Case Title: State v. Thomas H. Bush

Citation: 2005 WI 103

Docket Number: 2003AP002306

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2005-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
2005 WI 103 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP2306 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Commitment of Thomas H. Bush: 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
     v. 
Thomas H. Bush,  
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2004 WI App 193 
Reported at:  276 Wis. 2d 806, 688 N.W.2d 752 
(Ct. App. 2004-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 6, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 29, 2005   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Eau Claire   
 
JUDGE: 
William M. Gabler   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by Robert G. LeBell and Kostich, LeBell, Dobroski & Morgan LLP, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Robert G. LeBell. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent the cause was argued by Sally 
L. Wellman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
 
2005 WI 103
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP2306  
(L.C. No. 
97CI1) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Commitment of Thomas H. Bush: 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Petitioner-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Thomas H. Bush, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 6, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   Thomas H. Bush seeks review 
of a published court of appeals decision that affirmed a circuit 
court's order denying two pretrial motions challenging the 
constitutionality of Wis. Stat. ch. 980 (chapter 980) (2001-02).1   
State v. Bush, 2004 WI App 193, 276 Wis. 2d 806, 688 N.W.2d 752 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No. 
2003AP2306   
 
2 
 
(Bush III).  The court of appeals concluded that Bush was 
procedurally barred from raising a constitutional challenge 
against chapter 980.  Id., ¶19. 
¶2 
Bush asks this court to reverse the court of appeals' 
decision and hold that he is not procedurally barred from 
bringing this constitutional claim.  Bush further asks this 
court to conclude that chapter 980 is facially unconstitutional 
on substantive due process grounds in that it does not require 
proof of a "recent overt act" when there has been a break in the 
offender's 
incarceration 
and 
the 
offender 
has 
been 
reincarcerated for nonsexual behavior. 
¶3 
Although the State argues that Bush has waived the 
issue regarding his constitutional challenge to chapter 980, we 
reach the issue's merits.  We conclude that due process does not 
require a showing of a recent overt act when there is a break in 
the offender's incarceration and the offender is subsequently 
reincarcerated for nonsexual behavior in order to prove current 
dangerousness.  We decline to adopt a bright-line rule that 
requires current dangerousness to be proven by a particular type 
of evidence.  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court 
of appeals. 
I 
¶4 
The following facts are undisputed and were stipulated 
to by the parties at trial: 
Mr. Bush was convicted in 1988 of attempted second 
degree sexual assault, which, the state maintains, is 
the predicate act authorizing the filing of the 
original 
petition 
for 
a 
Chapter 
980 
commitment.  
No. 
2003AP2306   
 
3 
 
Subsequent to his 1988 conviction, Mr. Bush was 
paroled and was permitted to leave the State of 
Wisconsin in 1992.  He was arrested in 1992 for 
operating under the influence, but was acquitted of 
that charge.  As a direct result of his arrest for the 
operating under the influence charge, he was returned 
to 
the 
State 
of 
Wisconsin 
to 
face 
revocation 
proceedings.  Ultimately, he was revoked as a result 
of drinking related events.  At no time was he charged 
with any new sexually violent offense after the 1988 
assault.  His revocation was as a consequence to non-
sexually assaultive behavior.  These violations did 
not constitute recent overt acts of sexual violence.  
No evidence was provided in the petition to reflect 
that the respondent committed any "recent overt act," 
nor was any evidence, consistent with a "recent overt 
act," introduced at the time of the probable cause 
hearing.   
¶5 
The following additional facts are also helpful for 
our analysis.2  When Bush was arrested for attempted second-
degree sexual assault in 1988, he had been placed on parole just 
26 days prior for a conviction of attempted first-degree sexual 
assault.  Prior to his 1988 conviction, Bush was convicted of 
numerous sex-related offenses, which include: two counts of 
                                                 
2 As seen below, Bush has had two commitment hearings, one 
in 1997 and another in 2000.  The current appellate record does 
not contain the trial transcripts from the 2000 commitment 
hearing.  Although we do have the exhibits and a list of which 
exhibits were admitted at trial, we do not know if any of the 
exhibits were admitted for limited purposes.  We will assume 
that they were not.  Further, we do not know if any exhibits 
from the prior commitment hearing in 1997 were incorporated by 
reference during the 2000 commitment hearing.  As they are part 
of our record here, we will assume that they were.  See State v. 
McAttee, 2001 WI App 262, ¶5 n.1, 248 Wis. 2d 865, 637 N.W.2d 
774 ("It is the appellant's responsibility to ensure completion 
of the appellate record and when an appellate record is 
incomplete in connection with an issue raised by the appellant, 
we must assume that the missing material supports the trial 
court's ruling."  (citation and quotations omitted)). 
No. 
2003AP2306   
 
4 
 
sexual assault, three counts of sexual perversion, three counts 
of disorderly conduct (including a "Peeping Tom" offense), two 
counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, and two counts 
of 
attempted 
sexual 
assault. 
 
By 
1988, 
Bush 
had 
been 
incarcerated or under probation and parole community supervision 
almost continuously 
in 
Illinois, 
Michigan, 
Minnesota, and 
Wisconsin since his first conviction in 1966.  Aside from these 
convictions, Bush admitted committing other deviant sexual 
behavior than that for which he had been arrested.   
¶6 
In 1992, while serving the sentence for his 1988 
conviction, Bush completed the Oshkosh Sex Offender Treatment 
Program.  He was placed on parole to attend the Behavioral 
Medicine Institute of Atlanta, Georgia.  He successfully 
completed the inpatient component of the Georgia program, but 
failed to comply with the requirements of the outpatient 
program, in violation of the conditions of his parole, by 
purchasing a sports car without knowledge or permission of the 
program, drinking alcohol, and getting in a car accident.3  His 
parole was revoked and he was incarcerated again in Wisconsin. 
¶7 
In addition to Bush's prior convictions, since at 
least 1978, Bush's psychiatric evaluations have expressed the 
opinion that Bush is among those sexual offenders who are the 
                                                 
3 Although driving while intoxicated does not necessarily 
raise concerns for sexually violent behavior, drinking and 
driving are a particularly dangerous combination for Bush.  The 
record demonstrates that "Mr. Bush has specific triggers 
regarding his sex offender criminal activity which includes 
alcohol and fast cars."   
No. 
2003AP2306   
 
5 
 
least likely to change their behavior.  More recent evaluations 
conducted in 1996 and 1997 recommended that Bush be closely 
supervised and identified Bush as posing a high risk of 
recidivism, despite his extensive participation in sex-offender 
treatment.  Furthermore, while incarcerated, Bush continued to 
demonstrate behavior that is predictive of the likelihood that 
he will reoffend.  For example, Bush was reprimanded in 1995 for 
attempting to purchase pornography and for corresponding by mail 
with a person who was engaged in "grooming a boy for sexual 
purposes."   
¶8 
In 1997, while Bush remained incarcerated for his 1988 
offense, the State filed a chapter 980 petition,4 alleging that 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.02(2) outlines the procedures for 
filing a petition alleging an offender is a sexually violent 
person as follows: 
(2)  A petition filed under this section shall allege 
that all of the following apply to the person alleged 
to be a sexually violent person: 
(a) 
The 
person 
satisfies 
any 
of 
the 
following 
criteria: 
1. The person has been convicted of a sexually violent 
offense. 
2. The person has been found delinquent for a sexually 
violent offense. 
3. The person has been found not guilty of a sexually 
violent offense by reason of mental disease or defect. 
(ag) The person is within 90 days of discharge or 
release, on parole, extended supervision or otherwise, 
from a sentence that was imposed for a conviction for 
a 
sexually 
violent 
offense, 
from 
a 
secured 
correctional facility, as defined in s. 938.02 (15m), 
from a secured child caring institution, as defined in 
No. 
2003AP2306   
 
6 
 
Bush was still sexually violent.  See Bush III, 276 Wis. 2d 806, 
¶3; see also State v. Bush, No. 1997AP3454, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 1998) (Bush I).  Following the trial on 
that petition, the jury found that Bush was sexually violent.  
See Bush III, 276 Wis. 2d 806, ¶3.  Bush appealed and the court 
of appeals reversed his commitment because of a prejudicial jury 
instruction.  Id. 
¶9 
In 2000, Bush was retried and a second jury came to 
the same conclusion.  Id., ¶4.  Bush again appealed, arguing 
that:  (1) the State's expert witnesses should have been 
disqualified; (2) the State failed to present sufficient 
evidence to meet chapter 980's requirements; and (3) the State 
failed to file the petition within the requisite 90 days.  State 
v. Bush, No. 2001AP588, unpublished slip op. at ¶1 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Nov. 26, 2002) (Bush II).  The court of appeals affirmed in 
all respects except whether the State had filed the chapter 980 
petition in a timely manner.  See Bush III, 276 Wis. 2d 806, ¶4.  
On remand, the trial court determined that the State had 
complied with the filing requirements of chapter 980.  Id., ¶4. 
                                                                                                                                                             
s. 938.02 (15g), or from a secured group home, as 
defined in s. 938.02 (15p), if the person was placed 
in the facility for being adjudicated delinquent under 
s. 938.183 or 938.34 on the basis of a sexually 
violent offense or from a commitment order that was 
entered as a result of a sexually violent offense. 
(b) The person has a mental disorder. 
(c) The person is dangerous to others because the 
person's mental disorder makes it likely that he or 
she will engage in acts of sexual violence. 
No. 
2003AP2306   
 
7 
 
¶10 In August 2002, Bush filed a petition for release 
under Wis. Stat. § 980.09(2).5  Bush III, 276 Wis. 2d 806, ¶5.  
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 980.09(2) reads as follows: 
(a) A person may petition the committing court for 
discharge from custody or supervision without the 
secretary's approval.  At the time of an examination 
under s. 980.07 (1), the secretary shall provide the 
committed person with a written notice of the person's 
right to petition the court for discharge over the 
secretary's objection.  The notice shall contain a 
waiver of rights.  The secretary shall forward the 
notice and waiver form to the court with the report of 
the department's examination under s. 980.07.  If the 
person does not affirmatively waive the right to 
petition, the court shall set a probable cause hearing 
to determine whether facts exist that warrant a hearing 
on whether the person is still a sexually violent 
person.  The committed person has a right to have an 
attorney represent him or her at the probable cause 
hearing, but the person is not entitled to be present at 
the probable cause hearing. 
  
(b) If the court determines at the probable cause hearing 
under par. (a) that probable cause exists to believe that 
the committed person is no longer a sexually violent 
person, then the court shall set a hearing on the issue.  
At a hearing under this paragraph, the committed person is 
entitled to be present and to the benefit of the 
protections afforded to the person under s. 980.03.  The 
district attorney or the department of justice, whichever 
filed the original petition, shall represent the state at a 
hearing under this paragraph.  The hearing under this 
paragraph shall be to the court.  The state has the right 
to have the committed person evaluated by experts chosen by 
the state.  At the hearing, the state has the burden of 
proving by clear and convincing evidence that the committed 
person is still a sexually violent person. 
  
(c) If the court is satisfied that the state has not met 
its burden of proof under par. (b), the person shall be 
discharged from the custody or supervision of the 
department.  If the court is satisfied that the state 
has met its burden of proof under par. (b), the court 
may proceed to determine, using the criteria specified 
No. 
2003AP2306   
 
8 
 
In the pretrial motions, Bush argued, in pertinent part, that he 
had been denied due process because chapter 980 failed to 
require proof of a recent overt act.  Id.  The circuit court for 
Eau Claire County, Honorable William M. Gabler, denied Bush's 
pretrial motions, and a jury determined that Bush was still 
sexually violent.  Id., ¶6.  His petition for discharge was 
therefore denied.  Id. 
¶11 Bush again appealed, renewing his argument he made for 
the first time in the circuit court that chapter 980 is 
unconstitutional because it does not require a recent overt act.  
The State argued that Bush should not be allowed to attack the 
underlying commitment on constitutional grounds because he 
should have made this challenge in his two prior appeals.  Id., 
¶7.  The court of appeals agreed with the State and concluded 
that Bush was procedurally barred from raising the issue of the 
constitutionality of chapter 980.  Id., ¶¶8, 19. 
¶12 Bush seeks review, and we affirm.   
II 
¶13 Bush challenges the constitutionality of chapter 980 
on due process grounds, alleging that the statute fails to 
require a finding of a recent overt act.  The constitutionality 
of a statute is a question of law which we review de novo.  
State v. Randall, 192 Wis. 2d 800, 824, 532 N.W.2d 94 (1995).  
This court has already determined that the State has dual 
                                                                                                                                                             
in s. 980.08 (4)(b), whether to modify the person's 
existing commitment order by authorizing supervised 
release. 
No. 
2003AP2306   
 
9 
 
interests under the statute to protect the public from the 
dangerously 
mentally 
disordered 
and 
to 
provide 
care 
and 
treatment to those with mental disorders that predispose them to 
sexual violence.  State v. Post, 197 Wis. 2d 279, 302, 541 
N.W.2d 115 (1995).  "The Supreme Court has recognized both of 
these interests as legitimate, the first under a state's police 
powers and the latter under its parens patriae powers."  Id. 
(citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979)).  Thus, 
the issue is whether chapter 980 is narrowly tailored under the 
circumstances in this case to serve these compelling state 
interests.  Id.   
III 
¶14 Before addressing the merits of Bush's argument, we 
first address a procedural issue.  Relying on State v. 
Trochinski, 2002 WI 56, 253 Wis. 2d 38, 644 N.W.2d 891, State v. 
Molitor, 210 Wis. 2d 415, 565 N.W.2d 248 (Ct. App. 1997), and 
State 
ex 
rel. 
Skinkis 
v. 
Treffert, 
90 
Wis. 2d 528, 
280 
N.W.2d 316 (Ct. App. (1979), Bush asserts that facial challenges 
to the constitutionality of a statute present issues of subject 
matter jurisdiction which cannot be waived, notwithstanding his 
failure to raise that challenge in his earlier appeals.   
¶15 The State, on the other hand, argues that the law in 
this area lacks clarity and is inconsistent.  While the State 
recognizes the validity of those cases relied upon by Bush, it 
nevertheless suggests that those cases have not always been 
No. 
2003AP2306   
 
10 
 
followed.6  Moreover, the State argues that another line of 
cases, culminating in this court's decision last term in Village 
of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, ¶¶2, 30, 273 Wis. 2d 76, 
681 N.W.2d 190, suggest that pursuant to Article VII, Section 8 
of the Wisconsin Constitution,7 "no circuit court is without 
subject matter jurisdiction to entertain actions of any nature 
whatsoever."  Mikrut, 273 Wis. 2d 76, ¶8; see Mueller v. Brunn, 
105 Wis. 2d 171, 175, 313 N.W.2d 790 (1982); Eberhardy v. Cir. 
Ct. for Wood Co., 102 Wis. 2d 539, 307 N.W.2d 881 (1981). 
¶16 We agree with the State that the jurisprudence 
concerning subject matter jurisdiction and a circuit court's 
competence to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction is murky 
at best.  Nevertheless, we have recently resolved this area as 
Bush suggests, and we reaffirm those decisions here.   
                                                 
6 See State v. Wilks, 121 Wis. 2d 93, 107, 358 N.W.2d 273 
(1984) (where court declined to address defendant's claim that 
loitering ordinance was unconstitutionally vague when raised for 
first time on appeal); In re Baby Girl K., 113 Wis. 2d 429, 448, 
335 
N.W.2d 
846 
(1983) 
(where 
court 
considered 
facial 
constitutional challenge raised for first time on appeal as 
discretionary but to be done if in best interests of justice); 
and Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 66 Wis. 2d 296, 314, 224 N.W.2d 
582 (1975) (court declined to reach claim presented for first 
time on appeal that liability limits are unconstitutional, 
although it is not clear whether that challenge was facial or as 
applied).  See also State v. Thomas, 128 Wis. 2d 93, 97-101, 381 
N.W.2d 567 (Ct. App. 1985) (facial challenges that a statute is 
unconstitutionally vague go to subject matter jurisdiction).  
7 Under the Wisconsin Constitution, "[e]xcept as otherwise 
provided 
by 
law, 
the 
circuit 
court 
shall 
have 
original 
jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal within this 
state . . . ."  Wis. Const. art. VII, § 8.   
No. 
2003AP2306   
 
11 
 
¶17 In both State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶46, 264 Wis. 2d 
520, 665 N.W.2d 328, and Trochinski, 253 Wis. 2d 38, ¶34 n.15, 
this court concluded that while an "as applied" challenge to the 
constitutionality of a statute may be waived, a facial challenge 
is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction and cannot be waived.  
The logic behind this conclusion is entirely consistent with 
Article VII, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  Article 
VII, Section 8 states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by 
law," circuit courts have original jurisdiction "in all matters 
civil and criminal."  If a statute is unconstitutional on its 
face, any action premised upon that statute fails to present any 
civil or criminal matter in the first instance.  As the court of 
appeals correctly noted in Skinkis, if the facial attack on the 
statute were correct, the statute would be null and void, and 
the court would be without the power to act under the statute.  
Skinkis, 90 Wis. 2d at 538.  This is contrasted from an "as 
applied" challenge, where the court initially has jurisdiction 
over the subject matter, as the statute is valid upon its face.   
¶18 This rule is also entirely consistent with our line of 
cases that recognize that a criminal complaint which fails to 
allege any offense known at law is jurisdictionally defective 
and void.  See Champlain v. State, 53 Wis. 2d 751, 754, 193 
N.W.2d 868 (1972); State v. Lampe, 26 Wis. 2d 646, 648, 133 
N.W.2d 349 (1965).  Once again, the premise behind the rule is 
simple.  Circuit courts have original jurisdiction over all 
matters civil and criminal, except as otherwise provided by law.  
If a complaint fails to state an offense known at law, no matter 
No. 
2003AP2306   
 
12 
 
civil or criminal is before the court, resulting in the court 
being without jurisdiction in the first instance.     
¶19 We conclude that because Bush has facially challenged 
the constitutionality of chapter 980, his challenge goes to the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the court.  Therefore, because 
challenges to subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, we 
reach the merits of his claim.8 
IV 
¶20 We now consider the substance of Bush's argument.  
Chapter 980 applies only if an offender is a "sexually violent 
person." 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 980.01(7) 
defines 
a 
"sexually 
violent person" as follows: 
"Sexually violent person" means a person who has been 
convicted of a sexually violent offense, has been 
adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent offense, 
or has been found not guilty of or not responsible for 
a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity or 
mental disease, defect, or illness, and who is 
dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental 
disorder that makes it likely that the person will 
engage in acts of sexual violence.  (Emphasis added.) 
                                                 
8 Common law principles of waiver generally apply to Bush's 
"as applied" constitutional challenge.  See State v. Erickson, 
227 Wis. 2d 758, 766, 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999) (noting that the 
waiver rule exists to promote efficiency and fairness); see also 
State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, ¶46, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 
N.W.2d 328, and State v. Trochinski, 2002 WI 56, ¶34 n.15, 253 
Wis. 2d 38, 644 N.W.2d 891.  Because Bush failed to raise this 
issue in his earlier appeals, and because we do not have all 
components of the record, we conclude that Bush has waived his 
as applied challenge.  However, we decline to reach the question 
of whether a procedural bar, similar to one announced in State 
v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994), 
applies. 
No. 
2003AP2306   
 
13 
 
¶21 Bush argues that Wis. Stat. chapter 980 is facially 
unconstitutional because it does not require a showing of a 
recent overt act to prove that an offender is currently 
dangerous.  Specifically, Bush contends that chapter 980 
violates due process because it fails to require a showing of a 
recent overt act to prove current dangerousness when there has 
been a break in the offender's incarceration and the offender 
has been reincarcerated for nonsexual behavior.   
¶22 Bush asks this court to adopt the rationale used by 
the Washington Supreme Court in In re Albrecht, 51 P.3d 73 
(Wash. 2002).  In that case, the Washington Supreme Court 
concluded that when an offender has been released into the 
community and his or her release is revoked for a nonsexually 
violent act, due process requires that the state show a recent 
overt act by the offender.9  Albrecht, 51 P.3d at 78; see also In 
re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1009 (Wash. 1993).10  The Washington 
                                                 
9 According to the Washington court, a "recent overt act" is 
"any act that has either caused harm of a sexually violent 
nature or creates a reasonable apprehension of such harm."  In 
re Albrecht, 51 P.3d 73, 77 (Wash. 2002).  When the individual 
has been continuously incarcerated, no evidence of a recent 
overt act is required because that would create an impossible 
standard.  Id. at 77. 
10 In In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1009 (Wash. 1993), the 
Washington Supreme Court held that when an offender has been 
released from confinement since his or her last sex offense, but 
before sexually violent predator proceedings are initiated 
against him or her, the state had to prove he or she committed a 
recent overt act in order to establish dangerousness.  The 
Washington Legislature amended its sexual predator commitment 
statute to reflect the court's decision.  State v. Ward, 104 
P.3d 751, 753 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).  
No. 
2003AP2306   
 
14 
 
Supreme 
Court 
reasoned 
that 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
an 
involuntary civil commitment is predicated on proof that the 
offender is dangerous and that his or her dangerousness is 
current.  Albrecht, 51 P.3d at 76 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 
504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).  Once an offender has been released 
into the community and is later incarcerated for a nonsexually 
violent offense, the offender "cannot necessarily be said to be 
currently dangerous."  Id. at 78.  Therefore, when an offender 
has been released into the community, due process is violated if 
the state has not demonstrated that the offender is currently 
dangerous, and the offender's current dangerousness must be 
demonstrated by a recent overt act.  Id. at 76 (citing Young, 
857 P.2d at 41-42).  The Washington court stated: "The existence 
of 
a 
recent 
overt 
act . . . necessarily 
satisfies 
the 
dangerousness element required by due process [because] the 
recent overt act requirement directly and specifically speaks to 
a person's dangerousness."  Id. at 78.   
¶23 We decline to adopt Albrecht.  Bush's argument, rooted 
in the Albrecht rationale, raises three problems.  First, Bush's 
entire due process argument assumes that the mere fact that an 
offender has been granted parole constitutes a determination 
that the offender is no longer dangerous.  Second, Bush asks 
this court to adopt an absolute, bright-line rule that specifies 
the particular evidence that will adequately show current 
dangerousness, limiting the factfinder's ability to determine 
the offender's current level of dangerousness.  Third, Bush 
advocates an illogical standard by urging that this court 
No. 
2003AP2306   
 
15 
 
require proof of a "recent overt act" while defining "recent" as 
the period of time when the offender is in the community, 
regardless of the passage of time between the parole revocation 
and the filing of the involuntary civil commitment petition.  We 
discuss each issue in turn. 
A 
¶24 At the outset, Bush's entire argument rests on the 
assumption that the parole board must have determined that Bush 
was no longer dangerous when it granted him parole in 1992.    
Bush asserts that the parole board would not have released him 
into the community on supervised parole if the board believed he 
was dangerous.  Once the State presumably determined that Bush 
was no longer dangerous and released him into the community, 
Bush reasons, due process requires the State prove he had become 
dangerous subsequent to his release by showing a recent overt 
act.   
¶25 The State contends that this rationale is unpersuasive 
because nothing in the record demonstrates why Bush was released 
on supervised parole.   
¶26 As both parties correctly observe, the record is terse 
as to why Bush was paroled or on what basis that decision was 
made.  In fact, the evidence contained in the record could lead 
to contradictory conclusions as to the parole board's rationale.  
On one hand, the record indicates that prior to his 1992 parole, 
Bush had made "excellent" progress with his sex-offender 
treatment, had become a "low risk to society," and was "not 
No. 
2003AP2306   
 
16 
 
dangerous to others."  This evidence may have led to the 
conclusion that Bush was no longer dangerous.   
¶27 On the other hand, Bush was allowed to leave prison on 
supervised release in order to attend the Behavioral Medicine 
Institute of Atlanta, Georgia.  According to the record, the 
Atlanta program is an advanced sex-offender treatment program 
that "treats the most chronic of cases and those that have 
proven unresponsive to previous treatments."  In addition, the 
State imposed specific conditions of release upon Bush.  As 
such, evidence in the record also supports a determination that 
Bush remained dangerous. 
¶28 Therefore, we cannot conclude that the mere fact that 
the 
State 
granted 
Bush 
parole 
necessarily 
leads 
to 
the 
conclusion that he was no longer dangerous as that concept is 
used in chapter 980.  The record is simply too barren for us to 
agree with that conclusion.  Although the fact that the State 
placed Bush on supervised parole has probative value in 
undercutting 
the 
State's 
case, 
it 
is 
not 
a 
conclusive 
determination of Bush's dangerousness under chapter 980. 
B 
¶29 Bush advocates that we adopt a bright-line rule that 
requires a showing that he committed a recent overt act while on 
parole, regardless of any of his sexually violent behavior 
before, or after, the period of time he was on supervised parole 
in 1992.  We agree with the State that due process does not 
require adoption of this bright-line rule. 
No. 
2003AP2306   
 
17 
 
¶30 We recognize that substantive as well as procedural 
limitations on a state's power to commit the dangerously 
mentally ill vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  Post, 197 
Wis. 2d at 312 (citing Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 736-37 
(1972)).  As such, the United States Supreme Court has refused 
to proscribe strict boundaries for legislative determinations of 
what is necessary for voluntary commitment.  Id.   
¶31 Moreover, the Court has cautioned that "an absolutist 
approach is unworkable" in a civil commitment analysis.  Kansas 
v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 411 (2002).  The Court concluded that 
"the Constitution's safeguards of human liberty in the area of 
mental illness and the law are not always best enforced through 
precise bright-line rules."  Crane 534 U.S. at 413 (citing 
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359 (1997)).  Bright-line 
rules present 
unworkable 
standards 
because 
their rigidity 
hampers the factfinder's ability to measure an individual's 
dangerousness.  See State v. Laxton, 2002 WI 82, ¶21, 254 
Wis. 2d 185, 647 N.W.2d 784. 
¶32 Along 
similar 
lines, 
inhibiting 
a 
factfinder's 
evaluation 
of 
dangerousness 
through 
bright-line 
rules 
is 
problematic because chapter 980 is reserved for only the most 
dangerous offenders.  See Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 307.  Prior to 
commitment, chapter 980 requires the State to present evidence 
sufficient to allow the factfinder to distinguish "a dangerous 
sexual offender who has serious difficulty controlling his or 
her behavior from a dangerous but typical recidivist."  Laxton, 
245 Wis. 2d 185, ¶23.  This evaluation is not an exact science; 
No. 
2003AP2306   
 
18 
 
the standard "risk assessment" used by expert witnesses for 
sexual offenders "takes into account all past violations of the 
law in attempting to evaluate the probability of future sexually 
assaultive behavior."  State v. Franklin, 2004 WI 38, ¶22, 270 
Wis. 2d 271, 677 N.W.2d 276.   
¶33 Predicting an offender's dangerousness under chapter 
980 is a complex evaluation.  At trial, the factfinder is 
obligated to examine the totality of the offender's past actions 
and make a determination based on the offender's "relevant 
character traits and patterns of behavior," as to whether the 
offender's mental condition currently predisposes him or her to 
commit another sexually violent act.  Id., ¶14 (holding that 
Wis. Stat. § 904.04(2) did not apply to chapter 980); State v. 
Kienitz, 227 Wis. 2d 423, 441, 597 N.W.2d 712 (1999) (reasoning 
that the factfinder has an obligation to weigh all the evidence 
presented).  Ultimately, the question "is simply whether it is 
substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of 
sexual violence without regard to any specific restrictions, 
supervision or time frame."  See State v. Thiel, 2004 WI App 
140, ¶17, 275 Wis. 2d 421, 685 N.W.2d 890.  Thus, we agree with 
the State that due process does not require that an evaluation 
of dangerousness be limited based on Bush's proposed bright-line 
rule. 
C 
¶34 Finally, we agree with the State that Bush advocates 
an illogical application of requiring recent overt acts to prove 
current dangerousness.  Bush defines recent overt acts as 
No. 
2003AP2306   
 
19 
 
including acts during the time he was on parole, which in this 
case was five years before the State filed the initial petition.  
His rationale is again based on Albrecht, where the Washington 
court found that to determine the offender's level of current 
dangerousness, the factfinder must rely on an offender's 
behavior when he or she is not incarcerated.  Albrecht, 51 P.3d 
at 77.  When an individual is continuously incarcerated, the 
only behavior available to the factfinder is his or her behavior 
prior to incarceration.  Id.  But, under Albrecht, when the 
offender has been released back into the community, his or her 
behavior upon release is demonstrative of whether the offender 
continues to be dangerous.  Id.   
¶35 Looking to Bush's time on parole, without more, does 
not necessarily give the factfinder an adequate evaluation of 
Bush's current dangerousness for at least three reasons.   
¶36 First, Bush's parole was not close in time to his 
chapter 980 trial.  Bush was released into the community under 
supervised parole in early 1992.  In less than a month, he 
violated 
specific 
conditions 
of 
his 
parole 
and 
was 
reincarcerated for his 1988 offense.  Five years later, the 
State filed a petition to commit Bush under chapter 980.  Bush 
asks this court to conclude that his behavior while on parole in 
1992 should be the only reliable evidence for the factfinder to 
use in determining whether he was currently dangerous in 1997.  
His conduct during his parole merely establishes that he had 
difficulty in conforming his behavior to the law during his 
short release period.  
No. 
2003AP2306   
 
20 
 
¶37 Second, under Bush's approach, an offender's behavior 
while 
incarcerated 
would 
be 
irrelevant 
to 
support 
a 
determination 
of 
current 
dangerousness. 
 
However, 
the 
factfinder's analysis of an offender's current dangerousness is 
not limited to the offender's actions prior to his or her most 
recent incarceration and can include an offender's actions while 
incarcerated.  See Franklin, 270 Wis. 2d 271, ¶22; State v. 
Zanelli, 212 Wis. 2d 358, 379-80, 569 N.W.2d 301 (Ct. App. 
1997).   Here, Bush has engaged in the following behavior while 
incarcerated:  he was reprimanded for corresponding with a 
person who was "grooming a boy for sexual purposes," and he 
attempted to obtain pornographic materials.  This behavior may 
bear on Bush's dangerousness, but the weight to be given to this 
behavior is for the factfinder. 
¶38 Third, the sexually violent offense for which Bush is 
incarcerated may be relevant evidence of current dangerousness.  
Bush was eligible for a chapter 980 commitment only because he 
had been convicted of a sex-related crime.  The fact that Bush 
was incarcerated for attempted sexual assault when the chapter 
980 petition was filed is evidence of his dangerousness at that 
time.  Although this conviction, on its face, "is not sufficient 
to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the person has a 
mental disorder [as required for a chapter 980 commitment]," 
No. 
2003AP2306   
 
21 
 
Wis. Stat. § 980.05(4),11 we conclude that evidence of Bush's 
1988 conviction is a proper component of the evaluation of his 
current dangerousness. 
¶39 Therefore, we conclude that due process does not 
require a showing of a recent overt act to prove current 
dangerousness when there has been a break in the offender's 
incarceration and the offender has been reincarcerated for 
nonsexual behavior.  Because due process does not require this 
showing under these circumstances, we agree with the State that 
chapter 980 is accordingly narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
state interest for purposes of Bush's challenge.  Therefore, we reject 
Bush's argument that chapter 980 is facially unconstitutional on 
that basis.   
V 
¶40 In sum, we conclude that chapter 980 is not facially 
unconstitutional.  We conclude that due process does not require 
proof of a recent overt act in evaluating the dangerousness of 
the offender when there has been a break in the offender's 
incarceration and the offender is reincarcerated for nonsexual 
behavior.  Substantive due process allows for a chapter 980 
commitment 
when 
there 
is 
sufficient 
evidence 
of 
current 
                                                 
11 See 
Kansas 
v. 
Crane, 
534 
U.S. 
407, 
412 
(2002) 
(emphasizing the constitutional importance of the distinction 
between those who are dangerous sexual offenders and those more 
properly dealt with exclusively through criminal law.  "That 
distinction is necessary lest 'civil commitment' become a 
'mechanism for retribution or general deterrence'——functions 
properly those of criminal law, not civil commitment."). 
No. 
2003AP2306   
 
22 
 
dangerousness.  We decline to adopt any bright-line rule that 
requires current dangerousness to be proven by a particular type 
of evidence.   
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No. 
2003AP2306   
 
 
 
1