Case Title: Lancto v. City of Rawlins

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-04-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Lancto v. City of Rawlins1995 WY 49892 P.2d 800Case Number: 94-209Decided: 04/04/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

Robin 
LANCTO, Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

CITY OF RAWLINS, a Municipal Corporation, Appellee 
(Defendant).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Carbon County, Barton R. Voigt, J.

Juan Leo DeHerrera, Rawlins, 
representing 
appellant.

Kurt Kelly and Thomas A. 
Thompson of Williams, Kelly & Waldrip, Rawlins, representing 
appellee.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., THOMAS, MACY and TAYLOR, JJ., 
and KAIL, D.J. (Retired).

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Robin 
Lancto appeals from the district court's order which granted a summary judgment 
in favor of Appellee City of Rawlins.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

Issue

[¶3]      Lancto presents 
one issue on appeal:

Did the District Court err in refusing to follow the 
Wyoming Attorney General's Opinion and require a municipality to give employees 
up to 15 days of paid leave for National Guard training without requiring them 
to take earned vacation[?]

Facts

[¶4]      Lancto began his 
employment with the City in 1976 as a patrolman. In 1983, he enlisted in the 
Army National Guard of the State of Wyoming, and each summer since 1984 he has 
attended a two-week national guard training session. During each of the training 
sessions, Lancto received his regular pay from the City since he had used a 
portion of his annual leave, plus he received a salary from the national 
guard.

[¶5]      Prior to 1989, 
the PERSONNEL POLICIES FOR THE CITY OF RAWLINS, WYOMING, allowed members of the 
national guard to take military leaves of absence without pay for up to fifteen 
days per calendar year and did not require that the time be charged against the 
employee's accrued annual leave. In 1989, the City amended its PERSONNEL 
POLICIES by adding that, when the "pay by the City for the same period is 
greater than actual military pay, the City will pay the difference so there is 
no loss in pay for the period of fifteen (15) calendar days or 
less."

[¶6]      On December 7, 
1993, Lancto filed a governmental claim with the City, seeking monetary 
compensation for the time he had spent attending the national guard training 
sessions from 1984 through 1993. The City denied his claim, and Lancto filed a 
lawsuit against the City. Lancto alleged that, under WYO. STAT. § 19-2-504(a) 
(1977), he should have been allowed to take fifteen days of paid military leave 
each year without having to use his annual leave. Each party filed a motion for 
a summary judgment. The parties stipulated that the district judge's ruling on 
the motions for a summary judgment would be limited to interpreting § 
19-2-504(a) as it applied to the facts of this case. After the district court 
held a hearing on the parties' motions, it granted the City's motion for a 
summary judgment and denied Lancto's motion for a summary judgment. Lancto 
appealed.

Discussion

[¶7]      A district court 
should grant a summary judgment only "`when no genuine issue of material fact 
exists and when the prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter 
of law.'" Halpern v. Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562, 564 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Sandstrom 
v. Sandstrom, 884 P.2d 968, 971 (Wyo. 1994)). In reviewing a district court's 
grant of a summary judgment, we consider the case "`from the viewpoint favorable 
to the party opposing the judgment. We accord no deference to the district 
court's decisions on issues of law.'" Id. (quoting Smith, Keller & 
Associates v. Dorr & Associates, 875 P.2d 1258, 1264 (Wyo. 1994) (citation 
omitted)).

[¶8]      The parties agree 
as to the essential facts of the case. Their controversy centers on the legal 
interpretation of § 19-2-504(a). That statute provides:

(a) Any member of the Wyoming national guard or 
United States military forces reserve who is an officer or employee of this 
state or any political subdivision, municipal corporation or public agency of 
the state, shall be given a leave of absence not to exceed fifteen (15) calendar 
days in any one (1) calendar year to attend duly authorized encampments, 
training cruises and similar training programs in addition to any other leave or 
vacation time to which the person is otherwise entitled.

Lancto insists that the term 
"leave of absence" means leave with pay, while the City argues that the term 
means leave without pay.

We endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with 
the Legislature's intent. We begin by making an "`inquiry respecting the 
ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their 
arrangement and connection.'" Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game and 
Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Rasmussen v. Baker, 7 
Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)). We construe the statute as a whole, 
giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe together all 
parts of the statute in pari materia. 845 P.2d  at 1042.

State Department of Revenue 
and Taxation v. Pacificorp, 872 P.2d 1163, 1166 (Wyo. 1994). When the Court 
determines, as a matter of law, that a statute is clear and unambiguous, it must 
give effect to the plain language of the statute and should not resort to the 
rules of statutory construction. Id. If, on the other hand, the Court determines 
that a statute is ambiguous, it may use extrinsic aids of statutory 
interpretation to help it determine the Legislature's intent. Christensen v. 
Oedekoven, 888 P.2d 228, 230 (Wyo. 1995).

[¶9]      Lancto contends 
that § 19-2-504(a) is ambiguous. "Leave of absence" is not defined in the 
statute, and the Legislature did not specify whether a military leave of absence 
of fifteen days or less under § 19-2-504(a) would be with or without pay; 
however, when we construe together all the components of the statute in pari 
materia, the meaning of the term "leave of absence" in § 19-2-504(a) becomes 
clear and unambiguous. See Pacificorp, 872 P.2d  at 1166; Parker Land and Cattle 
Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 
1993).

[¶10]   WYO. STAT. § 19-2-504(b) (1977) 
pertains to military leaves of absence of greater than fifteen days. The 
Legislature expressly stated that those longer leaves of absence would be taken 
"without pay." Section 19-2-504(b). Since the Legislature felt compelled to 
specify that the longer leaves of absence were to be taken "without pay," it 
obviously intended that the shorter leaves of absence under § 19-2-504(a) would 
be taken "with pay." See Op. Att'y Gen. No. 77-04 (Wyo. 1977). Taking into 
consideration the plain language of the entire statute, we hold that the 
Legislature intended for employees and officers to be paid while they are on 
military leaves of absence pursuant to § 19-2-504(a). That payment, so long as 
it is reasonable, may be differential or full pay. The differential payment 
scheme incorporated into the PERSONNEL POLICIES which the City adopted in 1989, 
wherein members of the national guard receive the difference between their 
regular pay and their national guard pay when the City pay is greater than the 
military pay, complies with the payment requirement of § 
19-2-504(a).

[¶11]   We agree with the district court 
that Lancto was not entitled to receive any additional remuneration because he 
voluntarily opted to use his annual leave while he was attending the national 
guard training sessions. The option of receiving the differential pay provided 
for in the City's PERSONNEL POLICIES has been available to Lancto since 1989. 
Instead of choosing the differential pay option, Lancto has voluntarily elected 
to use his annual leave while he has attended his national guard training 
sessions so that he would receive both his regular City pay and his national 
guard pay. The City, therefore, properly paid Lancto during his military leaves 
of absence.

Conclusion

[¶12]   No genuine issue of material fact 
was presented in this case, and the City was entitled to be awarded a judgment 
as a matter of law.

[¶13]   Affirmed.