Case Title: In re Jenkins

Citation: 50 Cal. 4th 1167

Docket Number: S175242

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2010-10-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
Filed 10/28/10  
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
In re HARVEY ZANE JENKINS, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
On Habeas Corpus. 
) 
 
 
) 
S175242 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 3 C059321 
 
) 
 
) 
Lassen County 
 
 
) 
Super. Ct. No. CHW2321 
 
____________________________________) 
 
A prison inmate‟s participation in a prison work program may favorably 
affect that inmate‟s custody level.  Such participation can cause the inmate to be 
considered a reduced security risk, which in turn may cause the inmate to be 
placed in a lower security level institution.  We must decide whether an inmate 
who is willing to work but, without his or her fault, is not assigned to a work 
program may receive the benefit of work participation for classification purposes.  
The applicable regulations say no; they provide that actual work participation, and 
not mere willingness to work, is required for an inmate to receive a lower security 
evaluation.  Petitioner contends the regulations are invalid.  In accordance with the 
deference courts generally give to prison authorities in promulgating regulations 
concerning prison security, we conclude the regulations are valid.  It is rational, 
and not arbitrary, to consider an inmate‟s actual work performance for purposes of 
classifying and housing that inmate. 
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I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
We take these facts, which are undisputed, largely from Justice Robie‟s 
opinion in the Court of Appeal. 
Petitioner Harvey Zane Jenkins is in the custody of the California 
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.  He was convicted in 1993 of 
second degree murder with personal use of a firearm and sentenced to state prison 
for 15 years to life plus three years.  (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 190, subd. (a), 12022.5, 
subd. (a).)  The record indicates that he became eligible for parole on April 29, 
2005. 
On December 21, 2005, petitioner was transferred from Centinela State 
Prison to High Desert State Prison.  He was not assigned to a work program at 
High Desert until January 12, 2006.  From January 12 to March 9, 2006, he was 
assigned as “Facility C housing porter.”  On March 9, he was transferred to 
another facility within High Desert, where he spent 172 days without a work 
assignment.  He was subsequently assigned to an educational program. 
California prison inmates are classified pursuant to a scoring system that 
determines their prison custody level.  (See pt. II, post.)  A higher score means the 
inmate is considered a higher security risk and would be assigned to a 
correspondingly higher security facility; a lower score means the inmate is 
considered a lower security risk and would be assigned to a correspondingly lower 
security facility.  After the initial classification, inmates receive an annual 
classification review.  Among the factors considered in this annual review is the 
inmate‟s participation in a work, school, or vocational program. 
On October 24, 2006, prison authorities conducted the annual review of 
petitioner‟s classification score, covering the period from October 1, 2005, 
through September 30, 2006.  Petitioner received a four-point reduction in his 
score for having no serious disciplinary actions and a two-point reduction (out of a 
3 
possible maximum of four points) for average or above average performance in a 
work, school, or vocational program.  As was later explained, he was denied the 
additional two performance points that were available because he “was unassigned 
to a program for roughly half of the total review period.” 
Petitioner pursued an internal administrative appeal.  He contended that 
because his transfer to High Desert was not adverse, he was entitled to the full 
four-point reduction for average or above average performance in a work, school, 
or vocational program.  His appeal was denied at all administrative levels.  On 
July 25, 2007, he filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Lassen 
County Superior Court.  Following In re Player (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 813 
(Player), the superior court determined that because petitioner‟s work-qualifying 
status was disrupted based on circumstances and department conduct beyond his 
control, he was entitled to additional favorable work points.  In an order signed 
and filed April 25, 2008, the court granted petitioner‟s petition and directed the 
department “to reduce [his] classification score by two points and to thereupon 
make whatever adjustments to [his] custody designation, program and institution 
placement as may appear.” 
The superior court served its order on the parties by mail on April 29, 2008.  
On June 27, 2008, the warden of High Desert, represented by the Attorney 
General, filed a notice of appeal.  Originally, the Court of Appeal dismissed the 
appeal as untimely because it was not filed within 60 days of the time the superior 
court signed and filed the order being appealed.  (Citing Cal. Rules of Court, rules 
8.308(a), 8.388.)  Later, the Court of Appeal granted the Attorney General‟s 
petition for rehearing, reinstated the appeal, and directed the parties to address in 
their briefs the issue of whether the appeal was timely.  In their briefs in the Court 
of Appeal, the Attorney General argued, and petitioner conceded, that the appeal 
4 
was timely because the notice of appeal was filed within 60 days of the date the 
court served its order on the parties by mail. 
The Court of Appeal agreed that the appeal was timely.  It summarized its 
reasoning:  “[U]nder [California Rules of Court,] rule 8.308(a), „a notice of appeal 
. . . must be filed within 60 days after the rendition of the judgment or the making 
of the order being appealed.‟  Where, as here, the order being appealed was not 
pronounced in open court, but instead was embodied solely in a writing that was 
prepared, signed, and filed outside the presence of the parties, we conclude „the 
making of the order‟ does not occur until the court undertakes to communicate the 
substance of its order to the parties in some reasonable manner.  That occurred 
here when the court mailed copies of the written order to the parties four days after 
the order was signed and filed.  Because the warden filed his notice of appeal 
within 60 days of the date of that mailing, the appeal is timely.” 
On the merits, the Court of Appeal reversed the superior court‟s grant of the 
habeas corpus petition.  It summarized its reasoning in this regard also:  “[W]e 
conclude the superior court erred in determining Jenkins was entitled to the 
additional two work/school performance points for the time he did not actually 
participate in any work, school, or vocational program.  A governing department 
regulation specifies that „[f]avorable points shall not be granted for average or 
above average performance for inmates who are not assigned to a program.‟  (Cal. 
Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3375.4, subd. (a)(3)(B).)  Because the department‟s 
interpretation and application of that regulation here to deny Jenkins the additional 
work/school performance points he sought was not arbitrary, capricious, or 
irrational, the department‟s decision must be upheld.” 
We granted petitioner‟s petition for review, which presented the following 
issue:  “Is the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation‟s denial of favorable 
classification points for work or school to a prisoner whose classification point-
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qualifying assignment was disrupted for a period due to a nonadverse transfer to 
another facility, arbitrary, capricious, and/or irrational in light of the award of 
work-time credits which reduced the prisoner‟s sentence for the same period of 
incarceration?” 
II.  DISCUSSION 
The Legislature has directed the Secretary of the Department of Corrections 
and Rehabilitation to “cause each person who is newly committed to a state prison 
to be examined and studied.”  (Pen. Code, § 5068.)1  “Upon the basis of the 
examination and study, the [secretary] shall classify prisoners . . . .”  (Pen. Code, 
§ 5068.)  The Legislature has provided no specific guidance regarding how 
prisoners should be classified but instead has authorized the secretary to “prescribe 
and amend rules and regulations for the administration of the prisons . . . .”  (Pen. 
Code, § 5058.)  By enacting these statutes, “[t]he Legislature has given the 
[secretary] broad authority for the discipline and classification of persons confined 
in state prisons.  [Citations.]  This authority includes the mandate to promulgate 
regulations governing administration, classification and discipline.”  (In re Lusero 
(1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 572, 575.) 
This case involves prisoner classification.  “To ensure uniform application 
of the classification process, the [secretary], pursuant to the authority vested in 
him under Penal Code section 5058, has promulgated regulations stating the 
                                              
1  
Formerly, the administrative head of the department (then the Department 
of Corrections) was called the Director of Corrections.  In 2005, the Legislature 
abolished the office of the Director of Corrections and replaced it with the 
secretary.  (Pen. Code, §§  5050, 5054.)  Some Penal Code provisions still use the 
term “Director of Corrections,” but any such reference now “refers to the 
Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.”  (Pen. Code, 
§ 5050.)  Accordingly, we will change all references to the “director” to refer to 
the secretary. 
6 
factors to be considered by the correctional officer responsible for determining an 
inmate‟s security classification.”  (In re Richards (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 93, 97, 
fn. omitted; see Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3375 et seq.)2  These regulations 
provide that “[t]he classification of felon inmates shall include the classification 
score system as established.  A lower placement score indicates lesser security 
control needs and a higher placement score indicates greater security control 
needs.”  (§ 3375, subd. (d).)  “Prisoner classification scores play a significant role 
in determining where, within the state‟s many prison facilities, a prisoner will be 
sent to serve his/her term of incarceration.  (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, 
§ 3375.1.)  As a general rule, a prisoner‟s classification score is directly 
proportional to the level of security needed to house the inmate.  For example, 
prisoners with high classification scores will be sent to the prisons with higher 
levels of security.  (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§  3375.1 & 3377.)”  (In re 
Richards, supra, at p. 95, fn. 1.) 
After the initial classification under Penal Code section 5068, each inmate‟s 
classification score is reviewed at least annually.  (§ 3376, subd. (d)(2)(A).)  The 
Court of Appeal explained the regulatory scheme relevant here:  “ „For an annual 
reclassification review, two six-month periods may be counted.  When an inmate‟s 
status is interrupted during the period without inmate fault, the period shall be 
considered continuous.‟  ([§ 3375.4, subd. (a).])  Under California Code of 
Regulations, title 15, section 3375.4, subdivision (a)(2), an inmate is entitled to 
two favorable points (that is, points that are subtracted from the classification 
score) „[f]or each six-month period since the last review with no serious 
disciplinary(s).‟  Under California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 3375.4, 
                                              
2  
All further undesignated section references are to title 15 of the California 
Code of Regulations. 
7 
subdivision (a)(3), an inmate is also entitled to two favorable points „[f]or each 
six-month period with an average or above performance in [a] work, school or 
vocational program.‟ ”  This latter provision is qualified by section 3375.4, 
subdivision (a)(3)(B) — the regulation primarily at issue here — which provides:  
“Favorable points shall not be granted for average or above average performance 
for inmates who are not assigned to a program.” 
Petitioner received two favorable points for performance in a work, school 
or vocational program (hereafter, work program or program), but he did not 
receive the maximum of four points available because he was unassigned to a 
program for about half the relevant time period.  In his briefs, he argues that 
because he was willing to work, and unassigned through no fault of his own, he 
was entitled to the maximum point reduction available.3  The parties agree that he 
was unassigned through no fault of his own.  Thus, the issue is squarely presented:  
Must the inmate actually participate in a work program to receive classification 
credit for such participation?  Or, conversely, is it sufficient if the inmate is willing 
to work and is unassigned through no fault of the inmate?  Section 3375.4, 
subdivision (a)(3)(B), quoted in the previous paragraph, unambiguously answers 
the former question in the affirmative and the latter in the negative.  Petitioner 
contends, however, that the regulation is invalid on various grounds. 
He argues the regulation violates his right to due process of law under both 
the United States and the California Constitutions.  We disagree.  Courts 
necessarily review decisions and regulations regarding prison classification 
deferentially.  Classification of inmates, which determines the level of security 
                                              
3  
At oral argument, petitioner made various additional arguments that are not 
within the scope of review.  We do not consider those arguments.  (Cal. Rules of 
Court, rule 8.516(b).) 
8 
necessary for each inmate, obviously implicates institutional security.  “[C]entral 
to all other corrections goals is the institutional consideration of internal security 
within the corrections facilities themselves.”  (Pell v. Procunier (1974) 417 U.S. 
817, 823.)  The high court has explained that “the problems that arise in the day-
to-day operation of a corrections facility are not susceptible of easy solutions.  
Prison administrators therefore should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the 
adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed 
to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.  
[Citations.]  „Such considerations are peculiarly within the province and 
professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the absence of substantial 
evidence in the record to indicate that the officials have exaggerated their response 
to these considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in 
such matters.‟  [Citation.]  We further observe that, on occasion, prison 
administrators may be „experts‟ only by Act of Congress or of a state legislature.  
But judicial deference is accorded not merely because the administrator ordinarily 
will, as a matter of fact in a particular case, have a better grasp of his domain than 
the reviewing judge, but also because the operation of our correctional facilities is 
peculiarly the province of the Legislative and Executive Branches of our 
Government, not the Judicial.”  (Bell v. Wolfish (1979) 441 U.S. 520, 547-548, 
fns. omitted.) 
In a later decision, the high court returned to this theme:  “Running a prison 
is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the 
commitment of resources, all of which are particularly within the province of the 
legislative and executive branches of government.  Prison administration is, 
moreover, a task that has been committed to the responsibility of those branches, 
and separation of powers concerns counsel a policy of judicial restraint.”  (Turner 
v. Safley (1987) 482 U.S. 78, 84-85; see also Overton v. Bazetta (2003) 539 U.S. 
9 
126, 132 [“We must accord substantial deference to the professional judgment of 
prison administrators, who bear a significant responsibility for defining the 
legitimate goals of a corrections system and for determining the most appropriate 
means to accomplish them.”].) 
Often citing the high court decisions, California cases have also stressed the 
need for courts to defer to prison authorities in running the prison system.  (Woods 
v. Horton (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 658, 673; In re Zepeda (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 
1493, 1498; In re Farley (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1361-1362; Small v. 
Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1013-1014; In re Lusero, supra, 4 
Cal.App.4th at p. 575; In re Wilson (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 661, 666-667.)  “This 
deference, which extends to classification decisions [citation], limits judicial 
intervention to demonstrated instances of actions by prison officials that are 
arbitrary, capricious, irrational, or an abuse of the discretion granted those given 
the responsibility for operating prisons.”  (In re Wilson, supra, at p. 667; see also 
In re Farley, supra, at p. 1361.) 
Petitioner cites another test that has been applied in this context but that 
appears to have little relevance here.  The United States Supreme Court has held 
that the denial of good time credits which can reduce the period of incarceration 
“does not comport with „the minimum requirements of procedural due process,‟ 
[citation], unless the findings of the prison disciplinary board are supported by 
some evidence in the record.”  (Superintendent v. Hill (1985) 472 U.S. 445, 454, 
italics added.)  Although the high court has also held that prison inmates have no 
federal due process right to any particular prison classification (Moody v. Daggett 
(1976) 429 U.S. 78, 88, fn. 9; Meachum v. Fano (1976) 427 U.S. 215, 224-225), 
California courts have applied the “some evidence” test to adverse classification 
10 
actions.  (In re Farley, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 1362; In re Wilson, supra, 202 
Cal.App.3d at pp. 666-667.)4  Here, however, the relevant facts are undisputed.  
Section 3375.4, subdivision (a)(3)(B), provides that inmates who are not assigned 
to a program shall be not granted favorable performance points.  Petitioner does 
not deny that he was unassigned for approximately half of the review period.  The 
only dispute is the legal significance of this fact.  Accordingly, if section 3375.4, 
subdivision (a)(3)(B), is valid — a legal issue that is disputed — then clearly some 
evidence supports the finding that petitioner is not entitled to the favorable score at 
issue here. 
Accordingly, in determining whether section 3375.4, subdivision (a)(3)(B), 
comports with due process requirements under either the United States or 
California Constitution we ask whether it is arbitrary, capricious, or irrational.  
Applying this test, we conclude the regulation is valid.  In assessing the level of 
security an inmate needs, it is rational for the department to consider as one factor 
participation in a work program.  Petitioner does not seem to argue otherwise.  But 
petitioner contends that prison authorities may not distinguish between (1) inmates 
who are willing to work but are unassigned through no fault of their own and (2) 
inmates who actually work.  We agree with the Court of Appeal in rejecting this 
argument:  “The department could have rationally determined that an inmate who 
                                              
4  
Petitioner argues that the “some evidence” test applies to the superior 
court‟s ruling granting the petition for writ of habeas corpus rather than the 
department‟s action.  On the contrary, the test applies to the department‟s actions, 
not the superior court‟s.  As the Farley court explained, “A court must uphold the 
classification action if it is supported by „ “some” ‟ evidence.”  (In re Farley, 
supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 1362, italics added.)  The italicized word “it” clearly 
refers to the classification action, not a later court action either upholding or 
setting aside the classification action.  (See also Superintendent v. Hill, supra, 472 
U.S. at p. 454; In re Zepeda, supra, 141 Cal.App.4th at p. 1498.)  Courts give the 
deference to prison authorities, not reviewing courts to trial courts. 
11 
performs at average or above average level in a work, school, or vocational 
program requires less security than an inmate who performs below average or who 
has not demonstrated any performance in such a program.  Thus, there is a rational 
basis for the department‟s regulation that denies work/school performance points 
to inmates who are not assigned to a program, regardless of whether the lack of an 
assignment is attributable to the inmate or to the department.”  It is rational to 
require the inmate to be assigned to a work program and to perform satisfactorily 
in that program.  Otherwise, prison officials could not meaningfully assess that 
inmate‟s security risk for purposes of classifying and housing the inmate in the 
system. 
In his petition for writ of habeas corpus and its order granting relief, 
petitioner and the superior court relied on Player, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th 813.  
Player‟s facts were complex, but the Player court ultimately held that the inmate 
in that case was entitled to classification points for work participation during a 
time period in which he was not assigned to a program.  As relevant to the issue on 
review, the Court of Appeal in Player analogized classification decisions to 
statutory and regulatory provisions concerning work credits that inmates may 
receive towards their release date from prison.  To understand this portion of 
Player, we must briefly discuss prison release work credits. 
“Penal Code section 2933 offers state prisoners who participate in 
qualifying work, training and educational programs the privilege of earning 
„worktime credit‟ (id., subd. (a)) against their sentences.”  (In re Reeves (2005) 35 
Cal.4th 765, 768, fn. omitted.)5  In some circumstances, inmates may receive such 
                                              
5  
Penal Code section 2933 has been amended occasionally over the years, 
and the precise rules regarding who may receive credit, and how much, have 
 
(footnote continued on next page) 
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worktime credit even for time when they do not actually work.  (See In re Carter 
(1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 271; In re Reina (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 638.)  The prison 
regulations reflect this circumstance.  They provide that qualifying inmates may, 
under certain circumstances, receive worktime credits, called “ „S‟ time,” for time 
periods in which they are not actually working.  (§ 3045.3.) 
The Player court considered “S” time and classification decisions to be 
linked and concluded that if an inmate receives “S” time credit for a certain time 
period, that inmate is also entitled to favorable classification points for working 
during that time period even if the inmate did not actually work.  (Player, supra, 
146 Cal.App.4th at pp. 827-829.)  The superior court relied on this conclusion in 
finding that petitioner was entitled to “S” time credit and, accordingly, also 
favorable classification credit. 
The problem with this rationale is that worktime credit and classification 
decisions, although somewhat analogous, are not linked, at least not by statute or 
regulation.  Worktime credits are governed by Penal Code section 2933, which 
limits the discretion of prison authorities.  Classification is governed by Penal 
Code section 5068, which leaves much to the discretion of prison authorities.  
Similarly, the regulations governing classification are distinct from those 
governing worktime credits, including  “S” time.  Although the regulations 
governing worktime credits do grant such credits for some time periods in which 
an inmate is not working, the regulations governing classification scores 
specifically provide that “[f]avorable points shall not be granted for average or 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
(footnote continued from previous page) 
 
varied.  Because this case involves classification rather than worktime credit, we 
need not go into this matter further. 
13 
above average performance for inmates who are not assigned to a program.”  
(§ 3375.4, subd. (a)(3)(B).)  Accordingly, as the Court of Appeal here observed in 
disagreeing with Player, “in contrast to worktime credits, work/school 
performance points do depend on actual assignment to a qualifying program and 
do reward actual performance in such a program, namely, performance that is 
average or better.” 
The Player court quoted section 3375.4, subdivision (a)(3)(B), but it never 
directly confronted it.  It did not explain whether it found that the section is (1) 
ambiguous or inapplicable and, if so, why; or (2) invalid and, if so, why.  Instead, 
it simply said that “[e]ven though „S‟ time technically refers to excused work time 
for purposes of calculating credit off of a prisoner‟s sentence, we do not believe it 
is logical or fair to deny Player the favorable behavior points for each respective 
six-month period at issue in this case under this somewhat analogous situation 
where his credit-qualifying assignments were disrupted or changed due [to reasons 
not his fault].  To find otherwise would deprive Player of the favorable points he 
would have earned during those „continuous‟ periods if he had been left in the 
assignment status he was in before it was changed to unassigned by the actions of 
the [department].”  (Player, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 828, fn. omitted, italics 
added.)  But the fact that worktime credits and classification decisions are 
governed by entirely distinct statutes and regulations is not a mere technicality.  
Section 3375.4, subdivision (a)(3)(B), is unambiguous and, as we have explained, 
it does not violate due process.  It controls this case. 
Petitioner argues that it is unfair to deny him the benefits of participation in 
a work program when he was willing to work and was unassigned through no fault 
of his own.  But, as we have explained, it is neither arbitrary nor irrational to 
consider actual work performance in determining how much of a security risk the 
14 
inmate presents.  Accordingly, we must defer to the judgment of prison officials in 
providing for institutional security. 
Petitioner also contends that, because worktime credits — which can 
accelerate an inmate‟s release into society — are sometimes given for mere 
willingness to work, logic demands the same rules should apply to classification 
decisions.  He argues that “it simply cannot be the case that the governmental 
interest in public safety implicated by the release of an inmate into society at large 
early because he was willing to work, but was absent from work with 
authorization, or was willing to work and was simply not assigned to a program, is 
less compelling than [the department‟s] interest in maintaining prison security at a 
level that would be compromised by awarding an inmate two classification points 
in a six-month period, and which will only change his security classification 
within the institution in limited circumstances.”  But these are policy decisions that 
are neither arbitrary nor capricious.  The Legislature and, acting under legislative 
constraint, prison authorities made one policy decision regarding worktime credits.  
Prison authorities, exercising the discretion the Legislature has given them, made a 
different policy decision concerning prison classification.  As the Court of Appeal 
stated in this case, “just because the Legislature decided an inmate should get time 
off his sentence for being willing to participate in a work or school program does 
not mean the department was bound to decide that the same inmate poses a lesser 
security risk while in prison because of that same willingness.” 
Ensuring institutional security and determining when an inmate must be 
released into society are not the same thing and need not be governed by the same 
policy decisions.  Under the determinate sentence law, when an inmate who has 
been sentenced to a determinate term has served that term, even as reduced by 
credits, that inmate must be released even if possibly still dangerous.  “Prisoners 
sentenced to determinate terms had a date certain upon which they would be 
15 
released . . . .”  (In re Monigold (1983) 139 Cal.App.3d 485, 491; see § 3075.2, 
subd. (a).)  Even inmates in a maximum security prison can receive worktime 
credits and must be released when they have served their sentence.  Moreover, for 
convicted murderers like petitioner, who are sentenced to an indeterminate term, 
the connection between worktime credits and actual release is greatly attenuated.  
Inmates sentenced to an indeterminate term generally do not receive Penal Code 
section 2933 credits (In re Monigold (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1224, 1227), and to 
the extent those inmates do receive credits towards their sentence, the credits go 
only towards advancing their minimum eligible release date, not their actual 
release from prison.  (In re Dayan (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 184.)  Petitioner‟s 
minimum eligible parole release date has already passed.  Deciding when to 
actually release an inmate serving an indeterminate term is governed by different 
rules and regulations.  (See generally In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 
653-654.)  Thus, neither logic, regulation, statute, nor constitutional mandate 
requires that the rules governing worktime credits also govern classification 
decisions. 
Petitioner also argues that the Court of Appeal erred in considering the 
Attorney General‟s argument defending section 3375.4, subdivision (a)(3)(B)‟s 
validity — that it is rational to consider actual work performance as a 
classification factor — because the Attorney General did not make that argument 
in the superior court.  In his original petition for writ of habeas corpus in the 
superior court, petitioner relied exclusively on Player, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th 
813.  In his return, the Attorney General relied in part on section 3375.4, 
subdivision (a)(3)(B), but did not specifically discuss the section‟s constitutional 
validity.  Instead, he concentrated on trying to distinguish Player.  In his denial to 
the return, petitioner, now represented by an attorney, again relied primarily on 
Player.  He did not attempt either to challenge or to distinguish section 3375.4, 
16 
subdivision (a)(3)(B).  He simply ignored it.  The superior court relied solely on 
Player in granting relief. 
Petitioner contends the Attorney General has forfeited the right to defend 
section 3375.4, subdivision (a)(3)(B), against a constitutional challenge because he 
did not do so in the superior court.  But similar reasoning would lead to the 
conclusion that petitioner may not now challenge that section because he did not 
do so in the superior court.  It cannot be the case that petitioner may challenge, but 
the Attorney General may not defend, the regulation for the first time on appeal.  
In fact, we have “allowed parties to „ “advance new theories on appeal when the 
issue posed is purely a question of law based on undisputed facts, and involves 
important questions of public policy.” ‟ ”  (Farm Raised Salmon Cases (2008) 42 
Cal.4th 1077, 1090, fn. 11, quoting Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior 
Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1, 6.)  Because Player, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th 813, a 
published Court of Appeal decision, was binding on the superior court (Auto 
Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455), it made sense for 
the parties to litigate in the superior court whether Player applied rather than 
whether it was correct.  The Court of Appeal was a logical place to litigate 
Player‟s correctness, which necessarily included litigating section 3375.4, 
subdivision (a)(3)(B)‟s validity.  (See Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior 
Court, supra, at p. 6.)  Accordingly, we will permit petitioner to challenge, and the 
Attorney General to defend, section 3375.4, subdivision (a)(3)(B). 
Citing People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, petitioner argues that the 
question of section 3375.4, subdivision (a)(3)(B)‟s validity involves disputed 
facts — specifically, whether it is rational to consider as a classification factor 
actual work performance rather than mere willingness to work.  He argues the 
Court of Appeal erred, indeed, even violated his constitutional rights, in resolving 
the question without an evidentiary record.  In McKee, this court held that an 
17 
evidentiary hearing was needed to resolve an equal protection challenge to a 
statute that was subject to strict scrutiny.  (People v. McKee, supra, at pp. 1206-
1211.)  The due process issue here is whether section 3375.4, subdivision 
(a)(3)(B), is rational.  McKee specifically limited its holding to classifications 
subject to strict scrutiny; it does not extend to statutes or regulations subject only 
to review for rationality.  (People v. McKee, supra, at p. 1211, fn. 14.)  Whether a 
statute or regulation is rational is, as a general rule, a legal question for the courts 
to resolve, not a factual question requiring an evidentiary hearing.  In conducting 
rational-basis equal protection analysis, “ „a legislative choice is not subject to 
courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by 
evidence or empirical data.‟ ”  (Warden v. State Bar (1999) 21 Cal.4th 628, 650, 
quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc. (1993) 508 U.S. 307, 315, italics 
added in Warden.)  We believe the same rule should apply to a due process 
challenge asking whether the regulation is rational.  Accordingly, we agree with 
the Court of Appeal in rejecting petitioner‟s forfeiture argument:  “The proposition 
that, as a general matter, an inmate who performs at average or above average 
level in a work, school, or vocational program requires less security than other 
inmates is not a question of historical fact that had to be determined based on 
evidence presented in this case.  Thus, we do not become the trier of fact by 
considering that proposition on appeal.” 
In addition to his due process argument, petitioner invokes other 
constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions.  He contends that section 
3375.4, subdivision (a)(3)(B), also violates equal protection guarantees under both 
the United States and California Constitutions.  This case involves neither a 
suspect class nor a fundamental interest.  (See Warden v. State Bar, supra, 21 
Cal.4th at pp. 640-643.)  Accordingly, the classification will be upheld if there is a 
rational basis for it.  (Ibid.)  The classification distinguishing between those who 
18 
are willing to work but are unassigned through no fault of their own, and those 
who actually work, has a rational basis.  Our conclusion that 3375.4, subdivision 
(a)(3)(B), is not arbitrary, nor capricious, or irrational — the test we applied in 
finding the section comports with due process — necessarily also means that it is 
rational. 
Because an inmate may receive “S” time credit for “[a] temporary 
interruption or delay in the inmate‟s assignment which is no fault of the inmate” 
(§ 3045.3, subd. (b)(13)), petitioner claims it is irrational to distinguish between 
inmates who are unassigned and those who are assigned but whose actual 
performance is temporarily interrupted or delayed.  It is not clear whether the rules 
regarding classification credits under section 3375.4, subdivision (a), are similar to 
this “S” time rule.  But in any event, the department can rationally distinguish 
between an inmate who is not assigned to a program at all and one who is assigned 
to a program but has some excused absences.  An inmate may receive 
classification reduction points only for a “six-month period with an average or 
above performance” in a work program.  (§ 3375.4, subd. (a)(3).)  Thus, an inmate 
who is assigned to a program but never actually works (the situation petitioner 
posits) would presumably not receive the point reduction.  An inmate who is 
assigned to a program and temporarily missed some work — but is nevertheless 
found to have performed overall at an average or above level — will have a record 
of working, which would aid the department in determining how much of a 
security risk the inmate is. 
Petitioner also invokes Penal Code section 2600, which provides that an 
inmate confined in a state prison may “be deprived of such rights, and only such 
rights, as is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”  It is not clear 
exactly which right not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests 
petitioner claims he is being denied.  Certainly, noninmates have a right not to be 
19 
classified under Penal Code section 5068 and, in that sense, subjecting inmates to 
such classification deprives them of that right.  But classifying inmates is 
obviously, and reasonably, related to legitimate penological interests.  Penal Code 
section 2600 does not make Penal Code section 5068 invalid.  Petitioner does not 
appear to assert otherwise.  To the extent petitioner argues that by violating some 
other right, the classification decision of this case also violated Penal Code section 
2600, the argument adds nothing to those already considered.  Finally, petitioner 
argues that the department violated its own regulations, specifically section 3375, 
subdivision (f)(7), which requires that the classification decisions “be based on 
evaluation of available information.”  He claims that because he was unassigned 
during the period in question, “his performance in that job or program is 
information that is „unavailable.‟ ”  We disagree.  The fact that petitioner did not 
actually work during that time period — the critical fact under section 3375.4, 
subdivision (a)(3)(B) — is available information. 
For these reasons, we conclude the department properly applied section 
3375.4, subdivision (a)(3)(B), to deny petitioner the two-point reduction in his 
classification score at issue here.  The Court of Appeal in this case correctly so 
held.  We disapprove In re Player, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th 813, to the extent it is 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
 
20 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
MORENO, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion In re Jenkins 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted XXX 175 Cal.App.4th 300 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S175242 
Date Filed: October 28, 2010 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Lassen 
Judge: Dawson Arnold, Commissioner 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. 
Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Jessica N. Blonien, Anya M. Binsacca, Jennifer A. Neill and 
Christopher J. Rench, Deputy Attorneys General, for Appellant State of California. 
 
Linnéa M. Johnson, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and S. Lynne Klein, under appointment by 
the Court of Appeal, for Respondent Harvey Zane Jenkins. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Christopher J. Rench 
Deputy Attorney General 
1300 I Street, Suite 125 
Sacramento, CA  94244-2550 
(916) 324-5374 
 
Linnéa M. Johnson 
2407 J Street, Suite 301 
Sacramento, CA  95814 
(916) 442-3792