Case Title: Wild Meadows MHC, LLC v. Weidman

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2021-04-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
WILD MEADOWS MHC, LLC, 
 
 
 
            Petitioner Below, 
 
Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
DAVID J. WEIDMAN, ESQUIRE, 
ARBITRATOR,  
 
 
Respondent Below, 
 
Appellee, 
                
 
and 
 
WILD MEADOWS HOMEOWNERS’ 
ASSOCIATION 
 
 
Intervenor/ Respondent Below, 
          Appellee. 
                                                                                               
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
  
No. 253, 2020 
 
 
 
Court Below – Superior Court 
 
of the State of Delaware 
 
 
 
C.A. No. K19M-07-003  
Submitted: February 10, 2021 
Decided: 
April 14, 2021 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; V
AUGHN and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Justices. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court of Delaware.  AFFIRMED 
 
Michael P. Morton, Esquire, Robert J. Valihura, Jr., Esquire, and David C. Zerbato, Esquire, 
MORTON, V
ALIHURA & ZERBATO, LLC, Greenville, Delaware; Attorneys for 
Appellant, Wild Meadows MHC, LLC. 
 
James P. Sharp, Esquire, MOORE & RUTT, P.A., Georgetown, DE; Attorney for Appellee, 
David J. Weidman, Esquire, Arbitrator. 
 
Olga Beskrone, Esquire, COMMUNITY LEGAL AID SOCIETY
, INC., Wilmington, 
Delaware; Attorney for Appellee Intervenor/Respondent Wild Meadows Homeowners’
 
Association. 
 
2 
MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Justice: 
In this appeal, Wild Meadows MHC, LLC (“Wild Meadows”) challenges the 
Superior Court’s dismissal of its petition for a writ of prohibition.  Wild Meadows contends 
that the Superior Court erroneously held that an arbitrator appointed under Delaware’s Rent 
Justification Act has the authority to compel discovery and impose a confidentiality 
agreement upon parties concerning discovery material.  For the reasons set forth below, we 
AFFIRM the judgment of the Superior Court.   
I. 
BACKGROUND  
The Wild Meadows manufactured home community (the “Community”), owned by 
appellant Wild Meadows, is located in Dover, Delaware.1  Those living in the Community 
own their manufactured homes but pay rent for the land.  Therefore, the Community is 
governed by the Manufactured Home Owners and Community Owners Act2 and its 
subsection commonly known as the Rent Justification Act (the “Act”).3  Appellee 
Intervenor/Respondent Wild Meadows Homeowners’ Association (the “HOA”) represents 
these homeowners.  
 
1 App. to the Opening Br. A018 (hereinafter “A . . .”).  
2 See 25 Del. C. §§ 7001-67 (2013) (amended 2019).  As the Superior Court noted the below, the 
Assembly redesignated (i.e., renumbered) and amended the statutory provisions relevant to this 
appeal.  See 82 Del. Laws ch. 38, § 42 (2019) (amending and redesignating statutory sections); Wild 
Meadows MHC, LLC v. Weidman, 2020 WL 3889057, at *1 n.3 (Del. Super. Ct. July 10, 2020). 
(providing that the Superior Court cited to the old codification).  This opinion will cite the former 
statutes as they existed before the amendments because the issues in question arose before the Act’s 
redesignation.  
3 See 25 Del. C. §§ 7040-7046 (current version at 25 Del. C. §§ 7050-56). 
 
3 
On October 31, 2018, Wild Meadows notified each homeowner with an expiring 
lease that lot rent would increase above the average annual increase of the Consumer Price 
Index (the “CPI-U”) under the Act.  Subsequently, Wild Meadows conducted the statutorily 
required meeting, under § 7043(b), to disclose and explain the reasons for the rent increase.4  
Multiple homeowners rejected Wild Meadows’ rent increase and, through the HOA, filed a 
petition with the Delaware Manufactured Home Relocation Authority (the “Authority”).5   
The Authority appointed Appellee David J. Weidman, Esquire as the arbitrator under 
§ 7043(c).  Arbitration was scheduled for February 6, 2019.6  Before the scheduled 
arbitration, the HOA requested financial information from Wild Meadows relating to the 
Community’s recent revenue and costs.7  Wild Meadows refused to provide this 
information.8  The HOA filed a motion to compel discovery and a motion for summary 
judgment with Weidman.9 
In his initial decision dated January 18, 2019, Weidman granted discovery of any 
financial documents that Wild Meadows intended to rely upon at arbitration, but he denied 
the HOA’s motion to compel the production of additional financial documents from Wild 
 
4 A021.  
5 Wild Meadows, 2020 WL 3889057, at *1. 
6 A061.  
7 Intervenor Answering Br. 4.  
8 Id. at 4-5.  
9 A061.  
 
4 
Meadows.10  The HOA submitted a motion for reconsideration of the first decision regarding 
four categories of documents:  
1. Income statements from Wild Meadows for fiscal years 2016, 
2017 and 2018.  
  
2. Audited financial statements for Wild Meadows for FY 2016, 
2017 and 2018.  
  
3. The trial balances for Wild Meadows for FY 2016, 2017 and 
2018.  
  
4. Whatever else Wild Meadows intends to rely upon to 
establish at arbitration that the rent increase it seeks is “directly 
related to operating, maintaining or improving” the Wild 
Meadows community.11   
  
In the interim, this Court issued its opinion in Sandhill Acres MHC, LLC v. Sandhill 
Home Owners Association.12  Weidman, relying on our Sandhill decision, granted the HOA
’s 
requests for discovery of all four categories in his decision dated June 7, 2019.13  Having 
determined that he could compel discovery, Weidman ordered Wild Meadows to submit a 
proposed confidentiality agreement and ordered the HOA to submit any comments on the 
draft.14  He warned that if the parties could not come to a consensus, he would issue a final 
 
10 A064-66.  
11 A069.  
12 210 A.3d 725 (Del. 2019). 
13 A070-72. 
14 A072.  
 
5 
confidentiality agreement.15  Wild Meadows submitted its proposed confidentiality 
agreement, to which the HOA voiced numerous concerns.16   
Weidman issued a final confidentiality agreement on June 26, 2019.17  Weidman 
rejected many of the changes the HOA proposed, but he expanded the “attorney’s eyes only 
provision” to include “any directors, officers, or Board representatives who are attending the 
arbitration on behalf of the Association, up to the five (5) person limit, and only if those 
persons execute the [confidentiality agreement] to keep any confidential material . . . 
confidential.”18  To further protect confidential information, the agreement provided:    
Recipients of any Confidential Material are prohibited 
from copying or permitting to be copied (whether by taking 
notes, photographs, Xerox machine or otherwise), or creating an 
electronic image of all or any portion of the Confidential 
Material, except for use by counsel for the parties for use in the 
Arbitration.  Recipients shall not permit any person to review all 
or any portion of the Confidential Material, other than as 
provided in this Agreement.  Further, Recipients shall not 
discuss or disclose any Confidential Material to any 3rd Party 
outside of the persons set forth in Paragraphs 5(A) through (E).19 
Wild Meadows refused to sign the confidentiality agreement and, on July 3, 2019, 
filed for a writ of prohibition in the Superior Court.20  In its writ of prohibition, Wild 
 
15 Id.  
16 Opening Br. 15; Intervenor Answering Br. 6.  
17 A075.  
18 Id. (“This decision balances the need for confidentiality against the ability of the [HOA]’s 
representatives to meaningfully participate with counsel in preparing for the arbitration.”). 
19 A080-81.  This was just one of many safeguards Weidman included in the confidentiality 
agreement.  See A079-84. 
20 Wild Meadows, 2020 WL 3889057, at *2.  
 
6 
Meadows argued that Weidman exceeded his authority by ordering Wild Meadows to  
(1) “produce documents and engage in discovery matters not to be used or relied upon by 
[Wild Meadows] in the arbitration” and (2) “agree to a Confidentiality [agreement] which 
[Wild Meadows] will not accept.”21  In response, both Weidman and the HOA filed separate 
motions to dismiss.22  Wild Meadows filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings.23  Oral 
arguments were held on June 18, 2020.24 
On July 10, 2020, the Superior Court granted the motions to dismiss filed by both the 
HOA and Weidman.25  The court ruled that Weidman had the authority, under the Act and 
this Court’s caselaw, to compel discovery of the financial information.26  The Superior Court 
also denied Wild Meadows’ challenges to the confidentiality agreement, concluding that 
Weidman “properly wielded [that authority] to balance the HOA’s right to access to the 
information with Wild Meadows’ confidentiality and proprietary concerns.”27  Wild 
Meadows appeals this decision. 
 
 
 
21 A031.  
22A008-009 (The HOA filed its motion to dismiss on November 27, 2019.  Weidman’s was filed on 
January 31, 2020).  
23 A008.  
24 A090.  
25 Wild Meadows, 2020 WL 3889057, at *1.  
26 Id. at *6-10.  
27 Id. at *10-12.  
 
7 
II. 
ANALYSIS 
Wild Meadows argues that the Superior Court erroneously dismissed its petition by 
incorrectly holding that the Rent Justification Act permits arbitrators to compel discovery of 
financial information and to impose a confidentiality agreement upon the parties in rent 
justification proceedings. 
This Court reviews a decision granting a motion to dismiss de novo.28  The standards 
governing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim are well settled: we (1) accept all 
well-pleaded factual allegations as true, (2) accept even vague allegations as “well-pleaded” 
if they give the opposing party notice of the claim, (3) draw all reasonable inferences in favor 
of non-moving party, and (4) do not affirm a dismissal unless the plaintiff/petitioner would 
not be entitled to recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances.29 
We also review a trial court’s interpretation of the Act, like any other statutory 
interpretation, de novo.30  Our role is to determine and give effect to the legislature’s intent.31  
In doing so, we must “interpret the statutory language that the General Assembly actually 
adopt[ed], even if unclear and explain what [this Court] ascertain[s] to be the legislative 
intent without rewriting the statute to fit a particular policy position.”32  If the statute in 
 
28 Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Cap. Hldgs., LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 535 (Del. 2011) 
(citing Savor, Inc. v. FMR Corp., 812 A.2d 894, 896 (Del. 2002)). 
29 Savor, Inc., 812 A.2d at 896-97. 
30 Sandhill Acres, 210 A.3d at 728.  
31 LeVan v. Indep. Mall, Inc., 940 A.2d 929, 932 (Del. 2007). 
32 Taylor v. Diamond State Port Corp., 14 A.3d 536, 542 (Del. 2011); Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Wilm. 
Suburban Water Corp., 467 A.2d 446, 451 (Del. 1983) (“Judges must take the law as they find it, 
 
8 
question is unambiguous, this goal is accomplished by applying the plain, literal meaning of 
its words.33  Stated differently, “[i]f a statute is not reasonably susceptible to different 
conclusions or interpretations, courts must apply the words as written, unless the result of 
such a literal application could not have been intended by the legislature.” 34 
A. 
Ability to Compel Discovery 
Wild Meadows argues that an arbitrator lacks statutory authority to compel discovery 
because the text of the Act omits any reference to discovery proceedings.  According to Wild 
Meadows, a community owner must produce whatever it intends to rely on to justify its 
rents.35  If the homeowners request additional information to test the community owner’s 
justifications and the community owner does not comply, then the community owner runs 
the risk that the arbitrator will find the rent increase unjustified.  Thus, according to Wild 
Meadows, the community owner completely controls the flow of information in a rent 
justification proceeding.36  We disagree with this interpretation of the Act.  
An arbitrator may compel the production of documents under the Act and applicable 
provisions of the Delaware Administrative Code.  The General Assembly, through the 
 
and their personal predilections as to what the law should be have no place in efforts to override 
properly stated legislative will.”). 
33 Arnold v. State, 49 A.3d 1180, 1183 (Del. 2012) (citing Dennis v. State, 41 A.3d 391, 393 (Del. 
2012)). 
34 Leatherbury v. Greenspun, 939 A.2d 1284, 1289 (Del. 2007) (citing Rubick v. Sec. Instrument 
Corp., 766 A.2d 15, 18 (Del. 2000)). 
35 Opening Br. 22.  
36 Id. at 24-30.  
 
9 
Manufactured Home Owners and Community Owners Act, created the Authority.37  The 
Authority was tasked with overseeing manufactured home communities and was granted the 
explicit power to “[a]dopt a plan of operation and articles, bylaws, and operating rules.”38  
Under 25 Del. C. § 7011(c)(1), the Authority has the power to create regulations; the most 
relevant here are the Rent Increase Dispute Resolution Procedures.39  Under 1 Del. Admin. 
C. § 202-1.0, the Authority recognized its obligation to “implement[] and oversee[] the 
process by which rent increase disputes are resolved . . . .”40  To that end, the Authority 
promulgated § 202-7.10, which expressly allows an arbitrator to compel discovery of 
documents that are relevant to the rent increase at issue. 
The arbitrator is authorized to schedule an informal 
preliminary conference with the parties (in person or by 
telephone) as the arbitrator deems appropriate in order to narrow 
the issues and minimize the expense of the arbitration process. 
The arbitrator is authorized to require the parties to exchange 
or provide to the other parties documents relevant to the rent 
increase at issue, including documents related to the standards 
set forth in 25 Del. C. § 7042.41 
This regulation is consistent with the overall purpose of the Act.  The General 
Assembly enacted the Rent Justification Act to “protect the substantial investment made by 
manufactured homeowners, and enable the State to benefit from the availability of affordable 
 
37 25 Del. C. § 7011 (2013) (current version at 25 Del. C. § 7041). 
38 Id. § 7011(c)(1).  
39 See 1 Del. Admin. C. §§ 202-1.0 to 9.0. 
40 Id. § 202-1.0.  
41 Id. § 202-7.10 (emphasis added).   
 
10 
housing for lower-income citizens, without the need for additional state funding.”42  At the 
same time, the General Assembly recognized the property and other rights of manufactured 
home community owners and sought to provide them with fair return on their investment.43  
Therefore, the overarching purpose of the Act is to balance the conflicting interests of 
protecting manufactured homeowners from “unreasonable and burdensome . . . rental 
increases while simultaneously providing . . . community owners . . . a just, reasonable, and 
fair return on their property.”44  
To ensure a fair return on their property, community owners may raise a homeowner’s 
rent in an amount greater than the CPI-U.  But to protect the homeowners from an 
“unreasonable increase,” a community owner must demonstrate that such an increase is 
justified.45  To make this showing, the community owner must show that it “has not been 
found in violation of” health and safety regulations “during the preceding 12-month period,” 
and that “[t]he proposed rent increase is “directly related to operating, maintaining, or 
improving the manufactured home community, and justified by 1 or more factors listed 
under subsection (c) . . . .”46   
In Bon Ayre II, we explained the “directly related” inquiry as such:  
To impose an increase beyond CPI-U, the landowner 
must prove more.  In particular, it must show that the increase is 
 
42 25 Del. C. § 7040.  
43 Id. 
44 Id.  
45 Id. § 7042(a). 
46 Id. § 7042(a)(2); see id. § 7042(c). 
 
11 
“directly related to operating, maintaining or improving the 
manufactured home community.”  That is, the landowner must 
show that its original expected return has declined, because the 
cost side of its ledger has grown.  If a landowner can show that 
its costs have gone up, that opens the door to a rent increase 
based on § 7042(c)’s factors, including market rent.  If a 
landowner invests in its development, and therefore has 
“improve[ed]” the community, it can also reap the reward from 
that investment through higher-than-inflation rent increases. 
But, unless the landowner has seen its costs increase for 
“operating, maintaining or improving the manufactured home 
community,” the Rent Justification Act preserves the initial 
relationship the landowner creates between its revenue and its 
costs. The homeowner with her home semi-permanently 
planted in the community is protected from material increases 
in rent unrelated to the benefits and costs of living in the 
community, and the landowner receives the return it originally 
anticipated.47 
Thus, “[t]o make a prima facie case that a rent increase is directly related to improving 
the community—a requirement that we have previously described as ‘modest’—it suffices 
for the community owner to offer evidence that in making some capital improvement, the 
community owner has incurred costs that are likely to reduce its expected return.”48  Once 
the community owner has established its prima facie case, homeowners are “entitled to rebut 
that prima facie case by offering evidence of [their] own that the expenditure did not in fact 
reflect any increase in costs—for example because the expenditure was offset by reduced 
 
47 Bon Ayre Land, LLC v. Bon Ayre Cmty. Ass’n. (Bon Ayre II), 149 A.3d 227, 234-35 (Del. 2016). 
48 Sandhill Acres, 210 A.3d at 729 (citing Bon Ayre II, 149 A.3d at 235–36).  
 
12 
expenses in other areas . . . .”49  Homeowners are allowed to “fairly test” the community 
owner’s proffered justifications.50   
If adopted, Wild Meadows’ interpretation of the Act would negate a homeowner’s 
ability to rebut a prima facie case, undermining the Act’s stated goal of balancing the 
homeowner’s and community owner’s competing interests.  If tenants are not allowed to 
compel the production of documents relevant to the proceedings, the process skews heavily 
in the favor of community owners, leaving the tenants little opportunity to reasonably vet the 
information selected and provided by the community owner.  Permitting an arbitrator to 
compel production of documents, subject to reasonable confidentiality protections, furthers 
the Act’s goals of ensuring a fair process for all parties in a rent justification dispute. 
Furthermore, this Court has implicitly, if not explicitly, recognized the importance of 
a homeowner’s ability to test a community owner’s justifications.  For example, in Donovan 
Smith HOA v. Donovan Smith MHP
, LLC, we affirmed the arbitrator’s holding that the 
increase in rent was justified.51  But we expressly rejected the idea that nothing in the statute 
requires the community owner to expose its financial information (i.e. its underlying 
business records) to scrutiny.52  We explained that “it is not the case that a landowner may 
proceed under the [Act] to argue that it is entitled to an above-inflation rent increase without 
 
49 Id.  
50 See Donovan Smith HOA v. Donovan Smith MHP, LLC, 2018 WL 3360585, at *3 (Del. July 10, 
2018). 
51 Id. at *2. 
52 Id. at *2-3. 
 
13 
also being willing to produce documents to contesting homeowners that allow them to fairly 
test that assertion.”53  Further, we recognized that the arbitrator may control the production 
of documents by imposing “appropriate conditions” to address confidentiality concerns and 
may “require production” of the relevant books and records if the homeowners “fairly 
demand” that discovery.54 
This Court expanded its discussion of discovery in Sandhill Acres MHC, LLC v. 
Sandhill Acres Home Owners Association.55  We explained that “both sides of the 
community owner’s financial statements bear logically on whether and to what extent a rent 
increase is ‘directly related to operating, maintaining or improving the manufactured housing 
community’ under the Act.”56  Additionally, we emphasized that the parties to a case should 
shape the record by exchanging requests for information and stressed that 
a community owner seeking a rent increase would not be in any 
equitable or legal position to resist a reasonable request for 
information about its costs and profit margins . . . .  As a bottom-
line matter, the community owner must make a choice.  Refrain 
from seeking an increase above inflation and thus be able to 
keep its financial information to itself, or seek an increase and 
be willing to incur the concomitant requirement to justify that 
 
53 Id. at *3 (emphasis added).  
54 See id.  (“To the extent that there is a legitimate basis for claiming confidentiality as to any business 
record—a status that has to be proven—the Superior Court, or the arbitrator in the first instance, 
may condition discovery and use of the document to appropriate conditions.”); id. (“[T]he outcome 
could be quite different, especially if the homeowners fairly demand discovery of the landowner’s 
books and records relevant to the question of whether the proposed above-inflation rent increase is 
‘directly related to operating, maintaining or improving the manufactured home community’ and the 
arbitrator fails to require production of those records.”). 
55 210 A.3d at 731-32.  
56 Id. at 731. 
 
14 
increase.  On a complete record, that allows the tenants to make 
fair arguments and the arbitrator to assess whether the proposed 
increase satisfies the directly related requirement in view of a 
balanced record taking into account both key factors: revenues 
and costs.57 
We have also acknowledged the arbitrator’s power to oversee and direct such discovery by 
addressing legitimate confidentiality concerns through restrictions or by denying excessively 
burdensome requests.58  Both Donovan Smith and Sandhill Acres acknowledge that a 
community owner’s relevant business records are a necessary part of a homeowner’s ability 
to rebut a community owner’s prima facie case.  
Thus, based on a plain reading of the Act, the applicable sections of the Delaware 
Administrative Code, and our jurisprudence, we conclude that the Superior Court correctly 
held that Weidman, as an arbitrator, possessed the authority to compel the production of 
documents.  Furthermore, the Superior Court did not err in ruling that Weidman correctly 
compelled the discovery of Wild Meadows relevant financial information.   
Wild Meadows cannot create a unilateral process where it, as the community owner, 
gets to singularly choose what documents make the record.  If failing to obtain an above-
inflation rent increase poses an “enormous risk for the community owner,”59 then being 
assessed an above-inflation rent increase without a mechanism to test the community 
owner’s assertions poses an enormous risk to homeowners, particularly given the deference 
 
57 Id. (emphasis added).  
58 Id. 
59 Reply Br. 10-11. 
 
15 
that a reviewing court applies to an arbitrator’s decision.60  Imposing such an asymmetric 
burden on homeowners is contrary to the statute’s purpose of “accommodate[ing] the 
conflicting interests” of homeowners and landowners.61  Therefore, Weidman acted within 
his authority by compelling Wild Meadows to produce business records to afford the HOA 
a chance to fairly test Wild Meadows’ justifications for its rent increase.   
To raise rent above the CPI-U is a business decision that community owners should 
not take lightly.  A community owner has two options—either keep rent adjustments at 
inflation and keep business records private or seek higher rent adjustments and bear the 
responsibility of justifying that increase.62  Community owners have a modest threshold 
burden to justify the increase; but homeowners are afforded the opportunity to test that 
threshold.  Here the community owner sought an increase above inflation; thus, it may be 
compelled to produce records relating to its revenues and costs.63 
 
 
 
60 See, e.g., Sandhill Acres, 210 A.3d at 731 n.37 (“The Rent Justification [Act] is somewhat unclear 
about the appellate standard of review, stating that the reviewing court must determine ‘whether the 
record created in the arbitration is sufficient justification for the arbitrator’s decisions and whether 
those decisions are free from legal error.’ Considering substantially similar language in a prior 
version of the statute, we previously observed that this language sounds somewhat like substantial 
evidence review. . . .  We therefore conclude that substantial evidence review is the appropriate 
standard of review for the arbitrator’s factual findings.” (quoting 25 Del. C. § 7044 (current version 
at § 7054)) (citing Bon Ayre Land LLC v. Bon Ayre Cmty. Ass’n (Bone Ayre I), 133 A.3d 559, 2016 
WL 747989, at *2 n.11 (Del. Feb. 25, 2016) (TABLE))). 
61 See 25 Del. C. § 7040. 
62 210 A.3d at 731. 
63 Id.  
 
16 
B. 
Ability to Impose Confidentiality Agreement 
Wild Meadows also argues the Superior Court erred in holding that Weidman had 
statutory authority to impose a confidentiality agreement that Wild Meadows contested.  
Specifically, Wild Meadows complains that:  
Petitioner is a privately-held business, and engages in its 
business in a highly competitive market which today, in 
Delaware, is dominated by large competitors.  If Petitioner’s 
internal financial information were made available generally or 
disclosed publicly, Petitioner would face incalculable 
irreparable harm. Petitioner’s competitors would gain an 
enormous tactical and strategic advantage, to the permanent 
detriment of Petitioner and of the value of its investment in Wild 
Meadows.  Thus, an “attorney’s eyes-only level of protection 
was included in Petitioner’s proposed confidentiality stipulation 
. . . . 
. . . . 
The Confidentiality Stipulation did not and could not 
have “reasonably protected” Petitioner’s private, competitively 
sensitive and highly confidential financial documents without 
an attorney’s eyes-only provision.  If the arbitrator is imbued 
with the authority to compel discovery, a confidentiality 
agreement protecting the highly confidential documents of 
parties with an attorney’s eyes-only tier must be offered and 
made available to the parties in the arbitration.64 
We disagree.  
The Authority, under 25 Del. C. § 7011(c)(1), has promulgated 1 Del. Admin. C. § 
202-7.17.  Under 1 Del. Admin. C. § 202-7.17: 
Any party may request that the arbitrator accord 
confidential treatment to some or all of the information 
contained in a document.  If the claim of confidentiality is 
 
64 Opening Br. 16, 43.  
 
17 
challenged by any party, then the party claiming confidential 
treatment must demonstrate to the arbitrator that the designated 
information is confidential as recognized by state law.  
Notwithstanding any claim of confidentiality, any party to the 
proceeding shall be allowed to inspect a copy of the confidential 
document upon the signing of a confidentiality agreement in a 
form approved by the arbitrator.65 
Further, this Court has emphasized that “legitimate confidentiality and proprietary concerns 
should be addressed by the arbitrator through the imposition of use restrictions.”66  Thus, the 
arbitrator possessed the authority to impose a confidentiality agreement on the parties.    
Wild Meadows contends that a confidentiality agreement without an attorney-eyes 
only provision insufficiently protected its interests and exposed it to “irreparable harm.”67  
Yet Weidman recognized, and addressed, the need for confidentiality when dealing with 
Wild Meadows’ business records.  After taking input from both parties, Weidman crafted a 
confidentiality agreement in which he balanced the legitimate business interests of Wild 
Meadows against the HOA’s interest in “fairly testing” Wild Meadows’ justifications.   
Section 5 of the contested agreement limits who may access confidential information: 
5. Confidential Discovery Material may be disclosed, 
summarized, 
described, 
characterized, 
or 
otherwise 
communicated or made available in whole or in part only to the 
following persons:  
A. The Parties, and the directors, officers, or 
Board members of the Association who are attending the 
Arbitration and assisting counsel with decisions 
 
65 1 Del. Admin. C. § 202-7.17. 
66 Sandhill Acres, 210 A.3d at 731; see also Donovan Smith, 2018 WL 3360585, at *3 (citing Super. 
Ct. Civ. R. 26(c)(7); 1 Del. Admin. C. § 202-7.17). 
67 A129.   
 
18 
concerning the Litigation, to the extent deemed 
reasonably necessary by counsel of record for the 
purpose of assisting in the prosecution or defense of the 
Arbitration for use in accordance with this Stipulation, 
only if and after such directors, officers, or Board 
members of the Association execute Exhibit A attached 
hereto;  
 
B. Counsel who represent Parties in this 
Arbitration (including in-house counsel), and the 
partners, associates, paralegals, secretaries, clerical, 
regular and temporary employees, and service vendors 
of such counsel (including outside copying and 
Arbitration support services) who are assisting with the 
Arbitration for use in accordance with this Stipulation;  
 
C. Subject to Paragraph 7, experts or consultants 
assisting counsel for the Parties, and partners, associates, 
paralegals, secretaries, clerical, regular and temporary 
employees, and service vendors of such experts or 
consultants (including outside copying services and 
outside support services) who are assisting with the 
Arbitration;  
 
D. The Arbitrator, persons employed by the 
Arbitrator, and court reporters transcribing any hearing in 
this Arbitration, and the Court, persons employed by the 
Court, and court reporters transcribing any hearing in any 
appeal therefrom; and  
 
E. Any other person only upon (i) order of the 
Arbitrator entered upon notice to the Parties, or (ii) 
written stipulation of, or statement on the record by, the 
Producing Party who provided the Discovery Material 
being disclosed, and provided that such person signs an 
undertaking in the form attached as Exhibit A hereto. 
  
Recipients of any Confidential Material are 
prohibited from copying or permitting to be copied 
(whether by taking notes, photographs, Xerox machine or 
 
19 
otherwise), or creating an electronic image of all or any 
portion of the Confidential Material, except for use by 
counsel for the parties for use in the Arbitration. Recipients 
shall not permit any person to review all or any portion of 
the Confidential Material, other than as provided in this 
Agreement. Further, Recipients shall not discuss or disclose 
any Confidential Material to any 3rd Party outside of the 
persons set forth in Paragraphs S(A) through (E).68   
These individuals may only receive confidential documents if they agree to sign this 
agreement.69  
Section 12 adds that “[a]ll materials designated as Confidential Discovery Materials 
or filed pursuant to Paragraph 10 shall be released from confidential treatment only upon 
Order of a Court.”70 Additionally, 
[t]he Parties agree to be bound by the terms of this 
Stipulation pending the entry by the Court of this Stipulation, 
and any violation of its terms shall be subject to the same 
sanctions and penalties as if this Stipulation had been entered by 
a Delaware Court of competent Jurisdiction.71  
Wild Meadows does not expressly address why the specific provisions of this 
agreement are inadequate.  Instead, Wild Meadows vaguely argues that, as a private entity 
that engages in a competitive market, it faces “irreparable harm” if it is forced to disclose its 
business records.72  The party claiming a need for confidentiality, or greater confidentiality, 
bears the burden of proof; business records are not entitled to an “attorneys’ eyes only” 
 
68 A079-80.  
69 A075. 
70 A083.  
71 A085.  
72 A129-30.  
 
20 
designation simply because they are business records.  Wild Meadows’ vague assertions are 
not useful in assessing the need for greater protection because they do not identify legitimate 
deficiencies in the actual language of the agreement.  To the contrary, Weidman carefully 
balanced Wild Meadows’ concerns in order to “reasonably protect” its sensitive information.  
Therefore, we affirm the Superior Court’s conclusion that Weidman possessed the 
statutory authority to impose this confidentially agreement on the parties.  
III. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons provided above, we AFFIRM the Superior Court’s judgment.