Case Title: North Dakota v. Adan

Citation: 

Docket Number: 20160083

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 2016-11-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF NORTH
DAKOTA 2016 ND 215State of North
Dakota, Plaintiff and Appelleev.Abdullahi Ahmed Adan, Defendant and
AppellantNo. 20160083 State of North Dakota, Plaintiff and
Appellee v. Semereab Haile Tesfaye, Defendant and AppellantNo.
20160095Appeals from the District Court of Burleigh County, South Central Judicial
District, the Honorable Bruce A. Romanick,
Judge.AFFIRMED.Opinion of the Court by VandeWalle, Chief Justice.Justin J. Schwarz, Assistant State's Attorney, Burleigh
County Courthouse, 514 E. Thayer Ave., Bismarck, ND 58501-4413, for plaintiff and appellee;
submitted on brief.Laura C. Ringsak, 103 South
Third St., Ste. 6, Bismarck, ND 58501, for defendant and appellant Abdullahi Ahmed Adan;
submitted on brief. Kyle M. Melia, Bismarck-Mandan
Public Defender Office, 410 E. Thayer Ave., Ste. 201, Bismarck, ND 58501, for defendant and
appellant Semereab Haile Tesfaye; submitted on brief.State v.
Adan; State v. TesfayeNos. 20160083 &
20160095 VandeWalle, Chief Justice.[¶1] Abdullahi
Ahmed Adan and Semereab Haile Tesfaye appealed the judgments entered on conditional pleas
of guilty to the charges of possession of a controlled substance with intent to manufacture or
deliver. We affirm, concluding there was reasonable suspicion to extend the traffic stop and that
the district court properly denied their motions to suppress evidence gathered as a result of the
continued detention.I.[¶2] While driving
westbound on I-94, Officer Steven Clark observed a maroon, four-door car traveling east at
approximately 73 mph in a 75 mph zone. The vehicle appeared to weave in its lane and Officer
Clark noticed that the vehicle was from out of state. After turning around to follow it, Officer
Clark noted that the vehicle had slowed down to approximately 70 mph. From several car lengths
behind, Officer Clark saw the driver reach into the backseat of the vehicle and appear to place a
blanket or jacket over something in the backseat. Officer Clark pulled alongside the vehicle and
observed the driver with his hands at ten and two on the wheel, staring intently forward, and a
passenger who appeared to be sleeping. While alongside the vehicle, Officer Clark observed the
driver moving the corner of his mouth, as if he were trying to hide his conversation with the
passenger. However, not seeing any traffic infractions, Officer Clark stopped following the
vehicle.[¶3] Although he did not see any traffic infractions,
Officer Clark remained suspicious of the vehicle and called Officer Steve Edwards to relay his
suspicions and tell him to be on the lookout for the vehicle. While talking with Officer Edwards,
Officer Clark also relayed all of the information he observed while following the vehicle. Officer
Edwards located the suspicious vehicle and observed it speeding and following too close to the
vehicle in front of it. Based on these traffic violations, Officer Edwards initiated a traffic
stop.[¶4] The driver pulled off to the side of the road and left his
blinker on. Officer Edwards identified the driver as Adan and the passenger as Tesfaye. During
the traffic stop, Officer Edwards observed a blanket, covering approximately half of the backseat,
an air freshener, a bottle of Ozone scent spray, a global positioning system ("GPS"), eye drops, a
lighter, and an energy drink in the vehicle.[¶5] Officer Edwards
asked Adan to come back to his patrol vehicle to answer a few questions. During this time, Adan
appeared nervous to Officer Edwards; Adan touched his face, licked his lips, and his shoulders
quivered. Adan confirmed that the vehicle was a rental and explained that he had rented the
vehicle in St. Cloud and used it to travel to Fargo and then to Watford City to drop a friend off
for work. Officer Edwards stated that he did not observe any luggage consistent with this length
of a trip, but acknowledged that he did not look in the trunk of the car for any
luggage.[¶6] Officer Edwards also noted that during his
interactions with Tesfaye, Tesfaye appeared to be evasive, never looking him in the eye. When
questioned about the travel plans, Tesfaye replied that he and Adan were traveling from the
Williston area. Tesfaye was also unable to recall the name of the passenger Adan had dropped
off, even though they had ridden together for a couple of days.[¶7]
Through a records check, Officer Edwards discovered that Tesfaye was recently placed on
probation for possession of methamphetamine. After this discovery, Officer Edwards asked
Tesfaye if there was anything illegal in the vehicle and whether there was any methamphetamine
or marijuana. Tesfaye answered, "No," to each inquiry, but broke eye contact with Officer
Edwards when asked about the presence of marijuana. During the course of the traffic stop,
Officer Edwards did not smell the odor of marijuana nor did he observe any drug
paraphernalia.[¶8] After the traffic stop, Officer Edwards issued
Adan a warning and asked if Adan had time to answer a few more questions; Adan agreed.
Officer Edwards asked a few questions about Adan's trip before asking permission to search his
vehicle and have a dog walk around it. Adan did not consent. Officer Edwards called dispatch to
send a K-9 to his location. Forty-five minutes later, a K-9 arrived and signaled on the presence of
narcotics. After a search of the vehicle, officers seized over two pounds of marijuana.II.[¶9] When reviewing a district court's denial of
a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court's findings of fact. State v. Kitchen, 1997 ND 241, ¶ 11, 572 N.W.2d 106. However, questions
of law are fully reviewable on appeal. State v.
Bartelson, 2005 ND 172, ¶ 7,
704 N.W.2d 824. Whether the facts support a finding of reasonable articulable suspicion is a
question of law, and thus, is fully reviewable by this Court. State v. Fields, 2003 ND 81, ¶ 6, 662 N.W.2d 242.[¶10] The parties do not dispute the fact that the initial stop of Adan and
Tesfaye's vehicle was proper. As we have previously stated, "traffic violations, even if considered
common or minor, constitute prohibited conduct and, therefore, provide officers with requisite
suspicion for conducting investigatory stops." State
v. Stadsvold, 456 N.W.2d 295, 296
(N.D. 1990). In this case, Officer Edwards observed the vehicle speeding and following too close
to the vehicle in front of it. When Officer Edwards observed these traffic infractions, he had
probable cause to believe the law was being violated and, thus, properly initiated a traffic stop.
See Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding that the officer's subjective
intent for stopping the vehicle was not relevant in determining the validity of the traffic
stop).[¶11] During a valid traffic stop, "an officer can
temporarily detain the traffic violator at the scene of the violation." Fields, 2003 ND 81, ¶ 8. The duration of the investigatory
detention may continue "as long as reasonably necessary to conduct [the officer's duties resulting
from the traffic stop] and to issue a warning or citation." Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 269 F.3d 919, 925 (8th Cir. 2001)). When the original purpose of the traffic stop is complete, the
officer must have a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot to continue the detention.
Fields, at ¶ 10. Any further detention, without
reasonable suspicion, violates the traffic offender's Fourth Amendment rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Id.[¶12] When
deciding whether reasonable suspicion exists, this Court looks at the totality of the
circumstances, applies an objective standard, and takes "into account the inferences and
deductions that an investigating officer would make that may elude a layperson." Fields, 2003 ND 81, ¶ 13. "The question is whether a
reasonable person in the officer's position would be justified by some objective manifestation to
suspect the defendant was, or was about to be, engaged in unlawful activity." State v Kenner, 1997 ND 1, ¶ 8, 559 N.W.2d 538 (quoting State v. Smith, 452 N.W.2d 86, 88 (N.D. 1990)). Additionally, information
obtained by one officer may be used by another to establish reasonable suspicion if the first
officer conveyed the information to the second officer. Ell v. Dir., 2016 ND 164, ¶ 10, 883 N.W.2d 464; State v. Miller, 510 N.W.2d 638, 643-44 (N.D. 1994).III.[¶13] On appeal, Adan and Tesfaye argue that
after they were given a written warning for their driving conduct, Officer Edwards lacked a
reasonable and articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot to continue to detain
them.[¶14] The district court found that Officer Edwards relied
upon a number of different factors in establishing a reasonable, articulable suspicion. Such
factors include: the information relayed to him by Officer Clark, the nervousness of both Adan
and Tesfaye, the different accounts of the trip's destination, items he observed in the vehicle,
Tesfaye's criminal history, and the fact the vehicle was a rental.A.
Nervousness[¶15] An individual's nervousness during a
traffic stop "is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion." State v. Heitzmann, 2001 ND 136, ¶ 15, 632 N.W.2d 1 (citing Illinois v.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 120 (2000)). However, nervousness alone is insufficient to
establish a reasonable suspicion. Fields,
2003 ND 81, ¶ 19.[¶16] Here, both Adan and Tesfaye exhibited signs of nervousness. Adan's first
signs of nervousness occurred when Officer Clark was following the vehicle. Officer Clark
observed Adan driving rigidly with his hands gripped tightly at ten and two and placing a blanket
or jacket in the backseat as if attempting to cover something up. Officer Clark also thought it was
suspicious that Adan avoided eye contact with him and looked like he was talking out of the side
of his mouth to Tesfaye, even though Tesfaye appeared to be sleeping. After disengaging the
vehicle, Officer Clark called Officer Edwards and informed him of his observations. Because
these observations were properly relayed to Officer Edwards, this Court may use Officer Clark's
observations in its determination of whether Officer Edwards had a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity.[¶17] Adan also appeared nervous throughout
his interactions with Officer Edwards. During the duration of the traffic stop, Adan left his
blinker on. Officer Edwards believed this to be unusual and a sign of high stress, as most people
turn the blinker off to get rid of the blinking sound. When Adan followed Officer Edwards back
to the patrol vehicle, Adan was licking his lips, touching his face, and quivering. These actions
made Officer Edwards believe that Adan was nervous.[¶18]
Tesfaye also exhibited different instances of nervousness throughout his interactions with Officer
Edwards. When Officer Edwards first approached the vehicle on the passenger side, Tesfaye
would not make eye contact; Tesfaye kept looking down toward the floor mat or at his feet and
was generally evasive. Tesfaye did make eye contact with Officer Edwards later, when Officer
Edwards questioned him about the presence of illegal substances in the vehicle. When asked if
there was anything illegal or methamphetamine in the vehicle, Tesfaye held eye contact with
Officer Edwards and answered, "No." However, when asked if there was marijuana in the
vehicle, Tesfaye broke eye contact and looked down when he answered, "No."B. Inconsistencies in Travel Plans[¶19]
When there are inconsistencies about the details of a trip, these inconsistencies may be used in
forming a reasonable suspicion. State v.
Deviley, 2011 ND 182, ¶ 12,
803 N.W.2d 561; State v. Franzen, 2010
ND 244, ¶ 15, 792 N.W.2d 533 (citing
Jones, 269 F.3d at 928). When Officer Edwards questioned Adan and Tesfaye
individually about their travel plans, they gave conflicting stories. They both stated that they left
from Fargo to drop a friend of Adan's off in western North Dakota. However, Adan stated that
they dropped the friend off in Watford City, while Tesfaye stated it was in Williston.
Additionally, when questioned by Officer Edwards to the identity of the friend, Tesfaye was
unable to give a name. Officer Edwards testified that he believed this to be an indicator of
criminal behavior as Tesfaye had ridden with the unnamed individual for a significant amount of
time.C. Items in Vehicles[¶20] The
presence of different items in a vehicle can also be a factor in determining whether there was a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Franzen, 2010 ND 244, ¶ 16; Deviley, 2011 ND 182, ¶ 13. In Franzen, we noted that the presence of a
masking odor is a relevant factor in our determination, specifically the presence of multiple air
fresheners and an aerosol can air freshener. Id. at ¶ 13. In Deviley, we also acknowledged that an officer's
suspicions could reasonably be "increased by the presence of [an] energy drink and [a] minimal
amount of luggage." Id. at ¶ 13. While completing the traffic stop,
Officer Edwards noticed that Adan and Tesfaye's vehicle contained a new air freshener, an
aerosol can air freshener, a GPS, eye drops, an empty bottle of an energy drink, and a lack of
luggage.[¶21] Officer Edwards testified that through his training
and experience he often sees scent eliminators, such as air fresheners, in his marijuana and drug
arrests. Officer Edwards explained that drugs, especially marijuana, give off a very strong odor.
Additionally, Officer Edwards thought the presence of the GPS was significant for two reasons:
first, because drug traffickers often go places they are unfamiliar with to obtain or drop off drugs;
and, second, the drive from Fargo to either Watford City or Williston is simple, one right turn off
of the interstate.[¶22] Officer Edwards also found the presence
of eye drops to be significant. Through his training and experience, Officer Edwards believed the
presence of eye drops to be an indicator of marijuana use. He testified that eye drops were found,
either on the individual or in the vehicle, in over half of his marijuana arrests. Officer Edwards
explained that eye drops help treat the redness of the eyes which usually occurs after using
marijuana. However, Officer Edwards also testified that there was nothing unusual about Adan's
appearance and that neither Adan nor Tesfaye appeared to be under the influence of any
drug.[¶23] Officer Edwards also testified that it was common for
him to see energy drinks and antacids in vehicles trafficking drugs, as the driver is trying to cover
considerable distance in one stint. But, as stated above, the vehicle contained only one energy
drink and no antacids.[¶24] Additionally, Officer Edwards noted
that he was unable to see any luggage which would typically be present on a multi-day road trip.
However, Officer Edwards could not see into the trunk, nor did he inquire into whether the trunk
contained luggage. Officer Edwards also did not observe any sort of drug paraphernalia in the
vehicle. Although he did testify that it was not unusual to not find drug paraphernalia as some
drug traffickers do not use the drugs they traffic.D. Criminal History
[¶25] Although by itself it is insufficient, a person's criminal
history can support a finding of reasonable suspicion. Fields, 2003 ND 81, ¶ 15 (citing United States v.
Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 542 (10th Cir. 1994)). During the traffic stop, Officer Edwards
determined that Tesfaye had a criminal history and had recently been placed on probation for a
methamphetamine charge.E. Rental Vehicle [¶26] Both Officers Edwards and Clark testified that there was some
significance in Tesfaye and Adan driving a rented vehicle. They testified that in their experience,
individuals who traffic drugs typically use a rental vehicle. Officers Edwards and Clark explained
that a rental vehicle is preferred by drug traffickers because, in the event that they are caught,
their personal vehicles would not be seized. Officer Edwards testified that the fact the vehicle
was a rental was "extremely relevant" in his training and experience with regard to drug
interdiction.[¶27] Tesfaye argues that this Court cannot use
innocent conduct, such as possession of eye drops, energy drinks, and driving a rental vehicle, in
its analysis of reasonable and articulable suspicion. We agree that such conduct is not inherently
suspicious. However, this Court does not view each fact in isolation; rather, we look at the
totality of the circumstances to determine if reasonable, articulable suspicion exists. Therefore,
considering the totality of the circumstances, including (1) Adan and Tesfaye both acting
nervous; (2) they told Officer Edwards conflicting stories about the trip; (3) Tesfaye did not
know the name of the passenger they dropped off; (4) the vehicle contained masking agents, a
GPS, eye drops, and an energy drink; (5) Tesfaye had recently been put on probation for
possession of methamphetamine; and (6) the vehicle was a rental, we conclude there was
reasonable and articulable suspicion that Adan and Tesfaye were engaged in criminal activity.
And thus, their continued detention until a K-9 unit arrived was lawful.IV.[¶28] We affirm the district court's judgments
and orders denying Adan and Tesfaye's motions to suppress.[¶29] Gerald W. VandeWalle,
C.J.Dale V. SandstromLisa Fair McEvers McEvers, Justice,
concurring specially.[¶30] I agree with, and have signed
with, the majority. I agree with the district court that each little item noted by law enforcement in
its own right would not be sufficient to form reasonable suspicion, but the amalgamation of the
items does.[¶31] I write separately to note the dissent attempts to
create a new rule of law, stating, without authority, that for the seizure to be constitutionally
acceptable, it could only be based on events that happened in Burleigh County. The dissent takes
umbrage with the majority and the district court relying on events in Stark County to "bolster the
conclusion that reasonable and articulable suspicion exists because the driver was 'nervous.'"
Dissent, at ¶ 42. The dissent carefully cherry picks the evidence to determine
which of the facts standing alone "add little or nothing to the calculus of whether reasonable
suspicion exists." Id. at ¶ 43. I believe the dissent incorrectly applies the law,
because what happened in Stark County, regardless of whether it is lawful activity or mundane
activity, is part of the totality of the circumstances the detaining officer relied on to determine
whether there was reasonable suspicion to extend the lawful traffic stop. Law enforcement is
allowed to consider the tips received from other police officers or other informants, along with
their own observations, when determining reasonable suspicion. State v. Kenner, 1997 ND 1, ¶ 11-13, 559 N.W.2d 538.[¶32] Looking at the entire event is required when looking at
the totality of the circumstances, as is the consideration that law enforcement officers may take
into account inferences that may elude a lay person. State v. Fields, 2003 ND 81, ¶ 13, 662 N.W.2d 242. What the dissent
fails to see is that sometimes the whole is more than the sum of its parts. Consider as an analogy
this itemized list: aluminum foil, coffee filters, a coffee bean grinder, a coffee pot, mason jars,
plastic soda bottles, plastic straws, duct tape, liquid Drano, lithium batteries, lantern fuel, iodine,
pseudoephedrine tablets, ephedrine tablets, and acetone. Each of these items individually are
legal to possess and most of them are common items in our homes. But adding them together
creates a meth lab. How many of these legal mundane items must law enforcement see, which
standing alone would mean nothing, before there is reasonable and articulable
suspicion?[¶33] Here, there is no question the traffic stop is
lawful. In regard to the additional detention, the district court made the following findings of fact
to support reasonable and articulable suspicion: traveling below the speed limit; car had
out-of-state license plates and was later determined to be a rental car; driver was stiff with hands
at the 10-2 position; after braking for a car entering the interstate, the driver stayed in the left lane
for an extended period; driver did not look at the officer as he passed; driver talking out of the
side of his mouth to a passenger who was reclined and appeared to be sleeping; driver appeared
to put something in the back seat as if to cover something up; driver did not turn off the blinker
when stopped; air freshener, a bottle of Ozone scent spray, a Bic lighter, and a bottle of eye drops
were on the floor of the car; GPS in the car; driver was shaking; Adan went to both the front seat
and the back seat when he returned to the car to get the rental agreement; no visible luggage;
Tesfaye had no identification; Tesfaye did not know the name of another passenger who had been
riding with them; Tesfaye was on probation for possession of methamphetamine; and Tesfaye
stated they dropped off the passenger in the Williston area instead of Watford City as stated by
Adan. Also found by the district court, the officers testified that based on their training and
experience a number of the items found in the car were suspicious to mask the odor of drugs, and
drug traffickers use GPS and tend to use rental cars to avoid potential seizure of their personal
vehicle.[¶34] In addition to those facts found specifically by the
district court, the majority opinion points out several additional factors as testified by law
enforcement: Evasive behavior by Tesfaye; not looking the officer in the eye; and Adan was
quivering, shaking, constantly licking his lips, and touching his face. In the officer's training and
experience, this showed nervous behavior.[¶35] While I agree
that many of the findings standing alone may mean very little, when the totality of the
circumstances is considered, there was reasonable suspicion to detain the
defendants.[¶36] Most concerning to me is the dissent's assertion
that the defendants were detained based on their race. Adan and Tesfaye did not raise race as an
issue in their motions to suppress. This assertion is not supported by the evidence presented to
the district court. The officer was specifically asked in cross-examination whether the fact that
the driver was African American was part of his suspicion, and the answer was "No." It is for the
district court to weigh the evidence and make credibility determinations. State v. Rufus, 2015 ND 212, ¶ 7, 868 N.W.2d 534. The district court
made no finding that the officer's testimony was not credible. The dissent raises an issue not
presented to the district court, and, without hearing the officer testify goes further by weighing
the credibility of the officer's testimony. The dissent, in saying the appellants were the subjects
by "driving while black" accuses, law enforcement of racial profiling, and implies the district
court is not bright enough to see it. Seems like a mere hunch. Such an ungrounded assertion is
uncalled for and undermines the public's trust, not only in law enforcement, but in the judicial
system.[¶37] Lisa Fair
McEvers  Crothers, Justice,
concurring specially.[¶38] I reluctantly concur in the result
because our precedent, and post Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015),
judicial decisions elsewhere, require that I do so. See State v. Deviley, 2011 ND 182, 803 N.W.2d 561; United States v. Woods, 829 F.3d 675, 680 (8th Cir. 2016) (reasonable suspicion
justified extending of a traffic stop for 40 minutes until arrival of drug dog); United States v.
Walton, 827 F.3d 682, 689 (7th Cir. 2016) (reasonable suspicion justified detaining two
occupants for 22 minutes to perform a dog sniff); United States v. Davis, 620 Fed.Appx.
295, 300 (5th Cir. 2015) (reasonable suspicion supported extending traffic stop for a canine unit
located 30 miles away to arrive 51 minutes after the initial stop).[¶39] Regarding reasonable articulable suspicion to extend the traffic stop, I
agree with the dissent that out of state license plates, a rental car, a GPS device, no visible
luggage, an air freshener, one energy drink container and eye drops provide little to no evidence
of criminal activity. Kapsner dissent, ¶
58. Standing alone, grounding suspicion of criminality on possession of these common
things simply exposes too many people to prolonged detention to be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. I also have come to agree with Justice Kapsner's warning in Deviley that we must be cautious of reasonable
articulable suspicion built on "officer training and experience." Deviley, 2011 ND 182, ¶ 27, 803 N.W.2d 561 (J. Kapsner,
dissenting). ("However, the phrase 'officer's training and experience' should not be used to mask
what was operating in this case--the officer simply had a strong hunch that these individuals,
driving a vehicle with an out-of-state license, were engaged in criminal activity. We have to be
mindful not to let 'officer's training and experience' become a substitute for a showing of a true
reasonable and articulable suspicion that a person is engaged in criminal
activity.")[¶40] However, as the majority and Justice McEvers
correctly point out, courts do not look at isolated facts in determining whether an officer
possessed reasonable articulable suspicion. In Fields, this Court
explained:"Whether the facts support a reasonable and articulable
suspicion is a question of law, fully reviewable on appeal. This Court considers the totality of the
circumstances when deciding whether reasonable suspicion exists. Although we have recognized
that the concept of reasonable suspicion is not readily reduced to a neat set of legal rules, it does
require more than a 'mere hunch.' To determine whether reasonable suspicion exists, we apply an
objective standard, taking into account the inferences and deductions that an investigating officer
would make that may elude a layperson. The question is whether a reasonable person in the
officer's position would be justified by some objective manifestation to suspect the defendant
was, or was about to be, engaged in unlawful activity." State v. Fields, 2003 ND 81, ¶ 13, 662 N.W.2d 242 (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).[¶41] Here, the driver and
passenger ostensibly disagreed on their destination. Tesfaye had no identification, did not know
the name of the passenger they dropped off in North Dakota and was on probation for possession
of methamphetamine. The district court apparently found credibility in the officers' testimony
that, based on training and experience, Adan showed unusual nervousness by quivering, shaking,
constantly licking his lips and touching his face. These facts, considered together with the
otherwise innocent conduct and items, provided reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal
activity allowing the defendants to be detained beyond completion of the traffic
stop.[¶42] Whether reasonable articulable suspicion exists to
prolong defendants' detention is only part of the question, however. The remaining inquiry is
whether the duration of the post-traffic offense detention was reasonable.[¶43] I am troubled by the defendants' 45 minute roadside detention while
awaiting arrival of a drug-sniffing dog, especially given the thin suspicion to detain. However,
neither party has argued the length of permissible detention is regulated by the depth of suspicion
and, other than my own calculus from which I have been unable to craft a rule of law, I have
found no case advancing the notion. Therefore, once reasonable articulable suspicion exists,
focus must remain on the length of detention alone.[¶44] "An
officer . . . may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop. But . . .
he may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily
demanded to justify detaining an individual." Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct.  at 1615. Upon
completion of a traffic stop, the continued detention of automobile occupants is a Terry
stop requiring its own reasonable articulable suspicion. The Terry stop has
limits:"The predicate permitting seizures on suspicion short of probable
cause is that law enforcement interests warrant a limited intrusion on the personal security of the
suspect. The scope of the intrusion permitted will vary to some extent with the particular facts
and circumstances of each case. This much, however, is clear: an investigative detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly, the
investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to
verify or dispel the officer's suspicion in a short period of time. It is the State's burden to
demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was
sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative
seizure." Florida v. Royer, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325-26 (1983) (internal
citations omitted).[¶45] At some point, the duration of a driver's
detention awaiting arrival of a drug dog will violate the Fourth Amendment. See Wayne
R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise of the Fourth Amendment, 4 Search and Seizure
§ 9.2(f), n. 234 (5th ed. 2016). ("The Supreme Court has recognized a 'liberty interest in
proceeding with [an] itinerary,' United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 77 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1983), and thus the length of a detention is more likely to pass muster if 'the
detention did not interfere with defendant's travel plans.' United States v. Tavolacci, 895 F.2d 1423 (D.C. Cir. 1990)." Where that point lies is unclear. Post-Rodriguez judicial
decisions suggest a 45 minute seizure while waiting for a drug dog is permissible. But I am
skeptical whether that length of detention would be tolerated for other Terry stop
situations, and if it was an issue before the court I would question whether the duration of seizure
is permissible for travelers on the interstate highway system.[¶46] Daniel J. Crothers
Kapsner, Justice, dissenting.[¶47] If this stop and later seizure were to be constitutionally acceptable, it
would have to be solely on the basis of what happened in Burleigh County and not with any
reference to what happened in Stark County. What was observed in Stark County added no
objective basis for the eventual detention and search. In Stark County, two men were seen in a
car with out-of-state plates. The car was going slightly under the speed limit. The driver had his
hands at "ten and two" and did not look at the officer driving beside him. The driver appeared to
talk out of the side of his mouth to a passenger whose posture would indicate he was sleeping
and the driver reached into the back seat. These mundane observations add very little to the
calculus of a finding of reasonable suspicion. What the majority opinion does not mention is that
the two men in the car with out-of-state license plates are black. In my opinion, the appellants
were the subjects of a blatant case of "driving while black."[¶48]
Tesfaye and Adan may or may not have come to the attention of law enforcement in Burleigh
County for speeding, but the fact is Officer Clark in Stark County directed another officer in
another county to be on the lookout for the car on the basis of information that Officer Clark
acknowledged gave him no reason to stop the car. It is also worth noting Officer Clark had to
turn his vehicle around after spotting the appellants traveling in the opposite direction. He
followed the vehicle for roughly seven miles before deciding to disengage.[¶49] At the suppression hearing, Officer Clark was asked by defense counsel on
cross-examination:Q. Could you see the driver and his features?A. I
saw a male driver. Yes.Q. Did you take any notice of his skin color?A. I observed he was
African American. Yes.Q. Did that play into your suspicion?A. No.
Officer Clark testified the fact the men appeared to be African-American "played no role" in his
decision to tell another officer in another county "if you could try and keep an eye out for the
vehicle and if you can get a stop on it, see what's going on." Officer Clark could not remember if
he had relayed the racial information to Officer Edwards. Officer Edwards observed the car in
Morton County, had to turn around, and ultimately stopped the car in Burleigh County for
following too close and traveling 65 miles per hour in a 60-mile-per-hour zone.[¶50] Even if the directed stop was a total pretext, there is no license to drive
five miles over the speed limit, so the stop for speeding was valid. Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996). Officer Edwards issued a warning to Adan, which
completed the purpose of the stop.[¶51] Reasonable and
articulable suspicion was necessary to justify the continued seizure of the two men.
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614-15 (2015); State v. Fields, 2003 ND 81, ¶ 10, 662 N.W.2d 242. I dissent from the
majority's holding that reasonable and articulable suspicion justified holding the two men for
forty-five minutes to bring a drug dog to the scene. "[A] dog sniff is not fairly characterized as
part of the officer's traffic mission." Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct.  at 1615.[¶52] Both the district court and the majority rely on events in Stark County to
bolster the conclusion that reasonable and articulable suspicion exists because the driver was
"nervous." Aside from the fact he was African-American and the car had out-of-state license
plates, this assumption is made from the fact that he was driving in Stark County within the
speed limit, with his hands on "ten and two," did not look at the officer driving beside him, and
possibly placed something in the back seat. These facts do not tend to lead to a conclusion a
crime was being or about to be committed, regardless of any level of "training or experience."
What suggestion of criminal activity does this articulate? The officer and the majority rely on
"nervousness" but being nervous is not criminal and unless this Court is going to reverse Fields, 2003 ND 81, ¶ 19, 662 N.W.2d 242, it is not
sufficient.[¶53] The fact Adan was in a vehicle with an
out-of-state license plate should add little or nothing to the calculus of whether reasonable
suspicion exists. "It is wholly improper to assume that an individual is more likely to be engaged
in criminal conduct because of his state of residence[.]" Vasquez v. Lewis, 834 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th Cir. 2016). I agree with the Tenth Circuit that "it is time to abandon the
pretense that state citizenship is a permissible basis upon which to justify the detention and
search of out-of-state motorists[.]" Id. "Absent a demonstrated extraordinary
circumstance, the continued use of state residency as a justification for the fact of or continuation
of a stop is impermissible." Id. In this case, the stop was over as soon as the warning
was given to Adan.[¶54] Officer Edwards articulates his reasons
for finding the driver suspicious in a manner that suggests he is rejecting common sense reasons
for his observations in favor of finding them suspicious. According to Officer Edwards, a man
without a coat who has walked through 30-degree windy weather does not shiver because he is
cold:Besides the quivering shoulders, I didn't see any quivering of, like,
the mouth. When you get cold, your teeth chatter. I didn't see quivering of any other area except
just the shoulders, where it could be nerve induced, I guess.[¶55] Officer Edwards finds the driver's and passenger's stories inconsistent. The
driver said he dropped another passenger off "in Watford City," the passenger said "in the
Williston area," not, as the majority says, "in Williston."[¶56]
The reason for finding the presence of a GPS suspicious borders on ridiculous. GPS devices have
become so ubiquitous in today's technological society that the presence of a GPS unit in a vehicle
traveling on an interstate highway should not be surprising, much less suspicious. Officer
Edwards carefully explained that drug traffickers "are doing cross country travel where they don't
know where they're going." Adan and Tesfaye's trip was from St. Cloud, Minnesota, to Watford
City.So from Fargo to Watford City, which would consist of, typically,
traveling along I-94 and taking one right-hand turn on Highway 85.Q. So it's just a simple
trip with one turn is something you typically wouldn't need a GPS for?A.
Correct. Apparently North Dakotans and those who travel here have no need
of technology to find locations within the state, or, we are suspicious if we use it. If that is the
case, every driver with a "smart phone" is suspicious.[¶57]
Officer Edwards found it suspicious that the two men were traveling across two states, but he did
not see luggage in the car. He acknowledged he did not ask them if they had luggage or look in
the trunk before reaching this conclusion. Officer Edwards also noted Officer Clark made him
aware that Adan and his passenger were driving a rental car. There is nothing inherently
suspicious in an individual's use of a rental car. See, e.g., United States v. Beck,
140 F.3d 1129, 1137 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding there was nothing inherently suspicious about the
defendant's use of a rental car); United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 947 (10th Cir.
1997) (finding the defendant's use of a rental car was not inherently suspicious).[¶58] Officer Edwards found the presence of an air freshener, an Ozone spray,
and a cigarette lighter suspicious. We have said the presence of odor maskers can contribute to
reasonable and articulable suspicion. State v.
Franzen, 2010 ND 244, ¶ 16,
792 N.W.2d 533. However, Officer Edwards testified neither Adan or his passenger seemed
under the influence or exhibiting strange behavior; Officer Edwards did not detect any odor of
marijuana; Adan stopped appropriately when pulled over, although he left his turn signal on;
Adan had no trouble locating his driver's license; Office Edwards saw nothing that indicated drug
paraphernalia; he saw no signs that Adan had ingested drugs; he saw no indicators of any driving
impairment; Adan did not appear to be intoxicated; there was nothing unusual about Adan's eye
color; Adan was "very decent to talk to. Upbeat, almost talkative. Very cooperative" until he was
told he was being detained to bring a drug dog.[¶59] While
reasonable suspicion is something determined under the totality of the circumstances, such a
finding should not be created based upon piling up of innocuous facts. It is "impossible for a
combination of wholly innocent factors to combine into a suspicious conglomeration unless there
are concrete reasons for such an interpretation." Beck, 140 F.3d   at 1137. The concrete
reasons in this case go no further than simply claiming each innocuous fact is suspicious in
connection with the officers' "training and experience."[¶60]
Officer Edwards issued a warning about fifteen minutes after he stopped Adan. At that point the
purpose of the stop was complete. Officer Edwards decided to detain Adan and call for a drug
dog when Adan declined his request to search the car. At that time, Officer Edwards had nothing
more than a hunch, which proved to be a good hunch, there were drugs in the car. "[A] search is
not to be made legal by what it turns up. In law it is good or bad when it starts and does not
change character from its success." United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).
"[A] mere hunch does not create reasonable suspicion[.]" Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014). As the majority notes, "[t]he question is whether a reasonable person in
the officer's position would be justified by some objective manifestation to suspect the defendant
was, or was about to be, engaged in unlawful activity." State v. Kenner, 1997 ND 1, ¶ 8, 559 N.W.2d 538.[¶61] While there were odor maskers present in this case like in Franzen, based on Officer Edwards' description
of Adan's demeanor and behavior, there was no "extreme and persistent nervousness" or evidence
of a drug culture to support a finding of reasonable suspicion. 2010 ND 244, ¶ 14, 792 N.W.2d 533. In this case, the
arresting officer tried to rely on the absence of illegal activity, even law-abiding activity, to
suggest that reasonable and articulable suspicion existed. This driver was sought out initially by
Officer Edwards for law-abiding driving in Stark County. He found it suspicious to have a GPS
for a "simple trip with one turn." Officer Edwards was asked whether his "training and
experience" would suggest drug traffickers are not under the influence when they are arrested.
His answer was that "videos" indicate people who are transporting are not under the influence.
This suggests that it is equally suspicious to appear and not to appear to be under the influence of
a substance.[¶62] Whether reasonable and articulable suspicion
exists is a question of law and fully reviewable on appeal. Fields, 2003 ND 81, ¶ 6, 662 N.W.2d 242. It must be
determined under the totality of the circumstances. Navarette, 134 S. Ct., at 1687. The
courts are gatekeepers to this decision. "[A] traffic stop 'can become unlawful if it is prolonged
beyond the time reasonably required to complete [the] mission' of issuing a warning ticket."
Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct.  at 1614-15 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,
407 (2005)). What is articulated by an arresting officer must be reasonable and must pass a
credulity test. If it does not, a completed valid stop cannot be extended in the hopes of drug
interdiction. Rodriguez, at 1614-15. What Officer Edwards articulated passes neither
test. I would reverse and allow Adan and Tesfaye to withdraw their guilty pleas.[¶63] Carol
Ronning Kapsner