Case Title: State ex rel. Stiles v. School Emp. Retirement Sys.

Citation: 2004-Ohio-2140

Docket Number: 20031661

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-05-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Stiles v. School Emp. Retirement Sys., 102 Ohio St.3d 156, 2004-Ohio-2140.] 
 
 
[THE STATE EX REL.] STILES, APPELLANT, v. SCHOOL EMPLOYEES 
RETIREMENT SYSTEM, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Stiles v. School Emp. Retirement Sys., 102 Ohio St.3d 156, 
2004-Ohio-2140.] 
Workers’ compensation — School bus driver’s seat collapses while she is 
driving — Application for disability retirement benefits denied by School 
Employees Retirement System — SERS’s decision denying disability 
retirement 
benefits 
neither 
unreasonable, 
nor 
arbitrary, 
nor 
unconscionable, when. 
(No. 2003-1661 — Submitted March 15, 2004 — Decided May 12, 2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 02AP-1333, 2003-
Ohio-4137. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
Appellant, Mildred Stiles, was employed as a bus driver for 
Nordonia Hills City Schools. On March 1, 1999, Stiles was injured when the 
driver’s seat of her bus collapsed while she was driving.  Stiles has not worked 
since that date. 
{¶2} 
On August 20, 1999, Stiles had back surgery, i.e., a 
microlaminectomy and discectomy.  In January 2001, Stiles had another 
laminectomy and also had a dorsal-column stimulator surgically implanted to 
alleviate her back pain.  Subsequently, the stimulator was removed after the area 
around it became infected. 
{¶3} 
In June 2001, Stiles applied to appellee, School Employees 
Retirement System (“SERS”), for disability retirement benefits.  Stiles also 
submitted a report from her treating physician, James P. Bressi, D.O.  Dr. Bressi 
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diagnosed Stiles as having a displaced lumbar disk and chronic cervical, lumbar, 
and sacral sprain. Dr. Bressi concluded that Stiles would remain physically 
incapacitated for at least the next 12 months and was unable to perform her 
previous duties as a bus driver. 
{¶4} 
Upon SERS’s request, Nancy M. Vaughan, M.D., examined Stiles.  
Dr. Vaughan conducted a physical examination of Stiles and reviewed her 
medical records and job description.  Dr. Vaughan concluded that Stiles had pain 
that was disproportionate to objective physical findings and that her condition 
would improve in six to nine months with physical therapy, a flexibility program 
including aquatic therapy, myofascial release, ultrasound therapy, range-of-
motion exercises, nonsteroidal medication, a tricyclic antidepressant to improve 
sleep, and a weight-loss program.  In Dr. Vaughan’s opinion, Stiles was not 
permanently disabled from being able to carry out her duties as a school bus 
driver. 
{¶5} 
SERS then notified Stiles and Dr. Bressi that it would delay 
processing her disability-retirement application until she received the additional 
treatment recommended by Dr. Vaughan. 
{¶6} 
Thereafter, Stiles submitted additional reports by a physician and a 
psychologist diagnosing Stiles as being disabled due to depression.  SERS had 
psychiatrist Jeffery C. Hutzler, M.D., examine Stiles.  Dr. Hutzler diagnosed 
Stiles as having generalized anxiety disorder and concluded that Stiles was “not 
incapacitated in her ability to drive a bus from a psychiatric standpoint in any 
way.” 
{¶7} 
In December 2001, Stiles advised SERS that she was declining to 
follow Dr. Vaughan’s recommended treatment, based on Dr. Bressi’s conclusion 
that Dr. Vaughan’s suggested treatment would not improve her condition. 
{¶8} 
Thereafter, the medical advisory committee reviewed the 
application and evidence and concluded that Stiles was not permanently disabled 
January Term, 2004 
3 
from performing her duties as a school bus driver.  On April 18, 2002, SERS 
adopted the committee’s recommendation and denied Stiles’s application for 
disability retirement benefits. 
{¶9} 
Stiles appealed from the denial of her application and submitted 
additional evidence.  The medical advisory committee recommended that the 
appeal be denied.  On September 13, 2002, SERS upheld its original decision 
denying Stiles’s application. 
{¶10} On November 29, 2002, Stiles filed a complaint for a writ of 
mandamus and a declaratory judgment to compel SERS to vacate its denial and 
grant her application for disability retirement benefits.  SERS filed an answer, and 
the parties submitted evidence and briefs. 
{¶11} On August 5, 2003, the court of appeals refused to issue a writ.  
The court of appeals rejected Stiles’s claim that SERS abused its discretion by not 
conducting a vocational analysis to determine whether she could perform her 
former job as a bus driver. 
{¶12} This cause is now before the court upon Stiles’s appeal as of right. 
{¶13} “The Public School Employees Retirement System was established 
for the purpose of providing retirement allowances and other benefits to public 
school employees other than teachers.”  State ex rel. McMaster v. School Emp. 
Retirement Sys. (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 130, 133, 630 N.E.2d 701, citing 1 Baker & 
Carey, Ohio School Law (1993) 399, Section 8.25.  Under R.C. 3309.39(C), in 
order to be entitled to disability retirement benefits, a SERS member must be 
mentally or physically incapacitated for the performance of the member’s last 
assigned primary duty by a disability condition that is either permanent or 
presumed to be permanent for at least the 12 months following the filing of the 
application for benefits.  Because there is no provision for appealing a final SERS 
decision, mandamus is available to correct any abuse of discretion by SERS.  
McMaster, 69 Ohio St.3d at 133, 630 N.E.2d 701.  An abuse of discretion occurs 
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when a decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.  State ex rel. Van 
Dyke v. Pub. Emp. Retirement Bd., 99 Ohio St.3d 430, 2003-Ohio-4123, 793 
N.E.2d 438, ¶ 21. 
Vocational Evaluation 
{¶14} Stiles asserts that SERS abused its discretion by not including a 
vocational analysis in its disability retirement determination and by assuming that 
medical doctors have sufficient vocational expertise to render an opinion 
concerning a claimant’s ability to perform her last job.  Stiles’s assertion is 
meritless. 
{¶15} As the court of appeals correctly concluded, “[n]othing in the 
applicable statutes, regulations or case law requires that SERS [obtain a report 
from a vocational expert].”  “It is axiomatic that in mandamus proceedings, the 
creation of the legal duty that a relator seeks to enforce is the distinct function of 
the legislative branch of government, and courts are not authorized to create the 
legal duty enforceable in mandamus.”  (Emphasis sic.)  State ex rel. Pipoly v. 
State Teachers Retirement Sys., 95 Ohio St.3d 327, 2002-Ohio-2219, 767 N.E.2d 
719, ¶ 18.  R.C. 3309.39 to 3309.41 and Ohio Adm.Code 3309-1-40 do not 
impose any duty on SERS to obtain a vocational analysis from a nonmedical 
expert. 
{¶16} Moreover, R.C. 3309.39(C) expressly authorizes physicians to 
make the pertinent determination: 
{¶17} “Medical examination of a member who has applied for a 
disability benefit shall be conducted by a competent disinterested physician or 
physicians selected by the retirement board to determine whether the member is 
mentally or physically incapacitated for the performance of the member’s last 
assigned primary duty as an employee * * *.” 
{¶18} Furthermore, unlike the Industrial Commission’s duty in 
determining permanent total disability, or the Social Security Administration’s 
January Term, 2004 
5 
duty in determining Social Security disability, the duty of SERS in determining 
disability retirement is more limited: 
{¶19} “In an SERS determination of disability retirement * * * the only 
question is whether the applicant can return to his former duties.  SERS need not 
determine the applicant’s residual medical capacity for other types of work, nor 
does it evaluate the applicant’s education, work history, existing skills, 
trainability, vocational efforts, age, etc., in regard to ability to do some other kind 
of work.  The entire issue before the SERS retirement board is whether the 
applicant is medically capable of returning to the former duties, which is merely 
the threshold stage of a PTD determination.”  (Emphasis sic.)  State ex rel. 
Schmidt v. School Emp. Retirement Sys., 150 Ohio App.3d 597, 2002-Ohio-6757, 
782 N.E.2d 654, ¶ 75; see, also, Barnhart v. Thomas (2003), __ U.S. __, 124 S.Ct. 
376, 379-380, 157 L.Ed.2d 333 (discussing the five-step evaluation used to 
determine Social Security disability). 
{¶20} Stiles’s reliance on Social Security disability regulations to support 
her assertion that a vocational analysis was required is misplaced.  As previously 
mentioned, a Social Security disability determination is different from an SERS 
disability retirement decision.  See, e.g., Conley v. Pitney Bowes (C.A.8, 1999), 
176 F.3d 1044, 1050 (the type of evaluation of employability that requires 
vocational experts “is the special creature of social security” and is not applicable 
to a different retirement benefits case); Douglas v. Gen. Dynamics Long Term 
Disability Plan (C.A.6, 2002), 43 Fed.Appx. 864.  And even in Social Security 
disability cases, the Social Security Commissioner need not use a vocational 
expert when determining whether a claimant is able to perform tasks necessary for 
gainful employment.  Key v. Callahan (C.A.6, 1997), 109 F.3d 270, 274. 
{¶21} Finally, the record contains sufficient evidence to support the 
SERS’s decision denying Stiles’s application for disability retirement benefits.  
The record includes the employer’s description of Stiles’s job duties as a bus 
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driver.  Dr. Vaughan, Dr. Hutzler, and the medical advisory committee all 
concluded that Stiles was not disabled for purposes of R.C. 3309.39.  Therefore, 
the SERS’s decision denying disability retirement benefits was neither 
unreasonable, arbitrary, nor unconscionable.  The court of appeals properly 
refused to issue a writ.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of 
appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Michael A. Malyuk Co., L.P.A., and Michael A. Malyuk, for appellant. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Judith T. Edwards, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee. 
__________________