Case Title: MAY v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 01-40

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-01-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAY v. STATE2003 WY 1462 P.3d 574Case Number: 01-40Decided: 01/30/2003
October Term, A.D. 2002

 
 

 

JOSEPH 
MAY,

 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

 

 

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel, and Ryan 
R. Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Mr. 
Roden.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Kimberly A. Baker, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Baker.

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

*Chief 
Justice at time of oral argument.

 

   LEHMAN, 
Justice.

 

[¶1]      May 
appeals his convictions for aggravated assault and battery with a deadly weapon 
and aggravated burglary arising from his entry into the home of his wife's 
parents and his stabbing of two people.  
May claims that his aggravated burglary conviction cannot stand as the 
jury was instructed in the alternative and there was insufficient evidence to 
support one of the alternatives.  
May further asserts that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was 
violated.

 

[¶2]      We reverse in 
part and affirm in part.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      May states the 
issues as follows:

 

I.  Whether 
there was insufficient evidence to support appellant's aggravated burglary 
conviction.

 

II.  Whether 
appellant's state and federal constitutional rights not to be placed twice in 
jeopardy for the same offense were violated when the district court allowed the 
prosecution to use two charges appellant was acquitted of as evidence that 
appellant had committed the crime of aggravated burglary.

 

III.  Whether 
the trial court erred in refusing to appoint different standby counsel for 
appellant, resulting in a violation of appellant's Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.

 

IV.  Whether 
appellant's right to effective assistance of counsel during a critical stage in 
the proceeding was violated because of a conflict of 
interest.

 

V.  Whether 
the district court abused its discretion in failing to ensure appellant's access 
to adequate legal materials.

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      May and his wife, 
Shannon, separated around December of 1997.  After the separation, May was living and 
working in Colorado while Shannon and the couple's son were living in Casper 
with Shannon's parents, the Chadwicks.  
At the end of April 1998, May traveled to Casper for work-related 
reasons.  While in Casper, May saw 
Shannon only briefly but did have a visitation with the couple's son.  

 

[¶5]      May spent the 
evening of May 6 and early morning hours of May 7, 1998, out with friends 
visiting a couple bars. At the conclusion of his activities, May drove to the 
Chadwicks' home just east of Casper.  
When May arrived at the Chadwicks' home at approximately 3:30 a.m., he 
entered the home and made his way to Shannon's room.  He entered the room and approached the 
bed where Shannon was sleeping.  

 

[¶6]      Shortly after May 
entered the room, David Buss was awakened from his sleep in the bed next to 
Shannon by pain in his shoulder.  
When Buss felt blood under his arm, he asked Shannon to turn on the 
light.  With the light on, Buss saw 
May beside the bed holding a Swiss army knife in his hand.  Buss said, "You stabbed me."  May replied, "I didn't stab you."  Buss said, "You stabbed me under the 
arm."  May then approached Buss, 
stabbed him in the chest and said, "There, now I stabbed you." 

 

[¶7]      Buss jumped up 
from the bed, made his way to the door and tried to open it.  May came after him, and Buss and May 
struggled.  Buss yelled for 
Shannon's father, Mr. Chadwick.  
Awakened by the sound of yelling, Chadwick ran into his daughter's 
room.  He reached for May and was 
cut under the left arm.  Chadwick 
grabbed May's arm, twisted it behind him and held him up against the wall.  Chadwick told Shannon to call the 
police, which she did.  In the 
meantime, May struggled loose from Chadwick's hold and escaped through the 
balcony door.  He leaped off the 
balcony onto the lawn and ran off into the darkness. 

 

[¶8]      Later that 
morning, a deputy sheriff patrolling the east side of Casper apprehended May 
when he noticed a vehicle matching the description of May's car.  When arrested, May's clothes were 
stained with blood, and a red Swiss army knife was found in his pocket.  May was charged with three counts of 
aggravated assault and battery and one count of aggravated burglary.  Counsel was appointed on May 11, 
1998.   May had concerns about 
his appointed counsel and requested to proceed pro se.  A hearing was held on the motion on January 
21.  Following 
the hearing, the court entered an order allowing May to proceed pro se and 
ordering appointed counsel to act as standby counsel. 

 

[¶9]      On February 16, May 
filed motions requesting greater access to the law library in order to prepare 
his defense and requesting appointment of alternate standby counsel.  A hearing was held 
on the motions, at which time the court denied the motion for substitute counsel 
and denied, without prejudice, the motion concerning library access.  In March, May filed 
additional motions in which he claimed he was being denied access to the law 
library.  
Following a hearing, the court denied the motions, and the case proceeded 
to trial on April 12, 1999. 

 

[¶10]   On April 14, the jury returned a verdict 
finding May guilty of one count of aggravated assault and battery for stabbing 
Buss and not guilty of the remaining two counts of aggravated assault and 
battery.  The 
jury was not able to reach a unanimous verdict as to the charge of aggravated 
burglary, and the court declared a mistrial on that charge.  A second trial began 
on May 17, 1999.  
This time the jury found May guilty of aggravated burglary.  May was sentenced to 
a term of imprisonment in the Wyoming State Penitentiary of eleven to fifteen 
years on the aggravated burglary charge to run consecutively with a sentence of 
six to ten years on the aggravated assault and battery conviction.  May timely appealed 
on August 13, 1999.

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

Sufficiency of the Evidence

 

[¶11]   In reviewing May's sufficiency of the 
evidence claim, we utilize our usual standard:

 

When reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim in a 
criminal case, we must determine whether a rational trier of fact could find the 
essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  Jennings v. State, 806 P.2d 1299, 1302 (Wyo. 1991) 
(quoting Munson v. State, 770 P.2d 1093, 1095 (Wyo. 
1989)).  We do 
not consider conflicting evidence presented by the unsuccessful party, and 
afford every favorable inference which may be reasonably and fairly drawn from 
the successful party's evidence.  Bloomquist v. 
State, 914 P.2d 812, 824 (Wyo. 1996).  We have consistently held that it is the 
jury's responsibility to resolve conflicts in the evidence. Id. (citing Wetherelt v. 
State, 864 P.2d 449, 452 (Wyo. 1993)).  "We will not substitute our judgment for that 
of the jury, . . . our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable 
and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result as 
the jury actually did."  Id. (citing Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 339 (Wyo. 1995)).

 

Williams v. State, 986 P.2d 855, 857 (Wyo. 1999).

 

[¶12]   May was convicted of aggravated burglary 
under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301 (LexisNexis 2001).1  In his first claim 
of error, May contends that his conviction under the statute cannot stand 
because it is not clear on what ground the jury based its verdict of guilty to 
the charge of aggravated burglary.  Specifically, May asserts that to the extent 
the State did not specify which it was relying on, either the intent to commit 
larceny or the intent to commit a felony, the State is required to provide 
sufficient evidence of both.  As can be seen by our recent decision, Tanner v. State, 2002 WY 170, 57 P.3d 1242 (Wyo. 2002), 
we agree.2  

 

[¶13]   Much like the appellant in Tanner, May cites Bush v. 
State, 908 P.2d 963 (Wyo. 1995) to support his argument.   In Bush, we said a "verdict must be set aside in cases 
where the verdict is supportable on one ground, but not on another, and it is 
impossible to tell which ground the jury selected."  Id. at 966 (citations omitted).  Finding insufficient 
evidence to support one of the grounds with which the State had charged Bush, we 
reversed his conviction.  Id. at 968.  

 

[¶14]   In Bush, a 
jury convicted the defendant of burglary and felony accessory.   Neither the 
information, the jury instruction defining the elements of burglary, nor the 
general verdict form specified the underlying crime (larceny or a felony) 
supporting the burglary charge.  Instead, the information and jury instruction 
generically stated that the defendant entered the building without authority 
"with intent to commit larceny or a felony therein."  The court said:

 

Count I of the Information, Jury Instruction No. 10, and the 
general verdict form all fail to particularize the underlying crime that 
supports the burglary conviction.  It is impossible to tell whether the jury 
relied on the crime of felony accessory or the crime of larceny when it 
convicted Bush of burglary.  Therefore, the burglary conviction will stand, 
only if evidence in the record proves that Bush entered [the] apartment with the 
intent to commit both a felony and the crime of larceny.  Price v. State, 807 P.2d 909, 912 (Wyo. 1991).

 

Bush, 908 P.2d  at 967.  Stating these principles in a slightly 
different manner, "if a 
jury is instructed in the alternative, and if that jury returns a general verdict of guilty, 
then upon appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
conviction, the record must support each alternative beyond a reasonable doubt."  Tanner, ¶15.   

 

[¶15]   Just as it did in Tanner, the State argues the record shows that the State 
was proceeding on one theory, so there is no violation of the principles 
established in Bush.  In this case, the State's "one theory" is that 
May entered the residence with the intent to commit aggravated assault on one of 
the persons in the residence.  May's appellate brief appears to concede that 
the State's case was based on aggravated assault as the underlying felony to 
prove burglary.  
However, when resolving this issue, we review the information, the jury 
instructions, and the form of the jury's verdict, not the argument of the 
parties.  Tanner, ¶14.  

 

[¶16]   In this case, the Amended Information 
charged that:  

 

Joseph May late of the County aforesaid, on or about the 
7th day of May, 1998, in the County of Natrona, 
in the State of Wyoming, did unlawfully and without authority, enter or remain 
in a building, occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion 
thereof with intent to commit larceny or a felony therein and was in the course 
of committing the crime of burglary armed with or used a deadly weapon, or did 
knowingly or recklessly inflict bodily injury on any one, or did attempt to 
inflict bodily injury on any one in violation of W.S. § 6-3-301(a)(c) contrary 
to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace 
and dignity of the State of Wyoming.

 

Just as we saw in Tanner, the 
Amended Information was phrased in the entire language of the statute 
itself.  The 
information contains no indication of the circumstances related to the 
particular charge.  

 

[¶17]   Recently, in our supervisory role, we 
pointed out a recurring problem in prosecutions for felony interference where 
the defendant was being charged with the entire language of the statute with no 
differentiation between the two versions of the offense.  Regarding this 
problem, we said:  
"By failing to specify, either through charging documents or the jury 
instructions, the State was faced with the more difficult task of proving both 
crimes at trial.  
As a further result, now, on appeal, the conviction must be sustained on 
both theories."  
King v. State, 2002 WY 27, ¶24, 40 P.3d 700, 
¶24 (Wyo. 2002) (citing Bush v. State, 908 P.2d at 
966).  This 
statement applies with equal force when a person is charged with the entire 
language of the burglary statute as was May.

 

[¶18]   As indicated above, we also look to the 
jury instructions to determine whether the State specified the crime on which it 
is relying.  A 
thorough review of the jury instructions in this case convinces us that the jury 
was, in fact, instructed in the alternative with no particularization of the 
underlying intent to support the burglary conviction.  Instruction No. 4 
informed the jury of the charges against May and recited exactly the language of 
the Amended Information.  Instruction No. 5 reads in relevant part:

 

You are instructed that the elements of the crime of 
Aggravated Burglary, as charged in this case, are:

1.      On or about the 7th day of 
May, 1998

2.      In Natrona County, Wyoming 

3.      The Defendant, Joseph May

4.      While in the course of committing the crime of burglary

5.      Was armed with or became armed with or used a deadly weapon 
or knowingly or recklessly inflicted or attempted to inflict bodily injury on 
another person.3

 

The form of Instruction No. 5 requires that the jury then be 
instructed as to what constitutes the crime of burglary.  To this end, 
Instruction No. 7 states:  "You are instructed that Burglary' means the 
act of entering or remaining in a building, occupied structure or vehicle or 
separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with intent to commit larceny or a felony therein." 
(emphasis added).  
As was the case in Tanner, such instructions 
do not specify the underlying intent upon which the State is proceeding.  Instruction No. 7 is 
an accurate definition of burglary, but the instruction does nothing to indicate 
the circumstances of this particular case.  The jury must, at some point, still be 
instructed as to the underlying intent to support the burglary charge or 
sufficient evidence of both must be presented.  

 

[¶19]   The jury returned a guilty verdict on 
the aggravated burglary charge, so clearly it found all the elements listed in 
Instruction No. 5.  
The fifth element of Instruction No. 5 does give us pause, and we must 
determine whether a jury finding of the fifth element of Instruction No. 5 was 
equivalent to a finding of the underlying felony of aggravated assault and 
battery.  In 
this case, we would say no.  A person could enter a home armed with a 
deadly weapon but still only have the intent to commit larceny not aggravated 
assault.  
Although Buss and Chadwick were in fact injured, because the fifth 
element of Instruction No. 5 used alternatives, we do not know on what grounds 
the jury based its finding of the existence of this element.  It may simply have 
been that he was armed with a deadly weapon, which is not equivalent to 
aggravated assault.

 

[¶20]   The State points to two instructions to 
support its contention that the jury was only instructed on intent to commit a 
felony therein.  
Instruction No. 9 states:  "You are instructed that in the State of 
Wyoming, the crime of Aggravated Assault and Battery is a felony crime."   Instruction 
No. 16 reads:

 

You are instructed that the elements of the crime of 
Burglary as a lesser offense of 
the crime of Aggravated Burglary charged in this case, are:

1.      On or about the 7th day of 
May, 1998

2.      In Natrona County, Wyoming 

3.      The Defendant, Joseph May

4.      Without authority

5.      Entered or remained in a building, occupied structure, or 
vehicle or separately secured or occupied portion of a building, occupied 
structure or vehicle.[4]

6.      With intent to commit the felony of Aggravated Assault and 
Battery.

 

(Emphasis added.)  Instruction No. 9 merely informs the jury that 
aggravated assault and battery is a felony, it does nothing to particularize the 
theory of intent the State is relying on in this specific instance.  Instruction No. 16 
is more helpful to the State's argument, but the argument still fails.  Such an argument 
could possibly be persuasive if the jury had convicted May of the lesser 
included offense of burglary, but it did not.  Instead, May was convicted of aggravated burglary for which 
the instruction used alternate theories of intent.  

 

[¶21]   We also consider Instruction No. 18, the 
instruction on self-induced intoxication.  This instruction once again muddied the waters 
by stating in relevant part, "if the defendant was intoxicated to such a degree 
that he was unable to formulate the intention to commit larceny or a felony at the 
time he entered the building or occupied structure without authority" and 
"whether the defendant possessed the mental ability to form the intention to 
commit the larceny or 
felony at the time he entered the building."  Once again, the jury 
was exposed to either theory.  Although not an elements instruction, this 
instruction certainly gives the impression that either larceny or a felony can 
be used as the underlying intent for the burglary conviction.    

 

[¶22]   Charging the defendant and instructing 
as it did, the State gave the jury license to decide either way.  "Submitting claims 
to the jury which have no foundation in the evidence allows the jury to engage 
in conjecture or to speculate as to the defendant's guilt."  Fife v. State, 676 P.2d 565, 569 (Wyo. 1984).  With only the 
general verdict form guiding us, we cannot say on which grounds the jury 
found.  It is 
possible that the jury based its verdict on the charges properly in the case, 
but we cannot conclusively presume it did.  We do not know that the jury found its verdict 
on the State's "one theory" or that the jury considered the lesser-included 
instruction as a clarification to the other burglary instruction.  What we do know is 
that the verdict form read:

 

We the jury, duly empaneled and sworn to try the above 
entitled cause, do find as follows:

1.  As to the charge of Aggravated Burglary in the 
Amended Information, we 
find the Defendant, Joseph May . . . 

 

(Emphasis added.)  The amended information used the entire 
language of the statute itself.  Just as in Bush and 
Tanner, due to the general verdict, we are left to 
speculate on which ground the jury found May guilty of burglary.  Of course, as we 
stated in Fife v. State, 676 P.2d  at 568, "If both 
theories of intent submitted to the jury were sufficiently supported by the 
evidence, we could uphold the general verdict on the aggravated burglary 
charge."

 

[¶23]   We, therefore, now turn to the record to 
see whether both intent to commit a larceny and intent to commit a felony were 
supported by sufficient evidence.  The evidence showed that May went to the 
Chadwick home armed with a Swiss army knife, entered without authority, broke 
into the room where he knew Shannon was likely to be, and stabbed her companion 
in the chest.  
The evidence also showed that a few days before these events, May saw 
Shannon with Buss and reacted angrily to her being with him.  In addition, the 
evidence showed that two days before he broke into the Chadwick home, May 
appeared on the doorstep of Shannon's friend in an agitated and angry state and 
inquired as to the whereabouts of Shannon and Buss.  Testimony also 
showed that sometime in the early morning hours of May 7, May called a friend 
and asked if he had a gun, saying that he was going to go kill Shannon, and her 
parents if they got in the way.  Viewing this evidence in the light most 
favorable to the State, we find it sufficient to support a jury's finding of 
guilty on the aggravated burglary charge based on the intent to commit the 
felony of aggravated assault and battery.  

 

[¶24]   Sufficient evidence that May entered 
with the intent to commit larceny is not reflected in the record.  The majority of the 
State's witnesses testified only about the incident itself and circumstances 
that would indicate May's intent to harm someone in the house.  No evidence was 
presented that anything was taken from the Chadwick home.  Testimony did 
establish that May's entry into the house was unauthorized and that he did have 
knowledge of the house.  However, in Wyoming, no automatic inference of 
intent to steal arises with unauthorized entry by a person with knowledge of the 
contents of the building.  Bush, 908 P.2d  at 
967. One of the State's witnesses did testify that May had little money and had 
pawned some items to pay for necessities.  May himself testified that money was tight for 
him.  However, 
this evidence cannot be considered sufficient evidence of the intent to commit 
larceny.  

 

[¶25]   Because there was insufficient evidence 
of the intent to commit larceny, we cannot uphold the general jury verdict.  As discussed in Tanner, the appropriate remedy for such errors is for us 
to direct the district court to enter a judgment of acquittal on the burglary 
charge because jeopardy attaches when a conviction is overturned due to the 
insufficiency of evidence.  Tanner at ¶17 
(citing Longstreth v. State, 890 P.2d 551, 553 (Wyo. 
1995) and Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18, 98 S. Ct. 2141, 2150, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978)).  We, therefore, must reverse May's conviction 
for aggravated burglary.  

 

[¶26]   It is with the same frustration we 
expressed in Tanner that we reverse May's 
conviction.  Tanner at ¶18.  The error occurring in this case is easily 
avoidable, beginning with better charging documents.  W.R.Cr.P 3(b)(2) 
states, "The information shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the 
essential facts 
constituting the offense charged." (emphasis added).  We recognize that 
when originally charging a person with a crime, the exact facts and 
circumstances surrounding the crime may not be known.  But we also 
recognize that the rule allows the information to be amended.  W.R.Cr.P. 3(e).  Surely closer to 
trial when all the discovery and investigation is complete the State has a 
better idea of what it will be alleging and could amend the information to 
reflect such a charge.   

 

[¶27]   Following that, instructions to the jury 
need to be carefully crafted.  For instance, the instructions for burglary 
and aggravated burglary appear in this case to be taken from the Wyoming 
Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions.  The error could be avoided by simply following 
the use note that states:  "Use appropriate bracketed language in element 
. . . ."  W.Cr.P.J.I. 33.01C and 33.01A.  The introduction to 
the pattern instructions states that some of the instructions contain language 
in brackets, which signifies that the language in adjoining sets of brackets is 
meant to be used in the alternative.5  The instruction 
should only include the appropriate language that fits the circumstances of the 
crime charged and the evidence introduced not include every phrase within the 
brackets.  

 

[¶28]   We are not suggesting that the State 
must only charge one single theory. We are, however, saying that if the State is 
going to present two alternatives and instruct in the alternative, the State is 
required to provide sufficient evidence of both or utilize a special 
interrogatory verdict form requiring the jury to indicate which alternative 
formed the basis for its finding of guilt.  Our holdings in Bush, Tanner, and now this 
case, should make it clear more precise charging and jury instructions are 
required.   
Because we believe it accurately reflects the state of our law and 
properly advises practitioners, we would once again direct attention to 
Professor Theodore Lauer's explanation in his article, Burglary in Wyoming, XXXII Land & Water L.Rev. 721, 
780-81 (1997) wherein he states:

 

It is very important that only those alternative bracketed 
terms in the foregoing instruction which are supported by the evidence in the 
case be included in the instruction given to the jury.  In too many 
instances, the elements instruction given to the jury simply restates the 
content of the information, setting forth, for example, that the defendant 
"entered or remained in a building, occupied structure or vehicle or separately 
secured or occupied portion thereof," and "with intent to commit larceny or a 
felony therein."  
Such instructions are 
inadequate, and should lead to reversal of convictions.  The instruction must 
conform to the crime as charged in the information, and must also conform to the 
evidence which has been introduced.

 

(Emphasis added.)

 

[¶29]   May makes other arguments connected to 
his conviction for aggravated burglary such as: to support a conviction for 
aggravated burglary the charging document, jury instructions and verdict form 
must identify specifically the individual whom the 
defendant intended to injure and the conviction for aggravated burglary in the 
second trial must be reversed if in reaching its verdict the jury relied upon 
evidence of a crime for which he was acquitted in the first trial.  We need not address 
these issues, as our decision on May's first contention is ultimately 
determinative.  
We further decline to address May's second issue, as our resolution of 
the first disposes of the aggravated burglary conviction.  We will, however, 
address his third, fourth, and fifth issues because they relate to his 
conviction for aggravated assault and battery as well, which is unaffected by 
our previous discussion.   

 

Appointment of Standby Counsel

 

[¶30]   We review May's claims regarding the 
district court's refusal to appoint different standby counsel under an abuse of 
discretion standard.  
"While a trial court has the power in its discretion to appoint 
substitute counsel, its refusal to do so is not error unless an abuse of 
discretion is shown."  
Allen v. State, 2002 WY 48, ¶27, 43 P.3d 551, 
¶27 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Bell v. State, 994 P.2d 947, 
951 (Wyo. 2000)).  
May argues that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when 
the trial court refused to appoint new standby counsel to replace the attorney 
originally appointed to represent him.

 

[¶31]   After May's arrest in May of 1998, an 
attorney from the public defender's office was appointed to represent him.  On January 11, 1999, 
May sent a letter to the trial judge stating that he had seen appointed counsel 
only twice since his incarceration eight months earlier.  May also stated in 
the letter that counsel had failed to inform him about court dates, refused to 
accept his phone calls, and failed to respond to his letters.  May's letter to the 
court was followed a few days later by a motion requesting to proceed with the 
trial pro se.  
On January 21, a hearing was held on May's motion.  Appointed counsel 
was not present due to an automobile accident, and another attorney from the 
public defender's office appeared on May's behalf. 

 

[¶32]   During the hearing, the trial court 
inquired into May's understanding of the implications of representing himself 
and reviewed with May the charges filed against him and possible penalties.  The court also 
discussed with May the complexities of his case and risks involved in self 
representation and recommended that May proceed with counsel.  Despite the court's 
recommendation, May stated that he wished to proceed pro se.  May also asked the 
court to appoint standby counsel other than his appointed public defender.  The court stated 
that standby counsel would be required and that generally the selection of 
counsel is not left to the defendant.  The court granted May's motion to proceed pro 
se but indicated that standby counsel would be the attorney already appointed to 
represent May.  
The court directed May to contact that attorney to discuss his concerns 
and told May that if another hearing was needed to address the issue, the court 
would consider it.  
May responded that all he could do to contact counsel was write her a 
letter and that she did not respond to his letters and phone calls.  The attorney from 
the public defender's office indicated he, too, would contact May's 
attorney.  
Consistent with the court's rulings at the hearing, an order was entered 
on January 26, 1999, granting the request to proceed pro se with standby counsel 
to be present to assist at trial. 

 

[¶33]   On February 16, 1999, May filed a motion 
to dismiss standby counsel and for appointment of other counsel.  In support of the 
motion, May asserted that he and appointed counsel had been unable to establish 
an amenable relationship.  A hearing was held on the motion on February 
18, 1999, at which time May asserted that appointed counsel had hardly spoken to 
him since his arrest and they had not established any relationship.  The court reminded 
May that he had asked to proceed pro se, that he was responsible for 
representing himself at trial, and that the only function of standby counsel 
would be to answer questions, assist with legal technicalities, and provide 
minimal guidance where needed.  Finding no basis for concluding that appointed 
counsel would be unable to provide such guidance, the court denied May's 
motion.  May 
proceeded to trial on April 12 with appointed standby counsel present throughout 
all of the proceedings.

 

[¶34]   Citing United 
States v. Anderson, 189 F.3d 1201, 1210 (10th 
Cir. 1999), May argues that his right to counsel was violated because the trial 
court in this case failed to fulfill its duty to inquire into his reasons for 
requesting substitute counsel.  The constitutional right to have counsel 
appointed does not include a right to demand that a particular attorney be 
appointed by the court.  Irvin v. State, 584 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Wyo. 1978).  The same rule applies where a defendant asks 
for the substitution of a particular attorney.  Id. 

 

While a trial court has the power in its discretion to 
appoint substitute counsel, its refusal to do so is not error unless an abuse of 
discretion is shown.  
A factual showing of good cause for the appointment of substitute counsel 
is essential to the demonstration of an abuse of discretion, and good cause is 
to be found in incompetence, commitment to a position or an interest which would 
conflict with the furnishing of an effective defense to the accused, or other 
good reason to conclude that appointed counsel is unable to furnish effective 
assistance.

 

Id. at 1071.  Trial courts are under a duty to make formal 
inquiry into the defendant's reasons for dissatisfaction with present counsel 
when substitution of counsel is requested.  Johnson v. Gibson, 169 F.3d 1239, 1254 (10th Cir. 1999).  

 

[¶35]   This case is similar to Bell v. State, 994 P.2d 947, 951 (Wyo. 2000), wherein 
the defendant and counsel had differing opinions regarding case strategy and had 
difficulty communicating.  Citing Morris v. 
Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14, 103 S. Ct. 1610, 75 L. Ed. 2d 610 (1983), we said in 
Bell that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a 
meaningful relationship with appointed defense counsel.  Rather, the purpose 
of providing assistance of counsel is to ensure that criminal defendants receive 
a fair trial.  
Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 100 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1988).  In evaluating Sixth Amendment claims, the 
appropriate inquiry focuses on the adversarial process, not on the accused's 
relationship with his lawyer.  Id.

 

[¶36]   Once May asserted his right to represent 
himself, the court had no duty to appoint counsel for him.  Van Riper v. State, 882 P.2d 230, 235 (Wyo. 1994).   The 
appointment of standby counsel is not mandatory; standby counsel is appointed to 
a defendant simply through the goodwill of the trial judge.  Id.  We have held that failure to appoint standby 
counsel is not an abuse of discretion.  Id.  We, therefore, fail 
to see how refusing to appoint alternate standby counsel could be an abuse of 
discretion.  

 

[¶37]   Applying these principles, we are unable 
to find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying May's motions for 
substitute standby counsel.  The issue of substitute counsel was addressed 
by the trial court, and by May, at two separate hearings.  May was heard on the 
issue of his dissatisfaction with appointed counsel.  After discussing the 
matter with May and appointed counsel, the trial court confirmed the appointment 
of standby counsel.  
In doing so, the court reminded May of his right to retain private 
counsel, to proceed entirely on his own, or to make use of standby counsel to 
assist him during the trial.  Upon May's motions for substitute counsel, the 
trial court concluded, based upon all the facts and circumstances before it, 
that appointing a different attorney to act as standby counsel was not 
warranted.  
Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the denial 
of May's motions for appointment of substitute standby counsel.

 

Effective Assistance of Counsel

 

[¶38]   May contends that his Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel was violated when a public defender other than the one 
appointed to represent him appeared at the January 21 hearing on his motion to 
proceed pro se.  
May claims that the public defender had a conflict of interest because he 
worked in the public defender's office and a former employee of that office had 
a relationship with one of the victims of May's alleged offenses.

 

[¶39]   At the January 21 hearing, as the court 
was addressing with May his decision to represent himself, May made known that 
he wished to have different standby counsel appointed.  The court asked May 
to consult with appointed counsel about his concerns and also requested the 
public defender present at the hearing communicate with appointed counsel about 
May's concerns.  
The public defender mentioned the potential conflict within the public 
defender's office and told the court that appointed counsel was selected in 
order to avoid that conflict because she did not have an office in the public 
defender's office.  
The attorney also indicated that it was his understanding that a 
personality conflict existed between May and appointed counsel but that he did 
not believe it rose to the level that appointed counsel would be unable to 
assist as standby counsel in this case.  Beyond those comments made at the January 21 
hearing, that public defender had no further involvement in May's case.  From that point 
forward, appointed counsel appeared as standby counsel for May.  May contends that 
the attorney's limited appearance and comments at the January 21 hearing 
violated his right to effective assistance of counsel given the potential 
conflict of the public defender's office. 

 

[¶40]   The right to counsel is guaranteed by 
the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and is applicable 
to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In addition, it is 
specifically articulated in article 1, § 10, of the Constitution of the State of 
Wyoming:  "In 
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to defend in person 
and by counsel . . . ."  This right to counsel includes that the 
assistance of counsel be effective.  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984); Shongutsie v. State, 827 P.2d 361, 364 (Wyo. 1992).  The right to effective counsel encompasses 
the correlative rights that counsel be reasonably competent and that counsel be 
free from conflicts of interest.  Shongutsie, at 
364.

 

[¶41]   Co-existing with a defendant's right to 
counsel is the right to waive representation by an attorney and elect to proceed 
pro se.

 

A defendant has a 
constitutional right to waive his right to counsel and to represent himself at 
criminal trial.  
However, to be valid, the trial judge must ensure that the waiver of 
counsel is "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or 
privilege."  
Ideally, the trial judge should conduct a thorough and comprehensive 
formal inquiry of the defendant on the record to demonstrate that the defendant 
is aware of the nature of the charges, the range of allowable punishments and 
possible defenses, and is fully informed of the risks of proceeding pro se.  

 

Van Riper v. State, 882 P.2d  at 234 (citations omitted).

 

[¶42]   May makes no claim of error relating to 
his decision to waive his right to counsel and represent himself.  He does not claim, 
for example, that the trial court failed to properly inquire into his decision 
to proceed pro se or that his waiver was done without knowledge of the risks of 
appearing without counsel.  May claims only that his right to counsel was 
violated when a public defender made a limited appearance on his behalf despite 
the potential conflict within his office.  

 

[¶43]   We find no violation of May's right to 
effective assistance of counsel.  In reaching that result, we note that once May 
waived his right to counsel and elected to proceed pro se, his claim of 
ineffective assistance is of questionable validity in the absence of a clear 
showing of prejudice.  
Additionally, once May invoked his right to self-representation, the 
court appointed standby counsel to assist him.  The fact that the court required standby 
counsel to be present to assist May should not give rise to an ineffective 
assistance claim in the absence of a clear showing of prejudice.  May has made no 
showing of prejudice.

 

[¶44]   Finally, May raised no objection at the 
trial level, during the January 21 hearing, or at anytime thereafter to the 
appearance by the attorney from the public defender's office.  Absent such an 
objection, May must show that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected 
his lawyer's performance for prejudice to be presumed.  Sorensen v. State, 6 P.3d 657, 663 (Wyo. 2000).  May has made no 
showing of an actual conflict of interest nor has he shown any prejudice 
resulting from any such conflict.  Under these circumstances, we find no denial 
of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  

 

Access to Legal Materials

 

[¶45]   May's final contention is that the trial 
court abused its discretion in not requiring the Natrona County Detention Center 
to provide greater access to the law library and legal materials in order to 
prepare an adequate defense.  Specifically, May contends that his access to 
the library was on a very limited basis, inmates who were not getting ready for 
trial were allowed more time in the library than he was, access to the library 
was granted at unreasonable times, and there were times when he was not allowed 
to use the library at all because it was being used for some other purpose.  May asserts that the 
trial court abused its discretion by not ordering the detention center to allow 
him access to the library a set number of hours per week at reasonable times. 

 

[¶46]   When a defendant makes a decision to 
manage his own case, he relinquishes many of the traditional benefits associated 
with his right to counsel.  Jennings v. State, 
4 P.3d 915, 919 (Wyo. 2000).  In this case, over the trial court's warnings 
concerning the risks of proceeding pro se and its repeated recommendation that 
he have legal representation, May affirmatively invoked his right to proceed pro 
se.    

 

[¶47]   Additionally, in the months leading up 
to the trial, two continuances were granted by the court, one at the State's 
request and one on a motion by May which he filed expressly in order to gain 
more time to prepare his defense.  Both continuances were granted after May 
elected to proceed pro se, giving him extra time to prepare for trial.  At the time May 
filed his motion on February 16, the trial was scheduled to begin on February 
22.  By virtue 
of the order granting the continuance, the trial was rescheduled for April 12, 
giving May seven additional weeks to prepare his case.  

 

[¶48]   At the February 18 hearing on May's 
motion for more access to the library, the trial court specifically invited May 
to re-petition the court and delineate specifics concerning his denial of access 
claim.  On March 
1, May filed a motion to dismiss for denial of due process in which he again 
asserted, without specifics, that he was being denied access to legal 
materials.  That 
motion was followed on March 10 by another motion in which May asserted that he 
had only been able to do three hours of research in the preceding month.  Another motion 
followed on March 19 in which May alleged that he was awakened at 6:40 one 
morning and told that he could use the library.  In this last motion, May alternatively sought 
dismissal of the charges against him, a second continuance, or an order 
requiring the detention center to allow him access to the library one hour per 
day between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m. excluding mealtimes.   

 

[¶49]   A hearing was held on March 23 at which 
time the motions were denied on the ground that May failed to provide 
documentary evidence showing that he had made demand for more time in the 
library and that any such demands were denied.  In denying the motions, the court urged May to 
make his demands for use of the library in writing and to utilize standby 
counsel to assist him in gaining access.  The court also indicated that May could 
re-file his motions along with documentary support showing specific 
violations.  

 

[¶50]   Nothing further appears in the record 
concerning May's allegations that he was denied access to legal materials.  The trial began as 
scheduled on April 12 at which time the court asked May whether he was ready to 
proceed with his defense and May responded that he was.  Thereafter, in the 
course of the two trials that followed, May made no further claim that a denial 
of access to legal materials hampered his ability to present his defense.  Moreover, his 
performance during the trials demonstrated that he was adequately prepared.  Under these 
circumstances, we find no error in the court's rulings in this regard. 

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶51]   In accordance with the foregoing 
discussion, we affirm May's conviction for aggravated assault and battery.  We reverse May's 
conviction for aggravated burglary and vacate the judgment and sentence entered 
by the district court.  
We remand this matter to the district court for entry of judgment of 
acquittal on the aggravated burglary charge against May. 

 

FOOTNOTES

1Wyo. Stat. Ann § 6-3-301 (LexisNexis 2001) provides in 
relevant part:

 

(a)  A person is guilty of burglary if, without 
authority, he enters or remains in a building, occupied structure or vehicle, or 
separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with intent to commit larceny or 
a felony therein.

 

. . .

 

(c)  Aggravated burglary is a felony punishable by 
. . . if, in the course of committing the crime of burglary, the 
person:

 

(i)  Is or becomes armed with or uses a deadly 
weapon or a simulated deadly weapon;

(ii)  Knowingly or recklessly inflicts bodily 
injury on anyone; or

(iii)  Attempts to inflict bodily injury on 
anyone.

 

2The issues in this appeal are strikingly similar to the 
issues we recently addressed in Tanner; as such our 
discussion in this case will mirror in many respects the discussion set forth in 
that decision.  
We would note that May's appeal was submitted before our Tanner opinion was published.  

3We would note that this element is also being instructed in 
the alternative and would require sufficient evidence of each alternative.  See W.Cr.P.J.I. 33.01C.  However, as our discussion of the alternate 
theories of intent is dispositive, we decline to address whether sufficient 
evidence of each alternative existed.

 

4See fn. 3 and W.Cr.P.J.I. 33.01A.

5We note that Instruction No. 5 was taken from the W.Cr.P.J.I 
33.01C that referenced 33.01D as a definition of burglary.  But, as discussed 
above, at some point the jury must be instructed as to the underlying theory of 
intent or sufficient evidence of both must be presented.  Perhaps to avoid 
this problem in the future, the better instruction is the second option for 
33.01C that combines the elements of burglary and aggravated burglary into one 
instruction.