Case Title: Prentice v. Dalco Electric, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC17444

State: connecticut

Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

Date: 2006-10-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
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DAVID PRENTICE v. DALCO ELECTRIC, INC., ET AL.
(SC 17444)
Borden, Norcott, Katz, Vertefeuille and Sullivan, Js.
Argued April 17—officially released October 17, 2006
John B. Farley, with whom was David J. Crotta, Jr.,
for the appellant (named defendant).
Juri E. Taalman, with whom, on the brief, was Timo-
thy Brignole, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion
BORDEN, J. The dispositive issue in this appeal is
whether the trial court properly admitted scientific evi-
dence without first holding a hearing pursuant to State
v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57, 698 A.2d 739 (1997), cert. denied,
523 U.S. 1058, 118 S. Ct. 1384, 140 L. Ed. 2d 645 (1998).
The defendant, Dalco Electric, Inc. (Dalco), appeals1
from the judgment of the trial court in favor of the
plaintiff, David Prentice, following a jury trial.2 The
defendant claims that the trial court improperly admit-
ted certain expert testimony because the testimony
lacked the required scientific foundation.3 We conclude
that the testimony in question was scientific evidence
that required a validity assessment designed to ensure
reliability pursuant to our analysis in Porter. Accord-
ingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and
remand the case for a new trial.
The plaintiff brought this personal injury action
against the defendant alleging negligence. Prior to trial,
the plaintiff identified Mervin Strauss, a professional
forensic engineer and accident reconstructionist, as an
expert witness. The defendant filed a motion in limine
seeking to preclude Strauss’ testimony and requested
a Porter hearing. The trial court declined to rule on this
motion prior to trial and, over the defendant’s repeated
objection, allowed Strauss’ expert testimony to be
entered into evidence.4 The jury returned a verdict for
the plaintiff awarding the plaintiff $1.2 million in dam-
ages. Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion to set
aside the jury’s verdict. Following extensive posttrial
hearings, the trial court concluded that Strauss’ testi-
mony was admissible and did not constitute scientific
evidence that required a validity assessment under Por-
ter.5 Accordingly, the trial court denied the defendant’s
motion to set aside the jury’s verdict and rendered judg-
ment thereon. This appeal followed.
The jury reasonably could have found the following
facts. The plaintiff was employed by B.G. Graphics, Inc.,
a sign making company hired by the defendant to install
a sign on the front of its building in Meriden. The plain-
tiff accompanied Benedict Gagliardi, Jr., a partner at
B.G. Graphics, Inc., to complete the installation. Upon
arriving at the defendant’s building in Meriden and
learning of the precise location on the building where
the sign was to be installed, the plaintiff and Gagliardi
informed Daniel Luft, a part owner of the defendant,
that they would be unable to complete the work that
day because the ladders that they had with them were
too short. Luft offered Gagliardi the use of one of the
defendant’s extension ladders in order to install the
sign. Gagliardi accepted Luft’s offer solely to enable
the plaintiff to take the necessary measurements to
facilitate the installation of the sign on a future date.
Gagliardi and the plaintiff informed Luft, however, that
two people and two extension ladders were required
to install the sign and that borrowing an extension lad-
der did not mean that the sign would go up that day.6
Luft offered the plaintiff the use of another one of the
defendant’s extension ladders and informed him that
he was willing to provide any help necessary to com-
plete the installation. Neither the plaintiff nor Gagliardi
accepted Luft’s offer to locate a second ladder or to
provide assistance.
The plaintiff and Gagliardi used the first extension
ladder provided by the defendant and positioned it at
the front of the building so that the plaintiff could take
the necessary measurements for the sign’s future instal-
lation. Although Gagliardi and the plaintiff had decided
to take measurements only, and to install the defen-
dant’s sign on another day, Luft located a second exten-
sion ladder in one of the defendant’s storage areas and,
with the assistance of one of his employees, brought it
to the front of the building where the sign was to be
installed. Luft leaned the second ladder against the side
of the building approximately eight to ten feet to the
left of where the plaintiff had positioned the first lad-
der.7 The plaintiff informed Luft that he and Gagliardi
would not use the second ladder because it was in poor
condition and because they were only taking measure-
ments, which did not require multiple people or ladders
to complete. In particular, the plaintiff noticed that the
second ladder was missing braces required for stability
and that someone had tried to repair it by bolting pieces
of iron to the bottom of the ladder’s legs.
The plaintiff fully extended the first ladder and rested
the top section of the ladder against the aluminum edge
of the building’s roof. The plaintiff then climbed approx-
imately ten feet up the first ladder to take measurements
for the sign’s future installation. As the plaintiff was
completing his work, the second ladder, which was
positioned approximately ten feet to the left of where
the plaintiff was working, fell to the right, slid against
the edge of the defendant’s roof and struck the first
ladder, on which the plaintiff was standing, causing him
to fall to the ground and to sustain serious injuries. No
one was standing on or touching the second ladder
when it fell and collided with the plaintiff.
On the day of the incident, Meriden and the sur-
rounding area experienced sustained winds of 11.5
miles per hour, with gusts of wind up to 18 miles per
hour. The safety label on the ladder that collided with
the plaintiff stated that it should not be used in high
wind. Meteorologically, a high wind warning occurs
when winds exceed thirty-nine miles per hour, and a
high wind advisory occurs when a sustained wind
exceeds forty-five miles per hour. Neither a high wind
advisory nor a high wind warning had been issued for
Meriden on the day the plaintiff was injured. Building
on the facts surrounding the weather conditions on the
day of the accident, the plaintiff introduced Strauss’
expert testimony in an attempt to demonstrate that it
would have been physically impossible for the prevail-
ing winds to have overturned a ladder that was properly
set up and free from defects. Additional facts will be
set forth as necessary.
We begin with the standard of review that governs
this case. It is well established that ‘‘[t]he trial court’s
ruling on evidentiary matters will be overturned only
upon a showing of a clear abuse of the court’s discre-
tion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Billie,
250 Conn. 172, 180, 738 A.2d 586 (1999). Concerning
expert testimony specifically, ‘‘the trial court has wide
discretion in ruling on the admissibility of expert testi-
mony and, unless that discretion has been abused or
the ruling involves a clear misconception of the law,
the trial court’s decision will not be disturbed. . . .
Expert testimony should be admitted when: (1) the
witness has a special skill or knowledge directly appli-
cable to a matter in issue, (2) that skill or knowledge
is not common to the average person, and (3) the testi-
mony would be helpful to the court or jury in consider-
ing the issues.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id.
‘‘Beyond these general requirements regarding the
admissibility of expert testimony, [t]here is a further
hurdle to the admissibility of expert testimony when
that testimony is based on . . . scientific [evidence].
In those situations, the scientific evidence that forms
the basis for the expert’s opinion must undergo a valid-
ity assessment to ensure reliability. State v. Porter,
supra, 241 Conn. 68–69. In Porter, this court followed
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113
S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993), and held that
scientific evidence should be subjected to a flexible
test, with differing factors that are applied on a case-by-
case basis, to determine the reliability of the scientific
evidence. . . . Following State v. Porter, supra, 81–84,
scientific
evidence,
and
expert
testimony
based
thereon, usually is to be evaluated under a threshold
admissibility standard assessing the reliability of the
methodology underlying the evidence and whether the
evidence at issue is, in fact, derived from and based
upon that methodology . . . .’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Maher v. Quest
Diagnostics, Inc., 269 Conn. 154, 168, 847 A.2d 978
(2004). Accordingly, we limit the scope of our review
to whether the trial court abused its discretion in
determining that Strauss’ opinion was not scientific evi-
dence and that a Porter hearing was not required. See
State v. Kirsch, 263 Conn. 390, 399, 820 A.2d 236 (2003);
State v. Pappas, 256 Conn. 854, 878, 776 A.2d 1091
(2001).
By way of further background, we are also mindful
that ‘‘[i]n State v. Porter, supra, 241 Conn. 78–80, we
expressly recognized that, because the term scientific
evidence houses such a large and diverse variety of
topics, the formulation of a mechanical evidentiary
standard of admissibility designed to apply universally
to the many forms scientific evidence may take is an
unworkable concept. Rather, the better formulation is
a general, overarching approach to the threshold admis-
sibility of scientific evidence . . . . In accordance with
this philosophy, we set forth in Porter a number of
different factors, nonexclusive and whose application
to a particular set of circumstances could vary, as rele-
vant in the determination of the threshold admissibility
of scientific evidence. . . . In particular, we recog-
nized the following considerations: general acceptance
in the relevant scientific community; whether the meth-
odology underlying the scientific evidence has been
tested and subjected to peer review; the known or
potential rate of error; the prestige and background of
the expert witness supporting the evidence; the extent
to which the technique at issue relies upon subjective
judgments made by the expert rather than on objec-
tively verifiable criteria; whether the expert can present
and explain the data and methodology underlying the
testimony in a manner that assists the jury in drawing
conclusions therefrom; and whether the technique or
methodology was developed solely for purposes of liti-
gation.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Maher v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., supra, 269
Conn. 179–80.
In Porter, we also set forth a ‘‘fit’’ requirement for
scientific evidence. Id., 180. We stated that the ‘‘pro-
posed scientific testimony must be demonstrably rele-
vant to the facts of the particular case in which it is
offered, and not simply be valid in the abstract. . . .
Put another way, the proponent of scientific evidence
must establish that the specific scientific testimony at
issue is, in fact, derived from and based upon [the scien-
tifically reliable] methodology. . . . [A]lthough some
conclusions can be reasonably inferred from the meth-
odology employed, others cannot.’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
Similarly, we recognized in Porter that ‘‘a critical
postulate that underlies the Porter factors and indeed
underlies the entire Porter analysis [is that] in order
for the trial court, in the performance of its role as the
gatekeeper for scientific evidence, properly to assess
the threshold admissibility of scientific evidence, the
proponent of the evidence must provide a sufficient
articulation of the methodology underlying the scien-
tific evidence. Without such an articulation, the trial
court is entirely ill-equipped to determine if the scien-
tific evidence is reliable upon consideration of the vari-
ous Porter factors. Furthermore, without a clear
understanding as to the methodology and its workings,
the trial court also cannot properly undertake its analy-
sis under the fit requirement of Porter, ensuring that
the proffered scientific evidence, in fact, is based upon
the reliable methodology articulated.’’ Id., 181.
The defendant claims that a new trial is necessary
because the trial court improperly admitted Strauss’
expert opinion testimony. In particular, the defendant
contends that Strauss’ testimony was scientific evi-
dence that lacked the required scientific foundation and
was, therefore, inadmissible because it had not been
subjected to a reliability and validity assessment under
Porter. Conversely, the plaintiff contends that the trial
court properly concluded that Strauss’ testimony was
not scientific evidence and, therefore, that its admissi-
bility was not dependent on the outcome of a Porter
hearing. We agree with the defendant.
The following additional facts are relevant to our
analysis of the question of whether a Porter hearing
was required in this case. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant had erected a defective ladder, which ‘‘gave
out at the defective portion of the foot, and began to
slide across the front of the building striking the ladder
[that] the [p]laintiff was on . . . .’’ In particular, the
plaintiff claimed that the defendant was negligent due
to its numerous acts and omissions related to the
‘‘defective condition’’ of the ladder and its improper
installation.
Strauss was qualified by the trial court, without objec-
tion, as an expert in the field of mechanical and forensic
engineering. At trial, Strauss opined, over the defen-
dant’s objection, that the prevailing wind conditions in
Meriden on the day of the accident would not have
caused a properly set up ladder, free of defects, to fall
from the building and collide with the plaintiff. Strauss
further testified, however, that he could not state,
within a reasonable degree of engineering probability,
that the wind conditions on the day of the accident
were not the sole cause of the second ladder’s becoming
dislodged from its resting position and colliding with
the plaintiff.8
Strauss also acknowledged at trial that determining
the amount of force required to move a particular object
is an exercise within the realm of physics that requires
the accumulation of certain factual data and the comple-
tion of mathematical calculations. Specifically, Strauss
noted that, in order to make the necessary calculations
in this case, an expert would need to know the wind
speed, the weight of the ladder, and the coefficient of
friction applicable to the ladder and to the aluminum
edge of the defendant’s roof. Equipped with this infor-
mation, an engineer could then calculate whether an
11.5 to 18 mile per hour wind could apply sufficient
force to cause a properly set up ladder of the same
size, weight, and condition as the ladder in this case,
to fall. Strauss acknowledged that he had not acquired
any of this information as part of his investigation and
experimentation at the accident site, and had not per-
formed the scientific calculations that would allow him
to express his opinion to a ‘‘reasonable degree of engi-
neering probability.’’
Indeed, Strauss testified that his conclusions were
based on his experience as an engineer and that, despite
his ability to undertake such an effort, at no point had he
attempted to apply the readily available and applicable
tools of physics and mathematics with which he could
have tested his hypothesis. We also note that Strauss
asserted that common experience may allow a layper-
son to conclude that a ladder will fall only if it is set
up improperly, is defective, or is subjected to sufficient
external force to knock it over. Strauss maintained,
however, that common experience was not sufficient
to enable a layperson to assess the likely effect of a
wind at a certain speed on an immobile ladder. To the
contrary, Strauss asserted that what distinguished him
from an ordinary layperson was his engineering experi-
ence and education, which allowed him to apply the
laws of physics to make such a calculation.
The trial court concluded that Strauss’ opinion testi-
mony did not require a ‘‘preliminary gatekeeper Porter-
type validity assessment.’’ In particular, it noted that
‘‘[t]he opinion testimony [that Strauss] provided . . .
regarding the effect of certain wind speeds on a properly
setup ladder in good condition was supported by other
evidence [and was] thoroughly tested on cross-exami-
nation . . . .’’ Additionally, the trial court ruled that
a Porter hearing was not required because, although
Strauss’ testimony was rooted in scientific principles,
it was ‘‘not the sort of scientific evidence that would
place the jury in the position of abandoning common
sense and sacrificing independent judgment to the
expert’s assertions based on his special skill or knowl-
edge.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) We conclude
that Strauss’ opinion was scientific evidence within the
meaning of Porter, and that the trial court abused its
discretion by permitting Strauss’ expert opinion testi-
mony without first assessing the validity of the method-
ology underlying his opinion as part of a Porter hearing.
First, by concluding that a separate validity assess-
ment was not required under Porter, at least in part
because Strauss’ opinion testimony was supported by
other evidence and was tested thoroughly on cross-
examination,9 the trial court misconstrued the task that
was before it. Specifically, the fact that there was other
evidence in the record concerning the wind, namely, the
subjective impressions of laypersons, a meteorologist’s
description of the prevailing winds on the day of the
accident,10 and the warning that the ladder should not
be used in high winds, does not render Strauss’ opinion
unscientific per se. In short, otherwise scientific evi-
dence does not become unscientific simply because
the opposing party has had an opportunity for cross-
examination, or because there is unscientific evidence
that tends to corroborate the expert’s testimony.
Indeed, all scientific evidence is subject to cross-exami-
nation and likely will find some corroboration from
other evidence in the record. This fact, however, does
not obviate the need for the trial court separately to
determine whether Strauss’ testimony required a valid-
ity assessment under Porter.
Second, with respect to the trial court’s conclusion
that a Porter hearing was not required because Strauss’
testimony, although rooted in scientific principles,
would not place the jury in the position of abandoning
common sense and sacrificing its independent judg-
ment, Strauss’ own statements at trial do not support
the trial court’s ruling. As discussed previously, Strauss
acknowledged that common experience was not suffi-
cient to enable a layperson to assess the likely effect
of a wind at a certain speed on an immobile ladder. To
the contrary, Strauss testified that the determination of
the amount of force required to move a particular object
is an exercise within the realm of physics, and requires
the accumulation of certain factual data and the comple-
tion of mathematical calculations. This exercise is very
different from an understanding of the general princi-
ple, which may be known to the average layperson, that
if an external force is exerted on an object, that object
may fall over. Indeed, an understanding of how to apply
the sciences of physics and mathematics is necessary
to determine the amount of force required to dislodge
the defendant’s ladder from the building, and whether
that force could have been exerted by the prevailing
winds in Meriden on the day of the accident, and the
average person does not possess such an under-
standing.
Strauss acknowledged this reality when he testified
that he would need to know several variables, including
the weight of the ladder and the coefficient of friction
between the ladder and the building. Additionally,
Strauss testified that physics and mathematics are sci-
entific tools relied upon by engineers, but that he was
unable to state his opinion to a ‘‘reasonable degree of
engineering probability’’ because his investigation of
the accident did not include any scientific calculations
concerning what forces were applied to the ladder by
the wind.11 Accordingly, although Strauss failed to
gather the relevant data that would have enabled him
to complete the required calculations,12 his opinion that
the force created by the prevailing wind conditions in
Meriden on the day of the accident was not sufficient
to have caused a ladder that had been set up properly
and was free of defects to fall over, was dependent on
the result of scientific measurement and calculation.
This opinion, therefore, constituted scientific evidence
that required a validity assessment pursuant to our anal-
ysis in Porter.
Additionally, by exempting Strauss’ opinion from a
validity assessment under Porter, the trial court ignored
the ‘‘critical postulate’’ that underlies the entire Porter
analysis, which is that any exemption for scientific evi-
dence that depends upon existing techniques must pre-
suppose an ability on the part of the proponent of the
evidence to ‘‘provide a sufficient articulation of the
methodology
underlying
the
scientific
evidence.’’
Maher v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., supra, 269 Conn. 181.
In this case, by Strauss’ own admission, and despite his
familiarity with the scientific calculations that would
have allowed him to have tested his theory that the
force of the prevailing wind was not sufficient to upset
a ladder that was properly set up and was free from
defects, he used no methodology to arrive at his conclu-
sions. In light of our previous conclusion that Strauss’
opinion on the effect of the wind was ‘‘scientific evi-
dence’’ for the purposes of a Porter analysis, the trial
court was obliged to hold a hearing and the plaintiff was
obliged to explain the methodology underlying Strauss’
opinion. This information was necessary to assess the
scientific reliability and validity of Strauss’ opinion.
The plaintiff argues that pursuant to our holdings in
State v. Reid, 254 Conn. 540, 546–49, 757 A.2d 482 (2000),
and State v. Hasan, 205 Conn. 485, 490–91, 534 A.2d
877 (1987), a validity assessment by the trial court was
not required in this case because not all testimony
grounded in scientific principles requires a Porter hear-
ing. We disagree.
In Maher v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., supra, 269 Conn.
170–71 n.22, we noted a line of cases dealing with scien-
tific evidence that falls within a narrow category of
exceptional situations wherein ‘‘although ostensibly
rooted in scientific principles and presented by expert
witnesses with scientific training, [the evidence is] not
scientific for the purposes of our admissibility standard
for scientific evidence, either before or after Porter.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) In particular, we
referenced State v. Reid, supra, 254 Conn. 547–49, in
which we concluded that the testimony of a criminolo-
gist regarding visible characteristics of, and similarities
between, strands of hair was not scientific evidence for
Porter purposes,13 and State v. Hasan, supra, 205 Conn.
490, in which we held that a podiatrist’s testimony as
to the likelihood that a certain pair of sneakers would
fit on the defendant’s feet was not scientific evidence.14
We conclude that Strauss’ opinion does not fit within
the category of expert opinion identified in these cases,
nor does it fit within the rationale employed in those
cases to conclude that a validity assessment pursuant
to Porter was not required.
This narrow and distinct line of cases ‘‘indicates that
evidence, neither scientifically obscure nor instilled
with an aura of mystic infallibility . . . which merely
places a jury . . . in a position to weigh the probative
value of the testimony without abandoning common
sense and sacrificing independent judgment to the
expert’s assertions based on his special skill or knowl-
edge . . . is not the type of scientific evidence within
the contemplation of Porter . . . .’’ (Citations omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) Maher v. Quest
Diagnostics, Inc., supra, 269 Conn. 170 n.22. In particu-
lar, we noted that ‘‘Hasan and Reid stand for the propo-
sition that evidence, even evidence with its roots in
scientific principles, which is within the comprehension
of the average juror and which allows the jury to make
its own conclusions based on its independent powers
of observation and physical comparison, and without
heavy reliance upon the testimony of an expert witness,
need not be considered scientific in nature for the pur-
poses of evidentiary admissibility.’’ (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Id., 170–171 n.22. In short, in Hasan
and Reid, the expert witness taught the jury how to
look at physical evidence and then left the jury to look
at that evidence and reach its own conclusions.
Strauss did not teach the jury how to calculate the
force that a wind of 11.5 to 18 miles per hour would
exert on a ladder or how much force is required to cause
a ladder that is properly set up and in good condition to
be set into motion and to slide against the aluminum
edge of the defendant’s roof. Similarly, Strauss did not
provide the jury with the necessary factual data to
undertake such a calculation because he never per-
formed that analysis as part of his own investigation.
Consequently, the jury in this case lacked any of the
data, education or tools required to determine whether
a particular wind speed could have overturned such a
ladder. Contrary to the plaintiff’s assertion, therefore,
the jury largely was dependent on Strauss’ assessment
of the role that the wind played in the accident, and
had no meaningful way to evaluate independently the
amount of force that the prevailing wind would have
exerted on a ladder leaning against the defendant’s
building. As a result, this case must be distinguished
from Reid and Hasan because the jury in this case
could not evaluate Strauss’ hypothesis or compare the
likely effect of the force of the prevailing wind on the
ladder that collided with the plaintiff, as opposed to a
ladder that was properly set up and free from defects.
The problem with the jury’s dependence on Strauss’
testimony is that his opinion, by his own admission,
was based only on his experience, and was formed
without the benefit of an established scientific method-
ology. Strauss’ opinion nevertheless was introduced at
trial under the seal of science because it came from
an individual qualified as an expert in the fields of
mechanical and forensic engineering. The implication
of a scientific foundation for his opinion was especially
misleading because, although Strauss testified that as
a forensic engineer he had previous experience in
assessing whether wind would overturn an object on
the earth’s surface and had examined ‘‘at least a couple
of dozen of ladders or more over the years’’ in connec-
tion with accidents, he also acknowledged that he did
not have experience in determining what force a wind
must exert on a ladder to cause it to fall over, and that
none of his previous ladder cases dealt with a fact
pattern similar to this case. Strauss’ experience, there-
fore, was hardly extensive with respect to the specific
question on which he was asked to opine.
Furthermore, the trial court highlighted the perceived
expert nature of Strauss’ testimony by excluding the
lay opinion of an eyewitness to the incident who testi-
fied that he believed that a gust of wind had caused the
second ladder to fall and to collide with the plaintiff.15 In
sum, if Strauss’ expertise as a scientist made his opinion
admissible, as compared to the opinion of a layperson
who witnessed the accident but had no scientific train-
ing, then it was incumbent on the trial court to conduct
a Porter hearing to determine whether Strauss had used
his expertise to develop his opinion.16 In the absence
of such a validity assessment by the trial court in its
role as gatekeeper, the jury in this case was confronted
with a scientific conclusion, from an individual qualified
as a scientific expert and presumably rooted in scien-
tific principles, when in fact the opinion had no basis
in science and was derived from the expert’s limited
experience with the particular factual situation at issue.
The trial court’s failure to characterize Strauss’ testi-
mony as scientific evidence and to carry out its role as
a gatekeeper by conducting a Porter hearing, consti-
tuted an abuse of its discretion.
The plaintiff also argues that a Porter hearing was
not required because the underlying physical laws gov-
erning mass, force and motion were so fundamental
and dealt with such low level forces on common objects
that it was unnecessary for Strauss, given his experi-
ence and qualifications as an engineer, to conduct any
experimentation or testing. We disagree.
First, we reiterate that the question of whether the
prevailing winds in Meriden on the day of the plaintiff’s
accident were capable of generating enough force to
overturn an immobile ladder leaning against the defen-
dant’s building is more complicated than simply under-
standing that a force applied to an object may cause
the object to fall over. Specifically, as Strauss acknowl-
edged at trial, he never calculated the amount of force
that was generated by the wind on the day of the acci-
dent or how this force was hindered by the coefficient
of friction attributable to the building’s roof when he
investigated the accident. Moreover, both figures would
have required scientific data gathering and experimen-
tation that would have been inaccessible to the average
juror and could not have been performed by the aver-
age juror.
Additionally, the general acceptance in the scientific
community of Newtonian physics does not eliminate
the need for a validity assessment in this case pursuant
to Porter. In short, a party may not circumvent a validity
assessment simply by asserting that generally recog-
nized physical laws serve as the underpinnings for the
scientific methodology on which they seek to rely. Most
scientific methodologies are capable of being reduced
to a well recognized set of scientific principles. Under
Porter, however, it is the methodology itself that is
subject to a validity assessment. See Maher v. Quest
Diagnostics, Inc., supra, 269 Conn. 179. Accordingly,
if the stated methodology,17 apart from its foundational
physical laws, is not accessible to the jury, as was the
case here, the trial court is required to conduct a validity
assessment pursuant to Porter.
Finally, the plaintiff contends that the defendant was
not prejudiced by the trial court’s admission of Strauss’
opinion without a preliminary Porter hearing and, there-
fore, any error was harmless. In particular, the plaintiff
argues that the fact that there was other evidence in
the record to support the jury’s verdict, and that the
defendant had the opportunity to take Strauss’ deposi-
tion, to cross-examine him at trial, and to present rebut-
tal evidence, all negated any prejudice that may have
occurred by admitting Strauss’ expert opinion without
an assessment of its reliability. We disagree.
We acknowledge that ‘‘[e]ven when a trial court’s
evidentiary ruling is deemed to be improper, [as is the
case here] we [still] must determine whether that ruling
was so harmful as to require a new trial. . . . In other
words, an evidentiary ruling will result in a new trial
only if the ruling was both wrong and harmful. . . .
[T]he standard in a civil case for determining whether
an improper ruling was harmful is whether the . . .
ruling [likely] would [have] affect[ed] the result.’’ (Cita-
tions omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation
marks omitted.) Ryan Transportation, Inc. v. M & G
Associates, 266 Conn. 520, 530, 832 A.2d 1180 (2003);
see also Swenson v. Sawoska, 215 Conn. 148, 153, 575
A.2d 206 (1990) (rejecting standard that would have
required treating as harmless error any evidentiary rul-
ing, regardless of its effect upon verdict, so long as
evidence not implicated by ruling was sufficient as mat-
ter of law to sustain verdict). Additionally, we have held
that ‘‘any error in the admission of evidence does not
require reversal of the resulting judgment if the improp-
erly admitted evidence is merely cumulative of other
validly admitted testimony.’’ (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) Fink v. Golenbock, 238 Conn. 183, 211, 680
A.2d 1243 (1996). We conclude that the trial court’s
improper decision to admit Strauss’ testimony without
first conducting a Porter hearing likely affected the
result of the trial and, therefore, warrants a new trial.
First, in the context of a harmless error analysis, it
is not enough that there was other evidence in the
record to support the jury’s verdict. As noted previously,
we specifically rejected such a standard in Swenson v.
Sawoska, supra, 215 Conn. 153, in which we concluded
that the ‘‘sufficient other evidence standard . . . is too
restrictive in that it does not encompass situations
where the erroneously admitted evidence, while not
necessary itself to sustain the jury’s verdict, may none-
theless have affected the jury’s perception of the
remaining evidence.’’ (Internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Similarly, the fact that the defendant had the
opportunity to take Strauss’ deposition, to cross-exam-
ine him at trial, and to present rebuttal evidence, while
indicative of the sufficiency of the evidence presented at
trial to support the jury’s verdict, does not demonstrate
conclusively that the defendant was not harmed by the
trial court’s evidentiary ruling. As noted previously, the
relevant question is whether the ‘‘ruling . . . [likely]
would [have] affect[ed] the [trial’s] result’’; (internal
quotation marks omitted) Ryan Transportation, Inc.
v. M & G Associates, supra, 266 Conn. 530; and, as we
stated in Swenson, this assessment can include merely
whether the trial court’s ruling ‘‘affected the jury’s per-
ception of the remaining evidence.’’ Swenson v.
Sawoska, supra, 153.
Second, Strauss’ opinion was the only evidence to
support the plaintiff’s principal theory of liability,
namely, that the defendant’s negligence in setting up
the ladder, rather than the wind, was the proximate
cause of the ladder’s falling over. In this regard, Strauss’
opinion regarding whether an 11.5 to 18 mile per hour
wind could generate sufficient force to dislodge a ladder
that was properly set up and free from defects, from
its resting place against the roof of the defendant’s
building, was critical to the plaintiff’s case. Simply put,
the plaintiff could not make his case that the defendant’s
negligence caused the ladder in this case to fall unless
he could establish that it was impossible for the prevail-
ing wind on the day of the accident to knock over a
ladder that had been set up properly and was in good
condition. Once the wind was eliminated as a potential
cause of the collision, the plaintiff was able to argue
to the jury, under a theory of res ipsa loquitur, that
the second ladder must have fallen: (1) because the
defendant negligently had set up the device; (2) because
the defendant had erected a damaged and unstable lad-
der next to where the plaintiff was working; or (3) due
to some combination of these two actions. Accordingly,
Strauss’ opinion as to the effect of the wind on a ladder
that was properly set up and in good condition likely
played a role in how the jury viewed the other evidence
presented by the plaintiff regarding the defendant’s neg-
ligence.18
Moreover, during closing argument, counsel for the
plaintiff noted that the ‘‘issue of the wind [was] criti-
cal,’’19 and read to the jury the opinion Strauss had
offered during direct examination regarding the effect
of the wind on a properly set up ladder.20 Indeed, the
plaintiff devoted a significant portion of his closing
argument to Strauss’ opinion about the prevailing winds
on the day of the accident. His emphasis on Strauss’
opinion about the wind further suggests that Strauss’
opinion affected the jury’s evaluation of the remaining
evidence presented at trial.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded
for a new trial.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
1 The named defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court to
the Appellate Court. We then transferred the appeal to this court pursuant
to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1.
2 The plaintiff’s employer, B.G. Graphics, Inc., was permitted to intervene
as a plaintiff in this matter but did not file a brief and waived its right to
oral argument. For convenience, we refer to Prentice as the plaintiff.
In addition, the plaintiff also brought this action against 125 Research,
LLC, which owns the building where Dalco operates its business and where
the negligence at issue allegedly occurred. After the jury returned a verdict
in favor of 125 Research, LLC, the trial court rendered judgment accordingly
and the plaintiff has not appealed from that judgment. As a result, 125
Research, LLC, is not a party to this appeal and we refer to Dalco as
the defendant.
3 The defendant also claims that the evidence was inadmissible on other
grounds, and that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the theory
of res ipsa loquitur. In light of our order for a new trial on the issue of a
Porter hearing, we decline to review these claims because we conclude that
it is unlikely that they will arise on remand.
4 The trial court declined to rule on several other motions filed by the
defendant to exclude Strauss’ expert testimony, including a motion to strike,
which was filed immediately following the conclusion of Strauss’ testimony
at trial, and a motion for a directed verdict, which was filed at the conclusion
of the plaintiff’s case. Additionally, throughout the four days of Strauss’
testimony, the defendant repeatedly reiterated its objection to Strauss’
expert opinion and asked the trial court to conduct a Porter hearing. Over
the defendant’s objection, the trial court declined to make a ruling on the
issue and allowed Strauss’ testimony to proceed.
5 The trial court also concluded that Strauss’ testimony was not so specula-
tive as to be irrelevant, and that it had properly instructed the jury regarding
the plaintiff’s theory of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
See footnote 3 of this opinion.
6 Gagliardi also informed Luft that the plaintiff was able to climb an
extension ladder, but that Gagliardi was afraid of heights and was unable
to do so.
7 The second ladder subsequently was fully extended to the roof of the
building. The record is unclear as to who fully extended the second ladder
and completed its set up. The plaintiff and Gagliardi testified, however, that
they never touched the second ladder and had observed only Luft and his
employees handle it.
8 Strauss’ recognition that he could not offer an opinion about the wind’s
effect on the ladder within a ‘‘reasonable degree of engineering probability’’
was a disclaimer about his expert opinion that was also echoed in his
deposition testimony prior to trial.
9 Over the course of four days of testimony, Strauss was asked several
times for his opinion as to whether the wind could have caused a ladder
that had been set up properly and was in good condition to fall over. On
direct examination, he offered the opinion that an 11.5 to 18 mile per hour
wind would not cause such a ladder to fall. On cross-examination, however,
Strauss testified, as he had at his deposition, that he could not offer such
an opinion ‘‘within a reasonable degree of engineering probability.’’ As part
of redirect examination by the plaintiff, Strauss changed his answer and
testified that an 11.5 to 18 mile per hour wind would not have caused such
a ladder to fall ‘‘within a reasonable degree of engineering probability.’’ On
recross-examination, however, Strauss contradicted this statement once
again and stated that he could not rule out an 11.5 mile per hour wind as
the sole cause of the plaintiff’s accident ‘‘within a reasonable degree of
engineering probability.’’ The equivocal nature of Strauss’ testimony during
cross-examination does not render his opinion unscientific. Strauss’ contra-
dictory testimony, however, does highlight the importance of a trial court
conducting a reliability and validity assessment of Strauss’ methodology
pursuant to our analysis in Porter.
10 In particular, in addition to testifying that the prevailing winds in Meriden
ranged from 11.5 and 18 miles per hour on the day of the accident, Robert
Cox, a meteorologist, testified that the winds likely would move leaves and
small branches on trees, but not stable objects on the earth’s surface. The
plaintiff does not claim, however, that the testimony of Cox, who is a
meteorologist but is not an engineer, would have been sufficient for the
jury to find liability. It is clear from the record that it was Strauss’ testimony
that formed the necessary basis for the plaintiff’s claim of negligence.
11 Specifically, during cross-examination at trial, the following colloquy
took place between Strauss and the defendant’s counsel:
‘‘Q. You . . . testified last Friday that among the tools that the engineer
has at his disposal is physics?
‘‘A. Yes.
‘‘Q. And physics is a science?
‘‘A. Yes.
‘‘Q. That relies heavily on mathematics?
‘‘A. Yes, it is a tool.
‘‘Q. The science of . . . physics relies on algebra, trigonometry and calcu-
lus does it not?
‘‘A. Yes.
‘‘Q. And in your file you have no mathematical calculations at all concern-
ing what forces were applied to exhibit 40 on March 16, 2000, isn’t that true?
‘‘A. That is true.
‘‘Q. There isn’t a single mathematical calculation in your file concerning
that subject, right?
‘‘A. Correct.
‘‘Q. Nor are you able as you sit here now to undertake those mathematical
calculations because you don’t know one of the components of the equation,
namely, the weight, isn’t that right?
‘‘A. As of the moment, no.
‘‘Q. Now the ladder was available to you to weigh, wasn’t it?
‘‘A. Yes.
‘‘Q. And if you had wanted to weigh it nobody told you that you
couldn’t, correct?
‘‘A. Correct.
‘‘Q. And you knew, didn’t you, as an engineer who uses physics, that in
order to do a mathematical computation you need to know, among other
things, what is the weight, right?
‘‘A. That is one of the factors.
‘‘Q. But you didn’t ascertain what it was?
‘‘A. I did not sir . . . .
‘‘Q. Do I understand your testimony here to be that a wind of 11.5 miles
per hour cannot in your opinion as an engineer cause a properly set up
ladder that is not defective to fall over, is that your opinion?
‘‘A. That is my opinion.
‘‘Q. But that is based on no mathematical calculations?
‘‘A. Based on years of experience sir.
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: I didn’t ask you that.
‘‘Q. I asked you, that is based on no mathematical computations, correct?
‘‘A. That is correct.
‘‘Q. And it is based on your not knowing what the ladder weighed?
‘‘A. That is true.
‘‘Q. Even though you recognized that in order to properly apply the princi-
ples of physics to this problem you [would] need to work out a mathematical
equation that calculates not only the force which in this case would be 11.5
miles per hours in this hypothetical, but also the weight of the ladder,
correct?
‘‘A. You would need to know all of that information, yes.’’
12 We note that Strauss’ failure to gather and analyze scientific data in
forming his conclusion is exactly the sort of flaw in his expert opinion that
a validity assessment pursuant to Porter was meant to identify. In particular,
as we stated in Maher v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., supra, 269 Conn. 181,
the ‘‘critical postulate’’ underlying the entire Porter analysis is that ‘‘the
proponent of the evidence must provide a sufficient articulation of the
methodology underlying the scientific evidence. Without such an articula-
tion, the trial court is entirely ill-equipped to determine if the scientific
evidence is reliable [and] also cannot properly undertake its analysis under
the ‘fit’ requirement . . . ensuring that the proffered scientific evidence, in
fact, is based upon the reliable methodology articulated.’’
13 Specifically, in State v. Reid, supra, 254 Conn. 545–49, we held that a
validity assessment was unnecessary when the state sought to present the
expert testimony of a criminologist who had performed a microscopic analy-
sis and comparison of hair samples. The witness presented enlarged photo-
graphs of the hair samples and explained to the jury how he had compared
them. The jurors were then free to make their own comparison and decide
for themselves whether the hairs matched, leading us to conclude that a
Porter hearing was not required because the criminologist’s testimony ‘‘sim-
ply required the jurors to use their own powers of observation and compari-
son.’’ Id., 547.
14 Specifically, in State v. Hasan, supra, 205 Conn. 493–95, we upheld the
admission of a podiatrist’s testimony as to the likelihood that a pair of
sneakers would fit the defendant’s feet. In particular, we concluded that the
podiatrist’s testimony was not ‘‘scientific evidence’’ because the podiatrist
merely compared the footwear to the defendant’s feet. Id., 490. Accordingly,
the jury was in a position to weigh the probative value of the testimony
without abandoning common sense and sacrificing independent judgment
to the expert’s assertions based on his special skill or knowledge. Id., 491.
Furthermore, ‘‘[t]he jury was not required to accept blindly the merit of [the
expert’s] conclusions or methods. It had before it the same sneakers which
had been examined by the podiatrist and, during the course of the trial, had
seen the defendant try them on and walk in them.’’ Id., 494. In sum, although
the podiatrist’s skill and training were based on science, the subject to
which he testified ‘‘was a matter of physical comparison rather than scientific
test or experiment . . . .’’ Id., 490.
15 Specifically, the following colloquy took place at trial during direct
examination of Keith Donahue, an employee of the defendant, by the defen-
dant’s counsel:
‘‘Q. So this ladder here, exhibit 40, slid to the right coming in contact
with the ladder that [the plaintiff] was on, correct?
‘‘A. Correct.
‘‘Q. And do you know what caused this ladder to fall over?
‘‘The Court: This is just, yes or no.
‘‘A. Yes.
‘‘Q. Can you tell us what?
‘‘A. I believe that it was the wind.
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: Objection.
‘‘[The Defendant’s Counsel]: What is the basis?
‘‘The Court: Wait, what is the objection?
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: It calls for a conclusion. It calls for an opinion,
a legal opinion, with regard to causation.
‘‘The Court: Counsel sidebar please.
‘‘[The Plaintiff’s Counsel]: It is without foundation.
‘‘The Court: I am going to sustain the objection to that question. Members
of the jury, I am striking that answer. You are not to consider that answer
in your deliberations.’’
16 We are also mindful that in order for an expert’s opinion to be admissible,
it must assist the trier of fact in ‘‘understanding the evidence or in determin-
ing a fact in issue.’’ Conn. Code Evid. § 7-2. Additionally, in order to be
helpful and, therefore, relevant, an expert’s opinion must be derived from
the application of whatever skill or knowledge he or she brings to the case.
See State v. Billie, supra, 250 Conn. 178–81 (expert’s knowledge concerning
behavioral effects caused by components of drug mixture not admissible
where expert had no knowledge of mixture ratio). Strauss’ opinion failed
to meet this standard because, by his own admission, it was based only on
his experience, rather than on calculations derived from the laws of physics
and mathematics.
17 We note that in this case, Strauss did not state a methodology for his
opinion, other than his experience as a professional engineer, which made
it impossible for the trial court to evaluate whether the methodology was
reliable and whether the expert opinion was ‘‘in fact, derived from and
based upon that methodology . . . .’’ Maher v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc.,
supra, 269 Conn. 168.
18 We also note that Strauss’ expert opinion was unique and was not
cumulative of other evidence in the record. Indeed, the only other expert
to testify concerning the wind was Cox, who did not testify about the effect
of the wind on the ladder and limited his testimony to a discussion of the
prevailing wind speeds in Meriden on the day of the accident, as well as
to the likely appearance of such conditions to the average observer. By
stipulation, the plaintiff’s counsel stated: ‘‘Cox, is not going to testify as to
causation, a wind speed knocking over this ladder. That’s causation. I am
not going to ask . . . Cox . . . whether a [certain] wind speed . . . will
knock over a ladder.’’
19 The trial court similarly acknowledged the critical nature of Strauss’
testimony. Specifically, it instructed the jury as follows: ‘‘Thus, unless you
find it proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the wind wouldn’t
have blown over a ladder in good condition properly set up, [the] plaintiff’s
case fails, and you must return a defendant’s verdict for each defendant.’’
20 Specifically, during closing argument, counsel for the plaintiff empha-
sized certain portions of Strauss’ testimony by reading from the transcript
as follows:
‘‘Question: ‘Mr. Strauss, the question that we left off with on Friday was,
would a properly set up ladder with no defects in . . . Meriden with a . . .
sustained [wind] speed of approximately 11.5 miles per hour be knocked
over based upon the wind? Again, assume proper set up and no defects.’
Answer: ‘In my opinion it would not be overturned.’ . . . Next question.
. . . ‘Would a properly set up ladder with no defects in . . . Meriden
[leaned] against the side of a building, again, the same twenty-eight foot
ladder on the side of a building with a five second interval or gust of wind
at . . . eighteen miles an hour cause this properly set up, nondefective,
extension ladder to fall over?’ Answer: ‘In my opinion, it would not.’ ’’