Case Title: In re Vaquera

Citation: 

Docket Number: S258376

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2024-02-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
In re OSCAR MANUEL VAQUERA 
on Habeas Corpus. 
 
S258376 
 
Fourth Appellate District, Division Three 
G056786 
 
Orange County Superior Court 
12NF0653 
 
 
February 5, 2024 
 
Justice Groban authored the opinion of the Court, in which 
Chief Justice Guerrero and Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, 
Jenkins, and Evans concurred. 
 
1 
In re VAQUERA 
S258376 
 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
California’s “One Strike” law, codified at Penal Code 
section 667.61, is an alternative sentencing scheme that applies 
when the prosecution pleads and proves specific aggravating 
circumstances in connection with certain sex offenses.1  The 
prosecution charged Oscar Manuel Vaquera by information with 
two counts of an offense covered by the One Strike law — 
committing a lewd act on a child under the age of 14 — and a 
jury convicted him on both counts.  (§§ 288, subd. (a), 667.61, 
subd. (c)(8).)  In this habeas corpus proceeding, Vaquera 
challenges the 25-year-to-life sentence the trial court imposed 
for count 2.2 
In connection with this count, the prosecution alleged a 
multiple victim circumstance under subdivision (b) of the One 
Strike law, which provides for a sentence of 15 years to life 
“[e]xcept as provided in subdivision (a), (j), (l), or (m).”  (§ 667.61, 
subd. (b); see id., subd. (e)(4).)3  After the jury convicted Vaquera 
and found true the multiple victim circumstance, the prosecutor 
filed a sentencing brief requesting 15 years to life on count 2.  
But later, just days before Vaquera’s sentencing hearing, the 
 
1 
All further citations to statutes are to the Penal Code.  
2 
Vaquera does not challenge the 15-year-to-life sentence 
the trial court imposed for count 1. 
3 
All further citations to statutory subdivisions are to the 
One Strike law, section 667.61. 
In re VAQUERA 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
2 
prosecutor filed a second sentencing brief invoking subdivision 
(j)(2) of the One Strike law, which provides for a sentence of 25 
years to life when the victim is under the age of 14, and arguing 
Vaquera should be sentenced under that provision on count 2. 
Vaquera contends the court’s imposition of a 25-year-to-
life sentence for count 2 violated due process guarantees 
because the information did not provide him fair notice of the 
prosecution’s election to seek that sentence.  He further 
contends that he is entitled to be resentenced to 15 years to life 
on count 2 because the due process violation deprived him of the 
opportunity to consider his exposure under subdivision (j)(2) 
when making key decisions about his defense.  The Attorney 
General argues that the information provided Vaquera fair 
notice and that to the extent the information was ambiguous as 
to the prosecution’s intent to seek sentencing under subdivision 
(j)(2), Vaquera is not entitled to resentencing on that basis.  We 
agree with Vaquera and direct the trial court to strike his 25-
year-to-life sentence on count 2 and resentence him to 15 years 
to life on that count. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The One Strike Law 
“[T]he One Strike law sets forth an alternative and 
harsher sentencing scheme for certain sex crimes . . . .”  (People 
v. Anderson (2009) 47 Cal.4th 92, 107 (Anderson I).)  The law 
applies when the prosecution pleads and proves specific factual 
circumstances in addition to the elements of the underlying sex 
offense.  (Id. at p. 102.)  When the prosecution is pursuing 
sentencing under the One Strike law, the jury decides first 
whether the prosecution has proved the elements of the charged 
offense; if the jury convicts, it then independently considers 
In re VAQUERA 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
3 
whether the prosecution has proved the circumstances alleged 
to support sentencing under the One Strike law.  (Anderson I, at 
p. 102.)   
If the prosecution has not pled and proved a One Strike 
law allegation, the usual, determinate sentence for the sex crime 
applies.  (See § 1170, subds. (a)(3), (b).)  For example, for a 
violation of section 288, subdivision (a) — the provision under 
which Vaquera was convicted — the Penal Code prescribes a 
sentence of three, six, or eight years in state prison.  (Ibid.)   
When, however, a jury has found true a One Strike law 
allegation, the offense generally will be punishable by an 
indeterminate sentence of either 15 years to life or 25 years to 
life.  (See § 667.61, subds. (a)–(e).)  As relevant here, under 
subdivision (b), the sentence is 15 years to life if the jury has 
found the crime was committed under one of the circumstances 
listed in subdivision (e) of the One Strike law, among which is 
the multiple victim circumstance.  (§ 667.61, subds. (b), (e)(4).)   
This general scheme is subject to exceptions added by the 
Chelsea King Child Predator Prevention Act of 2010 (Stats. 
2010, ch. 219, § 16) (Chelsea’s Law), codified in subdivisions (j), 
(l), and (m).  (See § 667.61, subd. (b) [“[e]xcept as provided in 
subdivision (a), (j), (l), or (m) . . .”].)  Those subdivisions 
prescribe increased punishments of 25 years to life or life 
without the possibility of parole when the prosecution has pled 
and proved a One Strike circumstance involving a minor victim.  
(See § 667.61, subds. (j), (l), (m).)  Among these circumstances is 
subdivision (j)(2), under which Vaquera was sentenced on 
count 2, which provides for a sentence of 25 years to life for “[a] 
person who is convicted of an offense specified in subdivision (c) 
In re VAQUERA 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
4 
under one of the circumstances specified in subdivision (e), upon 
a victim who is a child under 14 years of age.” 
B.  Procedural History 
In an interview conducted as part of a child pornography 
investigation, Vaquera made incriminating admissions to the 
police about his conduct toward two children.4  The prosecution 
charged Vaquera by information with two counts — a separate 
count as to each of the two children — of committing “a lewd and 
lascivious act upon and with the body” of “a child under the age 
of fourteen (14) years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, 
and gratifying the lust, passions, and sexual desires of the 
defendant and the child” in violation of section 288, subdivision 
(a).5   
The information also contained a One Strike law 
allegation as to each of these two counts.  The allegation 
concerning the count at issue here read in full: “As to count(s) 2, 
it is further alleged pursuant to Penal Code sections 
667.61(b)/(e)(4), that in the commission of the above offense, 
defendant OSCAR MANUEL VAQUERA committed an offense 
specified in Penal Code section 667.61(c) against more than one 
victim.”  As noted above, subdivision (b) of the One Strike law 
prescribes a 15-year-to-life sentence for a conviction of one of the 
offenses listed in subdivision (c) when the jury finds true one of 
the circumstances specified in subdivision (e).  The offense of 
 
4 
The evidence at trial showed that Vaquera, who shared an 
apartment with the victims’ family, molested the two children 
and videotaped them and another child through a hole in the 
bathroom wall.  
5 
The information also alleged child pornography charges 
that are not relevant to our analysis.   
In re VAQUERA 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
5 
which Vaquera was convicted — committing a lewd act in 
violation of section 288, subdivision (a) — is among the offenses 
listed in subdivision (c).  Subdivision (e)(4) sets out the multiple 
victim circumstance, which applies when a defendant is 
convicted in a single case of committing an offense listed in 
subdivision (c) against multiple victims. 
The One Strike law allegation as to count 2 did not include 
a citation to subdivision (j)(2) — the provision under which the 
trial court ultimately sentenced Vaquera to 25 years to life.  Nor 
did the allegation specify that the victim was under 14 years 
old — the fact that would trigger application of subdivision (j)(2) 
to a crime otherwise punishable under subdivision (b).  (See § 
667.61, subd. (j)(2) [providing for a 25-year-to-life sentence when 
the defendant was “convicted of an offense specified in 
subdivision (c) under one of the circumstances specified in 
subdivision (e), upon a victim who is a child under 14 years of 
age” (italics added)].)  And the allegation did not otherwise 
specify that the prosecution was seeking a sentence of 25 years 
to life based on the victim’s age rather than the 15-year-to-life 
sentence generally provided for in subdivision (b). 
The jury convicted Vaquera as charged and found true the 
One Strike multiple victim allegations as to both counts.  In its 
initial sentencing brief, the prosecution asked the court to 
impose a sentence of 15 years to life for count 2, explaining:  
“Counts 1 and 2 are convictions for [section] 288(a) with a 
multiple victim ‘One Strike’ enhancement under Penal Code 
section 667.61(b)/(e)(4) and (5).  The penalty for each count is an 
indeterminate sentence of 15 years to life, with the court holding 
the option to run the counts concurrently or consecutively to 
each other.”  The prosecution requested that Vaquera be 
sentenced to “a minimum of 30 years to life” on all counts. 
In re VAQUERA 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
6 
A few weeks later, just four days before the sentencing 
hearing, the prosecution filed a new sentencing brief.  In this 
second brief, the prosecution informed Vaquera for the first time 
that it was seeking a sentence of 25 years to life on count 2.  The 
brief explained that Chelsea’s Law — which had taken effect 
two years before the prosecution filed the information in 
Vaquera’s case and almost four years before it submitted its 
second sentencing brief — had added subdivision (j)(2) to the 
One Strike law.  The brief argued that this amendment 
increased the sentence for an offense specified in subdivision (c) 
involving multiple victims from 15 years to life to 25 years to life 
whenever the victim was under 14 years old.  Because the 
conduct alleged in count 1 predated the Chelsea’s Law 
amendments, the prosecution acknowledged that Vaquera could 
be sentenced only to 15 years to life on that count.  As to the 
offense alleged in count 2, however, which occurred after the 
Chelsea’s Law amendments took effect, the prosecution 
contended that the One Strike law required the trial court to 
impose a 25-year-to-life sentence.  The prosecution’s new brief 
urged the court to impose the sentences on the two counts 
consecutively and sentence Vaquera to “a minimum of 40 years 
to life” — 10 years longer than it requested in its initial 
sentencing brief. 
The court sentenced Vaquera to 25 years to life on count 2 
and 15 years to life on count 1, to be served concurrently, for a 
combined sentence of 25 years to life.  Vaquera appealed but did 
not challenge the legality of his sentence.  The Court of Appeal 
affirmed, and we denied review. 
 
The following year, the Department of Corrections and 
Rehabilitation (CDCR) sent a letter to the trial court inquiring 
about Vaquera’s sentence.  The letter pointed out that although 
In re VAQUERA 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
7 
the information had alleged a multiple victim circumstance 
under subdivision (b) of the One Strike law, which provides for 
a 15-year-to-life sentence, Vaquera had been sentenced to 
25 years to life on count 2.  CDCR inquired whether the court 
had intended to sentence Vaquera under subdivision (b).  To 
address CDCR’s inquiry, the court ordered briefing and held a 
hearing, after which it decided to leave intact Vaquera’s 25-year-
to-life sentence for count 2 under subdivision (j)(2). 
Vaquera then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in 
the Court of Appeal, claiming the trial court unlawfully imposed 
the 25-year-to-life sentence for count 2 because he did not have 
fair notice that he faced 25 years to life on that count.  The Court 
of Appeal summarily denied relief, Vaquera sought review in 
this court, and we granted the petition and transferred the case 
back to the Court of Appeal with directions to issue an order to 
show cause.  
The Court of Appeal issued the order to show cause.  In 
the return, the Attorney General denied that the information 
failed to provide Vaquera fair notice that he could be sentenced 
to 25 years to life on count 2 under the One Strike law.  The 
parties agreed that no evidentiary hearing was necessary.  After 
oral argument, the court denied relief in a published opinion, In 
re Vaquera (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 233 (Vaquera).   
The Court of Appeal rejected as “fundamentally mistaken” 
Vaquera’s contention that “the People could have elected to 
pursue a prison term of 15 years to life under section 667.61, 
subdivision (b), rather than a prison term of 25 years to life 
under section 667.61, subdivision (j)(2).”  (Vaquera, supra, 
39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 244–245.)  It observed that “[s]ection 
667.61, subdivision (b), requires a sentence of 15 years to life 
In re VAQUERA 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
8 
‘[e]xcept as provided in subdivision . . . (j) . . . .’ ”  (Id. at p. 245.)  
It concluded that the prosecution provided Vaquera fair notice 
that he could be sentenced under subdivision (j)(2) by pleading 
“multiple victim allegations for qualifying sex offenses in which 
the victims were under 14 years of age.”  (Vaquera, at p. 245.)  
The Court of Appeal reasoned that because the jury necessarily 
found that the victims were under 14 years old when it convicted 
Vaquera on counts 1 and 2, “the trial court was required to 
impose a 25-year-to-life sentence.”  (Ibid.)   
The Court of Appeal expressly disagreed with People 
v. Jimenez (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 373 (Jimenez).  (See Vaquera, 
supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 244.)  In Jimenez, the court had held 
it violated due process to sentence a similarly situated 
defendant to 25 years to life under subdivision (j)(2) because “the 
information only informed [the defendant] he could be sentenced 
to terms of 15 years to life under Penal Code section 667.61, 
subdivisions (b) and (e) for committing the alleged offenses 
against multiple victims.”  (Jimenez, at p. 397.) 
We granted Vaquera’s petition for review to resolve this 
split of authority. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
Vaquera contends here, as he did in the Court of Appeal, 
that his sentence for count 2 is unlawful because the information 
did not provide fair notice of the specific One Strike sentence he 
faced.  He argues he had a constitutional right to notice that the 
prosecution was seeking a sentence of 25 years to life under 
subdivision (j)(2) based on the victim’s age, rather than 15 years 
to life under subdivision (b) based on the multiple victim 
circumstance alone.  He further contends he is entitled to be 
resentenced to 15 years to life on count 2 because the violation 
In re VAQUERA 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
9 
of this right deprived him of the opportunity to consider his 
exposure to additional prison time when making key decisions 
about how to conduct his defense.  The Attorney General argues 
that the information provided Vaquera fair notice of the 
sentence he faced on count 2 by way of the cross-reference to 
subdivision (j) in the text of subdivision (b) and that if the 
prosecution erred in failing to plead the One Strike 
circumstance with greater specificity, Vaquera is not entitled to 
resentencing on that basis.   
We begin by considering what constitutes fair notice in 
this context. 
A. Criminal Defendants Have a Constitutional 
Right to Fair Notice of Their Sentencing 
Exposure and the Factual Basis for That 
Exposure 
A defendant has a due process right to fair notice of any 
sentencing allegation that, if proven, will increase the 
punishment for a crime.  (People v. Anderson (2020) 9 Cal.5th 
946, 953 (Anderson II); People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th 735, 
747 (Mancebo).)  In the sentencing enhancement context, the 
touchstone of fair notice is whether the accusatory pleading 
enables the defense to predict the sentence the defendant faces 
if convicted.  To enable a defendant to make this prediction, an 
accusatory pleading must provide the defendant with fair notice 
of the factual basis on which the prosecution is seeking an 
increased punishment and of “the potential sentence.”  
(Anderson II, at p. 956.)   
When the prosecution has not alleged a particular 
sentencing enhancement in connection with a specific count, a 
“defendant is ordinarily entitled to assume the prosecution 
In re VAQUERA 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
10 
made a discretionary choice not to pursue the enhancement . . . 
and to rely on that choice in making decisions such as whether 
to plead guilty or proceed to trial.”  (Anderson II, supra, 
9 Cal.5th at p. 956.)  Since an accusatory pleading that fails to 
inform the defendant that the prosecution is pursuing a 
particular sentencing enhancement in connection with a specific 
count does not allow the defendant to predict the potential 
sentence, such a pleading does not provide fair notice.  (See id. 
at pp. 956–957.) 
Like a sentencing enhancement allegation, a “One Strike 
allegation exposes a defendant to greater punishment than 
would be authorized by a verdict on the offense alone.”  
(Anderson I, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 108.)  Without a true finding 
on a One Strike allegation, the court may not apply the lengthier 
sentences provided for in the One Strike law.  (Anderson I, at 
p. 108, citing Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 490 
(Apprendi) [“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact 
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt”].)  Accordingly, we have held the 
prosecution must provide the defendant “fair notice of the 
qualifying statutory circumstance or circumstances that are 
being pled, proved, and invoked in support of One Strike 
sentencing.”  (Mancebo, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 754.) 
The One Strike law contains an express pleading 
requirement:  “The penalties provided in this section shall apply 
only if the existence of any circumstance specified in subdivision 
(d) or (e) is alleged in the accusatory pleading pursuant to this 
section, and is either admitted by the defendant in open court or 
found to be true by the trier of fact.”  (§ 667.61, subd. (o).)  
Vaquera does not argue that the prosecution violated this 
In re VAQUERA 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
11 
statutory requirement, which by its terms does not apply to 
subdivision (j)(2) so is not directly implicated here.  Accordingly, 
we consider the question before us — whether the One Strike 
allegation provided fair notice that the prosecution was seeking 
a 25-year-to-life sentence under subdivision (j)(2) — exclusively 
under the rubric of due process.  (See Jimenez, supra, 
35 Cal.App.5th at pp. 396–397 [satisfying statutory pleading 
requirement, where applicable, is necessary but not sufficient to 
support application of alternative sentencing scheme under One 
Strike law; due process must also be satisfied]; cf. Anderson II, 
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 953 [“Beneath . . . statutory pleading 
requirements lies a bedrock principle of due process.”].)6   
The Attorney General argues that due process does not 
require the prosecution to notify the defendant of the specific 
One Strike sentence it is seeking.  In his view, the prosecution 
provides fair notice so long as it alleges the facts that support 
the One Strike sentence somewhere in the charging document 
and generally apprises the defendant of the potential for an 
enhanced penalty.  In support of this argument, he cites to 
People v. Thomas (1987) 43 Cal.3d 818 (Thomas), in which we 
held that a pleading that alleged a general charge of 
manslaughter put the defendant on notice that he could be 
convicted of either voluntary or involuntary manslaughter.  (Id. 
at p. 828.)  The Attorney General reads Thomas as supporting 
his argument that due process does not require the prosecution 
 
6 
It is unclear why, in enacting Chelsea’s Law, the 
Legislature did not amend subdivision (o) to say that the express 
pleading requirement applies to the circumstances specified in 
subdivisions (j), (l), and (m) as well as those specified in (d) and 
(e).  It may wish to do so now.   
In re VAQUERA 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
12 
to make clear that it is relying on facts alleged in support of a 
charged offense to also support a One Strike sentence.  
We rejected a similar argument in Mancebo, supra, 
27 Cal.4th at page 747, concluding that Thomas did not support 
the Attorney General’s contention that it was sufficient for the 
accusatory pleading to place the appellant on general notice that 
the facts underlying the One Strike circumstance would be at 
issue at trial.  In Mancebo, the defendant was charged with 
committing One-Strike-qualifying crimes against more than one 
victim, but the prosecution did not plead a One Strike multiple 
victim allegation.  (Mancebo, at p. 743.)  We acknowledged that 
the defendant’s conviction of the charged crimes would have 
made it “difficult to meaningfully contest” the truth of a multiple 
victim circumstance had the prosecution alleged one.  (Id. at 
p. 752.)  Nevertheless, we held that it would be inconsistent with 
the One Strike law’s express pleading requirement and with due 
process to base a One Strike sentence on that circumstance 
because the prosecution had not pled it.  (Mancebo, at p. 752.)  
An information, we held, must allege “which qualifying 
circumstance or circumstances are being invoked for One Strike 
sentencing.”  (Ibid.)  This requirement, we explained, is dictated 
not only by the language of the One Strike law’s express 
pleading requirement but also by due process, because the 
prosecution’s failure to inform the defendant that it is invoking 
those circumstances in support of a particular One Strike 
sentence “violates [the defendant’s] right to adequate notice of 
the factual and statutory bases of sentence enhancement 
allegations.”  (Mancebo, at p. 746; see id. at p. 747 [“[A] 
defendant has a cognizable due process right to fair notice of the 
specific sentence enhancement allegations that will be invoked 
to increase punishment”].)  In sum, to satisfy due process, an 
In re VAQUERA 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
13 
accusatory pleading must inform the defendant that the 
prosecution is relying on specific facts to support imposition of a 
particular One Strike sentence.  (Mancebo, at pp. 746–747.)  Our 
holding in Thomas is not to the contrary.  (Mancebo, at pp. 747–
748.)7    
To be sure, as we have emphasized, due process does not 
require “rigid code pleading or the incantation of magic words.”  
(Anderson II, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 957.)  An accusatory 
pleading need not specify the number of the pertinent 
sentencing statute, so long as it otherwise clearly notifies the 
accused of the factual basis on which it is seeking a longer 
sentence and the information necessary to calculate sentencing 
exposure.  (§ 952; see People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 698 
[“[T]he ‘accusatory pleading need not specify by number the 
statute under which the accused is being charged.’ ”].)  In the 
One Strike law context, we have observed that “[a]dequate 
notice can be conveyed by a reference to the description of the 
qualifying circumstance” in 
the One Strike allegation 
accompanied by either a general “reference to section 667.61” or 
a more specific reference to the relevant subdivision of section 
667.61.  (Mancebo, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 754.)  If a One Strike 
allegation describes the specific factual circumstance based on 
which the prosecution seeks One Strike sentencing and cites to 
section 667.61, the allegation does not necessarily need to 
specify the sentence (i.e., “15 years to life,” “25 years to life,” or 
“life without the possibility of parole”) or cite to the specific 
 
7 
We disapprove People v. Neal (1984) 159 Cal.App.3d 69, 
which we cited with approval in Thomas, supra, 43 Cal.3d at 
pages 830 to 831, to the extent it is inconsistent with the 
understanding of fair notice that is reflected in our present 
analysis. 
In re VAQUERA 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
14 
subdivision of section 667.61 that provides the applicable 
enhanced penalty.  (Mancebo, at pp. 753–754; see Anderson II, 
at p. 957 [“We do not mean to suggest that an information that 
fails to plead the specific numerical subdivision of an 
enhancement is necessarily inadequate”].)  Similarly, a One 
Strike allegation need not specify the factual basis of the 
sentence the prosecution is seeking if the allegation’s text 
otherwise makes clear that the prosecution intends to rely on 
the facts alleged in connection with the underlying count to seek 
imposition of a specific One Strike sentence on that count.  To 
satisfy due process, it is sufficient for an accusatory pleading to 
provide the defendant fair notice of the particular One Strike 
sentence the prosecution is seeking and of which facts it intends 
to prove to support that sentence.  (Mancebo, at pp. 753–754.) 
B.  The One Strike Allegation on Count 2 Did Not 
Provide 
Vaquera 
Fair 
Notice 
That 
the 
Prosecution 
Was 
Seeking 
a 
25-year-to-life 
Sentence Under Section 667.61(j)(2) Based on 
the Victim’s Age 
Applying these principles, we must determine whether the 
One Strike allegation as to count 2 provided Vaquera fair notice 
that the prosecution was seeking a sentence of 25 years to life 
under subdivision (j)(2) based on the victim being under the age 
of 14, rather than 15 years to life under subdivision (b) based on 
the multiple victim circumstance alone.  As noted above, the 
allegation stated: “As to count(s) 2, it is further alleged pursuant 
to Penal Code sections 667.61(b)/(e)(4), that in the commission 
of the above offense, [Vaquera] committed an offense specified 
in Penal Code section 667.61(c) against more than one victim.”  
The first subdivision of the One Strike law cited in the 
allegation, subdivision (b), states:  “Except as provided in 
In re VAQUERA 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
15 
subdivision (a), (j), (l), or (m), a person who is convicted of an 
offense specified in subdivision (c)” — which includes section 
288, subdivision (a), under which Vaquera was charged — 
“under one of the circumstances specified in subdivision (e) shall 
be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 15 years to 
life.”  The second subdivision cited in the allegation, subdivision 
(e)(4), sets out the multiple victim circumstance.    
At least on initial read, the allegation’s citations to 
subdivisions (b) and (e)(4), combined with its invocation of the 
qualifying circumstance that Vaquera committed the covered 
offense “against more than one victim,” suggest the prosecution 
was seeking a sentence of 15 years to life based on the multiple 
victim circumstance.  Subdivision (b) provides for a sentence of 
15 years to life, and subdivision (e)(4) applies when a defendant 
is convicted in a single proceeding of committing a One Strike 
offense “against more than one victim.”  Based on the underlying 
charges in this case, the prosecution had the choice of: (1) not 
including a One Strike allegation in the information and seeking 
a determinate sentence of three, six, or eight years (§ 288, subd. 
(a)); (2) seeking 15 years to life based on the multiple victim 
circumstance alone (§ 667.61, subds. (b) & (e)(4)); or (3) seeking 
25 years to life based on the additional circumstance that the 
victim of count 2 was under the age of 14 (id., subd. (j)(2)).  The 
information appears to reflect that the prosecution chose the 
middle ground, alleging a One Strike law circumstance, citing 
to subdivisions (b) and (e), and including a corresponding 
multiple-victim factual allegation, while omitting any citation to 
In re VAQUERA 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
16 
subdivision (j)(2) and any corresponding allegation that the 
victim was under the age of 14.8  
Looking beyond the language of the One Strike allegation 
as to count 2, the way the prosecution framed the allegations as 
a whole further suggests it was not seeking sentencing under 
subdivision (j)(2).  The Chelsea’s Law amendments, by which the 
Legislature added subdivision (j) to the One Strike law, had 
taken effect two years before the prosecution filed the 
information.  Under the prior version of the statute, subdivision 
(e)(4) pertained to the personal use of a firearm; the multiple 
victim circumstance was codified in former subdivision (e)(5).  
The information cites former subdivision (e)(5) in connection 
with the One Strike law allegation as to count 1, which was 
based on conduct predating the Chelsea’s Law amendments.  
The allegation as to count 2, by contrast, cites subdivision (e)(4) 
for the multiple victim circumstance.  The prosecution’s citation 
to subdivision (e)(4) rather than subdivision (e)(5) in connection 
 
8 
Notably, the One Strike allegation as to count 2 is framed 
how one might expect it to be framed if the prosecution wanted 
to make clear that it had elected to seek sentencing under 
subdivision (b) rather than under subdivision (j)(2).  Indeed, it 
is difficult to imagine how else a prosecutor would make that 
election clear in the information.  Subdivision (j)(2) applies in 
the same circumstances in which subdivision (b) applies — 
conviction “of an offense specified in subdivision (c) under one of 
the circumstances specified in subdivision (e)” (§ 667.61, 
subd. (b)) — but only when an additional circumstance is pled 
and proved: that the offense was committed “upon a victim who 
is a child under 14 years of age” (id., subd. (j)(2)).  Had the 
prosecution intended to seek sentencing under subdivision (j)(2) 
it could have simply cited that subdivision; there would have 
been no reason for it to cite subdivision (b). 
In re VAQUERA 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
17 
with count 2, but not count 1, therefore suggests it was aware of 
the renumbering of the One Strike law’s multiple victim 
circumstance pursuant to the Chelsea’s Law amendments when 
drafting the information.  (See Stats. 2010, ch. 219, § 16.)  
Reading the One Strike allegation as to count 2 in this context, 
defense counsel would have reasonably assumed the prosecutor 
was aware of subdivision (j)(2) and had elected to seek 
sentencing under subdivision (b) instead.  (See Anderson II, 
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 956.)  Indeed, it appears from the first 
sentencing brief that the prosecutor understood throughout the 
trial that the punishment for count 2 would be 15 years to life 
under subdivision (b).   
We considered a somewhat similar issue in Anderson II, 
supra, 9 Cal.5th at page 957, where we concluded that the 
pleading of a vicarious firearm allegation carrying a 25-year-to-
life sentence as to one count did not provide fair notice that the 
prosecution 
would 
seek 
additional 
vicarious 
firearm 
enhancements as to other counts.  We observed that the 
prosecution’s choice “to allege other, lesser enhancements” on 
the counts at issue gave the defendant “reason to believe the 
prosecution was exercising its discretion not to seek the . . .  25-
year-to-life enhancement” on those counts.  (Ibid.)  In this case, 
the framing of the One Strike allegation as to count 2, 
particularly when considered in juxtaposition to the framing of 
the One Strike allegation as to count 1, gave Vaquera reason to 
believe the prosecution was exercising its discretion not to seek 
sentencing under subdivision (j)(2) by pleading subdivision (b) 
and relying exclusively on the multiple victim circumstance 
rather than also pleading that the victim was under the age of 
14. 
In re VAQUERA 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
18 
In circumstances parallel to those of this case, the Court 
of Appeal in Jimenez, supra, 35 Cal.App.5th 373 held that the 
imposition of 25-year-to-life sentences under subdivision (j)(2) 
violated the defendant’s due process right to fair notice.  
(Jimenez, at p. 397.)  In Jimenez, as here, a jury convicted the 
defendant of committing One-Strike-eligible offenses against 
multiple victims under the age of 14 and also found true a One 
Strike multiple victim allegation: that “Jimenez did ‘commit the 
offense on more than one victim within the meaning of Penal 
Code Section 667.61 (b)/(e).’ ”  (Jimenez, at p. 394.)  The Court of 
Appeal concluded this allegation did not provide fair notice that 
Jimenez faced 25-year-to-life sentences under subdivision (j)(2).  
(Jimenez, at p. 397.)  It observed, “the information only informed 
Jimenez he could be sentenced to terms of 15 years to life under 
Penal Code section 667.61, subdivisions (b) and (e) for 
committing the alleged offenses against multiple victims.  The 
information did not put him on notice that he could be sentenced 
to terms of 25 years to life under section 667.61(j)(2) for 
committing those offenses upon multiple victims, at least one of 
whom was under 14 years of age.”  (Jimenez, at p. 397.)  In 
Jimenez, as here, the prosecution pled and the jury found the 
facts necessary to support imposition of a 25-year-to-life 
sentence under subdivision (j)(2).  (Jimenez, at p. 394; see 
Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490.)  The Court of Appeal’s 
conclusion that the prosecution did not provide fair notice rested 
on the information’s failure to inform Jimenez that the 
prosecution intended to rely on those facts to seek sentencing 
under subdivision (j)(2). 
The Attorney General points out that subdivision (b)’s 
initial clause states that a sentence of 15 years to life shall be 
imposed “[e]xcept as provided in subdivision . . . (j)” and that 
In re VAQUERA 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
19 
subdivision (j)(2), in turn, states that any “person who is 
convicted of an offense specified in subdivision (c)” — among 
which is the offense alleged in count 2 — “under one of the 
circumstances specified in subdivision (e), upon a victim who is 
a child under 14 years of age, shall be punished by imprisonment 
in the state prison for 25 years to life.”  (Ibid.)  He contends that 
because subdivision (b) cross-references subdivision (j), the 
information provided Vaquera fair notice that the prosecution 
was seeking a sentence of 25 years to life on count 2.  We 
disagree.  At most, the statutory cross-reference to subdivision 
(j) renders the allegation ambiguous as to whether the 
prosecutor might seek sentencing under that provision.  Read as 
a whole, the pleading failed to inform Vaquera of the 
prosecutor’s election to seek the more stringent sentence and did 
not provide fair notice of his sentencing exposure.9 
 
We recognize, as the Court of Appeal emphasized and as 
Vaquera concedes, that the provisions of the One Strike law 
 
9 
The Attorney General briefly argues that to hold that 
Vaquera’s right to fair notice was violated would be inconsistent 
with People v. Valladoli (1996) 13 Cal.4th 590.  In Valladoli, we 
concluded that the trial court did not violate due process when 
it authorized the prosecution to amend an accusatory pleading 
after trial to add prior felony conviction allegations.  (Id. at 
p. 607; see § 969a.)  Valladoli is distinguishable.  The case 
concerned whether the trial court violated due process by 
permitting the amendment of an accusatory pleading, not 
whether it did so by imposing a sentence based on an unpled 
provision.  (Valladoli, at p. 607.)  Moreover, the defendant in 
Valladoli knew from the outset of the case that the prosecution 
intended to seek an enhanced sentence based on his prior felony 
convictions and disavowed any claim of lack of notice.  (Id. at 
p. 608.)  
In re VAQUERA 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
20 
generally are mandatory when properly pled and proved.  
(Vaquera, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 245.)  If the prosecution 
had alleged under subdivision (j)(2) that Vaquera was subject to 
a 25-year-to-life sentence on count 2 based on having been 
“convicted of an offense specified in subdivision (c) under one of 
the circumstances specified in subdivision (e), upon a victim who 
is a child under 14 years of age” and the jury found that 
allegation true, the trial court generally would have been 
required to sentence Vaquera to 25 years to life on count 2.  
(§ 667.61, subd. (j)(2).) 
 
However, the question before us is whether the 
information provided fair notice to Vaquera of the One Strike 
sentence the prosecution was seeking and the factual basis on 
which it sought that sentence.  To provide fair notice, an 
“accusatory pleading must adequately inform the defendant as 
to how the prosecution will seek to exercise its discretion.”  
(Anderson II, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 957.)  As we have explained, 
a prosecutor has the discretion to charge any provision of the 
One Strike law supported by the facts or, indeed, to elect not to 
invoke the One Strike law at all; nothing requires the prosecutor 
to charge the One Strike provision that carries the longest 
sentence.  (See Anderson II, at p. 957; see People v. Villegas 
(2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 253, 367–368.)10  The fact that the trial 
court must impose a One Strike sentence when a One Strike 
allegation is properly pled and proved does not relieve the 
 
10 
We disapprove People v. Zaldana (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 
527 to the extent it is inconsistent with our conclusion that the 
prosecution 
has 
discretion 
to 
allege 
a 
subdivision (b) 
circumstance rather than a subdivision (j)(2) circumstance 
where the defendant is charged with committing One-Strike-
eligible offenses against multiple victims under the age of 14.   
In re VAQUERA 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
21 
prosecution of its obligation to provide fair notice to the 
defendant of the sentence it is seeking.  The Court of Appeal 
therefore erred in concluding that because the jury found the 
facts that would support sentencing under subdivision (j)(2) 
when it convicted Vaquera on counts 1 and 2, the court was 
“required to impose a 25-year-to-life sentence . . . .”  (Vaquera, 
supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 245.)  Whether the court was so 
required generally would turn on whether the prosecution 
properly invoked subdivision (j)(2) by pleading those facts in 
connection with the One Strike allegation.  The prosecution’s 
failure to do so violated Vaquera’s due process right to fair 
notice. 
The determination whether an accusatory pleading 
provides fair notice of a potential One Strike sentence requires 
a careful analysis of the language of the One Strike allegation.  
Here, the One Strike allegation specified that it was making 
“further” allegations “[as] to count 2.”  It may be possible to read 
this language as not only specifying the count to which the 
allegation pertained but as also incorporating by reference the 
factual allegations in count 2, including, as relevant here, that 
the victim was under the age of 14.  However, to use a fact 
alleged in connection with the underlying offense to support a 
One Strike allegation, the prosecution must provide fair notice 
that it intends to use that fact for purposes of One Strike 
sentencing.  (Cf. Anderson, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 956–957 
[“Fair notice requires that every sentence enhancement be 
pleaded in connection with every count as to which it is 
imposed”]; Mancebo, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 754 [upholding 
decision striking unpled multiple victim circumstances although 
charging document alleged One-Strike-qualifying offenses 
against multiple victims].)  The prosecution did not provide fair 
In re VAQUERA 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
22 
notice of its intent to rely on the allegation concerning the 
victim’s age to seek a 25-year-to-life sentence under 
subdivision (j)(2).  As noted above, the information is most 
reasonably interpreted as conveying a prosecutorial election not 
to rely on the age of the victim — and thus not to invoke 
subdivision (j)(2) in connection with count 2.  The One Strike 
allegation’s ambiguous reference to count 2 did not provide fair 
notice of the prosecution’s election to rely on the allegation of the 
victim’s age to seek a longer One Strike sentence. 
There are various ways the prosecution could have 
provided fair notice of its intent to seek sentencing under 
subdivision (j)(2).  The prosecution could have briefly alleged in 
the One Strike law allegation the factual circumstances on 
which it was relying (Vaquera having been convicted in the 
present case of committing violations of section 288, subdivision 
(a) against multiple victims and the victim being under the age 
of 14) and cited to the One Strike law generally (§ 667.61).  (See 
Mancebo, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 754.)11  Alternatively, the 
prosecution could have cited to subdivision (j)(2) and referenced 
the charge in count 2 (§ 288, subd. (a)), an essential element of 
which is that the victim was under 14 years old) and the 
multiple victim circumstance (§ 667.61, subd. (e)(4)).12  Had the 
 
11 
Indeed, the information did specify that that the victims 
were under 14 years of age in a separate allegation regarding 
defendant’s ineligibility for probation, making the prosecutor’s 
failure to include the same factual circumstance in the One 
Strike law allegation appear intentional. 
12  
The One Strike law applies to nine enumerated sex 
offenses. (§ 667.61, subd. (c).)  Only three of those offenses 
require proof that the victim was under 14 years of age at the 
 
In re VAQUERA 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
23 
prosecution framed the allegation in either of these ways, due 
process would not have required it to expressly specify that it 
was seeking 25 years to life on count 2, although doing so would 
have rendered the pleading even clearer as to Vaquera’s 
sentencing exposure.  Alternatively, had the prosecution 
specified in the One Strike allegation that it was seeking 25 
years to life on count 2 and alleged the factual circumstances on 
which it was relying to support that sentence, that would have 
provided fair notice even without a citation to subdivision (j)(2). 
The One Strike allegation as to count 2, however, did not 
specify that the prosecution was seeking 25 years to life on that 
count, cite to subdivision (j)(2), or otherwise make clear that the 
prosecution was seeking a longer sentence based on the victim’s 
age.  Because the allegation did not inform Vaquera of the 
prosecution’s intent to invoke the One Strike law circumstance 
on which the trial court ultimately sentenced him, the allegation 
failed to provide him fair notice. 
 
time of the offense.  (See id., subd. (c)(4), (8), (9).)  For any of the 
other six offenses, due process requires the One Strike 
allegation to specify that the victim was under the age of 14 
when the prosecution is seeking a longer sentence under 
subdivision (j)(2) on that basis.  And even when seeking a 
sentence under subdivision (j)(2) for an offense of which the 
victim’s age is an element, the best practice is to specify the 
offense in the One Strike allegation — e.g., that “the defendant 
was convicted of committing a lewd act on a child under the age 
of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a))” — in addition to specifying 
the subdivision (e) circumstance — e.g., that the defendant “has 
been convicted in the present case of committing the offense 
against more than one victim” (id., subd. (e)(4)). 
In re VAQUERA 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
24 
C. Vaquera Is Entitled To Resentencing on 
Count 2 
 
Having determined that the imposition of a 25-year-to-life 
sentence under subdivision (j)(2) on count 2 violated Vaquera’s 
due process right to fair notice, we now consider whether he is 
entitled to resentencing.  Vaquera argues, citing Mancebo, that 
he is entitled to be resentenced to 15 years to life on count 2 
because the prosecution waived its right to seek a 25-year-to-life 
sentence under subdivision (j)(2) by pleading subdivision (b) and 
not seeking to amend the information.  (See Mancebo, supra, 
27 Cal.4th at p. 749 [“doctrines of waiver and estoppel, rather 
than harmless error, apply” where the prosecution’s failure to 
plead a One Strike allegation reflects a “discretionary charging 
decision”].)  Alternatively, citing Anderson II, supra, 9 Cal.5th 
at pages 963 to 964, Vaquera contends that he is entitled to be 
resentenced to 15 years to life on count 2 because the Attorney 
General has not demonstrated that the prosecution’s failure to 
provide fair notice was harmless.   
 
We need not decide whether Mancebo’s analysis applies in 
the present context because even assuming the due process 
violation is subject to a prejudice analysis, Vaquera is entitled 
to resentencing.  In Anderson II, supra, 9 Cal.5th at page 964, 
we held that the defendant was entitled to resentencing where 
the prosecution’s intent to seek the sentencing enhancements at 
issue only became clear on the day of the sentencing hearing — 
“too late to cure the defective pleading.”  We reasoned that the 
purpose of a statutory pleading requirement is “to give sufficient 
notice to permit the defense to make informed decisions about 
the case, including whether to plead guilty, how to allocate 
investigatory resources, and what strategy to deploy at trial.”  
(Ibid.; see also Mancebo, supra, 27 Cal. 4th at p. 752 [observing 
In re VAQUERA 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
25 
that timely notice of a sentencing allegation may impact a 
defendant’s decision “whether to plea bargain or go to trial”].)  
Because Anderson did not receive notice of the potential 
sentence he faced in time for him to take his sentencing 
exposure into account in making those decisions, we concluded 
the pleading error was not harmless and he was entitled to 
resentencing.  (Anderson II, at p. 964.)  Nothing in the record 
here suggests Vaquera learned of his sentencing exposure on 
count 2 in time for him to take it into account in fashioning his 
defense strategy.  Accordingly, the Attorney General has not 
met his burden to show the fair notice violation was harmless. 
The Attorney General argues that Vaquera had actual 
notice that he faced a 25-year-to-life sentence on count 2 because 
the One Strike law required the court to impose a 25-year-to-life 
sentence.  This argument rests on the erroneous premise that a 
15-year-to-life sentence under subdivision (b) would be 
unauthorized in the context of this case.  As we have observed, 
subdivision (j)(2) requires the court to impose a 25-year-to-life 
sentence only when it has been properly pled and proved.  As 
the Attorney General would have us read the statute, the 
prosecution’s only options would be to omit a One Strike 
allegation entirely (i.e., not seek application of the One Strike 
scheme at all) or to seek the maximum sentence permitted 
under the One Strike law based on the facts proved in 
conjunction with the underlying sex offense (here, 25 years to 
life).  As we have explained, this reading is incorrect:  The 
prosecution may opt to allege a One Strike law circumstance 
that supports imposition of a 15-year-to-life sentence even when 
it alleges facts that would support imposition of a longer 
sentence elsewhere in the accusatory pleading. 
In re VAQUERA 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
26 
The Attorney General further argues that Vaquera is not 
entitled to resentencing because he should have been aware that 
the prosecution could seek sentencing under subdivision (j)(2).  
It seems the Attorney General would have us impute to Vaquera 
awareness that the prosecution intended to seek sentencing 
under subdivision (j)(2) although the Attorney General suggests 
the prosecution itself “inadvertently failed to consider” 
subdivision (j)(2), and although it appeared to CDCR, reviewing 
the trial record, that the prosecution was seeking sentencing 
under subdivision (b).  Because the information could be 
reasonably read as indicating that the prosecution had elected 
not to seek 25 years to life under subdivision (j)(2), the burden 
is on the Attorney General to demonstrate that Vaquera was 
aware of the sentence the prosecution was seeking at a time 
when he could have taken his sentencing exposure into 
consideration in making key decisions about how to conduct his 
defense, “including whether to plead guilty, how to allocate 
investigatory resources, and what strategy to deploy at trial.”  
(Anderson II, supra, 9 Cal. 5th at p. 964; see Mancebo, supra, 
27 Cal.4th at p. 752.)  The Attorney General has not met this 
burden.  The record shows that the same prosecutor filed the 
information, conducted the trial, and submitted both sentencing 
briefs.  In the almost two years between when the prosecution 
filed the information and when it filed its second sentencing 
brief, it did not seek to amend the information or otherwise 
clarify it was seeking sentencing under subdivision (j)(2) rather 
than subdivision (b).  Then, in its initial sentencing brief, the 
prosecution affirmatively asked the court to impose a sentence 
of 15 years to life on count 2 pursuant to subdivision (b).  It was 
not until the prosecution filed its second sentencing brief, three 
In re VAQUERA 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
27 
months after the jury returned its verdict, that it first made 
clear its intent to seek 25 years to life under subdivision (j)(2). 
This would be a different case if the prosecution had 
provided Vaquera timely actual notice that it was seeking a 25-
year-to-life sentence on count 2 and the factual basis on which 
it was seeking that sentence, despite its failure to provide such 
notice in the information.  (See People v. Houston (2012) 
54 Cal.4th 1186, 1228 [finding the defendant forfeited on appeal 
due process claim based on indictment’s failure to provide fair 
notice of sentencing exposure where the defendant “received 
adequate notice of the sentence he faced” before the case was 
submitted to the jury and had sufficient opportunity to request 
additional time to prepare a defense but “did not raise an 
objection in the trial court”].)  Here, however, the Attorney 
General does not attempt to demonstrate that Vaquera received 
such notice by any means other than the information.  In the 
return to the order to show cause, the Attorney General did not 
allege that Vaquera had actual notice the prosecution intended 
to seek a 25-year-to-life sentence under subdivision (j)(2) on 
count 2 at a time when Vaquera could have taken the 
prosecution’s election into account in formulating his defense 
strategy.  Nor did the return state facts or provide any 
“ ‘documentary evidence, affidavits, or other materials’ ” that 
would support a finding that Vaquera had timely actual notice.  
(People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 476.)  Vaquera therefore 
is entitled to resentencing on count 2. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons given above, we reverse the judgment of 
the Court of Appeal and remand with instructions to grant 
Vaquera habeas corpus relief and to direct the trial court to 
In re VAQUERA 
Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. 
 
28 
strike the 25-year-to-life sentence imposed under subdivision 
(j)(2) on count 2 and resentence Vaquera to 15 years to life on 
that count under subdivision (b). 
GROBAN, J. 
We Concur:  
GUERRERO, C. J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
EVANS, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  In re Vaquera  
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal  
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published) XX 39 Cal.App.5th 233 
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S258376 
Date Filed:  February 5, 2024 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Orange 
Judge:  David A. Hoffer 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Sharon Petrosino, Public Defender, Sara Ross, Assistant Public 
Defender, Miles David Jessup, Matthew Darling and Abby Taylor, 
Deputy Public Defenders, for Petitioner Oscar Manuel Vaquera. 
 
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, 
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney 
General, Steve Oetting, Paige B. Hazard and James M. Toohey, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent the People. 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion):  
 
Abby Taylor 
Deputy Public Defender 
801 Civic Center Drive West, Suite 400 
Santa Ana, CA 92701 
(657) 251-8607 
 
Paige B. Hazard 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 540-0201