Case Title: Beyer v. Morgan State

Citation: 369 Md. 335

Docket Number: 104/01

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Janet Beyer, Personal Representative of Betty Y. Keat  v. Morgan State University, No.
104, September Term 2001.
[Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the Circuit Court Pursuant to Maryland Code, Section 12-502
of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article to Hear De Novo Appeal of Orphans’ Court’s
Order Allowing the Payment of Attorney’s Fees from the Estate Where the Personal
Representative Failed to Give Notice of Filing of the Petition for Fees as Required By
Maryland Code, Section 7-502 of the Estates and Trusts Article; Held: the Circuit Court had
subject matter jurisdiction to hear Morgan State University’s appeal of the Orphans’ Court’s
orders.  The Circuit Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Morgan State
University and vacated the order of the Orphans’ Court which approved of attorney’s fees
to be paid from the estate.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 104
September Term, 2001
JANET BEYER
Personal Representative of Betty Y. Keat
v.
      MORGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
Bell, C.J.
Eldridge
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia,
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Filed:   June 10, 2002
1
Keat, who was sixty-four years old at the time of her death, suffered from manic
depression and paranoid schizophrenia.  Keat regularly clashed with her neighbors who
frequently called the Baltimore City Police to subdue her and take her to a hospital for
treatment.  On the afternoon of January 12, 1996, the neighbors watched Keat march up and
down the street with bottles filled with lighter fluid, which she threw at the neighbors’
homes.  Keat returned home and hurled a few more bottles from the third-floor window of
her home.  A neighbor called the police for assistance.  Several officers responded and
In the present matter, petitioner Janet Beyer (“Beyer”), the Personal Representative
for the Estate of Betty Y. Keat (“Keat”), challenges the subject matter jurisdiction of the
Circuit Court for Baltimore City on appeal, pursuant to Maryland Code (1974, 1998 Repl.
Vol.), Section 12-502(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, of two Orders of the
Orphans’ Court allowing payment of attorney’s fees and extraordinary expenses out of the
Estate.  Petitioner further contends that the Circuit Court improperly vacated the Order of the
Orphans’ Court allowing for the payment of attorney’s fees from the Estate based on an oral
motion for summary judgment made by respondent Morgan State University (“MSU” or
“University”) at the hearing on the appeal.  For the reasons set forth below, we find that the
Circuit Court of Baltimore City had subject matter jurisdiction to hear MSU’s appeal and
properly granted summary judgment in favor of MSU, vacating the Order of the Orphans’
Court authorizing the payment of attorney’s fees. 
I.
Facts
On January 12, 1996, Betty Keat met with an untimely death from gunshot wounds
inflicted by members of the Baltimore City Police Department during an altercation in which
she menacingly approached the officers, crying, “There’s no such thing as police in
Baltimore City.”1  Keat, who had been a professor at Morgan State University, executed a
entered Keat’s home through the only point of entry, a window.  Keat had abandoned using
the door to the home, thus the window served as the sole method of ingress and egress.  Prior
to the shooting, the officers unsuccessfully attempted to stop Keat from advancing with the
knife by spraying her with pepper spray.
2
The Soper Library is a facility at Morgan State University.
3
We concur with the Court of Special Appeals’s characterization of the tort action
brought by Beyer against the Baltimore City Police as a survival action rather than a
wrongful death action.  See Beyer v. Morgan State Univ., 139 Md. App. 609, 619, 779 A.2d
388, 394 (2001).  Section 7-401(y) of the Estates and Trusts Article of the Maryland Code
(1974, 2001 Repl. Vol.) allows personal representatives to pursue survival actions on behalf
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will on January 25, 1982, which stated, in part:
[T]his is a final will and testament to dispose of my property,
Betty Y. Keat, being of sound mind and body.
1.  House: to be sold.  Proceeds to Morgan State University for repair
of campus clocks.
2.  Stocks, mutual funds, deferred compensation,
pension.  Converted to cash for litigation costs, if
necessary, to enforce precedent provision.  Any
surplus to be donated towards fund to rectify
heating plant of Soper [L]ibrary.
* * *
6.  Books: on India: to Soper [L]ibrary for special
collection.2
The house was her residence at 326 Taplow Road in Baltimore City.  The will made various
other distributions of Keat’s personal affects, such as her china, crystal, jewelry, and personal
papers; it did not contain a residuary clause.
On January 18, 1996, Keat’s sister and sole heir at law, Janet Beyer, retained attorney
Anton J. S. Keating (“Keating”) to file a survival action3 against the Baltimore City Police
of the Estate:
He may prosecute, defend, or submit to arbitration actions,
claims, or proceedings in any appropriate jurisdiction for the
protection or benefit of the estate, including the commencement
of a personal action which the decedent might have commenced
or prosecuted, except that:
(1) A personal representative may not institute an action
against a defendant for slander against the decedent during the
lifetime of the decedent.
(2) In an action instituted by the personal representative
against a tortfeasor for a wrong which resulted in the death of
the decedent, the personal representative may recover the
funeral expenses of the decedent up to the amount allowed
under § 8-106(b) of this article in addition to other damages
recoverable in the action. 
Any recovery in the survival action would not have benefitted MSU, a specific legatee of the
house.
4
Beyer’s first accounting of the estate, filed with the Register of Wills on September
9, 1997, lists a payment to Keating in the amount of $20,000 on September 10, 1996, and
reimbursements to Beyer for fees paid to Keating in the amount of $2,500 on January 18,
1996, $2,500 on February 7, 1996, and $5,000 on April 25, 1996.  Additionally, Keating’s
Time Sheet which was attached as Exhibit 1 of the Petition for Allowance of Attorney’s Fees
filed on behalf of the personal representative listed a payment of $10,000 to him on June 24,
1997.
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officers who shot Keat.  At the same time, Beyer made the first of four payments of
attorney’s fees to Keating.4  On or about February 20, 1996, Keat’s will was admitted to
probate and Beyer was appointed as Personal Representative of the Estate.  Beyer engaged
the services of a second attorney, David Allen (“Allen”), to handle the legal affairs associated
with administering Keat’s Estate.  On April 6, 1996, Allen notified University Counsel for
MSU of Keat’s bequest, and informed the University that Keat’s relatives were conducting
5
Allen was subsequently replaced as attorney for the Estate of Betty Y. Keat by
Leonard A. Briscoe (“Briscoe”) on October 15, 1996.  He also did not respond to the MSU
letter.
6
Beyer v. Eldridge, Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Case No. 96-277005.
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an investigation of the circumstances surrounding Keat’s death, which would require use of
funds from the Estate to cover the costs of the investigation and any subsequent litigation
arising out of it.  In response, on April 29, 1996, MSU informed Allen in writing:
We acknowledge the intention to investigate the circumstances
surrounding Ms. Keat’s death.  However, we do not understand
why you have suggested that costs associated with those efforts
take precedence over the Morgan bequest.  In accordance with
§ 8-105(b) of the Estates and Trusts Article (Order of payment)
the Morgan bequest takes precedence.  Moreover, the testator
did not specify that funds from the estate be used for this
purpose.
Neither Beyer nor Allen responded to the University’s letter.5  Despite MSU’s expressed
concern about the costs of litigation, the Personal Representative filed a survival action on
October 3, 1996.6
On June 28, 1996, Beyer sold Keat’s house for $95,045.94 and failed to inform MSU
of the sale.  On August 13, 1997, after having not heard anything from the Personal
Representative or her attorneys, MSU’s Office of General Counsel sent a letter to Allen
inquiring as to the disposition of Keat’s house and the bequest of Keat’s books on India
which were supposed to have been turned over to the Soper Library.  Again, MSU received
no response.
On February 4, 1998, Beyer filed a Petition to Approve Expenditure of Extraordinary
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Expenses of Administration (“Expenses Petition”) in the Orphans’ Court for Baltimore City.
The Expenses Petition requested more than $13,000 for distribution to Beyer and her
relatives to compensate them for expenditures associated with cleaning and repairing Keat’s
house and property for sale.  Although Allen was aware of communications from MSU’s
Office of General Counsel, notice of the Expenses Petition was served on the Soper Library,
rather than on MSU’s attorney.  Thereafter, on March 30, 1998, Beyer filed a Petition for
Attorney’s Fees (“Fees Petition”) with the Orphans’ Court for services performed by Keating
in the survival action.  Once again, counsel for MSU did not receive notice of the Petition
because it had been mailed to the Soper Library.  On April 20, 1998, the Orphans’ Court
approved Beyer’s Expenses Petition.  On April 29, 1998, however, the Orphans’ Court
delayed acting upon the Fees Petition pending receipt of a verification, a certificate of service
to interested parties, a detailed list of services performed by Keating, and a first and final
administration account of the Estate.  Keating subsequently filed a Petition for an Extension
for filing these requested documents with the Orphans’ Court on May 19, 1998.
On May 6, 1998, counsel for MSU entered his appearance in the Orphans’ Court when
he learned about Beyer’s Expenses Petition and took exception thereto.  Beyer filed a motion
to strike MSU’s exceptions on the basis that they were untimely filed and allegedly contained
“inaccurate and false allegations.”
On June 8, 1998, Keating filed another Fees Petition requesting $40,000 from the
Estate, although the Personal Representative previously had paid Keating $30,000 for his
7
Section V (C) of the retainer agreement of August 24, 1996, executed by Beyer acting
in her capacity as Personal Representative of the Estate of Betty Keat provides:
The client and attorney agree that the legal fees in this
case shall not exceed $40,000, unless the client receives an
award, judgment, or settlement in excess of $100,000, then the
client and attorney agree that the attorney shall receive 33.33%
of any such award, judgment, or settlement amount, with credit
given for accrued attorney’s fees.  The attorney’s regular hourly
rate is $150 per hour.
Any litigation expenses or costs recovered in the case
will first be applied to litigation expenses and attorney’s fees
owed by the client to the attorney and then any overage will be
paid to the client.
8
At this point in time, MSU was privy to the fact that Beyer was pursuing a tort action
against the Baltimore City Police, but did not know that Keating had filed the Fees Petition
-6-
services.  The Orphans’ Court granted Keating an extension of time to provide the Court with
the information it had requested in its April 29th Order.  The Court also ordered Keating to
provide his retainer agreement with the Personal Representative for his representation of the
Estate in the survival action.7
On July 2, 1998, over two years after the sale, MSU learned that Keat’s house had
been sold.  MSU responded by immediately filing a Petition to Order Distribution of Property
(“Petition for Distribution”) with the Orphans’ Court to facilitate its receipt of the bequest.
In the Petition for Distribution, MSU objected to Beyer’s failure to file a first and final
administration account for the Estate and to the proposed payment of attorney’s fees for any
litigation arising out of Keat’s death and requested that the Orphans’ Court stay any further
expenditures from the Estate pending review by the court.8  The Orphans’ Court scheduled
with the Orphans’ Court on June 8, 1998.  
9
Section 12-502 provides:
(a) In general; exception in Harford and Montgomery Counties. – (1)
Instead of a direct appeal to the Court of Special Appeals pursuant to § 12-501
of this subtitle, a party may appeal to the circuit court for the county from a
final judgment of an orphans’ court.  The appeal shall be heard de novo by the
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a hearing on MSU’s Petition for Distribution for September 29, 1998.  
On September 9, 1998, without notice to MSU or a hearing, the Orphans’ Court
approved payment of $30,000 in attorney’s fees to Keating and allowed him to request
additional payment for services rendered following the disposition of the survival action.
Thereafter, on September 11, 1998, the Orphans’ Court denied M SU’s exceptions to Beyer’s
Expenses Petition without a hearing.  MSU did not receive a copy of the September 11th
Order until September 25, 1998.
On October 1, 1998, MSU sent a letter to the Chief Judge of the Orphans’ Court for
Baltimore City protesting the failure to receive notice of the petitions and the lack of hearings
prior to the issuance of the Orphans’ Court’s Orders of September 9 and September 11, 1998.
 Counsel for MSU did not learn of the June 8, 1998 Fees Petition or September 9, 1998 Order
approving of those fees until he appeared before the Orphans’ Court on September 29, 1998,
for the hearing on the Petition for Distribution.  Although MSU requested that the Orphans’
Court immediately remediate the situation, the Court declined to intervene.  MSU then filed
an appeal to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City pursuant to Maryland Code (1974, 1998
Repl. Vol.) Section 12-502 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article 9 challenging the
circuit court.  The de novo appeal shall be treated as if it were a new
proceeding and as if there had never been a prior hearing or judgment by the
orphans’ court.  The circuit court shall give judgment according to the equity
of the matter.
(2) This subsection does not apply to Harford County or
Montgomery County.
(b) Manner and time of taking appeal. – An appeal pursuant to this
section shall be taken by filing an order for appeal with the register of wills
within 30 days after the date of the final judgment from which the appeal is
taken.  Within 30 days thereafter the register of wills shall transmit all
pleadings and orders of the proceedings to the court to which the appeal is
taken, unless the orphans’ court from which the appeal is taken extends the
time for transmitting these pleadings and orders.
10
MSU was referring to the exceptions it filed in response to the initial approval of the
Expenses Petition by the Orphans’ Court on April 20, 1998, and to its objection to payment
of attorney’s fees raised in its Petition for Distribution.
-8-
legitimacy of the Orphans’ Court’s Orders of September 9 and September 11, 1998.  MSU
asserted that, despite filing pleadings in opposition to the payments of attorney’s fees and
extraordinary expenses from the Estate, it never had been given the opportunity to be heard
on the merits of the issues underlying the Orphans’ Court’s Orders of September 9 and
September 11, 1998.10  MSU also alleged that Beyer breached her fiduciary duty “to settle
and distribute the estate . . . as expeditiously and with as little sacrifice of value as is
reasonable under the circumstances,” as set forth in Maryland Code (1974, 2001 Repl. Vol.),
Section 7-101(a) of the Estates and Trusts Article.
The Circuit Court consolidated MSU’s appeal with the ongoing survival action
brought by Beyer as Personal Representative of the Estate of Betty Y. Keat against members
of the Baltimore City Police Department, which had been set for trial in February of 1999.
-9-
In addition, the Circuit Court, acting sua sponte on January 15, 1999, appointed attorney
Arthur Drager to serve as counsel to represent the interests of the Estate of Betty Y. Keat.
On February 23, 1999, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the individually named
police officers and the Baltimore City Police Department in the survival action.  The de novo
hearing on MSU’s appeal was held in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on February 24,
1999.  During the hearing, the following discourse took place:
Court:  I have given this case a great deal of thought, and this
case makes me feel extremely uncomfortable.  I have really been
in a dilemma as to how to deal with this.  I have read Mr.
Drager’s recommendation. I read the [Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Owrutsky, 322 Md. 334, 587 A.2d 511 (1991)] case.
I have real concerns about the propriety of conduct that I have
seen throughout this matter, and I am extremely concerned.
I am concerned about the Personal Representative
making expenditures without the approval of the Orphans’ Court
to almost half of the entire Estate, and approval of the Orphans’
Court was never even sought until more than two years after
some of the expenditures had been made.  That gives me a great
deal of concern.  I am concerned, because the original attorney
for the Estate was put on notice as far back as April of ‘96 of an
objection to a disbursement of attorney’s fees, and yet, this
matter went to the Orphans’ Court on a petition filed twenty-
three months later without a hearing in which there was an
approval of the – of thirty thousand dollars, and ten thousand of
it still has not been approved, which is all inconsistent with the
estates and trusts article.
* * *
I guess the biggest issue before me is what do we do
today.  You know, from – I don’t know what testimony or what
evidence would even be necessary, because I don’t think there
is a factual dispute concerning what was done by this Personal
Representative.  I don’t think it’s disputed at all that these
disbursements were made.  I don’t think that there is a dispute
that these disbursements were made prior to the approval of the
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Orphans’ Court.  And quite frankly, the Orphans’ Court hasn’t
even approved all of it.  I am concerned about Morgan not even
being put on notice after they filed an objection through the
original attorney representing the Estate.  And then for the
Orphans’ Court to almost perfunctorily sign these orders really
gives me some concern . . . .
[T]his case makes me very uncomfortable when I read
what I have read today.  In fact, forty thousand dollars was
disbursed before the approval was ever even obtained, and even
over objection, this disbursement was made without even having
a hearing . . . . 
The court then raised the issue of a summary judgment motion:
Court: . . . motions for summary judgment can be filed at any
time in a proceeding, and it can even be done orally.
Mr. Davis: I would so move, your honor.
Court: Mr. Briscoe, I will hear from you.
Mr. Briscoe: Well, I don’t think that Miss Beyer should be
penalized–
Court: I want you to tell me where there is a factual dispute
concerning the times these disbursements were made – don’t cut
me off, the amount of the disbursements that she took for
herself, what the commissions would have been.  I want to know
where there is a factual dispute regarding anything.
Mr. Briscoe: I can’t see any factual disputes, your honor.
* * *
Court: I want to add to the facts that as late as July of 1998, the
Personal Representative had not made a distribution, and then an
order was entered petitioning to have such a distribution made.
It was not until September of 1998 that the authorization by the
Orphans’ Court was made in the amount of thirty thousand
dollars.
Now, I don’t see any factual dispute as to any of these –
of the statements that I have made, and all of the distributions to
Mr. Keating were made prior to or on or about June 24th of
1997, at least a year and three months before . . . the final
authorization, . . .  And under the Estates and Trusts Article, and
Section 7-601 and 602, approval is required before such a
distribution can be made.  So as a matter – with respect to the
-11-
facts, I’d like to know if there is any issue or fact that is not
correct.
Mr. Briscoe: I can’t see that there is any issue of fact as far as
stated . . . .
The Circuit Court thereupon orally granted summary judgment in favor of MSU and the next
day memorialized the decision, in which it stated:
1.
Janet Beyer, the Personal Representative, wrongfully expended estate funds in
the amount of $40,000 for legal services to Anton J. S. Keating, Esquire, in
violation of her fiduciary duty under Md. Estates & Trusts Art. § 7-101(a) and
without prior court approval; and
2.
Janet Beyer, the Personal Representative, wrongfully expended estate funds in
the amount of $13,309.53 for extraordinary expenses.
Beyer filed a timely appeal in the Court of Special Appeals, wherein she challenged
the subject matter jurisdiction of the Circuit Court to hear the appeal, arguing that the
September 9 and September 11, 1998 Orders of the Orphans’ Court were not appealable
orders, and asserting that the Circuit Court erred in vacating the Orders of the Orphans’ Court
by granting summary judgment to MSU.  See Beyer v. Morgan State University, 139 Md.
App. 609, 613, 779 A.2d 388, 390-91 (2001).  The Court of Special Appeals held that the
Order granting Beyer’s Fees Petition on September 9, 1998, and the Order granting Beyer’s
Expenses Petition on September 11, 1998, constituted final appealable judgments of the
Orphans’ Court pursuant to Section 12-502(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,
so that the Circuit Court had subject matter jurisdiction over MSU’s timely filed appeal.  See
id. at 632-33, 779 A.2d at 401-02; Md. Code, § 12-502(a)(1).
With regard to Beyer’s contention that the Circuit Court erred in vacating the Orders
11
Neither party to this appeal has questioned the legitimacy of this part of the CSA
ruling.
-12-
of the Orphans’ Court premised on MSU’s oral motion for summary judgment, the Court of
Special Appeals concluded there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Beyer
had used money from the Estate to pay the legal fees of the attorney working on the tort
claim prior to receiving approval from the Orphans’ Court in violation of her fiduciary duties
as Personal Representative of Betty Keat’s Estate.  See Beyer, 139 Md. App. at 639, 779
A.2d at 406.  The intermediate appellate court did find, however, that the Circuit Court erred
in failing to make evidentiary findings as to whether the expenses for which Petitioner sought
payment approval were extraordinary expenses which could be paid from Estate funds
because the evidence was in dispute.  See id. at 641, 779 A.2d at 407.11  Therefore, the Court
of Special Appeals affirmed in part, and reversed in part the Circuit Court’s grant of
summary judgment, and remanded the matter for consideration of the legitimacy of the
expenses approved by the Orphans’ Court in its Order of September 11, 1998.
We granted a petition for a writ of certiorari in this case, 367 Md. 86, 785 A.2d 1290
(2001), to consider the following questions presented by Beyer, which we have rephrased:
1.
Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in finding that the Circuit Court for
Baltimore City had subject matter jurisdiction over an appeal pursuant to Maryland
Code, Section 12-502 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (1974, 1998
Repl. Vol.) about the September 9 and September 11, 1998 Orders entered by the
Orphans’ Court? 
2.
Whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in affirming the Circuit Court’s decision
to vacate the September 9, 1998 Order of the Orphans’ Court granting payment of
12
Additionally, in her Petition for Writ of Certiorari, petitioner cautioned that we should
not rely on the facts set forth in the Court of Special Appeals opinion, asserting that the facts
have not been “proven or even offered as evidence, and some have no basis in the briefs,
record extract, record or reality.”  Pet. for Writ at 10.  The facts with which petitioner takes
issue are of no consequence to the resolution of this matter.
13
Maryland Rule 6-416(a)(5) provides:
An exception shall be filed with the court within 20 days after
service of the petition and notice and shall include the grounds
therefor in reasonable detail.  A copy of the exception shall be
served on the personal representative.
In her brief to this Court, petitioner cites to Maryland Rule 6-416(e), which was eliminated
and rewritten in 1998 as the current provision quoted above.
-13-
attorney’s fees pursuant to an oral motion for summary judgment?12
II.
Discussion
A.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the Circuit Court
Beyer argues that because MSU, an interested party to the Estate, did not receive
notice of the Expenses and Fees Petitions pursuant to Section 7-502(a) of the Estates and
Trusts Article, the subsequent order of the Orphans’ Court granting the petition was not a
final judgment for purposes of triggering the appellate provisions of Section 12-502 of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.  Rather, Beyer contends that because MSU did not
receive notice, its appellate remedies were limited to challenging the order granting
attorney’s fees under the procedures set forth in Section 7-502(b) of the Estates and Trusts
Article and Maryland Rule 6-416(a)(5). 13  What Beyer is attempting to do is take advantage
of her own failure to act appropriately as the Personal Representative by bolting the door to
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the Circuit Court to MSU; with this we do not agree.
Our analysis begins with an examination and interpretation of Section 7-502 of the
Estates and Trusts Article and related Maryland Rule 6-416, governing notice of proposed
payments from the Estate to the Personal Representative or an attorney, as well as Section
12-502 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article and related Maryland Rule 6-463
concerning appeals to the Circuit Court from judgments rendered in the Orphans’ Court.  The
principal goal of statutory interpretation is to ascertain the legislative intent behind the
enactment.  See Ridge Heating, Air Conditioning & Plumbing, Inc. v. Brennen, 366 Md. 336,
349, 783 A.2d 691, 699 (2001); Taylor v. NationsBank, N.A., 365 Md. 166, 181, 776 A.2d
645, 654 (2001); Derry v. State, 358 Md. 325, 335, 748 A.2d 478, 483 (2000); Oaks v.
Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995).  The statutory language serves as the
primary source for determining legislative intent.  See Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union
v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 346 Md. 437, 444-45, 697 A.2d 455, 458 (1997); Tucker v.
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 308 Md. 69, 73, 517 A.2d 730, 731 (1986).  Where the statutory
language is clear and unambiguous, our inquiry is at an end.  See Fister v. Allstate Life Ins.
Co., 366 Md. 201, 212, 783 A.2d 194, 200 (2001); Board of License Comm’rs for Charles
County v. Toye, 354 Md. 116, 122, 729 A.2d 407, 410 (1999).  Where the statutory language
is ambiguous, we read it within the context of the statutory scheme as a whole.  See In re
Mark M., 365 Md. 687, 711, 782 A.2d 332, 346 (2001); Stanford v. Maryland Police
Training & Correctional Comm’n, 346 Md. 374, 380, 697 A.2d 424, 427 (1997).  Thus, the
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provisions must be read from “a commonsensical perspective to avoid a farfetched
interpretation.”  Graves v. State, 364 Md. 329, 346, 772 A.2d 1225, 1235 (2001).   
These principles applied to statutory interpretation are identical to those used to
interpret the Maryland Rules.  See Pickett v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 365 Md. 67, 78, 775
A.2d 1218, 1224 (2001); Johnson v. State, 360 Md. 250, 265, 757 A.2d 796, 804 (2000)(“If
the words of the rule are plain and unambiguous, our inquiry ordinarily ceases and we need
not venture outside the text of the rule.”); Marsheck v. Bd. of Trustees of the Fire and Police
Employees’ Retirement Sys. of Baltimore, 358 Md. 393, 402-03, 749 A.2d 774, 779
(2000)(interpreting the Baltimore City Code and explaining that the Court need not look
beyond the text when the words used are plain and unambiguous).
When Beyer was appointed as Personal Representative of her sister’s Estate, she
undertook to perform the following duties, as set forth in Maryland Code, Section 7-101 of
the Estates and Trusts Article:
(a) Fiduciary responsibility. – A personal representative is a
fiduciary.  He is under a general duty to settle and distribute the
estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of the will
and the estates of decedents law as expeditiously and with as
little sacrifice of value as is reasonable under the circumstances.
He shall use the authority conferred upon him by the estates of
decedents law, by the terms of the will, by orders in proceedings
to which he is party, and by the equitable principles generally
applicable to fiduciaries, fairly considering the interests of all
interested persons and creditors.
(b) Time for distribution.  – Unless the time of distribution is
extended by order of court for good cause shown, the personal
representative shall distribute all the assets of the estate of which
he has taken possession or control within the time provided in
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§ 7-305 for rendering his first account.
(c) Exoneration for certain payments.  – The personal
representative does not incur any personal liability by his
payment of claims or distribution of assets even if he does not
consider claims for injuries to the person prosecuted under the
provisions of § 8-103(e) or § 8-104, if at the time of payment or
distribution:
(1) He had no actual knowledge of the claim; and
(2) The plaintiff had not filed on time his claim with the
register.
Thus, we must first determine whether Beyer in her capacity as Personal Representative for
the Estate of Betty Y. Keat breached a fiduciary duty owed to the Estate by disbursing
attorney’s fees for services rendered allegedly on behalf of the Estate prior to providing
notice of such payment to MSU, an interested person, and prior to receiving approval by the
Orphans’ Court for such expenditures.  See Md. Code, § 7-502 of the Est. & Trusts Art.  
A Personal Representative owes a duty to the beneficiaries of a will to act in the best
interests of the Estate.  See Ferguson v. Cramer, 349 Md. 760, 769, 709 A.2d 1279, 1283-84
(1998).  In fulfilling this duty, the Personal Representative is obligated to exhibit the
following qualities:
1.  The exercise of the care, skill and diligence of a reasonably
prudent person dealing with his or her own property;
2.  The exercise of good faith and loyalty to all the beneficiaries;
3.  The lack of self-dealing;
4.  The exercise of reasonable watchfulness over investments;
and
5.  The maintenance of full, accurate and precise records.
Kann v. Kann, 344 Md. 689, 708, 690 A.2d 509, 518 (1997)(quoting A. J. GIBBER, GIBBER
ON ESTATE ADMINISTRATION, at 3-1 (3d ed. 1991)).
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It is undisputed that neither Beyer acting in her capacity as Personal Representative
of the Estate nor Allen or Briscoe as attorneys for the Estate, nor Keating filed the requisite
Fees Petition for the work allegedly performed by Keating in the survival action prior to
Keating’s receipt of payment of those fees.  Nevertheless, Beyer reasons that, “[i]f the
attorney’s fees would have been properly payable had preapproval payments not been made
by [Beyer], then the breach of fiduciary duty resulted in no loss to the Estate.”  We simply
cannot accept Beyer’s no harm, no foul argument.
When filing a petition for attorney’s fees, the Personal Representative of an estate is
required to give written notice to all interested persons.  Such notice sets forth the amount
requested from the estate and the basis for that request, and alerts interested persons that they
may make a request for a hearing within 20 days of the notice being sent.  See Md. Code, §
7-502(a) of the Est. & Trusts Art.  As “[a] legatee in being, not fully paid” based on the
bequest contained in Keat’s will, MSU qualified as an “interested person” for purposes of
the notice provision of Section 7-502(a).  See Md. Code, § 1-101(i)(3) of the Est. & Trusts
Art.  The procedure for giving notice to interested persons of a petition for attorney’s fees
is set forth in Maryland Rule 6-416(a)(3):
(3) Notice.  The personal representative shall serve on
each unpaid creditor who has filed a claim and on each
interested person a copy of the petition accompanied by a notice
in the following form:
NOTICE OF PETITION FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES OR
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE’S COMMISSIONS
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You are hereby notified that a petition for allowance of
attorney’s fees or personal representative’s commissions has
been filed.
You have 20 days after service of the petition within
which to file written exceptions and to request a hearing.
Furthermore, the rule provides that “[u]pon the filing of a petition, the court, by order, shall
allow attorney’s fees or personal representative’s commissions as it considers appropriate,
subject to any exceptions.”  Md. Rule 6-416(a)(4) (emphasis added).  The decision to allow
attorney’s fees is dependent upon the Orphans’ Court’s exercise of its discretion to approve
all, some, or none of the requested fees.  See Dessell v. Goldman, 231 Md. 428, 431, 190
A.2d 633, 635 (1963)(explaining that in allowing payment of attorney’s fees from an estate,
“the court must exercise sound judgment and discretion, basing its determination upon the
evidence offered for its instruction and guidance and a consideration of the tests held
generally applicable in fixing the size of a fee”).  
The Fees Petition failed to alert the Orphans’ Court to the fact that funds already had
been taken out of the Estate to pay Keating prior to receiving court approval for those
expenditures.  The first accounting for the Estate filed with the Register of Wills on
September 9, 1997, however, reveals that as early as January 20, 1996, Beyer wrote a check
from her own account in the amount of $500 to an investigator hired in relation to the
survival action and subsequently reimbursed herself from the Estate without the Court’s
permission.  Similarly, Beyer paid Keating a total of $30,000 in attorney’s fees from the
Estate for a period covering January 18, 1996 to September 10, 1996, more than two years
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before receiving approval for the payment of fees from the Orphans’ Court.  Due to Beyer’s
omission of information in the Fees Petition that these payments had been made, the
Orphans’ Court approved payment of the attorney’s fees without knowledge of her violation
of the dictates of Section 7-502(a) of the Estates and Trusts Article.  Beyer’s actions show
a lack of good faith and loyalty towards MSU as a specific legatee of the Estate in breach of
the fiduciary duty entrusted to her as Personal Representative of Keat’s Estate.
We turn now to the statutory provisions governing appeals from final judgments of
the Orphans’ Court and their applicability to the instant case.  A party may take an appeal
from “a judgment of the court” to either “the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland pursuant
to Code, Courts Article, § 12-501,” or with the exception of Harford and Montgomery
Counties, “to the circuit court for the county pursuant to Code, Courts Article, § 12-502.”
Md. Rule 6-463.  We have explained that “[a] final judgment is any judgment or order which
is ‘so far final as to determine and conclude the rights involved in the action, or to deny to
the party seeking redress by the appeal the means of further prosecuting or defending his
rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding.’” Grimberg v. Marth, 338 Md.
546, 551, 659 A.2d 1287, 1290 (1995)(quoting In re Buckler Trusts, 144 Md. 424, 427, 125
A. 177, 178 (1924)). 
Petitioner argues that the September 9 and September 11, 1998 Orders of the Orphans’
Court, which approved the payment of $30,000 in attorney’s fees to Keating from the Estate
and overruled MSU’s exceptions to the Expenses Petition, were not final judgments which
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would permit MSU to file an appeal with the Circuit Court under Section 12-502 of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.  In support of this argument, Beyer attempts to
extend our decision in Radcliff v. Vance, 360 Md. 277, 757 A.2d 812 (2000), to require that
an interested person who is not properly served with notice of a petition for attorney’s fees
must file a motion to vacate the Order of the Orphans’ Court granting such fees because the
“substantial irregularity” caused by improper service of notice on an interested party prevents
the order from being final.  In its counterargument, however, MSU states, “Radcliff simply
stands for the unremarkable proposition that when a party does not receive proper notice of
an orphans’ court order, there is ‘substantial irregularity’ sufficient to vacate the order.”  We
agree with MSU’s assessment of the applicability of Radcliff to the instant case.
In Radcliff, an interested person to an estate who did not receive notice of a petition
for attorney’s fees prior to the issuance of an order from the Orphans’ Court approving
payment of the fees challenged the court’s decision by filing a petition to revoke the order
with the Orphans’ Court.  Id. at  283-84, 757 A.2d at 815.  We concluded that because the
interested person had not received notice of the petition for attorney’s fees pursuant to
Section 7-502(a) of the Estates and Trusts Article, there was a “substantial irregularity” in
the proceeding which prevented the interested person from opposing the petition for
attorney’s fees prior to entrance of the order to pay by the Orphans’ Court.  Id. at 292-93, 757
A.2d at 820 (“An irregularity is a failure to follow required process or procedure.”)  In
reaching this conclusion, we stated that because the interested person had not received the
14
Similarly, Section 6-408 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides:
For a period of 30 days after the entry of a judgment, or
thereafter pursuant to motion filed within that period, the court
has revisory power and control over the judgment.  After the
expiration of that period the court has revisory power and
control over the judgment only in case of fraud, mistake,
irregularity, or failure of an employee of the court or of the
clerk’s office to perform a duty required by statute or rule.
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required notice, the order was not “final and binding upon” her.  Id. at 292, 757 A.2d at 820.
This finality language, however, cannot be manipulated against the position of an interested
person who did not receive notice.
Section 7-502(b) of the Estates and Trusts Article provides that “[u]nless there was
fraud, material mistake, or substantial irregularity in the proceeding, or a request for a
hearing is filed within 20 days of the sending of the notice, any action taken by the court on
the petition is final and binding on all persons to whom the notice was given”14 (emphasis
added).  In the instant case, MSU did not file exceptions within twenty days of the issuance
of the September 9, 1998 order granting payment of attorney’s fees to Keating.  Thus, for
purposes of Section 7-502(b), Beyer’s breach of the fiduciary duty owed to the Estate in her
capacity as Personal Representative, along with the failed notice of the Fees Petition to MSU
could constitute “substantial irregularit[ies].”  We agree, however, with the Court of Special
Appeals’s interpretation of the relevant provisions:
The language of ET § 7-502(b) and Md. Rule 6-416(c) cannot
be interpreted reasonably to mean that unless and until proper
notice is given, an order granting a petition for payment of
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attorney’s fees (or a personal representative’s commission) is
not final for purposes of appeal.  Under [Beyer’s] reading of the
pertinent language of ET § 7-502(b), an order granting such a
petition would at one time be final as to creditors and interested
parties who received proper notice and non-final as to those who
did not; and that would be the case in the absence of any
challenge to the order on that basis.  This interpretation is
practicably unworkable.  
Beyer, 139 Md. App. at 631, 779 A.2d at 401.  Thus, while it is true that MSU could have
elected to file a motion to vacate the September 9 and September 11, 1998 orders in the
Orphans’ Court based on the “substantial irregularity” in the proceedings, Section 7-502(b)
of the Estates and Trusts Article does not mandate that an aggrieved interested person or
creditor pursue this avenue of relief as adverse to any other avenue available when it did not
receive notice from the very party who would seek to bar the door to the Circuit Court.
Beyer  asserts that our decision in Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Owrutsky, 322 Md.
334, 587 A.2d 511 (1991), upon which the Circuit Court and Court of Special Appeals based
their decisions that she breached her fiduciary duty as Personal Representative, is “not on all
fours with this case.”  In Owrutsky, we emphatically declared that an attorney “has no right
to [estate] funds, either as a commission or as an attorney’s fee, unless and until an approval
pursuant to § 7-601 or § 7-602 of the Estates and Trusts Article . . . has been obtained from
the Orphans’ Court.”  Id. at 344, 587 A.2d at 516.  We admonished that “[a]ppropriating any
part of [estate] funds to [the attorney or Personal Representative’s] own use and benefit
without clear authority to do so cannot be tolerated.”  Id. at 345, 587 A.2d at 516.  The Court
of Special Appeals likewise chastised petitioner in this case:
15
When the notice provision of Section 7-502 was first enacted by Chapter 3 of the
Maryland Laws of 1969, the Governor’s Commission to Review and Revise the
Testamentary Law explained the purpose of the provision as follows:
When the Court is to be asked to pay out or distribute
estate assets to the personal representative or to the attorney for
the estate, or for their respective benefits, whether in payment of
a claimed debt, as compensation for services rendered, or
otherwise, the personal representative or the attorney becomes
momentarily, in effect, an adverse party.  Therefore, to this
limited degree the Commission felt that not only should notice
of such contemplated request be given to all interested persons,
but also that there should be a period of 20 days within which
any objection thereto could be filed, and a hearing held thereon,
before any payment is actually made.
Even in the absence of any request for a hearing, or an
objection filed, the Court would nevertheless on its own motion,
-23-
[Beyer] had no authority or discretion to use Estate funds to pay
Keating’s legal fee, to her personal benefit, without the prior
approval of the orphans’ court.  Her conduct, like that of the
lawyer in Owrutsky, amounted to an appropriation of Estate
funds in clear violation of her fiduciary duties. 
Beyer v. Morgan State University, 139 Md. App. at 639, 779 A.2d at 406.  The Owrutsky
analogy is extremely apt here, where the petitioner breached her fiduciary duty to give notice
and secure approval before expending estate assets.  See Md. Code, § 7-101(a) of the Est. &
Trusts Art. (mandating that Personal Representatives are fiduciaries, and as such, they must
“fairly consider[] the interests of all interested persons and creditors”).
The premise of giving notice to parties having an interest in a particular piece of
litigation is to prevent such parties from being bound by the determinations of the court
where they did not have an opportunity to be heard.15  Maryland Rule 6-416(a)(6) clearly
and with the thoroughness that it would deem appropriate,
scrutinize the validity, fairness and propriety of any such request
for payment.
GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION TO REVIEW AND REVISE THE TESTAMENTARY LAW OF
MARYLAND, SECOND REPORT § 7-502, at 117 (1968).  The 1969 provision, which serves as
the basis for the current version of Section 7-502 states:
The personal representative shall give written notice to each creditor who has filed a
claim under Section 8-104 which is still open and to all interested persons of any claim,
petition or other request which could result, directly or indirectly, in the payment of a debt,
commission, fee, or other compensation to, or for the benefit of, the personal representative
or the attorney for the estate.  The notice shall set forth in reasonable detail the amount to be
requested and the basis therefor.  Unless a request for a hearing thereon is filed within 20
days of the sending of the notice, any action taken by the Court in connection therewith shall
be final and binding on all persons to whom the notice was given unless there was fraud,
material mistake or substantial irregularity in the proceeding.
1969 MD. LAWS, ch. 3.  The language of the current provision is substantially the same.  See
Md. Code (1974, 2001 Repl. Vol.), § 7-502 of the Est. & Trusts Art.
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states, “[i]f timely exceptions are not filed, the order of the court allowing the attorney’s fees
or personal representative’s commissions becomes final.”  Beyer indicates a desire to force
MSU into a catch-22 that was created by Beyer, whereby MSU did not receive adequate
notice of the Expenses and Fees Petitions from Beyer or her attorneys acting on her behalf,
and yet where the failure to receive notice would bar MSU from seeking an available avenue
of redress through an appeal to the Circuit Court.  To permit such a conundrum would be an
obfuscation of the rules by allowing noncompliance with procedural safeguards to benefit
the wrongdoer.  We decline to read into the statutory framework an intention to force parties
who have not received the requisite notice to file motions to vacate orders of the Orphans’
-25-
Court prior to exercising their statutory remedies under Section 12-502 of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article and Maryland Rule 6-463 to appeal the final judgment of the
Orphans’ Court to the Circuit Court.  See Taylor, 365 Md. at 181, 776 A.2d at 654 (“We
neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not
reflected by the words the Legislature used or engage in forced or subtle interpretation in an
attempt to extend or limit the statute’s meaning.”).
Therefore, we find that under the facts of this case, MSU was not required to file a
motion to vacate the September 9 and September 11, 1998 Orders in the Orphans’ Court
prior to seeking an appeal in the Circuit Court pursuant to Section 12-502 of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article and Maryland Rule 6-463.  The Circuit Court for Baltimore City
properly had subject matter jurisdiction over MSU’s appeal.  We will not permit personal
representatives or their attorneys the luxury of controlling an interested person’s appellate
remedies through their own misfeasance.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court
of Special Appeals. 
B.
Grant of Summary Judgment
Beyer urges this Court to reverse the decision of the Court of Special Appeals by
asserting that MSU failed to make a motion for summary judgment that was appropriate,
because the motion was made orally rather than through a formal filing of pleadings. 
Maryland Rule 2-501(e) states that “[t]he court shall enter judgment in favor of or
against the moving party if the motion and response show that there is no genuine dispute as
16
An oral motion for summary judgment, however, may raise potential due process
considerations.  The context and chronology of the particular circumstances of such a motion
may implicate issues of fair notice and opportunity to defend for the nonmoving party.  Such
concerns were not expressed clearly in Petitioner’s arguments in the Circuit Court, the Court
of Special Appeals, or here.
-26-
to any material fact and that the party in whose favor judgment is entered is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”  The rule does not contain any language which would require
a written motion.  In fact, oral motions are permitted expressly by Maryland Rule 2-311(a),
which provides “An application to the court for an order shall be by motion which, unless
made during a hearing or trial, shall be made in writing, and shall set forth the relief or order
sought.”  See Crews v. Hollenbach, 358 Md. 627, 638, 751 A.2d 481, 487 (2000)(discussing
the trial court’s decision to grant both motions for summary judgment which were filed in
writing by two parties in advance of a hearing, as well as the oral motions for summary
judgment submitted by three other parties at the hearing).  Therefore, the form of the motion
complied with the rules; the only issue is whether the Circuit Court’s decision to grant the
motion was legally correct. 16
We review a lower court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judgment de novo.
See Schmerling v. Injured Workers’ Ins. Fund, 368 Md. 434, ____, 795 A.2d 715, _____
(2002).  In so doing, we must determine whether there is a dispute over a genuine issue of
material fact.  See Lippert v. Jung, 366 Md. 221, 227, 783 A.2d 206, 209 (2001). Where there
are no genuine disputes as to material facts, we must determine whether the Circuit Court
was legally correct in granting MSU’s oral motion for summary judgment.  See Maryland
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Dept. of the Environment v. Underwood, 368 Md. 160, 171, 792 A.2d 1130, 1136 (2002);
Okwa v. Harper, 360 Md. 161, 178, 757 A.2d 118, 127 (2000).
In the case sub judice, the transcript of the hearing before the Circuit Court shows that
there was no genuine dispute of material facts between the parties, that the last of Beyer’s
four payments to Keating came at least fifteen months before the Orphans’ Court granted
approval for payment of those fees, and that MSU did not receive notice of the Fees Petition,
all of which violated Section 7-502 of the Estates and Trusts Article.  Accordingly, the
Circuit Court’s decision to grant MSU’s motion for summary judgment and vacate the
September 9, 1998, Order allowing the payment of attorney’s fees from the Estate was
correct as a matter of law.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED WITH COSTS.