Case Title: Jan Raz v. Mary Brown

Citation: 2003 WI 29

Docket Number: 2001AP002436

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 29 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-2436 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In re the Marriage of: 
 
Jan Raz,  
 
Petitioner-Respondent-Cross-Appellant, 
 
v. 
Mary Brown,  
 
Respondent-Appellant-Cross-Respondent- 
 
Cross-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  257 Wis. 2d 621, 650 N.W.2d 559 
(Ct. App. 2002-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 1, 2003 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
March 6, 2003   
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee  
 
JUDGE: 
Michael Guolee   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
respondent-appellant-cross-respondent-cross- 
petitioner there were briefs by Randolph E. House and Law 
Offices of Randolph House, Mequon, and Pamela M. Schmidt and 
Whyte Hirschboeck Dudek, S.C., Milwaukee. 
 
For the petitioner-respondent-cross-appellant there was a 
brief by Jan Raz, pro se, Hales Corners. 
 
 
2003 WI 29 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-2436  
(L.C. No. 
90 FA 903638) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In re the Marriage of: 
 
Jan Raz,  
 
          Petitioner-Respondent-Cross- 
          Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Mary Brown,  
 
          Respondent-Appellant-Cross- 
          Respondent-Cross Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 1, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
remanded.  
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of an unpublished opinion of the court of appeals.  Our 
review is limited to that part of the decision of the court of 
appeals that summarily reversed orders of the circuit court for 
Milwaukee County, Michael Guolee, Judge, relating to child 
support obligations and physical placement of the children of 
No. 
01-2436   
 
2 
 
Mary Brown and her former husband, Jan Raz.1  The court of 
appeals summarily reversed part of the circuit court order as a 
sanction against the wife for failing to file a response brief 
to her former husband's cross-appeal.  The issue in this case is 
whether the court of appeals erred when it sanctioned the wife 
by summarily reversing the order because of her failure to file 
a response brief in the court of appeals.  
¶2 
The wife argues that the sanction of summary reversal 
imposed by the court of appeals was harsh and drastic and 
therefore, 
under 
State 
v. 
Smythe, 
225 
Wis. 2d 456, 
592 
N.W.2d 628 (1999), may be imposed only after a finding of 
egregious conduct, bad faith, or an abandonment of the appeal.  
According to the wife, neither her conduct nor that of her 
attorneys meets these criteria.  The husband responds that the 
wife's conduct and that of her attorney satisfy the Smythe 
standard and therefore summary reversal in his favor was an 
appropriate sanction.2 
¶3 
We hold that summary reversal is a drastic sanction 
and that the court of appeals may not impose this sanction 
without finding egregious conduct, bad faith, or a litigant's 
                                                 
1 Raz v. Brown, No. 01-2436, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. 
App. July 16, 2002). 
2 The husband also argues that his cross-appeal was not 
meritless or repetitious.  In addition, he devotes much of his 
response brief to arguing the unconstitutionality of the 
Wisconsin placement and child support statutes and invites this 
court to address this issue.  We decline to do so.  We denied 
his petition for review in our order of November 12, 2002. 
No. 
01-2436   
 
3 
 
abandonment of the appeal.  We therefore conclude that the court 
of 
appeals 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion 
when 
it 
summarily reversed the order of the circuit court as a sanction 
against the wife without applying this standard of law.  In 
addition, we conclude that the conduct of the wife and her 
counsel in the present case was not egregious, did not 
demonstrate bad faith, and did not amount to abandonment of the 
appeal.   
¶4 
Accordingly, that part of the decision of the court of 
appeals summarily reversing the circuit court orders on the 
issues raised in the husband's cross-appeal as a sanction is 
reversed and the case is remanded to the court of appeals for a 
determination of the merits of the issues raised in the cross-
appeal.   
¶5 
The procedural facts of the case are undisputed.  The 
parties were divorced in the Milwaukee County circuit court in 
December 1991.  The judgment of divorce included a marital 
settlement agreement that divided custody between the parties, 
granting the wife primary placement, and requiring the husband 
to pay child support in the amount of $2,100 per month.  On June 
7, 1996, the circuit court modified the amount of child support 
at the husband's request, and the modification was upheld on 
appeal.3   
                                                 
3 See Raz v. Brown, 213 Wis. 2d 296, 570 N.W.2d 605 (Ct. 
App. 1997). 
No. 
01-2436   
 
4 
 
¶6 
The present case began on October 22, 1998, when the 
husband filed a request to modify child support and a motion for 
declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that Wisconsin's 
child support statutes were unconstitutional.  The wife filed a 
counter-motion for modification of physical placement.  The 
husband filed an additional motion asking the circuit court to 
find the wife in contempt for allegedly failing to participate 
in court-ordered family therapy and a counter-motion to modify 
physical placement. 
¶7 
Extensive hearings were conducted on the issues of 
child support and placement between September 1999 and April 
2001.  On November 11, 1999, before hearing further testimony on 
the issue of child support, the circuit court heard argument on 
the husband's 
motion challenging 
the 
constitutionality of 
Wisconsin's child support statutes.  The circuit court ruled 
that the husband's constitutional claims were barred by the 
doctrine of claim preclusion.  According to the circuit court, 
the husband could have fully raised these claims in his 1996 
action, and because he did not, he was precluded from raising 
them in the present case.   
¶8 
In May 2001, the circuit court issued an order 
regarding physical placement and child support.  The circuit 
court ordered physical placement of the children to be divided 
equally between the parties.  The circuit court also vacated the 
existing child support order, requiring each parent to pay for 
the children's expenses while they were in his or her care.  In 
addition, the circuit court found the wife in contempt for 
No. 
01-2436   
 
5 
 
unilaterally interfering with the court's prior order to 
participate in therapy.  The circuit court declined to assess 
attorney fees to either party.4 
¶9 
The 
wife 
appealed 
the 
circuit 
court's 
orders, 
challenging the modification of physical placement and child 
support and alleging error in finding her in contempt of court.  
The husband cross-appealed.  He argued that Wisconsin's child 
support guidelines violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution, that the circuit court therefore erred by not 
considering his request for costs in bringing his underlying 
action, and that the circuit court erred by not retroactively 
modifying the existing child support order.  
¶10 The wife filed a brief as appellant.  The husband 
filed a combined response brief and cross-appellant's brief.  In 
a letter dated March 27, 2002, the wife's counsel advised the 
court of appeals that the wife did not intend to file either a 
reply brief on the appeal or a response brief to the husband's 
cross-appeal. 
                                                 
4 The wife filed a motion for reconsideration that was heard 
and denied on July 9, 2001. 
No. 
01-2436   
 
6 
 
¶11 The court of appeals issued an order dated April 2, 
2002, directing the wife to file either a responsive brief in 
the cross-appeal or a brief letter stating that she had decided 
not to file the responsive brief with the understanding that any 
issues raised in the cross-appeal and not refuted may be 
construed by the court as conceded.  The court of appeals' order 
reads, in relevant part, as follows: 
Before accepting [respondent's letter] in lieu of a 
responsive brief in the cross-appeal, this court must 
be assured that the cross-respondent has decided not 
to file a responsive brief with a full understanding 
of the possible consequences . . . Therefore, IT IS 
ORDERED that counsel for Brown shall, within ten days 
of the date of this order, either file a responsive 
brief in the cross-appeal or file a brief letter 
indicating that Brown has decided not to file a 
responsive brief with the complete understanding that 
any issues raised in the cross-appeal and not refuted 
as a result of not filing the responsive brief may be 
construed by this court as conceded. 
¶12 The wife's counsel responded to this order by letter 
dated April 4, 2002, advising the court of appeals that the wife 
would not file a response brief because the husband's cross-
appeal lacked merit.  The April 4, 2002, letter stated as 
follows: 
Counsel for [the wife] has previously discussed with 
[the wife] the consequences of not filing a brief in 
response to that filed by [the husband].  Counsel for 
[the wife] and his client have discussed on several 
occasions the total lack of merit set forth in the 
[husband's] brief.  It is also noted that the Attorney 
General's Office opted not to file a brief in response 
to the constitutional 
challenges 
raised 
in 
[the 
husband's] brief.  Further, it is the opinion of [the 
wife's] counsel that assuming, for argument purposes, 
No. 
01-2436   
 
7 
 
all of [the husband's] arguments were accepted by the 
court, they do not raise questions sufficient to 
challenge 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
the 
statutes.  
Also, it is [the wife's] position that should the 
court find the statutes unconstitutional, such a 
finding would require a retrial on all of the issues 
which are currently before the Court of Appeals with 
regard to the substantive aspects of the trial court's 
decision. 
¶13 The court of appeals issued a decision on the merits 
affirming the circuit court with regard to the claims the wife 
raised on appeal.  As to the claims raised by the husband on 
cross-appeal, the court of appeals summarily reversed the 
circuit court (without reaching the merits) "as a sanction" 
against the wife.5  The court of appeals concluded that the wife 
violated the rules of appellate procedure by not filing a 
response 
brief 
within 
the 
time 
set 
forth 
in 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.19(3)(a) (1999-2000) and explained that 
it declined to do her work for her.6  Consequently, the court of 
appeals summarily reversed the circuit court's order on the 
issues raised in the husband's cross-appeal.7 
¶14 A decision by the court of appeals to grant summary 
reversal as a sanction against a party who fails to file a brief 
                                                 
5 Raz v. Brown, No. 01-2436, unpublished slip op. ¶41 (Wis. 
Ct. App. July 16, 2002). 
6 Id. 
7 The court of appeals remanded the cause to the circuit 
court to determine the costs the husband incurred as a result of 
litigating the alleged violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
for a hearing to determine the amount of child support the 
husband is due from October 22, 1998, to June 7, 2001.  
No. 
01-2436   
 
8 
 
by the date due involves an exercise of discretion.8  This court 
does not normally review a discretionary decision of the court 
of appeals.9  However, when we do review a discretionary act of 
the court of appeals, we review the decision as we would any 
other exercise of discretion.10   
¶15 A discretionary decision will be upheld if the court 
being reviewed examined the relevant facts, applied a proper 
standard of law, and used a demonstrative rational process in 
reaching a decision that a reasonable judge could reach.11  A 
discretionary decision will be reversed as an erroneous exercise 
of discretion if we conclude that the decision was based on an 
improper standard of law.12 
¶16 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.83(2) (1999-2000)13 sets 
out several sanctions a court of appeals may impose in response 
to a litigant's failure to follow appellate rules of procedure.  
                                                 
8 State v. Smythe, 225 Wis. 2d 456, 462, 592 N.W.2d 628 
(1999) (dismissing an appeal as a sanction for failure to file a 
brief is a discretionary act). 
9 Id. 
10 Smythe, 225 Wis. 2d at 462-63 ("If this court does 
review, we must review the court of appeals' decision as we 
would any other exercise of discretion.") (quoting State v. 
Johnson, 149 Wis. 2d 418, 429, 439 N.W.2d 122 (1989), confirmed 
on reconsideration, 153 Wis. 2d 121, 449 N.W.2d 845 (1989)).   
11 Loy v. Bunderson, 107 Wis. 2d 400, 414-15, 320 N.W.2d 175 
(1982). 
12 Smythe, 225 Wis. 2d at 463.    
13 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are 
to the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
01-2436   
 
9 
 
The sanctions include dismissal of the appeal, summary reversal, 
imposition of a penalty or costs on a party or counsel, or such 
other 
actions 
"the 
court 
considers 
appropriate."  
Section 809.83(2) reads as follows: 
809.83(2).  Noncompliance with rules. Failure of a 
person to comply with a requirement of these rules, 
other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal or 
cross-appeal, does not affect the jurisdiction of the 
court over the appeal but is grounds for dismissal of 
the appeal, summary reversal, striking of a paper, 
imposition of a penalty or costs on a party or 
counsel, or other action as the court considers 
appropriate. 
¶17 In State v. Smythe, 225 Wis. 2d 456, 592 N.W.2d 628 
(1999), 
this 
court 
recognized 
that 
some 
sanctions 
under 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.83(2) constitute more severe punishment 
than others.  In particular, we concluded that "dismissal with 
prejudice is a drastic sanction."14  Dismissal of an appeal 
represents an abrupt termination of litigation, and, like the 
dismissal of a complaint by a circuit court, "in many cases it 
imposes a finality to both issues and claims."15  When an 
appellate court grants a dismissal, an appellant loses the right 
to a review on the merits; dismissal with prejudice is therefore 
reserved for extreme situations where there is compelling 
evidence of willful default.16  Consequently, we held in Smythe 
that for the court of appeals to dismiss an appeal under the 
                                                 
14 Smythe, 225 Wis. 2d at 468. 
15 Id. at 469. 
16 Id. at 468 n.10. 
No. 
01-2436   
 
10 
 
sanction provisions of § 809.83(2) there must be a showing that 
an appellant or an appellant's attorney has demonstrated bad 
faith or egregious conduct, or there must be a common sense 
finding that the appeal has been abandoned.17      
¶18 We conclude that the Smythe standard is applicable 
here even though the present case involves a summary reversal as 
a sanction rather than a dismissal.  Dismissal of an appeal 
results in an appellant losing and the respondent winning.  
Summary reversal results in an appellant (here the cross-
appellant) winning and the respondent losing.  In both a 
dismissal and a summary reversal, however, there is an abrupt 
termination of litigation and one party loses as a sanction 
without a consideration on the merits.  Dismissal and summary 
reversal are therefore both drastic sanctions.  Consequently, 
the court of appeals may not grant summary reversal of a circuit 
court order on appeal as a sanction without a finding of bad 
faith, egregious conduct, or a litigant's abandonment of the 
appeal.   
¶19 The court of appeals in the present case did not apply 
the standard of law announced in Smythe when reaching its 
decision to sanction the wife, nor did it make a finding of bad 
faith, egregious conduct, or a litigant's abandonment of the 
appeal.  The court of appeals granted summary reversal as a 
sanction because the wife did not file a brief within the time 
prescribed by Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.19(3)(a), and the court 
                                                 
17 Id. at 469. 
No. 
01-2436   
 
11 
 
declined to do the wife's work for her.  The court of appeals 
explained simply that it is a "fast-paced, high-volume court" 
that cannot serve as "both an advocate and judge."18  We thus 
conclude that the court of appeals' exercise of discretion was 
clearly erroneous. 
¶20 Because the court of appeals did not apply the Smythe 
standard to the facts of this case, we now do so.  This case 
turns on a paper record that we can review as well as the court 
of appeals. 
¶21 The husband argues that the actions of the wife and 
her counsel meet the criteria for sanctions established in 
Smythe.  According to the husband, the wife's decision not to 
file a response brief in the face of the court of appeals' April 
2, 2002, order represents contempt for the order and a choice to 
be in default.  In addition, the husband asserts that the wife's 
conduct throughout the history of this case, and that of her 
counsel, have been egregious and in bad faith as evidenced by 
her failure to respond to his overtures to resolve their issues 
without litigation and her repeated filing of motions for 
reconsideration and appeal.  This conduct, the husband contends, 
would be sufficient to warrant the imposition of attorney fees 
under Wis. Stat. § 767.262(1)(a), which governs the award of 
                                                 
18 Raz v. Brown, No. 01-2436, unpublished slip op., ¶41 
(quoting State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 674, 492 N.W.2d 633 
(Ct. App. 1992)). 
No. 
01-2436   
 
12 
 
attorney fees in actions affecting the family, or as a penalty 
under the overtrial doctrine.19 
¶22 The wife, in turn, argues that her decision not to 
file a response brief was not in bad faith, egregious conduct, 
or an abandonment of her appeal.  The wife contends that neither 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.19(6) governing the timing of filing 
briefs nor the April 2 court order required her to file a 
response brief in the present case.  Moreover, according to the 
wife, the husband's claims had been rejected by the court of 
appeals in a prior case between the two parties in 1997, and it 
was therefore reasonable to assume these claims would be 
rejected 
in 
the 
present 
case, 
making 
a 
response 
brief 
unnecessary. 
¶23 We agree with the wife that her conduct and that of 
her counsel was not egregious, done in bad faith, or an 
abandonment of her appeal.   
¶24 Instead of filing a response brief to the husband's 
cross-appeal, the wife sent a letter to the court of appeals 
within the time limit prescribed for filing her brief.  The 
letter explained very simply that the wife would not be filing 
either a reply brief or a "responsive brief in the cross-
appeal."   
                                                 
19 The overtrial doctrine may be invoked in family law cases 
when, 
for 
example, 
one 
party's 
unreasonable 
approach 
to 
litigation causes the other party to incur extra and unnecessary 
fees. 
 
Ondrasek 
v. 
Ondrasek, 
126 
Wis. 2d 469, 
484, 
377 
N.W.2d 190 (1985).  A court may order the party who engaged in 
overtrial to pay the opposing party's attorney fees. 
No. 
01-2436   
 
13 
 
¶25 The court of appeals responded to this letter by 
issuing an "order" that neither required the wife to file a 
response brief nor threatened summary reversal for her failure 
to do so.  The order explained that her failure to file a 
response brief may result in the court of appeals construing any 
issues raised in the cross-appeal as conceded.  The order quoted 
Charolais Breeding Ranches v. FPC Securities, 90 Wis. 2d 97, 
109, 279 N.W.2d 493 (Ct. App. 1979), for the proposition that 
"respondents on appeal cannot complain if propositions of 
appellants are taken as confessed when they do not undertake to 
refute them."   
¶26 The order then gave the wife a choice to be made 
"within ten days."  She had to either "file a responsive brief 
in the cross-appeal or file a brief letter indicating that [she] 
has decided not to file a responsive brief."  The wife's 
response fully complied with this order.  Two days after the 
order was issued, she filed a letter (through her attorney) 
indicating that she was aware of the consequences of not filing 
a response brief and elected not to file one because the 
arguments in the cross-appeal lacked merit. 
¶27 The wife's decision to file a letter instead of a 
response brief, therefore, cannot be considered egregious or 
conduct undertaken in bad faith.  The wife fully and timely 
complied with the court's order and through the wife's letter 
the court of appeals was made aware of her position that the 
husband's constitutional claims lacked merit and should be 
rejected.  Moreover, the wife cannot be said to have abandoned 
No. 
01-2436   
 
14 
 
her appeal since she timely sent letters to the court in lieu of 
a response brief after the court of appeals expressly gave her 
the invitation to do so.                
¶28 The present case should be compared with State ex rel. 
Blackdeer v. Township of Levis, 176 Wis.2d 252, 500 N.W.2d 339 
(Ct. App. 1993).  The Blackdeer case, like the present case, 
involved a summary reversal as a sanction for failure to file a 
response brief.  Unlike the present case, however, the Blackdeer 
decision appropriately applied the sanction on a party that had 
abandoned its appeal.   
¶29 In 
Blackdeer, 
the 
circuit 
court 
dismissed 
the 
plaintiff's complaint against the Town of Levis and the 
plaintiff appealed to the court of appeals.  The Town, the 
respondent, failed to file a response brief in the court of 
appeals.   
¶30 The Town's response brief was due on September 26, 
1990, but was not filed.  The court of appeals in Blackdeer sua 
sponte gave the Town several extensions of time to file its 
brief and ordered the Town to file a brief, warning that if no 
brief were filed it could result in summary reversal.  The Town 
did not file a brief; it did not respond to the court of 
appeals' orders; it did not move to extend its briefing 
deadline.   
¶31 On November 6, 1990, the court of appeals in Blackdeer 
summarily reversed the circuit court's order.  The court of 
appeals dismissed the complaint against the Town of Levis as a 
sanction "solely on the basis of the [Town's] respondent's 
No. 
01-2436   
 
15 
 
failure to file its brief and without regard to the merits of 
the appeal."20 
¶32 As the Smythe case has interpreted Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.83(2), a common sense abandonment of an appeal provides 
sufficient reason for imposing the drastic sanction of summary 
reversal.  In Blackdeer, the Town abandoned its position on 
appeal by not responding to numerous requests by the court of 
appeals to file a brief.  In the present case, in contrast, the 
wife did not abandon her position opposing the appeal.  The wife 
sent two letters to the court of appeals explaining her interest 
in proceeding with the appeal and her reasons for not filing a 
brief.  One letter was sent to satisfy the rule prescribing the 
time for filing a brief.  The other letter was sent in response 
to the order of the court of appeals, explaining why no further 
brief would be filed.   
¶33 The husband's assertions that the wife and her counsel 
are guilty of egregious conduct and bad faith for actions 
committed 
at 
the 
circuit 
court level 
do 
not 
alter our 
conclusion.  Assuming arguendo that his accusations are true, we 
are reviewing the court of appeals' sua sponte decision to 
summarily reverse a circuit court order as a sanction against a 
party for violating rules of appellate procedure, a decision 
made without reference to or regard for either party's conduct 
in the circuit court.  Issues of egregious conduct or bad faith 
in the circuit court are not relevant in the present case 
                                                 
20 State ex rel. Blackdeer v. Township of Levis, 176 Wis.2d 
252, 257-58, 500 N.W.2d 339 (Ct. App. 1993). 
No. 
01-2436   
 
16 
 
relating to the court of appeals' imposing sanctions for conduct 
in the court of appeals.   
¶34 The husband's claim that the sanction is appropriate 
under Wis. Stat. § 767.262(1), which governs attorney fees, also 
misses the mark.  Section 767.262(1) authorizes a court to order 
one party in an action affecting the family to pay for the costs 
or attorney fees associated with maintaining or responding to 
the action.21  It mentions nothing about summary reversal.   
¶35 Similarly, the overtrial doctrine allows a party in a 
family law case to seek attorney fees when another party's 
unreasonable 
approach 
to 
litigation 
causes 
him 
to 
incur 
unnecessary fees.22  The proper procedure is to bring a claim in 
the circuit court where the unreasonable litigation occurs and 
the proper remedy is attorney fees.23  In the present case, the 
husband has not properly raised any such claim.   
¶36 We appreciate that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals 
faces a heavy caseload and that it is entitled to wide latitude 
                                                 
21 Wisconsin Stat. § 767.262(1) reads in pertinent part: 
767.262. Award of attorney fees.  (1) The court, after 
considering the financial resources of both parties, 
may do the following: (a) Order either party to pay a 
reasonable amount for the cost to the other party of 
maintaining or responding to an action affecting the 
family and for attorney fees to either party. 
22 In re Attorney's Fees in Yu v. Zhang, 2001 WI App 267, 
¶13, 248 Wis. 2d 913, 637 N.W.2d 754 (quoting Ondrasek v. 
Ondrasek, 126 Wis. 2d 469, 484, 377 N.W.2d 190 (1985)).    
23 See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 199 Wis. 2d 367, 376-78, 
545 N.W.2d 239 (Ct. App. 1996). 
No. 
01-2436   
 
17 
 
when enforcing procedural rules designed to make the appellate 
process more efficient.  However, where the court of appeals 
elects to impose the drastic sanction of summary reversal for 
failure to file a response brief, it may do so only after 
unequivocally ordering the filing of a brief and clearly stating 
the consequences for failure to comply.  Here, the wife 
apparently did not conclude that she would be sanctioned by a 
summary reversal based on the court of appeals' order.  Nothing 
in this case should be read as prohibiting summary reversal as a 
sanction on different facts, should the court of appeals find 
egregious conduct, bad faith, or an abandonment of the appeal.  
¶37 For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the court 
of appeals to summarily reverse the circuit court on the issues 
raised in the husband's cross-appeal is reversed and the case is 
remanded to the court of appeals for a determination on the 
merits of the issues raised on cross-appeal including award of 
costs, if any.24  If a response brief is necessary to reach a 
                                                 
24 The husband filed a Motion for Costs, Damages, and 
Additional Sanctions with this court on December 30, 2002.  The 
motion seeks two things.  First, it seeks the husband's costs, 
measured in terms of lost work hours, for preparing his petition 
for review, his response to the wife's petition for review, and 
his response brief in this case.  According to the defendant, he 
was required to incur these costs as a result of the wife's 
"willful default and contempt of the Court of Appeals April 2, 
2002 order."  Second, the motion seeks sanctions against the 
wife's counsel for failing in his responsibility "to provide 
truthful statements of fact and law" despite being admonished by 
the court of appeals for misrepresenting the record on appeal. 
No. 
01-2436   
 
18 
 
determination on the merits, the court of appeals may order one 
to be filed. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and cause remanded. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
The husband's motion was held in abeyance pending this 
decision and we now deny the husband's motion.  For the reasons 
set forth in this opinion, we conclude that the wife fully and 
timely complied with the April 2 order of the court of appeals.  
Consequently, any resulting costs associated with proceedings in 
this court that the husband has incurred cannot be attributed to 
the wife's "willful default and contempt."  Furthermore, we do 
not find that any statements made by wife's counsel in the 
present case constitute professional misconduct or otherwise 
warrant sanctions. 
No. 
01-2436   
 
 
 
1