Case Title: Lake Cty. Bar Assn. v. Davies

Citation: 2015-Ohio-4904

Docket Number: 2014-1735

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2015-12-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Lake Cty. Bar Assn. v. Davies, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-4904.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-4904 
LAKE COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. DAVIES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Lake Cty. Bar Assn. v. Davies, Slip Opinion No.  
2015-Ohio-4904.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
including misappropriating client funds, engaging in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, failing to provide 
competent representation, failing to cooperate with a disciplinary 
investigation, charging an excessive fee, and engaging in conduct that 
adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law—Permanent 
disbarment. 
(No. 2014-1735—Submitted March 11, 2015—Decided December 1, 2015.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 2013-005. 
______________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, David Harrison Davies of Willoughby, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0016318, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1973.  
On February 27, 2014, relator, Lake County Bar Association, filed a three-count 
second amended complaint with the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline.1  The complaint alleged that Davies settled a personal-injury case 
without his clients’ authorization and never distributed the funds, failed to 
competently represent another client in a dental-malpractice case, and failed to 
disclose a conflict of interest and committed other ethical violations in the process 
of representing a client in the administration of an estate. 
{¶ 2} At the July 18, 2014 disciplinary hearing before a panel of the board, 
Davies stipulated to the truth of the facts as alleged in the second amended 
complaint, and the parties stipulated to the admission of each other’s exhibits into 
evidence.  Davies, the only witness appearing at the hearing, testified about the 
devastating effects of a son’s death in 1999; the death of his father in 2001; the 
significant health problems of his newborn grandson, who was living with him, in 
2004; the unexpected death of his son-in-law, who was living with him, in 2009; 
the death of his father-in-law, with whom he was close, in 2010; the death of his 
older brother two years later from Alzheimer’s disease; and the depression that he 
did not acknowledge for a number of years, for which he ultimately sought 
professional help. 
{¶ 3} In its report, the panel stated that Davies had admitted the factual 
allegations in his answer to the complaint and that he did not dispute any of the 
alleged violations that remained pending at the end of the hearing.  The panel 
recommended an indefinite suspension, with conditions on Davies’s future 
reinstatement.  The board adopted the panel’s findings of fact and conclusions of 
                                                 
1 Effective January 1, 2015, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline has been 
renamed the Board of Professional Conduct.  See Gov.Bar R. V(1)(A), 140 Ohio St.3d CII. 
January Term, 2015 
 
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law but recommended that Davies be permanently disbarred.  Davies has objected 
to the board’s recommended sanction, focusing in large part on his undiagnosed 
depression that was recognized after the misconduct had occurred and that he 
alleges contributed greatly to his misconduct. 
{¶ 4} We adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct, overrule 
Davies’s objections, and agree that Davies should be permanently disbarred. 
Misconduct 
Count One—The Scott Matter 
{¶ 5} In October 2008, Davies filed a personal-injury suit on behalf of 
Nannette Scott and her husband.  He voluntarily dismissed the case in 2009, then 
eventually refiled, settled, and dismissed it, all without the knowledge and 
authorization of his clients.  Mrs. Scott found out about the settlement during a 
conversation with another lawyer. 
{¶ 6} In June 2009, Davies accepted a check for $14,500 from the Scotts’ 
insurance company, made payable to Mrs. Scott, Mr. Scott, and Davies.  The 
Scotts allege that the endorsement signatures on the back of that check are not 
theirs and were signed without their permission, and the panel and board 
concluded that Davies signed their names without their knowledge or 
authorization.  After signing his own name to the back of the check, Davies 
deposited the money into his client trust account and took some of the money for 
his attorney fees.  The Scotts did not receive any of the money.  In August 2011, 
Davies received another check for $1,000 from the insurance company.  The 
smaller check was never negotiated, and its whereabouts are unknown. 
{¶ 7} In October 2011—after he had settled the case—Davies requested 
that his clients execute releases.  The Scotts refused to sign the releases, hired a 
new attorney, filed a malpractice suit against Davies, and obtained a $100,000 
default judgment against him.  That judgment remains unsatisfied. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 8} The panel and board found that Davies’s conduct violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.2(a) (requiring a lawyer to abide by the client’s decisions 
concerning the objectives of representation and to consult with the client as to the 
means by which they are to be pursued), 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with 
reasonable diligence in representing a client), 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to 
keep the client reasonably informed about the status of a matter), 1.15 (requiring a 
lawyer to preserve the identity of client funds and property and promptly deliver 
funds or other property that the client is entitled to receive), 8.4(b) (prohibiting a 
lawyer from committing an illegal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s 
honesty or trustworthiness), 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(d) (prohibiting 
a lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice).  The panel unanimously dismissed an allegation that Davies violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to comply as soon as practicable with 
reasonable requests for information from the client). 
Count Two—The Babcock Matter 
{¶ 9} In December 2009, Davies filed a dental-malpractice case on behalf 
of William C. Babcock.  In the course of that litigation, Davies failed to timely 
produce the necessary affidavit of merit, failed to produce an expert report, and 
failed to file a response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss or for summary 
judgment, which was granted by the trial court.  He filed an appeal, but his 
appellate brief was stricken because it did not comply with court rules.  He was 
granted leave to file a corrected brief but failed to do so, and the appeal was 
dismissed.  Although the court of appeals granted his motion to reinstate the 
appeal, the appeal ultimately failed on the merits.  The appellate court noted in its 
opinion that his repeated failures to comply with the trial court’s orders and to 
produce an expert report during the year that the case was pending demonstrated a 
January Term, 2015 
 
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complete disregard for the judicial system and the defendants’ rights.  See 
Babcock v. Albrecht, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2010-L-150, 2012-Ohio-1129, ¶ 28. 
{¶ 10} Babcock filed a grievance against Davies, and Davies failed to 
respond to the ensuing disciplinary investigation. 
{¶ 11} The panel and board found that this conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 
1.1 (requiring a lawyer to provide competent representation to a client), 1.3, and 
8.4(d) and Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) (now Gov.Bar R. V(9)(G)) (requiring a lawyer to 
cooperate with a disciplinary investigation).  The panel unanimously dismissed an 
allegation that Davies violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.4 (requiring a lawyer to reasonably 
communicate with a client). 
Count Three—The Griffith Estate 
{¶ 12} Davies represented Raymond Griffith in various matters over 
several years.  He defended him in an eviction action, obtained the revocation of a 
power of attorney that had been granted by Griffith’s father to another person, and 
defended and settled a claim filed against Griffith’s father for nursing-home 
care—all of which served to protect Griffith’s expectancy in a parcel of real estate 
owned by his father—and represented Griffith in a case involving unpaid child 
support.  Davies claims that because Griffith had no money to pay him for his 
legal representation, they entered into a contingent-fee agreement entitling Davies 
to one-third of the gross value of any interest that Griffith acquired in the real 
estate or any settlement he received in lieu of the real estate.  Davies never 
produced a signed contingency-fee agreement. 
{¶ 13} After Griffith took title to the real estate, he and Davies apparently 
agreed that Davies would instead receive a flat fee of $50,000 for the past legal 
representation, and they reduced the agreement to a promissory note for that 
amount that was secured by a mortgage on the real estate.  Griffith’s obligation to 
pay Davies $50,000 remained unpaid at Griffith’s death, intestate, in 2007 and 
was the largest amount owed by his estate to any creditor. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 14} Davies was retained by Griffith’s daughter, Rae Ann Enos, to assist 
her in the administration of Griffith’s estate.  While probating the estate, Davies 
obtained some of the proceeds from the sale of the real estate to satisfy in full the 
debt for $50,000 he claimed he was owed, but he never advised Enos that he was 
the largest creditor of the estate, never had her sign a waiver of the conflict of 
interest that arose when he was both a creditor of the estate and the attorney who 
was probating it, and never submitted his claim to the probate court for approval. 
{¶ 15} While the estate was being probated, Enos informed Davies that 
she had a half-sister named Deana Ivancic, who was Griffith’s biological daughter 
by a woman whom Griffith had never married.  Enos told Davies that Ivancic may 
have been adopted by the man who married Ivancic’s mother.  Davies took no 
action to determine whether Ivancic was a legitimate heir to Griffith’s estate, and 
the estate was closed. 
{¶ 16} In June 2009, Ivancic discovered that Griffith had died two years 
earlier.  She retained an attorney, who learned that Griffith’s estate had been 
administered without including Ivancic, who had not been adopted by the man her 
mother married, as an heir.  Ivancic filed an application to reopen the estate, but 
Davies made no filing in response to Ivancic’s application, he failed to attend any 
scheduled hearings, and he did not return telephone calls to Ivancic’s attorney.  
Because Davies and Enos were not cooperating in reopening the estate, Ivancic 
filed a breach-of-fiduciary-duty lawsuit against Enos, who obtained new counsel.  
Ivancic later discovered that Davies had received the $50,000 payment from the 
estate and added him as a defendant, and Enos cross-claimed against Davies.  
Following a hearing, Davies was found to have unlawfully taken the $50,000 
from the estate and was ordered to return those funds, plus $1,500 of the $3,000 
he had received in attorney’s fees for probating the estate.  He was also ordered to 
pay a total of $16,009.80 in attorney fees to Ivancic and Enos.  Although Davies’s 
bank records show that he deposited substantial funds into his accounts from July 
January Term, 2015 
 
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2011 through January 2012, he has never satisfied the $67,509.80 judgment 
against him and was held in contempt for failing to comply with the court’s order.  
The panel and board found that he did not cooperate in the judgment-debtor 
proceedings against him and also found that although Davies claimed that he did 
not know the sources of the deposits made into his client trust account, he 
admitted that he had paid personal expenses directly out of the account. 
{¶ 17} The panel and board found that Davies’s conduct in this matter 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1, 1.5(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from making an agreement 
for, charging, or collecting a clearly excessive fee), 1.7(b) (prohibiting the 
continued representation of a client if a conflict of interest would be created, 
unless the affected client gives informed consent in writing), 1.8(a)(2) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly acquiring an ownership, possessory, 
security or other pecuniary interest that is adverse to a client unless the client is 
advised in writing of the desirability of obtaining independent legal counsel), 
8.4(d), and 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct that adversely 
reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law).  With respect to the violation of 
Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(h), the panel and board found that Davies’s conduct was 
sufficiently egregious that it warranted a separate finding of that violation.  See 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Bricker, 137 Ohio St.3d 35, 2013-Ohio-3998, 997 N.E.2d 
500, ¶ 21. 
Sanction 
{¶ 18} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B).2 
{¶ 19} The panel determined, and the board agreed, that the applicable 
aggravating factors are that Davies (1) had a dishonest or selfish motive, (2) 
engaged in a pattern of misconduct, (3) committed multiple offenses, (4) failed to 
cooperate in the investigation of the Babcock grievance, (5) failed to admit that he 
had forged his clients’ signatures on a check until the panel hearing, (6) caused 
significant financial harm to the clients involved in all three counts, and (7) failed 
to make restitution or pay the judgments against him.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(b), (c), (d), (e), (g), (h), and (i).  The panel additionally found, and the 
board agreed, that the eighth aggravating factor is Davies’s failure to cooperate 
during the judgment-debtor examinations regarding the Griffith estate. 
{¶ 20} In mitigation, the panel and board found that Davies does not have 
a prior disciplinary record and that he submitted five letters from persons 
supporting his character and reputation.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a) and 
(e).  The panel and board specifically declined to consider Davies’s diagnosis of 
severe depression as a mitigating factor due to certain factual inaccuracies and 
inconsistencies in a letter submitted by his treating psychiatrist. 
{¶ 21} After considering seven disciplinary cases in which the respondents 
received indefinite suspensions for what the panel viewed as comparable 
misconduct, the panel recommended that we indefinitely suspend Davies from the 
practice of law and that we condition his reinstatement on proof of a positive 
mental-health evaluation and payment of restitution.  Although the board adopted 
the panel’s findings of fact and misconduct, it recommended permanent 
disbarment based on the nature of Davies’s conduct and the significant harm he 
caused to his clients. 
                                                 
2 Effective January 1, 2015, the aggravating and mitigating factors previously set forth in BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1) and (2) are codified in Gov.Bar R. V(13).  140 Ohio St.3d CXXIV. 
January Term, 2015 
 
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{¶ 22} Davies has filed objections to the board’s findings and 
recommendation, disputing some details of several of the factual findings but not 
disputing that he committed the disciplinary violations.  Davies relies on his 
lengthy undiagnosed depression as the reason for the change in his behavior after 
competently representing clients for almost 30 years and argues that the board 
should have acknowledged that his psychiatrist’s letter accurately explained that 
his actions were due to his depression.  He states that he did not offer this 
evidence of his mental illness as an excuse for his actions.  However, even if he 
had attempted to make that argument, the evidence he submitted is insufficient to 
sustain his burden of proving mental-health mitigation.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(g) (now Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7)). 
{¶ 23} We overrule Davies’s objections, adopt the board’s findings of fact 
and misconduct, and agree that permanent disbarment is the appropriate sanction 
in this case. 
{¶ 24} In Cleveland Bar Assn. v. Dixon, 95 Ohio St.3d 490, 2002-Ohio-
2490, 769 N.E.2d 816, the respondent neglected a probate estate by failing to 
accurately identify funds, failing to file accurate accounts in a timely fashion, 
failing to deliver assets to beneficiaries in a timely fashion, and failing to provide 
full information in a timely fashion to the court and to her client.  She also failed 
to account for fiduciary funds, made improper transfers of those funds by 
withdrawing them for her own use, transferred $110,000 of her client’s assets to 
her brother and another person without her client’s knowledge, charged an 
excessive fee, and failed to cooperate with the disciplinary investigation for 
months.  The respondent had no prior discipline, submitted positive character 
witnesses, and ultimately made restitution to the estate, but we did not give the 
latter factor great weight because of the circumstances surrounding that 
repayment.  We permanently disbarred the respondent for her multiple violations 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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of the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  Id. at  
¶ 27-28. 
{¶ 25} In Trumbull Cty. Bar Assn. v. Kafantaris, 121 Ohio St.3d 387, 
2009-Ohio-1389, 904 N.E.2d 875, the respondent did not disclose a personal-
injury settlement to the probate court following the death of his client and 
misappropriated the funds for his own use.  He also lied in an affidavit to this 
court regarding his earlier disciplinary suspension, the terms of which he had 
failed to abide by, converted a client’s proceeds from a life-insurance policy for 
his own use, kept virtually no written records for at least some of his client trust 
accounts, and failed to cooperate in the disciplinary process for months.  We 
considered the five aggravating factors found to be present and gave no mitigating 
weight to character testimony from numerous individuals, most of whom were 
family members.  Finding that the respondent “callously disregarded his client’s 
interests” and “show[ed] disrespect for the judicial system as a whole,” we 
permanently disbarred him from the practice of law.  Id. at ¶ 15. 
{¶ 26} And in Greene Cty. Bar Assn. v. Saunders, 132 Ohio St.3d 29, 
2012-Ohio-1651, 968 N.E.2d 470, the respondent committed numerous violations 
of the Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules 
of Professional Conduct in his representation of four clients.  He misappropriated 
more than $40,000 of a client’s funds, lied to the client about having paid her 
mother’s estate taxes with those funds, and refused to discuss the matter with his 
client.  The respondent was retained by a different client to file a lawsuit but 
failed to do so and never returned that client’s phone calls, neglected to finalize an 
estate account for a third client, even though he had been ordered to do so by a 
probate judge, and failed to respond to a disciplinary investigation concerning his 
alleged failure to file an appellate brief in a criminal matter.  Based on the serious 
nature of the misconduct and the many aggravating factors present, we adopted 
the board’s recommendation of permanent disbarment.  Id. at ¶ 18-19. 
January Term, 2015 
 
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{¶ 27} In Dixon, we stated that misappropriation of client funds carries a 
“presumptive sanction of disbarment.”  95 Ohio St.3d 490, 2002-Ohio-2490, 769 
N.E.2d 816, at ¶ 15.  Here, misappropriation is just one of Davies’s many 
violations.  And although the presumption of a specific sanction may be overcome 
if “an abundance of mitigating evidence” warrants a different result, Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Markijohn, 99 Ohio St.3d 489, 2003-Ohio-4129, 794 N.E.2d 24, ¶ 8, 
there is no such evidence here.  The compelling interest of protecting the public 
requires that the strictest discipline be imposed under these circumstances. 
{¶ 28} Accordingly, David Harrison Davies is permanently disbarred from 
the practice of law in Ohio.  Costs are taxed to Davies. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
KENNEDY, FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent and would indefinitely 
suspend the respondent from the practice of law in Ohio. 
_________________ 
 
James P. Koerner, for relator. 
 
David Harrison Davies, pro se. 
_________________