Case Title: In re Will of Lamparter

Citation: 348 N.C. 45

Docket Number: 354A97

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1998-04-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 354A97
FILED: 3 APRIL 1998
In the Matter of the Will of WILLIAM SMITH LANYON LAMPARTER,
Deceased
Appeal by respondents pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2)
from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 126
N.C. App. 593, 486 S.E.2d 458 (1997), affirming a judgment
entered by Caldwell, J., on 15 December 1995, in Superior Court,
Catawba County.  Heard in the Supreme Court 15 December 1997. 
Tate, Young, Morphis, Bach & Taylor, L.L.P., by
Terry M. Taylor, Thomas C. Morphis and T. Dean Amos;
and Hunter, Wharton & Stroupe, L.L.P., by John V.
Hunter, III, for caveator-appellees.
Maxwell, Freeman & Bowman, P.A., by James B. Maxwell,
for respondent-appellants.
LAKE, Justice.
This appeal presents the single issue of whether
beneficiaries under a holographic will may testify in a caveat
proceeding as to oral communications between themselves and the
decedent with regard to the testator’s intent to make a new will
or about specific bequests to be contained in a new will.  The
Court of Appeals majority concluded that Rule 601(c) of the North
Carolina Rules of Evidence, the Dead Man’s Statute, does not
disqualify interested beneficiaries from testifying with regard
to oral communications between themselves and the decedent.  The
Court of Appeals thus sustained the judgment of the trial court,
thereby invalidating the original will under which the
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respondents, Duke University and Rutgers Preparatory School, were
principal beneficiaries.  For the reasons stated below, we
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
Decedent, William Smith Lanyon Lamparter, was born 1
July 1926.  He graduated from Rutgers Preparatory School and Duke
University.  The decedent never married and had no children.  He
died with an estate valued at approximately one million dollars. 
On 10 March 1980, decedent executed an attested will in which he
provided support for his mother during her lifetime.  Duke
University and Rutgers were the primary residuary beneficiaries.
Mr. Lamparter also made bequests to many friends and relatives
including his cousin, Nadine Lanyon Smith Rogel; her son; and
other caveators in this action.  Decedent kept a copy of his will
in his home and provided copies to Rogel and C. Walton Hamilton,
the named co-executors in the will; his attorney, F. Gwynn
Harper, Jr.; and his accountant, Joanne Linda Waxman. 
Decedent’s mother died in 1980.  In 1985, decedent
prepared a document entirely in his own handwriting entitled,
“Codicil to My Will,” which was dated and signed.  In 1986,
decedent made some minor modifications to his 1985 codicil,
dating and signing each modification.  In the late 1980s,
decedent underwent surgery for cancer and thereafter spent his
time in a chair in his study surrounded by his papers, bills,
books and mail.  In the latter years of decedent’s life, he had
discussions with his attorney and with Ms. Waxman with regard to
changing his will and with regard to what would be legally
necessary to prepare a new will.
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In January 1992, decedent’s cancer returned, and he was
hospitalized for the last time.  Several of his friends and
relatives, including Michael Koch and Nadine Rogel, went to
decedent’s home and found beside his chair in the study eight
handwritten pages appearing to be a holographic will (hereinafter
“undated memorandum”), which revoked all previously executed
testamentary documents including the 1985 handwritten codicil. 
Decedent died two days later.
On 9 April 1992, the executrix named in the will,
Nadine Rogel, filed with the Clerk of Superior Court, Catawba
County, for probate the following documents:  (1) the decedent’s
typed will dated 10 March 1980; (2) the handwritten document
entitled “Codicil to My Will”; and (3) the eight-page undated
memorandum, expressly revoking all previous wills and testaments. 
The clerk admitted the 1980 will to probate and issued Letters
Testamentary to Ms. Rogel, as Executrix of the Estate of William
Smith Lanyon Lamparter.  On 15 September 1992, the executrix
filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking a determination as
to whether the decedent died testate and the effect of the two
handwritten documents.  The trial court held that the typed will
and the handwritten codicil were valid and that the undated
memorandum was invalid.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals held
that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to
determine the validity of the will and vacated the judgment. 
Rogel v. Johnson, 114 N.C. App. 239, 441 S.E.2d 558, disc. rev.
denied, 336 N.C. 609, 447 S.E.2d 401 (1994).
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On 13 October 1994, the caveators, nine individuals who
were named beneficiaries under the undated memorandum, including
decedent’s cousins, friends and longtime housekeeper, filed this
proceeding alleging that the undated memorandum was the
decedent’s last will and testament.  The caveators amended their
complaint to allege, in the alternative, that the purported 
handwritten codicil was a valid codicil to the probated 1980
will.  Respondents, Duke University and Rutgers Preparatory
School, filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and the
caveators filed a motion for summary judgment.  Both of these
motions were denied.
At the commencement of trial, respondents made a motion
in limine, pursuant to Rule 601 of the North Carolina Rules of
Evidence, to prohibit the caveators from testifying as to
conversations they had with decedent about his will.  The trial
court denied the motion on the ground that the intent of the
testator is a relevant, material and competent fact to which the
beneficiaries may testify in order to establish a valid
holographic will, pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 31-10(b).  At trial, for
the purpose of showing the decedent’s intent, the five witnesses
for the caveators all testified to conversations they had with
decedent in his final years about his plans to write a new will,
and they further testified with regard to specific bequests he
planned to include in this new will.  Respondents repeatedly
objected to such testimony.  Over objection, Nadine Rogel was
permitted to testify that in 1990, Mr. Lamparter “said he was
going to change his will drastically, that there were people who
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were very, very caring to him through his illness, and that he
wanted to remember them.”  Ms. Rogel continued to testify that
Mr. Lamparter told her he would be including Frances Davenport,
Rick Berry, and Terry and Rebekah Henderson in his will.  In
addition to this testimony, four caveators and beneficiaries
under the undated memorandum--Frances Davenport, the housekeeper;
Richard Berry; Terry Henderson; and Michael Koch--were also
allowed to testify with regard to conversations they had with Mr.
Lamparter concerning his intent to make a new will and his
proposed specific bequests to be made therein.
At the close of the caveators’ evidence, and again at
the close of all the evidence, the parties moved for a directed
verdict.  All motions were denied.  The jury found that the
eight-page undated memorandum was indeed the last will and
testament of the decedent, and on 15 December 1995, judgment was
entered reflecting this verdict.  Respondents appealed to the
Court of Appeals, a majority of which upheld this judgment.
The North Carolina “Dead Man’s Statute,” formerly
N.C.G.S. § 8-51 and now codified in Rule 601(c) of the Rules of
Evidence, N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 601(c), has traditionally
prohibited testimony involving both “transactions” and
“communications” by individuals who would potentially benefit
from the alleged statements of a deceased individual.  See In re
Will of Lomax, 226 N.C. 498, 39 S.E.2d 388 (1946); In re Will of
Brown, 194 N.C. 583, 140 S.E. 192 (1927).  The statute, or rule
as now codified, is applicable only to oral communications
between the party interested in the event and the deceased.  The
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Dead Man’s Statute was intended “as a shield to protect against
fraudulent and unfounded claims.”  Carswell v. Greene, 253 N.C.
266, 270, 116 S.E.2d 801, 804 (1960).  As this Court stated in
Carswell: 
The reasoning behind G.S. 8-51 and the
decided cases thereunder, is succinctly
stated by Stacy, J., later C.J., in Sherrill
v. Wilhelm, [182 N.C. 673, 675, 110 S.E. 95,
96 (1921)]:  “Death having closed the mouth
of one of the parties, (with respect to a
personal transaction or communication) it is
but meet that the law should not permit the
other to speak of those matters which are
forbidden by the statute.  Men quite often
understand and interpret personal
transactions and communications differently,
at best; and the Legislature, in its wisdom,
has declared that an ex parte statement of
such matters shall not be received in
evidence.”
Carswell, 253 N.C. at 269, 116 S.E.2d at 803.
As to matters “forbidden by the statute,” Rule 601(c)
provides in pertinent part:
(c) Disqualification of interested
persons.--Upon the trial of an action, or the
hearing upon the merits of a special
proceeding, a party or a person interested in
the event . . . shall not be examined as a
witness in his own behalf . . . concerning
any oral communication between the witness
and the deceased person . . . .
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 601(c) (1992).  In a proceeding for the
probate of a will, both propounders and caveators are parties
“interested in the event” within the meaning and spirit of this
statute.  In re Will of Brown, 194 N.C. at 595, 140 S.E. at 199;
accord In re Will of Hester, 84 N.C. App. 585, 595, 353 S.E.2d
643, 650, rev’d on other grounds, 320 N.C. 738, 360 S.E.2d 801
(1987).
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On its face, Rule 601(c) clearly prohibits persons
“interested in the event,” including caveators generally, from
testifying as to oral communications between themselves and the
decedent.  It is equally clear from our case law regarding the
Dead Man’s Statute that the “event,” about which a party or
person would be interested in the context of a caveat to a will,
would include the decedent’s intent, desire or plan to make a new
will, or with regard to specific bequests to be contained
therein, i.e., the decedent’s desired disposition of his
properties.  However, with regard to a holographic will, an
exception to the Dead Man’s Statute has evolved through our case
law which allows beneficiaries to testify as to the three
material elements of such a will:  (1) the testator’s
handwriting, (2) the testator’s signature, and (3) what the
testator considered to be his place for keeping valuable papers. 
See In re Will of Westfeldt, 188 N.C. 702, 125 S.E. 531 (1924);
Cornelius v. Brawley, 109 N.C. 542, 14 S.E. 78 (1891).
The North Carolina General Assembly has more recently
codified this exception to the Dead Man’s Statute for holographic
wills.  N.C.G.S. § 31-10 provides in part: 
(b) A beneficiary under a holographic
will may testify to such competent, relevant
and material facts as tend to establish such
holographic will as a valid will without
rendering void the benefits to be received by
him thereunder.
N.C.G.S. § 31-10(b) (1984).  The legislature has also
specifically defined “holographic will,” setting forth its three
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material elements.  N.C.G.S. § 31-3.4(a) provides in relevant
part:
(a) A holographic will is a will
(1)
Written entirely in
the handwriting of the
testator . . . and 
(2)
Subscribed by the
testator, or with his
name written in or on
the will in his own
handwriting, and 
(3)
Found after the
testator’s death among
his valuable papers or
effects, or in a safe-
deposit box or other
safe place where it
was deposited . . .
for safekeeping.
N.C.G.S. § 31-3.4(a)(1)-(3) (1984).
The caveators contend that the provisions of N.C.G.S. §
31-10(b) when properly construed are broad enough to permit
interested parties to testify as to oral communications with a
deceased regarding the essential element of any will, and the
ultimate question for the jury in a caveat proceeding--whether
the testator intended the document to be his last will and
testament.  We disagree.  This statutory exception, relating to
the holographic will, is specifically limited to testimony about
such material facts as may “establish” such will “as a valid
will.”  Obviously, this relates, and only relates, to the three
elements required to make a valid holographic will, as set forth
in N.C.G.S. § 31-3.4(a).  In In re Will of Crawford, 246 N.C.
322, 98 S.E.2d 29 (1957), this Court held that a beneficiary
under a purported holographic will could testify to the
handwriting of the testator.  Id. at 325, 98 S.E.2d at 31. 
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Similarly, this Court has held that the beneficiary under a
purported holographic will could testify that the document was
found among the testator’s valuable papers and effects.  In re
Will of Wilson, 258 N.C. 310, 311, 128 S.E.2d 601, 602 (1962).  
In caveat proceedings, in the absence of a clear
exception to the Dead Man’s Statute, this Court has not permitted
testimony as to oral communications between the decedent and a
beneficiary under the purported will.  To the contrary, we have
held that testimony of a witness is incompetent under the
provisions of the Dead Man’s Statute when it appears “(1) that
such witness is a party, or interested in the event, (2) that his
testimony relates to a personal transaction or communication with
the deceased person, (3) that the action is against the personal
representative of the deceased or a person deriving title or
interest from, through or under the deceased, and (4) that the
witness is testifying in his own behalf or interest.”  Godwin v.
Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 259 N.C. 520, 528, 131 S.E.2d 456, 462
(1963).  We thus hold that the legislature, in enacting N.C.G.S.
§ 31-10(b), did not intend to alter the long-standing rule in
this jurisdiction that beneficiaries under a contested will are
not competent witnesses to testify as to oral communications with
the deceased which tend to answer the ultimate question for the
jury in such cases--the testator’s desired disposition of his
properties through the document at issue.
Accordingly, we hold that the Dead Man’s Statute,
N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 601(c), prohibits beneficiaries from
testifying as to oral communications they had with the decedent
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about his intent to make a new will or with regard to specific
bequests to be contained in that will, and the trial court erred
in permitting the caveators’ five interested witnesses to so
testify.  The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and
the case is remanded to that court for further remand to the
Superior Court, Catawba County, for a new caveat proceeding at
which such testimony shall be excluded.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.