Case Title: State v. Ralph D. Smythe

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1997AP003191

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1999-05-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-3191 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
In the Matter of the Refusal of Ralph D.  
Smythe: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Ralph D. Smythe,  
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(No Cite) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 14, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
November 11, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Sauk 
 
JUDGE: 
Patrick Taggart 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Bradley, J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
 
Abrahamson, C.J., joins. 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were 
briefs by Ralph A. Kalal and Kalal & Associates, Madison and oral 
argument by Ralph A. Kalal. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by James H. McDermott, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
No. 
  
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-3191  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Ralph D. Smythe, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 14, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of an order of the Court of Appeals.   Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   The petitioner, Ralph D. Smythe 
(Smythe), seeks review of an order dismissing his appeal of the 
circuit court's determination that his refusal to submit to a 
breath test was unreasonable and that his operating privileges 
should be revoked.  The court of appeals denied a request by 
Smythe's counsel, Ralph A. Kalal (Kalal), for an eight-day 
extension (five working days) to file his brief and then, 
applying Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.83(2) (1995-96),1 it dismissed 
the appeal as a sanction for failure to file a brief. 
¶2 
Although the request for extension was the first in 
this case, Judge Charles P. Dykman noted that Kalal's firm had a 
"long history" of requesting time extensions and that the court 
                     
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 1995-
96 version unless otherwise noted.  
No. 97-3191  
 
2 
of appeals, in the past, had issued "stern warnings" and taken 
other actions in an attempt to reduce such requests from the 
firm.  Judge Dykman concluded that a scheduled vacation over the 
winter holidays by an associate in Kalal's office was not a 
showing of "good cause" for the requested five-day extension 
because it did not explain why 40 days was not sufficient time 
to brief the appeal.  Consequently, the court applied what it 
described as its "usual sanction" for failure to file a brief – 
dismissal.  On January 9, 1998, the court of appeals refused to 
reconsider that dismissal.   
¶3 
The petitioner seeks review of the following issue:  
Does Rule 809.83(2), pertaining to the imposition of sanctions, 
allow the court of appeals to dismiss a party's appeal as a 
sanction against the party's counsel, based upon the conduct of 
the counsel in other cases not involving the party and occurring 
in the past?  We conclude that a court of appeals decision to 
dismiss an appeal may be reversed when there is compelling 
evidence that that court based its decision, in part, on the 
past practices of counsel in unrelated matters.  Because the 
court based its decision in this case partly on past, unrelated 
extension practices by Attorney Kalal, we reverse the order and 
remand the case for reconsideration. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶4 
On January 18, 1997, Ralph Smythe was stopped for 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an 
intoxicant.  He refused to submit to a test of his breath, and 
as a result, a refusal hearing was held in Sauk County on June 
No. 97-3191  
 
3 
12, 1997, under Wis. Stat. § 343.305.  On October 15, 1997, 
Smythe's operating privileges were revoked by court order.  
Smythe appealed the order, giving timely notice of the appeal.  
The record was filed in the court of appeals on November 17, 
1997, and the opening brief for this appeal was due on December 
29, 1997.  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.19.2 
¶5 
On the due date, Smythe's counsel, Ralph Kalal, filed 
a motion to extend for five working days the time in which to 
file the opening brief.  The motion stated that the attorney 
assigned responsibility for preparation of the appeal brief, 
Michelle A. Tjader, was on a previously planned vacation from 
December 25, 1997, through January 4, 1998.  The motion further 
stated that due to the vacation, the attorney was able to 
complete only a draft of the brief prior to her scheduled 
vacation.   
¶6 
In an opinion and order dated January 2, 1998, the 
court of appeals, acting through a single judge, denied the 
motion to extend the time to file the brief and dismissed 
Smythe's appeal for failure to file a brief.  The court stated: 
 
Appellant's counsel's firm has a long history of 
extension motions in this court, and we have in the 
past issued stern warnings and taken other actions to 
attempt to reduce their number.  We have noted the 
toll these motions take on this court's time and 
resources.  We have advised counsel that extension 
motions based on counsel's heavy workload fail to make 
the showing of good cause required by Rule 809.82(2), 
                     
2 Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.19(1), states in pertinent part:  
"The appellant shall file a brief within 40 days of the filing 
in the court of the record on appeal."  
No. 97-3191  
 
4 
Stats., when they become routine.  In the past, such 
motions were routine.  For much of this past year, 
counsel's firm has been reasonable in its requests for 
extensions.  However, we have again noted an increase 
in such motions.  That increase, combined with this 
motion's complete absence of any showing of why the 
brief could not be completed during the five weeks 
before counsel's vacation, leads us to conclude that 
good cause has not been shown.  Therefore, we deny the 
motion.   
The court then went on to dismiss the appeal, stating, "Our 
usual sanction for failure to file an appellant's brief is 
dismissal." 
¶7 
On January 6, 1998, Kalal filed a renewed motion to 
extend the time for filing the appeal brief.  He advanced three 
arguments.  First, Kalal stated that the court was faulting 
Kalal for his past requests for extension of time.  Kalal argued 
that his past requests for extension had been no greater than 
those requested by his opponents.  He contended that in 1997, of 
80 total briefs he filed, only 15 extensions of time were 
requested.  Kalal asserted that given the fact that he often 
files two briefs while his opponents file one, his percentage 
record was actually better than the record of his opponents in 
the same appeals.  
¶8 
Second, Kalal argued that he would have been better 
off under the court's internal operating procedures if he would 
not have filed the motion to extend.3  He stated that if he had 
not requested an extension, the court would likely have issued a 
delinquency notice stating that he must file a brief within five 
days of issuance of the notice.  According to Kalal, under this 
                     
3 Wis. Ct. App. IOP VI(3)(h).  
No. 97-3191  
 
5 
scenario, he would have been granted an extension and the case 
would not have been dismissed. 
¶9 
Finally, Kalal acknowledged that he did not provide a 
sufficient factual background in his original motion for an 
extension.  Kalal attributed the insufficiency to the fact that 
he interrupted his own family vacation to draft the motion and 
that his children were present in his office while he drafted 
the motion. 
¶10 The court of appeals, in an order dated January 9, 
1998, denied Kalal's renewed motion to extend and confirmed the 
order of dismissal.  The court of appeals stated that opposing 
parties filed an equal number of requests for time extensions 
because they were generally prosecution offices with limited 
budgets and no control over their dockets.  The court also 
stated that since Kalal had control over his caseload and 
budget, he should be able to conduct his business in a manner 
that did not unduly burden the court of appeals. 
¶11 In addition, the court explained that a delinquency 
notice is a statement of forbearance from imposing a sanction 
which the court might otherwise impose; it is not an extension 
of time.  The court stated, "The fact that we refrain from 
immediately imposing sanctions in the normal case does not mean 
that we must do so in the abnormal case."   
¶12 Finally, the court noted that the renewed motion added 
little information and therefore failed to demonstrate good 
cause for an extension.  The court of appeals thus denied 
No. 97-3191  
 
6 
Kalal's renewed motion 
to 
extend 
the 
time 
to 
file the 
appellant's brief. 
¶13 This court granted Smythe's petition for review on the 
issue whether Rule 809.83(2) allows the court of appeals to 
dismiss a party's appeal as a sanction against counsel based 
upon the conduct of counsel in other cases not involving the 
party and occurring in the past. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
¶14 This 
controversy 
involves 
the court 
of appeals' 
discretionary act of dismissing an appeal for failure to file a 
brief.  The Supreme Court "will ordinarily refrain from 
reviewing 
a 
discretionary 
determination 
of 
the 
court 
of 
appeals."  State v. McConnohie, 113 Wis. 2d 362, 369, 334 N.W.2d 
903 (1983).  "If this court does review, we must review the 
court of appeals' decision as we would any other exercise of 
discretion."  State v. Johnson, 149 Wis. 2d 418, 429, 439 N.W.2d 
122 (1989), confirmed on reconsideration, 153 Wis. 2d 121, 449 
N.W.2d 
845 
(1990). 
 
A 
reviewing 
court 
will 
sustain 
a 
discretionary decision if it finds that that the lower court (1) 
examined the relevant facts, (2) applied a proper standard of 
law, and (3) used a demonstrative rational process in reaching a 
conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach.  See Loy v. 
Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175 (1982).  A 
reviewing court will not sustain a discretionary decision if the 
decision is based upon an improper standard of law, for that 
would constitute an erroneous exercise of discretion. 
ANALYSIS 
No. 97-3191  
 
7 
I. 
¶15 This case presents a clash between two competing 
interests:  a litigant's right to appeal and an appellate 
court's right to manage its heavy caseload. 
¶16 The right to appeal the final judgment of a circuit 
court is an important right.  For a criminal defendant, the 
right to appeal has been characterized as "absolute," State v. 
Perry, 136 Wis. 2d 92, 98, 401 N.W.2d 748 (1987), because it is 
guaranteed by the Wisconsin Constitution.  Wis. Const. art. I, 
§ 21(1).4  In other situations, the right to appeal is governed 
by statute.  See State v. Newman, 162 Wis. 2d 41, 46, 469 N.W.2d 
394 (1991); State v. Rabe, 96 Wis. 2d 48, 59, 291 N.W.2d 809 
(1980). 
¶17 Before the creation of the court of appeals, appeals 
from the circuit court were reviewed in the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court.  By the mid-1970s this court was swamped with cases.  In 
April 1977, the people amended the Wisconsin Constitution to 
create an intermediate appellate court, and the legislature 
acted quickly to implement the amendment with legislation.  The 
first twelve judges of the court of appeals were elected in 
April 1978, and the court began business the following August. 
¶18 Since 1978, Wis. Stat. § 808.03(1) has provided that 
"[a] final judgment or a final order of a circuit court may be 
                     
4 Article I, § 21(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution provides: 
Writs of error shall never be prohibited, and shall be 
issued by such courts as the legislature designates by 
law.  
No. 97-3191  
 
8 
appealed as a matter of right to the court of appeals unless 
otherwise expressly provided by law."  (Emphasis added). 
¶19 In State v. Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d 749, 778, 482 N.W.2d 
883 (1992), this court declared that, "Once the right to appeal 
is granted, a defendant is protected by the due process and 
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . ."  
These protections are not limited to criminal defendants.  Due 
process requires that the right to appeal not be rendered 
meaningless.  Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).  In 
order for an appeal to be considered meaningful, "the party 
seeking review must be afforded the right to be heard at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."  City of Middleton 
v. Hennen, 206 Wis. 2d 347, 354, 557 N.W.2d 818 (Ct. App. 1996). 
¶20 Of course, even a right guaranteed by the constitution 
can be waived or squandered. 
¶21 Today the court of appeals is the court swamped with 
cases.  The court has an enormous burden.  Its caseload has 
grown tremendously in the twenty plus years since its inception. 
 In 1979, the court's first full year, 1,983 cases were filed 
with the court of appeals.5  Combined with 809 cases carried over 
from the previous year and 13 cases reinstated, the court had 
2,805 cases on its docket in 1979.  In 1998, the last full year 
for which statistics are available, 3,577 cases were filed with 
                     
5  All statistical references to calendar year 1979, unless 
otherwise noted, are to a report dated April 1, 1980, by Judge 
John A. Decker, the Chief Judge of the Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals. 
No. 97-3191  
 
9 
the court.  Combined with the 2,303 cases carried over from 
1997, the court had 5,880 cases on its docket in 1998.6 
¶22 Four additional judges have been added to the court 
since 1978; but, as one writer recently noted, "while judges and 
staff have increased by only 33% over the past 20 years, the 
number of appeals filed has increased over 300% of the expected 
maximum number of appeals."7  Matthew E. Gabrys, Comment, A Shift 
in the Bottleneck:  The Appellate Caseload Problem Twenty Years 
After the Creation of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, 1998 Wis. 
L. Rev. 1547, 1567. 
¶23 Originally, the special committee which recommended 
creating the court of appeals suggested that each judge on the 
court would be responsible for terminating approximately 100 
appeals per year.  Id. at 1552.  This benchmark has been 
substantially exceeded from the beginning.  In 1979, with 12 
judges, the court of appeals terminated 1760 cases – an average 
of 147 terminations per judge.  In 1998, with 16 judges, the 
court terminated 3,777 cases – an average of 236 terminations 
per judge. 
¶24 Case numbers tell only part of the story.  The court 
of appeals has been overwhelmed by a torrent of motions.  In 
1997, 4,970 general and substantive motions were filed; 2,358 
                     
6 All case statistics from calendar year 1998, unless 
otherwise noted, are from a cumulative statistical report dated 
January 4, 1999, issued by Marilyn L. Graves, Clerk of the 
Wisconsin Court of Appeals. 
7 The expected maximum number of appeals was 1200 appeals 
per year. 
No. 97-3191  
 
10
motions were filed for cases not yet pending before the court; 
and 2,016 motions were filed for extensions of time on briefs, 
records, transcripts, et cetera.  In total, 9,344 motions were 
filed with the court in 1997.  In 1998, 4,943 general and 
substantive motions were filed; 2,365 motions were filed for 
cases not yet pending before the court; and 2,183 motions were 
filed for extensions of time on briefs, records, transcripts, et 
cetera.  In total, 9,491 motions were filed with the court 
during 1998.8  Virtually all these motions required a response. 
¶25 We are thus presented with a situation in which two 
important, competing interests have collided.  On the one hand, 
this court must recognize the constitutional or statutory right 
of a litigant to have the litigant's appeal heard in a timely 
and meaningful manner in the court of appeals.  On the other 
hand, we must recognize the heavy and overwhelming workload of 
the court of appeals and permit the court to manage its workload 
in an efficient, effective manner.  With these two competing 
interests as a backdrop, this court must determine if the court 
of appeals reasonably exercised its discretion when the court 
                     
8 All motion statistics from calendar years 1997 and 1998  
are from internal memoranda dated January 5, 1998, and January 
5, 1999, from Marilyn L. Graves, Clerk of the Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals, to the judges of the Court of Appeals.  Each memo 
summarized and totaled from the preceding year the monthly data 
on motions contained in the clerk's monthly statistical reports 
on the court of appeals.  These monthly reports are public 
documents.  Current monthly reports can be found on the court's 
website:  www.courts.state.wi.us.  
No. 97-3191  
 
11
dismissed Smythe's appeal as a sanction for Smythe's counsel's 
failure to timely file a brief. 
 
¶26 It should be emphasized that this case is different 
from a situation in which a court does not gain jurisdiction 
because a party or the party's counsel fails to act in a timely 
manner.  For instance, a party must file a notice of appeal 
within 45 days of entry of judgment if written notice of the 
judgment is given within 21 days of the judgment.  Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 808.04(1).  Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.10(1)(b) 
provides that:  "The filing of a timely notice of appeal is 
necessary to give the court jurisdiction over the appeal."  If a 
party fails to file a notice of appeal within the time specified 
by § 808.04(1), the court does not have jurisdiction over the 
case and has no discretion whether to accept the appeal.9  In 
that situation, the court does not examine who should be faulted 
for the tardy filing or whether the litigant had good cause. 
¶27 This case involves a discretionary decision by the 
court of appeals.  It does not involve the jurisdiction of the 
court.  In fact, the relevant statute specifically provides that 
jurisdiction is not affected by a party's failure to follow 
procedural rules.  Wisconsin Statute § (Rule) 809.19 requires an 
appellant to file a brief within 40 days of filing in the court 
of the record on appeal.  The Rules of Appellate Procedure 
further provide: 
                     
9 For another situation in which jurisdiction was not 
acquired because of late filing, see McDonald Lumber Co. v. Wis. 
Dept. of Revenue, 117 Wis. 2d 446, 344 N.W.2d 210 (1984).  
No. 97-3191  
 
12
 
Failure of a person to comply with a requirement of 
these rules, other than the timely filing of a notice 
of appeal or cross-appeal, does not affect the 
jurisdiction of the court over the appeal but is 
grounds for dismissal of the appeal, summary reversal, 
striking of a paper, imposition of a penalty or costs 
on a party or counsel, or other action as the court 
considers appropriate. 
Wisconsin Statute § (Rule) 809.83(2).  Because this case does 
not involve an untimely notice of appeal, dismissal of the 
appeal for failure to file a brief by the due date involves 
discretion, not jurisdiction. 
¶28 Section 809.83(2) sets out a variety of sanctions to 
address a litigant's failure to follow the appellate rules.  
These include dismissal of the appeal, summary reversal, 
striking of a paper, imposition of a penalty or costs on a party 
or counsel, or other actions as the court considers appropriate. 
¶29 Dismissal with prejudice is a drastic sanction.10  In 
Hudson Diesel, Inc. v. Kenall, 194 Wis. 2d 531, 542, 535 N.W.2d 
65 (Ct. App. 1995), the court of appeals declared that "Because 
dismissal of a complaint terminates the litigation without 
regard to the merits of the claim, dismissal is an extremely 
drastic penalty that should be imposed only where such harsh 
                     
10 See 20 Jeremy C. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice 
§ 303.31(3)(d) (3d ed. 1998) ("Dismissal of an appeal is a 
drastic 
sanction 
that 
should 
not 
be 
imposed 
for 
minor 
infractions of the rules.").  See also Dabney v. Burrell, 67 
F.R.D. 132, 133 (D. Md. 1975)  ("Dismissal with prejudice is a 
drastic sanction.  It is reserved for extreme situations where 
there is compelling evidence of willful default."); Wright & 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure:  Civil § 2369, at 340 
(2d ed. 1995).    
No. 97-3191  
 
13
measures are necessary."  Dismissal of a complaint and dismissal 
of an appeal are not the same and may not entail identical 
justifications.  Nonetheless, dismissal of an appeal represents 
an abrupt termination of litigation and in many cases it imposes 
a finality to both issues and claims.  For that reason, it is 
fitting that we adopt substantially similar criteria for 
dismissing an appeal. 
¶30 In Johnson v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 162 Wis. 2d 261, 
470 N.W.2d 859 (1991), we stated that "dismissal [of litigation] 
is improper . . . unless bad faith or egregious conduct can be 
shown on the part of the non-complying party."  Johnson, 162 
Wis. 2d at 275, citing Trispel v. Haefer, 89 Wis. 2d 725, 279 
N.W.2d 242 (1979).  The court also pointed to Trispel for the 
proposition that dismissal is improper if the non-complying 
party shows a "clear and justifiable" excuse for the conduct.  
Johnson, 162 Wis. 2d at 276. 
¶31 For a court to dismiss an appeal under § 809.83(2), 
there must be a showing that the party or the party's attorney 
has demonstrated bad faith or egregious conduct, or there must 
be a common sense finding that the appeal has been abandoned.  
In appropriate circumstances, the bad faith or egregious conduct 
of the party's attorney may be imputed to the party in order to 
No. 97-3191  
 
14
justify the dismissal.11  However, in these unusual situations, 
the conduct of the attorney should involve the same litigation. 
¶32 As we noted in Johnson, a "clear and justifiable" 
excuse is a defense for not complying with the rules.  While we 
cannot foresee every possible fact situation, it is difficult to 
conceive how an appellant can be guilty of bad faith or 
egregious conduct and still have a "clear and justifiable 
excuse" for non-compliance. 
¶33 In this case, there is compelling evidence in the 
record that the court relied impermissibly, at least in part, on 
Attorney Kalal's past practices in unrelated cases in dismissing 
the Smythe appeal.  In the court's January 2, 1998, order, the 
court said in part: 
 
We have advised counsel that extension motions based 
on counsel's heavy workload fail to make the showing 
of good cause . . . when they become routine.  In the 
past, such motions were routine.  For much of this 
past year, counsel's firm has been reasonable in its 
requests for extensions.  However, we have again noted 
an increase in such motions.  That increase, combined 
with this motion's complete absence of any showing of 
why the brief could not be completed during the five 
                     
11 The conduct of an attorney may be imputed to a client if 
the client failed to act as a reasonable and prudent person in 
engaging an attorney of good reputation, failed to rely upon the 
attorney to protect his or her rights, and failed to make a 
reasonable 
inquiry 
concerning 
the 
proceedings. 
 
Charolais 
Breeding Ranches, Ltd. v. Wiegel, 92 Wis. 2d 498, 514, 285 
N.W.2d 720 (1979); Wagner v. Springaire Corp., 50 Wis. 2d 212, 
221, 184 N.W.2d 88 (1971); Paschong v. Hollenbeck, 13 Wis. 2d 
415, 423, 108 N.W.2d 668 (1961).  Evidence of complicity, cf. 
United States v. Ford, 806 F.2d 769, 770 (7th Cir. 1986), or 
inexcusable neglect, cf. Charolais Breeding Ranches, 92 Wis. 2d 
498, strengthens the case against the client. 
No. 97-3191  
 
15
weeks before counsel's vacation, leads us to conclude 
that good cause has not been shown. 
¶34 The increase in Kalal's motions for extension in 
unrelated cases was cited as the first reason why Kalal's motion 
in Smythe's case was denied.  This was reaffirmed in the court's 
January 9, 1998, order, in which the court said: 
 
As stated in [the January 2 order], we denied the 
motion due to appellant's counsel's long history of 
extension motions in this court and the inadequate 
showing made in this particular motion. 
 
¶35 There is no evidence in the record of Smythe's 
complicity in or knowledge of the delay in filing the brief nor 
his 
involvement 
in 
any 
of 
Kalal's 
previous 
motions 
for 
extension.  As a result, we are unable to discern from the 
record the kind of egregious conduct by the attorney which may 
properly be imputed to the client.  Hence, the court applied an 
improper standard of law in its decision and we must reverse. 
 
¶36 Although we remand to the court of appeals for 
reconsideration, we think it unlikely the court will find bad 
faith or egregious conduct in a request for an extension of five 
working days overlapping the New Year's weekend.  Kalal's 
original motion made a point that "No other requests for 
extensions of time have been made herein or are contemplated."  
This does not suggest the type of protracted delay or abuse that 
will justify dismissal of an appeal.  Absent Kalal's motions in 
unrelated matters, this case does not appear to be "the abnormal 
case." 
II. 
No. 97-3191  
 
16
 
¶37 Our reversal of the dismissal order in this case 
should not be interpreted as an impairment of the court's power 
to dismiss appeals in appropriate circumstances.  Recently, we 
denied a petition for review in another case, State v. Baake, 
97-3852-CR, in which the court of appeals dismissed an appeal 
based upon Baake's failure to file a brief and appendix in 
compliance with Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.19.  In that dismissal, 
the court properly utilized its power to sanction under § (Rule) 
809.83(2).12  This court can be expected to affirm dismissals 
based upon bad faith, egregious conduct, or a litigant's 
effective abandonment of the appeal. 
 
¶38 We will also support sanctions directed personally at 
those attorneys whose slipshod practices abuse the system, 
create unnecessary work, and delay speedy justice for others.  
Section (Rule) 809.83(2) invites penalties, costs, and other 
actions the court considers appropriate.  Subsection (1) of the 
statute 
authorizes 
double 
costs, 
damages, 
and 
reasonable 
attorneys fees as sanctions available for appeals taken for the 
purpose of delay, and these tough sanctions may also be applied 
under subsection (2) "as the court considers appropriate."  The 
court of appeals might consider removing a non-complying 
attorney from the litigation.  It may also wish to refer 
particular attorneys to the Board of Attorneys Professional 
Responsibility for discipline. 
                     
12 See State ex rel. Blackdeer v. Levis Tp., 176 Wis. 2d 
252, 260, 500 N.W.2d 339 (1993), for discussion of summary 
reversal as a sanction for failure to file a brief. 
No. 97-3191  
 
17
III. 
 
¶39 In remanding this case to the court of appeals, we 
note that the order denying Kalal's motion and dismissing 
Kalal's appeal was issued by the Presiding Judge, acting alone. 
 
¶40 The Presiding Judge has a responsibility to exercise 
continuous 
leadership 
in 
management 
of 
the 
court's 
case 
assignment and processing systems and to initiate development of 
policy 
concerning 
the 
court's 
internal 
operations. 
 
The 
Presiding Judge has a duty to oversee and address the court's 
heavy caseload. 
 
¶41 According 
to 
the 
court's 
internal 
operating 
procedures, "Following filing of briefs, the Presiding Judge 
schedules a screening conference for members of the panel. . . . 
 One-judge appeals are identified and assigned by the Presiding 
Judge. . . ."  Wis. Ct. App. IOP VI(1) (June 13, 1994) (Emphasis 
added). 
 
¶42 The motions judge is the judge designated by the 
Presiding Judge to hear motions.  In the event the motions judge 
is not available, any other judge may consider a motion.  Wis. 
Ct. App. IOP VI(3).  The motions judge "may act on all motions, 
except those that reach the merits or preclude the merits from 
being reached, which can only be acted on by the panel.  The 
motions judge may direct that any motion be acted on by the 
panel.  The panel considers motions . . . that preclude the 
merits from being reached. . . .  The panel considers these 
motions at regularly scheduled or specially called motions 
conferences. . . ."  Wis. Ct. App. IOP VI(3)(c). 
No. 97-3191  
 
18
 
¶43 In 
one-judge 
appeals 
specified 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 752.31(2), "Motions and petitions . . . are decided by one 
Court of Appeals judge."  Wis. Ct. App. IOP VI(12)(b)(June 13, 
1994).  Standing alone, this provision explains how a single 
judge can deny a motion and dismiss an appeal.  But read 
together with either IOP VI(1) in which assignment of appeals is 
triggered by the filing of a brief or IOP VI(3)(h) in which 
extension motions are occasionally presented to the motions 
judge, the provision does not make clear how this case came 
before the Presiding Judge.  The procedure ought to be clarified 
for future cases.  
 
¶44 Because the court based its order to dismiss Smythe's 
appeal in part on the past, unrelated practice of Smythe's 
attorney, we reverse and remand the case to the court of appeals 
for reconsideration. 
By the Court.—The order of the court of appeals is reversed 
and the cause remanded. 
 
97-3191.awb 
 
1 
¶45 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (Concurring).   I agree with the 
majority that the court of appeals did not articulate a 
permissible reason to dismiss Smythe's appeal.  Requesting a 
five working day extension to file a brief, absent more, does 
not justify the imposition of this drastic penalty under Wis. 
Stat. (Rule) § 809.83(2).   
¶46 As we said most recently in Johnson v. Allis Chalmers 
Corp., 162 Wis. 2d 261, 275-76, 470 N.W.2d 859 (1991), the 
sanction of dismissal is only appropriate where the record 
reflects that a party's failure to comply with a court order 
both is without excuse and egregious.  While Attorney Kalal's 
conduct may have been without excuse, nowhere in the court of 
appeals' dismissal of Smythe's appeal or in its reconsideration 
of that dismissal is there any suggestion that it was egregious. 
  
¶47 Further, there is nothing in the record that would 
support a finding that Attorney Kalal's conduct in this case was 
egregious.  Even the majority opinion hesitatingly acknowledges 
this when it states: 
 
we think it unlikely the court will find bad faith or 
egregious conduct in a request for an extension of 
five 
working 
days 
overlapping 
the 
New 
Year’s 
weekend. . . .  This does not suggest the type of 
protracted delay or abuse that will justify dismissal 
of an appeal.  Majority op. at 15-16. 
¶48 I therefore see no point in remanding this case to the 
court of appeals for the purpose of having it review the same 
record to reconsider its dismissal.  Quite simply, on this 
record dismissal is not an option.  There is no reason to have 
97-3191.awb 
 
2 
the already overburdened court of appeals take additional time 
to reconsider its dismissal when the answer is foreordained. 
Accordingly, I would remand the case to the court of appeals to 
have it consider the merits of Smythe's appeal. 
¶49 I am authorized to state that CHIEF JUSTICE SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this opinion. 
 
97-3191.awb 
 
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