Case Title: LATASHA M. BOYER-GLADDEN V. DEPUTY SHERIFF BILL HILL, and DANNY GLICK, Sheriff of Laramie County Wyoming in his Official Capacity

Citation: 2010 WY 12, 224 P.3d 21

Docket Number: 458005

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-02-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Cite as: 2010 WY 12, 224 P.3d 21

OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
LATASHA 
M. BOYER-GLADDEN,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.DEPUTY 
SHERIFF BILL HILL, and DANNY GLICK, Sheriff of Laramie County Wyoming in his 
Official Capacity,Appellees(Defendants).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Peter G. Arnold, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Bernard 
Q. Phelan, The Phelan Law Firm, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee Bill Hill:

Kay 
Lynn Bestol of Sundahl, Powers, Kapp & Martin, LLC, Cheyenne, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee Danny Glick:

Nancy 
D. Freudenthal and Mark Stewart of Davis & Cannon, LLP, Cheyenne, Wyoming; 
and Bruce A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy 
Attorney General; Theodore R. Racines, Senior Assistant Attorney General.  Argument by Ms. Freudenthal and Mr. 
Racines.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

VOIGT, 
C.J., 
delivers the opinion of the Court; KITE, 
J., files 
a specially concurring opinion in which BURKE, 
J., joins.

 
 
VOIGT, 
Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      The appellant 
claims that, while she was a pretrial detainee in the Laramie County Detention 
Facility, she was sexually assaulted by a detention deputy.  She sued both the deputy and the sheriff 
who employed him, alleging assault and battery, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, negligent failure of the sheriff to supervise the deputy, 
and deprivation of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003).   She now appeals from the district 
court orders granting summary judgment both to the deputy and to the sheriff on 
all causes of action.

 
 
[¶2]      We affirm in part 
and reverse in part.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶3]      The parties' 
disjunctive identification of the appellate issues in their respective briefs 
not being conducive to structured analysis, we will restate the issues as 
follows:

 
 
            
1.   Did the district 
court appropriately grant summary judgment against the appellant on the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act claim?

 
 
            
2.   Did the district 
court appropriately grant summary judgment to the deputy on the state law tort 
claims?

 
 
            
3.   Did the district 
court appropriately grant summary judgment to the deputy on the federal civil 
rights claim?

 
 
            
4.   Did the district 
court appropriately grant summary judgment to the sheriff on the state law tort 
claims?

 
 
            
5.   Did the district 
court appropriately grant summary judgment to the sheriff on the federal civil 
rights claim?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶4]      
The 
undisputed material facts relevant to this appeal are not many.  On November 9, 2004, the appellant was a 
pretrial detainee incarcerated in the Laramie County Detention Facility.  While she was mopping the floors in the 
"pod" that evening, she was sexually assaulted by a detention deputy.1  Upon learning about the sexual assault, 
the sheriff suspended, and then terminated, the deputy's employment on the 
ground that sexual contact between inmates and detention deputies violated the 
policies of the sheriff's office. 

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶5]                  
Summary judgments are governed by W.R.C.P. 56(c):

 
 
The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.

 
 
            
A district court's summary judgment ruling is reviewed de novo, using the same materials and 
following the same standards as the district court.  The evidence is considered from the 
vantage point most favorable to the party opposing the motion, and we give that 
party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly be drawn from the 
record.

 
 
            
The summary judgment movant bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case for summary judgment by 
showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that judgment should 
be granted as a matter of law.  He 
must present admissible evidence to meet his burden.

 
 
            
If the party seeking summary judgment carries his burden, the opposing 
party must present specific facts to demonstrate a genuine issue of material 
fact exists. . . .

 
 
            
After a movant has adequately supported the motion for summary judgment, 
the opposing party must come forward with competent evidence admissible at trial 
showing there are genuine issues of material fact.  The opposing party must affirmatively 
set forth material, specific facts in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment, and cannot rely only upon allegations and pleadings[], and conclusory 
statements or mere opinions are insufficient to satisfy the opposing party's 
burden.

 
 
            
The evidence opposing a prima facie case on a motion for summary judgment 
must be competent and admissible, lest the rule permitting summary judgments be 
entirely eviscerated by plaintiff's proceeding to trial on the basis of mere 
conjecture or wishful speculation.  
Speculation, conjecture, the suggestion of a possibility, guesses, or 
even probability, are insufficient to establish an issue of material 
fact.

 
 

Alloway 
v. RT Capital, Inc., 
2008 WY 123, ¶¶ 5-8, 193 P.3d 713, 715-16 (Wyo. 2008) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted).  In 
reviewing the grant of a summary judgment, we do not defer to the district court 
as to issues of law.  Luhm v. Bd. of Trs. of Hot Springs County 
Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2009 WY 63, ¶ 7, 206 P.3d 1290, 1294 (Wyo. 2009).  We may affirm a grant of summary 
judgment on any proper legal basis supported by the record.  Id.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Did 
the district court appropriately grant summary judgment against the appellant on 
the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act claim?

 
 
[¶6]      The Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act (WGCA) provides at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-112 
(LexisNexis 2009) that "[a] governmental entity is liable for damages resulting 
from tortious conduct of peace officers while acting within the scope of their 
duties."  A detention deputy is a 
peace officer under the WGCA.  Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-39-103(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2009); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-2-101(a)(iv)(H) (LexisNexis 2009).  
To proceed under the WGCA, a claimant must present his or her claim to 
the governmental entity within two years of the alleged act, error or 
omission.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-39-113(a) (LexisNexis 2009).  Of 
particular importance in the instant case is the additional statutory mandate 
that an action against a governmental entity is forever barred unless it 
is "commenced" within one year after the date the claim was presented to 
the governmental entity.  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-39-114 (LexisNexis 2009).  
W.R.C.P. 3(b) defines "commenced" in the context of a statute of 
limitations:

 
 

            
(b)  When commenced.  For purposes of 
statutes of limitation, an action shall be deemed commenced on the date of 
filing the complaint as to each defendant, if service is made on the defendant 
or on a co-defendant who is a joint contractor or otherwise united in interest 
with the defendant, within 60 days after the filing of the complaint.  If 
such service is not made within 60 days that action shall be deemed commenced on 
the date when service is made. 
. . .

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)

 
 
[¶7]      The sexual 
assault occurred on November 9, 2004.  
The appellant's claim was presented to Laramie County on June 15, 2006, 
well within the two-year period mandated by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113(a).2  The appellant filed her complaint in 
district court on December 22, 2006.  It is significant that, while this filing 
occurred within the one-year limitation period of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-114, 
the deputy was not served with a copy of the complaint until October 5, 
2007.  Consequently, pursuant to 
W.R.C.P. 3(b), the suit was not "commenced" until that date, which was outside 
the one-year statutory period.  As a 
result, the appellant's state law tort claims against the deputy under the WGCA 
are time-barred, and the district court must be affirmed in that regard.3  The appellant conceded as much 
below.

 
 
Did 
the district court appropriately grant summary judgment to the deputy on the 
state law tort claims?

 
 
[¶8]       The 
appellant contends vigorously on appeal that, even if dismissal of the state law 
tort claims under the WGCA was appropriate, those claims should survive as 
personal claims against the deputy.4  Indeed, relying upon Milton v. Mitchell, 762 P.2d 372, 376-78 
(Wyo. 1988), the district court initially denied the deputy's motion for summary 
judgment on this issue on the ground that sexual assault was outside the 
deputy's "scope of duties."  The 
relevant holding of Milton is that 
the WGCA and its statute of limitations apply only to allegations of conduct 
within the "scope of duties," as opposed to allegations of conduct within the 
"scope of employment."  Id. at 378.  After the publication of Krenning v. Heart Mountain Irrigation 
District, 2009 WY 11, 200 P.3d 774 (Wyo. 2009), however, the district court 
reconsidered and granted the summary judgment motion.  The district court found that, as in Krenning, the appellant in the instant 
case "has consistently pled and argued that [the deputy] was acting within the 
course and scope of his duties," and that the WGCA and its statute of 
limitations were applicable.  Having 
reviewed the complaint filed in this matter, we find the latter conclusion of 
the district court to be correct as it applies to the only state law tort claim 
appealed, that being the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
and we affirm the granting of summary judgment to the deputy.5  That allegation was pled against the 
deputy as a WGCA claim"while on duty as a detention officer"and the statute of 
limitations governing WGCA actions was correctly applied.  When a claim is pled under the WGCA, we 
will not speculate that the appellant also intended to plead a separate tort 
claim against the governmental employee.  
See Krenning, 2009 WY 11, 
¶¶ 30-31, 200 P.3d  at 783; Watts v. 
Holmes, 386 P.2d 718, 719 (Wyo. 1963); W.R.C.P. 8(a), 
(e).

 
 
Did 
the district court appropriately grant summary judgment to the deputy on the 
federal civil rights claim?

 
 
[¶9]      The district 
court's resolution of this issue, and this Court's reversal of that resolution, 
are best understood if placed within the context of the applicable law.  In the restricted sense of a "civil 
rights action" such as the one at hand, a "civil right" is the "enjoyment of 
such guarantees as are contained in constitutional or statutory law, such as the 
. . . guarantees found in particular amendments to the United States 
Constitution . . . ."  15 Am. Jur. 
2d Civil Rights § 1 (2000).  Adopted after the Civil War to enforce 
equality for former slaves, the Fourteenth Amendment has become the source of 
many civil rights and their protection, especially against infringement by the 
states.  Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment provides as follows:

 
 
            
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside.  No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

 
 
[¶10]   Section 5 gives Congress the 
authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment "by appropriate legislation."  Actions such as the present one have 
come to be called "1983 actions" because their foundation is in 42 U.S.C.A. § 
1983 (2003):

 
 

Every 
person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, 
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for 
redress, 
except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or 
omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not 
be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was 
unavailable.  For the purposes of 
this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of 
Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of 
Columbia.

 
 
(Emphasis 
added.)  

 
 
[¶11]   The purpose of § 1983 is "to deter 
state actors from using the badge of 
their authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights' and 
to provide related relief."  Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 
403, 117 S. Ct. 2100, 2103, 138 L. Ed. 2d 540 (1997) (emphasis in original) 
(quoting Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 
161, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 1830, 118 L. Ed. 2d 504 (1992)).  42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 is not, itself, a 
source of substantive rights; rather, it provides for the enforcement of rights 
elsewhere conferred.  Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 278, 105 S. Ct. 1938, 1948, 85 L. Ed. 2d 254 (1985).  
"To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of 
a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show 
that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of 
state law."  West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 2254-55, 101 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1988).

 
 
[¶12]   The concept of action performed 
"under color of state law" must not be confused with the question of whether a 
defendant is being sued in his "personal capacity" or in his "official 
capacity."  The latter distinction 
was described in Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 S. Ct. 358, 361-62, 116 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1991) as 
follows:

 
 
            
In Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 87 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1985), the Court sought to eliminate 
lingering confusion about the distinction between personal- and 
official-capacity suits.  We 
emphasized that official-capacity suits "generally represent only another way 
of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.'"  Id., at 165, 105 S.Ct., at 3104 (quoting 
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social 
Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690n. 55, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2035, n. 55, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978)).  Suits against state 
officials in their official capacity therefore should be treated as suits 
against the State.  473 U.S., at 
166, 105 S.Ct., at 3105.  Indeed, 
when officials sued in this capacity in federal court die or leave office, their 
successors automatically assume their roles in the litigation.  See Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 25(d)(1); 
Fed.Rule App.Proc. 43(c)(1); this Court's Rule 35.3.  Because the real party in interest in an 
official-capacity suit is the governmental entity and not the named official, 
"the entity's policy or custom' must have played a part in the violation of 
federal law."  Graham, supra, at 166, 105 S.Ct., at 
3105 (quoting Monell, supra, 436 U.S., at 694, 98 S.Ct., at 
2037).  For the same reason, the 
only immunities available to the defendant in an official-capacity action are 
those that the governmental entity possesses.  473 U.S., at 167, 105 S.Ct., at 
3105.

 
 
            
Personal-capacity suits, on the other hand, seek to impose individual 
liability upon a government officer for actions taken under color of state 
law.  Thus, "[o]n the merits, to 
establish personal liability in a § 
1983 action, it is enough to show that the official, acting under color of state 
law, caused the deprivation of a federal right."  Id., at 166, 105 S.Ct., at 3105.  While the plaintiff in a 
personal-capacity suit need not establish a connection to governmental "policy 
or custom," officials sued in their personal capacities, unlike those sued in 
their official capacities, may assert personal immunity defenses such as 
objectively reasonable reliance on existing law.  Id., at 166-67, 105 S.Ct., at 
3105-3106.

 
 
(Emphasis 
in original.)

 
 
[¶13]   It goes without saying that the 
distinction between an official-capacity § 1983 action and a personal-capacity § 
1983 action is significant.  
Questions of both potential immunity and potential liability are answered 
by reference to the nature of the allegations in that regard.  Id. at 24-31, 112 S. Ct.  at 361-65.6  Although the United States Supreme Court 
has not directly addressed the question of the degree of specificity required 
when pleading personal-capacity and official-capacity actions under § 1983, it 
has indicated its preference for specificity, to avoid ambiguity.  Id. at 24, 112 S. Ct.  at 
361.

 
 
[¶14]   This last observation leads 
naturally to a discussion of the appellant's § 1983 claim in the instant 
case.  The ambiguity of the claim 
left both the deputy's trial attorney and the district court unsure as to 
whether a § 1983 claim was even being made against the deputy.  The district court eventually decided 
that, if such a claim was being made, it was being made against the deputy in 
his official capacity.  Finding no 
evidence of a county or sheriff's office custom or policy playing any part in 
the deputy's transgression, the district court granted the deputy's motion for 
summary judgment on the § 1983 claim.

 
 
[¶15]   We find that we must disagree with 
the district court on this one issue.  
The fact that the appellant's WGCA and state law tort claims are 
presented as violations occurring within the scope of the deputy's dutiesno 
doubt to fit within the WGCAdoes not automatically equate to an allegation 
under § 1983 that the deputy was acting in his official capacity.  In fact, a close reading of the 
complaint's fourth cause of action strongly suggests that the appellant intended 
to raise an official-capacity claim against the sheriff, and a personal-capacity 
claim against the deputy.  Under 
that cause of action, the appellant alleges that the sheriff acted in his 
official capacity, but does not allege that the deputy did so.  Instead, the complaint alleges only that 
the deputy's actions were "accomplished under color of State law," which is the 
language the United States Supreme Court has said is sufficient to state a 
personal-capacity claim under § 1983.  
Hafer, 502 U.S.  at 25, 112 S. Ct.  at 362; West, 487 U.S.  at 48, 
108 S. Ct.  at 2254-55.  Further, the 
appellant also alleges that the sheriff "is the authority responsible for making 
official policy," which phrase rings of an official-capacity suit, while the 
allegation against the deputy says nothing about policy.  The "icing on the cake," perhaps, is 
that, in the complaint's caption, the sheriff is named as a defendant in his 
official capacity, while the deputy is not.

 
 
[¶16]   We conclude that the § 1983 claim 
against the deputy was made in his personal capacity, rather than in his 
official capacity. Therefore, the summary judgment granted to the deputy on the 
claim must be reversed because it was based upon the district court's conclusion 
that there was no evidence the deputy had violated a custom or policy of the 
county or the sheriff's office.  Such evidence is not required to show a 
personal-capacity violation of § 1983.

 
 
Did 
the district court appropriately grant summary judgment to the sheriff on the 
state law tort claims?

 
 
[¶17]   It is somewhat difficult, with any 
assurance of accuracy, to identify from the complaint what state law tort claims 
the appellant intended to allege against the sheriff.  Assault and battery, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, are apparently intended to target both the 
deputy and the sheriff, while "failure to control detention officer," is 
obviously "aimed" at the sheriff.  
The summary judgment as to assault and battery was not appealed, so we 
will ignore that cause of action.  
As to intentional infliction of emotional distress, the complaint alleges 
that the deputy acted "while on duty as a detention officer in [sic] behalf of 
the Sheriff . . . ."  Such language 
suggests a respondeat superior theory 
of liability, if it is meant to be an accusation against the 
sheriff.

 
 
[¶18]   The third cause of actionfailure 
to control detention deputyis confusing in and of itself, although it is 
no doubt directed at the sheriff.  
After citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-603 (LexisNexis 2009), the 
complaint alleges the deputy's intentional sexual assault of the appellant "in 
the course of employment through the use of the power and authority given him as 
a detention officer of the Sheriff."7  Once again, this suggests liability on 
the part of the sheriff under a theory of respondeat superior, but it is unclear 
that such was intended.  The 
following paragraph, under the same cause of action, alleges that "[t]he Sheriff 
negligently failed to exercise reasonable care so as to control [the deputy] to 
prevent him from intentionally harming [the appellant] . . . ."  This direct allegation of negligence 
against the sheriff sets forth claims of negligent hiring, negligent rulemaking, 
and negligent supervision.

 
 
[¶19]   In her appellate brief, the 
appellant clarifies her allegations against the sheriff as follows:  "The [appellant] also sued the Sheriff 
in his official capacity based on state law claims, assault and battery, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of duty to keep the 
jail and prisoners safe pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 18-3-603(a)."  Her argument is that the cited statute 
creates a nondelegable duty on the part of the sheriff to care for prisoners, 
and that such duty cannot be escaped by asserting that the act of the detention 
deputy was not authorized by the sheriff.  
She relies upon Restatement 
(Second) of Agency § 214 (1958), Restatement (Second) of Torts § 424 
(1965); McLean v. Hyland Enters., 
Inc., 2001 WY 111, ¶ 25, 34 P.3d 1262, 1269 (Wyo. 2001) (employee 
termination); Abeyta v. Hensley, 595 P.2d 71, 73 (Wyo. 1979) (coemployee negligence); and Engen v. Rambler Copper & Platinum 
Co., 20 Wyo. 95, 121 P. 867, 874 (1912) (master's duty of care to 
servant).

 
 

[¶20]   The district court granted summary 
judgment to the sheriff on the state law tort claims, after a complex analysis 
of nondelegable duty, statutory construction, and strict liability.  We will affirm the summary judgment, but 
upon slightly different grounds.  
If 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-603 created a nondelegable duty on the part of the 
sheriff to care for prisoners, a question we need not answer, such was impliedly 
repealed by the much-later enacted WGCA.  
While we have repeatedly stated the general rule that statutory repeals 
by implication are not favored, we have also repeatedly stated just as firmly 
that where "the later statute is so repugnant to the earlier one that the two 
cannot logically stand together, or that the whole subject of the earlier 
statute is covered by the later one having the same object, clearly intending to 
prescribe the only rules applicable to the subject[,]" the former statute has 
been repealed.  Mathewson v. City of Cheyenne, 2003 WY 
10, ¶ 11, 61 P.3d 1229, 1233 (Wyo. 2003); see also Shumway v. Worthey, 2001 WY 
130, ¶ 15, 37 P.3d 361, 367 (Wyo. 2001); Longacre v. State, 448 P.2d 832, 833 
(Wyo. 1968); Doyle v. Schroeder, 76 
Wyo. 178, 301 P.2d 379, 380 (1956); and State v. Cantrell, 64 Wyo. 132, 186 P.2d 539, 542 (1947).  Specifically, we 
have applied this latter concept to statutes impliedly repealed by enactment of 
the WGCA.  See Emulsified Asphalt, Inc. of Wyo. v. 
Transp. Comm'n of Wyo., 970 P.2d 858, 859, 863-64 (Wyo. 1998) (later general 
statute intended to address entire subject of sovereign immunity repealed 
earlier specific statute).

 
 
[¶21]   The WGCA, at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-39-102 (LexisNexis 2009), clearly evinces the legislature's intent that the 
WGCA "cover the field" of sovereign immunity and liability.  And under the WGCA, immunity is the rule 
and liability the exception, for both the governmental entity and its public 
employee.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-39-104 (LexisNexis 2009); Hurst v. 
State, 698 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Wyo. 1985).  More specifically to the issues at hand, 
liability for the tortious conduct of peace officers may only be imposed for 
conduct "while acting within the scope of their duties."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-112.  In the instant case, not only is there 
no evidence that sexual assault of inmates was within the scope of the deputy's 
duties, it would be absurd to even suggest such a thing.  Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d 1337, 1345 
(Wyo. 1997) (sexual misconduct never within the scope of any public officer's 
duties).  Beyond that, there is no 
evidence in the record that the sheriff, within the scope of his own duties, 
negligently hired or supervised the deputy, or failed to enact reasonable rules 
for the protection of inmates.  In 
fact, the only evidence in regard to these accusations was that sexual contact 
between detention deputies and inmates violated the rules of the sheriff's 
office, that the deputy had been trained underthose rules, that the 
sheriff had no knowledge of the deputy's conduct until after the fact, and that 
the sheriff immediately suspended and then terminated the deputy's 
employment.

 
 
[¶22]   In summary, neither the sheriff nor 
the county is liable for the tortious conduct of the deputy because that conduct 
did not occur within the deputy's scope of duties, and neither the sheriff nor 
the county is liable for the conduct of the sheriff, even though within the 
scope of his duties, because his conduct was not tortious.

 
 
Did 
the district court appropriately grant summary judgment to the sheriff on the 
federal civil rights claim?

 
 
[¶23]   The appellant's § 1983 action 
against the sheriff is an action against the sheriff in his official 
capacity.  As stated earlier herein, 
such an action is treated as a suit against the county, and it requires proof 
that a policy or custom of the governmental entity played a part in the 
violation of law.  See supra ¶ 12, Hafer, 502 U.S.  at 25, 112 S. Ct.  at 
361-62.  Stated otherwise, a 
governmental entity "cannot be held liable solely because it employs a 
tortfeasoror in other words . . . on a respondeat superior theory."  Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City 
of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1978) 
(emphasis in original).  In more 
detail, the law is as follows:

 
 
            
We conclude, therefore, that a local government may not be sued under § 
1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.  Instead, it is when execution of a 
government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose 
edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the 
injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 
1983.

 
 

Id. 
at 436 U.S.  at 694, 98 S. Ct.  at 2037-38.  
As the law has been further refined, a governmental entity may only be 
liable under § 1983 in quite particular circumstances:

 
 
            
As our § 1983 municipal liability jurisprudence illustrates, however, it 
is not enough for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly 
attributable to the municipality.  
The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was 
the "moving force" behind the injury alleged.  That is, a plaintiff must show that the 
municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must 
demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the 
deprivation of federal rights.

 
 

Bd. 
of County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 
520 U.S. 397, 404, 117 S. Ct. 1382, 1388, 137 L. Ed. 2d 626 (1997) (emphasis in 
original).

 
 
[¶24]   It is redundant at this point for 
us to repeat the fact that no policy or custom of the county or the sheriff has 
been shown to have played any role in the deputy's conduct, except insofar as it 
has been shown that the deputy was violating a sheriff's office policy by his 
conduct.  The appellant's reliance 
upon Skurtenis v. Jones, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1238-39 (N.D. Ala. 1999), aff'd in 
part and reversed in part, 236 F.3d 678 (11th Cir. 2000), is misplaced.  In that case, the court found that a 
sheriff could not immunize himself from § 1983 liability by arguing that a 
strip-search policy was not his own policy, but that of a jail contractor.  Liability was based upon a policy that 
was, in effect, the sheriff's.  That 
is not the case here, where no policy is involved.

 
 
[¶25]   We will affirm the grant of summary 
judgment to the sheriff on the civil rights claim.  The sheriff was sued in his official 
capacity, and there is no evidence that a custom or policy of the county or of 
the sheriff played any part in the alleged violation of the appellant's civil 
rights.

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶26]   The 
district court appropriately granted summary judgment against the appellant on 
her claims under the WGCA because the Act's statute of limitations had run 
before the suit was commenced, which was conceded by the appellant.  The district court also appropriately 
granted summary judgment in favor of the deputy on the state law tort claims 
because (1) the appellant conceded that the statute of limitations had run on 
the assault and battery claim, and (2) both state law tort claims against the 
deputy were made under the WGCA, and were time barred by its statute of 
limitations.  The summary judgment 
granted in favor of the deputy on the § 1983 action must be reversed because the 
cause of action was sufficiently stated against the deputy in his personal 
capacity, and was not intended to be an official-capacity action as was 
concluded by the district court.  
Summary judgment in favor of the sheriff was appropriate on the cause of 
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, because the WGCA does 
not make the sheriff liable for the deputy's conduct outside the scope of the 
deputy's duties.  Summary judgment 
in favor of the sheriff was appropriate on the cause of action for negligent 
breach of duty of care by the sheriff because there was no evidence presented 
that the sheriff was in any way negligent in hiring, training, or supervising 
the deputy.  Finally, the district 
court appropriately granted summary judgment on the official-capacity § 1983 
action against the sheriff because no evidence was presented that any policy or 
custom of the sheriff or the county played a role in the alleged violation of 
the appellant's civil rights.

 
 
[¶27]   We affirm the ruling of the 
district court, with the exception of the summary judgment granted to the deputy 
on the § 1983 personal-capacity action, and we remand to the district court for 
further proceedings consistent with such ruling.

 
 
KITE, 
J., specially concurring, in which BURKE, J., 
joins.

 
 

[¶28]   I concur with the majority opinion, 
but write separately to address an issue raised by footnote 3.  While the parties addressed the issue of 
whether the allegations in the complaint complied with this Court's 
jurisprudence, no argument was presented concerning whether failure to comply 
with the statute of limitations contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-114 
(LexisNexis 2009) deprives the court of jurisdiction.  In Bell 
v. Schell, 
2004 WY 153, ¶ 11, 101 P.3d 465, 468-69 (Wyo. 2004), 
we set forth the analysis that should apply in determining that issue, but left 
it for another day.  While it could 
be argued that the issue was determined in Lankford 
v. City of Laramie, 
2004 WY 143, ¶ 22, 100 P.3d 1238, 1244 (Wyo. 2004) and Mountain 
View/Evergreen Improv. & Serv. Dist. v. Brooks Water & Sewer Dist., 
896 P.2d 1355, 1363 (Wyo. 1995), I would prefer to do so explicitly and after 
performing the analysis set forth in Bell. That is unnecessary, of course, in 
this case because there is no dispute that the plaintiff's claim is barred by 
her failure to file her complaint within one year of the filing of her claim as 
provided in § 1-39-114.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
deputy admits the sexual contact, but not that it was a sexual assault.  The distinction is mainly irrelevant, 
inasmuch as the policies of the sheriff's office forbid sexual contact between 
inmates and detention officers, whether consensual or not.

 
 

2This 
is the date of presentment alleged in the complaint.  In his answer to the complaint, the 
sheriff admitted receiving a notice of claim dated May 26, 2006.  No notice of claim is attached to the 
complaint, or appears anywhere in the record, so we are left to presume that the 
two references are to the same document.  
The sheriff does not indicate the date that he received the notice of 
claim, so we treat as true the allegation of the complaint that the claim was 
presented on June 15, 2006.  We also 
note that Laramie County, whose liability the appellant is attempting to 
establish by filing a WGCA action, is not named as a defendant.  Because we resolve the claim on other 
grounds, we will not consider that factor.

 
 

3Our 
conclusion that the appellant was time-barred from filing her WGCA complaint 
negates any need for the Court to explore the appellees' alternative theory that 
the allegations of the complaint in regard to the claim were inadequate under McCann v. City of Cody, 2009 WY 86, 210 P.3d 1078 (Wyo. 2009).  See Lankford v. City of Laramie, 2004 WY 
143, ¶¶ 23-24, 100 P.3d 1238, 1244 (Wyo. 2004); and Mountain View/Evergreen 
Improvement & Serv. Dist. v. Brooks Water & Sewer Dist., 896 P.2d 1355, 1363 (Wyo. 1995).

 
 

4The 
two state law tort claims made against the deputy in the appellant's complaint 
were (1) assault and battery, and (2) intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.  In her brief, the 
appellant concedes that "the one year statute of limitation for a civil action 
for Battery' had expired at the time the complaint was filed and [she] does not 
appeal the [district] court's dismissal of Count One."  Apparently, this concession is based 
upon the one-year statute of limitation for assault or battery found in Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. 1-3-105(a)(v)(B) (LexisNexis 2009).  We will recognize and honor this 
concession, despite the fact that the allegation of the complaint was that the 
deputy "did unlawfully and intentionally assault and batter plaintiff by 
subjecting her to sexual intrusion," and the one-year period of limitation found 
in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-105(a)(v)(B) excepts sexual assault.  In any event, the only state law tort 
claim now at issue is the allegation of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress.

 
 

5Neither 
this case nor Krenning should be read 
as an attempt to define what conduct is, or is not, within the "scope of duties" 
as opposed to within the "scope of employment" as those concepts are discussed 
in Milton.  In regard to the present issue, both 
this case and Krenning are concerned 
with what was pled, rather than what was done.  In the instant case, for example, the 
complaint alleges that the deputy "was then employed and acting as a detention 
officer," that the deputy acted "while on duty as a detention officer," that the 
deputy "act[ed] in a position of authority and threaten[ed] official 
punishment," and that the deputy acted "in the course of employment through the 
use of the power and authority given him as a detention 
officer."

 
 

6This 
impact on liability and immunity issues exists not just in the § 1983 action, 
but in underlying state tort claims.  
See Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d 1337, 1344 (Wyo. 1997).

 
 

7Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 18-3-603(a) reads in pertinent part as 
follows: