Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Sarver

Citation: 2018-Ohio-4717

Docket Number: 2017-1081

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2018-11-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Sarver, Slip Opinion No. 2018-Ohio-4717.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2018-OHIO-4717 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. SARVER. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Sarver, Slip Opinion No.  
2018-Ohio-4717.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
including soliciting or engaging in sexual activity with a client, committing 
an illegal act that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s honesty or 
trustworthiness, and engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation—Two-year license suspension, with 18 months 
stayed on conditions. 
(No. 2017-1081—Submitted May 22, 2018—Decided November 28, 2018.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 
Court, No. 2017-015. 
__________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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KENNEDY, J. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Jason Allan Sarver, of Rockbridge, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0082073, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 2007. 
{¶ 2} In a formal complaint certified to the Board of Professional Conduct 
on April 6, 2017, relator, disciplinary counsel, charged Sarver with four ethical 
violations arising from his sexual relationship with a client.  Initially, the parties 
entered into an agreement for discipline by consent and stipulated to a two-year 
suspension, with the entire suspension stayed on just one condition—that Sarver 
not engage in any further misconduct.  The board accepted the consent-to-discipline 
agreement and the stipulated sanction and recommended that we do so also.  
However, we rejected that sanction and remanded the matter for additional 
proceedings.  150 Ohio St.3d 1439, 2017-Ohio-7742, 82 N.E.3d 1173.  
Subsequently, at a hearing before a panel of the board, the parties presented 
stipulations of fact, misconduct, and aggravating and mitigating factors, submitted 
28 joint exhibits, and recommended that Sarver be suspended from the practice of 
law for two years, with the entire suspension stayed on multiple conditions. 
{¶ 3} The panel adopted the parties’ stipulations and recommended 
sanction, and the board again adopted the panel’s report in its entirety, and no 
objections have been filed.  Although we agree with the finding that Sarver 
committed professional misconduct, we reject the board’s recommended sanction 
and conclude that Sarver’s misconduct warrants a suspension from the practice of 
law for two years, with the last 18 months of the suspension stayed on the 
conditions recommended by the board. 
Misconduct 
{¶ 4} Sarver and J.B. met each other in 2012 when Sarver represented J.B.’s 
then boyfriend in a legal matter.  On September 11, 2015, J.B. reached out to Sarver 
when she needed “a good attorney for felony……some stupid shit happened and I 
really need to talk to u its not good.”  The next day, Sarver and J.B. met at a 
January Term, 2018 
 
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Columbus restaurant, discussed J.B.’s criminal case over drinks, and then had sex 
in Sarver’s vehicle in the parking lot. 
{¶ 5} J.B. was charged with theft in the Hocking County Municipal Court 
and a warrant was issued for her arrest.  According to Sarver, he was unaware that 
a warrant had been issued when he subsequently instructed her to turn off the 
Global Positioning System (“GPS”) on her mobile phone so that law enforcement 
could not track her.  Several days later, a grand jury indicted J.B. for multiple 
felonies, and due to Sarver’s advice to turn off the GPS on her mobile phone, she 
avoided arrest for almost one month before being apprehended. 
{¶ 6} The judge presiding over J.B.’s arraignment appointed Sarver to 
represent her, and Sarver, now representing an indigent client as court-appointed 
counsel, engaged in sexual activity with her at least seven more times over the next 
four months.  They also trespassed onto Sarver’s neighbor’s property to use a hot 
tub. 
{¶ 7} In the meantime, Sarver filed a petition to run for Hocking County 
Prosecuting Attorney.  And although rumors of his sexual relationship with J.B. 
soon spread, Sarver falsely denied the rumors to the judge presiding over J.B.’s 
criminal case on two separate occasions.  Around the same time that Sarver had 
lied about his inappropriate relationship with J.B. to the judge, the Hocking County 
Sherriff’s Office began investigating Sarver.  Detectives interviewed J.B. and 
promised her a reduced sentence if she disclosed the true nature of her relationship 
with Sarver.  J.B. agreed to cooperate with the investigation, and during her 
interview with detectives, she stated that Sarver had “insinuated” that he would help 
J.B. with her “warrants and cases for sexual favors.”  She told the detectives that 
she had “problems saying no to something like that * * *.  You feel kinda forced 
into it. * * *  And, you know, of course, I had something over my head, I was facing 
7 felonies.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 8} The state, through a special prosecutor, charged Sarver with several 
offenses, including two counts of sexual battery in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(1), 
which prohibits knowingly coercing another to engage in sexual conduct.  
However, the sexual-battery counts were dismissed as part of an agreement under 
which Sarver pleaded guilty to three misdemeanor counts of criminal trespassing 
(based on Sarver’s unauthorized use of his neighbor’s hot tub) and one 
misdemeanor count of obstructing official business (based on his advice to J.B. to 
turn off her phone’s GPS while there was an outstanding warrant for her arrest).  
Additionally, as part of the plea agreement, Sarver had to withdraw his candidacy 
for county prosecuting attorney and the special prosecutor dismissed the remaining 
counts of the indictment.  The court sentenced Sarver to two years of community 
control and fined him $1,250. 
{¶ 9} After we rejected the board’s original recommendation to accept the 
parties’ consent-to-discipline agreement and remanded the cause to the board for 
further proceedings, a hearing was held before a panel, the parties presented 
stipulations of fact, misconduct, and aggravating and mitigating factors, and they 
recommended that Sarver be suspended from the practice of law for two years, with 
the entire suspension stayed on multiple conditions. 
{¶ 10} The panel adopted the parties’ stipulations and recommended 
sanction.  The board adopted the panel’s report in its entirety and found that 
Sarver’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j) (prohibiting a lawyer from soliciting 
or engaging in sexual activity with a client unless a consensual sexual relationship 
between them existed prior to the client-lawyer relationship), 8.4(b) (prohibiting a 
lawyer from committing an illegal act that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s 
honesty or trustworthiness), 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(d) (prohibiting a 
lawyer from engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice). 
 
 
January Term, 2018 
 
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Sanction 
{¶ 11} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the 
aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions 
imposed in similar cases. 
{¶ 12} The parties stipulated and the board found the presence of two 
aggravating factors—that Sarver acted with a dishonest and selfish motive and 
committed multiple offenses.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(2) and (4). 
{¶ 13} Stipulated mitigating factors found by the board include the absence 
of prior discipline, Sarver’s full and free disclosure to the board and cooperative 
attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, and other penalties and sanctions 
incurred for his misconduct.  See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1), (4), and (6).  The parties 
stipulated and the board found that Sarver had submitted letters attesting to his good 
character and reputation, and the judge who had presided over J.B.’s criminal case 
also submitted a letter expressing his agreement with the proposed sanction.  See 
Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(5).  In addition, the board noted that Sarver had successfully 
completed court-ordered counseling and made a good-faith effort to address the 
issues underlying his misconduct by entering into a contract with the Ohio Lawyers 
Assistance Program (“OLAP”) and attending additional counseling with his spouse. 
{¶ 14} In considering the appropriate sanction for Sarver’s misconduct, the 
board emphasized that “compelling” mitigating factors in this case warranted a two-
year suspension, with the entire suspension stayed on conditions:  
 
(1) not only was there no harm to the client but the client leveraged 
her relationship with [Sarver] to get a better plea deal by agreeing to 
testify against him; (2) he received a very public reprimand of sorts 
from the local media because his arrest and indictment, while he was 
a candidate for prosecutor, were front-page news; (3) he was over-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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indicted with 14 felonies and four misdemeanors including bribery 
and sexual battery charges; (4) he was arrested twice and spent two 
nights in jail; (5) and he was forced to withdraw his candidacy for 
county prosecutor. 
 
The board explained that “[w]hat makes these factors so significant is that they all 
stem from [Sarver’s] consensual sexual relationship with his client.” 
{¶ 15} We agree that Sarver’s conduct violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j), 8.4(b), 
8.4(c), and 8.4(d).  However, we disagree that a two-year suspension, with the entire 
suspension stayed on the conditions recommended by the board, is the appropriate 
sanction for that misconduct. 
{¶ 16} Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j) prohibits a lawyer from soliciting or engaging in 
sexual activity with a client unless a consensual sexual relationship between them 
predated the client-lawyer relationship.  In the absence of a preexisting, consensual 
sexual relationship, seeking or having sex with a client is a per se violation.  The 
fact that a client appears to have consented does not mitigate the attorney’s 
misconduct or provide a defense against a violation.  Indeed, Comment 17 to 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j) explains that “this rule prohibits the lawyer from engaging in 
sexual activity with a client regardless of whether the relationship is consensual 
and regardless of the absence of prejudice to the client, unless the sexual 
relationship predates the client-lawyer relationship.”  (Emphasis added.)  Compare 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.7 (allowing client to consent to representation of another client that 
will be directly adverse to the client in certain circumstances); Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(a) 
(allowing client to consent to an attorney’s transacting business with the client 
when certain conditions are met).  And Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C) does not identify the 
client’s consent as a mitigating factor that may be considered in favor of a less 
severe sanction. 
January Term, 2018 
 
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{¶ 17} We have admonished lawyers and sanctioned them with an actual 
suspension from the practice of law for engaging in sexual conduct with clients 
with whom they had no sexual relationship prior to the representation.  “Most 
disturbing are cases in which a lawyer has had sex with a client while defending 
the client against criminal charges * * * or has accepted sex in lieu of fees.”  
Disciplinary Counsel v. Krieger, 108 Ohio St.3d 319, 2006-Ohio-1062, 843 N.E.2d 
765, ¶ 29. 
{¶ 18} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Booher, 75 Ohio St.3d 509, 664 N.E.2d 
522 (1996), Booher had been appointed to represent a female client who was facing 
felony charges.  When Booher met with his client to discuss a possible prison 
sentence in a jail meeting room, they engaged in sexual activity.  The client reported 
the incident to the judge presiding over her case, resulting in disciplinary action 
against Booher.  The board recommended a one-year suspension of Booher’s 
license, with the entire suspension stayed on conditions.  We concluded, however, 
that a more severe sanction was warranted, explaining: 
 
The case before us involves court-appointed counsel for a criminal 
defendant.  The lawyer-client relation in a criminal matter is 
inherently unequal.  The client’s reliance on the ability of her 
counsel in a crisis situation has the effect of putting the lawyer in a 
position of dominance and the client in a position of dependence and 
vulnerability.  The more vulnerable the client, the heavier is the 
obligation upon the attorney not to exploit the situation for his own 
advantage.  Whether a client consents to or initiates sexual activity 
with the lawyer, the burden is on the lawyer to ensure that all 
attorney-client dealings remain on a professional level. 
 
Id. at 510.  We also noted that because the client was incarcerated, Booher had 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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abused his status as an officer of the court by meeting with the client and engaging 
in sexual activity with her in the jail.  We therefore imposed a one-year actual 
suspension. 
{¶ 19} In Disciplinary Counsel v. Freeman, 106 Ohio St.3d 334, 2005-
Ohio-5142, 835 N.E.2d 26, Freeman paid his 18-year-old female client—who was 
facing serious criminal charges—$150 to pose for nude photographs.  And after the 
attorney-client relationship had ended, Freeman offered his underage client alcohol 
and solicited her to perform sex acts in exchange for specific monetary amounts.  
Citing Booher, this court explained that “[w]e have denounced the patent 
impropriety of similar misconduct before.”  Freeman at ¶ 12.  And given the 
reprehensible nature of Freeman’s conduct and our obligation to protect the public, 
we suspended his license to practice law for an actual six-month term.  Id. at ¶ 16. 
{¶ 20} In Krieger, 108 Ohio St.3d 319, 2006-Ohio-1062, 843 N.E.2d 765, 
at ¶ 33, we explained that an assistant public defender “took advantage of the 
‘inherently unequal’ balance of power between a criminal defense lawyer and his 
or her client” when Krieger had a sexual relationship with—and provided financial 
assistance to—a male client whom she had previously represented as a juvenile and 
continued to represent in other legal matters.  The attorney had also lied about the 
relationship to her employer, the public defender, and impeded the public defender 
in providing competent and objective representation to this indigent defendant, 
eventually causing the public defender to refuse to provide him with future legal 
representation.  Id. at ¶ 28, 34.  We suspended Krieger from the practice of law for 
two years, with one year of the suspension stayed on conditions.  Id. at ¶ 36. 
{¶ 21} In Akron Bar Assn. v. Williams, 104 Ohio St.3d 317, 2004-Ohio-
6588, 819 N.E.2d 677, the attorney represented a female client in a domestic-
relations proceeding and defended her against charges for driving under the 
influence and driving with a suspended license.  During this time, the client “was 
in danger of losing custody of her children, had little, if any, money to pay for legal 
January Term, 2018 
 
9
assistance, was struggling with drug use, and was in counseling for having 
attempted suicide.”  Id. at ¶ 3.  Nonetheless, Williams began a sexual relationship 
with the client with an understanding that she would not be charged for his legal 
services.  After the client filed a grievance, Williams lied in a deposition under oath 
when he denied that he was having a sexual relationship with her.  Id. at ¶ 6.  Noting 
the “egregious” misconduct in which the attorney “[took] advantage of a vulnerable 
client [and] lied under oath to hide his misdeeds,” we suspended Williams’s law 
license for two years, with the last 18 months of the suspension stayed on 
conditions.  Id. at ¶ 15-16. 
{¶ 22} These cases all involved attorneys who took advantage of the 
attorney-client relationship and their clients’ vulnerable circumstances for the 
attorneys’ own sexual gratification.  And in each case, we determined that an actual 
suspension was the appropriate sanction for their misconduct. 
{¶ 23} In this case, however, the board concluded that “compelling 
mitigating factors” supported adopting the parties’ recommendation of a two-year 
suspension, with the entire suspension stayed on conditions.  It noted that “not only 
was there no harm to the client but the client leveraged her relationship with 
[Sarver] to get a better plea deal by agreeing to testify against him.”  The board also 
explained that other negative consequences that Sarver experienced—a public 
shaming “of sorts” from the local media, his being “over-indicted with 14 felonies 
and four misdemeanors,” his two arrests and the two nights that he spent in jail, and 
his being forced to withdraw his candidacy for county prosecutor—were 
“significant” because “they all stem[med] from [Sarver’s] consensual sexual 
relationship with his client.” 
{¶ 24} However, the board’s finding that there was a consensual 
relationship seems oblivious to the facts that (1) J.B. was an indigent criminal 
defendant, (2) Sarver was her court-appointed, criminal-defense attorney, (3) “[t]he 
lawyer-client relation in a criminal matter is inherently unequal,” Booher, 75 Ohio 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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St.3d at 510, 664 N.E.2d 522, and (4) “[t]he client’s reliance on the ability of her 
counsel in a crisis situation has the effect of putting the lawyer in a position of 
dominance and the client in a position of dependence and vulnerability,” id.  This 
power imbalance “ ‘enable[s] the lawyer to dominate and take unfair advantage’ ” 
of the client.  Iowa Supreme Court Bd. of Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Hill, 
540 N.W.2d 43, 44 (Iowa 1995), quoting former Iowa Code of Professional 
Responsibility EC 5-25. 
{¶ 25} Reported cases are filled with clients who have said that they 
submitted to their attorney’s sexual advances out of fear that refusing to submit 
would affect the quality of their representation at a time of vulnerability and 
dependence on the attorney.  E.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Detweiler, 135 Ohio 
St.3d 447, 2013-Ohio-1747, 989 N.E.2d 41, ¶ 20; Disciplinary Counsel v. Moore, 
101 Ohio St.3d 261, 2004-Ohio-734, 804 N.E.2d 423, ¶ 12; Williams, 104 Ohio 
St.3d 317, 2004-Ohio-6588, 819 N.E.2d 677, at ¶ 4; In re Vogel, 482 S.W.3d 520, 
525, 544 (Tenn.2016); Iowa Supreme Court Atty. Disciplinary Bd. v. Moothart, 860 
N.W.2d 598, 617 (Iowa 2015); Matter of Berg, 264 Kan. 254, 281, 955 P.2d 1240 
(1998); In re Rinella, 175 Ill.2d 504, 516, 677 N.E.2d 909 (1997). 
{¶ 26} Here, Sarver met an indigent client “for drinks” and to discuss a 
serious criminal matter.  At the end of the meeting, Sarver proceeded to have sex 
with her in his parked car, which the client described as a “favor” for his legal 
services.  Then, after the client had been found indigent and Sarver had been 
appointed by the court to represent her, Sarver continued to engage in sexual 
activity with J.B. while she remained vulnerable and dependent on him as he 
defended her against serious criminal charges. 
{¶ 27} Yet, although J.B. told detectives that she believed Sarver was 
helping her in exchange for sexual favors and that she had submitted to his sexual 
advances because of her legal jeopardy—and notwithstanding relator’s statement 
at the hearing that J.B. still contended that the sexual activity with Sarver was not 
January Term, 2018 
 
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consensual—the board never heard directly from her before making conclusions 
about the nature of her relationship with Sarver.  Instead, the board essentially 
blamed the victim, J.B., for the negative consequences that Sarver experienced 
resulting from his own decision to engage in sexual relations with a vulnerable 
client whom he had been appointed to represent in a criminal case. 
{¶ 28} And then, ignoring all the indications that Sarver exploited the 
attorney-client relationship to obtain “sexual favors,” the board concluded that the 
client was all the better for it, because she “leveraged her relationship with [Sarver] 
to get a better plea deal.”  The mere fact that the client’s criminal case was not 
prejudiced does not mean that she suffered no harm from Sarver’s misconduct.  See 
Vogel, 482 S.W.3d at 537 (“the use of [the client’s] trust to her disadvantage 
constitutes injury”).  As the Supreme Court of Colorado has explained, “a sexual 
relationship between lawyer and client during the course of the professional 
relationship is inherently and insidiously harmful.”  People v. Boyer, 934 P.2d 
1361, 1363 (Colo.1997).  The client may be psychologically and emotionally 
harmed by an exploitative sexual relationship regardless of the outcome of the legal 
case.  See Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Sleibi, 144 Ohio St.3d 257, 2015-Ohio-
2724, 42 N.E.3d 699, ¶ 15 (noting that the attorney’s sexual relationships with 
clients caused those clients emotional harm); State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Assn. 
v. Denton, 258 Neb. 600, 609, 604 N.W.2d 832 (2000) (noting that the attorney’s 
sexual relationship with his client “caused further psychological harm to a 
vulnerable client”). 
{¶ 29} The abuse of the attorney-client relationship not only harms the 
dignity of the client, whose body and trust in her lawyer have been violated, but it 
also impugns the legal system as a whole.  J.B., an indigent criminal defendant, 
turned to the court and the legal profession to protect her freedom and right to due 
process, only to be exploited for Sarver’s sexual gratification. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 30} It is for all these reasons that Ohio has adopted a per se prohibition 
against an attorney’s having a sexual relationship with a client when such a 
relationship did not exist before the attorney-client relationship was formed, and 
the professional-conduct rules do not indicate that a lesser sanction should be 
imposed on the attorney when the relationship “appears” to be consensual or when 
the client’s case does not seem to have been prejudiced.  And in keeping with the 
aspiration expressed in A Lawyer’s Creed “to make the law and our legal system 
available to all,” courts have the obligation to ensure that the lawyers appointed to 
represent indigent criminal defendants “offer loyalty, confidentiality, competence, 
diligence and [their] best judgment” and abide by their professional duty not to 
initiate a sexual relationship with a vulnerable client whose liberty and right to due 
process is at stake.  A Lawyer’s Creed, Appendix V to the Supreme Court Rules 
for the Government of the Bar.  Failing to impose an actual suspension on a court-
appointed, criminal-defense attorney who has violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j) by 
having sex with his indigent client would contravene our obligation to protect the 
public. 
{¶ 31} The board’s finding that J.B. freely engaged in a relationship with 
Sarver ignores the power imbalance between an indigent client and court-appointed 
defense counsel, and its finding that J.B. had not been prejudiced discounts the 
inherent harm that results when an attorney abuses the attorney-client relationship 
in pursuit of the attorney’s own sexual gratification.  For all of these reasons, 
Sarver’s misconduct of engaging in a sexual relationship with a client in a criminal 
case—during which he also obstructed official business, committed trespass, and 
lied about the relationship to a judge—warrants an actual suspension of his law 
license. 
{¶ 32} Accordingly, Jason Allan Sarver is suspended from the practice of 
law in Ohio for two years, with 18 months of the suspension stayed on the 
conditions that he (1) comply with his December 12, 2017 OLAP contract, (2) take 
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the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam and receive a passing score, (3) in 
addition to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. X, complete 12 hours of continuing 
legal education focused on professional ethics or attorney-client relationships, 
(4) serve a two-year period of monitored probation in accordance with Gov.Bar R. 
V(21), and (5) engage in no further misconduct.  If Sarver fails to comply with any 
condition of the stay, the stay will be lifted and he will serve the full two-year 
suspension.  Costs are taxed to Sarver. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’DONNELL, FRENCH, and DEWINE, JJ., concur. 
FISCHER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion joined by 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and DEGENARO, J. 
_________________ 
FISCHER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 33} The sanction recommended by the Board of Professional Conduct, 
with the inclusion of conditions such as probation, is much improved from the 
previous discipline-by-consent agreement submitted to this court.  I agree with the 
majority’s position, however, that a two-year suspension, with the entire suspension 
stayed on the conditions recommended by the board, is an unsuitable sanction in 
this case.  Although I agree with much of the majority’s analysis, I believe that 
given the circumstances of this case, a longer actual suspension of respondent’s, 
Jason Allan Sarver’s, Ohio law license is warranted and is necessary to protect the 
public.  Specifically, I find that a two-year suspension, with one year stayed on the 
conditions recommended by the board, would be a more appropriate sanction in 
this case.  Therefore, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. 
A. An Actual Suspension of One Year is Warranted 
{¶ 34} I wholeheartedly agree with the majority that the board was incorrect 
to conclude that because Sarver’s client, J.B., was not prejudiced in her criminal 
case, she was not harmed by Sarver’s misconduct.  Majority opinion at ¶ 28.  And 
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I further agree with the board and the majority that Sarver acted selfishly and with 
a dishonest motive. 
{¶ 35} But I believe that Sarver’s actions necessitate a longer actual 
suspension of his law license.  Here, Sarver violated four professional-conduct rules 
stemming from his sexual relationship with his indigent female client, J.B:  
Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j), by engaging in sexual activity with a client; Prof.Cond.R. 
8.4(b), by committing an illegal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty 
or trustworthiness; Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c), by engaging in conduct involving 
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d), by 
engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. 
{¶ 36} Generally, for many of these rule violations, including Prof.Cond.R. 
1.8(j), whether an actual suspension is imposed depends on the facts of each case.  
See Disciplinary Counsel v. Detweiler, 135 Ohio St.3d 447, 989 N.E.2d 41, 2013-
Ohio-1747, ¶ 17-20.  However, when the violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j) involves 
an attorney and an indigent client, an actual suspension of an attorney’s law license 
is warranted.  See Disciplinary Counsel v. Krieger, 108 Ohio St.3d 319, 2006-Ohio-
1062, 843 N.E.2d 765 (court-appointed attorney who engaged in a sexual 
relationship with her indigent juvenile client received a two-year suspension from 
the practice of law, with one year stayed on conditions); Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Booher, 75 Ohio St.3d 509, 664 N.E.2d 522 (1996) (court-appointed attorney who 
engaged in sexual activity with his indigent client in the county jail received an 
actual one-year suspension from the practice of law). 
{¶ 37} We have also held that when an attorney engages in a course of 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, the attorney will 
serve an actual suspension from the practice of law.  Disciplinary Counsel v. 
Fowerbaugh, 74 Ohio St.3d 187, 658 N.E.2d 237 (1995), syllabus.  While we have 
tempered that sanction in cases presenting an isolated incident in an otherwise 
unblemished career, see, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Fumich, 116 Ohio St.3d 257, 
January Term, 2018 
 
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2007-Ohio-6040, 878 N.E.2d 6, this is not such a case.  Sarver made a series of 
poor decisions over the course of at least six months stemming from his selfish 
motives to engage in a sexual relationship with his indigent client. 
{¶ 38} The majority correctly emphasizes that the consensual nature of the 
sexual relationship between Sarver and J.B. does not excuse or provide a defense 
for Sarver’s misconduct.  But even if consent were a mitigating factor, given the 
imbalance of power inherent in an attorney-client relationship, I question whether 
J.B.—who was heavily dependent on Sarver for help with navigating the criminal-
justice system and maintaining her liberty—could have given adequate informed 
consent.  See Prof.Cond.R. 1.8(j), Comment 17. 
{¶ 39} Furthermore, “[w]hether a client consents to or initiates sexual 
activity with the lawyer, the burden is on the lawyer to ensure that all attorney-
client dealings remain on a professional level.”  Booher, 75 Ohio St.3d at 510, 664 
N.E.2d 522.  Here, it is apparent that Sarver did not meet his burden to maintain a 
professional relationship with J.B.  Sarver immediately acted on J.B.’s request for 
help with her criminal case by contacting an assistant prosecuting attorney.  The 
following day, Sarver met J.B. for drinks where they discussed her case and then 
proceeded to have sex in Sarver’s vehicle.  Sarver continued his sexual relationship 
with J.B., which included trespassing on the property of Sarver’s neighbor to use 
the neighbor’s hot tub.  Sarver acted dishonestly and selfishly, and he continuously 
and repeatedly failed to maintain professionalism in his interactions with J.B. 
{¶ 40} Perhaps the most disturbing behavior demonstrated by Sarver during 
this six-month period occurred when Sarver deceived the court at least three times.  
After establishing the attorney-client relationship with J.B., Sarver began a sexual 
relationship with her and then sought appointment by the court to serve as J.B.’s 
court-appointed, criminal-defense attorney.  A court, in making appointments, must 
take into account “[t]he avoidance of conflicts of interest or other situations that 
may potentially delay timely completion of the case,” Sup.R. 8(D)(4), and 
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“[i]ntangible factors, including the court[’s] * * * view of a potential appointee’s 
commitment to providing timely, cost-effective, quality representation to each 
prospective client,” Sup.R. 8(D)(5).  By seeking to be appointed to J.B.’s case and 
failing to disclose his relationship, Sarver misled the court as to his ability to 
adequately represent J.B. as her court-appointed, criminal-defense attorney.  
Making matters worse, Sarver continued his sexual relationship with J.B. after 
being appointed by the court and twice lied about the relationship to a caring judge 
when the judge expressed concern about the situation. 
{¶ 41} While there are some mitigating factors in Sarver’s favor, such as 
his lack of a disciplinary record, his cooperation with the board, and his character 
references, the mitigating factors do not outweigh Sarver’s abhorrent behavior, 
boorish selfishness, and complete disregard for the legal profession.  Sarver 
engaged in a sexual relationship with his indigent client who was facing serious 
felony charges, advised his client on how to evade authorities, and then misled and 
explicitly lied to the court about that relationship.  As the majority correctly 
emphasizes, the most disturbing attorney-disciplinary cases are those in which a 
lawyer engages in sexual activity with a client while defending the client against 
criminal charges.  Krieger, 108 Ohio St.3d 319, 2006-Ohio-1062, 843 N.E.2d 765, 
at ¶ 29.  Given the facts of this case, I believe that this court should suspend Sarver 
from the practice of law in Ohio for two years, with one year of the suspension 
stayed on the conditions recommended by the board. 
B. The Additional Conditions Will Help Ensure Protection of the Public 
{¶ 42} While I believe that an actual one-year suspension of Sarver’s law 
license is necessary to protect the public, I also believe that the board’s newly 
recommended conditions will help to further protect the public. 
{¶ 43} Originally, the board had accepted a discipline-by-consent 
agreement whereby disciplinary counsel and Sarver stipulated to a two-year 
suspension, fully stayed on just one condition—that Sarver not engage in further 
January Term, 2018 
 
17 
misconduct during those two years.  This court specifically rejected that 
recommended sanction and remanded the cause to the hardworking members of the 
board for further proceedings.  I voted to reject the board’s originally recommended 
sanction because that sanction did not adequately protect the public.  150 Ohio St.3d 
1439, 2017-Ohio-7742, 82 N.E.3d 1173. 
{¶ 44} Subsequently, the board again recommended that Sarver be 
suspended from the practice of law for two years, with the entire suspension 
conditionally stayed.  The board included additional conditions that require Sarver 
to comply with his Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program (“OLAP”) contract, take and 
pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam, and, in addition to his normal 
continuing-legal-education (“CLE”) requirements, complete 12 hours of CLE 
focused on professional ethics or relationships with clients.  And most importantly, 
the conditions include a period of monitored probation under Gov.Bar R. V(21). 
{¶ 45} Under Gov.Bar R. V(21)(A), disciplinary counsel must appoint an 
attorney or attorneys to monitor Sarver’s compliance with all of the conditions 
listed above.  The monitoring attorney or attorneys must then file written, certified 
reports with disciplinary counsel regarding the status of Sarver’s compliance with 
the conditions of his probation, see Gov.Bar R. V(21)(B)(2), and shall 
“[i]mmediately report” to disciplinary counsel any violation by Sarver of any 
condition of probation (emphasis added), Gov.Bar R. V(21)(B)(3).  The written 
reports must be filed “at least quarterly or as otherwise determined” by disciplinary 
counsel.  Gov.Bar R. V(21)(B)(2). 
{¶ 46} Further, while on probation, Sarver must (1) have a personal meeting 
with the monitoring attorney or attorneys at least once a month during the first year 
and at least quarterly thereafter, unless required by the monitoring attorney or 
attorneys to have more frequent meetings; (2) provide the monitoring attorney or 
attorneys with a written release or waiver so that Sarver’s compliance with the 
conditions concerning medical, psychological, or other treatment and his 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
18 
attendance at self-help programs may be verified; and (3) cooperate fully with the 
efforts of the  monitoring attorney or attorneys.  Gov.Bar R. V(21)(C).  
Significantly, Sarver’s probation may be terminated only with this court’s approval, 
see Gov.Bar R. V(21)(D), and disciplinary counsel must immediately investigate 
“any report of a violation of the conditions of probation” by Sarver and must move 
to revoke his probation if warranted (emphasis added), Gov.Bar R. V(21)(E). 
{¶ 47} These additional requirements will protect the public far more 
effectively than the sanction originally recommended by the board, as Sarver will 
be forced to be in regular and repeated contact with both the monitoring attorney or 
attorneys and OLAP.  The written release or waiver that Sarver signs will provide 
the monitoring attorney or attorneys access to Sarver’s medical and mental-health 
information—a significant intrusion into Sarver’s private life—to ensure that he is 
in compliance with the conditions of his probation.  Sarver must also abide by the 
significant obligations placed on him by his contract with OLAP.  Moreover, Sarver 
has the proverbial “sword of Damocles” of more time without his license “hanging 
over his head” if he violates any ethical duty or any of the conditions during the 
suspension period.  In other words, this sanction will keep Sarver, in colloquial 
terms, “on a short leash” once he is able to return to practice.  Indeed, these 
additional conditions on the stay of Sarver’s suspension will better help to protect 
the public. 
C.  Conclusion 
{¶ 48} While I agree with much of the majority opinion and agree that the 
significant conditions attached to Sarver’s suspension, specifically probation, will 
help protect the public more effectively than the board’s previously recommended 
discipline-by-consent agreement, I believe that a longer actual suspension of 
Sarver’s Ohio law license is warranted.  Therefore, I concur in part and dissent in 
part. 
January Term, 2018 
 
19 
{¶ 49} I hope that in the future, this court will more often utilize probation, 
as was done in this case, as a means of protecting the citizens of Ohio from attorney 
misconduct. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and DEGENARO, J., concur in the foregoing opinion. 
_________________ 
Scott J. Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, and Karen H. Osmond, Assistant 
Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Jason Allan Sarver, pro se. 
_________________