Case Title: Movrich v. Lobermeier

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015AP000583

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2018-01-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
2018 WI 9 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP583 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Jerome Movrich and Gail Movrich, 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
     v. 
David J. Lobermeier and Diane Lobermeier, 
          Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 372 Wis. 2d 724, 889 N.W.2d 454 
PDC No:  2016 WI App 90 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 23, 2018 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 20, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Price 
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick J. Madden 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
CONCURRED/DISSENTED: 
 
ABRAHAMSON, J. concurs and dissents (opinion 
filed). 
R.G. BRADLEY, J. concurs and dissents, 
joined by A.W. BRALDEY, J. and ABRAHAMSON, 
J. (except Part II) (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For 
the 
defendants-appellants-petitioners, 
there 
were 
briefs filed by Brian G. Formella and Anderson, O’Brien, Bertz, 
Skrenes & Golla, LLP, Stevens Point.  There was an oral argument 
by Brian G. Formella. 
 
For the plaintiffs-respondents, there was a brief and oral 
argument by Daniel Snyder, Park Falls. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Big Cedar 
Lake Protection and Rehabilitation District and Wisconsin 
 
 
2 
Association of Lakes, Inc. by William P. O’connor and Wheeler, 
Van Sickle & Anderson, S.C., Madison.  There was an oral 
argument by William P. O'Connor. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin 
REALTORS Association by Thomas D. Larson and Wisconsin REALTORS 
Association, Madison. 
 
 
 
2018 WI 9
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP583 
(L.C. Nos.  2013CV22 & 2013CV78) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Jerome Movrich and Gail Movrich, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
     v. 
 
David J. Lobermeier and Diane Lobermeier, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants-Petitioners. 
FILED 
JAN 23, 2018 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a published decision of the court of appeals.  
Affirmed in part; reversed in part.   
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   David and Diane 
Lobermeier appeal a decision of the court of appeals, affirming 
the circuit court's1 judgment entered in favor of Jerome and Gail 
Movrich regarding their asserted right to install a pier and to 
access the Sailor Creek Flowage directly from their shoreline 
property.  Lobermeiers own the waterbed of the Flowage where the 
Movrich property meets the water.2  Lobermeiers contend that the 
presence of navigable water over their property does not affect 
their basic property rights, including the right to prohibit 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Patrick J. Madden of Price County presided. 
2 Lobermeiers do not own the entire waterbed.   
No. 
2015AP583 
 
 
2 
 
Movriches from installing a pier into or over the portion of the 
waterbed of the Flowage that Lobermeiers own.  Lobermeiers 
further contend that Movriches may access the Sailor Creek 
Flowage only from a public access point.  Movriches respond that 
Lobermeiers' ownership is qualified by and subservient to their 
asserted riparian rights and to the Wisconsin public trust 
doctrine.   
¶2 
There are three issues on this appeal.  First, we 
consider whether Movriches have riparian rights, which when 
combined with their rights under the public trust doctrine, 
overcome 
Lobermeiers' 
private 
property 
rights 
such 
that 
Movriches can place a pier on or over Lobermeiers' property.  To 
answer this question we review property rights, riparian rights, 
and the public trust doctrine, detailing the origin and extent 
of each. 
¶3 
In regard to the first issue, we conclude that while 
Movriches' property borders the Flowage, they are not entitled 
to those riparian rights that are incidental to property 
ownership along a naturally occurring body of water wherein the 
lakebed is held in trust by the state.  Rather, any property 
rights Movriches may enjoy in regard to the man-made body of 
water created by the flowage easement must be consistent with 
Lobermeiers' property rights or the flowage easement's creation 
of a navigable body of water.  Because the placement of a pier 
is inconsistent with Lobermeiers' fee simple property interest 
and does not arise from the flowage easement that supports only 
No. 
2015AP583 
 
 
3 
 
public rights in navigable waters, Movriches' private property 
rights are not sufficient to place a pier into or over the 
waterbed of the Flowage without Lobermeiers' permission based on 
the rights attendant to their shoreline property.    
¶4 
Second, we consider the nature of the flowage waters, 
to which all agree the public trust doctrine applies, and 
whether the public trust doctrine grants Movriches the right to 
install a pier directly from their property onto or over the 
portion of the waterbed that is privately owned by Lobermeiers.  
In answering this inquiry, we consider whether and to what 
extent the existence of navigable waters over Lobermeiers' 
privately-owned property affects Lobermeiers' rights.     
¶5 
On this issue, we conclude that the public trust 
doctrine conveys no private property rights, regardless of the 
presence of navigable water.  In a flowage easement such as is 
at issue here, title to the property under the flowage may 
remain with the owner.  While the public trust doctrine provides 
a right to use the flowage waters for recreational purposes, 
that right is held in trust equally for all.  Furthermore, 
although the Lobermeiers' property rights are modified to the 
extent that the public may use the flowage waters for 
recreational purposes, no private property right to construct a 
pier arises from the public trust doctrine.   
¶6 
Third, we consider whether the Wisconsin public trust 
doctrine when combined with the shoreline location of Movriches' 
property allows Movriches to access and exit the flowage waters 
No. 
2015AP583 
 
 
4 
 
directly from their abutting property; or, whether, because 
Lobermeiers hold title to the flowage waterbed, Movriches must 
access the Flowage from the public access.  On this issue, we 
conclude that as long as Movriches are using the flowage waters 
for purposes consistent with the public trust doctrine, their 
own property rights are sufficient to access and exit the 
Flowage directly from their shoreline property.  
¶7 
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals in part 
and reverse it in part. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶8 
This appeal concerns the tension between asserted 
riparian rights, ownership of property underlying a flowage, and 
Wisconsin's public trust doctrine.  More specifically, property 
owners David and Diane Lobermeier appeal from a judgment 
granting Jerome and Gail Movrich the right to place a pier into 
and over Lobermeiers' property and to access Sailor Creek 
Flowage directly from Movriches' abutting property.  Movrich v. 
Lobermeier, 2016 WI App 90, 372 Wis. 2d 724, 889 N.W.2d 454. 
¶9 
The Sailor Creek Flowage is a 201 acre, man-made lake 
located near the Town of Fifield in Price County, Wisconsin.  It 
was created by a dam placed on Sailor Creek in 1941.  At that 
time, a Deed of Flowage Rights was executed by Margaret 
Hussmann, who granted the Town of Fifield "the perpetual rights, 
privilege and easement to submerge, flood and/or raise the 
ground water elevation" of the underlying property.  Over time, 
the property that Hussmann subjected to the flowage easement in 
No. 
2015AP583 
 
 
5 
 
1941 was transferred to various persons.  Some of that property 
was deeded to brothers David and Robert Lobermeier in 2000, 
while other property eventually became the Sailor Creek Flowage 
Subdivision, where Movriches purchased property in 2006. 
¶10 Today, Lobermeiers own a portion of the waterbed of 
the Flowage that is subject to the Hussmann flowage easement. 
Lobermeiers' portion of the waterbed abuts Movriches' property.3  
David Lobermeier and Gail Movrich are brother and sister.  For a 
number of years the families existed in harmony, each making use 
of a pier on the Movrich property to moor their boats, and from 
which they swam and fished.  In about 2011 or 2012, however, the 
families had a falling out, at which point Lobermeiers began to 
assert that they have exclusive rights to the waterbed at issue.  
Lobermeiers concede that the Wisconsin public trust doctrine 
grants Movriches, and all other members of the public, access to 
the Flowage's waters for navigation and recreation purposes.4   
¶11 This case originally involved several properties, each 
of which abutted the Lobermeier waterbed property.  David 
                                                 
3 The Movrich property is legally described as Lot One (1) 
of Sailor Creek Subdivision.  A surveyor's description of the 
Sailor Creek Subdivision provides that the lots run "to the 
shoreline" of the Flowage and thence "along said shoreline." 
4 The Flowage is navigable, meaning that it is capable of 
supporting at least light water craft at some time during the 
year.  It is considered a public water pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 30.10 (2013-14).  It is undisputed that the public trust 
doctrine applies to the Flowage. 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2015AP583 
 
 
6 
 
Lobermeier first brought an action against Robert D. McWilliams, 
who sought a declaration that Wisconsin's public trust doctrine 
granted to McWilliams the right to access Lobermeiers' waterbed 
property from McWilliams' abutting lot, as well as the right to 
install the pads of his pier directly on the bed of the Flowage, 
i.e., on the Lobermeier waterbed property.   
¶12 Separately, Movriches filed a summons and complaint 
against Lobermeiers seeking a declaration of their right to 
install and maintain a pier extending from their land over the 
Flowage for boating and recreational purposes and their right to 
enter the Flowage directly from their shoreline property 
pursuant to their asserted riparian rights and for purposes 
commonly sanctioned by the public trust doctrine.  These cases 
were consolidated and heard together in Price County circuit 
court.   
¶13 Following a one-day trial, the circuit court granted 
judgment in favor of Movriches, declaring that they "have the 
right to enter the waters of the said Sailor Creek Flowage from 
their said real estate . . . [and] to erect, maintain, and use a 
dock or pier anchored on their said real estate and extending 
over the waters of the said Sailor Creek Flowage . . . ."  The 
circuit court enjoined Lobermeiers from coming upon Movriches' 
property and from interfering or hindering Movriches in the 
exercise of their rights of ownership.  The circuit court 
limited its analysis to the public trust doctrine, concluding 
that the doctrine includes the right of an abutting property 
No. 
2015AP583 
 
 
7 
 
owner to place a pier on or over privately-owned land when it is 
submerged beneath navigable water.  The court of appeals 
affirmed.  
¶14 Lobermeiers petitioned for review, challenging the 
court of appeals' conclusion that the public trust doctrine 
allows Movriches to access the Flowage directly from their 
abutting property or to install and maintain a pier over the 
Flowage, whether supported by posts resting on the Flowage bed 
or by flotation devices.  We granted review and, for the reasons 
explained below, we now affirm in part and reverse in part. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶15 The relevant facts are not disputed.  Accordingly, we 
focus on whether prior court decisions properly applied the 
principles of property law, riparian rights, and the public 
trust 
doctrine. 
 
These 
are 
questions 
of 
law 
that 
we 
independently review.  Phelps v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 
Inc., 2009 WI 74, ¶35, 319 Wis. 2d 1, 768 N.W.2d 615; Linden v. 
Cascade Stone Co., Inc., 2005 WI 113, ¶5, 283 Wis. 2d 606, 699 
N.W.2d 189. 
B.  General Principles 
¶16 The parties have not presented any case law discussing 
the interplay between basic property rights, riparian rights, 
and the public trust doctrine under these or similar facts, 
i.e., where the bed of a navigable body of water is privately 
owned, only in part.  We address each issue in turn. 
No. 
2015AP583 
 
 
8 
 
1.  Private Property Rights 
¶17 Both the circuit court and the court of appeals 
analyzed the public trust doctrine and considered the rights of 
alleged riparian owners without first addressing the various 
types of common law property rights presented herein.  We agree 
with Lobermeiers that we must begin our analysis by addressing 
their 
private 
property 
rights 
and 
those 
of 
Movriches, 
respectively, because both assert private property interests, 
those of the waterbed-owning Lobermeiers and those of the 
shoreline-owning Movriches.   
¶18 Lobermeiers own their submerged property in fee 
simple.  "Authorities to prove that a fee-simple estate is the 
highest tenure known to the law are quite unnecessary, as the 
principle is elementary and needs no support."  Lycoming Fire 
Ins. Co. of Muncy, Pa. v. Haven, 95 U.S. 242, 245 (1877).  An 
owner 
in 
fee 
simple 
is 
presumed 
to 
be 
the 
"entire, 
unconditional, and sole owner[] of [any] buildings as well as 
the land . . . ."  Id.  This is true regardless of whether the 
property has positive economic or market value.  See Phillips v. 
Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 170 (1998). 
¶19 In Wisconsin, the breadth of rights accompanying a fee 
simple interest is settled law.  See Walgreen Co. v. City of 
Madison, 2008 WI 80, ¶44, 311 Wis. 2d 158, 752 N.W.2d 687 
(describing the fee simple interest as the right to use, 
possess, enjoy, dispose of, exclude, or the right not to 
exercise any of these rights); ABKA Ltd. P'ship v. DNR, 2001 WI 
No. 
2015AP583 
 
 
9 
 
App 223, ¶28, 247 Wis. 2d 793, 635 N.W.2d 168 ("A fee simple 
interest means 'an interest in land that, being the broadest 
interest allowed by law, endures until the current holder dies 
without heirs . . . .'").  These rights are equally reflected in 
federal law.5   
¶20 The significance of property rights is reflected in 
the law of damages.  One who intentionally steps from his or her 
own property onto the property of another, irrespective of 
whether he or she thereby causes harm to any legally protected 
interest of the other, is liable for trespass.  Grygiel v. 
Monches Fish & Game, 2010 WI 93, ¶40, 328 Wis. 2d 436, 787 
N.W.2d 6; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158.  
Wisconsin law acknowledges that actual harm occurs in every 
trespass.  Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, 209 Wis. 2d 605, 619, 563 
N.W.2d 154 (1997).  Although consent to entry is generally a 
defense to an action for trespass, consent may later be revoked.  
Grygiel, 328 Wis. 2d 436, ¶41; Manor Enterprises, Inc. v. Vivid, 
Inc., 228 Wis. 2d 382, 394, 596 N.W.2d 828 (1999); see also 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 160.  However, fee simple 
interests may be subject to certain limitations when an easement 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 
458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) ("Property rights in a physical thing 
have been described as the rights 'to possess, use and dispose 
of it.'") ("The power to exclude has traditionally been 
considered one of the most treasured strands in an owner's 
bundle of property rights.").   
No. 
2015AP583 
 
 
10 
 
is granted.  See Borek Cranberry Marsh, Inc. v. Jackson Cty., 
2009 WI App 129, ¶¶9-11, 321 Wis. 2d 437, 773 N.W.2d 522.   
¶21 These principles of property law are crucial to our 
analysis.  However, despite the consideration of private 
property rights, the presence of navigable water makes this a 
more complicated case.  We keep this in mind as we address 
alleged riparian rights and the public trust doctrine.  
2.  Riparian Rights 
¶22 Riparian rights may include "special rights to make 
use of water in a waterway adjoining [an] owner's property."  
93 C.J.S. Waters § 9.  They are the "bundle of rights" that may 
be conferred upon a property owner by virtue of his contiguity 
to a navigable body of water.  Mayer v. Grueber, 29 Wis. 2d 168, 
174, 138 N.W.2d 197 (1965).  Riparian rights are private 
property rights, subject to and limited to some extent by the 
public trust doctrine, discussed below.  R.W. Docks & Slips v. 
DNR, 2001 WI 73, ¶18, 244 Wis. 2d 497, 628 N.W.2d 781.  We have 
previously recognized that common law riparian rights may 
include: 
[t]he right to reasonable use of the waters for 
domestic, agricultural and recreational purposes; the 
right to use the shoreline and have access to the 
waters; the right to any lands formed by accretion or 
reliction; the right to have water flow to the land 
without artificial obstruction; the limited right to 
intrude onto the lakebed to construct devices for 
protection 
from 
erosion; 
and 
the 
right, 
now 
conditioned by statute, to construct a pier or similar 
structure in aid of navigation. 
No. 
2015AP583 
 
 
11 
 
Id., ¶21 (citing Cassidy v. DNR, 132 Wis. 2d 153, 159, 390 
N.W.2d 81 (Ct. App. 1986)). 
¶23 The extent of riparian rights varies in accordance 
with the nature of the body of water at issue.  Mayer, 29 
Wis. 2d at 173.  With respect to the owner of riverfront 
property, a riparian owner may own to the thread of the stream.  
Id.  However, the title of a riparian owner is qualified and 
subject to the interests of the state.  Id.  The "owner of land 
abutting a natural lake or pond owns to the water line only."  
Id.  The lake bottom is held in trust for the people of the 
state.  Id.   
¶24 In Wisconsin, there is a presumption that owning 
property abutting a natural body of water confers certain 
riparian rights.  Id. at 174.  However, Wisconsin common law 
also establishes that riparian rights, including rights to use 
the land beneath a body of water, are severable from basic 
property rights if the deed in question makes that severability 
clear.  "[O]ne who acquires land abutting a stream or body of 
water may acquire no more than is conveyed by his deed."  Id.  
In the case of a man-made body of water located wholly on the 
property of a single owner, there is no presumption in favor of 
riparian rights.  Id. at 176.6  Rather, "all of the incidents of 
                                                 
6 In Mayer v. Grueber, explained in further detail below, 
plaintiff Mayer sought an injunction to prevent Grueber from 
trespassing onto the waters of a man-made lake, the bed of which 
was entirely owned by Mayer.  Mayer v. Grueber, 29 Wis. 2d 168, 
170, 138 N.W.2d 197 (1965).  Grueber counter-claimed, insisting 
that as a "riparian owner" he was entitled to the beneficial use 
(continued) 
No. 
2015AP583 
 
 
12 
 
ownership are vested in the owner of the land" to convey as he 
or she expresses in conveyances.  Id.  
3.  Public Trust Doctrine 
¶25 Under the public trust doctrine, as a general rule, 
the State of Wisconsin "holds the beds underlying navigable 
waters in trust for all of its citizens."  Muench v. Public 
Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 501, 53 N.W.2d 514.  However, a 
riparian owner on the bank of a navigable stream may have a 
qualified title in the stream bed to its center.  Id. at 502.  
The public rights protected under the public trust doctrine 
include boating, swimming, fishing, hunting and preserving 
scenic beauty.  Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. DNR, 2013 WI 74, 
¶72, 350 Wis. 2d 45, 833 N.W.2d 800. 
¶26 The doctrine can be traced back to the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787, which set up the machinery for the government 
of 
the 
Northwest 
Territory 
after 
the 
Revolutionary 
War.  
Wisconsin Const. art. IX, § 1, adopted by the Territorial 
Convention on February 17, 1848, adopted verbatim the words of 
the Northwest Ordinance with respect to navigable waters: 
The state shall have concurrent jurisdiction on all 
rivers and lakes bordering on this state so far as 
such rivers or lakes shall form a common boundary to 
the state and any other state or territory now or 
hereafter to be formed, and bounded by the same; and 
the river Mississippi and the navigable waters leading 
into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the 
carrying places between the same, shall be common 
highways and forever free, as well to the inhabitants 
                                                                                                                                                             
and enjoyment of the lake.  Id.   
No. 
2015AP583 
 
 
13 
 
of the state as to the citizens of the United States, 
without any tax, impost or duty therefor. 
Muench, 261 Wis. 492 at 499-500. 
¶27 Although the doctrine was originally intended to apply 
only to water that was navigable per se, "[t]his court has long 
held that the public trust in navigable waters 'should be 
interpreted in the broad and beneficent spirit that gave rise to 
it in order that the people may fully enjoy the intended 
benefits.'"  Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist., 350 Wis. 2d 45, ¶72, 
(citing Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261, 271, 145 
N.W. 816 (1914)).  "Broadly interpreting the public trust has 
resulted 
in 
recognition 
of 
more 
than 
just 
commercial 
navigability 
rights. 
 
Protection 
now 
extends 
to 
'purely 
recreational purposes such as boating, swimming, fishing, 
hunting, . . . and . . . preserv[ing] scenic beauty.'"  Id.  The 
doctrine traditionally applies to all areas within the ordinary 
high water mark of the body of water in question.  R.W. Docks & 
Slips, 244 Wis. 2d 497, ¶19. 
¶28 The public trust doctrine does not convey private 
property rights.  Rather, for at least a century, we have 
recognized the public trust doctrine as a limit on riparian 
rights.  Wisconsin common law has established that the right to 
place structures for access to navigable water is "qualified, 
subordinate, and subject to the paramount interest of the state 
and the paramount rights of the public in navigable waters." 
Id., ¶22.  This is true even where the bed is privately held, as 
long as the body of water is public, navigable and created by 
No. 
2015AP583 
 
 
14 
 
use of public waters.  See Klingeisen v. DNR, 163 Wis. 2d 921, 
927-28, 472 N.W.2d 603 (Ct. App. 1991). 
¶29 The legislature, as trustee, is empowered to adopt 
regulations to protect public rights established under the 
public trust doctrine.  See Ashwaubenon v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 
22 Wis. 2d 38, 125 N.W.2d 647 (1963); State v. Bleck, 114 
Wis. 2d 454, 465, 338 N.W.2d 492 (1983).  Under this authority, 
the legislature has enacted provisions regulating the placement 
of any structure on the bed of navigable waters, unless placed 
under permit or other legislative authority.  See Wis. Stat. 
§§ 30.12-30.13.  However, where a waterbed is privately held, 
the state has no authority to compel private property owners to 
accept pier placement.  See Mayer, 29 Wis. 2d at 170.  
C.  Application 
1.  Common Law Property Rights 
¶30 The circuit court and court of appeals conducted their 
analyses based on the assumption that the public trust doctrine 
controls the outcome of this case.  However, as noted above, 
neither the public trust doctrine nor riparian rights principles 
addresses private property interests between abutting property 
owners.  The presence of navigable water does not cancel private 
property rights, although it may modify those rights.   
¶31 We begin by examining the ownership interests of 
Lobermeiers and Movriches, respectively.  Lobermeiers own a 
portion of the waterbed of the Flowage, purchased June 19, 2000.  
At the time of purchase, David Lobermeier and his brother, 
No. 
2015AP583 
 
 
15 
 
Robert, 
were 
warrantied 
that 
there 
were 
no 
easements, 
encroachments, walkways, or driveways affecting the property, 
except those listed in the commitment, and that no claims of 
easements, encroachments, walkways, or driveways had been made 
during the previous owner's ownership.  Movriches own Lot One 
(1) of the Sailor Creek Subdivision.  The boundary between 
Movriches' property and Lobermeiers' property is the shoreline 
of the Flowage, as described in the surveyor's certificate 
admitted at trial. 
¶32 In support of Lobermeiers' argument that they may 
prohibit an abutting lot owner from placing a pier on or over 
the Flowage, or from accessing the Flowage directly from their 
abutting property, Lobermeiers cite to numerous state and 
federal cases that lay the foundation of common law private 
property rights.7  Movriches contend that these cases are 
                                                 
7 Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434 ("The power to exclude has 
traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands 
in an owner's bundle of property rights."); Lycoming Fire Ins. 
Co. of Muncy, Pa. v. Haven, 95 U.S. 242, 245 (1877) (concluding 
that landowners under a fee simple title are presumed to be the 
"entire, unconditional, and sole owners of the buildings as well 
as the land . . . ."); Walgreen Co. v. City of Madison, 2008 WI 
80, ¶44, 311 Wis. 2d 158, 752 N.W.2d 687 (concluding that fee 
simple rights include the right of exclusion); Christensen v. 
Mann, 187 Wis. 567, 581, 204 N.W. 499 (1925) ("[P]roperty rights 
extend 
upwards 
from 
the 
surface 
to 
an 
unlimited 
extent 
. . . ."); Burnham v. Merch. Exch. Bank, 92 Wis. 277, 280, 66 
N.W. 510 (1896) (holding that courts must protect the right of 
the owner to his property); Brownell v. Durkee, 79 Wis. 658, 
663, 48 N.W. 241 (1891) (concluding that property rights should 
be "protected and secured as far as possible."); ABKA Ltd. 
P'ship v. DNR, 2001 WI App 223, ¶28, 247 Wis. 2d 793, 635 
N.W.2d 168 (concluding that an interest in fee simple is the 
broadest interest allowed by law). 
No. 
2015AP583 
 
 
16 
 
inapposite.  While it is true that none of them addresses 
shoreline property on a flowage, they all are relevant in 
addressing principles of property law, which, as we have 
acknowledged, must be considered. 
¶33 Under both Wisconsin and federal law, a fee simple 
estate is "the highest tenure known to the law."  Lycoming Fire 
Ins. Co. of Muncy, Pa., 95 U.S. at 245.  Among other rights, an 
owner in fee simple enjoys a basic right to exclude.  It is 
undisputed that were this contest between two upland property 
owners, any encroachment by one onto the property of the other 
would be trespass.  Jacque, 209 Wis. 2d at 617-18.  Lobermeiers' 
property interests are subject to certain protections, as are 
the public's interests in navigable water.  See Muench, 261 Wis. 
at 501-02.  Therefore, unless riparian rights or the public 
trust doctrine modify those rights, Movriches may not interfere 
with the property rights of Lobermeiers.  We therefore turn to 
whether Movriches are riparian owners and what effect the public 
trust doctrine has on Movriches' and Lobermeiers' respective 
rights. 
2.  Riparian Rights 
¶34 The Movriches allege that by virtue of owning "to the 
shoreline" of the Flowage, they are riparian owners and 
therefore entitled to all of the "amenities of waterfront 
property," including the right to install and maintain a pier 
extending from their property over the waters of the Flowage.   
No. 
2015AP583 
 
 
17 
 
¶35 As we set forth in Mayer v. Grueber, riparian rights 
vary depending on the body of water at issue.   
A perusal of the cited cases shows that the owner of 
property on a stream presumptively holds title to the 
middle of the watercourse.  The cases, however, are in 
accord that the riparian rights and title to the land 
under the water are severable if the deed makes that 
limitation clear.  In the case of natural lakes and 
bodies of water, the adjacent landowner owns only to 
the shore line; the lake bottom is held in trust for 
the people of the state.  In the case of artificial 
bodies of water, all of the incidents of ownership are 
vested in the owner of the land.  An artificial lake 
located wholly on the property of a single owner is 
his to use as he sees fit, provided, of course, that 
the use is lawful.  He may if he wishes reserve to 
himself or his assigns the exclusive use of the lake 
or water rights. 
Mayer, 29 Wis. 2d at 176. 
¶36 It is not disputed that the Flowage was created by the 
damming of Sailor Creek, a navigable public body of water, or 
that the Flowage is subject to the public trust doctrine.  What 
is unclear, however, is whether, simply by virtue of their 
property abutting the Flowage, Movriches are entitled to the 
full "bundle of [riparian] rights" when the portion of the 
waterbed of the Flowage adjacent to their property is privately 
held.  Id. at 174.   
¶37 In Mayer, we considered whether defendant, Grueber, 
who owned property to the shoreline of an artificial lake, the 
bed of which was entirely owned by Mayer, was entitled to 
riparian rights despite the language of his deed.  We concluded 
that he was not.  First, the deed in question described the 
boundary of Grueber's property as "along the easterly bank."  
No. 
2015AP583 
 
 
18 
 
Id. at 175.  We concluded that "riparian rights and title to the 
land under the water are severable if the deed makes that 
limitation 
clear." 
 
Id. 
at 
176. 
 
Second, 
Grueber 
was 
specifically told that ownership of the tract would not entitle 
him or his wife to use of the lake.  Id. at 172.  After the 
Gruebers purchased the land and commenced using the lake for 
recreational purposes, they were accused of trespass by the 
Mayers and ordered off the lake.  Id. at 172-73.   
¶38 Movriches argue that Mayer should be limited to 
situations where the entire lakebed is privately owned, and that 
their riparian rights arise out of ownership of shoreline 
property without regard to the ownership of the waterbed.  
Lobermeiers, however, argue the court of appeals failed to 
express or articulate why owning the entire portion of a 
waterbed matters.  Instead, they assert that their private 
property rights are no less important than Movriches' alleged 
riparian rights, and that the public trust doctrine cannot be 
used as a basis for allowing an abutting property owner to 
install a pier onto or over the Flowage, or to allow Movriches 
to access Lobermeiers' property directly from their abutting 
lot.  Both parties have overstated their cases.   
¶39 While we agree that the facts in Mayer differ from 
those presented herein, that difference is insufficient to 
extinguish Lobermeiers' fee simple interest in the waterbed that 
abuts Movriches' shoreline property.  As we have explained, the 
No. 
2015AP583 
 
 
19 
 
public trust doctrine does not convey private property rights.8 
Rather, it establishes rights of use of navigable waters that 
are held in trust for all members of the public.  
3.  Extent of Movriches' Rights 
¶40 Movriches claim that because their property borders on 
the 
shoreline 
of 
the 
Flowage 
they 
have 
riparian 
rights 
incidental to property ownership that borders a naturally 
occurring body of water, such as installing and maintaining a 
pier for ordinary boating and recreational purposes. 
¶41 First, they argue that the property law cited by 
Lobermeiers is inapposite and does not stand for the proposition 
that the owner of a flowage waterbed has the right to exclude 
access for pier placement.  As explained above, we disagree, 
because underlying legal principles applicable to adjacent 
property owners are not extinguished and must be considered.  On 
the contrary, the authorities cited by Movriches——namely, Rock-
Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. DNR, Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 
Doemel v. Jantz, and Diana Shooting Club v. Husting——do not 
support the proposition that Lobermeiers' fee simple title is 
overridden by Movriches alleged riparian rights. 
                                                 
8 As discussed above, the public trust doctrine has been 
"expansively interpreted to safeguard the public's use of 
navigable waters for purely recreational purposes such as 
boating, swimming, fishing, hunting, recreation, and to preserve 
scenic beauty."  R.W. Docks & Slips v. State of Wis., 2001 WI 
73, ¶19, 244 Wis. 2d 497, 628 N.W.2d 781 (2001).   
No. 
2015AP583 
 
 
20 
 
¶42 In Doemel v. Jantz, we addressed whether a member of 
the public has a lawful right to enter and travel upon that 
portion of Lake Winnebago between the ordinary high and low 
water marks.  In answering this question, we defined the scope 
of riparian rights and quoted, with approval, the following 
statement of law: 
Those [riparian] rights are not common to the citizens 
at large, but exist as incidents to the right of soil 
itself contiguous to and attingent on the water.  In 
such ownership [of the shoreland], they have their 
origin, and not out of the ownership of the bed, and 
they are the same whether the riparian owner owns the 
soil under the water or not. 
 
Doemel, 180 Wis. at 231. 
¶43 Movriches read this statement to mean that by virtue 
of owning to the shoreline of the Flowage, they are entitled to 
the full range of riparian rights.9  However, in Doemel we 
addressed an entirely different type of water, both in its 
nature and in ownership.  Unlike the Flowage, Lake Winnebago is 
a naturally occurring lake.  Although its water levels were 
artificially raised in 1850 and 1930, it is not man-made and, as 
far as we can tell, no portion of Lake Winnebago's waterbed is 
privately owned.  Therefore, because there was no conflict 
between shoreline property and a privately-owned waterbed, 
                                                 
9 Specifically, in Doemel we held that "[t]he riparian owner 
also has the right to build piers, harbors, wharves, booms, and 
similar structures . . . incident to the ownership of the 
upland."  Doemel v. Jantz, 180 Wis. 225, 231, 193 N.W. 393 
(1923).   
No. 
2015AP583 
 
 
21 
 
Doemel is not dispositive.  Rather, we read Doemel as addressing 
the range of riparian rights appurtenant to property ownership 
on natural, public, navigable lakes. 
¶44 In Diana Shooting Club, we considered whether the 
right to hunt and fish on navigable waters is limited where the 
title to the land covered by the waters is privately held.  We 
concluded that the public trust doctrine "should be interpreted 
in the broad and beneficent spirit that gave rise to it in order 
that the people may fully enjoy the intended benefits."  Diana 
Shooting Club, 156 Wis. at 271.  In so holding, we explained 
that riparian owners, although they may hold qualified title to 
the thread of a stream or river, may not interfere with public 
navigation or other rights incident to the public trust 
doctrine.  This remains good law.  However, while Diana Shooting 
Club spoke specifically to the Rock River, in the case at hand 
we are tasked with determining what rights the owners of land on 
which a man-made flowage now rests may assert against owners 
whose property ends at the shoreline.  Diana Shooting Club is 
not helpful in deciding that question.  
¶45 For similar reasons, we conclude that Movriches' 
reliance on Rock-Koshkonong and Muench is misplaced.  In Rock-
Koshkonong, we were tasked with determining, among other issues, 
whether the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) 
properly relied on the public trust doctrine for its authority 
to protect non-navigable land and non-navigable water above the 
ordinary high water mark.  Rock-Koshkonong, 350 Wis. 2d 45, ¶11.  
No. 
2015AP583 
 
 
22 
 
We concluded that, in attempting to extend its public trust 
jurisdiction beyond navigable waters to non-navigable waters and 
land, the DNR moved beyond the language of the Constitution.  
Id., ¶77.   
¶46 Movriches cite to paragraph 78 of Rock-Koshkonong, in 
which we wrote that riparian ownership runs to the center or 
thread of a stream as a "qualified title in the stream beds."  
Id., ¶78.  However, the Movrich property does not border a 
stream; it borders a 201 acre flowage.  Paragraph 78 provides no 
support for Movriches' assertion that they have the right to 
build a pier upon the Lobermeiers' property; it deals solely 
with the rights of the public under the public trust doctrine.  
¶47 Some may read Minehan v. Murphy, 149 Wis. 14, 134 N.W. 
1130 (1912), as giving assistance to Movriches.  However, 
Minehan was an action in ejectment from the waterbed of 
navigable waters.  Id. at 14.  There, Minehan's title described 
her western boundary as "the center line of the creek."  Id. at 
14-15.  She sought to eject Murphy from encroaching on her side 
of the creek's center line.  Id. at 15.  The question on which 
the case turned was whether the navigable water that bordered 
Minehan's land was a lake or a river.  Id. at 16.  If it was a 
river, she had rights to the center line; if it was a lake, she 
did not.  The navigable water was determined to be a river, and 
Minehan won.  Id. at 17.  However, Minehan has nothing to do 
with whether Movrich has the right to place a pier on 
Lobermeiers' property.    
No. 
2015AP583 
 
 
23 
 
¶48 Haase v. Kingston Co-operative Creamery Ass'n, 212 
Wis. 585, 250 N.W. 444 (1933), sets aside any misinterpretation 
of Minehan that would support a taking of private property 
rights due to a flowage upon private lands.  Id. at 588.  Haase 
was an action to recover for ice taken by Kingston from a 
flowage over lands Haase owned in fee.  Id. at 586.  Kingston 
claimed that due to the navigable waters over Haase's land for 
an extended time, title to the waterbed had passed to the state 
and, therefore, harvesting ice was part of the public's use of 
navigable waters.  Id.  We disagreed with Kingston's contention, 
and concluded that "title to the ice formed on this pond was in 
the plaintiff as the owner of the land beneath the same, and he 
is entitled to recover the value of the ice taken by the 
defendant."  Id. at 589. 
¶49 Finally, in Muench we traced the evolution of the 
public trust doctrine to determine whether the Public Service 
Commission was required to make findings as to whether a 
proposed dam would violate the doctrine.  Again, we stated that 
private title to the waterbed underlying navigable waters is 
qualified and subject to the public's right to use and enjoy the 
water.  Muench, 261 Wis. at 504-05.  In other words, the owner 
of a waterbed may not use his or her property in such a way as 
to interfere with public rights.  What we did not say was that 
the owner of a waterbed may not exercise his or her property 
rights in a way that interferes with another property owner's 
assertion of riparian rights. 
No. 
2015AP583 
 
 
24 
 
¶50 In short, Movriches argue that these cases (and 
others) 
establish 
their 
right 
as 
riparian 
owners, 
and, 
independently, under the public trust doctrine, to install and 
maintain a pier anchored on their property and extending over or 
into the Lobermeiers' property.  This reasoning completely 
ignores the property rights of Lobermeiers, including their 
right to exclude.  As the United States Supreme Court has 
written: 
[A]n owner suffers a special kind of injury when a 
stranger directly invades and occupies the owner's 
property . . . .  [P]roperty law has long protected an 
owner's 
expectation 
that 
he 
will 
be 
relatively 
undisturbed 
at 
least 
in 
the 
possession 
of 
his 
property.  To require, as well, that the owner permit 
another to exercise complete dominion literally adds 
insult to injury. 
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436-37.   
¶51 Furthermore, both state and federal jurisprudence 
conclude that the common law property right to exclude applies 
both above and below a property's physical surface.  See 
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436 n.13 ("[A]n owner is entitled to the 
absolute and undisturbed possession of every part of the 
premises, including the space above, as much as a mine 
beneath."); Christensen v. Mann, 187 Wis. at 581 ("As property 
rights extend upwards from the surface to an unlimited extent, 
they also extend downwards into the soil, . . . .").  Moreover, 
we have consistently held that "due regard should be had to the 
rights which the owner has to his property, and that these 
No. 
2015AP583 
 
 
25 
 
rights should be protected and secured as far as possible."  
Brownell, 79 Wis. at 663.   
¶52 Movriches also argue that they had the expectation 
that their property would include riparian rights, specifically 
the right to install a pier.  First, they argue their property 
was marketed and sold as a "waterfront lot," and that at the 
time of purchase many of the properties on the Flowage 
maintained "open and obvious" piers.  Second, they claim they 
purchased this lot specifically because it was a shoreline 
property, and for a period of years thereafter they made use of 
the Flowage by fishing, using a pier to moor their boat, 
swimming, and kayaking.  These arguments may have had arguable 
merit if Movriches had purchased their property from Lobermeiers 
or if they had obtained an easement or license from Lobermeiers.  
However, neither of these events occurred.  Furthermore, their 
arguments ignore Mayer's clear directive that "one who acquires 
land abutting a stream or body of water may acquire no more than 
is conveyed by his deed."  Mayer, 29 Wis. 2d at 174.   
¶53 The original conveyance given by Margaret Hussman to 
the Town of Fifield on September 13, 1941, did not convey any 
ownership interest in her land.  Rather, it conveyed a type of 
easement to permit water to flow on her land.  Borek Cranberry 
Marsh, 321 Wis. 2d 437, ¶¶9-11.   
¶54 When Movriches took title to their land, the legal 
description on their deed made no reference to riparian rights.  
Meanwhile, the surveyor's certificate clearly indicated that 
No. 
2015AP583 
 
 
26 
 
their property extended only "to the shoreline" of the Flowage.  
Although they claim they purchased the lot with the intention of 
maintaining a pier, they did not purchase their lot from 
Lobermeiers, and their deed describes no legal right, title, or 
interest in the flowage waterbed.   
¶55 We conclude that, as to the pier issue, Movriches have 
failed to establish that they are entitled to those riparian 
rights that are incidental to property ownership along a 
naturally occurring body of water where the lakebed is held in 
trust by the state or that the public trust doctrine creates an 
exception to Lobermeiers' property rights in the waterbed that 
is sufficient for placement of Movriches' pier on Lobermeiers' 
property.  Therefore, Lobermeiers may prevent Movriches from 
installing a pier onto or over Lobermeiers' property without 
their permission.   
4.  Movriches as Members of the Public 
¶56 Were these properties both upland, Movriches would be 
unable to step from their property onto Lobermeiers' property 
without trespassing.  Jacque, 209 Wis. 2d at 617-18.  Here, 
however, Lobermeiers' property is submerged beneath a public 
flowage that is indisputably subject to the public trust 
doctrine.  This qualifies Lobermeiers' rights in regard to 
public use.  Therefore, we agree that Movriches, as members of 
the public, are entitled to access and exit from the Flowage by 
way of their own shoreline property for purposes consistent with 
the public trust doctrine, e.g. swimming, fishing, and boating.   
No. 
2015AP583 
 
 
27 
 
¶57 Lobermeiers ask us to conclude that this case is 
analogous to Mayer, where we held that because defendant Grueber 
had no ownership rights in the bed of the lake at issue, "he 
ha[d] no other rights in the waters over the bed of the lake 
unless he acquired those rights by prescription or adverse 
possession."  Mayer, 29 Wis. 2d at 176.  However, Mayer is 
distinguishable because the public trust doctrine did not apply 
in Mayer.  Accordingly, we conclude that where the public trust 
doctrine applies to the body of water, an abutting property 
owner's rights are sufficient to access and exit the water.  
However, while Movriches may access and exit the Flowage from 
their own property for recreation purposes, Lobermeiers may not 
access or exit the Flowage except through the public access or 
with the permission of an owner of property bordering the 
Flowage. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶58 There are three issues presented in this review.  
First, we conclude that while Movriches' property borders the 
Flowage, they are not entitled to those riparian rights that are 
incidental to property ownership along a naturally occurring 
body of water where the lakebed is held in trust by the state.  
Rather, any rights Movriches may enjoy in regard to the man-made 
body of water created by the flowage easement must be consistent 
with Lobermeiers' property rights or the flowage easement's 
creation of a navigable body of water.  Because the placement of 
a pier is inconsistent with Lobermeiers' fee simple interest and 
No. 
2015AP583 
 
 
28 
 
does not arise from the flowage easement that supports only 
public rights in navigable waters, Movriches' private property 
rights are not sufficient to place a pier into or over the 
waterbed of the Flowage without Lobermeiers' permission based on 
the rights attendant to their shoreline property.   
¶59 Second, we consider the nature of the Flowage waters, 
to which all agree the public trust doctrine applies, and 
whether the public trust doctrine grants Movriches the right to 
install a pier directly from their property onto or over the 
portion of the Flowage whose waterbed is privately owned by 
Lobermeiers.  In answering this inquiry, we consider whether and 
to 
what 
extent 
the 
existence 
of 
navigable 
waters 
over 
Lobermeiers' 
privately-owned 
property 
affects 
Lobermeiers' 
rights.     
¶60 On this issue, we conclude that the public trust 
doctrine conveys no private property rights, regardless of the 
presence of navigable water.  In a flowage easement such as is 
at issue here, title to the property under the flowage may 
remain with the owner.  While the public trust doctrine provides 
a right to use the flowage waters for recreational purposes, 
that right is held in trust equally for all.  Furthermore, 
although the Lobermeiers' property rights are modified to the 
extent that the public may use the flowage waters for 
recreational purposes, no private property right to construct a 
pier arises from the public trust doctrine.   
No. 
2015AP583 
 
 
29 
 
¶61 Third, we consider whether the public trust doctrine, 
when 
combined 
with 
the 
shoreline 
location 
of 
Movriches' 
property, allows Movriches to access and exit the flowage waters 
directly from their abutting property; or, whether, because 
Lobermeiers hold title to the flowage waterbed, Movriches must 
access the Flowage from the public access.  On this issue, we 
conclude that as long as Movriches are using the flowage waters 
for purposes consistent with the public trust doctrine, their 
own property rights are sufficient to access and exit the 
Flowage directly from their shoreline property.  
¶62 Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals in part 
and reverse it in part. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed in part; reversed in part. 
 
 
No.  2015AP583.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶63 SHIRLEY 
S. 
ABRAHAMSON, 
J.   (concurring 
in 
part, 
dissenting in part).  I join Justice Rebecca G. Bradley's 
separate writing except for Part II.   
 
No.  2015AP583.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶64 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring in part; 
dissenting in part).  Riparian rights in Wisconsin are sacred.1  
For many, waterfront property in Wisconsin provides more than 
merely a place to live——it affords a lifestyle.  The proverbial 
cottage "up north" offers the opportunity for fishing off the 
pier in the morning, waterskiing with children or grandchildren 
in the afternoon, and an early evening ride on the pontoon boat 
with friends and neighbors.  None of this is possible absent 
riparian rights.  Traditionally, these rights have included "the 
right to build piers, harbors, wharves, booms, and similar 
structures, in aid of navigation, and such right is also one 
which is incident to the ownership of the upland."  Doemel v. 
Jantz, 180 Wis. 225, 231, 193 N.W. 393 (1923).  The majority 
opinion sweeps away these cherished and longstanding property 
rights and extinguishes riparian rights for those with cottages 
or homes on Wisconsin's waters called flowages. 
                                                 
1 "Riparian" is defined as "relating to or living or located 
on the bank of watercourse (as a river or stream) or sometimes a 
lake."  Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the 
English Language 1960 (3d ed. 1986).  "Sacred" as used in this 
context, as in other riparian rights cases, is used to describe 
something secured against violation or infringement rather than 
in the religious sense.  See, e.g., Chapman v. Oshkosh & M.R.R. 
Co., 33 Wis. 629, 637 (1873) ("And he holds every one of these 
[riparian] rights by as sacred a tenure as he holds the land 
from which they emanate."); Avery v. Fox, 2 F. Cas. 245, 247 
(C.C.W.D. Mich. 1868) ("This right of private persons to the use 
of water as it flows by or through their lands, in any manner 
not inconsistent with the public easement, is as sacred as is 
the right of a person to his land, his house, or his personal 
property."). 
No.  2015AP583.rgb 
 
2 
 
¶65 The issues before this court are (1) whether Jerome 
and Gail Movrich may maintain a pier resting over David and 
Diane Lobermeiers' flowage bed property either as part of their 
riparian rights or under the public trust doctrine, and (2) 
whether the Movriches have the right to cross the Lobermeiers' 
flowage bed from their own property to use and enjoy the flowage 
waters for recreational purposes.  As to the first issue, the 
majority 
reverses 
the 
court 
of 
appeals, 
concluding 
the 
Lobermeiers own the flowage bed in fee simple absolute, 
entitling them to exclude the Movriches from erecting a pier.  
As to the second issue, the majority affirms the court of 
appeals and holds that the Movriches nevertheless have the right 
to access and enjoy the flowage bed from their property pursuant 
to the public trust doctrine. 
¶66 I agree with the majority's conclusion that the 
Movriches may access the flowage from their property; I too 
would affirm the court of appeals on this issue.2  I disagree, 
however, with the majority's conclusion that the Movriches are 
prohibited from erecting a pier.  In defining the Lobermeiers' 
property rights in terms of fee absolute ownership, the majority 
ignores the most salient fact of this case:  the presence of 
navigable water over the Lobermeiers' property.  The presence of 
navigable water for over three quarters of a century alters the 
                                                 
2 See also deNava v. DNR, 140 Wis. 2d 213, 222, 409 
N.W.2d 151 (Ct. App. 1987) ("Since the riparian owner has the 
exclusive right of access to and from navigable waters to his 
shore, the riparian owner has exclusive riparian rights."). 
No.  2015AP583.rgb 
 
3 
 
Lobermeiers' property rights in the waterbed, subordinating them 
to the riparian rights of the Movriches and the rights of the 
public under the public trust doctrine.  Accordingly, I would 
affirm the court of appeals on this issue, although I would 
clarify that riparian rights are independent private property 
rights, which are not conferred under the public trust doctrine.  
¶67 The majority opinion overlooks the interplay between 
private property rights, riparian rights and the public trust 
doctrine.  Although separate and distinct, these competing 
rights intertwine and the majority opinion errs in its rigid 
approach toward applying them to the Movriches' and the 
Lobermeiers' property interests.  The majority adopts an 
unprecedented holding that a fee simple interest in land 
submerged 
by 
water 
cancels 
riparian 
rights 
presumptively 
recognized under the common law for at least 140 years.  The 
consequences of what began as a family squabble are not confined 
to the parties before us but fundamentally transform property 
rights for thousands of Wisconsin property owners along hundreds 
of flowages.3  Such a dramatic change in the law should be the 
legislature's prerogative, not that of the four justices 
comprising the majority. 
¶68 Ultimately, I conclude the Lobermeiers' title to a 
portion of the waterbed beneath the Sailor Creek Flowage is 
qualified by the existence of navigable water; the Movriches are 
entitled to erect and maintain a pier as part of the bundle of 
                                                 
3 See generally Wis. Dep't of Nat. Res., Wisconsin Lakes 
(2009), http://dnr.wi.gov/lakes/lakebook/wilakes2009bma.pdf. 
No.  2015AP583.rgb 
 
4 
 
rights they enjoy as riparian owners; and the public trust 
doctrine confers rights on the public to use the flowage.  
Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. 
I 
¶69 From its beginnings, Wisconsin prioritized public 
access to the watercourses across the state.  This preference is 
richly embodied in the public trust doctrine, which finds roots 
in the Northwest Ordinance and materialized upon statehood 
through the adoption of Article IX, Section 1 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.4  Under the public trust doctrine, the state holds 
the waters and beds of navigable lakes in trust for all of its 
                                                 
4 "The United States [S]upreme [C]ourt in Barney v. Keokuk 
(1876), 94 U.S. 324 . . . declared that the individual states 
have the right to determine for themselves the ownership of land 
under navigable waters."  Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. DNR, 
2013 WI 74, ¶79, 350 Wis. 2d 45, 833 N.W.2d 800 (quoting Muench 
v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 501, 501, 53 N.W.2d 514, adhered 
to on reh'g, 261 Wis. 492, 55 N.W.2d 40 (1952)).  Article IX, 
Section 1 states: "The state shall have concurrent jurisdiction 
on all rivers and lakes bordering on this state so far as such 
rivers or lakes shall form a common boundary to the state and 
any other state or territory now or hereafter to be formed, and 
bounded by the same; and the river Mississippi and the navigable 
waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the 
carrying places between the same, shall be common highways and 
forever free, as well to the inhabitants of the state as to the 
citizens of the United States, without any tax, impost or duty 
therefor."  
No.  2015AP583.rgb 
 
5 
 
citizens.5  Conversely, the public trust doctrine has been 
interpreted to "give[] riparian owners along navigable streams a 
qualified title in the stream beds to the center of the stream, 
while the state holds the navigable waters in trust for the 
public.  In reality, the state effectively controls the land 
under navigable streams and rivers without actually owning it."6  
Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist. v. DNR, 2013 WI 74, ¶78, 350 
Wis. 2d 45, 833 N.W.2d 800.  "The rule is different with respect 
to the beds under streams[ ] in part because streams can change 
course, streams can become unnavigable over time, and navigable 
streams 
can 
be 
very 
narrow 
and 
shallow, 
so 
that 
state ownership of 
stream 
beds 
could 
be 
problematic 
and 
impractical."  Id., ¶82 (footnote omitted). 
                                                 
5 The 
doctrine 
was 
"originally 
designed 
to 
protect 
commercial navigation," but its applicability has since "been 
expanded to safeguard the public's use of navigable waters for 
purely recreational and nonpecuniary purposes."  State v. Bleck, 
114 Wis. 2d 454, 465, 338 N.W.2d 492 (1983) (citing Muench, 261 
Wis. 492); see also Diedrich v. N. W. U. Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 248 
(1877); Illinois Steel Co. v. Bilot, 109 Wis. 418, 425, 84 
N.W. 855 (1901); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas Merrill, The Origins 
of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in 
Illinois Central, 71 Univ. Chic. L. Rev. 799 (2004).  "The 
legislature has the primary authority to administer the public 
trust for the protection of the public's rights, and to 
effectuate the purposes of the trust."  Hilton ex rel. Pages 
Homeowners' Ass'n v. DNR, 2006 WI 84, ¶19, 293 Wis. 2d 1, 717 
N.W.2d 166 (citing Bleck, 114 Wis. at 465). 
6 "It is said that the controlling distinction between a 
stream and a lake or pond is that in the one case the water has 
a natural motion,——a current,——while in the other the water is, 
in its natural state, substantially at rest, and this entirely 
irrespective of the size of the one or the other."  Ne-Pee-Nauk 
Club v. Wilson, 96 Wis. 290, 295, 71 N.W. 661 (1897) (citation 
omitted). 
No.  2015AP583.rgb 
 
6 
 
¶70 The public trust doctrine applies to lakes and streams 
that are "navigable in fact for any purpose."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 30.10 (providing that lakes and streams, if navigable in fact, 
are public waterways); see State v. Bleck, 114 Wis. 2d 454, 459-
60, 338 N.W.2d 492 (1983).  In the absence of a legislative 
declaration 
applying 
specifically 
to 
a 
certain 
type 
of 
watercourse, "navigability is a question of fact."  Klingeisen 
v. DNR, 163 Wis. 2d 921, 931, 472 N.W.2d 603 (Ct. App. 1991) 
(citing Angelo v. Railroad Comm'n, 194 Wis. 543, 552, 217 
N.W. 570 (1928)) (holding that "[t]he public trust doctrine, to 
be effective, must also extend to public, artificial waters that 
are directly and inseparably connected with natural, navigable 
waters").  A finding of navigability in fact is a fairly low bar 
to meet and thousands of waterways in Wisconsin are considered 
navigable.  Here, it is not disputed that the Sailor Creek 
Flowage is navigable.  Majority op., ¶10, n.4.  
¶71 If a body of water is navigable in fact, then its use 
is subject to the public trust doctrine, which permits all 
people to use the waters in aid of navigation and for hunting, 
fishing, and other recreational purposes.  Diedrich v. Nw. Union 
Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 248, 264 (1877); Illinois Steel Co. v. Bilot, 
109 Wis. 418, 425, 84 N.W. 855 (1901); Diana Shooting Club v. 
Husting, 156 Wis. 261, 271-73, 145 N.W. 816 (1914).  If a body 
of water is not navigable, "the public has no easement; and the 
riparian owner may, in general, put his estate under the water 
to any proper use he may please, not infringing upon the rights 
No.  2015AP583.rgb 
 
7 
 
of other riparian owners, and not violating any public law."  
Diedrich, 42 Wis. at 264. 
¶72 The applicability of the public trust doctrine does 
not purport to give a riparian owner more rights than those of 
the public; indeed, the public trust doctrine does not confer 
riparian rights at all.  Riparian rights exist under the common 
law as private property rights, independent of and subject to 
the public trust doctrine.  Indeed, the public's right to use 
the waters for purposes recognized under the public trust 
doctrine may supersede a riparian owner's various rights of use.  
Bleck, 114 Wis. 2d at 467 ("[Riparian] rights, however, are 
still subject to the public's paramount right and interest in 
navigable waters.").  Nevertheless, by virtue of owning property 
on the banks of navigable water, the public trust doctrine puts 
a riparian owner's exercise of otherwise public rights in a 
unique position. 
[A] riparian owner upon navigable water, whether or 
not he own the soil usque ad medium filum aquæ, and 
unless prohibited by local law, has a right to 
construct in shoal water, in front of his land, proper 
wharves or piers, in aid of navigation, and at his 
peril of obstructing navigation, through the water far 
enough to reach actually navigable water; this being 
held to further the public use of the water, to which 
the public title under the water is subordinate; and 
therefore to be, in the absence of prohibition, 
passively 
licensed 
by 
the 
public, 
and 
not 
a 
pourpresture. 
No.  2015AP583.rgb 
 
8 
 
Diedrich, 42 Wis. at 262 (1877).7 
¶73 If the Lobermeiers owned the entire waterbed beneath 
the flowage, the Movriches would not be able to maintain and 
erect a pier because they would enjoy no riparian rights under 
the common law.  Mayer v. Grueber, 29 Wis. 2d 168, 176, 138 
N.W.2d 197 (1965).  Of course, the owner of land who creates an 
artificial body of water not originating from natural, navigable 
water may permit members of the public, as well as owners of 
land abutting the waterbody, to use the water but under those 
circumstances 
such 
rights 
of 
use 
arise 
solely 
from 
the 
prerogative of the waterbed owner rather than common law 
riparian rights or the public trust doctrine.  See id. (citing 
Haase v. Kingston Coop. Creamery Ass'n, 212 Wis. 585, 588, 250 
N.W. 444 (1933)).  However, the Lobermeiers own only a portion 
of the waterbed, the public trust doctrine applies to the 
flowage because it originates from the public, natural, and 
navigable waters of Sailor Creek, and the Movriches have a 
fundamental right to place a pier in the water as riparian 
owners whose land abuts natural, navigable waters. 
¶74 "Riparian owners are those who have title to the 
ownership of land on the bank of a body of water."  ABKA Ltd. 
P'ship v. DNR, 2002 WI 106, ¶57, 255 Wis. 2d 486, 648 N.W.2d 854 
                                                 
7 "Usque ad medium filum aquæ" means "up to the middle of 
the stream."  Usque Ad Filum Aquæ, Black's Law Dictionary (1st 
ed. 1891).  A "pourpresture," also spelled "purpresture," is 
"[a]n inclsoure by a private party of a part of that which 
belongs to and ought to be open and free to the public at 
large."  Purpresture, Black's Law Dictionary (1st ed. 1891). 
No.  2015AP583.rgb 
 
9 
 
(citing Ellingsworth v. Swiggum, 195 Wis. 2d 142, 148, 536 
N.W.2d 112 (Ct. App. 1995)) (emphasis added); see also Diedrich, 
42 Wis. at 262 (1877) ("Riparian rights proper are held to rest 
upon title to the bank of the water, and not upon title to the 
soil under the water."); Doemel v. Jantz, 180 Wis. 225, 230, 193 
N.W. 393 (1923); Mayer v. Grueber, 29 Wis. 2d 168, 173, 138 
N.W.2d 197 (1965) ("Riparian land is land so situated with 
respect to a body of water that, because of such location, the 
possessor of the land is entitled to the benefits incident to 
the use of the water." (Citations omitted.)); Stoesser v. Shore 
Drive P'ship, 172 Wis. 2d 660, 665, 494 N.W.2d 204 (1993) 
(citing 78 Am. Jur. 2d Waters § 260 (1975)).  Riparian rights 
"are not dependent upon the ownership of the soil under the 
water, but upon his title to the banks."  Doemel, 180 
Wis. at 230 (first citing Diedrich, 42 Wis. at 248; then citing 
Delaplaine v. C.& N.W. Ry. Co., 42 Wis. 214 (1877); then citing 
Green Bay, etc., Co. v. Kaukauna Water Power Co., 90 Wis. 370 
(1895); then citing State ex rel. Wausau St. Ry. Co. v. 
Bancroft, 148 Wis. 124, 134 N.W. 330 (1912)). 
¶75 A riparian owner is presumptively entitled to certain 
rights, including:  
the rights of the owner of lands upon water to 
maintain his adjacency to it, and to profit by this 
advantage, and otherwise as a right to preserve and 
improve the connection of his property with the water.  
Those rights are not common to the citizens at large, 
but exist as incidents to the right of soil itself 
contiguous to and attingent on the water.  In such 
ownership they have their origin, and not out of the 
ownership of the bed, and they are the same whether 
the riparian owner owns the soil under the water or 
not. 
No.  2015AP583.rgb 
 
10 
 
Doemel, 180 Wis. at 230-31.  "The riparian owner also has the 
right to build piers, harbors, wharves, booms, and similar 
structures, in aid of navigation, and such right is also one 
which is incident to the ownership of the upland."  Id. at 231; 
Hicks ex rel. Askew v. Smith, 109 Wis. 532, 540, 85 N.W. 512 
(1901) ("the right to erect such a pier is simply an incident of 
riparian ownership").  For 140 years, title to the waterbed has 
been entirely irrelevant to determining riparian ownership under 
Wisconsin law.  Doemel, 180 Wis. at 230.  And the law presumes 
that riparian owners may construct a pier in aid of navigation. 
¶76 As 
a 
preliminary 
matter, 
the 
law 
presumes 
the 
Movriches are riparian owners because they own property that 
abuts the banks of the Sailor Creek Flowage, a navigable body of 
water.  Nevertheless, "[r]iparian rights do not necessarily 
follow as a matter of course the ownership of the adjacent 
land."  Mayer v. Grueber, 29 Wis. 2d 168, 175, 138 N.W.2d 197 
(1965) (citing Allen v. Weber, 80 Wis. 531, 536, 50 N.W. 514 
(1891)).  "No property owner's riparian rights are absolute."  
Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist., 350 Wis. 2d 45, ¶110.  While an 
owner may be riparian in nature, his ability to exercise 
riparian rights may be qualified by a number of factors.  Mayer, 
29 
Wis. 2d at 175 
(citing 
Allen, 
80 
Wis. at 536). 
 
As 
determinative here, these factors include the classification of 
the waterbody with which the Movriches' upland property is 
contiguous 
coupled 
with 
the 
private 
ownership 
of 
that 
waterbody's bed, as well as the language in the Movriches' deed. 
No.  2015AP583.rgb 
 
11 
 
¶77 The 
Movriches 
are 
unquestionably 
riparian 
owners 
because their property lies on the banks of the flowage.  The 
legal description of their property extends "to the shoreline" 
of the flowage.  Yet, the majority holds that the Movriches are 
not 
riparians, 
contrary 
to 
every 
definition 
of 
riparian 
ownership existing in this state's pertinent precedent, dating 
back to 1877.  See supra ¶10.  Relying on Mayer, the majority 
points out that "when Movriches took title to their land, the 
legal description on their deed made no reference to riparian 
rights."  Majority op., ¶53.  The majority equates the deed's 
silence on riparian rights to the nonexistence of either 
riparian ownership or riparian rights.  This conclusion is 
patently incorrect. 
¶78 It is true "that one who acquires land abutting a 
stream or body of water may acquire no more than is conveyed by 
his deed."  Mayer, 29 Wis. 2d at 174.  It is also true, however, 
that an owner of waterfront property possesses certain riparian 
rights under the common law and the common law provides that "a 
transfer of the property without any reference whatsoever to 
[riparian] rights automatically conveys and includes them."  
Doemel v. Jantz, 180 Wis. 225, 230, 193 N.W. 393 (1923) (citing 
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892)); 
Stoesser v. Shore Drive P'ship, 172 Wis. 2d 660, 667, 494 
N.W.2d 204 (1993) (citations omitted); Mayer, 29 Wis. 2d at 175.  
The only way to eliminate riparian rights tied to the property 
under the common law is "by the clear language in the deed."  
Mayer, 29 Wis. 2d at 174.  In other words, unless the deed 
No.  2015AP583.rgb 
 
12 
 
expressly 
disavows 
riparian 
rights, 
property 
adjacent 
to 
navigable 
water 
retains 
presumptive 
riparian 
rights, 
notwithstanding the conveyance documents' silence on this issue. 
¶79 The majority acknowledges the Movriches' deed does not 
mention riparian rights.8  Therefore, the riparian rights 
attached to the property were conveyed to the Movriches under 
common law when they purchased their waterfront property.  The 
deed does not need to expressly mention the status of riparian 
ownership because the presumption of riparian rights exists by 
operation of law unless the deed expressly excludes riparian 
rights. 
¶80 Wisconsin qualifies a riparian owner's rights based on 
the classification of the waterbody to which the riparian 
property is contiguous.  In the case of a natural body of water, 
"one who acquires land abutting a stream or body of water may 
acquire no more than is conveyed by his deed," which, as already 
discussed, means that a deed that expressly severs riparian 
rights will unequivocally strip the owner of those rights.  Id. 
at 174.  In the case of an artificial body of water, as was the 
case in Mayer, ownership of the waterbed may qualify the 
existence of riparian rights.  Id. 
                                                 
8 The majority suggests the possibility of a different 
outcome if the "Movriches had purchased their property from 
Lobermeiers."  Majority op., ¶52.  However, even if the 
Movriches had acquired their property from the Lobermeiers, if 
the deed were silent on riparian rights, as it actually is in 
this case, riparian rights are nevertheless conveyed under the 
common law.  
No.  2015AP583.rgb 
 
13 
 
¶81 In Mayer, we held that "the purchaser of property 
abutting an artificial lake acquires no rights as a riparian 
owner by virtue of the land acquisition alone."  Id. at 179.  
Rather, "[u]nless the vendor conveys the right to use the lake, 
the purchaser is precluded from either the right of access or 
use."  Id. 
¶82 The majority's characterization of the flowage as a 
"man-made" body of water similar to the property in Mayer is 
incorrect.9  The flowage was an artificial condition created by a 
dam, which over time became a natural condition.  Regardless, 
"man-made" lakes and streams are by law artificial waterbodies.  
Under Wis. Stat. § 30.19(1b)(a), an artificial waterbody is "a 
body of water that does not have a history of being a lake or 
stream or of being part of a lake or stream."  (Emphasis added.)  
In Mayer, the artificial lake was "formed as the result of 
gravel excavations."  29 Wis. 2d at 170.  Thus, it had no 
history of being a lake before seepage filled up the excavation 
site and created a lake.  Id.  In contrast, a flowage arises 
                                                 
9 "The artificial condition originally created by the dam 
became by lapse of time a natural condition."  Haase v. Kingston 
Coop. Creamery Ass'n, 212 Wis. 585, 250 N.W. 444 (1933) (citing 
Johnson v. Eimerman, 140 Wis. 327, 330, 122 N.W. 775 (1909)); 
see also Alvin E. Evans, Riparian Rights in Artificial Lakes and 
Streams, 16 Mo. L. Rev. 93, 108 n.63 (1951) (citing Minehan v. 
Murphy, 149 Wis. 14, 134 N.W. 1130 (1912)). 
No.  2015AP583.rgb 
 
14 
 
from the damming of a stream already in existence.10  Here, the 
Sailor Creek Flowage was created and is currently maintained by 
the damming of Sailor Creek, a natural, navigable stream, by the 
Town of Fifield in 1941 (a fact both parties and the majority 
concede).  Majority op., ¶9.  As the flowage has a history of 
being part of Sailor Creek, it is not an artificial waterbody 
and Mayer does not apply. 
¶83 In a case where a dam overflowed previously dry lands 
owned in fee, this court held that "the public and the riparian 
owners enjoy the same rights in and upon such artificial 
waters," regardless of the fact that the particular body of 
water on which those rights are subsequently exercised were 
artificially created by the dam.  Haase v. Kingston Coop. 
Creamery Ass'n., 212 Wis. 585, 587, 250 N.W 444 (1933) (emphasis 
added).  This concept, now discarded by the majority, was 
recognized over 100 years ago in Johnson v. Eimerman, 140 
Wis. 327, 330, 122 N.W. 775 (1909) ("The artificial condition 
originally created by the dam became by lapse of time a natural 
condition.")  More recently, the "well settled" principle was 
reiterated:  "If the volume or expanse of navigable waters is 
increased artificially, the public right to use the water is 
increased correspondingly."  Klingeisen v. DNR, 163 Wis. 2d 921, 
                                                 
10 A "flowage" is defined as "[t]he natural movement of 
water from a dominant estate to a servient estate."  Flowage, 
Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014); see also Flowage 
Easement, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) ("A common-law 
easement that gives the dominant-estate owner the right to flood 
a servient estate, as when land near a dam is flooded to 
maintain the dam or to control the water level in a reservoir"). 
No.  2015AP583.rgb 
 
15 
 
927, 472 N.W.2d 603 (Ct. App. 1991).  In that case, the court 
also recognized that title to the waterbed underlying navigable 
waters "is entirely subordinated to and consistent with the 
rights of the state to secure and preserve to the people the 
full enjoyment of navigability and the rights incident thereto."  
Id. at 928 (citing Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 269, 
271, 145 N.W. 816 (1914)). 
¶84 Subject to the public trust doctrine, "Wisconsin 
has . . . recognized the existence of certain common law rights 
that are incidents of riparian ownership of property adjacent to 
a body of water."  R.W. Docks & Slips v. DNR, 244 Wis. 2d 497, 
511, 628 N.W.2d 781 (2001) (citing Bleck, 114 Wis. 2d at 466).  
Such rights include "the right, now conditioned by statute, to 
construct a pier or similar structure in aid of navigation."  
Id. (citing Cassidy v. DNR, 132 Wis. 2d 153, 159, 390 N.W.2d 81 
(Ct. App. 1986).  Subject to a few exceptions not relevant here, 
"nothing in [Wis. Stat. ch. 30] applies to an artificial 
waterbody, 
as 
defined 
in 
s. 
30.19(1b)(a), 
that 
is 
not 
hydrologically connected to a natural navigable waterway and 
that does not discharge into a natural navigable waterway except 
as a result of storm events."  Wis. Stat. § 30.053.  As the 
Sailor Creek Flowage is hydrologically connected to Sailor 
Creek, it is not an artificial waterbody.  While Wis. Stat. ch. 
30 was enacted after the creation of the flowage, "[t]he statute 
did not claim to alter the common law" and "[i]t is fundamental 
that a statute should be construed in harmony with the common 
law . . . unless a different construction is plainly expressed."  
No.  2015AP583.rgb 
 
16 
 
Klingeisen v. DNR, 163 Wis. 2d 921, 930, 472 N.W.2d 603 (Ct. 
App. 1991). 
¶85 In attempting to distinguish the flowage from other 
natural waterbodies subject to Wis. Stat. ch. 30, the majority 
mistakenly limits the holding in Doemel v. Jantz to waterbodies 
that are public, navigable, and natural.  Assuming that "[Lake 
Winnebago] is not man-made" and that "as far as we can tell, no 
portion of Lake Winnebago's waterbed is privately owned," the 
majority holds that Doemel is not dispositive.  Majority 
op., ¶43.  Setting aside the fact that Doemel is silent on the 
nature of Lake Winnebago's hydrological makeup or the ownership 
of Lake Winnebago's lakebed, Doemel controls the outcome here 
because the flowage in this case is entirely analogous to Lake 
Winnebago for the purpose of determining whether the Movriches 
should be able to install a pier.  Like Lake Winnebago, Sailor 
Creek Flowage is navigable under the public trust doctrine and 
therefore it is public.  And while its existence depended upon 
human intervention, it is hydrologically connected to a natural 
navigable waterway (i.e., Sailor Creek) and therefore it is not 
an artificial waterbody under Wis. Stat. § 30.19(1b)(a).  Mayer, 
therefore, does not extinguish the Movriches' common law 
riparian rights. 
¶86 The next question is whether the Lobermeiers' private 
property rights in the waterbed trump the Movriches' riparian 
rights, preventing the Movriches from maintaining a pier 
anchored in the waterbed adjacent to the Movriches' shoreline 
No.  2015AP583.rgb 
 
17 
 
property.  The right of a riparian to maintain a pier is subject 
to the following statutory limitations: 
1. "A wharf or pier which interferes with public rights in 
navigable waters constitutes an unlawful obstruction of 
navigable waters unless the wharf or pier is authorized 
under a permit issued under s. 30.12 or unless other 
authorization 
for 
the 
wharf 
or 
pier 
is 
expressly 
provided."  Wis. Stat. 30.13(4)(a) (emphasis added). 
2. "A wharf or pier which interferes with rights of other 
riparian owners constitutes an unlawful obstruction of 
navigable waters unless the wharf or pier is authorized 
under a permit issued under s. 30.12 or unless other 
authorization 
for 
the 
wharf 
or 
pier 
is 
expressly 
provided."  Wis. Stat. 30.13(4)(b) (emphasis added). 
Notably, the right to maintain a pier is in no way statutorily 
limited by the rights of non-riparian owners.11 
¶87 The nature of the flowage bed's title is also 
distinguishable from that of the private lakebed in Mayer, which 
was entirely owned by a single owner.  In Mayer, this court 
recognized that in the case of an artificial waterbody, like the 
artificial lake in Mayer, "the title to the land remains in the 
owner and does not become vested in the state."  29 Wis. 2d at 
176 (citing Haase v. Kingston Coop. Creamery Ass'n, 212 
                                                 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 30.13 provides limited means by which 
non-riparian owners may maintain a pier.  This section mainly 
considers the rights of easement holders and is not relevant 
here. 
No.  2015AP583.rgb 
 
18 
 
Wis. 585, 588, 250 N.W. 444 (1933)).  Mayer's holding is limited 
to "[a]n artificial lake located wholly on the property of a 
single owner."  Id.  Here, although title to a portion of the 
flowage bed remains with the Lobermeiers, their title is 
qualified because of the presence of navigable water over the 
bed. 
¶88 This principle arises from Minehan v. Murphy, 149 
Wis. 14, 134 N.W. 1130 (1912), where the plaintiff brought an 
action for ejectment when the defendant adversely occupied the 
bed of an artificially enhanced stream by crossing over from his 
side of the stream's thread and onto the plaintiff's submerged 
property.12  The stream in question had previously been non-
navigable, but upon damming of the mouth and flooding of the 
privately-owned 
former 
uplands 
the 
stream 
was 
rendered 
navigable, such that "the former private title had become 
changed to the same character of qualified title as that of 
riparian proprietors to the beds of navigable rivers in 
general."  Id. at 16 (emphasis added).  Likewise, damming a 
stream and creating a flowage, which in character and shape may 
resemble a lake, does not transfer ownership of the bed to be 
held in trust to the state.  Rather, like that of a streambed, 
the title of the flowage bed is privately-held, but qualified by 
the presence of navigable waters.  See e.g., Ne-Pee-Nauk Club v. 
Wilson, 96 Wis. 290, 295, 71 N.W. 661 (1897); Rock-Koshkonong 
Lake Dist., 350 Wis. 2d 45, ¶78. 
                                                 
12 The court does not elucidate the exact details of the 
defendant's impermissible occupancy. 
No.  2015AP583.rgb 
 
19 
 
¶89 The plaintiff's action for ejectment was ultimately 
successful in Minehan, based in part upon her status as a 
riparian whose title to the bed of the navigable water bounding 
the banks of her land was "incidental to her title to the bank."  
Minehan, 149 Wis. at 14.  The court's articulation of the rule 
that title to private property submerged by navigable waters 
becomes qualified in the same sense as the qualified title of 
riparians to the beds of navigable waters, is particularly 
instructive here.  Private title enjoys no heightened status 
vis-à-vis riparian title; rather, "the former private title had 
become changed to the same character of qualified title as that 
of riparian proprietors to the beds of navigable rivers in 
general."  Id. at 16.  Unlike the riparian plaintiff in Minehan, 
who not only owned the waterbed, but also had title to the 
upland property along the banks, the Lobermeiers merely own the 
flowage bed.  The crux of the issue is whether the Lobermeiers 
may exclude the Movriches from erecting and maintaining a pier 
by virtue of owning only a portion of the flowage bed.  
¶90 Because the Lobermeiers do not own property on the 
bank of a waterbody, they are not riparian owners.  And while 
they retain ownership of a portion of the flowage bed in fee 
simple, that title is qualified by the presence of navigable 
waters.  The majority wholly relies upon the Lobermeiers' 
ownership of the flowage bed in fee simple absolute to reach its 
conclusion that the Movriches are not entitled to erect and 
maintain a pier.  Majority op., ¶¶17-21, 32 n.9.  The majority 
cites a string of cases that do not contemplate the presence of 
No.  2015AP583.rgb 
 
20 
 
navigable water over the land.  Id.  No authority in Wisconsin 
or in any other jurisdiction has adopted the majority's 
reasoning or otherwise restricted placement of a pier on 
navigable waters by a riparian owner in favor of non-riparian, 
fee simple ownership of the waterbed.  The presence of navigable 
waters qualifies the Lobermeiers' title to the flowage bed 
subject to the public trust doctrine and the rights of riparian 
owners along the banks of the flowage.  As riparian owners, the 
Movriches are entitled to exercise riparian rights to access the 
surface waters and to have their pier rest on the flowage bed. 
¶91 Over one hundred years ago, this court expounded the 
"well settled" principle that "if the volume or expanse of 
navigable waters be increased artificially, the public right is 
correspondingly increased."  Village of Pewaukee v. Savoy, 103 
Wis. 271, 277, 79 N.W. 436 (1899).  Specifically, the court in 
Savoy expanded the state's ownership rights in natural waterbeds 
to artificially submerged lands maintained for more than 20 
years at an artificially high water level, concluding that "an 
artificial condition, by lapse of time . . . becomes the natural 
condition."  Id. at 275.  Three decades later, the court 
determined it was unnecessary to vest title to the artificially 
submerged land in the state in order to protect the public's 
rights under the public trust doctrine.  Haase, 212 Wis. at 587.  
Nevertheless, the court in Haase reiterated the rule of law the 
majority should have applied here:  "It is true that, where the 
waters of a natural, navigable lake are artificially raised, the 
No.  2015AP583.rgb 
 
21 
 
public and the riparian owners enjoy the same rights in and upon 
such artificial waters."  Id. 
¶92 The Sailor Creek Flowage was created 76 years ago and 
has been maintained for more than 50 years beyond the 20-year 
timeframe deemed sufficient to qualify the fee simple rights 
enjoyed by the owners of the underlying lakebed.  The flowage, 
created artificially by construction of a dam, submerged 
privately owned land with the permission of the owner.  Over 
time, during the three quarters of a century this land has 
remained submerged, both riparian rights as well as public trust 
rights extended to this artificial expansion of Sailor Creek.  
While the creation of the flowage did not transfer any property 
rights from the Lobermeiers to either the state or the 
Movriches, it subordinated the Lobermeiers' property rights to 
riparian rights under the common law as well as public rights 
under the public trust doctrine.  While this reconciliation of 
three distinct rights perhaps leaves the Lobermeiers with 
property of limited value, this construction of the law takes 
nothing from the Lobermeiers and preserves what has always been, 
as reflected in the $400 assessed value of the flowage bed owned 
by the Lobermeiers.  In contrast, the majority strips the 
Movriches of their riparian rights and reallocates them to the 
Lobermeiers. 
¶93 Unfortunately, the majority's opinion diminishes not 
only the value of the Movriches' property, but also potentially 
guts the values of all properties abutting flowages throughout 
Wisconsin.  The breadth of the majority's opinion calls into 
No.  2015AP583.rgb 
 
22 
 
question the terms of deeds to such waterfront properties, the 
validity of prior conveyances, and the extent of ownership 
interests.  The majority's transfiguration of the common law 
governing riparian rights disturbs the reliance on access that 
induced purchases of waterfront property in Wisconsin for over a 
century. 
II 
¶94  By eschewing decades of controlling precedent in 
order to elevate fee simple property rights in a waterbed, 
unattached 
to 
shoreline 
property 
ownership, 
the 
court 
effectively extinguishes the property rights of thousands of 
waterfront property owners along flowages, while jeopardizing 
the property rights of waterfront property owners on all bodies 
of water in Wisconsin.  A change in the law of this magnitude 
should come from the legislature, not this court.  Accordingly, 
I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion 
that effectuates such a redistribution of property rights with 
no compensation to those left with substantially diminished 
property values and concur only in that part of the majority 
opinion that preserves the public's right to access the flowage 
waters. 
¶95 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion.   
¶96 I am also authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this opinion except for Part II. 
 
No.  2015AP583.rgb 
 
1