Case Title: Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Johnson

Citation: 2010-Ohio-4832

Docket Number: 20100693

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-10-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Johnson, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-4832.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-4832 
CLEVELAND METROPOLITAN BAR ASSOCIATION v. JOHNSON. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Johnson,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-4832.] 
Attorney misconduct, including neglecting entrusted legal matters — One-year 
suspension with six months stayed on conditions. 
(No. 2010-0693 — Submitted July 6, 2010 — Decided October 7, 2010.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 09-039. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Rita R. Johnson of University Heights, Ohio, 
Attorney Registration No. 0065959, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 
1996.  In June 2009, relator, Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association, filed a 
complaint charging respondent with violations of the Code of Professional 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
Responsibility and the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct1 alleging that she had 
neglected legal matters entrusted to her, failed to provide competent 
representation, disobeyed an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, and failed to 
take reasonable steps to protect a client’s interest upon the termination of her 
representation.  The board recommends that we suspend respondent for one year, 
with six months stayed on the condition that she enter into a three-year contract 
with the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”) and be in compliance with 
that contract before seeking reinstatement to the practice of law.  Respondent 
objects to the board’s recommendation, arguing that the board did not consider 
certain mitigating evidence and that it relied upon cases that are distinguishable 
from her own to determine the appropriate sanction. 
{¶ 2} For the reasons that follow, we overrule respondent’s objections 
and adopt the board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and accept its 
recommendation that we impose a one-year suspension with six months stayed.  
As conditions of the stay, however, respondent shall (1) commit no further 
misconduct, (2) submit to a mental-health evaluation conducted by OLAP, and if 
OLAP determines that treatment is necessary, (3) enter into an OLAP contract for 
a duration to be determined by OLAP, and (4) comply with all OLAP treatment 
recommendations. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 3} Relator’s complaint alleges that respondent neglected two 
unrelated legal matters that had been entrusted to her.  The parties have stipulated 
that in the first matter, a man hired respondent to defend himself, his wife, and his 
company in a civil action in federal district court and to file a counterclaim.  
                                                 
1. Relator charged respondent with misconduct pursuant to applicable rules for acts occurring 
before and after February 1, 2007, the effective date of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which 
superseded the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
 
 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
Respondent did not appear at the initial case-management conference or at the 
depositions of nonparty witnesses.  She also failed to take any depositions and to 
meet several discovery-related deadlines.  After the court denied her motion to 
withdraw as counsel, respondent failed to respond to a motion to dismiss the 
counterclaim and a motion for default judgment.  The court granted the motions, 
and, when respondent failed to notify her clients of or appear at a damages 
hearing, it entered a default judgment of $331,279.80 against all three of her 
clients. 
{¶ 4} The second matter involved a client who, in 2005, hired respondent 
to represent her on a contingency basis in an action against the city of Cleveland.  
Respondent filed a complaint on the client’s behalf in the Cuyahoga County 
Common Pleas Court, but failed to timely respond to either discovery requests or 
the city’s motion to dismiss the complaint.  The trial court granted the unopposed 
motion to dismiss, without prejudice, citing respondent’s failure to timely 
prosecute the case.  After respondent refiled the complaint, the city removed the 
case to federal district court.  That court then granted respondent’s motion to 
withdraw as counsel and dismissed the case without prejudice, “with the proviso 
that Plaintiff [could] re-instate [the] action on or before March 21, 2008.”  
Respondent did not inform her client of the deadline for refiling the case, which 
was not refiled before the deadline. 
{¶ 5} The parties stipulated, the board found, and we agree, that clear 
and convincing evidence demonstrates that respondent’s conduct with respect to 
the first matter violated DR 6-101(A)(3) (prohibiting neglect of an entrusted legal 
matter) and Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence 
and promptness in representing a client), 1.16(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
withdrawing from representation in a proceeding without leave of court if the 
rules of the tribunal so require), and 3.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly 
disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal) and that her conduct with 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
respect to the second matter violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 and 1.16(d) (requiring a 
lawyer withdrawing from representation to take reasonably practicable steps to 
protect a client’s interest). 
Sanction 
{¶ 6} In recommending a sanction, the panel and board considered the 
ethical duties that respondent had violated, the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations Governing Procedure on 
Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”), and the sanctions imposed in similar cases.  See, 
e.g., Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 
N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16; Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio St.3d 473, 2007-
Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21. 
{¶ 7} The parties stipulated and the panel and board found that 
respondent was the subject of a prior disciplinary proceeding.2  See BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(a).  The panel and board also found that, although not charged 
as an offense in the complaint, respondent’s admitted failure to notify her clients 
that she did not maintain malpractice insurance was an aggravating factor 
weighing in favor of a greater sanction. 
{¶ 8} In mitigation, the panel and board found that respondent did not act 
with a selfish motive, cooperated in the disciplinary proceedings, admitted and 
apologized for her ethical lapses, and expressed remorse for the consequences to 
her clients.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(b) and (d).  They declined, however, 
                                                 
2.  In Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Johnson, 123 Ohio St.3d 65, 2009-Ohio-4178, 914 N.E.2d 180, 
respondent received a public reprimand for violating DR 1-102(A)(5) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), 6-101(A)(2) (prohibiting a lawyer 
from handling a legal matter without preparation adequate under the circumstances), 6-101(A)(3) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from neglecting an entrusted legal matter), 7-101(A)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer 
from intentionally failing to seek a client’s lawful objectives), 7-101(A)(2) (prohibiting a lawyer 
from intentionally failing to carry out a contract of employment), and 1-104(A) and (B) (requiring 
a lawyer to advise clients if the lawyer does not carry malpractice insurance in the specified 
amount and to obtain the clients’ written acknowledgement of that warning).   
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
to consider as a mitigating factor the stress that respondent suffered as a result of 
family and financial matters at the time of her misconduct, reasoning that 
respondent had presented no affidavits, reports from a psychologist, psychiatrist, 
therapist, or counselor, and introduced no medical records to substantiate that she 
suffered from a mental disability, as required by BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g).  
Although noting that respondent had not practiced law since her appointment as 
the clerk of court for the Garfield Heights Municipal Court in November 2007, 
the board does not appear to have assigned any mitigating value to this fact. 
{¶ 9} Referring to the actual suspensions we have imposed for similar 
conduct in Columbus Bar Assn. v. Dice, 120 Ohio St.3d 455, 2008-Ohio-6787, 
900 N.E.2d 189, and Columbus Bar Assn. v. DiAlbert, 120 Ohio St.3d 37, 2008-
Ohio-5218, 896 N.E.2d 137, the panel rejected the parties’ stipulated sanction of a 
one-year suspension with the entire period stayed on conditions.  Instead the panel 
recommended that respondent be suspended for one year with six months stayed 
on the conditions that she enter into an OLAP contract to learn to manage her 
stress and personal problems, be in compliance with that contract before her 
reinstatement, and serve two years of monitored probation in accordance with 
Gov.Bar R. V(9).  The board agrees with the panel’s recommendation of a one-
year suspension with six months stayed on conditions, but specifies that 
respondent should enter a three-year OLAP contract, eliminating the requirement 
for monitored probation. 
Objections 
{¶ 10} Respondent objects to the recommended sanction, challenging the 
board’s failure to consider her testimony regarding her stress and her voluntary 
withdrawal from the practice of law as factors in mitigation, and contending that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
the cases cited by the board in support of the recommended sanction are 
distinguishable from the facts herein.3 
{¶ 11} Respondent testified that at the time of her misconduct, she had 
significant stress in her life due to her role as a single parent to a four-year-old 
child and a newly adopted infant.  Because she did not work for the first six or 
seven weeks following the adoption, financial hardships led to the repossession of 
her car.  She also claimed that she now sees a therapist regularly and takes 
medication to help her handle the stress in her life. 
{¶ 12} Respondent, however, fails to cite any decisions in which we have 
considered generalized stress to be a significant mitigating factor in the absence of 
(1) a diagnosis of a mental disability by a qualified health-care professional, (2) a 
determination that the metal disability contributed to cause the misconduct, (3) a 
sustained period of successful treatment, and (4) a prognosis from a qualified 
health-care professional that the attorney will be able to return to the competent, 
ethical, and professional practice of law.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g). 
{¶ 13} We recently we considered and rejected a similar argument in 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Robinson, __ Ohio St.3d ___, 2010-Ohio-3829, __ 
N.E.2d __, in which Robinson claimed that Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Fidler (1998), 
83 Ohio St.3d 396, 397, 700 N.E.2d 323, and Disciplinary Counsel v. Spencer 
(1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 316, 317, 643 N.E.2d 1086, permitted generalized stress to 
be considered as a mitigating factor.  Id. at ¶ 38. 
{¶ 14} In Robinson, we noted that it was not clear in Fidler whether the 
court had considered Fidler’s stress to be a significant mitigating factor.  And we 
observed that in Spencer, the “respondent’s stress was due, at least in part, to 
familial circumstances that were beyond his control,” while Robinson’s stress was 
                                                 
3.  Respondent did not appear for the scheduled oral argument on July 6, 2010.  Although she did 
file a motion to continue or waive oral argument that day, the court did not receive it until after 
argument was completed in her absence.  Accordingly, we excuse respondent’s failure to appear 
and deem respondent to have waived oral argument. 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
the direct result of his own conscious choices—first to seek public office, and 
then to commit various acts of misconduct when his employer objected to that 
decision.  Id. 
{¶ 15} Moreover, we now observe that in Fidler and Spencer, we adopted 
the findings of the board, which had adopted the findings of the panel, which had 
actually received the evidence of stress and found it to be credible.  Fidler at 323-
324; Spencer at 317.  “We will defer to a panel’s credibility determination in our 
independent review of discipline cases unless the record weighs heavily against 
those determinations.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Heiland, 116 Ohio St.3d 521, 
2008-Ohio-91, 880 N.E.2d 467, ¶ 39, citing Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Statzer, 101 
Ohio St.3d 14, 2003-Ohio-6649, 800 N.E.2d 1117, ¶ 8.  Here, in contrast, the 
panel rejected respondent’s testimony regarding stress as a factor in mitigation 
and the record does not weigh heavily against the panel’s credibility 
determination. 
{¶ 16} The standards set forth in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(g) create an 
objective standard to ensure that there is some objective evidence of a mental 
disability that rises above the stresses of ordinary life that every attorney faces at 
some point during his or her career.  While respondent may have a qualifying 
mental disability, she has failed to carry her burden of proving it.  As the dissent 
observed in respondent’s prior disciplinary case, “The fact that respondent had a 
busy professional workload and various issues in her personal life during this 
same time is entitled to miniscule weight in mitigation, and it does not excuse her 
failure to provide professional services.”  (Emphasis added.)  Johnson, 123 Ohio 
St.3d 65, 2009-Ohio-4178, 914 N.E.2d 180, at ¶ 17 (Moyer, C.J. dissenting). 
{¶ 17} Respondent’s argument that her decision to find employment that 
does not involve the practice of law should carry greater weight in mitigation is 
likewise without merit.  The fact that respondent stopped practicing law so that 
she would stop causing harm to clients appears to be a prudent decision, but her 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
inadequate communication with her clients and lack of attention to detail as she 
departed from the practice served to exacerbate the harm to one of her clients, 
who did not receive timely notice of the deadline to refile her case. 
{¶ 18} Any mitigating value that respondent’s voluntary withdrawal from 
the practice of law may have had is outweighed by the aggravating factors found 
by the board.  Moreover, in addition to the aggravating factors found by the 
board, we note that the respondent’s misconduct spans more than one year and 
involves multiple instances of neglect in two separate client matters.  Therefore, 
we consider respondent’s pattern of misconduct involving multiple offenses as 
factors in aggravation.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(c) and (d). 
{¶ 19} In her final argument, respondent attempts to distinguish her case 
from the cases that the board cited in support of its recommended sanction.  In 
Columbus Bar Assn. v. Dice, 120 Ohio St.3d 455, 2008-Ohio-6787, 900 N.E.2d 
189, we imposed a one-year suspension with a conditional six-month stay on an 
attorney who delayed filing an appellate brief for one client and failed to appear 
for oral argument on behalf of another client and then initially failed to cooperate 
in the resulting disciplinary investigation. 
{¶ 20} Respondent contends that her case differs because she has fully 
cooperated in the disciplinary investigation, while Dice did not.  Although 
respondent is correct that Dice did not initially cooperate in the investigation and 
was consequently found to have violated DR 1-102(A)(6) and Gov.Bar R. 
V(4)(G), in mitigation we found that he had no prior record of discipline (unlike 
respondent in this case), no dishonest motive, eventually cooperated in the 
disciplinary process, and suffered from a diagnosed mental disability that had 
contributed to the misconduct,  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a), (b), (d), and 
(g).  Dice at ¶ 8, 10-11. 
{¶ 21} Respondent also attempts to distinguish her case from Columbus 
Bar Assn. v. DiAlbert, 120 Ohio St.3d 37, 2008-Ohio-5218, 896 N.E.2d 137.  In 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
that case, we imposed a two-year suspension with 18 months stayed on conditions 
on an attorney who allowed the statute of limitations on a client’s claim to expire 
without filing a complaint, ignored the client’s repeated efforts to contact him, 
and failed to advise the client that he did not carry professional-liability insurance.  
Respondent contends that DiAlbert’s prior misconduct was more serious than her 
own because he had received a six-month stayed suspension, see Columbus Bar 
Assn. v. DiAlbert, 98 Ohio St.3d 386, 2003-Ohio-1091, 785 N.E.2d 747, while she 
received only a public reprimand.  We note, however, that DiAlbert also 
presented evidence of a mitigating mental disability pursuant to BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(2)(g) and received a two-year suspension with 18 months stayed, while the 
board recommends only a one-year suspension with six months stayed for 
respondent’s comparable misconduct.  Thus, the board’s recommendation has 
already taken these differences into account. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 22} Based upon the foregoing, we overrule respondent’s objections, 
and adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct.  The record demonstrates 
by clear and convincing evidence that respondent’s neglect of one client matter by 
failing to participate in the discovery process and by failing to respond to a 
motion for default judgment resulted in a judgment in excess of $330,000 against 
her clients. Her failure to timely prosecute a second client matter resulted in the 
dismissal without prejudice of that client’s complaint.  Her subsequent withdrawal 
as counsel in that case also resulted in a dismissal without prejudice, and her 
failure to timely notify the client of the deadline to refile the complaint effectively 
barred the client from refiling the action.  Having examined this conduct, weighed 
the aggravating and mitigating factors, and reviewed the sanctions imposed for 
comparable conduct, we agree that a one-year suspension with six months stayed 
on conditions is the appropriate sanction for respondent’s misconduct. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
{¶ 23} Accordingly, Rita R. Johnson is suspended from the practice of 
law in the state of Ohio for one year with six months stayed on the conditions that 
she (1) commit no further misconduct and (2) submit to a mental-health 
evaluation conducted by OLAP, and if OLAP determines that treatment is 
necessary (3) enter into an OLAP contract, the duration of which shall be 
determined by OLAP, and (4) comply with all of OLAP’s treatment 
recommendations.  If respondent fails to comply with the conditions of the stay, 
the stay will be lifted, and she will serve the entire one-year suspension. 
{¶ 24} Costs are taxed to respondent. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
BROWN, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Willacy, LoPresti, & Marcovy, Timothy A. Marcovy, and Thomas P. 
Marotta, for relator. 
Rita R. Johnson, pro se. 
______________________