Case Title: Allstate Indemnity Co. v. Solen Hingson

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC01-33

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2002-01-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC01-33
____________
ALLSTATE INDEMNITY COMPANY,
Petitioner,
vs.
SOLEN HINGSON and ANNETTE HINGSON,
Respondents.
[January 17, 2002]
PER CURIAM.
We have for review Allstate Indemnity Co. v. Hingson, 774 So. 2d 44 (Fla.
2d DCA 2000), which expressly and directly conflicts with the opinion in Herzog v.
K-Mart Corp., 760 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).  We have jurisdiction.  See
art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.  For the reasons expressed below, we approve the
result in Hingson.
The facts of Hingson are as follows.  On November 12, 1996, Allstate
Indemnity Company (Allstate) served an offer of judgment on Solen Hingson and
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Annette Hingson, husband and wife.  Allstate's offer was for $30,000 and was not
differentiated between the amount offered for Mr. Hingson's injuries in an
automobile accident and Mrs. Hingson's resulting consortium claim.  The jury
returned a verdict on March 2, 1999, resulting in the Hingsons receiving nothing and
the trial court entering judgment in favor of Allstate.  On March 11, 1999, Allstate
served its motion for fees under section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1995), based on
the $30,000 offer of judgment (policy limits) rejected by the Hingsons.  
The trial judge denied Allstate's motion for attorney's fees citing the policy
considerations regarding undifferentiated offers of judgment enunciated in section
768.79.  On appeal, the district court affirmed on the authority of C & S
Chemicals, Inc. v. McDougald, 754 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).  See Hingson,
774 So. 2d at 44.  In doing so, the district court acknowledged conflict with
Herzog.
C & S also involved a pre-1997 offer.  In that case, the district court
reasoned:
As this court recently noted, "[t]o further the statute's goal, each party
who receive[s] an offer of settlement is entitled, under the rule, to
evaluate the offer as it pertains to him or her."  United Serv.  Auto.
Ass'n v. Behar, 752 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).  Therefore, when
a lack of apportionment between offerees prevents them from
evaluating the offer independently, the joint offer is unenforceable.  
1. In a footnote, the C & S court explained that although amended Florida
Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 did not apply to pre-1997 offers,  case law
interpreting the earlier rule and statute clearly contemplated that a demand be
specific enough to allow each party to evaluate it independently.  See, e.g., Twiddy
v. Guttenplan, 678 So. 2d 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
 
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754 So. 2d at 797.1  
The facts of Herzog are as follows.  In November 1988, Marcia Herzog
slipped on spilled shampoo and fell while shopping in a K-Mart store.  She slid
across the floor, striking her head on a display with sufficient force to render her
unconscious.  She suffered a deep cut over her left eye which required thirty-nine
stitches to repair.  She also complained of headaches and pain in her neck, lower
back, and arms and subsequently was examined and treated by several physicians. 
A year later, she and her husband filed suit against K-Mart.  In February 1996,
K-Mart served the following offer of settlement upon the Herzogs:
Defendant, K-Mart Corporation, pursuant to Florida Statute 768.79
makes this Offer of Judgment to the Plaintiffs, Marcia Herzog and
Max Herzog, in the total amount of TWENTY THOUSAND AND
ONE DOLLAR ($20,001.00).  This Offer is inclusive of attorney's
fees and costs and cannot be accepted if any other offer from this
Defendant is accepted by the Plaintiffs.
760 So. 2d at 1009.  Judgment was ultimately entered for Mrs. Herzog in the
amount of $8601 and for Mr. Herzog in the amount of $3750.  K-Mart
2.  Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 was amended in 1997 to provide:
A proposal may be made by or to any party or parties and by or to
any combination of parties properly identified in the proposal.  A joint
proposal shall state the amount and terms attributable to each party.
See In re Amendments to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 682 So. 2d 105, 125
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unsuccessfully moved for an order awarding it costs and fees incurred subsequent
to the service of the its offer of judgment.  On appeal, the district court reversed,
stating:
   Rule 1.442(c)(3) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure was
amended effective January 1, 1997, to require that a joint proposal
state the amount and terms attributable to each party.  Prior to that
amendment neither the rule nor the statute had a requirement that the
amount attributable to each person be specified.  Thus, cases
involving a joint offer of judgment served prior to the amendment to
the rule, as K-Mart's was, have held such joint offers valid, despite the
failure to specify the amounts attributable to each plaintiff.  See, e.g.,
Bodek v. Gulliver Academy, Inc., 702 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 3d DCA
1997);  V.I.P. Real Estate Corp. v. Florida Executive Realty Mgmt.
Corp., 650 So. 2d 199, 201 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995);  Gross v.
Albertson's, Inc., 591 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).  On the
authority of these cases we agree with K-Mart's argument that its offer
of judgment, served prior to the amendment to the rule, was not
rendered ineffective to trigger the sanctions of the statute merely
because it was a joint offer which failed to specify the amount
attributable to each plaintiff.
760 So. 2d at 1009.
The question in this case is whether the former version of Florida Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.4422 required an offer of settlement made by a defendant to
(Fla. 1996) (emphasis added).  This amendment became effective January 1, 1997,
after the offers of settlement were made in Hingson and Herzog.
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multiple plaintiffs to state the amount and terms attributable to each plaintiff.  The
former version of rule 1.442 stated:
Parties shall comply with the procedure set forth in section 768.79,
Florida Statutes.
Section 768.79 provides in relevant part:
(2) The making of an offer of settlement which is not accepted 
does not preclude the making of a subsequent offer.  An offer must:
(a) Be in writing and state that it is being made pursuant to this
section.
(b) Name the party making it and the party to whom it is being
made.
(c) State with particularity the amount offered to settle a claim
for punitive damages, if any.
(d) State its total amount.
We agree with the district court in C & S that “[t]o further the statute's goal, each
party who receive[s] an offer of settlement is entitled . . . to evaluate the offer as it
pertains to him or her.”  754 So. 2d at 797-98.  Otherwise, in many cases, it would
be impossible for the trial court to determine the amount attributable to each party
in order to make a further determination of whether the judgment against only one
of the parties was at least twenty-five percent more or less than the offer
3. For example, consider the facts of Herzog.  K-Mart’s offer of settlement
to the Herzogs was for $20,001.  Judgment was ultimately entered for Mrs. Herzog
in the amount of $8601 and for Mr. Herzog in the amount of $3750.  It is not
necessarily clear whether these judgments were at least twenty-five percent less than
the amount of K-Mart’s offer.  If forced to specify the amount offered to each
party, K-Mart might have offered Mrs. Herzog $16,001 and Mr. Herzog $4000, in
which case K-Mart would not have been entitled to costs and fees relating to the
judgment in favor of Mr. Herzog.    
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(depending on which party made the offer).3  Moreover, the plain language of
section 768.79 supports the C & S court’s holding.  In subsection (2)(b), the
statute refers to “party” in the singular.  This, we believe, indicates the Legislature's
intent that an offer specify the amount attributable to each individual party.   
Accordingly, we approve the decision in Hingson.  We disapprove Herzog
to the extent that it is inconsistent with this opinion.  
It is so ordered.
WELLS, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur.
HARDING, J., dissents with an opinion, in which SHAW and ANSTEAD, JJ.,
concur.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
HARDING, J., dissenting.
I am persuaded by reasoning of the district court in Herzog v. K-Mart Corp.
760 So. 2d 1006, 1009 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000):
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   Rule 1.442(c)(3) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure was
amended effective January 1, 1997, to require that a joint proposal
state the amount and terms attributable to each party.  Prior to that
amendment neither the rule nor the statute had a requirement that the
amount attributable to each person be specified.  Thus, cases
involving a joint offer of judgment served prior to the amendment to
the rule, as K-Mart's was, have held such joint offers valid, despite the
failure to specify the amounts attributable to each plaintiff.  See, e.g.,
Bodek v. Gulliver Academy, Inc., 702 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 3d DCA
1997);  V.I.P. Real Estate Corp. v. Florida Executive Realty Mgmt.
Corp., 650 So. 2d 199, 201 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995);  Gross v.
Albertson's, Inc., 591 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).  On the
authority of these cases we agree with K-Mart's argument that its offer
of judgment, served prior to the amendment to the rule, was not
rendered ineffective to trigger the sanctions of the statute merely
because it was a joint offer which failed to specify the amount
attributable to each plaintiff.
Of the four district courts that have considered this issue, only the Second District
has held to the contrary.
At the time the offer was made in the instant case, neither section 768.79 nor
the former version of rule 1.442 required offers of judgment to state the amount and
terms attributable to each party.  See Bodek v. Gulliver Academy Inc., 702 So. 2d
1331, 1332 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (“Further, contrary to the plaintiffs' assertion,
section 768.79 does not require that in circumstances where the offer of judgment
is being made to multiple plaintiffs, that the offer of judgment state the amount that
is being offered to each plaintiff.  In fact, section 768.79(2)(d) merely provides that
the offer of judgment must [s]tate its total amount."); Tucker v. Shelby Mutual Ins.
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Co., 343 So. 2d 1357, 1358 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) (“[When] the claims of a father
and his minor daughter are properly joined in one action we fail to see that violence
has been done to the rule by a defendant making one offer to both parties.”). 
Hence, Allstate did all that section 768.79 and the former version of rule 1.442
required.
The majority argues that “in many cases, it would be impossible for the trial
court to determine the amount attributable to each party in order to make a further
determination of whether the judgment against only one of the parties was at least
twenty-five percent more or less than the offer (depending on which party made the
offer).”  Majority op. at 5.  Rather than worry about what may happen “in many
cases,” it is more appropriate to focus on the facts of this case.  The jury returned
a verdict in favor of the Defendant, resulting in the Plaintiffs receiving nothing. 
There is no question that the judgment was at least twenty-five percent less than the
amount of Allstate’s offer, regardless of its nonallocation.  Certainly section 768.79
would authorize plaintiffs to recover fees if they had made an unallocated joint offer
and received a verdict which was at least twenty-five percent more than that offer.
The majority also relies on “the plain language” of section 768.79, which
refers to the term “party” in the singular.  I am not persuaded by this reasoning, as
section 1.01(1), Florida Statutes (2001), provides, "In construing these statutes and
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each and every word, phrase, or part hereof, where the context will permit . . . [t]he
singular includes the plural and vice versa."  Hence, I am not convinced that the
singular use of the term “party” indicates the Legislature's intent that an offer
specify the amount attributable to each individual party.
For all of these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
SHAW and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct
Conflict
Second District - Case No. 2D00-1107
(Lee County)
Bonita Kneeland Brown of Fowler, White, Gillen, Boggs, Villareal & Banker, P.A.,
Tampa, Florida,
for Petitioner
Thomas Martin Pflaum, Micanopy, Florida; and Associates and Bruce L. Scheiner,
Fort Myers, Florida,
for Respondents