Case Title: State v. Angel Maisonet

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-98-99

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2001-01-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). VERNIERO, J., writing for a unanimous Court. This appeal requires the Court to determine whether defendant was deprived of a fair trial when he was denied basic necessities such as food, soap, water, and a comb while in custody. Defendant and his co-defendant, Adolfo Marquez, were arrested for drug-related offenses following a motor vehicle stop, and charged in a single indictment with possession of cocaine and possession with intent to distribute. Defendant and Marquez were tried together at a trial that lasted one week. During the course of the trial, defendant was housed in the Gloucester County Jail; Marquez was free on bail. On at least three days of the trial, defendant appeared dirty and unkempt. In contrast, the record indicates nothing untoward about Marquez's appearance. Because each man testified by accusing the other of owning the drugs in question, credibility was a critical issue for the jury. On the first day of trial, the trial court noticed defendant's disheveled appearance and expressed concern to the Sheriff's officer on duty. The trial court informed the officer that he wanted the situation worked out by the next day, and that he expected defendant to be provided with whatever basic amenities are available. The trial proceedings continued that day, despite defendant's appearance. The situation had not improved by the afternoon of the second day of trial. After the lunch break, defendant's counsel informed the trial court that defendant had not been provided with food for lunch. The trial court ordered one of the Sheriff's officers to deliver food to defendant. Defendant testified on the third day, and immediately afterward, counsel informed the court outside the jury's presence that despite counsel's efforts, the Sheriff's Office continued to deny defendant basic amenities. Counsel noted the importance of credibility in the case and expressed the view that defendant's appearance would weigh on the jury and could cause defendant severe prejudice. The trial court directed the Sheriff's officers to arrange for a representative to appear before the court to explain defendant's treatment. A lieutenant appeared later that day, confirming defendant's complaints. He attributed the lack of soap to a miscommunication and explained that other supplies were on order. Although the trial court was troubled by the actions of the Sheriff's Office, it concluded that defendant's appearance did not adversely sway the jury. Following closing arguments, the trial judge charged the jury. The instructions on evaluating credibility included language stating that the jurors could take into consideration the appearance and demeanor of the witness. The jury found defendant guilty of third-degree possession of cocaine and second degree possession with intent to distribute. Marquez was found guilty of the third-degree possession charge, but acquitted of the more serious, second-degree distribution charge. The Appellate Division affirmed defendant's conviction in an unreported decision. It concluded that the lack of basic amenities did not deprive defendant of a fair trial, noting that the trial court, after observing defendant, did not believe his appearance had a negative effect on the jury. It also noted that defendant failed to request the trial court to deliver a cautionary charge to the jury concerning his appearance. The Supreme Court granted defendant's petition for certification. HELD: Defendant's dirty and disheveled appearance created an unacceptable risk that the jury's verdict was tainted, and that verdict must be set aside. Alternatively, the doctrine of fundamental fairness would also warrant reversal on the facts presented. 1. Courts have long recognized that a defendant's outward appearance can threaten the fairness of proceedings. Decisions holding that it is a violation of fair-trial guarantees to force a defendant to appear in prison attire are instructive. The record here demonstrates that defendant was denied basic necessities while in custody. As a direct result, he appeared dirty and unkempt during most of the trial. Defendant's condition was noticed by the trial court, so presumably the jury was aware of it as well. The harm to defendant was compounded by the fact that his defense consisted mainly of his own testimony, requiring the jury to assess his credibility as compared to that of his co- defendant. (Pp. 7-12) 2. The State argues that defendant waived his right to complain about this issue on appeal because he failed to request a curative instruction. The Court disagrees. Although counsel did not request a curative instruction, he did object to defendant's treatment and articulated before the trial court precisely how that treatment could prejudice his defense. (Pp.12-13) 3. Even if the Court were to assume that defendant's disheveled state did not prejudice the jury's determination, the doctrine of fundamental fairness would also warrant reversal on the facts presented. That defendant was denied basic amenities is undisputed. The record provides no identifiable State interest served by such action. Simply stated, all persons in the criminal justice system are entitled to their dignity. (Pp. 13-15) 4. This holding is a limited one, and is based on a number of factors not likely to be present in future cases: defendant was deprived of all necessary amenities with no justification offered by the State; his physical condition was palpable to any reasonable observer; he testified before the jury and therefore put his truthfulness directly in issue; and Marquez, the co-defendant, who was apparently neatly groomed because he was free on bail, testified against defendant in what became a battle of credibility. Moreover, the jury presumably believed Marquez's testimony over that of defendant's, as indicated by their acquittal of Marquez on the more serious charge of drug distribution. (Pp. 15-18) Judgment of the Appellate Division is REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, LaVECCHIA, and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE VERNIERO's opinion. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ANGEL MAISONET, Defendant-Appellant. Argued November 28, 2000 -- Decided January 17, 2001 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division. Alan I. Smith, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant (Joel M. Harris, First Assistant Public Defender, attorney). Joseph H. Enos, Jr., Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Andrew N. Yurick, Gloucester County Prosecutor, attorney). The opinion of the Court was delivered by VERNIERO, J. In this criminal appeal, we must determine whether defendant's treatment at the Gloucester County Jail warrants reversal of his conviction. While in custody at the jail, defendant was denied basic necessities such as food, soap, water, a clean mattress and blanket, and a comb. After testifying before the jury in a visibly disheveled state, defendant was convicted of certain drug offenses and sentenced to sixteen years in prison with six years and four months of parole ineligibility. The Appellate Division upheld the conviction and sentence. We now reverse and hold that defendant is entitled to a new trial. Defendant: I don't have nothing out there. Co-defendant's counsel: When they come in from State Prison they don't have anything. Defendant: We don't have running water in the cell they got me. The court [to defendant's counsel]: [Y]ou may want to have a discussion with the Sheriff's Officer. A bar of soap, a combing, I think . . . that should be taken care of. And I want to make it very clear to the sheriffs through the Sheriff's Office, if [defendant] is entitled to basic amenities, I expect that that will be accomplished. Just sending a message. That's just a matter of humanity and fairness and dignity. Everyone is entitled to their integrity and fairness. The proceedings for that day took place despite defendant's appearance. By the afternoon of the second day, the situation had not improved. Defendant's counsel informed the trial court after the lunch break that the Sheriff's officers had not provided defendant with any food for lunch. The trial court then ordered one of the officers to deliver food to defendant. Still without a shower, defendant testified before the jury on the third day. Immediately following that testimony, defendant's counsel informed the court outside of the jury's presence: Perhaps this would be an appropriate time to place everything on the record. Judge, I had indicated to the court in chambers that [defendant] is a state prisoner, and he's been given really no -- nothing from this county jail . . . . [A]s we stand here today, Judge, [defendant] is on his fourth day without a shower. He has yet to have been provided soap, he has yet to have been provided toothpaste. He wasn't provided a meal -- lunch, yesterday . . . he's advised that he's been sleeping with a blanket that has -- is covered with ants. Judge, in an effort to try to resolve this situation, I went to the store yesterday, out of my pocket, purchased [defendant] soap and toothpaste. I brought it up here to the jail . . . [and] I was advised by the sheriff in charge there that absolutely under no circumstances was I permitted to give [them to defendant] or leave [them] for [defendant]. [Defendant's] here Judge . . . [h]e hasn't showered. And what's most concerning, Judge, is that we have a jury of fourteen people sitting here. We have jurors' seats . . . five or six feet away from where [defendant] was just on the stand. No offense to [defendant], but anyone that goes four days without a shower doesn't have the best body odor. And it's a concern because the jurors are looking at these people. Credibility could not be any more important in this case. The jury is looking at him and saying, not only looking at him but smelling him, and it's going to weigh on the jury and it could severely prejudice [defendant]. In response, the trial court directed the Sheriff's officers to arrange for a representative to appear before the court to explain defendant's treatment. A lieutenant from the Sheriff's Office appeared later that day, confirming that defendant's complaints were accurate. The officer attributed the lack of soap to a miscommunication. He explained that the toothpaste and other supplies were on order. When asked by the trial court whether defendant was provided with a clean blanket, the officer claimed that there were shortages at the jail, stating: If he got a blanket, he's lucky he has one, sir. The Sheriff's officer assured the court that defendant would be provided soap, toothpaste, and a shower. Although the trial court was troubled by the actions of the Sheriff's Office, the court nonetheless concluded that defendant's physical appearance did not adversely sway the jury. The court stated: Now, lookwise, [defendant] doesn't look like he's out of kilter. I have to indicate to you that I'm two feet away, three feet away, four, five, six feet away, and fortunately in this case, I don't smell anything . . . untoward. Now, it doesn't make it right. The answer is no, it doesn't make it right. Following closing arguments, the trial court charged the jury. The instructions on evaluating credibility included this language: As the judges of the facts, you are to determine the credibility of each and every witness, and in determining whether a witness is worthy of belief, and therefore, credible, you may take into consideration . . . the appearance and demeanor of the witness[.] The jury found defendant guilty of third-degree possession of cocaine and second-degree possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Marquez was found guilty of the third-degree possession charge but acquitted of the more serious second-degree distribution offense. Before sentencing, the trial court denied defendant's motion for a new trial. Defendant appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed his conviction and sentence in an unreported decision. The court concluded that the failure of the Sheriff's Office to furnish defendant with basic amenities did not deprive him of a fair trial. As support, the panel noted that the trial court, after observing defendant, did not believe his appearance had a negative effect on the jury. The panel also noted that defendant failed to request that the trial court deliver a cautionary charge to the jury concerning his appearance. The Appellate Division also addressed other contentions of defendant not pertinent to this appeal. We granted defendant's petition for certification, 165 N.J. 498 (2000), to address whether defendant's disheveled appearance impermissibly affected the jury's verdict, thereby requiring a new trial. We must also determine whether the denial of basic amenities itself violated principles of fundamental fairness, warranting our intervention. The court also noted that the proper voir dire of the jury, coupled with a cautionary instruction, could guard against potential prejudice. The court instructed that when a request for civilian clothing or a precautionary voir dire or jury charge is made by a defendant or his counsel such request may not be denied. Id. at 113; accord State v. Gertrude, 309 N.J. Super. 354, 357 (App. Div. 1998) (reversing conviction of defendant who appeared at trial in prison clothes because protective procedures articulated in Carrion-Collazo were not followed by trial court). See also State v. Roberts, 86 N.J. Super. 159, 163 (App. Div. 1965) (recognizing that physical restraints may be used on defendant only in exceptional circumstances because of inherent prejudice that they impart to jury). Courts in other jurisdictions have recognized the importance of having a defendant appear at trial in an acceptable physical condition. In Hicks v. State, 352 S.E.2d 762, 769 (Ga.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 931, 107 S. Ct. 3220, 96 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1987), the Supreme Court of Georgia observed that a defendant has a right to a suitable courtroom appearance. In the same vein, in State v. Spellman, 562 So. 2d 455, 456 (La. 1990), the Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed the conviction of a defendant who appeared at trial in prison clothing in part because the trial court had failed to find that the defendant's attire was reasonably clean and suitable. The court said that, [a] defendant may insist he appear before jurors with all the dignity of a free man, presumed innocent until determined otherwise[.] Ibid. Here, the record demonstrates that defendant was denied basic necessities while in custody. As a direct result of that treatment, defendant appeared dirty and unkempt during most of the trial. Defendant's condition was noticed by the trial court on the first day of trial, so presumably the jury was aware of it as well. In that regard, we find this case to be similar to the prison-attire cases. Through no fault of his own and despite his counsel's objections, defendant was compelled to appear at trial in a disheveled state that undoubtedly had the potential to diminish his credibility before the jury. The harm to defendant was compounded by the fact that his defense consisted mainly of his own testimony, requiring the jury to assess his truthfulness as compared to that of his co-defendant. We are satisfied that because defendant's credibility was a central issue for the jury to determine, his dirty and disheveled appearance created an unacceptable risk that the jury's verdict would be tainted. At the root of the inquiry concerning defendant's physical appearance is not whether jurors actually articulated a consciousness of some prejudicial effect, but whether 'an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play[.]' Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 570, 106 S. Ct. 1340, 1346-47, 89 L. Ed. 2d 525, 535 (1986) (citation omitted). Thus, the fact that the trial court may have failed to smell anything does not dispose of the issue. That defendant's overall appearance, caused by factors beyond his control, may have unduly impugned his credibility in the eyes of jurors is sufficient to establish a constitutional violation. The State argues that defendant waived his right to complain about those issues on appeal because he failed to request a curative instruction either at the conclusion of the trial or during voir dire. We disagree. Although defendant did not request a cautionary charge, his counsel did object to his treatment and articulated before the trial court precisely how that treatment would prejudice his defense. Moreover, because the court's instruction to the jurors invited them to consider the physical appearance of defendant when assessing his credibility, we are convinced that the circumstances endured by defendant were clearly capable of producing an unjust result. State v. Delibero, 149 N.J. 90, 106-07 (1997). We are thus compelled to set aside the jury's verdict. In furtherance of their responsibilities, trial courts possess inherent power and may, for example, direct Sheriff's officers or other law enforcement agents to provide basic amenities to those entrusted to their care. State v. Abbati, 99 N.J. 418, 428 (1985) (discussing contours of judiciary's inherent power to fashion needed and appropriate remedies ). Similarly, the trial court is authorized to give a cautionary charge in any case in which it reasonably concludes that the physical condition of the accused may impermissibly influence the jury's verdict. Ibid. That charge is advisable in that circumstance. Lastly, to assist in effective appellate review, trial courts must create an appropriate record whenever these issues arise. Zhu, supra, 165 N.J. at 557. Here, the trial court conducted a brief hearing on the record, which enabled the court to determine the validity of defendant's complaints outside the presence of the jury. That was the appropriate procedure under the circumstances in this case. NO. A-98 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ANGEL MAISONET, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED January 17, 2001 Chief Justice Poritz