Case Title: People v. Lemons

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87131

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-04-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 87131-Agenda 8-January 2000.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. HENRY BRUCE LEMONS, 
Appellant.
Opinion filed April 20, 2000.
JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court:
Following a 1997 bench trial in the circuit court of Pike County, Henry Bruce 
Lemons was convicted of aggravated battery and resisting a peace officer. He was 
sentenced to an extended 10-year prison term for the aggravated battery and a 
concurrent 364-day term for resisting a peace officer.
The basis of the extended-term sentence was a 1984 burglary to which 
defendant was convicted February 26, 1985, and sentenced to 18 months of 
probation. In September 1985, defendant's probation was revoked. The record 
fails to indicate the disposition of that revocation. In November 1989, 
defendant's probation was revoked again. He was resentenced in January 1990 when 
the judge extended defendant's probation for 24 months. In August 1991, a third 
petition to revoke his probation was filed. A hearing on that petition was not 
held until October 31, 1996, at which time defendant's probation was revoked and 
he was sentenced to 54 months in prison. (During the period from 1991 to 1996, 
defendant was absent from Illinois and committed various crimes in other states 
before returning.) Defendant was released from prison in July 1997, having 
served nine months of his sentence. In August 1997, five days after defendant's 
release from the Department of Corrections, defendant was charged with 
aggravated battery and resisting a peace officer. After a bench trial he was 
found guilty of both charges; he was sentenced to an extended term of 
imprisonment on December 3, 1997.
The defendant appealed, contending that the circuit court erred in imposing 
an extended-term sentence because the prior conviction on which the court 
predicated that sentence was more than 10 years old, in violation of the 
sentencing provisions contained in section 5-5-3.2(b)(1) of the Unified Code of 
Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(1) (West 1996)).
The appellate court, with one justice dissenting, affirmed the defendant's 
convictions and sentence. 303 Ill. App. 3d 259. The defendant filed a petition 
for leave to appeal and argued that the imposition of the extended-term sentence 
constituted reversible error because it was based on a prior conviction more 
than 10 years old, excluding time spent in custody. We granted defendant's 
petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a)) and now affirm the judgment 
of the appellate court.
DISCUSSION
The issue before us is whether, for the purpose of extended-term sentencing 
based on a prior conviction, the 10-year limitation period imposed in section 
5-5-3.2(b)(1) of the Unified Code of Corrections began to run on the date 
defendant was first sentenced for the 1985 burglary, or if it began to run on 
the date the defendant was last sentenced when his sentence of probation was 
last revoked on October 31, 1996.
Section 5-5-3.2(b)(1) of the Unified Code of Corrections authorizes a trial 
court to impose an extended-term sentence in the following circumstance: "When a 
defendant is convicted of any felony, after having been previously convicted in 
Illinois or any other jurisdiction of the same or similar class felony or 
greater class felony, when such conviction has occurred within 10 years after 
the previous conviction, excluding time spent in custody ***." 730 ILCS 
5/5-5-3.2(b)(1) (West 1996).
Defendant argues that the February 26, 1985, date of his sentence of 
probation for burglary should apply to determine if he is eligible for 
extended-term sentencing. He asserts that under a plain reading of the statute, 
his sentence was improper because his prior conviction was 11 years old.
The State urges us to apply the 10-year limitation imposed in section 
5-5-3.2(b)(1) from the October 31, 1996, date defendant was resentenced when his 
probation was revoked. The State asserts that the statutory definition of the 
word "conviction," as applied to section 5-5-3.2(b)(1), is ambiguous. The State 
further maintains that to use the initial sentencing date, instead of the final 
sentencing date, for the defendant's crime of burglary would defeat the policy 
considerations embodied in the extended-term statute and lead to absurd 
results.
For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the State that imposition of a 
10-year extended-term sentence was proper. A final sentence was imposed on 
defendant for the 1985 burglary conviction on October 31, 1996. Therefore, the 
time limitation for imposing an extended-term sentence does not expire until 
October 31, 2006.
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect 
to the plain meaning of a statute, and that inquiry begins with the language of 
the statute itself. People v. Hare, 119 Ill. 2d 441, 447 (1988). The 
most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute. 
People v. Bole, 155 Ill. 2d 188, 195 (1993). Where that intent can be 
ascertained from the language of the statute, it will be given effect without 
resorting to other aids for construction. People v. Robinson, 89 Ill. 2d 469, 475-76 (1982).
Section 5-5-3.2(b)(1) of the Unified Code of Corrections states that the 
10-year period begins to run on the date of the "previous conviction" and 
expires 10 years later. Section 5-1-5 of the Unified Code of Corrections defines 
conviction as "a judgment of conviction or sentence entered upon a plea of 
guilty or upon a verdict or finding of guilty of an offense, rendered by a 
legally constituted jury or by a court of competent jurisdiction authorized to 
try the case without a jury." 730 ILCS 5/5-1-5 (West 1996); 720 ILCS 5/2-5 (West 
1996).
In Robinson, this court stated that for the purpose of determining 
the 10-year period, "the date of a conviction is the date of entry of the 
sentencing order." Robinson, 89 Ill. 2d  at 477. The question here turns 
on whether the first sentencing order or the final sentencing order is 
applicable. The appellate court applied the rule in Robinson to the 
date of the defendant's last sentencing date for the underlying crime, in 
October 1996, instead of his original sentence in February 1985. The panel 
believed that the October 31, 1996, date was the relevant date because once 
probation has been revoked the original sentence no longer exists, and the court 
is free to impose any sentence it could have originally imposed. People v. 
Miller, 109 Ill. App. 3d 255, 256-57 (1982). Therefore, the appellate court 
concluded that the defendant qualified for extended-term sentencing. We 
agree.
Robinson makes clear that the date of a conviction is the date of 
entry of the sentencing order. Robinson, 89 Ill. 2d  at 477. In the 
present case, the sentencing order occurred on October 31, 1996, because that is 
the date defendant's probation was revoked and a final sentence was pronounced 
on defendant for committing the 1984 burglary. The defendant's date of 
conviction for that crime, then, is October 31, 1996.
We further agree with the State that to use the February 26, 1985, date that 
the original probation was handed down would lead to absurd results. In effect, 
if a defendant violates his probation and could postpone resentencing on the 
revocation of probation, he would escape later sentencing under the 
extended-term statute provisions.
As we stated in Robinson, "The aim of recidivist statutes is to 
impose harsher sentences on offenders whose repeated convictions have shown 
their resistance to correction. [Citation.] Realistically, one can assess an 
offender's tendency to recidivism only when, having served his sentence, he has 
returned to society; his behavior while in custody can hardly be viewed as a 
reliable indicator of the likelihood of his committing another offense when 
released." Robinson, 89 Ill. 2d  at 476.
Here, the defendant repeatedly violated his probation and continued to run 
afoul of the law. Having served only nine months of a 54-month sentence imposed 
on October 31, 1996, for his 1985 burglary conviction, defendant committed 
aggravated battery and resisting a peace officer within one week of his release. 
The imposition of an extended-term sentence imposed on December 3, 1997, 
predicated on his previous conviction for burglary, for which defendant was 
finally sentenced to the Department of Corrections on October 31, 1996, was 
appropriate under section 5-5-3.2(b)(1). We note that another jurisdiction has 
interpreted an analogous statute in a similar manner. Harrell v. State, 
832 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) ("Where a felony conviction is 
probated, it becomes final for purposes of enhancement on the date that 
probation is revoked").
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.JUSTICE RATHJE, dissenting:
Section 5-5-3.2(b)(1) of the Unified Code of Corrections authorizes the 
imposition of an extended-term prison sentence "[w]hen a defendant is convicted 
of any felony, after having been previously convicted in Illinois or any other 
jurisdiction of the same or similar class felony or greater class felony, when 
such conviction has occurred within 10 years after the previous 
conviction." (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5-5-3.2(b)(1) (West 1998). In this case, 
the trial court imposed-and the majority affirms-an extended-term sentence under 
section 5-5-3.2(b)(1), even though defendant's 1997 aggravated battery 
conviction occurred 12 years after defendant's 1985 burglary 
conviction. Unlike the majority, I believe that section 5-5-3.2(b)(1) means what 
it says and precludes the imposition of an extended-term sentence based upon a 
12-year-old conviction.(1) I 
therefore dissent.
JUSTICE HEIPLE joins in this dissent.
1. 1At the very least, the State's insistence 
that application of section 5-5-3.2(b)(1) is "far from clear," "imprecise," and 
"vague" under the facts of this case mandates a decision in defendant's favor. 
See People v. Whitney, 188 Ill. 2d 91, 98 (1999) (any ambiguity in a 
penal statute must be construed in the defendant's favor).