Case Title: Igo v. Igo

Citation: 

Docket Number: 88-64

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1988-08-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Igo v. Igo1988 WY 101759 P.2d 1253Case Number: 88-64Decided: 08/23/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
JUDY ANN IGO, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

RONALD JAMES IGO, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Timothy J. Judson, 
J.

Fred R. 
Dollison, Sheridan, for 
appellant.

Dwight F. Hurich 
of Preuit, Sowada & Hurich, Gillette, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant Judy Ann Igo 
(wife) appeals a divorce decree entered on January 19, 1988. She argues that the 
district court abused its discretion in the manner in which the court divided 
the parties' property. In turn, appellee Ronald James Igo (husband) urges this 
court to certify, under W.R.A.P. 10.05, that no reasonable cause for appeal 
existed so that attorney fees and damages will be taxed against 
wife.

[¶2.]     We affirm and refuse to 
certify that wife had no reasonable cause for appeal.

[¶3.]     The parties married on 
January 19, 1980, in Gillette, Wyoming. Husband had three minor children by a 
previous marriage. The parties had no children by this marriage. Husband brought 
into the marriage assets, including real property and a house, worth about 
$41,000. Wife brought into the marriage assets worth about $13,000. Husband 
operated a well service business and was solely liable for the indebtedness 
against it. Husband was the primary bread winner and contributed most of the 
funds used by the parties. Wife worked at different times and helped husband 
care for his minor children.

[¶4.]     During the marriage 
husband sold his real property and house and used $15,000 from the sale proceeds 
for a down payment on a contract for deed on two ten-acre plots of land in 
Campbell County, Wyoming. He fully paid and satisfied this 
contract for deed during the marriage. The parties built a home on one of the 
ten-acre plots against which they owed a mortgage of $99,200. At the time of the 
divorce the market value of this property was $126,500. The unimproved ten-acre 
plot was worth $18,300 at the time of the divorce and was 
unencumbered.

[¶5.]     The couple brought 
automobiles into the marriage and later acquired automobiles. They acquired 
other personal property, including horses. The parties' eleven horses were worth 
about $6,175. Two of these horses, "Ten Minus Zero" and "Sugar," together were 
worth $2,800. The parties owed $5,000 on a horse trailer. At the time of the 
divorce they had an income tax refund of $14,419.

[¶6.]     The parties separated 
on July 21, 1986. From separation to divorce husband paid about $5,800 to wife 
for support. Before the divorce the parties substantially divided their personal 
property and automobiles.

[¶7.]     At trial the district 
court granted husband the divorce decree as the aggrieved party. The district 
court divided the property and the debts as follows:

Husband

1. Ten-acre plot and 
house worth $126,500 with $99,200 mortgage.

2. Ten-acre unencumbered 
plot worth $18,300.

3. Income tax refund 
worth $4,400. 

4. Horses "Ten Minus 
Zero" and "Sugar," worth about $2,800.

5. Miscellaneous personal 
property and debts.

6. Debts of his well 
service.

Wife

1. Income tax refund 
worth $10,000.

2. Nine horses worth 
about $3,375.

3. Miscellaneous personal 
property.

4. No 
debts.

[¶8.]     As a result of this 
property division, husband received property worth $75,000 to $90,000, and wife 
received property worth $35,000 to $45,000.

[¶9.]     On appeal we review the 
evidence in favor of appellee husband, giving that evidence every reasonable 
inference that can be drawn and ignoring appellant wife's evidence. We defer to 
the trial court's exercise of broad discretion in adjusting the parties' rights 
and obligations upon marriage dissolution. We will not disturb that decision 
unless we find that the court abused its discretion. These appellate rules are 
so well-known that we need not cite supporting authority. We have defined 
"judicial discretion" as "a composite of many things, among which are 
conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised 
with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so 
arbitrarily or capriciously * * *." Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 
(Wyo. 
1986).

[¶10.]  After hearing the evidence at trial, the 
trial court applied the provisions of W.S. 20-2-114 (June 1987 Repl.) in making 
the property division. These provisions instruct the 
court:

In granting a divorce, 
the court shall make such disposition of the property of the parties as appears 
just and equitable, having regard for the respective merits of the parties and 
the condition in which they will be left by the divorce, the party through whom 
the property was acquired and the burdens imposed upon the property for the 
benefit of either party and children. The court may decree to either party 
reasonable alimony out of the estate of the other having regard for the other's 
ability and may order so much of the other's real estate or the rents and 
profits thereof as is necessary be assigned and set out to either party for 
life, or may decree a specific sum be paid by either 
party.

[¶11.]  The evidence favorable to husband shows, 
among other facts, that he supported his three minor children from a previous 
marriage, operated a well service against which indebtedness existed, brought 
real property with improvements into the marriage from the sale of which he used 
proceeds to buy other real property, assumed substantial indebtedness on the 
real property and its improvements so acquired, was the primary bread winner 
during the marriage, and was the aggrieved party to whom the trial court granted 
the divorce. We have held that "the court may also consider fault of the 
respective parties together with all other facts and circumstances surrounding 
the dissolution of the marriage for purposes of determining division of 
property, alimony, and award of attorneys fees." Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 820 (Wyo. 1984)

[¶12.]  Applying our appellate rules to the 
district court's exercise of discretion in applying the relevant statutory 
provision, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making the 
challenged property division. We refuse to certify appellant wife had no 
reasonable cause for appeal.

[¶13.]  We affirm the trial court's 
judgment.