Case Title: Butcher v. University of Massachusetts

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12698

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-12-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12698 
 
JON BUTCHER  vs.  UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS & others.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     October 1, 2019. - December 31, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & 
Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Newspaper.  Libel and Slander.  Emotional Distress.  Privileged 
Communication. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
January 21, 2014. 
 
 
The case was heard by Douglas H. Wilkins, J., on a motion 
for summary judgment. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Jon Butcher, pro se. 
 
David C. Kravitz, Deputy State Solicitor (Denise Barton 
also present) for Cady Vishniac. 
 
Zachary C. Kleinsasser, for Gatehouse Media, LLC, & others, 
amici curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
 
                     
 
1 Keith Motley, Winston Langley, Patrick Day, James Overton, 
Donald Baynard, Paul Parlon, Shira Kaminsky, Paul Driskill, Cady 
Vishniac, and Brian Forbes. 
2 
 
 
 
LENK, J.  In March of 2013, the University of Massachusetts 
Boston (UMass) police department received a report that an 
unknown man was engaging in suspicious activity near the UMass 
campus.  The police included an account of this report, and 
their attempts to find the unknown man, in their daily public 
police log (blotter).  At the time this activity was reported, 
defendant Cady Vishniac was a UMass student and the news editor 
of the school newspaper, Mass Media.  Mass Media republished the 
blotter entries for that week, including the report of the 
unknown man's allegedly suspicious activities.  After the UMass 
police were unable to locate the man, a UMass police officer 
sent a photograph to Mass Media asking for help in identifying 
him.  Mass Media republished a version of the report, 
accompanied by the photograph.  Soon after the photograph was 
released, the previously unknown man was identified as the 
plaintiff. 
 
According to the plaintiff, these reports, which circulated 
for over one week without his knowledge, were utterly false.  
Indeed, he asserts that he is a victim twice over:  first, of an 
assault by a bus driver, and, thereafter, by the publication of 
slanderous stories that suggested he was a sexual predator. 
 
The plaintiff commenced this action against UMass and a 
number of individually named defendants, largely UMass employees 
or former employees, for their role in spreading the purportedly 
3 
 
 
false reports about him.  The decisive question in this case is 
whether a newspaper can be liable for republishing public police 
logs and requests for assistance received from a police 
department.  We conclude that, based on the particular facts of 
these publications, the fair report privilege shielded Vishniac 
from liability.2 
 
1.  Background.  a.  Facts.  "We recite the facts in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff."  Ravnikar v. 
Bogojavlensky, 438 Mass. 627, 628 (2003).  The publications at 
issue refer to an alleged incident that occurred on March 13, 
2013.  At that time, the plaintiff was employed as a security 
engineer with the information technology department at UMass.  
At around 10 A.M. that morning, UMass Boston police officers 
responded to a report of suspicious activity at the John F. 
Kennedy station on the Massachusetts Bay Transportation 
Authority's Red Line (JFK Station).  When police arrived, they 
met with a bus driver who informed them that he had observed a 
suspicious male taking photographs of women on the bus.  Police 
then interviewed a second witness, a bus company employee, who 
also said that the bus driver had observed a man taking 
photographs of people.  The employee, who was a bus starter, 
                     
 
2 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by Gatehouse 
Media, LLC, Associated Press, Reporter's Committee for Freedom 
of the Press, New England First Amendment Coalition, and 
Massachusetts Newspapers Publishers Association. 
4 
 
 
indicated that the suspicious male was wearing dark glasses and 
did not appear to be a student.  The employee got on the bus and 
sat next to the individual in an effort to dissuade him from 
taking any more photographs. 
 
The plaintiff offers a very different account of this 
incident.  He states that he was on his way to work at UMass 
when he decided to take photographs of the buses housed at the 
JFK Station.  The purpose of those photographs was to document 
what he saw as serious safety concerns regarding the bus company 
and its drivers.3  He believed that he had permission to take 
these photographs, in part, because the bus company was engaged 
in an ongoing union dispute, and the union had encouraged 
members to document any problems.  The plaintiff contends that a 
bus driver saw what he was doing, accused him of taking 
photographs of the driver, and proceeded to accost him.  Then, 
the driver attempted to block the plaintiff from leaving the 
bus.  The altercation only ended when the plaintiff left the bus 
and the driver sped off.  That afternoon, the plaintiff sent an 
electronic mail message to the UMass office of public safety, 
                     
 
3 Approximately one year after this purported incident, the 
bus company was in fact shut down due to a host of safety 
issues. 
 
5 
 
 
under the pseudonym "Eric Jones," describing this encounter.4  
Police replied to the message on March 15, but received no 
response. 
 
The police included only a report of the bus driver's 
version of events in the UMass police blotter.  The police 
blotter for March 10, 2013, through March 16, 2013, later was 
republished by Mass Media.5  In that online publication, all of 
the week's blotter entries were listed, verbatim, in 
chronological order by the date and time that the report had 
been made.  The report of the JFK Station incident read: 
"A suspicious white male in a black jacket took photographs 
and video of nearby women, as well as some buildings on 
campus.  A witness stated that the party did not appear to 
be a student and was not wearing a backpack.  The witness 
snapped a photograph of the suspect and shared that 
photograph with Campus Safety.  Officers tried to locate 
the suspect at JFK/UMass Station, but could not find him." 
 
 
On March 22, 2013, UMass police received photographs from 
the bus company that supposedly depicted the man who had been 
                     
 
4 The plaintiff's message reported how "Eric Jones" had been 
attacked by a Crystal Transportation bus driver between 9:30 and 
9:45 A.M. that morning.  It also indicated that this incident 
was only the most recent unsafe behavior that he had observed on 
the part of that company's bus drivers. 
 
 
5 The parties contest precisely when this republication 
occurred. 
6 
 
 
reported to be taking photographs of women.  Officers added the 
photographs to their internal incident report.6 
 
UMass administrators became concerned about the activities 
of the as-yet unidentified "Eric Jones."  At the request of the 
UMass police, the photographs supplied by the bus company were 
provided to Mass Media in order to assist police in identifying 
the then unknown man.  On March 25, 2013, Mass Media published 
an article in their electronic edition under the title "Have you 
Seen This Man?"  Unlike the previous publication of the blotter, 
this article provided an account only of the JFK Station 
incident and included the photograph supplied by the UMass 
police.  It read: 
"On the morning of March 13, the man in the photograph 
allegedly walked around the UMass Boston campus snapping 
pictures of female members of the university community 
without their permission.  According to the student who 
reported him, he did not appear to be a student as he was 
not carrying a backpack.  If you see him, please call 
Campus Safety . . . ." 
 
The same article was included in the print version of the Mass 
Media newspaper that ran from March 26, 2013, through April 9, 
2013. 
 
On March 27, 2013, the plaintiff was identified by a 
coworker as the man in the photograph.  His supervisor brought 
                     
 
6 This report also included witness narratives of the 
incident, the identity of the responding officers, and the 
current status of the police investigation.  It was not 
published in the blotter or otherwise released to the public. 
7 
 
 
him to the UMass police department so security officers could 
speak with him.  The plaintiff was upset when he learned that 
his photograph had been placed in the article published by Mass 
Media.  He acknowledged that he had sent the electronic mail 
message from "Eric Jones," in order to preserve his privacy, but 
insisted that he had done nothing wrong and that he sought only 
to protect himself from the attack of the bus driver and the 
unsafe conditions on the bus.  UMass police took possession of 
the plaintiff's UMass-owned cellular telephone, which was issued 
in conjunction with his job,7 and later conducted a search of the 
image files stored on it with the assistance of an assistant 
district attorney.  None of the files dated March 13, 2013, were 
photographs of women.  Instead, several photographs from the 
time of the incident depicted buses and a bus driver. 
 
In the months following the publication of this story, the 
plaintiff sensed lingering hostility around the UMass campus.  
He noticed that bus drivers would slow down and stare at him as 
they passed.  He also perceived repercussions at his work.  
Coworkers asked him if he had seen the newspaper articles.  His 
workload was increased, and he was left out of critical 
                     
 
7 The cellular telephone itself was owned by UMass; the 
plaintiff maintains that the card seized was his private 
property. 
8 
 
 
meetings.  Finally, seven months after the publication, the 
plaintiff left his job at UMass. 
 
b.  Procedural history.  In January 2014, the plaintiff, 
acting pro se, filed a six-count complaint in the Superior Court  
against UMass and several individual defendants.  In May 2015, a 
Superior Court judge allowed the defendants' motion to dismiss 
pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), and 
dismissed all of the counts except the plaintiff's claims of 
defamation against Vishniac and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress against Vishniac and defendants University of 
Massachusetts, Keith Motley, Winston Langley, Hanes Overton, 
Donald Baynard, Paul Parlon, and Brian Forbes (collectively, the 
University defendants). 
 
The University defendants and Vishniac jointly filed a 
motion for summary judgment in September 2016; the motion was 
granted in November 2016.  In allowing the motion for summary 
judgment, the judge determined that the content of the articles 
was both attributed to official police logs and a substantially 
accurate account of those logs.  He concluded, therefore, that 
the purportedly defamatory statements fell under the "fair 
report privilege" and, as such, were not actionable. 
 
The plaintiff appealed and, in September 2018, the Appeals 
Court reversed the judgment as to Vishniac, after concluding 
that the fair report privilege did not apply.  See Butcher v. 
9 
 
 
University of Mass., 94 Mass. App. Ct. 33, 34 (2018).  We 
granted the defendants' application for further appellant 
review, limited to the claims against Vishniac. 
 
2.  Discussion.  We favor summary judgment in defamation 
cases, in light of the chilling effect that the threat of 
litigation can have on activities protected by the First 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  See King v. Globe 
Newspaper Co., 400 Mass. 705, 708 (1987) ("Even if a defendant 
in a libel case is ultimately successful at trial, the costs of 
litigation may induce an unnecessary and undesirable self-
censorship"); New England Tractor–Trailer Training of Conn., 
Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 395 Mass. 471, 476 (1985), cert. 
denied, 485 U.S. 836 (1988).  Nonetheless, to prevail on a 
motion for summary judgment in a defamation action, the moving 
party must meet the usual burden under Mass. R. Civ. P. 56 (c), 
as amended, 436 Mass. 1401 (2002).  See Mulgrew v. Taunton, 410 
Mass. 631, 633 (1991). 
 
Summary judgment is warranted where "there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and, where viewing the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  Harrison v. 
NetCentric Corp., 433 Mass. 465, 468 (2001).  See Mass. R. Civ. 
P. 56 (c).  Because the plaintiff ultimately would bear the 
burden of proof at trial, Vishniac "is entitled to summary 
10 
 
 
judgment if [she] demonstrates . . . that [the plaintiff] has no 
reasonable expectation of proving an essential element of [his] 
case."  Dulgarian v. Stone, 420 Mass. 843, 846 (1995), quoting 
Symmons v. O'Keeffe, 419 Mass. 288, 293 (1995). 
 
a.  Defamation.  To withstand a motion for summary judgment 
on his defamation claim, the plaintiff is required to 
demonstrate that "(a) [t]he defendant made a statement, 
concerning the plaintiff, to a third party . . . [;] (b) [t]he 
statement could damage the plaintiff's reputation in the 
community . . . [;] (c) [t]he defendant was at fault in making 
the statement . . . [;] [and] (d) [t]he statement either caused 
the plaintiff economic loss . . . or is actionable without proof 
of economic loss" (citations omitted).  Ravnikar, 438 Mass. at 
629-630. 
 
It makes no difference that Mass Media only republished the 
allegedly defamatory statements of another.  "[O]ne who repeats 
or otherwise republishes defamatory matter is subject to 
liability as if he had originally published it."  Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 578 (1981).  See Appleby v. Daily Hampshire 
Gazette, 395 Mass. 32, 36 (1985).  In the eyes of the law, 
"[t]ale-bearers are as bad as the tale-makers."8 
                     
 
8 R.B. Sheridan, The School for Scandal, act I, scene i, in 
R.B. Sheridan, The School for Scandal and Other Plays 197 
(Penguin Classics ed., 1988) (originally published in 1777). 
11 
 
 
 
i.  Fair report privilege.  In allowing the defendants' 
motion for summary judgment, the motion judge relied upon an 
exception to the republication rule:  the fair report privilege.  
Under early common law, newspapers and other types of 
journalists were subject to the republication rule like any 
other defamer.  See Medico v. Time, Inc., 643 F.2d 134, 137 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 836 (1981).  Recognizing the 
chilling effect this could have on media reporting, by the late 
Eighteenth Century9 courts began to develop the fair report 
privilege as a "safety valve" for the press.  See Howell v. 
Enterprise Publ. Co., LLC, 455 Mass. 641, 651 (2010); 1 R.D. 
Sack, Defamation § 2:7, at 2-118 (5th ed. 2019). 
 
Originally, the fair report privilege only shielded the 
press when it reported on defamation in judicial proceedings 
that happened in open court.  See Barrows v. Bell, 7 Gray 301, 
312 (1856) (describing British common-law approach).  Early in 
the Commonwealth's history, however, the privilege expanded to 
encompass a broader array of judicial actions.  Compare Cowley 
v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884) (no privilege in absence 
of judicial action on petition), with Thompson v. Boston Publ. 
Co., 285 Mass. 344, 347 (1934) (issuance of warrant by clerk was 
                     
 
9 See Note, Privilege to Republish Defamation, 64 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1102, 1102 (1964) (discussing emergence of fair report 
privilege), citing King v. Wright, 8 Durn. & E. 293, 101 Eng. 
Rep. 1396 (K.B. 1799). 
12 
 
 
privileged); Kimball v. Post Publ. Co., 199 Mass. 248, 249–250, 
(1908) (privilege attached to order to show cause).  Executive 
actions of a quasi judicial nature eventually came within the 
scope of the privilege as well.  See Conner v. Standard Publ. 
Co., 183 Mass. 474, 479 (1903) (fire marshal report); Barrows, 
supra at 315-316 (medical board). 
 
In its modern conception, the fair report privilege has 
grown beyond its judicial or quasi-judicial roots.  It has been 
described as follows: 
"The publication of defamatory matter concerning another in 
a report of an official action or proceeding or of a 
meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of 
public concern is privileged if the report is accurate and 
complete or a fair abridgment of the occurrence reported." 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 611 (1981). 
 
When distinguishing "official" actions, which are 
privileged, from "unofficial" actions, which are not, 
commentators and courts consider two primary policy 
justifications:  the "agency" rationale and the "public 
supervision" rationale.  See Sack, supra at § 7:3.5, at 7-28. 
Under the agency rationale, the press acts as the "eyes and 
ears" of the public by bringing them news of reports and 
activity that they have the right to observe.  ELM Med. Lab., 
Inc. v. RKO Gen., Inc., 403 Mass. 779, 783 (1989), overruled on 
another ground by United Truck Leasing Corp. v. Geltman, 406 
Mass. 811 (1990).  Under the "now predominant" public 
13 
 
 
supervision rationale, Sack, supra, the fair report privilege is 
crafted to "promote[] our system of self-governance."  2 R.A. 
Smolla, Law of Defamation § 8:3, at 8-8 (2d. ed. 2019).  "By 
subjecting to exacting public scrutiny the machinations of 
government agencies, the news media makes government officials 
accountable to the public in the performance of their duties."  
Ingenere v. American Broadcasting Cos., 11 Media L. Rep. 1227, 
1229 (D. Mass. 1984).  Accordingly, the public supervision 
rationale recognizes that: "(1) the public has a right to know 
of official government actions that affect the public interest; 
(2) the only practical way many citizens can learn of these 
actions is through a report by the news media; and (3) the only 
way news outlets would be willing to make such a report is if 
they are free from liability, provided that their report was 
fair and accurate."  Yohe v. Nugent, 321 F.3d 35, 43 (1st Cir. 
2003). 
 
We also are mindful that the fair report privilege 
implicates competing constitutional concerns.10  On one side of 
the scale, the fair report privilege "clearly partakes of First 
                     
 
10 See Wright, Defamation, Privacy, and the Public's Right 
To Know:  A National Problem and a New Approach, 46 Tex. L. Rev. 
630, 634 (1968); Moore, A Newspaper's Risks in Reporting Facts 
from Presumably Reliable Sources:  A Study in the Practical 
Application of the Right of Privacy, 22 S. C. L. Rev. 1, 33 
(1970). 
14 
 
 
Amendment values, and it has been suggested that the privilege 
(in some form) should perhaps be understood as required by 
modern First Amendment principles."  Smolla, supra at § 8:67, 
at 8-127.  See B.W. Sanford, Libel and Privacy § 10.2, at 10-15 
(2d. ed. Supp. 2019) (accord).11  As the United States Supreme 
Court noted in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 
(1974), ensuring that the press can report freely on public 
affairs "requires that we protect some falsehood in order to 
protect speech that matters."  On the other side, defamatory 
statements impede society's interest in preserving each 
individual's right to privacy12 and freedom from defamation. 
 
Recognizing these competing interests, "[o]ur cases have 
taken an expansive but not unlimited view of what qualifies as 
an 'official' action" to which the fair report privilege 
                     
 
11 "Although we have not had occasion to determine if the 
fair report privilege is compelled by the United States 
Constitution or the Massachusetts Constitution, there is little 
doubt that the privilege insulates a category of speech that 
tends to receive the utmost deference from both."  Howell v. 
Enterprise Publ. Co., 455 Mass. 641, 654 n.10 (2010). 
 
 
12 As future United States Supreme Court Associate Justice 
Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D. Warren wrote in their seminal 
work, "[t]he design of the law must be to protect those persons 
with whose affairs the community has no legitimate concern, from 
being dragged into an undesirable and undesired publicity and to 
protect all persons, whatsoever; their position or station, from 
having matters which they may properly prefer to keep private, 
made public against their will."  S. Warren and L. Brandeis, The 
Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, 214-215 (1890). 
15 
 
 
applies.  Howell, 455 Mass. at 654.  In this case, we are 
concerned with "reports of official statements" and "reports of 
official action," "both of which are covered by the fair report 
privilege." 13  Id. at 657. 
 
"Official statements" typically are either "on-the-record 
statements by high-ranking (authorized to speak) officials," or 
"published official documents."  Howell, 455 Mass. at 658.  
Although other, less formal statements also may qualify, 
anonymous statements, id., and "mere allegations made to public 
officials," id. at 658 n.14, do not.  See Jones v. Taibbi, 400 
Mass. 786, 796 (1987) ("unofficial statements made by police 
sources are outside the scope of the fair report privilege").  
"Official actions" are those that involve the "administration of 
public duties," or "the exercise of the power of government to 
cause events to occur or to impact the status of rights or 
resources."  Howell, supra at 654.  Unlike official statements, 
"if the unattributed statement reflects official action, the 
source of the statement is unimportant."  Id. at 659 n.16.  In 
sum, the contemporary fair report privilege is a "safe harbor 
for those who report on statements and actions so long as the 
statements or actions are official and so long as the report 
                     
 
13 The fair report privilege also clearly would apply to "a 
public hearing before a judge or the Legislature or some other 
governmental body."  See Howell, 455 Mass. at 656.  No such 
proceedings, however, are at issue in this case. 
16 
 
 
about them is fair and accurate" (emphasis added).  Howell, 
supra at 651. 
 
ii.  Police blotters.  Vishniac maintains that, because the 
blotters were public records, any statements contained within 
them were privileged.  The public nature of these records, 
however, does not dictate the outcome here. 
 
Clearly, police blotters, like those at issue here, are 
statutorily-mandated public records.  See G. L. c. 41, § 98F.14  
We have never held, however, that all reports based on public 
records are privileged.  In Sanford v. Boston Herald-Traveler 
Corp., 318 Mass. 156, 158 (1945), we rejected such a per se 
rule, stating that "we are not prepared to concede that the 
general right of inspection of public records enables one in 
every instance to publish such records broadcast without regard 
to the truth of defamatory matter contained in them."  Rather, 
we look to the contents of the actual records themselves to 
determine whether they are reports of either official statements 
or official actions.  See Howell, 455 Mass. at 654. 
                     
 
14 "Each police department and each college or university to 
which officers have been appointed pursuant to [G. L. c. 22C, 
§ 63,] shall make, keep and maintain a daily log, written in a 
form that can be easily understood, recording, in chronological 
order, all responses to valid complaints received, crimes 
reported, the names, addresses of persons arrested and the 
charges against such persons arrested.  All entries in said 
daily logs shall, unless otherwise provided in law, be public 
records available without charge to the public during regular 
business hours and at all other reasonable times . . . ." 
17 
 
 
 
Police departments are required to issue daily reports of 
three kinds of events:  "responses to valid complaints 
received," "crimes reported," and "the names, addresses of 
persons arrested and the charges against such persons arrested."  
G. L. c. 41, § 98F.  While G. L. c. 41, § 98F, makes all of 
these reports available to the public, the fair report privilege 
does not sweep as broadly.  To be sure, we have held that some 
required blotter entries, most notably reports of arrests, are 
privileged reports of official actions.  See Jones, 400 Mass. 
at 795 ("The publication of the fact that one has been arrested, 
and upon what accusation, is not actionable, if true" [citation 
omitted]).  Other entries required by G. L. c. 41, § 98F, 
however, fall outside the scope of reports that we have treated 
as privileged.  A "report of a crime," for example, may consist 
of an anonymous complaint accusing a person of committing a 
crime.15  Such anonymous accusations, without a subsequent 
response by police, are neither official statements nor official 
actions cloaked by the fair report privilege.  See Reilly v. 
Associated Press, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 764, 776-777 (2003).  See 
                     
 
15 The blotter in this case includes one such report of a 
crime:  "A vandal smashed the window of a car parked in the 
South Lot.  The owner of the vehicle stated that nothing had 
been stolen and that she did not know why anybody would 
deliberately damage her car."  The blotter includes no reference 
to a subsequent police response. 
18 
 
 
also Cowley, 137 Mass. at 394 (where "[b]oth form and contents 
depend wholly on the will of a private individual," statements 
are not privileged); Smolla, supra at § 8:72, at 8-142 (accord). 
 
Moreover, blotters may contain entries that are not 
required by statute.16  The blotter in this case, for example, 
listed fourteen entries over a period of six days.  Of those, at 
least three were not reports of arrests, crimes reported, or 
responses to valid complaints.17  None of those three entries was 
an official statement or demonstrated official police action 
beyond the mere act of placing an entry in the blotter. 
                     
 
16 Pursuant to G. L. c. 41, § 98F, the only records that 
police may not include in a public blotter are: 
 
"(i) any entry in a log which pertains to a handicapped 
individual who is physically or mentally incapacitated to 
the degree that said person is confined to a wheelchair or 
is bedridden or requires the use of a device designed to 
provide said person with mobility, (ii) any information 
concerning responses to reports of domestic violence, rape 
or sexual assault, (iii) any entry concerning the arrest of 
a person for assault, assault and battery or violation of a 
protective order where the victim is a family or household 
member, as defined in [G. L. c. 209A, § 1], or (iv) any 
entry concerning the arrest of a person who has not yet 
reached [eighteen] years of age." 
 
 
17 These three entries state:  (1) "A piece of yellow pipe 
was left lying on the ground in the Clark Lot.  A car rolled 
over the pipe, slashing the tire"; (2) "A student in the Clark 
Lot reported that she felt ill and nauseous.  Emergency 
personnel treated the student, but she refused to go to the 
emergency room"; and (3) "A teenager in the Upward Bound program 
tried to run away and then physically harmed herself.  An 
ambulance transported her to Boston Medical Center." 
19 
 
 
 
Neither the language nor the legislative history of G. L. 
c. 41, § 98F, indicates that the Legislature intended to expand 
the fair report privilege to otherwise unprivileged blotter 
entries.  The statute itself says nothing about the fair report 
privilege.  When the Legislature first enacted this statute in 
1980, see "An Act relative to the keeping of a daily log by 
police departments," St. 1980, c. 142, it debated how the 
proposed statute would expand press access to police logs.  
During those debates, legislators expressed concerns about the 
ways in which the statute could expose the lives of private 
citizens to the public.  See, e.g., Senate Floor Debate, Apr. 
22, 1980.  In urging other members to support the bill, its 
sponsor emphasized that the legislation would require a public 
listing only of actual arrests, not of all calls that police 
receive or all incidents that are reported.  See Public Arrest 
Log Bill Hits Snag in the Senate, Boston Globe, Apr. 17, 1980. 
 
More than a decade after G. L. c. 41, § 98F, was enacted, 
in 1991 the Legislature amended this statute to require certain 
school safety officers to maintain the same types of blotters as 
other police officers.  See St. 1991, c. 125.  This amendment 
came on the heels of several high-profile attempts by student 
journalists to gain access to school security logs.  See Campus 
crime logs to be open to public:  Weld signs bill allowing daily 
review, Boston Globe, July 15, 1991.  Even then, however, the 
20 
 
 
Legislature did not amend G. L. c. 41, § 98F, to create a 
statutory fair report privilege for blotters.  It does not 
appear that, at any stage of this statute's development, the 
Legislature ever contemplated codifying a form of the fair 
report privilege. 
 
As a practical matter, moreover, we do not think a blanket 
privilege is necessary to ensure that the press are able to 
report on blotter entries.  Even without the privilege, most 
statements in a blotter will not be actionable because they are 
not "of and concerning" a particular person.  See Hanson v. 
Globe Newspaper Co., 159 Mass. 293, 294 (1893).  At the very 
least, a plaintiff alleging defamation must establish "that the 
defendant was negligent in publishing words which reasonably 
could be interpreted to refer to the plaintiff."  New England 
Tractor-Trailer Training of Conn., Inc., 395 Mass. at 479.  
Here, the first publication referred only to a "suspicious white 
male in a black jacket . . . [who] did not appear to be a 
student and was not wearing a backpack."  No one reasonably 
could have interpreted this bare-bones description, without 
more, as referring specifically to the plaintiff.  Accordingly, 
regardless whether the privilege applied, this claim would fail 
as a matter of law. 
 
Extending the fair report privilege to cover all statements 
in police blotters would blur the line we have drawn between 
21 
 
 
privileged official statements and actions, and unprivileged 
unofficial ones.  Further, as some commentators have noted, 
extending the privilege would create a risk that blotters could 
become "a tempting device for the unscrupulous defamer" who 
could report, anonymously, scandalous accusations, knowing they 
could be "given wide currency in the tabloids and newspapers."  
See 2 F.V. Harper, F. James, Jr., & O.S. Grey, Torts § 5.24, at 
243 (3d. ed. 2006) (describing applicability of fair report 
privilege to groundless law suits).  Facilitating defamation in 
this way, when the press otherwise can report on the vast 
majority of blotter entries without risk of liability, would not 
serve the public interests that underlie the fair report 
privilege.  We decline, therefore, to apply the fair report 
privilege to all statements of any type contained in any police 
blotter.18 
 
iii.  First publication.  The first purportedly defamatory 
statements consisted of a verbatim republication of a blotter 
entry.  Rather than merely restating the bus driver's 
                     
 
18 We recognize that some other jurisdictions have reached a 
different result, and have determined that public blotters in 
their entirety are privileged.  See Whiteside v. Russellville 
Newspapers, Inc., 2009 Ark. 135 at 7-8, cert. denied, 558 U.S. 
876 (2009) (collecting cases).  Our decision reflects the more 
narrow approach to the fair report privilege that we 
consistently have applied in our previous jurisprudence, and 
continue to do in this case.  See 1 R.D. Sack, Defamation 
§ 7:3.5, at 7-33 & n.113 (5th ed. 2019). 
22 
 
 
allegations, the entry described how the police had responded to 
his complaint, and the results of that police response.  This 
response is what distinguishes the blotter entry in this case 
from a typical, unprivileged witness statement. 
 
As we previously have noted, one private citizen's 
accusations against another are not privileged simply because 
they appear in a police record.  See Reilly, 59 Mass. App. Ct. 
at 776-777.  When the police take action on accusations, 
however, "every citizen should be able to satisfy himself with 
his own eyes as to the mode in which [that] public duty is 
performed."  See Cowley, 137 Mass. at 394.  Accordingly, a 
report of this official action is privileged.19  Here, the UMass 
police department's discretionary decision to respond to and 
investigate the allegations against the plaintiff "imbue[d] 
[those] allegations with an official character."  See Howell, 
455 Mass. at 658 n.14.  At that moment, the police response 
became an "official action[]" that fell within the fair report 
privilege.  See id. at 658. 
                     
 
19 This distinction is consistent with at least one code of 
journalistic ethics, which provides that a journalist should 
"[b]alance a suspect's right to a fair trial with the public's 
right to know," and "[c]onsider the implications of identifying 
criminal suspects before they face legal charges." Society of 
Professional Journalists, Code of Ethics, https://www.spj.org 
/pdf/spj-code-of-ethics.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2TA-BGZ5].  
Although, as that code itself notes, these ethical guidelines 
are not legally enforceable, see id., they provide practical 
support for the line we draw. 
23 
 
 
 
Once the privilege attaches, it extends not only to the 
police response, but to the underlying allegations as well.  
When official government action takes place, the public likewise 
has an interest in knowing the circumstances giving rise to that 
action, including statements from police sources about the 
allegedly criminal activity that has produced a response.  See 
Jones, 400 Mass. at 796-797; Sibley v. Holyoke Transcript-
Telegram Publ. Co., 391 Mass. 468, 468-469 (1984) (contents of 
affidavit attached to search warrant were privileged); Thompson, 
285 Mass. at 346-347, 353 (applying privilege both to issuance 
of arrest warrant and underlying details).  Without this 
context, it would be impossible for the public to assess the 
appropriateness of the government's response, and the public 
supervision rationale would be thwarted.  See, e.g. Cowley, 137 
Mass. at 394. 
 
In sum, once police undertake an official response to a 
complaint, both that response and the allegations that gave rise 
to it fall within the fair report privilege.  Thus, here, both 
the report of the UMass police response, and the allegations 
that triggered that response, were privileged. 
 
iv.  Second publication.  The second publication, as well, 
fell within the fair report privilege.  That article included 
24 
 
 
two related communications:  a republication of relevant details 
from the police blotter, and a photograph of the plaintiff.20 
 
As with the first post, the republication of the blotter 
narrative was privileged as a report of official police actions.  
While it is not a perfect reproduction of the blotter post, it 
is substantively identical.  The later post still attributes the 
contents of the article to UMass police.  In so doing, the 
article carefully states that the police narrative is an 
"alleg[ation]" from a police source, and does not present it as 
the truth.  Moreover, as with the first publication, the second 
reflects ongoing police action, i.e., the search for an unknown 
man, and the reasons underlying that action.  Accordingly, 
because the article was limited to official actions, it was 
within the scope of the privilege. 
 
For related reasons, we conclude that the photograph of the 
plaintiff also was privileged.  Unlike the narrative, the 
photograph was never connected to the police blotter.  Rather, 
it was included in the Mass Media publication, both in print and 
                     
 
20 Unlike the first publication, the second is "of and 
concerning" the plaintiff.  See Hanson, 159 Mass. at 294.  It is 
clear from the record that at least one third party, the 
plaintiff's supervisor, was able to identify him based on the 
photograph contained in the publication.  Where a party is 
identifiable by a photograph, and that photograph is 
sufficiently tied to defamatory statements, those statements may 
be actionable by the identifiable party.  See Brauer v. Globe 
Newspaper Co., 351 Mass. 53, 56-57 (1966).  See also Stanton v. 
Metro Corp., 438 F.3d 119, 129, (1st Cir. 2006). 
25 
 
 
on the Internet, at the request of the UMass police, based on an 
inquiry from UMass administrators concerning the message from 
"Eric Jones" that they suspected was from a student.  Some 
courts in other jurisdictions have held that, when police 
release the photograph of a suspect or arrestee to solicit the 
aid of the press, the republication of that photograph is 
privileged.  See Kenney v. Scripps Howard Broadcasting Co., 259 
F.3d 922, 924 (8th Cir. 2001); McDonald v. Raycom TV 
Broadcasting, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 688, 691-692 (S.D. Miss. 
2009); Beyl v. Capper Publ., Inc., 180 Kan. 525, 528 (1957); 
Martinez vs. WTVG, Inc., Ohio Ct. Appeals, No. L-07-1269, slip 
op. at ¶¶ 2, 31 (Apr. 11, 2008).  Vishniac asks us similarly to 
conclude that the UMass police department's decision to release 
the plaintiff's photograph was an official action covered by the 
fair report privilege. 
 
In ELM Med. Lab., Inc., 403 Mass. at 783, we recognized 
that "public health warnings issued by a governmental agency" 
fall within the fair report privilege.  A year earlier, in MiGi, 
Inc. v. Gannett Mass. Broadcasters, Inc., 25 Mass. App. Ct. 394, 
396 (1988), the Appeals Court had reached the same conclusion 
concerning the Department of Public Health's release of a 
photograph of an allegedly defective child's toy.  Each of these 
decisions rested on the precept that, when the government seeks 
to warn the public about a potential hazard, the press is 
26 
 
 
privileged to offer fair and accurate reports of those warnings.  
Likewise, when the police reach out to local journalists and ask 
for their assistance in identifying an unknown person, they are 
performing an official act that falls under the fair report 
privilege.21  Accordingly, the release of the photograph by Mass 
Media also was a privileged report of official action. 
 
v.  Fairness and accuracy.  Although the reports at issue 
here thus fall within the scope of the fair report privilege, 
that does not foreclose liability.  The privilege is not 
absolute; it can be lost if a plaintiff shows that the publisher 
acted with malice or that the report is not a "fair and 
accurate" portrayal of official actions or statements.  See 
Yohe, 321 F.3d at 43.  We consider fairness and accuracy as two 
separate but related elements.  "A report is accurate if it 
'conveys to the persons who read it a substantially correct 
account of the proceedings.'"  Howell, 455 Mass. at 661, quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 611 comment f (1977).  "It is 
fair so long as it is not 'edited and deleted as to misrepresent 
the proceeding and thus be misleading.'"  Howell, supra, at 661-
662, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 611 comment f, 
supra. 
                     
 
21 Had the police released this photograph as part of an 
official press release, it also would have been privileged as an 
official statement.  The record is not clear, however, on 
exactly how the police provided this photograph to Mass Media. 
27 
 
 
 
The fairness and accuracy of a report is a matter of law to 
be determined by a court "unless there is a basis for divergent 
views."  Howell, 455 Mass. at 661.  We review the attributed 
statements in the context of the entire publication, and the 
addition or reframing of information can remove otherwise fair 
and accurate statements from the privilege.  See Brown v. Hearst 
Corp., 54 F.3d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 
There is little doubt that the first publication here was a 
fair and accurate report of the police blotter.  To meet this 
standard, a publisher must show only the "factual correctness of 
the events reported," and not "the truth about the events that 
actually transpired."  Yohe, 321 F.3d at 44.  As noted, supra, 
Mass Media's account was not only factually correct, it was a 
verbatim reproduction of the blotter without any commentary or 
framing by Mass Media.  Cf. Brown, 54 F.3d at 25.  This article 
was a fair and accurate report of police action.22 
                     
 
22 Of course, a report that begins as fair and accurate may 
not remain so as new information is released.  This can prove 
particularly problematic in the case of online publications.  A 
defamatory story posted online has both greater longevity and a 
greater potential to spread, resulting in ongoing injury.  See 
Peltz, Fifteen Minutes of Infamy:  Privileged Reporting and the 
Problem of Perpetual Reputational Harm, 34 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 
717, 719 (2008).  In this case, however, the online version of 
the story was removed from the Mass Media Web site before any 
new information could render it misleading.  Because of both the 
initial fairness and accuracy of the publication, and the 
subsequent removal of the article from the online version, this 
publication was fully privileged. 
28 
 
 
 
The second publication warrants closer scrutiny.  We note 
three inaccuracies in the article.23  It (1) identifies the 
source as a student, where the blotter is silent; (2) misstates 
that the subject was taking photographs on the UMass campus, 
instead of at the JFK Station; and (3) adds that the plaintiff 
took photographs of women "without their permission."  
Inaccuracies, however, "do not amount to falsity so long as 'the 
substance, the gist, the sting, of the libelous charge be 
justified'" (citation omitted).  Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 
Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991).  Here, the "sting" of the 
publication was that the plaintiff was seen suspiciously taking 
photographs of women.  Neither the location of the activity, nor 
the identity of the particular witness who reported it, would 
enhance the defamatory effect of this report.  The additional 
allegation that the plaintiff took photographs of women "without 
their permission" does have a greater potential impact on this 
defamatory sting.  Nonetheless, because the blotter itself 
described the man's activity as suspicious, the inference that 
he was taking these photographs in a surreptitious manner was 
not unreasonable.  This added detail did not transform the 
statements in the report or enhance its defamatory "sting."  ELM 
Med. Lab., Inc., 403 Mass. at 783.  Instead, it "produce[d] the 
                     
 
23 The plaintiff does not identify any inaccuracies 
regarding the photographs, and neither do we. 
29 
 
 
same effect on the mind of the recipient which the precise truth 
would have produced" (citation omitted).  Id.  The "rough-and-
ready summary" of the report was sufficiently accurate, and 
these statements are not actionable.  See Yohe, 321 F.3d at 44. 
 
b.  Intentional infliction of emotional distress.  In 
addition to his claim of defamation, the plaintiff also 
maintains that Vishniac is liable for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.  To prevail on that claim, the plaintiff 
would have to show:  "(1) that the actor intended to inflict 
emotional distress or that [she] knew or should have known that 
emotional distress was the likely result of [her] 
conduct . . . ; (2) that the conduct was 'extreme and 
outrageous,' was 'beyond all possible bounds of decency' and was 
'utterly intolerable in a civilized community' . . . ; (3) that 
the actions of the defendant were the cause of the plaintiff's 
distress . . . ; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained 
by the plaintiff was 'severe.'"  Howell, 455 Mass. at 672, 
quoting Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 144-145 
(1976). 
 
The plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress fails for the same reasons as does his claim 
of defamation.  These claims are based on the same underlying 
conduct:  the defendants' publications.  The defendants' 
statements were privileged; such a privilege cannot be evaded 
30 
 
 
simply by relabeling a deficient claim.  See Correllas v. 
Viveiros, 410 Mass. 314, 324 (1991).  Were it otherwise, a 
plaintiff could make an end-run around the First Amendment by 
camouflaging a defamation claim as a different tort.  Cf. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).  
Accordingly, we apply the fair report privilege to both actions.  
See Yohe, 321 F.3d at 44 ("a plaintiff cannot evade the 
protections of the fair report privilege merely by re-labeling 
his claim").  For this reason, both of the plaintiff's claims 
fail as a matter of law.  See Howell, 455 Mass. at 672. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgment affirmed.