Case Title: Commonwealth v. Collazo

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11210

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-02-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-11210 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JOSE I. COLLAZO. 
 
 
 
Essex.     December 7, 2018. - February 20, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Firearms.  Constitutional Law, Admissions and 
confessions.  Evidence, Admissions and confessions, 
Consciousness of guilt, Firearm, Relevancy and materiality.  
Practice, Criminal, Capital case, Admissions and 
confessions, Argument by prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on April 3, 2009. 
 
 
The cases were tried before David A. Lowy, J. 
 
 
 
Elizabeth A. Billowitz for the defendant. 
 
Marina Moriarty, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  Following a jury trial, the defendant, Jose I. 
Collazo, was convicted of murder in the first degree on a theory 
of deliberate premeditation, in connection with the shooting 
death of Jose Fuentes, and of carrying a firearm without a 
2 
 
license in violation of G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).1  On appeal, the 
defendant argues evidentiary errors as well as improper argument 
during the prosecutor's closing, all of which he claims require 
a reversal of his convictions.  Alternatively, the defendant 
requests that we exercise our authority under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, to reduce the verdict of murder in the first degree 
because the evidence is insufficient to establish deliberate 
premeditation.  Upon full review of the record, we affirm and 
decline to reduce his murder conviction under § 33E. 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts as the jury could have 
found them, reserving certain details for discussion infra.  On 
February 13, 2009, the defendant's former girlfriend, Sandra 
Fajardo, ended her dating relationship with the defendant and 
immediately started dating the victim.  On the evening of 
February 20, 2009, the victim, Fajardo, Fajardo's two young 
children, and Fajardo's friend Jenny Albizu were at the 
apartment that Fajardo and the defendant recently had rented.  
Sometime after midnight, Fajardo, the victim, and Albizu heard 
someone knocking on the back door and the windows of the 
basement apartment.  Fajardo told the victim not to go outside 
to see who was knocking because she thought it was the 
defendant. 
                     
 
1 The defendant was acquitted on an indictment charging home 
invasion. 
3 
 
 
Early the following morning, the defendant telephoned his 
friend, Jamie Fekeris, to ask what kind of automobile the victim 
drove.  After Fekeris provided the defendant with this 
information, the defendant stated, "I'm going to get that 
fucker."  Between approximately 8 A.M. and 8:30 A.M., the 
defendant asked the landlord to help him access the apartment, 
telling the landlord that Fajardo was out of town.  The 
landlord, who had rented the apartment to both Fajardo and the 
defendant days before, gave the defendant access to the basement 
and provided him with a butter knife to force open the lock on 
the door to the apartment. 
The defendant entered the apartment, greeted Albizu, and 
proceeded to walk to the bedroom where Fajardo, her two 
children, and the victim were sleeping.  Witnesses heard 
gunshots and screaming.  First responders found the victim lying 
on the bed in a pool of blood.  An autopsy revealed that the 
victim suffered four gunshot wounds and blunt trauma to the 
head. 
 
Approximately ten to twenty minutes after his first 
telephone call to Fekeris, the defendant called Fekeris again 
and told him, "I just merked him."  Fekeris understood the term 
"merk" to mean "kill."  The defendant went to Alyssa Hooper and 
Samantha Witham's apartment, which was located nearby.  While 
there, the defendant appeared upset and agitated.  He asked 
4 
 
Hooper if she had any bleach that he could use to wash his hands 
because he thought there was blood on them.  The defendant 
washed his hands and told Hooper and Witham that he would pay 
them to drive him to New York.  During the drive to New York, 
the defendant told Hooper and Witham that he killed the victim.  
On March 4, 2009, the defendant surrendered to New York City 
police after learning that there was a warrant for his arrest.  
During questioning with Massachusetts State police, the 
defendant claimed to have been in New York City at the time the 
victim was killed. 
At trial, the defendant mounted a heat of passion defense, 
conceding that he beat and shot the victim, but only did so 
because he "went crazy" when he saw Fajardo in bed with another 
man. 
 
Discussion.  1.  Defendant's statement to police.  A 
detective from the Haverhill police department and a trooper 
from the Massachusetts State police traveled to New York City to 
question the defendant, who had surrendered to local authorities 
weeks after the killing.  During the recorded interview, the 
defendant was asked when he was last in Massachusetts.  He 
responded that he left for New York prior to Valentine's Day and 
had not been back to the Commonwealth since then.  When 
questioned about whether he was in Haverhill on the day of the 
killing, he denied it.  On appeal, the defendant argues that the 
5 
 
denials undermined his sudden provocation defense and that 
admitting a recording of the interview created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice because it contained 
unequivocal denials of accusations of a crime.2  This argument 
lacks merit. 
 
It is true that if a defendant is accused of a crime and 
unequivocally denies it, the denial is not admissible at trial.  
See Commonwealth v. Santana, 477 Mass. 610, 621 (2017).  The 
rationale for the rule is that "[e]xtrajudicial accusatory 
statements made in the presence of a defendant, which he [or 
she] has unequivocally denied, are hearsay and inadmissible as 
evidence of guilt in the Commonwealth's case-in-chief" 
(footnotes omitted).  Commonwealth v. Womack, 457 Mass. 268, 272 
(2010).  That is not the case here.  The statement the defendant 
sought to suppress was neither a response to an accusation of a 
crime nor an unequivocal denial.  See Commonwealth v. Cruzado, 
480 Mass. 275, 278 (2018).  Instead, the defendant made self-
serving and demonstrably false statements that were admissible 
to show his consciousness of guilt.  See Commonwealth v. 
Martinez, 476 Mass. 186, 197 (2017).  There was no error. 
                     
2 Alternatively, the defendant claims that the failure to 
file a motion to suppress the statements he made during the 
interrogation was ineffective assistance of counsel. 
6 
 
2.  Admission of firearm evidence.  At trial, the 
Commonwealth offered evidence of a .25 caliber semiautomatic 
pistol and two boxes of ammunition recovered from a closet in 
Fajardo's apartment, along with testimony that these items 
belonged to the defendant.  On appeal, the defendant argues that 
this evidence was admitted erroneously because it "depicted 
[him] as a violent, lawless individual" and it lacked any 
probative value as it did not match the weapon used in the 
commission of the crime.3  Because defense counsel withdrew his 
initial objection to the admission of this evidence, our review 
is for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.4  
See Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 457 Mass. 773, 792 (2010), cert. 
denied, 563 U.S. 990 (2011). 
Relying on Commonwealth v. Tassinari, 466 Mass. 340, 352-
353 (2013), the Commonwealth asserts that the evidence was 
properly admitted because it "was relevant to the Commonwealth's 
                     
 
3 Spent projectiles recovered from the victim's body and two 
shell casings and one bullet were recovered from the bedroom  
were .38 caliber.  The firearm and boxes of ammunition recovered 
from Fajardo's apartment were .25 caliber. 
 
4 Defense counsel did not provide a basis for either lodging 
or withdrawing the objection.  However, we note that defense 
counsel argued during closing argument that the defendant could 
not be convicted of home invasion because he lived in the 
apartment -- one cannot be found guilty of invading one's own 
home.  See Commonwealth v. Marshall, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 710, 716 
(2006) (controlling question with respect to home invasion 
statute is whose place of habitation it is). 
7 
 
theory of premeditation."  Id. at 353.  We disagree.  In 
Tassinari, evidence of the defendant's firearms was relevant to 
the theory of premeditation because the Commonwealth asserted 
that the defendant deliberately selected particular guns from 
his firearm collection to shoot the victim.  Id.  Here, the 
second firearm and ammunition recovered from Fajardo's apartment 
was not used in the shooting, nor was there a possibility that 
it could have been used under either the Commonwealth's or the 
defendant's theory of the case.  "Where a weapon definitively 
could not have been used in the commission of the crime, we have 
generally cautioned against admission of evidence related to it" 
(citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Imbert, 479 Mass. 575, 585 
(2018).  See Commonwealth v. Valentin, 474 Mass. 301, 306 (2016) 
("The critical questions are whether the weapons-related 
evidence is relevant and, if so, whether the probative value of 
the evidence is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial 
effect"). 
Because the victim was not shot with the firearm found in 
the apartment, and there was no evidence presented that the 
defendant even tried to access the second firearm before he shot 
the victim, the fact that the defendant may have owned a second 
firearm and ammunition "bears no relevance to whether he 
deliberated before he shot [the victim]."  Valentin, 474 Mass. 
at 306-307.  It was therefore error to admit it. 
8 
 
 
Although this extraneous firearm evidence created a risk 
that the jury would impermissibly infer that the defendant has a 
bad character or a propensity to commit the crime charged, see 
Commonwealth v. McGee, 467 Mass. 141, 156 (2014), there was no 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.  The jury heard 
ample evidence that the defendant committed premeditated murder, 
including the testimony from Fekeris that the defendant 
telephoned him to ask what type of automobile the victim drove 
and said, "I'm going to get that fucker," referring to the 
victim, and that the defendant telephoned Fekeris again 
approximately twenty minutes later and told him that he had 
"just merked" the victim. 
In light of the evidence establishing that the defendant 
entered the apartment intending to shoot the victim, we are 
substantially confident that the evidence of a second firearm 
and ammunition did not alter the jury's verdicts.  See 
Commonwealth v. Vasquez, 478 Mass. 443, 451 (2017), citing 
Commonwealth v. Montrond, 477 Mass. 127, 135-136 (2017).  There 
was no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Valentin, 474 Mass. at 308 (although unrelated weapons evidence 
was admitted improperly, there was no substantial likelihood of 
miscarriage of justice because jury heard "a vast quantity of 
evidence" that defendant committed crime, including "defendant's 
confess[ion] and expla[nation of] his motive to police"). 
9 
 
 
3.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant 
additionally contends that the prosecutor's closing argument 
impermissibly commented on the defendant's right to remain 
silent and misstated evidence, resulting in reversible error.  
Because defense counsel failed to raise these objections at 
trial, we now "consider whether any of the challenged statements 
was improper and, if so, whether it created a substantial 
likelihood of a miscarriage of justice."  Commonwealth v. 
Martinez, 476 Mass. 186, 198 (2017). 
 
a.  Burden shifting.  In response to the defendant's 
argument that he could not be guilty of the indictment charging 
home invasion because the apartment he entered was his own, the 
prosecutor suggested during closing argument that the defendant 
had no belongings in Fajardo's apartment other than the .25 
caliber firearm and ammunition found there:  "Did you hear about 
another piece of property of his that was in [the apartment] 
besides that gun?  I suggest you didn't . . . ."  Although there 
was no objection at trial, the defendant now argues that this 
rhetorical question and answer was a comment on the defendant's 
failure to offer evidence in his own defense. 
 
A defendant has the right not only to remain silent, but 
also "to remain passive, and to insist that the Commonwealth 
prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt without explanation or 
denial by him."  Commonwealth v. Grant, 418 Mass. 76, 83 (1994), 
10 
 
quoting Commonwealth v. Madeiros, 255 Mass. 304, 307 (1926).  
"[P]rosecutors should scrupulously avoid any statement that 
suggests that the defendant has any burden to produce evidence."  
Commonwealth v. McMahon, 443 Mass. 409, 419 (2005).  However, 
"[a] prosecutor is entitled to emphasize the strong points of 
the Commonwealth's case and the weaknesses of the defendant's 
case, even though he [or she] may, in so doing, prompt some 
collateral or passing reflection on the fact that the defendant 
declined to testify."  Commonwealth v. Nelson, 468 Mass. 1, 12 
(2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Feroli, 407 Mass. 405, 409 
(1990). 
 
Here, the prosecutor attempted to demonstrate the lack of 
evidence supporting the defendant's claim that he resided in 
Farjado's apartment.  See Commonwealth v. Storey, 378 Mass. 312, 
323-324 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 955 (1980) (rhetorical 
question highlighting general weakness of defense was not 
comment on defendant's failure to testify).  See also Nelson, 
468 Mass. at 13 (prosecutor's statements were not improper where 
they attempted to undercut defendant's claim that his wounds 
were defensive).  Although this portion of the prosecutor's 
closing does not rise to the level of reversible error, we 
nonetheless urge caution whenever the Commonwealth's comments 
could be construed as suggesting that the defendant was required 
to present evidence.  See McMahon, 443 Mass. at 419. 
11 
 
 
b.  Characterization of evidence.  During closing 
arguments, the prosecutor also argued that the defendant 
committed premeditated murder because he was "humiliated in 
front of his boys" as he waited all night outside of Fajardo's 
apartment "like a fool," while Fajardo and the victim were 
inside.  The defendant contends that, as part of that theory, 
the prosecutor unfairly depicted the defendant as something akin 
to a gang leader, referring to him multiple times as an "Alpha 
dog" and "leader of the pack" who "became a very significant 
person in that group of people that hung around there [together] 
. . . in Haverhill." 
 
While prosecutors may not misstate evidence in their 
closing arguments, Commonwealth v. Joyner, 467 Mass. 176, 188-
189 (2014), they are "entitled to argue forcefully for the 
defendant's conviction based on the evidence" (quotation 
omitted).  Commonwealth v. Lopes, 478 Mass. 593, 606 (2018), 
quoting Commonwealth v. Wilson, 427 Mass. 336, 350 (1998).  A 
prosecutor's use of "[e]nthusiatic rhetoric, strong advocacy, 
and excusable hyperbole" in a closing argument is permissible.  
Lopes, supra at 606-607. 
 
The prosecution's depiction of the defendant as the leader 
of the group was a fair comment on the testimony presented at 
trial.  That testimony demonstrated that the defendant and his 
group of friends all lived near each other and spent time 
12 
 
together almost daily.  Further, when the defendant needed 
something from these friends, they would do what he asked.  For 
example, when the defendant and Farjado were moving into their 
new apartment, the defendant's friends helped get the apartment 
ready before the move, painting and wallpapering the apartment, 
and when the defendant asked Fekeris a week before the murder to 
drive him to the airport and then to New York at the last 
minute, Fekeris gave him a ride. 
 
Although the prosecutor's description of the defendant as 
"leader of the pack" and "Alpha dog" may have been better left 
unsaid, it did not create a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Siny Van Tran, 460 
Mass. 535, 554 (2011) (description of crime as "mass execution" 
and "[o]ne of the worst and most violent days in the history of 
Boston" excusable hyperbole); Commonwealth v. Silva, 455 Mass. 
503, 515 (2009) ("prosecutor's description of the defendant's 
gun as a 'cannon'" was "enthusiastic rhetoric, strong advocacy, 
and excusable hyperbole" [citation omitted]). 
 
4.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Finally, the 
defendant asks us to exercise our extraordinary power to grant 
relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the record 
13 
 
in its entirety and see no basis to set aside or reduce the 
verdict of murder in the first degree.5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
                     
5 We note that Erik Koester, a former crime scene analyst at 
the State police crime laboratory, testified for the prosecution 
at the defendant's trial on June 15, 2010.  Koester supervised 
the team that collected evidence from the crime scene and tested 
several pieces of the evidence collected for traces of blood. 
 
In 2012, Koester's employer learned that Koester received 
"unsatisfactory" results on his 2010 crime scene proficiency 
test as a result of improperly measured blood spatter evidence.  
See Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 481 Mass. 189, 195 (2019).  
Although the record does not reveal whether Koester took the 
proficiency test prior to his testimony in this case, if he did, 
the test results received after trial would be considered newly 
available evidence.  See Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 
306 (1986) (newly discovered evidence must have been unknown to 
defense and not reasonably discoverable at time of trial). 
 
However, the discovery of such evidence requires a new 
trial only if "there is a substantial risk that the jury would 
have reached a different conclusion had the evidence been 
admitted at trial."  Id.  Here, Koester's role in the 
investigation had no impact on the central issue of the case, 
that is, whether the defendant committed premeditated murder or 
manslaughter.  Thus, even though the evidence could be 
considered impeachment material, the fact that the defendant did 
not have the benefit of it did not create a substantial risk of 
a miscarriage of justice.  See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 478 
Mass. 369, 383 (2017), quoting Commonwealth v. Lo, 428 Mass. 45, 
53 (1998) (denying motion for new trial based on Koester's 
performance deficiencies).  A new trial is not warranted on this 
basis.