Case Title: In re C.C.A.

Citation: 128 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 15

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2012-04-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
428 Nev., Advance Opinion 15

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN THE MATTER OF THE PARENTAL No. 56723
RIGHTS AS TO C.C.A., A MINOR.

CHARLES C.L.A,

soreliant FILED

{THE STATE OF NEVADA DIVISION
[OF CHILD AND FAMILY SERVICES,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN RESOURCES: AND C.C.A.,
[Respondents

APR OS 2012

 

Appeal from a district court order terminating appellant's
jparental rights as to the minor child. Tenth Judicial District Court,
(Churchill County; David A. Huff, Judge.

Reversed and remanded,

steve E. Evenson, Lovelock,
for Appellant,

‘atherine Cortez Masto, Attorney General, and Sharon L. Benson, Deputy
‘ttorney General, Carson City,

Respondent the State of Nevada Division of Child and Family Services,
jepartment of Health and Human Resources.

\w Offices of Robert Witek and Robert W. Witek, Yerington,
for Respondent C.C.A., a minor.

 

21077

 
OPINION

 

[By the Court, DOUGLAS,
In this termination of parental rights appeal, we address the
eed for the district court to make express findings of fact in its written
yrder or on the record, when determining whether to grant or deny a
etition to terminate a parent's parental rights. A petitioner in
rmination proceedings has the burden to prove by clear and convincing
-vidence that termination is in the child's best interest and that parental
fault exists. When a district court fails to make any findings concerning
his standard of proof in its order or on the record, this court is unable to
jetermine on appeal whether substantial evidence supports the district
urt’s ruling. In the present case, neither the district court’s order nor
record contains findings of fact to support the district court’s
nclusions, and thus, we reverse the order terminating appellant's
arental rights and remand this matter to the district court to enter its
findings.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant is the biological father of the minor child who is the

uubject of the underlying proceedings. ‘The child was removed from

 

ippelant's care and subsequently placed in the legal custody of
sspondent State of Nevada, Division of Child and Family Servicos
CFS). DCFS eventually petitioned the district court to terminate
ppellant’s parental rights, In its petition, DCFS asserted that it was in
 child’s best interest to terminate appellant's parental rights, and it
sted six grounds of alleged parental fault.

During a two-day bench trial on the petition, DCFS and

ppellant, who was represented by appointed counsel, presented witnesses

om a

 

 
nd evidence supporting their respective positions. At the close of
wvidence, the district court instructed the parties to submit their closing
sguments in writing, and it reserved ruling on the termination petition
ter the parties submitted their closing arguments, the district court
entered a summary order terminating appellant's parental rights.

The district court's written order, drafted by the State, closely
follows DCFS's termination petition and purports to set forth findings of
fact. In particular, as to the child’s best interest, the order states only that
tlhe best interests of [the child] will be served by terminating any
javental rights of [appellant}.” Regarding parental fault, the order
identifies six bases for fault:

[Appellant] has abandoned [the child] and has
evinced a settled purpose to abandon him by not
providing support and by not communicating with
the child: he has neglected the child by failing to
provide proper parental care by reason of his own
faults and habits; he is an unfit parent in that by
reason of his faults, habits, or conduct he has
failed to provide the child with proper care,
guidance or supporti he has failed parental
adjustment in that he has been unable or
unwilling within a reasonable time to correct,
substantially the circumstances, conduct or
conditions which led to the removal of his child:
there would be a risk of serious physical, mental
or emotional injury to the child if the child was
returned to his care; and he has made only token
efforts to avoid being an unfit parent, to support or
communicate with the child or to eliminate the
risk of serious physical, mental or emotional
injury to the child.

ese six grounds of parental fault track, without explanation as to any

 

 

yrresponding evidence, the termination statutory provisions for parental

 

 
 

fault. See NRS 128.012; NRS 128.0126; NRS 128.014; NRS 128.018; NRS
128.105(2)(e); NRS 128.105(2)(). Following entry of the district court's
written termination order, appellant timely filed this appeal.
DISCUSSION

On appeal, appellant contends that because the district court's
order fails to set forth specific factual findings, the decision to terminate
his parental rights is not supported by substantial evidence. DCFS argues
that the district court’s order “clearly made explicit findings,” and that
DCES established, by clear and convincing evidence, that terminating
appellant's parental rights was warranted.

Express findings of facts are required in parental rights termination
proceedings

It is well-settled that termination proceedings implicate a
parent's fundamental rights in the care and custody of his or her child.
NRS 128.005(1) and (2); Matter of Parental Rights as to D.R.H,, 120 Nev.
422, 426-27, 92 P.8d 1230, 1233 (2004); Matter of Parental Rightsas to
CLM, 118 Nev. 724, 732, 58 P.3d 188, 194 (2002). In order to guard the
rights of the parent and the child, the Nevada Legislature has created a
statutory scheme intended to assure that parental rights are not
erroneously terminated and that the child's needs are protected. NRS
128.005(1) (declaring “that the preservation and strengthening of family
life is a part of the public policy of this State”); NRS 128.005(2)(a)
(recognizing that “[s}everance of the parent and child relationship is a
matter of such importance in order to safeguard the rights of parent and

"The legal conclusions set forth in the order are likewise conclusory
statements citing to the applicable statutory provisions.

 
 
  

 

child as to require judicial determination’); see generally NRS Chapter
128. To that end, when petitioning the district court to terminate a
parent's parental rights, a petitioner must demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interest and
that parental fault exists. See NRS 128.090(2); NRS 128.105. This court
will uphold the district court's termination order when it is supported by
substantial evidence, Matter of Parental Rights as to AJ.G., 122 Nev.
1418, 1423, 148 P.3d 759, 763 (2006).

Based on the interests at stake in these types of proceedings, a
petitioner has a high burden to establish that termination is warranted—
clear and convincing evidence. NRS 128.090(2); Santosky v. Kramer, 455
USS. 745, 769 (1982) (explaining that courts are required to apply a
heightened clear and convincing standard of proof in termination of
parental rights cases); Matter as to D.R.H., 120 Nev. at 428, 92 P.3d at
1234 (recognizing that Nevada applies a clear and convincing standard of
proof in termination proceedings). ‘This standard of proof underscores the
importance of the district court's fair and independent fact-finding. ‘Thus,
it is incumbent upon the district court in termination proceedings to
provide a decision, whether in writing or orally on the record, that
includes all the necessary factual findings for the benefit of the parties
and this court’s proper appellate review because without specific findings,
this court cannot determine whether the district court's conclusions are
supported by substantial evidence. NRS 128.105(1) and (2) (requiring «
finding of best interest and parental fault); NRCP 52(a) (stating that when
rendering a decision “fiJn alll actions tried upon the facts without a
jury]... the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
conclusions of law”); Holt v. Regional Trustee Services Corp., 127 Nev. __,

  

 

 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
  
 
  
 

_. 266 P.3d 602, 608 (2011) (recognizing that oral pronouncements on
the record that are consistent with a judgment may be used by the
appellate court to construe the judgment); see also In.re Edward B., 558
$.E.2d 620, 632-33 (W. Va. 2001) (holding that a lower court’s failure to
comply with statutes and rules of procedure when issuing a final order
impedes a proper appellate review); Matter of T. R. M., 303 N.W.2d 581,
583-84 (Wis. 1981) (explaining that adequate findings are required to
facilitate review by an appellate court).

In this case, the district court deferred ruling on the
termination petition until it received the parties’ written closing
arguments, and thus, the court did not make any oral findings on the
record. The subsequent written termination order does not reference any
specific facts or evidence presented by the parties during the two-day
bench trial; the order simply recites the statutory grounds required to
terminate a parent's parental rights, and such statements do not
constitute sufficient findings because they do not explain, based on the
record evidence, why the district court found that the statutory grounds
for termination existed. See Perez v. Dept. of Children & Family Serv.
894 N.E.2d 447, 451 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (Findings of fact are
determinations from the evidence of a case. .. concerning facts averred by
fone party and denied by another.” (internal quotation and citation
omitted)); Pacific Employers Ins, Co. v, Brown, 86 S.W.3d 353, 356-57
(ex. App. 2002) (stating that factual findings constitute ultimate
determinations concerning what transpired during the proceedings and
provide “answer{s] to any other specific inquiry necessary to establish

conduct or the existence or nonexistence of a relevant matter’)

 

 
Because the district court failed to identify, in writing or on
the record, the factual bases that support its termination order, we cannot
determine whether substantial evidence supports the district court's
decision, and thus, we reverse the district court's order terminating
appellant's parental rights and remand this case to the district court to

enter its findings.* See Robison v. Robison, 100 Nev. 668, 673, 691 P.2d
451, 455 (1984) (remanding the case to the lower court because the court's
findings failed to indicate the factual basis for its final conclusions).

Doug les a
Douglas
We concur:

Jobers

Hardesty

 

OI J

Parraguirre

2We make no comment on the merits of the underlying proceeding.
In light of this opinion, we elect not to consider the parties’ remaining
arguments.