Case Title: State v. Pal

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015AP001782-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2017-04-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
2017 WI 44 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP1782-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Sambath Pal, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(WI Ct. App. 2016 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 28, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
February 28, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Rock 
 
JUDGE: 
Richard T. Werner 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ROGGENSACK, C. J. concurs, joined by BRADLEY, R. 
G., J. (opinion filed). 
KELLY, J. concurs, joined by ABRAHAMSON, J. and 
BRADLEY, A. W., J. (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
      
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
and oral argument by Philip J. Brehm, Janesville. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by Daniel 
P. Lennington, deputy solicitor general, with whom on the brief 
was Misha Tseytlin, solicitor general and Brad D. Schimel, 
attorney general.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2017 WI 44
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2015AP1782-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2014CF766) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Sambath Pal, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
FILED 
 
APR 28, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
summary disposition of the court of appeals, State v. Pal, No. 
2015AP1782-CR, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2016), 
which affirmed the Rock County circuit court's1 judgment of 
conviction of defendant Sambath Pal ("Pal") and order denying 
Pal's motions for postconviction relief. 
¶2 
On April 20, 2014, Pal was involved in a traffic 
accident when his sport utility vehicle ("SUV") collided with a 
group of motorcyclists on a highway; two motorcyclists died from 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Richard T. Werner presided. 
No. 
2015AP1782-CR   
 
2 
 
the injuries they sustained in the crash.  Pal fled the accident 
scene, but was apprehended by the police a few days later.  He 
eventually pleaded guilty to two counts of hit and run resulting 
in death, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 346.67(1) (2013-14).2  The 
circuit court sentenced Pal to ten years of initial confinement 
and ten years of extended supervision for each count, with the 
term of imprisonment for the first count to be served 
consecutive to the term of imprisonment for the second count. 
¶3 
Before this court, Pal raises two challenges to his 
sentence.  First, Pal argues that he was unconstitutionally 
punished for two counts of hit and run resulting in death even 
though he only committed a single offense, his flight from the 
scene.  This is a multiplicity claim implicating double jeopardy 
and due process protections guaranteed by the state and federal 
constitutions.  Second, Pal argues that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion at sentencing by imposing 
an unduly harsh sentence.  Both the circuit court and the court 
of appeals rejected these arguments. 
¶4 
We conclude that Pal committed two offenses, not one, 
when he fled from the scene of his accident, and that the 
legislature authorized punishment for each offense.  It was 
therefore not unconstitutional for the circuit court to accept 
guilty pleas and sentence Pal for both counts of hit and run 
resulting in death.  We further conclude that the circuit court 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2013-14 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2015AP1782-CR   
 
3 
 
did not impose an unduly harsh sentence.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the decision of the court of appeals. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶5 
On 
April 
20, 
2014, 
at 
around 
8:00 
p.m., 
law 
enforcement officers and emergency responders were dispatched to 
a traffic accident near Janesville in Rock County, Wisconsin.  
Witnesses reported that an SUV had swerved into the oncoming 
traffic lane near a curve in the highway, collided with a group 
of motorcyclists, and driven off without stopping.  Two 
motorcyclists lay in the middle of the road.  The first was 
found dead; the second was found alive but later succumbed to 
his injuries.  Using debris found at the scene, members of law 
enforcement were able to determine the likely make and model of 
the SUV that had caused the accident. 
¶6 
Pal, the driver of the SUV, never turned himself in.  
But 
on 
April 
24, 
2014, 
Pal's 
father, 
suspecting 
Pal's 
involvement in the accident, notified the Rock County 911 Center 
that Pal had been driving his father's SUV in Janesville on the 
date of the accident and that Pal had returned the vehicle 
damaged.  Law enforcement confirmed that the make and model of 
the SUV owned by Pal's father matched that of the vehicle they 
were seeking.  The damage to the SUV was also consistent with 
the debris that law enforcement had located at the accident 
scene.   
¶7 
The same day a detective spoke with Pal's girlfriend 
and her mother, both of whom lived in Janesville.  Together, 
their statements indicated that Pal drove a black SUV matching 
No. 
2015AP1782-CR   
 
4 
 
the description of the vehicle involved in the accident; that 
Pal had been staying at their house in Janesville on April 20, 
2014; that Pal had left the house around 7:20 p.m. that night to 
pick up his girlfriend from work; and that Pal had left his 
girlfriend's place of work alone3 around 7:40 p.m. with plans to 
purchase a bottle of wine and return to his girlfriend's house. 
It was about a three-minute drive from the scene of the accident 
to Pal's girlfriend's house.   
II.  PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
¶8 
On April 25, 2014, a criminal complaint was filed 
against Pal in Rock County circuit court charging him with two 
counts of hit and run resulting in death, one count for each of 
the 
deceased 
motorcyclists, 
in 
violation 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 346.67(1).  On May 16, 2014, an information was filed.  On 
July 31, 2014, Pal pleaded guilty to both counts.  
¶9 
On October 1, 2014, the circuit court sentenced Pal to 
ten years of initial confinement and ten years of extended 
supervision for each count, with the term of imprisonment for 
the first count to be served consecutive to the term of 
imprisonment for the second count.4  On October 3, 2014, a 
judgment of conviction was entered. 
                                                 
3 Pal's girlfriend claimed she had informed Pal when he 
arrived at her place of work that night that she was "going to 
work another shift." 
4 The circuit court also concluded that Pal was not eligible 
for the Challenge Incarceration Program or the Earned Release 
Program. 
No. 
2015AP1782-CR   
 
5 
 
¶10 On May 7, 2015, Pal filed motions for postconviction 
relief, arguing, as explained above, that the circuit court had 
erroneously exercised its discretion at sentencing and that the 
two counts to which he had pleaded guilty were multiplicitous.  
On August 7, 2015, the circuit court denied the motions on the 
record following a hearing.  On August 11, 2015, the circuit 
court signed a written order to that effect.  
¶11 On August 24, 2015, Pal filed a notice of appeal.  On 
April 8, 2016, the court of appeals summarily affirmed Pal's 
judgment of conviction and the order denying Pal's motions for 
postconviction relief.  Pal, No. 2015AP1782-CR, unpublished 
order.  On May 2, 2016, Pal filed a petition for review in this 
court.  On October 11, 2016, we granted the petition. 
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶12 Whether the two counts to which Pal pleaded guilty 
"are multiplicitous in violation of the federal and state 
constitutions is a question of law subject to our independent 
review."  State v. Ziegler, 2012 WI 73, ¶38, 342 Wis. 2d 256, 
816 
N.W.2d 238. 
 
Examination 
of 
this 
question 
requires 
interpretation and application of Wis. Stat. §§ 346.67(1) and 
346.74(5), which "present questions of law that this court 
reviews de novo while benefitting from the analyses of the court 
of appeals and circuit court."  Id., ¶37.  
¶13 Finally, "[w]e review a trial court's conclusion that 
a sentence it imposed was not unduly harsh and unconscionable 
for an erroneous exercise of discretion."  State v. Cummings, 
2014 WI 88, ¶45, 357 Wis. 2d 1, 850 N.W.2d 915 (emphasis 
No. 
2015AP1782-CR   
 
6 
 
omitted) (quoting State v. Grindemann, 2002 WI App 106, ¶30, 255 
Wis. 2d 632, 648 N.W.2d 507).  Pursuant to this standard, "[w]e 
will not set aside a discretionary ruling of the trial court if 
it appears from the record that the court applied the proper 
legal standards to the facts before it, and through a process of 
reasoning, reached a result which a reasonable judge could 
reach."  Id. (quoting Grindemann, 255 Wis. 2d 632, ¶30). 
 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 
A. Whether Pal Can Be Punished for Two Counts of  
Hit and Run Resulting in Death 
¶14 Pal's multiplicity claim is a claim that he received 
multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution5 and its 
counterpart in the Wisconsin Constitution.6  See Ziegler, 342 
Wis. 2d 256, ¶59.  We therefore examine whether the two counts 
for which Pal was sentenced actually pertain to the commission 
of a single offense.  See, e.g., State v. Derango, 2000 WI 89, 
¶28, 236 Wis. 2d 721, 613 N.W.2d 833.  We must determine whether 
the circuit court "impos[ed] a greater penalty than the 
legislature intended."  Id. 
                                                 
5 "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . ."  U.S. Const. 
amend. V. 
6 "[N]o person for the same offense may be put twice in 
jeopardy of punishment . . . ."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 8(1); 
State v. Davison, 2003 WI 89, ¶18, 263 Wis. 2d 145, 666 N.W.2d 1 
("Our tradition is to view [the state and federal double 
jeopardy] provisions as identical in scope and purpose."). 
No. 
2015AP1782-CR   
 
7 
 
¶15 "We review multiplicity claims according to a well-
established two-pronged methodology."  Ziegler, 342 Wis. 2d 256, 
¶60.  We first examine "whether the charged offenses are 
identical in law and fact."  State v. Trawitzki, 2001 WI 77, 
¶21, 244 Wis. 2d 523, 628 N.W.2d 801; State v. Davison, 2003 WI 
89, ¶43, 263 Wis. 2d 145, 666 N.W.2d 1.  If we conclude that the 
offenses are not identical in law and fact, we presume that the 
legislature 
authorized 
multiple 
punishments. 
 
State 
v. 
Patterson, 2010 WI 130, ¶15, 329 Wis. 2d 599, 790 N.W.2d 909.  
This presumption, however, may be rebutted "by clear evidence of 
contrary legislative intent."  Id., ¶17.  Under our case law, 
legislative intent in multiplicity cases is discerned through 
study of: "(1) all applicable statutory language; (2) the 
legislative history and context of the statutes; (3) the nature 
of the proscribed conduct; and (4) the appropriateness of 
multiple 
punishments 
for 
the 
conduct." 
 
Ziegler, 
342 
Wis. 2d 256, ¶63.  If the presumption is rebutted and this court 
concludes that the legislature did not authorize multiple 
punishments, then the defendant "has a legitimate due process 
claim."  Id., ¶62; see also Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶33 ("'The 
same offense' is the sine qua non of double jeopardy."). 
¶16 The basic issue before us today was addressed by the 
court of appeals in State v. Hartnek, 146 Wis. 2d 188, 430 
N.W.2d 361 (Ct. App. 1988).  The court of appeals concluded that 
in situations involving "a single event of failing to stop and 
render aid following an automobile accident," the State may 
assert multiple counts under Wis. Stat. § 346.67 if there are 
No. 
2015AP1782-CR   
 
8 
 
multiple victims.  Hartnek, 146 Wis. 2d at 191.  Pal agrees that 
"[t]he issue in Hartnek was essentially identical to the issue 
raised by [Pal] in this appeal," but urges us to overrule that 
case. 
¶17 We proceed to analyze Pal's claim.7  First, we conclude 
that the two offenses for which Pal was sentenced are not 
identical in fact.  Second, we conclude that Pal has not 
rebutted 
the 
presumption 
that 
the 
legislature 
authorized 
punishment 
for 
each 
offense. 
 
Consequently, 
it 
was 
not 
unconstitutional for the circuit court to accept guilty pleas 
and sentence Pal for both counts of hit and run resulting in 
death. 
¶18 We begin by setting out the language of the relevant 
statutes.  Wisconsin Stat. § 346.67(1) provides: 
The operator of any vehicle involved in an 
accident resulting in injury to or death of any person 
or in damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended 
by any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at 
the scene of the accident or as close thereto as 
possible but shall then forthwith return to and in 
every event shall remain at the scene of the accident 
until 
the 
operator 
has 
fulfilled 
the 
following 
requirements: 
(a)  The operator shall give his or her name, 
address and the registration number of the vehicle he 
or she is driving to the person struck or to the 
                                                 
7 On direct appeal, "a guilty plea relinquishes the right to 
assert a multiplicity claim when the claim cannot be resolved on 
the record."  State v. Kelty, 2006 WI 101, ¶2, 294 Wis. 2d 62, 
716 N.W.2d 886.  We agree with Pal that we can resolve his claim 
on the basis of the facts in the record.  
No. 
2015AP1782-CR   
 
9 
 
operator or occupant of or person attending any 
vehicle collided with; and 
(b)  The operator shall, upon request and if 
available, exhibit his or her operator's license to 
the person struck or to the operator or occupant of or 
person attending any vehicle collided with; and 
(c)  The operator shall render to any person 
injured 
in 
such 
accident 
reasonable 
assistance, 
including the carrying, or the making of arrangements 
for the carrying, of such person to a physician, 
surgeon or hospital for medical or surgical treatment 
if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary or 
if such carrying is requested by the injured person. 
Wis. Stat. § 346.67(1).8  Wisconsin Stat. § 346.74(5) provides 
the applicable penalties:  
Any 
person 
violating 
any 
provision 
of 
s. 346.67(1): 
(a)  Shall be fined not less than $300 nor more 
than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than 6 months or 
both if the accident did not involve death or injury 
to a person. 
(b)  May be fined not more than $10,000 or 
imprisoned for not more than 9 months or both if the 
accident involved injury to a person but the person 
did not suffer great bodily harm. 
(c)  Is guilty of a Class E felony if the 
accident involved injury to a person and the person 
suffered great bodily harm. 
(d)  Is guilty of a Class D felony if the 
accident involved death to a person. 
                                                 
8 Shortly before oral argument in this case, Pal brought to 
our attention that the legislature recently amended Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.67.  See 2015 Wis. Act 319.  Neither party contends that 
the new version of the statute is applicable.  Nor do the 
parties argue that the revisions overruled State v. Hartnek, 146 
Wis. 2d 188, 430 N.W.2d 361 (Ct. App. 1988). 
No. 
2015AP1782-CR   
 
10 
 
(e)  Is guilty of a felony if the accident 
involved death or injury to a person. 
Wis. Stat. § 346.74(5). 
¶19 The State concedes that the counts charged against Pal 
are identical in law because they derive from violations of the 
same statute.  See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d 739, 
747, 580 N.W.2d 329 (1998); Ziegler, 342 Wis. 2d 256, ¶66.  We 
therefore must determine whether the offenses are identical in 
fact, inquiring into whether "the acts . . . committed are 
sufficiently different in fact to demonstrate that separate 
crimes have been committed."  Ziegler, 342 Wis. 2d 256, ¶60. 
¶20 Pal argues that "each count . . . in this case charges 
exactly the same offense of leaving the scene of an accident 
causing the death of any person."  We do not agree.  The State 
did not simply charge Pal for his failure to stop his vehicle at 
the scene of the accident; it charged Pal for his failure to 
stop his vehicle at the scene of the accident until he had 
fulfilled his statutory obligations of providing information and 
assistance to each of the two victims he had hit with his 
vehicle.  Because Pal did not perform his statutorily-imposed 
duties with regard to each of two victims, the State charged Pal 
with two violations of the statute.9   
                                                 
9 We note that, as this case involves two motorcyclists, one 
could perhaps argue that this case involved more than one "scene 
of the accident" under Wis. Stat. § 346.67(1).  This argument, 
however, is not one that was made by the parties, either in 
briefing or at oral argument, and we decline to address it.   
No. 
2015AP1782-CR   
 
11 
 
¶21 The first count in the information filed in this case 
reads in part: 
[Pal] . . . being 
the 
operator 
of 
a 
vehicle 
involved in an accident resulting in death to [D.J.], 
did fail to immediately stop his own vehicle at the 
scene of said accident, or as close thereto as 
possible, and failed to remain at the scene of said 
accident 
until 
he 
fulfilled 
the 
following 
requirements, to-wit: provide name, address and the 
registration number of the vehicle he is driving to 
the person struck or to the operator or occupant of or 
person attending any vehicle collided with; upon 
request and if available, exhibit his operator's 
license to the person struck or to the operator or 
occupant of or person attending any vehicle collided 
with; or render to any person injured in such accident 
reasonable assistance, including the carrying, or the 
making of arrangements for the carrying, of such 
person to a physician, surgeon or hospital for medical 
or surgical treatment if it is apparent that such 
treatment 
is 
necessary 
or 
if 
such 
carrying 
is 
requested by the injured person . . . . 
(Emphasis added.)  The second count repeats these allegations, 
substituting the second victim's name for the first victim's 
name.  The State's prosecutorial approach in this case is 
consistent with our previous conclusion in State v. Rabe that 
"where the crime is against persons rather than property, there 
are, as a general rule, as many offenses as individuals 
affected."  State v. Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d 48, 68, 291 N.W.2d 809 
(1980). 
¶22 "[I]f the State were put to their proof" in this case, 
they would have to establish that Pal had failed to complete his 
statutory responsibilities with regard to each victim.  State v. 
Richter, 189 Wis. 2d 105, 109, 525 N.W.2d 168 (Ct. App. 1994).  
Thus, we conclude that the offenses charged are not identical in 
No. 
2015AP1782-CR   
 
12 
 
fact.  See, e.g., Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d at 53, 62-68 (four counts of 
homicide by intoxicated use of a vehicle were not identical in 
fact in case wherein defendant's vehicle collided with a second 
vehicle and two occupants in each car died); c.f., e.g., 
Richter, 189 Wis. 2d at 107-110 (three counts of bail jumping 
were not identical in fact in case wherein defendant violated, 
with a single phone call, three distinct bonds in three distinct 
cases).  
¶23 Because the two counts of hit and run resulting in 
death are not identical in fact, we presume that the legislature 
authorized 
punishment 
for 
each 
offense. 
 
Patterson, 
329 
Wis. 2d 599, ¶15.  Pal's attempts to rebut that presumption 
fail.  With regard to the text of the statute, Pal points to the 
repeated use of the word "any" in Wis. Stat. § 346.67(1) as 
support for his claim that once "any" person is injured or 
killed in an accident——regardless of the actual number of 
victims——Wis. Stat. § 346.67(1) is triggered and a defendant can 
be penalized only once for leaving that single qualifying 
accident scene.  See, e.g., § 346.67(1) (applying to "[t]he 
operator of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in 
injury to or death of any person or in damage to a vehicle which 
is driven or attended by any person" (emphases added)).   
¶24 Pal's argument fails when viewed in light of the text 
of the statute as a whole.  Under Wis. Stat. § 346.67(1), Pal 
owed a distinct set of duties to each of the two victims at the 
accident scene he fled.  Although stopping one's vehicle at the 
scene of the accident is certainly one of the obligations that 
No. 
2015AP1782-CR   
 
13 
 
§ 346.67(1) imposes, that requirement is manifestly in service 
of the statute's true focus: the operator's obligation to remain 
at the scene of the accident until the operator has fulfilled 
each of the enumerated statutory obligations owed to specified 
persons at the scene.  To take one example, the statute requires 
certain vehicle operators to "remain at the scene of the 
accident" in order to  
render 
to 
any 
person 
injured 
in 
such 
accident 
reasonable assistance, including the carrying, or the 
making of arrangements for the carrying, of such 
person to a physician, surgeon or hospital for medical 
or surgical treatment if it is apparent that such 
treatment 
is 
necessary 
or 
if 
such 
carrying 
is 
requested by the injured person. 
Wis. Stat. § 346.67(1)(c) (emphasis added).  Thus "a person who 
renders aid to three out of four injured persons is still 
exposed to liability under the statute."  Hartnek, 146 Wis. 2d 
at 194 (citing State v. Lloyd, 104 Wis. 2d 49, 62-63, 310 
N.W.2d 617 (Ct. App. 1981)).  Section 346.67(1)'s statement that 
it applies to "an accident resulting in injury to or death of 
any person or in damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended 
by any person" simply establishes the minimum threshold at which 
the statute is triggered; it does not limit the number of 
beneficiaries of the duties the statute imposes on specified 
vehicle operators.  § 346.67(1) (emphases added).  And, as 
stated above, "where the crime is against persons rather than 
property, there are, as a general rule, as many offenses as 
individuals affected."  Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d at 68.  Given this 
rule, and the statute's clear imposition of duties with regard 
No. 
2015AP1782-CR   
 
14 
 
to each of the victims at the accident scene in this case, it is 
reasonable to presume, as we do, that the legislature authorized 
multiple punishments under § 346.67(1).   
¶25 We 
add 
to 
this 
analysis 
the 
observation 
that 
"[m]ultiple victim accidents are not so rare that we can say the 
legislature did not take them into consideration when drafting 
the statute.  Had the legislature intended that only one penalty 
could be imposed per accident, it could have more clearly done 
so."  Hartnek, 146 Wis. 2d at 194.  Nothing in Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.67(1) or Wis. Stat. § 346.74(5)10 persuades us that the 
legislature prohibited multiple counts under the circumstances 
present in this case.   
¶26 Next, Pal states that "the legislative history and the 
context of the statu[t]e" do not provide "relevant guidance 
either way."  The State somewhat similarly asserts that 
                                                 
10 Pal suggests that the penalties provided in Wis. Stat. 
§ 346.74(5) are graduated based on the greatest degree of harm 
sustained by any victim in a particular accident; that is, that 
"[t]he applicable penalty will presumably be based on the most 
seriously injured person."  See, e.g., § 346.74(5) ("Any person 
violating any provision of s. 346.67 (1): . . . (d) Is guilty of 
a Class D felony if the accident involved death to a person." 
(emphasis added)).  But see Hartnek, 146 Wis. 2d at 194-95 
(concluding that "a multiple victim accident could invoke 
several of the differing penalties of sec. 346.74(5)").   
Even if Pal were correct, this would not dictate that 
multiple counts are prohibited under the statute.  It might 
instead simply mean that the appropriate penalty for each of 
multiple counts must be based on the penalty applicable with 
regard to "the most seriously injured person."  We do not 
express an opinion on the question; we merely observe that Pal's 
argument is not determinative here.   
No. 
2015AP1782-CR   
 
15 
 
"[n]othing in the legislative history indicates that the 
Legislature intended to limit the number of charges that may be 
filed resulting from a multi-victim hit-and-run accident."  
Given that Pal bears the burden of rebutting the presumption, 
see Ziegler, 342 Wis. 2d 256, ¶62, and that nothing of a 
conclusive nature suggests itself to us with regard to this 
factor, we will not construct an argument for him.  See, e.g., 
Indus. Risk Insurers v. Am. Eng'g Testing, Inc., 2009 WI App 62, 
¶25, 318 Wis. 2d 148, 769 N.W.2d 82 ("[W]e will not abandon our 
neutrality to develop arguments.").   
¶27 With regard to the nature of the conduct proscribed by 
Wis. Stat. § 346.67(1), Pal again contends that "[t]he gravamen 
of the offense is not the killing of a person, but the flight 
from the scene."  We reiterate that the statute is patently 
concerned with more than simply flight from the scene of an 
accident.  Instead, the statute prohibits flight until the 
vehicle operator has fulfilled his or her duties with regard to 
specified persons at the scene.  Indeed, it is at least 
conceivable that a vehicle operator could, consistent with the 
statute, freely leave an accident scene in a matter of minutes 
if he or she manages to complete the statutorily-mandated tasks 
in that amount of time.  See § 346.67(1).  Given that the 
statute pertains to a vehicle operator's duties to certain 
individuals at an accident scene, it makes sense to allow 
punishment for violations of duties to separate individuals.  
"Each offense caused harm that the other offense did not."  
Anderson, 219 Wis. 2d at 755.  For the same reason, we see 
No. 
2015AP1782-CR   
 
16 
 
nothing inappropriate about punishing Pal for each instance of 
failing to aid one of the victims in this case.  See Davison, 
263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶98 (noting that "[o]ften in our multiplicity 
analyses, consideration of the appropriateness of multiple 
punishments is informed by our conclusions regarding the nature 
of the proscribed conduct").11 
¶28 Our analysis leads us to a single conclusion: the 
legislature authorized the State to charge multiple counts of 
the offense of hit and run resulting in death in cases involving 
multiple victims.  We therefore have no need to apply "the 'rule 
of lenity' and the general rule subjecting penal statutes to 
strict construction so as to safeguard a defendant's rights," 
State v. Kittilstad, 231 Wis. 2d 245, 266-67, 603 N.W.2d 732 
(1999), as Pal urges us to do.  See, e.g., Callanan v. United 
States, 364 U.S. 587, 596 (1961) ("The rule [of lenity] comes 
into operation at the end of the process of construing what 
Congress has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding 
consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers.  That is not the 
function of the judiciary."); Zarnott v. Timken-Detroit Axle 
Co., 244 Wis. 596, 600, 13 N.W.2d 53 (1944) ("[T]he rule of 
                                                 
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 346.67(1) enumerates a number of 
duties, some contained within the same paragraph.  Additionally, 
a given accident could involve varying numbers of victims.  One 
could therefore imagine many complex hypotheticals posing 
questions about how many violations could validly be charged in 
a given case.  We decline to weigh in on these types of 
hypotheticals, however, and instead simply conclude that what 
the State charged in this specific case is permissible.  
No. 
2015AP1782-CR   
 
17 
 
strict construction [of penal statutes] is not violated by 
taking the common-sense view of the statute as a whole and 
giving effect to the object of the legislature, if a reasonable 
construction of the words permits it.").   
¶29 In our system, "the substantive power to prescribe 
crimes 
and 
determine 
punishments 
is 
vested 
with 
the 
legislature."  Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶31 (quoting Ohio v. 
Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984)).  All that we determine today 
is that the legislature authorized the sentence meted out below.  
The legislature is free to clarify the statute in the future if 
it wishes.  Further, 
the fact that multiple counts may be charged for 
multiple deaths does not mean that in all such cases 
multiple 
charges 
will 
be 
filed 
or 
that, 
upon 
conviction, separate and consecutive sentences will be 
imposed. 
 
Such 
decisions 
are 
subject 
to 
both 
prosecutorial 
charging 
discretion 
and 
judicial 
sentencing discretion. 
9 Christine M. Wiseman & Michael Tobin, Wisconsin Practice 
Series:  Criminal Practice & Procedure § 1:23 (2d ed.) (footnote 
omitted). 
 
This 
latter 
safeguard, 
judicial 
sentencing 
discretion, is the subject of Pal's second challenge.  
B. Whether Pal's Sentence Is Unduly Harsh 
¶30 Pal contends that his sentence is unduly harsh.  We 
have said that "[a] sentence is unduly harsh or unconscionable 
'only where the sentence is so excessive and unusual and so 
disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock public 
sentiment 
and 
violate 
the 
judgment 
of 
reasonable 
people 
concerning what is right and proper under the circumstances.'"  
No. 
2015AP1782-CR   
 
18 
 
Cummings, 357 Wis. 2d 1, ¶72 (quoting Ocanas v. State, 70 
Wis. 2d 179, 185, 233 N.W.2d 457 (1975)).   
¶31 Pal's sentence was less than the statutory maximum.  
He received two consecutive 20-year terms of imprisonment, with 
each term consisting of ten years of initial confinement and ten 
years of extended supervision.  However, he could have received 
two consecutive 25-year terms of imprisonment, with each term 
consisting of 15 years of initial confinement and ten years of 
extended 
supervision. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 346.74(5)(d); 
939.50(3)(d); 973.01(2)(b)4. and (2)(d)3.   
¶32 We cannot conclude that the circuit court erred in 
rejecting Pal's claim that its sentence was unduly harsh.  In 
sentencing Pal, the circuit court properly considered "the 
gravity of the offense, the character of the defendant, and the 
need to protect the public."  State v. Harris, 2010 WI 79, ¶28, 
326 Wis. 2d 685, 786 N.W.2d 409 (citing State v. Harris, 119 
Wis. 2d 612, 623, 350 N.W.2d 633 (1984)). 
¶33 Remarking that it could not "say enough about the 
seriousness of these offenses," the circuit court explained that 
it was "giv[ing] the greatest amount of weight" to that factor.  
The circuit court discussed in detail Pal's actions in the hours 
and days after the accident which, in the circuit court's view, 
demonstrated 
Pal's 
lack 
of 
remorse 
and 
failure 
to 
take 
responsibility for his actions.  
¶34 In particular, the circuit court noted the following 
relevant pieces of information, among others: that following the 
accident (while two individuals lay dead or dying on the 
No. 
2015AP1782-CR   
 
19 
 
highway) Pal returned to his girlfriend's house where he "drank 
some beer and . . . talked about sports and other things" with 
his girlfriend's stepfather; that Pal did not confess to what he 
had done when questioned by his girlfriend and his father; that 
Pal never turned himself in; that a search of Pal's phone 
"indicated . . . web page searches of many pages, of many 
subjects about how to avoid being caught for a hit and run, how 
to repair a vehicle, how to hide a vehicle, what are the 
penalties"; that after his arrest, while in jail, Pal "tried to 
talk to [sic] [his] girlfriend into deleting some information"; 
and that "[t]he agent that wrote the [presentence investigation] 
report" viewed Pal's "claims of remorse [as] somewhat suspect."  
The court stated, "I . . . believe I must impose a sentence that 
does not unduly depreciate the seriousness of these offenses and 
a sentence that has a punitive component as well."   
¶35 Pal discusses a number of matters relating to the 
circumstances of the accident below, the nature of the crime 
itself, the recommendations of the State and of the author of 
the presentence investigation report, and his own personal 
background in support of his argument that a lighter sentence is 
appropriate.  He explains that he "expressed remorse for his 
conduct, not [by] mere words, but by waiving his right to a 
trial and pleading to the charges, as alleged."  But these 
arguments are generally for the circuit court, not this court, 
to consider.  See, e.g., Harris, 119 Wis. 2d at 622 ("We have 
acknowledged our reluctance to interfere with a trial court's 
No. 
2015AP1782-CR   
 
20 
 
sentence, because it has a great advantage in considering the 
relevant factors and the demeanor of the defendant.").   
¶36 In sum, the circuit court imposed a sentence within 
the statutory maximum after it had properly considered the 
relevant 
factors 
and 
had 
provided 
Pal 
with 
a 
thorough 
explanation of the reasons supporting its decision.  The circuit 
court's actions were not unduly harsh and unconscionable. 
¶37 Finally, Pal briefly argues that "[t]he focus by the 
trial court on the flight as an aggravating factor was 
misplaced" because the flight "was not an aggravating factor; it 
was the crime."  The circuit court below rejected this argument 
postconviction, 
explaining 
that 
what 
it 
had 
considered 
aggravating was not Pal's flight but his "course of conduct that 
went well beyond the initial flight or . . . not immediately 
stopping."  Our review of the sentencing transcript leaves us 
unable to disagree with this characterization.   
¶38 Pal similarly contends that "the remarks of the trial 
court indicate it considered the deaths an aggravating factor 
justifying a harsh penalty," even though "[t]he death of a 
person at the scene of a hit and run accident is what propelled 
the offense to a Class D felony" in the first place.  Again, we 
do not accept Pal's interpretation of the sentencing transcript.  
The circuit court undoubtedly viewed the deaths of the two 
victims in this case as relevant to its sentencing decision, but 
that was because the deaths pertained to "the gravity of the 
offense," undoubtedly a proper concern for the court.  See 
No. 
2015AP1782-CR   
 
21 
 
Harris, 326 Wis. 2d 685, ¶28.  We uphold the sentence the 
circuit court imposed in this case.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
¶39 This case arose because Pal abandoned two dead or 
dying motorcyclists on the road following his vehicle accident.  
We conclude that Pal committed two offenses, not one, when he 
fled from the scene of his accident, and that the legislature 
authorized punishment for each offense.  It was therefore not 
unconstitutional for the circuit court to accept guilty pleas 
and sentence Pal for both counts of hit and run resulting in 
death.  We further conclude that the circuit court did not 
impose an unduly harsh sentence.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
decision of the court of appeals. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2015AP1782-CR.pdr  
 
1 
 
¶40 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J.   (concurring).  The 
Majority opinion correctly applies well-established Wisconsin 
law, and therefore I join the opinion in full.  I write 
separately to explain that there is an alternate way in which 
this case could have been analyzed.  In so doing, I hope to 
encourage future parties who raise multiplicity challenges that 
are grounded in multiple charges under a single statute to 
address their challenges as "unit of prosecution" claims.  
¶41 "The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and its parallel provision in the 
Wisconsin Constitution, Article I, Section 8(1), prohibit 
multiple punishments for the same offense."  State v. Ziegler, 
2012 WI 73, ¶59, 342 Wis. 2d 256, 816 N.W.2d 238.  The Double 
Jeopardy Clause "protects against a second prosecution for the 
same offense after acquittal.  It protects against a second 
prosecution for the same offense after conviction.  And it 
protects against multiple punishments for the same offense."  
State v. Davison, 2003 WI 89, ¶19, 263 Wis. 2d 145, 666 N.W.2d 1 
(emphasis in original)(internal quotations omitted).   
¶42 The last protection is commonly referred to as a 
"multiplicity" claim.  "When a defendant is charged in more than 
one count for a single offense, 
the counts are 
deemed 
impermissibly multiplicitous."  Ziegler, 342 Wis. 2d 256, ¶59. 
Multiplicity claims may arise when multiple counts are charged 
under the same statute for what is asserted to be the same 
conduct or when multiple counts are charged under different 
statutes for what is asserted to be the same conduct.  In either 
No.  2015AP1782-CR.pdr  
 
2 
 
case, their resolution will turn on legislative intent, in part, 
because the legislature is constitutionally delegated the 
substantive power to delineate and define crimes.  Davison, 263 
Wis. 2d 145, ¶31.  
¶43 Wisconsin 
courts 
have 
analyzed 
both 
types 
of 
multiplicity claims using a two-step test.  Id., ¶43.  "First, 
the court determines whether the offenses are identical in law 
and fact using the 'elements-only' test set forth in Blockburger 
v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)."  Ziegler, 342 
Wis. 2d 256, ¶60.  "The results of the 'elements-only' test 
determine the presumption under which we analyze the second 
prong of our methodology."  Id., ¶61 (citation omitted).  "If 
the offenses are identical in law and fact, a presumption arises 
that the legislature did not intend to authorize cumulative 
punishments."  Id. (citation omitted).  "Conversely, if the 
offenses are different in law or fact, the presumption is that 
the legislature intended to permit cumulative punishments."  
Id., ¶62.  See also Davison, 263 Wis. 2d 145, ¶43 ("First, the 
court determines whether the charged offenses are identical in 
law and fact using the Blockburger test."). 
¶44 The Blockburger test was derived from the Court's 
analysis of the proper way to address multiple convictions that 
arose from under different statutory provisions.  Blockburger, 
284 U.S. at 304; see also Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 
773, 778 (1985) ("Where the same conduct violates two statutory 
provisions, the first step in the double jeopardy analysis is to 
determine whether the legislature-in this case Congress-intended 
No.  2015AP1782-CR.pdr  
 
3 
 
that each violation be a separate offense.").  Therefore, 
Blockburger is not directly on point for instances in which a 
defendant is convicted under a single statute.  However, 
Wisconsin courts have applied the two-step multiplicity test, 
and therefore the Blockburger test, to these situations.  
Specifically, we have used it to analyze situations in which a 
defendant receives multiple convictions under a single statute.  
See State v. Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d 48, 64-65, 291 N.W.2d 809 (1980); 
State v. Richter, 189 Wis. 2d 105, 108–09, 525 N.W.2d 168 (Ct. 
App. 1994) and other cases discussed below. 
¶45 However, the unit of prosecution analysis is also 
applicable when multiple charges are made under the same 
statute.  "The unit of prosecution is the manner in which a 
criminal statute permits a defendant's conduct to be divided 
into 
discrete 
acts 
for 
purposes 
of 
prosecuting 
multiple 
offenses."  Woellhaf v. People, 105 P.3d 209, 215 (Colo. 2005).  
In unit of prosecution cases, Wisconsin courts routinely apply 
the 
above-mentioned 
Blockburger 
test 
to 
determine 
if 
a 
defendant's convictions were multiplicitous.  See, e.g., State 
v. Multaler, 2002 WI 35, ¶59, 252 Wis. 2d 54, 643 N.W.2d 437 
("Having determined that the charges are different in fact, we 
turn to examine the legislature's intent regarding the allowable 
unit of prosecution."); Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d at 64-65; Richter, 189 
Wis. 2d at 108–09 ("In order to determine whether the three 
counts of bail jumping were multiplicitous, we must apply a two-
pronged test to the facts of this case . . . ."); State v. 
Hartnek, 146 Wis. 2d 188, 192, 430 N.W.2d 361 (Ct. App. 1988).  
No.  2015AP1782-CR.pdr  
 
4 
 
However, in the context of multiple counts made under the same 
statute, the application of the Blockburger test may not work as 
well as Wisconsin courts have assumed.  
¶46 For 
example, 
the 
first 
prong 
of 
Wisconsin's 
multiplicity analysis is potentially illusory when a defendant's 
convictions are for multiple violations of a single statute.  
"When a defendant is convicted for violating one statute 
multiple times, the same evidence test will never be satisfied."  
State v. Adel, 965 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Wash. 1998).  "Two 
convictions for violating the same statute will always be the 
same in law, but they will never be the same in fact.  In 
charging two violations of the same statute, the prosecutor will 
always attempt to distinguish the two charges by dividing the 
evidence supporting each charge into distinct segments."  Id.1   
                                                 
1 For a more thorough explanation of why Wisconsin's two-
prong multiplicity analysis may be reconsidered in unit of 
prosecution cases, see Michelle A. Leslie, Note, State v. 
Grayson, 
Clouding 
the 
Already 
Murky 
Waters 
of 
Unit 
of 
Prosecution Analysis in Wisconsin, 1993 Wis. L. Rev. 811, 824-25 
("The first prong of the Rabe test, 'identical in law and in 
fact,' is not useful in the continuing offense, unit of 
prosecution context.  The identical in law portion is always 
satisfied and therefore never determinative, since each charge 
is brought under the identical statutory provision.  The 
identical in fact portion is equally uninformative, but in a 
more subtle manner.  The prosecutor, in deciding on the 
challenged unit of prosecution, must divide the continuing 
conduct into distinct segments (usually temporal segments).  
Implicit in that division, however, are different factual 
contexts, 
controlled 
solely 
by 
the 
prosecutor's 
unit 
of 
prosecution choice.  Thus, identical in fact will never be 
satisfied.").   
No.  2015AP1782-CR.pdr  
 
5 
 
¶47 Perhaps for this reason, other courts, including the 
United States Supreme Court, generally do not apply the 
Blockburger 
analysis 
to 
multiplicity 
challenges 
based 
on 
multiple charges under the same statute.2  See generally Sanabria 
v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 70 (1978) ("Because only a single 
violation of a single statute is at issue here, we do not 
analyze this case under the so-called 'same evidence' test, 
which 
is 
frequently 
used 
to 
determine 
whether 
a 
single 
transaction may give rise to separate prosecutions, convictions, 
and/or 
punishments 
under 
separate 
statutes." 
(citing 
Blockburger, 284 U.S. 299 (1932)).  For example, the Court of 
Criminal Appeals of Texas stated:  "Both parties' arguments are 
predicated on the assumption that the proper analysis includes 
the application of the Blockburger test . . . .  However, we 
employ that analysis only when the charged conduct involves 
multiple offenses in different statutory provisions that are the 
result of a single course of conduct."  Loving v. State, 401 
S.W.3d 642, 645 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); see also State v. Smith, 
436 S.W.3d 751, 768 (Tenn. 2014) ("Generally, we do not apply 
                                                 
2 The Supreme Court's decision in Ladner v. United States, 
358 U.S. 169 (1958) is illustrative.  In Ladner, the defendant 
was convicted "of assaulting two federal officers with a deadly 
weapon" in violation of a single statute.  Id. at 170.  The 
defendant received separate convictions for each officer that 
was harmed.  Id. at 170-71.  The Court had to address whether 
"the wounding of two federal officers by the single discharge of 
a shotgun would constitute a separate offense against each 
officer under the statute."  Id. at 171.  The Court did not 
apply the Blockburger analysis; instead, the Court focused 
solely on the text of the statute.  Id. at 172.  
No.  2015AP1782-CR.pdr  
 
6 
 
the Blockburger test when addressing a unit-of-prosecution 
claim.").  
¶48 Instead, "[w]here two violations of the same statute 
rather than two violations of different statutes are charged, 
courts determine whether a single offense is involved not by 
applying the Blockburger test, but rather by asking what act the 
legislature intended as the 'unit of prosecution' under the 
statute."  United States v. Weathers, 186 F.3d 948, 952 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999).  Stated otherwise, a court's inquiry becomes "what 
'unit of prosecution' has the Legislature intended as the 
punishable act under the specific criminal statute."  Adel, 965 
P.2d at 1074 (citations omitted); see also State v. Thompson, 
200 P.3d 22, 28 (Kan. 2009) ("In a unit of prosecution case, the 
court asks how the legislature has defined the scope of conduct 
composing one violation of a statute.  Under this test, the 
statutory 
definition 
of 
the 
crime 
determines 
what 
the 
legislature intended as the allowable unit of prosecution."); 
Loving, 401 S.W.3d at 645 (reasoning, "whether the Legislature 
intended for the separate statutory subsections in a single 
statute to constitute distinct offenses" is the question); State 
v. Ravell, 922 A.2d 685, 689 (N.H. 2007) (Duggan, J., 
dissenting) ("Where, as here, a defendant asserts a double 
jeopardy violation, arguing that he is being punished multiple 
times under the same statute for the same offense, courts must 
inquire 
what 
'unit 
of 
prosecution' 
was 
intended 
by 
the 
legislature as the punishable act.").  
No.  2015AP1782-CR.pdr  
 
7 
 
¶49 Therefore, in multiplicity challenges grounded in 
multiple charges under a single statute, courts interpret the 
statute at issue to determine if the legislature authorized 
multiple convictions.   
¶50 In 
the 
present 
case, 
Pal 
alleges 
that 
he 
was 
impermissibly charged with two violations of a single statute.  
Accordingly, this case could be framed as a unit of prosecution 
case.  And, as discussed above, under a unit of prosecution 
analysis, the sole question would be whether the legislature 
intended to authorize multiple punishments through a single 
statute.  
¶51 However, as the Majority opinion correctly notes, the 
statute at issue in the present case is designed to confer a 
duty towards each individual harmed by a driver's actions.3  And, 
as a result, the legislature authorized the unit of prosecution 
to be one conviction for each victim.   
¶52 Because the Majority opinion proceeds under well-
established Wisconsin law, I join the Majority opinion in full.  
I respectfully concur in order to encourage future parties to 
consider a unit of prosecution analysis for multiplicity 
challenges based on multiple charges under a single statute.   
¶53 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY joins this concurrence. 
                                                 
3 Maj. Op., ¶24. 
No.  2015AP1782-CR.dk 
 
1 
 
¶54 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (concurring).  I concur in the 
mandate 
because 
there 
were 
two 
accidents, 
one 
following 
immediately after the other.  I do not join the court's opinion, 
however, because its reasoning could be understood to allow, in 
a single accident with a single victim, a separate charge for 
each paragraph of Wis. Stat. § 346.67(1)——a result that I think 
would be improper. 
¶55 For the foregoing reasons, I concur.  
¶56 I am authorized to state that Justices SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and ANN WALSH BRADLEY join this concurrence. 
 
No.  2015AP1782-CR.dk 
 
1