Case Title: Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Stuart

Citation: 2012-Ohio-5687

Docket Number: 2012-1008

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-12-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Stuart, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5687.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-5687 
LORAIN COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. STUART. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. Stuart,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5687.] 
(Case No. 2012-1008—Submitted August 22, 2012—Decided  
December 6, 2012.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 11-100. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Richard Paul Stuart, Attorney Registration No. 0047123, was 
admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1990. On December 5, 2011, relator, 
Lorain County Bar Association, filed a six-count complaint against Stuart for 
violating the Rules of Professional Conduct in connection with his representation 
of Carlonna Gerber.  The first four counts charged violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 
(a lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client), 1.3 (a lawyer shall 
act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client), 1.4(a)(3) (a 
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lawyer shall keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter), 
and 1.4(c) (a lawyer shall inform a client if the lawyer does not maintain 
professional liability insurance).  The fifth and sixth counts charged violations of 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(e) (a lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in 
connection with pending or contemplated litigation) and 1.8(h) (prohibiting 
agreements that prospectively limit the lawyer’s liability for malpractice, and 
prescribing standards for agreements that settle such a claim). 
{¶ 2} During the course of proceedings, relator and Stuart stipulated to 
facts, rule violations, aggravating and mitigating factors, and the proposed 
sanction, a public reprimand.  The parties stipulated to violations of counts one, 
four and five of the complaint which charged, respectively, violations of 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.1, 1.4(c), and 1.8(e), and the relator subsequently dismissed, 
without prejudice, the remaining three counts of the complaint.  On April 20, 
2012, the panel held a hearing at which the complainant and the respondent 
testified.  In its report, the panel recommended a finding that, as stipulated, Stuart 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 and 1.4(c).  But with respect to Prof.Cond. 1.8(h), the 
panel concluded that the facts of the present case did not establish a violation of 
that rule and recommended dismissal of that count. 
{¶ 3} With respect to aggravating factors, the panel and the board 
concluded that Stuart’s commission of multiple violations was an aggravating 
factor.  With respect to mitigating factors, the panel and the board recognized 
several mitigating factors, as stipulated by the parties:  (1) Stuart’s prompt and 
full cooperation in the disciplinary process, (2) the absence of a selfish motive, (3) 
the violations did not involve fraud or dishonesty, (4) Stuart’s acknowledgment of 
his wrongdoing and his acceptance of responsibility for his misconduct, and (5) 
the absence of a prior disciplinary record.  The panel and the board adopted the 
stipulated sanction of public reprimand. 
January Term, 2012 
 
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{¶ 4} We concur in the findings and conclusions of the board, and order 
a public reprimand be issued against Stuart. 
Misconduct 
Facts 
{¶ 5} In May 2009, Jay Workman filed a complaint in the Lorain County 
against several defendants, including his mother, the complainant, Carlonna 
Gerber.  On or about July 24, 2009, Stuart entered an appearance on Gerber’s 
behalf.  Workman subsequently settled with all defendants other than Gerber. 
{¶ 6} In February 26, 2010, Workman sought written discovery, 
including requests for admissions, from Gerber.  The requests were served on 
Stuart but Stuart did not respond to the requests for admissions.  Subsequently, on 
or about May 25, 2010, Workman moved for summary judgment on liability 
based on Stuart’s failure to respond to the requests for admissions.  Stuart did not 
oppose the motion.  On July 7, 2010, the court granted summary judgment in 
Workman’s favor on liability. 
{¶ 7} Prior to the order granting summary judgment, the parties had 
agreed to mediate the case.  That mediation was ultimately rescheduled to July 14, 
2010.  On July 12, 2010, Stuart contacted Gerber to “remind” her about the 
impending mediation but, notably, he had not previously given Gerber notice of 
the mediation.  Although he knew that the court had entered summary judgment 
in favor of Workman on liability, Stuart did not advise Gerber of that decision 
when he spoke with her.  Instead, on the morning of the mediation, July 14, 2010, 
he informed Gerber that he had not responded to Workman’s requests for 
admission and other discovery requests, and that summary judgment had been 
entered against her.  The case proceeded to mediation on the issue of damages. 
{¶ 8} After negotiations reached an impasse, Stuart requested to speak 
directly with Workman’s counsel.  After the discussion, counsel agreed to a settle 
the case for $10,000 , of which Stuart himself would pay $5,000.  A settlement 
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agreement was drafted reflecting the agreement and granting Gerber 60 days to 
make payment.  The agreement, however, was silent about Stuart’s monetary 
contribution. 
{¶ 9} When Stuart learned that Gerber was unable to pay her half of the 
settlement, he sent her a letter indicating his intent to withdraw as counsel.  He 
also demanded$4,750 in legal fees.  The following day, Stuart filed a notice of 
withdrawal with the trial court, citing Gerber’s failure to abide by the settlement 
agreement. 
{¶ 10} On October 14, 2010, Workman moved to enforce the settlement 
and for sanctions.  On or about February 25, 2011, the court held hearing on 
Workman’s motion.  Gerber attended without counsel, and the case settled Gerber 
paid Workman $5,000 the following month.  On or about June 13, 2011, Stuart 
paid $5,000 towards the settlement by delivering a U.S. Bank cashier’s check to 
Workman. 
Violations 
{¶ 11} The parties stipulated that Stuart violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 (a 
lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client) and Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(e) 
(a lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with 
pending or contemplated litigation).  Additionally, the parties stipulated that 
Stuart allowed his professional liability insurance to lapse between May 2, 2007 
and January 3, 2011, and that he failed to advise his client that he did not maintain 
malpractice insurance.  Based on those facts, the parties stipulated that Stuart 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(c) (a lawyer shall inform a client if the lawyer does not 
maintain professional liability insurance). 
{¶ 12} The panel and the board reviewed the evidence and found that 
Stuart had violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 and 1.4(c), as stipulated.  But the panel and 
the board concurred in dismissing the count alleging violation of Prof.Cond. 
1.8(e) (a lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection 
January Term, 2012 
 
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with pending or contemplated litigation).  In regard to that count, both the official 
comments and the case law recognize that the rule is designed to prohibit 
financial assistance in the context of promoting lawsuits that might not be pursued 
apart from the attorney’s financial interest.  As the panel stated, “the prohibition is 
aimed at preventing a conflict of interest between the attorney and a client whose 
best interests might not be served in pursuing litigation.”   See Toledo Bar Assn. v. 
Pheils, 129 Ohio St.3d 279, 2011-Ohio-2906, 951 N.E.2d 758; Cleveland Metro. 
Bar Assn. v. Podor, 121 Ohio St.3d 131, 2009-Ohio-358, 902 N.E.2d 488.  
Because Stuart’s representation of Gerber did not pose the type of conflict of 
interest that the rule was designed to prevent, the panel and the board recommend 
dismissal of the count charging him with that violation. 
{¶ 13} We concur with the findings and conclusions of the board, and 
agree that Stuart violated Prof.Cond. 1.1 and 1.4(c).  We further agree that the 
count relating to Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(e) was properly dismissed. 
Aggravation and Mitigation 
Aggravating factors 
{¶ 14} The parties stipulated that there were no aggravating factors, but 
the board recognized that two violations constitutes multiple violations under 
these circumstances. We agree that there is one aggravating factor pursuant to 
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(d). 
Mitigating factors 
{¶ 15} The parties stipulated, and the board found, the following 
mitigating factors:  (1) Stuart has no prior discipline, see BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(a); (2) Stuart promptly and fully cooperated in the disciplinary process,  
accepted responsibility for his misconduct, and acknowledged his violations of 
the Code of Professional Conduct, see BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(d); and (3) 
Stuart did not act with a selfish or self-serving motive, nor did his violations of 
the Code of Professional Conduct involved fraud or dishonesty, see BCGD 
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Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(b).  Additionally, Stuart presented five letters attesting to his 
character and diligence in the usual course of his legal practice.  We concur with 
the board’s evaluation of the mitigating factors. 
Disposition 
{¶ 16} The board adopted the stipulated sanction of public reprimand, 
finding that sanction was consistent with our precedent.  Indeed, several prior 
cases similarly involve isolated instances of neglect or incompetence, sometimes 
with the failure to notify the client of a lack of professional liability insurance.  
Those cases culminated in a public reprimand.  See Lorain Cty. Bar Assn. v. 
Godles, 128 Ohio St.3d 279, 2010-Ohio-6274, 943 N.E.2d 988; Cuyahoga Cty. 
Bar Assn. v. Johnson, 123 Ohio St.3d 65, 2009-Ohio-4178, 914 N.E.2d 180; 
Akron Bar Assn. v. Maher, 110 Ohio St.3d 346, 2006-Ohio-4575, 853 N.E.2d 
660; Medina Cty. Bar Assn. v. Kerek, 102 Ohio St.3d 228, 2004-Ohio-2286, 809 
N.E.2d 1.  We concur with the board and adopt the sanction of public reprimand.  
We believe that sanction is sufficient to protect the public. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 17} We adopt the findings and conclusions of the board, and we hold 
that Stuart violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 and 1.4(c).  We also concur in the 
recommended sanction of public reprimand.  We therefore order that a public 
reprimand issue against Stuart.  We further order that costs be taxed to 
respondent. 
 
 
 
 
    Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
____________________________ 
 
Giardini, Cook & Nicol, L.L.C., Daniel C. Cook; Dennis Will, Lorain 
County Prosecuting Attorney, and David P. Muhek, Assistant Prosecuting 
Attorney, for relator. 
January Term, 2012 
 
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Daniel G. Wightman, for respondent. 
____________________________