Case Title: Berry v. Bd. of Supervisors

Citation: 

Docket Number: 211143

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2023-03-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
DAVID BERRY, ET AL. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 211143 
JUSTICE WESLEY G. RUSSELL, JR. 
 
 
 
MARCH 23, 2023 
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS 
OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
David A. Oblon, Judge1 
 
 
David Berry, Carol A. Hawn, Helen H. Webb, and Adrienne A. Whyte, resident 
taxpayers of Fairfax County (collectively “Residents”), appeal the circuit court’s decision 
dismissing their claims against the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County.  In the proceedings 
below, the Residents sought declaratory relief and to enjoin the Board from adopting an updated 
zoning ordinance (“Z-Mod”) via electronic meeting.  Alternatively, if their request for 
preliminary relief was denied and the Board adopted Z-Mod via electronic meeting, the 
Residents sought a declaration “that any such action or approval by the [Board] concerning 
Z-Mod is not permitted by Virginia law during the pandemic emergency and, hence, is void ab 
initio and of no continuing force or effect.” 
The circuit court denied the requested relief, finding that the Residents’ claims were 
moot, that a portion of the Residents’ declaratory judgment action also was unripe, and that the 
Board had the authority to adopt Z-Mod in an electronic meeting.  The Residents appealed to this 
Court, and, for the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court. 
 
 
 
 
1 Judge Oblon ultimately made the ruling sustaining the Board’s demurrer and entered the 
dismissal order in the matter.  The Honorable John M. Tran presided over the proceedings 
related to the Residents’ request for a preliminary injunction.  On appeal, the Residents only 
challenge the circuit court’s ruling dismissing their claims. 
2 
 
I.  Background 
 
In 2016, Fairfax County began a process to update and modernize its existing zoning 
ordinance, which had been adopted in 1978.  The new ordinance was meant to replace the old 
zoning ordinance in its entirety.  Because the project involved editorial and substantive changes 
which required “[e]xtensive public outreach[,]” the process continued into late 2020. 
 
Earlier that year, the COVID-19 pandemic emerged, prompting the Governor to declare a 
state of emergency pursuant to Code § 44-146.17.  The General Assembly likewise addressed the 
pandemic in its 2020 budget bills, authorizing public bodies to meet electronically to address 
certain matters during a state emergency.  See 2020 Acts ch. 1283 § 4-0.01(g) (Reg. Sess.); 2020 
Acts ch. 56 § 4-0.01(g) (Spec. Sess. I).  In response to the pandemic, the Board adopted a 
continuity ordinance, pursuant to Code § 15.2-1413, establishing procedures for meeting 
electronically during the pandemic emergency in order to assure continuity in government by 
allowing the Board “to conduct necessary public business[.]”2  The state of emergency remained 
in effect throughout the critical events of this case. 
 
On January 28, 2021, Fairfax County’s Planning Commission held an electronic public 
hearing concerning Z-Mod.  On that date, the Planning Commission did not vote on whether to 
recommend adoption of Z-Mod to the Board but, rather, deferred its decision.  Ultimately, on 
March 3, 2021, the Planning Commission voted to recommend that the Board adopt Z-Mod. 
 
 
2 The ordinance, which was attached as an exhibit to the Residents’ complaint and in 
pleadings filed by the Board, is titled “AN UNCODIFIED ORDINANCE TO ESTABLISH 
METHODS TO ASSURE CONTINUITY IN FAIRFAX COUNTY GOVERNMENT AND 
CONDUCT OF BOARD OF SUPERVISORS MEETINGS DURING THE NOVEL 
CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 (COVID-19) EMERGENCY, AND TO REPEAL THE 
EMERGENCY ORDINANCE ADOPTED ON MARCH 24, 2020, WHICH IS HEREBY 
REPLACED[.]”  Because the ordinance is uncodified, we will cite to it as the “Continuity 
Ordinance” in this opinion. 
3 
 
 
Two days later, citing the open meeting provisions of the Virginia Freedom of 
Information Act (“VFOIA”), Code § 2.2-3700 et seq., the Residents filed a “Verified Complaint 
for Declaratory Judgment and Temporary/Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief,” seeking 
to enjoin the Board from adopting Z-Mod at an electronic public hearing which was scheduled 
for March 9, 2021.  The Residents alleged that the Board lacked the authority under Virginia law 
to consider and vote on Z-Mod in an electronic meeting,3 and, as such, any resulting action or 
approval concerning Z-Mod should be declared void ab initio. 
 
On the afternoon of March 9, 2021, prior to the Board’s scheduled electronic meeting, the 
circuit court held an emergency hearing at which it denied the Residents’ motion for 
temporary/preliminary injunction in a ruling from the bench.  At the electronic meeting later that 
day, the Board considered the adoption of Z-Mod, deferring its ultimate decision until later in the 
month.  The circuit court issued its written decision on March 12, 2021, reaffirming that the 
Board had authority under Code § 15.2-1413 and the General Assembly’s budget bills to 
consider and adopt Z-Mod at an electronic meeting. 
 
On March 22, 2021, the day before the Board’s next-scheduled electronic meeting, the 
Residents filed objections to and a “Motion for Reconsideration” of the circuit court’s order.  
The next day, the Board met electronically and voted to adopt Z-Mod.  On May 4, 2021, the 
circuit court issued an order denying the Residents’ March 22, 2021 Motion for Reconsideration. 
 
Shortly after it adopted Z-Mod in March 2021, the Board filed a demurrer to the 
complaint, seeking dismissal of the Residents’ complaint.  The circuit court sustained the 
 
 
3 For purposes of this opinion, “electronic meeting” refers to a meeting “conducted 
through telephonic, video, electronic or other electronic communication means where the 
members are not physically assembled to discuss or transact public business[.]”  
Code § 2.2-3707(B). 
4 
 
Board’s demurrer in a ruling from the bench and entered its final order dismissing the complaint 
on September 9, 2021.  As for its reasoning, the order incorporated the circuit court’s “reasons 
stated from the bench and reflected in the . . . transcripts[.]”  The circuit court concluded that 
Residents’ requests for injunctive relief had been “denied, decided, and are now moot[.]”  
Specifically, the circuit court had already denied the Residents’ request for a preliminary 
injunction to prevent the Board from proceeding with the amendment process electronically.  
Similarly, the circuit court found the Residents’ request for a permanent injunction to prevent the 
Board from proceeding with the amendment process electronically also was moot because the 
Board had already met and passed Z-Mod electronically. 
 
The circuit court further found that the Residents’ remaining request for relief—a 
declaration that the adoption of Z-Mod at an electronic meeting rendered it void ab initio—had 
been mooted by the Board’s adoption of Z-Mod.  Specifically, the circuit court found that the 
Residents’ right to challenge the adoption of Z-Mod “had already matured” because of the 
Board’s adoption of Z-Mod, and thus, the Residents’ declaratory judgment action was no longer 
viable because “‘where claims and rights asserted have fully matured and the alleged wrongs 
have already been suffered, a declaratory judgment proceeding, which is intended to permit the 
declaration of rights before they mature, is not an available remedy.’”  (Citation omitted).  The 
circuit court also concluded that the Residents’ challenge was premature under 
Code § 15.2-2285(F) and had to be asserted in a suit filed after adoption of Z-Mod.  In essence, 
the circuit court found that the claim simultaneously was both moot and unripe. 
 
As an additional ground for its decision, the circuit court concluded that the Board had 
the authority to hear and act on Z-Mod by electronic means because “[z]oning is inherently an 
essential act of local government[,] . . . critical, especially in the context of a national emergency 
5 
 
and state emergency because civility between neighbors is the foundation of domestic 
tranquility.”  From this premise, the circuit court concluded that the various emergency power 
statutes relied upon by the Board allowed it to adopt Z-Mod in an electronic meeting. 
 
The Residents noted an appeal to this Court, advancing three principal assignments of 
error.  The first two assignments of error address the circuit court’s procedural rulings, arguing 
that the Residents’ request for a declaratory ruling that the Board lacked authority to adopt 
Z-Mod electronically was neither moot nor a premature appeal.  The third assignment of error 
maintains that the Board had no legal authority to adopt Z-Mod in an electronic meeting that 
violated the open meeting requirements of VFOIA.  We granted the Residents’ petition to 
address these issues. 
II.  Analysis 
A.  Standard of review 
 
Whether a locality has the power to act is a question of law subject to de novo review in 
this Court.  Dumfries-Triangle Rescue Squad, Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Supervisors, 299 Va. 226, 233 
(2020).  Issues related to the interpretation of statutes and ordinances also are questions of law 
subject to de novo review.  See, e.g., Cole v. Smyth Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 298 Va. 625, 635-
36 (2020) (statutory interpretation); Alexandria City Council v. Mirant Potomac River, LLC, 273 
Va. 448, 455 (2007) (recognizing that “interpretation of a[n] . . . ordinance, like interpretation of 
a statute, is a pure question of law, subject to de novo review”). 
When interpreting a statute or ordinance, “our primary objective is ‘to ascertain and give 
effect to legislative intent,’ as expressed by the language used in the statute.”  Cuccinelli v. 
Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 283 Va. 420, 425 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Commonwealth v. Amerson, 281 Va. 414, 418 (2011)).  “[W]e determine [that] intent 
6 
 
from the words contained in the statute” or ordinance.  Williams v. Commonwealth, 265 Va. 268, 
271 (2003) (citing Vaughn, Inc. v. Beck, 262 Va. 673, 677 (2001); Thomas v. Commonwealth, 
256 Va. 38, 41 (1998)).  “[W]ords in a statute [or ordinance] are to be construed according to 
their ordinary meaning, given the context in which they are used.”  City of Va. Beach v. Board of 
Supervisors, 246 Va. 233, 236 (1993) (quoting Grant v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 680, 684 
(1982)). 
When addressing multiple legislative enactments dealing with the same subject matter, 
we do not view them “as isolated fragments of law, but as a whole, or as parts of a great 
connected, homogeneous system, or a single and complete statutory arrangement.”  Thorsen v. 
Richmond Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 292 Va. 257, 266 (2016) (quoting 
Prillaman v. Commonwealth, 199 Va. 401, 405 (1957)).  Thus, such enactments are “construed 
together” with “effect . . . given to them all” even if “they contain no reference to one another[] 
and were passed at different times.”  Prillaman, 199 Va. at 406 (quoting Mitchell v. Witt, 98 Va. 
459, 461 (1900)). 
B.  Declaratory judgments, mootness, and ripeness 
 
The Declaratory Judgment Act, Code § 8.01-184 et seq., represents a departure from the 
common law requirement that a litigant suffer actual damage before filing suit.  See Miller v. 
Highland Cnty., 274 Va. 355, 370 (2007).  By its own terms, it provides “relief from the 
uncertainty and insecurity attendant upon controversies over legal rights, without requiring one 
of the parties interested so to invade the rights asserted by the other as to entitle him to maintain 
an ordinary action therefor.”  Code § 8.01-191.  Although the Act “do[es] not create or change 
any substantive rights, or bring into being or modify any relationships, or alter the character of 
controversies, which are the subject of judicial power[,]” Lafferty v. School Bd. of Fairfax Cnty., 
7 
 
293 Va. 354, 360-61 (2017) (quoting Williams v. Southern Bank of Norfolk, 203 Va. 657, 662, 
(1962)), it “provides ‘a speedy determination of actual controversies between citizens, and 
[operates] to prune, as far as is consonant with right and justice, the dead wood attached to the 
common law rule of ‘injury before action[.]’”  Morgan v. Board of Supervisors of Hanover 
Cnty., 302 Va. ___, ___ (Feb. 2, 2023) (quoting Chick v. MacBain, 157 Va. 60, 66 (1931)).  In 
doing away with the requirement that a litigant suffer actual damage before filing suit, the Act 
does not permit a litigant to bring an action that is moot or in which the claims are so speculative 
that the action is not ripe for adjudication.  City of Fairfax v. Shanklin, 205 Va. 227, 229-30 
(1964). 
 
The Residents, citing their interests as taxpayers and the requirements of VFOIA,4 sought 
a declaration that the Board lacked the authority to consider, vote on, and ultimately adopt 
Z-Mod in an electronic meeting.  In challenging the Board’s authority in this regard, the 
Residents sought two distinct forms of relief:  injunctive relief preventing the Board from 
considering, voting on, and adopting Z-Mod at an electronic meeting or, alternatively if the 
Board did adopt Z-Mod at an electronic meeting, a declaration that Z-Mod was void ab initio.  
Although it is undisputed that the Residents’ complaint represented a live controversy when it 
was filed, the circuit court concluded that the entire declaratory judgment action was mooted by 
the time the Board adopted Z-Mod and that, alternatively, the second category of relief sought 
also was unripe.  We address both rulings below. 
 
 
 
 
4 Code § 2.2-3713(A) provides that “[a]ny person . . . denied the rights and privileges 
conferred by this chapter may proceed to enforce such rights and privileges,” seeking vindication 
by way of litigation. 
8 
 
1.  Mootness 
Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution of Virginia vests the “judicial power of the 
Commonwealth” in the judicial branch.  That power, however, “does not authorize [Virginia’s 
courts] to ‘issue advisory opinions on moot questions[.]’”  Godlove v. Rothstein, 300 Va. 437, 
439 (2022) (quoting Board of Supervisors v. Ratcliff, 298 Va. 622, 622 (2020)).  An action is 
moot “when ‘the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable 
interest in the outcome.’”  Id. (quoting Ratcliff, 298 Va. at 622). 
 
An action that involves a live controversy at its inception may become moot during the 
course of litigation.  For example, changing events during litigation may make it impossible for a 
court to award a litigant the relief requested.  A case is moot if the relief requested by a litigant 
can no longer be granted.  See, e.g., Hankins v. Town of Virginia Beach, 182 Va. 642, 644 
(1944); Hollowell v. Virginia Marine Res. Comm’n, 56 Va. App. 70, 77-78 (2010).  Regardless 
of how “it may have come about,” a determination that a claim is moot because it is no longer 
possible to grant the requested relief “deprives [a court] of [its] power to act; there is nothing for 
[it] to remedy, even if [it] were disposed to do so.”  Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 18 (1998). 
 
The circuit court correctly found that a portion of the Residents’ claimed relief had been 
mooted by events.  At the time of the circuit court’s final order, the Board had already met, voted 
on, and adopted Z-Mod in an electronic meeting.  Accordingly, it was impossible for the circuit 
court to enter an injunction preventing the Board from doing so, and thus, the circuit court 
correctly concluded that the portions of the Residents’ claims that sought to prevent such 
occurrences from happening were now moot.  See, e.g., Spencer, 523 U.S. at 18; Hankins, 182 
Va. at 644; Hollowell, 56 Va. App. at 77-78. 
9 
 
 
The fact that some of the Residents’ requested relief had been mooted by events did not 
render moot the Residents’ suit in total.  After all, the gravamen of the complaint—that the 
Board lacked the authority to adopt a revised zoning ordinance in an electronic meeting—
remained a live question, and the Residents had requested relief—a declaration that the Board 
lacked such authority and that Z-Mod was void ab initio—that the circuit court could still award.  
In short, although the claims seeking to enjoin the consideration and adoption of Z-Mod were 
moot, the underlying claim as to the Board’s authority was very much alive. 
 
Despite this, the circuit court found that the Residents’ declaratory judgment action had 
been mooted by the Board’s adoption of Z-Mod.  It reasoned that declaratory judgment actions 
like the one here may only be used before the “‘claims and rights asserted have fully matured 
and the alleged wrongs have already been suffered[.]’”  (Citation omitted).  The circuit court 
reasoned that, because the Residents challenged the adoption of Z-Mod, any deficiencies in its 
adoption fully matured once it was adopted. 
 
Although it is true that a declaratory judgment action may not be used to assert claims 
that have fully matured, see, e.g., Pure Presbyterian Church of Washington v. Grace of God 
Presbyterian Church, 296 Va. 42, 55 (2018), the circuit court’s ruling that the Residents’ 
declaratory judgment action was mooted by the adoption of Z-Mod was error because the 
Residents’ action was not exclusively a pre-adoption challenge to Z-Mod.  Rather, because of 
the alternative relief requested in the event that the Board adopted Z-Mod, it was also a 
pre-enforcement challenge to Z-Mod, seeking to prohibit the Board from enforcing the 
provisions of Z-Mod or expending taxpayer funds to implement it.  Accordingly, not all of the 
Residents’ claims had fully matured. 
10 
 
 
It is well-established that a declaratory judgment action is a proper vehicle for a 
pre-enforcement challenge to the manner in which an ordinance has been adopted.  See, e.g., Gas 
Mart Corp. v. Board of Supervisors, 269 Va. 334 (2005); Glazebrook v. Board of Supervisors, 
266 Va. 550, 557 (2003); Town of Jonesville v. Powell Valley Vill. Ltd. P’ship, 254 Va. 70, 74 
(1997); Board of Supervisors v. Rowe, 216 Va. 128 (1975).  The procedure is so well-established 
that, in its brief in this Court, the Board concedes that, regarding “a governing body’s decision to 
adopt or amend a zoning ordinance[,]” a declaratory judgment action “is the proper vehicle for 
challenging that decision.”5  Accordingly, the circuit court erred in concluding that the Board’s 
adoption of Z-Mod mooted the Residents’ declaratory judgment action.6 
2.  Ripeness 
 
Whereas mootness addresses a once viable claim that has lost its viability, the concept of 
ripeness applies to claims that, while potentially viable at some point in the future, have yet to 
mature into a justiciable controversy—that is, an actual controversy between the parties that is 
not based solely on speculation or purely hypothetical scenarios that may (or may not) occur at 
some undefined point in the future.  Even under the less stringent injury pleading requirements of 
the Declaratory Judgment Act, “[t]he controversy must be one . . . where specific adverse claims, 
based upon present rather than future or speculative facts, are ripe for judicial adjustment.”  
 
 
5 In making this concession, the Board argues that a declaratory judgment action is the 
appropriate vehicle only “after” the ordinance has been adopted.  We address this argument 
below. 
 
 
6 Because the existence of the Residents’ alternative claim for relief provides a sufficient 
basis for concluding that the circuit court erred on this question, we do not reach the question of 
whether a declaratory judgment action, viable at its filing, must be dismissed as moot if the 
claims and rights asserted fully mature, i.e., the potential injury becomes an actual injury, during 
the course of the litigation. 
11 
 
Charlottesville Area Fitness Club Operators Ass’n v. Albemarle Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 285 
Va. 87, 98 (2013) (quoting Shanklin, 205 Va. at 229). 
 
In the instant case, the Residents’ complaint was based on much more than mere 
speculation or purely hypothetical scenarios.  In required public notices, the Board made it 
known that it was planning to consider and adopt Z-Mod in an electronic meeting, and it did in 
fact do so.  The Residents’ complaint that the Board lacked the authority to do so rested on the 
situation as it existed and did not depend on future events unfolding in a particular way.  In this 
sense, the complaint was ripe because it presented the circuit court with “specific adverse claims, 
based upon present rather than future or speculative facts[.]”  Id. 
 
Despite this, at the Board’s behest, the circuit court concluded that the Residents’ 
declaratory judgment action needed to be dismissed because it was a “premature” appeal of the 
zoning ordinance.  Specifically, the circuit court concluded that Code § 15.2-2285(F) provides 
the sole manner by which the Residents could challenge the Board’s ultimate adoption of Z-Mod 
and that the statute required the Residents to refrain from initiating such a claim until after the 
Board had adopted Z-Mod.  We disagree. 
 
Code § 15.2-2285(F) provides, in part, that 
[e]very action contesting a decision of the local governing body 
adopting or failing to adopt a proposed zoning ordinance or 
amendment thereto or granting or failing to grant a special 
exception shall be filed within thirty days of the decision with the 
circuit court having jurisdiction of the land affected by the 
decision. 
 
The most common applications of the statute have dealt with appeals of individual zoning 
decisions, whether regarding an individual parcel of land or discrete provisions within a zoning 
ordinance.  Assuming without deciding that Code § 15.2-2285(F) applies to a challenge to the 
procedures by which a locality purports to have revised its zoning ordinance in its entirety, 
12 
 
neither the plain language of the statute nor its purpose required the dismissal of the Residents’ 
complaint as premature. 
 
The central premise of the Board’s argument and the circuit court’s conclusion that 
Code § 15.2-2285(F) required the dismissal of the Residents’ complaint as premature is the 
assumption that the phrase “within thirty days of the decision” necessarily means “within thirty 
days after” the decision.  Notably absent from the statute is the word “after,” and, like this Court, 
circuit courts are required to interpret statutes based upon “what the statute says and not by what 
[the court] think[s] it should have said.”  Amerson, 281 Va. at 421 (quoting Virginian-Pilot 
Media Cos. v. Dow Jones & Co., 280 Va. 464, 468-69 (2010)).  Accordingly, courts may not 
“add[] language to or delet[e] language from a statute” in the guise of interpreting that statute.  
Appalachian Power Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 284 Va. 695, 706 (2012) (citing BBF, Inc. v. 
Alstom Power, Inc., 274 Va. 326, 331 (2007)).  Absent the circuit court effectively adding “after” 
to the statute, the Residents’ complaint, which was filed eighteen days before the adoption of 
Z-Mod, literally was filed within thirty days of the Board’s decision to adopt Z-Mod as required 
by the statute.7 
 
A conclusion that Code § 15.2-2285(F) did not require the Residents’ complaint to be 
dismissed is not only consistent with the literal meaning of the statutory text, it also is consistent 
with the purpose of the statute.  Previously, we have recognized that the 30-day period in 
Code § 15.2-2285(F) and its predecessors is neither a statute of limitations nor a statute of 
repose.  Friends of Clark Mountain Found., Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 242 Va. 16, 19-20 
 
 
7 We note that, on at least one prior occasion, we have concluded that language requiring 
that a pleading be filed within a specific time “after” a specified event allowed for the pleading 
to be deemed timely filed if filed before the specified event.  See, e.g., Lackey v. Lackey, 222 Va. 
49, 50 (1981). 
13 
 
(1991).  In governing challenges to zoning decisions, the statute and resulting procedures exist to 
“assure[] that the legislative body’s decision will be reviewed in a fair, orderly, and prompt 
manner.”  Riverview Farm Assocs. Va. Gen. P’ship v. Board of Supervisors, 259 Va. 419, 426 
(2000). 
 
The circuit court’s conclusion that Code § 15.2-2285(F) required the Residents to dismiss 
the existing action only to file an identical challenge (minus the previously disposed of requests 
for injunctive relief) the day after Z-Mod’s adoption does nothing to increase or assure the 
fairness, orderliness, or promptness of the Residents’ challenge to Z-Mod.  To the contrary, such 
a requirement only would have resulted in both delay and disorderliness, thus producing an 
absurd result.  Given that such a construction of the statute is not compelled by its text and is at 
odds with its purpose, the circuit court erred in dismissing the Residents’ complaint as 
premature.8  Accordingly, we turn to the merits of the Residents’ challenge. 
C.  VFOIA and the presumption of open government 
 
The General Assembly adopted VFOIA, codified at Code § 2.2-3700 et seq., to “ensure[] 
the people of the Commonwealth . . . free entry to meetings of public bodies wherein the 
business of the people is being conducted.”  Code § 2.2-3700(B).  VFOIA guarantees such 
access because “[t]he affairs of government are not intended to be conducted in an atmosphere of 
secrecy since at all times the public is to be the beneficiary of any action taken at any level of 
government.”  Id.  Absent proper invocation of a statutory exception, “every meeting shall be 
open to the public” and “[a]ll public records and meetings shall be presumed open[.]”  Id. 
 
 
8 Our conclusion is tied to the specific challenge raised by the Residents to the Board’s 
power to adopt the ordinance at all.  There may be other circumstances, such as when the actual 
content of a proposed ordinance is challenged, in which filing suit before the ordinance is 
enacted might be premature. 
14 
 
 
Here there is no dispute that the Board is a “public body” for the purposes of VFOIA and 
that the occasions when the Board first considered and then ultimately adopted Z-Mod were 
“meetings” for the purpose of VFOIA.  As such, those meetings were subject to VFOIA’s open 
meeting requirements set forth in Code § 2.2-3707. 
 
Code § 2.2-3707(A) provides that “[a]ll meetings of public bodies shall be open, except 
as provided in §§ 2.2-3707.01 and 2.2-3711.”9  Code § 2.2-3707(B), as it existed at the time the 
Residents filed suit and the Board conducted the meetings in question,10 provided that “[n]o 
meeting shall be conducted through telephonic, video, electronic or other electronic 
communication means where the members are not physically assembled to discuss or transact 
public business, except as provided in § 2.2-3708.2[.]” 
 
Code § 2.2-3708.2 articulates various circumstances in which a public body may hold a 
meeting by electronic means.  As pertinent to the issues raised in this appeal, the applicable 
version of Code § 2.2-3708.2(A)(3) provided, in part, that 
[a]ny public body may meet by electronic communication means 
without a quorum of the public body physically assembled at one 
location when the Governor has declared a state of emergency in 
accordance with § 44-146.17, provided that (i) the catastrophic 
nature of the declared emergency makes it impracticable or unsafe 
to assemble a quorum in a single location and (ii) the purpose of 
the meeting is to address the emergency. 
 
 
 
9 Neither Code § 2.2-3701.01 nor Code § 2.2-3711 have any application to the meetings 
of the Board at issue in this appeal. 
 
 
10 In both 2021 and 2022, the General Assembly amended various provisions of VFOIA, 
including both Code §§ 2.2-3707 and 2.2-3708.2.  None of those amendments became effective 
prior to the Board’s adoption of Z-Mod.  Accordingly, we apply the version of VFOIA in effect 
at the time of the Board’s consideration and adoption of Z-Mod and only reference the 
amendments to the extent that the later actions of the General Assembly may shed light on the 
meaning of the version of statutes that were in effect when the Board adopted Z-Mod.  See 
Prillaman, 199 Va. at 406. 
15 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
It is undisputed that the Board’s consideration and ultimate adoption of Z-Mod was not 
undertaken to address the COVID-19 emergency.  After all, the process of revising the existing 
zoning ordinance that culminated in Z-Mod began in 2016, well before the existence, let alone 
the effect, of COVID-19 was known.  Accordingly, unless some other provision of law 
supplanted VFOIA’s requirements, the meetings at which Z-Mod was considered and ultimately 
adopted could not be conducted by electronic means. 
D.  Emergency powers legislation 
 
The Board contends that multiple legislative enactments granted it emergency powers 
during the COVID-19 state of emergency that allowed it to dispense with VFOIA’s open 
meeting requirements and conduct the meetings during which Z-Mod was considered and 
adopted by electronic means.  Specifically, the Board contends (and the circuit court agreed) that 
both Code § 15.2-1413 and the County’s adoption of the Continuity Ordinance as well as 
authority granted in the budget bills adopted by the General Assembly in 2020 allowed it to 
dispense with VFOIA’s requirement that the meetings regarding Z-Mod be in-person.  We 
address each argument in turn. 
1.  Code § 15.2-1413 and the Continuity Ordinance 
 
Code § 15.2-1413, as it existed at the relevant time, provided that 
[n]otwithstanding any contrary provision of law, general or special, 
any locality may, by ordinance, provide a method to assure 
continuity in its government, in the event of an enemy attack or 
other disaster.  Such ordinance shall be limited in its effect to a 
period not exceeding six months after any such attack or disaster 
and shall provide for a method for the resumption of normal 
governmental authority by the end of the six-month period.[11] 
 
 
11 In 2021, the General Assembly amended Code § 15.2-1413 to extend the period of 
time a continuity ordinance could remain in effect from six months to twelve months.  See 2021 
16 
 
 
The Board contends that this language overrode the in-person meeting requirement of 
Code § 2.2-3707 and allowed the Board, if it had adopted a continuity ordinance, to consider and 
adopt Z-Mod by means of an electronic meeting. 
 
In asserting that Code § 15.2-1413 supersedes VFOIA’s in-person meeting requirement, 
the Board correctly notes that, by its express terms, the statute is to be given effect 
“[n]otwithstanding any contrary provision of law, general or special[.]”  In this context, the plain 
and ordinary meaning of “notwithstanding” certainly suggests such a conclusion.  See, e.g., 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1545 (2002) (defining “notwithstanding” to mean 
“without prevention or obstruction from or by:  in spite of”); Black’s Law Dictionary 1281 (11th 
ed. 2019) (defining “notwithstanding” to mean “[d]espite; “in spite of”).  In addressing similar 
statutory provisions, the Court of Appeals has concluded that language providing that a statute 
controls “notwithstanding” other statutes “indicates the General Assembly intended that the 
statute ‘function without obstruction from’ ‘other incongruous laws.’”  Holloway v. 
Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 370, 377 (2020) (some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Green v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 567, 570 (1998)).  Applying this reasoning here, 
Code § 15.2-1413 trumps the open meeting provisions of VFOIA, but only if and to the extent 
that Code § 15.2-1413 conflicts with those provisions. 
 
The text of Code § 15.2-1413 does not, in and of itself, create such a conflict.  In 
providing only that “any locality may, by ordinance, provide a method to assure continuity in its 
government, in the event of an enemy attack or other disaster[,]” Code § 15.2-1413 (emphasis 
added), the statute merely grants localities the discretion to adopt such an ordinance.  See 
 
Acts ch. 295 (Spec. Sess. I).  The amendment became effective July 1, 2021, and thus, has no 
application to the Board’s consideration and adoption of Z-Mod in March 2021. 
17 
 
Masters v. Hart, 189 Va. 969, 979 (1949) (“Unless it is manifest that the purpose of the 
legislature was to use the word ‘may’ in the sense of ‘shall’ or ‘must,’ then ‘may’ should be 
given its ordinary meaning—permission, importing discretion.”).  Code § 15.2-1413 does not 
specify the content of any such ordinance and, given that the statute only grants localities 
discretion to adopt an ordinance, it does not require that a locality adopt any such ordinance at 
all.  See Wal-Mart Stores E., LP v. State Corp. Comm’n, 299 Va. 57, 70 (2020) (recognizing that 
the General Assembly’s use of “‘[m]ay’ presupposes that [the body granted discretion] also ‘may 
not’”).  Accordingly, the question becomes whether a locality has adopted an ordinance pursuant 
to Code § 15.2-1413 and whether that ordinance conflicts with VFOIA. 
 
To be sure, Code § 15.2-1413 sets some outer limits on the ordinance a locality is 
empowered to enact.  The ordinance must be enacted in response to “an enemy attack or other 
disaster[,]” may remain in place for a specified duration, and, of particular importance to this 
case, must be limited to “provid[ing] a method to assure continuity in its government” and 
nothing more.  Code § 15.2-1413. 
 
The parties have argued extensively about what the phrase “assure continuity in its 
government” means and the outer limit of what a locality may do in an ordinance adopted 
pursuant to Code § 15.2-1413.  Citing an opinion of the attorney general12 and the context of the 
statute authorizing action only “in the event of an enemy attack or other disaster[,]” the Residents 
argue that Code § 15.2-1413 allows local government to take steps to continue “governmental 
activities that are critical to the continued survival and function of government,” but not ordinary 
business, such as the wholesale revision and modification of a 40-year-old zoning ordinance.  
 
 
12 2020 Op. Atty. Gen. 8-17.  “Although the construction of a statute by the Attorney 
General is not binding upon this Court, it is of ‘persuasive character.’”  Clinchfield Coal Co. v. 
Robbins, 261 Va. 12, 18 (2001) (quoting Barber v. City of Danville, 149 Va. 418, 424 (1928)). 
18 
 
The Board argues that the interpretation championed by the Residents and the attorney general is 
“too narrow,” and effectively asserts that the statute empowers the Board to conduct any of its 
ordinary business under the emergency procedures it adopts in the ordinance without regard to 
the requirements imposed by VFOIA. 
 
We need not, however, answer the broad, abstract question of the outer limits of the 
implied authority granted to localities by Code § 15.2-1413 to resolve this portion of the appeal; 
rather, this portion of the appeal can be resolved by focusing on the much narrower question of 
whether the specific ordinance adopted by the Board authorized the Board to consider and adopt 
Z-Mod at electronic meetings.13  For the reasons stated below and assuming that the Continuity 
Ordinance falls within the grant of authority provided by Code § 15.2-1413, we conclude that it 
did not authorize the Board to consider and adopt Z-Mod at meetings conducted by electronic 
means. 
 
The Board adopted the Continuity Ordinance in 2020 “to establish[] methods to assure 
continuity in Fairfax County government, including Board of Supervisors’ procedures for 
meetings, during the COVID-19 emergency[.]”  Continuity Ordinance, § 1(A).  Of note given the 
Board’s arguments on appeal, the Continuity Ordinance does not purport to allow the Board to 
conduct all of its business without complying with VFOIA.  Section 1(D)(1) of the Continuity 
Ordinance provides that “[f]or any meeting at which the Board . . . transacts public business with 
any purpose other than addressing the emergency or assuring continuity in Fairfax County 
government, the Board . . . will meet in accordance with all usual procedures established by the 
 
13 “As we have often said, ‘[t]he doctrine of judicial restraint dictates that we decide cases 
on the best and narrowest grounds available.’”  Commonwealth v. White, 293 Va. 411, 419 
(2017) (some internal quotation marks and footnote omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Swann, 
290 Va. 194, 196 (2015)). 
19 
 
Virginia Freedom of Information Act.”  Accordingly, even if we were to assume that 
Code § 15.2-1413 allows a locality to decide to conduct all of its business by electronic meetings 
during an emergency, the Board did not do so when it adopted the Continuity Ordinance. 
 
Tellingly, even for matters falling within the scope of the emergency provisions of the 
Continuity Ordinance, the Board emphasized a desire to comply with VFOIA.  Section 1(D)(2) 
of the Continuity Ordinance provides that even when “the purpose of a meeting of the Board . . . 
is to address the emergency, the Board . . . will meet in accordance with” VFOIA.  Similarly, 
Section 1(D)(3) of the Continuity Ordinance provides that if a Board meeting “is being 
conducted [to] assur[e] continuity in Fairfax County government,” the meeting shall be 
conducted “in accordance with all usual procedures established by the Virginia Freedom of 
Information Act to the extent possible.”  Regarding continuity in government matters, the 
Continuity Ordinance only permits the Board to meet without complying with VFOIA, if the 
“items proposed to be considered are necessary to assure continuity in Fairfax County 
government and the usual procedures cannot be implemented safely or practically[.]”14  
Continuity Ordinance, § 1(D)(3)(B). 
 
It is undisputed that the Board did not consider and adopt Z-Mod to address the 
COVID-19 emergency.  Rather, the Board contends that, consistent with the Continuity 
Ordinance, the consideration and adoption of Z-Mod was necessary to assure continuity in 
government.  Accordingly, we turn to the Continuity Ordinance’s definition of continuity in 
government. 
 
 
14 “Usual procedures” is defined in the Continuity Ordinance to mean “the requirements 
and procedures established by [VFOIA] for public meetings, including remote participation by a 
Board member as long as a quorum of the Board is physically assembled at the meeting location, 
as allowed by Virginia Code § 2.2-3708.2(A)(1)[.]”  Continuity Ordinance, § 1(C). 
20 
 
 
Section 1(C) of the Continuity Ordinance defines “[c]ontinuity in Fairfax County 
government” as including 
without limitation, those actions, and the coordination of actions, 
that are necessary to assure the continuation of the County’s 
essential functions and services.  By way of example and not 
limitation, such necessary actions include those related to (1) the 
County’s finances, such as the public hearings and adoption of the 
FY 2021 budget, tax rate, and utilities fees; appropriations of 
funds; and funding requests; (2) contracts that need Board action; 
(3) applications, appeals, or other requests that are subject to 
mandatory or directory time frames for action; (4) satisfying due 
process and other constitutional requirements; (5) public safety; 
and (6) measures that help sustain the County’s economy. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
Although this illustrative list is intended to be non-exhaustive, it is clear that the 
consideration and adoption of Z-Mod after a revision process that began literally years before the 
COVID-19 emergency is different in kind from the listed examples, and thus, falls outside of the 
Continuity Ordinance’s definition of “continuity in . . . government[.]”  For each of the listed 
examples, there is, at the very least, an implied temporal element.  Questions regarding the 
County’s budget, entering into and renewing contracts, and meeting statutory deadlines for 
government action are all time-sensitive with a failure to meet such deadlines either imperiling 
the continued existence of the government or having the potential to cause the County to forever 
forego acting on a particular topic.  Similarly, taking steps to satisfy due process or other 
constitutional requirements, protect public safety, and sustain the County’s economy from 
collapse are things that require immediate attention.  If an issue does not require immediate 
attention, it cannot fairly be classified as “necessary” to allow the County government to 
continue with essential functions and services. 
21 
 
 
Although the language of the Continuity Ordinance amply supports such an 
interpretation, we note that the context of the ordinance further supports such a view.  See Potter 
v. BFK, Inc., 300 Va. 177, 182 (2021) (recognizing that “[a]lthough our focus is generally on the 
plain meaning of unambiguous [legislative] language, we must also consider that language in the 
context in which it is used”).  After all, by its own terms, the Continuity Ordinance is designed to 
allow Fairfax County to continue to function in the face of the COVID-19 emergency.  To the 
extent it authorizes a departure from normal procedures, including the open meeting 
requirements of VFOIA, it does so only to allow the Board to take the steps “necessary” to 
perpetuate the locality’s operations – not to conduct any and all business that the Board 
otherwise may be empowered to undertake.  In short, the Board enacted emergency procedures 
to deal with exigent business when an emergency made following normal procedures impossible 
or nearly so.  Nothing about that context suggests that the Continuity Ordinance should shield all 
of the Board’s ordinary, non-time-sensitive business from VFOIA’s requirement of open 
government. 
 
The process that led to the ultimate adoption of Z-Mod demonstrates that its adoption was 
far from time-sensitive.  After all, the revision process began in 2016—five years before Z-Mod 
was adopted and three years before the existence of COVID-19 publicly was known anywhere in 
the world.  This multi-year history of consideration and revision before adoption conclusively 
demonstrates that there were not hard and fast deadlines, statutorily required or otherwise, that 
needed to be met.  Prior to the Z-Mod revision, the zoning ordinance had existed for four 
decades and absolutely nothing suggests that Z-Mod needed to be adopted to satisfy due process 
or other constitutional requirements, protect public safety, or sustain the County’s economy.  
Everything about the history of Z-Mod suggests that the adoption of Z-Mod could have waited 
22 
 
days, weeks, or months without throwing the County’s operations into even minor distress let 
alone chaos.  Simply put, the consideration and adoption of Z-Mod was not time-sensitive, and 
thus, acting on it in March 2021 was neither essential nor necessary to allow for the continued 
operations of Fairfax County government. 
 
Despite the fact that the consideration and adoption of Z-Mod was not time-sensitive, the 
Board argues that it still fell within the Continuity Ordinance’s definition of “[c]ontinuity in 
Fairfax County government” because zoning represents “an essential local government 
function[.]”  As the Board notes, we previously have stated that “a local government’s exercise 
of its zoning authority is ‘one of the most essential powers of government[.]’”  Board of 
Supervisors v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 268 Va. 441, 446 (2004) (quoting Hadacheck v. 
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915)).  Although both the Continuity Ordinance and our decision 
in Board of Supervisors utilize the word “essential,” context makes clear that the word was not 
intended to convey the same meaning on each occasion. 
 
In our prior decision, we addressed whether a county board of supervisors had standing to 
challenge a decision of the county’s board of zoning appeals.  Id. at 445.  The question was 
whether the final word in zoning matters lay with the board of supervisors or the board of zoning 
appeals.  Citing Hadacheck, the United States Supreme Court’s 1915 decision characterizing 
zoning as an “essential” power of local government, we concluded that the board of supervisors, 
as the final repository of a county’s powers, had standing to bring the suit.  Id. at 446.  In contrast 
to its use in the Continuity Ordinance, we used the term “essential” to convey that the zoning 
power in general belongs to the locality (and hence the board of supervisors) not whether a 
particular action regarding zoning must be performed quickly or at all.  Thus, the fact that the 
23 
 
zoning power is an essential power of local government does not compel the conclusion that any 
particular zoning decision is essential.15 
Because there is no dispute in this case that zoning decisions belong to the Board, our 
decision in Board of Supervisors, including the use of the word “essential,” sheds little light on 
the issue in this case and does not alter our interpretation of the meaning of “essential” in the 
Continuity Ordinance. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the Continuity Ordinance did not authorize the Board to 
consider and adopt Z-Mod in an electronic meeting.  Accordingly, neither the Continuity 
Ordinance nor Code § 15.2-1413 conflicted with or superseded VFOIA’s open meeting 
requirements. 
2.  Budget language 
 
The Board also contends that, in enacting the budget in 2020, the General Assembly 
supplanted VFOIA’s open meeting requirements and authorized it to consider and adopt Z-Mod 
at meetings conducted by electronic means.  See 2020 Acts ch. 1283 § 4-0.01(g) (Reg. Sess.); 
2020 Acts ch. 56 § 4-0.01(g) (Spec. Sess. I) (“budget language”).  In pertinent part, the 
referenced budget language reads: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any public body, 
including any state, local, regional, or regulatory body, or a 
governing board as defined in § 54.1-2345 of the Code of Virginia, 
or any joint meeting of such entities, may meet by electronic 
communication means without a quorum of the public body or any 
member of the governing board physically assembled at one 
location when the Governor has declared a state of emergency in 
accordance with § 44-146.17, provided that (i) the nature of the 
 
 
15 We acknowledge that there are specific zoning/land use matters where a locality must 
act within a statutorily defined deadline or lose the ability to act at all.  See, e.g., 
Code §§ 15.2-2245(B), 15.2-2316.4(B)(1),15.2-2316.4:1(D), and 15.2-2259(A)(3).  Given that 
time is of the essence in such matters, action by the locality might fairly be characterized as 
“essential”; however, we do not decide that issue because that is not the case before us. 
24 
 
declared emergency makes it impracticable or unsafe for the public 
body or governing board to assemble in a single location; (ii) the 
purpose of meeting is to discuss or transact the business statutorily 
required or necessary to continue operations of the public body or 
common interest community association as defined in § 54.1-2345 
of the Code of Virginia and the discharge of its lawful purposes, 
duties, and responsibilities; (iii) a public body shall make available 
a recording or transcript of the meeting on its website in 
accordance with the timeframes established in §§ 2.2-3707 and 
2.2-3707.1 of the Code of Virginia; and (iv) the governing board 
shall distribute minutes of a meeting held pursuant to this 
subdivision to common interest community association members 
by the same method used to provide notice of the meeting. 
 
Id.  The Board contends that the budget language overrides the open meeting requirements of 
VFOIA and permitted the Board to consider and adopt Z-Mod in meetings conducted by 
electronic means. 
 
Much as it did regarding Code § 15.2-1413, the Board argues that the budget language 
superseded VFOIA because of its introductory phrase, “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of 
law[.]”  Id.  For the same reasons we stated regarding Code § 15.2-1413, we agree that this 
language overrides the open meeting provisions of VFOIA, but only to the extent that the 
provisions are in conflict.  See Holloway, 72 Va. App. at 377.  As pertinent to this appeal, such a 
conflict arises only if the budget language authorized the Board to consider and adopt Z-Mod at 
meetings conducted by electronic means. 
 
The budget language authorized public bodies such as the Board to “meet by electronic 
communication means without a quorum of the public body or any member of the governing 
board physically assembled at one location when the Governor has declared a state of emergency 
in accordance with § 44-146.17” and certain other conditions, set out in romanettes (i) - (iv), are 
met.  2020 Acts ch. 1283 § 4-0.01(g) (Reg. Sess.); 2020 Acts ch. 56 § 4-0.01(g) (Spec. Sess. I).  
The Residents do not contest that the Governor had declared the requisite emergency or that the 
25 
 
conditions in romanettes (i), (iii), and (iv) were satisfied.  They argue only that the consideration 
and adoption of Z-Mod did not satisfy the condition set forth in romanette (ii), that “the purpose 
of meeting[s where Z-Mod was considered and adopted wa]s to discuss or transact the business 
statutorily required or necessary to continue operations of the public body . . . and the discharge 
of its lawful purposes, duties, and responsibilities[.]”  Id. 
 
Specifically, the Residents argue that the revision of a 40-year-old zoning ordinance after 
a multi-year process is not “business statutorily required or necessary to continue operations of 
the public body[.]”  Id.  Although not contending that the revision of Z-Mod was “statutorily 
required[,]” the Board asserts that the phrase “necessary to continue operations of the public 
body” not only allowed the Board to adopt Z-Mod in a meeting conducted by electronic means, 
but exempted all of the Board’s business from VFOIA’s open meeting requirements.16 
 
We disagree with the Board.  As pertinent here, romanette (ii) exempts certain Board 
business from VFOIA’s open meeting requirements if two distinct conditions are met.  The 
business must be “necessary to continue operations of the [Board] . . . and [represent] the 
discharge of its lawful purposes, duties, and responsibilities”  Id. (emphasis added).  Because the 
two conditions are separated by the conjunctive “and,” both conditions had to be met for the 
Board to avoid the open meeting requirements of VFOIA in its consideration and adoption of 
Z-Mod.  See, e.g., Varga v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 547, 551 (2000) (holding that “by use of the 
conjunctive ‘and,’ the statute is clear that both” of the conditions separated by the conjunction 
must be met to satisfy the statutory requirement). 
 
 
16 At oral argument in this Court, the Board confirmed that its position was that the 
budget language exempted all Board business from the open meeting requirements of VFOIA. 
26 
 
 
The Board’s proffered interpretation effectively combines the two distinct conditions into 
one, identical condition—that the business considered be part of the Board’s otherwise lawful 
business.  By arguing that the first condition allows the Board to undertake any lawful Board 
business, the Board would effectively read the second condition out of the statute. 
 
Our task in statutory interpretation is “to give reasonable effect to every word” in a 
statute, Jones v. Conwell, 227 Va. 176, 181 (1984), and “we will not read a legislative enactment 
in a manner that renders any portion of that enactment useless.”  Antisdel v. Ashby, 279 Va. 42, 
48 (2010).  Because the Board’s proffered interpretation does just that, we cannot adopt it. 
 
Giving effect to both of the conditions found in romanette (ii), it becomes clear that the 
budget language does not exempt all Board business from VFOIA’s open meeting requirements.  
The second condition limits the exemption from VFOIA’s open meeting requirements to “the 
discharge of [the Board’s] lawful purposes, duties, and responsibilities[,]” which we interpret as 
encompassing the entire universe of activity that the Board is otherwise legally allowed to 
undertake.17  Thus, to give effect to both conditions, the first condition must limit the exemption 
to some subset of the Board’s lawful business. 
 
In determining what that subset is, we turn, once again, to context.  Potter, 300 Va. at 
182.  As the Board conceded at oral argument, the General Assembly adopted the budget 
language as a “specific response to COVID and the pandemic.”  Agreeing that the budget 
language was a response to the COVID emergency, we interpret the phrase “necessary to 
 
 
17 Given the context of the emergency, this is not simply a restatement that the Board 
may only do the things that a board may do.  It makes clear that any emergency powers granted 
by the budget language address how the Board may exercise its existing legal authority and does 
not expand the universe of what the Board may do. 
27 
 
continue operations of the” Board, 2020 Acts ch. 1283 § 4-0.01(g) (Reg. Sess.); 2020 Acts ch. 56 
§ 4-0.01(g) (Spec. Sess. I), in that light. 
 
Given the similarity in language and the shared context of the COVID-19 emergency, it 
is unsurprising that we conclude that the use of “necessary to continue operations” in the budget 
language conveys a meaning similar to the phrase “necessary to assure the continuation of the 
County’s essential functions and services” that appears in section 1(C) of the Continuity 
Ordinance.  In context, these similar phrases refer to time-sensitive matters that the Board must 
undertake to perpetuate the County’s operations.  Thus, the phrase “necessary to continue 
operations” in the budget language does not encompass all that the Board may lawfully do, and 
thus, the budget language cannot be construed as a wholesale license to ignore VFOIA’s open 
meeting requirements in conducting any and all business that the Board might wish to conduct. 
 
As noted above, the modification of a 40-year-old zoning ordinance after a five-year 
revision process does not satisfy this standard.  It is not a time-sensitive matter, and its adoption 
is not and was not necessary to allow the County to continue operations.  Accordingly, neither 
Code § 15.2-1413, nor the Continuity Ordinance, nor the budget language authorized the Board 
to consider and adopt Z-Mod in meetings conducted “by electronic communication means 
without a quorum of the public body or any member of the governing board physically 
assembled at one location[.]”18  2020 Acts ch. 1283 § 4-0.01(g) (Reg. Sess.); 2020 Acts ch. 56 
 
 
18 To the extent that there may be overlap in the circumstances when a continuity 
ordinance adopted under Code § 15.2-1413 and the budget language would allow a locality to 
dispense with the public meeting requirements, the budget language is not a mere redundancy.  
First, Code § 15.2-1413 applies only to a “locality” while the budget language applies to any 
“state, local, regional, or regulatory body, or a governing board as defined in § 54.1-2345 of the 
Code of Virginia[.]”  2020 Acts ch. 1283 § 4-0.01(g) (Reg. Sess.); 2020 Acts ch. 56 § 4-0.01(g) 
(Spec. Sess. I).  Second, any such authority granted by Code § 15.2-1413 to a locality only 
applies if the locality adopts a continuity ordinance pursuant to the statute.  The budget language 
applies whether or not the locality has adopted a continuity ordinance. 
28 
 
§ 4-0.01(g) (Spec. Sess. I).  Accordingly, the circuit court erred in concluding that the Board was 
authorized to do so, and thus, erred in dismissing the Residents’ complaint.19 
E.  Remedy 
 
Having concluded that the Board adopted Z-Mod in a manner that violated the open 
meeting provisions of VFOIA, we turn to the question of remedy.  The Residents argue that, 
because “Z-Mod could not be adopted through an electronic meeting[,]” the Board’s purported 
adoption of Z-Mod was and remains “void ab initio[.]”  We agree. 
 
By failing to hold the meetings at which Z-Mod was considered and ultimately adopted in 
compliance with VFOIA’s open meeting requirements, the Board’s actions prevented the public 
from participating in the manner required by VFOIA, and thus, potentially limited public 
participation and input into the process.  As such, the Board’s failure here is analogous to the 
circumstances in our prior cases in which a zoning ordinance was adopted despite the failure of 
 
 
19 We note that in the 2021 session, the General Assembly changed the open meeting 
requirements of VFOIA related to public meetings in an emergency by amending 
Code § 2.2-3708.2(A)(3).  The revised version, which became effective after the Board adopted 
Z-Mod, allows a board of supervisors to conduct meetings “by electronic communication means 
without a quorum of the public body physically assembled at one location” during declared 
emergencies.  The 2021 amendment removed VFOIA’s requirement that such meeting be “for 
the purpose of addressing the emergency” and allows such meetings if the purpose is either to 
“provide for the continuity of operations of the public body or the discharge of its lawful 
purposes, duties, and responsibilities.”  2021 Acts ch. 490 (Spec. Sess. I) (emphasis added).  The 
Residents concede that, if the 2021 amendment had been effective when the Board adopted 
Z-Mod, the removal of the requirement that the meeting address the emergency and the 
separation of the two other requirements by the disjunctive “or” as opposed to the conjunctive 
“and” would have permitted the Board to adopt Z-Mod in the manner it did.  Although the Board 
continues to maintain that the budget language fully authorized its actions, it conceded at oral 
argument in this Court that, compared to the budget language, the language of the amended 
Code § 2.2-3708.2(A)(3) is “somewhat broader if read literally.”  The fact that the General 
Assembly utilized “broader” language in its 2021 amendment to VFOIA is an indication that the 
General Assembly intended the VFOIA amendment to reach more situations than the budget 
language.  This further supports our conclusion that the budget language did not authorize the 
Board to conduct all of its business in electronic meetings.  See Prillaman, 199 Va. at 406. 
29 
 
the locality to provide the statutorily required public notice.  In such cases, we have held that 
such ordinances are void ab initio.  See, e.g., Glazebrook, 266 Va. at 557 (holding that certain 
“zoning ordinances passed pursuant to [defective] notices . . . are void ab initio”); Powell Valley 
Vill. Ltd. P’ship, 254 Va. at 74 (recognizing that a “[f]ailure to abide by the statutory 
prescriptions for the adoption of an ordinance renders the ordinance void ab initio”); City 
Council of City of Alexandria v. Potomac Greens Assocs. P’ship, 245 Va. 371, 378 (1993) 
(stating that, because the city “failed to give the requisite notices . . . , the TMP Ordinance is void 
ab initio”).  Accordingly, we conclude that the Board’s failure to comply with VFOIA’s open 
meeting requirements renders Z-Mod void ab initio.20 
III.  Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, VFOIA’s open meeting requirements applied to meetings at 
which the Board considered and ultimately adopted Z-Mod, and thus, the circuit court erred in 
dismissing the Residents’ complaint.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court 
and enter final judgment for the Residents, declaring Z-Mod void ab initio. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
 
 
20 Although maintaining that the manner in which it adopted Z-Mod was authorized, the 
Board, with commendable candor, conceded during oral argument in this Court that, if the Board 
was not authorized to adopt Z-Mod in a meeting by electronic means, the Residents “certainly” 
were entitled to relief.