Case Title: South Milwaukee Savings Bank v. John Barrett

Citation: 2000 WI 48

Docket Number: 1997AP003759

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2000-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
2000 WI 48 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
97-3759 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
South Milwaukee Savings Bank,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
v. 
John Barrett, in his official capacity as  
Clerk of Courts, unknown Clerk of Courts  
Docketing Clerk and Rod Lanser,  
 
Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners.  
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  229 Wis. 2d 521, 600 N.W.2d 205 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1999-Published) 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
June 9, 2000 
Submitted on Briefs: 
      
Oral Argument: 
April 5, 2000 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee 
 
JUDGE: 
Lee E. Wells 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
      
 
Dissented: 
      
 
Not Participating:       
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendants-respondents-petitioners there 
were briefs by Mark A. Grady, principal assistant corporation 
counsel, and oral argument by Mark A. Grady. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant there was a brief by 
Mark E. Sostarich and Petrie & Stocking, S.C., Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by Mark E. Sostarich. 
 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by William C. 
Niemann, Richard P. Carr, Beth Ermatinger Hanan, and Reinhart, 
Boerner, Van Deuren, Norris & Rieselbach, S.C., Milwaukee, on 
behalf of the Wisconsin Counties Association. 
 
2000 WI 48 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear 
in the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
No. 97-3759 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN                    :  
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
South Milwaukee Savings Bank,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
John Barrett, in his official capacity as  
Clerk of Courts, unknown Clerk of Courts  
Docketing Clerk and Rod Lanser,  
 
          Defendants-Respondents- 
          Petitioners. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed and 
cause remanded.  
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE.   This is a 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals, South 
Milwaukee Savings Bank v. Barczak, 229 Wis. 2d 521, 600 N.W.2d 
205 (Ct.App. 1999), which reversed the summary judgment granted 
in favor of the clerk of circuit court by the Circuit Court for 
Milwaukee County, Lee E. Wells, Judge.1 
                     
1 The clerk of circuit court at the time this matter arose 
was Gary J. Barczak.  John Barrett was the successor clerk, and 
his name was substituted in the caption. 
FILED 
 
JUN 9, 2000 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
97-3759 
 
 
2 
¶2 
Two issues are presented in the case at bar: First, 
which of the following two statutes applies to a claim brought 
under Wis. Stat. § 806.10(3) against a clerk of circuit court, 
alleging that the clerk neglected to docket a judgment at the 
proper time: Wis. Stat. § 893.93(1)(a)(1995-96),2 a six-year 
statute of limitations, or Wis. Stat. § 893.93(2)(a), a two-year 
statute of limitations?   
¶3 
Second, did the Milwaukee county office of the clerk 
of circuit court neglect to docket a judgment "at the proper 
time," 
subjecting 
itself 
to 
liability 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 806.10(3), when it docketed the judgment at 9:01 a.m. on 
September 27, 1994, after entering the judgment at approximately 
3:30 p.m. on September 26, 1994?  
¶4 
We hold that the six-year statute of limitations (Wis. 
Stat. § 893.93(1)(a)) governs actions against the clerk of 
circuit court under Wis. Stat. § 806.10(3).  We further hold 
that to neglect to docket a judgment "at the proper time" means 
to neglect to docket the judgment immediately upon entry of the 
judgment.  This court concludes that South Milwaukee Savings 
Bank's cause of action is not barred by the statute of 
limitations and that the office of the clerk of circuit court 
violated § 806.10(3) when it neglected to docket the judgment at 
                     
2 Subsequent references are to the 1995-96 volumes of the 
Wisconsin Statutes unless otherwise stated. 
In 1997, the legislature amended Wis. Stat. § 806.10(3) to 
remove the treble damages provision.  See Wis. Stat. § 806.10(3) 
(1997-98); 1997 Wis. Act 27, § 5175m. 
No. 
97-3759 
 
 
3 
the proper time.  Therefore, this court affirms the decision of 
the court of appeals, reversing the judgment of the circuit 
court and remanding the cause to the circuit court.  The court 
of appeals directed the circuit court on remand to enter a 
partial summary judgment for South Milwaukee Savings Bank (the 
Bank).  We clarify the directions on remand to direct the 
circuit court to determine whether the violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.10(3) by the office of the clerk of circuit court caused 
damage to the Bank and, if so, to calculate the amount of the 
damages. 
 
I 
¶5 
For purposes of determining the issues before us a 
simple statement of the facts suffices.  A more complete 
statement of the facts appears in the opinion of the court of 
appeals.  For ease in reading the facts, we note the following: 
¶6 
A judgment is entered "when it is filed in the office 
of the clerk of court."3   
¶7 
A judgment is docketed when the clerk places the 
information about the judgment in the judgment docket.4 
¶8 
When a judgment is docketed it becomes a lien on the 
real property owned by the judgment debtor.5 
                     
3 See Wis. Stat. § 806.06(1)(b).  
4 See Wis. Stat. § 806.10(1).  Wisconsin Stat. § 59.40(2)(e) 
provides that "a clerk of circuit court shall . . . [k]eep a 
judgment and lien docket of all money judgments of the 
court . . . ."  See also Wis. Stat. § 779.07. 
5 See Wis. Stat. § 806.15(1). 
No. 
97-3759 
 
 
4 
¶9 
On September 26, 1994, the Bank delivered its judgment 
against the debtor to the office of the Milwaukee clerk of 
circuit court with the applicable docketing fees.  The judgment 
was entered by the clerk's office at approximately 3:30 p.m. on 
September 26, 1994.  
¶10 The clerk's office did not, however, docket the 
judgment at the time of entry or at any time during September 
26, 1994, even though the clerk's office was open until 5:00 
p.m. that day.  The clerk's office docketed the judgment at 9:01 
a.m. on September 27, 1994.  
¶11 In September 1994, docketing was done manually in the 
Milwaukee clerk's office, and the clerk's office docketed 
judgments only at various times during the day.  On September 
26, 1994, the clerk's office began docketing judgments at 11:20 
a.m. and ceased docketing judgments at 3:20 p.m., a few minutes 
before the Bank's judgment was entered.6  
¶12 At 4:32 p.m. on September 26, 1994, after the entry of 
the judgment in favor of the Bank but before the docketing of 
the judgment, a deed from the judgment debtor allegedly 
conveying the property to the judgment debtor's wife was 
recorded in the office of the register of deeds.  In determining 
priority of interests in real estate, including judgment liens, 
Wisconsin is a "race-notice" state.  According to Wis. Stat. 
§ 706.08(1)(a), "every conveyance . . . which is not recorded as 
                     
6 The record and oral arguments reveal that docketing has 
been computerized in most Wisconsin counties and thus now occurs 
simultaneously with the entering of the judgment. 
No. 
97-3759 
 
 
5 
provided by law shall be void as against any subsequent 
purchaser 
in 
good 
faith 
and 
for 
a 
valuable 
consideration . . . whose 
conveyance 
shall 
first 
be 
duly 
recorded." 
¶13 The Bank and the judgment debtor's wife entered into a 
stipulation and a judgment on May 15, 1995, clarifying that the 
Bank's September 1994 judgment was applicable to the debtor's 
wife.  
¶14 The judgment debtor's wife then mortgaged the property 
to the Wauwatosa Savings Bank.  In yet another lawsuit, the 
Wauwatosa Savings Bank was declared a good faith purchaser whose 
mortgage lien had priority over the Bank's September 1994 
judgment lien.  
¶15 On March 12, 1997, the Bank brought this action 
against the clerk of circuit court, claiming that it was unable 
to collect on its 1994 judgment and seeking treble damages 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 806.10(3).  The Bank asserts that the 
office of the clerk of circuit court neglected to docket the 
judgment "at the proper time."  Wis. Stat. § 806.10(3) provided, 
at the time of this action, as follows: 
 
(3) Every clerk of circuit court who dockets a 
judgment or decree and enters upon the judgment and 
lien docket a date or time other than that of its 
actual entry or neglects to docket the same at the 
proper time shall be liable in treble damages to the 
party injured (emphasis added). 
¶16 The circuit court granted summary judgment to the 
clerk of circuit court, holding that the two-year statute of 
limitations, Wis. Stat. § 893.93(2)(a), barred the claim of 
No. 
97-3759 
 
 
6 
South Milwaukee Savings Bank.  The circuit court also ruled that 
Wis. Stat. § 806.10(3) requires a clerk of circuit court to 
docket a judgment within a reasonable time and that the judgment 
in this case was docketed within a reasonable time.   
¶17 The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the 
circuit court, directing the circuit court to enter a partial 
summary judgment for the Bank.  It concluded that the Bank's 
claim was governed by the six-year statute of limitations.  The 
court of appeals did not decide how Wis. Stat. § 806.10(3) 
should be interpreted.  Instead the court of appeals held that 
even if the statute allows the clerk of circuit court to docket 
a judgment as soon as practicable or within a reasonable time, 
as opposed to immediately upon entry of the judgment, the 
judgment was not, as a matter of law, timely docketed in this 
case. 
 
II 
¶18 The first issue this court must address is whether the 
Bank's action against the clerk of circuit court was filed 
timely.7  Determining the applicable statute of limitations is a 
question of law that this court decides independently of the 
circuit court and the court of appeals, benefiting from their 
analyses.  See Ghashiyah v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 198 
Wis. 2d 699, 702, 543 N.W.2d 538 (Ct. App. 1995).   
                     
7 The Bank filed the appropriate notices of claim pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 893.80 before initiating suit. 
No. 
97-3759 
 
 
7 
¶19 The clerk argues that Wis. Stat. § 893.93(2)(a), the 
two-year statute of limitations on actions "by a private party 
upon a statute penalty," bars the Bank's action to recover 
treble damages under Wis. Stat. § 806.10(3).  Section 893.93 
(2)(a) provided: 
 
(2) The following actions shall be commenced within 2 
years after the cause of action accrues or be barred: 
 
(a) An action by a private party upon a statute 
penalty, or forfeiture when the action is given to the 
party prosecuting therefor and the state, except when 
the 
statute 
imposing 
it 
provides 
a 
different 
limitation. 
¶20 The Bank contends that its claim is governed by Wis. 
Stat. § 893.93(1)(a), the six-year statute of limitations for an 
"action upon a liability created by statute when a different 
limitation is not prescribed by law."  Section 893.93(1)(a) 
provided as follows: 
 
(1) The following actions shall be commenced within 6 
years after the cause of action accrues or be barred: 
 
(a) An action upon a liability created by statute when 
a different limitation is not prescribed by law. 
¶21 Counsel for the clerk compares a violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 806.10(3) with a violation of the state antitrust law, 
Wis. Stat. § 133.01 et seq., which also imposes treble damages. 
 See Wis. Stat. § 133.18.  The two-year statute applies to 
antitrust actions.  Open Pantry Food Marts v. Falcone, 92 
Wis. 2d 807, 811-12, 286 N.W.2d 149 (Ct. App. 1979). 
¶22 The comparison presented by counsel for the clerk 
ultimately fails, however, because as the court of appeals 
No. 
97-3759 
 
 
8 
explains, the comparison does not take into account the analysis 
set forth in Erdman v. Jovoco, Inc., 181 Wis. 2d 736, 512 N.W.2d 
487 (1994).  In Jovoco, the court distinguished claims for 
violations of antitrust laws from a claim for violations of a 
wage statute, Wis. Stat. § 103.455 (1991-92), and determined 
that the six-year statute of limitations applies to claims for 
violations of the wage statute.   
¶23 Adhering to the analysis set forth in Jovoco, we 
conclude, as did the court of appeals, that insufficient 
similarities exist between Wis. Stat. § 806.10(3) and the 
Wisconsin antitrust law to apply the two-year statute of 
limitation that governs antitrust lawsuits.  The court of 
appeals concluded that § 806.10(3), like the wage statute in 
Jovoco, "provides an individual remedy for damages to an 
individual party caused by acts and omissions of the clerk's 
office, thus leading to the application of the six-year statute 
of limitations."  Barczak, 229 Wis. 2d at 535.  Furthermore, the 
court of appeals concluded that "[a]bsent a clear legislative 
mandate, case law instructs that the two-year statute of 
limitations must be narrowly construed in favor of plaintiffs to 
avoid extinguishing otherwise meritorious claims."  Barczak, 229 
Wis. 2d at 535. 
¶24 We agree with the analysis and reasoning of the court 
of appeals in holding that the six-year statute of limitations 
applies in the present case, and we adopt Part II.A of the 
opinion of the court of appeals relating to the statute of 
limitations issue as our own.  Barczak, 229 Wis. 2d at 531-36.  
No. 
97-3759 
 
 
9 
Accordingly, we conclude that the Bank's action was filed timely 
under Wis. Stat. § 893.93(1)(a), the six-year statute of 
limitations. 
 
III 
¶25 We turn now to the question of whether the clerk's 
office neglected to docket the 1994 judgment "at the proper 
time" under Wis. Stat. § 806.10(3), which provided: 
 
(3) Every clerk of circuit court who enters a judgment 
or decree and enters upon the judgment and lien docket 
a date or time other than that of its actual entry or 
neglects to enter the same at the proper time shall be 
liable 
in 
treble 
damages 
to 
the 
party 
injured 
(emphasis added). 
¶26 The parties disagree about the meaning of the words 
"at the proper time" in Wis. Stat. § 806.10(3).  Interpretation 
of a statute is a question of law that this court determines 
independently of the circuit court and the court of appeals, 
benefiting from their analyses.  
¶27 The clerk contends that docketing a judgment "at the 
proper time" means docketing it "within a reasonable time" or 
"as soon as practicable."  We conclude that docketing a judgment 
"at the proper time" means docketing it immediately upon entry 
of judgment.  We reach this conclusion for several reasons. 
¶28 First, our reading of Wis. Stat. § 806.10(3) fits with 
the language of § 806.10(1).  Subsection (1) of Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.10 provides in pertinent part that "[a]t the time of entry 
of a judgment . . . the clerk of circuit court shall enter the 
judgment in the judgment and lien docket . . . ."  Wisconsin 
No. 
97-3759 
 
 
10
Stat. § 806.10(1) thus contemplates that the docketing of a 
judgment is contemporaneous with the entry of the judgment: 
 
806.10  Judgment and lien docket.  (1) At the time of 
entry of a judgment directing in whole or in part the 
payment of money, or a judgment naming a spouse under 
s. 806.15(4), and upon payment of the fee prescribed 
in s. 814.61(5)(b), the clerk of circuit court shall 
enter the judgment in the judgment and lien docket, 
arranged alphabetically . . . . 
¶29 Our reading of Wis. Stat. § 806.10(1) is consistent 
with a 1992 amendment to that statute.  1991 Wis. Act 134, § 3. 
 In 1992 the legislature amended § 806.10(1) to add the words 
"and upon payment of the fee" so that subsection (1) would read 
that "at the time of entry of a judgment . . . and upon payment 
of the fee . . . the clerk shall enter [the judgment] in a 
judgment docket" (emphasis added).  A note to the 1992 amendment 
states that "the amendment conforms the statute to the opinion 
of the attorney general in OAG 10-90 that clerks have the 
discretion to defer docketing [of the judgment] until the fee is 
paid."8   
                     
8 The Note to § 3, 1991 Wis. Act 134, states in full:  
This amendment clarifies that the clerk of circuit 
court has discretion to defer the docketing of a 
judgment until the prescribed docketing fee is paid.  
The absence of an explicit fee requirement in s. 
806.10(1)(intro.), stats., previously gave rise to 
questions about the clerk's authority to withhold 
docketing until payment of the fee.  The amendment 
conforms the statute to the opinion of the attorney 
general in OAG 10-90 that clerks have the discretion 
to defer docketing until the fee is paid.  The 
attorney general added, however, that the deferral 
discretion is limited by a duty to make a reasonable 
No. 
97-3759 
 
 
11
¶30 The 
attorney 
general 
explained 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 806.10(1) "requires the clerk to docket a judgment at the time 
of entry," 79 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 55 (1990) (OAG 10-90), and 
that "[f]iling the judgment and docketing it, though two 
separate activities, are to occur at the same time."  79 Wis. 
Op. Att'y Gen. at 57.  See also 79 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. at 60.  
Nevertheless, the attorney general concluded on the basis of 
other statutes expressly providing for fees that the clerk of 
circuit court had the discretion to delay docketing a judgment 
until the fee was paid. 
¶31 In light of the legislature's stated purpose to 
conform Wis. Stat. § 806.10(1) to the attorney general's 
opinion, we conclude that the legislature agreed with the 
attorney general that § 806.10(1) requires "the clerk to docket 
a judgment at the time of entry" but that other statutes grant 
the clerk of circuit court discretion to defer docketing until 
the fee is paid.  
¶32 In sum, when Wis. Stat. § 806.10(1) is read with Wis. 
Stat. § 806.10(3), it is clear that docketing a judgment "at the 
                                                                  
effort to make the fee-prepayment requirement known to 
the party submitting the judgment for docketing.  
 
No. 
97-3759 
 
 
12
proper time" means docketing it immediately upon entry of the 
judgment.9  
¶33 Second, 
the 
legislative 
history 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 806.10(3) also demonstrates that the legislature intended a 
clerk to docket a judgment immediately upon entry of the 
judgment.  Wisconsin Stat. § 806.10(3) can be traced to § 18, 
ch. 102, Rev. Stat. 1849, that made clerks liable for a $250 
forfeiture and damages if they neglected to docket a judgment 
"as soon as practicable."10 
¶34 Thirty-six 
years 
later, the 
legislature in 
1885 
enacted another statute governing the liability of a clerk who 
neglects to docket a judgment timely.  The 1885 law made clerks 
liable for treble damages if they neglected to docket a judgment 
                     
9 The clerk's brief and the Wisconsin Counties Association 
non-party brief argue that clerks of circuit court have 
discretion 
in 
performing 
their 
duties 
and 
that 
our 
interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 806.10(3) is inconsistent with 
this discretion.  In Granado v. Sentry Ins. Co, 228 Wis. 2d 794, 
599 N.W.2d 62 (Ct.App. 1999), the court of appeals recognized 
that "[a]s elected officials, clerks are entitled to exercise 
some discretion in the performance of their duties."  At the 
same 
time, 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
acknowledged 
that 
the 
legislature can and does limit the clerks' discretion.  Granado, 
228 Wis. 2d at 800-801.  Wisconsin Stat. § 806.10 expressly 
limits a clerk's discretion regarding the time for docketing 
judgments. 
10 "Every clerk who shall neglect to docket any judgment as 
soon as practicable, shall forfeit to the party aggrieved two 
hundred and fifty dollars, in addition to all damages which such 
party may have sustained by such omission or neglect."  § 18, 
ch. 102, Rev. Stat. 1849 (emphasis added). 
No. 
97-3759 
 
 
13
"at the proper time."11  The 1885 law was the genesis of Wis. 
Stat. § 806.10(3).  Furthermore, § 1 of the 1885 law provided 
that the entry of a judgment immediately precedes the docketing 
of the judgment.12 
¶35 Both the 1849 and 1885 laws imposed liability on a 
clerk who neglects to docket a judgment timely, but the laws 
provided significantly different penalties.  The 1885 law did 
not, however, expressly repeal the 1849 law.  In the revised 
statutes of 1889, the 1849 law was codified as § 2905 and the 
1885 law as the immediately following § 2905a. 
¶36 The 1849 and 1885 laws, similar in scope and apparent 
purpose, existed on the books together for some 13 years — the 
former statute imposing liability for damages for failure to 
docket "as soon as practicable," with the latter requiring 
docketing at "the proper time" and imposing treble damages.  In 
                     
11 "No judgment or decree affecting real estate, which shall 
be docketed and dated back to a time prior to its actual entry 
in the judgment docket, shall be a lien upon real estate or 
notice to a purchaser for value.  Every clerk who shall docket a 
judgment or decree with a date or time other than the date and 
time of its actual entry, or shall neglect to docket the same at 
the proper time, shall be liable to the party injured in treble 
damages."  Section 2, ch. 200, Laws of 1885 (emphasis added). 
12 "It shall be the duty of every clerk of a court of 
record . . . to keep as part of the records of such court, a 
daily journal or book, in which every judgment or decree 
affecting real estate shall, at the proper time, be entered by 
him immediately before such judgment or decree shall be 
docketed.  After the entry of such judgment or decree affecting 
real estate in the daily journal, the clerk shall, at once, 
docket the same, as now provided by law."  Section 1, ch. 200, 
Laws of 1885 (emphasis added). 
No. 
97-3759 
 
 
14
1898, however, the revisors eliminated the 1849 law and retained 
only the 1885 law subjecting a clerk to treble damages when the 
clerk neglects to docket a judgment "at the proper time."13  When 
the revisors completed their work, the legislature adopted the 
entire revisors' bill as the revised statutes of 1898.14 
¶37 We agree with counsel for the clerk in the present 
case, who argues that a revisor's bill ordinarily does not 
result in a change in the meaning of the statutes revised.15  
Relying on this general rule, counsel reasons that imposing 
liability on a clerk who neglects to docket a judgment "at the 
proper time" (the 1885 law) must be interpreted as the 
equivalent of imposing liability on a clerk who neglects to 
docket a judgment "as soon as practicable" (the 1849 law). 
¶38 The revisors for the 1898 revised statutes were 
empowered to correct errors, harmonize discrepancies and add 
provisions to carry out the general design and spirit of the 
statutes.  The revisors explained that one of their aims was to 
eliminate laws that were inappropriate and to improve the 
language to fulfill the purposes the legislature sought to 
accomplish.  The revisors also acknowledged that their task was 
                     
13 See § 2905, 1898 Annot. Stat.  The notes to § 2905, 1898 
Annot. Stat., show that the sources of that provision are both 
§ 18, ch. 102, 1849 Rev. Stat., and ch. 200, Laws of 1885. 
14 Chapter 381, Laws of 1897. 
15 See Wisconsin Power & Light Co. v. Beloit, 215 Wis. 439, 
447, 254 N.W. 119 (1934); Oconto County v. Town of Townsend, 210 
Wis. 85, 96, 244 N.W. 761 (1932); Kugler v. Milwaukee, 208 
Wis. 251, 255, 252 N.W. 481 (1932). 
No. 
97-3759 
 
 
15
made more difficult because the legislature had enacted many 
laws without considering their relation to or effect on other 
laws, resulting in the revisors encountering conflicting and 
overlapping provisions and uncertainty as to the state of the 
law.16 
¶39 A better explanation for the revisors' having included 
only the 1885 law in the 1898 revised statutes than the one 
offered by counsel for the clerk is that the revisors determined 
that the 1849 and 1885 laws were overlapping and inconsistent 
and that the later law prevailed over the earlier inconsistent 
law.17  We conclude that the legislative history evidences a 
legislative intent that the 1885 law supersede the 1849 law and 
that the legislature did not intend for the words "at the proper 
time" in the 1885 law to be governed by the "as soon as 
practicable" language appearing in the 1849 law. 
¶40 The third justification for our reading of Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.06(3) is that this reading furthers the race-notice 
provisions of Wisconsin law.  In a race-notice jurisdiction such 
as Wisconsin, prompt docketing of judgments is needed to 
establish the proper priority of claims.  Determining the proper 
priority of claims should be uniform throughout the state and 
                     
16 See § 2, ch. 306, Laws of 1895, and the revisors' preface 
to the 1898 Annotated Statutes and Senate Bill 33, 1897 
Legislature (which was enacted into law). 
17 See Madison v. Madison Prof. Police Officers Ass'n, 144 
Wis. 2d 576, 587-88, 425 N.W.2d 8 (1988); State v. Kruse, 101 
Wis. 2d 387, 393, 305 N.W.2d 85 (1981); State ex rel. Mitchell 
v. Superior Court, 14 Wis. 2d 77, 79, 109 N.W.2d 522 (1961).  
No. 
97-3759 
 
 
16
should not be left to a variety of procedures for docketing 
judgments in offices of clerks of circuit court.  
¶41 In order to enable those searching the judgment 
dockets to rely upon these dockets and to avoid litigation about 
priority of claims, it is imperative that clerks' offices docket 
a judgment immediately upon entry of the judgment.  A holding 
that clerks' offices have a "reasonable time" after entry of a 
judgment in which to docket a judgment would render the judgment 
dockets untrustworthy.  As the court stated more than a century 
ago, the people of the state ought to be able to rely on the 
judgment docket to show encumbrances on real property without 
examining all the records in a clerk's office.18  
¶42 Counsel for the clerk cites material in its brief from 
the Office of Court Operations in the Office of the Director of 
State Courts arguing that the Director's office interprets Wis. 
Stat. § 806.10(3) to allow clerks to docket judgments within 24 
hours of entry.  The Director's material acknowledges that 
"docketing should occur 'immediately upon filing,'" citing Wis. 
Stat. § 779.07,19 but asserts that "[g]iven the impracticality of 
                     
18 "No statute requires a party seeking for judgment liens 
to examine all the records in the clerk's office, and no 
principle of law of which we are aware imposes any such 
diligence.  If the judgment docket shows a clear record, the 
party need seek no farther."  McKenna v. Van Blarcom, 109 Wis. 
271, 273, 85 N.W. 322 (1901). 
19 Wisconsin Stat. § 779.07 provides that "[e]very clerk of 
circuit court shall keep a judgment and lien docket in which 
shall be entered, immediately upon filing, the proper entries 
 . . . relative to each claim for lien filed . . . ." 
No. 
97-3759 
 
 
17
an 'immediate' docketing, the Wisconsin Records Management 
Committee encourages clerks to enter the judgment within 24 
hours as a reasonable accommodation and to avoid being sued for 
treble damages under Wis. Stat. § 806.10(3)."  The Records 
Management 
Committee 
recognized 
that 
"a 
longer 
period 
jeopardizes the protection for which the lien is intended to 
provide."20   
¶43 The Records Management Committee did not, and could 
not, change the statute governing the time for docketing 
judgments.  The statute requires that clerks docket a judgment 
upon entry of the judgment. 
¶44 For the reasons stated, we hold that a judgment is 
docketed "at the proper time" under Wis. Stat. § 806.10(3) when 
it is docketed immediately upon the entry of the judgment.  The 
office of the clerk of circuit court violated Wis. Stat. 
§ 806.10(3) in the present case when it neglected to docket the 
judgment immediately upon entry of the judgment. 
¶45 Our decision today should in no way be read as a 
criticism of the able and diligent clerks of circuit court in 
this state.  The clerk's brief and the Wisconsin Counties 
Association's non-party brief are concerned that as a result of 
our holding, busy clerks' offices will have to choose between 
docketing judgments and other important tasks.  We recognize 
that the clerks' offices have increasing duties and do not 
                     
20 See Report of the Technical Assistance Project Report to 
the Clark County Circuit Court, May 1997, Clerk's Appendix at 
114. 
No. 
97-3759 
 
 
18
always 
get 
increased 
staff 
to 
perform 
these 
duties.  
Nevertheless 
the 
legislature 
has 
spoken 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 806.10(3).  Given recent technological innovations, delay in 
docketing of judgments should no longer be an issue in most 
Wisconsin counties.  
¶46 For the reasons set forth, the judgment of the court 
of appeals is affirmed.  We clarify the directions on remand to 
direct the circuit court to determine whether the violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 806.10(3) by the office of the clerk of circuit 
court caused damage to the Bank and, if so, to calculate the 
amount of the damages. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court.