Case Title: State v. Newman

Citation: 313 N.W.2d 484

Docket Number: 

State: iowa

Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Date: 1981-12-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
313 N.W.2d 484 (1981) STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. James Clifford NEWMAN, Loren Robie Wilson, and Delbert Max Vanderpool, Appellants. No. 64760. Supreme Court of Iowa. December 23, 1981. *485 Nicholas S. Krpan, Gerald R. Ralph and William L. Kutmus, Des Moines, for appellants. Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Julie F. Pottorff, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Dan L. Johnston, Polk County Atty., for appellee. Considered en banc. McCORMICK, Justice. This is a consolidated appeal by defendants James Clifford Newman, Loren Robie Wilson, and Delbert Max Vanderpool from convictions and sentences for second-degree burglary under sections 713.1 and 713.3, The Code Supp. 1977. Although they urge two contentions, they preserved error on only one of them. They contend the trial court erred in overruling their motions to dismiss and for acquittal on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute the offense. We affirm the trial court. Defendants waived a jury, and the cases were jointly tried to the court. The State's evidence was presented by stipulation. It showed that Denny Hughes heard a drilling sound from a laundromat next door to his place of business in Des Moines. The laundromat was open to the public at the time. When Hughes went next door to investigate, he observed defendant Wilson drilling on the lock of a coin changing machine with an electric drill. Defendant Newman was nearby. When Hughes asked what they were doing, the two men said they were "fixing the machine." Defendant Vanderpool entered the premises and assured Hughes "everything was okay." Hughes returned to his place of business and asked his partner to call the police. When the police arrived, defendants were fleeing from the scene. They were apprehended after a chase. They did not have permission to be drilling into the coin changer. It contained $200 at the time. By motions to dismiss and for judgment of acquittal defendants alleged the facts did not constitute burglary. The trial court overruled their motions and, after submission of the case, found defendants guilty of the charge. Following sentencing, they appealed. They seek reversal on two grounds. One is the alleged vagueness and overbreadth of section 713.1, and the other is the alleged error in overruling their motions to dismiss and for acquittal. They did not urge their constitutional ground by pretrial motion nor did they obtain a trial court ruling on it. Therefore they did not preserve error on that ground. State v. Montgomery, 243 N.W.2d 596, 597 (Iowa 1976); State v. Ritchison, 223 N.W.2d 207, 214 (Iowa 1974). The only question presented under the record is whether breaking or entering a coin changing machine can constitute burglary under section 713.1. The legislature may define crimes as it wishes subject to constitutional constraints. In defining burglary, section 713.1 provides: *486 No dispute exists here concerning defendants' intent to commit a theft. Nor is there any dispute that they broke or entered the coin changer. The only controversy is whether the coin changer is either an "occupied structure" or "enclosed area" within the meaning of the statute. Our objective is to ascertain legislative intent. We must look to the object to be accomplished, the evils and mischief sought to be remedied, or the purpose to be subserved, and place on the statute a reasonable construction to accomplish the evident legislative intent. State v. Johnson, 216 N.W.2d 335, 337 (Iowa 1974). Because the statute is penal, the rule of strict construction comes into play in doubtful cases. State v. Welton, 300 N.W.2d 157, 160 (Iowa 1981). However, the rule of strict construction is not to be used to inject doubt when legislative intent is evident through a reasonable construction of the statute. State v. Lindsey, 165 N.W.2d 807, 810 (Iowa 1969). We have recognized that section 713.1 defines three alternative offenses: State v. Sangster, 299 N.W.2d 661, 662-63 (Iowa 1980). Because these definitions are alternative, they are independent and disjunctive. They are not dependent or conjunctive. The section uses two terms in describing property in which burglary may occur: an "occupied structure" and an "area enclosed." An "occupied structure" is separately defined, but an "area enclosed" is not. See § 702.12. We assume, without deciding, that the coin changer was not an occupied structure under the statutory definition. A coin changer is nevertheless covered by the statute if it is in an "area enclosed in such manner as to provide a place for the keeping of valuable property secure from theft or criminal mischief." It seems self evident that a coin changing machine is such a place. Because these words are not technical and do not have a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law, we must construe them "according to the context and the approved usage of the language." § 4.1(2). In common usage, "area" includes "any specific extent of space or surface." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 115 (1976). A sealed and locked coin changer has four walls, a top and bottom. The secure exterior of the machine surrounds a mathematically quantifiable volume. It is thus an enclosed area under the plain language of the statute. This conclusion is consistent with evident legislative intent. The statute is substantially broader than common law burglary and supplants a number of prior statutory offenses. See 4 J. Yeager and R. Carlson,Iowa Practice: Criminal Law and Procedure § 293 (1979). The gist of the present offense is a trespass against a secure place with the requisite intent. The trespass element distinguishes the offense from theft, and the intent element distinguishes it from criminal mischief. The ordinary meaning of enclosed area and this distinction are reflected in II Iowa Uniform Jury Instructions No. 1313 (1978): *487 Defendants assert, however, that a coin changer cannot be the subject of burglary because it is not large enough to hold a person. It is true that one of the alternative burglary offenses is committed by remaining in a place after it is closed or after expiration of the right to be there. Although size is not an element of the crime, the place would have to be large enough to hold a person for the offense to occur under that alternative. Nonetheless that is simply one way in which burglary may be committed. It is not the only one. When the legislature also made it burglary to break or enter "a place for the keeping of valuable property secure from theft or criminal mischief," it defined a place of a different kind. The size of the place is not a limitation in that situation. Although statutory language differs, courts in other jurisdictions have recognized that similar places can be the subject of burglary. See State v. Wilson, 7 Ariz.App. 384, 439 P.2d 831 (1968) (a vending machine is an "other place of safekeeping for money, goods or other property" under a statute proscribing possession of burglary tools); Estevez v. State, 189 So. 2d 830 (Fla.Ct.App.1966) (a soft drink machine is a "safe or other depository" within a statute proscribing possession of burglary tools); People v. Oliver, 129 Ill.App.2d 83, 262 N.E.2d 597 (1970) (a vending machine is a "depository designed for the safekeeping of property" under a statute proscribing possession of burglary toolsrule of strict construction recognized); Shumate v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 340 (Ky.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 993, 89 S. Ct. 1485, 22 L. Ed. 2d 769 (1969) (a soft drink vending machine is a "storehouse" or "warehouse" within offense of storehouse breaking); Commonwealth v. Marganon, 370 S.W.2d 821 (Ky.1963) (a vending machine outside a building is a "place" where goods, wares or merchandise is kept under a statute proscribing possession of burglary tools); State v. Stoner, 473 S.W.2d 363 (Mo.1971) (a coin box of a pay telephone is a "safe" under a statute prohibiting possession of tools for breaking into a safe); Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 1286 (1972). We hold that breaking or entering a coin changing machine can constitute burglary under section 713.1. Therefore the trial court did not err in overruling defendants' motions to dismiss and for judgment of acquittal. AFFIRMED. All Justices concur except REYNOLDSON, C. J., and UHLENHOPP, McGIVERIN and LARSON, JJ., who dissent. UHLENHOPP, Justice (dissenting). I think defendants' conduct does not come within section 713.1 of the Code. That section provides: (Emphasis added.) The section initially uses two terms in describing property which may constitute the subject of burglary: an "occupied structure" and an "area enclosed." What do those two terms encompass? An occupied structure is defined thus in section 702.12: *488 Keeping in mind that criminal statutes are strictly construed, State v. Welton, 300 N.W.2d 157, 160 (Iowa 1981), with doubts resolved in favor of the accused, State v. Lawr, 263 N.W.2d 747, 750 (Iowa 1978), a money changer can hardly be considered an "occupied structure" within the statutory definition of that term. It is neither a "building," a "structure," a "land, water or air vehicle," or a "similar place." Those are the only kinds of property the occupied structure section encompasses. The latter part of the first sentence of the section merely relates to the use which is made of those kinds of propertyfor "overnight accommodation of persons," or for "the purpose of carrying on business or other activity therein," or for "the storage or safekeeping of anything of value." The other expression in the burglary section, "area enclosed," does not appear to be statutorily defined. The "area" must be enclosed in such a manner as to provide a place for the keeping of valuable property secure from theft or criminal mischief. At three points the section speaks of the area as a "place": "enclosed in such manner as to provide a place," "such occupied structure or place not being open to the public," and "breaks an occupied structure or other place." (Emphasis added.) The word "place" in the section obviously refers to the "area enclosed" which is named at the beginning. As to the meaning of area enclosed, the word "area" does not convey the impression of an object, such as a money changer. Area is defined thus in Black's Law Dictionary 136 (4th ed. 1968): Webster's definition of "area" likewise does not give the impression of an object: "a level piece of ground," "areaway." Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 60 (1976). Similarly, the word "place" does not convey the impression of an object, even disregarding the antecedent "area enclosed." Black defines place thus: Black's, supra, at 1307. Webster's definition of place is long. Illustrative of the relevant items are "an indefinite region or expanse: area," or "a building or locality used for a special purpose." Webster's, supra, at 876. None of the items in the Webster definition refers to objects as distinguished from locales. At common law, 13 Am.Jur.2d Burglary § 3, at 320 (1968); see also 12A C.J.S. Burglary § 27 (1980). *489 Thus the language of section 713.1 does not appear to encompass a thing or an object, such as a money changer. This conclusion is supported by two additional parts in the section. First, the section applies to a person who enters an "occupied structure or place not being open to the public, or who remains therein. . . ." (Emphasis added.) Manifestly a person cannot remain in a money changer. Second, the section continues, "after the person's right, license or privilege to be there has expired . . . ." (Emphasis added.) The expression, to be there, can hardly have reference to an object, such as a money changer. The two expressions "remains therein" and "to be there" immediately follow "occupied structure or place" and plainly refer to both of those subjects. (As already noted, the antecedent of "place" throughout the section is the "area enclosed.") Decisions from other jurisdictions are distinguishable on the basis of the language of their statutes. In 1963 the Kentucky Court of Appeals applied the following statute in Commonwealth v. Marganon, 370 S.W.2d 821 (Ky.1963): (Emphasis added.) The Commonwealth charged that the defendant possessed various burglary tools and had the intention "to force a lock on a place where goods, wares, merchandise, and money was kept, to-wit: A Royal Crown soft-drink vending machine...." A "lock" was expressly covered by the statute. The enumeration of locks and the other subjects would bring vending machines within "other places" under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis"the meaning of particular terms in a statute may be ascertained by reference to words associated with them in the statute." 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 213, at 406-07 (1974). See Wright v. State Board of Engineering Examiners, 250 N.W.2d 412 (Iowa 1977). Section 713.1 of the Iowa statutes contains no enumeration of "locks." On the contrary, the associated words are, "or who remains therein after the person's right, license or privilege to be there has expired...." (Emphasis added.) A Florida statute defined a "burglarious tool" in a far different manner than our section 713.1, in the 1966 case of Estevez v. State, 189 So. 2d 830, 831 (Fla.Ct.App.1966): The Florida court evidently held that a soft drink machine is an "other depository." It merely stated, "The evidence was more than sufficient that the tire iron was a `burglarious tool' and that defendants intended to use it to commit a crime." Id. The Iowa statute does not use the "depository" language, and the Florida statute does not contain language comparable to the "remains therein" and "to be there" language of the Iowa statute. Likewise distinguishable is the 1968 case of State v. Wilson, 7 Ariz.App. 384, 439 P.2d 831 (1968). There the statute provided: A person who makes, keeps or sells, or has in his possession, a false key or other instrument or contrivance for the purpose of entering a building, or a safe, chest, trunk or other place of safekeeping for money, goods or other property, or any place where freight is on vehicles for transportation, or a railway car or vehicle kept or used for transportation of passengers *490 or freight, with intent to commit theft or other crime in any of such places, is guilty of a felony. Id. at 385 n.1, 439 P.2d at 832 n.1. The associated words, "safe, chest, trunk or other place of safekeeping for money, goods or other property," brought vending machines within the ambit of the statute, although the point was not directly involved in the appeal. The defendant's contentions on appeal were illegally obtained evidence, lack of corroboration of accomplice, insufficient evidence of criminal intent, and excessive sentence. The State's best authority, perhaps, is the 1968 decision of Shumate v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 340 (Ky.1968). The court held that a vending machine in which soft drinks were placed came within a Kentucky statute: Ky.Rev.Stat. § 433.190 (1973). The court concluded, "The fact that [vending machines] are movable, unlike a permanent structure, should not be a controlling factor in determining what a storehouse is; that they do not have roofs but are enclosed in metal cabinets should not be important." 433 S.W.2d at 343. In reaching that conclusion the court stated: Id. Contrast State v. Davis, 271 N.W.2d 693, 695 (Iowa 1978) (inapplicability of escape statute under the facts: "`[A]n act penal in nature, generally one which imposes punishment for an offense against the state, is interpreted strictly.'"); State v. Burtlow, 299 N.W.2d 665, 669 (Iowa 1980) ("Because the statute is penal, it must be construed strictly. Doubts are resolved in favor of the accused."). Again the statute involved in Shumate contained no language, as in our statute, that the person "remains therein" after his right "to be there" has expired. In 1970 an Illinois Appellate Court decided that a locked vending machine constitutes "any depository designed for the safekeeping of property." People v. Oliver, 129 Ill.App.2d 83, 89, 262 N.E.2d 597, 598 (1970). The statute provided: Id. at 87, 262 N.E.2d at 598. The case is quite similar to Estevez, and what was said about that decision need not be repeated here. In 1971 the Missouri Supreme Court decided State v. Stoner, 473 S.W.2d 363 (Mo.1971). The statute involved provided: Any person who makes, mends, designs or sets up, or who has in his custody or concealed about his person any tool, false key, lock, pick, bit, nippers, fuse, force screw, punch, drill, jimmy, bit, or any material implement, instrument, or other mechanical device whatsoever, adapted, designed, or commonly used for breaking into any vault, safe, railroad car, boat, *491 vessel, warehouse, store, shop, office, dwelling house, or door, shutter or window of a building of any kind, shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than two years, nor more than ten years. 473 S.W.2d at 366-67. The court stated: 473 S.W.2d at 368. Cf. Bagwell v. State, 51 Ala.App. 663, 288 So. 2d 450 (1973) ("structure" does not include a coin operated washing machine); Hulbert v. State, 44 Ala.App. 300, 208 So. 2d 94 (1968) (or a pay telephone). The holding of the court majority that section 713.1 covers a money changer runs counter to our long standing rule that criminal statutes are strictly construed and not enlarged by construction. State v. Kool, 212 N.W.2d 518 (Iowa 1973). The section is substantially broader than common-law burglary, but it is not broad enough to include money changers. The trial court should have dismissed the charge as made. I would reverse the judgment. REYNOLDSON, C. J., and McGIVERIN and LARSON, JJ., join in this dissent.