, 939 P.2d 228, 230 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting Mayer v. State, 618 P.2d 127, 132 (Wyo. 1980) and 
Dice v. State, 825 P.2d 379, 384 (Wyo. 1992)) (emphasis in 
original).

 

                                          
IV. DISCUSSION

 

A. THE COMPUTER-GENERATED 
ANIMATION

 

[¶15] Initially, Mintun 
asserts the district court should not have permitted the jury to view the 
computer-generated animation of Sergeant Kourbelas' accident reconstruction. 
Specifically, he argues that the animation was not properly authenticated 
because it did not accurately present what Huff claims to have seen as an 
eyewitness to the accident.

 

 [¶16] We have not previously considered 
the admissibility of a computer-generated animation. However, we see no reason 
to depart from long-standing rules of evidence in determining whether such an 
exhibit is admissible. Evidence is admissible when it is authenticated, 
relevant, and not subject to an exclusionary rule. Barnes v. State, 858 P.2d 522, 526 (Wyo. 1993). Pursuant to W.R.E. 901(a), authentication is accomplished 
by showing that the evidence in question is what its proponent claims. Here, the 
State offered the computer animation to show Sergeant Kourbelas' reconstruction 
of the accident from three vantage points, including the point at which Huff 
watched the accident occur. The animator's testimony as to how the animation was 
created, combined with Sergeant Kourbelas' testimony on the methods used in 
reconstructing the accident and his intent to show only his reconstruction, not 
Huff's version, are sufficient to authenticate this 
exhibit.

 

[¶17] Joining those 
jurisdictions which hold that an animated reconstruction of an accident is 
admissible so long as it does not offend the rules of evidence, we find no abuse 
of discretion in the admission of such evidence here. See, e.g., People v. 
McHugh, 124 Misc.2d 559, 560, 476 N.Y.S.2d 721, 722-23 (1984); and State v. 
Clark, 101 Ohio App.3d 389, 416-17, 655 N.E.2d 795, 811-12 
(1995).

 

B. TESTIMONY OF TWO EXPERTS

 

[¶18] Mintun's second issue 
calls into question the State's use of two expert witnesses in the field of 
accident reconstruction. His only complaint is that Kwasnoski's testimony was 
cumulative of Sergeant Kourbelas' and was, therefore, solely for the purpose of 
improperly enhancing Sergeant Kourbelas' credibility. Providing little cogent 
argument on this issue, Mintun's argument seems to be that the basis of 
Kwasnoski's testimony was Sergeant Kourbelas' measurements and police reports, 
and, therefore, Kwasnoski's opinion merely restated Sergeant Kourbelas' theories 
of how the accident occurred.

 

[¶19] There is no rule 
limiting the number of witnesses a party may call on a particular fact or issue. 
W.R.E. 403 permits a trial court to exclude relevant evidence for 
"considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence." This rule is to be used sparingly, because it excludes 
evidence which is concededly relevant and probative. Towner v. State, 685 P.2d 45, 49 (Wyo. 1984).

 

[¶20] Kwasnoski's 
mathematical conclusions, consistent with Sergeant Kourbelas' theories, served 
to corroborate Sergeant Kourbelas' testimony. Corroborative evidence, however, 
is not needlessly cumulative evidence. See Dallenbach v. State, 562 P.2d 679, 
682 (Wyo. 1977). The testimony of Sergeant Kourbelas and Kwasnoski varies in 
that Sergeant Kourbelas was not able to perform the mathematical calculations 
necessary to ensure that his theories were consistent with the laws of physics. 
Kwasnoski was able to perform these calculations, and did so using Sergeant 
Kourbelas' measurements. Sergeant Kourbelas and Kwasnoski enjoy different areas 
of expertise, and each presented testimony consistent with his area. Kwasnoski's 
testimony was not needlessly cumulative.

 

[¶21] Nor did Kwasnoski 
improperly vouch for Sergeant Kourbelas' credibility. Mintun admits it was 
proper for Kwasnoski to use the sergeant's facts and figures to reach a 
conclusion, but cries foul because the conclusion reached was the same as 
Sergeant Kourbelas'. This argument is the product of Mintun's mistaken notion 
that it is improper for a party to call two expert witnesses whose opinions are 
the same. The argument is lacking in substance and completely without 
merit.

 

[¶22] We find no abuse of 
discretion in permitting both Sergeant Kourbelas and Kwasnoski to testify 
regarding their separate reconstructions of the accident.

 

C. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

 

[¶23] Mintun next contends 
the prosecutor made inappropriate statements during closing argument, denying 
him a fair trial. When reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, we 
consider the closing argument in its entirety and do not take specific 
statements out of context. We also consider the closing argument in the context 
of the entire trial record, keeping in mind that the trial judge is in the best 
position to assess the appropriateness of the prosecutor's comments. Fales v. 
State, 908 P.2d 404, 410 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Taul v. State, 862 P.2d 649, 659 (Wyo. 1993) 
and Smith v. State, 880 P.2d 573, 574 (Wyo. 1994)).

 

[¶24] Initially, Mintun 
claims that eight statements made by the prosecutor over objection from the 
defense constituted personal attacks on defense counsel or were improper 
comments on the role of defense counsel to "create reasonable doubt." The 
aggregate of these statements, according to Mintun, is to shift the burden of 
proof to the defense. The State counters that the statements were not improper, 
but were part of a vigorous, legitimate attack on Mintun's theory of the case 
and on the evidence he presented in support of this 
theory.

 

[¶25] Typical of the 
statements to which Mintun objects is the following:

 

Ladies and gentlemen, like I said, in any case, it's 
the Defense's job to try to create doubt, and I suggest when that exists, the 
reasonable doubt - any doubt in this case cannot exist in the real 
world. You compare that evidence and 
the physical evidence. Any doubt in this case exists in a world where people 
drink themselves sober, drivers drive cars while they're upside-down, people get 
better driving after they drink, and the law of conservation of energy is 
suspended. That's where the reasonable doubt exists in this 
case.

 

(Emphasis added.) Mintun 
objects only to the bold portion of this paragraph. Standing alone, this 
sentence might be read to place a burden of proving reasonable doubt on the 
defense. The remainder of the statements in this paragraph, however, are a fair 
rendition of the evidence presented in Mintun's defense, and this paragraph is 
one of several discussing the evidence in detail. The perhaps inartful 
introductory statement of this paragraph, when read in the context of the 
complete argument, is one small part of an appropriate 
argument.

 

[¶26] The flaws in the 
remaining statements listed by Mintun as improper are similarly innocuous. While 
some statements could have been better phrased by the prosecutor, even when 
taken together, these comments do not have the effect of shifting the burden of 
proof. Thus, there is no " 'clear or patent' " abuse of discretion in the 
district court's rulings. See Arevalo, 939 P.2d  at 230 (quoting Mayer, 618 P.2d 
at 132).

 

[¶27] Mintun's second 
complaint is that the prosecutor improperly inserted his credibility into his 
closing argument by use of the phrases "I believe" and "I think." Since there 
was no objection to these comments, we will review for plain error, and reverse 
only if we find a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. See Arevalo, 939 P.2d  at 230 (quoting Dice, 825 P.2d at 384).

 

[¶28] A prosecutor may not 
assert his credibility or personal belief into his closing argument because he 
may be perceived by the jury as an authority whose opinion carries greater 
weight than their own opinion. Barela v. State, 787 P.2d 82, 83-84 (Wyo. 
1990).  We have recognized that "I 
believe" and "I think" are commonly used, colloquial phrases; a prosecutor's 
inadvertent and infrequent use of these phrases is not prejudicial. Browder v. 
State, 639 P.2d 889, 895 (Wyo. 1982).

 

[¶29] Here, the prosecutor 
used "I think" twice and "I believe" once during the course of a closing 
argument which consumes approximately sixty-three pages of the record. These 
isolated comments are not an attempt to persuade the jury to convict Mintun 
based upon the prosecutor's personal belief and his credibility as an employee 
of the state. They are simply part of an argument pointing out reasonable 
inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. Certainly, they do not present 
a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.

 

Closing arguments are meant to be just that, 
arguments premised upon the evidence already submitted to the jury.  Prosecutors are no more limited in their 
closing than defense counsel. They may review the evidence and suggest to the 
jury inferences based thereon. The purpose of closing arguments is to allow 
counsel to offer ways of viewing the significance of the 
evidence.

 

 Browder, 639 P.2d  at 893. See also Ross 
v. State, 930 P.2d 965, 971 (Wyo. 1996).

 

[¶30] There is no error in 
the prosecutor's closing argument.

 

D. IMPEACHMENT TESTIMONY

 

[¶31] Mintun's final 
contention is that, during his direct examination, Kwasnoski was improperly 
permitted to impeach Beaver's theories. Mintun argues that Kwasnoski should not 
have been permitted to discuss Beaver's theories until after Beaver, himself, 
had presented them to the jury.

 

[¶32] Two evidentiary rules 
guide our decision. W.R.E. 611(a) states:

 

The court shall exercise reasonable control over the 
mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) 
make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the 
truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from 
harassment or undue embarrassment.

 

W.R.E. 703 
states:

 

The facts or data in the particular case upon which 
an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known 
to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts 
in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the 
facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.

 

[¶33] Prior to trial, 
Kwasnoski and Beaver talked on the telephone and discussed Beaver's theories of 
how the accident occurred, although Beaver had not yet completed his analysis. 
During his direct testimony, Kwasnoski related this conversation and testified 
he reviewed his own conclusions after talking with Beaver, considering Beaver's 
theories. Kwasnoski told the jury why his opinions did not change in light of 
Beaver's analysis and why he had rejected Beaver's theories. It is not improper 
for an expert witness to comment upon the methods and opinions of other experts. 
See Hayes v. State, 599 P.2d 558, 564 (Wyo. 1979). An expert's use of another's 
methods and opinions in formulating, reviewing, or revising his own conclusions 
is permitted by W.R.E. 703.

 

[¶34] In addition, the 
district court is responsible for an orderly trial progression. This includes 
the scope and manner of witness examinations. Lindsey, 725 P.2d  at 656. We find 
no abuse of discretion in permitting the State's expert witness to comment 
during his direct testimony upon the opinion Mintun's expert witness expressed 
orally prior to trial.

 

                                          
V. CONCLUSION

 

[¶35] The record in this 
case presents what appears to be a hard fought battle with capable attorneys on 
both sides. The jury was asked to make difficult, probably agonizing, findings 
of fact. Mintun is understandably disappointed in the outcome; however, he 
clearly received a fair trial in a well-run courtroom. This case was for the 
jury to decide, and we see nothing that interfered with their responsibility. 
The verdict is affirmed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1Mintun's 
inability to recall the accident or the night preceding continued through the 
time of trial. His rehabilitation therapist testified that this amnesia will 
most likely be permanent.