Case Title: Hursh Agency, Inc. v. Wigwam Homes, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 5827

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-05-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Hursh Agency, Inc. v. Wigwam Homes, Inc.1983 WY 53664 P.2d 27Case Number: 5827Case Number: 5827Decided: 05/19/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
HURSH AGENCY, INC., A WYOMING CORPORATION, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT AND THIRD-PARTY PLAINTIFF),

v.

WIGWAM HOMES, INC., A 
WYOMING CORPORATION, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF). No. 5827

Appeal from the District Court,FremontCounty, W.J. Nicholas, 
J.

ARE NOT AN 
OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] 

William L. 
Miller (argued), and Holly B. Brown of Central Wyoming Law Associates, P.C., 
Riverton, for 
appellant.

David B. Hooper 
of David B. Hooper, P.C., Riverton, for 
appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE and 
BROWN, JJ.

RAPER, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     As the result of a jury 
verdict, a judgment for damages was made and entered by the trial judge in favor 
of Wigwam Homes, Inc. (appellee) against Hursh Agency, Inc. (appellant) in the 
stipulated sum of $19,169.61 plus interest thereon in the amount of $3,158.46. 
The damages were awarded because it was found by the jury that appellant, as 
agreed, failed to provide insurance which would have covered appellee's loss 
arising when half of a modular house fell into the basement during 
installation.

[¶2.]     The appellant presents 
as issues:

"1. The trial court erred 
by instructing the jury as a matter of law that the loss sustained would have 
been covered by the insurance company had a contract been in 
force.

"2. The trial court erred 
in excluding evidence of insurance policy exclusions and changes in 
specifications and increased hazards of risk.

"3. The trial court erred 
in not, sua sponte, directing a mistrial when Plaintiff-Appellee's counsel, 
during cross-examination of Mr. Hursh, asked a leading question, disclosing an 
offer to settle for a specific sum. The cautionary instruction given was 
inadequate. 

"4. The trial court erred 
in excluding the testimony of Mr. Strickler, whose testimony was relevant and 
credible. Said testimony directly impeached the Plaintiff's sworn testimony of 
the facts concerning attempts to obtain insurance 
coverage."

We will 
affirm.

[¶3.]     The appellee is in the 
business of selling modular homes which are installed on foundations on buyers' 
lots. The appellant is an independent insurance agency.

[¶4.]     In November 1979, 
appellee had acquired an installation floater from appellant to cover the 
transportation and installation of two modular homes. An installation floater 
insures against all risks of direct physical loss or damages to the insured 
property except as its terms otherwise provide. Those installations were 
completed without loss.

[¶5.]     In January 1980, 
appellee had on its lot two halves of a modular home which it sold to Jack Long 
for installation on his lot. Long contracted for construction of a foundation 
with basement. He reported completion to appellee. Appellee employed James 
Francisco to transport the two halves of the modular home to the Long homesite 
and install it on Long's foundation.

[¶6.]     On Friday, January 11, 
1980, Francisco moved the first half of the modular home to the foundation site. 
Upon arrival he discovered that the foundation had not been constructed to the 
particular modular home requirements in that it was two feet too long. He 
immediately so notified James Barquin, president of 
appellee.

[¶7.]     Later on that same day, 
Barquin and his wife Marguerite, along with Betty O'Donley and her husband, all 
the shareholders of appellee, met with Francisco to discuss the problem. James 
Barquin contacted Long, and it was decided that a beam to carry one end of the 
home be placed in the foundation to correct the error.

[¶8.]     Francisco did not have 
insurance. All parties agreed to hold each other harmless and that appellee get 
insurance. On Saturday, January 12, 1980, Mrs. Barquin attempted to call someone 
at appellant insurance agency. She finally called John Hursh, president of 
appellant, a corporation.

[¶9.]     At this point, the 
trial testimony of Mrs. Barquin and John Hursh is in conflict. Mrs. Barquin 
testified that John Hursh assured her the insurance would be arranged. Hursh 
testified that he told Mrs. Barquin nothing could be done over the weekend, and 
she would have to take the necessary information to the appellant's office on 
Monday, January 14, 1980 to see if the personnel there could help her. Mrs. 
Barquin did call the appellant agency office over the noon hour of Tuesday, 
January 15, 1980, and supplied the necessary information, i.e., descriptive data 
and identification numbers, etc. No policy with installation floater had been, 
nor was it thereafter, issued.

[¶10.]  Long, in the meantime, had his contractor 
install the beam decided upon. On Monday, January 14, 1980, Francisco started 
installation of one-half of the modular house. On Tuesday, January 15, 1980, at 
about 3:30 p.m. when he lowered it onto the foundation, the beam gave way, and 
the modular half fell into the basement completely destroying 
it.

[¶11.]  As we move along through the issues, 
other factual material will be added as required.

I

[¶12.]  The trial judge instructed the jury that 
as a matter of law:

"INSTRUCTION NO. 
9

"The physical loss and 
damage which the plaintiff sustained when the half of the modular home fell into 
the basement is a loss which the insurance company would have been obliged to 
reimburse, had an insurance contract similar to that of Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 
(the November insurance policy)[1] been in force at the 
time."

 

Appellant 
asserts this to be error on the ground that the insured (appellee) must meet its 
burden of proving that its loss came within coverage extended by a preponderance 
of the evidence, and any questions concerning the proximate cause of the loss 
must be resolved by the jury.

[¶13.]  We have no argument with the rules set 
out in the various cases cited by appellant. They are all court tried without a 
jury. Though findings of fact must be made by a trial judge, when sitting 
without a jury, the problems are different. Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Kohlhase, 9 
Ariz. App. 595, 455 P.2d 277, 48 A.L.R.3d 1114 (1969), cited by appellant, 
pretty well summarized the various burdens in establishing coverage: the insured 
has the burden of proving that its loss was due to an insured risk; the insurer 
has the burden of showing that the loss was within a policy exclusion; when the 
undisputed facts show no coverage exists, the court must direct a verdict for 
the insurer; when the undisputed facts show that the loss was a covered risk, 
then only the other facets of the litigation must be disposed of, whether 
questions of law or fact, by the court and jury respectively; and, when the 
evidence is conflicting, the question of whether the loss is within the risks of 
the policy or excepted therefrom is ordinarily for the trier of 
fact.

[¶14.]  In the case now before us there is no 
dispute as to what caused the loss: a beam gave way, and one-half of the 
structure was destroyed during installation; therefore, a loss occurred during 
installation. The court determined as a matter of law that if a policy had been 
issued, such a loss was a covered risk.2 There was no dispute in the 
evidence that the foundation was too long and it was necessary to install a beam 
on the foundation to accommodate the shorter module. There was no credible 
evidence that such a corrective method was not acceptable and would justify 
refusal to issue or cancellation of the policy, if issued. The court, in the 
face of such undisputed facts, found that the installation of the beam was not 
within the policy exclusions.3 We will discuss the exclusion 
matter a bit further in Part II since that is encompassed by appellant's 
separate issue 2.

[¶15.]  As we view it, the trial judge, by the 
questioned instruction, merely instructed the jury on a question of contract 
construction. A policy of insurance is a contract between the insurer and the 
insured and construed in the same way.4 Worthington v. State, Wyo., 598 P.2d 796 (1979); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 
v. Farmer's Insurance Group, Wyo., 569 P.2d 1260 (1977). When terms of a 
contract are shown without any conflict of evidence, interpretation of a 
contract becomes a question of law for the court. Engle v. First National Bank of Chugwater, Wyo., 
590 P.2d 826 (1979). Paraphrased, and as said approvingly from a quote in 
Horvath v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., 58 Wyo. 211, 131 P.2d 315 
(1942), the interpretation of a written contract is a question of law for the 
court; but where the terms of a contract are conflicting or doubtful, it is for 
the jury to ascertain the intention of the parties and determine what the 
contract was under proper instructions. The interpretation and construction of a 
contract are done by the court as a matter of law. Amoco Production Co. v. Stauffer Chemical 
Company of Wyoming, Wyo., 612 P.2d 463 
(1980). See also, Goodman v. Kelly, 
Wyo., 390 P.2d 244 (1964). 

[¶16.]  Since it was the duty of the trial judge 
to interpret the contract of insurance and not that of the jury, his 
interpretation must be conveyed to the jury. It is the function of instructions 
to give the jury guidance in reference to the law of the case to assist it in 
arriving at correct conclusions. Gale v. 
Kay, Wyo., 
390 P.2d 596 (1964); MacManus v. Getter 
Trucking Co., Wyo., 384 P.2d 974 (1963). The submission of a 
legal proposition to a jury would necessarily be reversible error. Chosen Friends Home Loan & Savings 
League v. Otterson, 7 Wyo. 89, 50 P. 194 
(1897).

[¶17.]  It was not error for the trial judge to 
give to the jury the benefit of his construction of the insurance contract under 
circumstances where there was no dispute as to the nature of the loss. The 
language of insurance policies at best is not always easy for the layman to 
understand. The policy pertinent to the circumstances of this case devotes 
itself for the most part to conditions and exclusions and never does specify 
what particular risks are covered. The jury was entitled to know wherein it 
covered appellee's loss, even if issued.

[¶18.]  The controlling question in this appeal 
is whether appellant had committed itself to procure installation insurance 
through an installation floater covering the loss for appellee - did appellant 
enter into an oral contract to furnish insurance such as it had sold to appellee 
previously? That query was fully presented to the jury as an issue of fact to be 
decided by the jury, which is its function. Jim's Water Service, Inc. v. Alinen, Wyo., 608 P.2d 667 (1980). There was a sharp conflict in 
the testimony. We have so often held that the supreme court assumes evidence in 
favor of the successful party to be true, leaving out entirely the evidence in 
conflict therewith, and assigns every favorable inference to evidence of the 
successful party that can be reasonably drawn from it. Crown Cork & 
Seal Co., Inc. v. Admiral Beverage Corp., Wyo., 638 P.2d 1272 (1982); Distad v. Cubin, Wyo., 633 P.2d 167 
(1981); Western National Bank of Lovell 
v. Moncur, Wyo., 624 P.2d 765 (1981).

[¶19.]  The law is clear that a broker or agent 
who, with a view to compensation for his services, undertakes to procure 
insurance for another and through fault or neglect fails to do so, will be held 
liable for any damage resulting. His liability arises under the concept that he 
is agent for the insured in negotiating for a policy and owes a duty to his 
principal to exercise reasonable skill, care and diligence in causing the 
issuance of a policy. His liability may arise either for breach of contract or 
negligent default in the performance of a duty imposed by contract, at the 
election of his client. 43 Am.Jur.2d Insurance § 139, pp. 221-222; Annot., 
Liability of Insurance Broker or Agent to Insured for Failure to Procure 
Insurance, 64 A.L.R.3d 398 §§ 2 and 3 in particular; 3 Anderson, Counch on 
Insurance 2d §§ 25:46, 25:47, 25:57-25:60; Arceneaux v. Bellow, La. App., 395 So. 2d 414 (1981), cert. denied 400 So. 2d 669; Sloan v. Wells, 296 N.C. 570, 251 S.E.2d 449 (1979); Keller Lorenz Co., Inc. v. Insurance Associates Corp., 98 
Idaho 678, 570 P.2d 1366 (1977); Insurance Management of Washington, Inc. v. Eno 
& Howard Plumbing Corp., D.C.App., 348 A.2d 310 (1975). This rule was 
incorporated into an instruction to the jury.

[¶20.]  John Hursh is president of appellant, a 
corporation. He is a lawyer but not a licensed insurance agent or broker, though 
he owns a substantial interest in the stock of the corporation. The corporation 
is in the business of selling insurance and real estate for profit. The 
corporation employs a licensed insurance agent to handle the insurance business. 
The testimony of Mr. Hursh was that when he receives telephone calls or is 
otherwise contacted about insurance, he refers the inquirer to the Hursh Agency 
and handles no insurance business himself. At the time of the call from Mrs. 
Barquin on a Saturday, he testified that he followed that practice and advised 
her to go into the office on Monday and give the information to someone there. 
At the time the agency was undergoing reorganization. The new licensed insurance 
agent was hired but temporarily was only available on call by a secretary in the 
office. There is evidence that Mr. Hursh did leave or caused to be left a note 
on a desk in the insurance office that had information supplied to him by Mrs. 
Barquin, but apparently was not noticed by anyone in the office. When Mrs. 
Barquin called the agency on Tuesday morning, the secretary on duty knew nothing 
about an installation floater.

[¶21.]  Mrs. Barquin's testimony about her 
contact with Mr. Hursh was:

"Q. What did you do after 
that?

"A. I said, I knew John, 
maybe I could call him and give him the information and he could take it into 
the office, which is what I did.

"Q. Now by John, you're 
referring to John Hursh?

"A. 
Yes.

"Q. Okay, now tell us as 
precisely as you can what took place?

"A. I called John at home 
and I told him that we'll be moving a house on Monday morning and we have 
forgotten to get the insurances and we are leaving town and would not be back 
and I presumed they were going to move it early Monday morning because they 
usually move them early in the morning. So I gave him the amount that we wanted 
the house insured for and insure ourselves too, we are getting one of these 
modular homes and we might as well insure ourselves at the same time. Insure 
both homes for the same amount of money. Betty went in her bedroom, into her 
file cabinet, and got the forms and gave me the serial numbers which I passed on 
to John on the telephone.

"Q. All right. Now what 
amount of coverage did you request on each of these homes?

"A. I asked $35,000 on 
each of these homes.

"Q. What, if any, was the 
response of Mr. Hursh?

"A. He said he would take 
it into the office on Monday morning. Not to worry, that it would be taken care 
of, that it would be taken into his office Monday morning. We 
left.

"Q. That was the end of 
the conversation?

"A. That was the end of 
the conversation.

"Q. Did you have any 
knowledge as to whether he was taking any notes with respect to this 
information?

"A. Well, I presumed he 
was. I give him the serial numbers off of both houses. I just presumed. He later 
told me he wrote it on the margin of a newspaper.

"Q. And did you tell him 
what type of insurance you were wanting?

"A. Installation floater 
like we had requested for the other two houses.

"Q. Other than the 
conversation wherein Mr. Heckart apparently advised Betty O'Donley that Marian 
Asbell was now in charge of the Hursh Agency insurance, did you have knowledge 
of anybody else that might be involved with Hursh Agency?

"A. Yes, I think he also 
said that Sheila McMillen was working as a secretary 
there.

"Q. Was any attempt made 
with respect to contacting her?

"A. I don't think so at 
that time. Now, I am not really sure, but I knew she wasn't the 
agent.

"Q. You did nothing 
further with respect to obtaining insurance after this telephone call with Mr. 
Hursh?

"A. No, I left 
town."

[¶22.]  The other evidence was that the appellant 
had sold installation coverage on similar modular home installations in the 
November preceding. Not only that, but the appellant sold a similar policy for 
installation of the replacement module for the half destroyed by falling into 
the basement.

[¶23.]  The difficulties in obtaining the 
insurance installation floater were explained by a former insurance agent 
employed by appellant. He testified that, since the agency had no authority to 
issue a policy without permission of the issuing insurance company, sometimes it 
took only a few hours to obtain a binder5 from the insurance underwriter but 
ordinarily it could be procured within 24 hours.

[¶24.]  Disregarding, then, any evidence of the 
appellant to the contrary, there is a reasonable inference that John Hursh, as 
an agent of the appellant, on Saturday entered into an oral contract in 
anticipation of a premium to procure the insurance coverage. Through negligence 
or otherwise, the policy was not bound, though on Monday a binder could have 
been acquired to be in effect on Tuesday morning in order to cover the loss 
Tuesday afternoon. The jury, as the sole judge of the credibility of the 
witnesses, was not required to accept Mr. Hursh's version of the facts. Kahler v. Martin, Wyo., 570 P.2d 720 
(1977). It clearly did not do so.

[¶25.]  The case was submitted to the jury on 
both contract and negligence theories. The jury found a breach of contract and 
negligence by the appellant and apportioned the negligence 67% to appellant and 
33% to appellee. As an alternative, appellant urges that the judgment should be 
for 67% of the loss. The claim is without merit in that the appellee has elected 
to recover on contract which it may do under the rule of liability heretofore 
stated.

II

[¶26.]  Appellant asserts that the court erred in 
excluding evidence of insurance policy exclusions and changes in specifications 
and increased hazards of risk. The policy provisions were a matter of law for 
the court, and, under the undisputed evidence as to the nature of the loss, this 
was included in instruction number 9. The undisputed evidence is also that in 
spite of knowledge of the destruction of the module when the beam collapsed, the 
appellant went ahead and, without question, obtained authority to and did issue 
an installation floater on the replacement module. It will be recalled that the 
evidence was that placement of a beam was a common, accepted practice. Appellant 
presented no evidence to the contrary.

[¶27.]  Furthermore, the questions posed by Mr. 
Hursh were questions which asked his opinion as a lawyer as to the meaning of 
various provisions of the insurance policy and their application to the facts. 
That intruded upon the function of the trial judge as the arbiter of the law of 
the case and the jury as the fact finder. Further, as noted by the trial judge, 
even if Mr. Hursh could be considered an expert, he was not qualified as such 
nor were there any facts in evidence upon which an exclusion could be based. 
There are no specifications of any sort in the record. The policies in evidence 
do not even include the length and width of the modular home 
covered.

III

[¶28.]  It is the position of appellant that the 
trial judge erred in not, sua sponte, directing a mistrial when 
plaintiff-appellee's counsel, during cross-examination of Mr. Hursh, asked a 
leading question disclosing an offer to settle for a specific sum and that the 
trial judge's "cautionary" (corrective) instruction was inadequate. The 
circumstances of the testimony of Mr. Hursh in that regard depict a legally 
inartistic but colorful picture that is most interesting. We disagree that there 
was error.

[¶29.]  On cross-examination, counsel for 
appellee, without objection from appellant's counsel, asked and Mr. Hursh 
answered:

"Q. Isn't it a fact that 
you authorized communication with respect to payment of the plaintiff's claim in 
an amount of at least five thousand?

"A. You mean in order to 
settle this case?

"Q. 
Yes.

"A. Well, we have 
dickered back and forth with you on settlement of this matter from the very 
beginning, and we have made an attempt to try to get around the jury trial here 
and you refused.

"Q. That's right, it 
wasn't a question of you just deciding you were going to go to the jury; was 
it?

"A. No, I think if the 
people can try to get it done at a minimal cost, you should 
try."

[¶30.]  On redirect examination appellant's 
counsel asked, appellee's counsel objected, and the trial judge 
instructed:

"BY MR. 
MILLER:

"Q. Mr. Hursh, Mr. Hooper 
asked you have you ever made an offer to Wigwam Homes in an attempt to resolve 
this matter for less than what they are claiming in this 
lawsuit?

"MR. HOOPER: I object to 
this question. It's improper, irrelevant, and 
immaterial.[!]

"THE COURT: I am going to 
permit him to answer and I will give the jury at the end of the trial a formal 
instruction in this regard:[6] It was highly improper for Mr. 
Hooper to have interrogated Mr. Hursh about offers of settlement. This question 
also is improper, but as much as Mr. Hooper asked the question and Mr. Hursh was 
compeled [sic] to answer, there being no objection, the Court does not interject 
itself to rule upon it. I am going to permit him to answer this question, but I 
am going to instruct you that it's the policy of the law to always encourage 
people who are involved in litigation to use their best means and their best 
conscience and best efforts to settle, even if necessary to do so, they are 
required to compromise their position or compromise their entitlements by reason 
that it is the policy of the law, it's also the law well stated and published 
and all these lawyers know about it, that conversations and offers which are 
made in negotiations in an attempt to settle a dispute are never admitted at a 
trial [sic] or never given to the jury. And one of the reasons that I will 
instruct you to disregard this testimony is because the law does expect that in 
the course of those negotiations parties will compromise their position, that 
they will forego very valid claims and that they will settle for less than they 
are entitled to; and therefore you as a jury gain no information from an offer 
of settlement which would be of any assistance to you in resolving the facts of 
the case. If a party compromises his position in order to get it settled that 
might confuse you but the offer certainly is no suggestion that the person is 
not entitled to more or not entitled to less.

"Go ahead and answer the 
question, Mr. Hursh, and that will end that topic.

"MR. MILLER: Your Honor, 
I will withdraw the question. And that's all I have.

"THE COURT: Very well, 
you are excused, Mr. Hursh."

The appellant's 
counsel did not move for a mistrial or make any objection at that time. An 
instruction given without objection becomes the law of the case. Matter of 
Estate of Mora, Wyo., 611 P.2d 842 (1980); Cox v. Vernieuw, Wyo., 604 P.2d 1353 
(1980); Pure Gas and Chemical Co. v. Cook, Wyo., 526 P.2d 986 (1974). See also, 
Rule 51, W.R.C.P. discussed in Part IV requiring that objections be made before 
the jury retires.

[¶31.]  An instruction may be given at any time 
before or during the taking of evidence. Rule 51, W.R.C.P. However, the same 
rule provides that such an instruction shall be reduced to writing, numbered, 
and delivered to the jury with the other instructions. We have not dealt with a 
failure to separately send such an instruction to the jury in a civil case, but 
we have in a criminal case. Hoskins v. 
State, Wyo., 552 P.2d 342 (1976), cert. denied 430 U.S. 956, 97 S. Ct. 1602, 
51 L. Ed. 2d 806 (1977). Requirements in the trial of criminal cases are usually 
considered more strictly. Rule 31, W.R. Cr.P., adopts by reference Rule 51, W.R. 
C.P., so the same rule appears in both types. In Hoskins it was held that the 
giving of oral instructions, even if contrary to a rule or statute, is not 
reversible error if proper and does not injure a party, especially when taken 
down by the court reporter for the record. The purpose of reducing to writing is 
to give a party the exact language so that he may appropriately object, but 
failure to do so may not be made a weapon of error. State v. Carroll, 52 Wyo. 29, 69 P.2d 542 (1937), cited in Hoskins.

[¶32.]  It was in this instance error for 
testimony of settlement negotiations to ever creep into the evidence. Rule 408, 
W.R.E.7 We are unable to discern from the 
record just what purpose there was in appellee's counsel opening up the subject, 
if it was not to obliquely plant in the jury's mind that here was an admission 
of liability in that $5,000 was a substantial offer. It is argued that the 
purpose of the testimony from appellee's point of view was impeachment. On the 
other hand, what did appellant's counsel have in mind by not objecting when the 
question was first asked? He must have felt that it demonstrated a generous, 
reasonable man and even wanted to expand upon it by going into the matter in 
greater depth, perhaps to show the invalidity of the claim. Either of the 
motives of counsel left the admission of such evidence within the discretion of 
the court. Rule 403, W.R.E.8 While the purposes for which such 
testimony can be admitted perhaps are not exclusive, such testimony does not fit 
within the listed exceptions to prove bias or prejudice, negativing a contention 
of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or 
prosecution (buying off the prosecution or a prosecution 
witness).

[¶33.]  We are satisfied that the trial judge 
exercised his discretion in excluding the evidence and giving a corrective 
instruction which effectively told the jury to disregard the evidence, even 
though appellant's counsel was offered the opportunity to proceed in that 
appellee opened the door, but appellant's counsel withdrew his question as 
futile after the trial judge had, in effect, advised the jury that the evidence 
was irrelevant. Determination of the relevancy9 of evidence rests largely within 
the discretion of the trial court. Canyon 
View Ranch v. Basin Electric Power Corp., Wyo., 628 P.2d 530 (1981), and 
cases therein cited. The advisory committee's (federal) note to Rule 408, also 
observes that the evidence of an offer to compromise is irrelevant since it may 
be motivated by a desire for peace, rather than any concession of weakness. The 
most important purpose of the rule, however, and that mentioned by the trial 
judge in his instruction, is the promotion of dispute 
settlement.

[¶34.]  We must assume that the jury followed the 
court's corrective instruction that the evidence of settlement negotiations was 
irrelevant. Barnette v. Doyle, Wyo., 622 P.2d 1349, 1365 (1981); Madrid v. 
State, Wyo., 592 P.2d 709, 711 (1979). The court's corrective instruction cured 
whatever error occurred by the improper questioning and answer that slipped into 
the record. Elite Cleaners and Tailors, 
Inc. v. Gentry, Wyo., 510 P.2d 784 (1973).

IV

[¶35.]  As a final issue, appellant claims that 
the trial judge erred in excluding the testimony of Mr. Strickler in that it was 
relevant and credible. In order to meet this question, it is necessary to relate 
some of the background.

[¶36.]  The appellee's witnesses, Mr. and Mrs. 
Barquin and Mrs. O'Donley, testified that after Mrs. Barquin talked to Mr. Hursh 
on Saturday, no further effort was made to obtain insurance. Mr. Hursh, to 
counteract that, testified that he had, on the morning of the trial, received a 
telephone call from Robert Strickler, an agent for the Allstate Insurance 
Company, to the effect that he had been contacted after appellant. The trial 
judge overruled an objection that the conversation between Mr. Strickler and Mr. 
Hursh was hearsay subject to further foundation and connection. Counsel for 
appellant did not pursue the matter any further at that point. On 
cross-examination by appellee's counsel, Mr. Hursh went into more detail about 
the contact between Mr. Strickler and him. Mr. Hursh, in response to 
questioning, also advised that Mr. Strickler was available as a 
witness.

[¶37.]  Out of the hearing of the jury the trial 
judge expressed great concern about the representations of Mr. Hursh as to 
various phases of his testimony which the trial judge at that point deemed 
incompetent. The next morning appellant's counsel advised the court that Mr. 
Strickler was available to testify and orally outlined what his testimony would 
be. Appellee's counsel objected on the ground that the offered witness was not 
listed on the pretrial order and further that he had also talked with the 
witness and the time of an inquiry about the insurance was not very definite nor 
could Mr. Strickler identify who from appellee had called.

[¶38.]  In the light of the conflict as to just 
what Mr. Strickler's testimony would be, the trial judge determined that he 
would receive an offer of proof by first hearing his testimony without the jury 
present, as authorized by Rule 103, W.R.E.10 That course was 
pursued.

[¶39.]  On examination Mr. Strickler testified 
how he was in the neighborhood and had observed the house that had fallen into a 
basement. He recalled having a telephone call from Wigwam a day or so before but 
could not exactly identify just who it was that called; but he thought he was a 
salesman for Wigwam. It seemed to him to be someone by the name of "Buck." He 
recalled that the caller wanted insurance to move the modular home from Wigwam 
to "Riverview Road" (the location where the mishap occurred). The trial judge 
decided that the testimony of Mr. Strickler was too indefinite to have probative 
value and was, in fact, speculative. But that is not the end of the 
saga.

[¶40.]  Later on, the day of the Strickler offer 
of proof, there appears in the record transcript a conference telephone call. 
Mr. Strickler had apparently telephoned the court that he now remembered who 
from appellant had talked to him. The trial judge at once got counsel for 
appellant and appellee on the line to hear what Mr. Strickler had to say. It 
turned out to be a man who had worked for appellant some two years before the 
occurrence who had contacted him about automobile insurance. Neither counsel had 
a question for Mr. Strickler. No objection was made by appellant's 
counsel.

[¶41.]  Upon reconvening court, the trial judge 
thereupon gave the following instruction to the jury:

"THE COURT: The Court 
observes that all members of the jury are present, counsel and the parties are 
present.

"To digress a minute, 
ladies and gentlemen of the jury: Over the plaintiff's objections yesterday 
afternoon, Mr. Hursh was permitted to testify regarding factors which the 
defendant considered in denying the plaintiff's claim in January of 1980. He 
testified in part as follows: `We became aware of the fact on Monday after 
Marguerite had called me and I told her that nothing could be done on the 
weekend, that Wigwam had called another insurance agent in Riverton to attempt 
to get insurance for this very house.' "A few questions later, he testified the 
agent's name was Bob Strickler from Allstate and he so advised me of that fact. 
Mr. Strickler's testimony was heard by the Court this morning, out of the 
presence of the jury.

"The Court finds as a 
matter of law that there is no sufficient foundation for Mr. Hursh's statement 
in that regard. There is no competent evidence that the plaintiff sought to get 
insurance from any other agency on or between Saturday, January 12, or the 
following Tuesday, January 15th. The testimony by Mr. Hursh in that regard 
should not have been given. The jury, therefore is instructed to entirely 
disregard that statement and to make or draw no inference or conclusions from it 
whatsoever."

No objection to 
the instruction was made at that time nor at any time thereafter including the 
time the jury was out, returned and reported its verdict, and was discharged. 
Following entry of judgment, appellant moved for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict or in the alternative for a new trial pursuant to Rule 50(b), W.R.C.P. 
It was denied. Included was an objection to the foregoing 
instruction.

[¶42.]  Rule 51, W.R.C.P. provides in pertinent 
part:

"At the close of the 
evidence, or at such earlier time during the trial as the court reasonably 
directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on 
the law as set forth in the requests. Before the argument of the case to the 
jury is begun, the court shall give to the jury such instructions on the law as 
may be necessary and same shall be in writing, numbered and signed by the judge, 
and shall be taken by the jury when it retires. No party may assign as error the giving or 
the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury 
retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he 
objects and the grounds of his objection. Opportunity shall be given to make any 
such objection out of the hearing of the jury. All instructions offered by the 
parties, or given by the court, shall be filed with the clerk and, with the 
endorsements thereon indicating the action of the court, shall be a part of the 
record of the cause." (Emphasis added.)

Appellant's 
objection to the instruction was, therefore, untimely. The instruction became 
the law of the case. We can say the same about this instruction as the one about 
settlement negotiations previously given to the jury and covered in Part III of 
this opinion.

[¶43.]  With respect to the testimony of Mr. 
Strickler, which was excluded by the court, it was clearly not competent to the 
appellant's case and actually would have been only an aid to appellee's position 
in that it would have impeached the testimony of Mr. Hursh. It was not relevant 
to the position of appellant. It had no probative value. Rule 401, W.R.E., supra 
fn. 9. 

[¶44.]  The trial judge in this case, through his 
alertness and initiative, successfully made the trial error free and rescued it 
from any requirement for a new trial.

[¶45.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Following the 
destruction of the module, the appellant, on March 27, 1980, issued an identical 
installation floater to cover the replacement for the period of January 17, 1980 
to February 1, 1980. It was installed on an identical beam without 
incident.

2 Appellant agreed; his 
evidence in describing the policy during the course of the trial was that the 
policy, if issued, would cover all risks except those 
excluded.

3 Appellant relies on the 
following exclusion clause: "4. This Endorsement [Installation Floater] Does Not 
Insure Against: * * * Loss, damage or expense caused by or resulting from error, 
omission or deficiency in design, specifications, workmanship or materials * * 
*."

4 There are some 
exceptions to construction not applicable here, for example, when there are 
ambiguities or uncertainties in the language used in a policy, they must be 
construed strictly against the insurer who drafted the contract. Wilson v. Hawkeye Casualty Co., 67 Wyo. 141, 215 P.2d 867, 
874-875 (1950).

5 A binder is an insurer's 
bare acknowledgement of its contract to protect the insured against casualty 
until a formal policy can be issued. The binder may be oral or written. No 
specific form is required nor does it have to set forth all the terms of the 
insurance contract. Sloan v. Wells, 
supra.

6 The court did not 
further instruct the jury on the offer of settlement at the close of the 
evidence. It either apparently considered this corrective instruction sufficient 
or forgot. No one objected that it was not reduced to a numbered instruction for 
inclusion with the instruction package.

7 Rule 408, W.R.E. 
provides:

"Evidence of (1) 
furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or 
promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to 
compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not 
admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. 
Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise 
not admissible. This rule does not require exclusion when the evidence is 
offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, 
negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a 
criminal investigation or prosecution."

8 Rule 403, W.R.E. 
provides:

"Although relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence."

9 Rule 401, W.R.E. 
provides:

"`Relevant evidence' 
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence."

10 Rule 103, W.R.E. 
provides in pertinent part:

"(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. - Error may 
not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a 
substantial right of the party is affected, and

"(1) Objection. - In case 
the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike 
appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific 
ground was not apparent from the context; or

"(2) Offer of Proof. - In 
case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence was 
made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which 
questions were asked.

"(b) Record of offer and ruling. - The court 
may add any other or further statement which shows the character of the 
evidence, the form in which it was offered, the objection made, and the ruling 
thereon. It may direct the making of an offer in question and answer 
form.

"(c) Hearing of jury. - In jury cases, 
proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent 
inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means, such as 
making statements or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of the 
jury." (Emphasis added.)