Case Title: In re Marriage of DeRossett

Citation: 

Docket Number: 80168

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1996-09-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days after 
the filing of the opinion to request a rehearing. Also, opinions 
are subject to modification, correction or withdrawal at anytime 
prior to issuance of the mandate by the Clerk of the Court. 
Therefore, because the following slip opinion is being made 
available prior to the Court's final action in this matter, it 
cannot be considered the final decision of the Court. The 
official copy of the following opinion will be published by the 
Supreme Court's Reporter of Decisions in the Official Reports 
advance sheets following final action by the Court. 
 
                 Docket No. 80168--Agenda 13--May 1996. 
     In re MARRIAGE OF JOHN G. DeROSSETT, Appellant, and CYNTHIA L. 
                          DeROSSETT, Appellee. 
                    Opinion filed September 19, 1996. 
 
     JUSTICE HARRISON delivered the opinion of the court: 
     Petitioner, John G. DeRossett, appealed from the judgment of 
the circuit court of Rock Island County entered upon dissolution of 
his marriage to respondent, Cynthia L. DeRossett. The appellate 
court affirmed (No. 3--95--0019 (unpublished order under Supreme 
Court Rule 23)), and we allowed petitioner's petition for leave to 
appeal (155 Ill. 2d R. 315). We granted leave to Tom Balanoff, 
president of General Service Employees Union, Local 73, AFL-CIO, to 
file an amicus curiae brief in support of petitioner. 155 Ill. 2d 
R. 345. The issue presented for our review is whether a workers' 
compensation award, arising out of a claim accrued during the 
marriage, is to be classified as marital property under section 503 
of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act) 
(750 ILCS 5/503 (West 1994)). 
     Petitioner and respondent were married on April 15, 1987. On 
February 2, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for dissolution of 
marriage. At that time, petitioner had been working at Case IH 
Corporation for approximately 30 years. As a result of his 
employment, petitioner had developed bilateral carpal tunnel 
syndrome that affected both his arms and elbows. He had filed a 
workers' compensation claim in which he alleged that the date of 
injury was January 18, 1990. On July 21, 1994, the dissolution 
matter proceeded to a hearing on contested issues, including 
whether respondent was entitled to an interest in petitioner's 
pending workers' compensation claim. On September 7, 1994, the 
trial court entered an order determining, inter alia, that 
respondent was entitled to a portion of the claim, and reserving 
the amount of the award until the claim was settled. Later that 
same month, petitioner accepted a lump-sum settlement offer of his 
claim in the amount of $140,000, which, after deducting attorney 
fees and costs, yielded a net sum of $111,905. 
     The trial court entered a judgment of dissolution of marriage 
on October 19, 1994. On November 1, 1994, petitioner filed a 
"Motion to Determine Respondent's Interest in Petitioner's 
Workman's Compensation Claim" and a motion to reconsider, 
requesting, inter alia, that the trial court reverse that portion 
of its judgment awarding respondent an interest in the claim. After 
a motion hearing on December 7, the trial court issued its opinion 
and order on December 13, 1994, denying petitioner's motion to 
reconsider and awarding respondent 30% of the $111,905 workers' 
compensation settlement. 
     The appellate court affirmed, finding that under section 503 
of the Act and the reasons set forth in In re Marriage of Dettore, 
86 Ill. App. 3d 540 (1980), and In re Marriage of Thomas, 89 Ill. 
App. 3d 81 (1980), the trial court had properly determined that the 
workers' compensation claim was marital property because it accrued 
during the marriage. No. 3--95--0019 (unpublished order under 
Supreme Court Rule 23). In this appeal, petitioner argues that 
because the settlement is compensation for his diminished earning 
capacity, which, due to his retirement, will continue far beyond 
the date of dissolution, the settlement should be considered 
nonmarital property. Petitioner urges this court to adopt the so- 
called "analytical" approach employed by the Fifth District in In 
re Marriage of Waggoner, 261 Ill. App. 3d 787 (1994). For the 
following reasons, we decline to do so. 
     In Waggoner, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 793-94, the appellate court 
held that the portions of a workers' compensation award which 
represent wage loss and medical payments incurred during the 
marriage should be classified as marital property, while the 
portion which replaces wages lost after dissolution should be 
classified as nonmarital. However, the problem with this approach 
is that it completely ignores section 503 of the Act, which 
mandates what constitutes marital and nonmarital property for 
purposes of disposition on dissolution of marriage. 
     Section 503(a) states: 
               "For purposes of this Act, `marital property' means 
          all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the 
          marriage, except the following, which is known as `non- 
          marital property': 
                    (1) property acquired by gift, legacy or 
               descent; 
                    (2) property acquired in exchange for property 
               acquired before the marriage or in exchange for 
               property acquired by gift, legacy or descent; 
                    (3) property acquired by a spouse after a 
               judgment of legal separation; 
                    (4) property excluded by valid agreement of 
               the parties; 
                    (5) any judgment or property obtained by 
               judgment awarded to a spouse from the other spouse; 
                    (6) property acquired before the marriage; 
                    (7) the increase in value of property acquired 
               by a method listed in paragraphs (1) through (6) of 
               this subsection, irrespective of whether the 
               increase results from a contribution of marital 
               property, non-marital property, the personal effort 
               of a spouse, or otherwise, subject to the right of 
               reimbursement provided in subsection (c) of this 
               Section; and 
                    (8) income from property acquired by a method 
               listed in paragraphs (1) through (7) of this 
               subsection if the income is not attributable to the 
               personal effort of a spouse." 750 ILCS 5/503(a) 
               (West 1994). 
     Additionally, section 503(b) creates a rebuttable presumption 
that all property acquired after marriage is marital property. 750 
ILCS 5/503(b) (West 1994); Hofmann v. Hofmann,  94 Ill. 2d 205 , 216 
(1983). In order to overcome this presumption, one must prove that 
"the property was acquired by a method listed in subsection (a)." 
750 ILCS 5/503(b) (West 1994); In re Marriage of Smith, 86 Ill. 2d 518, 530 (1981). Section 503(a) contains an "exclusive" and 
"specific" list of nonmarital property (Smith, 86 Ill. 2d  at 528, 
530), and workers' compensation awards do not fall under any of the 
methods listed. See 750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 1994); see also 
Dettore, 86 Ill. App. 3d at 541; In re Marriage of Lukas, 83 Ill. 
App. 3d 606, 613 (1980). 
     Petitioner and amicus curiae attempt, through creative 
argument, to shoehorn workers' compensation awards into various 
nonmarital exemptions listed in section 503(a). However, we agree 
with Lukas that: 
          " `Where the language of an act is certain and 
          unambiguous the only legitimate function of the courts is 
          to enforce the law as enacted by the legislature. 
          [Citations.] It is never proper for a court to depart 
          from plain language by reading into a statute exceptions, 
          limitations or conditions which conflict with the clearly 
          expressed legislative intent. [Citation.]' " Lukas, 83 
          Ill. App. 3d at 613, quoting Beckmire v. Ristokrat Clay 
          Products Co., 36 Ill. App. 3d 411, 415 (1976). 
Therefore, we agree with the appellate court herein that, under the 
Act, petitioner's workers' compensation award constitutes marital 
property because the claim accrued during the marriage of the 
parties. 
     This result should not surprise petitioner. With the exception 
of Waggoner, Illinois courts have consistently held that workers' 
compensation awards are marital property. See In re Marriage of 
Hall, 278 Ill. App. 3d 782 (1996); Thomas, 89 Ill. App. 3d 81; 
Dettore, 86 Ill. App. 3d 540; Lukas, 83 Ill. App. 3d 606. Moreover, 
personal injury awards have been found to be marital property, 
including claims for future pain, suffering, and loss of income 
(see In re Marriage of Burt, 144 Ill. App. 3d 177 (1986); In re 
Marriage of Gan, 83 Ill. App. 3d 265 (1980)), and a disability 
pension was held to constitute marital property even though it 
included elements of compensation for loss of income and physical 
impairment. See In re Marriage of Smith, 84 Ill. App. 3d 446 
(1980). 
     Petitioner argues that he has a "personal right to his 
financial security which is owned by him individually and was 
brought into the marriage as his separate property." However, it is 
unnecessary to adopt the "analytical" approach in order to address 
petitioner's concerns, because the statute already in place 
mandates that the trial court consider petitioner's financial 
security in dividing the marital estate. See 750 ILCS 5/503(d) 
(West 1994). As the appellate court stated in Burt: 
               "By the terms of section 503(d), in dividing marital 
          property, the court is expressly directed to consider 
          `the age, health, *** employability, *** and needs of 
          each of the parties' (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 
          503(d)(7)) together with the opportunity of a spouse to 
          secure future income (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 
          503(d)(10)). This, of itself, authorizes the court to 
          consider the disability of an injured spouse and award a 
          larger portion of marital property, including proceeds of 
          a cause of action to that spouse. Moreover, the factors 
          expressed in section 503(d) are not the only factors that 
          can be considered. Other factors may be considered if 
          relevant. [Citations.] The pain and suffering and 
          disability of an injured spouse would be relevant 
          considerations." Burt, 144 Ill. App. 3d at 182. 
See also Dettore, 86 Ill. App. 3d at 542 (trial court's 
consideration of section 503(d) factors "may well sustain a 
decision to apportion all of a workman's compensation award to the 
injured party"). Therefore, where section 503 of the Act adequately 
protects workers' compensation recipients from losing their fair 
share of such awards in dissolution cases, there is no reason to 
abandon its dictates in favor of another mechanism. 
     In the instant case, the trial court awarded respondent 30% of 
the workers' compensation settlement. A trial court's distribution 
of marital assets will not be disturbed unless the court clearly 
abused its discretion. See In re Marriage of Aschwanden,  82 Ill. 2d 31 , 36-38 (1980); see also Hall, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 785. Further, 
the question is not whether a reviewing court agrees with the trial 
court; rather, an abuse of discretion occurs only where no 
reasonable person would take the view adopted by the court. See 
Hall, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 785. Here, the trial court specifically 
stated that the settlement was awarded in this manner "in an 
attempt to apportion the assets of the parties equally," taking 
into consideration, inter alia, the fact that petitioner was 
ordered to pay the outstanding marital debts and to pay respondent 
maintenance. The record shows that the trial court considered the 
relevant factors and divided the marital property in what it 
believed to be "just proportions." 750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 1994); 
Aschwanden, 82 Ill. 2d  at 37. Because we cannot say that no 
reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court, 
we find no abuse of discretion. 
     For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the appellate 
court is affirmed. 
 
 Affirmed.