Case Title: LOBERG v. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-04-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
LOBERG v. WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND COMPENSATION DIVISION2004 WY 4888 P.3d 1045Case Number: 03-120Decided: 04/30/2004
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2004

 

                                                                                                
         

 

IN 
THE MATTER OF THE WORKER'S

COMPENSATION 
CLAIM OF:  
Brad

E. 
Loberg, Deceased:

 

DEBBIE 
LOBERG,

 

Appellant(Petitioner) 
,

 

v.

 

STATE 
OF WYOMING, ex rel., WYOMING

WORKERS' 
SAFETY AND COMPENSATION

DIVISION,

 

Appellee(Respondent) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Keith 
R. Nachbar of Casper, Wyoming

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; 
and David L. Delicath, Assistant Attorney General

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

HILL, 
C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court; GOLDEN, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion.

 

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Appellant, Debbie 
Loberg (Loberg), submitted a claim to Appellee, Wyoming Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Division (Division), seeking benefits for expenses associated with 
her husband's burial.  Loberg's 
husband died in an industrial accident.  
The Division denied her claim, and she requested a hearing before the 
Office of Administrative Hearings.  
The hearing officer ruled in favor of the Division.  Loberg then appealed to the district 
court and it affirmed.  Loberg 
contends that the hearing officer and the district court erred in determining, 
as a matter of law, that she was not entitled to $2,500.00 as a benefit to cover 
"other related expenses" associated with her husband's burial.  The Division reimbursed Loberg for the 
actual expenses of her husband's burial in the amount of $1,170.80.  Loberg also sought an additional benefit 
of $2,500.00 to cover other unitemized expenses, which the Division denied. 
 We will 
affirm.

 

 

[¶2]      Loberg raises a 
single issue in this appeal:

 

Under 
the death benefits provision of Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-403(e)(ii), is the surviving 
spouse entitled to a $2,500.00 lump sum payment in addition to the reimbursement 
of burial expenses of up to $2,500.00?

 

The 
State views the issue this way:

 

            
The Hearing Examiner concluded that W.S. § 27-14-403(e)(ii) (Lexis 2001) 
provides a benefit of up to $2,500.00 for burial expenses and an additional 
benefit of up to $2,500.00 for other expenses, actually incurred, that are 
related to the burial.  Is that 
construction in accord with law?

 

 

[¶3]      For clarity of 
context we recite the language of the applicable statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-403(e)(ii) (LexisNexis 2001)1, here:

 

§ 
27-14-403.  Awards generally; method 
of payment.

            
. . . .

            
(e) If an injured employee dies as a result of the work related injury 
whether or not an award under paragraphs (a)(i) through (iv) of this section has 
been made:

(i) 
All awards under paragraphs (a)(i) through (iii) of this section shall cease as 
of the date of death;

(ii) 
The burial expenses of the deceased employee shall be paid in an amount not 
to exceed two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00) together with an 
additional amount of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00) to cover 
other related expenses, unless other arrangements exist between the employer and 
employee under agreement;  
[Emphasis added.]

 

[¶4]      The parties 
entered into a stipulation to establish the facts pertinent to this 
question.  On September 14, 2001, 
Loberg's husband was fatally injured in an industrial accident.  Based on receipts submitted to the 
Division, she was paid $1,170.80 for burial expenses.  No other benefits were paid to Loberg 
under the applicable statute, and Loberg did not submit any additional receipts 
for reimbursement of burial expenses.  
Loberg concedes that she is seeking reimbursement for unitemized expenses 
she incurred incidental to her husband's funeral.  The nub of her argument is that the 
wording of the statute is not ambiguous and, by the words placed in the statute, 
the legislature intended that a deceased worker's spouse should automatically 
receive the second $2,500.00 to cover the ordinary costs of a funeral (things 
such as hotel rooms for relatives, food, travel, phone calls, counseling, 
opening probate estate, transferring titles and deeds, etc., which may be 
difficult to fully document or estimate).

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 

[¶5]      The issue posed 
is one of statutory construction:

 

            
Our standard of review with respect to the construction of statutes is 
well known.  In interpreting 
statutes, our primary consideration is to determine the legislature's 
intent.  All statutes must be 
construed in pari materia and, in ascertaining the meaning of a given 
law, all statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general 
purpose must be considered and construed in harmony.  Statutory construction is a question of 
law, so our standard of review is de novo.   We endeavor to 

interpret 
statutes in accordance with the legislature's intent.  We begin by making an inquiry respecting 
the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their 
arrangement and connection.  We 
construe the statute as a whole, giving effect to every word, clause, and 
sentence, and we construe all parts of the statute in pari materia.  When a statute is sufficiently clear and 
unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words and 
do not resort to the rules of statutory construction.  Wyoming Board of Outfitters and 
Professional Guides v. Clark, 2001 WY 78, ¶12, 30 P.3d 36, ¶12 (Wyo.2001); 
Murphy v. State Canvassing Board, 12 P.3d 677, 679 (Wyo.2000).  Moreover, we must not give a 
statute  a meaning that will nullify 
its operation if it is susceptible of another interpretation.  Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 
413 (Wyo.1990) (citing McGuire v. McGuire, 608 P.2d 1278, 1283 
(Wyo.1980)).

Moreover, 
we will not enlarge, stretch, expand, or extend a statute to matters that do not 
fall within its express provisions.  
Gray v. Stratton Real Estate, 2001 WY 125, ¶5, 36 P.3d 1127, ¶5 
(Wyo.2001); Bowen v. State, Wyoming Real Estate Commission, 900 P.2d 1140, 1143 (Wyo.1995).

 

Board 
of County Commissioners of Teton County v. Crow, 
2003 WY 40, ¶¶40-41, 65 P.3d 720, ¶¶40-41 (Wyo. 2003) (some internal citations 
omitted).

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶6]      We will begin our 
discussion by embracing, in this context, the usual burden of proof that is 
applicable to all worker's compensation claims, i.e., that the claimant has the 
burden of proving a claim for the benefits sought.  See, e.g., Robbins v. Workers' Safety 
and Compensation Division, 2003 WY 29, ¶16, 64 P.3d 729, ¶16 (Wyo. 
2003).  The record is clear that 
Loberg has not substantiated a claim for a sum certain.  On the face of the statute, we find the 
legislative intent unambiguous.  
Under the applicable worker's compensation statutes, "injury" includes 
death.  Wyo. Stat. Ann § 
27-14-102(a)(xi) (LexisNexis 2001).  
All claims for benefits must be documented.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-24-501 (esp. 
27-14-501(f)) (LexisNexis 2003).  We 
are unable to read into the statute the language for which Loberg argues (i.e., 
that it is a small life/burial insurance policy), although we are sympathetic to 
her plight.  In this respect, as is 
the case with many others, worker's compensation benefits are not especially 
generous.

 

[¶7]      Loberg directs 
our attention to several other principles of statutory construction that she 
contends are applicable here.  Her 
reasoning is that the denial of benefits renders the second $2,500.00 
meaningless, if it is construed to be only a second burial expense.  We must discount that argument because 
the statute only allows the second $2,500.00 sum to be paid for expenses 
incurred that are associated with the burial.  Reference to Larson's treatise on 
worker's compensation law reveals that statutes such as these have generated 
very little litigation.  That is 
likely because they are statutes that allow reimbursement for expenses incurred, 
and not a lump sum benefit.  The 
second half of that subsection is not rendered meaningless by our construction 
of it.

 

[¶8]      Loberg also 
contends that we must construe the statute with an eye to its intended 
purpose.  Continuing, she contends 
that its apparent purpose is to provide a lump sum benefit to assist a surviving 
spouse in managing the financial devastation that accompanies the death of a 
spouse.  We agree that the benefit 
is there to help the surviving spouse cope with the death.  However, we do not ignore the statute's 
intended purpose by construing it to mean that the expenses claimed under it 
must be documented with receipts or other substantial evidence.  Finally, Loberg refers us to a Maine 
statute that she claims reflects what the Wyoming legislature really intended in 
this circumstance.  Me. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 39A, § 216 (West 2001) provides:

 

§ 
216.  Burial expenses; incidental 
compensation.

 

            
If the employee dies as a result of the injury, the employer shall pay, 
in addition to any compensation and medical benefits provided for in this Act, 
the reasonable expense of burial, not to exceed $4,000 and an additional payment 
of $3,000 as incidental compensation.  
Burial expense reimbursement must be paid to the person who has paid or 
who is responsible for paying the employee's burial expenses.  The incidental compensation must be paid 
to the employee's estate.

 

Our 
perception is that Maine has adopted a statutory scheme that is quite different 
from Wyoming's, and it does not provide authority for us to construe our statute 
so as to conform to Maine's model.

 

[¶9]      Finally, we will 
take note that the Division's rules and regulations make only passing reference 
to the resolution of claims submitted in the wake of an employee's death.  See Workers' Compensation Rules, 
Regulations and Fee Schedules, Chapter 5, Section 2(b), 3 Weil's Code of Wyoming 
Rules, Chapter 5, 025 220 001-12 (2001).  "One measure of a statute's meaning is 
the interpretation placed on it by the agency charged with its administration, 
and this Court will defer to that interpretation where it does not conflict with 
legislative intent."  Board of 
County Commissioners, Sublette County v. Board of Equalization, 2001 WY 91, 
¶16, 33 P.3d 107, ¶16 (Wyo. 2001).  
While we agree that the Division's implementation of the burial benefits 
is consistent with the apparent intent of the legislature, the Division's 
analysis of such claims appears to be ad hoc.  It should flesh out the scope of those 
benefits in its rules and regulations, so as to aid the unfortunate claimants 
who must rely upon those benefits to bury a loved one, and so as to provide a 
frame of reference for review of decisions made by the Division with respect to 
such claims.

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶10]   We hold that the district court was 
correct in affirming the ruling of the Office of Administrative Hearings, and 
its order is affirmed.

 

GOLDEN, 
J., 
dissenting.

 

[¶11]      Mrs. 
Loberg's husband was killed in an industrial accident.  She submitted to the Division burial 
expense receipts, and the Division paid $1,170.80 for burial expenses based on 
her receipts.  Without submitting 
other receipts for related expenses, she sought, but the Division denied, an 
additional lump sum of $2,500 to cover other related expenses.  We are called upon to apply Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 27-14-403(e)(ii) (LexisNexis 2001), which reads in pertinent 
part:

 

            
The burial expenses of the deceased employee shall be paid in an amount 
not to exceed two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00) together with an 
additional amount of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00) to cover 
other related expenses . . . .

 

 

[¶12]      I 
agree with Mrs. Loberg that the wording of this statutory provision is 
unambiguous and plainly reads that she "shall be paid . . . an additional amount 
of two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500.00) to cover other related 
expenses."  Had the wording in the 
second clause (together with an additional amount of $2,500 to cover other 
related expenses) been identical to the wording in the first clause (burial 
expenses in an amount "not to exceed" $2,500), I would have agreed with the 
Division's position.  But, 
obviously, the legislature did not write the second clause to read "together 
with an additional amount not to exceed two thousand five hundred dollars 
($2,500.00) to cover other related expenses."  Our precedent requires us to work with 
the language exactly given to us by the legislature.

 

FOOTNOTES

   1Effective July 
1, 2002, the benefits payable under subsection (e)(ii) were increased to 
$5,000.00 each.  The statutory 
provision in effect at the time of injury controls the award of benefits.  Collicott v. Wyoming Workers' Safety 
and Compensation Division, 2001 WY 35, ¶13, 20 P.3d 1077, ¶13 (Wyo. 2001); 
also see 5 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 98.07 
(2003).