Case Title: Wieland v. Owner-Operator Services, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC96210

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2018-02-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
en banc 
AMIE WIELAND, 
  ) 
  ) 
Respondent, 
  ) 
  ) 
v. 
  ) 
No.  SC96210 
  ) 
OWNER-OPERATOR SERVICES, 
  ) 
INC.,  
  ) 
  ) 
Appellant. 
  ) 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY 
The Honorable Jack Grate, Judge 
Owner-Operator Services Inc. appeals the circuit court’s judgment in favor of Amie 
Wieland for her claim of negligence alleging her employer, Owner-Operator, breached its 
duty to protect her from the criminal act of a third person on its premises.  Owner-Operator 
argues the circuit court erred in submitting a verdict director to the jury that was not 
supported by substantial evidence and in allowing Wieland to make arguments to the jury 
that misstated the law as instructed in the verdict director.  The circuit court’s judgment is 
affirmed. 
I. Factual and Procedural History
Wieland was an Owner-Operator employee when she was served at her workplace 
with an ex parte order of protection sought and secured by Alan Lovelace, her ex-boyfriend.  
Opinion issued February 13, 2018
2 
 
Wieland told Owner-Operator’s director of human resources the allegations of harassment 
supporting the ex parte order of protection were acts Lovelace was committing against her, 
not vice versa.  Wieland told the director she was scared and felt threatened by Lovelace.  
The director asked Wieland to provide a description and photograph of Lovelace, which 
Wieland did.  The director gave the description and photograph to the supervisor of the 
front desk receptionists to disseminate.  The director also told her supervisor and Owner-
Operator’s volunteer safety team about the situation.   
 
Two weeks later, Wieland attended the court hearing set to consider the order of 
protection, and the case was dismissed after Lovelace failed to appear.  Wieland returned 
to work that same day and told the director she was “fearful” but did not know if Lovelace 
would show up to her workplace.  When Wieland left work that day, she encountered 
Lovelace lying in wait inside her vehicle parked in the employee parking lot.  As Wieland 
attempted to walk away from Lovelace, he shot her in the back of the head. 
 
Wieland survived the attack and filed a petition alleging negligence against Owner-
Operator, contending the business breached its duty of care to protect her against the 
criminal act of a third person on its premises.  At trial, Wieland offered evidence of Owner-
Operator’s internal safety protocol in place when an employee reports concerns of a 
potential threat from a known person.  In addition to the actions taken after Wieland 
expressed concern about her safety, Owner-Operator’s internal protocol included other 
precautions Owner-Operator did not undertake, such as offering Wieland a parking space 
in the visitor’s parking lot (which was by the front entrance of the building and in view of 
the receptionist desk) and offering an escort to Wieland’s vehicle by a member of the 
3 
 
volunteer safety team.  There was also evidence establishing Owner-Operator had security 
cameras surveilling the employee parking lot, but those cameras were not actively 
monitored, even after Wieland’s reported concerns.  The security cameras recorded 
Lovelace entering the employee parking lot and Wieland’s vehicle approximately one hour 
before he attacked Wieland.   
In making her case to the jury, Wieland primarily argued Owner-Operator failed to 
take reasonable precautions before Lovelace entered the employee parking lot that could 
have led to the discovery of Lovelace when he entered the parking lot.  The verdict director 
submitted to the jury read: 
 
Your verdict must be for plaintiff Amie Wieland if you believe: 
 
First, that Alan Lovelace was present in defendant’s parking lot on 
November 20, 2012 and he posed a danger to plaintiff, and 
 
Second, that defendant knew or by using ordinary care could have 
known that Alan Lovelace was in its parking lot and posed a danger to 
plaintiff, and 
 
Third, that defendant failed to use ordinary care to notify law 
enforcement authorities when the risk of danger to plaintiff became apparent, 
and 
 
Fourth, that defendant was thereby negligent, and 
 
Fifth, that sufficient time existed within which to prevent injury to 
plaintiff after defendant knew or by using ordinary care could have known 
that Alan Lovelace was in its parking lot and posed a danger to plaintiff, and 
 
Sixth, such negligence of defendant combined with the acts of Alan 
Lovelace to directly cause damage to plaintiff. 
 
The jury found in Wieland’s favor and awarded her $3,250,000 in damages.  The 
circuit court entered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict.  Owner-Operator then 
4 
 
filed a motion for new trial, which the circuit court overruled.  Owner-Operator appealed 
and, after opinion by the court of appeals, this Court transferred the case pursuant to article 
V, § 10 of the Missouri Constitution.  
II. Submissibility of the Verdict Director 
 
In any action for negligence, a plaintiff must establish the defendant owed a duty of 
care to the plaintiff, the defendant breached that duty, and the defendant’s breach 
proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury.  L.A.C. ex rel. D.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping 
Ctr. Co., L.P., 75 S.W.3d 247, 257 (Mo. banc 2002).  “The touchstone for the creation of 
a duty is foreseeability.”  Id. (internal quotations omitted).  “A duty to protect against the 
criminal acts of third parties is generally not recognized because such activities are rarely 
foreseeable.”  Id.  However, this Court has recognized “two ‘special facts and 
circumstances’ exceptions to the rule that businesses generally have no duty to protect 
invitees from criminal acts of third persons.”  Id.  This appeal concerns the differences 
between these exceptions and Owner-Operator’s allegation of error regarding the 
distinctions between these exceptions. 
In recognizing the two exceptions to the “no duty” rule, this Court essentially 
adopted the rule established by § 344, comment f, of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.  
See Madden v. C & K Barbecue Carryout, Inc., 758 S.W.2d 59, 62 (Mo. banc 1988).  That 
rule provides: 
Duty to police premises.  Since the possessor is not an insurer of the visitor’s 
safety, he is ordinarily under no duty to exercise any care until he knows 
or has reason to know that the acts of the third person are occurring, or 
are about to occur.  He may, however, know or have reason to know, from 
past experience, that there is a likelihood of conduct on the part of third 
5 
 
persons in general which is likely to endanger the safety of the visitor, even 
though he has no reason to expect it on the part of any particular individual.  
If the place or character of his business, or his past experience, is such that 
he should reasonably anticipate careless or criminal conduct on the part of 
third persons, either generally or at some particular time, he may be under a 
duty to take precautions against it, and to provide a reasonably sufficient 
number of servants to afford a reasonable protection.  
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 cmt. f (emphasis added).   
As further explained: 
The [rule] underscores two rather different situations in which the duty may 
arise.  The first is when the defendant knows, or has reason to know, that 
a third party is harming or is about to harm an entrant.  At this point the 
defendant may be able to protect the entrant only by warning him, 
summoning the police or utilizing already available security measures.  The 
second is when the nature of defendant’s business or past experience 
provides a basis for the reasonable anticipation on defendant’s part that 
the criminal activity of third persons might put entrants at risk.  In this 
class of cases the defendant may be liable for failing to adopt security 
measures which might have kept the third person from inflicting harm upon 
the entrant.  The distinction between these categories is significant, because 
the duty to foresee a general risk of criminal activity and to take steps to 
safeguard entrants from it may require substantial expenditures on the part 
of the possessor. 
 
The Law of Premises Liability § 11.03[1], 11-6 (emphasis added) (internal footnotes 
omitted).   
Notably, the Restatement’s rule is phrased in terms of “knows or has reason to 
know.”  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344, cmt. f.  Unlike “should know” or “could 
know,” “reason to know” creates no duty of care on the part of the business to preemptively 
discover the facts in question; rather, “reason to know” means a duty of care arises only 
after the business has information from which a reasonable actor would infer those facts.  
See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 12 cmt. a. 
6 
 
 
Accordingly, this Court has explained, “Under the first exception, ‘the duty may 
arise when a person, known to be violent, is present on the premises or an individual is 
present who has conducted himself so as to indicate danger and sufficient time exists to 
prevent injury.’”  L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d at 257.   Because the first exception concerns when a 
business knows or has reason to know a specific third person is both (1) on its premises 
and (2) dangerous, no duty of care arises until after that specific person has entered the 
business’s premises.  See id. at 257, 263; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 344 cmt. f and 
§ 12 cmt. a; The Law of Premises Liability § 11.03[1], 11-6. 
 
In contrast, the second exception “recognizes ‘a duty [on the part of business 
owners] to protect their invitees from the criminal attacks of unknown third persons’ under 
certain special circumstances.”  L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d at 257 (emphasis added).  Because the 
second exception concerns when a business knows or has reason to know of dangerous 
persons in general frequenting its premises, a duty of care arises without regard to any 
specific person entering the business’s premises. See id. at 257–58; Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 344 cmt. f and § 12 cmt. a; The Law of Premises Liability § 11.03[1], 11-6.  In 
other words, with the second exception, the business is tasked with taking “precautionary 
actions to protect its business invitees against the criminal activities of unknown third 
parties.”  L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d at 258. 
While Owner-Operator notes the distinctions between the two exceptions to the “no 
duty” rule, it does not allege in its first point on appeal that the verdict director failed to 
properly submit the elements of the first exception, as it argued in the circuit court.  In its 
first point on appeal, Owner-Operator argues the circuit court erred in submitting the 
7 
 
verdict director but alleges this error occurred because the submission was based on the 
first exception,1 which it alleges was not supported by substantial evidence.  Owner-
Operator contends Wieland’s evidence did not support the circuit court’s verdict director 
because her evidence focused only on precautions Owner-Operator could have taken 
before Lovelace entered the employee parking lot and, pursuant to the substantive law of 
the first exception, it had no duty of care until after Lovelace entered the employee parking 
lot.   
Owner-Operator is correct that “[a]ny issue submitted to the jury in an instruction 
must be supported by substantial evidence ‘from which the jury could reasonably find such 
issue.’”  Hayes v. Price, 313 S.W.3d 645, 650 (Mo. banc 2010).  Owner-Operator, 
however, did not raise this instructional challenge either during the instructions conference 
or in its motion for new trial, and so it has not been preserved for appellate review.  See 
Rules 70.03 and 78.07(a); Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 410 S.W.3d 623, 
640 (Mo. banc 2013).   
During the instructions conference and in its motion for new trial, Owner-Operator 
argued the language of the verdict director misstated the substantive law for the first 
exception because it imposed a duty of care on Owner-Operator before Lovelace entered 
the premises.  But, on appeal, Owner-Operator has changed its argument.  Owner-Operator 
no longer claims the language used in the verdict director was incorrect.  To the contrary, 
                                              
1  Wieland did not specify at trial whether she was submitting her claim pursuant to the 
first exception or the second exception.  However, because Lovelace was a known third 
person, Owner-Operator’s duty of care to Wieland would appear to be based on the first 
exception.   
8 
 
Owner-Operator expressly abandons any challenge to the language of the verdict director.  
Instead, Owner-Operator argues in its first point Wieland failed to present substantial 
evidence to support the verdict director based on the first exception.  Owner-Operator did 
argue in its motion for new trial that if the verdict director were based on the second 
exception, then it was not supported by substantial evidence because there was no evidence 
of prior violent crimes on Owner-Operator’s premises.  This argument, of course, is not 
the same argument Owner-Operator now makes on appeal.2  For these reasons, the 
allegation of error made in Owner-Operator’s first point on appeal has not been properly 
preserved. 
Even if Owner-Operator’s first point had been preserved for appeal, its argument is 
meritless.  Owner-Operator and the dissent mistakenly compare the evidence submitted at 
trial to the substantive law rather than to the language of the verdict director.  Owner-
Operator and the dissent argue there was no substantial evidence to support the verdict 
director because Wieland’s evidence focused only on precautions Owner-Operator could 
have taken before Lovelace entered the parking lot and, pursuant to the substantive law of 
the first exception, Owner-Operator had no duty of care until after Lovelace entered the 
parking lot.  This reasoning would be appropriate if Owner-Operator were arguing 
Wieland’s claim was not submissible.  Rather than arguing Wieland’s claim was not 
                                              
2  This does not amount to mere “parsing of words,” as the dissent suggests.  Because 
Owner-Operator did not specifically argue in its motion for new trial that there was no 
evidence to support the verdict director if it were based on the first exception, the circuit 
court was not given an opportunity to consider such an argument. See Smith, 410 S.W.3d 
at 640 (“The purpose of a motion for new trial is to give the circuit court the opportunity 
to correct its own errors without appellate court intervention.”) 
9 
 
submissible, Owner-Operator’s first point argues the verdict director was not submissible.  
Specifically, Owner-Operator’s first point asserts the actual verdict director submitted to 
the jury was not supported by substantial evidence.  Owner-Operator does not contend in 
its first point that a hypothetical verdict director flawlessly stating the substantive law was 
not supported by substantial evidence.  Therefore, Owner-Operator’s first point necessarily 
requires a comparison of the evidence introduced at trial to the language used in the verdict 
director actually submitted.3     
As is discussed in the analysis of Owner-Operator’s remaining points, though the 
verdict director must have been based on the first exception, the language of the verdict 
director suggests Owner-Operator had a duty of care before Lovelace entered the parking 
                                              
3  A submissibility-of-the-claim challenge argues the plaintiff’s claim should not go to the 
jury because substantial evidence does not support the claim as provided by the substantive 
law.  See, e.g., Sanders v. Ahmed, 364 S.W.3d 195, 208 (Mo. banc 2012).  A submissibility-
of-the-instruction challenge argues a specific instruction should not be given to the jury 
because substantial evidence does not support an issue as provided by that instruction.  See, 
e.g., Hayes, 313 S.W.3d at 650.  The former compares the evidence with the substantive 
law, while the latter compares the evidence specifically with the instruction. A 
submissibility-of-the-claim challenge is an attempt to have a claim outright disposed of 
and, therefore, must be raised in a motion for directed verdict and renewed in a motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict.   See Sanders, 364 S.W.3d at 207-08; Rule 72.01.  
In contrast, a submissibility-of-the-instruction challenge must be raised at the instructions 
conference and renewed in a motion for new trial.  See Rule 70.03.  Both at trial and on 
appeal, Owner-Operator appears to have conflated these two distinct challenges.  Owner-
Operator properly raised a submissibility-of-the-claim challenge in a motion for directed 
verdict but then failed to renew that challenge in a motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict and instead renewed the challenge at the instructions conference—which neither 
preserved the submissibility-of-the-claim challenge nor transformed it into a 
submissibility-of-the-instruction challenge.  Now, on appeal, Owner-Operator purports to 
raise a submissibility-of-the-instruction challenge but improperly compares the evidence 
to the substantive law rather than to the language of the verdict director. 
 
10 
 
lot.  Pursuant to the language actually used in the verdict director, the jury could have 
considered evidence of Owner-Operator’s failure to take precautions before Lovelace 
entered the parking lot.  Although Wieland’s evidence may not have supported a 
hypothetical verdict director flawlessly stating the substantive law for the first exception, 
Wieland’s evidence supported the verdict director actually submitted to the jury.  The 
dissent even acknowledges this, stating:  
The jury should only have considered what [Owner-Operator] knew or could 
have known after Lovelace’s arrival.  By submitting this verdict director, the 
trial court permitted the jury to impermissibly speculate about what [Owner-
Operator] could have known before Lovelace entered the property and enter 
a verdict based upon inadequate evidence.  This was error. 
 
Slip op. at 10 (emphasis in original). 
   
The “error” identified by the dissent is not that the verdict director submitted to the 
jury was not supported by substantial evidence as argued by Owner-Operator, but rather 
that the language of the verdict director allowed the jury to consider evidence irrelevant 
to the first exception.  Indeed, the dissent makes abundantly clear it is treating Owner-
Operator’s substantial-evidence challenge as a challenge to the language of the verdict 
director.  But these are wholly distinct challenges.4  See Deckard v. Webster Cnty., 467 
                                              
4  For example, the dissent states, “Because the verdict director did not instruct the jury to 
only consider evidence after Lovelace arrived, it failed to properly instruct on this [first] 
exception.” Slip op. at 6 (emphasis in original).  The verdict director’s failure to properly 
instruct does not mean it was not supported by substantial evidence.  The dissent also 
reasons Owner-Operator preserved its first point on appeal because, at both the instructions 
conference and in its motion for new trial, Owner-Operator argued the verdict director “did 
not accurately state the law” and “was worded incorrectly.”  But these are arguments that 
the verdict director misstated the law rather than arguments that the verdict director was 
not supported by substantial evidence. 
11 
 
S.W.3d 283, 290 (Mo. App. 2015); Roy v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 43 S.W.3d 351, 363 (Mo. 
App. 2001).   
Owner-Operator even differentiates these two distinct challenges.  In the midst of 
making a substantial-evidence challenge in its first point, Owner-Operator expressly 
abandons any challenge to the language of the verdict director, stating in its brief that “the 
language of [the verdict director] is not being challenged in this appeal on the basis that it 
did not properly instruct upon the elements of the [first] exception.”  While this Court is 
required by rule to disregard Owner-Operator’s abandoned challenge to the language of 
the verdict director, the dissent elects to revive it under the guise of a substantial-evidence 
challenge.5  See Rule 84.13(a) (stating “allegations of error not briefed or not properly 
briefed shall not be considered in any civil appeal”).  It is not this Court’s role to make an 
appellant’s argument.  See, e.g., Manzara v. State, 343 S.W.3d 656, 659 n.8 (Mo. banc 
2011).  This ensures the opposing party has proper notice and opportunity to respond and 
brief the argument.  Point I is denied.      
 
 
                                              
5  In doing so, the dissent also fails to appreciate Owner-Operator never proffered a correct 
verdict director itself.  The verdict director proffered by Owner-Operator required the jury 
to find “defendant knew that Alan Lovelace was present in defendant’s parking lot.”  As 
explained above, the first exception concerns when a defendant knew or had reason to 
know a dangerous person was on its premises.  Owner-Operator’s proffered verdict 
director omitted the “or had reason to know” language.  “[A]lthough a party is entitled to 
have its own instruction submitted to the jury if it is correct, this entitlement does not 
impose a duty on the trial court to draft a proper instruction when the parties fail to submit 
a correct instruction.”  Cluck v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 367 S.W.3d 25, 34 (Mo. banc 
2012). 
 
12 
 
III. Wieland’s Arguments to the Jury 
Owner-Operator’s two remaining and preserved points on appeal both relate to 
Wieland’s arguments to the jury.  In its second point, Owner-Operator argues the circuit 
court erred in allowing Wieland to argue to the jury that Owner-Operator was negligent in 
failing to take precautions before Lovelace entered the parking lot because this misstated 
the law as instructed in the verdict director.  A party may not, in arguing to the jury, misstate 
“the law as submitted in the court’s instructions.”  State ex rel. Mo. Highway and 
Transp. Comm’n v. Our Savior Lutheran Church, 922 S.W.2d 816, 819 (Mo. App. 1996) 
(emphasis added).  In this case, the “law as submitted in the court’s instructions” was the 
language used in the verdict director.  As noted, on appeal, Owner-Operator does not argue 
the verdict director misstated the law.  For this reason, Owner-Operator is mistaken in 
arguing this Court should compare Wieland’s trial argument to the substantive law of the 
first exception.  The only question before this Court is whether Wieland’s trial argument 
misstated the law as it was stated in the verdict director.  See Barlett v. Kansas City S. 
Ry. Co., 854 S.W.2d 396, 400 (Mo. banc 1993).    
The relevant language in the verdict director simply stated “that defendant knew or 
by using ordinary care could have known that Alan Lovelace was in its parking lot.”  This 
express language of the verdict director was not so narrow as to specify Owner-Operator 
had no duty of care until after Lovelace entered the parking lot.  Nor did this language 
clearly instruct the jury not to consider Owner-Operator’s failure to take precautions that 
could have led to the discovery of Lovelace in the parking lot.  As such, Wieland’s trial 
argument—that the jury should consider precautions Owner-Operator did not undertake 
13 
 
pursuant to its protocol before Lovelace entered the parking lot—did not misstate the law 
as it was stated in the verdict director.  Whether the verdict director misstated the 
substantive law or otherwise misled the jury is a separate and distinct issue not raised by 
Owner-Operator on appeal.  Point II is denied. 
Similarly, in its third point on appeal, Owner-Operator argues the circuit court erred 
in allowing Wieland to argue to the jury that Owner-Operator breached a duty of care by 
failing to take precautions because this misstated the law as instructed in the verdict 
director in that the verdict director specified only one duty of care that Owner-Operator 
could have breached, a duty to notify law enforcement authorities.  As with Owner-
Operator’s second point, because it does not challenge on appeal the instructional language, 
the only question is whether Wieland’s trial argument misstated the law as it was stated in 
the verdict director.  See id.  Again, the relevant language in the verdict director stated “that 
defendant knew or by using ordinary care could have known that Alan Lovelace was in 
its parking lot” (emphasis added).   
The phrase “by using ordinary care could have known” necessarily imposed a duty 
of care on Owner-Operator to discover Lovelace’s presence.  See Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 12 cmt. a.  Otherwise, it would be irrelevant whether Owner-Operator could have 
discovered Lovelace’s presence “by using ordinary care” because Owner-Operator would 
not be tasked with using ordinary care absent a duty of care being imposed.  See id.  
Because the verdict director imposed this additional duty to use ordinary care to discover 
Lovelace’s presence (and without specifying whether that duty arose before or after 
Lovelace entered the parking lot), Wieland’s trial argument did not misstate the law as it 
14 
 
was stated in the verdict director.  And, as with Owner-Operator’s second point, whether 
the verdict director misstated the substantive law in imposing this additional duty is a 
separate and distinct issue not raised by Owner-Operator on appeal.  Point III is denied.  
IV. Conclusion 
 
The circuit court’s judgment is affirmed.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
  W. Brent Powell, Judge 
 
 
 
 
Fischer, C.J., Draper, Wilson and Stith, JJ., concur;  
Russell, J., dissents in separate opinion filed; 
Breckenridge, J., concurs in opinion of Russell, J. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
AMIE WIELAND,  
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
Respondent,  
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
No.  SC96210 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
OWNER-OPERATOR SERVICES,  
  ) 
INC.,  
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ) 
 
 
 
Appellant. 
 
  ) 
 
DISSENTING OPINION 
 
I respectfully dissent.  Although the majority opinion states the law correctly, I 
disagree with its conclusion that Owner-Operator (“Employer”) did not preserve its 
substantial evidence argument for appellate review.  Because Employer advanced exactly 
the same theory of error in its motion for new trial and its appellate brief and properly 
objected to the verdict director at the instructions conference, its claim that the verdict 
director was not supported by substantial evidence was properly preserved for appeal.  
Further, it was error for the circuit court to submit Amie Wieland’s (“Employee”) verdict 
director to the jury, as it was not supported by substantial evidence.  Actually, Employer 
did not know of any present danger to Employee until after she had been shot.  For these 
reasons, I would reverse the circuit court’s judgment and remand the case for a new trial. 
2 
 
I. 
Employer’s Argument was Preserved for Appellate Review 
The majority opinion asserts Employer did not preserve on appeal its claim that 
the verdict director was unsupported by substantial evidence.  This is not true.  It has 
been long-established that an issue is preserved for appellate review if it is based on the 
same theory as presented at trial.  Gateway Foam Insulators, Inc. v. Jokerst Paving & 
Contracting, Inc., 279 S.W.3d 179, 188-89 (Mo. banc 2009); Welch v. McNeely, 269 
S.W.2d 871, 875 (Mo. 1954) (enforcing “the long-established and salutary principle that 
this [C]ourt will review a case only upon the same theory upon which it was submitted in 
the trial court”).  In fact, the same theory was advanced in Employer’s motion for new 
trial and its appellate brief: the verdict director was not supported by substantial evidence 
and should not have been submitted to the jury.   
The majority opinion attempts to manufacture a distinction that is without a 
difference.  This parsing of words is inconsequential because Employer advanced the 
same theory on appeal to this Court as it did in its motion for new trial.  Throughout the 
proceedings, Employer consistently asserted, whether due to its incorrect wording or the 
sheer lack of evidentiary support, that the verdict director was not supported by 
substantial evidence.  Legal writing is not an exacting science, and this Court does not 
require a party to use identical argument language throughout the proceedings.  Though 
the arguments in the motion for new trial and appellate briefs are admittedly worded 
differently, they advance the same substantive theory.   
In its appellate brief, Employer asserted the evidence adduced at trial was 
insufficient to give Employee’s verdict director, which submitted a recovery theory under 
3 
 
the known-person exception.1  As the majority opinion sets out, a duty arises under this 
exception after the known party has entered the business premises.  Employer contends 
on appeal “there was no evidence from which the jury could find that [Employer]: 
(1) actually knew; or (2) using ordinary care, could have known that Lovelace was in the 
parking lot in time to have called law enforcement authorities to prevent the shooting,” as 
required by Employee’s verdict director.  App. Brief at 38.  Employer clearly argued 
“there was no substantial evidence supporting” the verdict director and, by submitting 
this verdict director, the trial court erred.  App. Brief at 44. 
Similarly, in its motion for a new trial, Employer also made a substantial evidence 
argument.  First, it asserted that Employee’s verdict director did not accurately state the 
law on either the known-person exception or the unknown-person exception.  It raised 
instructional error as to both theories.  “Since it is not clear from the record on which 
theory of recovery [Employee’s] claim was being submitted … [Employer] asserts 
instructional error as to both.”  L.F. 110.  Employer asserted in its motion that the verdict 
director was worded incorrectly and allowed the jury to consider Employer’s actions 
before Lovelace entered the premises, which had the effect of allowing the jury to “find a 
causal link . . . based upon circumstances other than those that existed at the time 
Lovelace entered the parking lot ….”  L.F. 115-16 (emphasis added).  Further, the verdict 
director “allowed the jury to impermissibly speculate what [Employer] could have known 
                                              
1 The majority opinion refers to this exception as the “first exception.”  The “second exception,” 
or the unknown-person exception, imposes a duty on businesses that do not know of a third 
party’s presence but, due to prior similar incidents, have reason to know that third persons may 
put their invitees at risk.  The Law of Premises Liability § 11.03[1], 11-6.   
4 
 
had it taken security precautions [before Lovelace arrived].”  L.F. 116 (emphasis added).  
Employer argued that the effect of the verdict director was to allow the jury to reach a 
verdict based upon speculation and conjecture.  In other words, it argued the verdict 
director was unsupported by evidence, as was argued in Employer’s appellate brief.   
This Court has a substantial interest in judicial efficiency and ensuring arguments 
are properly preserved, but it has an equally important interest in ensuring that verdicts 
are supported by substantial evidence and that justice is served.  Here, the verdict director 
was not supported by substantial evidence.  This Court should prioritize substance over 
form and find the argument is preserved. 
Further, Employer made the requisite objection to Employee’s proffered verdict 
director during the instructions conference as required by Rule 70.03.  Under this rule, a 
party must state “distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection.”  
Rule 70.03.  Employer urged the trial court to submit an alternate verdict director 
expressly limiting the jury to consider only what steps Employer could have taken after it 
knew of Lovelace’s presence on the parking lot.  Employer argued:  
The plaintiff correctly [acknowledged] there has to be a paragraph in there 
about sufficient time to act on the part of the defendant, after they should 
have either known he was violent or that his conduct[,] after they became 
aware of him[,] indicated danger that there was sufficient time after that to 
have prevented the shooting by Alan Lovelace.  So what we put in there 
[i.e., proffered to the court in its instruction] is [Paragraph] Third: that 
sufficient time existed thereafter.  Meaning after they became aware of 
[Lovelace]. 
 
Tr. 1204-05 (emphasis added).  Employer also sufficiently stated the grounds for its 
objection – that the verdict director failed to comport with the known-person exception 
5 
 
by asking “the jury to consider things that are outside the scope” of the exception.  Tr. 
1192-93.  Employer made clear that Employee’s instruction, which failed to limit the 
evidence to be considered under the known-person exception, improperly allowed 
evidence of what Employer knew or could have known before Lovelace entered the 
property.  Employer clearly objected by stating, “we object to their proposed instruction.”  
Tr. 1208.  Because the issue is properly before this Court, its merits should be addressed.2 
II. 
The Verdict Director Was Not Supported by Substantial Evidence 
“Any issue submitted to the jury in an instruction must be supported by substantial 
evidence ‘from which the jury could reasonably find such issue.’”  Hayes v. Price, 313 
S.W.3d 645, 650 (Mo. banc 2010).  “Substantial evidence is evidence which, if true, is 
probative of the issues and from which the jury can decide the case.”  Id.  The verdict 
director submitted by Employee was intended to be based on the known-person 
exception.  For this exception to apply, the claimant must establish (1) the business owner 
knew of the third party’s presence, (2) the business owner knew the third party presented 
danger, and (3) there was sufficient time for the business owner to protect its invitees.  
L.A.C. ex rel. D.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Ctr. Co., L.P., 75 S.W.3d 247, 257 (Mo. 
banc 2002).  Under this exception, a business owner has a duty to protect its invitees from 
foreseeable dangers brought by a known third party after that known party has entered 
                                              
2 The majority opinion’s refusal to reach the merits in this case serves only to confuse business 
premises liability law in Missouri. 
6 
 
the business property.  No duty exists before the dangerous person has entered the 
business premises.3   
Both parties agree the applicable duty of care in this case is based upon what 
Employer knew or could have known after Lovelace entered the property (the known-
person exception).  Because the verdict director did not instruct the jury to only consider 
evidence after Lovelace arrived, it failed to properly instruct on this exception.  The 
verdict director required a finding in Employee’s favor if the jury found (1) Employer 
knew – or “by using ordinary care[,] could have known” – that Lovelace was on its 
property and posed a danger to Employee, (2) Employer failed to use ordinary care to 
notify law enforcement when the danger became apparent, and (3) there was sufficient 
time for Employer to take some action to prevent that danger.  Accordingly, under the 
known-person exception, the appropriateness of the verdict director turns on whether 
there was substantial evidence that, after Lovelace had entered Employer’s parking lot, 
Employer knew or could have known of his presence and of the danger he posed and 
there was sufficient time for Employer to take some action to protect Employee. 
The majority opinion posits that Employer’s argument – that the verdict director 
was not supported by substantial evidence – is appropriate only if making a 
submissibility-of-the-claim-argument, but not if making a submissibility-of-the-
instruction argument.  Employer did not file a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict as required to make a submissibility-of-the-claim argument.  Sanders v. Ahmed, 
                                              
3 A duty only exists before the danger arises under the unknown-person exception. 
7 
 
364 S.W.3d 195, 207-08 (Mo. banc 2012).  It did, however, make the requisite objections 
at the instruction conference and in its motion for new trial and appellate brief to preserve 
a submissibility-of-the-instruction argument.   
The majority opinion classifies a submissibility-of-the-instruction challenge as an 
argument that an instruction should not be given because substantial evidence does not 
support an issue as provided by that instruction.  Slip op. at 9, n. 3.  Despite the verdict 
director incorrectly instructing the jury, the majority opinion compares the mistaken 
verdict director language to the evidence adduced at trial and finds there was substantial 
evidence to support it.  In effect, the majority opinion holds that even though the verdict 
director is contrary to Missouri law, the Court is constrained in its analysis to considering 
only whether the evidence adduced at trial, relevant or not, supports this incorrect verdict 
director.  Here, though the verdict director did not properly instruct the jury on the 
substantive law of the known-person exception, the majority opinion elects to disregard 
this error in favor of evaluating the evidence under an incorrect legal standard.   
The majority opinion cites to Hayes to support the proposition that this Court must 
compare the evidence to the language of the verdict director and, in so doing, disregard 
the verdict director’s incorrect recitation of the elements of a claim.  That is a 
misstatement of Hayes.  Though Hayes does suggest the verdict director language should 
be compared to the evidence adduced at trial, unlike in this case, there was no dispute in 
Hayes that the proffered jury instruction correctly stated the law.  313 S.W.3d at 649.   
The majority opinion also relies on State ex rel. Missouri Highway and 
Transportation Commission v. Our Savior Lutheran Church, 922 S.W.2d 816 (Mo. App. 
8 
 
1996), to further its argument that the evidence may only be compared to “the law as 
submitted in the court’s instructions.”  922 S.W.2d at 819.  But Our Savior Lutheran 
Church also does not bind this Court to the verdict director’s incorrect language.  The 
court of appeals found a closing statement’s misrepresentation of the law, which was 
immediately corrected, did not result in prejudice to the opposing party due to repeated 
iterations of the correct law throughout the trial, including jury instructions accurately 
stating the law.  Id.  Indeed, the majority opinion’s chosen authority does not guide this 
Court to analyze a substantial evidence argument using a verdict director that clearly 
includes issues that are not correct elements of the submitted claim. 
But even making a comparison between the verdict director language and the 
evidence adduced at trial, the verdict director here was unsupported by substantial 
evidence because the evidence relevant to whether a duty exists after the known person 
enters the business premises is limited by the substantive law of the known-person 
exception.4  This Court has found prejudicial error in the submission of a verdict director 
that did not adequately instruct the jury on the substantive law.  Hervey v. Mo. Dept. of. 
Corr., 379 S.W.3d 156 (Mo. banc 2012) (finding reversible error when verdict director 
did not require jury to find essential element of claim).  “An instruction must be a correct 
statement of law.”  Spring v. Kansas City Area Transp. Auth., 873 S.W.2d 224, 226 (Mo. 
banc 1994).  To the extent a verdict director is not consistent with the law, it should not 
be given.  See, e.g., Clark v. Mo. & N. Ark. R.R. Co., 157 S.W.3d 665, 672 (Mo. App. 
                                              
4 In Hayes, though the Court compared the evidence with the jury instruction language, it did so 
keeping in mind the relevant substantive law.  313 S.W.3d at 650.   
9 
 
2004) (“If an instruction following MAI conflicts with the substantive law, any court 
should decline to follow MAI.”); State v. Beck, 167 S.W.3d 767, 778 (Mo. App. 2005), 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Bolden, 371 S.W.3d 802 (Mo. banc 2012) (“[T]o 
be in ‘proper form’ means that the instruction given must comport with substantive 
law.”).  Plaintiffs should not be allowed to recover on a basis unsupported by the relevant 
substantive law.   
The verdict director, erroneously written, cannot invalidate the law governing this 
case.  The only relevant evidence at trial – and the only evidence that may be considered 
here – is evidence of whether Employer knew or could have known of Lovelace’s 
presence after he entered the property.  There was no evidence Employer knew or could 
have known Lovelace was on its property before Employee was shot.5  Lovelace 
surreptitiously entered the parking lot, hid in Employee’s car, and shot her as she was 
leaving work.  No other employee observed Lovelace on the premises, and security 
camera footage went unobserved.  It was not until Lovelace shot Employee that his 
presence was within Employer’s knowledge, and there was no evidence, much less 
substantial evidence, to support a submission of a claim that Employer breached its duty 
to act after this occurred.  It was error to instruct the jury with Employee’s verdict 
director. 
                                              
5 Evidence from before Lovelace’s arrival on the property does not establish Employer knew or 
could have known of his presence on the premises at the time of the shooting.  After all, it was 
Lovelace who obtained a temporary restraining order against Employee, and not the other way 
around. 
10 
 
Employee nevertheless argues Employer breached its ordinary duty of care by 
neglecting to enforce its precautionary internal protocols, and the evidence she presented 
involved these omissions.  But these measures were steps that could have been taken 
before Lovelace entered the property.  Under the known-person exception, Employer was 
under no duty to take precautionary measures, as its duty did not arise until after 
Lovelace entered the property and his danger was known.  The Law of Premises Liability 
§ 11.03[1], 11-6.  This evidence cannot be considered, and, accordingly, it is not evidence 
that is “probative of the issues and from which the jury can decide the case.”    
 
Employer, having no legal duty to take precautionary measures set out in its 
protocol, was unaware of Lovelace’s presence when he entered the parking lot.  And 
because it had no such duty, it was error to allow the jury to consider whether Employer 
could have known of Lovelace’s presence before he entered the premises, as it misled 
and confused the jury.6  The jury should only have considered what Employer knew or 
could have known after Lovelace’s arrival.  By submitting this verdict director, the trial 
court permitted the jury to impermissibly speculate about what Employer could have 
known before Lovelace entered the property and enter a verdict based upon inadequate 
evidence.  This was error. 
 
 
                                              
6 A verdict should be reversed if the offending jury instruction “misdirected, misled, or confused 
the jury, resulting in prejudicial error.”  Harvey v. Washington, 95 S.W.3d 93, 97 (Mo. banc 
2003). 
11 
 
Conclusion 
For these reasons, I would reverse the circuit court’s judgment and remand for a 
new trial. 
 
 
______________________________ 
Mary R. Russell, Judge