Case Title: State v. Martinelli

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017 ME 217

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2017-11-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 217 
Docket: 
Pen-17-49 
Argued: 
October 25, 2017 
Decided: 
November 28, 2017 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
STATE OF MAINE 
 
v. 
 
MICHAEL MARTINELLI 
 
 
MEAD, J. 
 
[¶1]  Michael Martinelli appeals from an order entered by the trial court 
(Penobscot County, Lucy, J.) denying his motion to dismiss a complaint charging 
him with operating under the influence (OUI) (Class D), 29-A M.R.S. 
§ 2411(1-A)(C)(1) (2016).  He contends that, because he had already been 
convicted after a jury trial on a complaint containing the identical charging 
language, forcing him to stand trial on the complaint at bar would violate his 
constitutional rights to be free from double jeopardy.  U.S. Const. amend. V; 
Me. Const. art. I, § 8.  We conclude that Martinelli’s double jeopardy protections 
are not implicated on these facts and affirm the order. 
 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
 
[¶2]  The procedural facts are not disputed.  On September 18, 2015, the 
State charged Martinelli with OUI (Class D), alleging a violation of 
29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(C)(1), in a complaint assigned docket number 
PENCD-CR-2015-03461 (hereinafter 3461).  The complaint alleged: 
On or about May 6, 2015, in Bangor, Penobscot County, Maine, 
MICHAEL MARTINELLI, did operate a motor vehicle while under 
the influence of intoxicants.  MICHAEL MARTINELLI failed to 
submit to a test at the request of a law enforcement officer. 
 
At the hearing on Martinelli’s motion to dismiss, the parties agreed that the 
incident giving rise to the complaint in 3461 occurred shortly after midnight on 
May 6, 2015.  Martinelli was convicted of the charge after a jury trial held 
November 16-17, 2016; the court (Mallonee, J.) entered judgment and 
sentenced Martinelli to four days’ incarceration in the Penobscot County Jail, 
a $600 fine, and a 150-day license suspension.  Martinelli did not appeal. 
 
[¶3]  On June 3, 2015, about three months before the complaint in 3461 
was filed, the State had charged Martinelli with OUI (Class D), also alleging a 
violation of 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(C)(1), in a complaint assigned docket 
number PENCD-CR-2015-01568 (hereinafter 1568).1  At the hearing, the 
                                         
1  It is unclear why the two complaints proceeded separately, or with such different timelines. 
 
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parties agreed that the incident giving rise to this complaint occurred at about 
11:30 p.m. on May 6, 2015, just under twenty-four hours after the incident 
charged in 3461.  As later amended, the charging language of the two 
complaints is identical. 
 
[¶4]  On November 29, 2016, Martinelli moved to dismiss the complaint 
in 1568 with prejudice on the ground that forcing him to defend against the 
charge violated his rights under the federal and state constitutions to be free 
from double jeopardy.  The court held a hearing and denied the motion by 
written order, concluding that “the State has met its burden of demonstrating 
that this case does not involve the same conduct for which Defendant has 
already been convicted.”  Martinelli filed this interlocutory appeal, which we 
entertain as an exception to the final judgment rule.  State v. Hoover, 
2015 ME 109, ¶ 10 n.1, 121 A.3d 1281. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶5]  Martinelli is protected from being “twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb” by the United States and Maine Constitutions, which afford coextensive 
protections.  U.S. Const. amend. V; Me. Const. art. I, § 8; Ayotte v. State, 
2015 ME 158, ¶ 12, 129 A.3d 285.  Pertinent to this case, “[t]he constitutional 
prohibitions against double jeopardy prohibit . . . a second prosecution for the 
 
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same offense after conviction[] and . . . multiple punishments for the same 
offense.”  Ayotte, 2015 ME 158, ¶ 13, 129 A.3d 285 (quotation marks omitted).  
We review the trial court’s double jeopardy determination de novo.  Id. ¶ 12. 
 
[¶6]  Martinelli contends that, for the purpose of invoking his double 
jeopardy protections, “[b]ecause the allegations in [3461] are not more specific 
than alleging OUI on May 6, 2015, in Bangor, Penobscot County, these 
allegations are broad enough to include an OUI anytime on May 6, 2015, and 
anywhere within Bangor.”  In his view, that problem cannot be cured by simply 
amending the complaint in 1568 to include additional, potentially 
distinguishing details, because those facts “would necessarily be included 
within the non-specific allegations of [3461].” 
 
[¶7]  Relevant to Martinelli’s argument, in assessing whether successive 
complaints violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, we have said that 
[b]ecause a person, by one act or transaction, may violate 
multiple criminal laws, courts apply the Blockburger test to 
determine whether the crimes enumerated by those multiple 
statutes are the same offense for purposes of double jeopardy 
protections.  See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 
(1932).  The test asks whether each statutory provision requires 
proof of a fact that the other does not.  If each statutory provision 
requires a unique proof of fact, the Blockburger test is satisfied and 
there is no double jeopardy violation by subsequent prosecutions 
or multiple punishments. 
 
Id. ¶ 14 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 
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[¶8]  The parties’ arguments may be summarized this way.  Martinelli 
contends that because the State chose to draft the two complaints to recite 
identical elements, he was charged twice with the same offense, and, applying 
the Blockburger test, the Double Jeopardy Clause requires the dismissal of 
1568.2  In Martinelli’s view, his concession that the complaints arose from 
different factual circumstances is irrelevant.  The State counters that because 
the factual circumstances giving rise to the two complaints are different, 
Martinelli committed two separate offenses, and so neither the Blockburger test 
nor the Double Jeopardy Clause is implicated. 
 
[¶9]  The State’s position is persuasive.  In Blockburger, the United States 
Supreme Court said that 
[t]he applicable rule is that where the same act or transaction 
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test 
to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only 
one, is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact 
which the other does not. 
 
284 U.S. at 304 (emphasis added); see Ayotte, 2015 ME 158, ¶ 14, 129 A.3d 285 
(referring to the Blockburger test as applying to “one act or transaction”).  Here, 
the parties agree that the two complaints did not arise from “the same act or 
                                         
2  At oral argument, Martinelli agreed that the State could have avoided the issue he raises simply 
by drafting the complaints so as to include a differentiating feature in each, presumably the time of 
the offense, for example. 
 
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transaction,” Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304—they charge conduct separated by 
almost twenty-four hours.  Applying the plain language of Blockburger, its test 
and double jeopardy analysis generally are inapplicable.  Other courts are in 
accord with our analysis.3 
 
[¶10]  In sum, for the purpose of double jeopardy analysis, Martinelli 
committed (allegedly, in the case of 1568) two unrelated crimes on 
May 6, 2015.  The answer to the trial court’s question at the hearing—“So does 
the . . . Constitution . . . give [Martinelli] the right to . . . commit the same crime 
over and over again on the same day if the State is not precise enough to start 
putting times in their complaints?”—is no.4  See Hoover, 2015 ME 109, ¶ 11, 
                                         
3  See United States v. Trabelsi, 845 F.3d 1181, 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Pillard, J., concurring) 
(“Blockburger permits a subsequent prosecution under an indictment listing identical legal elements 
so long as it charges a different set of facts.  That much is obvious.”); Smith v. Montgomery Police Dep’t, 
No. 2:16-CV-156-WKW, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177867, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Dec. 23, 2016) (“Charges arising 
out of different transactions or occurrences are not charges for the ‘same offense’ and do not 
implicate the Double Jeopardy Clause.”); United States v. Kee, No. S1 98 CR 778 (DLC), 
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8784, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2000) (stating, in discussing Blockburger, 
“Neither the principle of multiplicity nor the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents a defendant’s being 
charged with more than one violation of the same statute where different acts underlie each 
violation.”); State v. Lola Mae C., 408 S.E.2d 31, 36 n.9 (W. Va. 1991) (“Since we conclude that factually 
two separate criminal acts have occurred, we find that the application of the [Blockburger] test . . . is 
inapplicable . . . .”); State ex rel. G.E., 94 So. 3d 863, 867 (La. Ct. App. 2012) (“The [defendant’s] 
argument that [the two charges] contain the same elements and therefore constitute double jeopardy 
is without merit.  In the instant case, the charges . . . stem from different acts or transactions.”); 
State v. Jordan, No. 14AP-978, 14AP-979, 2015 Ohio App. LEXIS 4353, at ¶ 16 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Oct. 27, 2015) (“If the offenses charged are separate and distinct because they arise from different 
transactions, and different evidence is required to prove each, then double jeopardy is not 
applicable.” (quotation marks omitted)). 
 
4  In his brief, Martinelli argues that his position is supported by the “same conduct” test 
announced by the Supreme Court in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 521 (1990), which we applied in 
 
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121 A.3d 1281 (“The double jeopardy clause bars multiple punishments for the 
same offense.” (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted)). 
 
The entry is: 
Order denying motion to dismiss affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jeffrey M. Silverstein, Esq. (orally), Silverstein-Law, PA, Bangor, for appellant 
Michael Martinelli 
 
R. Christopher Almy, District Attorney, and Mark A. Rucci, Asst. Dist. Atty. 
(orally), Prosecutorial District V, Bangor, for appellee State of Maine 
 
 
Penobscot County Unified Criminal Docket docket number CR-2015-1568 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY 
                                         
State v. Ricci, 611 A.2d 572, 573-75 (Me. 1992).  After Ricci was decided, Grady was overruled by 
United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 704, 711-12 (1993).