Case Title: People v. Page

Citation: 

Docket Number: 83921, 83922

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-08-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket Nos. 83921, 83922 cons.-Agenda 1-January 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v.
								 PATRICK PAGE, Appellant.
Opinion filed August 10, 2000.
	JUSTICE BILANDIC delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Patrick Page, was charged in the circuit court of
Cook County with two separate murders and various other
offenses. Defendant was first tried for the May 1987 murder of
John Goodman. The jury found defendant guilty of murder, armed
robbery, and home invasion. The jury then found that defendant
was eligible for the death penalty (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38,
pars. 9-1(b)(3), (b)(6)), and that there were no mitigating factors
sufficient to preclude a sentence of death. The trial court therefore
sentenced defendant to death for the murder conviction. The trial
court imposed concurrent 60-year terms of imprisonment for
defendant's remaining convictions. On direct appeal, this court
affirmed defendant's convictions and sentences. People v. Page,
155 Ill. 2d 232 (1993) (Goodman case).
	Defendant was next tried for the fall 1985 murder of Charles
Howell. The jury found defendant guilty of murder and armed
robbery. The jury also found that defendant was eligible for the
death penalty (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, pars. 9-1(b)(3),
(b)(6)), and that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to
preclude a death sentence. The trial court sentenced defendant to
death for the murder conviction and to an extended 60-year term
of imprisonment for the armed robbery conviction. This court
affirmed defendant's convictions and sentences on direct appeal.
People v. Page, 156 Ill. 2d 258 (1993) (Howell case).
	Defendant filed a pro se post-conviction petition in the
Goodman case. Appointed counsel filed a post-conviction petition
in the Howell case. Appointed counsel later filed a supplemental
post-conviction petition that consolidated the issues in both cases.
The State filed a motion to dismiss the post-conviction petition in
each case. Appointed counsel subsequently filed a consolidated
amended post-conviction petition that superseded all prior post-conviction petitions but refers to exhibits attached to those earlier
petitions. The State filed a motion to dismiss the consolidated
amended post-conviction petition (post-conviction petition). After
hearing arguments on the State's motion, the trial court dismissed
defendant's post-conviction petition without an evidentiary
hearing.
	Defendant now appeals from the dismissal of his post-conviction petition. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the
trial court's dismissal of defendant's post-conviction petition.
BACKGROUND
	The facts relating to defendant's trials are set forth in this
court's opinions on direct appeal. Because an understanding of
some of the trial evidence is necessary to evaluate defendant's
arguments in this post-conviction proceeding, we present a
summary of that evidence.
	Defendant has been convicted of three murders, the Goodman
and Howell murders at issue in this case, as well as the murder of
Dale Andrew Devine. On May 16, 1987, defendant was arrested
by the Olympia Fields police department as part of the
investigation into Goodman's murder. Over the next several days,
defendant gave law enforcement authorities several statements
admitting his involvement in the three murders. On two occasions
during that time, defendant led Olympia Fields police officers on
an unsuccessful search of the area in Wisconsin where defendant
claimed that he buried Goodman's body.
	On May 19, 1987, defendant gave a court-reported statement
in which he confessed to the three murders. Defendant revealed
that, during the fall of 1985, defendant, Kenneth Cheney, and
Gerald Feinberg murdered Devine. Devine and Cheney became
involved in a drug deal in which Devine apparently "ripped off"
Cheney. Devine was residing with defendant at this time.
Defendant contacted Feinberg and told him that Devine was at his
house. Feinberg came to defendant's house, and defendant and
Feinberg tied up Devine with an extension cord. Defendant then
called Cheney and told him that Devine was at his house. Cheney
came over and, using a hypodermic needle, injected Devine with
barbiturates. Defendant took approximately $100 from Devine's
pocket and gave it to Cheney.
	Defendant, Feinberg, and Cheney then transported Devine to
a wooded area near Wilmington, Illinois. Cheney asked Devine
how he wanted to die, either by being stabbed with a knife or by
being injected with a hypodermic needle. Devine indicated that he
preferred the injection. Cheney attempted to inject an air bubble
into Devine's bloodstream. When this did not kill Devine, Cheney
slit Devine's throat with the knife. Cheney then directed defendant
and Feinberg to stab Devine, which they did. After the murder,
defendant, Cheney, and Feinberg drove to Cheney's home, where
they drank alcohol and smoked marijuana. Two days later,
defendant and Cheney returned to the murder scene, and Cheney
poured gasoline on Devine's body and set it on fire. Defendant
was convicted in the circuit court of Will County of the murder of
Devine, and was sentenced to a 60-year term of imprisonment. The
appellate court affirmed defendant's murder conviction and
sentence. People v. Page, 196 Ill. App. 3d 285 (1990) (Devine
case).
	Defendant also confessed to the fall 1985 murder of Charles
Howell. Defendant stated that he and Feinberg killed Howell
because Howell had been a roommate of Devine, and Devine's
disappearance would make Howell suspicious. Defendant and
Feinberg decided to murder Howell and bury him in a forest
preserve in Park Forest, Illinois. Defendant and Feinberg planned
the murder in advance by drawing a map of the area where they
would bury Howell, taking shovels from defendant's home and
from the home of a neighbor, going to the planned burial site in
advance to dig a hole, and luring Howell to the site under the
pretense of having a party and engaging in a drug transaction there.
Defendant stabbed Howell, and Feinberg hit him in the head with
a large stick. Defendant and Feinberg laid Howell in the hole that
they had dug, covered him with dirt and branches, and started a
fire over the grave with lighter fluid. Feinberg, who had taken
Howell's car keys from the pocket of Howell's jeans prior to
burying him, gave the keys to defendant as they were leaving the
forest preserve. Defendant stated that he wanted the keys because
Howell's car was parked in front of defendant's house. After the
murder, defendant and Feinberg went to defendant's house,
smoked marijuana, and drove around in Howell's car. A few days
later, defendant sold Howell's car to a junkyard.
	Defendant's statement also included a confession to the
murder of John Goodman. Defendant stated that, on May 6, 1987,
he and Feinberg made plans to rob and kill Goodman. Defendant
originated the plan because he had a grudge against Goodman. On
Thursday, May 7, 1987, defendant and Feinberg visited
Goodman's home in Olympia Fields. When Goodman was in
another room, defendant displayed a knife to Feinberg. Defendant
then approached Goodman and asked Goodman about some
photographs that Goodman had taken of defendant. When
Goodman began to laugh, defendant stabbed him in the chest four
times. Defendant said that Goodman had not touched him prior to
that.
	Defendant and Feinberg then put Goodman's body in the
bathtub while they wiped the house clean of their fingerprints.
They stole credit cards and cash from Goodman's wallet. They
wrapped Goodman's body in a sheet and a rug and placed the body
in the trunk of Goodman's car. Defendant and Feinberg obtained
a shovel and a can of gasoline and left in Goodman's car. After
stopping at a tavern in southeastern Wisconsin to eat and play
pool, they drove to a rural area in Wisconsin, dug a hole, and
buried Goodman's body. They then burned the sheet and rug over
the grave.
	Defendant further stated that, on May 9, 1987, he and a friend
transported some electronic equipment from Goodman's house to
defendant's father's house. Defendant described his and his
friends' use of Goodman's credit cards during the weekend
following the murder. Defendant and Feinberg abandoned
Goodman's car at a commuter station the following Tuesday or
Wednesday.
	As discussed, defendant was convicted of all three murders
and received the death penalty for the murders of Goodman and
Howell. This appeal follows the dismissal of defendant's post-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing in the Goodman
and Howell cases. For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the
trial court properly dismissed defendant's post-conviction petition
without an evidentiary hearing. We therefore affirm the judgment
of the trial court.
ANALYSIS
	The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.
(West 1998)) provides a remedy to criminal defendants who claim
that substantial violations of their federal or state constitutional
rights occurred in their trial or sentencing hearing. People v.
Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 502 (1998). A post-conviction action,
however, is a collateral proceeding, not an appeal from the
underlying judgment. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 502. The purpose of the
post-conviction proceeding is to allow inquiry into constitutional
issues involved in the conviction and sentence that have not been,
and could not have been, adjudicated previously on direct appeal.
Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 502. The doctrine of res judicata bars
consideration of issues that were raised and decided on direct
appeal. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 502; People v. Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d 65,
73 (1997). Issues that could have been presented on direct appeal,
but were not, are waived. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 503; Griffin, 178 Ill. 2d  at 73.
	A defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a post-conviction petition as a matter of right. People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 427-28 (1998). Rather, an evidentiary hearing is warranted
only where the allegations of the post-conviction petition,
supported where appropriate by the trial record or accompanying
affidavits, make a substantial showing that the defendant's
constitutional rights have been violated. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d  at 428;
Towns, 182 Ill. 2d  at 503. In determining whether to grant an
evidentiary hearing, all well-pleaded facts in the petition and in
any accompanying affidavits are taken as true. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 
at 503. Assertions that are nonfactual and nonspecific and that
merely amount to conclusions are not sufficient to require an
evidentiary hearing. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 381
(1998). A trial court's determination regarding the sufficiency of
the allegations contained in a post-conviction petition is reviewed
de novo. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 388-89. With these principles in
mind, we review de novo the trial court's dismissal of defendant's
post-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing.
I. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
	Defendant first raises a series of challenges to the
effectiveness of his counsel during trial, sentencing, and on direct
appeal.
	To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must first show that counsel's performance was
deficient in that it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88,
80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). In satisfying
this prong, a defendant must overcome the strong presumption that
the challenged action or inaction of counsel was the product of
sound trial strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at
694-95, 104 S. Ct.  at 2065.
	A defendant must also establish prejudice by proving that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient
performance, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2068. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome; namely, that counsel's
deficient performance either rendered the result of the trial
unreliable or rendered the proceeding fundamentally unfair.
Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at
2068. When challenging a death sentence, a defendant must prove
that there is a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's
deficient performance, the sentencer would have concluded that
the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not
warrant death. Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 695, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698,
104 S. Ct.  at 2069.
	A defendant must establish both prongs of the Strickland test
to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. A court,
however, may resolve an ineffectiveness claim by reaching only
the prejudice prong, as lack of prejudice renders irrelevant the
issue of counsel's alleged deficient performance. See Strickland,
466 U.S.  at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 699, 104 S. Ct.  at 2069.
A. Failure to Present Sufficient Evidence of a Voluntary
Manslaughter Defense
	Defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective during the
Goodman trial for failing to present sufficient evidence to support
defendant's voluntary manslaughter theory of defense. At the time
of the offense, the homicide statute provided that a person
commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he
either had an actual but unreasonable belief regarding the need for
self-defense, or was acting under a sudden and intense passion
resulting from serious provocation. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par.
9-2.(1) Serious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an intense
passion in a reasonable person. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par.
9-2. This court has recognized the following categories of
provocation: substantial physical injury or substantial physical
assault; mutual quarrel or combat; illegal arrest; and adultery with
the offender's spouse. People v. Garcia, 165 Ill. 2d 409, 429
(1995); People v. Chevalier, 131 Ill. 2d 66, 71 (1989).
	During the opening argument in the Goodman trial, defense
counsel told the jury that defendant had committed the homicide
charged, but maintained that defendant was guilty of voluntary
manslaughter rather than murder. Later, however, the trial court
denied defendant's request that the jury be instructed on voluntary
manslaughter, finding that the evidence was not sufficient to
support the instruction. The trial court also directed defense
counsel not to argue the theory of voluntary manslaughter in
summation.
	On direct appeal in the Goodman case, defendant argued that
his trial counsel was ineffective for presenting the voluntary
manslaughter theory of defense. Defendant argued that this theory
was not supported by either the law or the facts of the case. This
court noted that trial counsel sought to demonstrate that defendant
killed Goodman while defendant was acting under a sudden and
intense passion resulting from serious provocation. Page, 155 Ill. 2d  at 261. Trial counsel sought to establish the provocation form
of the offense by showing evidence of mutual combat between
defendant and Goodman. Page, 155 Ill. 2d  at 261. Although
defendant did not testify, trial counsel was able to elicit evidence,
during cross-examination of one of the prosecution witnesses,
about an altercation between defendant and Goodman. Trial
counsel asked the witness about an inculpatory statement made by
defendant prior to his formal confession. In that statement,
defendant said that he and Goodman argued for 10 to 15 minutes
over some photographs that Goodman refused to surrender.
According to defendant, Goodman had taken photographs of
defendant and Goodman having a homosexual relationship.
Defendant said that he punched and stabbed Goodman when
Goodman refused to move from the bathroom doorway, where the
two were standing. In addition to this evidence, defendant, in his
formal statement, said that he stabbed Goodman after Goodman
began laughing at his request for the photographs. See Page, 155 Ill. 2d  at 261.
	This court rejected defendant's argument that trial counsel
was ineffective for arguing voluntary manslaughter. We held that
trial counsel's decision to present the voluntary manslaughter
defense was a matter of trial strategy, and that the record showed
that defendant expressly consented to this strategy. Page, 155 Ill. 2d  at 262-63. We found that, in light of the overwhelming
evidence of defendant's involvement in Goodman's murder,
defense counsel might reasonably have considered a voluntary
manslaughter theory to be the only reasonable course of defense.
Page, 155 Ill. 2d  at 262. We then recounted the overwhelming
evidence of defendant's guilt. Defendant confessed in detail to the
crimes. An eyewitness saw defendant at Goodman's house shortly
before Goodman disappeared. Other witnesses established that
defendant was in possession of property belonging to Goodman,
including his car and credit cards. Another witness testified that
defendant had access to Goodman's house shortly after he
disappeared. See Page, 155 Ill. 2d  at 266.
	In these post-conviction proceedings, defendant now argues
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present
sufficient evidence to support the voluntary manslaughter defense.
Defendant has waived review of this argument by failing to raise
it on direct appeal. See People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 503
(1998). Indeed, this argument is directly contrary to the argument
defendant did raise on direct appeal, i.e., that trial counsel was
ineffective for presenting the voluntary manslaughter defense.
	Defendant, however, appears to argue that his claim is not
waived because it is based on evidence outside the original trial
record. This exception to the waiver rule in post-conviction
appeals refers to those claims that the reviewing court on direct
appeal could not have considered because the claim's evidentiary
basis was de hors the record. See People v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 372 (1996), overruled in part on other grounds, People v.
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366 (1998). Defendant argues that there was
evidence available to trial counsel to substantiate defendant's
voluntary manslaughter defense. Defendant claims that he has now
"submitted police reports and evidence of other statements, from
numerous individuals, substantiating and establishing the
manslaughter defense, including: evidence that the pictures being
argued over were evidence of a homosexual attack perpetrated by
the victim and his friends; evidence that such tendencies and
similar photographs were discovered concerning the victim (as
well as additional material involving the defendants); and evidence
that in addition to an altercation over the pictures, the victim
attempted homosexual contact with the defendant."
	The evidence that defendant cites in support of his argument
is as follows. Defendant provides his own affidavit which states
that "John Goodman had pictures of Gerald Feinberg. Cheyney
[sic] told Gerald that if he helped Cheyney get Andy and Chuck,
Cheyney would help Gerald get Goodman for what he had done to
him. John Goodman and his friend had drugged Feinberg and
performed unnatural sex acts on him. Feinberg was very upset
about this, and wanted to get them back."
	Defendant attaches the affidavit of Edward Torres, an
investigator from the Capital Litigation Division. Torres
interviewed Kenneth Berksen, who was once Gerald Feinberg's
cellmate at the Cook County jail. According to Torres' affidavit,
Berksen stated that Feinberg told him that, on the night of
Goodman's murder, Goodman made a sexual advance toward
defendant, which enraged defendant and caused defendant to stab
Goodman. In this regard, defendant also provides a report from the
Olympia Fields police department which relates that Greg Wilson,
a friend of Goodman, spoke to a man named John Dixon, who
spoke to Feinberg, who said that "Goodman tried to make out with
Pat Page, and then they stabbed him."
	Defendant also cites numerous other reports from the Olympia
Fields police department which discuss relations among defendant,
Goodman, and Feinberg. One report recounts that a certain
newspaper reporter gave the Olympia Fields police department a
photograph of Goodman and defendant. The reporter received the
photograph from a third party who had received it from the
photographer. The reporter advised police that the source had
stated that the photograph was taken one week before Goodman's
murder while on a weekend fishing trip in Illinois. Another report
discusses information received from Greg Wilson. According to
Wilson, defendant had been to Goodman's home and had been
videotaped in one of Goodman's "home movies."
	An additional report from the Olympia Fields police
department describes an interview with Glen Rogers, a friend of
Goodman. Rogers stated that he led a homosexual lifestyle which
included a relationship with Feinberg, and that approximately one
month prior to the interview, Goodman told Rogers that Goodman
and Feinberg had a sexual encounter the previous weekend. One
report discusses Goodman's homosexual lifestyle and the police
department's possession of photographs of Goodman with Glen
Rogers and an unidentified nude male. Another report describes a
telephone call that the police department received from an
individual named Bill Davis. Davis "wanted to know why the
S&M angle of this homicide has not been followed up on in the
news media." According to Davis, Goodman "used to hang out"
at a Chicago bar "frequented by 'male hustlers' with homosexual
and S&M tendencies." Davis recognized defendant and Feinberg
as being patrons of this bar.
	The other evidence that defendant cites in support of his
current argument references personal details of Goodman's
lifestyle. Defendant has attached an affidavit from Appolon
Beaudouin, Jr., an investigator for the Capital Litigation Division.
This affidavit references Beaudouin's interview with Michelle
Kury, defendant's former girlfriend. According to Beaudouin,
Kury stated that "Patrick told her that Goodman was into sex
videos." Defendant further cites a report from the Olympia Fields
police department that lists property recovered from Goodman's
home. The list of property references "pornographic homosexual
assorted photos" and a "copy of Gay Chicago Magazine for
January, 87."
	Defendant argues that, had trial counsel presented this
evidence, he would have been entitled to a jury instruction on
voluntary manslaughter. We hold that defendant has failed to
make a substantial showing that he was prejudiced by trial
counsel's failure to present this evidence.
	Defendant's argument is that this evidence would have
supported a defense that he killed Goodman while acting under a
sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation.
Defendant's theory of provocation appears to be that Goodman
made unwanted sexual advances toward him on the night of the
murder. The only evidence that could have supported this theory
is (1) the affidavit from the Capital Litigation Division
investigator which recounts that a former cellmate of Feinberg
stated that Feinberg told him that, on the night of Goodman's
murder, Goodman made a sexual advance toward defendant which
enraged defendant and caused defendant to stab Goodman; and (2)
the police report which relates that Greg Wilson spoke to a man
named John Dixon, who spoke to Feinberg, who said that
"Goodman tried to make out with Pat Page, and then they stabbed
him." The remaining evidence is simply not evidence that
Goodman made an unwanted sexual advance toward defendant on
the night of the murder. Indeed, defendant's own affidavit states
that Goodman performed unwanted sexual acts on Feinberg, not
on defendant.
	Even focusing on the evidence that could have supported
defendant's theory of provocation, and accepting all of this
evidence as true, we hold that defendant has failed to make a
substantial showing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
present this alleged evidence of voluntary manslaughter. Initially,
we note that this evidence is hearsay and would likely not have
been admissible at defendant's trial. Defendant has failed to
provide an affidavit from Feinberg attesting to the information
which has been attributed to him, and stating that he would have
been willing to testify to this information at defendant's trial. In
any event, defendant's theory is that he killed Goodman while he
was acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from
serious provocation. Defendant argues that the provocation here is
that Goodman made sexual advances toward him. This is not one
of the categories of provocation that this court has recognized. See
Garcia, 165 Ill. 2d  at 429; Chevalier, 131 Ill. 2d  at 71. Thus, even
if evidence that Goodman made a sexual advance toward
defendant on the night of the murder had been admitted at trial,
this evidence would not have entitled defendant to a voluntary
manslaughter instruction.
	Defendant, however, argues that, in People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256 (1986), and in People v. Lenser, 102 Ill. App. 3d 214
(1981), the defendants received jury instructions for voluntary
manslaughter in cases similar to defendant's case. Although
Saldivar and Lenser involved fact scenarios where the victim
made a homosexual advance toward the defendants, the question
of whether the evidence was sufficient to entitle the defendants to
a voluntary manslaughter instruction was not at issue. Also, in
Saldivar, the stipulated evidence revealed that the defendant stated
that, after the victim made the sexual advance, "a struggle
ensued," and the defendant stabbed the victim with a kitchen
knife. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d  at 260-61. Thus, it appears that the
defendant received the voluntary manslaughter instruction on the
basis of mutual combat, not the sexual advance.
	Defendant cites additional cases which he contends "discuss
what could be termed the 'homosexual panic' defense and
demonstrate the accepted use of this 'defense' to obtain a
manslaughter instruction." While these cases likewise involve fact
scenarios where the victims made homosexual advances toward
the defendants, the defendants' theories of voluntary manslaughter
were based on the unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense,
not on serious provocation, which is the theory advanced by
defendant in this case. See, e.g., People v. Henne, 23 Ill. App. 3d
567 (1974); People v. Barnes, 23 Ill. App. 3d 390 (1974). These
cases, therefore, are inapposite.
	For the foregoing reasons, we hold that defendant has failed
to make a substantial showing that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to present the alleged evidence of voluntary manslaughter.
B. Failure to Adequately Present Defendant's Motion to
Suppress His Confession
	Defendant argues that trial counsel was ineffective in both the
Goodman and Howell cases in presenting defendant's motion to
suppress his confession. We note that defendant was represented
by the same two attorneys in both the Goodman and Howell cases.
The facts relevant to this issue are outlined extensively in our
opinions on direct appeal. See People v. Page, 156 Ill. 2d 258,
284-85 (1993) (Howell case); People v. Page, 155 Ill. 2d 232, 246-59 (1993) (Goodman case). We review those facts necessary to
address defendant's argument in this appeal.
	Defendant was arrested around 10 p.m. on Saturday, May 16,
1987, and remained in police custody, in Cook County, until May
20, when he was taken before a judge for a bond hearing.
Defendant gave law enforcement officers numerous statements
with respect to the Goodman murder on May 16, 17, 18, and 19.
On May 19, defendant also gave authorities formal statements
regarding the murder of Andrew Devine, committed in Will
County, and the murder of Charles Howell, committed in Cook
County.
	The first case to go to trial was the Will County prosecution
for Devine's murder. In that proceeding, defendant moved to
suppress his statements. Defendant's motion did not specify which
statements were being challenged. In his motion, defendant argued
that the interrogating officers made unfulfilled promises of
leniency; that defendant was led to believe that the only court
proceedings in which his statements would be used would be those
in which the promises of leniency would be enforced; that the
officers did not honor his wishes to consult with an attorney; and
that the officers threatened to charge defendant's father with the
offenses in the Goodman case.
	The Will County trial court held a hearing at which the parties
introduced testimony regarding the entire time period during
which defendant was in custody. The State presented the testimony
of three members of the Olympia Fields police department, the
assistant State's Attorney who had questioned defendant in all
three cases, and the court reporter who had transcribed defendant's
formal statements to the Devine and Howell murders. These
witnesses testified that defendant received Miranda warnings and
waived these rights prior to each session of questioning, and that
defendant was not mistreated while in custody. These witnesses
further denied that any promises of leniency were made to
defendant or that he or his family members were threatened in any
way.
	Defendant testified at the suppression hearing. Defendant
stated that, shortly after he was taken into custody, the police
showed defendant a booking photograph of his father and told
defendant that his father would be charged in the Goodman case
if defendant did not confess. We note that defendant's father had
been arrested when police learned that property belonging to
Goodman was in defendant's father's home. Defendant's father
was released soon after defendant's arrest. At the suppression
hearing, defendant also testified that the police refused defendant's
request to contact an attorney or a family member. Defendant
further testified that, prior to making the statements regarding the
Devine and Howell cases, the assistant State's Attorney promised
defendant that he would receive only a 20-year sentence for those
offenses if he confessed to the crimes.
	Defendant's mother and sister testified on behalf of defendant
at the suppression hearing. They stated that during the weekend of
defendant's arrest, they repeatedly called the Olympia Fields
police department, and their requests to speak with defendant were
denied. The defense also presented the testimony of Leila
Naszkiewicz, the mother of Michael Naszkiewicz, who had also
been arrested in connection with the Goodman murder. Leila
Naszkiewicz testified that she too encountered difficulty in
attempting to contact her son while he was in police custody.
	Following the suppression hearing, the Will County trial court
denied defendant's motion to suppress his statements. The trial
court held that defendant had given his statements voluntarily. The
trial court did not distinguish among the different statements made
by defendant.
	Subsequently, in both the Cook County Howell and Goodman
cases, defendant moved to suppress his statements. The trial court
in both cases granted the State's motion to strike defendant's
motion to suppress. The trial court in both cases held that the Will
County trial court had already resolved the admissibility of
defendant's statements, and that defendant was therefore
collaterally estopped from challenging that determination.
	On direct appeal in the Goodman case, this court extensively
reviewed this issue and concluded that the Will County trial court,
in rejecting defendant's claims, "necessarily determined issues
pertinent to all three sets of statements made by the defendant
while in police custody." Page, 155 Ill. 2d  at 254. This court stated
that "we have carefully examined the evidence and arguments
presented at the Will County suppression hearing. Our analysis
leads us to conclude that the Will County judge's ruling on the
admissibility of the Devine statements resolved as well factual
issues pertinent to the Goodman and Howell statements." Page,
155 Ill. 2d  at 257. Likewise, on direct appeal in the Howell case,
this court stated that "[w]e have carefully examined the record of
the Will County proceedings and the record in the instant case and
have found nothing to dissuade us from our earlier conclusion" in
the Goodman case that defendant is collaterally estopped from
challenging the admissibility of his statements. Page, 156 Ill. 2d 
at 285.
	Defendant argues in these post-conviction proceedings that
trial counsel was ineffective in both the Goodman and Howell
cases in presenting the motions to suppress defendant's
statements. Defendant contends that he has made a substantial
showing that, had trial counsel presented certain other evidence,
the trial court would not have held that defendant was collaterally
estopped from challenging the admissibility of his statements.
Defendant suggests that this new evidence includes "the extensive
searches and cooperation with authorities in searching for the
Goodman and Howell bodies; their promises relating to these
searches; and the additional conversations on these outings."
	We review the evidence that defendant now cites in support
of his argument that trial counsel was ineffective in presenting his
motion to suppress his statements in Cook County. Defendant
attaches his own affidavit in which he repeats allegations to which
he testified at the suppression hearing. In this affidavit, defendant
also states that he rehearsed his statements both before and after
the court reporter arrived. Defendant states that, before the court
reporter arrived, the assistant State's Attorney reminded defendant
that he would help defendant "get 20 [years] or less." However,
the assistant State's Attorney told defendant that "since he could
not promise me anything, [h]e would have to ask me if there was
a promise, that I would have to say no." Defendant further alleges
that he "found that Michael Naszkiewicz and Michelle Kury
repeatedly asked for attorneys and Michael's mother tried to get an
attorney, but the police would not let her." Finally, defendant
states that he "was told that my family and I would be killed if I
did not take the rap."
	Defendant also references an affidavit from the investigator
for the Capital Litigation Division, who interviewed Michelle
Kury on June 13, 1997. During this interview, Kury stated that she
was in the Village of Matteson jail for four days and could not get
an attorney or talk to her family for that period of time.
	Defendant further cites a report from the Olympia Fields
police department which discusses a May 15, 1987, meeting
between a police officer and Leila Naszkiewicz, whose son
Michael was in custody at the time. Naszkiewicz apparently
requested that she be notified when her son had a bond hearing,
and requested information regarding representation for her son by
the public defender's office. Naszkiewicz was advised that her son
was being held on burglary charges but that the charges could
change as the investigation progressed.
	In this regard, defendant attaches an affidavit from his brother.
His brother states that when defendant "was in the Richton Park
jail, my mother and I tried to see him and the police almost
arrested me for sitting in the parking lot. They held Pat [defendant]
for at least 72 hours, and told me that he had not been charged, he
did not need a lawyer and did not need to see anyone."
	Defendant also attaches an affidavit from his father. His father
relates that defendant told him that he confessed to the crimes
because the police showed him a picture of his father in a jail cell.
Finally, defendant cites two Olympia Fields police department
reports which recount that defendant was transported to Wisconsin
to search for Goodman's body. These reports also state that
defendant voluntarily gave statements after being advised of his
Miranda rights.
	Defendant fails to explain how any of this evidence would
have resulted in a holding by the trial court that defendant was not
collaterally estopped from challenging the admissibility of his
statements. Most of this evidence is cumulative of the evidence
that the trial court considered, and which this court reviewed, in
determining that defendant was collaterally estopped from
relitigating his motion to suppress his statements. The other
evidence, namely, the circumstances surrounding the arrests of
Michelle Kury and Michael Naszkiewicz, is simply not relevant to
a determination of the voluntariness of defendant's statements.
	We therefore hold that defendant has failed to make a
substantial showing that, had trial counsel presented this evidence,
there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would not have
held that defendant was collaterally estopped from challenging the
admissibility of his statements.
	We note that defendant also suggests in this regard that trial
counsel in the Howell and Goodman cases were ineffective for
failing to ensure that appellate counsel in the Devine case
challenged the admissibility of defendant's statements. In the
Devine case, defendant did not receive the death penalty. Thus,
defendant's appeal in that case was heard by the appellate court.
See People v. Page, 196 Ill. App. 3d 285 (1990). Appellate
counsel in the Devine case did not challenge the admissibility of
defendant's statements. Defendant now argues that trial counsel in
the Goodman and Howell cases "failed to insure that some level
of appellate review was had of these statements," and that as a
result of this "failure," the issue of the admissibility of defendant's
statements was never reviewed. This, of course, is an improper
argument, as we are not reviewing the Devine case. Furthermore,
defendant fails to offer any argument to support the notion that a
challenge to the admissibility of his statements would have been
successful.
	As a final matter, defendant suggests that trial counsel were
ineffective for failing to adequately present defendant's motion to
quash his arrest and suppress evidence. Defendant attaches police
reports regarding the taking of defendant into custody, and the
obtainment of permission from defendant's mother to search her
house.
	The Will County trial court denied defendant's motion to
quash his arrest and suppress evidence. On direct appeal in the
Goodman case, we noted that the trial court in the Goodman case
granted the State's motion to strike defendant's motion to quash
his arrest and suppress evidence on the basis that defendant was
collaterally estopped from challenging the Will County trial
court's prior determination. See People v. Page, 155 Ill. 2d 232,
248 (1993) (Goodman case). We further noted that the Cook
County trial court's disposition of defendant's motion to quash his
arrest and suppress evidence was not at issue in the appeal. Page,
155 Ill. 2d  at 248.
	Defendant offers no argument to support his suggestion that
trial counsel were ineffective for failing to adequately present
defendant's motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. We
therefore hold that defendant has waived any argument in this
regard. See 177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7) (stating that an appellant's
brief must include an argument, "which shall contain the
contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor").
C. Failure to Present Mitigating Evidence
	Defendant argues that he has made a substantial showing that
trial counsel was ineffective at sentencing in both the Goodman
and Howell cases for failing to present certain mitigating evidence.
The alleged mitigating evidence to which defendant cites includes
information regarding defendant's involvement in a cult and the
interplay of that cult involvement with defendant's psychiatric
history. Defendant contends that, had trial counsel presented this
evidence at the sentencing hearings, there is a reasonable
probability that the jurors would have concluded that the balance
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.
	The following is the evidence that was presented in mitigation
at defendant's sentencing hearings in the Goodman and Howell
cases. In the Goodman case, Arlene Messner-Peters, a social
worker, testified regarding a mitigation report that she prepared at
the request of trial counsel. She interviewed defendant's family
members, reviewed material from the Department of Corrections,
and reviewed defendant's confessions. Messner-Peters testified
that defendant's childhood was unstable. Defendant's parents were
often involved in physical altercations with each other.
Defendant's father was an alcoholic and would become abusive
toward his wife and children.
	Messner-Peters also testified regarding defendant's
difficulties in school, both academically and socially. Defendant
suffered from a learning disability. Also, a congenital condition
affecting defendant's eye muscles had caused defendant's eyes to
drift apart and to cross. The children at school teased defendant
because of this condition. Defendant also had a history of using
marijuana and LSD.
	Dr. Gerard Girdaukas, a licensed clinical psychologist,
testified that he administered psychological tests to defendant and
diagnosed him with a learning disability and with a "non-specific
personality disorder." Defendant exhibited symptoms of
depression, paranoia, delusional thinking, and organic brain
impairment. Dr. Girdaukas concluded that defendant was under
the influence of extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the
Goodman murder. Dr. Girdaukas recommended that defendant
take antipsychotic medication and attend support groups, and he
recommended further testing.
	Defendant's parents, Paul and Patricia Page, and defendant's
sister, Grace Page, testified on defendant's behalf. Their testimony
reiterated the evidence regarding defendant's academic and social
problems. The testimony also revealed that defendant's parents
separated when defendant was eight years old. Defendant lived
with each parent at various times in his childhood. The testimony
further described defendant's father's alcoholism, abusive
behavior, and infidelity.
	A neighbor also testified regarding her relationship with
defendant's family, and about defendant's good nature. Further, a
clergyman, who had visited defendant while he was an inmate at
the Cook County jail, testified about defendant's interest in
religion and his desire to be baptized.
	At the sentencing hearing in the Howell case, defendant
presented almost all of the same mitigating evidence that was
presented at the Goodman sentencing hearing. However,
defendant's mother, sister, and neighbor did not testify at this
sentencing hearing.
	Defendant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to investigate and present evidence regarding defendant's
involvement in a cult. According to defendant, this evidence
showed that defendant's involvement in a cult was "so extreme
that it was labeled by numerous mental health professionals, years
before the murders, as evidencing delusional thought processes
and psychotic behavior." Defendant argues that this evidence
would have helped to explain to the jurors "how he was associated
with these murders (and how others were more culpable) and how
he came to be able to be involved in such acts."
	Defendant attached to his post-conviction petition a 1981
psychiatric summary report from the Psychiatric Institute of Cook
County regarding defendant's fitness for trial of the pending
burglary charge against him. The psychiatrist who examined
defendant concluded that defendant was fit for trial, stating that
defendant "does not display any psychotic behavior nor show any
psychotic symptoms." The psychiatrist reported that defendant
"relates an interest in the occult [and] talks about getting together
with other young men to have some sort of seances involving
'black magic.' " Defendant insisted that "being sent to jail is not
right and he needs to be in a hospital for his 'problem.' "
According to the psychiatrist, defendant appeared "quite
manipulative."
	Defendant also attached a 1981 psychological examination
from the Psychiatric Institute which recounts defendant's
statements that he has "gone pretty far into the occult" and that he
saw devils in inkblots. Defendant next referenced a psychological
summary that was conducted by a psychologist who concluded
that defendant was not fit for trial on his pending burglary case.
Defendant reported to the psychologist that he was experiencing
hallucinations and paranoid delusions, and expressed concern
about his involvement in witchcraft. Specifically, defendant stated
that he was engrossed in the study of black magic, and that he and
several friends, led by a 24-year-old warlock, held services,
conjured demons, and cast spells. The psychologist concluded that,
although defendant's request for psychiatric treatment seemed
genuine, defendant "is shrewd enough to seek treatment as a
possible alternative to incarceration."
	Defendant also provided a May 17, 1987, report from the
Olympia Fields police department. The report states that Feinberg
told police officers that "there are people who believe that Mr.
Patrick Page is the anti-Christ, and that Page derived a power from
the location where Chuck Howell's body was buried." The report
further recounts that Feinberg "indicated that Patrick Page was the
leader of a Satanic cult." Another report from the Olympia Fields
police department describes a call that the reporting officer
received from Marty Carson, who identified himself as a friend of
defendant. Carson stated that he had accompanied defendant to a
campfire site where defendant would "party," and from where
defendant stated he derived a "special power." Defendant further
provided some unattributed notes regarding defendant's
involvement in black magic, rituals, and sacrifices.
	Defendant attached his own affidavit, which states that "I was
involved in certain practices from a young age, and am still in fear
of individuals who were involved and may still be involved in
these practices." Defendant likewise attached affidavits from his
father and brother. These affidavits relate that, when defendant
was 16 years old, he was involved in "some kind of cult or devil
worship."
	Finally, defendant provided reports from a physician and a
psychologist regarding the workings of cults. These doctors
essentially reviewed the information we have just discussed and
postulated that defendant was under the influence of a cult leader
at the time he committed the murders at issue. These doctors also
generally described the mind-control techniques used by leaders
of cults.
	After reviewing this allegedly mitigating evidence, we hold
that there is no reasonable probability that, had counsel presented
this evidence at the sentencing hearings, the juries would have
concluded that the mitigating factors were sufficient to preclude
the death sentence. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
695, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2069 (1984).
Contrary to defendant's argument, the jurors likely would have
viewed this evidence of cult involvement as aggravating evidence.
This evidence describes defendant's involvement in devil worship
and ritualistic sacrifices. Even worse, some of this evidence shows
that defendant was the leader of the cult engaged in these
practices. Significantly, the evidence also shows that the doctors
to whom defendant mentioned his cult involvement suggested that
defendant was manipulative and might be trying to avoid prison by
relying on his cult involvement. In any event, defendant fails to
explain how any of this evidence showed a "cult connection to the
murders" of Howell and Goodman.
	Furthermore, the aggravating evidence in this case far
outweighs the mitigating evidence. The State presented
defendant's confession to the murders of Devine, Howell, and
Goodman. Defendant, Feinberg, and Kenneth Cheney murdered
Devine because Devine "ripped off" Cheney in a drug deal. They
tied up Devine with an extension cord and transported him to a
wooded area, where they stabbed him to death. After the murder,
defendant, Cheney, and Feinberg drove to Cheney's home, where
they drank alcohol and smoked marijuana.
	Defendant and Feinberg later murdered Howell because they
were worried that Devine's disappearance would make Howell
suspicious. Defendant and Feinberg planned the murder in
advance. They drew a map of the area where they would bury
Howell, went to the planned burial site and dug a hole, and lured
Howell to the site under the pretense of having a party there.
Defendant stabbed Howell, and Feinberg hit him over the head
with a large stick. They buried Howell and set his grave on fire.
After the murder, defendant and Feinberg went to defendant's
house, smoked marijuana, and drove around in Howell's car.
	A year and a half later, defendant originated the plan to
murder Goodman because defendant held a grudge against
Goodman. Defendant stabbed Goodman in the chest four times.
Defendant and Feinberg stole credit cards and cash from
Goodman's wallet before wrapping Goodman's body in a sheet
and a rug and placing it in the trunk of Goodman's car. After
stopping at a tavern in southeastern Wisconsin to eat and play
pool, defendant and Feinberg drove to a rural area in Wisconsin,
dug a hole, and buried Goodman's body. They then burned the
sheet and the rug over the grave.
	The State also presented details of defendant's criminal
history. The State introduced certified copies of defendant's
conviction following a guilty plea on May 11, 1982, to seven
charges of burglary. Defendant was sentenced to five years'
imprisonment for the offenses. After defendant had served a
portion of this prison sentence, he was assigned to a prerelease
center. Residents were allowed to leave the center during the day
to work, but were required to return each night. A supervisor from
the center testified that defendant signed out on the morning of
December 5, 1983, and did not come back until January 2, 1984.
Defendant said that he did not return on December 5 because he
had gotten drunk and fallen asleep. Because defendant knew that
he was on escape status anyway, he decided to stay out for the
holidays. Consequently, defendant was returned to the custody of
the Illinois Department of Corrections.
	A case work supervisor from the Logan Correctional Center
testified that defendant was incarcerated at Logan beginning in
September 1982, and remained there until May 1983, when he was
assigned to the prerelease center. Defendant was returned to Logan
in February 1984, and was released on parole two months later.
Defendant received 27 disciplinary tickets while an inmate at
Logan. Defendant received these tickets for physical or verbal
altercations with other inmates, insulting behavior toward the staff,
possession of contraband, and failing to go to school.
	Captain Robert Maeyama of the Park Forest police
department also testified regarding various contacts he had with
defendant while defendant was a juvenile. Captain Maeyama
stated that he apprehended defendant in connection with several
different charges during a period from June 1977 to October 1980.
These charges included three batteries or aggravated batteries, two
burglaries, a theft, a car theft, and disorderly conduct.
	A review of this aggravating evidence shows that defendant
is a domineering and remorseless murderer. Given defendant's
extensive criminal history, as well as the heinous nature of the
crimes in this case, defendant has failed to establish the requisite
prejudice under Strickland. There is no reasonable probability that
the outcome of defendant's sentencing hearings would have been
different had the alleged mitigating evidence at issue been
presented.
	As a final matter, defendant requests this court to order a
limited remand so that he may have a complete neurological
examination conducted. Defendant initially filed a motion for
funds so that defendant could retain a neurological expert to
perform "full neurological testing" of defendant. Defendant argued
that the limited evaluation conducted by Dr. Girdaukas showed
possible brain damage or neurological disorders. Defendant sought
funds to retain an expert to conduct this testing. The trial court
denied defendant's motion. In accordance with our preceding
discussion, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying this motion.
	Defendant, in his reply brief in this court, states that the
Capital Litigation Division now has sufficient funds to pay for the
requested neurological testing. Defendant, therefore, requests a
limited remand "for the purpose of conducting the Neurological
Assessment and the Cult-related Psycho-Social investigation."
	We decline to order a limited remand in this case. Defendant
presented the testimony of Dr. Girdaukas, a licensed clinical
psychologist, at both sentencing hearings. Dr. Girdaukas
administered numerous psychological tests to defendant and
presented his findings to the jurors. There is no reasonable
probability that the outcome of defendant's sentencing hearings
would have been different had evidence of defendant's cult
involvement been presented. We therefore decline to remand this
case for the testing defendant now seeks.
D. Failure to Challenge Proportionality of Defendant's
Sentence
	Defendant argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to challenge the proportionality of defendant's death
sentences to the natural life sentences of his codefendant,
Feinberg. On direct appeal in the Howell case, appellate counsel
argued that the trial court improperly precluded defendant from
presenting to the jury, at the second stage of the sentencing
hearing, nonstatutory mitigation evidence that his codefendant,
Gerald Feinberg, had pled guilty and was sentenced to natural life
imprisonment for the murder of Howell. See People v. Page, 156 Ill. 2d 258, 270 (1993). We noted that defendant was not
requesting "that this court undertake a review of the
proportionality of his sentence." Page, 156 Ill. 2d  at 271. Rather,
defendant was arguing "that his codefendant's sentence and
relative degree of participation in the murder should have been
considered by the jury at the second stage of his sentencing
hearing." Page, 156 Ill. 2d  at 271. We rejected this argument and
held that defendant's request to have the jury consider evidence of
a codefendant's sentence is neither constitutionally required nor
relevant to the jury's examination of the individual defendant's
characteristics and the circumstances of his offense. Page, 156 Ill. 2d  at 270-72.
	Defendant now contends that appellate counsel in the Howell
case should have instead argued that defendant's death sentence is
disproportionate to the natural life sentence of his codefendant
Feinberg. Defendant also suggests that appellate counsel in the
Goodman case was likewise ineffective for failing to challenge the
proportionality of defendant's death sentence to the natural life
sentence of Feinberg.
	Comparative proportionality review in death penalty cases is
not required by either the United States Constitution (see Pulley v.
Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 79 L. Ed. 2d 29, 104 S. Ct. 871 (1984)) or the
Illinois death penalty statute (see People v. Palmer, 162 Ill. 2d 465, 491 (1994)). This court has, however, considered whether a
sentence of death in a particular case is disproportionately harsh in
comparison with a less severe sanction imposed on a codefendant
convicted of the same crime. See, e.g., People v. Burt, 168 Ill. 2d 49, 80-81 (1995); People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 294-96 (1992);
People v. St. Pierre, 146 Ill. 2d 494, 513 (1992); People v. Bean,
137 Ill. 2d 65, 134 (1990). Such judicial review acknowledges the
necessity to avoid arbitrary or capricious death sentences by
insuring that the cases in which death is imposed are rationally
distinguished from those in which it is not imposed. St. Pierre,
146 Ill. 2d  at 513. The focus of this review is on the particular
defendant's involvement in the crime, the nature of the crime, the
character and background of the defendant, including any criminal
record, and the defendant's potential for rehabilitation. See Burt,
168 Ill. 2d  at 80; Flores, 153 Ill. 2d  at 294.
	The record reveals the following relevant information
regarding defendant's involvement in the crimes. In the Goodman
case, it was defendant who originated the plan to rob and kill
Goodman because defendant held a grudge against Goodman.
Defendant stabbed Goodman in the chest four times; Feinberg did
not inflict any injuries on Goodman. In the Howell case, defendant
stabbed Howell in the chest, and Feinberg hit Howell in the head
with a stick.
	Moreover, defendant had a substantial criminal history while
Feinberg had no criminal convictions. Details of defendant's
criminal history were introduced at the sentencing hearings in the
Goodman and Howell cases. As we have previously discussed, this
criminal history includes defendant's conviction for burglary, and
his escape from the prerelease center where he was serving a
portion of his sentence for this conviction. Additionally, defendant
received 27 disciplinary tickets while an inmate at Logan
Correctional Center. These disciplinary tickets were for physical
or verbal altercations with other inmates, insulting behavior
toward the staff, possession of contraband, and failing to go to
school. Furthermore, defendant was charged with numerous
offenses while a juvenile, including three batteries or aggravated
batteries, two burglaries, a theft, a car theft, and disorderly
conduct.
	Given defendant's role as the leader in the crimes in this case,
defendant's criminal background, and defendant's lack of potential
for rehabilitation, defendant's death sentences were not
disproportionate to Feinberg's natural life imprisonment
sentences. Defendant, therefore, has failed to make a substantial
showing that he received ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel in this regard.
II. Perjured Testimony
	Defendant next argues that his constitutional right to due
process was violated at trial because the State failed to correct
false testimony.
	The State's knowing use of perjured testimony to obtain a
criminal conviction constitutes a violation of due process of law.
People v. Jimerson, 166 Ill. 2d 211, 223 (1995). A conviction
obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony must be set
aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony
could have affected the jury's verdict. People v. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d 326, 345 (1997), citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,
678-80, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 492, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3381-82 (1985).
	These principles likewise apply where the State, although not
soliciting the false testimony, allows it to go uncorrected. Olinger,
176 Ill. 2d  at 345, citing Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1217, 1221, 79 S. Ct. 1173, 1177 (1959). This is so even
where the witness' false testimony goes only to that witness'
credibility. Olinger, 176 Ill. 2d  at 345, citing Napue, 360 U.S.  at
269, 3 L. Ed. 2d  at 1221, 79 S. Ct.  at 1177.
	Defendant's claim revolves around the testimony of Glen
Rogers and Greg Wilson, who testified at the Goodman murder
trial. Glen Rogers and Greg Wilson testified that on Monday, May
11, 1987, they went to Goodman's house and looked in the
windows. They noticed that a television set and stereo equipment
were missing. They then called the Olympia Fields police
department. Goodman had been murdered the preceding Thursday.
	Defendant references the cross-examination of these
witnesses. Rogers denied that he had sexual relations with
Feinberg at Goodman's house, and also denied that he had any
sexual relations with Feinberg other than one time at his own
house. Wilson denied that there was any relationship involving
cocaine or homosexual conduct between himself and Goodman.
	Defendant now argues that the testimony by Rogers and
Wilson was false, and that the State should have corrected the
testimony. In support of this claim, he attaches a May 14, 1987,
report from the Olympia Fields police department. This report
describes the reporting officer's meeting with Rogers. Rogers
stated that he had two or three sexual encounters with Feinberg
during the past two months and three or four sexual encounters
with Feinberg during the past year. Defendant also attaches a page
of a May 17, 1987, Olympia Fields police department report which
recounts that Wilson told the officer that Feinberg had just called
Wilson and asked to speak to Rogers, who lived with Wilson.
Feinberg wanted to know if Rogers had any cocaine.
	Defendant argues that this alleged "homosexual and drug-related conduct went directly to the heart of the [voluntary]
manslaughter defense, and it also served to impeach the State's
witnesses." As we have discussed, defendant's theory of defense
at the Goodman trial was that he killed Goodman while acting
under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious
provocation, and therefore committed voluntary manslaughter. The
alleged provocation is that Goodman made a sexual advance
toward him. The number of sexual encounters between Rogers and
Feinberg, and their involvement in possessing or using cocaine, is
not relevant to defendant's establishing a voluntary manslaughter
defense based on Goodman's alleged sexual overture to defendant.
	Furthermore, even if Rogers and Wilson had been impeached
at trial with the evidence defendant cites, there is no reasonable
likelihood that their testimony could have affected the jury's
verdict. The testimony of Rogers and Wilson played a minor role
in the State's case, and, as this court stated on direct appeal in the
Goodman case, the evidence of defendant's guilt was
overwhelming. See People v. Page, 155 Ill. 2d 232, 262 (1993). In
particular, defendant confessed in detail to the crime, and an
eyewitness saw defendant at Goodman's house shortly before
Goodman disappeared. Thus, defendant has failed to make a
substantial showing of a constitutional violation in this regard.
III. Brady Violation
	Defendant also contends that the State violated his right to
due process by failing to disclose to the defense all exculpatory
evidence as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963). Defendant argues that the State
violated the Brady rule by failing to disclose evidence regarding
the victim Goodman's past homosexual conduct and evidence
regarding defendant's involvement in cult activities.
	To establish a Brady violation, the suppressed evidence must
be both favorable to the accused and material. Favorable evidence
is material in this context " 'only if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.' " People
v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 432-33 (1998), quoting United States
v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481, 494, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3383 (1985). A " 'reasonable probability' " of a different
result is a " 'probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.' " Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d  at 433, quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. 
at 682, 87 L. Ed. 2d  at 494, 105 S. Ct.  at 3383. To determine
whether evidence is material, a court must consider the cumulative
effect of all suppressed evidence favorable to the defense. Hobley,
182 Ill. 2d  at 433, 435. Furthermore, the prosecution cannot escape
its duty under Brady by contending that the suppressed evidence
was known only to police investigators and not to the prosecutors.
Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d  at 433, citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,
438, 131 L. Ed. 2d 490, 508-09, 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1568 (1995).
	The allegedly suppressed evidence to which defendant refers
is the evidence of defendant's involvement in a cult, which we
previously discussed in addressing defendant's claim that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence.
Defendant also references allegedly suppressed evidence of
Goodman's "homosexual conduct and contacts with the
defendants." This is the evidence that we previously discussed in
addressing defendant's claims that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to present sufficient evidence of a voluntary manslaughter
defense, and that the State failed to correct perjured testimony.
	Defendant has failed to offer any argument as to how there is
a reasonable probability that this allegedly suppressed evidence
would have changed the result of the proceedings. Moreover, our
resolution of defendant's other arguments which reference the
allegedly suppressed evidence demonstrates that there is no
reasonable probability that this evidence would have changed the
result of the proceedings. We therefore hold that defendant has
failed to make a substantial showing of a Brady violation.
	We also note that defendant offers no basis upon which to
conclude that his trial counsel did not in fact possess these police
reports. In this regard, however, defendant argues that the post-conviction trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion
to depose trial counsel. We hold that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in denying defendant's motion to depose his trial
counsel. Because this allegedly suppressed evidence is not
material within the meaning of Brady, there is no need to inquire
of defense counsel whether they possessed it.
IV. Death Penalty Instructions
	Defendant argues that the instructions given to the jury at his
sentencing hearings are confusing, misleading, and violate his
constitutional rights. Defendant has waived this issue by failing to
raise it on direct appeal. See People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 503
(1998). Defendant, however, argues that this argument is not
waived because its evidentiary basis was de hors the trial record.
See People v. Whitehead, 169 Ill. 2d 355, 372 (1996), overruled
in part on other grounds, People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366
(1998).
	Defendant relies on the studies of Professor Hans Zeisel and
Professor Shari Diamond in arguing that we should remand the
cause for an evidentiary hearing on the fairness of the instructions.
Both the Zeisel and Diamond studies purported to test the ability
of potential jurors to comprehend certain Illinois death penalty
instructions. The 1990 Zeisel study, which concluded that the
instructions resulted in misunderstanding and confusion, formed
the basis for a federal district court's holding that the death penalty
instructions were constitutionally infirm. See United States ex rel.
Free v. Peters, 806 F. Supp. 705 (N.D. Ill. 1992). The Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, reversed the district
court's holding. United States ex rel. Free v. Peters, 12 F.3d 700
(7th Cir. 1993); see also Gacy v. Wellborn, 994 F.2d 305 (7th Cir.
1993). This court has agreed that the Zeisel study does not
establish that the Illinois death penalty instructions are
unconstitutional. See People v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30, 93 (1998);
People v. Brown, 172 Ill. 2d 1, 55-56 (1996).
	Defendant, however, cites the study by Professor Diamond,
which was conducted after the Zeisel study. The Diamond study
was designed to address two primary objections to the Zeisel
study: (1) that the Zeisel study did not use a control group to
determine whether revised jury instructions would improve
performance and (2) that the Zeisel study did not take into account
jury deliberations. The results of the Diamond study confirmed the
conclusion of the Zeisel study that the death penalty instructions
were confusing.
	This court has already rejected the argument that the Diamond
study provides a basis for invalidating the Illinois death penalty
instructions. See People v. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d 467, 518-19 (1998);
Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d  at 93; People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 467-70 (1998); Brown, 172 Ill. 2d  at 55-57. Specifically, in Brown, we
stated:
		"[A]lthough the Diamond study claims to correct two
deficiencies in the Zeisel study, there still remain more
generalized problems with the research. Perhaps the most
fundamental objection is the 'lack of comparability
between the test setting and the sentencing hearing.' See
Free, 12 F.3d  at 705. There is no reason to suppose that
actual jurors who have sat through trial and a sentencing
hearing would respond to the sentencing instructions in
the same way as the test subjects who simply listened to
an audiotaped description of the evidence presented in the
case and an audiotape of the instructions, as was done in
the Diamond study." Brown, 172 Ill. 2d  at 57.
We adhere to our prior holdings and hold that an evidentiary
hearing is not warranted on defendant's claim that the death
penalty instructions are unconstitutional.
	In this regard, defendant also argues that the post-conviction
trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's request for
production of the juror cards for the 12 jurors who sat at the guilt
and sentencing proceedings in the Goodman case. Defendant seeks
to locate and interview the jurors so that he may "support the
claim that the instructions used in the instant case were confusing
or misled the jury."
	This court in People v. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d 404, 467-70
(1998), addressed a related issue. In Hobley, the defendant
likewise argued that the death penalty instructions are
unconstitutional. In addition to citing the Zeisel and Diamond
studies, the defendant submitted affidavits from the jurors in his
case. Some of the jurors stated that they found the instructions to
be confusing; that they felt obligated to impose the death penalty
as a result of their guilty verdict; and that they believed that the
defendant could be released on parole if they did not impose the
death penalty. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d  at 470. This court held that this
information pertains to the method, motive, or process by which
the jurors reached their verdict and therefore, may not be used to
impeach the jury's verdict. Hobley, 182 Ill. 2d  at 470.
	Accordingly, the information defendant seeks pursuant to his
motion for production of the juror cards may not be used to
support his current argument. Thus, we hold that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for
production of the juror cards.
CONCLUSION
	For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of
Cook County dismissing defendant's post-conviction petition
without an evidentiary hearing is affirmed. We direct the clerk of
this court to enter an order setting Tuesday, November 14, 2000,
as the date on which the sentence of death, entered by the circuit
court of Cook County, shall be carried out. Defendant shall be
executed in the manner provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West
1998). The clerk of this court shall send a certified copy of the
mandate in this case to the Director of Corrections, the warden of
Tamms Correctional Center, and the warden of the institution
where defendant is confined.
Affirmed.
	CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and
dissenting in part:
	I agree that Page's convictions should not be disturbed. In my
view, however, his sentence of death cannot be allowed to stand.
For the reasons set forth in my partial concurrence and partial
dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death
penalty law violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and
article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art.
I, §2). Page's sentence of death should therefore be vacated, and
the cause should be remanded for imposition of a sentence of
imprisonment. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 9-1(j). Because
Page has been found guilty of murdering more than one victim, the
term of his imprisonment must be natural life. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985,
ch. 38, par. 1005-8-1(a)(1)(c).
1.       Effective July 1, 1987, the legislature amended section 9-2 of
the Criminal Code of 1961 and replaced the offense of voluntary
manslaughter with the offense of second degree murder. See 720
ILCS 5/9-2 (West 1998). The second degree murder statute
incorporates the mitigating factors of sudden and intense passion
and unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense. See People v.
Tenner, 157 Ill. 2d 341, 371-72 (1993).