Case Title: Commonwealth v. Dorazio

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11765

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2015-09-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11765 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  HERBERT DORAZIO. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     February 3, 2015. - September 2, 2015. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Rape.  Assault with Intent to Rape.  Evidence, Prior misconduct, 
Relevancy and materiality.  Practice, Criminal, Trial of 
indictments together, Mistrial, New trial, Assistance of 
counsel, Fair trial, Collateral estoppel, Double jeopardy.  
Constitutional Law, Fair trial, Double jeopardy.  Due 
Process of Law, Fair trial, Collateral estoppel.  Fair 
Trial.  Collateral Estoppel. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on February 12, 2009. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Thomas P. Billings, J., and a 
motion for new trial, filed on April 6, 2012, was heard by him. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review.  
 
 
 
Marissa Elkins for the defendant. 
 
Patrick G. Fitzgerald, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
2 
 
 
HINES, J.  In July, 2010, a jury in the Superior Court 
found the defendant, Herbert Dorazio, guilty of rape of a child, 
Susan, by force, and of assault with intent to rape a second 
child, Jane.1,2  The defendant appealed.  In a memorandum and 
order pursuant to its rule 1:28, the Appeals Court affirmed the 
convictions.  Commonwealth v. Dorazio, 85 Mass. App. Ct. 1127 
(2014).  We granted the defendant's application for further 
appellate review. 
 
Represented by new counsel on appeal, the defendant argues 
that his convictions should be reversed because the judge 
erroneously (1) denied his motion for relief from prejudicial 
joinder; (2) admitted certain evidence of prior bad acts and 
other propensity evidence; (3) denied his motion for a mistrial; 
and (4) denied his motion for a new trial based on ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel.3  For the reasons that follow, we 
reverse his convictions. 
                     
 
1 In the interest of privacy, we use the same pseudonyms 
adopted by the Appeals Court.  Commonwealth v. Dorazio, 85 Mass. 
App. Ct. 1127 (2014).  See Commonwealth v. Aviles, 461 Mass. 60, 
61 n.1 (2011). 
 
 
2 The jury acquitted the defendant of indecent assault and 
battery on a child under the age of fourteen (Jane), G. L. 
c. 265, § 13B. 
 
 
3 The Appeals Court consolidated the defendant's direct 
appeal with the appeal from the denial of his motion for a new 
trial. 
 
3 
 
 
Facts.  We recite the facts that the jury could have found, 
reserving the development of other facts to the discussion of 
specific issues raised.  Commonwealth v. McCoy, 456 Mass. 838, 
839 (2010).  The incidents giving rise to the charges took place 
at the defendant's home.  Susan and Jane, the complainants, were 
neighbors of the defendant.  Their families were part of a 
close-knit residential neighborhood, in which there were many 
families with young children who would frequently socialize 
together.  While initially the defendant engaged with the adults 
during these occasions, he later gravitated toward spending time 
with the children. 
 
During the summer after Susan completed kindergarten, in 
1996, she was playing with several children in the defendant's 
basement.  The defendant asked her to go outside with him to 
look at something in the back yard.  They went through a door in 
the basement that opened up under a deck.  The other children 
stayed inside.  The defendant knelt down on his left knee, 
touched Susan on her back, and asked her to sit on his right 
knee.  Susan complied.  The defendant put his hand on Susan's 
inner thigh, then slid his fingers under her shorts and under 
her underwear.  He inserted one of his fingers into her vagina 
and moved it "in circular motions."  This went on for a "few 
minutes," until the defendant heard something and they went back 
inside the house. 
4 
 
 
Approximately one to two weeks later, "[i]t happened 
again."  Susan was playing at the defendant's house with other 
children and the defendant asked her to go outside with him.  
Under the deck, he knelt on one knee and had her sit on the 
other.  The defendant put his hand inside her underwear and 
inserted a finger into her vagina, moving it "[a]round and in 
and out" for a "few minutes."4 
 
Sometime around 2000 or 2001, the defendant separated from 
his wife and moved out of the neighborhood.  He did not, 
thereafter, attend any neighborhood gatherings. 
 
In June, 2008, after seeing the defendant at a gasoline 
station, Susan went home "hysterical" and told her mother (the 
first complaint witness for Susan) that the defendant had "hurt 
her" and in response to her mother's questions "looked at her 
lap."5 
                     
 
4 During Susan's cross-examination, defense counsel 
questioned her about using a ladder to view a bird's nest under 
the defendant's porch.  Susan recalled a bird's nest somewhere 
under the defendant's porch, but not using a step ladder to see 
it. 
 
 
5 During the cross-examination of Susan's mother, she 
recalled a bird's nest in the deck area of the defendant's porch 
in the summer of 1996.  Her daughter showed it to her.  Susan's 
mother, however, denied that the defendant had informed her of 
an incident involving Susan where Susan had fallen off a step 
ladder that she had climbed to view the nest.  Susan's mother 
also testified that the defendant did not give her a video 
recording of the bird's nest. 
 
5 
 
 
Concerning the other complainant, during the late spring or 
early summer of 1998, when she was six years of age, Jane 
testified to playing Wiffle ball with some children in the 
defendant's back yard; the defendant was pitching.  The ball 
went into some nearby woods.  The defendant asked Jane to go 
inside his house to get another ball.  Jane followed the 
defendant to the laundry room in the basement.  The defendant 
told Jane that the Wiffle balls were on a shelf above the 
washing machine that he could not reach.  He told her that she 
would have to reach for the ball and lifted her on top of the 
washing machine.  As Jane stood on top of the machine, the 
defendant touched the inside of her knee with one hand.  The 
defendant then moved his hand under Jane's underwear and touched 
her vagina, moving his fingers around "[v]ertically" for about 
ten seconds.  Frozen, Jane heard something jingle and the 
defendant took her right hand, put his penis in it, and told 
her, "Hold on.  Hold this."6  In seventh grade, Jane first told a 
friend (her first complaint witness) about the incident. 
 
Over the defendant's objection, the judge admitted evidence 
from three witnesses concerning an incident that took place on 
June 13, 1998, at a restaurant in Burlington involving the 
                     
 
6 These facts served as the basis for indecent assault and 
battery charge, on which the defendant was acquitted. 
 
6 
 
defendant and a young girl, J.D., who was six years of age.7  
J.D. testified that, on that date, she was at the restaurant 
with friends and family celebrating her birthday.  She and a 
friend8 were in a play tube along with other children.  Also 
present was an adult male and his toddler son.  The girls tried 
to avoid the man, but he cornered them in a dead end and began 
chatting with them.  J.D. gave a description of the man, but was 
unable to identify him in the court room. 
 
When his son started crawling in the opposite direction, 
the man placed his hand on J.D.'s knee and his other hand on her 
friend's knee.  His hand went up and under her dress and inside 
the front of her underwear, where it stayed for a minute or two 
before there was an interruption of some kind and the man and 
                     
 
7 Before J.D. testified, the judge gave an extensive 
limiting instruction concerning the use of the evidence of this 
incident, telling the jury that the Commonwealth bore the burden 
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the incident 
had occurred; that the incident formed the basis of a criminal 
charge for which the defendant had been acquitted; that the jury 
could not consider the evidence as bad act or propensity 
evidence or as a substitute for proof that the defendant 
committed the crimes charged in this case; and that they could 
consider the evidence only on the limited issue whether the 
defendant had acted intentionally or by mistake, accident, or 
some other innocent purpose and not for any other purpose.  
Before the other two witnesses testified, the judge reminded the 
jury that this instruction also applied to their testimony. 
 
 
8 The friend did not testify. 
 
7 
 
the girls headed in opposite directions.  J.D. later saw the man 
when she was with her father. 
 
J.D.'s father testified that, at the party, another parent 
had approached him, after which he summoned J.D. from the tube 
structure and asked her if someone had touched her, then asked 
her to point out who had done so.  She identified a man the 
father had seen earlier in the tubes, and whom he identified in 
the court room as the defendant.  J.D.'s father told the manager 
that his daughter had been assaulted and requested that he 
telephone the police. 
 
Burlington police Officer Charles T. Ferguson responded and 
was directed to a man he identified at trial as the defendant.  
After the defendant identified himself, the officer administered 
the Miranda warnings to the defendant and told him that he 
wished to speak with him about some "allegations" concerning 
some improper touching of girls.9  Asked whether he had had any 
contact with any children not his own, the defendant replied 
that "he may have had an accidental bumping of children up while 
he was in there playing with his children, but as far as 
knowingly touching them, he said absolutely not." 
                     
 
9 The judge gave a limiting instruction at this point, to 
the effect that the officer's statements were not evidence and 
that the jury were to consider only the defendant's responses. 
 
8 
 
 
The defendant testified.  He denied placing Susan on his 
knee or sexually assaulting her, and denied spending time with 
Jane in his basement and placing her on top of the washing 
machine and touching her as she testified.  The defendant 
recalled taking his toddler son, in 1998, to a restaurant where 
they met two girls in a tube play structure.  He testified that 
they remarked on his "cute baby," who then crawled all over 
them.  The defendant had to change position, but was able to 
pull his son away from the girls.  The defendant and his son 
crawled away and the girls "scooted by" and "bumped" him as they 
passed.  The defendant was arrested later that day, was tried, 
and was acquitted.10 
 
Discussion.  1.  Joinder.  Contrary to the defendant's 
contention, there was no abuse of discretion in the denial of 
his motion for relief from prejudicial joinder.  Commonwealth v. 
Walker, 442 Mass. 185, 199 (2004).  The facts of this case 
demonstrate that, although each offense involved different 
complainants, they were similar insofar as age and gender, and 
both were neighborhood children who knew the defendant and to 
whom the defendant had access.  Commonwealth v. Gaynor, 443 
                     
 
10 During his direct and cross-examination, the defendant 
testified about an incident in which he claimed that Susan 
climbed a step ladder to see a bird's nest under his deck.  She 
was unsteady, almost fell off, and the defendant had to grab her 
by the leg and the buttocks to lift her down. 
 
9 
 
Mass. 245, 260-261 (2005).  In addition, the manner and 
circumstances in which each had been isolated from the other 
children, distracted, and touched demonstrated that the offenses 
were related for joinder purposes because they involved a common 
pattern of conduct.  Commonwealth v. Pillai, 445 Mass. 175, 181-
182 (2005).  The temporal proximity between the offenses, two 
years, was not too remote, and both offenses took place at the 
defendant's home.  Gaynor, supra; Commonwealth v. Feijoo, 419 
Mass. 486, 489 (1995) (five-year time span for joined offenses 
not overly attenuated).  Last, the defendant failed to show 
prejudice of a nature that is so compelling that he was denied a 
fair trial.  Gaynor, supra at 263. 
 
2.  Admission of evidence relating to prior acquittal (the 
alleged incident involving J.D.).  The judge delayed ruling on 
the Commonwealth's motion in limine to admit evidence of the 
alleged incident involving J.D. until the fourth day of trial, 
at which time he allowed the motion over defense counsel's 
objection.  The defendant argues that the erroneous admission of 
this evidence prejudiced him and deprived him of his right to a 
fair trial and due process under the State and Federal 
Constitutions.  We address first the defendant's contention that 
the evidence lacked relevance as rebuttal to the defense of 
accident or lack of intent and that, on that basis, it was 
inadmissible under general evidentiary principles.  Because we 
10 
 
discern no error in the admission of the evidence on relevancy 
grounds, we go on to resolve the issue on the constitutional 
grounds raised for the first time in this appeal. 
 
a.  Admissibility under evidentiary principles.  The 
defendant objected at trial to the admission of the evidence on 
relevancy grounds.  Therefore, we review this claim for 
prejudicial error.  Commonwealth v. Montez, 450 Mass. 736, 744 
(2008).  "Generally, evidence of a defendant's prior misconduct 
may not be admitted to show bad character or propensity to 
commit the crime charged."  Id.  "However, such evidence may be 
admissible, if relevant, to show a common scheme or course of 
conduct, a pattern of operation, absence of accident or mistake, 
intent, or motive."  Commonwealth v. Barrett, 418 Mass. 788, 
793-794 (1994).  "When a court is presented with evidence of 
uncharged conduct by the defendant toward a child other than the 
complainant, the conduct in issue, to be admissible, must be 
closely related in time, place, and form of acts to show a 
common course of conduct by the defendant . . . so as to be 
logically probative."  Id. at 794. 
 
"If the judge finds that the evidence in question meets the 
above requirements, he or she next must determine whether its 
probative value is outweighed by a risk of undue prejudice to 
the defendant."  Id.  "It is implicit in the general rule 
regarding the inadmissibility of prior bad acts evidence that 
11 
 
the admission of such evidence carries with it a high risk of 
prejudice to the defendant."  Id. at 795. 
 
"Before prior bad act evidence can be admitted against a 
defendant, the Commonwealth must satisfy the judge that 'the 
jury [could] reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that 
the defendant was the actor.'"  Commonwealth v. Rosenthal, 432 
Mass. 124, 126 (2000), quoting Huddleston v. United States, 485 
U.S. 681, 689 (1988).  "The Commonwealth need only show these 
facts by a preponderance of the evidence."  Commonwealth v. 
Rosenthal, supra at 126-127. 
 
The defendant argues that, at trial, his defense counsel 
did not raise a defense of accident or lack of intent such that 
the evidence would have been relevant to rebut such a defense.  
The record does not support this contention.  See Commonwealth 
v. Kingston, 46 Mass. App. Ct. 444, 449-450 (1990) ("Whether a 
defense has been fairly raised is a matter of law for the 
court").  Prior to the introduction of the bad act evidence (the 
alleged incident involving J.D.), defense counsel questioned 
both Susan and her mother about the existence of a bird's nest 
under the defendant's deck and Susan's use of a ladder to view 
it.  See notes 4 and 5, supra.  This cross-examination laid a 
foundation to question the defendant about these matters when he 
testified.  See note 10, supra.  Then, in his closing argument, 
defense counsel stated that Susan was not lying, but was 
12 
 
"confused" about what had transpired between her and the 
defendant.  What really had happened, according to defense 
counsel, was that Susan had fallen off a ladder and the 
defendant had touched her buttocks when he grabbed her to catch 
her.  Although defense counsel did not use the words "accident," 
"mistake," or "lack of intent," this essentially was what he was 
arguing.  Viewing the record as a whole, we are able to see 
beyond the euphemism "confusion" and recognize the development 
and existence of a defense of accident or mistake at trial.  
Thus, we conclude that the judge acted within his discretion in 
admitting the evidence on the question whether the defendant had 
acted with intent and on the issue of the absence of accident or 
mistake. 
 
The defendant contends the evidence should not have been 
admitted because it lacked a close relation in time, place, and 
form of acts to be logically probative.  We disagree. 
 
As to time, the alleged incident involving J.D. occurred in 
June, 1998.  The conduct in this case allegedly occurred in the 
summer of 1996 (Susan) and between February, 1998, and February, 
1999 (Jane).  Thus, we conclude that the alleged incidents were 
sufficiently close in time. 
 
Turning to place, although the alleged acts against the 
complainants in this case occurred at the defendant's home and 
the alleged acts involving J.D. took place at a restaurant, both 
13 
 
locations were in Burlington.  More significantly, the defendant 
allegedly committed the acts that took place at a location and 
time when young children were separated from their parents and 
in circumstances where he was able to create a distraction 
before allegedly touching them. 
 
Concerning the acts themselves, the defendant commenced by 
allegedly touching each complainant's underwear.  We add that 
the complainants were the same gender and near the same age.  
These numerous similarities were sufficient to show "a common 
course of conduct by the defendant . . . so as to be logically 
probative."  Barrett, 418 Mass. at 794. 
 
The judge properly could conclude that the relevant and 
probative value of the evidence concerning J.D. was very high 
and that the potential for undue prejudice could be minimized by 
a limiting instruction.  Montez, 450 Mass. at 746.  The judge's 
limiting instructions stated the proper and limited use of the 
testimony.  See note 7, supra.  He repeated this instruction at 
the conclusion of trial in his final charge, and the jurors are 
presumed to follow the instructions.  Commonwealth v. Francis, 
432 Mass. 353, 359 (2000).  There was no error under existing 
evidentiary law.  Montez, supra. 
 
The "manner" in which the evidence concerning J.D. came in 
does not alter our conclusion.  Here, the defendant argues that 
undue prejudice resulted because J.D. alluded to the possibility 
14 
 
that there was another alleged victim.  The record does not 
support this contention.  J.D. testified to her personal 
observation that in addition to touching her, the defendant put 
his hand on her friend's knee, no more.  While the responding 
officer testified thereafter that he went to the restaurant to 
investigate and questioned the defendant about the "possible 
explicit touching of . . . young female girls," it was clear 
from the context that the touching of J.D. was the only 
suggested inappropriate touching that was alleged.  Further, 
during the officer's testimony, the judge instructed the jury 
that they were not to consider the officer's questions "to the 
extent that they imply such knowledge of the case."  In 
addition, the defendant had admitted to "bumping" children at 
the restaurant. 
 
We reject the defendant's suggestion that this bad act 
evidence overshadowed the trial.  The Commonwealth presented its 
case over three days; this bad act evidence consisted of the 
brief testimony of three witnesses (covering approximately forty 
pages).  The incident involving J.D. was no worse than the 
conduct alleged at trial.  Further, the jury acquitted the 
defendant on the indictment alleging indecent assault and 
battery of Jane, which demonstrates a careful consideration of 
the evidence. 
15 
 
 
b.  Admissibility under constitutional principles.  In 
addition to arguing that the evidence concerning J.D. was 
inadmissible under evidentiary principles, the defendant also 
argues that the admission of this evidence violated his 
constitutional rights.  Specifically, for the first time on 
appeal, the defendant argues that it was a violation of his 
rights to due process and a fair trial under art. 12 of the 
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights to admit the evidence 
concerning the alleged incident involving J.D. because he had 
been acquitted of that charge (acquittal evidence).  He also 
contends that art. 12 "demands that the Commonwealth be 
collaterally estopped from introducing such evidence."  The 
defendant's arguments turn not on the fact that there was a 
prior "bad act," but rather on the fact that the defendant had 
been acquitted of the charge, which he suggests necessarily 
means that he did not commit the underlying conduct forming the 
basis for the charge. 
 
The defendant's argument has been rejected under the 
Federal Constitution.  "As a matter of Federal constitutional 
law, collateral estoppel does not bar the government in a 
criminal prosecution from introducing evidence from a separate 
prosecution on unrelated charges in which the defendant was 
acquitted."  Francis, 432 Mass. at 359 n.5.  In Dowling v. 
United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990), the United States Supreme 
16 
 
Court held that because of the different standards of proof, the 
introduction of so-called acquittal evidence did not violate the 
collateral estoppel component of the double jeopardy clause of 
the United States Constitution.  Id. at 348-349.  The Court also 
concluded that its admission did not violate the Federal 
Constitution's due process clause.  Id. at 352-354.  Many courts 
have allowed the introduction of relevant evidence of prior 
charged incidents even where a defendant has been acquitted of 
such offenses.  See Commonwealth v. Barboza, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 
241, 243 n.6 (2010) (collecting cases).  We, however, have not 
decided "whether under the Massachusetts Constitution evidence 
introduced in a criminal prosecution at which the defendant was 
acquitted may later be used against a defendant in an unrelated 
criminal prosecution."  Krochta v. Commonwealth, 429 Mass. 711, 
718 n.14 (1999). 
 
We have observed that "[t]he Commonwealth's Constitution 
has no explicit double jeopardy provision."  Commonwealth v. 
Forte, 423 Mass. 672, 674 (1996).  See Kimbroughtillery v. 
Commonwealth, 471 Mass. 507, 510 (2015).  "Certain double 
jeopardy concepts are no doubt embraced within the Massachusetts 
Constitution's due process of law provisions, but those 
provisions do not . . . provide protection greater than the 
explicit protections of the Federal double jeopardy clause."  
Forte, supra.  In addition, double jeopardy concepts have been 
17 
 
embraced in statutory and common law.  Kimbroughtillery, supra.  
Because the "same principles and protections" afforded by the 
double jeopardy clause are similarly embraced in the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel, we have often applied that common-law 
doctrine to resolve claims of successive prosecutions for the 
same offense.  See id. at 510-511.  In Commonwealth v. Benson, 
389 Mass. 473, 478, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 915 (1983), we set 
forth the general principles that we use in applying the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel: 
"Collateral estoppel is an established rule of criminal 
law.  See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970); 
Commonwealth v. Lopez, 383 Mass. 497 (1981).  Collateral 
estoppel 'means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact 
has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, 
that issue cannot again be litigated between the same 
parties in any future lawsuit.'  Ashe v. Swenson, supra at 
433.  See Commonwealth v. Scala, 380 Mass. 500, 503 (1980).  
The doctrine of collateral estoppel may work in two ways.  
First, it may bar totally a subsequent prosecution if one 
of the issues necessarily decided at the first trial is an 
essential element of the alleged crime in the second trial.  
Second, even if a prosecutor may proceed to a second trial, 
the doctrine may bar the introduction of certain facts 
determined in the defendant's favor at the first trial.  
See United States v. Lee, 622 F.2d 787, 790 (5th Cir. 
1980).  The doctrine of collateral estoppel will preclude 
either the subsequent prosecution or the introduction or 
argument of certain facts, only if the jury could not have 
based their verdict rationally on an issue other than the 
one the defendant seeks to foreclose.  Ashe v. Swenson, 
supra at 444.  Whenever the doctrine of collateral estoppel 
is raised by a defendant, the task of the court is to 
decide exactly what issues were, or should have been, 
determined at the first trial. . . . See Sealfon v. United 
States, 332 U.S. 575, 578-579 (1948)" (footnote omitted). 
 
18 
 
In making this determination, the court must look for the 
concurrence of a (1) common factual issue, (2) prior 
determination of that issue between the same parties,11 and (3) 
determination of that issue in favor of the party raising the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel.  See Lopez, supra at 499.  See 
also Kimbroughtillery, supra at 511. 
 
It has been observed that a general verdict of "not guilty" 
that usually is rendered in a criminal case means that it is a 
"rare case where it [is] possible to determine with certainty 
what the jury in the earlier prosecution has decided."  United 
States v. Cioffi, 487 F.2d 492, 498 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974).  "A finding of not guilty at a 
criminal trial can result from any number of factors having 
nothing to do with the defendant's actual guilt."  Benson, 389 
Mass. at 481, quoting Commonwealth v. Cerveny, 387 Mass. 280, 
285 (1982).12  "It is sometimes possible to determine that the 
                     
 
11 The prior adjudication must have applied to the 
Commonwealth and to the defendant now invoking the doctrine.  
Commonwealth v. Stephens, 451 Mass. 370, 379-380 (2008).  See 
Commonwealth v. Benson, 389 Mass. 473, 478 n.6, cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 915 (1983) ("doctrine of collateral estoppel only 
applies in a criminal case where there is mutuality of the 
parties"). 
 
 
12 "A not guilty verdict may result from an exclusionary 
rule of evidence, inadequate investigation or proof, the 
composition of the jury, or the defendant's own insanity.  
Moreover, the jury may assume the power to acquit out of 
compassion or prejudice, and the prosecution is then powerless 
 
19 
 
jury's verdict necessarily implies one or more particular 
findings of fact, but such a determination requires a showing of 
the evidence adduced at the trial and the instructions under 
which the jury arrived at its verdict."  Commonwealth v. 
DeCillis, 41 Mass. App. Ct. 312, 315-316 (1996), citing Sealfon, 
332 U.S. at 579. 
 
Here, the defendant is not seeking to foreclose a second 
prosecution of charges based on the alleged incident with J.D.  
Rather, the defendant seeks to use the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel in order to "bar the introduction of certain facts 
determined in the defendant's favor at the first trial" 
involving J.D., for which he was acquitted, at the trial 
involving the complainants Susan and Jane.  See Benson, 389 
Mass. at 478.  Application of the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel as enunciated above, however, demonstrates that its 
essential components technically have not been met.  First, the 
acquittal evidence was admitted pursuant to a lower standard of 
proof than that required for a conviction, and second, the 
defendant has not satisfied his burden of showing that the jury 
in the trial involving J.D. "necessarily decided" that he did 
not engage in unlawful sexual conduct with J.D. 
                                                                  
to seek a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial on 
the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the 
evidence."  Commonwealth v. Cerveny, 387 Mass. 280, 285 (1982). 
 
20 
 
 
These determinations, however, do not resolve the issue.  
Not all State courts follow the Supreme Court's holding in 
Dowling, supra.  See State v. Perkins, 349 So. 2d 161, 163-164 
(Fla. 1977); State v. Mundon, 129 Haw. 1, 4 (2012); State v. 
Wakefield, 278 N.W.2d 307, 309 (Minn. 1979); Kerbyson v. State, 
McMichael v. State, 98 Nev. 1, 3-4 (1982); State v. Scott, 331 
N.C. 39, 42 (1992); State v. Holman, 611 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tenn. 
1981); 711 S.W.2d 289, 290 (Tx. Ct. App. 1986). As noted by 
Justice Brennan in his dissenting opinion in Dowling, there are 
a number of inherent problems in admitting evidence of a crime 
for which a defendant was acquitted despite its relevance on 
issues other than propensity in a subsequent trial: 
 
"First, '[o]ne of the dangers inherent in the 
admission of extrinsic offense evidence is that the jury 
may convict the defendant not for the offense charged but 
for the extrinsic offense.  This danger is particularly 
great where . . . the extrinsic activity was not the 
subject of a conviction; the jury may feel the defendant 
should be punished for that activity even if he is not 
guilty of the offense charged.' . . . Alternatively, there 
is the danger that the evidence 'may lead [the jury] to 
conclude that, having committed a crime of the type 
charged, [the defendant] is likely to repeat it.' . . . 
Thus, the fact that the defendant is forced to relitigate 
his participation in a prior criminal offense under a low 
standard of proof combined with the inherently prejudicial 
nature of such evidence increases the risk that the jury 
erroneously will convict the defendant of the presently 
charged offense."  (Citations omitted.) 
 
Dowling, 493 U.S. at 361-362 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
"Moreover, because of the significance a jury may place on 
evidence of a prior criminal offense, presenting a defense 
21 
 
against that offense may be as burdensome as defending against 
the presently charged offense."  Id. at 362 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting).  "[Because] the lower standard of proof makes it 
easier for the jury to conclude that the defendant committed the 
prior offense, the defendant is essentially forced to present 
affirmative evidence to rebut the contention that he committed 
that offense."  Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 
Justice Brennan also observed that the use of acquittal 
evidence offends the established interests of preserving the 
finality of judgments and protecting individuals from 
governmental overreaching.  Id. at 355 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting).  Because of the nature of a "not guilty" verdict, 
it is difficult, at best, for a defendant to prove what issues 
were "actually decided" in the earlier proceeding at which he 
was acquitted.  Id. at 357-358 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  The 
result is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's "admonition in 
Ashe that an excessively technical approach to collateral 
estoppel 'would, of course, simply amount to a rejection of the 
rule of collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings, at least in 
every case where the first judgment was based upon a general 
verdict of acquittal.'  [Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444].  Indeed, 
forcing defendants to choose between forgoing the protections of 
the Double Jeopardy Clause and abandoning the defense of a 
general denial raises grave due process concerns."  Dowling, 
22 
 
supra at 358 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Justice Brennan also 
found fault with the fact that the majority applied its 
reasoning to a successive criminal prosecution (and not a civil 
remedial proceeding as done in past cases) "in which the 
Government [sought] to punish the defendant and [based] that 
punishment at least in part on a criminal act for which the 
defendant [was] acquitted."  Id. at 360 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
 
We find the thoughtful and extensive considerations 
enunciated in the dissenting opinion in Dowling to be 
instructive, and we conclude that the collateral estoppel 
protections necessarily embraced by art. 12 warrant the 
exclusion of the acquittal evidence in the circumstances of this 
case, a subsequent criminal proceeding involving alleged 
unlawful sexual conduct with minors.13  See Arizona v. Evans, 514 
U.S. 1, 8 (1995) (State courts "are absolutely free to interpret 
[S]tate constitutional provisions to accord greater protection 
to individual rights than do similar provisions of the United 
States Constitution").  We agree with Justice Brennan that the 
majority in Dowling does precisely what the Supreme Court in 
                     
 
13 Our holding is limited to prior bad act evidence for 
which a defendant was acquitted.  Our holding does not apply to 
the admission of prior bad act evidence where no criminal 
charges were commenced, where the criminal charges are pending, 
or where the criminal charges were dismissed before trial. 
 
23 
 
Ashe admonished, employing a hypertechnical application of the 
collateral estoppel doctrine.  We add that such an approach 
offends the principles of the presumption of innocence, the 
significance of being treated "legally innocent" that results 
when the prosecution fails to prove a defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and notions of fairness and finality. 
 
Where the acquittal evidence was improperly admitted, we 
must now determine whether its admission created a substantial 
risk of a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Jackson, 
419 Mass. 716, 719 (1995) (when issue appealed is not properly 
preserved below, we reverse if error created substantial risk of 
miscarriage of justice).  We conclude that it did.  Although 
Susan and Jane may have presented as strong witnesses, their 
testimony acquired such force in part from the admission of the 
acquittal evidence.  As a result, the defendant was put to the 
task of defending against not only the allegations involving 
Susan and Jane, but also those involving J.D.  The trial 
involving the complainant J.D. had taken place approximately 
twelve years before the trial involving Susan and Jane, too 
remote in time not to result in prejudice to the defendant in 
having to defend again against those charges (because the 
defendant was acquitted, no record of testimony even exists).  
The judge's limiting instruction could not remedy such a defect, 
particularly where the prosecutor in this case only had to prove 
24 
 
that that the defendant committed the acts involving J.D. by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  We are constrained to reverse 
the defendant's convictions.14 
 
Conclusion.  For the reasons stated herein, the defendant's 
convictions are reversed and the cases are remanded for a new 
trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
                     
 
14 Our conclusion obviates the need to address the remaining 
issues argued by the defendant.  That said, we agree with the 
resolution of those issues by the Appeals Court and see no basis 
to reverse the defendant's convictions or order a new trial on 
those grounds.