Case Title: In the Matter of Leo

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12803

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-05-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12803 
 
IN THE MATTER OF ROBERT S. LEO. 
 
 
May 15, 2020. 
 
 
Attorney at Law, Suspension, Reinstatement. 
 
 
 
The petitioner, Robert S. Leo, appeals from the judgment of 
a single justice of this court denying his petition for 
reinstatement to the bar of the Commonwealth.  We affirm. 
 
 
Background.  The petitioner was admitted to the practice of 
law in Massachusetts in 1975.  Over the course of the next 
twenty-five years, he was subject to professional discipline 
twice.  Then, in 2001, he was suspended for a term of thirteen 
months for conduct "involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation," in violation of the rules of professional 
conduct then in effect, specifically S.J.C. Rule 3:07, Canon 1, 
DR 1-102 (A) (4) and (6), as appearing in 382 Mass. 769 
(1981).1,2  See Matter of Leo, 17 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 371 
(2001). 
 
 
In 2017, the petitioner filed a petition for reinstatement 
in the county court, which was transmitted to the Board of Bar 
                                                          
 
 
1 The current version of the applicable rule is Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 8.4 (c) and (h), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1483 (2015). 
 
 
2 Although his term suspension was for thirteen months, the 
respondent did not seek reinstatement for more than fifteen 
years, until 2017. 
 
2 
 
 
Overseers (board).3  See S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (4), as appearing 
in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009).  A hearing panel of the board, as the 
fact finder, heard the testimony of four witnesses, including 
the petitioner, and accepted various exhibits.  The panel issued 
a report of its findings and recommended that the petition for 
reinstatement be denied.  The board voted unanimously to adopt 
the report and the recommendation.  The record of proceedings 
was then filed in the county court.  A single justice of this 
court held a hearing and thereafter denied the petition.  This 
appeal followed. 
 
 
Discussion.  A petitioner for reinstatement must 
demonstrate that he or she "has the moral qualifications, 
competency and learning in law required for admission to 
practice law in this Commonwealth, and that his or her 
resumption of the practice of law will not be detrimental to the 
integrity and standing of the bar, the administration of 
justice, or to the public interest."  Matter of Weiss, 474 Mass. 
1001, 1002 (2016), quoting S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (5).  "The 
subsidiary findings of the hearing panel, as adopted by the 
board, 'shall be upheld if supported by substantial evidence,' 
see S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 18 (5),  . . . and the hearing panel's 
ultimate 'findings and recommendations, as adopted by the board, 
are entitled to deference, although they are not binding on this 
court.'"  Matter of Weiss, supra at 1001 n.1, quoting Matter of 
Ellis, 457 Mass. 413, 415 (2010). 
 
 
a.  Moral qualifications.  The petitioner's term suspension 
is "conclusive evidence that he was, at the time, morally unfit 
to practice law, and it continued to be evidence of his lack of 
moral character . . . when he petitioned for reinstatement."4  
Matter of Dawkins, 432 Mass. 1009, 1010 (2000).  See 
Centracchio, petitioner, 345 Mass. 342, 346 (1963).  He 
therefore bears the burden of demonstrating that, during the 
period of suspension, he has "redeemed himself and become 'a 
                                                          
 
 
3 While the matter was pending, the petitioner sought and 
received leave to work as a paralegal.  As a hearing panel of 
the board found, he worked on only one matter. 
 
4 To the extent the petitioner invites us to review 
underlying discipline, we decline the invitation.  Our review is 
limited to the single justice's judgment on the petition for 
reinstatement. 
 
4 To the extent the petitioner invites us to review 
underlying discipline, we decline the invitation.  Our review is 
limited to the single justice's judgment on the petition for 
reinstatement. 
3 
 
 
person proper to be held out by the court to the public as 
trustworthy.'"  Matter of Dawkins, supra at 1010-1011, quoting 
Matter of Keenan, 313 Mass. 186, 219 (1943).  See Matter of 
Ellis, 457 Mass. at 415. 
 
 
The substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the 
petitioner failed to demonstrate that he has led "a sufficiently 
exemplary life to inspire public confidence once again, in spite 
of his previous actions."5  Matter of Prager, 422 Mass. 86, 92 
(1996), quoting Matter of Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 452 (1975).  It 
is not enough to show that he has not been sued or accused of a 
crime; the petitioner must also demonstrate that he understands 
and has taken responsibility for his actions, and that he has 
done his best to make amends.  See Matter of Weiss, 474 Mass. at 
1002.  In this case, although the petitioner acknowledges that 
"he committed conversion and misrepresentation and deserved to 
be suspended," he has not made restitution of the full amount of 
the converted funds.6  As we have said, restitution is an 
"outward sign of the recognition of one's wrongdoing and the 
awareness of a moral duty to make amends to the best of one's 
ability."  Matter of Corbett, 478 Mass. 1004, 1005 (2017), 
quoting Matter of McCarthy, 23 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 469, 
470 (2007).  There is ample evidence to support the panel's 
conclusion that, "even after all this time, the petitioner still 
lacks insight as to the nature and severity of his misconduct." 
 
                                                          
 
 
5 We acknowledge the petitioner's claim that the board and 
the single justice each was required independently to explain 
the basis for their respective decisions.  That is incorrect.  
The hearing panel served as the fact finder.  Pursuant to S.J.C. 
Rule 4:01, § 18 (5), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1315 (2009), we 
are required to accept those findings if supported by 
substantial evidence.  In this case, after review, the board 
adopted the hearing committee's report and its recommendation.  
The single justice did the same. 
 
 
6 To resolve a criminal matter related to the conversion, 
the petitioner repaid a portion of the funds, gave a promissory 
note for the balance.  See Matter of Leo, 17 Mass. Att'y 
Discipline Rep. 371 (2001).  After he defaulted on the 
promissory note, the petitioner was tried and acquitted on a 
larceny charge. 
 
 
In his revised reinstatement questionnaire, the petitioner 
acknowledged involvement in various non-law related occupations 
since his suspension. 
4 
 
 
 
Furthermore, although the petitioner called three witnesses 
to testify on his behalf at the hearing (including his domestic 
partner and brother), the hearing panel determined that the 
testimony bore "only faint traces of what we were looking for:  
credible and disinterested testimony that, since his suspension, 
the petitioner has shown introspection and moral 
rehabilitation."  Likewise, while the petitioner submitted 
several letters in the nature of character references, they were 
conclusory and unpersuasive.  See, e.g., Matter of Dawkins, 432 
Mass. at 1011 n.5 (supportive letters given little weight given 
admissions that writers had little knowledge of petitioner's 
wrongdoing or disciplinary background). 
 
 
While there is other evidence to support the hearing 
panel's findings, we are particularly troubled by the 
petitioner's actions in connection with an application for a 
criminal complaint that he filed against another driver involved 
in a 2011 motor vehicle accident.  The petitioner testified that 
he did not intend to pursue the matter but, instead, filed it 
"to work out some sort of a settlement arrangement."  As the 
panel recognized, this conduct is inconsistent with the rules of 
professional conduct.  See Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4 (h), as 
appearing in 471 Mass. 1425 (2015) (lawyer shall not "threaten 
to present criminal . . .  charges solely to obtain an advantage 
in a private civil matter").  In short, the petitioner failed to 
"adduce substantial proof that he has such an appreciation of 
the distinctions between right and wrong . . . as will make him 
a fit and safe person to engage in the practice of law" 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Matter of Hiss, 368 Mass. at 
457. 
 
 
b.  Learning in the law.  In addition to demonstrating 
moral fitness, the petitioner also was required to demonstrate 
current competency and learning in the law.  See S.J.C. Rule 
4:01, § 18 (4) and (5).  The petitioner has been suspended from 
the practice of law since 2001.  In 2003, he took the multistate 
professional responsibility examination.  Beginning sometime 
after 2011, he represented himself as a plaintiff in litigation 
involving a motor vehicle accident.  As to that, however, the 
hearing panel recognized there were inconsistencies in the 
pleadings he filed, and some of his claims were without merit.  
In addition, the petitioner's testimony before the hearing panel 
reflects a lack of understanding of the legal principles 
associated with releases and settlements in civil actions such 
as those he commenced. 
 
5 
 
 
 
The petitioner argues that, after the petition for 
reinstatement was filed, he viewed "dozens" of "on demand" legal 
education programming on a variety of topics, and read several 
legal periodicals and treatises.  As the hearing panel found, 
however, "[t]he number of hours he has spent studying law 
equates to less than four work weeks -- a minuscule amount of 
time over seventeen years of not practicing law to maintain his 
legal competency."  And he had only limited experience working 
in the legal field, see note 6, supra, during the fifteen-plus 
years that he was suspended." Given all of these considerations, 
the substantial evidence supports the conclusion that the 
petitioner has not demonstrated current legal acumen.  See, 
e.g., Matter of Waitz, 416 Mass. 298, 306 (1993) (attendance at 
four legal education programs and reading legal publications for 
two to three hours weekly insufficient to support reinstatement 
following indefinite suspension). 
 
 
Conclusion.  In considering a petition for reinstatement, 
the question "is whether at the present time, in spite of his 
previous misconduct, the petitioner has rehabilitated himself 
sufficiently to inspire public confidence, that is, whether he 
currently possesses the moral character and legal acumen to be 
admitted to the bar of the Commonwealth."  Matter of Ellis, 457 
Mass. at 414).  The hearing panel's findings, adopted by the 
board, are amply supported by the evidence.  Giving deference to 
the board's recommendation, we conclude there was no error in 
denying the petition for reinstatement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on briefs. 
 
Robert S. Leo, pro se. 
 
Sherri A. Gilmore, Assistant Bar Counsel.