Case Title: In re Karpin

Citation: 162 Vt. 163, 647 A.2d 700

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1993-05-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN_RE_KARPIN.92-570; 162 Vt. 163; 647 A.2d 700

[Opinion Filed May 21, 1993]

[Motion for Reargument Denied June 3, 1994]

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 92-570


 In re Gary Karpin                            Supreme Court

                                              Original Jurisdiction

                                              March Term, 1993


 Shelley A. Hill, Bar Counsel, Montpelier, for plaintiff-appellee

 David J. Williams of Sleigh & Williams, St. Johnsbury, for defendant-
   appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      PER CURIAM.   Respondent-attorney appeals the recommendation of the
 Professional Conduct Board that he be disbarred from the practice of law.
 Respondent claims that (1) his due process rights were violated by allowing
 Bar Counsel to prosecute the case and participate in the Board's
 deliberations, in violation of the doctrine of "internal separation of
 powers," (2) the evidence is insufficient to support many of the Board's key
 findings, and (3) the recommended sanction is inappropriate.  We adopt the
 recommended sanction.
                                     I.
      Respondent's first argument is that his due process rights were
 violated when the Board failed to disqualify Bar Counsel from prosecuting
 this case.  Respondent claims that the dual role of Bar Counsel, as
 prosecutor and counsellor to the Board, violated the internal-separation-of-
 powers rule.  The combination of investigatory and adjudicatory functions
 does not, by itself, violate due process.  In re O'Dea, 4 Vt. L.W. 19, 22
 (Feb. 11, 1993).  Because the Board is not the final decision-making
 authority and has the power only to recommend the sanction, respondent has
 not demonstrated any deprivation of due process rights in the disciplinary
 process.  See id. (no violation of due process where Judicial Conduct Board
 prosecutor actively participated in the deliberative process).
                                             II.
      Respondent's second claim is that the evidence does not support the
 findings.  First, respondent argues that, because Bar Counsel carries the
 burden of proving respondent's misconduct by clear and convincing evidence,
 A.O.9 Rule 13(C), on appeal all reasonable doubts and inferences must be
 resolved in his favor, citing Emslie v. State Bar of California, 520 P.2d 991 (Cal. 1974).  Emslie, however, is distinguishable.  Under the
 California disciplinary system, findings of fact made by the disciplinary
 board are not binding on the reviewing court.  Id. at 995.  Under present
 Vermont law, however, this Court must accept the Board's findings of fact
 unless they are "clearly erroneous."  A.O. 9 Rule 8(E).  As long as the
 Board applies the correct standard of proof, the Board's findings will be
 upheld if they are "'clearly and reasonably supported by the evidence'"
 because the Board is the trier of fact.  In re Rosenfeld, __ Vt. __, __, 601 A.2d 972, 975 (1991) (quoting In re Wright, 131 Vt. 473, 490,