Case Title: State v. Belew

Citation: 2014-Ohio-2964

Docket Number: 2013-0711

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2014-07-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Belew, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-2964.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-2964 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. BELEW, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State v. Belew, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-2964.] 
Appeal dismissed as having been improvidently accepted. 
(No. 2013-0711—Submitted March 12, 2014—Decided July 10, 2014.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, 
No. L-11-1279, 2013-Ohio-1078. 
____________________ 
{¶ 1} The cause is dismissed as having been improvidently accepted. 
PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, and FRENCH, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER and O’NEILL, JJ., dissent. 
____________________ 
LANZINGER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 2} I respectfully dissent from the court’s decision to dismiss this case 
as having been improvidently accepted.  Amici curiae in support of appellant, 
Jeffery Belew, filed two memoranda in support of jurisdiction asserting that this 
case involves a matter of great general interest and public importance and filed 
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two supporting merit briefs.1  And although the state does not disagree with 
Belew’s proposition that “[w]hen credibly diagnosed, a trial court must consider 
combat-related post-traumatic stress disorder and other service-related disabilities 
as mitigation when imposing sentence on a military veteran,” it argues that the 
trial court here did properly consider those factors when sentencing him. 
{¶ 3} I believe that we should render an opinion on how posttraumatic 
stress disorder (“PTSD”) must be considered by a court when it sentences a 
military veteran.  And just as important, we should clarify the standard that an 
appellate court must use in reviewing a sentence of this type.  It is my position 
that only a full opinion by this court will clarify both the appellate court’s 
standard of review and the trial court’s need to support the record for a felony 
sentence. 
Case Background 
{¶ 4} On April 10, 2011, Belew fired at least four shots at police officers 
who were responding to a domestic-disturbance call in Oregon, Ohio.  Belew’s 
shots struck an arriving police car twice, and he did not respond to commands to 
cease fire until he was wounded by shots fired by the officers.  He was arrested 
and received hospital care. 
{¶ 5} Belew was indicted on April 20, 2011, for two counts of attempted 
aggravated murder of a law-enforcement officer and two counts of felonious 
assault, which were first-degree felonies under R.C. 2903.11(D)(1) because the 
shots were fired at peace officers.  Each count contained specifications that he 
both displayed, brandished, indicated possession of, or used a firearm (R.C. 
2941.145) and discharged his firearm at peace officers (R.C. 2941.1412).  He 
                                          
 
1 One brief was filed by Ohio Suicide Prevention Foundation, Disability Rights Ohio, National 
Disability Rights Network, National Alliance on Mental Illness of Ohio, and Ohio Empowerment 
Coalition, Inc.  The other brief was filed by the Arms Forces. 
January Term, 2014 
3 
 
entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”) to all 
charges and specifications. 
{¶ 6} As a result of his NGRI plea, Belew was evaluated by two 
psychologists, who provided reports to the court concluding that he did not 
qualify for the insanity defense.  One of the psychologists diagnosed him with 
alcohol dependence and persistent major depression and PTSD as a result of his 
military service in Iraq.  That psychologist believed that Belew was hoping to be 
killed by police on the day of the shooting.  The other psychologist found 
evidence of possible malingering or a personality disorder. 
{¶ 7} After plea negotiations, Belew changed his plea to guilty and the 
state dismissed certain counts and specifications.  He was sentenced to 27 years in 
prison: two consecutive ten-year terms for each count of felonious assault to be 
served consecutively to two concurrent seven-year terms for the firearm 
specifications.  He appealed his sentence to the Sixth District Court of Appeals, 
which affirmed the trial court’s order, holding that the trial court appropriately 
weighed statutory factors in imposing his sentence.  We then accepted a 
discretionary appeal. 
{¶ 8} In his appeal before this court, Belew contends that the sentencing 
judge did not understand PTSD and did not give appropriate weight to PTSD as a 
mitigating factor.  Belew argues that his actions were tied to his PTSD because 
his heightened responses, including irritability and anger, and his exacerbated 
alcoholism caused him to react in a manner he would not have otherwise.  He 
characterizes his 27-year aggregate sentence as an abuse of the court’s discretion 
as well as being contrary to law. 
{¶ 9} I believe that this case provides us with an opportunity to review 
statutory requirements for the consideration of mitigating evidence and the 
imposition of consecutive sentences, as well as the standard of review to be used 
by the courts of appeals. 
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Legal Analysis 
The Appellate Standard of Review 
{¶ 10} Ohio’s felony-sentencing scheme allows judges to exercise 
discretion within statutory bounds.  The sentencing court is required to follow 
statutory direction in choosing a prison term, and it is no longer enough that a 
sentence falls within the permitted range.  Regarding appellate review, after we 
struck down portions of the sentencing statutes in light of federal law in State v. 
Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856, 845 N.E.2d 470, a plurality of this 
court set forth a two-step approach for courts of appeals to use:  (1) whether the 
trial court adhered to all applicable rules and statutes in imposing the sentence and 
(2) whether a sentence within the permissible statutory range constitutes an abuse 
of discretion.  State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 
124, ¶ 26.  But as noted by the Kalish dissent, R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) had expressly 
rejected abuse of discretion as the standard for appellate review and Foster had 
not severed that portion of the statute.  See id. at ¶ 66 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting). 
{¶ 11} After the United States Supreme Court, in Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 
160, 163, 129 S.Ct. 711, 172 L.Ed.2d 517 (2009), upheld the ability of trial court 
judges to make findings of fact before imposing consecutive sentences, the 
General Assembly modified R.C. 2953.08(G), which governs appellate review of 
sentences, as part of 2011 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 86.  Effective September 30, 2011, 
R.C. 2953.08(G) reads: 
 
 
(2) The court hearing an appeal under division (A), (B), or 
(C) of this section shall review the record, including the findings 
underlying the sentence or modification given by the sentencing 
court. 
 
The appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise 
modify a sentence that is appealed under this section or may vacate 
January Term, 2014 
5 
 
the sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for 
resentencing.  The appellate court’s standard for review is not 
whether the sentencing court abused its discretion.  The appellate 
court may take any action authorized by this division if it clearly 
and convincingly finds either of the following: 
 
(a) That the record does not support the sentencing court’s 
findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division 
(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 
2929.20 of the Revised Code, whichever, if any, is relevant;
 
(b) That the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 12} R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) repudiates the abuse-of-discretion standard in 
favor of appellate review that upholds a sentence unless the court of appeals 
clearly and convincingly finds that the record does not support the trial court’s 
findings. 
The Sentencing Hearing 
{¶ 13} The trial court in this case received the psychological reports and 
the presentence-investigation report into evidence.  Psychologist Dr. Wayne 
Graves, who testified at the sentencing hearing, opined specifically about the 
diagnosis of PTSD, which resulted from Belew’s military service in Iraq, and 
about the consequences of PTSD.  Defense counsel and the prosecuting attorney 
also spoke.  Afterwards, the sentencing judge stated: 
 
I have reviewed the presentence report that has been prepared, I’ve 
reread the report prepared by Dr. Charlene Cassel of the Court 
Diagnostic and Treatment Center, I’ve reread Dr. Wayne Graves’ 
report, I have read two letters from the Defendant’s mother, and 
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I’ve listened very carefully to the testimony of Dr. Wayne Graves 
here today, as well as listened to what Counsel and Defendant has 
had to say, and I’ve balanced all of that information in sentencing 
this afternoon. 
 
{¶ 14} She then addressed the defendant directly: 
 
Mr. Belew, you claim that you suffer from post-traumatic stress 
disorder as a result of being in the military and you provide that as 
an excuse for your actions.  There is no excuse, Mr. Belew.  I have 
to—I feel that I’m compelled because of my concerns of why you 
entered the military, to weigh that.  And your words to Dr. 
Charlene Cassel were, I joined the Marines to see how many 
people I could kill.  That’s, generally—if I’m not mistaken, people 
don’t join the military to see how many people they can kill.  You 
were continually in trouble and constantly drunk and under the 
influence of alcohol and drugs, and you received a bad conduct 
discharge after being court martialed for stealing government 
property. 
 
{¶ 15} Turning to the offenses, the judge then stated: 
 
These offenses are extremely serious, Mr. Belew, these officers 
could have been killed, because you intended to kill them.  They 
responded to a call of a fight between you and your brother 
because you were in possession of a handgun and were extremely 
intoxicated.  And you don’t remember what happened that night, as 
you said, because you were suffering from an alcohol blackout.  
January Term, 2014 
7 
 
And according to Dr. Charlene Cassel, people who are suffering 
alcohol blackouts do not do things that are uncharacteristic of 
things that they wouldn’t normally do.  You shot at Officer Martin 
when he stopped his vehicle, you shot at him several times, and 
when the other two officers came to assist they gave several 
commands to you to stop and put down your weapon, but you 
continued to walk toward them with your gun pointed at them.  
And it was only after you were wounded that you stopped.  You 
are lucky to be standing here today, Mr. Belew, because they very 
well could have killed you. 
 
{¶ 16} The judge next stated:  “You do have a minimal criminal history.”  
However, she also stated, “because of your actions I believe you are a danger to 
this community.” 
{¶ 17} The judge specifically stated that she had considered R.C. 2929.19, 
Crim.R. 32, and the statutory factors under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 before 
imposing ten-year consecutive prison sentences for the two first-degree felonies 
of felonious assault.  The concurrent seven-year terms for the gun specifications 
were ordered to be served consecutively to the felonious-assault terms, with the 
judge finding pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) that consecutive sentences were 
necessary to protect the public from future crime and were not disproportionate to 
the seriousness of Belew’s conduct.  She also stated that no single prison term 
would reflect the seriousness of his conduct for the offenses committed as part of 
a course of conduct.  See R.C. 2929.14(C)(4)(b). 
Appellant’s Arguments 
{¶ 18} Belew contends that the court did not properly consider PTSD as a 
substantial ground to mitigate his conduct and argues that he should have received 
no more than the minimum aggregate sentence of ten years (three-year concurrent 
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sentences for the felonious assaults, served consecutively to the concurrent 
mandatory seven-year sentences for the gun specifications).  In essence, by 
objecting to the manner in which the court considered his PTSD, Belew is 
actually asking for a reweighing of the statutory factors that the trial court already 
balanced in determining his sentence.  But as long as the trial judge properly 
considered all mitigating factors, it was within her discretion to weigh them in any 
manner that she saw fit and to assign such weight to each factor as she thought 
appropriate.  See State v. Noling, 98 Ohio St.3d 44, 2002-Ohio-7044, 781 N.E.2d 
88, ¶ 130 (the weight, if any, to assign a given factor is a matter for the discretion 
of the individual decisionmaker).  Stated another way, this means that appellate 
courts are prohibited from substituting their judgment for that of the trial judge. 
The Record in This Case 
{¶ 19} The state in this case argues that the trial judge did consider the 
PTSD.  The record indicates that Belew’s alcohol abuse and troubles with 
authorities started before he enlisted in the Marines after high school.  His 
military experience seemed to aggravate his problems. 
{¶ 20} Belew served more than three years in the Marines but was given a 
bad-conduct discharge after “joy riding” in a government vehicle while 
intoxicated.  His psychological evaluations revealed that he began abusing other 
substances during his service in Iraq, and when he returned to the United States, 
his alcohol use increased significantly.  Belew struggled to adjust upon his return 
to civilian life, often drinking to the point of passing out or blacking out. 
{¶ 21} Although R.C. 2929.12(F) was not in effect at the time of Belew’s 
sentencing, that subsection now covers the issue of PTSD for those who have 
served in the military.  R.C. 2929.12(F), which became effective on March 22, 
2013, is a stand-alone provision and was not placed under subsection (D) (factors 
indicating that the offender is likely to commit future crimes) or subsection (E) 
January Term, 2014 
9 
 
(factors indicating that the offender is not likely to commit future crimes).  See 
2012 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 197.  R.C. 2929.12(F) reads: 
 
The sentencing court shall consider the offender’s military service 
record and whether the offender has an emotional, mental, or 
physical condition that is traceable to the offender’s service in the 
armed forces of the United States and that was a contributing 
factor in the offender’s commission of the offense or offenses. 
 
In other words, the court must consider PTSD and its possible impact, but the 
General Assembly has recognized that the mitigating weight to assign to PTSD is 
a matter for the sentencing judge. 
{¶ 22} Here, the record shows that the court considered the issue of 
Belew’s PTSD.  The judgment entry recites that the judge considered the record, 
oral statements, victim-impact statement, and presentence report.  R.C. 
2929.12(A) now states that a court that imposes a felony sentence 
 
has discretion to determine the most effective way to comply with 
the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in section 
2929.11 of the Revised Code. In exercising that discretion, the 
court shall consider the factors set forth in divisions (B) and (C) of 
this section relating to the seriousness of the conduct, the factors 
provided in divisions (D) and (E) of this section relating to the 
likelihood of the offender’s recidivism, and the factors set forth in 
division (F) of this section pertaining to the offender’s service in 
the armed forces of the United States and, in addition, may 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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consider any other factors that are relevant to achieving those 
purposes and principles of sentencing.2 
 
{¶ 23} Belew did not receive a maximum 34-year sentence for the 
offenses and specifications for which he was convicted.  The sentencing judge’s 
entry stated that the prison terms were ordered to be served consecutively because 
consecutive sentences were “necessary to fulfill the purposes of R.C. 2929.11, 
and not disproportionate to the seriousness of the offender’s conduct or the danger 
the offender poses” and that the “harm caused was great or unusual.”  The record 
here did not allow the Sixth District Court of Appeals to clearly and convincingly 
find that the record does not support the sentencing court’s findings. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 24} Although different judges may have weighed the statutory factors 
at issue here differently, the relevant statutes did not allow the appellate court to 
substitute its own judgment for that of the trial judge.  All findings of the trial 
judge have record support and the required findings were made.  I would therefore 
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.  I respectfully dissent from the order 
that dismisses this case as improvidently accepted. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
O’NEILL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 25} The United States Marine Corps took a marginal recruit from an 
abusive family and turned him into a fighting machine.  They sent him to Iraq to 
defend all of us, and in the process they turned him into a confused alcoholic with 
a clear diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and possibly a 
traumatic brain injury. 
                                          
 
2 The phrase within R.C. 2929.12(A) referring to R.C. 2929.12(F) was added after Belew was 
sentenced.  See 2012 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 197. 
January Term, 2014 
11 
 
{¶ 26} Once home, and still on active duty, he became a misfit alcoholic 
who was, essentially, no longer of any use to the Marine Corps.  He was often 
drunk, did not obey orders, and most significantly, received no treatment 
whatsoever for the PTSD that he had sustained in the fog of war. 
{¶ 27} Not too surprisingly, on one drunken day while on active duty, he 
and a friend “borrowed” a Humvee and went on a joyride.  They were quickly 
apprehended by the officer of the day, and from that point forward, it was clear 
that the Marines no longer needed the product they had created. 
{¶ 28} He was demoted and given a bad-conduct discharge for the 
Humvee incident.  Significantly, his less-than-honorable discharge deprived him 
of the medical assistance from the federal Department of Veterans Affairs that he 
so desperately needed. 
{¶ 29} As a civilian he simply did not fit in, and, still suffering from 
untreated and undiagnosed PTSD, his antisocial behavior predictably escalated. 
{¶ 30} We are here today because of the tragic events that led to his 
conviction.  It is without question, and well supported in the record, that this 
troubled throwaway from society wanted to commit suicide by cop.  There is no 
other explanation for why an individual would open fire on two approaching, 
well-trained, well-armed police officers.  He failed.  Rather than dying, Belew 
received a nonfatal bullet to the chest—and not one of the officers was struck.  He 
took responsibility for his actions and pled guilty to several offenses but received 
an aggregate sentence of 27 years in prison that was far harsher than it should 
have been. 
{¶ 31} Incredibly, the trial court and the court of appeals have locked onto 
the phrase “no excuse.”  The trial court stated, “Mr. Belew, you claim that you 
suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of being in the military and 
you provide that as an excuse for your actions.  There is no excuse, Mr. Belew.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 32} I would respectfully suggest that one trial court judge, three 
appellate court judges, and the majority of this court simply do not get it.  PTSD 
is not an excuse.  It is an explanation. 
{¶ 33} Mr. Belew’s disability was not an “excuse.”  He was and is 
suffering from a well known and definable disease, which was diagnosed by Dr. 
Wayne Graves, whose testimony was admitted into evidence without objection 
and presented in the sentencing hearing. 
{¶ 34} After the date of the trial court’s sentencing of Belew in this case, 
the General Assembly enacted the following language:  “The sentencing court 
shall consider the offender’s military service record and whether the offender has 
an emotional, mental, or physical condition that is traceable to the offender’s 
service in the armed forces of the United States.”  R.C. 2929.12(F). 
{¶ 35} This case is clearly the poster child for implementation of the new 
statute, and today this court has the rare opportunity to lead with clarity.  The 
record is before us.  There is more at stake here than garden-variety excuses for 
criminal culpability.  Belew was a marginal Marine recruit; he developed PTSD 
while on active duty; and he was turned out of the service with a bad-conduct 
discharge and little or no capacity to function safely in society.  Tragically, he is 
not the only member of the armed forces to arrive at this juncture.  He has been 
diagnosed with PTSD as a result of his time in the Marine Corps—a condition 
that remains untreated.  It is inexcusable that he cannot access federal benefits for 
his PTSD.  We can and should do better.  I would reverse the judgment of the 
court of appeals and remand this case to the trial court for a new sentencing 
hearing and decision that properly takes into consideration Belew’s military-
service record and his diagnosis of PTSD.  Anything else is unreasonable. 
____________________ 
 
Julia Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and David Cooper and 
Michael D. Bahner, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee. 
January Term, 2014 
13 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick and 
William J. Mooney, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant. 
Spengler Nathanson, P.L.L., and Laurie J. Pangle, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae the Arms Forces. 
McDonald Hopkins, L.L.C., and R. Jeffrey Pollock, urging reversal for 
amici curiae Ohio Suicide Prevention Foundation, National Alliance on Mental 
Illness of Ohio, and Ohio Empowerment Coalition, Inc. 
Ohio Disability Rights Law and Policy Center, Inc., and Kristen Henry, 
urging reversal for amici curiae Disability Rights Ohio and National Disability 
Rights Network. 
_________________________