Case Title: KG CONSTRUCTION, INC. V. DALE D. SHERMAN

Citation: 

Docket Number: 04-209

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-09-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
KG CONSTRUCTION, INC. V. DALE D. SHERMAN2005 WY 116120 P.3d 145Case Number: No. 04-209Decided: 09/15/2005
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
KG 
CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

 
 
Appellant

(Petitioner),

 
 
v.

 
 
DALE D. 
SHERMAN,

 
 
Appellee

(Respondent).

 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofCampbellCounty

The 
Honorable John Perry, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Jeremy D. Michaels of Michaels & Michaels, P.C., Gillette, Wyoming. 

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
C. John Cotton of Cotton Law Offices, Gillette, Wyoming.

 
 
 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Dale Sherman 
worked as a truck driver for KG Construction, Inc. (KG) for over 20 years.  In 2002, he began to suffer cervical 
problems and ultimately underwent surgery.  
The Workers' Compensation Division (Division) determined his injury was 
compensable and awarded him benefits.  
KG objected and a hearing was held by the Office of Administrative 
Hearings (OAH) which found Mr. Sherman was entitled to temporary total 
disability benefits because he had suffered a compensable work-related injury 
over a substantial period of time.  
KG appealed that decision and the district court affirmed.  Finding OAH's decision was supported by 
substantial evidence, we affirm.

 
 
 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      KG presents the 
following two issues:

 
 

1.                  
Is there 
substantial evidence to support the Hearing Examiner's decision that the 
claimant had met his burden of proof for temporary total disability 
compensation?

 
 

2.                  
Did the 
[H]earing Examiner abuse his discretion by ruling on an apportionment issue when 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division Rules and Regulations specify that he did 
not have the authority to do so?

 
 
Mr. 
Sherman states the issues as follows:

 
 

1.                  
Does 
W.S. § 27-14-603 require that employment be the sole cause of the 
injury?

 
 

2.                  
Can 
appellant expand appeal beyond issues raised in original petition for judicial 
review, and, in any event, is there any merit to additional issues 
raised?

 
 

3.                  
Was 
there substantial evidence to support the decision of the Office of 
Administrative Hearings?

 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
            

 
 
[¶3]      Mr. Sherman began 
working for KG in 1979.  During his 
employment with KG he worked as a truck driver hauling heavy equipment, hay and 
oilfield tanks.   His job also 
included loading baled hay onto semi trailers, off loading oilfield casing by 
hand, pulling rear ends out of trucks, pulling transmissions out of trucks, 
taking tires and wheels off, and working with tire chains weighing 50-60 pounds, 
that, if muddied, could weigh up to 150 pounds.  Heavy lifting and heavy manual work were 
"part and parcel" of Mr. Sherman's job at KG.   In addition to the regular work 
demands, Mr. Sherman testified he had sustained various traumatic injuries while 
employed by KG which could have contributed to his back 
problems.

 
 
[¶4]      Prior to working 
for KG, Mr. Sherman's jobs included ranch hand, general road construction, 
military service, and truck driver.  
Mr. Sherman estimated that he spent about ten years working as a truck 
driver before he went to work for KG.   In the mid-80s, Mr. Sherman began 
having pain in the base of his neck while loading hay bales and driving his 
truck.  He described the pain  as a burning sensation which would last 
all day. After a hot shower and a night's sleep, the pain would be gone.  However, as the day went on, the pain, 
which felt like a "hot knife," would return and become more severe. 

 
 
[¶5]      In February of 
2002, as Mr. Sherman was driving his truck to Newcastle, Wyoming, to pick up a load of rock, he felt a 
pain in the back of his neck that spread into his left shoulder and down his 
arm.  In addition to the pain, Mr. 
Sherman's fingers felt "numb and tingly."  
He stopped at a rest stop and the pain went away after he walked 
around.  He continued driving toward 
Newcastle and 
the pain returned.  It was so severe 
that Mr. Sherman became ill and thought he was having a heart attack.  He was taken by ambulance to the 
hospital in Newcastle, but, after a series of tests, 
doctors told Mr. Sherman his heart was fine.

 
 
[¶6]      The following 
week, as Mr. Sherman was driving his truck as usual, the pain returned.  He immediately sought medical 
attention.  An MRI of Mr. Sherman's 
back demonstrated "C5/6 central degenerative stenosis with fairly severe right 
sided foraminal stenosis" as well as "a left paracentral disc herniation and 
mild foraminal stenosis at C6/7."  
Mr. Sherman received a cervical epidural steroid injection to relieve the 
pain on March 29, 2002.  Following 
an evaluation by Dr. Edward Seljeskog in Rapid City, South 
Dakota, on April 30, 2002, Mr. Sherman underwent surgery 
described as an anterior cervical discectomy and partial vertebrectomy at C5-6 
and C6-7 with interbody bone fusion.  
Mr. Sherman returned to work for KG on July 1, 2002. 

 
 
[¶7]      Mr. Sherman 
sought and was granted temporary total disability benefits for the time he was 
off work.  Contending the injury was 
not compensable, KG objected to the Division's determination.  Following a hearing, the hearing 
examiner ruled the injury was a compensable injury occurring over a substantial 
period of time under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(a) (LexisNexis 2003).  The hearing examiner found "the repeated 
traumas, stresses, and strains of work over a 22 year period with KG 
Construction materially contributed to the degeneration of the cervical spine 
and to the fact that the degeneration became symptomatic."

 
 
[¶8]      KG sought review 
in the district court, which affirmed the order rendered by OAH.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶9]      The substantial 
evidence test is the appropriate standard of review in appeals from contested 
case proceedings when factual findings are involved and both parties submit 
evidence.  Robbins v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's 
Safety & Comp. Div., 2003 WY 29, ¶18, 64 P.3d 729, 732 (Wyo. 2003).  Substantial evidence is relevant 
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the agency's 
conclusions.  It is more than a 
scintilla of evidence.  Even if the 
factual findings are found to be supported by substantial evidence, the ultimate 
agency decision may still be found to be arbitrary or capricious for other 
reasons.  An appellate court does 
not examine the record only to determine if there is substantial evidence to 
support the agency's decision, but it also must examine the conflicting evidence 
to determine if the hearing examiner could have reasonably made its finding and 
order upon all of the evidence before it.  
Newman v. State ex rel. Wyo. 
Workers' Safety and Comp. Div., 2002 WY 91, ¶24, 49 P.3d 163, 172 (Wyo. 
2002).  In the instant case, the 
hearing examiner made factual findings and both parties submitted evidence; 
thus, we will apply the substantial evidence test.

 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶10]   KG argues that Mr. Sherman failed 
to meet the burden of proof applicable to claims for injuries which have 
occurred over a substantial period of time. Although KG does not contest that 
Mr. Sherman suffered major back trauma, it asserts his back condition was due to 
wear and tear from 40 years of employment, rather than directly attributable to 
the time Mr. Sherman worked for KG.  
In response, Mr. Sherman contends substantial evidence existed to support 
the hearing examiner's determination that his employment was a proximate cause 
of his injury, and that the statutes did not require the work must be the sole cause of the 
injury.

 
 
[¶11]   An employee seeking compensation 
for an injury that occurs over a substantial period of time is statutorily 
required to prove several elements by a preponderance of the evidence.  Baxter v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 2004 WY 
138, ¶11, 100 P.3d 427, 431 (Wyo. 2004).  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-603(a) (LexisNexis 2003) provides:  

 
 
     (a) The burden of 
proof in contested cases involving injuries which occur over a substantial 
period of time is on the employee to prove by competent medical authority that 
his claim arose out of and in the course of his employment and to prove by a 
preponderance of evidence that:

            
(i) There is a direct causal connection between the condition or 
circumstances under which the work is performed and the 
injury;

            
(ii) The injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the 
work as a result of the employment;

            
(iii) The injury can fairly be traced to the employment as a proximate 
cause;

            
(iv) The injury does not come from a hazard to which employees would have 
been equally exposed outside of the employment;  and

            
(v) The injury is incidental to the character of the business and not 
independent of the relation of employer and employee.

 
 

"[Section] 
27-14-603 
was intended to require a higher burden of proof for workers claiming benefits 
for illnesses or injuries developing over time without a definite triggering 
accident or event. Such situations might include repetitive motion injuries or 
repeated exposure to caustic or carcinogenic substances." Yenne-Tully v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety and 
Comp. Div., 12 P.3d 170, 172 (Wyo. 2000). We have held this statutory burden 
of proof requires a claimant/employee to prove  the claim arose out of and in the course 
of his or her employment through competent medical evidence, and to prove each 
of the five specified criteria which show a causal connection between the injury 
and employment by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.  

 
 
[¶12]   Thus, our threshold inquiry is 
whether substantial evidence exists to support the finding that Mr. Sherman, 
using competent medical evidence, demonstrated that his claim arose out of and 
in the course of his employment with KG.  
We have stated:

 
 
"To show 
that the injury arises out of or in the course of employment, the claimant 
must show a causal connection between the injury and the employment. This 
causal connection exists when there is a nexus between the injury and some 
condition, activity, environment or requirement of the 
employment."

Baxter, ¶12 (citations omitted).  We have held that   

 
 
the 
causal connection between an accident or condition at the workplace is satisfied 
if the medical expert testifies that it is more probable than not that the work 
contributed in a material fashion to the precipitation, aggravation or 
acceleration of the injury. We do not invoke a standard of reasonable 
medical certainty with respect to such causal connection. Testimony by the 
medical expert to the effect that the injury "most likely," "contributed to," or 
"probably" is the product of the workplace suffices under our established 
standard. 

 
 

Hall v. 
State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Comp. Div., 2001 
WY 136, ¶16, 37 P.3d 373, 378 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting In re Pino, 996 P.2d 679, 685 (Wyo. 2000)) (emphasis added). 

 
 
[¶13]   Mr. Sherman did not introduce 
medical testimony on his own behalf.  
In fact, neither of Mr. Sherman's treating physicians presented testimony 
at the hearing. A letter from a physician's assistant from the office of one of 
the treating physicians, which stated Mr. Sherman's work was a major factor 
contributing to his injury, was disregarded by the hearing examiner "for 
purposes of this case" apparently because it was signed by the physician's 
assistant.  Although Mr. Sherman 
produced no medical testimony of his own, the testimony provided by KG's expert, 
Dr. Joseph Allegretto, ultimately provided the requisite medical proof that Mr. 
Sherman's job was a proximate cause of his injury. The hearing examiner 
explained how Dr. Allegretto's testimony supported the conclusion that the work 
Mr. Sherman performed while employed at KG was a cause of Mr. Sherman's back 
problems.  While Dr. Allegretto 
adroitly stopped short of saying Mr. Sherman's employment at KG was a "direct 
cause," he did testify as follows:

 
 
Q: Can 
you say whether Mr. Sherman's 20-some years of truck driving for KG Construction 
caused his disc problems?

 
 
A: I can 
say that they contributed.

 
 
[¶14]   Dr. Allegretto also admitted that 
Mr. Sherman's work activities, including the 23 years working for KG, were a 
"major contributing factor for [Mr. Sherman's] cervical spondylosis and 
stenosis." Though Dr. Allegretto did claim it was "impossible to know" how much 
Mr. Sherman's work for KG contributed to his problem, as opposed to his work for 
other trucking companies,  he 
unquestionably agreed Mr. Sherman's work was a contributing factor.  In fact, Dr. Allegretto testified it was 
"correct" that repetitive trauma to the cervical spine can cause degeneration 
and problems with the cervical spine and discs.  He testified "the jostling around in a 
semi can be very aggravat[ing] to a very stiff spine.  You get the impression that in a cab 
that's bouncing around on uneven terrain that the muscles of the head and neck 
are trying to stabilize the head.  
The added force of the muscles pulling down and stabilizing just 
increases the amount of pressure and compression at the disk level." 

 
 
[¶15]   We have held claimants fail to 
prove causation when their physician testifies causation was "certainly a 
possibility," but could not make an "authoritative statement." Thornberg v. State ex rel. Wyo. Worker's Comp. Div., 913 P.2d 863, 869 
(Wyo. 
1996).  However, in this instance, 
Dr. Allegretto made an authoritative statement that, while Mr. Sherman's 
20-years of working for KG might not have been the only cause, his employment at 
KG was certainly a contributing factor. Dr. Allegretto agreed that "working 
hard" and "lifting" are cumulative traumas that "add up over time."  Therefore, under our established standard, the 
record supports the OAH finding that Mr. Sherman demonstrated  his claim arose out of and in the course 
of his employment. 

 
 
[¶16]   KG points to selected statements by 
Dr. Allegretto claiming they were insufficient, including that Mr. Sherman's 
years of driving, hauling, loading and lifting "may have" contributed to his 
condition, and that it would be "impossible to know" if Mr. Sherman's employment 
with KG contributed to the injury.  
These selected quotes are not representative of the entire record.  Instead, when Dr. Allegretto's entire 
testimony is reviewed, the nexus between Mr. Sherman's work and his injury is 
clear.

 
 
[¶17]   Section 27-14-603(a) establishes 
five separate elements a claimant must prove to establish an injury occurring 
over a substantial period of time. Subsections (i), (ii), (iii), and (v) require 
proof that the work was a proximate cause of the injury. Dr. Allegretto's 
testimony provided proof satisfying these subsections. "Although each of the 
five elements [is] specifically enumerated in the statute, they are closely 
related because each contributes to indicate whether the employment environment 
caused the injury.  Therefore, the 
same evidence will often offer support to several of the elements."  Baxter, ¶14.  

 
 
[¶18]   Section 27-14-603(a)(iv) requires 
the claimant to prove the injury did not result from a hazard to which employees 
would have been equally exposed outside of the employment. To address this 
element, KG offered Dr. Allegretto's testimony that three "cumulative traumas" 
added up over time to cause Mr. Sherman's injury: aging, smoking, and 
working.  Most of Mr. Sherman's 
working life was spent working for KG.  
Prior to working for KG, his work experience consisted of one year as a 
ranch hand, two years in the military, and ten years in road construction and 
driving trucks.  However, he spent 
over double that time working for KG, averaging 55 hours per week for over 23 
years.  In recognition of the 
contribution of his prior work, the hearing examiner remanded Mr. Sherman's 
award to allow the Division to consider apportionment as provided by § 
27-14-603(e).

 
 
[¶19]   Although Dr. Allegretto claimed Mr. 
Sherman's smoking could have contributed to his injury, he testified "no studies 
show that a smoker has a higher propensity for disc herniations than the regular 
population."  Additionally, he 
admitted that he has "a personal bias against smoking" because he "just 
[doesn't] care for the way tobacco companies don't necessarily inform the people 
that smoke of all the risks."  

 
 
[¶20]   The third possible contributing 
factor Dr. Allegretto listed was Mr. Sherman's age. Whether or not the effects 
of aging would have manifested themselves in the same way on Mr. Sherman's body 
under different work circumstances, Dr. Allegretto did not say. Indeed, he 
testified at length about the degeneration of the human spine and opined that 
degeneration begins at birth. However, he was not aware of any information 
regarding Mr. Sherman's family to indicate that heredity may have played a role 
in his back problems.  Further, Dr. 
Allegretto stated most people who suffer cervical disc degeneration usually 
experience it prior to the age of 50. However,  he also opined Mr. Sherman's 60-year-old 
spine showed substantially more degeneration than normal and his neck looked 
like that of a 70 or 80 year old. 

 
 
[¶21]   In addition to the doctor's 
testimony concerning other possible causes, KG educed testimony from Mr. Sherman 
about his activities outside of work in an effort to prove those activities 
caused his back problems.  Mr. 
Sherman testified to playing pick-up baseball and football as a boy, water 
skiing as an adult, and driving a used Ford pick-up with 300,000 miles on it, 
all of which, in the opinion of the hearing examiner, failed to outweigh the 
evidence that the injury was caused by his work.

 

[¶22]   Taking into consideration all of 
the above testimony, the hearing officer stated:

 
 
The 
claimant worked for 40 years with heavy equipment, trucks, and loading and 
unloading heavy cargo.  His cervical 
degeneration is much greater than is to be expected of a 60 year old man.  A combination of traumatic injuries 
caused by falls, slips, lifting of heavy oil field pipe, driving rough riding 
trucks, all contributed to the severity of his disc degeneration.  These insults were cumulative and arose 
over a substantial period of time.

 
 
The 
Office finds that at least some of the stresses and traumas which caused [Mr. 
Sherman's] cervical spine degeneration occurred prior to his employment with KG 
Construction, and the Office further finds as a matter of fact that the repeated 
traumas, stresses, and strains of work over a 22 year period with KG 
Construction materially contributed to the degeneration of the cervical spine 
and to the fact that the degeneration became symptomatic.

 
 
 
 
[¶23]   The hearing examiner, as the trier 
of fact, is charged with weighing the evidence and determining the credibility 
of witnesses. An agency's findings of fact are accorded deference, and will not 
be overturned unless they are clearly contrary to the overwhelming weight of the 
evidence.  Baxter, ¶9. 

 
 
[¶24]   After careful review of the entire 
record, we are persuaded the evidence supported the hearing examiner's 
conclusion that Mr. Sherman's employment at KG materially contributed to his 
back problems. According the findings the deference they are due, the hearing 
examiner's conclusion that Mr. Sherman's back problems followed as a natural 
incident of his work, which involved constant jostling of his spine in the truck 
cab and heavy labor attendant to the truck driving, is not contrary to the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence.  
We likewise find no error in the hearing examiner's conclusion that Mr. 
Sherman's work at KG was a proximate cause of his back problems and no hazard 
outside of his work was identified which could have just as well caused the 
injury. Accordingly, we agree with the conclusion that Mr. Sherman met his 
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his injuries 
occurred over a substantial period of time and arose in the course of his 
employment with KG.

 
 
[¶25]   In its appellate brief, KG suggests 
Mr. Sherman's back problem resulted from a pre-existing condition that worsened 
over time, and he had the added burden of proving the work at KG contributed to 
aggravating his preexisting degenerative spine condition to a material degree 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(F) (LexisNexis 2003) citing Frazier v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' 
Safety & Comp. Div., 997 P.2d 487, 4390 (Wyo. 2000).  The instant case began as a claim under § 
27-14-603, as an injury that occurred over a substantial period of time. We find 
no mention in the record of a claim for aggravation of a pre-existing condition. 
KG points to no evidence that Mr. Sherman experienced the severe symptoms which 
appeared in 2002 prior to his employment with KG. Moreover, KG did not raise the 
issue of aggravation of pre-existing injury at the hearing and the OAH decision 
did not consider or rely upon it.  
We have consistently declined to address issues not raised before the 
agency.  Kunkle v. State ex rel. Wyo. Workers' Safety 
& Comp. Div., 2005 WY 
49, ¶ 14, 109 P.3d 887, 
891 (Wyo. 2005). 

 
 
 
 
Apportionment

 
 
[¶26]   KG asserts in its second issue that 
the hearing examiner erroneously remanded the benefit award to the Division for 
apportionment.  KG contends the 
hearing examiner lacked the authority to find apportionment was proper and the 
Division, rather than the hearing examiner, should have made that determination. 
In response, Mr. Sherman asserts the hearing examiner was simply directing the 
Division's attention to the fact that apportionment may have been appropriate in 
this case.

 
 
[¶27]   Section § 27-14-603(e) 
states:

 
 
In those 
proceedings in which the entitlement of an employee to benefits for successive 
compensable injuries is established but no single employer can be determined to 
be chargeable for the injuries, the division shall apportion the benefit charge 
in accordance with W.S. 27-14-201(d).

 
 
Although 
the instant case does not involve a second compensable injury, this statute 
nonetheless clarifies that it is up to the Division to apportion benefits 
charges.  Indeed, the hearing 
examiner's order was quite deferential to the Division on this 
issue:

 
 
There is 
a question of apportionment. The Office finds that it is not appropriate in this 
situation, particularly when the Division was not participating as a party, to 
address the issue of apportionment without affording the Division a reasonable 
opportunity to first address that issue. The matter was not referred to the 
Office as an apportionment issue.  
It is therefore appropriate to remand the matter to the Division to make 
its determination as to whether the cost of injury should be apportioned fully 
to KG Construction or should be apportioned otherwise.  The employer should receive notice of 
that determination and should have the normal statutory opportunity to 
object.  

 
 
In the 
meantime, the claims should be paid.  
The Division's determination of apportionment should not effect [sic] the 
Claimant's entitlement to benefits.

 
 
The 
matter is remanded to the [Division] to determine whether the claims in this 
matter should be apportioned between the employer, KG Construction and any other 
employer or industry group."

 
 
[¶28]   Why KG would object to this 
determination is puzzling.  A 
finding by the Division that the benefits awarded should be apportioned would be 
in KG's favor. Should the Division grant apportionment, KG would be credited for 
that portion of the claims paid which was not its 
responsibility.

 
 
[¶29]   Affirmed.