Case Title: Interstate Collection Agency, Inc. v. Kuntz

Citation: 181 N.W.2d 234

Docket Number: 

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1970-10-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
181 N.W.2d 234 (1970) INTERSTATE COLLECTION AGENCY, INC., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Sebastian KUNTZ, a/k/a Sy Kuntz, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. No. 8627. Supreme Court of North Dakota. October 30, 1970. Rehearing Denied December 8, 1970. *235 Gordon O. Hoberg, Napoleon, for plaintiff and appellant. Rausch & Chapman, Bismarck, for defendant and respondent. ERICKSTAD, Judge. The plaintiff Interstate Collection Agency, Inc., whom we shall hereinafter refer to as the collection agency, appeals from a judgment of the district court, dated December 1, 1969, dismissing its claim against the defendant Sebastian Kuntz, whom we shall hereinafter refer to as the Coffee Cup, as it was under this name that the defendant conducted his business. A trial de novo is demanded in this court. The basis of this action is the assignment of an account by one Andrew E. Sperle, the former owner and operator of the Red Owl Store at Napoleon, North Dakota, allegedly incurred by Mr. Kuntz for groceries purchased for the operation of the Coffee Cup Cafe in that city. The complaint asserts an indebtedness of $1298.53 due the collection agency, resulting from the assignment by Mr. Sperle of the Cafe's account. The answer is in two parts. First, it denies each and every allegation of the complaint, and second, it asserts *236 that the claim was assigned for collection only and that it is therefore champertous and consequently illegal. The trial court found (1) that the collection agency failed to sustain the burden of proof and (2) that the assignment of the claim was void as champertous. When the case was tried before the district court, sitting without a jury, the collection agency called Mr. Sperle, the former owner of the grocery store with whom the alleged account was originally incurred, to establish the existence of the account. After considerable difficulty and numerous attempts on the part of counsel for the collection agency to lay a proper foundation for the introduction in evidence of the plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and 4, which allegedly were the books containing the originals and carbon copies of the record of the sales as they were made from day to day by the grocer's employees as the groceries were purchased and charged to the Coffee Cup, the court received the exhibits in evidence. The most inclusive objection made during the trial to the introduction of the sales books follows: Our statute pertinent to this objection reads: North Dakota Century Code. Although the foundation may have been somewhat unartfully laid, we believe that it was sufficient to justify the receipt of the exhibits in evidence and that little benefit would be derived from setting forth herein a detailed analysis of the record relative to that issue. As the defendant did not call *237 any witnesses to testify or offer any evidence, and as the plaintiff did not call the sales clerks who allegedly made out the charge slips to verify the sales; did not call the employees of the Coffee Cup to verify the purchases; and did not call the defendant for cross-examination under this statute, what we must decide today is the effect that should be given the exhibits under the circumstances. In other words, does the admission of the business records, such as they are in this case, establish a prima-facie case for the plaintiff? In a decision rendered by this court in 1933, construing our Business Records as Evidence Statute as then contained in Section 7909 of the Compiled Laws of North Dakota 1913, which section was more restrictive than the present section, the court said: Referring to the business records in Baldwin Piano the court further said: The supreme court concluded by remanding the case to the district court for the taking of additional testimony and required that the district court make findings and conclusions upon the additional testimony taken and that it then certify the same to the supreme court. In an earlier decision, this court quoted from Jones' Commentaries on Evidence as to the significance to be given business records. In the instant case, the district judge, acting as both judge and jury, received the records in evidence, weighed them, and apparently found them insufficient in probative value to establish a prima-facie case. In Jones' Fifth Edition of the Law of Evidence, as revised by Spencer A. Gard, the development of the Shop Book Rule is explained. In discussing the probative value or weight to be given books of account, it is further said in that edition: In discussing the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, which our State has adopted, the text writers of American Jurisprudence 2d have this to say: The writers further discuss the act as follows: 30 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 950 (1967). See especially Boland v. Dehn (Mo. App.) 348 S.W.2d 603 (1961) and Oil Field Operating Co. v. Eureka Tool Co., 181 Okl. 393, 74 P.2d 377 (1937), involving the admissibility of sales and shop tickets. From all of this we conclude that our statute, being the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, is much more liberal in permitting the use of *241 records as evidence than was the original Shop Book Rule or the rule at common law as to entries in books of account. Consistent with the legislative intent to broaden the use of business records as evidence we believe it proper to give such records, when received in evidence and when unrebutted by the opposing party, prima-facie effect. See J. R. Watkins Company v. Vangen, 116 N.W.2d 641 at 650 (N.D.1962), wherein this court reaffirmed its view that the intent of the Uniform Act was to enlarge the operation of the business records exception to the Hearsay Evidence Rule. The second issue raised in this appeal is whether the assignment from the grocer to the collection agency is champertous and therefore illegal. The main authority relied on by the defendant in support of his contention that the assignment is champertous is that of Stark County v. Mischel, 42 N.D. 332, 173 N.W. 817 (1919). He also refers the court to Section 9-11-08, the pertinent part of which reads: The holding in Stark County is based more on the statutory duties of a state's attorney and on the standard of ethics of an attorney generally than on the law of champerty. See the special concurrences of Judges Birdzell and Christianson, wherein they refused to find that the assumption of the costs in conjunction with a contingent fee made the contract there under consideration champertous. We find the reference to Subsection 2 of Section 9-11-08, N.D.C.C., of little aid to us in determining the issue here under consideration. The plaintiff contends that this issue was settled by the decision of Rohan v. Johnson, 33 N.D. 179, 156 N.W. 936 (1916). Without discussing this issue in great detail, we conclude that the plaintiff is correct. We think parts of what Justice Christianson said in Rohan, in 1916, would be even more true today. The court in Rohan concluded by saying that the agreement set forth in that case was merely to collect, compromise or settle a promissory note in consideration of a certain percentage of the amount collected or recovered and that such agreement was not per se void either on the ground of champerty or public policy. At this late date, some fifty-four years since Rohan, we do not believe it wise to retreat to the more restrictive meanings of champerty. We conclude by remanding this case to the trial court for a determination of the amount due the plaintiff from examination of the records received in evidence under our Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act. Since the trial court was of the impression that the records could be received and, although unrebutted, could then be ignored, it did not attempt to ascertain the amount due and owing under the evidence submitted. Although this court could, under a trial de novo, attempt to ascertain the exact amount due and owing, we think that it is better that the trial court first attempt this function, as ours is basically an appellate court and the district court is basically, and especially in this case, a trial court. The judgment of the district court is therefore reversed and the case is remanded. PAULSON, STRUTZ and KNUDSON, JJ., concur. TEIGEN, Chief Justice. I concur in the result that the judgment must be reversed. However, I feel that this court is not performing its duty under the statute when it remands the case to the trial court for a determination of the amount due. The court has not ordered a new trial. It merely directs the trial court to find the amount due from the evidence already of record and before us on this appeal. The appeal was taken under Section 28-27-32, N.D.C.C., and the appellant has specified in its statement that it desires a review of the entire case. All of the evidence and proceedings are embodied in the statement. Therefore, under the statute, this court shall try anew the questions of fact in the entire case and, pursuant to the statute, "shall finally dispose of the same whenever justice can be done without a *243 new trial, and shall either affirm or modify the judgment or direct a new judgment to be entered in the district court." Although the majority admit that this court could, under a trial de novo, ascertain the amount due, they do not do so because, as they state, "we think that it is better that the trial court first attempt this function, as ours is basically an appellate court and the district court is basically, and especially in this case, a trial court." Under this procedure, it would appear that after the trial court has found the amount due, if either party is aggrieved, another appeal may be taken to this court. This makes for piecemeal decisions, contrary to the intent and clear language of Section 28-27-32, N.D.C.C. I adhere to my dissent in Simon v. Woodland, 179 N.W.2d 422 (N.D. 1970). I believe that we have a duty under the trial de novo statute to finally dispose of these cases whenever justice can be done without a new trial. This is such a case.