Case Title: State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Floyd

Citation: 2006-Ohio-4437

Docket Number: 20060945

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2006-08-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Floyd, 111 Ohio St.3d 56, 2006-Ohio-
4437.] 
 
THE STATE EX REL. PLAIN DEALER PUBLISHING COMPANY v. FLOYD, JUDGE, 
ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Floyd, 
 111 Ohio St.3d 56, 2006-Ohio-4437.] 
Writ of prohibition granted to prevent juvenile court judge from closing 
proceedings without conducting evidentiary hearing and making 
required findings — Writ of mandamus granted to compel juvenile court 
to provide transcript of hearing that was improperly closed — Writ of 
mandamus granted to compel juvenile court judge to hold hearing to 
determine whether prior hearing was properly closed — Writ of 
mandamus granted to compel juvenile court to make publicly available 
notice of (1) motions to close proceedings, (2) when hearings on closure 
motions will be held, (3) court rulings on closure motions. 
(No. 2006-0945 ─ Submitted August 8, 2006 ─ Decided August 30, 2006.) 
IN PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS. 
____________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} This is an original action in which a newspaper publisher requests 
writs of prohibition and mandamus related to juvenile court closure orders.  We 
grant the writ of prohibition to prevent the juvenile court judge from closing 
proceedings without conducting an evidentiary hearing and without making the 
required findings.  We also grant all but one of the requested writs of mandamus. 
Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court: General Practices Concerning Closure 
{¶ 2} The clerk of respondent Cuyahoga County Court of Common 
Pleas, Juvenile Division does not normally allow the general public or the press to 
inspect any portion of the docket of any juvenile court matter.  In addition, the 
clerk does not generally permit public or press inspection of judicial rulings, 
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motions, transcripts, or any other paper filed with the clerk.  There is also no 
publicly accessible docket that notifies the general public and the press of any 
motion to exclude the public and the press from the courtroom, hearings 
scheduled on these closure motions, or judges’ rulings on the motions. 
{¶ 3} The press thus has only limited ways to learn about the existence 
of and content of motions, hearings, and court orders to close the juvenile 
courtroom:  from attorneys involved in the cases who are willing to talk with 
reporters or from court officers, such as the court’s media specialist.  The juvenile 
court’s media specialist provides the press with information requested by 
reporters only after obtaining approval from the court’s in-house attorney, the 
administrative judge, and the judge assigned to the particular case involved.  The 
media specialist has advised reporters to request information about cases before 
respondent Judge Alison Floyd of the juvenile court directly from Judge Floyd’s 
office. 
Juvenile Court Proceedings Involving the Goonies 
{¶ 4} In October 2005, charges were filed against 14 teenage boys who 
were alleged to have committed various crimes and acts of delinquency as 
members of a gang known as the Goonies.  The Goonies allegedly committed 
these crimes, including aggravated robbery, arson, felonious assault, burglary, and 
criminal gang activity, against people living in a section of Cleveland, Ohio, 
known as Slavic Village.  The crimes were committed from June 2005 through 
October 2005.  Judge Floyd presides over all of these cases in the Cuyahoga 
County Juvenile Court. 
{¶ 5} In November 2005, four of the boys ─ Michael Woody, age 16; 
Ronnie Tramble, age 16; Matthew Dupree, age 15; and Verlondo Harper, age 15 
─ were charged with the aggravated murder and murder of 76-year-old Therese 
Szelugowski, who had been killed near a bus stop in the middle of the day.  One 
of the four boys had allegedly knocked Szelugowski down on October 5, 2005, 
January Term, 2006 
3 
when he stole her purse.  Szelugowski hit her head on the pavement, lost 
consciousness, and died, without having regained consciousness, three weeks 
later, on October 26, 2005. 
{¶ 6} Relator, the Plain Dealer Publishing Company (“Plain Dealer”), 
publishes The Plain Dealer, a daily newspaper.  The Plain Dealer has published 
articles about the Goonies, but has not published the names of juveniles, except 
for the four teenagers charged with the murder of Szelugowski. 
{¶ 7} On November 4, 2005, after the juveniles retained or were 
appointed counsel, several of them filed motions to close their juvenile court 
proceedings to the public, and later that month, the Plain Dealer entered an 
appearance in the cases.  On January 13, 2006, Judge Floyd scheduled closure 
hearings in the juveniles’ cases.  The juvenile court notified the parties, their 
attorneys, and the Plain Dealer of the scheduled hearings.  On January 19, the 
Plain Dealer informed Judge Floyd that it would oppose the motions for closure in 
the Woody, Harper, and Dupree cases, but that it would not oppose the motions 
for closure in the other cases in which the juveniles moved to close their 
proceedings, including a case involving alleged Goonies member Darelle Burton. 
{¶ 8} For the juveniles whose motions to close the proceedings were not 
opposed, Judge Floyd claims that she conducted hearings and granted the motions 
only after determining that (1) there existed a reasonable and substantial basis for 
believing that public access could harm the child or endanger the fairness of the 
adjudication, (2) the potential for harm outweighed the benefits of public access, 
and (3) there were no reasonable alternatives to closure.  Judge Floyd filed an 
affidavit stating the foregoing as part of her submission of evidence in this case. 
{¶ 9} The juvenile court dockets for the cases, however, suggest 
otherwise.  For example, in several of the cases, Judge Floyd noted in entries that 
she was granting the juveniles’ motions for closure because the media opposition 
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had been withdrawn and “[w]ith the absence of evidence to the contrary, the 
motion should be granted.” 
{¶ 10} For those juveniles whose motions to close proceedings were 
contested by the media, i.e., Woody, Harper, and Dupree, Judge Floyd claims in 
her affidavit that she held hearings and denied the motions.  But the dockets for 
those cases show that Judge Floyd granted Woody’s motion to close a 
competency hearing, Harper withdrew his motion for closure, and Judge Floyd 
denied Dupree’s motion to close future proceedings when his attorney did not 
show up for the hearing.  In the cases that were not closed to the public and in 
which the media had requested to be present, Judge Floyd informed victims and 
witnesses of their right to object to being filmed, videotaped, recorded, or 
photographed, in accordance with Sup.R. 12 and Loc.R. 4 of the Court of 
Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, Juvenile Division (“Loc.Juv.R. 4”).  If a 
victim or witness objected, Judge Floyd informed members of the media that they 
could not film, videotape, record, or photograph that person. 
{¶ 11} In February 2006, Tramble agreed to plead guilty to involuntary 
manslaughter for his role in Szelugowski’s death and further agreed to testify 
against other alleged gang members.  Tramble then testified that Woody had 
stolen Szelugowski’s purse and that Tramble, Harper, and Dupree had planned 
various crimes. 
{¶ 12} Judge Floyd ordered Woody moved from the juvenile-detention 
facility to a county jail, ruled that whether Harper would be tried as an adult in the 
Szelugowski death depended on the outcome of future hearings, and determined 
that Dupree should not be tried as an adult in the death of Szelugowski.  The issue 
of whether Dupree would be tried as an adult for allegedly committing armed 
robbery of patrons at a local bar remained pending. 
{¶ 13} On the morning of May 2, 2006, Plain Dealer reporter Matthew 
Gabriel Baird attempted to attend a hearing in the delinquency case of Darelle 
January Term, 2006 
5 
Burton, but Judge Floyd informed Baird that he could not attend the hearing 
because she had previously granted Burton’s motion to close the proceedings.  
The juvenile court docket for Burton’s case, which was submitted as evidence by 
respondents on June 8, 2006, notes that his motion to close the proceedings was 
filed in November 2005, but the docket does not indicate any ruling by Judge 
Floyd on the motion.  On July 10, 2006, respondents filed a notice in this court 
advising that an entry granting the motion had been prepared by Judge Floyd in 
February 2006, but was not journalized until June 29, 2006.  In that entry, Judge 
Floyd granted Burton’s motion to close proceedings because “any opposition to 
the child’s motion has been sufficiently withdrawn and/or no defense to the 
motion shall be given in open court, such that the motion is found to be without 
opposition.” 
{¶ 14} On the afternoon of May 2, 2006, Baird attended an amenability 
hearing in Dupree’s juvenile delinquency case to determine if Dupree should be 
tried as an adult for aggravated robbery with criminal-gang specifications, 
burglary, and theft.  Baird was present during the presentation of the state’s case, 
but Judge Floyd did not permit Baird to attend that portion of the amenability 
hearing at which evidence related to Dupree’s confidential social history and 
physical or mental examination pursuant to Juv.R. 32 and Loc.Juv.R. 23 was 
presented.  Judge Floyd noted that because counsel had previously entered an 
appearance on behalf of the Plain Dealer, she would delay the hearing for 30 
minutes so that the Plain Dealer’s attorney could be heard on whether the hearing 
should be closed.  When counsel did not appear within the half hour, Judge Floyd 
proceeded with the closed hearing. 
{¶ 15} Immediately after concluding the portion of the hearing concerning 
Dupree’s confidential social history and physical or mental examination, Dupree 
called one of his parents to testify.  According to Judge Floyd, she “did not 
adjourn the court proceedings at that time just to invite the public back into the 
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courtroom.”  Consequently, Judge Floyd closed that portion of Dupree’s 
amenability hearing without first conducting a closure hearing and making 
findings that the hearing warranted closure.    
{¶ 16} On May 12, 2006, Judge Floyd conducted an amenability hearing 
in Harper’s juvenile-delinquency case.  Baird attended the hearing, but was not 
permitted to attend that portion of the hearing concerning Harper’s confidential 
social history and physical or mental examination under Juv.R. 32 and Loc.Juv.R. 
23. 
April 27, 2006 Juvenile Court Proceedings Involving Elementary-School Fire 
{¶ 17} Judge Floyd also presides over juvenile-delinquency cases 
involving two 11-year-old girls who are accused of setting a fire that caused over 
$200,000 in damage to St. John Nepomucene Elementary School.  On March 22, 
2006, charges were filed alleging that the juveniles had each committed two 
counts of aggravated arson, one count of arson, one count of inducing panic, and 
one count of possessing criminal tools.  Judge Floyd set the cases for an 
arraignment to be held on April 27, 2006.  On April 26, 2006, WOIO Channel 19, 
a Cleveland television station, faxed a written request to the juvenile court’s 
media liaison to attend the April 27 arraignment. 
{¶ 18} On April 27, 2006, one of the juveniles moved to close the 
proceedings.  The parents of the other juvenile, who had not yet been appointed 
an attorney, also objected to the media’s presence.  According to Judge Floyd, she 
delayed the arraignment for 30 minutes for the media that was present to secure 
the presence of counsel.  Judge Floyd ultimately conducted the arraignment 
outside the presence of the media and without previously holding a closure 
hearing and making findings to support closure.  Judge Floyd appointed counsel 
for the unrepresented juvenile, and the attorney subsequently filed a motion to 
close proceedings. 
Plain Dealer Request for Transcripts 
January Term, 2006 
7 
{¶ 19} On May 11, 2006, the Plain Dealer requested that Judge Floyd 
provide it with copies of transcripts of the April 27, 2006 arraignment of the two 
juveniles accused of causing the elementary-school fire and the portion of the 
May 2, 2006 amenability hearing for Matthew Dupree containing Dupree’s 
parent’s testimony.  Judge Floyd has not provided these transcripts or informed 
the Plain Dealer whether they will be provided. 
Prohibition and Mandamus Case 
{¶ 20} On May 12, 2006, the Plain Dealer filed this action for a writ of 
prohibition barring Judge Floyd “from enforcing any order to close the courtroom 
in a delinquency matter based upon the absence of an appearance of counsel to 
argue against closure and where [Judge Floyd’s] decision to close the courtroom 
was not preceded by a disinterested and independent judicial determination of the 
existence of sufficient evidence adduced at a closure hearing to require exclusion 
of the press and public in accordance with the standards established by this 
Court.” 
{¶ 21} The Plain Dealer also requests a writ of mandamus compelling 
Judge Floyd and the juvenile court either “to make available for inspection and 
copying the transcripts” of the April 27, 2006 arraignment of the two girls 
accused of setting fire to the elementary school and the portion of the May 2, 
2006 amenability hearing in which Dupree’s parent testified or “to conduct an 
evidentiary hearing to determine whether sufficient evidence exists to deny * * * 
the press and public generally * * * access to the transcripts.” 
{¶ 22} Finally, the Plain Dealer seeks a writ of mandamus compelling the 
juvenile court “to make available for public inspection docket entries or similar 
court records to the extent sufficient to afford notice to relator (and the press and 
public generally)” of motions to close the courtroom, dates and times of closure 
hearings, and judicial orders deciding whether to close the courtroom. 
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{¶ 23} On May 19, 2006, we granted an alternative writ and issued a 
schedule for the presentation of evidence and briefs.  State ex rel. Plain Dealer 
Publishing Co. v. Floyd, 109 Ohio St.3d 1474, 2006-Ohio-2453, 847 N.E.2d 
1221.  The parties submitted evidence and briefs pursuant to the court’s schedule.  
The Plain Dealer filed motions to strike (1) portions of Judge Floyd’s affidavit 
submitted as evidence in this case, (2) the closure order submitted by Judge Floyd 
and the juvenile court on July 10, 2006, advising this court of the trial court’s 
recent activity in the Burton case, and (3) unsworn statements of facts in 
respondents’ merit brief and memorandum in opposition to the Plain Dealer’s 
motion to strike portions of Judge Floyd’s affidavit. 
{¶ 24} This cause is now before the court for a consideration of the 
merits. 
Prohibition:  Court Closure 
{¶ 25} The Plain Dealer seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent Judge Floyd 
from closing any juvenile-delinquency proceeding based upon the nonappearance 
of counsel to argue against closure rather than holding a hearing at which 
sufficient evidence is adduced that justifies closure. 
{¶ 26} “There is a long line of cases holding that an action for a writ of 
prohibition is the proper vehicle to challenge an order of a trial court which orders 
closure of court proceedings.”  State ex rel. News Herald v. Ottawa Cty. Court of 
Common Pleas, Juvenile Div. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 40, 43, 671 N.E.2d 5.  In 
fact, “[i]nterlocutory orders of a trial court restricting public access to pending 
litigation are not final, appealable orders, and may be challenged during the 
pendency of the litigation only through an action for a writ of prohibition.  
Members of the press and public who seek access to a closed court proceeding 
have standing to seek a writ of prohibition for this purpose.”  In re T.R. (1990), 52 
Ohio St.3d 6, 556 N.E.2d 439, paragraph one of the syllabus; State ex rel. Dayton 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips (1976), 46 Ohio St.2d 457, 75 O.O.2d 511, 351 
January Term, 2006 
9 
N.E.2d 127, paragraph one of the syllabus (“A writ of prohibition provides an 
appropriate remedy to prevent the enforcement by a trial court of an order 
improperly excluding the public and members of the press from pretrial 
hearings”); see, also, id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 27} In the absence of a qualified constitutional right of access to 
juvenile delinquency proceedings, these proceedings “are neither presumed open 
nor presumed closed.”  State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Geauga Cty. 
Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Div. (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 79, 83-85, 734 
N.E.2d 1214.  “Therefore, under the applicable standard, a juvenile court may 
restrict public access to delinquency proceedings if, after hearing evidence and 
argument on the issue, the court finds that (1) there exists a reasonable and 
substantial basis for believing that public access could harm the child or endanger 
the fairness of the adjudication, (2) the potential for harm outweighs the benefits 
of public access, and (3) there are no reasonable alternatives to closure.”  
(Emphasis added.)  Id. at 85, 734 N.E.2d 1214, citing T.R., 52 Ohio St.3d 6, 556 
N.E.2d 439, paragraph three of the syllabus, and State ex rel. Dispatch Printing 
Co. v. Lias (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 497, 628 N.E.2d 1368, paragraph one of the 
syllabus.  The burden of establishing these factors is on the party seeking closure 
of the delinquency proceeding.  Plain Dealer, 90 Ohio St.3d at 85, 734 N.E.2d 
1214. 
{¶ 28} Notwithstanding Judge Floyd’s affidavit to the contrary, the entries 
she submitted as part of her evidence in this case establish a pattern in which she 
granted motions to close delinquency proceedings without hearing any evidence 
or making any findings, simply because media opposition had been withdrawn.  
See Hernandez v. Kelly, 108 Ohio St.3d 395, 2006-Ohio-126, 844 N.E.2d 301, ¶ 
30, quoting State ex rel. Geauga Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Milligan, 100 Ohio St.3d 
366, 2003-Ohio-6608, 800 N.E.2d 361, ¶ 20 (“It is axiomatic that ‘[a] court of 
record speaks only through its journal entries’ ”). 
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{¶ 29} Judge Floyd is correct that no statute or rule requires her to specify 
her reasons for closing juvenile court proceedings in her entries granting closure 
motions.  Cf., e.g., State v. Francis, 104 Ohio St.3d 490, 2004-Ohio-6894, 820 
N.E.2d 355, ¶ 52.  But, cf., In re Washington Post Co. (C.A.4, 1986), 807 F.2d 
383, 390-391 (if a court decides to close a hearing in a criminal case, it must state 
its reasons on the record).  But a review of her entries establishes that her reason 
for granting the motions was that the closure motions were unopposed.  No 
additional evidence is essential to discern the rationale employed by Judge Floyd.  
Cf. Joyce v. Gen. Motors Corp. (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 93, 551 N.E.2d 172, 
paragraph one of the syllabus (“Where, in the interest of justice, it is essential for 
a reviewing court to ascertain the grounds upon which a judgment of a lower 
court is founded, the reviewing court must examine the entire journal entry and 
the proceedings”).  Moreover, Judge Floyd’s actions in the Dupree and 
elementary-school-fire cases establish that she has engaged in a practice of 
closing proceedings without conducting closure hearings and making the requisite 
findings.  Therefore, Judge Floyd’s affidavit is contradicted by both her journal 
entries and her admitted actions in certain juvenile court proceedings. 
{¶ 30} In addition, Judge Floyd concedes in her affidavit that she closed a 
portion of the May 2, 2006 amenability hearing in the Dupree case because she 
did not want to adjourn the proceedings after hearing a confidential portion of the 
case simply to afford access to the public to a nonconfidential portion. 
{¶ 31} Finally, at the April 27, 2006 hearing for the two girls accused of 
setting the elementary-school fire, Judge Floyd conducted the arraignment outside 
the presence of the general public and the press after giving the media 30 minutes 
to secure counsel to object to the closure motion made that same day by one of the 
juveniles. 
{¶ 32} In all of these instances, Judge Floyd did not conduct an 
evidentiary hearing or make the findings required by precedent to justify closing 
January Term, 2006 
11 
the proceedings.  Plain Dealer, 90 Ohio St.3d at 85, 734 N.E.2d 1214; see, also, 
State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Louden (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 61, 65, 741 
N.E.2d 517.  Because the party moving for closure bears the burden of proof, 
Plain Dealer, 90 Ohio St.3d at 85, 734 N.E.2d 1214, the mere lack of opposition 
to the motion is not sufficient to warrant closure.  Therefore, Judge Floyd’s 
closure of these proceedings was unjustified.  See Plain Dealer, 90 Ohio St.3d at 
86-87, 734 N.E.2d 1214 (juvenile court judge abused his discretion in closing 
delinquency proceeding when the movant did not introduce any evidence in 
support of closure); Louden, 91 Ohio St.3d at 65, 741 N.E.2d 517, quoting Plain 
Dealer, 90 Ohio St.3d at 87, 734 N.E.2d 1214 (“Judge Louden did not hear 
evidence and argument on the issue of closing the detention hearing and did not 
make the requisite findings before adjudicating the issue in an informal, off-the-
record procedure.  * * * In the absence of the foregoing, Judge Louden’s closure 
of the detention hearing was unjustified and constituted ‘little more than [his] 
personal predilections’ ”). 
{¶ 33} Following Plain Dealer, 90 Ohio St.3d 79, 734 N.E.2d 1214, and 
Louden, 91 Ohio St.3d 61, 741 N.E.2d 517, the General Assembly amended R.C. 
2151.35(A)(1), which had previously provided that in any case in the juvenile 
court, “the general public may be excluded,” to require a separate closure hearing:  
“The court may exclude the general public from its hearings in a particular case if 
the court holds a separate hearing to determine whether that exclusion is 
appropriate.”  (Emphasis added.)  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 179, 148 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 
9447, 9515; see, also, Juv.R. 27, which was also amended to permit persons to 
demonstrate at a closure hearing “a countervailing right to be present” at a 
juvenile court proceeding. 
{¶ 34} The closure hearing and evidentiary findings required by 
precedent, statute, and rule are not removed simply because there is no opposition 
to a motion for closure.  As cogently observed by the Plain Dealer, Judge Floyd’s 
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granting closure because there was no opposition, when combined with the 
juvenile court’s general failure to give notice concerning closure motions and 
hearings on those motions, effectively precluded the general public from most 
juvenile court proceedings, resulting in an unfounded presumption of closed 
juvenile proceedings. 
{¶ 35} This result fails to accord sufficient weight to the “many legitimate 
interests [that] favor public access to [juvenile delinquency] proceedings.”  Plain 
Dealer, 90 Ohio St.3d at 84, 734 N.E.2d 1214.  These interests include educating 
society about the juvenile court, promoting public confidence in the judicial 
branch, deterring future acts of delinquency, deterring abuse of power by judges 
and other public officials, and alerting parents to their responsibilities regarding 
their minor children.  Id.  Even the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court 
Judges has acknowledged that traditional notions of confidentiality should be 
relaxed in juvenile proceedings because the juvenile court “ ‘should be open to 
the media, interested professionals, and students and, when appropriate, the 
public, in order to hold itself accountable, educate others, and encourage greater 
community participation.’ ”  Dienes, Levine & Lind, Newsgathering and the Law 
(2 Ed.1999) 139, fn. 443, quoting National Council of Juvenile & Family Court 
Judges, Children and Family First:  A Mandate for America’s Courts (1995) 3. 
{¶ 36} Therefore, we hold that Judge Floyd abused her discretion by 
conducting closed delinquency proceedings without first holding the required 
evidentiary closure hearing and making the requisite findings to support closure.  
Consequently, we grant the requested writ of prohibition. 
Mandamus to Compel Access to Transcripts of Improperly Closed Proceedings 
{¶ 37} The Plain Dealer requests a writ of mandamus to compel Judge 
Floyd and the juvenile court to provide access to transcripts of the April 27, 2006 
arraignment hearing in the school-fire case, the portion of the May 2, 2006 
January Term, 2006 
13 
amenability hearing in the Dupree case, in which one of his parents testified, and 
the May 2, 2006 hearing in the case involving Darelle Burton. 
{¶ 38} Regarding the first two matters ─ the arraignment in the school-
fire case and the parent’s testimony in the Matthew Dupree case ─ the juvenile 
court improperly closed those proceedings without first conducting the requisite 
evidentiary hearing and making the required findings.  The Plain Dealer claims 
that it is entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel access to copies of the 
transcripts of these proceedings.  See, e.g., Louden, 91 Ohio St.3d at 66, 741 
N.E.2d 517; see, also, State ex rel. Scripps Howard Broadcasting Co. v. 
Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Div. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 19, 
22, 652 N.E.2d 179, holding that Juv.R. 37(B), which provides that “[n]o public 
use shall be made by any person * * * of any juvenile court record, including the 
recording or a transcript of any juvenile court hearing, except in the course of an 
appeal or as authorized by order of the court or by statute,” did not preclude a writ 
of mandamus to compel access to a transcript of a juvenile court proceeding. 
{¶ 39} In both of these cases, however, there was no evidence of any 
motion by the parties in the underlying juvenile court cases to close the 
proceeding.  Louden, 91 Ohio St.3d at 62-63, 741 N.E.2d 517 (“Neither of the 
parties to the case, DiGian or the state of Ohio, nor their counsel had requested 
closure of the proceeding”); Scripps Howard, 73 Ohio St.3d at 19, 652 N.E.2d 
179 (“during an open court proceeding in the case,” a juvenile court judge found 
an attorney and her client in contempt). 
{¶ 40} We therefore hold that when a party requests that the juvenile court 
proceeding be closed, but the court fails to hold an appropriate evidentiary 
hearing and make the required findings before closing the proceeding, a person or 
entity successfully challenging that practice is not automatically entitled to release 
of the transcript of the improperly closed proceeding.  Instead, under these 
circumstances, the person or entity challenging the improper closure is entitled to 
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a writ of mandamus to compel the juvenile court judge to conduct the closure 
hearing that should have been held in order to determine if release of the 
transcript is warranted.  If the judge decides that the proceeding should not have 
been closed, the transcript should be released.  This procedure protects the 
important interests of the juveniles requesting closure, who are often ─ as is true 
of this case ─ not parties to the writ action challenging the improper closure, 
without diminishing the ability of the public, including the media, to argue against 
closure. 
{¶ 41} Applying these principles to the requested transcripts, because 
Judge Floyd improperly closed the April 27, 2006 arraignment hearing in the 
school-fire case and the juveniles involved in that case have filed motions to close 
the proceeding, the Plain Dealer is entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel 
Judge Floyd to conduct a closure hearing on the issue of whether the arraignment-
hearing transcript should be released to the Plain Dealer, with notice of the 
hearing given to the parties and the Plain Dealer and to the public by entering the 
date of the scheduled hearing on a publicly available docket in the case. 
{¶ 42} For the portion of the May 2, 2006 amenability hearing in the 
Dupree case at which one of Dupree’s parents testified, however, Judge Floyd had 
already denied Dupree’s motion to close proceedings in the case because 
Dupree’s attorney had failed to appear for a closure hearing.  Therefore, pursuant 
to Louden and Scripps Howard, the Plain Dealer is entitled to a writ of mandamus 
to compel the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, to 
allow the Plain Dealer access to the transcript of the nonconfidential portion of 
the Dupree amenability hearing. 
{¶ 43} Further, with respect to the Plain Dealer’s request for a writ of 
mandamus to compel access to a copy of the transcript of the May 2, 2006 hearing 
in the Burton case, the Plain Dealer never requested access to the transcript of this 
proceeding in its complaint and did not seek to amend its complaint to include this 
January Term, 2006 
15 
claim.  We granted an alternative writ based on the relief requested by the Plain 
Dealer in its complaint, and the parties presented evidence without notice that the 
claim was being raised.  In addition, there is no evidence that the Plain Dealer has 
ever requested that the juvenile court provide it with a copy of the transcript of the 
May 2, 2006 Burton proceeding.  Under these circumstances, we need not address 
the merits of this improperly raised claim.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Plain Dealer 
Publishing Co. v. Cleveland, 106 Ohio St.3d 70, 2005-Ohio-3807, 831 N.E.2d 
987, ¶ 64; State ex rel. Massie v. Gahanna-Jefferson Pub. Schools Bd. of Edn. 
(1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 584, 589, 669 N.E.2d 839; see, also, State ex rel. Hammons 
v. Chisholm, 99 Ohio St.3d 405, 2003-Ohio-4125, 792 N.E.2d 1120, ¶ 15 (Public 
Records Act requires prior request as a prerequisite for a mandamus action). 
Mandamus to Compel Notification of Motions to Close Juvenile 
Court Proceedings, Scheduled Hearings of the Motions, 
and Court Rulings on the Motions 
{¶ 44} The Plain Dealer claims entitlement to a writ of mandamus to 
compel the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, to 
make publicly available docket information regarding motions to close juvenile 
proceedings, scheduled hearings on the motions, and court rulings on the motions.  
The Plain Dealer cites the constitutional right of due process in support of its 
claim. 
{¶ 45} The right to procedural due process is required by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the 
Ohio Constitution.  State v. Hayden, 96 Ohio St.3d 211, 2002-Ohio-4169, 773 
N.E.2d 502, ¶ 6.  “[A]t its core, procedural due process under both the Ohio and 
United States Constitutions requires, at a minimum, an opportunity to be heard 
when the state seeks to infringe a protected liberty or property right.  Boddie v. 
Connecticut (1971), 401 U.S. 371, 377, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113.  Further, 
the opportunity to be heard must occur at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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manner.”  State v. Cowan, 103 Ohio St.3d 144, 2004-Ohio-4777, 814 N.E.2d 846, 
¶ 8. 
{¶ 46} We have held that the press and the general public have standing to 
contest the closure of a juvenile court proceeding.  See, e.g., T.R., 52 Ohio St.3d 
6, 556 N.E.2d 439, paragraph one of the syllabus; Lias, 68 Ohio St.3d at 502, 628 
N.E.2d 1368 (“the public [including the press] has a need and right to have open 
courts”).  In 2002, the General Assembly codified the requirement that a juvenile 
court conduct a separate hearing to determine the propriety of excluding the 
public from any proceeding.  R.C. 2151.35(A)(1).  Similarly, under the current 
version of Juv.R. 27(A)(1), persons ─ including the public and the press ─ have a 
right to present evidence at a closure hearing to show a “countervailing right to be 
present” at a juvenile court proceeding. 
{¶ 47} The foregoing right to be heard at an evidentiary hearing is 
rendered meaningless when ─ as here ─ the juvenile court does not allow public 
access to its docket to provide notice of filed motions for closure, scheduled 
hearing dates for those motions, and the court’s rulings on them.  The public 
availability of juvenile court dockets varies significantly from county to county, 
with some counties, such as Lucas County, routinely permitting public inspection 
and other counties, such as Franklin County, prohibiting public inspection.  Under 
the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court’s practice of routinely denying access to its 
docket and filings “even the most vigilant of reporters could not have known that 
the right of access was in jeopardy in time to be heard on the question of closure.”  
United States v. Raffoul (C.A.3, 1987), 826 F.2d 218, 225.  “The press should not 
be expected to ‘camp out’ in the hallway in order to ascertain whether evidentiary 
proceedings are being conducted in chambers.”  United States v. Criden (C.A.3, 
1982), 675 F.2d 550, 559.  Instead, “representatives of the press and general 
public ‘must be given the opportunity to be heard on the question of exclusion.’ ”  
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cty. (1982), 457 U.S. 596, 
January Term, 2006 
17 
609, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 73 L.Ed.2d 248, fn. 25, quoting Gannett Co., Inc. v. 
DePasquale (1979), 443 U.S. 368, 401, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (Powell, 
J., concurring). 
{¶ 48} In determining the scope of this notice, the California Supreme 
Court examined the pertinent precedent and held, “When a motion seeking 
closure is made in a written filing, adequate notice is provided by publicly 
docketing the motion reasonably in advance of a determination thereon.”  NBC 
Subsidiary, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999), 20 Cal.4th 1178, 1217, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 
778, 980 P.2d 337; cf. In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., Inc. (C.A.6, 1983), 723 
F.2d 470, 475 (“In order to protect this right to be heard, the most reasonable 
approach would be to require that motions to seal be docketed with the clerk of 
the district court”). Individual notice is generally not required.  Ex parte Hearst-
Argyle Television, Inc. (2006), 369 S.C. 69, 79, 631 S.E.2d 86, citing In re Knight 
Publishing Co. (C.A.4, 1984), 743 F.2d 231, 235.  Moreover, the court must 
provide interested persons with an opportunity to object before the court makes its 
decision, and if the court decides to close a hearing, it must state its reasons on the 
record, supported by specific findings.  Washington Post, 807 F.2d at 390-391; 
Raffoul, 826 F.2d at 226. 
{¶ 49} The public and press are afforded a meaningful opportunity to be 
heard on a motion for closure in juvenile court when (1) a written motion for 
closure is entered on a publicly available docket and the motion itself is available 
for public inspection, (2) the scheduled hearing on the motion is also entered on a 
publicly available docket, and (3) any court decision is entered on a publicly 
available docket and the decision is available for public inspection. 
{¶ 50} To be sure, unlike the dockets in civil and criminal cases, the 
dockets in juvenile cases are protected by Juv.R. 37(B), which provides, “No 
public use shall be made by any person, including a party, of any juvenile court 
record * * *, except in the course of an appeal or as authorized by order of the 
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18 
court or by statute.”  But this rule must yield when it impinges on the public’s due 
process right to a meaningful closure hearing.  Cf., e.g., Scripps Howard, 73 Ohio 
St.3d at 21-22, 652 N.E.2d 179; State ex rel. Cincinnati Post v. Court of Appeals, 
Second Appellate Dist. (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 378, 381-382, 604 N.E.2d 153 
(newspaper entitled to writ of mandamus to compel access to results of cases 
decided under judicial-bypass section of abortion statute’s parental-notification 
requirement, as long as disclosure does not compromise the anonymity of the 
minor). 
{¶ 51} “The purpose of Juv.R. 37(B) is to keep confidential juvenile court 
records involving children, since their welfare is at stake.”  Scripps Howard, 73 
Ohio St.3d at 22, 652 N.E.2d 179.  This purpose, however, is not adversely 
affected by the public disclosures required by constitutional due process to afford 
the press and public a meaningful opportunity to be heard in closure hearings, 
because the court can and should redact any confidential information.  This result 
secures the right of the press and the public to be heard on the issue of closure 
without compromising the vital confidentiality interests in place to protect the 
children involved in these proceedings. 
{¶ 52} Therefore, we grant a writ of mandamus to compel the juvenile 
court to enter on a publicly available docket motions for closure, notices of 
scheduled hearings on the motions, and court decisions on the motions, and to 
provide access to those motions, notices, and decisions, subject to redaction of 
confidential information. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 53} Based on the foregoing, we grant the requested extraordinary relief 
in prohibition to prevent Judge Floyd from closing juvenile court proceedings 
without conducting an evidentiary hearing and without making the required 
findings.  We grant a writ of mandamus to compel Judge Floyd and the juvenile 
court to provide a transcript of the portion of the May 2, 2006 Dupree amenability 
January Term, 2006 
19 
hearing at which one of his parents testified.  We also grant a writ of mandamus 
to compel Judge Floyd and the juvenile court to conduct a closure hearing on the 
issue of whether a transcript of the April 27, 2006 arraignment hearing in the 
school-fire case should be released to the Plain Dealer, with notice of the closure 
hearing to be given to the parties, the Plain Dealer, and the public.  In addition, we 
grant a writ of mandamus to compel the juvenile court to enter notice on a 
publicly available docket when motions to close are filed, when hearings on the 
motions will be held, and court rulings on the motions, and to permit public 
access to these filings and rulings after confidential information has been 
redacted.  We deny the request for a writ of mandamus to compel the court to 
provide the transcript of the May 2, 2006 proceeding in the Burton delinquency 
case.  Our holding renders the Plain Dealer’s motions to strike moot. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL 
and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
 
PFEIFER, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 54} I concur in the holdings of the court in this case, which balance 
well the competing, legitimate interests of openness and privacy in juvenile court 
proceedings.  However, some of the language in the opinion could be applied in 
future cases to discount the value of privacy in certain proceedings.  The 
opinion’s emphasis on the “ ‘many legitimate interests [that] favor public access 
to [juvenile delinquency] proceedings,’ ” majority opinion at ¶ 35, quoting State 
ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Geauga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 
Juvenile Div. (2000), 90 Ohio St.3d 79, 84, 734 N.E.2d 1214, and seeming 
approval of the statement that “traditional notions of confidentiality should be 
relaxed in juvenile proceedings,” majority opinion at ¶ 35, go much too far in 
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20 
shifting the balance in juvenile court proceedings away from privacy and toward 
complete openness. 
{¶ 55} Courts should be cognizant of the strong policy reasons for 
keeping certain juvenile proceedings closed.  The wrongs that children do that 
bring them before the juvenile court bench run the gamut from toilet-papering to 
murder.  Juveniles that commit minor wrongs (and their parents) should not be 
faced with having to satisfy a nearly impossible-to-meet standard to keep a 
hearing closed and personal.  The test for determining whether a juvenile 
proceeding should be open has in effect become “Is the newspaper interested in 
covering it?”  Juvenile court judges should have more leeway in determining 
whether to close a proceeding based on how an open proceeding could affect the 
ultimate rehabilitation of the child. 
__________________ 
 
Baker & Hostetler, L.L.P., and David L. Marburger, for relator. 
 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Charles 
E. Hannan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondents. 
______________________