Case Title: State v. Bishop

Citation: 2018-Ohio-5132

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2018-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
v. Bishop, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-5132.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-5132 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. BISHOP, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Bishop, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-5132.] 
Criminal law—Plea hearings—Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(A)—A trial court must advise a 
criminal defendant on postrelease control for a prior felony, during plea 
hearing in a new felony case, of trial court’s authority under R.C. 2929.141 
to terminate defendant’s existing postrelease control and to impose a 
consecutive prison sentence for postrelease-control violation—Defendant-
appellee need not show prejudice because trial court completely failed to 
inform him that he could receive a consecutive prison sentence under R.C. 
2929.141(A)—Court of appeals’ judgment vacating guilty plea and 
remanding cause affirmed. 
(Nos. 2017-1715 and 2017-1716—Submitted July 18, 2018—Decided December 
21, 2018.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Montgomery County, No. 
27496, 2017-Ohio-8332. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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__________________ 
FRENCH, J. 
{¶ 1} We are asked to resolve a certified conflict between judgments of the 
Second District Court of Appeals and the Fifth and Eighth District Courts of 
Appeals on the following question: “[w]hether a criminal defendant on [postrelease 
control] for a prior felony must be advised, during his plea hearing in a new felony 
case, of the trial court’s ability under R.C. 2929.141 to terminate his existing 
[postrelease control] and to impose a consecutive prison sentence for the 
[postrelease-control] violation.”  152 Ohio St.3d 1404, 2018-Ohio-723, 92 N.E.3d 
877.  We conclude that Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) requires that advisement.  We answer 
the certified question in the affirmative and affirm the judgment of the Second 
District Court of Appeals. 
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} While on postrelease control for a prior felony conviction, appellee, 
Dustin Bishop, was indicted on one count of possession of heroin, a fifth-degree 
felony, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a misdemeanor. 
{¶ 3} Bishop pleaded guilty to the possession count, and the state dismissed 
the drug-paraphernalia count.  At Bishop’s plea hearing, the trial court informed 
Bishop that the court could place him on postrelease control for the possession 
offense.  It also informed him that if he committed a new felony while on that 
postrelease control, the court could sentence him to serve one year in prison or the 
time remaining on his postrelease control, whichever was longer.  The trial court 
did not inform Bishop that once he pleaded guilty to the possession offense, the 
court would have the authority under R.C. 2929.141 to terminate Bishop’s existing 
postrelease control and impose a prison term that he would serve consecutively to 
the term of imprisonment imposed for the possession offense.  The trial court 
accepted Bishop’s guilty plea and set the matter for sentencing. 
January Term, 2018 
 
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{¶ 4} The trial court sentenced Bishop to serve a nine-month term of 
imprisonment for the possession offense.  For the postrelease-control violation, the 
court ordered Bishop to serve a one-year prison term under R.C. 2929.141 
consecutively to the sentence for the possession offense. 
{¶ 5} Bishop appealed to the Second District Court of Appeals, raising two 
assignments of error.  Bishop first argued that he had not knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily pleaded guilty to the possession offense because the trial court had 
not informed him of its authority under R.C. 2929.141 to terminate his postrelease 
control and to order him to serve a prison term consecutively to any term of 
imprisonment imposed for the felony offense to which he was pleading guilty.  The 
appellate court, relying on its prior decisions in State v. Branham, 2d Dist. Clark 
No. 2013 CA 49, 2014-Ohio-5067, and State v. Landgraf, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2014 
CA 12, 2014-Ohio-5448, sustained Bishop’s first assignment of error and 
concluded that the trial court erred by failing to advise Bishop, at the time of his 
plea, that he could have to serve an additional, consecutive sentence for his current 
postrelease-control violation.  2017-Ohio-8332, ¶ 7.  The appellate court deemed 
Bishop’s second assignment of error moot, reversed the trial court’s judgment, 
vacated Bishop’s guilty plea, and remanded the matter for further proceedings.  Id. 
at ¶ 8-9. 
{¶ 6} The appellate court, upon the state’s motion, certified that its decision 
conflicted with the Fifth District Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Hicks, 5th 
Dist. Delaware No. 09CAA090088, 2010-Ohio-2985, and the Eighth District Court 
of Appeals’ decision in State v. Dotson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101911, 2015-
Ohio-2392.  The state filed a notice of certified conflict and a jurisdictional appeal 
in this court.  We determined that a conflict exists and consolidated the conflict case 
with the state’s jurisdictional appeal.  152 Ohio St.3d 1404, 2018-Ohio-723, 92 
N.E.3d 877. 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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II.  Intervening Trial-Court Proceedings 
{¶ 7} According to the state’s merit brief, on January 29, 2018—after the 
state had appealed the court of appeals’ judgment to this court but prior to our 
accepting jurisdiction—the trial court accepted Bishop’s new guilty plea to the 
same possession offense and sentenced him to time served.  We must address 
whether this case is moot. 
{¶ 8} Nothing in the record before us confirms that the trial court did, in 
fact, accept a new guilty plea.  But even if the court did accept a new plea, we have 
held that we may resolve a matter, even if it is moot with respect to the parties, 
when it involves an issue of great public or general interest that will outlive the 
instant controversy.  See, e.g., Franchise Developers, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 30 Ohio 
St.3d 28, 31, 505 N.E.2d 966 (1987).  We have recognized this exception to the 
mootness doctrine in other certified-conflict cases and held that it was appropriate 
to resolve the question of law presented.  State v. Massien, 125 Ohio St.3d 204, 
2010-Ohio-1864, 926 N.E.2d 1282, ¶ 4, fn. 1; State v. Brooks, 103 Ohio St.3d 134, 
2004-Ohio-4746, 814 N.E.2d 837, ¶ 5.  For this reason, we proceed to consider the 
certified-conflict question. 
III.  Analysis 
{¶ 9} Turning to the merits, we confront a conflict between judgments of 
the Second District Court of Appeals and the Fifth and Eighth District Courts of 
Appeals regarding an interpretation of the requirements of Crim.R. 11(C).  The 
Second District Court of Appeals has held that the trial court must inform a 
defendant who is on postrelease control and is pleading guilty to a new felony 
offense of the trial court’s authority to revoke the defendant’s postrelease control 
and impose a prison term consecutively to any term of imprisonment it imposes for 
that new felony offense.  See 2017-Ohio-8332 at ¶ 7; Branham, 2d Dist. Clark No. 
2013 CA 49, 2014-Ohio-5067, at ¶ 14.  The Second District has interpreted that 
requirement to be part of the trial court’s duty under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) to advise 
January Term, 2018 
 
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the defendant of “the maximum penalty involved.”  See Landgraf, 2d Dist. Clark 
No. 2014 CA 12, 2014-Ohio-5448, at ¶ 23 (lead opinion).  In contrast, the Fifth and 
Eighth District Courts of Appeals have held that Crim.R. 11 does not require the 
trial court to inform the defendant of the possible effects of his guilty plea to a new 
offense on his postrelease control.  Hicks, 5th Dist. Delaware No. 09CAA090088, 
2010-Ohio-2985, at ¶ 10-13 (Crim.R. 11(D) did not require the trial court to inform 
the defendant, who was pleading guilty to a misdemeanor offense, of the possible 
effects of his plea on his postrelease control); Dotson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 
101911, 2015-Ohio-2392, at ¶ 13 (Crim.R. 11(C) did not require the trial court to 
inform the defendant, who was pleading guilty to a felony offense, of the possible 
effects of his plea on his postrelease control). 
{¶ 10} A criminal defendant’s choice to enter a guilty plea is a serious 
decision.  State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462,  
¶ 25.  Due process requires that a defendant’s plea be made knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily; otherwise, the defendant’s plea is invalid.  Id. 
{¶ 11} Crim.R. 11(C) prescribes the process that a trial court must use 
before accepting a plea of guilty to a felony.  State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 
2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 8.  The trial court must follow certain 
procedures and engage the defendant in a detailed colloquy before accepting his or 
her plea.  Clark at ¶ 26; see Crim.R. 11(C).  The court must make the determinations 
and give the warnings that Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b) require and must notify the 
defendant of the constitutional rights that Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) identifies.  Veney at 
¶ 13.  While the court must strictly comply with the requirements listed in Crim.R. 
11(C)(2)(c), the court need only substantially comply with the requirements listed 
in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b).  Id. at ¶ 18. 
{¶ 12} Most relevant here, Crim.R. 11(C)(2) includes the following among 
the determinations a trial court must make:  
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea 
voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of 
the maximum penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant 
is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community 
control sanctions at the sentencing hearing. 
 
{¶ 13} We must also consider the specifics of R.C. 2929.141.  That statute 
provides that when a defendant who is on postrelease control is convicted of or 
pleads guilty to a new felony, the trial court may terminate the postrelease-control 
term and convert it into additional prison time.  R.C. 2929.141(A)(1).  This 
additional penalty is often referred to as a “judicial sanction.”  See, e.g., State v. 
Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio-2927, 85 N.E.3d 700, ¶ 25.  The additional 
term can be as long as the greater of 12 months or the amount of time that remained 
on the existing postrelease-control term.  R.C. 2929.141(A)(1).  The court is not 
required to impose an additional prison term for the violation.  See id.  But if it 
does, the defendant must serve the additional term consecutively to the prison term 
for the new felony.  Id. 
A.  Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)—The “maximum penalty involved” includes the 
potential R.C. 2929.141(A) sentence 
{¶ 14} At issue here is the impact of R.C. 2929.141(A) on the portion of 
Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) that requires a trial court to ensure during the plea hearing that 
the defendant is entering his guilty plea “with understanding of the nature of the 
charges and of the maximum penalty involved.”  In arguing that the trial court need 
not inform a defendant of a potential consecutive prison term under R.C. 
2929.141(A), appellant, the state of Ohio, bypasses the plain language of the statute 
and the rule and looks instead to this court’s decision in State v. Johnson, 40 Ohio 
St.3d 130, 532 N.E.2d 1295 (1988).  In Johnson, we reasoned that neither the 
United States Constitution nor the Ohio Constitution requires a trial court to inform 
January Term, 2018 
 
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a defendant during his plea hearing of the maximum total of the sentences he faces 
or that the sentences can be imposed consecutively.  Id. at 133.  Regarding Crim.R. 
11, we said that “[i]t would seem to be beyond a reasonable interpretation to suggest 
that the rule refers cumulatively to the total of all sentences received for all charges 
which a criminal defendant may answer in a single proceeding.”  Id.  We concluded 
that because the trial court in Johnson explained to the defendant the individual 
maximum sentences possible, his guilty plea was proper.  Id. 
{¶ 15} Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) has been amended since Johnson so that a 
single plea can now apply to multiple charges, see 83 Ohio St.3d xciii, cix (effective 
July 1, 1998).  Nevertheless, the state argues that the rule’s advisements still apply 
only to the “maximum penalty involved” for the crimes to which the defendant 
pleads guilty.  We disagree. 
{¶ 16} First, what happened to the defendant in Johnson is a far cry from 
what happened to Bishop.  Johnson was told of his potential sentences for each 
individual offense; the trial court just failed to tell Johnson the sentences for each 
offense could run consecutively.  Here, the trial court told Bishop that he could 
receive a maximum sentence of 12 months for his fifth-degree-felony conviction.  
But the trial court did not tell Bishop that he was also subject to a separate 
consecutive 12-month sentence for his postrelease-control violation. 
{¶ 17} Second, and more importantly, we must look to the plain language 
of the statutes involved.  R.C. 2929.141(A)(1) provides that “[u]pon the conviction 
of or plea of guilty to a felony by a person on post-release control at the time of the 
commission of the felony, the court may terminate the term of post-release control” 
and impose a consecutive prison term.  Sentences imposed under R.C. 2929.141(A) 
cannot stand alone.  The court may impose the sentence only upon a conviction for 
or plea of guilty to a new felony, making the sentence for committing a new felony 
while on postrelease control and that for the new felony itself inextricably 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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intertwined.  By any fair reading of Crim.R. 11(C)(2), the potential R.C. 
2929.141(A) sentence was part of the “maximum penalty involved” in this case. 
B.  Bishop need not show prejudice 
{¶ 18} Finally, Bishop need not show that the trial court’s error prejudiced 
him—i.e., that he would not have entered the guilty plea if he had known that the 
trial court could terminate his existing postrelease control and convert it into 
additional prison time, see State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 564 N.E.2d 474 
(1990), citing State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 93, 364 N.E.2d 1163 (1977). 
{¶ 19} A trial court need only substantially comply with the 
nonconstitutional advisements listed in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a).  Veney, 120 Ohio 
St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, at ¶ 18.  But “[w]hen the trial judge 
does not substantially comply with Crim.R. 11 in regard to a nonconstitutional 
right, reviewing courts must determine whether the trial court partially complied or 
failed to comply with the rule.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-
Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, at ¶ 32.  “If the trial judge partially complied, e.g., by 
mentioning mandatory postrelease control without explaining it, the plea may be 
vacated only if the defendant demonstrates a prejudicial effect.”  Id.  But if the trial 
court completely failed to comply with the rule, the plea must be vacated.  Id.  
Complete failure “ ‘to comply with the rule does not implicate an analysis of 
prejudice.’ ”  Id., quoting State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509, 881 
N.E.2d 1224, ¶ 22. 
{¶ 20} Here, the trial court completely failed to inform Bishop that a 
consecutive prison sentence under R.C. 2929.141(A) was possible.  That is not 
partial compliance.  Bishop need not show prejudice. 
IV.  Conclusion 
{¶ 21} We conclude that Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) requires a trial court to advise 
a criminal defendant on postrelease control for a prior felony, during his plea 
hearing in a new felony case, of the trial court’s authority under R.C. 2929.141 to 
January Term, 2018 
 
9
terminate the defendant’s existing postrelease control and to impose a consecutive 
prison sentence for the postrelease-control violation.  We therefore answer the 
certified question in the affirmative and affirm the judgment of the Second District 
Court of Appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, J., concur. 
DEWINE, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion. 
KENNEDY, J., dissents, with an opinion. 
FISCHER, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by BROWN, J. 
SUSAN D. BROWN, J., of the Tenth District Court of Appeals, sitting for 
DEGENARO, J. 
_________________ 
DEWINE, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 22} I agree that the judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed.  
The potential sentence for a postrelease-control violation is part of the “maximum 
penalty involved” when a defendant pleads guilty to a new felony.  I write 
separately, however, because I disagree with the lead opinion’s dictum about 
mootness. 
{¶ 23} There is no question that this case is not moot.  As the lead opinion 
notes, there is nothing in the record to confirm that the trial court accepted Dustin 
Bishop’s guilty plea following the state’s notice of appeal to this court.  And even 
if the trial court did act, its order would be void because it acted without jurisdiction. 
{¶ 24} In its decision on October 27, 2017, the court of appeals remanded 
this case for resentencing by the trial court.  The state filed a timely notice of appeal 
on December 7, 2017.  According to the state’s merit brief, before this court had 
accepted jurisdiction, the trial court, acting on the remand order, resentenced Dustin 
Bishop.  But once the notice of appeal was filed in this court, the trial court was 
divested of jurisdiction.  We were confronted with a similar situation in State v. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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Washington, 137 Ohio St.3d 427, 2013-Ohio-4982, 999 N.E.2d 661, in which, after 
the state filed a notice of appeal but before this court accepted jurisdiction, the trial 
acted on a remand order to resentence a defendant.  The defendant moved to dismiss 
the state’s appeal as moot.  This court denied the motion: 
 
“An appeal is perfected upon the filing of a written notice of 
appeal.  Once a case has been appealed, the trial court loses 
jurisdiction except to take action in aid of the appeal.”  Thus, the 
trial court in this case had no jurisdiction to resentence the defendant 
once the state had filed its notice of appeal. 
 
(Citations omitted.)  Id. at ¶ 8, quoting In re S.J., 106 Ohio St.3d 11, 2005-Ohio-
3215, 829 N.E.2d 1207, ¶ 9.  Likewise, the trial court here had no jurisdiction to 
resentence Bishop.  Therefore, even if the trial court did act, its order would be void 
and the state’s appeal would not be moot. 
{¶ 25} Because the state’s appeal is not moot, there is no need to digress 
into a discussion of the propriety of considering certified-conflict questions in moot 
cases.  But because the lead opinion takes that path, I write to explain why I believe 
its dictum is misguided. 
{¶ 26} The Ohio Constitution vests the “judicial power of the state” in “a 
supreme court, courts of appeals, courts of common pleas and divisions thereof, 
and such other courts inferior to the supreme court as may from time to time be 
established by law.”  Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 1.  While the language 
of our Constitution does not mirror the “cases” and “controversies” language of the 
United States Constitution, see United States Constitution, Article III, Section 2, it 
is generally understood that the grant of the judicial power requires that we decide 
only “actual controversies where the judgment can be carried into effect, and not to 
give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles 
January Term, 2018 
 
11 
or rules of law which cannot affect the matter at issue in the case before it,” Travis 
v. Pub. Util. Comm., 123 Ohio St. 355, 359, 175 N.E. 586 (1931).  When a case 
becomes moot, there is no longer a controversy for this court to decide. 
{¶ 27} We have recognized exceptions to this principle and have decided 
cases that were moot after having found that the issues presented were capable of 
repetition yet evading review.  See Adkins v. McFaul, 76 Ohio St.3d 350, 350-351, 
667 N.E.2d 1171 (1996).  But there is no reason to believe that the issue in this 
case—plea-hearing requirements for defendants currently on postrelease control—
will evade review.  Nor does the fact that this case raises a question of public or 
great general interest militate against applying the mootness doctrine.  By 
definition, many cases we accept on jurisdictional appeal involve questions of 
“public or great general interest pursuant to Article IV, Section 2(B)(2)(e) of the 
Ohio Constitution.”  S.Ct.Prac.R. 5.02(A)(3).  But being of public or great general 
interest has never been considered sufficient to allow us to decide a jurisdictional 
appeal that has been rendered moot by subsequent events. 
{¶ 28} Despite the constitutional provision tying our authority to the 
judicial power, the justices joining the lead opinion apparently believe that different 
rules apply to appeals that come to us as certified conflicts.  But like our review of 
jurisdictional appeals, our review of certified-conflict questions depends on the 
existence of a case.  If a court of appeals finds that its judgment conflicts with that 
of another court, it certifies “the record of the case to the supreme court for review 
and final determination.”  (Emphasis added.)  Ohio Constitution, Article IV, 
Section 3(B)(4); see S.Ct.Prac.R. 8.02(D).  Unlike certified state-law questions 
from federal court, which we answer without deciding the underlying case, we 
decide certified-conflict cases and enter judgment.  If a case becomes moot, there 
is no controversy for us to decide and we should dismiss it. 
{¶ 29} But all of this discussion is unnecessarily advisory.  This case is not 
moot.  We should limit our discussion to the controversy before us. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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_________________ 
KENNEDY, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 30} When an offender violates the terms of his or her postrelease control 
by committing a new felony, the offender may be prosecuted for the new felony 
and judicially sanctioned with a prison term for the postrelease-control violation.  
R.C. 2929.141(A).  At issue in this case is whether Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) requires a 
trial court taking a guilty plea to the new felony to advise the accused that an 
additional, consecutive sentence for the postrelease-control violation may be 
imposed. 
{¶ 31} A trial court may accept a plea only if it is knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily made, and relevant here, Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) directs the court to 
inform the accused of the maximum penalty for each offense charged that will be 
resolved by the plea.  However, a postrelease-control violation does not result in a 
criminal “charge” because it is not a new criminal offense and involves only a 
possible judicial sanction separate from the punishment that may be imposed for 
the new felony.  Therefore, because the trial court is not required to advise the 
accused about the judicial sanction that may be imposed pursuant to R.C. 
2929.141(A), I dissent and would answer the certified question in the negative and 
reverse the judgment of the Second District Court of Appeals. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 32} Appellee, Dustin Bishop, was indicted on two counts: possession of 
heroin, a fifth-degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a misdemeanor.  
Appellant, the state of Ohio, and Bishop entered into a plea agreement in which he 
agreed to plead guilty to heroin possession in exchange for the dismissal of the 
drug-paraphernalia count. 
{¶ 33} At the plea hearing, the trial court informed Bishop that the fifth-
degree felony count of heroin possession carried a maximum penalty of 12 months 
in prison and a $2,500 fine.  It also advised him that he could be placed on 
January Term, 2018 
 
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community control and that if he violated its terms, he could be imprisoned for 12 
months.  The court further told him: 
 
Upon finishing any prison sentence, you may be placed on 
what’s called post-release control or PRC wherein you’d be under 
the supervision of the parole board for three years.  Do you 
understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: If you violate any of the terms of your release 
from prison or you violate any law while you’re under the 
supervision of the parole board then the parole board can add onto 
your sentence nine months for each individual violation up to a total 
of 50 percent of the stated prison term for multiple violations. 
If your violation is a felony, you could receive from the 
Court a prison term of either one year or whatever time is remaining 
on the post-release control, whichever is the longer time, plus you 
could be prosecuted and sentenced for the new felony, itself. 
Also, for any violations, the parole board could extend the 
length of the post-release control or impose other more restrictive 
sanctions upon you. 
I mentioned there, I believe, three items without giving you 
a chance to respond right away.  Do you understand all that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
 
(Capitalization sic.) 
{¶ 34} Neither Bishop nor defense counsel informed the trial court that 
Bishop was on postrelease control when he committed the new felony, and there 
was no objection to the court’s failure to inform Bishop that R.C. 2929.141(A) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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might subject him to a consecutive prison sentence for the postrelease-control 
violation.  After being informed of the constitutional rights he would be waiving, 
Bishop pleaded guilty to heroin possession.  The court ordered a presentence 
investigation and scheduled a sentencing hearing. 
{¶ 35} The presentence-investigation report contains the earliest mention in 
the record of the fact that Bishop was on postrelease control when he committed 
the new felony.  At sentencing, the trial court noted Bishop’s significant criminal 
history (including 14 prior felony convictions) and that he was on postrelease 
control at the time of his newest offense, and it imposed a 12-month sentence to be 
served consecutively with a 9-month sentence for heroin possession.  Neither 
Bishop nor defense counsel objected, and Bishop did not move to withdraw his plea 
due to a surprise at sentencing. 
{¶ 36} Rather, Bishop challenged the validity of his plea for the first time 
on appeal, asserting that he had not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
entered the plea because the trial court had not informed him that R.C. 2929.141 
permitted the court to terminate his postrelease control and order him to serve 
consecutive prison terms for the new felony and the violation of the terms of his 
postrelease control.  The court of appeals agreed that the plea was invalid because 
of the lack of this advisement, and it vacated the guilty plea and remanded the 
matter for further proceedings.  2017-Ohio-8332, ¶ 7, 9.  We accepted the state’s 
discretionary appeal and recognized that the Second District’s decision conflicted 
with decisions of the Fifth and Eighth District Courts of Appeals.  152 Ohio St.3d 
1404, 2018-Ohio-723, 92 N.E.3d 877. 
{¶ 37} The sole issue presented in this case is whether Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) 
requires a trial court accepting a guilty plea to a felony to inform the accused of a 
possible judicial sanction that could be imposed pursuant to R.C. 2929.141(A) for 
a violation of the terms of postrelease control. 
 
 
January Term, 2018 
 
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Law and Analysis 
{¶ 38} Crim.R. 11(C)(2) provides: 
 
In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty 
or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no 
contest without first addressing the defendant personally and doing 
all of the following: 
(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea 
voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of 
the maximum penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant 
is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of community 
control sanctions at the sentencing hearing. 
 
{¶ 39} “To interpret court rules, this court applies general principles of 
statutory construction. * * * Therefore, we must read undefined words or phrases 
in context and then construe them according to rules of grammar and common 
usage.”  State ex rel. Law Office of Montgomery Cty. Pub. Defender v. Rosencrans, 
111 Ohio St.3d 338, 2006-Ohio-5793, 856 N.E.2d 250, ¶ 23.  We must give effect 
to the words used in the rule, refraining from inserting or deleting words.  Cleveland 
Elec. Illum. Co. v. Cleveland, 37 Ohio St.3d 50, 53, 524 N.E.2d 441 (1988).  If the 
language of a rule is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite 
meaning, then there is no need for this court to resort to the rules of interpretation; 
rather, we apply the rule as written.  State ex rel. Potts v. Comm. on Continuing 
Legal Edn., 93 Ohio St.3d 452, 456, 755 N.E.2d 886 (2001). 
{¶ 40} The language of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) is plain and unambiguous.  
Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) requires a trial court accepting a guilty “plea” from a defendant 
to ensure that the defendant understands the “charges” and the “maximum penalty 
involved.”  The words “plea,” “charges,” and “maximum penalty” are not defined 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
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in either the Criminal Rules or the Revised Code, but they have common, everyday 
meanings that we can apply. 
{¶ 41} A “plea” is “[a]n accused person’s response of ‘guilty,’ ‘not guilty,’ 
or ‘no contest’ to a criminal charge.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1337 (10th Ed.2014).  
A “charge” is “[a] formal accusation of an offense as a preliminary step to 
prosecution.”  Id. at 282.  The word “maximum penalty” refers to “[t]he heaviest 
punishment permitted by law.”  Id. at 1314. 
{¶ 42} Accordingly, the plea is the defendant’s response to a charge filed 
alleging an offense, and the maximum penalty is the heaviest punishment 
prescribed by statute for that offense.  Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) therefore requires the 
trial court to advise the defendant of the maximum penalty for each of the charges 
that the accused is resolving with the plea.  Here, that means that the trial court was 
required to inform Bishop that he could be sentenced to up to 12 months in prison 
and a $2,500 fine for possession of heroin, and the trial court did that in the plea 
colloquy. 
{¶ 43} Our decision in State v. Johnson, 40 Ohio St.3d 130, 532 N.E.2d 
1295 (1988), supports this plain reading of the rule.  In that case, the accused had 
agreed to plead guilty to aggravated robbery, robbery, and forgery, and in its plea 
colloquy, the trial court informed him of the maximum possible penalty for each 
individual charge without advising him that the court had authority to run the 
sentences consecutively.  Id. at 130-131.  The accused pleaded guilty, the court 
accepted the pleas, and it imposed consecutive sentences.  Id. at 131.  The Second 
District Court of Appeals reversed and invalidated the pleas, holding that the trial 
court had failed to advise the accused “as to the maximum sentence possible for 
such violations because the trial court failed to inform him that the sentences may 
be imposed to run consecutively, rather than concurrently.”  Id. at 131-132. 
{¶ 44} We reversed, concluding that the trial court’s application of Crim.R. 
11(C)(2)(a) was not prejudicial error.  Id. at 134-135.  We explained: 
January Term, 2018 
 
17 
 
Upon its face the rule speaks in the singular.  The term “the charge” 
indicates a single and individual criminal charge.  So, too, does “the 
plea” refer to “a plea” which the court “shall not accept” until the 
dictates of the rule have been observed.  Consequently, the term “the 
maximum penalty” which is required to be explained is also to be 
understood as referring to a single penalty.  In the context of “the 
plea” to “the charge,” the reasonable interpretation of the text is 
that “the maximum penalty” is for the single crime for which “the 
plea” is offered.  It would seem to be beyond a reasonable 
interpretation to suggest that the rule refers cumulatively to the total 
of all sentences received for all charges which a criminal defendant 
may answer in a single proceeding. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Johnson at 133. 
{¶ 45} We further reasoned that 
 
Crim.R. 11 applies only to the entry and acceptance of the plea.  It 
has no relevance to the exercise of the trial court’s sentencing 
discretion at that stage other than directing the court to proceed with 
or impose sentencing.  Thus, it can hardly be said that the rule 
imposes upon a trial judge a duty to explain what particular matters 
he may, at a later date, determine are significant to the exercise of 
his discretion.  Moreover, explaining definitions of basic terms and 
calculating potential sentences are matters which are within the 
purview of legal representation, and of which even minimally 
competent trial counsel are capable. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
18 
(Emphasis added.)  Id. at 134. 
{¶ 46} Johnson therefore stands for the proposition that the trial court is 
required to inform the accused of the maximum penalty for each charged offense 
that will be resolved by the plea. 
{¶ 47} The lead opinion correctly notes that since we decided Johnson, 
Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) has been amended to require the trial court to ensure that the 
accused understands the nature of the “charges” and the maximum penalty 
involved.  However, we amended the rule in 1998—almost a decade after we 
decided Johnson—“in light of changes in terminology used in the criminal law of 
Ohio effective July 1, 1996,” by Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2, 146 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 7136 
(“S.B. 2”), and the staff comment to the amendment does not indicate that making 
the word “charge” plural was intended to be a substantive change.  83 Ohio St.3d 
xciii, cxi.  We do not make significant revisions to our procedural rules cryptically, 
and we have never held that our holding in Johnson has been abrogated by the 
amended rule.  Ohio appellate courts continue to follow Johnson and hold that 
Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) does not require the trial court to advise a defendant during a 
plea colloquy of the possibility of consecutive sentencing.  E.g., State v. Dansby-
East, 2016-Ohio-202, 57 N.E.3d 450, ¶ 16-17 (8th Dist.); State v. Gabel, 6th Dist. 
Sandusky Nos. S-14-038, S-14-042, S-14-043, and S-14-045, 2015-Ohio-2803,  
¶ 13-14; State v. Mack, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-140054, 2015-Ohio-1430, ¶ 25. 
{¶ 48} Importantly, the judicial sanction authorized by R.C. 2929.141 was 
not enacted by the General Assembly until 2002, so it could not have been 
contemplated by the amendment to Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a).  See Am.Sub.H.B. No. 
327, 149 Ohio Laws IV, 7536, 7576, 7626.  But in any case, the amendment does 
not support the lead opinion’s conclusion that the trial court is required to inform 
the defendant about penalties that may result from the guilty plea but that are not 
part of the “maximum penalty involved” for the “charges” resolved by the “plea.”  
Simply put, there is no “charge” brought for a violation of the terms of postrelease 
January Term, 2018 
 
19 
control, because the General Assembly has not made a postrelease-control violation 
a separate crime as it has, for example, in criminalizing the violation of a protective 
order.  See R.C. 2919.27.  This conclusion is dictated by an understanding of how 
postrelease control works. 
{¶ 49} In 1996, the General Assembly enacted the postrelease-control 
statute as part of a comprehensive revision of Ohio’s criminal sentencing scheme, 
S.B. 2, and its companion bill, Am.Sub.S.B. No. 269, 146 Ohio Laws, Part VI, 
10752 (“S.B. 269”).  As we explained in Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d 504, 508, 
733 N.E.2d 1103 (2000), our first decision to address the postrelease-control 
statute, S.B. 2 and S.B. 269 “chang[ed] the landscape of Ohio’s sentencing system” 
to provide “truth in sentencing,” primarily accomplished by eliminating both 
indefinite sentences and parole and replacing them with definite sentences and 
postrelease control.  The legislature removed the Adult Parole Board’s authority to 
determine how long an offender stays in prison and instead provided that offenders 
are subject to mandatory and discretionary terms of postrelease control that 
commence upon release from imprisonment. 
{¶ 50} Postrelease control is a “period of supervision by the adult parole 
authority after a prisoner’s release from imprisonment that includes one or more 
post-release control sanctions imposed under section 2967.28 of the Revised 
Code.”  R.C. 2967.01(N).  The parole board has authority to impose “conditions of 
release under a post-release control sanction that the board or court considers 
appropriate, and the conditions of release may include [a] community residential 
sanction, community nonresidential sanction, or financial sanction.”  R.C. 
2967.28(D)(1). 
{¶ 51} An offender who is released on postrelease control is under the 
general jurisdiction of the Adult Parole Authority and supervised by parole officers 
as if the offender had been placed on parole.  R.C. 2967.28(F)(1).  If the Adult 
Parole Authority determines that an offender has violated a condition of postrelease 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
20 
control, it may impose a more restrictive condition (but not a residential sanction 
that includes a prison term) or it may refer the matter for a hearing before the parole 
board, which has the authority to impose a prison term for a postrelease-control 
violation.  R.C. 2967.28(F)(2) and (3).  Importantly, courts are not involved in 
determining whether a violation occurred or what the sanction should be.  The 
sanction, even if a prison term, is administratively imposed. 
{¶ 52} However, if an offender violates the terms of postrelease control by 
committing a new felony, upon the conviction or plea of guilty for that offense, the 
court may terminate postrelease control and impose either community-control 
sanctions or a prison term for the postrelease-control violation for the greater of 12 
months or the time remaining to be served on postrelease control.  R.C. 
2929.141(A).  If a prison term is imposed, it is to be served consecutively to the 
sentence for the new felony but must be reduced by any prison term 
administratively imposed by the parole board.  R.C. 2929.141(A)(1). 
{¶ 53} R.C. 2929.141(A)(1) expressly distinguishes between the penalty 
imposed for a new felony and the sanction imposed for a postrelease-control 
violation, stating that the court may impose a prison term for the postrelease-control 
violation “[i]n addition to any prison term for the new felony.”  Our decisions have 
long recognized this distinction as well. 
{¶ 54} In Woods, we rejected the argument that permitting the Adult Parole 
Board to impose postrelease control on offenders violated the separation-of-powers 
doctrine by allowing the executive branch to exercise judicial authority, exactly 
because “post-release control is part of the original judicially imposed sentence” 
and because postrelease-control sanctions are “aimed at behavior modification in 
the attempt to reintegrate the offender safely into the community, not mere 
punishment for an additional crime.”  89 Ohio St.3d at 512, 733 N.E.2d 1103. 
{¶ 55} Similarly, in State v. Martello, we held that it does not offend the 
double-jeopardy protections of the Ohio and United States Constitutions to 
January Term, 2018 
 
21 
prosecute an offender who was sanctioned for violating the terms of postrelease 
control for the same conduct that was the reason for the sanction.  97 Ohio St.3d 
398, 2002-Ohio-6661, 780 N.E.2d 250, ¶ 1.  We explained that “the General 
Assembly has indicated its clear intent that the prison term imposed for the violation 
of postrelease control is a reinstatement of part of the original sentence for violating 
the conditions of supervision, and is not meant to be a separate criminal 
punishment.”  Id. at ¶ 19.  We continued: “[J]eopardy does not attach when a 
defendant receives a term of incarceration for the violation of conditions of 
postrelease control.  Such a term of incarceration is attributable to the original 
sentence and is not a ‘criminal punishment’ for Double Jeopardy Clause purposes 
* * *.”  Id. at ¶ 26. 
{¶ 56} Accordingly, as the statutory scheme demonstrates, a violation of the 
terms of postrelease control is not separately charged when the accused commits a 
new felony, and it is not part of the charge resolved by the accused’s guilty plea 
resolving the new felony charged in the case.  Nor is any sanction imposed for the 
postrelease-control violation part of the “maximum penalty involved,” because it is 
not part of a new sentence that may be imposed for a new felony but, rather, is part 
of the original sentence that imposed postrelease control. 
{¶ 57} Nonetheless, the lead opinion reasons that a prison term imposed 
pursuant to R.C. 2929.141(A) “cannot stand alone” and is “inextricably 
intertwined” with the sentence imposed for the new felony that constitutes the 
postrelease-control violation.  Lead opinion at ¶ 17.  It is unclear whether the 
justices joining the lead opinion view the postrelease-control violation as a “charge” 
or whether they view the judicial sanction imposed as part of the maximum penalty 
involved.  But either way, the lead opinion’s analysis cannot be squared with the 
language of the postrelease-control statute or our decisions recognizing that a 
sanction for a postrelease-control violation is not punishment for the commission 
of a new offense.  It is true that the postrelease-control violation is connected to the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
22 
new felony, but that is only because the guilty plea or conviction is the form of 
proof that the General Assembly has specified for showing that an offender violated 
the terms of his or her postrelease control by committing a felony.  Standing alone, 
that does not make the violation any part of the charge resolved by the plea or make 
the sanction any part of the punishment for the conviction. 
{¶ 58} And as the lead opinion notes, at the time of the plea, there was only 
a “potential R.C. 2929.141(A) sentence.”  Id. at ¶ 17.  This language implies that a 
Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) advisement is required for any “possible” or “potential” 
sanction that may be imposed as a collateral consequence of pleading guilty to a 
felony.  But as we recognized in Johnson, Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) simply does not 
impose any duty on the trial court to inform the accused about its sentencing 
discretion.  40 Ohio St.3d at 134, 532 N.E.2d 1295.  Rather, calculating potential 
sentences and informing the accused of the collateral consequences of a conviction 
are matters within the purview of legal representation.  It is incumbent on defense 
counsel to know that the client committed a felony while on postrelease control, 
and an accused’s guilty plea to an offense without knowing the legal consequences 
that may result might raise an issue of ineffective assistance of counsel but is not 
invalid. 
{¶ 59} Lastly, the lead opinion fails to appreciate the logical consequences 
of this court’s judgment today.  Its reasoning applies equally to an offender who 
violates community-control sanctions by committing a new offense.  Although 
Crim.R. 11(C)(2) does not apply to community-control revocation proceedings, 
e.g., State v. Mayle, 2017-Ohio-8942, 101 N.E.3d 490, ¶ 13-14 (11th Dist.) (citing 
cases), the possible imposition of a sentence for an offender’s violation of the terms 
of his or her probation is “inextricably intertwined” with the commission of the new 
offense that constitutes the probation violation.  Following the lead opinion’s logic, 
the trial court’s failure to advise the defendant that a probation violation could result 
in the imposition of a sentence served consecutively to the sentence for the new 
January Term, 2018 
 
23 
offense would likewise be a complete failure to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), 
invalidating the plea.  See generally R.C. 2929.25(A)(3)(c); State v. Jones, 2017-
Ohio-943, 86 N.E.3d 821, ¶ 19 (7th Dist.) (upholding consecutive sentences for 
multiple probation violations).  We have never interpreted Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) in 
this manner, and we should not do so today. 
{¶ 60} More fundamentally, for more than a decade, we have grappled with 
case after case addressing the consequences of a trial court’s failure to properly 
impose postrelease control, debating whether the resulting sentence is void or 
voidable.  See State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 
864, ¶ 23 (holding that a trial court’s failure to properly impose a statutorily 
mandated term of postrelease control renders the sentence contrary to law and 
void); State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961, ¶ 12-
13 (explaining that a void sentence is a nullity and a de novo sentencing hearing 
therefore is required to correct it); State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-
6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, ¶ 17, 36 (overruling Bezak, holding that the improper 
imposition of postrelease control does not affect the valid parts of the conviction 
and sentence, and stating that resentencing is limited to properly imposing 
postrelease control); State v. Billiter, 134 Ohio St.3d 103, 2012-Ohio-5144, 980 
N.E.2d 960, ¶ 12 (allowing an offender to challenge an escape conviction by 
collaterally attacking the imposition of postrelease control); State v. Gordon, 153 
Ohio St.3d 601, 2018-Ohio-1975, 109 N.E.3d 1201, ¶ 12 (R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(e) 
does not require the trial court at sentencing to advise an offender of the judicial 
sanction authorized by R.C. 2929.141(A) for committing a new felony while on 
postrelease control). 
{¶ 61} This court’s judgment today sparks a new debate by creating a new 
form of postrelease-control error on par with these cases.  Courts of this state have 
held that a guilty plea that was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary was obtained 
in violation of due process and is “void.”  E.g., State v. Gheen, 7th Dist. Belmont 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
24 
No. 17 BE 0023, 2018-Ohio-1924, ¶ 9, citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 
243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); State v. Miller, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 
102848, 2015-Ohio-4688, ¶ 5; State v. Davis, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24927, 
2012-Ohio-4745, ¶ 4.  According to the lead opinion, an accused’s plea is not 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary if he or she is not informed that the trial court 
can impose a prison term for a violation of the terms of postrelease control when 
the accused pleads guilty to a felony that also constitutes the violation.  Such a plea 
is presumed invalid, and no showing of prejudice is needed; that is, it is void. 
{¶ 62} However, during the plea hearing, the trial court generally will not 
know that an offender was on postrelease control at the time of the offense unless 
the offender or defense counsel volunteers that information; for example, that fact 
does not appear in this record until the filing of the presentence-investigation report.  
But if the court does not know that the R.C. 2929.141(A) judicial sanction is in 
play, it has no reason to give the advisement required by this court’s judgment 
today.  The court’s judgment therefore brings the validity of countless guilty pleas 
into question, regardless of whether the accused was prejudiced by any error.  It 
also gives defendants a perverse incentive to conceal the fact that they were on 
postrelease control when they committed their new offense so that they may “wait 
and see” what sentence is imposed and then raise the issue like a rabbit from the 
hat in the court of appeals.  Our decisions should not countenance such 
gamesmanship, but this court’s judgment today makes that a winning strategy. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 63} The General Assembly has enacted a clear-cut statutory scheme of 
supervision of offenders reentering society after a term of incarceration.  It made 
policy choices by providing that a violation of postrelease control is not a crime 
and by granting trial courts discretion in deciding whether to impose a prison term 
as a sanction for that violation.  Rather than second-guessing these policy choices 
January Term, 2018 
 
25 
in the guise of interpreting a court rule, we should leave the policymaking to the 
General Assembly, the sole arbiter of public policy. 
{¶ 64} Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) advisements were never intended for 
nonexistent criminal offenses that cannot be charged or for a potential penalty that 
cannot be known at the time of a plea.  Rather, the trial court’s duty in accepting a 
guilty plea is to ensure that the accused understands the nature of the charges to be 
resolved by the plea and the maximum penalty that may be imposed on each of 
those charges.  Because a violation of the terms of postrelease control is not a new 
charge and because the judicial sanction imposed for the violation is not a 
punishment imposed on the guilty plea to an offense, Bishop’s plea hearing 
complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). 
{¶ 65} For these reasons, I would answer the certified question in the 
negative and reverse the judgment of the Second District Court of Appeals. 
_________________ 
 
FISCHER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 66} I respectfully dissent.  When a defendant pleads guilty to a new 
felony offense while on postrelease control for a prior felony, Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) 
does not require a trial court to advise that defendant at the plea hearing for the new 
felony offense of the court’s sentencing discretion under R.C. 2929.141(A) to 
terminate the defendant’s existing postrelease control and impose a consecutive 
prison sentence for the postrelease-control violation. 
I.  This case is not moot 
{¶ 67} As the lead opinion notes, there is nothing in the record before this 
court to show that after the court of appeals’ remand of the case, appellee, Dustin 
Bishop, entered a new guilty plea to possession of heroin and that the trial court 
accepted this new guilty plea and resentenced him.  Because the record before us 
indicates that there is a live controversy, this case is not moot. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
26 
{¶ 68} Moreover, despite the analysis set forth in the lead opinion and as 
the opinion concurring in judgment only explains, we need not consider this court’s 
ability to address moot questions of law; even if the trial court had accepted a guilty 
plea and resentenced Bishop pursuant to the appellate court’s remand of the case, 
our precedent is clear that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to do so.  See State v. 
Washington, 137 Ohio St.3d 427, 2013-Ohio-4982, 999 N.E.2d 661, ¶ 8.  Neither 
party challenges our decision in Washington; Washington remains good law.  Any 
purported resentencing after the state had perfected its appeal could not, therefore, 
render the certified-conflict question before this court moot. 
II.  Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) does not require advisement of a trial court’s R.C. 
2929.141(A) discretionary authority 
{¶ 69} The lead opinion contains the conclusion that “[b]y any fair reading 
of Crim.R. 11(C)(2), the potential R.C. 2929.141(A) sentence was part of the 
‘maximum penalty involved’ in this case.”  Lead opinion at ¶ 17.  This conclusion 
is not supported by our caselaw interpreting the language of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). 
{¶ 70} “Crim.R. 11(C) governs the process that a trial court must use before 
accepting a felony plea of guilty * * *.”  State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-
Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 8.  Pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), a trial court shall 
not accept a plea of guilty without 
 
[d]etermining that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with 
understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum 
penalty involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible 
for probation or for the imposition of community control sanctions 
at the sentencing hearing. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
January Term, 2018 
 
27 
{¶ 71} Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) sets out distinct concepts.  See State v. Jones, 
116 Ohio St.3d 211, 2007-Ohio-6093, 877 N.E.2d 677, ¶ 22.  One of these distinct 
concepts is that the trial court must inform the defendant who is pleading guilty of 
“the maximum penalty involved.” 
{¶ 72} This court, in an opinion that analyzed a prior version of Crim.R. 
11(C)(2)(a), determined that “ ‘the maximum penalty’ ” is the penalty “for the 
single crime for which ‘the plea’ is offered.”  State v. Johnson, 40 Ohio St.3d 130, 
133, 532 N.E.2d 1295 (1988), quoting former Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), 46 Ohio St.2d 
xxxi, xxxii (effective July 1, 1976).  The lead opinion distinguishes this court’s 
analysis in Johnson on the bases that Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) has since been amended 
to allow for a single plea to apply to multiple charges and that the facts in Johnson 
are dissimilar to the facts in this case. 
{¶ 73} While we did interpret a prior version of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) in 
Johnson, the plain language of the rule still demonstrates that “Crim.R. 11 applies 
only to the entry and acceptance of the plea,” Johnson at 134, and that “the 
reasonable interpretation of the text is that ‘the maximum penalty’ is for the single 
crime [now “crimes”] for which ‘the plea’ is offered.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at 
133.  In Johnson, the specific facts of the case had no bearing on this court’s 
interpretation of the language of former Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a).  The court reviewed 
the plain language of former Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and determined that “the 
maximum penalty involved” means the penalty for the “crime” for which “the plea” 
was offered, not that “the maximum penalty involved” means any and all possible 
future consequences of the plea. 
{¶ 74} A plea of guilty is a complete admission of the defendant’s guilt of 
the offense or offenses to which the plea is entered.  Crim.R. 11(B)(1).  As used in 
the Revised Code, the term “offenses” includes “aggravated murder, murder, 
felonies of the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth degree, misdemeanors of the 
first, second, third, and fourth degree, minor misdemeanors, and offenses not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
28 
specifically classified.”  R.C. 2901.02(A).  Thus, a guilty plea is entered to a 
charged offense, and “the maximum penalty involved” is the maximum penalty for 
that offense to which the defendant pleads guilty and not additional or collateral 
possible punishments that are an indirect consequence of the guilty plea. 
{¶ 75} The judicial sanction that the trial court could impose for a 
defendant’s violation of the terms of his or her postrelease control is not a part of 
the penalty for the offense to which the plea is entered; instead, it is a potential 
sanction for the defendant’s postrelease-control violation.  The defendant’s existing 
postrelease control is a part of his or her prior felony sentence, see Woods v. Telb, 
89 Ohio St.3d 504, 512, 733 N.E.2d 1103 (2000); State v. Qualls, 131 Ohio St.3d 
499, 2012-Ohio-1111, 967 N.E.2d 718, ¶ 34 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting), not the 
sentence for the offense to which the defendant is later pleading guilty.  Therefore, 
a defendant’s punishment for violating the terms of postrelease control, a part of 
the defendant’s prior sentence, cannot be considered a part of “the maximum 
penalty involved” for the criminal offense to which the current plea is entered. 
{¶ 76} This conclusion is supported by the language of R.C. 2929.141(A).  
That statute specifically provides that “[u]pon * * * [a] plea of guilty to a felony by 
a person on post-release control at the time of the commission of the felony, the 
court may terminate the term of post-release control, and the court may * * * impose 
a prison term for the post-release control violation.”  (Emphasis added.)  R.C. 
2929.141(A)(1).  The General Assembly made it clear that the judicial sanction 
permitted under R.C. 2929.141(A) is not imposed for the offense but may be 
imposed for the violation of the terms of the defendant’s existing postrelease 
control.  It is our duty to give effect to the words used in the statute, not to insert or 
delete words.  Cline v. Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 61 Ohio St.3d 93, 97, 573 N.E.2d 
77 (1991).  Thus, pursuant to the plain language of R.C. 2929.141(A), the penalty 
for violating the terms of postrelease control cannot also be considered “the 
maximum penalty involved” for the new offense to which the plea is entered. 
January Term, 2018 
 
29 
{¶ 77} The lead opinion would expand this court’s interpretation of “the 
maximum penalty involved” to include a judicial sanction that may be imposed for 
the defendant’s violation of the terms of his or her existing postrelease control by 
committing a felony offense.  That conclusion is reached by relying on the 
proposition that “the sentence for committing a new felony while on postrelease 
control and that for the new felony itself [are] inextricably intertwined.”  Lead 
opinion at ¶ 17.  The trial court’s discretionary sentencing authority should have no 
bearing on this court’s interpretation of Crim.R. 11(C), which governs strictly what 
occurs at a plea hearing.  The implicit definition of “the maximum penalty 
involved” that is found in Crim.R. 11(C) has not changed since we decided 
Johnson, and as we stated in that case, Crim.R. 11(C) “has no relevance to the 
exercise of the trial court’s sentencing discretion at [the plea hearing] other than 
directing the court to proceed with or impose sentencing,” 40 Ohio St.3d at 134, 
532 N.E.2d 1295.  The effect of the lead opinion would be to make “the maximum 
penalty involved” include the speculative consequences of the plea in addition to 
the penalty for the charged offense to which the defendant is pleading guilty.  
Pursuant to R.C. 2929.141(A)(1), the trial court may “impose a prison term for the 
post-release control violation” that “shall be the greater of twelve months or the 
period of post-release control for the earlier felony minus any time the person has 
spent under the post-release control for the earlier felony.”  The trial court, without 
knowing the terms of the defendant’s prior felony sentence, specifically the terms 
of the defendant’s existing postrelease control, will not be able to inform the 
defendant of “the maximum penalty involved.”  At best, under the lead opinion’s 
interpretation of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), the trial court would be able to inform the 
defendant of an indeterminate range—from one year to a period of time that is equal 
to the time left on the defendant’s postrelease-control term, whatever that might 
be—that the court may impose, at its discretion, that could be added to the 
defendant’s sentence for the postrelease-control violation.  The lead opinion would 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
 
30 
add confusion to “the maximum penalty involved” and would leave the defendant 
to speculate as to “the maximum penalty” that he or she would receive for pleading 
guilty to the felony offense.  Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), the statutes governing postrelease 
control, and our caselaw simply do not support the lead opinion’s conclusion in this 
case. 
{¶ 78} In order for the trial court to accept a guilty plea to a charge of 
possession of heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), the court must inform the 
defendant of “the maximum penalty involved” when a defendant is convicted of 
possession of heroin.  The following exchange occurred at Bishop’s plea hearing: 
 
THE COURT:  The charge you’re pleading guilty to is 
classified as a felony of the fifth degree.  With that classification, 
the maximum penalty in terms of incarceration is 12 months in 
prison.  Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
THE COURT:  The maximum penalty in terms of a fine is 
$2,500.  Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
 
(Capitalization sic.)  The trial court informed Bishop of “the maximum penalty 
involved” for a possession-of-heroin offense. 
{¶ 79} I would hold that the trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) 
by notifying Bishop of “the maximum penalty involved” for his possession-of-
heroin offense.  Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) did not require that the court inform Bishop of 
its discretionary authority under R.C. 2929.141(A) to sentence him to a consecutive 
term of incarceration for violating the terms of the postrelease control that was 
imposed as a part of his prior felony conviction. 
January Term, 2018 
 
31 
III.  When does the trial court need to inform a defendant of its R.C. 
2929.141(A) discretionary authority? 
{¶ 80} One potential criticism of determining that the term “the maximum 
penalty involved” used in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) does not include the potential 
penalty that may be imposed by the trial court under R.C. 2929.141(A) is that the 
defendant may not be made aware of such possible consequence.  This criticism, 
however, is speculative. 
{¶ 81} This court has previously held, applying the plain language of R.C. 
2929.19(B)(2)(e), that “the statute does not require that a trial court notify an 
offender at his initial sentencing hearing of the penalty provisions contained in R.C. 
2929.141(A)(1) and (2) (provisions that apply only when an offender is convicted 
of committing a new felony while serving a period of postrelease control).”  State 
v. Gordon, 153 Ohio St.3d 601, 2018-Ohio-1975, 109 N.E.3d 1201, ¶ 2; see also 
State v. Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19, 2017-Ohio-2927, 85 N.E.3d 700, ¶ 19 (holding 
that a trial court need not identify in a sentencing entry the judicial sanctions that 
may be imposed for violating the terms of postrelease control). 
{¶ 82} In this case, Bishop asserts that his plea was not knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily made because the trial court did not advise him of its 
discretionary authority under R.C. 2929.141(A) to revoke his existing postrelease 
control and impose a consecutive prison term for violating the terms of his 
postrelease control.  Bishop argues that Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) requires that 
advisement as a part of “the maximum penalty involved” and that the trial court’s 
failure to follow Crim.R. 11 violated his federal due-process rights.  As explained 
above, Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) does not require such an advisement; therefore, the trial 
court did not violate Bishop’s due-process rights when it did not advise him of its 
R.C. 2929.141(A) authority. 
{¶ 83} The parties did not raise on appeal whether any statute, constitutional 
guarantee, or rule other than Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) independently requires that a 
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defendant pleading guilty to a felony be informed at his or her initial sentencing 
hearing or in the sentencing entry in which the trial court imposes his or her 
postrelease control of the trial court’s ability to later revoke that postrelease control 
and impose a consecutive prison term when the defendant is convicted of or pleads 
guilty to a new felony offense.  Nor did the parties raise whether any other rule, 
statute, or constitutional guarantee requires that the defendant be provided such 
information at any other time. 
{¶ 84} A defendant is not foreclosed from raising other arguments—
statutory, rule-based, or constitutional—to attack the validity of a judicial sanction 
imposed pursuant to R.C. 2929.141(A) when that defendant feels that the 
information provided prior to the judicial sanction being imposed was insufficient.  
In my opinion, however, a defendant cannot successfully base such a challenge on 
the language of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), which is the only issue at bar. 
IV.  The new requirement proposed by the lead opinion under Crim.R. 
11(C)(2)(a) would place an unreasonable burden on trial courts 
{¶ 85} The new requirement proposed by the lead opinion under Crim.R. 
11(C)(2)(a) would place an unreasonable burden on trial courts in many cases.  I 
foresee multiple problems that this requirement would create for trial courts 
attempting to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), and this new requirement might 
allow certain defendants to abuse the system. 
{¶ 86} As a result of the new requirement proposed in the lead opinion, if a 
trial court failed to inform a defendant of a potential and speculative judicial 
sanction, the defendant’s guilty plea would not be valid.  The lead opinion does not 
include an explanation of what would happen when the court is not aware of the 
defendant’s existing postrelease control.  In many cases, the judicial sanction will 
not be imposed by the judge that sentenced the defendant to postrelease control in 
that defendant’s prior felony case; indeed, the prior felony conviction may not even 
have been entered in the same jurisdiction.  See State v. Hicks, 5th Dist. Delaware 
January Term, 2018 
 
33 
No. 09CAA090088, 2010-Ohio-2985, ¶ 9; State v. Dixon, 5th Dist. Stark No. 
2008CA00254, 2009-Ohio-3137, ¶ 20. 
{¶ 87} Moreover, as noted above, pursuant to R.C. 2929.141(A)(1), the trial 
court may “impose a prison term for the post-release control violation” that “shall 
be the greater of twelve months or the period of post-release control for the earlier 
felony minus any time the person has spent under the post-release control for the 
earlier felony.”  Thus, to comply with the requirement proposed in the lead opinion, 
the trial court would need to inform the defendant of the maximum penalty 
involved, but the trial court would have to know not only that the defendant was 
serving a period of postrelease control but also know the details of the underlying 
felony conviction and of the defendant’s existing postrelease-control term. 
{¶ 88} This would place an unreasonable burden on the trial court to be 
aware of every defendant’s existing postrelease control.  The trial court is often not 
made aware of the defendant’s existing postrelease control and prior felony 
convictions until after the plea hearing through a presentence-investigation report.  
See R.C. 2951.03; Crim.R. 32.2. Would trial courts now be required to do their own 
investigation prior to a guilty plea?  Would prosecuting attorneys now be required 
to provide the trial court with the defendant’s rap sheet prior to the plea?  Or would 
it be the defendant’s burden to provide such information, as the defendant is likely 
the only individual to know whether or not he or she is on postrelease control?  If 
it would be the defendant’s burden to inform the trial court, then any error by the 
trial court would have been invited by the defendant.  And what would happen if a 
defendant pleaded guilty at arraignment?  Would trial courts be required to delay 
such a plea in order to conduct such an investigation? 
{¶ 89} Further, the practical reality of the position taken by the lead opinion 
is that it might allow for the potential abuse of our plea system.  When a defendant, 
who is likely in the best position to inform the trial court that he or she is serving a 
period of postrelease control, fails to provide that information to the trial court, the 
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court will not provide notice of “the maximum penalty involved.”  Moreover, if the 
defendant waives a presentence-investigation report, see R.C. 2951.03(A)(1), then 
that court might not revoke the defendant’s postrelease control at sentencing at all.  
The practical implication of this court adopting the lead opinion’s conclusion would 
be that the defendant then could successfully argue that his plea was not knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily made simply based on an error that the defendant had 
invited.  And the defendant would not be required to show prejudice because “the 
trial court completely failed to inform [the defendant] that a consecutive prison 
sentence under R.C. 2929.141(A) was possible,” lead opinion at ¶ 20, even though 
the lengthier sentence was not realistically possible because the trial court could 
not impose the lengthier sentence without having the information that the defendant 
withheld from the trial court.  In that scenario, a defendant who had suffered no 
prejudice would get another bite at the apple simply because that defendant failed 
to provide to the trial court information related to the defendant’s existing 
postrelease control. 
{¶ 90} The conclusion of the lead opinion would likely place an 
unreasonable burden on the trial court and might provide defendants who are on 
postrelease control with the opportunity to abuse the plea system. 
V.  Conclusion 
{¶ 91} I would reverse the judgment of the Second District Court of 
Appeals and hold that pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), a trial court does not need 
to advise a criminal defendant on postrelease control for a prior felony, during a 
plea hearing in a new felony case, of the trial court’s ability under R.C. 2929.141(A) 
to terminate the defendant’s existing postrelease control and impose a consecutive 
prison sentence for the postrelease-control violation.  Therefore, I respectfully 
dissent. 
BROWN, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
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35 
Mathias H. Heck Jr., Montgomery County Prosecuting Attorney, and 
Michael J. Scarpelli and Andrew T. French, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for 
appellant. 
Carl Bryan, for appellee. 
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