Case Title: Jose Castaneda v. Woody Welch

Citation: 2007 WI 103

Docket Number: will

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2007-07-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
2007 WI 103 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP3306 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State ex rel. Jose Castaneda, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Woody Welch, Chairman, Milwaukee Fire and Police  
Commission, Eric Mandel Johnson, Vice Chair, 
Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission, Carla Y. 
Cross, Leonard J. Sobczak, Ernesto A. Baca, 
Members of the Milwaukee Fire and Police 
Commission, David L. Heard, Executive Director  
and Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission, 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 17, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 6, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Patricia D. McMahon   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendants-appellants there were briefs by Grant F. 
Langley, city attorney, Bruce D. Schrimpf, assistant city 
attorney, 
and 
Maurita 
Houren, 
assistant 
city 
attorney, 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Bruce D. Schrimpf. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by John F. 
Ebbott, Ness Flores, and Legal Action of Wisconsin, Inc., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by John F. Ebbott. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by John Celichowski, and 
Prov. of St. Joseph of the Capuchin Order, Milwaukee, and Karyn 
L. Rotker, Laurence J. Dupis, and ACLU of Wisconsin Foundation, 
Inc., Milwaukee. 
 
 
2007 WI 103
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP3306  
(L.C. No. 
2003CV8737) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State ex rel. Jose Castaneda, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Woody Welch, Chairman, Milwaukee Fire and 
Police Commission, Eric Mandel Johnson, Vice 
Chair, Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission, 
Carla Y. Cross, Leonard J. Sobczak, Ernesto A. 
Baca, Members of the Milwaukee Fire and Police 
Commission, David L. Heard, Executive Director 
and Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission, 
 
          Defendants-Appellants. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 17, 2007 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee 
County, Patricia D. McMahon, Judge.  Modified and, as modified, 
affirmed.  Rights declared.     
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This case is before the court 
on 
certification 
by 
the 
court 
of 
appeals, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (2005-06).1  It concerns the aftermath 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2005-
06 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No.  2004AP3306 
2 
 
of allegedly excessive conduct at a police raid in Milwaukee in 
September 2002. 
¶2 
Wisconsin Stat. § 62.50(19) authorizes an aggrieved 
person to file a complaint against a member of the fire or 
police department (member) [in a city of the "1st class"] 
alleging conduct sufficient to warrant removal of the member.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 62.50(19) provides: 
Charges by Aggrieved Person.  In cases where duly 
verified charges are filed by any aggrieved person 
with the board of fire and police commissioners, 
setting forth sufficient cause for the removal of any 
member of either of the departments, including the 
chiefs or their assistants, the board or chief may 
suspend such member or officer pending disposition of 
such charges.  The board shall cause notice of the 
filing of the charges with a copy to be served upon 
the accused and shall set a date for the trial and 
investigation of the charges, following the procedure 
under this section.  The board shall decide by a 
majority vote and subject to the just cause standard 
described in sub. (17)(b) whether the charges are 
sustained.  If sustained, the board shall immediately 
determine whether the good of the service requires 
that the accused be removed, suspended from office 
without pay for a period not exceeding 60 days or 
reduced in rank.  If the charges are not sustained, 
the accused shall be immediately reinstated without 
prejudice.  The secretary of the board shall make the 
decision public.   
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19).   
 
¶3 
The Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission (FPC) Board 
promulgated Rule XVII to implement the citizen complaint 
proceedings in Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) for complaints in the City 
of Milwaukee (the City).2 
                                                 
2 The full text of Rule XVII is reprinted in the Appendix 
attached hereto. 
No.  2004AP3306 
3 
 
¶4 
Jose Castaneda (Castaneda) filed a complaint seeking 
declaratory judgment that Rule XVII is invalid and unlawful.  
Castaneda argues not only that Rule XVII is invalid but also 
that the FPC Board has no authority to promulgate any rule 
governing citizen complaint proceedings under subsection (19) of 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50.   
¶5 
We conclude that the FPC Board has express and implied 
authority 
to 
promulgate 
a 
rule 
implementing 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) pertaining to complaints by aggrieved 
persons against a member.  However, we conclude that the FPC 
Board exceeded its authority in adopting Rule XVII because at 
least four provisions of the rule contravene the language or 
intent of Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19).  Therefore, we modify and, as 
modified, affirm the judgment of the circuit court declaring 
Rule XVII invalid in its entirety. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶6 
This action arose from a police raid at El Rey grocery 
store and tortilla factory on September 18, 2002.  Members of 
the Milwaukee Police Department were executing a search warrant 
to investigate the sale of prescription drugs.  On November 7, 
2002, Castaneda and 24 other complainants filed a joint 
complaint 
with 
the 
FPC pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) 
concerning this police raid.   
¶7 
According to the allegations in the joint complaint, 
the police officers exceeded the scope of their search warrant, 
which was to search El Rey grocery store and tortilla factory 
for prescription drugs, and instead performed an overbroad 
No.  2004AP3306 
4 
 
search for nonprescription drugs, including narcotics and other 
controlled substances.  The joint complaint also alleged that 
the police officers engaged in excessive force and violence 
against innocent employees and customers by doing the following: 
a. 
Entering the premises screaming and shouting 
in 
English 
only, 
and 
manhandling 
and 
frightening people who didn't understand 
their orders; 
b. 
Entering the premises with their police 
identities hidden, so that employees and 
customers could not determine whether they 
were in fact law enforcement officials; 
c. 
Entering 
the 
premises 
with 
guns 
drawn, 
including 
handguns, 
shotguns, 
and 
semiautomatic 
rifles, 
and 
pointing 
and 
waving them at persons; 
d. 
Pointing guns directly in the faces of 
persons; 
e. 
Jabbing 
guns 
hard 
into 
the 
bodies 
of 
employees; 
f. 
Forcing pregnant women to lie on their 
stomachs, then jerking them hard to their 
feet; 
g. 
Pushing or otherwise forcing employees at 
the tortilla factory to lie on the ground; 
h. 
In violation of MPD Policy 3/360.15(f), 
bringing in large and frightening police 
dogs to the general area where employees 
were herded together in close confinement. 
¶8 
The joint complaint also alleged that the police 
officers "improperly and unreasonably detained and imprisoned 
employees and other persons" by doing the following: 
a. 
In violation of Police Department Rules 
3/730.00, 3/730.05 and 3/730.15, handcuffing 
No.  2004AP3306 
5 
 
all the employees at the tortilla factory 
for one or more hours; 
b. 
In violation of Police Department Rules 
3/730.00, 3/730.05 and 3/730.15, handcuffing 
pregnant women; 
c. 
Blocking all exits so that no employees 
could leave of their own free will; 
d. 
Forbidding 
employees 
and 
other 
persons 
lawfully present to speak or to depart the 
premises; 
e. 
At the grocery store, ordering employees to 
raise their hand to request something to 
drink 
or 
to 
go 
to 
the 
bathroom, 
and 
accompanying employees to the bathroom; 
f. 
Detaining employees and other persons for 
hours; 
g. 
At the grocery store, forcing employees and 
other persons to stand with their hands 
above their heads for extended periods of 
time.   
¶9 
The complainants requested that the FPC investigate 
the actions of all the police officers involved in the raid, 
including the chief of police; investigate whether the police 
department members filed all necessary reports of the incident, 
including reports of when firearms are pointed at persons; hold 
a hearing to take evidence; impose appropriate discipline, 
including suspension or termination, on all officers involved; 
conduct a policy review of the Milwaukee Police Department 
search warrant execution policy and procedure; and order the 
Milwaukee Police Department to issue a public apology to the El 
Rey employees and customers and to the southside community.  
No.  2004AP3306 
6 
 
¶10 The joint complaint was accompanied by 25 individual 
complaints on prescribed FPC forms.  The completed forms were 
nearly identical and merely referenced the joint complaint when 
describing the alleged misconduct.  Under the portion of the 
complaint 
that 
asked 
for 
facts 
supporting 
the 
alleged 
misconduct, each complaint included the following:  "The alleged 
misconduct is set forth in the attached joint complaint.  I 
verify that those acts and incidents which I observed are true.  
I am not verifying that acts or incidents which I did not 
observe are true." 
¶11 The joint complaint did not identify any of the police 
officers involved in the police raid.  The inability to identify 
any of the police officers was allegedly the result of the 
police officers' deliberate concealment of their identities 
during the raid.  In response to the lack of identification in 
the joint complaint, the FPC requested and received in December 
2002 from the Milwaukee Police Department a list of all police 
personnel who were present during the execution of the search 
warrant. 
¶12 In January 2003 the FPC also requested an additional 
individual complaint from each complainant in order to identify 
the specific rule violations that related to each accused.  
¶13 From mid-February to mid-June 2003, upon receipt of 
the individual complaints, the FPC was able to identify only two 
possible rule violations and was not able to link any of the 
misconduct alleged in the specific individual complaints to any 
of the 21 officers involved in the raid.  In August 2003 several 
No.  2004AP3306 
7 
 
members of the FPC conferred and concluded that, due to the 
inability to identify the accused police officers, the only 
alternative available would be to forward the complaints to the 
chief of police. 
¶14 On September 30, 2003, Castaneda commenced an action 
in Milwaukee County Circuit Court for a writ of mandamus 
directing the FPC to set a date for the trial and investigation 
of the charges in Castaneda's joint complaint.  The action named 
the Chairman, Vice Chair, and members of the FPC (Board), as 
well as the Executive Director, as defendants.  Two days later, 
on October 2, 2003, the FPC Board addressed the joint complaint 
at a meeting.  The Board heard from its Committee on Rules and 
Complaints (Committee), which presented three possible options.   
¶15 First, the Committee stated it "could recommend that 
the Board refer matters for conciliation, pretrial and trial, 
but [it did] not believe that this [was] appropriate given the 
fact that none of the complaints identify specific acts of 
alleged misconduct by specific department members."   
¶16 Second, 
the 
Board 
could 
"dismiss 
each 
of 
the 
complaints for lack of prosecutorial merit" on the theory that 
"[i]f a complainant is unable to identify the individual who may 
have committed an act of misconduct, there is little likelihood 
of that complainant being able to prove that a specific 
department member in fact committed misconduct."  However, the 
Committee did not recommend this option because if the Board 
dismissed the complaints, it "would be doing nothing more than 
'sweeping the matter under the rug.'"   
No.  2004AP3306 
8 
 
¶17 Third, the Committee recommended that the Board refer 
the 
complaints 
to 
the 
chief 
of 
police 
"with 
a 
firm 
recommendation from the Board that each complaint be fully 
investigated and appropriate action taken."  The Committee noted 
that the "Chief has reassured this Board and this community on 
numerous occasions that any and all allegations of misconduct 
which are brought to his attention will be fully investigated 
and acted upon in an appropriate manner.  We take the Chief at 
his word in this regard, and trust that he will do his best to 
see that justice is done as concerns complainants and department 
members alike."  
¶18 The Board accepted the Committee's recommendations, 
and, on the following day, the Board forwarded "24 complaints" 
to then Milwaukee Chief of Police Arthur Jones (Chief Jones).  
In a letter to Chief Jones, the FPC Executive Director, David L. 
Heard (Heard), explained that the complaints "allege numerous 
and often broad allegations of misconduct, but do not identify 
specific department members who are alleged to have committed 
any such act(s) of misconduct."  Heard explained that the FPC 
"did not take provisional jurisdiction over these matters and 
have referred them to [Chief Jones] for a full investigation and 
appropriate disposition." 
¶19 Following this referral to Chief Jones, on October 7, 
2003, Castaneda filed an amended complaint seeking declaratory 
judgment that Rule XVII is invalid and unlawful.  Specifically, 
Castaneda asked the circuit court to declare that "FPC Rule XVII 
Citizen 
Complaint 
Procedure 
is 
invalid 
because 
it 
is 
No.  2004AP3306 
9 
 
inconsistent with Wis. Stat[]. § 62.50 and because the FPC had 
no authority under Wis. Stat[]. § 62.50 to promulgate said 
rule."  Castaneda also asked the circuit court to declare that 
the Milwaukee Police and Fire Department policy and practice 
that permitted police officers to hide their identities was 
invalid. 
¶20 On November 26, 2003, the circuit court ordered the 
FPC to direct the new Chief of Police, Nannette Hegerty (Chief 
Hegerty), to expedite the internal investigation concerning the 
citizen complaints.  On December 16, 2003, Chief Hegerty 
concluded her investigation, and her report to the FPC was 
forwarded to the circuit court.  In her report, Chief Hegerty 
acknowledged that the El Rey search warrants were executed in a 
manner similar to procedure routinely performed at drug house 
raids and other high-risk operations.  Chief Hegerty reported 
that she was instituting some changes "in an effort to ensure 
that this unfortunate sequence of events does not re-occur in 
the future."  One of the changes was that all personnel involved 
in the execution of a search warrant would be identifiable at 
all times, regardless of an operation's degree of risk.  
Specifically, 
the 
change 
would 
require 
that 
"Tactical 
Enforcement Unit Officers, even when outfitted in full tactical 
gear, . . . have individual identification clearly visible on 
their outermost garment(s)."  In her report, Chief Hegerty also 
suggested that all the aggrieved parties meet with her and 
representatives of the FPC to "engage in honest and open 
communication" and to successfully resolve the complaint. 
No.  2004AP3306 
10 
 
¶21 The circuit court was impressed by Chief Hegerty's 
report and ordered the parties to "have a productive meeting as 
referenced in Chief Hegerty's letter."  The parties were able to 
settle 
the 
mandamus 
claim 
and 
the 
"concealed 
identity" 
declaratory judgment claim, and the court dismissed those claims 
without prejudice on December 7, 2004. 
¶22 However, the parties did not settle the declaratory 
judgment claim concerning the validity of Rule XVII.  In May the 
circuit court conducted a hearing.  On July 15, 2004, the court 
issued a declaratory judgment declaring Rule XVII invalid as not 
authorized by and contrary to Wis. Stat. § 62.50.  The circuit 
court determined that Wis. Stat. § 62.50 grants no general 
rulemaking authority to the Board for enacting Rule XVII.  
Specifically, 
the 
circuit 
court 
concluded 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) "occupies the field with regards to 
complaints by an aggrieved person and leaves no room for rules 
by the [Board]."  The circuit court also declared that, "as 
adopted and implemented, Rule XVII frustrates the intent of the 
legislature in enacting § 62.50(19)." 
¶23 The FPC appealed the circuit court's decision, and the 
court of appeals certified the case to this court.  The court of 
appeals asked this court to determine the scope of the Board's 
rulemaking authority and whether the Board has authority to 
promulgate rules concerning the citizen complaint procedure as 
provided in Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19).   
No.  2004AP3306 
11 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶24 The issues presented in this case are whether the 
Board has authority to promulgate a rule concerning the citizen 
complaint 
procedure 
in Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19), and if so, 
whether Rule XVII exceeds statutory authority.  Whether an 
agency has authority to promulgate rules requires statutory 
interpretation, which is a question of law that we review de 
novo.  See Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶29, 236 
Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659.  Whether an administrative rule 
exceeds statutory authority is also a question of law that we 
review de novo, "although we benefit from the analyses of the 
circuit court and the court of appeals."  Conway v. Bd. of the 
Police & Fire Comm'rs of the City of Madison, 2003 WI 53, ¶19, 
262 Wis. 2d 1, 662 N.W.2d 335.   
DISCUSSION 
 
¶25 This case requires us to determine whether the Board 
has either express or implied authority to promulgate a rule 
governing 
the 
citizen 
complaint 
procedure 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19).  If we conclude that the Board does have 
such authority, we must determine whether the Board exceeded its 
statutory authority by promulgating Rule XVII.  See Conway, 262 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶29. 
No.  2004AP3306 
12 
 
A. 
Authority to Promulgate Rules 
¶26 The legislature may either expressly or implicitly 
authorize an agency, such as the Board, to promulgate a rule.3  
Seider, 236 Wis. 2d 211, ¶70.  "[A]n administrative agency has 
only those powers as are expressly conferred or necessarily 
implied from the statutory provisions under which it operates."  
Brown County v. DHSS, 103 Wis. 2d 37, 43, 307 N.W.2d 247 (1981).  
To determine whether the legislature expressly or implicitly 
authorized the Board to promulgate a rule, we first examine the 
enabling statute.  Seider, 236 Wis. 2d 211, ¶70.  We strictly 
construe 
an 
agency's 
enabling 
statute 
and 
"resolve 
any 
reasonable doubt pertaining to an agency's implied powers 
against the agency."  Wis. Citizens Concerned for Cranes & Doves 
v. Wis. DNR, 2004 WI 40, ¶14, 270 Wis. 2d 318, 677 N.W.2d 612.  
¶27 To determine whether the legislature gave express 
authority, we identify the elements of the enabling statute and 
match the rule against those elements.  Wis. Hosp. Ass'n v. 
Natural Res. Bd., 156 Wis. 2d 688, 706, 457 N.W.2d 879 (Ct. App. 
1990).  "If the rule matches the statutory elements, then the 
statute expressly authorizes the rule.  However, the enabling 
statute need not spell out every detail of a rule in order to 
expressly authorize [the rule]; if it did, no rule would be 
necessary."  Conway, 262 Wis. 2d 1, ¶31 (citation omitted).   
                                                 
3 The parties do not dispute that the Board of the Milwaukee 
Fire and Police Commission is to be treated as an administrative 
agency.  See Conway v. Bd. of Police & Fire Comm'rs of the City 
of Madison, 2003 WI 53, ¶27, 262 Wis. 2d 1, 662 N.W.2d 335.   
No.  2004AP3306 
13 
 
¶28 In this case, we look to the identified enabling 
statute, Wis. Stat. § 62.50(3)(a), to determine whether the 
legislature expressly authorized the Board to promulgate a rule 
concerning 
the 
citizen 
complaint 
procedure 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19).  We look to the plain language of the 
statute.  "If the language of the statute is clear and 
unambiguous, we apply the language to the facts at hand."  
Conway, 262 Wis. 2d 1, ¶30.  We also consider the statute in 
context; that is, "in relationship to the whole statute and to 
related sections." Id.  In general, we give words and phrases 
their common and approved meaning and may consult a dictionary 
if necessary.  Id.  "If this process of analysis yields a plain, 
clear statutory meaning, then there is no ambiguity, and the 
statute is applied according to this ascertainment of its 
meaning."  Bruno v. Milwaukee, 2003 WI 28, ¶20, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 
660 N.W.2d 656.  Thus, "[o]nly if the statute is ambiguous must 
we turn to extrinsic sources such as legislative history to aid 
our interpretation."  Wis. Citizens, 270 Wis. 2d 318, ¶7. 
¶29 Wisconsin Stat. § 62.50(3)(a) 
provides 
that 
"[t]he 
board may prescribe rules for the government of the members of 
each department and may delegate its rule-making authority to 
the chief of each department."  The parties disagree whether the 
authority to prescribe rules for the government of the members 
includes the authority to promulgate a rule relating to citizen 
complaints under Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19).   
¶30 On one hand, Castaneda argues that the authority 
relates only to the members of each department whereas the 
No.  2004AP3306 
14 
 
citizen complaint procedure in Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) relates to 
the general public.  Castaneda agrees with the circuit court 
that the dictionary definition of "government" is not so 
expansive as to include authority over investigation and trials.  
Castaneda compares the language in Wis. Stat. § 62.05(3)(a) to 
the 
language 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(g), 
which 
concerns 
disciplinary actions against subordinates in cities not of the 
first class.4  Wisconsin Stat. § 62.13(5)(g) explicitly provides 
that "[f]urther rules for the administration of this subsection 
may be made by the board."  Castaneda asserts that the absence 
of comparable language in § 62.50(3)(a) is evidence that the 
Board does not have broad rulemaking authority to promulgate 
rules for complaint, investigation, and trial procedures. 
¶31 Finally, Castaneda argues that the statutory scheme in 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50 is such that where the legislature intended 
the Board to have rulemaking authority, it provided language in 
the statute, such as "in accordance with such rules and 
regulations."  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 62.50(4), (7)(a).  Where 
the legislature did not intend the Board to have rulemaking 
authority, it provided language such as "under this section."  
See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 62.50(9), (11), (12), (16), and (19). 
¶32 On the other hand, the FPC argues that the legislature 
expressly authorized the Board to promulgate rules for the 
administration of Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19).  The FPC contends that 
                                                 
4 "Cities of 150,000 population and over shall constitute 
1st class cities."  Wis. Stat. § 62.05(1)(b).  Milwaukee is a 
first class city.   
No.  2004AP3306 
15 
 
the language in Wis. Stat. § 62.50(3)(a) authorizing the Board 
to "prescribe rules for the government of the members of each 
department" includes the authority to prescribe rules concerning 
disciplinary proceedings before the Board.  The FPC cites Kasik 
v. Janssen, 158 Wis. 606, 610, 149 N.W. 398 (1914), which held 
that the term "government of the members" includes the power to 
regulate 
discipline. 
 
The 
FPC 
observes 
that 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) is a disciplinary statute because the 
trials contemplated under Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) are only those 
trials that may lead to the discipline of a member.  Therefore, 
it contends, the Board is expressly authorized to promulgate 
rules 
for 
administering 
citizen 
complaints 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19). 
¶33 In addition, the FPC argues that the Board has 
implicit authority to promulgate rules for the administration of 
citizen 
complaints. 
 
The 
FPC 
argues 
that 
the 
Board's 
responsibilities 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) 
could 
not 
be 
effectuated in the absence of an implied grant of authority to 
clarify procedure. 
¶34 We agree with the FPC that the plain language of 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(3)(a) gives the Board express authority to 
promulgate 
rules concerning the administration of citizen 
complaints 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) 
insofar 
as 
those 
complaints affect member discipline.  The language of the 
enabling statute——"[t]he board may prescribe rules for the 
government of the members of each department"——is plain and 
unambiguous.  As defined in the dictionary, "government" means 
No.  2004AP3306 
16 
 
"authoritative direction or control."  Webster's New Collegiate 
Dictionary 
497 
(1977). 
 
Therefore, 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(3)(a), the Board may prescribe rules for the 
authoritative direction or control of its members.  As we said 
in Kasik, the authority to prescribe rules for the government of 
the members "covers all those disciplinary regulations which 
experience has shown to be valuable and to promote obedience and 
efficiency."  Kasik, 158 Wis. at 610.   
¶35 The circuit court invalidated Rule XVII in its 
entirety saying that, "The rule making authority of the 
Milwaukee FPC is limited to rules for governance and selection 
only.  It does not grant authority for rules with respect to 
investigation and trial procedures."  Elsewhere, the court said 
that the legislature has evinced "a clear intent to preclude 
general rulemaking authority in the area of suspension or 
removal of members." 
¶36 In our view, the citizen complaint procedure in 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) does not deal solely with the general 
public.  It also deals with the discipline of members.  The 
citizen complaint procedure in Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) requires 
allegations serious enough to lead to removal of a member; it 
authorizes the Board or chief to suspend a member pending 
disposition of the charge; and it contemplates discipline of the 
member, including removal, suspension, or a reduction in rank.  
Therefore, while Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) affects how complaints 
from members of the general public will be processed, it also 
deals with the discipline of members.   
No.  2004AP3306 
17 
 
¶37 We conclude, therefore, that the plain language of 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(3)(a) gives the Board express authority under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(3)(a) to promulgate rules concerning the 
administration 
of 
citizen 
complaints 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19).  We acknowledge a concern, however, with 
reliance on Wis. Stat. § 62.50(3)(a) for express authority.  
While § 62.50(3)(a) gives the Board authority to "prescribe 
rules for the government of the members of each department[,]" 
it also authorizes the Board to "delegate its rule-making 
authority to the chief of each department."  We recognize an 
inconsistency between Wis. Stat. § 62.50(3)(a), which would seem 
to authorize the Board to delegate to the chief its authority to 
promulgate rules concerning the citizen complaint procedure, and 
the rest of the statutory scheme in Wis. Stat. § 62.50, which 
requires the Board to govern the citizen complaint procedure.  
While we raise concern with relying on Wis. Stat. § 62.50(3)(a) 
as the source of express authority for the Board, we do not 
think 
such 
concern 
precludes 
a 
determination 
of 
express 
authority for the Board in this case.  The troublesome issue of 
whether the Board could delegate its rulemaking authority 
concerning citizen complaint procedure to the chief of each 
department is not before us.   
¶38 We also conclude that even without this express 
authority, the Board would have implied authority to promulgate 
rules concerning citizen complaints in Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19).  
As we stated in Kasik, a public officer "has by implication such 
additional powers as are necessary for the due and efficient 
No.  2004AP3306 
18 
 
exercise of powers expressly granted or such as may be fairly 
implied from the statute granting express powers."  Kasik, 158 
Wis. at 610.  Likewise, the Board has implied authority to 
promulgate 
rules 
to 
carry 
out 
its 
express 
powers 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19). 
¶39 Castaneda argues that Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) gives the 
Board no authority to promulgate rules because the statute 
includes a directive that the Board "follow[] the procedure 
under this section" and does not include the expansive language 
of "in accordance with such rules and regulations."  Castaneda's 
argument would be persuasive if § 62.50 provided the entire 
citizen complaint procedure for the Board to follow.  It does 
not. 
¶40 Wisconsin Stat. § 62.50 does provide a considerable 
direction.  To illustrate, Wis. Stat. § 62.50(15) requires that 
notice of trial be served pursuant to the rules of civil 
procedure.  Wisconsin Stat. § 62.50(17) provides the standard 
for the Board to apply when deciding whether to sustain the 
charges.  Wisconsin Stat. § 62.50(20) permits a member to bring 
an action in circuit court following imposition of discipline 
and even provides a sample form for the member to use to serve 
notice on the secretary of the Board.  A number of other 
subsections in the section could be cited. 
¶41 However, 
while 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50 
in 
general 
and 
subsection (19) in particular provide much detail concerning the 
citizen complaint procedure, it is not comprehensive and does 
not provide much direction for the handling and processing of 
No.  2004AP3306 
19 
 
complaints.  Wisconsin Stat. § 62.50(19) does not define an 
aggrieved person, which is very important for standing.  It does 
not indicate how and where an aggrieved person should file a 
complaint.5  It requires that the charge set forth "sufficient 
cause for removal" but does not indicate what an aggrieved 
person must do to allege sufficient cause for removal.  It 
requires the Board to follow the procedures for the trial and 
investigation of the charges under Wis. Stat. § 62.50(16), but 
§ 62.50(16) does not provide comprehensive instruction for these 
procedures. 
¶42 In sum, Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) implicitly conveys some 
powers to the Board because it leaves open some of the methods 
by which the Board should operate.  Therefore, the Board's 
authority to promulgate rules concerning the administration of 
citizen 
complaints 
is 
necessarily 
implied 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19).  See Kasik, 158 Wis. at 610.   
B. 
Whether Rule XVII Exceeds Statutory Authority 
¶43 Having concluded that the Board has both express and 
implied 
authority 
to 
promulgate 
rules 
concerning 
the 
administration 
of 
citizen 
complaints 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19), we must now determine whether the Board 
exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating Rule XVII.  
Although the Board has authority to promulgate a rule, the "rule 
is 
not 
valid 
if 
it 
exceeds 
the 
bounds 
of 
correct 
                                                 
5 Unlike 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(13) 
and 
(20), 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) does not provide a sample form. 
No.  2004AP3306 
20 
 
interpretation."  Wis. Stat. § 227.11(2)(a); see Seider, 236 
Wis. 2d 211, ¶71.  "A rule exceeds an agency's statutory 
authority if it conflicts with an unambiguous statute" by 
contradicting either the language of a statute or legislative 
intent.  Id., ¶72.  In cases in which a conflict arises between 
a statute and an administrative rule, the statute prevails.  Id.  
We must consider, therefore, whether Rule XVII contravenes the 
language in Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) or frustrates legislative 
intent.   
¶44 The circuit court declared Rule XVII invalid in its 
entirety because the Board did not have authority to promulgate 
rules on citizen complaints.  It then proceeded to address 
several deficiencies in present Rule XVII that it believed 
frustrated legislative intent.  The circuit court said that, 
rather than facilitating the processing of citizen complaints, 
Rule XVII "has served as a barrier to citizens seeking redress 
from their government."  The circuit court noted that "[i]n 
adopting Rule XVII, the FPC has engrafted a complex layer of 
requirements onto § 62.50(19) that was not contemplated by the 
legislature and which serves to frustrate the legislative 
purpose."  The circuit court declared that the requirement in 
Rule XVII for complainants to identify the officer complained of 
fails to account for allegations that officer identities were 
deliberately concealed.  The circuit court also concluded that 
the requirement for complainants to set forth specific rule 
violations "serves only to frustrate and discourage such 
complaints." 
No.  2004AP3306 
21 
 
¶45 In addition, the circuit court said that subsection 
4(a), which requires complainants to state cause for removal, 
and subsection 6(b)(i), which allows the complaint to be 
dismissed 
and 
referred 
to 
the 
Milwaukee 
Police 
or 
Fire 
Department for investigation and disposition, were in direct 
contravention of Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19). 
¶46 At oral argument of this case, Castaneda proffered 
seven problems with Rule XVII: (1) Rule XVII permits dismissal 
and referral of the complaint to the chief not only for 
investigation, but also for disposition; (2) Rule XVII permits 
dismissal of the complaint where the Board decides that it does 
not have provisional jurisdiction; (3) Rule XVII permits 
dismissal of the complaint where the complainant cannot identify 
police officers who have concealed their identities; (4) Rule 
XVII permits the complaint to be held with the Committee on 
Rules and Complaints indefinitely; (5) Rule XVII restricts use 
of police department records to identification of police 
officers; (6) Rule XVII prohibits admissibility at trial of any 
evidence which the Board gathers in its investigation of the 
complaint; and (7) Rule XVII permits dismissal of the complaint 
for any reason, including complainant passivity. 
¶47 In response, the FPC argues that "[b]y adopting Rule 
XVII . . . the Board was effectuating the purpose of the powers 
delegated to it under Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19)."  The FPC asserts 
that 
nothing 
in 
Rule 
XVII 
is 
inconsistent 
with 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19).  In response to the circuit court's 
invalidation of subsection 4(a), which requires the complainant 
No.  2004AP3306 
22 
 
to state grounds sufficient for removal, the FPC argues that 
subsection 4(a) mirrors the language of Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19), 
which requires the complaint to set forth "sufficient cause for 
the removal."  In response to the circuit court's invalidation 
of subsection 6(b)(i), which allows the Board to dismiss and 
refer 
the 
complaint 
to 
the 
chief 
for 
investigation 
and 
disposition, 
the 
FPC 
argues 
that 
subsection 
6(b)(i) 
is 
consistent with Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) "because it allows the 
Board to refer the matter to the Chief after the Board has 
determined that it does not have jurisdiction over the matter."  
(Emphasis added.)  The FPC contends that this provision does not 
violate 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) 
because § 62.50(19) 
does 
not 
require the Board to hear complaints that do not meet statutory 
requirements. 
¶48 Because we have recognized the FPC's authority to 
promulgate a rule concerning citizen complaints against members, 
we face the unenviable prospect of trying to dissect Rule XVII 
section by section, line by line, to determine what parts of the 
rule are valid and what parts are not.  If we were to engage in 
this sort of analysis, we would be rewriting the rule ourselves 
and depriving the FPC of the authority we believe it has been 
given by the legislature.  Instead, we declare Rule XVII invalid 
as a whole because four important provisions of Rule XVII are 
inconsistent with 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19).  We then simply 
comment on other provisions of the Rule that we believe may 
frustrate the purpose of the statute.  If the FPC decides to 
No.  2004AP3306 
23 
 
promulgate a new rule, it should craft a rule that better 
reflects the purpose intended by the legislature.  
¶49 Wisconsin Stat. § 62.50(19) recognizes that persons in 
the community can be truly aggrieved by the actions or inactions 
of members of fire and police departments.  The statute provides 
that, in serious cases, these grievants have a right to hold 
members accountable by presenting verified charges at a public 
trial.  The FPC is not required to facilitate the public trial 
of a charge under Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) when the charge is 
insufficiently serious, if proved, to warrant removal of a 
member; however, neither FPC rules nor FPC administration can be 
permitted to frustrate the right to a prompt public trial when 
the charge is, in fact, sufficient to warrant removal. 
¶50 The FPC is conflicted by its statutory role in 
investigating complaints against members and then sitting in 
judgment on these complaints.  Rules can help to reconcile this 
conflict without sacrificing fairness either to the grievant or 
to the member. 
1. 
Section 1 is Invalid 
¶51 Section 1 of the Rule defines a citizen complaint as 
"any written communication . . . which alleges a violation of 
rules or standard operating procedures[,]" and which meets the 
requirements of Sections 2, 3, and 4.  This section is 
problematic because it implies that a complainant must be able 
to cite a violation of a specific rule or standard operating 
procedure in order to file a complaint.  Furthermore, this 
section does not assure a consistent response to each complaint.   
No.  2004AP3306 
24 
 
¶52 From the record in this case, it is not clear whether 
Rule XVII requires a complainant to cite the rule allegedly 
being violated or simply to describe the alleged misconduct that 
constitutes a violation.  At the motion hearing on the 
declaratory judgment in the circuit court, the FPC implied that 
a complainant had the duty to cite a specific rule violation in 
the complaint.  The FPC stated at the hearing that the 
complainant has "to be able to identify a rule violation or an 
order violation or violation of standard operating procedures."  
Earlier in the proceeding, when the circuit court stated that 
the requirement for a complainant to cite a rule violation was a 
"sticking point," the FPC responded that "[t]he rules and the 
[standard operating procedures] are available at every public 
library.  There isn't a person in the city that cannot obtain a 
true, correct, accurate copy."   
¶53 By contrast, there is language in section 4, entitled 
"Contents and Form of Complaint," that the complainant provide 
only a "description of the alleged misconduct."  In addition, 
the citizen complaint form does not request the complainant to 
cite any specific rule violation where it asks the complainant 
to describe the alleged misconduct.  However, the citizen 
complaint form does state in a paragraph at the top of the form 
that "[t]he Fire and Police Commission's citizen complaint 
process is designed to address allegations of intentional acts 
of 
misconduct 
by 
specific 
department 
members 
which 
are 
violations of Department rules."  (Emphasis added.)   
No.  2004AP3306 
25 
 
¶54 According to an affidavit from David Heard, the FPC's 
Executive Director, FPC practice is that the FPC staff "reviews 
the complaint to determine which, if any, rule violations of the 
Milwaukee Police or Fire Department may have occurred."  Heard 
explained that the FPC staff has a formatted memo that allows 
the staff members to "summarize in their own words the 
allegations of the complaint and to provide a list of the most 
commonly occurring rule violations that staff can literally 'cut 
and paste' into the memo to match the allegations contained in 
the citizen complaint." 
¶55 However, in this case, according to another of Heard's 
affidavits, the FPC staff "requested from the individual 
complainants that each complainant attempt to identify the 
specific rule violation that related to each of the [accused]." 
¶56 Whatever the practices of the FPC have been, the 
language 
of 
Rule 
XVII 
contravenes 
the 
language 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19).  Wisconsin Stat. § 62.50(19) does not 
require the complainant to allege a rule violation; it requires 
the complainant to set forth "sufficient cause for the removal."  
This might be established by a rule violation, but it might also 
be shown by other means.   
¶57 Section 1 is misleading because it appears to equate 
setting forth sufficient cause for removal with alleging a rule 
violation.  The FPC argues that Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) must be 
read in conjunction with Wis. Stat. § 62.50(17), which pertains 
to the just cause standard that the Board is to apply when 
No.  2004AP3306 
26 
 
deciding whether to impose discipline.6  However, while the just 
cause standard in Wis. Stat. § 62.50(17) may require the Board 
to consider whether the member violated a rule or order, 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50 does not require the complainant to cite a 
rule or standard operating procedure to set forth sufficient 
cause for removal. 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 62.50(17)(b) provides in part: 
In making its determination, the board shall apply the 
following standards, to the extent applicable: 
1. 
Whether the subordinate could reasonably be 
expected to have had knowledge of the probable 
consequences of the alleged conduct. 
2. 
Whether 
the 
rule 
or 
order 
that 
the 
subordinate allegedly violated is reasonable. 
3. 
Whether the chief, before filing the charge 
against the subordinate, made a reasonable effort to 
discover whether the subordinate did in fact violate a 
rule or order. 
4. 
Whether the effort described under subd. 3 
was fair and objective. 
5. 
Whether the chief discovered substantial 
evidence that the subordinate violated the rule or 
order as described in the charges filed against the 
subordinate. 
6. 
Whether the chief is applying the rule or 
order fairly and without discrimination against the 
subordinate. 
7. 
Whether the proposed discipline reasonably 
relates to the seriousness of the alleged violation 
and to the subordinate's record of service with the 
chief's department.   
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(17)(b).   
No.  2004AP3306 
27 
 
¶58 To require the complainant to cite a specific rule or 
standard operating procedure that the complainant believes was 
violated 
also 
frustrates 
the 
legislative 
intent 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) because such a requirement is unduly 
burdensome.  First, complainants are typically not represented 
by counsel.  Second, the rules and standard operating procedures 
are more than 500 pages long.  Third, versions of the current 
rules and standard operating procedures may be inaccessible to 
the general public.  Counsel for the FPC, after having been 
requested by the circuit court to provide it with a current copy 
of the Milwaukee Police Department rules and standard operating 
procedures, conceded that, while the Milwaukee Public Library 
did have 13 copies, the copies were all from the year 2000 and 
did not reflect the most current updates.  As the circuit court 
noted, "[t]o require a citizen to comb through these rules and 
determine which one or ones are applicable . . . is unreasonable 
and not consistent with the intent to give the citizen access to 
government." 
¶59 Section 1, as written, is invalid because it appears 
to create a barrier to filing a complaint that does not exist in 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19). 
2. 
Section 2 is Invalid 
 
¶60 Section 2 is entitled "Who May File a Citizen 
Complaint."  The section is unduly restrictive and therefore 
frustrates legislative intent.  It limits the filing of a 
complaint to an "aggrieved person," and it defines an aggrieved 
person as "someone who is directly affected by the alleged 
No.  2004AP3306 
28 
 
misconduct, or the parent or legal guardian of a minor who is 
directly affected by the alleged misconduct."  (Emphasis added.)  
There may be situations in which a person who is not a minor may 
be unable to file a written complaint.  For example, the rule 
does not provide who may bring a complaint on behalf of deceased 
victims. 
 
Furthermore, 
the 
rule 
does 
not 
account 
for 
eyewitnesses of wrongdoing who may not be directly affected by 
the alleged misconduct.  A well-crafted rule should be able to 
take account of these special situations. 
3. 
Section 4 is Invalid 
¶61 Section 4 is invalid, but not for the exact reasons 
given by the circuit court.  The circuit court declared that 
subsection 4(a) of Rule XVII contravenes Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) 
by requiring citizen complaints to state cause for removal.  The 
circuit 
court 
reasoned 
that 
because 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) 
allows the Board to impose discipline less than removal, the 
complainant need not seek only the remedy for removal in his or 
her complaint.  Therefore, the circuit court concluded that the 
complainant need not state cause for removal, but may state 
cause for other disciplinary action, in the complaint. 
¶62 The circuit court's interpretation is not consistent 
with our reading of the statute.  The statute calls for the 
complainant to set forth "sufficient cause for the removal of 
[a] member."  Hence, the ability to proceed does not depend on 
the ultimate objective of a complainant in terms of discipline; 
the ability to proceed under Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) depends on 
whether the conduct alleged is "sufficient" to warrant removal 
No.  2004AP3306 
29 
 
of a member.  Although Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) allows the Board 
to impose discipline less severe than removal, the statute still 
requires that the complaint satisfy a minimum standard in 
setting forth sufficient cause for removal.  Subsections 4(a) 
and (b) of Rule XVII accurately reflect the difference in 
proceeding 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19), 
where 
the 
alleged 
misconduct is sufficient to warrant removal, or proceeding under 
the City of Milwaukee Charter Ordinance (Charter Ordinance), 
where the alleged misconduct is grounds for discipline but may 
not warrant removal.   
¶63 Therefore, so far as Rule XVII requires a complainant 
to 
state 
cause 
for 
removal 
to 
proceed 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19), the rule is valid.  In addition, the 
requirement in section 4 that the complainant specify whether 
the complaint is being filed pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) 
or the City Charter is also valid.  However, to avoid confusing 
citizens who may not know under which provision to proceed, a 
well-crafted rule should clarify the gravity of the "individual 
acts" 
necessary 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) 
versus 
the 
"individual acts" necessary under the City Charter.7   
                                                 
7 We note that the language in the citizen complaint form is 
most likely at fault for causing some of the circuit court's 
confusion and should be modified.  The citizen complaint form 
informs 
the 
complainant 
that 
he 
may 
proceed 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) only if he "believe[s] the department 
member(s) is/are guilty of misconduct which should result in the 
removal (termination) of the member(s) from the department."  
(Emphasis added.)  The language in the citizen complaint form 
might 
better 
direct 
the 
complainant 
to 
proceed 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) 
only 
if 
he 
believes 
the 
alleged 
misconduct would constitute grounds for removal.   
No.  2004AP3306 
30 
 
¶64 The provision in section 4, which requires the 
complainant 
to 
state 
the 
"name, 
badge 
number 
or 
other 
identification of the accused member(s)" is invalid.  It 
frustrates legislative intent when it does not account for 
situations, such as the El Rey police raid, where the 
complainant alleges that the members deliberately concealed 
their identities.  The language may deter complainants from 
filing a complaint because they do not know the identity of the 
accused member.  The language in any new rule should be less 
restrictive 
and 
request 
the 
complainant 
to 
provide 
the 
identification information or description of the member to the 
best of his or her knowledge. 
¶65 We note that the last paragraph in subsection 4(b) 
implies that the FPC takes measures to identify officers 
described in the complaint by requesting department records from 
the fire and police departments.  In addition, according to 
Heard's affidavit, FPC staff works with the fire and police 
departments to aid in the identification of accused members.8  
While this effort of FPC staff to identify the accused members 
may be part of the FPC's practice, the language in Rule XVII, 
the citizen complaint form, and the citizen complaint guide9 all 
                                                 
8 In this case, however, the parties disputed whether 
Castaneda obtained through an open records request the names of 
the members involved in the police raid or whether the FPC 
obtained the names. 
9 The "Guide to the Citizen Complaint Procedure" is a 
publication by the Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission that 
informs citizens of the complaint procedure and guides them in 
filling out their complaints. 
No.  2004AP3306 
31 
 
direct the complainant to identify the officer and suggest that 
the failure to identify the accused member will lead to a 
dismissal of the complaint.  This must be clarified in any new 
rule. 
4. 
Section 6 is Invalid 
¶66 Section 6 is entitled "Provisional Jurisdiction and 
Further Appropriate Action."  There are several problems with 
this section.  First, subsection 6(a) provides that "[t]he 
Committee on Rules and Complaints will review all complaints and 
determine whether the Board has jurisdiction over both the 
accused member and the subject matter of the complaint."  This 
part of the Rule fails to incorporate any limit on the time to 
review the complaint before making a recommendation to the 
Board.  In this case, the joint complaint was filed on November 
7, 2002.  The Committee waited almost a year before it made its 
recommendations to the Board on October 2, 2003.  It appears as 
though the Board did not decide to act on the joint complaint 
until after Castaneda filed a mandamus action in circuit court.  
The absence of any timetable for decision may facilitate delays 
in making recommendations on complaints. 
¶67 Under the present rule, the Committee is expected to 
make a recommendation on the sufficiency of the complaint 
(jurisdiction over the subject matter) and FPC's jurisdiction 
No.  2004AP3306 
32 
 
over the accused member.10  Inasmuch as the FPC has decided to 
have a rule, the rule ought to have some timetable for making 
decisions.  We acknowledge that if a timetable is set, there 
will be situations that require additional time.  These 
situations should require some formal explanation and the 
setting of deadlines for determining jurisdiction.  If there 
were no Rule XVII, a grievant would be able to seek a writ of 
mandamus without facing the uncertainty inherent in a rule 
without a timetable. 
¶68 Preliminary investigation of the complaint prior to a 
decision on jurisdiction is one of the situations that may 
require additional time.  Referral to the fire or police 
department may be appropriate as a part of the investigation 
prior to a determination of jurisdiction.11  However, the FPC 
should retain control of the complaint, unless referral to the 
chief or to a department is made after dismissal.   
¶69 Subsection 
6(b) 
allows 
the 
Committee 
to 
make 
recommendations to the Board that are inconsistent with the 
                                                 
10 The Board would not have jurisdiction over the accused 
individual and would be able to dismiss the complaint if, for 
example, the accused individual is employed by a different 
governing jurisdiction or if the accused individual has resigned 
or been terminated for other reasons.  In such circumstances, 
the accused individual is a not a member of either the police or 
fire department as contemplated under Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19).   
11 However, in cases where the chief of either the police or 
fire department is one of the subjects of the complaint, the 
Board should not use the chief for help with investigation.  In 
this case, Milwaukee Chief of Police Arthur Jones was one of the 
subjects of the complaint and should not have been involved in 
the investigation. 
No.  2004AP3306 
33 
 
language in Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19).  Subsection 6(b) allows the 
Committee to make the following recommendations to the Board: 
(i) dismiss the complaint "for lack of prosecutorial merit or 
for such other reason as may be determined by the Committee[;]" 
(ii) dismiss the complaint and refer it "to the Milwaukee Police 
or Fire Department for investigation and disposition;" (iii) 
proceed with the complaint for conciliation, pretrial, and 
trial; (iv) hold the complaint "in committee to give staff an 
opportunity to obtain additional information;" or (v) take 
"other such actions as the Committee may deem appropriate."  
(Emphasis added.) 
¶70 The plain language of Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) gives the 
Board only two options: (i) the Board may dismiss the complaint 
for failure to "set[] forth sufficient cause for the removal of 
any member of either of the departments;" or (ii) the Board 
"shall set a date for the trial and investigation of the 
charges, following the procedure under [Wis. Stat. § 62.50]."  
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19). 
¶71 The FPC should not refer the complaint to the fire or 
police department for disposition unless the Board dismisses the 
complaint on legal grounds.  The Board's judgment will then be 
subject to certiorari review.  See Conway, 262 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶47-
48. 
 
To 
do 
otherwise 
is 
in 
direct 
contravention 
of 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) 
and 
inconsistent 
with 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(12). 
 
Wisconsin Stat. § 62.50(12) 
directs 
that "[w]henever complaint against any member of the force of 
either department is made to the chief thereof, the chief shall 
No.  2004AP3306 
34 
 
immediately communicate the same to the board of fire and police 
commissioners and a trial shall be ordered by the board under 
this 
section." 
 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(12). 
 
This 
statutory 
directive 
appears 
to 
reflect 
a 
legislative 
intent 
that 
complaints be directed from the chief to the Board, not vice 
versa.   
¶72 The Committee's other options, such as conciliation, 
may be desirable, but they must not obfuscate or swallow up a 
complainant's right to a decision under the statute, unless they 
are pursued with the complainant's consent.  Dismissal of a 
complaint with the consent of the complainant is reasonable.  
Dismissal of a complaint that has prosecutorial merit "for such 
other reason as may be determined by the Committee" does not 
square with the statute. 
¶73 In several respects, then, section 6 is in direct 
contravention of Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) because it allows the 
Board to take actions that are not authorized by the text of the 
statute.   
¶74 We now examine other sections of the Rule for comment. 
5. 
Section 7 
¶75 Subsection 
7(a) 
authorizes 
conciliation 
at 
the 
instance of the FPC and then requires a complainant to 
participate.  Failure of the complainant to appear at the 
conciliation conference results in a recommendation to the Board 
that 
the 
complaint 
be 
dismissed. 
 
Required 
conciliation 
contravenes Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19).  Wisconsin Stat. § 62.50(19) 
states that the Board "shall set a date for the trial and 
No.  2004AP3306 
35 
 
investigation of the charges."  It does not mandate that a 
complainant participate in conciliation.  While conciliation may 
be an effective tool in processing citizen complaints, it must 
be voluntary under the statute, not mandatory.12  In addition, 
the procedure for conciliation should be agreed upon by the 
complainant and the accused member.  Therefore, subsection 
7(b)'s requirement that "counsel may act as an observer only" 
appears 
to 
be 
inconsistent 
with 
a 
grievant's 
voluntary 
participation in conciliation.  Once again, conciliation will 
often be helpful, but Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) does not permit the 
FPC to force conciliation on an unwilling complainant. 
6. 
Section 8 
¶76 Section 8, which requires a written request for an 
adjournment of trial at least five working days before the 
scheduled trial date, appears too rigid to apply in all 
circumstances.  Wisconsin Stat. § 62.50(16) provides that "[t]he 
accused and the chief shall have the right to an adjournment of 
the trial or investigation of the charges, not to exceed 15 
days."  Imposing an inflexible five days notice for an 
adjournment on a grievant may obstruct the facilitation of the 
citizen complaint procedure.   
                                                 
12 We acknowledge that conciliation has been reported to be 
"[t]he only aspect of the FPC complaint process that appears to 
have worked."  Richard Jerome, Police Assessment Resource 
Center, Promoting Police Accountability in Milwaukee 50 (2006).   
No.  2004AP3306 
36 
 
CONCLUSION 
¶77 We affirm as modified the circuit court's judgment 
declaring Rule XVII invalid.  We invalidate sections 1, 2, 4, 
and 6 and therefore affirm the circuit court's invalidation of 
Rule XVII in its entirety.  We affirm the circuit court's 
invalidation of subsection 6(b)(i). We reverse, however, the 
circuit court's invalidation of subsection 4(a), which requires 
complainants to state cause for removal.  We also reverse the 
circuit court's conclusion that the Board has no authority to 
promulgate rules concerning citizen complaint proceedings under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19).   
¶78 If the Board wants to promulgate a rule, it should 
craft a rule that better reflects the purpose intended by the 
legislature of providing persons with serious grievances against 
a member the right to present those grievances at a public 
trial.   
¶79 We are advised that under this present Rule, the Board 
has conducted only four trials, has imposed no discipline in 491 
complaints since 1998, and has conducted no trials since 2001.  
Although parts of the Rule are plainly defective, the court is 
hard pressed to rally to its defense in the face of these 
statistics.  If the Board wants to promulgate a rule, it should 
start over and devise a rule that assures fair procedures for 
members without creating an obstacle course for persons with a 
grievance. 
¶80 We recognize some of the challenges that are inherent 
in 
the 
citizen 
complaint 
procedure 
as 
provided 
in 
No.  2004AP3306 
37 
 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19). 
 
For 
instance, 
we 
recognize 
the 
sensitive balance between the Board's duty to remain neutral and 
its duty to facilitate citizen complaints.  However, because 
complainants are often unrepresented by counsel, the Board's 
staff must bear some responsibility with regard to the technical 
aspects of the complaint, such as assisting with identifying the 
accused member, citing a specific rule violation, and aiding a 
complainant 
in 
deciding 
whether 
to 
proceed 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19) or the Charter Ordinance.   
¶81 We recognize that the Board is a citizen body charged 
with many responsibilities under Wis. Stat. § 62.50.  We affirm 
the Board's use of the chief to help with its investigation of 
the charges, but we must invalidate the Board's practice of 
referring a complaint to the chief for investigation and 
disposition, at least until the Board formally dismisses the 
complaint for insufficiency.   
¶82 We conclude that the Board does have authority to 
promulgate rules under Wis. Stat. § 62.50(19).  However, the 
Board exceeded its statutory authority in promulgating sections 
1, 2, 4, and 6 of Rule XVII.  We therefore declare Rule XVII 
invalid in its entirety.   
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is modified 
and, as modified, affirmed; rights declared.   
¶83 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate. 
 
 
 
No.  2004AP3306 
38 
 
APPENDIX 
RULE XVII 
CITIZEN COMPLAINT PROCEDURE 
Section 1. CITIZEN COMPLAINT DEFINED. A citizen 
complaint is any written communication received by the 
Fire and Police Commission which alleges a violation 
of rules or standard operating procedures by a member 
of either the Fire or Police Department, which meets 
the requirements of Sections 2, 3 and 4 below. 
Section 2. WHO MAY FILE A CITIZEN COMPLAINT. Any 
aggrieved person may file a written complaint alleging 
misconduct by a member of either the Fire Department 
or Police Department. An aggrieved person is someone 
who is directly affected by the alleged misconduct, or 
the parent or legal guardian of a minor who is 
directly affected by the alleged misconduct.  
Section 3. WHERE AND HOW TO FILE. A complaint alleging 
misconduct by a member of either the Fire or Police 
Department must be filed by mailing or delivering a 
properly executed complaint to the Board of Fire and 
Police Commissioners, City Hall, 200 East Wells 
Street, Room 706, Milwaukee, WI, 53202.  
Section 4. CONTENTS AND FORM OF COMPLAINT. The 
complaint must state, in plain language, the full 
name, address and telephone number of the complainant; 
the name, badge number or other identification of the 
accused member(s); the date, approximate time and 
location of the incident; and a description of the 
alleged misconduct. The complainant (aggrieved person) 
must specify whether the complaint is being filed 
pursuant 
to 
Section 
62.50(19) 
of 
the 
Wisconsin 
Statutes or the City of Milwaukee Charter Ordinances.  
(a) If the complaint is filed under the State 
Statute, the complaint must describe individual 
acts 
of 
each 
accused 
member 
which 
would 
constitute grounds for removal (firing) of the 
member(s) from the department. The complaint must 
be signed by the aggrieved person, or the parent 
or legal guardian of an aggrieved minor, in the 
presence of a notary. The person signing the 
No.  2004AP3306 
39 
 
complaint must, upon oath or affirmation, declare 
that the contents of the complaint are true and 
correct to the best of that person’s knowledge. 
The complaint must also be signed and dated by a 
notary. 
(b) If the complaint is filed under the Charter 
Ordinance, the complaint must describe individual 
acts of each member accused which would be 
grounds for discipline. The complaint must be 
signed by the aggrieved person or the parent or 
guardian of an aggrieved minor.  
The Fire and Police Departments shall permit the 
Executive 
Director, 
or 
designee, 
to 
access 
all 
department records other than personnel records which 
are relevant to the incident stated in the complaint, 
as may be necessary to determine the identity of the 
officer(s) involved. Any records reviewed are for this 
limited purpose only. Should provisional jurisdiction 
be granted, the accused member(s) shall, upon request, 
be provided with copies of documents used to establish 
identity.  
Section 5. RECEIPT OF COMPLAINT AND TRANSMITTAL TO 
BOARD. Upon receipt of a complaint at the Fire and 
Police Commission, a docket number will be assigned. 
The complaint will then be given to the Committee on 
Rules and Complaints and placed on the Rules and 
Complaints Committee agenda.  
Section 
6. 
PROVISIONAL 
JURISDICTION 
AND 
FURTHER 
APPROPRIATE ACTION. 
(a) The Committee on Rules and Complaints will review 
all complaints and determine whether the Board has 
jurisdiction over both the accused member and the 
subject matter of the complaint.  
(b) The 
Committee 
will 
report 
to 
the 
Board 
recommendations regarding provisional jurisdiction and 
will recommend one of the following alternatives:  
(i) that the complaint be dismissed for lack of 
prosecutorial merit or for such other reason as 
may be determined by the Committee, or that the 
complaint 
be dismissed and referred to the 
No.  2004AP3306 
40 
 
Milwaukee 
Police 
or 
Fire 
Department 
for 
investigation and disposition; or  
(ii) that the matter be referred to the Board, or 
to a Hearing Examiner to be designated by the 
Board, for conciliation, pretrial and trial; or  
(iii) 
that the complaint be held in committee 
to give staff an opportunity to obtain additional 
information; or  
(iv) other such actions as the Committee may deem 
appropriate.  
(c) Upon 
receipt 
of 
the 
recommendation 
of 
the 
Committee, the Board, by majority vote in open 
session, will make and announce its decision regarding 
whether provisional jurisdiction will be granted and 
how the matter is to proceed.  
(d) If provisional jurisdiction is not granted, the 
Board will dismiss the complaint and will advise the 
complainant in writing of the denial and the reason(s) 
for such denial.  
(e) If the Board grants provisional jurisdiction, the 
complainant will be notified in writing of such 
action. A copy of the complaint and a Notice of 
Complaint will be served upon the accused member(s) 
and the Chief of the department, with a statement 
indicating the department rule which is alleged to 
have been violated.  
Section 7. REFERRAL FOR CONCILIATION, PRETRIAL AND 
TRIAL. PROCEDURE. 
(a) Any complaint which is recommended for trial 
pursuant to Section 6(b)(ii) above may be referred for 
conciliation. 
Written 
notice 
of 
a 
conciliation 
conference, to take place within thirty (30) calendar 
days of referral, will be sent to both the complainant 
and the accused member, or their counsel. The notice 
will indicate the date, time and place of conciliation 
conference and will advise the parties that the 
attendance of both the complainant and the accused 
member is required.  
No.  2004AP3306 
41 
 
(b) The conciliation conference will be conducted by 
a member of the Board or the Board’s designee. The 
conference 
will 
be 
informal, 
with 
both 
parties 
encouraged to discuss the matter in an attempt to 
resolve it short of trial. Either party may be 
accompanied by legal counsel, but counsel may act as 
an observer only. The purpose of the conciliation 
conference 
is 
to 
seek 
resolution, 
not 
pretrial 
discovery, and statements made at the conciliation 
conference will not be admissible at time of trial. 
Any Board member who participates in the conciliation 
conference will not, unless both parties agree in 
writing, participate in any subsequent trial on the 
complaint. No individual who participates in the 
conciliation conference may sit as Hearing Examiner 
(see Section 10 below), unless both parties agree in 
writing.  
(c) Failure of the complainant to appear at the 
conciliation 
conference 
shall 
result 
in 
a 
recommendation to the Board that the complaint be 
dismissed. Members of both departments are required to 
appear at the conciliation conference. Failure of the 
accused member to appear shall result in a referral to 
the 
chief 
of 
the 
appropriate 
department 
for 
investigation and possible disciplinary action. 
(d) If 
a 
mutual 
agreement 
is 
reached 
at 
the 
conciliation conference, both parties will be asked to 
sign a statement of resolution stating that the 
dispute has been resolved and that the matter may be 
dismissed. If the resolution requires any further 
action by either party, the statement of resolution 
will specify the action required and state that, upon 
completion of the action required, the matter is to be 
dismissed. 
A 
copy 
of 
the 
signed 
statement 
of 
resolution will be given to each party. When the 
complainant and accused notify the Board that all 
necessary action has been completed, the matter will 
be recommended for dismissal, based upon successful 
conciliation, at a meeting of the Board.  
(e) If no conciliation agreement is reached, the 
matter will be returned to the Committee on Rules and 
Complaints for dismissal or scheduling of a pretrial 
conference or other action as the Committee deems 
appropriate.  
No.  2004AP3306 
42 
 
(f) The purpose of the pretrial conference is to 
attempt a final settlement effort, narrow the issues 
to be tried, and shorten the length of time necessary 
to complete presentation of evidence at trial. To 
accomplish these tasks, the pretrial conference will 
include: 
(i) Final settlement negotiations; and, 
(ii) Establishment of dates for the exchange and 
filing of witness and exhibit lists; and,  
(iii) 
Establishment of dates for the exchange 
of accurate copies of exhibits; and,  
(iv) Determination 
of 
the 
issue(s) 
to 
be 
addressed at trial; and,  
(v) Execution of a Pretrial Order by the Hearing 
Examiner, 
with a copy supplied to parties, 
setting forth the trial date and any remaining 
requirements 
for 
trial 
preparation 
by 
the 
parties, with deadlines for such activities.  
(g) A request for postponement of the conciliation 
conference or pretrial must be submitted in writing to 
the Board at least five (5) working days prior to the 
scheduled conciliation or pretrial date. The Board 
will decide whether to allow the postponement.  
(h) Both parties must provide witness and exhibit 
lists to the Board and the opposing party. Copies of 
all proposed exhibits will be supplied to the opposing 
party according to the schedule determined at the 
pretrial 
conference. 
Actual 
copies 
of 
proposed 
exhibits need not be filed with the Board until they 
are introduced at trial.  
(i) Failure of either party to exchange witness 
lists, exhibit lists or copies of proposed exhibits 
according to the scheduling order, unless an extension 
is granted in writing by the Board or its designated 
Hearing Examiner, may result in denial of the right to 
call any witness or present any exhibit not supplied 
in a timely fashion pursuant to this section. Denial 
may be made, at the discretion of the Board, either 
prior to trial or at time of trial upon the motion of 
opposing party or counsel. 
No.  2004AP3306 
43 
 
Section 8. TRIAL DATES AND ADJOURNMENTS. The Hearing 
Examiner will set the date and time of trial and will 
notify the complainant and the accused by mail, at 
least fourteen (14) calendar days before the trial. 
The accused and the complainant have the right to an 
adjournment of the trial date not to exceed fifteen 
(15) calendar days provided that a written request for 
adjournment is received by the Board at least five (5) 
working days before the scheduled trial date. Any 
subsequent request for adjournment of the trial date 
must be in writing and received by the Board at least 
five (5) working days prior to trial and must state 
the reasons for the request. The Board may grant any 
adjournment request upon a proper and timely showing 
of good cause. The Board may adjourn any trial at its 
own volition.  
Section 9. TRIAL PROCEDURE. WITNESSES. Witnesses may 
be required to attend any scheduled trial and give 
testimony 
when 
served 
with 
a 
Board 
subpoena. 
Preparation 
and 
service 
of 
a 
subpoena 
is 
the 
responsibility of the party desiring attendance of the 
witness. 
Section 10. TRIAL BEFORE THE EXAMINER. PROCEDURE. The 
Hearing Examiner will preside over any trial and is 
authorized to make any and all evidentiary rulings 
necessary during the trial. Procedural and evidentiary 
rules governing trials before the Board will also 
apply to trials before the Hearing Examiner. Within 
twenty (20) calendar days after the close of the 
proceedings, the Hearing Examiner will provide to the 
Board a transcript of the proceedings and a report 
summarizing the evidence presented, and containing 
proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and a 
recommended disposition. At the same time, a copy of 
the report only will be mailed to all parties or their 
respective counsels. Within twenty (20) calendar days 
of mailing the report to the parties, the parties may 
file written briefs with the Board setting forth their 
respective positions. Any reference to the transcript 
of the proceedings must be accompanied by pertinent 
portions of the transcript. Within ten (10) calendar 
days of the filing of the briefs, the Board may, at 
its option, schedule the matter for oral argument. The 
Board will meet on the date scheduled for disposition 
and, after receiving oral argument, if necessary, 
No.  2004AP3306 
44 
 
deliberate in closed session. The Board shall then, in 
open session, render a decision, which will either 
accept the Hearing Examiner’s report or will make 
appropriate 
modifications 
to 
it. 
If 
the 
Board 
determines that the charges are sustained, it will 
then proceed to the dispositional phase in accordance 
with Section 20 of this Rule. 
Section 11. TRIAL BEFORE THE BOARD. PRESIDING OFFICER. 
The Hearing Examiner will preside at a trial before 
the Board, and shall be responsible for conducting the 
trial. The Hearing Examiner will rule upon all matters 
arising in the course of the trial provided Fire and 
Police Commission members are in attendance and all 
decisions, determinations and dispositions are made by 
the Board members.  
Section 12. GENERAL CONDUCT OF TRIAL. DECORUM. All 
trials conducted under this rule will, to the extent 
possible, be informal. Testimony may be elicited 
either through interrogation or in narrative form. The 
Wisconsin Rules of Evidence will apply in the same 
manner that they apply in a civil case. The Board may 
relax the rules of evidence if it deems the interests 
of justice to be served thereby. The trial shall be 
conducted 
to 
assure fundamental fairness to the 
parties. Objections to evidentiary offers and offers 
of proof regarding evidence ruled inadmiss[i]ble may 
be made and incorporated into the record. Witnesses 
may be sequestered at the request of either party or 
upon motion of the Board. 
Section 
13. 
INADMISS[I]BLE 
EVIDENCE. 
Evidence 
resulting from personnel investigations of the Fire 
Department 
or 
Police 
Department, 
or 
from 
an 
investigation by the City Attorney for the purpose of 
a civil action, or gathered ex parte regarding the 
specific citizen complaint by investigation of the 
Board, is not admissible.  
Section 14. EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE BY NOTICE. The Board 
may take official notice of, and accept as evidence 
without additional foundation, the constitutions of 
the United States and the State of Wisconsin, the laws 
of the State of Wisconsin, applicable case law 
interpreting relevant legal issues, the Charter of the 
City 
of 
Milwaukee, 
ordinances 
of 
the 
City 
of 
Milwaukee, Fire and Police Commission Rules and By 
No.  2004AP3306 
45 
 
Laws, applicable Fire Department or Police Department 
rules and regulations, and previous written decisions 
of the City of Milwaukee Board of Fire and Police 
Commissioners. 
Section 
15. 
DOCUMENTARY 
EVIDENCE 
ADMISSIBLE 
VIA 
CERTIFICATION OR REASONABLE VERIFICATION. Relevant 
information or records which are either certified or 
contain 
reasonable 
guarantees 
of 
trustworthiness 
through questioning of the proponent under oath, may 
be admissible without the necessity of presenting 
direct testimony from the source of such records. 
Section 16. TRIALS OPEN TO PUBLIC. All trials are open 
to the public.  
Section 17. PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE AT TRIAL. BURDEN 
OF PROOF. The complainant must prove the charges by a 
preponderance 
of 
the 
evidence. 
(That 
is, 
the 
complainant must show that it is more likely than not 
that the charges are true.) The complainant will make 
the first presentation of witnesses and exhibits, 
after 
which 
the 
accused 
will 
have 
a 
similar 
opportunity. Cross examination of all witnesses is 
permitted. Either party may be called as a witness by 
the other party.  
Section 18. TRIAL SUMMATION AND DECISION OF THE BOARD. 
After presentation of evidence regarding the charges 
filed against the accused member, each party will be 
permitted to offer a five (5) minute summation of the 
evidence. The Board will then deliberate in closed 
session 
to 
consider 
the 
testimony 
and 
evidence 
received. Upon reaching a decision by majority vote, 
the Board will announce its decision on the record, in 
open session. 
Section 19. TRIAL PROCEDURE. FAILURE TO MEET BURDEN TO 
RESULT IN DISMISSAL. If the Board determines that the 
complainant has not met the burden of proof, the 
matter will immediately be dismissed and proceedings 
terminated. A summary of proceedings, findings of fact 
and decision will be prepared by the Hearing Examiner 
and signed by a Board member within three (3) working 
days after such decision is made. A copy of the 
written decision will be mailed to each of the 
parties.  
No.  2004AP3306 
46 
 
Section 20. TRIAL PROCEDURE. BURDEN MET. DISPOSITIONAL 
PHASE AND DECISION. At the beginning of the trial, the 
department will provide the Hearing Examiner with a 
sealed copy of the employment history and performance 
records of the accused member(s). These file(s) will 
be retained by the Hearing Examiner, and will not be 
opened 
or 
viewed 
by 
Board 
members, 
unless 
a 
determination has been made that the charges have been 
sustained. If the Board finds that the accused 
violated a department rule or procedure, the Board 
will review the employment history and performance 
records of the member(s) or such other personnel 
records as the Board may request. The Board will then 
receive testimony, exhibits, and oral argument from 
each party concerning disposition. Oral argument will 
be limited to five (5) minutes for each party. After 
hearing 
testimony 
and 
argument, 
the 
Board 
will 
deliberate in closed session until a decision is 
reached by majority vote. The Board will then announce 
its decision to the parties and the public. A written 
summary of proceedings, findings of fact and decision 
will be prepared by the Hearing Examiner and signed by 
a Board member within three (3) working days after the 
decision is announced. A copy of the decision will be 
mailed to all parties.  
Section 21. DISPOSITIONAL OPTIONS. Upon a finding of 
guilt, the Board has the following dispositional 
options: 
(a) Suspension without pay for a set period not to 
exceed the equivalent of 60 working days; or,  
(b) Demotion to a lesser rank within the department, 
with a corresponding decrease in pay and benefits; or,  
(c) Discharge from the department; or,  
(d) Other such dispositions as permitted by law.  
 
 
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