Case Title: In the Matter of Port Authority Police Benevolent Association, Inc. v. Laura L. Anglin

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2009-06-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This memorandum is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 110  
In the Matter of Port Authority 
Police Benevolent Association, 
Inc., et al., 
            Appellants, 
        v. 
Laura L. Anglin, &c., et al.,
            Respondents.
James B. Tuttle, for appellants.
William E. Storrs, for respondents.
MEMORANDUM:
The judgment of the Appellate Division should be
affirmed, with costs.
For a period of time after the events of September 11,
2001, petitioner, a member of the Port Authority Police
Department of New York and New Jersey, was required to work 12-
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No. 110
* Under § 374 of the Retirement and Social Security Law
(RSSL), "[t]he comptroller shall have exclusive authority to
determine all applications for any form of retirement or benefit
provided for in [the Policemen's and Firemen's Retirement
System]," of which it is undisputed that the Port Authority
Police Officers are a part.
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hour shifts and all vacation, regular days off, personal days,
and compensatory time off were cancelled.  Pursuant to the
collective bargaining agreement, petitioner was paid time-and-a-
half for all overtime hours and for all paid vacation days
worked.  Petitioner retired in 2003 and respondent New York State
and Local Police and Fire Retirement System excluded from his
final average salary a part of the payments made for working
scheduled vacation days.  
Petitioner filed the instant article 78 proceeding and
upon transfer from Supreme Court, the Appellate Division
confirmed the determination of the Deputy Comptroller* and
dismissed the petition.  The majority below found respondent's
determinations to be rational as the excluded payments
constituted payments for loss of time off from work rather than
for "work in excess of [the employees'] regularly established
hours of employment" (54 AD3d 495, 497).  The dissent below
perceived no difference between payment for overtime work and
that for working on paid vacation days (id. at 498 [Kavanagh, J.
dissenting]).
  
The instant dispute is over the exclusion, in
appellant's final average salary for the purpose of calculating
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No. 110
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retirement benefits under RSSL §§ 302 and 431 and General
Municipal Law § 90, of time-and-a-half payments arising from the
first eight hours of work performed on a day that would have
otherwise been a paid vacation day for appellant.  General
Municipal Law § 90 states that overtime compensation may be paid
to public employees "for all time such [employees] are required
to work in excess of their regularly established hours of
employment" (emphasis added) and "[t]he amounts received as
overtime compensation . . . shall be regarded as salary . . . for
any of the purposes of any pension or retirement system." 
However, the RSSL specifically excludes from the computation of
retirement benefits "lump sum payments for deferred compensation,
sick leave, accumulated vacation or other credit for time not
worked" (RSSL § 431 [1]), "or any form of termination pay" (RSSL
§ 302 [9] [d]).
Normally on a paid vacation day, petitioner receives
eight hours of straight pay, included as a part of his salary,
notwithstanding that petitioner does not have to work his
regularly scheduled eight hours for that day.  In addition to the 
above mentioned straight pay, when petitioner was required to
work on a paid vacation day, he also received additional time-
and-a-half pay for the first eight hours and the same rate for
any overtime.  Respondent's exclusion of the first eight hours
and inclusion of the last four hours of time-and-a-half pay are
consistent with the plain language of General Municipal Law § 90
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No. 110
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as the first eight hours of work on a paid vacation day do not
constitute "work in excess of . . . regularly established hours
of employment."  Therefore, respondent correctly distinguished
the disputed payments from the payments which were included in
petitioner's final average salary (i.e., payments for working
regular days off, four extra hours on scheduled work days, and
four extra hours on vacation days worked) as the latter payments
were for work outside of petitioner's regularly scheduled hours
of employment while the former payments were for work within
those hours (see General Municipal Law § 90).
Matter of Hohensee v Regan (138 AD2d 812 [3d Dept
1988]) and Matter of Hoffman v New York State Policemen's &
Firemen's Retirement Sys (142 AD2d 854 [3d Dept 1988]) are
consistent with the result in this case.  Periodic and lump-sum
payments for working normal hours on vacation days were excluded
from computation of retirement benefits in Hohensee and Hoffman
because petitioners in those cases made a voluntary election to
forego vacation and work instead.  In our view, petitioners
Hohensee and Hoffman's excluded payments could not be considered
includable "overtime" not only because working on vacation days
was not "required" (i.e., mandatory) but also because the actual
hours worked were within "regularly established hours of
employment" rather than "in excess" of such hours (see General
Municipal Law § 90).  
In all these cases, inclusion of additional payments
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No. 110
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for working vacation days, whether compulsory or not, would
amount to crediting the hours in a paid vacation day twice: once,
because the eight hours of straight time as a part of the regular
salary is already included in final average salary for pension
purposes, and again, because any additional payments for working
those same hours would also be included.  We, therefore, conclude
that respondent's exclusion of the disputed payments avoids this
anomalous result and is consistent with the RSSL and General
Municipal Law.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Judgment affirmed, with costs, in a memorandum.  Chief Judge
Lippman and Judges Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and
Jones concur.
Decided June 24, 2009