Case Title: Dike v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-11-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Dike v. State1999 WY 153990 P.2d 1012Case Number: 98-254Decided: 11/30/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

WILLIAM H. DIKE, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

                                

Appeal from the District Court 
of Platte County, The Honorable

Keith G. Kautz, 
Judge.

 

 

Sylvia Lee Hackl, State 
Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Diane Courselle, Director 
of the Wyoming Defender Aid Program; and Daniel Pedriana and Brenda Hammitt, 
Student Interns for the Wyoming Defender Aid Program, representing 
appellant.

 

Gay Woodhouse, Attorney 
General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior Assistant Attorney 
General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director of the Prosecution Assistance Program; and 
Monique DuPont Armijo and Jodi A. Weppner, Student Interns for the Prosecution 
Assistance Program, representing appellee.

 

    
Before LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN & HILL, 
JJ.

 

    
MACY, Justice.

 

  [¶1]      Appellant William Dike appeals from the 
judgment and sentence that was entered after a jury found him guilty of 
aggravated assault and battery. We affirm.

 

                               
ISSUES

 

  [¶2]      Dike presents several issues for our 
review:

 

                               
ISSUE I

 

Did the state fail to prove that William Dike 
committed aggravated assault since he did not use a "deadly 
weapon?"

 

                              
ISSUE II

 

Did the trial court deprive William Dike of his due 
process right to a fair trial by failing to instruct the jury on the elements of 
aggravated assault?

 

                              
ISSUE III

 

Did the trial court err by allowing unfairly 
prejudicial evidence to be introduced at trial, whereby a reasonable juror could 
be so inflamed as to infer that because of all the guns and ammunition seized 
from the Dike residence, William Dike must have committed the aggravated 
assault?

 

                             
ISSUE IV

 

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by allowing 
hearsay evidence of a taped phone call that does not qualify for the excited 
utterance exception to be heard by the jury?

 

                               
ISSUE V

 

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by allowing 
the jury to hear portions of a taped phone call that do not qualify for the 
excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule?

 

                              
ISSUE VI

 

Did the trial court violate Billy Dike's right to 
confrontation, his right to testify in his own behalf, and his right to receive 
due process and a fair trial when the court allowed the prosecutor to remark in 
closing that Mr. Dike's right to be 
present during his own trial gave him an unfair advantage as a witness and that 
a conviction was required in order to uphold the community's trust in the 
jury?

 

                              
ISSUE VII

 

Did the ineffectiveness of William Dike's counsel 
deny him his due process right to a fair trial?

 

                                
FACTS

 

  [¶3]      Shortly after arriving home on November 
1, 1997, at approximately 11:00 p.m., the victim heard someone pounding on her 
door. She went to the door and found Dike, who hollered: "Open this door." The 
victim knew Dike because he had worked for her and her husband and he had 
previously been a guest in their home. 
She opened the door, and Dike walked into her house, informing her that he 
needed to use her telephone. The victim agreed to let him use her telephone, 
but, feeling uncomfortable, she remained near the door. She did not believe that 
Dike actually used the telephone because he did not turn on the light 
in the room where the telephone was 
located and she did not hear him pick up the receiver. When she asked him if he 
got a hold of anyone, he responded that the line was busy.

 

  [¶4]      Because of the victim's uneasiness about 
being alone with Dike, she told him that she could not visit with him because 
she had to go back to work at the Buffalo Lodge, that a friend was spending the 
night, and that her husband would be back from hunting that night, all of which 
were untrue. She walked out the door, and Dike followed her outside. When she 
tried to get into her car, Dike pulled her out. When she attempted to get into 
her car again, he again pulled her out. After a brief struggle, Dike told the 
victim that she was going with him and pointed a pistol at her head, telling 
her: "I will use this if I have to." The victim ultimately convinced Dike to let 
her take her car. Dike got into the car with the victim and began accusing her 
of telling her husband about the sexual advances he had made toward her the 
previous summer. The victim denied telling her husband anything and tried to 
persuade Dike to give her the gun.

 

  [¶5]      The victim was finally able to convince 
Dike to give her the gun, which she held in her left hand while she drove toward 
the Buffalo Lodge. When she arrived at the Buffalo Lodge, she spoke with a new 
employee and told him that she was going to take Dike to his truck and that she 
would return to train him, hoping he would get suspicious if she did not come 
back. When they got to Dike's truck, Dike told the victim that he would kill 
himself if she called the police. The victim assured Dike that she would not 
call the police and gave the gun back to him. At that point, Dike showed the 
victim that the gun was not loaded. He exited her vehicle and followed her as 
she drove back toward the Buffalo Lodge.

 

  [¶6]      While she was on her way back to the 
Buffalo Lodge, the victim used her cellular telephone to call her mother-in-law, 
who advised her to call the police. Although she was apprehensive about doing 
so, the victim did call the police from the Buffalo Lodge and asked to speak 
with Deputy Sheriff Jake Hardin. During this telephone conversation, the victim 
told the dispatcher what had happened and also communicated it to Deputy Hardin. 
Deputy Hardin, along with two detectives from the Laramie County sheriff's 
office, went to Dike's home and arrested him. Searches of the house on separate 
occasions netted various guns and ammunition.

 

  [¶7]      Dike was charged with aggravated assault 
and kidnapping. At the trial, Dike acknowledged that he went to the victim's 
home, that they had an argument, and that he rode with her to the Buffalo Lodge, 
but he denied threatening the victim with a gun. A jury convicted Dike of the 
aggravated assault offense, and the trial judge sentenced him to serve a term in 
a state penal institution of not less than two years nor more than five years. 
Dike appeals from his conviction to this Court.

 

                             
DISCUSSION

 

  A. 
Definition of a "Deadly Weapon"

 

  [¶8]      In his first claim of error, Dike 
contends that the state failed to prove that he committed aggravated assault 
because the only evidence relating to the deadly weapon requirement of the 
offense was that he possessed an unloaded gun. The state counters that it was 
not required to establish that the firearm was loaded in order to prove that 
Dike committed aggravated assault.

 

[¶9]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-2-502(a)(iii) (LEXIS 1999) describes the aggravated assault 
offense:

 

            (a) A person is 
guilty of aggravated assault and battery if he:

 

            . . 
.

 

(iii) Threatens to use a drawn deadly weapon on 
another unless reasonably necessary in defense of his person, property or abode 
or to prevent serious bodily injury to another . . .

 

  The term "deadly weapon" is defined in 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-104(a)(iv) (LEXIS 1999) as follows:

 

(iv) "Deadly weapon" means but is not limited to a 
firearm, explosive or incendiary material, motorized vehicle, an animal or other 
device, instrument, material or substance, which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used is 
reasonably capable of producing death or serious bodily 
injury[.]

 

Dike contends that the 
phrase "which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used is reasonably 
capable of producing death or serious bodily injury" qualifies each of the 
previously listed items, including "a firearm."

 

  [¶10] 
  In deciding this issue, we 
must apply our well established standard for construing statutes. We attempt to 
interpret statutes in accordance with the legislature's intent. State Department 
of Revenue and Taxation v. Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo. 1994). We begin 
by making an "`inquiry respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words 
employed according to their arrangement and connection.'" Parker Land and Cattle 
Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993) 
(quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)). We 
construe statutes as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, 
and we construe together all parts of the statutes on the same subject. State ex 
rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division v. Bruhn, 951 P.2d 373, 
376 (Wyo. 1997); Pacificorp, 872 P.2d  at 1166. We give effect to the plain 
language of unambiguous statutes. Lyles v. State ex rel. Division of Workers' 
Compensation, 957 P.2d 843, 846 (Wyo. 1998). We resort to extrinsic aids of 
statutory interpretation, such as legislative history or intent, only when 
statutes are ambiguous. Christensen v. Oedekoven, 888 P.2d 228, 230 (Wyo. 
1995).

 

  [¶11] 
  In making the determination 
of whether this statute is clear and unambiguous, we must analyze the structure 
and position of the words in the statute, applying rules of common grammatical 
principles. "`This Court naturally does not review congressional enactments as a 
panel of grammarians; but neither do we regard ordinary principles of English 
prose as irrelevant to a construction of those enactments.'" Management Council 
of Wyoming Legislature v. Geringer, 953 P.2d 839, 843-44 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting 
Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 150 (1960)).

 

  [¶12] 
  After analyzing § 
6-1-104(a)(iv), we conclude that the language is clear and unambiguous. The 
phrase "which in the manner it is used" modifies only the last antecedent, 
"other device, instrument, material or substance." "[O]ther device" is preceded 
by an "or," and, generally, where no contrary intention appears, relative and 
qualifying words and phrases are construed to refer solely to the last 
antecedent with which they are closely connected. Moschetti v. Liquor Licensing 
Authority of City of Boulder, 490 P.2d 299, 301-02 (Colo. 1971) (en 
banc).

 

  
[¶13]   The aggravated 
assault statute enhances the punishment if the defendant uses a deadly weapon 
because deadly weapons cause a greater degree of fear in the person being 
assaulted. The victim does not know that the firearm is not loaded, and his 
apprehension and consequent reactions will be the same as if the firearm were 
loaded. He may try to escape or defend himself, conceivably putting himself and 
others into a precarious and dangerous situation. Id; see generally Sindelar v. 
State, 932 P.2d 730, 733 (Wyo. 1997); ALJ v. State, 836 P.2d 307, 310-11 (Wyo. 
1992) (recognizing the danger created when an unloaded firearm is pointed at an 
individual).

 

  
[¶14]   We hold that the 
"deadly weapon" definition includes unloaded firearms. It necessarily follows 
that an assault with an unloaded gun is elevated to the offense of aggravated 
assault. This is consistent with the cases where we held that unloaded firearms 
are deadly weapons for the purposes of the aggravated burglary statute. Britt v. 
State, 734 P.2d 980, 981 (Wyo. 1987); Sutherland v. State, 944 P.2d 1157, 1162 
(Wyo. 1997).

 

  B. Instruction

 

  
[¶15]   Dike also claims 
that the trial court denied him his due process right to a fair trial by 
instructing the jury that a firearm is a deadly weapon. He maintains that the 
jury should have been permitted to make the determination of whether an unloaded 
gun qualifies as a deadly weapon.

 

  
[¶16]   The trial court is 
given wide latitude in instructing the jury.  Duckett v. State, 966 P.2d 941, 943 (Wyo. 
1998). We will not find reversible error if the instructions correctly state the 
law. Id.

 

  
[¶17]   As we discussed in 
the last issue, an unloaded firearm is by definition a "deadly weapon." This 
determination is, therefore, not one to be made by the jury. Because the 
instruction was a correct statement of the law, the trial court did not err by 
giving it.

 

  C. Evidence of Seized Handguns and 
Ammunition

 

  
[¶18]   Dike next asserts 
that the trial court erred by allowing evidence into the trial of "a plethora of 
guns and ammunition" which was seized from the Dike residence after his arrest. 
He claims that the evidence was so unfairly prejudicial that it likely 
contaminated the minds of the jurors and prevented them from objectively 
deciding the case.

 

  
[¶19]   Dike testified at 
the trial that he did not have a gun during his argument with the victim, and 
law enforcement officials were unable to locate a gun matching the victim's 
description. After arresting Dike, however, officers searched the residence in 
which Dike lived with his parents and seized a number of other guns, along with 
a variety of ammunition. Defense counsel filed a motion in limine wherein he 
argued that the introduction of a .22 caliber handgun would violate W.R.E. 401, 
402, and 403. The motion was denied, and the evidence was allowed into trial 
without further objection. Dike contends that his motion in limine was 
sufficient to preserve an objection and escape the application of the plain 
error standard of review of the evidence regarding this particular gun. He 
acknowledges that the plain error standard of review must be employed with 
regard to the testimony concerning the other firearms and ammunition.

 

  
[¶20]   This Court has not 
addressed the issue of whether a motion in limine is sufficient to preserve an 
objection, and we do not consider this case to be an appropriate one in which to 
invoke that rule of law. The motion did not address the specific testimony with 
which Dike takes issue nor did it demonstrate how W.R.E. 401, 402, and 403 would 
be violated if the officers' testimony were allowed. Furthermore, the trial 
court did not make a final ruling on the evidentiary issues raised in Dike's 
motion, opting instead to make specific determinations upon proper objections at 
the trial. Accordingly, our review is limited to a search for plain error.

 

A three-part test has been 
established for determining whether an error may achieve the status of plain 
error. First, the record must be clear as to the incident which is alleged as 
error. Second, the party claiming that the error amounted to plain error must 
demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated. Finally, that 
party must prove that a substantial right has been denied him and as a result he 
has been materially prejudiced.

 

Bradley v. State, 635 P.2d 1161, 1164 (Wyo. 1981); see also 
Hodgins v. State, 962 P.2d 153, 156 (Wyo. 1998).

 

  
[¶21]   "Relevant evidence 
may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice." Hermreck v. State, 956 P.2d 335, 340 (Wyo. 1998); see also W.R.E. 
403. Before this Court will conclude that the trial court erroneously admitted 
unduly prejudicial evidence, the appellant "must demonstrate that the evidence 
had little or no probative value and that it was extremely inflammatory or 
introduced for the purpose of inflaming the jury." Apodaca v. State, 627 P.2d 1023, 1027 (Wyo. 1981); see also Hermreck, 956 P.2d  at 340.

 

  
[¶22]   Dike complains 
about the testimony from Detective Bruce Dexter, Detective John Haukup, and 
Deputy Hardin, who detailed the guns and ammunition that were found at the Dike 
residence. Quoting 22 Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Evidence 5215, at 278 (1978), Dike maintains that the 
testimony "dominat[ed] the mind of the jury'" and prevented it from making a 
"`rational determination of the truth.'"

 

  
[¶23]   Dike did not object 
to the challenged testimony, and he is unable to overcome his burden to 
demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated because the 
probative value of this evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect. Dike was 
charged with threatening to use a drawn firearm. The fact that various handguns, 
along with ammunition, were found in the house was relevant to show that Dike 
had these types of weapons available to him. The defense elicited testimony that 
the officers did not know whether any of the seized items belonged to Dike. The 
jury, therefore, had a complete picture and was able to weigh the evidence and draw 
reasonable inferences therefrom. We agree with the state's observation that it 
is unlikely a Wyoming jury would become so inflamed by the fact that a defendant 
owns or has access to guns that it would abandon its duty to reach a rational 
verdict on the basis of the evidence and the court's instructions.

 

  
[¶24]   Dike also 
challenges testimony from his ex-girlfriend regarding his "habit" of carrying a 
handgun in his truck. She testified that Dike kept handguns in his truck during 
the time that they dated, which was approximately three to four years prior to 
the trial. Dike objected to this testimony, citing W.R.E. 404, 405, and 406. The ex-girlfriend also 
identified one of the pistols seized from the Dike residence as being one of the 
guns Dike carried in his truck. Dike argues on appeal that the testimony 
concerned activities too remote in time to be relevant to the current charges 
against him.

 

            W.R.E. 
406 provides:

 

Evidence of the habit of a 
person or of the routine practice of an organization, whether corroborated or 
not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that 
the conduct of the 
person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit 
or routine practice.

 

The ex-girlfriend's testimony was relevant because it 
demonstrated that Dike owned or had access to guns which made the possibility 
that he had a gun in his truck on the night in question more likely. Dike has 
not cited authority for his proposition that his ex-girlfriend's knowledge of 
his habits was too old to be relevant. We defer to the sound discretion of the 
trial court and its decision to allow the jury to consider the remoteness of the 
evidence in deciding what weight to give to it.

 

  
[¶25]   We come to the same 
conclusion regarding the relevance of the victim's husband's unchallenged 
testimony that Dike had told him on several occasions that he had a handgun in 
his pickup. This testimony was relevant to the charged crime in that it too made 
the likelihood more probable that Dike had a gun on the night in question.

 

  D. Taped Telephone Conversation

 

  
[¶26]   Dike complains that 
the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the jury to hear portions of 
the victim's taped telephone call to the Platte County sheriff's office. The 
state responds that the trial court properly admitted the tape as excited 
utterances, prior consistent statements, and statements of a then-existing state 
of mind.

 

In general, rulings on the 
admissibility of evidence are within the sound discretion of the trial court and 
are entitled to considerable deference. Such rulings will not be disturbed on 
appeal absent demonstration of a clear abuse of discretion. This court will not 
find an abuse of discretion as long as a legitimate basis exists for the trial court's 
rulings. Thus, unless the court acted in a manner exceeding the bounds of 
reason, no abuse of discretion will be found.

 

  Brown v. State, 953 P.2d 1170, 1175 (Wyo. 
1998) (citations omitted).

 

  
[¶27]   A tape recording 
was made of the telephone call from the victim to the sheriff's office. Dike 
filed a motion in limine, seeking to bar its admission on the ground that it was 
hearsay. The state countered that the tape was admissible under the excited 
utterance exception to the hearsay rule. The trial court denied the motion, holding that it was 
premature, and ordered the state to submit to counsel and the court those 
portions of the tape which it proposed to offer at trial. The trial court also 
ordered the parties to "present written facts and arguments as to whether the 
statements qualify under a hearsay exception" for purposes of making a preliminary ruling on 
their admissibility. The state complied with this order, but Dike did not. 
Before trial, the court ruled that the statements were admissible as excited 
utterances and as prior consistent statements.

 

  
[¶28]   At the trial, the 
state introduced four portions of the tape through the dispatcher for the 
sheriff's office. Dike's counsel objected, and, although the trial court 
overruled the objection, it allowed the defense a continuing objection.

 

  
[¶29]   W.R.E. 801(c) 
defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted."  
W.R.E. 803 provides in pertinent part:

 

The following are not excluded 
by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:

 

            
. . .

 

(2) Excited utterance. - A 
statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant 
was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.

 

  
[¶30]   This Court has 
outlined five factors that are intended to guide trial courts in determining 
whether hearsay statements qualify as excited utterances. James v. State, 888 P.2d 200, 206 (Wyo. 1994). Those factors are as follows:

 

            1. The 
nature of the startling event;

 

            2. The 
declarant's physical manifestation of excitement;

 

            3. The 
declarant's age;

 

            4. The 
lapse of time between the event and the hearsay statement; and

 

            5. 
Whether the statement was made in response to an inquiry.

 

Clarke v. Vandermeer, 740 P.2d 921, 927 (Wyo. 1987); see 
also James, 888 P.2d  at 206. Although these factors are useful in determining 
whether the evidence qualifies as an excited utterance, the ultimate inquiry 
must be whether the "`declarant's condition at the time was such that the 
statement was spontaneous, excited or impulsive rather than the product of 
reflection and deliberation.'" LP v. Natrona County Department of Public 
Assistance and Social Services (Matter of GP), 679 P.2d 976, 1003 (Wyo. 1984) 
(quoting United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 86 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 450 U.S. 1001 (1981)); see also James, 888 P.2d  at 206.

 

  
[¶31]   Dike contends that 
the taped statements did not constitute excited utterances because the 
statements were made approximately thirty minutes after the incident occurred; 
the victim repeated the night's events three times in response to questions from 
the dispatcher; the incident was not all that startling; and the victim 
displayed presence of mind following the incident in that she asked to speak to 
her friend, she requested that her conversation not go over the scanner, she did 
not want anyone to know about it for fear Dike would kill himself, she concealed 
the fact that she called her mother-in-law on her cellular telephone, and she 
was able to converse with the sheriff's office for over thirty minutes.

 

  
[¶32]   After analyzing the 
taped conversation in question, we agree that the victim's statements during 
that telephone conversation qualified as excited utterances. The tape reveals 
that the victim was frightened and distraught following the incident. It is also 
apparent that the victim remained extremely agitated throughout the entire 
telephone call.  
Although the victim ultimately learned that the gun was unloaded, that 
fact does not change the terror she must have felt when Dike pointed it at her 
head nor does it mean that she had nothing more to fear. That the victim 
displayed some presence of mind after the incident does not convince us that she 
lacked the necessary degree of spontaneity or impulsiveness to qualify her 
statements as excited utterances. To the contrary, the tape reveals exactly the 
opposite. It demonstrates that, despite the lapse of time between the incident 
and the telephone call and despite her knowledge that the gun was not loaded, 
the incident was on-going in the victim's mind. See James, 888 P.2d  at 206 
(holding that a lapse of fifteen to twenty minutes did not preclude a statement 
from qualifying as an excited utterance). She was very concerned that Dike had 
followed or was watching her. Our review of the conversation also reveals that, 
although the dispatcher asked the victim questions about what happened, many of 
the victim's statements were not really in response to the dispatcher's 
inquiries, and it appears that the questioning was really an attempt by the 
dispatcher to calm the victim.

 

  
[¶33]   Dike also complains 
about statements on the tape from other individuals that were played for the 
jury. During the debate about whether the tape should be allowed into evidence, 
the state announced its intention to play only portions of it. Dike argued that 
the state should play the entire tape rather than isolate and play only the most 
damaging statements. Dike now argues, however, that portions of the tape were 
unfairly prejudicial.

 

  
[¶34]   Dike first directs 
our attention to a statement made by the employee who was at the Buffalo Lodge 
with the victim when she made the telephone call. The state argues that this 
statement was admissible as a present sense impression and as a then-existing 
mental or emotional condition.

 

  
[¶35]   Our review of the 
tape shows that the victim became frightened because a car was approaching the 
lodge and she was worried that it was Dike. The dispatcher asked to speak to the 
employee who stated that he had just seen a white and blue pickup truck "at the 
rest stop just now and it was just slowly driving around."  The dispatcher then 
asked whether the employee had "any idea where [Dike] might have gone or what he 
might be" doing. The employee replied: "[M]y feeling right now he's probably 
watching." The challenged statement qualified as a statement of his 
then-existing state of mind pursuant to W.R.E. 803(3). It was a statement of 
what the witness was perceiving at the time, and its admission did not result in 
error.

 

  
[¶36]   Dike also complains 
about Deputy Hardin's comments that "I've seen it before, it[']s a ploy to get 
your sympathy. And then to hold a gun, he thinks if he scares you enough that 
you'll come along with him. Okay. You did nothing wrong . . . don't fault 
yourself for it, okay"; "Bill Dike has not been playing with a full load for a 
long time. And he's aggravated a lot of people"; and "But he put a gun to your 
head. That's aggravated battery.  Whether it was loaded or not. He cannot point 
a gun at you and get away with it." Dike maintains that these comments were 
tantamount to improper and  prejudicial opinion testimony and that they 
resulted in per se reversible error. We disagree.

 

  
[¶37]   The rule of law 
expressed in Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879, 881 (Wyo. 1990), and Stephens v. 
State, 774 P.2d 60, 68 (Wyo. 1989), cited by Dike, does not require a per se 
reversal in this case. In Dudley v. State, 951 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Wyo. 1998), we 
held that the Bennett/Stephens rule of per se reversible error was not 
applicable because the per se rule does not require reversal absent the direct 
solicitation of the testimony from the prosecutor and an express opinion as to 
the guilt of the defendant. We explained that, in such a situation, the effect 
of the testimony must be analyzed against "`the factual backdrop' of the case 
using `the most careful exercise of delicate judicial judgment.'" 951 P.2d  at 
1179 (quoting Whiteplume v. State, 841 P.2d 1332, 1340-41 (Wyo. 1992)).

 

  
[¶38]   The comment was not 
directly solicited by the prosecutor in this case, and, therefore, error per se 
will not attach. Given the lack of a specific objection, we must analyze this 
argument using our plain error standard of review. In Whiteplume, we stated: "In 
measuring the quantum of harm caused by the error, we considered the strength of 
the prosecution's case against the accused." 841 P.2d  at 1340.

 

  
[¶39]   An appropriate 
discussion of this matter requires a more complete recitation of the context of 
Deputy Hardin's statements:

 

[VICTIM]: Listen to me. I don't 
want anybody to get hurt over this. I don't know what I'm doing. I mean, I 
wasn't even gonna call you.

 

            
[DEPUTY HARDIN]: Well . . . it[']s best you did.

 

            
[VICTIM]: Jake, what the hell is happening?

 

[DEPUTY HARDIN]: Well, what it 
is, I've seen it before, it[']s a ploy to get your sympathy. And then to hold a 
gun, he thinks if he scares you enough that you'll come along with him. Okay. 
You did nothing wrong. Okay.  And you don't need to . . ., I know it hurts 
hon. But you don't fault yourself for it, okay.

 

            
[VICTIM]: What is going on with me?

 

[DEPUTY HARDIN]: It[']s not you 
. . ., it's him. Bill Dike has not been playing with a full load for a long 
time.  And he's 
aggravated a lot of people. Now you, you've got to quit blaming yourself. You 
did nothing wrong. Okay?

 

[VICTIM]: Jake, [the employee] 
thinks that he's still out there. I don't even, I can't even tell you what the 
hell he was in, Jake.

 

[DEPUTY HARDIN]: Well I've seen 
his truck and I know what Bill Dike Jr. looks like. . . . I'm going to come down 
there.

 

            
[VICTIM]: [unintelligible] Please I don't want him to know, Jake.

 

            
[DEPUTY HARDIN]: You don't want him to what?

 

[VICTIM]: I don't want him to 
know, Jake, I don't want him to kill himself. I can't live with myself if he 
kills himself.

 

[DEPUTY HARDIN]: He's not gonna 
kill himself okay.  
What I'll do is I'm gonna come down there just on regular patrol. Okay. 
I'll act like it[']s regular patrol. But he put a gun to your head. That's 
aggravated battery. Whether it was loaded or not. He cannot point a gun at you 
and get away with it.

 

Our review of this particular colloquy leads us to conclude 
that the challenged statements were made in an effort to calm the victim and to 
assure her that calling the sheriff's office was the right thing to do. The 
statements were an integral part of the conversation with the victim which 
contained her excited utterances. We believe that the jurors understood that the 
decision regarding Dike's guilt or innocence was theirs to make after hearing 
all the evidence and that they recognized Deputy Hardin made the statements to 
calm and reassure the victim before he could have formed an informed opinion 
because he made them before he knew all the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the incident. After carefully considering these statements in light of the other 
evidence that the state presented against Dike, we cannot say Deputy Hardin's 
statements were so prejudicial that a reasonable possibility exists that, 
without them, the verdict would have been more favorable to him. We do, however, 
caution the prosecution that its decision to play the statements was extremely 
dangerous, given that a slightly different set of facts could have ended in a 
reversal if not a reversal per se, resulting in an unfortunate waste of judicial 
resources.

 

  
[¶40]   Dike also claims 
that the dispatcher's testimony concerning the substance of the taped 
conversation was extremely prejudicial cumulative hearsay. Our review of the 
record discloses that her testimony on direct examination laid foundation for 
the admission of the tape by identifying and authenticating it and that she 
described the substance of the tape only generally. To the extent any of her 
testimony was redundant, we hold that the trial court's decision to allow it did 
not fall outside the bounds of reason as it put that portion of the taped 
conversation in context for the jury. As a related matter, Dike complains that 
the trial court improperly admitted the transcript of the entire taped 
conversation. Again, we do not find that this materially prejudiced Dike. 
Certainly no abuse of discretion was demonstrated.

  

  E. Hearsay Testimony

 

  
[¶41]   Dike asserts that 
the trial court abused its discretion and committed plain error when it allowed 
the jury to hear the hearsay testimony of eight witnesses who repeated the story 
that the victim told to them. The state counters that the testimony was 
admissible as prior consistent statements.

 

  
[¶42]   Dike objected to 
only some of the testimony that he challenges on appeal. To the extent that he 
lodged a proper objection, we will use an abuse of discretion standard of review 
to analyze the challenged comments. Our review of the testimony that Dike did 
not object to will be limited to a search for plain error.  Because we utilized 
both standards of review earlier in this opinion, we will not restate them 
here.

 

  
[¶43]   Without belaboring 
the testimony of the eight witnesses, suffice it to say that each one testified 
generally about what the victim told him or her happened with Dike. Dike claims 
that the victim had a motive from the outset to fabricate her story when she and 
he drove to the lodge where an employee happened to be outside, smoking a cigarette. 
Dike insists that, because this employee saw him and the victim together in the 
car, the victim had to concoct some story to explain why she was out with 
another man while her husband was away on a hunting trip.

 

 [¶44]     Dike relies on Tome v. United States, 
513 U.S. 150, 165, 115 S. Ct. 696, 130 L. Ed. 2d 574 (1995), wherein the United 
States Supreme Court, interpreting the federal rule regarding prior consistent 
statements, held that prior consistent statements are admissible only when the 
motive to fabricate occurred between the two statements. He maintains that each 
repetition of the victim's story came after the motive to fabricate a story was 
present and, therefore, should not have been allowed into evidence.

 

  
[¶45]   This Court settled 
that issue in Makinen v. State, 737 P.2d 345, 349 (Wyo. 1987), where we 
held:

 

There is no express condition in 
the rule which states that the prior consistent statement must be made before 
the alleged improper motive to fabricate arose. In the absence of an express 
prohibition, we think the trial court should have the discretion to determine 
whether a prior consistent statement should be admitted whether or not it was 
made before an improper motive to fabricate arose.

 

Later, in Stephens, we stated that a prior consistent 
statement may be admitted for the truth of the matter asserted only when it was 
made before the improper motive to fabricate arose and that, if the statement 
was made afterwards, it was admissible only for purposes of rehabilitation. 774 P.2d  at 71. We also required:

 

Should the trial court find that 
the improper influence or motive or the claim of recent fabrication antedated 
the consistent statement, and yet still determine that the probative value 
justifies admission, a limiting instruction must be given, if requested, to the 
effect that the statement may be considered only for the limited purpose of 
evaluating the credibility of the declarant witness and that it should not be 
considered directly as proof of the matter asserted.

 

774 P.2d  at 71-72. The reason for allowing prior consistent 
statements when they were made after the alleged improper influence or motive to 
fabricate arose is because "it is the consistency, rather than the substance of 
the consistent statement, which takes such a statement out of the realm of 
objectionable hearsay and tends to prove the value of the original statement." 
Curl v. State, 898 P.2d 369, 374 (Wyo. 1995).

 

  
[¶46]   We hold that the 
trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit plain error by allowing the 
prior consistent statements into evidence. The statements were made after the 
alleged improper influence arose and, therefore, should have been "considered 
only for the limited purpose of evaluating the credibility of the declarant 
witness," but, because Dike did not request a limiting instruction, the trial 
court did not err by not giving one. Stephens, 774 P.2d  at 71; see also Frenzel 
v. State, 849 P.2d 741, 751 (Wyo. 1993).

  

  F. Prosecutorial Misconduct

 

  
[¶47]   Dike next complains 
that the prosecutor improperly commented on his right to be present and to 
testify at his own trial when he said: "You know there is something else about 
the defendant, who sits through the trial, has an opportunity to testify, and 
then gets on the witness stand, and tailors his testimony for you based upon 
what he has heard and what he thinks you might take - ." We review claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct by using the following standard of review:

 

Claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct are settled by reference to the entire record and hinge on whether a 
defendant's case has been so prejudiced as to constitute denial of a fair 
trial.  
Similarly, the propriety of any comment within a closing argument is 
measured in the context of the entire argument. A trial court's rulings as to 
the scope of permissible argument will not be disturbed absent a "clear or 
patent" abuse of discretion. Even then, reversal is not warranted unless a 
reasonable probability exists, absent the error, that the appellant may have 
enjoyed a more favorable verdict.

 

Arevalo v. State, 939 P.2d 228, 230 (Wyo. 1997) (citations 
omitted); see also Gayler v. State, 957 P.2d 855, 860 (Wyo. 1998). Counsel are 
afforded wide latitude in the making of their closing arguments. Sides v. State, 
963 P.2d 227, 232 (Wyo. 1998).  The scope of permissible argument is best 
determined by the trial judge. Id.

 

  
[¶48]   For the purpose of 
our discussion, we have put the prosecutor's remarks into the context in which 
they were made:

 

[PROSECUTOR:]  You know there is 
something else about the defendant, who sits through the trial, has an 
opportunity to testify, and then gets on the witness stand, and tailors his 
testimony for you based upon what he has heard and what he thinks you might take 
-

 

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, 
your Honor. I think that is improper closing.

 

            
THE COURT: Overruled.

 

            
[PROSECUTOR]: I am arguing the credibility of the defendant.

 

            
THE COURT: Overruled.

 

[PROSECUTOR]: Apparently, the 
defendant must have found the state's case convincing. He virtually agreed with 
all the facts, except those which necessarily convicted him.

 

Dike claims that the remarks invited the jury to consider 
the fact that he testified in his own defense as evidence of his guilt, thereby 
penalizing him for exercising his rights to be present, to confront the 
witnesses against him, and to testify in his own defense. As support for his 
argument, Dike cites Agard v. Portuondo, 117 F.3d 696, 708-09 (2d Cir. 1997), 
cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S. Ct. 1248, 143 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1999), where the 
United States Court of Appeals held that a similar comment violated Agard's 
constitutional rights to confrontation, to testify in his own behalf, and to 
receive due process and a fair trial. On petition for rehearing, however, the 
court retreated "from any language in our prior opinions suggesting that it is 
constitutional error for a prosecutor to make a factual argument that a 
defendant used his familiarity with the testimony of the prosecution witnesses 
to tailor his own exculpatory testimony." Agard v. Portuondo, 159 F.3d 98, 99 
(2d Cir. 1998). The majority reasoned:

 

Although one factual element of 
such an argument may be the presence of the defendant during the trial, its 
principal focus is on a comparison of defendant's testimony with the testimony 
of other witnesses. Such an argument, unlike that made here, depends on what the 
defendant testified to regarding pertinent events, rather than focussing solely 
on his presence in the courtroom.

 

Id. In the case at bar, the prosecutor's argument did 
highlight the differences in the testimony. The following comments were made 
just prior to the comments that Dike challenges in this appeal:

 

Now, [the victim] described for 
you, and it was uncomfortable, she described to you exactly what the crude 
sexual overture was, and she said that's what they were arguing about and 
discussing, and the defendant was upset about her having told her husband . . . 
about that.

 

Contrast that with the 
defendant's testimony. He said they were arguing about something, about telling 
[the victim's husband], but he never really said what. He left it very vague; 
and he left a gaping hole, which can be filled only by the truth that you heard 
from [the victim] about what their dispute was.

 

  
[¶49]   We also find 
support for the propriety of the remarks in our own case law. This Court has 
held that the purpose of closing arguments is to afford counsel the opportunity 
to explain the significance of the evidence and how it should be viewed by the 
jury. Harper v. State, 970 P.2d 400, 403 (Wyo. 1998). During closing arguments, 
counsel may assist the jury by reflecting upon the evidence and drawing 
reasonable inferences that logically flow from the evidence. Gayler, 957 P.2d  at 
861. When the jury is presented with contradictory testimony, counsel is allowed 
to communicate the reasonable inference that one of the witnesses is lying. 
Barela v. State, 787 P.2d 82, 84 (Wyo. 1990).

 

  
[¶50]   Dike also contends 
that the prosecutor improperly appealed to the jurors' prejudice or passion for 
their state and community when he told the jury that the State of Wyoming 
trusted its judgment. The prosecutor made the following final remarks:

 

[PROSECUTOR:]  You know, the 
defendant's lawyer argues that you should acquit his client. What else would you 
expect?  Ladies 
and gentlemen, if you feel that the defendant's conduct should permit his 
acquittal, set him free. Send him back to the community. Acquit him. If you feel 
the state failed to prove each of those elements that we discussed earlier, each 
of the elements of the crimes charged here, acquit the defendant. That it your 
duty.

 

You, ladies and gentlemen, are 
the final deciders of the facts. You know better. The state asks you to convict 
the defendant. The people of the State of Wyoming and this community trusts 
-

 

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection, your Honor.  Improper argument.

 

            
THE COURT: I don't know where it's going. Overruled.

 

[PROSECUTOR]: The people of the 
State of Wyoming, ladies and gentlemen, trust your judgment.

 

  
[¶51]   In Gayler, we 
warned against community outrage arguments which improperly appeal to a jury's 
prejudice or passion:

 

Arguments which are designed to 
appeal to the jury's prejudice or passion are improper. The fear in allowing 
such appeals is that the accused will be convicted for reasons wholly irrelevant 
to her guilt or innocence. "Jurors may be persuaded by such appeals to believe 
that, by convicting a defendant, they will assist in the solution of some 
pressing social problem. The amelioration of society's woes is far too heavy a 
burden for the individual criminal defendant to bear."

 

957 P.2d  at 861 (quoting United States v. Monaghan, 741 F.2d 1434, 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1085 (1985)) (citations 
omitted). In Gayler, we found that the prosecutor's repeated statements inviting 
the jury to take a stand with law enforcement in the war on drugs and find the 
defendant guilty in the face of sustained objections was an improper community 
outrage argument because it appealed to the jury's passion and prejudice against 
drug-related crimes. Id. We were concerned in that case that the remarks were a 
"blatant invitation to the jurors to convict Gayler not on the evidence but 
because of their fear and disapproval of drug dealers in general." 957 P.2d  at 
861-62. The comments at issue here, however, do not rise to the same level of 
impropriety. The prosecutor merely told the jury that the people trusted its 
judgment. We do not view the comment as being an improper community outrage 
appeal and are unmoved by Dike's attempt to characterize it as such.

 

  G. Effective Assistance of Counsel

 

  
[¶52]   Dike's last 
contention is that he was denied his constitutional right to have effective 
assistance of counsel at his trial.  Specifically, he complains about his 
counsel's failure to argue that an unloaded gun is not a deadly weapon for 
purposes of the aggravated assault statute, to object to the introduction of the 
guns and ammunition testimony, and to object to the hearsay testimony of the 
witnesses who repeated the victim's story.

 

  
[¶53]   In order to prevail 
on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Dike must make the dual 
showings that his counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient 
performance prejudiced his defense. Smith v. State, 959 P.2d 1193, 1198 (Wyo. 
1998). Dike has failed to make the first required showing.

 

  
[¶54]   We addressed the 
claims of error throughout this opinion that Dike makes the basis of his 
ineffective assistance of counsel argument. As we stated in our discussion of 
the first two issues, the definition of "deadly weapon" includes a firearm, 
whether or not it was loaded at the time of its use. The fact that Dike's 
counsel did not assert an incorrect legal argument does not render his 
representation defective.

 

  
[¶55]   We turn to Dike's 
complaint that his counsel did not object to the testimony regarding the guns 
and ammunition that were seized from his home or to the testimony of the 
witnesses who testified about what the victim told them happened. As we 
discussed earlier in this opinion, the testimony was admissible. That Dike's 
counsel did not make a futile objection to admissible testimony does not cause 
us to doubt his performance or question the soundness of the verdict. 

 

[¶56]   Affirmed.

 

    LEHMAN, Chief Justice, dissenting.

 

  
[¶57]   I cannot agree with 
the majority that an audio tape introduced into evidence by the prosecutor that 
included Deputy Hardin's objectionable statement of "he put a gun to your head. 
That's aggravated battery" was not "directly solicited by the prosecution in 
this case." Maj. op. at 11. In addition, I would hold the hearsay statements 
were improperly admitted under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) as prior consistent 
statements.

 

  Solicited Statements

 

  
[¶58]   While Hardin's 
statements were not directly solicited from the prosecutor in the traditional 
sense of witness examination, the record reveals the prosecutor wished to play 
excerpts from the tape but did not excise the potion of the tape that included 
Officer Hardin's statements.1 It is not as if a witness volunteered the 
testimony to the prosecutor's surprise. Instead, the record establishes that 
introduction of these statements was the result of a deliberate choice by the 
prosecutor. I am led to the inescapable conclusion that Deputy Hardin's 
statements, played to the jury by audio tape, were directly solicited by the 
prosecutor.

 

  
[¶59]   The only question, 
therefore, is whether Officer Hardin's statements amount to an opinion of Dike's 
guilt. Rather than comparing the objectionable statement, "he [Dike] placed a 
gun to your head. That's aggravated battery," to other cases compare Whiteplume 
v. State, 841 P.2d 1332, 1337-39 (Wyo. 1992) (In response to prosecutor's 
question of "What did you do at that point?" deputy sheriff testified that "I 
listened to her [complaining witness'] story and made a determination that she 
had been raped."); Newport v. State, 983 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Wyo. 1999) (In 
response to prosecutor's question of "what was your reaction to the victim at 
the time," prosecution witness answered "[w]e believed her."); Brown v. State, 
953 P.2d 1170, 1181 (Wyo. 1998) (In response to prosecutor's question whether 
witness had anything against the accused and his co-conspirator, witness 
answered "Just the fact that they killed somebody.") - the majority states:

 

We believe that the jurors 
understood that the decision regarding Dike's guilt or innocence was theirs to 
make after hearing all the evidence and that they recognized Deputy Hardin made 
the statements to calm and reassure the victim before he could have formed an 
opinion because he made them before he knew all the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the incident.

 

Maj. op. at 12. That belief may or may not be accurate 
because of the "impossibility of assessing whether the jury relied upon [those 
statements] in reaching its verdict." Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d 60, 68 (Wyo. 
1989); Bennett v. State, 794 P.2d 879, 882 (Wyo. 1990).

 

  Hearsay

 

  
[¶60]   Next, I do not 
agree with the majority's interpretation of W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) concerning 
admission of prior consistent hearsay statements. I would revive the analysis 
approved by this court in Chambers v. State, 726 P.2d 1269 (Wyo. 1986), the same 
analysis accepted by the United States Supreme Court in Tome v. United States, 
513 U.S. 150, 115 S. Ct. 696, 130 L. Ed. 2d 574 (1995), and require that the motive 
to fabricate must come after the hearsay statements in order for those 
statements to be admissible as prior consistent statements under W.R.E. 
801(d)(1)(B). Therefore, I would hold that admission of hearsay by eight 
prosecution witnesses, repeating the victim's story, was improper and amounted 
to prejudicial error.2

 

  
[¶61]   Although this court 
attempted to clarify its position on this issue in Stephens v. State, 774 P.2d  
at 70-72, the current state of the law is less than clear ten years later. The 
general rule is that prior consistent statements are not admissible where the 
person making those statements has testified fully in open court and been 
available for cross-examination. Chambers v. State, 726 P.2d  at 1273; Stephens 
v. State, 774 P.2d  at 70. Rule 801(d)(1), W.R.E,3 creates an 
exception to the general rule which, if satisfied, allows prior consistent 
statements into evidence. In Chambers, we recited the following rule on 
admission of prior consistent statements:

 

A witness's prior consistent 
statements are not admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), W.R.E., unless they were 
made before the alleged fabrication or improper influence. Statements made by a 
witness after corrupting forces come into play could be just as fabricated as 
trial testimony and do not rebut the charge of fabrication just because they are 
consistent with his testimony at trial.

 

  726 P.2d  at 1273 (citations omitted).

 

  
[¶62]   However, in the 
later case of Makinen v. State, 737 P.2d 345, 349 (Wyo. 1987), as the majority 
observes, this court shifted course mid-stream. There the court wrote:

 

There is no express condition in 
the rule which states that the prior consistent statement must be made before 
the alleged improper motive to fabricate arose. In the absence of an express 
prohibition, we think the trial court should have the discretion to determine 
whether a prior consistent statement should be admitted whether or not it was 
made before an improper motive to fabricate arose.

 

Faced with this inconsistency, the court in Stephens v. 
State, 774 P.2d 60, attempted to reconcile Chambers and Makinen, drawing a 
distinction between prior consistent statements used for 
rehabilitative/credibility purposes and those that would be permitted as 
substantive evidence. The Stephens court wrote:

 

Should the trial court find that 
the improper influence or motive or the claim of recent fabrication antedated 
the consistent statement, and yet still determine that the probative value 
justifies admission, a limiting instruction must be given, if requested, to the 
effect that the statement may be considered only for the limited purpose of 
evaluating the credibility of the declarant witness and that it should not be 
considered directly as proof of the matter asserted.

 

  774 P.2d  at 71-72.

 

  
[¶63]   I find the 
distinction between rehabilitative/credibility use and substantive use of the 
statements, as a practical matter, provides a distinction without a difference. 
First, as the Stephens court recognized, even if the statements are admitted 
only for rehabilitative purposes, whether the statements were admitted before or 
after the declarant testified was of little consequence: "preadmission may be 
justified as harmless error if the declarant does testify later in a manner that 
is consistent with a prior statement." 774 P.2d  at 71. Second, while the 
Stephens court suggests that a limiting instruction will assist the jury in its 
consideration of the prior consistent statements, even the dissenting justices 
in Tome recognized that such limiting instructions are either misunderstood or 
ignored by juries. 513 U.S.  at 171, 115 S. Ct. 707-08. Finally, "[w]hen a witness 
presents important testimony damaging to a party, the party will often counter 
with at least an implicit charge that the witness has been under some influence 
or motive to fabricate," thus opening the floodgates to prior consistent 
statements that need only satisfy Rule 403. Id. 513 U.S.  at 162, 115 S. Ct.  at 
703.

 

  
[¶64]   I believe Chambers 
embodies the appropriate interpretation of W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B), and the United 
States Supreme Court has held likewise. In Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 
156, 115 S. Ct. 696, 700, 130 L. Ed. 2d 574, the Court held that the drafters of 
F.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) intended that rule to embody the common law requirement that 
a prior consistent statement has no relevancy to refute a charge of fabrication 
unless the consistent statement was made before the source of bias, interest, 
influence, or incapacity originated. This interpretation was based upon the 
plain language of the rule, legislative history, and analysis of the policies 
underlying the adoption of the rule. In reaching its conclusion, the United 
States Supreme Court noted that "[t]he Rule speaks of a party rebutting an 
alleged motive, not bolstering the veracity of the story told." Tome, 513 U.S. 
at 157-58, 115 S. Ct.  at 701. Thus, the kind of impeachment contemplated and 
covered by the rule is the kind for which the premotive temporal requirement 
makes the most sense:

 

Impeachment by charging that the 
testimony is a recent fabrication or results from an improper influence or 
motive is, as a general matter, capable of direct and forceful refutation 
through introduction of out-of-court consistent statements that predate the 
alleged fabrication, influence, or motive. A consistent statement that predates 
the motive is a square rebuttal of the charge that the testimony was contrived 
as a consequence of that motive. By contrast, prior consistent statements carry 
little rebuttal force when most other types of impeachment are involved.

 

  Tome, 513 U.S.  at 158, 115 S. Ct.  at 701.

 

  
[¶65]   Without this 
requirement, parties desiring to fabricate stories would have merely to repeat 
their stories to numerous people and they would have ready-made witnesses who 
could sway juries with their numbers. However, "repetition does not imply 
veracity."  
Stephens, 774 P.2d  at 72. Perhaps more importantly the interpretation 
accepted by the majority would shift the emphasis in trial to out-of-court 
statements, not the in-court ones.  Tomes, 513 U.S.  at 165, 115 S. Ct.  at 705. The 
late Justice Cardine explained:

 

There is good reason for the 
rule excluding prior consistent statements. If the rule were otherwise, parties 
could prepare a multitude of self-serving, biased, inflammatory, video, audio, 
and written statements for trial; testify; and then introduce into evidence 
these consistent statements made prior to testifying. There would be no opportunity for 
cross-examination. The statements, as exhibits, might go with the jury and be 
used during deliberations. The same testimony would be repeated several times, 
unduly emphasizing that testimony over all other testimony in the case.

 

  
Baum v. State, 745 P.2d 877, 882 (Wyo. 1987) (Cardine, J., specially 
concurring).

 

  
[¶66]   My research reveals 
that every state high court addressing the issue has adopted the Tome temporal 
limitation, reasoning that, to be admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), the prior 
consistent statement must precede the motive to fabricate. See, e.g., Cole v. 
State, 818 S.W.2d 573 (Ark. 1991); Shellito v. State, 701 So. 2d 837 (Fla. 1997); 
Bouye v. State, 699 N.E.2d 620 (Ind. 1998); State v. Johnson, 539 N.W.2d 160 
(Iowa 1995); Smith v. Commonwealth, 920 S.W.2d 514 (Ky. 1995); State v. 
Littlefield, 540 A.2d 777 (Me. 1988); Holmes v. State, 712 A.2d 554 (Md. 1998) 
(adopting Tome but allowing prior consistent statements under unique Maryland 
rule with no federal counterpart); Owens v. State, 666 So. 2d 814 (Miss. 1995); 
State v. Veis, 962 P.2d 1153 (Mont. 1998); State v. Morris, 554 N.W.2d 627 (Neb. 
1996); Peterson v. State, 744 P.2d 1259 (Nev. 1987); State v. Leinen, 598 N.W.2d 102 (N.D. 1999); State v. Haslam, 663 A.2d 902 (R.I. 1995); State v. Ard, 505 S.E.2d 328 (S.C. 1998); State v. Carter, 674 A.2d 1258 (Vt. 1996); State v. 
Quinn, 490 S.E.2d 34 (W.Va. 1997). But see, People v. Eppens, 979 P.2d 14, 19 
(Colo. 1999) (declining to reach the issue of whether 801(d)(1)(B) embodies a 
premotive requirement); State v. Chew, 695 A.2d 1301 (N.J. 1997) (allowing prior 
consistent statements to support witness credibility but declining to resolve 
whether New Jersey's rule contains the Tome temporal requirement); State v. 
Brown, 969 P.2d 313 (N.M. 1998) (allowing certain limited rehabilitative uses of 
prior consistent statements).

 

  
[¶67]   Although some 
courts have noted that Tome leaves open the possibility of admitting prior 
consistent statements under Rule 803(24), it appears Wyoming stands alone in 
explicitly rejecting Tome on state law grounds. Not only do I believe Tome to be 
a correct interpretation of the rule, but adopting Tome would allow consistent 
application of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) in both Wyoming's federal and state courts. See 
State v. Johnson, 539 N.W.2d  at 165.

 

  
[¶68]   Finally, since the 
Wyoming Rules of Evidence are based upon and are virtually identical to the 
federal rules, the Tome analysis is valid here. "The Wyoming Rules of Evidence 
are based on the policy that conformity to federal practice is more important 
than uniformity of state practice." Wyoming Rules of Evidence, Committee note. 
Accordingly, this court has chosen to follow the lead of the federal courts and 
adopt federal interpretations of the rules of evidence in previous cases. See, 
e.g., Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351, 354 (Wyo. 1996). We should follow the lead 
of the United States Supreme Court in Tome, thus reaffirming Chambers v. State, 
726 P.2d 1269.

 

   [¶69] For the foregoing reasons, I 
respectfully dissent.

 

  
    

 

  

        

 

FOOTNOTES

1 In a related matter, the majority states that "Dike argued 
that the state should play the entire tape rather than isolate and play only the 
most damaging statements." Maj. op. at 10. That seems to imply that Dike made 
this argument prior to the introduction of the tape. However, it was only after 
the tape was played at trial, during his cross-examination of the witness 
through whom the prosecutor introduced the tape, that Dike's counsel 
contemplated playing the entire tape. He eventually chose not to do so.

 

 

2  In 
its brief, the State contends that testimony of "only three" witnesses was 
admitted as prior consistent statements.  It aruges that, of the other  five witnesses, 
three witnesses' statements were admitted as excited utterances and the 
testimony of two other witnesses was introduced without objection.  However, because 
the majority treats all of the statements as prior consistent statements, I will 
do the same.

 

3 W.R.E. 801 provides:

 

    (d) Statements which are not 
hearsay. - A statement is not hearsay if:

 

    (1) Prior Statement by Witness. - The declarant testifies 
at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the 
statement, and the statement is . . . (B) consistent with his testimony and is 
offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication 
or improper influence or motive. . . .