Case Title: Williams v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 20/13

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2013-11-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Melvin D. Williams v. State of Maryland, No. 20, September Term, 2013. 
 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – DISCHARGE OF COUNSEL – SUFFICIENCY OF 
REQUEST.  A circuit court commits reversible error under Maryland Rule 4-215(e) 
when it fails to address a criminal defendant’s clear and unambiguous letter directed to 
the court requesting discharge of counsel. 
 
CRIMINAL LAW – RESISTING ARREST – USE OF FORCE.  Where a bystander 
intervened voluntarily to assist law enforcement officers in effectuating an arrest, the 
Court of Special Appeals did not misinterpret Maryland Code (2002, 2011 Cum. Supp.), 
Criminal Law Article, § 9-408(b)(1), when it held that the use of force necessary to 
sustain a conviction for resisting a lawful arrest can be satisfied by the defendant 
employing force against someone other than the arresting officers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Harford County 
Case No. 12-K-08-1673 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF 
MARYLAND 
 
No. 20 
 
September Term, 2013 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MELVIN D. WILLIAMS 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Barbera, C.J., 
  
Harrell, 
Battaglia, 
  
Greene, 
  
Adkins, 
  
McDonald, 
  
Rodowsky, Lawrence F. (Retired,  
  
 
 
Specially Assigned), 
  
 
 
  
 
JJ. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion by Harrell, J. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Filed: November 22, 2013 
 
 
 
 
Petitioner, Melvin D. Williams, was prosecuted in the Circuit Court for Harford 
County for controlled substance and resisting arrest offenses.  Following his convictions, 
Williams appealed to the Court of Special Appeals arguing that: (1) the trial court 
violated Maryland Rule 4-215(e) by failing to respond to a letter he sent to the court, 
prior to trial, seeking to discharge his counsel, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to 
support his conviction on the charge of resisting a lawful arrest under Maryland Code 
(2002, 2011 Cum. Supp.), Criminal Law Article, § 9-408(b)(1).  The intermediate 
appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  Williams asks us to reverse on 
the grounds that the letter he sent to the trial court (filed in the case jacket) was sufficient 
to trigger Rule 4-215(e) and that the trial court’s failure to conduct an inquiry consistent 
with the mandates of the Rule is reversible error.  He asks us also to hold that the Court 
of Special Appeals erred when it held that the use of force element necessary to sustain a 
conviction for resisting arrest may be satisfied by the deployment of force against a 
civilian who assisted voluntarily the arresting law enforcement officers in the capture of 
Williams.   
We hold that Williams’s letter to the trial court was sufficient to trigger the rigors 
of Rule 4-215(e), and further that the trial court’s failure to inquire into the reasons 
behind Williams’s request to discharge counsel was reversible error.  We hold also that, 
on this record, the intermediate appellate court did not misinterpret Maryland’s resisting 
arrest statute.  Accordingly, we reverse in part and affirm in part the judgment of the 
Court of Special Appeals and shall direct remand ultimately to the Circuit Court for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with our opinion. 
-2- 
 
FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
On 8 October 2008, the State’s Attorney for Harford County filed in the Circuit 
Court a four-count criminal information charging Melvin D. Williams with three 
controlled dangerous substances offenses and one count of resisting a lawful arrest.  John 
Janowich, Esquire, from the local Office of the Public Defender entered his appearance 
as Williams’s counsel on 11 February 2009.  On 27 January 2010, Williams sent from jail 
a letter that reads in its entirety:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Case No 12-K-08-1673 
 
The Honorable Judge ??  
 
 
 
 
                 1/27/2010 
 
My name is Melvin Williams JR  Im writting to request New representation 
From the Public defender’s office.  Pending me being able to afford an 
attorney.  MR John Janowich has truly No interest on my behalf in trying to 
help me on my case. I truly feel Im being mis-represented. May U please 
remove him from my case.  I’ll truly be appreciated. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sincerely Melvin Williams  
 
This letter, filed in the court jacket, has a date stamp by the Circuit Court Clerk as being 
received on 29 January 2010.  An entry on the docket confirms the Circuit Court’s receipt 
of Williams’s letter: “Letter of Defendant requesting new representation from the public 
defender’s office.  Filed: 1/29/10  Entered: 2/17/10.”  An additional notation in the same 
docket entry states “Copies sent to SAO, and PD 2/17/10,” presumably meaning that the 
Clerk sent copies of Williams’s letter to the State’s Attorney’s Office and the local Office 
of the Public Defender.1   
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 A notation at the bottom of the letter reads also “2/18/10 cc: SAO + PD.”  Despite the 
one-day discrepancy between the notations in the docket entry and on the letter itself, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(continued…) 
-3- 
 
There was utterly no response to Williams’s letter documented.  Mr. Janowich 
continued to represent Williams over the course of the next sixteen months, including a 
hearing in the Circuit Court on 7 June 2010, three subsequent hearings, and a two-day 
jury trial.2  There is no further mention in the record of Williams’s letter by any of the 
four judges who presided over those various proceedings, by Janowich, by the assistant 
state’s attorney who prosecuted the case, or by Williams.    
 
At Williams’s jury trial, two law enforcement officers testified to the following 
facts pertinent to the circumstances of Williams’s arrest.3  During the evening of 15 
September 2008, Deputies Grant Krulock and Robert Schultz of the Harford County 
Sheriff’s Office (collectively, “the Officers”) were in uniform and on bicycle patrol in 
Edgewood, Maryland.  At approximately 11:00 P.M., the Officers were talking to a group 
of civilians clustered around a van parked on the side of Fountain Rock Way.  During this 
conversation, Melvin Williams, who the Officers did not know or recognize at the time, 
was observed walking toward them down the center of the street, holding his left hand 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(…continued) 
 
neither party disputes that copies of the letter were sent to the State’s Attorney’s Office 
and local Office of the Public Defender on or about 17-18 February 2010.  Nowhere in 
the record before us, however, does the prosecutor, Janowich, or any of the judges who 
considered aspects of Williams’s case admit to reading the letter prior to or during 
Williams’s trial.  For all we know, Williams’s letter was something like a “message in a 
bottle” tossed in the ocean. 
 
2 The Circuit Court held the additional hearings on 21 September 2010, 12 January 2011, 
and 10 March 2011.  Williams’s trial occurred on 4-5 May 2011. 
 
3 The testimony of a third officer is not relevant for present purposes.  
 
-4- 
 
inside of his shorts.  Williams veered toward the driver’s side of the van, but, after 
making eye contact with Krulock, changed direction and walked past the van and 
returned to the center of the street.   
At that point, Krulock, with Schultz close behind, began to follow Williams on 
their bicycles.  Krulock asked Williams to stop so the Officers could identify him.  He 
also asked Williams to take his hand out of his pants.  Williams removed his left hand 
from his pants, but, while doing so, turned away from Krulock.  The Officer saw a clear 
plastic baggie fall to the ground from Williams’s hand.  Krulock decided then to detain 
Williams, and asked him to put his hands behind his back.  Williams began to comply, 
but suddenly ran away.  The Officers yelled for Williams to stop running.  Schultz 
deployed his Taser to no avail.  A chase ensued, in which Williams, with the Officers in 
hot pursuit, ran around a nearby apartment building.  Krulock’s literal narrative picks up 
the “Cat Ballou-like” chase: 
We continued to pursue the subject on foot around the apartment building.  
We completely circled the apartment building that we were originally in 
front of.  As we came around back to the area where we originally tried to 
detain him, one of the subjects as I mentioned earlier that we were talking 
to at the van, he came running along side [sic] the building and pursued the 
subject in front of us and he ended up tackling him and holding him down 
on to the ground for us to catch up.    
 
. . . 
  
As soon as we turned the corner we saw the subject that we were originally 
talking to holding the subject down on the ground who was attempting to 
get away at the time and then we approached him.  I advised for the subject 
to get down on the ground and he refused to listen to my commands.  
Several times I then advised that he was going to be Tased if he did not 
listen to commands.  He continued to ignore my commands.  At that point I 
-5- 
 
Tased him to gain compliance and detain him and end up getting the cuffs 
on him.   
 
Krulock concluded by stating that he searched Williams’s wallet, finding a fingernail-
sized plastic bag containing crack cocaine. 
 
At the close of the State’s case-in-chief, Williams moved for judgment of acquittal 
on the resisting arrest count, arguing that the force used against the officers, if any, was 
de minimis.  The Circuit Court denied the motion, finding that the use of force was a 
question of fact for the jury to decide. 
 
Williams testified in his defense.  Much of his testimony contradicted that of the 
Officers.  In particular, although Williams admitted to running from the Officers, he did 
not admit to using force against the bystander who tackled him.  On direct examination, 
Williams stated: 
I ran.  Basically, when I got back into the middle of the street I gave up 
because I’m safe now, but a guy that I remember when I was a little kid, he 
jumps on me.  I gave up.  I got my weight back from not using [drugs].  He 
was only like about 100 pounds and I was 250, real big.  He didn’t pin me 
nowhere.  I gave up.    
  
Williams testified similarly in response to cross-examination questioning regarding his 
arrest: 
I ran back in the middle of the street by the civilians where everybody had a 
visual of what was going on with me. 
  
. . .  
 
I just gave up.  I was laying on the ground.  A citizen was supposedly 
holding me, a ond [sic] hundred pound pound [sic] guy. 
 
-6- 
 
Following his testimony, Williams rested his case and renewed his motion for judgment 
of acquittal on the resisting arrest count.  The Circuit Court denied the motion for the 
same reasons as before.    
 
    The jury found Williams guilty on the counts of misdemeanor possession of 
cocaine and resisting arrest.4  Following sentencing, Williams filed timely a notice of 
appeal to the Court of Special Appeals.  Williams argued that the Circuit Court failed to 
comply with Maryland Rule 4-215(e) by not addressing his written request to discharge 
counsel.  Further, he insisted that the State’s evidence was insufficient to sustain his 
conviction on the charge of resisting arrest.  The intermediate appellate court, in an 
unreported opinion initially, affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court.  The State filed a 
Motion to Designate for Reporting the Unreported Opinion.  The Court of Special 
Appeals granted the State’s motion and filed subsequently a reported opinion.  Williams 
v. State, 208 Md. App. 622, 57 A.3d 508 (2012).       
 
Williams sent a letter to this Court on 6 December 2012, which we treated as a 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.  We notified Williams that he had until 7 January 2013 to 
supplement his Petition.  On that date, the Office of the Public Defender filed a Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari on behalf of Williams.  We granted the Public Defender’s Petition 
to consider the following questions: 
Where Petitioner stated unequivocally and conspicuously his desire to 
discharge his attorney in a letter filed with the court, was the court required 
to comply with the requirements of Maryland Rule 4-215(e), without the 
need for Petitioner to repeat his request in open court? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 The jury acquitted Williams on the other two controlled substances violations. 
-7- 
 
 
Did the Court of Special Appeals misinterpret Maryland Code (2002, 2011 
Cum. Supp.), Criminal Law Article, § 9-408 in upholding Petitioner’s 
conviction for resisting arrest where the force allegedly used in resisting 
arrest was “employed against someone other than the police officer who is 
attempting to effectuate the arrest”? 
 
Williams v. State, 430 Md. 644, 62 A.3d 730 (2013). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
We are called upon here to interpret provisions of the Maryland Rules and the 
Maryland Code.  Our interpretations of both “are appropriately classified as questions of 
law.”  Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604, 861 A.2d 78, 80 (2004).  As such, “we review 
the issues [without deference] to determine if the trial court was legally correct in its 
rulings on these matters.”  Id.   
We use “the same canons and principles” of construction to interpret the Rules and 
the Code, as we do generally with legislation.  Pinkney v. State, 427 Md. 77, 88, 46 A.3d 
413, 420 (2012) (quoting Knox v. State, 404 Md. 76, 85-86, 945 A.2d 638, 644 (2008)); 
see also Grade v. State, 431 Md. 85, 102, 64 A.3d 197, 207 (2013) (“[T]he canons of 
construction applicable to statutes are equally applicable to rules.”).  We explained 
recently those canons and principles that are pertinent to this case: 
We look to the plain meaning of the language employed in the[ ] rules and 
construe that language without forced or subtle interpretations designed to 
limit or extend its scope.  We avoid a construction of a rule or statute that is 
unreasonable, illogical, or inconsistent with common sense.  We construe 
statutes and rules as a whole so that no word, clause, sentence, or phrase is 
rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory.  
Black v. State, 426 Md. 328, 338-39, 44 A.3d 362, 368 (2012) (alteration in original) 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).   
-8- 
 
ANALYSIS 
I. 
 
We address first the question of whether Williams’s letter to the Circuit Court was 
sufficient to require the Circuit Court to conduct an inquiry consistent with the rigors of 
Rule 4-215(e). 
A. 
  Williams advances four interlocking arguments in pursuit of his quest for a 
reversal of the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals based on the trial court’s 
asserted non-compliance with Rule 4-215(e).  First, he argues that, once Rule 4-215(e) is 
triggered, the court must inquire into the defendant’s reasons for discharge.  As Williams 
sees it, he triggered the Rule in the present case by “unequivocally and conspicuously 
stat[ing] his desire to discharge counsel.”  Second, he contends that the plain language of 
the Rule does not require that the modality of expression be oral and made in open court, 
nor does it require that the request, once made, need be repeated thereafter.  Third, 
Williams claims that the Court of Special Appeals’s reliance on State v. Northam, 421 
Md. 195, 26 A.3d 344 (2011),  is misplaced because we did not hold there that a trial 
court may ignore a request to discharge counsel when the request was sufficient to trigger 
Rule 4-215(e) at the time it was advanced.  Fourth, Williams disagrees with the 
conclusion of the Court of Special Appeals that the four Circuit Court judges, who 
presided over the collective hearings and the trial that took place after the letter was 
received, could infer reasonably that any problems between Williams and his counsel 
were resolved after the letter was sent merely because Williams did not reiterate 
-9- 
 
subsequent displeasure or dis-satisfaction with Janowich and allowed the representation 
to continue (even through trial), especially in view of defense counsel’s ethical 
obligations under the Maryland Lawyers Rules of Professional Conduct to note for the 
court any discontent on his client’s part.  
The State counters that Williams did not trigger Rule 4-215(e) because he 
refrained from re-asserting the discharge of counsel issue during any of his five court 
appearances following sending the letter.  In support of that argument, the State contends 
that Maryland case law, including Northam, creates an additional requirement for the 
defendant who expresses the desire to discharge counsel in a modality other than in open 
court, to “utter something in open court that can reasonably be construed as a present 
desire by the defendant to discharge counsel.”  By failing to reiterate his desire to 
terminate counsel’s representation in open court, the State continues, Williams waived 
effectively his initial request.  Urging us to reject Williams’s assertion that the content of 
his letter is more direct than, and therefore distinguishable from, the letter at the heart of 
Northam, the State argues that the “motion” must be brought again to the court’s 
attention regardless of how clearly and succinctly Williams styled it in his letter.  The 
State contends also that it would be “absurd” to require that a trial court “should sua 
sponte involve itself in the attorney-client relationship,” where defense counsel did not 
apprise the court of Williams’s unhappiness with his representation. 
B. 
The purpose of Rule 4-215 is to “protect that most important fundamental right to 
the effective assistance of counsel, which is basic to our adversary system of criminal 
-10- 
 
justice.”  Parren v. State, 309 Md. 260, 281, 523 A.2d 597, 607 (1987).  That right is 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is applied 
to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, and by Article 21 of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights.  State v. Davis, 415 Md. 22, 29, 997 A.2d 780, 784 (2010) (citing 
Brye v. State, 410 Md. 623, 634, 980 A.2d 435, 441 (2009)).  Accordingly, “we have held 
consistently that the requirements of the Rule are mandatory,” that its “mandates [] 
require strict compliance,” and that “a trial court’s departure from the requirements of 
Rule 4-215 constitutes reversible error.”  Pinkney, 427 Md. at 87-88, 46 A.3d at 419; see 
also Davis, 415 Md. at 31, 997 A.2d at 785 (“The failure to inquire into a defendant’s 
reasons for seeking new counsel when the proper request has been made to the court is 
reversible error.” (citing Snead v. State, 286 Md. 122, 131, 406 A.2d 98, 103 (1979))). 
The first part of subsection (e) of Rule 4-215, the only provision of the Rule at 
issue in this case, states: “(e) Discharge of Counsel--Waiver. If a defendant requests 
permission to discharge an attorney whose appearance has been entered, the court shall 
permit the defendant to explain the reasons for the request.”  The Rule does not define 
“what level of discourse is required to discharge counsel.” State v. Campbell, 385 Md. 
616, 629, 870 A.2d 217, 224 (2005).  Furthermore, a review of the Rule’s history 
“contains no commentary on the meaning of the phrase ‘requests permission to discharge 
an attorney.’”  Campbell, 385 Md. at 628 n.4, 870 A.2d at 224 n.4.  
Our prior interpretations of Rule 4-215(e) (and its predecessor, Rule 723c) assist, 
however, in clarifying what constitutes a cognizable discharge request under the Rule.  
We explained that a defendant need not “utter a talismanic phrase,” Leonard v. State, 302 
-11- 
 
Md. 111, 124, 486 A.2d 163, 169 (1985), or “state his position or express his desire to 
discharge his attorney in a specified manner” to trigger the rigors of the Rule.  Davis, 415 
Md. at 32, 997 A.2d at 786.  Moreover, a request to discharge an attorney need not be 
explicit.  See State v. Hardy, 415 Md. 612, 623, 4 A.3d 908, 914 (2010) (“A defendant 
makes such a request when his or her statement constitutes more a declaration of 
dissatisfaction with counsel than an explicit request to discharge.”).  Rather, Rule 4-
215(e) is triggered by any statement from which a court could conclude reasonably that 
the defendant may be inclined to discharge counsel.  State v. Taylor, 431 Md. 615, 634, 
66 A.3d 698, 710 (2013); Hardy, 415 Md. at 623, 4 A.3d at 914; Davis, 415 Md. at 31, 
997 A.2d at 785; Leonard, 302 Md. at 124, 486 A.2d at 169.   
Once Rule 4-215(e) is triggered, the trial court has an affirmative duty to address 
the defendant’s request.  As we explained in Taylor, when it is (or should be) clear 
objectively that a defendant is making a request to discharge counsel, “the defendant 
must be provided [] with a forum in which he or she (and/or counsel) may explain the 
underlying reasons for the purported request to discharge counsel.”  State v. Taylor, 431 
Md. at 633, 66 A.3d at 709. 
We held recently in Northam that the defendant’s choice to send to the trial court a 
letter of a certain content did not trigger Rule 4-215(e), and therefore did not require an 
inquiry by the court.  There, the defendant’s writing, captioned as a Motion for Change of 
Venue, contained in its fourth and final paragraph, the following language:  
Regardless of my race, gender, or ethnic belief I feel as a American citizen 
I have the right to be judge properly and be granted the ability to be 
represented by a Firm who has represented.  Thereselves with Integerty and 
-12- 
 
Justice.  My Lawyers filed are updated but he has made no contact with me 
and trial is set at Sept 24  I’m requesting a Court appointed attorney and 
change of venue.  
 
Northam, 421 Md. at 203, 26 A.3d at 348.  The first three paragraphs of the letter 
concerned the defendant’s request for a change of venue.  The trial court denied 
Northam’s “motion” in a simple order filed on 11 September 2008.  Id.  The transcript of 
a hearing held the following day contained no mention of Northam’s expressed desire to 
discharge his counsel; a docket entry from that day, however, stated “Defendant consents 
to continued representation by [defense counsel].”  Northam, 421 Md. at 203-04, 26 A.3d 
at 348-49.  At a final pretrial hearing on 24 September 2008, Northam attempted to 
address the court, but was told by the judge to “talk to [his] lawyer,” who in turn told the 
court that he needed to resolve something with his client, and suggested that they may 
need a recess and reconvene the hearing.  Northam, 421 Md. at 204-05, 26 A.3d at 349.  
No request to reconvene was made that day.  Northam, 421 Md. at 205, 26 A.3d at 349.  
Northam stood for trial the next day and was convicted.  Id.  The Court of Special 
Appeals overturned, in an unreported opinion, Northam’s conviction, holding that 
Northam’s letter was sufficient to trigger a Rule 4-215(e) inquiry.  See Northam, 421 Md. 
at 205, 26 A.3d at 350 (citing the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals). 
 
On certiorari review, we reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.  
The Court agreed with the State’s argument that Northam’s “vague request, that he 
wanted a ‘Court appointed attorney,’ buried in the final sentence of the final paragraph of 
what was captioned and pled specifically and solely as a change of venue motion stands 
in stark contrast to other cases where 4-215 inquiries were mandated.”  Northam, 421 
-13- 
 
Md. at 206, 26 A.3d at 350.  We considered other cases where we held that defendants 
waived the opportunity for rulings on particular written requests that were part of larger 
“omnibus” motions because the defendants failed to re-assert undecided motions in open 
court.  Following our review of those cases, we noted that Northam failed to reiterate a 
request to discharge counsel in three appearances in open court after sending his letter.  
Northam, 421 Md. at 206-07, 26 A.3d at 350-51.  Consequently, we accepted the State’s 
argument that, in Northam’s case, “‘Rule 4-215(e) was not implicated, much less 
violated, by the trial court.’”  Northam, 421 Md. at 207, 26 A.3d at 351.  Additionally, we 
refused to infer that Northam was attempting to request discharge of his counsel at the 24 
September 2008 hearing when the judge cut him off because the court’s “talk to your 
lawyer” response was an appropriate one under the circumstances, and because “we shall 
not infer that [defense counsel] failed to comply with the Maryland Rules of Professional 
Conduct.”  Id. 
C. 
 
We agree with Williams that his letter was sufficient to trigger the requirements of 
Rule 4-215(e).  His letter stated clearly, solely, and unequivocally that he intended to 
discharge his counsel.  Unlike Northam’s fleeting reference in closing to wanting a 
“Court appointed attorney,” Williams’s request was neither vague nor embedded within 
extraneous matter in an unrelated written motion.  Indeed, by stating that he was writing 
“to request New representation From the Public defender’s office,” and asking the court 
to “remove [Mr. Janowich] from [his] case,” Williams posed a request that was just as 
explicit, focused, and direct in content, if not more so, than requests in other cases where 
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we held that Rule 4-215(e) inquiries were necessary.  See, e.g., Hardy, 415 Md. at 622, 4 
A.3d at 914 (defendant stated that he was “‘thinking about changing the attorney or 
something’”); Campbell, 385 Md. at 632, 870 A.2d at 226 (defendant made several 
statements including “I don't like this man as my representative” and “[y]ou all wouldn't 
let me fire him”); Williams v. State, 321 Md. 266, 267, 582 A.2d 803, 804 (1990) 
(defendant stated to the court “I want another representative”).  The only difference was 
that Williams chose a written form of expression. 
The State’s argument that Williams’s letter was insufficient to trigger Rule 4-
215(e) because the Rule requires that someone “utter something in open court that can 
reasonably be construed as a present desire by the defendant to discharge counsel” is 
well-intentioned, but unfounded.  First, the plain language of the Rule states only that a 
court must inquire into the reasons for discharge “[i]f a defendant requests permission to 
discharge an attorney.”  Nowhere in the Rule does it state that such a request must be 
oral, as opposed to written, or made in open court.  We decline to adopt the State’s 
categorical view that an out-of-open-court, written request filed with the court cannot 
alone compel an inquiry and disposition by the court.  The State bases its argument on the 
ground that our prior decisions in which we held that statements triggered Rule 4-215(e) 
all involved oral declarations made in open court.  In none of those cases, however, were 
we called upon to consider whether the Rule meant that an oral declaration made in open 
court is the only way to invoke the Rule.  Furthermore, when we stated in Davis that a 
request to discharge counsel “need not be made in writing or even formally worded,” 415 
-15- 
 
Md. at 31, 997 A.2d at 785 (emphasis added), the clear implication was that a written 
request may suffice under the Rule.   
Here, Williams presented the Circuit Court with a request, in his own words, to 
discharge counsel.  That Williams relayed those words by his pen, instead of his voice, is 
of no consequence.  Moreover, that he delivered his request outside of open court is 
equally inconsequential.  To hold otherwise would be to engraft impermissibly additional 
language into the Rule.  See, e.g., Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Marcas, L.L.C., 415 Md. 676, 
685, 4 A.3d 946, 951 (2010) (“We neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an 
intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the [Rule].”). 
Of course, a danger to be guarded against when a defendant chooses a letter 
format, rather than something stated plainly in open court, is the trial court being sand-
bagged or the “mine being salted.”5  Although perhaps unstated as such in Northam, there 
is an undercurrent to the Court’s reasoning that burying such a request in a more 
expansive writing will not necessarily be cognizable as a Rule 4-215(e) trigger.  Here, no 
such ulterior motive is so obviously present.  Even if a defendant harbors a hope that a 
letter (even expressing succinctly the desire to fire present counsel) in the court jacket 
may go unobserved by a busy trial judge (or group of trial judges, as was the case here), a 
busy prosecutor, or his/her defense counsel, and thus create insurance guaranteeing a “do-
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 See Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1038 (1989) (defining “salt” as “to 
enrich (as a mine) artificially by secretly placing valuable mineral in some of the working 
places”). 
 
-16- 
 
over” if the defendant is convicted, that degree of slyness6 can be protected against by 
reasonable diligence on the part of the other dramatis personae in criminal litigation, not 
the least of which could be the Clerk’s Office transmitting the court jacket to a judge 
(with a copy of the letter appended to the front) when a document such as was filed here 
is received. 
Second, the State’s reliance here on the need for a defendant to indicate a “present 
desire” to discharge counsel misconstrues our decisions.  We noted in Davis that, to 
trigger Rule 4-215(e), a statement must indicate the defendant’s “present intent to seek a 
different legal advisor.” 415 Md. at 33, 997 A.2d at 786.  In that case, defense counsel 
told the administrative judge, on the morning of trial, that the defendant indicated, in a 
prior conversation, that he “[w]anted a jury trial and new counsel,” and that “I told him it 
was very unlikely that the Court was going to award him another attorney in this case.” 
415 Md. at 27, 997 A.2d at 782.  Thus, the first representation to the court that the 
defendant intended to discharge his counsel was expressed in the past tense and was 
unclear as to whether the defendant still harbored that intent.  We concluded that, 
although Rule 4-215(e) does not mandate an inquiry where the court is informed only of 
a prior intent to discharge counsel, “the Court at least was required to inquire further so it 
could determine whether Davis still maintained that intent.”  Davis, 415 Md. at 33, 997 
A.2d at 786.         
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 Williams does not resemble even vaguely Lex Luthor, the human criminal mastermind 
and nemesis of Superman. 
-17- 
 
Williams’s request was written and expressed in the present tense. It would be 
illogical to hold that a court may allow a defendant’s expression of a present desire to 
discharge counsel (sufficient to trigger Rule 4-215(e)) to moulder into a past desire (not 
sufficient to trigger the Rule) by neglecting, overlooking, or otherwise failing to address 
promptly the defendant’s clear request.  Moreover, even if we were to accept the 
argument that Williams’s aged request reflected a past desire, Davis requires that the 
court determine, at some point prior to trial, whether Williams continued to harbor an 
intent to discharge counsel.   
The Court of Special Appeals erred by relying too uncritically on Northam.  We 
did not hold in Northam that a request to discharge counsel must be made orally or in 
open court; nor did we hold that a request sufficient to trigger Rule 4-215(e) may be 
waived effectively by failure to repeat it or otherwise bring it to the court’s attention once 
filed in writing.  We concluded that Northam’s written request was insufficient to trigger 
Rule 4-215(e) because it was vague and obscured by the larger body of the written 
motion captioned as (and concerned with) a Motion for Change of Venue.  We touched 
briefly upon the matter of waiver in Northam only in the context of omnibus motions, 
where, like Northam’s request for a “Court appointed attorney,” a single sentence request 
or issue is concealed or obscured by other issues in the particular form where it is raised.  
Williams’s request does not suffer from the problems of vagueness or obscurity—his 
request is singular and unambiguous.  Any argument to the contrary is belied by the 
Circuit Court Clerk’s docket entry on 29 January 2010 reflecting the filing of a “Letter of 
Defendant requesting new representation from the public defender’s office.”  Because we 
-18- 
 
conclude that Williams’s letter was sufficient for the Circuit Court to recognize it as a 
request to discharge counsel, the onus was on the Circuit Court to “permit the defendant 
to explain the reasons for the request.”  Md. Rule 4-215(e).  By failing to do so, the 
Circuit Court violated the Rule. 
Additionally, we agree with Williams’s argument that the Court of Special 
Appeals erred by concluding that “it was reasonable for the trial court to infer that any 
issues between the appellant and Mr. Janowich had been resolved, and that [Williams] 
was assenting to his continued representation by Mr. Janowich.”  Williams, 208 Md. App. 
at 634, 57 A.3d at 516.  That conclusion assumes too much.  More specifically, it 
assumes that at least one of the judges who presided over the hearings and the trial read 
the letter, which the intermediate appellate court could not confirm based on the record.7  
If a Circuit Court judge did read the letter, that judge could not assume that Williams and 
Janowich ever discussed, and resolved subsequently, the reasons for the discharge 
request.  It is possible that Williams sent the discharge request directly to the court 
because he was uncomfortable discussing the request with, or in front of, Janowich.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 Although it is unclear from the record whether any of the Circuit Court judges read the 
letter, it is clear from our opinions that evidence of date-stamping or other handling of the 
letter by the court’s clerk can be sufficient to charge the Circuit Court with receipt of the 
letter.  See, e.g., Denicolis v. State, 378 Md. 646, 658, 837 A.2d 944, 951 (2003) 
(concluding that a jury note marked as a court exhibit and included in the record was 
received by the circuit court for the purposes of Md. Rule 4-326(d)); cf. Fitzgerald v. 
Somerset Cnty. Sanitary Comm'n, 231 Md. 242, 246, 189 A.2d 601, 603 (1963) 
(“Payment to the clerk is payment to the court of which he is an agent[.]”).  Not only was 
Williams’s letter date-stamped by the Clerk of the Circuit Court, it was noted accurately 
and clearly in a docket entry.  Moreover, neither of the parties dispute that the Circuit 
Court received Williams’s letter.    
 
-19- 
 
Because the Circuit Court did not confirm whether Janowich was aware of the request, it 
could not presume or rely on Janowich’s ethical obligation to disclose the request, under 
the Maryland Lawyers Rules of Professional Conduct,8 as proof that Williams abandoned 
his intent to seek new counsel. 
Based on the record in the present case, we do not know whether the absence of a 
Rule 4-215(e) inquiry by the Circuit Court was the result of an oversight, a mistake, the 
adoption of what Williams calls a “wait-and-see approach,” or some other reason.  
Similarly, we do not know whether Williams refrained from repeating his desire in open 
court because he changed his mind, thought the court denied implicitly his request, 
thought that pressing the issue further would anger the court or Janowich, or he was 
adopting his own “wait-and-see approach,” hoping to use the court’s failure to respond to 
his letter as grounds to reverse a potential conviction.  Most importantly, we do not know 
all of Williams’s reasons for requesting the discharge in January 2010 and whether they 
were meritorious—the purpose behind the mandates of Rule 4-215(e). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 In Garner v. State, 414 Md. 373, 995 A.2d 694 (2010), we discussed a lawyer’s ethical 
obligations under similar circumstances in the context of a trial court’s compliance with 
Md. Rule 4-215(a)(3):  
 
Members of the Maryland Bar are officers of the court who have an 
obligation to comply with the Rules of Professional Conduct.  While 
serving as Petitioner’s trial counsel, Rule 1.2 required that [defense 
counsel] abide by Petitioner’s decision concerning the services to be 
performed on Petitioner’s behalf, and Rule 3.3 prohibited [defense counsel] 
from making a false statement to the Circuit Court.  When [Petitioner’s trial 
counsel] stated “I’m still in the case[,]” the Circuit Court was entitled to 
rely upon that statement and was not required to make further inquiry. 
 
414 Md. at 390, 995 A.2d at 705.     
-20- 
 
We hold that Williams’s unambiguous and to-the-point letter was sufficient, on its 
own, to constitute a request to discharge counsel under Rule 4-215(e).  The Circuit 
Court’s failure to inquire into the reasons for that request before trial, in accordance with 
the Rule, is reversible error.      
II. 
 
The second question before us arises from circumstances that are atypical and 
extraordinary in contemporary society.  A bystander, of his own volition and without 
prompting from law enforcement officers, intervened physically to assist officers in 
effectuating an arrest.9  We are asked to decide the novel question of whether force used 
by the arrestee against the volunteer in this case can support a conviction for resisting 
arrest under Maryland's resisting arrest statute.  
A. 
 
Williams urges us to hold that the Court of Special Appeals erred when it 
concluded that the use of force necessary to prove a resisting arrest charge may be force 
“employed against someone other than the police officer who is attempting to effectuate 
the arrest.”  In support of that argument, Williams contends that the intermediate 
appellate court’s conclusion misinterprets the plain language of Md. Code, Criminal Law 
Art., § 9-408.  Williams points to the language of resisting arrest statutes in other 
jurisdictions to justify his interpretation of the plain language of § 9-408.  Furthermore, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 That sort of conduct may be frowned upon by law enforcement as a matter of general 
policy (and be dangerous to the civilian as well), although cooperation with law 
enforcement in its investigations is desirable generally. 
-21- 
 
Williams claims that the holding of the Court of Special Appeals is inconsistent with the 
common law of Maryland and the General Assembly’s purpose in enacting § 9-408. 
 
Not surprisingly, the State disagrees with Williams’s reading of the plain language 
of § 9-408, and argues that the Court of Special Appeals interpreted correctly the 
language of subsection (b)(1), which contains no reference to  police officers as the sole 
objects of the prohibited force.  The State refutes similarly Williams’s reliance on foreign 
statutes, his claims regarding the purpose of § 9-408, and his interpretation of Maryland 
common law.  Moreover, the State urges us to uphold the judgment of the Court of 
Special Appeals based on our recent opinion in Nicolas v. State, 426 Md. 385, 44 A.3d 
396 (2012). 
B. 
 
The General Assembly enacted Maryland’s resisting arrest statute in 2004.  The 
statute reads, in full:  
 (a)  “Police officer” defined.  — In this section, “police officer” means an 
individual who is authorized to make an arrest under Title 2 of the Criminal 
Procedure Article. 
 (b) Prohibited.  — A person may not intentionally: 
(1) resist a lawful arrest; or 
(2) interfere with an individual who the person has reason to 
know is a police officer who is making or attempting to make 
a lawful arrest or detention of another person. 
 (c) Penalty.  — A person who violates this section is guilty of a 
misdemeanor and is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 3 years or a fine 
not exceeding $5,000 or both. 
(d) Unit of prosecution.  — The unit of prosecution for a violation of this 
section is based on the arrest or detention regardless of the number of 
police officers involved in the arrest or detention. 
-22- 
 
 
Md. Code (2002, 2011 Cum. Supp.), Criminal Law Art., § 9-408.  Although the General 
Assembly changed the common law by criminalizing third-party interference with a 
lawful arrest in § 9-408(b)(2), it did not alter by enacting subsection (b)(1) the common 
law elements of the crime of resisting arrest.  McNeal v. State, 200 Md. App. 510, 526, 28 
A.3d 88, 97 (2011).   
The year before the General Assembly enacted § 9-408, we considered the 
common law elements of resisting arrest in Purnell v. State, 375 Md. 678, 827 A.2d 68 
(2003).  We compared analyses of the elements of the offense in Preston v. Warden of the 
Maryland House of Correction, 225 Md. 628, 629, 169 A.2d 407, 408 (1961), where we 
stated that the elements are “‘refusal to submit to lawful arrest and resistance to an officer 
of the law in the performance of his duties,’” and Barnhard v. State, 325 Md. 602, 609-
10, 602 A.2d 701, 704-05 (1992), where we approved a jury instruction stating the 
elements as: “(1) the defendant was arrested; (2) the arrest was lawful; and (3) the 
defendant refused to submit to the arrest.’”  Purnell, 375 Md. at 695, 827 A.2d at 78.  We 
adopted as the elements of the offense the Barnhard formulation.  Id.  Explaining our 
adoption of the Barnhard elements, we noted that “[u]nlike the statement of the elements 
made by the Preston Court, Barnhard’s formulation does not refer to a ‘law enforcement 
officer,’ as the object of the resistance.”  Purnell, 375 Md. at 695-96, 827 A.2d at 78.  
The statement of the elements expressed in Barnhard, and adopted in Purnell, constituted 
the common law elements of the crime of resisting arrest at the time that the Legislature 
codified it in 2004.    
-23- 
 
C. 
 
We reject the State’s argument that we may decide this case based on Nicolas.  In 
that case, we compared the elements of second degree assault and resisting arrest to 
determine whether the offenses merge for sentencing purposes. In doing so, we stated 
“we agree with the State’s contention that the force element of resisting arrest need not 
always constitute second degree assault against a law enforcement officer.”  426 Md. at 
407, 44 A.3d at 409.  The State submits that this statement in Nicolas is the equivalent of 
the Court of Special Appeals’s holding in this case that “[t]he necessary force [to sustain 
a conviction for resisting arrest] may be employed against someone other than the police 
officer who is attempting to effectuate the arrest.”  Williams, 208 Md. App. at 642, 57 
A.3d at 520.  Au contraire.  Nicolas did not require us to contemplate the use of force 
against persons other than law enforcement officers.  We decline to be circumscribed by 
that literal statement under the circumstances and context of this case. 
We do agree, however, with the State’s argument that Williams misreads the plain 
language of § 9-408(b)(1).  Williams makes much of the fact that Maryland’s resisting 
arrest statute contains a definition of the term “police officer” in subsection (a), and uses 
that term in subsections (b)(2) and (d).  He argues, essentially, that the presence of the 
term “police officer” in those subsections suggests that the Legislature intended 
subsection (b)(1) to subsume and apply only to police officers.  Williams points out that 
the definition of “police officer” from the Criminal Procedure Article, cross-referenced in 
§ 9-408(a), does not include civilians who, like the gentleman in the present case, 
intervene with the apparent intent of helping police officers to effectuate an arrest.  See 
-24- 
 
Md. Code (2001, 2008 Repl. Vol.), Criminal Procedure Art., § 2-101(c).  The definition 
of the term “police officer” and subsequent uses of that term in § 9-408, however, belies 
Williams’s argument.   
Section 9-408(a) states, “[i]n this section, ‘police officer’ means . . . [,]” for the 
purposes of ascribing a particular meaning to the term “police officer” whenever it is 
used actually in the resisting arrest statute.  But the Legislature did not include the term 
“police officer” in subsection (b)(1), the provision of the statute implicated in this case; 
rather, § 9-408(b)(1) states simply that it is a crime to “resist a lawful arrest.”  Because 
the term “police officer” is included in subsections (b)(2) and (d), we presume that the 
General Assembly would include the term also in subsection (b)(1) if it intended police 
officers to be sole subjects of the resistance.  By leaving the term “police officer” out of 
subsection (b)(1), the General Assembly fashioned a statute that was consistent with the 
common law elements of resisting arrest as defined in Purnell, and our conclusion there 
that “resisting arrest is, in short, an offense against the State and not personally against 
the officers.”  375 Md. at 698, 827 A.2d at 80.10   
Reviewing the many statutes Williams cites from other states does not change our 
view of the plain language of § 9-408(b)(1).  Even if we were to look to those statutes for 
guidance in our plain language analysis, which we need not do, we are not persuaded by 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 The Legislature’s definition of “police officer” and use of that term in § 9-408 is 
logical and understandable because the vast majority of arrests are affected by police 
officers as modalities of the State’s power of arrest. 
 
-25- 
 
the arguments Williams derives from their language.11  We are unwilling to conclude that 
the Maryland Legislature intended § 9-408(b)(1) to criminalize only force used against 
police officers because it could have adopted language similar to those states whose 
resisting arrest statutes refer to the use of force “against the peace officer or another,” if it 
wanted to include civilians.  See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-2508 (2003) (West).  
Nor are we convinced, as Williams urges, that § 9-408(b)(1) applies only to force used 
against police officers because Delaware’s resisting arrest statute refers to “peace 
officer[s],” and a reference in the General Assembly’s Fiscal Policy Note states that the 
members of the House subcommittee who recommended the original resisting arrest bill 
in Maryland “loosely based their recommendation on Delaware’s codification.”12  We 
have no clear indications concerning which aspects of the totality of § 9-408 may be 
“loosely based” upon Delaware’s resisting arrest statute.  One of the most glaring of the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 His arguments are weakened further by the fact that he cites to 2012 and 2013 versions 
of those foreign statutes, which offer no illumination necessarily on what the Maryland 
Legislature did by enacting § 9-408 in 2004. 
 
12 During the time the Maryland Legislature may have considered Delaware’s resisting 
arrest statute in the course of considering its resisting arrest statute in 2004, Delaware’s 
statute read:  
 
A person is guilty of resisting arrest when the person intentionally prevents or 
attempts to prevent a peace officer from effecting an arrest or detention of the 
person or another person or intentionally flees from a peace officer who is 
effecting an arrest. 
 
Resisting arrest is a class A misdemeanor.  
 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 11 § 1257 (2004). 
 
-26- 
 
myriad differences between § 9-408 and the pertinent parts of Delaware’s statute is the 
conspicuous absence of “peace officer,” or any similar term, in subsection (b)(1).   
Williams does not challenge whether the officers were acting lawfully when they 
arrested him; nor does he challenge whether the intervention of the bystander who 
tackled him constituted a citizen’s arrest, and, if so, whether such an arrest would be a 
“lawful” one under § 9-408(b)(1).13  Therefore, we shall assume, for present purposes, 
that the police officers were attempting lawfully to arrest Williams, and need only 
consider whether the requisite resistance-by-force element was proved under the 
circumstances of this case.   
Assuming the arrest of Williams was lawful, we do not think the General 
Assembly intended to preclude a resisting arrest charge arising under the peculiar facts of 
this case.  We agree with the Court of Special Appeals’s conclusion that “[t]he plain 
language of [§ 9-408(b)(1)] does not specify that a defendant may be found guilty of 
resisting arrest only if he employs force against the police officer who is attempting to 
arrest him.”  Williams v. State, 208 Md. App. at 641, 57 A.3d at 520.  It is reasonable to 
conclude from the evidence presented at Williams’s trial that: (1) the bystander was 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13  We defined a lawful citizen’s arrest in Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Paul:  
 
In Maryland a private person has authority to arrest without a warrant only 
when a) there is a felony being committed in his presence or when a felony 
has in fact been committed whether or not in his presence, and the arrester 
has reasonable ground (probable cause) to believe the person he arrests has 
committed it; or b) a misdemeanor is being committed in the presence or 
view of the arrester which amounts to a breach of the peace. 
 
256 Md. 643, 655, 261 A.2d 731, 738-39 (1970).  
-27- 
 
aware that Krulock and Schultz were attempting to arrest Williams; (2) he tackled 
voluntarily Williams with the intent of helping the officers effectuate the arrest; (3) 
Williams used physical force against the bystander in the ensuing struggle; and, (4) 
Williams’s use of force was for the purposes of resisting the imminent arrest by the 
officers who were in hot and close pursuit.  We hold that, on the record of the present 
case, the Court of Special Appeals did not misinterpret the plain language of § 9-
408(b)(1).   
 
 
 
 
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS 
REVERSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART. 
CASE REMANDED TO THE COURT OF SPECIAL 
APPEALS WITH DIRECTIONS TO REVERSE THE 
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
CIRCUIT 
COURT 
FOR 
HARFORD COUNTY AND REMAND THE CASE TO 
THAT COURT FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS NOT 
INCONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.  THE COSTS 
IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL 
APPEALS TO BE DIVIDED EQUALLY BY THE 
PARTIES.