Case Title: Robin K. v. Lamanda M.

Citation: 2006 WI 68

Docket Number: 2004AP000767

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2006-06-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
2006 WI 68 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP767 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of the Guardianship of  
James D.K.: 
 
Robin K.,  
          Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Lamanda M.,  
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  277 Wis. 2d 875, 690 N.W.2d 884 
(Ct. App. 2004-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 13, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 6, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Sauk   
 
JUDGE: 
James Evenson   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
PROSSER, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the appellant-petitioner there was a brief by Alan J. 
White and Helland Law Offices, Wisconsin Dells, and oral 
argument by Alan J. White. 
 
For the respondent there was a brief by Katherine E. 
Campbell and LaRowe, Gerlach & Roy, S.C., Reedsburg, and oral 
argument by Katherine E. Campbell. 
 
 
 
 
2006 WI 68
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP767  
(L.C. No. 
2003JG33) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of the Guardianship of James 
D.K.: 
 
 
 
Robin K., 
 
          Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Lamanda M., 
 
          Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 13, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
¶1 
LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.  Robin K. ("Robin") seeks 
review of an unpublished court of appeals' decision that 
affirmed an order of the circuit court for Sauk County, 
Honorable 
James 
Evenson, 
denying 
Robin's 
petition 
for 
guardianship of James D. K. ("James").1  Robin K. v. Lamanda M., 
                                                 
1 Robin is James's great aunt. 
No. 
2004AP767   
 
2 
 
2004AP767, unpublished slip op., ¶1 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 11, 
2004).   
¶2 
At issue in this case is the proper standard a circuit 
court must impose in considering a guardianship petition 
involving a minor when a parent objects, pursuant to Wisconsin 
Statutes Chapter 880 (2003-04).2  Robin asserts that the circuit 
court and the court of appeals erred in denying her the 
guardianship appointment.   
¶3 
We conclude that when a parent objects, a court is 
authorized under chapter 880 to appoint a nonparent as guardian 
of a minor if there exist extraordinary circumstances affecting 
the health or safety of the minor.  We further conclude that the 
record 
does 
not 
support 
a 
finding 
that 
the 
required 
extraordinary 
circumstances 
exist 
in 
the 
present 
case.  
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals.3 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-
04 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 Although we affirm the court of appeals, we do so on other 
grounds.   
The court of appeals ruled that because Robin failed to 
assert that Lamanda was an unfit mother, Robin failed to meet 
the Barstad standard.  Barstad v. Frazier, 118 Wis. 2d 549, 568, 
348 N.W.2d 479 (1984).   
Barstad examined the constitutional implications of a 
custody dispute between a parent and a nonparent third party.  
Id. at 562.  The court recognized "[t]he fundamental liberty 
interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management 
of their child," id., and established criteria constitutionally 
required in custody disputes between parents and nonparents:  
[A] parent is entitled to custody of his or her 
children unless the parent is either unfit or unable 
No. 
2004AP767   
 
3 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
to care for the children or there are compelling 
reasons for awarding custody to a third party. 
Id. at 568.   
The 
present 
case 
involves 
the 
application 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 880.03 to a dispute over guardianship between a 
parent and a nonparent, which may present different concerns 
than other guardianships.  See Howard M. v. Jean R., 196 
Wis. 2d 16, 539 N.W.2d 104 (Ct. App. 1995).  The statute grants 
courts the authority to appoint a guardian if there exist 
"extraordinary 
circumstances 
requiring 
medical 
aid or the 
prevention of harm to his or her person or property."  Id.   
We note that there may be similarities between the 
statutory 
requirement 
that 
a 
court 
find 
"extraordinary 
circumstances requiring medical aid or the prevention of harm to 
his or her person," Wis. Stat. § 880.03, and the Barstad 
requirement that a court find "[c]ompelling reasons includ[ing] 
abandonment, persistent neglect of parental responsibilities, 
extended disruption of parental custody, or other similar 
extraordinary circumstances that would drastically affect the 
welfare of the child," Barstad, 118 Wis. 2d at 568.  Because we 
conclude 
that 
Robin 
has 
failed 
to 
meet 
the 
statutory 
requirements under Wis. Stat. § 880.03, we decline to reach the 
constitutional concerns raised in Barstad, or whether the 
statutory requirements concerning "extraordinary circumstances" 
are essentially the same as the constitutionally required 
"compelling reasons."  We do not normally decide constitutional 
questions if the case can be resolved on other grounds.  Labor & 
Farm Party v. Elections Bd., 117 Wis. 2d 351, 354, 344 N.W.2d 
177 (1984).   
No. 
2004AP767   
 
4 
 
I 
¶4 
Robin filed a petition for guardianship of James on 
November 5, 2003, under chapter 880 of the Wisconsin Statutes.4  
In the petition, Robin alleged that (1) James had been living 
with her for the past two and one-half years; (2) both parents 
had little contact with the child; and (3) both parents were 
unable to give proper care to James.  According to Robin, the 
guardianship was necessary to allow her to obtain essential 
services for the child, including medical services, particularly 
when James traveled with Robin to other states.   
¶5 
James was three years old when the guardianship 
petition was filed.  Robin contends that she had primary 
responsibility for the care and welfare of James for the vast 
majority of his life.  Robin alleges James had been living with 
her since he was six months old.  According to Robin, Lamanda M. 
("Lamanda"), James's mother, refused to financially support her 
son during the two-and-a-half years prior to the filing of the 
petition.  Robin further asserts that Lamanda voluntarily 
                                                 
4 We note that in her November 5, 2003 petition, Robin asked 
the court to appoint her as James's permanent guardian.  
However, on November 13, 2003, Robin also filed a petition for 
temporary guardianship of James.  Although the record fails to 
clarify the nature of the guardianship at issue in this case, we 
determine that the circuit court addressed Robin's request as a 
request for permanent guardianship.  We draw this conclusion 
because 
the 
circuit 
court 
noted 
its 
concern 
that 
the 
guardianship statutes "have no seeming end;" yet, by law, a 
temporary guardianship can last no longer than 120 days.  
Wis. Stat. § 880.15.   
No. 
2004AP767   
 
5 
 
allowed Robin to care for James up until the point that Robin 
filed for guardianship.5   
¶6 
Lamanda opposed the petition.6  Lamanda contends that 
Robin misrepresents the amount of time James truly spent with 
Robin.  Lamanda observes that the circuit court only assumed, 
for purposes of the decision, that Robin spent a great deal of 
time with James and made no finding as to the amount of time 
Robin actually spent with the child.   
¶7 
On December 3, 2003, a hearing was held on Robin's 
petition for guardianship in Sauk County Circuit Court before 
the Honorable James Evenson.  The guardian ad litem appointed to 
represent James recommended that the guardianship be granted to 
Robin.  At the hearing, Lamanda asserted that she allowed James 
to visit with Robin periodically and to go on trips to 
California at Robin's request.  Lamanda disputed Robin's 
contention that Robin was the primary caregiver for James:   
I never thought that I couldn't take care of my son.  
That's 
not 
why 
I 
let 
[Robin] 
take 
[James] 
to 
California and keep him over night.  She would ask me 
                                                 
5 According 
to 
Robin's 
affidavit, 
upon 
filing 
for 
guardianship, James was removed from Robin's care.   
6 We presume for purposes of this appeal that James's 
father, William L. ("William"), did not oppose the petition.  
The sparse record indicates that William planned to nominate 
Robin K. as the guardian of James D. K. because he was "unable 
to perform the duties of a guardian at the present time."  The 
record from the hearing includes only hand-written notes from 
the clerk and indicates that William testified over the phone.  
We have no additional information as to the content of William's 
testimony.  The trial court record before this court bears no 
reference to William's decision not to oppose the petition. 
No. 
2004AP767   
 
6 
 
if I would let her take him to California.  And, at 
first, I would let him go.  And then, when she was 
here, she would want to take him for a few days or for 
a week and I would agree with it, because he likes 
going over there.  I wasn't——that was my family.  She 
was my aunt.  I trusted her.  I remember going over 
there when I was a young girl and I would like playing 
out in the yard and going fishing and going swimming.  
That's the only reason I let him go over there.  I 
never once thought I wasn't capable enough of taking 
care of my son. 
¶8 
The 
circuit 
court 
denied 
Robin's 
petition 
for 
guardianship.  The court indicated that it had difficulty with 
the guardianship statutes in that they did not seem to be 
designed for a case like the present case.  The court expressed 
concern that the guardianship statutes offered no guidance on 
commencing a guardianship action, and no standards concerning 
when and how a guardianship should end.   
¶9 
The circuit court concluded that there was no evidence 
that Lamanda neglected her children, and that the fact that 
Human Services had not taken the other children from the home 
was tacit approval that home placement was appropriate, subject 
to certain programming.  Therefore, the circuit court rejected 
the recommendation of the guardian ad litem and denied the 
petition for guardianship. 
¶10 Robin appealed the circuit court's decision.  On 
appeal, Robin asserted that the parental preference established 
by Wis. Stat. § 880.09(2)7 required the circuit court to appoint 
                                                 
7 That section reads as follows: 
(2) PREFERENCE. If one or both of the parents of a 
minor, a developmentally disabled person or a person 
with other like incapacity are suitable and willing, 
No. 
2004AP767   
 
7 
 
a guardian if the court found James's parents "unsuitable and 
unwilling" to care for James.  Robin further asserted that 
Lamanda was unsuitable.  In contrast, Lamanda argued that the 
court must apply the higher standard of "unfitness" under 
Barstad v. Frazier, 118 Wis. 2d 549, 348 N.W.2d 479 (1984).8   
¶11 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court, 
concluding that in a guardianship proceeding between a nonparent 
and a parent, the parent must be proven "unfit" consistent with 
the standard set forth in Barstad.  Robin K., 2004AP767, 
unpublished slip op., ¶¶1, 3-4.  Robin seeks review, and we 
affirm.   
II 
¶12 This case presents mixed questions of fact and law, 
including questions of statutory interpretation.  A circuit 
court's decision on whether to appoint a guardian involves a 
determination by the court based on the court's review of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
the court shall appoint one or both of them as 
guardian unless the proposed ward objects. The court 
shall appoint a corporate guardian under s. 880.35 
only if no suitable individual guardian is available.  
Wis. Stat. § 880.09(2).   
8 In Barstad, this court concluded:  
the rule to be followed in custody disputes between 
parents and third parties is that a parent is entitled 
to custody of his or her children unless the parent is 
either unfit or unable to care for the children or 
there are compelling reasons for awarding custody to a 
third party. 
Barstad, 118 Wis. 2d at 568.   
No. 
2004AP767   
 
8 
 
facts of the case.  See Anna S. v. Diana M., 2004 WI App 45, ¶7, 
270 Wis. 2d 411, 678 N.W.2d 285.  Such a determination is within 
the discretion of the circuit court judge.  Id.  We give 
deference to the circuit court's factual findings unless clearly 
erroneous.  Howard M. v. Jean R., 196 Wis. 2d 16, 20, 539 
N.W.2d 104 
(Ct. 
App. 
1995). 
 
Therefore, 
"[w]e 
affirm 
discretionary decisions if the circuit court applies the proper 
legal standard to the relevant facts and uses a rational process 
to reach a reasonable result."  Anna S., 270 Wis. 2d 411, ¶7 
(citing Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 
175 
(1982)). 
 
Although 
the 
circuit 
court's 
factual 
determinations and discretionary decisions are given deference, 
"[w]hether the circuit court applied the correct legal standard 
in exercising its discretion presents a question of law, which 
we review de novo."  Id. (citing F.R. v. T.B., 225 Wis. 2d 628, 
637, 593 N.W.2d 840 (Ct. App. 1999)). 
¶13 We also review statutory interpretation de novo.  
State v. Reed, 2005 WI 53, ¶13, 280 Wis. 2d 68, 695 N.W.2d 315.  
The purpose of statutory interpretation is to give the statute 
its full, proper, and intended effect.  Id. (citation omitted).  
"We begin with the statute's language because we assume that the 
legislature's intent is expressed in the words it used."  Id.  
We refrain from interpreting statutory language in isolation and 
interpret the language in the context in which it is used to 
avoid absurd or unreasonable results.  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110.  If the meaning is plain from the language of 
No. 
2004AP767   
 
9 
 
the statute, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.  Reed, 280 
Wis. 2d 68, ¶13 (citation omitted).   
III 
¶14 In this action, we are asked to determine the 
appropriate standard for a circuit court to use in deciding 
whether to appoint a nonparent as a guardian for a minor under 
chapter 880 when the minor's parent objects.9  The case requires 
us to review chapter 880 in general, focusing on the application 
of Wis. Stat. § 880.0310 in particular. 
                                                 
9 When a nonparent files a petition for guardianship over 
the objections of the child's parent, the nonparent is asking 
the court to grant the third party the right to make decisions 
regarding the "care, custody and control" of the child.  
Wis. Stat. § 880.01(3).  Because the appointment of a guardian 
for a minor over the objections of a parent gives major 
decision-making authority to a non-parent regarding how the 
child will be raised, decisions usually reserved for a child's 
parent(s), a guardianship appointment of a nonparent implicates 
the constitutionally protected rights of parents.  Troxel v. 
Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72-73 (2000) (concluding that due 
process prevents a state from infringing on the "fundamental 
right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because 
a state judge believes a 'better' decision could be made.") 
(citations omitted).  Because we resolve this matter on 
statutory grounds in the parent's favor, we decline to reach the 
constitutional issues otherwise implicated here. 
10 Section 880.03 reads: 
Persons and estates subject to guardianship.  All 
minors, incompetents and spendthrifts are subject to 
guardianship.  The court may appoint a guardian of the 
person of anyone subject to guardianship who is also a 
resident of the county, or of a nonresident found in 
the 
county, 
under 
extraordinary 
circumstances 
requiring medical aid or the prevention of harm to his 
or her person or property found in the county.  The 
court may appoint a guardian of the estate of anyone 
subject to guardianship, whether a resident of the 
No. 
2004AP767   
 
10 
 
¶15 Chapter 
880 
codifies 
certain 
guardianships 
for 
children in Wisconsin.11  Under chapter 880, when a court 
appoints a guardian for a minor, that guardian is entrusted with 
the "care, custody and control" of the minor.12  Prior to 
determining who should be appointed as a guardian, a court must 
first hold a hearing to determine if the child is "the proper 
subject for guardianship" and in need of a guardian.13  While all 
minors are potentially subject to guardianship, the relevant 
statute directs a court to appoint a guardian when there exist 
                                                                                                                                                             
state or not, if any of the estate is located within 
the county. Separate guardians of the person and of 
the estate of a ward may be appointed. 
Wis. Stat. § 880.03.  
On May 10, 2006, the Wisconsin Legislature repealed 
Wis. Stat. § 880.03.  2005 Wis. Act. 387, § 307.  This Act, 
among 
other 
things, 
creates 
chapter 
54 
to 
address 
the 
appointment of a guardian.  2005 Wis. Act. 387, § 100.   
Under the newly created chapter 54, "A court may appoint a 
guardian of the person or a guardian of the estate, or both, for 
an individual if the court determines that the individual is a 
minor."  Wis. Stat. § 54.10(1) (2005-06).   
11 See also Wis. Stat. §§ 48.831 and 48.977. 
12 Wis. Stat. § 880.01(3). 
13 Wisconsin Statute § 880.12 reads, in relevant part:  
Determination and order appointing guardian.  (1) The 
court shall after hearing determine whether the person 
is a proper subject for guardianship.  If the person 
is found to be in need of a guardian, the court shall 
appoint one or more guardians but not more than one 
guardian of the person shall be appointed unless they 
be husband and wife.   
No. 
2004AP767   
 
11 
 
"extraordinary circumstances" requiring medical aid or the 
prevention 
of 
harm 
to 
the 
minor's 
person 
or 
property.  
Wis. Stat. § 880.03.14   
¶16 The 
legislature 
has 
not 
defined 
"extraordinary 
circumstances" under this section, and this court has not 
previously 
discussed 
what 
would 
constitute 
"extraordinary 
circumstances" under the guardianship statutes.  In construing a 
statute, 
this 
court 
ascertains 
and 
gives 
effect 
to 
the 
legislative intent.  State v. Petty, 201 Wis. 2d 337, 355, 548 
N.W.2d 817 (1996).  "In accord with the canons of statutory 
construction, [this court] give[s] words their ordinary and 
accepted meanings so as not to render any part of the statute 
superfluous."  Id. at 356-57.  This court often relies upon 
definitions of that word in a "recognized dictionary to 
determine the common and ordinary meaning of the word."  Mared 
Industries, Inc. v. Mansfield, 2005 WI 5, ¶32, 277 Wis. 2d 350, 
690 N.W.2d 835 (quoting State v. Polashek, 2002 WI 74, ¶19, 253 
Wis. 2d 527, 646 N.W.2d 330). The applicable dictionary 
definition of "extraordinary" is "beyond what is ordinary or 
usual."  American Heritage Dictionary 649 (3d ed. 1992).  
                                                 
14 The statute reads, in relevant part: 
The court may appoint a guardian of the person of 
anyone subject to guardianship who is also a resident 
of the county, or of a nonresident found in the 
county, under extraordinary circumstances requiring 
medical aid or the prevention of harm to his or her 
person or property  . . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 880.03 (emphasis added). 
No. 
2004AP767   
 
12 
 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "extraordinary circumstances" as 
"[f]actors 
of 
time, 
place, 
etc., 
which 
are 
not 
usually 
associated with a particular thing or event; out of the ordinary 
factors."  Black's Law Dictionary 586 (6th ed. 1990).  We 
conclude that the statute is clear and unambiguous: the statute 
authorizes courts to appoint a guardian only in cases where 
circumstances out of the ordinary require medical aid, or in 
cases where circumstances out of the ordinary require the 
appointment of a guardian in order to prevent harm to the person 
or property.   
¶17 In proceedings for the appointment of a guardian, the 
burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence rests upon the 
party seeking guardianship.  See Colliton v. Colliton, 41 
Wis. 2d 487, 
491, 
164 
N.W.2d 480 
(1969) 
(addressing 
the 
appointment of a guardian due to mental incompetency); Cheryl F. 
v. Sheboygan County, 170 Wis. 2d 420, 425, 489 N.W.2d 636 (Ct. 
App. 1992) (addressing the appointment of a guardian due to 
mental 
incompetency). 
 
We 
next 
examine 
whether 
Robin 
established, by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of 
extraordinary 
circumstances 
requiring 
medical 
aid 
or 
the 
prevention of harm, which would allow the court to appoint Robin 
as the guardian of James over the objections of James's mother.   
No. 
2004AP767   
 
13 
 
¶18 We begin our analysis by observing that the record 
before us is incomplete.15  Full transcripts of the various 
hearings referenced in the parties' briefs were not made 
available.  Our review is therefore limited to those parts of 
the record that are made available to us.  Ryde v. Dane County, 
76 Wis. 2d 558, 563, 251 N.W.2d 791, 793 (1977) (holding that 
the lack of a transcript "merely limits the review to those 
portions of the record that are available to the reviewing 
court").  Even when we examine a limited record, however, our 
standard of review does not permit us to second-guess the 
circuit 
court's 
factual 
findings. 
 
See 
Howard 
M., 
196 
Wis. 2d at 27.   
                                                 
15 We note that the parties failed to explicitly address 
whether the present case is a proper situation to impose a 
guardianship and, instead, limited their briefs to an analysis 
of who the court should appoint as guardian.  As discussed 
earlier, Robin asserted on appeal that the parental preference 
established by Wis. Stat. § 880.09(2) required the circuit court 
to appoint her as guardian if the court found James's parents 
"unsuitable and unwilling" to care for James.  Lamanda responded 
that instead of applying the standard of "unsuitable and 
unwilling" the court must apply a higher standard of "unfitness" 
under Barstad.  The parties' arguments are misdirected.  Section 
880.09(2) addresses whether a parent should be given preference 
when the court is deciding who to appoint as a guardian.  This 
section is inapplicable if the court does not first determine 
that there exist conditions for a guardianship in the first 
place.   
Although this court often requests briefs when an issue is 
raised sua sponte, this court has "decline[ed] to adopt a per se 
rule requiring courts to permit the submission of additional 
briefs whenever an issue is raised sua sponte."  Bartus v. DHSS, 
176 Wis. 2d 1063, 1073, 501 N.W.2d 419 (1993).  In the present 
case, we find that additional briefing is unnecessary because 
the record and briefs contain adequate information to continue 
our analysis. 
No. 
2004AP767   
 
14 
 
¶19 In the present case, the circuit court found Lamanda's 
home "somewhat chaotic," and noted the existence of "some 
general allegations of neglect."  However, the court concluded 
that there were no specific signs of neglect to any of Lamanda's 
children.  The circuit court further found that because the 
Wisconsin Department of Human Services decided against removing 
Lamanda's other children, the department had tacitly approved 
that James's home placement was appropriate, subject to certain 
programming.  Based on this finding, the court ruled that 
guardianship was inappropriate in this case. 
¶20 Upon review of the record, we conclude that the 
circuit court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous.  We 
further conclude that Robin failed to establish by clear and 
convincing 
evidence 
that 
extraordinary 
circumstances 
exist 
requiring medical aid or the prevention of harm with respect to 
James.  We agree with the circuit court that on the basis of 
this record, no need for a guardian has been shown.    
¶21 In sum, we conclude that in evaluating a petition for 
a permanent guardianship on behalf of a minor filed by a 
nonparent when a parent objects, a court must first determine 
whether the party bringing the guardianship petition has shown 
that the child is in need of a guardian because there exist 
extraordinary 
circumstances 
requiring 
medical 
aid 
or 
the 
prevention of harm.  Absent a showing of such extraordinary 
circumstances or need for a guardian, the court cannot appoint a 
guardian.   
 
No. 
2004AP767   
 
15 
 
IV 
¶22 We conclude that under chapter 880, a court is 
authorized to appoint a guardian for a minor when a parent 
objects when there exist extraordinary circumstances affecting 
the health or safety of the minor.  We further conclude that the 
record in the present case does not support a finding of the 
requisite extraordinary circumstances or any need to appoint a 
guardian.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals on other grounds. 
¶23 By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2004AP767.dtp 
1 
 
 
¶24 DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   (concurring).  While I concur 
in the result, I cannot join the majority opinion because I 
believe the standard it sets for granting a guardianship is not 
responsive to the complex realities that demand the appointment 
of a guardian.  By adopting a one-size-fits-all standard that 
exceeds 
what 
is 
constitutionally 
required, 
the 
majority 
hamstrings the usefulness and flexibility of guardianships. 
¶25 On November 5, 2003, Robin K. filed a petition for 
permanent guardianship of a minor, James D.K.  Robin K. was the 
child's great aunt.  She alleged that three-year-old James had 
spent most of the past two-and-one-half years living with her.  
¶26 The following day, November 6, the child's mother, 
Lamanda M., asked a police officer to remove James from Robin 
K.'s home and return him to her. 
¶27 On November 13, Robin K. filed an amended petition, 
seeking temporary guardianship of James.  The amended petition 
was supported by a sworn affidavit alleging that for the past 
two-and-one-half 
years 
Robin 
K. 
had 
borne 
the 
primary 
responsibility for the care of James; during that time the child 
had been primarily placed with her by the mother, and Robin K. 
had provided for the child's care and welfare; Robin K. had 
taken the child to California during business trips "on numerous 
occasions;" the mother had "refused to financially support" the 
child "at any point in the child's life;" the child referred to 
his great aunt Robin K. as "Mommy;" and until the time the 
guardianship petition was filed, Lamanda M. had no objection to 
the placement of James with Robin K. 
No.  2004AP767.dtp 
2 
 
¶28 Robin K.'s affidavit also stated that she feared for 
the emotional and physical welfare of James when he was at his 
mother's house.  On one occasion when he was with Lamanda M., 
the child was in an automobile accident that involved drinking; 
on another occasion, the child was in the car when the driver 
was arrested for operating under the influence of an intoxicant.  
Robin K. claimed that multiple people lived at the mother's 
residence and that James did not have his own bedroom. 
¶29 In 
response 
to 
Robin 
K.'s 
petition, 
the 
court 
scheduled a hearing for November 20, 2003.  Lamanda M. objected.  
In a November 18 letter to the court, she wrote: 
 
I need to postphon my coort date on Nov. 20th 
2003 for 2 resons.  1 I jest found out yesterday and I 
haven't found a lawer for my case.  2. I have to go 
out of state for a funrul.  I have to leave tonight 
and I proble won't be back in til Saterday.  I hope 
you will understand.  I reall haven't found time to 
get council.  Thanks for your time. 
¶30 The court rescheduled the hearing, and it took 
evidence on December 3, 2003.  Lamanda M. appeared at the 
December hearing without an attorney. 
THE CIRCUIT COURT HEARING 
 
¶31 This court is at a disadvantage because it does not 
have a transcript of the evidentiary portion of the circuit 
court hearing.  We know, however, that the case came before the 
court as a petition for a temporary guardianship of the person 
of a minor under Wis. Stat. § 880.15 and that the court assumed 
the truth of Robin K.'s allegations about the child's placement, 
commenting that "the child's obviously spent a great deal of 
time with [Robin K.] over the two and a half years," a 
No.  2004AP767.dtp 
3 
 
"placement" that ended "when the guardianship [proceeding] was 
commenced." 
 
¶32 There is a transcript of the court's ruling and the 
arguments that preceded the ruling.  In the arguments, the 
guardian ad litem recommended the requested guardianship based 
upon (a) "concerns that I see with regard to the parenting that 
is being provided," (b) the abandonment standard having somewhat 
been met "by the mere fact that the child has not been in the 
care of the mother for most of the time," (c) the apparent lack 
of stability in the mother's life, (d) some of the decisions the 
mother "makes are not necessarily in the best interests" of her 
children, (e) the absence of stability in maintaining work or 
having a regular income, (f) concern about the stability of the 
mother's relationships with men ("four children, three born/one 
unborn . . . and all of them have different fathers"), (g) 
concerns leading to the intervention of the Sauk County 
Department of Human Services, and (h) "the wellbeing and best 
interests of the child." 
 
¶33 Counsel for Robin K. made legal arguments about 
guardianship and how the mother could terminate the guardianship 
if the mother could show that she had become a "suitable" 
parent.  "This guardianship is not something that goes on 
indefinitely," counsel argued.  "I have been involved in 
guardianships that have terminated and I think that all [that] 
has to be shown is that it's in the child's best interests to be 
with the mother." 
 
¶34 "[T]he most telling evidence against the mother in 
this case," counsel added, "is the fact that she has allowed 
No.  2004AP767.dtp 
4 
 
[Robin K.] to have this child[,] and the Court then has to ask 
itself why.  And I think the answer is clear.  Because she 
didn't feel she could care for the child." 
 
¶35 Lamanda M. fired back: 
I never thought that I couldn't take care of my 
son. . . .  I still don't understand why they think 
I'm not capable of taking care of my son, or stable 
enough to take care of my son, when I've had my girls 
and I'm stable enough to take care of them.  And I 
know that I'm young and I know that I have some money 
problems and some problems with having my friends come 
over.  But . . . I think everybody once in their life 
goes through money situations when they lose their job 
or they can't find new employment. 
 
¶36 In its ruling, the court stated that it had difficulty 
with the guardianship statute "in a situation such as this."  
The court indicated there were no limitations on commencing the 
action and no apparent way to end the guardianship.  "[W]hat is 
the standard to be applied?" the court asked.  The court then 
answered its own question: "[T]he guardianship does not have a 
standard."  Although the court expressed concern "with the 
situation as it[']s been described to exist in [the mother's] 
home," the number of people there, the number of children, the 
"somewhat chaotic" atmosphere, and the general allegations of 
neglect, it concluded: "I don't believe that the guardianship is 
appropriate in this case."  The court then dismissed the 
petition. 
 
¶37 The issue presented on review is what standard the 
circuit court should employ in determining whether to grant a 
temporary guardianship of the person of a minor child when the 
guardianship is opposed by the child's mother. 
 
No.  2004AP767.dtp 
5 
 
DISCUSSION 
¶38 Chapter 
880 
is 
entitled 
"Guardians 
and 
Wards."  
Wisconsin Stat. § 880.03 provides in part that "[a]ll minors, 
incompetents, and spendthrifts are subject to guardianship."  
There may be a guardian of the "person" or a guardian of the 
"estate," or both.  § 880.03.  In each case, the circuit court 
makes the appointment. 
¶39 A 
"guardian" 
is 
defined, 
in 
part, 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 880.01(3) as "one appointed by a court to have 
care, custody and control of the person of a minor . . . or the 
management of the estate of a minor . . . ."  (Emphasis added.) 
¶40 In this case, Robin K. is seeking a new legal status——
guardian of the person of a minor child.  That status would give 
her "custody" of the child.  She is attempting to secure this 
legal status over the opposition of the mother.  In these 
specific circumstances, the standard appears to be governed by 
Barstad v. Frazier, 118 Wis. 2d 549, 568-69, 348 N.W.2d 479 
(1984): 
We conclude that the rule to be followed in 
custody disputes between parents and third parties is 
that a parent is entitled to custody of his or her 
children unless the parent is either unfit or unable 
to care for the children or there are compelling 
reasons for awarding custody to a third party.  
Compelling reasons include abandonment, persistent 
neglect 
of 
parental 
responsibilities, 
extended 
disruption of parental custody, or other similar 
extraordinary circumstances that would drastically 
affect the welfare of the child.  If the court finds 
such compelling reasons, it may award custody to a 
third party if the best interests of the children 
would be promoted thereby. 
 
¶41 The court expanded its analysis in a footnote: 
No.  2004AP767.dtp 
6 
 
We are not . . . holding that parents may be 
deprived of custody of their children only if they are 
found to be unfit. . . .   A complete failure to 
assume 
any 
significant 
responsibility 
for 
the 
child . . . may well constitute compelling reasons 
warranting an award of custody to a non-parent. 
Id. at 569 n.9 (emphasis added). 
¶42 This court adhered to the Barstad standard as the 
proper standard when determining whether custody should be 
granted to a party who is not a minor’s biological or adoptive 
parent.  Holtzman v. Knott, 192 Wis. 2d 649, 664-65, 533 
N.W.2d 419 
(1995). 
 
See 
also 
Sporleder 
v. 
Hermes, 
162 
Wis. 2d 1002, 1009, 471 N.W.2d 202 (1991). 
 
¶43 The standard set out in Barstad is a statement of 
"constitutional principles."  Id. at 563.  This means that when 
it applies, this standard prevails over any different statutory 
language.  Nonetheless, the Barstad court tied the standard to 
the existing custody statute, Wis. Stat. § 767.24(1)(c) (1979-
80): 
If the interest of any child demands it, and if the 
court finds that neither party [parent] is able to 
care for the child adequately or that neither party 
[parent] is fit and proper to have the care and 
custody of the child, the court may declare any such 
child to be in need of protection or services and 
transfer legal custody of the child to a relative of 
the child . . . . 
 
¶44 The substance of this quoted provision is now found in 
Wis. Stat. § 767.24(3)(a).  Significantly, this same paragraph 
(a) also states: "If the court transfers legal custody of a 
child under this subsection [3], in its order the court shall 
notify the parents of any applicable grounds for termination of 
parental rights under s. 48.415." 
No.  2004AP767.dtp 
7 
 
 
¶45 If one were able to draw a clear distinction between 
the legal custody under present § 767.24(3) and the guardianship 
custody implicated in § 880.03, then the Barstad standard might 
be relaxed.  But the evidence here suggests that Robin K.'s 
ultimate goal was to obtain, through a permanent guardianship, 
the kind of legal custody, care, and control of the child 
contemplated in § 767.24(3).  Absent a clear distinction between 
custody and guardianship, the court of appeals correctly applied 
the Barstad standard to this case. The court of appeals has also 
applied the Barstad standard in other guardianship cases, 
stating that the party petitioning for guardianship must first 
meet the Barstad standard——not the extraordinary circumstances 
standard——before a non-parent can be appointed guardian.  See 
e.g., Elgin W. v. DHFS, 221 Wis. 2d 36, 42, 584 N.W.2d 195 (Ct. 
App. 1998); Howard M. v. Jean R., 196 Wis. 2d 16, 24, 539 
N.W.2d 104 (Ct. App. 1995). 
 
¶46 At the December 3, 2003, hearing, Robin K. sought a 
temporary guardianship.  A temporary guardianship is described 
in Wis. Stat. § 880.15: 
If, 
after 
consideration 
of 
a 
petition 
for 
temporary guardianship, the court finds that the 
welfare 
of 
a 
minor, 
spendthrift 
or 
an 
alleged 
incompetent requires the immediate appointment of a 
guardian 
of 
the 
person . . . it 
may 
appoint 
a 
temporary guardian for a period not to exceed 60 days 
unless further extended for 60 days by order of the 
court.  The court may extend the period only once.  
The authority of the temporary guardian shall be 
limited 
to 
the 
performance 
of 
duties 
respecting . . . the performance of particular acts, 
as stated in the order of appointment.  All provisions 
of the statutes concerning the powers and duties of 
guardians shall apply to temporary guardians except as 
limited by the order of appointment. 
No.  2004AP767.dtp 
8 
 
 
¶47 Because the appointment of a temporary guardian is 
limited in time, the court may focus on the short-term welfare 
of the child in light of a parent's alleged inability to provide 
care or the presence of some immediate risk to the child as 
reflected in a need for protection or services.  The statute 
appears to give the court power to set conditions in its order 
of appointment. 
 
¶48 A temporary guardianship permits a troubled parent to 
stabilize 
her 
situation, 
addressing 
problems 
that 
might 
jeopardize her parental rights.  A temporary guardianship 
permits the guardian or other person seeking a change of legal 
custody to determine whether to go forward, assuming the burden 
of proving parental "unfitness" or other grounds that will 
overcome parental opposition. 
 
¶49 I part company with the majority opinion for three 
reasons. 
 
¶50 First, the majority treats this case as a request for 
a permanent guardianship but declines to apply the Barstad 
standard.  Majority op., ¶3 n.3.  I disagree.  The majority's 
standard, "extraordinary circumstances affecting the health or 
safety of the minor," is entirely consistent with the phrase in 
the Barstad standard: "extraordinary circumstances that would 
drastically affect the welfare of the child."  Barstad, 118 
Wis. 2d at 568. 
 
¶51 Unless 
this 
court 
withdraws 
that 
language 
or 
successfully distinguishes the facts here from the facts in 
Barstad, 
the 
Barstad 
standard——which 
is 
not 
limited 
to 
No.  2004AP767.dtp 
9 
 
"unfitness"——applies to a permanent, non-parental guardianship 
opposed by a mother. 
 
¶52 Second, by turning to the language in § 880.03 for its 
"standard," the court is creating a quandary for future cases.1  
The "extraordinary 
circumstances" language 
applies to all 
permanent guardianships.  It applies to guardianships of the 
person for minors (regardless of whether a parent objects), 
spendthrifts, 
and 
incompetents, 
and 
it 
also 
applies 
to 
guardianships of their respective "estates."2 
                                                 
1 As the majority indicates, 2005 Wisconsin Act 387 repeals 
and amends Chapter 880 of the Wisconsin Statutes.  Majority op., 
¶14 n.10.  One such amendment is the repeal of the extraordinary 
circumstances standard.  Since this standard will no longer 
apply, I urge the legislature to examine the standards it wishes 
to apply to guardianship cases when a parent is involved, as 
well as in other circumstances.  The legislature is not free to 
disregard a constitutional standard for guardianship of a 
minor's person in cases involving the opposition of a parent.  
Additionally, I would encourage the legislature to examine the 
constitutionality of the "best interest of the minor" standard 
created by Act 387 in Wis. Stat. §§ 54.15(5) and 54.56(2) in 
light of Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72-73 (2000). 
2 When determining guardianship, the circuit court must 
select one of five categories of residency under which the minor 
is classified.  Despite this court’s statutory interpretation of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 
880.03, 
the 
Determination 
and 
Order 
for 
Guardianship of Minor form, created by the Judicial Conference 
Forms 
Committee, 
requires 
a 
showing 
of 
extraordinary 
circumstances only for a minor who is a nonresident of the 
county in which the petition for guardianship is filed.  The 
form does not reference the standard for minors who are 
residents of the state and county, residents of the state and 
physically present in the county, nonresidents of the state 
whose person or property may be found in the county, or 
residents or nonresidents of the state with property located 
within the county.  The forms committee would need to amend this 
form, in light of the majority opinion, so that it is consistent 
with 
the 
statutory 
interpretation 
that 
the 
extraordinary 
circumstances standard applies to all guardianships, except that 
2005 Wis. Act 387 appears to leave the majority opinion without 
any prospective effect. 
No.  2004AP767.dtp 
10 
 
 
¶53 Frankly, the standard applied in these cases cannot be 
the same in all situations.3  The standard has to vary when a 
parent is not involved, when a guardianship is not contested, 
and perhaps when there is a contested guardianship of the 
"estate" as opposed to a contested guardianship of the "person."  
To illustrate, if Robin K. had retained actual custody of James 
and if the mother did not oppose Robin K.'s guardianship of the 
child's person, the standard would have to be different from 
"extraordinary circumstances affecting the health or safety of 
the minor," because there would be, on such facts, no threat to 
the health or safety of James.  It is not clear, under the 
majority's analysis, whether it would insist on applying the 
same standard on such facts, relying on § 880.03. 
 
¶54 Third, I recognize that this court does not have the 
full record and that the circuit court did not find facts to 
grant the petition for a temporary guardianship.  But I 
completely disagree that the court could not have granted a 
temporary guardianship if the facts alleged were established at 
the hearing.  I believe it could have. 
 
¶55 The Barstad court took pains to explain that the 
fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, 
custody, and management of their own children does not evaporate 
simply because they have not been model parents.  Barstad, 118 
Wis. 2d at 562.  On the other hand, the assertion of parental 
rights is to some extent dependent upon the assumption of 
                                                 
3 Although the majority claims to limit its holding to the 
appointment of a guardian when a parent objects, there is no 
statutory basis for this limitation. 
No.  2004AP767.dtp 
11 
 
parental responsibilities.  "A biological parent who has never 
borne any significant responsibility for the child and who has 
not functioned as a member of the child's family unit is not 
entitled to the full constitutional protections."  Id. at 563. 
 
¶56 Lamanda 
M. 
asserted 
her 
parental 
rights 
but 
substantially abdicated her parental responsibilities.  A young 
mother who willingly places her child in the care, de facto 
custody, and control of a relative for the better part of two-
and-one-half years is either not responsible or, conversely, 
sufficiently responsible to realize that she cannot properly 
care for her child.  It is not likely that her situation changed 
abruptly overnight. 
¶57 In addition, at the time of the hearing, Lamanda M. 
was a mother who allegedly had four non-marital children by four 
different fathers, who had never provided financial support for 
James, who was unemployed, who had no stable source of income, 
who had a chaotic household, who had drug and alcohol problems, 
who had lost her driving privileges, who was (on the basis of 
her letter to the court) poorly educated, and who had a lengthy 
history of law enforcement contact and prosecution. 
 
¶58 This court should not deprive circuit courts of the 
legal authority to grant guardianships, especially temporary 
guardianships, when facts of this gravity are established. 
 
¶59 I concur in the result here, first, because I am not 
prepared to say that the findings of the circuit court are 
clearly erroneous, and, second, because two-and-one-half years 
have passed since December 3, 2003, and we do not know how the 
situation has changed.  However, I urge authorities in Sauk 
No.  2004AP767.dtp 
12 
 
County to assure themselves that James is not a child in need of 
protection or services.  Unlike many contemporary children, 
James has a good alternative, if an alternative is necessary. 
 
 
 
No.  2004AP767.dtp 
 
 
1