Case Title: Pushard v. Riverview Psychiatric Center

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2020 ME 23

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2020-01-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2020 ME 23 
Docket: 
Ken-19-201 
Argued: 
December 4, 2019 
Decided: 
January 30, 2020 
 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
Majority: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
Dissent: 
JABAR, J. 
 
 
ROLAND PUSHARD III 
 
v. 
 
RIVERVIEW PSYCHIATRIC CENTER 
 
 
ALEXANDER, J. 
[¶1]  Roland Pushard III appeals from a summary judgment entered by 
the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Stokes, J.) in favor of Riverview 
Psychiatric Center on Pushard’s complaint alleging a violation of the 
Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, 26 M.R.S. §§ 831-840 (2018).  Pushard argues 
that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether he is entitled 
to whistleblower protection based on complaints he made, while employed at 
Riverview, about (1) Riverview’s staffing policies; (2) his supervisor’s alleged 
mistreatment of another employee; and (3) a potential violation of patient 
 
2 
confidentiality pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA), see 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500-.534 (2019).  We affirm the judgment.1 
I.  CASE HISTORY 
[¶2]  Viewed in the light most favorable to Pushard, as the party against 
whom summary judgment has been granted, the following material facts are 
undisputed.  See Berry v. Mainestream Finance, 2019 ME 27, ¶ 6, 202 A.3d 1195. 
[¶3]  Pushard was the director of nursing at Riverview.  His supervisor 
was Jay Harper, the superintendent of Riverview.  As director of nursing, 
Pushard often disagreed with Harper’s staffing decisions and policies.  The 
parties agree that “[u]nderstaffing was a persistent, ongoing problem at 
Riverview for years.”  The issue was publicly known and had been discussed by 
the media and the Legislature.   
[¶4]  To address Riverview’s staffing problems, Harper instituted several 
new policies, including replacing mental health workers with acuity 
specialists.2  Pushard disagreed with this decision and told Harper that he 
                                         
1  To the extent that Pushard raises arguments not discussed in this opinion, we are unpersuaded. 
2  The statement of material facts does not explain with any detail the difference between a mental 
health worker and an acuity specialist.  The statement of material facts says only that Pushard “felt 
tha[t] non-CNAs could not provide the range of hands-on care to patients that CNAs could.”  “As a 
central tenet of summary judgment motion practice, ‘[f]acts not set forth in the statement of material 
facts are not in the summary judgment record, even if the fact in question can be gleaned from 
affidavits or other documents attached to, and even referred to in portions of, a statement of material 
 
3 
believed the decision threatened the safety of patients and employees because 
acuity specialists could not perform all the tasks that mental health workers 
could.   
[¶5]  Harper also moved two full-time nurse educators to administrative 
roles.  Although Harper allowed Pushard to hire two new employees to fill the 
vacant positions, Pushard eventually hired two part-time nurse educators 
because no one who applied for the positions was willing to work full-time.  
Pushard told Harper that he disagreed with Harper’s decision to move the 
full-time nurse educators because he believed that replacing them with 
part-time employees would result in nurse educators spending less time 
assisting with patient management, which in turn would create unsafe 
conditions for patients and employees.   
[¶6]  The record demonstrates that Pushard “did not believe that he was 
making Harper or anyone else [at Riverview] aware of anything they were not 
already aware of” when he made complaints about Harper’s decisions to hire 
acuity specialists and to move the full-time nurse educators to administrative 
roles.   
                                         
fact.’”  Berry v. Mainestream Finance, 2019 ME 27, ¶ 7, 202 A.3d 1195 (alteration in original) (quoting 
HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Gabay, 2011 ME 101, ¶ 22, 28 A.3d 1158).   
 
4 
[¶7]  The assistant director of nursing lodged complaints similar to those 
made by Pushard.  Around the time that Pushard and the assistant director 
made these complaints, Harper took away the assistant director’s office and 
assigned it to another employee.  Pushard also perceived that Harper had 
treated the assistant director in a disrespectful manner during meetings.  
Pushard complained to Harper, explaining that he thought Harper was 
retaliating against the assistant director because of her complaints about 
Harper’s staffing decisions.   
[¶8]  In early 2015, Pushard reported to Harper that a Riverview 
employee had sent internal hospital documents to a former employee.  Pushard 
was concerned that the documents contained patient information and that the 
release of the information violated HIPAA.  Harper reviewed the documents 
that were sent to the former employee and referred the matter to Riverview’s 
risk management office.  The risk management office did not advise Harper that 
a HIPAA violation had occurred.   
[¶9]  In December 2014, a nurse under Pushard’s supervision sent 
Pushard an email detailing her concerns about another nurse, referred to in the 
record as “Nurse A.”  By April 2015, several employees had reported that Nurse 
A was having difficulty performing her duties because of tiredness or 
 
5 
impairment and that Nurse A was diverting patient medication.  At least three 
nurses made these allegations directly to Pushard.  Pushard discounted the 
reports because he believed they originated from an employee who did not like 
Nurse A.  Nevertheless, Pushard instructed the assistant director to investigate.  
The assistant director did not find evidence that Nurse A had diverted 
medication.  Pushard never made Harper or the Riverview human resources 
staff aware of the allegations against Nurse A.   
[¶10]  Another employee eventually reported Nurse A directly to the 
human resources staff.  This report led to an investigation of Nurse A, who was 
terminated after Riverview substantiated allegations that she had been sleepy 
and inattentive on duty and that she had been overstaying her scheduled 
breaks because she would use that time to sleep in her car.  Pushard was placed 
on administrative leave pending an investigation into whether he knew of the 
concerns about Nurse A and whether he acted improperly by failing to relay 
those concerns to Harper or to human resources.   
[¶11]  After completing its investigation of Pushard’s conduct, 
Riverview’s Human Resources Department concluded the following in a 
written report: 
Although he took some action, Mr. Pushard did not report these 
matters to management above him, follow up on the action he had 
 
6 
taken in January 2015, or more closely monitor the on-going 
situation involving Nurse A to ensure that the issues were being 
appropriately addressed.  Mr. Pushard asserted that he knew Nurse 
A was sickly, for which he made adjustments to her job in January 
2015 and May 2015, but did not know there were concerns she was 
impaired by drugs at work.  However, he didn't follow up on these 
adjustments or any other concerns after January 2015 nor did he 
have other nursing managers actively monitor the situation. 
 
 
[¶12]  Ricker Hamilton, the deputy director of DHHS, reviewed this 
report and informed Pushard that he was recommending Pushard’s 
termination.  At a Loudermill hearing, Pushard’s termination was upheld.  See 
Cleveland Bd. of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (holding that 
certain public sector employees have a due process right to a hearing before 
their employment is terminated).   
[¶13]  Pushard filed a complaint with the Maine Human Rights 
Commission and received notice of his right to sue.  See 5 M.R.S. § 4612(6) 
(2018).  Pushard then filed the instant action.  The court granted Riverview’s 
motion for summary judgment, and Pushard timely appealed.  See M.R. App. P. 
2B(c)(1). 
II.  LEGAL ANALYSIS 
 
[¶14]  We review de novo the grant of a motion for summary judgment.  
See Brady v. Cumberland County, 2015 ME 143, ¶ 10, 126 A.3d 1145.  Summary 
judgment is proper if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
 
7 
law because, considering the evidence “in the light most favorable to the party 
against whom the summary judgment has been granted,” there is no “genuine 
issue of material fact” for a jury to decide.  Id.    
[¶15]  A WPA claim consists of three elements: “(1) [the employee] 
engaged in activity protected by the WPA; (2) [the employee] experienced an 
adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection existed between the 
protected activity and the adverse employment action.”  Id. ¶ 14; 
see 26 M.R.S. §  833(1).  “If the evidence in the summary judgment record would 
allow a jury to find for the employee on each element of the employee’s case, 
then the employer is not entitled to summary judgment.”  Brady, 2015 ME 143, 
¶ 39, 126 A.3d 1145.   
 
[¶16]  Pushard asserts that he engaged in three protected activities that 
entitled him to whistleblower protection from adverse employment actions: 
(1) complaining about Harper’s staffing decisions; (2) complaining about 
Harper’s treatment of the assistant director; and (3) reporting a possible HIPAA 
violation.  Only the first and third of these claims merit a full discussion.3 
                                         
3  Pushard’s argument that he engaged in protected activity when he complained to Harper about 
Harper’s mistreatment of the assistant director of Nursing contends that (1) the assistant director 
engaged in protected activity when she complained about Harper’s staffing decisions; (2) Harper 
violated the WPA when he retaliated against the assistant director by taking away her private office 
space and treating her discourteously in meetings; and (3) Pushard’s complaint about Harper’s 
conduct was a whistleblower report of his employer’s violation of law pursuant to 26 M.R.S. 
 
8 
A. 
Complaints About Staffing  
[¶17]  As relevant to Pushard’s claim, the WPA applies where  
[t]he employee, acting in good faith, or a person acting on behalf of 
the employee, reports to the employer or a public body, orally or in 
writing, what the employee has reasonable cause to believe is a 
condition or practice that would put at risk the health or safety of 
that employee or any other individual. 
 
26 M.R.S. § 833(1)(B).  In Cormier v. Genesis Healthcare LLC, 2015 ME 161, ¶ 11, 
129 A.3d 944, we explained that “[a]lthough this provision is not triggered by 
every complaint that relates to safety, it protects employees who, in good faith, 
make safety-related complaints when the employee reasonably believes that a 
dangerous condition or practice exists.”  To satisfy the reasonable cause 
requirement, an employee must show that he has both “a subjective and 
objectively reasonable belief that a dangerous condition or practice exists.”  Id.; 
see Stewart-Dore v. Webber Hosp. Ass’n, 2011 ME 26, ¶ 11, 13 A.3d 773. 
                                         
§ 833(1)(A) (2018) (making it unlawful for an employer to take an adverse employment action 
against an employee who reports a violation of the law).   
We find no merit to Pushard’s contention.  As we will explain, see infra ¶¶ 17-22, neither Pushard’s 
nor the assistant director’s complaints about understaffing qualify as protected activity.  Even if 
Pushard subjectively believed that he was reporting a violation of the WPA when he complained 
about Harper’s mistreatment of the assistant director, this is not enough to bring him within the 
WPA’s scope.  See Galouch v. Dep’t of Prof’l & Fin. Reg., 2015 ME 44, ¶¶ 13-15, 114 A.3d 988 (explaining 
that a “subjective belief alone is insufficient to meet the WPA’s reasonable cause requirement”). 
 
9 
[¶18]  Pushard argues that he made whistleblower protected complaints 
when he told Harper that replacing mental health workers with acuity 
specialists4 and replacing two full-time nurse educators with two-part time 
nurse educators compromised patient and employee safety.   
[¶19]  Pushard’s staffing complaints were not whistleblower protected 
activity because he was not exposing a concealed or unknown safety issue.  
Instead, he was simply giving his opinion concerning his supervisor’s attempts 
to address well-known problems related to staffing.  In Cormier, 2015 ME 161, 
¶ 12, 129 A.3d 944, we explained that an employee had presented evidence 
sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment because she had shown 
facts “sufficient to support a finding that [she] held a reasonable belief that 
staffing levels compromised the safety of the residents and that her complaints 
would bring the safety issue to [her employer’s] attention.”  (Emphasis added.)   
[¶20]  Similarly, the First Circuit has explained that the WPA applies only 
if an employee’s “report was made to shed light on and ‘in opposition to’” an 
illegal act or unsafe condition.  Harrison v. Granite Bay Care, Inc., 811 F.3d 36, 
                                         
4  Pushard argued in his brief and at oral argument that acuity specialists are harder to recruit 
than are mental health workers and that the resultant delay in hiring contributed to unsafe 
conditions caused by understaffing.  However, there is no support in the statement of material facts 
for this proposition.  We must therefore disregard Pushard’s assertion.  See Berry, 2019 ME 27, ¶ 7, 
202 A.3d 1195. 
 
10 
51 (1st Cir. 2016) (emphasis added).  Cormier and Harrison thus support the 
proposition that an employee does not enjoy whistleblower protection simply 
because he disagrees with his employer about whether the employer’s policy 
decisions cause safety concerns.  Instead, a “report” under the WPA is one that 
“would bring the safety issue to the [the employer’s] attention,” Cormier, 
2015 ME 161, ¶ 12, 129 A.3d 944, or is “made to shed light on and ‘in opposition 
to’” a safety-related concern.  Harrison, 811 F.3d at 51.  
[¶21]  Pushard’s conduct does not meet that standard because he was 
simply engaged in a policy dispute with his employer about how best to handle 
Riverview’s staffing issues.  That Riverview was understaffed was known to the 
public, the Legislature, and Riverview employees.  Even if the specific staffing 
decisions about which Pushard complained were not widely known, it is 
uncontroverted that Pushard “did not believe that he was making Harper or 
anyone else aware of anything they were not already aware of.”  For this reason, 
Pushard was not reporting; he was complaining. 
[¶22]  Because Pushard’s complaints about Harper’s staffing decisions 
fall well short of being “reports” as that term is used in the WPA, we have no 
occasion here to articulate a comprehensive standard for what qualifies as a 
protected report.  In particular, we decline to adopt an “initial reporter” rule for 
 
11 
WPA cases, as urged by Riverview.5  Under the particular facts of this case, 
summary judgment was proper because there is no genuine issue of material 
fact as to whether Pushard intended, at the time he made his complaints, to 
expose an unknown or concealed safety issue.  See Cormier, 2015 ME 161, ¶ 12, 
129 A.3d 944; Harrison, 811 F.3d at 48-51. 
B. 
HIPAA Violation 
[¶23]  Pushard also challenges the court’s determinations that (1) his 
report of a possible HIPAA violation was not protected activity and (2) even if 
it was protected, summary judgment was also warranted on the causation 
element of Pushard’s claim.  Assuming, without deciding, that the report of a 
potential HIPAA violation was protected activity, Pushard has not established 
any genuine dispute as to material fact regarding causation. 
[¶24]  An employee satisfies the causation element of a WPA claim by 
showing that his protected activity “was a substantial, even though perhaps not 
the only, factor motivating the employee’s dismissal.”  Walsh v. Town of 
Millinocket, 2011 ME 99, ¶ 25, 28 A.3d 610.  The appropriate inquiry is 
                                         
5  In Currie v. Indus. Sec., Inc., 2007 ME 12, ¶ 26 & n.7, 915 A.2d 400, we noted, without resolving, 
the argument that an employee cannot maintain a WPA claim if that employee is not the “initial 
reporter,” that is, if the employer has already learned of the unsafe condition or practice from some 
other source. 
 
12 
“whether the record as a whole would allow a jury to reasonably conclude that 
the adverse employment action was motivated at least in part by retaliatory 
intent.”  Brady, 2015 ME 143, ¶ 37, 126 A.3d 1145. 
[¶25]  Pushard argues that (1) the temporal proximity between his 
report of a HIPAA violation and his suspension and termination suffices to 
survive a summary judgment motion on the issue of causation and (2) 
Riverview should have concluded that he did nothing wrong in his handling of 
the reports about Nurse A, and therefore the reason given by Riverview for his 
termination was pretextual.   
[¶26]  Pushard’s pretext argument misses the mark.  In Murray v. 
Kindred Nursing Ctrs. West LLC, 789 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir. 2015), the First Circuit 
explained—and we agree—that “evidence of a decisionmaker’s mistaken 
judgment is not dispositive of the question of pretext unless that evidence 
would permit the factfinder to conclude that the stated nondiscriminatory 
justification for the adverse employment action was either knowingly false or 
made in bad faith.”  See also Johnson v. York Hospital, 2019 ME 176, 
¶ 25, --- A.3d ---.  Pushard does not argue that Hamilton knew that the human 
resources report contained false information, that Hamilton relied on the 
report in bad faith, or that those who created the report were biased against 
 
13 
Pushard because of his report of a HIPAA violation.  Moreover, Pushard has not 
offered any evidence that would allow a factfinder to reasonably conclude that 
Harper, Hamilton, or anyone else at Riverview wanted to manufacture a reason 
for Pushard’s termination because of his report of a potential HIPAA violation.  
For this reason, Pushard’s pretext argument falls short. 
[¶27]  Therefore, to survive the summary judgment motion as to 
causation, Pushard must rely solely on the temporal proximity between his 
report of a HIPAA violation and his termination.  In Theriault v. Genesis 
Healthcare LLC, 890 F.3d 342, 352 (1st  Cir. 2018), the First Circuit rejected a 
similar argument, explaining that temporal proximity “is not sufficient, by itself, 
to forge a causal link strong enough to create an inference of causation and thus 
satisfy [the standard set forth in Brady] in the face of an employer’s asserted 
legitimate non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action.”  We 
similarly conclude that, in light of Riverview’s asserted non-retaliatory 
justification for its termination decision—specifically, Pushard’s mishandling 
of the reports about Nurse A—Pushard has failed to demonstrate the existence 
of a triable issue of fact as to the element of causation. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
14 
 
 
 
 
  
JABAR, J., dissenting. 
 
[¶28]  I respectfully dissent because I believe there are genuine issues of 
material fact regarding whether Pushard engaged in protected activity and 
whether there was a causal connection between his protected activity and his 
termination.  See 26 M.R.S. §§ 831-840 (2018). 
[¶29]  We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the 
summary judgment has been granted in order to determine if there is a genuine 
issue of material fact.  Stewart-Dore v. Webber Hosp. Ass’n, 2011 ME 26, ¶ 8, 13 
A.3d 773.  A genuine issue of material fact exists when the factfinder must 
choose between competing versions of the truth.  Id.  When the party moving 
for summary judgment is the defendant, the burden rests on that party to show 
that the evidence fails to establish a prima facie case for the claim.  Cormier v. 
Genesis Healthcare LLC, 2015 ME 161, ¶ 7, 129 A.3d 944. 
[¶30]  The facts set forth by the parties in their nearly 100 pages of 
statements of material facts portray different versions of the events taking 
place between June 2014, when Pushard was hired as director of nursing, and 
June 2015, when he was suspended from his position.   
 
15 
I.  PROTECTED ACTIVITY 
[¶31]  A claim for violation of rights established under the Maine 
Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA), 26 M.R.S. §§ 831-840, consists of three 
elements: (1) that the employee engaged in activity protected by the WPA, 
(2) that the employee experienced an adverse employment action, and (3) that 
there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse 
employment action.  Brady v. Cumberland Cty., 2015 ME 143, ¶ 14, 126 A.3d 
1145; see 26 M.R.S. § 833(1).  The Court focuses on the first element—whether 
the employee was involved in protected activity.  The Court places great 
emphasis on Riverview’s assertion that the complaints that Pushard made 
about the staffing levels at Riverview were well known and that therefore 
Pushard’s complaints cannot be determined to be “protected activity” within 
the meaning of the WPA.  See Cormier, 2015 ME 161, ¶ 10, 129 A.3d 944.  
A. 
Complaints Regarding Staffing 
[¶32]  In his response to Riverview’s statements of material facts, 
Pushard asserts that he repeatedly complained that the continuation of the 
 
16 
staffing approach by administrator Harper and others in management 
endangered both patient and employee health and safety.6  
[¶33]  Pushard told Harper that he was concerned that nurses were being 
placed in administrative roles instead of on the floor.  Specifically, Pushard 
complained that removing Nurses Orange and Cote from the patient floor was 
endangering 
both 
patient 
and 
employee 
health 
and 
safety 
in 
already-dangerous work situations.  He complained that the replacement of 
two full-time nurse educators with part-time nurse educators decreased the 
availability of nurses on the patient floors.  Pushard also argued for the hiring 
of more mental health workers rather than acuity specialists, because there 
was no provision for acuity specialists rather than mental health workers 
under the consent decree that governs Riverview’s operations.  He continued 
to report and argue for more mental health workers because there was a ratio 
of nurses and mental health workers that needed to be maintained under the 
consent decree.   
                                         
6  In Pushard’s response to Paragraph 16 of Riverview’s statement of material facts (“In his 
conversations with Harper and others at Riverview about staffing issues, Pushard did not believe that 
he was making Harper or anyone else aware of anything they were not already aware of.”), Pushard 
stated that he was more outspoken than other employees and “particularly stressed that the 
continuation of the staffing approach by Harper and others in management endangered both patient 
and employee health and safety.”   
 
17 
[¶34]  In Cormier, we addressed whether complaints about understaffing 
at healthcare facilities may be protected by the WPA:  
Although this provision is not triggered by every complaint 
that relates to safety, it protects employees who, in good faith, 
make safety-related complaints when the employee reasonably 
believes that a dangerous condition or practice exists.  A complaint 
is made in good faith if the employee’s motivation is to stop a 
dangerous condition.  A complaint is supported by reasonable 
cause when the employee has a subjective and objectively 
reasonable belief that a dangerous condition or practice exists.    
 
2015 ME 161, ¶ 11, 129 A.3d 944 (citation omitted)(quotation marks omitted). 
[¶35]  The Court states that “Pushard’s staffing complaints were not 
whistleblower protected activity because he was not exposing a concealed or 
unknown safety issue.  Instead, he was simply giving his opinion concerning 
. . . well-known problems related to staffing,” Court’s Opinion ¶ 19, and that 
“Pushard was not reporting; he was complaining.”  Court’s Opinion ¶ 21.  I 
disagree.   
[¶36]  First, complaints concerning safety may be protected activity, and 
the complaints do not need to be in the form of a report in order for them to be 
protected.  We made it very clear in Cormier that complaints about safety issues 
may constitute protected activity.  Cormier, 2015 ME 161, ¶¶ 10-16, 129 A.3d 
944; see also 26 M.R.S. § 833(1)(B).  Second, that the conditions about which 
 
18 
Pushard complained were publicly known does not preclude Pushard from 
convincing a jury that his complaints are protected by the WPA.  
[¶37]  The proposition that complaints about publicly known safety 
issues can never be protected activity has been expressly overruled by 
Congress.  5 U.S.C.S § 2302(f)(1)(B) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-91) (“A 
disclosure shall not be excluded from subsection (b)(8) [listing WPA protected 
activities] because . . . the disclosure revealed information that had been 
previously disclosed.”); see also Hartzman v. Wells Fargo & Co., 1:14CV808, 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18733 at *25-26 (M.D.N.C. Feb. 17, 2016).  In Hartzman, 
the court refuted the defendant’s contention that the plaintiff’s activity was not 
protected because the plaintiff raised public information.  The court noted that 
Congress had clearly expressed its intent to the contrary:  
Further, several of those cases have since been in effect overruled 
by Congress. For example, Meuwissen v. Department of Interior, 234 
F.3d 9 (Fed. Cir. 2000), held that a public employee was not 
protected under the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (“WPA”) 
when disclosing information that was already publicly known.  
After this holding, Congress expressly overruled this case and 
amended the statute to specifically include disclosures of already 
public information.  
 
 
19 
Hartzman, 1:14CV808, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18733 at *25-26 (citation 
omitted).7  The WPA protects Pushard’s complaints regarding staffing and 
safety, whether the alleged understaffing was publicly known or not.  
[¶38]  Furthermore, the content of Pushard’s complaints was not 
necessarily publicly known.  The public may have known that Riverview was 
operating under a consent decree, and that there were staffing issues, but the 
public may not have necessarily known that Riverview was not complying with 
the consent decree, and thereby was creating safety issues for patients and 
staff.   
 
[¶39]  The Court fails to take into consideration that Riverview was 
operating pursuant to a consent decree with the State regarding management 
and staffing.  Pushard’s complaints regarding understaffing and patient safety 
take on special significance because of the existence of the consent decree.  
Even though Riverview was under close scrutiny by the courts because of 
staffing issues, it does not follow that Riverview’s failure to comply with the 
consent decree was publicly known and that noncompliance created safety 
                                         
7  See Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-199, § 101(b)(2)(C) 
(2012)(codified at 5 U.S.C.S § 2302(f)(1)(B) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-91)).  The Maine 
Whistleblowers’ Protection Act is comparable to its federal counterpart, 5 U.S.C. § 2302.  Me. Human 
Rights Comm’n v. Me. Dep’t of Veterans’ Servs., 627 A.2d 1005, 1007 (Me. 1993). 
 
20 
issues for staff and patients.  The issue is not whether Riverview in fact was 
violating the consent decree and creating safety issues for patients and staff; 
the issue is whether Pushard had a good faith belief of said safety issues and 
complained about them to the administration. 
 
[¶40]  Pushard’s version of the facts paints a completely different picture 
than the version accepted as fact by the Court.  It is up to a jury to decide 
whether Pushard’s complaints constituted protected activity.  See, e.g., Cormier, 
2015 ME 161, ¶¶ 9, 16, 129 A.3d 944 (stating that whether a complaint rises to 
the level of a protected activity is a question of fact for the jury to resolve).   
B. 
Complaints Regarding Treatment of Cutler 
[¶41]  In addition to Pushard’s direct complaints of understaffing and 
related safety concerns made to the administrator, Harper, he also complained 
about the mistreatment of his assistant director of nursing, Colleen Cutler, after 
she complained about the same staffing problems.  Pushard told Harper that he 
believed that Harper’s mistreatment of Cutler was in retaliation for her 
complaints about staffing problems.  Pushard complained to Harper that he 
thought Harper had taken away Cutler’s office in retaliation for Cutler’s 
complaints about Harper’s staffing practices.  When Pushard moved Cutler into 
his office, Harper told Pushard that he disapproved of the move.  The complaint 
 
21 
regarding the mistreatment of his assistant who joined him in his complaints is 
part and parcel of Pushard’s complaints about the staffing levels at Riverview.  
The action taken by the administration against Cutler must be considered along 
with her relationship to Pushard; the content of her complaints, which were the 
same as Pushard’s complaints; and the administration’s displeasure with 
Pushard’s attempt to support his assistant. 
[¶42]  On these facts, a jury could find that Pushard was involved in 
protected activity.  See Cormier, 2015 ME 161, ¶¶ 9, 16, 129 A.3d 944.  A jury 
could easily infer that Pushard was engaged in protected activity because his 
complaints were related to patient and employee safety and the complaints 
involved Riverview’s failure to comply with the consent decree.  Pushard has 
raised issues surrounding the question of protected activity that should be 
submitted to a jury.   
C. 
Reported HIPAA Violation 
 
[¶43]  The Court decided that there was no causal connection between 
Pushard’s reporting of a possible HIPAA violation and his termination.  Court’s 
Opinion ¶ 27.  For purposes of this issue the Court assumed that the activity 
was protected activity.  The Court held that Pushard “must rely solely on the 
temporal proximity between his report of a HIPAA violation and his 
 
22 
termination to establish causation.”  Court’s Opinion ¶ 27.  The Court never 
definitively decided that the reporting of the HIPAA violation was protected 
activity. 
 
[¶44]  However, this issue surrounding the reporting of a HIPAA violation 
cannot be considered in isolation—it must be considered in the context of all 
that was going on during the 12 months that Pushard was director of nursing 
before his suspension and ultimate termination.  More importantly, Pushard’s 
reporting of the HIPAA violation, combined with his complaints regarding the 
staffing levels and his complaints about the retaliatory treatment of his 
assistant who was also complaining about the staffing levels, are all facts upon 
which a jury could find that he was involved in protected activity.    
II.  CAUSATION 
[¶45]  The trial court and the Court on appeal did not address the 
causation issue except as it applies to the reporting of the HIPAA violation.  
Court’s Opinion ¶¶ 26-27.  The administrative actions taken against Pushard 
raise disputes of fact related to the causal connection between Pushard’s 
protected activity and his suspension and termination.   
[¶46]  “Temporal proximity of an employer’s awareness of protected 
activity and the alleged retaliatory action may serve as the causal link for 
 
23 
purposes of a prima facie case.”  Daniels v. Narraguagus Bay Health Care Facility, 
2012 ME 80, ¶ 21, 45 A.3d 722; see also Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 
86 (1st Cir. 2005) (applying both federal and state employment discrimination 
law and reasoning that an adverse condition of employment that “follows hard 
on the heels of protected activity . . . often is strongly suggestive of retaliation”); 
Oliver v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 110 (1st Cir. 1988) (interpreting federal 
employment discrimination law and stating that evidence that adverse 
employment action occurred “soon after” the employee’s known protected 
activity is circumstantial proof of a causal connection “because it is strongly 
suggestive of retaliation.”).  
[¶47]  We have previously held that temporal proximity between 
protected activity and an adverse employment decision may be sufficient for a 
WPA claim to survive a motion for summary judgment.  See Currie v. Indus. Sec., 
Inc., 2007 ME 12, ¶ 28, 915 A.2d 400 (holding that temporal proximity between 
protected activity and termination would be sufficient to infer causation where 
the protected activity and the termination occurred within one month of one 
another); see also Brady, 2015 ME 143, ¶ 23, 126 A.3d 1145 (“[T]he lack of 
temporal proximity, although potentially persuasive, is not dispositive, and in 
 
24 
the context of a summary judgment motion it does not compromise a plaintiff’s 
prima facie case.”).  
[¶48]  Temporal proximity, however, is not the only circumstantial 
evidence of causation that Pushard has asserted in his statement of material 
facts.  He also alleges that he was subject to poor treatment by Harper, a pattern 
that built in intensity and culminated in his suspension and termination.  In the 
context of WPA claims, where causation must often be proved by way of 
circumstantial evidence and inference, these are the type of facts that may form 
the basis of a prima facie case.  See Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 828 
(1st Cir. 1991) (“There are many sources of circumstantial evidence that, 
theoretically, can demonstrate retaliation in a way sufficient to leap the 
summary judgment or directed verdict hurdles.  These include, but are not 
limited to, evidence of differential treatment in the workplace.”); see also Osher 
v. Univ. of Me. Sys., 703 F. Supp. 2d 51, 68 (D. Me. 2010) (“Changes in an 
employer’s treatment of its employee after the protected conduct can reveal a 
causal connection.”).  
[¶49]  Pushard was hired as director of nursing in June 2014.  His 
repeated complaints to Harper began shortly thereafter.  The first sign of the 
administration’s attitude toward Pushard surfaced in November 2014, when 
 
25 
Pushard’s assistant director’s office was taken away from her without any 
explanation.  In February 2015, Pushard was removed from decision-making 
regarding the hiring of nurses.  To the displeasure of Harper, Pushard allowed 
his assistant director to share his office beginning in March 2015.  He was 
placed on leave in June 2015, approximately one year after his hiring, and his 
employment was terminated in October 2015.  Pushard asserts that the 
administration’s purported reason for the termination—failure to report 
Nurse A—was pretextual.  Harper directed the human resources department at 
Riverview to launch an investigation of Pushard.   
[¶50]  Pushard has asserted sufficient facts from which a jury could find 
that Harper’s purported reason for terminating Pushard was mere pretext.  See 
Trott v. H.D. Goodall Hosp., 2013 ME 33, ¶ 20, 66 A.3d 7 (“[W]hen judges 
evaluate a summary judgment record, they should be mindful that what might 
initially appear to be a weak case of pretext is not the same as no case.”); see 
also Stanley v. Hancock Cty. Comm’rs, 2004 ME 157, ¶¶ 20-21, 864 A.2d 169 
(stating that a defendant is entitled to rely on circumstantial evidence of pretext 
in making out a prima facie case for a WPA claim).  
[¶51]  There are many facts presented in the statements of material facts 
that support Pushard’s assertion that the stated reason for his termination was 
 
26 
pretextual.  Pushard asserts that he took all reasonable steps to monitor the 
activity of Nurse A, and in the end the claims against Nurse A—the nurse he 
allegedly failed to supervise, monitor and report to the administration—were 
only partially substantiated.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
[¶52]  In his statement of material facts, Pushard presents many facts 
from which a jury could infer that his termination resulted from his repeated 
complaints about staffing and safety issues related to the consent decree and 
his reporting of a possible HIPAA violation.  Because Pushard has presented 
facts that, if true, would establish a prima facie case that he engaged in 
protected activity and that he was terminated because of that activity, we 
should not decide these issues as matters of law.  In deciding a motion for 
summary judgment, all reasonable inferences must be given to the moving 
party, and when reasonable inferences raise issues of material fact, the issues 
must be decided by a jury. 
[¶53]  I would vacate the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor 
of Riverview and remand for a jury trial.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
Arthur J. Greif, Esq. (orally), Gilbert & Greif, P.A., Bangor, for appellant Roland 
Pushard III 
 
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Valerie A. Wright, Asst. Att. Gen. (orally), 
Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Riverview Psychiatric 
Center 
 
 
Kennebec County Superior Court docket number CR-2017-134 
For Clerk Reference Only