Case Title: Smith v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Elections

Citation: 2009-Ohio-5866

Docket Number: 20090900

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-11-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Smith v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-5866.] 
 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2009-OHIO-5866 
SMITH ET AL., APPELLEES, v. SCIOTO COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS; 
ESSMAN, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Smith v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Elections,  
Slip Opinion No. 2009-Ohio-5866.] 
Appeal from judgment granting a contest and setting aside the result of a special 
election on a proposed amendment to a city charter — Contest barred by 
laches. 
(No. 2009-0900 — Submitted October 20, 2009 — Decided November 12, 2009.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas for Scioto County, No. 09CIH00067. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from a judgment granting a contest and setting 
aside the result of a February 3, 2009 special election on a proposed amendment 
to the charter of the city of Portsmouth, Ohio.  Because the challenge to the 
proposed amendment raised in the election contest was not instituted with the 
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requisite diligence and should have been raised before the election, laches barred 
the contest.  Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the common pleas court. 
Facts 
Petition to Amend City Charter 
{¶ 2} In August 2008, appellant, Larry C. Essman, and the rest of a 
committee of petitioners, filed a petition requesting the submission to a vote of the 
electors of the city of Portsmouth, Ohio, the following proposed amendment to 
Section 47 of the Portsmouth Charter: 
{¶ 3} “Section 47(f):  Limitations of Taxing Authority 
{¶ 4} “No taxes may be levied on the property owners of the City of 
Portsmouth for the retirement of any bonded indebtedness without the approval of 
such levy by a majority of the electors of the City of Portsmouth.  Bonded 
indebtedness for the construction, acquisition and/or improvement of City 
property costing more than $100,000 in total may be incurred only by approval of 
a majority of the electors of the city at the next general election or a special 
election called by the Council.  Expenditures for the construction, acquisition, 
and/or improvement of City property in excess of $100,000 in a fiscal year, not 
funded by bonded indebtedness, must be paid from Capital Improvements Funds, 
as approved in Section 47(c) and Section 47(d); an appropriate enterprise fund, or 
from designated grant funds.  This amendment shall become effective immediately 
upon passage by a majority of the electors of the City of Portsmouth, Ohio.”  
(Emphasis added.)   
Ballot Language 
{¶ 5} On the election ballot for the proposed charter amendment, the 
foregoing language from the petition was repeated following a heading that 
specified:  “Approval of a majority of the electors of the City of Portsmouth 
needed for Passage.”  The ballot form was sent by the Scioto County Board of 
Elections to the secretary of state for approval.  According to the director of the 
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board of elections, the ballot accurately reflected the proposed charter 
amendment. 
Election Result 
{¶ 6} On February 18, 2009, the board of elections certified that 1,159 
electors voted on the issue of whether to adopt the proposed charter amendment at 
the February 3 special election and that of those votes, 584 voted yes and 575 
voted no.  The director of the board of elections believed that there may have been 
6,000 electors in Portsmouth at the time of the election.  The board did not 
determine the legal effect of the number of affirmative votes cast on the issue; 
instead, the board merely counted the votes and certified the totals. 
Election Contest 
{¶ 7} In March 2009, appellees, Patricia Smith and Michael W. Evans, 
filed in the Scioto County Court of Common Pleas, a complaint to contest the 
special election pursuant to R.C. 3515.09.  Although purporting to be an election 
contest, appellees requested that the court “declare that the proposed Portsmouth 
City Charter amendment did not receive the required number of votes necessary 
for passage based upon the ballot language at issue or for such other relief either 
in equity or at law.”  The board of elections filed an answer and a motion to 
dismiss in which it claimed that it did not make any declaration concerning the 
impact of the voting results.  Essman submitted an answer. 
{¶ 8} The common pleas court conducted a hearing on the election 
contest on March 24, and the parties submitted briefs.  Essman also filed two 
motions to dismiss the contest. 
{¶ 9} The common pleas court treated the matter as an election contest 
and determined that the ballot had misled electors and that the proposed 
amendment had failed. 
{¶ 10} The cause is now before this court upon Essman’s appeal as of 
right from the common pleas court’s judgment. 
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Legal Analysis 
{¶ 11} “We have consistently required relators in election cases to act 
with the utmost diligence.”  Blankenship v. Blackwell, 103 Ohio St.3d 567, 2004-
Ohio-5596, 817 N.E.2d 382, ¶ 19.  Laches may bar an action for relief in an 
election-related matter if the persons seeking this relief fail to act with the 
requisite diligence.  See generally State ex rel. Stoll v. Logan Cty. Bd. of 
Elections, 117 Ohio St.3d 76, 2008-Ohio-333, 881 N.E.2d 1214, ¶ 24. 
{¶ 12} Appellees claimed an election irregularity resulting from the use of 
ballot and petition language that was “violative” of statutory requirements and 
“inaccurate and misleading.”  The challenged language, however, was contained 
in the proposed charter amendment incorporated in the petition filed in August 
2008.  Appellees could have raised their claims in a timely pre-election protest to 
the petition.  R.C. 3501.39(A).  “Election contests may not be used as a vehicle 
for asserting an untimely protest.”  Portis v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Elections (1993), 
67 Ohio St.3d 590, 592, 621 N.E.2d 1202. 
{¶ 13} Moreover, appellees were aware of or should have been aware of 
the ballot language long before the February 3 special election, but they failed to 
raise the issue until after the election was completed.  See Maschari v. Tone, 103 
Ohio St.3d 411, 2004-Ohio-5342, 816 N.E.2d 579, ¶ 33-36, citing In re Contested 
Election of Nov. 2, 1993 (1995), 72 Ohio St.3d 411, 413-414, 650 N.E.2d 859. 
{¶ 14} Although Essman did not raise this issue in his answer, he did raise 
it in his trial brief.  More importantly, “[f]or election cases, laches is not an 
affirmative defense, and [persons seeking relief] have the burden of proving that 
they acted with the requisite diligence.”  State ex rel. Vickers v. Summit Cty. 
Council, 97 Ohio St.3d 204, 2002-Ohio-5583, 777 N.E.2d 830, ¶ 13. 
{¶ 15} Appellees’ reliance on our decision in Beck v. Cincinnati (1955), 
162 Ohio St. 473, 55 O.O. 373, 124 N.E.2d 120, is misplaced.  In Beck, we did 
not consider laches.  Instead, we held that contestors who had challenged ballot 
January Term, 2009 
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language after the election were not estopped from raising their claim, even 
though they could have raised it before the election, because the irregularity 
involved was “ ‘of such substantial nature as to void the results of the election.’ ”  
Id. at 476, quoting the trial court opinion. 
{¶ 16} The misleading language inserted in the ballot language for a tax 
levy in Beck provided, “If levy passes, there will be no city income tax in 1955 or 
1956.”  Id. at 474.  We concluded that this additional language violated R.C. 
3505.06 and exceeded the authority of city council.  Id. at 474-475.  We further 
reasoned that the contestors were not estopped from raising their claim, because 
“[i]t is a matter of common knowledge that the majority of electors are not 
property holders and therefore undoubtedly were persuaded by the unauthorized 
phrase at issue.”  Id. at 476.  The alleged irregularity in this case is not so 
substantial that relators should be permitted to, in effect, sleep on their rights until 
after an adverse election result. 
{¶ 17} Therefore, laches barred appellees’ election contest, and the 
common pleas court erred in granting the contest and setting aside the special-
election result. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 18} Based on the foregoing, we reverse the judgment of the common 
pleas court granting the election contest.  Insofar as appellees challenged the 
election result because of the petition and ballot language, they should have raised 
their claims in a pre-election protest or proceeding rather than in a postelection 
contest.  By so holding, we need not address other matters raised by the parties.  
See, e.g., Rzepka v. Solon, 121 Ohio St.3d 380, 2009-Ohio-1353, 904 N.E.2d 870, 
¶ 34. 
{¶ 19} Insofar as appellees requested the determination of the special-
election result in accordance with their interpretation – that the proposed charter 
amendment did not pass, because it did not receive the majority vote of all city 
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electors rather than simply a majority of those electors that voted in the special 
election – that request is outside the scope of an election contest, which 
challenges an election result rather than seeking its determination.  Unlike the 
board of elections in Rzepka, at ¶ 23, which expressly certified that although a 
majority of city electors voted in favor of a proposed rezoning ordinance, the 
ordinance had been rejected because it had not passed in the ward in which the 
rezoning was to occur in accordance with the ordinance’s ward-majority 
requirement, the board of elections here did not certify whether the proposed 
charter amendment had passed or failed.  Appellees’ remedy is thus a declaratory-
judgment action instead of an election contest.  We note that there is no appeal as 
of right directly to this court from a common pleas court judgment in a 
declaratory-judgment action.  We deny appellees’ request for oral argument. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Larry C. Essman, pro se. 
 
Rodeheffer & Miller, Ltd., and Stephen C. Rodeheffer; and George L. 
Davis III Co., L.L.C., George L. Davis III, and George L. Davis IV, for appellees. 
______________________