Case Title: In Re: Ashley E.

Citation: 387 Md. 260

Docket Number: 90/04

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2005-05-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re Ashley E., Laione D., Matthew B., and Gregory B.-G., No. 90, September Term 2004.
Evidence.  Application of the Maryland Rules of Evidence – Maryland Rules 5-101 (c) and
11-115 – Application of the Maryland Rules of Evidence in Permanency Planning Hearings.
Maintaining confidentiality in child abuse cases.  Under Maryland Rule 5-101 (c), providing
for the discretionary strict application of the Rules of Evidence in disposition hearings under
Maryland Rule 11-115, the juvenile court is not required to strictly apply the Rules of
Evidence in permanency planning hearings, which are dispositional in nature.  Juvenile court
did not err in permitting Department of Social Services employees who were privy to
confidential information at issue to remain in the courtroom during hearing in which
allegations of child abuse were discussed.    
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 90
September Term 2004
__________________________________
IN RE: ASHLEY E., LAIONE D.,
MATTHEW B., AND GREGORY B.-G.
__________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene
JJ.
Opinion by Battaglia, J.
           Filed:     May 17, 2005
1
Many of the following facts were recited in the opinion of the Court of Special
Appeals, although we have exercised our license to add or delete specific facts where
appropriate.
This case arises out of a permanency planning hearing held on October 1, 2003, in the
Circuit Court for Montgomery County, sitting as a juvenile court.  We are asked to determine
whether permanency planning hearings under Maryland Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.),
Section 3-823 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article are a form of disposition
hearing under Maryland Rule 11-115, in which the application of the rules of evidence are
discretionary and informal, or whether the rules of evidence must be applied during
permanency planning hearings.  Also we are asked to address whether employees of a local
department of social services, who are not presently involved in the case before the court, but
were previously, can be present during otherwise confidential juvenile court proceedings.
Because we find that a permanency planning hearing is a type of disposition hearing as
described by Maryland Rule 11-115d., we hold that the Maryland Rules of evidence apply
informally to such hearings in accordance with Maryland Rule 5-101 (c).  Moreover, we
conclude that the juvenile court did not commit error in permitting the department employees
to remain in the courtroom during the proceedings.  Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the
Court of Special Appeals.
Facts1
The children, who are the subject of the permanency planning hearing at issue, are
Gregory B.-G., born August 6, 1993, now eleven years old; Matthew B., born August 26,
1994, now ten years old; Laione D., born December 6, 1995, now nine years old; and Ashley
2
The juvenile court granted an uncontested termination of parental rights with respect
to Ashley E. and Laione D. on November 2, 2004.  A contested termination of parental rights
hearing concerning Matthew B., which occurred over a period of several days, was
concluded on October 1, 2004.  The juvenile court is holding its ruling in that case sub curia.
On August 31, 2004, the permanency plan for Gregory B.-G. was changed to Another
Permanent Living Arrangement.  Therefore, the appeal is moot as to Ashley and Laione;
however, because the issues raised by this appeal cannot be described as applying to one
child but not another, our analysis remains unchanged.  
2
E., born November 24, 1997, now seven years old.2  Petitioner is the children’s biological
mother, Ms. B., and has identified various putative fathers for the children.
Ms. B. and the children first became involved with the Child Welfare Services Unit
of the Montgomery County Department of Health And Human Services (“the Department”)
in August of 2001 while residing in Rockville, Maryland.  Although it did not eventuate, Ms.
B. contacted the Department seeking assistance in caring for the children because she
anticipated being incarcerated due to an outstanding warrant.  In October of 2001, the
Department helped Ms. B. in making arrangements for her children while she resolved the
warrant issue.  In November of 2001, Ms. B. and the children became homeless, and she once
again sought help from the Department.  The Department arranged for temporary shelter,
medical treatment for Gregory for a mass in his larynx, and foster care for the children when
Ms. B. was hospitalized for complications of a pregnancy, which ended in miscarriage.
On January 31, 2002, Laione, then six years of age, informed her first grade teacher
that “her dad” had “pushed [her] down and stuck a . . . beer bottle in [her] butthole.”  The
teacher immediately reported the suspected child sexual abuse to the Department’s Child
3
Matthew and Ashley were not interviewed that day because the children were too tired
to continue.
3
Protective Services unit.  According to her teacher, Laione was very upset and crying when
she revealed the abuse and demonstrated the position in which she was restrained when she
was abused.  Moreover, Laione had been having problems at school due to exhibiting
sexually inappropriate behavior.  The teacher also reported that Laione wore dirty clothes to
school, had an unpleasant odor due to a lack of proper hygiene, and regularly urinated or
defecated on herself, usually immediately prior to leaving school to return home. 
A social worker from the Department interviewed Laione.  Using anatomically correct
dolls, Laione demonstrated that a male, whom she identified as “Sean,” had put his penis in
her mouth.  She also described her mother’s sexual activities, and in doing so, spontaneously
got on the cot in the interview room and imitated her mother’s actions and noises when
engaged in sexual activity.  
The next day, at the request of the social worker, Ms. B. brought all of the children
to the Department to be interviewed.  During that interview, Laione recanted her prior
statements and denied having “sa[id] anything about penises in the mouth” the day before,
but then continued to talk about Ashley and Gregory “sexing.”  Gregory denied any sexual
contact with his sister, but demonstrated a “horsie” game he played with the girls, which had
sexual overtones.3  
At the social worker’s direction, Ms. B. took the children to the Sexual Abuse and
4
Assault Center at Shady Grove Hospital to be examined.  Laione’s physical examination
revealed signs of “chronic vaginal penetration” and that the “circumference around the anus
and the area around the vaginal opening [were] colored with . . . magic marker.”  The
forensic nurse, who conducted the examination, concluded, from the precision of the
markings and the fact that they would have caused pain, that they were not self-inflicted.
Laione repeated her previous statement that “Sean” had put a beer bottle in her “butthole”;
she later stated that a glass had been inserted.  She denied having sex with anyone, saying,
“Nobody’s ever sexed me because I’m too ugly.” She reported that Gregory had done “nasty
stuff” and that Ashley had “stopped doing that nasty stuff.”
When the social worker confronted Ms. B. about the children’s medical and
behavioral problems, Ms. B. denied them and became angry and defensive.  She blamed the
children’s problems on the school system and told the social worker that she was going to
leave the country.  After the initial investigation, the social worker contacted Ms. B. three
or four times and scheduled three appointments for Ms. B. to bring Ashley and Matthew to
be interviewed; however, Ms. B. failed to comply.  Ms. B. continued to complain about the
ongoing nature of the investigation and expressed irritation at the Department’s continued
involvement.  When the social worker attempted to accommodate Ms. B.’s work schedule
when setting up appointments, Ms. B. did not respond.  
During this period, Ms. B. was involved sexually with two men: “Big Gregory” and
“Monte,” Ashley’s putative father.  When Ms. B. told the social worker that the men no
5
longer had contact with the children, the Department transferred the case to the intensive
family services unit, which provided a parent aide several times a week. 
That arrangement was in effect until April 22, 2002, when Laione made another
sexual abuse disclosure to her teacher.  Laione stated that she had seen her mother “sexing
it up” with two men in the bathroom, and when the three adults moved to another room “to
do it harder,” her mother told her to “come join in” and watch Big Gregory perform a sex act
upon her.  Laione quoted her mother, using sexually explicit adult language that would not
be in the ordinary vocabulary of a young child.  When Laione’s teacher suggested that they
speak to the school counselor, Laione screamed and begged the teacher not to tell for fear
that Ms. B. would kill her.  Laione also revealed that Big Gregory had banged Gregory’s
head against the wall.  
That day, the teacher made a second report of sexual abuse to the Child Protective
Services unit, and the children were placed in emergency shelter care and interviewed.
Laione was fearful at first, saying that what had occurred was a “secret” that she was “afraid
to tell” and that it was none of the social worker’s business.  She then spelled out the word
“sex” and described her mother and Big Gregory and Monte “in the bathroom . . . sexing”
with their clothes off.  She talked about a time when Ms. B. and Big Gregory were in bed and
Ms. B., seeing her in the room, asked her to join in and perform a sex act.  Once again,
Laione quoted her mother, using sexually explicit, age inappropriate language.  She also
described seeing Gregory in the closet with Ashley, “sexing,” and said that afterward Ashley
6
complained, “My poo-poo hurts.” 
When interviewed, Ashley, then four years old, said that Big Gregory was “licking
everybody’s stomach” and that he would lick Ms. B.’s breasts.  She also used sexually
explicit adult language when describing Big Gregory’s conduct.  During his interview,
Gregory, then nine years old, again demonstrated the “horsie” game and said that Ashley had
touched his “private parts” but he only had touched her through her clothing.  When asked
where he had learned such behavior, he stated that he had observed Ms. B. and Big Gregory
having sex in a hotel room in which the two adults and four children were staying.  
Matthew, who was seven years old at the time, denied that he had been sexually
abused, but told the social worker that he had seen Gregory touching “Lae-Lae’s [Laione’s]
poo-poo” and her “butt” with his hand and mouth.  He also stated that when he told his
mother what he had witnessed, she “whipped” Gregory and Laione.  Gregory later told
Matthew that Ms. B. had said “not to tell our business.”  Matthew told the social worker
about dreaming that something would come down from the sky and take him away.  He also
talked about an imaginary “bad” brother, whom he referred to as “Invisible Gregory.”  After
the interview ended, the social worker found Matthew crouching behind a door in the waiting
room, claiming that “Invisible Gregory” had taken money from his pocket.
When Ms. B. was informed of the children’s statements, she stated that she was not
surprised about the sexual activity between them, because Matthew had informed her about
it and that she told them that it was inappropriate.  She also acknowledged that there was “an
4
Shelter care “means a temporary placement of a child outside of the home at any time
before disposition.”  Md. Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 3-801(w) of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article.  A shelter care hearing “means a hearing held before disposition
to determine whether the temporary placement of the child outside the home is warranted.”
Md. Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 3-801(x) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
5
Md. Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 3-801(f) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article provides:
“Child in need of assistance” means a child who requires court
intervention because:
(1) The child has been abused, has been neglected, has a
developmental disability, or has a mental disorder; and
(2) The child’s parents, guardian, or custodian are unable or
unwilling to give proper care and attention to the child and the
child’s needs.
7
episode when the children walked in on her having sex” and “a time when Laione walked in
and saw her performing fellatio on Monte.”  
On April 23, 2002, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, sitting as the juvenile
court, held an emergency shelter care4 hearing and committed the children to the Department
for foster care placement.  Ms. B. agreed to drop off medication for Matthew the following
day, but did not do so, and also failed to give the Department forms so they could access the
children’s medical records.  
Subsequently, based on allegations of fact derived from the children’s interviews, the
Department filed Child In Need of Assistance (“CINA”)5 petitions for all four children.  The
6
Md. Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 3-801 (c) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article defines “adjudicatory hearing” as “a hearing under this subtitle to determine whether
the allegations in the petition, other than the allegation that the child requires the court’s
intervention, are true.”
7
Md. Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 3-801(m) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article defines “disposition hearing” as “a hearing under this subtitle to determine: (1)
Whether a child is in need of assistance; and (2) If so, the nature of the court’s intervention
to protect the child’s health, safety, and well-being.”
8
Section 3-823 (b)(1)(i) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides:
Permanency planning hearing. – (1) the court shall hold a
permanency planning hearing:
(i) No later than 11 months after a child in a CINA proceeding
enters an out-of-home placement to determine the permanency
plan for the child committed under § 3-819 (b) of this subtitle.
8
Circuit Court held adjudicatory6 and disposition7 hearings on May 23 and 24, 2002.  The
court sustained most of the factual allegations, including those allegations that Ms. B.
engaged in sexual activity with Laione.  The children were declared CINA and committed
to the Department’s continuing care for foster care placement.  The court also ordered that
Ms. B. be permitted supervised visitation with the children.  At that point, the Department’s
permanency plan for the children was reunification with Ms. B.  
On March 25, 2003, eleven months after the initial CINA determination, the juvenile
court conducted a permanency plan review hearing pursuant to Maryland Code (1973, 2002
Repl. Vol.), Section 3-823 (b)(1)(i) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.8  At the
hearing, the Department took the position that the permanency plan for the children should
be changed to termination of parental rights (“TPR”)/adoption.  Ms. B. opposed such a
9
change.
The Department called two witnesses: Nancy Atikkan, the Department social worker
assigned to the children since September of 2002, and Polly H. Kraft, M.D., a psychiatrist
who examined the children at The Reginald S. Lourie Center for Infants and Young Children
(“Lourie Center”), and participated with others at that center in evaluating their emotional
and mental health problems.  Ms. B. did not call any witnesses.  Counsel for the children
participated in the hearing, but did not call any witnesses.
The evidence introduced by the Department showed that the children at first were
placed in two foster homes in Montgomery County: Gregory and Matthew were together and
Laione and Ashley were together.  In both placements, the children were aggressive and
combative with each other and destructive to property, and had to be moved to separate
homes.  Additionally, Laione told lies of a sexual nature and Ashley engaged in “sex talk.”
In mid-May, Matthew moved to a second foster home, also in Montgomery County,
where he has remained and adjusted well.  The other three children went through multiple
foster homes in the first few months immediately after entering shelter care and eventually
were placed in therapeutic foster homes in Baltimore City through the Pressley Ridge Center.
Gregory, Laione, and Ashley received therapy at the Pressley Ridge Center, and Pressley
Ridge facilitated their visitations with Ms. B.
In the summer of 2002, Ms. B. moved to Baltimore City to be closer to her three
children in foster care there. Weekly visits at Pressley Ridge were scheduled with all four
10
children, with the Department providing transportation for Matthew from Montgomery
County.  Ms. B. then requested that the visits be scheduled bi-weekly to accommodate her
work schedule.  
According to the children’s social worker, Ms. Atikkan, Ms. B. failed to attend the
scheduled visits consistently or reliably, despite the fact that Ms. B. lived within walking
distance of the Pressley Ridge Center.  When she would participate in visits with all of the
children, the children ran around and interacted aggressively with each other while Ms. B.
exercised little to no control over their behavior.  As a result, the visits were subsequently
scheduled individually, on alternating weeks, with M atthew’s visits occurring in
Montgomery County.  Ms. B. continued to miss a significant number of the scheduled visits
and to be late for others.  During part of the time period in which the visits were scheduled
on alternating weeks, Ms. B. was working in Takoma Park; however, when she lost her job
and became unemployed, she did not schedule any additional visits and continued to either
miss or be late for visits.  The Department recommended that Ms. B. undergo a psychological
evaluation. Ms. B., however, did not submit to one.  
Dr. Kraft, the psychiatrist who examined the children at The Reginald S. Lourie
Center for Infants and Young Children, testified about the evaluation of the children
performed by the Lourie Center in the summer of 2002, and the children’s mental health
issues.  The evaluation was conducted by a team of therapists, including Dr. Kraft, and
covered a period of forty to fifty hours.  It included an interview with Ms. B., individual
11
sessions with the children, sessions with the children and Ms. B., and sessions with the foster
parents, and psychological testing of the children. 
Dr. Kraft conducted the interview of Ms. B., who vocalized her belief that the
children’s problems were the result of mistreatment by the child welfare system.  She angrily
insisted that the children were not being cared for properly and claimed that the children were
perfectly normal prior to their removal from her care.  She refused to acknowledge that she
was responsible for their problems.  Dr. Kraft concluded that the children’s emotional and
mental problems were the result of long-term abuse, most likely occurring throughout their
lives, which could not have been caused solely by their removal from their mother’s custody.
In Dr. Kraft’s opinion, Ms. B.’s ability to properly socialize the children and keep them safe
was “severely impaired.”
According to Dr. Kraft, Gregory, Laione, and Ashley had suffered severe emotional
damage as a result of physical and sexual abuse in their mother’s home.  Each of the children
was diagnosed with mental illnesses as a consequence.  Gregory’s ability to trust others was
damaged to the extent that he exhibited deviant anti-social behavior, including lying, stealing,
and attempting to trick people.  Ashley was the most seriously emotionally damaged, to such
a degree that the evaluators first believed that she was psychotic.  She engaged in sexualized
and inappropriate behavior that included making an overt sexual advance to one of the
interviewing therapists.
Laione also suffered severe personality damage, marked by a very low sense of self-
12
esteem.  She sexualized all relationships and resorted to sexual self-stimulation when
experiencing stress.  Matthew was the only child who suffered moderate, rather than serious,
emotional damage, exhibited mainly through anxiety.  Dr. Kraft stated that all of the children
would need to be “resocialized.”
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court determined that the permanency plan would
remain reunification, stating, “I do not think TPR is yet appropriate.”  The court noted that
some of the problems with Ms. B.’s failure to attend visits could have been caused by
distance and that it was necessary that Ms. B. undergo a psychological evaluation.  Moreover,
the court stated that, without an evaluation, the appropriate plan for the children could not
be determined.  The judge explained:
So, I want to make it clear by saying it a third time, that the
mother must participate in this psychological evaluation, in
which she tells the evaluator what happened in her childhood
and what happened in the lives of the children while they were
with her that may be significant, so we can look to what has to
be done to reunify the children.
I do not think we’ve had a full enough opportunity to do that.
That’s why I can’t approve today a Permanency Plan of
Termination of Parental Rights.  I do not think we’ve had
enough opportunity on behalf of the mother for that to be an
appropriate Plan . . . .
The court ordered that the psychological evaluation of Ms. B. be performed within thirty
days.
A second permanency planning review hearing was held on October 1, 2003.  The
Department once again requested that the permanency plan be changed to TPR/adoption, and
9
Md. Rule 5-615 provides in pertinent part:
(A) In general. . . . upon the request of a party made before
testimony begins, the court shall order witnesses excluded so
that they cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses.
13
Ms. B. again opposed that request.  During the approximately six months between the first
and second permanency plan review hearings, Dr. Michael Gelles, performed a psychological
evaluation of M s. B.  
During the hearing, the Department called Dr. Gelles and Ms. Atikkan as witnesses.
Counsel for the children called Shelby Morgan, Ph.D., Gregory and Laione’s therapist at
Pressley Ridge, and the supervisor for Ashley’s therapist at Pressley Ridge.  Ms. B. testified
on her own behalf.  Also present were Joanna Duncan, a Community Services Aide, Josie
Traum, the children’s former social worker, and Charley Mathews, a social worker who
supervises the Sex Abuse Treatment division, all of whom were employed by the
Department.
The Department introduced a ninety-nine page report which included a calendar
containing entries indicating when Ms. B. had failed to attend visits, a discharge summary
from Shepard Pratt for Gregory, and writings by the children.  Ms. B. objected to the
admission of the report as impermissible hearsay and objected to opinion testimony from Ms.
Atikkan, the children’s social worker.  She also requested that the other people who had been
identified as witnesses be excluded from the courtroom during Dr. Gelles’s testimony
pursuant to Maryland Rule 5-615,9 and that the courtroom be cleared of all members of the
10
Md. Rule 5-101 (c) provides:
(c) Discretionary application.  In the following proceedings,
the court may, in the interest of justice, decline to require strict
application of the rules in this Title other than those relating to
the competency of witnesses:
(1) The determination of questions of fact preliminary to
admissibility of evidence when the issue is to be determined by
the court under Rule 5-104 (a);
(2) Proceedings for revocation of probation under Rule 4-347;
(3) Hearings on petitions for post-conviction relief under Rule
4-406;
(4) Plenary proceedings in the Orphans’ Court under Rule 6-
462;
(5) Waiver hearings under Rule 11-113;
(6) Disposition hearings under Rule 11-115;
(7) Modification hearings under Rule 11-116; and
(8) Any other proceeding in which, prior to the adoption of the
rules in this Title, the court was authorized to decline to apply
the common-law rules of evidence.
11
Maryland Rule 11-115 provides in pertinent part:
a.  Hearing – Scheduling.  If after an adjudicatory hearing the
court determines that the allegations of the petition at issue in
the adjudicatory hearing have been sustained, it shall promptly
schedule a separate disposition hearing.  The disposition hearing
shall be held no later than thirty days after the conclusion of the
adjudicatory hearing.
* * *
d.  Commitment to Department of Social Services.  In cases
in which a child is committed to a local department of social
services for placement outside the child’s home, the court,
within 18 months after the original placement and periodically
14
general public, but the court denied her requests.  In addition, the court denied Ms. B.’s
objections stating that a permanency planning hearing is a “species of” disposition hearing
under Maryland Rules 5-101(c)10 and 11-115,11 and thus, application of the Maryland Rules
thereafter at intervals not greater than 18 months, shall conduct
a review hearing to determine whether and under that
circumstances the child’s commitment to the local department
of social services should continue.  Considerations pertinent to
the determination include whether the child should (1) be
returned home, (2) be continued in foster care for a specified
period, (3) be placed for adoption, or (4) because of the child’s
special needs or circumstances, be continued in foster care on a
permanent or long-term basis.  The hearing shall be conducted
as prescribed in Rule 11-110 or, if conducted by a master, as
prescribed in Rule 11-111, except that the child’s presence shall
not be required if presence at the hearing is likely to cause
serious physical, mental, or emotional harm to the child.  
15
of evidence was discretionary outside of the context of competency of witnesses.
Dr. Gelles, the psychologist who evaluated Ms. B., testified that, prior to conducting
the evaluation, he reviewed documents related to her and to the children, including an intake
evaluation of Ms. B. by a social services agency in Montgomery County, in September of
2001.  He interviewed Ms. B. for approximately two and one half hours and administered a
variety of psychological tests.  Based upon all of the information at his disposal, Dr. Gelles
concluded that Ms. B. did not have a major psychological condition, but manifested a minor
to moderate personality disorder characterized by passive, aggressive, and avoidance traits
that negatively impact her behavior.  
Dr. Gelles found Ms. B. to have difficulty being consistent and reliable, as a person
and therefore, as a parent.  She told people what she wanted them to hear to portray herself
in the manner in which she wanted to be seen.  As an example, Dr. Gelles informed the court
about lies that Ms. B. had told in order to obtain housing assistance, including that as a child
16
she was sexually abused by a relative and had witnessed a murder.  Dr. Gelles concluded that
Ms. B.’s pervasive unreliability and extreme need to please others resulted in others
distrusting what she said and only basing their judgments on her actions.  
Ms. B. told Dr. Gelles that none of the abuse reported by the children as having
occurred in her household had happened.  She continued in her denial even when shown a
letter written by Laione during therapy which detailed Ms. B.’s sexual relations with her.
Ms. B.’s reaction was that the letter might have been written by someone else or that
someone had influenced Laione to write it.  Ms. B. was angry with the Department and
blamed it for the children’s problems.  Dr. Gelles testified that Ms. B. lacked any real
understanding about how her past behavior had impacted her children, as evidenced by Ms.
B.’s defensiveness and denial.  At the close of Dr. Gelles’s testimony, the Department stated
that it did not intend to call Ms. Duncan, Ms. Traum, or Mr. Mathews as witnesses.  
Ms. Atikkan testified that the children had been in foster care for sixteen months and
that during that time Ms. B. failed to comply with the service agreements.  Ms. B. had not
participated in parenting classes which were offered to her, had not consistently signed
releases for medical treatment for the children, and had not consistently attended visitation
with the children.  During sixty-eight weeks of visitation, she had seen Gregory twenty-six
weeks, Matthew fourteen weeks, Laione twenty-one weeks, and Ashley eighteen weeks.  Ms.
B. also did not attend school meetings for the children and changed jobs several times since
September of 2002.  
17
Ms. Atikkan also explained that Ms. B. refused to acknowledge the abuse that had
occurred in her household, and therefore, failed to take responsibility for it.  She stated that
Ms. B.’s lack of honesty in acknowledging the circumstances in which her children were
sexually abused and inability to empathize with them made it difficult for the children to heal
emotionally from the trauma.
After Ms. Atikkan testified, the children’s attorney called Ms. Morgan, the Clinical
Coordinator for Pressley Ridge, to testify.  Ms. Morgan is a therapist who specializes in
treating children who have been sexually abused.  She began treating Laione in September
of 2002 and testified that at that time Laione would engage in sexual talk during therapy and
exhibit sexualized behavior at school and in her foster home.  Laione would touch other
children sexually at school, would ask her foster mother to have sex with her, and would
become angry and intentionally wet the bed when her foster mother refused.
Ms. Morgan stated that through therapy Laione made progress and developed a sense
of trust over the preceding year.  Laione disclosed more sexual abuse during that time,
including abuse by Ms. B.  Ms. Morgan worked with Laione to control her sexual thoughts
and dreams, by labeling them the “sex monster,” and by writing about her feelings in a
journal. When Ms. Morgan discussed Laione’s problems with Ms. B., Ms. B. acknowledged
that Laione had been sexually abused, but claimed that she did not know the identity of the
perpetrator.
Gregory began meeting with Ms. Morgan in April of 2003, after his first counselor
18
left Pressley Ridge.  According to Ms. Morgan, in the beginning, Gregory had difficulty
expressing any feelings, but eventually began to talk about his anger.  He has engaged in
bizarre behavior at his foster home, such as defecating in a potato bag, which he said that he
did because he was angry.  According to Ms. Morgan, Gregory has problems with lying,
stealing, and trusting adults.  
Ms. Morgan stated that, although Ms. B. does have some skills in dealing with the
children, she is inconsistent, unreliable, and unable to keep them safe outside of a highly
structured and protective treatment environment.  Responding to questions posed by the
court, Ms. Morgan observed that Laione had experienced anger when her mother failed to
attend a scheduled visit, and at one time wrote a letter to her mother expressing her feelings.
Laione also would experience a large amount of anxiety after meeting with Ms. B.  Gregory,
however, responded to his mother’s absence with stated indifference.  
As the last witness, Ms. B. testified on her own behalf. She stated that she never
engaged in sexual abuse of her children and that, to her knowledge, they were not sexually
abused in her home.  The court then ruled from the bench, granting the Department’s petition
to change the permanency plan.  It found that the Department had made reasonable efforts
to reunify Ms. B. with her children and that Ms. B.’s testimony was replete with hollow
empathy and “sophistry.”  The same day, the court issued written orders changing the
children’s permanency plans to TPR/adoption.  
On October 31, 2003, Ms. B. noted her appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, asking
19
the following questions:
I.  Did the juvenile court err by denying [Ms. B.’s] motion to
sequester witnesses and otherwise failing to strictly apply the
Maryland Rules of Evidence in the permanency plan review
hearing?
II.  Did the juvenile court err by refusing to exclude non-parties
from the courtroom?
III.  Did the juvenile court err in changing the children’s
permanency plans from reunification to adoption when the
evidence was insufficient to show that the Department had made
reasonable efforts to reunify [Ms. B.] with the children?
In a reported opinion, In re: Ashley E., 158 Md. App. 144, 854 A.2d 893 (2004), the
Court of Special Appeals upheld the decision to change the permanency plan from
reunification to TPR/adoption and agreed with the Circuit Court’s determination that a
permanency planning hearing is a kind of disposition hearing because at such a hearing the
court is determining the appropriate actions that the court should take and reviewing the
permanency plan established at the original disposition hearing.  Therefore, the Court of
Special Appeals concluded that the Rules do not mandate the application of the Rules of
Evidence during the hearing.  Because the application of the Rules of Evidence was
discretionary, the court held that the Circuit Court was not bound to apply Maryland Rule 5-
615 (a), and thus, was not required to order the exclusion of witnesses when asked to do so
prior to the first witness’s testimony.  Moreover, the Court of Special Appeals held that the
Circuit Court’s decision to permit certain employees of the Department to remain in the
courtroom during the hearing did not constitute good cause for overturning the court’s
12
Rule 5-101 (c)(8) lists “[d]isposition hearings under Rule 11-115" as proceedings in
which the court “may in the interest of justice, decline to require strict application” of the
Rules of Evidence.  Because the review hearings mandated under Rule 11-115d. require the
court to assess the historical circumstances supporting the original disposition order, as well
as any subsequent developments, and determine “the nature of the court’s intervention to
protect the child’s health, safety, and well-being,” Md. Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 3-
801 (m)(2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which is the purpose of the initial
disposition hearing, Rule 5-101 (c)(8) may properly be interpreted as including disposition
20
decision because Ms. B. could not show both error and prejudice. 
Ms. B. filed a petition for writ of certiorari with this Court on September 1, 2004,
presenting two issues for our consideration:
1.
Whether the Maryland Rules of Evidence should be strictly applied in
a permanency planning hearing and the subsequent hearings to review
the permanency plan when such hearings are  separate and distinct from
disposition hearings under Rule 11-115, are meant to accomplish more
than simply modify the dispositional order under Rule 11-116, and were
created by statute in 1998, subsequent to the adoption of the rules of
evidence, such that the court could not have been authorized to decline
to apply the common-law rules of evidence in these hearings.
2.
Whether all non-parties must be excluded from the courtroom pursuant
to Courts and Judicial Proceedings Section 3-810 (b)(2) when the
proceedings were concerning confidential information from the child
abuse report and record and the mere presence of the non-parties caused
the natural parent’s right to confidentiality to be breached.
On November 12, 2004, we granted the petition and issued the writ of certiorari.  In re Ashley
E., 383 Md. 569, 861 A.2d 60 (2004).  Because we find that permanency planning hearings
are dispositional in nature and may properly be characterized as hearings governed by Rule
11-115d., we hold that the juvenile court was not required to apply the Rules of Evidence
during a permanency planning hearing.12  Moreover, we conclude that the juvenile court did
review hearings under Rule 11-115d. within its purview.  To determine otherwise would
produce an absurd result.
21
not err in failing to exclude the Department’s employees who were no longer directly
involved in the case under Section 3-810 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article
because their presence did not destroy the confidential nature of the proceedings due to their
prior knowledge.
Discussion
On December 15, 1993, this Court adopted Title 5 of the Maryland Rules governing
the admission of evidence during judicial proceedings.  Md. Reg. vol. 21, at 1 (Jan. 7, 1994).
At that time, we approved Rule 5-101, “Scope,” which stated:
(a) Generally.  Except as otherwise provided by statute or rule,
the rules in this Title apply to all actions and proceedings in the
courts of this State.
(b) Rules inapplicable.  The rules in this Title other than those
relating to the competency of witnesses do not apply to the
following proceedings:
(1) Proceedings before grand juries;
(2) Proceedings for extradition or rendition;
(3) Direct contempt proceedings in which the court may act
summarily;
(4) Small claim actions under Rule 3-701 and appeals under rule
7-112 (c)(2);
(5) Issuance of a summons or warrant under Rule 4-212;
(6) Pretrial release under Rule 4-216 or release after conviction
under Rule 4-349;
(7) Preliminary hearings under Rule 4-221;
(8) Post-sentencing procedures under Rule 4-340;
(9) Sentencing in non-capital cases under Rule 4-342;
(10) Issuance of a search warrant under Rule 4-601;
(11) Detention and shelter care hearings under Rule 912; and
13
This Court’s Rules Order of April 5, 2005 designated “catastrophic health emergency
proceedings under Title 15, Chapter 1100" as a proceeding in which the application of the
Rules of Evidence may be relaxed in the interests of justice.  
22
(12) Any other proceeding in which, prior to the adoption of the
rules in this Title, the court was traditionally not bound by the
common-law rules of evidence.
(c) Discretionary application.  In the following proceedings,
the court may, in the interest of justice, decline to require strict
application of the rules of evidence in this Title other than those
relating to the competency of witnesses:
(1) The determination of questions of fact preliminary to
admissibility of evidence when the issue to be determined by the
court under Rule 5-104 (a);
(2) Proceedings for revocation of probation under Rule 4-347;
(3) Hearings on petitions for post-conviction relief under Rule
4-406;
(4) Plenary proceedings in the Orphans’ Court under Rule 6-
462;
(5) Waiver hearings under Rule 913;
(6) Disposition hearings under Rule 915;
(7) Modification hearings under Rule 916; and
(8) Any other proceeding in which, prior to the adoption of the
rules in this Title, the court was authorized to decline to apply
the common-law rules of evidence.
Md. Rule 5-101 (1994).  Rule 5-101 was amended in 1996 to conform to the new numbering
scheme of the Maryland Rules.  Md. Rule 5-101 (1997). The Rule had not been altered
substantively until April 5, 2005, when we adopted the recommended amendment to the Rule
to align its provisions with the newly promulgated Title 15, Chapter 1100 of the Rules, which
govern catastrophic health emergency proceedings.  Md. Reg. vol. 32, at 279 (Feb. 4, 2005);
Rules Order (Apr. 5, 2005).13
23
Maryland Rule 5-101 (c) permits a court to “decline to require the strict application
of the rules” in various proceedings including “[d]isposition hearings under Rule 11-115”
Md. Rule 5-101 (c).  When discussing Rule 5-101(c), the Rules Committee considered
various phrases including: “relax the application of the rules of evidence”; “decline to apply
as justice may require”; “decline to apply certain rules of evidence”; and “decline to apply
the rules of evidence strictly.”  Minutes of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure Meeting, June 19, 1992, at 47.  Ultimately, the Rules Committee recommended
the language presently contained in subsection (c).  Id.  The Chairman of the Committee, the
Honorable Alan M. Wilner, now a Judge on this Court, noted that the adopted language
“clearly allows the application of some rules and not others.”  Id. at 48.  Based upon the
Rules Committee’s discussion, “decline to require strict application of the rules” appears to
have been intended to mean that the application of the various rules of evidence in a
proceeding listed in subsection (c) is entrusted to the discretion of the court.
This conclusion is consistent with the structure of Rule 5-101.  Rule 5-101 delineates
three different categories of proceedings depending upon the application of the Rules of
Evidence identified.  Subsection (a) provides the general rule that the Rules of Evidence
apply to “all actions and proceedings in the courts of this State,” subject to certain
exceptions.  Md. Rule 5-101(a).  Subsection (b) lists those proceedings in which the Rules
of Evidence do not apply, except “those relating to the competency of witnesses.”  Md. Rule
5-101 (b).  Finally, subsection (c), entitled “Discretionary application,” prescribes
14
Md. Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 3-823 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article states in pertinent part:
(b) Permanency planning hearing. – (1) The court shall hold a
permanency planning hearing:
(i) No later than 11 months after a child in a CINA proceeding
enters an out-of home placement to determine the permanency
plan for the child committed under § 3-819 (b) [Disposition
hearings] of this subtitle; or 
(ii) Within 30 days after the court finds that reasonable efforts
to reunify a child with the child’s parent or guardian are not
required based on a finding that a circumstance enumerated in
§ 3-812 of this subtitle has occurred.  
* * *
(e) Determinations to be made at hearing. – At a permanency
24
proceedings in which the court, in its discretion, may decline to apply the Rules of Evidence.
Md. Rule 5-101 (c).  Therefore, it is clear that the phrase “decline to require strict
application” means that the application of the Rules of Evidence is not mandatory with
respect to those proceedings listed in subsection (c), and in this context “strict” is
synonymous with “mandatory.” 
Ms. B. argues that the application of the Rules of Evidence in permanency planning
hearings is mandatory because such hearings cannot be categorized as any of the proceedings
listed in Maryland Rule 5-101(c).  Ms. B. notes that the only possible categories applicable
to permanency planning hearings under Rule 5-101 (c) are either disposition hearings under
Maryland Rule 11-115 or modification hearings under Maryland Rule 11-116.  She
distinguishes permanency planning hearings held under Section 3-823 of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article 14 from disposition review hearings described under Maryland
planning hearing, the court shall:
(1) Determine the child’s permanency plan, which may be:
(i) Reunification with the parent or guardian;
(ii) Placement with a relative for:
1.  Adoption; or
2.Custody and guardianship;
(iii) Adoption by a nonrelative;
(iv) Guardianship by a nonrelative;
(v) Continuation in a specified placement on a permanent basis
because of the child’s special needs or circumstances;
(vi) Continuation in placement for a specified period because of
the child’s special needs or circumstances; or
(vii) Independent living . . .
(h) Periodic reviews. – (1)(i) Except as provided in
subparagraphs (ii) and (iii) of this paragraph, the court shall
conduct a hearing to review the permanency plan at least every
six months until commitment is rescinded. 
15
Maryland Rule 11-116 provides in pertinent part:
a.  Revisory power.  An order of the court may be modified or
vacated if the court finds that action to be in the best interest of
the child or the public, except in cases involving commitment of
a child to the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene for
placement in a State mental hospital.
* * *
c.  Hearing – When required.  If the relief sought under
section a of this Rule is for revocation of probation and for the
commitment of a respondent, the court shall pass an order to
show cause why the relief should not be granted and setting a
date and time for a hearing. The clerk shall cause a copy of the
petition and Show Cause Order to be served upon the parties.
In all other cases, the court may grant or deny the relief, in
whole or in part, without a hearing.  
d.  Conduct of hearing.  In the interest of justice, at any hearing
held pursuant to this Rule the court may decline to require strict
25
Rule 11-115d. on the basis of their applicable time periods.  Ms. B. also asserts that
permanency planning hearings are not modification hearings under Maryland Rule 11-11615
application of the rules in Title 5, except those relating to the
competency of witnesses. 
16
Ms. B. also contends that, because the Maryland Rules of Evidence must be applied
to the permanency planning hearing, it was error for the court to deny her motion to sequester
the witnesses under Maryland Rule 5-615.  Moreover, Ms. B. argues that this error was not
harmless because the testimony of Ms. Atikkan and Ms. Morgan was influenced by Dr.
Gelles’s prior testimony and that the court was “undoubtedly convinced” that Ms. B. was not
a capable parent for the children, and thus changed the permanency plan to TPR/adoption.
17
Section 3-810 provides in pertinent part:
(b) Confidentiality; exclusion of general public. – (1) In any
proceedings in which a child is alleged to be in need of
assistance, the court may exclude the general public from a
hearing and only admit those persons having a direct interest in
the proceeding and their representatives.
(2) The court shall exclude the general public from a hearing
where the proceedings involve discussion of confidential
information from the child abuse and neglect report and record,
or any information obtained from the child welfare agency
concerning a child or family who is receiving Title IV-B child
welfare services or Title IV-E foster care or adoption assistance.
Md. Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 3-810 (b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article.  
26
because permanency planning hearings are not intended solely to modify the dispositional
order.  Ms. B. characterizes the result of a permanency planning order as a new order based
on new factual findings rather than one modifying the original order.16 
Ms. B. also argues that because Ms. Traum, Ms. Duncan, and Mr. Mathews were not
witnesses or the designated representatives of the Department, they should have been
excluded as members of the general public from a confidential proceeding concerning child
abuse under Maryland Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), Section 3-810 of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article.17  She asserts that exclusion was mandatory, and that because
27
of the nature of the underlying issues and purpose of the applicable statute, the failure to
exclude should not be considered harmless error.  
Conversely, the Department argues that a permanency planning hearing is
dispositional, and as such, the application of the Rules of Evidence is not mandatory.  In
short, the Department asserts that the juvenile court may decide which Rules should apply.
The Department notes that the determinations made at a permanency planning hearing are
virtually identical to those listed in Rule 11-115d. and that certain evidence may be
considered by the court in permanency planning hearings that otherwise would not be
admissible.  According to the Department, because permanency planning hearings are
properly considered disposition hearings, “strict application” of the Rules of Evidence is not
necessary, and the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to do so.
The Department also asserts that Ms. Traum, Ms. Duncan, and Mr. Mathews cannot
properly be considered members of the general public because all are employees of the
Department, were involved in the case, and had access to the confidential information at
issue.  Therefore, the Department states that it was not error for the court to decline to
exclude them from the hearing.
Disposition Hearings Under Maryland Rule 11-115
In 1969, the Rules Committee formulated, and the Court adopted, Maryland Rule 913
to govern the conduct of disposition hearings in juvenile causes.  Minutes of the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure Meeting, June 31, 1969.  The draft version
28
of Maryland Rule 913 stated:
Rule 913.  Disposition Hearing
a.  Conduct of the Hearing
1.  By Judge or Master.  The judge or master who presided at the
adjudicatory hearing shall, wherever possible, preside at the
disposition hearing.
2. Availability of Social Study Report.  Any social study report
made available to the court at the hearing shall be made
available to the parties before the court or their counsel, if any.
b.  Disposition of Case.  The disposition of the case shall be
entered on the docket by the clerk.  Each commitment shall be
made subject to the further order of the court.  If the disposition
order includes placement of the child out side his home, the
court shall announce and dictate to the court stenographer or
reporter or prepare and file with the clerk a brief statement of
the reasons why such placement is necessary.  
Md. Rule 913 (draft, 1969); Md. Rule 913 (1970).  In 1975, in response to a new statewide
juvenile code enacted by the General Assembly, Rule 913 was amended to include a
reference to Section 3-820 (b) of the Courts Article and renumbered as Rule 915.  Forty-
Ninth Report of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, at 1 (June 3,
1975); Md. Rule 915 (effective 1977).  Amended Rule 915 stated:
a.  Hearing  – Scheduling.
If after an adjudicatory hearing the court determines that the
allegations of the petition at issue in the adjudicatory hearing
have been sustained, it shall promptly schedule a separate
disposition hearing.  The disposition hearing shall be held no
later than thirty days after the conclusion of the adjudicatory
hearing.
b.  Disposition – Judge or Master.
The disposition made by the court shall be in accordance with
Section 3-820 (b) of the Courts Article.  If the disposition
hearing is conducted by a judge, and his order includes
placement of the child outside the home, the judge shall
29
announce in open court and on the record or shall prepare and
file with the clerk, a statement of the reasons why the placement
is necessary.  If the hearing is conducted by a master, the
procedures of Rule 911 [present Rule 11-111] shall be followed.
A commitment recommended by a master is subject to approval
by the court in accordance with Rule 911 [present Rule 11-111],
but may be implemented in advance of court approval.
Md. Rule 915 (1980).  Three years later, Rule 915 was amended again to include section c.,
defining the procedures for placing a juvenile in a State mental hospital.  Md. Rule 915c.
(1981).  
In 1983, the last substantive change, the addition of section d., was made to Rule 915.
That Section provided:
d.  Commitment to Department of Social Services.  
In cases in which a child is committed to a local department of
social services for placement outside the child’s home, the court,
within 18 months after the original placement and periodically
thereafter at intervals not greater than 18 months, shall conduct
a review hearing to determine whether and under what
circumstances the child’s commitment to the local department
of social services should continue.  Considerations pertinent to
the determination include whether the child should (1) be
returned home, (2) be continued in foster care for a specified
period, (3) be placed for adoption, or (4) because of the child’s
special needs or circumstances, be continued in foster care on a
permanent or long-term basis.  The hearing shall be conducted
as prescribed in Rule 911, except that the child’s presence shall
not be required if presence at the hearing is likely to cause
serious physical, mental, or emotional harm to the child.
Md. Rule 915d. (1984).  In 1996, this Court issued an order, effective January 1, 1997, which
renumbered Rule 915 as Rule 11-115.  Section d. was not substantively changed.  Md. Rule
11-115 (1997).  
30
When section d. was presented by the Rules Committee, it was accompanied by the
following explanatory note:
The proposed addition to Rule 915 [present Rule 11-115]
has been drafted in response to the requirements of a federal
foster care and child welfare statute (P.L. 96-272) which
requires states receiving federal assistance for foster care and
child welfare services to provide procedural safeguards for the
review of the status of and planning for children in foster care
(i.e. children committed to local departments of social services
for placement outside their homes).  The proposed rule change
is also responsive to the recommendation made by the Office of
the Attorney General after reviewing the federal statute and
consulting with local departments of social services, foster care
review board staff, and members of the judiciary.
Proposed section (d) of Rule 915 [present Rule 11-115]
will require juvenile courts, at intervals of no greater than 18
months, to hear and review each case of a child who has been
committed to a local department of social services for placement
outside the child’s home.  In virtually the exact language as the
federal act, the rule amendment clarifies that the purpose of the
hearing is to determine the future status of the child including
whether the child should be returned home, continued in foster
care for a specified period, placed for adoption, or continued in
foster care on a permanent or long-term basis because of the
child’s special needs or circumstances.
In addition, in partial response to the concern of the
Family Law and Procedure Committee of the Maryland Judicial
Conference and the recommendation of the Office of the
Attorney General, proposed section (d) provides that the child
is not required to attend the review hearing if presence at the
hearing would be likely to cause serious physical, mental, or
emotional harm to the child.  
Minutes of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure Meeting, May 20-21,
1983, at 48-49. 
31
Permanency Plans in CINA Proceedings
In response to concerns that children were being lost in the foster care system without
belonging to a permanent family, Congress enacted Public Law 96-272, the “Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980,” codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-79 (1988), and the
Federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, P.L. 105-89, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 673b,
678, 679b (2000), which required states, among other things, to “provide a written case plan
for each child for whom the state claims federal foster care maintenance payments.”  42
U.S.C. § 671 (a)(16); see also In re Samone H. & Marchay E., __ Md. __, __A.2d __ (2005);
In re Yve S., 373 Md. 551, 574-75, 819 A.2d 1030, 1044 (2003).  Pursuant to Congress’s
condition for federal funding, Maryland created a statutory scheme directing the Department
of Social Services to “develop and implement a permanency plan that [was] in the best
interests” of those children committed to the local department of social services.  In re
Samone H., __ Md. at __, __ A.2d at __; In re Yve S., 373 Md. at 574, 819 A.2d at 1044,
quoting In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 10941, 335 Md. 99, 103-06, 642 A.2d 201, 203-05
(1994); Md. Code (1984, 1999 Repl. Vol., 2002 Cum. Supp.), § 5-525(e) of the Family Law
Article.  In In re Damon M., 362 Md. 429, 765 A.2d 624 (2001) we identified the importance
of a permanency plan:
The permanency plan is an integral part of the statutory scheme
designed to expedite the movement of Maryland’s children from
foster care to a permanent living, and hopefully, family
arrangement.  It provides the goal toward which the parties and
the court are committed to work.  It sets the tone for the parties
and the court and, indeed, may be outcome determinative.
32
Services to be provided by the local social service department
and commitments that must be made by the parents and children
are determined by the permanency plan.  And, because it may
not be changed without the court first determining that it is in
the child’s best interest to do so, the permanency plan must be
in the child’s best interest.  These are the reasons, no doubt, that
the court is charged with determining the plan and with
periodically reviewing it, evaluating all the while the extent to
which it is being complied with.
362 Md. at 436, 765 A.2d at 627-28.  Most recently, in In re Samone H., we explained the
need for trial courts to review permanency plans to ensure that children are being cared for
in the best possible manner:
As In re: Damon M. observes, the purpose of a permanency plan
is to set the direction in which the parent, agencies, and the court
will work in terms of reaching a satisfactory conclusion to the
situation.  Once set initially, the goal of the permanency plan is
re-visited periodically at hearings to determine progress and
whether, due to historical and contemporary circumstances, that
goal should be changed.  It is not the purpose of the initial
permanency plan hearing, however, to resolve all issues
involved in that final resolution.  If that were the case, there
would be no need for review of how, on a regular basis, the plan
is progressing or not.  Also as In re: Damon M. indicates, the
initial permanency plan hearing is to be held and conducted
expeditiously.  Protracted proceedings in establishing the initial
plan defeat the purpose of the statute.  The statute presumes that,
unless there are compelling circumstances to the contrary, the
plan should be to work toward reunification, as it is presumed
that it is in the best interest of a child to be returned to his or her
natural parent.
__Md. at __, __ A.2d at __, quoting In re Yve S., 373 Md. at 582, 819 A.2d at 1049.
In In re Samone H., quoting from In re Yve S., we also delineated the requirements a
trial court must follow when implementing a permanency plan:
33
[T]he court has the responsibility for determining the
permanency plan, § 3-826.1(a)(1) and justifying the placement
of children in out of home placements for a specified period or
on a long-term or permanent basis, § 3-826.1(d), in addition to
conducting periodic, six month reviews.  § 3-826.1 (f). 
* * *
Section 3-826.1 [now codified as Section 3-823 of the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article] requires the court, not later
than 11 months after a child found to be in need of assistance
has been placed in foster care, see also Md. Code (1989, 1991
Repl. Vol., 1997 Cum. Supp.) § 501(m) of the Family Law
Article, to hold a permanency planning hearing to determine the
permanency plan for that child. § 3-826.1(a)(1) [now § 3-
823(b)(1)].  At that hearing, for each child in placement and in
determining the plan, the court is required to make certain
decisions and findings, § 3-826.1(c), [now § 3-823(e)]
specifically, whether the child should be: returned to the parent
or guardian, § 3-826.1(c)(1)(i) [now § 3-823(e)(1)(i)]; placed
with relatives to whom adoption or guardianship is granted, § 3-
826.1(c)(1)(ii) [now § 3-823(e)(1)(ii)]; placed for adoption, § 3-
826.1(c)(1)(iii) [now § 3-823(e)(1)(iii)]; emancipated, § 3-
826.1(c)(1)(iv) [now deleted]; or because of the child’s special
needs or circumstances, continued in placement on a permanent
or long-term basis or for a specified period.” § 3-826.1(c)(1)(v)
and (vi) [now § 3-823(e)(1)(v) and (vi)].  There are restrictions
on the court’s ability to continue a child in placement because of
the child’s special needs or circumstances.  § 3-826.1(d) [now
§ 3-823(f)].  That section prohibits the court from using that
option “unless it finds that the agency to which the child is
committed has documented a compelling reason for determining
that it would not be in the best interest of the child to:
(1) Return home;
(2) Be referred for termination of parental rights; or 
(3) Be placed for adoption or guardianship with a specified and
appropriate relative or legal guardian willing to care for the
child.
__ Md. at __, __ A.2d at __, quoting In re Yve S., 373 Md. at 577-81, 819 A.2d at 1046-48
(additions in original).  We explained:
34
Section 3-826.1(f) [now § 3-823(h)] mandates periodic reviews
of the permanency plan by the court.  Subsection (f)(1)(i)
provides [now § 3-823(h)(1)(i)] that such reviews will be ‘no
less frequently than every six months until commitment is
rescinded.’  If, however, at the permanency planning hearing or
a subsequent review hearing, the court, inter alia, orders a child
continued in permanent foster care, the court is no longer
required to hold the review hearings at six month intervals.
Subsection (f)(1)(ii) [now § 3-823(h)(1)(ii), is revised to require
review hearings every 12 months.].  As is true of the initial
permanency planning hearing, the court must make some
determinations at the hearing to review the permanency plan.
§ 3-826.1(f)(2) [now § 3-823(h)(2)].  Among other things, in
addition to determining whether the commitment remains
necessary and appropriate, subsection (f)(2)(i) [now § 3-
823(h)(2)(i)], and evaluating the progress made toward
alleviating or mitigating the causes of the commitment,
subsection (f)(2)(iii) [now § 3-823(h)(2)(iii)], the court is
required to ‘determine the extent of compliance with the
permanency plan,’ Subsection (f)(2)(ii) [now § 3-823 (h)(2)(ii)],
and to change it ‘if a change in the permanency plan would be
in the child’s best interest.’  Subsection (f)(2)(v) [now § 3-823
(h)(2)(vi)].
In re Samone H., __ Md. at __, __ A.2d at __, quoting In re Yve S., 373 Md. at 581, 819 A.2d
at 1048 (additions in original). 
The Relationship Between Rule 11-115d. and Section 3-823 of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article
Ms. B. argues that review hearings under Rule 11-115d. are distinct from permanency
planning hearings under Section 3-823 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, and
therefore, under Rule 5-101, the juvenile court is required to strictly apply the Rules of
Evidence in permanency planning hearings.  To that end, she notes the differing time
18
We find this distinction between the hearings held under Rule 11-115d. and Section
3-823 to be unpersuasive.  Rule 11-115d. requires hearings to be held “within 18 months of
the original placement and periodically thereafter at intervals not greater than 18 months.”
Section 3-823 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article requires that the initial hearing
occur no later than eleven months after the placement and periodic review hearings every six
months thereafter.  Md. Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol., 2004 Cum. Supp.), § 3-823 (b)(i), (h).
Obviously, the hearings mandated by Section 3-823 comply with the time limitations
imposed by Rule 11-115d.  Therefore, we are not persuaded that this indicates that the
hearings are distinct from one another.
35
intervals for holding hearings under the two provisions18 and the fact that Section 3-823 of
the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, governing permanency planning hearings, was
enacted after Rule 11-115 was last amended.  She also places considerable emphasis on what
she characterizes as the significantly greater number of determinations that the court must
make under Section 3-823 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article as compared to
what the court must accomplish to comply with the requirements under Rule 11-115d.  We
disagree.
Both the disposition review hearings under Rule 11-115d. and the permanency
planning hearings under Section 3-823 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article were
enacted to “provide procedural safeguards for the review of the status of and planning for
children in foster care (i.e. children committed to local departments of social services for
placement outside their homes).”  Minutes of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure Meeting, May 20-21, 1983, at 48; see also In re Samone H., __ Md. at __-__,
__ A.2d at __ (stating that the statutory scheme was enacted to insure that actions be taken
in the child’s best interests when committed to the Department of Social Services); In re Yve
36
S., 373 Md. at 582, 819 A.2d at 1049 (observing that “the goal of the permanency plan is re-
visited periodically at hearings to determine progress and whether, due to historical and
contemporary circumstances, that goal should be changed”); In re Damon M., 362 Md. at
436, 765 A.2d at 627 (noting that the permanency plan is “an integral part of the statutory
scheme designed to expedite the movement of Maryland’s children from foster care to a
permanent living, and hopefully, family arrangement”).  Moreover, the language governing
the disposition review hearings in Rule 11-115d., requiring that a hearing must be held to
determine “whether and under what circumstance the child’s commitment to the local
department should continue,” reflects that the plan developed by the Department for the
placement of the child is the focus of the hearing required by that Rule.  Md. Rule 11-115d.
This is precisely the juvenile court’s task in permanency planning hearings as well.  Md.
Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol., 2004 Cum. Supp.), § 3-823 (e) of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article.  Both embody the purpose of disposition hearings: to determine “the
nature of the court’s intervention to protect the child’s health, safety, and well-being.”  Md.
Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 3-801 (m)(2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
Furthermore, Ms. B.’s attempt to characterize Section 3-823 of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article and Rule 11-115d. as requiring qualitatively different determinations and
considerations by the juvenile court, and therefore, mandating the conclusion that the
provisions describe different proceedings, is inapposite.  As stated previously, Rule 11-115d.
governing disposition review hearings directs the juvenile court to determine whether to
37
continue the child’s commitment to the Department and also to decide the nature of that
commitment.  Md. Rule 11-115d.  Section 3-823(h)(2) identifies criteria for deciding whether
the child’s commitment to the Department and the nature of the placement by the Department
is appropriate:
(i) 
Determin[ing] 
the 
continuing 
necessity 
for 
and
appropriateness of the commitment;
(ii) Determin[ing] the extent of compliance with the permanency
plan;
(iii) Determin[ing] the extent of progress that has been made
toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating
commitment;
(iv) Project[ing] a reasonable date by which a child in placement
may be returned home, placed in a preadoptive home, or placed
under a legal guardianship;
(v) Evaluat[ing] the safety of the child and tak[ing] necessary
measures to protect the child; and
(vi) Chang[ing] the permanency plan if a change in the
permanency plan would be in the child’s best interest.
Md. Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol., 2004 Cum. Supp.), § 3-823 (h)(2) of the Courts and
Judicial Proceedings Article.  Whereas Rule 11-115d. governing disposition review hearings
identifies the focus of the hearing in juvenile court, the provisions of Section 3-823 of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article supply the details to be considered in making any
decision.
Ms. B. relies on a footnote in In re Damon M., in which we presented the statutory
response to federal conditions, as evidence of our recognition that permanency planning
hearings in CINA cases are inherently different from disposition review hearings under Rule
11-115d.  In that footnote we stated:
38
Prior to 1998, the responsibility for developing a permanency
plan for a child in foster care was entrusted to the local
department of social services.  Md. Code (1984, 1991 Repl.
Vol., 1995 Cum. Supp.), § 5-525 (c) of the Family Law Article.
Before 1996, a plan developed by the local department was
reviewed by the court, together with the report and
recommendation of the Foster Care Review Board, as a part of
the disposition review hearing that the court was required to
conduct.  Md. Code (1984, 1991 Repl. Vol.), § 5-544 (3) of the
Family Law Article.  As a result of the amendment of the
Juvenile Causes Act in 1996, see Ch. 595, Laws of 1996, the
juvenile court was mandated to ‘hold a hearing to review the
implementation of a permanency plan for each child in foster
care within 10 months of the disposition hearing in which the
CINA finding was made.  Md. Code (1996, 1997 Cum. Supp.),
§ 3-826.1 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.  It is
of interest to note that the statute provided that if the child was
to be ‘continued in placement for a specified period,’ then the
court would have to determine ‘the extent of compliance with
the permanency plan.’ § 3-826.1 (d).  The subsequent
amendment to § 3-826.1, see ch. 539, Laws of 1998, to make it
conform with the Federal Adoption and Safe Families Act of
1997 effected a significant change.  Now, the court has the
responsibility for determining the permanency plan, § 3-826.1
(a)(1) and justifying the placement of children in out of home
placements for a specified period or on long-term or
permanency basis, § 3-826.1 (d), in addition to conducting
periodic, six month reviews. § 3-826.1 (f).
In re Damon M.,362 Md. at 430-31 n.1, 765 A.2d at 624-25 n.1.  We disagree with Ms. B.’s
interpretation of the meaning of the footnote.  
The statutory changes that occurred in 1998 clarified the roles of the local department
of social services and the court rather than substantively changed them.  The local department
of social services remains responsible for drafting a permanency plan for a child in out-of-
home placement, and the court, despite any perceived implication in In re Damon M. to the
19
This conclusion is consistent with a number of our sister jurisdictions which have
considered this issue.  See, e.g., In the Matter of D.L., A.L., 603 S.E.2d 376, 382 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2004) (“Whenever the trial court is determining the best interest of a child, any
evidence which is competent and relevant to a showing of the best interest of that child must
be heard and considered by the trial court, subject to the discretionary powers of the trial
court”) (emphasis in original), quoting In re Shue, 319 S.E.2d 567, 574 (N.C. 1984); Cal.
Rules 1455 (b) (2005) (“The court shall receive in evidence and consider the social study,
a guardianship assessment, the report of any court-appointed child advocate, and any relevant
evidence on its own motion”); La. Rule 10th Dist. Ct. 40.0 (2005) (stating that in juvenile
permanency planning hearings hearsay evidence is admissible and acceptable; this rule is
consistent throughout the district courts in Louisiana); Mich. Rule 3.976 (2005) (“The
Michigan Rules of Evidence do not apply, other than those with respect to privileges, except
to the extent such privileges are abrogated . . . .  At the permanency planning hearing all
relevant and material evidence, including oral and written reports, may be received by the
court and may be relied upon to the extent of its probative value”); N.M. Rule 11-1101
(2005) (providing that the New Mexico Rules of Evidence do not apply to permanency
planning hearings); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 7B-907 (b) (2004) (“The court may consider any
evidence, including hearsay evidence as defined in [N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1], Rule 801, that
the court finds to be relevant, reliable, and necessary to determine the needs of the juvenile
and the most appropriate disposition”). 
20
Because Ms. B only raised the issue of whether the Rules of Evidence should be
strictly applied during permanency planning hearings and did not raise any question
regarding the evidence introduced, we do not reach the hearsay issue.
39
contrary, always made the final decision as to the appropriate plan for the child.  The roles
of the local departments of social services and the juvenile courts have not changed due to
this legislation.  Therefore, we conclude that permanency planning hearings are properly
characterized as disposition review hearings under Rule 11-115d., and as such, “the court
may, in the interest of justice, decline to require strict application” of the Rules of Evidence
“other than those relating to the competency of witnesses,”19 Md. Rule 5-101 (c), as the trial
judge did in the present case.20
40
Exclusion of the General Public Under Section 3-810 of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article
In 2001, the General Assembly enacted Maryland Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.),
Section 3-810 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which provides in pertinent
part:
(b) Confidentiality; exclusion of general public. – (1) In any
proceeding in which a child is alleged to be in need of
assistance, the court may exclude the general public from a
hearing and admit only those persons having a direct interest in
the proceeding and their representatives.  
(2) The court shall exclude the general public from a hearing
where the proceedings involve discussion of confidential
information from the child abuse and neglect report and record,
or any information obtained from the child welfare agency
concerning a child or family who is receiving Title IV-B child
welfare services or Title IV-E foster care or adoption assistance.
Md. Code (1973, 2002 Repl. Vol.), § 3-810 (b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings
Article.  According to the legislative history of the section, the General Assembly enacted
subsection (b)(2) to comply with the provisions of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act (“CAPTA”), P.L. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 5106a (2000).  2001 Md.
Laws, Chap. 415.  CAPTA requires states that receive federal grants to support their child
welfare programs to enact
methods to preserve the confidentiality of all records in order to
protect the rights of the child and of the child’s parents or
guardians, including requirements ensuring that reports and
records made and maintained pursuant to the purposes of this
subchapter . . . shall only be made available to . . . any Federal,
State, or local government entity, or any agent of such entity,
that has a need for such information in order to carry out its
41
responsibilities under law to protect children from abuse or
neglect.
42 U.S.C. § 5106a (b)(2)(A)(viii), (ix).  
Ms. B. urges this Court to conclude that Ms. Traum, Ms. Duncan, and Mr. Mathews
were members of the general public, and as such, should have been excluded from the
proceedings in which confidential information from the child abuse report and record was
discussed.  We disagree.
All three individuals, Ms. Joanna Duncan, Ms. Josiane Traum, and Mr. Charley
Mathews, were involved in the case at various stages of the process.  Ms. Duncan, a
Community Services Aide with the Department, observed Ms. B.’s visitation with the
children on several occasions and was privy to the information concerning the treatment of
the children and their experiences while in the custody of Ms. B.  Ms. Traum, a licensed
social worker, was originally assigned to the children when they became involved with the
Department, and therefore, also was aware of the confidential information concerning the
child abuse.  Mr. Mathews, a licensed social worker with the Sex Abuse Treatment division
of the Department, supervised Ms. Atikkan, the children’s current social worker, drafted a
memorandum to the juvenile court discussing the children, and also had knowledge of the
information at issue prior to the hearing.  As such, each was an employee who had
information regarding the status of the children and conceivably, could have needed
information gleaned during the hearing.
The purpose of Section 3-810 (b)(2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,
42
and CAPTA, is to prevent disclosure of confidential information concerning allegations and
evidence of abuse that would impair the treatment and rehabilitation of the children and
parents or guardians involved.  Although we agree with Ms. B. that mere employment with
the Department would not be sufficient to justify an employees presence during a hearing
from which the general public must be excluded, we find no error in permitting employees
of the Department who already knew of information concerning the child abuse in issue to
remain during the hearing. 
Conclusion
Because we find that permanency planning hearings under Section 3-823 of the Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Article and disposition review hearings under Maryland Rule 11-
115d. are substantively identical, we conclude that the application of the Rules of Evidence
is not mandatory during permanency planning hearings.  Moreover, we hold that because
department employees who were present during the hearing, had prior knowledge of and
access to the confidential information contained in the child abuse report and record, they are
not properly considered members of the general public.  Thus, the juvenile court did not err
in failing to exclude them.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED.  COSTS IN THIS
COURT AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS 
TO 
BE 
PAID 
BY 
THE
PETITIONER.