Case Title: Knape v. Brown

Citation: 342 P.2d 195, 86 Ariz. 158

Docket Number: 

State: arizona

Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Date: 1959-07-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
86 Ariz. 158 (1959) 342 P.2d 195 Mildred Louise KNAPE and Arthur W. Knape, husband and wife, Appellants, v. Elizabeth A. BROWN, Isabel Rogers and Pearl Ware, as President, Vice-President and Secretary, respectively, of the Arizona State Board of Beauty Culturist Examiners, Appellees. No. 6575. Supreme Court of Arizona. July 15, 1959. *159 Lovell B. Lieurance and Thos. J. Croaff, Jr., Phoenix, for appellants. Robert Morrison, Atty. Gen., by Newman W. White, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees. UDALL, Justice. Mildred Louise Knape (plaintiff-appellant), made application to the Board of Beauty Culturist Examiners (defendants-appellees) for a certificate of registration entitling her to practice or operate a school or shop of beauty culture in accordance with the requirements of the Beauty Culture Act, A.R.S. Title 32, Chapter 5. The parties will hereafter be referred to as plaintiff and the Board, respectively. After an examination, the Board refused to issue plaintiff a certificate of registration upon the ground that she had failed to receive a passing grade of seventy-five percent upon the examination. Thereafter the instant suit which is in the nature of an appeal was brought in the superior court to review said action of the Board. The complaint recites that it is brought under the Administrative Review Act, A.R.S. Title 12, Article 6, sections 12-901 et seq., and it is further alleged: The Board filed an answer and a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action. Specifically it was urged (a) that no appeal would lie under the Administrative Review Act, A.R.S. § 12-902, because plaintiff's exclusive remedy was to apply for review under the Beauty Culture Act, A.R.S. § 32-554, F and G, and (b) that the required appeal bond had not been furnished. After oral argument was had the Board's motion to dismiss was granted and a judgment of dismissal was entered. This timely appeal followed. It is elemental that the right of appeal is one given litigants by statute, and exists only by force of statute, and this right is limited by the terms of the statute. See, State Tax Commission v. Miami Copper Co., 74 Ariz. 234, 246 P.2d 871; Ross v. Industrial Commission, 82 Ariz. 9, 307 P.2d 612, and the cases cited therein. The correctness of the trial court's ruling in entering a judgment of dismissal *160 is the sole question presented for determination. If the matter is governed by the appeal provisions of the Beauty Culture Act, then manifestly the trial court's ruling was correct. Furthermore it appears plaintiff wholly failed to file a cost bond of $200 within thirty days, or at all, as is required by section 32-554F. The failure to file such a bond is considered jurisdictional. Cf. Shattuck v. Costello, 8 Ariz. 255, 71 P. 940; Dean v. Territory, 13 Ariz. 152, 108 P. 476; Lount v. Strouss, 63 Ariz. 323, 162 P.2d 430; 16 A.R.S. Rule 73(h), Rules of Civil Procedure. Let us examine the pertinent statutes. The Beauty Culture Act, section 32-554, expressly provides: Plaintiff contends that because the above statute does not specifically enumerate as one of the grounds of appeal the Board's refusal to give her a license for failing to make a passing grade, thereby she has the right to base her review in the superior court upon the Administrative Review Act. The argument is advanced that the purpose of the last named Act This position appears to us to be wholly untenable as surely the legislature did not intend to permit a disgruntled applicant to jump from the one Act to the other. Moreover, it is a well recognized rule of statutory construction that where special provisions of a statute deal with the same subject as a general statute, the special provision prevails. Moeur v. Chiricahua Ranches Co., 48 Ariz. 226, 241, 61 P.2d 163. It should be noted that the Administrative Review Act expressly limits the right of review thereunder to situations where no other relief is available. We quote: The Beauty Culture Act, giving it a reasonable and logical construction, we believe provided a remedy of review for the plaintiff under the particular circumstances herein shown, as well as prescribing a definite procedure to follow. We hold the learned trial court was therefore correct in dismissing the complaint. Judgment affirmed. PHELPS, C.J., and STRUCKMEYER, JOHNSON and BERNSTEIN, JJ., concur.