Case Title: Foianini v. Brinton

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1993-07-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Foianini v. Brinton1993 WY 96855 P.2d 1238Case Number: 92-195Decided: 07/14/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
Gino 
FOIANINI, 

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Jay 
Howard BRINTON and John David Brinton, 

Appellees 
(Defendants).

 

Jack 
Gage of Gage and Moxley, Cheyenne, for appellant.

J.C. 
DeMers, Cheyenne, for appellees.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, JJ.

MACY, 
Chief Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Gino 
Foianini appeals from a summary judgment entered against him in his action to 
condemn an irrigation ditch right-of-way located on land owned by Appellee Jay 
Howard Brinton.

[¶2]      We reverse and 
remand.

[¶3]      Mr. Foianini 
presents a single issue for our review:

[D]id 
plaintiff/appellant Gino Foianini impermissibly split a single cause of action 
by not bringing the suit to establish the ditch right-of-way by condemnation at 
the same time that he attempted to establish that right-of-way by 
prescription?

[¶4]      Mr. Foianini and 
Mr. Brinton owned adjoining land in Uinta County, Wyoming. Until the summer of 
1989, Mr. Foianini irrigated his land by drawing water through a ditch which 
crossed Mr. Brinton's property. The record is not exactly clear as to the 
reason, but in the summer of 1989 Mr. Brinton filled in the ditch. On July 10, 
1989, Mr. Foianini filed a lawsuit against Mr. Brinton, alleging that he had a 
prescriptive easement or, alternatively, an irrevocable license to use the ditch 
on Mr. Brinton's property. The district court denied the claim, finding that Mr. 
Foianini had no legal interest in the ditch.

[¶5]      Mr. Foianini 
subsequently brought a second action in which he sought to condemn a ditch 
right-of-way across Mr. Brinton's land. Mr. Brinton moved for a summary 
judgment, claiming that the rule against splitting a cause of action required 
Mr. Foianini to include the condemnation action with his first suit. The 
district court agreed and granted a summary judgment in favor of Mr. Brinton. 
The court offered the following rationale in its decision letter:

Although 
a number of different legal theories may apply to a given episode and although 
several legal theories may depend on different shadings of the facts, or would 
emphasize different elements of the facts, or would call for different kinds of 
relief, after judgment against the plaintiff he is precluded from seeking 
remedies derived from the same grouping of facts that were not brought out in 
his original action. See Restatement Judgments (Second) §§ 24 and 25 
(1982).

The 
basis of the rule is that under modern rules of civil procedure a plaintiff may 
pursue in one action all possible remedies whether or not consistent, whether 
alternative or cumulative, legal or equitable. Rule 8(e)(2) W.R.C.P.

The 
plaintiff in his brief opposing the motion to dismiss discusses the inherent 
inconsistencies of claiming a prescriptive right and then claiming no right at 
all in order to seek condemnation. However, as the Restatement clearly 
indicates, mutually exclusive remedies do not give rise to separate causes of 
action.

. 
. . .

The 
defendant has established that this case and the plaintiff's original suit 
involve the same cause of action; that plaintiff could have pursued condemnation 
as an alternative remedy in his original action but did not; and, that, 
therefore, the plaintiff has violated the rule against splitting a cause of 
action.

[¶6]      Our familiar 
standard of review for summary judgment appeals is: "We examine [the record to 
determine] whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the 
prevailing party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Slavens v. Board 
of County Commissioners for Uinta County, Wyoming, 854 P.2d 683, 685 (Wyo. 
1993).

[¶7]      Mr. Foianini 
argues that the trial court acted improperly in granting the summary judgment 
because he did not impermissibly split a single cause of action by bringing the 
condemnation action after he had brought the prescriptive easement action. We 
agree. The general rule regarding splitting a cause of action is: "[A] single 
wrong gives rise to one cause of action for which only one suit may be 
maintained, however numerous the elements of damages resulting therefrom." Lane 
Company v. Busch Development, Inc., 662 P.2d 419, 421 (Wyo. 1983). The objective 
of the rule is to prevent repetitive and vexatious litigation and to avoid the 
duplication of costs and expenses. Hurst v. Davis, 386 P.2d 943, 949 (Wyo. 
1963).

[¶8]      The determination 
of whether a party impermissibly split a cause of action hinges in large part on 
how one defines a cause of action. In Rialto Theatre, Inc. v. Commonwealth 
Theatres, Inc., 714 P.2d 328, 337 (Wyo. 1986), this Court adopted the broad 
definition of a cause of action found in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 
24 at 196 (1982):

"§ 
24. Dimensions of `Claim' for Purposes of Merger or Bar - General Rule 
Concerning `Splitting'

"(1) 
When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the 
plaintiff's claim pursuant to the rules of merger or bar (see §§ 18, 19), the 
claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the 
defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of 
connected transactions, out of which the action arose.

"(2) 
What factual grouping constitutes a `transaction', and what groupings constitute 
a `series', are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such 
considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or 
motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their 
treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business 
understanding or usage."

[¶9]      Mr. Foianini 
suggests that the RESTATEMENT definition may not be appropriate in this case 
because we adopted § 24 in Rialto Theatre, Inc., which ultimately turned on the 
doctrine of res judicata rather than on impermissible claim splitting. Mr. 
Foianini does not offer, nor can we perceive, a reason why § 24's transactional 
approach to defining the scope of a claim or cause of action would not apply to 
both the doctrine of res judicata and the closely related rule against claim 
splitting. Other courts have interpreted § 24 as encompassing the rule against 
splitting a cause of action. Hughes v. Salo, 203 Mont. 52, 659 P.2d 270 (1983). 
Our prior decisions also appear to have adopted this view. See Lane Company, 662 P.2d  at 425 (referring to § 24 as being a rule "against splitting a cause of 
action").

[¶10]   The resolution of whether Mr. 
Foianini impermissibly split a single claim depends upon whether his 
prescriptive easement and condemnation actions stemmed from the same transaction 
as defined in § 24.1 Section 24 states that a 
transaction is to be defined

pragmatically, 
giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in 
time,  as a unit conforms to the 
parties' expectations or business understanding or usage.

RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra, § 24 at 196.

[¶11]   The two actions at issue here were 
certainly factually similar in that they involved the same irrigation ditch and 
essentially the same parties. The problem is that they did not form a 
"convenient trial unit." The two remedies involve significantly different proofs 
and would probably involve different witnesses. The principal difference between 
the two proceedings is that the prescriptive easement action involved Mr. 
Foianini's right to use Mr. Brinton's property due to his open and adverse use 
for the statutory period, whereas the condemnation action involved Mr. 
Foianini's right to appropriate the ditch right-of-way upon payment. Mr. Brinton 
points out that, according to § 24's comment b, a second action may be precluded 
even though different proofs are required.2 However, even if different proofs 
had not been required in this case, these two actions would still not form a 
convenient trial unit.

[¶12]   To condemn the ditch right-of-way, 
Mr. Foianini had to comply with Wyo. Stat. § 1-26-510 (1988) of the Wyoming 
Eminent Domain Act, which provides:

(a) 
Except as provided in W.S. 1-26-511,[3] an action to condemn property may 
not be maintained over timely objection by the condemnee unless the condemnor 
made a good faith effort to acquire the property by purchase before 
commencing the action.

(Emphasis 
added.) Section 1-26-510's directive that the condemnor make a good faith effort 
to purchase the ditch right-of-way prior to bringing a condemnation 
action essentially foreclosed Mr. Foianini from including his prescriptive 
easement action with the condemnation action. If Mr. Foianini had brought the 
prescriptive easement and the condemnation action simultaneously, Mr. Brinton 
would have had the opportunity to sell him the right-of-way before the 
prescriptive easement action was heard. Such an opportunity would potentially 
preclude Mr. Foianini from proving his right to a prescriptive easement. The 
fact that Mr. Foianini had to attempt to purchase the ditch right prior to the 
condemnation action indicates that these two actions were not, in the words of § 
24, a "convenient trial unit" and did not stem from the same transaction. 
Consequently, Mr. Foianini did not impermissibly split a single 
claim.

[¶13]   Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

 

1 
When discussing impermissible claim splitting, we do not mean to suggest that a 
party is prohibited from suing for part of a cause of action. The rule against 
claim splitting merely prevents a party who chooses to sue for only part of a 
cause of action in the first lawsuit from seeking to recover for the omitted 
portion in a subsequent suit. 1A C.J.S. Actions § 179 (1985); FLEMING JAMES, JR. 
& GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.7 (3d ed. 1985).

2 
Comment b provides in part:

Though 
no single factor is determinative [for deciding what constitutes a transaction], 
the relevance of trial convenience makes it appropriate to ask how far the 
witnesses or proofs in the second action would tend to overlap the witnesses or 
proofs relevant to the first. If there is a substantial overlap, the second 
action should ordinarily be held precluded. But the opposite does not hold true; 
even when there is not a substantial overlap, the second action may be precluded 
if it stems from the same transaction or series.

3 
Wyo. Stat. § 1-26-511 (1988) provides:

(a) 
A condemnor's failure or inability substantially to comply with W.S. 1-26-509 
and 1-26-510 does not bar the maintenance of a condemnation action, 
notwithstanding timely objection, if:

(i) 
Compliance is waived by written agreement between the property owner and the 
condemnor;

(ii) 
One (1) or more of the owners of the property is unknown, cannot with reasonable 
diligence be contacted, is incapable of contracting and has no legal 
representative, or owns an interest which cannot be acquired by contract; 
or

(iii) 
Due to conditions not caused by or under the control of the condemnor, there is 
a compelling need to avoid the delay in commencing the action which compliance 
would require.