Case Title: Henry v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2007-08-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
PATRICK HENRY,  
 
Defendant Below- 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below- 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 40, 2007 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below─Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware 
§  in and for Sussex County 
§  Cr. ID No. 0506024010 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted:  July 2, 2007 
Decided:  August 7, 2007 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R  
 
 
This 7th day of August 2007, upon consideration of the appellant’s 
brief filed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 26(c), his attorney’s motion to 
withdraw, and the State’s response thereto, it appears to the Court that: 
 
(1) 
The defendant-appellant, Patrick Henry, pleaded guilty in 
January 2006 to Possession With Intent to Deliver Ecstasy.  In September 
2006, while serving the probationary portion of his sentence, Henry was 
arrested and charged with Trafficking in Cocaine, Possession With Intent to 
Deliver Cocaine and other crimes.  As a result, Henry was found to have 
committed a violation of probation (“VOP”).   
 
2
 
(2) 
A contested VOP hearing was held on January 11, 2007.  The 
record reflects that, prior to the hearing, Henry, with his counsel, watched a 
DVD of his interview with police.  Henry’s probation officer, two Delaware 
State Police officers, and Henry testified.  Detective Francis Fuscellaro, a 
member of the Governor’s Task Force, testified to receiving a tip in 
September 2006 that Henry would be making a drug delivery to a mobile 
home park in Georgetown, Delaware.  Intercepting Henry before he made 
the delivery, the police found in his hand a Newport cigarette pack 
containing two baggies of a substance that later was confirmed to be crack 
cocaine, plus $583.00 in his pocket.   
 
(3) 
Henry testified that he did not know what was in the cigarette 
pack, and was only serving as a messenger.  He testified that he was high on 
cocaine at the time.  Henry also insisted that the police and probation 
officers on the Governor’s Task Force had promised him that, if he told 
them who gave him the cocaine, he would receive only 60 days on the VOP 
and the new charges would be dropped.  He stated that the DVD 
corroborated his story.  Detective Fuscellaro denied that such a promise was 
made, stating that he had only agreed to tell the Attorney General’s Office 
that Henry had been cooperative following his arrest.  
 
3
 
(4) 
After finding Henry in violation of his probation, the Superior 
Court judge heard testimony concerning Henry’s subsequent arrest on drug 
charges in October 2006.  The judge ruled that the testimony was relevant 
only on the issue of Henry’s sentence.  Again, Detective Fuscellaro testified 
that he received a tip that Henry would be making a delivery of crack 
cocaine and that the police intercepted Henry with the drugs before the 
transaction took place.  At a separate hearing, the judge sentenced Henry to 
8 years of Level V incarceration, to be followed after 4 years and completion 
of the Key or Greentree Program by the Level IV Residential Substance 
Abuse Program, in turn to be followed by Level III Aftercare.1  This is 
Henry’s direct appeal from the VOP proceedings. 
 
(5) 
Henry’s counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw 
pursuant to Rule 26(c).  The standard and scope of review applicable to the 
consideration of a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief under 
Rule 26(c) is twofold: (a) the Court must be satisfied that defense counsel 
has made a conscientious examination of the record and the law for claims 
that arguably could support the appeal; and (b) the Court must conduct its 
own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so totally 
                                                 
1 Henry’s 4-year sentence subsequently was reduced to 1 year. 
 
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devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without 
an adversary presentation.2 
 
(6) 
Henry’s counsel asserts that, based upon a careful and complete 
examination of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues.  By 
letter, Henry’s counsel informed Henry of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and 
provided him with a copy of the motion to withdraw, the accompanying 
brief and the complete transcript.  Henry also was informed of his right to 
supplement his attorney’s presentation.  Henry responded with a brief that 
raises several issues for this Court’s consideration.  The State has responded 
to the position taken by Henry’s counsel as well as the issues raised by 
Henry and has moved to affirm the Superior Court’s judgment. 
 
(7) 
Henry raises several issues for this Court’s consideration, which 
may fairly be summarized as follows: a) the police and probation officers 
reneged on their promise of leniency; b) his attorney provided ineffective 
assistance; c) the promise of leniency was recorded on a DVD, which is now 
missing; d) the Superior Court judge who presided over the VOP hearing 
should have recused himself; e) there was insufficient evidence presented at 
the hearing to support a finding of a VOP; and f) the judge’s correction of 
his sentence in May 2007 violated principles of double jeopardy. 
                                                 
2 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 
U.S. 429, 442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 
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(8) 
Henry’s first claim is that the police and probation officers 
reneged on their promise of leniency.  The record reflects that Detective 
Fuscellaro’s testimony directly contradicted Henry’s testimony with respect 
to a promise of leniency.  The Superior Court judge, as the trier of fact, was 
the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and was responsible for 
resolving any conflicts in the testimony.3  The Superior Court was, thus, 
within its discretion to credit the testimony of Detective Fuscallero over the 
testimony of Henry on this point.  We conclude, therefore, that this claim is 
without merit. 
 
(9) 
Henry’s second claim is that his attorney provided ineffective 
assistance.  This claim was not raised below.  Because we will not entertain 
a claim of ineffective assistance raised for the first time on direct appeal, we 
decline to decide this claim at this time.4      
 
(10) Henry’s third claim is that the promise of leniency was made 
during his interview with police and that the DVD of the interview is now 
missing.  The record does not reflect that the DVD is missing.  The hearing 
transcript reflects that, prior to the hearing, Henry watched the DVD with his 
counsel present.  At the hearing, Detective Fuscallero testified that he was 
not aware of any such discussion with Henry and that, if there had been, it 
                                                 
3 Knight v. State, 690 A.2d 929, 932 (Del. 1996). 
4 Supr. Ct. R. 8.  
 
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would be on the DVD.  Henry’s counsel did not cross-examine Detective 
Fuscallero about what was on the DVD, nor did she question Henry on that 
subject during his direct examination.  The clear implication is that the DVD 
did not corroborate Henry’s testimony. 
 
(11) On cross-examination, Henry stated that the DVD would 
corroborate his memory of the deal he struck with the police.  However, 
Henry also admitted that he was high on cocaine at the time the police 
interviewed him.  The transcript of the hearing reflects that the Superior 
Court did not credit Henry’s testimony concerning the alleged deal. We find 
no abuse of discretion on the part of the Superior Court in so determining 
and, therefore, conclude that this claim is without merit. 
 
(12) Henry’s fourth claim is that the Superior Court judge who 
presided over the VOP hearing should have recused himself, presumably 
because his familiarity with Henry would result in judicial bias.  Generally, a 
claim of bias on the part of a judge must stem from an extrajudicial source.5  
Because there is no evidence, indeed no claim, of any extrajudicial source of 
judicial bias, we conclude that Henry’s fourth claim, too, is without merit. 
 
(13) Henry’s fifth claim is that there was insufficient evidence 
presented at the hearing to support the finding of a VOP.  Because probation 
                                                 
5 Los v. Los, 595 A.2d 381, 384 (Del. 1991).  See also Weber v. State, 547 A.2d 948, 951-
52 (Del. 1988). 
 
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is an “act of grace,” the State need only present “some competent evidence” 
that the violation took place.6  The eyewitness testimony of Detective 
Fuscellaro that he received a tip that Henry would be delivering drugs, and 
that he intercepted Henry and found crack cocaine packaged for sale in his 
hand constituted such “competent evidence.”  As such, we conclude that 
Henry’s fifth claim is without merit. 
 
(14) Henry’s sixth, and final, claim is that the Superior Court’s May 
16, 2007 order correcting his sentence violated principles of double 
jeopardy.  The double jeopardy clauses of the United States and Delaware 
Constitutions protect a criminal defendant against multiple punishments or 
successive prosecutions for the same offense.7  Principles of double jeopardy 
are irrelevant to the circumstances presented here.  For that reason, we 
conclude that Henry’s sixth claim is also without merit.      
 
(15) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded 
that Henry’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably 
appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Henry’s counsel has made a 
conscientious effort to examine the record and has properly determined that 
Henry could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal. 
                                                 
6 Kurzmann v. State, 903 A.2d 702, 717 (Del. 2006). 
7 Sullins v. State, Del. Supr., No. 466, 2006, Jacobs, J. (July 23, 2007) (citing Green v. 
United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957)).  
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State’s motion to 
affirm is GRANTED.  The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.  
The motion to withdraw is moot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice