Case Title: HEATHER M. ZUPAN v. JOHN M. ZUPAN

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-09-0127

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2010-05-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
HEATHER M. ZUPAN v. JOHN M. ZUPAN2010 WY 59230 P.3d 329Case Number: No. S-09-0127Decided: 05/07/2010

APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2010

 
 
HEATHER 
M. ZUPAN,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
JOHN 
M. ZUPAN,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Hot Springs County

The 
Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
Wendy 
Sweeny, Worland, Wyoming.

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
Michael 
S. Messenger and Bobbi Overfield, Messenger & Jurovich, PC, Thermopolis, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Before 
GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ., 
and TYLER, D.J.

 
 
TYLER, 
District Judge.

 
 

[¶1]        
Expiration 
of the parties' negotiated child custody agreement, incorporated into the 2004 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce, resulted in the filing of a contempt petition, 
an unsuccessful mediation, a two-day trial in the district court, and this 
appeal.  Heather M. Zupan ("Mother") 
appeals the post-divorce order in which the district court found that, with 
slight changes, the best interests of the parties' children were being served by 
the existing shared custody and visitation plan; that no grounds to modify the 
prior custody arrangement existed; and, that John M. Zupan ("Father") was not in 
contempt for violating the Judgment and Decree of Divorce ("Decree").  The district court did not abuse its 
discretion in any of its findings and there were no procedural errors committed 
by the trial court.  We will 
affirm.  

 
 

ISSUES

 
 

[¶2]        
Mother 
states her appeal issues as follows:

 
 
I.          
Did the trial court commit error or abuse its discretion when it imposed 
a joint legal and shared custodial arrangement on the 
parties?

 
 
II.         
Did the trial court commit error or abuse its discretion in failing and 
refusing to consider evidence pertaining to the Appellee's relationship with his 
other children and grandchildren?

 
 
III.        Did 
the trial court commit error or abuse its discretion in implementing a parenting 
plan which conditions a parent's custodial status on her continued residence in 
the same location as the other party?

 
 
IV.       Did the 
trial court abuse its discretion by failing to find the Plaintiff/Appellee in 
contempt of Court?

 
 
Father 
characterizes the issues on appeal as follows:

 
 
I.          
Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it found it was in the 
children's best interests to continue with the parties' stipulated child custody 
agreement that had been in place since 2003.

 
 
II.         
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to find the 
Appellee in contempt of court.

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]        
The 
parties were married in June 1996.  
Two children were born to them during the marriage: NEZ, born in 1997, 
and CJMZ, born in 2000. 

 
 

[¶4]        
Prior 
to completion of the divorce, the parties negotiated a Child Custody Agreement 
("Agreement") which established joint legal custody with a shared custody and 
visitation arrangement.  The 
Agreement provided that the parties would alternate residential custody of the 
children on an annual basis every July 15th.  The shared custody plan began on 
November 1, 2003, and it expired upon its own terms on July 15, 2008.  The Decree, filed on May 3, 2004, fully 
incorporated the parties' Agreement.  
Generally, the parties were able to make their custody and visitation 
arrangement work from its inception until near its expected natural termination. 
 

 
 

[¶5]        
Built 
into the Agreement was a process aimed at resolving any disputes over custody 
when the Agreement expired:  "At the 
end of the term of this agreement, if the parties are unable to agree regarding 
custodial arrangements after July 15, 2008, they will submit the matter to 
mediation before returning to the Court."  
Anticipating that the custody agreement would end in July 2008, Mother 
contends that she contacted Father about setting up mediation two different 
times  once in 2005 and again in December 2007.

 
 

[¶6]        
On 
February 12, 2008, Mother filed her Verified Petition for Order to Show Cause 
("contempt petition") asserting that Father should be found in contempt of court 
for disobeying the Decree, mainly due to his failure to engage in the mediation 
process as had been requested.  The 
Order to Show Cause ("OTSC") required Father to appear before the district court 
in early May.  At his initial 
hearing, Father denied violating the terms of the Decree and he requested a 
hearing. 

 

[¶7]        
Mediation 
was scheduled pursuant to a stipulated order filed before Father's appearance on 
the OTSC.  The parties and their 
attorneys engaged in mediation on June 5th, but it was not successful 
in resolving their custody disputes.  The next day, after a telephone hearing 
"upon the failure of the parties to successfully mediate this matter," the 
district court entered an Order Granting Temporary Custody and Setting Notice 
giving Mother temporary custody of the children, subject to visitation by 
Father, until a determination could be made after a trial.1  Specifically, the district court 
directed that "all pending matters, being the [Mother's] Petition for Order to 
Show Cause and determination for future custodial arrangements for the minor 
children shall come before the Court" for trial.

 
 

[¶8]        
A 
two-day trial was held on September 4 and 5, 2008.2  On September 9, 2008, the trial court 
issued its Decision Letter.  The 
Order Denying Contempt and Establishing Custody was filed on March 9, 2009.  

 
 

[¶9]        
In 
essence, the district court found that the best interests of the parties' 
children were being served by the existing shared custody and visitation plan, 
with some modifications; that no grounds to modify the prior custody arrangement 
had been shown; and, that Father was not in contempt for violating the 
Decree.  It is the Order Denying 
Contempt and Establishing Custody from which this appeal ensued. 

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 

Standard 
of Review  Custody and Visitation 
Modification

 
 

[¶10]     
In 
the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, an agreement made 
and entered into, in anticipation of a divorce which has been incorporated or 
adopted by reference into a decree, is presumed to merge into the divorce decree 
and will no longer be in effect.  Pauling v. Pauling, 837 P.2d 1073, 1078 
(Wyo. 1992) (citing Phillips v. 
Phillips, 93 Idaho 384, 387, 462 P.2d 49, 52 (1969)); Witowski v. Roosevelt, 2009 WY 5, ¶ 23, 
199 P.3d 1072, 1078-1079 (Wyo. 2009).  
In the present case, clear and convincing evidence shows that the parties 
intended that the terms and provisions of their Agreement would survive 
merger.  The district court's 
findings and orders in the Decree support the parties' intent that the custody 
and visitation provisions in the Agreement would survive merger.  As a result, when the parties were 
unable to agree regarding custodial arrangements after the Agreement's 
expiration date, it became necessary for the district court to determine custody 
and visitation. 

 
 

[¶11]     
Statutorily, 
to modify an existing custody and visitation order, there must be "a showing by 
either parent of a material change in circumstances since the entry of the order 
in question and that the modification would be in the best interests of the 
children pursuant to W.S. 20-2-201(a)."  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204(c) (LexisNexis 2009).  "The party seeking a modification of the 
custody provisions of a divorce decree has the burden of showing that a material 
and substantial change of circumstances has occurred, after the entry of the 
initial decree, and that modification is in the best interests of the 
children."  Fergusson v. Fergusson, 2002 WY 66, ¶ 9, 
45 P.3d 641, 644 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 150 
(Wyo. 1998)); see Leitner v. 
Lonabaugh, 402 P.2d 713, 718-719 (Wyo. 1965).

 
 

[¶12]     
The 
trial court has discretion in determining custody and visitation issues to be in 
the best interests of the children:     

            

Custody, 
visitation, child support, and alimony are all committed to the sound discretion 
of the district court.  It has been 
our consistent principle that in custody matters, the welfare and needs of the 
children are to be given paramount consideration.  The determination of the best interests 
of the child is a question for the trier of fact.  "We do not overturn the decision of the 
trial court unless we are persuaded of an abuse of discretion or the presence of 
a violation of some legal principle."  
Fink [v. Fink], 685 P.2d [34,] 36 [(Wyo. 
1984)].

 
 

Pace 
v. Pace, 
2001 WY 43, ¶ 9, 22 P.3d 861, 865 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Reavis v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 431 
(Wyo. 1998)); Testerman v. Testerman, 
2008 WY 112, ¶ 8, 193 P.3d 1141, 1144 (Wyo. 2008).  We apply the same standard of review 
regarding a trial court's determinations involving modification of custody and 
visitation arrangements.  Fergusson, ¶ 9, 45 P.3d  at 644; Morris v. Morris, 2007 WY 174, ¶ 5, 170 P.3d 86, 88 (Wyo. 2007).

 
 

[¶13]     
"The 
law affords wide discretion to the district court when fashioning custody and 
visitation provisions for the best interests of the children."  Pace, ¶ 11, 22 P.3d  at 865 (quoting Reavis, 955 P.2d at 431).  Such discretion "encompasses one of the 
most difficult and demanding tasks assigned to a trial judge."  Reavis, 955 P.2d  at 431.  "Ultimately, the goal to be achieved is 
a reasonable balance of the rights and affections of each of the parents, with 
paramount consideration being given to the welfare and needs of the 
children.'"  Pace, ¶ 11, 22 P.3d  at 865 (quoting Leitner, 402 P.2d at 
720).

 
 
A 
court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the 
bounds of reason under the circumstances.  
Our review entails evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the district court's decision .   
Findings of fact not supported by the evidence, contrary to the evidence, 
or against the great weight of the evidence cannot be sustained.  Similarly, an abuse of discretion is 
present when a material factor deserving significant weight is ignored. 

 
 

Buttle 
v. Buttle, 
2008 WY 135, ¶ 15, 196 P.3d 174, 178 (Wyo. 2008) (quoting  Eickbush v. Eickbush, 2007 WY 179, ¶ 
9, 171 P.3d 509, 511 (Wyo. 2007)).

 
 

[¶14]     
In 
every case, the district court must base its child custody determinations in the 
best interests of the children using the factors enumerated in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-201(a).  No single factor is 
determinative.  Hayzlett v. Hayzlett, 2007 WY 147, ¶¶ 9, 
10, 167 P.3d 639, 642 (Wyo. 2007).  
"Every case . . . requires careful weighing of relevant factors, looking 
to the unique and individual family relationships, in order to reach a 
resolution in the best interests of the children in that family."  Pace, ¶ 13, 22 P.3d  at 866 (quoting Reavis, 955 P.2d at 431).  The district court must articulate those 
"factors which were considered and how those factors support its 
conclusions."  Pace, ¶ 13, 22 P.3d  at 866 (quoting Reavis, 955 P.2d at 431).  "To play fair, a trial judge relying on 
discretionary power should place on record the circumstances and factors that 
were crucial to his determination  so that counsel and the reviewing court will 
know and be in a position to evaluate the soundness of his decision."  Reavis, 955 P.2d  at 431-432 (quoting 
Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of 
the Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22 Syracuse L.Rev. 635, 665-66 (1971)). 

 
 

[¶15]     
"The 
court shall order custody in well defined terms to promote understanding and 
compliance by the parties.  Custody 
shall be crafted to promote the best interests of the children, and may include 
any combination of joint, shared or sole custody."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(d).  Similarly, there is statutory discretion 
for a district court to order visitation, "in enough detail to promote 
understanding and compliance," as "it deems in the best interests of each 
child."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-202(a)(i).

 
 

[¶16]     
Mother 
challenges the sufficiency and weight of the evidentiary findings, to some 
degree, in every issue presented by her on appeal.  "In reviewing a challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence, we accept the evidence of the successful party as 
true and give all favorable inferences to that evidence."  Cranston v. Cranston, 879 P.2d 345, 351 
(Wyo. 1994) (citing Hill v. Zimmerer, 
839 P.2d 977, 981 (Wyo. 1992)).  "We 
leave out of consideration entirely the conflicting evidence of the unsuccessful 
party."  Cranston, 879 P.2d  at 351 (citing Kadrmas v. Valley West Homeowner's 
Ass'n, 848 P.2d 826, 828 (Wyo. 1993) and Hill, 839 P.2d at 
981).

 
 

The 
District Court's Determinations as to Custody, Visitation and the Residency 
Restriction

 
 

[¶17]     
In 
this case, the parties' Decree which assimilated their negotiated Agreement 
provided, in relevant part: (1) they would "enjoy joint legal custody and shared 
physical custody of the minor children of the parties, beginning on November 1, 
2003, and ending on July 15, 2008;" (2) they would "alternate annual residential 
custody until the end of this agreement;" (3) the non-custodial parent would 
have visitation on alternating weekends and two evenings per week; (4) they 
would "alternate custody during the holidays of Thanksgiving, Christmas, and 
Easter;" (5) they would "be flexible to arrange a makeup weekend or evening for 
those missed because of these holidays;" and, (6) Mother would maintain "a 
residence during the term of this agreement in Thermopolis or within five miles 
of Thermopolis" (although it was acceptable if Mother "moves from Thermopolis 
during her non-residential years").

 
 

[¶18]     
After 
trial, the district court ordered, in pertinent part, as follows: (1) "[t]hat it 
is in the best interests of the minor children to continue with the custody 
arrangement that has been in place for the minor children for the previous five 
years subject to slight modification;" (2) "[t]hat custody of the minor children 
shall continue to be joint legal custody with shared physical custody 
alternating on a yearly basis;" (3) that "[t]he non-residential parent shall 
have visitation on alternating weekends and two evenings per week;" (4) that 
"[t]he parties shall alternate custody during the holidays of Thanksgiving, 
Christmas, and Easter;" (5) that "[t]he parties agree to be flexible to arrange 
a makeup weekend or evening for those missed because of these holidays;" (6) 
that "[Father] shall have the children each Labor Day weekend and [Mother] shall 
have the children on each Memorial Day weekend;" and, (7) "[t]hat the residency 
provision set forth in the prior agreement is hereby lifted and any issues of 
residency of the parents would need to be addressed through a future 
modification proceeding."

 
 

A.    The District Court's Determinations 
Concerning the Shared Custody Arrangement

 
 

[¶19]     
Wyoming 
statute specifically allows a district court to fashion a custody plan to 
"include any combination of joint, shared or sole custody" which it finds to be 
in the best interests of the children.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(d).  
"Shared custody" arrangements are not preferred, however.  Reavis, 955 P.2d  at 432; Eickbush, ¶ 11, 171 P.3d  at 512; Buttle, ¶ 31, 196 P.3d  at 181; Testerman, ¶ 15, 193 P.3d  at 1145; Parris v. Parris, 2009 WY 44, ¶ 19, 204 P.3d 298, 304 (Wyo. 2009).  To 
validate a shared custody plan, the record must show that, in determining the 
best interests of the children, "a comprehensive evaluation of all relevant 
factors occurred prior to determining custody."  Id.;  Buttle, ¶ 31, 196 P.3d  at 181; Pace, ¶ 17, 22 P.3d  at 867.  The evidence presented by the parties 
and the trial court's findings must adequately reflect that a shared custody 
plan favors stability in the children's surroundings and that it is in the 
children's best interests.  Buttle, ¶ 36, 196 P.3d  at 182. 

 
 

[¶20]     
Overall, 
Mother asserts that the trial evidence and testimony demonstrated that 
continuing with the parties' shared custody arrangement will not promote 
stability in the children's milieu and is contrary to the children's best 
interests  particularly with regard to the parties' youngest child, CJMZ.  Mother claims that the district court 
erred or abused its discretion in concluding that "the children are doing well 
under the custody arrangement that has been followed and their lives would not 
be improved by changing the procedure" and "it would be in the children's best 
interests to continue with the custody and visitation schedule outlined in the 
earlier agreement."

 
 

[¶21]     
More 
specifically, Mother insists that the shared custody arrangement does not work 
because the parties are unable to effectively communicate or cooperate on 
matters relating to the children's welfare.  In particular, Mother cites to select 
testimony and evidence in the record which she believes establishes that Father 
intimidates her, that he is domineering, and that he does not permit her to 
parent without interference.  Father 
counters Mother's arguments by noting that Mother failed to cite any specific 
occasion where the parties' failure to communicate or cooperate resulted in any 
material breakdown of the shared custody arrangement in five years.  Moreover, Father points to the report of 
the Guardian Ad Litem which indicates 
that the parties communicate well with each other.  After considering all of the evidence, 
the district court expressly found that "[t]he parents communicate well with the 
children and reasonably well with each other."

 
 

[¶22]     
Next, 
Mother argues that Father does not act in ways to promote the children's best 
interests when the children are in his care.  She refers to the fact that Father has a 
dog in his home despite his awareness that CJMZ suffers from allergies.  Further, Mother claims that Father 
failed to note CJMZ's allergies on school records, thereby placing the child's 
safety and welfare in jeopardy.  
Also, Mother criticizes Father for his failure to procure necessary 
reading glasses for CJMZ, while the child is in his care.  The record shows that, while CJMZ has 
been diagnosed with certain allergies, CJMZ has not had any allergic reactions 
to the dog.  The child's allergic 
reactions have subsided over time.  
CJMZ's allergy condition had long since been updated in the school 
files.  CJMZ's reading glasses 
usually remain at school so they are not forgotten at home, and there has been 
no denial of appropriate vision aids by Father.  We find no abuse of discretion in the 
district court's weighing of this evidence.

 
 

[¶23]     
Mother 
also contends that the shared custody arrangement has left the children with 
uncertainty and instability.  In 
addition to Mother's subjective view concerning this contention, she claims that 
the testimony of the children's care provider and their teacher bolsters this 
conclusion.  Mother asserts that 
CJMZ needed special education services when in the custody of Father, but that 
those services were no longer necessary when the child was subsequently in her 
custody.  She argues that this 
proves that CJMZ is particularly sensitive to the instability of the custody 
situation while in the custody of Father.  
Father maintains that the shared custody and visitation arrangement has 
worked well for the children, chiefly due to the length of custody, coupled with 
the historical fact that both parents reside in the same municipality.  The evidence in the record reflects that 
there was uncertainty and instability noted when the shared custody plan first 
began in 2003, but the children's care provider and their teacher readily agreed 
that after the initial adjustment to the custody arrangement, the children 
appear to have settled into a stable routine.  Both witnesses indicated that 
alternating custody on an annual basis has aided in the children's ability to 
adjust.  The educator acknowledged 
that CJMZ did utilize special education services when in the custody of 
Father.  However CJMZ has 
consistently benefitted from additional educational support, even though such 
support was not characterized as special education services. 

 
 

[¶24]     
Father's 
previous physical aggression was raised by Mother as a factor to which she 
claims that the district court did not attribute appropriate weight in 
determining the best interests of the parties' children under the shared custody 
and visitation plan.3  Mother relates that Father reportedly 
physically abused one of his daughters from a prior relationship when she was an 
early teenager.  This incident 
purportedly occurred in 1992  approximately four years before the marriage of 
these parties.  Mother recounted an 
incident in 1997 when Father "hit the wall or door" near Mother's head and he 
would also "shove" her with "his finger a lot in the chest."  The next stated incident involving 
physical aggression by Father occurred in approximately 2000 when he grabbed NEZ 
by the shoulder and shook the child for accidentally dropping a video 
camera.  Mother cites to an incident 
in 2002 when Father "smacked" CJMZ, who was then age two, because the child was 
biting Father's leg.  In October 
2003, Mother described that Father got angry, twisted her arm, and shoved her 
into a door.  Mother further claims 
that Father was verbally abusive toward her and the children during the 
marriage.  The district court 
undoubtedly considered this evidence as a factor in its determinations in 
specifically finding that, "[Father] was physically aggressive on a few 
occasions several years ago.  This 
is not a current problem."  Implicit 
in its findings, the district court acknowledged that all of the incidents cited 
by Mother occurred before the divorce was completed in 2004, and there were no 
more recent instances of similar conduct by Father.

 
 

[¶25]     
Finally, 
Mother argues that the trial court failed to sufficiently acknowledge that she 
had custody of the children for the 14 months immediately preceding the trial, 
which distorted the true picture of the effects of the annual rotation of 
custody upon them, since the children were then "well-behaved, well-adjusted and 
performing at above-average levels."  
Nevertheless, the record supports the district court's conclusion, 
"[t]hat the children are doing well under the custody arrangement that has been 
followed and their lives would not be improved by changing the procedure."  The district court did not ignore the 
fact that Mother had custody for the previous 14 months.  It may have given that fact less weight 
than Mother would like, but Mother has not demonstrated that was an abuse of 
discretion.

 
 

[¶26]     
Mother 
fundamentally disagrees with the district court's determination "to continue 
with the custody arrangement that has been in place for the minor children for 
the previous five years subject to slight modification."  Instead, she steadfastly maintains that 
she should be granted sole physical custody of the children, subject to 
visitation rights by Father.  To 
achieve this relief, Mother had the burden of showing the district court that 
there was "a material change in circumstances" since entry of the Decree and 
"that the modification would be in the best interests of the children pursuant 
to W.S. 20-2-201(a)."  Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 20-2-204(c).  See Leitner, 402 P.2d at 718-719; Fergusson, ¶ 9, 45 P.3d  at 644; Clark, 953 P.2d  at 150.  Most of the testimony and evidence 
relied upon by Mother which may tend to support her challenges to the 
appropriateness of a shared custody and visitation plan pre-dates entry of the 
Decree.  The record is accurately 
summarized by the district court's finding, "[t]hat if this is viewed as a 
modification action, there has been no substantial change in circumstances." 
 Mother failed in her burden to 
demonstrate "a material change in circumstances" subsequent to implementation of 
the shared custody and visitation arrangement which warrants modification. 

 
 

[¶27]     
The 
district court's findings reveal that all relevant factors were thoughtfully 
analyzed and carefully weighed in discerning the best interests of the children 
before arriving at its conclusions.  Accepting the evidence of Father as true, 
giving all favorable inferences to that evidence, and leaving out of 
consideration entirely the conflicting evidence of Mother, the record and the 
trial court's findings fully sustain the overall conclusion that the shared 
custody plan favors stability in the children's environment and that it is in 
the children's best interests.  See Cranston, 879 P.2d  at 351; Buttle, ¶ 36, 196 P.3d  at 182.  The district court did not err 
procedurally and it did not abuse its discretion in its 
determinations.

 
 

B.    The District Court's Consideration of 
Father's Relationships with His Other Children and 
Grandchildren   

 
 

[¶28]     
Mother 
refers to a recent opinion where a district court's consideration of a parent's 
"past mistakes" made during a child's five and a half year lifetime in 
determining the best interests of the child in a custody modification proceeding 
was upheld on appeal.  JT v. KD, 2008 WY 104, ¶ 19, 192 P.3d 969, 973 (Wyo. 2008).  Relying upon 
this precedent, Mother argues that the district court in this case should have 
taken more fully into account the evidence in the record indicating that Father 
has been unable to maintain good relationships with his older children or his 
grandchildren to more accurately assess the best interests of NEZ and CJMZ.  Mother reasons that had the trial court 
properly considered this evidence, it could not have concluded that Father 
possesses the parenting skills qualifying him as a fit and competent parent for 
NEZ and CJMZ, with the ability to strengthen the parent-child relationship.  In this regard, Mother points to the 
evidence of Father's past aggressiveness with his daughter from a prior 
relationship and his overall "inability to deal with teenage children as was 
historically the case with his other children."

 
 

[¶29]     
Father 
initially responds that Mother's contentions are factually unsupported.  Father refers to the conflicting 
evidence in the record concerning the reasons for the problems in the 
relationships he has had with his older children.  Father's eldest daughter, now well into 
her 30's, testified that she has a "really good relationship" with her father 
and that they love each other.  The 
daughter attributed much of the breakdown in the relationships that Father may 
have had with her and her siblings to Father's former spouse who caused them to 
move out of Father's home when they were teenagers.  Father distinguishes the egregious 
nature of the parent's "past mistakes" in JT as being much different than any 
"past mistakes" that Mother claims Father made in his relationships with his 
older children or grandchildren.  
Father cautions that a parent's entire life, especially events occurring 
before the birth of the children sub 
judice, should not be open to scrutiny by a trial court.  He suggests that a better approach would 
be to limit an inquiry into "past mistakes" to the lifetimes of children who are 
the focus of the trial court's determinations as to their best 
interests.

 
 

[¶30]     
The 
district court is statutorily required to determine the best interests of the 
children in fashioning a custody and visitation order.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-201(a).  To comply with this mandate, the trial 
court "shall consider, but is not limited to," the ten factors enumerated in the 
statute.  Id.  Among the factors required to be 
considered are, "[a]ny other factors the court deems necessary and 
relevant."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-201(a)(x).  Hence, the only 
limitation upon what a district court may consider in determining the best 
interests of a child is such "other factors the court deems necessary and 
relevant."  Id.  See Selvey v. Selvey, 2004 WY 166, ¶ 18, 
102 P.3d 210, 215 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 

[¶31]     
Although 
the district court did not make any specific findings concerning Father's 
relationships with his other children and grandchildren in this case, the record 
shows that the trial court accepted the testimony on this issue presented by 
both parties.  Further, the district 
court's findings, in toto, lead to 
the conclusion that this evidence was obviously considered and given appropriate 
weight.  The district court did not 
commit any procedural error and it did not abuse its discretion as to the 
consideration and weight given to Father's relationships with his older children 
and grandchildren.

 
 

C.    The District Court's Determination of the 
Travel or Relocation Restriction  

 
 

[¶32]     
In 
the parties' negotiated Agreement, as ratified and included into the Decree, 
Mother and Father agreed to the following residency provision: "[Mother] agrees 
to maintain a residence during the term of this agreement in Thermopolis or 
within five miles of Thermopolis, although [Father] has no objection if [Mother] 
moves from Thermopolis during her non-residential years."

 
 

[¶33]     
At 
the trial, Mother sought to have the residency provision removed because it 
adversely impacted her constitutional right to travel or relocate.  Watt v. Watt, 971 P.2d 608, 615-616 
(Wyo. 1999); Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283, 1286-89 (Wyo. 1993); Gurney v. 
Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, 55 (Wyo. 1995); Resor v. Resor, 987 P.2d 146, 151 (Wyo. 
1999); Testerman, ¶ 18, 193 P.3d  at 
1146; Harshberger v. Harshberger, 
2005 WY 99, ¶ 12, 117 P.3d 1244, 1250-51 (Wyo. 2005).  After trial, the district court ordered: 
"That the residency provision set forth in the prior agreement is hereby lifted 
and any issues of residency of the parents would need to be addressed through a 
future modification proceeding."

 
 

[¶34]     
Mother 
asserts that, despite the court's removal of the residency provision, her right 
to relocate is nonetheless violated, since the shared custody arrangement still 
provides for visitation by the non-custodial parent on alternating weekends and 
for two evenings per week.  She 
claims that this visitation provision "exerts pressure" upon her to remain in 
the locality in derogation of her rights because relocation is not recognized as 
a change in material circumstances warranting modification of a custody order.4  We disagree with Mother's 
assertion.

 
 

[¶35]     
There 
is nothing in the shared custody and visitation plan or in the order lifting the 
residency requirement which unconstitutionally requires, or "exerts pressure" 
upon, either parent to reside in the same locality.  Moreover, Mother is incorrect in her 
contention that Wyoming case law prevents judicial review of a request to modify 
a custody and visitation order after a parent relocates:

 
 
To 
summarize, our precedent is quite clear that relocation, by itself, cannot be a 
substantial and material change in circumstances sufficient to justify reopening 
a custody order. That precept is also applicable to any factors that are 
derivative of relocation. What Mother has failed to acknowledge in her argument, 
however, is that our precedent does not preclude the district court from 
considering the effects of relocation on the children so long as there is some 
other circumstance that is "sufficiently deleterious to the welfare of the 
children that by itself ... would serve as a substantial and material change in 
circumstances even in the absence of a relocation." Watt, 971 P.2d  at 617; see Gurney, 899 P.2d  at 55 (Where a custody 
order was properly reopened because both parties asserted that joint custody was 
not working, district court could have reasonably concluded that factors 
derivative of the relocation could have contributed to parties' inability to 
agree and communicate.). Furthermore, our cases stress that the rule set forth 
in Love and its progeny is predicated 
upon the motivation for the relocation being in good faith. Love, 851 P.2d  at 1288-89 ("So long as 
the court is satisfied with the motives of the custodial parent in seeking the 
move ... removal should be granted."); Watt, 971 P.2d  at 614 ("Love and Gurney together capture a rule that a 
relocation by a custodial parent, where the motivation for the relocation is 
legitimate, sincere, in good faith, and still permits reasonable visitation by 
the non-custodial parent, is not a substantial and material change in 
circumstances.").

 
 

Harshberger, 
¶ 12, 117 P.3d  at 1250-1251.

 
 

[¶36]     
The 
district court properly removed the residency provision from the shared custody 
plan.  The district court was 
justified in including visitation in the custody arrangement as being in the 
children's best interests. No abuse of the trial court's discretion occurred and 
it committed no procedural errors. 

            
            

Standard 
of Review  Contempt

 
 

[¶37]     
The 
standard of review for contempt proceedings involving child custody matters is 
well-developed:

 
 
The 
standard of review enunciated in other child custody and domestic relations 
contempt cases is applicable to this matter. Crites v. Alston, 837 P.2d 1061, 1066 
(Wyo. 1992).

 
 
In 
Goss v. Goss, 780 P.2d 306, 313 (Wyo. 
1989), we said that "[w]e will not disturb the decision of the trial court ... 
in the absence of some serious procedural error, a violation of a principle of 
law, or a clear and grave abuse of discretion."  See also Deen v. Deen, 774 P.2d 621 
(Wyo. 1989) and Fanning v. Fanning, 
717 P.2d 346 (Wyo. 1986).

Id.; see also Rogers v. Rogers, 973 P.2d 1118, 1121 (Wyo. 1999).  "Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means exercising sound judgment with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously." 
Belless v. Belless, 2001 WY 41, ¶ 6, 
21 P.3d 749, [751] (Wyo. 2001); see also 
Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998). We must determine whether 
the trial court could reasonably conclude as it did and whether any facet of its 
ruling was arbitrary or capricious. Belless, ¶ 6.

 
 

Erhart 
v. Evans, 
2001 WY 79, ¶ 11, 30 P.3d 542, 545 (Wyo. 2001); McElwain v. McElwain, 2005 WY 147, ¶ 6, 
123 P.3d 558, 561 (Wyo. 2005).  If 
the record includes sufficient evidence to support the district court's exercise 
of discretion, we uphold its decision.  
In re KJD, 2002 WY 26, ¶ 21, 
41 P.3d 522, 527 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 

The 
District Court's Denial of Mother's Contempt Petition

 
 

[¶38]     
Mother 
asserts that the district court erred in denying her contempt petition after 
finding that she failed to meet her burden of proving that Father was in 
contempt for violating the Decree in the following respects: (1) Father's 
refusal to communicate with Mother regarding the provision in the agreement 
requiring that the parties submit to mediation concerning custody and visitation 
determinations after the custody agreement expired or to participate in 
mediation in good faith; (2)  
Father's failure and refusal to allow make-ups of lost visitations, 
especially during Memorial Day and Labor Day holidays; and, (3) Father's 
instruction to school personnel to not communicate with Mother concerning the 
children.

 
 

[¶39]     
Mother 
first assigns error or an abuse of discretion by the district court in finding 
that Father participated in mediation in good faith and that he did not 
willfully violate the Decree. Mother contends that in 2005, and again in 
December 2007, she directly contacted Father to inquire about setting up the 
mediation process in anticipation of the expiration of the shared custody 
plan.  Mediation was not addressed 
between them prior to February 12, 2008, when Mother filed her contempt 
petition.  Father could not have 
violated the Decree before February 12, 2008, since the unambiguous intent of 
the parties was, "[a]t the end of the term of this agreement, if the parties are 
unable to agree regarding custodial arrangements after July 15, 2008, they will 
submit the matter to mediation before returning to the 
Court."

 
 

[¶40]     
The 
OTSC issued on February 12, 2008, required Father to appear before the district 
court on May 5, 2008.  The contempt 
petition and the OTSC were served upon Father on February 13, 2008.  Pursuant to a stipulated court order 
filed before Father made his initial appearance on the OTSC in May, mediation 
was ultimately scheduled for, and held on, June 5, 2008.  

 
 

[¶41]     
Although 
the mediation process was not successful, the trial court later found that 
Father participated in good faith.  
Adding weight to the trial court's finding that Father participated in 
mediation in good faith were the following facts: (1) Father nominated a 
mediator; (2) Father stipulated to a court order scheduling mediation prior to 
his appearance on the OTSC; (3)  
Father stipulated to the order scheduling the mediation to take place 
over one month before the expiration of the shared custody plan; (4) Father was 
represented by counsel before, and during, the mediation; and, (5) Father 
participated in mediation even though the shared custody arrangement had not yet 
expired.  

 
 

[¶42]     
Next, 
Mother disputes that the record supports the district court's finding that 
Father did not violate the Decree by failing and refusing to allow make-ups of 
lost visitations, especially during Memorial Day and Labor Day holidays.  To the contrary, the record is replete 
with testimony by both parties that each party has accommodated extra visitation 
times to allow for the circumstances and for the benefit of the children.  Specifically, Father allowed Mother's 
requests for extra visitation when her family came to town; Father left the 
children with Mother during the day in summer while he was working, instead of 
leaving the children with a childcare provider, because she was off work in the 
summer; and, there were other infrequent requests by Mother to have the children 
during Father's visitation periods which he allowed. 

 
 

[¶43]     
The 
record highlighted an unintended consequence resulting in some lost visitation 
by Mother because the weekends of Memorial Day and Labor Day were not considered 
holidays under the original shared custody and visitation plan.  The district court did not view this 
consequence as rising to the level of contemptuous conduct on the part of Father 
due to the structure of the underlying custody and visitation plan.  Instead, the district court modified the 
custody arrangement to include provision for splitting those holiday weekends 
between the parties.

 
 

[¶44]     
Mother's 
last contention that Father engaged in conduct violating the Decree relates to 
her claim that he instructed school personnel to not communicate with Mother 
concerning the children.  The 
related testimony and evidence shows that in October 2007, one of the children's 
teachers contacted Mother to request a special meeting about the child's 
educational issues.  The teacher 
specifically asked Mother if she would notify Father about the meeting, and 
Mother agreed to do so.  For unknown 
reasons, Father was not informed of the meeting until after it occurred.  He then sent the teacher an email which 
stated, "I would like to reiterate my request for notification of both [Mother] 
and I when you or any other concerned party deems it necessary for a dialogue 
with or about either [CJMZ] or [NEZ]."  
The affected teacher testified that this email was not interpreted as an 
attempt by Father to restrict or interfere with any communications about the 
children with Mother.  In actuality, 
there was no impact upon the free flow of communication between Mother and the 
teacher.  The teacher merely 
understood this email to be a request by Father to be specifically included, 
along with Mother, in matters pertaining to the educational issues involving the 
parties' children.  The district 
court concluded that Father did not forbid school personnel from communicating 
with Mother.

 
 

[¶45]     
In 
sum, the record contains ample support for the findings of the trial court that: 
(1) Mother did not meet her burden of proof in showing that Father was in 
contempt for disobeying the Decree; (2) Father had not repeatedly refused to 
allow Mother to recover lost time with the children, and each party had allowed 
the other extra time in accordance with the best interests of the children; (3) 
Father had not forbidden school personnel from communicating with Mother, he had 
only asked that he be included in any major teacher conference; (4) neither 
party had willfully denied custodial nor visitation rights of the other; (5) 
Father had participated in mediation in good faith; and, (6) there had not been 
willful violations of court orders by either party.

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 

[¶46]     
In 
this appeal, Mother invites this Court to reweigh the testimony and evidence 
adduced at trial.  We decline to do 
so, especially since Mother has not articulated the existence "of some serious 
procedural error, a violation of a principle of law, or a clear and grave abuse 
of discretion" by the trial court.  
See Goss, 780 P.2d  at 
313.  

 
 

[¶47]     
We 
affirm the Order Denying Contempt and Establishing Custody. 

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1By the time of trial, 
Mother had physical custody of the parties' children for approximately 14 
consecutive months.

 
 

2Presiding District 
Court Judge Gary P. Hartman retired on July 31, 2008.  The case was then assigned to the 
Honorable Robert E. Skar.  Judge 
Skar was subsequently disqualified since a close family member was designated to 
testify as a witness at the trial of this case.  The case was then assigned to the 
Honorable Dan Spangler pursuant to an Order of Temporary 
Assignment.

 
 

3In cases where 
"spousal abuse" or "child abuse" is present, the trial court is required to 
consider such evidence "as being contrary to the best interest of the 
children."  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-201(c).  In those cases, the 
trial court is mandated by statute to fashion custody and visitation orders to 
provide for the best interests of the children and to protect the spouse and 
children.  Id.  "However, in determining custody in the 
best interest of a child, evidence of spousal abuse is only one of the factors 
district courts are required to consider."  
Buttle, ¶ 23, 196 P.3d  at 
180.  Thus, evidence of spousal 
abuse or child abuse "must be considered along with all of the other 
factors."  Id., ¶ 25, 196 P.3d  at 
180.

 
 

4The 
record is bereft of any indication that Mother presented this issue in this 
manner to the district court at trial.  

 
 
In 
general, we do not consider claims raised for the first time on appeal.  See Davis v. City of Cheyenne, 2004 WY 
43, ¶ 26, 88 P.3d 481, 490 (Wyo. 2004).  
We "take[] a dim view of a litigant trying a case on one theory and 
appealing it on another .   Parties 
are bound by the theories which they advanced below."  WW Enterprises, Inc. v. City of 
Cheyenne, 956 P.2d 353, 356 (Wyo. 1998).  We have in the past recognized two 
exceptions to this rule: when the issue raises a jurisdictional concern or when 
the issue concerns such a fundamental nature of fairness that it must be 
considered.  Davis, ¶ 26, 88 P.3d  at 
490.

                                                            
                        

Anderson 
v. Board of County Comm'rs of Teton County, 
2009 WY 122, ¶ 15, 217 P.3d 401, 405 (Wyo. 2009).  Since Mother's claim implicates a 
fundamental right, we will address it.