Case Title: Harvey v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97, 2005

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
FRANKLIN C. HARVEY,
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§
No. 97, 2005
Defendant Below,
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Appellant,
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Court Below--Superior Court 
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of the State of Delaware, in and
v.
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for Kent County in IK82-08-
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0001.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
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Plaintiff Below,
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Appellee.
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Def. ID No. 0004014566
Submitted: May 26, 2005
Decided:
August 22, 2005
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices.
O R D E R
This 22  day of August 2005, upon consideration of the appellant’s
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opening brief and the State’s motion to affirm, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The appellant, Franklin C. Harvey, filed an appeal from the
Superior Court’s order dated February 25, 2005 that denied his motion for
declaratory judgment.   We find no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we
AFFIRM.
(2)
In 1983, Harvey pleaded guilty to Manslaughter and Possession
of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of a Felony and was sentenced to
Under Delaware law, the Board determines whether a person confined to a
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correctional facility should be paroled.  See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, ch. 43, subchapter IV
(governing parole). 
Letter from Marlene Lichtenstadter, Chairperson, Board of Parole, to Franklin C.
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Harvey (Oct. 7, 1993).
Letter from Marlene Lichtenstadter, Chairperson, Board of Parole, to Franklin C.
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Harvey (Mar. 12, 1997).
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a total of fifty years at Level V.  It appears that Harvey has filed four
applications for parole, all of which have been denied.
(3)
On October 5, 1993, the Board of Parole (“the Board”) denied
Harvey’s first parole application.   The Board based its decision upon four
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factors, i.e., (a) violent/senseless nature of offense; (b) insufficient participation
in appropriate treatment program; (c) inability to accept responsibility for
offense; and (d) brief time served in relation to seriousness of offense.  The
Board informed Harvey that he would be eligible to apply again for parole
consideration after the expiration of thirty-six months.  
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(4)
On March 11, 1997, the Board denied Harvey’s second parole
application based this time upon three factors, i.e, (a) violent nature of offense;
(b) insufficient participation in appropriate treatment; and (d) brief time served
in relation to seriousness of offense.  The Board informed Harvey that he would
be eligible to apply again for parole consideration after the expiration of thirty
months.3
Letter from Marlene Lichtenstadter, Chairperson, Board of Parole, to Franklin C.
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Harvey (Oct. 27, 1999).
Letter from Dwight F. Holden, Chairperson, Board of Parole, to Franklin C. Harvey
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(April 15, 2004).
Harvey also sought “immediate/retroactive parole [and compensation] for his illegal
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incarceration.” 
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(5)
On October 26, 1999, the Board denied Harvey’s third parole
application based upon two factors, i.e., (a) violent nature of offense and (b)
insufficient participation in appropriate treatment.  The Board advised Harvey
that he would be eligible to apply again for parole consideration after the
expiration of twenty-four months.4
(6)
On April 13, 2004, the Board denied Harvey’s fourth parole
application based upon one factor, i.e., violent nature of offense.  The Board
advised Harvey that he would be eligible to apply again for parole
consideration after the expiration of twelve months.   
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(7)
On October 1, 2004, Harvey filed a document entitled “Motion for
Emergency Court Order and/or Declaratory Judgment” in the Superior Court.
Harvey sought an order directing the Board “to stop using illegal reasons to
deny parole.”   By order dated February 25, 2005, the Superior Court denied
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Harvey’s motion.  This appeal followed.
Harvey contends that the Board’s error “is a violation of the separation of powers,
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an abuse of discretion, is arbitrary and violates [his] right to due process.”
Beebe v. Carroll, 2004 WL 1195449 (Del. Supr.) (citing Eskridge v. Casson, 471
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F. Supp. 98, 101 (D. Del. 1979)). 
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(8)
On appeal, Harvey argues that the Board erred  when it denied his
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parole applications based on “violent nature of offense.”  According to Harvey,
the Superior Court already factored in the violent nature of the offense when
the court over twenty years ago decided to impose the maximum sentence of
thirty years for Manslaughter and two-thirds of the maximum sentence, or
twenty years, for Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission of
a Felony.  Thus, Harvey contends, when the Board denied parole based upon
the violent nature of the offense, the Board illegally intruded into a function
within the “traditional province of the judiciary” and “in effect pass[ed]
sentence upon him for [a] second time.”  Nonetheless, Harvey’s claim is
unavailing. 
(9)
The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion or otherwise err
when denying Harvey’s motion for declaratory judgment that sought to prevent
the Board from denying his application for parole on the basis of “violent
nature of offense.” In Delaware, a prisoner has no legally enforceable right to
be paroled and no due process claim if parole is denied.   The Board has
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Eskridge v. Casson, 471 F.Supp. 98, 101 (D. Del. 1979).  See Del. Code Ann. tit. 11,
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§ 4347(c) (providing in part that “[a] person shall be placed on parole only when the Board
believes that the person is able and willing to fulfill the obligations of a law-abiding
citizen.”). See also Delaware Board of Parole, Factors Considered by the Delaware Board
of Parole at Parole, Sentence Modification and Sentence Commutation Hearings, available
at http://www.state.de.us/parole/factors.htm (last updated 11/17/1999) (listing factors
used in parole decisions).
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“virtually unfettered discretion” to consider a wide variety of factors when
determining whether an inmate is entitled to early release from prison.  
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(10)
It is manifest on the face of Harvey’s opening brief that this
appeal is without merit.    The issues presented on law are controlled by settled
Delaware law.  To the extent judicial discretion is implicated, there was no
abuse of discretion.
 NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 25(a), the appellee’s motion to affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Myron T. Steele
Chief Justice