Case Title: PEGGY JO KECK V. ROGER LYNN JORDAN

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0201

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-04-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
PEGGY JO KECK V. ROGER LYNN JORDAN2008 WY 38180 P.3d 889Case Number: S-07-0201Decided: 04/08/2008
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
PEGGY 
JO KECK,Appellant(Defendant),v.ROGER LYNN 
JORDAN,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Kathryn 
J. Edelman of Edelman Law Office, Gillette, Wyoming.  

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Rex O. 
Arney and Vincent P. Schutte of Brown, Drew & Massey, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming.      

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 

KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]  Peggy Jo Keck (Mother) appeals from an 
order modifying child support claiming the district court abused its discretion 
in allowing a deviation from the presumptive child support guidelines and 
permitting Roger Lynn Jordan (Father) to redact portions of his tax return 
pertaining to his new wife.  We 
reverse the part of the order allowing the deviation.  We affirm the order permitting 
redaction.   

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]  Mother presents the following issues for 
this Court's determination:  

 
 

I.                    
Whether 
the District Court abused its discretion in deviating from presumptive child 
support without a request by either party to do so and in the absence of 
sufficient evidence supporting statutory factors for 
deviation.

 
 

II.                  
Whether 
a district court abdicates its responsibility under Wyoming Statute Section 
20-2-308 (LexisNexis 2007) when it permits a parent to redact portions of his 
joint federal income tax return in the context of a child support modification 
action.

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]  The parties married in 1984.  They had two daughters, the first born 
July 11, 1985, and the second born January 4, 1987.  The parties divorced in 1999.  Pursuant to the divorce decree, Mother 
was awarded primary custody of the daughters and Father was required to pay 
monthly child support in the amount of $1,700 "during any child's minority 
(until age 18) and beyond if the child has a mental, emotional or physical 
impairment preventing emancipation."    

 
 
[¶4]  The older daughter turned 18 in July of 
2003, but Father continued to pay child support in the amount of $1,700 until 
she turned 20.  Then, in August of 
2005, he reduced his payment to $850.  
The younger daughter is profoundly disabled and, although she reached the 
age of majority in 2005, she is incapable of emancipation.  In April of 2006, Father filed a 
petition to modify child support in which he requested calculation of a new 
monthly child support amount for the disabled daughter and credit for $20,400, 
the amount he claimed that he paid after the older daughter turned 18.   

 
 
[¶5]  After a hearing, the district court 
found that Father's monthly net income was $15,318 and Mother's monthly net 
income was $3,108.  The district 
court calculated Father's presumptive monthly support obligation at $1,577 and 
Mother's at $320.  However, the 
court concluded the presumptive amount was not appropriate because:  1) Father contributed to the college 
expenses of the older daughter; 2) substantial government benefits would accrue 
on the younger daughter's behalf when she turned 21 on January 4, 2008; 3) 
Father was required to pay $1,700 monthly through April 30, 2006; and 4) Father 
did not receive credit for the "overpayment" of $20,400.  Given these circumstances, the district 
court concluded that ordering Father to pay the presumptive amount would result 
in Mother receiving a windfall.  The 
court concluded it was "appropriate to take the operative effect of this ruling 
as to back child support into account when attempting to fashion a fair and just 
result in determining child support."  
The district court held that a deviation from presumed child support was 
appropriate and ordered Father to pay $1,000 per month for the younger 
daughter's support effective May 1, 2006.  
The district court also ruled that Father could redact from his income 
tax returns matters attributable solely to his new wife's income prior to 
sharing the returns with Mother.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶6]      We review a district court's 
order on a petition to modify child support for an abuse of discretion.  Gray v. Pavey, 2007 WY 84, ¶ 8, 158 P.3d 667, 668 (Wyo. 2007).  

 
 
We will 
not interfere with the district court's decision regarding modification of 
custody absent a procedural error or a clear abuse of discretion.  In determining whether the district 
court has abused its discretion, we must decide whether it could reasonably 
conclude as it did.  Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means exercising sound judgment with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.  

 
 

Id. 
(citations omitted).  This same 
abuse of discretion standard applies when we are asked to review a district 
court's decision to deviate from the presumptive child support 
amount.

 

DISCUSSION

 
 
1.         
Deviation From Presumptive Child Support 
Amount

 
 
[¶7]  Mother contends that the district court 
abused its discretion in deviating from the presumptive child support amount 
when neither party requested and the evidence did not support deviation.  She claims that no evidence was 
introduced to support the district court's finding that Father paid continuing 
support for the older daughter after January of 2005.  She also claims there was no evidence 
that the younger daughter will qualify for or receive government disability 
benefits after she reaches the age of 21 or that any such benefits will be 
substantial and no evidence concerning the younger daughter's level of financial 
need. 

 
 
[¶8]  Father contends the district court's 
findings fall within the factors set forth in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-307(b) 
(LexisNexis 2007) that courts are to consider in deciding whether to deviate 
from the presumptive child support guidelines and that the deviation is 
supported by the general rule allowing for deviation when the presumptive amount 
"would be unjust or inappropriate" in the particular case.  He contends the district court's 
findings were supported by the financial information the parties provided in 
their affidavits and that evidence was sufficient without testimony from 
witnesses.  

 
 
[¶9]  The Wyoming legislature has established a 
comprehensive method for determining child support.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-304 (LexisNexis 
2007) establishes presumptive child support based upon the parents' income.  Section 20-2-307(a) provides that the 
presumptive child support established in § 20-2-304 "shall be rebuttably 
presumed to be the correct amount of child support to be awarded."  Section 20-2-307(b) provides in 
pertinent part:

 
 
A court 
may deviate from the presumptive child support established by W.S. 20-2-304 upon 
a specific finding that the application of the presumptive child support would 
be unjust or inappropriate in that particular case.  In any case where the court has deviated 
from the presumptive child support, the reasons therefore shall be specifically 
set forth fully in the order or decree.  
In determining whether to deviate from the presumptive child support 
established by W.S. 20-2-304, the court shall consider the following factors[.] 

 
 
The 
provision goes on to identify thirteen factors to be considered, 
including:

 
 
. . . 
.

 
 

(ii)               
The cost 
of necessary child day care;

(iii)             
Any 
special health care and educational needs of the child;

. . . 
.

 
 
(x)        Any 
other necessary expenses for the benefit of the child;

. . . 
.

 
 
(xiii)  Other factors deemed relevant by the 
court.       

 
 
[¶10]  In establishing support pursuant to the 
guidelines, the district court has discretion to deviate from the presumptive 
amount on a case by case basis.  Plymale v. Donnelly, 2007 WY 77, ¶ 37, 
157 P.3d 933, 941 (Wyo. 2007).  
However, deviation from the presumptive amount can only occur in 
accordance with the requirements of § 20-2-307(b).  Id.  If a court finds that a deviation is 
proper, it must set forth detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law.  Id.

 
 
[¶11]  Although trial courts are to give 
serious consideration to the guidelines, they are not to follow them 
blindly.  Steele v. Steele, 2005 WY 33, ¶ 11, 108 P.3d 844, 848-49 (Wyo. 2005), quoting Holtz v. State ex rel. Houston, 847 P.2d 972 (Wyo. 1993).  They are expected to exercise their 
discretion in determining child support amounts so as to serve the best 
interests of justice in light of all the circumstances.  Id.  "[The] guidelines are just that  
guidelines, and do not accommodate to all circumstances or cases."  Id.  This Court is hesitant to impinge on the 
trial court's historic discretion.  
Id.  However, there is no question that the 
presumptive support table set out in § 20-2-304(a) has the effect of 
circumscribing the trial court's discretion in calculating child support 
awards.  Steele, ¶ 12, 108 P.3d  at 
849.

 
 
[¶12]  In Shelhamer v. Shelhamer, 2006 WY 83, ¶ 
22, 138 P.3d 665, 675 (Wyo. 2006), we applied these principles to hold that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in deviating from presumptive 
support.  There, the district court 
concluded deviation was appropriate based upon the following factors:  the age of the child, the value of 
services contributed by either parent, mother's forgiveness of child support 
arrearages owed by father, and its finding that application of the presumptive 
support guidelines would be unjust and inappropriate under the 
circumstances.  In Ready v. Ready, 2003 WY 121,  ¶ 9, 76 P.3d 836, 838 (Wyo. 2003), we 
upheld the district court's determination that an upward deviation was 
appropriate based upon: 1) the father's choice to reside in an economically 
depressed area where work in his profession was unavailable; 2) the special 
healthcare and educational needs of the parties' second child; 3) the mother's 
contribution of tutoring services for their hearing-impaired son; 4) the 
father's failure to exercise his right to overnight visitation with his 
daughter; 5) the mother's cash assistance to the oldest son in college; and 6) 
the father's expectation of eventual profit from the house he was 
renovating.  These cases illustrate 
the manner in which this Court has applied § 20-2-304(a).

 
 
[¶13]  Although not a deviation case, Starkey v. Starkey, 2007 WY 106, 161 P.3d 515 (Wyo. 2007) is also relevant to our discussion.  In Starkey, father paid extra child support 
each month in order to pay off his child support in advance.  Mother later sought to modify child 
support and, in connection with that proceeding, the district court considered 
whether father should receive a credit for his overpayments.  The district court ruled he was not 
entitled to a credit and we affirmed.  
We reiterated an earlier holding that parties may not unilaterally or 
jointly modify or abrogate the terms of a child support order.  Starkey,  ¶ 9, 161 P.3d  at 518, quoting Kimble v. Ellis, 2004 WY 161, ¶ 13, 101 P.3d 950, 954 (Wyo. 2004).  We 
said:

 
 
We do 
not doubt that these overpayments made by Father were made with the best of 
intentions.  However, it is Father's 
obligation to pay the specified amounts according to the decree, and orders 
modifying it thereafter.  Allowing 
an increase at one time and a reduction at another would simply lead to 
incongruity and disorder in the child support system.

 
 

Starkey, ¶ 11, 
161 P.3d  at 518.  In Kimball, ¶ 8, 101 P.3d  at 953 (citations 
omitted), we also said:

 
 
[C]hild 
support is for the benefit of the children, and that the custodial parent stands 
in the shoes of a trustee who administers the money for the exclusive benefit of 
the children based upon their needs and welfare.  A child's right to adequate support 
cannot be bargained away by a contract between the parents regardless of the 
validity of the agreement between the parents themselves.  

  

[¶14]  With this precedent in mind, we turn to 
consideration of the record in the present case.  We address first Mother's claim that 
there was no evidence to support the district court's finding that Father 
continued to support the older daughter after he stopped making monthly child 
support payments on her behalf in 2005.  The district court found that Father 
contributed to payment of the older daughter's college related expenses after 
2005.  Father testified that Exhibit 
3, introduced at the hearing, was a summary table of monies he contributed to 
his children's needs beyond the monthly child support payments.  He testified that Mother requested that 
he contribute $2,000 per semester during the older daughter's first two years of 
college.  Exhibit 3 reflects that he 
made four payments of $2,000 each for the older daughter's college expenses 
beginning in August of 2003 and ending in January of 2005.    

 
 
[¶15]  Given this evidence, Mother's assertion 
that there was no evidence to support the district court's finding that Father 
helped pay the older daughter's college related expenses is incorrect.  However, Father's voluntary 
contributions to the older daughter's expenses cannot be used to reduce the 
amount of child support due the younger daughter.  His child support obligation to the 
younger daughter is for her benefit and her right to adequate support cannot be 
bargained away based upon contributions he makes to the older daughter.  Kimball, ¶ 8, 101 P.3d  at 953.  Regardless of the assistance Father 
provides to her sister, the younger daughter is entitled to adequate support 
unless evidence relating to her situation showed that a deviation was 
justified.

 
 
[¶16]  We consider next Mother's claim that 
there was no evidence presented at the modification hearing to show that the 
younger daughter will qualify for or receive government disability benefits 
after she reaches the age of 21 or that any such benefits will be 
substantial.  Father testified that 
he had no information concerning any state, federal or social security 
assistance for the younger daughter "other than what was provided in discovery" 
after the modification petition was filed.  
No discovery information is contained in the record.  Mother testified that, other than Title 
XIX benefits, for which the younger daughter qualified, she receives no benefits 
from any government source.  
Although Mother testified that upon turning 21 years of age in January of 
2008, the younger daughter would become eligible for state assistance, no 
evidence was presented concerning the amount of assistance she would 
receive.  No other evidence appears 
in the record on this issue.  Yet, 
the district court found that "the government benefits which will accrue on [the 
younger daughter's] behalf as of her twenty-first birthday (January 4, 2008) 
will be substantial."  Absent the 
presentation of some evidence showing that the younger daughter in fact would 
receive "substantial" benefits and the amount of such benefits, the district 
court could not reasonably conclude deviation from presumptive child support was 
appropriate on the basis of any such benefits.

 
 
[¶17]  Mother also contends that no evidence 
was presented concerning the younger daughter's level of financial need and 
without such evidence the district court abused its discretion in deviating 
downward from the presumptive amount.  
We agree.  While there was 
testimony concerning the younger daughter's level of disability and that Mother 
would need to find day care for her after she became ineligible for state 
special education at the age of 21, no evidence appears in the record filed with 
this Court concerning her financial needs.  
Absent such evidence, we hold the district court could not reasonably 
conclude that deviation from presumptive child support was appropriate. 

 
 
[¶18]  Given the lack of evidence, we hold that 
the district court abused its discretion in deviating from standard child 
support on the basis of the younger daughter's level of financial need and 
possible benefits she might receive in the future.  We further hold that the evidence 
showing that Father contributed to the older daughter's college expenses cannot 
be utilized to deviate from the support owed for the second daughter.  

 
 
2.         
Redaction From Income Tax Returns

 
 
[¶19]  Mother argues that Wyoming law requires 
child support calculations to be based on reliable and accurate 
disclosures.  She claims that in 
Father's 2006 tax return, he blacked out portions so that not even the district 
court had an accurate return.  
Mother asserts that Father should not be permitted to unilaterally edit 
his financial information. 

 
 
[¶20]  Father contends that the district court 
properly exercised its discretion to allow him to redact the portions of his tax 
returns relating solely to his wife's earnings.  He asserts that his wife is not 
obligated to support the children from his prior marriage and so her income is 
irrelevant.  He also argues that 
Mother can obtain accurate and complete information concerning his income from 
the financial affidavits required from the parties if child support modification 
is sought by either party. 

 
 
[¶21]  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-308 (LexisNexis 
2007) provides that full disclosure of the financial status of the parties is 
required before an order establishing or modifying child support may be 
entered.  It further provides that 
the court may require, or the parties may agree to, the exchange of financial 
information annually for the purpose of determining whether child support 
modification is warranted.  In the 
present case, the parties agreed to exchange tax returns annually as long as the 
child support obligation existed.  
In accordance with their agreement, the court incorporated the tax return 
exchange provision into the divorce decree.  

 
 
[¶22]  Despite the statutory and decree 
provisions requiring the exchange of tax returns, we are unable to conclude that 
the district court abused its discretion in allowing Father to redact portions 
relating to his wife's income.  
Particularly in light of the requirement that the parties fully and 
completely disclose their financial status by affidavit when modification is 
sought, this Court is hard pressed to find an abuse of 
discretion.

 
 
[¶23]  The district court's determination that 
Father may redact portions of his tax return related solely to his wife's income 
is affirmed.  The district court's 
deviation from the child support guidelines is reversed.  The case is remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.