Case Title: BHP PETROLEUM COMPANY, INC., A Delaware Corporation v. STATE OF WYOMING, WYOMING TAX COMMISSION and its Members, SHIRLEY WITTLER, CARROL ORRISON AND THOMAS E. TROWBRIDGE in Their Official Capacities and THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND TAXATION, STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 89-141

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-12-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
BHP PETROLEUM COMPANY, INC., A Delaware Corporation v. STATE OF WYOMING, WYOMING TAX COMMISSION and its Members, SHIRLEY WITTLER, CARROL ORRISON AND THOMAS E. TROWBRIDGE in Their Official Capacities and THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND TAXATION, STATE OF WYOMING1989 WY 234784 P.2d 621Case Number: 89-141Decided: 12/29/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
BHP PETROLEUM COMPANY, 
INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF),

v.

STATE OF WYOMING, WYOMING 
TAX COMMISSION AND ITS MEMBERS, SHIRLEY WITTLER, CARROL ORRISON AND THOMAS E. 
TROWBRIDGE IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES AND THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE AND 
TAXATION, STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, 
J.

William J. 
Thomson, II of Dray, Madison & Thomson, P.C., Cheyenne and John C. 
Siegesmund of Parcel, Mauro, Hultin & Spaanstra, Denver, Colo., for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Michael L. Hubbard, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees.

Morris R. Massey 
of Brown & Drew, Casper for W.A. Moncrief, Jr. as amicus curiae.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

URBIGKIT, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     A statutory 
construction issue, singularly important to Wyoming oil and gas producers and the Wyoming 
Department of Revenue and Taxation, is presented for consideration of the 
severance tax liability of the unit operator defined to be the "person 
extracting" for production from the Madden Deep Unit as a unitized field.1 Appellant, BHP Petroleum Company, 
Inc. (unit operator), by a declaratory judgment complaint, challenged intended 
assessment on it of all severance tax within the unit. The judgment of the 
district court validated the unit operator tax assessment and we affirm on 
present appeal.

[¶2.]     The issue presented as 
narrowly defined yet exceptionally important in procedural effect is stated by 
BHP whether it "merely by virtue of being the contract operator of a federal oil 
and gas unit was a `person extracting' 100% of the natural gas from the unit, 
within the meaning of WS § 39-6-307(e)." As rephrased by the State, more 
immediately demonstrating the substantive economic issue, we are asked whether 
"appellant is a `person extracting' within the meaning of W.S. 39-6-307(e) and 
is therefore liable for the tax deficiency imposed by the 
Department."

[¶3.]     The statutory provision 
states:

Any person extracting 
valuable products subject to this article, and any person owning an interest in 
the valuable products to the extent of their interest ownership are liable for 
the payment of the taxes imposed by this article together with any penalties and 
interest. The tax is a lien upon the interest of any owner and the interest of 
any person extracting any valuable deposits from and after the time they are 
extracted until the taxes are paid. The tax lien shall have preference over all 
liens except any valid mortgage or other liens of record filed and recorded 
prior to the date the tax became due.[2]

W.S. 
39-6-307(e).

[¶4.]     This is the second 
appearance of this case before this court. On first appeal, the district court 
denied jurisdiction of the declaratory judgment complaint based on the 
procedural and factual posture of the case involving exhaustion of 
administrative remedies. We reversed and remanded for a district court 
interpretation of the statutes and regulations challenged by BHP. BHP Petroleum 
Co., Inc. v. State, Wyoming Tax Com'n, 766 P.2d 1162 (Wyo. 
1989). A second hearing was held before the district court on April 10, 1989, at 
which time both BHP and the State presented testimony and documentary evidence. 
By an opinion letter dated April 13, 1989, the district court held that because 
BHP was the operator of the Madden Deep Unit, it was a "person extracting" all 
of the gas from the unit within the meaning of W.S. 39-6-307(e) and was liable 
for severance tax on this gas.

[¶5.]     The factual background 
of the controversy is well-stated in our prior opinion and will not be repeated 
except as reference becomes necessary to involve additional facts in discussion 
of the litigants' argument. May it suffice generally that the State is 
attempting to collect severance tax from BHP as the unit operator for the Madden 
Deep Unit which includes leases in Fremont and Natrona counties in central 
Wyoming.

[¶6.]     The Madden Deep Unit 
natural gas production goes to zones below 20,000 feet with high volumetric 
production within an extended geographical area. File documents reflect that in 
addition to BHP and the amicus curiae, W.A. Moncrief, Jr. (holding a large 
working interest), there are approximately twenty-eight other working interest 
owners and perhaps more than 100 royalty interest owners. BHP's working interest 
ownership is relatively small in total percentage ranging from about 8.4 percent 
to 12.7 percent.3 The Madden Deep Unit agreement was 
first executed on May 1, 1967 for about 70,000 acres with Erving Wolf, d/b/a 
Wolf Exploration Company as unit operator. It was then revised June 17, 1969 to 
change terms and operators. The basic agreement was a printed form, Rocky 
Mountain Unit Operating Agreement Form 2 (Divided Interest) January, 1955, which 
form was a product of the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation. The 1969 
agreement was supplemented or amended by a June 2, 1975, Supplemental Unit 
Operating Agreement, for depths 5,500 feet below the Waltman Shale. Monsanto 
Company became the operator by that agreement. Responsibility was then 
transferred to its one-time subsidiary, Monsanto Oil Company, which has since 
been renamed to BHP and has constituted the operator since 1982. The unit 
involves land in five townships including federal, state and fee 
acreage.

[¶7.]     It is noteworthy that 
the general system is different from a typical pooling agreement of many 
production type unitization fields. Right, title and interest to the mineral 
estate is not conglomerated, but rather each working interest owner retains 
ownership in the proportionate share and is entitled to make arrangements for 
sale of the product in any fashion desired. Consequently, the unit operator is 
generally not involved in contracting product sale and only releases gas in the 
name of working interest owners based on monthly nominations as directed to 
specific wells for production.

[¶8.]     The unit operator files 
periodic reports with state and federal agencies and the Wyoming Department of 
Revenue and Taxation. Generally speaking, it has also paid quarterly installment 
taxes for severance tax assessments on behalf of most working unit interests 
but, in current time, has neither been responsible for filing the specific tax 
forms nor payment of the tax for one of the major interest holders, Moncrief, 
who filed an amicus curiae brief.

[¶9.]     The aegis of this 
particular litigation demonstrates the economic issues involved for both the 
operator and the state. The fundamental conflict in deficiency assessment arose 
from gas pricing for assessment valuation with the specific issue apparently 
developing from some gas purchase contracts where the buyer repaid ad valorem 
taxes to the vendor as a price consideration. The question whether taxation 
valuation should include or exclude the add on tax repayment creates the price 
differential. That substantive issue of valuation pricing is not presented in 
this litigation. However, if the Wyoming Department of Revenue and Taxation is 
correct and the higher price is taxable, there is a deficiency due on past 
production that in preliminary notices totaled about $880,000 plus penalties and 
interest to total a potential assessment of more than $1.8 million. Obviously, 
there could be other pricing features of individual purchase contracts whereby 
the State could contend that the price received was understated and the tax 
underpaid.

[¶10.]  If so, who is liable for the deficiency? 
BHP contends that only the working owners can be reached for deficiency 
collection. Conversely, the State contends the operator should pay and can 
pursue reimbursement under the unit agreement and applicable statutes from the 
working interest owners who may also have reimbursement questions with regard to 
payments made to royalty and override interest holders. BHP does not contend the 
State lacks authority to impose the tax collection duty on the operator. It 
makes the argument that the statute does not now impose on it that very arduous 
payment responsibility and particularly so in cases where a deficiency on past 
payments may occur. Consequently, we consider whether the district court was 
correct in its interpretation of the statute which decision is a matter of law. 
See Attletweedt v. State, 684 P.2d 812 (Wyo. 1984) and McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278 (Wyo. 1980) which direct this court to make sense out of a statute and 
give full force and effect to the legislative product. We are not persuaded by 
either party that we can dispose of this appeal by application of the first rule 
of statutory construction by finding a clearly stated plain and ordinary 
meaning. State Bd. of Equalization v. Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 737 P.2d 350, 
reh'g granted 745 P.2d 58 (Wyo. 1987); Amoco Production Co. v. Hakala, 644 P.2d 785 (Wyo. 1982).

[¶11.]  There are a combination of statutory 
construction concepts presented by these litigants to assist this court in 
determining whether "any person extracting" is "the oil field unit operator." 
Both litigants persuasively argue hardship and complexity in the countervailing 
adaptations. The contention is developed from the realistic belief that "[t]ax 
statutes should have a practical construction." State Bd. of Equalization v. 
Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc., 611 P.2d 805, 813 (Wyo. 1980). Each litigant then factually 
argues interpretation of the unit agreements to determine whether the unit 
operator extracts in terms of statutory taxation 
responsibility.

[¶12.]  Where the arguments diverge is in BHP's 
appellate definition of operator in an ownership concept that the mineral 
interest owner extracts while the State argues from an operational concept that the entity 
which physically does the extractive work, mainly the unit operator, is the 
extractor. BHP adds the further argument that the State would make the field 
hand or pumper also initially liable for the tax. BHP finds a prospective 
redundancy in the language under the state construction from the phraseology of 
"any person extracting" to the provision "any person owning an interest." 
SeeBasin Elec. Power Coop. v. State Bd. of Control, 578 P.2d 557 (Wyo. 
1978). The State responsively argues for the continuity of a history of 
interpretation since the severance tax enactment in 1969 and a similar 
application to all unitized fields within the state since that date. This 
divergence sustains a conclusion of contended ambiguity since "a single term can 
fairly be said to mean different things." Amoco Production Co. v. State, 751 P.2d 379, 381 (Wyo. 1988).

[¶13.]  The principal argument of BHP to obtain a 
different adaptation from historical practice is derived from the nature of the 
retained control of individual working interest owners as to when and how 
production is actually accomplished for their separate sale. The nomination 
process utilized for production is contended to be significant when conversely 
compared with the full interest operation where a single sale and unitary 
production arrangement is utilized in the more typical production unit. Basing 
their argument then on the ownership concept of the working interest holders as 
the "person extracting," BHP conceives that as to its non-owned interest, it 
serves a function as an operational contract agent which is not essentially 
different from that performed by the pumper and field hands.4 We reject this 
analysis.

[¶14.]  It is apparent that a taxation reporting 
and collection burden exists and it is within legislative responsibility to 
determine whether the burden will be placed on the unit operator or assumed by 
the state agency. Whatever this court elects to do in present analysis of the 
1969 statutory language, the legislature will retain the option to change the 
responsibility in future sessions. Under the separation of powers, the 
legislature does have both the budgetary and revenue raising responsibilities 
with which this court will not properly interject itself in contravention of 
Wyo. Const. art. 2, § 1, except to interpret that "legislative intent." See also 
Mauler v. Titus, 697 P.2d 303 (Wyo. 1985) and Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 
1.

[¶15.]  In application, we follow the operational 
definition of "person extracting" and conclude, as did the district court, that 
BHP, by contracting to assume physical activity responsibility, extracts the 
mineral resource for the working interest owners. We are provided significant 
support in this analysis by examining the history of the severance tax since 
1969 and the consistent practice of the State in assessment responsibility. 
Oregon Basin Oil & Gas Co. v. Ohio Oil Co., 70 Wyo. 263, 248 P.2d 198 
(1952).5 The legislature has frequently been 
called to alter and amend the severance tax statutes since original adoption and 
has not seen fit to change the well-established State policy in this definition 
of the responsible party for tax reporting and payment. If ever a practice of 
the State, cf. Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. State Bd. of Equalization, 
749 P.2d 221 (Wyo. 1987), has validity, this case persuades us that legislative 
intent is observable and a definition of terms strengthened from the historical 
practice which remains unamended in statutory language.6

[¶16.]  The Wyoming severance tax is an excise tax upon 
the current and continuing privilege of extracting 
minerals.

The tax is not levied 
upon the preceding year's production, and that production is not called upon to 
bear the burden of the tax. The tax is not an ad valorem tax. The statute is 
very plain in stating that it is an excise tax laid upon the present and 
continuing privilege of extracting minerals. The value of the privilege is 
measured by applying a certain percentage figure to the gross production of the 
previous year. A statute is not necessarily retroactive because it draws on 
antecedent facts for its operation.

Belco Petroleum 
Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 587 P.2d 204, 210 (Wyo. 1978) (footnote 
omitted and emphasis in original). See likewise Amoco Production Co., 644 P.2d 785. Within this context of the incident of taxation resulting from removal, we 
are provided the dispute about who extracts - the operator who does it for the 
owner physically within the unit or the operator whose property is extracted, 
whether or not directly done or by an agent such as the unit 
operator.

[¶17.]  We are not persuaded that the decision on 
statutory interpretation is answered by argument that ultimate liability rests 
with the product owner against whom a lien may be impressed. We perceive that 
the legislature interdicted a liability upon the entity that extracts and 
impressed a lien against any owner who receives and sells. Consequently, the 
lien liability follows the product from which production the taxable incident 
and liability arose. W.S. 39-6-304(h). For a historical perspective, see Miller 
v. Buck Creek Oil Co., 38 Wyo. 505, 269 P. 43 
(1928).

[¶18.]  Rules of strict construction on taxation 
statutes, Sutherland Stat. Const. § 66.01 (4th ed. 1986), are not involved. No 
issue of either the existence of a taxation responsibility nor its amount is 
presented in this proceeding. The rather ordinary but terribly significant 
question presented is to determine the party against whom initial responsibility 
is imposed as a statutory imposition. BHP seeks a construction favorable to one 
taxpayer which would then move the burden on to another to be the reporting and 
paying obligor. No strict construction rule can consequently be applied since 
someone is obligated to pay. The inheritance tax case of Kelsey v. Taft, 72 
Wyo. 210, 263 P.2d 135 (1953) questioning the existence of any tax liability is inapplicable. 
In Belco Petroleum Corp., 587 P.2d 204, the issue was liability and not who pays 
and the strict construction rule for taxation was applied in approval of the tax 
for the production during the year prior to the date of taxation statute 
passage. Compare Jackson Hole Ski Corp., 737 P.2d 350, where both the 
appropriateness of the tax and existence of the statutory authority was 
litigated.

[¶19.]  Likewise inapposite is any determination 
of tax responsibility from oil and gas ownership concepts determining privilege 
to extract. See 8 H. Williams & C. Meyers, Oil & Gas Law 1086 (1987). 
The authority of the legislature to determine the functional taxpayer is not in 
question and we apply a functional construction of the Wyoming severance tax 
statute to emplace responsibility on the entity performing the physical 
operation. This is also consistent with the early Wyoming procedure 
statutes and case law for the ad valorem tax where it was "the practice of the 
state board of equalization to assess the entire tax against the operating and 
producing company." Miller, 269 P.  at 45. 

[¶20.]  In practical operation, we perceive that 
a simple taxation reporting and collection plan was enunciated by the 
legislature and applied by the Wyoming Department of Revenue and Taxation for 
taxation of the product produced in the unitized field. First, the unit operator 
is responsible for the reporting of the production and payment of the taxes on 
the entire well production, W.S. 39-6-304(a) and 39-6-307(e). Additionally, the 
tax is a lien on the interest owner (of any part of the produced mineral) until 
the tax is paid. W.S. 39-6-304(k); 39-6-307(e). The taxpayer paying the tax may 
deduct the tax from any amounts due or to become due to the interest owner, W.S. 
39-6-304(h), or enforce other rights for reimbursement that may be provided in 
the contractual unit agreement documents. Consequently, we distinguish between 
the initial obligation to report and pay and the ultimate liability of the 
amount by approving the conclusion and decision of the district court. Ashland 
Oil Co. v. Jaeger, 650 P.2d 265 (Wyo. 1982); Oregon Basin Oil & Gas Co., 
248 P.2d 198; Miller, 269 P. 43.

[¶21.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Appellant, BHP Petroleum 
Company, Inc., accurately observes that plans for unitization come in two 
general types, although text writers also observe that wide variations within a 
class can exist. L. Hoffman, Voluntary Pooling and Unitization, ch. 4 at 140 
(1954). The first class of unitization agreement exists for exploration and 
development purposes. Within that group, in response to the substantial amount 
of federal acreage in Wyoming, the federal unit agreement is 
frequently found. The federal unit agreement is authorized by 30 U.S.C.A. § 
226(m) wherever federal lands are included and grants authority for both 
unitization and commutation provisions in leases and the authority of the 
Secretary of the Interior to approve a cooperative or unit plan of development 
or operation. See Kirkpatrick Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 675 F.2d 1122 (10th Cir. 1982) and 
Ohmart v. Dennis, 188 Neb. 260, 196 N.W.2d 181 (1972). Obviously, 
the "federal unit plan" need not necessarily first involve an exploratory and 
development plan. The Madden Deep Unit, however, was organized as a 
developmental unit within the context of the Federal Mineral Leasing Act. Gray 
& Swan, Fieldwide Unitization in Wyoming, 
VIILand & Water L.Rev. 433, 435 (1972) 
states that "[o]n federal lands, the exploratory type of unit under which lands 
are unitized before the first exploratory wells are drilled also has been widely 
used."

The second class of unit 
agreements are created for production purposes and may invoke forced pooling. 
See W.S. 30-5-110. This class of unitization was especially adopted for 
secondary recovery purposes. Gray & Swan, supra, VII Land & Water L.Rev. 
433. Cf. Comment, Wyoming's New Unitization Statute, VI Land 
& Water L.Rev. 537 (1971).

2 When originally enacted 
with first passage of the Wyoming severance tax in 1969, the comparable 
provision, Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 193, § 9 (1969), provided:

Any person extracting 
products under this act, and every person owning an interest in said products to 
the extent of their interest ownership shall be liable for the payment of the 
tax imposed by this act, together with any and all penalties and interest, and 
the tax shall be and become a lien upon the interest of any owner and the 
interest of any person extracting any such products from and after the time the 
same are extracted until the tax is paid thereon.

The title clause 
of that act included within its provisions "an act * * * providing for deduction 
by operators [of] a proportionate share of the tax from the share of interest 
owners * * *." Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 193 (1969) (emphasis added). The legislature 
also provided that "[e]very person, partnership, corporation, company, firm or 
association of whatever nature, extracting any of the products hereinabove 
described shall be required to report the gross production * * *." Id. at § 3. Additionally, 
the legislature said:

Any person upon which a 
tax is imposed by this act for extracting any of the products referred to shall 
have the right and be empowered to deduct the tax so paid from any amounts due 
or to become due to the interest owners of such products in proportion to the 
interest ownership thereof.

Id. at § 
7.

Constitutionally required 
legislative bill titles, Wyo. Const. art. 3, § 24, dictating expression of the 
subject of the bill in the title justifies use of the information as worthy of 
consideration for determination of the purpose of the legislation. See Sanchez 
v. State, 567 P.2d 270 (Wyo. 1977) and 
WyomingState Treasurer ex rel. Workmen's Compensation Dept. 
v. Niezwaag, 452 P.2d 214 (Wyo. 1969). Consequently, the reference in the 
title to Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 193 (1969) to the operator's right of deduction of 
a proportionate share of the tax against interest owners is significant as 
demonstrating the initial process developed and the continuing procedure since 
utilized by the Wyoming Department for processing the tax.

A portion of the mineral 
severance tax is constitutionally emplaced by the creation of a permanent 
Wyoming 
mineral trust fund, Wyo. Const. art. 15, § 19, adopted December 12, 1974, which 
requires collection of the excise tax "on the value of the gross product 
extracted." Consequently, the collection statutes are in part addressed to a 
specific constitutional responsibility requiring "[t]he legislature * * * 
provide by law for an excise tax * * *." Of the total tax assessed on covered 
minerals, one and one-half percent is constitutionally earmarked for this 
permanent trust fund. Consequently, analysis of a severance tax collection 
procedure is impressed with a constitutional responsibility of present 
government to collect for the state's future measured on the value of the gross 
product extracted. The constitutional amendment was adopted by vote of the 
people of the state with familiarity about a system first created in passage of 
the 1969 severance tax act, Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 193 (1969). "How to do it" is 
discretionary within legislative decision. To do it at full value is not 
discretional for any branch of the state government. Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas 
Ass'n v. State Bd. of Equalization, 749 P.2d 221 (Wyo. 
1987).

3 The Madden Deep Unit is 
one of the major oil and gas production units presently operating in Wyoming, but only one of 
a large number of unitized areas in the state. It may be exceptional in the 
large number of working interest owners. Unitization and forced pooling is not 
an unexplored litigative subject in this state. Majority of Working Interest 
Owners in Buck Draw Field Area v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Com'n, 721 P.2d 1070 (Wyo. 1986); Trout v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Com'n, 721 P.2d 1047 (Wyo. 1986); Gilmore v. Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 642 P.2d 773 
(Wyo. 1982); Larsen v. Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 569 P.2d 87 (Wyo. 
1977); Mitchell v. Simpson, 493 P.2d 399 (Wyo. 1972); Inexco Oil Co. v. Oil and 
Gas Conservation Commission, 490 P.2d 1065 (Wyo. 1971). See also Gifford, The 
Law of Oil and Gas in Wyoming: An Overview, XVII Land & Water 
L.Rev. 401 (1982); Gray & Swan, supra n. 1, VII Land & Water L.Rev. 433; 
Comment, supra n. 1, VI Land & Water L.Rev. 537; Comment, Secondary Recovery 
Operations - Protection of Correlative Rights, II Land & Water L.Rev. 129 
(1967); and Note, The Constitutionality of Wyoming's Oil and Gas Compulsory Pooling 
Provision, 6 Wyo.L.J. 300 (1952).

4 The files and testimony 
do reflect that BHP provides minimal personnel at the field and essentially 
subcontracts all of the physical activities required in opening valves and 
reading meters for production. In characterization, the function of BHP is 
managerial and not with its own personnel operationally employed. BHP also 
argues that it is not necessarily privy to the terms of sales agreements 
executed by working interest owners and consequently may not have the actual 
information upon which it can, with accuracy, determine amounts of tax due. 
Intrinsic to the status of this case as presently developed is both the 
longstanding examination by legislative committees of petroleum product pricing 
for tax purposes and on-going audits by state and federal agencies of amounts of 
tax paid which have, on occasion, established significant underpayment. It is 
understandable why BHP disclaims interest in becoming its brother's tax keeper 
under these circumstances. The countervailing posture of the State is that 
today, there are roughly a thousand operators and 15,000 producing wells in the 
state. If there were twenty to thirty working interest owners in the individual 
wells times the 15,000 wells, the State says "we haven't got a big enough 
building to hold the paper." In practical fact, the argument of the State was 
obviously exaggerated but, without question, the singular increase from the 
1,000 taxation entities which report and pay the severance tax would obviously 
occur and possibly in the range of tenfold or more.

5 We do not find the lack 
of clarity about past practices of the State in unit operator assessment that is 
suggested by contention in the briefs. The first unit agreement for the Madden 
Deep Unit predated passage of the severance tax by two years. The testimony 
clearly demonstrates that the Wyoming Department of Revenue and Taxation has 
consistently considered the operator to be the reporting and tax paying entity. 
Oregon Basin Oil & Gas Co., 248 P.2d 198. Other generalized testimony in the 
record reveals a consistent history of revenue department 
operation.

6 See Sunstein, 
Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv.L.Rev. 405, 503 (1989) 
which states:

Under the approach 
suggested * * *, the statutory text is the foundation for interpretation, but 
structure, purpose, intent, history, and "reasonableness" all play legitimate 
roles. It is possible, moreover, to distinguish among those roles, and thus to 
produce a system in which dictionary definitions of statutory terms ordinarily 
suffice, but are subject to various forms of contextual 
qualification.