Case Title: State of WI v. Hunt

Citation: 2014 WI 102

Docket Number: 2012AP002185-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2014-08-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
2014 WI 102 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP2185-CR   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
James R. Hunt, 
          Defendant-Appellant.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 349 Wis. 2d 789, 837 N.W.2d 178 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
August 1, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
March 19, 2014   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Jefferson 
 
JUDGE: 
Randy R. Koschnick 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., ABRAHAMSON, C.J., PROSSER, J., 
dissent. (Opinion filed.)   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 
argued by Eileen W. Pray, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.  
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief by Shelley 
M. Fite, assistant state public defender, and oral argument by 
Shelley M. Fite.  
 
 
 
2014 WI 102
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2012AP2185-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2010CF320) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
James R. Hunt, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
AUG 1, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.    
 
¶1 
MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN, J.   We review an unpublished, 
per curiam decision of the court of appeals1 reversing the 
Jefferson County Circuit Court's judgment of conviction against 
the defendant, James R. Hunt.2  At trial, a jury found Hunt 
guilty of one count of causing a child under 13 to view or 
                                                 
1 State v. Hunt, No. 2012AP2185-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. July 18, 2013). 
2 Judge Randy R. Koschnick presided. 
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
2 
 
listen to sexual activity in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.055 
(2009-10).3 
¶2 
Two issues are presented for our consideration: 1) 
whether the circuit court erred in excluding the testimony of 
Hunt's friend, Matt Venske, that he never sent Hunt a video of a 
man and woman engaging in sexual intercourse, and if so, whether 
the error was harmless; and 2) whether Hunt's trial counsel 
provided ineffective assistance.  
¶3 
Because Venske's testimony was relevant to Hunt's 
theory of defense and corroborated his version of events, we 
hold that the circuit court erred in excluding the testimony.  
However, we conclude that the State met its burden of proving 
that it is "clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury 
would have found the defendant guilty absent the error," State 
v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, ¶49, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189 
(quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)), and 
thus, the error was harmless.  We further determine that Hunt's 
ineffective assistance of counsel arguments fail under the two-
part inquiry of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 
(1984). 
We 
conclude 
that, 
under 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances, Hunt received a fair trial, and our confidence in 
the judgment is not undermined.  Accordingly, we reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals and reinstate the circuit 
                                                 
3 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
3 
 
court's judgment of conviction and affirm its denial of Hunt's 
post-conviction motion.         
I. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶4 
On November 11, 2010, James R. Hunt was charged with 
one count of sexual assault of a child under 13 in violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1), and one count of causing a child under 
13 to view or listen to sexual activity in violation of Wis. 
Stat. § 948.055(1) and (2)(a).  The complaining witness was 
Hunt's adopted daughter, A.H.  A.H. alleged that Hunt had placed 
her hand on his penis when she was six years old, and that when 
she was twelve, he had shown her three inappropriate images on 
his cell phone.  The first image was a cartoon depiction of a 
woman in a dress bending over.  The second image was a picture 
of a woman undressed from the waist up posing over a deer head 
and holding the antlers.  The third image was a video of a man 
and a woman engaged in sexual intercourse.     
¶5 
Hunt pled not guilty to both charges, and the case was 
tried in the Jefferson County Circuit Court.  During the 
preliminary hearing, A.H. testified that when Hunt had shown her 
the graphic images, he told her "this is the stuff that Matt 
sends me," referring to Hunt's friend, Matt Venske, who would 
later testify at trial for the defense.  This testimony was 
supported by A.H.'s account of events to Police Officer Terrance 
Nachtigal of the Fort Atkinson Police Department during his 
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
4 
 
initial investigation of the incident, as recorded in his police 
report.4     
¶6 
Prior to trial, the court ruled the first two images 
described above did not constitute "sexually explicit conduct" 
under Wis. Stat. § 948.055(1).5  However, the court determined 
that the video of the man and woman engaged in sexual 
intercourse could satisfy the statutory requirements.  Hunt's 
counsel filed a pretrial motion in limine arguing for exclusion 
of testimony regarding any images other than the video of sexual 
intercourse, citing Wis. Stat. § 906.08(2),6 but did not mention 
                                                 
4 Officer Nachtigal's police report, which recounted his 
initial interview with A.H. on October 11, 2010, was admitted 
into evidence as Def. Ex. No. 2. 
5 "Sexually explicit conduct" is defined as actual or 
simulated:  
(a) Sexual intercourse, meaning vulvar penetration as 
well as cunnilingus, fellatio or anal intercourse 
between persons or any other intrusion, however 
slight, of any part of a person's body or of any 
object into the genital or anal opening either by a 
person or upon the person's instruction. The emission 
of semen is not required; 
(b) Bestiality; 
(c) Masturbation; 
(d) 
Sexual 
sadism 
or 
sexual 
masochistic 
abuse 
including, but not limited to, flagellation, torture 
or bondage; or 
(e) Lewd exhibition of intimate parts. 
Wis. Stat. § 948.01(7).   
6 Wis. Stat. § 906.08(2) provides:  
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
5 
 
the 
motion 
during 
the 
final 
pretrial 
motion 
hearing.  
Nevertheless, Hunt's counsel objected at trial to statements 
regarding the two other images described by A.H. and also moved 
for a mistrial on that basis on two occasions.  The circuit 
court ruled that evidence concerning these two images was 
relevant and admissible, explaining: 
Well, these two images are not sexually explicit 
conduct under the statute. 
They are, however, inappropriate images for an adult 
male to show to a minor female. 
Mr. Hunt allegedly displayed these images to [A.H.] in 
a very short period of time on one particular 
occasion.  So, all these three images are relevant to 
provide context and to fill out the picture of what 
occurred at that time. 
These are not separate or remote incidents.  All three 
images were allegedly displayed at about the same 
time.   
Only one fits the definition of sexually explicit 
conduct.  The other two, however, are inappropriate 
given the circumstances and are relevant to allow the 
State 
to 
explain 
the 
entire 
relevant 
set 
of 
circumstances to the jury. 
Hunt's counsel continued to object that the other images were 
irrelevant each time A.H. testified regarding their content.   
                                                                                                                                                             
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for 
the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness's 
credibility . . . may 
not 
be 
proved 
by 
extrinsic 
evidence. They may, however, subject to s. 972.11(2), 
if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness and not 
remote in time, be inquired into on cross-examination 
of the witness or on cross-examination of a witness 
who testifies to his or her character for truthfulness 
or untruthfulness. 
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
6 
 
¶7 
At trial, A.H. testified that Hunt had shown her the 
images in question in the basement of her grandparents' house.  
She explained that Hunt walked across the room and held the cell 
phone in his hand and laughed as he showed her the images, and 
he admonished her to never tell her mother.  On cross-
examination, Hunt's counsel asked A.H. the following question: 
"When your father showed you the pictures on his cell phone, he 
said something like, hey, do you want to see the kind of stuff 
that Matt sends me?"  The State objected on hearsay grounds, and 
Hunt's counsel countered that the evidence was admissible as a 
statement against interest.  The circuit court sustained the 
State's objection.   
¶8 
Hunt testified that he had never shown A.H. any of the 
images she described.  Hunt explained that, on the day in 
question, he received a text message from Venske that said "just 
be glad you don't have a hernia like this."  Accompanying the 
message was a picture of a testicular hernia.  Hunt had recently 
undergone surgery for an umbilical hernia, and he believed the 
message was meant as a joke.  Hunt testified that A.H. was 
standing next to him when he received the text, but he did not 
intentionally show it to her, and he immediately turned his cell 
phone off after viewing the picture.  Hunt also stated the image 
of a woman posing with a deer head described by A.H. was 
actually the screensaver on his cell phone for approximately a 
year and a half, and although he never purposefully showed it to 
A.H., she had seen it on his cell phone during that period.  
Hunt maintained he had never possessed any image of a cartoon 
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
7 
 
depiction of a woman bending over or any videos of sexual 
intercourse, and he denied ever receiving text message images 
from anyone other than Venske.7   
¶9 
Hunt's theory of defense was that A.H. had seen the 
image of the testicular hernia and embellished the event to 
include other, more explicit images.  Hunt believed the charges 
against him stemmed from his recent divorce from A.H.'s 
biological mother and the ensuing battle for custody of their 
biological daughter, J.H.  Hunt also testified that, several 
months before A.H. leveled accusations against him, she had 
gotten into a fight with Hunt's mother during a family trip and 
did not see Hunt for several months after that incident.   
¶10 Officer Nachtigal also testified at trial.  Officer 
Nachtigal initially interviewed A.H. at the Fort Atkinson Police 
Department regarding her complaint against Hunt.  Officer 
Nachtigal explained that, based on his interview with A.H., he 
had reason to believe Venske was the source of the inappropriate 
images allegedly sent to Hunt's cell phone.  Following his 
interview with A.H., Officer Nachtigal interviewed Venske and 
                                                 
7 None of the images at issue in this case were recovered 
from Hunt's cell phone or otherwise admitted into evidence at 
trial.  While Hunt acknowledges that the image of the naked 
woman posing with a deer head and image of the testicular hernia 
were, at one time, in his cell phone, he denies that he ever 
possessed the other images that A.H. alleges he showed her.   
Because the circuit court determined the image described by A.H. 
of the cartoon depiction of a woman bending over did not meet 
the statutory criteria for "sexually explicit conduct," and was 
never offered into evidence, the image's existence was not 
established at trial and remains disputed by the parties.   
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
8 
 
asked him whether he had ever sent any videos to Hunt from his 
cell phone or computer.  Officer Nachtigal testified that Venske 
denied sending any videos from his cell phone.  Hunt's counsel 
then asked Officer Nachtigal if Venske admitted sending videos 
to Hunt from his computer, but the State objected on hearsay 
grounds.   
¶11 The circuit court overruled the State's objection 
after issuing the following hearsay instruction to the jury: 
A witness is not allowed to tell us what somebody else 
told him to prove that it happened.  But the officer, 
or 
any 
witness, 
is 
allowed 
to 
discuss 
other 
conversations simply to establish who said what to 
whom.  
So, if somebody wants to prove that Mr. Venske -– 
. . . . Did something or didn't do something, they 
either need to have a witness who saw him do it or 
have Mr. Venske come in and testify himself.  
When the Officer is being allowed to testify about 
this conversation, it's not to be used by you to 
determine whether Mr. Venske actually sent something 
from his phone or not.  
It's being admitted simply so you understand the 
conversation 
that 
took 
place 
between 
these 
two 
gentlemen. . . . 
A statement is not hearsay if it's not used to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted, is the technical 
legal definition.  
¶12 Hunt's counsel then called Venske, who testified he 
had 
sent 
Hunt 
text 
messages 
that 
occasionally 
contained 
pictures.  Venske explained he had sent Hunt a picture of a 
testicular hernia as a joke following Hunt's hernia surgery, and 
he also had sent Hunt a picture of a topless woman posing with a 
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
9 
 
deer head.  Hunt's counsel then attempted to ask Venske the 
following question: "There has been allegations against my 
client that you sent something to Mr. Hunt and he showed it to 
his daughter involving a man and woman engaging in intercourse.  
Did you ever send such——"  The court interrupted counsel mid-
question and pointed out that there was no allegation that the 
disputed video came from Venske.   
¶13 Hunt's counsel replied that Officer Nachtigal had 
recently testified that A.H. told him Venske was the source of 
the video.  Therefore, it was important for the defense to 
counter that statement with Venske's own testimony that he had 
never sent the video.  The circuit court disagreed, noting that 
the question posed by Hunt's counsel to Officer Nachtigal 
centered on the issue of where A.H. claimed Hunt obtained the 
video.  The court explained, "It seems to me that you are the 
one who is introducing it in the first place and you are the one 
that is also introducing contradictory evidence concerning the 
source."  The circuit court concluded the source of the video 
was a collateral issue and irrelevant to the defense.   
¶14 During the jury instruction conference, the circuit 
court suggested adding language to a pattern instruction 
indicating that the video of sexual intercourse was the only 
image supporting the charges against Hunt.  Both parties 
accepted the proposed instruction, and the jury was instructed 
as follows: 
The second count of the information charges that 
between September 1st, 2009, and June 30th, 2010, in 
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
10 
 
the 
City 
of 
Fort 
Atkinson, 
Jefferson 
County, 
Wisconsin, the defendant did commit the crime of 
causing a child to view or listen to sexual activity, 
specifically, a video clip of a man and woman engaging 
in sexual intercourse. 
(Emphasis added).  The circuit court also suggested that the 
parties 
specify 
which 
image 
was 
disputed 
during 
closing 
arguments. 
 
In 
addition, 
the 
circuit 
court 
recommended 
additional 
clarifying 
language 
to 
the 
jury 
instruction 
describing the elements of causing a child to view or listen to 
sexual activity.  If accepted, the circuit court would have 
delivered the following instruction to the jury: 
Element Number 1, the defendant caused [A.H.] to view 
or listen to sexually explicit conduct.  Sexually 
explicit conduct means actual or simulated sexual 
intercourse, 
masturbation, 
lewd 
exhibition 
of 
an 
intimate part. 
In this case, the State alleges that the video clip of 
a man and woman engaging in sexual intercourse is 
sexually explicit conduct. 
(Emphasis added). 
¶15 Hunt's counsel objected to this latter proposed 
instruction, however, providing the following explanation: 
I think [the instruction] amplifies it and gives some 
validity of the State's argument when we tell [the 
jury] an element of this is what the State is 
alleging.  It's like me adding that what the defense 
is alleging is a defense as well. 
The 
circuit 
court 
agreed, 
and 
the 
second 
proposed 
jury 
instruction was rejected. 
¶16 Hunt was found not guilty of the sexual assault charge 
but guilty of causing a child under 13 to view or listen to 
sexual activity in violation of Wis. Stat. § 948.055.  Hunt was 
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
11 
 
sentenced to seven years of probation and one year of 
conditional jail time.   
¶17 Hunt appealed his conviction, arguing that the circuit 
court improperly excluded Venske's testimony regarding the video 
and that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.  The 
court of appeals reversed Hunt's conviction and remanded to the 
circuit court for a new trial.  The court of appeals determined 
that the circuit court's decision to exclude Venske's testimony 
was erroneous, because the evidence was relevant and would have 
corroborated Hunt's version of events.  The court of appeals 
also concluded that the circuit court's error was not harmless, 
because the outcome of the case turned on the credibility of the 
parties.   
¶18 Although 
the 
State 
argued 
Officer 
Nachtigal's 
testimony regarding his interview with Venske functionally 
conveyed the same information as Venske's excluded testimony, 
the court of appeals reasoned that the circuit court's hearsay 
instruction prevented the jury from considering "whether Venske 
did or did not send anything from his phone to Hunt . . . ."   
State v. Hunt, No. 2012AP2185-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶13 
(Wis. Ct. App. July 18, 2013).  Further, the court of appeals 
noted that the circuit court's instruction specifically informed 
jurors "that proof of what Venske did or did not do would have 
to be established through Venske's testimony, only highlighting 
the lack of that testimony from Venske."  Id.  Because the court 
of appeals reversed Hunt's conviction based on his evidentiary 
claim, it did not address Hunt's ineffective assistance claims. 
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
12 
 
¶19 Hunt petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on December 17, 2013.  We now reverse.   
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶20 This court will not disturb a circuit court's decision 
to 
admit 
or 
exclude 
evidence 
unless 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously exercised its discretion.  State v. Ringer, 2010 WI 
69, ¶24, 326 Wis. 2d 351, 785 N.W.2d 448.  "A circuit court 
erroneously exercises its discretion if it applies an improper 
legal standard or makes a decision not reasonably supported by 
the facts of record."  Weborg v. Jenny, 2012 WI 67, ¶41, 341 
Wis. 2d 668, 816 N.W.2d 191 (citing Johnson v. Cintas Corp. No. 
2, 2012 WI 31, ¶22, 339 Wis. 2d 493, 811 N.W.2d 756).      
¶21 A circuit court's erroneous exercise of discretion in 
admitting evidence is subject to the harmless error rule.  State 
v. Harris, 2008 WI 15, ¶85, 307 Wis. 2d 555, 745 N.W.2d 397.  
Whether the error was harmless presents a question of law that 
this court reviews de novo.  State v. Jackson, 2014 WI 4, ¶44, 
352 Wis. 2d 249, 841 N.W.2d 791. 
¶22 This case also requires us to determine whether Hunt's 
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.  Whether a person 
was deprived of the constitutional right to the effective 
assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of law and fact.  
State v. Trawitzki, 2001 WI 77, ¶19, 244 Wis. 2d 523, 628 
N.W.2d 801.  The circuit court's findings of fact will be upheld 
unless they are clearly erroneous.  State v. Pitsch, 124 
Wis. 2d 628, 634, 369 N.W.2d 711 (1985).  Whether counsel's 
performance was deficient and prejudicial to his or her client's 
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
13 
 
defense is a question of law that we review de novo.  Trawitzki, 
244 Wis. 2d 523, ¶19.    
¶23 In Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, the United States 
Supreme Court set forth a two-part test for determining whether 
counsel's actions constitute ineffective assistance.  First, the 
defendant must demonstrate that counsel's performance was 
deficient.  Id.; State v. McDowell, 2004 WI 70, ¶49, 272 
Wis. 2d 488, 681 N.W.2d 500.  Second, the defendant must 
demonstrate that counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial 
to his or her defense.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; McDowell, 
272 Wis. 2d 488, ¶49.  This requires a showing that counsel's 
errors were "so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial, a trial whose result is reliable."  Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 687.  
III. DISCUSSION 
¶24 We first consider whether the circuit court erred in 
excluding Venske's testimony and conclude that it did.  We then 
address whether the error was harmless and hold that it was.  
Finally, we examine Hunt's three ineffective assistance claims 
and determine that each argument fails under Strickland's two-
part test.  
A. 
The Circuit Court's Decision to Exclude Venske's 
Testimony was Harmless Error 
¶25 As a threshold matter, we agree with the court of 
appeals and both parties that the circuit court erred in 
excluding Venske's testimony that he never sent the video of 
sexual intercourse to Hunt.  Venske's testimony was directly 
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
14 
 
relevant to Hunt's theory of defense.8  As explained above, 
Hunt's theory of defense at trial was that A.H. saw an image of 
a testicular hernia on Hunt's cell phone, and A.H. later 
embellished that event by alleging that Hunt had also shown her 
other, more sexually explicit, images.  At trial, Venske 
corroborated Hunt's testimony regarding sending Hunt the photo 
of a testicular hernia, but the circuit court excluded his 
testimony that he had never sent Hunt any videos, including the 
video of sexual intercourse.  Venske's excluded testimony would 
have corroborated Hunt's testimony and lent credibility to 
Hunt's version of events.  
¶26 Thus, we must consider whether the circuit court's 
error in excluding Venske's testimony was harmless.  The 
erroneous exclusion of testimony is subject to the harmless 
error rule.  See Wis. Stat. § 901.03(1) ("Error may not be 
predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence 
unless a substantial right of the party is affected . . . .").  
Harmless error analysis requires us to look to the effect of the 
error on the jury's verdict.  State v. Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶29, 
263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d 485.  For the error to be deemed 
harmless, the party that benefited from the error——here, the 
                                                 
8 Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the 
existence 
of 
any 
fact 
that 
is 
of 
consequence 
to 
the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence."  Wis. Stat. § 904.01.  
Evidence is deemed to be relevant if it bears "upon any one of 
[the] countless . . . factors which are of consequence to the 
determination of the action."  Holmes v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 259, 
268, 251 N.W.2d 56 (1977). 
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
15 
 
State——must prove "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained." 
Harris, 307 Wis. 2d 555, ¶42 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 
U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).  Stated differently, the error is harmless 
if it is "clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury 
would have found the defendant guilty absent the error."  
Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶49 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 18). 
¶27  This court has previously articulated several factors 
to assist in a harmless error analysis, including but not 
limited to: the importance of the erroneously admitted or 
excluded 
evidence; 
the 
presence 
or 
absence 
of 
evidence 
corroborating or contradicting the erroneously admitted or 
excluded evidence; the nature of the defense; the nature of the 
State's case; and the overall strength of the State's case.  
State v. Norman, 2003 WI 72, ¶48, 262 Wis. 2d 506, 664 N.W.2d 
97.  Although non-exhaustive, these factors assist in our review 
of whether the exclusion of Venske's testimony was harmless.  We 
consider each in turn.   
¶28 The State and Hunt naturally dispute the importance of 
the erroneously excluded evidence at issue in this case.  Hunt 
contends the exclusion of Venske's testimony was vitally 
important because it corroborated his theory of defense.  In a 
case that largely turns on credibility determinations, Hunt 
argues the court's error in excluding testimony that would have 
lent credibility to his version of the facts cannot be harmless.   
¶29 To be sure, Venske's testimony was relevant to Hunt's 
theory of defense.  This is why we agree with the parties and 
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
16 
 
the court of appeals that it was error for the circuit court to 
exclude the evidence.  The exclusion of relevant evidence, 
however, does not automatically trigger the need for a new 
trial.  Harmless error analysis is not intended to simply 
identify errors, but instead is meant to determine whether the 
error was consequential to the verdict obtained.  For this 
reason, we examine the totality of the circumstances, which 
requires the reviewing court to gauge whether the admitted or 
excluded evidence contributed to the trial's outcome.   
¶30 In determining the import of the erroneously excluded 
evidence, we find another factor in particular informs our 
analysis——that 
is, 
the 
presence 
or 
absence 
of 
evidence 
corroborating or contradicting the erroneously admitted or 
excluded evidence.  Hunt testified at trial that Venske had 
never sent him any videos and, specifically, had never sent him 
a video of a man and woman engaging in sexual intercourse.  
Although Venske's testimony on this point was excluded by the 
circuit court, we agree with the State that Officer Nachtigal's 
testimony functionally served the same purpose by corroborating 
Hunt's version of events.  See State v. Everett, 231 Wis. 2d 
616, 631, 605 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding that exclusion 
of evidence was harmless where other evidence was heard by the 
jury that "functionally conveyed the same theory of defense 
 . . . .").   
¶31 Hunt argues that Officer Nachtigal's testimony could 
not have corroborated Hunt's testimony because the jury was 
instructed by the circuit court that it could use Officer 
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
17 
 
Nachtigal's testimony only to determine "who said what to whom," 
and not as evidence to ascertain "whether Venske actually sent 
something from his phone or not."  Hunt claims this instruction 
to the jury rendered Officer Nachtigal's testimony "wholly 
irrelevant" because it was "stripped of the truth of its 
content." 
¶32 Hunt's argument overstates the implications of the 
circuit court's hearsay instruction.  Simply because the jury 
could not use Officer Nachtigal's testimony as evidence to prove 
the truth of what Venske had told him does not render Officer 
Nachtigal's testimony immaterial.  The jury could still use 
Officer Nachtigal's testimony as evidence to prove that Venske 
had told Officer Nachtigal that he sent no videos to Hunt.  
Undoubtedly, Venske's excluded testimony had some probative 
value to Hunt's defense.  However, with respect to corroborating 
Hunt's testimony that Venske did not send the video of sexual 
intercourse to Hunt, we conclude that there is little meaningful 
difference between Venske's assertion that he did not send Hunt 
a video and Officer Nachtigal's testimony that Venske told him 
he did not send Hunt a video.  The circuit court's instruction 
accurately informed the jury that it could not conclude, based 
solely on Officer Nachtigal's testimony, that Venske did not 
send the video.  However, the jury still heard that Venske had 
represented to the police that he did not send the video, which 
corroborated what Hunt had already alleged at trial.   
¶33 Further, the erroneously excluded evidence would not 
have assisted Hunt's defense by contradicting the State's 
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
18 
 
evidence regarding the source of the images.  The State never 
suggested at trial that Hunt obtained the images from Venske.  
In fact, no evidence regarding the source of the images was ever 
introduced by the State at trial.  So, while the excluded 
evidence would have lent credibility to Hunt's version of 
events, it would not have served to weaken the State's case on 
the issue of where Hunt obtained the sexually explicit video, 
because the State never alleged it was sent by Venske.      
¶34 We conclude our harmless error analysis by examining 
the nature of the defense, the nature of the State's case, and 
the overall strength of the State's case.  Norman, 262 Wis. 2d 
506, ¶48.  Hunt was charged with one count of causing a child to 
view or listen to sexual activity in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.055(1).  The statute prohibits "intentionally caus[ing] a 
child who has not attained 18 years of age . . . to view or 
listen to sexually explicit conduct . . . ."  Id.  Under the 
plain language of the statute, the State is not required to 
establish the source of the sexually explicit conduct shown to 
the complainant.  The State need only demonstrate that the 
defendant showed sexually explicit conduct to a child under 18 
years of age.  Since the source of the video was not a required 
element of the State's case, the value of Venske's excluded 
testimony lay solely in its potential to corroborate Hunt's 
version of events.  Thus, any harm arising from the exclusion of 
Venske's testimony was minimized by the admission of Officer 
Nachtigal's testimony.   
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
19 
 
¶35 Moreover, the fact that Officer Nachtigal's testimony 
could not be considered for the purpose of determining whether 
Venske actually sent Hunt the video is not decisive, because it 
is clear from a review of the record that the State's case 
against Hunt was not predicated on whether Hunt received the 
video of sexual intercourse from Venske.  The strength of the 
State's 
case 
was 
largely 
dependent 
on 
the 
specific 
and 
consistent testimony of A.H, who was the State's principal 
witness at trial.  Notably, A.H. never testified about the 
source of the images on Hunt's cell phone, and the State never 
raised the issue while making its case to the jury.  The crux of 
the State's case was not who sent the video of sexual 
intercourse to Hunt, but rather, whether Hunt showed the video 
of sexual intercourse to A.H.   Consequently, A.H.'s testimony, 
and the State's case, focused on A.H.'s detailed description of 
the circumstances surrounding Hunt showing her inappropriate 
images on his cell phone, as well as the content of those 
images. 
 
Therefore, 
the 
importance 
of 
Venske's 
excluded 
testimony was its value in corroborating Hunt's testimony that 
Venske never sent him a video, a purpose that was effectively 
achieved by the admission of Officer Nachtigal's testimony.  
 
¶36 In sum, we conclude that the exclusion of Venske's 
testimony was harmless error.  The jury heard direct testimony 
from Hunt that Venske did not send him the video of sexual 
intercourse.  This testimony was corroborated by Officer 
Nachtigal's testimony that Venske had told him in a police 
interview that he did not send any videos to Hunt, which 
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
20 
 
bolstered Hunt's version of the facts and was favorable to the 
defense.  Further, the record shows that the State's case did 
not hinge on establishing the source of the inappropriate images 
on Hunt's cell phone.   The strength of the State's case rested 
largely on A.H.'s testimony, and the State never raised the 
issue at trial of where the images on Hunt's phone originated 
from in proving the essential elements of the crime for which 
Hunt was convicted.  For these reasons, we conclude that it is 
clear "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of 
did not contribute to the verdict obtained."  Harris, 307 Wis. 
2d 555, ¶42 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24). 
B. 
Hunt's Ineffective Assistance Argument 
¶37 Hunt's second argument on appeal is that his trial 
counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance.  To 
support his claim, Hunt points to three separate incidents at 
trial that he contends amount to ineffective assistance.  First, 
Hunt asserts trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue 
an applicable hearsay exception that would permit A.H. to 
testify that Venske sent the images to Hunt's cell phone.  
Second, Hunt maintains trial counsel did not effectively argue 
to prevent testimony regarding the two images described by A.H. 
that the circuit court determined did not constitute "sexually 
explicit conduct" as a matter of law.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.055(1). 
 
Finally, 
Hunt 
argues 
trial 
counsel 
was 
ineffective for failing to accept the circuit court's invitation 
to 
include 
additional 
clarifying 
language 
in 
the 
jury 
instructions.  Because Hunt's ineffective assistance claims 
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
21 
 
implicate distinct facts from his evidentiary argument discussed 
above, we address each individually below.  We conclude that, 
regarding Hunt's first two ineffectiveness claims, Hunt's 
defense was not prejudiced by the performance of trial counsel.  
On Hunt's third ineffectiveness claim, we conclude Hunt's 
counsel was not deficient. 
i. Applicable Legal Principles 
¶38 Criminal 
defendants 
are 
guaranteed 
a 
right 
to 
effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 685-86; State v. Balliette, 2011 WI 79, ¶21, 336 Wis. 2d 
358, 805 N.W.2d 334.  In Strickland, a seminal decision on 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the United States 
Supreme Court set forth a two-part test for establishing that 
counsel's performance was ineffective: (1) counsel's performance 
was deficient; and (2) the defendant was prejudiced as a result.  
466 U.S. at 687.  "The benchmark for judging any claim of 
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined 
the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial 
cannot be relied on as having produced a just result."  Id. at 
686.   In addition, "a court need not determine whether 
counsel's 
performance 
was 
deficient 
before 
examining 
the 
prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged 
deficiencies."  Id. at 697; see also State v. Johnson, 153 
Wis. 2d 121, 128, 449 N.W.2d 845 (1990). 
¶39 Regarding the first prong of the Strickland test, the 
Supreme Court explained counsel's performance is deficient when 
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
22 
 
"in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or 
omissions 
were 
outside 
the 
wide 
range 
of 
professionally 
competent assistance."  Id. at 690.  "[C]ounsel is strongly 
presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all 
significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional 
judgment."  Id.  In assessing counsel's performance, a court 
must make "every effort . . . to eliminate the distorting 
effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of 
counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 
counsel's perspective at the time."  Id. at 689. 
¶40 Under the second prong of the Strickland test, 
deficient performance by counsel is prejudicial only if the 
"errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair 
trial, a trial whose result is reliable."  Id. at 687.  A 
defendant must demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but 
for 
counsel's 
unprofessional 
errors, 
the 
result 
of 
the 
proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable probability 
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome."  Id. at 694. 
ii. Hunt's First Ineffective Assistance Claim 
¶41 Hunt first asserts his trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to argue that certain testimony by A.H. was 
admissible under the present sense impression exception to the 
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
23 
 
hearsay rule.9  During the trial, Hunt's counsel asked A.H. the 
following question: "When your father showed you the pictures on 
his phone, he said something like, hey, do you want to see the 
kind of stuff that Matt sends me?"  The State objected on 
hearsay grounds, and Hunt's counsel argued the testimony was 
within the scope of cross-examination and admissible under the 
exception to the hearsay rule for statements against interest.10  
The circuit court sustained the State's objection, noting that 
Hunt's counsel sought to "introduce a statement of your own 
client against your own client's interests."  On appeal, Hunt 
argues counsel performed deficiently by failing to argue the 
evidence was admissible as a present sense impression, and his 
defense was prejudiced as a result.   
                                                 
9 Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible at trial.  Wis. 
Stat. § 908.02.  However, Wis. Stat. § 908.03(1) provides for 
the admission of hearsay evidence that describes a present sense 
impression, defined as "[a] statement describing or explaining 
an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving 
the event or condition, or immediately thereafter." 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 908.045(4) provides that a statement 
against interest is admissible as an exception to the general 
rule against hearsay evidence.  A statement against interest is 
defined as "[a] statement which was at the time of its making so 
far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary 
interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or 
criminal 
liability . . . that 
a 
reasonable 
person 
in 
the 
declarant's position would not have made the statement unless 
the person believed it to be true."  Id.  However, this 
provision only applies if the declarant is unavailable to 
testify.  Wis. Stat. § 908.045.  The exception would not apply 
in this case because the declarant, Hunt, testified on his own 
behalf shortly after A.H. 
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
24 
 
¶42 The State concedes the present sense impression 
exception applied to A.H.'s testimony.11  However, the State 
argues that "cho[osing] the wrong exception" to the hearsay rule 
does not rise to the level of deficient performance.  The State 
also asserts that any deficiency by counsel did not prejudice 
Hunt for purposes of an ineffective assistance claim.  
¶43 We conclude Hunt was not prejudiced by trial counsel's 
failure to cite an applicable hearsay exception.  The State's 
case against Hunt was not predicated on whether he received the 
video from Venske.  Hunt was charged with causing a child to 
view or listen to sexual activity in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.055(1).  The source of the sexually explicit image is not 
an essential element of the statute.  Had the State brought 
charges against Venske, the issue of whether Venske sent the 
video would be unquestionably central to his defense.  As it 
stands, however, the relevant question for the jury to consider 
was whether Hunt showed A.H. the video, not from whom it was 
received. 
                                                 
11 We note that, while the State has conceded the present 
sense impression exception applied to A.H.'s testimony, the 
question of whether a statement is admissible under a hearsay 
exception is a question of law.  Horak v. Bldg. Servs. Indus. 
Sales Co., 2012 WI App 54, ¶11, 341 Wis. 2d 403, 815 N.W.2d 400.  
Because it is our constitutional duty to say what the law is, we 
are not bound by a party's concessions of law.  Lloyd Frank 
Logging v. Healy, 2007 WI App 249, ¶15 n.5, 306 Wis. 2d 385, 742 
N.W.2d 337. However, for the sake of argument, we assume, 
without deciding, that A.H.'s testimony was admissible under the 
present sense impression exception to the hearsay rule.           
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
25 
 
¶44 Therefore, any testimony relating to whether Venske 
sent the video to Hunt could relate only to the credibility of 
each party's respective version of events.  The testimony that 
was admitted at trial conveyed two stories: Hunt testifying that 
Venske did not send him a video, and Officer Nachtigal 
testifying that A.H. told him in her police interview that the 
video 
came 
from 
Venske.12 
 
Officer 
Nachtigal's 
testimony 
functionally conveyed the same information as A.H.'s excluded 
testimony.   Although A.H.'s version of events might have been 
stronger if she had been allowed to corroborate Officer 
Nachtigal's testimony, such an outcome would certainly not be 
helpful to Hunt.  If Hunt's counsel had successfully argued for 
admission of A.H.'s testimony, the jury would have heard her 
provide only more detailed information about where Hunt obtained 
the video.  Such additional evidence would have been utterly 
inconsistent 
with 
Hunt's 
own 
testimony, 
and 
far 
from 
strengthening his case, might instead have undercut his own 
credibility.  Counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to 
successfully introduce testimony that might very well have been 
damaging to Hunt and that was functionally conveyed from another 
source.  We therefore conclude that Hunt's counsel was not 
ineffective for failing to argue for admission of A.H.'s 
testimony as a present sense impression.   
                                                 
12 Officer Nachtigal's testimony was further collaborated by 
the police report recounting his interview with A.H.  The police 
report——which was admitted into evidence at trial——explained 
A.H. told Officer Nachtigal that when Hunt showed her the video, 
he remarked, "this is the kind of stuff that [Hunt's] friend 
[Venske] sends him."  
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
26 
 
iii. Hunt's Second Ineffective Assistance Claim 
¶45 Hunt's second ineffective assistance argument is that 
trial counsel failed to provide the circuit court with the 
strongest argument for excluding evidence regarding the cell 
phone image of a topless woman posing with a deer head and the 
alleged image of a woman bending over.  Hunt's counsel filed a 
pretrial motion in limine arguing for exclusion of this 
evidence, but did not mention the motion during the pretrial 
motion hearing.  During the trial, Hunt's counsel objected to 
A.H.'s testimony describing these two images on the basis that 
they were extrinsic and irrelevant.   
¶46 Hunt contends his trial counsel performed deficiently 
in failing to invoke Wis. Stat. § 904.03, which provides for 
exclusion of evidence "if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury . . . ."  Specifically, Hunt 
argues that Wis. Stat. § 904.03 was applicable because the 
evidence in question posed a high likelihood of confusing or 
misleading the jury.  According to Hunt, because the other two 
images described by A.H. also featured offensive sexual conduct, 
the jury could easily be confused about which image could 
support a conviction.  As a result, there was a high risk that 
Hunt would be convicted based on images which the circuit court 
had already ruled were not "sexually explicit conduct" as a 
matter of law.  See Wis. Stat. § 948.055(1).  Hunt also points 
out that the probative value of the evidence was minimal because 
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
27 
 
it was admitted for the purpose of providing context to A.H.'s 
testimony.   
¶47 The State argues that, even assuming Hunt's counsel 
performed deficiently in failing to invoke Wis. Stat. § 904.03, 
the deficiency did not prejudice his defense.   
¶48 We agree with the State.13  Hunt's argument is premised 
on the possibility that the jury could have convicted him based 
on images that did not meet the statutory criteria in Wis. Stat. 
§ 948.055(1).  However, the circuit court's instruction to the 
jury specified that the only unlawful image was the video of 
sexual intercourse: 
The second count of the information charges that 
between September 1st, 2009, and June 30th, 2010, in 
the 
City 
of 
Fort 
Atkinson, 
Jefferson 
County, 
Wisconsin, the defendant did commit the crime of 
causing a child to view or listen to sexual activity, 
specifically, a video clip of a man and woman engaging 
in sexual intercourse. 
(Emphasis added).  For Hunt's argument to succeed, we would have 
to assume that the jury failed to adhere to the circuit court's 
instruction.  However, as Hunt points out in his brief, 
"[j]urors are presumed to have followed jury instructions."  
State v. LaCount, 2008 WI 59, ¶23, 310 Wis. 2d 85, 750 N.W.2d 
780. 
                                                 
13 As we have previously observed, because the defendant 
must prove both deficient performance and prejudice under 
Strickland's two-part test in order to establish ineffective 
assistance of counsel, courts "may reverse the order of the two 
[Strickland] tests or avoid the deficient performance analysis 
altogether if the defendant has failed to show prejudice[.]"  
State v. Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d 121, 128, 449 N.W.2d 845 (1990).    
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
28 
 
¶49  In addition, during the supplemental postconviction 
motion hearing, the circuit court explained that even if Hunt's 
counsel had raised the confusion argument at trial, the outcome 
would have been no different: 
I 
don't 
think 
that 
the 
confusion 
argument 
is 
particularly compelling.   
. . . . Even if it were made, I would not have granted 
the objection on that basis because the danger of 
confusion is really relatively low here.  Especially 
given the fact that I instructed the jury that the 
image of the two people allegedly engaging in a sex 
act is the image that constitutes the basis for that 
criminal charge.   
. . . . The other two images, as they have been 
referred to today and elsewhere on the record, were 
highly probative for the reasons I have previously 
indicated. 
That highly probative value substantially outweighs 
whatever danger of confusion might have been present 
and I find that any risk of confusion was relatively 
low.  
¶50 In arguing that evidence of the two images described 
by A.H. posed a significant risk of confusing the jury, Hunt 
overlooks that he also introduced evidence of an additional 
offensive image at trial——that is, the picture of a testicular 
hernia.  If there was a risk of confusion to the jury, it was 
created equally by both sides.  Hunt cannot convincingly argue 
that his own evidence posed "no real danger" of confusion, but 
that comparable evidence introduced by the prosecution should 
have been excluded. 
¶51 For these reasons, we conclude that Hunt failed to 
meet his "burden of showing that the decision reached would 
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
29 
 
reasonably likely have been different absent the errors" under 
his second ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 696. 
iv. Hunt's Third Ineffective Assistance Claim 
¶52 Hunt's final ineffective assistance claim is that 
trial counsel was deficient for failing to ensure the jury 
instructions clearly distinguished between the images that were 
discussed at trial.  During the jury instruction conference, the 
circuit court suggested adding clarifying language to the jury 
instruction describing the elements of causing a child to view 
or listen to sexual activity.   The proposed instruction would 
have specified that the contested image in this case was the 
video of sexual intercourse, not the other images described by 
A.H.  If accepted, the circuit court would have delivered the 
following instruction to the jury: 
Element Number 1, the defendant caused [A.H.] to view 
or listen to sexually explicit conduct.  Sexually 
explicit conduct means actual or simulated sexual 
intercourse, 
masturbation, 
lewd 
exhibition 
of 
an 
intimate part. 
In this case, the State alleges that the video clip of 
a man and woman engaging in sexual intercourse is 
sexually explicit conduct. 
(Emphasis added).  Hunt's trial counsel objected to the 
additional language, and Hunt now argues his trial counsel 
lacked a valid strategic reason for the objection.  Hunt 
maintains that, due to the nature of the images described by 
A.H., there was a heightened risk the jury would convict him 
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
30 
 
based on an image that did not meet the statutory criteria for 
"sexually explicit conduct" under Wis. Stat. § 948.055(1).  
 
¶53 The State asserts that counsel's decision to object to 
the instruction was a legitimate strategic decision, and as 
such, it cannot form the basis for an ineffective assistance 
claim.   
¶54 We agree with the State that counsel's performance was 
not deficient.  During the jury instruction conference, Hunt's 
counsel provided the following rationale in support of his 
objection to the proposed instruction: 
I think [the instruction] amplifies it and gives some 
validity of the State's argument when we tell [the 
jury] an element of this is what the State is 
alleging.  It's like me adding that what the defense 
is alleging is a defense as well. 
Hunt's counsel also referred to the circuit court's previous 
amended jury instruction, which already clarified that the video 
of sexual intercourse was the basis for the State's charge.  In 
response to Hunt's objection, the circuit court explained, 
"Okay, I don't mind if we take that one out. . . . I want the 
jury to be on notice of what image we are talking about, and I 
think 
we 
have 
covered 
that 
in 
[the 
previous 
instruction]. . . . I'm agreeing with you." 
¶55 Hunt's counsel weighed the possibility of juror 
confusion against the likelihood that the proposed instruction 
would appear to legitimize the State's allegations, and he made 
a reasonable strategic choice to object to the instruction.  
Hunt's counsel concluded that the circuit court's other amended 
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
31 
 
jury instruction would rectify any possible confusion about 
which image formed the basis for the State's complaint.  We find 
no reason for concluding that counsel's strategic decision "fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness."  Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 688.  To the contrary, the circuit court later expressed 
agreement with the reasoning of Hunt's counsel.14  "A strategic 
trial decision rationally based on the facts and the law will 
not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel."  
State v. Elm, 201 Wis. 2d 452, 464-65, 549 N.W.2d 471 (Ct. App. 
1996).  We will not "second-guess[] the trial counsel's 
considered selection of trial tactics or the exercise of a 
professional judgment in the face of alternatives that have been 
weighed by trial counsel."  State v. Felton, 110 Wis. 2d 485, 
502, 329 N.W.2d 161 (1983).  Therefore, we conclude that 
counsel's decision to object to the circuit court's second 
                                                 
14 In Hunt's postconviction motion hearing, the circuit 
court explained:  
[Hunt's trial counsel's] stated strategy was that he did 
not want that to be in the instruction because it might 
convey to the jury that the Court believed that the video 
image in question was, in fact, sexually explicit conduct.   
That's 
a 
legitimate 
strategy 
decision. 
. 
. 
. 
[I]n 
hindsight, I think [Hunt's trial counsel] was right about 
that.  It probably would have been detrimental to the 
defense to have that explanation in [the jury instruction], 
because it could have placed that quality on the assertion 
in the instruction that this has been endorsed by the Court 
as constituting sexually explicit conduct.   
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
32 
 
amended jury instruction was not deficient performance for 
purposes of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.15 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
¶56 Because Venske's testimony was relevant to Hunt's 
theory of defense and corroborated his version of events, we 
hold that the circuit court erred in excluding the testimony.  
However, we conclude that the State met its burden of proving 
that it is "clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury 
would have found the defendant guilty absent the error," Harvey, 
254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶49 (quoting Neder, 527 U.S. at 18), and thus, 
the error was harmless.  We further determine that Hunt's 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims fail under the two-part 
                                                 
15 Hunt also argues that his trial counsel's alleged 
deficiencies, taken in the aggregate, had a significant, 
prejudicial impact on his defense.  It is true that we consider 
the cumulative effect of counsel's deficiencies when assessing 
whether the prejudice standard in Strickland has been satisfied.  
State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶59, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 
305.  As this court has previously explained, "[j]ust as a 
single 
mistake 
in 
an 
attorney's 
otherwise 
commendable 
representation may be so serious as to impugn the integrity of a 
proceeding, the cumulative effect of several deficient acts or 
omissions may, in certain instances, also undermine a reviewing 
court's confidence in the outcome of a proceeding."  Id., ¶60.  
This approach is inapplicable, however, in situations——such as 
this case——where the reviewing court concludes that the alleged 
errors, taken in isolation, did not constitute a deficient act 
or omission.  "[E]ach alleged error must be deficient in law——
that is, each act or omission must fall below an objective 
standard of reasonableness——in order to be included in the 
calculus for prejudice."  Id., ¶61.  Because we conclude that 
one of the alleged errors raised by Hunt are not deficient as a 
matter of law, we cannot address Hunt's aggregacy argument, as 
we do not find any, let alone multiple, instances of deficient 
performance.  
No. 
2012AP2185-CR   
 
33 
 
inquiry of Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (1984).  We conclude 
that, under the totality of the circumstances, Hunt received a 
fair trial, and our confidence in the judgment is not 
undermined.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court 
of appeals and reinstate the circuit court's judgment of 
conviction and affirm its denial of Hunt's post-conviction 
motion.         
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2012AP2185-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶57 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).   The 
State 
of 
Wisconsin seeks review of an unpublished per curiam opinion of 
the court of appeals that reversed the defendant's conviction. 
¶58 This is not a close case on the relevant issue of law, 
that is, whether the circuit court committed error in excluding 
key witness testimony necessary to support the defendant's 
version of events.  Rather, this is a case where both parties, 
the court of appeals, the majority, and I all conclude that it 
was error.1  
¶59 I part ways with the majority, however, when it 
concludes that the error is harmless.  Its conclusion is based 
on the faulty assertion that there is "little meaningful 
difference" between the probative value of Venske's excluded 
testimony and the probative value of Officer Nachtigal's 
admitted testimony.  Majority op., ¶32. 
¶60 To support this conclusion the majority has to ignore 
both logic and the law of evidence.  When an out-of-court 
statement 
is 
admitted 
to 
show 
the 
event 
occurred 
but 
specifically is not admitted for the truth of the matter 
asserted, its probative value in ascertaining the truth of the 
matter asserted is minimal, if any.  Contrary to the majority's 
assertion, it is meaningfully different in probative value than 
                                                 
1 Accordingly, there is no law development function that we 
engage in here.  The test for determining whether the error is 
harmless is well established.  We are left to address only an 
error correction function, one that this court does not normally 
perform.  See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.62(1r). 
 
No.  2012AP2185-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
relevant in-person testimony which is offered for the truth of 
the assertion. 
¶61 This was a he-said——she-said case.  The excluded 
evidence was the only evidence available to corroborate either 
version of the events——and it corroborated the defendant's 
version. 
¶62 After reviewing all of the relevant factors in a 
harmless error analysis, I conclude that the exclusion of key 
testimony 
supporting 
the 
defendant's 
credibility 
was 
not 
harmless.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.2  
I 
¶63  Hunt was charged with showing an obscene video on his 
cell phone to his stepdaughter.  She told police that the video 
had been sent by Hunt's friend, Venske.  Hunt testified that he 
never had a video like the one she described and that he had not 
received any such video from Venske.  The circuit court excluded 
Venske's corroborating testimony that he never sent any videos 
to Hunt.     
¶64 The majority determines as a threshold matter that the 
circuit court erred in excluding Venske's relevant testimony 
"that he had never sent Hunt any videos, including the video of 
sexual intercourse."  Majority op., ¶25.  It acknowledges that 
                                                 
2 Because this issue is dispositive, I do not address the 
majority's ineffective assistance of counsel analysis.  However, 
I note that the majority's analysis appears to continue a 
troubling 
trend 
of 
paying 
lip 
service 
to 
Strickland 
v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), while deviating from the 
principles of Strickland itself.  See State v. Starks, 2013 WI 
69, ¶82, 349 Wis. 2d 274, 833 N.W.2d 146 (Bradley, J., 
dissenting).     
No.  2012AP2185-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
"Venske's testimony was directly relevant to Hunt's theory of 
defense" 
because 
"Venske's 
excluded 
testimony 
would 
have 
corroborated Hunt's testimony and lent credibility to Hunt's 
version of events."  Nevertheless, it concludes that the error 
was harmless.  Id.        
¶65 The 
majority 
notes 
that 
although 
the 
excluded 
testimony had value in corroborating Hunt's testimony, that 
purpose "was effectively achieved by the admission of Officer 
Nachtigal's testimony."  Id., ¶35.  Specifically, it determines 
that Officer Nachtigal's testimony that Venske told him that he 
had not sent Hunt the video "functionally served the same 
purpose as Venske's excluded testimony by corroborating Hunt's 
version of events." Id., ¶30. Even though the circuit court 
instructed the jury not to use the officer's testimony to 
determine "whether Venske actually sent something from his phone 
or 
not," 
the 
majority 
concludes 
that 
there 
was 
"little 
meaningful difference" between the probative value of Venske's 
excluded 
testimony 
and 
the 
probative 
value 
of 
Officer 
Nachtigal's admitted testimony.  Id., ¶¶31, 32.  
II  
¶66 The majority's determination of harmless error rests 
primarily on its erroneous conclusion that Officer Nachtigal's 
testimony was essentially as valuable to the defense as Venske's 
excluded 
testimony 
would 
have 
been. 
 
Id., 
¶¶10, 
30-32.  
Undermining the majority's conclusion is the fact that the jury 
was specifically instructed not to consider for the truth of the 
matter asserted Nachtigal's testimony about what Venske told 
No.  2012AP2185-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
him.  The circuit court's instruction was detailed and unusually 
specific, and bears repeating in its entirety: 
A witness is not allowed to tell us what somebody else 
told him to prove that it happened. But the officer, 
or 
any 
witness, 
is 
allowed 
to 
discuss 
other 
conversations simply to establish who said what to 
whom.  
So, if somebody wants to prove that Mr. Venske ——  
[COUNSEL]:  That is correct. 
THE COURT:  Did something or didn't do something, they 
either need to have a witness who saw him do it or 
have Mr. Venske come in and testify himself.  
When the Officer is being allowed to testify about 
this conversation, it's not to be used by you to 
determine whether Mr. Venske actually sent something 
from his phone or not.  
It's being admitted simply so you understand the 
conversation 
that 
took 
place 
between 
these 
two 
gentlemen. 
That's the best explanation I can give you for 
hearsay.  You spend about three months on it in law 
school, and that's the nutshell version.   
A statement is not hearsay if it's not used to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted, is the technical 
legal definition. 
(Emphasis supplied.)  It is difficult to imagine what else the 
circuit court could have done to communicate to the jury that it 
could not consider Officer Nachtigal's testimony as probative of 
whether or not Venske actually sent the video to Hunt.     
¶67 In light of this detailed jury instruction, there is 
no logical way to reconcile the majority's suggestion that the 
jury could use Officer Nachtigal's testimony as probative in 
proving what Venske told him, with the court's instruction that 
No.  2012AP2185-CR.awb 
 
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it could not use it for that purpose.  The court instructed: 
"it's not to be used by you to determine whether Mr. Venske 
actually sent something from his phone or not." 
 ¶68 The only way to make any sense of the conclusion that 
the majority embraces is that the majority assumes that the jury 
did not heed the court's instruction.  However, the jury is 
presumed to have followed the court's instructions.  State v. 
LaCount, 2008 WI 59, ¶23, 310 Wis. 2d 85, 750 N.W.2d 780; see 
also State v. Gary M.B., 2004 WI 33, ¶33, 270 Wis. 2d 62, 676 
N.W.2d 475 ("When a circuit court gives a proper cautionary 
instruction, appellate courts presume that the jury followed 
that instruction and acted in accordance with the law."); State 
v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 507, 451 N.W.2d 752 (1990) 
("[O]nce the jury has been properly instructed on the principles 
it must apply to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt, a court must assume on appeal that the jury has abided by 
those instructions.").  The majority undermines the presumption 
and calls into question whether the circuit court's instructions 
had any effect. 
III 
¶69 The 
majority's 
conclusion 
also 
rests 
on 
a 
misperception of the law of evidence.  The majority mistakenly 
treats Officer Nachtigal's testimony about Venske's out-of-court 
statement, admitted to prove that a conversation occurred, as 
having essentially the same probative value as direct testimony 
from Venske.  In his instruction to the jury, the circuit court 
correctly explained the difference.  
No.  2012AP2185-CR.awb 
 
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¶70 Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 908.01(3).  Here the statement was that Venske did not send 
Hunt the video.  As the circuit court specifically instructed, 
this statement by Venske to Officer Nachtigal was not admitted 
into evidence for the truth of the statement.  Rather it was 
admitted to explain how Officer's Nachtigal's investigation 
proceeded.  State v. Wilson, 160 Wis. 2d 774, 779, 467 N.W.2d 
130 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991) ("Where a declarant's statement is 
offered for the fact that it was said, rather than for the truth 
of its content, it is not hearsay.").  This type of evidence has 
been held admissible under res gestae, which literally means 
that the thing happened, "things done" or "thing transacted."   
Black's Law Dictionary 1310 (7th ed., 1999). 
¶71 Nachtigal's testimony has little, if any, probative 
value in regards to proving the truth of the statement that 
Venske did not send a video to Hunt.  "Probative value" has been 
defined 
as 
"the 
tendency 
of 
evidence 
to 
establish 
the 
proposition that it is offered to prove."  1 Charles T. 
McCormick on Evidence 774 (4th ed. 1992).  Even if there is some 
minimal probative value, proving that the conversation took 
place is different than proving as true what was said in the 
conversation.  See State v. Payano, 2009 WI 86, ¶81, 320 Wis. 2d 
348, 768 N.W.2d 832 (2009) ("Essentially, probative value 
reflects the evidence's degree of relevance. Evidence that is 
No.  2012AP2185-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
highly relevant has great probative value, whereas evidence that 
is only slightly relevant has low probative value.").   
¶72 In light of the circuit court's jury instruction that 
Officer Nachtigal's testimony could not be used for the truth of 
the matter asserted, the majority's conclusion of "little 
meaningful difference" between the probative value of Venske's 
excluded 
testimony 
and 
the 
probative 
value 
of 
Officer 
Nachtigal's admitted testimony is baffling.  Majority op., ¶32.  
Contrary to the majority's conclusion, there is a vast probative 
difference.  It takes both a leap of logic and the law to 
conclude otherwise. 
IV 
¶73 This court has repeatedly stated that a harmless error 
analysis considers the totality of the circumstances.  State v. 
Beamon, 2013 WI 47, ¶3, 347 Wis. 2d 559, 830 N.W.2d 681 ("A 
harmless error analysis asks whether, based on the totality of 
the circumstances, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
rational jury, properly instructed, would have found the 
defendant guilty."); State v. Patricia A.M., 176 Wis. 2d 542, 
556-57, 500 N.W.2d 289 (1993) ("[A]  reviewing court must look 
to the totality of record and determine whether the error 
contributed to the trial's outcome.").   
¶74 The majority correctly observes that this court has 
previously articulated a number of factors to assist in a 
harmless error analysis, including the importance of the 
erroneously admitted or excluded evidence, the presence or 
absence 
of 
evidence 
corroborating 
or 
contradicting 
the 
No.  2012AP2185-CR.awb 
 
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erroneously admitted evidence, the nature of the State's case, 
the overall strength of the State's case, and the nature of the 
defense.  Majority op., ¶27 (citing State v. Norman, 2003 WI 12, 
¶48, 262 Wis. 2d 605, 664 N.W.2d 97). 
 
 ¶75 Although the majority pays lip service to the totality 
of the circumstances, its focus appears narrow.  In all but one 
of the factors it considers, the majority relies on the strength 
of Officer Nachtigal's testimony.  This almost singular focus is 
contrary to our harmless error jurisprudence. 
¶76 In considering the first factor, importance, the 
majority determines it is informed by the presence or absence of 
corroborating evidence.  Id., ¶30.  It notes that although 
Venske was not allowed to testify, Officer Nachtigal's testimony 
served the same function.  Id., ¶¶32, 35.   
¶77 In addressing the nature of the case, the majority 
again relies on the strength of Officer Nachtigal's testimony.  
It reasons that because the State was not required to prove how 
Hunt obtained the video, the only value in Venske's testimony 
was 
to 
corroborate 
Hunt's 
version 
of 
events. 
Thus, 
it 
determines, "any harm arising from the exclusion of Venske's 
testimony was minimized by the admission of Officer Nachtigal's 
testimony."  Id., ¶34. 
¶78 Next, in its discussion of the nature and strength of 
the State's case against Hunt, the majority observes that the 
State's case was not predicated on whether Hunt received the 
video from Venske.  Id., ¶35.  It then reiterates that the value 
of Venske's testimony was in corroborating Hunt's testimony, "a 
No.  2012AP2185-CR.awb 
 
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purpose that was effectively achieved by the admission of 
Officer Nachtigal's testimony."  Id. 
¶79 The only point at which the majority relies on a 
different basis is in its discussion of Hunt's defense.  Id., 
¶33.  There, it notes that the State never suggested at trial 
that Hunt obtained the video from Venske.  Thus, it reasons, 
although the excluded evidence would have lent credibility to 
Hunt's version of events, it would not have weakened the State's 
case.  Id. 
¶80 Overall, the majority's conclusion that the error in 
excluding Venske's testimony was harmless relies fundamentally 
on its erroneous assertion that Officer Nachtigal's testimony 
was the functional equivalent of Venske's.  The majority 
continuously 
emphasizes 
its 
focal 
point 
that 
Nachtigal's 
testimony filled the void left by the exclusion of Venske's 
testimony.  It is hard to square what is essentially the 
singular focus in the majority's harmless error analysis with 
the directive to consider the totality of the circumstances. 
V 
¶81 Contrary to the majority, after considering the 
totality of the circumstances, I conclude that the State has not 
shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the circuit court's 
erroneous exclusion of Venske's testimony was harmless.   
¶82 In assessing whether an error is harmless, "we focus 
on the effect of the error on the jury's verdict."  State v. 
Weed, 2003 WI 85, ¶29, 263 Wis. 2d 434, 666 N.W.2d 485.  We have 
described the test as "whether it appears beyond a reasonable 
No.  2012AP2185-CR.awb 
 
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doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the 
verdict obtained."  Id. (quoting State v. Harvey, 2002 WI 93, 
¶44, 254 Wis. 2d 442, 647 N.W.2d 189, quoting in turn Neder v. 
United States, 527 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1999)).  To conclude that an 
error "did not contribute to the verdict . . . a court must be 
able to conclude 'beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury 
would have found the defendant guilty absent the error.'" Id. 
(quoting Harvey, 254 Wis. 2d 442, ¶48 n.14). 
¶83  As previously noted, we are to consider the totality 
of the circumstances when conducting a harmless error analysis.  
Beamon, 347 Wis. 2d 559, ¶3.  This court has articulated a 
number of factors which include: the nature of the case, the 
importance of the erroneously admitted or excluded evidence, the 
nature of the error and the alleged harm caused, the presence or 
absence 
of 
evidence 
corroborating 
or 
contradicting 
the 
erroneously 
admitted 
or 
excluded 
evidence, 
whether 
the 
erroneously admitted evidence duplicates untainted evidence, the 
nature of the defense, the nature of the State's case, and the 
overall strength of the State's case.  Norman, 262 Wis. 2d 506, 
¶48; Weed, 263 Wis. 2d 434, ¶30; see also State v. Rhodes, 2011 
WI 73, ¶33, 336 Wis. 2d 64, 799 N.W.2d 850. 
¶84 Considering the nature of the case, the excluded 
evidence was of high importance.  This case presents two 
versions of what happened: the events as relayed by A.H. and the 
events as relayed by Hunt.  There was no evidence of what 
happened on the day in question other than their statements.  In 
No.  2012AP2185-CR.awb 
 
11 
 
these circumstances, the primary focus is on the credibility of 
these witnesses.   
¶85 "Corroborating evidence is often the key to breaking 
credibility deadlocks."  Daniel D. Blinka, 7 Wisconsin Practice 
Series: Wisconsin Evidence, § 420.5 at 294 (3d ed. 2008); see 
also State v. Daniels, 160 Wis. 2d 85, 109, 465 N.W.2d 633 
(1991) (error not harmless when the excluded evidence "was 
needed to bolster the defendant's credibility").  Venske's 
testimony would have corroborated Hunt's version of events and 
thus 
was 
important 
to 
the 
credibility 
determination.  
Accordingly, the nature of the case and the importance of the 
excluded evidence weigh against a determination that the error 
was harmless. 
¶86 In 
this 
context, 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
error 
is 
particularly onerous. Defendants have a constitutional right to 
present a defense.  As the United States Supreme Court has 
repeatedly observed, "few rights are more fundamental than that 
of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense."  
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (citations 
omitted).  
¶87 Our caselaw stresses the importance of allowing a 
defendant to "produce supporting evidence" to corroborate his or 
her version of events.  Daniels, 160 Wis. 2d at 104 (a defendant 
should not be "limited merely to his own assertion but should be 
allowed to produce supporting evidence" to corroborate his 
testimony).  Here, the excluded testimony was necessary to 
No.  2012AP2185-CR.awb 
 
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bolster Hunt's version of events.  This weighs against a 
determination that excluding Venske's testimony was harmless. 
¶88 There was no admitted evidence that duplicated or 
corroborated the erroneously excluded evidence.  In this case 
the only evidence that could be considered duplicating or 
corroborating the excluded testimony was Officer's Nachtigal's 
testimony about what Venske told him.  Given that Officer 
Nachtigal's testimony could not be considered for the truth of 
"whether Venske actually sent something from his phone or not" 
it was of no value as corroborating evidence.  There was no 
other evidence to take the place of the erroneously excluded 
evidence.  Further, the jury instruction explaining that proof 
of what Venske did or did not do would have to be established 
through Venske's testimony only highlighted the lack of such 
testimony from Venske.  As such, this factor also cuts against a 
conclusion of harmless error.   
¶89 The other factors this court has offered to assist in 
harmless error analysis also demonstrate that the State has not 
met its burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error did not contribute to the verdict.  The majority briefly 
alludes to the "strength of the State's case" which it frames as 
"largely dependent on the specific and consistent testimony of 
A.H., who was the State's principal witness at trial."  Majority 
op., ¶35.  However, it omits any specific discussion of A.H.'s 
testimony, and the strength of any other evidence of guilt.  
Compare id. with State v. Evers, 139 Wis. 2d 424, 450, 407 
N.W.2d 256 (1987) (examining the record as a whole, finding that 
No.  2012AP2185-CR.awb 
 
13 
 
the "evidence of guilt was overwhelming," and concluding that 
the error of admitting prior crimes testimony was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt).  A closer look at the State's case 
reveals that the fact that it was dependent on A.H.'s testimony 
was part of its weakness.  This was a case of he-said——she-said, 
and the excluded evidence was the only available evidence to 
corroborate either version of the story.   
¶90 These factors, considered in light of the totality of 
the circumstances, create a reasonable doubt that a rational 
jury would have found the defendant guilty had the erroneously 
excluded evidence been admitted.  Hunt's sole conviction 
depended on the jury's belief that he had the video on his 
phone, despite Hunt's testimony to the contrary.  The case 
turned on the relative credibility of Hunt and A.H., and 
Venske's excluded testimony was the only testimony offered to 
bolster either story.    
VI 
¶91  In sum, I conclude that the State failed to meet its 
burden of proving that the erroneous exclusion of testimony was 
harmless.  It was "directly relevant to Hunt's theory of 
defense" and "would have corroborated Hunt's testimony and lent 
credibility to Hunt's version of events."  Majority op., ¶25.    
¶92 Contrary 
to 
the 
majority, 
I 
conclude 
that 
the 
exclusion of key testimony going to the defendant's credibility, 
in this case involving two competing versions of events, was not 
harmless.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
No.  2012AP2185-CR.awb 
 
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¶93 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice DAVID T. PROSSER, JR., join this dissent.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
No.  2012AP2185-CR.awb 
 
 
 
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