Case Title: Commonwealth v. Muller

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11176

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2017-07-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11176 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  CHRISTIAN MULLER. 
 
 
 
Worcester.     December 9, 2016. - July 11, 2017. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Hines, & Gaziano, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Armed Assault with Intent to Murder.  Armed Home 
Invasion.  Firearms.  Mental Impairment.  Insanity.  
Intoxication.  Evidence, Insanity, Intoxication.  Practice, 
Criminal, Capital case, Instructions to jury, Argument by 
prosecutor. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on August 23, 2007. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Richard T. Tucker, J. 
 
 
 
Deirdre L. Thurber for the defendant. 
 
Susan M. Oftring, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
HINES, J.  During an armed home invasion of an apartment in 
Dudley, the defendant, Christian Muller, and an accomplice1 shot 
and killed two of the occupants and critically wounded a third.  
                     
1 According to the Commonwealth, the accomplice ultimately 
pleaded guilty to several charges. 
2 
 
After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of two counts of 
murder in the first degree, on the theories of deliberate 
premeditation and felony-murder,2 armed assault with intent to 
murder, armed home invasion and unlawful possession of a 
firearm. 
At trial, the defendant admitted that he had shot the 
victims; his primary defense was that he lacked criminal 
responsibility because of mental illness and cocaine addiction.  
On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the jury instruction on 
criminal responsibility and voluntary intoxication was erroneous 
because it failed to comply with Commonwealth v. Berry, 457 
Mass. 602 (2010), S.C., 466 Mass. 763 (2014), and Commonwealth 
v. DiPadova, 460 Mass. 424 (2011); (2) certain of the other jury 
instructions were fatally flawed; and (3) the prosecutor's 
closing argument was improper.  We affirm the convictions and 
decline to grant relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
 
Background.  1.  The trial.  We summarize the facts as the 
jury could have found them, reserving additional details for 
later discussion. 
 
a.  The Commonwealth's case.  On the evening of July 8, 
2007, Joanne Mercier was in her bedroom in the third-floor 
apartment that she shared with her brother, Aaron Bash, in 
                     
 
2 The predicate felony for Muller's convictions of felony-
murder in the first degree was armed home invasion. 
3 
 
Dudley.  Bash was asleep in his bedroom and their friend, Denise 
Johnston, was sleeping on a sofa in the living room.  Shortly 
after midnight on July 9, the defendant and Marc Letang kicked 
down the back door and entered the apartment with their guns 
drawn.3  The men walked through the kitchen and entered Mercier's 
bedroom, asking where Bash was.  After Mercier told them that 
Bash was asleep in his bedroom, the men left Mercier's room and 
awoke Bash.  As Mercier followed the men into Bash's bedroom, 
she heard the defendant asking Bash whether he was sleeping with 
the defendant's wife.  Bash denied the accusation. 
 
Letang went into the living room and brought Johnston into 
Bash's bedroom at the defendant's request.  The defendant was at 
the foot of the bed facing the victims, who were all sitting on 
the bed, while Letang stood in the corner of the room.  The 
defendant continued to accuse Bash of sleeping with his wife and 
Bash repeatedly denied it, stating that he would not do that to 
his friend.  Finally, the defendant told Bash that if he just 
admitted it and told the defendant what he wanted to hear, this 
would all be over.  When Bash refused to admit to the 
defendant's accusations, the defendant said, "Fuck this," and 
                     
 
3 Earlier in the evening of July 8, 2007, the defendant 
attempted to gain entry into Aaron Bash and Joanne Mercier's 
apartment, looking for Bash.  The defendant was banging on the 
door and calling Bash's name; Bash told Mercier not to answer 
the door, and eventually the defendant left without further 
incident. 
4 
 
shot Johnston in the head.  As Bash asked the defendant, "What 
the eff are you doing?" the defendant shot Mercier in the head.  
When Mercier regained consciousness a few minutes later, she 
realized that the defendant and Letang were gone, and discovered 
that Johnston was still breathing despite the gunshot to her 
head. 
 
Mercier had not yet comprehended that she had been shot, 
but knew she needed to call an ambulance for Johnston.  She 
retrieved her cellular telephone and then called to Bash.  When 
Bash failed to answer her, she looked him and saw that he had 
been fatally shot in the head.  Mercier was so distraught that 
she had to telephone 911 twice because, at first, she could not 
remember where she was. 
 
Shortly after midnight on July 9, 2007, a patron was 
leaving a nearby bar when he heard five to seven loud noises he 
assumed were fireworks.  Approximately one minute later, he 
observed two men, whom he was able to describe, running around 
the corner; one of the men was carrying a firearm.  The witness 
heard someone say, "Go.  Let's go," as the men got into a 
vehicle and drove away. 
 
When officers entered the apartment, they observed Mercier 
conscious and bleeding from her head.  She was in shock, crying 
and "yelling things," but was able to communicate that 
"Christian" shot her. 
5 
 
Officers then discovered Bash and Johnston.  Bash was found 
on the bed; he was dead from two gunshot wounds to his head.  
Johnston was found near the end of the bed, but she appeared to 
be alive.  She later died at a hospital of a gunshot wound to 
her head. 
 
Right before the shootings, the defendant and Letang had 
been at the home of a friend of the defendant, who lived in 
Webster; a woman and a man were also there.  Both the woman and 
the defendant had been smoking "crack" cocaine.  The woman 
testified that the more "crack" the defendant smoked, the more 
"crazy" he became.  The defendant was agitated; he was pacing 
back and forth, waving his gun around, saying that he was going 
to put bullets in their heads.  He also said that Bash owed him 
money for drugs and that Mercier was "just a stupid bitch."4  
Prior to leaving the house, the defendant said he was going to 
"take care of some business" and left with his firearm. 
 
The defendant and Letang returned to the friend's home.  
They came running up the stairs, saying that they had just 
murdered some people.  The defendant and Letang told the woman 
that if she said anything about their involvement in the murders 
that they would "put a cap in her head."  There was discussion 
                     
 
4 Until one week prior to the shootings, the defendant and 
Mercier had been in a short romantic relationship outside the 
defendant's marriage.  Mercier ended the relationship because 
the defendant became angry with her; when she left in a vehicle 
without him, he fired a gun at the vehicle. 
6 
 
about killing the woman because she knew and had seen too much.  
The defendant eventually went outside the house and demanded 
that the woman join him.  He was pacing in the road with his 
firearm, telling the woman both that he did not mean to do it 
and that he did not commit the murders.  Ultimately, however, 
the defendant told her that he "shot the motherfucker," 
referring to Bash, and that he put the three victims on the bed 
and shot them execution style.  He put the gun to the woman's 
head several times, threatening to shoot her in the head if she 
said anything about his involvement in the murders. 
 
The woman and the defendant walked down the street where 
the defendant stopped to hide his gun, which the defense 
stipulated was used to shoot the victims, in the cellar of a 
home.  He warned the woman not to tell anyone where he hid the 
gun.  Next, they walked to the defendant's parents' home, where 
he changed out of his bloody clothing.  Finally, they walked 
through town and ended up back at the friend's home where they 
slept until later that morning. 
 
When they woke up, the police had the house surrounded.  
The defendant got up, saying, "I didn't do it," as he left the 
house and ran into some woods behind the home, where he was 
arrested. 
 
The defendant was interviewed by two State police troopers 
at the Dudley police department.  Although the defendant 
7 
 
initially declined to speak with the officers, after he spoke to 
his wife and mother, he agreed to the interview.  The defendant 
admitted that he was in Webster the night before and "smoked a 
bunch of crack," but initially denied seeing Bash. 
 
However, after the defendant figured out that Mercier had 
survived and was told that the police had found his gun, he 
admitted to committing the shootings and stated that he knew he 
was going to jail.  The defendant stated that he had been doing 
a lot of drugs that night, and after "the gun went off" and he 
shot Johnston, he thought, "If I leave them alive, I'm going to 
jail for my life, so I [shot Bash and Mercier]." 
 
He also told the officers, "When I'm on drugs, I see . . . 
lots of things.  I get real crazy.  I hallucinate . . . I have 
psych attacks.  I get rages.  I am a different total person."  
The defendant told the officers that he was off his medications 
and that he was bipolar and schizophrenic, had anxiety, and 
suffered from panic attacks and paranoia.  He also noted that 
when he is off his medication, he gets even more paranoid and 
goes "cuckoo." 
 
b.  The defendant's case.  The defendant offered five 
witnesses in support of his lack of criminal responsibility 
defense, including three expert witnesses. 
 
i.  Dr. Giulia Mezzacappa.  Mezzacappa, a clinical 
psychiatrist, evaluated the defendant at an organization 
8 
 
providing mental health services, in February and June, 2006, 
one year before the murders.5  As part of her psychiatric 
evaluation of the defendant, Mezzacappa also interviewed the 
defendant's family, including his wife, sister, stepfather, and 
mother.  Based on Mezzacappa's evaluation of the defendant and 
interviews with his family, Mezzacappa diagnosed the defendant 
with schizoaffective disorder.6  At the time of Mezzacappa's 
February, 2006, evaluation, the defendant had stopped taking his 
prescribed antipsychotic and anxiety medications.  As a result 
of her evaluation, Mezzacappa prescribed an antipsychotic mood 
stabilizer.  During his evaluations, the defendant and his 
family freely reported the defendant's use of heroin, marijuana, 
and "crack" cocaine. 
 
Mezzacappa opined that "substance abuse can definitely 
worsen any mental illness, especially a psychotic disorder or 
mood disorder," and agreed that drug usage can also trigger 
                     
 
5 Dr. Giulia Mezzacappa estimated that she saw the defendant 
no more than three times in 2006, for a total of approximately 
two to two and one-half hours. 
 
 
6 Mezzacappa defined schizoaffective disorder as "a chronic 
mental illness that's characterized by recurrent episodes of 
affective symptoms, either depression or mania or a mixed state, 
and chronic psychotic symptoms, like hallucination, delusional 
ideation, or thought disorder."  She further defined psychotic 
symptoms as "hallucination, abnormal perception, sensory 
perception, that don't correspond to reality, such as hearing 
voices or seeing things that are not there, or physical 
sensation that is not related to anything realistic.  There is 
an ideation or fixed beliefs that don't correspond to reality." 
9 
 
psychotic effects in an individual suffering from a mental 
disease or defect.  She noted that she had no reason to believe 
that the defendant was exaggerating his symptoms or malingering, 
especially where his family also supported his history.  
Nonetheless, she did believe that the defendant was aware of the 
effect drugs like cocaine and heroin had on him, although she 
could not opine as to the degree of his knowledge.  Finally, 
Mezzacappa had no opinion as to whether the defendant was 
criminally responsible for his actions at the time of the 
murders. 
 
ii.  Dr. Hanya Bluestone.  Bluestone, a forensic 
psychologist employed by the courts, evaluated the defendant's 
competence to stand trial and criminal responsibility, pursuant 
to G. L. c. 123, § 15 (a), on July 10, 2007.  In order to 
evaluate the defendant's competence and criminal responsibility, 
Bluestone spoke with the defendant and reviewed his court clinic 
file, which contained a prior competency evaluation conducted by 
a colleague of Bluestone's, an evaluation regarding the 
defendant's need for involuntary commitment for substance abuse 
treatment in 2006, and the police report for killings.  She also 
spoke with Mezzacappa regarding the defendant's psychiatric 
treatment in 2006. 
 
During Bluestone's evaluation, the defendant had some 
difficulty recalling dates and placing events in time, and he 
10 
 
expressed some paranoia and persecutory ideation.  Bluestone was 
concerned about psychotic symptoms the defendant reported, 
especially command auditory hallucinations, which he said 
commanded him to commit violent acts.  She also noted that the 
defendant's psychotic symptoms were consistent with his prior 
evaluations.  She could not, however, determine the etiology of 
the defendant's psychotic symptoms -- whether those symptoms 
were primarily related to a mental illness or to the defendant's 
ongoing and varied substance abuse -- because his symptoms were 
consistent with mental illness and substance abuse and 
withdrawal from substance abuse.  Bluestone concluded that based 
on the defendant's symptoms during her evaluation alone, he 
should be further evaluated in Bridgewater State Hospital 
(Bridgewater).7  She did not offer an opinion regarding the 
defendant's criminal responsibility. 
 
iii.  Dr. Paul A. Spiers.  Spiers, a neuropsychologist,8 
evaluated the defendant for his competence to stand trial and 
                     
 
7 Dr. Hanya Bluestone interviewed the defendant for 
approximately forty minutes, and she spent an additional eight 
hours preparing his competency evaluation.  In addition to her 
interview with the defendant, Bluestone also spoke with the 
defendant's wife, who reported that when the defendant was using 
illicit drugs, his mental illness would get out of control and 
he would emotionally and physically abuse her.  His wife opined 
that the defendant used illicit drugs to manage the symptoms of 
his mental illness. 
 
 
8 Dr. Paul A. Spiers defined "neuropsychology" as "an 
investigation of the relationship between the brain and 
11 
 
criminal responsibility in April, 2009.9  In preparation for his 
evaluation of the defendant, Spiers reviewed the defendant's 
records from the Department of Youth Services and the Department 
of Social Services, school records, prior psychiatric treatment 
notes, and records from the defendant's prior incarcerations.  
He also reviewed expert reports regarding the defendant's 
competence and criminal responsibility created for the trial, 
including reports from Bridgewater and a corresponding 
evaluation from a clinical psychologist on staff at Bridgewater, 
and the videotape of the defendant's interview with the State 
police.  He also administered neuropsychological tests to 
determine whether the defendant's neuropsychological functioning 
was appropriate. 
 
Spiers determined that the defendant was deficient in many 
critical areas, such as reading ability and vocabulary, which 
invalidated some of the testing results, because of the danger 
of false positive results.  Specifically, Spiers noted that 
tests, such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory 
(MMPI), were inappropriate for the defendant, because it 
required the test-taker to possess a seventh or eighth grade 
                                                                  
behavior. . . . [the brain is] responsible for all our 
interactions with the world around us.  It's responsible for all 
of our behavior, and it's responsible for how we understand and 
control our behavior." 
 
 
9 Spiers met with the defendant once, for two or three hours 
in April, 2009, to conduct his evaluation. 
12 
 
reading level, which the defendant did not have.  Spiers further 
noted that the MMPI is made up of 560 true or false questions, 
which help evaluators not only to diagnose psychological 
disorders but also to gauge effort and malingering, based on how 
the test-taker answered the questions.  The defendant had been 
evaluated previously using the MMPI and other tests, the results 
of which led another psychologist to conclude that the defendant 
was a malingerer and that he exaggerated his symptoms at 
Bridgewater in 2007.  Spiers noted, however, that although he 
agreed with the methodology of the defendant's previous testing, 
he took issue with the conclusions regarding that testing 
because of the defendant's intellectual limitations. 
 
Spiers concluded that the defendant showed evidence of 
defective functioning in the left frontal lobe of his brain,10 
such that he would experience difficulty with reasoning and 
controlling his behavior.  In Spiers's opinion, the defendant 
continues to have the neurodevelopmental deficits he had as a 
child and young adult, including oppositional defiant disorder 
and attention deficit disorder.  As a result of the defendant's 
neurodevelopmental deficits, mental illness, and his drug 
intoxication, Spiers opined that at the time of the shootings, 
                     
 
10 Spiers concluded that the defendant had defective 
functioning in the frontal lobe of his brain, but Spiers did not 
have the benefit of functional magnetic resonance imaging of the 
defendant's brain in aid of his diagnosis. 
13 
 
the defendant was unable to conform his behavior to the 
requirements of the law, and thus was not criminally 
responsible.11  Spiers further opined that it was highly probable 
that because of the defendant's mental illness, the defendant 
could not form the specific intent to commit murder under 
theories of premeditation or extreme atrocity or cruelty, or to 
commit an assault with intent to murder. 
 
iv.  The defendant's family.  The defendant's wife and his 
cousin testified regarding their experiences with the 
defendant's mental illness and drug addiction.  The defendant's 
wife testified that in 2007, the defendant was receiving Social 
Security disability benefits for his mental disabilities.  She 
described the defendant as very mean, angry, and abusive when he 
was using drugs12 and stated that he did not take his 
prescription medications when he consumed illegal drugs.  His 
wife said that the defendant was taking heroin, "crack" cocaine, 
and pills, such as OxyContin, Percocet, and Vicodin.  Two weeks 
prior to the shootings, his wife barred the defendant from the 
family home because he was consuming a large amount of illegal 
                     
 
11 Spiers opined that at the time of the shootings, the 
defendant had substantial capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct. 
 
 
12 The defendant's wife testified, however, that when the 
defendant was on his medication and not taking illegal drugs he 
was a good father and would participate fully in taking care of 
their children and the household, and maintained a close 
relationship with their extended families. 
14 
 
drugs and was accusing her of cheating on him.13  The defendant 
attempted to come back home five or six times during the two-
week period, but she refused unless the defendant sought help 
for his drug addiction.  The defendant's wife also stated that 
on four or five occasions throughout their marriage, she 
observed the defendant talking to himself and when she asked who 
he was talking to, he answered, "his friends," although no one 
else was present; this occurred whether or not he was on 
medication. 
 
The defendant's cousin testified that the defendant began 
exhibiting symptoms of mental illness after his father died when 
the defendant was twelve or thirteen years of age.  He became 
untrusting and had behavior issues.  The defendant began to use 
illegal drugs during this time period as well.  Approximately 
one or two days before the shootings, the defendant visited his 
cousin, who testified that the defendant was "binging" drugs and 
that the defendant told him that he had not slept or eaten in 
days.  His cousin fed the defendant and noted that he was having 
a conversation with himself.  His cousin had observed similar 
behavior from the defendant on countless occasions since their 
teenage years. 
                     
 
13 In 2006, the defendant was admitted to a substance abuse 
treatment center after his wife filed a petition to have him 
involuntarily committed pursuant to G. L. c. 123, § 35.  He had 
been previously treated for substance abuse at other in-patient 
facilities without sustained success. 
15 
 
 
In his cousin's opinion, there was a drastic difference in 
the defendant's personality when he was taking his antipsychotic 
medications and off illegal drugs.  The defendant appeared to be 
unstable while using drugs.  The defendant's cousin also stated 
that the defendant did not seem to remember what he did when he 
was abusing drugs, and his cousin would have to recount the 
defendant's activities to him.  Finally, his cousin stated that 
while on drugs, the defendant held objectively untrue beliefs 
about those close to him, especially his wife. 
 
c.  The Commonwealth's rebuttal expert.  Dr. Karin Towers, 
a forensic psychologist and attorney, first evaluated the 
defendant in July and August, 2007, for competency to stand 
trial and criminal responsibility, during his forty-day 
hospitalization at Bridgewater, and again during the summer of 
2010 for the purposes of a criminal responsibility evaluation.  
During his hospitalization at Bridgewater in 2007, Towers and 
other staff members administered psychological tests to the 
defendant.  Towers deemed the defendant's MMPI and Structured 
Interview of Reported Symptoms test results invalid because his 
answers demonstrated that he was malingering and exaggerating 
symptoms.  Observations from Towers and other staff members 
confirmed the test results.14 
                     
 
14 During the defendant's forty-day hospitalization at 
Bridgewater State Hospital, he admitted to making an insincere 
16 
 
 
Towers concluded that the defendant's answers demonstrated 
an unsophisticated attempt to appear to have more symptoms than 
he was genuinely experiencing.  She was unable to make a 
definitive mental illness diagnosis because of the defendant's 
exaggerated or feigned symptoms and his lengthy history of 
illegal drug abuse.  She stated that, in these circumstances, it 
can be more difficult to assess whether a patient actually has a 
mental illness, whether the symptoms are caused by illegal drug 
use, or whether there is an underlying mental illness that has 
been triggered or exacerbated by the drug use. 
 
After viewing the videotape of the defendant's police 
interview, Towers concluded that the defendant exhibited 
volitional behavior, meaning that the defendant was aware of his 
surroundings and circumstances, was able to advocate for 
himself, and could assert his wishes.  Towers opined that the 
defendant clearly met the criteria for antisocial personality 
disorder and that he very likely had some sort of psychotic 
disorder, or substance abuse-induced psychotic disorder.  Towers 
further opined that the defendant was criminally responsible for 
his acts on July 8-9, 2007, despite the fact that he was likely 
experiencing psychological symptoms, because his symptoms did 
                                                                  
suicidal gesture because he was unhappy with the medications 
prescribed by his treating psychiatrist.  Additionally, Towers 
and other staff members interpreted his behavior, in which he 
grossly exaggerated his symptoms, as drug-seeking behavior. 
17 
 
not interfere with his ability to either appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his behavior to the 
requirements of the law.15 
 
2.  Discussion.  On appeal, the defendant (1) challenges 
the jury instructions on criminal responsibility as inconsistent 
with the law governing the interplay between mental illness and 
the voluntary consumption of drugs or alcohol; (2) argues that 
certain of the other jury instructions were flawed; (3) contends 
that the Commonwealth's closing argument was improper; and (4) 
requests that we exercise our power pursuant to G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, to reverse his convictions and either order a new trial 
or enter judgments of not guilty by reason of lack of criminal 
responsibility.  We address each argument in turn. 
 
a.  Criminal responsibility and voluntary intoxication 
instructions.  The defendant argues that the judge’s 
instructions on criminal responsibility were erroneous in 
failing to comport with Berry and DiPadova.16  Although the 
                     
 
15 Towers noted a number of factors that were significant in 
rendering her opinion regarding the defendant's ability to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.  He decided 
to shoot Bash and Mercier, after he initially shot Johnston, to 
avoid leaving witnesses; he was able to control his behavior, 
such as when he left the scene of the crime; and he acted to 
avoid apprehension in threatening the woman who was at his 
friend's house, hiding the gun, and changing his clothing. 
 
16 The defendant is entitled to the benefit of Commonwealth 
v. Berry, 457 Mass. 602 (2010), S.C., 466 Mass. 763 (2014); and 
Commonwealth v. DiPadova, 460 Mass. 424 (2011), because his 
18 
 
defendant's challenge to this aspect of the jury instructions 
lacks precision, it appears to be based on a claim that the 
judge erroneously charged the jury to consider whether the 
defense of lack of criminal responsibility was vitiated by the 
defendant's knowledge that his voluntary consumption of drugs or 
alcohol would activate a "latent" mental disease or defect.  We 
discern no error in the instructions on that ground.  We 
conclude, however, that the judge's instructions were erroneous 
in failing to clarify, as required in Berry, that the voluntary 
consumption of drugs or alcohol does not preclude the defense of 
lack of criminal responsibility where the mental disease or 
defect, standing alone, causes the defendant to lose the 
substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the 
law.  Berry, 457 Mass. at 618.  Notwithstanding the error, 
reversal is not required. 
We briefly summarize the governing principles of law as 
background for our analysis of the defendant's claims of error.  
In Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544 (1967), we established 
the basic principle of law for determining criminal 
responsibility.  We held that a defendant is not criminally 
                                                                  
trial commenced approximately seven months after Berry was 
released, and his direct appeal was pending when DiPadova was 
released.  See Commonwealth v. Johnston, 467 Mass. 674, 704 
(2014). 
19 
 
responsible for his actions if, as a result of a mental disease 
or defect, he lacked the substantial capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his conduct or conform his behavior to the 
requirements of the law.  Id. at 546-547.  Since McHoul, our 
cases have evolved, addressing the impact of a defendant's 
voluntary consumption of drugs or alcohol on criminal 
responsibility.  In Commonwealth v. McGrath, 358 Mass. 314, 319-
320 (1970), we emphasized that a mental disease or defect is the 
sine qua non of a lack of criminal responsibility defense, 
holding that the defense is not available where the defendant's 
loss of the substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness 
of his conduct or conform his behavior to the requirements of 
the law is caused by the voluntary consumption of drugs or 
alcohol as opposed to a mental disease or defect.  Later cases 
affirmed the necessity of a causal relationship between a mental 
disease or defect and lack of criminal responsibility.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Sheehan, 376 Mass. 765, 767 (1978). 
 
In Berry, we revisited the relationship between the 
defendant's voluntary consumption of drugs or alcohol and lack 
of criminal responsibility.  We set forth jury instructions that 
included a provision that allowed for a defense of lack of 
criminal responsibility even where the defendant voluntarily 
consumed drugs or alcohol:  "Where a defendant has an active 
mental disease or defect that caused [him] to lose the 
20 
 
substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of [his] 
conduct or the substantial capacity to conform [his] conduct to 
the requirements of the law, the defendant's consumption of 
alcohol or another drug cannot preclude the defense of lack of 
criminal responsibility."  Berry, 457 Mass. at 618.  In 
DiPadova, 460 Mass. at 432, we considered again the interplay 
between a mental disease or defect that, unlike in Berry, did 
not independently cause the defendant to lack criminal 
responsibility, and the voluntary consumption of drugs and 
alcohol.  We clarified that in these circumstances, the defense 
is available but only if the defendant lacked knowledge that the 
voluntary consumption of drugs or alcohol would trigger a 
"latent"17 mental disease or defect that would cause him to lack 
criminal responsibility.  Id. 
Here, the judge gave the following instruction regarding 
the impact of the voluntary consumption of drugs or alcohol on 
the defendant's entitlement to a lack of criminal responsibility 
defense: 
 
"The issue has been raised that the defendant may not 
have been criminally responsible for his alleged actions 
due to his use of drugs or alcohol.  Voluntary intoxication 
with drugs or alcohol is not by itself a mental disease or 
                     
 
17 Here, in making the reference to a "latent" mental 
disease or defect, the judge did not have the benefit of our 
caution in DiPadova, 460 Mass. at 432 n.10, that "the use of 
such terms ['latent' and 'activation'], particularly in jury 
instructions, may be confusing."  In any event, the use of the 
terms did not constitute error. 
21 
 
defect that will support a verdict of not guilty by reason 
of insanity.  The normal consequences of drug and alcohol 
addiction are not a basis for relieving a defendant of 
criminal responsibility.  However, there may be situations 
where a defendant who is addicted to drugs or alcohol might 
have a defense of lack of criminal responsibility available 
to him.  You may consider whether the defendant had a 
mental disease or defect, apart from his drug or alcohol 
addiction, such that he lacked substantial capacity at the 
time of his crime to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law. 
 
 
"In addition, you may consider whether the defendant's 
voluntary consumption of drugs or alcohol activated a 
latent mental disease or defect apart from the addiction 
itself.  If as a result of the activation of that latent 
mental disease or defect, the defendant lost the 
substantial capacity to understand the wrongfulness of his 
conduct . . . or to conform his conduct to the requirements 
of the law, the defendant would lack criminal 
responsibility.  However, if the defendant knew or 
subjectively had reason to know under the circumstances 
that his use of drugs or alcohol would activate the latent 
mental disease or defect, he may not rely on that disease 
or defect to assert lack of criminal responsibility.  In 
deciding what the defendant subjectively had reason to 
know, you should consider the question solely from the 
defendant's point of view, including his mental capacity. 
 
 
"Thus, if the Commonwealth has proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant knew or had reason to 
know that his consumption of alcohol or drugs would 
activate a mental disease or defect, then you must find 
that the defendant was criminally responsible for his 
actions.  It is not necessary that the defendant knew or 
had reason to know that he had a mental disease or defect, 
as long as he knew that his voluntary consumption of drugs 
or alcohol would trigger inappropriate conduct." 
 
 
As the Commonwealth notes, the jury instructions 
substantially comported with the generally accepted Superior 
Court jury instructions for explaining the impact of the 
voluntary consumption of drugs or alcohol on criminal 
22 
 
responsibility.  See Massachusetts Superior Court Criminal 
Practice Jury Instructions, §§ 3.1, 3.1.1(b) (Mass. Cont. Legal 
Educ. 1999 & supp. 2003).  The defendant, however, takes issue 
with this instruction, claiming that the reference to a "latent" 
mental disease or defect was improper under DiPadova in the 
absence of evidence that the defendant knew of the effect of 
drugs or alcohol on his mental illness and that it was otherwise 
inconsistent with Berry. 
 
The defendant's argument that the instructions were 
erroneous under DiPadova fails.  The Commonwealth presented 
ample evidence that the defendant knew his consumption of drugs 
would exacerbate the symptoms of his mental illness, especially 
in his confession to police.  See DiPadova, 460 Mass. at 436-
437.  Thus, we discern no error in this aspect of the judge's 
instructions. 
For reasons unknown, however, the judge and parties failed 
to avail themselves of the revised instruction in Berry.  
Although the judge correctly instructed the jury to "consider 
whether the defendant had a mental disease or defect, apart from 
his drug or alcohol addiction, such that he lacked substantial 
capacity at the time of the crime to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law," he neglected to inform the jury that 
in such a case, the defendant's consumption of alcohol or 
another drug cannot preclude the defense of lack of criminal 
23 
 
responsibility.  Thus, the failure to instruct in accordance 
with Berry was error.  See Berry, 457 Mass. at 617-618. 
 
Because the defendant did not object to the jury charge on 
this ground (or raise the issue in his brief), we review the 
error for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  
See id. at 618.  "In analyzing a claim under the substantial 
likelihood standard, we review the evidence and case as a whole 
and consider whether any error made in the course of the trial 
was likely to have influenced the jury's conclusion."  Id., 
citing Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Mass. 678, 682 (1992).  We 
conclude that the erroneous jury instructions regarding the 
impact of voluntary consumption of drugs on the lack of criminal 
responsibility defense did not create a substantial likelihood 
of a miscarriage of justice. 
In assessing prejudice, the issue we decide is whether the 
failure to inform the jury that the voluntary consumption of 
drugs or alcohol does not vitiate the defense if the defendant's 
mental illness was an independent cause of his lack of criminal 
responsibility likely influenced the jury's verdict.  We 
conclude that it did not. 
Here, the defendant presented no evidence that at the time 
of the shootings, his mental disease or defect was active, such 
that he lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to 
24 
 
the law.18  See Berry, 457 Mass. at 617-618.  Of the defendant's 
three expert witnesses, only Spiers opined that the defendant 
lacked criminal responsibility at the time of the murders.  
Although Spiers agreed that the defendant was able to appreciate 
the wrongfulness of his conduct, he believed that the defendant 
lacked the substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law, based on his neurodevelopmental 
deficits, mental illness, and drug addiction.  The jury heard 
Mezzacappa's opinion, however, that the defendant suffered from 
schizoaffective disorder, but that the symptoms of mental 
illness can worsen with substance abuse.  Bluestone testified 
that she could not determine the source of the defendant's 
reported symptoms because of his ongoing, varied substance 
abuse, where his symptoms were consistent with mental illness 
and substance abuse and withdrawal from substance abuse.  None 
of the expert testimony suggested that mental illness alone was 
the cause of the defendant's alleged lack of capacity.  Cf. id. 
at 617-618.  See DiPadova, 460 Mass. at 432.  Therefore, the 
judge's omission of the Berry instruction, although erroneous, 
did not prejudice the defendant where there was no evidence that 
the defendant's mental illness, regardless of his consumption of 
                     
 
18 The experts for the Commonwealth and the defendant who 
opined on the matter agreed that the defendant had the capacity 
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. 
25 
 
illegal drugs, caused him to lose substantial capacity.  Berry, 
supra. 
 
b.  Other jury instructions.  The defendant argues that 
certain other jury instructions were flawed.  Specifically, he 
argues that two of the instructions, concerning armed home 
invasion and armed assault with intent to murder, impermissibly 
contained language requiring a guilty finding where the jury 
found that the Commonwealth proved each element beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  He also argues that three instructions, 
concerning armed assault with intent to murder, voluntary 
manslaughter, and unlawful possession of a firearm, failed to 
include language instructing the jury that, if they found that 
the Commonwealth failed to prove each element beyond a 
reasonable doubt, then the jury must find the defendant not 
guilty.  The defendant's arguments are unavailing.  Because the 
defendant did not object to the jury charge, we review for a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 437 Mass. 554, 559 (2002).  "Error in 
a charge is determined by reading the charge as a whole, and not 
by scrutinizing bits and pieces removed from their context." 
Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Gunter, 427 Mass. 259, 267 (1998). 
 
The judge charged the jury on nine offenses.  For all nine, 
the judge instructed the jury that, if they found that the 
Commonwealth had proved each element beyond a reasonable doubt, 
26 
 
then they must return a guilty verdict.  In addition, six of the 
nine instructions included the instruction that if the jury 
found that the Commonwealth had failed to prove each element 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then they must find the defendant not 
guilty.  In the instructions for armed assault with intent to 
murder, voluntary manslaughter, and illegal possession of a 
firearm, the judge neglected to add the latter instruction.  
Although this was error, there was no substantial likelihood of 
a miscarriage of justice.  The jury were properly instructed 
regarding the burden of proof on several occasions during the 
charge.  "Viewed as a whole, the charge to the jury indicated 
that it was the jury's duty to [determine if] the Commonwealth 
has met its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond 
a reasonable doubt before they could convict."  Commonwealth v. 
Giguere, 420 Mass. 226, 232 (1995), quoting Commonwealth v. 
Sellon, 380 Mass. 220, 234 (1980). 
 
c.  Inference of sanity instruction.  In Commonwealth v. 
Lawson, 475 Mass. 806, 815 (2016), we concluded that "the 
inference that the defendant is criminally responsible because 
the great majority of persons are criminally responsible is not 
sufficient alone to warrant a rational finder of fact to 
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is 
criminally responsible."  We further determined that "given the 
meager weight of this inference and the risk of juror confusion 
27 
 
regarding the burden of proof, judges should not instruct juries 
regarding this inference."  Id. at 815 n.8.  Here, the jury were 
instructed as follows: 
 
"In determining whether the defendant was sane at the 
time of the alleged crime, you may consider the fact, if 
you so desire, that a great majority of men are sane and 
the resulting probability that any particular man was sane.  
It is for you do decide whether to draw that inference.  
The fact that I have given you this inference does not mean 
that you must adopt it.  It is something you may not adopt, 
depending on how you view all of the evidence, including 
medical evidence given by the psychologists and other 
witnesses who have testified in this case." 
 
 
This is substantially similar to the instruction that we 
discontinued in Lawson, supra at 815 n.8.19  Here, the defendant 
is entitled to the benefit of Lawson, as that case was released 
while the defendant's appeal was pending on direct review.  See 
Commonwealth v. Johnston, 467 Mass. 674, 704 (2014).  Therefore, 
although the defendant did not raise this claim of error on 
appeal, we review to determine whether this error created a 
substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.  See 
Commonwealth v. Griffin, 475 Mass. 848, 863 (2016).  We conclude 
it does not. 
 
Although the instruction regarding the inference of sanity 
was error, the judge ameliorated the error where he specifically 
instructed the jury that they did not have to draw such an 
                     
 
19 This instruction has since been removed from the Model 
Jury Instructions on Homicide.  See Commonwealth v. Griffin, 475 
Mass. 848, 863 (2016), citing Model Jury Instructions on 
Homicide 1-12 (2013). 
28 
 
inference, especially in light of the jury's view of the expert 
medical testimony.  "Where the trial judge strongly and 
specifically instructed that the burden is on the Commonwealth 
to prove criminal responsibility beyond a reasonable doubt and 
where there was substantial evidence supporting the jury's 
finding of criminal responsibility, we conclude that this 
instruction did not create a substantial likelihood of a 
miscarriage of justice."  Griffin, 475 Mass. at 863. 
 
d.  Prosecutor's closing argument.  The defendant argues 
that the prosecutor improperly demeaned the defense of lack of 
criminal responsibility, misstated the evidence and the law, and 
vouched for the credibility of the defendant's witnesses.  The 
defendant did not object to the prosecutor's closing argument, 
so we review for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  Commonwealth v. Braley, 449 Mass. 316, 329 (2007).  
"Closing arguments must be viewed 'in the context of the entire 
argument, and in light of the judge's instruction to the jury, 
and the evidence at trial.'"  Id. at 328-329, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 408 Mass. 533, 553 (1990). 
 
During his closing argument, the prosecutor stated that the 
defendant was using his mental illness as a "crutch."  He 
referred to the defendant's statements to a family member made 
during a telephone call that was recorded during his police 
interview.  The defendant told his family member, "I need all my 
29 
 
psych papers, all my medical papers ready, everything, all my 
history."  The prosecutor told the jury that it was then that 
the defendant created his defense.  He went on to say, "[i]t's a 
crutch, is what it is.  As I said, [the defendant] may have some 
[mental] infirmities, but he's using it as a crutch to say that 
he wasn't responsible."  Although the prosecutor's 
characterization of the defense of lack of criminal 
responsibility was better left unsaid, it did not rise to the 
level of creating a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of 
justice.  He was properly suggesting that the defense of lack of 
criminal responsibility was weak, and that although the 
defendant may suffer from mental illness, he was criminally 
responsible on July 8-9, 2007.  See Commonwealth v. Lewis, 465 
Mass. 119, 129-130 (2013). 
 
Similarly, in his closing argument the prosecutor suggested 
that the defendant was "not a raving lunatic," that he was 
"rational" and that "he wasn't some recluse in a darkened room 
with the shades pulled, not going out."  These statements were 
rhetorical and referenced the evidence of the defendant's 
ability to be an active parent and spouse when he was not on 
drugs.  See Commonwealth v. Simpson, 434 Mass. 570, 586 (2001).   
Especially where the jury heard evidence of the defendant's 
malingering and exaggerating the symptoms of his mental illness, 
the prosecutor's comments did not prejudice the defendant.  
30 
 
Compare Lewis, 465 Mass. at 128-130 (reversal warranted where 
prosecutor suggested that entire defense was "sham" and insulted 
defendant by repeatedly referring to him as "street thug" during 
closing argument), with Simpson, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. 
Wilson, 427 Mass. 336, 350 (1998) (prosecutor's characterization 
of defense argument as "insult" and "'enthusiastic rhetoric' not 
ground for reversal and juries presumed to have measure of 
sophistication to sort out excessive claims"). 
 
The defendant's argument that the prosecutor misstated the 
law is without merit.  Although the defendant correctly notes 
that the Commonwealth's burden was to prove that the defendant 
had the substantial capacity to conform his behavior to the 
requirements of the law, it was not improper for the prosecutor 
to refer to the defendant's behavior as "rational."  Moreover, 
the prosecutor's characterization of the defendant as a "faker" 
was based on evidence, as Towers opined that the defendant was 
exaggerating and feigning symptoms while he was hospitalized at 
Bridgewater. 
 
Finally, the defendant asserts that the prosecutor 
improperly vouched for the credibility of Mercier and Towers.  
We disagree.  "Improper vouching occurs if 'an attorney 
expresses a personal belief in the credibility of a witness, or 
indicates that he or she has knowledge independent of the 
evidence before the jury.'"  Commonwealth v. Kee, 449 Mass. 550, 
31 
 
560 (2007), quoting Commonwealth v. Ortega, 441 Mass. 170, 181 
(2004).  Here, the prosecutor did not express any personal 
belief in the credibility of the witnesses, nor did he suggest 
that he had any personal knowledge that supported the witnesses' 
credibility.  See Kee, supra.  The prosecutor merely observed 
that Mercier was "a very moving witness, a very candid and 
honest witness in all of her answers, on both direct and cross," 
and that Towers gave a "very candid appraisal of the defendant's 
mental state."  The prosecutor's comments were proper.  See id. 
 
e.  Relief pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  The defendant 
requests that this court exercise its power under G. L. c. 278, 
§ 33E, to reverse his convictions and either order a new trial 
or enter judgments of not guilty by reason of mental disease or 
defect.  "When we undertake review under § 33E, we do not 
function as a second jury. . . . That is we do not determine 
what verdict we would have returned but whether the verdict 'was 
against the law or weight of the evidence, or because of newly 
discovered evidence, or for any other reason that justice may 
require'" (citation omitted).  Johnston, 467 Mass. at 705, 
quoting G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have examined the entire case, 
considered the law and the evidence, and conclude that the 
defendant is not entitled to any relief from the judgments 
against him.  See Commonwealth v. Brown, 376 Mass. 156, 167 
(1978). 
32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.