Case Title: Patterson v. Coffin, et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 564, 2003

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2004-07-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
ANEITA PATTERSON,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 564, 2003 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
JEAN COFFIN, SHEREE A. MITCHELL, )  C.A. No. 99C-08-190 
DANIEL A. TICE, and DELAWARE  
) 
STATE UNIVERSITY,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Defendants Below, 
 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  June 22, 2004 
Decided:  July 19, 2004 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
O R D E R 
 
This 19th day of July 2004, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs, it 
appears to the Court that: 
 
1. 
Appellant Aneita Patterson has been involved in eight different 
automobile accidents over approximately fifteen years.  This case consolidated her 
claims for damages from three separate automobile accidents: an October 31, 1997 
accident involving Jean Coffin; a January 27, 2000 accident involving Sheree 
Mitchell; and a March 23, 2000 accident involving Delaware State University 
employee Daniel Tice.   
 
2
 
2. 
After a four-day trial in June 2003, a jury returned answers to ten 
questions on a special interrogatory form.  The jury found that the accidents 
involving both Mitchell and Tice, but not Coffin, caused injury to Patterson.  The 
jury was not asked to specify what injuries each accident caused or whether the 
plaintiff suffered a facet fracture, exacerbation of prior chronic back and neck 
problems, myofacial pain with classic trigger points, or any other specific injury.  
The jury awarded Patterson $76,500 and apportioned fault as 2% to Mitchell and 
98% to Tice.  Patterson moved for a new trial on the grounds that the jury awarded 
less than her total alleged special damages of $133,770.60. 
 
3. 
Patterson argues that she presented undisputed medical evidence 
establishing that her accident related injuries, which included spinal fusion surgery, 
lost wages, and permanent physical limitations, were the source of her alleged 
damages.  She claims that her facet fracture was the only injury disputed at trial, 
and when the jury determined that the two accidents caused her injuries, it 
necessarily included a finding that she had suffered a facet fracture as a result.  An 
award of $76,500.00 is, she claims, inadequate as a matter of law, because no 
reasonable jury could award less than the full amount of her special damages of 
$133,770.60.   
 
4. 
Appellees Mitchell and Tice argue that their expert medical testimony 
sufficiently attacked Patterson’s experts to the extent that much of the evidence 
 
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became, in fact, controverted.  According to the record, defendants medical expert 
testified that Patterson’s diagnostic tests precluded a diagnosis of a facet fracture 
due to specific spinal abnormalities.  One expert testified that Patterson’s spinal 
fusion surgery did not relate to any of the accidents in question.   
 
5. 
In addition to disputed testimony about the facet fracture, the record 
reveals that the jury heard a variety of other injury complaints and diagnoses 
stemming from the three accidents by Patterson’s own medical experts.  The jury 
also heard evidence regarding the ongoing effects of injuries suffered by Patterson 
in earlier accidents, unrelated to these accidents involved in the trial.   
 
6. 
In Christina School District v. Reuling, we held that when a plaintiff 
presents uncontroverted medical expert opinion regarding causation of injuries, a 
jury is required to award past lost wages and past medical expenses.1  Reuling, 
however, is distinguishable because the defendants here presented expert medical 
testimony that no existing data could relate Patterson’s surgery to any of the three 
accidents.  Further, the trial judge even noted that Patterson’s own medical experts 
offered conflicting opinions regarding the event(s) and underlying causes that may 
have necessitated her surgery.   
                                                 
1 577 A.2d 752, 1990 WL 72598 (Del. 1990). 
 
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7. 
A new trial should be granted only when the great weight of the 
evidence is against the jury verdict.2  The presumption is that a jury verdict is 
correct.3  We find here that the jury rationally responded to the evidence and made 
its award of damages accordingly.  Although Patterson could have sought specific 
jury determinations about specific injuries caused by any particular or combination 
of accidents, she chose not to do so.  Because the jury was not specifically asked to 
determine whether a particular injury actually occurred, the disputed evidence 
concerning the facet fracture and the later surgery could have reasonably caused 
the jury to find against Patterson on those issues.  We, therefore, cannot find that it 
was against the weight of the evidence for the jury to have found Patterson’s actual 
accident related damages less than her total alleged special damages.   
 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by 
denying Appellant’s Motion for a New Trial. 
  
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court be, and the same hereby is AFFIRMED.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
                                                 
2 Storey v. Camper, 401 A.2d 458, 465 (Del. 1979). 
3 Young v. Frase, 702 A.2d 1234, 1237 (Del. 1997).