Case Title: Darnell v. State

Citation: 257 Ind. 613, 277 N.E.2d 366

Docket Number: 670S134

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1972-01-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
257 Ind. 613 (1972)
277 N.E.2d 366
SANDRA L. DARNELL
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 670S134.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed January 17, 1972.
*614 J. Byron Hayes, Hayes & Hayes, of Fort Wayne, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Attorney General, Lon D. Showley, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
PRENTICE, J.
Defendant (Appellant) was convicted of forgery under Acts of 1905, ch. 169, § 676, 1956 Repl. Burns Ind. Stat. Ann. § 10-2102, I.C. 1971, XX-X-XXX-X, in that she fraudulently used a credit card without the authorization of the owner and signed the owner's name to the credit instrument prepared in reliance upon said credit card. The statute under which the defendant was charged by affidavit is as follows:
The affidavit charging the defendant, omitting its formal parts, is as follows:
The motion to correct errors asserts (1) that the verdict of the jury is not sustained by sufficient evidence and (2) that the verdict of the jury is contrary to law.
When the sufficiency of the evidence is raised on appeal, this Court will consider only that evidence most favorable to the State, together with all logical and reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom. Fuller v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 681, 271 N.E.2d 720; Gibson v. State (1971), 257 Ind. 23, 271 N.E.2d 706; Lambert v. State (1969), 252 Ind. 441, 249 N.E.2d 502.
The conviction will be affirmed if, from that viewpoint, there is substantial evidence of probative value from which the trier of fact could reasonably infer that the appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Fuller v. State, supra; Gibson v. State, supra; Taylor v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 170, 267 N.E.2d 383.
This Court, on appeal, will not weigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses. Fuller v. State, supra; Rusher v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 520, 270 N.E.2d 748; Sanchez v. State (1971), 256 Ind. 140, 267 N.E.2d 374.
Reviewing the evidence most favorable to the State, together with all logical and reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom, we find that the defendant had in her possession *617 a bank credit card issued to the prosecuting witness, Robert D. Taylor, by the Indiana Bank and Trust Company, and that she presented it to a retail store clerk and signed Taylor's name to the credit instrument prepared by the clerk in reliance upon the credit card, as payment for merchandise purchased. The prosecuting witness testified that his credit card had been lost, that he was not acquainted with the defendant and had not authorized her to use the credit card. The defendant admitted the use of the credit card but testified that such use had been authorized by the prosecuting witness in return for sexual favor extended to him. It is her contention that in view of her testimony of sexual favors the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecuting witness is weakened to such point as to be insufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury. This is a novel approach and one that we cannot accept. Clearly it was within the exclusive province of the jury to determine which of the conflicting testimony it would believe and which it would disbelieve.
Under the heading of insufficiency of the evidence, the defendant refers to "special proof problems" and "gaps in the prosecution's case" with reference to the allegation in the affidavit of Defendant's intent to defraud the Indiana Bank and Trust Company and a variance in the proof with regard to a person or firm to be defrauded. This is essentially the same question as Defendant presents under the specification that the verdict is contrary to law and will be discussed under that specification.
It is the defendant's contention hereunder that when it is alleged that forgery is committed to defraud a particular person, that allegation must be proven and that proof that, in fact, a person or firm other than the ones specified would suffer the loss will not suffice. In support of this proposition, Defendant cites the following cases: Wilkinson v. State, 10 Ind. 372, Shinn v. State (1877), 57 Ind. 144.
In the Shinn case, supra, the appellant was charged with uttering to the firm of Charles A. Clouser & Company a forged *618 note with intent to defraud one Solomon B. Skinner. A copy of the note was set out in the indictment, the signature thereto being "S.B. Skinner." It was the appellant's position that the indictment was faulty in that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute the crime, there being no averment that the Solomon B. Skinner named in the indictment is the "S.B. Skinner" whose name appeared upon the note and no averment that the Solomon B. Skinner" who was intended to be defrauded was the "S.B. Skinner" whose name appeared upon the note alleged to be forged. A further insufficiency in the indictment was charged by the appellant who asserted that the allegation to defraud Solomon B. Skinner should have been an allegation of intent to defraud "Clouser and Moore." The conviction was reversed by reason of the first alleged deficiency, the court saying that it could not be inferred, either as matter of fact or of law that Solomon B. Skinner was the person met or intended by the name "S.B. Skinner," which was subscribed to the note on which the charge of forgery was predicated. Having thus disposed of the case, the court did not deal with the second proposition; and we fail to see the degree of similarity between the Shinn case and the case at bar that would render it authority for or in any way pertinent to the defendant's proposition.
In the Wilkinson case, supra, the question under consideration was not raised or determined. As a matter of dicta in that case, the court did say "It should be observed, however, that where the prosecutor does aver the intent to be, to defraud a particular person, he will probably be held to proof of the averment." (Emphasis ours). This is not the law of the case nor the law of this state. The specific point raised by Defendant was recently decided by this Court in the case of Boyd v. State (1971), 257 Ind. 443, 266 N.E.2d 802, wherein we held that a variance between the person named in the indictment as the one whom the defendant intended to defraud, and the person who would bear the loss, as shown by the evidence, was not fatal. In that case we said:
It is clear from the evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, that upon the occasion alleged in the affidavit, Defendant knowingly executed a false document of credit and presented it to the business firm alleged in the affidavit as payment of merchandise, and that she did so with the intent of obtaining said merchandise without payment therefor. It is unlikely that she knew or cared who would be the loser, but under the statute this is immaterial. The inference is inescapable that by her conduct she intended to defraud some "person, body politic or corporate,". We do not think the identity of such "person, body politic or corporate," to be material, as there is no question but that the affidavit properly and adequately advised the defendant of the charges, so that she was not to be misled thereby or subjected to possible double jeopardy; and the proof offered was sufficient and not at variance with the allegations of the affidavit within this context.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Arterburn, C.J., DeBruler, Givan and Hunter, JJ., concur.
NOTE.  Reported in 277 N.E.2d 366.