Case Title: MARRIAGE OF BURNS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 82-035

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1982-06-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 8 2 - 3 5 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1 9 8 2 I N RE THE MARRIAGE OF PEGGY ANN BURNS, P e t i t i o n e r and A p p e l l a n t , -vs- DEWEY JAMES BURNS, R e s p o n d e n t and R e s p o n d e n t . A p p e a l f r o m : D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e C o u n t y of Silver Bow, T h e H o n o r - able A r n o l d O l s e n , Judge presiding. C o u n s e l of R e c o r d : For A p p e l l a n t : Joseph C. E n g e l , 111, B u t t e , M o n t a n a For R e s p o n d e n t : S w e e n e y and B e l k e , B u t t e , M o n t a n a S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : A p r i l 1 5 , 1 9 8 2 D e c i d e d : June 1 4 , 1 9 8 2 F i l e d : JUN 1 4 1982 Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. T h i s appeal r e s u l t s froin t h e d e n i a l of a p e t i t i o n by t h e D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Second J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , i n and f o r t h e County of S i l v e r Bow, f o r t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e p a r e n t a l r i g h t s of Dewey Burns. Peggy Burns and Dewey Burns were married on December 31, 1975. Two c h i l d r e n were born a s i s s u e of t h e i r marriage. A t t h e time of t h e d i v o r c e Peggy was awarded c u s t o d y of t h e c h i l d r e n . Dewey Burns was ordered t o c o n t r i b u t e $300 a month t o t h e maintenance of t h e minor c h i l d r e n . He was t o make payments t o t h e Clerk of t h e D i s t r i c t Court on t h e 6 t h and 2 1 s t days of each month beginning A p r i l 21, 1978, and c o n t i n u i n g u n t i l t h e youngest c h i l d reached t h e age of h i s m a j o r i t y . A d d i t i o n a l l y , Dewey Burns was t o maintain h e a l t h i n s u r a n c e coverage f o r t h e c h i l d r e n and t o c o n t r i b u t e $100 a month f o r t h e s u p p o r t and maintenance of Peggy Burns begin- ning on A p r i l 21, 1978. From t h e o u t s e t , Dewey Burns f a i l e d t o make t h e re- q u i r e d c o n t r i b u t i o n s . The r e c o r d s of t h e Clerk of t h e D i s - t r i c t Court i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e l a s t d a t e on which Dewey Burns made a c o n t r i b u t i o n , p r i o r t o t h e p e t i t i o n t o t e r m i n a t e h i s p a r e n t a l r i g h t s , was December 6, 1978. O n November 26, 1980, Peggy Burns p e t i t i o n e d t h e D i s t r i c t Court t o t e r m i n a t e t h e p a r e n t a l r i g h t s of Dewey Burns t o t h e p a r t i e s ' two c h i l d r e n under s e c t i o n 40-8- 111(1) ( a ) ( v ) , MCA, which provides: " ( 1 ) A n adoption of a c h i l d may be decreed when t h e r e have been f i l e d w r i t t e n c o n s e n t s t o adoption executed by: " ( a ) both p a r e n t s , i f l i v i n g , o r t h e surviv- ing p a r e n t of a c h i l d provided t h a t c o n s e n t is n o t r e q u i r e d from a f a t h e r o r mother: " ( v ) i f it is proven t o t h e s a t i s f a c t i o n of t h e c o u r t t h a t t h e f a t h e r o r mother, i f a b l e , h a s n o t c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e s u p p o r t of t h e c h i l d d u r i n g a period of 1 year b e f o r e t h e f i l i n g of a p e t i t i o n f o r a d o p t i o n ; " (Empha- sis s u p p l i e d . ) The p e t i t i o n t o t e r m i n a t e was f i l e d p r i o r t o t h e f i l i n g of a p e t i t i o n f o r adoption. See, Commissioners' Notes, c o n t a i n e d i n Annotations t o s e c t i o n 40-8-111, MCA. A f t e r t h e p e t i t i o n was f i l e d , Dewey Burns made two lump sun payments: one of $2,580 on December 23, 1980, c o i n c i d e n t a l with t h e f i r s t hearing on t h e p e t i t i o n t o t e r m i n a t e h i s p a r e n t a l r i g h t s ; and t h e second of $3,250 on May 6 , 1981, a g a i n c o i n c i d e n t a l with t h e May 8, 1981, h e a r i n g c a l l e d by t h e c o u r t on t h e p e t i t i o n t o t e r m i n a t e h i s p a r e n t a l r i g h t s . The a p p e l l a n t , Peggy, a r g u e s t h a t t h e s e af t e r - t h e - f a c t payments s h o u l d n o t a f f e c t d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e p e t i t i o n s i n c e t h e wording of t h e s t a t u t e speaks about n o n s u p p o r t p r i o r t o t h e p e t i t i o n t o t e r m i n a t e . Tlrl e a p p e l l a n t a l s o a r g u e s she was t r e a t i n g $2,400 of t h i s money a s payment of past-due spouse maintenance, which was d e l i n - quent i n t h a t amount. I t is important t o n o t e h e r e t h a t Dewey Burns is still s e v e r a l thousand d o l l a r s i n a r r e a r s o f h i s c h i l d s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n s . A t t h e f i r s t h e a r i n g , h e l d December 19-22, 1980, Dewey Burns argued t h a t d e s p i t e t h e f a c t he had n o t made h i s payments t o t h e c l e r k of c o u r t ' s o f f i c e , a s ordered by t h e d e c r e e , he had paid $925 i n c a s h , p l u s $400 through h i s mother, p l u s $1,400 t o t h e S t a t e of Utah t h e year preceding t h e p e t i t i o n . Peggy was on w e l f a r e i n Utah and a s s i g n e d h e r c l a i m t o t h e S t a t e of Utah f o r s u p p o r t given t h e s e two c h i l d r e n by t h e w e l f a r e department i n Utah. Peggy B u r n s ' s testimony i n d i c a t e d she received o n l y $670 from Dewey Burns and t h a t Dewey had no evidence t o s u p p o r t h i s claims. A t b e s t , by h i s own testimony, he c o n t r i b u t e d $2,725 from December 1978 u n t i l December 1980. The c o u r t found t h a t according t o t h e c l e r k of t h e c o u r t ' s r e c o r d s t h e l a s t c h i l d s u p p o r t payment by Dewey Burns b e f o r e t h e p e t i t i o n t o t e r m i n a t e h i s p a r e n t a l r i g h t s was f i l e d on December 6, 1978, and t h e n e x t payment was f i l e d on December 22, 1980. The c o u r t noted t h a t Dewey Burns had made no c h i l d s u p p o r t payments through t h e c l e r k of c o u r t ' s o f f i c e f o r twenty-four months. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e c o u r t found t h a t Dewey Burns f a i l e d t o make s u p p o r t payments a s o r d e r e d by t h e c o u r t although f i n a n c i a l l y a b l e t o do s o and t h a t he had maintained c o n t a c t with t h e c h i l d r e n and knew where t h e y were. The c o u r t t h e n , i n a f i n d i n g of f a c t , found t h a t Dewey Burns had paid a t o t a l of $4,750 i n back payments on a d v i c e of counsel a f t e r t h e f i l i n g of t h e p e t i - t i o n t o t e r m i n a t e h i s p a r e n t a l r i g h t s . Peggy Burns t a k e s e x c e p t i o n t o s e v e r a l of t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n s of law a s being c o n t r a d i c t o r y t o its f i n d i n g s of f a c t . The c o u r t concluded: t h a t t h e s t a t u t e is t o be i n t e r p r e t e d most s t r i c t l y i n f a v o r of p r e s e r v i n g t h e n a t u r a l p a r e n t ' s r i g h t s ; t h a t i n viewing t h e evidence i n t h a t l i g h t , t h e e v i d e n c e i n d i c a t e s t h a t Dewey B u r n s , although f i n a n c i a l l y a b l e t o do s o , d i d n o t s u p p o r t h i s c h i l d r e n f o r one year p r i o r t o t h e p e t i t i o n t o t e r m i n a t e h i s p a r e n t a l r i g h t s ; and t h a t Dewey B u r n s ' s n e g l e c t i n making court-ordered c h i l d s u p p o r t payments f o r a p e r i o d of twenty- four months j u s t i f i e d Peggy's seeking t o t e r m i n a t e h i s p a r e n t a l r i g h t s and r e p l a c e him a s t h e boys' f a t h e r with her second husband who would have provided a more s t a b l e and proper i n f l u e n c e . The c o u r t , however, d e c l i n e d t o t e r m i n a t e t h e p a r e n t a l r i g h t s of Dewey Burns, The c o u r t a l s o concluded t h a t because Peggy was j u s t i f i e d i n b r i n g i n g an a c t i o n t o t e r m i n a t e Dewey's p a r e n t a l r i g h t s f o r nonsupport of t h e c h i l d r e n , s h e is e n t i t l e d t o c o s t s and r e a s o n a b l e a t t o r n e y f e e s even though t h e c o u r t m u s t hold t h a t t h e p e t i t i o n t o t e r m i n a t e is n o t well taken and t h e r e b y dismissed. Two i s s u e s a r e p r e s e n t e d on a p p e a l : 1. Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r i n d e c l i n i n g t o t e r m i n a t e t h e p a r e n t a l r i g h t s of Dewey Burns a f t e r it had e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t he f a i l e d t o make court-ordered c h i l d s u p p o r t payments f o r a period of twenty-four months p r i o r t o t h e p e t i t i o n t o t e r m i n a t e h i s p a r e n t a l r i g h t s ? 2. May a f t e r - t h e - f a c t payments be t r e a t e d by t h e r e c i p i e n t a s payments of o t h e r o u t s t a n d i n g o b l i g a t i o n s ? W e f i n d t h e f i r s t i s s u e d e t e r m i n a t i v e i n t h i s m a t t e r . Two r e c e n t c a s e s of t h i s Court, Matter of Adoption of SLR (1982) 1 Mont . , 640 P.2d 886, 39 St.Rep. 156, and Matter of Adoption of Smigaj ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 171 Mont. 537, 560 P.2d 141, a r e c o n t r o l l i n g , Mr. J u s t i c e Daly, t h e a u t h o r of t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n i n - SLR, quoted Smigaj i n p a r t and s t a t e d : " ' , , we have no d i f f i c u l t y c o n s t r u i n g t h e p l a i n meaning of t h e words i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e consent s t a t u t e s a s r e f e r r i n g t o t h e f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t t h a t a p a r e n - t o w e s a c h i l d . ' [ C i t a t i o n o m i t t e d , ] H e r e , t h e f a t h e r was under a d u t y , p u r s u a n t t o t h e d i s s o l u t i o n d e c r e e , t o provide c h i l d s u p p o r t payments of $100 per month. I t is undisputed t h a t t h e f a t h e r f a i l e d t o pay any c h i l d s u p p o r t over a year b e f o r e t h e p e t i t i o n f o r a d o p t i o n was f i l e d . The p l a i n meaning approach of Smigaj r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e f a t h e r c o n t r i b u t e f i n a n c i a l support t o t h e c h i l d . The f a i l u r e t o p r o v i d e f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t cannot be cured by g i v i n g t h e c h i l d s e v e r a l a r t i c l e s of c l o t h i n g . " S i m i l a r l y , t h e n o n c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t cannot s a t i s f y h i s o b l i g a t i o n t o provide f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t by i n c u r r i n g or paying d e b t s which a r e u n r e l a t e d t o t h e c h i l d . . . It SLR, 64PI P.2d a t 887-888. 'The f a i l u r e t o provide f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t cannot be cured by g i v i n g t h e c h i l d s e v e r a l a r t i c l e s of c l o t h i n g . J u s t i c e Daly noted a l s o i n Matter of Adoption of SLH, s u p r a , t h a t t h e n o n c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t cannot s a t i s f y h i s o b l i g a t i o n t o provide f i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t by i n c u r r i n g o r paying d e b t s u n r e l a t e d t o t h e c h i l d . The e x p r e s s terms of t h e s t a t u t e , a s J u s t i c e Daly n o t e d , r e f e r r e d t o " s u p p o r t t h a t a p a r e n t owes a child.'' See a l s o , Smigaj, s u p r a . F u r t h e r , i n - SLR, t h i s Court noted t h a t t h e f a t h e r had no v a l i d reason f o r f a i l i n g t o make even one c h i l d s u p p o r t payment during t h e e n t i r e year preceding t h e f i l i n g of t h e p e t i t i o n . He s u f f e r e d no p h y s i c a l o r mental impairment during t h a t time, and he possessed s k i l l s t h a t would have made him employable ( c a r p e n t r y , l a b o r , o p e r a t o r of heavy equipment) . The f a t h e r v o l u n t a r i l y chose a l i f e s t y l e incon- s i s t e n t with p a r e n t a l s u p p o r t o b l i g a t i o n s . That he had a r i g h t t o choose such a l i f e s t y l e is conceded. That he had a l e g a l r i g h t t o prevent t h e adoption of h i s c h i l d , however, is n o t c o n s i s t e n t with t h e v o l u n t a r y f a i l u r e t o c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e c h i l d ' s s u p p o r t . I n t h e words of t h e C a l i f o r n i a c o u r t : " A s t a t u t e should n o t be i n t e r p r e t e d i n f a v o r of a f a t h e r who s e e k s t h e b e n e f i t of p a r e n t a l r i g h t s b u t shuns t h e b u r d e n of p a r e n t a l o b l i g a t i o n s . " I n Re B u r t o n ' s Adoption ( 1 9 5 6 ) , 147 Cal.App.2d 125, 305 P.2d 185, 191. For t h e s e r e a s o n s , t h e c o n c l u s i o n s of t h e D i s t r i c t Court a s t o t h e i s s u e s of f a t h e r ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e s u p p o r t of t h e c h i l d r e n and h i s a b i l i t y t o so c o n t r i b u t e a r e v a c a t e d . The r i g h t s of t h e f a t h e r t o t h e c h i l d r e n a r e terminated. The D i s t r i c t Court is r e v e r s e d and o r d e r e d t o cornply w i t h t h i s o p i n i o n . W e concur: J u s t i c e s