Case Title: Orchard v. State Dep't of Transp.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0084

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2011-10-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
MARK ORCHARD v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION2011 WY 145Case Number: No. S-11-0084Decided: 10/20/2011NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2011
MARK 
ORCHARD,
Appellant 
(Plaintiff),
 
v.
 
THE STATE OF WYOMING, 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
Appellee 
(Defendant)
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Carbon County
The 
Honorable Wade E. Waldrip, Judge

 
Representing 
Appellant:
R. Michael Vang, 
Fleener & Vang, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Gregory A. Phillips, 
Attorney General; Robin Sessions Cooley, Deputy Attorney General; Douglas J. 
Moench, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Michael T. Kahler, Assistant Attorney 
General.
 

Before KITE, C.J., 
and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.
 
BURKE, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]        
Appellant, 
Mark Orchard, was arrested for driving while under the influence of 
alcohol.  As a result, the Wyoming 
Department of Transportation advised him that it was suspending his driver’s 
license pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102.  Appellant contested the suspension 
before the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), and the OAH upheld the 
suspension.  He sought review in the 
district court, and the court affirmed the OAH’s order.  Appellant challenges the district 
court’s order, contending that the police officer who arrested him lacked 
reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop.  We affirm.
 
ISSUE
 
[¶2]      
Appellant presents 
the following issue:
 
1.    
The only issue 
presented for appeal is whether or not the arresting officer presented 
sufficient facts within his Officer’s Signed Statement and certified record to 
support his claim that he received an anonymous REDDI report and observed 
sufficient facts while on routine traffic patrol that would allow the arresting 
officer to make contact with the Licensee and ultimately arrest him for “driving 
while under the influence of alcohol” (DWUI).
 
The Wyoming 
Department of Transportation (WYDOT) phrases the issues as 
follows:
 
1.    
Did the OAH correctly 
conclude that [the arresting officer] had reasonable suspicion to initiate a 
traffic stop on Appellant?
 
2.    
Did the OAH correctly 
conclude that [the arresting officer] had probable cause to arrest Appellant for 
driving while under the influence of alcohol?
 
FACTS
 
[¶3]        
On December 17, 2009, 
an officer of the Baggs Police Department received a Report Every Drunk Driver 
Immediately (REDDI) alert involving a purple Dodge pickup traveling north from 
Cowpoke Lane in Baggs, Wyoming.  A 
short time later, the officer passed a vehicle with the same description driving 
south through town.  According to 
the officer’s narrative report, as he was passing the pickup he observed the 
vehicle cross the double yellow centerline.  The officer turned around to follow and 
noticed that the driver failed to use a turn signal when turning right into a 
gas station.  The officer activated 
his emergency lights and initiated a traffic stop.
 
[¶4]        
As the officer exited 
his patrol car, Appellant left the pickup and walked toward the officer.  Appellant exhibited poor balance and had 
difficulty walking.  Upon making 
contact with Appellant, the officer detected a strong odor of alcohol on his 
breath.  Appellant stated that he 
had been drinking at a local establishment.  The officer requested that Appellant 
perform field sobriety maneuvers, including the horizontal gaze nystagmus, one 
leg stand, and walk and turn tests.  Appellant stated that he would not be 
able to pass, but agreed to perform the tests.  The officer’s report indicated that, 
during the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, Appellant lacked smooth pursuit in 
both eyes and sustained distinct nystagmus at maximum deviation.  Appellant was unable to complete the 
other tests.  The officer then asked 
Appellant to submit to a preliminary breath test, which he refused.  Based on the officer’s observations 
during the traffic stop and Appellant’s performance on the field sobriety tests, 
the officer placed him under arrest for driving while under the influence of 
alcohol.  A breath test was 
subsequently administered at the Carbon County jail, which showed that Appellant 
had a .135% blood alcohol content.
 
[¶5]        
WYDOT notified 
Appellant of its intent to suspend his driver’s license for driving while under 
the influence, as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102.  Appellant requested a contested case 
hearing, and a hearing was held on March 4, 2010.  Appellant appeared via telephone and the 
Department relied on its certified record, which included the arresting 
officer’s narrative report.  Appellant contested the officer’s version 
of the events, arguing that the officer had not made contact with him until 
three to five minutes after he had parked his vehicle to get gas.  Appellant presented three video 
recordings of the arrest, two of which were taken from the arresting officer’s 
dashboard camera, and another that was taken from an assisting officer’s camera. 
 He noted that none of the 
recordings actually showed him driving or showed the officer’s initial contact 
with him.  
 
[¶6]        
Each of the videos of 
the incident appears to have been taken after Appellant was stopped at the gas 
station.  The first video was taken 
from a moveable camera that was initially inside the arresting officer’s 
vehicle.  The hearing examiner noted 
that the video was “not very helpful because the camera was continuously moving 
around, as if [the arresting officer] believed it was not activated.”  The hearing examiner also noted that, in 
the video, Appellant “repeatedly asked if he could be given a break and 
repeatedly stated that he had too much to drink and would not be able to do the 
field sobriety maneuvers.”  The 
second video, which was taken from inside of the arresting officer’s vehicle, 
showed Appellant during transport to the detention facility after his 
arrest.  In this video, Appellant 
asked the arresting officer why he was stopped, and the officer told Appellant 
that he stopped him for drifting over the centerline and for failing to use his 
turn signal when turning into the gas station.  The third video was taken from the 
assisting officer’s vehicle, which arrived on the scene after the 
stop.
 
[¶7]        
Appellant also 
presented testimony of a witness who stated that she observed the arresting 
officer receive the REDDI alert at a restaurant in Baggs, and that she 
subsequently observed the officer’s vehicle with its overhead lights illuminated 
and Appellant’s pickup parked at the gas station.  Appellant argued that this testimony 
indicated that the officer had not observed him driving his vehicle.  Finally, Appellant noted that both the 
time of the incident and the time it was reported were listed as 8:48 p.m. on 
the arresting officer’s case report.  
Based on this evidence, Appellant asserted that the Department did not 
prove that the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop 
because the officer had lied about observing Appellant crossing the double 
yellow centerline and about observing Appellant failing to use his turn 
signal.
 
[¶8]        
The hearing examiner 
found the officer’s statements to be more credible than Appellant’s version of 
the events and explained:
 
            
14.       
This Office disagrees with counsel for Orchard.  The alleged inconsistencies in the 
timing of the REDDI Report and [the arresting officer’s] contact with Orchard 
are not sufficient to refute [the arresting officer’s] sworn statements 
regarding his observation of traffic violations.  In addition, Orchard’s testimony was 
less credible than [the arresting officer’s] more contemporaneous written report 
due to Orchard’s undisputed intoxication and [the witness’s] testimony did not 
have any bearing on what occurred while [the arresting officer] was driving past 
Orchard just prior to stopping Orchard because she was still in the 
restaurant.  Finally, Orchard did 
not subpoena [the arresting officer] and did not properly challenge his sworn 
statements.
 
The hearing examiner 
ultimately determined that the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion to 
initiate the traffic stop because he “properly corroborated the REDDI Report by 
observing driving indicative of impairment and observed Orchard commit two 
traffic infractions, crossing over the double yellow centerline and failing to 
use a turn signal while turning into the Conoco station parking lot.”1 
 
[¶9]        
The district court 
upheld the hearing examiner’s decision, finding “no reason to reverse the 
conclusions of the Office of Administrative Hearings in determining that, based 
on the facts as found by the Hearing Officer, [the arresting officer] had 
reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop of Mr. Orchard.”  Appellant subsequently filed this timely 
appeal.
 
STANDARD OF 
REVIEW
 
[¶10]     
When we consider an 
appeal from a district court’s review of an administrative agency’s decision, we 
review the case as if it had come directly from the administrative agency.  Batten v. Wyo. DOT Drivers’ License 
Div., 2007 WY 173, ¶ 6, 170 P.3d 1236, 1239 (Wyo. 
2007).  Review of an administrative 
agency’s action is governed by the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, which 
provides that the reviewing court shall:
 
(ii) Hold unlawful 
and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:
(A) Arbitrary, capricious, an 
abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law;          
(B) Contrary 
to constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;      (C) In excess of statutory 
jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory right;           
(D) Without 
observance of procedure required by law; or(E) Unsupported by substantial 
evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by 
statute.          

 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2009).  We 
apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the hearing examiner’s 
findings of fact.  Batten, ¶ 12, 170 P.3d  at 
1241.
 
Substantial evidence 
is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support 
a conclusion. [Bradshaw v. Wyo. Dep’t of 
Transp. Drivers’ License Div., 2006 WY 70, ¶ 11, 135 P.3d 612, 616 (Wyo. 
2006).]  Phrased another way, 
“[f]indings of fact are supported by substantial evidence if, from the evidence 
preserved in the record, we can conclude a reasonable mind might accept the 
evidence as adequate to support the agency findings.”  Id.           

Id., ¶ 7, 170 P.3d  at 1240.  We review the agency’s conclusions of 
law de novo. Id.
DISCUSSION
 
[¶11]     
The Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution protects persons from unreasonable searches 
and seizures.  A routine traffic 
stop constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment “even 
though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite 
brief.”  Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 9, 64 P.3d 700, 704 
(Wyo. 2003).  The decision to stop 
an automobile is justified when the officer has probable cause to believe a 
traffic violation has occurred or when the officer has a reasonable articulable 
suspicion that the particular motorist is engaged in criminal activity.  Harvey v. State, 2011 WY 72, ¶ 9, 250 P.3d 167, 171 
(Wyo. 2011); Frazier v. State, 2010 WY 107, ¶ 16, 236 P.3d 295, 300 (Wyo. 2010). 
 An officer’s personal observation 
of a traffic violation provides probable cause to initiate a stop.  
Tiernan v. State, 2011 
WY 143, ¶ 12, ___ P.3d      , ___ (Wyo. 
2011); Fertig v. State, 2006 WY 148, ¶ 27, 146 P.3d 492, 501 (Wyo. 2006).   
 
[¶12]     
An 
investigatory stop may be justified by reasonable suspicion where a police 
officer is “able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken 
together with rational inferences [drawn] from those facts, reasonably warrant 
that intrusion.” McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Wyo. 
1999).  We have said that
 
            
Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon both the 
content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability. Both 
factors -- quantity and quality -- are considered in the “totality of the 
circumstances -- the whole picture,” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 
417, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981), that must be taken into account 
when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion.    
Id., 988 P.2d  at 1075 (quoting Alabama v. 
White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 2416, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301 
(1990)).  In cases where reasonable 
suspicion originates from an anonymous informant’s tip to the police, we have 
held that the tip may provide reasonable suspicion for an investigatory stop if 
it carries sufficient “indicia of reliability.”  McChesney, 988 P.2d  at 1076.  Where an anonymous informant makes no 
prediction of future behavior indicating “a special familiarity with the 
respondent’s affairs,” the investigating officer is required to corroborate the 
tip in some other fashion, usually by observing either a traffic violation or 
driving indicative of impairment.  
Id. (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S.  at 332, 110 
S.Ct. at 2417).
 
[¶13]     
In the present case, 
the arresting officer’s narrative stated that, as he passed a vehicle matching 
the description in the REDDI report, he “noticed that the vehicle drifted over 
the double yellow centerline on Hwy 789.”  The officer further stated that he 
“turned around to follow the vehicle, and I then noticed that they did not 
activate their blinker when turning right into Sheppard’s Conoco.”2  The officer activated his emergency 
overhead lights and initiated a traffic stop of Appellant’s 
vehicle.
 
[¶14]     
Appellant does not 
dispute that the officer’s observations, as presented in his narrative report, 
provide sufficient justification for a stop.  He contends, however, that the officer 
did not see Appellant driving his vehicle.  
He argues that the video recordings of the traffic stop and the witness 
testimony indicate that “the officer never saw a traffic violation and simply 
approached [Appellant] as he was gassing up his car for the next morning and his 
car happened to match a REDDI report.”  
Appellant’s argument presents a question of fact.  Accordingly, we determine whether 
substantial evidence exists to support the hearing examiner’s 
findings.
 
[¶15]     
The hearing examiner 
determined that the alleged inconsistencies in the arresting officer’s statement 
were not sufficient to disprove the State’s prima facie case.  The hearing examiner explained that 
decision as follows:
 
First, [the arresting 
officer] was not subpoenaed to testify at hearing and the burden of challenging 
the veracity or validity of an officer’s testimony or sworn statements rests 
squarely on the driver.  [Department of Revenue and Taxation v.] Hull, 751 P.2d [351,] 356 [(Wyo. 
1988)].  An officer must be properly 
subpoenaed to testify when the decision is made to challenge such 
statements.  Id.  In general, when the driver fails to 
properly challenge the officer’s statements, this Office will not reject the 
officer’s statements or their presumption of validity as provided by statute, 
rules and regulations.  Second, [the 
arresting officer’s] sworn statements in his Narrative were more credible than 
Orchard’s testimony because [the arresting officer’s] statements were made more 
contemporaneously and Orchard’s testimony was based upon his memory from an 
evening when he was admittedly intoxicated.  Third, the alleged inconsistency in the 
time of the REDDI Report to the Carbon County Sheriff’s Department and [the 
arresting officer’s] time of initial contact with Orchard was not sufficient to 
demonstrate [the arresting officer] fabricated his sworn Narrative, especially 
in light of the failure to call [the arresting officer] or the dispatcher from 
the Sheriff’s Department as witnesses to attempt to explain the alleged 
inconsistency.  Fourth, [the 
witness’s] testimony did not have any bearing on what occurred while [the 
arresting officer] was driving past Orchard just prior to stopping Orchard 
because she was still in the restaurant at the time.  Finally, although the videos were of 
poor quality and not very professionally made, the videos were consistent with 
[the arresting officer’s] Narrative.  
In fact, during the second video, [the arresting officer] told Orchard he 
stopped him for drifting over the centerline and for failing to use his turn 
signal when he turned into the Conoco station, which corroborated [the arresting 
officer’s] Signed Statement and Narrative.
 
In sum, the hearing 
examiner considered the evidence presented by Appellant, weighed the credibility 
of the witnesses, and concluded that the arresting officer had, in fact, 
observed Appellant in his vehicle before initiating a traffic stop.  
 
[¶16]     
We conclude that the 
hearing examiner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, and that 
those findings support a determination that the stop of Appellant’s vehicle was 
reasonable under either a reasonable suspicion or probable cause analysis.  As noted above, an observed violation of 
a traffic law, by itself, provides an officer with probable cause to initiate a 
traffic stop.  Observation of 
traffic violations may also provide sufficient corroboration of a REDDI report 
to justify an intrusion based on reasonable suspicion that a motorist is driving 
while under the influence.  The 
arresting officer’s signed statement indicated that he observed Appellant commit 
two traffic violations, and the statement was supported by the videos presented 
at the contested case hearing.  In 
one of the recordings, Appellant can be heard asking the officer why he was 
stopped.  This statement indicates 
that Appellant was indeed “stopped” by the officer, and it appears to contradict 
Appellant’s claim that he had been parked at the gas station for three to five 
minutes before being approached by the officer.  Further, in response to Appellant’s 
inquiry as to why he was stopped, the officer stated that he stopped him for 
drifting over the centerline and failing to use his turn 
signal.
 
[¶17]     
In addition, the 
testimony from the witness who was present when the arresting officer received 
the REDDI alert does not contradict any material fact set forth in the arresting 
officer’s narrative.  Although the 
witness’s statements may create a dispute as to whether the officer received the 
report while he was “on routine patrol,” this alleged inconsistency in the 
officer’s narrative does not negate the possibility that the officer observed 
Appellant between the time that the officer left the restaurant and stopped 
Appellant at the gas station.  

 
[¶18]     
Having reviewed the 
entire record, we find no reason to 
depart from our usual deference to a lower tribunal’s credibility 
determinations.  See, e.g., Hittner v. State ex rel. Wyo. DOT (In re Hittner), 2008 WY 91, ¶ 16, 189 P.3d 872, 877 
(Wyo. 2008).  As we have repeatedly 
stated, “Our job is not to re-weigh the evidence or determine credibility of 
witnesses. That is the responsibility of the finder of fact.”  Batten, ¶ 20, 170 P.3d  at 1243. 
The Department of Transportation’s certified record, which included the 
arresting officer’s signed statement, constitutes relevant evidence that a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the determination that the 
arresting officer had probable cause or reasonable suspicion to initiate a 
traffic stop of Appellant’s vehicle.
 
[¶19]     
Finally, Appellant 
contends that the arresting officer did not have probable cause to make an 
arrest.  Appellant, however, did not 
raise this issue in the proceedings before the OAH.  We recently reiterated that, “With the 
exception of certain jurisdictional or fundamental issues, we will not consider 
issues raised for the first time on appeal.”  Street v. Street, 2009 WY 85, ¶ 17, 211 P.3d 495, 501 
(Wyo. 2009).  We have held that 
“This rule is equally applicable to appeals from administrative decisions as to 
those from district courts.”  BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 2006 WY 27, ¶ 18, 130 P.3d 438, 462 (Wyo. 2006).  Appellant has made no argument and has 
offered no authority indicating that he presents a “jurisdictional” or 
“fundamental” issue.  Consequently, 
we do not address the issue of whether the officer had probable cause to arrest 
Appellant.
[¶20]     
Affirmed.
 
FOOTNOTES
 
1Although the hearing 
examiner concluded that the arresting officer had “reasonable suspicion” to 
initiate the stop, we note that the decision to stop a motorist may also be 
based on probable cause.  See infra, ¶¶ 
11-12.
 
2In his report, the 
officer did not indicate which statutes Appellant may have violated.  However, the officer’s observations 
suggest violations of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-5-207, governing “No-passing zones,” 
§ 31-5-209, titled “Driving on roadways laned for traffic,” and § 31-5-217, 
governing “Turning movements and required signals.”  In any event, Appellant does not dispute 
that crossing the centerline and failing to use a turn signal are traffic 
violations.