Case Title: GARY COLLINS SCOTT v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-10-0139

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-03-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
GARY COLLINS SCOTT v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2011 WY 56Case Number: S-10-0139Decided: 03/30/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
GARY 
COLLINS SCOTT,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Campbell County

The 
Honorable John C. Brooks, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate 
Counsel.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General. 

 
 
VOIGT, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The appellant, 
Gary Collins Scott, was convicted of multiple counts of sexual assault, 
attempted sexual assault, and sexual abuse of a minor.  In this appeal, the appellant asserts 
that the district court abused its discretion in failing to strike certain 
portions of the presentence investigation (PSI) report prior to sentencing.  We find the PSI report was proper and 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering it.  We affirm. 

 
 
ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      Did the 
district court abuse its discretion when it denied the appellant's motion to 
strike from the PSI report the sentencing recommendations of the probation and 
parole agent?1

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      While the 
appellant was employed as the fire chief of the Campbell County Fire Department, 
he instituted a cadet program.  This 
program allowed juveniles to participate in certain activities with the fire 
department.  The appellant worked 
closely with many of the juveniles involved in the program.  On September 28, 2007, the appellant was 
charged with nine counts of third-degree sexual assault, one count of 
second-degree sexual assault, and two counts of sexual abuse of a minor in the 
second degree.  All the charges 
arose from contact with the juveniles involved in the cadet program.  The prosecutor summarized the nature of 
the appellant's conduct giving rise to the charges as 
follows:

 
 
THE 
COURT:  And [Prosecutor], if you 
would, sir, give me a factual basis for these charges.

 
 
[Prosecutor]:  I will, Your Honor, with respect to all 
the charges alleged in the information, the state would anticipate, if this 
matter went to trial, that the evidence would be starkly similar with respect to 
each allegation.  Those events would 
transpire and describe contact the defendant had with juvenile-aged individuals 
often times in their early

  
 
 
teenage 
years at a time when those people were participating in the cadet program 
operated by the Campbell County Fire Department.

 
 
The 
evidence would establish that the defendant created that program, and it was a 
program where young people could receive training and experiences associated 
with the fire department.  In each 
and every one of the incidents described and charged in the information, an 
individual was singled out by the defendant, and he began to focus attention on 
that individual.

 
 
Ultimately 
that would culminate in a private encounter between the defendant and the 
juvenile, wherein he would perpetrate a sexual assault upon that juvenile.  Sometimes that took the form of oral sex 
or fellatio.  Sometimes it took the 
form of digital penetration with the hand.  Sometimes it took the form of 
masturbation.

 
 
In 
each and every one of those incidents, the juvenile would testify that they were 
-- they perceived that they were in some ways under the control of the defendant 
as he was the fire chief of the local fire department, and they were 
participating in the cadet program, and they would testify that that was at 
least one of the reasons why they were put in the position they were put 
in.

 
 
The 
state would anticipate that the information solicited at trial would be in large 
conformance with the affidavit of probable cause tendered to the court in 
support of the charges and would anticipate that all of those witnesses would 
testify to the facts specifically described by each and every one of them as 
described in the affidavit.

 
 
[¶4]      As part of a plea 
agreement, the appellant agreed to plead "no contest" to the charges and the 
State agreed to recommend that the sentences be served concurrently.  The parties also agreed that each party 
was free to argue whether the state sentences should be served concurrently or 
consecutively to related federal sentences arising out of the same conduct, 
which sentences had already been imposed.

 
 
[¶5]      Prior to 
sentencing, the appellant filed an objection to the PSI report and requested 
that certain comments "be stricken and not considered in sentencing."  The specific content of the PSI report to 
which the appellant objected will be outlined in the discussion section 
below.  The appellant raised the 
same concerns at sentencing and the district court told defense counsel it would 
"not consider[] anything that you are determining to be argument or bias."  The district court sentenced the 
appellant to a prison term of twelve to fifteen years on each count, to be 
served concurrently.  The district 
court also determined that the state sentences were to run consecutive to the 
related set of concurrent federal sentences involving interstate transportation 
of minors with the intent to engage in illegal sexual 
acts.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]      We recently 
recited our standard of review when considering claims involving alleged 
inappropriate statements in a PSI report.  

 
 

We 
review a district court's sentencing decision for abuse of discretion.  Roeschlein v. State, 2007 
WY 156, ¶ 17, 168 P.3d 468, 
473 (Wyo. 2007).  A sentence will 
not be disturbed because of sentencing procedures unless the defendant can show 
an abuse of discretion, procedural conduct prejudicial to him, circumstances 
which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the 
public sense of fair play.  
Id.  
An 
error warrants reversal only when it is prejudicial and it affects an 
appellant's substantial rights.  
Id.  
The 
party who is appealing bears the burden to establish that an error was 
prejudicial.  
Id.  
This 
Court has declined to reverse a sentence where the party objecting to particular 
portions of a PSI failed to demonstrate that the district court based its 
decision upon those parts of the report and the challenged comments "merely 
summarized what was apparent elsewhere in the report and provided the rationale 
for the agent's sentencing recommendation."  
Doherty 
v. State, 2006 
WY 39, ¶ 34, 131 P.3d 963, 974 
(Wyo. 2006).

Noller v. 
State, 2010 WY 30, ¶ 7, 226 P.3d 867, 869 (Wyo. 
2010).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶7]      PSI reports 
are governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-303 (LexisNexis 2009)2 and W.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(2)3. 

In 
considering the statutory provision and the rule, we have said that trial courts 
have broad discretion when imposing sentence to consider a wide range of factors 
about the defendant and the crime.  Thomas v. State, 2009 WY 92, ¶ 10, 211 P.3d 509, 512 (Wyo. 2009). 
 They are free, in the exercise of 
their sentencing discretion, to consider victim impact statements, PSIs and 
other factors relating to the defendant and his crimes in imposing an 
appropriate sentence within the statutory range.  Garcia v. State, 2007 WY 48, ¶ 10, 153 P.3d 941, 944 (Wyo. 2007), 
citing Smith v. State, 2005 WY 113, ¶ 37, 119 P.3d 411, 422 (Wyo. 
2005).

 
 

Hackett 
v. State, 
2010 WY 90, ¶ 10, 233 P.3d 988, 991 (Wyo. 2010) 
(quoting Noller, 2010 WY 30, ¶ 13, 226 P.3d at 
871).  Regarding the role of the 
probation or parole agent preparing the report, we have 
said:

 
 

[T]he 
preparer of a presentence report is to be a neutral and independent participant 
in the sentencing process.  It 
necessarily follows that a parole or probation officer acts on behalf of an 
independent judiciary, not as an agent of the state, in preparing a presentence 
report.  Like the sentencing court, 
the preparer of a presentence report is neither a party to nor bound by a plea 
agreement between the defendant and the state and, therefore, cannot breach the 
terms of that agreement in preparing the report.

 
 

Duke 
v. State, 
2009 WY 74, ¶ 16, 209 P.3d 563, 569 (Wyo. 2009) 
(quoting State v. McQuay, 452 N.W.2d 377, 383-84 (Wis. 1990)).  

 
 

[¶8]      We 
quote from the PSI report below, emphasizing the specific statements to which 
the appellant takes exception on appeal.

 
 
 
 
Because 
the current offenses involve 14 counts but 13 different and distinct victims, this 
Writer is strongly compelled to recommend that the Court deviate from the plea 
agreement and sentence the Defendant to at least 13 consecutive terms. 
 However, as reported at the change 
of plea hearing, all but one of the victims was able to be contacted by the 
Prosecutor's Office before conviction and each of them ultimately expressed 
support for the plea agreement, which recommends that the 14 counts be 
served concurrently with each other.  Because this Writer fundamentally believes 
that the opinions of victims in these matters should supersede any 
recommendations made by any other party, this Writer will defer the 
Court to their wishes regarding the issue of concurrent or consecutive State 
offenses.

 
 

However, 
this Writer makes the argument that any State sentences should be served 
consecutively to the Federal offenses. 
 Based in the number of victims and 
the vast period of time which these crimes were committed, this Writer proposes 
that the Defendant will require additional time, even after the Federal 
sentences, in which to address any potential rehabilitative needs while also 
serving the retributive and incapacitative aspects of his criminal deeds.  Even in the face of a lifetime of Federal 
supervision upon release, this Writer views the time the Defendant will serve on 
those matters to be separate and distinct, and therefore requiring separate and 
distinct consequences regardless of their similar nature to the current 
offenses.  

 
 
Finally, 
the Defendant does not appear to need a determination as a Qualified 
Offender.

 
 
Recommendation:

It 
is respectfully recommended that Gary Collins Scott be denied probation and that 
the imposed prison terms in these matters, whether concurrent or consecutive to 
each other, be ordered to be served consecutively to the Federal sentences 
already imposed.

 
 
(Emphasis 
supplied.)

 
 
[¶9]      The appellant 
does not claim that the PSI contained inflammatory or erroneous information. 
 Instead, he argues that the 
above-emphasized language shows that the PSI writer "did not make a neutral, 
rational recommendation" and was "solely a victim advocate, and not a neutral 
factfinder for the trial court."  We 
disagree.  We have many times said 
that it is common and appropriate for a PSI writer to make a sentencing 
recommendation.  Noller, 2010 WY 30, ¶ 13, 226 P.3d  at 871 
("[a] sentencing recommendation contained in a PSI is one of the factors that a 
court may properly consider in determining the appropriate sentence to 
impose."); Duke, 2009 WY 74, ¶ 15, 209 P.3d  at 569; 
Doles v. State, 2002 WY 146, ¶ 16, 55 P.3d 29, 33 (Wyo. 2002); Tilley v. State, 912 P.2d 1140, 1142 (Wyo. 
1996).  Furthermore, the PSI 
writer's recommendation that the sentencing deviate from the terms of the plea 
agreement was not inconsistent with the recognized role of a probation and 
parole officer compiling a PSI report.

 
 
[T]he 
Wyoming Department of Probation and Parole acts on behalf of an independent 
judiciary when it compiles a PSI for the court. The Wyoming Department of 
Probation and Parole is not an agent of the prosecutor but rather serves the 
sentencing court. Because the Wyoming Department of Probation and Parole is not 
an agent of the prosecutor, it cannot be bound by a plea agreement between 
Defendant and the prosecutor. 

 
 

Duke, 
2009 
WY 74, ¶ 11, 209 P.3d  at 568.

 
 
[¶10]   Although generally a sentencing 
recommendation from a PSI author is appropriate, that recommendation must be 
presented within the bounds set forth in the above-described rules and our 
cases.  That is, the recommendation 
may not be erroneous, extreme, inflammatory, or argumentative, and should not 
contain indications of "personal animosity toward the appellant" or undue 
"sympathy for the victims."  See Hackett, 2010 WY 90, ¶ 15, 233 P.3d  at 992; 
Noller, 2010 WY 30, ¶ 25, 226 P.3d  at 873 
(Voigt, C.J., specially concurring); Carothers v. State, 2008 WY 58, ¶¶ 23-24, 185 P.3d 1, 14-15 (Wyo. 2008).  The recommendations made by the PSI 
author here, when read and considered in their entirety, simply do not lead us 
to conclude that they were inappropriate and should have been stricken.  Although the PSI author urges the 
district court to make certain sentencing decisions, those recommendations do 
not possess the traits we have condemned in the past.  Therefore, we cannot say that the 
district court abused its discretion when it denied the appellant's motion to 
strike from the PSI report the sentencing recommendations of the probation and 
parole agent.

 
 
[¶11]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1The 
record is not entirely clear as to whether the district court denied or granted 
the appellant's motion to strike portions of the PSI report.  After hearing the appellant's arguments, 
the district court stated, "I'm not considering anything that you are 
determining to be argument or bias."  
For purposes of deciding this matter, we will assume that the district 
court considered the PSI report in its entirety.

2Wyo. 
Stat. Ann § 7-13-303(a), entitled "Investigation preceding probation or 
suspension of sentence" provides, in part:

 
 
(a)    When directed by the court, . 
. . the state probation and parole officer . . . shall investigate and report to 
the court in writing:

(i)     The circumstances of 
the offense;

(ii)    The criminal record, social 
history and present conditions of the defendant;

(iii)   If practicable, the findings of a 
physical and mental examination of the defendant;

(iv)   If practicable, statements from the 
victim; and

(v)    A summary of the impact of 
the offense on the victim.

 
 

3W.R.Cr.P. 
32(a)(2) prescribes the content of a PSI, reading, in 
part:

 
 
(2)    Report. -- The report of 
the presentence investigation shall contain:

(A)   Information about the history and 
characteristics of the defendant, including prior criminal record, if any, 
financial condition, and any circumstances affecting the defendant's behavior 
that may be helpful in imposing sentence or in the correctional treatment of the 
defendant;

(B)   Verified information stated in a 
nonargumentative style containing an assessment of the financial, social, 
psychological, and medical impact upon, and cost to, any individual against whom 
the offense has been committed and attaching a victim impact statement as 
provided in W.S. 7-21-103 if the victim chooses to make one in writing.  In any event the report shall state that 
the victim was advised of the right to make such a statement orally at the 
defendant's sentencing or in writing.  
If the victim could not be contacted, the report shall describe the 
efforts made to contact the victim;

. 
. . .

(D)   Such other information as may be 
required by the court.