Case Title: Kilpatrick v. State

Citation: 265 P.2d 978, 58 N.M. 88

Docket Number: 

State: new-mexico

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date: 1953-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
265 P.2d 978 (1953) 58 N.M. 88 KILPATRICK v. STATE. No. 5709. Supreme Court of New Mexico. December 30, 1953. *979 Williams & Johnson, Hobbs, for appellant. Richard H. Robinson, Atty. Gen., Wm. J. Torrington, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. LUJAN, Justice. Defendant was convicted in the district court of Lea County of violation of the gambling laws of the state and he appeals. The information was framed under Chapter 41, Article 22 of 1941 Compilation. Section 41-2201 provides: The record discloses that the defendant is the owner of a cockfighting pit located approximately three miles from the city of Hobbs. The room is about 40 to 50 feet wide and 60 feet long. There are bleachers for the spectators. The cock pit is about 20 feet long. The defendant charged an admission fee of $2.44, per male person. On April 24, 1953, cock fights were conducted on said premises, attended by an estimated crowd of 150 to 200 persons. During the progress of these fights several bets were wagered on the cocks by the spectators among themselves. It was shown that on said date the defendant conducted a "Calcutta" pool whereby the owners of roosters were auctioned off to the highest bidder; and that on this occasion $335 was derived from the auction of the "Calcutta" pool which was turned over to the highest bidder, less 10% which was retained by the operator of the game. A reversal of this case is urged upon eight grounds: The last proposition above stated will be first considered. It is contended that the evidence is wholly insufficient to sustain a conviction. We will not review the evidence; suffice it to say that we have carefully examined all of the evidence appearing in the record and are of opinion that there was a substantial conflict as to whether or not the defendant operated a game of chance for money in his premises on the night in question. This being so, it was for the jury to determine its weight, and also the credibility of the witnesses and it is not the duty of this court to do so. Melini v. Freige, 15 N.M. 455, 110 P. 563; Riverside Sand & Cement Manufacturing Company v. Hardwick, 16 N.M. 479, 120 P. 323; James v. Hood, 19 N.M. 234, 142 P. 162; Thayer v. Denver & R.G.R. Co., 28 N.M. 5, 205 P. 733. In the instant case the jury believed the testimony of the state and disbelieved that of the defendant. Where there is a substantial conflict in the evidence the verdict of the jury will not be disturbed unless errors of law occurred upon the trial. Corkins v. Prichard, 3 N.M. (Gild.) 278, 3 P. 746; Lacey v. Woodward, 5 N.M. 583, 25 P. 785; State v. Sakariason, 21 N.M. 207, 153 P. 1034. As a general rule the court should not direct a verdict of acquittal where there is any evidence to support, or reasonably tending to support, the charge. 16 C.J., Criminal Law, p. 936, § 2299. State v. Martin, 53 N.M. 413, 209 P.2d 525. There being substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict, the court did not err in refusing to direct an acquittal as requested. The seventh assignment is to the effect that the court erred in admitting certain evidence, over his objections, of betting on fighting cocks among spectators without showing that the defendant participated therein and in refusing to admonish the jury to disregard such evidence. This assignment was not argued under any of defendant's points and it will therefore be considered abandoned. Robinson v. Mittry Bros., 43 N.M. 357, 94 P.2d 99; Pankey v. Hot Springs National Bank, 46 N.M. 10, 119 P.2d 636. The sixth assignment is to the effect that the court erred in giving its instruction No. 3A which is as follows: By this instruction the court merely told the jury what constituted an operator of a game of chance and is substantially in the *981 the language of the statute, and correctly states the law. The first, second, third, fourth and fifth assignments are to the effect that the court erred in refusing to give to the jury five requested instructions. They are as follows: The court, among other things, instructed the jury as follows: In the case of Joseph v. Miller, 1 N.M. 621, we said: There was no error in refusing requested instruction No. 3, as the court accurately covered that issue by its instruction No. 2B. The trial court is not bound to give requested instructions, which, even if correct, are merely cumulative, and state in another form a proposition of law already given to the jury. State v. Carabajal, 26 N.M. 384, 193 P. 406, 17 A.L.R. 1098; State v. Ulibarri, 28 N.M. 107, 206 P. 510. Refused charge No. 4 is a correct proposition of law, but, as framed it might easily have misled the jury as to the point to be emphasized; viz., the aspect of the gambling feature in the conduct of cock fighting. This phase of the law was sufficiently covered by the court's instruction No. 4. The court did not err in refusing to give defendant's requested instruction No. 5. The question involved in the request was sufficiently and accurately covered by the court's instructions Nos. 4 and 6-2, wherein the court told the jury that if they believed beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did unlawfully operate a game of chance for money or anything of value they should find him guilty; otherwise they should acquit him. As to the claimed errors alleged to have been committed by the court in refusing to give defendant's requested instructions Nos. 6 and 7, we consider them not well taken. As to No. 6, the defendant acquiesced in the trial court's ruling that it presented a false issue, in that it related to an offense with which the defendant was not charged. Note the following colloquy between the court and counsel: As to No. 7, we believe the court adequately covered the material issues of this request by its own instructions and did not err in refusing to give the same. After a careful comparison of the several instructions given by the court we are convinced that the jury was fully and properly instructed upon the several phases of the law brought into question. The judgment is affirmed, and It is so ordered. SADLER, C. J., and McGHEE, COMPTON, and SEYMOUR, JJ., concur.