Case Title: DONNA MARIE RODRIGUEZ V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0179

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-05-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
DONNA MARIE RODRIGUEZ V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2010 WY 61230 P.3d 1111Case Number: S-09-0179Decided: 05/14/2010
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
DONNA 
MARIE RODRIGUEZ,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County

The 
Honorable Steven R. Cranfill, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. 
Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Jenny Lynn Craig, Assistant 
Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1]        
Appellant, 
Donna Marie Rodriguez, challenges the district court's order revoking her 
probation and imposing the original prison sentence.  She contends that her plea admitting the 
State's allegations was obtained in violation of her right to counsel.  We find that Ms. Rodriguez was not 
properly advised of her right to be represented by an attorney, and that she did 
not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive her right to counsel.  We reverse and remand for further 
proceedings.

 
 
ISSUE

 
 

[¶2]        
Did 
Ms. Rodriguez waive her right to be represented by counsel during her probation 
revocation proceedings?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
Ms. 
Rodriguez was charged with accessory after the fact to escape in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-202 (LexisNexis 2007).1  Counsel was appointed to represent 
her.  She pled guilty pursuant to a 
plea agreement.  The district court 
sentenced her to two to three years of incarceration but suspended that sentence 
and placed Ms. Rodriguez on probation. 

 
 

[¶4]        
Approximately 
eight months later, the State filed a petition to revoke her probation.  A bench warrant was issued and Ms. 
Rodriguez was arrested on May 7, 2009.  An initial hearing was held before the 
district court on May 11, 2009.  At 
that hearing, Ms. Rodriguez admitted the allegations in the petition.  The court revoked her probation and 
orally imposed the original two to three year prison sentence.  Ms. Rodriguez was not represented by 
counsel at that hearing.  

 
 

[¶5]        
On 
May 14, 2009, the State filed a Request for Sentencing Hearing and counsel was 
subsequently appointed to represent Ms. Rodriguez.  She then filed a Motion to Withdraw 
Admission to Probation Revocation, asserting that the plea had been obtained in 
violation of her right to counsel.  
The district court held a hearing addressing both the motion to withdraw 
and the State's sentencing request on June 17, 2009.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
district court denied the motion to withdraw the plea and imposed the original 
sentence.  A Sentence Order was 
entered on July 10, 2009 and the Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Withdraw 
Admission to Probation Revocation was entered on July 15, 2009.  Ms. Rodriguez filed a timely 
appeal.  

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 

[¶6]        
Whether 
an individual has been denied the right to counsel is a constitutional issue 
that we review de novo.  Wilkie v. State, 2002 WY 164, ¶ 4, 56 P.3d 1023, 1024 (Wyo. 2002).  

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶7]        
The 
State contends that Ms. Rodriguez "was advised of her right to counsel, 
voluntarily waived that right, and chose to admit the allegations against her 
without the assistance of counsel."  Ms. Rodriguez 
disagrees.

 
 

[¶8]        
The 
right to counsel in probation revocation proceedings is specifically provided 
for in the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure:

 
 
Any 
probationer  who is alleged to have violated the terms of a probation order, 
for which violation incarceration is provided by law, and who is financially 
unable to obtain adequate representation is entitled to appointed counsel if, 
after being informed of the right, requests that counsel be appointed to 
represent him/her.  

 
 
W.R.Cr.P. 
44(a)(2).  We have also recognized 
that appointment of counsel for probationers who cannot afford an attorney is 
constitutionally protected.  Pearl v. State, 996 P.2d 688, 689 (Wyo. 
2000).2  

 
 

[¶9]        
When 
a probationer is arrested on a bench warrant, as was Ms. Rodriguez, the 
probationer must "be taken before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay." 
W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(2).  At the initial 
appearance, the probationer must be advised of her right to counsel: 

 
 
(3) 
Advice to Probationer.At the probationer's first appearance before the court, 
the court shall advise the probationer of the allegations of the petition for 
revocation and of the contents of any affidavits and shall further advise the 
probationer:

 
 

(A)         
Of 
the probationer's right to retain counsel and, where applicable, the right to 
appointed counsel[.]

 
 
W.R.Cr.P. 
39(a)(3)(A).  There is no 
requirement that the initial appearance be held before the same judicial officer 
who imposed the original sentence.  
Often, in a felony case, the initial appearance will be held before a 
circuit judge and subsequent revocation proceedings, including the plea, 
evidentiary hearing, and disposition, will be held in district court.  In this case, the initial hearing, plea, 
and disposition all occurred in front of the district court at the May 11, 2009 
hearing.  We must determine if Ms. 
Rodriguez validly waived her right to counsel at that hearing. 

 

[¶10]     
In 
deciding whether 
the right to counsel has been waived, "we indulge every reasonable presumption 
against waiver."  Bolin 
v. State, 
2006 WY 77, ¶ 31, 137 P.3d 136, 146 (Wyo. 2006).  We review the record as a whole to 
determine if the right to counsel has been voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently waived.  Trujillo v. State, 2 P.3d 567, 571 (Wyo. 
2000). 
 A 
defendant must "know" of her right to counsel before she can voluntarily waive 
that right.  
Nelson 
v. State, 
934 P.2d 1238, 1241 (Wyo. 1997).  

 
 

[¶11]     
The 
district court's entire discussion with Ms. Rodriguez concerning her right to 
counsel occurred during the following exchange: 

 

THE 
COURT: Ms. Rodriguez, have you received copies of both Petitions to Revoke your 
probation?

 
 
[Ms. 
Rodriguez]: Yes, Your Honor.

 
 
[Q]: 
Okay.  So do you fully understand 
what you've beenwhat the allegations are?

 
 
[A]: 
Yes, sir.

 
 
[Q]: 
Okay.  You are entitled to a 
hearing, not a jury trial, but a hearing before the Court, a bench trial.  The State has to prove at that time by a 
preponderance of the evidence these allegations.  That's a different standard than the 
original criminal charges which would be beyond a reasonable doubt.  Preponderance of the evidence means a 
little more than not.  

 
 

You 
are entitled to be represented at that hearing if you wish.  So have you thought about that and 
decided whether or not you want to have a hearing?

 
 
[A]: 
Yes, Your 
Honor.

 
 
[Q]: 
Do you?

 
 
[A]: 
No, sir.

 
 
[Q]: 
You do not?  Okay.  The alternative to that then would be 
for you to admit these allegations.  
If you do that I'm going to swear you in and establish a factual basis 
for that.  So is that your desire 
today?

 
 
[A]: 
Yes, Your Honor.

 
 
[Q]: 
All right.  Then would you please 
raise your right hand?

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.) 

 
 

[¶12]     
After 
Ms. Rodriguez entered the plea, counsel for the State advised the court that the 
State was prepared to proceed with sentencing.  The State recommended that the 
previously suspended prison sentence be reinstated.  Ms. Rodriguez sought treatment and 
intensive supervised probation.  The 
district court sided with the State:

 
 
So 
the Court has considered probation, finds it to be inappropriate, will accept 
the State's recommendation that you be sentenced to the Wyoming State Women's 
facility in Lusk for a period of not less than two and not more than three 
years.  That is to run consecutive 
with any other term that is imposed.

 
 

[¶13]     
On 
May 14, 2009, the State filed a Request for Sentencing Hearing.  The reasons for the filing are not 
readily ascertainable from the record.  
It is undisputed that during the disposition phase of the May 11th 
hearing, the district court imposed the original sentence.  On May 18, 2009, the district court 
entered an Order on Initial Appearance and Order Revoking Probation.  The order did not address 
disposition.  A sentencing hearing 
was held on June 17, 2009.  

 
 

[¶14]     
Prior 
to the sentencing hearing, Ms. Rodriguez sought the appointment of counsel, and 
defense counsel was appointed.  
Shortly after the appointment, defense counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw 
Admission to Probation Revocation claiming the admission had been obtained in 
violation of Ms. Rodriguez's right to counsel.  That motion was also heard on June 
17th.  The State opposed the 
withdrawal of the plea.  During 
argument the prosecutor stated:

 
 
Your 
Honor, in looking at the transcript from the proceedings that occurred on May 
11th, Ms. Rodriguez was advised of all those rights.    
The Court then askedor advised Ms. Rodriguez if shethat she had 
the right to a trial, a bench trial in this matter, before the Court, and 
that she also had the right to be represented by counsel, both at an admission 
phase and also at an evidentiary or adjudicatory hearing later down the 
road.

 
 
Ms. 
Rodriguez stated that she understood that she had those rights, and the Court 
asked Ms. Rodriguez what she wanted to do, if she wanted to be represented by an 
attorney.  Ms. Rodriguez said 
no, she did not wish to be represented by an attorney.  And then the Court proceeded to take the 
plea from Ms. Rodriguez, and then proceeded to sentencing in this matter. 

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 

[¶15]     
Contrary 
to the State's assertion, the transcript of the May 11th hearing does not 
reflect that Ms. Rodriguez was advised of her right to counsel during the 
admission phase.  It reflects only 
that she was advised of her right to counsel if a subsequent hearing was 
necessary.  Additionally, she was 
never specifically asked if she waived her right to counsel.  

 
 

[¶16]     
The 
State maintains on appeal that the district court adequately informed 
Ms. Rodriguez of her right to counsel when it stated: "You are entitled to 
be represented at that hearing if you wish."  We disagree.  The advisement of the right to counsel 
was clearly limited to an evidentiary hearing that would be held only if Ms. 
Rodriguez denied the allegations of the petition.  Ms. Rodriguez should have been advised 
that she had the right to consult with counsel before entering the plea.  See W.R.Cr.P. 39(a)(3)(A); W.R.Cr.P. 
44(a)(2); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-106(a).  

 
 

[¶17]     
The 
State asserts that Ms. Rodriguez knew of her right to counsel because she made 
the following statement during the disposition phase of the May 11th 
hearing:

 
 
[Ms. 
Rodriguez]: And DFS is working with me right now that I am back just so I can 
have [my daughter] back, Your Honor, that's why I didn't deny these allegations 
and get a lawyer. 

 
 
This 
statement does not establish a valid waiver.  It reveals only that Ms. Rodriguez was 
aware that she was entitled to counsel if she denied the allegations in the 
petition and the subsequent evidentiary hearing was held.  This is consistent with the advisement 
given by the district court that she was "entitled to be represented at 
that hearing."  (Emphasis 
added.)  We cannot read Ms. 
Rodriguez's statement as a clear, unequivocal waiver of the right to counsel 
before entering her plea.  

 
 

[¶18]     
The 
State also asserts that the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case 
establish that Ms. Rodriguez waived the right voluntarily, knowingly, and 
intelligently.  It maintains that 
although Ms. Rodriguez was relatively young21 at the time of the revocationshe 
had a lengthy criminal history and had been involved in numerous probation 
revocation hearings.  The State also 
asserts that the case was not complicated and it was apparent that Ms. Rodriguez 
understood the proceedings.  The 
State relies on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-107 to support its assertions.  

 

[¶19]     
Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 7-6-107 is entitled "Waiver of Rights" and 
states:

 
 
A 
person who has been advised of his rights under W.S. 7-6-105 may waive any right 
provided by this act if at the time of or after waiver, the court finds that the 
person has acted with full awareness of his rights and of the consequences of a 
waiver and if the waiver is otherwise made according to law.  Before making its findings, the court 
shall consider such factors as the person's age, education, familiarity with the 
English language and the complexity of the crime involved.  A person who knowingly and voluntarily 
waives his right to counsel and who elects to represent himself shall not be 
entitled to standby counsel under this act. 

 
 
According 
to the plain language of the statute, the defendant may waive her rights only if 
she is advised of her rights, acts with a full awareness of those rights, and 
understands the consequences of waiving those rights.  

 
 

[¶20]     
When 
we apply every reasonable presumption against waiver, as we are required to do, 
we conclude that Ms. Rodriguez did not voluntarily waive her right to 
counsel.  At the May 11th hearing, 
the district court did not properly advise Ms. Rodriguez of her right to 
counsel, took no steps to ascertain whether she understood that right, and never 
specifically asked Ms. Rodriguez if she waived her right to counsel.  The district court made no attempt to 
inform her of the repercussions of entering a plea, or of the disadvantages of 
proceeding to the sentencing phase without counsel.  

 
 

[¶21]     
An 
individual's right to counsel is such a basic right 
that its denial can never be treated as harmless error.  Gentry v. State, 806 P.2d 1269, 
1272 (Wyo. 1991); Campbell v. State, 589 P.2d 358, 367 & n.6 (Wyo. 
1979) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 
83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L. Ed. 2d 799 (1963)).  "Where the right to counsel has been 
denied at a critical stage of the proceedings  reversal is automatic."  Nelson, 934 P.2d  at 1241.  The entry of a plea is a critical stage 
of probation revocation proceedings.  
Ms. Rodriguez was not represented by counsel and did not voluntarily, 
knowingly, and intelligently waive her right to counsel during that 
proceeding.  We reverse and remand 
for further proceedings in accordance with this 
opinion.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-5-202(a) states:  "A person is an 
accessory after the fact if, with intent to hinder, delay or prevent the 
discovery, detection, apprehension, prosecution, detention, conviction or 
punishment of another for the commission of a crime, he renders assistance to 
the person."

 
 

2Additionally, 
the district court is required by statute to determine whether an individual 
qualifies for appointed counsel during probation revocations.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-106(a) 
provides:  

 
 
The 
determination of whether a person  is a needy person shall be deferred until 
his first appearance in court.   
 Thereafter, the court shall 
determine, with respect to each proceeding, whether he is a needy person.  For purposes of this section, an appeal, 
probation revocation or proceeding to correct or modify a sentence is a separate 
proceeding.  The determination of 
need shall be based on a separate application submitted at the time of each 
proceeding.

 
 
It 
is undisputed that Ms. Rodriguez financially qualified for appointment of 
counsel.