Case Title: Theurer v. Farrell

Citation: 376 Md. 65

Docket Number: 26/03

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2003-06-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 26
September Term, 2003
_________________________________________
BETTY JEAN THEURER, et al.
v.
JOHN S. FARRELL, et al.
__________________________________________
Bell, C.J.
        Eldridge
       
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia, 
                                
         JJ.
__________________________________________
Opinion by Eldridge, J.
_________________________________________
Filed:   June 19, 2003
The petitioners, Betty Jean Theurer and Donald Lee Theurer, are the parents of
Daniel Lee Theurer who died on September 11, 1998, as a result of a motor vehicle
accident allegedly caused by Daniel’s intoxication.  At the time of his death, Daniel
was unmarried and had no children.  Prior to the accident, Daniel had been a volunteer
participant in a Prince George’s County Police Department “Driving While Intoxicated
training program” for police officers, during which program Daniel allegedly consumed
a large quantity of alcoholic beverages.  It was alleged that the alcoholic beverages,
administered to Daniel by police officials as part of the program, rendered Daniel
“helpless” and “unable to protect himself.”
Betty Jean Theurer, as personal representative of Daniel’s estate, and Betty Jean
Theurer and Donald Lee Theurer individually, instituted this wrongful death and
survival action by filing, in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County, a complaint
against the Prince George’s County Chief of Police and several other officials of the
Prince George’s County Police Departm ent.  Counts one and two of the complaint
related to the wrongful death claim, with count one asserting strict liability and count
two asserting negligence.  Counts three and four concerned the survival action, with
count three sounding in strict liability and count four sounding in negligence.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, and,
according to the docket entries and the parties, the Circuit Court dismissed counts one
-2-
1
As pointed out in the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals, however, the record contains no
written order dismissing counts one and three.
and three.1  After considerab le discovery, the defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment on counts two and four, asserting public official immunity.  The Circuit Court
denied this motion, and the defendants immediately noted an appeal to the Court of
Special Appeals.  After the filing of the notice of appeal, the defendants filed a motion
in the Circuit Court to stay all proceedings, and the court granted this motion.
The Court of Special Appeals, in a reported opinion, held that the interlocutory
order denying the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on counts two and four
was appealable under the collateral order doctrine.  The intermediate appellate court
also held that the Circuit Court erred in denying the motion.  Farrell v. Theurer, 149
Md. App. 424, 816 A.2d 113 (2003).  The Court of Special Appeals’ entire
appealability holding was as follows (149 Md. App. at 425, 816 A.2d at 113-114):
“This appeal is from an interlocutory order of the Circuit Court
for Prince George’s County denying appellants’ motion for
summary judgment.  The order appealed from is an exception to the
general rule barring appellate review of the denial of a motion for
summary judgment.  Since appellants have interposed a plea of
immunity, the instant appeal is properly taken.”
The plaintiffs filed in this Court a petition for a writ of certiorari which we have
granted.  In Dawkins v. Baltimore Police Department, ___ Md. ___, ___ A.2d ___
(2003), an opinion which we have filed today, this Court held that interlocutory orders
denying immunity defenses generally are not appealable under the collateral order
-3-
doctrine.  In light of Dawkins, as well as numerous other Court of Appeals’ cases
discussed therein, the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals must be summarily
reversed and this appeal must be dismissed.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
REVERSED,
AND CASE REMANDED TO THAT
COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO
DISMISS THE APPEAL.  COSTS IN
THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT
OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID
BY THE RESPONDENTS.