Case Title: Haynes v. Golub Corp.

Citation: 166 Vt. 228, 692 A.2d 377

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1997-01-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Haynes v. Golub Corp.  (95-444); 166 Vt. 228; 692 A.2d 377

[Filed 31-Jan-1997]

NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

                                 No. 95-444

Marylu Haynes                                     Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
     v.                                            Washington Superior Court

Golub Corporation, et al.                         April Term, 1996

David A. Jenkins, J.

Leighton C. Detora of Valsangiacomo, Detora & McQuesten, P.C., Barre, for
plaintiff-appellee

Robert H. Claridge, Schenectady, New York, and John J. Boylan, III of Boylan
& Bowen, Springfield, for defendants-appellants

PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.

DOOLEY, J.   Defendant Golub Corporation (FN1) appeals from a $175,000 jury
verdict finding that defendant had wrongfully discharged plaintiff, Marylu
Haynes.  Defendant raises four claims of error:  (1) there was insufficient
evidence to support the jury's finding that plaintiff was fired without
sufficient cause; (2) evidence regarding a promise to retransfer plaintiff to
her backdoor receiver position was erroneously admitted; (3) the jury
instructions on reducing damages for future wages to present value misled the
jury and require a new trial on damages; and (4) the trial court erred in
failing to grant a remittitur or, in the alternative, a new trial on damages
because the jury award was excessive.  We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Plaintiff was a long-time employee of a grocery store first owned by
Martin's, then by P & C, and finally by defendant, which operated it as Price
Chopper, Inc.  Defendant retained plaintiff as an employee and granted her
sixteen years of seniority for her years of employment with the former
owners.

 

Plaintiff began as a backdoor receiver, the same position she had with P & C. 
As a receiver, plaintiff kept the back room clean, took care of any damage,
and checked in inventory items that came into the store.  She continued to
work as a backdoor receiver until a new store manager decided to transfer her
to the deli department.  Plaintiff resisted the transfer, explaining to the
manager that she understood that the deli supervisor was a difficult person
to work under. Plaintiff finally agreed to the transfer on the condition that
if it did not work out, she would be able to return to her original receiver
position.  The manager agreed to the condition and put it in writing.

Another employee expressed surprise about the transfer to the manager because
everyone knew that plaintiff did not get along with the deli manager. 
Moreover, the deli department was busy and understaffed.  When the employee
asked the manager about the transfer, he replied with a muffled laugh, "We'll
see which one of them goes out the door first."

After some time in the deli department, plaintiff requested to be returned to
her receiver position.  The manager replied to the effect that if plaintiff
went back to her receiver position, she would end up being fired within two
weeks.  Somewhat intimidated by the manager's remarks, plaintiff remained at
her deli position.  Subsequently, she was disciplined on three occasions. 
The latter two incidents became the basis of her termination.

The first incident involved the use of abusive language.  Plaintiff was
written up for swearing at a co-worker.  The second alleged act of misconduct
occurred on December 4, 1991 when plaintiff was disciplined for acting rudely
towards a customer who requested a complimentary cup of coffee.  The store
manager recorded the violation, reporting in writing: "[c]ustomer asked
[plaintiff] for free cup of coffee and [plaintiff] ignored and was rude when
he asked her for the coffee -- customer felt he was intruding and was upset
after I personally told him that free coffee was available at deli."  For
this infraction, plaintiff received a three-day suspension and a warning that
in the event of further infractions, she would be terminated.

In January, the deli supervisor told another employee that the store
management was looking for a way to "get rid of" plaintiff.  The supervisor
complained that plaintiff's presence

 

in the deli department was requiring her to cut the hours of part-time
workers to pay plaintiff's salary as a long-tenured employee.  To a different
employee, the supervisor described plaintiff as the most highly paid deli
employee and part of the reason the deli was losing money.

On January 16, 1992, plaintiff was again disciplined for rude conduct toward
a patron. A customer complained that plaintiff had been rude and had thrown
cold cuts of meat at her. The store manager again documented this incident on
the appropriate form, but plaintiff refused to sign and verify the complaint. 
On the basis of this alleged violation of store policy, defendant terminated
plaintiff on January 23, 1992.

Plaintiff brought this wrongful discharge action in May 1992.  She claimed
that her at-will employment relationship was modified by defendant's policy
to terminate employees only for just cause.  She disputed that either of the
disciplinary incidents occurred as charged.  She alleged that she was set up
for failure by the transfer to the deli department because of the personal
animus of the manager and her status as a long-term employee with a
relatively large salary.

Plaintiff also claimed two violations of specific personnel policies in the
decision to discharge her.  First, plaintiff argued that defendant's employee
handbook required four misconduct citations to support termination, and only
three had occurred.  Second, she argued that the handbook provided extra
procedural protection for employees with five or more years of experience,
that the proposed termination would be "automatically . . . reviewed" by the
company president, and that that had not occurred.

The case was tried to a jury in November 1994.  Following the presentation of
evidence, the trial court held a jury charge conference.  Defendant agreed to
jury instructions on just cause for termination and also to instructions that
the jury had to determine whether the proffered reasons for plaintiff's
termination were pretextual.  Defendant objected, however, to the trial
court's instructions on future damages.  Both defendant and plaintiff agreed
to submit the following interrogatories for the jury to answer:

 

     1.   Was there an employment contract which required just
          cause for discharge?
     2.   If your answer is YES, was the Plaintiff discharged without
          just cause?
     3.   Aside from the just cause discharge question, was there a
          substantial breach of contract of employment by Defendant
          in the manner and means of discharge?
     4.   If your answer to questions 1 and 2 were yes, or your
          answer to question 3 was yes, what damages, if any, were
          proximately caused by the breach of contract?
     5.   Do you award punitive damages?

The jury chose to believe plaintiff's version of the events.  It found that
(1) plaintiff could be terminated only for just cause, (2) plaintiff was
discharged without just cause, and (3) defendant breached its contract in the
manner and means of discharge.  As a result, the jury awarded plaintiff
compensatory damages in the amount of $175,000.  No punitive damages were
awarded.

Following the verdict, defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict.  It also moved for a new trial on liability on the basis that
irrelevant evidence was erroneously admitted and on damages because of an
error in the jury instructions.  It requested that the court order a
remittitur or, in the alternative, a new trial on damages because the jury
award was excessive. The trial court denied all of defendant's motions.

Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant its
motion for judgment as a matter of law made after the verdict on plaintiff's
wrongful discharge and breach-of-implied-contract claims.  The motion for
judgment as a matter of law is the successor to the motion for a directed
verdict and the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.  See
V.R.C.P. 50.  Although the terminology has changed, the applicable standard
has not.  See Reporter's Notes to 1995 Amendment, V.R.C.P. 50.  Thus, on
review of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, we must determine
"`whether the result reached by the jury is sound in law on the evidence
produced.'"  Nadeau v. Imtec, Inc., 164 Vt. ___, ___,