Case Title: State v. McKnight

Citation: 

Docket Number: 100246

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2011-08-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 100,246 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
WILLIAM E. MCKNIGHT, JR., 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
 
K.S.A. 22-3716(b) authorizes a trial court revoking a defendant's probation to 
require the defendant to serve the sentence imposed, or any lesser sentence. A plain 
language reading of this section gives the trial court the authority to impose any sentence 
lesser than that originally imposed. Such a lesser sentence might be a shorter prison 
sentence, a shorter term of postrelease supervision, or any combination thereof. 
 
2. 
 
Once a legal sentence is pronounced from the bench, the trial court does not have 
jurisdiction to modify the sentence. The sentence is effective upon pronouncement from 
the bench, regardless of the court's intent at the time the sentence is pronounced. 
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 42 Kan. App. 2d 945, 219 P.3d 825 (2009). 
Appeal from Shawnee District Court; NANCY E. PARRISH, judge. Opinion filed August 12, 2011. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is reversed. Judgment of the district court is 
reversed and the sentence is vacated. 
 
Carl Folsom, III, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for 
appellant.  
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Natalie A. Chalmers, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Chadwick J. Taylor, district 
attorney, and Steve Six, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
ROSEN, J.:  William E. McKnight pleaded no contest to possession of marijuana 
with intent to distribute and was sentenced to 30 months' incarceration with 24 months' 
postrelease supervision. Because his crime fell in a border box on the drug grid, the trial 
court suspended the sentence and put McKnight on an 18-month probation. When 
McKnight violated the terms of his probation, the court revoked McKnight's probation 
and imposed a modified sentence of 22 months' incarceration. After a discussion during 
the probation revocation hearing, the court concluded that postrelease supervision did not 
apply because McKnight's probation was being revoked for technical violations. The 
court ultimately imposed a sentence of 22 months' incarceration with no period of 
postrelease supervision. 
 
Two months later, the State made an oral motion to correct an illegal sentence at a 
hearing with McKnight and his counsel present. The hearing was continued to allow the 
parties to review the transcript from the probation revocation hearing and conduct 
additional research. Two weeks later, with all parties present, the trial court found at the 
probation revocation hearing that "I mistakenly believed that there should have been no 
supervision in this particular case. I did not make a conscious decision to modify Mr. 
McKnight's sentence by not requiring post-release. It was more that I did not believe I 
could order post-release because it was a technical violation of probation." The court then 
imposed the modified 22 months' incarceration with 24 months' postrelease supervision.  
 
The Court of Appeals held that "[t]he mandatory period of postrelease supervision 
may not be reduced upon probation revocation unless K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 22-3716(e) is 
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applicable to the offender." State v. McKnight, 42 Kan. App. 2d 945, Syl. ¶ 4, 219 P.3d 
825 (2009). Therefore, the Court of Appeals found that the sentence originally imposed 
upon probation revocation was illegal and the trial court properly corrected the illegal 
sentence upon the State's motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. 
McKnight, 42 Kan. App. 2d at 948.  
 
MOOTNESS 
 
As an initial matter, the State filed a notice of change in custodial status on 
December 17, 2010, alleging that the Kansas Department of Corrections website, Kansas 
Adult Supervised Population Electronic Depository (KASPER), shows that McKnight 
was discharged from his sentence on October 12, 2010. We declined to issue a show 
cause order; instead, the notice was noted by the court on January 7, 2011. The only issue 
raised on appeal and in the petition for review is the sentencing issue regarding the trial 
court's reinstatement of the postrelease supervision period. If McKnight has been 
discharged and is no longer subject to postrelease supervision, the appeal would be moot. 
The State, however, did not argue that the case is moot, file a motion to dismiss based on 
a mootness argument, or provide any evidence beyond the notice filed in December.  
 
"The general rule is that an appellate court does not decide moot questions or 
render advisory opinions. The mootness doctrine is one of court policy which recognizes 
that it is the function of a judicial tribunal to determine real controversies relative to the 
legal rights of persons and properties which are actually involved in the particular case 
properly brought before it and to adjudicate those rights in such manner that the 
determination will be operative, final, and conclusive." Board of Johnson County 
Comm'rs v. Duffy, 259 Kan. 500, Syl. ¶ 1, 912 P.2d 716 (1996). 
 
In State v. Upham, No. 97,961, 2008 WL 1847703 (Kan. App. 2008) (unpublished 
opinion), the Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal where the only issue was whether the 
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trial court properly considered placement in Labette Correctional Conservation Camp 
because the defendant had finished the prison portion of the sentence. In Upham, the 
State moved to add to the record the KASPER printout and a form from the Kansas 
Department of Corrections indicating that the defendant had been released on supervised 
parole. The defendant did not respond to the State's mootness argument or deny that he 
had completed the contested part of his sentence. As a result, the Court of Appeals 
dismissed the appeal as moot. 
 
Unlike Upham, the State made no further effort to argue or prove that this appeal 
is moot. As a result, the record will not support a holding that the appeal is moot. Further, 
we must consider whether the issue is one that is likely to reoccur. 
 
"An appellate court may sometimes elect to entertain issues which, although 
moot, are subjects of real controversy and include issues of statewide interest and 
importance. Where a particular issue, although moot, is one capable of repetition and one 
of public importance, an appellate court may consider the appeal and render an opinion." 
Duffy, 259 Kan. 500, Syl. ¶ 2. 
 
Whether the trial court, at a probation revocation hearing, can impose a modified 
sentence that does not include a term of postrelease supervision is an issue that is likely to 
reoccur. Due to the length of time to complete a direct appeal, file a petition for review, 
and get the case docketed before this court, the issue is unlikely to arise in a case that is 
not moot.  
 
ANY LESSER SENTENCE 
 
K.S.A. 22-3716(b) authorizes a trial court revoking a defendant's probation to 
"require the defendant to serve the sentence imposed, or any lesser sentence." McKnight 
argues that the trial court, at the probation revocation hearing, had the statutory authority 
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to impose a sentence that did not include postrelease supervision as a lawful "lesser 
sentence." If the trial court imposed a lawful lesser sentence, the court was without 
jurisdiction to later modify that sentence. See, e.g., State v. Ballard, 289 Kan. 1000, 
1010-11, 218 P.3d 432 (2009). The State argues that postrelease supervision is mandated 
by K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(B) and that the only exception to postrelease supervision at a 
probation revocation hearing is for an offender to qualify for the K.S.A. 22-3716(e) 
exception. If the trial court imposed an illegal sentence at the probation revocation 
hearing, the court had jurisdiction to correct that sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504(1). 
 
Once a legal sentence is pronounced from the bench, the trial court does not have 
jurisdiction to modify the sentence. State v. McCoin, 278 Kan. 465, 468, 101 P.3d 1204 
(2004). "A sentence is effective upon pronouncement from the bench, regardless of the 
court's intent at the time the sentence is pronounced." Abasolo v. State, 284 Kan. 299, 
310, 160 P.3d 471 (2007). On the other hand, K.S.A. 22-3504(1) gives the court 
jurisdiction to correct an illegal sentence at any time. This court may review a claim by 
either party that the sentence imposed was an illegal sentence. See State v. McCarley, 287 
Kan. 167, 173-76, 195 P.3d 230 (2008). 
 
"An illegal sentence is a sentence imposed by a court without jurisdiction; a 
sentence which does not conform to the statutory provision, either in character or the 
term of the punishment authorized; or a sentence which is ambiguous with regard to the 
time and manner in which it is to be served." 
"Whether a criminal sentence is illegal, e.g., imposed without jurisdiction, is a 
question of law with unlimited review." 
 
"The sentencing of a criminal defendant is strictly controlled by statute." 
 
"The existence of jurisdiction is a question of law over which this court's review 
is unlimited." McCarley, 287 Kan. 167, Syl. ¶¶ 1, 2, 5, and 8. 
 
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"Interpretation of a sentencing statute is a question of law and the appellate court's 
standard of review is unlimited." State v. Riojas, 288 Kan. 379, Syl. ¶ 7, 204 P.3d 578 
(2009).  
 
K.S.A. 22-3716(b) authorizes a trial court revoking a defendant's probation to 
"require the defendant to serve the sentence imposed, or any lesser sentence." K.S.A. 22-
3716(e) exempts certain offenders from serving postrelease supervision when their 
probation was revoked for technical violations rather than commission of a new crime. 
This section does not apply to offenders "whose offense falls within a border box of 
either the sentencing guidelines grid for nondrug or drug crimes." K.S.A. 22-3716(e). 
McKnight does not qualify for the K.S.A. 22-3716(e) exception because his offense was 
a border box crime.  
 
The Court of Appeals concluded that "[t]he mandatory period of postrelease 
supervision may not be reduced upon probation revocation unless K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 22-
3716(e) is applicable to that offender." McKnight, 42 Kan. App. 2d at 948. This court has 
not ruled on whether the mandatory period of postrelease supervision may be reduced at a 
probation revocation hearing as part of a "lesser sentence" imposed pursuant to K.S.A. 
22-3716(b). The Court of Appeals, however, has addressed this issue in other cases. 
 
In State v. Bishop, No. 99,928, 2009 WL 744193 (Kan. App. 2009) (unpublished 
opinion), the Court of Appeals considered a situation strikingly similar to that presented 
in this case. At a probation revocation hearing, the trial judge imposed no postrelease 
supervision term because Bishop's probation was revoked for technical violations. 
Bishop, 2009 WL 744193, at *1. Like McKnight, Bishop's crime fell in a border box of 
the sentencing guidelines drug grid. The panel rejected Bishop's argument that the 
sentence without a term of postrelease supervision was a lawfully imposed "lesser 
sentence" under K.S.A. 22-3716(b). Bishop, 2009 WL 744193, at *2. 
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To reach this conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied upon K.S.A. 21-4705(c)(2), 
which states: 
 
"In presumptive imprisonment cases, the sentencing court shall pronounce the 
complete sentence which shall include the prison sentence, the maximum potential 
reduction to such sentence as a result of good time and the period of postrelease 
supervision at the sentencing hearing. Failure to pronounce the period of postrelease 
supervision shall not negate the existence of such period of postrelease supervision." 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
The Court of Appeals also looked to K.S.A. 22-3717(d)(1)(B), which states: 
 
"(d)(1) Persons sentenced for crimes, other than off-grid crimes, committed on or 
after July 1, 1993, or persons subject to subparagraph (G), will not be eligible for parole, 
but will be released to a mandatory period of postrelease supervision upon completion of 
the prison portion of their sentence as follows: 
. . . . 
"(B) Except as provided in subparagraphs (D) and (E), persons sentenced for 
nondrug severity levels 5 and 6 crimes and drug severity level 3 crimes must serve 24 
months, plus the amount of good time and program credit earned and retained pursuant to 
K.S.A. 21-4722, and amendments thereto, on postrelease supervision." (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
Further, the Court of Appeals was persuaded by State v. Johnson, 39 Kan. App. 2d 
438, 180 P.3d 1084, rev. denied 286 Kan. 1183 (2008). In Johnson, the Court of Appeals 
dismissed an appeal as moot because the defendant had served the entire incarceration 
portion of his sentence. The panel rejected the defendant's contention that, upon remand 
for another probation revocation hearing, he could argue for a reduction in his postrelease 
supervision time because K.S.A. 22-3716(b) does not address postrelease supervision. 
The Court of Appeals noted that a trial court could extend the postrelease supervision 
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period upon a finding that the crime was sexually motivated, but the statute did not allow 
for a reduction in the postrelease supervision term. Johnson, 39 Kan. App. 2d at 442. 
 
We disagree. The analysis of K.S.A. 22-3716(b) must begin with the plain 
language of the statute. "The fundamental rule to which all other rules are subordinate is 
that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. [Citation 
omitted.] Intent of the legislature is to be derived in the first place from the words used." 
McCarley, 287 Kan. at 178. The relevant language to be interpreted is:  
 
"[I]f the violation is established, the court may continue or revoke the probation, 
assignment to a community correctional services program, suspension of sentence or 
nonprison sanction and may require the defendant to serve the sentence imposed, or any 
lesser sentence, and, if imposition of sentence was suspended, may impose any sentence 
which might originally have been imposed." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 22-3716(b).  
 
K.S.A. 22-3716(b) authorizes a trial court revoking a defendant's probation to 
"require the defendant to serve the sentence imposed, or any lesser sentence," but the 
statute does not go on to define "lesser sentence." If imposition of the sentence was 
suspended, however, the statute limits the court's discretion to "impose any sentence 
which might have originally been imposed."  
 
At initial sentencing, the trial court does not have discretion to impose a term of 
postrelease supervision that is shorter than the period mandated by statute. Ballard, 289 
Kan. at 1012; State v. Baber, 44 Kan. App. 2d 748, 754, 240 P.3d 980 (2010). In Ballard, 
this court considered whether a trial court had jurisdiction to impose a shorter term of 
postrelease supervision along with a departure sentence. Ballard pleaded no contest to 
aggravated indecent liberties with a child pursuant to a plea agreement in which he and 
the State jointly requested a downward durational departure, from off-grid to the grid 
block appropriate for a severity level 3 person felony. Ballard, 289 Kan. at 1002. At 
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sentencing, the court imposed a downward durational departure sentence of 55 months, 
with 36 months' postrelease supervision based on the departure to the grid. Ballard, 289 
Kan. at 1003. This court ultimately concluded that Ballard's initial sentence of 36 months' 
postrelease supervision did not conform to the statutory provision and was therefore 
illegal. Because the sentence was illegal, the trial court had jurisdiction to correct the 
illegal sentence and impose the lengthier lifetime postrelease supervision. Ballard, 289 
Kan. at 1012. 
 
In cases where a sentence was announced, but probation was granted, the court 
"may require that defendant serve the sentence imposed, or any lesser sentence." The 
phrase "any lesser sentence" is not defined, and the "lesser sentence" is not limited to that 
which might have been imposed at sentencing. A plain language reading of K.S.A. 22-
3716(b) gives the trial court the authority to impose any sentence less than that originally 
imposed. Such a "lesser sentence" might be a shorter prison sentence, a shorter term of 
postrelease supervision, or any combination thereof.  
 
If the legislature intended to limit the trial court's discretion to imposing only a 
lesser prison sentence, K.S.A. 22-3716(b) should specifically state "any lesser prison 
sentence" or define what "lesser sentence" might be imposed by the court. Arkansas, for 
example, provides that at a probation revocation hearing "the court may revoke the 
probation and require the probationer to serve the sentence imposed or any lesser 
sentence which might have been originally imposed." (Emphasis added.) Ark. Code Ann. 
§ 16-93-402(c)(5) (2010). Such language would clearly limit the trial court's imposition 
of a lesser sentence that includes the statutory postrelease supervision term. 
 
Contrary to the State's position, K.S.A. 22-3716(e) does not require that 
postrelease supervision be imposed at a probation revocation hearing. K.S.A. 22-3716(e) 
describes a number of situations in which a period of postrelease supervision cannot be 
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imposed at a probation revocation hearing. This section does not require that a period of 
postrelease supervision be imposed in all other circumstances. 
 
At McKnight's probation revocation hearing, the trial court imposed a legal lesser 
sentence of 22 months' incarceration with no postrelease supervision. Whether the trial 
court mistakenly imposed no postrelease supervision due to a misunderstanding of K.S.A. 
22-3716(e) is not relevant. "A sentence is effective upon pronouncement from the bench, 
regardless of the court's intent at the time the sentence is pronounced." Abasolo, 284 Kan. 
at 310. The trial court imposed a legal sentence; therefore, the court did not have 
jurisdiction to later modify that sentence. See McCoin, 278 Kan. at 468. 
 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is reversed. 
Judgment of the district court is reversed and the sentence imposing postrelease 
supervision is vacated and the sentence originally imposed at the probation revocation 
hearing of 22 months' incarceration with no postrelease supervision is affirmed. 
 
MORITZ, J., not participating. 
 
DANIEL A. DUNCAN, District Judge, assigned.1 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE: District Judge Duncan was appointed to hear case No. 100,246 
vice Justice Moritz pursuant to the authority vested in the Supreme Court by Art. 3, § 6(f) 
of the Kansas Constitution.