Case Title: State v. Michael J. Carter

Citation: 2010 WI 40

Docket Number: 2008AP001185-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2010-05-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
2010 WI 40 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2008AP1185-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Michael James Carter, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(no cite) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 25, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 3, 2009   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Mel Flanagan   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
BRADLEY, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., joins concurrence.   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Aaron R. O’Neil, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by John T. 
Wasielewski and Wasielewski & Erickson, Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by John T. Wasielewski. 
 
 
 
 
2010 WI 40
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2008AP1185–CR 
(L.C. No. 
2005CF4726) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,   
 
 
v. 
 
Michael James Carter,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant.   
FILED 
 
MAY 25, 2010 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of an 
unpublished court of appeals' decision1 that reversed the 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Judge Patricia D. McMahon 
presiding, and remanded for further proceedings.  On January 27, 
2006, Michael J. Carter (Carter) was convicted of one count of 
first-degree sexual assault of a child under Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
1 State v. Carter, No. 2008AP1185-CR, unpublished order 
(Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2009). 
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
2 
 
§ 948.02(1) (2005-06).2  Judge Mel Flanagan sentenced Carter to 
27 years imprisonment, comprised of 12 years in initial 
confinement and 15 years on extended supervision.  On January 
25, 2008, Carter filed a post-conviction motion for a new trial 
on 
the 
grounds 
of 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
counsel.  
Specifically, 
Carter 
argued 
that 
his 
trial 
counsel 
was 
ineffective because he failed to introduce evidence that the 
five-year-old victim was previously sexually assaulted, which 
would have provided an alternative explanation for her detailed 
sexual knowledge.  On April 17, 2008, Judge McMahon conducted a 
Machner hearing3 and denied the motion.  Carter appealed, and the 
court of appeals remanded the matter to the circuit court for 
further proceedings.  The State petitioned this court for 
review, and we accepted.  We now reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals. 
¶2 
The issue before us is whether the court of appeals 
properly remanded the case to the circuit court for further 
                                                 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.02(1)(2005-06) provides in relevant 
part: "Whoever has sexual contact or sexual intercourse with a 
person who has not attained the age of 13 years is guilty of one 
of the following: . . . (b) If the sexual contact or sexual 
intercourse did not result in great bodily harm to the person, a 
Class B felony." 
3 "Under State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 
(Ct. App. 1979), a hearing may be held when a criminal 
defendant's trial counsel is challenged for allegedly providing 
ineffective assistance.  At the hearing, trial counsel testifies 
as to his or her reasoning on challenged action or inaction."  
State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶2 n.3, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 
305. 
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
3 
 
proceedings on Carter's claim that his trial counsel was 
ineffective.   
¶3 
We conclude that the court of appeals improperly 
remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings.  
Carter's ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails under the 
two-part inquiry of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984).  First, his trial counsel's performance was not 
deficient.  His counsel's strategic decision not to introduce 
evidence that the child victim was previously sexually assaulted 
was objectively reasonable considering all the circumstances.  
Second, even assuming that his counsel's performance was 
deficient, the deficiency did not prejudice Carter's defense.  
Evidence that the child victim was previously sexually assaulted 
would have been inadmissible under Wisconsin's rape shield law, 
Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2) (2007-08),4 and the narrow five-part test 
articulated in State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 656-57, 456 
N.W.2d 325 (1990).  Accordingly, this court reverses the court 
of appeals' decision and upholds the judgment of the circuit 
court denying Carter's post-conviction motion for a new trial. 
I. FACTS 
¶4 
On August 25, 2005, Carter was charged with one count 
of first-degree sexual assault of a child.  The State alleged 
that on or between March 1, 2005, and July 31, 2005, Carter 
forced five-year-old Cassandra L. (Cassandra) to perform oral 
                                                 
4 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
4 
 
sex on him.  The assault occurred while Carter was living with 
Cassandra and her mother, Denise.  About two weeks after Denise 
and Cassandra moved to another residence, Cassandra informed 
Denise that Carter "touched her down in her private area and 
wanted her to lick his private area."  Denise took Cassandra to 
urgent care, and they eventually spoke to police. 
¶5 
Cassandra spoke with city of Milwaukee police officer 
Lucretia Thomas (Officer Thomas).  According to Cassandra, one 
night while her mother was sleeping, she was watching television 
with Carter when he asked her to "come by him."  Carter 
unbuttoned his shorts and pulled them down a short distance.  
Cassandra described seeing "a thing sticking out like my kitty."  
To demonstrate for Officer Thomas, she placed her stuffed pink 
cat at her vaginal area and angled it upward.  Cassandra also 
described seeing hair the same color as her mother's (brunette).  
According to Officer Thomas, Cassandra indicated "that she knew 
what [Carter] wanted her to do" because Cassandra said that she 
"closed her mouth tight" when he told her to come by him.  
Carter then pried open Cassandra's mouth and pushed her head 
down onto his "private part," using his hand to push her head up 
and down.  When he stopped, Cassandra described wiping her mouth 
and seeing "white stuff hanging from her hand."  Cassandra 
stated that after she washed her hands in the bathroom, she 
passed Carter in the hallway, and he pretended to zip his mouth 
and turn a key. 
¶6 
At trial, before any witness was called, Carter's 
trial counsel, Stephen Sargent (Sargent), informed the circuit 
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
5 
 
court that he would not be presenting any evidence that 
Cassandra may have been previously sexually assaulted by a third 
party.  As a "strategic decision," he opted not to present the 
evidence because he thought (1) the prosecutor would object; (2) 
the evidence was not relevant; and (3) the evidence would build 
the jury's sympathy for Cassandra. 
¶7 
The jury convicted Carter of one count of first-degree 
sexual assault of a child.  After he was sentenced, Carter 
retained new counsel and filed a post-conviction motion for a 
new trial, claiming that Sargent provided ineffective assistance 
of counsel.  Carter argued that Sargent was ineffective because 
he failed to introduce evidence that Cassandra was previously 
sexually assaulted, which would have provided an alternative 
explanation for her detailed sexual knowledge.   
¶8 
At 
the 
Machner 
hearing, 
Carter 
testified 
that 
Cassandra was previously sexually assaulted by her cousin, and 
it was from that assault that Cassandra derived her detailed 
sexual knowledge.  Carter learned of the alleged sexual assault 
in the summer of 2004 while he, Denise, and Cassandra were at 
Carter's grandmother's house.  According to Carter, he was in 
the bathroom when Cassandra stood outside the door and asked 
Carter if he "wanted her to make juice."  Carter came out of the 
bathroom and told Cassandra that they did not have any juice, to 
which Cassandra replied that she "can help [Carter] make juice" 
and pointed towards his crotch.  When asked what she meant, 
Cassandra said, "Like [her cousin]."  Carter gathered from 
Cassandra's explanation that "her and [her cousin] were upstairs 
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
6 
 
in her bedroom, and she basically pulled on his penis to get him 
to ejaculate."   
¶9 
Carter then testified that on the same day, he relayed 
the incident to Denise.  He testified that when questioned by 
Denise, Cassandra described playing upstairs with her cousin 
when he pulled his pants down and told her to pull "on his 
thing."  Carter testified that Cassandra then told Denise that 
"some stuff came out," and the color was white. 
¶10 According 
to Carter's testimony at the hearing, 
sometime later Denise told him specifically that a social worker 
and sheriff came over to the house and spoke to Cassandra alone.5 
¶11 Carter alleged that Cassandra referenced the previous 
sexual assault in a videotaped interview with city of Milwaukee 
police officer Christine Koch taken on August 26, 2005, shortly 
after Carter was charged with sexually assaulting Cassandra.6  In 
his post-conviction motion, Carter summarized the relevant 
portion of the videotape as follows:   
In this 
interview, after telling of events 
involving Mr. Carter, Officer Koch asked Cassandra if 
she had seen anyone else's private part.  (This starts 
at about 10:14 a.m. on the clock superimposed on the 
video.)  Cassandra related that she saw [her cousin's] 
                                                 
5 However, as the circuit court pointed out, Carter's post-
conviction motion made no mention of the alleged previous sexual 
assault ever being reported to the police. 
6 This videotape was not presented at trial, and neither 
Carter nor the State introduced the videotape at the post-
conviction hearing.  Accordingly, the videotaped interview did 
not appear in the record before this court, and we must rely on 
the parties' interpretations of the interview. 
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
7 
 
private part. 
 [Her cousin] . . . is older than 
Cassandra and is like a grown-up.  This happened when 
Cassandra was four years old.  This happened in a big 
place where they went upstairs.  [Her cousin] was 
"making juice."  His pants were down.   
The State, however, maintained that Cassandra made no such 
reference: 
What we have is a statement by a girl in a 
videotape that says she saw her cousin's penis and 
that is all we have in that videotape. 
 
She doesn't talk about anything else.  She 
doesn't describe it.  She doesn't say anything.  All 
she says she sees her cousin's penis.  She doesn't 
even know whether he's a boy or an adult. 
 
Then there is some incident of playing and some 
making of drinks and things like that; but there is 
nothing that says that she touched him, that he 
touched her, that there was anything that was sexual 
in nature. 
¶12 In either case, Carter's trial counsel, Sargent, 
viewed the videotaped interview and opted not to present 
evidence at trial of the alleged previous sexual assault.  At 
the Machner hearing, Sargent recalled that Carter mentioned to 
him that another person may have "molested" Cassandra, but 
Carter 
was 
not 
any 
more 
specific. 
 
After 
hearing 
the 
information, Sargent arranged for an investigator to contact 
Cassandra through Denise, but Denise declined to speak to the 
investigator.   
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
8 
 
¶13 According to Sargent,7 presenting evidence of the 
previous sexual assault would have been an unwise defense 
strategy: 
[A]s far as who may have sexually assaulted this girl, 
or when, or where, I did have my investigator attempt 
to contact the mother of the child.  That was not 
going anywhere, and I made the strategic move we 
should challenge the mother's credibility through the 
child rather than other defenses. 
¶14 Instead of directly attacking Cassandra, Sargent opted 
instead 
to 
challenge 
her 
credibility 
through 
Denise, 
by 
demonstrating that there was a breakdown in Denise and Carter's 
relationship, and Denise pressured Cassandra into making the 
allegations against Carter.  In Sargent's view, the videotaped 
interview depicted a "very sympathetic child," and he did "not 
wish to build up sympathy for the Jury towards this child and 
then have to challenge this child's credibility and the mother's 
credibility within the same trial." 
¶15 In deciding not to present evidence of the previous 
sexual assault, Sargent conceded that he never researched 
whether the evidence would have been admissible.  Specifically, 
Sargent did not review State v. Pulizzano, a decision by this 
court 
that 
created 
a 
narrow 
exception 
to 
the 
general 
inadmissibility of a victim's sexual history.  See 155 Wis. 2d 
633.  Pursuant to Pulizzano, evidence of a prior sexual assault 
against a child victim is admissible if the defendant satisfies 
                                                 
7 By the time of the Machner hearing on April 17, 2008, 
Sargent had been employed for 18 years as a staff attorney in 
the State Public Defender's Office, Milwaukee Trial Division. 
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
9 
 
a five-part test, and the court determines that the defendant's 
right to present the evidence outweighs the State's interest in 
excluding it.  Id. at 656-57.  Concerning his familiarity with 
Pulizzano, Sargent provided the following testimony at the post-
conviction hearing: 
Q: [Attorney Wasielewski, on behalf of Carter]: Now 
when you considered whether or not to bring up this 
prior sexual assault of Cassandra, what was your 
understanding 
as 
to 
whether 
it 
was 
legally 
admissible? 
A: [Attorney Sargent]: I would have to say I did not 
look too far whether it was admissible.  It was my 
understanding at some point it may or may not have 
been. 
Q: Did you ever review a case called State v. 
Pulizzano? 
A: No, I did not. 
Q: Or any subsequent case that quotes the Pulizzano 
test? 
A: Prior to trial, no, I did not. 
Q: Did you do any research that led you to any 
conclusion as to the admissibility of the prior 
incident? 
A: I did not go into researching of that issue. 
Q: So you made a strategic decision not to go after it 
without pursuing the question whether you could 
pursue the admission of the prior incident; is that 
a fair statement? 
A: No.  To be accurate to say I did not believe that 
issue to be a strong one as strategic——as a trial 
defense strategy that I——that as far as who may 
have sexually assaulted this girl, or when, or 
where, I did have my investigator attempt to 
contact the mother of the child.  That was not 
going anywhere, and I made the strategic move we 
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
10 
 
should challenge the mother's credibility through 
the child rather than other defenses. 
¶16 At the close of the Machner hearing, the circuit court 
denied Carter's motion for a new trial, concluding that Carter 
did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel.  First, the 
circuit court determined that Sargent's decision not to present 
evidence of the previous sexual assault was a reasonable one.  
The circuit court declined to criticize Sargent for opting not 
to present evidence that he deemed irrelevant to his defense 
strategy and that would have conjured up sympathy for the child 
victim.  Second, Carter failed to establish that his defense was 
prejudiced by Sargent's decision not to present evidence of the 
previous sexual assault.  According to the circuit court, the 
admissibility of the evidence presented a "very uphill battle" 
under Pulizzano.  The circuit court also found that Carter's 
testimony was not credible, especially concerning his statement 
that the alleged previous sexual assault had been reported to 
the police. 
¶17 The court of appeals remanded the case to the circuit 
court for further proceedings.  The court of appeals concluded 
that Sargent's performance was deficient given his failure to 
investigate whether the previous sexual assault had occurred and 
his unfamiliarity with Pulizzano.  However, the court of appeals 
stated that until further investigation was completed, neither 
the court of appeals nor the circuit court could determine 
whether 
Carter 
was 
prejudiced 
by 
Sargent's 
deficient 
performance.  Accordingly, the court of appeals did not grant 
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
11 
 
Carter a new trial and instead remanded the case to the circuit 
court for further proceedings.8 
¶18 On review, we conclude that Carter did not receive 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  We therefore reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals and uphold the judgment of the 
circuit court denying Carter's post-conviction motion for a new 
trial. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶19 A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a 
mixed question of fact and law.  State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, 
¶21, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305; State v. Erickson, 227 
Wis. 2d 758, 768, 596 N.W.2d 749 (1999).  We will uphold the 
circuit court's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  Thiel, 264 Wis 2d 571, ¶21.  "Findings of fact 
include 'the circumstances of the case and the counsel's conduct 
and strategy.'"  Id. (quoting State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 
514 n.2, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992)).  Moreover, this court will not 
                                                 
8 The State argues for the first time in its reply brief 
that since the court of appeals did not grant Carter's request 
for a new trial and instead remanded for further proceedings, 
Carter cannot request this court to grant him a new trial 
because he failed to file a petition for cross-review.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 809.62(3m)(a) ("A party who seeks to reverse, vacate, or 
modify an adverse decision of the court of appeals shall file a 
petition for cross-review within the period for filing a 
petition for review with the supreme court, or 30 days after the 
filing of a petition for review by another party, whichever is 
later."); 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 809.62(1g)(b) 
(defining 
"adverse 
decision" to include the court of appeals' failure to grant the 
full relief sought).  Because of our decision to reverse the 
court of appeals, it is unnecessary for us to address this 
issue. 
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
12 
 
exclude 
the 
circuit 
court's 
articulated 
assessments 
of 
credibility and demeanor, unless they are clearly erroneous.  
Thiel, 
264 
Wis. 2d 571, 
¶23. 
 
However, 
the 
ultimate 
determination of whether counsel's assistance was ineffective is 
a question of law, which we review de novo.  Id., ¶21. 
III. ANALYSIS 
¶20 Both the United States Constitution and the Wisconsin 
Constitution guarantee criminal defendants the right to counsel.  
U.S. Const. amend. VI; Wis. Const. art. I, § 7.9  The United 
States Supreme Court has recognized that "'the right to counsel 
                                                 
9 The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides:  
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defense. 
Similarly, the Wisconsin Constitution, Article I, Section 7 
guarantees: 
In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel; to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him; to meet the witnesses face to face; to have 
compulsory 
process 
to 
compel 
the 
attendance 
of 
witnesses in his behalf; and in prosecutions by 
indictment, or information, to a speedy public trial 
by an impartial jury of the county or district wherein 
the offense shall have been committed; which county or 
district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law. 
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
13 
 
is 
the 
right 
to 
the 
effective 
assistance 
of 
counsel.'"  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 
U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)).10  
¶21 Whether a convicted defendant received ineffective 
assistance of counsel is a two-part inquiry.  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687.  First, the defendant must prove that counsel's 
performance 
was 
deficient. 
 
Id. 
 
Second, 
if 
counsel's 
performance was deficient, the defendant must prove that the 
deficiency prejudiced the defense.  Id.  In order for Carter to 
succeed on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he 
must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test.  See id.  This 
court concludes that he has satisfied neither. 
A. Deficient Performance 
¶22 To demonstrate deficient performance, the defendant 
must show that his counsel's representation "fell below an 
objective 
standard 
of reasonableness" considering all the 
circumstances.  Id. at 688.  In evaluating the reasonableness of 
counsel's performance, this court must be "highly deferential."  
Id. at 689.  We must make "every effort . . . to eliminate the 
distorting 
effects 
of 
hindsight, 
to 
reconstruct 
the 
circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate 
the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time."  Id.  
Counsel enjoys a "strong presumption" that his conduct "falls 
                                                 
10 "The 
standard 
for 
determining 
whether 
counsel's 
assistance is effective under the Wisconsin Constitution is 
identical to that under the federal Constitution."  Thiel, 264 
Wis. 2d 571, ¶18 n.7. 
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
14 
 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance."  
Id.  Indeed, counsel's performance need not be perfect, nor even 
very good, to be constitutionally adequate.  Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 
571, ¶19 (citing State v. Williquette, 180 Wis. 2d 589, 605, 510 
N.W.2d 708 (1993)). 
¶23 Strategic decisions made after less than complete 
investigation of law and facts may still be adjudged reasonable.  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91.  "[C]ounsel has a duty to make 
reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that 
makes particular investigations unnecessary."  Id. at 691 
(emphasis added).  In evaluating counsel's decision not to 
investigate, 
this 
court 
must 
assess 
the 
decision's 
reasonableness in light of "all the circumstances," "applying a 
heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments."  Id. 
¶24 We 
conclude 
that 
Sargent's 
performance 
was 
not 
deficient because his strategic decision not to present evidence 
of the previous sexual assault was objectively reasonable 
considering all the circumstances.11  At trial, Sargent informed 
the circuit court that he had made the strategic decision not to 
present evidence that Cassandra may have been previously 
                                                 
11 In his brief, Carter appears to argue that the deficiency 
of Sargent's performance is not at issue because the State, in 
its brief, "acknowledge[d], though not wholeheartedly, that 
. . . 'perhaps Sargent's decision not to pursue the [alleged 
previous sexual assault] matter further was not reasonable.'"  
We decline to dispose of the deficient performance prong on that 
basis.  As discussed supra Part II, the determination of whether 
counsel performed deficiently is a question of law that this 
court reviews independently.  Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶21. 
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
15 
 
sexually assaulted by a third party.  He gave three reasons for 
his decision: (1) "[he] thought the DA would likely object"; (2) 
"[he did not] see it as relevant"; and (3) "[he thought he 
would]——if anything, build up sympathy for this young girl."  
Like the circuit court, we decline to criticize Sargent for 
opting not to present evidence that he deemed irrelevant to his 
defense strategy and that would have conjured up the jury's 
sympathy for Cassandra. 
¶25 At the Machner hearing, Sargent clearly articulated 
the defense strategy he chose: instead of directly attacking 
Cassandra, he opted instead to challenge her credibility through 
Denise, by demonstrating that there was a breakdown in Denise 
and Carter's relationship, and Denise used Cassandra as a tool 
in that breakup.  Sargent's chosen defense strategy was revealed 
at trial through his opening argument; his cross-examination of 
Denise and Cassandra; his direct-examination of Carter; and the 
State's closing argument. 
¶26 In his opening argument, Sargent represented to the 
jury that Denise and Carter had an angry relationship, for which 
Denise and Cassandra harbored hostility towards Carter: 
Look at the case.  Look at all the witnesses.  
Look at their testimony.  Look at the——the nature of 
this 
girl, 
relationship 
with 
her 
mother, 
their 
relationship with Mr. Carter. 
Now, I think one fallacy in life is that we think 
that we have to show that kids are manipulative or 
they think that——you know, they create grand schemes. 
It's not one of those cases. 
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
16 
 
Question of whether or not the atmosphere of this 
child that was living at——was such that there was a 
great deal of hostility towards Michael Carter. 
There will be.  There will be some things you 
hear about the relationship of Michael Carter and her 
mother that were bad. 
There will be some things you hear about Michael 
Carter that are not good to hear, that he was involved 
in some very bad arguments with his girlfriend.  There 
was arguments over money.  There was arguments over 
drugs.  Okay. 
That is not very good to talk about, that's not 
very positive, but that's the facts that this child 
was living in. 
There will be testimony about the hostility that 
this girl saw . . . . 
. . . . 
. . . In the end I'm gonna ask you to return a not 
guilty verdict, 'cuz the evidence will show that there 
really is——there, really, is no clear evidence that 
Michael Carter did anything improper towards this 
girl. 
He was a man, he was in a relationship, an adult 
relationship with a woman, the woman had a child, the— 
The 
adult 
relationship 
was 
a 
volatile 
one 
possibly at times, it was [an] angry relationship, it 
was not a good relationship. 
¶27 Denise and Carter's broken relationship was further 
revealed through Sargent's cross-examination of Denise: 
Q:  . . . Towards the spring, into the early summer of 
2005, you and Mr. Carter began to have arguments, 
correct? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Some 
of 
these 
arguments 
were——in 
the——when 
Cassandra was home? 
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
17 
 
A: Yes. 
Q: Some of these arguments were very loud? 
A: Oh, yes. 
Q: About money? 
A: Yes. 
Q: About drug use? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Michael Carter's drug use? 
A: Yes. 
Q: They were about a——Michael Carter and a breakup of 
a relationship, correct? 
A: Pardon? 
. . . .  
Q: Your relationship with Michael Carter was breaking 
up, correct? 
A: Yes. 
Q: There's a lot of animosity in that, correct? 
A: Correct. 
Q: And your daughter had to see a lot of that. 
A: Right. 
¶28 During 
Sargent's 
cross-examination 
of 
Cassandra, 
Cassandra testified that the arguments between her mother and 
Carter caused Cassandra to "want[] to get away from" Carter: 
Q: And they argued sometimes in front of you. 
A: Yes. 
Q: And that made you very sad, didn't it? 
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
18 
 
A: Mm-hmm. 
Q: And you wanted to get away from that house, didn't 
you?  And you wanted to get away from Mike, didn't 
you? 
A: Yes. 
¶29 Sargent's 
direct-examination 
of 
Carter 
confirmed 
Denise and Carter's broken relationship: 
Q: Now, and in March till August 2005, would——towards 
the latter part, would you say that you and her 
mother were having— 
 . . . Break-up issues, I call it.   
You were having disagreements, right? 
A: Yes. 
Q: You were arguing about money? 
A: Quite a bit. 
Q: And brought up by her mother, that you were arguing 
about her drug use? 
A: Yes.  Along with alcohol abuse. 
Q: Okay.  And you and her mother were——having some 
pretty loud arguments—— 
A: Yes—— 
Q: ——in front—— 
A: ——we were—— 
Q: ——of the child.   
During that time——were your——Was your alcohol and 
drug use affecting the relationship? 
A: Yes.  Quite a bit. 
Q: Was that causing a strain on your relationship? 
A: Yes. 
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
19 
 
¶30 Finally, Sargent's chosen defense strategy was made 
clear when it was attacked by the State in its closing argument: 
And the last thing I want to talk to you about 
is, again, [Cassandra's] testimony. 
If there was a reason to get Mr. Carter in 
trouble that was contrived between the mother and this 
little girl, would it not have been simpler? 
Would it have not just been, he hit me.  He hit 
me in my face.  Something a little girl would 
remember. 
But a sexual assault, and a sexual assault with 
this much detail and graphic detail? 
Ask yourself, would a six year old be able to 
carry that off?  She's six.  Not a sophisticated liar. 
¶31 Sargent determined that evidence of a previous sexual 
assault against Cassandra was irrelevant to his defense strategy 
of 
challenging 
Cassandra's 
credibility 
through 
Denise 
by 
demonstrating that there was a breakdown in Denise and Carter's 
relationship, and Denise used Cassandra as a tool in that 
breakup.  That determination was a reasonable one.  Whether 
Cassandra was previously sexually assaulted by a third party 
would not have necessarily assisted the trier of fact in 
assessing whether Denise's broken relationship with Carter 
caused her to pressure Cassandra into making allegations against 
Carter.  If Denise pressured Cassandra into making up the 
allegations, the jury could have believed that Denise was the 
source of Cassandra's sexual knowledge, regardless of the 
alleged previous sexual assault.  
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
20 
 
¶32 In addition, it was reasonable for Sargent to conclude 
that if he presented evidence of the previous sexual assault, 
the jury would have questioned his chosen defense theory.  The 
jury could have found it even less likely that Denise would put 
her daughter through a lie about sexual assault allegations, 
given the fact that Cassandra was already a victim.  It was a 
reasonable trial strategy to not risk causing greater sympathy 
for Cassandra by introducing her as a victim of sexual assault 
and then directly attacking her credibility.  On balance, when 
evidence of the previous sexual assault is weighed with the 
strategy employed, and there is already an alternative source of 
sexual knowledge, that being Cassandra's mother, the fact that 
Cassandra was previously sexually assaulted militates against 
the defense.  Furthermore, the jury could have concluded that 
this child was vulnerable to sexual assault by Carter because 
she was previously a victim.  In the end, the jury had to decide 
who it believed: the child or Carter.  Whether the child was a 
previous victim of sexual assault would not have necessarily 
assisted the jury in answering that question.12  
¶33 Even more reasonable, however, was Sargent's concern 
that presenting evidence of the previous sexual assault would 
                                                 
12 In this case, we conclude that evidence of the alleged 
previous sexual assault would have been inadmissible.  See supra 
Part III.B.  Such evidence, offered as proof of a child victim's 
"alternative source of sexual knowledge," is not admissible 
without safeguards.  See State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 
656-57, 456 N.W.2d 325 (1990).  We do not accept the proposition 
that children who are victims of sexual assault should be 
automatically subject to greater attack than adult victims. 
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
21 
 
have built up the jury's sympathy for Cassandra.  The jury would 
have been faced with the unfortunate prospect that five-year-old 
Cassandra had been sexually assaulted not once, but twice, and 
both times by men close to her (her cousin and her mother's 
live-in boyfriend).  Moreover, by attempting to demonstrate that 
Cassandra gained her detailed sexual knowledge, not from Carter, 
but from a previous sexual assault by her cousin, Sargent would 
necessarily have been asking the jury to discredit the testimony 
of a five-year-old victim of sexual assault.  It was certainly 
reasonable that Sargent was more confident asking the jury to 
discredit the mother, Denise, instead of directly attacking the 
child victim. 
¶34 Finally, Carter urges us to adopt the court of 
appeals' conclusion that Sargent's performance was deficient 
because he "ma[d]e a strategic determination without full 
knowledge of the circumstances of the alleged prior assault and 
its potential admissibility."  State v. Carter, No. 2008AP1185-
CR, unpublished order (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2009).  We decline 
the invitation to override the circuit court's determination 
regarding the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the 
"very uphill battle" regarding the admissibility of the alleged 
prior assault under Pulizzano.  Under the facts of this case, 
counsel's failure to further investigate is not deficient as a 
matter of law.  Strategic decisions made after less than 
complete investigation of law and facts may still be adjudged 
reasonable.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91.  "[C]ounsel has a 
duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable 
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
22 
 
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary."  Id. 
at 691 (emphasis added).  It is our responsibility to determine 
whether Sargent's 
decision that further investigation was 
unnecessary was a 
reasonable one in light of "all the 
circumstances," bearing in mind that his judgment is entitled to 
"a heavy measure of deference."  See id. at 691.  We conclude 
that Sargent reasonably decided that further investigation of 
the alleged prior sexual assault and its admissibility was 
unnecessary.  However, to be clear, we do caution that the 
better practice is for counsel to always research and be 
familiar with pertinent legal authority.  In another case, the 
failure to do so may constitute deficient performance.  Under 
"all the circumstances" of this case, id., however, we conclude 
that Sargent's decision not to investigate was reasonable. 
¶35 After being informed by Carter that another person may 
have sexually assaulted Cassandra13 and after viewing the 
                                                 
13 There is a discrepancy in the record as to whether Carter 
was any more specific in describing to Sargent the alleged 
previous sexual assault.   
Sargent testified that at some point before trial (he could 
not recall when), Carter mentioned to him "that some other 
possible person" may have previously "molested" Cassandra.  
However, according to Sargent, Carter never told him about an 
incident in which Cassandra pointed to Carter's crotch and 
offered to help him "make juice" and furthermore that Carter 
never even mentioned Cassandra's cousin: 
Q: [Attorney Wabitsch, on behalf of the State]: So the 
only thing you knew of any prior incidents that 
might have been sexual in nature was when Mr. 
Carter told you that he believes there was an 
incident that happened not in Milwaukee and she was 
molested by another person? 
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
23 
 
videotaped interview in which Cassandra told the police that she 
had seen her cousin's penis, Sargent followed up on the 
information 
by 
arranging 
for 
an 
investigator 
to 
contact 
Cassandra through Denise.  Denise, however, would not permit the 
investigator to speak with Cassandra and never spoke to the 
investigator herself.  Because his investigator's efforts were 
fruitless and because, in his opinion, the videotaped interview 
depicted a "very sympathetic child," Sargent decided that 
                                                                                                                                                             
A: [Attorney Sargent]: That would be accurate. 
Q: But he didn't tell you what he meant by molesting? 
A: He did not have more specific information to my 
knowledge.   
Carter, on the other hand, maintained that he explained to 
Sargent the specifics about the time in the bathroom when 
Cassandra asked Carter if he "wanted her to make juice."  Carter 
testified that when he was at the House of Corrections, he told 
Sargent's assistant, and he was "almost positive that [he] told 
Steve Sargent, too," that he thinks Cassandra acquired her 
sexual knowledge from an incident with her cousin.  He then 
testified that he explained to Sargent specifically "everything 
that Cassie told [him], that there was some type of——something 
happened between her and her cousin earlier."  According to 
Carter, he consistently took the position with Sargent that 
evidence of the previous incident between Cassandra and her 
cousin should be introduced at trial. 
The 
circuit 
court 
questioned 
Carter's 
credibility, 
specifically his testimony surrounding the alleged previous 
sexual assault and whether it had been reported to the police.  
This court must uphold the circuit court's assessment of 
Carter's credibility, as it is not clearly erroneous.  See 
Thiel, 264 Wis. 2d 571, ¶23.  As a practical matter, we cannot 
expect Carter's trial counsel to engage in a full investigation 
of the alleged previous sexual assault when, according to 
Sargent, Carter himself offered no specifics on the prior 
incident between Cassandra and her cousin until he challenged 
his counsel's effectiveness.  
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
24 
 
further investigation of the alleged previous sexual assault was 
unnecessary.  Instead, he opted to pursue what he considered a 
wiser defense strategy: attacking Denise's credibility.  At that 
point, it was not necessary for Sargent to research whether 
evidence of the alleged previous sexual assault was admissible.  
In light of all the circumstances, we cannot conclude that 
Sargent made an unreasonable decision when he determined that it 
was unnecessary to further investigate the alleged previous 
sexual assault and its admissibility. 
¶36 Our conclusion that Sargent's performance was not 
deficient is enough to defeat Carter's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700 ("Failure to 
make the required showing of either deficient performance or 
sufficient 
prejudice 
defeats 
the 
ineffectiveness 
claim.")  
Nevertheless, we continue our analysis into the second prong of 
the two-part inquiry and conclude that irrespective of whether 
Sargent's performance was deficient, Carter's ineffectiveness 
claim still fails because the deficiency did not prejudice 
Carter's defense. 
B. Prejudice 
¶37 To warrant setting aside the defendant's conviction, 
the defendant must demonstrate that his counsel's deficient 
performance was prejudicial to his defense.  Id. at 691-93 
(recognizing 
that 
"[t]he 
purpose 
of 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment 
guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the 
assistance necessary to justify reliance on the outcome of the 
proceeding," and therefore, the defendant must affirmatively 
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
25 
 
prove that his counsel's deficient performance actually had an 
adverse effect on the judgment).  It is not sufficient for the 
defendant 
to 
show 
that 
his 
counsel's 
errors 
"had 
some 
conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding."  Id. at 
693.  Rather, the defendant must show that "there is a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."  
Id. at 694. 
¶38 Even 
assuming 
that 
Sargent's 
performance 
was 
deficient, we conclude that the deficiency did not prejudice 
Carter's defense because evidence of the previous sexual assault 
would have been inadmissible.  Thus, regardless of whether 
Sargent attempted to present evidence of the previous sexual 
assault, the result of the proceeding would have been the same. 
1. General Inadmissibility under Wisconsin's Rape Shield Law 
¶39 Wisconsin's rape shield law, Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2),14 
generally prohibits a defendant like Carter from introducing 
                                                 
14 Wisconsin Stat. § 972.11(2) provides in relevant part: 
(a) In this subsection, "sexual conduct" means any 
conduct or behavior relating to sexual activities of 
the complaining witness, including but not limited to 
prior experience of sexual intercourse or sexual 
contact, use of contraceptives, living arrangement and 
life-style. 
(b) If the defendant is accused of a crime under s. 
940.225, 948.02, 948.025, 948.05, 948.051, 948.06, 
948.085, or 948.095, or under s. 940.302(2), if the 
court finds that the crime was sexually motivated, as 
defined in s. 980.01(5), any evidence concerning the 
complaining witness's prior sexual conduct or opinions 
of the witness's prior sexual conduct and reputation 
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
26 
 
evidence concerning the alleged victim's prior sexual conduct.  
Our legislature enacted the rape shield law "to counteract 
outdated beliefs that a complainant's sexual past could shed 
light on the truthfulness of the sexual assault allegations."  
State v. Dunlap, 2002 WI 19, ¶19, 250 Wis. 2d 466, 640 N.W.2d 
112 (citing Michael R.B. v. State, 175 Wis. 2d 713, 727, 499 
N.W.2d 641 (1993)).  The law "protect[s] victims of sexual 
assault from themselves becoming the focus of scrutiny during 
trial," Michael R.B., 175 Wis. 2d at 727, as it is generally 
recognized that evidence of the victim's prior sexual conduct is 
"'irrelevant or, if relevant, substantially outweighed by its 
prejudicial effect,'" State v. Dodson, 219 Wis. 2d 65, 70, 580 
N.W.2d 181 (1998) (quoting Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 644). 
¶40 Evidence that Cassandra may have had previous sexual 
contact with her cousin clearly falls under the rape shield 
                                                                                                                                                             
as to prior sexual conduct shall not be admitted into 
evidence during the course of the hearing or trial, 
nor shall any reference to such conduct be made in the 
presence of the jury, except the following, subject to 
s. 971.31(11): 
1. 
Evidence of the complaining witness's past 
conduct with the defendant. 
2. 
Evidence of specific instances of sexual 
conduct showing the source or origin of semen, 
pregnancy or disease, for use in determining the 
degree of sexual assault or the extent of injury 
suffered. 
3. 
Evidence of prior untruthful allegations of 
sexual assault made by the complaining witness. 
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
27 
 
law's 
definition 
of 
"sexual 
conduct." 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 972.11(2)(a).  Accordingly, unless Carter can demonstrate that 
such evidence is statutorily or judicially excepted from the 
rape shield law, the evidence is inadmissible.15 
2. Inadmissibility even under State v. Pulizzano's exception to 
the Rape Shield Law 
¶41 In Pulizzano, this court held that while Wisconsin's 
rape shield law is constitutional on its face, as applied it may 
unconstitutionally 
infringe 
upon 
a 
defendant's 
rights 
to 
confrontation and compulsory process.  155 Wis. 2d at 647-48.  
"'In the circumstances of a particular case evidence of a 
complainant's prior sexual conduct may be so relevant and 
probative 
that 
the 
defendant's 
right 
to 
present 
it 
is 
constitutionally protected.'"  Dodson, 219 Wis. 2d at 71 
(quoting Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 647).  In particular, this 
court has recognized that when the complainant is a child, the 
possibility of the child having a previous sexual experience may 
be relevant to the defendant's case because it could provide an 
alternative source for the child's detailed sexual knowledge.  
Dunlap, 250 Wis. 2d 466, ¶19 (citing Michael R.B., 175 Wis. 2d 
at 728). 
¶42 Accordingly, in Pulizzano, we articulated a narrow 
test that the defendant must satisfy in order "to present 
                                                 
15 It is evident from Carter's brief that he does not take 
issue with the fact that evidence that Cassandra may have been 
previously sexually assaulted by her cousin does not fall under 
any of the three statutory exceptions to the rape shield law.  
See Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b)(1)—(3). 
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
28 
 
otherwise excluded evidence of a child complainant's prior 
sexual conduct for the limited purpose of proving an alternative 
source for sexual knowledge": 
[P]rior to trial the defendant must make an offer of 
proof showing: (1) that the prior acts clearly 
occurred; (2) that the acts closely resembled those of 
the present case; (3) that the prior act is clearly 
relevant to a material issue; (4) that the evidence is 
necessary to the defendant's case; and (5) that the 
probative 
value 
of 
the 
evidence 
outweighs 
its 
prejudicial effect.  If the defendant makes that 
showing, the circuit court must then determine whether 
the State's interests in excluding the evidence are so 
compelling 
that 
they 
nonetheless 
overcome 
the 
defendant's right to present it. . . . 
Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 656-57. 
¶43 Despite our acknowledgement that the rape shield law 
"takes on a slightly different role when the complainant is a 
child," Dunlap, 250 Wis. 2d 466, ¶19, this court cautions that 
the Pulizzano exception to the rape shield law is intentionally 
narrow and must be applied accordingly.  Even when the 
complainant is a child, evidence of his or her previous sexual 
experience 
can 
still 
be 
"extremely 
prejudicial" 
and 
can 
"improperly focus attention on the complainant's character and 
past actions, rather than on the circumstances of the alleged 
assault."  Id.  That the complainant happens to be a child, 
rather than an adult, does not alter the intention behind the 
rape shield law: "to protect victims of sexual assault from 
themselves becoming the focus of scrutiny during trial," Michael 
R.B., 175 Wis. 2d at 727. 
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
29 
 
¶44 In this case, we conclude that Carter's offer of proof 
fails the first and second prongs of the Pulizzano test, and 
therefore, evidence of the alleged previous sexual assault 
against Cassandra is not admissible as an exception to the rape 
shield law. 
a. Did the prior sexual assault "clearly occur"? 
¶45 Carter's offer of proof fails the first prong of the 
Pulizzano test because the alleged previous sexual assault 
against Cassandra did not "clearly occur[]."  See 155 Wis. 2d at 
656.  To demonstrate that the previous assault "clearly 
occurred," Carter's offer of proof "'should state an evidentiary 
hypothesis underpinned by a sufficient statement of facts to 
warrant the conclusion or inference that the trier of fact is 
urged to adopt.'"  Id. at 652 (quoting Milenkovic v. State, 86 
Wis. 2d 272, 284, 272 N.W.2d 320 (Ct. App. 1978)).  The facts as 
presented do not warrant the conclusion that Cassandra was 
clearly sexually assaulted by her cousin.  As for evidence of 
the sexual assault, we have only Carter's testimony and a 
videotaped interview with Cassandra in which she told Officer 
Koch that she had seen her cousin's penis.  Neither Carter's 
testimony nor the videotaped interview sufficiently demonstrates 
that the previous sexual assault "clearly occurred."  
¶46 Carter testified that Cassandra pointed to his crotch 
and offered to "help [him] make juice," explaining to him that 
she "made juice" with her cousin by pulling on his penis and 
getting him to ejaculate.  Carter offered no corroborating 
testimony 
from 
Cassandra, 
Denise, 
or 
Cassandra's 
cousin.  
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
30 
 
Furthermore, while he testified that a social worker and sheriff 
came over to the house and talked to Cassandra about the 
incident, Carter introduced no documentation to support his 
assertion that the incident had ever been reported to the 
police.  The circuit court adjudged Carter not credible, and we 
uphold that finding because it is not clearly erroneous.  See 
Thiel, 
264 
Wis. 2d 
571, 
¶23. 
 
Given 
Carter's 
lack 
of 
credibility, this court cannot conclude from his testimony that 
the previous sexual assault "clearly occurred." 
¶47 In a videotaped interview taken after Carter was 
charged, Cassandra told Officer Koch that she had seen her 
cousin's penis.  The parties agree on little else.  At one point 
in the interview, Cassandra apparently referenced the making of 
drinks.  According to Carter, she was referring to "making 
juice" with her cousin while his pants were down.  The State, on 
the other hand, maintains that Cassandra's statement about 
making drinks was merely a reference to playing.  The State 
contends that Cassandra's blank statement about seeing her 
cousin's penis was void of any sexual description: "there is 
nothing that says that she touched him, that he touched her, 
that there was anything that was sexual in nature."  Because the 
videotaped interview did not appear in the record before this 
court, 
we 
are 
left 
to 
rely 
on 
the 
parties' 
competing 
interpretations.  As it was relayed to us, the videotaped 
interview is too insufficient to support the conclusion that the 
previous sexual assault "clearly occurred." 
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
31 
 
¶48 Our conclusion that Carter's offer of proof fails the 
first prong of the Pulizzano test is enough to dispose of 
Carter's argument that evidence of the previous sexual assault 
is excepted from the rape shield law.  See, e.g., Dunlap, 250 
Wis. 2d 466, ¶29 (recognizing that this court need not go 
further in applying the Pulizzano test after one of the five 
prongs is not satisfied).  Nevertheless, we move on to discuss 
the second prong and further conclude that Carter's offer of 
proof fails to demonstrate that the previous sexual assault 
"closely resemble[s]" that of the present case.  See Pulizzano, 
155 Wis. 2d at 656. 
b. Did the prior act "closely resemble" this act? 
¶49 In order to satisfy the second prong of the Pulizzano 
test, the defendant's offer of proof must show that the prior 
act "closely resembled" the act that the defendant is accused of 
committing.  Id.  This court has refused to broadly interpret 
"closely resembled."  Dunlap, 250 Wis. 2d 466, ¶23.  We have 
recognized that evidence of prior sexual touching does not 
sufficiently 
resemble 
a 
present 
allegation 
of 
sexual 
intercourse.  Dodson, 219 Wis. 2d at 79.16 
                                                 
16 Wisconsin Stat. § 948.01(6) defines "sexual intercourse" 
as 
vulvar penetration as well as cunnilingus, fellatio or 
anal 
intercourse 
between 
persons 
or 
any 
other 
intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person's 
body or of any object into the genital or anal opening 
either by the defendant or upon the defendant's 
instruction.  The emission of semen is not required.   
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
32 
 
¶50 In Dodson, in analyzing whether a prior act "closely 
resembled" 
the 
act 
alleged 
in 
the 
underlying 
case, 
see 
Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d at 656, this court made the distinction 
between (a) a prior act of sexual touching and a present 
allegation of sexual intercourse, and (b) a prior act of sexual 
intercourse and a present allegation of sexual touching.  
Dodson, 219 Wis. 2d at 79.  "Although evidence of prior sexual 
touching does not sufficiently 'resemble sexual intercourse,' it 
does not automatically follow that evidence of prior sexual 
intercourse does not resemble or involve sexual touching."  Id.  
Indeed, "it is impossible to conceive" of a prior act of sexual 
intercourse 
that 
does 
not 
involve 
sexual 
contact. 
 
Id.  
Accordingly, in Dodson, this court concluded that the defendant 
satisfied the second prong of the Pulizzano test because the 
previous act of sexual intercourse commissioned against the 
victim necessarily involved, and hence "closely resembled," the 
sexual contact that the defendant was accused of.  Id. at 78-79. 
¶51 In Michael R.B., we analyzed the converse scenario.  
175 Wis. 2d at 736.  The defendant, who was accused of having 
sexual intercourse with the child victim, made an offer of proof 
that the victim and her brother were previously seen touching 
each other's "private parts" while sitting together in a tire 
swing.  Id.  This court concluded that the defendant failed the 
second prong of the Pulizzano test, stating that it was "an 
                                                                                                                                                             
Carter was charged with forcing Cassandra to perform oral sex on 
him.  Oral sex constitutes "sexual intercourse" as defined by 
§ 948.01(6). 
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
33 
 
insupportable leap of reasoning to conclude that two or three 
minutes of undefined sexual touching while sitting in a tire 
swing so closely resembles sexual intercourse as to satisfy the 
Pulizzano test."  Id. 
¶52 Here, Carter's offer of proof must fail the second 
prong of the Pulizzano test because the previous sexual assault 
against Cassandra does not "closely resemble[]" the act of 
sexual intercourse that Carter was charged with.  See Pulizzano, 
155 Wis. 2d at 656.  Carter was charged with forcing Cassandra 
to perform oral sex on him, an act of "sexual intercourse."  See 
Wis. Stat. § 948.01(6).  Carter's offer of proof consists of 
testimony that Cassandra had previous sexual contact with her 
cousin, specifically that Cassandra "pulled on [her cousin's] 
penis to get him to ejaculate."17  As this court has made clear, 
a previous act of sexual contact does not sufficiently resemble 
an act of sexual intercourse for purposes of satisfying the 
second prong of the Pulizzano test.  Dodson, 219 Wis. 2d at 79.  
Similar to our analysis in Michael R.B., it would require "an 
insupportable leap of reasoning" to conclude that the uncertain 
sexual touching that took place between Cassandra and her cousin 
"closely resembles" the act of oral sex that Carter was charged 
                                                 
17 In his brief, Carter concedes that the previous sexual 
assault did not involve oral sex: "The State correctly asserts 
that Mr. Carter did not and does not claim the assault by [her 
cousin] involved oral sex."  It is therefore irrelevant that, 
according to Carter, Cassandra's statement to Officer Thomas 
(that she "closed her mouth tight" when she saw Carter's penis) 
indicated that Cassandra had some prior knowledge of oral sex. 
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
34 
 
with.  See Michael R.B., 175 Wis. 2d at 736.  "[W]e refuse to 
interpret the second prong of Pulizzano so broadly."  Dunlap, 
250 Wis. 2d 466, ¶23. 
¶53 Because we conclude that Carter's offer of proof fails 
the first and second prongs of the Pulizzano test, we hold that 
evidence 
of 
the 
alleged 
previous 
sexual 
assault 
against 
Cassandra is not excepted from the rape shield law and is 
therefore inadmissible.  Accordingly, Carter has failed to 
demonstrate that his defense was prejudiced by his trial 
counsel's decision not to present the evidence.  Regardless of 
whether Sargent attempted to present evidence of the previous 
sexual assault, the result of the proceeding would have been the 
same. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶54 To summarize, we conclude that the court of appeals 
improperly remanded the case to the circuit court for further 
proceedings.  Carter's ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
fails under the two-part inquiry of Strickland v. Washington.  
First, his trial counsel's performance was not deficient.  His 
counsel's strategic decision not to introduce evidence that the 
child victim was previously sexually assaulted was objectively 
reasonable considering all the circumstances.  Second, even 
assuming that his counsel's performance was deficient, the 
deficiency did not prejudice Carter's defense.  Evidence that 
the child victim was previously sexually assaulted would have 
been inadmissible under Wisconsin's rape shield law, Wis. Stat. 
§ 972.11(2), and the narrow five-part test articulated in State 
No. 
2008AP1185-CR   
 
35 
 
v. Pulizzano.  Accordingly, this court reverses the court of 
appeals' decision and upholds the judgment of the circuit court 
denying Carter's post-conviction motion for a new trial. 
By the Court.-The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2008AP1185-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
¶55 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).  I agree with 
the majority that Carter did not receive ineffective assistance 
of counsel and is therefore not entitled to a new trial.  I also 
agree with the majority that the evidence Carter presented at 
the post-conviction hearing was insufficient to demonstrate that 
he was prejudiced by his attorney's failure to seek the 
admission of evidence of a prior assault.   
¶56 I write separately, however, because the majority goes 
further.  It unnecessarily places its imprimatur on the 
attorney's "strategic decision," which was apparently made in 
ignorance of the law and left unaddressed a question that was 
fundamental to the defense in this case.  Because the court 
should not needlessly ratify this attorney's questionable 
decision, I respectfully concur. 
I 
¶57 In State v. Pulizzano,1 the court recognized an 
exception to the rape shield statute, Wis. Stat. § 972.11(2)(b).  
It concluded that a defendant may have a constitutional right to 
present evidence of a prior sexual assault to demonstrate an 
alternative source of the child's detailed sexual knowledge.  
Based on Sargent's testimony at the post-conviction hearing, the 
court of appeals determined that he "was unfamiliar with the 
Pulizzano exception to the rape shield statute."  State v. 
Carter, No. 2008AP1185-CR, unpublished order at 4 (Wis. Ct. App. 
                                                 
1 State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 456 N.W.2d 325 
(1990). 
No.  2008AP1185-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
March 12, 2009).  At the hearing, Sargent acknowledged that he 
did not "ever review a case called State v. Pulizzano."2    
¶58 The majority recognizes that it need not determine 
whether Sargent's performance was deficient, because "even 
assuming that [it] was deficient, the deficiency did not 
prejudice Carter's defense."  Majority op., ¶3.  The majority 
could have and should have decided this case based solely on a 
determination 
of 
no 
prejudice. 
 
Instead, 
the 
majority 
unnecessarily gives Sargent's performance a stamp of approval.  
Despite his apparent admitted ignorance of the relevant law and 
the failure of his purported strategy to address a question 
fundamental to the defense, the majority determines that the 
"strategic decision . . . was objectively reasonable considering 
all the circumstances."  Id. 
                                                 
2 The following exchange took place between Carter's post-
conviction counsel and Sargent: 
Q: Did you ever review a case called State v. 
Pulizzano? 
A: No, I did not. 
Q: Or any subsequent case that quotes the Pulizzano 
test? 
A: Prior to trial, no, I did not. 
Q: Did you do any research that led you to any 
conclusion as to the admissibility of the prior 
incident? 
A: I did not go into researching of that issue. 
 
No.  2008AP1185-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
A 
¶59 Why does the majority needlessly ratify a "strategic 
decision" when Sargent apparently made the decision without 
knowing the law?  The majority sets the bar too low when it 
relegates knowledge of the law to merely a "better practice."  
It cautions "that the better practice is for counsel to always 
research and be familiar with pertinent legal authority."  Id., 
¶34.  
¶60 Ignorance of the relevant law is often considered 
deficient performance.  Even the State appears to acknowledge 
deficient performance here.  After scant briefing on deficiency, 
the State concludes: "[P]erhaps Sargent's decision not to pursue 
the matter further was not reasonable[.]3 
¶61 In State v. Felton, we thoroughly considered how 
defense counsel's ignorance of a possible defense strategy 
should be evaluated in an ineffective assistance claim.  110 
Wis. 2d 485, 329 N.W.2d 161 (1983).  We concluded that without 
knowledge of the applicable law, it is impossible for an 
attorney to "make a reasoned decision consistent with the 
standard of performance expected of a prudent lawyer," and that 
the court should not "ratify a lawyer's decision merely by 
labeling it . . . 'a matter . . . of trial strategy.'"  Id. at 
505-06, 502.   
                                                 
3 At oral argument, counsel for the State asserted that 
Sargent's strategy was reasonable.  The court asked: "If he 
doesn't know what the facts are and he has not really carefully 
looked at Pulizzano, then how can he make a reasonable 
strategy?"  The State's attorney responded, "I think I agree 
with that statement, that he can't."   
No.  2008AP1185-CR.awb 
 
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¶62 In that case, Rita Felton was routinely battered by 
her husband and shot him on a day when his physical abuse was 
especially acute.  Id. at 489-92.  Felton was charged with 
second degree murder.  Id. at 488.  Prior to trial, defense 
counsel quickly zeroed in on a theory of self-defense and 
therefore failed to further explore the statutes and discover an 
alternative defense.  Id. at 505.  Because counsel was ignorant 
of the heat-of-passion defense, "he never was in a position even 
to consider whether, in light of the facts, heat of passion was 
an appropriate defense."  Id.   
¶63 Post-conviction, 
the 
circuit 
court 
deferred 
to 
counsel's "strategic choice": "[T]here may have been some 
shortcomings in the matters handled during the trial, but very 
often that is a matter of trial strategy. . . . [T]he defenses 
[Felton's attorney] put forth were a matter of choice and of 
trial strategy, and not grounds for a new trial."  Id. at 498.  
¶64 On review, we acknowledged that "this court is loath 
to interfere with a lawyer's exercise of professional judgment 
by a hindsight evaluation."  Id. at 507.  Nevertheless, we 
clarified that "strategic or tactical decisions must be based 
upon rationality founded on the facts and the law."  Id. at 502.  
"We 
will 
in 
fact 
second-guess a lawyer if the initial 
guess . . . is the exercise of professional authority based upon 
caprice rather than upon judgment."  Id. at 503.   
¶65 We unanimously concluded that "[t]he failure to be 
informed of this defense in the circumstances of this case 
constitutes a glaring deficiency in trial counsel's knowledge of 
No.  2008AP1185-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
the law" and was deficient performance.4  Id. at 505.  We refused 
to "ratify a lawyer's decision merely by labeling it, as did the 
trial court, 'a matter of choice and of trial strategy.'"  Id. 
at 502.   
¶66 Here, Sargent acknowledges that he did not make a 
legal determination about whether evidence of the prior assault 
would have been admissible.  See majority op., ¶15.  Because of 
his apparent ignorance of Pulizzano, it appears impossible for 
him to "weigh alternatives and to make a reasoned decision" 
consistent with professional standards.  See Felton, 110 
Wis. 2d at 505-06.  Instead, the decision was made in a legal 
vacuum.  I cannot join the majority in putting a stamp of 
approval on a decision apparently made in ignorance of the 
applicable law. 
B 
¶67 There is an additional reason that the court should 
not put its imprimatur on Sargent's questionable strategic 
decision.  Sargent's purported strategy left unaddressed a 
fundamental question: was Cassandra telling the truth about the 
source of her detailed sexual knowledge? 
¶68 At the post-conviction hearing, Sargent explained that 
he wanted to avoid challenging the credibility of a sympathetic 
five-year-old girl.  Instead, he asserted, he planned to attack 
                                                 
4 See 
also 
State 
v. 
Thiel, 
2003 
WI 
111, 
¶40, 
264 
Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305 ("[D]efense counsel cannot claim to 
have decided strategically to forgo interviewing a particular 
witness if counsel has not read the police report relating to 
that witness, because that would not be an informed decision.").  
No.  2008AP1185-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
her mother's credibility and demonstrate that the mother 
pressured Cassandra into making false allegations.  Majority 
op., ¶14.  The majority concludes that this strategy was 
reasonable: 
[B]y attempting to demonstrate that Cassandra gained 
her detailed sexual knowledge, not from Carter, but 
from a previous sexual assault by her cousin, Sargent 
would necessarily have been asking the jury to 
discredit the testimony of a five-year-old victim of 
sexual assault.  It is certainly reasonable that 
Sargent 
was 
more 
confident 
asking 
the 
jury 
to 
discredit the mother, Denise, instead of directly 
attacking the child victim.   
Id., ¶33.   
¶69 Although it might have been worthwhile to challenge 
the mother's credibility, it was essential to the defense that 
Sargent challenge the child's credibility as well.  Even if the 
mother had originally fabricated the story, it was the child who 
was repeating as true the mother's allegations.  In his opening 
argument, Sargent argued to the jury that "there[] really[] is 
no clear evidence that Michael Carter did anything improper 
towards this girl."  Yet, there was such evidence——Cassandra's 
own testimony.5   
¶70 If the jury fully credited this testimony, then the 
allegations were true and Carter was guilty.  Thus, it was 
essential to the defense that Sargent challenge Cassandra's 
credibility.  Unless Sargent was able to undermine her version 
                                                 
5 Cassandra testified that she and Carter were sitting on 
the couch, that her mouth was on his private part, and that 
Carter was pushing on her head saying "[k]eep on going down."  
She testified that afterwards, she went to the bathroom to wash 
up because she "had some white stuff" on her hand.   
No.  2008AP1185-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
of events, the jury would be forced to conclude that Carter did 
in fact do something "improper towards this girl."  
¶71 In fact, contrary to the "strategy" he described at 
the post-conviction hearing, Sargent did make attempts to 
discredit Cassandra.  Ultimately, she testified that she 
"want[ed] to get away from that house" and from Carter.  
Certainly, the jury might infer that Cassandra had a motivation 
to tell a story that would keep Carter away.   
¶72 Yet, 
Sargent's 
"strategy" 
left 
unaddressed 
one 
fundamental question.  How was a girl of that age able to 
recount a sexual incident with many sexual details had she not 
been assaulted by Carter?6  In Pulizzano, we explained that in 
the absence of evidence of an alternative source for a child's 
detailed sexual knowledge, the jury would likely make the 
"logical and weighty inference" that the alleged assault had 
occurred.  155 Wis. 2d at 652.   
¶73 The majority's lengthy reiteration of portions of the 
testimony and argument is notable only for what it does not 
demonstrate.  The record does not demonstrate that Sargent fully 
                                                 
6  
In 
closing 
arguments, 
the 
prosecutor 
repeatedly 
emphasized Cassandra's detailed sexual knowledge as proof of 
Carter's guilt. She asked the jury to consider Cassandra's 
"opportunity for observing and knowing the matters testified 
to . . . . And the reason I say that is, the proof is really in 
the 
pudding. 
 
The 
proof 
is 
in 
what 
this 
little 
girl 
said. . . . [She testified she] could see the dark hair of Mr. 
Carter's 
groin. . . . Now, 
she 
doesn't 
know 
why 
that's 
important.  She doesn't know that men have hair there, but she 
observed that . . . .  And that is something that a six-year-old 
is not gonna know."  The prosecutor repeated this theme when 
discussing Cassandra's knowledge of erections, ejaculation, and 
oral sex.      
No.  2008AP1185-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
followed through with his "strategy" of demonstrating that the 
mother pressured Cassandra into making untruthful allegations.  
Further, Sargent never argued that the mother provided Cassandra 
with the necessary adult information to tell a convincing story.7  
In light of these shortcomings, it is surprising that the 
majority 
concludes 
that 
Sargent's 
purported 
strategy 
was 
"reasonable under the circumstances." 
II  
¶74 Here, the majority's willingness to ratify Sargent's 
questionable trial strategy, which was apparently made in 
ignorance of the applicable law, is troublesome.  Where there is 
ignorance of the law, you cannot excuse a lawyer's performance 
by labeling it trial strategy.   
¶75 The 
majority, 
however, 
ultimately 
concludes 
that 
"irrespective of whether Sargent's performance was deficient, 
Carter's 
ineffectiveness 
claim 
still 
fails 
because 
the 
deficiency did not prejudice Carter's defense."  Majority op., 
¶36.  I agree.    
¶76 The law is clear that Carter is not entitled to a new 
trial unless he demonstrates that (1) his counsel's performance 
was deficient and (2) the deficiency prejudiced his defense.  It 
is well settled that the court need not decide whether an 
                                                 
7 As the majority reports, there was evidence that Carter 
and Denise had a "broken relationship."  See majority op., ¶¶26-
29.  Yet Sargent never explained to the jury how the hostility 
in the household could be relevant in evaluating the likelihood 
of Carter's guilt.  As the majority acknowledges, the only 
direct suggestion that Denise could be the ultimate source of 
the allegations came from the prosecutor, rather than defense 
counsel.  See id., ¶30.   
No.  2008AP1185-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
attorney's performance was deficient if the court has already 
determined that there was no prejudice.  Id., ¶21 (citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). 
¶77 To demonstrate prejudice, Carter has the burden to 
"show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  In 
this case, that means that Carter had to show a reasonable 
probability that the evidence would have been admitted and would 
have been persuasive to the jury.8   
¶78 I agree with the majority that the evidence Carter 
presented at the post-conviction hearing was insufficient to 
satisfy the Pulizzano test.  See majority op., ¶¶39-53.  Without 
showing a reasonable probability that the evidence of an alleged 
prior assault would have been admitted at trial, Carter has not 
demonstrated that he was prejudiced by Sargent's apparent 
ignorance of the law.  Therefore, he is not entitled to a new 
trial.  
 
¶79 Generally, an appellate court should decide cases on 
the 
narrowest 
possible 
grounds. 
 
State 
v. 
Blalock, 
150 
Wis. 2d 688, 703, 442 N.W.2d 514 (Ct. App. 1989).  I am at a 
loss to understand why the majority feels compelled to go 
                                                 
8 As we explained in Felton, "[t]here are, of course, a 
multitude of cases in which a lawyer's failure to inform himself 
of a particular defense could in no way be prejudicial[.]"  110 
Wis. 2d at 507.  "If the failure could have had no adverse 
effect on the defendant, the representation would not have been 
any more effective had that failure not occurred."  State v. 
Fencl, 109 Wis. 2d 224, 241, 325 N.W.2d 703 (1982) (Heffernan, 
J., concurring). 
No.  2008AP1185-CR.awb 
 
10 
 
further here.  I cannot understand why it unnecessarily 
concludes that Sargent made a "reasonable strategic decision," 
even though this decision was apparently made in ignorance of 
the law and left unaddressed a question fundamental to the 
defense in this case.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur.  
 
¶80 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this concurrence. 
 
No.  2008AP1185-CR.awb 
 
1