Case Title: State v. Cunningham

Citation: 333 N.C. 744, 429 S.E.2d 718

Docket Number: 

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1993-06-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
429 S.E.2d 718 (1993)
333 N.C. 744
STATE of North Carolina
v.
Calvin Christmas CUNNINGHAM.
No. 232A91.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.
June 4, 1993.
Michael F. Easley, Atty. Gen. by Isaac T. Avery, III, Sp. Deputy Atty. Gen., Linda M. Fox and Robert T. Hargett, Asst. Attys. Gen., Raleigh, for the State.
Thomas F. Loflin III, Durham, for defendant-appellant.
EXUM, Chief Justice.
Defendant Calvin Christmas Cunningham was capitally tried for the first-degree murder of Charlotte Police Officer Terry Lyles. The evidence tended to show that on 5 August 1990 defendant, while seated in the rear of Officer Lyles' police cruiser, shot Officer Lyles in the head. Prior to the shooting, defendant had been in custody following his arrest for communicating threats to police officers during a domestic disturbance. The jury found defendant guilty as charged and recommended that the death penalty be imposed. Judgment was then entered, and defendant was sentenced to death.
Defendant Cunningham has preserved one hundred twenty-two assignments of error, *719 and briefed fifty-seven of those issues. Because we find error which prejudiced defendant during the jury selection phase of his trial, we need only discuss defendant's twenty-fourth assignment. In this assignment, defendant contends that the trial court improperly denied his motion to remove for cause two jurors, Carnes and Schormak, thereby violating his right to a fair and impartial jury, as guaranteed by North Carolina law and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Because we find prejudicial error requiring a new trial with regard to the denial of defendant's challenge of juror Carnes for cause, we decline to address the voir dire of juror Schormak.
Defendant contends that, during voir dire, juror Carnes stated that she believed defendant would need to prove his innocence to avoid conviction on the charge of first-degree murder. By harboring such a misunderstanding of defendant's presumption of innocence, defendant alleges that juror Carnes was "unable to render a fair and impartial verdict," as required by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1212. Therefore, defendant must be given a new trial.
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1212, entitled "Grounds for challenge for cause," provides in pertinent part:
N.C.G.S. § 15A-1212(8) codifies the rule of the United States Supreme Court in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S. Ct. 1770, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1968). See State v. Kennedy, 320 N.C. 20, 26, 357 S.E.2d 359, 363 (1987).
In order to preserve an assignment of error from a denial of a challenge for cause, defendant must follow the procedures set out in N.C.G.S. § 15A-1214(h). Having thoroughly reviewed the transcript of the jury selection phase, we find that defendant has satisfied the mandates of § 15A-1214(h) by (1) exhausting his peremptory challenges, (2) renewing his challenge for cause as to juror Carnes, and (3) having that renewed challenge denied by the trial court. Should we find any error in the denial of defendant's challenge to Ms. Carnes for cause, defendant's conviction must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. State v. Leonard, 296 N.C. 58, 248 S.E.2d 853 (1978).
Defendant's contention that Ms. Carnes was "unable to render a verdict in accordance with North Carolina law," N.C.G.S. § 15A-1212(8) (1988), or that she was "unable to render a fair and impartial verdict," N.C.G.S. § 15A-1212(9) (1988), requires that we review the entire, albeit lengthy, transcript of her voir dire testimony regarding defendant's right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty by the State. During the course of juror Carnes' voir dire testimony, the following conversation took place between Ms. Carnes and Mr. Murphy, counsel for defendant:
It is important to note here that the repeated explanations outlined above of our law on the presumption of innocence followed two, separate explanations of the same subject by the trial judge and the prosecutor during their voir dire of juror Carnes.
The transcript reveals that after the above testimony, counsel for defendant pursued a different, and unrelated, line of questioning. Neither the trial court nor counsel for defendant returned to the subject of whether Ms. Carnes would require that defendant prove his innocence or whether Ms. Carnes still believed that defendant's failure to testify would potentially compromise his presumption of innocence. Following questioning by Mr. Murphy, defendant exercised one of his fourteen peremptory challenges, and Ms. Carnes was excused. As previously noted, defendant exhausted his peremptory challenges, and renewed his challenge for cause to Ms. Carnes. Counsel for defendant informed the trial court that, if his *723 challenge for cause was allowed and defendant received an additional peremptory challenge, he would excuse juror Schormak who did in fact serve on the jury which convicted defendant.
We have oft stated that the granting of a challenge for cause rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Hightower, 331 N.C. 636, 641, 417 S.E.2d 237, 240 (1992); State v. Quick, 329 N.C. 1, 17, 405 S.E.2d 179, 189 (1991); State v. Watson, 281 N.C. 221, 227, 188 S.E.2d 289, 293, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1043, 93 S. Ct. 537, 34 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1972). As a rule, we will therefore not disturb the trial court's ruling on a challenge for cause absent a showing of an abuse of that discretion. "Nevertheless, in a case ... in which a juror's answers show that he could not follow the law as given ... by the judge in his instructions to the jury, it is error not to excuse such a juror." State v. Hightower, 331 N.C. 636, 641, 417 S.E.2d 237, 240.
We find that the opinion of this Court in Hightower controls the outcome of the case sub judice. In Hightower, we found error in the denial of a challenge for cause to a juror who said on voir dire that defendant's failure to testify during his trial for first-degree murder would "stick in the back of my mind." Id. Although the Hightower juror ultimately acknowledged that he would "try to follow the law" despite this feeling, we concluded that the trial court erred in failing to grant the defendant's challenge for cause. Writing for the Hightower majority, Justice Webb stated: "We can only conclude from the questioning of this juror that he would try to be fair to the defendant but might have trouble doing so if the defendant did not testify." Id. Because the defendant's challenge for cause should have been allowed under both sections (8) and (9) of N.C.G.S. § 15A-1212, the Court reversed the defendant's conviction and remanded for a new trial.
In the case sub judice, juror Carnes' voir dire colloquy demonstrates either confusion about, or a fundamental misunderstanding of, the principles of the presumption of innocence or a simple reluctance to apply those principles should the defense fail to present evidence of defendant's innocence. Whether Ms. Carnes' reluctance to give defendant the benefit of the presumption of innocence was caused by confusion regarding the law, a misunderstanding of the law or a reluctance to apply the law as instructed, its effect on her ability to give defendant a fair trial remained the same.
After a great deal of explanation from the trial court, juror Carnes ultimately stated that she understood that defendant was not required to prove his innocence. We cannot, however, overlook her subsequent comment that "if [defendant] doesn't want to prove his innocence, I would have to accept that." While in some circumstances this would be a satisfactory response, we believe that, in the context of the entire voir dire on this topic, the comment is at best ambiguous. Furthermore, and again taken in context, the statement is not sufficient to abrogate Ms. Carnes' earlier assertions that she would expect defendant to prove his innocence. It was, therefore, error for the trial court to deny defendant's challenge for cause.
We are cognizant of certain factual similarities between this case and State v. McKinnon, 328 N.C. 668, 403 S.E.2d 474 (1991). In McKinnon, we found no error in the trial court's denial of the defendant's challenge for cause to a juror who expressed some confusion as to the defendant's presumption of innocence, and gave ambiguous answers to questions about whether she would hold the State to its burden of proof. Id. at 677, 403 S.E.2d  at 479. Her voir dire testimony included a comment that she would require defendant to present evidence in his defense. Id.
McKinnon, however, is distinguishable from the present case because the juror there "ultimately agreed three times that if the State did not meet its burden of proof she could find defendant not guilty even though he presented no witnesses in his behalf." Id. (emphasis added). In McKinnon, the following final exchange between the juror and defense counsel was dispositive:
Id. at 677, 403 S.E.2d  at 479. It is clear from this unequivocal exchange that any doubt or confusion in the juror's mind as to the State's burden and the defendant's presumption of innocence was dissipated to the extent that she could give the defendant there a fair trial and render an impartial verdict.
That is not the case here. We cannot point to any exchange between juror Carnes and either the trial court or defense counsel which satisfies us that Ms. Carnes' confusion about or misunderstanding of or reluctance to apply the law, whichever it was, on such a fundamental concept as defendant's presumption of innocence was resolved as required by N.C.G.S. § 15A-1212.
We therefore find error requiring a
NEW TRIAL.