Case Title: State v. Darrow

Citation: 

Docket Number: 109397

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2016-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 109,397 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
ERIN KRISTENA DARROW, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1. 
Under the driving under the influence (DUI) statute, K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 8-1567, 
the term "operate" is synonymous with "drive," which requires some movement of the 
vehicle. Consequently, an "attempt to operate" under the DUI statute means an attempt to 
move the vehicle. The taking of actual physical control of a vehicle, without an attempt to 
move the vehicle, is insufficient to meet the attempt to operate element of DUI. 
 
2. 
 When presented with stipulated facts, a court cannot ignore the circumstantial 
evidence presented in the stipulations because, if such evidence provides a basis from 
which the factfinder may reasonably infer the existence of the fact in issue, that 
circumstantial evidence can support a guilty verdict. In other words, a court must 
consider the stipulated context in which the stipulated facts occurred.  
 
3. 
The probative values of direct and circumstantial evidence are intrinsically similar, 
and there is no logically sound reason for drawing a distinction as to the weight to be 
assigned to each. Consequently, like with direct evidence, an appellate court does not 
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reweigh the circumstantial evidence supporting a conviction against the circumstantial 
evidence supporting a not-guilty verdict. Instead, the appellate court's function is to 
determine if the direct and circumstantial evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to 
the State, could have reasonably supported a rational factfinder's guilty verdict.  
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed May 9, 2014. 
Appeal from Johnson District Court; THOMAS H. BORNHOLDT, judge. Opinion filed July 1, 2016. 
Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district court is affirmed. Judgment of the district court is 
affirmed. 
 
Michelle A. Davis, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, was on the briefs for appellant.  
 
Steven J. Obermeier, senior deputy district attorney, Betsey L. Lasister, legal intern, Stephen M. 
Howe, district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the briefs for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
JOHNSON, J.:  Erin Darrow petitions this court for review of the Court of Appeals' 
decision in State v. Darrow, No. 109,397, 2014 WL 1887629 (Kan. App. 2014) 
(unpublished opinion), affirming her driving under the influence (DUI) conviction, third 
offense. The district court found Darrow guilty on stipulated facts. Darrow argues the 
stipulated facts were insufficient to prove she operated or attempted to operate a vehicle. 
We disagree, finding that the stipulated facts presented to us by the parties, together with 
the reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts, when viewed in the light most 
favorable to the State, are sufficient to support the conviction.  
 
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL OVERVIEW  
 
Darrow was convicted of DUI, third offense, and refusing a preliminary breath test 
(PBT) after a bench trial on stipulated facts. But this particular case presents an unusual 
circumstance with respect to the stipulated facts. 
 
Apparently, the presiding judge made inquiries beyond the written stipulation of 
facts presented at the bench trial, as evidenced by a stipulation on appeal. But, 
unfortunately, the record of the bench trial could not be transcribed because of an 
electronic recording malfunction and any discussion of the facts beyond the written 
stipulation in the record was lost. Consequently, the Court of Appeals granted defense 
counsel's motion to stay briefing in order to prepare and file an agreed statement as to the 
substance of the bench trial hearing. The parties then signed and filed a stipulation of 
facts for appeal. The written stipulation of facts submitted at the bench trial and the 
written stipulation of facts submitted in lieu of the trial transcript for appellate purposes 
are overlapping, but not identical. The propriety of this course of action was not 
challenged in the petition for review, and the parties' briefs cite to both sets of stipulated 
facts. Therefore, we will consider both factual stipulations.  
 
The parties stipulated that on December 4, 2010, after a night of drinking, one of 
Darrow's friends commenced to drive Darrow and another person home. En route, 
Darrow was acting "a little belligerent," so the driver parked the car at the end of a dead-
end street with the front of the vehicle against a chain-link fence. The driver and other 
passenger left, leaving Darrow alone in the vehicle. At some point after being abandoned 
by her friends, Darrow moved to the driver's seat, where she was later discovered asleep 
with the car running.  
 
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The next morning at 7:47 a.m., Officer S. Parker was dispatched to Darrow's 
location on report of an accident. When Parker approached the car, it was running, as 
evidenced by exhaust coming from the car's mufflers. Parker spoke with the reporting 
party, who explained that when she approached the car, she saw the sole occupant, later 
identified as Darrow, "passed out" behind the wheel. Parker made contact with Darrow, 
who remained asleep behind the wheel. Parker was able to wake Darrow and asked her to 
turn off the car. Darrow "started to reach down and fumble[] with the gear shift, but the 
car stayed in park."  
 
Darrow opened the door and got out of the car. Parker noted Darrow smelled of 
alcohol, her speech was slurred, and her balance was unsteady. After Darrow failed field 
sobriety tests and exhibited other clues of impairment, Parker placed her under arrest. At 
the police station, Darrow refused to take a breath test. Based on his training and 
experience, Parker determined Darrow was operating a motor vehicle while she was 
under the influence of alcohol to a degree that rendered her incapable of safely driving.  
 
In the stipulation of facts, the parties narrowed the issues before the district court. 
The State conceded that Darrow did not drive to the location where the police officer 
found her. In turn, Darrow conceded that if the district court determined she was 
operating or attempting to operate her vehicle, she was under the influence of alcohol to a 
degree that rendered her incapable of safely operating the vehicle. The parties also 
stipulated that Darrow had two prior DUI convictions. And finally, the parties agreed that 
the ultimate issue should be:  "Is fumbling with [the] gear shift while [the] vehicle is 
running, operating or attempting to operate a motor vehicle?"  
 
The district court found Darrow guilty of DUI and refusing a PBT. Darrow timely 
appealed from the district court's judgment, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting her DUI conviction. The Court of Appeals held that under the totality of the 
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evidence presented in the stipulated facts, Darrow was guilty of DUI when she fumbled 
with the car's gear shift. 2014 WL 1887629, at *4.  
 
DEFINITION OF ATTEMPT TO OPERATE 
 
 
Before determining whether the State presented sufficient evidence to prove that 
the defendant violated a criminal statute, one must know the specific acts that are 
proscribed by the statutorily defined crime. Here, the Court of Appeals panel identified 
the relevant part of the applicable statute, K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 8-1567(a)(3), to be:  "No 
person shall operate or attempt to operate any vehicle within this state while:  . . . under 
the influence of alcohol to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely driving a 
vehicle." 2014 WL 1887629, at *2. The panel then determined that the proscribed act of 
attempting to operate a vehicle was satisfied if the defendant had "actual physical 
control" of the vehicle. 2014 WL 1887629, at *3. We disagree. 
 
Standard of Review  
 
Interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which an appellate court has 
unlimited review. State v. Keel, 302 Kan. 560, 571, 357 P.3d 251 (2015). 
 
Analysis 
 
The Court of Appeals correctly recited that in State v. Kendall, 274 Kan. 1003, 
1009, 58 P.3d 660 (2002), this court held that the terms "drive" and "operate" are 
synonymous. But then the panel took a wrong turn by importing a portion of the 
definition of "drive" from the Uniform Commercial Driver's License Act (UCDLA). That 
unrelated act defines "drive" as "to drive, operate or be in physical control of a motor 
vehicle . . . ." K.S.A. 2010 Supp. 8-2,128. Darrow, 2014 WL 1887629, at *2. The panel 
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then proceeded to decide the case on the basis of "whether Darrow was in 'actual physical 
control' of the vehicle when she fumbled with the gear shift." 2014 WL 1887629, at *3. 
 
Pointedly, however, the panel failed to acknowledge that Kendall rejected the 
State's attempt to use the K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 8-2,128(j) definition of "drive" to define 
"operate or attempt to operate" in the DUI statute. After opining that the definitions in the 
Commercial Driver's License Act apply only to that act, Kendall specifically and 
unequivocally stated:  "K.S.A. 1999 Supp. 8-2,128 makes no difference here." 274 Kan. 
at 1009.  
 
Instead, Kendall adhered to the holding in State v. Fish, 228 Kan. 204, 612 P.2d 
180 (1980), that said "'operate' as used in [the DUI] statute should be construed to mean 
'drive,' thus requiring some evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that the defendant 
drove the automobile while intoxicated in order for the defendant to be convicted [of 
DUI].'" Kendall, 274 Kan. at 1009 (quoting Fish, 228 Kan. at 210).  
 
Kendall went on to say that the legislature's post-Fish amendment to K.S.A. 8-
1567, prohibiting the operation or attempt to operate under the influence, was designed 
to encompass "those who merely tried but failed" to drive the vehicle. 274 Kan. at 1009. 
Therefore, "[m]ovement of the vehicle is not required in order to convict a defendant of 
DUI under the theory that defendant attempted to operate the vehicle." 274 Kan. at 1009-
10. We reinforced that notion in State v. Ahrens, 296 Kan. 151, 160, 290 P.3d 629 
(2012):  "[R]ather than requiring the State to prove that a defendant actually drove a 
vehicle while under the influence, the legislature employed the phrase 'operate or attempt 
to operate' in order to encompass a broader set of factual circumstances that could 
establish the driving element."  
 
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Importantly, however, Kendall declared that "nothing in Fish or other pertinent 
Kansas law says that the definition of 'driving' does not require movement of the 
vehicle." 274 Kan. at 1010. In other words, to "operate" means to "drive"; "driving" 
requires movement of the vehicle; therefore, "operating" requires movement of the 
vehicle, and an "attempt to operate" means to attempt to move the vehicle. Taking actual 
physical control of the vehicle is insufficient to attempt to operate that vehicle without an 
attempt to make it move. Accordingly, that part of the panel's decision holding that taking 
actual physical control of a vehicle satisfies the operate or attempt to operate element of 
DUI is overruled. 
 
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
 
The evidentiary question, then, is whether the State presented sufficient evidence 
through the stipulations of facts to prove that Darrow attempted to move the vehicle. 
 
Standard of Review  
 
The State argues that the Court of Appeals incorrectly applied a de novo standard 
of review to Darrow's sufficiency of the evidence claim. The ordinary standard of review 
for sufficiency of the evidence issues is "whether, after reviewing all the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court is convinced that a rational 
factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. 
Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 581, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), rev. denied 132 S. Ct. 1594 (2012). But 
as Darrow argues and the Court of Appeals recognized, when a case is decided on 
stipulated facts, an appellate court can conduct a de novo review. Darrow, 2014 WL 
1887629, at *1. See State v. Dull, 298 Kan. 832, 840, 317 P.3d 104 (2014) (citing State v. 
McCammon, 45 Kan. App. 2d 482, 488, 250 P.3d 838, rev. denied 292 Kan. 968 [2011]). 
Nevertheless, even when an appellate court states it is exercising de novo review of 
stipulated facts, the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the State when 
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testing their sufficiency. See McCammon, 45 Kan. App. 2d at 489-90 (reviewing the 
stipulated facts and holding the "evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution, was legally sufficient"). Cf. Siruta v. Siruta, 301 Kan. 757, 761, 348 P.3d 
549 (2015) ("We review the district court's denial of summary judgment de novo, 
viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.").  
 
Evidence that may be considered  
 
In the district court, the parties argued for the narrow factual consideration of 
whether simply fumbling with the gear shift while the vehicle is running, standing alone, 
would be sufficient evidence of an attempt to operate the vehicle. On appeal, the State 
contends that the court must view Darrow's actions in their entirety. The Court of 
Appeals implicitly agreed by considering the totality of the evidence presented in the 
stipulated facts. Darrow, 2014 WL 1887629, at *4.  
 
We agree that all of the facts and circumstances, including the reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn therefrom, must be considered. See State v. McBroom, 299 
Kan. 731, 754, 325 P.3d 1174 (2014) (quoting State v. McCaslin, 291 Kan. 697, Syl. ¶ 9, 
245 P.3d 1010 [2011]) (conviction can be based entirely on circumstantial evidence "'and 
the inferences fairly deducible therefrom'"). The parties cannot cherry-pick the facts they 
want tested for sufficiency, but rather, an appellate court must review "all the evidence in 
a light most favorable to the prosecution." (Emphasis added.) State v. Williams, 299 Kan. 
509, 525, 324 P.3d 1078 (2014). We cannot ignore the circumstantial evidence presented 
in the stipulations because, if such evidence provides a basis from which the factfinder 
may reasonably infer the existence of the fact in issue, that evidence can support a guilty 
verdict. See State v. Brooks, 298 Kan. 672, 689, 317 P.3d 54 (2014). We often recite that 
a conviction of even the gravest offense can be based entirely on circumstantial evidence. 
298 Kan. at 689. See also State v. Perkins, 296 Kan. 162, 167, 290 P.3d 636 (2012) ("[A] 
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DUI conviction, like any conviction, can be supported by direct or circumstantial 
evidence."). In short, the stipulated facts must include the stipulated context in which 
they occurred. 
 
Consequently, we first take a look at the stipulations. The original trial stipulation 
recites as follows: 
 
"1. On December 5, 2010, at 7:47 AM Overland Park Officer S. Parker was 
dispatched to an accident, at the dead end street of W. 110th and Gillette, Overland Park, 
Johnson County, Kansas. 
"2. Officer Parker located the Silver convertible, with the front of the vehicle into 
a chain link fence. Officer Parker observed the vehicle to be running because exhaust 
smoke was coming from the mufflers. 
"3. Officer Parker made contact with the reporting party, Patricia Eikenberry who 
originally approached the vehicle and observed the sole occupant, later identified as Erin 
K. Darrow (defendant herein) passed out behind the wheel. 
"4. Officer Park made contact with the defendant, who was still asleep behind the 
wheel. Once Officer Parker was able to arouse the defendant, she started to reach down 
and fumbled with the gear shift, but the car stayed in park. 
"5. Upon the defendant opening her door, Officer Parker detected an odor of 
alcohol coming from defendant, her speech was slurred and balance was unsteady. 
"6. Officer Parker had the defendant perform Standardized Field Sobriety Tests 
(SFSTs) which after performed indicated impairment. 
"7. After failing the SFSTs and exhibiting other clues of impairment, the 
defendant was placed under arrest. 
"8. At the station, the defendant was read the Implied Consent Advisory (DC70) 
and asked to submit to a breath test. The defendant refused a breath test.  
"9. Officer Parker determined based on his training and experience that 
Defendant was operating a motor vehicle while she was under the influence of alcohol to 
a degree that rendered her incapable of driving safely. 
"10. The State will concede the defendant did not drive to the location where her 
and her vehicle were initially found by Patricia Eikenberry. 
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"11. The Defendant will concede that if determined by this court she was 
operating or attempting to operate her vehicle as observed by Patricia Eikenberry or 
Officer Parker, she was indeed under the influence of alcohol to a degree that rendered 
her incapable of safely driving a vehicle. 
Records confirm Defendant has the following prior convictions: 
1) A DUI that occurred in Merriam, Kansas on 12/6/01 and resulted in a 
diversion on 8/21/03. 
2) A DUI that occurred in Overland Park, Kansas on 5/10/01 and resulted in a 
conviction on 3/26/03." 
 
The agreed upon stipulation of facts for appeal recites as follows: 
 
"1. On November 27, 2012, Judge Bornholdt found Ms. Erin Darrow guilty of DUI 
based on the stipulation of facts presented by the State and Defense. 
"2. The stipulation of facts presented were agreed upon by Defense Attorney Edward 
Pitluck and Assistant District Attorney Josh Brunkhorst. 
"3. The stipulated facts presented to the Judge described the following events: 
a. Ms. Darrow was found asleep in her car by nearby homeowner; the 
car was on but in park. 
b. The car was parked against a chain link fence; the car was actually 
touching the fence. 
c. A police office was called and knocked on Ms. Darrow's window. 
d. The officer asked if she was alright and asked her to turn off the car. 
e. Ms. Darrow, in a daze, fumbled with the gear shift and eventually 
was able to open the car and get out. 
f. Earlier that night Ms. Darrow was drinking with some friends. 
g. One of these friends was driving Ms. Darrow and another friend 
home that night after drinking. 
h. Ms. Darrow was acting a little belligerent so the driver parked the car 
just as it was found by the police officer and left with the friend, 
leaving Ms. Darrow alone in the car. 
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i. 
Ms. Darrow switched to the driver's seat and fell asleep with the car 
on. 
"4. The Judge had asked for clarification after reading the facts and both the State 
and Defense agreed that the only issue was whether that brief moment of fumbling with 
the gear shift amounted to a DUI. 
"5. The Judge then found that there was evidence to support the charge and found 
her guilty." 
 
Are the facts, circumstances, and inferences sufficient? 
 
The original stipulation includes the circumstances that Darrow was observed 
passed out behind the wheel, i.e., in the driver's seat of the vehicle; that the vehicle 
engine was running; and that upon waking Darrow reached down and fumbled with the 
gear shift lever, but the transmission remained in park. The appeal stipulation tells us a 
bit more. Upon awakening Darrow, the police officer asked Darrow to turn off the car 
engine. Darrow was in a daze when she fumbled with the gear shift lever. The parties also 
stipulated that, after being abandoned by her friends, Darrow switched to the driver's seat 
and fell asleep with the engine running. Pointedly, we do not know whether Darrow 
started the engine or it was left running by her "friends" when they jumped ship. 
 
Darrow argues that the stipulated facts do not prove attempted operation, i.e., do 
not prove that she tried to move the car. Rather, she claims that those facts are consistent 
with her suggestion that she was simply sleeping in a running car and moved to the 
driver's seat to smoke a cigarette because the passenger side window was broken. One 
might also view Darrow's fumbling with the gear shift lever upon being awakened as a 
dazed person's attempt to comply with the officer's command to turn off the engine, 
rather than an attempt to get the vehicle moving.  
 
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But we do not view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant's 
theory of what might have happened—the State gets that advantage after a factfinder 
convicts the defendant. From that vantage point, the State can point to the following 
facts:  the vehicle's engine was running, i.e., the vehicle was ready to move upon the 
engagement of the transmission; Darrow had previously moved into the driver's seat, i.e., 
she had intentionally placed herself in a position to manipulate the controls necessary to 
move the vehicle and may have been the one to start the engine; and, upon being 
awakened, Darrow reached down and fumbled with the gear shift lever, i.e., she made an 
overt act toward engaging the transmission, which was arguably the last act needed to 
legally "drive" the vehicle.  
 
The State calls our attention to the facts found sufficient in Kendall. There, the 
police found Kendall's truck in the middle of a residential street, with the engine running, 
lights on, and transmission in neutral. Kendall was slumped over the steering wheel, 
wearing his seat belt, with his foot on the brake, but apparently asleep. When he awoke, 
he told the officers that he had not been driving and claimed that someone else had driven 
the vehicle to the location where he was discovered. This court found sufficient evidence 
to support an attempt to operate. 
 
Other cases have looked at similar scenarios. For instance, in State v. Sprague, No. 
105,827, 2012 WL 3822625 (Kan. App. 2012) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 297 
Kan. 1255 (2013), a police officer found a sleeping Sprague slumped over the steering 
wheel in the driver's seat of a truck parked on the side of the street. The truck's engine 
was running, and the radio was playing loudly. Sprague testified that his cousin had 
driven him home from a local bar and he "passed out" in the passenger seat on the way 
home. He could not recall how he ended up in the driver's seat with the engine running. 
In arguing the State failed to prove operation, Sprague conceded the facts proved an 
attempt to operate a vehicle, and the panel noted:  "After all, [the vehicle] was found with 
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him in the driver's seat and the engine running." 2012 WL 3822625, at *7. See also State 
v. Adame, 45 Kan. App. 2d 1124, 1129, 257 P.3d 1266 (holding sufficient evidence 
supported attempt to operate by showing Adame sat on the driver's side of vehicle with 
key in ignition trying to start vehicle), rev. denied 293 Kan. 1108 (2011); State v. 
Stottlemire, No. 105,284, 2011 WL 4357860, at *3 (Kan. App. 2011) (unpublished 
opinion) (holding sufficient evidence supported attempt to operate because the deputy 
saw Stottlemire in driver's seat of parked SUV with key in the ignition and motor running 
and Stottlemire admitted she placed the key in the ignition and started the vehicle); cf. 1 
Erwin, Defense of Drunk Driving Cases § 1.02(1)(c) (2016) ("The fact that the engine is 
running is almost always sufficient to constitute operation, even in a case in which the 
defendant is found sleeping or passed out while sitting behind the wheel of the vehicle.").  
 
Certainly, as the Court of Appeals opined, the facts here present a close case. But 
we are not afforded the luxury of deciding this case on the basis of the inferences we 
would have found most persuasive as a factfinder. As with direct evidence, it is not the 
function of this court to reweigh the circumstantial evidence supporting Darrow's 
conviction versus the circumstantial evidence supporting a not-guilty verdict. See State v. 
Scott, 271 Kan. 103, 107, 21 P.3d 516 (2001) ("The probative values of direct and 
circumstantial evidence are intrinsically similar, and there is no logically sound reason 
for drawing a distinction as to the weight to be assigned to each."). Instead, our function 
is to determine if the direct and circumstantial evidence, viewed in a light most favorable 
to the State, could have reasonably supported a rational factfinder's guilty verdict. Here, 
we are compelled to sustain the integrity of the factfinder's determination and hold the 
evidence was legally sufficient to support the verdict. 
 
Affirmed.  
 
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BEIER, J., not participating. 
MICHAEL J. MALONE, Senior Judge, assigned.1 
 
                                                 
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE:  Senior Judge Malone was appointed to hear case No. 109,397 
vice Justice Beier under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by K.S.A. 20-2616.