Case Title: State v. Steven R. Fortin

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-31-01

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2004-02-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Plaintiff-Respondent, v. STEVEN R. FORTIN, Defendant-Appellant. Argued October 22, 2002 Decided February 3, 2004 On appeal from the Superior Court, Law Division, Middlesex County. Jacqueline E. Turner and Linda Mehling, Assistant Deputy Public Defenders, argued the cause for appellant (Yvonne Smith Segars, Public Defender, attorney). Nancy A. Hulett, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Peter C. Harvey, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney). Justice ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court. Defendant Steven Fortin was convicted by a jury of capital murder and sentenced to death. He claims that he was denied a fair trial as a result of various rulings of the trial court in the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. We conclude that the trial errors were sufficiently egregious so as to deny defendant a fair trial and, therefore, we are constrained to reverse. A fundamental issue in this case will be did [defendant] commit this crime and will the State prove he committed the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. As part of its proofs, the State will produce evidence of a crime the defendant committed in the State of Maine. You will be instructed that the evidence you will hear about the incident in Maine can be considered by you for a limited purpose . . . . I will ask you to think about the Maine evidence in conjunction with the limiting instruction. I will then ask if you can follow this limiting instruction given the nature of the Maine evidence. And just as importantly, whether you can be a fair and impartial juror in this case and decide whether the State has proven [defendant] is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of killing Melissa Padilla, not based on the fact he might be a bad person who committed a serious crime in Maine. The evidence you will hear is that on April the 3rd, 1995, about eight months after Padilla was killed, Trooper Vicki[] Gardner, while acting as a State Trooper was assaulted by [defendant]. He hit Gardner a number of times in the face, fracturing her nose. He bit and sexually assaulted Trooper Gardner by digitally penetrating her both vaginally and anally. Trooper Gardner was also strangled. She survived the incident with a fractured nose, numerous bumps, bruises, and scrapes to basically her entire body. . . . . I m going to ask all of you individually what your reaction was to the evidence and the instructions, whether you feel you can follow the instructions given the nature of the Maine evidence, and whether you can give [defendant] a fair trial despite all you will hear about the Maine incident. The two prosecutors representing the State, one of whom was a seasoned capital litigator, raised no objection to the proposed instruction, except to insist on the expansion of paragraph five to include language that defendant had bitten Trooper Gardner on the chin and breast, and that the trooper had suffered those bite marks, as well as injuries to her anus and vagina. The trial court clearly was vexed that the attorneys had agreed to inquire about a subject that would consume additional time in selecting a jury, asking: Gentlemen, do we really want to get a jury in this case? The court stated that generally it would abide by an agreement of the parties on the need for a particular juror inquiry, but that its interpretation of State v. Manley, 54 N.J. 259 (1969), led it to foreclose any disclosure of defendant s sexual assault on Trooper Gardner. The court focused on Manley s call for an expedient selection of a fair and impartial jury, and its disapproval of the improper use of voir dire to give a favorable spin to a party s preferred view of legal principles and the facts. (Quoting id. at 280). The trial court expressed its concern that potential jurors might not be able to keep an open mind after hearing about one isolated incident, the assault on Trooper Gardner, and feared that some jurors might say to themselves, oh, my goodness. Evidently, the court believed that asking jurors, after disclosure of such a prior crime, now can you be absolutely fair in this case?, was a pointless exercise. The trial court considered defendant s voir dire instruction to be loading the deck, and refused to put a layperson through having to in seconds make that determination, to assimilate all of that information in a vacuum and then say, well, that s not going to have any effect on me. Throughout the jury selection process, defendant continued to press the court to give the proposed instruction, fearing that the nature of his crime against a female trooper in Maine would render some jurors incapable of returning a fair verdict, particularly those with law enforcement ties. After the trial court excused for cause four prospective jurors who could not remain fair and impartial given the nature of the charges in the Padilla case, the court denied another request by defense counsel for voir dire on the Maine crime. One potential juror, L.D., informed the court at sidebar that she had learned all about the case, including the female State Trooper in Maine, from newspaper reports. The court excused L.D. for cause sua sponte, because L.D. had formulated a pretty good opinion about the case. Afterwards, the court excused two prospective jurors who could not maintain their impartiality in light of the murder charges, and seven jurors whose law enforcement ties affected their ability to be fair. Defendant renewed his voir dire request and expressed concern about shielding prospective jurors from evidence of the sexual assault against a female State Trooper. Defendant inferred that if a number of jurors could not keep an open mind after hearing the nature of the charges regarding the Padilla murder, then others might similarly be affected if they knew of defendant s crime in Maine. Moreover, defendant was uncertain whether anybody with a close connection to law enforcement could sit impartially as a juror. Defense counsel urged the court to reconsider its position: Once, again, I m asking the court to please inform the jurors what they re going to hear from the State of Maine. So[] we have the ability to judge the impact that this evidence is going to have on any potential juror. . . . So, at least, the exercise of our peremptory challenges are done with a knowledge of . . . whether anybody is going to be biased by . . . hearing [about] the Maine case. The State did not resist defendant s request. The trial court, however, was not persuaded: I hope that this is the last time I have to address this business of whether or not I should set forth, with particularity, the details of the 404[(b) evidence]. . . . There is no way that I could present that in a vacuum. It would be presented without this jury having heard the first word of evidence. To hit them with what the defendant s alleged conduct was in Maine, would be totally unfair. It would truly affect the ability of any juror to be fair and impartial. When this evidence is presented in the proper context, with the proper instructions, when they already have heard evidence concerning the charge against the defendant, . . . they will know how to put it in that prospective [sic]. The court excused another juror, C.F., for cause sua sponte because he too remembered from reading the newspapers something about defendant s Maine crime against a state trooper, and admitted that he would probably have some prejudice. Undeterred, defendant renewed his voir dire request, only to have it denied again. The court also denied defendant s request that it question J.B., a panelist with numerous friends in local law enforcement, as to whether the Maine-crime evidence would undermine his ability to remain impartial. The court reasoned that J.B., like the other panelists with close ties to law enforcement, had not indicated that he had close female friends . . . [in] law enforcement, and that it did not follow that a juror with such ties would be more aggrieved at any law enforcement person being assaulted. (Emphasis added). The court also denied defendant s request to excuse for cause R.S., an East Jersey State Prison plumber who had twice been assaulted by inmates and whose daughter had been dating a Carteret police officer for ten years, and C.M., a New Jersey State Prison corrections officer in Trenton with an uncle on the Sayreville police force. Defendant exercised the last of his twenty peremptory challenges to remove R.S. from the panel. Although defendant requested three additional peremptory challenges, the court granted only one to allow the removal of C.M. Defendant was not permitted the additional two challenges requested to make up for the one . . . used for [R.S.], and to remove M.C., who was related by marriage to a state trooper, and was nervous about the case because she frequented the area where Padilla had been killed. In all, the trial court questioned 154 potential jurors. The court removed many jurors for cause, including twenty-seven who had ties to law enforcement, and twenty-two who admitted that they could not be impartial after hearing the nature of the charges in the Padilla case. Of the eighteen jurors with law enforcement connections not disqualified by the court for cause, the defense removed ten, and the State two, by peremptory challenges. Thus, six individuals with law enforcement ties became sworn jurors, and five of those six became deliberating jurors. See footnote 4 After the jury was sworn and impaneled, the prosecutor gave his opening remarks, in which he predictably and properly discoursed on the Maine crime and its relationship to the State s other proofs. The prosecutor described both Padilla s murder and defendant s attack on Trooper Gardner in Maine: He attacked that female State Trooper. He beat her. He sexually assaulted her. He strangled her into unconsciousness. And, in a bizarre and unique kind of attack, he bit her on the left breast. And he bit her on the chin. And . . . he forced something into her anus that caused the flesh to lacerate. After the State s opening, the court gave a limiting instruction to the effect that the Maine evidence could only be considered in determining the identity of Padilla s killer, and that it could not be considered as evidence that defendant was a bad person, with a propensity for committing bad acts. The late timing of the disclosure and the limiting instruction, however, already had denied the court and the parties the opportunity to learn whether the sixteen sworn jurors would have answered any of the voir dire questions differently had they known that they were to receive evidence of defendant s sexual assault on Trooper Gardner. [N.J.R.E. 702.] We have recognized three basic requirements for the admission of expert testimony pursuant to N.J.R.E. 702: (1) the intended testimony must concern a subject matter that is beyond the ken of the average juror; (2) the field testified to must be at a state of the art such that an expert s testimony could be sufficiently reliable; and (3) the witness must have sufficient expertise to offer the intended testimony. [State v. Kelly, supra, 97 N.J. at 208.] Not only must the methodology be valid and the procedures applied correctly, but the results achieved also must be reliable. In addition to showing its general acceptance in the scientific community, a party offering scientific evidence must show that the technique, methodology or procedure was correctly used to produce that evidence. State v. Marcus, 294 N.J. Super. 267, 275 (App. Div. 1996), certif. denied, 157 N.J. 543 (1998). An expert offering scientific opinion testimony must do so within a reasonable degree of certainty or probability. See State v. Freeman, 223 N.J. Super. 92, 116 (App. Div. 1988) (holding that medical opinion testimony must be couched in terms of reasonable medical certainty or probability; opinions as to possibility are inadmissible ) (internal citations omitted), certif. denied, 114 N.J. 525 (1989). In this case, both Yates and Dr. Word testified that Cellmark could not reach conclusions within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty or probability because of the absence of appropriate controls. Defendant presented no expert testimony to refute that assertion. Thus, we are left with a record in which the test results of the vaginal swab were deemed scientifically unreliable. That unchallenged testimony ultimately led the trial court correctly to exclude the evidence. Even were we to accept the testimony of Yates and Dr. Word in which they assumed interpretable results, defendant would fare no better because he was not eliminated as a potential source of the sperm found on the victim s body. Moreover, this Court is reluctant to come to scientific conclusions based on some of the disjointed testimony adduced from the experts. We decline to speculate as to the import of the testimony that Fernandez did not possess the number 2 allele. The record must provide those answers. The most liberal interpretation of the record in favor of defendant reveals that Padilla had sexual relations with someone other than her boyfriend or defendant at some unknown time before her death. That hardly counts as evidence that that unidentified person killed Padilla. The expert testimony failed to provide any relevant connection between the sperm analyzed and the murder. Reasonable doubt cannot arise from pure conjecture. Accordingly, based on the record before us, we find that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in barring evidence and argument that some unknown third party engaged in penile penetration at the time of the victim s death. The State argued that those two mitigating factors did not relate to defendant s character or record, or to the circumstances of the offense. Defendant contended that the proposed mitigating factors rebutted the 4(g) felony murder-aggravating factor that Fortin killed Padilla in the course of a robbery and sexual assault. The trial court rejected the proposed mitigating factors because they were not relevant to the statutory language of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h). We agree. We also find no support for defendant s contention that he was barred from introducing relevant mitigation evidence to undermine the existence of the State s aggravating factors. First, we address the basis for the trial court s rejection of the two mitigating factors. Our capital sentencing jurisprudence requires that courts grant defendants wide leeway in presenting evidence in mitigation of the death penalty. State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 157 (1988) (Bey II), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1164, 115 S. Ct. 1131, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1093 (1995). Although the scope of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(h) is broad, it is not unlimited. State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 103 (1988). Defendant does not claim that the proposed mitigating factors were relevant to his character or record. He does claim, however, that they were relevant to the circumstances of the offense. In Gerald, we construed the phrase circumstances of the offense to encompass only those circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime itself. Id. at 104. For example, the relative role of the defendant s participation in the crime meets that standard. Ibid. The jury may weigh whether the defendant was a ringleader or a lesser player in comparison to codefendants. Ibid. In contrast, the sentences received by codefendants are not a relevant mitigating factor. Ibid. In State v. Timmendequas, we rejected as a factor bearing on circumstances of the offense and character the defendant s offer to plead guilty in exchange for a life sentence. 161 N.J. 515, 626-27 (1999) (Timmendequas I), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S. Ct. 136, 151 L. Ed. 2d 89 (2001). For similar reasons, the period of parole ineligibility a defendant would serve if he received a non-capital sentence is not a mitigating factor. State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383, 466 (1998) (Morton I), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 931, 121 S. Ct. 1380, 149 L. Ed. 2d 306 (2001). On the other hand, a defendant s claim-of-right defense in the penalty phase his honest belief that he was entitled to recover money from the person he murdered is a permissible mitigating factor that could have a countervailing effect on the 4(g) aggravating factor, murder committed during a felony. State v. Mejia, 141 N.J. 475, 500 (1995). Applying those principles to this case, the trial court properly rejected the two proposed catch-all mitigating factors. That Padilla sold drugs earlier in the evening bore no relationship to any of the circumstances of the offense. The proposed drug-dealing mitigating factor was a thinly disguised effort to demean the character of the victim while in no way lessening defendant s personal involvement or moral culpability in the murder. Contrary to defendant s assertion, Padilla s involvement in drugs did not refute the State s allegation that he committed a felony-robbery-murder or suggest that someone else robbed her. Her drug dealing was not germane to any legitimate defense or mitigating factor. In addition, the victim s prior sexual conduct was not relevant as a mitigating factor. That Padilla s boyfriend had anal sex with her one to two weeks before her murder did not qualify as a mitigating factor because it too bore no relationship to the crime. Such evidence did not refute the evidence that Padilla was the victim of a sexual crime at the time of the murder. Defendant was unable to present any evidence that the fresh wounds to Padilla s anus were caused by consensual sexual relations with her boyfriend. We next consider defendant s argument that he was denied the opportunity to present mitigating evidence. This Court has recognized that mitigating evidence serves multiple purposes: (1) to weaken the State s proofs concerning the existence of aggravating factors; (2) to establish the existence of mitigating factors; and (3) to bolster the weight of those mitigating factors found to exist in an attempt to have those factors outweigh the aggravating factors found to exist during the jurors ultimate deliberation. [State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 316 (1993) (Martini I), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 875, 116 S. Ct. 203, 133 L. Ed. 2d 137 (1995).] The defendant has a right to both criticize the evidence supporting the aggravating factors as well as to present his own evidence supporting mitigating factors and undermining aggravating factors. State v. Josephs, 174 N.J. 44, 116 (2002); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(b) (providing that defendant may offer, without regard to the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials, reliable evidence relevant to any of the mitigating factors ); N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(d) (providing that defendant and State may rebut any evidence presented during penalty trial and may argue adequacy of evidence establishing any aggravating or mitigating factor). In State v. Davis, this Court emphasized the different evidentiary standards applicable to the guilt and penalty phases. 96 N.J. 611, 619-20 (1984). Given this most sensitive and critical aspect of the capital punishment statute, the Court found that the Legislature intended a broad understanding of evidential relevance during the penalty phase. Id. at 619. The Court noted doubts must be resolved in favor of admission when evidence of a mitigating factor is offered by the defendant. Id. at 620. Additionally, evidence inadmissible during the guilt phase, such as a claim-of-right defense to robbery, may be admissible during the penalty phase to lessen the weight that a jury might give to the felony-robbery-murder aggravating factor. Mejia, supra, 141 N.J. at 500. However, the Court cautioned in Davis, supra, that a relaxation of the standards of admissibility is not the equivalent of automatic admissibility. 96 N.J. at 623. A court may exclude mitigation evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its unfounded or speculative character or by the risk it would cause confusion. Morton I, supra, 155 N.J. at 461. The drug sales evidence did not discredit the felony-robbery-murder aggravating factor because there was no evidence that connected drug dealing to the murder. We found the drug-dealing evidence irrelevant in the guilt phase; we find it irrelevant in the penalty phase as well. See supra Part IV.B. The trial court, nevertheless, gave defense counsel considerable latitude to explore this subject. Defense counsel elicited through cross-examination of the State s witnesses the drug milieu of the area in which the crime was committed. For instance, he established that Padilla was killed in an area spotted with welfare motels and known for drug activity. He also proved that a civilian witness had smoked crack cocaine with the victim in the room of a local motel and that a law enforcement officer had questioned several witnesses about the use of cocaine. Defendant was not inhibited in his presentation of mitigating evidence, even that of questionable relevance. Moreover, defendant s repeated assertions that he was not allowed to present evidence in rebuttal of the sexual assault aggravating factor is not supported by the record. At the penalty-phase hearing, in cross-examining Dr. Lawrence Ricci, the State s sexual assault expert, defense counsel relied on the statement given by Padilla s boyfriend to the police that he and the victim engaged in consensual anal sex one to two weeks before her death. Defense counsel suggested through his questioning that the injuries to Padilla s anus were caused by consensual sexual activity with the boyfriend. Dr. Ricci dashed that theory by testifying that the anal injuries, whether caused by consensual or non-consensual activity, were fresh injuries that occurred within twenty-four to forty-eight hours of death. Accordingly, there was no connection between the victim s sexual activity with her boyfriend and her injuries discovered at the time of her death. In sum, the trial court properly struck the two mitigating factors in question and gave wide latitude to the admission of mitigating evidence at the penalty hearing. Waiver of Ex Post Facto Challenges in Sentencing The trial court in this case did not have the benefit of our holdings in Nelson II and Koskovich or the amended Model Jury Charge. We trust that trial courts in all future penalty-phase proceedings will follow the Model Jury Charge. The jury considers the capital triggers only after finding a defendant guilty of knowing or purposeful murder. See State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 42-43 (1998), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 932, 121 S. Ct. 1380, 149 L. Ed. 2d 306 (2001); State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 100 (1988). Third, in the penalty-phase trial, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of any alleged statutory aggravating factors. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(a). If the jury finds one or more aggravating factors, it must then determine whether those outweigh all of the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(3)(a). The capital sentencing procedure in New Jersey, therefore, requires three different findings beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury before an accused receives a death sentence: (1) knowing and purposeful killing, (2) one of the capital triggers, and (3) one or more aggravating factors. The jury s failure to find any one of those facts renders the defendant ineligible for the death penalty. Additionally, before a defendant may be sentenced to death, the jury must then find that the aggravating factors outweigh beyond a reasonable doubt the mitigating factors. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(3)(a). The following chart summarizes the role of the different factual findings made by the jury in a capital case. As can be seen, the specificity we require in indictments has antecedents in the traditions of our law. The Apprendi Court held that due process requires that [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455. The Court concluded that [i]t is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. Id. at 490, 120 S. Ct. at 2363, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252-53, 119 S. Ct. 1215, 1228, 143 L. Ed. 2d 311, 332 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring)). The Court emphasized that the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury s guilty verdict? Id. at 494, 120 S. Ct. at 2365, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 457. In Ring, supra, the Supreme Court logically extended its Apprendi holding to strike down Arizona s capital sentencing scheme that allowed a judge alone to make the factual findings required to sentence a defendant to death. 536 U.S. at 588-89, 122 S. Ct. at 2432, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 564. Under Arizona law, the maximum punishment that a defendant could receive based solely on a jury s finding of guilt of first-degree murder was life imprisonment. Id. at 597, 122 S. Ct. at 2437, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 569. That defendant could not be sentenced to death, the statutory maximum penalty for first-degree murder, unless at a hearing the judge found beyond a reasonable doubt at least one aggravating circumstance and then found no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. Id. at 592-93, 122 S. Ct. at 2434-35, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 566. The Court, in Ring, concluded that the Sixth Amendment s jury trial guarantee made applicable to the States entrusted to the jury the ultimate finding of the aggravating factor that exposed the defendant to the penalty of death. The Court reasoned that [c]apital defendants, no less than noncapital defendants, . . . are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment. Id. at 589, 122 S. Ct. at 2432, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 564. The Court rejected Arizona s argument that, because the statute at issue specified death or life imprisonment as the only sentencing options, Ring s death sentence was within the range of punishment authorized by the jury verdict. The Court noted: [Arizona s] argument overlooks Apprendi s instruction that the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect. In effect, the required finding [of an aggravated circumstance] expose[d] [Ring] to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury s guilty verdict. The Arizona first-degree murder statute authorizes a maximum penalty of death only in a formal sense for it explicitly cross-references the statutory provision requiring the finding of an aggravating circumstance before imposition of the death penalty. If Arizona prevailed on its opening argument, Apprendi would be reduced to a meaningless and formalistic rule of statutory drafting. [Id. at 604, 122 S. Ct. at 2440-41, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 573-74 (citations omitted).] Where enumerated aggravating factors operate as the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense, the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury. Id. at 609, 122 S. Ct. at 2443, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 577 (citations omitted). Ring thus fundamentally altered the constitutional significance of aggravating factors that expose a defendant to the death penalty. In the context of deciding when the Fifth Amendment s double jeopardy protection applied to a penalty-phase hearing in a capital case, the Supreme Court in Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania reasserted the principles established in Ring: [Ring] held that aggravating circumstances that make a defendant eligible for the death penalty operate as the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense. That is to say, for purposes of the Sixth Amendment s jury-trial guarantee, the underlying offense of murder is a distinct, lesser included offense of murder plus one or more aggravating circumstances : Whereas the former exposes a defendant to a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, the latter increases the maximum permissible sentence to death. Accordingly, we held that the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury, and not a judge, find the existence of any aggravating circumstances, and that they be found, not by a mere preponderance of the evidence, but beyond a reasonable doubt. [ 537 U.S. 101, 111, 123 S. Ct. 732, 739, 154 L. Ed. 2d 588, 598-99 (2003) (plurality opinion) (internal citations omitted).] See also Sattazahn, supra, 537 U.S. at 126 n.6, 123 S. Ct. at 747 n.6, 154 L. Ed. 2d at 608 n.6 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that capital sentencing proceedings involving proof of one or more aggravating factors are to be treated as trials of separate offenses, not mere sentencing proceedings ). Unlike Arizona, New Jersey always has required that capital triggers and aggravating factors go to the jury and that the facts in issue be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. On more than one occasion, this Court has acknowledged that, in important ways, aggravating factors are functionally indistinguishable from the elements of a crime. State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 59 (1987) (Biegenwald II) (noting the functional similarity of aggravating factors and the weighing process itself to the traditional proof of elements of an offense ). As we observed in State v. Ramseur, supra: It is clear to us, however, that functionally, the aggravating factors in the Act are indistinguishable, for this purpose, from the elements of a crime. For example, no more or less than premeditation under our prior law, proof of an aggravating factor could mark the difference between imprisonment and death. [106 N.J. at 201 n.27.] Before Apprendi and Ring, New Jersey treated aggravating factors as though they were elements of the offense by submitting them to a petit jury and subjecting them to proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Following Ring, today, those procedures are a constitutional imperative. In a constitutional sense, the Arizona capital aggravating factors are indistinguishable from those in New Jersey in the manner in which they operate to elevate a term of imprisonment to a death sentence. See footnote 16 For purposes of the Sixth Amendment s jury-trial guarantee, aggravating factors operate as the functional equivalent of an element of the greater offense. . . . [o]f murder plus one or more aggravating circumstances. Sattazahn, supra, 537 U.S. at 111, 123 S. Ct. at 739, 154 L. Ed. 2d at 599 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Thus, murder is a distinct lesser-included offense of the greater offense of capital murder. Ibid. After Ring, federal prosecutors in capital prosecutions under the Federal Death Penalty Act, 18 U.S.C.A. 3591 3598, have submitted to federal grand juries those aggravating factors that make a defendant eligible for the imposition of a sentence of death. They are doing so by obtaining superseding indictments that contain a Notice of Special Findings alleging the aggravating factors. See, e.g., United States v. Haynes, 269 F. Supp. 2d 970, 973 (W.D. Tenn. 2003) (noting that, post-Ring, government obtained a superseding indictment alleging aggravating factors); United States v. Sampson, 245 F. Supp. 2d 327, 329 (D. Mass. 2003) (same); United States v. Church, 218 F. Supp. 2d 813, 814 (W.D. Va. 2002) (same); United States v. Matthews, 246 F. Supp. 2d 137, 140 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (same); United States v. Lentz, 225 F. Supp. 2d 672, 675 (E.D. Va. 2002) (same); United States v. Regan, 221 F. Supp. 2d 672, 677 (E.D. Va. 2002) (same). Federal prosecutors apparently have assumed that Ring requires a grand jury to conclude that the government s decision to seek the death penalty is supported by sufficient evidence. The federal experience shows no sign that submission of aggravating factors to the grand jury has impaired law enforcement s ability to prosecute capital cases. The aggravating factors in the federal capital sentencing scheme serve a substantially similar purpose to the aggravating factors under our Capital Penalty Act. See footnote 17 Although we recognize that the Fifth Amendment right to indictment by a grand jury does not apply to the States, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538, 4 S. Ct. 111, 122, 28 L. Ed. 232, 239 (1884), we have never construed our grand jury provision under Article I, Paragraph 8 as providing lesser protection than its federal analogue. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 215 n.42 (1987); State v. Porro, 152 N.J. Super. 259, 265 (Law Div. 1977), aff d, 158 N.J. Super. 269 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047, 99 S. Ct. 724, 58 L. Ed. 2d 706 (1978). If aggravating factors and capital triggers are the functional equivalent of elements of capital murder pursuant to the Sixth Amendment s right to trial by jury, we see no reason to define them as something other than elements for purposes of the state constitutional right to a grand jury presentation. We, therefore, hold that our State Constitution requires that aggravating factors be submitted to the grand jury and returned in an indictment. In a criminal justice system in which all of the elements of a crime must be submitted to the grand jury it would be odd to make capital murder the one exception. Our analysis of the development of federal law does not compel this result; logic and fairness and the historical importance we attach to our grand jury system do. In light of Apprendi and Ring and our recognition that functionally, the aggravating factors in [N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c] are indistinguishable . . . from the elements of a crime, Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 201 n.27, we conclude that Article I, Paragraph 8 requires the submission of the aggravating factors and capital triggers to the grand jury. Courts do not lightly overrule their own precedents. The United States Supreme Court, by declaring unconstitutional one part of Arizona s capital penalty law in Ring v. Arizona, overruled its decision in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S. Ct. 3047, 111 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1990), to the extent that it allow[ed] a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty. 536 U.S. at 609, 122 S. Ct. at 2443, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 576-77. The Court took note of its break with precedent: Although the doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of law[,] . . . [o]ur precedents are not sacrosanct. [W]e have overruled prior decisions where the necessity and propriety of doing so has been established. We are satisfied that this is such a case. Id. at 608, 122 S. Ct. at 2442-43, 153 L. Ed. 2d at 576 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In light of Ring, federal constitutional law now clearly defines the elements of capital murder in a way that is fatally at odds with Martini I. We are left with no alternative but to part ways with that portion of the Martini I decision inconsistent with our holding today. We are mindful that the rule we announce overrules Martini I s interpretation of Article I, Paragraph 8 and thereby is a new rule of law. State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 57 (1997) (quoting State v. Cupe, 289 N.J. Super. 1, 11 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 589 (1996)). We limit this rule to purely prospective application for several reasons. See footnote 18 In determining whether to apply a new rule retroactively or prospectively, we consider the following three factors: (1) the purpose of the rule and whether it would be furthered by a retroactive application, (2) the degree of reliance placed on the old rule by those who administered it, and (3) the effect a retroactive application would have on the administration of justice. See footnote 19 Knight, supra, 145 N.J. at 251 (quoting State v. Nash, 64 N.J. 464, 471 (1974)). The first factor, the purpose of the new rule, is often the pivotal consideration. State v. Burstein, 85 N.J. 394, 406 (1981). New rules are given complete retroactive effect where the purpose of the new rule is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function and which raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials. Id. at 406-07 (quoting Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653, 91 S. Ct. 1148, 1152, 28 L. Ed. 2d 388, 395 (1971)). We have given a new rule retroactive effect where it deals with the ultimate fairness and soundness of the jury's verdict. State v. Czachor, 82 N.J. 392, 408 (1980). On the other hand, in cases where the new rule is designed to enhance the reliability of the factfinding process but the old rule did not substantially impair the accuracy of that process, we have declined to grant retroactive effect to the new rule if the countervailing interests of the State reliance on the old rule and the undisrupted administration of justice were held to outweigh the negligible effect that the old rule had on the integrity of the truth-finding process. Burstein, supra, 85 N.J. at 408-09. The previous rule, enunciated in Martini I, had little impact on the truth-finding process. Before our decision today, we had in place safeguards that served as a substitute for the indictment process. Prosecutors were required to give timely notice of the aggravating factors and defendants were able to contest the validity of any alleged aggravating factor through the process established in McCrary, supra, 97 N.J. at 142. In this case, at a McCrary hearing the trial court rejected a defense motion to dismiss aggravating factors 4(c) (murder involving aggravated assault and/or torture) and 4(f) (murder committed for the purpose of escaping detection), finding an adequate factual basis to support those factors. Furthermore, a defendant who advances to the penalty phase is not sentenced to death unless the jury finds an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt and that all of the aggravating factors outweigh beyond a reasonable doubt all of the mitigating factors. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(3)(a). Together, those procedures ensured the accuracy of the truth-finding process endorsed in Martini I, and we find no evidence that the failure to submit the aggravating factors to the grand jury in this case impaired the accuracy of that process. Given our resolution of this issue, we need not reach the question whether the finding of the sentencing jury rendered moot the failure of the indictment to allege the aggravating factors. See United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 70, 106 S. Ct. 938, 942, 89 L. Ed. 2d 50, 56 (1986); State v. Murphy, 110 N.J. 20, 28 (1988) (limiting Mechanik to violations of the technical variety that raised no issue of fundamental fairness ) (quoting United States v. Taylor, 798 F.2d 1337, 1340 (10th Cir. 1986)). In light of the reliance by the State on Martini I and the opportunity for defendants to avail themselves of a McCrary hearing, we apply this new rule prospectively. In all future capital cases, the State is required to submit the aggravating factors to the grand jury and specify in the indictment those factors it intends to prove at a penalty hearing. See footnote 20 Because there are separate trials for the guilt and penalty phases of a capital case and because the aggravating factors only apply to the penalty phase, the trial court must not read that portion of the indictment concerning the aggravating factors to the guilt-phase jury. The purpose is to prevent irrelevant and prejudicial information from tainting the guilt-phase trial. This simple rule follows from our precedent in cases in which counts in an indictment are bifurcated into separate trials. See, e.g., State v. Ragland, 105 N.J. 189, 193 (1986). Our holding today applies only to those cases that have yet to reach the penalty-phase. In those capital cases yet to be tried, the State must present the aggravating factors to the grand jury, which then may return a supplemental indictment specifying those factors the defendant will face at a penalty trial. By this opinion, we in no way intend to limit the flexibility of the Attorney General or prosecutors as they go about the difficult task of deciding which murder cases merit a capital prosecution. Prosecutors have the discretion to present a criminal homicide case to the grand jury at one hearing while continuing to review the circumstances that bear on classifying the case as capital murder. In such cases in which there is a later decision to prosecute the case as capital murder, the State may submit the aggravating factors to the grand jury and seek a supplemental indictment. We leave these matters to the judgment of the executive branch. Nevertheless, we expect that any such decision will be made at an early stage after indictment so as not to cause prejudicial delay. Plaintiff-Respondent, v. STEVEN R. FORTIN, Defendant-Appellant. JUSTICE VERNIERO, concurring and dissenting. I join the Court in setting aside defendant s conviction and death sentence and concur in all but two narrow aspects of its opinion. The first issue concerns whether the State is required to submit aggravating factors to a grand jury to be included in a capital indictment. I start with a fundamental premise that this Court should direct the co-equal branches of government to alter existing statutory practices only when federal or a superior State law requires that direction. There is no such mandate to compel that result today. Accordingly, I would affirm the long-standing practice of having prosecutors serve notice of aggravating factors on a defendant in a capital case, a straightforward statutory procedure that provides fair notice to an accused in this setting. This Court in State v. Martini squarely rejected the argument that, as a matter of State law, aggravating factors are elements of capital murder subject to the indictment requirement. 131 N.J. 176, 222-28 (1993). In reaching our holding, we specifically acknowledged but were not persuaded by the notion that, in every case, aggravators should be considered the functional equivalent of elements. Id. at 225-26. Although two members dissented on other aspects of the Court s decision, the dissenters registered no disagreement on the indictment question. Id. at 324-68 (Handler, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority on certain issues but not on indictment question). The Court, therefore, resolved that issue unanimously and reaffirmed its holding as recently as a few years ago. State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 638 (1999). Its rationale need not be repeated here, except to say that the Martini Court concluded that New Jersey s legislatively-established system adequately ensures that capital-cause defendants are afforded both of the protections contemplated by the Constitution: adequate notice and well-founded prosecutions. Martini, supra, 131 N.J. at 227. The Court also expressed concerns about the negative consequences of a contrary conclusion, observing in some instances, inclusion of alleged aggravating factors in the indictment would create the unwanted situation of having the factors read to the jury at the start of trial. For example, if the State were seeking to establish aggravating factor c(4)(a), that defendant had previously been convicted of murder, a reading of the indictment to the jury during the guilt phase could substantially prejudice the trial s outcome. NO. A-31 SEPTEMBER TERM 2001 ON APPEAL FROM Appellate Division, Superior Court STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. STEVEN R. FORTIN, Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED February 3, 2004 Chief Justice Poritz PRESIDING OPINION BY Justice Albin CONCURRING/DISSENTING OPINION BY Justice Verniero DISSENTING OPINION BY No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense, unless on the presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases of impeachment, or in cases now prosecuted without indictment, or arising in the army or navy or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger. Every indictment for murder shall specify whether the act is murder as defined by N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), (2) or (3) and whether the defendant is alleged: (1) to have committed the act by his or her own conduct or (2) to have procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value or (3) to be the leader of a drug trafficking network, as defined in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3, and who, in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3, commanded or by threat or promise solicited the commission of the offense. In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right . . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation . . . .