Case Title: Johnson v. State

Citation: 281 N.E.2d 473

Docket Number: 770S150

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1972-04-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
281 N.E.2d 473 (1972)
Mike JOHNSON, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
No. 770S150.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
April 25, 1972.
*474 John G. Bunner, Evansville, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Zaban, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.
PRENTICE, Justice.
Defendant (Appellant) was convicted of robbery in a trial by jury under Acts of 1941, ch. 148, § 6, 1956 Repl. Burns Ind. Stat. Ann. § 10-4101, IC XX-XX-X-X. He was sentenced to imprisonment for not less than ten nor more than twenty-five years and disfranchised for five years. His Motion to Correct Errors assigns grounds 1 through 11. Alleged errors 5, 7 and 9 have been waived under Appellate Rule 8.3(A) (7).
Alleged errors 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8 are treated together in Appellant's brief and relate to the overruling of his motion to quash the affidavit and the sustaining of the State's motion, at the close of its evidence, permitting it to amend the date of the jurat upon the charging affidavit.
The charging affidavit was as follows:
The reverse side of the affidavit shows it to have been filed on December 5, 1969.
The motion to quash and supporting memo was as follows:
The evidence disclosed that the robbery with which the defendant was charged took place on October 29, 1969. The affiant testified that he signed the affidavit on December 5, 1969, in open court and that it was then filed on that same date. The court's file mark disclosed the filing date to be December 5, 1969. (Transcript pp. 122-124). We note that the appellant's brief reflects that the affiant testified that he signed the affidavit on October 5, 1969 and we assess this as a typographical error.
It is the defendant's position that since the affidavit alleged the date of offense subsequent in time to the date of the affidavit, it did not state a public offense and that permitting its amendment to make it good would necessarily be a change in substance, rather than in form, and prejudicial error. He relies upon Pagotis v. State (1938), 214 Ind. 697, 17 N.E.2d 830; Hunt v. State (1927), 199 Ind. 550, 159 N.E. 149; and Shonfield v. State (1925), 196 Ind. 579, 149 N.E. 53. We find these cases distinguishable upon the facts and his contention without merit. In Pagotis (supra) the affidavit was returned on September 18, 1936 and charged an offense to have been committed on December 15, 1936. The amendment changed the alleged commission date to December 15, 1934. The date of the alleged commission of the offense charged is usually an essential part of the allegation, and when it is, it is, therefore, by its very nature substantive. The date of the jurat is a formality only.
As in Pagotis (supra), Shonfield (supra) involved an affidavit filed prior to the date of the alleged offense. The affidavit in Hunt (supra) alleged that the offense occurred on two different dates, i.e. "* * * on or about the 27th day of Oct., A.D. nineteen hundred 1923 * * *."
The motion to quash did not direct the court's attention to the discrepancy between the date of the jurat and the date of the alleged offense. If it had, it could very easily have been corrected at that time. The alleged date of the offense was definite and anterior to the date of filing; hence the defendant could not have been misled or prejudiced in the preparation of his defense. The subsequent amendment of the jurat appears to have been irregular, since it was predicated upon the testimony of the affiant rather than upon that of the attesting official. However, it is clear the defendant could not have been prejudiced.
The governing statutes have not been offended and provide:
It has been held that if the defense under the affidavit as it originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made, and if any evidence the accused might have would be equally applicable to the affidavit in one form as in the other, the amendment is one of form and not of substance. Smith v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 148, 246 N.E.2d 765; State ex rel. Kaufman v. Gould (1951), 229 Ind. 288, 98 N.E.2d 184. Also see, 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations § 240, p. 1250.
Alleged error number 6 relates to the court's having permitted a State's witness to testify, over objection, that she had previously identified the defendant at a lineup. Prior to such testimony, a hearing was held outside the view and hearing of the jury, at which it was determined that the defendant had counsel present at the lineup and that it was properly conducted in all respects and that the witness had there identified the defendant without suggestion from any of the others present.
In Jacoby v. State (1932), 203 Ind. 321, 180 N.E. 179, cited by the defendant, the witness was allowed to testify that two weeks following the robbery, when he went to the police station with the officer, he saw the appellant come up the steps, that he then turned to the officer and told him that there was the man who had robbed him. In Thompson v. State (1944), 223 Ind. 39, 58 N.E.2d 112, also cited by Defendant, police officers were permitted to testify that on the morning following the alleged crime the prosecuting witness had viewed the appellant through a "one way" glass and had then identified him as the man who had robbed her. In both cases we reversed. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to draw any relevant distinctions between these two cases and the one at bar. However, having re-examined them, together with other like cases and the writings of eminent authorities in the field of criminal evidence, we have concluded that they should not be followed. Other jurisdictions appear to be about evenly divided upon the question of the competency of testimony by a witness, as to his own prior identification of the defendant. The trend, however, appears to be favoring its admissibility, and other states that once refused it as hearsay, now admit it under proper circumstances.
Wigmore on Evidence, Third Edition, § 1130, is unyielding in favor of its admissibility.
In agreement are Wharton on Criminal Evidence, Twelfth Ed., 1972 Supp. §§ 181, 182 and Underhill's Criminal Evidence, Fifth Ed., 1970 Supp. § 127. Such testimony would be admissible under the Model Code of Evidence of the American Law Institute, Rule 503(b) which admits hearsay declarations if the declarant is present and subject to cross-examination.
Our viewpoint is summed up in the following statement from Colbert v. Commonwealth, Court of Appeals of Kentucky (1957), 306 S.W.2d 825, 71 A.L.R.2d 442, where that court reversed its earlier position.
The question is annotated at 70 A.L.R. 910 and 71 A.L.R.2d 449.
Accordingly, we hold that if the prior identification does not offend against the principles laid down in United States v. Wade (1967), 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1149, Gilbert v. California (1967), 388 U.S. 263, 87 S. Ct. 1951, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1178 or Stovall v. Denno (1967), 388 U.S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199, such testimony should be admitted; and to the extent that they conflict herewith, Jacoby v. State (supra) and Thompson v. State (supra), are expressly overruled.
Defendant has also cited us to Tyrrel v. State (1912), 177 Ind. 14, 97 N.E. 14; Hicks v. State (1905), 165 Ind. 440, 75 N.E. 641 and Gilbert v. California (supra). We do not agree that these cases are relevant to this issue.
Alleged errors number 10 and 11 are that the court erred in refusing Defendant's tendered instructions number 1 and 2, which are as follows:
The refusal or failure to give an instruction is not ground for reversal, if the substance of the requested instruction is covered by other instructions. Doss v. *478 State (1971), Ind., 267 N.E.2d 385; Lambert v. State (1969), Ind., 249 N.E.2d 502; Rariden v. State (1961), 242 Ind. 689, 177 N.E.2d 736. An examination of the foregoing tendered instructions reveals that their substance was included in the following instructions given:
It is our opinion that the jury was adequately instructed upon the matters covered by the defendant's tendered instructions that were refused.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
ARTERBURN, C.J., and DeBRULER, GIVAN and HUNTER, JJ., concur.