Case Title: Dehorty v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 494, 2000

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2002-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
 
SHELLY DEHORTY, 
 
)  No. 494, 2000 
 
 
) 
Defendant Below, 
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
Appellant, 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
 
 
)  and for Kent County 
v. 
 
) 
 
 
)  Cr. ID. No. 0001003668 
STATE OF DELAWARE,  
) 
 
 
) 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
Appellee. 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  February 21, 2002 
Decided:  June 10, 2002 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, HOLLAND, BERGER and STEELE, 
Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 10th day of June, 2002, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and 
record below, it appears to the Court that: 
 
1.  The Defendant Appellant, Shelly A. Dehorty, filed this appeal from the 
Superior Court’s order dated July 20, 2000, which convicted Dehorty of three 
counts of Assault in the Second Degree and certain motor vehicle offenses, largely 
irrelevant to this appeal, after a bench trial.  On October 31, 2001, we remanded 
the case to Superior Court and requested that the trial judge address the 
 
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applicability, if any, of Bullock v. State,1 to the facts of this case and requested 
appropriate findings and conclusions in that regard.  On January 3, 2002, we 
received the report of those findings and conclusions on remand.  After a careful 
review of the report, we conclude that the trial judge ruled correctly on each issue 
raised by Dehorty relevant to her convictions except for Driving While Revoked.2  
That conviction and sentence is vacated.  We affirm the Superior Court’s judgment 
on all other counts. 
 
2.  The record reflects that after a bench trial, the trial judge found Dehorty 
guilty of three counts of Assault Second, lesser included offenses of Assault First, 
arising from reckless conduct while driving her automobile at night into a horse-
drawn buggy within 100 feet of an intersection on an unlighted, unmarked, 
shoulderless, narrow, county road.  Dehorty drove her vehicle in excess of the 
posted speed limit, did not slow down as she approached the buggy from behind 
and moved into the left lane in an attempt to pass the buggy after the buggy had 
already begun a left turn.  At the time she collided with the buggy, the horse had 
already completely cleared the road upon which both vehicles were traveling.  
Dehorty left only 17 feet of skid marks before the point of impact. 
 
3.  The trial judge correctly concluded after detailed findings of fact that 
these actions constituted reckless conduct that a trier of fact could not excuse.  The 
                                          
 
1 775 A.2d 1043 (Del. 2001). 
2 Del. Code Ann. tit. 21 § 2756 (1995). 
 
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collision resulting from speeding and attempting to pass an appropriately marked 
horse-drawn vehicle within 100 feet of an intersection was not outside the risk of 
which Dehorty was aware and the actual result involved the same kind of injury as 
the probable result.  The result was not too remote to have a bearing on Dehorty’s 
penal liability. 
4.  The trial judge’s opinion on remand carefully examines Del. Code Ann. 
tit. 11 § 263 and correctly distinguishes Bullock from the facts of this case.  
Dehorty caused the collision by being where she had no right to be at a time and 
place where a reasonable person could anticipate or foresee that the buggy ahead of 
her might make a slow left turn into her path.  The folly of approaching a horse-
drawn vehicle at night on a dark, narrow county road and attempting to pass within 
100 feet of an intersection at a speed in excess of the posted 50 m.p.h. speed limit 
constituted reckless conduct which caused the collision resulting in serious injury 
to the buggy’s three occupants. 
 
5.  The trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he found that all three 
occupants of the buggy suffered serious physical injury.  Dehorty argues that one 
occupant merely suffered from injuries that her emergency room physician 
characterized as “significant” rather than “serious.”3  Our standard of review of the 
                                          
 
3 Dr. Craig Hochstein opined at trial that a “broken clavicle or collar bone, and . . . a broken bone 
in her leg” along with “numerous abrasions and contusions” were significant but not “serious or 
life threatening.” 
 
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trial judge’s ruling on this issue is whether any rational trier of fact could, viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, find that the occupant suffered 
“serious physical injuries” from the collision caused by Dehorty.  When measured 
by a legal standard, a rational person could find these injuries to be “serious.”4 
 
6.  Dehorty urges this Court to vacate her sentence on the basis that the trial 
judge abused his discretion by imposing an excessive term of imprisonment that 
exceeds TIS guidelines and is out of proportion to sentences imposed in other 
similar cases.  The trial judge’s sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum for 
Assault Second.  The fact that the sentence for each Assault Second conviction 
exceeded TIS guidelines is not subject to Appellate review.5  On October 30, 2000, 
the Superior Court deferred action on a Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence 
until this Court returned the record and mandate to the Superior Court.6  Dehorty 
may wish to address sentencing issues at that time.  To the extent a proportionality 
                                          
 
4 See Bass v. State, 670 A.2d 1336, 1995 WL 788594 at 1 (Del. 1995) Berger, J., order) (second 
degree assault victim hospitalized four days and treated for multiple face bruises, a black eye, a 
broken nose and a brain contusion); Young v. State, 610 A.2d 728, 1992 WL 115175 at 2 (Del. 
1992) (Horsey, J, order) (second degree assault victim suffered at least one fractured toe, two 
black eyes, extensive bruises, and a laceration above her left eyebrow which the treating 
physician predicted would result in an “unacceptable outcome”); Slaton v. State, 670 A.2d 907 
1996 WL 147619 at 2 (Del. 1995) (Holland, J., order) ( sexual assault victim sustained no bone 
fractures, but “suffered pulled ligaments and tendons in her arm” and was unable to work for 
approximately three weeks because of the loss of use of her arm). 
5 Mayes v. State, 604 A.2d 839, 846 (Del. 1992); Gaines v. State, 571 A.2d 765, 766-67 (Del. 
1990). 
6 State v.Dehorty, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. 00-01-0003668 (Oct. 30, 2000). 
 
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analysis is appropriate, the sentencing judge should have an opportunity to 
consider the issue initially. 
 
6.  Dehorty’s claim that there was insufficient evidence to support the 
conviction of Reckless Driving is without merit for the reasons stated in this 
Order’s discussion of the Assault Second convictions. 
 
7.  We must, as the State has conceded, vacate the judgment and sentence for 
the conviction of Driving While Revoked.  While Dehorty did drive at the time of 
the offense without having taken steps to reinstate her license, her actual 
revocation period expired on May 5, 1998 after a one year revocation period.  This 
offense occurred on December 24, 1999.  At most, the record reflects that she 
could have been charged with and convicted of Del. Code Ann. tit. 21 § 2701(b). 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is VACATED as to IK00-02-0196 and AFFIRMED as to all other counts of 
the Indictment. 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________________ 
 
 
 
Justice