Case Title: Ronald A. Schaefer v. Robert G. Riegelman

Citation: 2002 WI 18

Docket Number: 2000AP002157

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2002-02-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
2002 WI 18 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
00-2157 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Ronald A. Schaefer,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Robert G. Riegelman,  
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 27, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 5, 2001   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Racine   
 
JUDGE: 
Bruce E. Schroeder   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY and PROSSER, J.J., join dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there were briefs by Robert R. 
Weinstine and Winthrop & Weinstine, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, and 
oral argument by Thomas H. Boyd. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Terry E. 
Johnson, David F. Andres and Peterson, Johnson & Murray, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Terry E. Johnson. 
 
 
2002 WI 18 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The 
final version will appear in the 
bound 
volume 
of 
the 
official 
reports.   
No.  00-2157  
(L.C. No. 
99 CV 1382) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Ronald A. Schaefer,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Robert G. Riegelman,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 27, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Racine 
County, Bruce E. Schroeder, Judge.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   In this case we review a summary 
judgment order of the Racine County Circuit Court, Bruce E. 
Schroeder, Judge.  The circuit court held that because the 
plaintiff's summons and complaint were signed by an attorney who 
was not licensed to practice law in Wisconsin, they contained a 
fundamental 
defect, 
which 
deprived 
the 
circuit 
court 
of 
jurisdiction even though the signature was made on behalf of and 
at the direction of an attorney who was licensed in Wisconsin. 
¶2 
The plaintiff, Ronald Schaefer, attempted to commence 
a legal malpractice action against Attorney Robert Riegelman.  
No. 
00-2157   
 
2 
 
The original summons and complaint were signed by Attorney Julie 
Fishel 
on 
behalf 
of 
Attorney 
Robert 
R. 
Weinstine 
with 
Weinstine's knowledge and authorization.  Weinstine and Fishel 
were members of the same firm and both were licensed to practice 
law in Minnesota.  However, only Weinstine was licensed to 
practice law in Wisconsin.  Riegelman filed a motion for summary 
judgment claiming that, because of the defective summons and 
complaint, the action had not properly been commenced and the 
court 
lacked 
jurisdiction. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
granted 
Riegelman's motion and found that the defective pleadings 
deprived the court of jurisdiction.  Schaefer appealed and the 
court of appeals certified the case to this court. 
¶3 
We now affirm the judgment of the circuit court.  We 
conclude that the pleadings were defective, the defect was 
fundamental rather than technical, and that the defect was not 
cured by any action taken by the plaintiff.  Thus, the circuit 
court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary 
judgment based on a lack of jurisdiction. 
I 
¶4 
The procedural facts that give rise to this case are 
not 
disputed. 
 
Schaefer 
attempted 
to 
initiate 
a 
legal 
malpractice claim against Riegelman, alleging that Riegelman had 
failed 
to 
properly 
draft 
certain 
business 
documents 
to 
sufficiently protect Schaefer's interests in a corporation that 
was being purchased by Schaefer.  Schaefer was being represented 
in the malpractice action by the Minneapolis law firm of 
Winthrop & Weinstine. 
No. 
00-2157   
 
3 
 
¶5 
Schaefer's summons and complaint were filed with the 
Racine County Circuit Court on August 17, 1999.  Both documents 
were signed by Attorney Julie Fishel, who wrote "Robert R. 
Weinstine (by J.A. Fishel)" above a signature line with the 
typed name of Robert R. Weinstine and Weinstine's Wisconsin 
State Bar number below the line.  Fishel signed the documents at 
the express request of Weinstine, who was not available to 
personally sign them.  Both Weinstine and Fishel were employed 
by the Winthrop & Weinstine firm and both were licensed to 
practice law in Minnesota.  Weinstine was also licensed to 
practice law in Wisconsin, but Fishel was not.  After Schaefer's 
complaint was filed, Fishel filed a petition in the Wisconsin 
court to appear pro hac vice.  The petition was granted and an 
admission order was signed by Judge Schroeder on August 31, 
1999. 
¶6 
Riegelman filed an answer on September 9, 1999, in 
which he raised the defenses that the circuit court lacked 
personal and subject matter jurisdiction because the summons and 
complaint were defective and, therefore, the case had not been 
properly commenced.  On September 20, 1999, Schaefer filed an 
amended summons and complaint.  The amended summons was signed 
by Fishel in her capacity as an attorney admitted pro hac vice, 
but the amended complaint was simply a photocopy of the original 
complaint.  Three days later, Riegelman renewed his affirmative 
defenses in his answer to the amended complaint. 
¶7 
On May 30, 2000, Riegelman filed a motion with the 
circuit court for summary judgment.  Riegelman argued that the 
No. 
00-2157   
 
4 
 
summons and complaint did not comport with Wis. Stat. §§ 801.09 
and 802.05 (1999-2000)1 because Fishel, who signed the complaint, 
was not licensed to practice law in Wisconsin.  Riegelman also 
contended that Fishel could not legally sign the pleadings on 
behalf of Weinstine.  Riegelman claimed that the defect in the 
pleadings 
was 
fundamental, 
which 
deprived 
the 
court 
of 
jurisdiction and required the court to grant summary judgment. 
¶8 
The circuit court agreed with Riegelman.  In a hearing 
on the summary judgment motion, the court deemed the original 
summons and complaint defective because they had not been signed 
by an attorney who was authorized to practice law in Wisconsin.  
The court noted that at the time the summons and complaint were 
filed and served, the alleged attorney of record who was 
licensed in Wisconsin (Weinstine) had not officially appeared or 
participated in the proceedings under § 802.05(1)(a) because he 
had not personally signed the pleadings. 
¶9 
The circuit court also held that Fishel's pro hac vice 
admission did not cure the defect.  The court noted that the 
purpose of pro hac vice sponsorship is to have a licensed 
attorney accountable to the court.  The court found that at the 
time of filing, no Wisconsin attorney had appeared on the record 
as a sponsor and pro hac vice status was thus not available to 
Fishel under SCR 10.03(4).  Likewise, the court stated that the 
amended complaint had not cured the defect because the amended 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
00-2157   
 
5 
 
complaint was not truly amended, but rather it was only a 
photocopy of the original complaint and thus contained the same 
defect as the original. 
¶10 The 
court 
concluded 
that 
the 
signature 
on 
the 
documents did not comply with the subscription requirements of 
Wis. Stat. §§ 801.02(1) and 802.05(1)(a), and that the non-
compliance constituted a fundamental defect in the pleadings.  
Because the defect was fundamental, the court held that it 
lacked jurisdiction and granted Riegelman's motion for summary 
judgment. 
¶11 Schaefer 
appealed 
the 
circuit 
court's 
decision.  
Recognizing this issue as one of first impression in Wisconsin, 
the court of appeals certified the case to this court.  We 
accepted the certification and we now affirm the judgment of the 
circuit court. 
II 
¶12 In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we apply the 
same methodology used by the circuit court.  Baierl v. 
McTaggart, 2001 WI 107, ¶11, 245 Wis. 2d 632, 629 N.W.2d 277.  
We will hold that summary judgment is appropriate if the record 
reveals no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party 
is 
entitled 
to 
judgment 
as 
a 
matter 
of 
law.  
Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2). 
¶13 Here, we must decide whether there was a defect in 
Schaefer's 
pleadings 
that 
would 
deprive 
the 
court 
of 
jurisdiction and entitle Riegelman to judgment as a matter of 
law. 
 
The 
plaintiff 
must 
secure 
the 
court's 
personal 
No. 
00-2157   
 
6 
 
jurisdiction over the defendant by properly serving the summons 
and complaint on the defendant.  Wis. Stat. § 801.04(2)(a); Lak 
v. 
Richardson-Merrill, 
Inc., 
100 
Wis. 2d 641, 
649, 
302 
N.W.2d 483 (1981).  However, if the pleadings contain a 
fundamental defect, the court will be deprived of jurisdiction.  
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 167 Wis. 2d 524, 
533, 481 N.W.2d 629 (1992). 
¶14 To establish whether or not a pleading is fatally 
defective, this court uses a two-part test.  First, we must 
ascertain whether there is, in fact, a defect in the pleading.  
Id.  Second, we must determine if the defect is technical or 
fundamental in nature.  Id.  If the defect is technical, the 
court has jurisdiction only if the non-pleading party has not 
been prejudiced by the defect.  Id.  If the defect is 
fundamental, however, the court does not have jurisdiction over 
the action, regardless of whether or not prejudice exists.  Id. 
A 
¶15 We first address whether the pleadings in this case 
were, in fact, defective.  Whether the subscription requirements 
have been properly satisfied under the Wisconsin Statutes is a 
question 
of 
statutory 
interpretation, 
which 
we 
review 
independently, without deference to the lower courts.  Gaddis v. 
La Crosse Prods., 198 Wis. 2d 396, 401, 542 N.W.2d 454 (1996).  
The burden is on the party alleged to have filed the defective 
pleading to show that there was no defect.  Id. at 402; Am. 
Family, 167 Wis. 2d at 533. 
No. 
00-2157   
 
7 
 
¶16 When interpreting a statute, we first look to its 
plain language.  Jadair, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 
209 Wis. 2d 187, 195, 562 N.W.2d 401 (1997).  If the meaning is 
clear from the plain language of the statute, we look no 
further. 
 
Id. 
 
The 
relevant 
statute 
here, 
Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.05(1)(a), provides in part: 
 
Every pleading, motion or other paper of a party 
represented by an attorney . . . shall be subscribed 
with the handwritten signature of at least one 
attorney of record in the individual's name. . . . The 
signature of an attorney or party constitutes a 
certificate that the attorney or party has read the 
pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of 
the attorney's or party's knowledge, information and 
belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, the pleading, 
motion or other paper is well-grounded in fact and is 
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for 
the extension, modification or reversal of existing 
law; and that the pleading, motion or other paper is 
not used for any improper purpose, such as to harass 
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in 
the cost of litigation.  If a pleading, motion or 
other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless 
it is signed promptly after the omission is called to 
the 
attention 
of 
the 
pleader 
or 
movant. . . . 
(emphasis added). 
¶17 Section 802.05(1)(a) 
clearly 
lays 
out 
the 
basic 
requirements for a sufficient signature on a complaint.  The 
signature must (1) be handwritten; (2) be the signature of an 
attorney of record; and (3) be in that attorney's name.  
Although the signature in this case was handwritten, it was not 
the signature of the attorney of record in that attorney's own 
name.  Fishel was not licensed to practice law in Wisconsin at 
the time the pleadings were filed and she was therefore 
ineligible 
to 
appear 
as 
an 
attorney 
of 
record. 
 
See 
No. 
00-2157   
 
8 
 
Wis. Stat. § 757.30; see also Jadair, 209 Wis. 2d at 201-04.  
Weinstein——the only potential attorney of record in this case——
did not personally sign the summons or the complaint and the 
signature was therefore not his own.  Because no attorney of 
record signed the pleadings in accordance with § 802.05(1)(a), 
the pleadings were defective. 
¶18 Schaefer argues that the signature by Fishel satisfied 
the statute because the signature was in Weinstine's own name 
and was made with Weinstine's express authorization.  Schaefer 
argues that the law of agency binds a principal to the signature 
when the principal directs an agent to sign on the principal's 
behalf.  See Restatement (Second) of the Law of Agency § 156, 
cmt. a (1957).  Schaefer suggests that the use of the 
preposition "by" creates the presumption that the principal, not 
the agent, is the bound party.  See id.  Under this argument, 
Schaefer 
contends 
that 
the 
purpose 
of 
the 
subscription 
requirement in § 802.05 was met. 
¶19 We reject the agency argument put forth by Schaefer.  
The plain language of § 802.05(1)(a) requires that the signature 
on the pleadings shall be the signature of the attorney of 
record and that it shall be made in the attorney's own name.  
The 
statute 
does 
not 
allow 
for 
the 
delegation 
of 
the 
subscription requirement to an agent.  Fishel was not authorized 
by law to sign the pleadings for Weinstine and she was not 
authorized to sign the pleadings in her own capacity.  Because 
the attorney of record did not sign the pleadings in his own 
No. 
00-2157   
 
9 
 
name, the statutory subscription requirements were not met in 
this case and for that reason the pleadings were defective. 
B 
¶20 We must next determine whether Fishel and Weinstine 
were able to cure the defect in the pleadings.  We hold that 
they were unable to do so.  Whether the defect was properly 
cured is a question of statutory interpretation which we review 
de novo.  Gaddis, 198 Wis. 2d 396, 401. 
¶21 Section 802.05 provides that "[i]f a pleading, motion 
or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is 
signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of 
the pleader or movant."  Wis. Stat. § 802.05(1)(a).  Here, 
Schaefer called the defective pleadings to the attention of the 
plaintiff in his answers to both the original complaint and the 
amended complaint.  Over eight months after Schaefer's second 
answer, when no attempt to correct the defect had been made, 
Schaefer filed for summary judgment.  Under such circumstances, 
the circuit court was correct in dismissing the case. 
¶22 Fishel's pro hac vice admission was not enough to cure 
the defect.  The Supreme Court Rules state, "[a] judge in this 
state may allow a nonresident counsel to appear in his or her 
court and participate in a particular action or proceeding in 
association with an active member of the state bar of Wisconsin 
who appears and participates in the action or proceeding."  
SCR 10.03(4) (2000).  Thus, one of the fundamental requirements 
of granting a motion for pro hac vice admission is that the 
nonresident counsel proceeds in connection with an attorney who 
No. 
00-2157   
 
10 
 
is licensed to practice in Wisconsin and that the Wisconsin 
attorney appears and takes part in the proceeding.2 
¶23 As of the time that Fishel made her motion to appear 
pro hac vice, no Wisconsin attorney had appeared on the record 
because the original pleadings had been improperly subscribed.  
As the circuit court correctly pointed out, the purpose of the 
sponsorship requirement is to ensure that there is a Wisconsin 
attorney who is accountable to the court.  Because there was no 
sponsoring attorney on the record, Fishel's signature could not 
retroactively become valid to commence the action when she was 
admitted pro hac vice. 
¶24 Likewise, the filing and service of the amended 
complaint did not cure the defect.  First, the fact that the 
amended complaint was filed after the order to admit Fishel pro 
hac vice does not matter, since Fishel's admission was itself 
invalid.  Just as important, however, is the fact that the 
amended complaint was merely a photocopy of the original 
complaint.  Because the amended complaint, most notably the 
signature, had not been changed, it contained the same defect as 
the original complaint and could not create jurisdiction for the 
circuit court. 
                                                 
2 The circuit court explicitly recognized the sponsorship 
requirement.  Judge Schroeder handwrote "Wisconsin-licensed 
attorney sponsor must maintain general supervision over the 
case" on the bottom of the order to admit Fishel pro hac vice. 
No. 
00-2157   
 
11 
 
C 
¶25 Having 
decided 
that 
Schaefer's 
pleadings 
were 
defective, we next look at whether the defect in the complaint 
was fundamental or technical in nature.  If the defect was 
technical, the court has jurisdiction only if the defendant was 
not prejudiced by the defect.  Gaddis, 198 Wis. 2d at 401-02; 
Am. Family, 167 Wis. 2d at 533.  If the defect was fundamental, 
no jurisdiction exists regardless of whether or not the 
defendant was prejudiced.  Gaddis, 198 Wis. 2d at 401-02; Am. 
Family Mut. Ins., 167 Wis. 2d at 533.  The burden is on the 
party who allegedly served the defective pleading to show that 
the defect was technical.  Id.  If that party is able to show 
that the defect was technical, the party then has the burden of 
showing that the defect did not prejudice the opposing party.  
Gaddis, 198 Wis. 2d at 402; Am. Family, 167 Wis. 2d at 533.  
Whether a defect is technical or fundamental is a question of 
law, which we review de novo.  Am. Family, 167 Wis. 2d at 529.  
Here, we determine that the defect in the complaint was 
fundamental 
and 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
therefore 
lacked 
jurisdiction over the defendant. 
¶26 In American Family Mutual Insurance v. Royal Insurance 
Co., 167 Wis. 2d 524, this court explained the fundamental-
technical 
distinction 
and 
noted 
that 
when 
there 
was 
a 
fundamental 
defect 
in 
a 
pleading, 
the 
court 
would 
lose 
jurisdiction.  Id. at 533.  In American Family, we held that 
when a complainant fails to meet the pleading requirements of 
§ 801.02(1), it carries a fundamental defect.  That is, when the 
No. 
00-2157   
 
12 
 
complainant fails to file a summons and complaint naming the 
defendant, when the copy of the pleadings served on the 
defendant are not authenticated, or where service of the summons 
and complaint does not occur within 60 days after filing, the 
court does not gain jurisdiction over the person.  Id. at 533-
34. 
¶27 Conversely, in Gaddis v. La Crosse Products, 198 
Wis. 2d 396, we held that the plaintiff's failure to sign a 
summons was a technical error, as long as the summons was 
accompanied by a properly subscribed complaint.  Id. at 407.  We 
noted that this court has traditionally avoided dismissal of 
actions 
based 
on 
nonjurisdictional 
and 
nonprejudicial 
technicalities.  Id. at 407-08. 
¶28 Schaefer argues that the defect of subscription in 
this case was just such a nonjurisdictional technicality because 
the purpose and intent of the statutory rule were fulfilled.  
Schaefer points to several recent court of appeals cases that 
have suggested that when the purpose and intent of a statute 
have been fulfilled, defects in their fulfillment are technical 
in nature.  See, e.g., Schlumpf v. Yellick, 94 Wis. 2d 504, 288 
N.W.2d 834 (1980) (concluding that when the wrong file number is 
typed on the complaint, the defect is technical because the 
primary purpose of service is to give notice to the defendant 
that an action has been commenced); Bendimez v. Neidermire, 222 
Wis. 2d 356, 588 N.W.2d 55 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a 
defect is fundamental when the defendant is served by a non-
resident of Wisconsin, because the purpose behind § 801.10 has 
No. 
00-2157   
 
13 
 
not been met); Dungan v. County of Pierce, 170 Wis. 2d 89, 486 
N.W.2d 77 (Ct. App. 1992) (holding that when a plaintiff signs a 
summons pro se, but directs the defendant to serve the answer on 
his attorney, the purpose of § 801.09 is fulfilled and the error 
is only technical). 
¶29 We agree with the principle that when a pleading that 
contains a defect nevertheless comports with the purpose and 
nature of a statute, the defect is generally technical.  
However, we do not agree that the purpose and intent of § 802.05 
have been met under the circumstances of this case.  As we have 
stated, the purpose of § 802.05 is to "'place a professional 
obligation on the attorney as an officer of the court to satisfy 
himself that there are grounds for the action.'"  McMillan- 
Warner Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kauffman, 159 Wis. 2d 588, 593, 465 
N.W.2d 201 (Ct. App. 1990) (quoting C. Clausen & D. Lowe, The 
New Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure: Chapters 801 to 803, 59 
Marq. L. Rev. 1, 48 (1976)).  When an attorney signs a pleading, 
the signature verifies that the attorney: 
 
has read the pleading . . . that to the best of the 
attorney's . . . knowledge, 
information and 
belief, 
formed after reasonable inquiry, the pleading . . . is 
well-grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law 
or 
a 
good 
faith 
argument 
for 
the 
extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law; and that the 
pleading . . . is not used for any improper purpose, 
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or 
needless increase in the cost of litigation. 
Wis. Stat. § 802.05(1)(a).  Additionally, a lawyer who properly 
subscribes a pleading is bound by the rules of professional 
responsibility and faces professional disciplinary action if the 
No. 
00-2157   
 
14 
 
rules are not followed.  See SCR 20:8.5(a), 21.03(2) (2000); see 
also SCR 10.02, 10.03 (2000).  The obligations under those rules 
include, inter alia, the responsibility not to advance frivolous 
claims.3  See SCR 20:3.1 (2000). 
¶30 As evidenced by the above rules and statutes, the 
subscription requirement is not simply putting ink on paper.  
Rather, it is a deliberate process by which the lawyer 
guarantees the validity of a claim.  When a lawyer signs a 
pleading, it is not merely a pro forma act of notarization.  
Before affixing a signature to pleadings, the lawyer is expected 
to engage in a moment of reflection, review the facts, consider 
the law, and satisfy himself or herself that there is a good 
faith basis on which to commence the action.  In this way, the 
subscription requirement provides an essential protection for 
the people and businesses of the state to remain free from being 
sued frivolously or improperly——a protection that is at the core 
of an attorney's professional responsibility.  If we were to 
adopt Schaefer's argument, we would eliminate the necessary 
safeguard that the statute provides. 
¶31 Minimizing 
the 
subscription 
requirement 
also 
necessarily weakens attorney accountability.  In this case, it 
is arguable whether or not Fishel could have been held 
                                                 
3 We note that there is no evidence in the record showing 
that the claims here were improper or frivolous and we also note 
that Weinstine has submitted an affidavit attesting to the 
validity 
of 
the 
claims. 
 
However, 
in 
assessing 
the 
fundamentality of the subscription defect, whether or not the 
claims were actually valid is not an issue. 
No. 
00-2157   
 
15 
 
accountable under the Wisconsin rules of professional conduct.  
Had she been properly admitted pro hac vice, either she or the 
sponsoring Wisconsin attorney could potentially have been held 
liable for misconduct.  However, here, as we have already 
pointed out, Fishel's admission was invalid and Weinstine never 
formally appeared, which makes the answer to the question of 
whom to hold responsible unclear.  The subscription requirement 
is in place to prevent such uncertainty. 
¶32 In upholding this fundamental protection, we decline 
to take up Schaefer's offer to apply the court of appeals' 
recent decision in Novak v. Phillips, 2001 WI App 156, 246 
Wis. 2d 673, 631 N.W.2d 635, to the present case.  In Novak, the 
court of appeals held that the rubber-stamped signature of the 
attorney of record on a summons and complaint was a technical 
defect because it could be corrected.4  Id. at ¶2.  Schaefer 
argues that his situation is even less egregious than the one in 
Novak because the substituted signature in this case was made by 
an attorney from the same firm as the Wisconsin-licensed 
attorney of record and it was made at the Wisconsin attorney's 
direction. 
¶33 We disagree with Schaefer's argument and we now 
overrule Novak to the extent that the court of appeals held that 
                                                 
4 The court of appeals went on to hold that the defect in 
the pleading, although technical, still deprived the court of 
jurisdiction because the defect was prejudicial to the defendant 
when 
it 
was 
not 
corrected 
promptly, 
as 
required 
by 
Wis. Stat. § 802.05(1)(a).  Novak v. Phillips, 2001 WI App 156, 
¶27, 246 Wis. 2d 673, 631 N.W.2d 635. 
No. 
00-2157   
 
16 
 
the subscription defect was technical rather than fundamental.  
As we have stated, the purpose of requiring a handwritten 
signature, made by the attorney of record, is not only to 
clarify who is accountable for an invalid claim, but also to 
guarantee that an attorney who is familiar with the procedural 
and substantive laws of this state has read the claims and has 
made an assessment of the claims' validity.  Authorizing rubber-
stamped signatures or allowing someone who is not licensed to 
practice law in Wisconsin to sign a pleading runs counter to 
this guarantee.  To hold that a failure to meet the subscription 
requirement is merely technical jeopardizes judicial economy, 
erodes attorney accountability, and 
lessens 
the 
essential 
protection 
that 
the 
subscription 
requirement 
affords 
to 
defendants. 
¶34 We think that our holding in Jadair, Inc. v. United 
States Fire Insurance Co., 209 Wis. 2d 187, is a better analogue 
to this case.  In Jadair, the court of appeals held that a 
fundamental defect existed when a nonlawyer had signed a notice 
of appeal on behalf of a corporation.  Id. at 212.  The court 
stated that to allow this type of defect would be contrary to 
the legislative mandates of the procedural requirements and 
would evince this court's acceptance of the unauthorized 
practice of law.  Id.  We think that similar reasoning is 
applicable in this case. 
¶35 We also think that the court of appeals' holding in 
McMillan-Warner Mutual Insurance v. Kauffman, 159 Wis. 2d 588, 
is persuasive.  In McMillan, the court of appeals upheld the 
No. 
00-2157   
 
17 
 
circuit court's decision to strike the plaintiffs' amended 
summons and complaint because the pleadings were not properly 
subscribed.  Id. at 590.  The court held that the failure of 
counsel or the party to subscribe and authorize a summons and 
complaint is not a "'non-jurisdictional technicalit[y]'".  Id. 
at 593 (citing Cruz v. DILHR, 81 Wis. 2d 442, 449, 260 
N.W.2d 692 (1978)).  As we mentioned above, the McMillan court 
held that the purpose and effect of the subscription requirement 
is "to place a professional obligation on the attorney as an 
officer of the court to satisfy himself that there are grounds 
for the action, defense or motion."   McMillan, 159 Wis. 2d at 
593 (quoting C. Clausen & D. Lowe, The New Wisconsin Rules of 
Civil Procedure: Chapters 801 to 803, 59 Marq. L. Rev. 1, 48 
(1976)).  We agree. 
¶36 Schaefer 
contends 
that 
reliance 
on 
McMillan 
is 
misplaced because the suit in McMillan had been filed before 
several relevant amendments to § 802.05 were enacted.  When 
McMillan was decided, the relevant portion of the statute read: 
"if a pleading is not signed . . . it may be stricken as sham 
and 
false . . . ." 
 
Wis. Stat. § 802.05 
(1987-88). 
 
The 
corresponding part of the current statute reads: "If a pleading, 
motion or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless 
it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the 
attention of the pleader or movant."  Wis. Stat. § 802.05 (1999-
2000).  Schaefer contends that the current statutory language 
indicates that an unsigned summons and complaint cannot be 
No. 
00-2157   
 
18 
 
fundamentally invalid because the legislature has allowed for a 
corrective action. 
¶37 To the contrary, we think that the amendments to the 
statute reinforce our decision.  First, the facts of this case 
do not support Schaefer's argument because the defect in the 
pleadings was never properly cured by Fishel or by Weinstine.  
Second, and perhaps more importantly, the clause that provides a 
pleader the opportunity to correct an improperly subscribed 
pleading, when read in conjunction with the language that the 
pleadings "shall be subscribed," indicate that the subscription 
requirement is not only mandatory, but is also important enough 
to warrant an extra safeguard to make sure it is accomplished.  
This allowance for corrective action actually promotes the goals 
of judicial economy and integrity that underpin the subscription 
requirement, and further indicates that the failure to properly 
subscribe a pleading is a fundamental defect. 
III 
¶38 Because we hold that there was a defect, that 
Schaefer's attorneys were unable to cure that defect, and that 
the defect was fundamental in nature, the circuit court did not 
gain jurisdiction over the defendant.  Because we conclude that 
the defect was fundamental, we are not required to examine 
whether or not Riegelman was prejudiced by the defect.  Jadair, 
209 Wis. 2d at 213; Gaddis, 198 Wis. 2d at 402.  Because the 
circuit 
court 
lacked 
jurisdiction, 
it 
properly 
dismissed 
Schaefer's claim, and we therefore uphold the circuit court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of Riegelman. 
No. 
00-2157   
 
19 
 
By the Court.—The judgment of the circuit court is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  00-2157.ssa 
 
 
 
1
¶39 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   (dissenting).  
I agree that the original summons and complaint at issue in the 
present case contain a defect and that the second summons and 
complaint are not perfect.  However, I disagree with the 
majority that the defects are of sufficient magnitude to justify 
dismissal of the action.  Therefore, I dissent. 
¶40 When the purpose and intent of a statute have been 
fulfilled, defects in its fulfillment are technical in nature.5  
The statute in the present case, Wis. Stat. § 802.05(1)(a), 
states, 
in 
relevant 
part, 
that 
every 
pleading 
shall 
be 
subscribed with the handwritten signature of at least one 
attorney 
of 
record. 
 
The 
purpose 
and 
intent 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 802.05(1)(a) are to place a professional obligation 
on attorneys to satisfy themselves that there are grounds for an 
action.6   
¶41 The purpose and intent of Wis. Stat. § 802.05 were 
fulfilled in the present case because both Attorney Fishel and 
Attorney Weinstein bound themselves to the rules of professional 
conduct by their actions.  Unlike the majority, which concludes 
that it is unclear whom to hold responsible, I conclude that 
both Attorney Weinstein and Attorney Fishel were subject to the 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., Dugan v. County of Pierce, 170 Wis. 2d 89, 98-
99, 486 N.W.2d 77 (Ct. App. 1992).   
6 McMillan-Warner 
Mut. 
Ins. 
Co. 
v. 
Kauffman, 
159 
Wis. 2d 588, 593, 465 N.W.2d 201 (Ct. App. 1990). 
No.  00-2157.ssa 
 
 
 
2
Wisconsin rules of professional conduct to ensure accountability 
for their conduct as attorneys in Wisconsin and to provide the 
protection 
afforded 
to 
litigants 
by 
the 
subscription 
requirement.   
¶42 In the present case, the summons and complaint dated 
August 16, 1999, were not filed unsigned, nor were they merely 
"signed" using a rubber stamp.7  Rather, the summons and 
complaint were signed by not one, but two, attorneys.  Attorney 
Fishel, licensed to practice law in Minnesota, subscribed 
Attorney Weinstein's name in her (Attorney Fishel's) own 
handwriting.  Attorney Fishel did so with the knowledge, 
authorization, and express authority of Attorney Weinstein, who 
was licensed to practice law in Wisconsin.  That signature 
begins this saga.   
¶43 To allow Attorney Fishel to correct the defect by 
refiling the documents, Wisconsin Attorney Tourek moved the 
circuit court on August 31, 1999, to admit Attorney Fishel and 
Attorney Gleekel pro hac vice.  The circuit court granted 
Attorney Fishel and Attorney Gleekel leave to appear as counsel 
for Schaefer.8  
                                                 
7 See Novak v. Phillips, 2001 WI App 156, ¶27, 246 
Wis. 2d 673, 631 N.W.2d 635, which the majority now overrules to 
the extent that the court of appeals held that a rubber stamp 
subscription was a technical rather than fundamental defect.   
8 Supreme Court Rule 10.03(4) states: 
No.  00-2157.ssa 
 
 
 
3
¶44 On September 16, 1999, Attorney Fishel submitted an 
amended summons and complaint.  She subscribed the summons in 
her own handwriting and showed her pro hac vice status, 
attaching the original complaint, signed by her on behalf of 
Attorney Weinstein.  According to the majority opinion, the fact 
that the original complaint still had the original signatures is 
a fatal defect. 
¶45 While 
I 
agree 
with 
the 
majority 
that 
Attorney 
Weinstein's failure to personally subscribe the original summons 
and complaint was a defect under Wis. Stat. § 802.05 and that 
the amended summons would have been "tidier" had it been 
                                                                                                                                                             
A judge in this state may allow a nonresident counsel 
to appear in his or her court and participate in a 
particular action or proceeding in association with an 
active member of the state bar of Wisconsin who 
appears and participates in the action or proceeding.  
Permission to the nonresident lawyer may be withdrawn 
by the judge granting it if the lawyer by his or her 
conduct manifests incompetency to represent a client 
in a Wisconsin court or by his or her unwillingness to 
abide by the rules of professional conduct for 
attorneys and the rules of decorum of the court. 
This pro hac vice representation began on August 31, 1999, 
and did not date back to the original documents to remedy the 
defective signature on the original documents.  Majority op. at 
¶9; Transcript, Motion Hearing June 27, 2000, Record 32-17. 
Attorney Fishel and Attorney Gleekel remained as counsel of 
record for Schaefer, with their last filing, dated August 8, 
2000, being a motion to the circuit court to reconsider its 
decision. 
No.  00-2157.ssa 
 
 
 
4
accompanied by a newly signed complaint, these defects should 
not deprive the circuit court of personal jurisdiction.9  
¶46 This court traditionally avoids dismissing actions 
based on nonprejudicial technicalities.10  There is no evidence 
in the present case that the claims were frivolous or improper 
or that any prejudice resulted.  The defendants in the present 
case were doubly or triply protected.  Two attorneys (and maybe 
even three attorneys) were responsible to the defendants for any 
misconduct.   
¶47 The majority seems offended that the attorneys could 
not get it right a second time and failed to try a third time.  
I agree that the resubmission may be viewed as imperfect.  But 
what's the big deal?   
¶48 This case is much ado about nothing.  It is really a 
trivial pursuit.  It elevates form over substance, resulting in 
a litigant being thrown out of court.  
                                                 
9 The statutes are clear that the defect in the summons and 
complaint does not deprive the circuit court of subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Wisconsin Stat. § 801.04(1) provides:  "Nothing 
in chs. 801 to 847 affects the subject matter jurisdiction of 
any court of this state." 
10 Gaddis v. La Crosse Products, 198 Wis. 2d 396, 407-08, 
542 N.W.2d 454 (1996). 
No.  00-2157.ssa 
 
 
 
5
¶49 For the reasons set forth, I cannot join this opinion. 
¶50 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and DAVID T. PROSSER join this opinion. 
 
No.  00-2157.ssa 
 
1