Case Title: ABRAHAM v. GREAT WESTERN ENERGY, LLC.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 03-226

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2004-11-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
ABRAHAM v. GREAT WESTERN ENERGY, LLC.2004 WY 145101 P.3d 446Case Number: 03-226Decided: 11/24/2004Notice:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publicaiton in the permanent volume.
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2004

                                                                                                
   

CRAIG 
ABRAHAM and KIM ABRAHAM,

husband 
and wife, individually, and on  
behalf of

their 
minor children, ETHAN ABRAHAM,

JESSICA 
ABRAHAM, SHELDON ABRAHAM,

and 
BRANDEN ABRAHAM; and GARY A. BARNEY,

as 
Bankruptcy Trustee for Craig Abraham and

Kim 
Abraham

Appellants(Plaintiffs) ,

 
 

v.

 

GREAT 
WESTERN ENERGY, LLC, a Montana

corporation, 
d/b/a WYO.L.P. GAS; and BIG HORN

CO-OPERATIVE 
MARKETING ASSOCIATION,

a 
Wyoming corporation,

Appellees(Defendants) .

 
 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Big Horn County

The Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge (Retired)

 
 
    

Representing Appellants:
 

William L. Simpson of Simpson, Kepler & Edwards, LLC, 
Cody, Wyoming, and Diane Vaksdal Smith of Burg, Simpson, Eldredge, Hersh and 
Jardine, P.C., Cody, Wyoming.  Argument by Ms. Smith.

 

Representing Appellees:

John V. McCoy and Thomas C. Hofbauer of McCoy & 
Hofbauer, Waukesha, Wisconsin, and Bradley D. Bonner of Bonner & Stinson, 
P.C., Powell, Wyoming, for appellee Great Western Energy, LLC; Scott McColloch 
of McColloch & Burns, Greybull, Wyoming, and Thomas W. Pahl, David M. 
Dahlmeier, and Jessica B. Rivas of Foley & Mansfield, PLLP, Minneapolis, 
Minnesota, for appellee Big Horn Co-Operative Marketing Association.  Argument by 
Messers. Dahlmeier and McCoy.

 

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Craig Abraham was 
severely burned and permanently injured in a propane gas flash fire1 at his home in Otto, Wyoming, on July 29, 
2000.  On 
November 29, 2001, a complaint was filed in the district court naming Craig, as 
well as his wife Kim Abraham and their four children, as plaintiffs 
(collectively the Abrahams).2  In their complaint, the Abrahams asserted 
that they ran out of propane gas (which was used to run two hot water heaters 
and a furnace) in late July of 2000.  Kim Abraham called Great Western Energy, LLC 
(GWE)3 and asked it to deliver 50 gallons of 
propane.  Craig 
was unable to get the hot water heater to light after that delivery was made, 
and so he ordered a second delivery of propane from Big Horn Co-Operative 
Marketing Association (Big Horn).  He called Big Horn for the second delivery 
because it was the only supplier open on Saturday.  Following the 
second delivery, Craig made a second attempt to light the hot water heaters and 
that effort eventuated in the flash fire.

 

[¶2]      The Abrahams averred 
that GWE and Big Horn were negligent because they "failed to provide adequately 
odorized gas, preventing Craig Abraham from being alerted to the presence of 
propane when he was attempting to light the pilot light.  Furthermore, [both 
GWE and Big Horn] failed to follow proper off-loading procedures, violated 
industry safety standards, and failed to perform the necessary inspections to 
ascertain whether the gas system was safe."  In addition, they claimed that because of the 
inherently dangerous nature of propane gas, GWE and Big Horn owed a duty to 
ensure that their product was safely delivered and used in a safe manner.  The Abrahams' 
complaint included claims for negligence, strict liability (defective product), 
and willful and wanton misconduct.  Big Horn answered the complaint on February 
28, 2002, denying any negligence on its part and raising numerous affirmative 
defenses, including spoliation (destruction) of evidence.  GWE answered on 
August 1, 2002, denying any negligence on its part and also raising numerous 
defenses, including spoliation of evidence ("certain evidence may have been 
tampered with, destroyed, lost and/or undergone destructive testing to [its] 
prejudice.").

 

[¶3]      On June 4, 2003, Big 
Horn filed a motion for summary judgment that ran to almost 400 pages.  The central issue 
in that motion was that it was entitled to summary judgment because of 
spoliation of evidence.  On June 30, 2003, GWE filed a very similar 
motion for summary judgment centered on the spoliation of evidence 
issue.

 

[¶4]      The Abrahams opposed 
both motions by papers filed on June 25, 2003, and July 16, 2003, 
respectively.  
In the later document, the Abrahams asked for a continuance and asserted 
that the deadline for discovery was August 15, 2003, but that the hearing on the 
motions for summary judgment was scheduled for July 28, 2003.  The Abrahams 
contended this additional time was important in order to respond to the 
affidavit of an expert witness submitted by Big Horn.

 

[¶5]      A decision letter 
granting the motions for summary judgment was filed of record on August 5, 2003, 
and an order memorializing the decision letter was entered on September 3, 
2003.  The 
effect of the summary judgment order was that the Abrahams' complaint was 
dismissed with prejudice.  It is from that order that this appeal is 
taken, as well as the district court's denial of the Abrahams' motion for 
continuance, which was incorporated into the summary judgment order.

 

[¶6]      The Abrahams 
articulate these issues:

 

            
1.  Whether denial of [the Abrahams'] Rule 56(f) motion for a 
continuance to substantively respond to pending motions for summary judgment 
constitutes an abuse of discretion and reversible error?

            
2.  Whether the trial court should have denied the motions for 
summary judgment because material facts remained in dispute concerning [the 
Abraham's] causes of action as well as the allegations of spoliation of 
evidence?

            
3.  Whether dismissal of [the Abrahams'] entire case, without 
proof of intentional spoliation and without consideration of the Abrahams' 
claims unrelated to the alleged spoliated evidence, is reversible 
error?

 

Big Horn responds with this statement of the 
issues:

 

I.          
Dismissal of all claims is appropriate where a litigant, intentionally or 
negligently, disposes of crucial evidence involved in an accident before the 
adversary has an opportunity to inspect the accident scene.  Here, before [Big 
Horn] was notified of the propane fire, unidentified persons entered the 
Abrahams' residence with [their] knowledge and destroyed critical physical 
evidence from the flash fire.  Did the district court err in granting [Big 
Horn's] summary judgment motion in light of the complete destruction or 
alteration of the physical evidence that precluded [the Abrahams] from proving 
their allegations against [Big Horn]?

II.          
Wyoming law recognizes that "the whole purpose of the procedural 
technique of a summary judgment would be defeated if cases could be forced to 
trial by the mere assertion that a genuine issue of material fact exists."  Here, [the 
Abrahams] failed to argue below that there were material facts that defeated 
summary judgment and no amount of additional discovery will change the 
undisputed facts which the district court relied upon in dismissing [the 
Abrahams'] claims.  
Did the district court err in Granting [Big Horn's] summary judgment 
motion where [the Abrahams] failed to point to evidence raising disputed issues 
of material fact and where the undisputed facts in the record demonstrated that 
loss of physical evidence from the fire prevented [them] from proving their 
claims against [Big Horn]?

 
III.         A 
district court has the discretion to order a continuance only where a party 
demonstrates that more time is needed for discovery in order for that party to 
respond to a summary judgment motion.  Here, [the Abrahams] sought a continuance to 
respond to [GWE's] motion for summary judgment less than two weeks before the 
oral argument, claiming they needed more time for discovery after a two-year 
opportunity to conduct discovery.  No such similar request for a continuance was 
made as to [Big Horn].  Did the district court here abuse its 
discretion by denying [the Abrahams'] motion for a continuance where [they] had 
two years to conduct discovery and where no amount of additional discovery was 
going to change the undisputed facts in the record?

 

GWE presents this statement of the issues:

 

            
1.  Whether [the Abrahams] lack standing to pursue this 
appeal;

            
2.  Whether the district court properly granted summary 
judgment because there were no remaining issues of material fact and [GWE was] 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law;

            
3.  Whether the district court properly dismissed [the 
Abrahams'] case because, due to permanent alteration of the evidence, [their] 
case rests only on speculation and [GWE] is irreparably prejudiced;

            
4.  Whether the district court acted within its discretion when 
it denied [the Abrahams'] Rule 56(f) motion for a continuance because adequate 
time was afforded and any further discovery would have been fruitless; and

            
5.  Whether [the Abrahams] are judicially estopped from 
pursuing this appeal.

 

In their reply brief, the Abrahams contend GWE and Big Horn 
raised several new issues that they articulate as follows:

 

A.  [GWE] argues that the [Abrahams] lack 
standing to pursue this appeal]

B.  [GWE] argues that [the Abrahams] are 
judicially estopped from bringing this appeal.

C.  [GWE] argues that the trial court did not 
dismiss the Abrahams' claims as a sanction for spoliation of the evidence.

D.  [GWE and Big Horn] argue that Wyoming law 
recognizes spoliation of evidence and would permit the sanction of dismissal, 
based on authorities not from Wyoming.

E.  [GWE and Big Horn] argue that the Abrahams 
failed to timely pursue discovery, and the denial of the Rule 56(f) motion for 
continuance was proper because further discovery would have been 
futile.

 

[¶7]      Since this case was 
disposed of pursuant to GWE's and Big Horn's motions for summary judgment, the 
applicable standard of review requires this Court to view the evidence in a 
light most favorable to the Abrahams, to disregard the evidence favorable to GWE 
and Big Horn, and to embrace any and all inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence in favor of the Abrahams.  Therefore, we will confine our recitation of 
the facts to that standard.  The Abrahams moved into the residence where 
the flash fire occurred in late May of 2000.4  At the time they 
moved into the five-bedroom house, the pilot for the furnace was not lit because 
it was summer, but the landlord lit the pilots for the water heaters.  It was the 
Abrahams' responsibility to provide propane for their use.  On Friday, July 28, 
2000, Kim Abraham discovered that there was no hot water for the residence.  After moving into 
the house, the Abrahams had not taken steps to get on a regular delivery route 
for propane.  
Kim checked the gauge on the propane tank and found it was empty.  She contacted her 
husband who was in Laramie and, because money was tight, ordered a delivery of 
only 50 gallons (for a 1,000 gallon tank) from GWE.

 

[¶8]      Craig Abraham 
returned to Otto during the night of July 28-29, 2000.  The next morning he 
tried to light the water heaters.  He had prior experience lighting pilot flames 
and had worked around propane as a farmer, but had not "bled" propane gas lines 
before.  After 
many attempts, he could not get either pilot lit and gave up in 
disgust.

 

[¶9]      He called Big Horn to 
get a second delivery of another 50 gallons of propane and then left home to go 
to his office for a couple of hours.  The second order for gas was delivered in his 
absence.  Kim 
was home when the gas was delivered, and the delivery man told Kim they would 
need to "bleed" the gas lines in order to get the water heaters to light.  Kim related that 
neither delivery man offered to light the pilot flames.5  Craig had hoped the 
delivery man would have lit the pilots, but since he had not, Craig began a 
second attempt to light them.  Craig checked the tank and could tell that 
additional propane had been added to the tank.  He then began the process of bleeding the gas 
lines and lighting the pilots and, in the course of that process, completely 
disconnected the gas lines from the water heaters in order to "bleed" them and 
get propane flowing to the system.  During this process, Craig never smelled the 
odor of propane, although he had his nose "right in it."  He heard a hissing 
noise, but did not think it was gas because he smelled no odor of gas  
"[o]therwise I would have never struck a match."  Craig had the in-line "on/off" valve in the 
"off" position and was going to attempt to turn that valve slightly into the 
"on" position and see if gas was coming through by striking a match at the tip 
of the gas line.  
When he did strike a match, the flash fire occurred.

 

[¶10]   Craig was seriously burned in the flash 
fire.  He was 
taken to the hospital in Powell and later flown to a hospital burn unit in Salt 
Lake City, where he remained in treatment for three weeks.  Kim accompanied her 
husband to Salt Lake City, and relatives cared for the children in their 
absence.  Kim 
did not know in what condition the house was, so she had family members, the 
landlord, and a plumber who lived nearby, check the house to make sure 
everything was all right.  In that process all gas lines were 
reconnected and pilot flames were lit so that the gas system was in operating 
order.  While 
the Abrahams were in Salt Lake City, anonymous donor(s) put 800 gallons of 
propane in the Abrahams' propane tank.  That supply of gas lasted until December of 
2000.  At that 
time, the Abrahams again ran out of gas and when the propane tank was refilled, 
that supplier (neither GWE or Big Horn was involved) required a system check 
before refilling the propane tank because of the "out of gas" condition.  When that delivery 
was made, a regulator on the Abrahams' propane tank was replaced with a new 
model of regulator.  
The old regulator was left on the propane tank but was eventually 
discarded by the Abrahams' landlord.

 

[¶11]   The Abrahams offered an affidavit from 
an expert witness, Robert C. Stubbs (a consulting analytic chemist), in support 
of their opposition to the motions for summary judgment.  In pertinent part 
it related:

 

            
2.  One of the dangers of a propane tank running out of gas is 
that air can enter the line and tank unless the valves are turned off.  After reviewing the 
facts of this case it is my understanding that the valves were not turned 
off.

            
3.  After [GWE] delivered 50 gallons of gas on Friday July 28, 
2000, Mr. Abraham unsuccessfully attempted to light the pilot the next 
morning.  This 
inability to light the pilot was caused by air that had entered the line and 
tank.

            
4.  Mr. Abraham never smelled gas while bleeding the line in 
attempting to light the pilot the morning of July 29, 2000.  The reason he never 
smelled gas was because air had gotten into the line.

            
5.  It is a well established fact that when air gets into a 
line it can cause oxidation, which oxidation interacts with the chemical added 
to the gas, ethyl mercaptan, which gives it its distinctive odor.  This chemical is 
added deliberately to act as a warning of the presence of the gas.  Unfortunately, the 
odorant can be lost or diminished by a variety of methods, including 
oxidation.

            
6.  Even if odorized propane gas is added to a tank, propane 
gas may flow for a period of time while its odorant is being absorbed into 
either the piping or the tank before odorized gas is finally released.  This "lag" period 
in releasing odorized gas is caused by oxidation, which, in turn is caused by 
air entering the system.

            
7.  Air may enter the system due to "tank breathing."  Tank breathing is 
caused when the pressure inside the tank rises or falls due to temperature 
fluctuations in the atmosphere.  The changes in the tank temperature and 
pressure may result in air being drawn into the system due to a temporary 
pressure vacuum.  
This often occurs in out-of-gas situations.

            
8.  The propane industry has known for many years preceding the 
explosion in this case that an out-of-gas situation is extremely dangerous, in 
part because air can infiltrate the lines, cause oxidation, and rob the propane 
of its warning odorant.

            
9.  Every year, thousands of people are injured or killed in 
propane related accidents.

            
10.  The majority of people do not understand that they can be 
standing in propane and not smell it if its odorant chemical has been 
compromised.  
This is what happened in this case.  The reason Mr. Abraham did not smell gas was 
because the odorant had been neutralized by the oxidation due to air getting 
into the system from an open line.

            
11.  Both gas companies violated industry standards in their 
response to Kim Abraham's calls for gas, and but for these violations, Mr. 
Abraham would not have been subject to the explosion.  I understand that 
my expert report will be due by August 15, 2003, if I am called upon to submit 
one, and I will provide my opinions on what specific breaches and violations 
were committed, and the bases for my opinions in that report.

            
12.  Mr. Mahre has stated in his affidavit[6] that the removal of the regulator and 
the reconnection of the gas line to the water heater and lighting of the water 
heater precludes him from testing the system in its post-explosion 
condition.

            
13.  However, Big Horn Co-op should have inspected and tested 
the system when it arrived at the Abraham's residence in accordance with 
industry standards.  
Had Big Horn Co-op done so before the explosion, they would have been 
able to do all the testing they now complain they cannot do and Mr. Abraham 
would not have been involved in the explosion.

            
14.  There is no evidence that any system leakage existed 
anywhere in the system.  I am aware of no evidence that there has been 
a leak in the system found either before of after the explosion.  The only reasonable 
cause of the accident is described by Mr. Abraham attempting to bleed the line, 
with gas robbed of its odorant by oxidation entering the basement, which 
exploded when he struck a match.

            
15.  One would have expected if there was a leak in the system, 
Mr. Abraham would have ignited it when he first attempted to light the pilot 
light.  If 
there had been a leak, one would expect that after the explosion either another 
explosion would have occurred, or some evidence would exist of repairs or other 
incidences, none of which I am aware.

            
16.  Taking a sample of the storage tank before additional 
propane was introduced would only demonstrate whether the gas put into the tank 
was properly odorized, but would not have demonstrated whether the gas flowing 
from the line during Mr. Abraham's bleeding the line retained the odorant, after 
air had infiltrated the system.  Even assuming the gas that was put into the 
tank by Big Horn Co-op was fully and properly odorized, does not mean that the 
same gas after air infiltrated the line retained the necessary smell to alert 
one to its presence.

            
17.  Regarding the regulator, no evidence exists that it would 
have played any role in this incident.  As evidenced by the [V-1] Propane invoice 
dated January 18, 2001, the regulator was eventually removed not because it was 
malfunctioning, but rather because it was "outdated."  Regulators are 
customarily replaced once they have reached a certain age, regardless of the 
working condition.  
Even if the regulator had malfunctioned it would not have resulted in an 
explosion of this nature.  To suggest that this regulator had any 
importance to the cause and origin investigation of this explosion is 
unsustainable.

            
18.  I strongly disagree that Mr. Mahre's independent forensic 
work is or has been impaired by any of the assertions he has set forth in his 
affidavit.

 

[¶12]   When we review a summary judgment, we 
have before us the same materials as did the district court, and we follow the 
same standards which applied to the proceedings below.  The propriety of 
granting a motion for summary judgment depends upon the correctness of the dual 
findings that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  A genuine issue of 
material fact exists when a disputed fact, if proven, would have the effect of 
establishing or refuting an essential element of an asserted cause of action or 
defense.  We, 
of course, examine the record from a vantage point most favorable to that party 
who opposed the motion, affording to that party the benefit of all favorable 
inferences that fairly may be drawn from the record.  If the evidence 
leads to conflicting interpretations or if reasonable minds might differ, 
summary judgment is improper.  That standard of review is refined somewhat 
when applied to a negligence action.  Summary judgment is not favored in a 
negligence action and is, therefore, subject to more exacting scrutiny.  Woodard v. Cook Ford Sales, Inc., 927 P.2d 1168, 1169 
(Wyo.1996).  We 
have, however, affirmed summary judgment in negligence cases where the record 
failed to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.  See Krier v. Safeway Stores 46, Inc., 943 P.2d 405 (Wyo.1997) 
(failure to establish duty); Popejoy v. Steinle, 820 P.2d 545 (Wyo.1991) 
(failure of proof of underlying claim of a joint venture); MacKrell v. Bell H2S Safety, 795 P.2d 776 (Wyo.1990) 
(failure of proof of defendant's duty); DeWald v. 
State, 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo.1986) 
(cause element was pure speculation); and Fiedler v. 
Steger, 713 P.2d 773 (Wyo.1986) 
(failure to establish cause in a medical malpractice action).  See McMackin v. Johnson County Healthcare Center, 2003 WY 91, ¶¶ 8-9, 
73 P.3d 1094, ¶¶ 8-9 
(Wyo. 2003).

 

[¶13]   There are several other matters we will 
discuss as we progress through the issues raised in this appeal.  We will set forth 
the applicable standard of review as we discuss those other issues.

 

[¶14]   We embark upon our discussion by 
briefly addressing whether the Abrahams lack standing to prosecute this appeal 
because it is an asset of their bankruptcy estate.  This issue was 
resolved when this Court issued an order granting the Abrahams' motion to 
substitute the trustee in bankruptcy for the Abrahams.

 

[¶15]   The Abrahams sought a continuance of 
the July 28, 2003 hearing on the motions for summary judgment.7  The record bears 
out that the deadline for completing discovery was August 15, 2003, and the 
parties do not dispute that that date was established by the district court's 
scheduling order.8  In the motion for continuance, the Abrahams 
were very specific in asserting that they needed additional time to respond to 
the other side's expert opinion and to obtain the detailed report which the 
Abrahams' expert was in the process of preparing.  In addition, the Abrahams informed the 
district court that they were still in the process of deposing key witnesses and 
had taken the deposition of GWE's delivery man the day of the hearing on the 
motion for summary judgment (relating to odorization, failure to inspect, and 
failure to warn).  
Several other very important witnesses, all employees of GWE or Big Horn, 
were scheduled to be deposed before the August 15 discovery deadline.  All of these 
proposed discovery materials clearly had a bearing on whether there were genuine 
issues of material fact, and needed to be examined by the Abrahams' expert in 
order to rebut GWE's and Big Horn's assertions with respect to spoliation of 
evidence.  
However, the district court opined in its decision letter that spoliation 
of the evidence relating to the flash fire created a situation that made it 
impossible for further discovery to make any difference in this case.  The district 
court's decision letter is brief and we set it out here:

 

Plaintiffs' complaint asserts two grounds for liability: 
(1) [GWE and Big Horn] failed to provide adequately odorized propane gas so that 
[Craig Abraham] was not alerted to the presence of gas when he was attempting to 
light [the] pilot light and (2) [GWE and Big Horn] failed to perform inspections 
to ascertain whether the gas system was safe.

These contentions cannot be proved by [the Abrahams] nor 
disproved by [GWE and Big Horn] because [the Abrahams] did not preserve the 
essential evidence for inspection by either side.  The allegedly defective propane gas was 
altered by being mixed with new gas deliveries.  The condition of the gas system was 
substantially changed so that it is impossible to determine if it was safe or 
unsafe at the time of the accident.

The evidence available shows that the propane was 
adequately odorized.  
There is testimony that an odor was detected at delivery.[9]  Bills of lading show that the gas was 
odorized.

. . . .

The evidence also demonstrates that there were no leaks in 
the gas system.  
After the first delivery of gas, a number of matches were lit without 
producing any fire.  
The explosion occurred only after Mr. Abraham disconnected the lines and 
struck a match.

Plaintiffs' expert witness surmises that air was introduced 
into the gas line, that this neutralized the odor, and that Mr. Abraham was then 
unable to detect the presence of gas.  The problem is that no expert will ever be 
able to inspect the gas system as it existed at the time of the explosion.  Thus, there is no 
way to determine if air had invaded the lines.  Testimony to the contrary is only 
speculation.

Consequently, [the Abrahams'] motion for continuance is 
denied.  In the 
absence of the physical evidence, expert witnesses can only speculate about what 
might have happened.  
There are no inspections or experiments that can be conducted because the 
evidence no longer exists.

 

As our further discussion will bear out, the district court 
misapprehended the spoliation of evidence rules and engaged in fact finding with 
respect to genuine issues of material fact that were in dispute.  Those factual 
issues must be resolved by a jury.

 

[¶16]   The trial court has broad discretion in 
granting or denying a motion for continuance, and absent a manifest abuse of 
discretion, the reviewing court will not disturb such ruling.  To find an abuse of 
discretion, the refusal must be so arbitrary as to deny appellant due process, 
and the burden rests upon appellant to prove actual prejudice and a violation of 
his rights.  
Upon review we look at the peculiar circumstances of the case and the 
reasons presented to the trial judge at the time of the request.  Byrd v. Mahaffey, 2003 WY 137, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 671, ¶ 7 
(Wyo. 2003).

 

[¶17]   W.R.C.P. 56 (c) and (f) 
provide:

 

(c)  Motion and 
proceedings thereon.  Unless the court otherwise orders, the motion and any 
response and other papers relating thereto shall be served pursuant to Rule 
6(c).  The 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.   A summary 
judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability 
alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.

.

            
(f)  When affidavits are 
unavailable. -- Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the 
motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts 
essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just.

 

[¶18]   W.R.C.P. 6(c)(1) provides:

 

            
(c) Motions and motion practice.

(1) Unless these rules or an order 
of the court establish time limitations other than those contained herein, all 
motions, except (A) motions for enlargement of time, (B) motions made during 
hearing or trial, (C) motions which may be heard ex parte, and (D) motions 
described in subdivisions (3) and (4) below, together 
with supporting affidavits, if any, shall be served at least 10 days before the 
hearing on the motion.  Except as otherwise provided in Rule 59(c), 
or unless the court by order permits service at some other time, a party affected by the motion may serve a response, 
together with affidavits, if any, at least three days prior to the hearing on 
the motion or within 20 days after service of the motion, whichever is 
earlier.  
Unless the court by order permits service at some other time, the moving 
party may serve a reply, if any, at least one day prior to the hearing on the 
motion or within 15 days after service of the response, whichever is 
earlier.  
Unless the court otherwise orders, any party may serve supplemental 
memoranda or rebuttal affidavits at least one day prior to the hearing on the 
motion.  
[Emphasis added.]

 

[¶19]   The combination of these rules 
demonstrates that the district court abused its discretion in these 
circumstances.  
W.R.C.P. 56(c) presupposes that discovery is complete and, ordinarily, 
discovery on the issues which are the subject of the summary judgment motion 
should be allowed to be completed before a motion for summary judgment is 
scheduled, heard, and decided.  By scheduling the hearing on the motions for 
summary judgment before the deadline for discovery had passed and, thus, not 
allowing the Abrahams adequate time to prepare and file any other pertinent 
materials prior to that hearing, they were deprived of the protections to due 
process afforded by the applicable rules of civil procedure.

 

[¶20]   The district court determined that 
spoliation of evidence, which the court attributed to the fault of the Abrahams, 
commanded that GWE's and Big Horn's motions for summary judgment be 
granted.  The 
jurisprudence associated with spoliation is more forgiving than that applied by 
the district court.

 

            
It is well settled that a party's bad-faith withholding, destruction, or 
alteration of a document or other physical evidence relevant to proof of an 
issue at trial gives rise to a presumption or inference that the evidence would 
have been unfavorable to the party responsible for its nonproduction, 
destruction, or alteration.  "In essence, the inference is akin to an 
admission by conduct of the weakness of one's own case."  This adverse 
inference has both an evidentiary and a punitive rationale.  The evidentiary 
rationale derives from the common sense observation that a party who has notice 
that a document or other object is relevant to litigation and who proceeds to 
destroy it is more likely to have been threatened by it than is a party in the 
same position who does not destroy the document.  Moreover, that the jury's attention will be 
called to the inference presumably deters parties from destroying relevant 
evidence before it can be introduced at trial.  Indeed, scholars have argued that the 
inference should apply as well to an attorney's pretrial discovery 
misconduct.

            
Thus, for example, in a negligence action, where a party demonstrates 
that evidence was concealed or destroyed in bad faith (either deliberately or 
with reckless disregard for its relevance), that fact should be admitted, 
counsel should be permitted to argue the inference to the jury, the court should 
instruct the jury as to the inference, and the jury may infer that the fact 
would have helped prove negligence; a court's refusal may be an abuse of 
discretion.  
Indeed, some courts have held that such destruction creates a presumption 
that shifts the burden of production, or even persuasion, to the party 
responsible for the destruction.

            
Where the evidence, rather than being destroyed, has been tampered with 
in bad faith, a court also has the option of excluding it to deny the tampering 
party any use of it.  
Where the alteration is not in bad faith and the alteration is not so 
egregious, however, the evidence itself should be admitted, together with 
information relating to how it was altered, and counsel may argue the issue to 
the jury.

            
Where the loss or destruction of evidence is not intentional or reckless, 
by contrast, some courts give the trial court discretion to admit or exclude 
testimony relating to the missing evidence, and discretion to give or withhold a 
"missing evidence" instruction.  And, a court should refuse to give such 
instruction if the nonproduced evidence is cumulative or of marginal 
relevance.

 

2 Jones on Evidence Civil and Criminal, § 13:12 (1994 7th ed. and Supp. 2000) (footnotes 
omitted).

 

[¶21]   An annotation of this subject provides 
this guidance:

 

            
The cases collected in this annotation reveal that the effect of the loss 
or destruction of a product, or a critical component of a product, on the 
subsequent products liability claim depends on a number of varying 
circumstances.  
In making its determination whether to sanction the spoliating party, the 
court will consider the following: (1) whether the innocent party was prejudiced 
by loss of the evidence; (2) whether this prejudice can be cured; (3) the 
practical importance of the lost evidence; (4) the fault of the spoliator; and 
(5) what is the least onerous sanction that will effectively deter the offending 
conduct.

            
In a case in which the innocent party is in no way prejudiced by loss or 
destruction of the product, and circumstantial evidence of the claim is 
sufficient to make out a prima facie case, the court may choose not to impose 
any sanctions,  nor will sanctions be imposed if the person or party benefited 
by the spoliation was not at fault in any way with regard to the loss of the 
evidence and did not act intentionally or in bad faith.   A court may also 
hold that a sanction is inappropriate in a case in which the plaintiff contends 
that a design defect, as opposed to a manufacturing defect, caused the 
injury.  In 
such a case, sufficient proof of the defect may be obtained from examining any 
one of the defendant's products, not merely the injury-causing product.

            
In a case in which one or more of the factors under consideration 
warrants imposition of a sanction against the spoliating party, the court may 
choose to instruct the jury on the "spoliation inference," i.e., inform the jury 
that the lost evidence is to be presumed unfavorable to that party; preclude the 
spoliating party from introducing expert testimony concerning testing on the 
missing product or other evidence concerning the product; or dismiss the 
plaintiff's claim or the defendant's defense or grant summary judgment to the 
innocent party.

 

Richard E. Kaye, Annotation, Effect 
of Spoliation of Evidence in Products Liability Action, 102 A.L.R.5th 99-100 (2002); also see 
Joseph Schneider and Edward M. Swartz, Liquefied 
Petroleum (LP) Gas Fires and Explosions, 14 Am.Jur. Trials 343, esp. §§ 6 
(failure to test or inspect), 7 (failure to warn), 8 (failure to comply with 
safety standard or code), and 23 (odorization procedures) (1968 and Supp. 2001); 
Hay v. Peterson, 6 Wyo. 419, 432-41, 45 P. 1073 (Wyo. 
1896).

 

[¶22]   Based on an overview of these 
authorities, we are compelled to conclude that the district court erred in its 
resolution of the spoliation issue, as well as its conclusion that the lack of 
evidence doomed both the Abrahams' case and GWE's and Big Horn's defenses.  The district court 
abused its discretion in granting the motion for summary judgment based on the 
theory of spoliation, given the facts and circumstances available to it.  Upon full 
development of this matter at trial, it may be that a sanction less than summary 
judgment or dismissal of the complaint is appropriate, or even no sanction at 
all.

 

[¶23]   We have carefully reviewed the record 
on appeal.  The 
evidence presented by the Abrahams structured one or more genuine issues of 
material fact that must be resolved by the fact finder.  See, e.g., Van Hoose v. Blueflame Gas, Inc., 642 P.2d 36 (Colo.App. 1982) (buyer of inherently dangerous product, propane, need 
not prove it was in a defective condition when it left hands of seller); Tune v. Synergy Gas Corporation, 883 S.W.2d 10, 14 
(Mo.banc 1994) (failure to warn cases have two separate requirements of 
causation: (1) product for which there was no warning must cause injury 
complained of; (2) plaintiff must show that warning would have altered his 
behavior.  
Where plaintiff testified he did know what propane smelled like, but did 
not know that odorant might not be effective under some circumstances, plaintiff 
made out prima facie case); Crook v. Farmland 
Industries, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 2d 947, 959-60 (D.Neb. 1999) (where plaintiffs 
were intimately familiar with properties of propane, e.g., that it was heavier 
than air and could lose its odorant, failure to warn not proximate cause of 
injury, summary judgment appropriate); and see generally 
Parkinson v. California Company, 233 F. 2d 432 (10th Cir. 1956); Wade R. 
Habeeb, Annotation, Duty and Liability in Connection 
with Odorization of Natural Gas, 70 A.L.R.3d 1060 (1976 and Supp.2002).  For this reason the 
order granting summary judgment must be reversed.

 

[¶24]   The district court abused its 
discretion in setting the hearing on the motions for summary judgment before the 
discovery deadline had expired and in denying the Abrahams' motion to continue 
that hearing to a time that was within the contemplation of the applicable rules 
of civil procedure.  
The district court erred in the manner in which it applied the doctrine 
of spoliation of evidence and, thus, the order granting the motions for summary 
judgment must be reversed.  In addition, there are genuine issues of 
material fact at large in this case that render it inappropriate for resolution 
by summary judgment.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

   1Although the incident is most often referred to as an 
"explosion" in the record and the briefs, it seems clear that what occurred in 
this case was a "flash fire."  Joseph Schneider and Edward M. Swartz, Liquefied Petroleum (LP) Gas Fires and Explosions, 
14  Am.Jur. 
Trials 343, §2 (definitions and terminology) (1968 and Supp. 
2001).

 

   2By 
order entered by this Court on March 2, 2004, Gary A. Barney was substituted for 
the Abrahams as Bankruptcy Trustee for Craig and Kim Abraham.  However, for 
convenience and clarity we will continue to refer to the Abrahams and the 
Bankruptcy Trustee as "the Abrahams."

 

3   GWE was known 
locally as Wyo LP Gas.

 

   4We take 
note at this juncture that reviewing the record in this case was quite 
difficult.  
Much of the important factual background was in depositions and no party 
included the entirety of the depositions in its papers.  GWE and Big Horn 
included excerpts of the depositions of Craig and Kim Abraham, but only those 
portions that were favorable to their view of the facts.  Moreover, the 
depositions were in the compressed format and the excerpts began and left off 
without regard to context, i.e., it was difficult to ascertain the purport of 
the excerpts because of under inclusion.  Excerpts included in the Abrahams' papers 
filled in some of these gaps, but those excerpts were also in the compressed 
format.

 

   5Both 
GWE and Big Horn contend that offers were made to light the pilots and Kim 
Abraham refused them.

 

  6William A. Mahre served as an expert witness for Big 
Horn and submitted an affidavit, which, in essence, stated that because of 
spoliation of the evidence at the scene of the flash fire, it was impossible for 
Big Horn to defend this action by the Abrahams and, conversely, it was 
impossible for the Abrahams to prove their case.  It is Big Horn's contention, and that of GWE 
as well, that because the system was hooked back up before an investigation took 
place, and because 800 gallons of propane were added to the Abrahams' propane 
tank, and because the old regulator on the tank was discarded, it is impossible 
for anyone to establish what caused the flash fire.

 

   7Although the motion was placed in the Abrahams' opposition 
to GWE's motion for summary judgment, it is clear in context that it applied to 
both motions for summary judgment.

 

   8Neither 
the record nor questioning at oral arguments explains why the hearing on the 
motions for summary judgment was scheduled before the deadline for 
discovery.

 

   9Kim 
Abraham said she smelled the odor of propane when GWE made its delivery, but did 
not remember whether she smelled it when Big Horn made its delivery.