Case Title: Galindo v. Super. Ct.

Citation: 50 Cal. 4th 1

Docket Number: S170550

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2010-07-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 7/22/10 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
MOISES GALINDO, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Petitioner, 
) 
 
 
) 
S170550 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 2/8  B208923 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS  
) 
ANGELES COUNTY, 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
) 
Super. Ct. No. BA337159 
 
Respondent; 
) 
 
 
 
) 
CITY OF LOS ANGELES POLICE 
) 
DEPARTMENT et al., 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Real Parties in Interest. 
) 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Charged by felony complaint with threatening and resisting an arresting 
officer in the performance of his duties (Pen. Code, §§ 422, 69), petitioner Moises 
Galindo brought a Pitchess motion (see Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 
Cal.3d 531; Evid. Code, §§ 1043-1045) for disclosure of prior citizen complaints 
made against the arresting officer and four other officers involved in the incident. 
Pitchess motions are so named after this court‟s 1974 decision in Pitchess 
v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531, which afforded criminal defendants a 
judicially created right to discovery of prior citizen complaints alleging 
misconduct by California peace officers.  In 1978, the Legislature codified the 
right and set forth which officer records are subject to Pitchess discovery.  (Pen.  
 
 
2 
Code, §§ 832.7, 832.8; Evid. Code, §§ 1043-1045.)  As relevant here, these 
statutes permit a criminal defendant to “ „compel discovery‟ of certain relevant 
information in the personnel files of police officers by making „general allegations 
which establish some cause for discovery‟ of that information and by showing 
how it would support a defense to the charge against him.”  (Warrick v. Superior 
Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1018-1019.)  When the trial court, in exercising its 
discretion, grants a defendant‟s Pitchess motion, it orders disclosure of the names, 
addresses, and telephone numbers of individuals who have in the past witnessed 
alleged officer misconduct or who have complained of misconduct by the officer 
named in the motion.  (Warrick, at p. 1019; see, e.g., People v. Prince (2007) 40 
Cal.4th 1179, 1283.) 
When petitioner here moved for Pitchess discovery, no preliminary hearing 
had yet been held to determine whether there was probable cause to conclude that 
he had committed the charged offenses.  The magistrate denied the motion by an 
order that did not preclude petitioner from renewing the motion after the 
preliminary hearing.  The magistrate gave two reasons for the denial:  Pitchess 
discovery was as a matter of course not available for use at the preliminary 
hearing; and petitioner had not shown that Pitchess discovery would yield 
“something that would change the outcome” of the hearing.  Petitioner 
unsuccessfully sought a writ of mandate first in the superior court, then in the 
Court of Appeal.  We granted petitioner‟s petition for review. 
Although no statute prohibits a criminal defendant from filing a Pitchess 
motion before a preliminary hearing is held, neither does any statute expressly 
grant a right to obtain Pitchess discovery for use at the preliminary hearing.  
Accordingly, we hold that although a defendant may file a Pitchess motion before 
a preliminary hearing, the pendency of that motion will not necessarily or 
invariably constitute good cause for postponing the preliminary hearing over the 
3 
prosecution‟s objection.  The purpose of the preliminary hearing is merely “to 
establish whether there exists probable cause to believe that the defendant has 
committed a felony” (Pen. Code, § 866, subd. (b)), and “[b]oth the defendant and 
the people have the right to a preliminary examination at the earliest possible 
time” (id., § 859b, 2d par.). 
Here, petitioner sought Pitchess discovery to obtain evidence for use at the 
preliminary hearing, and his attorney told the trial court that petitioner would be 
requesting a continuance of that hearing if the Pitchess discovery revealed 
potential defense witnesses.  Under these circumstances, as we explain below, the 
magistrate‟s denial of the motion was not erroneous.  When this case returns to the 
trial court, petitioner may, however, renew his Pitchess motion for the purpose of 
obtaining evidence relevant to issues at trial.   
I 
The police report contains these facts:  On the evening of February 29, 
2008, Los Angeles Police Department Officers “S. Flores” and “J. Smith” were 
patrolling on foot when they saw petitioner Moises Galindo drinking alcohol in a 
public place, a municipal code violation.  At their approach, petitioner fled into an 
apartment.  Soon a crowd of petitioner‟s angry relatives and neighbors gathered 
outside the apartment.  After three more officers arrived, the officers obtained 
permission from petitioner‟s father to enter the apartment, where they arrested 
petitioner.  Also arrested was petitioner‟s brother, whose presence in the apartment 
complex was prohibited by a gang injunction.  
As the two brothers were being taken to a police car, they made death 
threats against the officers escorting them.  The brothers were placed in the 
backseat of the patrol car for transport to the police station.  Petitioner sat between 
his brother and Officer Flores.  During the trip, both brothers “became extremely 
belliger[e]nt,” and petitioner told Officer Flores, “I am going to . . . kill you and 
4 
your family.”  Then petitioner, who was apparently handcuffed, struck his head 
against Officer Flores‟s head.  
The complaint charged petitioner with resisting a police officer in the 
performance of his duties.  (Pen. Code, § 69.)  But on March 14, 2008, an 
amended felony complaint added a charge of making threats to kill or cause great 
bodily injury to Officer Flores (id., § 422), a serious felony (id., § 1192.7, subd. 
(c)), and alleged that the offense was committed to benefit a criminal street gang 
(id., § 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(B)).  
Petitioner was arraigned on March 26, 2008, and a preliminary hearing was 
set for April 18, but on that date defendant waived time.  On or after April 24, 
before a preliminary hearing was held, petitioner filed a motion seeking Pitchess 
discovery as to the five officers who had been present at his arrest.  
Petitioner‟s Pitchess motion sought disclosure by the Los Angeles Police 
Department of the names and contact information of “all persons” who had 
witnessed or complained of prior incidents involving excessive force, violence, 
false arrest, fabrication or dishonesty, and any departmental discipline imposed on 
Officer Flores, Smith, or any of the other three officers.  Defense counsel‟s 
declaration in support of the motion denied that petitioner had threatened Officer 
Flores and accused the officer of assaulting petitioner both inside and outside the 
patrol car on the way to the police station. 
On May 16, 2008, the magistrate held a hearing on petitioner‟s Pitchess 
motion.  At the hearing, petitioner‟s attorney told the magistrate that if Pitchess 
discovery revealed potential witnesses, petitioner would seek postponement of the 
preliminary hearing, which had been set for June 2.  Without precluding petitioner 
from renewing the motion at a later time, the magistrate denied the Pitchess 
motion, giving two reasons.  First, the magistrate concluded that Pitchess 
discovery was not normally available before a preliminary hearing, because the 
5 
discovery sought would be pertinent only to issues at trial, where the prosecution 
had to prove petitioner‟s guilt of the charged offenses.  Second, the magistrate 
concluded that even if Pitchess discovery was permissible before the preliminary 
hearing, petitioner had failed to establish that the discovery sought would affect 
the crucial issue at the preliminary hearing of whether there was probable cause to 
hold petitioner to answer on the charges against him.  In the magistrate‟s words:  
“If you make a Pitchess motion pre-prelim in addition to the ordinary Pitchess 
showing, you have to show . . . a reasonable chance you are going to discover 
something that will change the outcome of the [preliminary] hearing,” such as 
evidence negating required elements of the offense, which would preclude finding 
probable cause of petitioner‟s guilt.  (See Pen. Code, § 866, subd. (a).) 
The date for petitioner‟s preliminary hearing was postponed, apparently to 
permit preparation of a petition for a writ of mandate challenging the magistrate‟s 
ruling on petitioner‟s Pitchess motion.  On June 17, 2008, petitioner filed a 
mandate petition in the superior court, seeking an order directing the City of Los 
Angeles (City) to disclose the Pitchess information requested.  When the superior 
court denied relief, petitioner sought a writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal.  
That court stayed the preliminary hearing and asked both the District Attorney of 
the County of Los Angeles (District Attorney) and the City to brief the issue of 
whether a criminal defendant has a right to obtain Pitchess discovery before a 
preliminary hearing is held.  After consideration of the parties‟ briefs, the Court of 
Appeal summarily denied relief and vacated the stay. 
Petitioner then filed in this court a petition for review and a request to stay 
the proceedings, arguing that without the fruits of Pitchess discovery he could not 
receive effective assistance of counsel at the preliminary hearing, which he 
described as a “critical stage” in a criminal proceeding.  We stayed the preliminary 
hearing, granted the petition for review, vacated the Court of Appeal‟s order 
6 
denying the petition for a writ of mandate, and transferred the matter to the Court 
of Appeal, directing it to order the superior court to show cause why the requested 
relief should not be granted.  After briefing and oral argument, the Court of 
Appeal issued its opinion rejecting “petitioner‟s contention that Pitchess discovery 
is a precondition for effective assistance of counsel” at a preliminary hearing.  
II 
A defendant who is arrested and arraigned on a felony complaint is entitled 
to a preliminary hearing.  Both the defendant and the prosecution possess the right 
to have the hearing occur “within 10 court days of the date the defendant is 
arraigned or pleads, whichever occurs later.”  (Pen. Code, § 859b, 2d par.) 
The purpose of the preliminary hearing is to determine whether there is 
probable cause to conclude that the defendant has committed the offense charged.  
(People v. Wallace (2004) 33 Cal.4th 738, 749; Pen. Code, § 872.)  Probable cause 
exists if a person “ „ “ „of ordinary caution or prudence would be led to believe 
and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion‟ ” ‟ ” that the defendant 
committed the crime.  (Cooley v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 228, 251; see 
People v. Slaughter (1984) 35 Cal.3d 629, 636.) 
Petitioner here argues that his right to the effective assistance of counsel as 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution will be impaired if 
he cannot obtain, for use at his preliminary hearing, Pitchess discovery of prior 
citizen complaints against all five officers present at his arrest.  He asserts that 
because “all the witnesses are police officers,” Pitchess discovery is necessary to 
enable his counsel to impeach the officers‟ credibility.  Particularly, petitioner 
seeks to undermine the credibility of Officer Flores, who prepared the police 
report and whom petitioner allegedly assaulted and threatened with death.  
We agree with petitioner that the right to effective assistance of counsel, as 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution, applies not only 
7 
to trial but also to the preliminary hearing, which the high court has described as a 
“critical phase” in a criminal proceeding (Coleman v. Alabama (1970) 399 U.S. 1, 
9-10; see People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 615).  But we disagree that this 
right is violated if defense counsel lacks Pitchess discovery for use at the 
preliminary hearing.  Our conclusion rests not only on the nature of the 
preliminary hearing itself but also on the type of evidence obtained through 
Pitchess motions, as we explain below. 
 
At a preliminary hearing, the defendant may offer evidence that is 
“reasonably likely to establish an affirmative defense, negate an element of a 
crime charged, or impeach the testimony” of the arresting officers.  (Pen. Code, 
§ 866, subd. (a).)  Petitioner here contends that “Pitchess witnesses could testify 
that the arresting officers had used excessive force” against them and that the 
officers “then lied about” doing so.  Thus, petitioner argues, the testimony of 
witnesses obtained through Pitchess discovery could support a claim by him of 
self-defense or the defense of others to the charge against him of resisting an 
officer (Pen. Code, § 69), or such testimony could negate an element of that crime.  
The availability of such witnesses to testify at the preliminary hearing, petitioner 
claims, would make it more likely that the magistrate would exercise discretion 
(id., § 866, subd. (b)) to admit their testimony at the hearing.  But the magistrate 
could also refuse to admit the testimony of these witnesses if strong and credible 
evidence of defendant‟s guilt exists apart from the testimony provided by the 
arresting officers.  (See Evid. Code, § 352; see also People v. Slaughter, supra, 35 
Cal.3d at p. 637.)  When there is such evidence, “the magistrate may reasonably 
assume the possibility of [the defendant‟s] guilt” and find probable cause without 
resolving “all conflicts in the evidence.”  (Slaughter, at p. 637.) 
 
In this case, various relatives and neighbors of petitioner were present at his 
arrest and witnessed some, if not all, of the officers‟ conduct.  Petitioner knew the 
8 
identity of these eyewitnesses to his arrest.  Through Pitchess discovery, petitioner 
sought to learn the identity of individuals who in the past had filed misconduct 
complaints, alleging that these same officers used excessive force or were 
untruthful.  It is highly unlikely that the testimony of Pitchess witnesses at the 
preliminary hearing would defeat a finding that there was probable cause to 
believe that the defendant “committed a felony and should be held for trial.”  
(Correa v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 444, 452; see Pen. Code, § 872, subd. 
(a).)  Given this low standard of proof governing preliminary hearings, we 
conclude that here the denial of petitioner‟s Pitchess discovery motion, made 
before the holding of a preliminary hearing, would not prevent defense counsel 
from providing effective representation at the preliminary hearing. 
III 
The parties dispute the impact in this case of the voters‟ June 1990 passage 
of Proposition 115, the Crime Victims Justice Reform Act, a broad anticrime 
initiative measure that, as relevant here, (1) adopted a new scheme of reciprocal 
discovery in criminal cases; (2) limited criminal discovery to that scheme or to 
“other express statutory provisions” for discovery (Pen. Code, § 1054, subd. (e)); 
and (3) acknowledged the People‟s right in a criminal case to due process of law 
and a speedy trial.  Our focus is on the measure‟s second and third components in 
determining, first, whether Pitchess motions may be made before a preliminary 
hearing has been held, and second, whether the preliminary hearing must be 
delayed until evidence obtained through Pitchess discovery can be used at the 
preliminary hearing.  The answer to the first question is “yes,” and the answer to 
the second question is “no,” as explained below. 
The City and the District Attorney argue that the use of Pitchess discovery 
at a preliminary hearing would be inconsistent with both the intent underlying 
Proposition 115 and the express statutory changes it made.  Petitioner, on the other 
9 
hand, argues that Proposition 115 did not amend the Pitchess statutory discovery 
scheme, thus leaving intact the preexisting practice of allowing Pitchess discovery 
motions to be made before the holding of a preliminary hearing and allowing 
testimony or evidence obtained through Pitchess discovery to be used at the 
hearing.  The arguments of both sides have some merit, as we explain below. 
As relevant here, Proposition 115 amended the California Constitution 
(Cal. Const., art. I, § 30, subd. (c)) and enacted a statutory scheme to provide in 
criminal cases for reciprocal discovery between the prosecution and the defense 
(see Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356, 364-365).  We discuss first 
the statutory and then the constitutional changes, and their effect on the issue in 
this case. 
Proposition 115 added chapter 10 to the Penal Code.  That chapter begins 
with section 1054, which defines the purpose of pretrial discovery, and limits it to 
aiding the trial process.  That statute‟s subdivision (e) states that “no discovery 
shall occur in criminal cases except as provided by this chapter, other express 
statutory provisions, or as mandated by the Constitution of the United States.”  
(Pen. Code, § 1054, subd. (e), italics added.)  Predating this new statutory 
provision by 12 years are the Pitchess discovery statutes, which therefore are 
within subdivision (e)‟s category of “other express statutory provisions” that 
survived the voters‟ June 1990 passage of Proposition 115. 
The Pitchess discovery statutes (Evid. Code, §§ 1043-1045; Pen. Code, 
§§ 832.7-832.8) do not restrict the use of evidence obtained through such 
discovery to any particular proceeding.  As there is no legislative prohibition 
against the filing of a Pitchess discovery motion before a preliminary hearing is 
held, we conclude that such a filing is permissible. 
That conclusion, however, does not mean that over the prosecution‟s 
objection the defense is invariably entitled to have the preliminary hearing 
10 
postponed until the defense has, through Pitchess discovery, obtained evidence 
and witnesses for presentation at the preliminary hearing.  In this context, repeated 
postponements of the preliminary hearing would, as discussed below, defeat a goal 
of Proposition 115:  to reduce delays in criminal cases. 
Before the voters‟ June 1990 passage of Proposition 115, courts would 
“routinely” and repeatedly grant continuances to accommodate a criminal 
defendant‟s request for “pretrial discovery to prepare for a preliminary 
examination.”  (Pipes & Gagen, Cal. Criminal Discovery (4th ed. 2007) 
Preliminary Examinations, § 2:12, pp. 329-330; see, e.g., Saulter v. Municipal 
Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 231, 247.) 
In their ballot argument, the proponents of Proposition 115 stressed their 
goal of reducing unnecessary delays in criminal proceedings.  According to the 
measure‟s proponents, criminal “defense lawyers love delays” because it is in their 
client‟s interest when “[w]itnesses die or their memories fade,” but Proposition 
115 would end the “useless delays that frustrate criminal justice in California.”  
(Ballot Pamp., Primary Elec. (June 5, 1990) argument in favor of Prop. 115, 
p. 34.)  The voters‟ passage of Proposition 115 codified that goal in Penal Code 
section 1054, which stresses avoidance of “undue delay” in criminal proceedings.  
(Pen. Code, § 1054, subd. (d).)  That goal would be frustrated if we were to uphold 
the pre-Proposition 115 practice of routinely and repeatedly granting 
postponements of a preliminary hearing to accommodate a defendant‟s efforts to 
obtain Pitchess discovery for use at the preliminary hearing.  
Support for that conclusion is also found in Proposition 115‟s amendment 
of our state Constitution by adding a new section declaring that “[i]n a criminal 
case, the people of the State of California have the right to due process of law and 
to a speedy and public trial.”  (Cal. Const., art. I, § 29.)  By so amending our state 
Constitution, the voters expressly acknowledged that not just the criminal 
11 
defendant but also the People, represented in a criminal case by the prosecutor, are 
constitutionally entitled to due process and to a speedy trial.  The People‟s 
constitutional right to a speedy trial would be violated if, as petitioner urges us to 
do, we were to uphold the pre-Proposition 115 practice in question.  Below, we 
provide a glimpse of the delays inherent in obtaining and using Pitchess discovery. 
 
Turning Pitchess discovery into evidence admissible at trial is not a rapid 
process.  To obtain Pitchess discovery of a particular peace officer‟s personnel 
records, a criminal defendant must provide not only “a written motion and notice 
to the governmental agency which has custody of the records” but also a  
“ „description of the type of records or information sought,‟ ” as well as affidavits 
“ „showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure‟ ”; and the defendant must 
set forth the materiality of the information sought to the pending litigation.  (City 
of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 82.)  If the defendant 
shows good cause, the trial court directs the custodian of the records to produce all 
potentially relevant documents (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1228-
1229) for its examination in chambers, that is, in a nonpublic proceeding designed 
to protect the officer‟s privacy (Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 
1038-1039). 
 
If, after reviewing the officer‟s personnel records, the trial court concludes 
that they do not contain information that is statutorily excluded from disclosure 
(see Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. (b)), then disclosure is called for.  (Alford v. 
Superior Court, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1039.)  But the information disclosed to the 
defense will be limited to names and contact information for persons who have on 
prior occasions either witnessed or filed complaints of misconduct by the officer 
who is the subject of the Pitchess discovery motion.  (Ibid.)  The defense then 
needs time to locate, interview, and obtain the in-court presence of those 
individuals. 
12 
 
Long before the voters‟ June 1990 passage of Proposition 115, Penal Code 
section 859b provided:  “Both the defendant and the people have the right to a 
preliminary examination at the earliest possible time, and unless both waive that 
right or good cause for a continuance is found,” the “preliminary examination 
shall be held within 10 court days of the date” on which the defendant “is 
arraigned or pleads.”  (Italics added.)  To postpone a preliminary hearing over the 
prosecutor‟s objection beyond the statutory10-court-day period for the sole 
purpose of allowing a defense motion for Pitchess discovery, which may or may 
not yield a witness whose testimony will be relevant to the issues at the 
preliminary hearing, would deny the People their state constitutional rights to 
procedural due process and to a speedy trial, in addition to, as discussed earlier, 
their statutory right under Penal Code section 859b to a prompt preliminary 
hearing. 
 
Here, the magistrate heard petitioner‟s Pitchess discovery motion on May 
16, 2008.  At that time, petitioner‟s preliminary hearing was scheduled for June 2.  
Such a short time, as the magistrate noted at the hearing on the Pitchess motion, 
would not enable defense counsel “to look into” any Pitchess disclosures received 
before the holding of the preliminary hearing.  And defense counsel specifically 
informed the magistrate that if Pitchess discovery revealed potential witnesses, 
petitioner would seek postponement of the preliminary hearing.  For the reasons 
discussed above, such delay would have been contrary to one of Proposition 115‟s 
goals:  to avoid “undue delay” in criminal proceedings.  (See p. 10, ante.) 
 
After the magistrate concluded that petitioner‟s purpose in bringing the 
Pitchess motion was to develop evidence for use at the preliminary hearing, that 
this objective could be realized only by postponing the preliminary hearing, and 
that the possibility of discovering evidence favorable to the defense did not justify 
delaying the preliminary hearing, the magistrate denied petitioner‟s Pitchess 
13 
motion.  We hold that this ruling was not an abuse of the magistrate‟s discretion.  
The ruling does not preclude petitioner from bringing a renewed Pitchess motion, 
when this matter returns to the magistrate, for the purpose of obtaining evidence 
for use at trial. 
 
Although we agree with the District Attorney, and with the Court of 
Appeal, that the magistrate did not err in denying the Pitchess motion, we do not 
agree with the District Attorney that the amendment of Penal Code section 866 by 
Proposition 115 has impliedly repealed what was, until its passage, an informal 
practice of granting Pitchess discovery motions before the holding of a 
preliminary hearing and permitting the fruits of such discovery to be used at the 
preliminary hearing.  Although one statute may impliedly repeal another statute if 
the two statutes are entirely irreconcilable and incapable of operating concurrently 
(Western Oil & Gas Assn. v. Monterey Bay Unified Air Pollution Control Dist. 
(1989) 49 Cal.3d 408, 419), no statute has ever authorized Pitchess discovery for 
use at a preliminary hearing, and thus the rules concerning implied repeals are not 
helpful in this context. 
DISPOSITION 
 
Our previously ordered stay is vacated, and the Court of Appeal‟s judgment 
denying the petition for writ of mandate is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J. 
 
Before his scheduled preliminary hearing, petitioner moved for Pitchess 
discovery, that is, discovery of information from the arresting police officers‟ 
personnel files that might be relevant to the officers‟ respective credibility.  
(Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531; Evid. Code, §§ 1043-1045.)  
The magistrate denied the motion without prejudice to its renewal before trial, 
explaining that, before he would grant the motion, “the defense has to logically 
show they are going to discover something or might discover something that 
would change the outcome of the preliminary hearing.”  In addition, noted the 
magistrate, “[e]ven if the Court orders disclosures, you wouldn‟t have [the] time to 
look into it [before the] preliminary hearing.”  The majority concludes the 
magistrate did not abuse his discretion by so ruling.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 13.)  
I concur.  I write separately to explain my reasons and to clarify what I believe to 
be the majority‟s holding. 
I.  Effective Assistance of Counsel 
As the majority explains (maj. opn., ante, at pp. 6-7), a criminal defendant 
is guaranteed the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel at the 
preliminary hearing.  (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 615.)  Moreover, to 
facilitate the right to effective assistance of counsel and to prepare for a 
meaningful preliminary hearing, a criminal defendant can, as the majority affirms, 
file for Pitchess discovery in advance of the hearing, not only because “[t]he 
2 
Pitchess discovery statutes . . . do not restrict the use of evidence obtained through 
such discovery to any particular proceeding” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 9), but also 
because “there is no legislative prohibition against the filing of a Pitchess 
discovery motion before a preliminary hearing is held . . .” (ibid.).  However, 
responding to petitioner‟s argument that denial of Pitchess discovery deprived him 
of the effective assistance of counsel, the majority concludes that the right to 
effective assistance of counsel is not violated “if defense counsel lacks Pitchess 
discovery for use at the preliminary hearing.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 7.)   
Notwithstanding petitioner‟s argument, petitioner‟s right to effective 
assistance of counsel at the preliminary hearing is, in my view, only tangentially 
related to his Pitchess motion.  Instead, a defendant‟s inability to obtain and 
present relevant evidence at the preliminary hearing relates to the defendant‟s due 
process right to a fair hearing.  Although the function of a preliminary hearing is 
merely to determine if probable cause exists to bind a defendant over for trial, the 
ability to impeach accusatory witnesses at the hearing is an important part of that 
process.  The value of impeachment is explicitly recognized by Penal Code section 
866, subdivision (a), which provides that a criminal defendant may present 
evidence at the preliminary hearing that is “reasonably likely to . . . impeach the 
testimony of a prosecution witness . . . .”  “The purpose of this right is obvious:  to 
permit the defendant to rebut the People‟s evidence of probable cause and 
persuade the magistrate not to make a probable cause finding.  One of „ “[t]he 
purpose[s] of the preliminary hearing is to weed out groundless or unsupported 
charges of grave offenses, and to relieve the accused of the degradation and 
expense of a criminal trial.  Many an unjustifiable prosecution is stopped at that 
point where the lack of probable cause is clearly disclosed.” ‟ ”  (Nienhouse v. 
Superior Court (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 83, 91.) 
3 
From the facts of petitioner‟s case, we may surmise that some of the 
principal witnesses against him will be the arresting police officers.  Because the 
Pitchess process facilitates the gathering of evidence that potentially could 
impeach the credibility of such officers, it follows logically that Pitchess discovery 
material may be relevant and thus admissible at the preliminary hearing.  In a 
given case, denying a defendant a fair opportunity to impeach the witnesses 
against him could infringe on his statutory right under Penal Code section 866 and, 
possibly, produce a hearing so fundamentally unfair that the error implicates his 
due process right to a fair hearing.1  Nevertheless, as explained below, I do not 
believe denial of petitioner‟s Pitchess motion deprived him of due process. 
II.  Proposition 115 
Neither the right to a fair hearing or to effective counsel at the hearing nor 
Penal Code section 866 guarantees a defendant the right to introduce any and all 
evidence at the preliminary hearing.  The right to introduce evidence at the 
hearing, as in a trial proper, is subject to numerous constraints.  In this case, the 
                                              
1  
The majority opines that “the magistrate could also refuse to admit the 
testimony of [impeaching] witnesses if strong and credible evidence of 
defendant‟s guilt exists apart from the testimony provided by the arresting 
officers.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 7.)  I am unaware of any legal authority 
authorizing a magistrate to refuse to admit evidence impeaching a prosecution 
witness on the ground that the magistrate had—midhearing—already decided the 
prosecution‟s evidence demonstrated probable cause.  “Depending on the 
credibility of the testimony and the circumstances of the case, probable cause 
would be found present or absent by the magistrate at the conclusion of the 
hearing.”  (Nienhouse v. Superior Court, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 91.)  Nor is 
the majority‟s citation to People v. Slaughter (1984) 35 Cal.3d 629, 637 of any 
assistance.  Slaughter holds only that, after hearing all the evidence, the magistrate 
may be able to discern that probable cause exists, sufficient to bind an accused 
over for trial, without resolving all the factual disputes raised by the evidence.  
Slaughter does not hold the magistrate may deny an accused the right to present 
impeachment evidence suggesting his innocence. 
4 
majority relies on one such limitation on evidence:  the delay inherent in the 
Pitchess discovery process.  (Cf. Evid. Code, § 352 [“The court in its discretion 
may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
probability that its admission will . . . necessitate undue consumption of time 
. . .”].)  Thus, the majority emphasizes Proposition 115‟s concern for “undue 
delay” (Pen. Code, § 1054, subd. (d)) and the creation by Proposition 115 of the 
People‟s right to a speedy trial (Cal. Const., art. I, § 29).  From this, the majority 
opines that petitioner‟s acknowledged right to move for prehearing Pitchess 
discovery “does not mean that over the prosecution‟s objection the defense is 
invariably entitled to have the preliminary hearing postponed . . . .”  (Maj. opn., 
ante, at pp. 9-10, italics added; see also id. at p. 10 [“repeated postponements of 
the preliminary hearing would . . . defeat a goal of Proposition 115:  to reduce 
delays in criminal cases” (italics added)]; ibid. [the “goal [of a speedy hearing] 
would be frustrated if we were to uphold the pre-Proposition 115 practice of 
routinely and repeatedly granting postponements” (italics added)].)  I agree.   
The converse, of course, is also true:  a criminal defendant‟s need for 
Pitchess discovery could, depending on the particular circumstances of the case, 
justify a magistrate‟s exercise of discretion to grant a request to continue the 
preliminary hearing over the prosecutor‟s objection.  Just as the magistrate should 
not invariably or routinely grant postponements of the hearing, neither should he 
or she invariably or routinely deny them.  Instead, whether to continue the 
preliminary hearing is committed to the magistrate‟s traditional discretion, after 
considering all the relevant factors including, but not limited to, the speedy 
hearing rights of both the People and the accused.  Thus, the second paragraph of 
Penal Code section 859b provides:  “Both the defendant and the people have the 
right to a preliminary examination at the earliest possible time, and unless both 
waive that right or good cause for a continuance is found as provided for in 
5 
Section 1050, the preliminary examination shall be held [within prescribed time 
limits].”  (Italics added.)  Penal Code section 1050, referenced in Penal Code 
section 859b, provides that “[n]either the convenience of the parties nor a 
stipulation of the parties is in and of itself good cause” (Pen. Code, § 1050, subd. 
(e)), and “[w]hen deciding whether or not good cause for a continuance has been 
shown, the court shall consider the general convenience and prior commitments of 
all witnesses, including peace officers” (id., subd. (g)(1)).  
In sum, the importance of a speedy preliminary hearing, explicit in Penal 
Code section 1054, subdivision (d), must be balanced against both a defendant‟s 
right to a fair hearing and the defendant‟s statutory right, set forth in Penal Code 
section 866b, to impeach the witnesses against him at the hearing.  Thus, despite 
the admitted value of a speedy preliminary hearing, a magistrate entertaining a 
prehearing Pitchess motion should also consider whether an accused can receive a 
fair hearing in the absence of Pitchess discovery and whether he has had a fair and 
reasonable opportunity to marshal the available evidence to impeach the 
prosecution‟s witnesses. 
On the facts of this case, I agree with the majority that the magistrate did 
not abuse his discretion by denying the Pitchess motion.  The need for a speedy 
hearing is an important consideration.  Petitioner‟s motion for discovery, which 
was not heard until May 16, 2008, even if granted, would not reasonably have 
enabled him to obtain any pertinent discovery (if any existed in the officers‟ 
personnel files) before the preliminary hearing, then scheduled for June 2.  
Defense counsel expressly stated she would ask for a continuance if Pitchess 
discovery revealed potential witnesses, thus making delay fairly certain rather than 
merely speculative.  But also significant to the magistrate‟s decision is that 
evidence other than any potentially impeaching Pitchess material was available to 
petitioner to rebut the prosecution‟s case.  Judging from the police report, 
6 
petitioner‟s arrest was witnessed by several people who were friends and family of 
petitioner; if the officers were lying, some of those witnesses could likely 
contradict the police version of events, diminishing the importance of the potential 
Pitchess evidence.  “[T]he trial court has discretion to exclude impeachment 
evidence . . . if it is . . . cumulative . . . .”  (People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 
412.)  Finally, the magistrate‟s denial was without prejudice to petitioner‟s 
renewing the motion before trial, ensuring that if the officers‟ personnel files 
contained pertinent information, petitioner would not be forever denied access to 
that evidence. 
Because I agree the magistrate did not abuse his discretion, I concur in the 
majority opinion, which affirms the Court of Appeal‟s judgment denying 
petitioner a writ of mandate.  I do so with the understanding that the majority‟s 
opinion neither imposes a categorical bar to defendants moving for, and obtaining, 
Pitchess discovery before the preliminary hearing, nor prohibits the admission at 
the hearing of information gained through the Pitchess process.  Instead, I 
understand the majority opinion to hold that the decision whether to grant 
prehearing Pitchess discovery is within the magistrate‟s discretion after balancing 
the likelihood of delay with the defendant‟s right to a fair hearing, as well as his 
right, under Penal Code section 866, to present evidence impeaching the 
prosecution‟s witnesses at the hearing.  The discretion to grant a continuance, as 
always, is committed to the magistrate‟s traditional discretion under Penal Code 
section 1050.  With those caveats, I concur. 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Galindo v. Superior Court 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 169 Cal.App.4th 1332 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S170550 
Date Filed: July 22, 2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Steven R. Van Sicklen 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Michael P. Judge, Public Defender, Albert J. Menaster, Susanne Blossom and Mark Harvis, Deputy Public 
Defenders, for Petitioner. 
 
Mary Greenwood, Public Defender (Santa Clara) and Michael Ogul, Deputy Public Defender, for 
California Public Defenders Association and Santa Clara County Public Defender, as Amici Curiae on 
behalf of Petitioner. 
 
John T. Philipsborn; Sanger & Swysen and Stephen P. Dunkle for California Attorneys for Criminal Justice 
as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioner. 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Steven Cooley, District Attorney, John K. Spillane, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Irene Wakabayashi, 
Head Deputy District Attorney, Sharon J. Matsumoto, Brentford J. Ferreiera, Natasha Cooper and Gilbert 
Wright, Deputy District Attorneys, for Respondent. 
 
Rockard Delgadillo and Carmen A. Trutanich, City Attorneys, Carlos De La Guerra and Jess J. Gonzalez, 
Assistant City Attorneys, and Kjehl T. Johansen, Deputy City Attorney, for Real Parties in Interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Mark Harvis 
Deputy Public Defender 
320 West Temple Street, Suite 590 
Los Angeles, CA  90012 
(213) 974-3066 
 
Gilbert Wright 
Deputy District Attorney 
320 West Temple Street, Suite 540 
Los Angeles, CA  90012 
(213) 974-5911 
 
Kjehl T. Johansen 
Deputy City Attorney 
201 North Los Angeles Street, L.A. Mall Space #301A 
Los Angeles, CA  90012 
(213) 978-2130