Case Title: French v. Pearl River Valley Water Supply Dist.

Citation: 394 So. 2d 1385

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1981-03-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
394 So. 2d 1385 (1981) James E. FRENCH et al. v. PEARL RIVER VALLEY WATER SUPPLY DISTRICT et al. No. 52313. Supreme Court of Mississippi. March 18, 1981. *1386 L. Glenn Fant, Jr., Holly Springs, for appellants. William N. Reed, Watkins, Pyle, Ludlam & Stennis, Walker W. Jones, III, Jones & Mockbee, Heber Ladner, Jr., William C. Reeves, Upshaw & Ladner, Jackson, for appellees. En banc. WALKER, Justice, for the Court: This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, which court sustained defendants' demurrer and dismissed plaintiffs' declaration. Plaintiffs had sued Pearl River Valley Water Supply District and the members of its Board of Directors. The declaration alleged in detail improper management and operation of Ross Barnett Reservoir and resulting property damage to plaintiffs. The declaration, as amended, stated that prior to the occurrence of the alleged wrongs and injuries one or more of the defendants, acting either severally or in concert, procured for the protection of the Pearl River Valley Water Supply District and the members of its Board of Directors a policy of liability insurance, issued by a company qualified to do and doing business in the State of Mississippi, in the usual and ordinary form of such policies, and in the principal sum unknown to plaintiffs. The defendants' demurrer and the court's reason for sustaining same was upon the ground of sovereign immunity. The appellants' first assignment of error is that the Legislature waived the District's immunity from suit by including in the statute under which the District was formed, Mississippi Code Annotated section 51-9-121(j) (1972), the power "to sue and be sued in its corporate name." The appellants contend that this language in the statute clearly permits suits against the District and, in effect, waives its sovereign immunity. However, we laid this question to rest in Berry v. Hinds County, 344 So. 2d 146 (Miss. 1977), where suit was brought against the county for injuries suffered when the plaintiff's automobile crashed into a collapsed bridge. In that case the Court said: The appellants' next assignment of error is: "The existence of liability insurance waives, pro tanto, sovereign immunity." The question, as it pertains to this case, is: Does a governmental entity, by obtaining liability insurance without express statutory authority, waive, to the extent of its coverage, immunity from suit? This is a question of first impression in this State. Although the doctrine of sovereign immunity is of common-law origin and was first pronounced in this State by the Supreme Court, we have consistently held since that time that there can be no liability against the State or its political subdivisions or agencies unless it is expressly or impliedly created by statute. We have also held steadfast to the proposition that, although the courts have the authority to abolish the doctrine of governmental immunity, the Legislature is in a better position to limit and restrict claims that can be asserted because the Legislature must provide the ways and means for paying, by taxation or appropriation, such claims it should see fit to allow. It is true that some jurisdiction take the view that a governmental unit is liable for its torts to the extent that a liability insurance policy protects it, because the insurance, to the extent that it protects the public funds, removes the reason for immunity from suits, i.e., if the public funds are protected by liability insurance, the justification and reasoning for the rule of immunity are removed. Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consolidated School District, 348 Ill. App. 567, 109 N.E.2d 636 (1952). However, the majority of jurisdictions adhere to the rule that there can be no liability against the State or its political subdivisions, unless expressly or impliedly created by statute. See Annot., 68 A.L.R.2d 1437 (1959 and Supp. 1980) where the two views are collated. The Legislature is representative of the will of the people of this State and is aware of the problems connected with the doctrine of sovereign immunity. In fact, the Legislature, in its collective judgment, has addressed the question of immunity in a number of statutes dealing with state agencies and political subdivisions, an example being section 41-13-37 which provides: However, there is no statute pertaining to the Pearl River Valley Water Supply District which waives its immunity or permits it to purchase liability insurance for such purpose. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the unauthorized purchase of liability insurance by the District for protection against claims for which it had immunity does not, pro tanto, waive such immunity or preclude the assertion of such immunity as a defense to suits brought against it. As stated earlier, the Legislature is in a better position to limit and restrict claims that can be asserted and to provide the ways and means for the paying of such claims, if it should see fit to do so. An agency of the government may not assume that legislative function. The judgment of the circuit court sustaining the demurrer is affirmed. AFFIRMED. SMITH and ROBERTSON, P. JJ., and SUGG, BROOM, LEE and HAWKINS, JJ., concur. PATTERSON, C.J. and BOWLING, J., dissent. PATTERSON, Chief Justice, dissenting: I dissent for the reasons heretofore expressed by Justice Bowling in Jones v. Knight, 373 So. 2d 254 (1979). Another issue is presented in this case of sovereign immunity and that is whether a public entity may purchase liability insurance with public funds, the use and expenditure of such funds being subject to legislative approval, and thereafter interpose a defense of sovereign immunity to protect the insurance carrier? I think not. The case of Thomas v. Broadlands Community Consolidated School District, 348 Ill. App. 567, 109 N.E.2d 636 (1952) presents the better and more practical reasoning for the resolution of this issue. In my judgment the insurance, to the extent that it protects the public funds removes the reason for immunity from suit. I therefore dissent. BOWLING, J., joins in this dissent.