Case Title: Riverside County Sheriff's Dep’t v. Stiglitz

Citation: 

Docket Number: S206350

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2014-12-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed 12/1/14 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
RIVERSIDE COUNTY SHERIFF‘S  
) 
DEPARTMENT, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S206350 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/2 E052729 
JAN STIGLITZ, as Hearing Officer, etc., 
) 
 
) 
Riverside County 
 
Defendant and Respondent; 
) 
Super. Ct. No. RIC10004998 
 
 
) 
KRISTY DRINKWATER,  
) 
 
 
) 
 
Real Party in Interest and  
) 
 
Respondent; 
) 
 
 
) 
RIVERSIDE SHERIFFS‘  
) 
ASSOCIATION, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Intervener and Appellant. 
) 
 
____________________________________) 
 
) 
RIVERSIDE COUNTY SHERIFF‘S  
) 
DEPARTMENT, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 4/2 E052807 
JAN STIGLITZ, as Hearing Officer, etc., 
) 
 
) 
Riverside County 
 
Defendant and Respondent; 
) 
Super. Ct. No. RIC10004998 
 
 
) 
KRISTY DRINKWATER, 
) 
 
 
) 
2 
 
 
Real Party in Interest and 
) 
 
Appellant. 
) 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Here we hold that when hearing an administrative appeal from discipline 
imposed on a correctional officer, an arbitrator may rule upon a discovery motion 
for officer personnel records, commonly referred to as a Pitchess motion.  
(Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess); Evid. Code, §§ 1043, 
1045.)  Evidence Code section 1043 expressly provides that Pitchess motions may 
be filed with an appropriate ―administrative body.‖  The language reflects a 
legislative intent that administrative hearing officers be allowed to rule on these 
motions.  This holding harmonizes the statutory scheme with other Evidence Code 
provisions and furthers the goals of the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of 
Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq.).   
I.  BACKGROUND 
The Riverside County Sheriff‘s Department (the department) fired Deputy 
Kristy Drinkwater for falsifying her payroll forms.  A memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) between the Riverside Sheriffs‘ Association (Sheriffs‘ 
Association) and the county provided for an administrative appeal.  The parties 
chose arbitrator Jan Stiglitz as the hearing officer.   
Drinkwater intended to urge a disparate treatment defense, claiming that 
others had committed similar misconduct but were not fired.  Accordingly, she 
sought discovery of redacted records ―from personnel investigations of any 
Department employees who have been disciplined for similar acts of misconduct.‖  
(See Pegues v. Civil Service Com. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 95, 105-106; Talmo v. 
Civil Service Com. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 210, 229-231.)  Limiting her request to 
events during the previous five years, she sought incident summaries, the rank of 
3 
 
the officer, and the discipline imposed.  The department objected, arguing in part 
that Drinkwater could not satisfy the requirements for a Pitchess motion under 
Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045, and could not establish the good cause 
required for discovery.  Stiglitz denied the motion without prejudice, ruling the 
department need not search its records for similar disciplinary cases.  Instead, 
Drinkwater was obligated to identify particular officers whose records she 
believed were relevant to her claim.   
Drinkwater renewed her motion, supported by counsel‘s declaration that 11 
named officers had allegedly committed similar misconduct but received little or 
no discipline.  Stiglitz ordered production of the 11 officers‘ records for in camera 
review.   
The department sought a writ of administrative mandate in superior court.  
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.)  It argued initially that Drinkwater failed to 
establish good cause for discovery because counsel‘s declaration was speculative 
and Pitchess discovery was only available for officers involved in the underlying 
incident at issue.  The department then filed a supplemental brief citing the recent 
case of Brown v. Valverde (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1531 (Brown).  Brown held 
that a driver facing a license suspension for driving under the influence could not 
seek Pitchess discovery in a Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) administrative 
proceeding.  (See discussion, post.)  Relying upon Brown, the department argued 
only judicial officers could grant Pitchess motions, depriving Stiglitz of authority 
to rule.  The superior court agreed and granted mandate, ordering Stiglitz to 
reverse his prior order.   
The Sheriffs‘ Association sought to intervene, moving to set aside the 
mandate order and to secure a new hearing.  Intervention was granted.  After 
additional briefing and a new hearing, the superior court again granted the 
department‘s mandate petition, relying upon Brown.   
4 
 
Drinkwater and intervener Sheriffs‘ Association sought review.  In 
consolidated appeals, the Court of Appeal reversed, distinguishing Brown and 
criticizing its reasoning.  We affirm.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
The department again urges that only judicial officers are authorized to rule 
on Pitchess motions.  That argument fails in light of the governing statutes.   
A.  The Pitchess Statutes 
In Pitchess, this court held a criminal defendant could obtain discovery of 
certain law enforcement personnel records upon a sufficient showing of good 
cause.  (Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 537-540.)  ―In 1978, the California 
Legislature codified the privileges and procedures surrounding what had come to 
be known as ‗Pitchess motions‘ . . . through the enactment of Penal Code sections 
832.7 and 832.8 and Evidence Code sections 1043 through 1045.‖  (City of Santa 
Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 81, fn. omitted (City of Santa 
Cruz).)  Those sections create a statutory scheme making these records 
confidential and subject to discovery only through the procedure set out in the 
Evidence Code.  (City of Santa Cruz, at pp. 81-82.)  The sole issue here is 
whether, by statute, these motions may only be ruled on in the superior court, or 
whether they can be resolved by an administrative hearing officer.  In answering 
this question of statutory interpretation, our goal is to effectuate the Legislature‘s 
intent.  (People v. Johnson (2013) 57 Cal.4th 250, 260; People v. Cornett (2012) 
53 Cal.4th 1261, 1265.)  ― ‗When interpreting statutes, we begin with the plain, 
commonsense meaning of the language used by the Legislature.  [Citation.]  If the 
language is unambiguous, the plain meaning controls.‘  [Citation.]  ‗[W]henever 
possible, significance must be given to every word [in a statute] in pursuing the 
legislative purpose, and the court should avoid a construction that makes some 
5 
 
words surplusage.‘  [Citation.]  ‗[W]e may reject a literal construction that is 
contrary to the legislative intent apparent in the statute or that would lead to absurd 
results . . . .‘  [Citation.]‖  (People v. Rodriguez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1125, 1131; 
accord, Voices of the Wetlands v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2011) 52 
Cal.4th 499, 518-519.)  We consider the applicable statutes in turn.   
Penal Code section 832.7, subdivision (a) provides in part:  ―Peace officer 
or custodial officer personnel records and records maintained by any state or local 
agency pursuant to [Penal Code] Section 832.5 [regarding the investigation and 
retention of citizen complaints], or information obtained from these records, are 
confidential and shall not be disclosed in any criminal or civil proceeding except 
by discovery pursuant to Sections 1043 and 1046 of the Evidence Code.‖  (Italics 
added.)  Penal Code section 832.8 defines ―personnel records,‖ a definition not 
disputed here.1   
Evidence Code section 1043, subdivision (a) reads in part:  ―In any case in 
which discovery or disclosure is sought of peace or custodial officer personnel 
records . . . , the party seeking the discovery or disclosure shall file a written 
motion with the appropriate court or administrative body . . . .‖  (Italics added.)  
The expansive language of Evidence Code section 1043, subdivision (a) does two 
things.  First, it makes clear that Pitchess motions may be brought in both civil and 
criminal cases.  (See Commission on Peace Officer Standards & Training v. 
Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 278, 293 (Peace Officer Standards); Pen. Code, 
                                              
1  
Penal Code section 832.8 defines personnel records as any file maintained 
under an individual‘s name by his or her employer, and includes information such 
as personal data, medical history, employee ―advancement, appraisal, or 
discipline,‖ complaints or investigation of complaints pertaining to the 
performance of the officer‘s duties, and ―[a]ny other information the disclosure of 
which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.‖   
6 
 
§ 832.7, subd. (f).)  Second, Evidence Code section 1043 specifically states the 
motion should be filed in the appropriate court ―or administrative body.‖  Sections 
1043 and 1045 appear in division 8 of the Evidence Code dealing with privileges.  
Chapter 4, article 9 of that division contains definitions to govern the construction 
of sections contained in division 8.  Evidence Code section 901 expansively 
defines a ―proceeding‖ as ―any action, hearing, investigation, inquest, or inquiry 
(whether conducted by a court, administrative agency, hearing officer, arbitrator, 
legislative body, or any other person authorized by law) in which, pursuant to law, 
testimony can be compelled to be given.‖  (Italics added.)  The Law Revision 
Commission explained that this definition included ―administrative proceedings‖ 
and ―arbitration proceedings‖ (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., reprinted at 29B pt. 
3A West‘s Ann. Evid. Code (2009 ed.) foll. § 901, p. 213), and that this broad 
definition was necessary to protect privileges by making them applicable to 
nonjudicial proceedings (id., foll. § 910, pp. 216-217).   
As explained in City of Santa Cruz, Evidence Code section 1043 sets out 
the initial good cause showing an applicant must make to even begin the discovery 
process.  If that showing is successful, Evidence Code section 1045 governs the 
conduct of the resultant hearing in camera.  The materials sought must be shown 
―relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation.‖  (Evid. Code, 
§ 1045, subd. (a).)  Certain categories of information are not discoverable.2  (Evid. 
Code, § 1045, subds. (a), (b); see City of Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 83.)   
                                              
2  
Information excluded from disclosure include complaints regarding 
incidents occurring five or more years before the event at issue, facts ―that are so 
remote as to make disclosure of little or no practical benefit,‖ and, in any criminal 
case, the conclusions of an officer investigating a complaint.  (Evid. Code, § 1045, 
subd. (b).)   
7 
 
B.  Evidence Code Section 1043 and the Lack of a Transfer Mechanism 
The department observes that Evidence Code section 1045 repeatedly refers 
to ―the court‖ as the entity that must conduct an in camera review, determine 
relevance, and issue appropriate protective orders.  It argues that because ―the 
court‖ appears five3 times in Evidence Code section 1045, these references trump 
the single reference to ―administrative body‖ in Evidence Code section 1043.  The 
department argues that although Evidence Code section 1043 mandates that 
Pitchess motions be filed in ―the appropriate court or administrative body,‖ 
Evidence Code section 1045‘s repeated reference to ―the court‖ means that only 
judicial officers may rule on them.   
This argument fails for several reasons.  First, it simply reads 
―administrative body‖ out of Evidence Code section 1043.  If the Legislature 
intended that only the superior court could rule on Pitchess motions, it could easily 
have said so.  There is no discernable reason why the Legislature would expressly 
provide in Evidence Code section 1043 that a Pitchess motion may be filed before 
an administrative body, then implicitly suggest in Evidence Code section 1045 that 
such a body was powerless to act upon the motion because only ―the court‖ may 
conduct the required in camera review.  Indeed, such an interpretation would mean 
the Legislature had expressly provided for the doing of an idle act:  filing a motion 
in a body not authorized to rule on it.   
                                              
3  
See Evidence Code section 1045, subdivisions (b) (―In determining 
relevance, the court shall examine . . . :‖), (c) (―the court shall consider . . . .‖), (d) 
(―the court may make any order which justice requires . . . .‖), (e) (―The court 
shall . . . order that the records disclosed or discovered may not be used for any 
purpose other than a court proceeding pursuant to applicable law.‖).  The 
department counts as a sixth reference the use of ―the court‖ in Evidence Code 
section 915, subdivision (b).  This statute predated the statutory Pitchess scheme, 
and its reference to ―the court‖ does not support the department‘s position in any 
event.   
8 
 
Second, the argument completely ignores the broad definition of 
―proceeding‖ in Evidence Code section 901, which includes administrative 
hearings and arbitrations.  Disregarding that section violates the principle that we 
consider the language of the entire scheme and related statutes, harmonizing the 
terms when possible.  If any ambiguity remains, we may examine the legislative 
history and the stated purpose of the scheme to guide our interpretation.  (See 
Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 55 
Cal.4th 783, 803.)  Evidence Code section 900 reflects a legislative mandate that 
the definitions provided ―govern the construction‖ of the division in which 
Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 appear.   
Further, had the Legislature intended that Pitchess motions could only be 
conducted in the superior court, it could have provided a mechanism to transfer a 
motion from an administrative proceeding to the superior courts.  It did not do so.  
Evidence Code section 1043 makes no provision for the transfer of Pitchess 
motions from an administrative setting to the superior court.  The parties agree that 
no other statute authorizes such a transfer.  A transfer procedure would require the 
creation of an extraordinary procedure because, in a case like this one, there is no 
case or controversy pending in the superior court.   
While the parties cite no statutory transfer mechanism, amici curiae suggest 
one may be found through various other provisions.  The Los Angeles Police 
Protective League (the Protective League) points to two statutes that might permit 
an extraordinary transfer.  First, it cites Code of Civil Procedure4 section 1281.8, 
subdivision (b), which allows a party in arbitration to file in superior court ―an 
application for a provisional remedy in connection with an arbitrable controversy, 
                                              
4  
Unspecified statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.   
9 
 
but only upon the ground that the award to which the applicant may be entitled 
may be rendered ineffectual without provisional relief.‖  (Italics added.)  ―The 
logical reason for the requirement that an applicant be required to show that an 
arbitration award may be rendered ineffectual is to ensure that the court does not 
invade the province of the arbitrator—i.e., the court should be empowered to grant 
provisional relief in an arbitrable controversy only where the arbitrator‘s award 
may not be adequate to make the aggrieved party whole.‖  (Woolley v. Embassy 
Suites, Inc. (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 1520, 1527, italics added; see California Retail 
Portfolio Fund GMBH & Co. KG v. Hopkins Real Estate Group (2011) 193 
Cal.App.4th 849, 856.)  Section 1281.8, thus, does not speak to any and all types 
of harm.  It addresses only a circumstance in which a party might prevail in an 
arbitration but still have no recourse due to some changing condition.  (See 
California Retail Portfolio Fund GMBH & Co. KG, at pp. 859-862 [affirming writ 
of attachment under section 1281.8 due to the defendant‘s potential insolvency, 
which might have rendered an arbitration award ineffectual].)   
This scheme does not apply here.  Initially, section 1281.8 only applies to 
applications by parties.  There may be instances in which the custodian of records 
is not a party to the arbitration.  Here, although the department is a party, the only 
substantive ―award‖ to which it may be entitled in the arbitration is a confirmation 
that its decision to terminate Drinkwater was proper.  The department does not 
explain how that potential confirmation would be rendered ineffectual by 
production of the records sought, or by any proper order of disclosure.   
The Protective League also cites a provision of the Public Safety Officers 
Procedural Bill of Rights Act (POBRA) (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq.).  Government 
Code section 3309.5, subdivision (d)(1) provides:  ―In any case where the superior 
court finds that a public safety department has violated any of the provisions of 
this chapter, the court shall render appropriate injunctive or other extraordinary 
10 
 
relief to remedy the violation and to prevent future violations of a like or similar 
nature, including, but not limited to, the granting of a temporary restraining order, 
preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction prohibiting the public safety 
department from taking any punitive action against the public safety officer.‖  This 
provision was enacted to prevent police departments from violating the rights of 
officers.  (See Jaramillo v. County of Orange (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 811, 827-
828.)  It simply does not speak to the situation at issue here.  Further, nothing in 
the POBRA‘s general grant of a right to administrative appeal (Gov. Code, 
§§ 3304, subd. (b), 3304.5) suggests an authorization to transfer a matter from an 
administrative proceeding to the superior court.   
The California State Association of Counties and the California League of 
Cities suggest a writ of administrative mandate might provide a transfer 
mechanism.  They propose that the hearing officer could begin the Pitchess 
inquiry under Evidence Code section 1043.  If the hearing officer finds a good 
cause showing has been made, a party may seek administrative mandate.  The 
superior court could then review the records under Evidence Code section 1045.   
Such an interpretation would morph the mandate statute beyond its 
delineated contours.  The Code of Civil Procedure permits administrative mandate 
for inquiry ―into the validity of any final administrative order,‖ but only as to 
―whether the respondent has proceeded without, or in excess of, jurisdiction; 
whether there was a fair trial; and whether there was any prejudicial abuse of 
discretion.‖  (§ 1094.5, subds. (a), (b).)  In that mandate proceeding, the superior 
court would only be empowered to review the propriety of the good cause 
determination and production order.  If it determined that the order was proper, the 
court‘s review role would end.  The authority conferred under section 1094.5 does 
not grant the court broader jurisdiction to actually conduct a review of the records 
11 
 
produced.  Nor does it create a cause or controversy beyond the question referred 
to in the statutory language.   
Similarly, we are not authorized to create a nonstatutory transfer 
mechanism here.  Drinkwater cites section 187, which states:  ―When jurisdiction 
is, by the Constitution or this Code, or by any other statute, conferred on a Court 
or judicial officer, all the means necessary to carry it into effect are also given; and 
in the exercise of this jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding be not specifically 
pointed out by this Code or the statute, any suitable process or mode of proceeding 
may be adopted which may appear most conformable to the spirit of this code.‖  
―The section does not speak to jurisdiction; it does not create jurisdiction; rather, 
the existence of jurisdiction is the premise for its application.  Where jurisdiction 
exists from other sources, Code of Civil Procedure section 187 grants courts 
authority to exercise any of their various powers as may be necessary to carry out 
that jurisdiction.‖  (People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 338 
(Picklesimer).)   
Code of Civil Procedure section 187 (CCP section 187) comes into play 
only when a court has lawful jurisdiction.  No statute confers jurisdiction on the 
superior court to hear a Pitchess motion when, as here, the motion is filed with an 
administrative hearing officer.  Neither Evidence Code section 1045 nor Evidence 
Code section 915 speaks to jurisdiction.  (See discussion, post.)  At most, those 
provisions describe the duties of a court if the motion is properly before it.  Only 
Evidence Code section 1043, which allows a Pitchess motion to be filed ―with the 
appropriate court or administrative body,‖ speaks to jurisdiction.  This 
understanding is confirmed by Evidence Code section 1043, subdivision (b)(3), 
which provides that a motion must include affidavits that ―set[] forth the 
materiality thereof to the subject matter involved in the pending litigation . . . .‖  
(Italics added.)  Here, the pending litigation is the administrative appeal conducted 
12 
 
pursuant to the MOU.  The only express grant of jurisdiction reflected in the 
Pitchess statutes allows the matter to be placed before the hearing officer.  CCP 
section 187 requires an independent grant of jurisdiction by constitution or statute.  
Evidence Code section 1043 articulates the appropriate venue for the filing of a 
Pitchess motion.  These provisions, read together, do not authorize the judicial 
creation of a transfer mechanism from the hearing officer to superior court.  (See 
Picklesimer, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 338 [refusing to apply CCP § 187 to find the 
superior court had jurisdiction to hear a postjudgment motion for relief from an 
improper sex offender registration requirement]; Swarthout v. Superior Court 
(2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 701, 707-708 [same as to a postconviction motion to 
transfer an inmate]; People v. Ainsworth (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 247, 254-255 
[same as to postconviction discovery motion].)   
Drinkwater also suggests that ―all courts have inherent supervisory or 
administrative powers which enable them to carry out their duties, and which exist 
apart from any statutory authority.‖  This argument suffers the same defect as the 
one above.  Courts have supervisory authority to ― ‗control litigation before 
them. . . .  [Citation.]‘ ‖  (In re Reno (2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 522, italics added.)  A 
court has no authority to confer jurisdiction upon itself where none exists.  Indeed, 
in Pitchess itself, although we suggested that a court had ―inherent power to order 
discovery when the interests of justice so demand‖ (Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d at 
p. 535), there was no question that the court had jurisdiction over the pending 
criminal case.  Similar exercises of a court‘s inherent supervisory authority have 
occurred in the context of a court that already had jurisdiction over the matter.5   
                                              
5  
See Shively v. Stewart (1966) 65 Cal.2d 475, 479-480 (nonstatutory 
discovery); Citizens Utilities Co. v. Superior Court (1963) 59 Cal.2d 805, 811-813 
(compensation for mandatory improvements made after condemnation); Tide 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
13 
 
The Legislature did not specify a transfer mechanism in the Pitchess 
statutes.  No other statute or authority exists for such a transfer.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that by expressly permitting filing with an appropriate administrative 
body in Evidence Code section 1043, the Legislature intended to allow 
administrative hearing officers to decide such motions without court intervention.  
The department‘s contrary construction of the scheme violates ―the rule of 
construction that courts should, if possible, accord meaning to every word and 
phrase in a statute to effectuate the Legislature‘s intent.‖  (People v. Cobb (2010) 
48 Cal.4th 243, 253; St. Marie v. Riverside County Regional Park & Open-Space 
Dist. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 282, 289.)  There is no indication the Legislature 
contemplated the filing of an ineffectual motion with a body that could not 
consider it.   
C.  Evidence Code Sections 1045 and 915 
Evidence Code section 1045‘s repeated reference to the duties of ―the 
court‖ can be understood in the context of the legislative history of the Pitchess 
statutes.  When Evidence Code sections 1043 and 1045 were enacted, the 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
Water Associated Oil Co. v. Superior Court (1955) 43 Cal.2d 815, 825-826 (cross-
complaints); People v. Castello (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1246-1250 
(reconsideration of interim ruling); In re Amber S. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1260, 
1263-1267 (control of testimony); Cottle v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 
1367, 1376-1381 (exclusion of evidence); Asbestos Claims Facility v. Berry & 
Berry (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 9, 18-23 (designating defense counsel program in 
asbestos litigation); Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. Superior Court (1988) 200 
Cal.App.3d 272, 286-291 (evidence sanction); James v. Superior Court (1978) 77 
Cal.App.3d 169, 175-176 (juvenile competency hearing); cf. Rutherford v. Owens-
Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967-968 (control of litigation); Walker v. 
Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 266-267 (preunification authority to transfer 
cases to the municipal court).   
14 
 
Legislature was focused primarily upon our Pitchess decision and its 
consequences in the context of criminal prosecutions, which obviously occur 
before courts.  ―After this court rendered its decision, concerns were expressed to 
the Legislature that, in response to Pitchess, law enforcement departments were 
destroying personnel records in order to prevent discovery; in some instances, 
criminal charges had been dismissed because the records to which the defendant 
would have been entitled no longer were available.  (See Sen. Com. on Judiciary, 
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1436 (1977–1978 Reg. Sess.) as introduced, p. 7; Sen. 
Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1436 (1977–1978 Reg. Sess.) as 
amended Apr. 3, 1978; Assem. Com. on Crim. Justice, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 
1436 (1977–1978 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 7, 1978.)  As a result of these 
concerns, Senate Bill No. 1436 was enacted, requiring that records relating to 
citizen complaints be maintained for a period of five years.  (Stats. 1978, ch. 630, 
§ 4, p. 2083, amending [Pen. Code,] § 832.5, subd. (b).)  The statute also 
established procedures, consistent with Pitchess, permitting discovery of peace 
officer personnel records in civil or criminal cases only after an in camera review 
of the records by a judge and a determination that the information sought is 
relevant to the pending litigation.  (Stats. 1978, ch. 630, §§ 1 & 3, pp. 2082–2083, 
adding Evid. Code, §§ 1043 & 1045.)‖  (Peace Officer Standards, supra, 42 
Cal.4th at p. 293.)   
The reality that Pitchess motions are so frequently made in the context of 
criminal prosecutions would explain why Evidence Code section 1045 references 
―the court.‖  However, the Legislature recognized in Evidence Code section 1043 
that Pitchess motions may be relevant in other contexts, thus explaining its broad 
language allowing the filing of the motion in ―any case‖ before ―the appropriate 
court or administrative body.‖  Given the legislative history of the Pitchess 
statutes, the expansive language of Evidence Code section 1043, and the absence 
15 
 
of a transfer mechanism, the Legislature‘s reference to ―the court‖ in Evidence 
Code section 1045 cannot be interpreted as a coded expression of legislative intent 
to substantively limit who may rule on Pitchess motions.   
The department argues that Evidence Code section 915 constitutes such a 
substantive limitation.  Evidence Code section 915, subdivision (a) states that in 
ruling on a claim of privilege, the presiding officer cannot require disclosure of the 
assertedly privileged information before ruling on the privilege claim.  Evidence 
Code section 915, subdivision (b) provides an exception when the court is unable 
to rule unless it knows the content of the assertedly privileged information.  In 
such a case, the court may order the disputed information disclosed for review in 
chambers.  The Law Revision Commission‘s comments following Evidence Code 
section 915 noted that ―[t]he exception in subdivision (b) applies only when a 
court is ruling on the claim of privilege.  Thus, in view of subdivision (a), 
disclosure of the information cannot be required, for example, in an administrative 
proceeding.‖  (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B pt. 3A West‘s Ann. Evid. 
Code, supra, foll. § 915, p. 256.)   
The department observes Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b) 
directs that ―[i]n determining relevance, the court shall examine the [sought] 
information in chambers in conformity with Section 915 . . . .‖  Because Evidence 
Code section 915 does not mention administrative proceedings, the department 
argues hearing officers have no authority to decide Pitchess motions.  The 
department‘s argument is unpersuasive for several reasons.  First, Evidence Code 
section 1045 simply requires that an in camera Pitchess hearing must be had ―in 
conformity with‖ Evidence Code section 915, ― ‗i.e., out of the presence of all 
persons except the person authorized to claim the privilege and such other persons 
as he or she is willing to have present . . . .‘ ‖  (Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 
Cal.4th 1033, 1038 (Alford); see City of Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 83.)  
16 
 
We observed in People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216 (Mooc):  ―[T]o protect the 
officer‘s privacy, the examination of documents and questioning of the custodian 
should be done in camera in accordance with the requirements of Evidence Code 
section 915, and the transcript of the in camera hearing and all copies of the 
documents should be sealed.‖  (Id. at p. 1229.)  Thus, we have recognized that 
Evidence Code section 1045 referenced Evidence Code section 915 only to the 
extent the latter provision defined what procedure was required at an in camera 
hearing, not who would conduct the hearing.  The department‘s reading of the 
statute would render the reference to Evidence Code section 915 mere surplusage.   
Second, section 915 was enacted as part of the original Evidence Code in 
1965.  The Law Revision Commission‘s comment predated both our Pitchess 
decision and the Legislature‘s subsequent codification of it.  It is, then, a poor 
indicator of legislative intent as to the proper scope of the Pitchess scheme.  The 
commission‘s comments informed the Legislature‘s understanding at the time it 
enacted the Evidence Code.  They did not bar the Legislature from taking future 
action, as it did when it amended the code 13 years later following this court‘s 
Pitchess decision.  (Cf. Duarte v. Chino Community Hospital (1999) 72 
Cal.App.4th 849, 856, fn. 3.)   
Third, and most problematic, the department‘s interpretation of Evidence 
Code section 915 suffers from the same defect as its interpretation of Evidence 
Code section 1045.  It requires us to conclude that the Legislature intended to also 
permit Pitchess filings with an appropriate ―administrative body‖ under Evidence 
Code section 1043, yet render that body unable to act on them.  The Legislature 
could not have intended to provide for the idle act of filing ineffectual motions.   
17 
 
D.  The Purposes Behind the Pitchess Statutes and POBRA 
Our conclusion is also consistent with the purposes behind the POBRA.  
The POBRA, to which these parties have contractually bound themselves, ―sets 
forth a number of basic rights and protections which must be accorded individual 
public safety officers by the public agencies which employ them.‖  (White v. 
County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 679.)  Included is the right to 
administratively appeal an adverse employment decision, ―to give a peace officer 
‗an opportunity . . . ―to convince the employing agency to reverse its decision‖ ‘ to 
take punitive action.‖  (Copley Press, Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 
1272, 1287 (Copley Press), italics omitted; County of Riverside v. Superior Court 
(2002) 27 Cal.4th 793, 799.)  The Legislature declared that ―effective law 
enforcement depends upon the maintenance of stable . . . relations, between public 
safety employees and their employers,‖ and that basic protections for officers were 
necessary to preserve that stability.  (Gov. Code, § 3301.)  Allowing relevant 
discovery to be ordered in an administrative hearing furthers these goals.   
Our conclusion is also consistent with the overall aims of the Pitchess 
scheme.  Although the department adamantly argues the sole purpose of the 
statutes was to rein in Pitchess motions, that characterization is not entirely 
accurate.  As discussed, the Pitchess statutes reflected the Legislature‘s attempt to 
balance a litigant‘s discovery interest with an officer‘s confidentiality interest.  
(See Peace Officer Standards, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 293; Garcia v. Superior 
Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 63, 69-70 (Garcia); City of Santa Cruz, supra, 49 Cal.3d 
at p. 84.)  Whether filed before a court or an administrative hearing officer, 
interests must still be balanced when ruling on a Pitchess motion.   
We emphasize that here there is no question hearing officer Stiglitz, an 
attorney, is qualified to rule on the Pitchess motion.  The MOU provides that a 
hearing officer be selected from a mutually agreed-upon list.  (MOU, art. XII, 
18 
 
§ 14, subd. A.)  If the department believed Stiglitz was not qualified for any 
reason, it could have removed him from the list or stricken him as an available 
hearing officer in this case.  In any event, the Legislature in Evidence Code section 
914 has determined that hearing officers generally have the authority to rule on 
claims of privilege in the same manner as courts.6   
Further, we observe that this case reflects several safeguards against 
improper disclosure of confidential records.  The MOU here expressly provides 
that the administrative hearing is a ―private proceeding‖ between the disciplined 
officer and the county.  (MOU, art. XII, § 14, subd. (H)(9).)  Officer personnel 
records are confidential under Penal Code section 832.7, and we have held such 
records produced at administrative disciplinary proceedings are not subject to 
public disclosure.  (See Copley Press, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 1286-1299.)  In 
addition, any discovered records may only be used in the proceeding at issue.7  
(See Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. (e); Alford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 1039-1043.)   
An additional confidentiality safeguard appears in Evidence Code section 
1045, subdivision (c), which provides that ―[i]n determining relevance where the 
issue in litigation concerns the policies or pattern of conduct of the employing 
agency, the court shall consider whether the information sought may be obtained 
from other records maintained by the employing agency in the regular course of 
agency business which would not necessitate the disclosure of individual 
                                              
6  
See Evidence Code section 914, subdivision (a) (―The presiding officer 
shall determine a claim of privilege in any proceeding in the same manner as a 
court determines such a claim under Article 2 (commencing with Section 400) of 
Chapter 4 of Division 3.‖). 
7  
The parties are free to include other protective language in their MOUs, 
including an explicit agreement that any Pitchess material can only be used in 
connection with the proceeding in which it is sought.   
19 
 
personnel records.‖  Thus, upon an appropriate finding, other data could be 
released in lieu of personnel records.   
We have also clarified that an officer‘s entire personnel file need not be 
presented for review, only materials of the type requested.  (Mooc, supra, 26 
Cal.4th at pp. 1228-1230.)  In the present case, such materials would be limited to 
incidents involving conduct similar to Drinkwater‘s.  This limitation balances 
privacy interests while permitting focused discovery.   
The department does not argue that Drinkwater‘s disparate treatment 
defense is invalid or that the discovery she seeks is irrelevant to that defense.  
Accordingly, we have no occasion to discuss the availability or scope of such a 
defense.  Drinkwater‘s Pitchess motion also named the specific officers whose 
records she sought, reducing the possibility of an improper ―fishing expedition.‖   
The department relies heavily upon Brown, supra, 183 Cal.App.4th 1531, a 
case readily distinguishable.  Brown concluded that a Pitchess motion was 
inconsistent with the statutory scheme by which a driver‘s license may be 
suspended after a drunk driving arrest.  The Brown court reasoned a Pitchess 
motion would frustrate the Legislature‘s aim to quickly remove unsafe drivers 
from the road using an administrative procedure.  Further, the hearing addressed 
only whether the licensee drove with a blood-alcohol level above the legal limit.  
The relevance of Pitchess discovery in that context was questionable.  (Brown, at 
pp. 1555-1557.)  To the extent Brown rejected the claim ―that the Legislature 
intended Pitchess discovery to be available in all administrative proceedings‖ 
where an officer‘s credibility was at issue (id., at p. 1555, italics added), such 
conclusion is inapposite here.  The department concedes that the discovery 
Drinkwater seeks is relevant to the review of her discipline and does not bear on 
the credibility of officers whose records are sought.  The question here is not 
whether those officers might be credible, but whether department decisionmakers 
20 
 
granted those officers disparate treatment.  Additionally, unlike the license 
suspension context, allowing Pitchess motions in this case furthers the goals of the 
POBRA, and honors the Legislature‘s Pitchess scheme.  In any case, ― ‗ ―[i]t is 
axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered.‖ ‘ ‖  
(McWilliams v. City of Long Beach (2013) 56 Cal.4th 613, 626; People v. Johnson 
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 519, 528.)  The precedential value of Brown is limited to its 
facts involving a driver‘s license suspension.   
E.  Evidence Code Section 1047 
The department argues that, because the officers whose records Drinkwater 
has requested had nothing to do with her termination, she is not entitled to 
discovery.  In support, the department cites Evidence Code section 1047, which 
provides in part:  ―Records of peace officers or custodial officers . . . who either 
were not present during the arrest or had no contact with the party seeking 
disclosure from the time of the arrest until the time of booking, or who were not 
present at the time the conduct is alleged to have occurred within a jail facility, 
shall not be subject to disclosure.‖  The department‘s reading of this statute was 
rejected in Alt v. Superior Court (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 950.  Alt reasoned that 
Evidence Code section 1047 only applies if the discovery request relates to an 
incident involving an arrest or its equivalent.  When, as here, the discovery request 
is unrelated to an arrest, Evidence Code section 1047‘s limitation does not apply.  
As Alt observed, a contrary conclusion ―would largely supplant the general 
discovery standards set forth in sections 1043 and 1045.  [A contrary] 
interpretation of section 1047 would mean that police personnel information could 
be discovered only if there had been an arrest or contact between arrest and 
21 
 
booking, and in no other situation.  This reading runs counter to Memro‘s[8] 
observation that sections 1043 and 1045 do not limit discovery of police personnel 
records to cases involving altercations between police officers and arrestees.‖  
(Alt, at pp. 957-958.)   
Evidence Code section 1047‘s legislative history supports Alt‘s conclusion.  
The proponents of the provision urged its purpose was to deter frivolous Pitchess 
requests made by criminal defendants ―as a bargaining tool to attempt to reduce 
pending criminal charges‖ ―made primarily to harass the officers and supervisors 
within police and sheriff‘s departments.‖  (Sen. Judiciary Com., analysis of 
Assem. Bill No. 1112 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.) July 3, 1985, p. 3.)  The Senate 
Judiciary Committee analysis observed:  ―The bill would only pertain to cases 
alleging the use of excessive force by a peace officer in connection with an arrest.  
It would not apply where the person had only been detained and not arrested.  [¶] 
This distinction appears well founded:  since the person had not been arrested 
there would be no incentive to file a frivolous request.‖  (Id. at p. 4.)  This analysis 
expressly alerted the Legislature to the limitation recognized by Alt.   
F.  The Dissenting Opinion 
The dissenting opinion concludes that an administrative hearing officer is 
empowered to rule on a Pitchess motion, but may not compel production of 
personnel records for in camera review before it rules.  (Conc. & dis. opn., post, at 
pp. 11-12.)  It suggests that if the custodian of records voluntarily produces the 
records ―with the consent of the officer whose personnel records are sought, the 
matter is at an end.‖  (Id. at p. 12.)  If the custodian refuses to comply, the party 
                                              
8  
People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, overruled on another ground in 
People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 181, footnote 2. 
22 
 
seeking discovery may seek to have the matter referred to the superior court.  
Under the dissent‘s proposal, after such a transfer, the court could then review 
materials in camera to decide whether it should order discovery and make any 
protective order.  (Ibid.)   
The dissent cites Evidence Code section 914, subdivision (b), which 
provides that a person may not be held in contempt for failing to disclose 
privileged information unless by order of court, and Code of Civil Procedure 
section 1991, which empowers a hearing officer to report to the superior court a 
witness‘s disobedience to a subpoena or refusal to answer a question and to seek a 
court order compelling compliance.  The dissent suggests this scheme applies to 
Pitchess motions before administrative hearing officers.  (See conc. & dis. opn., 
post, at pp. 13-15.)   
This proposal is inconsistent with the Pitchess statutes.  Most 
fundamentally, under the dissent‘s view, an in camera review of personnel records 
would no longer be required prior to disclosure.  Under the cited scheme of Code 
of Civil Procedure section 1991, the superior court would become involved only if 
the custodian of records refused to comply with the disclosure order.  The dissent 
asserts that if the custodian voluntarily complies with the disclosure order, ―the 
matter is at an end‖ without any in camera review by anyone.  (Conc. & dis. opn., 
post, at p. 12.)   
The Legislature could not have contemplated such a scheme because 
Evidence Code section 1045 expressly provides that in camera review is 
mandatory before disclosure in every case.  As noted, subdivision (b) of that 
provision requires an examination of the records to exclude complaints about 
conduct ―occurring more than five years‖ earlier; the conclusions of any 
investigating officer (in a criminal proceeding); and ―[f]acts sought to be disclosed 
that are so remote as to make disclosure of little or no practical benefit.‖  (Evid. 
23 
 
Code, § 1045, subd. (b).)  ―By providing that the trial court should conduct an in 
camera review, the Legislature balanced the accused‘s need for disclosure of 
relevant information with the law enforcement officer‘s legitimate expectation of 
privacy in his or her personnel records.‖  (Mooc, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1220, maj. 
opn. of Werdegar, J.; see Garcia, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 69-70.)  Nothing in the 
wording of Evidence Code section 1045 remotely suggests the custodian of 
records may waive in camera review, much less conduct the required review on its 
own.   
Indeed, in enacting the Pitchess statutes, the Legislature amended the bill to 
specifically eliminate language in earlier versions that made an in camera review 
optional at the request of the officer or other person who could assert the privilege.  
(See Sen. Bill No. 1436 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Jan. 27, 1978, p. 3; 
Sen. Amend. to Sen. Bill No. 1436 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 3, 1978, p. 3; Sen. 
Amend. to Sen. Bill No. 1436 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 17, 1978, p. 3; Assem. 
Amend. to Sen. Bill No. 1436 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 7, 1978, p. 3.)  
Previous versions of the bill also limited discovery to the identities of 
complainants and witnesses and, in some circumstances, their statements.  They 
also allowed officers an absolute right not to disclose any privileged information 
notwithstanding a court‘s finding that it was relevant to the litigation at issue.  
(See Assem. Com. on Criminal Justice, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1436 (1977-1978 
Reg. Sess.) June 5, 1978, p. 2; Assem. Amend. to Sen. Bill No. 1436 (1977-1978 
Reg. Sess.) Aug. 7, 1978, pp. 4-5.)  It was in this context that legislative 
committee reports provided the assurance that ―[a]ll requests for discovery of 
police personnel records would require that before disclosure could be made the 
judge would have to review, in camera, the records sought, to determine which if 
any of them are relevant to the litigation‖ (Assem. Com. on Criminal Justice, Final 
Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1436 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 30, 1978, p. 2, italics 
24 
 
added), and ―[a]ll requests for discovery would require an in camera hearing at 
which the court would determine the relevancy of the material sought‖ (Assem. 
Com. on Criminal Justice, analysis of proposed amendments to Sen. Bill No. 1436 
(1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 18, 1978, p. 2, italics added, underlining omitted).  
This history reflects that, in exchange for allowing broader discovery of officer 
personnel records and eliminating an officer‘s absolute privilege to foreclose 
discovery of his files, the Legislature considered an in camera review a pivotal and 
necessary protection for officers.  Thus, contrary to the dissent‘s suggestion (see 
conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 8), the focus of the reports was that an in camera 
review would be conducted before disclosure, not on who would conduct the 
review.  The legislative history materials, like Evidence Code section 1045 itself, 
largely assumed a judicial proceeding, and made no mention of any difference in 
procedure between judicial and nonjudicial proceedings.  If the Legislature 
contemplated a difference, as the dissent posits, one would expect the extensive 
legislative history would have mentioned it at least once.   
The dissent asserts the Pitchess statutes ―ensur[ed] that whenever discovery 
was opposed, in camera review would follow as a matter of course.  ([Evid. Code,] 
§ 1045, subd. (b).)‖  (Conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 13, italics added.)  But 
Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b) says nothing about contested 
motions.  It requires a determination of relevance and the conduct of an in camera 
review to exclude certain categories of information regardless of relevance.  
Nothing in the language of the statutory scheme suggests the duty to determine 
relevance may be waived by the custodian of records.  The only reference to 
waiver appears in Evidence Code section 1043, subdivision (c), which provides 
that ―[n]o hearing upon a motion for discovery or disclosure shall be held‖ without 
compliance with notice obligations, including notice to the affected officer, ―or 
upon a waiver of the hearing by the governmental agency identified as having the 
25 
 
records.‖  Thus, while the custodian may waive a hearing on whether good cause 
has been shown, no similar waiver provision appears regarding the duty to find 
relevance under Evidence Code section 1045.  (See California Highway Patrol v. 
Superior Court (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1016 [the trial court conducted an in 
camera review even though the custodian did not oppose the Pitchess motion].)   
The dissent suggests an ―unfortunate consequence‖ of our approach is that 
a nonlawyer might preside over the administrative hearing and ―the nonparty 
peace officer will have no input‖ into his selection.  (Conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 
2.)  The dissent further laments that such a person may order disclosure and 
―formerly confidential records may be opened to inspection.‖  (Ibid.)  These 
comments find no footing in actual practice.  First, a nonparty officer whose 
records are sought would never have input into who would decide the Pitchess 
motion, be it a court or an arbitrator.  In any case, that concern is completely 
unfounded here, where the custodian of records, who is obligated to assert the 
privilege, and the Sheriff‘s Association, which represents the officer, are involved 
in the litigation.  Second, it is simply not so that officer records would be ―opened 
to inspection.‖  (Conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 2.)  As noted, officer records 
disclosed at these private proceedings remain confidential under Penal Code 
section 832.7.  (See Copley Press, supra, 39 Cal.3th at pp. 1286-1299.)  Further, 
the Pitchess statutes themselves restrict use of such records to the proceeding at 
issue.  (Evid. Code, § 1045, subd. (e); Alford, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 1039-1043.)   
The dissent first gleans legislative intent regarding the Pitchess statutes 
from general Evidence Code provisions concerning privileges.  We have already 
addressed the Evidence Code argument, particularly the applicability of Evidence 
Code section 915, at pages 15-16, ante.   
26 
 
Next, the dissent relies on a repealed provision of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA) (Gov. Code, § 11340 et seq.).  Government Code section 
11507.6 allows parties in an APA proceeding to request various pretrial discovery 
from the opposing party.  Under Government Code former section 11507.7, if a 
party failed to comply, the aggrieved party could ―file a verified petition to compel 
discovery in the superior court . . . naming as respondent the party refusing or 
failing to comply with‖ pretrial discovery obligations.  (Gov. Code, former 
§ 11507.7, subd. (a), added by Stats. 1968, ch. 808, § 5, p. 1562.)  The court would 
thereafter rule on the discovery matter, which included the power to review in 
camera materials claimed to be privileged.  (Gov. Code, former § 11507.7, subds. 
(d), (e), added by Stats. 1968, ch. 808, § 5, p. 1563.)  Pointing to this mechanism, 
which existed at the time the Pitchess statutes were enacted, the dissent asserts that 
―the Legislature has taken pains historically to identify and limit who may conduct 
in camera review.‖  (Conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 11.)  It suggests the Legislature 
had these provisions in mind when enacting the Pitchess scheme.   
This reasoning misses the mark.  First, the Legislature has expressly stated 
that officer personnel records ―are confidential and shall not be disclosed in any 
criminal or civil proceeding except by discovery pursuant to Sections 1043 and 
1046 of the Evidence Code.‖  (Pen. Code, § 832.7, subd. (a), italics added.)  We 
have affirmed that ―[t]he Pitchess procedure is the sole and exclusive means‖ to 
obtain Pitchess discovery, and cases ―have rejected attempts to use other discovery 
procedures to obtain Pitchess records.‖  (City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court 
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 1, 21.)  Given the Legislature‘s adoption of the Pitchess statutes 
as the exclusive method for discovery of these records, it is doubtful the 
Legislature contemplated that the repealed APA discovery procedure would apply.  
This is especially true when neither the language nor legislative history of the 
Pitchess statutes makes any reference to the APA.   
27 
 
Second, the Legislature could not have contemplated the former APA 
procedure would apply to Pitchess motions in administrative hearings for the same 
reasons it could not have contemplated application of Code of Civil Procedure 
section 1991.  Like that procedure, Government Code former section 11507.7 
required an aggrieved party to file a discovery motion before the superior court 
would become involved; if a party complied with the discovery request, the court 
would never need to rule or view the records in camera.  Again, the dissent fails to 
explain why the Legislature would have expressly required an in camera review of 
records before disclosure under Evidence Code section 1045, yet countenanced 
application of a scheme that would have allowed disclosure of records without 
such review.   
Third, the motion under Government Code former section 11507.7 only 
applied to discovery violations by parties.  (See Gov. Code, former §§ 11507.6 
[pretrial discovery obligation of parties], 11507.7, subd. (a).)  By contrast, 
Pitchess motions are directed at ―the governmental agency which has custody and 
control of the records‖ (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (a)), even when the custodian is 
not a party to the litigation.  The Legislature could not have believed this vastly 
different scheme would have any application to the Pitchess statutes.   
Fourth, the Legislature‘s subsequent amendment of Government Code 
former section 11507.7 presents strong evidence that the Legislature never 
believed it applied to the Pitchess scheme.  As the dissent acknowledges, the 
Legislature in 1995, as part of a comprehensive overhaul of the APA (see 
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals 
Bd. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 1, 5), amended Government Code former section 11507.7 to 
allow an administrative law judge (ALJ) to rule on discovery matters, which 
included the power to examine privileged materials if necessary to make a ruling.  
(See Gov. Code, § 11507.7, subd. (d).)  An ALJ is a specialized arbitrator on staff 
28 
 
with the Office of Administrative Hearings, and the APA requires all hearings 
under its provisions to be conducted by an ALJ.  (Gov. Code, § 11502, subd. (a).)   
Under the dissent‘s view, the 1995 amendment to the APA created a 
distinction between ALJs and non-ALJ arbitrators.  Thus, with respect to a 
Pitchess motion after 1995, an ALJ now can conduct an in camera review of 
records under Evidence Code section 1045, because Government Code section 
11507.7 generally gives ALJs the power to review privileged materials in camera, 
whereas non-ALJ arbitrators cannot.  The dissent acknowledges that the 
Legislature never amended the Pitchess statutes to reflect this asserted intent.  
Indeed, the dissent, in attacking our interpretation of the scheme, makes much of 
the fact that Evidence Code section 1045 repeatedly uses ―the court,‖ and reasons 
that ―the Legislature has been precise in its choice of terminology‖ and ―[w]e 
should take the Legislature at its word.‖  (Conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 8.)  
However, after 1995, and to this day, Evidence Code section 1045 still uses ―the 
court,‖ making no reference to ALJs or the APA.   
The dissent cannot have it both ways.  If the Legislature intended that the 
1995 amendment of the APA constituted a substantive modification of the 
Pitchess scheme, such a change would have constituted a significant departure in 
the law.  Yet the dissent posits this major change resulted solely from silent 
implication.  It is doubtful that the Legislature would have instituted such a 
significant change through silence.  While the law can occasionally be subtle, we 
should avoid constructions that render it delphic.  Indeed, the 1995 bill constituted 
a comprehensive amendment of the APA and numerous related statutes.  It 
amended or added over 100 different laws spanning 16 codes, including not only 
provisions of the Government, Evidence, and Penal Codes, but sections of the 
Health and Safety, Business and Professions, Labor, Revenue and Taxation, 
Welfare and Institutions, Vehicle, Fish and Game, Financial, Education, Military 
29 
 
and Veterans, Public Resources, Public Utilities, and Unemployment Insurance 
Codes as well.  (See Stats. 1995, ch. 938, pp. 7104-7225.)  It is difficult to believe 
that the Legislature intended the amendment to the APA to change the Pitchess 
statutes, yet chose not to modify them expressly as it did with respect to dozens of 
other statutes tangentially related to the APA.   
Responding to our discussion of Government Code former section 11507.7, 
the dissent states it ―take[s] no position‖ on the interaction between the repealed 
APA procedure and the Pitchess scheme because ―the issue is, after all, long since 
moot.‖  (Conc. & dis. opn., post, at p. 10.)  The dissent suggests we are imputing 
to it a position about the applicability of the APA that it has not taken.  (Id. at p. 
14.)  The dissent misapprehends the import of our discussion.  The dissent asserts 
that ―the Legislature had taken the extraordinary step of creating a special 
statutory transfer mechanism to allow privilege disputes arising in administrative 
matters to be resolved by the only body authorized to conduct in camera review, a 
court.‖  (Id. at p. 1.)  The dissent reasons that the existence of these transfer 
mechanisms shows ―the Legislature took seriously the limits on the powers of 
nonjudicial officers‖ (id. at p. 5), and, thus, the Legislature‘s use of ―the court‖ in 
Evidence Code section 1045 meant only courts are authorized to conduct in 
camera review.  However, as noted, that transfer mechanisms such as Code of 
Civil Procedure section 1991 and Government Code former section 11507.7 do 
not fit the Pitchess procedure shows that the Legislature could not have had them 
in mind when enacting the Pitchess statutes.  And the fact that the Legislature did 
not amend the Pitchess statutes in 1995 when granting ALJs authority to conduct 
in camera review further supports our view that the Legislature did not consider 
the former APA transfer mechanism when enacting the Pitchess scheme.   
Rather than gleaning legislative intent from general statutes of questionable 
applicability, the better view recognizes that the Legislature, by expressly allowing 
30 
 
Pitchess motions to be filed with an appropriate administrative body under 
Evidence Code section 1043, contemplated administrative Pitchess motions from 
the very beginning of the scheme.  To conclude that administrative hearing 
officers lack authority to rule on them effectively reads this language out of the 
statute.  If the Legislature intended to keep hearing officers from ruling on such 
motions, or to require that only courts conduct the in camera review, it certainly 
could have done so by providing that such motions not be filed before hearing 
officers, or by expressly creating a transfer mechanism to the superior court.  It did 
neither.  Our conclusion harmonizes the Pitchess scheme with Evidence Code 
sections 914 and 915.  It is consistent with Penal Code section 832.7 and our 
holding that the confidentiality of officer personnel records extends to 
administrative proceedings.  Finally, allowing administrative hearing officers to 
determine Pitchess motions in this context furthers the goals of the POBRA and 
maintains the balance between an officer‘s interest in privacy and a litigant‘s 
interest in discovery.  Of course, the Legislature remains free to clarify its intent as 
to the authority of administrative hearing officers in this context, and to take 
additional steps to protect the confidentiality of officer personnel records in the 
administrative context.   
31 
 
 
III.  DISPOSITION 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.  
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
CHIN, J. 
LIU, J.   
WILLHITE, J.   * 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________ 
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, 
Division Four, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 
California Constitution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
I agree with the majority that Pitchess1 discovery can be sought in 
administrative proceedings.  I disagree, however, with the further conclusion that 
every nonjudicial presiding officer may review privileged and confidential 
materials in the context of such a motion. 
As of the 1970s, when the Pitchess discovery scheme was enacted, the 
Legislature had never entrusted administrative hearing officers with reviewing 
allegedly privileged and confidential documents to determine their discoverability.  
Only judicial officers were permitted to examine such documents.  The disparity 
in authority was neither a relic of an older time nor an inadvertent oversight; as 
recently as 1968, the Legislature had taken the extraordinary step of creating a 
special statutory transfer mechanism to allow privilege disputes arising in 
administrative matters to be resolved by the only body authorized to conduct in 
camera review, a court. 
The Pitchess discovery scheme continues this regime.  At every turn, 
Evidence Code section 1045,2 the statute governing in camera review of 
confidential peace officer records, spells out what a ―court‖ should do, eschewing 
the broader term ―presiding officer‖ used elsewhere to identify those powers and 
                                              
1  
Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531 (Pitchess). 
2  
All further unlabeled statutory references are to the Evidence Code. 
2 
 
duties shared by both judges and administrative hearing officers.  Yet the majority 
concludes the Legislature in enacting the Pitchess discovery statutes not only 
intended the then unprecedented step of empowering administrative officers to 
conduct in camera privilege review, but took this step sub silentio, using each 
directive to ―the court‖ to announce what a ―court [or any other presiding officer]‖ 
should do.  This cannot be what the Legislature intended. 
The unfortunate consequence of the majority opinion is this.  Often, the 
person presiding over an administrative hearing need not be a lawyer and could be 
whomever the parties choose; the nonparty peace officer will have no input.  On 
the say-so of such a person, without judicial oversight or any guarantee of a 
protective order, the peace officer‘s formerly confidential records may be opened 
to inspection.  Because the statutory scheme does not compel this regrettable 
result, I respectfully dissent. 
I. 
In 1965, the Legislature first codified in one place the rules of evidence.  
(Stats. 1965, ch. 299, p. 1297.)  The new Evidence Code adopted largely verbatim 
the work of the California Law Revision Commission (Commission), which had 
been asked to study the possibility of conforming the state‘s evidence rules to a set 
of nationally proposed uniform rules.  (Stats. 1956, ch. 42, pp. 263, 265; see 
Recommendation Proposing an Evidence Code (Jan. 1965) 7 Cal. Law Revision 
Com. Rep. (1965) p. 3.)3 
                                              
3  
The Commission‘s recommendations were delivered to the Legislature, 
which expressly endorsed the Commission‘s commentary as reflecting its own 
intent unless otherwise noted.  (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Assem. Bill 
No. 333 (1965 Reg. Sess.) 1 Assem. J. (1965 Reg. Sess.) p. 1712; Sen. Com. on 
Judiciary, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 333 (1965 Reg. Sess.) 2 Sen. J. (1965 Reg. 
Sess.) p. 1573.)  Consequently, ―with respect to unchanged sections of the 
Evidence Code the commission‘s comments state the intent of the Legislature 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
3 
 
With respect to privilege issues, the Commission recognized that questions 
of privilege might arise in a broad range of proceedings and sought to ―remove the 
existing uncertainty concerning the right to claim a privilege in a nonjudicial 
proceeding.‖  (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B pt. 3A West‘s Ann. Evid. Code 
(2009 ed.) foll. § 910, p. 217.)  The policy served by privileges would be seriously 
undermined if ―[e]very officer with power to issue subpoenas for investigative 
purposes, every administrative agency, every local governing board, and many 
more persons could pry into the protected information . . . .‖  (Id. at p. 216.)  
Accordingly, the Commission proposed, and the Legislature enacted, an explicit 
declaration that privilege protections would apply equally to judicial, 
administrative, and other proceedings.  (§§ 901, 910.) 
Equally important to protecting confidentiality, the new Evidence Code 
articulated procedures for how privilege claims would be resolved in nonjudicial 
proceedings.  In general, ―presiding officer[s],‖ broadly defined to include not 
only judicial officers but also arbitrators and anyone else overseeing a nonjudicial 
proceeding, could ―determine a claim of privilege in any proceeding in the same 
manner as a court determines such a claim‖ under the Evidence Code.  (§ 914, 
subd. (a); see § 905 [defining ― ‗Presiding officer‘ ‖]; Cal. Law Revision Com. 
com., 29B pt. 3A West‘s Ann. Evid. Code, supra, foll. § 905, at p. 215.)  
However, the authority to determine a claim of privilege was subject to two 
significant limits.  First, only a ―court,‖ not just any presiding officer, could 
―require the person from whom disclosure is sought or the person authorized to 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
regarding those sections.‖  (Arellano v. Moreno (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 877, 884.)  
This principle applies fully to each section I discuss. 
4 
 
claim the privilege, or both, to disclose the information in chambers . . . .‖  (§ 915, 
subd. (b).)  The consequence of this was quite clear:  the narrow authorization for 
in camera review ―applies only when a court is ruling on the claim of privilege.  
Thus, in view of [§ 915,] subdivision (a), disclosure of the information cannot be 
required, for example, in an administrative proceeding.‖  (Cal. Law Revision Com. 
com., 29B pt. 3A West‘s Ann. Evid. Code, supra, foll. § 915, at p. 256.)  
Nonjudicial in camera review remained forbidden.  (See ibid. [the statute‘s broad 
limits on in camera review ―codif[y] existing law‖].)4 
Second, recognizing the risk of error inherent in having nonjudicial officers 
make privilege determinations, the Commission and Legislature withheld the 
power to issue enforceable orders on privilege matters.  Orders to disclose issued 
by such officers carried no risk of contempt for noncompliance.  (§ 914, subd. (b).)  
Instead, parties seeking discovery needed a court order compelling disclosure.  
(Ibid.; see Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B pt. 3A West‘s Ann. Evid. Code, 
supra, foll. § 914, at p. 254 [―What is contemplated is that, if a claim of privilege 
is made in a nonjudicial proceeding and is overruled, application must be made to 
a court for an order compelling the witness to answer.‖].)  This detour to court was 
necessary ―to protect persons claiming privileges in nonjudicial proceedings.  
Because such proceedings are often conducted by persons untrained in law, it is 
desirable to have a judicial determination of whether a person is required to 
disclose information claimed to be privileged before he can be held in contempt 
                                              
4  
Stressing the importance of section 915‘s safeguards, the Commission 
explained in camera disclosure will frequently be wholly prohibited, and even 
when it is allowed, ―[s]ection 915 undertakes to give adequate protection to the 
person claiming the privilege by providing that the information be disclosed in 
confidence to the judge and requiring that it be kept in confidence if it is found to 
be privileged.‖  (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B pt. 3A West‘s Ann. Evid. 
Code, supra, foll. § 915, at p. 256.) 
5 
 
for failing to disclose such information.‖  (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., at 
p. 254.) 
In 1968, the Legislature codified procedures for discovery in proceedings 
under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).  (Stats. 1968, ch. 808, § 3, 
p. 1561; Arnett v. Dal Cielo (1996) 14 Cal.4th 4, 21.)  As discussed, at the time all 
nonjudicial officers were prohibited from conducting in camera review of 
assertedly privileged documents.  (§ 915.)  Rather than lift this prohibition, the 
Legislature authorized the filing of a freestanding ―verified petition to compel 
discovery in the superior court for the county in which the administrative hearing 
will be held, naming as [a] respondent the party‖ refusing to provide discovery.  
(Gov. Code, former § 11507.7, subd. (a), enacted by Stats. 1968, ch. 808, § 5, 
p. 1562.)  Former section 11507.7 expressly granted a court the authority 
nonjudicial officers lacked:  the power to review in camera the assertedly 
privileged administrative discovery materials under the rules set out in section 915 
of the Evidence Code.  (Gov. Code, former § 11507.7, subd. (d); Stats. 1968, ch. 
808, § 5, pp. 1562, 1563.)  Plainly, the Legislature took seriously the limits on the 
powers of nonjudicial officers. 
This, then, was the landscape in 1978 when the Legislature enacted the 
Pitchess discovery statutes.  Claims of privilege could be raised in judicial and 
nonjudicial settings alike.  (§ 910.)  Courts and nonjudicial presiding officers 
could rule on these claims.  (§ 914, subd. (a).)  Courts had authority to rule on 
claims of privilege following in camera review.  (§ 915, subd. (b).)  Presiding 
officers, other than court judges, did not; they were required to issue rulings 
without directly inspecting assertedly privileged materials.  (Id., subd. (a); see 
§ 905 [defining ― ‗Presiding officer‘ ‖].)  Moreover, compliance with nonjudicial 
privilege rulings was not inherently compulsory.  (§ 914, subd. (b).)  Persons 
possessing assertedly privileged documents could not be required to allow 
6 
 
nonjudicial officers to examine them and could not be forced to disclose them 
without review by an actual court. 
The statutory scheme offered a path to resolution of any privilege dispute 
by the only entity entrusted to conduct in camera review and issue binding 
rulings—the court.  If discovery was sought and refused on grounds of privilege in 
a proceeding covered by the APA, the party seeking discovery could file a petition 
in superior court under Government Code former section 11507.7 and have the 
court proceed with in camera review and a determination whether disclosure 
should be required.  (See Gov. Code, former § 11507.7, subds. (d), (e); Stats. 
1968, ch. 808, § 5, p. 1563.)  In proceedings not covered by the APA, application 
to a court for an order compelling discovery was also necessary.  In the absence of 
any more specifically applicable statutory procedure, such as Government Code 
former section 11507.7, the Legislature directed parties to use ―the procedure 
prescribed by Section 1991 of the Code of Civil Procedure‖ to obtain such an 
order.  (Evid. Code, § 914, subd. (b); see Code Civ. Proc., § 1991 [granting 
superior courts jurisdiction to issue orders compelling discovery].) 
II. 
In Pitchess, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531, 535–540, we recognized a right to 
discovery of relevant peace officer records, subject only to a court‘s balancing 
under section 1040 the interest in disclosure against the interest in confidentiality.  
The Legislature responded by creating a new statutory peace officer privilege.  
(Stats. 1978, ch. 630, § 5, p. 2083.)  Henceforth, peace officer records were to be 
deemed confidential, and were to be discoverable solely to the extent authorized 
by newly enacted section 1043 et seq.  (Pen. Code, § 832.7, subd. (a).) 
Section 1043 explains how to obtain peace officer records discovery.  (See 
generally Alford v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1033, 1038–1039; City of 
Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 82–83.)  The party seeking 
7 
 
disclosure must file ―a written motion with the appropriate court or administrative 
body.‖  (§ 1043, subd. (a).)  Notice must be given to the custodian of records, who 
will notify the party whose records are sought.  (Ibid.)  The motion must be 
supported by evidence establishing ―good cause‖ for discovery, including a 
showing that the evidence sought would be material and reason to believe the 
identified government agency has records of the type sought.  (Id., subd. (b)(3).)  
A hearing is required absent waiver by the governmental agency with custody.  
(Id., subd. (c).)  
Section 1045 further authorizes a ―court‖ to determine relevance by 
examining records ―in chambers in conformity with Section 915.‖  (§ 1045, subd. 
(b).)  The ―court‖ may exclude certain irrelevant and outdated matters (ibid.), 
―make any order which justice requires to protect the officer or agency from 
unnecessary annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression‖ (id., subd. (d)), and issue 
protective orders (id., subd. (e)). 
As an initial matter, the text plainly authorizes Pitchess discovery in 
nonjudicial proceedings.  Section 1043, subdivision (a) expressly allows motions 
before ―administrative bod[ies],‖ and we must give this language its natural and 
obvious meaning. 
Nothing in the text of section 1043 or section 1045, however, relaxes the 
settled limits on the power of nonjudicial officers, who may neither compel 
disclosure in the face of privilege claims nor demand in camera disclosure.  (See 
§§ 914, subd. (b), 915, subd. (b).)  Nor does anything suggest the Legislature was 
any less concerned about those limits here, or intended to make the new peace 
officer privilege less secure against nonjudicial abrogation than other existing 
privileges.  Throughout section 1045, the Legislature uses the specific term 
―court,‖ not the broader term ―presiding officer,‖ to identify who is authorized to 
8 
 
conduct in camera review—a distinction that comports with what was then the 
firmly established practice.  We should take the Legislature at its word. 
Of note, the Legislature has been precise in its choice of terminology 
elsewhere in the Evidence Code and, indeed, in the very legislation at issue.  (See 
§§ 905 [specially defining ― ‗Presiding officer‘ ‖ to encompass all hearing officers, 
as distinct from judges or courts], 914 [making distinct and differential use of the 
terms ―presiding officer‖ and ―court‖], 915 [same], 1043 [referring to a ―court or 
administrative body‖ (italics added)].)  We should not lightly presume the 
Legislature was any less precise in section 1045.  If it had meant ―presiding 
officer,‖ the term the majority‘s interpretation effectively reads into the statute in 
place of ―court,‖ it would have said so.  (Cf. § 914, subd. (a) [using the term 
―presiding officer‖ to explicitly grant nonjudicial hearing officers authority to 
conduct privilege hearings under § 400 et seq.].)  Indeed, the commentary to 
section 914 notes that express authorization for nonjudicial hearing officers to 
conduct privilege hearings was ―necessary because Sections 400–406, by their 
terms, apply only to determinations by a court.‖  (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 
29B pt. 3A West‘s Ann. Evid. Code, supra, foll. § 914, at p. 254.)  When the 
Legislature has written a statute to extend power only to a ―court,‖ it knows that 
statute does not extend power to every nonjudicial ―presiding officer.‖  And when 
the Legislature intends to extend new powers to nonjudicial officers, it knows how 
to do so expressly. 
The legislative history supports the plain meaning of the text.  The purpose 
of the new statutes was to ―protect peace officer personnel records from discovery 
in civil or criminal proceedings‖ (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill 
No. 1436 (1977–1978 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 3, 1978, p. 1) by creating a 
new privilege limiting their disclosure (id. at pp. 4–5).  In committee report after 
committee report, assurances were offered that peace officers could not be forced 
9 
 
to surrender this newly created privilege until a judge had reviewed materials in 
camera.  (E.g., id. at pp. 3–5; Assem. Com. on Criminal Justice, Analysis of Sen. 
Bill No. 1436 (1977–1978 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 7, 1978, p. 2; Assem. 
Com. on Criminal Justice, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1436 (1977–1978 Reg. Sess.) 
Final Analysis, pp. 1–2.)5  These guarantees mirror the recognition in connection 
with section 914 that only a judicial determination could support compelled 
disclosure of privileged materials.  (See Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B pt. 3A 
West‘s Ann. Evid. Code, supra, foll. § 914, at p. 254.) 
That the Legislature knows how to authorize nonjudicial officers to conduct 
in camera review of privileged documents, and says so expressly when that is its 
intent, is further illustrated by how the Legislature later handled nonjudicial 
privilege review under the APA.  In 1995, in response to recommendations from 
the Commission, the Legislature substantially updated and modernized the APA.  
(Stats. 1995, ch. 938, p. 7104; see Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 1, 8–9.)  Among the 
proposed changes the Legislature enacted verbatim were revisions to the act‘s 
discovery provisions.  Whereas under then existing law, ―discovery disputes 
between the parties [were] referred to the superior court for resolution and 
enforcement,‖ the Commission sought to ―expedite the discovery process‖ by 
―vest[ing] resolution of discovery disputes in the administrative law judge.‖  
(Recommendation: Administrative Adjudication by State Agencies (Jan. 1995) 25 
                                              
5  
The majority is quite right to note no special focus was placed on who 
would conduct the review (maj. opn., ante, at p. 24), the reason being no special 
focus was needed; the various bill analyses, like the text of section 1045, carried 
forward the assumption that had always been true, that in camera review was 
something done only by courts and judges.  If the Legislature contemplated a 
departure from that well-established practice, as the majority posits, one would 
expect the legislative history to so indicate.  Instead, there is only silence. 
10 
 
Cal. Law Revision Com. Rep. (1995) pp. 55, 116.)  Government Code section 
11507.7 was revised to allow administrative law judges to do what previously only 
courts had done, including, with respect to privilege claims, authorizing for the 
first time an ―administrative law judge [to] order lodged with it matters provided 
in subdivision (b) of Section 915 of the Evidence Code and examine the matters in 
accordance with its provisions.‖  (Gov. Code, § 11507.7, subd. (d).)  This new 
authority eliminated any need for a transfer mechanism to bring every APA 
discovery dispute before a court; accordingly, the freestanding petition previously 
authorized by section 11507.7 was eliminated.  (See Gov. Code, § 11507.7, subd. 
(a) [motion to compel may be filed directly with the administrative law judge].) 
Curiously, the majority imputes to me the view that a Government Code 
former section 11507.7 petition would necessarily have provided the mechanism 
for Pitchess discovery, then refutes that asserted view at length.  (Maj. opn., ante, 
at pp. 25-27.)  But I take no position on how a former section 11507.7 petition and 
the Pitchess statutes might have interacted; the issue is, after all, long since moot.  
For  present purposes, the significance of Government Code former section 
11507.7, and of the current version of that same statute, is simply this:  when it 
comes to withholding or granting in camera powers to nonjudicial hearing officers, 
the Legislature has acted intentionally and explicitly.  We cannot fairly assume 
that uniquely, in Evidence Code section 1045, it acted inadvertently and implicitly. 
Turning the interpretive question on its head, the majority asks whether 
section 1045 contains a limit on who may act.  The majority argues that section 
1045 at most ―implicitly‖ withholds from nonjudicial hearing officers the power to 
conduct in camera review (maj. opn., ante, at p. 7, italics omitted), and references 
to ― ‗the court‘ ‖ in that statute should not be read ―as a coded expression of 
legislative intent to substantively limit who may rule on Pitchess motions‖ (maj. 
opn., ante, at p. 15).  But there is nothing implicit or coded about the statute.  Its 
11 
 
designation of who may conduct in camera review and issue appropriate protective 
and other orders is explicit and plain:  ―the court.‖  (§ 1045, subds. (b), (c), (d), 
(e).)  When the Legislature intends a grant of authority to a broader group, it has 
available, and uses, a different and more encompassing term:  ―presiding officer.‖  
(See §§ 905, 913–916, 919.)  More fundamentally, the issue here is not whether 
section 1045 contains a limit on who may act.  Rather, given that until 1995, when 
the Legislature amended the APA, only a judicial officer had the express power to 
conduct in camera review, the relevant inquiry ought to be whether section 1045 
contains an unprecedented affirmative grant of such authority to a nonjudicial 
officer.  By its terms, the statute does not. 
The Legislature has taken pains historically to identify and limit who may 
conduct in camera review.  Nothing in the text or history of the Pitchess discovery 
statutes authorizes us to undo that effort.  We should honor the language the 
Legislature has chosen by giving it effect. 
III. 
If, as I conclude, section 1043 allows administrative discovery but section 
1045 does not authorize administrative in camera review, the further question is 
how the statutory scheme, correctly applied, would operate here. 
As noted, this dispute arises in a non-APA proceeding; no administrative 
law judge is involved, and nonjudicial officers other than administrative law 
judges have no power to issue protective orders, nor any authority to conduct in 
camera review.  (§ 915, subd. (b); cf. Gov. Code, §§ 11511.5, subds. (b)(7), (e), 
11507.7, subd. (d).)  Section 1043, subdivision (c), however, authorizes any 
administrative body presented with a peace officer records discovery motion to 
conduct a hearing.  At that hearing, the nonjudicial presiding officer may consider 
the arguments and evidence in favor of and against whether the requested 
information is material and likely to be possessed by the identified custodian of 
12 
 
records, and may rule on whether a showing has been made to warrant discovery.  
(See § 1043, subd. (b)(3).)  Although the nonjudicial officer may not order in 
camera disclosure to assist in this determination (see § 915, subd. (b)), this is 
hardly unusual; the Evidence Code has always called on nonjudicial presiding 
officers to rule on privilege matters without examining the assertedly privileged 
documents (§§ 914, subd. (a), 915; see Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. Public Utilities 
Com. (1990) 50 Cal.3d 31, 45, fn. 19).  Privilege determinations nevertheless can 
be rendered based on all other available evidence.  (See United States v. Reynolds 
(1953) 345 U.S. 1, 8–11; Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Superior Court (2009) 47 
Cal.4th 725, 737.) 
As has also always been the case, a nonjudicial order directing discovery is 
not self-executing.  If the custodian of records voluntarily complies, with the 
consent of the officer whose personnel records are sought, the matter is at an end.  
If the custodian does not comply, or the party seeking discovery believes 
compliance has been only partial, no immediate sanction is available, but the party 
requesting discovery may seek referral of the matter to the superior court in the 
county where the administrative proceeding is ongoing.  (§ 914, subd. (b); Code 
Civ. Proc., § 1991.)  At this point, the provisions of Evidence Code section 1045 
come into play; a court asked to enforce a nonjudicial order for section 1043 
Pitchess discovery can review materials in camera to decide whether to issue a 
court order directing discovery, as well as a protective order (§ 1045, subd. (e)) or 
any other order ―which justice requires‖ (id., subd. (d)). 
The majority criticizes this view of the governing statutes as permitting 
compelled discovery without in camera review, as required by section 1045.  To 
the contrary, unlike the majority construction, this view ensures in camera review, 
in all cases where discovery is contested, by the entity authorized to do such 
review—―the court.‖  Nothing in the statutory text or history supports the view the 
13 
 
Legislature intended the contemplated protections to apply even in the rare 
hypothetical instance where a privilege holder might have no objection and waive 
the privilege. 
To support its view that ―shall examine‖ in section 1045 means ―shall 
examine‖ even when the privilege is waived and disclosure uncontested, the 
majority points to earlier unenacted versions of the Pitchess discovery legislation 
that made in camera review optional by placing a burden on the privilege holder to 
affirmatively seek in camera review.  (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 23-24; e.g., Assem. 
Amend. to Sen. Bill No. 1436 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 7, 1978, p. 3 [―In 
determining relevance, the court shall, at the request of any person authorized to 
claim the privilege, examine the information in chambers in conformity with 
Section 915 . . .‖].)  The enacted version lifted that burden, ensuring that whenever 
discovery was opposed, in camera review would follow as a matter of course.  
(§ 1045, subd. (b).)  To interpret this change as also compelling review in 
uncontested cases, and the new privilege as unwaivable even by the holder, lacks 
any basis. 
The majority also would find no statute currently authorizes transfer of a 
discovery dispute from a nonjudicial setting to a judicial setting, and in the 
absence of such a mechanism would read broad new powers for nonjudicial 
officers into section 1045.  Given a choice between disregarding the plain text of 
section 1045, on the one hand, and reading section 914, subdivision (b) and Code 
of Civil Procedure section 1991 as collectively allowing a court to act on 
discovery disputes arising before nonjudicial officers, on the other, I would choose 
the latter course, the one that gives effect to the text of each relevant statute and 
accords with the Legislature‘s long-standing desire ―to protect persons claiming 
privileges in nonjudicial proceedings‖ from having to surrender those privileges at 
the sole behest of nonjudicial officers.  (Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B pt. 3A 
14 
 
West‘s Ann. Evid. Code, supra, foll. § 914, at p. 254.)  Far from reading Pitchess 
discovery in administrative hearings out of section 1043, this approach embraces 
such discovery.  Moreover, unlike the majority‘s approach, it does so without also 
sacrificing equally significant protections for privileged information expressly 
codified in the in camera review provisions of section 1045. 
Here, the majority again imputes to me, and then refutes, a position I do not 
assert in connection with a scenario not before us:  that if this were an APA 
proceeding, the appropriate course necessarily would be to seek discovery under 
Government Code section 11507.7, rather than under Code of Civil Procedure 
section 1991.  (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 27 [first imputing this imagined view and 
then using it to claim ―[t]he dissent cannot have it both ways‖].)  Because this case 
does not involve the APA, neither I nor the majority need sort out which would be 
the correct course in such a proceeding.  Concerning the non-APA proceeding that 
is before us, and the demonstration that Pitchess discovery can be had without 
violating the general rule against nonjudicial in camera review, the majority is 
largely silent. 
15 
 
IV. 
Applying the foregoing framework to the instant case, I agree with the 
majority and the Court of Appeal that former Deputy Kristy Drinkwater can seek 
Pitchess materials through a motion filed with the nonjudicial hearing officer 
reviewing her termination.  I cannot agree that the nonjudicial officer has authority 
to demand their production for in camera review.  To so hold unjustifiedly 
eviscerates the protections in sections 914, 915, and 1045 that ensure judicial 
officers, and judicial officers alone, will conduct privilege review.  Instead, any 
determination that good cause for discovery has been shown should be followed, 
in the absence of voluntary compliance, by a request for a court order enforcing 
discovery under section 914, subdivision (b), and Code of Civil Procedure section 
1991. 
I respectfully dissent. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
I CONCUR: 
 
BAXTER, J. 
 
1 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Riverside County Sheriff‘s Department v. Stiglitz 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 209 Cal.App.4th 883 
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S206350 
Date Filed: December 1, 2014 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Riverside 
Judge: Mac R. Fisher 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Hayes & Cunningham, Dennis J. Hayes, Adam E. Chaikin and Amanda K. Hansen for Intervener and Appellant. 
 
Stone Busailah, Michael P. Stone, Muna Busailah, Melanie C. Smith, Robert Rabe and Travis M. Poteat for Real 
Party in Interest and Appellant and Real Party in Interest and Respondent. 
 
Lackie, Dammeier & McGill and Michael A. Morguess for Peace Officers‘ Research Association of California 
Legal Defense Fund as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Intervener and Appellant, Real Party in Interest and Appellant 
and Real Party in Interest and Respondent. 
 
Silver, Hadden, Silver, Wexler & Levine, Richard A. Levine, Brian P. Ross and Michael Simidjian for Los Angeles 
Police Protective League as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Intervener and Appellant, Real Party in Interest and 
Appellant and Real Party in Interest and Respondent. 
 
Green & Shinee, Richard A. Shinee and Helen L. Schwab for Association for Los Angles Deputy Sheriffs as 
Amicus Curiae on behalf of Intervener and Appellant, Real Party in Interest and Appellant and Real Party in Interest 
and Respondent. 
 
Law Office of James E. Trott and James E. Trott for Association of Orange County Deputy Sheriffs, Long Beach 
Police Officers Association and Southern California Alliance of Law Enforcement as Amici Curiae on behalf of 
Intervener and Appellant, Real Party in Interest and Appellant and Real Party in Interest and Respondent. 
 
Ferguson, Praet & Sherman, Jon F. Hamilton, Kimberly A. Wah and Bruce D. Praet for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
Kathleen Bales-Lange, County Counsel (Tulare) and Crystal E. Sullivan, Deputy County Counsel, for California 
State Association of Counties and California League of Cities as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
Jones & Mayer, Martin J. Mayer, Gregory P. Palmer and Krista MacNevin Jee for California State Sheriffs‘ 
Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
No appearance for Defendant and Respondent. 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Michael P. Stone 
Stone Busailah 
200 East Del Mar Boulevard, Suite 350 
Pasadena, CA  91105 
(626) 683-5600 
 
Bruce D. Praet 
Ferguson, Praet & Sherman 
1631 E. 18th Street 
Santa Ana, CA  92705-7101 
(714) 953-5300