Case Title: In re C.W.

Citation: 2004-Ohio-6411

Docket Number: 20040847

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-12-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as In re C.W., 104 Ohio St.3d 163, 2004-Ohio-6411.] 
 
 
IN RE C.W.; SUMMIT COUNTY CHILDREN SERVICES BOARD, APPELLANT; 
WEINSHEIMER ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as In re C.W., 104 Ohio St.3d 163, 2004-Ohio-6411.] 
Before a public children-services agency or private child-placing agency can 
move for permanent custody of a child on R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) 
grounds, the child must have been in the temporary custody of an agency 
for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period. 
(No. 2004-0847 — Submitted October 12, 2004 — Decided December 8, 2004.) 
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Summit County, Nos. 21809 and 21811, 
2004-Ohio-1987. 
_______________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Before a public children-services agency or private child-placing agency can move 
for permanent custody of a child on R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) grounds, the 
child must have been in the temporary custody of an agency for at least 12 
months of a consecutive 22-month period. 
_______________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J. 
{¶1} 
On June 20, 2002, appellant, Summit County Children Services 
Board, filed a complaint seeking temporary custody of C.W. (born September 24, 
1999, to appellees, Mark Worrell and Elizabeth Weinsheimer).  That same day, 
the trial court issued an emergency order awarding temporary custody to 
appellant.  After a hearing on June 21, 2002, the trial court ordered that C.W. 
remain in the temporary custody of appellant. 
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{¶2} 
The trial court held an adjudicatory hearing on July 17, 2002.  At 
that hearing, the parties informed the court of their agreement that C.W. be 
adjudicated a dependent child and that the allegations of neglect be dismissed.  On 
July 19, 2002, the trial court adjudicated C.W. a dependent child, dismissed the 
allegations of neglect, and ordered that C.W. remain in the temporary custody of 
appellant. 
{¶3} 
On April 23, 2003, nine months after the dependency adjudication, 
appellant moved for permanent custody of C.W., alleging that permanent custody 
was in C.W.’s best interest, that C.W. had been in the temporary custody of 
appellant for 12 of the prior 22 months, and that C.W. could not be placed with 
his parents within a reasonable period of time. 
{¶4} 
On October 14, 2003, the trial court granted appellant’s motion for 
permanent custody and terminated appellees’ parental rights.  The trial court 
determined that C.W. had been in the temporary custody of appellant for 12 or 
more 
months 
of 
a 
consecutive 
22-month 
period 
pursuant 
to 
R.C. 
2151.414(B)(1)(d) and that permanent custody with a goal of adoption was in 
C.W.’s best interest.  The trial court did not address the other ground for 
permanent custody alleged by appellant.  Appellees separately appealed from the 
trial court’s judgment to the Court of Appeals for Summit County.  Upon motion 
by appellant, the court of appeals consolidated the appeals. 
{¶5} 
The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s order granting 
permanent custody to appellant and remanded the cause for further proceedings.  
Specifically, the court of appeals found that the trial court had erred in terminating 
appellees’ parental rights, since the court had based its judgment on the erroneous 
conclusion that C.W. had been in the temporary custody of appellant for 12 or 
more months pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d).  The court of appeals noted the 
undisputed evidence that C.W. had not been in the temporary custody of appellant 
January Term, 2004 
3 
for 12 months prior to the filing of appellant’s motion for permanent custody.  
Stating that a motion for permanent custody must allege grounds that currently 
exist, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court had erred in relying on the 
R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) ground in granting permanent custody to appellant. 
{¶6} 
The court of appeals found its judgment to be in conflict with the 
judgment of the Fourth District Court of Appeals in In re Dyal (Aug. 9, 2001), 4th 
Dist. No. 01CA12, 2001 WL 925423, on the following issue: “Where a children 
services agency files a permanent custody motion pursuant to R.C. 2151.414 and 
asserts grounds under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), must the child have been in the 
temporary custody of the children services agency for at least twelve months of a 
consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 18, 1999, as 
counted pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), at the time of the filing of the motion 
for permanent custody or is it sufficient that the child be in the temporary custody 
of the children services agency for at least twelve months by the date the 
permanent custody trial commences?”  The cause is now before this court upon 
our determination that a conflict exists. 
{¶7} 
Statutes concerning the same subject matter must be construed in 
pari materia.  In re Hayes (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48, 679 N.E.2d 680.  
Therefore, in order to examine R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), we must review both R.C. 
2151.413 and R.C. 2151.414. 
{¶8} 
R.C. 2151.413 sets forth guidelines for determining when a public 
children-services agency or private child-placing agency must or may file a 
motion for permanent custody.  Most relevant to the issue before us is R.C. 
2151.413(D)(1), which states, “[I]f a child has been in the temporary custody of 
one or more public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for 
twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or 
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after March 18, 1999, the agency with custody shall file a motion requesting 
permanent custody of the child.” 
{¶9} 
R.C. 2151.414 sets forth the procedures a juvenile court must 
follow and the findings it must make before granting a motion filed pursuant to 
R.C. 2151.413.  Upon an agency’s filing of a motion for permanent custody, the 
court must conduct a hearing.  R.C. 2151.414(A).  According to R.C. 
2151.414(B)(1), before a court can grant permanent custody to the moving 
agency, it must “determin[e] * * *, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in 
the best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the agency 
that filed the motion for permanent custody and that any of the following apply: 
{¶10} “(a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned or has not been in the 
temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or private 
child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two 
month period ending on or after March 18, 1999, and the child cannot be placed 
with either of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be placed 
with the child’s parents. 
{¶11} “(b) The child is abandoned. 
{¶12} “(c) The child is orphaned, and there are no relatives of the child 
who are able to take permanent custody. 
{¶13} “(d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more 
public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or 
more months of a consecutive twenty-two month period ending on or after March 
18, 1999. 
{¶14} “For the purposes of division (B)(1) of this section, a child shall be 
considered to have entered the temporary custody of an agency on the earlier of 
the date the child is adjudicated pursuant to section 2151.28 of the Revised Code 
or the date that is sixty days after removal of the child from home.” 
January Term, 2004 
5 
{¶15} In interpreting the statutory provisions concerning the juvenile 
court, we must carry out the purposes set forth in R.C. 2151.01: 
{¶16} “The sections in Chapter 2151. of the Revised Code * * * shall be 
liberally interpreted and construed so as to effectuate the following purposes: 
{¶17} “(A) To provide for the care, protection, and mental and physical 
development of children subject to Chapter 2151. of the Revised Code, whenever 
possible, in a family environment, separating the child from the child’s parents 
only when necessary for the child’s welfare or in the interests of public safety; 
{¶18} “(B) To provide judicial procedures through which Chapter 2151. 
and 2152. of the Revised Code are executed and enforced, and in which the 
parties are assured of a fair hearing, and their constitutional and other legal rights 
are recognized and enforced.” 
{¶19} Our inquiry centers around a determination whether a trial court 
may count the time between the filing of a motion for permanent custody and the 
time of the permanent-custody hearing to satisfy the requisite 12-month period of 
temporary custody set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d).  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 484, 
147 Ohio Laws, Part II, 4189, 4222, 4224 (“H.B. 484”), effective March 18, 1999, 
added the “12 of 22” provision found in R.C. 2151.413(D)(1) and R.C. 
2151.414(B)(1)(d).  The “12 of 22” provision significantly changed the 
permanent-custody statute.  See In re K.G., 9th Dist. Nos. 03CA0066, 03CA0067, 
and 03CA0068, 2004-Ohio-1421, 2004 WL 573887, ¶ 18. 
{¶20} Prior to the H.B. 484 amendments, R.C. 2151.413 was a 
permissive statute, setting forth only situations in which an agency could file for 
permanent custody.  See former R.C. 2151.413, Sub.H.B. No. 419, 146 Ohio 
Laws, Part III, 4660, 4679.  After H.B. 484’s amendments, an agency must, except 
in limited circumstances, file for permanent custody once a child has been in the 
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agency’s temporary custody for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22-month 
period.  See R.C. 2151.413(D)(1). 
{¶21} Also, prior to H.B. 484’s amendments, when a child was not 
abandoned or orphaned, an agency seeking permanent custody was required to 
establish (1) that permanent custody was in the child’s best interests and (2) that 
the child could not be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should 
not be placed with the parents.  Former R.C. 2151.414(B), Sub.H.B. No. 274, 146 
Ohio Laws, Part II, 3246, 3306.  After H.B. 484’s addition of the “12 of 22” 
provision to R.C. 2151.414, an agency need no longer prove that a child cannot be 
returned to the parents within a reasonable time or should not be returned to the 
parents, so long as the child has been in the temporary custody of an agency for at 
least 12 months. 
{¶22} The “12 of 22” provisions set forth in R.C. 2151.413(D)(1) and 
R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) balance the importance of reuniting a child with the 
child’s parents against the importance of a speedy resolution of the custody of a 
child.  See In re K.G., 2004-Ohio-1421 at ¶ 19.  Through the “12 of 22” 
provisions in the permanent-custody statues, the legislature provides parents with 
12 months to work toward reunification before an agency can institute a 
permanent-custody action asserting R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) grounds.  Id. at ¶ 21;  
In re Workman, 4th Dist. No. 02CA574, 2003-Ohio-2220, 2003 WL 2012574, ¶ 
40. 
{¶23} Parents have a basic civil right to raise their children.  In re Hayes, 
79 Ohio St.3d at 48, 679 N.E.2d 680, citing In re Murray (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 
155, 157, 556 N.E.2d 1169.  This court has noted that the “[p]ermanent 
termination of parental rights has been described as ‘the family law equivalent of 
the death penalty in a criminal case.’ ”  Id., quoting In re Smith (1991), 77 Ohio 
App.3d 1, 16, 601 N.E.2d 45.  Consequently, parents “ ‘must be afforded every 
January Term, 2004 
7 
procedural and substantive protection the law allows.’”  Id., quoting In re Smith at 
16, 601 N.E.2d 45.  Therefore, in light of the purpose of R.C. Chapter 2151 and a 
court’s obligation to provide parents with procedural protections in permanent 
custody proceedings, an agency must afford parents the full 12-month period to 
work toward reunification before moving for permanent custody on R.C. 
2151.414(B)(1)(d) grounds. 
{¶24} Furthermore, Juv.R. 19 provides, “An application to the court for 
an order shall be by motion.* * * It shall state with particularity the grounds upon 
which it is made * * *.”  “[A] motion for permanent custody must allege grounds 
that currently exist.”  In re K.G., 2004-Ohio-1421 at ¶ 13.  A juvenile court lacks 
authority to grant an agency’s motion on R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) grounds if those 
grounds were not satisfied when the motion was filed. 
{¶25} In the conflict case, In re Dyal, 4th Dist. No. 01CA12, 2001 WL 
925423, the Fourth District Court of Appeals interpreted R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) 
as allowing a trial court to grant permanent custody to an agency if the child had 
been in the temporary custody of an agency for at least 12 out of the prior 22 
months by the date of the hearing on the motion for permanent custody (as 
opposed to the date that the motion was filed).  This interpretation undermines the 
purposes of R.C. Chapter 2151 and interferes with the protection of parental rights 
afforded by the legislature.  The statute clearly provides parents with 12 months to 
demonstrate their ability and fitness to care for their child before an agency can 
move for permanent custody on R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) grounds. 
{¶26} Accordingly, we hold that before a public children-services agency 
or private child-placing agency can move for permanent custody of a child on 
R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) grounds, the child must have been in the temporary 
custody of an agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period.  In 
other words, the time that passes between the filing of a motion for permanent 
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custody and the permanent-custody hearing does not count toward the 12-month 
period set forth in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). 
{¶27} Finally, we note that our holding does not preclude an agency from 
moving for permanent custody before a child has been in the agency’s temporary 
custody for at least 12 months.  If a ground other than R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) 
exists to support a grant of permanent custody, the agency may move for 
permanent custody on that other ground. 
{¶28} For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the 
Summit County Court of Appeals on the issue certified for our review. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR 
and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Sherri Bevan Walsh, Summit County Prosecuting Attorney, and Richard 
S. Kasay, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Kernan, Reed & Reed, L.P.A., and Joel D. Reed, for appellee Mark 
Worrell. 
________________________