Case Title: Walker v. Karpan

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-09-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Walker v. Karpan1986 WY 178726 P.2d 82Case Number: 85-240Decided: 09/30/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Marcia WALKER, Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Kathleen M. KARPAN, in 
her official capacity as Director, Julia E. Robinson, in her official capacity 
as Administrator of the State of Wyoming Department of Health and Social 
Services Division of Public Assistance & Social Service, Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal from District 
Court for NatronaCounty, Dan Spangler, 
J.

Duane Myres, 
Casper, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Carole Shotwell, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Whitehead, Zunker, Gage, 
Davidson & Shotwell, P.C., Cheyenne, for appellees.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

THOMAS, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     The sole question 
presented in this case is whether Marcia Walker should have been afforded a 
hearing prior to the termination of benefits for her and her minor son under the 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. The Department of Health 
and Social Services (Department) denied a hearing after furnishing notice to 
Marcia Walker of the termination of benefits and of her opportunity to request a 
hearing, and that action was affirmed by order of the district court upon a 
petition for review presented by Walker. We hold that given the circumstances 
reflected in the record the law does not require that a fair hearing be granted 
to Marcia Walker, and we affirm the judgment of the district 
court.

[¶2.]     Prior to May 20, 1985, 
Marcia Walker and her minor son were receiving benefits under the AFDC program. 
Another son was receiving social security benefits due to the death of his 
father. The total of these benefits for the three-member family was $688 per 
month. The rules of the Division of Public Assistance and Social Services 
(DPASS) were changed prior to May 20, 1985, in accordance with the Deficit 
Reduction Act of 1984, Public Law 98-369. Section 2640(a) of Public Law 98-369 
provided that § 402(a) of the Social Security Act would be amended by inserting 
among others the following new paragraph which provided in pertinent 
part:

"(38) * * * [I]n making 
the determination under paragraph (7) with respect to a dependent child and 
applying paragraph (8), the State agency shall (except as otherwise provided in 
this part) include -

* * * * * 
*

"(B) [A]ny brother or 
sister of such child, if such brother or sister meets the conditions described 
in clauses (1) and (2) of § 406(a), if such * * * brother, or sister is living 
in the same home as the dependent child, and any income of or available for such 
* * * brother, or sister shall be included in making such determination and 
applying such paragraph with respect to the family * * *."

[¶3.]     Title 45 C.F.R. § 
206.10(a)(1)(vii) (1982) then was amended to provide that the definition of 
assistance unit included all related children, that is both of the minor sons of 
Marcia Walker. 49 Fed.Reg. 35,599 (1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 206.10). 
Consistently with the amendment to the statute, existing federal AFDC policy, 
which permitted the exclusion of a child receiving social security benefits such 
as Walker's one son received, was stated to be no longer valid, and State Letter 
1088, which promulgated that policy, was revoked. 49 Fed.Reg. 35,588-35,589 
(1984) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 206.10). The Wyoming Public Assistance 
Manual at § 5006.02 was changed to conform with the federal 
requirements.

[¶4.]     The effect of these 
changes on the situation of Marcia Walker was that the social security benefits 
received by the one minor son had to be considered in determining the level of 
need of the three-person assistance unit. The result of these changes, in 
accordance with appropriate calculations, was that the AFDC benefit of $320 
previously paid to Walker and the minor son who did not receive 
social security was eliminated. An employee of the Wyoming DPASS then advised 
Walker that the 
benefits would be terminated. 

[¶5.]     Upon receiving that 
advice Walker 
requested a fair hearing, or agency appeal of the termination. She indicated 
that her reason for requesting the hearing was to determine whether DPASS 
legally could terminate the benefits. On June 13, 1985, a letter from the 
Wyoming Department of Health and Social Services was sent to Walker denying the request 
for fair hearing. Walker received that letter June 27, 1985, and 
on July 25, 1985, she filed a petition for review in the district court. After 
amending the petition on July 26, 1985, Walker also filed motions requesting the 
district court to order the Department to afford her a hearing and to continue 
her benefits until the hearing was held.

[¶6.]     While the proceedings 
were pending in the district court, Walker received another notice of termination 
on August 16, 1985, and she again requested a fair hearing on August 26, 1985. 
The district court entered an order on September 3, 1985, affirming the June 
denial of a hearing. Walker's benefits then were terminated on 
September 5, 1985. Walker filed a motion to vacate the district 
court's order on September 11, 1985, which the district court granted on 
September 12, 1985, but on September 18, 1985, another order was entered 
affirming the denial of the fair hearing. After that the Department of Health 
and Social Services sent Marcia Walker a letter on October 16, 1985, which 
informed her that her second request for a fair hearing, the one presented on 
August 26, 1985, also was denied. Walker's appeal is from the order of the 
district court affirming the denial of a fair hearing.

[¶7.]     Walker's statement of the 
issues discloses that she attacks the denial of a hearing on all possible 
theories. Her statement of issues is:

"1. When the Department 
of Public Assistance and Social Services (hereinafter Agency or D-PASS) gives 
Claimant notice that they intend to terminate her AFDC benefits and Claimant 
timely requests a fair hearing to determine whether or not the Agency has the 
legal right to terminate her AFDC grant and/or reduce said benefit levels, does 
the denial of a fair hearing by the Agency violate Claimant's constitutional 
right of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution which requires that she be afforded an evidentiary hearing 
before termination of her benefits by the Agency? See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287, 90 S. Ct. 1011 (1970).

"2. Was the Agency's 
decision to deny Claimant's requests for fair hearing based upon Public Welfare, 
45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(5)(v) unlawful in one or all of the following 
ways:

"A. Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law; 
and/or

"B. Contrary to 
Claimant's constitutional right to due process; and/or

"C. In excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory right; 
and/or

"D. Without observance of 
procedure required by law?

"3. Does the Agency's 
Rules and Regulations, Chapter 1, Procedures for the Conduct of Contested Case 
Hearings, Section 15, Decisions and Section 17(c)(5), Transcripts and Records, 
comply with the procedural due process requirements of Article I, Section 6 of 
the State of Wyoming's Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution as set forth in detail by the United States Supreme Court in 
Goldberg?

"4. Did the District 
Court incorrectly find that:

"A. The Claimant's 
Petition for Review is based upon an incorrect assumption that she has a 
constitutionally protected interest in her AFDC benefits; 
and/or

"B. That W.S. § 16-3-106 
applies to this Petition for Review and therefore the Agency decision is not 
subject to review;

"and thereby incorrectly 
decide that the Agency decision be affirmed and the Petition for Review be 
denied? 

"5. Was the District 
Court in error not to decide Appellant's Petition for Review in accordance with 
W.S. § 16-3-114 and, thereby failing to find that the Agency's denial of 
Appellant Marcia Walker's request for hearing was wrong in 
that:

"A. The Agency action of 
failure to grant a fair hearing was unlawful;

"B. The Agency action of 
refusing to grant a fair hearing was:

"1. Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law; 
and/or

"2. Contrary to 
Claimant's constitutional right to procedural due process as guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and by Article I, Section 
6 of the Wyoming Constitution; and/or

"C. In excess of the 
Agency statutory authority and in direct conflict with Claimant's statutory 
rights; and/or

"D. Without observance of 
procedure required by law; and/or

"F. That the Agency 
decision was unsupported by substantial evidence on the 
record?

"6. Did the District 
Court Judge abuse his discretion under W.S. § 16-3-114 and Rule 12, W.R.A.P. in 
failing to comply with said Rule by not compelling the Agency to complete the 
record prior to the District Court's decision denying any and all requests that 
motions or oral arguments be set or heard and by denying any written briefs be 
filed before he, on his own initiative and without notice to either party, 
affirmed the Agency's denial of Appellant's request for a fair hearing and 
denying Appellant's Petition for Review?"1

[¶8.]     The appellees state the 
issues for decision as follows:

"A. The Department of 
Health and Social Services, Division of Public Assistance and Social Services 
denial of appellant's request for hearing upon termination of benefits from the 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program did not violate appellant's 
rights under the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14th Amendment 
to the United States Constitution, as interpreted in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287, 90 S. Ct. 1011 (1970).

"B. The Division of 
Public Assistance and Social Services did not act arbitrarily or capriciously, 
exceed its jurisdiction or abuse its discretion in denying appellant's request 
for a hearing.

"C. The District Court, 
reviewing the appellant's petition under W.R.A.P. 12.09, correctly confined its 
review to the issues before the agency and correctly confined its decision to 
meet the requirements of W.S. § 16-3-114(c).

"D. The reviewing court 
correctly decided the case based upon the procedural requirements of W.R.A.P. 
12.07 and 12.09."

[¶9.]     Walker relies upon Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1970). In that case the Supreme Court of the United States held that it was a violation of the 
mandate of procedural due process embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution of the United 
States of America to terminate AFDC benefits 
such as those which are in issue in this case, without a pre-termination 
hearing. Examples of the grounds for terminating the benefits in Goldberg v. 
Kelly, supra, included the failure of the recipient to cooperate with the agency 
in a suit against the recipient's estranged husband, and the refusal of another 
recipient to accept counseling and rehabilitation for drug addiction. Issues of 
fact or issues of the applicability of policy or standards to the particular 
facts were assumed. 

[¶10.]  The opinion of the court said that the 
only function of such a pre-termination hearing would be "to produce an initial 
determination of the validity of the welfare department's grounds for 
discontinuance of payments in order to protect a recipient against an erroneous 
termination of his benefits." Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, 90 S. Ct.  at 1020. In so 
holding the court said, "[I]n almost every setting where important decisions 
turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and 
cross-examine adverse witnesses." Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, 90 S. Ct.  at 1021. 
The opinion emphasized, however, that it was dealing with factual disputes 
between a department and recipients, the resolution of which would result in the 
termination or continuation of benefit payments.

"These rights are 
important in cases such as those before us, where recipients have challenged 
proposed terminations as resting on incorrect or misleading factual premises or 
on misapplication of rules or policies to the facts of particular cases." 
Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, 90 S. Ct.  at 1020.

In footnote 15, 
Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, 90 S. Ct.  at 1020, the court pointed out that it did 
not address a situation in which there were no factual issues in dispute or in 
which application of the law was not intertwined with factual 
issues.

[¶11.]  Walker's complaint presents just such a case. 
There are no factual questions in dispute so far as this record discloses. There 
is no question that both of the minor boys are Marcia Walker's sons and that 
they fall within the new regulations defining an assistance unit. There is no 
question that the one son receives social security in the amount of $368 per 
month. The only questions of fact which Walker claims could be determined at the 
fair hearing are (1) that the new assistance unit factors were not properly 
promulgated under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, §§ 16-3-101 et seq., 
W.S. 1977, and (2) that the need level, which ultimately determines the amount 
of the benefit for a given assistance unit, was not properly 
established.

[¶12.]  As we understand Walker's brief and 
argument before this court, she contends that unless afforded a fair hearing she 
will have no forum in which to present challenges to the standard of need 
established by the Department of Health and Social Services; to the adoption of 
federal regulations in applying the Wyoming AFDC program without following the 
requirements for promulgation of the rules under the Wyoming statutes; and to 
the provisions in certain rules which she contends deny her an impartial 
decision maker. The district court correctly referred to § 16-3-106, W.S. 1977, 
as the appropriate statutory procedure to treat with such issues. A fair hearing 
such as that which Walker seeks is not the appropriate forum for 
resolving these questions. Even so Walker is not left without a remedy. In Rocky 
Mountain Oil and Gas Association v. State, Wyo., 645 P.2d 1163, 1168 (1982), 
this court said that where "desired relief concerns the validity and 
construction of agency regulations, or if it concerns the constitutionality or 
interpretation of a statute upon which the administrative action is, or is to 
be, based the [declaratory judgment] action should be entertained." Despite her 
protestations to the contrary, Marcia Walker has an appropriate 
remedy.

[¶13.]  It is clear from the focus of the 
arguments in her brief and at oral argument that the "facts" which Walker would have resolved 
in a hearing are legislative facts.

"Legislative facts are 
the facts which help the tribunal determine the content of law and of policy * * 
*. Legislative facts are ordinarily general and do not concern the immediate 
parties." Scarlett v. Town Council, Town of Jackson, Teton County, Wyo., 463 P.2d 26, 29 n. 5 (1969), quoting 2 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 15.03 at 
353 (1958).

The requirement 
of due process of law that an opportunity be afforded to be heard on issues of 
adjudicative facts does not necessarily encompass any similar hearing on 
legislative facts. Scarlett v. Town Council, Town of Jackson, Teton County, 
supra, citing Londoner v. City and County of Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 28 S. Ct. 708, 
52 L. Ed. 1103 (1908) and Bi-Metallic Investment Company v. State Board of 
Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 36 S. Ct. 141, 60 L. Ed. 371 
(1915), and quoting 1 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 7.04 at 
420 (1958).

Often it is 
difficult to determine whether facts are legislative or adjudicative, but 
adjudicative facts "relate to the parties, their activities, their properties, 
their businesses." Scarlett v. Town Council, Town of Jackson, TetonCounty, supra, citing 2 Davis, supra, § 15.03 at 
353. The right to a hearing is determined by whether the agency is acting in a 
legislative or adjudicative capacity. Foster's Inc. v. City 
of Laramie, Wyo., 718 P.2d 868 
(1986); McGann v. City Council of City 
of Laramie, Wyo., 581 P.2d 1104 (1978).

"Legislative action 
produces a general rule or policy which applies to a general class of 
individuals, interests or situations. Judicial or adjudicatory functions apply 
generally to identifiable persons and specific situations." Holdings Little 
America v. Board of CountyCommissioners of Laramie County, Wyo., 670 P.2d 699, 702 
(1983).

We have been 
consistent in recognizing that a different result may flow depending upon 
whether the facts to be settled are legislative or 
adjudicative.

[¶14.]  The opinion in Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, 
is compatible with the distinction this court has made between adjudicative 
facts and legislative facts. As it has been construed by lower federal courts, 
that decision does not require a pre-termination hearing in a situation in which 
the sole questions to be decided clearly are not what we denominate as 
adjudicative facts. Russo v. Kirby, 453 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1971); Becker v. 
Conn, 518 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.Ky. 1980). In this latter case the court relied upon Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976), in which the Supreme 
Court structured a three-step test involving the balancing of interests to 
determine whether a pre-termination hearing was required. In the light of Becker 
v. Conn, 
supra, we conclude that the due process requirement for a hearing pertains only 
when it is appropriate to test the truth of factual issues which affect the 
beneficiary's eligibility. In this instance Walker seeks to contest legal issues only, and 
the balancing factors suggested in Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, lead to a 
conclusion that a hearing was not required.

[¶15.]  Walker argues, however, that she is involved in 
a contested case as defined in § 16-3-101, W.S. 1977, and she therefore is 
entitled to a hearing without regard to the federal statutes, regulations, or 
case authority. Under the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, § 
16-3-101(b)(ii), W.S. 1977:

"`Contested case' means a 
proceeding including but not restricted to ratemaking, price fixing and 
licensing, in which legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are required 
by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for hearing; * * 
*."

Walker asserts that the 
Department denied her a hearing by relying upon 45 C.F.R. § 205.10(a)(5)(1982), 
and that this reliance was improper because of her claimed right to a hearing 
pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. The upshot, she again 
asserts, is a denial of her right to due process of law.

[¶16.]  We conclude that Walker's position in this 
regard begs the question of whether a contested case is present in these 
circumstances and assumes the applicability of the contested case definition. 
The "rights, duties or privileges of a party" which the statute requires to be 
determined by an agency after an opportunity for a hearing must necessitate a 
trial-type hearing before the proceeding meets the statutory definition. 
Scarlett v. Town Council, Town of Jackson, 
TetonCounty, supra. In Lund v. 
Schrader, Wyo., 492 P.2d 202, 209 (1971), this court said, "[W]e made it clear 
in the Scarlett opinion that contested cases were not involved in legislative or 
argumentative-type hearings."

"[A]n administrative 
matter qualifies as a contested case where the law, independent of the Wyoming 
Administrative Procedure Act, requires rights to be determined after an 
opportunity for a trial type hearing." In re Application for Certificate of Need 
by HCA Health Services of Wyoming, Inc., Wyo., 689 P.2d 108, 110 (1984), citing 
Diefenderfer v. Budd, Wyo., 563 P.2d 1355 (1977), and Thornley v. Wyoming 
Highway Department, Motor Vehicle Division, Wyo., 478 P.2d 600 
(1971).

[¶17.]  Walker's position that the Department 
should not have relied upon federal regulations in denying a hearing does not 
take into account the proposition that in cooperative state-federal programs 
such as this, the state provisions derive "meaning and substance from the 
corresponding federal enactments." In re Application for Certificate of Need by 
HCA Health Services of Wyoming, supra, 689 P.2d  at 113. The corresponding 
federal enactments in this instance begin with 45 C.F.R. § 206.10(1982), which 
requires that when there is proposed action to terminate assistance the agency 
must give timely and adequate notice which must comply with the provisions of 45 
C.F.R. § 205.10(1982). That notice, including advice as to an opportunity for a 
hearing, is mandated in every instance. The pertinent portion of 45 C.F.R. § 
205.10 (1982), is found in subsection (a)(5) which states in 
part:

"* * * A hearing need not 
be granted when either State or Federal law requires automatic grant adjustments 
for classes of recipients unless the reason for an individual appeal is 
incorrect grant computation."

Later in 
subparagraph (a)(5)(v) the following language appears:

"The agency may deny * * 
* a request for hearing * * * where the sole issue is one of State or Federal 
law requiring automatic grant adjustments for classes of recipients, * * *." (As 
amended 47 Fed.Reg. 47,827 (1982) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 
205.10)

Obviously this 
regulatory language is designed to be compatible with the decision in Goldberg 
v. Kelly, supra, which specifically is referenced in 45 C.F.R. § 
205.10(a)(1)(ii)(1982).

[¶18.]  The procedures of the Department of 
Health and Social Services do not conflict with the federal regulations cited 
and quoted above. The Department is required to notify recipients of the 
opportunity for a fair hearing. Wyoming Public Assistance Manual, § 5008.03. 
The rules and regulations of the Department, however, provide that a fair 
hearing need not be held in every case. Section 5(b)(1)(c), Rules and 
Regulations, Department of Health and Social Services, State of Wyoming, 
Procedures for the Conduct of Contested Case Hearings, 
provides:

"* * * A hearing may be 
denied if the request for a hearing does not meet the definition of a contested 
case. * * *"

Contested case 
is defined in § 4(c) of those Rules as:

"[A] proceeding by the 
Department or its divisions, involving, * * * benefit determination or level of 
benefits, * * * in which legal rights, duties or privileges of a party are 
required by law or regulation to be determined by the 
Department."

[¶19.]  Walker then insists that this is exactly the 
effect of § 42-1-115, W.S. 1977. Walker's reliance upon this statutory provision 
is not well founded. That statute provides:

"The Department, upon 
receipt of such an appeal, shall give the applicant or recipient reasonable 
notice and opportunity for a fair hearing. The Department may make such 
additional investigation as it may deem necessary and shall make such decision 
as to the providing of social services and the granting of assistance and the 
amount of assistance to be granted as in its opinion is justified, and in 
conformity with the provisions of this act." Section 42-1-115(b) W.S. 
1977.

The language of 
this statute is consistent with the provisions of 45 C.F.R. § 205.10, as 
amended, 47 Fed.Reg. 5673 (1982) and 47 Fed.Reg. 47,827 
(1982).

[¶20.]  Although an opportunity for hearing is 
recognized by both the state and federal regulations, it is clear that under the 
federal regulations a hearing is not mandated in all instances. This is an 
instance in which a hearing is not mandated by the federal regulations, and it 
appropriately follows that because the state provisions are supplemented by the 
federal regulations, In re Application for Certificate of Need by HCA Health 
Services of Wyoming, supra, one may be denied under these state statutes. As we 
have indicated, a hearing is not required under due process of law because of 
the nature of the issue presented by Walker, and 
Walker has not 
directed us to any other provision of state law which seems to require the 
invocation of the contested case procedure. There are no factual issues that 
could be resolved in such a hearing.

[¶21.]  We next address the contention of 
Walker that she 
has been denied an impartial decision maker in this case because the agency 
rules and regulations provide that the director, after reviewing the hearing 
officer's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, shall make a final 
decision. Section 15(b), Rules and Regulations, Department of Health and Social 
Services, State of Wyoming, Procedures for the Conduct of Contested Case 
Hearings. In this instance we have ruled that Walker is not entitled to a hearing. 
Consequently, whether the rule about which she complains violates procedural due 
process guarantees is not a justiciable question.

"* * * The criteria which 
qualify a justiciable controversy are set out in Brimmer v. Thomson, [Wyo.], supra, 521 P.2d 
[574] at 578 [(1974)] * * *:

"`* * * First, a 
justiciable controversy requires parties having existing and genuine, as 
distinguished from theoretical, rights or interests. Second, the controversy 
must be one upon which the judgment of the court may effectively operate, as 
distinguished from a debate or argument, evoking a purely political, 
administrative, philosophical or academic conclusion. Third, it must be a 
controversy the judicial determination of which will have the force and effect 
of a final judgment in law or decree in equity upon the rights, status or other 
legal relationships of one or more of the real parties in interest * * *.'" 
Washakie County School District No. One v. Herschler, Wyo., 606 P.2d 310, 
317-318, reh. denied, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 828, 101 S. Ct. 86, 66 L. Ed. 2d 28 
(1980).

Furthermore, in 
accordance with the standards reviewed in Gooden v. State, Wyo., 711 P.2d 405 
(1985), Walker has not demonstrated standing to assert this question. Under the 
circumstances we do not address it.

[¶22.]  We then turn to the claim that the 
district court erred in not proceeding with judicial review pursuant to the 
provisions of § 16-3-114, W.S. 1977, ruling instead that review is foreclosed 
because of the provisions of § 16-3-106, W.S. 1977. This court will affirm 
rulings of the district court for any proper reason appearing of record, even if 
the articulated reasons are incorrect. Committee to Restore Mayor-Council Form 
of Government v. City of Rawlins, Wyo., 692 P.2d 944 (1984); Anderson v. Bauer, 
Wyo., 681 P.2d 1316 (1984); Mentock v. Mentock, Wyo., 638 P.2d 156 (1981). In 
this case we also have applied the concept that when the case comes to us from a 
district court acting as an intermediate appellate court we review the case as 
if it had been appealed directly to this court without affording special 
deference to the rulings of the district court. Employment Security Commission 
v. Laramie Cabs, Inc., Wyo., 700 P.2d 399 (1985); Kloefkorn-Ballard Construction 
and Development, Inc. v. North Big Horn Hospital District, Wyo., 683 P.2d 656 
(1984); Mountain Fuel Supply Company v. Public Service Commission of Wyoming, 
Wyo., 662 P.2d 878 (1983).

[¶23.]  Consistently with these propositions we 
affirm the action of the district court in this regard because of our holding 
that the agency action was lawful. Given that ruling the dispute about the 
appropriate modes of review substantially is moot.

[¶24.]  Finally we address Walker's claim that 
the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow briefing or oral 
argument on the petition for review. Section 16-3-114(a), W.S. 1977, provides 
that "[t]he procedure to be followed in the proceeding [review] before the 
district court shall be in accordance with rules * * * adopted by the Wyoming 
supreme court." Rule 12.09, W.R.A.P., states in pertinent part that "[t]he 
district court may receive written briefs and hear oral argument in its 
discretion." Thus, Walker must depend upon an abuse of discretion in asserting 
error in this regard.

"A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law 
committed by the court under the circumstances. [Citations omitted.]" Martinez 
v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 (1980).

When the issue 
is abuse of discretion by the trial court what is being tested is the propriety 
of a ruling. If this court is convinced that under the circumstances the lower 
court exceeded the bounds of reason or could not have reached the conclusion 
represented by its ruling in any reasonable way then an abuse of discretion has 
been identified. This court reverses errors of law, and if a trial court is to 
be reversed for an abuse of discretion then its action must be characterized as 
an error of law.

[¶25.]  We have held, however, that the trial 
court correctly affirmed the agency's denial of a hearing. In light of the 
correctness of the decision of the district court, no matter how it was reached, 
we cannot say that there occurred an abuse of discretion in the denial of a 
request for the presentation of written briefs or oral 
argument.

[¶26.]  The order of the district court affirming 
the rulings of the Department denying a hearing in the case of Marcia Walker is 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Walker has not furnished 
us a succinct statement of the issues to be decided in accordance with Rule 
5.01, W.R.A.P. Our rule does not contemplate a prolix and rambling narrative 
such as that found in Walker's brief. In Cline v. Safeco Insurance 
Companies, Wyo., 614 P.2d 1335 (1980), this court pointed out that a failure to 
provide a list of issues violates Rule 5.01, W.R.A.P., and in that case and in 
Mariner v. Marsden, Wyo., 610 P.2d 6 (1980), the court criticized the 
presentation of arguments that did not correspond definitively with the 
statement of issues.