Case Title: Freedom Road Found. v. Ohio Dept. of Liquor Control

Citation: 1997-Ohio-346

Docket Number: 19961006

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-11-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
FREEDOM ROAD FOUNDATION, APPELLEE, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF LIQUOR 
CONTROL, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as Freedom Road Found. v. Ohio Dept. of Liquor Control (1997), 80 Ohio 
St.3d 202.] 
Crimes — Gambling — R.C. 2915.02(D) permits participation in the operation of 
a charitable organization’s scheme of chance on liquor-permit premises by 
owners and/or their employees, when. 
R.C. 2915.02(D) permits participation in the operation of a charitable 
organization’s scheme of chance on liquor-permit premises by premises 
owners and/or their employees, so long as neither owners nor employees are 
compensated for their participation. 
(No. 96-1006 — Submitted May 21, 1997 — Decided November 5, 1997.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 95APE08-1030. 
 
Plaintiff-appellant, Freedom Road Foundation (“Freedom Road”), is a 
charitable corporation and nonprofit educational entity that is classified as an 
exempt charitable organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue 
Code.  Freedom Road filed a declaratory judgment action in the Franklin County 
Court of Common Pleas seeking a declaration that R.C. 2915.02(D) authorizes its 
method of conducting charitable fundraising activities involving schemes of 
chance in liquor-permit premises.  In addition to the declaratory judgment, 
Freedom Road sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary and 
permanent injunctions to enjoin the Ohio Department of Liquor Control from 
issuing citations based on those fundraising activities.   
 
Freedom Road uses liquor-permit-premises owners and employees as 
volunteers for the organization to sell and redeem “tip tickets” on the liquor-
permit premises.  Tip tickets are similar to Ohio Lottery instant winner games in 
 
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that a limited number of tickets contain a hidden winning symbol and may be 
redeemed for a cash prize.  Typically, Freedom Road employees supply permit 
premises with a bag of tip tickets.  Each ticket is sold for one dollar, and a 
predetermined amount of the gross proceeds from ticket sales is paid out in cash 
prizes.  Of the net proceeds, one hundred percent is paid to Freedom Road. 
 
The dispute arose because the Liquor Control Department cited several of 
the permit-premises owners under its Regulation 53, Ohio Adm.Code 4301:1-1-
53, for sale of Freedom Road tip tickets.  The citations were necessarily based on 
the department’s interpretation that R.C. 2915.02 had been violated, as the 
regulation authorizes the sale of schemes of chance in liquor-permit premises “so 
long as there is strict compliance with division (D) of section 2915.02 of the 
Revised Code.”  Ohio Adm. Code 4301:1-1-53(D) . 
 
As the litigation progressed, the central issue became whether Freedom 
Road  “conducted” the tip ticket operation, as required by R.C. 2915.02(D)(1).  
That issue turned on whether the statute allowed permit-premises owners and their 
employees to act as volunteers for Freedom Road by selling the tip tickets to 
tavern patrons and redeeming winning tickets out of the sale proceeds and 
whether, under Freedom Road’s scheme, owners or employees were compensated 
for their participation.  The trial court concluded that compensation received by 
permit-premises employees for their duties as tavern employees could not be 
separated from their volunteer services rendered for Freedom Road and ruled that 
their conduct violated R.C. 2915.02.  The court of appeals reversed, concluding 
that the record contained insufficient evidence to support that finding.  
 
The cause is now before the court upon the allowance of a motion to certify 
the record. 
__________________ 
 
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Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn Co., L.P.A., and John A. Gleason, for appellee. 
 
Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, Chester T. Lyman, Jr., and Simon 
B. Karas, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant. 
__________________ 
 
COOK, J. 
I 
FREEDOM ROAD’S REQUEST FOR DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT IS PROPER 
 
The department initially argues that the trial court never should have 
reached the merits of the declaratory judgment action because Freedom Road lacks 
standing to challenge the department’s actions.  The department’s argument is 
based on the fact that Regulation 53 has been enforced against liquor-permit 
premises, not Freedom Road.  The department states that it, in fact, has no 
authority to regulate the activities of charitable organizations such as Freedom 
Road.  Accordingly, the department argues that only permit-premises owners have 
standing to challenge the citations. 
 
By requesting a declaratory judgment, however, Freedom Road is not 
directly challenging any particular administrative order of the department.  
Freedom Road would have no standing to make such a challenge.  Instead, 
Freedom Road seeks judicial construction of R.C. 2915.02(D).  Judicial 
construction of R.C. 2915.02(D), while having no direct effect on the department’s 
administrative orders, will resolve whether the department has correctly 
interpreted that statute in finding a violation under Regulation 53. 
 
The Declaratory Judgment Act allows “[a]ny person * * * whose rights, 
status, or other legal relations are affected by a * * * statute [or] rule * * * [to] 
have determined any question of construction * * * arising under such * * * statute 
 
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[or] rule * * * and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations 
thereunder.”  R.C. 2721.03.  Because (1) this action is within the scope of the 
Declaratory Judgment Act, (2) a justiciable controversy exists between adverse 
parties, and (3) speedy relief is necessary to preserve rights that may otherwise be 
impaired or lost, Freedom Road’s request for a declaratory judgment is proper. 
Compare Burger Brewing Co. v. Ohio Liquor Control Comm. (1973), 34 Ohio 
St.2d 93, 96-100, 63 O.O.2d 149, 150-152, 296 N.E.2d 261, 263-266. 
II 
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES BEFORE THE COURT 
 
The remaining issues before the court involve interpretation of R.C. 
2915.02(D).  The first issue requires an analysis of whether Freedom Road 
“conduct[s]” the tip ticket operation, as required under R.C. 2915.02(D)(1).  The 
second issue involves the question of whether permit premises owners or their 
employees derive a benefit prohibited by R.C. 2915.02(D) from their participation 
in otherwise lawful tip ticket operations. 
A 
FREEDOM ROAD CONDUCTS THE FUNDRAISING ACTIVITY 
 
Analysis of the statutory terms chosen by the General Assembly to identify 
the potential actors under R.C. 2915.02(D) resolves the issue of what the General 
Assembly meant by its requirement under R.C. 2915.02(D)(1) that legal schemes 
of chance be “conducted” by charitable organizations.  R.C. 2915.01(T) defines 
“conduct” as follows:  “ ‘Conduct’ means to back, promote, organize, manage, 
carry on, or prepare for the operation of a scheme or game of chance * * *.”1  
Because these verbs are listed in the disjunctive, a charitable organization 
conducts the scheme or game of chance when it executes any of the actions listed. 
 
5
 
A corollary of the legislature’s use of the disjunctive “or” in defining the 
types of actions subsumed in the broader concept of “conducting” a scheme of 
chance is that a charitable organization may conduct a scheme of chance despite 
the fact that owners and/or employees of permit premises actually “carry on” that 
activity.  In fact, R.C. 2915.02(D) contemplates operation or assistance in the 
operation of a scheme or game of chance by persons other than the charitable 
organization, merely prohibiting such persons from being compensated for that 
activity. 
 
“Operate,” while not expressly defined in R.C. Chapter 2915, connotes 
performance of an activity, while the verbs used to define “conduct” would allow 
a charitable organization to delegate operation of the activity, while retaining a 
supervisory or organizational role.  See, e.g., Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary (1986) 1580-1581 (defining “operate”); see, also, R.C. 2915.01(U) 
(defining a “bingo game operator” as one who carries out any of the bingo gaming 
functions).  Accordingly, the permit-premises owners’ operation or carrying on of 
Freedom Road’s tip ticket activities does not prevent Freedom Road from 
“conducting” the scheme of chance, as required by statute. 
B 
OWNERS AND EMPLOYEES ARE NOT COMPENSATED 
 FOR OPERATING THE FUNDRAISING ACTIVITY 
 
R.C. 2915.02(D) states that “[n]o person shall receive any commission, 
wage, salary, reward, tip, donation, gratuity, or other form of compensation, 
directly or indirectly, for operating or assisting in the operation of any scheme or 
game of chance.”  (Emphasis added.)  Appellant argues that this provision 
prevents permit-premises owners and employees from participating in on-premises 
tip ticket operations.  The evidence on the issue demonstrates that neither permit-
 
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premises owners nor their employees are paid for operating the fundraising 
activity and that all of the net proceeds from the activity are paid to Freedom 
Road.  Further, the department failed to produce any evidence that permit-
premises owners or their employees receive anything in the nature of 
compensation for operating the fundraising activity. 
 
Appellant argues that permit holders and their employees necessarily 
receive an impermissible “benefit” from any increased patronage that results from 
the sale of Freedom Road tip tickets in their establishments.  Although the 
department produced no evidence regarding the effect of tip ticket sales on 
patronage at trial, Freedom Road’s president, Lindy Douglas, acknowledged in her 
deposition testimony that sales of tip tickets allow participating permit premises to 
keep customers who otherwise might go elsewhere to engage in gambling.  
 
In interpreting a statute, we must begin by examining its express terms.  The 
statute itself does not expressly prohibit one who operates or assists a scheme or 
game of chance from deriving any benefit from that activity.  Instead, the statute 
carefully sets out a list of the types of compensation that such persons are 
forbidden from receiving.  None of the listed forms of compensation may be 
received “for operating or assisting in the operation of a scheme or game of 
chance.”  The statute thus contemplates a quid pro quo — the receipt of  
something of value for the giving of another.  The benefit of increased patronage, 
on the other hand, does not come in the form of compensation and therefore is not 
within the prohibited class. 
 
We conclude that the benefit of increased patronage does not fall within the 
prohibited class of compensation listed in R.C. 2915.02(D).  Thus, there is nothing 
in the evidence to remove the scheme of chance from R.C. 2915.02(D)’s exception 
to that section’s general prohibition against gambling. 
 
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III 
FREEDOM ROAD IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE 
 INJUNCTIVE RELIEF THAT IT SEEKS 
 
Along with a declaration of its rights under statute, Freedom Road requested 
that the court “temporarily, preliminarily and permanently enjoin the Department, 
its agents, employees and anyone acting in active concert or participation with it, 
from issuing citations as a result of Freedom Road’s charitable fundraising 
activities on permit premises throughout the State of Ohio.” 
  
There may be any number of reasons not addressed in this action that would 
authorize the department to cite the permit holders under its Regulation 53.  Our 
analysis is necessarily restrained by the limited evidence presented by the parties 
to this action.  Accordingly, it would be improper to grant the broad injunctive 
relief requested by Freedom Road.  
IV 
CONCLUSION 
 
For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm, in part, the decision of the 
appellate court.  We reverse that portion of the appellate court’s decision ordering 
remand and issue a declaration that R.C. 2915.02(D) permits participation in the 
operation of a charitable organization’s scheme of chance on liquor-permit 
premises by premises owners and/or their employees, so long as neither owners 
nor employees are compensated for their participation. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
RESNICK and F.E. SWEENEY, JJ., concur. 
 
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in the syllabus and judgment only. 
 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
FOOTNOTE: 
 
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1. 
We note that the term “conduct” is used elsewhere in R.C. 2915.02, both as 
a noun and as a verb that, in context, must be given a narrower construction than 
that given in our opinion.  For instance, R.C. 2915.02(A)(1) prohibits persons 
from 
engaging 
in 
“conduct” 
that 
facilitates 
bookmaking 
and 
R.C. 
2915.02(D)(2)(e) prohibits otherwise legal games of chance that are “conducted” 
during, or within ten hours of, a bingo game held pursuant to R.C. 2915.12.  
Nevertheless, in construing the verb “conducted” in R.C. 2915.02(D)(1) as 
requiring a level of action below which an otherwise lawful scheme of chance 
becomes unlawful, we must construe any ambiguity in that term strictly against the 
state and liberally in favor of the defendant.  R.C. 2901.04(A). 
 
Accordingly, even if we were to conclude that the definition of “conduct” 
found at R.C. 2915.01(T) is inapplicable to that term’s use in R.C. 2915.02(D)(1), 
we nevertheless would be confined to construing that term within its context in 
connection with its common usage.  R.C. 1.42.  The common usage of  “conduct,” 
when used as a verb, connotes management, control, or the giving of direction. 
See, e.g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1986) 474.  Accordingly, 
even without reference to R.C. 2915.01(T), our conclusion would be the same. 
__________________ 
 
MOYER, C.J., dissenting.  I respectfully dissent from the majority's 
conclusion that the record before us demonstrates that Ohio liquor permit owners or 
employees who participate in Freedom Road's tip ticket scheme of chance as 
described by Freedom Road’s president are not “compensat[ed], directly or 
indirectly, for operating or assisting in the operation of any scheme or game of 
chance” as prohibited by R.C. 2915.02(D).  Moreover, for the reasons which follow, 
I believe that the court of appeals correctly ordered a remand of this cause for 
further proceedings. 
 
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I 
R.C. 2915.02 and Regulation 532 
 
I am unable to concur in the conclusion of the majority that R.C. 2915.02(D) 
includes an element of a quid pro quo between the charitable organization itself and 
permit holders or permit holder employees who sell Freedom Road tip tickets.  The 
last sentence of  R.C. 2915.02(D) provides, “No person shall receive any 
commission, wage, salary, reward, tip, donation, gratuity, or other form of 
compensation, directly or indirectly, for operating or assisting in the operation of 
any scheme or game of chance.”  (Emphasis added.)  This broad, inclusive language 
should be construed as it was intended so as to proscribe the receipt of any 
pecuniary benefit flowing to a person based on operation or assistance in a scheme 
of chance.   
 
Lindy Douglas, Freedom Road’s president, testified that permit holders 
benefit from selling the tip tickets in that sale of the tickets “keep[s] the customers in 
their bars” who otherwise might leave to engage in gambling at “the Eagles, Elks or 
Moose lodges or American Legions.”  This evidence demonstrates that permit 
holders indirectly received a pecuniary benefit in the form of increased patronage, 
i.e., increased income, as a result of the sale of tip tickets on their liquor 
establishment premises.  In my view, a bar owner who increases profits as a result of 
offering on-premises charitable gambling thereby indirectly receives a form of 
compensation for operating or assisting in that scheme.  Thus that permit holder falls 
within the proscription of the quoted last sentence of R.C. 2915.02(D).  Inclusion of 
a direct quid pro quo requirement unjustifiably diminishes the language “direct or 
indirect” within the prohibition in R.C. 2915.02(D).  I believe Douglas's testimony 
is sufficient to support the conclusion of the trial court that  R.C. 2915.02(D) was 
violated by the sale of tip tickets.   
 
10
 
Moreover, if selling Freedom Road tip tickets is an express or implied 
employment duty of permit holder employees, then those employees are in fact 
compensated for their assistance in operating the scheme of chance  when they 
receive their pay from their employer. 
 
Freedom Road itself acknowledged that its tip ticket system constituted a 
scheme of chance as defined in the Revised Code (“a lottery, numbers game, pool, 
or other scheme in which a participant gives a valuable consideration for a chance to 
win a prize.”  R.C. 2915.01[C].).  R.C. 2915.01(E) defines “scheme or game of 
chance conducted for profit” as “any scheme or game of chance designed to produce 
income for the person who conducts or operates the scheme or game of chance * * 
*.”  R.C. 2915.02(A) provides, “No person shall * * * (2) [e]stablish, promote, or 
operate or knowingly engage in conduct that facilitates any scheme or game of 
chance conducted for profit.”  Thus, were Freedom Road not able to invoke the 
charitable organization exemption provided by R.C. 2915.02(D), its scheme of 
chance would clearly be illegal.   
 
However, Freedom Road, as a charitable organization, could legally conduct 
a tip ticket scheme of chance pursuant to R.C. 2915.02(D).  Thus, it arguably could 
itself conduct a scheme of chance on liquor control premises by using its own 
volunteers to approach liquor premises patrons and solicit them to purchase the tip 
tickets. 
 
If, however, permit-premises employees were selling tip tickets not because 
they desired to volunteer a service for Freedom Road, but instead because selling the 
tickets was an express or implied duty of employment assigned for the purpose of 
increasing the income of the liquor establishment, then the employees would not be 
volunteers.  I agree with the court of appeals that the record is insufficient to 
 
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indicate whether the persons selling tip tickets were acting as employees of the 
permit holders or as volunteers. 
 
If it is true that those employees were not true volunteers, the employer permit 
holder directing their activities would itself be “conducting” the tip ticket scheme, 
and  the scheme of chance would not be solely “conducted by a charitable 
organization” as required by R.C. 2915.02(D)(1), nor would the permit holder 
qualify for the statutory charitable organization exemption. Instead, the permit 
holder conducting the scheme would be committing a gambling offense in violation 
of R.C. 2915.02, and possession of the tip tickets on liquor premises would therefore 
fall within the proscription of Regulation 53.  See, also, R.C. 2915.02(E), which 
prohibits a charitable organization from transferring its right to conduct a charitable 
scheme of chance.  
 
In determining whether permit holders themselves “conduct” the tip ticket 
scheme at issue, we look to R.C. 2915.01(T), where that term is defined in an 
inclusive manner to include backing, promoting, organizing, managing, carrying on, 
or preparing for the operation of a scheme or game of chance.  Moreover, R.C. 
2915.01(E) defines “scheme or game of chance conducted for profit” to include any 
such scheme “designed to produce income” for the person who conducts or operates 
the scheme or game. 
 
It is possible for more than one legal entity to be deemed to be “conducting” a 
single scheme of chance, and the testimony of Douglas shows that such a 
circumstance may well have existed in this case.  The evidence in this case shows 
that Freedom Road itself did little more than periodically drop off new tip ticket 
supplies and pick up proceeds.  On this record, in which Freedom Road’s 
supervision of actual day-to-day sales of tip tickets was minimal at best, I conclude 
that the evidence could support a conclusion that permit holders themselves illegally 
 
12
conducted, i.e., backed, promoted, organized, managed, carried on, or prepared, a 
scheme of chance for their own profit, and not for altruistic or charitable motives, 
whether or not Freedom Road also may be deemed to have conducted the scheme. 
 
It is appropriate to mention the scale of the tip ticket scheme at issue here.  
Douglas testified that, prior to 1994, tip ticket sales had generated revenues totaling 
as much as $40,000 a week from sales in nearly three hundred fifty liquor 
establishments.  It is doubtful that the General Assembly intended to authorize a 
largely unregulated gambling scheme of this magnitude when it adopted the 
charitable organization exemption provision found in R.C. 2915.02(D). 
II 
Disposition 
 
Even assuming that the proposition of law set forth in the syllabus is correct, I 
do not believe that it is fully dispositive of the action before us.  Rather, I would 
affirm the court of appeals’ remand of this cause for further proceedings. 
 
 
Unfortunately the combined decision and judgment entry issued by the trial 
court is ambiguous as to whether the court intended thereby to award a declaratory 
judgment or, rather, to deny a declaratory judgment and issue findings of fact and 
conclusions of law justifying that denial.  The caption to its decision reads “Decision 
and Entry Denying Plaintiff Freedom Road Foundation’s Request for Declaratory 
Judgment and Permanent Injunctive Relief Filed on October 19, 1994.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  The trial court expressly stated in the body of its opinion that “Freedom 
Road’s requests for a declaration and an injunction are DENIED.” 
 
Nevertheless, the opinion included findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
which might, in a general sense, be deemed declarations of law.  Clearly, however, 
the trial court refused to grant Freedom Road the declaratory judgment it sought, 
 
13
that being a declaration that “its charitable fundraising activities are in compliance 
with R.C. 2915.02 and Regulation 53.”  
 
In either event, my review of the record leads me to conclude that the trial 
court entered final judgment adverse to Freedom Road based solely on its 
determination that participating permit owners/employees were not volunteers.  It 
failed to discuss numerous other arguments the department had made, apparently 
deeming them to be moot, as to why the best exercise of the trial court’s discretion 
would be complete denial of declaratory judgment.  Among those arguments were  
contentions that no true case or controversy existed between the parties and that 
issuance of a declaratory judgment was precluded by res judicata and estoppel 
doctrines.  Moreover, I note that R.C. 2721.12 provides, “When declaratory relief is 
sought, all persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which 
would be affected by the declaration.”  Even assuming, arguendo, that a dispute 
subject to resolution through declaratory judgment existed between Freedom Road 
and the department as to whether or not Freedom Road's actions were legal, it is 
clear that the interests of participating liquor permit holders were also very much at 
issue.  Yet they were not joined as parties in the case at bar.   
 
The requirement of R.C. 2721.12 that all persons who will be affected by a 
declaratory judgment are to be joined as parties has been held to be a substantive 
jurisdictional requirement.  Bretton Ridge Homeowners Club v. DeAngelis (1988), 
51 Ohio App.3d 183, 555 N.E.2d 663.  Under existing Ohio precedent, Freedom 
Road's failure to join statutorily mandated parties in and of itself would have 
justified the trial court in refusing  to enter declaratory judgment. 
 
In view of the majority’s rejection of the sole basis for the trial court decision, 
I believe the trial court should be given the opportunity to consider the department’s 
remaining arguments against entry of declaratory judgment.  In effect, the majority 
 
14
has itself determined that a declaratory judgment should be issued, has formulated 
the terms of that declaratory judgment and has incorporated that declaration into 
syllabus law.  The majority thereby encroaches upon the principle that issuance or 
denial of declaratory judgment is committed in the first instance to the sound 
discretion of the trial court, reversible only upon demonstration of an abuse of that 
discretion or error of law.  
 
 
I do not believe the court was bound to issue a declaratory judgment at the 
conclusion of the trial.  As noted in 2 Anderson, Actions for Declaratory Judgments 
(1951) 919-920, Section 383, “there is a distinction between the jurisdiction of a 
court to grant declaratory relief and the exercise of discretion pursuant to that 
jurisdiction. * * * [T]he final exercise of the court's discretion either to declare 
rights and legal relations of the parties, or to decline to pronounce a declaratory 
judgment, cannot be anticipated in advance of the development of the proof.”  Thus, 
even where a justiciable controversy exists, declaratory judgment may be refused if, 
in the exercise of a sound discretion, it appears that the determination is not proper 
under all of the circumstances.  Id.  On the record established in this case, the trial 
court might well yet determine it appropriate to deny declaratory judgment if given 
the opportunity. 
 
For the foregoing reasons I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals 
and remand the cause to accord the trial court the opportunity to reconsider whether 
to issue a declaratory judgment .  
 
PFEIFER and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting 
opinion. 
FOOTNOTE: 
2. 
R.C. 2915.02 states:  
 
“(A)  No person shall do any of the following:  
 
15
 
“* * * 
 
“(2)  Establish, promote, or operate or knowingly engage in conduct that 
facilitates any scheme or game of chance conducted for profit[.] 
 
“* * * 
 
“(D)  This section does not apply to any of the following: 
 
“(1)  Schemes of chance conducted by a charitable organization that is * * * 
[a recognized 501(c)(3) organization], provided that all of the money or assets 
received from the scheme of chance after deduction only of prizes paid out during 
the conduct of the scheme of chance are used by, or given, donated, or otherwise 
transferred to, any [recognized 501(c)(3) organization], and provided that the 
scheme of chance is not conducted during, or within ten hours of, a bingo game 
conducted for amusement purposes only pursuant to section 2915.12 of the Revised 
Code[.] 
 
“(2) * * * 
 
“No person shall receive any commission, wage, salary, reward, tip, donation, 
gratuity, or other form of compensation, directly or indirectly, for operating or 
assisting in the operation of any scheme or game of chance. 
 
“(E)  Division (D) of this section shall not be construed to authorize the sale, 
lease, or other temporary or permanent transfer of the right to conduct schemes of 
chance or games of chance as granted by division (D) of this section, by any 
charitable organization that is granted that right.”  (Emphasis added.) 
 
Ohio Adm.Code 4301:1-1-53 (“Regulation 53”) states: 
 
“(B)  No person authorized to sell alcoholic beverages shall have, harbor, 
keep, exhibit, possess or employ or allow to be kept, exhibited or used in, upon or 
about the premises of the permit holder any gambling device * * * which is or has 
been used for gambling offenses * * *. 
 
16
 
“* * * 
 
“(D)  This rule * * * shall not prohibit the conducting of schemes of chance * 
* * by charitable organizations * * * so long as there is strict compliance with 
division (D) of section 2915.02 of the Revised Code.”