Case Title: Commonwealth v. Rodriguez-Nieves

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12307

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-04-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12307 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JORGE RODRIGUEZ-NIEVES. 
 
 
 
Hampden.     December 7, 2020. - April 9, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, 
& Wendlandt, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Disclosure of evidence, Exculpatory.  
Practice, Criminal, Disclosure of evidence, New trial, 
Comment by prosecutor, Instructions to jury, Assistance of 
counsel, Capital case. 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on September 2, 2014. 
 
The case was tried before John S. Ferrara, J., and a motion 
for a new trial, filed on March 18, 2019, was considered by him. 
 
 
Merritt Schnipper for the defendant. 
John A. Wendel, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
WENDLANDT, J.  The defendant, Jorge Rodriguez-Nieves, was 
convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty in the stabbing death of Angel Morales.  
Prior to the defendant's trial, the prosecutor failed to 
2 
 
disclose material, exculpatory evidence in his possession, in 
violation of the principles set forth in Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  See Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (A) (vii), 
as amended, 444 Mass. 1501 (2005).  The defendant first learned 
of the evidence -- visceral testimony by the stepdaughter of the 
victim describing the victim's dying words -- when she took the 
stand as the Commonwealth's last witness.  In this consolidated 
appeal from his conviction and from the denial of his motion for 
a new trial, the defendant contends that a new trial is 
necessary due to the prosecutor's failure to disclose the 
stepdaughter's statements and on the basis of newly discovered 
evidence from a forensic pathologist who opined that the victim 
would have been unable to speak after having been stabbed in the 
neck, which would have shown the stepdaughter's statement that 
he did to be medically impossible.  The defendant has shown that 
the prosecutor's failure to disclose the stepdaughter's 
testimony prejudiced his ability to prepare and present his 
defense effectively, and that the pathologist's opinion probably 
would have been a real factor in the jury's deliberations.  
Accordingly, we set aside the verdict, vacate the conviction, 
and remand the matter to the Superior Court for a new trial.  We 
emphasize that "the duties of a prosecutor to administer justice 
fairly, and particularly concerning requested or obviously 
3 
 
exculpatory evidence, go beyond winning convictions."1  
Commonwealth v. Tucceri, 412 Mass. 401, 408 (1992).  "The 
Constitution requires both that a criminal defendant be given a 
fair and impartial trial and that the government's conduct of 
the trial be free from all that is deliberately devious or 
inconsistent with the highest standards of professional 
conduct."  Commonwealth v. Vaughn, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 435, 435 
(1992).  "We ought not have to remind the Commonwealth once 
again 'to do the right thing.'"  Id. at 440.  Here, the 
prosecutor's efforts fell far short of that constitutional 
imperative. 
 
Insofar as they may arise in connection with any retrial, 
we also address the defendant's other claims of error, including 
the prosecutor's use of familial language to describe the 
relationships among the victim, the defendant, and some of the 
witnesses; the denial of his request for an instruction on 
manslaughter; and the ineffective assistance of trial counsel 
for not having introduced evidence concerning the defendant's 
traumatic childhood and his life experiences. 
 
 
1 See Bridgeman v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 
476 Mass. 298, 315 (2017), quoting Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.8 (d), as 
appearing in 473 Mass. 1301 (2016) ("The prosecutor in a 
criminal case shall . . . make timely disclosure to the defense 
of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that 
tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the 
offense . . ."). 
4 
 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  We recite the evidence at 
trial in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving 
some details for later discussion. 
 
At around 11 A.M. on July 13, 2014, the victim was outside 
his Holyoke apartment building with family, preparing to attend 
a parade.  Among the group gathering for the parade were his 
wife;2 Geneciz Diaz, one of his stepdaughters; a second 
stepdaughter; and Diaz's two children.  The defendant, who lived 
in the same building, also was outside, not far from the victim 
and his family. 
 
The defendant was angry and yelled to the victim, whom he 
believed had spread a rumor that the defendant was spending time 
with a woman other than Maria Pimental, his long-time 
girlfriend.3  The defendant, who appeared "furious," shoved the 
victim and suggested that they "go to the back of the building 
so we can see what happens."  The victim said that he did not 
want any trouble; he was with his family and did not want to 
 
 
2 While not legally married, the victim referred to his 
long-time girlfriend as his "wife," as did other friends and 
family members, and she referred to the victim as her "husband."  
We refer to this and the attendant relationships in the same 
familial terms that the witnesses used. 
 
3 The defendant and Maria Pimental had had a long-standing 
relationship of at least six years, lived together, and also 
were commonly referred to as "husband" and "wife."  At trial, 
however, Pimental described the defendant as her "boyfriend." 
5 
 
fight.  The victim and the defendant parted company, each 
returning to his respective apartment. 
 
Minutes later, both were back outside.  Still angry, the 
defendant was shouting and cursing.  The defendant warned that 
he would "take [the victim's] heart out of his chest" and 
threatened the victim, "Son of a bitch, I'm going to kill you."  
The victim elicited assistance from his brother-in-law, a long-
time friend of the defendant.  The brother-in-law tried to calm 
the defendant, but the defendant rushed past the brother-in-law 
and towards the victim, while pulling a knife from his pants.  
The victim fled to a parking lot, where he tripped and fell.  
The defendant caught the victim, held him down, and stabbed him 
once in the neck.  The victim stood momentarily, held his neck, 
which was spurting blood, and then fell.  There was "massive 
bleeding." 
 
Although none of the other witnesses to the events 
surrounding the stabbing testified that the victim spoke after 
he had been stabbed,4 Diaz testified that the victim "looked at 
me and he said:  Take care of the children.  He was saying my 
daughter . . . was his princess. . . .  He told me to take care 
of the girls and he fell."  Diaz, again the only person to do so 
 
 
4 Diaz and the victim's third stepdaughter saw the stabbing, 
and his wife, the second stepdaughter, and his brother-in-law 
witnessed the immediate aftermath. 
6 
 
among the percipient witnesses (all of whom were the victim's 
family), said that the defendant "stood up and . . . walked over 
to [a nearby] stop sign to laugh."  When paramedics reached the 
scene shortly after 11:15 A.M., they found the victim face down 
in a pool of blood and unresponsive.  The victim was transported 
to an emergency room, where doctors detected no signs of life, 
and he was declared dead. 
 
Later that day, the defendant explained to Pimental that he 
had argued with the victim and had "cut" his neck.  The 
defendant asked Pimental to "get a ticket so that [they] could 
go to Puerto Rico."5  The defendant was arrested that evening.  
His pants were stained with blood, and a search of his apartment 
revealed a chef's knife in a drawer in the kitchen that later 
tested positive for blood.  Blood samples from the pants and the 
knife were consistent with the victim's deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA). 
 
The medical examiner who conducted the autopsy testified 
that the stab wound was about five inches deep and would have 
required "a significant amount of force" to inflict.  The wound 
 
 
5 By the time of trial, the defendant's appearance had 
changed; whereas previously he had kept his beard and head 
shaved, he had allowed both to grow.  The defendant also was 
"thinner" at the time of the stabbing than he was at trial.  
Pimental testified that the defendant told her that he hoped his 
changed appearance "would confuse . . . [t]he witnesses." 
7 
 
penetrated muscle, transected the left internal jugular vein and 
the right carotid artery, and partially transected the trachea.  
He explained, "[G]iven that two large vessels were transected, 
there would have been a combination of spurting potentially from 
the arterial bleed and profuse bleeding from . . . the jugular 
vein."  The medical examiner opined that the victim would have 
been "choking on his own blood" and likely had been conscious 
and experiencing pain for "minutes" before he lost consciousness 
and died.  The medical examiner was not asked, and did not 
testify, whether, given the nature of the wound, the victim 
could have spoken. 
 
b.  Procedural history.  The defendant was indicted on a 
charge of murder in the first degree.  At trial, the 
Commonwealth proceeded on theories of deliberate premeditation 
and extreme atrocity or cruelty.  The judge instructed the jury 
on both theories, over trial counsel's objection to the latter.6  
The jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree 
on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
 
c.  Postconviction investigation.  Diaz's testimony 
regarding the victim's dying words and the defendant laughing 
had not been part of her statements to police on the day of the 
 
 
6 The judge also instructed on murder in the second degree.  
He declined the defendant's request to give an instruction on 
voluntary manslaughter. 
8 
 
stabbing, which were memorialized in a police report and 
disclosed to the defendant.  When asked on cross-examination 
about these differences, Diaz stated that she had given the 
information to the prosecutor "last week." 
After his conviction, the defendant retained a forensic 
pathologist to consider the question whether the victim could 
have spoken after he had been stabbed.  The pathologist opined 
that "it is highly unlikely [the victim] would have been able to 
speak clearly [following the stabbing], or even have vocalized 
understandable words at all, with the wound he sustained."  
Given the victim's injuries, she asserted, the "speech-
suppressing inflow of blood . . . would have occurred almost 
instantaneously . . . and prohibited intelligible speech." 
 
The defendant also obtained the prosecutor's notes, which 
showed that, at least two days prior to calling Diaz to take the 
stand, the prosecutor became aware of her changed statements and 
understood their relevance to the theory of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty.  The prosecutor's notes of his conversation with Diaz7 
 
 
7 The prosecutor's hand-written notes stated, "Oly [(the 
defendant's nickname)] -- STOP SIGN -- LAUGHS"; "DAVID [(the 
victim)] -- STANDS -- Holds NECK 'TAKE CARE KIDS'"; "D [(the 
victim)] stands up -- looks @ G [(Diaz)] --> says holds own neck 
-- take care of baby -- falls again"; "O [(the defendant)] 
@ stop sign -- looks + laughs @ us"; and "sees Δ [(the 
defendant)] look back + laugh!"  An additional note, dated 
"4/30/16," includes the word "Cunneen" and sets forth the 
evidentiary requirements for the introduction of a dying 
 
9 
 
recorded her changed statements; on one page, the word "Cunneen" 
is scribed, an apparent reference to the factors to be 
considered in deciding whether a killing was committed with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty as set forth in Commonwealth v. 
Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 227 (1983). 
 
d.  Motion for a new trial.  Following his postconviction 
investigation, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial.  
The defendant argued that, while the words attributed to the 
victim by Diaz likely would have been a real factor in the 
jury's deliberations, newly discovered evidence (the forensic 
expert's opinion) showed that the victim could not have spoken 
after he was stabbed.  The defendant argued further that the 
Commonwealth's failure to disclose Diaz's changed statements 
prejudiced him in investigating and rebutting the theory of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty; the Commonwealth knew or should 
have known that Diaz's statement concerning the victim's dying 
words was false; and a new trial or a reduction in the verdict 
should be ordered pursuant to this court's authority under G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E. 
 
The motion judge, who was also the trial judge, found that 
"there [was] evidence of bad faith, prejudice, and an impact on 
 
declaration.  Diaz testified late in the afternoon, two days 
later, as the Commonwealth's final witness. 
10 
 
trial strategy" in the prosecutor's failure to disclose Diaz's 
changed statements, and noted that, had he known at trial of the 
prosecutor's conduct, he might have sanctioned the Commonwealth 
"perhaps by excluding [Diaz's] testimony regarding [the victim] 
having spoken to her."  The judge credited trial counsel's 
affidavit in which he averred that, had the evidence been 
disclosed in a timely fashion, counsel would have called a 
forensic pathologist, who, as set forth in the expert's 
affidavit that accompanied the defendant's motion, would have 
opined that the victim would have been unable to speak after 
having been stabbed in the neck.  Concluding that the expert's 
opinion would have served merely as impeachment evidence, and 
that the defendant had been able to impeach Diaz effectively 
with her prior inconsistent statements, as well as with the 
differences between her testimony and that of the other 
percipient witnesses, the judge denied the motion. 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  A new trial may 
be granted where it appears that justice may not have been done.  
See Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 
(2001).  We review the denial of a motion for a new trial "to 
determine whether there has been a significant error of law or 
other abuse of discretion, . . . and whether any such error 
create[d] a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice."  
Commonwealth v. Vargas, 475 Mass. 338, 355 (2016).  Where, as 
11 
 
here, the motion judge was also the trial judge, we give special 
deference to the judge's decision.  See Tucceri, 412 Mass. at 
412.  "If the new trial claim is constitutionally based, this 
court will exercise its own judgment on the ultimate . . . legal 
conclusions."  Id. at 409. 
 
In determining whether the prosecutor's failure to disclose 
Diaz's changed statements requires a new trial, we consider 
(i) whether the prosecutor violated the constitutional duty to 
disclose material, exculpatory evidence in the Commonwealth's 
possession, custody, or control, and (ii) if so, whether the 
defendant has shown that he was prejudiced in his ability "to 
make effective use of the evidence in preparing and presenting 
his case" when he first learned of the evidence in the heat of 
trial.  Commonwealth v. Adrey, 376 Mass. 747, 755 (1978).  See 
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 381 Mass. 90, 107 (1980), quoting United 
States v. Pollack, 534 F.2d 964, 973 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 924 (1976) (prosecution must disclose material, 
exculpatory evidence in its possession "at such a time as to 
allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in 
the preparation and presentation of its case"). 
 
Newly discovered evidence "warrants a new trial if that 
evidence 'casts real doubt on the justice of the conviction,' in 
the sense that the evidence 'would probably have been a real 
factor in the jury's deliberations.'"  Commonwealth v. Brescia, 
12 
 
471 Mass. 381, 389 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Cowels, 470 
Mass. 607, 616–617 (2015).  See Tucceri, 412 Mass. at 408 
("There is no reason why the nondisclosure issue could not be 
advanced by a motion for a new trial to which the regular 
principles of Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 [b] . . . apply"). 
 
b.  Duty to disclose.  The Commonwealth has a 
constitutional duty, grounded in the defendant's right to due 
process, to disclose in a timely manner material, exculpatory 
evidence over which it has possession, custody, or control.  See 
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 ("suppression by the prosecution of 
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due 
process when the evidence is material"); Commonwealth v. 
Sullivan, 478 Mass. 369, 380 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Ellison, 376 Mass. 1, 22 (1978) ("The Brady obligation 
comprehends evidence which provides some significant aid to the 
defendant's case . . .").  We need not dwell long on the 
question whether there was a Brady violation here.  It is 
indisputable that there was. 
 
The prosecutor had in his possession Diaz's changed 
statements at least as early as two days before she testified, 
yet he failed to disclose them.  Diaz's statements, while in and 
of themselves inculpatory, also were exculpatory because they 
were not reflected in her report of the events to police on the 
day of the stabbing.  The difference in the two statements 
13 
 
provided a basis upon which to impeach Diaz, who was the 
Commonwealth's key witness on the issue of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty.  See Commonwealth v. Murray, 461 Mass. 10, 20 (2011) 
(evidence may be exculpatory where it can be used to impeach 
witness); Ellison, 376 Mass. at 22 (evidence that "challenges 
the credibility of a key prosecution witness" is exculpatory).  
The statements were material8 because Diaz was the only witness 
to testify that the victim spoke and that the defendant laughed 
after the victim had been stabbed, each of which comprised 
strong evidence in support of the theory of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty.9  See Cunneen, 389 Mass. at 227 ("indifference to or 
 
 
8 Because there was a specific request for witness 
statements, see note 12, infra, the defendant need only show 
that there is a substantial basis for claiming the undisclosed 
evidence was material, see Commonwealth v. Gallarelli, 399 Mass. 
17, 22 (1987). 
 
9 The trial judge explicitly recognized the significance of 
Diaz's testimony.  When the defendant objected to its 
introduction, the judge observed that "there's no question [the 
testimony was] prejudicial on the idea of extreme atrocity or 
cruelty," but determined that it was "very probative."  Later, 
when the defendant objected to instructing the jury on the 
theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, the judge explained that 
Diaz's testimony regarding the victim's dying words and the 
defendant's laughter was sufficient to warrant the instruction.  
Furthermore, the prosecutor emphasized Diaz's testimony in his 
closing argument.  He remarked that "[t]he fact that [the 
defendant] turns and laughs just speaks for itself," and 
repeatedly focused the jury's attention on the victim's 
statements in his final moments. 
 
To be sure, other evidence, particularly the medical 
examiner's testimony, could have supported the theory of extreme 
 
14 
 
taking pleasure in the victim's suffering" and "consciousness 
and degree of suffering of the victim" are among factors 
relevant to determination whether killing was accomplished with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty).10 
 
c.  Prejudice to defendant.  We turn to consider whether 
the prosecutor's failure to meet his disclosure obligations with 
respect to Diaz's statements prejudiced the defendant.11  
"Whether and the extent to which the defendant was disadvantaged 
in defending himself are the pivotal issues when considering the 
prejudicial quality of exculpatory, material evidence" not 
 
atrocity or cruelty.  See Commonwealth v. Anderson, 445 Mass. 
195, 200-202 (2005) (single gunshot wound to face during robbery 
was sufficient for finding of extreme atrocity or cruelty where 
evidence presented supported Cunneen factors on extent of 
injuries, manner and degree of force, and defendant's 
indifference).  This evidence, however, was far from 
overwhelming.  Compare Commonwealth v. Rivera, 482 Mass. 259, 
273 (2019) (defendant stabbed victim thirteen times in head and 
chest with butcher's knife); Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 460 Mass. 
409, 417-418 (2011) (defendant dealt at least five blows to 
victim's head, striking her with hammer, ten-pound weights, log, 
and hedge trimmers, dragged her, and stomped on her). 
 
10 The reformulation of the Cunneen factors in Commonwealth 
v. Castillo, 485 Mass. 852, 865-866 (2020), is not applicable to 
the defendant's trial in 2016. 
 
 
11 The Commonwealth contends that to warrant a new trial, 
the defendant must show that, given a timely disclosure, he 
could have altered his trial tactics so as to create a 
reasonable doubt that otherwise would not have existed.  We have 
applied that standard "[w]here the defense has not made a 
specific request for the evidence whose disclosure is delayed." 
Wilson, 381 Mass. at 114.  That situation is not present here.  
See note 12, infra. 
15 
 
timely disclosed.  Commonwealth v. Lam Hue To, 391 Mass. 301, 
309 (1984).  "In measuring prejudice, 'it is the consequences of 
the delay that matter, not the likely impact of the nondisclosed 
evidence, and we ask whether the prosecution's disclosure was 
sufficiently timely to allow the defendant 'to make effective 
use of the evidence in preparing and presenting his case.'"  
Commonwealth v. Almeida, 452 Mass. 601, 609-610 (2008), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Stote, 433 Mass. 19, 23 (2000).12 
 
 
12 The provisions of Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (A) (vii) 
are deemed a specific request for all "statements of persons the 
party intends to call as witnesses."  "Because rule 14 was 
intended to facilitate the automatic production of mandatory 
discovery 'without the need for motions or argument,' . . . and 
because the Commonwealth's obligation to produce is 
ongoing, . . . the defendant need not request any mandatory 
discovery items."  Commonwealth v. Taylor, 469 Mass. 516, 521 
(2014), quoting Reporter's Notes (Revised, 2004) to Rule 14, 
Massachusetts Rules of Court, Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
at 179 (Thomson Reuters 2014).  This automatic discovery 
obligation put the prosecution on notice of the defendant's 
specific interest in evidence falling within the discovery 
topics enumerated in rule 14 (a) (1) (A) (i), (ii), and (iv)-
(ix), see Committee for Pub. Counsel Servs. v. Attorney Gen., 
480 Mass. 700, 731-732 & n.15 (2018) ("Rule 14 [a] . . . 
incorporates the constitutional disclosure requirements of 
Brady"), and served as a court order for the specific discovery 
mandated by the rule, see Commonwealth v. Frith, 458 Mass. 434, 
439 (2010), citing Mass. R. Crim. P. 14 (a) (1) (C).  In light 
of this automatic discovery obligation alone, the Commonwealth's 
present claim that the prosecutor was not on notice that the 
defendant sought witness statements is unsupportable.  Moreover, 
on the first day of trial, the defendant filed a motion in 
limine to preclude the Commonwealth from introducing any 
undisclosed witness statements.  At a hearing on the motion, the 
judge stated, "[I]f [the prosecution is] interviewing 
witness[es] in preparation for trial close in time to the trial 
and they've learned something new as a result, their obligation 
 
16 
 
 
The defendant has made the requisite showing of prejudice 
by detailing the manner in which, had he been informed timely of 
Diaz's statements, he would have altered his defense tactics to 
undermine the veracity of Diaz's statements.  In particular, the 
defendant showed that, had trial counsel timely been made aware 
of Diaz's changed statements, he would have retained an expert 
to determine whether the victim could have spoken after having 
been stabbed.  If the expert determined that it would not have 
been possible, counsel would have called the expert as part of 
the defense case, and also would have cross-examined the 
Commonwealth's expert on the issue.  See, e.g., Vaughn, 32 Mass. 
App. Ct. at 441-443 (new trial was warranted where defendant 
showed that, had witness's changed testimony been disclosed 
timely, he would have altered his trial tactics and would have 
called expert to challenge witness's statements).  Compare 
Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 377 Mass. 887, 895 (1979) (no prejudice 
in preparation where cross-examination of witness whose changed 
testimony was not disclosed "was not only extended but 
searching," and would not "have been materially improved by 
earlier warning about the witness's departure from the written 
statement"). 
 
is to provide [the defendant] . . . with notice of the changed 
statement."  The prosecutor certified his compliance with the 
discovery obligations of Mass. R. Crim. P. 14. 
17 
 
 
In support of his motion, the defendant attached the 
forensic pathologist's affidavit in which she opined that, given 
the nature of the victim's wounds, the victim almost certainly 
could not have spoken after having been stabbed.  The defendant 
would not have had reason to seek out expert opinion before 
trial, nor introduce expert testimony at trial, because he had 
not been provided Diaz's statements that would have motivated 
such an expert.13  Accordingly, the expert's opinion properly was 
considered newly discovered evidence.  See Vaughn, 32 Mass. App. 
Ct. at 443 (exhibit that had been introduced at trial was newly 
discovered evidence insofar as Commonwealth's failure to 
disclose change in witness testimony gave defendant no reason to 
have called expert to examine exhibit independently).  The 
pathologist's opinion probably would have been a real factor in 
the jury's deliberations.  See Cowels, 470 Mass. at 623, citing 
Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 469 Mass. 340, 353 (2014). 
Focusing on the medical examiner's testimony, the judge 
noted that there was sufficient evidence (other than Diaz's 
testimony) of extreme atrocity or cruelty, and the judge 
therefore dismissed the pathologist's opinion as mere 
 
 
13 We reject the Commonwealth's suggestion that trial 
counsel should have had the clairvoyance to call such an expert 
when, at least as far as was known to the defense, there was no 
evidence that the victim had spoken after having been stabbed. 
18 
 
impeachment evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Sleeper, 435 Mass. 
581, 607 (2002) (failure of nongovernment expert, who gave 
opinion "that touched on the defendant's ability to form 
requisite intent," to clarify that he had "honorary" position as 
medical school instructor did not require new trial).  This, 
however, overlooks the impact of Diaz's testimony, which was 
compelling evidence underlying the Commonwealth's case on the 
theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.  See Murray, 461 Mass. at 
22 (impeachment evidence supported new trial where "credibility 
played a central role").  Her emotionally gripping testimony 
regarding the victim's dying words was the last testimony placed 
before the jury before they began their deliberations.  Her 
depiction of the defendant laughing as the victim lay dying 
would have been fresh in the jurors' minds as they evaluated the 
Commonwealth's case.  Far more than what counsel was able to do 
to respond to Diaz's testimony in the heat of trial, by 
attempting to challenge Diaz's credibility using only her prior 
inconsistent statement to police, the expert's opinion would 
have directly undermined Diaz's later version of events.  The 
opinion powerfully suggests that Diaz's testimony was not 
medically possible, calling into question the veracity of her 
statement regarding the victim's dying words, as well as the 
19 
 
credibility of her memory that the defendant laughed.14  See 
Cowels, 470 Mass. at 621, quoting Commonwealth v. Liebman, 388 
Mass. 483, 489 (1983) ("a new trial may be warranted '[w]here 
the Commonwealth's case depends so heavily on the testimony of a 
witness' and where the newly discovered evidence 'seriously 
undermines the credibility of that witness'").  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 385 Mass. 165, 176 (1982) (unexpected 
witness testimony, even if timely disclosed, would not have 
significantly weakened Commonwealth's case). 
Given that Diaz's testimony was crucial to the conviction 
of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity 
or cruelty, the failure to disclose, and the defendant's 
resulting inability effectively to challenge the credibility of 
that testimony with the expert evidence that what Diaz testified 
she observed could not have been physically possible, "casts 
real doubt on the justice of the conviction."  Commonwealth v. 
Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 305 (1986).  Therefore, a new trial is 
required.15 
 
 
14 The pathologist's testimony also would have served to 
contradict the prosecutor's invitation in closing argument that 
the jury use their "common sense" to conclude that the victim 
had made the statement Diaz described because there was no 
evidence that the victim's "voice box" had been cut. 
 
15 The concurrence maintains that this court should offer 
the Commonwealth a unilateral choice between conducting a new 
trial or accepting a reduction in the verdict to murder in the 
 
20 
 
To the extent that they might be relevant at any retrial, 
we turn to address the defendant's other arguments. 
 
d.  Use of familial language.  As had been their usual 
practice, at trial the witnesses referred to Pimental as the 
 
second degree.  "[T]he power to reduce verdicts is not without 
constraint."  Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 485 Mass. 491, 505 
(2020).  We have exercised such discretion "where the weight of 
the evidence in the case, although technically sufficient to 
support the jury's verdict, points to a lesser crime."  
Commonwealth v. Rolon, 438 Mass. 808, 821 (2003).  Here, the 
situation differs from the cases relied on by the concurrence 
where the error at trial involved a jury instruction or an 
improper closing argument that went to the defendant's intent, 
or where the defendant admitted at trial to murder in the second 
degree.  See Commonwealth v. Niemic, 483 Mass. 571, 585-591 
(2019) (improper use of impeachment evidence and appeal to 
sympathy in closing argument); Commonwealth v. Howard, 469 Mass. 
721, 750 (2014), S.C., 479 Mass. 52 (2018) (permitting 
Commonwealth to choose new trial or reduction to murder in 
second degree, "which was the verdict urged by the defendant at 
his first trial"); Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 469 Mass. 410, 423-
424 (2014) (improper instruction on intoxication); Commonwealth 
v. Bell, 460 Mass. 294, 309-310 (2011), S.C., 473 Mass. 131 
(2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2467 (2016) (failure to 
instruct on felony-murder in second degree); Commonwealth v. 
Rutkowski, 459 Mass. 794, 799-800 (2011) (failure to instruct on 
mental impairment).  In this case, the prosecutor's failure to 
disclose material, exculpatory evidence in his possession, and 
the resulting prejudice to the defendant, did not comport with 
the standards of justice.  The error infected not only the 
element of extreme atrocity or cruelty, but also the entire 
trial.  It cannot be ameliorated by providing the Commonwealth 
the unilateral choice suggested by the concurrence.  Therefore, 
a new trial is warranted.  See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88 ("A 
prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused 
which, if made available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce 
the penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily on the 
defendant.  That casts the prosecutor in the role of an 
architect of a proceeding that does not comport with standards 
of justice . . ."). 
21 
 
defendant's wife; the two were not legally married, however, and 
the spousal privilege and spousal disqualification rule 
accordingly were inapplicable.16  The defendant maintains that 
because the spousal privilege and spousal disqualification rule 
were not applicable to Pimental, it was improper for the 
prosecutor to describe their relationship, as well as the 
relationships of other witnesses, in marital and familial terms, 
where no legal marriage existed. 
 
There was no error in the prosecutor's references to the 
various relationships in marital and familial terms.  The 
witnesses described the relationships in that manner, and the 
prosecutor's use of the witnesses' own descriptions likely 
assisted the jury in understanding the nature of those 
relationships.  Certainly, the prosecutor did not unfairly 
appeal to the jury's sympathies in describing the witnesses as 
family members, precisely as had the witnesses themselves. 
 
e.  Instruction on manslaughter.  In the ambulance on the 
way to the hospital, while cutting the victim's clothing from 
his body, paramedics found a large kitchen knife tucked into the 
 
 
16 See G. L. c. 233, § 20 ("neither husband nor wife shall 
be compelled to testify in the . . . criminal proceeding against 
the other"; "neither husband nor wife shall testify as to 
private conversations with the other"); Mass. G. Evid. § 504 
(2021).  Absent a legal marriage, no such privileges apply.  See 
Goodridge v. Department of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 327 
(2003); Wilcox v. Trautz, 427 Mass. 326, 332-333 (1998). 
22 
 
waistband of his shorts.  The defendant maintains that the judge 
erred in rejecting his request that the jury be instructed on 
voluntary manslaughter.  He argues that this evidence, viewed in 
the light most favorable to the defendant,17 suggested that the 
defendant's reaction could have been in self-defense or in 
response to sudden combat.  Neither theory, however, was 
supported by the evidence. 
 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the jury reasonably could 
have inferred that the defendant knew that the victim was armed, 
the defendant points to no evidence before the jury that he 
availed himself of any "reasonable opportunity to retreat" from 
the confrontation with the victim.  See Commonwealth v. Glover, 
459 Mass. 836, 842 (2011).  Similarly, none of the percipient 
witnesses testified that the victim reached for a weapon or 
attempted to strike a blow.  See Commonwealth v. Howard, 479 
Mass. 52, 58 (2018); Commonwealth v. Espada, 450 Mass. 687, 697 
(2008); Commonwealth v. Brum, 441 Mass. 199, 206 (2004).  
Compare Commonwealth v. Hinds, 457 Mass. 83, 91-92 (2010) (no 
instruction on voluntary manslaughter was warranted because 
there was no evidence that defendant attempted to retreat; he 
 
 
17 In deciding whether a defendant is entitled to an 
instruction on voluntary manslaughter, we view the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the defendant.  Commonwealth v. 
Hinds, 457 Mass. 83, 88 (2010). 
23 
 
chose to leave his home and to confront victims on street); 
Commonwealth v. Avila, 454 Mass. 744, 769 (2009) (defendant 
could have retreated from confrontation on public street). 
 
f.  Ineffective assistance.  In a case of murder in the 
first degree, we generally review a claim of ineffective 
assistance to determine whether there was a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. 
Gulla, 476 Mass. 743, 745-746 (2017); Commonwealth v. Wright, 
411 Mass. 678, 681 (1992), S.C., 469 Mass. 447 (2014).  A 
tactical or strategic decision, however, is erroneous only if it 
was manifestly unreasonable when made.  See Commonwealth v. 
Kolenovic, 478 Mass. 189, 193 (2017). 
The defendant maintains that his trial counsel provided 
ineffective assistance because counsel did not introduce 
evidence of how the defendant's life experiences and history of 
mental health and behavioral problems had an impact on his 
decision-making on the day of the stabbing.  In a case where 
"the major issue is the effect of the defendant's serious, long-
standing mental illness on the conduct complained of," this 
court has held that the jury should be able to consider "the 
defendant's mental illness and its effect on his conduct" in 
weighing "whether the murder was committed with extreme atrocity 
or cruelty."  Commonwealth v. Gould, 380 Mass. 672, 676-678, 
685-686 (1980) (defendant had long-standing, constant, 
24 
 
delusional belief system, had been institutionalized for mental 
illness during four years preceding incident at issue in that 
case, and was suffering from paranoid psychosis and 
schizophrenia at time of killing). 
 
Following the defendant's conviction, defense counsel 
retained a forensic psychologist, who interviewed the 
defendant,18 reviewed his mental health and other records, and 
provided an analysis regarding the defendant's mental status at 
the time of the stabbing.  The psychologist opined that, at the 
time of the incident, the defendant finally had "developed a 
relatively stable interpersonal relationship with a woman" and 
had achieved a "sense of financial stability."  The victim 
threatened this stability by exposing the defendant's purported 
philandering; this threat would have become "overwhelming" for 
the defendant.  The psychologist concluded that the defendant 
responded "in a manner rooted in his early life experiences," 
during which he had coped with "losses through a series of 
maladaptive behaviors and poor decisions." 
 
The defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for 
failing to introduce this evidence of his prior life experience, 
 
 
18 The defendant reported to the psychologist that his life 
experiences included an unstable, traumatic childhood marked by 
a physically and emotionally abusive relationship with his 
mother, sexual abuse, periods of incarceration, sporadic mental 
health treatment, and homelessness. 
25 
 
which he argues would have shown that he suffered from an 
illness or mental impairment.  The expert's assessment, however, 
falls short of suggesting a mental health defense, and counsel 
was not ineffective for not having raised it.  See Commonwealth 
v. Walker, 443 Mass. 213, 225-228 (2005) (defendant's history of 
alcohol and drug abuse, prior suicide attempt, and discharge 
from armed services due to psychiatric problems were not 
sufficient to suggest potential mental health defense).  Indeed, 
although the psychologist found "sufficient data to support the 
presence of a mental disorder," the expert expressly declined to 
opine that, at the time of the stabbing, the defendant had been 
suffering from a mental illness or impairment.  Thus, as any 
mental health defense would have failed, counsel's decision not 
to introduce the information concerning the defendant's prior 
life experiences could not have been ineffective.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Lessieur, 472 Mass. 317, 327 (2015).19  Contrast 
Commonwealth v. Rutkowski, 459 Mass. 794, 796-797, 799 (2011) 
 
 
19 As we have previously, we also decline the defendant's 
invitation that we modify our standards to require that, in 
order for a jury to find a defendant guilty on a theory of 
extreme atrocity or cruelty, the jury would have to find that 
the defendant had the specific intent to commit an extremely 
atrocious or cruel killing.  See Castillo, 485 Mass. at 864-865 
("As we said in Cunneen, 389 Mass. at 227, 'proof of malice 
aforethought is the only requisite mental intent for a 
conviction of murder in the first degree based on murder 
committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty'"). 
26 
 
(evidence of defendant's long history of bipolar disorder, 
depression, psychosis, and head injuries, which "were in play" 
at time of killing, warranted jury instruction on mental 
impairment with respect to extreme atrocity or cruelty charge). 
 
g.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Because of the 
result we reach, we need not address the defendant's request 
that we exercise our extraordinary authority under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, and reduce the verdict to one of murder in the second 
degree.20 
 
3.  Conclusion.  The judgment of conviction is vacated and 
set aside, and the matter is remanded to the Superior Court for 
a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
20 Because the Commonwealth may seek to introduce certain 
autopsy photographs again at a subsequent trial, we do, however, 
briefly touch upon one of the autopsy photographs that was 
introduced, over the defendant's objections, that we have 
considered pursuant to our review of the entire record under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Exhibit no. 21, a photograph of the 
victim's head and torso from the left side, with the blood 
cleaned from the body and lying on a gurney, was introduced to 
show the wound to the victim's neck.  The upper right quadrant 
of the photograph, however, also shows the seriously damaged 
legs of at least one, and possibly two, unrelated bodies lying 
on gurneys.  These images have no relevance to any issue in this 
case.  On retrial, these portions of the image should be 
redacted, or a different image should be used.  Of course, on 
remand the defendant may seek reconsideration of whether any of 
the other autopsy photographs were more prejudicial than 
probative. 
 
 
LOWY, J. (concurring).  I agree that the conviction must be 
vacated because the Commonwealth failed to disclose Diaz's 
testimony.  Because that is the only reversible error, and it 
only implicated the defendant's conviction of murder in the 
first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty, I would 
allow the Commonwealth "the option of either proceeding with a 
new trial on the murder indictment or accepting a reduction of 
the verdict to murder in the second degree."  Commonwealth v. 
Gonzalez, 469 Mass. 410, 424 (2014). 
 
We repeatedly have offered the Commonwealth a similar 
option in cases "where an error does not affect the lesser 
included offense that is supported by the evidence."  
Commonwealth v. Gilbert, 447 Mass. 161, 169 (2006).  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Niemic, 483 Mass. 571, 598-599 (2019) 
(Commonwealth given option of either retrying defendant for 
murder in first degree or accepting verdict of voluntary 
manslaughter because prosecutor's improper statements in closing 
argument tainted conviction of murder in first degree); 
Commonwealth v. Howard, 469 Mass. 721, 749-750 (2014), S.C., 479 
Mass. 52 (2018) (Commonwealth given option of retrying defendant 
for murder in first degree or moving to have defendant sentenced 
for murder in second degree because erroneous admittance and use 
by prosecutor in closing argument of defendant's statements 
obtained after police failed to scrupulously honor invocation of 
2 
 
constitutional right to remain silent tainted conviction of 
murder in first degree); Gonzalez, 469 Mass. at 423-424 (same 
option given where absence of instruction on intoxication 
undermined conviction of murder in first degree based on extreme 
atrocity or cruelty); Commonwealth v. Bell, 460 Mass. 294, 309-
310 (2011) , S.C., 473 Mass. 131 (2015), cert. denied, 136 S. 
Ct. 2467 (2016) (Commonwealth had option of retrying defendant 
for murder in first degree or choosing entry of verdict of 
felony-murder in second degree after proper jury instruction was 
not given); Commonwealth v. Rutkowski, 459 Mass. 795, 800 (2011) 
(Commonwealth given option of retrying defendant for murder in 
first degree or moving to have defendant sentenced for murder in 
second degree where absence of instruction on mental impairment 
undermined conviction of murder in first degree based on extreme 
atrocity or cruelty). 
The fact that the error here was constitutional does not 
alter the analysis.  See Howard, 469 Mass. at 750 (option given 
in light of violation of Miranda rights).  Cf. Commonwealth v. 
Sanchez, 485 Mass. 491, 505 (2020) (verdict reduction improper 
where nature of error affected "all of the lesser included 
offenses to the same extent as the greater").  Consequently, the 
option to accept a reduction of the verdict to murder in the 
second degree should remain open to the Commonwealth.