Case Title: Douglas v. Newell

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-05-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Douglas v. Newell1986 WY 116719 P.2d 971Case Number: 85-105, 85-106Decided: 05/16/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
Donna I. Read DOUGLAS, James L. Read and Joanne Read Trumper, 
Appellants (Plaintiffs),

v.

Donald L. NEWELL and Earl 
R. Cherry, Jr., Personal Representatives of the Estate of Elizabeth Newell, 
Appellees (Defendants).

Donald L. NEWELL and Earl 
R. Cherry, Jr., Personal Representatives of the Estate of Elizabeth Newell, 
Appellants (Defendants),

v.

Donna I. Read DOUGLAS, James L. Read and Joanne Read Trumper, Appellees 
(Plaintiffs).

Appeal from District Court, GoshenCounty, J.T. Langdon, J.

Eric M. Alden of 
Jones, Jones, Vines & Hunkins, Wheatland, for appellants (plaintiffs) in 

No. 85-105 and appellees 
(plaintiffs) in No. 85-106.

Donald E. Jones 
of Jones and Graham Law Offices, Torrington, for appellees (defendants) in No. 85-105 
and appellants (defendants) in No. 85-106.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and ROONEY,* BROWN, CARDINE and URBIGKIT, JJ.

* Retired November 30, 
1985.

ROONEY, Justice.

[¶1.]     Plaintiffs (appellants 
in Case No. 85-105 and appellees in Case No. 85-106) brought an action for 
declaratory judgment construing the will of Elizabeth Newell (hereinafter 
referred to as "deceased") with respect to the occurrence or nonoccurrence of 
the ademption of a specific devise contained in Article X of the will, 
contending that it did not adeem. Defendants (appellees in Case No. 85-105 and 
appellants in Case No. 85-106) presented, as an affirmative defense, a 
contention that Article X had lapsed at the death of deceased's husband. Both 
parties moved for a summary judgment. The trial court granted plaintiffs' motion 
on the issue of lapse - i.e., Article X did not lapse - and it granted 
defendants' motion on the issue of ademption - i.e., Article X did adeem. Both 
parties appealed from the judgment.

[¶2.]     The unanimous court 
affirms the decision that Article X had not lapsed, and a majority of the court 
determines that the specific bequest did not adeem, with which determination I 
dissent.

[¶3.]     Deceased and her 
husband owned real property in Nebraska and 
Wyoming. 
Deceased owned a percentage interest in real property in ConverseCounty as a result of inheritance from a 
brother. The remaining percentage was owned by other relatives of deceased and 
of her brother.

[¶4.]     A Nebraska attorney prepared wills for deceased and her 
husband which were executed at Mitchell, Nebraska, on September 19, 1969. Article II of 
deceased's will provided in part:

"I give and devise unto 
my husband, Louis Newell, if he shall survive me, all my real estate and 
interest therein, where-so-ever situated, except however, any interest I may own 
in real estate in Converse County, Wyoming, which I inherited from my deceased 
brother, Frederic S. Read, which is disposed of in Article X of this will * * 
*."

Article III 
thereof provided in part:

"If my husband shall have 
predeceased me, I devise and bequeath all my property, both real and personal, 
unto my Trustees * * *."

The 
beneficiaries of the trust were the two grandsons of deceased and their issues. 
In Article X of her will, deceased gave, devised and bequeathed to two nephews 
and two nieces, three of whom are plaintiffs,

"* * * all of my interest 
and title in the real estate located in Converse County, Wyoming, which I 
inherited from my deceased brother, Frederic S. Read * * *."

Deceased's 
husband did predecease her.

[¶5.]     On January 28, 1980, 
deceased and the other owners of the ConverseCounty property executed a contract for a 
warranty deed in consideration of payments to be made over a five-year period. 
Deceased died on May 16, 1982. At that time $192,522 was due to her under the 
contract for deed. Two more annual payments were made under it, but there was a 
default on the final payment, which payment was due January 15, 
1985.

[¶6.]     As noted, the ultimate 
issue in this case is whether or not the disposition of the ConverseCounty property is controlled by Article X 
of the will. Article X does control if it did not lapse upon the death of 
deceased's husband and if an ademption did not occur as to it when the property 
to which it pertained was sold under the contract for deed. Defendants contend 
that it did lapse and that Article III controls the disposition of the property. 
They further contend that if Article X did not lapse, the ademption 
occurred.

LAPSE - CASE NO. 
85-106

[¶7.]     Both parties seem to 
recognize that there is an ambiguity in the will and that the construction of 
the will is to be resolved by determining the intent of deceased as such appears 
from a full and complete consideration of the entire will when read in the light 
of the surrounding circumstances. We have recently held such to be the law in In 
re Estate of Croft, Wyo., 713 P.2d 782 (1986). We need not repeat 
that which was said there.

[¶8.]     Defendants construe 
Article II of the will as designating the Converse County property as that which 
should not pass to deceased's husband in any event; that such direction is not 
conditioned on the fact that he survive her; that Article X was intended to 
relate to, and be a part of, Article II, thus being effective only if the 
husband survived deceased; and that Article III, therefore, disposed of such 
property. Plaintiffs contend that Article II and Article X are two distinct 
provisions and that all of the provisions of Articles II, III and X can be given 
effect only if this distinction is recognized. They argue that defendants' 
literal interpretation of Article III would destroy the provisions of Article 
X.

[¶9.]     These contentions 
evidence the ambiguity. See In re Estate of Lendecke, 79 Wyo. 27, 329 P.2d 819 
(1958). Either Article X stands alone in disposition of the ConverseCounty property or Article III disposes of 
such since deceased survived her husband.

[¶10.]  In resolving the ambiguity in this will, 
we place great weight on the fact that Article III is a general provision 
whereas Article X is a specific one. In re Estate of Deutsch, Wyo., 644 P.2d 768 (1982).

"`Where there is an 
inconsistency between a general and a specific provision, the latter will 
prevail * * * regardless of the order in which it stands in the will, but 
especially where the specific follows the general.'" In re Estate of Lendecke, 
329 P.2d  at 822, quoting from 95 C.J.S., Wills § 621 at 873 (1957).

"While the will of 
testator is to be construed as an entirety and all provisions therein are to be 
rendered consistent with each other, it not infrequently happens that the 
general intent of testator as deduced from the consideration of the will as a 
whole, is at variance with a particular direction of some clause. * * In such a 
case, the court, while avoiding making a will for a man who did not succeed in 
making one for himself, will, nevertheless, if the general intention of the 
testator is clear, give effect to such intention, disregarding the particular 
intent of the particular clause." 4 Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills, § 30.11 
(1961).

[¶11.]  We agree with the trial court's 
determination that at the time the will was made the original testamentary 
scheme of distribution and the intent of deceased as expressed in the entire 
will were to have the real property received by her from her brother pass to 
plaintiffs under Article X; that the specific provisions in Article X prevail 
over the general ones in Article III; and that Article X did not lapse upon the 
prior death of deceased's husband.

URBIGKIT, Justice.

ADEMPTION - CASE NO. 
85-105

[¶12.]  This court having determined through the 
opinion of Justice Rooney that Article X of the will did not lapse, the question 
is pertinent as to whether or not it was subject to ademption by virtue of the 
disposition of the subject matter of the devise prior to deceased's death; i.e., 
whether or not the Converse County property was no longer the property of 
deceased at the time of her death as a result of the contract for 
deed.

[¶13.]  The interest in question was a 29.17 per 
cent ranch land ownership inherited by decedent Elizabeth Newell from her 
brother. That ranch, called the Read lands, was jointly sold by the co-owners by 
installment contract.

The case 
contestants are the members of the Read family (nieces and nephews), as the 
beneficiaries of the special devise in the Read lands, contesting with the 
grandchildren, who are the residual devisees. The original intent of the 
decedent at the time of will execution to leave the Read lands to the Read 
family members is not seriously in question; what is involved is the query: 
whether the original intent will be abrogated by ademption.1

[¶14.]  Sequentially, the following occurred: 
September 19, 1969, decedent and her husband executed their will in Nebraska, prepared by a Nebraska attorney. Thereafter, on January 1, 
1977, the Nebraska Uniform Probate Act became effective, which abolished 
ademption for the kind of transaction involved in this case. In the Fall of 1979 
and early 1980, the Read lands were sold by the individual interest owners, 
under a joint installment contract. Prior thereto, on March 6, 1979, Wyoming had enacted its 
own new probate code, to be effective April 1, 1980, and thereafter, on May 16, 
1982, Elizabeth Newell died.

[¶15.]  The case in this aspect questions whether 
the remaining balance of $192,522 due to the decedent on the installment 
contract should go to the grandchildren or the nieces and nephews.

[¶16.]  The pathway in this case, whereby the 
original intent of the will was avoided by trial-court decision, encompasses the 
following substantive concerns:

(1) Wyoming, for the first 
time, would now judicially adopt ademption by extinction through application to 
this will.

(2) The present probate 
code, effective April 1, 1980, would generally not be effective as to a will 
earlier executed.

(3) The application of 
the equitable conversion classification rule to remaining proceeds of an 
installment contract would destroy the interest and title to the real estate 
bequest defined in the will and by definition would cause the devise to 
extinguish.

(4) Without regard for 
execution in Wyoming, Wyoming rather than Nebraska law would apply to a construction of 
the will.

[¶17.]  Excluding the interests of the present 
litigants in the sale balance remaining, the importance of this case in the 
future framework of Wyoming probate law cannot be overstated. The 
effective-date decision of this opinion will singularly affect Wyoming probate practice 
in the multiple regards that the recent legislation has significantly changed 
the entire probate code.2

[¶18.]  The history of Wyoming probate law 
changed through two enacted and vetoed bills generally adopting the Uniform 
Probate Code in 1975 (House Bill 44, Digest of House Journal 1975, pp. 69, 71) 
and 1977 (Senate File 10, Digest of Senate Journal 1977, pp. 20, 32) to the 
appointment of the special governor's committee, culminating in the probate act 
of 1980. See Ch. 142, S.L. of Wyoming 1979; Ch. 54, S.L. of Wyoming 1980; and 
further amendments. Ch. 151, S.L. of Wyoming 1981 reflects the legislative 
commitment to modernize and improve prior Wyoming probate law which, by any fair 
analysis, hardly then justified even its 1890 derivation.

[¶19.]  The specific initiation of modernization 
efforts reached the Joint Judiciary Committee of the legislature, chaired by now 
United States Senator Alan K. Simpson, from recommendations of the Wyoming State 
Bar Committee on the Uniform Probate Code, in 1973. See Legislative Service 
Office records, Joint Judiciary Committee 1973-1974.

[¶20.]  The Uniform Probate Code was first 
introduced in its complete form by Senator Richard Jones as Senate File No. 32, 
in the legislative session of 1973. The intent to significantly change existing 
law is reflected by committee documents, including specifically a comparison 
chart prepared by Professor Lawrence H. Averill of the University of Wyoming 
College of Law, a member of the Bar committee. See legislative committee records 
supra.

I

Court Adoption of 
Ademption by Extinction at This Time

[¶21.]  We will not apply this principle of 
construction, at this late time and when the legislature has otherwise 
determined, to create by judicial rule ademption by extinction, and thus defeat 
testator intent. This is the first case coming before this court to promulgate 
the principle as a rule of the law, and it would do so in a fashion that could 
only apply to wills predating passage of the current law. Since the legislature 
has determined that the principle is inappropriate, we will not embrace this 
outmoded principle for application in this case, and more particularly as only 
applicable to wills written and not later revoked predating April 1, 
1980.

[¶22.]  This can properly be done by utilization 
of the determinative question of actual intent without the artificiality of 
implied construction derived from Roman law, to be followed by Lord Thurlow's 
Ghost of Ashbruner v. MacGuire, 29 Eng.Rep. 62 (Ch. 1786).3 

[¶23.]  Many caustic critiques are available, but 
the subject is well summarized:

"The present mechanical 
rule of ademption has little relation to the factors relevant in determining 
whether the testator would wish that the legatee take an economic equivalent." 
Note, Ademption and the Testator's Intent, 74 Harvard L.Rev. 741, 750 
(1960-1961).

The author, with 
pessimism, then observed that there would be more than a little judicial 
hesitancy in overruling the doctrine, and concluded:

"* * * In view, however, 
of the traditional judicial reluctance to act in this manner, legislative action 
may be necessary to bring about the desired change." 74 Harvard L.Rev. at 
751.

[¶24.]  The Wyoming legislature acted before the doctrine 
was inculcated into the state law, and we have no present interest in 
retrospectively creating a doctrine for a period of time predating the action of 
the legislature obviously undertaken to avoid the rule.

[¶25.]  The exhaustively considered and carefully 
reasoned Iowa case of Newbury v. McCammant, Iowa, 182 N.W.2d 147, 45 A.L.R.3d 1 
(1970) is clearly more persuasive than the contradicting case of In re 
Krotzsch's Estate, 60 Ill. 2d 342, 326 N.E.2d 758 (1975), upon which appellee 
relied so extensively. The factual status of Newbury is very similar to this 
case, and the conclusion well derived in philosophy and legal 
reason:

"* * * [I]t has long been 
held the primary consideration in will construction is intent of the testator. 
[Citations.]

"And we resort to 
technical rules or canons of construction only if the language of a will is 
clearly ambiguous, conflicting, or testator's intent is for any reason 
uncertain. [Citations.]" 182 N.W.2d  at 150.

[¶26.]  Considering the testatrix' sale of the 
specifically devised realty, the court said as to the contracted balance of 
purchase price:

"Briefly stated, the 
remaining unpaid contractual proceeds are, (1) identifiable, (2) found in the 
estate, and (3) constitute identical property which testatrix intended should 
pass to appellants. As to such proceeds there is no ademption." 182 N.W.2d  at 
151.

[¶27.]  The dissent also had something of value 
to say in the case:

"If we were starting anew 
here, perhaps the majority opinion would represent the best choice." 182 N.W.2d  
at 153.

See an excellent 
discussion of the case in Comment, Ademption in Iowa - A Closer Look at the Testator's Intent, 57 
Iowa L.Rev. 
1211, 1213 (1972).

[¶28.]  Wyoming is starting anew and need not now 
adopt a discredited and legislatively repealed rule. Directly and specifically 
stated, the ademption rule of Lord Thurlow more frequently than not serves to 
frustrate intent, and this will be such a case. Note, Wills, Ademption and 
Legacies in Oklahoma, 14 Okla.L.Rev. 108, 113 (1961); 
Mechem, Why Not a Modern Wills Act, 33 Iowa L.Rev. 501, 515 (1958). See also other 
law journal articles which speak to the subject in detail, supra n. 3, including 
the conclusion of Paulus, Ademption by Extinction: Smiting Lord Thurlow's Ghost, 
2 Texas Tech 
L.Rev. 195, 227 (1970-1971):

"The current status of 
the law of ademption by extinction framed in medical terms is, `condition 
serious, prognosis poor.' The depressing nature of this report is due to the 
fact that the courts and legislatures have been treating the symptoms rather 
than the cause of the ailment. The cause, of course, is the 185-year-old 
identity doctrine. Current deficiencies are compounded by the fact that the 
medication prescribed to relieve the symptoms is often ineffective."

"The major ground of 
criticism of the ademption doctrine, and probably also the reason for the 
proliferation of exceptions to it, is that the results produced, whether 
favorable to the legatee or not, are often contrary to the testator's probable 
intention." 74 Harvard L.Rev. at 745-746.

To a like result 
see In re Estate of Atkinson, 19 Wis.2d 272, 120 N.W.2d 109 (1963); Comment, 
Wills - Ademption - Inapplicable Where Contract of Sale Follows Specific Devise 
of Land, 49 Iowa L.Rev. 623 (1964).

II

Effective Date Of Probate 
Code

[¶29.]  The result of the court's decision is to 
determine that the new Wyoming probate code applies to wills 
previously written in order to afford the significant modernization factor of 
the new law to those pre-1980 wills.

[¶30.]  The applicable provisions include § 
2-1-102, W.S. 1977:

"Rules of construction 
and applicability.

"(a) This code shall be 
liberally construed and applied, to promote the following purposes and policies 
to:

"(i) Simplify and clarify 
the law concerning the affairs of decedents, missing persons, protected persons, 
minors and incapacitated persons;

"(ii) Discover and make 
effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his property;

* * * * * *

"(b) Unless displaced by 
the particular provisions of this code, the principles of law and equity 
supplement the code provisions.

"(c) This code is a 
general act intended as a unified coverage of its subject matter and no part of 
it shall be deemed impliedly repealed by subsequent legislation if it can 
reasonably be avoided.

"(d) The procedure herein 
prescribed shall govern all proceedings in probate brought after the effective 
date of this code. It shall also govern further procedure in proceedings in 
probate then pending unless the court determines its application in particular 
proceedings or parts thereof is not feasible or will work an injustice, in which 
event the former procedure shall apply."4

[¶31.]  Section 2-6-105, W.S. 1977:

"The intention of a 
testator as expressed in his will controls the legal effect of his dispositions. 
The rules of construction expressed in the succeeding sections of this article 
apply unless a contrary intention is indicated by the will."

[¶32.]  This intention section is followed by the 
specific rules of construction, which provisions include § 2-6-106, antilapse, 
deceased devisees, class gifts; § 2-6-107, failure of a testamentary provision; 
§ 2-6-108, specific devise of securities, accessions, nonademption; § 2-6-109, 
nonademption of specific devises where sold, etc., by conservator, exception, 
rights of specific devisee; § 2-6-110, exercise of power of appointment; and § 
2-6-111, nonexoneration.

[¶33.]  For the court to hold otherwise would 
require the declaration that a potential beneficiary of some testamentary 
disposition has a property right in an existent will after execution, and also 
in the construction and interpretation afforded by case law or legislation 
existent at the time of execution without later possible amendment by case 
decision or statutory change. See Redd v. Hargroves, 40 Ga. 18 (1869). We do not 
accept that conclusion.

[¶34.]  It is axiomatic that wills are ambulatory 
until testator death fixes inheritance rights. ParkCounty 
ex rel. Park County Welfare Department v. Blackburn, Wyo., 394 P.2d 793 (1964).

"* * * The right to make 
a testamentary disposition of property is neither a natural nor a constitutional 
right. Such right is derived from and rests in positive law. A will is said to 
be ambulatory until the death of the testator, and until that event occurs the 
testamentary disposition is subject to the will of the testator, and likewise to 
the will of the state as expressed in its public laws. The will speaks as of the 
date of the testator's death, and must conform to the laws in force at that 
time. These rules are elementary, and need no citation of authority in their 
support. While the Legislature may not interfere with or divest estates which 
have already become vested through the death of the testator, its power over 
wills, the manner of their execution, and the mode of carrying out their 
provisions is absolute and supreme until death occurs." Strand v. Stewart, 51 Wn. 685, 99 P. 1027, 1028-1029 
(1909).

[¶35.]  Not until the ancestor dies is there any 
vested right in the heir; no one is the heir of a living person, nemo est haeres 
viventis. See In re Davidson's Estate, 96 Cal. App. 2d 263, 215 P.2d 504 (1950); 
Riggs National Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Zimmer, Del. Ch., 304 A.2d 69, aff'd 
314 A.2d 178 (1973); Haskell v. Wilmington Trust Co., Del.Super., 304 A.2d 53 
(1973); Friedman v. Cohen, 215 Ga. 859, 114 S.E.2d 24 (1960); Matter of Buffi's 
Estate, 98 Ida. 354, 564 P.2d 150 (1977); Estate of Weeks, Me., 462 A.2d 44 
(1983); Evans v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 190 Md. 332, 58 A.2d 649 (1948); Equitable Trust v. Smith, 26 Md. App. 264, 337 A.2d 205 (1975); In 
re Bresler, 155 Mich. 567, 119 N.W. 1104 (1909); Wilson v. Greer, 50 Okla. 387, 
151 P. 629 (1915); Wakefield v. Phelps, 37 N.H. 295 (1858); In re Holibaugh's 
Will, 18 N.J. 229, 113 A.2d 654, 52 A.L.R.2d 1222 (1955); Varick v. Smith, 69 
N.J. Eq. 505, 61 A. 151 (1905); Montclair Trust Co. v. Spadone, 139 N.J.E. 7, 49 A.2d 497 (1946); In re Davis, 134 N.J.E. 393, 35 A.2d 880 (1944); In re Linn's 
Estate, 435 Pa. 598, 258 A.2d 645 (1969); In re Tripp's Estate, 402 Pa. 211, 166 A.2d 619 (1961); In re Collin's Estate, 393 Pa. 195, 142 A.2d 178 (1958); Hannah 
v. Hannah, 70 R.I. 175, 37 A.2d 783 (1944); Dwight v. Dwight, 64 R.I. 294, 12 A.2d 227, 129 A.L.R. 855 (1940). See also Annot., 129 A.L.R. 859, Law in effect 
at time of execution of will or at time of death of testator as 
controlling.

"* * * [I]t may be noted 
that in some cases the courts, while holding that the statute in force at the 
date of death of the testator controlled, have stated that, the will being 
ambulatory and so not becoming effective until the death of the testator, such 
statute was not retrospective, since it affected no rights vested before its 
passage." 129 A.L.R. at 861.

[¶36.]  The misapprehension as to the law as 
contended by the dissenting opinion is reflected by footnote exclusion of the 
Wyoming cases of Matter of Miller's Estate, Wyo., 541 P.2d 28 (1975); In re 
Randall's Estate, Wyo., 506 P.2d 432 (1973); and Park County ex rel. Park County 
Welfare Department v. Blackburn, supra. The dissenting opinion distinguishes 
between "status of beneficiaries and their respective interests in the property 
of the estate," as compared with "that which is in the estate and its attributes 
or to the intention of the testator."

[¶37.]  First, this distinction is not generally 
established by the voluminous case law.5 More particularly, ademption is 
specifically an artificial conception of presumed intent now abrogated by the 
Wyoming 
legislature.

[¶38.]  The present Wyoming statutes are 
determinative in providing:

"Discover and make 
effective the intent of a decedent," § 2-1-102(a)(ii),

and:

"A specific devisee has 
the right to the remaining specifically devised property and:

"(i) Any balance of the 
purchase price together with any security interest owing from a purchaser to the 
testator at death by reason of sale of the property * * *." Section 
2-6-109.

[¶39.]  The general law quoted by the dissenting 
opinion on the retrospective implementation of legislation is not in issue, but 
also is not determinative.

[¶40.]  Two answers immediately arise. First, in 
considering the probate code in term and philosophy, there is clear cause for 
the declaration and determination that the intent was to apply this general law 
generally

"* * * unless the court 
determines its application in particular proceedings or parts thereof is not 
feasible or will work an injustice, in which event the former procedure [or 
provision] shall apply." Section 2-1-102(d).

[¶41.]  Secondly, the court is charged, not only 
by § 2-1-102, W.S. 1977, of the new probate code, but demonstrably by prior law 
with the ascertainment of testator intent. Section 2-1-102(a)(ii). See also § 
2-6-105; Industrial National Bank of Rhode 
Island v. Austin, 100 R.I. 697, 210 A.2d 389 (1966); In re Works' Estate, 168 Kan. 539, 213 P.2d 998 (1950).

[¶42.]  The subject was well stated in the 
California case, In re Moore's Estate, 135 Cal. App. 2d 122, 286 P.2d 939, 943-944 (1955):

"But California has outgrown 
this ancient doctrine in favor of effectuation of the actual intent of the 
testator so far as it can be discerned."

[¶43.]  Additionally, the law of probate is clear 
and universal that no vested expectancy exists in favor of an heir by virtue of 
the provisions of a will until death, or at least as long as the testator is 
competent to alter or amend.

[¶44.]  As to the tens of thousands of Wyoming wills presently 
outstanding, it can hardly be construed or asserted that either the testator or 
the attorney-scrivener only expects that the prior repealed law will apply in 
construction, effectuation and interpretation. Matter of Seymour's Estate, 93 N.M. 
328, 600 P.2d 274, 277 (1979):

"* * * The Probate Code 
provided for a time lag prior to its effective date. This provided time for 
adjustments by parties who felt their will would need to be changed. The Code's 
planning period provision would not have been necessary if the Legislature had 
intended the Code to apply only to wills executed after its effective 
date."

[¶45.]  Assuredly, as of March 30, 1980, it could 
hardly be said that the grandchildren in this case had a vested right through 
lack of knowledge or counsel inattentiveness that the Read heirs would not 
inherit their devise after the installment contract was executed, until the 1979 
Wyoming law would become effective.

[¶46.]  We hold that § 2-6-105, as well as other 
probate code provisions, mean what they say and are effective if the date of 
death follows the effective date of the probate code, unless then-existent 
vested rights are adversely affected.

[¶47.]  Furthermore, if the testator and his 
attorney want ademption, lapse, nonaccession, power of attorney exercised by 
residual clause, or exoneration, then by earlier stated express intent in the 
will, or now by amendment, that expressed intent of the testator can be provided 
as required by § 2-6-105 and § 2-1-102, rather than continuing to apply outmoded 
rules of implied intent or nonintended result. 2 Texas Tech.L.Rev., supra.

III

Equitable 
Conversion

[¶48.]  Equitable conversion, as a determinative 
rule in this case, and as implicated by the decision of the trial court, briefed 
by the parties and involved in the differences manifested in our decision, is a 
causative factor in ademption cases where installment contract sales were made. 
We get to ademption as an asset extinguished by virtue of equitable conversion 
as a theory of partial revocation. 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence § 372 (5th 
ed.) p. 33.

[¶49.]  In this case, decedent inherited a 29.17 
per cent interest in ranch lands. She executed a will to leave that interest to 
her relatives in the family from which the interest had been inherited. She, as 
a member of that family, then entered into a sales agreement for the ranch sale 
with the funds due from the ranch price payable periodically on an installment, 
balloon-payment basis.

[¶50.]  From the date of her inheritance to the 
date of her death, the esse of ownership remained undisturbed. Originally, a 
proportionate ownership existed, or if a partnership, then the interest was 
personal property all of the time, see § 17-13-503, W.S. 1977, and Simpson v. 
Kistler Investment Company, Wyo., 713 P.2d 751 (1986). By the sales 
transaction, the ownership continued with the remaining value of the assets 
available at death to satisfy the determined special bequest.

[¶51.]  The theory of equitable conversion as a 
function of the body of law surely should have nothing to do with the 
construction of intent to deny the substance of an intended bequest as available 
for devolution by testacy. Besides, how can the testator be more specific by the 
description of the devise than "all of my interest and title in the real estate"? (Emphasis 
added.) It is that interest, evolving from the sale and remaining balance due, 
which presently remains for distribution in accord with the expressed intent of 
the decedent.

"* * * [T]he theory of 
equitable conversion is a fiction invented by courts of equity in carrying out 
the intent of the testator, and it should be applied with that effect in view." 
In re Graham's Estate, 216 Kan. 770, 533 P.2d 1318, 1323 
(1975).

The court denied 
application of the rule

"* * * because we 
consider it [a] better reasoned rule and more in line with our prior decisions 
which give supreme importance to the intention of a testator." 533 P.2d  at 
1324.

 

Cf. earlier 
case, In re Estate of Snyder, 199 Kan. 487, 430 P.2d 212 (1967).6

[¶52.]  We have been presented with two theories 
of artificial intent, to be serially embraced, to deter the decedent from 
accomplishing a desired result: ademption to defeat intent if the bequest can be 
considered to be extinguished, and equitable conversion to determine that 
extinguishment has occurred so ademption can be applied. In re Estate of 
Atkinson, supra.7

IV

Nebraska Ademption 
Statute

[¶53.]  The Wyoming statutory provision which was in 
effect at the time of death is § 2-6-104, W.S. 1977:

"Law governing meaning 
and effect.

"The meaning and legal 
effect of a disposition in a will is determined by the law of the state in which 
the will was executed, unless the will otherwise provides or unless the 
application of that law is contrary to the public policy of this state otherwise 
applicable to the disposition."

[¶54.]  The will was written in Nebraska, prepared by a Nebraska attorney. Nebraska adopted the 
Uniform Probate Code ademption provision which, of course, is the same as the 
present Wyoming provision, and then determined that the modernized law was to be 
considered to be in effect as of the date of death by attribution in a 
particular will case. In re McClow's Estate, 205 Neb. 739, 290 N.W.2d 186 (1980). The pervasive 
logic of the commentators and text writers obviously had an effect in the 
draftsmanship of the Uniform Probate Code in the interpretative issues including 
the common-law rules of ademption. Chaffin, The Time Gap in Wills: Shifting 
Assets and Shrinking Estates - Obsolescence and Testamentary Planning in 
Georgia, 6 Ga.L.Rev. 649, 696 
(1972).

[¶55.]  Since we have now applied the same 
substantive interpretation for the Wyoming probate code as did the courts of 
Nebraska, it is not necessary to further pursue the forum interpretation statute 
included in the present Wyoming probate code, § 2-6-104, since the law is 
identical and the anti-ademption provision is effective as to the will in either 
state.

V

Read Lands Devolution As 
A Question of Testator's Intent

[¶56.]  Simplicity and directness would call this 
court to give effect to the bequest as stated and afford distribution of the 
asset interest remaining in decedent at the date of her death in the properties 
inherited from her relatives by distribution of the balance remaining due on the 
installment contract to those designated by the will. Consequently, the law 
would do what decedent directed by will to be done. Shure v. Dahl, N.D., 80 N.W.2d 825, 62 A.L.R.2d 953 (1957); Washington Escrow Co. v. McKinnon, 40 Wn.2d 432, 243 P.2d 1044 (1952); Bates v. Fuller, Tex. App., 663 S.W.2d 512 (1983); Chandler v. Owen, 233 Ga. 25, 209 S.E.2d 618 (1974).

[¶57.]  The decision of this court is determined 
by the application of the explicit provisions of § 2-6-109(b)(i):

"Any balance of the 
purchase price together with any security interest owing from a purchaser to the 
testator at death by reason of sale of the property * * *."

[¶58.]  The question finally remaining is whether 
anything in the will or the record would demonstrate an intent under the purview 
of § 2-6-105:

"The intention of a 
testator as expressed in his will controls the legal effect of his dispositions. 
The rules of construction expressed in the succeeding sections of this article 
apply unless a contrary intention is indicated by the will,"

so that § 
2-6-109 would not apply. Obviously, the latter section explicitly covers the 
provision as a balance of the purchase price remaining unpaid at date of death 
of testator. Considering the terminology of the will as any "interest and 
title," the statutory provision seems explicitly to effectuate the intent of 
testator, and consequently we determine that the application of § 2-6-109 
controls and the contract balance remaining for the Read ranch lands should be 
distributed in accord with the specific bequest provisions of Article X of the 
will.

[¶59.]  Affirmed as to Case No. 85-106 (lapse), 
reversed as to Case No. 85-105 (ademption), and remanded for entry of an order 
in favor of appellant in Case No. 85-105.

FOOTNOTES

1 The will provided in 
Section X:

"I give, devise, and 
bequeath all of my interest and title in the real estate located in Converse 
County, Wyoming, which I inherited from my deceased brother, Frederic S. Read, 
to the following named persons in equal shares:

"(1) Malcolm R. Johnson, 
my nephew * *.

"(2) Joanne Read Trumper, 
my niece * * *.

"(3) Donna I. Read 
Douglas, my niece * *.

"(4) James L. Read, my 
nephew * * *."

Section II 
provided:

"I give and devise unto 
my husband, Louis Newell, if he shall survive me, all my real estate and 
interest therein, wheresoever situated, except however, any interest I may own 
in real estate in Converse County, Wyoming, which I inherited from my deceased 
brother, Frederic S. Read, which is disposed of in Article X of this will * * 
*."

2 Although in itself not 
inclusive of all subjects that could be covered, including recent legislation in 
addition to the probate code of 1980, attention is directed to Appendix I, 
Source and Status of the Wyoming Probate Code of 1980, XVI Land & Water 
L.Rev. 389 (1981), for an analysis of the current probate code. The total scope 
of actual change is immediately obvious. Less than one-third of the provisions 
of the present law can be found in realistically similar terms in prior 
statutory provisions. Noteworthy are the significant structural change of the 
law as implicated by inclusion of original draftsmanship, adoption of provisions 
from the Uniform Probate Code and also significant adaptations from the probate 
law of Iowa.

            
In addition to that compilation, see also the discussion by Professor 
Averill on the Uniform Probate Code as a part of it was subsequently included in 
the Wyoming 
probate act of 1980. See Averill, Wyoming's Law of Decedents' Estates, Guardianship and 
Trusts: A Comparison With the Uniform Probate Code - Part I, VIILand & Water L.Rev. 169 (1972); 
Id., Part II, VIIILand & Water L.Rev. 187 (1973); 
Id., Part III, 
IX Land & Water L.Rev. 567 (1974); Id. Part IV, X Land & Water L.Rev. 155 
(1975).

3 Several interesting 
articles are available, including Paulus, Ademption by Extinction: Smiting Lord 
Thurlow's Ghost, 2 Tex. Tech L.Rev. 195 (1970-1971). See also 
Page, Ademption by Extinction: Its Practical Effects, 6 Wis.L.Rev. 11 (1943); 
Note, Wills, Ademption and Legacies in Oklahoma, 14 Okla.L.Rev. 108 (1961); Comment, 
Ademption in Iowa - A Closer Look at the 
Testator's Intent, 57 Iowa L.Rev. 1211 (1972); Note, Ademption and a 
Testator's Intent, 74 Harvard L.Rev. 741 (1960-1961); Note, Wills: Ademption of 
Specific Legacies and Devises, 43 Cal.L.Rev. 151 (1955); Mechem, Specific 
Legacies of Unspecific Things, Ashbruner v. MacGuire Reconsidered, 87 
U.Pa.L.Rev. 546 (1939); Mechem, Why Not a Modern Wills Act, 33 Iowa L.Rev. 501, 514 
(1958); Recent Cases, Wills - Implied Revocation - Effect of Adoption of Child 
Subsequent to Execution, 5 Vand.L.Rev. 125 (1951); Comment, Wills - Ademption 
Inapplicable Where Contract of Sale Follows 
Specific Defense of Law, 49 Iowa L.Rev. 623 (1964); Note, Ademption by 
Extinction: The Form and Substance Test, 39 Va.L.Rev. 1085 (1953); Warren, The History of Ademption, 25 Iowa L.Rev. 290 (1940); 
Chaffin, The Time Gap in Wills, 6 Ga.L. Rev. 649, 675 (1971-1972).

The subject is best 
summarized in the law journal article authored by Page, supra, 6 Wis.L. Rev. at 
38:

"The single instance, 
which we have been considering, of a rule of law which was worked out in order 
to give effect to the probable intention of the average testator, and which has 
ended by defeating such intention far more often than it has given effect to it, 
can be matched in our law again and again. It is not the fault of either courts 
or legislatures that as prophets they fall short of perfection when they try to 
read the future. It would seem to be a serious defect in the development of our 
law that it has thus far seemed unnecessary to make any attempt to find out 
whether our surmises and prophecies come true; and, if they do not, how the law 
can be made better when once its actual working has been studied 
scientifically."

4 The 1979 Act, Ch. 142, 
S.L. of Wyoming 1979, was subject to the curative Act of Ch. 54, S.L. of Wyoming 
1980. In the first Act, the effective-date provision was stated at § 6 with 
slightly different phraseology:

"* * * The procedure 
herein prescribed shall govern all proceedings in probate brought after the 
effective date of this code. It shall also govern further procedure in 
proceedings in probate then pending, except to the extent that, in the opinion 
of the court, its application in particular proceedings or parts thereof would 
not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former procedure 
shall apply."

5 Matter of Miller's 
Estate, supra, spouse-election; In re Randall's Estate, supra, adoption; Park 
County ex rel. Park County Welfare Department v. Blackburn, supra, devolutionary 
of heirs determined by date of death; Powell's Distributees v. Powell's 
Legatees, 30 Ala. 697 (1857), contract for conveyance of lands and slaves; Welsh 
v. Pounders, 36 Ala. 668 (1860), installment sale of real estate interest; Bush 
v. First National Bank of Tuskaloosa, Ala., 431 So. 2d 1229 (1983), contingent 
remaindermen interpretation; In re Brace's Estate, 180 Cal. App. 2d 797, 4 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1960), validity of will as to personalty; In re Davidson's 
Estate, supra, charity bequest limitations; Heinneman v. Colorado College, 150 
Colo. 515, 374 P.2d 695 (1962), operation of the instrument, not its 
construction - stock split; Haskell v. Wilmington Trust Co., supra, issue as 
determined by adoption statute; Riggs National Bank of Washington, D.C. v. 
Zimmer, supra, gift class as affected by adoption; Warner v. First National Bank 
of Atlanta, 242 Ga. 661, 251 S.E.2d 511 (1978), adoption; Arrington v. 
Hosemann, 224 Ga. 592, 163 S.E.2d 722 (1968), execution of a 
trust; Carnegie v. First National Bank of Brunswick, 218 Ga. 585, 129 S.E.2d 780 
(1963), adoptive child - remaindermen; Friedman v. Cohen, supra, divorce; Matter 
of Buffi's Estate, supra, noncupative will; Draper v. Morris, 137 Ind. 169, 36 N.E. 714 (1894), spouse election; Newbury v. McCammant, supra, balance 
installment contract, real estate; Lorieux v. Keller, 5 Ia. 196 (1857), 
disinheritance; Succession of Rabito, La. App., 229 So. 2d 380 (1969), 
termination date of testamentary trust; Richie v. Richie, Ky., 476 S.W.2d 190 
(1972), dower right in real estate; Estate of Weeks, supra, marital deduction; 
New England Merchants National Bank v. Groswold, 387 Mass. 822, 444 N.E.2d 359 
(1983), testamentary trust adoption; Bunnell v. Hixon, 205 Mass. 468, 91 N.E. 1022 (1910), spouse election; Hund v. Holmes, 395 Mich. 188, 235 N.W.2d 331 
(1975), exercise of power of appointment (see § 2-6-110, W.S. 1977, current 
law); In re Hemmingsen's Estate, Minn., 333 N.W.2d 880 (1983), revocation of 
will by marriage; In re McClow's Estate, supra, installment balance real estate 
contract; Wakefield v. Phelps, supra, power of woman to devise; In re 
Holibaugh's Will, supra, adoption; In re Davis, supra, revocation and revivor; 
Varick v. Smith, supra, will definition of children; Matter of Seymour's Estate, 
supra, revocation by divorce, uniform probate code governs wills executed before 
its passage - involves will revocation; Estate of Ragone, 116 Misc.2d 993, 459 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1981), legislative change in inheritance - adoption; Will of 
Tilly, 88 Misc.2d 904, 388 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1976), next-of-kin definition; In re 
Drury's Will, 222 App. Div. 577, 226 N.Y.S. 712 (1928), violation of the statute 
against perpetuities; North Carolina National Bank v. Norris, 21 N.C. App. 178, 
203 S.E.2d 657 (1974), rule against perpetuities; C.L.W. v. M.J., N.D., 254 N.W.2d 446 (1977), uniform probate code, laws to inheritance legitimacy; Wilson 
v. Greer, supra, capacity to devise; In re Linn's Estate, supra, life estate 
power of consumption; Hannah v. Hannah, supra, omitted heir; Dwight v. Dwight, 
supra, omitted heir; Re Ziegner's Estate, 146 Wn. 537, 264 P. 12 (1928), 
divorce; Weiss v. Soto, 142 W. Va. 783, 98 S.E.2d 727 (1957), tax assessment, 
life estate or fee devise.

The foregoing are only 
illustrative as to the general scope of cases which have considered the effect 
of a statute passed after execution and before testator's death.

6 Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 95, 
is an annotation on anti-ademption statutes for installment contracts, and lists 
some of the states with this kind of curative statute. Effectiveness as to date 
of will is not discussed therein.

We should step back and 
readopt the common-sense philosophy of the Connecticut Supreme Court of 1912 in 
Weed v. Hoge, 85 Conn. 490, 83 A. 636 (1912), in considering a mortgage interest 
as a specific bequest:

"`What, after all, is a 
devise of lands? It is only a devise of such estate or interest as the devisor 
has in the land, and prima facie whatever estate or interest the testator has in 
land will pass under a devise of it by that name, if it is specifically referred 
to so as to show that the testator had that particular land in his mind, and if 
there is nothing else to answer the description.' Devenish v. Pester, 72 L.T.R. 
(N.S.) 816, 818.

"In the present case the 
will does not in terms purport to give the land, but the testatrix's right, 
title, and interest in it." 83 A.  at 639.

7 The absurdity of result 
is well demonstrated by Pleasant's Appeal, 77 Pen.State Rep. 356 (1875). 
Testator left to his wife all real and personal property in the island of Jamaica, by will dated 1830, including 130 
slaves. In 1833, England freed the slaves and made 
provision for governmental reparations to former owners. Slaves were real 
property under the law. Equitable conversion not only extinguished the devise of 
the slaves, but the reparation was determined to be situate in England, not 
Jamaica, and thus not pass under "the specific devise." Undoubtedly, the former 
slaves enjoyed their changed status, but the will intent was appropriately 
frustrated. See a more enlightened approach involving ex-slaves, Redd v. 
Hargroves, supra.

THOMAS, Chief Justice, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part.

[¶60.]  I am in accord with the opinion of the 
court in case No. 85-106 to the effect that Article X of this will did not lapse 
upon the prior death of Mrs. Newell's husband. I dissent from that aspect of the 
opinion which reverses the district court in case No. 85-105 and holds that 
pursuant to § 2-6-109, W.S. 1977, the nieces and nephews of Mrs. Newell are to 
receive the unpaid balance of the proceeds from the installment sale contract 
covering the Read lands.

[¶61.]  As my point of departure, I would rely 
upon the provisions of § 2-6-105, W.S. 1977, which provides:

"The intention of a 
testator as expressed in his will controls the legal effect of his dispositions. 
The rules of construction expressed in the succeeding sections of this article 
apply unless a contrary intention is indicated by the will."

[¶62.]  In my view the majority mistakenly 
assumes that the application of the nonademption statute is consistent with Mrs. 
Newell's intent. As I read this will, it seems clear to me that Mrs. Newell 
wanted to preserve the Read lands as a family ranch, so long as it was the 
purpose of other owners to do that. In my view, however, when this will is read 
in its entirety, one becomes impressed with the proposition that the entire 
focus of the will was to provide for Mrs. Newell's grandsons who were the 
beneficiaries of the testamentary trust. The only exception to that overall 
purpose and motive was to preserve the Read ranch as a family ranch, and once it 
was sold by those who owned an interest in it, I am satisfied that Mrs. Newell 
wanted the cash proceeds included in the testamentary trust for her 
grandsons.

[¶63.]  At the time Mrs. Newell executed her 
will, the attorney who assisted her in that endeavor quite properly would have 
advised her that "[t]he common-law doctrine that ademption results where there 
has been a sale of the specific property by the testator before the will becomes 
operative * * *" was in effect in Nebraska. In re McClow's Estate, 205 
Neb. 739, 290 N.W.2d 186 (1980), citing Baacke 
v. Baacke, 50 Neb. 18, 69 N.W. 303 (1896); In 
re Estate of Bose, 136 Neb. 156, 285 N.W. 319 
(1939); and Austin v. Austin, 147 Neb. 109, 22 N.W.2d 560 
(1946). In light of the adoption in Wyoming of 
the principle of equitable conversion, Baldwin v. McDonald, 24 Wyo. 108, 156 P. 27 (1916), it would have been an 
appropriate prediction that the law in Wyoming would adopt the concept of ademption. 
I do not feel free to ignore these legal facts in resolving the issue of the 
actual intent of the testator, Mrs. Newell. In executing her will she would have 
been entitled to rely upon advice as to the state of the law from her Nebraska attorney in 
concluding that the language and provisions used in this will would result in 
the proceeds from the sale of the Read lands becoming a part of the trust for 
her two grandsons.

[¶64.]  In Dainton v. Watson, Wyo., 658 P.2d 79 (1983), this court said that 
it has been its long-accepted position that the intent of the testator, as 
determined from the will, governs. This rule is reaffirmed by the provisions of 
§ 2-6-105, W.S. 1977. I would continue to apply those principles to the effect 
that, as I have noted, this will speaks to an intent of benefiting the 
testatrix's grandsons exclusively with the exception of an acknowledged desire 
to maintain the Read family ranch. This latter purpose of course was frustrated 
by the sale.

[¶65.]  I would also point out that the 
application of the nonademption provision of the Wyoming Probate Code creates a 
somewhat anomalous situation in that the grandsons receive the proceeds of any 
amounts paid on the installment land contract prior to Mrs. Newell's death, and 
her nephews and nieces receive only that payable subsequent to her death. I have 
some difficulty with the statutory logic that the application of the 
nonademption provision thus effectuates the intent of a testator, as presumed by 
the legislators when it leaves some of the property in the hands of the nieces 
and nephews but the balance goes to the testamentary trust for the 
grandsons.

[¶66.]  I would affirm the district court in all 
respects.

ROONEY, Justice, dissenting in 
Case No. 85-105.

[¶67.]  My dissent from the "Ademption" section 
of the majority opinion was originally presented to the Court for consideration 
as part of the majority opinion. It read as follows:

ADEMPTION - CASE NO. 
85-105

[¶68.]  In In re Estate of Scott, Wyo., 642 P.2d 1287, 1289 (1982), on appeal 
after remand, 657 P.2d 361 (1983), we said that "[a]demption has been defined in 
several ways," and we quoted definitions thereof from several sources. Among 
such definitions were:

"`Ademption means "a 
taking away." For our purpose if the particular piece of property, real or 
personal, is not found in the estate and the bequest or devise cannot be 
fulfilled there is said to be an ademption. * * *' In Re Bierstedt's Estate, 254 
Iowa 772, 119 N.W.2d 234, 236 (1963).

* * * * * *

"`It would consequently 
seem better, instead of attempting to deduce from the cases any all-inclusive 
definition of the term "ademption," to point out that an ademption of a legacy 
or devise may result from a variety of causes or circumstances, among which may 
be mentioned, in the case of gifts of specific property, the nonexistence of the 
property at the death of the testator, or its * * disposal by sale, gift, or 
other alienation, or change in form, during the lifetime of the testator * * *.' 
80 Am.Jur.2d Wills, § 1702 * * *." 642 P.2d  at 1289-1290.

[¶69.]  As long ago as 1916 we settled the 
relation between a vendor and vendee under a contract for sale of land in 
Wyoming 
as:

"* * * [T]he vendee is 
treated as the beneficial owner of the land and the vendor as the owner of the 
purchase-money * * *." Baldwin v. McDonald, 24 Wyo. 108, 134, 156 P. 27 (1916).

It is consistent 
to hold that a contract for deed is sufficient as a "sale" or "other alienation" 
of the property for the purpose of adeeming a specific devise of such 
property.

[¶70.]  Of course, such recognized law could be 
changed by statute. And it was changed by the enactment of § 2-6-109(b), W.S. 
1977 (July 1980 Replacement), effective date of April 1, 1980.1 This section provides in pertinent 
part:

"(b) A specific devisee 
has the right to the remaining specifically devised property and:

"(i) Any balance of the 
purchase price together with any security interest owing from a purchaser to the 
testator at death by reason of sale of the property; * * *"

The statute 
would certainly settle the ademption question here presented with reference to a 
will executed subsequent to April 1, 1980 - there would not be an ademption. 
Plaintiffs contend that the statute prevented ademption in this case, wherein 
the deceased died after April 1, 1980, albeit the will was executed in 1969, 
prior to the enactment of the statute, and the contract for deed was executed on 
January 28, 1980, prior to the effective date of the statute. They point to § 
2-1-102(d), W.S. 1977 (July 1980 Replacement), which provides:

"The procedure herein 
prescribed shall govern all proceedings in probate brought after the effective 
date of this code. It shall also govern further procedure in proceedings in 
probate then pending unless the court determines its application in particular 
proceedings or parts thereof is not feasible or will work an injustice, in which 
event the former procedure shall apply."

However, § 
2-1-102(d) speaks only to procedures. 
It has no application to substantive law. Section 2-6-109(b) did change the 
substantive law and cannot be applied retroactively. Retrospective operation of 
a statute to events occurring before enactment of a statute is not favored. In 
re Estate of Boyd, 
Wyo., 606 P.2d 1243 (1980), and 
cases quoted therein. Also see Hagood v. Texas Pacific Coal and Oil Company, 
Wyo., 356 P.2d 135 (1960). In construing a will to determine the intent of the testator as such 
appears from a full and complete consideration of the entire will when read in 
the light of the surrounding circumstances (see In re Estate of Croft), one of 
the most important "surrounding circumstances" is the law in force at the time 
the will was executed. The intent of the testator must be to have the will 
governed by such law. Deceased's intent, at the time of execution of the 
contract for deed, was to dispose of the ConverseCounty property other than by 
will.

[¶71.]  Plaintiffs point to cases in which rights 
of inheritance and devolution rights are determined as of the time of the death 
of the testator or intestate.2 Such rights pertain to the status 
of beneficiaries and their respective interests in the property of the estate as 
of that time. They do not pertain to the determination of that which is in the 
estate and its attributes or to the intention of the testator concerning such 
when making his will. Our holding that the law in effect at the time the will 
was executed controls the fact ademption is not predicated upon any rights 
vesting in beneficiaries at the time of death. Such rights do not vest simply 
because a will is executed. The statute simply does not apply to the substantive 
right of the deceased to make a will and to adeem a provision thereof before her 
death in accordance with an intention formulated under existing law.

[¶72.]  Plaintiffs also argue that § 2-6-104, 
W.S. 1977 (July 1980 Replacement), requires the application to this case of 
Nebraska law, 
which is similar to § 2-6-109(b). Section 2-6-104 was enacted as part of the 
present Wyoming Probate Code. It provides:

"The meaning and legal 
effect of a disposition in a will is determined by the law of the state in which 
the will was executed, unless the will otherwise provides or unless the 
application of that law is contrary to the public policy of this state otherwise 
applicable to the disposition."

Our 
determination of the law in effect at the time the will was executed makes 
unnecessary extensive consideration of this argument. Nebraska law at that time was substantially the same as 
Wyoming law 
before enactment of the present Wyoming Probate Code. Additionally,

"[a]t common law, if not 
modified by statute, the general rule in the United States is that the validity, 
operation, effect, etc., of a will by which real property is devised is 
determined by the law of the place where the land is situated; or, as it is 
sometimes called in the language of an earlier day, the lex rei sitae. * * *" 6 
Bowe-Parker: Page on Wills, § 60.3 at 445 (1962).

As an aside, the 
"unless" clause of § 2-6-104 indicates the propriety of the testator making a 
determination as to which law of the several states shall control the provisions 
of his will. It would seem to follow that, unless stated otherwise, he would 
intend the will to be controlled by the law in effect at the time he made the 
will.

[¶73.]  The devise in Article X of deceased's 
will was a specific devise of real property. The property was alienated by 
deceased before her death. Thus, the devise adeemed under the law in effect at 
the time the will was executed, and such law controls this particular 
incident.

[¶74.]  I would have affirmed Case No. 
85-105.

FOOTNOTES

1 The section is a part of 
the Wyoming Probate Code, which is a complete revision of the previous probate 
code and consists of §§ 2-1-101 through 2-15-107, W.S. 1977 (July 1980 
Replacement).

2 In re Estate of Miller, 
Wyo., 541 P.2d 28 (1975); In re Estate of 
Randall, Wyo., 
506 P.2d 432 (1973); ParkCounty ex rel. Park County Welfare 
Department v. Blackburn, 
Wyo., 394 P.2d 793 (1964).