Case Title: Emma McPeek, et al v. Charles McCardle

Citation: 

Docket Number: 58S01-0708-CV-305

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS  
 
 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE 
Leanna Weissmann 
 
 
 
 
Alison T. Frazier 
Lawrenceburg, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
Dupont, Indiana 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 58S01-0708-CV-305 
 
EMMA MCPEEK (Petitioner Below), 
CAROLL VANTYLE, AND BRENDA ALLEN, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellants (Plaintiffs below), 
 
v. 
 
CHARLES MCCARDLE, 
 
 
 
 
 
Appellee (Defendant below). 
_________________________________ 
 
Appeal from the Ohio Circuit Court, No. 58C01-0412-PL-0005 
The Honorable James Humphrey, Judge 
_________________________________ 
 
On Petition To Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 58A01-0609-CV-400 
_________________________________ 
 
June 10, 2008 
 
Rucker, Justice. 
 
Summary 
 
 
The question raised in this opinion is whether a marriage solemnized in another state in 
violation of that state’s law may be recognized as valid in this state if the marriage complies with 
this state’s law.  The answer is yes.   
 
FILED
CLERK
of the supreme court,
court of appeals and
tax court
Jun 10 2008, 3:06 pm
Facts and Procedural History 
 
As a result of her first husband’s death, Edwina VanTyle became the sole owner of the 
family farm located in Ohio County and Switzerland County, Indiana.  On June 30, 1994, armed 
with a marriage license obtained from the clerk of the circuit court in Ohio County, Indiana, 
Edwina and Charles McCardle, both residents of Indiana, traveled across state lines and were 
ostensibly married in the state of Ohio.  The Reverend Donald S. Campbell performed the 
wedding ceremony and filled out the marriage certificate.  Although Rev. Campbell was 
apparently authorized by his church to solemnize marriages in the state of Ohio, no marriage 
license was issued by the state of Ohio.  Further, no ceremony took place in the state of Indiana.  
On July 1, 1994, the clerk of the circuit court in Ohio County, Indiana filed and recorded the 
marriage license and certificate.  Shortly thereafter, in August 1994, Edwina executed a warranty 
deed transferring ownership of the farm to Charles McCardle and herself as husband and wife.  
 
On July 26, 2004, Edwina died intestate.  In December 2004, Edwina’s two daughters 
and one son from her first marriage – Emma McPeek, Brenda Allen, and Caroll VanTyle 
(referred to collectively as “McPeek”) – filed a complaint for declaratory judgment.  In the 
complaint McPeek contended that the marriage between her mother and McCardle was void, and 
therefore she and her siblings were the proper owners of one-half the farm, which had been in the 
family for three generations.  McPeek also filed a motion for summary judgment.  
 
McCardle responded with a motion to dismiss the declaratory judgment action, 
contending McPeek was not a party to the marriage and therefore lacked standing to challenge its 
validity.  McCardle also filed a motion seeking attorney fees, contending McPeek’s complaint 
was frivolous and brought in bad faith.  After a hearing based on certain stipulated facts alleged 
in the complaint, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss.  In so doing, the trial court agreed 
that McPeek lacked standing.  However, the trial court concluded that the marriage was voidable 
under Indiana law and the weight of legal authority indicated that such marriages may not be 
attacked after the death of one of the parties.  Noting the significant legal issues in this case, the 
trial court denied McCardle’s request for attorney fees. 
 
 
 
2
 
McPeek appealed the dismissal of her complaint, and McCardle cross-appealed the denial 
of his request for attorney fees.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.  
McPeek v. McCardle, 866 N.E.2d 387, 391 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).  Having previously granted 
McPeek’s petition to transfer, we also affirm the judgment of the trial court.  We summarily 
affirm the Court of Appeals’ disposition of McCardle’s cross-appeal.  
 
Standard of Review 
 
A claim of lack of standing is properly treated as a motion to dismiss under Indiana Trial 
Rule 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Huffman v. Office 
of Envtl. Adjudication, 811 N.E.2d 806, 813 (Ind. 2004).  Such a motion tests the legal 
sufficiency of a claim, not the facts supporting it.  Charter One Mortgage Corp. v. Condra, 865 
N.E.2d 602, 604 (Ind. 2007).  We review de novo the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Indiana 
Trial Rule 12(B)(6).  Id.  Viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party, we must determine whether the complaint states any facts on which the trial court could 
have granted relief.  If a complaint states a set of facts that, even if true, would not support the 
relief requested, we will affirm the dismissal.  Id. at 605.  And we may affirm the grant of a 
motion to dismiss if it is sustainable on any theory.  Right Reason Publ’n v. Silva, 691 N.E.2d 
1347, 1349 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).   
 
Discussion 
 
 
McPeek argues that her mother’s marriage to McCardle is void because it was 
solemnized in the state of Ohio without the benefit of an Ohio marriage license in violation of 
Ohio Revised Code section 3101.05.1  McCardle does not respond to this argument head on.  
                                                 
1 McPeek also contends that the marriage was conducted by a minister not authorized to solemnize 
marriages in the state of Ohio in violation of Ohio Revised Code section 3101.09.  To support this 
contention, McPeek relies on her own affidavit submitted in support of her motion for summary 
judgment.  Appellant’s App. at 29-30.  McCardle challenged the accuracy of the allegations claiming they 
were false, and this in part formed the bases for his request for attorney fees.  In any event, the trial court 
did not rule on McPeek’s summary judgment motion.  Rather, relying on the parties’ stipulated facts, 
which did not include those alleged in the affidavit, the trial court ruled on McPeek’s complaint for 
declaratory judgment, which it dismissed.  Accordingly, the McPeek affidavit is not properly before us. 
 
3
Instead he makes the same argument made before the trial court, namely, “once a party to a 
marriage is dead, her marriage may not be challenged by anyone other than the other party to the 
marriage.”  Resp. to Pet. to Trans. at 4.  As recounted above, the trial court had a slightly 
different view.  The Court of Appeals pursued a different analysis altogether, ultimately 
concluding that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.  We agree with the Court of 
Appeals’ ultimate conclusion.  However, our analysis is slightly different than our colleagues.   
 
 
Unless strong public policy exceptions require otherwise,2 the law of the place where a 
marriage occurs generally determines the validity of a marriage.  Bolkovac v. State, 229 Ind. 
294, 98 N.E.2d 250, 254 (1951); Sweigart v. State, 213 Ind. 157, 12 N.E.2d 134, 139 (1938); 
Mason v. Mason, 775 N.E.2d 706, 709 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); Gunter v. Dealer’s Transp. Co., 
120 Ind. App. 409, 91 N.E.2d 377, 379 (1950).  As a corollary, the general rule of law is that a 
marriage valid where it is performed is valid everywhere.  Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 
216, 223 (1934).  The converse of this proposition is equally well settled: a marriage void 
where it is performed is void everywhere.   
 
McPeek insists that her mother’s Ohio marriage to McCardle is void.  More specifically, 
according to McPeek, “[b]ecause the McCardle union which took place in Ohio did not meet the 
legal requirements for a lawful marriage to exist under Ohio law, Indiana must give Full Faith 
and Credit to the Ohio law and recognize that a lawful marriage did not occur and that their 
relationship was nothing more than a void common law marriage.”  Pet. to Trans. at 7.  However, 
our research reveals no authority declaring that a marriage solemnized in the state of Ohio 
without the benefit of a marriage license obtained from that state is considered a void marriage.  
Instead Ohio, like Indiana, draws a distinction between marriages that are void in contrast to 
those that are merely voidable.  See 19 I.L.E., Marriage § 16 at 245-46 (2003).  According to 
Ohio law, “There are major conceptual differences between void and voidable marriages.  A 
voidable marriage is one which is valid when entered and which remains valid until either party 
secures a lawful court order dissolving the marital relationship.”  Darling v. Darling, 335 N.E.2d 
708, 710 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).  Conversely, “a void marriage is invalid from its inception, and 
                                                 
2 See e.g., Ind. Code § 31-11-1-1(b) (“A marriage between persons of the same gender is void in Indiana 
even if the marriage is lawful in the place where it is solemnized.”). 
 
4
the parties thereto may simply separate without benefit of a court order of divorce or annulment.”  
Id. at 710-11.  The policy of Ohio is to sustain marriages “where they are not incestuous, 
polygamous, shocking to good morals, unalterably opposed to a well defined public policy, or 
prohibited.”  Mazzolini v. Mazzolini, 155 N.E.2d 206, 208 (Ohio 1958).  Thus, Ohio appears to 
label a defective marriage voidable rather than void, unless such a label is against policy 
considerations.  “A marriage contract is a nullity ab initio only where expressly so declared by 
statute.  In such a case it is absolutely void, requiring no judicial decree for its dissolution.”  Id. 
at 209 (emphasis added).  This jurisdiction has embraced a similar view.  See Mason v. Mason, 
101 Ind. 25, 27 (1885) (“[A] marriage, contracted in violation [of the statute] . . . is not 
absolutely void unless declared to be so by the statute under which the order was made.”). 
 
Our review of Ohio case and statutory authority has not revealed that a marriage 
solemnized in that state without the benefit of an Ohio marriage license is void as against public 
policy.  It therefore appears that the Ohio marriage, although defective, was nonetheless valid 
from its inception under the laws of Ohio and remained so at least until Edwina’s death because 
the parties did not seek dissolution.  As indicated earlier, unless strong public policy exceptions 
require otherwise, the law of the place where a marriage occurs generally determines the validity 
of a marriage.  Bolkovac, 98 N.E.2d at 254.  
 
We acknowledge however that Ohio’s court of last resort has not spoken on this subject 
in fifty years.  And the latest reported decision by its intermediate Appellate Court occurred over 
thirty years ago.  We are therefore hesitant to ground the resolution of this case solely on what 
may or may not be the current law of our sister state.  We thus advance an alternative ground as 
well. 
 
Not all jurisdictions adhere to the general rule that the law of the place where the 
marriage occurs determines the validity of the marriage.  The Restatement (Second) Conflict of 
Laws § 283(1) (1971) advises, “The validity of a marriage will be determined by the local law of 
the state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant relationship to the 
spouses and the marriage . . . .”  And following the Restatement’s guidance several jurisdictions 
have determined that even if invalid where solemnized, a marriage can be recognized as valid 
 
5
under the law of the forum state.  See e.g., Donlann v. Macgurn, 55 P.3d 74, 77-79 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2002) (Applying Arizona law to recognize an invalid marriage under the law of Mexico, 
the court declared that a marriage invalid under the law where the ceremony occurred was valid 
in Arizona if it would have been valid had the ceremony been performed in Arizona.); Matter of 
Estate of Murnion, 686 P.2d 893, 898-99 (Mont. 1984) (Applying Montana law, the court 
recognized a marriage which was invalid in the state of Washington because Washington 
retained no interest in the case.); In re Estate of Shippy, 678 P.2d 848, 851-52 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1984) (Applying Washington law, the court recognized as valid a marriage that was invalid in 
the state of Alaska and declared that, although the validity of a marriage is generally governed by 
the law of the state where it is contracted, the state of Washington had a dominant interest in the 
validity of the decedent’s marriage because decedent and wife were domiciled in Washington, 
decedent’s property was located in Washington, and probate proceedings were pending there.).  
See also John C. Williams, Recognition by Forum State of Marriage Which, Although Invalid 
Where Contracted, Would Have Been Valid if Contracted Within Forum State, 82 A.L.R.3d 1240 
(1978) (collecting cases).  
 
We think the foregoing authorities express the better view as applied to this case.  Before 
and after their marriage, Indiana was the domiciliary of both McCardle and Edwina, and both 
owned real and personal property in the state of Indiana.  It appears that the only contact the 
parties had with Ohio is that the ceremony was conducted in that state.  In essence any interest 
Ohio may have in the McCardles’ marriage is overcome by the more substantial interest this 
state has in recognizing the marriage of the parties who, after all, obviously anticipated that their 
marriage would be valid.  See Restatement § 283 cmt. i (noting that the basic policy underlying 
the rule recognizing a marriage even where invalid where contracted is “protection of the 
justified expectations of the parties”). 
 
Accordingly, we measure the McCardles’ marriage against Indiana’s solemnization 
provisions.  Before two people may marry in Indiana they must negotiate a multi-step process.  
The parties must first obtain a marriage license from the clerk of the circuit court of either 
person’s county of residence.  I.C. §§ 31-11-4-1, -3.  The marriage license issued by the circuit 
court is the legal authority for an authorized person to marry the betrothed couple.  I.C. § 31-11-
 
6
4-14.  The parties must then present the marriage license to a person who is authorized to 
solemnize marriages.  I.C. § 31-11-4-13.  Marriages may be solemnized by, among others, a 
member of the clergy of a religious organization.  I.C. § 31-11-6-1(1).  The person solemnizing 
the marriage must complete a marriage certificate and file the certificate and license with the 
clerk of the circuit court that issued the license; the clerk must then record the certificate and 
license.  I.C. § 31-11-4-16.  
 
It is undisputed that Edwina and McCardle complied with the requisite statutes in 
obtaining and filing their Indiana marriage license and certificate of marriage with the clerk of 
the Ohio County Circuit Court.  And there was no evidence presented to the trial court, and no 
argument made on appeal, that the couple were married in Ohio with the intent of evading the 
laws of this state.3  We conclude that where, as here, a couple has complied with Indiana’s 
statutory requirements regarding marriage licenses, certificates, and solemnization, such that the 
marriage would have been valid if solemnized in this state, we will recognize the marriage as 
valid even if the marriage ceremony took place in another state and did not comply with that 
state’s law or public policy.4  It is worth emphasizing however that a couple intending to use or, 
                                                 
3 Indiana Code section 31-11-8-6 provides: 
 
A marriage is void if the parties to the marriage: 
(1) 
are residents of Indiana; 
(2) 
had their marriage solemnized in another state with the intent to 
(A) evade IC 31-11-4-4 or IC 31-11-4-11 (or IC 31-7-3-3 or IC 31-
7-3-10 before their repeal); and 
 
(B) subsequently return to Indiana and reside in Indiana; and 
(3) 
without having established residence in another state in good faith, 
return to Indiana and reside in Indiana after the marriage is 
solemnized. 
 
4 We acknowledge that the Indiana Attorney General concluded that “compliance with Indiana’s statutory 
requirements has no effect if the marriage does not comply with the legal requirements of the jurisdiction 
in which the marriage actually occurs.”  Solemnization of Marriages under Indiana Law, 2004 Ind. Op. 
Att’y Gen. No. 3 (2004), available at http://www.in.gov/attorneygeneral/legal/advisory/opinions.html.  
However, Attorney General opinions are not binding on the Court.  Illinois-Indiana Cable Television 
Ass’n v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 427 N.E.2d 1100, 1111 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).  We do agree however with 
the following conclusion: 
 
[A] couple obtaining an Indiana marriage license but intending to be 
married outside of Indiana should be advised to check the legal 
requirements of the jurisdiction in which they will be married to 
 
7
 
8
as occurred here, has already used an Indiana marriage license for an out-of-state marriage 
should take the additional step of re-solemnizing their marriage in Indiana in order to avoid 
future questions about its validity.  See fn. 4.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The trial court granted McCardle’s motion to dismiss based on the lack of standing.  We 
affirm the judgment of the trial court albeit on a different theory. 
 
Shepard, C.J., and Dickson, Sullivan and Boehm, JJ., concur. 
                                                                                                                                                             
determine what is necessary for a legally binding marriage in that 
jurisdiction.  If a couple intends to use (or has used) an Indiana marriage 
license for an out-of-state marriage, it is advisable to recommend that the 
marriage be re-solemnized in Indiana to avoid future question about its 
validity.  
 
2004 Ind. Op. Att’y Gen. No. 3 (2004).