Case Title: Gill v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC11-1553

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2012-09-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2012 
 
                                                          CASE NOS.:  SC11-1553 
                                                          Lower Tribunal No.:  63-2002-CF-000028-A 
 
RICARDO I. GILL, ET AL. 
vs. 
 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA 
Appellant(s) 
 
Appellee(s) 
 
Ricardo I. Gill, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals the circuit court’s 
order finding Gill competent to discharge his postconviction counsel and waive 
postconviction proceedings filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 
3.851.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1), of the Florida 
Constitution.   
After this Court affirmed Gill’s death sentence on direct appeal, see Gill v. 
State, 14 So. 3d 946, 967 (Fla. 2009), Gill’s postconviction proceedings were 
assigned to the Eighth Judicial Circuit Court for Union County, Florida, and D. 
Todd Doss was appointed as counsel for Gill.  Shortly thereafter, Gill sought to 
discharge Doss as postconviction counsel and waive the postconviction 
proceedings.  After holding a combined competency, Faretta, and Durocher 
hearing, the circuit court found Gill competent and issued an order discharging 
Doss and dismissing the proceedings.  See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 
(1975) (requiring a hearing to determine if an accused’s unequivocal request for 
self-representation should be granted); Durocher v. Singletary, 623 So. 2d 482, 485 
(Fla. 1993) (requiring trial courts to evaluate defendants to determine if they 
understand the consequences of waiving collateral counsel and proceedings).  Both 
Gill and Doss filed notices of appeal from the decision of the circuit court.  This 
Court then issued a briefing schedule assuming that Gill and Doss would file 
separate briefs, but Gill did not file a brief in this case.  On appeal, Doss contends  
 
 
 
 
Case No. SC11-1553 
Page 2 
 
 
on behalf of Gill that: (1) Gill was not afforded constitutionally adequate 
competency, waiver of postconviction, and discharge of counsel proceedings in 
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; and (2) the circuit court erred 
in finding Gill competent to waive postconviction proceedings and discharge 
counsel.  Doss asks this Court to vacate the circuit court’s rulings and remand this 
cause to the circuit court for a constitutionally adequate competency hearing and a  
new hearing on waiver of postconviction proceedings and discharge of counsel.   
Doss contends that: (a) Dr. Brian Cooke, one of the two expert witnesses 
who testified regarding Gill’s competence, was unqualified because he was 
unfamiliar with the legal and procedural aspects of postconviction proceedings; 
and (b) the two experts, Drs. Cooke and Harry Krop, were unable to view Gill’s 
medical and disciplinary records from the Department of Corrections prior to 
evaluating him because the postconviction court denied Doss’s request to order 
them released out of respect for Gill’s desire to keep them confidential.  Doss also 
cites Gill’s allegedly bizarre behavior and notes that Gill told the experts he had 
not researched appellate procedure prior to waiving the proceedings.   
Regarding his first claim, Gill is not entitled to relief for several reasons.  
First, this claim was not properly preserved for appellate review.  See Doorbal v. 
State, 983 So. 2d 464, 492 (Fla. 2008) (“For an issue to be preserved for appeal, it 
must be presented to the lower court, and the specific legal argument or ground to 
be argued on appeal must be part of that presentation.”).  Second, the circuit court 
did not abuse its discretion by finding that Dr. Cooke, a forensic psychiatrist at the 
University of Florida who had previously testified as an expert regarding 
 
 
competency, was qualified as an expert.  See Ramirez v. State, 542 So. 2d 352, 355 
(Fla. 1989) (“The determination of a witness’s qualifications to express an expert  
 
 
Case No. SC11-1553 
Page 3 
 
 
opinion is peculiarly within the discretion of the trial judge, whose decision will 
not be reversed absent a clear showing of error.”).  Finally, the circuit court did not 
abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of Gill’s medical records and 
disciplinary records from the Department of Corrections.  See Frances v. State, 970 
So. 2d 806, 813 (Fla. 2007) (noting that a trial court’s ruling on the admission or 
exclusion of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion).  Gill’s attorney, 
Doss, did not preserve this issue for appeal because he failed to proffer the records 
under seal.  See Baker v. State, 71 So. 3d 802, 816 (Fla. 2011) (stating that the 
party seeking to admit evidence must proffer the contents of the excluded evidence 
to the trial court to preserve a claim of error), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1639 (2012).  
In addition, it was at Gill’s direction that the trial court did not order the release of 
the medical records and disciplinary records.  Cf. Gore v. State, 24 So. 3d 1, 15 
(Fla. 2009) (concluding, in an ineffective assistance of counsel context, that the 
trial court did not err in ruling any inability of current counsel to obtain the records 
was due primarily to Gore’s own decision not to release them).   
As to his second claim, Gill is not entitled to relief.  “Once a defendant has 
been deemed competent, the presumption of competence continues throughout all  
subsequent proceedings.”  Dessaure v. State, 55 So. 3d 478, 482-83 (Fla. 2010).  
Gill was found competent to stand trial in 2005 and that finding was affirmed by 
this Court.  See Gill, 14 So. 3d at 960.  In this proceeding, Gill has failed to present 
any facts that demonstrate he is incompetent; his arguments merely reflect that he 
 
 
wishes to set aside his waiver because he has changed his mind.  See Trease v. 
State, 41 So. 3d 119, 125, 126 (Fla. 2010) (holding that “the party challenging the 
defendant’s waiver request bears the burden of proving that the defendant is 
incompetent” (quoting Durocher, 623 So. 2d at 485) and holding that a mere  
 
 
Case No. SC11-1553 
Page 4 
 
 
change of mind is an insufficient basis for setting aside a prior valid waiver).  In 
addition, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion because its determination was 
supported by competent, substantial evidence.  Id. at 124 (stating that this Court 
reviews a trial court’s ruling regarding competency to waive postconviction 
counsel and proceedings in a death penalty case for an abuse of discretion); Gore, 
24 So. 3d at 10 (stating that a trial court’s determination of competency supported 
by competent, substantial evidence will not be disturbed on appeal).   
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s order finding Gill competent to 
discharge his postconviction counsel and waive postconviction proceedings. 
It is so ordered. 
 
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, 
JJ., concur. 
CANADY, J., concurs in result. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
A True Copy 
Test: 
 
 
 
aa 
Served:     
HON. ROBERT P. CATES, JUDGE         
    
HON. REGINA H. PARRISH, CLERK 
HON. WILLIAM P. CERVONE 
STEPHEN RICHARD WHITE 
RICARDO I. GILL 
D. TODD DOSS