Case Title: Clay v. Kuhl

Citation: 

Docket Number: 86938

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-01-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket Nos. 86938, 86941 cons.-Agenda 31-September 1999.
TERESA CLAY, Appellee, v. BROTHER RICHARD KUHL et al., 
Appellants.
Opinion filed January 21, 2000.
JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:
The plaintiff, Teresa Clay, brought the present action in the circuit court 
of Kane County, alleging that defendant Brother Richard Kuhl sexually abused her 
while she was a minor. The plaintiff also asserted that the religious order to 
which Brother Kuhl belonged-defendant Society of the Missionaries of the Sacred 
Heart-had notice of similar misconduct allegedly committed by Kuhl yet failed to 
take any steps to prevent the abuse charged here from occurring. The circuit 
court dismissed the action on motion of the defendants, agreeing with the 
defendants that the plaintiff's complaint was untimely. The appellate court 
reversed and remanded the cause for further proceedings. 301 Ill. App. 3d 694. 
We allowed the defendants' petitions for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 
315(a)), and we now reverse the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the 
judgment of the circuit court.
The plaintiff initiated the present action by filing a complaint in the 
circuit court of Kane County on January 10, 1996. The allegations relevant here 
are found in the plaintiff's third amended complaint. According to the third 
amended complaint, Brother Richard Kuhl befriended the plaintiff, her sister, 
Joell, and their mother and, in 1972 or 1973, began to molest the plaintiff and 
Joell; the plaintiff was born on March 31, 1964. The plaintiff alleged that the 
abuse occurred about one or two times a week and continued for approximately 
seven years. According to the plaintiff's third amended complaint, Kuhl "would 
try to make [the plaintiff] touch his penis and he would penetrate her vagina 
with his fingers, while he was masturbating." The plaintiff estimated that some 
900 separate incidents of abuse occurred during that period. The third amended 
complaint further alleged that the plaintiff was examined by a psychologist, Dr. 
Susan Phipps Yonas, who suggested that the plaintiff, like other victims of 
childhood sexual abuse, had not been able to realize the causal relationship 
between the abuse she suffered and subsequent psychological problems she 
experienced. The plaintiff alleged that it was not until June 1994 that she 
realized that Kuhl's misconduct caused her injuries. Counts I and II were 
directed against Kuhl; count I alleged that his acts constituted battery, and 
count II alleged that his conduct was negligent or reckless. Count III, against 
Kuhl's religious order, the Society of the Missionaries of the Sacred Heart, 
alleged that the Society was aware the Kuhl had engaged in similar misconduct 
with another girl and that it was negligent or reckless in failing to prevent 
the abuse from occurring in this case.
The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's action under section 
2-619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure, arguing that the matter was barred 
by the applicable statute of limitations. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 1996). 
The defendants maintained that the time for bringing the present action expired 
on March 31, 1984, when the plaintiff turned 20. The defendants reasoned that 
the instances of misconduct alleged here were sudden, traumatic events and that 
the plaintiff therefore should have been required to bring her action within two 
years of the time she reached the age of majority. See 735 ILCS 5/13-211 (West 
1996). The trial court granted the defendants' motions, concluding that the 
plaintiff's action was untimely. The trial court relied on the appellate court's 
opinion in M.E.H. v. L.H., 283 Ill. App. 3d 241 (1996), aff'd on 
other grounds, 177 Ill. 2d 207 (1997), which had characterized occurrences 
of child sexual abuse, for purposes of the statute of limitations, as sudden, 
traumatic events that triggered the running of the limitations period once the 
victim of the abuse attained majority.
The plaintiff appealed. The appellate court reversed and remanded, concluding 
that the action was not barred by the statute of limitations. 301 Ill. App. 3d 
694. The court disagreed with its earlier decision in M.E.H. and 
expressed the view that the discovery rule should apply in cases of repressed 
memories of sexual abuse. The court viewed the present action as one involving 
repressed memories of abuse. The court concluded that the action was timely, 
noting that the plaintiff's third-amended complaint "alleged that in June 1994 
she first realized that the sexual encounters with Brother Kuhl caused her 
injuries" and that the plaintiff commenced the action in January 1996. 301 Ill. 
App. 3d at 704. The appellate court declined to consider a further contention by 
the defendants, who questioned whether the case actually involved a claim of 
repressed memory. Construing this argument as simply an objection to the 
sufficiency of the pleadings, the appellate court did not believe that it was 
appropriate to address the challenge, given the procedural posture of the case. 
301 Ill. App. 3d at 704. We allowed the defendants' separate petitions for leave 
to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). We granted leave to a number of organizations 
to file amicus briefs in behalf of the parties. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345.
We note that this action was originally consolidated in the appellate court 
with another case making similar allegations against the same defendants. While 
the appeals were pending before this court, the plaintiff in the other case, 
Josefa Ferrer, reached a settlement agreement with the defendants, and Ferrer's 
case has been dismissed. We have accordingly limited our discussion to the 
remaining case, involving plaintiff Clay.
The defendants argue that the plaintiff's action was barred within two years 
of the time when she reached the age of 18, as provided by statute. 735 ILCS 
5/13-211 (West 1996) (if plaintiff is a minor when cause of action accrues, then 
"he or she may bring the action within 2 years after the person attains the age 
of 18 years"). The plaintiff was born in 1964, and under the defendants' 
reasoning the present action would have been barred in 1984. In the alternative, 
the defendants contend that, even if the common law discovery rule does apply in 
this case, the plaintiff's action must still be considered untimely, for she 
knew of her injury and cause of action long before she finally brought suit. The 
plaintiff, in response, argues that the common law discovery rule applies in 
these circumstances and, moreover, that the allegations in her complaint 
demonstrate that she brought suit within two years of the time she discovered 
the injury.
We need not determine in this case whether the instances of childhood sexual 
abuse alleged here must be considered "sudden traumatic events" for purposes of 
applying the statute of limitations. Even if the plaintiff were to prevail on 
this question, she would still be required to establish the timeliness of her 
action under the discovery rule. As we explain below, we do not believe that the 
discovery rule is of assistance to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff contends that application of the discovery rule is necessary in 
this case, given the allegations in the complaint that she did not realize the 
existence of her injury until much later. Under the discovery rule, a party's 
cause of action accrues when the party knows or reasonably should know of an 
injury and that the injury was wrongfully caused. Knox College v. Celotex 
Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 415 (1981); Nolan v. Johns-Manville 
Asbestos, 85 Ill. 2d 161, 171 (1981); Witherell v. Weimer, 85 Ill. 2d 146, 156 (1981). The limitations statute applicable here would be found in 
section 13-202 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides a two-year period 
for bringing actions for personal injuries. 735 ILCS 5/13-202 (West 1996). We 
note that the legislature later enacted a statute, section 13-202.2 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure, codifying the common law discovery rule for actions 
involving childhood sexual abuse. 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 (West 1996). That 
provision took effect in 1991. The plaintiff correctly concedes that if her 
action was already barred under the common law discovery rule prior to the 
enactment of section 13-202.2, then the new statute could not have revived it; 
under Illinois law, the barring of an action by a statute of limitations creates 
a vested right in favor of the defendant, and the action cannot later be 
revived. See M.E.H. v. L.H., 177 Ill. 2d 207, 215 (1997); see also 
Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 404-05 (1998) 
(supplemental opinion upon denial of rehearing). Accordingly, we have no 
occasion here to consider the operation or application of section 13-202.2.
The plaintiff, in her third amended complaint, alleged that it was not until 
June 1994 that she "realized that the sexual encounters with [Kuhl] had caused 
her injuries." The plaintiff further alleged that "the abuse was not caused by 
force or violence and the injuries were not caused immediately but evolved with 
the overlay of life experience. At the time the abuse occurred, she did not know 
it was abnormal behavior." The third amended complaint also stated that a 
psychologist who had examined the plaintiff reached the following 
conclusion:
The issue whether an action was brought within the time allowed by the 
discovery rule is generally resolved as a question of fact. County of 
Du Page v. Graham, Anderson, Probst & White, Inc., 109 Ill. 2d 143, 153-54 (1985); Nolan, 85 Ill. 2d  at 171. The question may be 
determined as a matter of law, however, when the answer is clear from the 
pleadings. Witherell v. Weimer, 85 Ill. 2d 146, 156 (1981); Franke 
v. Geyer, 209 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 1012 (1991). We believe that the 
circumstances alleged in this case allow this issue to be resolved as a matter 
of law.
Examining the plaintiff's third amended complaint, we conclude that the 
present action is untimely under the discovery rule. In the present case, the 
allegations of the plaintiff's complaint make it clear that the plaintiff had 
sufficient information about her injury and its cause to require her to bring 
suit long before the date of discovery alleged in the complaint. The plaintiff 
does not argue that she repressed her memories of the abuse, and the allegations 
in the complaint indicate that the plaintiff was aware of the abuse as it 
occurred. From the chronology set forth in the third amended complaint, it 
appears that the abuse began when the plaintiff was eight or nine years old, and 
that it continued for about seven years, until the plaintiff was 15 or 16. 
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the plaintiff at one point alleges that 
the abuse commenced when she was four or five years old; in a later document in 
the circuit court, however, the plaintiff refers to that allegation as a 
typographical error. The plaintiff reached the age of majority in 1982. She did 
not bring the present action until 1996, when she was nearly 32 years old. Given 
the allegations in the third amended complaint, which show that the plaintiff 
was always aware of the misconduct charged, and the absence of any contrary 
assertion that the plaintiff repressed memories of the abuse, we believe that 
the plaintiff's action must be considered untimely under the discovery rule. We 
make no determination here whether the discovery rule would toll the running of 
the limitations period in a case alleging repressed memories of abuse. See 
Johnson v. Johnson, 701 F. Supp. 1363 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (applying 
discovery rule in case alleging delayed recollection of childhood sexual 
abuse).
The plaintiff contends, however, that her injuries were latent to some extent 
and did not fully manifest themselves until years after the abuse occurred. We 
do not believe that the plaintiff's alleged failure to fully discover the nature 
of her injuries is sufficient to delay the running of the limitations period. 
There is no requirement that a plaintiff must know the full extent of his or her 
injuries before suit must be brought under the applicable statute of 
limitations. This court addressed a similar question in Golla v. General 
Motors Corp., 167 Ill. 2d 353 (1995). In that case, the plaintiff was 
injured in an automobile accident on September 3, 1985, and she obtained medical 
treatment that day. Later, in March 1988, she was diagnosed as having reflex 
sympathetic dystrophy, which she believed was caused by the earlier accident. 
The plaintiff brought an action against the manufacturer of the car in which she 
was injured on August 7, 1989, more than two years after the occurrence. This 
court agreed with the defendant that the action was untimely. The court 
concluded that the plaintiff was required to bring suit within two years of the 
date of the accident, even though she was not aware of the additional ailment 
until after the limitations period expired. The Golla court 
explained:
Notably, Illinois law presumes an intent to harm and a resulting injury from 
the type of misconduct allegedly committed by Kuhl. Doe v. Montessori 
School, 287 Ill. App. 3d 289, 297 (1997); Scudder v. Hanover Insurance 
Co., 201 Ill. App. 3d 921, 928-29 (1990). Thus, it was not necessary that 
the plaintiff postpone the commencement of her action until she was aware of the 
full extent of her injuries.
In further support of her argument for delayed discovery of the injury, the 
plaintiff compares the present case to tort actions arising from exposure to 
asbestos. This court has applied the discovery rule in those cases, permitting 
plaintiffs to bring suit long after they were exposed to the substance. See, 
e.g., Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 85 Ill. 2d 161 (1981). 
The plaintiff maintains that the injuries she incurred as a consequence of 
Kuhl's alleged misconduct were, like those caused by exposure to asbestos, slow 
to develop and unknowable at the time of the occurrence. We do not agree.
We believe that there are substantial distinctions between cases involving 
exposure to asbestos or other dangerous substances, in which the risk of harm is 
not immediately apparent, and cases involving events that give rise to an 
immediate awareness of injury. In rejecting a similar contention, this court in 
Golla explained:
We believe that a similar result must obtain here. The plaintiff does not 
contend that she repressed memories of the abuse allegedly committed by Kuhl, or 
that she was not aware that his misconduct was harmful. Rather, the plaintiff 
asserts that she did not discover, until years later, the full extent of the 
injuries she allegedly sustained as a result of the childhood occurrences. As 
the court determined in Golla, however, a plaintiff's failure to learn 
the full extent of the injuries caused by the defendant's acts will not toll the 
statute of limitations. Accepting the plaintiff's argument in support of delayed 
discovery of the injury would improperly create a subjective standard by which 
accrual of a cause of action would have to be measured.
The plaintiff briefly raises two other theories in opposition to the statute 
of limitations defense. First, the plaintiff argues that the present matter is 
similar to cases involving fraudulent concealment, for here Kuhl allegedly used 
his position of trust and authority to abuse the plaintiff and to secure her 
silence. We do not agree. Under Illinois law, the fraudulent concealment will 
toll the statute of limitations if the plaintiff pleads and proves that fraud 
prevent the discovery of the cause of action. 735 ILCS 5/13-215 (West 1996). As 
a general matter, one alleging fraudulent concealment must "show affirmative 
acts by the fiduciary designed to prevent the discovery of the action." 
Hagney v. Lopeman, 147 Ill. 2d 458, 463 (1992). The plaintiff in the 
present case does not allege, however, that Kuhl attempted to conceal the cause 
of action from her, and thus we conclude that fraudulent concealment is of no 
assistance to the plaintiff in this case.
The plaintiff also argues in favor of the equitable tolling of the 
limitations period here, contending that she failed to discover the cause of 
action during her minority because of Kuhl's actions in selecting victims who 
would remain silent and in leading them to believe that his behavior was 
acceptable. Equitable tolling of a statute of limitations may be appropriate if 
the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff, or if the plaintiff has been 
prevented from asserting his or her rights in some extraordinary way, or if the 
plaintiff has mistakenly asserted his or her rights in the wrong forum. 
Ciers v. O.L. Schmidt Barge Lines, Inc., 285 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 1052 
(1996). We do not believe that the present action is one in which equitable 
tolling is proper. The plaintiff does not contend that, after the alleged abuse 
ceased and she reached the age of majority, Kuhl misled her or otherwise 
attempted to prevent her from asserting her rights in a timely manner.
Finally, the plaintiff asks that the cause be remanded so that she can 
further amend her complaint, if the statute of limitations is found to bar the 
present action. The plaintiff contends that further attempts to amend the 
complaint in the circuit court would have been futile, for the appellate court's 
opinion in M.E.H. v. L.H., 283 Ill. App. 3d 241 (1996), aff'd on 
other grounds, 177 Ill. 2d 207 (1997), then the controlling authority, 
characterized all instances of childhood sexual abuse as sudden traumatic events 
for statute of limitations purposes. We note that the appellate court decided 
that case after the plaintiff had already commenced the present action; 
moreover, even in the face of that decision, the plaintiff later amended her 
complaint to add allegations in support of her delayed discovery of her injury. 
The plaintiff does not suggest what further allegations might be made in support 
of her action, and we do not believe that remandment is appropriate or would be 
helpful in these circumstances.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court is reversed, and 
the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is affirmed.
Appellate court reversed;
circuit court affirmed.JUSTICE RATHJE took no part in 
the consideration or decision of this case.
JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting:
The majority affirms the trial court's dismissal with prejudice of 
plaintiff's third amended complaint. I disagree with this result. Under the 
discovery rule, as the majority correctly states, a party's cause of action does 
not accrue for limitations purposes until the party "knows or reasonably should 
know of an injury and that the injury was wrongfully caused." Slip op. at 4 
(citing, inter alia, Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 415 (1981)). The majority acknowledges that the issue of whether an action 
has been brought within the time allowed by the discovery rule should ordinarily 
be resolved as a question of fact. Slip op. at 5. However, the majority 
concludes that in this case the pleadings establish that plaintiff's suit is 
untimely as a matter of law. Slip op. at 5.
Although the majority never states whether plaintiff actually "knew" or 
merely "reasonably should have known" before January 1994 that she had sustained 
a wrongfully caused injury, either conclusion would be suspect in light of the 
allegations contained in the third amended complaint. Plaintiff explicitly 
stated that she did not incur any physical harm from Kuhl's sexual abuse, nor 
did she realize until June 1994 that her childhood molestation had caused her 
any psychological harm. The complaint also contains the allegation that Susan 
Phipps Yonas, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist who had examined the plaintiff, was 
of the opinion that many victims of childhood sexual abuse were unaware that 
such abuse had caused them psychological problems. The complaint further alleged 
that Yonas believed that plaintiff may have been "unable" to comprehend any link 
between the apparently destructive path her life was on and the abuse she had 
suffered as a child. In light of these allegations, it is difficult to 
comprehend how the majority can conclude as a matter of law that plaintiff knew 
or should have known that she had been injured and that the injury was 
wrongfully caused. If the majority's objection is to the lack of a specific 
allegation as to when plaintiff first became aware that she had some degree of 
psychological dysfunction, the proper course would seem to be to allow plaintiff 
to replead, rather than dismissing the case with prejudice.
The cornerstone, if not the entire edifice, of the majority's analysis is 
Golla v. General Motors Corp., 167 Ill. 2d 353 (1995). See slip op. at 
5-8. Golla was a case in which an automobile driver was involved in an 
accident in September 1985. It was conclusively established that plaintiff 
sustained physical injuries in the accident of which she was aware at the time. 
She did not file suit until August 1989, after the relevant limitations period 
had expired. Plaintiff argued that her suit was nevertheless timely because she 
had not become aware of the extent of her injuries until March 1988. 
This court rejected plaintiff's argument and affirmed the circuit court's grant 
of summary judgment to defendant. We held that there was
I believe the majority's reliance on Golla is misplaced. First, this 
case should not be governed by the "sudden, traumatic event" rule. Although the 
majority disclaims having answered this question (slip op. at 3), Golla 
is a case in which the "sudden, traumatic event" rule was clearly applied. 
Golla, 167 Ill. 2d  at 362-63. Golla expressly characterized 
its holding as follows:
Accordingly, unless this case involves a "sudden, traumatic event," the 
majority's reliance on Golla is misplaced.
Our appellate court has succinctly explained the difference between "sudden, 
traumatic event" cases and cases involving "disease":
Golla reaffirmed that a distinction must be drawn between "sudden, 
traumatic event" cases and cases involving "nontraumatic" events, and that in 
the latter type of case the discovery rule must toll the limitations period 
"until the plaintiff either knew or reasonably should have known that he was 
injured and that the injury was wrongfully caused." Golla, 167 Ill. 2d  
at 366. See also Hutson v. Hartke, 292 Ill. App. 3d 411, 415 (1997), 
stating:
I am a layman with respect to matters psychological, but I would suggest that 
it is uncontroversial that psychological dysfunction can occur without 
an outside causative agent. Accordingly, I believe it is improper to hold 
as a matter of law that a plaintiff's awareness of any psychological distress 
automatically puts him on notice that his distress may potentially have an 
external causative agent, therefore starting the limitations clock running.
More fundamentally, however, even if this case were governed by the sudden, 
traumatic event rule, basing our result on Golla puts the cart before 
the horse. Golla stands for the proposition that in sudden, traumatic 
event cases the limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff first 
becomes aware of any injury. But this begs the threshold question, 
i.e., When did the plaintiff first become aware of her injury? The 
majority's analysis of this question in this case amounts to nothing more than a 
conclusion: "the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint make it clear that the 
plaintiff had sufficient information about her injury and its cause to require 
her to bring suit long before the date of discovery alleged in the complaint." 
Slip op. at 5. There is no factual basis for this conclusion. In the complaint 
plaintiff explicitly states that Kuhl's molestation caused her no 
contemporaneous physical injury and that her psychological injuries did not 
develop until later in her life. There is no indication in the complaint as to 
when plaintiff's psychological injuries in fact arose or when she became aware 
of them, but plaintiff did specifically allege that until June 1994 she was 
unaware of the link between her psychological injury and the abuse she alleges 
she endured as a child. These statements must be taken as true for purposes of a 
motion to dismiss. Carver v. Nall, 186 Ill. 2d 554, 556 (1999); In 
re Chicago Flood Litigation, 176 Ill. 2d 179, 184 (1997). Moreover, the 
statement of Yonas suggests that it is common for victims of childhood 
molestation to be unaware of psychological problems resulting therefrom. How, 
then, does the majority conclude that plaintiff knew or reasonably should have 
known of her injuries and that her injuries were wrongfully caused before 
January 1994?
The majority several times notes that plaintiff does not contend that she 
repressed her memories of the abuse. Although the majority does not explicitly 
so state, the implication seems to be that awareness of childhood sexual abuse 
is tantamount to awareness of injury-that if one is aware of having been 
sexually abused, one must be aware that one was psychologically injured 
thereby. I cannot endorse so broad a statement as a matter of law, especially in 
light of the factual contentions directly to the contrary in the 
complaint. A number of jurisdictions have held that even in the absence of 
repressed memory claims the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations in 
childhood sexual abuse cases until the plaintiff becomes aware of his or her 
injuries and the causal link between the injuries and the past events. See, 
e.g., Dunlea v. Dappen, 83 Haw. 28, 924 P.2d 196 (1996); 
Frideres v. Schiltz, 540 N.W.2d 261 (Iowa 1995); Cosgriffe v. 
Cosgriffe, 262 Mont. 175, 864 P.2d 776 (1993); Osland v. Osland, 
442 N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1989); McCreary v. Weast, 971 P.2d 974 (Wyo. 
1999). But see Doe v. First United Methodist Church, 68 Ohio St. 3d 
531, 629 N.E.2d 402 (1994) (discovery rule inapplicable in childhood sexual 
abuse cases in which plaintiff knows his or her attacker and does not raise a 
claim of repressed memory). Some other cases which have affirmed 
limitations-based dismissals have done so because it was clearly established 
that before filing the complaint the plaintiff was aware of past abuse, 
psychological injury, and the possibility of some relationship between the 
injury and the abuse. See, e.g., Woodroffe v. Hasenclever, 540 N.W.2d 45 (Iowa 1995). There is no basis for such a conclusion in the 
allegations of the third amended complaint in the instant case.
I see no reasoned distinction between this case and cases involving toxic 
exposure, in which the discovery rule tolls the statute of limitations until the 
plaintiff realizes or should realize that a past event has harmed him. See, 
e.g., Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 85 Ill. 2d 161, 169-71 
(1981). The toxic exposure cases are not based on "repressed memory" of the 
event which caused the injury-the plaintiff in Nolan had worked with 
asbestos products for over 32 years. Rather, the timeliness of the filing of 
such cases is evaluated according to the date on which the plaintiff "knows or 
reasonably should know of an injury and also knows or reasonably should 
know that the injury was caused by the wrongful acts of another." 
(Emphasis added.) Nolan, 85 Ill. 2d  at 169. The mere fact that a 
plaintiff remembers the event which is ultimately found to have caused his 
injury does not necessarily impute awareness of a link between the event and the 
injury. If it did, the complaint would have been untimely in Nolan, in 
which the plaintiff was always aware that he had worked with asbestos and was 
aware of physical problems as early as 18 years before filing his complaint. See 
Nolan, 85 Ill. 2d  at 163-64. Why should a plaintiff irrebuttably be 
imputed awareness of a causative link between a past event and a current 
psychological ailment when our past precedent holds that plaintiffs are not 
automatically imputed awareness of a relationship between a past event and a 
current physical ailment?
The only support marshaled by the majority is two cases which it cites for 
the proposition that there exists a legal presumption of an intent to harm and a 
resulting injury from the type of acts plaintiff alleges Kuhl to have committed. 
See slip op. at 6 (citing Doe v. Montessori School, 287 Ill. App. 3d 
289, 297 (1997), and Scudder v. Hanover Insurance Co., 201 Ill. App. 3d 
921, 928-29 (1990)). But this presumption does not constitute a basis for 
imputing to the plaintiff knowledge that she had been psychologically injured by 
the sexual abuse she had suffered as a child. To so hold would turn Doe 
on its head. In Doe, defendants argued that the complaint (filed 
by the victim's parents during her minority) should have been dismissed as 
unripe because the victim did not remember the events which allegedly caused her 
injury. See Doe, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 298-99. Far from utilizing the 
presumption to impute awareness to the victim, however, the Doe court 
relied on the presumption to conclude that the case was ripe because the victim 
had been injured even though the victim was not aware of her injury. 
The question in the instant case is not whether the victim was injured by her 
childhood molestation, but when she became or should have become aware of that 
injury and its wrongful cause. Scudder, the other case cited by the 
majority, involved a determination whether an insurer had a duty to defend or 
indemnify its insured against a claim that he had molested four juveniles. The 
Scudder court held that because injury was "practically certain" to 
result from a sexual assault, the acts allegedly committed by the insured fell 
within a policy exclusion for injuries " 'expected or intended by the 
insured,' " such that summary judgment in favor of the insurer was proper. 
Scudder, 201 Ill. App. 3d at 926, 928-29. See also West American 
Insurance Co. v. Vago, 197 Ill. App. 3d 131, 137 (1990). Scudder 
did not involve any question whether the plaintiffs were aware of their 
injuries. Neither Doe nor Scudder supports the majority 
position.
To paraphrase an earlier case, if the plaintiff were barred from prosecuting 
this action because she must be said, as a matter of law, to have been 
psychologically injured prior to January 1994, she would have had only a 
delusive remedy against defendants. It would mean that at some past moment in 
time, unknown and inherently unknowable even in retrospect, plaintiff was 
charged with knowledge of the slow and tragic disintegration of her mind. Under 
this view her failure to diagnose within the applicable statute of limitations a 
mental disease of whose symptoms she may not even have been conscious would 
constitute waiver of her right to compensation at the ultimate day of discovery 
and disability. See Nolan, 85 Ill. 2d  at 168, quoting Urie v. 
Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169, 93 L. Ed. 1282, 1292, 69 S. Ct. 1018, 1024 
(1949). With this result I cannot concur, and I respectfully dissent.
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON joins in this dissent.
1. 1Although this court overruled the appellate 
court on the ultimate question as to whether the plaintiff's complaint was 
timely, finding that plaintiff was in possession of sufficient facts to have 
been put on notice that her condition may have been externally caused, we did 
not reject the appellate court's explanation of the difference between disease 
and injuries caused by sudden, traumatic events. See Witherell, 85 Ill. 2d  at 156-58.