Case Title: Taylor v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 460, 2003

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2004-05-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
RONDELL D. TAYLOR,                       
           
Defendant Below- 
Appellant,   
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
     
 
 
     
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
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   No. 460, 2003 
 
   Court Below---Superior Court 
   of the State of Delaware, 
   in and for New Castle County  
   Cr. A. Nos. IN02-12-0362 thru 
         0366; 2184 
 
Submitted: March 18, 2004  
   Decided: May 12, 2004    
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Todd E. Conner, Esquire, Office of the Public Defender, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellant. 
 
 
Timothy J. Donovan, Esquire, Department of Justice, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
 
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The defendant-appellant, Rondell D. Taylor, was found guilty by a Superior 
Court jury of Aggravated Menacing, Possession of a Deadly Weapon by a Person 
Prohibited, Terroristic Threatening, two counts of Endangering the Welfare of a 
Child, and Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony.  He was 
sentenced to a total of ten years incarceration at Level V, to be suspended after five 
years for probation.  This is Taylor’s direct appeal of his convictions and 
sentences. 
Motion to Withdraw 
 
Taylor’s trial counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw pursuant to 
Supreme Court Rule 26(c).  The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under Rule 
26(c) is twofold: (a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel has made a 
conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims that arguably could 
support the appeal; and (b) the Court must conduct its own review of the record 
and determine whether the appeal is so totally devoid of at least arguably 
appealable issues that it can be decided without an adversary presentation.1 
 
Taylor’s counsel asserts that, based upon a careful and complete 
examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  By letter, 
                                                 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
 
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Taylor’s counsel informed Taylor of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided him 
with a copy of the motion to withdraw, the accompanying brief and the complete 
trial transcript.  Taylor also was informed of his right to supplement his attorney’s 
presentation.  Taylor responded with a brief that raises nine issues for this Court’s 
consideration. 
Motion to Affirm 
 
The State has responded to the position taken by Taylor’s counsel.  In 
addition, the State has responded to all of the issues raised by Taylor.  The State 
has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgments of conviction. 
Taylor’s Issues 
 
Taylor raises several issues for this Court’s consideration, which may fairly 
be summarized as follows: a) the prosecutor improperly interrupted the direct 
examination of the victim’s seven year-old stepson to present other testimony; b) 
the investigating officer was improperly permitted to remain in the courtroom 
during the entire trial; c) there was conflicting testimony concerning when the 
crime was committed; d) the trial judge improperly ruled that the victim’s three 
prior convictions of second degree unlawful sexual contact would not be admitted 
into evidence; e) the trial judge improperly ruled that the victim’s seven year-old 
stepson was competent to testify; and f) the victim’s in-court identification of him 
 
 
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as the perpetrator should not have been admitted into evidence.  With the exception 
of the claim that the victim’s prior sexual assault convictions should have been 
admitted, Taylor’s claims have been presented for the first time in this appeal and, 
therefore, will be reviewed for plain error.2   
Facts 
 
The testimony at trial was that, in the evening of November 13, 2003, James 
Cooper and his neighbor, Harvena Taylor, had an argument concerning some trash 
at their apartment building.  Harvena Taylor was defendant Taylor’s mother.  
Several minutes after the argument, Cooper heard a knock on his door.  He went to 
the door with his infant daughter in his arms and his young stepson, Daquan 
Harris, at his side.   
 
As Cooper opened the door, he saw defendant Taylor standing outside.  
Taylor pulled out a gun and pointed it at Cooper’s head.  Cooper told his stepson to 
take the infant and move out of the way.  Taylor continued to hold the gun to 
Cooper’s head and repeatedly threatened him for “disrespecting” his mother.  Both 
Cooper and his stepson testified for the State.  Cooper made an in-court 
identification of Taylor as the perpetrator.   
                                                 
2 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986) (an error is “plain” if it is “so 
prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process”). 
 
 
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The defense presented the testimony of Katia Moody and Katia’s brother, 
Tyrone.  Katia and Tyrone testified that, on the date of the crime, Taylor spent the 
entire evening with them in Katia’s apartment and spent the night there.  The State 
presented Amber Harris, Cooper’s fiancée, as a rebuttal witness.  She testified that 
Katia had come to her apartment several weeks after the incident and asked her to 
testify in court that Taylor was not the perpetrator.  She also stated that Katia told 
her that, on the date of the incident, Taylor spent the evening playing video games 
with his uncle.  
Prior Statement Properly Presented 
 
Taylor first claims that the prosecutor improperly interrupted the direct 
testimony of Daquan Harris in order to present testimony from Officer Dean 
Snyder, the investigating officer, concerning Daquan’s out-of court statement.  The 
voluntary out-of-court prior statement of a witness who is present and subject to 
cross-examination may be used as affirmative evidence with substantive 
independent testimonial value.3  The statement must be offered into evidence no 
later than at the conclusion of the direct examination of the declarant.4   
 
In this case, the direct examination of Daquan Harris was interrupted 
temporarily so that the investigating officer could testify concerning the 
                                                 
3 Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 3507(a) (2001). 
4 Smith v. State, 669 A.2d 1, 8 (Del. 1995). 
 
 
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circumstances under which Harris’ out-of-court statement was secured.  The 
prosecutor followed the proper procedure in introducing the out-of-court statement.  
We find no error, plain or otherwise, in connection with this claim.   
Witness Sequestration 
 
Taylor next claims that Officer Snyder should have been sequestered during 
the trial.  Whether or not witnesses will be excluded from the trial proceedings lies 
within the discretion of the trial court.5  This Court has ruled that the chief 
investigating officer for the prosecution in a criminal case is exempted from 
sequestration as “an officer or employee of a party which is not a natural person 
designated as its representative by its attorney.”6  Thus, absent other reasons for 
sequestration, the chief investigating officer may not be excluded from the trial 
even if he is scheduled to testify.7  We find no error, plain or otherwise, in 
connection with this claim. 
Time of Incident 
 
As for Taylor’s claim that Cooper and Officer Snyder did not agree on the 
time the incident occurred, we do not find that the record clearly supports that 
claim.  Even assuming there was a conflict in the testimony concerning the time of 
                                                 
5 D.R.E. 615. 
6 D. R. E. 615(2); Hamann v. State, 565 A.2d 924, 929-30 (Del. 1989). 
7 Hamann v. State, 565 A.2d at 930. 
 
 
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the incident, any such conflict was for the jury to resolve.8  We find no error, plain 
or otherwise, in connection with this claim.    
Witness’ Prior Convictions 
 
Taylor next claims that the trial judge improperly excluded evidence of 
Cooper’s three prior convictions of unlawful sexual assault.9  Although crimes 
involving dishonesty or false statement, whether felony or misdemeanor, are 
admissible as bearing directly on a witness’ credibility,10 felony convictions not 
involving dishonesty or false statement are admissible only if the trial court, in the 
exercise of its discretion, concludes that the probative value of the evidence 
outweighs its prejudicial effect.11  Here, the trial judge determined that the 
prejudicial effect of the evidence regarding Cooper’s prior sexual assault 
convictions outweighed its probative value and excluded it.  We find no error or 
abuse of discretion on the part of the Superior Court in so doing. 
Child’s Testimony Proper 
 
Taylor also claims that the Superior Court abused its discretion by 
permitting seven year-old Daquan Harris to testify.  The record reflects that, prior 
                                                 
8 Chao v. State, 604 A.2d 1351, 1363 (Del. 1992) overruled on other grounds by 
Williams v. State, 818 A.2d 906 (Del. 2002). 
9 The record reflects that Cooper’s prior conviction of misdemeanor shoplifting was 
admitted into evidence. 
10 D. R. E. 609(a) (2). 
11 D. R. E. 609(a) (1). 
 
 
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to the testimony, the trial judge conducted a voir dire examination of Daquan, who 
stated that he knew the difference between a lie and the truth and promised that he 
would tell the truth.  This was the proper procedure for determining Daquan’s 
competence to testify.12  We find no error, plain or otherwise, in connection with 
this claim.   
Identification at Trial 
 
Taylor’s final claim is that Cooper’s in-court identification of him as the 
perpetrator was improper because Cooper had never previously so identified him.  
Whether an in-court identification is permitted is a matter of the trial judge’s 
discretion.13  In this case, because Cooper had been confronted and berated at 
length by the perpetrator at gun point, the Superior Court properly permitted 
Cooper’s in-court identification of Taylor as the perpetrator.  We find no error, 
plain or otherwise, in connection with this claim. 
Conclusion 
 
This Court has reviewed the record carefully.  We have concluded that 
Taylor’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable 
issue.  We also are satisfied that Taylor’s counsel has made a conscientious effort 
                                                 
12 Ricketts v. State, 488 A.2d 856, 857-58 (Del. 1985). 
13 Parson v. State, 1990 WL 17767 (Del. Feb. 5, 1990). 
 
 
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to examine the record and has properly determined that Taylor could not raise a 
meritorious claim in this appeal. 
 
The State’s motion to affirm is granted.  The judgments of the Superior 
Court are affirmed.  The motion to withdraw is moot.