Case Title: Ott v. Rissler & McMurry Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-10-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Ott v. Rissler & McMurry Co.1986 WY 192726 P.2d 1079Case Number: 86-152Decided: 10/23/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming

Lawrence OTT, Appellant 
(Employee-Claimant),

v.

RISSLER & McMURRY 
CO., Appellee (Employer-Defendant).

Appeal from District 
Court, NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

David A. Drell, 
Casper, for appellant.

Susan Maher 
Overeem, Casper, 
for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
an order of the district court denying worker's compensation benefits to 
Lawrence Ott, appellant. The district court found that appellant failed to meet 
his burden of proving "a causal connection between the injury and the 
claims."

[¶2.]     We 
affirm.

[¶3.]     During May and June of 
1985, appellant was employed as a truck driver by Rissler & McMurry Company, 
appellee. On June 4, 1985, the truck and trailer unit which appellant was 
operating in the course of his employment was struck by a train. Upon impact, 
the truck was propelled forward by the train, and appellant was thrown around 
inside the cab of the truck. When the train stopped, he climbed out of the cab, 
lay down on the ground, and lost consciousness. He was taken to Memorial 
Hospital of Natrona County where he was examined by doctors and released. Upon 
his release, he filled out a worker's report of accident in which he described 
his injury as: "Left leg skinned up - Driving truck and was hit by 
train."

[¶4.]     The day after the 
accident, appellant went back to work. He testified that although he was in 
extreme pain, he returned to work the following day as well. On June 7, 1985, 
appellant quit his job with Rissler & McMurry Company to return to his home 
in Michigan. 
That same day he also filed a second worker's report of accident, this time 
describing his injury as: "Bad knee, some back pain in upper back and lower 
back, some bruises."

[¶5.]     More than six weeks 
after the accident, appellant sought medical care. He went first to Dr. Robert 
Benson, a chiropractor, who referred him to Dr. Robert Gruesen, a neurosurgeon. 
Dr. Gruesen diagnosed appellant's condition as being "back and neck sprain with 
soft tissue injury." On the basis of what appellant told them, both Dr. Benson 
and Dr. Gruesen concluded that his condition was caused by the 
accident.

[¶6.]     On August 7, 1985, 
appellant submitted a claim for initial temporary total disability to the 
worker's compensation division. Appellee filed an objection to the claim, and 
the case was set for hearing. The parties stipulated to the admission of the 
medical reports of Dr. Benson and Dr. Gruesen. However, the stipulation was 
conditioned upon the acknowledgement by both parties that, in reaching their 
findings, the doctors relied solely on the description of the accident given to 
them by appellant.

[¶7.]     In denying appellant's 
claim, the district court found that appellant was injured in the course of his 
employment, that he completed a claim for the injuries he received in that 
accident, and that he was treated for those injuries and released. The district 
court also found that appellant returned to work the day following the accident 
but quit his job shortly thereafter and filed a second claim for different 
injuries. Finally, the court found that, despite the second claim, appellant did 
not seek medical treatment for the new injuries for more than six weeks. Given 
these facts, the court concluded that appellant failed to carry his burden of 
proof. Appellant now contends that the district court's holding is not supported 
by substantial evidence.

"In a worker's 
compensation case, the burden of proof is on the claimant to prove the essential 
elements of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. * 
*

* * * * * 
*

"In determining whether 
an unsuccessful claimant has met his burden of proof on an essential element, we 
must assume on review that the evidence favoring the employer is true and leave 
out of consideration entirely the evidence presented by the claimant which 
conflicts with the employer's evidence. * * * [W]e can reverse the trial court 
only if its findings are `clearly erroneous or manifestly wrong and totally 
against the evidence.'" Potter v. RMT Properties, Inc., Wyo., 715 P.2d 214, 
216-17 (1986).

[¶8.]     In the present case, 
the essential element of appellant's claim is the causal connection between the 
accident and appellant's back injury. Having reviewed the record, we find 
sufficient evidence to support the district court's holding. As in Potter v. RMT 
Properties, Inc., we reach this conclusion even though the only medical evidence 
on causation favored the claimant.

[¶9.]     The medical evidence 
presented to the district court consisted of the doctors' reports and findings 
which, as indicated previously, were based entirely upon the description of the 
accident given by appellant. Neither of the doctors learned of the accident 
until over six weeks after it occurred. Their examinations revealed only that 
appellant was suffering from a back injury.

[¶10.]  In addition to the medical reports, the 
district court had before it evidence that on the day of the accident appellant 
was treated for a leg injury and released. The evidence also showed that, after 
leaving the hospital, appellant returned to the scene of the accident to take 
pictures, and the next day he went back to work. In addition, evidence was 
presented that appellant quit his job two days after the accident, because he 
"wanted to take a break from driving," and after quitting he filed his second 
claim. Finally, the evidence demonstrated that appellant drove himself back to 
Michigan and 
did not see a doctor for more than six weeks after filing the second 
claim.

[¶11.]  Where evidence justifies either of two 
reasonable inferences, the trier of fact is allowed to determine which, if 
either, of the two inferences is more reasonable or probable. Bocek v. 
City of Sheridan, Wyo., 432 P.2d 893 (1967). "The trial court is 
in a far better position to judge the demeanor, truth and veracity of a witness; 
therefore, we give considerable deference to the court's findings regarding such 
witness." Smith v. State, Wyo., 714 P.2d 1201, 1204 
(1986).

[¶12.]  The district court heard the testimony of 
the witnesses, considered the evidence, and found that appellant failed to meet 
his burden of proving a causal connection between the accident and his back 
injury. We cannot say that finding was clearly erroneous or manifestly wrong. On 
the basis of the evidence set forth above, the district court could reasonably 
have found against appellant.

[¶13.]  Affirmed.