Case Title: Amazon Logistics, Inc. v. LIRC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2022AP000013

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2024-03-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
2024 WI 15 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2022AP13 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Amazon Logistics, Inc., 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Labor and Industry Review Commission, 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
Department of Workforce Development UI  
Div. Bureau of Legal Affairs, 
          Defendant-Co-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 407 Wis. 2d 807, 992 N.W.2d 168 
 (2023 – published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 26, 2024   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 19, 2023   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha  
 
JUDGE: 
Michael O. Bohren   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
PER CURIAM. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Erik K. Eisenmann, Emily Logan Stedman, and Husch 
Blackwell LLP, Milwaukee; Michael E. Kenneally (pro hac vice), 
Stephanie Schuster (pro hac vice), Brendan J. Anderson (pro hac 
vice), and Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Washington, DC; 
Christopher Ramsey (pro hac vice), and Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 
LLP, Pittsburgh, PA. There was an oral argument by Michael E. 
Kenneally 
 
 
 
2 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Jennifer P. Carter, and Wisconsin Labor and Industry Review 
Commission, Madison. There was an oral argument by Jennifer P. 
Carter.  
 
For the defendant-co-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Christin L. Galinat, Ryan X. Farrell, and Department of 
Workforce Development, Madison. There was an oral argument by 
Ryan X. Farrell.  
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Nathan J. Kane, Scott 
E. Rosenow, and WMC Litigation Center, Madison, on behalf of 
Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce, Inc. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Brenda Lewison, and 
Legal Action of Wisconsin Inc., Milwaukee, on behalf of Legal 
Action of Wisconsin, Inc. 
 
 
2024 WI 15 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2022AP13 
(L.C. No. 
2020CV579) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Amazon Logistics, Inc., 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Labor and Industry Review Commission, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant, 
 
Department of Workforce Development UI  
 
Div. Bureau of Legal Affairs, 
 
          Defendant-Co-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
MAR 26, 2024 
 
Samuel A. Christensen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Dismissed as 
improvidently granted.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   Amazon Logistics petitioned for review 
of the decision of the court of appeals, Amazon Logistics, Inc. 
v. LIRC, 2023 WI App 26, 407 Wis. 2d 807, 992 N.W.2d 168, 
affirming LIRC's decision that Amazon Logistics' Flex delivery 
drivers do not qualify as independent contractors under Wis. 
Stat. § 108.02(12).  After reviewing the record and briefs from 
all of the parties, and after hearing oral arguments on December 
No. 
2022AP13   
 
2 
 
19, 2023, we conclude that this matter should be dismissed as 
improvidently granted. 
By the Court.—The review of the decision of the court of 
appeals is dismissed as improvidently granted. 
¶2 
BRIAN HAGEDORN, J., did not participate.    
 
 
No.  2022AP13.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶3 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  As I have done 
in the past, I write separately because I believe that this 
court should explain to the litigants and the public the reason 
for its dismissal.  It is the least we can do when the litigants 
have expended substantial effort and resources arguing the case 
before us. 
¶4 
We granted review in order to address what we then 
thought was an issue that would result in the development of the 
law.  And now, without explanation, the court disposes of the 
case in a two-sentence per curiam decision, dismissing the case 
as improvidently granted.  Such a dearth of explanation has been 
the court's pattern for the past seven years.  But this was not 
always so.  A wider examination of such dismissals reveals a 
largely inconsistent practice with regard to whether this court 
provides any explanation for its decision when it dismisses a 
case as improvidently granted.1  
                                                 
1 For examples of dismissals without explanation, see State 
v. Jackson, 2023 WI 37, 407 Wis. 2d 73, 989 N.W.2d 555; Slamka 
v. Gen. Heating and Air Conditioning Inc., 2022 WI 68, 404 
Wis. 2d 586, 980 N.W.2d 957; Cobb v. King, 2022 WI 59, 403 
Wis. 2d 198, 976 N.W.2d 410; Fond du Lac County v. S.N.W., 2021 
WI 41, 396 Wis. 2d 773, 958 N.W.2d 530; State v. Kloss, 2020 WI 
26, 390 Wis. 2d 685, 939 N.W.2d 564; Waukesha County v. J.J.H., 
2020 WI 22, 390 Wis. 2d 531, 939 N.W.2d 49; Halbman v. Barrock, 
2017 WI 91, 378 Wis. 2d 17, 902 N.W.2d 248.   
No.  2022AP13.awb 
 
2 
 
¶5 
The result of the court's inconsistent practice is a 
lack of guidance for potential litigants and the public, as well 
as an effective negation of the numerous hours of work and sums 
of money spent seeking a decision on the merits.  Because there 
is a strong public policy rationale behind providing reasons for 
a dismissal as improvidently granted, the court's general 
practice should be to provide an explanation for such a 
dismissal, and as such it should have provided an explanation in 
this case. 
¶6 
After reviewing the court of appeals opinion, together 
with the record and the briefs, and after hearing oral 
arguments, I agree with the per curiam that this review should 
be deemed improvidently granted because the issues for which we 
took this fact-dependent case will not lead to any further 
development of the law.  See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r).  
Thus, further review by this court and publication of an opinion 
would not serve any meaningful purpose. 
¶7 
Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
¶8 
I am authorized to state that Justices REBECCA FRANK 
DALLET and JANET C. PROTASIEWICZ join this concurrence. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
In contrast, for examples of explanations provided by the 
court for a dismissal as improvidently granted, see Smith v. 
Anderson, 2017 WI 43, 374 Wis. 2d 715, 893 N.W.2d 790; Michael 
J. Waldvogel Trucking, LLC v. LIRC, 2012 WI 28, 339 Wis. 2d 248, 
810 
N.W.2d 811; 
Nedvidek 
v. 
Kuipers, 
2009 
WI 
44, 
317 
Wis. 2d 340, 766 N.W.2d 205; State v. Welda, 2009 WI 35, 317 
Wis. 2d 87, 765 N.W.2d 555; State v. Gajewski, 2009 WI 22, 316 
Wis. 2d 1, 762 N.W.2d 104; State v. Townsend, 2007 WI 31, 299 
Wis. 2d 672, 728 N.W.2d 342. 
No.  22AP13.rgb 
 
1 
 
 
¶9 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  When this 
court decides to dismiss a case as improvidently granted, 
customarily it does not offer an explanation for the dismissal.  
Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's concurrence renews her arguments 
made in her dissent in State v. Jackson, 2023 WI 37, 407 Wis. 2d 
72, 989 N.W.2d 555, urging the court to change this practice and 
provide the reasons for dismissal.  She again argues there is a 
"strong public policy rationale" to do so.  Justice Ann Walsh 
Bradley's Concurrence, ¶5.  Just as in Jackson, her concurrence 
does not grapple with the countervailing reasons to withhold an 
explanation and exemplifies why changing this practice would 
result in more confusion for litigants.  
¶10 In 
her 
concurrence, 
Justice 
Ann 
Walsh 
Bradley 
reiterates her claim that this court's practice of dismissing 
cases as improvidently granted is inconsistent "with regard to 
whether this court provides any explanation for its decision[.]"  
Id., ¶4.  This claim was rebutted in Jackson, 407 Wis. 2d 73, 
¶¶4-5 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., concurring), and Justice Ann 
Walsh Bradley has provided no new information to establish an 
inconsistency in this court's practice.1  As I have previously 
documented, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley "may lament the no-
explanation 
trend, 
but 
calling 
the 
court's 
practice 
'inconsistent' flies in the face of the facts."  Id., ¶5.   
                                                 
1 In this concurrence, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley lists a 
nearly identical collection of cases as referenced in her 
Jackson dissent. State v. Jackson, 2023 WI 37, ¶15 n.2, 407 
Wis. 2d 73, 989 N.W.2d 555 (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., dissenting). 
No.  22AP13.rgb 
 
2 
 
¶11 This court's custom of issuing per curiam decisions 
dismissing cases as improvidently granted is standard practice.  
"When courts of last resort dismiss a petition, they customarily 
do not explain why, although courts have at times exercised 
their discretion to make exceptions to this practice on a case 
by case basis."  Id., ¶6 (citing 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review 
§ 347 (updated Feb.  2023)).  The United States Supreme Court 
will 
dismiss 
a 
case 
as 
improvidently 
granted 
without 
explanation, typically in a one-sentence order.2  Justice Ann 
Walsh Bradley "does not suggest this case warrants an exception 
to our [customary] practice; [she] argues explanations should 
accompany all dismissals."  Id.  She therefore "bears the burden 
of examining why the practice exists and then explaining why it 
should be rejected[.]"  Id., ¶7 (quoting G.K.  Chesterton, The 
Thing: Why I  am  Catholic 27 (Dodd,  Mead and  Co.  1930)).  
Just as in Jackson, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley fails to do so.       
¶12 Justice Ann Walsh Bradley suggests a per curiam 
opinion dismissing a case without an accompanying explanation is 
a "negation of the numerous hours of work and sums of money 
spent seeking a decision on the merits."  Justice Ann Walsh 
Bradley's Concurrence, ¶5.  The conclusory explanation Justice 
                                                 
2 E.g., Arizona v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 596 U.S. 
763 (2022) (per curiam); Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White 
Sales, Inc., 592 U.S. 168 (2021) (per curiam); Dalmazzi v. 
United States, 585 U.S. 527 (2018) (per curiam); Duncan v. 
Owens, 577 U.S. 189 (2016) (per curiam); Unite Here Local 355 v. 
Mulhall, 571 U.S. 83 (2013) (per curiam); Vasquez v. United 
States, 566 U.S. 376 (2012) (per curiam); Sullivan v. Florida, 
560 U.S. 181 (2010) (per curiam); Bell v. Kelly, 555 U.S. 55 
(2008) (per curiam); Maryland v. Blake, 546 U.S. 72 (2005) (per 
curiam). 
No.  22AP13.rgb 
 
3 
 
Ann Walsh Bradley offers does not, however, restore the hours 
worked or money spent on this case by the parties.  Providing an 
illusory explanation might make some justices feel better about 
dismissing 
cases 
as 
improvidently 
granted, 
but 
such 
an 
explanation does not help litigants or vindicate their efforts.  
A shallow explanation of the court's reason for dismissing a 
case as improvidently granted amounts to nothing more than a 
hollow victory for one party and provides nothing for future 
litigants.   
¶13 Justice Ann Walsh Bradley asserts "this fact-dependent 
case will not lead to any further development of the law."  
Justice Ann Walsh Bradley's Concurrence, ¶6.  But her attempt to 
provide clarity to the parties will only sow additional 
confusion.  "Without some explanation as to why the court's 
review of the case would not develop any law, the conclusory 
order recommended by [Justice Ann Walsh Bradley] would not 
promote transparency."  Jackson, 407 Wis. 2d 73, ¶11 (Rebecca 
Grassl Bradley, J., concurring).  Parties may be left scratching 
their heads, believing their case would lead to law development.  
Justice Ann Walsh Bradley "does not recognize that merely 
declaring a petition lacks law-developing potential is itself a 
holding with law-developing potential.  Even if not binding, it 
hints this court would not distinguish or overrule an existing 
precedent."  Id., ¶10 (citations omitted).  Instead of injecting 
needless confusion into the process, this court should stay the 
traditional course.  
No.  22AP13.rgb 
 
4 
 
¶14 There are several reasons courts of last resort 
typically do not supply a reason for dismissing a case.  For one 
thing, this tradition preserves limited judicial resources.  
"For example, if this court determines the lower court reached 
the correct outcome, further review can be a waste of time."  
Id., ¶8 (citation omitted).  Additionally, providing litigants 
an explanation for dismissal "presupposes a majority of this 
court in a particular case would agree on why a petition should 
be dismissed.  Often, no such majority exists."  Id., ¶9.  If a 
justice disagrees with the reasoning for dismissal, the justice 
may write separately, possibly leading other justices to write 
separately in response.  On the other hand, "[a] broadly-worded 
order without a specific reason for dismissal facilitates 
joinder," avoiding any waste of judicial resources.  Id.  The 
traditional route also avoids "undermining the very decision not 
to decide" a case:  "If this court declines to decide an issue, 
explaining the avoidance could inadvertently create persuasive 
authority on the issue . . . ."  Id., ¶8.   
¶15 When this court issues a per curiam opinion dismissing 
a case as improvidently granted, the opinion should be short and 
formulaic without unnecessary explanations that could mislead 
litigants.  This directive mirrors the practice of the United 
States Supreme Court and maintains the status quo of this 
court's recent practice.  Justice Ann Walsh Bradley offers no 
convincing reason to depart from this court's custom. 
¶16 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER joins this concurrence.  
No.  22AP13.rgb 
 
 
 
1