Case Title: Southeast Floating Docks, Inc., et al. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC11-285

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2012-02-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC11-285 
____________ 
 
SOUTHEAST FLOATING DOCKS, INC., et al., 
Appellants, 
 
vs. 
 
AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY,  
Appellee. 
 
[February 2, 2012] 
 
LEWIS, J. 
 
This case is before the Court for consideration of a question of Florida law 
certified by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit to be 
determinative of a cause pending in that court and for which there appears to be no 
controlling precedent.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(6), Fla. Const.  In 
Auto-Owners Insurance Co. v. Southeast Floating Docks, Inc., 632 F.3d 1195 
(11th Cir. 2011), the Eleventh Circuit certified the following questions to this 
Court:   
DOES FLA. STAT. § 768.79 ALLOW FOR VALID OFFERS OF 
JUDGMENT IN A SEPARATE SECOND TRIAL; AND, IF SO, 
MAY OFFERS BE DEEMED VALID IN INSTANCES WHERE AN 
 
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APPELLATE COURT REINSTATES THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
FIRST TRIAL? 
 
DOES THE CONDITIONING OF AN OFFER OF JUDGMENT ON 
THE RESOLUTION AND DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE OF 
THE OFFEREE‟S CLAIMS IN THE ACTION AGAINST A THIRD-
PARTY RENDER THE OFFER OF JUDGMENT A JOINT 
PROPOSAL, AS THAT TERM IS USED IN FLORIDA RULE OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 1.442(c)(3)? 
 
DOES FLA. STAT. § 768.79 APPLY TO CASES THAT ARE 
GOVERNED BY THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF ANOTHER 
JURISDICTION; AND, IF SO, IS THIS STATUTE APPLICABLE 
EVEN TO CONTROVERSIES IN WHICH THE PARTIES HAVE 
CONTRACTUALLY AGREED TO BE BOUND BY THE 
SUBSTANTIVE LAWS OF ANOTHER JURISDICTION? 
 
Id. at 1200, 1202-03.  For the reasons stated below, we answer the third certified 
question in the negative which renders the first two certified questions moot.  We, 
therefore, decline to address those moot issues.  
Facts and Procedural History 
 
The facts of this case are not in dispute.  Auto-Owners Insurance Company 
(Auto-Owners) issued a performance bond in connection with the work of 
Southeast Floating Docks, Inc. (Southeast) pursuant to a contract which provided 
that Southeast would build a floating dock for Rivermar Contracting Company 
(Rivermar).  See Southeast, 632 F.3d at 1197.  A dispute arose with regard to the 
performance by Southeast under the contract, and Rivermar filed an action against 
both Southeast and Auto-Owners for breach of contract.  See id.  Auto-Owners 
settled the dispute with Rivermar for $956,987, and filed the instant action against 
 
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Southeast in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida 
based on a written agreement between Auto-Owners, Southeast, and Southeast‟s 
president, Alan Simpson.  See id.1  Of note, the agreement between Auto-Owners 
and Southeast included a choice-of-law clause that provided for the substantive law 
of Michigan to apply to all disputes arising under the contract.  See id. at 1202.  
During trial, Southeast and Simpson contended that they were not responsible for 
the indemnification of Auto-Owners because the settlement Auto-Owners reached 
with Rivermar was in bad faith.  See id. at 1197. 
On June 1, 2006, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Southeast.  See id.  It 
found that Auto-Owners settled with Rivermar in bad faith, and, as a result, 
Southeast had no obligation to indemnify Auto-Owners.  See id.  A judgment of no 
liability was entered the next day.  See id.  Auto-Owners subsequently filed a 
motion for a new trial.  See id. at 1198.  The district court granted the motion and 
set aside the verdict and judgment of no liability previously entered.  See Auto-
Owner Ins. Co. v. Southeast Floating Docks, Inc., No. 6:05-cv-334-Orl-31JGG, 
2006 WL 2598765, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 11, 2006), rev‟d, Auto-Owners Ins. Co. 
v. Southeast Floating Docks, Inc., 571 F.3d 1143, 1155-56 (11th Cir. 2009).  On 
September 25, 2006, the district court scheduled a retrial for April 2, 2007.  See 
Southeast, 632 F.3d at 1197. 
                                         
 
1.  Simpson is not a party to this appeal.  
 
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On December 11, 2006, more than six months after the conclusion of the 
first trial and four months before the date scheduled for the second trial, Southeast 
sent Auto-Owners an offer of judgment pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes 
(2006).  See id.  Southeast offered to pay Auto-Owners $300,000 in exchange for 
the resolution and dismissal, with prejudice, of all claims asserted by Auto-Owners 
against Southeast and Simpson, including attorney‟s fees.  See id.  Auto-Owners 
rejected the offer, and the case proceeded toward the scheduled retrial.  See id.   
 
On March 1, 2007, the district court granted Auto-Owners‟s motion for 
summary judgment, and entered an award of $1,135,658.98 in favor of Auto-
Owners.  See id.  Southeast appealed that judgment and argued, among other 
things, that the district court‟s original grant of the motion for new trial after the 
first trial was erroneous.  See id.  On June 16, 2009, the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed the judgment and the district court‟s order for a new trial and 
reinstated the jury verdict from the original trial in favor of Southeast.  See id.2  
Shortly thereafter, Southeast filed a motion for attorney‟s fees in federal district 
court pursuant to section 768.79, which establishes a party‟s entitlement to 
                                         
 
2.  Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that, despite the presentation 
of solely circumstantial evidence with regard to Auto-Owners‟ bad faith, the jury 
reasonably could have “aggregated inferences from this circumstantial evidence to 
find by a preponderance of the evidence Auto-Owners did not settle with Rivermar 
in good faith.”  Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Southeast Floating Docks, Inc., 571 F.3d 
1143, 1152 (11th Cir. 2009).  
 
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attorney‟s fees upon certain conditions related to filing an offer of judgment.  See 
id.  That motion for attorney‟s fees was denied on the basis that Southeast failed to 
serve the plaintiff a proposal for settlement at least forty-five days before trial as 
required by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(b).  See id.  The foundation of 
the district court‟s determination was that the trial date in question for 
consideration of the issue of attorney‟s fees was only that of the first trial, which 
rendered Southeast‟s December 11, 2006 offer, a date more than six months after 
the conclusion of the first trial, untimely.  See id. 
 
 Southeast sought review of the determination of attorney‟s fees in the 
Eleventh Circuit.  The circuit court, based upon an inability to find “definitive 
answers in clearly established Florida law,” certified the previous three questions 
to this Court with regard to the application of section 768.79 and Florida Rule of 
Civil Procedure 1.442.  See id. at 1197.  This proceeding followed.    
Analysis 
 
We begin our analysis by addressing the third certified question, which 
involves a determination of whether section 768.79(1) constitutes substantive law 
and, therefore, is inapplicable in instances where parties to a contract have agreed 
to be bound by the substantive law of another forum.  We begin here because the 
answers to the first two certified questions are dependent on a determination of 
whether section 768.79 applies in this case, which requires us to determine whether 
 
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the fee statute is substantive or procedural.  This dispute originates from the 
choice-of-law clause in Southeast and Auto-Owners‟s contract that provides for the 
substantive law of Michigan to apply to disputes that arise under the agreement.  
Southeast argues that section 768.79 is procedural for conflict of law purposes, 
warranting its application in this dispute, while Auto-Owners argues that the 
statute is substantive, and, therefore, is not applicable because the parties have 
agreed that the substantive law of Michigan shall apply.3  The issue before the 
Court involves a question of statutory interpretation and we review it de novo.  See 
Borden v. East-European Ins. Co., 921 So. 2d 587, 591 (Fla. 2006).    
Article V, section 2(a), of the Florida Constitution grants this Court the 
exclusive authority to adopt rules of judicial practice and procedure for actions 
filed in this State, while the Legislature is charged with the responsibility of 
enacting substantive law.  See Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So. 2d 52, 59 (Fla. 2000); 
see also TGI Friday‟s, Inc. v. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d 606, 611 (Fla. 1995).  The 
distinction between substantive laws enacted by the Legislature and procedural 
rules governed by the Court is not always clear.  See Caple v. Tuttle‟s Design-
Build, Inc., 753 So. 2d 49, 53 (Fla. 2000).  Therefore, this Court has provided the 
                                         
 
3.  The parties have stipulated that no comparable statute exists under 
Michigan law.  
 
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following guidelines to determine whether a statute is procedural or substantive in 
nature:  
Substantive law has been defined as that part of the law which creates, 
defines, and regulates rights, or that part of the law which courts are 
established to administer.  It includes those rules and principles which 
fix and declare the primary rights of individuals with respect towards 
their persons and property.  On the other hand, practice and procedure 
“encompass the course, form, manner, means, method, mode, order, 
process or steps by which a party enforces substantive rights or 
obtains redress for their invasion.  „Practice and procedure‟ may be 
described as the machinery of the judicial process as opposed to the 
product thereof.”  It is the method of conducting litigation involving 
rights and corresponding defenses. 
Massey v. David, 979 So. 2d 931, 936-37 (Fla. 2008) (emphasis in original) 
(quoting Haven Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass‟n v. Kirian, 579 So. 2d 730, 732 (Fla. 
1991)).  Article II, section 3 proscribes one branch of government from exercising 
“any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided 
herein[,]” and it is clear that both the Legislature and the judiciary are jointly 
responsible for ensuring that statutes which may contain both procedural and 
substantive aspects work harmoniously to prevent one branch from encroaching on 
the constitutional powers of another.  See TGI Friday‟s, 663 So. 2d at 611.4   
                                         
 
4.  For example, statutes that detail only procedural requirements are an 
unconstitutional intrusion into the rule-making authority of this Court guaranteed 
under article V, section 2(a), of the Florida Constitution.  See Knealing v. Puelo, 
675 So. 2d 593, 596 (Fla. 1996).  Similarly, rules adopted by this Court that solely 
create substantive rights are also unconstitutional.  See Timmons v. Combs, 608 
So. 2d 1, 2-3 (Fla. 1992) (holding that the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure can 
only control procedural matters).   
 
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Although the Florida Legislature did not codify section 768.79 until 1986, 
see § 768.79, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1986), the origins of Florida‟s offer of judgment 
statute date back to 1972, when this Court initially adopted a variation of section 
768.79 that mirrored Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68.  See In re Fla. Bar, 265 
So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1972); see also Sarkis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 863 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 
2003).5  The current version of the offer of judgment statute is procedurally 
buttressed by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442, which details the 
requirements to properly file a proposal of settlement.  See Attorneys‟ Title Ins. 
Fund, Inc. v. Gorka, 36 So. 3d 646, 649 (Fla. 2010) (per curiam) (citing TGI 
Friday‟s, 663 So. 2d at 611).  Section 768.79 was enacted to deter parties from 
rejecting presumably reasonable settlement offers by imposing sanctions through 
costs and attorney‟s fees.  See Gorka, 36 So. 3d at 649 (citing Willis Shaw 
Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 So. 2d 276, 278 (Fla. 2003)).  The threat of a 
potentially unfavorable award of costs and fees, in theory, would promote 
settlement, reduce litigation costs, and conserve judicial resources.  See Gorka, 36 
So. 3d at 649.  This statute, however, has not produced the desired outcome as the 
validity and applicability of section 768.79 and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 
1.442 have produced a significant amount of independent litigation.  See id. at 650. 
                                         
 
5.  Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 governs offers of judgment in federal 
cases.  
 
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With regard to the cause at hand, the relevant portion of the offer of 
judgment statute provides:  
In any civil action for damages filed in the courts of this state, if a 
defendant files an offer of judgment which is not accepted by the 
plaintiff within 30 days, the defendant shall be entitled to recover 
reasonable costs and attorney‟s fees incurred by her or him or on the 
defendant‟s behalf pursuant to a policy of liability insurance or other 
contract from the date of filing of the offer if the judgment is one of 
no liability or the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at least 25 
percent less than such offer, and the court shall set off such costs and 
attorney‟s fees against the award. 
 
§ 768.79(1) Fla. Stat. (2011) (emphasis supplied).  According to section 768.79, a 
court is required to award reasonable costs and fees to a defendant when two 
conditions are satisfied: (1) the defendant files an offer of judgment that is not 
accepted by the plaintiff within thirty days, and (2) the final judgment is either one 
of no liability or is at least twenty five percent less than the defendant‟s offer to the 
plaintiff.  See id.  The mandatory language used by the Legislature—i.e., “the 
defendant shall be entitled . . . the court shall”—is reflective of an intentional 
policy choice to limit judicial discretion in the award of attorney‟s fees.  Thus, 
section 768.79 provides courts with a “simple, arithmetic, calculation” to 
determine an award of costs and fees.  TGI Friday‟s, 663 So. 2d at 611 (quoting 
Schmidt v. Fortner, 629 So. 2d 1036, 1040 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)).    
We have previously considered the constitutionality of section 768.79 and 
held it to be constitutional despite its combination of substantive and procedural 
 
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aspects.  See Knealing, 675 So. 2d at 596 (citing Timmons, 608 So. 2d at 2-3); see 
also TGI Friday‟s, 663 So. 2d at 611.  Specifically, in Timmons, we held section 
768.79 to be properly enacted by the Legislature because it is “clear that the 
circumstances under which a party is entitled to costs and attorney‟s fees is 
substantive.”  608 So. 2d at 2-3.  We have also noted that the Legislature, by 
enacting section 768.79, modified the traditional American rule, which requires 
each party to pay its own attorney‟s fees, to establish a mandatory award for 
attorney‟s fees once certain statutory conditions are satisfied.  See TGI Friday‟s, 
663 So. 2d at 611.  To the extent that section 768.79 alters the common law 
approach to attorney‟s fees, the statute creates a substantive right.  See id. 
 
The issue at hand, whether section 768.79 is substantive for conflict of law 
purposes, was not before this Court in Timmons, TGI Friday‟s, or Knealing, 
because those cases exclusively addressed the substantive-procedural 
determination in the context of constitutionality.  Now properly before the Court, 
we hold that section 768.79 is substantive for both constitutional and conflict of 
law purposes.  In doing so, we reaffirm the holding in the Timmons and TGI 
Friday‟s cases that the Legislature created a substantive right to attorney‟s fees in 
section 768.79.  See TGI Friday‟s, 663 So. 2d at 611; Timmons, 608 So. 2d at 2-3.  
Our holding is further supported by the plain language of the statute which 
expressly limits judicial discretion to the procedural calculation of an award of 
 
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attorney‟s fees when the requisite conditions are satisfied.  As this Court stated in 
TGI Friday‟s:  
Under this statute, the [L]egislature did not give judges the discretion 
to determine whether it is reasonable to entitle qualifying plaintiffs to 
fees.  Rather, it determined for itself that it is reasonable to entitle 
every offeror who makes a good faith offer (later rejected) 25 percent 
more or less than the judgment finally entered to an award of fees. 
Under subsection (7)(b), the court‟s discretion is directed by the 
statutory text solely to determining the reasonability of the amount of 
fees awarded . . . . 
 
663 So. 2d at 613 (emphasis supplied) (quoting Schmidt, 692 So. 2d at 1042).  
Section 768.79 is unlike procedural rules that provide courts significant discretion 
to facilitate the administration of justice.  This fact, along with the holdings of the 
Timmons and TGI Friday‟s cases, leads us to conclude that section 768.79 is 
substantive in nature both for constitutional and conflict of law purposes. 
Conflict of Law 
An agreement between parties to be bound by the substantive laws of 
another jurisdiction is presumptively valid, and this Court will enforce a choice-of-
law provision unless applying the chosen forum‟s law would contravene a strong 
public policy of this State.  See Mazzoni Farms, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours 
Co., 761 So. 2d 306, 311 (Fla. 2000).  The countervailing public policy must be of 
sufficient importance and rise above the level of routine policy considerations to 
warrant invalidation of a party‟s choice to be bound by the substantive law of 
another state.  See id. at 312.   
 
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In Mazzoni Farms, we held that a party‟s ability to contract against liability 
for past intentional torts did not raise sufficient public policy concerns to warrant 
rendering the choice-of-law provision unenforceable.  See 761 So. 2d at 312-13.  
Specifically, in finding the choice-of-law provision valid, we recognized the 
importance of Florida‟s public policy against fraudulent contracts, but affirmed 
that there are only limited circumstances under which a choice-of-law provision 
will be invalidated for public policy reasons.  See id. at 213 (stating that “we are 
mindful of the rigorous standard employed” in a conflict of law analysis); see also 
Burroughs Corp. v. Suntogs of Miami, Inc., 472 So. 2d 1166, 1169 (Fla. 1985) 
(holding that a statute prohibiting contracts that provide for less than the statutory 
allotted time period to bring a contractual claim was not a sufficient public policy 
concern to render the choice-of-law provision unenforceable); Morgan Walton 
Props., Inc. v. Int‟l City Bank & Trust Co., 404 So. 2d 1059, 1062 (Fla. 1981) 
(“The „public policy‟ against usury . . . was not so strong as to overcome the policy 
in favor of giving effect to the expressed intentions of contracting parties, even 
though as a factual matter the designation may indeed have been motivated by a 
desire to „evade‟ Florida‟s usury law.”) (discussing Cont‟l Mortg. Investors v. 
Sailboat Key, Inc., 395 So. 2d 507, 512-13 (Fla. 1981)).  
Similar to the issue at hand, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held in Walls 
v. Quick & Reilly, Inc., 824 So. 2d 1016 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002), that a sufficiently 
 
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strong public policy interest in section 57.105, Florida Statutes (1999), which 
governs reciprocal fee awards, did not outweigh the policy of protecting freedom 
of contract.  See id. at 1019-20.  The district court noted that, comparatively, the 
public policy supporting the invalidation of a choice-of-law provision for section 
57.105(5) purposes was not as strong as the public policy concerns in the usury or 
statute of limitations context.  See id. at 1020.  Thus, the court concluded that, if a 
sufficient public policy reason did not exist to invalidate the choice-of-law 
provision in those cases, then no such policy existed in the context of a section 
57.105 award of attorney‟s fees.  Similarly, the Fourth District Court of Appeal in 
Precision Tune Auto Care, Inc. v. Radcliffe, 815 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), 
also refused to disregard the parties‟ contractual decision to apply the substantive 
law of Virginia with respect to attorney‟s fees under section 57.105(2).  See id. at 
710 (“[W]e detect no Florida policy which would override the parties‟ ability to 
freely contract on the issue of attorney‟s fees.”).  The court further held that parties 
that enter into commercial contracts reasonably expect choice-of-law provisions to 
be valid and enforceable, and to disregard a choice-of-law provision in a 
commercial transaction would destabilize an area of law relied upon for its 
predictable and uniform application.  See id. at 711 (“To disregard the choice of 
law provision here would do violence to the concept of commercial comity.”).6   
                                         
 
6.  We agree with the Fourth District‟s holding in Precision Tune Auto Care 
 
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Under a conflict of law analysis, an award of attorney‟s fees under section 
768.79 is not substantially different than an award of fees under section 57.105.  
Neither statute advances a sufficient public policy concern to override the strong 
policy of protecting freedom of contract.  Accordingly, we answer the third 
certified question in the negative, and hold that because an award of attorney‟s fees 
under Florida‟s offer of judgment statute is a substantive right, section 768.79 will 
not apply in instances where the parties have agreed to be governed by the 
substantive law of another jurisdiction.    
 
In holding that section 768.79 is inapplicable in instances where parties have 
agreed to be bound by the substantive laws of another forum, we recognize that the 
majority holdings by the Fourth District in BDO Seidman, LLP v. British Car 
Auctions, Inc., 802 So. 2d 366, 368 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), and the Fifth District in 
Bennett v. Morales, 845 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003), have taken the position 
that introductory clause of section 768.79, which provides, “[i]n any civil action 
for damages filed in the courts of this state,” mandates the application of the statute 
irrespective of the parties‟ choice of applicable substantive law.  The Fifth 
District‟s opinion in Bennett merely agrees with the reasoning of the majority 
                                                                                                                                   
that Weatherby Associates, Inc. v. Ballack, 783 So. 2d 1138 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), 
a case that Southeast relies on to argue section 768.79 is procedural for conflict of 
law purposes, is inapplicable to cases where the contractual choice-of-law 
provisions govern the dispute.  See Precision Tune Auto Care, 815 So. 2d at 711.   
 
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conclusion in BDO Seidman that “section 768.79 applies to all civil actions for 
damages brought in Florida, even where the substantive law of another jurisdiction 
is applied.”  845 So. 2d at 1004.  If the statute actually stated this, its plain reading 
would supersede the choice of law by the parties.  But it does not.  Thus, the 
reasoning of the Fourth District in BDO Seidman, as agreed with by the Fifth 
District in Bennett, is erroneous and we disapprove those cases to the extent they 
conflict with our opinion today.  
In applying our holding to the facts at hand, we conclude that Southeast is 
not entitled to costs and fees under section 768.79 because the statute is 
substantive, and therefore inapplicable because Southeast and Auto-Owners have 
contractually agreed to be bound by the substantive laws of Michigan.  We 
presume that the choice-of-law clause is valid, and find no sufficient public policy 
concern to override the parties‟ right to choose the law of the particular forum that 
governs the substantive portions of their contract.  
Conclusion 
 
Florida‟s offer of judgment statute, set forth in section 768.79, creates a 
substantive right to costs and attorney‟s fees upon the satisfaction of certain 
conditions.  Accordingly, under a conflict of law analysis, when parties have 
agreed to be bound by the substantive law of another jurisdiction, section 768.79 
simply does not apply.  As a result, we answer the third certified question in the 
 
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negative.  By our doing so, the first two questions are rendered moot, and we 
remand the case to the Eleventh Circuit.   
It is so ordered.     
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, POLSTON, and LABARGA, JJ., 
concur. 
PERRY, J., dissents with an opinion. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
PERRY, J., dissenting. 
 
Because I would find that section 768.79 is procedural for conflict of law 
purposes, I would find section 768.79 applicable to the instant case despite the 
parties‟ contractual agreement to apply the substantive law of another jurisdiction.  
Therefore, I would answer the third certified question in the affirmative.  
Respectfully, I dissent. 
Section 768.79 addresses offers of judgment and provides in relevant part: 
In any civil action for damages filed in the courts of this state, if a 
defendant files an offer of judgment which is not accepted by the 
plaintiff within 30 days, the defendant shall be entitled to recover 
reasonable costs and attorney‟s fees incurred by her or him or on the 
defendant‟s behalf pursuant to a policy of liability insurance or other 
contract from the date of filing of the offer if the judgment is one of 
no liability or the judgment obtained by the plaintiff is at least 25 
percent less than such offer, and the court shall set off such costs and 
attorney‟s fees against the award. 
 
 
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§ 768.79(1), Fla. Stat. (2011).  I agree with the majority that section 768.79 has a 
combination of substantive and procedural aspects.  Despite its having both 
substantive and procedural aspects, this Court has held this statute constitutional, 
determining that for constitutional purposes, the statute is substantive.  See 
Knealing v. Puelo, 675 So. 2d 593, 596 (Fla. 1996); TGI Friday‟s, Inc. v. Dvorak, 
663 So. 2d 606, 611 (Fla. 1995); Timmons v. Combs, 608 So. 2d 1, 2-3 (Fla. 
1992).  However, a statute may be substantive in terms of constitutionality, but 
procedural for choice of law purposes.  See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
Laws § 122 cmt. b (1971).  I would apply that principle here.   
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 6 (1971) provides a 
helpful analytical framework in determining the range of applicability a legislature 
intended for a given statute:  
The court should give a local statute the range of application intended 
by the legislature when these intentions can be ascertained and can 
constitutionally be given effect.  If the legislature intended that the 
statute should be applied to the out-of-state facts involved, the court 
should so apply it unless constitutional considerations forbid.  On the 
other hand, if the legislature intended that the statute should be 
applied only to acts taking place within the state, the statute should 
not be given a wider range of application.  Sometimes a statute‟s 
intended range of application will be apparent on its face, as when it 
expressly applies to all citizens of a state including those who are 
living abroad. . . . Provided that it is constitutional to do so, the court 
will apply a local statute in the manner intended by the legislature 
even when the local law of another state would be applicable under 
usual choice-of-law principles. 
 
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Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 cmt. b (1971).  Looking to the plain 
language of section 768.79, the statute‟s intended range of application is apparent 
on its face—section 768.79 is to apply “[i]n any civil action for damages filed in 
the courts of this state.”  § 768.79(1), Fla. Stat. (2011).  As Judge Gross aptly noted 
in his concurring opinion in BDO Seidman, LLP v. British Car Auctions, Inc., 802 
So. 2d 366 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011), “Significantly, the legislature did not limit the 
statute to cases „arising‟ or „accruing‟ in Florida, or to cases controlled by Florida 
substantive law.”  Id. at 372.  I cannot ignore the plain language of the statute.  
Based on this unambiguous language, it could not be more clear that the 
Legislature intends for this statute to apply to every civil action filed in the courts 
of this state.  In light of the plain language of the statute, along with this Court‟s 
precedent that the court‟s discretion to deny attorney‟s fees under this statute is 
limited, I do not see how the Legislature could mean anything but that this statute 
applies to all cases filed in Florida.  See TGI Friday‟s, 663 So. 2d at 610.  
Accordingly, the statute is procedural for choice of law purposes.   
Even if I were to agree with the majority that section 768.79 is substantive 
for conflict of law purposes, I would find that the public policy of preserving 
judicial resources outweighs the policy of the parties‟ freedom to contract.  
Florida‟s Legislature has authorized contracting parties to agree that the laws of 
another state having a reasonable relation to the transaction may govern their 
 
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rights; however, the exception to this rule arises when the law of the chosen forum 
contravenes a strong public policy of Florida.  See § 671.105, Fla. Stat. (2011).  
This Court‟s precedent provides that a right to attorney‟s fees does not outweigh 
the public policy promoting freedom of contract.  See Walls v. Quick & Reilly, 
Inc., 824 So. 2d 1016, 1019-20 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Precision Tune Auto Care, 
Inc. v. Radcliffe, 815 So. 2d 708, 710-11 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002).  However, the 
Legislature‟s driving concern in implementing section 768.79 was not simply 
allocation of attorney‟s fees.  Instead, the main purpose of section 768.79 is “to 
encourage resolution of disputed claims without the unnecessary consumption of 
scarce judicial resources.”  Allstate Insurance Co. v. Materiale, 787 So. 2d 173, 
176 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).  “The purpose of section 768.79 is to lead „litigants to 
settle by penalizing those who decline offers that satisfy the statutory 
requirements.‟ ”  BDO Seidman, 802 So. 2d at 371 (Gross, J., concurring specially) 
(quoting MGR Equip. Corp., v. Wilson Ice Enters., Inc., 731 So. 2d 1262, 1264 
(Fla. 1999)); see Allstate, 787 So. 2d at 176.  The Legislature has made a clear 
policy decision here to preserve this state‟s judicial resources.  As Judge Gross 
noted in his concurring opinion in BDO Seidman, whether the instant lawsuit 
expends Florida‟s judicial resources is not a concern of another state, but rather a 
concern of Florida.  See BDO Seidman, 802 So. 2d at 372 (Gross, J., concurring 
specially).  “Not to apply section 768.79 in this type of case would „impose 
 
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an undue burden upon‟ Florida.”  Id.  I cannot think of a stronger policy than 
preserving the already overburdened judicial resources of this state.  Thus, I would 
find that the policy of encouraging settlement and preserving Florida‟s judicial 
resources outweighs freedom of contract in this case and should not be avoided by 
parties agreeing that another jurisdiction‟s substantive law applies.  Therefore, I 
would find the Offer of Judgment Statute applicable to the instant case despite a 
contract to apply the law of another state.  Accordingly, I would answer the third 
certified question in the affirmative.  Because I would answer the third question in 
the affirmative, I would also address the other certified questions. 
 
Certified Question of Law from the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit - Case No. 09-15846 
 
James McCrae of Law Office of Jim McCrae, P.A., Lake Mary, Florida, and 
Richard A. DeTar of Miles and Stockridge, P.C., Easton, Maryland, 
 
 
for Appellants 
 
Robert E. Bonner of Meier, Bonner, Muszynski, O‟Dell and Harvey, Orlando, 
Florida, and Thomas E. Crafton of Alber Crafton, PSC, Louisville, Kentucky, 
 
 
for Appellee