Case Title: Commonwealth v. Field

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11403

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2017-08-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11403 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  EUNICE M. FIELD. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     March 10, 2017. - August 1, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Hines, Lowy, & Budd, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Constitutional Law, Assistance of counsel, Admissions 
and confessions, Voluntariness of statement.  Mental 
Impairment.  Evidence, Admissions and confessions, 
Voluntariness of statement, Videotape, Competency.  
Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Assistance of counsel, 
Admissions and confessions, Voluntariness of statement, 
Competency to stand trial. 
 
 
 
 
Indictment found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on October 21, 2010. 
 
 
The case was tried before Charles J. Hely, J., and a motion 
for a new trial, filed on June 16, 2014, was heard by him. 
 
 
 
Elizabeth Caddick for the defendant. 
 
Stacey L. Gauthier, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
LOWY, J.  In August, 2010, the victim, Lorraine Wachsman, 
was stabbed to death.  A jury in the Superior Court found the 
defendant guilty of murder in the first degree on theories of 
2 
 
deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty.  The 
defendant appeals from her conviction and from the denial of her 
motion for a new trial. 
 
The defendant asserts several claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, centering on trial counsel's failure to 
consult with a mental health expert regarding (1) a defense of 
mental impairment, including impeaching the Commonwealth's 
mental health expert; (2) the suppression of statements made by 
the defendant during two police interviews; and (3) the 
defendant's competency to stand trial.  Although we conclude 
that trial counsel erred by failing to consult with a mental 
health expert, the error does not require reversal of the 
defendant's conviction.  See Commonwealth v. Nolin, 448 Mass. 
207, 220 (2007); Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 
(1992), S.C., 469 Mass 447 (2104).  We also decline to grant 
relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
Background.  We recite the facts the jury could have found 
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, reserving 
certain details for our analysis of the issues. 
 
The defendant, who was prescribed medication for bipolar 
disorder, and who had a history of substance abuse, came to know 
the victim through Alcoholics Anonymous (AA).  The defendant and 
the victim had a strained relationship for some time leading up 
to the victim's death.  The victim was close with the 
3 
 
defendant's former longtime girl friend and acted as the girl 
friend's AA "sponsor."  The defendant blamed the victim for the 
defendant's romantic relationship with the girl friend ending in 
early 2010.  Even before the events leading to the end of her 
romantic relationship with the girl friend, the defendant 
harbored resentment toward the victim.  According to the 
defendant, the victim prevented her from visiting a sick mutual 
friend in the hospital, prior to that friend's death. 
 
On the night before the victim's death, the defendant 
telephoned the victim and arranged to meet her the following 
morning.  That night, the defendant wrote on her page on the Web 
site Facebook, "Tic toc, tic toc.  I'm going to finish my book 
tomorrow.  You're all going to be real interested in it because 
you're all in it.  The title is Tormented Minds by Eunice 
Field."  At around the same time, the defendant wrote a note, 
addressed to the former girl friend, which stated that the 
victim would "get what she deserves for coming between you and 
me,"1 and that she had "snapped" because of her bipolar disorder. 
                               
 
1 The note stated: 
 
 
"I love you with all my heart.  I know you know that.  
I'm sorry for not giving you a better life.  My heart aches 
for what I have done to you.  But remember to always follow 
your heart.  My mind is tired now, so I have to go.  Your 
[sic] the best thing that ever happened to me.  I will love 
you always for that, but something happened to me, with my 
bipolar and all, I snapped.  Lorraine will get what she 
deserves for coming between you and me.  I love you. . . 
4 
 
 
The defendant traveled to the victim's apartment in 
Bridgewater on the morning of August 9, 2010, and killed the 
victim by stabbing her nine times with a knife in the neck, 
chest and back.  After killing the victim, the defendant drove 
herself to the Brockton police station.  When she arrived, she 
remained in her motor vehicle. Officers found the defendant, 
complaining of chest pain.  As they helped the defendant out of 
her automobile, they saw that she was covered in blood.  After 
being asked about the blood, the defendant stated that she had 
just killed someone. 
 
The defendant was brought into the police station and 
seated on a bench in the lobby, where she repeated that she had 
killed someone, and when asked, gave the victim's name.  She 
also provided the officers with the name of the apartment 
complex in which the victim lived.  The defendant was taken to 
an interview room.  She was read the Miranda rights, and she 
responded that she understood them and that she wished to waive 
them.  Police conducted a videotaped interview in which the 
defendant made incriminating statements. 
 
The defendant was then transported to the Bridgewater 
police station.  After the standard booking procedure, she again 
waived her Miranda rights.  The police conducted another 
                                                                                                  
 
Eunice.  P.S. Someday we will all know the real truth.  
P.S.S.  [sic] . . . Tell Truth.  'Wasn't my pain real'? by 
Eunice Field." 
5 
 
videotaped interview, during which she made additional 
incriminating statements.  The police searched the victim's 
apartment that afternoon.  They found the victim's body near the 
doorway and bloodstains throughout the apartment. 
 
The two videotaped interviews were introduced at trial.  
The Commonwealth also called an expert who testified that, in 
watching the interviews of the defendant, he saw no evidence of 
manic behavior, depression, delusions, or hallucinations, and 
stated that he believed that she was criminally responsible for 
her actions. 
 
The defendant did not contest that she had killed the 
victim.  Counsel argued essentially that the defendant's severe 
bipolar disorder prevented her from forming the requisite intent 
to commit murder in the first degree.  Counsel did not consult a 
mental health expert but did cross-examine the Commonwealth's 
expert about the severity of the defendant's bipolar disorder. 
 
In October, 2012, the defendant was convicted of murder in 
the first degree.  While her direct appeal was pending in this 
court, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial, in which 
newly appointed counsel argued that trial counsel had been 
ineffective on the same grounds that she asserts in this appeal.  
After an evidentiary hearing at which a mental health expert 
testified for the defendant, the judge, who also had been the 
trial judge, denied the motion.  He determined, in essence, that 
6 
 
any errors committed by trial counsel did not affect the 
evidence that the defendant deliberately premeditated the 
murder.  The defendant timely appealed, and the appeal was 
consolidated with her direct appeal. 
 
Discussion.  "When this court reviews a defendant's appeal 
from the denial of a motion for a new trial in conjunction with 
his direct appeal from an underlying conviction of murder, we 
review both under G. L. c. 278, § 33E" (citation omitted). 
Commonwealth v. Mercado, 466 Mass. 141, 145 (2013).  The 
defendant's arguments on appeal stem from the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims she made in her motion for a new 
trial. 
 
In capital murder cases, we review ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims by first determining "whether the alleged 
lapse created a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice, a standard more favorable to the defendant than the 
constitutional standard otherwise applied under Commonwealth v. 
Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974)" (quotations and citation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Fulgiam, 477 Mass. 20, 29 (2017).  We 
determine whether trial counsel erred and whether any such error 
was likely to influence the jury's conclusion.  Id.  Where an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is based on a tactical 
or strategic decision, we find error only if the decision was 
manifestly unreasonable when made.  See Commonwealth v. LaCava, 
7 
 
438 Mass. 708, 713 (2003).  See also Commonwealth v. Kolenovic, 
471 Mass. 664, 674 (2015). 
 
1.  Failure to consult an expert and trial strategy.  Faced 
with overwhelming evidence, including noncustodial admissions 
from the defendant,2 counsel's goal from the beginning of the 
trial was to obtain a verdict of murder in the second degree.  
The defendant claims that, had counsel consulted with a mental 
health expert at the time of trial, counsel would have been 
better able to mount a defense to the charge of murder in the 
first degree, by presenting evidence regarding her mental 
impairment at the time of the killing and by assisting him with 
the cross-examination of the Commonwealth's expert witness.  
Although we agree that trial counsel's decision not to consult 
with an expert was error, the defendant has not established that 
this failure was likely to have influenced the jury's verdict of 
murder with deliberate premeditation.  See Commonwealth v. 
Walker, 443 Mass. 213, 225 (2005). 
 
Trial counsel apparently recognized, as evidenced by his ex 
parte motion for expert funds prior to trial, that the 
defendant's mental state was central to his strategy of 
                               
 
2 Although, as discussed infra, the defendant asserts that 
her custodial statements made to both Brockton and Bridgewater 
police officers should have been suppressed, she does not 
contest the admissibility of her earlier noncustodial statements 
to the Brockton police, in which she admitted that she had 
killed the victim. 
8 
 
obtaining a verdict of murder in the second degree.  Further, 
trial counsel knew that the defendant had claimed that she had 
run out of her prescription bipolar medication several days 
before the killing, and that in her handwritten note to her 
former girl friend, the defendant claimed that she had "snapped" 
due to her bipolar disorder. 
 
Although trial counsel's overarching strategy to avoid a 
conviction of murder in the first degree may have been the best 
available defense, it was apparent from facts known and 
available to counsel that the defendant's mental impairment 
would be central to this defensive strategy.  Nonetheless, trial 
counsel never consulted with an expert regarding the defendant's 
mental impairment at the time of the killing.  Cf.  Commonwealth 
v. Roberio, 428 Mass. 278, 279-280 (1998), S.C., 440 Mass. 245 
(2003) (failure to investigate criminal responsibility defense 
manifestly unreasonable "if facts known to, or accessible to, 
trial counsel raised a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's 
mental condition" [citation omitted]).  Contrast Commonwealth v. 
Bois, 476 Mass. 15, 23 (2016) (decision not to offer medical 
records for mental health issue was not unreasonable when 
counsel had retained two experts to review records).  In his 
testimony at the hearing on the motion for a new trial, trial 
counsel did not provide a tactical justification for his failure 
to consult an expert.  See Commonwealth v. Alcide, 472 Mass. 
9 
 
150, 167-168 (2015) ("This is not a case where arguably reasoned 
tactical or strategic judgments . . . are called into question 
. . . .  Rather, . . . defense counsel did not investigate the 
only realistic defense . . . to the charge of murder in the 
first degree" [quotations and citation omitted]).  Trial counsel 
stated only that he did not consult with an expert because he 
thought he understood the issues and he was skeptical that the 
defendant could have "underst[oo]d what was going on."  
Accordingly, we conclude trial counsel erred by failing at least 
to consult with an expert regarding the defendant's mental 
impairment at the time she killed the victim. 
 
Because of this conclusion, we now examine whether that 
error was likely to have affected the jury's verdict of murder 
in the first degree.  Walker, 443 Mass. at 225.  In order to 
prevail on a motion for a new trial based on a claim of 
ineffective assistance, the defendant must establish that 
consulting with an expert would have enabled trial counsel to 
mount an effective defense based on her lack of capacity for 
murder in the first degree. See Kolenovic, 471 Mass. at 673 
(defendant bears burden to prove ineffectiveness).  Moreover, 
where a jury have returned a conviction of murder in the first 
degree based on more than one theory, the verdict remains even 
if only one theory is sustained on appeal.  See Nolin, 448 Mass. 
at 220. 
10 
 
 
At the hearing on the motion for the new trial, the 
defendant's expert contested that the defendant's confession had 
been voluntary and that she had had the capacity to act with 
extreme atrocity or cruelty.  He did not testify that the 
defendant lacked the capacity to deliberately premeditate.  
Indeed, the expert agreed that there was evidence to support the 
conclusion that the defendant had formulated a plan to kill the 
victim and had executed that plan.3  Contrast Roberio, 428 Mass. 
at 280-281 (at hearing on motion for new trial, defense expert 
testified that defendant was unable to conform conduct to law).  
Therefore, even assuming that the expert would have assisted the 
defense argument that the defendant could not have committed the 
murder with extreme atrocity or cruelty, the record does not 
establish that the expert could have assisted trial counsel in 
either presenting a defense to, or more effectively cross-
examining the Commonwealth's expert regarding, deliberate 
premeditation.  As the judge noted at the hearing on the motion 
for the new trial, there is no basis on which to conclude that 
consultation with the expert would have altered the jury’s 
                               
 
3 We note also that the judge instructed the jury regarding 
lack of criminal responsibility, even though the motion judge 
noted that the defendant had, at no time, demonstrated that lack 
of criminal responsibility was an available ground of defense. 
The defendant does not, however, argue on appeal that she was 
not criminally responsible.  Nor did the defense expert so 
testify at the new trial motion hearing. 
11 
 
conviction of murder in the first degree based on deliberate 
premeditation. 
 
2. Failure to suppress the two police interviews.  The 
defendant argues that, had trial counsel consulted with an 
expert, he could have successfully suppressed both videorecorded 
police interviews for being involuntary, based on her state of 
mind.  Without these recordings, the defendant contends, the 
jury would not have had a sufficient basis to find either 
premeditation or extreme atrocity or cruelty. 
Trial counsel believed that allowing the jury to view the 
video recordings of both police interviews and to observe her 
strange behavior firsthand would increase the likelihood that 
the jury would find that the defendant had not premeditated the 
killing or acted with extreme atrocity or cruelty.  Trial 
counsel's choice not to challenge the admissibility of the 
interviews, therefore, was a tactical decision that was not 
without justification.4  We do not, however, need to resolve 
whether counsel's judgment was manifestly unreasonable because 
even if we were to assume that it was, as discussed below, we 
cannot conclude on this record that the admission of the 
videorecorded interviews was likely to have affected the jury's 
                               
 
4 Given the overwhelming evidence of guilt separate and 
distinct from the videorecorded interviews, it was reasonable to 
allow the jury to see the defendant's behavior for themselves, 
rather than having witnesses describe it in an antiseptic 
fashion. 
12 
 
verdict of murder by deliberate premeditation.  See Fulgiam, 477 
Mass. at 29 (where defendant's ineffective claim is based on 
failure to move to suppress, defendant must show motion would 
have succeeded and that failure created substantial likelihood 
of miscarriage of justice). 
 
a. The Brockton police interview.  In the interview at the 
Brockton police station, the defendant made incriminating 
statements, including that she intended to kill the victim 
before she went to the victim's apartment and that she brought 
the murder weapon with her to the victim's apartment.  The 
defendant contends that, without this evidence, the jury could 
not have convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree 
based on deliberate premeditation.  We disagree. 
The defendant's expert testified at the hearing on the 
motion for a new trial that the defendant exhibited some strange 
behaviors during the interview, such as slurred speech, requests 
for questions to be repeated, and long pauses between words when 
answering questions.  The expert further testified that the 
defendant may have been experiencing auditory hallucinations.  
Based on these behaviors, the expert stated his opinion that the 
defendant was not capable of voluntarily making these statements 
or waiving her Miranda rights. 
 
Even if we assume, however, that the Brockton interview was 
involuntary and should have been suppressed, there was still 
13 
 
compelling evidence of premeditation.  Most significantly, the 
defendant had written a note in which she said the victim would 
get what "she deserves" for interfering with the defendant's 
relationship with her girl friend.  Additionally, the defendant 
telephoned the victim the night before the killing to arrange 
the meeting -- the same night that the defendant wrote a 
Facebook post that, although not directly alluding to the victim 
or a plot for murder, allowed the jury to conclude that the 
defendant was preparing to take some sort of drastic action the 
following day.  Finally, the defendant harbored ill feelings 
toward the victim for at least several years before the killing, 
and had arranged to meet the victim that morning. 
 
b.  The Bridgewater police interview.  The defendant argues 
that the second recorded interview formed the evidentiary basis 
that allowed the jury to conclude that the defendant had acted 
with extreme atrocity or cruelty.  The defendant asserts that 
the interview could have been suppressed based on either a lack 
of voluntariness due to her mental state or the defendant's 
assertion that she wanted to stop answering questions until she 
received food and a cigarette.  See Commonwealth v. Howard, 469 
Mass. 721, 735 (2014) (when defendant decides to stop answering 
questions, that decision must be "scrupulously honored" 
[citation omitted]). 
14 
 
Many of the incriminating statements from the second 
interview supported the Commonwealth's theory of extreme 
atrocity or cruelty, providing evidence of conscious suffering 
by the victim and the defendant's indifferent attitude towards 
that suffering.  See Commonwealth v. Cunneen, 389 Mass. 216, 227 
(1983).  For example, the defendant told police that the victim 
had repeatedly asked her "why?" during the attack, and that, 
after the stabbing, she lay down on the floor with the victim, 
looked into her eyes, and told her she was "feisty" and needed 
to mind her own business.  The defendant also stated that she 
felt good about what she had done. 
 
Even assuming, however, that the Bridgewater interview 
formed the sole basis of the jury's finding as to extreme 
atrocity or cruelty and that the interview should have been 
excluded, the defendant's conviction of murder in the first 
degree would still stand, based on the compelling evidence of 
deliberate premeditation.  Accordingly, even if the defendant 
were to have prevailed on a motion to suppress, the evidence of 
deliberate premeditation from other sources (such as her 
confessional note, her social media post, and her arranging the 
meeting with the victim) was so overwhelming that we cannot say 
admission of the video recording was likely to have influenced 
the jury's decision to convict her on the theory of 
premeditation.  Wright, 411 Mass. at 682. 
15 
 
 
3.  Defendant's competency to stand trial.  Finally, the 
defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to consult an expert to ascertain her competency to stand trial.  
Such an inquiry is appropriate where there is a "substantial 
question of possible doubt" regarding the defendant's competency 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Companonio, 445 Mass. 39, 
48-49 (2005), S.C., 472 Mass. 1004 (2015).  Although the 
Commonwealth bears a burden to demonstrate a defendant's 
competency when the issue is raised before trial, Commonwealth 
v. Crowley, 393 Mass. 393, 400 (1984), the defendant bears the 
burden to demonstrate ineffectiveness when seeking a new trial.  
See Kolenovic, 471 Mass. at 673.  The defendant has not met that 
burden. 
 
The defendant has presented no evidence, beyond trial 
counsel's statement that he was not sure that the defendant 
understood the mental impairment defense, that the defendant was 
incompetent to stand trial.  As noted by the trial judge, there 
was no testimony that the defendant lacked the ability to 
consult with a reasonable degree of understanding.  Although the 
defendant argues on appeal that consulting with an expert may 
have helped trial counsel realize that the defendant lacked that 
ability, the defendant presented no evidence to support such a 
conclusion.  The defendant's expert did not testify at the 
hearing on the motion for a new trial that the defendant was 
16 
 
incompetent to stand trial.  Accordingly, we are unable to say, 
on this record, that the defendant has raised a substantial 
doubt as to her competency to stand trial.  See Companonio, 445 
Mass. at 48-49. 
 
Conclusion.  We have reviewed the entire pursuant to our 
obligation under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Although counsel 
unreasonably failed to consult with a mental health expert for 
trial, we conclude that the defendant has failed to establish 
that such a consultation would have provided a basis to 
challenge the Commonwealth's theory of premeditated murder.  
Because we conclude that, even if the interviews should have 
been excluded and even if the second interview formed the sole 
basis for the jury's finding of extreme atrocity, there was 
ample evidence of premeditation independent of the interviews, 
the conviction of murder in the first degree stands.  
Accordingly, neither trial counsel's shortcomings nor the 
interests of justice require entry of a lesser degree of guilt 
or a new trial.  The defendant's conviction and the order 
denying the defendant's motion for a new trial are affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered.