Case Title: Emory v. Memphis City Schools Board of Education

Citation: 

Docket Number: W2014-01293-SC-R11-CV

State: tennessee

Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Date: 2017-01-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE MAR 2 8 2017
AT JACKSON

 

ROGELYNN EMORY vy. MEMPHIS CITY SCHOOLS BOARD OF
EDUCATION, NOW KNOWN AS SHELBY COUNTY BOARD OF
EDUCATION

Chancery Court for Shelby County
No. CH062420

 

No, W2014-01293-SC-RIL-CV.

 

ORDER

‘The Appellee, Rogelynn Emory, fled a petition to rehear the Opinion of this Court
filed on January 13, 2017. On February 1, 2017, the Tennessee Education Association
filed a motion for leave to file a brief as amicus curiae. By order of February 7, 2017,
‘Appellant, Memphis City Schools Board of Education, now known as Shelby County
Board of Education, was ordered to file a response to the petition to rehear and the amicus
curiae brief as to the standard of review. Appellant’s response was filed on March 9,
2017. On March 14, 2017, Appellee filed a motion for leave to file a response to
Supplemental brief in support of petition to reheat.

 

 

 

 

 

In her petition to reheat, Appellee argues inter alia that the standard of review
adopted by the Court was incorrect. In its amicus brief, the Tennessee Education
‘Association argues that the Court’s discussion of the standard of review should not be
limited to the Teacher Tenure Act as it was in 2005 and 2006, but should instead also take
into account amendments to the Teacher Tenure Act that were enacted in 2007,

  

Upon due consideration, the Court concludes that the petition to rehear is well-aken
as to the standard of review and therefore should be granted as to this issue. No reargument
‘or resubmission is required under the circumstances ofthis ease.

The petition to rehear is denied as to all remaining issues. Further, Appellee’s

motion for leave to file a supplemental brief in support of the petition to rehear is denied.

 
ITIS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the attached
Opinion be and the same is hereby substituted for that Opinion filed in this cause on
January 13, 2017, without change to this Courts judgment entered contemporaneously
with the filing of the original Opinion on January 13, 2017, and without the further taxing

of costs

PER CURIAM
  

FILED
SANT 3 2017

el oe

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNE
AT JACKSON
February 10, 2016 Session

 

 
  

a

 

ROGELYNN EMORY v. MEMPHIS CITY SCHOOLS
BOARD OF EDUCATION, NOW KNOWN AS
SHELBY COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION

 

Appeal by Permission from the Court of Appeals
Chancery Court for Shelby County
‘No. CH062420° Walter L. Evans, Chancellor

No. W2014-01293-SC-RII-CV

 

‘This case arises out of the termination of a tenured teacher. Afer a three-day hearing, the
schoo! board concluded that there was ample evidence of the teacher's unsatisfactory job
performance, s0 it terminated her employment. In the trial court review of the school
board's decision, the teacher argued that she should be reinstated with back pay because
her school board hearing occurred well beyond the thity-day period set forth in the
‘Teachers’ Tenure Act, The tial court affirmed the termination and the teacher appealed.
The Court of Appeals declined to reinstate the teacher based on the untimeliness of the
school board hearing but it awarded her partial back pay. On appeal, we first clarify the
standard of judicial review for the termination of a tenured teacher under the Tenure Act.
Second, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ award of partial back pay to the teacher
because the relief ordered is without basis in the Tenure Act. Finally, because the teacher
failed to raise to the school board any objection as to the timeliness of her hearing, we
hold that the issue is not properly before this Court. Accordingly, we affirm the trial
court’ decision to uphold the termination ofthe teacher’s employment.

 

 

‘Tenn, R. App. P. 11 Appeal by Pern ; Judgment of the Court of Court of
‘Appeals Reversed; Judgment of the Trial Court Affirmed

 

HOLLY KIRBY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JEFFREY S. BIVINS, C.J.,
and CORNELIA A. CLARK and SHARON G. LEE, JJ., joined,

Jeff Weintraub and Gabriel P. MeGaha, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Shelby
‘County Board of Education

 
‘Mark Allen, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Rogelynn Sue Emory

OPINION
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Rogelynn Emory began working fulltime as a teacher in the Memphis City
School System! in 1977 and eventually attained tenured status. Ms. Emory was certified
to teach French, English and Social Studies, and she was also certified in Administration.
During her carcer with Memphis City Schools, Ms. Emory taught French and/or English
‘at a number of different high schools in Memphis.”

   

 

During the 1996-1997 school year, Ms. Emory began exhibiting unusual stress
while at school, She had trouble managing her fears and emotions when instructing
students, which in tun led to difficulty controlling her classroom. Written evaluations
‘and witness testimony indicated that, during that time, Ms. Emory’s classroom instruction
‘was poor and she did not give proper attention to student needs and differences. Her
‘behavior became increasingly erratic and irrational, and administrative attempts to help
hher were unavailing. Her psychiatrist diagnosed her with post-traumatic stress disorder
‘and paranoia. Eventually, in April 1999, Ms. Emory was placed on indefinite leave to
seck medical attention. She stayed on leave for several years,

 

 

 

In 2003, Ms. Emory's medical leave ended. She resumed teaching in the Memphis
‘School System in November 2003. However, despite the end of her medical leave,
Ms. Emory’s problems persisted.

 

During the 2004-2005 school year, Ms. Emory taught eleventh-grade English at
Central High School in Memphis. Early in the school year, Central High principal Greg,
‘McCullough observed that there was very little learning going on in Ms. Emory's classes,
He saw “major classroom management issues,” to the point that he viewed her class as
“out of control.” Ms. Emory repeatedly called the administrative office for classroom
help on problems that a seasoned teacher should have been able to handle, such as

Jassroom noise. She displayed a low level of teaching skill even during planned
classroom observation. From Mr. MeCullough’s vantage point, the students did not
appear to be the issue. All five of Ms. Emory’s classes had disruption and chaos, but
other teachers with the same students in their classes experienced far fewer problems.

 

 

 

“The Memphis City Schoo! System is now known as the Shelby County School System,

2 Daring her career, Ms. Emory taught atthe following schools: Melrose High Schoo, Kingsbury
igh School, Hiller High Schol, Treadwell High Schoo, and Cental High Schoo
ne
Mr. McCullough felt that the problems were Ms. Emory’s poor classroom management
and her low level of teaching skills.

Repeated administrative attempts to assist Ms. Emory and help her improve
proved futile. She blamed her difficulties on students and the administration and was not
receptive to either advice or assistance, Ultimately, Mr. McCullough recommended that
the Memphis City Schools Board of Education (the “Board”) terminate Ms. Emory's
employment at the end of the school year.

‘After receiving Mr. MeCullough’s recommendation, the Superintendent of the
Memphis City Schools, Dr. Carol Johnson, initiated termination proceedings pursuant to
the Teachers’ Tenure Act (“Tenure Act”), codified at Tennessee Code Annotated sections
49-5-501 to -515 (2006). In a letter to the Board dated September 20, 2005, Dr. Johnson
set out Ms. Emory’s troubled employment history with the school system and her
unsatisfactory job performance dating back to the 1996-1997 school year.' Under the

* The Tenure Act has been significantly amended since the events in this ease occurred. For
‘purposes ofthis opinion, we apply the Tenure Actas codified in 2005 and 2006,

“The text ofthe leter reads as follows:

‘Dear Ladies and Gentlemen:

Ms, Rogelyan Emory has been an employee ofthe Memphis City School System
since October 7, 1976, when she was hired as a substitute teacher. ‘She was given an
interim position at Melrose High Schoo! from 1977-1979 and received a regular teaching
position beginning in the 1979-80 school year at Kingsbury High School. She was
‘wansferred to Hillerest High Schoo! in uly 1983 and Treadwell High School in Octobee
‘of 1998. After unsatisfactory performance at both Hillerest and Treadwell, she was given
8 final opportunity to succeed at Central High School beginning November 5, 2003. Foe
the reasons given below, her performance at Central High School has. also. been
‘unacceptable snd her temmination is recommended. ‘Throughout her career, Ms. Emory
‘has taught French and/or English atthe high schoo! evel

 

 

Since atleast the 1996.97 school year at Hilleest and continuing t the present
through hr asignments at Treadwell and Central, Ms. Emory has displayed an ongoing
inability to control her clases and to control her own fears and emotions when dealing
with her classes. At Hillerest, she reated bad relationships with her students by referring
to them as criminals and drug users. On one occasion, she called 911 to seck to have the
police come tothe schoo! because she had been hit on the hand by a penny. She refused
‘counsel and advice from the principal, Mr. Sammy 1. Hall, and ukimately Mr. Hall
requested that she be transferred

 

‘At Treadwell, Ms, Emory repeated her disruptive class patter of conduct and her

lack of classroom control. At Treadwell, she was given an assigament, French I and IL

‘and to a seventh grade honors English class. Both provious teachers of these clases and
3+
the substitute who had been teaching them prior to Ms. Emory’s arrival bad not
experienced diseiplinary problems] and in fact these were very desirable assignments
To the amazement of the school Principal, Ms. Emory, at the outset of her teaching at
Treadwell, began to erate her clases and ell them that "She didnot come to Treadwel

to die.” She remained irational when the principal, Mr. John L. Malone, PhD. tried [to]
calm and correct he.

‘A similar patter of conduct continued at Treadwell with Ms. Emory
complaining that stadents were criminals and were running over her. Minor incidents
‘would lead to hysteria, and very little learning (was) taking place in her classrooms
because of the disruption and lack of control that she herself was creating. Her
classrooms also showed poor preparation for instruction and poor attention to student
needs and differences.

 

{In an attempt to assist Ms, Emory, she was allowed leave time and an opportunity
to receive professional stention for her problems with fear and lack of self-control. Also,
At the request of her own physician she was given a transfer away from the Treadwell
‘setting. She was allowed to teach at Central High School beginning November 5, 2003.
He problems of poor preparation and presentation and poor classroom management
reasserted themselves at Central, At the observation of (the) Principal, she was hurting
hier high school English students because of her poor job performance. The principal,
Mr. Gregg McCullough, exerted himself as much as possible to support and assist Ms.
Emory. Ili office dealt with an excessive number of disciplinary referals from Ms.
[Emory’s classes, Mr. McCullough, like her previous principals, counseled with her and
provided her with writen plans of improvement, which she resisted and did not
implement. Ms, Emory’s clases at Central wore frequently disrupted with persons not
‘on task. On occasion, Ms. Emory would not even be aware that the principal had stopped
atthe door because of the disruption of her room. On other occasions, the sudents were
‘obviously uninterested inthe subject and very few even had their books open or materials
‘out. Throughout her time at Centra, her class was frequently out of contol and no sign
‘of Fearing of instruction was apparent. Mr. MeCullough correctly concluded that this,
Situation was not fair to the stidents and that continuing the pattern of unsatisfactory
teaching and tansfers was unfair to the system. He therefore recommended termination
in which the Department of Human Resources and strongly concur.

 

 

Based on the foregoing, it is my belie that Ms. Emory should be terminated for
the following reason as slated in Tennessee Tenure Law: “Inefiieiency” as defined in
TCA, §49-5-501(5): “Being below the standants of efficiency maintained by others
curently employed by the Board for similar work; habitually tardy, inaveurate, or
‘wanting ineffective performance of duties.

 

It is requested that the Board review this leter pursuant to T.C.A. §49-5-511 and
determine thatthe charges are of such nature as to warrant the dismissal of the teacher
‘and ditect that proceedings commence and notice be given under the Tennessee Tenure
Law.

Respectfully submitted,

 

 
Tenure Act, Dr. Johnson recommended that the Board terminate Ms. Emory’s
employment on the ground of “inefficiency."* See Tenn, Code Ann. § 49-5-511(a)(2).

  

In a letter dated September 30, 2005, Dr. Johnson notified Ms. Emory of the
charges against her. The letter attached a statement of Ms. Emory's rights under the
‘Tenure Act and a copy of the written charges against her. It informed Ms. Emory that
she had thirty days to request a hearing before the Board on the charges.

 

In a letter to Dr. Johnson dated October 18, 2005, Ms. Emory requested a hearing
before the Board on the charges against her. The letter included the name and contact
information for Ms. Emory’s Tennessee Education Association attorney and asked Dr.
Johnson to contact her attomey to determine “a mutually agreeable date for a hearing.” A
stamp on the letter indicates that it was received by the Superintendent's office on
October 20, 2005.

  

 

In a letter dated November 11, 2005, the Director of the Memphis City Schools
Division of Labor and Employee Relations, James Davis, acknowledged receipt of Ms.
Emory’s request for a tenure hearing. Mr. Davis said in the letter that he would “get
some dates that the Board Commissioners are available to hear your case and advise you
of when the hearing is scheduled.”

 

On April 7, 2006, Tennessee Education Association attomey Virginia McCoy sent
4 letter to the Memphis ‘City School System, notifying them that she was replacing Ms.
Emory’s prior attorney.

Board Hearing
On November 1, 2, and 8, 2006, the Board conducted a three-day hearing on Ms.

Emory's appeal ofthe charges against her. Ms. Emory was represented by Ms. MeCoy,
‘who isnot the attomey of recordin this appeal.

 

Dr, Carol R. Jobson
Superintendent

* As discussed below, Section 49-5-501(2)(2) provides that a tenured teacher may be dismissed or
suspended for “incompetence, inefficiency, neglect of duty, unprofessional conduct and insubordination

“Inefficiency” is defined as “being below the standards of efficiency maintained by others currently
employed by the board for similar work, or habitually tardy, inaccurate, or wanting in effective
performance of duties.” ean, Code Ann, § 49-5-501 (2006,)

 

 

 

-5-
At the hearing, Mr. MeCullough testified about his observations regarding Ms,
Emory’s teaching difficulties, outlined above. ‘The Board also proffered the testimony of
Central High’s assistant principal, Gary Steverson, who observed similar problems with
Ms. Emory’s teaching. One of Mr. Steverson’s main areas of responsibility was student
discipline, and he said that Ms. Emory got the administration involved in disciplinary
issues in her classroom nearly every day. He testified that the administration had
received complaints from some students and parents that the students in Ms, Emory's
classes were not getting what they needed for college preparation. Ms. Emory did not
icate to Mr. Steverson that emotional or mental problems contributed to her classroom
sues. Despite administrative efforts to help Ms. Emory, Mr. Steverson said, her job
performance got progressively worse over the course of the school year

 

  

The Board also offered testimony from other school administrators and other
teachers who worked with Ms. Emory after her return from medical leave. They
corroborated the testimony from Principal MeCullough and Assistant Principal Steverson
regarding Ms. Emory’s poor classroom management, lack of teaching skills, and
‘unwillingness or inability to receive constructive criticism and improve, and supported
the written charges against Ms. Emory.

In response, Ms. Emory presented the testimony of several witnesses, Alberta
Hardaway taught with Ms. Emory at Central High School. She testified that Ms. Emory
‘was “great” at explaining the lessons to students; she said that Ms. Emory was very
knowledgeable and felt that she could be an effective teacher. Roosevelt Hancock, Jr.
‘was an assistant prineipal at Ms. Emory taught there, Mr. Hancock
testified that Ms. Emory “did her job” teaching classes “without anything out of order”
but had students “who did not want to adhere” to the rules. However, Mr. Hancock
conceded that Ms. Emory had only partial control over her classroom, and he
acknowledged that this was not sufficient. Fellow Hillcrest foreign language teacher
Diane Noyes described Ms. Emory as an excellent, conscientious teacher who “tried her
best to teach these children.” However, both Ms. Noyes and Mr. Hancock had heard Ms
Emory refer to her students as “criminals.”

 

  

Ms. Emory testified as well. In her testimony, Ms. Emory described incidents
dating back to the 1990s involving student behavior that was upsetting or even traumatic
for her.° She testified about numerous grievances after she retumed from medical leave,
stemming either from student misconduct or administrative admonitions that she believed
were without basis. Nevertheless, in response to a Board member's question, Ms. Emory

 

“In her testimony, Ms, Emory described students throwing things at er, such as pencils, coins,
and once a book. She repeated referred to herself as “a tattered teacher.”
-6-

 
maintained that she had no lingering psychological effects from all of these incidents.
She insisted that she was an effective teacher and that she wanted to continue teaching.

At the close of the proof, the Board deliberated at some length. After deliberation,
the Board voted unanimously to sustain Ms, Emory’s dismissal and to adopt the findings
as set forth in the written notice of charges. On November 9, 2006, the Board terminated
Ms, Emory from her tenured position.

Chancery Court Proceedings

In December 2006, Ms. Emory, representing herself, filed a “Petition for Judicial
Review” in the Chancery Court of Shelby County seeking judicial review of the Board's
decision, ‘The petition alleged that the Board violated Tennessee Code Annotated section
49-5-512 by failing to hold her hearing within thiry days from receipt of her letter
demanding a hearing, that the dismissal was in retaliation for unrelated litigation she had
initiated, and that the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious.

 

For reasons that do not appear in the record, there was no activity in the case for
‘two years. In October 2008, the Board’s attomey filed a notice of appearance, ‘The
record contains no further action by either party for over two years thereafter, until it was
finally dismissed for lack of prosecution in April 2011, Shortly after the dismissal for
lack of prosecution, Ms. Emory’s new attorney, her counsel in this appeal, filed a notice
of appearance. The trial court then set aside its order dismissing the case.

 

 

In June 2013, the trial court held a hearing on Ms. Emory’s petition. At the
hearing, Ms. Emory took the position that the Board’s decision was arbitrary and
capricious. She sought to present additional evidence regarding her contention that the
Board violated Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-5-512(a)(2) by not providing Ms.
Emory with a hearing within the required 30-day period, Once the thirty-day period for
Ms. Emory’s Board hearing lapsed, she contended, the Board lost jurisdiction to
terminate Ms. Emory’s employment. At that point, Ms. Emory argued, in order to
terminate her employment, the Board, was required to reissue its notice ofthe charges
and start the termination process over.” She asked the trial court to permit her to submit

 

 
  

Ms, Emory also argued that her termination was due to disability. The Board contended that
any argument regarding. an alleged disability was improper because the case was not a disability
discrimination lawsuit. The Board also noted that any argument to the effect that Ms, Emory was
disabled and needed accommodation was at odds with her Board testimony that she had no mental
infirmities and was ready and able to work. In this appeal, Ms. Emory rises no issues regarding these
allegations, so we do not address them,

 

 
additional evidence, order reinstatement, and award Ms. Emory back pay dating back to
the date of her suspension.

In response, the Board noted that Ms. Emory was represented by counsel in the
Board hearing, and it observed that she received a multi-day hearing with numerous
itnesses and exhibits and ample opportunity to put on her own proof. The Board
pointed to overwhelming proof supporting its decision to terminate Ms. Emory's
‘employment, demonstrating that it was neither arbitrary nor capricious. It opposed the
introduction of any evidence that was not before the Board in its hearing. The Board
emphasized that, over the course of the entire Board hearing, neither Ms. Emory nor her
counsel raised the issue of the delay. The Board attorney, who had participated in the
Board hearing, explained to the trial court that the delay in the termination hearing was
consensual and was the result of the parties” joint effort to balance the schedules of the
many persons required to participate in the hearing, including the attorneys and the
citizen Board members. ‘The Board argued that Ms. Emory was not entitled to relief
because she could not show that the delay prejudiced her right to a full and fair hearing,

   

* Daring the Boars hearing, the partis’ lawyers andthe Board discussed the scheduling ofthe
tearing the length ofthe hearing andthe efforts ofthe Board to give Ms. Emory il hearing:

 

MS. MeCOY: These were the Boards dates.

DR. JOHNSON: | understand that, but everynight you schedule, they are going ~ this is
1 working board, I just need for people to understand, they work very har, they're at
something almost every night. And so I just feel like I need to say that because T think
people think of this as job, that people jst come and go and this Board doesn’t,

“They are very committed to hearing, but I think that at some point ~ they do start very
carly with meetings and they go very late and so ~ and almost everybody at the table has
‘another fll-time ral job.

At the trial court hearing, the Board's attorney repeatedly indicated thatthe delay in setting the
Board hearing was consensual, He stated:

T've done a numberof those hearings over the past years, Your Honor, none of them have
ever been within 30 days. It's fact of which the Board is aware, 1 a fact of Whi
‘TEA is aware, and the teachers are aware.

   

Itcan't be done. Our Board members work during the day, so they have to fin
‘mest at night. We have to work withthe teacher and with the teacher's attorney, the
‘TEA, my schedule or whoever is handling the hearing, all that has to be worked out. I's
done consensually. was involved in that one. 1 kaow that's what happened here

  

 
In response to questions from the trial court, Ms. Emory’s counsel said that, even
if the date of the hearing had been consensual, he'd seen no documents stating that it was.
Also in response to the trial court’s inquiry, Ms. Emory’s attorney conceded that the
delay had no effect on the outcome of the hearing. Regardless of prejudice, Ms. Emory
insisted, the Tenure Act clearly required a hearing within thirty days and Ms. Emory's
hearing was not held in thirty days; 50, she was entitled to reinstatement.

 

‘The trial court permitted Ms. Emory’s counsel to make an offer of proof, which
consisted of the additional documents he asked the trial court to consider. The Board's
attorney submitted several documents as well, and the parties stipulated as to the
‘authenticity of all of the additional documents. However, the Board maintained that any
delay in conducting the hearing was harmless error, so it asked the trial court not to
consider anything outside of the record that was before the Board. Both parties were
asked to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court then
took the matter under advisement.

 

In late October of 2013, the trial court entered an order affirming the Board’s
decision, In a separate statement of factual findings and conclusions of law, the trial
court set out at length the evidence presented by both parties at the Board hearing. It
noted that, during the Board hearing, Ms. Emory “did not complain about her hearing
being untimely or about any prejudice to her caused by its delay.” The court concluded
that the testimony before the Board “demonstrated that (Ms. Emory} had severe
deficiencies in her teaching ability, which includes classroom-management skills, for
several years.” It deemed the evidence “more than sufficient” to support the Board’s
conclusion that Ms. Emory’s teaching skill was below the required standard and to justify
its decision to terminate her employment.

 

‘As to the Board’s delay in conducting the hearing, the trial court noted that Ms.
Emory had notice and an opportunity to be heard. It stated, “The fact that the hearing
before the Board occurred beyond the statutory 30-day period did not affect Ms. Emory’s
substantial rights... . [Violations of procedural aspects of the tenure law do not entitle a
plaintiff to damages if the termination was justified.” It cited federal cases to the effect
that a deprivation of procedural due process would entitle a terminated teacher to
substantive relief only if the teacher showed that she was damaged by the procedural
violation. The trial court distinguished Thompson v. Memphis City Schools, 395 8.W.3d
616 (Tenn. 2012), on the basis that, in that case, the noncompliance with the Tenure Act
‘was so extensive that it amounted fo a violation of the teacher's substantive rights. The
trial court added: “There is no evidence in the record that [Ms. Emory] objected or did
not consent {0 the date chosen for the heating. [Ms. Emory] concedes that she has not
bbeen harmed or prejudiced by the delay of the hearing,”

 

 

 

 

 
In November 2013, Ms. Emory filed a motion to alter or amend the trial court's,
judgment. Ms. Emory’s attomey noted that the findings of fact and conclusions of law
id not refer to the additional exhibits submitted to the trial court, and he sought to clarify
‘whether the trial court had considered them. He reiterated the argument that the Board
violated the Tenure Act by failing to give Ms. Emory a hearing within 30 days of her
request and contended that the remedy was for the Board to reinstate her. He conceded
that the Board could immediately reinsttute the charges against Ms. Emory but felt that
doing so would permit him to pursue a more effective strategy in the new hearing,

 

 

In response to the trial court's question about the delay, Ms. Emory’s counsel said,
“[Ms. Emory] had counsel . . She was represented by [Memphis Education
|] . .. like most every other teacher. I don't know why it got put off. I wasn’t
representing her... .I don’t know what happened.” He asserted, “I don't know why [Ms.
Emory’s] counsel didn't say anything at the [Board] hearing about {the delay}, but I don’t
think counsel had to because the mandates of the Tennessee [Tenure] Act are clear,
they have to {hold the hearing] within . . . 30 days.” After Ms. Emory’s counsel
conceded that her attorney did not raise the delay as an issue before the Board, the trial
court asked him about “present{ing} « new [issue] in the, inthe chancery court where it
‘was not raised before the board?” Ms. Emory’s counsel claimed:

 

 

 

1 get to do that, It's a de novo hearing, Judge. I get to raise a legal question
ight now that's never been raised before . .. the school board. ... T can’t
raise it in the Court of Appeals, but I have to raise it to you, And that’s
what I'm doing.

 

  

At the conclusion of the hearing on the motion to alter or amend, the trial court
reiterated that the record before the Board supported the decision to terminate. It stated:

[The primary and moving concern that [Ms. Emory] has at this point is that
it took 300 Something days from her termination day for her to have a
hearing. But notwithstanding the extensive time that it took to bring the
matter to a hearing, the issue of the delay was never considered by . .. the
board.

‘The trial court concluded that Ms. Emory had not established that, “had that issue
been presented,” the result would have been different. It allowed the additional
documents to be part of the record but said that Ms. Emory had not shown that they
would have changed the outcome. The trial court denied the motion to alter or amend,
Ms. Emory appealed.

 

 

-10-
Court of Appeals Decision

(On appeal, the Court of Appeals indicated thatthe trial court had mischaract
‘Ms. Emory's claim as based on an alleged deprivation of procedural due process. Emory
vy. Memphis City Sch. Bd. of Edue., No. W2014-01293-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 1934397,
at *3-4 (Tenn, Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2015), perm. app. granted (Sept. 18, 2015). It noted that
the Tenure Act provides greater protections to teachers than the minimal constitutional
‘due process requirements, and it framed the issue as whether Ms. Emory received the
statutory protections afforded her under the Tenure Act. Id. at *4,

 

‘After discussing Thompson at length, the Court of Appeals turned to the question
of whether the statutory provision requiring the Board to conduct its hearing within thirty
days of the teacher's demand is “mandatory” or “directory.” Id. at *4-7 (citing Tenn.
Code Ann. § 49-5-512(a)(2); Thompson, 395 8,W.3d at 618-630). It acknowledged that
the statute uses the word “shall” in connection with the thirty-day period for the hearing
but noted that statutory requirements related to the time for performing an act may be
construed as directory rather than mandatory. Id. at *6, It noted that the primary purpose
of the Tenure Act is to protect teachers from arbitrary dismissals and that the essential
purpose of section 49-$-512 is “to ensure that tenured teachers are provided a full and fair
pre-termination hearing.” Id, at *7. The time requirement for the hearing, it held is not
“fundamental” to the statute, It also observed that the statute contains no language
indicating that “the failure to provide a hearing within the specified time period renders
the proceedings void.” Id. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the “timely
hearing requirement in Section 49-5-512(a)(2) is directory rather than mandatory.” 1d.

  
   

  

 

     

 

‘At that point, the appellate court expressed concern that its holding that the thirty
day hearing provision is directory rather than mandatory, coupled with the absence of any
penalty for a failure to hold the hearing within thirty days, “could render the provision
meaningless.” Id. It declined to rule that the Board’s failure to hold Ms. Emory’s
hearing within thirty days rendered the Board’s proceedings void, but it felt that “some
sanction . . . is necessary.” Id. ‘The appellate court noted that “the only prejudice Ms.
Emory suffered as a result of the delayed hearing is that she was suspended without pay
following her demand for @ hearing for a number of days that exceeded the statutory
limit” Id. “Accordingly.” it held, “the proper remedy is an award of back pay for the
additional days that Ms. Emory was suspended without pay and without @ hearing in
violation of the Tenure Act.” Jd. The Court of Appeals then reversed the judgment of
the trial court and remanded the case to the trial court to determine the amount of back
pay to which Ms, Emory was entitled. 1

 
Both partes filed applications for permission to appeal to this Court, We accepted
both applications.

ISSUES ON APPEAL

On appeal, the Shelby County Board of Education raises the following issue:
“Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Ms. Emory was entitled to back pay
when the Tenure Act does not preseribe an award of back pay when a tenured teacher,
‘who has been terminated, does not receive a tenure hearing within 30 days of requesting
in”

 

Ms. Emory also challenges the remedy crafted by the Court of Appeals, but, not
surprisingly, frames the issue differently: “Does the Court of Appeals have the authority
under the Tenure Act to award partial back pay where Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-511(a)3)
requires an award of full salary without offset?” In addition, Ms. Emory raises three
more issues

 

(1) Whether the Tenure Act's provision at Tenn, Code Ann. § 49-5-
512(a)(2) requiring that a hearing for a suspended or dismissed teacher
“shall not” be set later than 30 days following the receipt of the demand for
a hearing is mandatory?

 

 

(2) Whether the Tenure Act at Tenn, Code Ann. § 49-5-511(a)(1) prohibits
the discharge of a tenured teacher when there is a violation of Tenn. Code
Ann, §49-5-512(a)(2)?

(3) Whether the Appellee is entitled to reinstatement and full back pay
under the ‘Tenure Act?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-5-513 affords a tenured teacher whose
employment has been terminated by a school board the right to judicial review of the
school board's decision. Opinions from our intermediate courts have differed somewhat
‘on the scope of the trial court's review. Compare Ripley v. Anderson Co. Bd. of Educ..
293 S.W.3d 154, 156 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Lee v. Franklin Special Sch, Dist. Bd.

237 S.W.3d 322, 329 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (applying a statutory writ of
i standard of review), with Winkler v. Tipton Cnty. Bd. of Edue., 63 S.W3d 376,
inn. CL. App. 2001) (applying a common-law writ of certiorari “material

 

 

 
 

<12-
evidence” standard of review); Wallace v. Mitchell, 303 S.W.34 685, 687 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2000) (same). We will endeavor to clarify.”

Prior to 1992, the Tenure Act contained no provision requiring the school board (0
create a record of its hearing in @ case involving the dismissal of a tenured teacher. The
Act provided that, in the chancery court’s review of a school board’s decision, “[t}he
hearing shall be de novo and may be on deposition and interrogatories, or on oral
testimony.” Cooper v. Williamson Cnty. Bd. of Edue., 746 S.W.24 176, 179 (Tenn, 1987)
(alteration in original) (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-513(g) as of 1986). In Cooper,
this Court discussed the difference between a common law writ of certiorari and a
statutory writ of certiorari, The Court recognized that a common-law writ of certiorari
intended to allow review of “the legality of the action of a board or inferior tribunal,
while a statutory writ of certiorari is intended “to be employed [by a court), in liew of an
appeal, to review and correct errors of fact and law committed by such inferior tribunal.”
Id. (quoting Anderson v. City of Memphis, 72 8.W.2d 1059, 1060 (Tenn. 1934)).

 

      

The Cooper Court went on to explain that, because the two types of writs had
different purposes, the scope of review for each type also differed. Generally, the scope
of review for a common-law writ of certiorari (intended to address legality) “is limited to
the record to determine as a question of law whether there is any material evidence to
support the agency's findings,” but new evidence could be admitted “on the issue of
whether the administrative body exceeded its jurisdiction or acted illegally,
capriciously{,] or arbitrarily.” Id. (quoting Davison v. Carr, 659 8.W.2d 361, 363 (Tenn.
1983)). In contrast, trial court proceedings on a statutory writ of certiorari (intended to
address correctness) “may provide for some form of a trial de novo.” Id. The scope of
the “rial de novo" varies, however, because “ ‘{tJhe meaning of ‘trial de novo in each
statute is obviously dictated by the wording and context of the statute in which it appears
and by the nature of the administrative body, decision and procedure being used.’ ” Id.
(quoting Pledger v. Cox, 626 P.2d 415, 416-417 (Utah 1981)). The Cooper Court opined
that the Tenure Act sets forth a “species of the statutory writ of certiorari" that required
the chancery court to “redetermine both the facts and the law from all the evidence before
the court.” Id. at 179, 181,

 

 

 

 

In 1992, our legislature enacted comprehensive legislation related to education
that included amendments to the Tenure Act, Among other things, the amendments
required that teachers be provided “a full, complete, and impartial heating before the

* In footnote 3 above, we state that, in this Opinion, we apply the Tenure Actas itwas coed in
2005 and 2006, because Ms. Emory's termination, schoo! board hearing, and appeal tothe chancery court
took place ia 2005 and 2006. However, in discussing the standard of review, we consider amendments
that oscured in 2007 for clarity in future eases involving the Tenure Act

“Be
board, including the right to have evidence . .. included in the record of the hearing.”
‘The Teachers’ Tenure Act, ch. $35, 1992 Tenn. Pub. Acts (amending Tenn. Code Ann. §
49-5-512). The amendments also mandated the preparation of a record of the hearing and
directed that all actions by the school board be “reduced to writing and included in the
record, together with all evidence otherwise submitted.” The Teachers’ Tenure Act, ch.
535, 1992 Tenn. Pub, Acts (amending Tenn, Code Ann.§ 49-5-512(a)(1).

 

In addition to mandating a hearing and the creation of a record, the 1992
legislation also set forth a standard of judicial review of the decision that resulted from
the school board hearing. Subsection (g) of Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-5-513
‘was amended to read:

The review of the court shall be limited to the written record of the hearing
before the board and any evidence or exhibits submitted at such hearing.
Additional evidence or testimony shall not be admitted except as to
cstablish arbitrary or capricious action or violation of statutory or
constitutional rights by the board

‘The Teachers’ Tenure Act, ch, $35, 1992 Tenn, Pub. Acts (amending Tenn. Code Ann. §
49-5-513(@); see Wallace, 303 S.W.3d at 686-87 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (noting the
statutory change). ‘Thus, the 1992 amendments changed the judicial review from a de
novo hearing to a review of the written record of the school board hearing; it gave the
chancery court limited authority to admit additional evidence only if needed to establish
that the schoo! board acted arbitrarily or capriciousty or that the school board violated the
teacher's statutory or constitutional rights. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-513(g). The
1992 amendments led some appellate courts to apply a common-law writ of certiorari
standard of review, icc. limited to the record to determine whether there was mat.
‘evidence to support the school board’s decision, with new evidence admissible only on
the issues of whether the school board exceeded its jurisdiction or acted illegally,
arbitrarily or capriciously. See, e.g., Wallace, 303 8.W.3d at 687 (quoting Davidson v.
Carr, 659 8. W.2d 361, 363 (Tenn. 1983)); see also Winkler, 63 8.W.3d at 381.

 

 

   

   

In 2007, however, the legislature amended the Tenure Act to further address the
standard of review. The 2007 amendment added language to section 49-5-12(c\(7), now
‘codified at (c)(4), It stated that a party dissatisfied with the school boards decision “shall
hhave the right to appeal to the chancery court.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-512(eX4)
(2016). If such an appeal were filed, the school board was directed to transmit the record
of its proceedings to the chancery court. The amendment then provided: “The review of
the court shall be de novo on the record of the hearing held by the hearing officer and
reviewed by the board.” Id.

 

   

“14s
‘These statutes do not refer to either the common law or the statutory writ of
certiorari, Reading section 49-5-512(c)(4) and section 49-5-513(e) together, however, it
is apparent that the standard of review under the Tenure Act is not the standard applicable
to a common law writ of certiorari. Instead, the standard of review specified in the
statute js intended to permit the chancery court to address the intrinsic correctness of the
school board's decision. The appellate court in Ripley aptly described this standard of
review: “The chancery court’s review, as contemplated by [section 49-5-513]. is a de
novo review wherein the chancery court does not altach a presumption of correctness to
the school board’s findings of fact, nor is it confined to deciding whether the evidence
‘preponderates in favor of the school board's determination.” Ripley, 293 S.W.3d at 156
(iting Zee, 237 S.W.3d at 329). The teacher does not have the ability to present new
evidence on the merits of the charges; the chancery court's de novo review is limited to
the record of the school board proceedings. New evidence is only admissible “to
establish arbitrary or capricious action or violation of statutory ot constitutional rights by
the board.” ‘Tenn, Code Ann. § 49-5-513(g)-

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

‘Appellate court review of the chancery court's decision is under the familiar Rule
13(4) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, applicable in non-jury eases, to
determine whether the evidence preponderates in favor of the chancery court's findings
of fact. Ripley, 293 S.W.34 at 156. Issues of law, of course, are reviewed de novo, with
zo presumption of correctness in the chancery court's conclusions. Jd.

ANALYSIS:

In Thompson v. Memphis City Sch. Bd. of Ed., this Court set out the purposes of
the Tenure Act and outlined the protections afforded to tenured teachers under the Act:

{[Thhe Legislature enacted the Tenure Act in 1951. Act of Feb. 27, 1951,
ch. 76, 1951 Tenn. Pub. Acts 292, 292-305. The primary purpose of the
‘Tenure Act is “to protect school teachers from arbitrary demotions and
dismissals.” Cooper v. Williamson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 746 8.W.24 176,
179 (Tenn. 1987) (quoting Snell v. Brothers, 527 8.W.2d 114, 116 (Tenn.
1975)). The Tenure Act also affords “a measure of job security to those
educators who have attained tenure status” and assures “efficient
‘administration of the local educational systems of this State” by creating
stability. Ryan v. Anderson, 481 S.W.24 371, 374 (Fenn. 1972),

 

The statute defines “tenure” as:

-1S-
 

‘the statutory requirements, conditions, relations and
provisions in this part, under which a teacher employed by a
board holds « position as a teacher under the jurisdiction of
the board.

‘Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-501(11)(A). The Act creates two types of tenure
— limited and permanent. 1d. § 49-5-503. . . . Once attained, permanent
tenure extends “until such time as the teacher . .. resigns, retires or is
dismissed under [the] provisions of this part.” Id. § 49-5-501(11XC)
(emphasis added). ‘The Tenure Act declares in no uncertain terms that “[aJo
teacher shall be dismissed or suspended except as provided in this part.”
Ia, § 49-5-S11(a)(1) (emphasis added),

 

 

 

‘The five exclusive ‘causes for which a teacher may be dismissed” are

incompetence, inefficiency, neglect of duty, unprofessional conduct and
insubordination as defined in § 49-5-501.” Id § 49-5-511(a)Q2). However,
even if one of these causes is charged, certain procedures must be provided
before a tenured teacher is dismissed. First, written charges must be
presented to the board of education specifically stating an offense that
‘would amount to cause for the teacher's dismissal, and “the charges shall be
‘made in writing, specifically stating the offenses which are charged, and
shall be signed by the party or parties making the charges.” Id. § 49-5-
511(a)(4) (emphasis added). If the board of education determines that the
“charges are of such nature as to warrant the dismissal of the teacher, the
director of schools shall give the teacher” written notice of the board's
decision, a copy of the charges against the teacher, and “a copy of a form
which shall be provided by the commissioner of education advising the
teacher as to the teacher's legal duties, rights and recourse under the terms
of this part.” Jd. § 49-5-511(aXS) (emphasis added). The teacher then
“may, within thirty (30) days after receipt of notice, demand a hearing
before the board” by giving “written notice to the director of schools of the
teacher's request for a hearing.” Id. § 49-5-512(a)(1) (emphasis added). .

  

 

When a teacher demands a hearing before the board, “{t]he director of
schools shall, within five (5) days after receipt of [the] request, indicate the
place of such hearing and set a convenient date, which date shall not be
later than thirty (30) days following receipt of [the] notice demanding a
hearing.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-512(a)(2) (emphasis added). “The
teacher may appear at the hearing and plead the teacher’s cause in person ot
by counsel.” id. § 49-5-512(a)(3). Additionally, the teacher “may present

-16-
witnesses, and shall have full opportunity to present the teacher's
contentions and to support them with evidence and argument.” Id. at § 49-
5-512(a\(4). The teacher must be provided a “full, complete, and impartial
hearing before the board, including the right to have evidence deemed
relevant by the teacher included in the record of the heating, even if
‘objected to by the person conducting the hearing,” Jd. The board chair
‘conducting the hearing has the power to issue subpoenas, and both the
teacher and the board may have subpoenas issued. Id. § 49-5-512(a\(5).
{All testimony must be given under oath, and either party may invoke the
rule of sequestration for witnesses. /d. § 49-5-512(a)(6) (8). If an appeal
is taken, a transcript or recording of the hearing must be prepared, and all
actions of the board must be reduced to writing and included in the record.
Id. § 49-5-512(a)(7). After the hearing, “{tJhe board shall within ten (10)
days decide what disposition to make of the case and shall immediately
thereafter give the teacher written notice of its findings and decision.” Jd. §
49-5-512(a)(9). A tenured teacher “who is dismissed or suspended by
action of the board” may then obtain judicial review by filing a petition for
writ of certiorari within thirty days of the board's decision. Jd. § 49-5-
513(a)-b)

 

 

  

 

 

Thompson v. Memphis City Sch. Bd. of Educ., 395 8.W.34 616, 623-24 (Tenn. 2012)
(footnotes omitted) (emphasis removed),

Under the next provision of the Tenure Act, Tennessee Code Annotated section
49-5-513, a tenured teacher whose employment has been terminated may obtain judicial
review of the termination, As noted above, the statute provides that the chancery court's
review of the schoo! board's decision “shall be limited to the written record of the
hearing before the board and any evidence or exhibits submitted at the hearing.
‘Additional evidence or testimony shall not be admitted except as to establish arbitrary or
capricious action o violation of statutory or constitutional rights by the board.” Tenn.
Code Ann. § 49-5-513(8),

 

In this appeal, Ms. Emory asserts that the Board failed to abide by the provision in
section 49-5-512 stating that the hearing before the school board shall be set no later than
thirty days after receipt of the notice demanding a hearing. Tenn, Code Ann. § 49-5-
512(aX2)." Both parties argue that the relief awarded by the Court of Appeals has no
basis in the Tenure Act. Ms. Emory contends that she is entitled to reinstatement and full

   

® singe the Board's hearing on the charges against Ms. Emory, sction 49-5512 of the Tenure
‘Act has been amended mukiple times. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-5-512 2014).

 

-17-
back salary, and the Board argues that Ms. Emory suffered no prejudice from the time
delay and thus is entitled to no relief at all.

We consider first the relief awarded by the Court of Appeals, and then address Ms.
Emory’s request for relief based on the statutory time provision.

Relief Ordered by Court of Appeals

In this case, the trial court appeared to view the timeliness issue raised by Ms.
Emory as a question of procedural due process and did not rule direetly on whether the
thirty-day statutory period is mandatory or directory. The Court of Appeals clarified that
Ms. Emory’s contention is not based on due process but is instead based on Tennessee
Code Annotated section 49-5-512 (a)(2), which states that, once a tenured teacher sends
the school board a demand for a hearing, “[{Jhe director of schools shall, within five (5)
days after receipt of the request, indicate the place of the hearing and set a convenient
date, which date shall not be later than thirty (30) days following receipt of [the] notice
‘demanding a hearing."" Emory, 2015 WL 1934397, at *3, *6 (alterations in original)
(emphasis removed) (quoting Tenn, Code Ann. § 49-5-512(a)(2)).

  

 

 

‘The Court of Appeals considered at length whether the 30-day time period is
directory rather than mandatory. Ultimately it concluded that, despite the use ofthe word
“shall” in the statute, the timeliness provision for the school board hearing “is directory
rather than mandatory.”!' See Tenn, Code Ann. § 49-5-512(a)(2); Emory, 2015 WL
1934397, at *7.

 

In general, if statutory provisions are deemed mandatory, “they are not subject to
faction by substantial compliance, Substantial compliance is sufficient only when

 

sat

 

 

 

Tn general, use of the word “shall” in a statute indicates that the statutory provision is
mandatory, not discretionary, See Home Bullders Ass'n of Middle Tennessee v. Williamson Cnty, 304
‘S.W.3d 812, 819 (Tenn, 2010) (citing Gray v. Cullom Mach, Tool d Die, In, 152 SW.36 439, 446
(evn. 2004); Stubbs ¥. State, 393 S.W 24 150, 154 (Tenn, 1963); Sanford Realty Cov. Cy of Knoxville,
110 S.W.24 325, 327 (Tenn. 1937), “Notwithstanding this general ale, a statutory provision that pertains
tothe time for performing an act governed by the statute i usually construed tobe directory only.” Home
Builders Ass'n, 304 S.W.34 at 819 (citations omitted, see also Scheele v. Hartford Undereriters Ins. Co.
218 SW-3d 636, 640 (Tenn, 2007) (quoting Presley v. Bennett, 860 S.W.24 857, 860 (Tenn, 1993),
Trapp v- McCormick, 130 S.W 24 122, 125 (1939)) ("Statutory provisions relating tothe mode or time of
doing an act to which te statute applies are ordinarily held to be dseotory rater than mandatory") As
this Court explained in Myers, “To determine whether the use of the word “shal” ina statue is mandatory
for merely directory, we look to see “whether the prescribed mode of action is of the essence of the thing,
to be accomplished." Myers x. AMISUB (SFH), Inc., 382 S.W.3d 300, 309 (Tem. 2012) (quoting 3
Norman I, Singer & 1D. Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statuory Construction § 57:2 (7h ed. 2008))

 

 

 

-18-
the statute's requirements are directory, not mandatory.” Myers v. AMISUB (SFE), Inc.,
382 S.W.3d 300, 310 (Tenn. 2012). Nevertheless, despite holding that the Tenure Act's
time provision is directory rather than mandatory, the Court of Appeals id not go on to
‘address whether there was substantial compliance in this case. It pointed out that section
49-5-512(a)(2) contains no specific consequence for failure to hold the school board
hearing within the thirty-day statutory period." Emory, 2015 WL 1934397 at *7.. The
appellate court declined Ms. Emory’s invitation to hold that the Board's termination of
Ms. Emory was void, but it expressed concern that its holding “could render the provision
meaningless.” /d. Commenting that “some sanction . . . is necessary,” the Court of
‘Appeals held as follows:

 

 

 

In our view, the only prejudice Ms. Emory suffered as a result of the
delayed hearing is that she was suspended without pay following her
demand for a hearing for a number of day’ that exceeded the statutory
Accordingly, the proper remedy is an award of back pay for the additional
days that Ms. Emory was suspended without pay and without a hearing in
violation of the Tenure Act. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and
remand this matter to the trial court to determine the amount of back pay to
which Ms. Emory is entitled for those days.

 

Ia.

In this appeal, both parties argue that the relief awarded by the Court of Appeals
hhas no basis in the Tenure Act. We agree. As noted by the intermediate appellate court,
the time provision in section 49-5-512 (a)(2) carries no specific penalty for
noncompliance. Courts are not at liberty to rewrite statutes. See Myers, 382 8.W.3d at
310 (citing Gleaves v, Checker Cab Transit Corp., 15 S.W.3d 799, 803 (Tenn, 2000)
({l]tis not our prerogative to rewrite the statutes.”); Carter v. Duke, 921 So. 2d 963, 970

 

 

"The question of whether the statute specifies the consequence for noncompliance js factor in
determining whether a statutory provision is mandstory or directory. See 3 Norman J. Singer & J.D.
Singee, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § ST:% (th ed, 2008) (“the lack of stated
consequences for noncompliance leads to a directory constuction"); Marks v. New Orleans Police Dep’
543 So. 2d 1028, 1035 (La, 2006) (“Generall, statues using mandatory langxage prescribe the result {0
follow (@ penalty) if the required action isnot taken. Ifthe tems of the statute are limited to what is
required 0 be done, 4, procedural rules, then the statute is considered directory even though mandatory
language is employed.”). Compare Myers, 382 8.W.3d at 310-11 (noting that Tenn, Code Ann. §§ 29-2
131 and -122 both excuse noncompliance only if plaintiff can demonstrate “extraordinary caus
‘otherwise, “the complaint shall be dismissed."), cf Stevens v, Hickman Coty. Health Care Sere, Inc, 418
S.W.3d 547, $55 (Lena, 2013) (holding that “shall” is directory rather than mandatory and permiting
substantial compliance, rather than strict compliance, where plaintiff's HIPAA authorization form did not
‘mec criteria in Tenn, Code Ann. § 29-26-121(a)2XE).

 

 

  

 

-19-
(La, 2006) (“It is not the function of the judicial branch . . . to legislate by inserting
penalty provisions into statutes where the legislature has chosen not to do s0.”); see also
Marks v, New Orleans Police Dep't, 943 So. 2d 1028, 1035-36 (La. 2006) (“Marks
contends that the statutory provision provides the officer with... the right that the
investigation be completed within sixty days. While this contention is correct, the statute
does not establish a penalty for non-compliance and in the absence of prejudice, we
cannot supply a penalty.”). The remedy crafted by the Court of Appeals is not contained
in the Tenure Act, and we are not at liberty to judicially modify the Act.

 

 

‘Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ award to Ms. Emory of “back pay
for the additional days that Ms. Emory was suspended without pay and without a hearing,
in violation of the Tenure Act.” Emory, 2015 WL 1934397, at *7.

 

 

Timeliness of Hearing

‘On appeal, Ms. Emory takes the position that the Board’s decision was arbitrary
and capricious in that the Board failed to provide Ms. Emory with a hearing within the
30-day period required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-5-512(a)(2). Once the
thirty-day period for Ms. Emory’s Board hearing lapsed, she contends, the Board lost
to terminate Ms. Emory’s employment. At that point, Ms. Emory argues, in
‘order to terminate her employment, the Board was required to re-issue its notice of the
charges and start the termination process over. She asks this Court to reverse the trial
court, order reinstatement, and award Ms. Emory back pay dating back to the date of her
suspension,

    

 

 

 

It is uncontroverted that, in her hearing before the Board, Ms. Emory raised no
objection to the Board’s failure to conduct the hearing within 30 days after it received
notice of her demand for a hearing, as set forth in section 49-5-512(a)(2). Consequently,
the Board had no opportunity to address the issue. As explained below, for this reason,
‘we find that the timeliness issue is not properly before the Court.

We begin with the basic legal principle that, with few exceptions, litigants must
raise their objections in the trial court or forego the opportunity to argue them on appeal.
“It has long been the general rule that questions not raised in the trial court will not be
centertained on appeal ....” In re Adoption of E.N.R., 42 S.W.3d 26, 32-33 (Tenn. 2001)
(quoting Lawrence v. Stanford, 655 S.W.24 927, 929 (Tenn. 1983); see also In re Taylor
B.W,, 397 $.W.3d 105, 114 (Tenn. 2013) (citing Lawrence, 655 8.W.2d at 929; Tenn. R.
App. P. 36(a)) (“It has long been the rule that this Court will not address questions not
raised in the trial court.”); Simpson v. Frontier Cmty. Credit Union, 810 S.W.2d 147, 153
(Tenn, 1991) (“issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal”); Rhea v. Marko Construction Co., 652 8.W.2d 332, 334 (Tenn. 1983); East

=20-

 
Sevier Cnty. Util. Dist. of Sevier Cnty. v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., $70 8.W.24 850,
854 (Tenn. 1978); City of Elizabethton v. Carter County, 321 S.W.2d 82, 827 (Tenn.
1958).

 

 

ple that a litigant must raise his objection at the first available
‘opportunity applies no less where the tribunal of first instance is an administrative body.
See, e., Welch v. Bd. of Prof'l Responsibility. for the Sup. Ct. of Tenn., 193 S.W.34 451,
464 (Tenn. 2006) (stating that the general principle is that “failure to make a timely,
specific objection” in the trial court prevents a litigant from raising challenge on appeal
“applies equly to proceedings before the hearing commie as does to proceatings in

). In the ease of In re Billing & Collection Tariffy of S. Cent. Bell, 779
$.W.24 375,380 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989), the Court of Appeals explained

  

In the context of civil litigation, our courts have long revognized that itis
incumbent upon a litigant to call tothe trial court's attention those errors he
believes have adversely affected his case, Thus, we have consistently held
that even in cases where error might exist litigant will not be permitted to
raise questions and issues on appeal that have not first been presented to the

‘court. The trial court must be given the opportunity to correct errors in
the conduet ofa tral such as the erroneous admission of evidence before a
litigant will be able to seck reversal on appeal.

 

 

‘These principles have equal validity in administrative proceedings. No
matter how informal the proceeding, a person appearing before an
administrative tribunal must make timely objections to procedural errors
and must raise ina timely manner the issues and questions he deems
material before he will be permitted to raise them in a petition for review.
To require otherwise would undercut the effectiveness of administrative
proceedings and would cause serious waste of effort by the parties and the
administrative tribunal itself

 

 

Id. at 380 (citations omitted).

This rule applies with particular force with respect to alleged procedural
deficiencies in the underlying, administrative proceedings. In McClellan v. Board of
Regents of State University, the Court held: “One appearing before an administrative
tribunal must make timely objections to procedural errors and must raise the errors at the
administrative level in order to preserve them for consideration in a petition for judicial
review.” 921 S.W.2d 684, 690 (Tenn, 1996) (citation omitted); see also City of
Brentwood v. Metro. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 149 $.W.34 49, 55 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004)

 

 

  

 

-21-
 

(Parties to administrative proceedings must raise all objections to procedural errors
during the hearing in order to preserve these questions for later appellate review.”).

 

In McClellan, the plaintiff was charged with various violations of the policies of
the Tennessee State Board of Regents. McClellan, 921 8.W.2d at 686. Pursuant 10
Tennessee's Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), he received an
administrative hearing on the charges. Jd. The administrative proceedings resulted in an
adverse decision, and the plaintiff sought judicial review. /d. at 687. In the judicial
proceedings, the plaintiff raised for the first time several alleged procedural iregulatities,
including an argument that the composition of the hearing panel was contrary to the
UAPA. Id. ‘The lower courts affirmed the administrative decision, and the plaintiff was
‘granted permission to appeal to this Court. Id. at 687-88,

 

 

On appeal, the McClellan Court declined to grant relief to the plaintiff, in part
because he had raised no objection to the hearing procedures either before or during the
administrative hearing. Id. at 690. ‘The Court drew the analogy to a ltigant’s failure 10
raise an issue in the trial court:

 

 

Judicial review of an agency decision is confined to the administrative
record, except in limited circumstances. It follows that it is no less
incumbent for a party to an administrative proceeding to raise issues of
procedural irregularity than itis for a party in a judicial proceeding. The
‘administrative tribunal, like the trial court, must be given the opportunity to
‘correct procedural errors. Allowing parties to acquiesce in the procedures,
but to challenge those same procedures on appeal is inefficient and
tunreasonable. Had Dr. McClellan complained of the procedure initially, or
even in his Petition for Appeal of the Initial Order, the procedures could
have been clarified or even modified. He did not raise the issue until long
after it could have been explored and, if necessary, rectified. He cannot be
heard to complain at this late date.

 

Id. af 690 (citation and footnote omitted).

‘The Court applied the same principle in
employee failed to raise alleged procedural deficienc
‘charges against him; the administrative proceedings resulted in the employee's dismissal
Bailey v, Blount Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 303 S.W.3d 216, 221, 237 (Tenn, 2010). In the
‘ensuing judicial review of the administrative decision, the employee contested his
dismissal on the basis of a variety of alleged procedural irregularities. Id. at 226. The
Court observed that, prior to filing his complaint in the circuit court, the plaintiff “made
no objection to the procedures Defendants utilized in conjunction with dismissing him.”

-2-

  

 

 
Id, at 237. The Bailey Court cited several Tennessee cases holding that parties must
object to procedural deficiencies at the administrative level in order to preserve them for
judicial review. Id. (citing McClellan, 921 S.W.2d at 690; Richardson v. Tenn. Bd. of
Demtisiry, 913 8.W.26 446, 455 (Tenn.1995) (“Full consideration of constitutional
procedural issues by the agency will assure that the responsible agency has a full
‘opportunity to reach a considered decision on a complete record after a fair
proceeding.”); City of Brentwood, 149 S.W.3d at 35 (citing McClellan, 921 $.W.2d at
690) (“Parties to administrative proceedings must raise all objections to procedural errors
during the hearing in order to preserve these questions for later appellate review.”).!°

‘The Court in Bailey noted that the plaintiff employee “could have raised the issue
of the timeliness of the Full Hearing either before it was conducted or during it.” Id.
Doing so, the Court observed, would have given the administrative authorities the
‘opportunity to correct the procedural deficiencies. Id. at 237-38. The Court commented
that the plaintiff employee had “offered no reason for his failure to raise” the procedural
issues at the administrative level. Ld. at 237-38, Finding waiver based on the employee's
‘silence, acquiescence, and active participation in the administrative procedures
provided,” the Court declined to rule in favor of the employee based on the alleged
irregularities in the administrative procedures provided. Id. at 237-38,

 

In this case, in oral argument, the Court asked counsel for Ms. Emory whether she
had waived the timeliness issue by not raising it at the school board level. Counsel for
Ms, Emory pointed out that, although there was much discussion in the lower courts
about the fact that Ms, Emory did not raise her timeliness objection in the Board hearing,

other sates likewise requie litigants 10 raise objections first at the administrative level,
pacticulasly where the administalive hearing is similar to wal See, eg Tr for Alaska State Dept of
Natural Re, 865 0.24 745, 748 (Alaska 1993) (recognizing that a party must aise an issue during the
administrative proceedings to preserve the issue for appeal); Dragan v. Conn. Med. Examining Bd, 613
‘A.24-739, 747 {holding that paitiff waived his right to eon-examine a witness when plain ied to
fimely acer the right during the adninisetive proceeding and filed to seek appropiate reli from the
thard) Teraco-Cies Sere Pipcine Co. x. McGaw, 695 N24 481, 489 (lt 1998) (holding that the
reviewing cout wll generally not consider forthe fist time issues or defenses, including constitutional
Challenge, tht plait fled to rae Deore the adminisraive agency); Dd of Regisration in Med.
Fiori, 488 4.24 1371, 1374-75 (Me. 1985) (bolding that doctor waived any defense or objection tothe
boar’ alleged failure to comply with the administrative procedures by failing 10 raise such defense or
objection in his pleadings of before the adminisvaive cour). Waiver has been applied in other
Juritons to tenured teachers, See, eg, Alexander v. Sch Dist, Na. 17 af Thurston Cn, 248 N.W.2d
335, 338 (Neb, 1976) (addressing toned teachers’ objection to lack of public notice of termination
heating, the Court stated, “Any person who has notice of meeting and attends the meeting should be
required to object specifically tothe lack of public notice atthe meeting. or be held to have waived his
Tig to objet on tht ground at ater dale")

 

 

 

 

 

-23-
the Board has not asserted waiver per se; for this reason, Ms. Emory argued that the
Court should not now consider whether Ms. Emory had waived her objection.

“Rules 13(b) and 36(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, considered
together, give appellate courts considerable discretion to consider issues that have not
been properly presented in order to achieve fairness and justice.” In re Kaliyah S., 455
S.W.3d 533, 540 (Tenn. 2015) (citing Heatherly v. Merrimack Mut, Fire Ins. Co., 43
W.3d 911, 916 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000))."" “Taken together, these rules permit
courts to grant complete relief to the parties as long as they have been given fair notice
‘and an opportunity to be heard on the dispositive issues.” Id. (quoting Heatherly, 43
S.W.3d at 916). In this case, to achieve fairness and justice, we exercise our discretion to
address whether Ms. Emory’s failure to raise the timeliness issue in the proceedings
before the Board precludes her from raising it on judicial review of the Board’s decision,

     

 

 

As discussed above, section 49-5-512 provides for tenured teachers faced with
dismissal to receive a comprehensive hearing before the schoo! board. The statute
contains detailed provisions; subsection (a) of section 49-5-512 alone contains nine
subparts that set forth a plethora of requirements. These requirements range from
imperatives, such as the right to counsel, to lesser matters, such as payment for mileage
for witnesses.'*

"Rule 13(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:

‘Consideration of Issues Not Presented for Review. Review generally will extend only 19
those issues presented for review. The appellate cout shal also consider whether the tial
‘and appellate court have jurisdiction over the subject matter, whether or not presented for
review, and may in its disertion consider other issues in order, among other reasons: (1)
‘to prevent needless litigation, (2) to prevent injury tothe interests ofthe public, and (3) to
prevent prejudice to the judicial process

Rule 36(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure provides:

(6) Effect of Ero. A final judgment from which ree is available and otherwise
appropriate shall not beset aside unless, considering the whole record, error involving a
‘substantial right more probably than not affected the judgment of would result in
Prejudice to the judicial process. When necessary to do substantial justice, an appellate
‘court may consider an exor that has affected the substantial rights ofa party at anytime,
‘even though the error was not raised in the motion fora new trial or assigned as error on
app

 

 

"The requirements forthe hearing detailed in subsection (a) of section 49-5-$12 (2006) are:

(a) A teacher, having received notice of charges pursuant to § 49-5-S11, may,
‘within thiny G0) days after receipt of notice, demand a hearing before the board, as
Follows

24.
We consider Ms. Emory’s hearing before the Board in this ease. Thompson, 395
S.W.3d at 623. The hearing took place over three separate days and was well-nigh a tral
Both parties were represented by counsel, could subpoena witnesses, gave opening and

 

(1) The teacher shall give written notice tothe director ofsehools of the teacher's
request fora hearing;

(@) The director of schools shall, within five (5) days after receipt of request,
Indicate the place of such hearing and seta convenient date, which date shall not be lat
‘than thity (30) days following receipt of notice demanding s heai

 

@) The teacher may appear at the hearing and plead the teacher's ease in person
or by counsel;

(4) The teacher may present witnesses, and shall have full opportunity to present
the teacher’s contentions and to support them with evidence and argument. The teacher
shall be allowed a full, complete, and impartial hearing before the board, including the
right to have evidence deemed relevant by the teacher included in the record of the
hearing, even if objected to by the person conducting the hearing:

(5) The chair ofthe board conducting the hearing is hereby empowered t0 issve
subpoenas for witnesses to compel their attendance at hearings authorized under this
section. All parties tothe proceeding shall have the right to have subpoenas issued by the
chair of the board to compel the attendance ofall witneses deemed by such parties to be
necessary, for a full and complete hearing. All witnesses shall be entitled to the witness
fees and mileage provided by law for legal witnesses, which foes and mileage shall be
paid asa part of the costs of such proceeding. The costs of such proceeding shall be paid
by the losing party;

(6) The chair of the board shall administer oaths to witnesses, who shall testify
‘under oath

(1) A record of the hearing, either by transcript, recording, of as is otherwise
greed by the parties, shall be prepared, ifthe action of the board is appealed, and all
actions of the board shall be reduced to writing and inchided inthe record, together with
all evidence otherwise submitted;

  

(8) On request of either party to the tral, winesses may be barred from the
hearing except as they are called 1 testify, The hearing may be private atthe request of
the teacher or inthe discretion of the board; and

(9) The board shall within ten (10) days decide what disposition to make of the
case and shall immediately thereafter give the teacher written notice of it findings and
decision.

 

 

Tenn. Code Ann, §49-5-512 (a)X1-(9) (2006).
-25-
closing statements, and exchanged witness lists. The Board followed the Rules of
Evidence," put witnesses under oath, invoked “the Rule” to bar witnesses from being,
present except when testifying, allowed both parties to conduit direct examination, cross-
‘examination, redirect and re-cross, and then allowed Board members to ask theit own
‘questions of each witness. See generally Tenn, Code Ann. § 49-5-512(a). Over the three
days of proceedings, the Board put on testimony from five witnesses, Ms. Emory put on
testimony from four witnesses and testified on her own behalf, and twenty-five exhi
were placed into evidence. The testimony and exhibits covered a ten-year span during,
which Ms. Emory had taught at several different schools,

 

 

As we have observed, during the lengthy Board hearing, nary a word about the
considerable delay in scheduling the hearing was uttered by either Ms. Emory or her
‘counsel, Despite the fact that Ms. Emory was represented by counsel during the period
preceding the Board hearing, nothing in the record suggests that she objected to the
delayed hearing date in advance of the hearing. Like the teacher in Bailey, Ms. Emory
could have raised the issue of the timeliness of the Board hearing “either before it was
‘conducted or during it.” Bailey, 303 S.W.3d at 237. Also as in Bailey, Ms. Emory “has
offered no reason” for failing to do so. Id. at 238.

 

Despite Ms. Emory’s failure to even mention the delay during the Board hearing,
in the ensuing judicial review of the Board's decision, she made the Board’s failure to
hold the hearing within 30 days the centerpiece of her argument. In response to Ms.
Emory’s argument, counsel for the Board repeatedly told the chancery court that the
delay in the hearing date was consensual, the product of attempts to aecommodate the
busy schedules of the attorneys and the eitizen school board members, and also to allow
adequate time to prepare for the hearing. Counsel for Ms. Emory claimed that he did not
know the reason for the delay.”

 

There are no documents in the record showing actual consent for the substantial
delay in scheduling the hearing.'* However, the record indicates that Ms. Emory changed
attorneys several months after the Board received her demand for a hearing; the
correspondence between the Memphis City School System and Ms, Emory’s counsel,

 

"6-The Board allowed some hearsay evidence.

" Ms. Emory’s counsel for the chancery court proceedings and for this appeal did not represent
ther before the Board

"The fact that there are no documents or testimony inthe record of the Board hearing showing
the reason for the delay arses, of course, from the fact that Ms. Emory made no objection in the Board
proceedings to the delay in holding her hearing,

-26-
who had been supplied to Ms. Emory by the Tennessee Education Association, contains
no reference to the ongoing delay. These circumstances, considered along with the
substantial nature of the hearing and Ms. Emory’s failure to even refer in the hearing to
the delay in scheduling, much less object to it, suggest at least acquiescence by Ms.
Emory in the failure to hold the hearing during the statutory period.

 

From our review of the record, Ms. Emory received a full and fair heating. She
was given ample opportunity to put on proof, present testimony from witnesses on her
behalf, testify on her own behalf, cross-examine the Board’s witnesses, answer questions
from Board members, and argue her view of the significant events that were the basis for
the charges. On appeal, though Ms. Emory’s counsel indicates that he would have
pursued a different strategy had he been representing her atthe time, he does not question
the fairness of the Board's hearing,

 

 

Ms. Emory argues that she was prejudiced by the delay in scheduling the hearing.
Ms. Emory’s affidavit, supplied to the chancery court, states that she was without income
and health insurance after her discharge, and that she suffered stress from the uncertainty
during the pendency of the proceedings. Respectfully, this does not amount to prejudice
from the delay in scheduling the hearing. ‘The trial court found that “[t]he facts presented
and the outcome of [Ms. Emory’s] tenure hearing would not have been different if the
hearing had been held earlier.” This finding is fully supported in the record. Ms. Emory
has not pointed to any way in which her ability to respond to the charges against her was
adversely impacted by the delay. United States v. L. A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344
USS. 33, 35-36 (1952) (surmising that “{t]he apparent reason for complacency” by the
appellant, in failing to object to a procedural error during the underlying administrative
proceedings, “was that {the appellant} was not actually prejudiced by” the procedural
error). To the contrary, considering Ms. Emory’s change in attomeys during the
pendency of the hearing. the need for her new attomey to prepare forthe hearing, and the
very substantial nature of the proceedings, it could be argued that holding the hearing
‘beyond the thirty-day period may have actually enhanced Ms. Emory’s ability to meet the
charges against her. See Potts v. Gibson, 469 S.W.2d 130, 133-34 (Tenn. 1971) (“Except
in the clearest case of a material disregard by the Board of the procedural requirements of
the statute or a showing of prejudice, where a trial de novo has been had in which the
teacher appeared and fully participated, the appellate court should not interfere with the
‘action of the Board on procedural grounds.”).

 

 

 

 

We are struck as well by what Ms. Emory acknowledges would likely occur if we
‘were to grant the relief she seeks. Ms. Emory concedes that, if this Court were to reverse
the termination of her employment, the Board could immediately re-issue its notice of the
charges against her—the same charges that were the subject of the September 20, 2005
letter to Ms. Emory—and start the termination process over. Indeed, the Board would

-27-
have little choice but to do so, since the prior Board hearing clearly established that Ms.
Emory should not be placed back in the classroom teaching children, Ms. Emory
nevertheless secks reinstatement, at least until the charges are re-issued, and an award of
back pay dating back to the date of Ms. Emory’s suspension,

 

Under these circumstances, we would achieve little more than irony by voiding,
Ms. Emory’s dismissal and remanding this case for the Board to start the termination
process anew, over ten years after her employment was terminated and twenty years after
the events underlying the termination, solely to vindicate a delay in the hearing that Ms.
Emory did not believe warranted even a mention in the Board proceedings. See L. A.
Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 USS. at 35-36 (“The issue is clearly an afterthought,
brought forward at the last possible moment to undo the administrative proceedings
without consideration of the merits and can prevail only from technical compulsion
irrespective of considerations of practical justce.”).

Had Ms. Emory objected during the Board proceedings to the delay in holding the
hearing, the Board could have voided the charges at that time, re-issued them, and
prompily scheduled a new hearing, the same relief Ms. Emory seeks today. See Bailey,
303 S.W.3d at 237 (quoting McClellan, 921 $,W.2d at 690) (“The administrative
‘tribunal, like the tial court, must be given the opportunity to correct procedural errors.”);
Unemployment Comp. Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 US. 143, 155 (1946) (“A reviewing court
usurps the agency's funetion when it sets aside the administrative determination upon a
ground not theretofore presented and deprives the Commission of an opportunity to
consider the matter, make its ruling, and state the reasons for its action.”).

 

 

‘The efficient and fair administration of justice demands that a litigant not be
permitted to withhold her objections, await the outcome, and then complain that she was
denied her rights if she does not approve of the resulting decision. See Bailey, 303
S.W.3d at 237 (quoting McClellan, 921 S.W.2d at 690) (“Allowing parties to acquiesce
in the procedures, but to challenge those same procedures on appeal is inefficient and
unreasonable.""); Dragan v. Connecticut Med. Examining Bd., 613 A.24 739, 747 (1992)
citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (“A party to an administrative
procceding cannot be allowed to participate fully at hearings and then, on appeal, raise
claims that were not asserted before the board, We have made it clear that we will not
parties to anticipate a favorable decision, reserving a right to impeach it or set it
happens to be against them, for a cause which was well known to them before
or during the trial”), Allowing a party to hide an ace up her sleeve for appeal would
undermine fair play and finality of judgment. In contrast, our reaffirmed insistence upon
contemporaneous objections to agency errors should provide incentive for litigants to see
that all procedural deficiencies are addressed before the administrative body completes
consideration of a dispute, See City of Brentwood, 149 S.W.3d at 55 (citing McClellan,

-28-

   

 

 

  

 

  

 
921 S.W.2d at 690) (“Parties to adminis
procedural errors during the hearing
appellate review.”).

 
 
 

rative proceedings must raise all objections to
order to preserve these questions for later

For these reasons, we hold that the timeliness issue raised by Ms. Emory in the
judicial review of the Board’s decision is not properly before this Court, and we decline
to overtum the Board's decision to terminate Ms. Emory’s employment because of the
delay in holding the school board hearing.”” Therefore, we affirm the trial court's
decision to uphold the Board’s termination of Ms. Emory’s employment.

  

ConcLusion

In sum, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ award of partial back pay to Ms. Emory
‘because the relief ordered by the Court of Appeals is without basis in the Tenure Act. AS
to Ms. Emory’s argument that the termination of her employment must be set aside
because the Board failed to hold her hearing within thirty days after it received her notice
of a demand for a hearing, as set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-5-
512(a(2), we hold that the issue is not properly before this Court because Ms. Emory
failed 10 raise her timeliness objection either before or during the Board hearing.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial coun’s decision to uphold the termination of Ms.
ny's employment, Costs on appeal are to be taxed to Plaintiff/Appellee, Rogelynn
Emory.

   

 

 

   

LLY KIRBY,

 

This holding pretermits the issue of whether the thrty-day period forthe schoo! board hearing
set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-5-512(aX2) is mandatory or directory.

-29-