Case Title: Hirshberg v. Coon

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0113

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-01-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
WILLIAM HIRSHBERG v. DAVID COON, GAIL JENSEN, RUSSELL MAGARITY, SUSAN MAGARITY, and DEBRA DAVIS. DR. MARK MENOLASCINO v. DAVID COON, GAIL JENSEN, RUSSELL MAGARITY, SUSAN MAGARITY, and DEBRA DAVIS2012 WY 5Case Number: S-11-0113, S-11-0115, S-11-011Decided: 01/10/2012NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
 
WILLIAM 
HIRSHBERG,Appellant (Proposed Intervenor),
 
v.DAVID 
COON, GAIL JENSEN, RUSSELL MAGARITY, SUSAN MAGARITY, and DEBRA 
DAVIS,
Appellees 
(Petitioners) .
DR. 
MARK MENOLASCINO,Appellant (Proposed Intervenor),
 
v.DAVID 
COON, GAIL JENSEN, RUSSELL MAGARITY, SUSAN MAGARITY, and DEBRA 
DAVIS,
Appellees 
(Petitioners).
 
 
Appeals 
from the District Court of Teton County
The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge
 
 
Representing 
Appellants, William Hirshberg and Dr. Mark 
Menolascino:
Stuart 
R. Day, Keith J. Dodson, and Brian J. Marvel, Williams, Porter, Day & 
Neville, P.C., Casper, Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Appellee, Debra Davis:
Elizabeth 
Greenwood and Inga L. Parsons, Attorneys at Law, Pinedale, 
Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Appellees, David Coon, Gail Jensen, Russell Magarity, and Susan 
Magarity:
Peter 
F. Moyer, Esq., Jackson, Wyoming.
 
 
Before 
GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, J.J.; WALDRIP, D.J.
 
 
WALDRIP, 
District Judge.
 
[¶1]      In 2008, the 
Teton County Commission (“the Commission”) approved a “Parcel Boundary 
Adjustment Application” regarding certain real property located in Teton County, 
Wyoming.  Appellees, David Coon, Gail 
Jensen, Russell and Susan Magarity, and Debra Davis (“Appellees”), sought 
judicial review of the Commission’s decision.  In late 2008 and early 2009, 
respectively, Appellants, Dr. Mark Menolascino and William Hirshberg, purchased 
the subject property.  Neither 
sought to intervene in the judicial review proceedings.  Ultimately, in February 2011, the reviewing district court reversed the 
decision of the Commission.  The 
parties to the original administrative proceedings, and the judicial review 
thereof, declined to appeal this ruling. Appellants Hirshberg and Menolascino, 
however, filed a notice of appeal with respect to the district court’s 
decision.  They contemporaneously 
filed a motion to intervene in the district court proceedings for the sole 
purpose of pursuing the appeal therefrom.  
The district court denied their motion to intervene, and Appellants 
Hirshberg and Menolascino appealed from this decision as well.  All four appeals have been consolidated 
before this Court.  
For the reasons set forth herein, we will affirm Appeal Nos. S-11-0115 
and S-11-0116 and dismiss Appeal Nos. S-11-0113 and S-11-0114.  
 
ISSUES
 
[¶2]      Appellants Hirshberg and 
Menolascino present the following issues for 
review:
 
1.         
Whether the District Court Erred When It Denied Appellant’s Motion to 
Intervene.
 
2.         
Whether A Non-Party May Appeal From a Judgment, i.e., The District Court’s Order 
Reversing and Remanding Decision of the Board of County Commissioners of Teton 
County, Wyoming.
 
3.         
Whether a Non-Party May Intervene, Post-Judgment, for the Purpose of 
Appeal.
 
4.         
Whether the Board of County Commissioners for Teton County’s Decision Was 
Supported By Substantial Evidence and in Accordance with 
Law.
 
5.         
Whether the District Court’s Order Reversing and Remanding Decision of 
the Board of County Commissioners of Teton County, Wyoming Was Not Supported by 
Substantial Evidence, Was Contrary to Law, or Was Arbitrary and 
Capricious.
 
6.         
Whether The District Court Failed to Apply the Appropriate Standard of 
Review.
 
7.         
Whether the District Court Erred in Applying the Merger 
Doctrine.
 
8.         
Whether the District Court Erred in Holding the Subject Parcels of Real 
Property Merged into One Parcel of Real Property.
 
9.         
Whether an Exception to the Merger Doctrine Applies to the Subject 
Parcels of Real Property.
 
Appellees 
generally rely upon the same issues but have addressed only the first three, 
given their position that those issues are dispositive of the outcome of this 
case.1 
 
RELEVANT 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
 
[¶3]      The underlying 
history is lengthy, and given this Court’s disposition of the issues on 
procedural grounds, it is necessary only to set forth a condensed version of the 
background facts:  In January 2008, the owners of 
four (4) lots of real property located in Teton County, Wyoming, filed a “Parcel 
Boundary Adjustment Application” with the Teton County Planning Board (“the 
Planning Board”), proposing to develop a single family residence on each 
parcel.  The Planning Board approved 
the application on the condition that the property would be divided into three 
parcels, not four.  In September 
2008, the Teton County Commission (“the Commission”) affirmed the Planning 
Board’s decision, also ruling on a corollary issue that the lots had not merged 
into one.
 
[¶4]      In October 2008, 
Appellees, David Coon, Gail Jensen, Russell and Susan Magarity, and Debra Davis 
(“Appellees”) sought judicial review of the Commission’s 
decision.
 
[¶5]      In December 2008, Appellee Dr. Mark Menolascino purchased 
one of the approved/adjusted lots.  
In April 2009, Appellee William Hirshberg purchased the other two 
lots.  Mr. Hirshberg and Dr. 
Menolascino were aware of the pending judicial review of the County’s decision 
at the time each purchased his property but neither sought to intervene in those 
proceedings.
 
[¶6]      On February 25, 2011, the District Court for the Ninth 
Judicial District, Teton County, entered its Order Reversing and Remanding Decision of 
the Board of County Commissioners of Teton County, Wyoming, ruling that the 
four lots had merged into one.  In 
March 2011, the Commission decided not to appeal the district court’s 
decision.  

 
[¶7]      On March 21, 
2011, Dr. Menolascino and Mr. Hirshberg filed motions 
to intervene in the district court case for the sole purpose of pursuing appeals 
from the Order Reversing and Remanding 
Decision of the Board of County Commissioners of Teton County, Wyoming.  On or about March 25, 2011, although not 
parties to the district court case, they filed timely notices of appeal of that 
court’s Order Reversing and Remanding 
Decision of the Board of County Commissioners of Teton County, 
Wyoming.
 
[¶8]      On April 7, 2011, the district court entered its Order Denying Motion to Intervene by Dr. 
Mark Menolascino and William Hirshberg.  The court ruled that the motions were 
untimely and noted that “the movants were aware of the appeal prior to their 
purchase of their properties.”  On 
May 2, 2011, Dr. Menolascino and Mr. Hirshberg filed notices of appeal from 
the Order Denying Motion to Intervene by 
Dr. Mark Menolascino and William Hirshberg.  All four appeals have been consolidated 
before this Court.
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶9]      Although the 
underlying substantive matters involve the review of an administrative agency’s 
final decision, this Court is not called upon to reach that level of review to 
resolve the issues presented to it and, thus, not called upon to recount the 
standard of review applicable to administrative proceedings.  Rather, this Court is concerned with the 
parties’ ability to seek 
appeal from the district court’s decision, particularly given the denial of the 
motion to intervene.  That said, the 
appropriate standard of review regarding motions to intervene has been set forth 
as follows:
 
Two 
kinds of intervention exist: intervention of right and permissive 
intervention.  W.R.C.P. 24.  In reviewing a denial of intervention of 
right, both questions of law and judicial discretion exist.  Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. v. 
Gunter, 2007 WY 151, ¶ 5, 167 P.3d 645, 648 (Wyo. 2007) (quoting Masinter v. Markstein, 2002 WY 64, ¶ 7, 
45 P.3d 237, 240 (Wyo. 2002)).  In 
order for an applicant for intervention of right to be allowed to participate, 
he or she must meet four conditions, which are discussed in detail below.  State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Colley, 871 P.2d 191, 194 (Wyo. 1994) (citing James S. Jackson Co., Inc. v. Horseshoe 
Creek Ltd., 650 P.2d 281, 286 (Wyo. 1982)).  The first three conditions of 
intervention of right are questions of law.  Halliburton, ¶ 5, 167 P.3d  at 648 
(quoting Masinter, ¶ 7, 45 P.3d at 
240-41).  “This [C]ourt accords no 
deference to a district court’s decisions on issues of law.”  Masinter, ¶ 7, 45 P.3d  at 240.  Because the first three conditions of 
intervention of right are questions of law, this Court will reverse the district 
court’s denial of intervention of right if it erroneously denied intervention of 
right based on the first, second, or third conditions.  Id. at 240-41.  The fourth condition, however, is a 
“matter within the discretion of the district court.”  Id. at 241.
 
The 
district court is permitted to weigh the timeliness of an application to 
intervene in light of the circumstances of the particular case, including 
whether the applicant may have sought intervention earlier.  Therefore, to prevail on an appeal from 
a finding that an application to intervene is untimely, an abuse of discretion 
must be demonstrated.
 
Id.  
 
The 
district court’s denial of a motion for permissive intervention is given 
deference.  Halliburton, ¶ 9, 167 P.3d  at 649.  This Court reviews the district court’s 
denial of a motion for permissive intervention for an abuse of discretion.  Id.  
 
Concerned 
Citizens of Spring Creek Ranch v. Tips Up, L.L.C., 
2008 WY 64, ¶¶ 11-12, 185 P.3d 34, 38 (Wyo. 2008).
 
DISCUSSION
 
[¶10]   Due to its potentially dispositive 
nature, this Court initially considers whether the district court appropriately 
denied Appellants 
Hirshberg and Menolascino’s motion to intervene in the district court’s judicial 
review of the Commission’s agency action.  On March 21, 2011, Appellants Hirshberg 
and Menolascino sought leave to intervene in the district court’s judicial 
review proceedings for the sole purpose of pursuing an appeal from the district 
court’s order reversing the agency action.  
On April 7, 2011, the court denied their requests for intervention in its 
Order Denying Motion to Intervene by Dr. 
Mark Menolascino and William Hirshberg.  Dr. Menolascino and Mr. Hirshberg then 
appealed that order, arguing that the 
court erred in denying their request to intervene.  A logical analysis requires a 
consideration as to whether the district court appropriately denied the 
post-judgment request to intervene for purposes of pursing the appeal of the Order Reversing and Remanding Decision of 
the Board of County Commissioners of Teton County, 
Wyoming.
[¶11]   Intervention, for purpose of appeal, is a legal 
possibility.  Courts have recognized 
situations where nonparties have been permitted to intervene solely for purposes of pursuing an 
appeal.  See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 
432 U.S. 385, 395-96, 97 S. Ct. 2464, 2470-71, 53 L. Ed. 2d 423 (1977); NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366, 93 S. Ct. 2591, 2603, 37 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1973); Flying J, Inc. v. Van Hollen, 578 F.3d 569, 574 (7th Cir. Wis. 2009); United 
States ex rel. McGough v. Covington Technologies Co., 967 F.2d 1391, 1394-95 
(9th Cir. 1992); Yniguez v. Mofford, 
130 F.R.D. 410, 414 (D. Ariz. 1990), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 939 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1991) (post-judgment intervention may be appropriate if the 
intervenors act promptly after entry of judgment).  Recognizing 
that some courts have permitted post-judgment intervention for purposes of 
appeal, this Court must decide whether the district court erred in its denial of 
Dr. Menolascino and Mr. Hirshberg’s request to intervene in this case, affording 
that court appropriate deference.
 
[¶12]   Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 
24(a) provides, in part:
 
(a)       
Intervention of right. 
– Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an 
action:
 
. 
. . .
 
(2)       When the 
applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is 
the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition 
of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant’s ability 
to protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately 
represented by existing parties.
 
W.R.C.P. 
24(a)(2).
 
[¶13]   Additionally, this Court has 
discussed intervention of right as follows:
 
Four 
conditions must be satisfied to permit intervention as of right under W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2).  First, the applicant must claim an 
interest related to the property or transaction which is the subject of the 
action.  Second, the applicant must be so 
situated that the disposition of the action may, as a practical matter, impair 
or impede the applicant’s ability to protect that interest.  Third, there must be a showing that the 
applicant’s interest will not be adequately represented by the existing 
parties.  Fourth, the application for 
intervention must be timely.  An 
applicant who fails to meet any one of these conditions is not permitted to intervene as of 
right under W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2). . . .
 
Questions 
of law and judicial discretion are presented by the denial of a motion to intervene. This court accords no deference to a district 
court’s decisions on issues of law.  
Therefore, if the district court erroneously denied intervention as of 
right under the first, second or third conditions of W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2), we will reverse.  However, the determination of the 
timeliness of an application to intervene is a 
matter within the discretion of the district court.  The district court is permitted to weigh 
the timeliness of an application to intervene in 
light of the circumstances of the particular case, including whether the 
applicant may have sought intervention earlier.  Therefore, to prevail on an appeal from a 
finding that an application to 
intervene 
is 
untimely, an abuse of discretion must be demonstrated.
 
Masinter 
v. Markstein, 
2002 WY 64, ¶ 7, 45 P.3d 237, 240-41 (Wyo. 2002) 
(emphasis added).  See Concerned Citizens of Spring Creek 
Ranch, ¶¶ 11-22, 185 P.3d  at 
38-41.
 
[¶14]   Because the district court denied 
Dr. Menolascino and Mr. Hirshberg’s request for intervention on the basis of 
lack of timeliness, this Court reviews the district court’s Order Denying Motion to Intervene by Dr. 
Mark Menolascino and William Hirshberg for an abuse of discretion on those 
grounds.  Generally 
speaking,
 
[a] 
motion for intervention, whether permissive or as of right, must be timely 
made. This requirement is 
intended to prevent a tardy intervenor from derailing the lawsuit that is near 
completion.  The test is one of reasonableness - 
potential intervenors must be reasonably diligent in learning of a suit that 
might affect their rights, and upon so learning they need to act reasonably 
promptly.  
 
Among 
the factors that courts normally consider in making this determination are the 
following: (1) the point to which the suit has progressed; (2) the purpose for which 
intervention is sought; (3) 
the length of time preceding the application during which the proposed 
intervenors knew or should have known of their interest in the case; (4) the prejudice to the 
original parties due to the proposed intervenor’s failure to promptly intervene 
after it knew or reasonably should have known of its interest in the case; and (5) the existence of unusual 
circumstances mitigating against or in favor of 
intervention.  Timeliness, in short, requires 
consideration of all the relevant facts and circumstances involved in a given 
case, not just the mere passage of time.  
 
Indeed, 
intervention has even been allowed after entry of judgment.  
In these cases, however, the intervenor must establish a compelling basis 
to allow intervention at such a late stage in the proceedings and provide a 
strong justification for its failure to intervene earlier.  Intervention has also been allowed 
on appeal, even where the putative intervener did not seek to intervene in the 
district court.  A party seeking intervention on appeal 
must satisfy the prerequisites of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure governing 
intervention as a matter of right and the motion to intervene must generally be 
filed within the time period allowed for the parties to appeal.
 
The 
trial judge is entitled to a full range of reasonable discretion in determining 
whether the timeliness and other requirements for intervention have been met, 
and only an abuse of discretion will cause reversal.  The court could reach a conclusion that 
a party’s delay is simply a matter of its own negligence in acting diligently or 
that the party has been following a cause of action to see how well it is 
progressing and deciding when to step in.  
Even more important is whether the party’s intervention will in any 
manner delay the progress of the case as contemplated by the court.  If so, the party will probably not 
succeed.  Therefore, it is important 
to make an analysis of all considerations as previously suggested the moment the 
party becomes aware of the suit in which the party is considering the 
possibility of intervention.
 
Samuel 
Adams, Michael S. Greco, and Ryan M. Tosi, 2 Bus. & Com. Litig. Fed. Cts. § 18:56 
(3d ed.) (emphasis added).
 
[¶15]   This Court has recognized that “[an] application to intervene may be denied solely on 
the basis of timeliness,” which requires a court to consider the “totality of the 
circumstances” in making a timeliness determination.  See Concerned 
Citizens of Spring Creek Ranch, 
¶ 15, 
185 P.3d  at 39.  
There are four factors a court should consider in determining 
timeliness:
 
1)    
“the 
length of time the applicant for intervention knew or reasonably should have 
known of its interest in the case before the application for leave to intervene 
was filed”;
 
2)    
“the 
extent of the prejudice that the existing parties to the litigation may suffer 
as a result of the applicant’s failure to seek intervention as soon as the 
applicant actually knew or reasonably should have known of its interest in the 
case”;
 
3)    
“the 
extent of the prejudice that the applicant for intervention may suffer if the 
application is denied”; and
 
4)    
“the 
existence of unusual circumstances militating either for or against a 
determination that the application is timely.”
 
State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Colley, 
871 P.2d 191, 197 (Wyo. 1994).  

 
[¶16]   Here, the district court was 
presented with a request for intervention that occurred at the end of the judicial review process.  Considering all of the circumstances, 
the district court stated:
 
having 
considered the law on timeliness and the factual circumstances including the 
timing of the motions having been filed after the final judgment was issued in 
this matter, that the movants were aware of the appeal prior to their purchase 
of their properties, any delay in failing to intervene earlier and the prejudice 
to the parties including the fact that the judgment provides for a remand to the 
County Commissioners, that said motions are 
untimely[.]
 
[¶17]   The district court appropriately 
based its holding on a consideration that the request to intervene occurred only 
after the final order had been 
entered and only after Dr. 
Menolascino and Mr. Hirshberg learned that the Commission was not intending to 
appeal the court’s final order.  
This decision occurred despite the fact that, at the time they purchased 
their property, in December 2008 and April 2009, respectively, both Dr. 
Menolascino and Mr. Hirshberg knew of the judicial review proceedings, which had 
been pending since October 2008.  
The district court did not enter its Order Reversing and Remanding Decision of 
the Board of County Commissioners of Teton County, Wyoming until February 
25, 2011, some two years later, providing ample 
time for Dr. Menolascino and Mr. Hirshberg to become involved in the 
proceedings.  Further, the district 
court considered the prejudice to the parties, including the required remand to 
the Teton County Commissioners.
 
[¶18]   From a public policy perspective, 
concluding that the district court erred in denying a request for intervention 
under these circumstances would be akin to allowing a tardy intervenor to derail 
a lawsuit near its completion without any “compelling basis” to allow 
intervention at such a late stage in the proceedings and without a strong 
justification for the failure to intervene earlier.  Based on the totality of the 
circumstances, the district court did not err in denying the request to 
intervene; particularly given the discretion afforded that court in making this 
decision.  Its decision must be 
affirmed.
 
[¶19]   Having concluded that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Dr. Menolascino and Mr. 
Hirshberg’s requests to intervene for purposes of appeal, this Court is left to 
consider whether nonparties are permitted to appeal the final order of a 
court.  After all, Dr. Menolascino 
and Mr. Hirshberg were never parties to the district court’s judicial review of 
the Teton County Commission’s decision.  
That judicial review was resolved by the district court’s February 25, 
2011, Order Reversing and Remanding 
Decision of the Board of County Commissioners of Teton County, Wyoming.  Still, Dr. Menolascino and Mr. Hirshberg 
sought to appeal the court’s order.
 
[¶20]   Simply put, pursuant to Wyoming 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 2.07, an appeal is limited to a “party.” Id.  The general rule is that “only parties 
to a lawsuit, or those that properly become parties, may appeal an adverse 
judgment.”  S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. 
Kemthorne, 525 F.3d 966, 968 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation 
omitted).  Accordingly, Dr. 
Menolascino and Mr. Hirshberg have no “right,” or ability, as nonparties, to 
appeal the final order from the district court.  Their direct appeals to this Court of 
the district court’s Order Reversing and 
Remanding Decision of the Board of County Commissioners of Teton County, 
Wyoming must be dismissed.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶21]   After reviewing the record, this 
Court first concludes that the district court did not err in denying Dr. Menolascino and Mr. 
Hirshberg’s request to intervene in the judicial review proceedings for the sole 
purpose of pursuing an appeal therefrom.  
The district court’s Order Denying 
Motion to Intervene by Dr. Mark Menolascino and William Hirshberg in Appeal 
Nos. S-11-0115 and S-11-0116 is affirmed.
 
[¶22]   Second, given their status as 
nonparties, Dr. Menolascino and Mr. Hirshberg have no 
ability to appeal the final order of the district court, and their direct 
appeals of the district court’s Order 
Reversing and Remanding Decision of the Board of County Commissioners of Teton 
County, Wyoming in Appeal Nos. S-11-0113 and S-11-0114 must be dismissed for 
lack of standing.  Having so 
concluded, this Court need not address the underlying substantive merits of 
those appeals.
 
FOOTNOTES
1The Court notes the risk of this tactic.  We know of no automatic procedure that 
would allow Appellees to file another brief on the other issues, should that 
become necessary.