Case Title: State v. Coleman

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2020-09-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 120,246 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
CURTIS L. COLEMAN JR., 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
1.  
In postconviction sentence modification proceedings there must be a procedural 
vehicle for presenting an argument to the court.  
 
2.  
The rule of law declared in Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 
186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013), that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
requires any fact which increases a sentence beyond the mandatory minimum must be 
submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt, cannot be applied 
retroactively to invalidate a sentence that was final when the Alleyne decision was 
released. 
 
3.  
A sentence imposed in violation of the constitutional holding in Alleyne v. United 
States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013), does not fit within the 
definition of an illegal sentence that may be addressed with a K.S.A. 22-3504(1) motion 
to correct an illegal sentence. 
 
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4. 
 For a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion filed in a case that was final when Alleyne v. United 
States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013), was decided, the change 
in the law effected in Alleyne cannot provide the exceptional circumstances required to 
permit a successive motion or demonstrate the manifest injustice necessary to permit an 
untimely motion. 
 
5. 
 
The change in law effected in Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S. Ct. 
2151, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013), does not trigger K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6628(c). The 
Alleyne Court did not find either the term of imprisonment or the statute authorizing the 
term of imprisonment to be unconstitutional.  
 
Appeal from Wyandotte District Court; J. DEXTER BURDETTE, judge. Opinion filed September 
11, 2020. Affirmed. 
 
Curtis L. Coleman Jr., appellant pro se, was on the briefs.  
 
Lois Malin, assistant district attorney, Mark A. Dupree Sr., district attorney, and Derek Schmidt, 
attorney general, were on the brief for appellee. 
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
WARD, J.:  Curtis L. Coleman Jr. takes this appeal from the district court's decision 
summarily denying his postsentence motion to modify sentence. Determining that no 
legal avenue exists for the relief requested by Coleman, we affirm the district court's 
denial of Coleman's motion. 
 
 
 
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BACKGROUND OF THE CASE  
 
Trial, Sentencing, and Direct Appeals 
 
On March 11, 1999, a jury convicted Coleman of premeditated first-degree murder 
and three counts of aggravated assault for crimes he committed in October 1998 at age 
15. Prior to trial, he was certified for adult prosecution. On May 14, 1999, the district 
court sentenced Coleman to a hard 40 life sentence on the murder charge pursuant to 
K.S.A. 21-4635. The court added 13 additional months in prison for the aggravated 
assault charges.  
 
Coleman appealed to this court challenging the constitutionality of the adult 
certification statute as well as the constitutionality of his hard 40 life sentence. He also 
asserted that the district court committed instructional error and that the prosecutor made 
improper statements in final argument. And he argued that the district court improperly 
considered several nonstatutory aggravating factors when imposing the hard 40 life 
sentence.  
 
In State v. Coleman, 271 Kan. 733, 26 P.3d 613 (2001) (Coleman I), this court 
upheld the convictions and rejected his several constitutional challenges. But we found 
that the district court erred in sentencing him to a hard 40 life sentence by considering 
two aggravating factors not found in the statute, namely the victim's age and the victim's 
state of mind between the time of her injury and the time of her death. The case was 
remanded for resentencing on the murder charge.  
 
On September 14, 2001, Coleman was again sentenced to a hard 40 life term for 
first-degree murder, a sentence later affirmed in State v. Coleman, No. 88,159, 2003 WL 
21664787 (Kan. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (Coleman II). The United States Supreme 
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Court denied certiorari. Coleman v. Kansas, 540 U.S. 993, 124 S. Ct. 494, 157 L. Ed. 2d 
393 (2003).  
 
 
Current Motion 
 
 
On January 5, 2018, over 14 years after his direct appeals were finalized, Coleman 
filed a pro se motion seeking to have his hard 40 life sentence modified "to require no 
mandatory term of imprisonment." His motion cited Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 
99, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013), and State v. Soto, 299 Kan. 102, 322 P.3d 
334 (2014), in support of the contention that his sentence violated his Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial because the trial judge and not a jury made the factual findings 
necessary for sentence enhancement. He asserted that K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6628(c) was 
the statutory mechanism by which his constitutionally defective sentence could be 
remedied. The State filed a response to Coleman's motion and Coleman filed a reply.   
 
 
On August 15, 2018, the district judge (the same district judge who sentenced 
Coleman 17 years earlier) filed a memorandum decision summarily denying Coleman's 
motion and request for hearing. The judge briefly noted the history of Coleman's trial, 
sentencing, and direct appeals, as well as a motion Coleman had earlier filed pursuant to 
K.S.A. 60-1507. Without addressing the applicability of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6628(c), 
the district judge ruled that Coleman's reliance on Alleyne was misplaced, noting that the 
rule of law announced in Alleyne "cannot be applied retroactively to cases that were final 
when that case was decided as in the defendant's underlying case."  
 
 
Coleman appeals the district court's denial of his motion. Because he received a 
life sentence for the first-degree murder charge, the jurisdiction of this court is proper 
under K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 22-3601(b)(3)-(4). 
 
 
 
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ANALYSIS  
 
Standard of Review 
 
 
In his petition for review, Coleman contends the district court misconstrued his 
motion for sentence modification and, in doing so, committed a "manifest error of both 
fact and law . . . thereby constituting an abuse of discretion."  He cites State v. Santos-
Vega, 299 Kan. 11, 321 P.3d 1 (2014), in support of an abuse of discretion standard of 
review. He also cites State v. Burnett, 297 Kan. 447, 301 P.3d 698 (2013), for the 
proposition that jurisdictional and statutory interpretation issues are questions of law over 
which an appellate court's scope of review is unlimited.   
 
The State compares Coleman's motion for sentence modification to a motion to 
correct illegal sentence pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3504, asserting that when the district court 
summarily denies a motion to correct illegal sentence a reviewing court applies a de novo 
standard of review, citing, State v. Gray, 303 Kan. 1011, 1013-1014, 368 P.3d 1113 
(2016). The State also characterizes this appeal as one involving statutory interpretation, 
namely K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6628(c), a question of law over which the appellate courts 
have unlimited review, citing, State v. Collins, 303 Kan. 472, 473-74, 362 P.3d 1098 
(2015).  
 
We conclude this appeal involves constitutional issues as well as questions of 
statutory interpretation. Constitutional claims are questions of law subject to de novo 
review. State v. Engelhardt, 280 Kan. 113, 138, 119 P.3d 1148 (2005). Interpretation of a 
statute is a question of law over which appellate courts likewise have unlimited review. 
State v. Bryant, 310 Kan. 920, 921, 453 P.3d 279 (2019).  
 
 
 
6 
 
Sentence Enhancement Based on Judicial Fact-finding  
 
 
When Coleman was resentenced in 2001 following remand by this court, the 
district court found the existence of one or more aggravating factors by a preponderance 
of the evidence and imposed a hard 40 life sentence. The finding of these aggravating 
factors was not submitted to a jury for consideration.  
 
Coleman argued in his direct appeal that his Sixth Amendment jury trial right had 
been violated per Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476-77, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. 
Ed. 2d 435 (2000), in which the United States Supreme Court held: "Taken together, 
these rights [to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury] indisputably entitle a 
criminal defendant to 'a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every element of the 
crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.'" That Court added:  "Other 
than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. at 490.  
  
 
The Coleman I court rejected his Sixth Amendment argument. Coleman I, 271 
Kan. at 741. The issue had already been considered and resolved. In State v. Conley, 270 
Kan. 18, Syl. ¶ 3, 11 P.3d 1147 (2000), the court held: 
 
"Imposition of the K.S.A. 21-4638 hard 40 sentence based on a fact not found by 
the jury does not increase a defendant's maximum sentence of imprisonment for life 
imposed under K.S.A. 21-4706(c). The hard 40 sentence limits the lower end of the 
sentence. Defendant's hard 40 sentence violates neither the Due Process Clause of the 
United States Constitution, nor his right to trial by jury under the 6th Amendment to the 
United States Constitution or § 5 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights." 
 
The Conley court acknowledged Apprendi's Sixth Amendment ruling but found 
that McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 2411, 91 L. Ed. 2d 67 (1986), 
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controlled the issue rather than Apprendi. Conley, 270 Kan. at 34. In McMillan, the 
United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute under 
which the sentencing court was required to impose a mandatory minimum sentence of 
five years if it found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant visibly 
possessed a firearm during commission of the underlying crime. The McMillan Court 
concluded that the firearm possession finding was a sentencing factor to be determined 
by the court rather than an element of the underlying crime which the State must prove to 
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 477 U.S. at 85-93.  
 
Two years after Conley, the United States Supreme Court decided Harris v. United 
States, 536 U.S. 545, 122 S. Ct. 2406, 153 L. Ed. 2d 524 (2002). That decision upheld a 
federal sentencing scheme which provided for increased mandatory minimum sentences 
based on a district court's finding that the defendant possessed, brandished, or discharged 
a firearm during commission of the underlying offense. Relying on McMillan and 
seeking to reconcile Apprendi, the Harris Court characterized the firearm finding as a 
judicial sentencing factor rather than an element of the underlying crime. 536 U.S. at 557, 
564-565. However, the same year the United States Supreme Court decided Harris it 
relied on Apprendi to hold that Arizona's capital sentencing scheme was unconstitutional 
because it permitted a judge and not a jury to find and balance aggravating versus 
mitigating circumstances in determining a sentence of death. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 
584, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556 (2002).     
 
A decade later the landscape on this issue shifted when the United States Supreme 
Court decided Alleyne, 570 U.S. 99. The Alleyne Court looked again at the federal 
sentencing scheme it had previously reviewed in Harris. It held that because the 
sentencing court's finding of an aggravating factor produces a higher range of penalty, it  
 
"conclusively indicates that the fact is an element of a distinct and aggravated crime. It 
must, therefore, be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.  
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"Because there is no basis in principle or logic to distinguish facts that raise the 
maximum from those that increase the minimum, Harris was inconsistent with Apprendi. 
It is, accordingly, overruled." Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 116.  
 
Less than a year after Alleyne was decided, this court in State v. Soto, 299 Kan. 
102, 322 P.3d 334 (2014), looked again at the constitutionality of the Kansas hard 50 
sentencing scheme (hard 40 for crimes prior to July 1, 1999). Based on Alleyne and also 
in part on Ring, we found:  
 
 
"Kansas' statutory procedure for imposing a hard 50 sentence as provided in 
K.S.A. 21-4635 violates the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution as 
interpreted in Alleyne . . .  because it permits a judge to find by a preponderance of the 
evidence the existence of one or more aggravating factors necessary to impose an 
increased mandatory minimum sentence, rather than requiring a jury to find the existence 
of the aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation omitted.]" Soto, 299 Kan. 
102, Syl. ¶ 9.  
 
Modification of Coleman's Sentence 
 
As noted above, Coleman's motion asks that his sentence be modified "to require 
no mandatory term of imprisonment." He seeks elimination of the hard 40 aspect of his 
life sentence. Although he is not explicitly requesting retroactive application of Alleyne 
and Soto, he has no remedy here unless the rule of law established in Alleyne is applied to 
his case.  
 
 
In postconviction proceedings seeking sentence modification, "there must be a 
procedural vehicle for presenting the argument to the court." State v. Trotter, 296 Kan. 
898, 905, 295 P.3d 1039 (2013).  Motions for sentence modification should be dismissed 
for lack of jurisdiction unless there is statutory language authorizing the specific 
requested relief. State v. Anthony, 274 Kan. 998, 1002, 58 P.3d 742 (2002). Coleman 
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cites K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6628(c) as the mechanism for his requested relief, but pro se 
postconviction pleadings must be analyzed by their content, not necessarily by their label. 
State v. Redding, 310 Kan. 15, 18, 444 P.3d 989 (2019). We therefore consider the 
several ways in which Coleman's motion may be viewed. 
 
It should first be noted that Coleman's motion is not a proper motion to correct an 
illegal sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504, since a sentence imposed in violation of Alleyne 
does not fall within the definition of an "illegal sentence" that may be addressed by 
K.S.A. 22-3504. State v. Brown, 306 Kan. 330, Syl. ¶ 1, 393 P.3d 1049 (2017); State v. 
Moncla, 301 Kan. 549, Syl. ¶ 4, 343 P.3d 1161 (2015).  
 
Second, even if Coleman's motion is analyzed as one brought under K.S.A. 60-
1507, it also fails. That statute provides a mechanism for collateral attack of an 
unconstitutional sentence, but it has limitations. A motion for relief under this statute 
must be brought within one year following the conclusion of any direct appeals, including 
the denial of a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. K.S.A. 
2019 Supp. 60-1507(f)(1). This time limitation may be extended by the court "only to 
prevent a manifest injustice." K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-1507(f)(2).  
 
Coleman's direct appeals in this case were final in 2003. As noted, he was 
resentenced to a new hard 40 term following remand by the Coleman I court. His appeal 
of the new hard 40 sentence was denied in 2003 by the Coleman II court. And, the United 
States Supreme Court denied his petition for writ of certiorari later that same year. All of 
this occurred 10 years before Alleyne was decided in June 2013. 
 
In Kirtdoll v. State, 306 Kan. 335, Syl. ¶ 1, 393 P.3d 1053 (2017) (Kirtdoll II), this 
court specifically addressed the retroactive application of Alleyne to cases already final 
when Alleyne was decided. Kirtdoll was convicted in 2004 of first-degree murder and 
sentenced to a hard 50 life sentence. His conviction and sentence were affirmed in a 
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direct appeal where one of the issues he raised was an Apprendi challenge to his hard 50 
life sentence. State v. Kirtdoll, 281 Kan. 1138, 1151, 1153, 136 P.3d 417 (2006) (Kirtdoll 
I).  
 
Following his direct appeal Kirtdoll filed K.S.A. 60-1507 motions in 2007 and 
2010. Both were denied by the district court. The Court of Appeals affirmed each 
denial. Kirtdoll v. State, No. 100,880, 2009 WL 2766290 (Kan. App. 2009) (unpublished 
opinion); Kirtdoll v. State, No. 107,385, 2013 WL 517812 (Kan. App. 
2013) (unpublished opinion).  
 
In 2013, Kirtdoll filed what he styled a "Motion to Vacate Sentence." The district 
court analyzed the motion under K.S.A. 22-3504 and under K.S.A 60-1507. It determined 
that the motion was not proper under K.S.A. 22-3504 because it was an attack upon the 
statutory scheme used to arrive at the hard 50 sentence rather than an attack upon the 
actual sentence itself. The district court further determined that his motion was not proper 
under K.S.A. 60-1507 because it was impermissibly successive as well as untimely.  
 
The Kirtdoll II court agreed with the district court and held that the rule of law 
declared in Alleyne cannot be applied retroactively to invalidate a sentence that was final 
when the Alleyne decision was released. That court further held that when a K.S.A. 60-
1507 motion is filed in a case that was final prior to Alleyne, the change in law effected 
by Alleyne cannot provide the exceptional circumstances required to permit a successive 
motion or demonstrate the manifest injustice necessary to permit an untimely motion. 306 
Kan. at 341.  
 
K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6628(c) 
 
Having determined that Coleman has no remedy under K.S.A. 22-3504 or K.S.A. 
60-1507, and that Alleyne and Soto do not apply retroactively to his case, the only 
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question that remains is whether K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6628(c), the specific provision 
relied upon by Coleman, changes that. We conclude it does not.  That statute in its 
entirety reads: 
 
 
"(a) In the event the term of imprisonment for life without the possibility of 
parole or any provision of K.S.A. 21-6626 or 21-6627, and amendments thereto, 
authorizing such term is held to be unconstitutional by the supreme court of Kansas or the 
United States supreme court, the court having jurisdiction over a person previously 
sentenced shall cause such person to be brought before the court and shall modify the 
sentence to require no term of imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole and 
shall sentence the defendant to the maximum term of imprisonment otherwise provided 
by law. 
 
"(b) In the event a sentence of death or any provision of chapter 252 of the 1994 
Session Laws of Kansas authorizing such sentence is held to be unconstitutional by the 
supreme court of Kansas or the United States supreme court, the court having jurisdiction 
over a person previously sentenced shall cause such person to be brought before the court 
and shall modify the sentence and resentence the defendant as otherwise provided by law. 
 
"(c) In the event the mandatory term of imprisonment or any provision of chapter 
341 of the 1994 Session Laws of Kansas authorizing such mandatory term is held to be 
unconstitutional by the supreme court of Kansas or the United States supreme court, the 
court having jurisdiction over a person previously sentenced shall cause such person to be 
brought before the court and shall modify the sentence to require no mandatory term of 
imprisonment and shall sentence the defendant as otherwise provided by law." 
 
 
Although this court has not specifically interpreted K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6628(c), 
we did analyze the predecessor statute of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6628(b) in State v. 
Thurber, 308 Kan. 140, 420 P.3d 389 (2018), a death penalty case. The Thurber court 
held that a provision contained in the Kansas death penalty scheme, K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 
21-6622(h), unconstitutionally limited the class of intellectually disabled persons 
qualifying for protection against execution. 308 Kan. 140, Syl. ¶ 17. Thurber argued that 
12 
 
because the court concluded subsection (h) was unconstitutional, the entire death penalty 
scheme was invalid, and his sentence of death should be commuted to a sentence of life 
in prison. Thurber based his argument on K.S.A. 21-4629, which provided: 
 
"In the event a sentence of death or any provision of this act authorizing such 
sentence is held to be unconstitutional by the supreme court of Kansas or the United 
States supreme court, the court having jurisdiction over a person previously sentenced 
shall cause such person to be brought before the court and shall modify the sentence and 
resentence the defendant as otherwise provided by law."  
 
The Thurber court compared a similar Florida statute, Section 775.082(2) of the 
Florida Statutes (2015), which provided in pertinent part: 
 
"In the event the death penalty in a capital felony is held to be unconstitutional by 
the Florida Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, the court having 
jurisdiction over a person previously sentenced to death for a capital felony shall cause 
such person to be brought before the court, and the court shall sentence such person to 
life imprisonment as provided in subsection (1)." 
 
  
This statute was discussed by the Florida Supreme Court in Hurst v. State, 202 
So.3d 40, 63-66 (Fla. 2016), which addressed whether an appellant's death sentence was 
required to be commuted to life imprisonment based on the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92, 136 S. Ct. 616, 193 L. Ed. 2d 504 
(2016). There the United States Supreme Court held that a provision of the Florida capital 
sentencing scheme, under which an advisory jury makes recommendations to a judge 
who then made the critical findings needed for imposition of a death sentence, violated 
the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.  
 
The Florida Supreme Court interpreted the Florida statute as one providing a "fail 
safe" sentencing option if the death penalty, as a penalty, was declared categorically to be 
an unconstitutional sentence. Hurst, 202 So. 3d at 66. Because the United States Supreme 
13 
 
Court invalidated only a portion of the Florida death penalty scheme, the Florida court 
held that its "fail safe" statute did not automatically operate to commute death sentences 
to life imprisonment without parole. 202 So. 3d at 63-66.  
 
The Thurber court held that K.S.A. 21-4629 likewise operates as a "fail safe" if the 
death sentence itself or a provision "authorizing such sentence" is deemed 
unconstitutional. Thurber, 308 Kan. at 234. The Thurber court concluded that K.S.A. 21-
4629 was not implicated because K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-6622(h) was not a provision 
authorizing a death sentence. Nor did that court find that the death penalty itself was 
unconstitutional. Thurber was therefore not entitled to have his death sentence 
automatically converted to a life sentence. 308 Kan. at 234-35.  
 
We reach the same conclusion today with respect to K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-
6628(c) as the Thurber court did with the predecessor of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6628(b). 
We have said that the legislative intent governs if that intent can be ascertained from the 
statute's language. State v. Pulliam, 308 Kan. 1354, 1364, 430 P.3d 39 (2018). Criminal 
statutes, although construed strictly against the State, must be interpreted in a way that is 
reasonable and sensible to effectuate the legislative design and the true intent of the law. 
State v. Keel, 302 Kan. 560, Syl. ¶ 5, 357 P.3d 251 (2015). 
 
The statute in question here is a fail-safe provision. By its clear and unequivocal 
language it applies only when the term of imprisonment or the statute authorizing the 
term of imprisonment are found to be unconstitutional. Neither circumstance has 
occurred.  
 
The statute under which the district court in Coleman's case found the existence of 
aggravating factors necessary to impose a hard 40 life sentence, K.S.A. 21-4635, was not 
a statute authorizing his hard 40 life sentence. Instead, it was part of the procedural 
framework by which the enhanced sentence was determined. His hard 40 life sentence 
14 
 
was authorized by virtue of his commission of premeditated first-degree murder, an 
offense qualifying for such sentence under Kansas law. 
 
And regarding Coleman's term of imprisonment itself, Kansas' hard 40 and hard 
50 sentences have never been determined to be categorically unconstitutional. This court 
continues to uphold such sentences in appropriate cases. See e.g. State v. Hilt, 307 Kan. 
112, 129, 406 P.3d 905 (2017); State v. Alford, 308 Kan. 1336, 1342, 429 P.3d 197 
(2018); and State v. Kahler, 307 Kan. 374, 414, 410 P.3d 105 (2018). And such sentences 
continue to be imposed in qualifying cases in Kansas.  
 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
 
The district court correctly denied Coleman's motion for sentence modification. 
Alleyne and Soto do not operate retroactively to provide a remedy in this case. And 
K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6628(c) does not apply. The judgment of the district court is 
affirmed. 
 
 
MICHAEL E. WARD, Senior Judge, assigned.1 
                                                          
 
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE:  Senior Judge Ward was appointed to hear case No. 120,246 
under the authority vested in the Supreme Court by K.S.A. 20-2616 to fill the vacancy on 
the court by the retirement of Chief Justice Lawton R. Nuss.