Case Title: Madden v. State

Citation: 254 Ind. 628, 261 N.E.2d 847

Docket Number: 169S14

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1970-09-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
254 Ind. 628 (1970)
261 N.E.2d 847
MADDEN
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 169S14.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed September 14, 1970.
Lawrence D. Renfro, of New Castle, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Aaron T. Jahr, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
No petition for rehearing filed.
JACKSON, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Henry Superior Court wherein the appellant, following a trial by jury, was convicted of first degree burglary and theft against property.
This action was commenced on January 8, 1968, by the filing of an affidavit in two counts. The affidavit reads in pertinent part as follows:
Appellant was arraigned January 11, 1968, and entered a plea of not guilty to the crimes charged. The trial of this cause commenced September 30, 1968; on October 1, 1968, the jury returned its verdict finding appellant guilty on both counts as charged in the affidavit. The court thereupon ordered a pre-commitment report be filed by the Probation Officer of said county. On October 11, 1968, the court sentenced appellant, on Count I (First Degree Burglary), to the Indiana State Prison for a period of not less than ten (10) nor more than twenty (20) years and disfranchised him and rendered him incapable of holding any office of trust or profit for a period of one year. The court also sentenced appellant on Count II (Theft) to the Indiana State Prison for a period of one year.
*630 On October 31, 1968, appellant filed his motion for new trial and affidavit in support thereof, said motion and affidavit reading in pertinent part as follows:
Appellant's motion for new trial was overruled on November 8, 1968. Appellant's sole Assignment of Error is that: "1. The Court erred in overruling appellant's motion for new trial."
From the evidence adduced at trial, viewed in a light most favorable to the State, it appears that on January 6, 1968, Clifford Denny was the owner of certain property located at *632 925 S. 14th Street in New Castle, Indiana, said property being a house of human habitation. On said date Denny and his family went to Markleville to visit friends, and upon their return Denny discovered that his house had been broken into and a .22 pistol, holster, and belt stolen. A few days later appellant went to Denny's home and admitted that it was he who had broken into the residence and had stolen the pistol. He returned the stolen property at such time. Appellant stated that he was drunk at the time he broke into complainant's home, and then he begged Denny not to report the incident to the police. Denny said he would not press charges against appellant because he had returned the stolen property, but apparently did so later.
Mrs. Denny testified that when appellant came to the house he told her that he thought he was going into the home of a relative of his, one Vernon Thompson, to get a shotgun. For some time prior to this incident, Thompson had rented certain apartments from Denny on the property in question.
Edna Bryant, with whom appellant had been living at the time of this incident, testified that she had seen appellant in her home on the evening of January 6, 1968, with a pistol. She stated that appellant told her to get rid of the holster and belt, and that he had previously found the pistol.
On appeal appellant initially argues that the trial court committed reversible error in giving its final instructions numbered 11 and 14 over the objections of his counsel. Instruction No. 11 reads as follows:
Appellant's objection was that the giving of this instruction was prejudicial to him in that no defense of intoxication was set up. More specifically, he argues that said instruction was not applicable to the evidence and, therefore, should not have been given.
In Reed v. State (1894), 141 Ind. 116, 40 N.E. 525, this Court stated:
Since there was evidence presented to the trial court concerning appellant's intoxication at the time of the crime (direct examination of Clifford Denny, Tr. p. 102), and since the above-mentioned instruction contained a correct statement of the law, we hold that the giving thereof was not error.
Instruction No. 14 reads as follows:
Appellant's objection to the giving of said instruction was to the effect that the presumption contained therein tends *634 to mislead the jury and places a burden on the defendant in the court below not intended under our law.
In the case of Dedrick v. State (1936), 210 Ind. 259, 2 N.E.2d 409, the following instruction was given by the trial court:
The appellant in that case specifically questioned the correctness of the trial court giving said instruction to the jury on the grounds that: (1) it had the effect of removing from him the presumption of innocence to which he is entitled and which attends him throughout the trial; (2) said instruction invades the province of the jury  that the jury is the judge of the facts and the law in all criminal cases, and the court exceeded its lawful function in telling the jury that the proof of certain facts raises the presumption of his guilt as a matter of law. The appellant in the case at bar raised substantially the same objections to the giving of instruction No. 14.
With respect to the above-mentioned instruction, given by the trial court in the case of Dedrick v. State, supra, this Court stated:
We, therefore, hold that the trial court erred in submitting to the jury Final Instruction No. 14 for the reason that said instruction effectively deprived the jury of its function exclusively to determine whether or not the proof in any given case proves the defendant guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
The State contends that, assuming that the giving of Final Instruction No. 14 was indeed error, the error committed by the trial court was harmless and would not result in a reversal of the judgment because "the conviction was clearly sustained *636 by the facts established by the evidence * * *." (Appellee's Brief, p. 6)
In Dedrick this Court distinguished those cases where the precise question in issue here is raised upon the assignment of error that the verdict of the jury is not sustained by sufficient evidence from those cases where such question is raised by an attack upon an instruction given to the jury. The appellant in Dedrick, as did appellant in the case at bar, attacked the precise language of the instruction itself, and this Court, without reaching the question of sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, stated:
The giving of Instruction No. 14 in the case at bar deprived appellant of a substantive right, that being the right to have the jury independently assess the merits of his case and arrive at a determination of his guilt or innocence free from any and all unnecessary, external influences and coercion imposed upon it by the court through its erroneous instruction.
Appellant raises other questions for our consideration; however, we need not decide them at this time due to the fact that this case must be reversed on the question of improper instructions.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this cause is remanded with instructions to sustain appellant's motion for new trial.
Hunter, C.J., Arterburn, DeBruler and Givan, JJ., concur.
NOTE.  Reported in 261 N.E.2d 847.