Case Title: In re S.P., Juvenile

Citation: 173 Vt. 480, 788 A.2d 10

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2001-09-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re S.P., Juvenile (2001-179); 173 Vt. 480; 788 A.2d 10

[Filed 26-Sep-2001]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2001-179

                            SEPTEMBER TERM, 2001

In re S.P., Juvenile	               }	APPEALED FROM:
                                       }
                                       }
                                       }	Caledonia Family Court
                                       }	
                                       }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 149-12-99 Cajv

                                                Trial Judge: Mark J. Keller 

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       R.B., the custodial guardian of S.P., a child found to be in need of
  care and supervision  (CHINS), appeals the family court's disposition order
  terminating her guardianship and transferring  custody of the child to the
  Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services (SRS) without  limitation
  as to adoption.  We affirm.

       S.P. was born on January 12, 1994.  On December 23, 1994, a probate
  and family court in  Massachusetts appointed S.P.'s maternal grandmother,
  R.B., as the child's guardian and gave her  legal custody of the child
  because his parents were unfit.  R.B. moved to Vermont with S.P.  In the 
  spring of 1997, S.P. exhibited aggressive and highly sexualized behavior at
  the pre-school he was  attending.  On several occasions, he came to the
  pre-school with bruises located on parts of his body  where it would be
  unusual to see accidental bruising.  The matter was referred to SRS for 
  investigation, but insufficient information was uncovered to substantiate
  any abuse.  S.P.'s highly  sexualized behavior continued, however, and the
  child became emotionally distraught on a number  of occasions during the
  following two or three years.  At one point, during an October 1999 child 
  protection team meeting, it came up that R.B.'s adult son, an adjudicated
  sex offender who had not  completed sex offender treatment, was living with
  R.B. and S.P.  R.B. was given six weeks to  remove her son from her home or
  face another "risk of harm" investigation.  In December 1999, after  S.P.
  told authorities that he still saw his uncle every day, and that his uncle
  was sexually abusing  him, S.P. was taken into SRS custody.  R.B.
  eventually stipulated that the family court could find by  clear and
  convincing evidence that her son had sexually abused S.P.

       Following a merits hearing, the family court found S.P. to be a child
  in need of care and  supervision.  In making this determination, the court
  found that S.P. had told R.B. of his abuse at the  hands of his uncle, and
  that R.B. was well aware that her son was an untreated sex offender who had 
  sexually abused his sisters (her daughters) years earlier.  The court
  further found that R.B. had 

 

  knowingly and unreasonably exposed S.P. to his uncle's abuse, and that the
  abuse predictably  occurred as the result of R.B.'s disregard of the patent
  risks known to her.  The court concluded that  S.P. was without proper care
  and supervision because of R.B.'s failure to protect him from his uncle's 
  abuse.

       Following a disposition hearing, the family court terminated R.B.'s
  guardianship and  transferred custody of S.P. to SRS without limitation as
  to adoption. (FN1)  The court found that R.B.  consciously disregarded the
  obvious dangers and allowed her son to viciously attack S.P., thereby 
  causing the child serious and permanent injuries.  Calling her behavior
  "outrageous at best," the court  declared that R.B. was an unfit custodian
  and guardian under any standard, whether it be an unfitness  test under 14
  V.S.A. § 3001 (probate court may remove guardian who is incapable of
  discharging  duties with respect to minor) and 14 V.S.A. § 3077(a)(5)
  (guardianship may be terminated upon  showing of change in capacity or
  suitability of guardian for carrying out duties) or a best-interests  test
  under 33 V.S.A. § 5532(a) (prior order in juvenile proceedings may be
  terminated upon showing  that changed circumstances so require in best
  interests of child) and 33 V.S.A. § 5540 (listing factors  for family court
  to consider in determining best interests of child).

       On appeal, R.B. argues that the family court has jurisdiction to apply
  only the changed-circumstances/best-interests standard contained in the
  juvenile proceedings act, and that the court  erred in applying this
  standard because it did not take into account whether SRS's failure to
  provide  her with services led to stagnation in her parental abilities and
  thus affected the likelihood of her  being able to resume parental duties
  within a reasonable period of time.  We find no merit to this  argument. 
  We conclude that, under any standard, the evidence supports the family
  court's decision to  terminate R.B.'s guardianship and place S.P. in SRS
  custody without limitation as to adoption.  The  evidence of R.B.'s
  incompetence as S.P.'s guardian is overwhelming.  Her conscious disregard
  for  her grandson's safety and welfare warranted immediate and permanent
  cessation of her guardianship  and custodial rights.

       As R.B. acknowledges, the family court has the authority to modify the
  Massachusetts  guardianship order.  In relevant part, 33 V.S.A. § 5528
  provides that if a child is found to be CHINS,  the family court may
  "[p]ermit the child to remain with his parents, guardian or custodian," or 
  "[t]ransfer legal custody, or guardianship over the person, or residual
  parental rights and  responsibilities" to individuals or entities as set
  forth in the statute.  Although we know little of the  circumstances
  surrounding the issuance of the Massachusetts guardianship order, we accept
  R.B.'s  position that the order, like any other family court order, cannot
  be amended or set aside unless the  standard set forth in 33 V.S.A. §
  5532(a) of the juvenile proceedings act is satisfied.  Under that  section,
  prior orders of the family court may be set aside (1) upon a showing of
  fraud, mistake, lack  of jurisdiction, or newly discovered evidence; or (2)
  "on the ground that changed circumstances so  require in the best interests
  of the child."  Id.

 

       In the context of this case, however, this standard does not differ
  significantly from the  standard of unfitness contained in 14 V.S.A. §§
  3001, 3077(a)(5) for removing a guardian.  The  purpose of a guardianship,
  as its name suggests, is to lawfully invest a person with the authority and 
  duty to protect and take care of another person.  Black's Law Dictionary
  712 (7th ed. 1999)  ("guardian" is person "who has legal authority and duty
  to care for another[] person . . . because of  the other's infancy,
  incapacity, or disability").  The Massachusetts court that issued the
  guardianship  order in this case obviously believed that R.B. would be
  willing and able to protect and care for S.P.   That turned out not to be
  the case, however.  S.P. was adjudicated CHINS based on R.B.'s manifest 
  neglect in failing to protect him from serious and permanent injury.  The
  CHINS order, in and of  itself, demonstrates a substantial change in
  material circumstances - the custodial guardian is unable  to protect and
  care for her ward, contrary to expectations when the guardianship was
  conferred.

       This is not a "stagnation" case, as R.B. suggests.  When a court
  removes a child from a parent's  custody, and the parent fails to acquire
  parenting skills that would allow the parent to resume their  parenting
  role, we refer to this as stagnation, which may be a basis for finding
  changed  circumstances.  See In re J.M., 160 Vt. 146, 149,