Case Title: Matter of Unemployment Appeal of Fickbohm

Citation: 323 N.W.2d 133

Docket Number: 

State: south-dakota

Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1982-08-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
323 N.W.2d 133 (1982) In the Matter of the APPEAL FROM the FINAL DECISION OF the SOUTH DAKOTA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE DIVISION, FOR Laura FICKBOHM, Appeal No. C-2587. No. 13677. Supreme Court of South Dakota. Considered on Briefs May 20, 1982. Decided August 18, 1982. *134 Joseph G. Rimlinger, East River Legal Services Corp., Sioux Falls, for appellant Laura Fickbohm. Julie M. Johnson, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Aberdeen, for appellee State of S. D. FOSHEIM, Justice. Laura Fickbohm (appellant), a single parent, was employed by Litton Microwave in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, on the assembly line. She worked from 7:00 a. m. to 3:30 p. m., Monday through Friday, 40 hours per week, at an hourly wage of $3.75. Appellant was laid off from this job on January 5, 1981, whereupon she applied for unemployment benefits. On January 21, 1981, Job Service notified appellant of a job opening, paying $3.35 per hour, for a combination cashier and prep worker at a cafe. Although appellant had experience in restaurant work, she refused the job referral. Because of that refusal, the Benefit Section of the South Dakota Department of Labor denied her unemployment benefits. Her appeal of this denial resulted in a hearing before a referee of the South Dakota Department of Labor. At that hearing appellant stated she refused the referral because: (1) the job required Saturday work and day care was not available on Saturdays for her infant son; (2) she understood the job was not full-time and she needed a full-time job, paying more than $3.35 per hour, to make ends meet;[1] and (3) she did not like prep work. The referee's decision, affirmed by the Secretary of Labor, was that appellant was properly denied unemployment benefits because she refused a referral to suitable work without good cause. Appellant appealed the agency's decision to the circuit court. This appeal is from the circuit court's order affirming the agency's decision. We also affirm. SDCL 61-6-15 states: "If the department finds that an unemployed individual has failed, without good cause ... to apply for available suitable work when so directed by the department ... such claimant shall be denied benefits[.]" The issues appellant raises on appeal are whether child care responsibilities constitute good cause for refusing to apply for a job and whether a job is suitable if it pays approximately 10% less than the claimant previously earned. The standard of review in this Court is SDCL 1-26-36, which states: This court reviews the agency's decision in the same manner as the circuit court, unaided by a presumption that the circuit court's decision was correct. In the Matter of the South Lincoln Rural Water System Application for Permit No. 4300-3, 295 N.W.2d 743 (S.D.1980). No reference to SDCL 1-26-36 is made in appellant's brief, and no specific action by the agency in violation or contravention of that statute is noted. However, in light of the statutes cited by appellant, she apparently considers the agency's decision in violation of SDCL 1-26-36(1). There is no statute defining good cause for failure to apply for a job and we have not had occasion to interpret SDCL 61-6-15 before. Looking then to other jurisdictions, we find Pennsylvania has developed the following definition: Trexler v. Com., Unemployment Comp. Bd., 27 Pa.C. 180, 365 A.2d 1341, 1344 (1976) (citations omitted). The Trexler decision held that parental responsibilities do present a substantial and reasonable basis for refusing to take a job. The claimant in Trexler was held to be entitled to unemployment benefits because of her good faith effort to secure new employment. Subsequent Pennsylvania unemployment cases dealing with refusal to accept a job because of parental responsibilities have consequently centered on whether the claimant's refusal was made in good faith. For example Liebrum v. Com., Unemployment Comp. Bd., 32 Pa. Cmwlth. 401, 379 A.2d 664, 666 (1977), justified its denial of unemployment benefits to such a claimant with the following language. Similarly Brink v. Com., Unemployment Comp. Bd., 38 Pa.C. 168, 392 A.2d 338 (1978), affirmed a denial of benefits to a parent who refused a job offer requiring Saturday work. The parent claimed that she could not accept the job because it was impossible to find a babysitter on Saturdays. As in Liebrum, the Brink court justified its decision on the lack of a good faith showing. Id. 392 A.2d at 340. Turning to the present case, we agree with the Pennsylvania courts that the fulfillment of parental responsibilities and duties is a substantial and reasonable basis, i.e. good cause, for refusing to accept a job. However, appellant presented no evidence at the hearing that it was impossible for her to secure care for her child while she worked on Saturday. We therefore hold that appellant was properly denied unemployment benefits because her showing of good cause lacked evidence of good faith. The final issue, whether a job is suitable if it pays approximately 10% less than the claimant's prior earnings, addresses suitability of work under SDCL 61-6-16. That statute reads: "In determining whether or not any work is suitable for an individual, the department shall consider ... his ... prior earnings[.]" The record does not reveal whether the $3.35 per hour wage included tips. We realize that even a 10% reduction in wages would undoubtedly strain appellant's meager budget. However, appellant presented no evidence to substantiate her claim that she and her son could not live on the offered wage. Wage considerations are also addressed in SDCL 61-6-17, which reads: Therefore, the agency's decision was not in violation of statutory provisions. We accordingly affirm the order of the circuit court. HENDERSON, J., concurs. WOLLMAN, C. J., concurs specially. DUNN and MORGAN, JJ., dissent. WOLLMAN, Chief Justice (concurring specially). Unlike the situation that was presented to us in Red Bird v. Meierhenry, 314 N.W.2d 95 (S.D.1982), as the majority opinion points out, there is no definition of "good cause" as that term is used in SDCL 61-6-15. The Department of Labor argues that we should look to the provisions of SDCL 61-6-16 and 61-6-17 as limitations upon the grounds that would constitute good cause for refusing to apply for or accept suitable work.[*] *137 In construing statutes similar to SDCL 61-6-15, 61-6-16, and 61-6-17, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held: Barclay White Co. v. Unemploy. Comp. Bd. of Rev., Etc., 356 Pa. 43, 50 A.2d 336, 339-40 (1947). We have elected to follow the Pennsylvania approach. If the legislature should decide that our interpretation is not in keeping with legislative intent, then it will be a simple enough job for the legislature to define, as it did in the statute under consideration in Red Bird v. Meierhenry, supra, "good cause," as that term is used in SDCL 61-6-15, in a more restrictive manner than we have done in this opinion. DUNN, Justice (dissenting). I would concur with the majority that the fulfillment of parental responsibilities and duties constitutes good cause for refusing to accept a job under SDCL 61-6-15. I would, however, reverse and remand this case for a determination of whether appellant made a good faith effort to secure care for her child while she worked on Saturdays. The good faith test adopted by the majority in this case works a hardship on appellant. This standard requires the establishment of a factual record at the time of the hearing; a requirement appellant was not aware of at the time of her hearing. The hearing in this case was conducted before a referee who elicited information from appellant in the form of questions. Appellant was not represented by counsel (although counsel is not required at such hearings), was not given the opportunity to call witnesses and present testimony concerning good faith to procure day care facilities for her child, and, more importantly, was not even asked by the referee about her efforts to find child care. There was just no factual hearing held on the issue of the good faith efforts of appellant to obtain suitable care for her child on Saturdays. This was undoubtedly due to the fact that the State rejects outright the "fulfillment of parental responsibilities" test to show good cause for refusing employment. The appellant is entitled to a hearing and finding on this issue and I would reverse and remand the case for this purpose. I am authorized to state that Justice MORGAN joins in this dissent. [1] At the hearing appellant was informed by the referee that the referral was for a full-time job. Appellant stated that she was under the impression the job was not full-time but that" . . . I you know really wasn't listening that close because after she said it was having to do with prep work and Saturdays I just you know right there had decided because I've never had to work weekends since I've had [my son] so and I don't want to start now." [*] SDCL 61-6-16 reads as follows: In determining whether or not any work is suitable for an individual, the department shall consider the degree of risk involved to his health, safety, and morals, his physical fitness and prior training, his experience and prior earnings, his length of unemployment and prospects for securing local work in his customary occupation, and the distance of the available work from his residence. SDCL 61-6-17 reads as follows: Notwithstanding any other provisions of this title no work shall be deemed suitable and benefits shall not be denied under this title to any otherwise eligible individual for refusing to accept new work under any of the following conditions: (1) If the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or other labor dispute; (2) If the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered are substantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for similar work in the locality; (3) If, as a condition of being employed, the individual would be required to join or to resign from or refrain from joining any labor organization.