Case Title: State v. Dirk E. Harris

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1993AP000730-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1996-02-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  93-0730-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
DIRK E. HARRIS, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 FEB 29, 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  
Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                 
  
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
 
JANINE P. GESKE, J.  This is a review of a published decision 
of the court of appeals, affirming the conviction of Dirk Harris 
for first-degree murder and armed robbery.
1  The court of appeals 
held that physical evidence recovered as a result of a statement 
taken after Harris had invoked his right to have counsel present 
during interrogation could be used in the prosecution's case-in-
chief.  We conclude that the circuit court committed error by not 
excluding physical evidence proximately derived from a violation 
of the bright-line rule articulated by the United States Supreme 
                     
     
1  State v. Harris, 189 Wis. 2d 162, 525 N.W.2d 334 (Ct. App. 
1994). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
2 
Court in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), which bars all 
uncounseled police-initiated interrogation after invocation of the  
right to counsel.  However, we hold that the error in this case 
was harmless, and we therefore affirm the judgment of conviction. 
 
 
FACTS 
 
The body of Dennis Owens was discovered at approximately 4:15 
a.m. on December 4, 1988.  He died from multiple gunshot wounds to 
the head and chest, fired at close-range from a .22 caliber gun.  
A witness saw a gray Pontiac identified as belonging to the victim 
leaving the area.  The next day, Harris was seen driving Owens' 
car.  He also used Owens' credit card to purchase a bracelet.  
Harris's mother, Barbara Harris, told a co-worker that she was 
afraid that her son was involved in the murder because he had 
showed her identification belonging to the dead man.  The police 
interviewed 
Barbara 
Harris 
and 
recovered 
the 
victim's 
identification and license plates from her trash.  She told police 
that after her son called her at work and told her he needed money 
to leave town, she took him $180.  The police arrested James 
Malone, who told them that Harris committed the murder.  Harris 
was arrested in Amarillo, Texas, on December 6, 1988. 
 
Public Defender Kathy Stilling, who had represented Harris on 
a previous matter, recognized his description in news reports of 
the incident and called the police station in Amarillo where 
Harris was being held.  Harris returned her call and, after he 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
3 
indicated that he wanted her to represent him, attorney Stilling 
advised him that it would not be in his best interests to initiate 
conversation with law enforcement personnel or anyone else except 
his lawyer.  Harris indicated that he understood and would not 
talk to anyone.  Attorney Stilling then asked Harris to put the 
accompanying officer on the phone and told the officer that she 
represented Harris and that he had indicated his desire not to 
make any statements to Amarillo or Milwaukee authorities outside 
the presence of counsel.  Harris then got back on the phone and 
Stilling heard him repeat that instruction to the officer.  
Stilling then called Assistant District Attorney Jackson in 
Milwaukee and informed him that she represented Harris and that he 
didn't wish to make any statements in the absence of counsel.  She 
also called Milwaukee police detective Sucik who was working on 
the case and told him the same thing. 
 
A criminal complaint and felony warrant were issued in 
Wisconsin on December 7, 1988, charging Harris with first-degree 
murder and armed robbery.  Following his arraignment that same day 
in Amarillo, Harris again informed the Amarillo police that he had 
made contact with his lawyer in Milwaukee and that he would make 
no statements to anyone without his lawyer being present.  This 
information was recorded in the police incident report. 
 
Milwaukee police detectives Sucik and Blazer were assigned to 
fly to Amarillo to accompany Harris back to Milwaukee.  Before 
leaving Wisconsin, Sucik informed Blazer of the content of his 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
4 
conversation with attorney Stilling.  On the morning of December 
8, 1988, the two detectives arrived at the Amarillo police station 
where they reviewed police reports including the one containing 
the information that Harris had stated that "he would make no 
statements to anyone without his lawyer being present."  After 
reviewing these reports, the detectives asked that Harris be 
brought to them.  
 
At the suppression hearing, the detectives testified that 
they merely wanted to see Harris to advise him of the charges and 
to assess his demeanor for security reasons because they were 
responsible for escorting him back to Milwaukee on public 
carriers.  Blazer testified that "armed with the knowledge that an 
attorney was representing him . . . I did not think that we would 
be able to talk to [Harris]."  Despite that belief, Blazer 
admitted that he initiated the ensuing "conversation" that lasted 
somewhere between 45 minutes and an hour.  No Miranda warnings 
were given.
2  During the conversation, Blazer mentioned that he 
had spoken with Harris's mother.  When Harris responded by asking 
what his mother had said, Sucik cautioned him about "getting into 
the offense itself," because of his request for an attorney.  
However, Sucik later left the room and Blazer testified that he 
continued the conversation by informing Harris that certain 
property of the deceased had been obtained from his mother's home 
                     
     
2  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
5 
and that people were in custody in Milwaukee in relation to the 
crime.  Blazer stated that he had possibly even told Harris that 
his fingerprints had been found on the victim's license plates.  
When he was told that Malone had been arrested and charged with 
the murder, Harris responded that Malone "had nothing to do with 
it" and, at that point, indicated that he wanted to tell the 
detectives about the offense.  Then Blazer recited the Miranda 
warnings and Harris said he was willing to waive his right to an 
attorney.  Harris made a confession in which he admitted killing 
Owens and told the detectives how and where he had disposed of the 
gun he used.    
 
After hearing Harris's motion to suppress, the circuit court 
ruled that the "conversation" amounted to interrogation which had 
been initiated by the police.  Further, it found that the 
"detectives clearly overreached in their zeal."  The court 
acknowledged that state-initiated communication after Harris had 
asserted his right to counsel triggered the per se exclusion of 
his subsequent statement according to Edwards and Michigan v. 
Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986) (extending the Fifth Amendment-based 
Edwards proscription of further interrogation to the right to 
counsel under the Sixth Amendment).
3  However, the circuit court 
                     
     
3  Although the circuit court found there had been a 
violation of the right to counsel under both the Sixth and Fifth 
Amendments, the parties' appellate briefs and the court of 
appeals' decision are limited to analysis under the Fifth 
Amendment.  The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches upon 
formal commencement of prosecution, here in Wisconsin, upon filing 
of the criminal complaint or issuance of a warrant.  Jones v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
6 
went on to find that the statement Harris made after he was read 
his Miranda rights was based on a voluntary and knowing waiver 
which had not been coerced.  It therefore concluded that although 
the statement must be suppressed in the State's case-in-chief, it 
could be used for impeachment purposes if Harris chose to testify. 
 
The circuit court denied Harris's later motion to suppress 
the gun and other physical evidence recovered as a result of his 
statement.  Relying primarily on a federal case from the Sixth 
Circuit,
4 
the 
court 
concluded 
that 
nontestimonial 
physical 
evidence is admissible in the State's case-in-chief if the 
statement from which it was derived was voluntary.   
(..continued) 
State, 63 Wis. 2d 97, 105, 216 N.W.2d 224 (1974).  Both the 
criminal complaint and arrest warrant were issued for Harris on 
December 7, 1988, before Sucik and Blazer left for Texas.  Once 
asserted, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel bars further 
uncounseled interrogation by police concerning the charged crime, 
and any subsequent waivers are presumed ineffective.  See Michigan 
v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986).   
 
The Supreme Court, in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), 
held that evidence concerning the discovery of the victim's body, 
whose location had been revealed during questioning violative of 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, was admissible through the 
inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule.  This 
holding clearly indicates that the Court's analysis began with the 
assumption that the exclusionary rule is applicable to physical 
evidence discovered through exploitation of a violation of the 
right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.  Although we find Nix 
informative, we do not rely on it because the parties neither 
briefed the Sixth Amendment issue, nor argued inevitable discovery 
and we conclude that this case can be fully resolved under the 
Fifth Amendment.    
     
4  United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501 (6th 
Cir. 1988). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
7 
 
Harris did not testify at his trial and his statement was not 
introduced.  The prosecution did present evidence that the murder 
weapon, .22 caliber ammunition and the victim's keys had been 
recovered from a sewer located approximately two blocks from 
Harris's home.  They also presented ballistic evidence that 
matched the gun to spent cartridges found at the crime scene.  No 
identifiable prints were found on the gun, box of cartridges or 
keys.  The jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts.  
Harris appealed. 
 
The court of appeals concluded that the circuit court had not 
erred in admitting the challenged evidence and affirmed Harris's 
conviction.  Harris, 189 Wis. 2d at 165.  It found that the 
circuit court had correctly concluded that Harris's confession was 
voluntary and held that "derivative, non-testimonial evidence is 
admissible when its discovery results from a suppressed, voluntary 
confession."  Harris, 189 Wis. 2d at 177.  This court subsequently 
granted Harris's petition for review. 
 
 
ISSUES 
 
The issues presented by this case are of first impression in 
Wisconsin.
5  (1) Is it constitutional error to admit, in the 
                     
     
5  Not only is this a case of first impression in Wisconsin, 
but the United States Supreme Court has yet to rule directly on 
point.  The Court has not addressed the question of admissibility 
of physical evidence derived from an Edwards violation.  The 
admissibility of such evidence derived from a Miranda violation 
has been broached but not reached.  
 
In New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), the Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
8 
State's case-in-chief, physical evidence discovered solely through 
a statement taken in violation of the Edwards proscription against 
police-initiated interrogation following a suspect's invocation of 
the right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment?  (2) If so, is 
such error subject to harmless error analysis?  Resolution of 
these 
questions 
requires 
constitutional 
interpretation 
and 
application of constitutional principles to facts as established 
by the circuit court.  Both are tasks which this court undertakes 
without deference to the courts below.  State v. Jones, 192 Wis. 
2d 78, 92-3, 532 N.W.2d 79 (1995). 
 
 
APPLICABILITY OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
 
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966), the Supreme 
Court fashioned a set of procedural guidelines designed to protect 
a suspect's rights under the Fifth Amendment from the "inherently 
compelling pressures" of custodial interrogation.  The Court held 
(..continued) 
delineated a "public safety" exception to the requirement of pre-
interrogation administration of Miranda warnings.  Because it 
ruled there had been no Miranda violation in the instant case, the 
Court found no occasion to reach the question whether the gun 
discovered via the unwarned statement should be admitted either as 
nontestimonial evidence or through the inevitable discovery 
exception to the exclusionary rule.  Quarles, 467 U.S. at 660 n.9.  
 
Justices White and Brennan dissented to a denial of 
certiorari in a case involving the admissibility of physical 
evidence obtained through an unwarned statement on the basis that 
the Court should answer the question presented which had been 
expressly left open in Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 
(1974) and was not squarely addressed in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 
U.S. 298 (1985).  Patterson v. United States, 485 U.S. 922 (1988) 
(White, J., with whom Brennan, J., joins, dissenting from the 
denial of certiorari). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
9 
that the prosecution was barred from using any statements obtained 
through custodial interrogation unless it could "demonstrate[] the 
use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege 
against self-incrimination."  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.  The Court 
recommended that the following, now familiar, procedure be 
employed: 
[A suspect] must be warned prior to any questioning that he 
has the right to remain silent, that anything he says 
can be used against him in a court of law, that he has 
the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he 
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him 
prior to any questioning if he so desires. 
 
Id. at 479 (emphasis added).  The Court went on to stress that the 
"[o]pportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to [a 
suspect] throughout the interrogation."  And, although a suspect 
may waive these rights after being given warnings, "unless and 
until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution 
at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be 
used against him."  Id. 
 
This per se exclusionary rule was extended in Edwards v. 
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).  The suspect in Edwards was informed 
of his rights under Miranda and initially stated he was willing to 
submit to questioning.  When Edwards later stated that he wanted 
an attorney, the questioning ceased.  However, the next morning, 
before he had been allowed contact with an attorney, two 
detectives came to see him in the jail.  Although Edwards told the 
guard he did not want to talk to anyone, he was told that he "had 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
10 
to."  He was taken to the officers who read him his Miranda rights 
again and Edwards then gave an inculpatory statement.  Edwards, 
451 U.S. at 478-79.   
 
The Court reversed Edwards' conviction on the basis that use 
of his statement violated his rights under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.  The Court held that, an accused, "having 
expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, 
is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until 
counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself 
initiates further communication."  Id. at 484-85.  According to 
the Court, the Edwards bright-line proscription "serves the 
purpose of providing 'clear and unequivocal' guidelines to the law 
enforcement profession.  Surely there is nothing ambiguous about 
the requirement that after a person in custody has expressed his 
desire to deal with the police only through counsel, he 'is not 
subject to further interrogation by authorities until counsel has 
been made available to him, . . .'"  Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 
675, 682 (1988) (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85).  The 
Edwards rule is "designed to protect an accused in police custody 
from being badgered by police officers in the manner in which the 
defendant in Edwards was."  Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 
1044 (1983). 
 
In reaching our decision today, we find it significant that 
the Court has commented that the per se aspects of both the 
Miranda and Edwards rules are,  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
11 
based on this Court's perception that the lawyer occupies a 
critical position in our legal system because of his [or 
her] unique ability to protect the Fifth Amendment 
rights 
of 
a 
client 
undergoing 
custodial 
interrogation. . . .  "The right to have counsel present 
at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection 
of the Fifth Amendment privilege under the system" 
established by the Court.   
 
Roberson, 486 U.S. at 682 n.4 (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 
U.S. 707, 719 (1979)). 
 
The State concedes that the police conduct here violated the 
proscription against initiating questioning of a suspect who has 
asserted his right to counsel and that any statements thus 
obtained must be excluded.
6  However, the State argues that 
physical evidence derived from a statement taken in violation of 
Edwards is admissible so long as the statement itself was 
constitutionally voluntary, i.e. non-coerced.  The State bases its 
argument on the same cases relied upon by the court of appeals--
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 435 (1974); Oregon v. Elstad, 
470 U.S. 298 (1985); United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 
1501, 1516 (6th Cir. 1988); and United States v. Cherry, 794 F.2d 
201 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1056 (1987).  To 
assess the State's argument, it is necessary to analyze the 
applicability of each of the cases cited.  
                     
     
6 
We note that the critical facts in this case are readily 
distinguishable from those we encountered in our recent decision, 
State v. Coerper, No. 94-2791-CR (S. Ct. Feb. 20, 1996), in which 
the right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment was not implicated 
because the defendant never personally asserted this right. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
12 
 
In Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 435 (1974), the Supreme 
Court addressed the issue of whether the testimony of a witness 
"must be excluded simply because police had learned the identity 
of the witness by questioning [Tucker] at a time when he was in 
custody as a suspect, but had not been advised that counsel would 
be appointed for him if he was indigent."  Prior to questioning, 
the police warned Tucker that he had the right to remain silent 
and that anything he said could be used against him.  When asked 
if he wanted an attorney, he responded in the negative. Id. at 
444-45.  The police failed to inform Tucker that if he was 
indigent, counsel would be provided for him.   
 
The Tucker Court characterized the problem it faced as one of 
defining the proper scope of consequences to be judicially imposed 
as a result of an inadvertent disregard of Miranda's procedural 
rules.  Tucker, 417 U.S. at 445.  The Court held that Tucker's 
statement must be suppressed pursuant to Miranda.  However, it 
concluded that Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), 
which requires suppression of the "fruits" of police conduct that 
actually infringes on a suspect's Fourth Amendment rights, was not 
controlling as to the testimony of the witness.  The Court found 
that the police conduct at issue "did not abridge [Tucker's] 
constitutional privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, 
but departed only from the prophylactic standards later laid down 
by the Court in Miranda to safeguard that privilege."  Tucker, 417 
U.S. at 446.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
13 
 
Tucker's interrogation took place before the release of the 
Miranda decision, but the trial occurred afterwards.  The Court 
found it significant that Tucker was adequately informed of his 
rights under the principles of the controlling law at the time, 
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).  Tucker, 417 U.S. at 
447.  The deterrent purpose underlying the exclusionary rule, 
which "necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in 
willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which has 
deprived the defendant of some right," lost much of its force 
when, as in the case at bar, the police had acted in good faith.  
Id.  The Tucker Court distinguished Escobedo, in which the 
suspect's express and repeated requests to see his lawyer were 
denied, as being "in direct contrast to the situation here."
7  
Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447 n.22.   
 
In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), the Supreme Court 
framed the issue before it as: 
 whether an initial failure of law enforcement officers to 
administer the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 
without more, "taints" subsequent admissions made after 
a suspect has been fully advised of and has waived his 
Miranda rights. 
 
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 300 (citation omitted, emphasis added).  While 
police were serving a warrant for his arrest on suspicion of 
                     
     
7  The Court's language implies that the outcome might have 
been different if Tucker had asserted his right to have counsel 
present.  The broader implication is that a violation of an 
asserted right is substantively different than a simple defect in 
warning a suspect of the existence of that right. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
14 
burglary, Elstad made an incriminating statement before he had 
been given Miranda warnings.  Elstad was subsequently taken to 
police headquarters where, after he was fully advised of his 
Miranda rights, he indicated he understood his rights but wished 
to speak with the police.  He then gave a written statement 
describing his involvement in the burglary.  The Court found that 
the initial statement must be suppressed as violative of Miranda 
but concluded that, in the absence of coercion or improper police 
tactics, subsequent voluntary statements taken after proper 
administration of warnings and valid waiver of rights need not be 
suppressed. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308-09. 
 
In Sangineto-Miranda, the Sixth Circuit addressed the issue 
of "whether nontestimonial physical evidence proximately derived 
from a Miranda violation is inadmissible as 'fruit of the 
poisonous tree.'"  United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 
1501, 1516 (6th Cir. 1988).  In response to a question posed prior 
to administration of Miranda warnings, the suspect told police 
where his truck was located.  Drugs were found in the truck.  
Relying heavily on Elstad, the federal appellate court concluded 
that the evidence was admissible because the location of the truck 
had been revealed in a voluntary statement and there were no 
indications of coercion.  Id. at 1518.  Again, as in Elstad and 
Tucker, 
the 
violation 
was 
limited 
to 
a 
defect 
in 
the 
administration of required warnings.  In Sangineto-Miranda, the 
drugs were discovered pursuant to a consensual search of the truck 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
15 
conducted after the suspect had been informed of, and voluntarily 
waived his Miranda rights.  Id. at 1519.  
 
Of the cases relied upon by the court of appeals, only United 
States v. Cherry, 794 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1986), involves the 
admissibility of physical evidence discovered as a result of a 
statement taken in violation of Edwards.  Unlike the court of 
appeals, however, we do not find the facts in Cherry "virtually 
identical"
8 to those we face.  After his identification was found 
in the backseat of a murdered cab driver's taxi, Cherry was taken 
into custody by FBI and CID agents at Fort Bliss, Texas, on 
suspicion of murder.
9  During questioning, Cherry was twice 
informed of his Miranda rights and signed waivers thereof.  He 
also consented to a search of his cubicle area in the barracks.  
Agents found the victim's billfold and had begun to search space 
in the ceiling panels above Cherry's cubicle but suspended their 
efforts when it grew dark.  Cherry, 794 F.2d at 203.  
 
At some point during interrogation the next day, Cherry said, 
"maybe I should talk to an attorney before I make a further 
statement."  Cherry, 794 F.2d at 203.  The FBI agents told Cherry 
                     
     
8  In its opinion, the court of appeals drew heavily upon 
Cherry, which it characterized as involving "virtually identical 
circumstances."  Harris, 189 Wis. 2d at 177. 
     
9 
The arrest was later held to be illegal.  United States 
v. Cherry, 794 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1986).  Cherry's cause was 
twice remanded to the district court on various claims.  See 
Cherry, 794 F.2d at 204.  We are concerned in the present analysis 
only with the opinions rendered by the Fifth Circuit in its third 
review of the matter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
16 
that an attorney would probably advise him to remain silent but 
they did not try to secure counsel for him.  They did, however, 
ask if he wanted to be alone to consider whether to make further 
statements.  At this point, Cherry asked to see one of his 
sergeants.  While waiting for the sergeant to arrive, the FBI 
agents mentioned that fellow soldiers had seen him with a .32 
caliber pistol and yet Cherry had told them he did not own one.  
Cherry responded, "haven't you found the gun yet?"  Id.  He then 
told agents the murder weapon was hidden in the ceiling 
compartment above his cubicle, confessed to the murder and signed 
written consent for a second search.  Id. at 203-04. 
 
The court found that although Cherry's request for counsel 
had been equivocal, it constituted assertion of his right to 
counsel and his confession must be suppressed as violative of 
Miranda and Edwards.  Cherry, 794 F.2d at 204.  On review of the 
propriety of suppression of the gun, the court concluded that 
there had been no violation of Cherry's Fifth Amendment rights 
because his statements and consent to search had been voluntarily 
given.  The court relied on Elstad and Tucker in holding that the 
murder weapon was, therefore, properly admitted.  Id. at 208. 
 
We find that there are critical distinctions, both factual 
and legal, between Cherry and the case at hand.
10  It is notable 
                     
     
10  Further, we point out that, although they may at times be 
informative, we are in no way bound by decisions of the federal 
circuit courts even if they are on all fours with the case before 
us.  See Thompson v. Village of Hales Corners, 115 Wis. 2d 289, 
307, 340 N.W.2d 704 (1983). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
17 
that Cherry was decided in 1986, before the Supreme Court's ruling 
that a request for counsel must be unambiguous in order to 
preclude further questioning.  Davis v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 
2350, 2355 (1994).
11  Prior to his equivocal comment about counsel, 
Cherry had twice waived his Miranda rights and had consented to 
search of the area where the weapon was eventually found.
12  In 
contrast, Harris unequivocally and unambiguously expressed his 
desire to face custodial questioning only in the presence of his 
attorney.  Further, although Sucik cautioned Harris to stay away 
from the topic of the murder because he had requested counsel, the 
detectives did not read Harris his Miranda rights and Harris did 
not purport to waive any rights until after more than 45 minutes 
of "conversation" about the crime.  
 
Of greater importance to our analysis, the cases on which the 
Cherry decision rests (Tucker and Elstad) involved only defects in 
the administration of Miranda warnings.  As does the court of 
appeals, Cherry blurs any distinction between mere failure to 
administer Miranda warnings "without more" (Elstad, 470 U.S. at 
300) and violations of the bright-line rule of Edwards which is 
triggered upon assertion of the right to have counsel present 
during interrogation.  Cherry states that, "Elstad makes clear 
                     
     
11  See also State v. Jones, 192 Wis. 2d 78, 95 n.4, 532 
N.W.2d 79 (1995).  
     
12  In fact, on the second remand, the court determined that 
the gun was admissible under the inevitable discovery rule.  
Cherry, 794 F.2d at 204. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
18 
that failure to give or carry out the obligation of Miranda 
warnings in and of itself is not a constitutional infringement."  
Cherry, 794 F.2d at 207 (emphasis added).   
 
On the contrary, nowhere in Elstad does the Court equate 
failure to administer warnings with failure to "carry out the 
obligations" of Miranda.  Elstad limits its discussion of the 
inapplicability of the Wong Sun doctrine to instances of error in 
administering Miranda's prophylactic warnings.  Elstad, 470 U.S. 
at 309.  The Elstad Court expressly distinguished the case at bar 
from those involving statements elicited after invocation of the 
rights enumerated in Miranda: 
Most of the 50 cases cited by JUSTICE BRENNAN [dissent] in 
his discussion of consecutive confessions concern an 
initial unwarned statement obtained through overtly or 
inherently coercive methods which raise serious Fifth 
Amendment and due process concerns. . . .  JUSTICE 
BRENNAN cannot seriously mean to equate such situations 
with the case at bar.  Likewise inapposite are the cases 
the dissent cites concerning suspects whose invocation 
of their rights to remain silent and to have counsel 
present were flatly ignored while police subjected them 
to continued interrogation. 
 
Elstad, 470 U.S. at 312-13, n.3 (emphasis added).  
 
In line with the reasoning employed in Cherry, the State 
contends that a violation of Edwards does not constitute violation 
of a substantive constitutional right, but merely of the 
prophylactic rules designed to protect that right.
13  The State 
                     
     
13  The State correctly points out that the bright-line rule 
established in Edwards has alternatively been referred to as a 
"prophylactic rule" (Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 349 (1990)) 
and a "second layer of prophylaxis" (McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
19 
argues that a violation of Edwards is no more egregious and, if 
anything, is less serious than a defect in the "core requirement" 
of administering the Miranda warnings.  The State asserts that, 
like Miranda, an Edwards violation does not automatically 
constitute a violation of the Fifth Amendment and therefore should 
not trigger the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine in the 
absence of actual coercion by the police. 
  
 
The primary flaw in the State's argument is the failure to 
distinguish between violation of a procedure (informing an accused 
of his rights) and violation of a right (the right to have counsel 
present during interrogation).  The procedure required under 
Miranda is that warnings must be given prior to custodial 
interrogation, while the procedure required by Edwards is that 
once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, all police-initiated 
questioning must cease until counsel is present.  With the former, 
it is possible to act in a manner that is violative of the 
safeguard but not of the rights it seeks to protect; this is not 
possible with conduct that violates Edwards.  A violation of 
Edwards is a violation of the right to counsel under the Fifth 
Amendment.   
(..continued) 
171, 176 (1991)).  It has also been referred to as a "corollary to 
Miranda" (Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 680 (1988)), and 
"reinforce[ment 
of] 
the 
[Miranda] 
protections" 
(Minnick v. 
Mississippi,498 U.S. 146, 147 (1990)).  It is not the nomenclature 
that concerns us so much as the substance of the protections 
crafted by the Court in Miranda, Edwards and their progeny and the 
impact of violations thereof on constitutionally-protected rights. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
20 
 
We find that there is a critical difference between a mere 
defect in the administration of Miranda warnings "without more" 
and police-initiated interrogation conducted after a suspect 
unambiguously invokes the right to have counsel present during 
questioning.  The latter is a violation of a constitutional 
right.
14  As such, an Edwards violation triggers the fruit of the 
poisonous tree doctrine requiring the suppression of the fruits of 
that constitutional violation.  In arriving at this conclusion, we 
have not sailed alone into uncharted waters.  Several courts have 
followed similar reasoning and reached the same result--that 
physical evidence derived from statements taken in violation of a 
suspect's asserted right to counsel must be suppressed.
15  We agree 
                     
     
14  "'[T]he right to have counsel present at the interrogation 
is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege,'" Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979), 
(quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966)); "an accused has a 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to have counsel present 
during custodial interrogation," Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 
482 (1981); after invocation, "subsequent incriminating statements 
made without his attorney present violated the rights secured to 
the defendant by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments," Oregon v. 
Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1043 (1983) (describing the Edwards 
holding). 
     
15 
See, e.g., Boles v. Foltz, 816 F.2d 1132 (6th Cir. 
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 857 (1987) (finding as harmless 
error improper admission of confession and its derivative evidence 
obtained through interrogation following invocation of rights 
under Edwards); United States v. Downing, 665 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 
1981) (holding any evidence obtained as a result of violation of 
suspect's Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during 
interrogation is inadmissible); United States ex rel. Hudson v. 
Cannon, 529 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding denial of suspect's 
requests to call attorney entitled him to establish that his right 
to counsel had been violated and that testimony of accomplices was 
"tainted fruit" of these violations); United States v. Massey, 437 
F. Supp. 843 (M.D. Fla. 1977) (concluding fruit of poisonous tree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
21 
with the Court in Elstad that the analysis employed therein is 
"inapposite" once the right to silence or counsel has been 
asserted, and we decline to extend Elstad to cover evidence 
obtained in violation of Edwards.  Therefore, we conclude that the 
circuit court erred by allowing the prosecution to use the items 
retrieved from the sewer (the gun, bullets, and keys) in its case-
in-chief.   
 
 
Further, once a criminal suspect invokes his or her right to 
counsel, 
judicial 
inquiry 
into 
voluntariness, 
i.e. whether 
subsequent statements were actually coerced, is "beside the 
point."
16  Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 99 n.8 (1984).  "[T]he 
(..continued) 
doctrine applicable to all indirect evidence, testimonial and 
tangible, acquired through suspect's admissions made in violation 
of asserted right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment); 
Commonwealth v. White, 371 N.E.2d 777, 780-81 (Mass. 1977), aff'd 
by an equally divided court, 439 U.S. 280 (1978) (finding that 
evidence obtained after suspect had "affirmatively demonstrated a 
desire for the assistance of counsel" could not be used).  
 
See also Mark S. Bransdorfer, Miranda Right-to-Counsel 
Violations and the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine, 62 
Indiana L.J. 1061, 1099-1100 (1987). 
The bright-line rules Miranda v. Arizona announced, the so-
called prophylactic safeguards, should not be allowed to 
block 
the 
effective 
assertion 
of 
other 
rights, 
constitutional in nature, which Miranda reaffirmed. . 
. . The right to counsel, once invoked by a suspect in a 
custodial interrogation setting whatever its source, is 
more than a mere procedural device. . . .  Wong Sun's 
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine should apply with 
its full and reasonable vigor to second generation 
derivative evidence after an Edwards violation. 
     
16  Throughout the course of this case Harris has argued that 
the gun and other physical evidence should be excluded because his 
statements to Sucik and Blazer were coerced under the traditional 
due process voluntariness standard.  We will not address these 
arguments further as voluntariness is not the critical factor in 
determining whether evidence gathered in violation of Edwards is 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
22 
voluntariness of a consent or an admission on the one hand, and a 
knowing and intelligent waiver on the other, are discrete 
inquiries."  Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484.   
 
Following invocation, the key issue becomes whether the right 
to counsel was effectively waived.  A suspect may, of course, 
choose to waive his right to counsel, but even suspect-initiated 
conversation does not constitute a priori proof of waiver.
17  A 
valid waiver of an asserted right "cannot be established by 
showing only that [the suspect] responded to further police-
initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of 
his rights."  Id.  Further, if the authorities reinitiate contact, 
(..continued) 
admissible in the State's case-in-chief. 
 
Alternatively, Harris asks this court to base its decision on 
an affirmation of what he characterizes as the primary principle 
of Wentela v. State, 95 Wis. 2d 283, 299-300, 290 N.W.2d 312 
(1980),-- that the tainted fruit of illegal confessions must be 
suppressed.  In 1980, this court found Wentela's statement, "I 
think I need an attorney," sufficient as an assertion of the right 
to counsel and yet we declined to apply a blanket bar on further 
questioning or a per se exclusionary rule to evidence obtained 
after assertion of the right to counsel.  Id. at 292.  Instead, we 
applied the "scrupulously honored" standard from Michigan v. 
Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), (which involved violation of the 
asserted right to silence) in finding that because the defendant's 
rights had not been respected his subsequent statements must be 
suppressed.  Id. at 299.  While we do not overrule Wentela, 
neither do we rely on it as controlling.  Too much critical law 
has since been made (Wentela was decided before Edwards, Elstad 
and Davis).  We find that Wentela gives us very little guidance 
today. 
     
17  See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 (1983) (even 
if the suspect initiates contact after invocation, "the burden 
remains upon the prosecution to show that subsequent events 
indicated a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to have counsel 
present during the interrogation"). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
23 
"it is presumed that any subsequent waiver that has come at the 
authorities' behest, and not at the suspect's own instigation, is 
itself the product of the 'inherently compelling pressures' and 
not the purely voluntary choice of the suspect."  Roberson, 486 
U.S. at 681.  The Court has consistently held that, following 
assertion of the right to counsel, police-initiated interrogation 
renders purported waivers ineffective and thus statements so 
obtained 
are 
inadmissible 
as 
substantial 
evidence 
in 
the 
prosecution's case-in-chief even if preceded by a purported 
waiver.
18  See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 177. 
 
The circuit court found that detectives Sucik and Blazer 
initiated interrogation after Harris had unequivocally invoked his 
right to have counsel present during questioning.  We conclude 
that this questioning constituted a substantive violation of 
Harris's rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  The 
fact 
that 
45 
minutes 
to 
one 
hour 
after 
initiating 
the 
"conversation" Blazer recited the rights that Miranda was crafted 
to protect and that Harris then "waived" those rights, does not 
alter our conclusion.  That waiver is presumed to be the product 
of the inherently compelling atmosphere of custodial interrogation 
                     
     
18  Although the circuit court used the word "waiver" in 
ruling that Harris' statement was available for impeachment 
purposes, there was no mention of the presumption against the 
validity of that waiver nor does the record reflect the inquiry 
required 
to 
determine 
that 
a 
suspect 
has 
knowingly 
and 
intelligently waived a known right.  The court's analysis appears 
to have been limited to the question of voluntariness under due 
process standards.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
24 
and is, therefore, invalid.  Today we follow the teaching of the 
Court in Edwards when it concluded that "the fruits of the 
interrogation initiated by the police . . . could not be used 
against Edwards."
19  Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485.  Both the statement 
and its fruits were inadmissible in the State's prosecution of 
Harris.  
 
 
HARMLESS ERROR 
 
We conclude that although the circuit court erroneously 
admitted the physical evidence derived from the Edwards violation, 
such error was harmless and, therefore, Harris's conviction should 
stand.   
 
The Supreme Court fashioned a "harmless-constitutional-error 
rule" in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967), a case 
that involved denial of the defendants' rights under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.
20  The Court held that for a federal 
constitutional error to be held harmless, "the court must be able 
                     
     
19  The "fruits of interrogation" at issue in Edwards are 
discussed only in terms of the defendant's confession and 
involuntary statements, not physical evidence. 
     
20  The defendants had been tried under a California 
constitutional provision that allowed the prosecution to comment 
on a defendant's failure to testify in his defense and to urge the 
jury to draw inferences of guilt therefrom.  While Chapman and co-
defendant Teals' appeal was pending, this provision was struck 
down in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), on the grounds 
that it punished a defendant for exercising the right against 
compelled self-incrimination.  Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 
19 (1967). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
25 
to declare a belief that [the error] was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.  In Chapman, the 
Court indicated that "there are some constitutional rights so 
basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated 
as harmless error," and cited as examples the use of a coerced 
confession, right to an impartial judge and right to counsel.
21  
Id. at 23 and n.8.   
 
And yet, in  Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285 (1991), 
a plurality of the Court determined that it was appropriate to 
apply harmless error analysis to the admission of a coerced 
confession.  The Court also utilized the harmless error test in 
review of a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  
See Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256-57 (1988) (involving 
the erroneous admission of a doctor's testimony which was based on 
a psychiatric examination conducted outside the presence of and 
without 
the 
advice 
of 
counsel). 
 
The 
Satterwhite 
Court 
distinguished the case at hand from those involving Sixth 
Amendment violations that pervade the entire proceeding and 
thereby cast so much doubt on the trial's fairness that they 
should never be deemed harmless, pointing out that: 
 [w]e have permitted harmless error analysis in both capital 
and noncapital cases where the evil caused by a Sixth 
Amendment 
violation 
is 
limited 
to 
the 
erroneous 
admission of particular evidence at trial.  
 
                     
     
21  The case Chapman cites regarding the right to counsel is 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which involved a total 
deprivation of counsel throughout proceedings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
26 
Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 257.   
 
The Fulminante Court pointed to numerous other instances, 
since Chapman, in which constitutional error has been treated as 
harmless.  Those particularly relevant to our decision today 
include: Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986) (exclusion of 
defendant's testimony concerning circumstances surrounding his 
confession); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) 
(improper comment on defendant's silence at trial in violation of 
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination); Moore 
v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220 (1977) (introduction of testimony 
identifying the accused from uncounseled line-up conducted in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment).
22   
 
The Court found that the critical "common thread" in these 
cases was that they all involved "'trial error'--error which 
occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury, and 
which may therefore be quantitatively assessed in the context of 
other evidence presented in order to determine whether its 
                     
     
22  As is logically implied by the dearth of Supreme Court 
cases that directly address the issue at hand, the Court has yet 
to apply harmless error to a fully analogous case.  Milton v. 
Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972), a habeas corpus review, provides 
the closest authority.  There, the Court did not find a need to 
reach the merits of the petitioner's "arguable" claims of Miranda 
and Sixth Amendment right to counsel violations because it found 
that admission of the challenged evidence was harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  The Seventh Circuit has applied harmless error 
to evidence admitted in violation of Miranda (See United States v. 
Jackson, 429 F.2d 1368, 1372-73 (7th Cir. 1970)), and to 
"arguable" violations of Edwards (United States v. D'Antoni, 856 
F.2d  975, 982 (7th Cir. 1988)). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
27 
admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."  Fulminante, 
499 U.S. at 307-08.   
   
 
We agree with the principles expressed above, and like the 
Supreme Court, remain:  
faithful to the belief that the harmless-error doctrine is 
essential to preserve the "principle that the central 
purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual 
question of the defendant's guilt or innocence, and 
promotes public respect for the criminal process by 
focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather 
than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial 
error."   
 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 308 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 
U.S. 673, 681 (1986)). 
 
  
In State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 543, 370 N.W.2d 222 
(1985), this court attempted to clarify the standard to be applied 
in Wisconsin to appellate review of harmless error; "whether of 
omission or commission, whether of constitutional proportions or 
not, the test should be whether there is a reasonable possibility 
that the error contributed to the conviction."  Alternatively 
stated, we held that where there is error, "a court should be sure 
that the error did not affect the result or had only a slight 
effect."  Id. at 540.  We discussed the similarities between the 
Dyess test and that utilized in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668 (1984), to assess prejudice in cases of ineffective assistance 
of counsel, and favorably noted the flexibility of such analyses 
that focus on whether or not the error undermines confidence in 
the outcome of the proceeding.  Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 544-45. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
28 
 
In a case decided two years before the Dyess standard was 
adopted, this court was faced with the task of reviewing 
statements admitted into the State's case-in-chief that were 
obtained after the defendant had invoked his right to counsel 
under the Fifth Amendment.  State v. Billings, 110 Wis. 2d 661, 
329 N.W.2d 192 (1983).
23  Because we found the error was not 
harmless 
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt 
(applying 
the 
Chapman 
standard), we did not find it necessary to reach the larger 
question of whether such error could ever be deemed harmless.
24  
Billings, 110 Wis. 2d at 666.  Today we take the opportunity to 
clarify that the Dyess harmless error test is applicable to the 
erroneous admission of evidence obtained in violation of Edwards.  
 
We must now apply the harmless error standard to the evidence 
before us.  Our task is to examine the erroneously admitted 
evidence and the remainder of the untainted evidence in context to 
determine whether the error was harmless.  Billings, 110 Wis. 2d 
at 673; see also Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310.  In the case before 
us, the following untainted evidence was presented to the jury. 
                     
     
23  The inquiry in Billings is framed in terms of the 
applicability of harmless error analysis to a violation of the 
right to counsel under Miranda.  State v. Billings, 110 Wis. 2d 
661, 329 N.W.2d 192, 665-66 (1983).  No mention is made of 
Edwards. 
     
24  The court of appeals, in State v. Goetsch, 186 Wis. 2d 1, 
11, 519 N.W.2d 634 (Ct. App. 1994), found that statements made 
after the defendant had invoked his right to silence were 
erroneously admitted.  Applying the Dyess analysis, the court 
concluded that the error was harmless in that it "could not 
reasonably have contributed to [Goetsch's] conviction."  Id. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
29 
 
The body of Dennis Owens was discovered by Mr. Hungelmann, a 
security guard who worked in a building in the 300 East block of 
Florida Street in the City of Milwaukee.  At approximately 4:00 or 
4:15 a.m. on the morning of December 4, 1988, Hungelmann saw a car 
heading slowly down the street which made two U-turns, then 
stopped in front of his building.  The car was only about 15 feet 
away and Hungelmann saw only one person in the car, the driver.  
Although he could not make a positive identification, he testified 
that the man was white.  The car was a bluish gray, 1984 or 1985 
model.  He wrote down the license plate number which was traced to 
the victim, Dennis Owens. Hungelmann testified that when he 
stepped outside the building he saw something in the street and, 
as he walked over to see what it was, the car took off.  He found 
that the object in the street was an African-American man lying on 
his side who looked dead.  
      
 
There was very little blood at the site where the body was 
found.  However, there was a smear or skid mark leading away from 
the body which ran approximately 300 feet across a set of railroad 
tracks into a field.  Just east of the railroad tracks, where the 
skid mark ended, the police found tire tracks, blood on the 
gravel, three live bullets and two spent casings.  There, they 
also found a man's jacket with tire marks running across it.  
 
Harris's co-defendant, James Malone, testified that he and 
Harris had been out drinking on the night of December 3, 1988.
25  
                     
     
25  The court informed the jury that Malone, being tried 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
30 
At approximately 10 p.m. that night they left a bar in Harris's 
station wagon, which Malone noticed had a Diamond Jim "license 
applied for" placard in place of the rear license plate. Harris 
drove to his home at 29th and Scott, went in alone and came back 
out with a gun and a box of shells which he put under the seat 
when he got back in the car.  After having a few more beers in 
another bar, the two got into Harris's car again and Harris said, 
"let's go down to the fag bars and roll a queer."  
 
Malone stated that he told Harris he'd been in jail briefly 
and didn't want to get into any more trouble, so at about 11 p.m. 
when Harris parked the car in an area near some gay bars, Malone 
stayed in the car and fell asleep.  Malone testified that he was 
awakened about 2:30 a.m. when Harris knocked on the window saying 
he'd be back in about 10 minutes.  Malone looked out the window 
and saw a car idling across the street with its lights on and 
someone sitting in the front seat.  He fell asleep again until 
Harris woke him and said, "I just shot a nigger."  
 
Malone testified that he was told to drive Harris's car and 
follow Harris, who was driving the car that Malone had previously 
seen idling across the street.  After parking the victim's car 
near his house, Harris got back into the station wagon and told 
Malone he wanted to go back to where the body was.  On the way, 
Harris said the gun had jammed earlier but then tested it and was 
(..continued) 
separately, was charged with the same crimes as Harris--first 
degree homicide and armed robbery as a party to the crime.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
31 
able to successfully fire it from inside the car.  Harris told 
Malone he would also have to shoot the man to "finish the job."  
Malone testified that Harris held a gun to his head and said, "if 
you don't, I'll kill you."  Harris directed Malone to drive to a 
field and when they stopped, Malone saw the body of an African-
American man and blood all over the ground.  Malone refused to 
shoot the man, who looked like he was already dead.  Harris went 
through the man's coat and pants pockets and, after searching the 
body, shot the man twice in the back of the head.  
 
Harris then drove Malone home, dropping him off about 3 a.m. 
Harris woke Malone up later that day and said that the man he had 
killed was a TV-6 cameraman.  He asked if Malone wanted to go 
shopping with him using the man's credit cards.  Malone declined 
and Harris left stating he'd be in touch.  
 
The 
State 
presented 
the 
following 
testimony 
which 
corroborates Malone's version of the events.  Although Harris's 
mother, Barbara, took the position on the stand that she didn't 
remember anything, detective Kraus, of the Milwaukee Police 
Department, testified as to his interview with Mrs. Harris at her 
home the day after the murder.  At that time, she told the police 
that earlier that day Harris had called her at work and said he 
was leaving town and needed money.  She left work, got $180 out of 
her credit union and took it to a tavern where she met her son and 
gave him the money.  While being interviewed, Mrs. Harris 
indicated that items belonging to the victim were located in her 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
32 
garbage.  The police retrieved the victim's driver's license, 
credit cards, work and other identification cards.  They also 
recovered the license plates of the vehicle belonging to the 
victim.  
 
 A co-worker of Mrs. Harris testified that on the morning of 
December 5, 1988, Barbara Harris had asked her if she'd heard 
about the murder of a Channel 12 news reporter.
26  Mrs. Harris was 
upset and crying and told the witness that she'd seen the 
reporter's credit cards in her son's possession and that he had 
dumped them in the trash.  
 
An employee of a jewelry store positively identified Harris 
as the man who came into her store on the afternoon of December 5, 
1988, and purchased a 14-carat gold filigree bracelet.  The total 
cost was $158.13, which Harris paid using a credit card in the 
name of Dennis Owens.  Harris signed Owens' name to the credit 
card slip.  Later that afternoon, Harris drove to his girlfriend's 
house in the victim's 1985 Pontiac.  The two drove to a movie 
together and afterwards Harris gave his girlfriend the bracelet he 
had purchased with Owens' credit card.  He told her he was in 
trouble and was going to leave town.  The next day, Harris was 
arrested in Amarillo, Texas.    
                     
     
26  The witness later acknowledged that she could be confused 
about what channel the man worked for.  The victim, Dennis Owens, 
was a cameraman for Channel 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
33 
 
The State also presented testimony of two inmate witnesses 
whom the jury was told had been given consideration for their 
testimony.  In December of 1988, while Michael Peterson and Harris 
were cellmates in Milwaukee County Jail, Harris told Peterson that 
he and Malone had been together on the night of the murder but 
that Malone had gotten drunk and fallen asleep in the car.  Harris 
said that he had gotten into the car of an African-American male 
who drove to a dead end street and shut off the car's ignition.  
Harris said that after the man grabbed him in the groin, he shot 
him and pushed him out of the car.  Harris also told Peterson that 
he had driven back and forth over the body, and although the body 
had originally been on gravel, it got stuck under the car and he 
had to drive a distance until he got to a hard surface and could 
shake the body from the undercarriage.  Harris said he'd later 
gone to the victim's apartment and ripped him off.  
 
Harris and Ricky Loney met as inmates at the Dodge 
Correctional Institute.  Loney testified that Harris approached 
him in June of 1989 and, over the next few days, told Loney a 
version of the events surrounding the murder that very closely 
matched Malone's testimony.  Additionally, Harris said that he'd 
used the victim's keys to enter his apartment and steal a VCR and 
microwave and had left the door open.  Loney testified that Harris 
also told him that he'd used the victim's credit card to buy 
jewelry for his girlfriend.  Harris said that he'd stolen the gun 
used in the murder in an earlier burglary in Cudahy and that, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
34 
after the murder, he'd gotten rid of it in a sewer near his home. 
 He also told Loney he had abandoned the car after getting rid of 
the license plates.  
 
The defense countered the above evidence with its theory that 
Harris's involvement was limited to accepting and using stolen 
property.  In closing arguments, defense counsel depicted Harris 
as a "dummy" who had "gotten in over his head."  It was not 
contested that Harris had used the victim's credit cards to buy 
jewelry nor that he had driven Owens' car.  But the defense 
asserted that it was not until Harris saw the news about the 
murder that he decided he'd better get out of town.  
 
According to the defense, Malone was involved in the murder 
with a second man who was not Harris.  The defense raised the 
possibility that the real killer was one of two other men, Glen 
Conroy or Arthur Fromke.  A witness testified that at about 3:30 
or 4:00 a.m. on December 4, 1988, he had seen an African-American 
man driving a dark blue or gray car stop, open the passenger door 
and begin talking to a young white man walking by.  The witness 
identified the two men as the victim and Conroy.  A second 
security guard at the building where Owens' body was found picked 
Arthur Fromke's photo out of a photo array as the driver of the 
car that left the murder scene at 4:08 a.m.  However, the State 
presented witnesses who testified that Conroy and Fromke were at 
their homes on the night of the murder.  The defense generally 
characterized the testimony of Malone and the two inmate witnesses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
35 
as self-serving lies and urged the jury to discount their 
testimony.  
 
The following additional evidence was presented by the State 
in support of Harris's culpability in the murder.  Police 
discovered that the car Harris had been using prior to the murder 
was itself stolen.  After police returned the vehicle to its 
owner, she found a spent casing on the floor under the front seat. 
 The casing matched those found at the murder scene and 
corroborates Malone's testimony that Harris test-fired the gun 
while in that car.  
 
At approximately 6 a.m. on December 4, 1988, the police went 
to the victim's apartment where they found the door open and 
lights on.  There were no signs of forced entry.  A neighbor 
testified that when he arrived home at 1 a.m., the lights were out 
and the door closed.  The neighbor also told investigating 
officers that Owens' microwave and VCR were missing from the 
apartment.  
 
 
The autopsy revealed that Owens had been shot five times-- 
twice in the chest, once in the stomach, and twice in the back of 
his head.  His body showed abrasions consistent with having been 
dragged for a distance across gravel and/or pavement.  The 
victim's car was discovered parked on West Scott Street, 
approximately two blocks from Harris's residence.  There were no 
metal license plates on the vehicle, only temporary "license 
applied for" placards from Diamond Jim's.  Hair and blood stains 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
36 
found on the underside of the car were consistent with samples of 
the victim's hair and blood.  
 
In contrast to the situation we faced in Dyess, in which an 
erroneous jury instruction so permeated the trial that we 
concluded there was not "any unpolluted or untainted evidence,"
27 
here we find that the physical evidence admitted in error played a 
very minor part in the State's case and was largely cumulative in 
nature.  When the evidence of the gun, bullets and keys is 
quantitatively assessed in the context of the whole, its admission 
does not undermine our confidence in the outcome of this trial. 
 
After reviewing the overwhelming amount and force of the 
State's evidence, we are convinced that there is no reasonable 
possibility that the error in admission of those three items 
contributed to Harris's conviction.  Therefore, we affirm the 
entry of the judgment of guilt. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
                     
     
27  See State v. Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d 525, 546, 370 N.W.2d 222 
(1985). 
 
No. 93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
ROLAND B. DAY, C.J.  (concurring).  I concur in the mandate 
of the majority opinion, and agree that if the "fruits" of the 
Edwards
28 violation were erroneously admitted into evidence, such 
admission was harmless.  However, I write separately because I 
disagree with the majority's conclusion that any fruits of an 
Edwards violation are inadmissible.  I recognize that other courts 
in some jurisdictions noted by the majority opinion disagree.  The 
court of appeals and the circuit court in this case, like some of 
the courts from other jurisdictions discussed below, have held 
that evidence derived from a suspect's voluntary statement, given 
after police questioning in violation of Edwards, is admissible.  
I agree. 
 
The majority attempts to distinguish Michigan v. Tucker, 417 
U.S. 433, 435 (1974), Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), 
United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501 (6th Cir. 1988), 
and United States v. Cherry, 794 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 1056 (1987), see majority op. at 11-23, but the 
factual differences the majority observes cannot obscure the 
simple result of this line of cases, culminating in Cherry: the 
fruits of a voluntary statement made after an Edwards violation 
are admissible, just as, under Tucker and Elstad, the fruits of a 
                     
     
28  See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
 
No. 93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
2 
Miranda violation are admissible when there is only a violation of 
the 
Miranda 
prophylactic 
rule, 
and 
not 
of 
the 
suspect's 
constitutional rights.  See Cherry, 794 F.2d at 208 n.6 
("[D]ifferent interests prevail when we evaluate derivative 
evidence obtained through the exploitation of statements obtained 
in violation of Miranda and Edwards but which, nevertheless, were 
voluntary."); see also Wilson v. Zant, 290 S.E.2d 442, 448 (Ga. 
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1092 (1982) ("[T]he exclusionary 
rule does not apply to evidence derived from a voluntary statement 
obtained in violation of Edwards v. Arizona . . . ."); State v. 
May, 434 S.E.2d. 180, 182 (N.C. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 
1310 (1994).  The reasoning of the majority, that the violation 
here was of Harris's constitutional rights and not merely of the 
prohibition against interrogation from Edwards, see majority op. 
at 19-20, was rightly rejected by the courts that have reached a 
contrary result.  See, e.g., May, 434 S.E.2d at 182 (noting that 
violation at issue was of "the prophylactic rule of Miranda as 
extended by Edwards," but not of a constitutional right).  Edwards 
presented a prophylactic rule plainly violated in this case, but 
just as plainly Harris's statement was voluntary.  The statement 
is rightly suppressed, but to suppress the evidence derived from a 
voluntary statement unnecessarily extends Edwards' "second layer 
of prophylaxis," McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176 (1991), to 
a much broader protection than it need be, or should be.  Cherry, 
 
No. 93-0730-CR 
 
 
 
3 
Wilson, and May, in my opinion, are better reasoned, and result in 
a rule more in keeping with sound public policy while protecting 
defendants from having inculpatory statements or admissions used 
against them.  As the North Carolina Supreme Court stated in May: 
 
In Tucker and Elstad, the United States Supreme Court 
emphasized that determining whether evidence discovered 
as the result of a Miranda violation should be admitted 
depends on whether its exclusion would serve to deter 
improper police conduct . . . .  It is important that 
all relevant evidence be submitted to the jury in order 
for it to make the proper findings.  This outweighs the 
need to exclude evidence which was gathered as the 
result of a non-coercive statement made in violation of 
the prophylactic rule of Miranda as extended by Edwards. 
 The deterrent value of the rule is satisfied by the 
exclusion of the statement made as a result of the 
Miranda or Edwards violations. 
 
May, 434 S.E.2d at 613. 
 
The United States Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue 
before us as to the effect of Edwards on the fruits of voluntary 
statements made following a request for counsel.  Until such time 
as the Supreme Court rules otherwise, I believe we should follow 
the reasoning of Cherry, Wilson, and May.  I would hold that the 
weapon and other physical evidence were properly admitted in this 
case. 
 
For the reasons here stated, I concur. 
 
I am authorized to state that Justice DONALD W. STEINMETZ and 
Justice JON P. WILCOX join this opinion. 
 
No. 93-0730-CR SSA 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.  (concurring).   The court's 
opinion correctly states the applicable federal constitutional law 
and I therefore join it.  I write separately to emphasize my 
concern that we have embraced the United States Supreme Court's 
recent departure from its longstanding harmless error test without 
having had an adequate opportunity to consider whether Wisconsin 
should follow suit or, alternatively, retain our adherence to the 
standard enunciated by the Court in Chapman v. California, 386 
U.S. 18, 23 (1967) and adopted by this court in State v. Dyess, 
124 Wis. 2d 525, 370 N.W.2d 222 (1985).   
 
As the opinion correctly observes, Chapman had warned that 
some constitutional rights are "so basic to a fair trial that 
their infraction can never be treated as harmless error," citing 
as examples the use of a coerced confession, the right to an 
impartial judge, and the right to counsel.  Chapman, 386 U.S. at 
23.  In clarifying the application of harmless error analysis in 
Wisconsin, the Dyess court referred to this caveat in Chapman and 
cautioned that the violation of constitutional rights comparable 
to the three rights enumerated in Chapman renders a harmless error 
analysis inapplicable and "automatically results in reversal."  
Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 543 n.10.  Dyess also drew support for its 
adoption of the Chapman standard from Wisconsin's harmless error 
 
No. 93-0730-CR SSA 
 
 
 
2 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 805.18 (1993-94).  Dyess, 124 Wis. 2d at 
547.   
 
As the opinion explains, in the subsequent United States 
Supreme Court decision of Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 
(1991), a narrowly divided (5-4) Court effectively overruled this 
language in Chapman.  This change of direction in federal 
constitutional jurisprudence created a tension between the Chapman 
standard which we had adopted in Dyess and the new federal 
standard articulated in Fulminante.   
 
At least one and arguably two of the rights enumerated in 
Chapman and Dyess--the right to counsel and the right to a 
voluntary 
confession--are 
implicated 
in 
this 
case. 
 
The 
defendant's counsel did not address the tension between Dyess and 
Fulminante or  the prospect that an application of harmless error 
analysis under the Wisconsin Constitution, Dyess, and Wis. Stat. 
§ 805.18 might afford defendants more protection than does the 
federal constitution.  Had counsel done so, the court would have 
been in a position to assess more fully whether it should adopt 
the new harmless error standard announced in Fulminante in lieu of 
this court's  Dyess standard.  Because the state law issues were 
not briefed, however, I do not comment on their merits.  See State 
v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 628, 646, 369 N.W.2d 711 (1985).   
 
For the reasons set forth, I join the opinion.  
 
No. 93-0730-CR SSA 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
93-0730-CR 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Dirk E. Harris, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
____________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
Reported at:  189 Wis. 2d 162, 525 N.W.2d 334 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1994) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PUBLISHED 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
February 29, l996 
 
 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
October 31, 1995 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
WILLIAM D. GARDNER 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
DAY, C.J., ABRAHAMSON, J. concur 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs and oral argument by William O. Marquis, Milwaukee. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Gregory 
Posner-Weber, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was James E. Doyle, attorney general.