Case Title: In the Matter of Arthur J. Walsh, et al.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2011-06-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 94  
In the Matter of Arthur J. Walsh, 
et al.,
            Respondents,
        v.
Anita S. Katz, et al.,
            Respondents,
Daniel C. Ross,
            Appellant.
(And a Third-Party Action.)
Appellant, pro se.
Frank A. Isler, for respondent Town of Southold.
Patrick B. Fife, for respondents Katz, et al.
JONES, J.:
At issue, in this proceeding pursuant to Election Law §
16-102, is the constitutionality of the residency requirement for
the elected position of town justice/town board member, Fishers
Island, Town of Southold, Suffolk County (L 1860, ch 113, § 2, as
amended by L 1898, ch 373, § 1, as further amended by L 1977, ch
276, § 1).  We hold that the residency requirement does not
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violate the equal protection clause.  In so holding, we conclude
that the requirement is subject to a rational basis test, and
that a rational basis exists to justify the requirement.
I.
Fishers Island is situated in the Town of Southold and
located approximately 11 miles off the North Fork of the eastern
coast of Long Island.  While the island is only about two miles
from the Connecticut coast, and has no direct ferry service to
the mainland portion of the Town, it has historically been part
of Southold in Suffolk County.  
The island is Election District 1 in the Town of
Southold.  According to data compiled from the 2000 United States
Census, a total of 20,599 individuals resided in Southold.  Of
this number, 289 individuals were residents of Fishers Island,
which represents approximately 1.5% of Southold's population.
In 1860, the State Legislature enacted a law providing
for a fifth justice of the peace for the Town of Southold (see L
1860, ch 113, § 2).  Pursuant to the law, the fifth justice of
the peace was required to reside either upon Fishers Island or
upon one of the islands adjacent thereto (id.).  At the time the
law was enacted, justices of the peace were also members of the
Southold Town Board.  The law was amended in 1898 to require the
fifth justice of the peace to reside on Fishers Island itself
(see L 1898, ch 373, § 1).
In 1976, pursuant to L 1976, ch 739, § 60-a, the
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Legislature eliminated the dual role and town justices no longer 
served on town boards.  This legislation had no effect on the 
requirement that the fifth justice reside on Fishers Island.  
In 1977, the Legislature reinstituted the dual town
justice/town board member position for Fishers Island and
continued the long-standing residency requirement (see L 1977, ch
276, § 1), as follows:
"There shall be elected at the meeting of the
Town of Southold in the County of Suffolk, to
be held in the spring of [1898], and every
four years thereafter, one town justice who
shall reside upon Fisher's island in said
town.  The justice so elected shall enter
upon the duties of his office at the
expiration of the term of office of his
predecessor, and shall hold his office for
four years.  Notwithstanding the provisions
of any other law, such town justice residing
upon Fisher's island shall, in addition to
his duties as town justice, serve as a member
of the Southold town board"
(id. [emphasis added]).1  The Bill Jacket accompanying Chapter
276 of the Laws of 1977 sets forth the Legislature's rationale in
support of this enactment.  It states, in pertinent part:
"The effect of the 1976 enactment is to
remove the Fishers Island town justice from
the Town Board and thus leave the people of
Fishers Island without any representation. 
Moreover, there is no direct transportation
between Fishers Island and the mainland of
the Town of Southold and therefore, it is
virtually impossible for the Fishers Island
residents to attend Town Board meetings.  It
has been the custom for the resident town
1 The 1977 legislation also replaced the "justice of the
peace" title with "town justice" (see M. Cuomo Mem [dated 6-6-
77], Bill Jacket, L 1977, ch 276).
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justice of Fishers Island to keep the
residents of the Island apprised of Town
matters as well as to present their views on
various issues which may concern them.  In
effect, the Fishers Island town justice, as a
member of the Town Board, has acted as the
link between Town government and the people
of Fishers Island.  It has been argued that
the effect of the 1976 amendment to the Town
Law is to deprive the residents of Fishers
Island from meaningful participation in Town
government"
(Sponsor's Mem, Bill Jacket, L 1977, ch 276; see also I. Evanick
Ltr [dated 6-2-77], id. [stating, "By operation of law the
residents of Fishers Island, who are in a unique geographical
position, will suffer the loss of meaningful representation. 
This legislation was intended to rectify this situation."]; M.
Cuomo Mem [dated 6-6-77], id. [Mem noted that application of the
1976 legislation to Southold would be "unfeasible" given the
"unusual circumstances" regarding Fishers Island's access to
Southold and the island's "limited population base," and stated
that "[r]epresentation on the town board is the primary
consideration."]).
Since 1977, there have been no further amendments to
the Fishers Island residency requirement for the elected position
of town justice/town board member, which position is elected in a
town-wide election.
II.
In July 2009, respondent Daniel C. Ross, a resident of
Southold but not a resident of Fishers Island, filed with the
Suffolk County Board of Elections (BOE) a petition designating
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himself a candidate in the September 2009 primary election for
the nomination of the Democratic Party as its candidate for the
Fishers Island town justice/town board member seat.  Petitioners
Arthur J. Walsh and Nina J. Schmid -- residents of Fishers Island
-- filed objections to the designating petition, alleging that it
was invalid because Ross did not meet the residency requirement. 
Respondents Anita S. Katz and Cathy L. Richter Geier, as
Commissioners of the BOE, denied the objections and upheld the
designating petition.
Petitioners commenced this Election Law proceeding
seeking to prohibit the BOE from placing Ross's name on the
ballot for the September 2009 primary election or the November
2009 general election based on Ross's failure to meet the
residency requirement.  Ross counterclaimed and, in effect,
cross-petitioned to validate the designating petition,
challenging, among other things, the constitutionality of the
residency requirement.  Ross also sought to join the Town of
Southold and the State of New York as parties.
Supreme Court denied the petition and dismissed the
proceeding, without prejudice, on the ground that Ross was not
required to meet the residency requirement until 30 days after
the commencement of the term of office -- in this case, by
January 30, 2010.  The Appellate Division modified the Supreme
Court order and upheld the constitutionality of the statute on
equal protection grounds (66 AD3d 1052 [2d Dept 2009]).  The
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court held that a rational basis standard was applicable, and
that a rational basis exists to support the Legislature's
determination that the fifth town justice/town board member for
Southold should be a resident of Fishers Island.  With respect to
Supreme Court's ruling that the prevailing candidate need not
abide by the residency requirement until 30 days after beginning
his or her term of office, the court modified Supreme Court's
order by holding that January 1, 2010 was the appropriate date by
which a candidate had to meet the residency requirement.
Ross appeals as of right, pursuant to CPLR 5601 (b) (1)
constitutional question grounds, as limited by his notice of
appeal, from that portion of the Appellate Division order that: 
(1) upheld the constitutionality of the Fishers Island residency
requirement; and (2) remitted the matter to Supreme Court for
entry of a judgment declaring that Ross did not establish that
the challenged law is unconstitutional.  Ross challenges the
residency requirement only as it applies to the position on the
Town Board of the Town of Southold.
Although Ross lost the November 2009 general election,
this appeal presents a live controversy.  Supreme Court converted
and continued Ross's constitutional claims as a declaratory
judgment action, and the Appellate Division decided the
constitutional issues.  Though no longer a candidate, Ross is a
voter who claims that his right to vote is being
unconstitutionally burdened.   
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III.
Ross argues that the Appellate Division improperly used
a rational basis standard, as opposed to a strict scrutiny
standard, in determining that the residency requirement was
constitutional.  He contends that the residency requirement is
subject to strict scrutiny because it affects fundamental
interests -- the right to run for public office and the right to
vote.  
Ross further argues that the residency requirement
violates equal protection guarantees by reserving one Town Board
seat to a group of people that make up less than 1.5% of the Town
of Southold's population.  He contends that every voter's
interest in being able to vote for this office is limited by the
residency requirement.  Relying on Reynolds v Sims (377 US 533
[1964]), Ross argues that the residency requirement violates the
constitutional right of a qualified voter not to have his/her
vote diluted.  According to Ross, even when the seat is
contested, the person who ultimately occupies the office must be
a Fishers Island resident; thereby creating a district within an
otherwise at-large town election system that violates the equal
protection provisions of the federal and state constitutions.  
Next, Ross argues there is no governmental interest
promoted by the residency requirement.  He maintains that the
reasons for the challenged legislation, which are set forth in
the Bill Jacket, are not compelling, and no rational bases
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No. 94
support the law.  We disagree with Ross's arguments.
Section 1 of the 14th Amendment to the Federal
Constitution provides in part that "[n]o State shall . . . deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."  The Federal Equal Protection Clause extends to the states
and their subdivisions (see e.g., Hunter v Erickson, 393 US 385
[1969]), and this Court has held that the State Constitution's
equal protection guarantee (NY Const, Art I, § 11 ["No person
shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or
any subdivision thereof"]) is as broad in its coverage as that of
the Fourteenth Amendment (see Golden v Clark, 76 NY2d 618, 624
[1990] [citations omitted]).
"[V]oting is of the most fundamental significance under
our constitutional structure" (Illinois Bd. of Elections v
Socialist Workers Party, 440 US 173, 184 [1979]); however, the
right to vote in any manner and the right to associate for
political purposes through the ballot are not absolute (see Munro
v Socialist Workers Party, 479 US 189, 193 [1986]).  States play
an active role in structuring and regulating their own elections
(see Tashjian v Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 US 208, 217
[1986]; Storer v Brown, 415 US 724, 730 [1974] ["[A]s a practical
matter, there must be . . . substantial [governmental] regulation
of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort
of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic
processes."]).  Moreover, because election laws invariably impose
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some burden upon individual voters (see Anderson v Celebrezze,
460 US 780, 788 [1983] ["whether [the voting regulation] governs
the registration and qualifications of voters, the selection and
eligibility of candidates, or the voting process itself, [the
regulation] inevitably affects -- at least to some degree -- the
individual's right to vote and his right to associate with others
for political ends"]), subjecting all voting regulations to
strict scrutiny, and requiring that the regulations be narrowly
tailored to advance a compelling state interest, could interfere
with the state's ability to ensure the fair and efficient
operation of elections.
Thus, a court considering an equal protection challenge
to a state election law must weigh "the character and magnitude
of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate"
against "the precise interests put forward by the State as
justifications for the burden imposed by its rule," taking into
consideration "the extent to which those interests make it
necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights" (Anderson, 460 US at
789; Tashjian, 479 US at 213-214).  In sum, a court's inquiry
into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the
extent to which a challenged regulation directly infringes upon
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The direct impact of the Fishers Island residency
requirement is not on one's right to vote, but on an individual's
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right to be a candidate for public office.  Although "laws that
affect candidates always have at least some theoretical,
correlative effect on voters . . . not every limitation or
incidental burden on the exercise of voting rights is subject to
a stringent standard of review" (Bullock v Carter, 405 US 134,
143 [1972]).  That is, the mere fact that a state election law
"creates barriers . . . tending to limit the field of candidates
from which voters might choose . . . does not of itself compel
close scrutiny" (id.; see Galbraith v New York Conservative
Party, 155 AD2d 183, 185-186 [3d Dept 1990] [the right to run for
elective office is not fundamental]).2
Ross cannot point to a residency requirement case that
supports his position.  Instead, he argues that this case should
be considered under the analysis applied in apportionment cases
which involve the "one person, one vote" principle.  However,
Ross's reliance on these cases in support for stringent review of
the residency requirement is misplaced.  In the apportionment
cases cited by Ross, there were disproportionate numbers of
voters in two districts, where each district directly elected its
own representative.  This resulted in unequal voting power
between the two groups of voters, and the Supreme Court found
2 Strict scrutiny has been held applicable to ballot access
cases involving restrictions based on wealth or restrictions that
impose special burdens on new or small political parties or
independent candidates (see Golden v Clark, 76 NY2d at 624-626
[citations omitted]).
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that the citizens' votes had been diluted (see Reynolds v Sims,
supra; Hadley v Junior College District 397 US 50 [1970]; New
York City Bd. of Estimate v Morris, 489 US 688 [1989]).
Here, the challenged residency requirement imposes only
reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights of the voters of the Town of
Southold.  Since all Town Board members are elected in a town-
wide election, the voters are not unduly restricted in their
choice of candidates for Town Board positions.  As a result, all
Southold voters may vote in the elections for all six Town Board
positions, including the position reserved for the Fishers Island
town justice.  Stated differently, each citizen of the Town has
an equal vote as they are all entitled to vote for the town
justice/town board seat.  
Further, the residency requirement does not require a
candidate to be a resident of Fishers Island prior to
commencement of his/her term of office.  In other words, the
winner of the town justice/town board position does not need to
establish residency on Fishers Island until the beginning of
his/her term, and must only retain that residency for the
duration of the term.  Thus, any Southold resident who would
otherwise be eligible to run for political office can run for the
Fishers Island seat.
Notably, the United States Supreme Court has addressed
similar residency requirements in Dusch v Davis (387 US 112
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[1967]) and Dallas County, Alabama v Reese (421 US 477 [1975]). 
In Dusch and Dallas County, the Supreme Court rejected equal
protection challenges, upholding electoral plans in which
candidates were required to be residents of specific geographic
areas within a larger political unit so long as all of the voters
in the larger political unit were allowed to vote for each
candidate.  The Supreme Court recognized that a state has a
legitimate interest in assuring an elected representative is
familiar with the unique problems of a specific geographic area,
and rejected the idea that numerical variances between political
units, standing alone, are sufficient to make out an equal
protection challenge in such cases.
Dusch involved an election plan for city council under
which four members were elected at large, without regard to
residence, and seven members, subject to a residency requirement,
were elected by voters of the entire city.  Each one of the seven
members was required to live in one of the seven boroughs of the
city.  The Supreme Court held that the election plan did not
constitute invidious discrimination violative of the equal
protection clause even though the populations of the seven
boroughs varied from less than 1,000 (i.e., 733) to nearly 30,000
(i.e., 29,048), and where the plan made no distinction based on
race, creed, economic status or location.  
In Dallas County, the Alabama State Legislature
established a system for the election of members of the county
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commission of Dallas County, Alabama.  The system provided for
county-wide balloting for each of the four commission members but
required that a member be elected from each of four residency
districts.  The Supreme Court held that the system was not
unconstitutional even though the populations of the four
districts varied widely.  The Court determined that to establish
the unconstitutionality of such an election plan, the challenge
must be based on findings showing that the plan impermissibly
dilutes the voting strength of an identifiable element of the
voting population.
The Supreme Court also reiterated a basic teaching of
representative government that it discussed previously in Dusch
(387 US at 115) and Fortson v Dorsey, 379 US 433, 438 [1965]),
"that elected officials represent all of those who elect them,
and not merely those who are their neighbors" (Dallas County, 421
US at 480).  Applying this principle here, since the Fishers
Island seat is subject to a town-wide vote, the individual
elected to fill the seat represents the entire town, not just the
residents of Fishers Island.  Thus, Ross's contention that the
residency requirement gives the people of Fishers Island a
permanent advantage of greater representation is unavailing.  
Based on the foregoing, we agree with the Appellate
Division that the rational basis approach is the proper standard
of review in the present case.  There is no direct and
appreciable impact on Southold's residents' right to vote.  Nor
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has an identifiable class within the Town been disenfranchised. 
To be sure, the Fishers Island residency requirement affects the
right to vote, but only in an incidental and remote way.  This
statutory provision does not rise to a level which would require
that it be subject to strict scrutiny.
We further conclude, as did the Appellate Division,
that the Fishers Island residency requirement satisfies the
rational basis test.  In particular, the legislative history of
the residency requirement, discussed supra, articulates several
rational bases for the residency requirement and retaining the
dual town justice/town board member seat -- e.g., the main
purpose of the legislation is to ensure that the residents of
Fishers Island are not deprived of meaningful representation in
Town government (see Sponsor's Mem, Bill Jacket, L 1977, ch 276).
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division,
insofar as appealed from, should be affirmed, without costs.
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order, insofar as appealed from, affirmed, without costs.
Opinion by Judge Jones.  Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Ciparick,
Graffeo, Read, Smith and Pigott concur.
Decided June 2, 2011
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