Case Title: State v. McNeely

Citation: 

Docket Number: S41941

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2000-08-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  August 3, 2000
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STATE OF OREGON,
	Respondent,
	v.
MICHAEL JAMES McNEELY,
	Appellant.
(CC 93-05-33276; SC S41941)

	On automatic and direct review of the judgment of conviction
and sentence of death imposed by the Multnomah County Circuit
Court.
	Ellen Rosenblum, Judge.
	Argued and submitted March 8, 2000.
	Eric Johansen, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the
cause for appellant.  David E. Groom, State Public Defender,
Anthony Bornstein, Deputy Public Defender, and Stephen J.
Williams, Deputy Public Defender, filed the brief for appellant.
	Robert B. Rocklin, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause for respondent.  With him on the brief were Hardy
Myers, Attorney General, Michael D. Reynolds, Solicitor General,
and Kathleen Cegla, Assistant Attorney General.
	Before, Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, Leeson, and Riggs, Justices.*
	VAN HOOMISSEN, J.
	The judgment of conviction and sentence of death are
affirmed.
	*Kulongoski, J., did not participate in the consideration or
decision of this case.
		VAN HOOMISSEN, J. 
		This criminal case is before the court on automatic and
direct review of defendant's conviction for aggravated murder and
sentence of death.  Former ORS 163.150(1)(g) (1997), repealed by
Or Laws 1999, ch 1055, § 1. (1)  For the reasons that follow, we
affirm the judgment of conviction and the sentence of death.
		The victim in this case disappeared from Portland in
March 1993.  In May 1993, her body was discovered in a dumpster. 
An autopsy indicated that she had died of strangulation. 
Defendant was convicted of seven counts of aggravated murder and
12 other felonies in connection with her death. (2)  After the jury
answered Oregon's four death-penalty sentencing-phase questions
in the affirmative, ORS 163.150(1)(b), the trial court sentenced
defendant to death.  On review, defendant makes 18 assignments of
error.  Defendant seeks reversal of his conviction.  In the
alternative, he requests that this court vacate his death
sentence. 
GUILT PHASE

		Defendant makes six assignments of error relating to
the guilt phase of his trial, only two of which warrant
discussion.
		Defendant contends that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to suppress the testimony of Thompson, another
jail inmate.  While defendant was in jail, another inmate
introduced defendant to Thompson.  Thompson spoke with defendant
several times over a three- or four-day period.  During some of
those conversations, defendant discussed the facts of this case. 
A few days after those conversations took place, Thompson
contacted the police and disclosed incriminating statements that
defendant had made to him about the victim's death.  
		At trial, defendant objected to Thompson's testimony. 
Defendant's theory was that Thompson was acting as a state-controlled informant when he obtained defendant's incriminating
admissions.  Defendant argued that, because Thompson was
attempting to gain a benefit from the state by providing
information to the police, Thompson automatically became a "state
agent" for purposes of the state and federal constitutions. 
		In denying defendant's motion to suppress Thompson's
testimony, the trial court in this case stated:
	"Well, first of all, I'm going to deny the motion and
find that Mr. Thompson was acting as a private citizen
on his own initiative and for his own reasons in
contacting or in speaking with * * * [defendant], I
don't think he actually contacted [defendant] based on
the evidence, but once he was contacted by [defendant]
he was not being directed or even indirectly was he
involved with the police in any way, any police agency
in either initiating, planning, controlling or
supporting his activities.  So, I find that the
exclusionary rule simply doesn't apply in this case.
		"As for these issues of his ultimately perhaps
receiving some benefit, I would agree with the State's
position that the fact that he may have received a
benefit ultimately as a result of this does not then
make him an agent of the State at the outset of the
contacts. * * *
		"Obviously anybody who, in the course of their
time in prison, who happens to come upon some evidence,
as he apparently did, someone willing to talk to him
who was charged with a serious crime, Mr. Thompson used
his brain here and realized that maybe this could
assist him as well as what he had undertaken in
connection with that agreement, and apparently it may
have benefitted him.  But that does not then result in
his being termed an agent of the State at the time that
he first made the contact.  There is simply no evidence
whatsoever to indicate that anybody asked him to do
this."
		Defendant's assignment of error presents the question
whether his state or federal constitutional rights to remain
silent and to counsel were violated. (3) 
		In State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 13, 791 P2d 836 (1990),
this court adopted the rule that, if the police are involved to a
sufficient extent in initiating, planning, controlling, or
supporting an informant's activities, then the exclusionary rule
applies.  Defendant points to no evidence in the record
demonstrating that anyone from the state initiated, planned,
controlled, or supported Thompson's activities in obtaining
information from defendant about this case.  We hold that the
trial court properly refused to suppress Thompson's testimony. (4) 
		Defendant contends, in the alternative, that the trial
court erred in denying his motion to exclude Thompson's
testimony, because Thompson was unable to identify defendant at
trial as the man with whom he had spoken in jail.  At a pretrial
hearing, Thompson was unable to identify defendant.  At trial,
Thompson again stated that he did not recognize defendant. 
Defendant objected, arguing that because Thompson was unable to
identify defendant, his testimony was irrelevant.
		The trial court ruled:
		"Okay. Well, I'm going to allow Mr. Thompson to
testify.  I have heard his testimony at the pretrial
hearing and I'm satisfied that although he was not able
to specifically identify the -- [defendant] in the
courtroom, there is ample evidence that his appearance
is different now, and based upon the evidence that he
did -- or testimony that he did give at the time, I
believe that it should go to the weight and not the
admissibility of his testimony.  So, I'll allow him to
testify." 
		On review, defendant argues that Thompson's testimony
was irrelevant and should have been excluded at trial.  The state
responds that Thompson's testimony was "conditionally relevant,"
citing OEC 104, (5) and, thus, was properly admitted.
		Defendant's assignment of error presents a question of
conditional relevancy.  We review to determine whether there was
sufficient evidence for the trial court to have submitted the
issue to the jury.  See State v. Carlson, 311 Or 201, 208-11, 808
P2d 1002 (1991) (discussing OEC 104).  We view the record as
consistent with the trial court's ruling, accepting reasonable
inferences and reasonable credibility choices that the trial
judge could have made.  Id. at 214.  
		When dealing with a matter of conditional relevancy
under OEC 104(2), the judge determines whether the foundation
evidence is sufficient for the jury reasonably to find that the
condition on which relevance depends has been fulfilled. 
Carlson, 311 Or at 209.  If so, the evidence is admitted; if not,
the evidence is not admitted.  Id.  After the judge decides that
the foundation evidence is sufficient for the jury reasonably to
find the contested fact under OEC 104(2), either party may
introduce evidence before the jury that is relevant to the weight
and credibility of the evidence.  Id. at 210.
		At trial, Thompson testified that he had spoken with a
man in jail who had admitted choking and killing the victim.  If
defendant were that man, then Thompson's testimony was relevant
evidence. (6)  There also was evidence at trial that Thompson and
defendant had met in jail in 1993.  Thompson testified:
		"I spoke to somebody that represented himself as
being [defendant] or was represented by somebody else
as being [defendant]."
Thompson related several incriminating conversations that he had
had with that man.  Moreover, there also was evidence that
defendant had gained 25 pounds and had shaved off his moustache
since the time when he and Thompson were in jail together. 
		Despite Thompson's inability to identify defendant at
trial, the trial court determined that a reasonable juror could
find that defendant was the person with whom Thompson had spoken
in jail.  The record supports that conclusion.  We agree with the
trial court.  Thompson's inability to identify defendant at trial
went to the weight the jury might give to his testimony, not to
its admissibility.  It follows that the trial court did not err
in leaving the matter to the jury.
		Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in
denying his motions for a mistrial during the guilt phase of his
trial.  Defendant moved for a mistrial both during and after the
prosecution's closing argument.  He advanced several grounds for
those motions, only one of which warrants discussion.  We review
the trial court's ruling for an abuse of discretion.  State v.
Larson, 325 Or 15, 22, 933 P2d 958 (1997).   
		During closing argument, the prosecutor argued:    
		"Who is this man over here?  Who is this man here? 
You've gotten to know him for two-and-a-half weeks. 
Don't lose sight of [the victim] because you've seen a
living, breathing human body over here.  That might
invoke some sympathy on your part.
		"Who is that man over there?  If we could
resurrect [the victim] for you maybe she could tell
you.  If we could do that." 
Defense counsel objected to the state's argument and moved for a
mistrial, citing State v. Leland, 190 Or 598, 227 P2d 785 (1951),
aff'd sub nom Leland v. Oregon, 343 US 790, 72 S Ct 1002, 96 L Ed
1302 (1952). (7)  The trial court denied defendant's motion.  
		Defendant asserts that the following passage from
Leland, 190 Or at 642, is relevant here: 
	"The argument [reference to the murdered victim as the
state's 'silent witness'] was not particularly
inflammatory, but it might have become so had it
continued along the same lines, and we think the court
did well to put a prompt stop to it.  The ruling had
the effect of forestalling any prejudice that might
otherwise have resulted.  There was no abuse of
discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial." 
Defendant argues that, unlike in Leland, "the prosecutor here was
allowed to continue with this inflammatory theme."
		We agree with the state that the prosecutor did not
violate defendant's rights "by pointing out the obvious to the
jury."  Moreover, our reading of the record does not support
defendant's assertion that the prosecutor continued with this
theme, even assuming that it was such.  Following defendant's
objection, the prosecutor mentioned the victim only once more,
telling the jurors, "Don't for a moment forget about [the
victim]."  The trial judge, who was in the best position to
assess the impact of the prosecutor's comment on the jury,
expressly concluded that it was not impermissibly prejudicial to
defendant.  We will not disturb that conclusion.  We hold that
the trial court did not err.
PENALTY PHASE

		Defendant makes twelve assignments of error regarding
the penalty phase of his trial.  Only three warrant discussion.
		Defendant contends that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for a mistrial during the state's closing
argument in the penalty phase.  The prosecutor told the jury:
		"But let's talk a little bit about the things that
they said about why [defendant] is the way that he is
today.  Excuses after excuses after excuses were
brought before you during the testimony of these
people.  And this relates not to the questions that you
have here but it relates to the word 'provocation,' and
it relates to the defendant not taking responsibility
for his actions and it relates generally to his
inability to take responsibility --
		"* * * * *
		"Think back to Dr. McGovern's testing of the
defendant.  Think back to that.  Did he take
responsibility for his thefts?  Sometimes.  At least
according to Dr. McGovern, even though Dr. McGovern's
colleague did not get that indication.  
		"Did he take responsibility for committing an act
of prostitution?  No.  Did he take responsibility for
the fact that he beat his prior lovers?  Never.  How
was it that [defendant] referred to his prior
relationship with these women and how was it that it
was characterized by Dr. McGovern?  Oh, he had problems
with the people he was involved with.  They had
misunderstandings.  They had problems.  But nobody,
nobody who took the stand for the defendant in the last
day-and-a-half has come up here and admitted to you
that the defendant has a problem."
Defendant moved for a mistrial, claiming that the prosecutor's
remarks were an impermissible comment on defendant's decision not
to testify.  The trial court denied defendant's motion,
explaining that the prosecutor's comment "was appropriate given
Dr. McGovern's testimony[.]"  Defendant renews that argument
here.  The state responds that no reasonable juror would have
interpreted the prosecutor's remarks to be such a comment.  We
review the trial court's ruling for an abuse of discretion. 
Larson, 325 Or at 22.
		The prosecutor's comment concerned defendant's refusal
to take responsibility for his actions in the past.  A discussion
of a capital defendant's failure to take responsibility for his
conduct in the past is related to the issue of that defendant's
future dangerousness, which is the subject of the second penalty-
phase question.  ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B).  Under the circumstances,
the trial court was entitled to conclude that a reasonable juror 
would have understood that he or she was being asked by the
prosecutor to conclude that defendant, whom the state had argued
had a history of unwillingness to accept responsibility for his
conduct, was likely to be dangerous in the future.  We hold that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant
a mistrial.
		Defendant contends that the trial court erred in
denying his motion to limit the prosecutor's rebuttal argument in
the penalty phase.  The trial court submitted four questions to
the jury.  ORS 163.150(1)(b).  The fourth question asked the jury "[w]hether the defendant should receive a death sentence."  ORS
163.150(1)(b)(D).  Defendant timely moved for an order precluding
the state from presenting any argument "that relates to or
touches on the fourth question."  Relying on ORS 163.150,
defendant argued:  
	"[T]he state should be precluded, because there is no
burden of proof on the fourth question, of [sic]
presenting evidence either in rebuttal or argument,
that relates to or touches on that fourth question. 
That fourth question is set out as a defendant's
question * * *."  
The trial court concluded that the statute allows the state to
present argument on the fourth question and denied defendant's
motion.
		Defendant argues that the trial court's ruling
permitting the state to present argument on the fourth question
violated his rights under ORS 163.150.  He relies primarily on
State v. Wagner, 309 Or 5, 18, 786 P2d 93 (1990):
	"The state must prove each of the first three statutory
issues submitted beyond a reasonable doubt; but that
requirement does not apply to the fourth question.  ORS
163.150(1)(d)(1989).  There is no burden of proof on
the fourth question because it does not present an
issue subject to proof in the traditional sense, rather
it frames a discretionary determination for the jury."
Defendant asserts that, absent a burden of proof, the state has
no right to present any argument on the fourth question.  
		Whether ORS 163.150(1) prohibits the state from
presenting rebuttal argument is a question of statutory
interpretation.  In interpreting a statute, the court's task is
to discern the intent of the legislature.  ORS 174.020; PGE v.
Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143
(1993).  At the first level of our analysis we examine both the
text and context of the statute.  The text of the statute is the
best evidence of the legislature's intent.  Id.  If the
legislature's intent is clear from the inquiry into text and
context, further inquiry is unnecessary.  Id. at 611.
		The answer to defendant's argument is clear.  The text
of ORS 163.150(1)(a) unambiguously permits the state to argue for
a sentence of death.  That paragraph provides, in part: 
	"The state and the defendant or the counsel of the
defendant shall be permitted to present arguments for
or against a sentence of death and for or against a
sentence of life imprisonment with or without the
possibility of release or parole."  
See also State v. Guzek, 322 Or 245, 262, 906 P2d 272 (1995),
(state and defense may make arguments for and against death
penalty under each question, citing ORS 163.150(1)(a) (1985)).		Defendant argues, in the alternative, that, even if the
state may present arguments related to the fourth question in its
initial argument, it may not present rebuttal argument on the
fourth question, because it does not bear the burden of proof on
that question.  The state responds that, as the plaintiff in a
criminal case, it commences and concludes the arguments to the
jury during both the guilt phase and the penalty phase of the
trial.  Defendant replies, however, that the Stevens court
mentioned in dictum that a plaintiff is entitled to rebuttal
because the plaintiff bears the burden of proof.  Id. at 148. 
From that statement, defendant posits that, because the state has
no burden of proof on the fourth question, ORCP 58 B(4) is
inapplicable here.  ORCP 58 B(4) provides in part: 
		"When the evidence is concluded, * * * the
plaintiff shall commence and conclude the argument to
the jury[.]"
ORS 136.330(1) makes ORCP 58 B applicable to criminal trials.  
See State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 147-48, 806 P2d 92 (1991) 
(penalty and guilt phases are governed by ORCP 58 B(4)).
		Assuming, arguendo, that the rule allowing a plaintiff
the opportunity for rebuttal arose because a plaintiff bears the
burden of proof, that does not change or limit the text of ORCP
58 B(4).  When the legislature adopted that rule, it did not
limit a plaintiff's right to rebuttal to those issues on which
the plaintiff bore the burden of proof.  We agree with the state
that ORCP 58 B(4) authorizes the state to present rebuttal
argument on any penalty phase matter raised by a defendant's
argument.  We conclude that, absent some limit, statutory or
constitutional, on ORCP 58 (B)(4) -- and defendant identifies
none here -- the state may address the fourth question in its
rebuttal closing argument.  Accordingly, we hold that the trial
court did not err in denying defendant's motion to limit the
prosecutor's penalty phase rebuttal argument on the fourth
question. 
		Defendant also contends, without analysis or
elaboration, that the trial court's ruling violated his Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a reliable sentencing hearing
and due process.  Defendant's summary reference to the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments is insufficient to present any specific
federal constitutional argument to this court and, accordingly,
we decline to address the issue.  See State v. Barone, 329 Or
210, 986 P2d 5 (1999), citing State v. Montez, 309 Or 564, 604
789 P2d 1352 (1990) (declining to address undeveloped claim of
constitutional error).
		Finally, defendant contends that the trial court erred
in failing to declare the death penalty unconstitutional. 
Defendant correctly recognizes that this court has considered and
rejected in earlier cases all the state and federal
constitutional grounds on which he relies for this assignment of
error.  The trial court did not err in failing to declare the
death penalty unconstitutional.
		We have considered all of defendant's assignments of
error and every argument made in support thereof.  Any assignment
or argument not discussed in this opinion has been considered
previously by this court and resolved against defendant, is not
well taken, or is unpreserved.  An extended discussion of those
assignments and arguments would not benefit the bench or bar.
		The judgment of conviction and sentence of death are
affirmed.
1. 	Judgments of conviction and sentences of death now are
subject to automatic review in this court under ORS 138.012(1). 
In enacting ORS 138.012(1), the legislature renumbered the
statute that described the court's reviewing authority in death
penalty cases, but made no substantive change to that authority. 
That statutory change does not affect the analysis or disposition
of this case.

2. 	Defendant also was convicted of murder, manslaughter,
kidnapping (two counts), rape, attempted rape, sodomy (two
counts), attempted sodomy, abuse of a corpse (two counts), and
unauthorized use of a vehicle.

3. 	Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution,
provides in part:
		"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
have the right * * * to be heard by himself and
counsel[.]"
Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution, provides in
part:
		"No person shall be * * * compelled in any
criminal prosecution to testify against himself."
	The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides in part:
		"No person * * * shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself[.]"
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in
part:
		"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right * * * to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence."
The quoted portions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments are
applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.  Malloy v. Hogan, 378 US 1, 6, 84 S Ct
1489, 12 L Ed 2d 653 (1964) (Fifth Amendment); Pointer v. Texas,
380 US 400, 403, 85 S Ct 1065, 13 L Ed 2d 923 (1965) (Sixth
Amendment).

4. 	Defendant makes no argument, and we are aware of none,
suggesting that the result would be different under the Fifth or 
Sixth Amendments.  See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 US 436, 459, 106 S
Ct 2616, 91 L Ed 2d 364 (1986) (defendant must demonstrate that
police took some action, beyond merely listening to informant,
that was designed to elicit incriminating remarks). 

5. 	OEC 104 provides in part:
		"(1)  Preliminary questions concerning the
qualification of a person to be a witness, the
existence of a privilege or the admissibility of
evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to
the provisions of subsection (2) of this section.  In
making its determination the court is not bound by the
rules of evidence except those with respect to
privileges.
		"(2)  When the relevancy of evidence depends upon
the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall
admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of
evidence sufficient to support a finding of the
fulfillment of the condition."
Conditional relevancy means a situation where one fact is
relevant only if another fact is proven.  Laird C. Kirkpatrick,
Oregon Evidence 31 (2d ed 1989 & supp 1999).

6. 	Under OEC 401, "relevant evidence" is
		"evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence."
The standard contained in OEC 401 is a very low threshold that
evidence must cross to be considered relevant.  State v. Stevens,
319 Or 573, 584, 879 P2d 162 (1994).

7. 	 Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution
provides in part:  "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall have the right to * * * meet the witnesses face to face[.]" 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in
part:  "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right * * * to be confronted with the witnesses against him[.]"