Case Title: MICHAEL SPONSEL, as personal representative of the estate of Michael Scott Sponsel; and KATHLEEN SPONSEL, as personal representative of the estate of Justin Mark Anderson V. PARK COUNTY, WYOMING; BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, OF THE COUNTY OF PARK, STATE OF WYOMING; and PARK COUNTY AGENTS AND EMPLOYEES

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-01-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
MICHAEL SPONSEL, as personal representative of the estate of Michael Scott Sponsel; and KATHLEEN SPONSEL, as personal representative of the estate of Justin Mark Anderson  V. PARK COUNTY, WYOMING; BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, OF THE COUNTY OF PARK, STATE OF WYOMING; and PARK COUNTY AGENTS AND EMPLOYEES2006 WY 6126 P.3d 105Case Number: 05-109Decided: 01/11/2006
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
MICHAEL 
SPONSEL, AS PERSONAL

REPRESENTATIVE 
OF THE ESTATE

OF 
MICHAEL SCOTT SPONSEL; and KATHLEEN

SPONSEL, 
AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE

OF THE 
ESTATE OF JUSTIN MARK ANDERSON;

 
 
Appellants

(Plaintiffs),

 
 
v.

 
 

PARK 
COUNTY, 
WYOMING;

BOARD OF 
COUNTYCOMMISSIONERS,

OF THE 
COUNTY OF 
PARK, STATE 
OF

WYOMING; and 
PARK COUNTY AGENTS

AND 
EMPLOYEES,

 
 
Appellees

(Defendants).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofParkCounty

The 
Honorable Jere Ryckman, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellants:

 
 
Richard 
A. Mincer of Hirst & Applegate, Cheyenne, Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellees:

 
 
Tracy J. 
Copenhaver and Scott E. Kolpitcke of Copenhaver, Kath, Kitchen & Kolpitcke, 
LLC, Powell, Wyoming.  Argument by 
Mr. Copenhaver.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellants, 
Michael Sponsel, as personal representative of the estate of Michael Scott 
Sponsel, and Kathleen Sponsel, as personal representative of the estate of 
Justin Mark Anderson (collectively "the Personal Representatives"), filed 
governmental claims against Appellee, Park County, and certain of its employees 
(collectively referred to as Park County), asserting that Park County's 
negligence in failing to provide adequate signage on County Road 8VC (Clark's 
Fork Canyon Road) contributed to the deaths of Michael Scott Sponsel and Justin 
Mark Anderson.  The district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of ParkCounty on the basis that it was immune 
from liability under the terms of the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA), 
given the circumstances of this case.1  We affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      The Personal 
Representatives pose these issues for our consideration:

 
 
            
Is ParkCounty immune from claims 
that it breached statutory duties to regulate, warn and guide traffic in 
substantial compliance with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control 
devices?

            
Does Wyoming Statute section 1-39-108 waive immunity only for those 
enumerated utilities despite the Legislature's use of the word "including" in 
that statute?

 
 

Park 
County 
rephrases the issues in these terms:

 
 
            
A.  The [Personal 
Representatives] failed to provide any material facts which fit within the 
exceptions to immunity under the Governmental Claims Act.

            
B.  The Wyoming Governmental 
Claims Act's specific grant of immunity for the maintenance and reconstruction 
of roads provides immunity for ParkCounty.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      This matter is on 
appeal from the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of 
ParkCounty on its theory that 
it was immune from liability because of the application of the WGCA.  The facts of this case have not been 
adjudicated, but for purposes of summary judgment we set out all asserted facts 
in a light most favorable to the Personal Representatives, as required by our 
applicable standard of review.

 
 
[¶4]      On May 5, 2002, 
Michael Scott Sponsel (Sponsel) and Justin Mark Anderson (Anderson) died in a one-car crash on Clark's Fork Canyon Road in 
ParkCounty.  The automobile was operated by Amanda 
DeBerg (DeBerg),2 and she too died in the crash.  At the time of the crash DeBerg was not 
of an age where she was permitted to buy or consume alcoholic 
beverages.

 
 
[¶5]      Thomas P. and 
Mary L. Klein, who are not parties to this appeal, are the owners of a business 
known as the Edelweiss Bar.  That 
business is located on the Clark's Fork Canyon 
Road.  
Sponsel, Anderson, and DeBerg spent a part of the night 
of May 4, 2002, into the early morning of May 5, 2002, drinking alcoholic 
beverages at the Edelweiss.

 
 
[¶6]      The exact 
circumstances of the crash are not known.  
The Personal Representatives aver that DeBerg was driving at the time of 
the crash, but the two persons who survived the accident indicated that 
Anderson was 
driving.  What is apparent is that 
the five occupants of the car left the Edelweiss Bar and drove down the 
Clark's Fork Canyon Road.  That road comes to an abrupt end as it 
approaches a forest recreation area.  
The automobile crashed through a barbed wire fence and down into a field 
strewn with boulders.

 
 
[¶7]      The Personal 
Representatives contend that there were several negligent acts that contributed 
to the deaths of Sponsel and Anderson but, for purposes of this appeal, we are 
concerned only with the Personal Representatives' contention that proper road 
signage was lacking and that Park County was responsible for providing proper 
road signage.  The specific 
allegations of the complaint are these:

 
 
            
9.  ParkCounty assumed jurisdiction of the Road 
on or about 27 October 1988 from the State of Wyoming.  
At that time, the road had a WC-3 barricade across the  main roadway and shoulders with a black 
on yellow left turn arrow mounted on the barricade.  This arrow advised of a turn onto an 
existing forest service trail providing access to a recreation area.  There was also a black on yellow left 
turn arrow with a 15 MPH speed advisory mounted below the arrow located 
approximately 925 feet in advance of the WC-3 barricade.  Upon information and belief, 
ParkCounty purposely removed these signs and devices at 
some point after ParkCounty assumed jurisdiction for the 
Road.

            
10.  Park County had a statutory duty to provide a public 
service by placing appropriate signage on roadways under its jurisdiction 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. §§ 31-5-113, 31-5-112, and 31-5-108.  The signage must conform to the Manual 
on Uniform Traffic Control Devices.  
One of the express purposes of this Legislative mandate is to warn 
traffic.

            
11.  On 5 May 2004, the only sign in the vicinity of this 
accident was a "Pavement Ends" sign.  
A "Pavement Ends" sign does not conform to the Manual on Uniform Traffic 
Control Devices for this location.  
As such, ParkCounty breached its statutory duty to the 
traveling public, including  
[Sponsel and Anderson] and the other vehicle occupants.3

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶8]      When considering 
a district court's order granting a motion for summary judgment, we review the 
district court's ruling without according any deference to the district court's 
decisions on issues of law.  Summary 
judgment is not favored in negligence actions, and in such cases a more exacting 
scrutiny is applied.  However, where 
a plaintiff cannot establish the existence of a duty on the part of the 
defendant, summary judgment is appropriate.  The result in this case is controlled by 
the WGCA,  and those statutes 
establish that immunity is the rule and liability is the exception.   Newberry v. Board of CountyCommissioners of FremontCounty, 919 P.2d 141, 144-45 (Wyo. 
1996).

 
 
[¶9]      In this case, the 
Personal Representatives ask us to construe a particular provision of the 
WGCA.  The general rules applicable 
to the construction of statutes guide our resolution of such an issue.  In interpreting statutes, our primary 
consideration is to determine the legislature's intent.  All statutes must be construed in pari 
materia and, in ascertaining the meaning of a given law, all statutes relating 
to the same subject or having the same general purpose must be considered and 
construed in harmony.  Statutory 
construction is a question of law, so our standard of review is de novo.  We endeavor to interpret statutes in 
accordance with the legislature's intent.  
We begin by making an inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning 
of the words employed according to their arrangement and connection.  We construe the statute as a whole, 
giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe all parts of 
the statute in pari materia.   
When a statute is sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we give effect to 
the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and do not resort to the rules of 
statutory construction.  We must not 
give a statute a meaning that will nullify its operation if it is susceptible of 
another interpretation.  Moreover, 
we will not enlarge, stretch, expand, or extend a statute to matters that do not 
fall within its express provisions.  
Loberg v. Wyoming Workers' Safety 
and Compensation Division, 2004 WY 48, ¶5, 88 P.3d 1045, 1048 (Wyo. 2004) 
(citing Board of County Commissioners of 
Teton County v. Crow, 2003 WY 40, ¶¶40-41, 65 P.3d 720, ¶¶40-41 (Wyo.2003)) 
(internal citations omitted); see also Union Pacific Resources Company v. 
Dolenc, 2004 WY 36, ¶¶13, 17, 86 P.3d 1287, 1291-93 (Wyo. 2004).  In addition, we direct our readers' 
attention to City of Cheyenne v. 
Huitt, 844 P.2d 1102, 1104-5 (Wyo. 1993) (wherein we construed Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-39-108(a)).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   We begin our discussion with 
recognition that the signage maintained by ParkCounty 
on the Clark's Fork Canyon Road was 
most likely inadequate and, to the extent signage was present at all, it was 
misleading.  If the resolution of 
this case were to turn on the status of those facts, summary judgment would most 
certainly be improper because at a minimum there could be a genuine issue of 
material fact in this regard.  
However, this case is not to be decided on the question of whether or not 
Park County provided inadequate signage, but whether the WGCA provides the 
Personal Representatives with an exception to the general rule of governmental 
immunity so that Park County may be held liable for its inaction with respect to 
road signage.  In other words, does 
the WGCA except ParkCounty's conduct with respect to placing 
necessary signage on this road from the general rule of immunity.  

 
 
[¶11]   The Personal Representatives assert 
that the circumstances of this case are outside the general rule of immunity 
provided by the WGCA.  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann § 1-39-108(a) (LexisNexis 2005) provides:

 
 
(a)  A 
governmental entity is liable for damages resulting from bodily injury, wrongful 
death or property damage caused by the negligence of public employees while 
acting within the scope of their duties in the operation of public utilities and services 
including gas, electricity, water, solid or liquid waste collection 
or disposal, heating and ground transportation.  [Emphasis added.]

 
 
[¶12]   The Personal Representatives 
contend that use of the word "including" greatly expands the reach of that 
statute.  In Teton County Sheriff's Department v. 
Bassett, 8 P.3d 1079, 1083 (Wyo. 2000) we recited this general rule:  "The use of the word includes' is 
significant because includes' generally signifies an intent to enlarge a 
statute's application, rather than limit it, and it implies the conclusion that 
there are other items includable, though not specifically enumerated."  That general rule certainly has 
vitality, but it cannot so broaden the statute at issue here, so as to make a 
"public service" of all things that are a "public responsibility," without 
regard as to whether or not they are somehow related to the more limited concept 
of "public utilities and services."

 
 
[¶13]   Going somewhat deeper into that 
argument, the Personal Representatives rely in part on Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
31-5-112 (LexisNexis 2005), which provides:

 
 
The 
department [of transportation] shall adopt a manual and specifications for a 
uniform system of traffic-control devices consistent with this act for use upon 
highways within this state.  The 
uniform system shall correlate with and so far as possible conform to the system 
set forth in the most recent edition of the "Manual on Uniform Traffic Control 
Devices for Streets and Highways" and other standards issued or endorsed by the 
federal highway administrator.

 
 
[¶14]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-113 
(LexisNexis 2005) provides:

 
 
(a)  The 
department [of transportation] shall place and maintain such traffic-control 
devices, conforming to the department's manual and specifications, upon all 
state highways as it deems necessary to indicate and to carry out this act or to 
regulate, warn or guide traffic.

            
(b)  No local authority shall place or maintain any 
traffic-control device upon any highway under the jurisdiction of the highway 
department except with the highway department's 
permission.

 
 
[¶15]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-108 
(LexisNexis 2005) provides:

 
 
The 
provisions of this act shall be applicable and uniform throughout this state and 
in all political subdivisions and municipalities therein.  Local authorities may, however, adopt by 
ordinance, traffic regulations for all streets within their city limits and 
highways under their corporate jurisdiction and shall have the express authority 
to enforce the traffic regulations so adopted, by action in their respective 
local municipal courts.

 
 
[¶16]   We cannot question that the 
Department of Transportation and ParkCounty have been assigned the 
responsibility to provide proper road signage.  However, construing the plain language 
of § 1-39-108(a) as written and in accordance with the applicable standard of 
review set out above, we deem that statute unambiguous insofar as the issue 
raised here is concerned.  We 
conclude that the providing of traffic control devices on county highways is not 
a public service for which immunity has been waived by the WGCA.4  The statutory construction rule of ejusdem generis instructs us that the 
legislature must have intended a catch-all phrase to include things similar to 
those specifically listed.  See Laughter v. Board of County Commissioners 
for Sweetwater County, 2005 WY 54, ¶39, 110 P.3d 875, 886-87 (Wyo. 2005); Union Pacific Resources Company, ¶17, 86 P.3d  at 1293; and Gainsco Insurance 
Company v. Amoco Production Company, 2002 WY 122, ¶88, 53 P.3d 1051, 1078 
(Wyo. 2002); see also King v. Wyoming 
Division of Criminal Investigation, 2004 WY 52, ¶17, 89 P.3d 341, 348 (Wyo. 
2004) (mentioning the related concept of noscitur a sociis, i.e., that general 
and specific words are associated with and take color from each other, 
restricting general words to a sense analogous to the less general.  Black's Law Dictionary, 1087 
(8th ed. 2004)).

 
 
[¶17]   Providing road signage on county 
highways simply is not of the same genre as the other public utilities and 
services specifically mentioned in § 1-39-108(a), and that statute does not 
create an exception to the general rule of immunity in these circumstances. 

 
 
[¶18]   ParkCounty's arguments focus on these 
provisions of the WGCA.  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-39-104 (LexisNexis 2005) provides:

 
 
(a)  A governmental entity and its public 
employees while acting within the scope of duties are granted immunity from 
liability for any tort except as provided by W.S. 1-39-105 through 1-39-112 
and limited by W.S. 1-39-121.  Any 
immunity in actions based on a contract entered into by a governmental entity is 
waived except to the extent provided by the contract if the contract was within 
the powers granted to the entity and was properly executed and except as 
provided in W.S. 1-39-121.  The 
claims procedures of W.S. 1-39-113 apply to contractual claims against 
governmental entities.

            
(b)  When liability is alleged against any public employee, if 
the governmental entity determines he was acting within the scope of his duty, 
whether or not alleged to have been committed maliciously or fraudulently, the 
governmental entity shall provide a defense at its 
expense.

            
(c)  A governmental entity shall assume and pay a judgment 
entered under this act against any of its public employees, 
provided:

(i)  The 
act or omission upon which the claim is based has been determined by a court or 
jury to be within the public employee's scope of duties;

(ii)  The 
payment for the judgment shall not exceed the limits provided by W.S. 
1-39-118;  and

(iii)  All 
appropriate appeals from the judgment have been exhausted or the time has 
expired when appeals may be taken.

            
(d)  A governmental entity shall assume and pay settlements of 
claims under this act against its public employees in accordance with W.S. 
1-39-115, 1-41-106 or 1-42-107.  
[Emphasis added.]

 
 
We have 
construed the WGCA to be a "close-ended tort claims act;" "by this we simply 
mean that unless the claim falls within the statutory exceptions, it will be 
barred."  See White v. State, 784 P.2d 1313 (Wyo. 
1989); Gibson v. State Through Department 
of Revenue and Taxation, 811 P.2d 726, 728 (Wyo. 1991); Sawyer v. City of Sheridan, 793 P.2d 476, 478 (Wyo. 1990); and  Hoff v. City of Casper-Natrona County 
Health Department,  2001 WY 97, 
¶9, 33 P.3d 99, 105 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 
[¶19]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-120 
(LexisNexis 2005) provides:

 
 
(a)  The 
liability imposed by W.S. 1-39-106 through 1-39-112 does not include liability 
for damages caused by:

(i)  A 
defect in the plan or design of any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, 
alley, sidewalk or parking area;

(ii)  The 
failure to construct or reconstruct any bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, 
street, alley, sidewalk or parking area; or

(iii)  The 
maintenance, including maintenance to compensate for weather conditions, of any 
bridge, culvert, highway, roadway, street, alley, sidewalk or parking area. 

 
 
[¶20]   Employing the same rules of 
statutory construction that we used above, we conclude that inadequate highway 
signage, if it should rise to the level of alleged negligence, constitutes a 
defect in the plan or design of a highway or the proper maintenance of a highway 
and, thus, is specifically excepted from any waiver of immunity contained in the 
WGCA.5

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶21]   The Order of the district court 
granting summary judgment in favor of ParkCounty is affirmed.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

1Although 
other claims remain pending in this matter, the district court made an express 
determination that there is no just reason for delay and an express direction 
for entry of judgment.  W.R.C.P. 
54(b).

 
 

2DeBerg does 
not join in this appeal.

 
 

3According to 
the Appellant's brief, proper signage was subsequently put in 
place.

 
 

4We also 
conclude that our decision in Natrona 
County v. Blake, 2003 WY 170, 81 P.3d 948 (Wyo. 2003) has no particular 
application to the discussion at hand.

 
 

5See generally Am.Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 
351, § 2, Hon. D. Duff McKee, Establishing Liability of a State or Local Highway 
Administration, Where Injury Results from the Failure to Place or Maintain 
Adequate Highway Signs (1995); Diane M. Allen, Annotation, Highways:  Governmental Duty to Provide Curve 
Warnings or Markings, 57 A.L.R.4th 342 (1987 and Supp. 
2005).