Case Title: Ponder v. Pechon

Citation: 274 So. 2d 386

Docket Number: 

State: louisiana

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Date: 1973-02-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
274 So. 2d 386 (1973) Cecelia S. PONDER v. Mary Purser PECHON et al. No. 52221. Supreme Court of Louisiana. February 19, 1973. Rehearing Denied March 26, 1973. *387 L. B. Ponder, Jr., J. Lynn Ponder, Amite, for plaintiff-applicant. Pittman & Matheny, Tom H. Matheny, Hammond, for defendants-respondents. Joseph H. Simpson, Amite, for amicus curiae. SANDERS, Justice. The plaintiff seeks to set aside, because of insanity, an employment contract and a judgment dismissing a previous suit to annul that contract. We granted certiorari, 260 La. 1193, 258 So. 2d 549, to review the judgment of the Court of Appeal, holding that the action could not be maintained absent a showing that the plaintiff had been interdicted at the time suit was filed. 256 So. 2d 802. We affirm. The plaintiff executed the contract on June 28, 1962. The agreement, for legal services, transferred to the attorney-defendants a fractional interest in the community estate formerly existing between herself and her husband. Although the plaintiff discharged these attorneys, she later entered a second agreement with them, dated October 10, 1963, which reinstated the employment but reduced the fee from 25% of her community share to 20%. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed suit to annul the agreement on the ground of error. She dismissed this action, however, filing a motion in proper person in which she alleged that "mover is now convinced that the contract and deed herein sued upon was not obtained by any undue influence, error or fraud and that she does moreover hereby confirm and ratify the said contract and deed, and desires that her original petition be dismissed with prejudice for the reasons set forth." The Court entered judgment dismissing the suit on March 16, 1964. Although the plaintiff asserts that she was insane at the time she entered the agreements and that she remains so, she was not under interdiction either then or at the time this suit was filed. Article 1788 of the Louisiana Civil Code, containing rules governing litigation challenging the mental capacity to contract, provides: Paragraph 4 of the Article is explicit. A contract of a living party may be attacked in a direct action on the ground of insanity only after interdiction. Vance v. Ellerbe, 150 La. 388, 90 So. 735 (1922); Comment, Contractual Incapacity of the Insane in Louisiana, 22 Tul.L.Rev. 598, 602 (1948); 9 Tul.L.Rev. 120 (1935). In the landmark case of Vance v. Ellerbe, supra, this Court held: Relying upon Article 1788 and citing Vance v. Ellerbe, the Court of Appeal dismissed plaintiff's suit. The plaintiff argues, however, that the court erred in failing to give proper consideration to two other decisions of this Court, Nalty v. Nalty, 222 La. 911, 64 So. 2d 216 (1953) and Twomey v. Papalia, 142 La. 621, 77 So. 479 (1918), holding that prior interdiction is unnecessary. We have reviewed these decisions and find them to be distinguishable. Neither is authority for a rule that prior interdiction is unnecessary in such cases. In Nalty v. Nalty, supra, plaintiff sued an interdict, through his curator, to recover a sum represented by checks given by him prior to his interdiction. This Court affirmed the lower court's denial of recovery, finding under Article 402 of the Louisiana Civil *389 Code that the check-giver was notoriously insane to the knowledge of plaintiff and that plaintiff accepted the checks in bad faith. In Twomey v. Papalia, supra, the plaintiff brought executory proceedings on a mortgage given by defendant. At the time the executory proceedings were filed, a petition to interdict the defendant was pending. The defendant died and the proceeding was continued against the widow and a tutor ad hoc appointed to represent the children. The issue before the court was whether the widow was entitled to enjoin the executory proceeding. This Court held that she was not. We hold, therefore, as did the Court of Appeal, that an action to annul a contract of a living party because of insanity cannot be maintained in the absence of interdiction prior to suit. Our holding as to the contract makes it unnecessary to review the law applicable to the judgment of dismissal. For the reasons assigned, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed at plaintiff's costs. BARHAM, J., dissents. PER CURIAM In the application for rehearing, plaintiff complains that the Court failed to expressly dispose of alternative allegations of fraud and misrepresentation. These allegations were considered and found to be without merit. The application for rehearing is denied.