Case Title: Palmer v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 351, 2021

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2022-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
MICHAEL K. PALMER, 
 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§ 
§  No. 351, 2021 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below–Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§   
§  Cr. ID No.  1902013833 (K) 
§                                          
§ 
§   
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted: January 4, 2022 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
March 23, 2022 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
ORDER 
 
After careful consideration of the appellant’s opening brief, the State’s motion 
to affirm, and the Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The appellant, Michael Palmer, appeals the Superior Court’s decision 
denying Palmer’s first motion for postconviction relief.  The State has filed a motion 
to affirm the judgment below on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Palmer’s 
opening brief that his appeal is without merit.  We agree and affirm. 
 
(2) 
In June 2019, a grand jury indicted Palmer for multiple drug and 
weapon offenses, including six counts of drug dealing.  In August 2019, Palmer filed 
a motion to suppress, which the Superior Court denied after a hearing.   
2 
 
 
(3) 
On October 7, 2019, Palmer rejected a plea offer at final case review, 
and his case was set for trial.  On the morning of trial, Palmer pleaded nolo 
contendere to two counts of drug dealing in a Tier 4 quantity—each of which carried 
a minimum-mandatory prison term of two years—and one count of carrying a 
concealed deadly weapon.  In exchange, the State entered a nolle prosequi on the 
remaining sixteen charges in the indictment.  Following a presentence investigation, 
the Superior Court sentenced Palmer to an aggregate of ten years of unsuspended 
Level V incarceration, followed by decreasing levels of probation.  Palmer did not 
appeal his convictions or sentence. 
 
(4) 
On July 21, 2020, Palmer filed a timely motion for postconviction relief 
under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61, raising claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  After expanding the record with an affidavit from trial counsel addressing 
the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and the State’s response to the 
motion for postconviction relief, a Superior Court Commissioner recommended that 
the Superior Court deny Palmer’s motion.  The Superior Court conducted a de novo 
review of the Commissioner’s report, adopted it in its entirety, and denied Palmer’s 
motion for postconviction relief.  This appeal followed.  
(5) 
We review the Superior Court’s denial of postconviction relief for 
abuse of discretion and questions of law de novo.1  The procedural bars of Rule 61 
 
1 Baynum v. State, 211 A.3d 1075, 1082 (Del. 2019). 
3 
 
must be considered before any substantive claims are addressed.2  Ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims, however, are not subject to Rule 61’s procedural bars 
and are properly raised in a timely filed motion for postconviction relief.3  Claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by the two-pronged test set forth in 
Strickland v. Washington.4  In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel after a defendant has entered a guilty plea (or its legal equivalent), the 
defendant must demonstrate that (i) trial counsel’s representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness5 and (ii) counsel’s actions were so prejudicial 
“that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the defendant 
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”6  Although 
not insurmountable, there is a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was 
professionally reasonable.7   
(6) 
As he did below, Palmer raises eight claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Palmer argues that his counsel was ineffective for: (1) pressuring Palmer 
into taking the plea by advising him that his case would proceed to trial the following 
day if he rejected it; (2) failing to investigate Palmer’s case and present evidence on 
 
2 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
3 Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160, 175 (Del. 2020). 
4 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
5 Id. at 687-88. 
6 Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629, 631 (Del. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted).  
7 Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 59 (Del. 1988). 
4 
 
his behalf; (3) failing to introduce certain evidence at the suppression hearing; (4) 
missing a purported mistake at sentencing; (5) forcing Palmer to hire another 
attorney to assist with postconviction proceedings because of counsel’s 
unprofessional errors;8 (6) failing to enforce the plea agreement; (7) coercing Palmer 
to agree to a presentence investigation; and (8) failing to file a motion to dismiss.   
(7) 
The record does not support Palmer’s argument that trial counsel 
pressured Palmer into accepting the plea offer (Claim 1) or his claim that trial 
counsel coerced Palmer into agreeing to a presentence investigation (Claim 7).  Nor 
does it support Palmer’s claim that counsel somehow failed to ensure that the 
Superior Court followed the parties’ plea agreement (Claim 6).  On the Truth-in-
Sentencing Guilty Plea Form, Palmer indicated that he had freely and voluntarily 
decided to enter a nolo contendere plea; he had not been promised anything that was 
not contained in the plea agreement; no one had threatened or forced him to enter 
the plea; he understood that he was waiving certain constitutional rights by entering 
the plea, including the right to present evidence in his defense; and he was satisfied 
with his lawyer’s representation.  Palmer also acknowledged that he faced a 
maximum prison term of fifty-eight years, including a minimum-mandatory term of 
 
8 In connection with this claim, Palmer contends for the first time on appeal that trial counsel failed 
to advise Palmer of his right to appeal his convictions and sentence.  Absent plain error, which we 
do not find here, we will not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. Del. Supr. Ct. 
R. 8.  This general rule is particularly appropriate in the context of ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claims because trial counsel was not afforded the opportunity to respond to the claim in 
the first instance.  
5 
 
four years, and the plea paperwork indicates that the parties agreed to a presentence 
investigation.  Before accepting Palmer’s nolo contendere plea, the Superior Court 
engaged in a colloquy with him, during which Palmer acknowledged that a nolo 
contendere plea has the same legal effect of a guilty plea; the State’s evidence 
against him formed a basis for the charges to which he was pleading nolo 
contendere; he faced a maximum total penalty of fifty-eight years of incarceration, 
with a minimum-mandatory term of four years of prison; no one had threatened or 
forced him to enter the plea; and he was satisfied with his attorney’s representation.  
Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, which he has not identified, 
Palmer is bound by his representations during the plea colloquy and on the Truth-in-
Sentencing Guilty Plea Form.9  Finally, we note that Palmer received a significant 
benefit from the plea agreement negotiated by trial counsel.  Had Palmer proceeded 
to a jury trial on the nineteen drug and weapons charges in the indictment and been 
found guilty, his sentence could have been—and likely would have been—far more 
severe.  We conclude that the plea agreement, the guilty plea form, and the transcript 
of the plea hearing all support a finding that Palmer knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily pleaded nolo contendere.  
 
9 Sommerville, 703 A.2d at 632. 
6 
 
(8) 
Because a valid guilty plea waives any Palmer’s right to contest any 
error made prior to the entry of the plea,10 Palmer’s inability to demonstrate that his 
plea was involuntary is also fatal to his claims that counsel failed to present certain 
evidence or argument on his behalf (Claims 2 and 3) and failed to file a motion to 
dismiss the indictment (Claim 8). 
(9) 
Palmer’s argument that counsel failed to notice a purported error at 
sentencing (Claim 4) also fails.  Palmer alleges that the Superior Court mistakenly 
applied the sentencing range applicable to Class C felonies when it fashioned his 
sentences for the drug dealing offenses, which are Class B felonies.  Palmer does not 
allege prejudice but claims that his sentence is still “incorrect.”  The Court has 
reviewed the sentencing transcript, and it contains no mention of the sentencing 
range applicable to Class C felonies.  In any event, Palmer’s sentence falls with the 
statutorily authorized range of penalties for Class B felonies.  And we note that the 
Superior Court, despite finding aggravating factors, imposed a sentence less than 
that recommended by the State. 
(10) Finally, Palmer’s claim that he “had” to hire another attorney to assist 
him with postconviction proceedings (Claim 5) is not grounds for postconviction 
relief because it does not attack the validity of Palmer’s convictions.11 
 
10 Barham v. State, 2002 WL 31084259, at *1 (Del. Sept. 16, 2002); Brown v. State, 108 A.3d 
1201, 1202 (Del. 2015). 
11 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(a)(1). 
7 
 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to affirm is 
GRANTED and the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Collins J. Seitz, Jr. 
        Chief Justice