Case Title: P. A. Stricklin et al. v. Patrick Henry Hays, Mayor of North Little Rock

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1998-03-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
P.A. STRICKLIN et al. v. Patrick Henry HAYS,
Mayor of North Little Rock

97-721                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered March 19, 1998


1.   Municipal corporations -- construction of ordinances -- rules
     of statutory construction apply. -- The supreme court applies
     the same statutory construction rules to ordinances as it does
     to statutes; in interpreting a statute, the words in the
     statute are given their ordinary meaning and common usage; if
     the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the
     court's analysis need go no further.

2.   Statutes -- construction of -- consistent and uniform
     interpretation important. -- A cardinal rule in dealing with
     a statutory provision is to give it a consistent and uniform
     interpretation so that it is not taken to mean one thing at
     one time and something else at another time.

3.   Municipal corporations -- trial court's interpretation of
     ordinance forced -- ordinance did not contain sunset
     provision. -- Where the text of the initiated ordinance did
     not contain a "sunset provision," whereby the ordinance would
     expire on a certain date, the supreme court was unable to
     agree with the trial court's interpretation that the ordinance
     had lapsed; such an interpretation would have resulted in
     subtle and forced construction for the purpose of limiting or
     extending the meaning of the ordinance.
4.   Municipal corporations -- trial court erred in accepting
     city's interpretation that initiated ordinance had lapsed --
     case reversed and remanded. -- Where the city's interpretation of the ordinance was
     inconsistent with its previous interpretations of the measure, the voters had rejected the
     proposal to repeal the ordinance and parity pay, and since any doubtful interpretation of
     the initiated ordinance had to be resolved in favor of the popular will, the supreme court
     concluded that the trial court erred in accepting the city's interpretation that the initiated
     ordinance had lapsed and that the city no longer had an obligation to provide parity pay
     to the firefighters; the case was reversed and remanded.


     Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court, Seventh Division; John B. Plegge, Judge; reversed and
remanded.
     Lavey & Burnett, by:  John L. Burnett, for appellants.
     Jeannette L. Hamilton, Assistant City Att'y, for appellees. 

     W.H."Dub" Arnold, Chief Justice.
     This case involves a salary dispute between the appellants, P.A. Stricklin and other North
Little Rock firefighters, and the City of North Little Rock, of which appellee Patrick Henry Hays
serves as mayor.  Resolution of this appeal requires our interpretation of an initiated ordinance,
adopted by popular vote in the November 1990 general election, which provides that North Little
Rock firefighters and police officers are to receive salaries and benefits commensurate with Little
Rock firefighters and police officers after considering rank, seniority, time in grade, and service. 
 The trial court found that the initiated ordinance was valid but had lapsed, and thus concluded
that the city no longer had any obligation to provide þparity payþ to the firefighters.  Because we
agree with the firefighters that the trial court erred in interpreting the initiated ordinance, we
reverse and remand.  
     A procedural review of the history of the initiated ordinance is as follows.  On June 18,
1980, an initiative petition was filed in the office of the North Little Rock City Clerkþs office. 
The text of the proposed ordinance read as follows:
     þAN ORDINANCE TO PROVIDE THE NORTH LITTLE ROCK POLICE AND
     FIREMEN WITH SALARIES AND BENEFITS COMMENSURATE WITH THOSE OF
     THE LITTLE ROCK POLICE AND FIREMEN.þ

     BE IT ENACTED BY THE PEOPLE OF THE CITY OF NORTH LITTLE ROCK,
     ARKANSAS:

     SECTION 1.  That the North Little Rock Police and Firemen are to be provided with
     salaries and benefits commensurate with or greater than those of the Little Rock Police
     and Fire Departments, rank, seniority, time in grade and service considered.  

     SECTION 2.  That the number of employees, ranks, and positions within each rank for
     the North Little Rock Police Department and Fire Department shall not be reduced to a
     level below that authorized as of January 1, 1980, except in case of extreme emergency. 

After the citizens of North Little Rock approved this initiated ordinance in the November 1980
election, the city council passed Ordinance No. 5203 on January 5, 1981, adding the following
two sections:
     SECTION 3. That the sum of $700,000 is hereby appropriated from the general fund of
     the City of North Little Rock to fund the provisions of this ordinance.

     SECTION 4. That the present salaries and benefits of the North Little Rock police and
     firemen have caused many of the policemen and firemen in the City to seek higher paying
     jobs leaving a serious shortage of trained police and firemen, therefore an emergency is
     hereby declared to exist and this Ordinance being necessary for the preservation of the
     public peace, health and safety, shall be in full force retroactive to January 2, 1981. 

In December 1981, the city council passed Ordinance No. 5363, which directed the mayor to
negotiate with each department head and assistant department head in the city to establish a
salary.  The ordinance contained a repealer clause, specifically repealing Ordinance No. 5203. 
Thereafter, Police Chief William Younts and his assistant filed suit against the city in Pulaski
County Circuit Court, alleging that the city had considered factors other than rank, seniority, time
in grade, and service in determining their salaries.  The trial court found that the city council had
not complied with Ordinance No. 5203, and that Ordinance No. 5363, purportedly repealing
Ordinance No. 5203, was void.  This court affirmed in Thompson v. Younts, 282 Ark. 524, 669 S.W.2d 471 (1984).
     In 1983, the city council passed Ordinance No. 5494, amending Ordinance No. 5203 to
exclude the Police Chief, Assistant Police Chief, and Fire Chief from the parity-pay obligation.
Later in 1983, the city council referred to the voters Resolution No. 2521, a proposal to repeal
parity pay, and, specifically, Ordinance No. 5203.   At a special election held on February 7,
1984, the voters defeated this proposal.  
     In 1994, the requirements of the parity-pay ordinance were met by an agreement between
the city and the firefightersþ union.  This agreement expired by its own terms on December 31,
1994.  The agreement renewed automatically for one year and expired on December 31, 1995.
After the parties were unable to reach a new agreement, the firefighters filed the present
complaint in Pulaski County Circuit Court on January 15, 1996, claiming that their salaries and
benefits are not commensurate with or greater than those firefighters in Little Rock.  
     The parties agreed to file motions for summary judgment on the issue of the validity of
the initiated ordinance.  The city maintained in its motion that, when it provided the increases
by making the $700,000 appropriation in Ordinance No. 5203 in 1981, it met its obligation under
the initiated ordinance regarding parity pay.  The city further claimed that it had no þcontinuing
obligationþ to provide further parity-pay increases after the increases it provided in January 1981. 

In the firefightersþ motion for summary judgment, they argued that the cityþs interpretation was
inconsistent with its own previous treatment of the ordinance, and that the ordinance contained
no language that parity-pay requirement was a þone-time-onlyþ obligation.  The trial court agreed
with the city and dismissed the firefighters complaint.  The firefighters appeal that decision. 
     We apply the same statutory construction rules to ordinances as we do to statutes.  Tackett
v. Hess, 291 Ark. 239, 723 S.W.2d 833 (1987).  In interpreting a statute, we will give the words
in the statute their ordinary meaning and common usage.  Burcham v. City of Van Buren, 330
Ark. 451, 954 S.W.2d 266 (1997).  If the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, our
analysis need go no further.  Id.
     In reviewing the text of the initiated ordinance in question, we observe that it does not
contain a þsunset provision,þ whereby the ordinance would expire on a certain date.  See Williams
v. State, 325 Ark. 432, 930 S.W.2d 297 (1996).  Were we to agree with the trial courtþs
interpretation that the ordinance has þlapsed,þ we would be þresorting to subtle and forced
construction for the purpose of limiting or extending the meaning.þ  Thompson v. Younts, 282
Ark. at 527, citing City of North Little Rock v. Montgomery, 261 Ark. 16,