Case Title: John G. Kierstyn v. Racine Unified School District

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1997AP001573

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1999-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-1573 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
John G. Kierstyn,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Racine Unified School District, Indiana 
Insurance Company and Mike Farrell,  
 
Defendants-Respondents.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  221 Wis. 2d 563, 585 N.W.2d 721 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1998, Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 9, 1999 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
May 4, 1999 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Wayne J. Marik  
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
Bablitch, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
 
Crooks, J., joins 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner there was 
a brief by John G. Shannon and Dye, Foley, Krohn & Shannon, S.C., 
Racine and oral argument by John G. Shannon. 
 
 
For the defendants-respondents there was a brief 
by Raymond J. Pollen, Michele M. Ford and Crivello, Carlson, 
Mentkowski & Steeves, S.C., Milwaukee and oral argument by 
Raymond J. Pollen. 
 
No. 
97-1573 
 
1 
 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 97-1573 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
John G. Kierstyn,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Racine Unified School District, Indiana  
Insurance Company and Mike Farrell,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents.  
FILED 
 
JUL 9, 1999 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   The Petitioner, John Kierstyn 
(Kierstyn), seeks review of a published decision of the court of 
appeals that affirmed the circuit court’s grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the Racine Unified School District (the 
District).1  Kierstyn argues that the District and its employee 
benefits specialist are not immune from suit under Wis. Stat. 
§ 893.80(4) 
when 
the 
employee 
gave 
incorrect 
information 
regarding disability benefits.  Because we determine that the 
employee’s act does not fit any exception to public officer 
immunity, we affirm the court of appeals. 
                     
1 Kierstyn v. Racine Unified School Dist., 221 Wis. 2d 563, 
585 N.W.2d 721 (Ct. App. 1998) (affirming decision and order of 
Circuit 
Court 
for 
Racine 
County, 
Hon. 
Wayne 
J. 
Marik, 
presiding).  
No. 
97-1573 
 
2 
¶2 
For purposes of this summary judgment motion, the 
facts are not in dispute.  Both John and Judith Kierstyn 
(collectively, the Kierstyns) were employed by the District for 
many years:  John Kierstyn (Kierstyn) as a librarian for over 27 
years and Judith Kierstyn (Mrs. Kierstyn) as a teacher for over 
25 years.  Mrs. Kierstyn was diagnosed with cancer in the early 
part of 1993.  By March of 1993 Mrs. Kierstyn became incapable 
of continuing work and took a medical leave of absence.  From 
March until her death in late June of that year, Mrs. Kierstyn 
received her regular teacher’s salary through sick days she had 
accumulated over the course of her tenure as an employee of the 
District.   
¶3 
Mrs. Kierstyn received benefits both as a union 
employee with the District and as a municipal employee with the 
Wisconsin Retirement System (WRS).  See Wis. Stat. ch. 40.  In 
April, shortly after Mrs. Kierstyn ceased working, the Kierstyns 
met with a benefits specialist employed by the District, Mike 
Farrell, in order to discover what disability benefits Mrs. 
Kierstyn was entitled to receive.   
¶4 
Farrell had been employed by the District since 1991. 
 As a benefits specialist he provided general information to 
District employees about their employment benefits and was often 
the first contact for employees who sought such information.  
Farrell 
was 
authorized 
to 
give 
the 
District’s 
employees 
information about their union benefits.  He was not, however, an 
agent of the WRS and could not authoritatively represent to 
District employees what WRS benefits they were entitled to 
No. 
97-1573 
 
3 
receive.  Notwithstanding this fact, Farrell was generally aware 
of the WRS disability benefits, had pamphlets from WRS relaying 
information about WRS programs in his office, had WRS computer 
software that he used to provide benefit estimates to the 
District’s employees, and knew of persons at the WRS whom a 
District employee could contact in order to obtain specific WRS 
benefit information. 
¶5 
At the April meeting with the Kierstyns, Farrell 
misstated that Mrs. Kierstyn could only apply for WRS disability 
benefits upon the depletion of all of her available sick leave.2 
 This information was incorrect.3  Mrs. Kierstyn could have 
applied for those benefits when she ceased working in March.  
However, she would not have been eligible to receive those 
benefits until she exhausted her available sick leave.  Farrell 
also informed the Kierstyns that WRS would have more specific 
information about these matters and instructed them to contact 
the WRS directly. 
                     
2 In actuality, Farrell contends that he correctly told the 
Kierstyns that while Mrs. Kierstyn could apply for those 
benefits at the time of the April meeting, she would not be 
eligible to receive those benefits until her sick leave was 
exhausted.  For purposes of summary judgment, the District 
invited the court to assume that Kierstyn’s version of the facts 
is correct. 
3 For present purposes, a WRS participant could receive one 
of two types of disability benefits:  a disability survivorship 
annuity and a non-annuitant survivor benefit.  The former 
provided 
significantly 
greater 
financial 
benefits 
to 
the 
participant.  However, in order to receive the disability 
survivorship annuity, WRS participants needed to have applied 
prior to their death.  It was the survivorship annuity that the 
Kierstyns were seeking to receive. 
No. 
97-1573 
 
4 
¶6 
The Kierstyns did contact the WRS, which mailed to 
them benefit estimates tailored to Mrs. Kierstyn.  In addition 
to the estimates, the mailing included an application for 
disability benefits with instructions and a 16-page brochure 
explaining WRS disability benefits.  The instructions read, in 
pertinent part: 
 
DEATH BEFORE DISABILITY BENEFIT APPROVAL 
 
If you are an active employe or on leave of absence on 
or after August 15, 1991 and die before the Board 
approves your benefit, your disability annuity will be 
granted if prior to your death we have received your 
application and one Medical Report certifying your 
disability. . . .  It is therefore very important that 
the Medical Reports be submitted as quickly as 
possible.  The department must also receive your 
employer's certification that you ceased employment 
due to your disability before your disability benefit 
can be approved.  
 
Whether or not your disability benefit is approved can 
have a substantial impact on the amount of the death 
benefits payable upon your death.  Death benefits from 
a disability benefit will be based on the annuity 
option you select.  You may contact the department for 
further information about how death benefits are 
calculated. 
¶7 
Aside from glancing at the estimates, Kierstyn did not 
read the information he received from the WRS.  Mrs. Kierstyn 
did not apply for disability benefits at that time. 
¶8 
About a week before Mrs. Kierstyn’s death, Kierstyn 
again met with Farrell.  By this date, there was little doubt 
that Mrs. Kierstyn soon would die.  Kierstyn, still under the 
incorrect assumption that Mrs. Kierstyn could not file for 
disability benefits until her sick days were exhausted, wanted 
No. 
97-1573 
 
5 
to know of any available method to rid Mrs. Kierstyn of her 
remaining sick days.  Farrell again incorrectly stated that the 
sick leave must be completely exhausted before filing the 
application with WRS.4 
¶9 
After 
Mrs. 
Kierstyn’s 
death, 
Kierstyn 
filed 
an 
application 
for 
the 
disability 
benefits. 
 
Because 
the 
application had not been filed prior to her death, Kierstyn was 
only entitled to a non-annuitant survivor benefit and not to the 
more financially generous disability survivorship annuity. 
¶10 Kierstyn filed suit, alleging that Farrell and the 
District were liable for common law negligence and negligent 
misrepresentation.  The District filed a motion for summary 
judgment, contending that it and Farrell were immune from suit 
under Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) (1997-98).5  The circuit court 
granted that motion, concluding that Farrell’s act of giving 
                     
4 Much like his earlier statement, Farrell disputes that he 
gave this incorrect information.  
5 Wisconsin Stat. 893.80(4) reads as follows: 
No suit may be brought against any volunteer fire 
company 
organized 
under 
ch. 
213, 
political 
corporation, governmental subdivision or any agency 
thereof for the intentional torts of its officers, 
officials, agents or employes nor may any suit be 
brought 
against 
such 
corporation, 
subdivision 
or 
agency or volunteer fire company or against its 
officers, officials, agents or employes for acts done 
in the exercise of legislative, quasi-legislative, 
judicial or quasi-judicial functions.  
 
All further references to the Wisconsin statutes are to the 
1997-98 version unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
97-1573 
 
6 
information was a discretionary act rather than a ministerial 
one.   
¶11 Kierstyn appealed and the court of appeals affirmed in 
a 2-1 decision.  The court of appeals concluded that Farrell’s 
giving of benefit advice was a “governmental” act, so he 
retained immunity as a municipal employee under this court’s 
decision in Scarpaci v. Milwaukee County, 96 Wis. 2d 663, 292 
N.W.2d 816 (1980).  Judge Brown dissented, concluding that the 
act of advising a “client” in an intimate setting was not 
“governmental” but rather “professional” in nature and therefore 
was an act subject to liability.  Kierstyn petitioned this court 
for review. 
¶12 It is well settled that when this court reviews a 
motion for summary judgment it applies the same standards as the 
circuit court.  Grams v. Boss, 97 Wis. 2d 332, 338-39, 294 
N.W.2d 473 (1980).  In this case we are asked to determine 
whether Farrell, though negligent, is entitled to immunity as a 
municipal employee under Wis. Stat. § 893.80.  This application 
of a set of facts to a legal standard is a question of law that 
we review independently of the legal determinations rendered by 
the circuit court and court of appeals.  Miller v. Thomack, 210 
Wis. 2d 650, 658, 563 N.W.2d 891 (1997). 
¶13 Public officers or employees enjoy immunity from 
liability for injuries resulting from the performance of any 
discretionary act within the scope of their governmental 
No. 
97-1573 
 
7 
employment.6  Barillari v. City of Milwaukee, 194 Wis. 2d 247, 
257, 533 N.W.2d 759 (1995); C.L. v. Olson, 143 Wis. 2d 701, 710, 
422 N.W.2d 614 (1988); Lister v. Board of Regents, 72 Wis. 2d 
282, 300, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976).  This rule applies regardless 
of whether the public official is employed by the state or by a 
political subdivision of the state, such as a municipality or 
school district.  Lifer v. Raymond, 80 Wis. 2d 503, 511-12, 259 
N.W.2d 537 (1977). 
¶14 Public officer immunity traces its origins to the 
common law and is separate and distinct from the constitutional 
guarantee of sovereign immunity, although the distinction is 
often overlooked.7  As a derivation of the common law, 
                     
6 Kierstyn apparently does not differentiate between the 
District’s conduct and Farrell’s conduct.  That is to say, 
Kierstyn does not argue that the District’s actions ought to be 
analyzed separately from Farrell’s so that theoretically the 
District could be subject to immunity while Farrell could not, 
or vice versa.  See generally Estate of Cavanaugh v. Andrade, 
202 Wis. 2d 290, 550 N.W.2d 103 (1996) (drawing distinction 
between political subdivision’s conduct and public official’s 
conduct).  
7 As we said years ago in Lister v. Board of Regents, 72 
Wis. 2d Wis. 2d 282, 298-99, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976): 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity and the principle 
which extends an immunity to public officers from 
civil liability for damages are two separate and 
distinct 
concepts . . . [T]he 
state's 
sovereign 
immunity from suit is procedural in nature and arises 
from the state constitution.  The immunity afforded 
public officers with respect to the performance of 
their official functions, on the other hand, is a 
substantive limitation on their personal liability for 
damages and is common law.  It does not derive, as the 
language in some cases would imply, from the state's 
No. 
97-1573 
 
8 
governmental immunity is founded upon policy considerations that 
strike a balance between “the need of public officers to perform 
their functions freely [and] the right of an aggrieved party to 
seek redress.”  Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 300.  Those policy 
considerations focus largely on the protection of the public 
purse against legal action and on the restraint of public 
officials through political rather than judicial means.  As we 
identified in Lister, 72 Wis. 2d at 299, those considerations 
include: 
 
(1) The danger of influencing public officers in the 
performance of their functions by the threat of 
lawsuit; (2) the deterrent effect which the threat of 
personal liability might have on those who are 
considering entering public service; (3) the drain on 
valuable 
time 
caused 
by 
such 
actions; 
(4) 
the 
unfairness 
of 
subjecting 
officials 
to 
personal 
liability for the acts of their subordinates; and (5) 
the feeling that the ballot and removal procedures are 
more appropriate methods of dealing with misconduct in 
public office.  Id. at 299. 
¶15 As outlined in Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4), governmental 
immunity relieves both a political subdivision and public 
officials from acts done pursuant to legislative, judicial, 
quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial capacities.  To describe an 
activity as quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative is to say that 
the activity involves the exercise of discretion.  Lister, 72 
Wis. 2d at 299; Spencer v. Brown County, 215 Wis. 2d 641, 647, 
573 N.W.2d 222 (Ct. App. 1997). 
                                                                  
sovereign immunity under art. IV, sec. 27 of the 
Wisconsin Constitution . . . . 
No. 
97-1573 
 
9 
¶16 However, immunity under Wis. Stat. § 893.80 is not 
absolute.  Over the years, this court has recognized four 
exceptions to public officer immunity.  Since Kierstyn contends 
that Farrell’s actions fall within three of the four exceptions, 
we address each of those three exceptions separately below.8 
Ministerial Duty 
¶17 For 
at least a 
century, 
the law 
has drawn a 
distinction 
between 
discretionary 
and 
ministerial 
acts, 
shielding the performer of the former but exposing the latter to 
liability.  Barillari,  194 Wis. 2d at 257-58; Cords v. Ehly, 62 
Wis. 2d 31, 41, 214 N.W.2d 432 (1974); Druecker v. Salomon, 21 
Wis. 628 (*621), 637 (*630) (1867).  The oft-cited summation of 
this most common exception was stated initially in Lister, 72 
Wis. 2d at 301: 
 
A public officer's duty is ministerial only when it is 
absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely the 
performance of a specific task when the law imposes, 
prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion for 
its performance with such certainty that nothing 
remains for judgment or discretion. 
¶18 The difficulty Kierstyn faces with this exception is 
that Farrell was under no duty that was “absolute, certain and 
imperative” which “impose[d], prescribe[d] and define[d] the 
time, mode and occasion for its performance.”  Kierstyn has not 
                     
8 The fourth exception, and the one that Kierstyn does not 
suggest Farrell’s conduct constitutes, removes immunity when a 
public officer engages in negligent conduct that is “malicious, 
willful and intentional.”  C.L. v. Olson, 143 Wis. 2d 701, 710-
11, 422 N.W.2d 614 (1988); Ibrahim v. Samore, 118 Wis. 2d 720, 
728, 348 N.W.2d 554 (1984). 
No. 
97-1573 
 
10
pointed 
to 
any 
statutory 
obligation 
Farrell 
faced 
under 
Wisconsin law to advise the District’s employees regarding their 
WRS benefits or even any similar obligation he faced under his 
contractual arrangement with the District.  See Coffey v. City 
of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 539, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976) 
(ministerial duties can arise by statute or by contract). 
¶19 In actuality, Kierstyn has not seriously argued that 
Farrell was legally obligated to provide WRS benefit information 
to employees of the District.  Rather, he has posited all along 
that Farrell’s conduct should be considered ministerial because 
Farrell’s incorrect information resulted from his errant reading 
of a clear and unambiguous statute.   
¶20 Kierstyn acknowledges that typically a public officer, 
such as Farrell, is clothed in immunity when that officer 
applies statutes to a given set of facts, such as interpreting 
how statutes will apply to a particular person.  Olson, 143 
Wis. 2d at 717-18.  He argues, however, that this is not a 
typical case because judgment and interpretation, the hallmarks 
of 
discretion, 
are 
not 
implicated 
where 
the 
statute 
is 
unambiguous.  His argument, as we understand it, is that one 
does not “interpret” an unambiguous statute, one follows it.   
¶21 We 
cannot 
accept 
Kierstyn’s 
argument 
that 
an 
unambiguous statute creates a ministerial duty.  As noted above, 
a public officer’s duty must arise from some obligation created 
by law.  The District was under no legal obligation to hire a 
benefits specialist.  In like fashion, Farrell was under no 
legal obligation to offer advice about WRS benefits to employees 
No. 
97-1573 
 
11
of the District.  See Olson, 143 Wis. 2d at 722; Lifer, 80 
Wis. 2d at 510; c.f. Estate of Cavanaugh v. Andrade, 202 Wis. 2d 
290, 300-01, 550 N.W.2d 103 (1996); Turner v. City of Milwaukee, 
193 Wis. 2d 412, 421-22, 535 N.W.2d 15 (Ct. App. 1995). 
¶22 Kierstyn does not end his argument there.  Rather, he 
maintains that even if Farrell was under no ministerial duty to 
provide WRS information to the District’s employees in the first 
instance, his choosing to do so created a ministerial duty to 
provide the correct information.   
¶23 It is true that in a select number of cases we have 
concluded that once public officers choose in their discretion 
to act, they are bound by a ministerial duty to act in a certain 
manner.  For example, in a series of cases involving the 
erection of highway road signs, this court determined that once 
public officers make the discretionary decision to place a 
highway warning sign, they have a ministerial duty to place that 
sign 
according 
to 
the 
specific 
administrative 
rules 
for 
placement.  Chart v. Dvorak, 57 Wis. 2d 92, 102, 203 N.W.2d 673 
(1973).  Also, in Major v. Milwaukee County, 196 Wis. 2d 939, 
944-45, 539 N.W.2d 472 (Ct. App. 1995), the court of appeals 
concluded that, while a county had discretion both to sell a 
parcel of property and to negotiate the terms of the sale, once 
it signed a sales contract the county had a ministerial duty to 
adhere to the provisions of the contract.   
¶24 These cases, however, provide little aid to Kierstyn’s 
cause because they are readily distinguishable.  The public 
officers in Chart and Major were deemed to have a ministerial 
No. 
97-1573 
 
12
duty not because they elected to act.  They were deemed to have 
a ministerial duty because they elected to act and the subject 
matter of their action imposed specific legal obligations on the 
manner in which they were to act.  That is to say, these public 
officers did not have to act at allbut if they did choose to 
act, they faced a specific legal obligation to do so in a 
prescribed manner.   
¶25 As a result, while the public officers in Chart were 
not legally obligated to erect road signs in any particular 
place, once they did choose to erect signs, they were obligated 
to erect those signs in the manner specified by the rules and 
statutes.  Chart, 57 Wis. 2d at 99.  See also Raisanen v. City 
of Milwaukee, 35 Wis. 2d 504, 513-14, 151 N.W.2d 129 (1967).  
Likewise, while the public officers in Major were not obligated 
to sell county property or were free to sell it on their own 
terms, once they signed a sales contract they were under a 
ministerial duty to follow the terms of that contract.  Major, 
196 Wis. 2d at 944-45.  This same principle has been followed in 
other contexts as well.  See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Metropolitan Sewerage Comm., 80 Wis. 2d 10, 15-17, 258 N.W.2d 
148 
(1977) 
(design 
of 
sewer 
systems 
is 
discretionary; 
construction of sewers according to the design is ministerial). 
¶26 Here, Farrell was under no duty to provide WRS benefit 
information in the first instance.  Similarly, once Farrell 
elected to provide some WRS benefit information, he was under no 
legal duty to do so in a particular manner or according to any 
particular rules.  See Barillari, 194 Wis. 2d at 261-62. 
No. 
97-1573 
 
13
¶27 In the end, Kierstyn’s argument really is not that the 
statute imposed any duty on Farrell to provide information, only 
that Farrell negligently interpreted the clear provisions of the 
statute.  Kierstyn focuses his ministerial duty analysis not on 
any obligation the statute imposed on Farrell, but rather on the 
statute’s clarity.   
¶28 However, to argue that the statute is clear is to miss 
the point of immunity.  As the circuit court aptly stated: 
 
[Kierstyn really argues] that Farrell had a duty to 
exercise due care and a duty not to be negligent.  
That, however, is precisely what the doctrine of 
immunity insulates a party from, i.e., liability due 
to the fact that they have been negligent.  The fact 
that certain conduct may have been negligent does not 
transform that conduct into a breach of a ministerial 
duty.  The existence of a duty of care does not 
necessarily imply that the duty was ministerial.  
Consideration of the issue of immunity implies that 
the party was or may have been negligent.  If they 
were not, they would not need to seek the protection 
of immunity. 
Immunity presupposes negligence and has no reason for existence 
without it.  Kimps v. Hill, 200 Wis. 2d 1, 11, 546 N.W.2d 151 
(1996). 
¶29 The statute may have been clear and Farrell may have 
negligently applied it, but the statute did not direct Farrell 
to act in any manner.  Farrell was under no ministerial duty. 
Known Danger 
¶30 Even where a public officer’s duty is not proscribed 
in its time, mode, and occasion so that nothing remains for the 
officer’s judgment, the factual circumstances of the case may 
nevertheless clearly require a public officer to act.  Cords v. 
No. 
97-1573 
 
14
Anderson, 80 Wis. 2d 525, 541-42, 259 N.W.2d 672 (1977).  This 
exception is a very limited one, having rarely been asserted 
successfully.   
¶31 The facts of Anderson best exemplify the type of 
extraordinary events that will be necessary in order to trigger 
the exception.  They also demonstrate why this case is not 
sufficiently extraordinary: 
 
[In Anderson,] the manager of a state-owned park was 
held subject to liability for negligence by failing to 
take steps to warn of the dangerous condition posed by 
a path open for night hiking that ran within inches of 
a precipitous drop into a 90-foot gorge.  We concluded 
that because the park manager knew of the dangerous 
terrain, was in a position to do something about it, 
yet did nothing, he was not immune to liability.  Our 
holding in that case was based on facts that presented 
a "duty so clear and so absolute that it falls within 
the definition of a ministerial duty." 
Kimps, 200 Wis. 2d at 15 (citations omitted).  In light of these 
facts, we concluded that  
 
[t]here comes a time when "the buck stops."  Anderson 
knew 
the 
terrain 
at 
the 
glen 
was 
dangerous 
particularly at night; he was in a position as park 
manager to do something about it; he failed to do 
anything about it. He is liable for the breach of this 
duty. 
Anderson, 80 Wis. 2d at 541. 
¶32 Similarly, in Domino v. Walworth County, 118 Wis. 2d 
488, 490-92, 347 N.W.2d 917 (Ct. App. 1984), the court of 
appeals concluded that a police dispatcher informed of a downed 
tree was under a “duty so clear and absolute” that the 
dispatcher was legally obligated to send a police squad to 
investigate the situation.  As a result, a person injured when 
No. 
97-1573 
 
15
his motorcycle hit the downed tree could maintain a suit against 
the government.   
¶33 As we said in Olson, 143 Wis. 2d at 715, the known 
danger exception is effective only in those cases where the 
“nature of the danger is compelling and known to the officer and 
is of such force that the public officer has no discretion not 
to act.”  By way of comparison, we cannot say that the 
possibility of reduced disability benefits was “of such force” 
to impose a duty on Farrell to act.  We do not believe that the 
necessity to give benefit advice reasonably resembles either the 
necessity to warn of a 90-foot cliff or the necessity to 
investigate a fallen tree blocking a roadway.  See Kimps, 200 
Wis. 2d at 15-16.  See also Bauder v. Delavan-Darien School 
Dist., 207 Wis. 2d 310, 315-16, 558 N.W.2d 881 (Ct. App. 1996) 
(using a deflated soccer ball in physical education class does 
not present known danger of injury). 
The Scarpaci Rule 
¶34 Finally, Kierstyn argues that even if Farrell’s duty 
was discretionary and did not present a known danger, Farrell is 
not entitled to immunity because any discretion on his part was 
“professional” in nature.  This argument is based on our 
decision in Scarpaci, 96 Wis. 2d at 686-88.   
¶35 In Scarpaci, we 
decided 
that 
discretionary 
acts 
performed by public officers would only be clothed in immunity 
if those acts involved “governmental discretion.”  As a result, 
we concluded that a county medical examiner’s decision to 
perform an autopsy was an exercise of governmental discretion.  
No. 
97-1573 
 
16
Id. at 683-85.  However, this court concluded that the medical 
examiner was not entitled to immunity for any negligence in his 
performance of the autopsy.  Id. at 686.  While we recognized 
that the medical examiner’s method of performing the autopsy was 
discretionary in nature, we concluded that the “discretion [was] 
medical, 
not 
governmental” 
and 
therefore 
not 
clothed 
in 
immunity.  Id.   
¶36 Since 1981 when Scarpaci was decided, this exception 
has been successfully asserted on only two other occasions, both 
occurring in the medical context.  Protic v. Castle Co., 132 
Wis. 2d 364, 369-70, 392 N.W.2d 119 (Ct. App. 1986) (post-
surgical care medical discretion); Gordon v. Milwaukee County, 
125 Wis. 2d 62, 67-69, 
370 
N.W.2d 
803 (Ct. 
App. 
1985) 
(psychiatric diagnosis and treatment medical discretion).  In 
Stann v. Waukesha County, 161 Wis. 2d 808, 818, 468 N.W.2d 775 
(Ct. App. 1991), the court concluded that Scarpaci’s rule 
extends no further than the medical setting.   
¶37 Kierstyn 
argues 
that 
Stann’s 
limitation 
is 
an 
artificial one.  He posits that no legitimate reason exists to 
limit Scarpaci’s rationale solely to medical decisions.  See 
also Kierstyn v. Racine Unified School Dist., 221 Wis. 2d 563, 
570, 585 N.W.2d 721 (Ct. App. 1998) (Brown, J., dissenting).  
Rather, Kierstyn argues that Scarpaci ought to be interpreted as 
exempting “professional” discretion from immunity.  See also 
C.L. v. Olson, 140 Wis. 2d 224, 231, 409 N.W.2d 156 (Ct. App. 
1987), aff’d, 143 Wis. 2d 701, 422 N.W.2d 614 (1988); but see 
Kimps, 200 Wis. 2d at 17-18.   
No. 
97-1573 
 
17
¶38 We have previously declined the invitation to revisit 
the Stann rule.  Kimps, 200 Wis. 2d at 19-20.  We now do so 
twice, as it is unnecessary to reach the issue in order to 
resolve this case.  Even if we were inclined to conclude that 
Scarpaci should be interpreted as excluding a public officer’s 
“professional” discretionary acts from immunity, we would not 
include a benefits specialist within that category.   
¶39 With 
the 
inclusion 
of 
a 
benefits 
specialist, 
Kierstyn’s concept of a “professional” becomes the exception 
that would swallow the rule.  Certainly Farrell had expertise in 
a particularized area; after all, he was a benefits specialist. 
 However, 
if 
Scarpaci’s 
rule 
extends 
beyond 
the 
medical 
profession, we are confident that the term “professional” could 
not have as vacuous a meaning as Kierstyn would have it.   
¶40 In the modern parlance, the professions extend beyond 
theology, law, and medicine.  However, a profession is generally 
thought 
of 
in 
ways 
similar 
to 
the 
Webster’s 
Dictionary 
definition of it: 
 
a calling requiring specialized knowledge and often 
long and intensive preparation including instruction 
in skills and methods as well as in the scientific, 
historical, or scholarly principles underlying such 
skills 
and 
methods, 
maintaining 
by 
force 
of 
organization or concerted opinion high standards of 
achievement and conduct, and committing its members to 
continued study and to a kind of work which has for 
its prime purpose the rendering of public service. 
Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1811 (unabr. 1993) (quoted 
in State v. Kittilstad, 222 Wis. 2d 204, 214, 585 N.W.2d 925 
(Ct. App. 1998)); see also Black’s Law Dictionary 1089-90 (5th 
No. 
97-1573 
 
18
ed. 1979).  A benefits specialist for the District, as that 
position was described in a job posting in the record, would not 
fall within such a definition.9  As a result, even if we were to 
read Scarpaci as erasing immunity for acts of professional 
discretion, this expansion would be of no avail to Kierstyn. 
¶41 In sum, Kierstyn has not shown that Farrell’s conduct 
fits any of the exceptions to public officer immunity.  This 
case represents the difficulty that can be associated with 
public officer immunity.  By all accounts, Kierstyn is denied 
his opportunity to further pursue a legal remedy solely because 
Farrell happened to be an employee of a municipality.  Such a 
result is harsh; however, such a result is the reflection of the 
balancing of various policy considerations.  Ultimately, such a 
result is required by Wis. Stat. § 893.80(4) and the cases that 
                     
9 That posting read in relevant part: 
POSITION 
PURPOSE:  
Plan, 
organize 
and 
supervise 
employee 
benefit 
programs 
in 
the 
district 
both 
directly and in cooperation with other administrators. 
 This 
position 
reports 
to 
the 
Assistant 
Superintendent, Personnel Services.  
 
QUALIFICATIONS:  Bachelors Degree with at least two 
years experience in Human Resources with special 
emphasis in benefits management. 
 
ADDITIONAL 
DESIRED 
EXPERIENCE/TRAINING: 
 
Claims 
processing experience.  Computer information reporting 
and 
analysis 
experience. 
 
Benefits/counseling 
experience.  Knowledge of state and federal programs 
e.g., 
Unemployment 
Compensation, 
Worker's 
Compensation, Social Security, COBRA, and Wisconsin 
Retirement System.  
No. 
97-1573 
 
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have interpreted the statute.  Because we conclude that Farrell 
is entitled to immunity, we affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No. 97-1573.wab 
 
1 
¶42 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. (Dissenting).   This is a very 
harsh result for Mr. Kierstyn.  It is also, in my opinion, an 
incorrect result.  
¶43 The Kierstyns asked a public official for advice, the 
answer to which was in the statutes.  The public official gave 
them an erroneous answer.  The Kierstyns, unfortunately, 
followed that advice.  It was a very costly error to Mr. 
Kierstyn: the difference between approximately $1100 a month, 
and $400 a month for the rest of his life.  The majority says 
Mr. Kierstyn will have to live with it.   
¶44 In 
this 
case, 
the 
benefits 
specialist, 
Michael 
Farrell, undertook to do what he had no legal obligation to 
dogive the Kierstyns information regarding WRS benefits.  
Because the statute regarding when to apply for WRS disability 
benefits leaves no room for interpretation, I would conclude 
that once Farrell, in his discretion, decided to give the 
information, 
he 
had 
a 
ministerial 
duty 
to 
give 
correct 
information.  Accordingly, I dissent.   
¶45 As the majority accurately states, public officers or 
employees are immune from liability for injuries arising from 
any discretionary act which the officer or employee performs as 
part of his or her governmental employment.  Majority op. at 6-
7.  The majority also accurately points out that there are 
exceptions to public officer or employee immunity.  Because I 
conclude that Farrell was performing a ministerial rather than 
discretionary 
action 
in 
giving 
the 
Kierstyns 
information 
regarding when to apply for WRS disability benefits, I believe 
No. 97-1573.wab 
 
2 
his actions fall within an exception to public official 
immunity.    
¶46 As explained in the majority opinion: 
 
A public officer’s duty is ministerial only when it is 
absolute, certain and imperative, involving merely the 
performance of a specific task when the law imposes, 
prescribes and defines the time, mode and occasion for 
its performance with such certainty that nothing 
remains for judgment or discretion. 
Majority op. at 9 (quoting Lister v. Board of Regents, 72 
Wis. 2d 282, 301, 240 N.W.2d 610 (1976)).  However, if a public 
officer or employee chooses, in his or her discretion, to 
undertake a task, he or she may have a ministerial duty to carry 
out that task in accord with given rules or statutes.  Chart v. 
Dvorak, 57 Wis. 2d 92, 100-01, 203 N.W.2d 673 (1973) (relying on 
Firkus v. Rombalski, 25 Wis. 2d 352, 130 N.W.2d 835 (1964)).  
For example, in Chart, the court determined that once the 
highway commissioners made the discretionary decision to place a 
highway warning sign, “they had the duty to place it and 
maintain it without negligence.”  Chart, 57 Wis. 2d at 100-01.   
¶47 Similarly, in Major v. County of Milwaukee, 196 
Wis. 2d 939, 539 N.W.2d 472 (Ct. App. 1995), the court of 
appeals determined that Milwaukee County had discretion whether 
to sell a parcel of property, but “[o]nce those terms of sale 
were set and reified in the contract, . . . the County was under 
a ministerial duty to comply.”  Id. at 944-45.  The County was 
under an “absolute, certain and imperative duty” to not make a 
representation that it had no knowledge of the presence of toxic 
No. 97-1573.wab 
 
3 
materials or conditions affecting the property unless such 
representation was true.  Id. at 945.   
¶48 The case now before the court presents a similar 
situation.  The majority is correct to point out that the 
District had no legal obligation to hire a benefits specialist 
and the benefits specialist, once hired, had no legal obligation 
to provide District employees with information regarding WRS 
benefits.  Majority op. at 10.  However, as in Chart and Major, 
once the benefits specialist chose, in his discretion, to 
provide such information, and where the statute leaves no room 
for interpretation, he had a ministerial duty to give the 
unambiguous information provided in the statute.    
¶49 The majority attempts to distinguish Chart and Major 
by asserting that once the governmental officials in these cases 
chose to act, they had “a specific legal obligation to do so in 
a proscribed manner.”  Majority op. at 12.  In Chart, once the 
public officers chose to erect certain signs, they were 
obligated to do so in accord with the manner specified by 
certain rules and statutes.  Id.  In Major, once the public 
officers chose to sell a parcel of land and entered a sales 
contract, they were under a ministerial duty to follow the terms 
of the contract.  Id.  The majority attempts to reason in this 
case, that once Farrell chose to provide benefits information to 
the Kierstyns “he was under no legal duty to do so in a 
particular manner or according to any particular rules.”  Id.  
The majority reaches its conclusion despite the very clear 
No. 97-1573.wab 
 
4 
directive of Wis. Stat. § 40.63(8)(f) (reprinted below)10 that a 
participant in the WRS may apply for a disability annuity as if 
the last day worked were the last day paid though the employee 
continues to receive payment for sick time after the last day 
worked.  The majority reaches its conclusion despite the very 
clear directive of § 40.63(8)(h) (reprinted below)11 that an 
application for disability benefits is deemed valid only if the 
                     
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 40.63(8)(f) provides: 
(f) If an employer certifies that an employe’s date 
of termination of employment is being extended past 
the last day worked due to any payment for accumulated 
sick 
leave, 
vacation 
or 
compensatory 
time, 
a 
participating employe may file an application for a 
disability annuity as if the last day worked were the 
last day paid.  Regardless of the application date for 
a disability annuity, the date of termination of 
employment for effective date purposes shall be deemed 
to be the last day for which the participant was paid, 
including any payment for accumulated leave, but if a 
disability annuity application whose application has 
been approved dies before the last day paid, but after 
the last day worked, the effective date is the date of 
death. 
  
11 Wisconsin Stat. § 40.63(8)(h) provides: 
(h) If an applicant dies prior to the date a 
decision regarding the approval or disapproval of an 
application for a disability benefit becomes final 
under sub. (5), the application is deemed to have been 
approved prior to the applicant’s death if: 
1. The applicant was eligible for the disability 
benefit; 
2. The department received an application for the 
disability benefit in the form approved by the 
department and at least one written qualifying medical 
certification required under sub. (1)(d); and 
3. The applicant dies on or after the date which 
would have been the effective date of the disability 
benefit.  
No. 97-1573.wab 
 
5 
department receives the application before the applicant’s 
death.  In this case, the unambiguous statutes, §§ 40.63(8)(f) 
and (h), leave nothing for judgment or discretion.  Cf. Lister, 
72 Wis. 2d at 301.    
¶50 I do not see the distinction that the majority 
attempts to create between this case and Chart and Major.  In 
Chart, the public officials had no legal obligation to erect the 
highway sign; in Major, the public officials had no legal 
obligation to sell the parcel of land; in the present case, the 
benefits 
specialist 
had 
no 
legal 
obligation 
to 
provide 
information regarding when to apply for WRS disability benefits 
to the Kierstyns.  In each case the decision to take on the 
specific task was discretionary.   
¶51 Similarly, in each case the performance of the 
undertaken task was ministerial.  In Chart, the court determined 
that it was a factual question whether the placement of the sign 
complied with the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for 
Streets and Highways which required that signs be placed “‘about 
750 feet in advance of the hazard or condition warned of . . . 
.’”  Chart, 57 Wis. 2d at 100 (quoting the Manual).  In Major, 
the County represented in its sales contract that it had “‘no 
notice or knowledge of . . . the presence of any dangerous or 
toxic materials or conditions affecting the property.’”  Major, 
196 Wis. 2d at 945 (quoting the sales contract).  The court 
determined that the County had a ministerial duty to not make 
this representation unless true.  “Simply put, Milwaukee County 
should not have made the representation without checking its 
No. 97-1573.wab 
 
6 
files.”  Id.  In the present case, the statute unambiguously 
provides that an applicant may file an application for a 
disability annuity before his or her sick leave has been 
exhausted, Wis. Stat. § 40.63(8)(f), and failure to do so before 
the 
applicant’s 
death 
deems 
the 
application 
invalid, 
§ 40.63(8)(h).  The benefits specialist represented to the 
Kierstyns that Mrs. Kierstyn could not apply for a disability 
annuity until after her sick leave was exhausted.  Simply put, 
Farrell should not have made the representation without checking 
the unambiguous statute.   
¶52 Once Farrell, in his discretion, took on the task of 
providing the Kierstyns with information about when to apply for 
WRS disability benefits, information provided in an unambiguous 
statute, I conclude that Farrell had a ministerial duty to 
provide the correct information.  Accordingly, I dissent, and 
would reverse the court of appeals’ decision and remand the case 
to the circuit court for proceedings on the merits. 
¶53 I am authorized to state that Justice N. Patrick 
Crooks joins this dissent. 
 
  
 
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