Case Title: DEKK Property Development, LLC v. Wisconsin Dep't of Transportation

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2020AP002146

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2023-04-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
2023 WI 30 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP2146 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
DEKK Property Development, LLC, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
Reported at 400 Wis. 2d 548, 971 N.W.2d 201 
(2022 – unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
April 18, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 1, 2022   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
Anthony G. Milisauskas   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ROGGENSACK, DALLET and 
HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a 
concurring opinion. 
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Alan Marcuvitz, Andrea Roschke, Smitha Chintamaneni, 
Adam S. Bazelon, and von Briesen & Roper, S.C., Milwaukee. There 
was an oral argument by Alan Marcuvitz.  
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Hannah S. Jurss, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral 
argument by Hannah S. Jurss, assistant attorney general.
 
 
2023 WI 30 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2020AP2146 
(L.C. No. 
2019CV1226) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
DEKK Property Development, LLC, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Wisconsin Department of Transportation, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
FILED 
 
APR 18, 2023 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ZIEGLER, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ROGGENSACK, DALLET and 
HAGEDORN, JJ., joined. REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed a 
concurring opinion. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Modified, 
and as modified, affirmed. 
 
¶1 
JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.   This controversy stems from a 
driveway closure——specifically, the Wisconsin Department of 
Transportation's (DOT's) closure of a driveway connecting DEKK 
Property Development, LLC's (DEKK's) property to State Trunk 
Highway (STH) 50.  DEKK is seeking compensation for the closure.  
The case potentially raises two questions:  (1) whether DEKK may 
seek compensation for the driveway closure in a "right-to-take" 
No. 
2020AP2146   
 
2 
 
action under Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5)(2021-22),1 and (2) if so, 
whether DOT must compensate DEKK for the closure.  We hold that 
DEKK may not bring its claim under § 32.05(5), and thus we do 
not reach the second question.  Section 32.05(5) provides a 
means to challenge DOT's right to take property described in a 
jurisdictional offer issued under § 32.05(3), and here DOT's 
jurisdictional offer to DEKK did not describe any removal of 
access to STH 50.  Therefore, the circuit court2 should have 
granted DOT's summary judgment motion and dismissed DEKK's 
claim.  Because this procedural issue is dispositive, we do not 
decide the question of whether DEKK might be owed compensation 
had it challenged the driveway closure via a different avenue. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
DEKK owns approximately four acres of property (the 
Property) in Kenosha County near the southeast corner of STH 50 
and County Highway (CTH) H.  The following is an aerial photo of 
the Property.3  STH 50 runs east-west along the top of the photo, 
and CTH H runs north-south on the left.  There is one driveway 
from the Property to STH 50, which DOT seeks to close, and one 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2021-22 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 The Honorable Anthony G. Milisauskas of the Kenosha County 
Circuit Court presided. 
3 This aerial photo is from an appraisal report DOT 
commissioned before issuing an offer to purchase a portion of 
DEKK's property that abuts CTH H.  We have added labels for CTH 
H and STH 50 to aid the reader in understanding the layout of 
the Property. 
No. 
2020AP2146   
 
3 
 
driveway from the Property to CTH H, which will remain available 
for use. 
¶3 
In 1961, the former owners of a portion of the 
property deeded to Kenosha County (acting as an agent for DOT) 
"the Right of Access, including all existing, future, or 
potential common law . . . rights of access" to STH 50, along 
with a tract of land adjacent to STH 50.  This tract included 
the land on which the contested STH 50 driveway is located.  The 
deed included the following exception: 
Except there is reserved the right of access to said 
highway by means of one restricted driveway same to be 
STH 
50 
CTH 
H 
No. 
2020AP2146   
 
4 
 
used only for barber shop purposes for the term of 
fifteen years from date of this conveyance and then to 
become 
a 
private 
driveway 
conforming 
to 
the 
regulations of the State Highway Commission.  Said 
driveway is to be constructed with its eastern limits 
along the east line of the owner's property line in 
conformance with State Highway Commission policy. 
There is little information on any subsequent use or development 
of the STH 50 driveway in the record. 
¶4 
In 2019, DOT sought to acquire another part of the 
Property——a strip of land abutting CTH H——as part of a project 
to improve STH 50.  After DOT decided to acquire the CTH H 
parcel, it commissioned an appraisal of the parcel as required 
by Wis. Stat. § 32.05(2)(a).  The appraisal report assessed the 
CTH H parcel, and explained that DOT was not seeking to acquire 
any access rights.  The report noted that the driveway between 
the Property and STH 50 (located on a different part of the 
Property than the CTH H parcel) would have to be closed.  It 
also noted that DOT would not compensate DEKK for the STH 50 
driveway because the commercial building that the driveway 
formerly served had been demolished, and redevelopment of the 
property would "likely require new driveway approvals in an 
alternate location farther from the intersection." 
¶5 
After DOT provided the appraisal report to DEKK, DEKK 
emailed DOT to ask about the lack of compensation for the STH 50 
driveway closure.  A DOT real estate specialist explained that 
"at the time of acquisition the current driveway will still 
remain in place," and that any revocation of the access point 
would be "non-compensable now because it has not happened yet, 
and if it ever did, it would be through police power." 
No. 
2020AP2146   
 
5 
 
¶6 
DOT then issued a jurisdictional offer to DEKK as 
required by Wis. Stat. § 32.05(3).  In the jurisdictional offer, 
DOT offered to purchase the CTH H parcel for $272,100.  It did 
not offer to purchase any access rights, allocate compensation 
for any loss of access rights, or reference any driveway 
closures.  The jurisdictional offer included a Transportation 
Project Plat, which denoted the property interests DOT sought to 
acquire.  We include the relevant portion of the Plat below: 
The CTH H parcel is identified on the left side of the Property.  
Arrows point to the part of the parcel DOT sought to purchase in 
fee simple (indicated by diagonal lines), the part on which it 
sought a temporary limited easement (indicated by dots), and the 
part on which it sought a permanent limited easement (too small 
No. 
2020AP2146   
 
6 
 
to be visible on this Plat).  DEKK does not challenge the 
purchase of the land or easements. 
¶7 
After DOT issued the jurisdictional offer, DEKK filed 
an action under Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5) in the Kenosha County 
Circuit Court.  DEKK did not challenge the acquisition of the 
CTH H parcel, but instead challenged "DOT's right to remove 
DEKK's rights of access to STH 50."  Both DOT and DEKK moved for 
summary judgment. 
¶8 
Shortly after the filing of the summary judgment 
motions, but before the circuit court's decision, DOT sent a 
letter to DEKK providing "official notice" that it "plan[ned] to 
remove the existing driveway from State Highway 50 . . . during 
an upcoming improvement project."  The letter explained that 
under Wis. Admin. Code § Trans 231.03(2), the number of 
driveways serving a property along a state trunk highway shall 
be the "minimum" deemed necessary "for reasonable service to the 
property without the undue impairment of safety, convenience, 
and utility of the highway," and "[r]emoving unnecessary access 
points . . . increases the mobility of the highway facility 
while reducing the potential for crashes as vehicles enter and 
leave the highway."  The letter further explained that DEKK 
could contest the removal by submitting an objection letter to 
DOT, and DOT would then send a "revocation letter" if either 
DEKK failed to respond to the notice or DOT upheld its 
revocation decision.  Because DEKK  initiated this challenge 
under Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5) prior to DOT sending the official 
notice, the record is unclear as to whether DEKK took advantage 
No. 
2020AP2146   
 
7 
 
of 
DOT's 
administrative 
review 
process, 
or 
whether 
DOT 
subsequently sent a revocation letter. 
¶9 
After receiving the notice, DEKK filed a motion for a 
temporary restraining order and injunction to prevent DOT from 
closing the driveway.  The circuit court granted DEKK's motion 
for the injunction along with its motion for summary judgment, 
reasoning that DEKK had "some sort of right of access" to the 
driveway and thus deserved compensation for its closure.  The 
court further determined that DEKK properly filed its claim 
under Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5).  DOT appealed, and the court of 
appeals reversed, reasoning that the 1961 transaction only 
reserved the right to use the driveway subject to DOT 
regulations, and DOT was within its rights to close the driveway 
without compensation as an exercise of police power.  Because 
the court of appeals held for DOT on the merits, it did not 
address DOT's alternative argument that § 32.05(5) was not the 
proper procedural mechanism for DEKK's claim.  We granted DEKK's 
petition for review and now affirm the court of appeals on the 
alternative procedural grounds. 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶10 This case requires us to review the circuit court's 
decision to grant summary judgment for DEKK and deny summary 
judgment for DOT.  Summary judgment is appropriate when there is 
no genuine issue of material fact and a party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.  McKee Fam. I, LLC v. City of 
Fitchburg, 2017 WI 34, ¶27, 374 Wis. 2d 487, 893 N.W.2d 12.  We 
review summary judgment decisions independently.  Id. 
No. 
2020AP2146   
 
8 
 
¶11 In determining whether either party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law, we must determine whether DEKK may 
bring its claim under Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5).  To do so, we must 
interpret and apply the statute.  Statutory interpretation 
presents a question of law that we review independently.  260 N. 
12th St., LLC v. DOT, 2011 WI 103, ¶39, 338 Wis. 2d 34, 808 
N.W.2d 372. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
¶12 We begin our analysis with a brief review of the 
relevant principles and procedures that apply when DOT seeks to 
acquire private property by eminent domain.  We then turn to the 
different means by which property owners may challenge or seek 
compensation for DOT's actions.  Finally, we examine whether in 
this case DEKK may bring its claim in a Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5) 
right-to-take action. 
¶13 When DOT determines that it is necessary to take 
private property under its eminent domain authority, it must pay 
just compensation.  U.S. Const. amend. V. ("nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation."); 
Wis. Const. art. I, § 13 ("The property of no person shall be 
taken for public use without just compensation therefor.").  But 
not all state actions that affect private property result in a 
compensable taking.  118th St. Kenosha, LLC v. DOT, 2014 WI 125, 
¶32, 359 Wis. 2d 30, 856 N.W.2d 486.  Injuries to property that 
result from a valid exercise of the state's police power are 
generally not compensable.  Nick v. State Highway Comm'n, 13 
No. 
2020AP2146   
 
9 
 
Wis. 2d 511, 514, 109 N.W.2d 71 (1961).  Compensable eminent 
domain and non-compensable police power actions "can occur 
contemporaneously," and DOT may exercise both its police power 
and its eminent domain authority as part of the same highway 
construction project.  118th St. Kenosha, LLC, 359 Wis. 2d 30, 
¶¶31-33. 
¶14 When DOT exercises its eminent domain authority to 
obtain private land for transportation projects, it must follow 
the procedures set forth in Wis. Stat. § 32.05.  Under that 
statute, once DOT determines that it must acquire a piece of 
property, it is required to seek an appraisal of the property, 
provide the owner a copy of the appraisal report, and confer 
with 
the 
owner, 
if 
reasonably 
possible. 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.05(2)(a).  DOT must then attempt to negotiate with the 
owner for the property.  § 32.05(2a).  If negotiations are 
unsuccessful, DOT issues a jurisdictional offer to purchase the 
property.  The jurisdictional offer describes the property and 
the compensation being offered (among other requirements).  
§ 32.05(3).  If the property owner rejects the offer, the owner 
may file a "right-to-take" action under § 32.05(5) to contest 
DOT's 
right 
to 
take 
the 
property 
"described 
in 
the 
jurisdictional offer."  § 32.05(5). 
¶15 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.05(5) is just one of several 
statutes that enable property owners to challenge DOT when DOT 
undertakes 
highway 
construction 
projects 
affecting 
private 
No. 
2020AP2146   
 
10 
 
property.4  See TFJ Nominee Tr. v. DOT, 2001 WI App 116, ¶¶25-26, 
244 Wis. 2d 242, 629 N.W.2d 57.  The appropriate statute depends 
on the facts of the case and the nature of the challenged 
governmental action.  These statutes are not interchangeable, 
and "even if a highway construction project results in damages 
that are compensable under a particular statute, those damages 
cannot be recovered in a claim brought under the wrong statute."  
118th St. Kenosha, LLC, 359 Wis. 2d 30, ¶33. 
¶16 Moreover, even when DOT undertakes different projects 
that are part of the same overall highway construction project, 
"that does not necessarily merge each project into one single 
compensable act."  Id.  Importantly here, different projects are 
not necessarily merged into a single compensable act even when 
the projects affect the same property owner, or occur around the 
same time.  For instance, in 118th Street Kenosha v. DOT, DOT 
undertook two separate actions as part of the same highway 
improvement project: (1) relocating a highway, which eliminated 
the property owner's direct access to the highway, and (2) 
                                                 
4 For instance, if an owner believes that DOT took a 
property right, but failed to properly condemn the property by 
following the procedures set out in Wis. Stat. § 32.05, the 
owner may file an action for inverse condemnation under Wis. 
Stat. § 32.10.  See TFJ Nominee Tr. v. DOT, 2001 WI App 116, 
¶25, 244 Wis. 2d 242, 629 N.W.2d 57.  Additionally, if DOT 
revokes a permit for a driveway to a state trunk highway, the 
owner may challenge DOT's revocation under the procedures set 
out in Wis. Stat. § 86.073, which include the right to appeal 
DOT's final determination under the 
administrative review 
procedures set out in Wis. Stat. ch. 227.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 86.073(3); Wis. Stat. § 227.43(1)(bg). 
No. 
2020AP2146   
 
11 
 
acquiring a temporary limited easement from the owner in order 
to build a driveway to a private road that intersected with the 
highway.  Id., ¶2.  The property owner sought damages under Wis. 
Stat. § 32.09(6g) for the diminution in value to its property 
caused by the relocation of the highway.  We held that the owner 
could not do so under § 32.09(6g) because § 32.09(6g) provided a 
means to seek damages resulting from the taking of an easement, 
and the damages sought by the owner did not result from the 
easement.  Id., ¶57. 
¶17 Taking these principles together, we must determine 
whether DEKK may seek damages under Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5) for 
DOT's closure of the STH 50 driveway.  The statute reads in 
pertinent part as follows: 
If an owner decides to contest the right of the 
condemnor to condemn the property described in the 
jurisdictional offer, for any reason other than that 
the amount of compensation offered is inadequate, the 
owner may within 40 days from the date of personal 
service of the jurisdictional offer . . . commence an 
action in the circuit court of the county wherein the 
property 
is 
located, 
naming 
the 
condemnor 
as 
defendant.  Such action shall be the only manner in 
which any issue other than the amount of just 
compensation . . . may be raised pertaining to the 
condemnation 
of 
the 
property 
described 
in 
the 
jurisdictional offer . . . .  Nothing in this section 
shall be construed to limit in any respect the right 
to determine the necessity of taking as conferred by 
s. 32.07 nor to prevent the condemnor from proceeding 
with condemnation during the pendency of the action to 
contest the right to condemn. 
Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5). 
¶18 Section 32.05(5) sets out a process by which DEKK may 
"contest the right of the condemnor," here, DOT, "to condemn the 
No. 
2020AP2146   
 
12 
 
property described in the jurisdictional offer."  Actions under 
§ 32.05(5) are limited to issues "pertaining to the condemnation 
of the property described in the jurisdictional offer."  Wis. 
Stat. § 32.05(5); see Warehouse II, LLC v. DOT, 2006 WI 62, ¶24, 
291 Wis. 2d 80, 715 N.W.2d 213 (explaining that § 32.05(5) 
permits owners to challenge the government's right to condemn 
the property described in the jurisdictional offer).  Put 
simply, if DEKK's access to STH 50 is "described in the 
jurisdictional offer," then § 32.05(5) would be the proper 
procedural mechanism by which DEKK could bring its claim.  If 
not, then DEKK may not recover damages under that statute, and 
its action should be dismissed.  See 118th St. Kenosha, LLC, 359 
Wis. 2d 30, ¶33. 
¶19 We therefore turn to DOT's jurisdictional offer to 
determine whether it describes any such access right.  The 
jurisdictional offer states that DOT "offers to purchase a 
parcel of real estate and/or rights therein in which [DEKK] 
own[s] an interest as described on attached page, and within 60 
days from the acceptance of this offer agrees to pay the sum of: 
Two Hundred Seventy-Two Thousand One Hundred and 0/100 Dollars 
(272,100.00)."  The attached page provides a legal description 
of the CTH H parcel.  The parcel described does not touch the 
STH 50 driveway that is in dispute here.  While the parcel 
described does include the CTH H driveway, both DEKK and DOT 
agree that DEKK retains access to CTH H via that driveway.  The 
parcel 
description 
also 
incorporates 
by 
reference 
"[a]ny 
interest or rights not listed above for said parcel but shown as 
No. 
2020AP2146   
 
13 
 
required on [Transportation Project Plat 1310-10-22]."  Of 
import here, the referenced Plat does not indicate that DOT was 
seeking to remove any STH 50 access rights.5  The Plat only 
highlights the fee simple, permanent limited easement, and 
temporary limited easement that DOT sought to acquire, none of 
which connect to the STH 50 driveway. 
¶20 The rest of the jurisdictional offer similarly does 
not describe the removal of any STH 50 access rights——instead, 
it relates only to the taking of the CTH H parcel.  The offer 
allocates the bulk of its purchase price to "[l]oss of land, 
including improvements and fixtures actually being acquired," 
and the rest to rounding and the easements DOT sought on the CTH 
H parcel.  The offer allocates zero dollars to "Damages caused 
by loss of existing rights of access," and it does not otherwise 
mention any access rights. 
¶21 If DEKK sought to challenge DOT's right to take the 
CTH H parcel, Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5) would be the appropriate 
means to do so.  However, § 32.05(5) is not the appropriate 
means for determining the nature of DEKK's access rights to STH 
50, whether those rights are being impeded, or whether any such 
impediment is compensable.  See TFJ Nominee Tr., 244 Wis. 2d 
242, ¶2.  Because the jurisdictional offer does not describe the 
                                                 
5 The referenced Plat does show that DOT restricted access 
to STH 50 in a 2003 project, but it does not indicate that DOT 
is taking any access rights as part of the current project.   
No. 
2020AP2146   
 
14 
 
STH 50 driveway closure or any loss of access rights, DEKK may 
not challenge the closure under § 32.05(5). 
¶22 DEKK's arguments to the contrary are unavailing.  DEKK 
relies primarily on Waller v. American Transmission Company, in 
which we held that property owners could raise an uneconomic 
remnant claim in a Wis. Stat. § 32.06(5)6 proceeding.  2013 WI 
77, ¶118, 350 Wis. 2d 242, 833 N.W.2d 764.  But DEKK is not 
raising an uneconomic remnant claim——that is, it does not argue 
that the taking of the CTH H parcel leaves its remaining 
property in "such size, shape or condition as to be of little 
value or of substantially impaired economic viability."  See 
Wis. Stat. § 32.05(3m) (defining "uneconomic remnant").  Waller 
does not stand for the broad proposition that a property owner 
may challenge any DOT action under § 32.05(5).  This proposed 
expansion of Waller would run contrary to the plain language of 
§ 32.05(5), which is limited to issues "pertaining to the 
condemnation of the property described in the jurisdictional 
offer" (emphasis added).  Here, DEKK does not challenge the 
taking of the CTH H parcel described in the jurisdictional 
offer, or allege that the taking left it with an uneconomic 
remnant, but instead challenges the closure of a driveway on a 
different part of its Property.  That the driveway closure and 
                                                 
6 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.06(5) provides a means for property 
owners to challenge the government's right to take property 
under § 32.06, which sets out the condemnation procedures for 
non-transportation-related takings.  The relevant language in 
§ 32.06(5) is nearly identical to § 32.05(5).  
No. 
2020AP2146   
 
15 
 
the taking of the CTH H parcel may be part of a larger project 
to improve STH 50 does not "merge each project into one single 
compensable act."  See 118th St. Kenosha, LLC, 359 Wis. 2d 30, 
¶33.  Consequently, DEKK may not pursue damages for the driveway 
closure under § 32.05(5). 
¶23 Because we decide the case on this narrow ground, we 
need not decide whether DEKK might recover damages for the 
driveway closure through a different procedural avenue.  See Md. 
Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 
786 N.W.2d 15.  ("Typically, an appellate court should decide 
cases on the narrowest possible grounds.  Issues that are not 
dispositive need not be addressed." (citation omitted)). 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
¶24 DEKK may not recover damages for the closure of the 
STH 50 driveway under Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5) because the access 
rights that DEKK alleges it lost were distinct from the taking 
described in DOT's jurisdictional offer.  Summary judgment 
should therefore be granted in DOT's favor. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
modified, and as modified, affirmed. 
No.  2020AP2146.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶25 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.   (concurring).   
To empower government excessively is to endanger the 
very rights government is constituted to secure. 
Peter C. Myers, From Natural Rights to Human Rights——And Beyond 
33 (2017). 
¶26 The majority properly resolves this case on limited 
procedural grounds; I agree that DEKK's claim for compensation 
cannot be brought under Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5).  Instead of 
limiting its analysis to what it properly characterizes as a 
dispositive procedural issue, the majority nevertheless makes 
unnecessary, overly broad, and inaccurate statements about the 
availability of compensation to property owners stemming from 
the exercise of the state's police power.  I write separately 
because the majority opinion could be misconstrued to undermine 
constitutionally protected private property rights; I therefore 
do not join it. 
¶27 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits 
private property from being taken for public use without just 
compensation.  U.S. Const. amend. V.  The Wisconsin Constitution 
similarly provides that "[t]he property of no person shall be 
taken for public use without just compensation therefor."  Wis. 
Const. art. I, § 13.  The majority jumps from reciting the 
constitutional limits on the power of the government to take 
private property, to asserting that "[i]njuries to property that 
result from a valid exercise of the state's police power are 
generally not compensable."  Majority op., ¶13.  Exceptions and 
caveats abound but go unmentioned by the majority, leaving the 
mistaken impression that the government may injure property and 
No.  2020AP2146.rgb 
 
2 
 
deny compensation to the affected property owner merely by 
invoking its police power.  Of course this is not true and never 
has been since the people established the government in order to 
secure the people's rights:   
We assume that one of the uses of the convenient 
phrase "police power" is to justify those small 
diminutions of property rights which, although within 
the 
letter 
of 
constitutional 
protection, 
are 
necessarily incident to the free play of the machinery 
of government.  It may be that the extent to which 
such diminutions are lawful without compensation is 
larger when the harm is inflicted only as incident to 
some general requirement of public welfare.  But, 
whether the last-mentioned element enters into the 
problem or not, the question is one of degree, and 
sooner or later we reach the point at which the 
constitution 
applies 
and 
forbids 
physical 
appropriation and legal restrictions alike, unless 
they are paid for. 
Bent v. Emery, 173 Mass. 495, 496, 53 N.E. 910 (1899) (emphasis 
added).   
¶28 In this case, we need not determine whether the 
Department of Transportation (DOT) exercised its police power 
"to justify . . . small diminutions of property rights" or 
instead reached the point of physically appropriating private 
property or so restricting it as to trigger the constitutional 
command for compensation to the property owner.  Chapters 32 and 
86 of the Wisconsin Statutes outline various procedural avenues 
for property owners to challenge the government's deprivation of 
an asserted right of access and to seek compensation.  In this 
case, DEKK seeks compensation for DOT's alleged elimination of a 
deeded right of access to STH 50.  As the majority explains, 
No.  2020AP2146.rgb 
 
3 
 
Wis. Stat. § 32.05 is not the proper statute for seeking just 
compensation. 
¶29 The 
majority 
confuses 
the 
dispositive 
procedural 
issue, 
ostensibly 
rejecting 
DEKK's 
claim 
because 
"DOT's 
jurisdictional offer to DEKK did not describe any removal of 
access to STH 50."  Majority op., ¶1.  The majority's framing of 
its holding suggests DOT could avoid paying just compensation by 
simply omitting the removal of access to STH 50 from its 
jurisdictional offer.  Of course the law would not countenance 
such gamesmanship.  The court rejects DEKK's just compensation 
claim against DOT because DEKK brought that claim under Wis. 
Stat. § 32.05, which governs takings challenges initiated "for 
any reason other than that the amount of compensation offered is 
inadequate."  Wis. Stat. § 32.05(5) (emphasis added).  DEKK 
purported in its complaint to seek only a "declaration that DOT 
has no power or right under the police power to remove DEKK's 
access rights to STH 50[.]"  As litigation proceeded, DEKK 
altered its posture.  During the hearing on the parties' motions 
for summary judgment, DEKK seemingly conceded DOT may possess 
the power to remove its northern driveway and requested 
compensation: 
What we are looking for here is not an order blocking 
the Department from closing the driveway.  We are only 
asking for summary [judgment] which says, if the 
Department must close this driveway and can establish 
that they need to do so for public safety reasons, 
they 
can 
only 
do 
so 
by 
the 
payment 
of 
just 
compensation. 
 
¶30 Before this court, DEKK again frames the issue in 
terms of compensation:  "Can DOT remove a 'right of access,' 
No.  2020AP2146.rgb 
 
4 
 
contained in a recorded deed made in an eminent domain 
procedure, under the guise of an exercise of the police power, 
without 
prior 
due 
process 
proceedings 
and 
without 
just 
compensation?"  A claim for just compensation cannot be 
litigated under Wis. Stat. § 32.05, which prescribes procedural 
rules the State must follow before condemning property.  Crown 
Zellerbach Corp. v. Dep't of City Dev. Of City of Milwaukee, 47 
Wis. 2d 142, 148, 177 N.W.2d 94 (1970).  Establishing, among 
other things, rules regarding due notice, actions to contest, 
and acceptance of offers, this statute prescribes no criteria or 
procedure for determining whether an offered award reflects the 
fair value of a condemned property.  See generally Wis. Stat. 
§ 32.05.  Those rules are located in Wis. Stat. § 32.09, 
entitled "Rules governing determination of just compensation."  
Pursuant to this statute, courts must adhere to procedures 
adapted to accurately ascertain the value of property loss due 
to condemnation.  Backus v. Waukesha Cnty., 2022 WI 55, ¶22, 402 
Wis. 2d 764, 
976 
N.W.2d 492 
(Rebecca 
Grassl 
Bradley, 
J., 
concurring).  Section 32.09(8), for example, empowers the court 
to require both the condemnor and the owner to "submit . . . a 
statement covering the respective contentions" on a host of 
factors affecting the value of a property.1  Section 32.09 
                                                 
1 Those factors include: 
(a) 
Highest and best use of the property. 
(b) 
Applicable zoning. 
(continued) 
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5 
 
procedures also ensure property owners receive the highest award 
to which they are entitled.  Wis. Stat. § 32.09(2) (requiring 
just 
compensation 
be 
determined 
"on 
the 
basis 
of 
[the 
property's] most advantageous use but only such use as actually 
affects the present market value.").  Property owners seeking 
compensation for condemned property must bring their claims 
under § 32.09.   
¶31 The court's disposition of DEKK's claim is narrowly 
decided 
on 
procedural 
grounds. 
 
The 
majority 
opinion 
unnecessarily makes broad statements about the government's 
authority to exercise its police power without compensation to 
adversely affected property owners.  This is a complex area of 
                                                                                                                                                             
(c) 
Designation of claimed comparable lands, sale 
of which will be used in appraisal opinion 
evidence. 
(d) 
Severance damage, if any. 
(e) 
Maps and pictures to be used. 
(f) 
Costs of reproduction less depreciation and 
rate of depreciation used. 
(g) 
Statements of capitalization of income where 
used as a factor in valuation, with supporting 
data. 
(h) 
Separate opinion as to fair market value, 
including 
before 
and 
after 
value 
where 
applicable by not to exceed 3 appraisers. 
(i) 
A recitation of all damages claimed by owner. 
(j) 
Qualifications 
and 
experience 
of 
witnesses 
offered as experts. 
Wis. Stat. § 32.09(8)(a)–(j). 
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6 
 
the law.  Generalized statements without proper attention to 
legal nuances may inadvertently have profound implications for 
private property owners.  Because the majority should have more 
carefully 
circumscribed 
its 
pronouncements, 
I 
respectfully 
concur but do not join the majority opinion.   
 
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