Case Title: GRAINEY v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 98-271

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
GRAINEY v. STATE2000 WY 38997 P.2d 1035Case Number: 98-271Decided: 03/03/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
DENNIS JOHN GRAINEY, 
Appellant (Defendant), v.THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Johnson County, The Honorable John C. Brackley, 
Judge.

Ethelyn (Lynn) 
Boak, Cheyenne, WY. Argument by Ms. Boak, representing appellant.Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; Theodore 
E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance Program; and Cathleen E. Reed, 
Student Intern. Argument by Ms. Reed, representing 
appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.

LEHMAN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1] Dennis 
Grainey appeals his conviction for destruction of property in violation of Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-3-201(a) and (b)(iii) (Lexis 1999) on the ground that he was 
denied effective assistance of counsel. Finding that Grainey has not met his 
burden of proof, we affirm his conviction. 

ISSUE

[¶2] We discern 
the following issue for our review:

I. Whether the defendant 
was denied effective assistance of counsel.

FACTS

[¶3] On December 
10, 1997, Dennis Grainey rented room 118 at the Wyoming Motel in Buffalo, 
Wyoming. Later that evening, Grainey went to the Crossroads Inn Bar in Buffalo 
where he ordered a beer or two and perhaps a shot. Approximately one-half hour 
later, he was escorted out of the bar by the manager for being loud and 
obnoxious and causing problems with other customers.

[¶4] A short 
time thereafter, a guest in an adjoining room at the Wyoming Motel reported that 
she heard the sound of breaking glass from the room next door and asked the 
motel's owner to come and investigate. The owner observed glass broken from the 
window of room 118 and heard loud crashes from inside the room. He returned to 
the office and called the police.

[¶5] When law 
enforcement officers arrived, room 118 was dark, and all was quiet. As the 
officers approached the room, the owner went around to the back to make sure no 
one was going out the back window. Upon entering the room, Grainey was found 
slumped down behind the door. The room and nearly everything in it had been 
destroyed. The officers attempted to rouse Grainey; and, when he did not 
respond, they picked him up and carried him outside. Four empty beer cans and a 
half empty bottle of whiskey were found in the room. Grainey was charged with 
destruction of property.

[¶6] On December 
11, 1997, the public defender was appointed to represent Grainey. A preliminary 
hearing was held on December 19, 1997, and Grainey was bound over for trial in 
district court. Trial was set for April 20, 1998.

[¶7] At the 
arraignment on January 13, 1998, Grainey was asked whether he was satisfied with 
the representation of counsel. He said that he was. Three weeks later, Grainey 
wrote the first of many letters to the court complaining that the public 
defender's office was "just going through the motions for appearance and not 
adequately handling this matter" and requested that private counsel be appointed 
to represent him pro bono. A hearing was immediately set to address Grainey's 
concerns. Prior to the hearing, trial counsel filed a motion to withdraw from 
representation of Grainey, stating that "the attorney-client relationship has 
deteriorated to the point of no return."

[¶8] At the 
hearing, the court gave Grainey a full opportunity to explain his concerns. 
Although two months remained before trial, Grainey complained that no 
investigation had been done. Grainey also complained that he was being 
railroaded, counsel had in mind a "flimsy" defense, counsel had not responded 
within ten days to a letter he had written, his civil rights were being violated 
by the "120" day speedy trial rule, his case may not have been filed properly, 
the public defender's office would now be prejudiced against him, and he would 
not receive a fair trial.

[¶9] Grainey's 
counsel told the court that her investigator had been apprised of the facts of 
the case and would begin investigating as soon as he could, certainly by 
sometime in March. She expressed confidence that if someone besides Grainey was 
in room 118 and did the damage, that person would be found by her investigator. 
She also said that Grainey's complaints and lack of cooperation had impeded her 
ability to represent him.

[¶10] After 
listening to Grainey and counsel, the court stated that in its view Grainey had 
created the conflict with counsel. The court informed Grainey that, while he had 
the right to representation, he did not have the right to a lawyer of his 
choosing. The court recommended that Grainey cooperate with counsel but also 
advised him of his right to represent himself. Finally, the court denied 
counsel's motion to withdraw but indicated substitute counsel from the public 
defender's office would be permitted.

[¶11] Grainey 
continued to complain about his counsel. Thus, with a month still to go before 
trial, the public defender's office attempted to obtain Grainey's consent to 
substitute counsel. Grainey refused to consent and sent a letter to the court 
stating that substituting counsel at that point would be "detrimental to his 
appealable issues." In a subsequent writing to the court, Grainey accused the 
public defender's office of attempting to "sabotage" his case by offering 
substitute counsel.

[¶12] On April 
20, 1998, Grainey's case went to trial. Two attorneys from the public defender's 
office appeared on his behalf. In chambers prior to jury selection, the court 
gave Grainey another opportunity to discuss his complaints about his attorney 
and go forward without the assistance of counsel. Grainey declined to comment 
further on his dissatisfaction with counsel and declined to proceed pro 
se.

[¶13] Following 
the in-chambers proceedings, jury selection began. During her voir dire of the 
panel members, defense counsel addressed, among other issues, Grainey's concern 
about being an outsider, the prosecution's burden of proving each element of the 
crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, a defendant's right to remain silent, 
and the jury's duty to give equal weight to the testimony of all witnesses, 
including that of law enforcement officials. All jurors who gave answers which 
might be construed as adverse to Grainey or his case were excused following 
peremptory challenges by defense counsel.

[¶14] At trial, 
defense counsel cross-examined each of the State's witnesses. Consistent with 
Grainey's claim that someone else may have been in room 118 that night, counsel 
established that the owners of the motel did not see Grainey nor anyone else 
come or go from the room during the evening, that it would have been possible 
for someone to enter room 118 without being seen from the room next door or the 
motel office, that someone could have left room 118 through the back window 
without being seen before law enforcement arrived, and that no one saw Grainey 
wrecking the room. Also consistent with Grainey's wishes, trial counsel 
presented evidence through cross-examination to support an intoxication defense, 
despite the dubious applicability of a voluntary intoxication defense to a 
general intent crime.

[¶15] At the 
close of the State's case, trial counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal on 
the ground that the State failed to present a prima facie case that it was 
Grainey who destroyed room 118. Counsel argued that there were no eyewitnesses 
to what occurred in the room and that the only evidence implicating Grainey was 
that he was found in the room after the fact. The court denied the 
motion.

[¶16] Trial 
counsel argued in her closing that there were no eyewitnesses to what occurred 
in room 118 and there was no one who could establish that Grainey was alone in 
the room prior to the officers' arrival. She argued that the circumstantial 
evidence presented was insufficient to support a finding beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Grainey destroyed the room. The jury returned a verdict of guilty; 
and, following a hearing on June 9, 1998, Grainey was sentenced to not less than 
two nor more than four years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. This appeal 
followed.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶17] The law of 
ineffective assistance is well established and was articulated in Jackson v. 
State, 902 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Wyo. 1995):

When reviewing a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, the paramount determination is whether, in 
light of all the circumstances, trial counsel's acts or omissions were outside 
the wide range of professionally competent assistance. Herdt v. 
State,

[¶18] 891 P.2d 793, 796 (Wyo. 1995); Starr v. State, 888 P.2d 1262, 1266-67 (Wyo. 1995); Arner 
v. State, 872 P.2d 100, 104 (Wyo. 1994); Frias v. State, 722 P.2d 135, 145 (Wyo. 
1986). The reviewing court should indulge a strong presumption that counsel 
rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise 
of reasonable professional judgment. Herdt, at 796; Starr, at 1266; Arner, at 
104; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).

[¶19] Under the 
two-prong standard articulated in Strickland and Frias, an appellant claiming 
ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate on the record that counsel's 
performance was deficient and that prejudice resulted. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 
687, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064; Starr, at 1266; King v. State, 810 P.2d 119, 125 (Wyo. 
1991) (Cardine, J., dissenting); Campbell v. State, 728 P.2d 628, 629 (Wyo. 
1986); Frias, 722 P.2d  at 145. In other words, to warrant reversal on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, an appellant must demonstrate that his 
counsel failed to "render such assistance as would have been offered by a 
reasonably competent attorney" and that "counsel's deficiency prejudiced the 
defense of [the] case." Lower v. State, 786 P.2d 346, 349 (Wyo. 1990). "The 
benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's 
conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the 
trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 686, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064.

DISCUSSION

[¶20] Grainey 
complains that counsel failed to consult him about the objectives of 
representation and that counsel failed to act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in investigating his case and raising available defenses. From our 
review of the record, we conclude that Grainey has not met his burden of proving 
ineffective assistance of counsel. He has presented no evidence that could 
overcome the presumption that counsel "rendered adequate and reasonable 
assistance making all decisions within the bounds of reasonable professional 
judgment." Gist v. State, 737 P.2d 336, 342 (Wyo. 1987) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066). He has failed to prove that counsel's 
performance was so deficient as to deprive him of his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel. Strickland, supra.

[¶21] Other than 
Grainey's vague, unsworn accusations in his many letters to the trial court, 
there is no evidence in the record before us that trial counsel failed to 
consult with him about her objectives, nor is there any evidence that her 
investigation was inadequate. Instead, the record reveals that, despite 
Grainey's continuous criticism of her, counsel was communicating with him 
sufficiently to understand and act upon his wishes. Even the motion to withdraw 
from representation and the efforts to obtain consent to substitute counsel 
(about which Grainey later complained) reflect that counsel was listening to her 
client and attempting to satisfy his wishes. When her motion to withdraw was 
denied and the efforts to provide substitute counsel failed, counsel proceeded 
with her representation as required.

[¶22] Although 
counsel did not subpoena the more than sixteen witnesses Grainey asked to have 
subpoenaed, the explanation she gave in chambers prior to trial of her reasons 
for not doing so was satisfactory. That is, many of the witnesses were already 
testifying pursuant to subpoenas issued by the State and would be subject to 
cross-examination by the defense; the other witnesses on Grainey's list 
remembered him but either would not be helpful or had no information relevant to 
his case. Trial counsel's explanation also reveals that, by the time of trial, 
her office had conducted an investigation, including contacting the witnesses 
Grainey wanted subpoenaed.

[¶23] That 
counsel, in fact, adequately investigated the case and communicated with Grainey 
sufficiently to understand his wishes is further demonstrated by her performance 
at trial. Motions were filed and argued for change of venue, speedy trial, and 
discovery, as Grainey requested. Although Grainey claims in his brief that the 
defense presented by counsel was weak and that she did not pursue other 
available defenses, the record does not support this claim. Instead, the record 
reveals that, consistent with her client's wishes, counsel presented the two 
main defenses available to him that someone else was in the room and, although a 
questionable defense, that Grainey was too intoxicated to form the intent 
necessary to commit the crime charged. See Cox v. State, 829 P.2d 1183, 1186 
(Wyo. 1992). Thus, counsel established through cross-examination that no one saw 
Grainey or anyone else come or go from the room during the evening, that it 
would have been possible for someone else to enter and leave the room without 
being seen, and that no one saw Grainey wrecking the room. 

[¶24] In 
addition to presenting Grainey's theories of defense through cross-examination 
of the State's witnesses, counsel reinforced these theories in her argument to 
the court on her motion for acquittal and to the jury in her closing argument. 
She also reinforced the intoxication defense by persuading the court to give 
three jury instructions on voluntary intoxication.

[¶25] Although 
Grainey claims in his brief that counsel's allegedly cursory and untimely 
investigation Acaused the loss of potential witnesses, the loss of evidence that 
a third party might have committed the crime, and the loss of evidence that 
might have contradicted the amount of damage done to the motel room," he fails 
to point specifically to a single witness, item of evidence, or defense which 
was lost as a result of counsel's alleged inaction. Grainey's assertion that the 
late investigation made an intoxication defense difficult to support and made it 
more difficult for witnesses to remember him is likewise without specific 
factual support. As in Cureton v. State, 950 P.2d 544, 548 (Wyo. 1997), Grainey 
"has not provided even a hint of exculpatory evidence that [his] trial counsel 
failed to learn or investigate." Absent such evidence, Grainey has failed to 
meet his burden of overcoming the presumption that counsel provided effective 
assistance.

[¶26] We also 
find no merit in the claim that counsel was ineffective because she stipulated 
to the admissibility of photographs of the damaged room and objected to the 
admission of evidence that her client was released from jail earlier in the day 
on a driving under the influence charge. Decisions whether to stipulate or 
object to the admission of evidence are matters of trial strategy and are left 
to the discretion of counsel. In Hopkinson v. State, 664 P.2d 43, 78 (Wyo. 
1983), this court adopted Standard 4-5.2, ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, 
The Defense Function (Little, Brown and Company 2nd ed. 1980). See also n.25, 
Hopkinson, supra, in which appears the comment to that standard, and Osborn v. 
State, 672 P.2d 777, 796 (Wyo. 1983). Since then, the standard governing control 
and direction of the case has been modified. The revised standard 
provides:

Standard 4-5.2 Control 
and Direction of the Case

(a) Certain decisions 
relating to the conduct of the case are ultimately for the accused and others 
are ultimately for defense counsel. The decisions which are to be made by the 
accused after full consultation with counsel include:

(i) what pleas to 
enter;

(ii) whether to accept a 
plea agreement;

(iii) whether to waive 
jury trial;

(iv) whether to testify 
in his or her own behalf; and

(v) whether to 
appeal.

(b) Strategic and 
tactical decisions should be made by defense counsel after consultation with the 
client where feasible and appropriate. Such decisions include what witnesses to 
call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept or 
strike, what trial motions should be made, and what evidence should be 
introduced.

(c) If a disagreement on 
significant matters of tactics or strategy arises between defense counsel and 
the client, defense counsel should make a record of the circumstances, counsel's 
advice and reasons, and the conclusion reached. The record should be made in a 
manner which protects the confidentiality of the lawyer-client relationship.1

[¶27] ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution Function and Defense Function (3rd 
ed. 1993).

[¶28] Grainey's 
complaints all relate to tactical decisions made by defense counsel - which 
witnesses to call, which jurors to strike, what evidence to introduce, etc. 
These decisions should be made by defense counsel after appropriate client 
consultation. Defense counsel clearly engaged in such consultation here, so 
there was no violation of the standard. Grainey has failed to meet his burden of 
proving that counsel's decisions in this regard rendered her performance 
ineffective.

[¶29] We also 
find nothing in the manner in which counsel conducted voir dire to support an 
ineffectiveness claim. Counsel succeeded in getting one member of the panel 
excused before jury selection even began without having to use a peremptory 
challenge. Thereafter, as a result of her voir dire of the remaining panel 
members, all of the jurors who gave answers which might be construed as adverse 
to Grainey or his case were excused from the jury. In fact, all of the veniremen 
who made comments about which Grainey complains in his brief were excused from 
the jury following peremptory challenges by defense counsel; none of them 
ultimately served on the jury that convicted him.

[¶30] We also 
find no merit in Grainey's claim that the trial court failed to conduct a 
hearing to consider his complaints about counsel. This case is not like Calene 
v. State, 846 P.2d 679 (Wyo. 1993) where no hearing was held at the trial court 
level to address the issue of ineffective assistance and the issue was developed 
for the first time on appeal. Here, the issue was raised repeatedly before 
trial, and a hearing was held specifically for the purpose of addressing 
Grainey's concerns. Twice during that hearing, and again before trial, Grainey 
was given a full opportunity to present a specific factual basis for his claim 
of ineffective assistance. Despite these opportunities, Grainey has never 
provided a specific factual basis.

[¶31] Instead, 
the record reflects that, almost from the beginning, Grainey went on the 
offensive, attacking trial counsel before ever really giving her a chance to 
perform effectively. Even when the trial court recommended to Grainey that he 
cooperate with counsel, and basically give her the chance to do her job, Grainey 
responded with yet another lengthy letter criticizing counsel. Yet, when offered 
the opportunity to represent himself or have substitute counsel provided, 
Grainey again impeded the process by refusing to consent even to substitute 
counsel. His stated reason - to preserve his "appealable issues" suggests that 
his motive from the beginning was to create an ineffective assistance claim for 
purposes of appeal. Under these circumstances, and in light of the total context 
of counsel's performance, we find no basis for Grainey's claim of 
ineffectiveness.

[¶32] Having 
concluded that Grainey has not met his burden of proving that counsel's 
performance was deficient, we do not reach the second prong of the Strickland 
test, the issue of prejudice.

CONCLUSION

[¶33] Viewing 
the claim of ineffective assistance in the total context of the representation 
afforded, Grainey has failed to meet his burden of overcoming the presumption of 
effective assistance. From the record before us, viewed in light of all the 
circumstances, we do not find that trial counsel's acts or omissions were 
outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance, or that she made 
errors so serious that she was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment and art. 1, § 10 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.

[¶34] 
Affirmed.
Footnotes
Footnotes

1 The revised 
commentary for this standard provides:

Allocation of Decision-making Power

Certain basic decisions have come to belong to the client while others 
fall within the province of the lawyer. The requirement that the defendant 
personally enter a guilty plea and that it be voluntary and informed carries the 
implication that it is the defendant who must make the choice as to the plea to 
be entered and, concomitantly, whether to accept a proffered plea agreement. 
Similarly, the decisions whether to waive a jury trial or whether to take an 
appeal have long been considered to belong to the defendant. With respect to the 
decision whether the defendant should testify, the lawyer should give his or her 
client the benefit of his or her advice and experience, but the ultimate 
decision must be made by the defendant, and the defendant alone. In making each 
of these decisions - whether to plead guilty, whether to accept a plea 
agreement, whether to waive jury trial, whether to testify, and whether to 
appeal - the accused should have the full and careful advice of counsel. 
Although it is highly improper for counsel to demand that the defendant follow 
what counsel perceives as the desirable course or for counsel to coerce a 
client's decision through misrepresentation or undue influence, counsel is free 
to engage in fair persuasion and to urge the client to follow the proffered 
professional advice. Ultimately, however, because of the fundamental nature of 
decisions such as these, so crucial to the accused's fate, 
the accused must make the decisions himself or 
herself.

Strategy and Tactics

In 
general, the power of decision in matters of trial strategy and tactics rests 
with the lawyer, after consultation with the client when such consultation is, 
in the lawyer's judgment, both feasible and appropriate. The lawyer should 
determine which witnesses should be called on behalf of the defendant. 
Similarly, the lawyer should decide what evidence should be introduced, whether 
to object to the admission of evidence, whether and how a witness should be 
cross-examined, and whether to stipulate to certain 
facts.

Many of the rights of an accused, including constitutional rights, are 
such that only trained experts can comprehend their full significance, and an 
explanation to any but the most sophisticated client would be futile. Numerous 
strategic and tactical decisions must be made in the course of a criminal trial, 
many of which are made in circumstances that do not allow extended, if any, 
consultation. Every experienced advocate can recall the disconcerting experience 
of trying to conduct the examination of a witness or follow opposing arguments 
or the judge's charge while the client "plucks at the attorney's sleeve" 
offering gratuitous suggestions. Some decisions, especially those involving 
which witnesses to call, can be anticipated sufficiently so that counsel can 
ordinarily consult with the client concerning them. Because these decisions 
require the skill, training, and experience of the advocate, the power of 
decision on them should rest with the lawyer. The lawyer should seek to maintain 
a professional relationship at all stages while maintaining the ultimate choice 
and responsibility for the strategic and tactical decisions in the 
case.

It 
is also important in a jury trial for defense counsel to consult fully with the 
accused about any lesser included offenses the trial court may be willing to 
submit to the jury.

Record of advice

A 
disagreement between counsel and the accused on a significant decision to be 
made before or during the trial may be the subject of post-conviction 
proceedings questioning the effectiveness of the lawyer's performance. Rather 
than leave the matter to be determined on the strength of the memories of the 
lawyer and client, which are invariably in conflict if the issue arises, some 
record should be made. This may be accomplished by a memorialization of the 
nature of the disagreement as to such significant decision, the advice given, 
and the action taken.

(Footnotes omitted.)