Case Title: Livingston v. Virginia State Bar

Citation: 

Docket Number: 122144

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2013-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT: All the Justices 
 
ERIC JOSEPH LIVINGSTON 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v. Record No. 122144 
CHIEF JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER 
 
 
 
June 6, 2013 
VIRGINIA STATE BAR 
 
FROM THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOARD 
 
In this appeal of right by an attorney from an order of the 
Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (Disciplinary Board), we 
conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether 
there is clear and convincing evidence that Eric Joseph 
Livingston violated Rules 1.1, 3.1, and 3.8(a) of the Virginia 
Rules of Professional Conduct.  Because we find such evidence 
only with regard to the violation of Rule 1.1, we will affirm in 
part and reverse in part the Disciplinary Board's order and 
remand for consideration of an appropriate sanction. 
I.  RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
Pursuant to Part 6, Section IV, Paragraph 13-16(A) of the 
Rules of this Court, the Virginia State Bar (VSB) served 
Livingston with a Charge of Misconduct, alleging that he 
violated Rule 1.1 requiring competent representation, Rule 3.1 
regarding assertion of frivolous claims or contentions, and Rule 
3.8(a) addressing additional responsibilities of a prosecutor.  
The Charge of Misconduct related to Livingston's conduct, as an 
Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney in Prince George County, 
2 
during his prosecution of James Collins on drug-related 
offenses. 
Collins was arrested after he purchased 50 pills of what he 
believed were 80 mg Oxycontin from an undercover police officer 
at a park within 1,000 feet of a public school in Prince George 
County.  The pills that Collins purchased were imitations of the 
actual prescription drug and were made especially for undercover 
drug operations. 
Collins initially agreed to work with police narcotics 
investigators as an informant, but after he stopped doing so, 
Livingston obtained two direct indictments against Collins.  In 
the first indictment, a grand jury charged that Collins "did 
manufacture, sell, give, distribute or possess with the intent 
to manufacture, sell, give, or distribute, a controlled 
substance listed in Schedule I or Schedule II of the Drug 
Control Act namely Oxycodone, in violation of" Code § 18.2-248.1  
In the second indictment, the grand jury charged that Collins  
did manufacture, sell or distribute or 
possess with intent to sell, give or 
distribute any controlled substance, 
imitation controlled substance or marijuana 
while upon the property, including buildings 
and grounds, of any public or private 
elementary, secondary, or post secondary 
school, or any public or private two-year or 
four-year institution of higher education; 
or upon public property or any property open 
                         
1 Oxycodone is the generic name for Oxycontin.  See Startin 
v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 374, 376, 706 S.E.2d 873, 875 (2011). 
3 
to public use within 1,000 feet of such 
school property, in violation of [Code § 
18.2-255.2]. 
 
Collins was tried on both indictments in a bench trial in 
the Circuit Court of Prince George County.  During the trial, 
Livingston called a surveillance narcotics officer and the 
undercover police officer as witnesses.  The undercover police 
officer testified that she sold Collins the 50 pills in exchange 
for $500.  The surveillance narcotics officer testified that 
after Collins' arrest, Collins initially stated that he intended 
to keep all 50 pills for himself but, in a subsequent interview, 
admitted he could sell each pill for $80. 
After Collins moved to dismiss both charges at the close of 
the Commonwealth's evidence and again at the close of all the 
evidence, the parties submitted to the trial court memoranda 
addressing two issues: (1) whether Collins was guilty of 
possession with the intent to distribute a controlled substance 
when he was unaware that the item possessed was an imitation 
controlled substance; and (2) whether the Commonwealth must 
prove that Collins actually intended to distribute the imitation 
controlled substance within 1,000 feet of public school 
property. 
As to the first issue, Livingston conceded in his 
memorandum that it would be error for the trial court to find 
Collins guilty of possession with the intent to distribute 
4 
Oxycodone because the pills he purchased were an imitation 
controlled substance.  Livingston, nevertheless, asserted that 
factual impossibility was not a defense to an attempted crime.  
Accordingly, Livingston moved to amend the indictment to the 
charge of "attempt to possess with the intent to distribute a 
controlled substance." 
On the second issue, Livingston argued that the decision in 
Toliver v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 27, 561 S.E.2d 743 (2002), 
was not controlling.  He maintained that unlike the defendant in 
Toliver, who was chased onto school property, Collins' purchase 
of the imitation controlled substance and his subsequent 
statement to a police officer that he could sell each pill for 
approximately $80 established that, while within 1,000 feet of a 
public school, Collins possessed the pills and had the intent to 
distribute them. 
The trial court denied Livingston's motion to amend the 
first indictment, finding that the "motion [was] untimely" and 
stating that if Livingston believed it appropriate, he could 
"reindict" Collins.  The trial court entered an order dismissing 
the first and second indictments; however, in the order, the 
court referred to the charge in the second indictment as 
"possession with intent to distribute marijuana on or near 
school property."  Collins moved to amend that portion of the 
order by substituting the phrase "imitation controlled 
5 
substance" for the word "marijuana."  Because of concerns about 
possible res judicata or collateral estoppel arguments that 
Collins might raise, Livingston opposed the wording of Collins' 
requested amendment but agreed to an amendment of the order 
substituting the exact language of the offense as charged in the 
indictment for the word "marijuana."  The trial court agreed and 
entered an order adopting Livingston's proposed wording. 
Livingston subsequently presented a third indictment to a 
grand jury, which charged that Collins "did manufacture, sell, 
give, or distribute an imitation controlled substance which 
imitates a schedule I or II controlled substance, namely, 
Oxycodone, in violation of" Code § 18.2-248.  Collins moved to 
dismiss that indictment on the basis of, among other things, 
double jeopardy.  At the hearing on the motion, Livingston 
referred to the charge in the third indictment as "possession 
with intent to distribute" even though the indictment charged a 
different offense, i.e., "manufacture, sell, give, or 
distribute."  Livingston never moved to amend the third 
indictment to charge possession with the intent to distribute, 
and the trial court granted Collins' motion to dismiss it. 
Livingston challenged the trial court's judgment dismissing 
the third indictment in an appeal to the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia.  The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal because 
Livingston failed to file a timely petition for appeal.  In his 
6 
"brief" filed in the Court of Appeals, Livingston again 
incorrectly referred to the charge in the third indictment as 
"possession with intent to distribute" while at the same time 
quoting the charge in the indictment verbatim. 
Based on these facts, the VSB charged that Livingston was 
"incompetent" in approving the issuance of the first indictment 
and proceeding to trial because it charged possession with the 
intent to distribute a controlled substance, Oxycodone, when 
Livingston knew that the pills Collins purchased were an 
imitation controlled substance.  The indictment, according to 
the VSB, was not supported by probable cause.  In the Charge of 
Misconduct, the VSB further alleged that Livingston was 
"incompetent and obtained an indictment not supported by 
probable cause when he obtained the third indictment" because 
Livingston knew there was no evidence that Collins actually 
manufactured or distributed the pills.  Furthermore, the VSB 
claimed that Livingston repeatedly and incorrectly referred to 
the third indictment as charging possession with the intent to 
distribute.  The VSB also charged that Livingston was 
"incompetent" when he filed the petition for appeal late.  
Finally, the VSB alleged that Livingston "maintained an argument 
that was frivolous in objecting to the substitution of the words 
'imitation controlled substance'" for the word "'marijuana.'" 
7 
In a hearing before the Third District Committee, Section I 
of the VSB (District Committee), Livingston testified that he 
has worked as a prosecutor since he obtained his license to 
practice law in 2007.  He acknowledged that he has handled 
hundreds of cases involving drug-related offenses, including 
charges of possession with the intent to distribute.  With 
regard to the first indictment, Livingston admitted that in 
other instances involving a controlled buy of an imitation 
controlled substance, he had always charged the suspect with 
possession with the intent to distribute the imitation 
controlled substance.  Livingston explained that he previously 
had not charged possession with the intent to distribute the 
controlled substance because he "never had the person actually 
handling it, examining it, being satisfied that it's Oxycodone, 
and having such a good statement where he intends to sell it for 
$80 a pill."  Also, after researching the issue of factual and 
legal impossibility, Livingston believed he had probable cause 
to indict Collins for possession with the intent to distribute 
the actual controlled substance.  According to Livingston, he 
did not realize he had misanalysed the law until he prepared the 
post-trial memorandum.2 
                         
2 Livingston testified that when he researched the issue of 
factual and legal impossibility, he "glazed over the section" 
and did not recognize that the cases he was reviewing involved 
charges of attempted offenses, not completed crimes. 
8 
As to the second indictment, Livingston admitted that he 
had not read the decision in Toliver when he presented that 
indictment to the grand jury.  In fact, Livingston did not read 
that opinion until after Collins' attorney discussed it in his 
brief to the trial court.  Livingston also acknowledged that he 
could not prove where Collins intended to distribute the pills.  
But, Livingston asserted, Code § 18.2-255.2 could be interpreted 
to require only a showing that when Collins was within 1,000 
feet of public school property, he possessed the pills with the 
intent to distribute them, even if the distribution was to be 
accomplished elsewhere.  According to Livingston, he did not 
have to prove that Collins intended to distribute the pills 
within the prohibited school zone.3 
With regard to the third indictment, evidence presented at 
the hearing showed that Livingston instructed his staff to 
prepare an indictment for possession with the intent to 
distribute an imitation controlled substance.  Livingston 
admitted that he never reviewed the indictment for accuracy 
before presenting it to a grand jury and that he repeatedly 
referred to the charge as possession with the intent to 
                         
3 Contrary to Livingston's argument, the Court of Appeals in 
Toliver clearly held that Code § 18.2-255.2 "does not state that 
it prohibits possession of a controlled substance while upon 
school property, or within 1,000 feet thereof, with the intent 
to sell, give or distribute the substance elsewhere."  38 Va. 
App. at 32, 561 S.E.2d at 746. 
9 
distribute, even though the indictment charged a different 
offense.  Livingston claimed that he did not realize the mistake 
until he received the Charge of Misconduct from the VSB. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the District Committee 
found that Livingston violated Rules 1.1, 3.1, and 3.8(a) and 
sanctioned him by imposing a public reprimand with terms.4  
Livingston appealed the District Committee's determination, in 
accordance with Part 6, Section IV, Paragraph 13-17(A), to the 
Disciplinary Board.  After hearing argument from the parties and 
reviewing the parties' briefs along with the record from the 
District Committee hearing, the Disciplinary Board found that 
"there is substantial evidence in the record upon which the 
District Committee could reasonably have found as it did."  The 
Disciplinary Board thus affirmed the District Committee's 
determination that Livingston violated Rules 1.1, 3.1, and 
3.8(a) and imposed the same sanction.  Pursuant to Part 6, 
Section IV, Paragraph 13-26 of the Rules of this Court, 
Livingston appeals the Disciplinary Board's Memorandum Order 
dated October 5, 2012 and challenges the Disciplinary Board's 
determination that substantial evidence exists in the record to 
support the District Committee's findings. 
                         
4 The terms required Livingston to complete two hours of 
Continuing Legal Education on the subject of ethics, in addition 
to the two hours required annually, and to certify completion of 
such hours to the VSB no later than December 9, 2012. 
10 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Standard of Review 
The VSB has the burden to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that an attorney violated the Rules of Professional 
Conduct.  Weatherbee v. Virginia State Bar, 279 Va. 303, 306, 
689 S.E.2d 753, 754 (2010).  In reviewing the Disciplinary 
Board's decision, "we conduct an independent examination of the 
entire record."  Williams v. Virginia State Bar, 261 Va. 258, 
264, 542 S.E.2d 385, 389 (2001); accord Northam v. Virginia 
State Bar, 285 Va. 429, 435, 737 S.E.2d 905, 908 (2013).  We 
review the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be 
drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the VSB, 
the prevailing party.  El-Amin v. Virginia State Bar, 257 Va. 
608, 612, 514 S.E.2d 163, 165 (1999).  We give factual findings 
substantial weight and view them as prima facie correct.  Id.  
The factual conclusions are not given the weight of a jury 
verdict, but they "will be sustained unless it appears they are 
not justified by a reasonable view of the evidence or are 
contrary to law."  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
B.  Rule 1.1 - Competence 
Rule 1.1 provides that a "lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a client.  Competent representation requires 
the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation 
11 
reasonably necessary for the representation."  To determine 
"whether a lawyer employs the requisite knowledge and skill in a 
particular matter, relevant factors include . . . the lawyer's 
training and experience in the field in question, the 
preparation and study the lawyer is able to give the matter and 
whether it is feasible to refer the matter to, or associate or 
consult with, a lawyer of established competence in the field in 
question."  Va. Sup. Ct. R., Part 6, § II, R. 1.1, cmt. 1.  In 
addition, "[c]ompetent handling of a particular matter includes 
inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of 
the problem, and use of methods and procedures meeting the 
standards of competent practitioners.  It also includes adequate 
preparation."  Id. at cmt. 5. 
"Whether an attorney is subject to discipline for failing 
to provide competent representation is a matter decided on a 
case by case basis."  Barrett v. Virginia State Bar, 272 Va. 
260, 272, 634 S.E.2d 341, 347 (2006).  For example, in Barrett, 
we considered charges of misconduct that arose from an attorney's 
failure to file or settle a personal injury lawsuit prior to the 
expiration of the statute of limitations, filing a special plea 
based on incorrect legal research, and delay in reading 
responsive pleadings and withdrawing the special plea.  Id. at 
271, 634 S.E.2d at 347.  The Court concluded that the attorney's 
conduct, while negligent or in error, nevertheless did not 
12 
constitute clear and convincing evidence of incompetence under 
Rule 1.1.  Id. at 272, 634 S.E.2d at 347-48.  We explained that 
"negligence without more," or "incorrect legal research alone," 
or practicing law in a manner that is not the "preferred way" 
did not support a finding of incompetent representation.  Id. 
However, in Green v. Virginia State Bar, 274 Va. 775, 652 
S.E.2d 118 (2007), we affirmed a judgment holding that an 
attorney violated Rule 1.1 when he filed an appeal in the wrong 
court and did not advise his client that the appeal had been 
dismissed, and when he failed to timely file another appeal and 
again did not inform his client that the appeal had been 
dismissed.  Id. at 781-91, 652 S.E.2d at 120-26; see also Motley 
v. Virginia State Bar, 260 Va. 251, 263-64, 536 S.E.2d 101, 106-
07 (2000) (imposing discipline for incompetence under former DR 
6-101 when an attorney permitted his client to sign a promissory 
note that did not reflect the parties' agreement and caused 
consequences the attorney did not understand). 
In this case, Livingston concedes that he made three 
"mistakes" in his prosecution of Collins: (1) reaching an 
incorrect legal conclusion about the law of factual 
impossibility and thus erroneously charging Collins with 
possession with the intent to distribute the actual controlled 
substance; (2) obtaining the third indictment for distribution 
of an imitation controlled substance rather than for possession 
13 
with the intent to distribute and failing to recognize that 
mistake during the trial and on appeal; and (3) missing the 
deadline for filing the petition for appeal in the Court of 
Appeals.5  Livingston argues, however, that while these mistakes 
might constitute negligence, they do not rise to the level of 
clear and convincing evidence of incompetent representation in 
violation of Rule 1.1. 
Based on our "independent examination of the entire 
record," giving the District Committee's factual findings 
"substantial weight and view[ing] them as prima facie correct," 
we find no error in the Disciplinary Board's order holding that 
Livingston violated Rule 1.1.  Williams, 261 Va. at 264, 542 
S.E.2d at 389.  During the prosecution of Collins, he failed to 
provide the "thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary 
for the representation" of his client, the Commonwealth.  Rule 
1.1.  Even if an attorney has the necessary legal knowledge and 
skill, "thoroughness and preparation" require the "[c]ompetent 
handling of a particular matter," which includes "inquiry into 
and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem 
and use of methods and procedures meeting the standards of 
                         
5 Livingston does not acknowledge any mistake with regard to 
the second indictment charging possession with the intent to 
distribute an imitation controlled substance within 1,000 feet 
of public school property or his failure to read the decision in 
Toliver until after Collins' attorney cited it to the trial 
court. 
14 
competent practitioners."  Va. Sup. Ct. R., Part 6, § II, R. 
1.1, cmt. 5 (emphasis added). 
Livingston obtained three indictments against Collins.  
Each was based on factual and/or legal errors due not to mere 
negligence, but to his failure to analyze the evidence and the 
elements of the charges he brought against Collins.  And, 
without checking the accuracy of the charge in the third 
indictment, which contained the wrong criminal offense, he 
presented the indictment to a grand jury and pursued it in the 
trial court and also on appeal when he filed the untimely 
petition for appeal.  It is not necessary to determine whether 
any one of these acts of misconduct alone would violate Rule 
1.1.  In this case, viewing the record in its entirety, there is 
clear and convincing evidence that Livingston failed to provide 
competent representation to his client in the prosecution of 
Collins. 
C.  Rule 3.1 - Meritorious Claims and Contentions 
In relevant part, Rule 3.1 states that "[a] lawyer shall 
not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an 
issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not 
frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an 
extension, modification or reversal of existing law."  We have 
defined the term "frivolous" as "[o]f little weight or 
importance, having no basis in law or fact: light, slight, sham, 
15 
irrelevant, superficial."  Weatherbee, 279 Va. at 309, 689 
S.E.2d at 756 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); 
see also Black's Law Dictionary 739 (9th ed. 2009) (defining the 
term "frivolous" as "[l]acking a legal basis or legal merit; not 
serious; not reasonably purposeful"). 
The Charge of Misconduct alleged that Livingston 
"maintained an argument that was frivolous in objecting to the 
substitution of the words 'imitation controlled substance' for 
'marijuana,'" because "he anticipated that [Collins] would then 
argue to dismiss the third indictment due to collateral estoppel 
and double jeopardy."6  However, the record shows that Livingston 
                         
6 The VSB also argues that Livingston violated Rule 3.1 by 
obtaining three indictments against Collins that had no basis in 
law or fact.  However, the VSB did not make that argument at the 
District Committee hearing.  Not until questioning by members of 
the Disciplinary Board did the VSB take the position that it was 
not relying solely on Livingston's objection to the proposed 
amended wording of the dismissal order as the basis for the 
charge that he violated Rule 3.1.  Even in its brief to the 
Disciplinary Board, the VSB did not argue that Livingston's 
conduct in pursing indictments that lacked probable cause 
violated Rule 3.1.  Although a proceeding to discipline an 
attorney is an informal proceeding, an attorney nevertheless is 
entitled to be informed of the nature of the charge against him.  
See Moseley v. Virginia State Bar, 280 Va. 1, 3, 694 S.E.2d 586, 
589 (2010); Virginia State Bar v. Gunter, 212 Va. 278, 284, 183 
S.E.2d 713, 717 (1971).  Given the language of the Charge of 
Misconduct and the VSB's position at the District Committee 
hearing when evidence was presented, we conclude that Livingston 
was not fairly informed that the VSB was including his conduct 
with regard to the three indictments as a basis for the charge 
that he violated Rule 3.1.  So, in determining whether there is 
clear and convincing evidence that Livingston violated Rule 3.1, 
we will consider only his response to the motion to amend the 
order dismissing the second indictment. 
16 
did not oppose the amendment of the order dismissing the second 
indictment.  Instead, Livingston stated to the trial court that 
"the Commonwealth doesn't oppose [the] motion to modify, the 
Commonwealth opposes [the] motion to modify as written."  
Moreover, the trial court adopted Livingston's position and 
amended the order to include the language that Livingston urged. 
Based on our independent review of the record, we do not 
find clear and convincing evidence that Livingston violated Rule 
3.1.  The argument he asserted in response to Collins' motion to 
amend the language of the order dismissing the second indictment 
was not frivolous.  Thus, the portion of Disciplinary Board's 
order finding that Livingston violated Rule 3.1 was in error. 
D.  Rule 3.8 - Additional Responsibilities of a Prosecutor 
Pursuant to Rule 3.8(a), a prosecutor may "not file or 
maintain a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by 
probable cause."  A prosecutor is prohibited "from initiating or 
maintaining a charge once he knows that the charge is not 
supported by even probable cause."  Va. Sup. Ct. R., Part 6, § 
II, R. 3.8, cmt. 1a.  The term "knows" "denotes actual knowledge 
of the fact in question.  A person's knowledge may be inferred 
from circumstances."  Va. Sup. Ct. R., Part 6, § II, Preamble. 
Livingston argues that he did not initiate or maintain any 
indictment against Collins with actual knowledge that it was not 
17 
supported by probable cause.  He asserts, instead, that his 
"negligence" led to the mistakes in the indictments. 
As we have already discussed, Livingston’s erroneous and/or 
complete lack of legal research along with his failure to 
examine the evidence in conjunction with the elements of the 
respective offenses resulted in his belief, albeit erroneous, 
that he had probable cause to initiate and maintain the first 
and second indictments.  After he ultimately realized that he 
could not charge Collins with possession with the intent to 
distribute the actual controlled substance, he moved to amend 
the first indictment to the charge of "attempt to possess with 
the intent to distribute a controlled substance."  Livingston 
proceeded with the second indictment without reading the 
decision in Toliver.  When he did read it, Livingston, 
nevertheless, surmised that Toliver could be distinguished on 
its facts, leading to his erroneous belief that he did not need 
to prove Collins intended to distribute the pills within the 
prohibited school zone.  While this evidence supports the 
determination that Livingston was "incompetent" under Rule 1.1, 
it does not constitute clear and convincing evidence that 
Livingston violated Rule 3.8(a).  In other words, Livingston’s 
incompetent representation of his client in pursuing the first 
and second indictments actually demonstrates that he did not 
18 
initiate and maintain those indictments with actual knowledge 
that they were not supported by probable cause. 
With regard to the third indictment, evidence introduced at 
the District Committee hearing established that Livingston 
instructed his staff to prepare an indictment charging the 
correct offense, possession with the intent to distribute an 
imitation controlled substance.  Livingston admitted that he 
never reviewed the indictment for accuracy before presenting it 
to a grand jury.  Accordingly, the District Committee determined 
that Livingston "did not read the indictment carefully before 
submitting it to the grand jury" and "did not realize the 
indictment did not contain the language 'possession with intent 
to distribute' until a few weeks before the District Committee 
hearing."  Viewing these factual findings as prima facie 
correct, we conclude that they are "justified by a reasonable 
view of the evidence" and are not "contrary to law," meaning 
Livingston did not initiate or maintain the third indictment 
with actual knowledge that it was not supported by probable 
cause.  El-Amin, 257 Va. at 612, 514 S.E.2d at 165 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
But, we must point out that "[a]n indictment is a written 
accusation of crime, prepared by the attorney for the 
Commonwealth."  Code § 19.2-216 (emphasis added).  Livingston 
quoted the charge in the third indictment verbatim in his brief 
19 
to the Court of Appeals, i.e., that Collins did "manufacture, 
sell, give, or distribute an imitation controlled substance 
. . . in violation" of Code § 18.2-248.  And, he signed that 
brief as the attorney of record for the Commonwealth.  See Code 
§ 8.01-271.1.  His signature constituted "a certificate" that he 
had read the brief, and having done so, he then should have 
realized that the third indictment contained the wrong charge.  
Id.  As with the first and second indictments, these 
circumstances likewise support the determination that Livingston 
did not provide competent representation to his client as 
required by Rule 1.1.  But, in light of the District Committee’s 
factual findings, we cannot infer from these circumstances 
Livingston’s actual knowledge that the third indictment lacked 
probable cause to support it.  See Va. Sup. Ct. R., Part 6, § 
II, Preamble. 
Thus, with regard to all three indictments, the record does 
not contain clear and convincing evidence that Livingston 
violated Rule 3.8(a).  The portion of the Disciplinary Board’s 
order finding a violation of this Rule was in error. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, we will affirm the portion of the 
Disciplinary Board's order finding that Livingston violated Rule 
1.1 and reverse the part of the order finding that he violated 
Rules 3.1 and 3.8(a).  Because the sanction imposed by the 
20 
Disciplinary Board was a single sanction for violation of all 
three Rules, we will vacate the sanction and remand for further 
consideration of an appropriate sanction for Livingston's 
violation of Rule 1.1.  See Barrett, 272 Va. at 273, 634 S.E.2d 
at 348. 
Affirmed in part, 
reversed in part, 
and remanded.