Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V TIMOTHY P ZUBKE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 122183

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2003-07-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
                                          
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 16, 2003  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v
 No. 122183  
TIMOTHY P. ZUBKE,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
MARKMAN, J.  
We granted leave to appeal to consider whether, within  
the meaning of MCL 333.7409, defendant’s act that gave rise to  
a federal conviction of conspiracy to possess with intent to  
distribute a controlled substance was the “same act” that  
subsequently gave rise to the state charge of possession with  
  
intent to deliver a controlled substance (PWID).1  The circuit  
court 
dismissed 
all 
state 
charges 
against 
defendant,  
concluding that the state was barred under § 7409 because  
defendant had already been convicted under federal law for the  
“same act.”  The Court of Appeals affirmed.  We reverse the  
judgment of the Court of Appeals because we conclude that, for  
purposes of § 7409, defendant’s act that gave rise to his  
federal 
drug-conspiracy conviction was not the “same act” that  
gave rise to the state PWID charge. 
Accordingly, we remand  
this case to the circuit court for trial on all charges.  
I. BACKGROUND  
On August 10, 2000, federal authorities indicted  
defendant on multiple counts of conspiracy to possess with  
intent to distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana and  
more than 5 kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 USC 841  
and 21 USC 846.
 The indictment alleged a conspiracy  
commencing in January 1993 and continuing through August 10,  
2000. In January 2001, defendant pleaded guilty to a single  
count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute  
cocaine. He was sentenced on May 14, 2001.  
In the meantime, on July 7, 2000, state authorities filed  
the instant charges against defendant.  The complaint alleged  
1 Section 7409 also bars state prosecution when defendant 
has been acquitted under federal law or has been acquitted or 
convicted under the laws of another state for the same act.  
2  
that on July 6, 2000, defendant possessed with intent to  
deliver more than 225 grams, but less than 650 grams, of  
cocaine, in violation of MCL 333.7401, and that he possessed  
a firearm during the commission of this felony, in violation  
of MCL 750.227b.  Defendant was bound over for trial on  
September 15, 2000, and on February 26, 2001, he filed a  
motion to dismiss the state charges. MCL 333.7409 generally  
precludes state prosecutions if the same act has been the  
predicate for a federal prosecution.
 Pursuant to § 7409,  
defendant contended that he could not be prosecuted by the  
state for PWID because he had already been convicted under  
federal law for the “same act.”  His claim was that he fell  
within the protections of § 7409 because the federal drug­
conspiracy conviction involved the same period in which the  
PWID allegedly occurred. On March 23, 2001, the circuit court  
granted defendant’s motion and dismissed all state charges  
against him, finding that the state prosecution was barred by  
§ 7409.  
The prosecutor appealed by right, and on July 30, 2002,  
the Court of Appeals, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed.2  
This Court granted the prosecutor’s application for leave to  
2 Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued July 30, 2002 
(Docket No. 234130).  
3  
 
 
appeal.3  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
We review de novo a trial court’s decision that involves  
statutory interpretation.  People v Thousand, 465 Mich 149,  
156; 631 NW2d 694 (2001).  
III. ANALYSIS 
 MCL 333.7409 provides:  
If 
a 
violation 
of 
this 
article 
[the 
controlled-substances act] is a violation of  
federal law or the law of another state, a  
conviction or acquittal under federal law or the 
law of another state for the same act is a bar to  
prosecution in this state. [Emphasis added.]  
We must determine whether, for purposes of § 7409, defendant’s  
act that gave rise to the federal drug-conspiracy conviction  
was the “same act” that gave rise to the state PWID charge.  
An “act” is defined as, “[a] thing done; a deed.”  The  
New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. 
Thus, a court, for  
purposes of § 7409, must determine whether defendant’s “thing  
done,” or “deed,” that gave rise to his federal conviction  
constitutes the same “thing done” or “deed” that gave rise to  
the state charge.4
 If it does not, then § 7409 does not  
operate to bar the state prosecution.  
3 467 Mich 921 (2002).  
4 In making this determination, the circuit court must 
examine the underlying facts and circumstances of each 
individual case.  
4  
 
 
Applying this rule to this case, we conclude that the  
state charge did not violate the “same act” prohibition of  
§ 7409.  The “thing done” or “deed” that gave rise to the  
federal conspiracy conviction was the entering into an  
agreement to possess cocaine, whereas the “thing done” or  
“deed” that gave rise to the state PWID charge was defendant’s  
actual physical possession or control of the cocaine. Thus,  
because the act giving rise to each charge was different, such  
acts were not, for purposes of § 7409, the “same act.”  
In affirming the circuit court’s decision to dismiss the  
charges against defendant, the Court of Appeals relied on its  
decision in People v Aliva (On Remand), 229 Mich App 247, 250­
251; 582 NW2d 838 (1998), in which the Court affirmed a  
decision of a trial court to dismiss a charge, concluding that  
under § 7409 such a charge arose out of the “same acts” as  
those that formed the basis of the federal conviction.  There,  
as 
here, 
defendant 
pleaded guilty to a federal drug-conspiracy  
charge and then moved to have the state PWID charge dismissed.  
The trial court agreed with defendant and dismissed the state  
charges.  On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that, although  
the 
federal 
conspiracy conviction did not constitute the “same  
offense” as the state PWID charge, the state PWID charge “arose  
out of the same acts as those that formed the basis of the  
federal drug conviction,” and thus the state prosecution was  
5  
 
 
barred by § 7409. Id. at 251.  
For the same reasons we find that the Court of Appeals  
erred in this case, we find that the Avila Court erred. As in  
this case, the act or conduct that gave rise to Avila’s  
federal drug-conspiracy conviction was his entering into an  
agreement to possess drugs, whereas the act or conduct that  
gave rise to Avila’s state PWID charge was his physical  
possession or control of the drugs.  Thus, because the act or  
conduct giving rise to each charge was different, such acts or  
conduct were not, for purposes of § 7409, the “same act.”  
Section 7409 bars the state from prosecuting a defendant  
where he has already been prosecuted under federal law for the  
“same act,” not for the “same offense.”  Therefore, it is a  
defendant’s actions that must be compared, not the elements of  
the crimes.5  
In sum, § 7409 bars the state from prosecuting a  
defendant where that defendant has already been convicted  
under federal law for the “same act.”  Accordingly, if the act  
that gave rise to the federal conviction is the “same act”  
that gave rise to the state charge, i.e., the same “thing  
done” or “deed,” the state prosecution is barred.  However, if  
the act that gave rise to the federal conviction is not the  
5 Here, the act of possessing is not subsumed within the 
act of conspiring, nor is the act of conspiring subsumed 
within the act of possessing.  
6  
   
 
“same act” that gave rise to the state charge, the state  
prosecution is not barred.  
IV. CONCLUSION  
For purposes of § 7409, defendant’s act that gave rise to  
his federal drug-conspiracy conviction was not the “same act”  
that gave rise to the state PWID charge. 
Accordingly, we  
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this  
case to the trial court for trial on all state charges.  
Stephen J. Markman 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr.  
CAVANAGH, J.  
I concur in the result only.  
Michael F. Cavanagh  
7  
___________________________________ 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
No. 122183  
TIMOTHY P. ZUBKE,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
I respectfully dissent and would hold that MCL 333.7409  
bars the state prosecution in this case because the same  
criminal act "gave rise" to both the federal and the state  
charges.  Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the Court  
of Appeals.  
I do not dispute the majority's contention that the only  
necessary element of the federal conspiracy charge is an  
agreement to possess cocaine.  However, the elements of the  
crime are not at issue here; the majority stresses that the  
  
question is whether "defendant's act that gave rise to the  
federal drug-conspiracy conviction was the 'same act' that  
gave rise to the state PWID charge."1 
Ante at 4. It is my  
conclusion that the act that gave rise to the PWID charge was  
part of the basis for the federal conspiracy conviction.  
By the majority's own terminology, the question is not  
whether the act is necessary for the federal conviction, but  
whether it "gave rise" to the federal conviction.  "In making  
this determination, the circuit court must examine the  
underlying facts and circumstances of each individual case."  
Ante at 4 n 4. In the words of the majority:  
Applying this rule to this case, we conclude 
that the state charge did not violate § 7409's 
"same act" prohibition.  The "thing done" or "deed" 
that gave rise to the federal conspiracy conviction 
was the entering into an agreement to possess 
cocaine, whereas the "thing done" or "deed" that 
gave rise to the state PWID charge was defendant’s 
actual physical possession or control of the  
cocaine.  Thus, because the act giving rise to each 
charge was different, such acts were not, for 
purposes of § 7409, the "same act."  [Ante at 5.]  
The "underlying facts and circumstances" here do not  
support the majority's conclusion.  As the majority noted, the  
federal 
indictment 
charged 
a 
conspiracy 
"commencing 
in 
January  
1993 and continuing through August 10, 2000."  Ante at 2. The  
1I would note that the prosecution did not propose this 
analysis. In fact, the prosecutor relied on the distinction 
between the elements of the crimes and made no argument at all 
that involved these particular facts.  
2  
 
incident that formed the basis of the instant charges occurred  
within that period, on July 6, 2000. In addition, Assistant  
United States Attorney Ross Parker submitted an affidavit  
stating that "it was the government's intention to proffer  
evidence of [this incident] in federal court as part of its  
case in chief had [defendant] gone to trial."  
Therefore, there is ample evidence that the July 6  
incident was an integral part of the federal conspiracy case.  
As the Court of Appeals noted, there is a "general practice of  
federal prosecutors to prove conspiracies with evidence of  
overt acts of the underlying substantive crime, even in the  
absence of an overt act requirement.  See [People v Mass, 464  
Mich 615, 650; 628 NW2d 540 (2001)] (Markman J., concurring)."  
Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued July 30, 2002 (Docket  
No. 234130) at 4.  
One might question whether the Court of Appeals was  
correct in concluding that the "state substantive crime [was  
thus] a functional element of the federal conspiracy crime .  
. . ."  Id.  However, it is beyond dispute that it was correct  
in stating that overt acts form a partial basis for the  
convictions obtained in most federal conspiracy cases. They  
are used to prove the existence of the conspiracy agreement.  
If a federal case required proof of a certain act to obtain a  
conviction, that act "gave rise" to the federal conviction.  
3  
 
 
This is not to say that a federal conspiracy prosecution  
is an absolute bar to state charges for offenses that bear  
some relation to the conspiracy. 
For instance, if the  
incident at issue here had occurred outside the time frame  
stated in the federal indictment, there would be no bar.  
Moreover, if the act were not to be used as evidence in the  
federal case, there would be no bar.  
Here, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded on the  
basis of the evidence submitted that the same act gave rise to  
part of both the federal and the state charges:  
[D]efendant explained that the July 6, 2000, 
incident occurred within the same time frame as the  
events forming the basis of the federal conspiracy 
charge, both charges were based on the acts of 
defendant in purchasing controlled substances in 
Texas and selling the controlled substances to drug 
dealers in the Detroit metropolitan area, and the 
federal government had planned on using the July 6, 
2000, incident as part of its case-in-chief against 
defendant.  Defendant submitted with his motion and  
his brief on appeal an affidavit by the Assistant 
United States Attorney prosecuting the federal 
charges, who stated that the government intended to 
offer, as part of its case-in-chief, evidence of 
the June-July 2000 criminal acts as overt acts in 
furtherance of the conspiracy. [Slip op at 3.]  
Given the appropriate test, the Court of Appeals engaged  
in the correct analysis. Specifically, the "underlying facts  
and circumstances" tend to show that the July 6 incident  
formed part of the basis for the federal conspiracy  
conviction.  The prosecutor makes no argument in support of a  
4  
different 
conclusion, 
instead 
focusing 
on 
the 
general 
elements  
of each crime, an argument inapposite to the test articulated  
by the majority.  
In this case, the federal prosecutor chose to make the  
incident at issue part of the factual basis for defendant's  
conspiracy conviction.  The prosecutor might have avoided  
including it, seeking a conviction based on a simple  
conspiracy agreement, without any evidence of defendant's  
acts.  But, given the undisputed fact that the July 6 incident  
was part of the purported conspiracy proofs, I conclude that  
the incident "gave rise" to the conspiracy conviction.  
Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the Court of  
Appeals.  
Marilyn Kelly  
5