Case Title: State v. Davis

Citation: 2013-Ohio-1748

Docket Number: 2012-0830

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2013-05-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Davis, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-1748.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-1748 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. DAVIS, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Davis, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-1748.] 
Appeal dismissed as having been improvidently accepted. 
(No. 2012-0830—Submitted March 12, 2013—Decided May 2, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Summit County, 
No. 25826, 2012-Ohio-1440. 
__________________ 
{¶ 1} The cause is dismissed as having been improvidently accepted. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, and FRENCH, JJ., 
concur. 
LANZINGER and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent. 
__________________ 
O’NEILL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 2} I must dissent from the majority’s decision to dismiss this appeal 
as having been improvidently accepted.  This case involves unresolved issues 
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touching on lesser offenses and the right to a trial by jury, and it therefore presents 
important constitutional questions and issues of public and great general interest. 
{¶ 3} This case is a classic example of voluntary manslaughter.  To hold 
otherwise, as the court of appeals did, ignores the facts presented at trial.  During 
a brawl that was instigated primarily by the victim, the victim pushed appellant 
Tyran Davis’s pregnant sister to the ground and then punched another of Davis’s 
sisters.  Although Davis was not at the scene at that time, a witness informed 
Davis that the victim had punched and pushed Davis’s sisters.  After Davis 
arrived at the scene, the victim took off his shirt and told Davis that they had to 
fight.  A more definitive demonstration of provocation is hard to imagine.  Davis 
refused the invitation to fight and began to walk away.  The victim then ran across 
the street and punched Davis’s pregnant girlfriend with enough force to knock her 
down and stun her, and possibly knocking her unconscious.  It is unclear how 
much Davis knew about the particulars of the assaults on his loved ones; however, 
it is abundantly clear that one of the final pieces of information was one of 
Davis’s sisters telling him, “[H]e just hit your baby’s mama.”  In a matter of 
seconds, the fight was on, and Davis crossed the street toward the victim, shooting 
as he walked or ran.  It is uncontroverted that the fight ended when he shot the 
victim ten times.  Davis was approximately five feet away from the victim when 
he started shooting. 
{¶ 4} Defense counsel submitted proposed jury instructions that 
requested a voluntary-manslaughter instruction under both the murder and the 
felony-murder charges.  As a condition for presenting evidence by the defense, 
counsel asked the court to provide a voluntary-manslaughter instruction to the 
jury.  After the trial court stated that it would not provide a voluntary-
manslaughter instruction, counsel proffered Davis’s testimony in order to 
establish the necessity of the instruction.  The defense proffered that Davis would 
have testified that he witnessed the victim run over to Davis’s girlfriend and 
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punch her, that he was blinded by anger, and that he lost control of himself when 
he shot the victim.  The trial court again refused to provide counsel’s requested 
voluntary-manslaughter instruction, and the charges of murder and felony murder 
went to the jury.  Davis did not testify. 
{¶ 5} The jury acquitted Davis on the charge of murder but found him 
guilty of felony murder and felonious assault  After merging these convictions, 
the trial court imposed a sentence of 15 years to life for felony murder and a 
consecutive sentence of 3 years for a firearm specification, for a total of 18 years 
to life.  Had Davis been convicted of voluntary manslaughter, he would have 
faced a sentence of 3 to 10 years for the conviction under the criminal statutory 
provisions in effect at that time, and an additional 3-year sentence for the 
specification, for a total of 6 to 13 years. 
{¶ 6} On 
appeal, 
the 
parties’ 
arguments 
regarding 
voluntary 
manslaughter addressed only whether there had been adequate evidence of 
reasonably sufficient provocation to warrant an instruction to the jury on 
voluntary manslaughter.  However, the Ninth District Court of Appeals decided 
the question on an issue that was not briefed by the parties: whether the failure to 
provide a voluntary-manslaughter instruction was harmless error.  The appellate 
court concluded that because the jury had acquitted Davis of murder, the failure 
was indeed harmless.  For the reasons that follow I disagree. 
{¶ 7} We accepted Davis’s appeal to determine the propriety of the 
court’s failure to provide a lesser-degree-offense instruction, given that the 
defendant was on trial for a single homicide, but on two distinctly different 
murder theories.  132 Ohio St.3d 1461, 2012-Ohio-3054, 969 N.E.2d 1230.  The 
majority’s decision to dismiss this appeal as having been improvidently accepted 
implies that this case does not require any clarification of the law surrounding 
lesser offenses, because that law is already settled and because the appellate court 
applied that law correctly.  Given that we are still struggling with the parameters 
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of lesser offenses, as demonstrated in State v. Deanda, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2013-
Ohio-___, ___ N.E.2d ___, the law on this subject is far from settled.  And also 
importantly, the appellate court’s decision is clearly erroneous. 
{¶ 8} To start with, it is clear that the evidence, when viewed in a light 
most favorable to Davis, required an instruction for voluntary manslaughter.  
Voluntary manslaughter is a lesser-degree offense of murder because the elements 
of voluntary manslaughter are contained in the indicted offense of murder, except 
for one or more mitigating elements.  State v. Shane, 63 Ohio St.3d 630, 632, 590 
N.E.2d 272 (1992).  Voluntary manslaughter consists of knowingly causing the 
death of another “while under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of 
rage, either of which is brought on by serious provocation occasioned by the 
victim that is reasonably sufficient to incite the person into using deadly force.”  
R.C. 2903.03(A).  The offense of murder consists of purposefully causing the 
death of another.  R.C. 2903.02(A). 
{¶ 9} In order to warrant an instruction for voluntary manslaughter as a 
lesser-degree offense to murder, the trial court must determine whether there was 
“evidence of reasonably sufficient provocation.”  Shane, paragraph one of the 
syllabus.  If, under any reasonable view of the evidence, it would be possible for 
the jury to find a defendant not guilty of the greater offense but guilty of the 
lesser-degree offense, the trial court is required to provide an instruction on the 
lesser-degree offense.  State v. Wilkins, 64 Ohio St.2d 382, 388, 415 N.E.2d 303 
(1980); State v. Nolton, 19 Ohio St.2d 133, 135, 249 N.E.2d 797 (1969); State v. 
Campbell, 69 Ohio St.3d 38, 47, 630 N.E.2d 339 (1994).  It is not discretionary.  
Due process makes it a requirement.  It cannot be stressed strongly enough that 
the evidence on this point must be considered in a light most favorable to the 
defendant, Campbell at 47-48, citing Wilkins at 388, and that the persuasiveness 
of the evidence regarding the lesser-degree offense is irrelevant, Wilkins at 388.  
To allow a trial court to weigh the evidence on its own would deprive a defendant 
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of his constitutional right to a trial by jury.  United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 
506, 510-511, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995). 
{¶ 10} We have previously acknowledged that there are certain classic 
scenarios that call for a voluntary-manslaughter instruction: 
 
There are certain types of situations that have been 
regarded as particularly appropriate cases in which voluntary 
manslaughter instructions are often given when murder charges are 
brought.  For example, assault and battery, mutual combat, illegal 
arrest and discovering a spouse in the act of adultery are some of 
the classic voluntary manslaughter situations. 
 
 Shane, 63 Ohio St.3d at 635, 590 N.E.2d 272.  Certainly if seeing one’s wife 
having consensual sex with a man is sufficient provocation to allow consideration 
of voluntary manslaughter, then seeing the mother of one’s child getting punched 
and knocked unconscious by a man is also sufficient.  If voluntary manslaughter 
cannot be applied in this case, then there is no reason for it to exist. 
{¶ 11} It therefore goes without saying that the question of voluntary 
manslaughter should have reached the jury.  Even if there was conflicting 
testimony, and even if there were inferences that could have been drawn against 
the defendant, it was for the jury to decide whom to believe, and it was for the 
jury to decide what inferences to draw from the evidence.  State v. Loudermill, 2 
Ohio St.2d 79, 82-83, 206 N.E.2d 198 (1965).  The trial court compounded the 
problem by not giving the jury all the tools that it needed in order to do its job.  
Contrary to the appellate court’s holding, the error most certainly was not 
harmless.  An error is harmless only if it does not affect substantial rights and is 
not prejudicial to the defendant.  Crim.R. 52(A).  In order to dismiss an error as 
harmless, the error must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. 
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DeMarco, 31 Ohio St.3d 191, 195, 509 N.E.2d 1256 (1987).  An error is harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt only if there is no reasonable possibility that the error 
affected the defendant’s conviction.  Id. at 195; State v. Allen, 73 Ohio St.3d 626, 
630, 653 N.E.2d 675 (1995).  The defendant was sentenced to 18 years to life for 
felony murder and the accompanying firearm specification.  The jury was never 
given the opportunity to weigh the facts and determine whether in fact this was a 
case of voluntary manslaughter, which would have resulted in a maximum 
sentence of 13 years.  The trial court simply did not provide the jury with the right 
tools to do its job. 
{¶ 12} This court has decisively held that the failure to provide a 
warranted lesser-offense instruction to the jury is prejudicial to the rights of the 
defendant.  Loudermill at syllabus.  Granted, had Davis been acquitted of murder, 
and had there been no other alternative murder charge, and had there remained 
only offenses of lower degrees with lesser penalties, then Davis would not have 
been prejudiced by being denied the opportunity to be convicted of voluntary 
manslaughter.  But that is not what happened here.  Instead, the appellate court 
erroneously allowed a felony-murder conviction to stand, while in the same breath 
claiming a lack of prejudice due to the absence of a murder conviction. 
{¶ 13} The appellate court incorrectly held that the failure to provide an 
instruction for voluntary manslaughter was harmless error because of the acquittal 
on the murder charge.  By being denied its role as trier of fact on the issue of 
voluntary manslaughter, the jury was forced to make a false choice between the 
two theories of murder and felony murder.  When looking at errors in jury 
instructions, “[a] single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial 
isolation but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge.”  State v. Price, 
60 Ohio St.2d 136, 398 N.E.2d 722 (1979), at paragraph four of the syllabus, 
following Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147, 94 S.Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 
(1973).  “Thus not only is the challenged instruction but one of many such 
January Term, 2013 
 
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instructions, but the process of instruction itself is but one of several components 
of the trial which may result in the judgment of conviction.”  Cupp at 147.  
Accordingly, if there was any possibility that the jury’s decision was affected by 
the trial court’s error, then Davis was prejudiced by the error.  Because the jury 
could readily have convicted Davis of voluntary manslaughter and acquitted him 
of both murder and felony murder, Davis was prejudiced by the felony-murder 
conviction, and the error was not harmless.  The appellate court did not erase the 
prejudice by playing a word game with the different homicide theories. 
{¶ 14} Further, the practical reality of Davis’s sentence makes it clear that 
the trial court’s error was prejudicial.  Voluntary manslaughter is a first-degree 
felony, which carries a definite prison sentence of three to ten years.  R.C. 
2903.03(B) and former R.C. 2929.14(A)(1).  However, both murder and felony 
murder are special felonies, which at a minimum carry indefinite prison terms of 
15 years to life.  R.C. 2903.02(C) and 2929.02(B)(1).  Thus the consequence of 
being denied a voluntary-manslaughter instruction is the prejudice of being 
subjected to a substantially longer prison sentence. 
{¶ 15} Finally, this court’s willingness to instill some sanity into the 
lesser-offenses doctrine when requested by the state in Deanda coupled with its 
unwillingness to do so here when requested by the defendant calls for concern.  
Justice Sweeney voiced similar concern in his dissenting opinion in State v. 
Kidder, 32 Ohio St.3d 279, 288, 513 N.E.2d 311 (1987) (Sweeney, J., dissenting): 
“I am disturbed that the holding today leaves the impression on bench, bar and the 
general public that the rule [of lesser offenses] varies with the outcome of the 
case.” 
{¶ 16} Rather than dismissing this appeal as having been improvidently 
accepted, after the parties have fully briefed the issues and presented their oral 
arguments before this court, we should instead make the effort to untangle this 
case and clarify the law on these fundamental issues.  I therefore dissent from the 
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majority’s decision to dismiss this appeal as having been improvidently accepted.  
I would take the opportunity to clarify Ohio law regarding the state of lesser 
included and lesser-degree offenses in light of Deanda and regarding a 
defendant’s right to have sufficiently proven lesser-degree offenses considered by 
the finder of fact rather than the judge. 
{¶ 17} Because the appellate court came to erroneous conclusions on all 
of the foregoing issues, I would reverse the judgment of the Ninth District Court 
of Appeals and hold that the jury should have been provided a voluntary-
manslaughter instruction and that the murder acquittal did not render the error 
harmless when Davis was alternatively charged with felony murder. 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in the forgoing opinion. 
__________________ 
 
Sheri Bevan Walsh, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Richard S. 
Kasay, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Terrence K. Scott, Assistant 
Public Defender, for appellant. 
______________________