Case Title: Ingato v. Wilmington College

Citation: 

Docket Number: 92, 2005

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JOHN M. INGATO,
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No. 92, 2005
Plaintiff Below,
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Appellant,
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v.
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Court Below:  
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Superior Court
WILMINGTON COLLEGE, INC.,
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of the State of Delaware
a Delaware corporation,
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in and for New Castle County
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C.A. No. 03C-05-87
Defendants Below,
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Appellee.
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Submitted: July 27, 2005
Decided: August 22, 2005
Before BERGER, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices.
O R D E R
This 22  day of August, 2005, on consideration of the briefs of the parties, it
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appears to the Court that:
1) John M. Ingato appeals from a Superior Court decision granting summary
judgment to Wilmington College, Inc. in this personal injury action.  Ingato was a
full-time student studying aviation management at Wilmington College in February
2002, when he was injured in a plane crash.  The College’s aviation management
program required, among other things, that students receive Federal Aviation
Authority (FAA) Certification.  According to Ingato, the College did not require that
he enroll in flight training at Sky Safety, Inc., but the College’s program coordinator
594 A.2d 506 (1991).
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Id. at 522.
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recommended that flight school over the other two flight schools listed in the
College’s materials.
3) Ingato began flight training at Sky Safety in the summer of 2001. He
contracted with and paid Sky Safety directly.  The flight school used its own
materials, facilities and instructors.  Although the College had discussed forming some
sort of association with Sky Safety, nothing came of those discussions. As a result,
there was never any business relationship between the two entities, and the College
had no control over any aspect of Sky Safety’s operations.
4) In Furek v. University of Delaware,  this Court considered the relationship
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between colleges and students.  The Court explained that the doctrine of in loco
parentis, which imposed on colleges a broad duty to protect students, is no longer
recognized.   Nonetheless, the relationship between colleges and students is close
enough to require that colleges “regulate and supervise foreseeable dangerous
activities occurring on [their] property.”   Thus, because the University was aware of
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the dangers of fraternity hazing, and had a policy against hazing, it assumed a duty to
protect its students from hazing injuries.
893 P.2d 55 (Ariz. App. 1995).
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376 F.Supp. 1324 (M.D. Pa 1974).
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See: Restatement (Second) Torts § 413 (1965). 
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5) Ingato relies on Furek in arguing that the College assumed a duty to protect
him from the inherent dangers of flight training.  He also cites Delbridge v. Maricopa
County Community College District  and the “peculiar risk doctrine” as bases for
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imposing liability on the College. We conclude that, as in Stephenson v. College
Misericordia,  the record provides no basis on which to impose liability on the
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College.
6) Furek is inapposite because: i) there is no evidence that flight training is a
dangerous activity that the College attempted to regulate; and  ii) the injury did not
occur on the College’s property.  Delbridge, likewise, fails to support Ingato’s claim.
In that case, a student was injured while taking an off-campus construction class.  The
student registered at the college and paid the college to take the class; the student
received grade reports from the college; the college set the curriculum; the college
paid the instructor; and the college had the authority to terminate the instructor.  None
of these facts is present in Ingato’s case. The “peculiar risk doctrine” is inapplicable
because the College never employed Sky Safety.5
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7) Stephenson v. College Misericordia, by contrast, presents a similar fact
pattern and guides the result here.  In  Stephenson, a student was injured while
attending an independent riding school in order to satisfy her college’s physical
education requirement.  The student selected and paid the riding school, and the
college had no business relationship with or control over the riding school’s
operations. Under those circumstances, the court held that the college owed no duty
to the student in connection with her riding injury.  
8) We conclude that, following Furek and Stephenson, the College owed no
duty to protect Ingato from the negligence of Sky Safety’s flight instructor.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court be, and the same hereby is, AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Carolyn Berger
Justice