Case Title: State v. Banks

Citation: 

Docket Number: 93-K-0238

State: louisiana

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Date: 1993-03-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
#29875-a-PJD 
2023 S.D. 39 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
* * * * 
 
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
 
 
 
v. 
 
RAYMOND CHARLES BANKS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
* * * * 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT 
MINNEHAHA COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA 
 
* * * * 
 
THE HONORABLE ROBIN J. HOUWMAN 
Judge 
 
* * * * 
 
KRISTI JONES 
Sioux Falls, South Dakota 
 
MANUEL J. DE CASTRO JR. 
Sioux Falls, South Dakota 
Attorneys for defendant 
 
and appellant. 
 
 
MARTY J. JACKLEY 
Attorney General 
 
PAUL S. SWEDLUND 
Solicitor General 
Pierre, South Dakota 
 
 
 
 
Attorneys for plaintiff 
and appellee. 
 
* * * * 
 
 
 
ARGUED 
 
MARCH 23, 2023 
 
OPINION FILED 07/26/23 
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DEVANEY, Justice 
[¶1.]  
Raymond Banks pled guilty to first-degree manslaughter.  Prior to his 
sentencing hearing, Banks sought to introduce evidence of a polygraph examination 
regarding his role in the crime.  The circuit court precluded the admission of the 
polygraph evidence and sentenced Banks to eighty years in the penitentiary with 
twenty years suspended.  Banks appeals, raising the single issue of whether the 
circuit court erred in excluding the polygraph evidence in its sentencing 
consideration.  We affirm. 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
[¶2.]  
Casey Bonhorst was killed by a single gunshot wound to his neck on 
the evening of February 26, 2020, after delivering a pizza to a home in Sioux Falls.  
The investigation of this incident led law enforcement to suspect Banks and 
Jahennessy Bryant as the perpetrators of the shooting.  Bryant was arrested first, 
but on August 12, 2020, Banks and Bryant were charged as co-defendants in a five-
count superseding indictment that included two counts of first-degree murder, one 
count of second-degree murder, one count of first-degree manslaughter, and one 
count of attempted first-degree robbery. 
[¶3.]  
Throughout the entirety of the proceedings, Banks and Bryant have 
maintained differing accounts of the events that transpired leading to Bonhorst’s 
death.  Both agreed that while walking from Banks’s girlfriend’s apartment to the 
duplex where Banks’s aunt resided, they noticed a Domino’s delivery vehicle parked 
outside the duplex.  According to Bryant, Banks suggested that they rob the 
delivery man, but Banks claimed it was Bryant’s idea. 
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[¶4.]  
As to the subsequent events, Bryant testified at a pretrial hearing that 
Banks approached Bonhorst, pulled a gun on him, and told him, “Don’t move or 
anything, try anything stupid.”  Bryant explained that he started moving toward 
Banks to help him by holding Bonhorst from behind, but then he heard gunshots.  
After the shooting, both he and Banks took off running in different directions. 
[¶5.]  
The roles were essentially reversed in Banks’s version of the events, 
with Bryant being the shooter and Banks serving as the lookout.  Banks claimed 
that he stayed back behind the house as a lookout while Bryant walked up to 
Bonhorst and put the gun in his face.  According to Banks, Bonhorst threw some 
change at Bryant and lunged at him.  Bryant reacted by pulling the trigger, after 
which they both fled the scene. 
[¶6.]  
In November 2020, both defendants moved to sever their cases and the 
circuit court granted their motions.  Bryant subsequently entered into a plea 
agreement with the State, pleading guilty to first-degree manslaughter in exchange 
for a cap on his sentence of twenty-five years in prison with twenty-five additional 
years suspended.  As part of his plea agreement, Bryant was required to testify 
against Banks. 
[¶7.]  
Later, Banks also pled guilty to first-degree manslaughter.  His 
agreement capped the prison time he would have to serve at sixty years with the 
possibility of more time suspended.  At Banks’s change of plea hearing, the State 
described the factual basis for the plea in accord with Bryant’s version of the events, 
with Banks being the shooter.  Banks contested this factual basis and alleged that 
while the underlying facts provided by the State were true, the roles were reversed.  
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Banks claimed Bryant was the shooter but acknowledged to the court that he knew 
a robbery was going to occur and that he stood by as a lookout.  In response to 
further questions from the court about his actions, Banks admitted that he was 
aiding and abetting the situation.  The court then accepted Banks’s guilty plea. 
[¶8.]  
Two days before his sentencing hearing, Banks notified the court and 
counsel that he was planning to offer the testimony of Mike Webb, a polygraph 
examiner, regarding the results of a polygraph examination Banks had recently 
taken at the jail, which supported his version of the shooting.  The polygraph report 
states that in the examiner’s opinion, Banks showed “no significant reaction 
indicating deception” when he answered “no” to questions regarding whether he had 
shot Bonhorst on the date in question. 
[¶9.]  
Prior to the hearing, the State objected to the admission of any 
testimony regarding the polygraph examination.  The State argued that polygraph 
evidence is not admissible at sentencing absent an agreement by the parties, citing 
State v. Stevenson, 2002 S.D. 120, 652 N.W.2d 735.  The circuit court agreed with 
the State and noted that because of the questionable reliability of polygraph 
examination results, this Court has consistently held that such evidence is not 
admissible in any proceeding and has only affirmed the admission of such evidence 
where there was a stipulation or agreement between the parties.  The court 
therefore ruled that the evidence of Banks’s polygraph examination would not be 
admitted at his sentencing hearing. 
[¶10.]  
Banks and Bryant were sentenced at a joint sentencing hearing at 
which the circuit court considered evidence of the crime committed relating to both 
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defendants, as well as information regarding each defendant’s history and 
background.  The State asked for sentences consistent with the respective agreed-
upon caps in each defendant’s plea agreement.  Banks, however, maintained that he 
was not the shooter and urged the circuit court to impose the same sentence for 
both defendants. 
[¶11.]  
The circuit court began its remarks by explaining what must be 
considered when imposing a sentence, including the gravity of the offense in 
comparison to the harshness of the penalty, the character and history of the 
defendant, the defendant’s rehabilitation prospects, any expressed remorse, an 
appropriate punishment, and deterrence.  The court then acknowledged that the 
facts were not clear about what had happened in this case.  Because there was no 
trial, the court noted its reliance on other sources of information, such as police 
reports, prior testimony, forensic evidence reports, and the additional information 
contained in the presentence investigation reports. 
[¶12.]  
In describing the offense itself, the circuit court acknowledged the 
divergent stories of the two defendants.  The court related the evidence implicating 
both Banks and Bryant and also commented on the evidence in the record which did 
or did not support each defendant’s version of the events.  Importantly, the court 
noted that regardless of the two versions, both men had pled guilty to manslaughter 
in the first degree—a killing of another human being with a dangerous weapon.  See 
SDCL 22-16-15(3).  The court further noted that “one who aids and abets this crime 
is equally culpable under the law of the State of South Dakota” and that “legally it 
does not matter who pulled the trigger.” 
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[¶13.]  
In considering Banks’s history, the court commented on his childhood 
during which he resided with his mother and moved frequently.  The court noted 
Banks’s early use of substances which included smoking marijuana every day since 
the age of fourteen and drinking alcohol several times a week.  The court also noted 
that Banks had been suspended from school on a few occasions, but nevertheless 
obtained his GED. 
[¶14.]  
Regarding rehabilitation, the court observed that Banks was only 
eighteen years old at the time of the crime but then noted his extensive juvenile 
history, which included intensive probation and placements with the Department of 
Corrections.  The court further observed that previous rehabilitation efforts had not 
been effective given that Banks continued to commit crimes very similar to the one 
for which he was being sentenced.  His criminal history, as noted by the court, 
included drug-related charges, curfew violations, intentional damage to property, 
theft, second-degree robbery, riot, and assault, and some of these crimes were 
committed while Banks was on probation.  The court also noted that following the 
shooting of Bonhorst, Banks was charged with simple assault for violent acts 
against two different women, and according to testimony from Bryant, he and 
Banks committed another robbery immediately after their attempted robbery and 
shooting of Bonhorst.  Additionally, the court mentioned that Banks had been the 
subject of many informal disciplinary reports as well as two major violations for 
fighting while in jail, and at the time of sentencing, Banks had pending federal 
charges involving the theft of firearms. 
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[¶15.]  
As for remorse, the court considered that Banks had pled guilty to the 
crime and expressed in court that he was remorseful, but just three days prior, 
Banks had joked while talking with his girlfriend by phone at the jail that instead 
of getting a tear drop tattoo in prison indicating that he had killed an individual, he 
should instead get a tattoo of a slice of pizza.  The court concluded its remarks by 
noting the devastating impact this crime had on Bonhorst’s family members and the 
fact that Bonhorst’s shooting had impacted the entire community’s ability to feel 
safe and secure. 
[¶16.]  
Ultimately, the court sentenced Banks, consistent with his plea 
agreement, to eighty years in prison, with twenty years suspended.1  Banks 
appeals, raising the single issue of whether the circuit court erred by excluding his 
polygraph results from the sentencing hearing. 
Analysis 
 
[¶17.]  
In this appeal, Banks is not directly challenging his sentence per se.  
Instead, he challenges the circuit court’s refusal to consider a particular type of 
evidence when determining his sentence.  “[A] circuit court’s ruling on the 
admissibility of evidence is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.”  State 
v. Loeschke, 2022 S.D. 56, ¶ 17, 980 N.W.2d 266, 272.  “An abuse of discretion is a 
fundamental error of judgment, a choice outside the range of permissible choices.”  
State v. Mitchell, 2021 S.D. 46, ¶ 27, 963 N.W.2d 326, 332 (quoting State v. Rice, 
2016 S.D. 18, ¶ 23, 877 N.W.2d 75, 83).  “An abuse of discretion occurs when the 
 
1. 
The court sentenced Bryant, in accord with his plea agreement, to fifty years 
in prison with twenty-five years suspended. 
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circuit court exercises its discretion to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly 
against reason and evidence.”  State v. Reeves, 2021 S.D. 64, ¶ 11, 967 N.W.2d 144, 
147 (quoting State v. Berget, 2014 S.D. 61, ¶ 13, 853 N.W.2d 45, 52).  “This Court . . . 
will not overturn the circuit court’s abuse of discretion unless that ‘error is 
demonstrated and shown to be prejudicial error.’”  Mitchell, 2021 S.D. 46, ¶ 27, 963 
N.W.2d at 332 (quoting State v. Klinetobe, 2021 S.D. 24, ¶ 26, 958 N.W.2d 734, 740). 
[¶18.]  
As the evidentiary ruling at issue here pertains to a sentencing 
hearing, we note that “[c]ircuit courts have broad discretion in sentencing” and 
when making a sentencing decision, “[c]ourts should consider the traditional 
sentencing factors of retribution, deterrence—both individual and general—
rehabilitation, and incapacitation.”  Klinetobe, 2021 S.D. 24, ¶ 28, 958 N.W.2d at 
741.  “[C]ircuit courts must look at both the person before them and the nature and 
impact of the offense.”  Mitchell, 2021 S.D. 46, ¶ 29, 963 N.W.2d at 333.  Regarding 
the latter, “courts must consider sentencing evidence tending to mitigate or 
aggravate the severity of a defendant’s conduct and its impact on others.  
Sentencing courts are often required, in this regard, to accurately assess the ‘true 
nature of the offense.’”  Id. ¶ 30, 963 N.W.2d at 333 (quoting Klinetobe, 2021 S.D. 
24, ¶ 36, 958 N.W.2d at 742). 
[¶19.]  
With regard to the information presented to a sentencing court, we 
have noted that “the range of evidence that may be considered at sentencing is 
extremely broad.”  State v. Arabie, 2003 S.D. 57, ¶ 21, 663 N.W.2d 250, 257.  This 
broad range of information may include evidence that would be inadmissible at 
trial, as the rules of evidence do not apply at sentencing hearings.  Stevenson, 2002 
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S.D. 120, ¶ 15, 652 N.W.2d at 740; see also SDCL 19-19-1101(4) (listing sentencing 
as one of the situations where the rules of evidence do not apply). 
[¶20.]  
Banks argues that because his polygraph results supported his claim 
that he was not the shooter, the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to 
admit this mitigating evidence.  At oral argument, counsel for Banks urged this 
Court to adopt a categorical rule that all evidence that is conceivably mitigating in 
nature must be admitted at sentencing.  Banks’s argument centers on this Court’s 
statements in Mitchell, 2021 S.D. 46, ¶ 30, 963 N.W.2d at 333, directing that 
mitigating evidence must be considered at sentencing, and the fact that the rules of 
evidence do not apply at sentencing hearings.  While it is true that circuit courts 
have wide latitude in determining what type of evidence may be considered at 
sentencing, Banks’s reliance on Mitchell to support his suggestion that any and all 
possible mitigating evidence must be admitted without limitation is misplaced. 
[¶21.]  
In Mitchell, the evidence the sentencing court failed to consider 
involved the very essence of the crime to which the defendant had pled guilty.  Id. 
¶ 38, 963 N.W.2d at 335.  In pleading guilty to first-degree manslaughter under 
SDCL 22-16-15(4), the defendant admitted that he had unnecessarily killed another 
person while resisting that person’s attempt to commit a crime.  Id. ¶ 33, 963 
N.W.2d at 334.  Thus, the crime for which Mitchell was being sentenced 
contemplates criminal conduct by the victim and the exercise of an “imperfect” self-
defense by the defendant.  Id. ¶ 36, 963 N.W.2d at 334–35.  Because the circuit 
court failed to take the victim’s criminal conduct into account when evaluating the 
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defendant’s culpability and determining his sentence, we vacated the sentence and 
remanded for a new sentencing hearing.  Id. ¶ 40, 963 N.W.2d at 335–36. 
[¶22.]  
Here, unlike in Mitchell, the circuit court did not fail to consider 
evidence relating to an essential element of the first-degree manslaughter offense to 
which Banks had pled guilty.  Although Banks maintains that a determination of 
which defendant was the shooter was critical to the court’s sentencing 
determination, here, the circuit court noted that under the circumstances 
surrounding Bonhorst’s shooting, “legally it does not matter who pulled the trigger.”  
See SDCL 22-3-3 (“Any person who, with the intent to promote or facilitate the 
commission of a crime, aids, abets, or advises another person in planning or 
committing the crime, is legally accountable, as a principal to the crime.”).  While 
the role each defendant played may, in some cases, have a mitigating or 
aggravating effect on the court’s sentencing determination, the court has broad 
discretion to determine what constitutes a mitigating or aggravating circumstance 
given the unique facts of each case.2 
[¶23.]  
As for the other premise on which Banks relies to support his claim 
that the polygraph evidence should have been admitted, the fact that the rules of 
evidence do not apply at a sentencing hearing does not mean that any and all 
 
2. 
Notably, in cases involving a shooting and charges against multiple 
defendants, a court may find the individual who actually fired the gun to be 
less culpable than a co-defendant who instigated the offense or provided the 
weapon.  See, e.g., Rice, 2016 S.D. 18, ¶¶ 24–25, 877 N.W.2d at 83–84 
(rejecting a defendant’s claim that because he was not directly involved with 
the shooting, the sentence he received for first-degree manslaughter was 
disproportionate to the sentences his co-defendants received for the same 
offense). 
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evidence proffered by the parties must be considered.  Though much less restrictive 
than the limitations posed by the rules of evidence, this Court has still placed guard 
rails on what can be introduced at a sentencing hearing. 
[¶24.]  
In State v. Berget, in the context of the sentence selection phase of a 
capital murder case, the Court acknowledged that while the rules of evidence do not 
apply to sentencing, “[t]his does not mean, however, that the sentence-selection 
determination is a free-for-all at which any information can be presented to the 
sentencing authority, regardless of its reliability.”  2013 S.D. 1, ¶ 65, 826 N.W.2d at 
21.  In considering the admissibility of hearsay evidence, Berget held that “due 
process requires that some minimal indicia of reliability accompany a hearsay 
statement.”  Id. ¶ 65, 826 N.W.2d at 22.  This rule requiring a base level of 
reliability before hearsay evidence can be considered at sentencing is generally 
applicable to other types of evidence as well.3 
[¶25.]  
Given the reliability concerns surrounding polygraph evidence, this 
Court has established a per se rule prohibiting the admission of polygraph evidence 
in criminal and civil cases.  State v. Bertram, 2018 S.D. 4, ¶ 14, 906 N.W.2d 418, 
423–24.  We have explained the basis for this per se rule, citing three rules of 
evidence, as follows: 
 
3. 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has similarly required a base level of 
reliability for evidence introduced at sentencing.  In rejecting the use of 
polygraph evidence at a sentencing hearing in Ortega v. United States, the 
Eighth Circuit stated that “although at sentencing a district court may 
consider information that would be inadmissible at trial, the information 
must have ‘sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable accuracy.’”  
270 F.3d 540, 548 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a)). 
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The rationale advanced for not admitting evidence of polygraph 
results, in civil or criminal cases, is that such evidence is 
irrelevant because of dubious scientific value [(Rule 402)], it has 
no “general scientific acceptance as a reliable and accurate 
means of ascertaining truth or deception,” it is not reliable 
[(Rule 702)], it has no probative value, and it is likely to be given 
significant, if not conclusive weight by the jury, so that “the 
jurors’ traditional responsibility to collectively ascertain the 
facts and adjudge guilt or innocence is thereby preempted” 
[(Rule 403)]. 
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Sabag v. Cont’l S.D., 374 N.W.2d 349, 353 (S.D. 
1985)).  Banks notes, however, that Bertram and the cases cited therein pertain to 
polygraph evidence offered at trial and the inherent concerns regarding how such 
evidence would be considered by a jury.4  He asserts that because the rules of 
evidence do not apply at sentencing hearings, the concerns identified in Bertram 
should not preclude a sentencing court from considering polygraph evidence. 
[¶26.]  
This Court has, thus far, only analyzed the use of polygraph evidence 
at sentencing hearings in a scenario where such evidence was offered for a 
particular purpose relating to a condition in a plea agreement.  In State v. 
Stevenson, the defendant was required under the terms of her plea agreement to 
take a polygraph examination regarding her role in forest fires, the failure of which 
would result in a revocation of the agreement.  2002 S.D. 120, ¶ 2, 652 N.W.2d at 
737.  At the sentencing hearing, the State offered testimony from a polygraph 
 
4. 
The discussion in Bertram regarding the per se rule prohibiting the 
admission of polygraph evidence also noted other decisions by this Court 
affirming the exclusion of such evidence.  See State v. Waff, 373 N.W.2d 18 
(S.D. 1985) (holding that the trial court did not err in refusing to admit 
polygraph evidence offered by the defendant as impeachment evidence and to 
implicate a third-party perpetrator); State v. Muetze, 368 N.W.2d 575, 588 
(S.D. 1985) (affirming the exclusion of polygraph evidence to impeach a 
State’s witness). 
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examiner to establish that the defendant had failed a polygraph examination 
regarding her involvement in a previous fire.  Id. ¶ 5, 652 N.W.2d at 738.  This 
evidence was offered in conjunction with the State’s request for leave of the court to 
depart from its agreed-upon sentencing recommendation and argue for a more 
severe sentence.  Id.  The circuit court admitted the evidence for this limited 
purpose and determined that the defendant had breached the plea agreement by 
failing the polygraph examination.  The court then granted the State’s request for 
leave to argue for a sentence outside the bounds of the plea agreement.  Id. 
[¶27.]  
On appeal, the defendant asserted that the circuit court erred in 
finding a breach of the plea agreement and allowing the State to seek a greater 
sentence, arguing, in part, that the court’s ruling was contrary to this Court’s cases 
rejecting the admission of polygraph evidence.  Id. ¶ 16, 652 N.W.2d at 741.  After 
analyzing the prior cases that have addressed such evidence, the Court determined 
that the circuit court did not err in allowing the admission of the polygraph 
evidence given the circumstances presented, i.e., “where passage of a polygraph was 
made a significant part of the [parties’] bargain and where proof of any breach 
would necessitate introduction of polygraph evidence.”5  Id. ¶ 19, 652 N.W.2d at 
742. 
 
5. 
In affirming the admission of the polygraph evidence in Stevenson, the Court 
referred to a special writing in Satter v. Solem, 458 N.W.2d 762, 771 (S.D. 
1990) (Henderson, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part), and the 
related opinion this Court issued in State v. Satter, 1996 S.D. 9, 543 N.W.2d 
249 after the case was remanded and once again appealed.  2002 S.D. 120, 
¶ 18, 652 N.W.2d at 741.  The Court observed that the Satter cases “yield a 
conclusion that polygraph results may be admitted in legal proceedings . . . 
according to the agreement or stipulation of the parties.”  Id. ¶ 19, 652 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued . . .) 
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[¶28.]  
Here, unlike the Stevenson case, there was no agreement or stipulation 
between the parties as to the use of polygraph evidence.  But even if there had been 
such an agreement, Banks seeks to use the results of a polygraph examination, not 
to establish whether he passed or failed, but as substantive proof of an underlying 
fact in dispute.  The Court’s affirmation of the admission of the results of a 
polygraph examination in Stevenson for the distinct purpose of showing 
noncompliance with a plea agreement does not resolve the reliability concerns 
associated with the accuracy of polygraph examinations in determining the truth or 
falsity of a disputed fact.  Such concerns are present regardless of whether the 
polygraph results are being offered at a trial or at a sentencing hearing. 
[¶29.]  
As the United States Supreme Court stated in rejecting a claim that a 
rule precluding the admissibility of polygraph evidence is contrary to a defendant’s 
constitutional right to present a defense, “there is simply no consensus that 
polygraph evidence is reliable.”  United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 309, 118 S. 
Ct. 1261, 1265, 140 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1998).  The Court in Scheffer also observed that 
“there is simply no way to know in a particular case whether a polygraph 
examiner’s conclusion is accurate, because certain doubts and uncertainties plague 
even the best polygraph exams.”  Id., 523 U.S. at 312, 118 S. Ct. at 1266. 
________________________ 
(. . . continued) 
N.W.2d at 742.  Notably, however, the statements quoted from these Satter 
cases are, at best, dicta, given that the admissibility of polygraph evidence 
was not the issue in either case.  Nevertheless, the Court’s ruling in 
Stevenson supports the general principle that the circuit court has the 
discretion to admit polygraph evidence under certain circumstances.  But this 
does not mean, as Banks suggests, that a sentencing court is required to 
admit such evidence simply because the rules of evidence do not apply at 
sentencing. 
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[¶30.]  
Further, in contrast to the scenario in Stevenson, the polygraph here 
was commissioned by Banks alone and the State did not find out about it until after 
it had been administered.  As we noted in Bertram, a “privately commissioned 
polygraph test, which [is] unknown to the government until after its completion, is 
of extremely dubious probative value[.]”  2018 S.D. 4, ¶ 18, 906 N.W.2d at 425 
(alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Montgomery, 635 F.3d 1074, 1094 
(8th Cir. 2011)). 
[¶31.]  
Nevertheless, despite the shortcomings with polygraph evidence, this 
Court has acknowledged the possibility of the admissibility of such evidence in the 
future, stating: 
We do not foreclose the possibility of reconsidering this per se 
rule in the future if presented with an appropriate case.  
However, abandoning the per se rule against admitting 
polygraph-test results would require, at a minimum, strong 
evidence that the technology of polygraphs has advanced to such 
a degree that they are generally accepted as reliable in the 
scientific community. 
 
Bertram, 2018 S.D. 4, ¶ 15 n.6, 906 N.W.2d at 424 n.6.  When making his proffer to 
the circuit court, Banks did not provide evidence as to any scientific advancement in 
polygraph administration or a shift in the consensus among the scientific 
community indicating greater confidence in the reliability of the examination 
results to support the admission of his polygraph results.6 
 
6. 
Banks relies heavily on this Court’s decision in State v. Huettl to support his 
claim that evidence otherwise inadmissible at trial because of reliability 
concerns may nevertheless be considered at sentencing despite such concerns.  
In Huettl, the circuit court relied on the results of a preliminary breath test 
(PBT) as a factor in determining its sentence even though the PBT results 
had been excluded from trial.  379 N.W.2d 298, 304 (S.D. 1985).  Notably, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued . . .) 
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[¶32.]  
The circuit court, in refusing to admit Banks’s polygraph evidence 
because of reliability concerns, cited extensive research showing that most state and 
federal appellate courts considering the admissibility of polygraph evidence at 
sentencing have upheld refusals to admit this evidence.  See, e.g., Ortega, 270 F.3d 
at 548 (citing numerous cases from other appellate courts).  While Banks attempts 
to distinguish a few of the cases the circuit court cited, he has not refuted the 
central point that the weight of the authority is contrary to his position.  Moreover, 
given this Court’s clearly expressed concerns regarding the reliability of polygraph 
evidence, Banks has failed to show how the circuit court’s ruling would be “clearly 
against reason and evidence,” Reeves, 2021 S.D. 64, ¶ 11, 967 N.W.2d at 147 
(quoting Berget, 2014 S.D. 61, ¶ 13, 853 N.W.2d at 52), or “outside the range of 
permissible choices.”  Mitchell, 2021 S.D. 46, ¶ 27, 963 N.W.2d at 332 (quoting Rice, 
2016 S.D. 18, ¶ 23, 877 N.W.2d at 83).  We therefore conclude that the circuit court 
did not abuse its discretion in excluding the proffered polygraph evidence. 
[¶33.]  
Affirmed. 
[¶34.]  
JENSEN, Chief Justice, and KERN, SALTER, and MYREN, Justices, 
concur. 
________________________ 
(. . . continued) 
however, the defendant’s primary argument on appeal did not relate to the 
unreliability of PBT results.  Instead, the defendant asserted a lack of 
foundation for the admission of this evidence at sentencing because the 
witness through whom the evidence was offered was not the person who 
administered the PBT.  Id.  It was in this context (an asserted lack of 
foundation) that this Court referred to the rules of evidence not applying at 
sentencing hearings and determined that the sentencing court did not err in 
admitting the PBT results.  Id.  These statements in Huettl do not support 
Banks’s broad assertion that circuit courts lack the discretion to refuse to 
admit evidence with questionable reliability at sentencing hearings.