Case Title: Romero v. Schulze

Citation: 

Docket Number: 98-112

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-03-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Romero v. Schulze1999 WY 28974 P.2d 959Case Number: 98-112Decided: 03/19/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
Rebecca ROMERO, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

Kenneth W. SCHULZE, M.D.; 
and Board of Trustees of Memorial Hospital of Carbon County, d/b/a Carbon County 
Memorial Hospital, Appellees (Defendants).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Carbon County, Jeffrey A. Donnell, J.

 

Michael 
Rosenthal, Dominique D.Y. Cone, and Martin L. Hardsocg of Hathaway, Speight 
& Kunz, LLC, Cheyenne, Wyoming, Representing 
Appellant.

George E. 
Powers, Jr. of Sundahl, Powers, Kapp & Martin, Cheyenne, Wyoming, 
Representing Appellees.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Retired November 2, 
1998.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Rebecca 
Romero appeals from the summary judgment which was entered in favor of Appellee 
Kenneth Schulze, M.D. and from the order which dismissed her lawsuit against 
Appellee Board of Trustees of Memorial Hospital of Carbon County, d/b/a Carbon 
County Memorial Hospital (the hospital).

[¶2]      We reverse and 
remand.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Romero presents 
the following issues for our review:

A. In light of 
prior representations to the public which indicated that Dr. Schulze was not a 
public employee, should the Appellees be allowed to invoke the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act?

B. Based upon 
the terms of his employment contract and his qualifications as a surgeon, was 
Dr. Schulze acting within the scope of his duties as defined in the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act?

C. Did Romero 
provide timely notice, as required by the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, 
within two years of discovering her causes of action against Memorial 
Hospital?

 

FACTS

[¶4]      Romero worked as 
a housekeeper for Rip Griffin's Truck Stop in Rawlins. On August 26, 1994, she 
accidentally cut the little finger of her right hand with a knife while she was 
opening a cardboard box. Romero was admitted to the hospital where she was 
examined by Dr. Schulze, an orthopedic surgeon. Dr. Schulze diagnosed two 
severed tendons and recommended immediate surgery. Romero consented to the 
surgery and signed the hospital's conditions-of-service form, which provided in 
part: "The undersigned recognizes that all doctors furnishing services to the 
patient, including the radiologist, pathologist, anesthesiologist and the like 
are independent contractors and are not employees or agents of the hospital." 
Dr. Schulze performed the surgery on Romero's finger later that 
evening.

[¶5]      In mid-September 
1994, Dr. Schulze prescribed occupational therapy for Romero, which she 
participated in until she moved to Albuquerque, New Mexico, in mid-November of 
1994. Despite the therapy, Romero began experiencing inflammation; swelling; 
stiffness; a flexion contracture (claw hand); and loss of motion, atrophy, and 
pain in the fingers of her right hand, wrist, and arm. Dr. Schulze provided 
ongoing medical care to Romero until her mid-November 
move.

[¶6]      Pursuant to a 
referral from Dr. Schulze, Romero began receiving medical treatment in 
mid-November from Laurel D. McGinty, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon and hand 
specialist in Albuquerque. She continued therapy but saw little improvement in 
her condition. On August 18, 1995, Dr. McGinty amputated Romero's right little 
finger.

[¶7]      Romero filed a 
lawsuit against Dr. Schulze on August 23, 1996, alleging negligence. After 
receiving an extension of time in which to respond, Dr. Schulze answered 
Romero's complaint on October 7, 1996. In paragraph 31 of Dr. Schulze's answer, 
he pleaded the following affirmative defense:

The Defendant, 
acting within the scope of his duties as an employee of Memorial Hospital of 
Carbon County, a governmental entity, affirmatively alleges immunity from tort 
liability except as specifically provided under the Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act §§ 1-39-101 through 1-39-120 and hereby invokes all of the limitations, 
requirements and protection of said Act.

[¶8]      Romero 
subsequently served interrogatories, requests for production of documents, and 
requests for admission on Dr. Schulze. On November 19, 1996, Dr. Schulze 
responded to Romero's discovery requests and disclosed that he had been an 
employee of the hospital during the time he treated Romero. He also produced a 
copy of his 1994 employment contract.

[¶9]      Dr. Schulze moved 
for a summary judgment, claiming that Romero

a. last saw and 
treated with Dr. Schulze on October 27, 1994;

b. was 
discharged November 15, 1994, from the occupational therapy (ordered by Dr. 
Schulze) so as to move to New Mexico; and

c. formally 
became the patient of Dr. Laurel D. McGinty of Albuquerque, New Mexico 
thereafter.

He argued that, 
although Romero filed her lawsuit within the two-year statute of limitations for 
negligence actions, she failed to serve notice of her claim pursuant to the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act under which he claimed protection by virtue of 
his status as a public employee of a governmental entity.

[¶10]   Romero opposed Dr. Schulze's motion 
for a summary judgment, asserting, among other things, that Dr. Schulze's 
employment by the hospital was unknown to her and was not reasonably 
ascertainable before the two-year notice period expired. Romero argued that she 
was under the impression that Dr. Schulze was an independent contractor until 
November 19, 1996, just days after the two-year period had run, because all her 
interactions with Dr. Schulze supported that conclusion.

[¶11]   The district court granted Dr. 
Schulze's motion for a summary judgment. It reasoned that Dr. Schulze's 
affirmative defense put Romero on notice of his employment status on October 7, 
1996, which gave her approximately five weeks to give notice of her claim. The 
district court decided that Romero's failure to serve a notice of her claim 
within the two-year period required by the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act 
deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, 
barred her cause of action against Dr. Schulze.

[¶12]   On May 13, 1997, Romero served the 
hospital with notices of claims concerning her independent allegations against 
the hospital of negligent hiring and supervision. She was granted leave to amend 
her complaint to add the hospital as a defendant on July 22, 1997, and she filed 
her first amended complaint on August 28, 1997, in which she pleaded, among 
other things, negligent hiring and negligent supervision causes of action 
against the hospital. The hospital subsequently filed a motion to dismiss 
Romero's complaint, claiming protection under the Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act's two-year notice-of-claim requirement.

[¶13]   The district court granted the 
hospital's motion to dismiss Romero's complaint, finding that Romero did not 
give notice of her claim within the two-year period required by the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act. Romero appeals from the summary judgment which was 
entered in favor of Dr. Schulze and from the order which dismissed her causes of 
action against the hospital.

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶14]   A summary judgment is appropriate 
when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and the prevailing party is 
entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. Estate of Noell v. Norwest Bank 
Wyoming, N.A., 960 P.2d 499, 500 (Wyo. 1998). Because a dispute does not exist 
with regard to the material facts, the question presented for our review is one 
of law. Id. We do not accord special deference to the district court's decisions 
on matters of law. Id.

[¶15]   We will affirm a dismissal of a 
complaint only if the complaint

shows on its 
face that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief under any set of facts. In 
considering such a motion, the "facts alleged in the complaint are admitted and 
the allegations must be viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs." 
Dismissal is a drastic remedy, and is sparingly granted.

Mostert v. CBL 
& Associates, 741 P.2d 1090, 1092 (Wyo. 1987) (quoting Moxley v. Laramie 
Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 734 (Wyo. 1979)). See also Harshfield v. 
Harshfield, 842 P.2d 535, 536 (Wyo. 1992).

DISCUSSION

A. Order 
Granting Summary Judgment

[¶16]   The Wyoming Governmental Claims Act 
was enacted in response to the "inherently unfair and inequitable results which 
occur in the strict application of the doctrine of governmental immunity." Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 1-39-102(a) (Michie 1997). Under the Wyoming Governmental Claims 
Act, governmental entities and public employees acting within the scope of their 
duties are generally immune from liability for the torts they commit. Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 1-39-104(a) (Michie 1997). Certain enumerated activities are specific 
exceptions to the general immunity rule. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-39-105 to -112 
(Michie 1997). Section 1-39-110(a) provides that "[a] governmental entity is 
liable for damages resulting from bodily injury, wrongful death or property 
damage caused by the negligence of health care providers who are employees of 
the governmental entity . . . while acting within the scope of their 
duties."

[¶17]   Before a suit can be brought 
against a governmental entity or public employee, however, certain procedures 
must be adhered to. Among those procedures is the notice-of-claims requirement, 
which provides in part:

(a) No action 
shall be brought under this act against a governmental entity unless the claim 
upon which the action is based is presented to the entity as an itemized 
statement in writing within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error 
or omission, except that a cause of action may be instituted not more than two 
(2) years after discovery of the alleged act, error or omission, if the claimant 
can establish that the alleged act, error or omission was:

(i) Not 
reasonably discoverable within a two (2) year period; or

 

(ii) The 
claimant failed to discover the alleged act, error or omission within the two 
(2) year period despite the exercise of due diligence.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 1-39-113(a) (Michie 1997).

[¶18]   Romero alleges that she did not 
serve notice of her claim within the original two-year period because Dr. 
Schulze's status as a public employee was unknown to her and was not reasonably 
ascertainable before the two-year notice period expired. She maintains that, 
prior to receiving Dr. Schulze's responses to her discovery requests, all 
indications were that Dr. Schulze was an independent contractor rather than an 
employee of the hospital. She emphasizes the following facts to support her 
argument:

1. Defendant 
Hospital's own "Conditions of Service" form, which . . . required Plaintiff 
Romero to sign before services would be provided to her, stated in 
part,

The undersigned 
recognizes that all doctors furnishing services to the patient, including the 
radiologist, pathologist, anesthesiologist and the like are independent 
contractors and are not employees or agents of the 
hospital.

(emphasis 
added).

2. All of the 
care and treatment provided by Dr. Schulze following the surgical procedure he 
performed on Plaintiff Romero was provided at or from his private office in the 
Wagon Circle Medical Clinic located at 2012 West Elm Street, Rawlins, Wyoming. 
His office is separate and distinct from the hospital and is located two blocks 
away.

3. Dr. Schulze's 
office has a name (Wagon Circle Medical Clinic) unrelated and entirely distinct 
from the hospital. In addition, prior to the time Romero filed her complaint, 
the Wagon Circle Medical Clinic was a for-profit corporate entity inactive for 
failure to pay taxes, according to the Wyoming Secretary of 
State.

4. The Wyoming 
Board of Medicine responded to the inquiry of Romero's counsel about Dr. Schulze 
and indicated he was a licensed physician in Wyoming with an office address of 
2012 West Elm Street, Rawlins, Wyoming 82301 - the same street address as the 
Wagon Circle Medical Clinic.

5. When 
Plaintiff Romero visited Dr. Schulze for post-surgical care in his private 
office, she was given forms to fill out with the words "Wagon Circle Medical 
Clinic" and the separate address of the clinic at the top of the 
forms.

6. Several of 
the clinic's forms authorized payment of insurance or worker['s] compensation 
benefits directly to Wagon Circle Medical Clinic.

7. No mention of 
Memorial Hospital of Carbon County was contained on any of the forms given to 
Plaintiff Romero to fill out. In fact, the Wagon Circle Medical Clinic 
"Conditions of Service" form signed by Mrs. Romero prior to her first 
postoperative visit with Dr. Schulze in August, 1994, stated, in 
part:

The bill for 
services is an agreement between you and the clinic.

(emphasis 
added).

8. The medical 
records pertaining to Plaintiff Romero's care by Dr. Schulze were created and 
maintained by him at the Wagon Circle Medical Clinic, separate and apart from 
the records maintained at the hospital.

9. During the 
time Dr. Schulze was providing care and treatment to Romero, he sent no 
correspondence or billing statements which in any way indicated that he was an 
employee of Memorial Hospital of Carbon County.

10. During the 
period of his care and treatment of Romero, Dr. Schulze did not wear any 
identification which would identify him as an employee of Memorial 
Hospital.

(Record 
citations omitted.)

[¶19]   The district court found that 
Romero had been placed on notice of Dr. Schulze's status as a public employee 
when she received his answer on October 7, 1996, in which he "clearly asserted 
his status as a public employee." Explaining that Wyoming is a "notice" 
jurisdiction, the district court opined that pleadings are only required to 
alert the adverse party of what it might expect and contain the operative facts 
that will give fair notice of the claim. The district court decided that, 
because October 7, 1996, was within two years of the discovery of the alleged 
act, error, or omission, Romero forfeited her cause of action by failing to 
serve a notice of her claim sometime in the five or so weeks that followed.1

[¶20]   We disagree with the district 
court's finding that Dr. Schulze's "pleading was sufficiently specific to 
provide [Romero] with notice of the intended defense, and [Romero] had adequate 
time thereafter to file the required notice of claim." To the contrary, the 
affirmative defense merely informed Romero that Dr. Schulze was claiming to be 
an employee of the hospital at the time he filed his answer. In light of all the 
indications that Dr. Schulze was an independent contractor, he should have 
pleaded an affirmative defense clearly stating that, at the time of his alleged 
negligent conduct, he was an employee of the hospital. We hold that, as a matter 
of law, Romero did not have sufficient notice of Dr. Schulze's status as a 
public employee until November 19, 1996, when she received the discovery 
responses that clearly evidenced an employment relationship existed at the time 
Dr. Schulze rendered treatment for her injured hand. Dr. Schulze, therefore, was 
not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, and the summary judgment in his 
favor is reversed.

B. Order 
Granting Dismissal.

[¶21]   Romero asserts that she provided 
timely notice to the hospital of her claims for negligent hiring and negligent 
supervision, arguing that the notice-of-claim time period did not commence until 
she became aware of the employment relationship and, therefore, of the 
hospital's negligence. The hospital claims that Romero could have brought her 
claims for negligent hiring and supervision in a timely manner without knowing 
that Dr. Schulze was employed by the hospital because her claims were not 
dependent upon the existence of an employment 
relationship.

[¶22]   The hospital relies on Greenwood v. 
Wierdsma, 741 P.2d 1079 (Wyo. 1987), and Sharsmith v. Hill, 764 P.2d 667 (Wyo. 
1988), in arguing that the employment relationship was of no consequence to 
Romero's claims for negligent hiring and supervision. It argues that, under 
these cases, hospitals are required to screen their physicians so that only 
competent physicians are allowed on staff and hospitals must supervise and 
review treatment rendered by the physicians to ensure quality health care is 
being rendered. Greenwood, 741 P.2d  at 1088; Sharsmith, 764 P.2d  at 673. The 
hospital claims that it is required to perform these duties regardless of 
whether its physicians are employees or only have staff 
privileges.

[¶23]   An important distinction exists 
between the point the hospital makes and the case at bar. Although we agree that 
the torts of negligent hiring and supervision do not depend upon an employment 
relationship, the hospital could potentially be liable under a respondeat 
superior theory. Traditionally, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of a 
physician who is an independent contractor. Adamski v. Tacoma General Hospital, 
20 Wn. App. 98, 579 P.2d 970, 973 (1978). In this case, however, the physician 
was an employee of the hospital. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an 
employer is liable for the negligence of an employee who is acting within the 
scope of his employment. Austin v. Kaness, 950 P.2d 561, 563 (Wyo. 1997). This 
Court has recognized that, if a physician is the employee of a hospital, the 
hospital may be held liable for the injuries negligently inflicted by the 
physician under the doctrine of respondeat superior:

"Where a 
hospital holds itself out to the public as providing a given service, . . . and 
where the hospital enters into a contractual arrangement with one or more 
physicians to direct and provide the service, and where the patient engages the 
services of the hospital without regard to the identity of a particular 
physician and where as a matter of fact the patient is relying upon the hospital 
to deliver the desired health care and treatment, the doctrine of respondeat 
superior applies and the hospital is vicariously liable for damages proximately 
resulting from the neglect, if any, of such physicians."

Sharsmith, 764 P.2d  at 672 (quoting Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So. 2d 358, 371 (Miss. 
1985)).

[¶24]   Viewing the facts in the light most 
favorable to Romero, as we are obligated to do under our standard of review, we 
hold that Romero's complaint pleads sufficient facts to enable her to assert a 
respondeat superior cause of action and that she could not have known about this 
cause of action until she received clear evidence of the employment 
relationship. The district court's order granting the drastic remedy of 
dismissal is, therefore, reversed.

CONCLUSION

[¶25]   Romero did not discover that Dr. 
Schulze was an employee of the hospital until November 19, 1996. The two-year 
notice-of-claim period under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, therefore, 
commenced on that date, and the summary judgment entered because of the failure 
to timely serve the notice of claim is reversed. Furthermore, because Dr. 
Schulze is an employee of the hospital, the hospital could potentially be held 
vicariously liable for Dr. Schulze's negligence under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior. The district court's order dismissing Romero's claims against the 
hospital is, therefore, also reversed.

LEHMAN, Chief Justice, 
dissenting, with whom THOMAS, Justice, joins.

[¶26]   I respectfully dissent. After 
analyzing Dr. Schulze's answer within the parameters of Wyoming's notice of 
pleading system, I am led inescapably to the conclusion that the pleading was 
sufficiently specific to provide Ms. Romero with fair notice of Dr. Schulze's 
status as a government employee.

[¶27]   Rule 8 of the Wyoming Rules of 
Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part:

(b) Defenses: 
form of denials. - A party shall state in short and plain terms the party's 
defenses to each claim asserted. . . .

. . 
.

(e) Pleading to 
be concise and direct; consistency.

(1) Each 
averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No technical forms 
of pleading or motions are required.

[¶28]   Under the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure, technical forms of pleadings are not required, and each averment of 
pleading should be simple, concise and direct. Harris v. Grizzle, 599 P.2d 580, 
583 (Wyo. 1979); Guggenmos v. Tom Searl-Frank McCue, Inc., 481 P.2d 48, 51 (Wyo. 
1971). Whether the specificity standard has been satisfied is to be determined 
in terms of whether the pleadings give fair notice to the opposing party and not 
whether it contains conclusions. Id. Ignoring this legal framework, the majority 
writes: "In light of all the indications that Dr. Schulze was an independent 
contractor, he should have pleaded an affirmative defense clearly stating that, 
at the time of his alleged negligent conduct, he was an employee of the 
hospital." Maj. op. at 964. However, Dr. Schulze's answer contradicts the 
majority's assertion: "The Defendant, acting within the scope of his duties as 
an employee of Memorial Hospital of Carbon County, a governmental entity, 
affirmatively alleges immunity from tort liability . . . ." (emphasis supplied). 
It is hard to imagine how this allegation could be simpler, more concise, or 
more direct.

[¶29]   I would hold that Dr. Schulze's 
answer was sufficient to put Ms. Romero on notice that he was acting as a 
government employee during her treatment and care. I would, therefore, hold that 
Ms. Romero's subsequent failure to provide notice of her claim within the 
two-year limitations period operates to bar her suit against both Dr. Schulze 
and the hospital. Cranston v. Weston County Weed and Pest Bd., 826 P.2d 251, 255 
(Wyo. 1992); Duran v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Sweetwater County, 787 P.2d 971, 
972-73 (Wyo. 1990).

 Footnotes

1 The 
district court found that the two-year period expired November 14, 1996, two 
years after Romero was discharged from Dr. Schulze's 
care.