Case Title: Jones v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 223, 2001

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2001-10-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
WAYNE A. JONES,
Defendant Below-
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff Below-
Appellee.
§
§
§  No. 223, 2001
§
§  Court Below—Superior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for Sussex County
§  Cr.A. Nos. VS93-09-0571-03,
§  VS95-03-0344-03,
§  VS99-09-0414-02
§
Submitted: September 20, 2001
  Decided:
October 31, 2001
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH, and STEELE, Justices.
O R D E R
This 31st day of October 2001, upon consideration of the appellant’s
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm, it appears to the Court
that:
(1)
The defendant-appellant, Wayne A. Jones, filed this appeal
from his adjudication and sentence for violation of probation (VOP).
Following a hearing on April 16, 2001, the Superior Court concluded, based
on Jones’ own admissions, that Jones had violated three conditions of his
probation.  At defense counsel’s suggestion, the Superior Court ordered an
evaluation by the Treatment Access Center (TASC) and deferred sentencing
until TASC issued its report. On May 8, 2001, the Superior Court followed
2
the TASC recommendation and sentenced Jones to a total of 4 years at Level
V incarceration, to be suspended upon successful completion of the Key
program, to be followed by work release and probation.
(2)
Jones raises eight separately numbered issues in his opening
brief on appeal, although many of the issues are interrelated.  The heart of
Jones’ complaint is that the Superior Court improperly sentenced him to
complete the Level V Key drug treatment program rather than allowing him
to participate in the out-patient treatment program recommended by Jones’
private psychiatrist, Dr. Mittal.  The State has moved to affirm the judgment
of the Superior Court.
(3)
The record of the VOP hearing reflects that Jones admitted to
violating three conditions of his probation by failing to keep appointments
with his probation officer, by failing to timely report a change in his
employment to his probation officer, and by testing positive for cocaine use.
As a result of Jones’ admissions, there was no error in the Superior Court’s
conclusion that Jones had violated his probation.  The real issue is whether
there is any error in the sentence imposed by the Superior Court.
(4)
Jones complains that, at the VOP hearing, the Superior Court
failed to treat Dr. Mittal as an expert, failed to accord Dr. Mittal’s opinion
the proper weight, and improperly deferred to the respective opinions of
3
Jones’ probation officer and the TASC counselor.  Jones further argues that
it was improper for the Superior Court to consider the TASC report, which
refuted Dr. Mittal’s recommendation, after the conclusion of the VOP
hearing on April 16, 2001.  As a corollary to that argument, Jones argues
that because the TASC report was improperly admitted below after the close
of the April 16, 2001 hearing, it should not be considered part of the record
on appeal.
(5)
None of these arguments has merit. Because Jones admitted
violating several conditions of his probation, the record of the April 16, 2001
VOP hearing reflects that the focus of the hearing concerned the appropriate
punishment for Jones’ violations.  Dr. Mittal did not testify at the April 16,
2001 hearing.  Accordingly, there was no opportunity or need for the Court
to qualify Dr. Mittal as an expert.  Nonetheless, it is clear that Dr. Mittal’s
written recommendation was offered into evidence and was considered by
the Superior Court.  Given the conflicting recommendations concerning
whether private drug treatment was more appropriate than the Key Program,
the Superior Court, at defense counsel’s suggestion, ordered the TASC
evaluation and deferred sentencing.  This was entirely within the Superior
Court’s discretion, and we find no abuse of discretion.1  The TASC report
                                                
1 See Williams v. State, Del. Supr., 560 A.2d 1012, 1015 (1989) (holding that trial court
4
was appropriately considered by the Superior Court in formulating its
sentencing decision and is appropriately part of the record on appeal.  In
determining the appropriate sanction for Jones’ admitted violations, it was
well within the Superior Court’s discretion to reject the recommendation of
Dr. Mittal for private drug treatment in favor of the TASC recommendation
for the Key Program.2
(6)
Jones also complains that the Superior Court improperly found
him in violation of all of his probationary sentences (including probation he
had not yet begun serving) when, in fact, he was serving only the Level III
portion of his probation at the time of the violations.  There is no merit to
this claim.  We previously have held that, after a VOP finding, the Superior
Court may revoke any portion of a defendant’s probationary sentence
including the unexecuted portion of the sentence.3  Accordingly, we reject
this claim.
(7)
Finally, Jones complains that his probation officer improperly
mentioned a pending assault charge at the VOP hearing, although Jones
ultimately was found not guilty of the charge after a trial.  The record,
however, reflects that it was defense counsel who first mentioned the
                                                                                                                                                
has “wide latitude in probationary matters”).
2 Accord Tyre v. State, Del. Supr., 412 A.2d 326, 330 (1980) (holding that factfinder is
responsible for weighing evidence and resolving conflicting testimony).
5
pending assault charge in response to a question from the Superior Court
about a bandage on Jones’ head.  Furthermore, in light of Jones’ admissions
to other violations, it is clear that the pending assault charge did not form the
basis of the Superior Court’s finding that Jones had violated probation.
Even if the pending assault charge had been considered by the Superior
Court, we do not find any error.  We previously have recognized that the
Superior Court has authority to revoke probation notwithstanding the
defendant’s acquittal on criminal charges involving the same conduct giving
rise to the VOP hearing.4
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
   s/Joseph T. Walsh
Justice
                                                                                                                                                
3 Williams v. State, 560 A.2d at 1013.
4 See Gibbs v. State, Del. Supr., 760 A.2d 541 (2000).