Case Title: P. v. Delgadillo

Citation: 

Docket Number: S266305M

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2023-02-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 2/15/23 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
JOSE DE JESUS DELGADILLO, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S266305 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Four 
B304441 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BA436900 
 
 
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION 
 
THE COURT: 
 
The majority opinion in this case, filed on December 19, 
2022, and appearing at 14 Cal.5th 216, is modified as follows: 
1. 
Footnote 2 on page 222 presently reads:  “The brief 
summary of facts is drawn from the Court of Appeal’s prior 
opinion in Delgadillo’s direct appeal.”  After the only sentence 
in that footnote, add the following text:  “We rely on that 
opinion solely for the purpose of summarizing the background 
of this case; our consideration of whether Delgadillo is entitled 
2 
to relief under section 1172.6 is based on our independent 
review of the record of conviction.”  As modified, the footnote 
reads as follows: 
 
The brief summary of facts is drawn from the Court of 
Appeal’s prior opinion in Delgadillo’s direct appeal.  We 
rely on that opinion solely for the purpose of 
summarizing the background of this case; our 
consideration of whether Delgadillo is entitled to relief 
under section 1172.6 is based on our independent review 
of the record of conviction. 
 
2. 
The third sentence of the only full paragraph on page 233 
presently reads:  “Specifically, eyewitnesses identified him as 
the driver of a Ford Explorer that crossed into incoming traffic 
and crashed into another vehicle, killing the passenger.”  That 
sentence is deleted.  As modified, the paragraph reads as 
follows: 
 
Nevertheless, we determine, based on our independent 
review of the record, that Delgadillo is not entitled to any 
relief under section 1172.6.  Indeed, the record here 
makes clear that Delgadillo was the actual killer and the 
only participant in the killing.  At trial, defense counsel 
conceded that the accident occurred while Delgadillo was 
driving on the wrong side of the road.  (See § 1172.6, 
subd. (a) [“A person convicted of felony murder or murder 
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or 
other theory under which malice is imputed to a person 
based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, 
attempted murder under the natural and probable 
consequences doctrine, or manslaughter may file a 
petition with the court” to have the conviction vacated].)  
We affirm the Court of Appeal’s holding that Wende 
3 
procedures are not constitutionally compelled on 
Delgadillo’s appeal.6 
 
These modifications do not affect the judgment. 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
JOSE DE JESUS DELGADILLO, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S266305 
 
Second Appellate District, Division Four 
B304441 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
BA436900 
 
 
December 19, 2022 
 
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justices Corrigan, Liu, 
Kruger, Jenkins, and Guerrero concurred. 
 
1 
PEOPLE v. DELGADILLO 
S266305 
 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
In People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), we held 
the Courts of Appeal must conduct a review of the entire record 
whenever appointed counsel submits a brief on direct appeal 
which raises no specific issues or describes the appeal as 
frivolous.  (Id. at p. 441.)  This procedure is applicable to the first 
appeal as of right and is compelled by the constitutional right to 
counsel under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.  (Wende, at pp. 439, 441; see Pennsylvania v. 
Finley (1987) 481 U.S. 551, 554–557 (Finley); In re Sade C. 
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 983–984 (Sade C.).)  In this case, we 
granted review to determine the procedures appointed counsel 
and the Courts of Appeal must follow when counsel determines 
that an appeal from an order denying postconviction relief under 
recently enacted remedial legislation lacks arguable merit and 
to decide whether defendants are entitled to notice of these 
procedures.   
The Court of Appeal found that it has no duty to 
independently review an order denying a petition for 
postconviction relief under Penal Code former section 1170.95, 
which defendant Jose De Jesus Delgadillo filed here, when 
appointed counsel submits notice that the appeal lacks arguable 
PEOPLE v. DELGADILLO 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
2 
merit.1  The Court of Appeal concluded that since Delgadillo’s 
appeal does not implicate a constitutional right to counsel, the 
procedures set out in Wende do not apply.  (Finley, supra, 
481 U.S. at pp. 556–557; Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 978.)  
We agree with the Court of Appeal as to this issue. 
We further exercise our inherent supervisory powers to 
establish the appellate procedures and the requirements for 
providing notice to a defendant before a Court of Appeal 
dismisses an appeal from the denial of a petition under section 
1172.6.  When counsel submits notice that such an appeal lacks 
arguable merit, the Court of Appeal should provide notice to the 
defendant that counsel was unable to find any arguable issues; 
the defendant may file a supplemental brief or letter raising any 
argument the defendant wishes the court to consider; and if no 
such supplemental brief or letter is timely filed, the court may 
dismiss the appeal as abandoned.  In this case, although the 
Court of Appeal did provide notice to Delgadillo, the notice was 
suboptimal because it indicated that the Wende procedures 
would apply when they did not, and it did not inform Delgadillo 
that the appeal would be dismissed as abandoned if no 
supplemental brief or letter was filed.  However, based on our 
own independent review of the record, which we undertake 
voluntarily in the interest of judicial economy, we determine 
that Delgadillo is not entitled to relief under section 1172.6. 
 
 
1  
Assembly Bill No. 200 (Reg. Sess. 2021–2022; Assembly 
Bill 200) has since renumbered section 1170.95 as section 
1172.6.  (See Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)  For clarity, we refer 
simply to section 1172.6 throughout the discussion section.  All 
undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
PEOPLE v. DELGADILLO 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
3 
I. BACKGROUND 
On the afternoon of May 27, 2015, Delgadillo’s Ford 
Explorer crossed into incoming traffic and collided head on into 
a Mazda sedan occupied by a driver and passenger in the front 
two seats.2  The passenger died from injuries sustained in the 
accident.  The driver of the Ford Explorer, later identified as 
Delgadillo, fled the scene on foot, and a police dog located him 
hiding in a building nearby.  Approximately two and a half hours 
after the accident, two breath tests showed Delgadillo’s blood-
alcohol level to be .13 and .14 percent.  Two hours later, 
Delgadillo provided a blood sample that showed a blood-alcohol 
level of .13 percent.  
A jury convicted Delgadillo of second degree murder under 
an actual implied malice theory (§ 187, subd. (a)) and gross 
vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (§ 191.5, subd. (a)).  
The jury also found true allegations that Delgadillo fled the 
scene (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (c)) and had two prior 
convictions for driving while under the influence of alcohol (Veh. 
Code, § 23152).  The court sentenced Delgadillo to a term of 15 
years to life.  The judgment was affirmed on appeal.  
After the appeal was final, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–
2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437; Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) went 
into effect and barred a conviction for murder under the natural 
and probable consequences theory as well as limited the scope 
of the felony-murder rule.  (§ 188, subd. (a)(3), as amended by 
Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2; § 189; see People v. Gentile (2020) 
10 Cal.5th 830, 838.)  This change in the law was “to ensure that 
 
2  
The brief summary of facts is drawn from the Court of 
Appeal’s prior opinion in Delgadillo’s direct appeal.  
PEOPLE v. DELGADILLO 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
4 
murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual 
killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major 
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless 
indifference to human life.”  (Sen. Bill 1437, § 1, subd. (f).)  
Senate Bill 1437 further created a procedure under former 
section 1170.95 for persons convicted of felony murder or 
murder under a natural and probable consequences theory to 
petition for retroactive relief.3 
Delgadillo filed a petition for resentencing pursuant to 
this new law.  After the cause was submitted upon written 
briefing, the superior court denied the petition at a hearing.  The 
superior court found no “grounds whatsoever for re-sentencing” 
because “defendant was the actual and only participant” in the 
crime.  An order to show cause did not issue. 
Delgadillo filed an appeal.  Appointed counsel found no 
arguable issues in the appeal and filed a brief in accordance with 
the procedures outlined in Wende.  The brief set out the 
procedural history and relevant facts of the case and requested 
that the Court of Appeal conduct an independent review of the 
 
3  
The Legislature has since amended former section 1170.95 
with the passage of Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) 
(Senate Bill 775; Stats. 2021, ch. 551).  Senate Bill 775 codified 
and clarified People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961–972 
(Lewis), reaffirmed that beyond a reasonable doubt is the proper 
burden of proof for a former section 1170.95 resentencing 
hearing, and expanded former section 1170.95’s provisions to 
apply also to persons convicted of attempted murder or 
manslaughter.  (Sen. Bill 775, § 1, subds. (a)–(d).)  As mentioned 
above, with the passage of Assembly Bill 200, the Legislature 
then renumbered former section 1170.95 to section 1172.6 
without any further substantive change.  (See People v. Strong 
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708, fn. 2.) 
PEOPLE v. DELGADILLO 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
5 
record in accordance with Wende.  In an accompanying 
declaration, counsel stated she had advised Delgadillo by letter 
“that a brief on his behalf would be filed according to the 
procedures outlined” in Wende and that he would receive a copy 
of the brief. Counsel further stated she had also advised 
Delgadillo that “he may personally file a supplemental brief” 
raising “any points which he chooses to call to the court’s 
attention” and that she had provided him with the record. 
The Court of Appeal directed counsel to send the record 
and a copy of appointed counsel’s brief to Delgadillo.  The Court 
of Appeal sent notice to Delgadillo and counsel that “[c]ounsel 
appointed to represent appellant on appeal has filed appellant’s 
opening brief.  Counsel’s inability to find any arguable issues 
may be readily inferred from the failure to raise any.  (People v. 
Wende[, supra,] 25 Cal.3d [at p.] 442.)  [¶]  Appointed counsel is 
directed to send the record on this appeal and a copy of 
appellant’s opening brief to appellant immediately.  Within 30 
days of the date of this notice, appellant may submit by brief or 
letter any grounds of appeal contentions, or argument which 
appellant wishes this court to consider.”  Delgadillo did not 
submit a brief or letter within the requisite time.   
Following People v. Cole (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 1023, 
review granted October 14, 2020, S264278 (Cole), the Court of 
Appeal found, “[T]he procedures set forth in Wende are not 
constitutionally compelled if a criminal defendant’s appeal is not 
his or her initial appeal of right.”  (People v. Delgadillo (Nov. 18, 
2020, B304441) [nonpub. opn.].)  Since Delgadillo did not file a 
brief or letter, the Court of Appeal presumed the order appealed 
from was correct and dismissed Delgadillo’s appeal as 
abandoned without conducting an independent review.  The 
PEOPLE v. DELGADILLO 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
6 
Court of Appeal denied Delgadillo’s petition for rehearing.  We 
then granted review.   
II. DISCUSSION 
A.  Wende Procedures 
The Attorney General argues that Wende and related 
cases are designed to protect only the indigent criminal 
defendant’s constitutional right to counsel on direct appeal from 
a criminal conviction.  We agree that since Delgadillo’s appeal 
from the denial of his petition does not implicate a constitutional 
right to counsel, the procedures set out in Wende do not apply.   
The prophylactic procedures in Wende are “relevant when, 
and only when, a litigant has a previously established 
constitutional right to counsel.”  (Finley, supra, 481 U.S. at 
p. 555.)  Criminal defendants have a right to the effective 
assistance of counsel on the first appeal granted as a matter of 
right from a criminal conviction.  (Evitts v. Lucey (1985) 469 U.S. 
387, 394 [“right to counsel is limited to the first appeal as of 
right”]; Douglas v. California (1963) 372 U.S. 353, 356.)  In 
Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders), the United 
States Supreme Court considered “the extent of the duty of a 
court-appointed appellate counsel to prosecute a first appeal 
from 
a 
criminal 
conviction, 
after 
that 
attorney 
has 
conscientiously determined that there is no merit to the 
indigent’s appeal.”  (Id. at p. 739.)  In the state appellate court, 
court-appointed counsel concluded, after reviewing the record 
and consulting petitioner, that an appeal of the conviction had 
no merit.  (Ibid.)  Counsel advised the court by letter that the 
appeal had no merit and that petitioner wished to file a pro se 
brief.  (Id. at pp. 739–740.)  After the pro se brief was filed, the 
court affirmed the conviction.  (Id. at p. 740.)  The United States 
PEOPLE v. DELGADILLO 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
7 
Supreme Court ultimately reversed, concluding that the 
procedure was inadequate under the Fourteenth Amendment.  
(Anders, at p. 741.) 
The high court reasoned, “The constitutional requirement 
of substantial equality and fair process can only be attained 
where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate [o]n behalf 
of his client, as opposed to that of amicus curiae.  The no-merit 
letter and the procedure it triggers do not reach that dignity. . . . 
Of course, if counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a 
conscientious examination of it, he should so advise the court 
and request permission to withdraw.  That request must, 
however, be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the 
record that might arguably support the appeal.  A copy of 
counsel’s brief should be furnished the indigent and time 
allowed him to raise any points that he chooses; the court — not 
counsel — then proceeds, after a full examination of all the 
proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.”  
(Anders, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 744, fn. omitted.)  
Subsequently, in Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, we 
“approved a modified procedure to ensure an indigent criminal 
defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel.”  (People v. 
Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 118.)  In Wende, counsel filed a brief 
that summarized the proceedings and facts, raised no specific 
issues, and requested that the court review the entire record to 
determine whether there were any arguable issues.  Counsel 
submitted a declaration stating that he had advised defendant 
of the nature of the brief, that he would send defendant a copy 
of the brief, and that he had informed defendant that the court 
would permit him to file a brief on his own behalf.  Counsel also 
stated that he would advise his client that he could move to have 
counsel relieved.  The defendant did not file a brief.  (Wende, at 
PEOPLE v. DELGADILLO 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
8 
p. 438.)  Ultimately, after undertaking “a review of the entire 
record in this case,” a “thorough review of the merits,” and 
hearing oral argument, we affirmed the judgment.  (Id. at 
p. 443.)  In the process, we interpreted Anders to require that 
“[t]he court itself must expressly determine whether the appeal 
is wholly frivolous.  Since the court’s concern [in Anders] was 
with not merely accepting counsel’s assessment of the case, it 
follows that the determination and concomitant review of the 
entire record must be made regardless of whether the defendant 
has availed himself of the opportunity to submit a brief.”  (Id. at 
p. 441.) 
The United States Supreme Court approved our Wende 
procedure in Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 276.  The 
high court reasoned that the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the due process clause of that 
amendment “largely converge to require that a State’s 
procedure ‘affor[d] adequate and effective appellate review to 
indigent defendants,’ [citation].  A State’s procedure provides 
such review so long as it reasonably ensures that an indigent’s 
appeal will be resolved in a way that is related to the merit of 
that appeal.”  (Robbins, at pp. 276–277.)  The high court 
concluded that “the Wende procedure reasonably ensures that 
an indigent’s appeal will be resolved in a way that is related to 
the merit of that appeal.”  (Id. at pp. 278–279.)  Specifically, 
Wende provides at least two tiers of review and “ensures that a 
trained legal eye has searched the record for arguable issues and 
assists the reviewing court in its own evaluation of the case.”  
(Id. at p. 281.) 
However, the procedures set out in Anders and Wende do 
not apply to an appeal from the denial of postconviction relief, 
even if the defendant has a state-created right to the 
PEOPLE v. DELGADILLO 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
9 
appointment of counsel for that appeal.  (Finley, supra, 481 U.S. 
at pp. 556–557; Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 978; see also 
Austin v. United States (1994) 513 U.S. 5, 8.)  This is because 
“there is no constitutional right to the effective assistance of 
counsel” in state postconviction proceedings.  (People v. Boyer 
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 489; see People v. Young (2005) 
34 Cal.4th 1149, 1232–1233; People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 
1100, 1139–1140; Coleman v. Thompson (1991) 501 U.S. 722, 
755 (Coleman).)  “Anders established a prophylactic framework 
that is relevant when, and only when, a litigant has a previously 
established constitutional right to counsel.”  (Finley, at p. 555.)   
“Postconviction relief is even further removed from the criminal 
trial than is discretionary direct review.  It is not part of the 
criminal proceeding itself, and it is in fact considered to be civil 
in nature.  See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423–424 (1963).  It is 
a collateral attack that normally occurs only after the defendant 
has failed to secure relief through direct review of his conviction.  
States have no obligation to provide this avenue of relief, cf. 
United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317, 323 (1976) (plurality 
opinion), and when they do, the fundamental fairness mandated 
by the Due Process Clause does not require that the State supply 
a lawyer as well.”  (Finley, at pp. 556–557.)  After the first 
appeal as a right, “the Constitution does not put the State to the 
difficult choice between affording no counsel whatsoever or 
following the strict procedural guidelines annunciated in 
Anders.”  (Id. at p. 559.) 
 “Anders’s ‘prophylactic’ procedures are limited in their 
applicability to appointed appellate counsel’s representation of 
an indigent criminal defendant in his first appeal as of right.  
(Pennsylvania v. Finley, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 554–559 [95 
L.Ed.2d at pp. 545–549]; see Anders v. California, supra, 
PEOPLE v. DELGADILLO 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
10 
386 U.S. at pp. 739, 741–742, 744–745 [18 L.Ed.2d at pp. 495, 
496–497, 498–499]; see also Austin v. U.S., supra, 513 U.S. at 
p. [8] [130 L.Ed.2d at p. 223, 115 S.Ct. at p. 381].)  They do not 
extend to an appeal, even on direct review, that is discretionary.  
(See Austin v. U.S., supra, 513 U.S. at p. [8] [130 L.Ed.2d at p. 
223, 115 S.Ct. at p. 381].)  A fortiori, they do not reach collateral 
postconviction proceedings.”  (Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at 
p. 978 [Anders and Wende do not apply to an indigent parent 
appealing a child custody or parental status decision]; see also 
Conservatorship of Ben C. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 529, 535 (Ben C.) 
[Anders and Wende do not apply to conservatorship proceedings 
under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act].)  The reasoning that led 
to the procedures in Anders and Wende thus does not apply to 
Delgadillo’s postconviction proceeding here.  
Furthermore, we have recently affirmed the proposition, 
specifically in the context of section 1172.6, that “[t]here is no 
unconditional state or federal constitutional right to counsel to 
pursue collateral relief from a judgment of conviction.”  (Lewis, 
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972, citing In re Barnett (2003) 31 Cal.4th 
466, 475 [no federal or state “constitutional right to counsel for 
seeking collateral relief from a judgment of conviction via state 
habeas corpus proceedings”]; People v. Shipman (1965) 
62 Cal.2d 226, 232 (Shipman) [observing the same in the context 
of coram nobis relief]; Finley, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 557 
[concluding “respondent has no underlying constitutional right 
to appointed counsel in state postconviction proceedings”].)  As 
Delgadillo concedes, there is no federal constitutional right to 
counsel under subdivision (c) of section 1172.6, and the right to 
PEOPLE v. DELGADILLO 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
11 
counsel at that point in the proceedings is purely statutory.4  
Given there is no constitutional right to counsel in a proceeding 
under section 1172.6, subdivision (c), it would “defy logic” to 
conclude there is a constitutional right to counsel “to appeal 
[that] state collateral determination.”  (Coleman, supra, 
501 U.S. at pp. 756, 757.)  Courts below have uniformly agreed 
that Wende procedures are not constitutionally required on an 
appeal from a denial of a postconviction petition under section 
1172.6.  (See People v. Griffin (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 329, 333; 
People v. Figueras (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 108, 111, review 
granted May 12, 2021, S267870 (Figueras); People v. Scott 
(2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 1127, 1130–1131, review granted March 
17, 2021, S266853 (Scott); People v. Gallo (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 
594, 598–599; People v. Allison (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 449, 456 
(Allison); Cole, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1028, 1039, review 
granted; People v. Flores (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 266, 269, 273 
(Flores).)  Indeed, at oral argument, Delgadillo’s counsel 
abandoned the position that federal constitutional principles 
require Wende review in this case.    
We have noted that a defendant can have a constitutional 
due process right to the appointment of counsel in habeas corpus 
or coram nobis proceedings after a defendant establishes a 
prima facie case for postconviction relief.  (Lewis, supra, 
11 Cal.5th at p. 973 [“ ‘if a [habeas corpus] petition attacking the 
validity of a judgment states a prima facie case leading to 
issuance of an order to show cause, the appointment of counsel 
is demanded by due process concerns’ ”], quoting In re Clark 
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 780; Shipman, supra, 62 Cal.2d at p. 232 
 
4  
Subdivision (c) of section 1172.6 describes the process for 
determining whether a prima facie case for relief has been made. 
PEOPLE v. DELGADILLO 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
12 
[when “an indigent petitioner has stated facts sufficient to 
satisfy the court that a hearing is required, his claim can no 
longer be treated as frivolous and he is entitled to have counsel 
appointed to represent him”].)  The questions raised in such 
cases that attack the validity of the original conviction “are as 
crucial as those that may be raised on direct appeal.”  (Shipman, 
at p. 231.)  Our Shipman precedents have never extended the 
right to counsel to an appeal from a ruling in an ameliorative 
legislative scheme.  In any event, an order to show cause did not 
issue in this case, and Delgadillo did not establish a prima facie 
case for section 1172.6 relief.  (See Shipman, at p. 232 [“in the 
absence of adequate factual allegations stating a prima facie 
case, counsel need not be appointed either in the trial court or 
on appeal from a summary denial of relief in that court”].)  
Anders and Wende, accordingly, do not apply in this case. 
Rather than rely upon constitutional right to counsel 
principles that would compel Wende review, Delgadillo 
alternatively contends that general due process principles 
requiring fundamental fairness constitutionally mandate 
Wende-type procedures for his appeal under the test set forth in 
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services (1981) 452 U.S. 18, 27.  
“[D]ue process does not call for the same procedures in every 
situation.  Instead, ‘ “[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such 
procedural 
protections 
as 
the 
particular 
situation 
demands.” ’ ”  (People v. Tilbury (1991) 54 Cal.3d 56, 68.)  “[W]e 
evaluate and balance these three elements in order to determine 
whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause 
requires Anders’s ‘prophylactic’ procedures for fundamental 
fairness:  (1) the private interests at stake; (2) the state’s 
interests involved; and (3) the risk that the absence of the 
procedures in question will lead to an erroneous resolution of 
PEOPLE v. DELGADILLO 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
13 
the appeal.”  (Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 987; see also 
Lassiter, at p. 27; Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 335.) 
We note at the outset that the Lassiter test has more 
typically been applied to determine whether Anders and Wende 
should be extended to protect a right to counsel that has already 
been identified, which is not the case here.  (E.g., Sade C., supra, 
13 Cal.4th at p. 986.)  It is unclear whether Lassiter has any role 
where, as here, the United States Supreme Court has already 
determined that the right to effective assistance of counsel does 
not extend to postconviction proceedings generally.  (See Finley, 
supra, 481 U.S. at p. 557.)  Nonetheless, the parties do not 
dispute that the Lassiter balancing test should be applied here 
in determining whether Wende procedures should be applied to 
section 1172.6 appeals.  At oral argument, Delgadillo’s counsel 
argued that Lassiter provided the appropriate framework 
following the examples of Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th 952 and 
Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th 529.  He argued that these cases 
suggest that even after we determined that Anders/Wende did 
not apply directly to the circumstances before the court, we then 
went on nonetheless to determine whether the Lassiter test 
favored extending Anders/Wende prophylactic procedures to the 
new context.  (Sade C., at pp. 986–991; Ben C., at pp. 537–543].)    
We need not decide whether the Lassiter test must be applied 
here given Finley’s determination that the right to effective 
assistance of counsel does not extend to postconviction 
proceedings generally.  We apply the Lassiter balancing test 
here only because the parties assume its applicability, and we 
do not now decide its applicability to the current circumstances. 
In any event, general due process principles requiring 
fundamental fairness do not alter the outcome.  Applying the 
first factor, “[i]n an appeal from a denial of a section [1172.6] 
PEOPLE v. DELGADILLO 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
14 
petition, the private interests at stake are the liberty interests 
of the person who may be in custody and seeking release.”  
(Flores, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 274.)  The potential for relief 
under section 1172.6 from a prior murder, attempted murder, or 
manslaughter conviction is a “significant” interest.  (Ben C., 
supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 540.)  We agree with Delgadillo that this 
factor weighs in his favor. 
The state, however, also has an interest in an “economical 
and expeditious resolution” of an appeal from a decision that is 
“presumptively accurate and just.”  (Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th 
at p. 990.)  Independent review in Wende appeals consumes 
substantial judicial resources.  (People v. Serrano (2012) 
211 Cal.App.4th 496, 503 (Serrano).)  Though not as onerous as 
independent review on direct appeal, requiring appellate courts 
to independently review the records of numerous postconviction 
appeals after appointed counsel found no arguable issues would 
still impose a significant burden on the court system.   
Ultimately, “[t]he salient question here is whether the 
absence of the Anders/Wende procedures significantly increases 
the risk of erroneous resolutions.”  (Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at 
p. 538.)  Delgadillo and the Office of State Public Defender cite 
a handful of cases, mostly unpublished, where the Court of 
Appeal identified (or, they contend should have identified 
meritorious issues) in a section 1172.6 appeal, even though a no-
issue brief was filed.  However, this largely anecdotal recitation 
of errors ignores the broader procedural protections already in 
place.  To proceed to an evidentiary hearing, there is only a 
“limited” prima facie inquiry.  (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at 
p. 971.)  The “ ‘prima facie bar was intentionally and correctly 
set very low.’ ”  (Id. at p. 972.)  In all cases, the superior court 
will review the petition before deciding the matter.  While 
PEOPLE v. DELGADILLO 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
15 
section 1172.6 does not require the appointment of counsel on 
appeal, some courts have a routine practice of appointing 
counsel to represent defendants appealing from the denial of 
postconviction relief.  (See, e.g., Cole, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at 
p. 1029, review granted.)  As Delgadillo concedes in arguing for 
a more limited review, appellate courts can often readily confirm 
that a defendant is ineligible for relief as a matter of law without 
conducting an independent review of the entire record.  As 
discussed below, the defendant is also permitted to file a 
supplemental brief if counsel files a brief raising no arguable 
issues.  As also detailed below, if the appellate court wishes, it 
may also exercise its discretion to conduct its own independent 
review of the record in the interest of justice. 
Indeed, the procedures implemented with respect to 
Delgadillo’s petition demonstrate the elaborate protections 
already in place.  After the appointment of counsel, a review of 
the record, briefing, and a hearing, the superior court concluded 
Delgadillo was ineligible for relief as a matter of law because the 
record showed he was the actual and only participant in the 
crime.  On appeal from that determination, Delgadillo again had 
the assistance of appointed counsel, who again examined the 
record and determined there were no grounds upon which to 
challenge the superior court’s determination.  The Legislature 
has already given petitioners broad access to counsel in the 
superior courts (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 968) and 
considered the competing policy considerations in enacting the 
postconviction procedures in section 1172.6.  (Lewis, at p. 969 
[the “legislative background shows the Legislature did, in fact, 
engage in the exact type of cost-benefit assessment and policy 
determination it was entitled to make”].)  Accordingly, once 
appointed counsel here concluded there are no arguable issues, 
PEOPLE v. DELGADILLO 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
16 
“the value of applying the procedures required by our decision 
in Wende in criminal appeals is ‘too slight to compel their 
invocation.’ ”  (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844, 
quoting Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 991.)  
Delgadillo argues that the state Constitution provides its 
own due process guarantee and that we are free to interpret it 
to afford more protection of a defendant’s rights than is required 
under the federal Constitution.  However, for similar reasons, 
the Court of Appeal’s refusal to undertake an independent 
review of the record does not violate the due process clause of 
article I, section 7, subdivision (a), of the California Constitution 
because, again, the balance of interests and risks does not 
mandate such a procedure.  The analysis under the state 
constitutional provision would take into account not only the 
three elements discussed above, “but also, under the first, ‘the 
dignitary interest in informing individuals of the nature, 
grounds and consequences of the [governmental] action [in 
question] and in enabling them to present their side of the story 
before a responsible governmental official . . . .’ ”  (Sade C., 
supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 991, fn. 18, quoting People v. Ramirez 
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 269 (plur. opn. of Mosk, J.).)  However, 
independent review does not further an individual’s dignitary 
interest when counsel has already been given an opportunity to 
present any arguments, found no issues warranting briefing, 
and the defendant was notified that counsel found no issues but 
that the defendant could file supplemental briefing presenting 
PEOPLE v. DELGADILLO 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
17 
any arguments.  We therefore find that the procedures set out 
in Wende do not apply to Delgadillo’s appeal.5 
B. Procedures 
Required 
in 
Section 
1172.6 
Proceedings 
The Attorney General and Delgadillo both suggest that we 
prescribe guidance for counsel and courts to follow in 
postconviction appeals where counsel finds no arguable issues.  
The Attorney General also notes that the appropriate 
procedures may vary depending on the particular context.  We 
agree that it is possible that some more unusual postconviction 
context will call for additional or more specialized requirements.  
We agree though that we should invoke our inherent 
supervisory powers to prescribe a few basic procedures going 
forward, while leaving it to the Courts of Appeal to tailor and 
develop any additional procedures as they see fit.  (See Robinson 
v. Lewis (2020) 9 Cal.5th 883, 899 [“This court has ‘inherent 
authority to establish “rules of judicial procedure” ’ ”].)   
On an appeal from the denial of a section 1172.6 petition, 
we therefore prescribe the following framework.  When 
appointed counsel finds no arguable issues to be pursued on 
appeal:  (1) counsel should file a brief informing the court of that 
 
5  
In this case, we are not deciding Wende’s application to 
other postconviction contexts, which may present different 
considerations.  (E.g., Coleman, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 755 [not 
answering whether “an exception to the rule of Finley” provides 
for a right to effective counsel in state postconviction 
proceedings “where state collateral review is the first place a 
prisoner can present a challenge to his conviction”]; Martinez v. 
Ryan (2012) 566 U.S. 1, 8 [not resolving the question Coleman 
“left open” of “whether a prisoner has a right to effective counsel 
in collateral proceedings which provide the first occasion to raise 
a claim of ineffective assistance at trial”].) 
PEOPLE v. DELGADILLO 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
18 
determination, including a concise recitation of the facts bearing 
on the denial of the petition; and (2) the court should send, with 
a copy of counsel’s brief, notice to the defendant, informing the 
defendant of the right to file a supplemental letter or brief and 
that if no letter or brief is filed within 30 days, the court may 
dismiss the matter.  (Scott, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 1131, 
review granted; Serrano, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 503; Cole, 
supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 1039, review granted; Figueras, 
supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 112, review granted.)   
If the defendant subsequently files a supplemental brief or 
letter, the Court of Appeal is required to evaluate the specific 
arguments presented in that brief and to issue a written opinion.  
The filing of a supplemental brief or letter does not compel an 
independent review of the entire record to identify unraised 
issues.  (Cole, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at p. 1028, review granted; 
Figueras, supra, 61 Cal.App.5th at p. 113, review granted.)  If 
the defendant does not file a supplemental brief or letter, the 
Court of Appeal may dismiss the appeal as abandoned.  
(Serrano, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 503–504.)  If the appeal 
is dismissed as abandoned, the Court of Appeal does not need to 
write an opinion but should notify the defendant when it 
dismisses the matter.  (Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 544.)  
While it is wholly within the court’s discretion, the Court of 
Appeal is not barred from conducting its own independent 
review of the record in any individual section 1172.6 appeal.  
(Scott, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 1131, review granted; 
Figueras, at p. 113, fn. 2, review granted.) 
The procedures announced here, however, are not 
intended to be exhaustive, and the Courts of Appeal are well 
suited to identify any additional procedures for counsel and 
courts to follow in postconviction appeals where counsel finds no 
PEOPLE v. DELGADILLO 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
19 
arguable issues.  The Courts of Appeal are free to adopt 
additional procedures as they see fit. 
C. Notice of the Procedures the Court of Appeal 
Employed 
Delgadillo 
argues 
the 
Court 
of 
Appeal 
provided 
inadequate notice of its procedures in violation of due process 
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.  He 
contends that the court should have notified his counsel that 
involuntary dismissal was being considered and requested 
briefing on that issue.  The Attorney General counters that 
Delgadillo had adequate notice and every reason to anticipate 
that his appeal could be dismissed.  
We conclude that the notice provided in this case was 
suboptimal. Delgadillo’s counsel did file a brief raising no 
arguable issues.  The Court of Appeal also sent Delgadillo notice 
of his right to file a supplemental brief, and yet he declined to 
do so.  However, the notice the Court of Appeal sent Delgadillo 
and counsel affirmatively cited Wende after Delgadillo’s counsel 
had filed a brief pursuant to Wende.  The court advised 
Delgadillo by letter that “[c]ounsel appointed to represent 
appellant on appeal has filed appellant’s opening brief.  
Counsel’s inability to find any arguable issues may be readily 
inferred from the failure to raise any.  (People v. Wende[, supra, 
] 25 Cal.3d [at p.] 442.)”  This notice directly implicates the core 
holding of Wende:  “We conclude that Anders requires the court 
to conduct a review of the entire record whenever appointed 
counsel submits a brief which raises no specific issues or 
describes the appeal as frivolous.  This obligation is triggered by 
the receipt of such a brief from counsel and does not depend on 
the subsequent receipt of a brief from the defendant personally.”  
PEOPLE v. DELGADILLO 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
20 
(Wende, at pp. 441–442.)  Delgadillo reasonably could have 
concluded from this notice that the Wende procedures would 
apply and that the Court of Appeal would conduct an 
independent review of the record, even absent a supplemental 
brief — even though the Court of Appeal later determined, 
without providing an opportunity to be heard on the matter, that 
Wende was inapplicable.  The notice further did not inform 
Delgadillo that the appeal would be dismissed as abandoned if 
no supplemental brief or letter were filed.  While arguing that 
the notice was adequate, the Attorney General concedes that the 
court should ordinarily “give the appellant clear notice that the 
court will dismiss the appeal as abandoned if no supplemental 
brief is received.”  We therefore conclude that the notice in this 
case was suboptimal.   
Nevertheless, we determine, based on our independent 
review of the record, that Delgadillo is not entitled to any relief 
under section 1172.6.  Indeed, the record here makes clear that 
Delgadillo was the actual killer and the only participant in the 
killing.  Specifically, eyewitnesses identified him as the driver 
of a Ford Explorer that crossed into incoming traffic and crashed 
into another vehicle, killing the passenger.  At trial, defense 
counsel conceded that the accident occurred while Delgadillo 
was driving on the wrong side of the road.  (See § 1172.6, subd. 
(a) [“A person convicted of felony murder or murder under the 
natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory 
under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that 
person’s participation in a crime, attempted murder under the 
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter 
may file a petition with the court” to have the conviction 
vacated].)  We affirm the Court of Appeal’s holding that Wende 
PEOPLE v. DELGADILLO 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
21 
procedures are not constitutionally compelled on Delgadillo’s 
appeal.6 
III.  DISPOSITION 
For the reasons discussed above, the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GROBAN, J. 
 
 
We Concur: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
GUERRERO, J. 
 
 
 
6  
We are choosing to conduct independent review in the 
interest of judicial economy, but we emphasize that the decision 
to conduct independent review is solely up to the discretion of 
the Courts of Appeal and is not required.  In light of our own 
independent review of the record, we do not reach the 
constitutional question raised by Delgadillo of whether the 
notice he received violated due process. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Delgadillo 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished) XX NP opn. filed 11/18/20 – 2d Dist. 
Div. 4 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S266305 
Date Filed:  December 19, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Los Angeles 
Judge:  Katherine Mader 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Nancy J. King and Eric R. Larson, under appointments by the 
Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Michael J. Mongan, State Solicitor 
General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Janill L. 
Richards, Principal Deputy State Solicitor General, Julie L. Garland 
and Charles Ragland, Assistant Attorneys General, Samuel P. Siegel, 
Deputy State Solicitor General, Lynne G. McGinnis, Deputy Attorney 
General, and Amari L. Hammonds, Associate Deputy State Solicitor 
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Eric R. Larson 
Attorney at Law 
330 J Street, #609 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 238-5575 
 
Samuel P. Siegel 
Deputy State Solicitor General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA 94102 
(415) 510-3917