Case Title: People v. Conley

Citation: 

Docket Number: S211275

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2016-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 6/30/16 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S211275 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C070272 
PATRICK LEE CONLEY, 
) 
 
) 
Yolo County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. CRF113234 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Under the ―Three Strikes‖ law as originally enacted in 1994, an individual 
convicted of any felony offense following two prior convictions for serious or 
violent felonies was subject to an indeterminate term of life imprisonment with a 
minimum term of no less than 25 years.  (Pen. Code, former §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 
1170.12, subd. (c)(2).)  In 2012, the electorate passed the Three Strikes Reform 
Act of 2012 (Reform Act or Act) (Prop. 36, as approved by voters, Gen. 
Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012)), which amended the law to reduce the punishment prescribed 
for certain third strike defendants.  The electorate also authorized persons 
―presently serving‖ an indeterminate term of life imprisonment imposed under the 
prior version of the law to seek resentencing under the amended penalty scheme 
by filing a petition for recall of sentence.  (Pen. Code, § 1170.126, subd. (a).)  
Under the Act, a court must grant a recall petition unless it determines that 
resentencing the petitioner ―would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public 
safety.‖  (§ 1170.126, subd. (f).) 
SEE CONCURRING OPINION 
2 
The Reform Act took effect on November 7, 2012.  The question in this 
case is whether third strike defendants who were sentenced under the Three 
Strikes law before November 7, 2012, but whose judgments were not yet final as 
of that date, are entitled to automatic resentencing under the revised penalty 
provisions of the Reform Act.  We conclude that these defendants are not entitled 
to automatic resentencing, but instead may seek resentencing by petitioning for 
recall of sentence under section 1170.126. 
I. 
 
A. 
Enacted ―to ensure longer prison sentences and greater punishment for 
those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or 
violent felony offenses‖ (Pen. Code, former § 667, subd. (b), as amended by Stats. 
1994, ch. 12, § 1, pp. 71, 72), the Three Strikes law ―consists of two, nearly 
identical statutory schemes.‖  (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 
Cal.4th 497, 504 (Romero).)  The first of these schemes was enacted by the 
Legislature in March 1994.  (Pen. Code, former § 667, subds. (b)-(i).)  The second 
was enacted by ballot initiative in November of the same year.  (Pen. Code, former 
§ 1170.12, added by Prop. 184, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994) 
(Proposition 184).)  The two statutes differ only in minor respects not relevant 
here.  (Accord, Romero, at p. 505.)1 
Under the Three Strikes law as originally enacted, a felony defendant who 
had been convicted of a single prior serious or violent felony (a second strike 
defendant) was to be sentenced to a term equal to ―twice the term otherwise 
                                              
1  
For convenience, we therefore refer in this opinion to the version enacted 
by Proposition 184.  Our decision, however, applies equally to both. 
3 
provided as punishment for the current felony conviction.‖  (Pen. Code, former 
§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).)  By contrast, a defendant who had been convicted of two 
or more prior serious or violent felonies (a third strike defendant) was to be 
sentenced to ―an indeterminate term of life imprisonment with a minimum term 
of‖ at least 25 years.  (Pen. Code, former § 1170.12, subd. (c)(2).) 
The Reform Act changed the sentence prescribed for a third strike 
defendant whose current offense is not a serious or violent felony.  (See Teal v. 
Superior Court (2014) 60 Cal.4th 595, 596-597.)  Under the Reform Act‘s revised 
penalty provisions, many third strike defendants are excepted from the provision 
imposing an indeterminate life sentence (see Pen. Code, § 1170.12, subd. 
(c)(2)(A)) and are instead sentenced in the same way as second strike defendants 
(see id., subd. (c)(2)(C)):  that is, they receive a term equal to ―twice the term 
otherwise provided as punishment for the current felony conviction‖ (id., subd. 
(c)(1)).  A defendant does not qualify for this ameliorative change, however, if his 
current offense is a controlled substance charge involving large quantities (id., 
subd. (c)(2)(C)(i)), one of various enumerated sex offenses (id., subd. 
(c)(2)(C)(ii)), or one in which he used a firearm, was armed with a firearm or 
deadly weapon, or intended to cause great bodily injury (id., subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii)).  
The ameliorative provisions of the Reform Act also do not apply in cases in which 
the defendant was previously convicted of certain enumerated offenses, including 
those involving sexual violence, child sexual abuse, homicide or attempted 
homicide, solicitation to commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a peace 
officer or firefighter, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, or any serious or 
violent felony punishable by life imprisonment or death.  (§ 1170.12, subd. 
(c)(2)(C)(iv)(I)-(VIII).)  The Act provides that these disqualifying factors must be 
pleaded and proved by the prosecution.  (§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C).) 
4 
In the Reform Act, the voters also established a procedure for ―persons 
presently serving an indeterminate term of imprisonment‖ under the prior version 
of the Three Strikes law to seek resentencing under the Reform Act‘s revised 
penalty structure.  (Pen. Code, § 1170.126, subd. (a).)  Under section 1170.126, 
―within two years after the effective date of the act . . . or at a later date upon a 
showing of good cause,‖ such persons can file a petition for a recall of sentence 
before the trial court that entered the judgment of conviction.  (Id., subd. (b).)  If 
the petitioner would have qualified for a shorter sentence under the Reform Act 
version of the law, taking into consideration the disqualifying factors (§ 1170.126, 
subds. (e), (f)), section 1170.126 provides that he ―shall be resentenced pursuant to 
[the Reform Act] unless the court, in its discretion, determines that resentencing 
the petitioner would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety‖ (id., 
subd. (f)).  In exercising this discretion, the court may consider the defendant‘s 
criminal conviction history, the defendant‘s disciplinary record and record of 
rehabilitation while incarcerated, and ―[a]ny other evidence the court . . . 
determines to be relevant.‖  (Id., subd. (g).) 
B. 
In October 2010, a California Highway Patrol officer observed defendant 
Patrick Lee Conley retrieving tools from the middle of a county road.2  
Defendant‘s pickup truck was parked nearby, partially blocking a lane of the road.  
Defendant appeared to be intoxicated and smelled of alcohol.  At first, defendant 
claimed that his son had been driving the truck and had gone to get gas, but later 
defendant admitted that he had been the driver.  Defendant also admitted that he 
had consumed a few cans of malt liquor at his son‘s house.  After defendant failed 
                                              
2  
We take the facts from the opinion of the Court of Appeal. 
5 
a series of field sobriety tests, the highway patrol officer arrested him.  
Defendant‘s blood was drawn at a hospital approximately an hour after he was 
first stopped.  Testing showed defendant‘s blood alcohol content (BAC) was 0.19 
percent. 
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of driving under the 
influence of alcohol (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)) and driving with a BAC level 
of 0.08 percent or more (id., § 23152, subd. (b)), with enhancements for refusing 
to take a chemical test (id., § 23578).3  The jury also found true allegations that 
defendant had four prior convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol 
(see Veh. Code, § 23550), that he had served three prior prison terms (Pen. Code, 
§ 667.5), and that he had two prior convictions that qualified as strikes under the 
Three Strikes law (Pen. Code, § 1170.12).  The first prior strike conviction was for 
a residential burglary in which defendant — then on parole for a different first 
degree burglary that he committed as a juvenile — entered a home, while armed 
and wearing a stocking over his face, and assaulted and bound the occupant.  The 
second prior strike conviction was for a physical altercation in which defendant 
stabbed his opponent multiple times.  On January 23, 2012, the trial court denied 
defendant‘s motion to dismiss one or both strike allegations (see Romero, supra, 
13 Cal.4th at p. 504), citing the details of defendant‘s prior offenses, his poor 
parole record, and his attempt to evade responsibility for his current offense by 
shifting the blame to his son.  The court sentenced defendant under the Three 
Strikes law to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life (Pen. Code, former 
                                              
3  
Defendant also pleaded no contest to driving with driving privilege 
suspended due to a driving-under-the-influence conviction (with three prior 
violations within the preceding five years) (Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a)), 
failure to provide proof of insurance (id., § 16028), and driving an unregistered 
vehicle (id., § 4000, subd. (a)(1)). 
6 
§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)), plus three consecutive one-year terms for his three prior 
prison terms (Pen. Code, § 667.5). 
Defendant appealed, raising no issues but asking the Court of Appeal to 
independently review the record under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.  
While defendant‘s appeal was pending, the voters enacted the Reform Act on 
November 6, 2012.  Two days later, the Court of Appeal issued an opinion 
affirming defendant‘s conviction. 
Defendant petitioned for rehearing, asking the Court of Appeal to vacate his 
sentence and remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing under the new 
sentencing provisions of the Three Strikes law.  Although the Court of Appeal 
initially denied the petition, it later granted rehearing on its own motion to more 
fully explain its reasoning.  The court noted that, under In re Estrada (1965) 63 
Cal.2d 740 (Estrada), courts ordinarily presume that newly enacted legislation 
lessening a criminal punishment is intended to apply ―to all cases not yet reduced 
to final judgment on the statute‘s effective date.‖  The court concluded, however, 
that the Estrada presumption is inapplicable here because the Reform Act includes 
a procedure whereby ―persons presently serving an indeterminate term of 
imprisonment [under the Three Strikes law]‖ (Pen. Code, § 1170.126, subd. (a)) 
may file a petition for recall of sentence.  Observing that this provision does not 
distinguish between persons serving final sentences and those serving nonfinal 
sentences, the court concluded that ―[t]hose already sentenced and serving an 
indeterminate term of imprisonment must petition the trial court for a recall of 
sentence regardless of whether or not their judgment is final.‖ 
We granted defendant‘s petition for review to resolve a conflict in the 
Courts of Appeal about the application of the Reform Act to defendants who had 
been sentenced to indeterminate life terms under the previous version of the Three 
Strikes law but whose sentences were not yet final when the Act took effect. 
7 
II. 
In answering the question presented, we begin by identifying common 
ground.  Defendant is a ―person[] presently serving an indeterminate term of 
imprisonment‖ under the prior version of the Three Strikes law.  (Pen. Code, 
§ 1170.126, subd. (a); see, e.g., People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 30-31 
[a defendant‘s sentence of imprisonment begins to run upon the delivery of the 
defendant to the custody of the Director of Corrections], citing Pen. Code, § 2900, 
subds. (a), (c).)  Therefore, under the plain language of the Reform Act, defendant 
is entitled to seek the benefit of the Act‘s reduced penalties by filing a petition to 
recall his sentence and requesting resentencing under the new law.  (Pen. Code, 
§ 1170.126, subd. (b).) 
Defendant argues, however, that he and others whose judgments were not 
yet final as of the effective date of the Reform Act are entitled to automatic 
resentencing under the revised penalty provisions of the Act, without the need to 
file a recall petition under Penal Code section 1170.126, and thus without regard 
to whether the trial court determines that resentencing the defendant would pose 
―an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.‖  (Id., subd. (f).)  He relies for his 
argument on this court‘s decision in Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, which held 
that new laws that reduce the punishment for a crime are presumptively to be 
applied to defendants whose judgments are not yet final. 
In Estrada, we considered the retroactive application of a statutory 
amendment that reduced the punishment prescribed for the offense of escape 
without force or violence.  ―The problem,‖ we explained, ―is one of trying to 
ascertain the legislative intent — did the Legislature intend the old or new statute 
to apply?  Had the Legislature expressly stated which statute should apply, its 
determination, either way, would have been legal and constitutional.‖  (Estrada, 
supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 744.)  But in the absence of any textual indication of the 
8 
Legislature‘s intent, we inferred that the Legislature must have intended for the 
new penalties, rather than the old, to apply.  (Id. at pp. 744-745.)  We reasoned 
that when the Legislature determines that a lesser punishment suffices for a 
criminal act, there is ordinarily no reason to continue imposing the more severe 
penalty, beyond simply ― ‗satisfy[ing] a desire for vengeance.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 745, 
quoting People v. Oliver (1956) 1 N.Y.2d 152, 160.)  Thus, we concluded, ―[i]t is 
an inevitable inference that the Legislature must have intended that the new statute 
imposing the new lighter penalty now deemed to be sufficient should apply to 
every case to which it constitutionally could apply,‖ including ―to acts committed 
before its passage[,] provided the judgment convicting the defendant of the act is 
not final.‖  (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745.) 
Because the Estrada rule reflects a presumption about legislative intent, 
rather than a constitutional command, the Legislature (or here, the electorate) may 
choose to modify, limit, or entirely forbid the retroactive application of 
ameliorative criminal-law amendments if it so chooses.  Thus, as we explained in 
Estrada, the presumption does not govern when the statute at issue includes a 
―saving clause‖ providing that the amendment should be applied only 
prospectively.  (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 747; see People v. Floyd (2003) 31 
Cal.4th 179, 184-188.)  And we have since made clear that, while such express 
statements unquestionably suffice to override the Estrada presumption, the 
―absence of an express saving clause . . . does not end ‗our quest for legislative 
intent.‘ ‖  (People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 784, 793, quoting In re Pedro T. 
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 1041, 1049 (Pedro T.).)  Our cases do not ―dictate to legislative 
drafters the forms in which laws must be written‖ to express an intent to modify or 
limit the retroactive effect of an ameliorative change; rather, they require ―that the 
Legislature demonstrate its intention with sufficient clarity that a reviewing court 
9 
can discern and effectuate it.‖  (Pedro T., supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 1048-1049; 
accord, Nasalga, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 793.) 
In Pedro T., for example, we concluded that the Estrada presumption did 
not govern the interpretation of a ― ‗sunset‘ ‖ provision attached to legislation 
increasing the maximum punishment for vehicle theft.  (Pedro T., supra, 8 Cal.4th 
at p. 1045.)  Although the legislation contained no express saving clause, we 
concluded that the presumption did not control where the overarching purpose of 
the legislation was to temporarily increase, rather than to decrease, the penalties 
for the offense.  We reaffirmed that, ―[o]rdinarily when an amendment lessens the 
punishment for a crime, one may reasonably infer the Legislature has determined 
imposition of a lesser punishment on offenders thereafter will sufficiently serve 
the public interest.‖  (Ibid.)  But we concluded that ―[i]n the case of a ‗sunset‘ 
provision attached to a temporary enhancement of penalty, the same inference 
cannot so readily be drawn.‖  (Ibid.; see id. at pp. 1045–1046.)  We further 
reasoned that giving controlling weight to the Estrada presumption would have 
―practical effect[s]‖ the Legislature could not have intended:  It would both 
undermine ―[t]he utility of a three-year legislative experiment in enhanced 
penalties‖ and ―provide a motive for delay and manipulation in criminal 
proceedings.‖  (Pedro T., at pp. 1046–1047.) 
Here, a similar set of interpretive considerations persuades us that the 
voters who passed the Reform Act did not intend to authorize automatic 
resentencing for third strike defendants serving nonfinal sentences imposed under 
the former version of the Three Strikes law.  First, unlike the statute at issue in 
Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, the Reform Act is not silent on the question of 
retroactivity.  Rather, the Act expressly addresses the question in section 
1170.126, the sole purpose of which is to extend the benefits of the Act 
retroactively.  Section 1170.126 creates a special mechanism that entitles all 
10 
persons ―presently serving‖ indeterminate life terms imposed under the prior law 
to seek resentencing under the new law.  By its terms, the provision draws no 
distinction between persons serving final sentences and those serving nonfinal 
sentences, entitling both categories of prisoners to petition courts for recall of 
sentence under the Act. 
The Estrada rule rests on an inference that, in the absence of contrary 
indications, a legislative body ordinarily intends for ameliorative changes to the 
criminal law to extend as broadly as possible, distinguishing only as necessary 
between sentences that are final and sentences that are not.  (See Estrada, supra, 
63 Cal.2d at p. 745.)  In enacting the recall provision, the voters adopted a 
different approach.  They took the extraordinary step of extending the retroactive 
benefits of the Act beyond the bounds contemplated by Estrada — including even 
prisoners serving final sentences within the Act‘s ameliorative reach — but 
subject to a special procedural mechanism for the recall of sentences already 
imposed.  In prescribing the scope and manner of the Act‘s retroactive application, 
the voters did not distinguish between final and nonfinal sentences, as Estrada 
would presume, but instead drew the relevant line between prisoners ―presently 
serving‖ indeterminate life terms — whether final or not — and defendants yet to 
be sentenced. 
Second, the nature of the recall mechanism and the substantive limitations 
it contains call into question the central premise underlying the Estrada 
presumption:  that when an amendment lessens the punishment for a crime, it is 
reasonable to infer that the enacting legislative body has categorically determined 
that ―imposition of a lesser punishment‖ will in all cases ―sufficiently serve the 
public interest.‖  (Pedro T., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1045.) 
There can be no doubt that the Reform Act was motivated in large measure 
by a determination that sentences under the prior version of the Three Strikes law 
11 
were excessive.  As the ballot materials argued, ―[p]eople convicted of shoplifting 
a pair of socks, stealing bread or baby formula don‘t deserve life sentences.‖  
(Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012), rebuttal to argument against 
Prop. 36, p. 53.)  But voters were motivated by other purposes as well, including 
the protection of public safety.  The ballot materials explained that ―dangerous 
criminals are being released early from prison because jails are overcrowded with 
nonviolent offenders who pose no risk to the public.‖  (Ibid.)  Voters were told 
that the Reform Act would protect public safety by ―prevent[ing] dangerous 
criminals from being released early‖ (ibid.) and would have no effect on ―truly 
dangerous criminals‖ (id., argument in favor of Prop. 36, p. 52). 
The recall procedures in Penal Code section 1170.126 were designed to 
strike a balance between these objectives of mitigating punishment and protecting 
public safety by creating a resentencing mechanism for persons serving 
indeterminate life terms under the former Three Strikes law, but making 
resentencing subject to the trial court‘s evaluation of whether, based on their 
criminal history, their record of incarceration, and other relevant considerations, 
their early release would pose an ―unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.‖  
(Id., subd. (f).) 
Where, as here, the enacting body creates a special mechanism for 
application of the new lesser punishment to persons who have previously been 
sentenced, and where the body expressly makes retroactive application of the 
lesser punishment contingent on a court‘s evaluation of the defendant‘s 
dangerousness, we can no longer say with confidence, as we did in Estrada, that 
the enacting body lacked any discernible reason to limit application of the law 
with respect to cases pending on direct review.  On the contrary, to confer an 
automatic entitlement to resentencing under these circumstances would undermine 
the apparent intent of the electorate that approved section 1170.126:  to create 
12 
broad access to resentencing for prisoners previously sentenced to indeterminate 
life terms, but subject to judicial evaluation of the impact of resentencing on 
public safety, based on the prisoner‘s criminal history, record of incarceration, and 
other factors.  This public safety requirement must be applied realistically, with 
careful consideration of the Reform Act‘s purposes of mitigating excessive 
punishment and reducing prison overcrowding.  But given that section 1170.126, 
by its terms, applies to all prisoners ―presently serving‖ indeterminate life terms, 
we can discern no basis to conclude that the electorate would have intended for 
courts to bypass the public safety inquiry altogether in the case of defendants 
serving sentences that are not yet final. 
Finally, unlike in Estrada, the revised sentencing provisions at issue in this 
case do more than merely reduce previously prescribed criminal penalties.  They 
also establish a new set of disqualifying factors that preclude a third strike 
defendant from receiving a second strike sentence.  (See Pen. Code, § 1170.12, 
subd. (c)(2)(C).)  The sentencing provisions further require that these factors be 
―plead[ed] and prove[d]‖ by the prosecution.  (Ibid.) 
These provisions add an additional layer of complexity to defendant‘s 
request for automatic resentencing under the revised penalty scheme.  In cases 
arising after the Reform Act‘s effective date, operation of the pleading-and-proof 
requirements is straightforward enough.  But for defendants who have already 
been tried and sentenced, the matter would be considerably more complicated.  
Before the Reform Act, prosecutors may have had no reason to plead and prove 
the new disqualifying factors in a particular case.  Take, for example, the 
application of the ―armed with a firearm‖ disqualifying factor (Pen. Code, 
§ 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii)) in the case of a prisoner serving an indeterminate 
life term for possessing a firearm as a felon.  (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a); cf. 
People v. White (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 512.)  Case law holds that possession of a 
13 
firearm does not necessarily imply being armed; ―a convicted felon may be found 
to be a felon in possession of a firearm if he or she knowingly kept a firearm in a 
locked offsite storage unit even though he or she had no ready access to the 
firearm and, thus, was not armed with it.‖  (White, at p. 524.)  Before the Reform 
Act, the prosecution ordinarily would have had no reason to plead and prove that 
the defendant was actually armed with, not merely in possession of, the firearm; 
arming is not an element of the offense, and case law suggests that the armed-
with-a-firearm enhancement (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (a)) does not apply to the 
offense of felon in possession of a firearm (see People v. Hicks (2014) 231 
Cal.App.4th 275, 283-284).  Thus, if the Reform Act version of the Three Strikes 
law applied retroactively to a defendant who was appealing a felon-in-possession 
conviction, then the defendant might receive a second strike sentence without the 
prosecution ever having had occasion to plead and prove that the defendant was 
disqualified from receiving that sentence on account of being armed with, not just 
in possession of, the firearm. 
Similar difficulties would arise in applying the ―intent to cause great bodily 
injury‖ disqualifying factor.  (Pen. Code, § 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii).)  Before 
the Reform Act became law, the prosecution ordinarily would have had no reason 
to plead and prove a defendant‘s intent to cause great bodily injury.  (Cf. Pen. 
Code, § 12022.7 [creating an enhancement for inflicting great bodily injury].)4  
Thus, much as in the case of the ―armed with a firearm‖ factor, if the Reform Act 
version of the Three Strikes law applied retroactively to a defendant who was 
                                              
4  
Penal Code section 12022.7 at one time included a specific intent 
requirement (see People v. Colantuono (1994) 7 Cal.4th 206, 222), but that 
requirement was deleted from the statute in 1995 (Stats. 1995, ch. 341, § 1, 
p. 1851). 
14 
appealing a conviction involving the infliction of great bodily injury, the defendant 
might receive a second strike sentence without the prosecution ever having had 
occasion to plead and prove that the defendant was actually disqualified from 
receiving that sentence under section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(2)(C).   
In short, application of the Reform Act‘s revised sentencing scheme would 
not be so simple as mechanically substituting a second strike sentence for a 
previously imposed indeterminate life term.  Unless defendants were to be 
resentenced solely based on the existing trial court record — leaving the 
prosecution without the opportunity to plead and prove the presence of 
disqualifying factors or offenses that have become newly relevant under the Act 
— trial courts presumably would have to permit prosecutors to hold mini-trials for 
the sole purpose of determining whether, for example, the defendant‘s offense of 
conviction involved arming with a firearm or an intent to cause great bodily injury 
(see Pen. Code, § 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(C)(iii)). 
As defendant points out, such single-issue trials would not be 
unprecedented.  (See People v. Figueroa (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 65 [setting aside 
the jury‘s true finding on an enhancement after an amendment to the law narrowed 
the enhancement‘s scope, but remanding to permit the prosecution to prove the 
enhancement as more narrowly defined].)  But the question before us is not 
whether such trials are possible.  The question is whether this is the system the 
voters intended to create, though no provision of the Act contains any affirmative 
indication to that effect.  We find it difficult to escape the conclusion that the Act 
does not address the complexities involved in applying the pleading-and-proof 
requirements to previously sentenced defendants precisely because the electorate 
did not contemplate that these provisions would apply.  Rather, voters intended for 
previously sentenced defendants to seek relief under section 1170.126, which 
15 
contains no comparable pleading-and-proof requirements.  (See Pen. Code, 
§ 1170.126, subd. (e)(2), (3).) 
III. 
Defendant objects that this analysis is inconsistent with Estrada, supra, 63 
Cal.2d 740, which he reads to mean that ―a defendant whose judgment is not final 
is entitled to the benefit of a lighter penalty in the absence of a clear indication to 
the contrary.‖  Defendant argues that in the absence of an express statement that 
section 1170.126 was meant to provide the exclusive means for defendants with 
nonfinal sentences to seek resentencing under the Act, section 1170.126 should be 
understood as supplementing, rather than supplanting, such defendants‘ 
entitlement to automatic resentencing.  He further argues that the recall provision 
expressly preserves this ―right‖ in subdivision (k), which states that ―[n]othing in 
this section is intended to diminish or abrogate any rights or remedies otherwise 
available to the defendant.‖  (Pen. Code, § 1170.126, subd. (k).)  Neither argument 
is persuasive. 
As noted, our decision in Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, recognizes that the 
retroactive application of ameliorative changes to the criminal laws is ultimately 
governed by the intent of the legislative body.  And we have expressly rejected the 
notion that Estrada ―dictate[s] to legislative drafters the forms in which laws must 
be written to express the legislative intent.‖  (Pedro T., supra, 8 Cal.4th at 
pp. 1048-1049.)  ―[W]hat is required is that the Legislature demonstrate its 
intention with sufficient clarity that a reviewing court can discern and effectuate 
it.‖  (Id. at p. 1049.)  As explained above, the text, structure, and purposes of the 
Act all lead to the conclusion that the electorate meant what it said when it 
approved section 1170.126:  Prisoners presently serving indeterminate life terms 
imposed under the prior version of the Three Strikes law, including those with 
nonfinal judgments, may seek resentencing under the Act, but subject to judicial 
16 
determination of whether resentencing would pose an unreasonable danger to the 
public. 
That being the case, section 1170.126, subdivision (k) cannot help 
defendant‘s argument.  Subdivision (k) contains no indication that automatic 
resentencing — as opposed to, for example, habeas corpus relief — ranks among 
the ―rights‖ the electorate sought to preserve.  A careful reading of the statute 
points to the opposite conclusion:  The voters authorized defendant and others 
similarly situated to seek resentencing under the recall provisions of section 
1170.126, but they did not intend to confer a right to automatic resentencing under 
the amended penalty provisions of the Reform Act.5 
IV. 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KRUGER, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J.
                                              
5  
Defendants with nonfinal judgments who did not file petitions for recall of 
sentence within the mandated two-year period (see Pen. Code, § 1170.126, subd. 
(b)) because they were litigating the question of automatic resentencing will 
generally have good cause for filing late petitions (ibid.), and therefore they will 
not be deprived of the resentencing mechanism that the electorate created for 
them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J. 
 
I concur in the court‘s decision that defendant, who was serving a third-strike 
life term when the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 (Prop. 36, as approved by 
voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 2012) (Reform Act or act)) took effect, may seek relief 
under the act only through the statutory procedure for recalling the sentence (Pen. 
Code, § 1170.126)1 even though his judgment of conviction was not yet final.  
Because I concur, I also necessarily agree that In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 
(Estrada) does not require a different result.  As the author of the court‘s opinion 
in In re Pedro T. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1041 (Pedro T.), and the only current member 
of the court who participated in that case, I write separately to explain its 
significance.   
To conclude that Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, does not govern our 
interpretation of the Reform Act is a relatively straightforward exercise.  Estrada 
articulates a presumption of statutory construction:  ―[A]n amendatory statute 
lessening punishment is presumed to apply in all cases not yet reduced to final 
judgment as of the amendatory statute‘s effective date‖ (People v. Floyd (2003) 31 
Cal.4th 179, 184, citing Estrada, at p. 744), unless the enacting body ―clearly 
signals its intent to make the amendment prospective, by the inclusion of either an 
express savings clause or its equivalent‖ (People v. Nasalga (1996) 12 Cal.4th 
                                              
1  
All further statutory citations are to the Penal Code.   
 
2 
784, 793 (Nasalga), citing Estrada, at p. 747).  A savings clause is a provision in 
which the lawmakers articulate how the amended law is to apply, if at all, to cases 
decided under the prior law.  This is precisely the effect of the Reform Act‘s 
provision for recalling sentences.  The recall provision offers, to all ―persons 
presently serving an indeterminate term of imprisonment‖ (§ 1170.126, subd. (a)) 
under the Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12), an opportunity to 
seek sentence reductions, without regard to whether the judgments underlying 
those sentences are final or not.  (See maj. opn., ante, at pp. 7, 9–10.)  Thus, the 
recall provision both functions as a saving clause and clearly signals the drafters‘ 
intent that the revised penalty provisions apply prospectively.  (See maj. opn., 
ante, at p. 10.)   
In contrast to the Reform Act and the statute at issue in Estrada, supra, 63 
Cal.2d 740, the law we construed in Pedro T., supra, 8 Cal.4th 1041, expressly 
declared the Legislature‘s intention not to mitigate, but rather to ― ‗enhance . . . 
penalties.‘ ‖  (Id. at p. 1046, quoting Stats. 1989, ch. 930, § 1, p. 3247, italics 
added.)  Enacted to support ―an experimental study of the deterrent effect of 
enhanced penalties‖ (Pedro T., at p. 1046), the statute temporarily increased the 
punishment for vehicle thefts committed within a three-year period, and then 
automatically reinstated the prior, lower punishment for offenses committed 
thereafter through a ― ‗sunset‘ ‖ provision.  (Id. at p. 1043.)  Asked whether 
Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, required retroactive application of the sunset 
provision, we concluded it did not.  The sunset provision did not include a savings 
clause or its equivalent.  But retroactive sentence reductions would have 
compromised the experiment‘s validity, and thus defeated the statute‘s purpose, by 
reducing the data set from a three-year sample of offenders to a smaller sample 
―comprised only of those whose convictions happened to become final before the 
sunset date of the increased penalties.‖  (Pedro T., at p. 1046.)  In other words, 
 
3 
applying the Estrada presumption would have violated the important rule that we 
do not interpret legislation in a manner that would render it ―an idle act‖ by the 
Legislature or ―a nullity.‖  (California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd. of Rialto 
Unified School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627, 634.)   
This was the context for our observation in Pedro T., supra, 8 Cal.4th 1041, 
that, ―[d]espite broad language in Estrada regarding the necessity of express 
saving clauses, . . . courts [cannot] dictate to legislative drafters the forms in which 
laws must be written to express the legislative intent.  Rather, what is required is 
that the Legislature demonstrate its intention with sufficient clarity that a 
reviewing court can discern and effectuate it.‖  (Pedro T., at pp. 1048–1049, fn. 
omitted.)  While we thus declined to apply the Estrada presumption to defeat the 
purpose of a statute expressly intended to increase penalties, we did not abandon 
the presumption or replace it with a holistic inquiry into legislative intent 
concerning prospective versus retroactive operation.  Indeed, just two years after 
Pedro T., this court strongly reaffirmed Estrada and pointedly declined the 
Attorney General‘s invitation to abrogate it.  (Nasalga, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 792 
& fn. 7.)  Neither does today‘s decision abrogate Estrada.      
Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d 740, has now governed our application of 
statutes reducing punishment for half a century.  Our consistent application of the 
presumption articulated in that case assists the state‘s lawmakers in predicting and 
controlling the manner in which statutes mitigating punishment are applied.  As 
explained above, I view the court‘s decision as consistent with our prior decisions 
on the subject, and on that basis I concur.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
WE CONCUR: 
LIU, J.  
CUÉLLAR, J. 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Conley 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 211 Cal.App.4th 953 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S211275 
Date Filed: June 30, 2016 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Yolo 
Judge: Stephen L. Mock 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Patrick Lee Conley, in pro. per.; and Carol Foster, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant 
and Appellant. 
 
Michael S. Romano for Three Strikes Project as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. 
Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Ivan P. Marrs, Deputy Attorneys General, 
for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Carol Foster 
Central California Appellate Program 
2407 J Street, Suite 301 
Sacramento, CA  95816 
(916) 441-3792 
 
Ivan P. Marrs 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 324-0069