Case Title: Jensen v. Whitlow

Citation: 

Docket Number: S48130

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2002-08-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  August 8, 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

TONENIA JENSEN, as guardian
for Vanessa Gurkin, a child,
	Plaintiff,
	v.
CLIFFORD WHITLOW, CUBAZELL O'NEILL, 
KATHLEEN M. POWERS, RUTH MARTEN,
MIKE LUTZ, WILLIAM EDGES, and
HEDGES & MITCHELL, PC, an
Oregon corporation,
		Defendants.
(USDC CV99-1679 BR; SC S48130)

	En Banc
	On certified questions from the United States District Court
for the District of Oregon dated December 28, 2000; certification
accepted January 30, 2001.
	Michael R. Hogan, Chief Judge.
	Argued and submitted September 11, 2001.
	Mark Morrell, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief
for plaintiff.
	Robert M. Atkinson, Assistant Attorney General, Salem,
argued the cause for defendants.  With him on the brief were
Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor
General.
	Maureen Leonard and Kathryn H. Clarke, Portland, filed a
brief on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers
Association.
	Gerald H. Itkin, and Thomas Sponsler, County Attorney,
Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Multnomah
County.
	William F. Gary, Jerome Lidz, James E. Mountain, Jr., and
Harrang Long Gary Rudnick PC, Eugene, filed a brief on behalf of
amicus curiae Oregon Health and Science University.
	Harry Auerbach, Senior Deputy City Attorney, Portland City
Attorney's Office, Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amicus
curiae League of Oregon Cities.
	DE MUNIZ, J.
	Certified questions answered.
		DE MUNIZ, J.



		This court accepted certification of the following 
questions from the United States District Court for the District 
of Oregon:
		"1.  Does the limitation of causes of action for a
tort committed by an agent of a public body to a cause
of action against only the public body violate Article
I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution?
		"2.  Does the limitation of causes of action for a
tort committed by an agent of a public body to a cause
of action against the public body violate Article I,
section 17, of the Oregon Constitution?
		"3.  Does the limitation of causes of action for a
tort committed by an agent of a public body to a cause
of action against only the public body violate Article
I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution?"
See ORS 28.200 et seq. (describing certified question process);
ORAP 12.20 (prescribing procedures for consideration of certified
questions); see also Western Helicopter Services v. Rogerson
Aircraft, 311 Or 361, 811 P2d 627 (1991) (discussing factors
court considers in exercising discretion to accept certified
questions).  
		As a preliminary matter, it is important to clarify the
exact nature of the constitutional challenges presented in the
certified questions.  The United States District Court initially
certified a single question to this court:  "Does ORS 30.265(1),
on its face or as applied, violate the terms of Article I,
sections 10, 17, or 20, of the Oregon Constitution?"  This court
divided the district court's question into six separate questions
-- one "facial" challenge and one "as-applied" challenge for each
constitutional provision.  Having rephrased the questions as
such, this court then declined to consider any of the questions
framed as an "as-applied" challenge.  We declined to consider the
"as-applied" challenges because, in most cases, a record
containing evidence of the nature of the injury sustained by a
plaintiff and a jury's assessment of an appropriate damages award
is a necessary prerequisite to this court's consideration of an
"as-applied" challenge to a statute such as ORS 30.265(1). 
Because this case is in a very preliminary stage, that kind of
record is not present.  That said, we turn to the procedural
history of this case in the United States District Court, and
provide a brief historical overview of the Oregon Tort Claims
Act, ORS 30.260 et seq.
I.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY
		Plaintiff filed a complaint in the United States
District Court on behalf of her minor daughter, Gurkin. 
Plaintiff alleged that a male foster parent had abused Gurkin 
while she was in the custody of Children Services Division of the
State of Oregon (CSD). (1)  Plaintiff further alleged that
individual agents and employees of CSD were negligent in placing
Gurkin in that foster parent's home and, therefore, were
responsible for the sexual abuse that the foster parent inflicted
on Gurkin.  The individually named defendants moved to strike and
dismiss the claims against them and to substitute the state as
the sole defendant in accordance with ORS 30.265(1). (2)

  While that
motion was pending, plaintiff moved the district court to certify
questions to this court.
II.  OVERVIEW OF THE OREGON TORT CLAIMS ACT

		In 1967, the legislature passed the Oregon Tort Claims
Act (OTCA), which abrogated, in part, the state's sovereign
immunity.  See Or Laws 1967, ch 627 (first tort claims act in
Oregon).  Although the 1967 version of the OTCA limited the
state's liability, it did not do so for officers, employees, or
agents.  
		The legislature revised the OTCA in 1975, requiring,
rather than permitting, a public body to indemnify its officers,
employees, and agents against tort claims "arising out of an
alleged act or omission occurring in the performance of duty." 
Smith v. Pernoll, 291 Or 67, 71, 628 P2d 729 (1981); 1975 Or
Laws, ch 609, § 16.  Further, "[t]he monetary limitation of
liability, which previously had applied only to public bodies,
was extended to officers, employees, and agents of all public
bodies."  Id. at 71.     
		In 1977, the legislature again revised the OTCA,
coordinating all references within the act and subjecting claims
against officers, employees, and agents to the monetary
limitations, the notice of claim requirements and the statutory
exceptions to liability.  Or Laws 1977, ch 823, §§ 2(3) and 3.  
		Finally, in 1991, the legislature amended the OTCA to
eliminate any claim against any officer, employee, or agent for 
their work-related torts.  In place of a claim against an
individual, the legislature substituted a single claim against
the public body, subject to its attendant damages limitation. 
ORS 30.265(1).  The 1991 revisions frame the issues in this case. 
III.  DISCUSSION

		As noted, each certified question pertains to a
different constitutional provision.  We begin our discussion with
Article I, section 10.
A.	Article I, Section 10
		Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution,
includes a "remedy clause" that provides that "every man shall
have remedy by due course of law for injury done him in his
person, property, or reputation." (3)  In Smothers v. Gresham
Transfer, Inc., 332 Or 83, 23 P3d 333 (2001), this court examined
in detail the origins and meaning of that "remedy clause."  The 
court concluded that, because Article I, section 10, guarantees a
remedy for any "injury" to absolute common-law rights respecting
person, property, or reputation, the legislature does not have
plenary authority to extinguish a remedy for such injuries.  Id.
at 124.  The legislature may abolish a "remedy" that existed at
common law only if the legislature simultaneously provides a
"constitutionally adequate substitute remedy."  Id. at 124.
		The conclusions about the remedy clause outlined in
Smothers define the inquiry necessary to determine whether
legislative action, in this case the enactment of ORS 30.265(1),
violates that constitutional guarantee.  In accordance with the
analytical approach outlined in Smothers, our first step is to
determine whether the injury that plaintiff has alleged is one
for which the remedy clause guarantees a remedy.  Smothers, 332
Or at 124.  If we answer that question affirmatively, and if the
legislature has abolished that common-law claim, then our second
step is to determine whether the legislature has provided a
constitutionally adequate substitute remedy for that abolished
common-law claim.  Id.
		The parties have not addressed the initial question
whether plaintiff has alleged an "injury" for which the remedy
clause guarantees a remedy.  For that reason, and because the
second step of the Smothers analytical framework is dispositive
in this case, we assume without deciding that plaintiff's
"injury" is one for which Article I, section 10, guarantees a
"remedy."  Further, we agree, as plaintiff asserts and the state
does not dispute, that the effect of ORS 30.265(1) is to abolish
any claim against individual officers, employees, or agents of a
public body and to substitute the public body as the sole
defendant.  Therefore, in this case, we focus on whether
plaintiff's right of action against the public body alone
provides "a constitutionally adequate substitute remedy[.]" 
Smothers, 332 Or at 124 (emphasis added).  We turn to that
inquiry.
		Plaintiff and the state disagree about what constitutes
a constitutionally adequate substitute remedy.  Plaintiff
contends that any substitute remedy must be a "substantial
equivalent" of the remedy that has been abolished and that
"capped" damages, (4) where there was once the possibility of
unlimited damages, is not a constitutionally adequate substitute
remedy under Article I, section 10.
		The state disagrees, contending that this court's
decision in Hale v. Port of Portland, 308 Or 508, 517-24, 783 P2d
506 (1989), is "dispositive because it holds that the remedy
provided by the OTCA satisfies Article I, section 10."  Further,
the state disputes plaintiff's assertion that a constitutionally
adequate remedy is one that is "substantially equivalent." 
According to the state, a constitutionally adequate substitute
remedy is one that is substantial, but need not be perfectly
equivalent. (5) 
		This court's decision in Hale is not controlling here. 
In Hale, the plaintiff suffered severe personal injuries when the
vehicle in which he was riding struck an obstacle embedded in a
road.  The plaintiff's medical bills alone reportedly exceeded
$600,000.  Through his guardian ad litem, the plaintiff filed an
action against several defendants, including the Port of Portland
(Port) and the City of Portland (City), to recover for those
injuries.  The trial court granted motions by the Port and the
City to strike the plaintiff's claim for damages in excess of the
$100,000 damages limitation in ORS 30.270(1)(b).  On review in
this court, the plaintiff contended that the OTCA damage
limitations applicable to the Port and the City deprived him of
his remedy for injury to his person in violation of Article I,
section 10, of the Oregon Constitution.  This court disagreed
with plaintiff's argument, because it determined that the
substitute remedy provided in the OTCA was a "substantial one." 
Hale, 308 Or at 523.  
		As plaintiff points out, under the version of the OTCA
that existed when this court considered Hale in 1989, "the
immunity of the state, along with all of the OTCA's special
restrictions related to notice and the limitations on damages,
had never been applied to an individual employee defendant."  In
other words, the OTCA, at that time, allowed a plaintiff to
pursue a cause of action against an individual employee-defendant.  By contrast, since 1991, the OTCA has limited a
plaintiff's cause of action to one against the employing public
body only.  For that reason, the issue presented here differs
from that presented in Hale and does not resolve the question
whether ORS 30.265(1), on its face, provides a constitutionally
adequate substitute remedy for the claim plaintiffs once had
against individual employees of a public body.  We turn to that
question.
		In Smothers, this court held that the plaintiff had a
right to proceed with his negligence action against his employer
because the workers' compensation laws left him with no remedial
process whatsoever for his injuries.  Smothers, 332 Or at 136.  
In this case, by contrast, plaintiff does not -- and cannot --
argue that the OTCA leaves her in the same predicament as the
plaintiff in Smothers.  Plaintiff, on behalf of Gurkin, concedes
that she "is left with a claim against the state."  Because
plaintiff has a remedial process, she instead argues that "the
limitations on damages [pursuant to ORS 30.270(1)(b)] * * *
deprive [her] of a substantially equivalent remedy."  Thus, the
question in this case is whether, on its face, the damages cap
renders the substitute remedy provided in ORS 30.265(1) an
"emasculated" remedy in violation of Article I, section 10.  See
Smothers, 332 Or at 119-20 (legislature may not substitute "an
'emasculated remedy' that is incapable of restoring the right
that has been injured").  	
		A statute is not facially unconstitutional unless the
statute is incapable of constitutional application in any
circumstance.  See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 317 Or 131,
147, 854 P2d 449 (1993) (court ought not decide constitutionality
of statute except in actual factual setting that makes such a
decision necessary); Northup v. Hoyt, 31 Or 524, 529, 49 P 754
(1897) (if statute may constitutionally operate upon certain
persons or cases, it is not unconstitutional simply because there
may be persons or cases to whom it constitutionally cannot
apply).  The OTCA is capable of constitutional application.  For
example, if a damages award to an individual does not exceed the
"cap," then the OTCA does not implicate Article I, section 10, in
any way.  Because the damages "cap" is not implicated in every
case, and because a damages award has yet to be determined in
this case, the damages "cap" does not render the remedy available
to plaintiff "incapable of restoring the right that has been
injured."  Smothers, 332 Or at 119-120.  Thus, ORS 30.265(1), on
its face, does not deprive plaintiff of that which the remedy
clause guarantees her.
		We turn next to the question presented under Article I,
section 17.  
B.	Article I, section 17
		Article I, section 17, provides:  "In all civil cases
the right of Trial by Jury shall remain inviolate."  In Lakin v.
Senco Products, Inc., 329 Or 62, 82, 987 P2d 463 (1999), this
court held that a statutory cap that required reduction of a
jury's award of noneconomic damages violated Article I, section
17, because "[t]he legislature may not interfere with the full
effect of a jury's assessment of noneconomic damages, at least as
to civil cases in which the right to a jury trial was customary
in 1857, or cases of like nature."  Plaintiff asserts that Oregon
law historically has entitled persons injured by individual state
employees to bring an action against those employees and receive
a trial by jury.  Relying on Lakin, plaintiff argues that, by
eliminating actions against individual public employees and by
capping damages recoverable in a substitute action against the
public body, the legislature has violated Article I, section 17. 
Plaintiff's reliance on Lakin is misplaced.  
		In Lakin, neither party questioned that the plaintiffs
had the right under Oregon law to bring their claims or that they
had the right to require a jury trial on their claims.  The
question, instead, was whether the plaintiffs had the right to
have the jury determine the issue of damages.  Id. at 68.  This
court held that, because the issue of noneconomic damages is a
question of fact, the right to a trial by jury includes the right
to have the jury determine the amount of those damages.  Id. at
82.  In other words, because the plaintiffs had the right to
bring a civil action to which the right to a jury trial was
attached, Article I, section 17, prohibited the legislature from
interfering with or interrupting that right by imposing a cap on
the amount of noneconomic damages that the jury could award.
		By contrast, in this case the legislature has
eliminated plaintiff's right to bring her claim against the
individual employees and has substituted a different remedy
against the state.  Article I, section 17, is not a source of law
that creates or retains a substantive claim or a theory of
recovery in favor of any party.  Instead, as this court
previously has held, Article I, section 17, simply "guarantees a
jury trial in civil actions for which the common law provided a
jury trial when the Oregon Constitution was adopted in 1857[.]" 
Lakin, 329 Or at 82 (citing Molodyh v. Truck Insurance Exchange,
304 Or 290, 744 P2d 992 (1987)).   The right to pursue a "civil
action," if it exists, must arise from some source other than
Article I, section 17, because, that provision "is not an
independent guarantee of the existence of a cognizable claim." 
Sealey v. Hicks, 309 Or 387, 396, 788 P2d 435 (1990), overruled
in part on other grounds by Smothers, 332 Or at 123.
		We already have determined that, for purposes of this
facial inquiry, the legislature did not violate Oregon's remedy
guarantee by requiring substitution of the state as the only
defendant in the action.  Plaintiff has no "civil action" against
the individual defendants.  It follows that there is no claim to
which a right to a jury trial can attach.  Thus, ORS 30.265(1),
on its face, does not violate Article I, section 17.
C.	Article I, Section 20
		Article I, section 20, provides:
		"No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or
class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which,
upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all
citizens."
		Plaintiff argues that ORS 30.265(1) violates Article I,
section 20, because that statute provides an immunity to
government employees that is not available to other citizens.  In
other words, she contends that the statute creates two classes,
one made up of those persons who benefit from the statutory
protection and one made up of those persons to whom the
protection does not extend.  See Crocker and Crocker, 332 Or 42,
54, 22 P3d 759 (2001) (equal privileges and immunities clause
scrutinizes benefits given a particular class, rather than
discrimination against particular class).
		The state offers multiple responses to plaintiff's
argument.  First, the state contends that plaintiff's argument
disregards this court's decisions in Hale, 308 Or at 524, and Van
Wormer v. City of Salem, 309 Or 404, 788 P2d 443 (1990), which
hold that victims of governmental torts do not constitute a "true
class" separate from victims of nongovernmental torts.  Second,
the state contends that, even if the statute addresses a true
class, plaintiff lacks standing to make the challenge that she
asserts.  Finally, the state contends that, even if plaintiff has
standing to make the challenge, the classification that ORS
30.265(1) creates does not violate Article I, section 20, because
it is not based on race, gender, or other immutable personal
characteristics.  Therefore, according to the state, this court
reviews the statute under the rational basis test, and it easily
passes that test.
		We need not address each of the state's responses
separately.  Even assuming that ORS 30.265(1) creates a favored
class of public employees, and that plaintiff has standing to
raise such a challenge under section 20, plaintiff's argument
fails for the reasons that follow.
		ORS 30.265(1) distinguishes on the basis of public
employment, not any immutable characteristic such as race,
religion, or alienage.  See Hewitt v. SAIF, 294 Or 33, 45, 653
P2d 970 (1982) (classifications based on immutable
characteristics are suspect).  Because ORS 30.265(1) does not
distinguish based on any immutable characteristic, it satisfies
Article I, section 20, if the legislature had a rational basis
for distinguishing between the classes involved.  Crocker, 332 Or
at 55.
		ORS 30.265(1) satisfies that rational-basis test. 
Public bodies must attract employees to perform public services. 
The legislature reasonably may conclude that providing public
workers with personal immunity from liability for torts committed
in the scope of their public employment will assist public bodies
in recruiting qualified persons to work in public service. 
Accordingly, ORS 30.265(1), on its face, does not violate Article
I, section 20.  
IV.  SUMMARY

		To summarize, ORS 30.265(1), on its face, does not
violate Article I, sections 10, 17, or 20.
		Certified questions answered.  



1. 	That agency now is the Department of Human Services. 
We refer to the agency as "CSD" throughout the opinion, because
that is how the complaint in the United States District Court
identifies the agency.

2. 	ORS 30.265(1) provides:
		"Subject to the limitations of ORS 30.260 to
30.300, every public body is subject to action or suit
for its torts and those of its officers, employees and
agents acting within the scope of their employment or
duties, whether arising out of a governmental or
proprietary function or while operating a motor vehicle
in a ridesharing arrangement authorized under ORS
276.598.  The sole cause of action for any tort of
officers, employees or agents of a public body acting
within the scope of their employment or duties and
eligible for representation and indemnification under
ORS 30.285 or 30.287 shall be an action against the
public body only.  The remedy provided by ORS 30.260 to
30.300 is exclusive of any other action or suit against
any such officer, employee or agent of a public body
whose act or omission within the scope of their
employment or duties gives rise to the action or suit.
No other form of civil action or suit shall be
permitted.  If an action or suit is filed against an
officer, employee or agent of a public body, on
appropriate motion the public body shall be substituted
as the only defendant."
3. 	Article I, section 10, provides:
		"No court shall be secret, but justice shall be
administered, openly and without purchase, completely
and without delay, and every man shall have remedy by
due course of law for injury done him in his person,
property, or reputation."

4. 	ORS 30.270(1)(b) "caps" the liability of the public
body for damages as follows:
		"Liability of any public body or its officers,
employees or agents acting within the scope of their
employment or duties on claims within the scope of ORS
30.260 to 30.300 shall not exceed:
		"* * * * *
		"(b) $100,000 to any claimant as general and
special damages for all other claims arising out of a
single accident or occurrence unless those damages
exceed $100,000, in which case the claimant may recover
additional special damages, but in no event shall the
total award of special damages exceed $100,000."

5. 	The state also argues that, in determining whether a
substitute remedial process is substantial and therefore
constitutionally adequate, the court must analyze the remedy
categorically, by examining whether potential plaintiffs as a
group, not as individuals, retain a substantial remedy.  Because
of the manner in which we resolve plaintiff's Article I, section
10, challenge, we do not reach that argument.