Case Title: Alston v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 070007

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2007-11-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and 
Agee, JJ., and Lacy, S.J. 
 
ANDREW ROBERT ALSTON 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v. Record No. 070007 
 
 
 
JUSTICE G. STEVEN AGEE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    November 2, 2007 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
Andrew Robert Alston was found guilty of voluntary 
manslaughter by a jury in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Charlottesville.  In addition to a term of active incarceration, 
the circuit court also imposed a three-year term of postrelease 
supervision as required by Code § 19.2-295.2.  On appeal in the 
Court of Appeals, Alston challenged the term of postrelease 
supervision, which he contends violates his rights under the 
Sixth Amendment, his right to due process, and constituted an 
abuse of sound judicial discretion.  The Court of Appeals 
affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. 
For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
I. 
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On November 9, 2004, a jury in the Circuit Court of the 
City of Charlottesville convicted Alston of voluntary 
manslaughter in the death of Walker Sisk.  The jury recommended 
a sentence of three years active incarceration.  The circuit 
 
 
2
court set the case for sentencing pending the completion of a 
pre-sentence investigation report pursuant to Code § 19.2-299. 
Prior to the sentencing hearing, Alston filed a motion 
challenging a term of postrelease supervision under Code § 19.2-
295.2 on several grounds.  Alston contended the application of 
that statute to permit the imposition of a term of postrelease 
supervision, in addition to the term of active incarceration 
recommended by the jury, violated the separation of powers 
between the legislative and judicial branches.  In an additional 
memorandum filed with the circuit court, Alston argued that 
postrelease supervision under Code § 19.2-295.2 extends a 
sentence beyond the statutory maximum as determined by the line 
of cases represented by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 
(2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).  He also 
argued that the judicial construction of the statute contravened 
both the plain language of the statute and the legislature’s 
intent in enacting it.  When Alston argued his motion at the 
sentencing hearing, he expressly rejected a characterization of 
his challenge to Code § 19.2-295.2 as one based on due process 
grounds. 
Based on the briefs and argument, the circuit court found 
that, as part of the statutory sentencing framework established 
by the General Assembly, postrelease supervision imposed under 
Code § 19.2-295.2 does not violate the separation of powers, and 
 
 
3
that neither Apprendi nor Blakely applied.  Alston specifically 
requested that the circuit court identify any facts that it, as 
opposed to the jury, had found as a basis for imposing a 
specific term of postrelease supervision under Code § 19.2-
295.2:  “I want to be clear I’ve asked the Court to focus now on 
any fact the Court would have to take into consideration or 
determine . . . .”  The court responded that “I don’t think I 
need to make any other fact finding” than the jury’s verdict of 
guilty. 
The circuit court then imposed the jury’s recommended 
three-year period of active incarceration, and ordered that 
Alston also be placed under postrelease supervision pursuant to 
§ 19.2-295.2(A) for an additional three years.1 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit 
court.  Alston v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 115, 117, 637 S.E.2d 
344, 345 (2006).  We awarded Alston this appeal. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
On appeal in this Court, Alston assigns error to the 
judgment of the Court of Appeals on four basic grounds.  
Initially, he contends the Court of Appeals erred because it 
failed to find that a term of postrelease supervision under Code 
§ 19.2-295.2, as applied in this case, violates Alston’s Sixth 
                     
1 Alston’s three-year term of active incarceration is not at 
issue in this appeal. 
 
 
4
Amendment rights.2  As a corollary matter, Alston contends that 
Code § 19.2-295.2 is unconstitutional on its face. 
 
Separately, Alston contends the imposition of the three-
year term of postrelease supervision “is arbitrary and violates 
the principals of sound judicial discretion.”  Lastly, Alston 
assigns error to the failure of the circuit court and Court of 
Appeals to hold that Code § 19.2-295.2, as interpreted, 
contradicts legislative intent. 
A.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Each of Alston’s assignments of error raises questions of 
law.  On appeal, we review such issues de novo.  Harrell v. 
Harrell, 272 Va. 652, 656, 636 S.E.2d 391, 393 (2006); Shivaee 
v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 112, 119, 613 S.E.2d 570, 574 (2005). 
B.  THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
Alston’s primary argument is that the imposition of a term 
of postrelease supervision under Code § 19.2-295.2 constitutes 
an unconstitutional enhancement of the sentence of active 
incarceration permitted by the jury’s sentence and findings of 
fact in his case.  Alston bases his argument on the Sixth 
Amendment right to trial by jury as explicated by the Supreme 
Court of the United States in Apprendi v. New Jersey and its 
                     
2 The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent part that “[i]n 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to 
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”  U.S. 
Const. amend. VI. 
 
 
5
progeny, primarily Blakely v. Washington and Cunningham v. 
California, 549 U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 856 (2007).  He contends the 
Court of Appeals erred in its application of those decisions 
because it found no Sixth Amendment violation in his case. 
In Apprendi, the Supreme Court enunciated the Sixth 
Amendment requirement that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.  
The defendant in Apprendi pled guilty to the crime of 
“possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose,” which was 
punishable by statute for a term of incarceration “between five 
years and 10 years.”  However, the applicable New Jersey law 
permitted “an extended term of imprisonment if the trial judge 
finds, by a preponderance of the evidence,” that the defendant 
acted with a purpose to intimidate the victim on the basis of 
race or similar factors.  Id. at 468-69.  The trial judge so 
found and sentenced Apprendi to twelve years in prison instead 
of the five to ten years that otherwise would have been the 
applicable range of sentence.  Id. at 471. 
The Supreme Court reversed Apprendi’s sentence because his 
Sixth Amendment rights were violated when the trial judge 
increased the otherwise applicable statutory maximum sentence 
(five to ten years) based upon facts only found by the judge and 
 
 
6
which were beyond those inherent in Apprendi’s guilty plea and 
by a standard lower than beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 476.  
Apprendi set the stage for further refinement of the Sixth 
Amendment concept in Blakely, Cunningham, and United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
In Blakely, the Court clarified “that the ‘statutory 
maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge 
may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the 
jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”  Blakely, 542 U.S. 
at 303 (emphasis in original).  Blakely pled guilty to the 
abduction of his spouse, which carried a maximum sentence by 
statute in the State of Washington of no more than ten years.  
However, other statutory restrictions limited the trial judge’s 
sentencing option to a maximum range of 49 to 53 months, unless 
the judge “finds ‘substantial and compelling reasons justifying 
an exceptional sentence.’”  Id. at 299 (quoting Wash. Rev. Code 
§ 9.94A.120(2)).  The trial judge alone made such additional 
findings of fact and based on the additional findings imposed an 
“exceptional sentence of 90 months⎯37 months beyond the standard 
maximum.”  Id. at 300. 
Citing Apprendi, the Supreme Court reversed Blakely’s 
sentence because it exceeded the “relevant statutory maximum” –
that is, the sentence that could be derived only from a jury 
verdict and findings or the defendant’s admissions. 
 
 
7
Our precedents make clear, however, that the 
"statutory maximum" for Apprendi purposes is the 
maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the 
basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or 
admitted by the defendant.  In other words, the 
relevant "statutory maximum" is not the maximum 
sentence a judge may impose after finding additional 
facts, but the maximum he may impose without any 
additional findings.  When a judge inflicts punishment 
that the jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury 
has not found all the facts "which the law makes 
essential to the punishment," and the judge exceeds 
his proper authority. 
 
Id. at 303-04 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in 
original). 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely effectively 
overturned the mandatory sentencing guideline system in the 
State of Washington.  Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court 
similarly invalidated the federal mandatory sentencing guideline 
system in Booker.  In referencing Blakely as it considered the 
federal sentencing scheme, the Court in Booker reiterated that 
“[t]he application of Washington’s sentencing scheme violated 
the defendant’s right to have the jury find the existence of 
‘any particular fact’ that the law makes essential to his 
punishment.”  Booker, 543 U.S. at 232. 
 
Booker was convicted by a jury under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) 
for possession with the intent to distribute cocaine based on 
the evidence at trial that Booker had 92.5 grams of cocaine in 
his possession.  On those facts alone, under the federal 
sentencing guidelines, Booker was subject to a sentence of no 
 
 
8
more than 262 months incarceration.  However, the trial judge 
found separately from the jury and only by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that Booker possessed a substantially greater 
quantity of cocaine than 92.5 grams and was also guilty of 
obstructing justice.  Based on these additional findings, the 
federal sentencing guidelines required that the trial judge 
exceed the otherwise applicable maximum sentence of 262 months 
and sentence Booker to 360 months.  In considering Booker’s 
enhanced sentence, the Supreme Court restated its declaration in 
Blakely “that the ‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is 
the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of 
facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the 
defendant.”  Booker, 543 U.S. at 228 (emphasis in original). 
 
Because Booker’s enhanced sentence was based on facts 
neither found by the jury nor admitted by him, that sentence 
violated his Sixth Amendment rights and was reversed. 
The jury never heard any evidence of the additional 
drug quantity, and the judge found it true by a 
preponderance of the evidence.  Thus, just as in 
Blakely, "the jury's verdict alone does not authorize 
the sentence.  The judge acquires that authority only 
upon finding some additional fact."  There is no 
relevant distinction between the sentence imposed 
pursuant to the Washington statutes in Blakely and the 
sentences imposed pursuant to the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines in these cases. 
 
Booker, 543 U.S. at 235 (internal citations omitted). 
 
 
9
 
Importantly, the Court in Booker went on to explain that 
when a sentence is within the permissible statutory range, and 
no additional facts are required to be found by the sentencing 
judge in order to impose sentence, then the inherent judicial 
discretion in imposing a sentence within the statutory range 
does not implicate the Sixth Amendment. 
If the Guidelines as currently written could be read 
as merely advisory provisions that recommended, rather 
than required, the selection of particular sentences 
in response to differing sets of facts, their use 
would not implicate the Sixth Amendment.  We have 
never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise 
broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a 
statutory range. . . .  For when a trial judge 
exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence 
within a defined range, the defendant has no right to 
a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems 
relevant. 
 
Booker, 543 U.S. at 233. 
 
Earlier this year, in setting aside a similarly enhanced 
sentence under California’s determinate sentencing system in 
Cunningham, the Supreme Court again reiterated the basic 
principles of the foregoing cases. 
This Court has repeatedly held that, under the Sixth 
Amendment, any fact that exposes a defendant to a 
greater potential sentence must be found by a jury, 
not a judge, and established beyond a reasonable 
doubt, not merely by a preponderance of the evidence. 
. . . . 
We cautioned in Blakely, however, that broad 
discretion to decide what facts may support an 
enhanced sentence, or to determine whether an enhanced 
sentence is warranted in any particular case, does not 
shield a sentencing system from the force of our 
decisions. If the jury's verdict alone does not 
 
 
10
authorize the sentence, if, instead, the judge must 
find an additional fact to impose the longer term, the 
Sixth Amendment requirement is not satisfied. 
 
Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. at 863, 869. 
 
As in Booker, the Court in Cunningham clarified that if the 
sentence in a criminal case is within the permitted statutory 
limit based solely upon the finding of a jury or the defendant’s 
admissions, without any additional fact-finding by the trial 
court, then a sentence within that range raised no Sixth 
Amendment claim.  “Other States have chosen to permit judges 
genuinely ‘to exercise broad discretion within a statutory 
range,’ which, ‘everyone agrees,’ encounters no Sixth Amendment 
shoal.”  Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. at 871 (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. 
at 233). 
 
It is against this precedential background that Alston 
raises his Sixth Amendment claim.  In short, he argues that the 
“relevant statutory maximum” for Apprendi purposes is solely the 
three years of active incarceration set by the jury.  He grounds 
this argument in his reading of Code § 19.2-295 as a state law 
limitation on the statutory maximum, but alternatively asserts 
that the circuit court also engaged in the type of additional 
fact-finding Apprendi prohibits. 
 
Alston first contends that Code § 19.2-295, which provides 
that the term of confinement “of a person convicted of a 
criminal offense shall be ascertained by the jury,” unless the 
 
 
11
case is tried without a jury, is a Virginia statutory limit that 
also serves as the Apprendi relevant statutory maximum when a 
jury recommends a sentence.  Alston thus concludes that the 
terms of Code § 19.2-295 prohibit any sentence under Code 
§ 19.2-295.2 since the latter code section does not involve a 
sentence from the jury.3 
The Commonwealth responds that this issue was addressed in 
Williams v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 580, 621 S.E.2d 98 (2005), 
when we decided that the Code § 19.2-295.2 term of postrelease 
supervision was combined with any term of active incarceration 
for the purposes of calculating the statutory maximum sentence.  
Id. at 584, 621 S.E.2d at 100.  However, the Sixth Amendment 
claims raised under Apprendi and Blakely were not before the 
Court in Williams because those issues had been waived.  270 Va. 
at 583 & n.3, 621 S.E.2d at 100 & n.3.  Nevertheless, the 
Commonwealth contends that Williams is dispositive in this case 
because Alston did not receive the statutory maximum under 
Williams.  In the Commonwealth’s view, since voluntary 
manslaughter is punishable as a Class 5 felony under Code 
§ 18.2-10 with a maximum term of ten-years incarceration, 
Alston’s  
                     
3 In Alston’s view, a term of postrelease supervision under 
Code § 19.2-295.2 could be imposed, consonant with Code § 19.2-
295, only if an equivalent part of the sentence of active 
 
 
12
                                                                  
incarceration permitted by the jury recommendation were 
suspended. 
 
 
13
sentence of three-years active incarceration and three-years 
postrelease supervision is within the Code § 18.2-10 maximum 
term and thus does not violate the Apprendi Sixth Amendment 
framework.  We disagree with both parties. 
There are several fatal flaws in Alston’s analysis.  First, 
he ignores the necessity to read the statutes, Code §§ 19.2-295 
and 19.2-295.2, together and not in isolation.  “It is a 
cardinal rule of construction that statutes dealing with a 
specific subject must be construed together in order to arrive 
at the object sought to be accomplished.”  Prillaman v. 
Commonwealth, 199 Va. 401, 406, 100 S.E.2d 4, 7 (1957) (quoting 
Seaboard Fin. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 280, 286, 38 S.E.2d 
770, 772 (1946) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Under the rule of statutory construction of statutes 
in pari materia, statutes are not to be considered as 
isolated fragments of law. . . . [T]hey should be so 
construed as to harmonize the general tenor or purport 
of the system and make the scheme consistent in all 
its parts and uniform in its operation, unless a 
different purpose is shown plainly or with 
irresistible clearness. 
 
Prillaman, 199 Va. at 405, 100 S.E.2d at 7 (quoting 50 Am. Jur., 
Statutes § 349).  Alston also ignores the plain language of the 
statutes.  “When the language of a statute is plain and 
unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of that statutory 
language.”  Lee County v. Town of St. Charles, 264 Va. 344, 348, 
568 S.E.2d 680, 682 (2002). 
 
 
14
 
Notwithstanding any limitations Code § 19.2-295 may place 
upon a term of confinement a jury may determine, Code § 19.2-
295.2 unequivocally directs the circuit court, “in addition to 
any other punishment imposed,” to impose the term of postrelease 
supervision.  Code § 19.2-295.2(A) (emphasis added).  The term 
of postrelease supervision is a mandate to the court, not the 
jury, and applies by the plain terms of Code § 19.2-295.2 
irrespective of any limitations Code § 19.2-295 may apply to a 
jury’s sentence.  “In addition to any other punishment imposed” 
means what it says and, by those plain terms, contains no 
limitation from Code § 19.2-295.  In short, Code § 19.2-295.2 is 
a clear and unmistakable requirement upon the court that is 
unrelated to any jury limitation under Code § 19.2-295. 
As we noted in Williams, the term of postrelease 
supervision under Code § 19.2-295.2 is part of the maximum term 
permitted by statute and is not limited by Code § 19.2-295.  
“Under a proper application of the Code section, in determining 
the length of a permitted sentence, the three-year term of 
postrelease supervision is added to the . . . term that could 
have been imposed for the . . . offenses of which the defendant 
was convicted.”  Williams, 270 Va. at 584, 621 S.E.2d at 100. 
Thus, properly read, Code §§ 19.2-295 and 19.2-295.2 do not 
support Alston’s thesis that Virginia law limits the relevant 
statutory maximum term, for Apprendi purposes, to the three-year 
 
 
15
term of active incarceration determined by the jury.4  However, 
as we recognized in Williams, resolution of the question of 
Virginia statutory law does not answer the federal 
constitutional question.  270 Va. at 583 n.3, 621 S.E.2d at 100 
n.3. 
To answer that query, we must determine what constitutes 
“the relevant statutory maximum” for Sixth Amendment purposes 
under Apprendi, regardless of what that maximum term may be 
under Virginia statute.  The roadmap to determine that answer 
has been clearly demarcated by the Supreme Court as we noted 
above in quoting the Blakely decision. 
[T]he "statutory maximum" for Apprendi purposes is the 
maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the 
basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict . . . 
. [T]he relevant "statutory maximum" is not the 
maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding 
additional facts, but the maximum he may impose 
without any additional findings. 
 
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04 (internal citations omitted) 
(emphasis in original). 
                     
4 Alston’s statutory language argument under Code § 19.2-295 
is also rebutted by the multitude of actions a trial court is 
authorized to take by statute in addition to any sentence 
“ascertained by the jury.”  These include ordering substance 
abuse screenings under Code § 19.2-299.2 of a person convicted 
of possession of controlled substances; collection of a DNA 
sample under Code § 19.2-310.2 of a person convicted of a 
felony; and ordering restitution to victims under Code § 19.2-
305.1, to name but three.  If Alston’s theory of the 
exclusiveness of a jury sentence under Code § 19.2-295 were 
correct, all the foregoing could arguably be a legal nullity. 
 
 
16
Clearly, the Commonwealth’s position that the maximum term 
of incarceration permitted by statute for a particular crime is 
the equivalent of the relevant statutory maximum for Sixth 
Amendment purposes was rejected in Blakely.  While the maximum 
term provided by a statute and the Apprendi relevant statutory 
maximum may be coterminous, that circumstance depends on the 
“facts reflected in the jury verdict.”  As a matter of federal 
constitutional law, only those facts found by the jury or 
necessarily derived from its verdict can be the basis of the 
relevant statutory maximum sentence that a court can impose 
consonant with the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. 
So viewed, we agree with the conclusion of the Court of 
Appeals on this issue.  “This statute[, Code § 19.2-295.2,] does 
not require that a trial court find proof of particular facts 
independent of the jury's conviction. The trial court here did 
not make any factual determinations beyond those implicit in the 
jury's conviction.”  Alston, 49 Va. App. at 121-22, 637 S.E.2d 
at 347. 
The verdict of guilty to the charge of voluntary 
manslaughter was the sole factual finding by the jury that was 
needed by the circuit court for the imposition of a term of 
postrelease supervision under Code § 19.2-295.2.  The jury’s 
verdict of guilty was the only factual predicate required by 
Code § 19.2-295.2 before the statutory mandate was triggered 
 
 
17
that the circuit court “impose a term of postrelease supervision 
of not less than six months nor more than three years.”  The 
jury finding of Alston’s guilt was “all the facts which the law 
makes essential to the punishment” under Code § 19.2-295.2.  
Thus, the Apprendi requirement that the sentence imposed be 
“solely on the basis of facts reflected in the jury verdict” was 
met in this case and Alston’s three-year term of postrelease 
supervision is within the “relevant statutory maximum” for that 
reason.  The fact that the circuit court exercised its 
discretion in selecting the term of postrelease supervision to 
impose a term of between six months and three years does not 
alter our conclusion. 
The choice as to the duration of that term was a matter 
within the inherent discretion of the court in imposing a 
sentence, and required no additional fact-finding in an Apprendi 
context.  A court clearly has that authority under Virginia law 
when it chooses a point within the permitted statutory range.  
“[W]hen a statute prescribes a maximum imprisonment penalty and 
the sentence does not exceed that maximum, the sentence will not 
be overturned as being an abuse of discretion.”  Abdo v. 
Commonwealth, 218 Va. 473, 479, 237 S.E.2d 900, 903 (1977) 
(citing Perry v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 283, 156 S.E.2d 566 
(1967)).  Such a choice within the relevant statutory range 
raises no Apprendi Sixth Amendment issue because no additional 
 
 
18
fact-finding is made by the sentencing judge under Code § 19.2-
295.2 or required in addition to those facts found or implied by 
the jury’s verdict.  This conclusion is securely grounded in the 
Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Booker that “when a trial judge 
exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within a 
defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury 
determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant.”  543 
U.S. at 233; accord Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. at 866. 
Lastly, Alston argues that even if the circuit court was 
within its authority to impose the term of postrelease 
supervision under Apprendi, the circuit court nonetheless acted 
to take that sentence out of any constitutional safe harbor by 
making factual findings independent of the jury, as the basis 
for its decision to fix a term of postrelease supervision at 
three years instead of a lesser term.  This argument is without 
merit and has no basis in the record. 
Contrary to Alston’s contention, the circuit court 
specifically declined to accept Alston’s request to state 
findings of fact as the basis for the court’s choice in the 
length of the postrelease term.  In fact, the circuit court 
noted that no fact-finding on its part was required:  “Well I 
don’t think I need to make any other fact finding other than to 
impose  . . . .  I think my discretion is only limited to how 
much.”  Any observations by the circuit court in imposing the 
 
 
19
term of postrelease supervision were remarks of a general 
nature, which were not findings of fact. 
Accordingly, we find no error in the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals that the imposition of a term of postrelease 
supervision under Code § 19.2-295.2 did not violate any rights 
of Alston under the Sixth Amendment.5 
C.  PROCEDURAL DEFAULT 
Alston argues in another assignment of error that the 
duration of the term of postrelease supervision imposed by the 
circuit court was arbitrary, in violation of his due process 
rights, and an abuse of sound judicial discretion.  The Court of 
Appeals found Alston’s due process claim was procedurally 
defaulted, and Alston also separately assigns that determination 
as error.  The Commonwealth contends Alston’s appellate claims 
of arbitrary action and abuse of discretion by the circuit court 
were also defaulted because they were never made in the circuit 
court.  We agree with the Commonwealth. 
                     
5 Alston’s second assignment of error is that Code § 19.2-
295.2 is unconstitutional on its face.  To establish facial 
unconstitutionality, Alston “must establish that no set of 
circumstances exists under which [§ 19.2-295.2] would be valid.”  
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).  As our 
resolution of Alston’s first assignment of error reflects, we 
find no constitutional infirmity in the application of Code 
§ 19.2-295.2 in this case.  Thus, Alston’s contention that the 
section is unconstitutional on its face obviously fails and we 
need comment no further on this assignment of error. 
 
 
20
The rules of this Court limit the consideration of the 
Court of Appeals to those rulings upon which timely objection 
has been made, with the grounds for such objection, and provide 
that “mere statement that the judgment . . . is contrary to the 
law . . . is not sufficient to constitute a question to be ruled 
upon on appeal.”  Rule 5A:18.  Our rules similarly limit the 
consideration of this Court.  Rule 5:25. 
In considering whether or not Alston preserved his due 
process claim, the Court of Appeals noted the transcript of the 
circuit court sentencing hearing.  At that hearing, Alston’s 
counsel told the circuit court that “due process [is] not our 
challenge” to the application of a postrelease term under Code 
§ 19.2-295.2.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that 
Alston’s due process claim on appeal was barred by Rule 5A:18. 
Alston points to no place in the record where his due 
process claim was preserved so as to contradict the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals on this issue.  Neither does Alston plead 
good cause for his failure to assert a due process claim or seek 
application of the ends of justice exception.  Thus, the Court 
of Appeals did not err in holding any due process claim by 
Alston was waived. 
The Commonwealth also asserts that Alston’s arbitrary 
action and abuse of discretion arguments are actually a thinly 
veiled attempt to raise his defaulted due process claim and that 
 
 
21
neither of those claims was raised in the circuit court.  Again, 
we agree with the Commonwealth.  The record does not reflect 
that Alston ever argued to the circuit court that imposition of 
the term of postrelease supervision was either arbitrary or an 
abuse of discretion.  Accordingly, this claim is defaulted under 
Rule 5:25 and will not be considered. 
D.  LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
Finally, Alston argues that the application of Code § 19.2-
295.2 by the circuit court and the Court of Appeals contravened 
the General Assembly’s intent in enacting that statute. 
“While in the construction of statutes the constant 
endeavor of the courts is to ascertain and give effect to the 
intention of the legislature, that intention must be gathered 
from the words used . . . .  Where the legislature has used 
words of a plain and definite import the courts cannot put upon 
them a construction which amounts to holding the legislature did 
not mean what it has actually expressed.”  Chase v. 
DaimlerChrysler Corp., 266 Va. 544, 547-48, 587 S.E.2d 521, 522 
(2003).  “Therefore, when the language of an enactment is free 
from ambiguity . . . we take the words as written to determine 
their meaning.”  Brown v. Lukhard, 229 Va. 316, 321, 330 S.E.2d 
84, 87 (1985). 
As noted above, Code § 19.2-295.2 provides, in relevant 
part, that “[a]t the time the court imposes sentence upon a 
 
 
22
conviction for any felony offense . . . the court . . . shall, 
in addition to any other punishment imposed . . . impose a term 
of postrelease supervision of not less than six months nor more 
than three years.”  Code § 19.2-295.2(A) (emphasis added).  
Accordingly, the statute clearly required that Alston’s term of 
postrelease supervision be in addition to his term of active 
incarceration.  Alston’s argument that “[t]here is no clear 
language requiring that the postrelease term be in addition to 
the full sentence” is contradicted by the plain language of Code 
§ 19.2-295.2:  he begs of us a construction of the statute that 
the words “in addition to any other punishment” cannot bear.  
Alston’s argument on his final assignment of error is thus 
without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals. 
Affirmed.