Case Title: NELSON BY NELSON v. Dibble

Citation: 353 Pa. Super. 537, 510 A.2d 792

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1986-05-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
353 Pa. Superior Ct. 537 (1986) 510 A.2d 792 William L. NELSON by Orrie L. NELSON as His Attorney-In-Fact and Orrie L. Nelson v. John DIBBLE, Individually and d/b/a John "Jack" Dibble Tree Service, Appellant. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued April 30, 1986. Filed May 29, 1986. *538 Frank L. Kroto, Jr., Erie, for appellant. Edward J. Lucht, Erie, for appellee. Before DEL SOLE, MONTEMURO and POPOVICH, JJ. POPOVICH, Judge: This is an appeal from a final decree of the trial court which granted injunctive relief and declaratory judgment to appellees-plaintiffs, the Nelsons.[1] We must reverse and remand the matter for the reasons herein stated. The record establishes the following set of facts: In April, 1984, one of the appellees, Orrie L. Nelson, filed a complaint in equity seeking to enjoin a neighbor, appellant-defendant, John Dibble, from blocking appellees' use of a certain adjoining roadway. The trial court discharged a Rule to Show Cause why the injunction should not be issued because Orrie L. Nelson lacked standing to bring the lawsuit since he was not the owner of the property. An amended complaint was filed after William Nelson executed a document which gave Orrie Nelson, his father, a power of attorney and a life estate in the subject property. Subsequently, a hearing was held and the trial court issued the following verbal order, which was later reduced to writing: This appeal eventually followed. Appellant frames the issue in the following manner: Whether the trial court erred in granting a preliminary injunction declaring the existence of either a prescriptive easement or an easement by necessity (1) where all the owners of the servient tenements were not parties to the court action, (2) where the road involved is a once declared public road which was owned by the township and which *540 has not been vacated formally, and (3) where the owner of the dominant tenement has other access to his property. At the outset, we recognize the applicable standard of review which governs this case: Valley Forge Historical Society v. Washington Memorial Chapel, 330 Pa.Super. 494, 501, 479 A.2d 1011, 1015 (1984), petition for allowance of appeal denied, October 15, 1984. In this case, because the trial court's conclusions of law were in error and because the record is incomplete, we must reverse and remand the matter for further proceedings. The court stated as its first legal conclusion that "whether we call this Lavery Lane vacated or abandoned, it is my opinion, at this point at least, that that is a difference without any real distinction. It is now no longer maintained or claimed by the township." Notes of Testimony at p. 64. This conclusion was in error because the principle is well-recognized that a "claim of title by adverse possession does not lie against Commonwealth property." Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. J.W. Bishop & Co., 497 Pa. 58, 62, 439 A.2d 101, 103 (1981). Similarly, our Courts have held that local governments have immunity from a *541 claim of adverse possession when the land in question is devoted to public use. Zlotucha v. Cziebowicz, 275 Pa.Super. 205, 418 A.2d 684 (1980); Torch v. Constantino, 227 Pa.Super. 427, 323 A.2d 278 (1974). Additionally, our Supreme Court has commented as follows: Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. J.W. Bishop & Co., 497 Pa. at 62, 439 A.2d at 103. (Footnote omitted). Accord (Art. 3, § 32, "The General Assembly shall pass no local or special law in any case which has been or can be provided for by general law and specifically the General Assembly shall not pass any local or special law:. . . 2. Vacating roads, town plats, streets or alleys. . . .). The rationale for a rule which intends to favor the public interest over private interests has been set forth by the United States Supreme Court: Commonwealth, Department of Transportation v. J.W. Bishop & Co., 497 Pa. at 64, 439 A.2d at 103 (quoting United *542 States v. State of California, 332 U.S. 19, 39-40, 67 S. Ct. 1658, 1669, 91 L. Ed. 1889, 1900 (1947)). On this present state of the record, we must remand because the outcome of appellees' adverse possession claim is linked inextricably with whether title to the subject property is vested in Greene Township. On remand, the trial court should also grant a hearing on whether certain indispensable parties, i.e., adjoining property owners, should be joined. There is no question in this case that Greene Township could be an indispensable party to this action because appellees' claim of adverse possession, if granted, could directly affect the interests of Greene Township. We have outlined the requirements for an indispensable party in the following manner: *543 Borough of Wilkinsburg v. Horner, 88 Pa.Cmwlth. 594, 596, 490 A.2d 964, 965 (1985). If title was at one time vested in Greene Township, then the Court of Common Pleas was without jurisdiction to grant the preliminary injunction. Id. The trial court concluded that the issue of whether Greene Township should have been joined was waived because the appellant waited until the trial to raise the issue. We, however, are unable to agree with this waiver theory because the failure to join an indispensable party deprives a court of jurisdiction. Barren v. Dubas, 295 Pa.Super. 443, 441 A.2d 1315 (1982). Additionally, we have said that "when there is a dispute as to the existence of an easement, all owners of servient tenements have a material interest in the controversy and should be joined as defendants, even though such an owner may have had no part in the interference with, or obstruction of, the alleged easement." Id., 295 Pa.Superior Ct. at 446, 441 A.2d at 1316. The matter is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction is relinquished. [1] The appellees-plaintiffs are a father, Orrie L. Nelson, and a son, William L. Nelson.