Case Title: Spradlin v. Smith

Citation: 494 So. 2d 354

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1986-09-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
494 So. 2d 354 (1986) Michael J. SPRADLIN v. Maynard H. SMITH. No. 55779. Supreme Court of Mississippi. September 17, 1986. James W. Backstrom, Carolyn Dohn, Bryan, Nelson, Allen, Schroeder & Backstrom, Pascagoula, for appellant. Arvos V. Cumbest, Scott Cumbest, Cumbest, Cumbest & Hunter, Pascagoula, for appellee. *355 Before WALKER, C.J., DAN M. LEE and GRIFFIN, JJ. GRIFFIN, Justice, for the Court: This is an appeal of a suit for personal injuries from the Circuit Court of Jackson County. There was a verdict for the defendant, whereupon the plaintiff filed his motion for a new trial or, in the alternative, "for a judgment in favor of the plaintiff notwithstanding the verdict of the jury". The judgment was entered on the 25th day of January, 1984. The plaintiff's motion was filed in the office of the circuit clerk on February 6, 1984. The court sustained the motion, first by an order dated March 2, 1984, wherein it was stated that the plaintiff "is hereby granted a new trial on the issues of damages only". This order was amended by an order nunc pro tunc on March 8, 1984, wherein it was stated that the plaintiff "is hereby granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in his favor, and a new trial on the issue of damages only". It is apparent that the judge expected his order to be appealed; in fact, he so stated in the record. So that there would be no misunderstanding as to his wishes in this matter, he entered still another order nunc pro tunc on March 23, 1984, wherein it was stated the plaintiff "is hereby, granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict in his favor, and unless reversed or vacated a new trial on the issue of damages only". The order further stated that it was for the purpose of assuring an appeal to this Court, under Rule 50 Miss.R.Civ.P. The appellant, defendant below, assigns two errors: first, that the motion for a new trial or, alternatively, for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict was not "timely served", and that the questions of negligence and proximate cause were for the jury. Also to be considered on this appeal is the appellee's motion to dismiss the defendant's appeal because of this Court's lack of jurisdiction, asserting that the lower court has not presented any appealable order. First we address the filing or serving of the plaintiff's motion. Factually, the 10-day period for serving the motion, according to Rule 59, expired on February 4, 1984, except that Rule 6(a) does not require the counting of Saturday and Sunday. February 4th was a Saturday; therefore, February 6th was the last day. The motion was filed in the office of the clerk on that date; however, according to the postmark, it was not mailed to the defendant until February 7th and received on February 8th. Plaintiff's counsel testified that he did in fact mail the same on February 6th, and apparently the lower court so found and proceeded to hear his motion. We should not disturb the lower court's finding of fact and ruling thereon. Next we consider the appellee's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Rule 50(c) expressly provides for the conditional grant of a new trial when a judgment notwithstanding the verdict has been entered. The comment under Rule 50 applicable where both motions have been granted is as follows: We hold that Rule 50(c) expressly provides for an appeal where a judgment notwithstanding the verdict has been entered and a new trial conditionally granted. Johnson v. City of Pass Christian, 475 So. 2d 428 at 431-32 (Miss. 1985) and Larkin v. Perry, 427 So. 2d 138, 139 (Miss. 1983). Now to the merits of this appeal: After reviewing the evidence, and particularly in light of the fact that the appellee was heavily intoxicated at the time he was struck by appellant's automobile, we are of the opinion that the judgment notwithstanding the verdict should not have been granted. In Paymaster Oil Mill Co. v. Mitchell, 319 So. 2d 652 (Miss. 1975), the rule applied to directed verdicts, peremptory instructions, judgments notwithstanding the verdict and the granting of new trials was clearly delineated and review of this case and those that follow, especially Stubblefield v. Jesco, 464 So. 2d 47 (Miss. 1984), reveals that an entirely different burden applies to the granting of new trials than to judgments notwithstanding the verdict. In Jesco, Inc. v. Whitehead, 451 So. 2d 706 (Miss. 1984), Justice Robertson, in a specially concurring opinion, expressed the rule as follows: 464 So. 2d at 54. Judge Dan Lee in Stubblefield, supra, writing for the majority, adopted Judge Robertson's language. Judge Robertson, in a specially concurring opinion in Stubblefield had the following to say: 464 So. 2d at 58. We now hold that, considering the evidence as a whole, applying the rule to judgments not withstanding the verdict the trial court was manifestly in error in sustaining the motion for j.n.o.v. In Paymaster, supra, we said, in an opinion by Chief Justice Patterson, the following: 319 So. 2d at 656. The trial judge gave no reason for his ruling, however, we must assume that the basis for granting the judgment notwithstanding the verdict was that reasonable men, acting reasonably, would have believed the plaintiff's case and prudently acted upon it and that the defense testimony established no defense at all. This then necessarily encompassed a belief on his part that the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, and since he went further than this, we will remand the case for a new trial on all issues. We do believe the evidence would support such finding by the trial judge. As stated, there is no dispute that the plaintiff was heavily intoxicated. However, he had walked almost the width of a three-lane city street before he was struck by the defendant's automobile. As pointed out by Judge Hawkins in a specially concurring opinion in Ross v. Miller, 441 So. 2d 541 (Miss. 1983), in a similar factual situation, the plaintiff had yielded to approaching traffic when he entered the street. This is supported by the fact that the accident occurred on a three-lane street. The defendant was in his right lane travelling west. The plaintiff entered the road from the south side (or to the defendant's left). He stated he thought he had plenty of time to make it across the road. A witness verified this, by stating that the plaintiff walked up to the street and waited a second before starting across. The witness did state, however, that the plaintiff was looking down at a newspaper he had in his hand after he entered the street. Nevertheless, the defendant left a stoplight a short distance back from the scene of the accident with no automobiles in front of him, nor any evidence that one was approaching from the opposite direction. The occasion was on a clear night, the street was well lighted, straight and level, familiar to the defendant, who travelled it twice daily five days a week and had over a period of twelve years. He admitted he knew pedestrians crossed the street at or about this point. Still, he did not see the plaintiff until he heard a thump or bump and saw the plaintiff through his windshield. *358 The conclusion is inescapable that he was not maintaining a proper lookout. It is arguable that some decisions of this Court might support the judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Ulmer v. Pistole, 115 Miss. 485, 76 So. 522 (1917); Robertson v. Welch, 242 Miss. 110, 134 So. 2d 491 (1961); Layton v. Cook, 248 Miss. 690, 160 So. 2d 685 (1964); Cole v. Todd, 355 So. 2d 292 (Miss. 1977). We do not believe this case to be factually like those cases and now hold that a new trial on all issues should be granted. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED. WALKER, C.J., ROY NOBLE LEE and HAWKINS, P.JJ., and DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN and ANDERSON, JJ., concur.