Case Title: In re M.G., M.B., K.R., J.R.

Citation: 363 N.C. 570

Docket Number: 36PA08

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2009-08-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE MATTER OF M.G., M.B., K.R., J.R.
No. 36PA08  
FILED: 28 AUGUST 2009
Child Abuse and Neglect--amendment to juvenile petition-–sexual abuse allegation--nature
of conditions of petition
The trial court did not err by allowing the Department of Social Services’s motion
to amend a juvenile petition to add sexual abuse allegations relating to the minor child M.B.
because: (1) the conditions upon which the petition was based included abuse, neglect, and
dependency, and the additional allegations did not change the nature of the conditions upon
which the petition was based; (2) the nature of abuse, based upon its statutory definition under
N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(1), was the existence or serious risk of some nonaccidental harm inflicted or
allowed by one’s caretaker, and the additional facts still fell within the nature of the abuse
condition that was initially alleged as they related to harm inflicted upon M.B. by a parent or
caretaker; and (3) respondents had sufficient notice of the amendment well before the
adjudicatory hearing, thus giving them time to prepare to answer the additional allegations.  The
case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of any assignments of error not
addressed by that court in its previous opinion
On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of
a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 187 N.C. App. 536,
653 S.E.2d 581 (2007), affirming in part, reversing in part, and
remanding in part an order entered on 8 March 2007 by Judge
Edward A. Pone in District Court, Cumberland County.  Heard in
the Supreme Court 16 December 2008.
Elizabeth Kennedy-Gurnee, Staff Attorney, for
petitioner-appellant Cumberland County Department of
Social Services; and Beth A. Hall, Attorney Advocate,
for Guardian ad Litem.
Lisa Skinner Lefler for respondent-appellee mother. 
Annick Lenoir-Peek, Assistant Appellate Defender, for   
respondent-appellee father.
MARTIN, Justice.
We allowed discretionary review in this case to
consider when an amendment to a juvenile petition “change[s] the
nature of the conditions upon which the petition is based.” 
N.C.G.S. § 7B-800 (2007).
-2-
On 18 May 2006, the Cumberland County Department of
Social Services (DSS) filed a juvenile petition alleging that
juveniles M.G., M.B., K.R., and J.R. were each abused, neglected,
and dependent.  See N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(1), (9), (15) (2007).  The
petition alleged abuse with specific reference to four
subdivisions of N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(1):  N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(1)(b)
(creation or allowance of substantial risk of serious physical
injury); N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(1)(d) (commission, permission, or
encouragement of any of several enumerated sexual offenses);
N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(1)(e) (creation or allowance of serious
emotional harm); and N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(1)(f) (encouragement of
delinquent acts involving moral turpitude by the juvenile).  The
petition contained numerous supporting factual allegations.  No
specific allegations regarding sexual abuse of M.B. appeared,
however.
Many of the allegations in the petition referenced
respondent-father Felix R.  Felix R., who is the biological
parent of K.R. and J.R., lived with respondent-mother Brandy G.
and was a caretaker for all four children.  During a medical
evaluation on 17 July 2006, M.B. disclosed inappropriate sexual
conduct by respondent-father.  DSS subsequently moved on 5
December 2006 to amend its petition by adding M.B.’s disclosures
of sexual abuse as factual allegations.  Following a hearing on 4
January 2007, the trial court entered an order in open court
allowing the motion to amend. 
The trial court conducted the adjudicatory hearing on
19 and 20 February 2007.  The trial court found as fact that M.B.
-3-
had been subjected to sexual contact by respondent-father, along
with other factual findings relating to abuse of M.B. such as
respondent-father’s commission of domestic violence in front of
the children and his driving while drunk with the children in the
vehicle.  The trial court concluded that M.B. was abused
according to the definition of abuse in N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(1). 
First, the trial court determined that M.B.’s parent or guardian
committed, permitted, or encouraged the commission of one or more
statutorily enumerated sexual offenses.  See id. § 7B-101(1)(d). 
Second, the trial court found that a parent or guardian created
or allowed a substantial risk of serious physical injury by
nonaccidental means.  See id. § 7B-101(1)(b).
The Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order as
to the finding that M.B. was abused as defined by N.C.G.S. § 7B-
101(1)(d).  In re M.G., 187 N.C. App. 536, 548, 653 S.E.2d 581,
588 (2007).  The Court of Appeals stated that the sexual abuse
allegations relating to M.B. “‘change[d] the nature of the
conditions upon which the petition [was] based,’” id. at 546-47,
653 S.E.2d at 587 (quoting N.C.G.S. § 7B-800), and thus, the
trial court erred in allowing the DSS motion to add the
allegations, id. at 547-48, 653 S.E.2d at 588.  Specifically, the
Court of Appeals concluded:  “Because the new allegations gave
rise to a different status for [M.B.] than alleged in the
original petition, they violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-800 . . .
.”  Id.  We disagree.
The dispositive issue is whether the additional
allegations changed the “nature of the conditions upon which the
-4-
petition is based.”  N.C.G.S. § 7B-800 (“The court may permit a
petition to be amended when the amendment does not change the
nature of the conditions upon which the petition is based.”).  In
deciding whether the amendments did so, we must determine the
meaning of the statutory language in sections 7B-800 and 7B-
101(1).  See Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 360 N.C. 384, 387, 628
S.E.2d 1, 3 (2006) (stating that this Court will give effect to
the plain meaning of a statute).  
Here, the conditions upon which the petition was based
include abuse, neglect, and dependency.  With regard to the issue
before this Court, only the condition of abuse is relevant.  The
question is whether the additional allegations changed the nature
of the condition alleged:  abuse.
Because the relevant condition on which the petition
was based is abuse, we must first determine the nature of that
condition.  Section 7B-101(1) defines the term “abused
juvenile[].”  N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(1).  Six separate parts set out
acts or omissions that support a finding of abuse.  Id.  A
juvenile is considered “abused” when a “parent, guardian,
custodian, or caretaker:”
a. Inflicts or allows to be         
    inflicted upon the juvenile a   
    serious physical injury by      
    other than accidental means;
b. Creates or allows to be created  
    a substantial risk of serious   
    physical injury to the juvenile 
    by other than accidental means;
c. Uses or allows to be used upon   
    the juvenile cruel or grossly   
    inappropriate procedures or     
    cruel or grossly inappropriate  
    devices to modify behavior;
-5-
  This is distinct from, for instance, the “nature of the
1
offense alleged” referenced in determining whether an amendment
to a delinquency petition will be allowed.  N.C.G.S. § 7B-2400
(2007).  The nature of the offense will typically be its
elements.  See In re Davis, 114 N.C. App. 253, 255-56, 441 S.E.2d
696, 698 (1994) (interpreting “nature of the offense” language in
a predecessor statute, N.C.G.S. § 7A-627 (1989)).  Thus, a
department of social services could not amend a delinquency
petition to add an offense with different elements. 
d. Commits, permits, or encourages  
    the commission of a violation   
    of [one or more listed sexual   
    offenses] by, with, or upon the 
    juvenile . . . ;
e. Creates or allows to be created  
    serious emotional damage to the 
    juvenile . . . ; or
f. Encourages, directs, or approves 
    of delinquent acts involving    
    moral turpitude committed by    
    the juvenile.
Id.  There is a commonality present in these criteria.  Each
definition states that a juvenile is abused when a caretaker
harms the juvenile in some way, allows the juvenile to be harmed,
or allows a substantial risk of harm.  The harm may be physical,
see N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(1)(a), (b); emotional, see id. § 7B-
101(1)(e), (f); or some combination thereof, see id. § 7B-
101(1)(c), (d).  Although several criteria are listed, they are
both disjunctive and overlapping.   Certain allegations might
1
justify a finding of abuse under several or even all of the
criteria.  We therefore hold that the nature of abuse, based upon
its statutory definition, is the existence or serious risk of
some nonaccidental harm inflicted or allowed by one’s caretaker.
Having determined the nature of the condition of abuse,
we now consider whether the additional allegations in this case
changed the nature of the condition.  DSS alleged in its initial
-6-
petition that M.B. was abused.  Specific factual allegations
existed to support that finding under multiple criteria,
including allowance of a risk of serious injury as well as
infliction of emotional harm.  The additional factual allegations
related to inappropriate sexual contact between M.B. and
respondent-father.  The allegations supported a finding of abuse
under N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(1)(d), but may also have justified that
finding under N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(1)(b) (creation of a substantial
risk of serious physical injury) or N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(1)(e)
(creation of serious emotional harm).  Both of the latter
criteria were alleged and supported by specific allegations in
the original petition.  The additional facts still fell within
the nature of the abuse condition that was initially alleged, as
they related to harm inflicted upon M.B. by a parent or
caretaker.  Therefore, the allegations of sexual abuse did not
change the nature of the condition when DSS had already alleged,
with supporting facts, that M.B. was abused.  
Often a juvenile may reveal additional incidents
supporting a finding of abuse after the initial juvenile petition
has been filed.  Setting aside requirements of fairness and
notice to the respondents, which must be satisfied in every case,
the inclusion of these incidents via amendments to a petition
alleging abuse will not typically change the nature of the
conditions upon which the petition is based.  We note that here,
respondents had notice of the amendment well before the
adjudicatory hearing.  DSS filed the motion to amend on 5
December 2006.  The trial court allowed the motion to amend
-7-
following a hearing conducted on 4 January 2007, at which
respondents were present and represented by counsel.  The trial
court specifically noted in its order allowing the amendment that
the parties were aware of the additional factual allegations. 
The hearing on the juveniles’ statuses began on 19 February 2007. 
Thus, respondents had sufficient notice and time to prepare to
answer the additional allegations.  We do not here address the
situation in which a petitioner adds factual allegations at trial
or with inadequate notice to a respondent.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that In re D.C., 183 N.C.
App. 344, 644 S.E.2d 640 (2007), required reversal in this case. 
In re M.G., 187 N.C. App. at 547-48, 653 S.E.2d at 587-88.  The
analysis used by the Court of Appeals in In re D.C., while not
binding on this Court, is instructive regarding what constitutes
a “change” in the “nature of the conditions” alleged.  N.C.G.S. §
7B-800.  In that case, the original petition alleged only that
the juvenile was dependent as defined in N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(9). 
In re D.C., 183 N.C. App. at 346, 348-49, 644 S.E.2d at 641-43. 
At adjudication, however, the petitioner proceeded on a theory of
neglect, id., which is defined by a separate subsection, N.C.G.S.
§ 7B-101(15).  The trial court found the juvenile to be
neglected.  In re D.C., 183 N.C. App. at 348, 644 S.E.2d at 642. 
Thus, the trial court essentially amended the petition by finding
a condition, neglect, that had never been alleged before trial. 
Id. at 349, 644 S.E.2d at 643.  The Court of Appeals also noted
that, in addition to the absence of a formal allegation of
neglect in the petition, the factual allegations supporting the
-8-
dependency claim failed to clearly give notice that neglect was
at issue.  Id. at 350, 644 S.E.2d at 643.  The Court of Appeals
therefore reversed the finding of neglect.  Id.
The amendment of the petition in the present case does
not raise problematic issues similar to those in In re D.C.  As a
formal matter, the original petition alleged that each child,
including M.B., was abused as defined in N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(1). 
It alleged in particular that the children were abused as defined
in the subdivision referencing sexual abuse.  Thus, unlike In re
D.C., in which the petition failed to allege the condition
ultimately found, the original petition in this case stated that
a claim of abuse was at issue with respect to M.B.  Moreover,
respondents here were aware well before the adjudicatory hearing
that the additional factual allegations and a claim of abuse as
defined in N.C.G.S. § 7B-101(1)(d) were at issue, unlike the
respondent in In re D.C., in which the petitioner proceeded on a
different theory at adjudication than had been presented in the
petition.
For the reasons stated above, we reverse the opinion of
the Court of Appeals as to the issue before us on discretionary
review.  The remaining issues addressed by the Court of Appeals
are not properly before this Court, and its decision as to those
matters remains undisturbed.  This case is remanded to the Court
of Appeals for consideration of any assignments of error not
addressed by that court in its previous opinion.
REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.