Case Title: Baskin v. State ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-07-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
Baskin v. State ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div.1986 WY 150722 P.2d 151Case Number: 85-198Decided: 07/10/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
James T. BASKIN, 
Appellant (Employee-Claimant),

v.

STATE of Wyoming, ex rel., 
WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee (Respondent), Hicklin Sod Farm, 
Appellee (Employer-Defendant).

Appeal from District 
Court, LaramieCounty, Alan B. Johnson, 
J.

Daniel E. White, 
Vines, Rideout, Gusea & White, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneison, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and Terry J. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee State of Wyo. 

Carole Shotwell, 
Whitehead, Zunker, Gage, Davidson & Shotwell, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellee 
Hicklin.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE and MACY, 
JJ., and TAYLOR, District Judge.

THOMAS, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal is taken 
from the denial of a claim for worker's compensation benefits. The significant 
question to be resolved is the constitutionality of the exception of "ranching 
or agriculture" from the extra-hazardous occupations of teaming and truck 
driving and motor delivery as defined in § 27-12-106(a)(xviii) and (xix), W.S. 
1977. The constitutionality of § 27-12-102(a)(xvi), W.S. 1977, which permits an 
employer engaged in "power farming" to elect coverage under the Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Act also is raised as an issue. In addition Baskin questions 
whether his employment in fact was in agriculture or ranching so as to permit 
the invocation of the exceptions. The district court entered an order denying 
worker's compensation benefits. We affirm that order and hold the statute is 
constitutional and was applied correctly in this case.

[¶2.]     Baskin was an employee 
of Hicklin Sod Farm which produces lawn sod in addition to other agricultural 
products. Hicklin Sod Farm owns and operates a tractor-trailer unit which it 
uses for delivery of lawn sod. Baskin was injured while delivering sod from 
LaramieCounty to Rock Springs. The accident which resulted in 
his injury was caused by a blow-out of a front tire. Baskin filed a claim for 
worker's compensation benefits, and the employer denied that Baskin's claim was 
covered by the worker's compensation statutes.

[¶3.]     Hicklin Sod Farm took 
the position that it was engaged in "ranching or agriculture". It then relied 
upon the exceptions from extrahazardous occupations which are set forth in § 
27-12-106(a), W.S. 1977, in this pertinent language:

"The extrahazardous 
occupations and employees to which this act [§§ 27-12-101 through 27-12-804] 
applies are:

* * * * * 
*

"(xviii) Teaming and 
truck driving, except in connection with ranching or 
agriculture;

"(xix) Motor delivery, 
including drivers and helpers in connection with any occupation except 
agriculture or ranching; * * *."

The record 
discloses that Baskin's duties consisted primarily of transporting sod, but when 
occasion required he also bailed hay, did fencing, cleaned the shop, maintained 
machinery and piled and hauled sod pallets. The district court concluded that 
Baskin was engaged in "ranching or agriculture" and then held that he was not 
covered by the provisions of the worker's compensation statutes at the time of 
his injury. Baskin has appealed from that decision of the trial 
court.

[¶4.]     In his brief Baskin 
states the issues to be addressed in this way:

"I. Should the agricultural exemption provided in W.S. § 
27-12-106(a)(xviii) and (xix) apply in this case where the character of the 
appellant's work was primarily non-agricultural?

"II. Does the 
agricultural exemption provided in W.S. § 27-12-106(a)(xviii) and (xix) violate 
the appellant's rights to due process and equal protection of law guaranteed to 
him under the Constitutions of the United States of America and the State of 
Wyoming?

"III. Does the 
agricultural exemption available under W.S. § 27-12-102(a)(xvi) violate Article 
10, Section 4 and Article 3, Section 27 of the Wyoming 
Constitution?"

Hicklin Sod 
Farm, as appellee, presents this statement of the issues for 
decision:

"A. The facts in the case 
at bar require the district court's ruling be upheld that the agricultural 
exemption provided in Wyoming Statute 27-12-106(a)(xviii) and (xix) applies 
where appellant was injured while engaged in agricultural labor. 

"B. The agricultural 
exemption in Wyoming Statute 27-12-106(a)(xviii) and (xix) does not violate 
either the due process or the equal protection clause of the Wyoming or United States 
Constitutions.

"C. The agricultural 
exemption under Wyoming Statute 27-12-102(a)(xvi) does not violate either Art. 
10, § 4 or Art. 3, § 27 of the Wyoming Constitution."

The State of 
Wyoming has 
also appeared as an appellee, and it asks that these issues be 
addressed:

"I. Section 
27-12-106(a)(xviii) and (xix), W.S. 1977, does not constitute a denial of equal 
protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United 
States.

"II. Section 
27-12-102(a)(xvi), W.S. 1977, does not violate either Article 10, Section 4, or 
Article 3, Section 27 of the Wyoming Constitution."

[¶5.]     In his initial 
contention Baskin urges the proposition that the exception for "ranching or 
agriculture" should not be applied in his instance because his work primarily 
was different from traditional ranching or agricultural activities. Baskin is 
misguided in presenting this argument, however, because in the law of worker's 
compensation, determinations of whether an employee is or is not engaged in 
extrahazardous employment are made by reference to the employer's business. 1C 
Larson, Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 53.31, p. 9-153 (1986). In this 
instance there is no real dispute over the fact that the employer's business is 
an agricultural enterprise. The district court found that the sod delivery in 
which Baskin was engaged at the time of the accident resulting in his injuries 
was an integral part of that agricultural enterprise. We perceive Baskin's 
argument as a contest of this factual determination, but we have held that 
whether the claimant was involved in an extra-hazardous occupation is a fact 
question for the trial court. Randell v. WyomingState 
Treasurer ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Division, Wyo., 671 P.2d 303 (1983). We also held in 
that case that the determination of the trial court is to be upheld if it is 
supported by substantial evidence.

[¶6.]     The general rule is 
that if the employer does not engage in extrahazardous activities, then whether 
the individual employee's activities are hazardous in nature is not material to 
this determination. Randell v. Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Wyoming Worker's 
Compensation Division, supra, citing 1C Larson, Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 
55.41, p. 9-235 (1982). Baskin cites to us In re Merritt's Claim, Wyo., 455 P.2d 661, 664 
(1969), in which this court said:

"[T]he term `motor 
delivery' brought within the coverage of the law as an extrahazardous occupation 
the driving of an employer's motor vehicle ordinarily used and being used in a 
merchandising business for the delivery or hauling of the employer's goods and 
merchandise."

We accept this 
principle as well as the proposition that some phases of a business may be 
covered and others not. Randell v. Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Division, supra. We held in Herring v. Welltech, Inc., 
Wyo., 660 P.2d 361, 365 (1983), reh. denied 715 P.2d 553 (1986), however, that "[i]n construing 
a statute, words must be given their plain and ordinary meaning." In this case, 
§ 27-13-106(a)(xviii) and (xix), W.S. 1977, clearly exempt from the 
extrahazardous employments covered by the worker's compensation statutes teaming 
and truck driving and motor delivery in connection with ranching or agriculture. 
In a 1939 case we held that the marketing of hay was within the agricultural 
pursuit. In re Roby, 54 Wyo. 439, 93 P.2d 940 (1939). Consistently 
with that determination we hold that in this case the activity in which the 
employee was involved was covered by the exception for ranching or agriculture. 
There was substantial evidence that delivery of sod to its customers was an 
integral part of the business operations of Hicklin Sod Farm. That is what 
Baskin was doing when he was injured, and the trial court did not err in 
concluding that he was not a covered employee within the meaning of the 
statute.

[¶7.]     Baskin argues that this 
result is not consistent with the proposition that worker's compensation 
statutes should be liberally construed to provide protection for the injured 
worker. This rule of liberal construction cannot be applied, however, where it 
"results in an extension of the coverage to situations which are not reasonably 
within the language of the statute. Alco of Wyoming v. Baker, supra, [Wyo., 651 P.2d 266 (1982)]; In re Hardison, Wyo., 429 P.2d 320 (1967)." Randell v. Wyoming 
State Treasurer ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, supra, 671 P.2d  
at 309. In the case before us the delivery of sod for the agricultural 
enterprise is not reasonably within the coverage of the statute because of the 
clear language of the exception.

[¶8.]     Baskin then argues 
that, if he is not covered by the worker's compensation statute because of the 
agricultural exception, the exception is unconstitutional as a violation of his 
rights to due process and equal protection guaranteed to him by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America and Article 1, 
Section 6 and Article 1, Section 34 of the Constitution of the State of 
Wyoming.1

[¶9.]     In treating with this 
aspect of Baskin's argument we must differentiate between two equal protection 
tests. According to one test if a fundamental interest is involved the court 
must apply a standard of strict scrutiny, that is the statutory classification 
must be necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and there must be no 
less intrusive alternative means available. Washakie County School District No. 
One v. Herschler, Wyo., 606 P.2d 310, cert. denied sub nom Hot Springs County 
School District Number 1 v. Washakie County School District Number 1, 449 U.S. 824, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28 (1980). If an ordinary interest is involved, 
however, the classification is only required to bear a rational relationship to 
a legitimate state objective. This test has historically been the one applied in 
Wyoming with 
respect to worker's compensation cases. In In re Trent's Claim, 68 Wyo. 146, 231 P.2d 180, 185 (1951), overruled sub nom Bowers v. Wyoming State Treasurer ex 
rel. Workmen's Compensation Division, Wyo., 593 P.2d 182 (1979), this court 
said:

"One who assails the 
classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not 
rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially 
arbitrary."

Even though the 
precise holding in In re Trent's Claim, supra, was overruled in Bowers 
v. Wyoming State Treasurer ex rel. Workmen's Compensation Division, supra, the 
quoted test remains good law. Mauch v. Stanley Structures, Inc., Wyo., 641 P.2d 1247 (1982); Meyer v. Kendig, Wyo., 641 P.2d 1235 (1982); Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Emerson, Wyo., 578 P.2d 1351 (1978); United States Steel Corporation v. Wyoming Environmental Quality Council, Wyo., 575 P.2d 749 (1978); and Bell v. Gray, Wyo., 
377 P.2d 924 (1963).

[¶10.]  In presenting his argument Baskin must 
confront the burden manifested by our rule that statutes are presumed to be 
constitutional, and one who denies the constitutionality of a statute must 
establish that unconstitutionality. Meyer v. Kendig, supra, Nickelson v. People, 
Wyo., 607 P.2d 904 (1980); and Stephenson v. 
Mitchell ex rel. Workmen's Compensation 
Department, Wyo., 569 P.2d 95 (1977). Our rule is that courts have a duty to uphold statutes, and any 
doubts with respect to this issue will be resolved in favor of 
constitutionality. Meyer v. Kendig, supra; and Washakie County School District 
No. One v. Herschler, supra. Expressing this in another way, we have said that 
unconstitutionality must be "clearly and exactly shown beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Stephenson v. Mitchell ex rel. Workmen's Compensation Department, supra. 
Not only is the burden of showing the classification to be improper on the 
assailant, Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Emerson, supra, but if any state of 
facts reasonably can be conceived which will sustain the classification, they 
will be assumed to have existed when the law was passed. Meyer v. Kendig, supra; 
Nickelson v. People, supra; Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Emerson, supra; and 
Bell v. Gray, 
supra.

[¶11.]  Our examination of the covered 
occupations as defined in the Wyoming Worker's Compensation statutes 
demonstrates that the legislature has not included agricultural or ranching 
enterprises within the coverage of this act. The exceptions for "ranching or 
agriculture" found in those statutory provisions dealing with teaming and truck 
driving and with motor delivery are consistent with the general legislative 
scheme. We conclude that our legislature decided to except the economically 
unique agricultural employers in Wyoming from required participation in the 
worker's compensation program because they were not in as good a position to 
pass on as readily the costs to an ultimate consumer, and frequently did not 
employ ranch hands on the same basis as employees in other commercial 
enterprises. We recognize a legitimate state objective with respect to (1) not 
imposing an additional expense upon Wyoming agricultural operations and (2) some 
practical difficulty in always identifying the work force. Michigan has recognized 
that the "economic uniqueness" of agricultural employers justifies exclusion of 
agricultural workers from the worker's compensation scheme. Eastway v. Eisenga, 
420 Mich. 410, 
362 N.W.2d 684 (1984). Nebraska, likewise, has found a rational basis 
for such an exclusion based on possible political or social reasons. Otto v. 
Hahn, 209 Neb. 
114, 306 N.W.2d 587 (1981). The United States Supreme Court has offered an 
additional justification:

"[I]t reasonably may be 
considered that the risks inherent in these [agricultural and domestic] 
occupations are exceptionally patent, simple, and familiar. Missouri, K. & 
T.R. Co. v. Cade, 233 U.S. 642, 650, 58 L. Ed. 1135, 1137, 
34 Sup.Ct. Rep. 678 [680], and cases there cited." New York Central Railroad 
Company v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 37 S. Ct. 247, 61 L. Ed. 667 
(1917).

The exceptions 
of these activities from the statutory definitions are rationally related to a 
legitimate state objective. Even though such a plan may leave some employees 
outside the protection of the worker's compensation statutes, the legislature is 
authorized to address the question of compensation protection in a piecemeal 
fashion. Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Emerson, supra, 578 P.2d  at 1355, 
citing Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 75 S. Ct. 461, 
99 L. Ed. 563, reh. denied 349 U.S. 925, 75 S. Ct. 657, 99 L. Ed. 1256 
(1955).

[¶12.]  This does not mean that employees who are 
injured by virtue of their employer's negligence are left without recourse. 
Because the worker's compensation statute does not apply they may bring an 
action for injuries or damages against their employer if the injuries are caused 
by the employer's negligence. We conclude that the agricultural exception 
contained in the provisions of § 27-12-106(a), W.S. 1977, is constitutional as 
bearing a rational relationship to a legitimate state 
objective.

[¶13.]  Finally, Baskin argues that he should be 
entitled to coverage because Hicklin Sod Farm was engaged in "power farming" 
operations. He argues that the provision in the worker's compensation statutes 
which allows those engaged in power farming to elect worker's compensation 
coverage violates the constitutional prohibition in the State of Wyoming against 
special laws and that the constitutional provision making worker's compensation 
available for all extrahazardous employment should 
control.

[¶14.]  The statutory provision which is involved 
in this contention is § 27-12-102(a)(xvi), W.S. 1977, which provides 
that:

"`Power farming' means a 
farm, livestock ranch or poultry farm which uses any power driven equipment such 
as a pickup, truck, feed grinder, stacking machinery, tractor, mower, baler or 
road grader, where one (1) or more employees or operators are regularly employed 
for an average of six (6) months each year, other than casual employees of the 
employer, if the employer elects to come under the provisions of this act by 
notifying the division of the election. Upon an election being made, the 
employer shall not withdraw for a period of five (5) years, and shall not 
withdraw at all if his account is overdrawn;"

Article 3, 
Section 27 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming prohibits local or 
special laws in enumerated areas, and specifically provides that "[i]n all other 
cases where a general law can be made applicable no special law shall be 
enacted." Then Article 10, Section 4, of the Wyoming Constitution, 
provides:

"* * * As to all 
extrahazardous employments the legislature shall provide by law for the 
accumulation and maintenance of a fund or funds out of which shall be paid 
compensation as may be fixed by law according to proper classifications to each 
person injured in such employment or to the dependent families of such as die as 
the result of such injuries, except in cases of injuries due solely to the 
culpable negligence of the injured employee. Such fund or funds shall be 
accumulated, paid into the state treasury and maintained in such manner as may 
be provided by law. The right of each employee to compensation from such fund 
shall be in lieu of and shall take the place of any and all rights of action 
against any employer contributing as required by law to such fund in favor of 
any person or persons by reason of such injuries or 
death."

[¶15.]  The essence of Baskin's contention is 
that the election for power farming provided by the statute results in worker's 
compensation participation being mandatory for some employers and elective for 
others. He claims that this result is contrary to the constitutional provision 
providing for our worker's compensation plan and also is a special 
law.

[¶16.]  With respect Article 10, § 4 of the 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming, the legislature is given the 
authority to decide what employment shall be covered. In re Trent's Claim, supra. The 
logical conclusion of appellant's argument, however, is that there is no 
reasonable basis for singling out power farming for elective coverage. This 
amounts to an equal protection of the laws argument, and we have pointed out 
above that a rational basis exists for excepting agriculture from the 
requirements of worker's compensation. The rational basis for allowing those 
involved in power farming, which by its very nature is more likely to cause more 
severe injuries to workers than non-power agriculture, to choose between making 
contributions to the worker's compensation fund and being immune from tort suit 
or making no contributions and being subject to suit is as present as the 
rational basis for excepting from the other requirements of worker's 
compensation "ranching or agriculture". There is a legitimate objective to which 
the means adopted is rationally related.

[¶17.]  We have said that Article 3, § 27, 
Constitution of the State of Wyoming, which prohibits special laws "means 
only that the statute must operate alike upon all persons in the same 
circumstances." Meyer v. Kendig, supra, 641 P.2d  at 1240; and Mountain Fuel 
Supply Company v. Emerson, supra, 578 P.2d  at 1356. The provision providing for 
the election operates in the same way as to all who are engaged in power 
farming. Employees whose employers have elected coverage will be covered, but in 
those instances where the employers have not elected coverage employees will be 
without coverage. Article 3, § 27, Constitution of the State of Wyoming requires no more 
than this. The focus of the Wyoming worker's compensation scheme is to protect 
"contributing employers" from suit, Parker v. Energy Development Company, Wyo., 
691 P.2d 981 (1984), and to make benefits available to "covered employees." 
Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., Wyo., 687 P.2d 885 (1984). As we have pointed 
out previously if coverage is not available there is no immunity of the employer 
from suit, and an agricultural or ranching employee who has not been covered 
because of an employer's election pursuant to § 27-12-102(a)(xvi), W.S. 1977, is 
not without remedy. Although not entitled to worker's compensation benefits, he 
can seek recovery from the employer if the employer's conduct was negligent and 
caused his injury. Unfortunately that does not appear to be the situation in 
Baskin's case, and if he cannot receive compensation without a showing of fault 
he probably recovers nothing.

[¶18.]  We conclude that the district court 
correctly denied coverage because of the patent applicability of the statute 
which we hold to be constitutional. The judgment of the district court denying 
worker's compensation benefits is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 The Fourteenth Amendment 
to the Constitution of the United States of America provides as 
follows:

"All persons born or 
naturalized in the United 
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws."

Article 1, 
Section 6, of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming provides:

"No person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of 
law."

Article 1, 
Section 34, of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming provides:

"All laws of a general 
nature shall have a uniform operation."