Case Title: O NEIL v LIPINSKI

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1977-07-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13313 IN TEE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1977 LAWRENCE E. O'NEIL, CHARLES H. O'NEIL and WYNONA M. O'NEIL, Plaintiffs and Respondents, JOHN 2. LIPINSKI and ANN LIPINSKI, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, Honorable Robert C. Sykes, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Hash, Jellison and O'Brien, Kalispell, Montana M. Dean Jellison argued, Kalispell, Montana For Respondents: Warden, Walterskirchen and Christiansen, Kalispell, Montana William C. Walterskirchen argued, Kalispell, Montana Submitted: May 4, 1977 Decided : tjuf 1 $ ,jf -: ; , Filed: Clerk M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. This i s an appeal by defendants Lipinski from a judgment of the d i s t r i c t court, Flathead County, f o r p l a i n t i f f s 0 ' ~ e i l granting specific performance of an agreement t o r e p a i r an i r r i g a t i o n dam and t o replace c e r t a i n pipe. Lipinski presents three issues on appeal: I. bfiether specific performance of a contract should be granted where alleged unreasonable delay by p l a i n t i f f renders timely performance of t h i s contract impossible and defeats the primary consideration f o r the contract? 2. Whether p l a i n t i f f had an adequate remedy a t law? 3 . Whether s p e c i f i c performance i s an adequate remedy t o compel performance of a construction contract? P l a i n t i f f 0 'Neil owns a g r i c u l t u r a l land i n Flathead County i r r i g a t e d by the waters of Ashley Creek. I n addition, he owns a water r i g h t and a d i t c h r i g h t over and across lands purchased by defendant Lipinski. O'Neil's water i s diverted by a concrete dam and concrete pipes over land Lipinski purchased. Following the purchase of the property by Lipinski a dispute arose between the p a r t i e s and Lipinski denied OINeil access t o the dam and alleged O'Neil did not own e i t h e r the water r i g h t o r the d i t c h r i g h t . O'Neil f i l e d s u i t i n 1968 against Lipinski seeking t o e s t a b l i s h h i s water r i g h t , d i t c h r i g h t and t o recover $7,415.05 f o r damages caused by Lipinski's denial of water and $5,000.00 punative damages. That case was s e t t l e d on the> day s e t , f o r t r i a l . Stipulated findings of f a c t s and conclusions of law were entered and signed by a l l p a r t i e s and a judgment entered. A t the same time, June 16, 1969, the memorandum agreement involved i n t h e i n s t a n t case was entered into between the parties. That agreement, among other things, s e t t l e d O'Neil's claim f o r damages against Lipinski and s e t up the method and manner of repairing the dam and the d i s t r i b u t i o n l i n e s . It provided OfNeil was t o see and approve the plans and specifica- tions, and the project was t o be completed by December 10, 1969. O n November 21, 1969, Lipinski discharged h i s counsel and obtained new counsel who advised O'Neil t h a t Lipinski refused t o comply with the agreement. The court found according t o the agreement t h a t (1) Lipinski desired t o have a l l of the pipeline underground, (2) Lipinski was t o have f u l l control and supervision of the repair project, subject t o O'Neilt s approval of the plans and specifications, (3) on June 16, 1969 LZpinski employed an engineering firm t o draw up such plans but the firm f a i l e d t o do so, (4) on August 15, 1969 another engineer was employed who submitted plans and specifications t o O'Neil's attorney on August 26, 1969, (5) these were submitted t o O'Neilts engineer on o r about September 19, 1969, and a f t e r a conference c e r t a i n changes were proposed, and (6) t h a t these changes were incorporated i n t o t h e plans by Lipinski's engineer and resubmitted t o O'Neil who requested nine further changes. O n November 21, 1969, Lipinski discharged h i s attorney and engineer and terminated the agreement.' The court further found the nine changes were a l l i n accord with accepted engineering practices, save and except the requiring of a lowering of the intake entry 12 inches below the spillway s l a b and the requirement of 12 rather than 6 inches of f i l l . These l a t t e r two requirements were found t o be substantial and unreasonable but the other 7 were reasonable. I n addition, the court found t h a t had the work been done i n 1969, the cost would have been approximately $9,000 and a t the time of t h i s t r i a l i n 1975, the cost had increased t o $19,710.00. The t r i a l court found a breach of the agreement by Lipinski and ordered t h e repairs be made, excepting the two above referred t o exceptions by December 1, 1976. Lipinski appeals from t h a t judgment. During the period from December 1969 t o the t r i a l on December 26, 1975, c e r t a i n negotiations took place between counsel and on September 20, 1974, by agreement of t h e p a r t i e s , the court appointed Douglas Daniels a s a special master and he submitted a report t o the court and t e s t i f i e d a t the t r i a l . Issue 1. W e note appellant argues t h a t he was excused from performing because delays by respondent prevented work completion by December 10, 1969. W e find no merit t o t h i s argument. The settlement agreement was signed on June 16, no engineer was hired by appellant u n t i l August 15; t h e revised plan of appellant's engineer Marquardt was not given t o respondent u n t i l October 15 and t h a t plan was not i n accord with accepted engineering practices. Respondent's engineer Wiedenman had h i s revised plan before appellant by October 28, but he did not respond u n t i l November 21 when h i s new attorney n o t i f i e d respondent the agreement would not be performed. W e note Marquardt t e s t i f i e d i f h i s Plan B , dated October 15, had been immediately approved he could not have met the December 10 deadline. Obviously, t h e recommended changes of Wiedenman would have extended t h a t date. Marquardt was n o t i f i e d by appellant t o cease work on November 6. The record speaks f o r i t s e l f . I f anyone i s t o be charged with delay, it is appellant not respondent. Lipinski a t t r i a l on cross-examination revealed h i s r e a l reason when he said: ' I * * * i n hindsight t h a t was a poor decision because I wouldn't do it today, make t h a t agree- ment * Jc Jc." Issue 2. Did respondent have an adequate remedy a t law and therefore is not e n t i t l e d t o equitable r e l i e f ? Appellant argues t h a t respondent's l e g a l remedy is of such a character a s t o preclude r e l i e f by way of specific performance. I n support he c i t e s Philbrick v. American Bank and Trust Co., 58 Mont. 376, 193 P. 59; J e f f r i e s Coal Co. v. I n d u s t r i a l Acc~Board 126 Mont. 411, 252 P.2d 1046, but these cases a r e not applicable factually. He argues he wrote respondent a l e t t e r authorizing the him t o proceed with the work and thatthe costs of doing/work would be the same i f one o r the other did it. However, a s noted i n 7 1 Am.Jur.2dY Specific Performance 59: "* * 2 k It i s c l e a r , however, t h a t the mere f a c t t h a t a party can avail.himself of some r e l i e f a t law does not preclude o r defeat the j u r i s d i c t i o n of equity t o decree specific performance. * * *" Such i s the case here where the t r i a l court found respondent had no plain, speedy o r adequate remedy a t law. This i s t h e second law s u i t over the water and d i t c h r i g h t s and some 8 years have passed t o the detriment of respondent. The-court here :was "eonfronted with a multiplicity of s u i t s , the f a c t situa- t i o n i s unique,so the court properly exercised i t s equitable powers. I n the settlement agreement of 1969 Lipinski i n s i s t e d on having absolute control and management of the repairs and i n s t a l l a t i o n because it was on h i s property. I n the years leading up t o 1969, he had threatened t o r e s t r a i n O'Neil from coming onto h i s property t o make repairs and had ordered workmen off the property. The t r i a l court granted h i s demands i n t h e 1969 agreement and i n i t s e f f o r t s t o avoid continued l i t i g a t i o n the court had authority t o grant the equitable r e l i e f here. W e find no e r r o r . Issue 3. The f i n a l issue questions whether specific performance i s an available remedy t o enforce a construction contract. To support h i s position appellant c i t e s Lubin v. Lubin, 144 C.A.'2d'781, 302 P.2d 49 and Moklofsky v. Moklofsky, 79 C.A.2d 259, 179 P.2d 628. These cases a r e not on point and can be distinguished. Lubin i s a property settlement i n a divorce action and has nothing t o do with a construction contract. Moklofsky deals with an agreement t o construct an outside s t a i r - case, but t h i s was not the controlling issue i n the case. Here, the court did not grant specific performance nor did t h e complaint, ask f o r it. The court ordered Lipinski t o repair and replace the dam and pipeline i n accord with the plans o r i n the a l t e r n a t i v e , i f he f a i l e d t o do so within a specific time, 0 ' ~ e i l could do the work under the supervision 6f an engineer appointed by the court and he would have judgment f o r the costs. Contrary t o Lipinski's position, the court could have ordered f u l l and complete specific performance of the construction contract. While there a r e diverse views on the specific performance of construction contracts, we find and adopt the position taken by the Massachusetts Court i n Jones v. Parker, 163 Mass. 564, 40 N.E. 1044,1045, where M r . J u s t i c e Holmes stated: "There i s no universal r u l e t h a t courts of equity never w i l l enforce a contract which requires some building t o be done. They have enforced such con- t r a c t s from the e a r l i e s t days t o the present time." That;view was adopted i n a more recent case, Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. I r i s Const. Corp., 8 N.Y.2d 133, 202 N.Y.Supp.2d 303, 168 N.E.2d 377,379. There the court i n reviewing the problem of specific performance of construction contracts said: "Tbere is of course, an old t r a d i t i o n o r approach according t o which courts have been reluctant t o enforce 'Contracts which require the performance of varied and continuous a c t s , o r the exercise of special s k i l l , t a s t e , and judgment' 1 because the execution of the decree would require such constant superintendence a s t o make j u d i c i a l control a matter of extreme d i f f i c u l t y ' . Standard Fashion Co. v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 157 N.Y. 60,66, 51 N.E. 408,409, 43 L.R.A. 854. I n some instances courts of equity i n other States have f o r some such reasons refused t o order specific performance of building contracts. [Citing cases] Other courts of equity have gone the other way (see Jones v. Parker, 163 Mass. 564, 40 N.E. 1044, which a l s o was a contract t o build f o r a lessee). 'There is no universal r u l e t h a t courts of equity never w i l l enforce a contract which requires some building t o be done. They have enforced such contracts from the e a r l i e s t days t o the present time' (Jones v. Parker, supra, 163 Mass. a t page 567, 40 N.E. a t page 1045). O n varying f a c t s our N e w York decisions take one o r the other position. [Citing cases]. Modern writers think t h a t the ' d i f f i - c u l t y of enforcement' idea is exaggerated and t h a t the trend i s toward specific performance (5 Corbin, Contracts [I951 ed.], 5 1172; 5 Williston, Contracts [rev.ed.], p. 3977; Restatement, Contracts, 5 371, comment a ) . Clearly there i s no binding r u l e t h a t deprives equity of j u r i s d i c t i o n t o order specific performance of a building contract. A t most there i s discretion i n the court t o refuse such a decree. And here we do not even have an equity s u i t but a motion made a s of r i g h t t o confirm a completely valid a r b i t r a t i o n award con- forming i n a l l respects t o the express conferral of authority on the a r b i t r a t o r s and meeting a l l s t a t u t o r y requirements f o r confirmation * * * . I 1 While not raised a s an issue on appeal the s p l i t t i n g of the costs over $9,000 was c l e a r l y e r r o r i n view of the record and must be reversed. The t r i a l court i n i t s conclusion of law No. 7 found Lipinski should pay the f i r s t $9,000 and t h a t t h e r e a f t e r the, two p a r t i e s would share a l l expenses over and above t h a t figure. W e find t h e court erred i n t h i s holding and d i r e c t a l l costs be paid by appellant i n the construction and i n s t a l l a t i o n of the i r r i g a t i o n system a s proposed by the Marquardt plans and specifi- cations, incorporating i n same the recommended changes of Wiedenman a s referred t o i n the findings of f a c t and conclusions of law of the t r i a l court. To hold ~othenrcSiee would be t o penalize respon- dent O'Neil who did what he could t o g e t t h e 1969 agreement carried out i n 1969. He has been deprived of the use of h i s water f o r over 8 years, due t o l i t i g a t i o n and obstinance of appellant Lipinski. The judgment of the t r i a l court i s affirmed and the cause remanded t o the t r i a l court with directions t o correct i t s conclusion of law No. 7 i n accordance with t h i s opinion. I W e Concur: Chief J u s t i c e