Case Title: TW v. BM

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-05-8

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2006-06-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
TW v. BM2006 WY 68134 P.3d 1262Case Number: No. C-05-8Decided: 06/01/2006
 
 
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
                                                            

TW,

Appellant 
(Respondent),

 
 
v.

 
 
BM,

Appellee 
(Respondent).

 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofParkCounty

The 
Honorable Hunter Patrick, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Gibson 
Sean Benham of Casper, 
Wyoming

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Kyle R. 
Smith of Worrall, Greear & Smith, P.C., Worland, Wyoming

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

HILL, 
Chief Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      In this appeal, 
TW (mother) challenges an order granting BM's (father's) petition to modify 
custody of their son.  Mother 
contends that, contrary to her constitutional right to travel, the district 
court modified custody based solely on her various relocations.  We will 
affirm.

 
 

[¶2]      TW presents one 
issue for our review:

 
 
Whether 
the trial court abused its discretion by ordering a modification of custody 
based on relocations by mother in light of the mother's constitutional right to 
travel?

 
 
FACTS

 
 

[¶3]      Because there is 
no transcript from the 
district court's hearing, we must derive this statement of facts from the 
pleadings and orders.  The parties' 
son was born February 3, 1996.  The 
parties never married each other.  
In March of 1998, the Wyoming Department of Family Services filed a 
"Petition to Establish Paternity and Support."  In July of 1998, the district court 
entered a "Judgment and Order of Paternity and Support by Default."  By that order, BM (father) was 
adjudicated the natural father of the parties' son.  Mother was awarded primary physical 
custody of the parties' son, subject to the right to reasonable visitation by 
father.  No specific visitation 
schedule was established.  Father 
was ordered to pay monthly child support of $200.

 
 
[¶4]      Over the next 
several years, father filed three petitions to modify custody.  In June of 2002, father filed a 
"Petition for Modification and Contempt of Court."  Among other things, father's petition 
alleged that, since the 1998 paternity judgment, (1) mother had moved with son 
to Las Vegas, Nevada; (2) mother changed addresses frequently since her 
relocation to Las 
Vegas; (3) son attended school only "sporadically"; (4) 
mother had thwarted father's attempts to exercise his visitation rights; and (5) 
father had married and established a stable home.  On August 2, 2002, the district court 
held a hearing on father's petition.  
At that hearing, the parties informed the district court that they had 
agreed to settle the matter.  Under 
the parties' agreement, custody was not modified.  However, the parties established a 
specific visitation schedule for father:  
alternating holidays, six weeks in the summer, telephone visitation, and 
other visitation as agreed upon.  
The district court instructed the parties to submit an order approving 
their settlement, but no such order was ever entered.

 
 
[¶5]      In January of 
2003, father filed an "Amended Petition for Modification of Child Custody."  In addition to reasserting the 
allegations contained in the initial petition, father's amended petition 
alleged, among other things, that (1) mother continued to change addresses and 
telephone numbers without notifying father; and (2) son continually stayed 
overnight at the homes of individuals other than mother.  The district court ordered the parties 
to mediate the dispute.  The record 
does not reveal what resulted from the mediation, but it is apparent that 
primary legal custody of son remained with mother. 

 
 
[¶6]      The present 
action began on September 29, 2004, when father filed a "Petition for 
Modification of Custody."  This 
petition chronicled mother's repeated relocations to, and in, Wyoming; Las Vegas, 
Nevada; and Bozeman, Montana.  
Significantly, the petition alleged:

 
 
During 
the period of time including the school years 2001/2002 and 2002/2003, the 
parties' minor child has been enrolled or re-enrolled about thirteen (13) 
different times in schools and school districts in three different states as a 
result of the overall instability and irresponsibility of 
Mother.

 
 
[¶7]      On February 8, 
2005, the district court held a hearing on father's petition.  Mother appeared pro se at the hearing.  The hearing was not reported.  Following the hearing, the district 
court entered its "Order Modifying Custody & Establishing Visitation & 
Child Support."  In that order, the 
district court awarded father sole custody of the parties' son.  A visitation schedule was established 
for mother, and she was ordered to pay monthly child support of $762.44. 

 
 
[¶8]      In its order 
modifying custody, the district court determined that father had "met his burden 
of proving that a substantial and material change in circumstances has occurred 
affecting the best interest of the parties' child."  In its findings of fact, the district 
court wrote:

 
 
1.  The 
parties' minor child has a loving relationship with both 
parties;

 
 
2.  The 
stability and home environment of [father] is such that he is in a better 
position to provide adequate care for the parties' minor 
child;

 
 
3.  The 
instability of [mother] has been proven through her testimony regarding the many 
residential and educational changes regarding the parties' minor child while the 
parties' minor child has been in her primary care and custody since the date of 
the last hearing regarding custody of the parties' minor child on July 31, 
2002;

 
 
4.  [Father] 
persuasively proved to the court through his testimony and the testimony of his 
wife that his current residential environment is stable and capable of 
sustaining a safe, loving and productive home environment for the parties' minor 
child;

 
 
5.  Each 
of the parties is willing to accept the responsibilities of parenting, however, 
[mother's] erratic schedule of leaving the parties' minor child with [father] 
indicated to the court an unacceptable willingness to pass this responsibility 
to [father] at her convenience;

 
 
6.  [Father] 
has willingly accepted and performed the responsibilities of parenting on 
several occasions at the convenience of [mother];

 
 
7.  [Father's] 
demonstrated stability and responsibility regarding the parties' minor child's 
best serves the continued maintenance and strengthening of his parenting 
relationship with the [mother] as well as with the parties' minor 
child:

 
 
8.  [Father] 
has attempted to maintain contact and communication with the parties' minor 
child despite the regular changes of residence and education instigated by 
[mother] without notice to [father]:

 
 
9.  [Father] 
is better able to facilitate and develop regular communication between the 
parties and the parties' minor child;

 
 
10.  [Father] 
is better able to care for the safety, security and support of the parties' 
minor child;

 
 
11.  It 
is in the best interests of the parties' minor child ***** that [father] be 
awarded sole custody of the parties' minor child[.]

 
 
Mother 
then filed this timely appeal.

 
 

 
 

[¶9]      Modification 
of custody is governed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-204 (LexisNexis 2005), which 
provides in pertinent part:

 
 

§ 
20-2-204.  Enforcement and 
modification.

. 
. . .

(c)  A court 
having jurisdiction may modify an order concerning the care, custody and 
visitation of the children if there is a showing by either parent of a material 
change in circumstances since the entry of the order in question and that the 
modification would be in the best interests of the children pursuant to W.S. 
20-2-201(a).  In any proceeding in 
which a parent seeks to modify an order concerning child custody or visitation, 
proof of repeated, unreasonable failure by the custodial parent to allow 
visitation to the other parent in violation of an order may be considered as 
evidence of a material change of circumstances.

 
 
[¶10]   In reviewing such a matter, our 
standard of review is well established:

 
 
"The 
party seeking a modification of the custody provisions of a divorce decree has 
the burden of showing that a material and substantial change of circumstances 
has occurred, after the entry of the initial decree, and that modification is in 
the best interests of the children."  
Clark v. Alexander, 953 P.2d 145, 150 (Wyo. 1998).  This court will not interfere with the 
trial court's decision regarding modification of custody absent a procedural 
error or a clear abuse of discretion.  
Id.  We recently clarified the definition of 
an abuse of discretion when we stated the core of our inquiry must reach "the 
question of reasonableness of the choice made by the trial court."  Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 
(Wyo. 1998); 
see also Pace v. Pace, 2001 WY 43, 
¶ 9, 22 P.3d 861, ¶ 9 (Wyo. 2001).  Judicial discretion is a composite of 
many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means 
exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances 
and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously.  Id.

 
 

Fergusson 
v. Fergusson, 
2002 WY 66, ¶ 9, 45 P.3d 641, 644 (Wyo. 2002).

 
 

 
 
A.  Substantial 
change of circumstances; constitutional right to 
travel

 
 

[¶11]   Mother contends 
that the district court abused its discretion in finding a substantial change in 
circumstances.  She claims that the 
district court's decision was based solely on her relocations and is thus in 
direct conflict with her constitutional right to travel.  She argues that relocations, by 
themselves, may not serve as a basis for finding a substantial change of 
circumstances.

 
 
[¶12]   Recently, we summarized the law 
governing mother's claim:

 
 

To 
summarize, our precedent is quite clear that relocation, by itself, cannot be a 
substantial and material change in circumstances sufficient to justify reopening 
a custody order.  That precept is 
also applicable to any factors that are derivative of relocation.  What Mother has failed to acknowledge in 
her argument, however, is that our precedent does not preclude the district 
court from considering the effects of relocation on the children so long as 
there is some other circumstance that is "sufficiently deleterious to the 
welfare of the children that by itself  would serve as a substantial and 
material change in circumstances even in the absence of a 
relocation."  [Watt v. 
Watt, 971 P.2d 608, 617 (Wyo. 1999)]; see [Gurney 
v. Gurney, 899 P.2d 52, 55 (Wyo. 1995)] (Where a custody order was properly 
reopened because both parties asserted that joint custody was not working, 
district court could have reasonably concluded that factors derivative of the 
relocation could have contributed to parties' inability to agree and 
communicate.).  Furthermore, our 
cases stress that the rule set forth in Love and its progeny is predicated upon 
the motivation for the relocation being in good faith.  [Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283, 1288-89 
(Wyo. 1993)] 
("So long as the court is satisfied with the motives of the custodial parent in 
seeking the moveremoval should be granted."); Watt, 971 P.2d  at 614 ("Love and Gurney together capture a rule that a 
relocation by a custodial parent, where the motivation for the relocation is 
legitimate, sincere, in good faith, and still permits reasonable visitation by 
the non-custodial parent, is not a substantial and material change in 
circumstances.").

Here, a 
review of the record shows that the district court did not abuse its discretion 
by considering Mother's numerous relocations since the parties' divorce.  The court's Decision Letter sets forth 
various factors independent of the relocations that could establish the 
existence of a substantial and material change in circumstances justifying the 
decision to reopen the custody order[.]

 
 

Harshberger 
v. Harshberger, 2005 
WY 99, ¶¶ 12-13, 117 P.3d 1244, 1250-51 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
[¶13]   Relying on these principles, mother 
contends that father did not establish that her various relocations had any 
adverse consequences on son.  To the 
contrary, mother asserts that son is excelling in school.  Mother is correct that the district court did not make any specific 
written findings that mother's relocations had deleterious effects on son.  At the same time, there is nothing in 
the district court's findings that suggests the district court relied on 
mother's relocations, standing alone, to justify the change in custody.  To the extent that the district court's 
findings of fact address mother's relocations, the district court found that 
mother's instability was proven through her testimony regarding the many 
residential and educational changes regarding son.  Thus, it is apparent that the district 
court focused on the instability such relocations created, not on the 
relocations themselves.  

 
 
[¶14]   Certainly, it would be helpful to 
this Court's review if the district court had provided more detailed findings of 
fact regarding the substantial change in circumstances.  Indeed,

 
 
[w]e 
have repeatedly implored trial courts, when exercising their discretionary power 
in custody matters, to place the circumstances and factors which were crucial to 
their custody determinations on the record.  If they did so, the reviewing court 
could better understand and evaluate the soundness of their decisions.  See Produit v. Produit, 2001 WY 123, 
¶¶ 10-13, 35 P.3d 1240, ¶¶ 10-13 (Wyo. 2001); Pace, 2001 WY 43, ¶ 15, 22 P.3d 861; Reavis v. Reavis, 955 P.2d 428, 
431-32 (Wyo. 1998).  We continue to 
encourage trial courts to rely on their discretionary power to make a record of 
the critical circumstances and factors which constitute the foundation of a 
custody award.  Produit, 2001 WY 123, ¶ 10, 35 P.3d 1240.  However, except in instances 
involving unconventional custody approaches, trial courts are not required to do 
so.  We have placed the onus on the 
parties to request findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to W.R.C.P. 
52(a).  Id.; Pace, 2001 WY 43, ¶ 16, 22 P.3d 861; RDS v. GEMN (In re MS), 9 P.3d 984, 986 (Wyo. 
2000).  Neither party made such a 
request and, therefore, cannot be heard to complain about the absence of formal 
findings.  Resor v. Resor, 987 P.2d 146, 148 
(Wyo. 
1999).

 
 

Fergusson, 
¶ 15, 45 P.3d  at 645-46.  Here, 
neither party requested detailed findings of fact.  With no such request, mother does not 
complain that the findings are inadequate.  
More importantly for purposes of this case, there is nothing in the 
findings of fact that suggests the district court, as mother claims, relied 
solely on mother's relocations to modify custody.

 
 
[¶15]   If the hearing had been reported, 
we would review the record to determine if mother's relocations had an adverse 
impact on son.  
However,

 
 
[w]hen 
this Court does not have a properly authenticated transcript before it, it must 
accept the trial court's findings of fact upon which it bases any decisions 
regarding evidentiary issues.  Capshaw v. Schieck, 2002 WY 54, 
¶ 21, 44 P.3d 47, ¶ 21 (Wyo. 2002).  The failure to provide a transcript does 
not necessarily require dismissal of an appeal, but our review is restricted to 
those allegations of error not requiring inspection of the transcript.  Lacking a transcript, or a substitute 
for the transcript, the regularity of the trial court's judgment and the 
competency of the evidence upon which that judgment is based must be 
presumed.  Stadtfeld v. Stadtfeld, 920 P.2d 662, 664 (Wyo. 1996); Combs v. Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50, 55 
(Wyo. 1993); and see Wood v. Wood, 865 P.2d 616 (Wyo. 1993) (dismissing 
appeal for lack of record, rather than affirming).  

 
 

Harshberger, ¶ 3, 117 P.3d  at 
1246-47 (quoting Burt v. Burt, 2002 
WY 127, ¶ 7, 53 P.3d 101, 103 (Wyo. 2002)).  Without a transcript to review, we must 
accept the district court's finding that father established a substantial change 
in circumstances.  We will not 
assume the district court violated the law.

 
 
[¶16]   In addition, as in Harshberger, there are other findings, 
independent of mother's relocations that support the district court's 
determination that there was a substantial change in circumstances.  See JRS v. GMS, 2004 WY 60, ¶ 12, 90 P.3d 718, 723-24 (Wyo. 2004).  
The district court found that mother's "erratic schedule of 
leaving the parties' minor child with [father] indicated to the court an 
unacceptable willingness to pass this responsibility to [father] at her 
convenience."  Also, the district 
court found that father "has willingly accepted and performed the 
responsibilities of parenting on several occasions at the convenience of 
[mother]."

 
 
[¶17]   As for mother's assertion that son 
is excelling in school, the record simply does not support mother's 
assertions.  As noted, there is no 
transcript from the hearing, and the designated record does not otherwise 
support mother's contentions.

 
 

[¶18]   Mother also argues that the 
district court should not have relied on evidence that pre-dates the parties' 
2002 stipulation settling father's first petition to modify custody.  Mother 
contends that her relocation to Las 
Vegas cannot be considered a change of circumstances 
because she already lived there when father filed his first petition to modify 
custody.  We recently rejected a similar argument in Harshberger, where we 
wrote:

 
 
In a 
related argument, Mother contends that the district court erred when it 
considered relocations that occurred before the court modified the parties' 
custody and support order on July 8, 2003.  
Similarly, she claims that the court also considered employment changes 
that occurred before this date. 

. . . 
.

We 
recently held that [W.S. § 20-2-204(c)] prohibits consideration of pre-divorce 
evidence when there is a determination of whether there has been a substantial 
change in circumstances but that it did not limit the court's consideration of 
such information when making a determination of the children's best 
interest.  Selvey v. Selvey, 2004 WY 166, 
¶ 18, 102 P.3d 210, ¶ 18 (Wyo. 2004).  As noted above, there are independent 
grounds in the record for finding a material change of circumstances without 
considering either the relocations or Mother's employment history.  Once material changes of circumstances 
have been found, the district court could consider evidence of Mother's 
relocations and employment history under our decision in Selvey.  We also note that the July 8, 2003 order 
was only concerned with visitation, not custody.  Mother does not explain why the 
visitation order should act as a bar on the evidence the court could consider 
when determining custody.  The 
original custody order set forth in the parties' 1999 divorce decree was still 
in effect at the time this proceeding was commenced.  A review of the Decision Letter 
indicates that all of the events cited by the court relating to Mother's 
relocations and employment occurred after the divorce decree was entered.  No matter how one views it, the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in considering this evidence when determining 
the best interests of the children.

 
 

Harshberger, 
¶ 14-15, 117 P.3d  at 1251-52.

 
 

[¶19]   Likewise, here, the parties' 2002 
stipulation altered only visitation, not custody.  Thus, the initial custody order, entered 
in 1998, was still in effect when father filed the present petition to modify 
custody.  Therefore, the 1998 order 
was "the 
order in question" pursuant to § 20-2-204(c).  Under the circumstances, we must reject 
mother's claim.

 
 
[¶20]   On this record, we cannot conclude 
that the district court committed any error in finding a substantial change in 
circumstances.

 
 
B.  Best interests of the 
child

 
 

[¶21]   In a one-paragraph argument, mother 
claims it is in the child's best interests that primary physical custody remain 
with her.  She asserts that she is 
the primary caregiver for son.  
While acknowledging her multiple relocations, mother 
contends that the relocations have been in an effort to improve her economic 
condition.  She states that she is 
now able to provide a financially stable environment. She also asserts that 
custody should not be modified simply because father is inconvenienced in 
exercising visitation.

 
 
[¶22]   Mother's argument depends upon a 
review of the evidence presented at the district court hearing.  Without a transcript from that hearing, 
this Court is unable to ascertain whether or not mother's assertions are 
accurate.  Instead, we must again 
accept the district court's findings on this issue.

 
 
[¶23]   Affirmed.