Case Title: Ex Parte Leo

Citation: 480 So. 2d 572

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1985-09-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
480 So. 2d 572 (1985)
Ex parte: Mary LEO, d/b/a The Leo Agency.
(Re: MARY LEO, INC.; Mary Leo, d/b/a Leo Agency, a sole proprietorship, et al. v. Charles D. NEILL).
No. 83-1372.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 13, 1985.
*573 Gary V. Conchin of Higgs & Conchin, Huntsville, for petitioner.
William K. Bell of Lammons, Bell & Sneed, Huntsville, for respondent.
ADAMS, Justice.
This is a case involving the fraudulent sale of a house. Defendant, Mary Leo, petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari following the Court of Civil Appeals' affirmance, 480 So. 2d 570, of the trial court's denial of her motion for summary judgment, directed verdict, and post trial motions in favor of plaintiff-appellee, Charles Neill. The trial court had entered a $7,500.00 judgment based upon a jury verdict for plaintiff Charles Neill.
Leo contends that the Court of Civil Appeals erred by affirming the trial court's denial of her summary judgment and directed verdict motions. We agree, and reverse.
Charles Neill purchased a used house in Huntsville, Alabama, on April 12, 1979, for $61,000.00. Mary Leo, d/b/a the Leo Agency, was the real estate listing broker for the house Neill purchased. Stan Erwin, a real estate salesperson and friend of Neill, showed the house to Neill.
In July 1984, after living in the house for over three and one-half years, Neill discovered that the house contained 1,976 square feet of living area and 332 square feet of garage area. Soon after Neill's discovery, he filed suit against Leo, charging that Leo had fraudulently misrepresented the square footage of the house he purchased. Neill's allegations are based upon a notation printed in a multiple listing service booklet shown to him by Erwin, which listed the square footage of the house as 2,300 square feet of living space and 390 square feet of garage area. Leo prepared the listing that was published, including the square footage notation, based upon calculations and measurements made by her husband. Leo moved for summary judgment. This motion was denied, as were Leo's subsequent motions for directed verdict, JNOV, and new trial.
Leo argues that Neill failed to present sufficient evidence to support an action against her for fraudulent misrepresentation of the square footage of the house Neill purchased. A careful, extensive examination of the record leads us to the same conclusion.
At the outset, we note that:
Armstrong v. Life Ins. Co. of Virginia, 454 So. 2d 1377, 1379 (Ala.1984).
Neill's complaint is grounded upon Code 1975, § 6-5-101, which defines legal fraud:
As we noted in Roney v. Ray, 436 So. 2d 875, 877 (Ala.1983):
We think that Neill's action fails because of the complete lack of credible evidence of the third element of this tort, namely, reliance.
Speaking to the element of reliance, this Court, in Marshall v. Crocker, 387 So. 2d 176, 178, (Ala.1980), quoting Jordan & Sons v. Pickett, 78 Ala. 331 (1884), opined:
78 Ala. at 338.
Although Neill testified that the square footage of the house he purchased was important to him and that he relied upon the square footage notation in the multiple listing booklet, we find that this evidence is conclusively negated by Neill's own actions and words, as well as other evidence found in the record.
The record discloses that prior to signing the sales contract, Neill inspected the house on four or five occasions. He visited the house another four or five times prior to closing and was given a key which gave him unlimited access to the house.
In addition to making thorough inspections of the house, Neill actually measured several of the rooms. He measured the master bedroom because, he said, "the master bedroom didn't look as large as what it indicated in the book." Erwin accompanied Neill on his visits to the house and assisted Neill with the measurements.
Erwin testified that the two men measured the master bedroom and the garage and that they talked about the garage size in relation to total square footage. Furthermore, Erwin stated that he offered to check on the square footage with Leo and told Neill to satisfy himself as to the suitability of the house, including square footage. Erwin testified that Neill responded "No, I like the house. Let's go on with it."
Neill's own testimony negates any finding of reliance upon the listed square footage:
We think that this evidence compels no other finding but that Neill did not rely upon the figures in the multiple listing booklet, but, rather, relied upon his own *576 meticulous inspection of the property to satisfy any reservations he may have entertained. There is no evidence that had Neill known of the area discrepancy prior to the purchase that he would not have consummated the deal, but the evidence does establish that his purchase was motivated by a multitude of other factors.
Even if reliance by Neill could be supported by the record before us, such reliance would not be justified under these facts.
Cook v. Brown, 393 So. 2d 1016, 1019 (Ala. Civ.App.1981). Moreover, in Marshall, supra, we reiterated:
387 So. 2d  at 179, quoting Jordan & Sons v. Pickett, supra. Although the fraud in Marshall was that of concealment of a material fact, we find the principle espoused therein equally applicable to the fraudulent misrepresentation alleged in the present case. Following this same premise, the court in Marshall v. Keaveny, 38 N.C.App. 644, 650, 248 S.E.2d 750, 754 (1978), a case factually close in point to the instant case, held:
Neill was given every opportunity to inspect and measure the house. His access was unlimited. He inspected the house on numerous occasions and measured at least a portion of the house because he was suspicious about the square footage listing. In addition, Neill was learned in real estate transactions, having previously purchased residential rental property. We think these facts, considered with those previously set out, preclude a case of actionable fraud.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals and remand the cause to that court.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
MADDOX, JONES, ALMON and BEATTY, JJ., concur.
TORBERT, C.J., recused.
SHORES and EMBRY, JJ., not sitting.