Case Title: Prince George's County v. Concerned Citizens

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2023-09-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Prince George’s County Council, et al. v. Concerned Citizens of Prince George’s County, 
et al., No. 23, September Term, 2022.  Opinion by Gould, J. 
 
LAND USE – ZONING – STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
Maryland courts review amendments to the text of a zoning ordinance as legislative 
actions.  Md. Overpak Corp. v. Mayor of Balt., 395 Md. 16, 35 (2006); MBC Realty, LLC 
v. Mayor of Balt., 192 Md. App. 218, 234 (2010).  In Prince George’s County, amendments 
to the zoning ordinance are considered “final decision[s]” of the Prince George’s County 
Council, sitting as the District Council, and are reviewed by courts only for legality.  See 
Md. Code Ann., Land Use § 22-407(a)(1), (e) (2012, 2022 Supp.); Town of Upper 
Marlboro v. Prince George’s Cnty. Council, 480 Md. 167, 180-81, 191 (2022); Cnty. 
Council of Prince George’s Cnty. v. Chaney Enters. Ltd. P’ship, 454 Md. 514, 528-31 
(2017).  
 
LAND USE – ZONING – UNIFORMITY 
 
In uniformity challenges to zoning regulations, Maryland courts evaluate whether the 
regulation is “reasonable and based upon the public policy to be served.”  Montgomery 
County v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280 Md. 686, 720 (1977).  The Supreme Court of 
Maryland has held that “[t]he crux of the [uniformity] requirement is only that similarly 
situated properties are treated the same under the zoning regulations,” observing that “the 
kind of discrimination violative of the uniformity requirement occurs when a zoning 
ordinance singles out a property or properties for different treatment than others similarly 
situated.”  Anderson House, LLC v. Mayor of Rockville, 402 Md. 689, 714-15 (2008). 
 
LAND USE – ZONING – UNIFORMITY 
 
The Supreme Court of Maryland upheld an amendment to a Prince George’s County zoning 
ordinance that allowed qualifying properties in the Residential-Agricultural Zone to 
develop higher-density housing.  Even though the amendment’s text and history showed 
that the Council knew that only one particular property would likely qualify, the 
amendment was valid because it furthered a valid public purpose and did not discriminate 
between similarly situated properties.
 
 
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County 
Case No. C-02-CV-20-001850 
Argued: February 3, 2023 
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
 
OF MARYLAND* 
 
No. 23 
 
September Term, 2022 
__________________________________ 
 
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY 
COUNCIL, et al. 
 
v. 
 
CONCERNED CITIZENS OF PRINCE 
GEORGE’S COUNTY, et al. 
__________________________________ 
 
Fader, C.J., 
Watts, 
Booth, 
Biran, 
Gould, 
Eaves, 
Getty, Joseph M. (Senior Justice, 
 
Specially Assigned) 
 
JJ. 
__________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Gould, J. 
Fader, C.J., Watts, and Booth, JJ., dissent. 
__________________________________ 
 
Filed: August 22, 2023 
 
 
 
*At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a 
constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme 
Court of Maryland.  The name change took effect on December 14, 2022.
 
 
This zoning dispute involves the interplay between the public’s interest in the future 
of a small, struggling private airport in Prince George’s County and the financial interests 
of its owner. 
The airport lies in an area that was once rural and is now largely suburban.  Over 
the past forty years or so, a few dozen small planes have crashed during takeoff or landing.  
Some of those planes have crashed into nearby residences or the highway that runs next to 
the airport, sometimes fatally.  Since at least the 1990s, the county has identified the airport 
as a public safety risk. 
The airport has experienced financial difficulties in recent years.  As a result, its 
owners have said they will increase operations or, alternatively, redevelop the site for 
non-airport use.  The county’s zoning ordinance has historically limited development of 
housing at the airport to low-density, single-family detached housing.  To incentivize 
redevelopment of the airport, the County Council, over the protests of some constituents, 
amended the text of the zoning ordinance to allow the airport to develop higher-density 
housing, including townhouses. 
Those constituents challenged the legality of that ordinance in court, claiming that 
it violated Maryland’s uniformity requirement, which requires zoning laws to “be uniform 
for each class or kind of development throughout a district or zone.”  Md. Code Ann., Land 
Use (“LU”) § 22-201(b)(2)(i) (2012, 2022 Supp.).1  They argued that the ordinance, though 
facially neutral, violates uniformity because it is tailored so narrowly as to afford favorable 
 
1 The cited statute applies to Prince George’s County.  Maryland’s uniformity law 
applicable elsewhere in the State is functionally identical.  See LU § 4-201(b)(2). 
2 
 
development opportunities, in effect, to only the airport property.  The circuit court rejected 
their challenge, but the Appellate Court of Maryland2 reversed, finding that the ordinance 
violated the uniformity requirement. 
We find that, notwithstanding the financial benefits the airport’s owners and 
developers may enjoy, the ordinance was adopted to further a valid public purpose and 
does not discriminate against similarly situated properties; therefore, it should have 
survived the uniformity challenge.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate 
Court. 
BACKGROUND 
In November 2019, the Prince George’s County Council, sitting as the District 
Council (the “Council”),3 enacted Council Bill 17-2019 (“CB-17” or “Council Bill 17”), a 
text amendment to the Prince George’s County Code, to encourage the decommissioning 
of the Freeway airport by allowing higher-density housing.  Under the county zoning 
ordinance then in effect (the “Old Zoning Ordinance” or “PGCC § 27-”), the airport was 
zoned as Residential-Agricultural (“R-A”).  The R-A Zone prohibited single-family 
attached residences (“townhouses”) and imposed a maximum development density of 0.5 
dwelling units per acre.  PGCC §§ 27-441(b), 27-442(h).   
 
2 At the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a 
constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Special Appeals to the 
Appellate Court of Maryland.  The name change took effect on December 14, 2022. 
 
3 The Council is the ultimate local legislative authority over zoning laws and maps 
within Prince George’s County.  LU § 22-104.   
3 
 
Council Bill 17, however, exempts qualifying R-A Zone properties, namely the 
Freeway airport, from those limitations, allowing townhouses and a development density 
of up to 4.5 dwelling units per acre.  PGCC § 27-441(b) n.136.4  Specifically, CB-17 allows 
for higher-density housing5 if located on an assemblage of adjacent properties that: (1) is 
100-150 acres or was formerly used as an airport; (2) is entirely within one mile of a 
municipal boundary; (3) is entirely within 2,500 feet of land used for the generation, 
transmission, or distribution of electricity; and (4) has frontage on a freeway.  Id. 
The Freeway Airport and Environs 
The Freeway airport is a privately-owned general aviation airport on a 129-acre 
property at 3900 Church Road in Bowie.  The Rodenhauser family has owned and operated 
the airport since it began as an airfield in the 1930s, when the area was rural.  In 1947, the 
airport opened for general aviation and has operated as an airport ever since.  In 1968, the 
property was included in the R-A Zone.  Because the R-A Zone does not allow for airports,6 
the property obtained legal nonconforming use status.7 
 
4 The cited footnote appears throughout the record variously as Footnote 134 and 
Footnote 135.  The current version of the zoning ordinance codifies the text amendment as 
Footnote 136.  PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY, MD., MUN. CODE (2022 Supp., Update 3), 
(codified through Bill No. CB-104-2022, effective Dec. 27, 2022). 
 
5 We refer to the allowance of townhouse construction and a development density 
of up to 4.5 dwelling units per acre collectively as “higher-density housing.” 
 
6 The R-A Zone allows special exceptions for private airstrips, which are much 
smaller and limited in their operations.  PGCC §§ 27-441(b), 27-445.07. 
 
7 Nonconforming uses are lawful uses that do not conform to zoning regulations, 
typically because they predate the enactment of a new zoning ordinance.  Trip Assocs., Inc. 
v. Mayor of Balt., 392 Md. 563, 573 (2006).  A nonconforming use may be permitted to 
4 
 
Today, the airport is largely surrounded by suburban residential communities, 
developed mostly in the last two decades, containing hundreds, if not thousands, of homes.  
Waterford Estates is directly west of the airport, containing hundreds of single-family 
detached homes; Fairwood lies to the north and has approximately 1,700 residences, 
including townhouses; Fairview Manor sits to the east; and Woodmore Highlands is to the 
southeast.  The Woodmore golf course community, directly west of Waterford Estates and 
approximately one-half mile from the Freeway airport, contains 259 townhouses.  That 
community was developed under a 2008 amendment to the zoning ordinance allowing 
townhouses on certain R-A Zone properties, up to a density of 0.5 dwelling units per acre.  
PGCC § 27-444(b)(6). 
Route 50, an interstate highway with four lanes in each direction, abuts the north 
end of the airport’s only runway.  Along the property’s western edge, high-voltage electric 
transmission lines installed in the 1960s run approximately one thousand feet from, and 
parallel to, the runway.  The transmission lines, in addition to presenting aviation obstacles, 
reduce the space available for emergency landings.  The eastern boundary of the property 
runs along Church Road, a county road with one lane in each direction.  
In the mid-1990s, the Small Airports Advisory Committee—which included 
Councilmember Derrick Leon Davis, the sponsor of CB-17—studied the various airports 
in Prince George’s County in an effort to promote safe development near the Freeway 
airport.  The committee was especially concerned with the risk of, and damage from, planes 
 
continue if a property owner can show the use was lawful at the time the new zoning 
ordinance was enacted.  LU § 22-114. 
5 
 
crashing during takeoff and landing.  Subsequent development of the Fairwood 
community, located just north of the airport, incorporated lessons from that study.  
Specifically, the Council enacted regulations limiting development density in areas where 
planes were more likely to crash. 
Since 1983, 32 accidents have been documented at the Freeway airport, resulting in 
10 fatalities.  In some cases, planes have landed directly on or close to Route 50, colliding 
with traffic in at least one instance.  On September 12, 2019, while CB-17 was under 
consideration by the Council, a plane from the airport crashed into Route 50, striking a car 
and injuring multiple people.  At least twice, planes have crashed into or very close to 
homes, sometimes fatally. 
The Enactment of CB-17-2019 
Councilmember Davis introduced CB-17 on April 30, 2019, to amend the Table of 
Uses under the Old Zoning Ordinance for the stated purpose “of permitting Townhouse 
and One-family detached dwelling uses in the R-A (Residential Agricultural) Zones of 
Prince George’s County, under certain circumstances.”  CNTY. COUNCIL OF PRINCE 
GEORGE’S CNTY., MD., SITTING AS THE DIST. COUNCIL, CB-17-2019, 2019 Leg. (2019). 
The first draft of the bill would have permitted development of townhouses up to 
6.0 dwelling units per acre and single-family detached homes up to 6.7 dwelling units per 
acre in the R-A Zone if the assemblage of land: (1) was no more than 140 acres; (2) was 
formerly used, entirely or in part, as an airport; (3) was located within one mile of a 
municipal boundary; and (4) had frontage on a public right-of way classified as an arterial 
6 
 
or higher by the State.  Despite the facially neutral language of the bill, CB-17 specifically 
sought to incentivize the decommissioning of the Freeway airport. 
Two days later, the Prince George’s County Planning Board (the “Planning Board”) 
held a hearing on the bill.  The Planning Board is a five-member body responsible for local 
planning, subdivision, and zoning.  LU § 20-202(a)(i).  Proposed amendments to the zoning 
ordinance must be sent to the Planning Board for comments and recommendations.  PGCC 
§ 27-217.  At the hearing, when a board member asked Robert Antonetti, counsel for 
Freeway Airport, LLC,8 why Freeway Airport did not instead apply to rezone the property, 
Antonetti said he expected a text amendment would be a faster and more direct process. 
The same day, the Planning Board issued a report to the Council opposing CB-17.  
The Planning Board argued that townhouses were not appropriate for the R-A Zone, the 
stated purposes of which are “to provide for large-lot one-family detached residential 
subdivisions, while encouraging the retention of agriculture as a primary land use[,]” and 
to “encourage the preservation of trees and open spaces[.]”  PGCC § 27-426(a). 
 The Planning Board determined that, without the “former airport” requirement, 
approximately 262 properties would meet the criteria of the bill.  With the “former airport” 
requirement, however, only the Freeway airport would qualify, as the three other 
operational airports in the county were not zoned R-A.  The Planning Board added that it 
“believe[d] this bill was drafted for a specific property”—the Freeway airport.  The Prince 
 
8 Freeway Airport, LLC, a partnership between the Rodenhauser family and St. John 
Properties, Inc., is the contract purchaser of the Freeway airport property.  For clarity, we 
refer to petitioner Freeway Airport, LLC, as “Freeway Airport” and the Freeway airport 
property as “the Freeway airport” or “the airport.” 
7 
 
George’s County Office of Law (“Office of Law”) agreed, writing in a one-sentence 
memorandum that “[t]he bill may be subject to challenge as it appears to be drafted for a 
specific parcel.”  Neither the Planning Board nor the Office of Law expressly raised the 
prospect of a uniformity violation. 
Before CB-17 was sent to the Council, the Planning, Housing, and Economic 
Development Committee of the Prince George’s County Council (the “Planning 
Committee”) considered CB-17 in a hearing on June 20.  In advance, Councilmember 
Davis had asked Karen Zavakos, Legislative Officer for the Planning Committee, to draft 
amendments to the bill (“Draft 2”) “[i]n the interest of tempering the concerns raised by 
[the] Planning Board[.]”  In response to concerns that the “formerly used as an airport 
language . . . may have been too specific,” Draft 2 made the bill “more facially neutral.”  
As relevant here, Draft 2 eliminated the “former airport” language; increased the maximum 
area from 140 to 150 acres; required the assemblage to be within 2,500 feet of land used 
for electrical generation, transmission, or distribution; and changed the requirement of 
proximity to an arterial right-of-way to proximity to a freeway. 
Discussion at the Planning Committee hearing was dedicated to the Freeway airport.  
“Council Member Davis, the bill sponsor, informed the Committee that CB-17-2019 is 
intended to facilitate an idea for a development opportunity on property in his district where 
growth in the surrounding area of a small airport has occurred.”  CNTY. COUNCIL OF PRINCE 
GEORGE’S CNTY., MD., PLANNING, HOUSING, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE 
REPORT, 2019 Leg., 1 (2019).  Various constituents testified.  Most opposed CB-17, 
expressing concerns about traffic safety on Church Road, increased burdens on public 
8 
 
resources like infrastructure and schools, and changes to the character of the area.  A few 
residents, however, testified in support of CB-17, citing the unsuitability of the airport to 
the area, the undesirability of expanded airport operations there, and opportunities for 
economic development. 
Kim Rodenhauser, whose family owns the Freeway airport, read a prepared 
statement.  She described the financial challenges of the business and said that CB-17 
would allow her family to redevelop the property rather than expand airport operations, 
which the Rodenhausers believed would otherwise be necessary to stay in business.  She 
was forthright about the family’s financial interest in CB-17, saying, “This legislation 
would benefit our family . . . we have a vested interest in the future of the property[.]”  The 
statement also described when, in 1998, an airplane crashed into the Rodenhausers’ home, 
killing one person.  Antonetti testified about the history of aviation accidents at the airport 
and the risk presented by the nearby transmission lines, adding that “this bill would 
absolutely motivate the permanent closure of this airport.”  He also argued that the site was 
well-suited for townhouses because it was located near existing housing development, a 
freeway, and electricity transmission, and had already been cleared. 
Councilmember Thomas Dernoga suggested reducing the maximum distance from 
electrical infrastructure from 2,500 feet to 2,000 feet to ensure that no properties other than 
the Freeway airport would qualify.  This suggestion, however, was ultimately not proposed 
as an amendment.  The Planning Committee adopted the amendments proposed by 
Councilmember Davis, further revised the acreage requirement to include a minimum of 
100 acres, and voted to advance Draft 2 to the Council. 
9 
 
The Council held a hearing on September 10.  Public comment largely tracked the 
testimony at the Planning Committee hearing, with most opposing CB-17.  Councilmember 
Colin Byrd of the Greenbelt City Council expressed concern that, even though the bill 
targeted the Freeway airport, it “could allow other properties in the County to do similar 
things.”  One constituent alleged that the proposed developer, St. John Properties, Inc., had 
misled residents into submitting letters supporting the closure of the airport. 
Others testified in support.  Members of the Prince George’s County Chamber of 
Commerce called the use of the site as an airport “unsustainable” and contended that CB-17 
would create jobs, expand the tax base, and encourage development of nearby retail and 
entertainment.  Tom Williams, a longtime employee and instructor at the Freeway airport, 
described his unease flying so close to housing developments.  Antonetti also introduced 
maps into the record showing the 32 documented accidents since 1983. 
Councilmember Davis described his participation in the County’s past efforts to 
reduce public safety risks arising from the airport’s proximity to housing developments, 
namely Fairwood.  He also rejected accusations made by certain constituents that 
councilmembers had been paid by private interests to support CB-17. 
The Council considered further amendments (“Draft 3”) on October 8, 2019.  The 
principal amendment, proposed by Councilmember Davis, reintroduced the “formerly used 
as an airport” language—no longer, however, as an absolute requirement but as an 
alternative to the acreage requirement.  The record does not reveal why the former airport 
use language was reintroduced.  When Councilmember Davis was asked if the language 
was necessary, given that the Freeway airport already satisfied the acreage requirement, he 
10 
 
replied affirmatively but without explanation.  Another amendment reduced the maximum 
development density to 4.5 dwelling units per acre.  The Council approved the amendments 
without explanation. 
Before the next public hearing, Planning Board staff provided the Planning Board 
with a memorandum opposing CB-17, contending that townhouses were neither 
appropriate for the R-A Zone nor the successor Agricultural-Residential Zone (“AR”) 
under the New Zoning Ordinance (“2022 PGCC § 27-”),9 and that the bill appeared to have 
been drafted for a specific property.  Two days later, the Planning Board submitted another 
report to the Council repeating its concerns and recommending that the property instead be 
rezoned to permit townhouses.  The report noted that staff could not identify all properties 
meeting the criteria of Draft 3 because staff (1) lacked records of land “formerly used as 
an airport” and (2) could not determine what was meant by “assemblages of properties,” 
which could potentially describe an “infinite” number of properties.  The Planning Board, 
 
9 In October 2018, the District Council adopted a new zoning ordinance (the “New 
Zoning Ordinance”).  The New Zoning Ordinance was set to take effect when the Council 
approved a countywide sectional map amendment, a process requiring the Council to apply 
the appropriate zoning classification in the New Zoning Ordinance to each parcel of real 
property in the County.  CNTY. COUNCIL OF PRINCE GEORGE’S CNTY., MD., SITTING AS 
THE DIST. COUNCIL, CB-13-2018, 2018 Leg. (2018).  The New Zoning Ordinance—both 
the zoning text and accompanying maps—ultimately took effect April 1, 2022.  To 
distinguish citations to the Old Zoning Ordinance (“PGCC § 27-”) from citations to the 
New Zoning Ordinance, references to the New Zoning Ordinance are identified as “2022 
PGCC § 27-.” 
 
When the New Zoning Ordinance took effect, the Freeway airport was rezoned as 
Agricultural-Residential (“AR”), the successor to the R-A Zone under the Old Zoning 
Ordinance.  The AR Zone, like its predecessor, prohibits townhouses as a principal use and 
provides for a maximum density of 0.5 dwellings units per acre.  2022 PGCC 
§§ 27-4201(d)(2), 27-5101(c). 
11 
 
however, noted that the Freeway airport would meet the criteria if its airport operations 
ceased. 
The Office of Law also reviewed Draft 3, writing on November 13 that the bill 
“appear[ed] to be drafted for a specific parcel contained within an R-A zone” because only 
one parcel met the eligibility criteria for townhouse development.  The Office of Law stated 
that “[i]f townhomes are permitted in the R-A zone, then the zoning regulations will not be 
uniform because townhomes are not detached, single family, nor on large lots.”  This 
statement marked the first direct appearance in the record of a uniformity concern.  
Notably, the Office of Law’s concern apparently arose not because only the Freeway 
airport met the townhouse development requirements but because, as a general matter, 
allowing townhouse development conflicted with the purposes of the R-A Zone. 
The Council held a public hearing on Draft 3 on November 19.  Constituents 
presented similar arguments as those previously described.  Antonetti contended that the 
bill was “not merely for private gain,” citing the accident history at the Freeway airport 
and “the public safety benefit to closing a general aviation airport surrounded by residential 
development.”  The President of the Woodmore Homeowner’s Association10 expressed 
concern that a specific parcel in his community called “Hidden Pond” might qualify for 
higher-density housing under CB-17.  This prompted the Council to amend the bill in a 
manner designed to exclude that parcel. 
 
10 The Woodmore Homeowner’s Association represents homeowners from the 
Woodmore golf course community, not to be confused with Woodmore Highlands. 
12 
 
When it came time for the Council to vote on CB-17, Councilmember Deni Taveras 
explained her affirmative vote and encouraged other Councilmembers to do the same, 
saying: 
. . . I’ll mention my experience with airport safety issues.  And the 
irony is that the gentleman from St. John’s does highlight seven 
crashes and nine, and ten fatal deaths that have occurred over the last 
several years and you are included.  I remember.  And what it remind 
—what that also reminds me of is that, on November 12, 2001, back 
where I’m from in New York, we had 265 people die in a plane crash, 
Flight 587, heading to Dominican Republic.  I don’t know if anybody 
remembers that, but it was shortly after 9/11.  And I lost ten people, 
ten family members, on that plane crash, ones, family and friends.  
And, especially after 9/11, as a New Yorker, I was never the same, 
and neither was my family, and neither was the neighborhood.  
Especially if you live in [sic] an airport, none of that is ever the same.  
 
. . . [T]he alternative [to developing the Freeway airport] is that they’re 
going to rebrand and they’re going to reengage to have higher, 
increasing traffic.  This is the risk that you take.  And everybody feels 
that it’s not them.  They’re never going to get hit.  They’re never—
they’ll survive.   
 
And so, the thing is, I just say there’s nothing wrong with the outline 
of the development plan that’s provided.  With the same way we have 
Fairwood and some of these other higher-density, and Woodmore 
Highlands, some of these higher densities, they would look at—
there’s no difference with what’s being proposed, which concerns me 
that why this area and not Fairwood and not these other places.  Why 
is that okay?  And I think that the lady says, if they were allowed, why 
can’t this? 
 
And so, with that, I just want to say that, and there’s already plans for 
an ice rink.  There’s already plans for a school site.  There are already 
plans in place for future development that compensates and that 
accounts for the changes that are coming.  So, with that, I just want to 
say go ahead and vote in favorable [sic] for this proposal. 
 
13 
 
The Council then approved the final version of CB-17, and CB-17 took effect 45 
days later on January 3, 2020.  The enacted bill added Footnote 13611 to the Table of Uses,  
permitting townhouses and single-family detached homes in the R-A Zone at up to 4.5 
dwelling units per acre if: 
(a) The use is located on an assemblage of adjacent properties 
that: 
(i)  is no less than one hundred (100) acres and no more 
than one hundred fifty (150) acres in size or was 
formerly used as an airport; 
(ii) is entirely within one (1) mile of a municipal 
boundary; 
(iii) is entirely within 2,500 feet of land owned by a 
regulated public utility and used for purposes of 
electrical generation, transmission, or distribution 
in connection with providing public utility service 
in the County by a regulated public utility; and 
(iv) a portion of the boundary of the assemblage of 
adjacent properties has frontage on a public 
right--of--way classified as a freeway or higher in 
the Master Plan of Transportation and is maintained 
by the State Highway Administration. 
PGCC § 27-441(b). 
Procedural Background 
Judicial Review in the Circuit Court 
 
Concerned Citizens of Prince George’s County, et al. (“Concerned Citizens”) 
petitioned for judicial review of CB-17 in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County on 
December 16, 2019.  In its supporting memorandum, Concerned Citizens presented five 
 
11 See text accompanying note 4, supra. 
14 
 
questions, including whether CB-17 violated the uniformity requirement.12  They argued, 
without reference to case law, that CB-17 “[o]n its face” violated uniformity by allowing a 
“very specific, very limited segment of the R-A zone”—the Freeway airport—to develop 
higher-density housing, in conflict with the stated purposes of the R-A Zone. 
Citing Montgomery County v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280 Md. 686 (1977), 
Freeway Airport and the Council argued in a joint opposition memorandum that CB-17 did 
not violate uniformity because: (1) the text of the ordinance applied “uniformly to all 
qualifying properties using the same exact terminology of the regulation,” even if it 
produced “vastly different results on different properties throughout the zone,” and 
(2) CB-17 was “rooted in a sound public policy of protecting the citizens of Prince 
George’s County” by encouraging the decommissioning of the Freeway airport.  
Concerned Citizens’ reply memorandum focused on the alleged impropriety of using a text 
amendment to effect a “site-specific land use process,” but did not elaborate upon the 
uniformity issue. 
 
12 Concerned Citizens presented the following questions before the circuit court: 
 
(1) Was the District Council’s enactment of CB-17-2019 an unlawfully granted 
zoning approval for the Freeway Airport property, when the statutory requirements 
for site-specific zoning actions were not met?;  
(2) Did the District Council’s enactment of CB-17-2019 constitute unlawful spot 
zoning?;  
(3) Did the District Council’s enactment of CB-17-2019 violate the uniformity 
requirement of the Regional District Act?;  
(4) Did the District Council’s enactment of CB-17-2019 violate the “special law” 
prohibition of Maryland’s Constitution?; and  
(5) Was CB-17-2019 enacted unlawfully in the absence of a required public 
hearing?  
15 
 
The matter was subsequently transferred to the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel 
County.  At the hearing, Concerned Citizens’ uniformity argument was limited to showing 
that CB-17 was narrowly drafted to target and benefit the Freeway airport.  On May 7, 
2021, the circuit court affirmed the Council’s decision without explanation. 
Judicial Review in the Appellate Court 
On appeal to the Appellate Court of Maryland, Concerned Citizens raised 
substantially the same challenges as in the circuit court13 and largely repeated their 
uniformity argument.  In discussing Woodward & Lothrop for the first time, Concerned 
Citizens distinguished that case on the grounds that the regulations there were relatively 
broad and had an actual effect on numerous properties, in contrast to those in CB-17, which 
“were painstakingly specific to the Freeway Airport property.”  Concerned Citizens did not 
argue, however, that any criteria of CB-17 were unreasonable or not based on a public 
 
13 Those issues, as stated and numbered by the Appellate Court, were: 
  
(1) Did the District Council’s enactment of CB-17-2019 violate the uniformity 
requirement of Maryland Code, Land Use Article, Regional District Act?;  
(2) Did the District Council's enactment of CB-17-2019 violate the “special law” 
prohibition of the Maryland Constitution?;  
(3) Did the District Council's enactment of CB-17-2019 constitute unlawful “spot” 
zoning?;  
(4) Was the District Council's enactment of CB-17-2019 an unlawful grant of relief 
to Freeway Airport from the use and density restrictions of the R-A zone without 
the required administrative, quasi-judicial procedure?; and 
(5) May the District Council’s enactment of CB-17-2019 be affirmed on the basis 
of “public interest” or “public benefit”? 
 
In re Concerned Citizens of PG Cnty. Dist. 4, 255 Md. App. 106, 109-10 (2022). 
16 
 
purpose.  Those issues arose only when the Appellate Court questioned Freeway Airport 
during oral argument, which led to a cursory and unrevealing discussion.  Concerned 
Citizens did not contend that any other properties were unreasonably excluded from the 
development opportunities under CB-17. 
The Appellate Court held that CB-17 violated Maryland’s uniformity requirement.  
In re Concerned Citizens of PG Cnty. Dist. 4, 255 Md. App. 106 (2022).  The Court 
reasoned that CB-17 was “tailor-made for Freeway Airport” and that the record did not 
show “any public purpose for creation of this special high-density area within an R-A 
zone[.]”  Id. at 124.  In effect, the Court deemed CB-17 a “mere favor” to Freeway Airport.  
Id. at 125-27.  As evidence, the Court pointed to the provisions in CB-17 relating to former 
airport use and proximity to electrical infrastructure, finding that they lacked any 
discernible public purpose.14  The Court did not reach the other issues on appeal. 
Petition for Certiorari and the Motion to Dismiss 
Freeway Airport and the Council each petitioned for writ of certiorari, asking this 
Court to reverse the Appellate Court and affirm the validity of CB-17.  To complicate 
matters, after we granted writ of certiorari, Prince George’s Cnty. Council v. Concerned 
Citizens of Prince George’s Cnty., 482 Md. 31 (2022),  a newly elected Council enacted 
Council Bill 17-2023 (“CB-17-2023”), which took aim at CB-17 and the broader practice 
of enacting footnote exceptions to the Table of Uses in the Old Zoning Ordinance.  CNTY. 
 
14 The Court did not take issue with the provisions requiring proximity to a 
municipality and a freeway.  Concerned Citizens, 255 Md. App. at 125-26 & n.16.  
Concerned Citizens has not argued that those provisions are not reasonable and based upon 
public policy, except to the extent they target the Freeway airport. 
17 
 
COUNCIL OF PRINCE GEORGE’S CNTY., MD., SITTING AS THE DIST. COUNCIL, CB-17-2023, 
2023 Leg. (2023).15  The Council subsequently filed a notice of dismissal, thereby 
withdrawing as a party and leaving Freeway Airport as the sole petitioner.  See Md. Rule 
8-601(a).   
Concerned Citizens moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that CB-17-2023 had 
repealed CB-17 and thus rendered the uniformity question moot.  See Md. Rule 
8-602(c)(8).  “Generally, a case is moot if no controversy exists between the parties[.]”  
D.L. v. Sheppard Pratt Health Sys., Inc., 465 Md. 339, 351 (2019).  In land use and zoning 
cases, we generally presume that, absent contrary legislative intent, a substantive change 
in law occurring during litigation and before any substantive rights have vested is applied 
retroactively.  McHale v. DCW Dutchship Island, LLC, 415 Md. 145, 170 (2010).  Thus, if 
CB-17-2023 were to indeed preclude Freeway Airport from developing under CB-17, this 
controversy would be moot. 
Freeway Airport, in opposing the motion to dismiss, contends that development of 
the airport can proceed under CB-17 despite the passage of CB-17-2023.  Freeway Airport 
argues that: (1) the New Zoning Ordinance allows, in certain cases, for development under 
the Old Zoning Ordinance, see Concerned Citizens, 255 Md. App. at 109 n.2; (2) 
CB-17-2023 prohibits development only under 2022 PGCC § 27-1903; and (3) 
CB-17-2023 does not prohibit Freeway Airport from developing the property under other 
 
15 Council Bill 17-2023 declared as its purposes: “limiting the authority in the 
Zoning Ordinance for development of Townhouse and One-family attached dwelling uses 
under the prior Ordinance in the R-A [] Zone” and “eliminat[ing] uses permitted in the 
prior Ordinance by way of Footnoted exceptions[.]” 
18 
 
sections, namely 2022 PGCC § 27-1704, which allows for development of certain 
“grandfathered” projects.   
From the information in this record, we are unable to definitively determine that the 
case is moot.  We shall, therefore, address the merits.  The effect of our decision on the 
parties will be an issue for another day. 
ZONING AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Zoning authorities in Maryland implement land use plans and determinations of 
zoning categories primarily through three processes: original zoning, comprehensive 
rezoning, and piecemeal rezoning.  Mayor of Rockville v. Rylyns Enters., Inc., 372 Md. 
514, 532 (2002).  Original zoning is the initial designation through legislative action, 
ordinarily by a local government, of large areas according to their permissible or prohibited 
uses and conditions.  Id. at 532, 535.  Comprehensive rezoning, as its name suggests, refers 
to the same process applied to areas previously zoned.  Id.  In contrast, piecemeal rezoning 
is a quasi-judicial action, culminating in a legislative act, relating to an individual parcel, 
lot, or assemblage, and is typically requested by a property owner.  Id. at 532; Anderson 
House, LLC v. Mayor of Rockville, 402 Md. 689, 708 n.17 (2008). 
The Council derives its zoning authority from the Maryland-Washington Regional 
District Act (the “RDA”).  Prince George’s County v. Zimmer, 444 Md. 490, 525-26, 523 
n.29 (2015) (providing a history of the RDA); LU, Titles 14 to 27 (codifying the RDA).  
The RDA establishes the Maryland-Washington Regional District, which consists of nearly 
all of Montgomery and Prince George’s counties, LU § 20-101, and grants primary zoning 
authority to the County Councils sitting as the District Councils, LU § 22-101. 
19 
 
The Council’s zoning powers include “divid[ing] the portion of the regional district 
located within its county into districts and zones of any number, shape, or area it may 
determine.”16  LU § 22-201.  The Council has authority to “adopt and amend the text of the 
zoning laws” and their accompanying maps to regulate, among other things: “the location, 
height, bulk, and size of each building or other structure”; “the density and distribution of 
population”; “the location and uses of buildings and structures”; and “the uses of land[.]”  
LU § 22-104; see also LU § 22-201(b)(1).  Importantly, a text amendment is not a 
piecemeal rezoning, as it does not change the assigned zone of any parcel.  MBC Realty, 
LLC v. Mayor of Balt., 192 Md. App. 218, 238 (2010).  Instead, it amends the regulations 
that apply to a particular zone.  Id. 
We review the Council’s action in zoning matters as administrative agency action.  
Cnty. Council for Prince George’s Cnty. v. Carl M. Freeman Assocs., Inc., 281 Md. 70, 74 
(1977); Md. Rule 7-201(b).  We look through the decisions of the trial court and evaluate 
agency action directly.  Comptroller of Md. v. FC-GEN Operations Invs. LLC, 482 Md. 
343, 359 (2022). 
For Prince George’s County, Section 22-407 of the Land Use Article provides the 
standards of judicial review for the Council’s “final decision[s]” in zoning matters.  LU 
§ 22-407(a)(1), (e); see also Town of Upper Marlboro v. Prince George’s Cnty. Council, 
480 Md. 167, 181, 191 (2022); Cnty. Council of Prince George’s Cnty. v. Chaney Enters. 
Ltd. P’ship, 454 Md. 514, 528-31 (2017).  Both legislative and quasi-judicial acts by the 
 
16 Here, we use the terms “district” and “zone” interchangeably. 
20 
 
Council constitute reviewable “decisions.”  Chaney Enters., 454 Md. at 531 n.12 
(clarifying that zoning “decision[s]” under LU § 22-407(a)(1) include legislative acts, in 
contrast to other statutes that limit review to zoning “actions”); see also Town of Upper 
Marlboro, 480 Md. at 180-81, 191 (reviewing legislative acts of Prince George’s County 
Council under LU § 22-407). 
Section 22-407(e) identifies the circumstances under which we may reverse or 
modify a zoning decision by the Council.  The decision must be: “(i) unconstitutional; 
(ii) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the district council; (iii) made on 
unlawful procedure; (iv) affected by other error of law; (v) unsupported by competent, 
material, and substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted; or (vi) arbitrary 
or capricious.”  LU § 22-407(e).   
Quasi-judicial decisions may be reversed or modified under any of the above 
circumstances.  Town of Upper Marlboro, 480 Md. at 180-81, 191.  In contrast, we review 
legislative decisions only for legality, which implicates only provisions (i) to (iv) of the list 
above.  Id.  Review for legality “is an even more limited standard than the already narrow 
review for arbitrary and capricious action, or for action unsupported by substantial 
evidence.”  Talbot County v. Miles Point Prop., LLC, 415 Md. 372, 393 (2010). 
Here, the Council’s enactment of CB-17 was “in the nature of” a legislative action.  
MBC Realty, 192 Md. App. at 234 (holding that a text amendment is “in the nature of a 
legislative action”); see Md. Overpak Corp. v. Mayor of Balt., 395 Md. 16, 35 (2006).17  
 
17 Community members and at least one councilmember protested the Council’s 
decision to use a text amendment here, arguing that Freeway Airport should have applied 
21 
 
Legislative action enjoys a strong presumption of validity; we do not substitute our policy 
judgments for those of the legislature, and we assume as the action’s basis any reasonably 
conceived state of facts that would sustain it.  See Rylyns, 372 Md. at 535, 542-43 
(“Because special exceptions [and conditional uses] are legislatively-created[,] . . . they 
enjoy the presumption of correctness[.]”); Anderson House, 402 Md. at 723-24 (discussing 
the presumption in the context of original zoning and comprehensive rezoning).  The 
challenger to the law or regulation “carries the heavy burden of establishing, by clear and 
affirmative evidence” the invalidity of the action.  Anderson House, 402 Md. at 724. 
 
 
 
for a piecemeal rezoning—a quasi-judicial action.  Those critics saw CB-17 and text 
amendments broadly as ways to circumvent the more rigorous requirements of 
quasi-judicial action. 
 
In that vein, Concerned Citizens argued before the circuit court and Appellate Court 
that CB-17 unlawfully bypassed what they contended were the required quasi-judicial 
procedures for “site-specific zoning action.”  The Appellate Court did not reach this issue, 
instead invalidating CB-17 on uniformity grounds.   
 
In MBC Realty, opponents of a text amendment which, in effect, allowed only a 
single arena to install new billboards, argued that the amendment was piecemeal zoning.  
192 Md. App. at 238.  The Appellate Court rejected that argument, reasoning that the 
amendment did not change the assigned zone of the arena.  The same reasoning applies 
here.  
 
Additionally, neither the Land Use Article nor the Prince George’s County Code 
require that “site-specific” zoning decisions be subject to quasi-judicial proceedings, 
despite providing for rules in other specific situations.  See LU § 22-206 (providing for text 
amendment procedures); LU § 22-301 (providing authority to grant special exceptions and 
variances); PGCC §§ 27-143 to 27-157 (providing rules for map amendments); PGCC 
§§ 27-214 to 27-219 (providing rules for text amendments); PGCC §§ 27-296 to 27-418 
(providing rules for special exceptions).  Though applying for piecemeal rezoning may 
have been available to Freeway Airport, the Council was permitted to act legislatively. 
22 
 
DISCUSSION 
Concerned Citizens challenges the legality of CB-17 on the grounds that the 
ordinance violates the uniformity requirement, which requires zoning laws to “be uniform 
for each class or kind of development throughout a district or zone.”  LU § 22-201(b)(2)(i).  
Concerned Citizens argues, and the Appellate Court agreed, that CB-17 violates uniformity 
because the Council narrowly tailored it to single out18 the Freeway airport as the only 
qualifying property. 
Maryland’s uniformity statutes, the likes of which nearly all other states have 
adopted, Anderson House, 402 Md. at 713 & n.20, reassure property owners that they will 
not be subject to “arbitrary” or “invidious” discrimination, id. at 717-20, or government 
favoritism or coercion, id. at 716 (quoting Rylyns, 372 Md. at 536).19  Modern courts, 
including this one, understand uniformity as a state law counterpart to “the constitutional 
equal protection prohibition against purely arbitrary zoning classifications and 
restrictions,” and generally apply similar principles of review.  1 Rathkopf’s The Law of 
 
18 The term “singling out” in Maryland uniformity cases first appears, to our 
knowledge, in Anderson House, 402 Md. at 714, 715 n.21, 717, 720, though the concept 
appeared long before then in spot zoning cases, see, e.g., Rylyns, 372 Md. at 546. 
 
19 Maryland’s uniformity statutes adopt, nearly verbatim, the language of the 
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, a model act promulgated by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce.  The model act provides: “All such regulations shall be uniform for each class 
or kind of buildings throughout each district.”  A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING 
ACT § 2 (U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE 1926). 
 
Courts have also described improper discrimination as “unfair,” Anderson House, 
402 Md. at 720, “unequal,” id., “ad hoc,” id. at 714, and “unreasonable,” Rylyns, 372 Md. 
at 546 (describing illegal spot zoning). 
23 
 
Zoning and Planning § 4:8 (4th ed. rev. 2023) (“Rathkopf”) (citing Woodward & Lothrop, 
280 Md. 686); see also Anderson House, 402 Md. at 719 n.23 (comparing the Equal 
Protection clause analysis to uniformity analysis).  Spot zoning cases, which typically 
involve uniformity or uniformity-like challenges to piecemeal rezonings, are also 
instructive.20  See, e.g., Cassel v. Mayor of Balt., 195 Md. 348 (1950); Hewitt v. Cnty. 
Comm’rs of Baltimore Cnty., 220 Md. 48 (1959). 
We may consider direct and circumstantial evidence, including “the historical 
background of the decision under [legislative] challenge, the specific series of events 
leading to the enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative 
history, including contemporaneous statements made by the members of the 
decisionmaking body.”  Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 
U.S. 520, 540 (1993) (describing the standard of review in an equal protection challenge). 
Regulations that draw classifications between properties within a zone are, as a 
general matter, permissible.  The leading cases in Maryland’s limited uniformity case law 
provide that such regulations do not violate uniformity when “reasonable and based upon 
the public policy to be served,” Woodward & Lothrop, 280 Md. at 720, and when “similarly 
situated properties are treated the same[,]” Anderson House, 402 Md. at 715.   
 
 
 
20 “Spot zoning occurs when a small area in a District is placed in a different zoning 
classification than the surrounding property[.]”  Rylyns, 372 Md. at 546 (quoting Tennison 
v. Shomette, 38 Md. App. 1, 8 (1977)). 
24 
 
Public Purpose 
Two of our leading uniformity cases present examples of regulations based upon 
valid public purposes, that is, “the public policy to be served.”  Woodward & Lothrop, 280 
Md. at 720.  In Woodward & Lothrop, we upheld regulations discriminating between 
properties in the same zone based on size and the year that the use began, when those 
regulations furthered “the legislative purpose of encouraging land assembly to permit 
cohesive development and to assure open spaces and other amenities[.]”  Id. at 721.  And 
in Anderson House, we found that regulations tailored to existing property conditions—
which, in effect, created classifications—helped “avoid[] the need for a race to obtain 
variances lest existing developed properties become nonconforming,” 402 Md. at 719, 
“minimiz[ed] the impact of businesses on adjacent residential properties,” id. at 725 n.26, 
and “preserv[ed] the residential character of the existing structures and lots,” id. 
In contrast, zoning regulations have been held invalid when they lack a public 
purpose.  In Cassel v. Mayor of Baltimore, we invalidated the rezoning of a single property 
in a larger residential zone because the sole purpose of the rezoning was to allow the 
property owner to operate a funeral home, not to satisfy any apparent public need.  195 
Md. at 358 (finding little local demand for funeral homes, three existing funeral homes 
within a close distance, and proximity to a commercial district where the funeral home 
could have operated instead).  Similarly, in Hewitt v. County Commissioner of Baltimore 
County, we struck down a zoning map amendment reclassifying two properties in a large 
residential area to business zoning when the only evidence of a public benefit was a vague, 
speculative notion of serving travelers from a nearby expressway.  220 Md. at 62-63. 
25 
 
The requirement that there be a valid public purpose promotes uniformity by 
protecting against mere favoritism toward particular parties.  For example, in Board of 
County Commissioners of Washington County v. H. Manny Holtz, Inc., the Appellate Court 
invalidated the piecemeal rezoning of a property because the Washington County Board of 
County Commissioners (the “Board”) had, merely to appease certain neighbors, restricted 
the allowable uses of the property as a condition of approval.  65 Md. App. 574, 576-77 
(1985); see also Benner v. Tribbit, 190 Md. 6, 20 (1948) (describing invalid zoning 
regulations, broadly, as “arbitrary permission to A and prohibition to B to use their own 
property, at the pleasure of neighbors or at the whim of legislative or administrative 
agencies”); Rockville Fuel & Feed Co. v. City of Gaithersburg, 266 Md. 117, 130 (1972) 
(discussing an invalidated ordinance where “the sole basis for [different treatment] was a 
‘plebescite [sic] of neighbors’ without any supporting evidence that related to the public 
health, comfort, safety or welfare []”). 
Here, CB-17 furthers a public purpose by incentivizing the redevelopment of land 
currently used for a nonconforming and dangerous airport.  Eliminating the risk of plane 
crashes, particularly in a residential area, without question furthers an interest in public 
safety, and Concerned Citizens has not argued otherwise.  Moreover, some constituents 
and at least one local association supported CB-17 because they expected townhouse 
development would benefit the local economy.  
The Council was presented with the following arguments and information, which 
together make up a “state of facts reasonably [] conceived that would sustain” the Council’s 
26 
 
enactment of CB-17.  See Anderson House, 402 Md. at 724 (quoting Edgewood Nursing 
Home v. Maxwell, 282 Md. 422, 427 (1978)). 
1. A history of crashes and fatalities relating to aircraft taking off or landing at the 
Freeway airport.  This record included detailed maps in the record showing crash 
events—some fatal—and testimony from the owners of the airport.  
2. Testimony from an employee of the Freeway airport describing the risks 
presented by nearby transmission lines and residences. 
3. A history of the County’s past efforts to mitigate crashes involving aircraft from 
the Freeway airport (and other airports), the harms from which were exacerbated 
by the growth of nearby housing developments.  The County’s efforts included 
studies and implementation of safety regulations. 
4. Support from some residents and members of the Chamber of Commerce on the 
grounds that development of townhouses would provide economic benefits and 
that continued use of the property as an airport would be inappropriate. 
Additionally, the elimination or mitigation of nonconforming uses is, as a general 
matter, a valid public purpose.21  Trip Assocs., 392 Md. at 573.  That is because 
nonconforming uses are, by definition, incompatible with the zone in which they are 
located and thus reduce uniformity.  Cnty. Council of Prince George’s Cnty. v. E. L. 
Gardner, Inc., 293 Md. 259, 267 (1982) (“[N]onconforming uses pose a formidable threat 
to the success of zoning” because they “limit the effectiveness of land use controls, . . . 
imperil the success of the community plan, and injure property values.”).  For instance, we 
have upheld as a proper exercise of the police power a regulation that phased out all 
 
21 Concerned Citizens did not argue before the circuit court or Appellate Court that 
discontinuing a nonconforming use, either as a general matter or as applied here, is not a 
valid public purpose.  The question did not even arise until the Appellate Court held that 
CB-17’s effort to eliminate a nonconforming use did not overcome the uniformity 
challenge.  Concerned Citizens, 255 Md. App. at 126-27. 
27 
 
nonconforming junk yards within two years.  Shifflett v. Baltimore County, 247 Md. 151, 
154 (1967).  Here, the Freeway airport has been a legal nonconforming use since 1968, 
when the mostly rural area was first zoned as R-A.  Moreover, the airport has become, over 
time, even less practically suited to the increasingly suburban area.   
The circumstances here contrast with those in Cassel, 195 Md. 348, and H. Manny 
Holtz, 65 Md. App. 574, where we invalidated regulations that reduced uniformity.  In 
Cassel, we invalidated the rezoning of a property located in an established residential 
neighborhood that had previously been used as a residence.  195 Md. at 357-58.  The 
property had been rezoned to commercial use to allow the owner to run a funeral home. Id.  
That is not a use most people would call “in harmony with” a residential area.  Id. at 355. 
In H. Manny Holtz, a property owner sought a rezoning of his property from 
residential to business to operate a convenience store.  65 Md. App. 574.  There, the Board, 
in its legislative capacity, had already established the appropriate uses for the business 
zone, which included a convenience store use.  Id. at 577 n.1, 583 n.3.  Subsequently, the 
Board, in its quasi-judicial capacity, restricted the uses of only the applicant’s property to 
prohibit convenience store use.  Id. at 577.22  Thus, the Board’s action not only deviated 
from the zoning ordinance, but reduced uniformity.  Moreover, the Board stripped the 
property owner of a use to which he was otherwise entitled.  In contrast, the Council here, 
in its legislative capacity, passed a text amendment that determined in the first instance the 
 
22 The Appellate Court also said that because the Board had already legislatively 
designated the permitted uses in the zone, “the exclusion of any one or more uses by the 
County Commissioners in its quasi-judicial capacity [was] a usurpation of the legislative 
function.”  H. Manny Holtz, 65 Md. App. at 583 n.3. 
28 
 
possible uses in the R-A Zone and could be seen as increasing uniformity by encouraging 
an out-of-place airport to redevelop as housing in a largely residential area.23 
Concerned Citizens, having failed to argue that decommissioning the Freeway 
airport, or any other similar airport, has no valid public purpose, instead has presented 
evidence of public opposition to CB-17.  Indeed, dozens of community members and other 
public officials opposed higher-density housing development at the Freeway airport.  But 
Concerned Citizens conflates public sentiment with public purpose.  Our duty is not to 
weigh public opinion or debate public policy, but to determine only whether specific 
legislation reasonably serves a public purpose. 
Concerned Citizens argues that any of the ostensible public purposes for CB-17, 
even if valid on their face, are mere pretext for favoritism toward Freeway Airport.  In 
doing so, counsel for Concerned Citizens acknowledged to the circuit court that the 
Council, in enacting CB-17, expressed a concern for public safety: 
I mean, come on.  How can the District Council. . . not understand and accept 
all of this nonsense about how dangerous the airport is[?]  Yes, maybe the 
airport is dangerous.  Maybe when it started in the ‘40s, it was in the middle 
of nowhere. 
 
23 Nor does this case present the same risk of “emasculat[ing] the uniformity 
requirement,” see H. Manny Holtz, 65 Md. App. at 584, as in Cassel and H. Manny Holtz.  
In those cases, the courts feared that upholding the challenged regulations could be “an 
opening wedge for other enterprises,” Cassel, 195 Md. at 358, and encourage the 
“piecemeal proliferations [sic] of [] mini-districts [,]” H. Manny Holtz, 65 Md. App. at 584.   
 
We see little risk that CB-17 will push Prince George’s County down a slippery 
slope into zoning chaos.  If anything, CB-17 is just another ordinance in a long line of 
exceptions, carveouts, and workarounds to Prince George’s County’s antiquated zoning 
ordinance (the Old Zoning Ordinance).  Indeed, the enactment of the New Zoning 
Ordinance was largely motivated by a desire to streamline zoning and do away with such 
exceptions. 
29 
 
 
Concerned Citizens claims, however, that the Council’s concern was either disingenuous 
or induced by Freeway Airport through improper means, and that the real driver of CB-17 
was “development, money.” 
Concerned Citizens has repeatedly alleged the existence of an illegal or unethical 
relationship between the Council and Freeway Airport.  The Appellate Court appeared to 
share this view, expressing concern with what it perceived as a “worrisome dynamic 
between public and private interests.”  Concerned Citizens, 255 Md. App. at 126.  
According to the Court, the Council appeared to have bestowed a “mere favor” upon 
Freeway Airport, id. at 125-26, enacting CB-17 “merely to accommodate private interests 
detrimental to the welfare of other property owners in the same district[,]” id. at 126 
(quoting Page v. City of Portland, 165 P.2d 280, 283 (Or. 1946)).  In this vein, the 
Appellate Court questioned the credibility of the public safety interest in closing the 
Freeway airport, citing the airport’s “[i]ncongruous[]” plan to intensify operations if unable 
to develop higher-density housing.  Id. at 122.  
Concerned Citizens has not, however, identified evidence of favoritism toward 
Freeway Airport, instead merely insinuating that developers have contributed to the 
election campaigns of councilmembers.  The record provides no reason to think the Council 
would not have passed CB-17 if some other party owned or intended to develop the airport.  
The only specific example of impropriety we have discerned in the record is the allegation 
by nearby residents that the developer used misleading tactics to solicit support for the 
proposed development.  Concerned Citizens has not shown, however, how the developer’s 
30 
 
actions implicate the motives of the Council in enacting CB-17.24  And, that Freeway 
Airport’s plans under one scenario might conflict with the public safety interest does not 
undermine the public safety interest in closing the airport.  If anything, Freeway Airport’s 
alternative plan to intensify flight operations could reasonably heighten that interest.25 
Nor are we moved that Freeway Airport pushed the Council to adopt CB-17 by 
raising the undesirable prospect of increased airport operations.  See Concerned Citizens, 
255 Md. App. at 126 (remarking that the airport owners leveraged their “allegedly 
dangerous” airport to “bull[y]” the Council into enacting favorable legislation).  Whether 
 
24 In any event, the Council was made aware of these allegations at public hearings. 
 
25 The Appellate Court also contended that the Council lacks authority to make land 
use policy relating to airport safety, reasoning that regulation of airport safety is the domain 
of the State.  Concerned Citizens, 255 Md. App. at 122-23.  We disagree.  The Council did 
not purport to enact an airport safety policy.  This was merely a text amendment to 
encourage the decommissioning of an airport, which was squarely within the Council’s 
domain. 
 
Moreover, though the State is indeed responsible for many aspects of airport 
regulation, that authority does not preclude political subdivisions from establishing airports 
and enacting certain regulatory measures to promote their safety.  State law explicitly 
allows political subdivisions to establish airports, Md. Code. Ann., Transp. (“TR”) § 5-416 
(1977, 2020 Repl. Vol.), encourages them to adopt zoning regulations to eliminate airport 
hazards, TR § 5-602, and affords them authority to “adopt, under its police power, airport 
zoning regulations to protect the aerial approaches of [a]ny airport not owned by this State,” 
TR § 5-604(a).  See also Rathkopf § 85:3 (“State courts generally have rejected implied 
state preemption claims based on state licensing or regulation of pilots or aircraft, or control 
of other aspects of airport development and operation.”) (footnote omitted). 
 
In fact, Prince George’s County has already used zoning regulations to promote 
airport safety.  The County established Aviation Policy Areas “to establish a standard of 
safety and compatibility for the occupants of land in the immediate vicinity of airports[.]”  
PGCC § 27-548.32; see also PGCC § 27, Part 10B.  These areas are subject to detailed 
regulations, covering everything from development density to the proliferation of birds that 
might interfere with flight paths.  PGCC § 27-548.38. 
31 
 
the operative word is “bullied,” “pressured,” “persuaded,” “influenced,” or “encouraged,” 
the result is the same.  That Freeway Airport, a private company, presented the Council 
with two options—including one at odds with the public interest—does not evidence 
corruption, but a business decision.  Even if the Council conceded more than what was 
necessary to incentivize redevelopment of the property, such miscalculation does not 
sustain a uniformity challenge.  Accountability for any such error in judgment must come 
from the voters, not the courts. 
Facial Neutrality 
Concerned Citizens asks us to infer, as the Appellate Court appears to have done, 
that the Council improperly favored Freeway Airport simply because CB-17 is 
“site-specific,”26 “tailored” in an “excruciatingly detailed” manner to “single out” the 
Freeway airport without mentioning it by name.  Concerned Citizens thus asks us to look 
beyond the facial neutrality of CB-17 to the reality of its practical application. 
Freeway Airport, on the other hand, argues that facial neutrality is the only 
requirement to survive a uniformity challenge, understanding Anderson House to require 
only that the same terminology apply to all properties in a zone.  Freeway Airport finds 
support in our statements there that “uniformly applicable regulations that produce 
disparate results in application do not violate the uniformity requirement,” Anderson 
 
26 In this context, we understand the term “site-specific” to mean affecting one or 
just a few properties.  Though the term is used broadly in the zoning context, see Rathkopf 
§ 60, the term does not appear to have any basis in Maryland uniformity law, as it is absent 
from our key uniformity cases.  See, e.g., Anderson House, 402 Md. 689; Woodward & 
Lothrop, 280 Md. 686; H. Manny Holtz, 65 Md. App. 574; Rylyns, 372 Md. 514.   
32 
 
House, 402 Md. at 717; that “zoning regulations need to be equally applicable,” id. at 719 
n.23; and that we focus “upon the terminology of the ordinance, rather than upon its 
application,” id. at 718 (quoting Woodward & Lothrop, 280 Md. at 720).  If Freeway 
Airport is correct, CB-17 is valid because, regardless of the results, it is facially neutral. 
Facial neutrality, though relevant to our analysis, is not, on its own, a sure defense 
to a uniformity challenge.  See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 534 (holding, 
in an equal protection context, that facial neutrality is not determinative when evaluating 
claims of improper discrimination).  Rather, regulatory classifications must “be founded in 
real and not feigned differences having to do with the purpose for which the classes are 
formed.”  Rumson Ests., Inc. v. Mayor of Fair Haven, 828 A.2d 317, 330 (2003) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Roselle v. Wright, 122 A.2d 506, 511 (N.J. 1956)).  Otherwise, legislators 
could circumvent the uniformity requirement with clever drafting.  Indeed, facial neutrality 
in Woodward and Anderson House was not enough to survive a uniformity challenge—we 
also required a showing of a reasonable relationship to a public purpose and equal treatment 
of similarly situated properties.  
Moreover, courts in the out-of-state cases that we reviewed in Anderson House 
required the same showing.  402 Md. at 714-15 (citing Rumson Ests., 828 A.2d 317 and 
Harris v. Zoning Comm’n of New Milford, 788 A.2d 1239 (Conn. 2002)).  We distinguished 
the regulations in those cases from ones that did not further the public welfare, which were 
consequently invalidated.  Anderson House, 402 Md. at 725 n.26 (citing Hamer v. Town of 
Ross, 382 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1963) and C & M Devs., Inc. v. Bedminster, 820 A.2d 143 (Pa. 
2002) and Nat’l Land and Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1965)). 
33 
 
“Site-Specific” 
Concerned Citizens argues that CB-17 is invalid because it is too site-specific.  
Concerned Citizens highlights not only the narrowly drafted qualifying criteria, but also 
what the Dissent calls the “very limited shelf life” of CB-17.  Dissenting slip op. at 9, 45, 
71.  Concerned Citizens and the Dissent contend that the Council, aware that the previously 
enacted New Zoning Ordinance would soon take effect, not only understood the Freeway 
airport to be the sole qualifying property at that time, but likely for all time.  Dissenting 
slip. op. at 9 (“[CB-17] did not have any prospective application beyond the Freeway 
Property.”); id. at 65. 
The record is not clear, however, that other properties—including non-airport 
properties qualifying under the property size criterion—could not have developed under 
CB-17 between its effective date of January 4, 2020, and the effective date of the New 
Zoning Ordinance, April 1, 2022.  When the Council considered CB-17, the effective date 
of the New Zoning Ordinance was unknown, as it was contingent upon the Council’s 
adoption of the countywide sectional map amendment—an outcome which, at the time, 
was not itself guaranteed.  Indeed, the sectional map amendment was not enacted until 
April 1, 2022.  See note 9, supra.  In other words, CB-17 was in effect for more than two 
years, during which time other property owners could have sought to develop under the 
ordinance.  Nonetheless, for purposes of our analysis, we proceed as if the Council, in 
enacting CB-17, intended to reach only the Freeway airport and believed it would be the 
only property to ever qualify under, and take advantage of, CB-17. 
34 
 
We do not think that a regulation’s “site-specific” intent or effect alone sustains a 
uniformity violation.  That a regulation affects only one or a few properties, though relevant 
to our uniformity analysis, is not dispositive.  See Rylyns, 372 Md. at 543-44 (quoting 
Collard v. Village of Flower Hill, 421 N.E.2d 818, 821 (N.Y. 1981) (“[Z]oning is not 
invalid per se merely because only a single parcel is involved or benefitted[.]”)); id. at 546 
(explaining that spot zoning is not per se invalid).  For example, the piecemeal rezoning in 
Cassel was invalidated not because it affected one property—which is the definition of 
piecemeal rezoning—but because it discriminated between similarly situated properties 
without good reason.  195 Md. at 357-58. 
This proposition holds not only when regulations inadvertently affect only one or a 
few properties, but even when a zoning authority deliberately targets a particular property 
or properties.  See Rockville Fuel & Feed, 266 Md. at 130 (upholding a text amendment 
challenged on equal protection grounds even though it was enacted for the sole purpose of 
thwarting the construction of a specific concrete mixing plant).  That a legislature may 
contemplate a specific property does not prove the absence of a public purpose, or arbitrary 
or invidious discrimination; we do not require legislatures to conceive of legislation “as an 
abstraction” without any actual properties in mind.  MBC Realty, 192 Md. App. at 236.  
And though Concerned Citizens portrays the Council’s “site-specific” efforts as alarming, 
such amendments are not unusual and are often initiated by private interests.27 
 
27 See O’Donnell v. Basslers, Inc., 56 Md. App. 507 (1983) (owner of a private 
airfield seeking to develop a commercial airport and who successfully petitioned the zoning 
board for a text amendment allowing commercial airports in certain zones); MBC Realty, 
192 Md. App. at 223-26 (noting that “every conditional use that has been added to the 
35 
 
For example, in MBC Realty, LLC v. Mayor of Baltimore, the City Council of 
Baltimore enacted a text amendment, at the express request of a development company, 
allowing new billboards in the “B-5” zone only on publicly owned stadiums and arenas, 
knowing that only the First Mariner Arena would be eligible.  192 Md. App. at 226 & n.5, 
235-36.  Immediately after, the City Council granted the conditional use to that arena.  Id.  
Though the text amendment was not challenged on uniformity grounds, the Appellate 
Court rejected the challengers’ argument that the circumstances proved favoritism and a 
lack of public purpose, holding that we “[do] not impose a [] knowledge limitation upon 
the legislative act.”  Id. at 236.   
Thus, the Appellate Court upheld a text amendment solicited by a private interest 
and targeting one property both in intent and effect.  Moreover, as with CB-17, only one 
property would ever likely qualify under the text amendment, given that the text 
 
Baltimore City Zoning Code since 1971 has been effectuated by means of a text 
amendment”). 
 
Other times, opponents of development or certain uses seek “site-specific” text 
amendments to restrict uses by others.  See Rockville Fuel & Feed, 266 Md. at 119-23 (text 
amendment prohibiting concrete manufacturing that the City of Gaithersburg enacted as an 
emergency measure just one day before the plaintiff property owner sought final approval 
for a special exception to construct and operate a concrete manufacturing plant); Free State 
Recycling Sys. Corp. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs for Frederick Cnty., Md., 885 F. Supp. 798 
(D. Md. 1994) (zoning board that sought to close a recycling facility with a text amendment 
that would impose impossibly burdensome regulations on the facility).  For example, 
citizens thwarted Costco’s plans to install a large gas station at the Westfield Wheaton Mall 
by persuading the Montgomery County Council, on two separate occasions, to pass text 
amendments requiring greater distance between large gas stations and nearby communities.  
Bill Turque, Wheaton Costco Gas Station Nixed by Montgomery Planning Board, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 1, 2013; Bill Turque, Costco Loses Latest Round in Fight to Open Big Gas 
Station at Wheaton Mall, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2015; MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MD., 
ZONING ORDINANCE § 59-3.5.13.C (2023). 
36 
 
amendment applied only to publicly-owned stadiums and arenas.  Yet those circumstances 
did not give rise to a finding of improper favoritism.  Id.; see also Eutaw Enters., Inc. v. 
City of Baltimore, 241 Md. 686, 696 (1966) (upholding ordinances that the City Council 
knew would only affect one commercial check casher because the ordinances were general 
in application and applied equally to similarly situated properties). 
Finally, we note that the “painstakingly specific” tailoring to which Concerned 
Citizens points as evidence of favoritism toward Freeway Airport was prompted in part by 
opposition to higher-density housing on other properties.  For instance, at the request of 
the President of the Woodmore Homeowner’s Association, the Council passed a narrowing 
amendment to ensure that the Hidden Pond parcel in Woodmore would not qualify for 
higher-density housing.  Similarly, the provision requiring a minimum acreage of 100 acres 
was proposed not by Freeway Airport but by an outspoken critic of CB-17, Councilmember 
Dernoga, to “further limit the number of [qualifying] properties.”  Councilmember 
Dernoga had also proposed, unsuccessfully, to reduce the proximity to electrical 
infrastructure requirement from 2,500 feet to 2,000 feet—again, to limit the number of 
qualifying properties.  Thus, at least some of the “painstakingly specific” tailoring of which 
Concerned Citizens complains arose not out of demands by Freeway Airport but, 
ironically, out of concerns by others that non-Freeway airport properties might qualify for 
higher-density development. 
 
 
37 
 
Similarly Situated Properties 
A finding that a regulation furthers a public purpose does not mark the end of our 
uniformity analysis.  We also examine how the regulation operates, specifically whether it 
discriminates between properties in a reasonable manner.  Woodward & Lothrop, 280 Md. 
at 720 (“reasonable and based upon the public policy to be served” (emphasis added)). 
It is worth repeating that discrimination between properties within a zone, i.e., 
regulatory classification, is not per se prohibited.  We held in Anderson House that “[t]he 
crux of the [uniformity] requirement is only that similarly situated properties are treated 
the same under the zoning regulations,” 402 Md. at 715 (emphasis added), observing that 
“[m]any jurisdictions agree that the kind of discrimination violative of the uniformity 
requirement occurs when a zoning ordinance singles out a property or properties for 
different treatment than others similarly situated,” id. at 714 (emphasis added).  A 
regulation that discriminates between similarly situated properties is invalid. 
What it means for properties to be “similarly situated” is central to understanding 
the apparent disconnect between the parties’ arguments, and between ours and the 
Dissent’s.  Concerned Citizens assumes that all properties in the R-A Zone are, by 
definition, similarly situated and that site-specific classification within the zone thus 
violates uniformity.  Just because properties are within the same zone, however, does not 
make them similarly situated; zoning categories are not determinative.  Rylyns, 372 Md. at 
593 (Cathell, J., dissenting) (quoting Sweetman v. Town of Cumberland, 364 A.2d 1277, 
1288 (R.I. 1976)) (establishing, in a conditional use challenge, that “[o]wners of property 
in the same land-use category are not necessarily ‘similarly situated’ so that they must be 
38 
 
treated identically under the equal protection clause. . . . [T]wo parcels may have been 
classified at different times when the needs of the municipality differed. Different pieces 
of property [in the same zone] may also have physical characteristics which differ enough 
to require some minor differences in use restriction[.]”).28   
Properties are similarly situated when there is no reasonable basis to treat them 
differently; regulations thus violate uniformity when they discriminate between properties 
unreasonably.  See Anderson House, 402 Md. at 714 (discussing N.T. Hegeman Co. v. 
Mayor of River Edge, 69 A.2d 767 (N.J. 1949), where the setback requirement that was 
invalidated applied to only one block of a business district without any apparent reason for 
disparate treatment); id. at 715 (discussing Veseskis v. Bristol Zoning Comm’n, 362 A.2d 
538 (Conn. 1975), where the invalidated ordinance applied only in one specific instance, 
but not in other instances presenting the same circumstances); see also Village of 
Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000) (invoking the concept of “similarly 
situated” in an equal protection claim).  For example, as we cited in Anderson House, 402 
Md. at 715 n.21, a Wisconsin court struck down, on uniformity grounds, an ordinance 
exempting one of four parcels in the same zone from obtaining a permit for a rendering 
plant because the exemption was “not based upon substantial distinctions which make the 
operation of a rendering plant and packing plant in one area of the industrial district 
different from any other areas in the industrial district,”  Boerschinger v. Elkay Enters., 
Inc., 145 N.W.2d 108, 110-11 (Wis. 1966). 
 
28 Conversely, just because properties are zoned differently does not permit 
invidious discrimination between properties.  Rathkopf § 4:8. 
39 
 
In Anderson House, we upheld zoning regulations that discriminated between 
properties based on size and produced different—and even unique—results.  402 Md. at 
720.  In doing so, we, by implication, held that properties of different sizes were not 
similarly situated and could thus be treated differently under the regulations.  Similarly, in 
Woodward & Lothrop, we upheld density regulations based on property size, thus 
recognizing properties 22,000 square feet or larger as not similarly situated to smaller 
properties.  280 Md. at 721.  We did the same for the compliance requirements there, which 
differed according to whether the use of the property began before or after January 1, 1959.  
Id. at 722-23.29  
 
29 The Dissent distinguishes CB-17 from the valid regulations in Anderson House, 
Woodward & Lothrop, and MBC Realty, on the grounds that those cases involved original 
and comprehensive zoning or text amendments having “general application” in a zone.  
Dissenting slip op. at 7-8, 35 & n.15.  By “generally applicable,” we understand the Dissent 
to be describing regulations affecting many properties broadly, even if they produce 
different or unique results among properties in the zone.  See Dissenting slip op. at 31, 
34-36; see also Anderson House, 402 Md. at 715.  The Dissent distinguishes between 
“generally applicable” regulations and those which target a property or properties.  
Dissenting slip op. at 7-8, 34-36.  Council Bill 17, the Dissent contends, is invalid because, 
as applied, it affects only one property, even if the entire body of regulations applying to 
the R-A Zone are facially neutral and apply uniformly.  Dissenting slip op. at 7-10, 34-36, 
41.   
 
As an initial matter, in our view, the Dissent misconstrues the text amendment held 
valid in MBC Realty, 192 Md. App. 218, as having “general prospective application[.]”  
Dissenting slip op. at 35 n.15.  There, the City Council of Baltimore enacted Ordinance 
03-514, at the explicit request of a development company, to “amend[] the text of the 
Zoning Code to create for the B-5 district a conditional use for new billboards on publicly 
owned stadia and arenas[.]”  MBC Realty, 192 Md. App at 226 & n.5.  The City Council 
knew that only the First Mariner Arena would be eligible for the conditional use.  Id. at 
226, 235-36.  That does not strike us as a text amendment having “general application.” 
 
Instead, Council Bill 17 stands out for how transparently the Council targeted the 
Freeway airport, as manifested by the legislative history.  That seems to be, at heart, what 
40 
 
Perhaps hypotheticals will help.  Imagine two identical, adjacent single-family 
houses.  A regulation, with narrowly drafted and facially neutral terms, allows House A to 
install a backyard swimming pool, but not House B.  The owner of House B could argue 
that the regulation violates uniformity because his property is similarly situated to his 
neighbor’s and, yet, his property is treated differently.  
Or, under the circumstances here, imagine a property in an R-A Zone that was 
formerly used as an airport, has freeway frontage, and is within one mile of a municipality, 
but fails to qualify for higher-density development under CB-17 because it is 3,000 feet 
from the nearest electrical infrastructure rather than entirely within 2,500 feet, as CB-17 
requires.  The owner of that property could argue that the regulation violates uniformity 
because the property is similarly situated to the Freeway airport and yet is excluded because 
of the 2,500-foot requirement.  At that point, the Council would have to explain why the 
500-foot difference between 3,000 feet and 2,500 feet is reasonable and based in public 
 
the Dissent takes issue with.  Dissenting slip. op. at 9-10 (“[T]he legislative record in this 
case contains a robust discussion among the decisionmakers that reflects a clear and 
unmistakable intent to draft criteria that would apply only to the Freeway Property.”).  
Transparency, however, should not count as a demerit in a uniformity analysis.  
 
Indeed, transparency seems to be the antidote to the Dissent’s concern that our 
holding will encourage landowners to secure favorable text amendments through ex parte 
communications with local elected officials.  Dissenting slip. op at 68.  But enacting a text 
amendment requires much more than obtaining the sponsorship of a single elected official.  
In Prince George’s County, enacting a text amendment requires a public hearing with 
adequate notice to the public.  PGCC § 27-216.  The proposed amendment must be referred 
to the Planning Board for comments and a recommendation.  PGCC § 27-217.  Moreover, 
an amendment generally requires multiple readings and consideration by the appropriate 
standing committee.  See THE CNTY. COUNCIL RULES OF PROC. (CNTY. COUNCIL FOR 
PRINCE GEORGE’S CNTY., MD. JULY 2020).  A text amendment requires a majority vote of 
the full Council, PGCC § 27-218.   
41 
 
policy.  If the Council lacks a credible explanation, then that regulation would evince the 
sort of arbitrariness or favoritism characteristic of a uniformity violation.  
Here, CB-17 discriminates between properties, but Concerned Citizens has not 
shown that CB-17 discriminates between similarly situated properties.  Concerned Citizens 
has not identified any actual, or even hypothetical, properties similarly situated to the 
Freeway airport that the qualifying criteria of CB-17 excluded from higher-density 
development opportunities.30   
This comes as little surprise, as there are presumably few, if any, properties in the 
R-A Zone that reasonably resemble the Freeway airport.  Instead, Concerned Citizens 
assumes that all R-A Zone properties are, by definition, similarly situated.  Not only is that 
assumption legally erroneous, see Rylyns, 372 Md. at 593 (Cathell, J., dissenting), but it is 
practically flawed, for many other existing properties in the R-A Zone are very different 
from the airport.  For instance, the properties featuring single-family detached residences 
in nearby Waterford Estates are wholly different, practically speaking, from the 129-acre 
airport property, and treating them differently does not offend our sense of fairness.   
Concerned Citizens has not argued that any of the qualifying criteria of CB-17 are 
unreasonable, i.e., that they discriminate between similarly situated properties or are not 
“based upon the public policy to be served.”  Woodward & Lothrop, 280 Md. at 720.  As 
 
30 Nor does the Dissent.  Instead, the Dissent appears to incorrectly shift the burden 
to Freeway Airport, pointing out that Freeway Airport failed to identify any other 
properties qualifying under CB-17 that would have showed that CB-17 had “general 
application.”  Dissenting slip op. at 7 (“Although the Majority alludes to ‘similarly situated 
properties,’ neither the Majority, nor Freeway identify any.”); id. at 63-64 n.30. 
42 
 
previously noted, that topic arose only when the Appellate Court questioned Freeway 
Airport during oral argument.  The Court then took it upon itself to evaluate the 
reasonableness of those criteria, finding that the requirements of proximity to a municipal 
boundary and freeway frontage could reasonably relate to a public interest, but that the 
requirement of proximity to electrical infrastructure and the provision making eligible 
former airport property do not.  Concerned Citizens, 255 Md. App. at 125-26 & n.16. 
We disagree with how the Appellate Court analyzed the qualifying criteria.  The 
Court evaluated each criterion of CB-17 in a vacuum, focusing on the “site-specific” nature 
of each rather than the broader purpose of encouraging the closure of the Freeway airport 
and any other nonconforming airport presenting similar public safety risks, to the extent 
one exists.  When viewed in this light, the qualifying criteria are “reasonable and based 
upon the public policy to be served.”  Woodward & Lothrop, 280 Md. at 720.  Nearby 
highways, population centers, and transmission lines are the safety hazards at the Freeway 
airport.  That these features are not uniquely hazardous at Freeway Airport, but other 
airports too, bolsters that finding.  Moreover, the Council could have reasonably concluded 
that higher-density housing, though generally inappropriate in the R-A Zone, is appropriate 
near existing highway transportation, electrical infrastructure, and population centers. 
The Appellate Court also seized upon the clause making eligible properties formerly 
used as airports, finding that it lacked a public purpose and was included only to select the 
Freeway airport, while finding the qualifying criterion of property size reasonably based 
upon public policy.  Concerned Citizens, 255 Md. App. at 126.  But identifying airport 
43 
 
property, and the Freeway airport specifically, is the public purpose here, and, if anything, 
the qualifying criterion based on property size is the peculiar provision.  
Concerned Citizens speculates that the property size criterion was drafted to make 
CB-17 look less “site-specific”31 and that the former airport provision was subsequently 
reintroduced either to (1) bolster CB-17’s ostensible public purpose of decommissioning 
unsafe airports or (2) allow Freeway Airport to develop fewer than one hundred acres.  The 
first possibility is irrelevant, as CB-17 indeed furthers a public policy of retiring a 
hazardous, nonconforming airport.  The second possibility, even if true, would remain 
consistent with the aim of encouraging the redevelopment of the Freeway airport by 
allowing the developer greater flexibility. 
Again, we assume any reasonably conceived state of facts that would sustain CB-17.  
See Anderson House, 402 Md. at 724.  We can reasonably suppose—and, in the absence 
of contrary evidence, conclude—that the Council sought both to encourage the 
decommissioning of the Freeway airport and to provide for general housing needs on large 
properties near existing population centers and infrastructure.  For these reasons, we cannot 
say that the disjunctive requirement of property size or former airport use is so 
unreasonable as to violate uniformity. 
 
 
 
31 That the Council drafted CB-17 to appear less “site-specific” by including other 
assemblages of properties, in addition to airports, does not change the fact that CB-17 was 
designed, as its critics contend, to target the Freeway airport.  The Council’s effort to make 
CB-17 more legally defensible by broadening its potential application is not, however, a 
sufficient basis to invalidate CB-17.   
44 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Council, in enacting CB-17, exercised its authority under the RDA to amend 
the text of the Prince George’s County zoning ordinance.  LU § 22-104.  We afford 
legislative action a strong presumption of validity, and Concerned Citizens has the “heavy 
burden of establishing, by clear and affirmative evidence[,]” that CB-17 is invalid.  
Anderson House, 402 Md. at 723-24.  Consistent with that standard of review and burden 
of proof, we neither invalidate CB-17 on speculation that the Council acted with improper 
motives nor transfer the primary burden of proof to Freeway Airport. 
Though Concerned Citizens has accurately observed that CB-17 targets the Freeway 
airport using narrow, site-specific language, Concerned Citizens has not shown that CB-17 
lacks a public purpose or discriminates between similarly situated properties.  Concerned 
Citizens has not established that CB-17 discriminates arbitrarily, either by providing 
examples of similarly situated properties that CB-17 treats differently or by establishing 
that its qualifying criteria are not reasonably based upon the public policy to be served.  See 
Woodward & Lothrop, 280 Md. at 720; Anderson House at 402 Md. at 714-15.  On these 
grounds, Concerned Citizens’ uniformity challenge falls short. 
For these reasons, we reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court and affirm the 
decision of the District Council.  With respect to the issues that Concerned Citizens raised 
but were not reached by the Appellate Court, our analysis here substantially answers those 
questions and renders a remand unnecessary.  See Md. Rule 8-604(d)(1). 
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
APPELLATE 
COURT OF MARYLAND REVERSED.  
COSTS TO BE PAID BY RESPONDENTS. 
 
 
Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County 
Case No.: C-02-CV-20-001850 
Argued: February 3, 2023 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT  
OF MARYLAND* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 23 
September Term, 2022 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY COUNCIL, et al. 
v. 
CONCERNED CITIZENS OF PRINCE 
GEORGE’S COUNTY, et al. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fader, C.J., 
Watts, 
Booth, 
Biran, 
Gould, 
Eaves, 
Getty, Joseph M., (Senior Justice, 
Specially Assigned), 
 
JJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dissenting Opinion by Booth, J., which Fader, 
C.J. and Watts, J., join. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Filed: August 22, 2023 
 
* At the November 8, 2022 general election, the 
voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional 
amendment changing the name of the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland to the Supreme Court of 
Maryland.  The name change took effect on 
December 14, 2022.  
1 
 
Respectfully, I dissent.   
 
In this case, we must determine whether the Prince George’s County Council, sitting 
as the District Council (“District Council”), was acting within its legal boundaries when it 
enacted CB 17-2019—a legislative zoning text amendment that permitted townhouse uses 
in certain limited circumstances in the Residential-Agricultural (“R-A”) Zone, a Euclidean 
zone in the Prince George’s County zoning ordinance that was in effect in 2019.  See Town 
of Upper Marlboro v. Prince George’s County Council, 480 Md. 167, 180–81 (2022) 
(explaining the standard of review for agency actions that are deemed to be legislative is 
limited to assessing whether the agency was acting within its legal boundaries); Maryland 
Code (2012, 2022 Supp.), Land Use (“LU”) § 22-407(e).1  “Under this ‘legal boundaries’ 
 
1 In this case, it is undisputed that the Prince George’s County Council, sitting as 
the District Council (“District Council”), was undertaking a legislative act (as opposed to 
a quasi-judicial act) when it enacted CB 17-2019.  The General Assembly has provided for 
judicial review of a District Council’s decision pursuant to Maryland Code (2012, 2022 
Supp.), Land Use (“LU”) § 22-407(e), authorizing courts to:  
 
(1)  affirm the decision of the district council;  
(2)  remand the case for further proceedings; or  
(3)  reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the petitioner have been 
prejudiced because the district council’s action is:  
(i) 
unconstitutional;  
(ii) 
in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the district 
council;  
(iii) 
made on unlawful procedure;  
(iv) 
affected by other error of law;  
(v) 
unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in 
view of the entire record as submitted; or 
(vi) 
arbitrary or capricious.   
 
Under the statute, a court may reverse or modify the decision of the District Council if the 
court determines that the district council exceeded its statutory authority.  LU § 22-
 
2 
 
standard, government legislative action will be permitted to stand as long as it was 
‘consistent with relevant law.’”  Talbot County v. Miles Point Prop., LLC, 415 Md. 372, 
393 (2010) (quoting Judy v. Schaefer, 331 Md. 239, 264–66 (1993)). 
I. 
Overview  
 
In determining whether the District Council exceeded its legal boundaries in 
enacting CB 17-2019, we start our analysis with the State enabling statute that confers 
authority upon the District Council to enact text amendments within Euclidean zones.  We 
begin our discussion with the enabling statute because, “[u]nder Maryland’s constitutional 
scheme, a local government’s authority to regulate land use may emanate only from the 
enabling legislation of the General Assembly.”  County Council of Prince George’s County 
v. Zimmer Dev. Co., 444 Md. 490, 504 (2015) (citations omitted).  Indeed, where a local 
government adopts zoning legislation that is inconsistent with its enabling authority, this 
Court has not hesitated to hold that it is invalid.2 
 
407(e)(3)(ii).  This standard of review is consistent with our case law that describes the 
scope of our review of legislative actions as assessing whether the legislative body was 
acting within its legal boundaries.  Town of Upper Marlboro v. Prince George’s County 
Council, 480 Md. 167, 180–81 (2022); Talbot County v. Miles Point Prop., LLC, 415 Md. 
372, 393 (2010). 
 
 
2 See, e.g., Mossburg v. Montgomery County, 329 Md. 494, 496, 508 (1993) 
(holding that a provision of the Montgomery County zoning ordinance that required special 
exceptions to be granted by a “supermajority” vote was not “expressly authorized by the 
General Assembly in the zoning enabling statute” and was therefore invalid); Richmark 
Realty Co. v. Whittlif, 226 Md. 273, 276, 285–86 (1961) (invalidating an ordinance that 
purported to waive a zoning provision prohibiting the construction of a filling station within 
300 feet of a park because it was arbitrary and discriminatory).  
3 
 
A. 
The Enabling Statute and the Uniformity Requirement 
 
It is undisputed that the R-A Zone is a Euclidean zone.  The applicable State 
enabling statute requires that zoning laws enacted by the District Council for traditional 
Euclidean zones “shall be uniform for each class or kind of development throughout a 
district or zone.”  LU § 22-201(b)(2)(i) (emphasis added).  If the zoning text amendment 
violates the “uniformity” requirement of the enabling statute, it is invalid.  Although there 
is not a lot of case law on the uniformity requirement, courts consistently find the 
requirement violated in at least one scenario.  That scenario “occurs when a zoning 
ordinance singles out a property or properties for different treatment than others similarly 
situated.”  Anderson House, LLC v. Mayor & City Council of Rockville, 402 Md. 689, 714 
(2008) (emphasis added).  In Anderson House, this Court explained that “the uniformity 
requirement demonstrates that . . .  discrimination in favor of, or against, particular 
properties . . . will not be tolerated.”  Id. at 717.  In this case, we must determine whether 
the text amendment enacted by CB 17-2019 violates the uniformity requirement.  By way 
of brief background, it is helpful to review CB 17-2019’s provisions and the facts about 
the property at the center of this case, the Freeway Property. 
B. 
CB 17-2019 
 
Prior to the enactment of CB 17-2019, townhouses were not permitted in the R-A 
Zone.  The text amendment enacted by CB 17-2019 permitted townhouses to be 
constructed at a density of up to 4.5 dwelling units per acre in “certain circumstances.”  
Those circumstances are that the townhouses could be constructed “on an assemblage of 
adjacent properties” that: (1)(a) is no less than 100 acres and no more than 150 acres in 
4 
 
size, or (b) “was formerly used as an airport”; (2) is located entirely within one mile of a 
municipal boundary; (3) is located “entirely within 2,500 feet of land owned by a regulated 
public utility and used for purposes of electrical generation, transmission, or distribution 
in connection with providing public utility service in the County by a regulated public 
utility”; and (4) “has frontage on a public right-of-way classified as a freeway or higher in 
the Master Plan of Transportation and is maintained by the State Highway Administration.” 
C. 
The Freeway Property 
 
The Freeway Property, also known as Freeway Airport, is owned by the 
Rodenhauser family and is under contract to be purchased by Petitioner Freeway Realty, 
LLC (“Freeway”), a partnership between St. John Properties, Inc. and the Rodenhauser 
family.  The Freeway Property is located at 3900 Church Road, Bowie, Maryland.  
Although its mailing address is Bowie, it is located outside Bowie’s corporate limits, but 
within one mile of the municipal boundary.  The Freeway Property consists of multiple 
separate parcels totaling 129 acres.  It has been used as a general aviation airport since 
1947, and its airport use has been a certified nonconforming use3 under the Prince George’s 
 
3 A nonconforming use is a use that predates the adoption of a new zoning ordinance 
and is inconsistent with it.  If a property owner can demonstrate that a use was valid and 
lawful at the time of the adoption of a new zoning ordinance, the use may be permitted to 
continue.  Trip Assocs., Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 392 Md. 563, 573 (2006).  
The Regional District Act (“RDA”) expressly authorizes Prince George’s County and 
Montgomery County to recognize the continuation of “lawful nonconforming use[s] that 
existed on the effective date of a zoning law enacted” within the Regional District.  LU 
§ 22-114.  Although the continuation of nonconforming uses is not favored (and local 
ordinances are strictly construed in order to effectuate the purpose of eliminating 
nonconforming uses), such uses are nevertheless “‘a vested right entitled to constitutional 
protection.’”  Trip Assocs., Inc., 392 Md. at 573–74 (quoting Amereihn v. Kotras, 194 Md. 
591, 601 (1950)).  
5 
 
County Zoning Ordinance since 1968.  In the 1960’s, a power company that owns an 
adjacent property installed high-tension lines along the entire western boundary of the 
Freeway Property.  The Freeway Property’s northern boundary runs along U.S. Route 50, 
and its eastern boundary runs along Church Road, which is a county road. 
Before April 1, 2022, the Freeway Property was classified in the R-A Zone under 
what I refer to as the Old Zoning Ordinance.  As part of the enactment of a New Zoning 
Ordinance and a comprehensive rezoning, the Freeway Property was rezoned to the 
Agricultural-Residential (“AR”) Zone effective April 1, 2022.  Under both the former R-A 
Zone and the successor AR Zone, the Freeway Property can be developed as a matter of 
right for single-family residences on two-acre lots.   
It is undisputed that the Freeway Property fit the criteria contained within CB 17-
2019, and therefore could be developed with townhouses at a maximum density of 4.5 
dwelling units per acre—a use and density that were not permitted in the R-A Zone prior 
to the enactment of CB 17-2019, and which are not permitted in the successor AR Zone. 
D. 
The Parties’ Contentions 
Respondent Concerned Citizens of Prince George’s County (“Concerned Citizens”) 
argues that the text amendment violates the uniformity requirement because it is “site-
specific” and applies only to the Freeway Property.  Concerned Citizens contends that the 
criteria are “painstakingly specific” to the Freeway Property.  In determining whether the 
text amendment violates the uniformity requirement, Concerned Citizens urges the Court 
to look not simply at the text of the criteria, but to consider the text within the broader 
context of the legislative record in this case, including contemporaneous statements by the 
6 
 
Bill sponsor, the Bill’s drafter, and a member of the District Council who opposed the Bill, 
and the various iterations of the Bill that were proposed over the course of seven months.  
Concerned Citizens contends that the legislative record in this case confirms that the 
criteria of the text amendment were drafted in a manner to ensure that only the Freeway 
Property would be eligible for townhouse uses.  Concerned Citizens asserts that the text 
amendment was discriminatory and site-specific to the Freeway Property, giving it 
favorable treatment over other similarly situated properties.   
Freeway argues that the text amendment does not violate the uniformity requirement 
because “identical terminology . . . applies to all present and future properties in the R-A 
Zone, including all other properties that potentially qualify under the criteria set forth” in 
the text amendment.  Or, stated another way, Freeway asserts that the text amendment 
applies “to any eligible R-A zoned property within Prince George’s County.”  Freeway 
points out that, under the uniformity case law, the question is whether the zoning 
classification “uniformly applies to all qualifying properties using the same exact 
terminology or whether a property is singled out for discriminatory treatment.”   
E. 
Summary of Conclusions 
The Majority assumes that the Council “intended to reach only the Freeway airport 
and believed it would be the only property to ever qualify under, and take advantage of,” 
CB 17-2019.  Maj. Slip Op. at 33.  Under the Majority’s theory, the District Council’s 
action in deliberately targeting the Freeway Property for favorable treatment satisfies the 
uniformity requirement under state law because the Majority believes that the text 
amendment did not discriminate between similarly situated properties.  Id. at 41 (“Here, 
7 
 
CB [17-2019] discriminates between properties, but Concerned Citizens has not shown that 
CB [17-2019] discriminates between similarly situated properties.”).  Although the 
Majority alludes to “similarly situated properties,” neither the Majority, nor Freeway 
identify any.  Moreover, an independent review of the record reflects that there are no 
similarly situated properties.4 
For the reasons set forth more fully herein, I agree with Concerned Citizens that 
CB 17-2019 violated the uniformity requirement because “by the terms of the 
legislation[,]” it singles out the Freeway Property “for disparate treatment[.]”  Anderson 
House, 402 Md. at 720.  This is a rare case where zoning text that uses ostensibly facially 
neutral language was not, in fact, generally applicable because its criteria were pretextual.  
Together, the criteria serve no purpose other than to identify an individual property.  In 
short, the text was drafted in a manner to ensure that it would apply only to Freeway 
Property, thereby singling it out.  As I will detail below, the Majority embraces the clear 
and unmistakable effort on the part of the Bill sponsor to draft a text amendment that 
purported to have general application, but in fact, singled out a specific property for 
favorable treatment.  
 
4 The Majority contends that I am incorrectly shifting the burden to the District 
Council and, by extension, to Freeway.  Maj. Slip Op. at 41 n.30.  I am not.  My review of 
the legislative record in this case confirms Concerned Citizens’ contention that no one—
including the Prince George’s County Planning Board—could identify any other property 
that satisfied the criteria, aside from the Hidden Pond parcel, which was excluded by final 
legislative amendments after the public hearing closed.  Freeway argued to this Court that 
the amendment applies to other similarly situated properties.  That argument is not borne 
out by the record. 
8 
 
Under our case law, as well as the case law from other states, when faced with a 
uniformity challenge, courts generally interpret the ordinance in question utilizing the same 
principles employed when analyzing equal protection claims.  In the context of equal 
protection claims, facial neutrality is not dispositive.  I would consider the ordinance’s text 
and also its context in the broader legislative rezoning process that was ongoing in Prince 
George’s County when the text amendment was being considered, as well as the legislative 
record, including contemporary statements by the Bill sponsor as he proposed various 
iterations of the Bill.   
Starting with the text, the criteria are tailor-made to describe the unique 
characteristics of the Freeway Property.  The Freeway Property falls within CB 17-2019’s 
size and location criteria.  Other criteria identify the uses being made of the adjacent 
properties.  Although the text amendment uses facially neutral language, its unique set of 
combined criteria do not in fact apply to “similarly situated properties,” and single out the 
Freeway Property for disparate treatment.  In other words, the legislation was drafted in a 
manner to ensure that only one property could satisfy the criteria despite the general 
language utilized by the District Council, in violation of the uniformity requirement.   
This is confirmed by the broader legislative rezoning.  As discussed in more detail 
herein, six months prior to the District Council’s consideration of CB 17-2019, it adopted 
a new zoning ordinance which does not permit townhouse uses in the AR Zone that 
succeeded the R-A Zone.  The new zoning ordinance was expected to become effective 
upon the completion of a district-wide comprehensive rezoning, which was ongoing when 
CB 17-2019 came before the District Council.  At the time, the Council was aware that the 
9 
 
text amendment permitting townhouse uses would have a very limited shelf life.  In other 
words, the District Council knew the text amendment would not have prospective 
application to “similarly situated properties” beyond the period necessary to complete the 
ongoing comprehensive rezoning.  Although the Majority acknowledges that the Old 
Zoning Ordinance was being phased out, it makes no attempt to explain how a text 
amendment to an old zoning ordinance—that was enacted after the adoption of a new and 
inconsistent zoning ordinance—could possibly apply to any property other than the 
Freeway Property.  In other words, it did not have any prospective application beyond the 
Freeway Property.   
Additionally, the legislative record in this case—including the contemporaneous 
statements of the Bill sponsor, Bill drafter and a District Councilmember who opposed  the 
legislation, as well as the various iterations of the Bill itself—clearly demonstrate that the 
criteria were drafted in a pretextual manner to suggest that the text might have general 
application, but in fact, when read in their aggregate, would apply only to one property—
the Freeway Property.  Although the Majority purports to review the legislative record, and 
pays lip service to the notion that, without such a review, “legislators could circumvent the 
uniformity requirement with clever drafting[,]” Maj. Slip Op. at 32, that is precisely what 
occurred here.  The Majority condones the conduct that it purports to disavow by refusing 
to grapple with the pretextual nature of CB 17-2019.  As I set forth in more detail below, 
the legislative record in this case contains a robust discussion among the decisionmakers 
that reflects a clear and unmistakable intent to draft criteria that would apply only to the 
Freeway Property.  
10 
 
CB 17-2019 singled out the Freeway Property for favorable treatment in violation 
of the uniformity requirement.  The effect of the text amendment was to permit townhouse 
uses on only one property within the R-A Zone, which is now the AR Zone under the New 
Zoning Ordinance.  The text amendment was the functional equivalent of an illegal spot 
zoning of a particular property—the creation of a “mini-district” comprised of the Freeway 
Property in the R-A Zone—enabling that lone property to be developed for townhouses.  
Accordingly, I would hold that CB 17-2019 violated the uniformity requirement of the 
enabling statute and is therefore ultra vires and invalid.   
II. 
Planning and Zoning Laws—Some Background 
Before turning to the uniformity analysis, it is useful to provide an overview of the 
planning and zoning tools that the General Assembly has provided to the District Council.  
If our case law teaches us anything in the area of zoning law, it is that zoning and planning 
concepts are nuanced and difficult to discuss in a vacuum.  Zoning opinions tend to be 
lengthy for a reason—it is necessary to understand the interrelationship between different 
zoning tools and the reasons behind them—to consider their correct application.  
Unfortunately for the reader, this dissenting opinion is no exception 
A. 
The Maryland-Washington Regional District Act 
 
In November 1970, the citizens of Prince George’s County adopted a charter form 
of government pursuant to Article XI-A of the Constitution of Maryland.  Prince George’s 
County v. Thurston, 479 Md. 575, 579 (2022).  The legislative branch of the County 
government—the Prince George’s County Council—is comprised of eleven members, nine 
11 
 
of whom are elected from geographic districts and two of whom serve as at-large members.  
Prince George’s County Charter, Art. III §§ 301, 304.   
Like all charter counties in Maryland, Prince George’s County has been given 
planning and zoning authority by the General Assembly.  Prince George’s County’s zoning 
authority primarily emanates from the Maryland-Washington Regional District Act 
(“RDA”), which is currently codified in Division II of the Land Use Article of the Maryland 
Code.  Zimmer, 444 Md. at 523–24.  “The RDA is the essential source of the delegation by 
the State of zoning authority to Prince George’s County for the areas of Prince George’s 
County within the Regional District.”  Id. at 524–25 (footnote omitted). 
The RDA “regulates planning and zoning” within the Maryland-Washington 
Regional District (“Regional District”), which includes most of Prince George’s County 
and Montgomery County.5  In Zimmer, we described the statutory delegation of planning 
and zoning authority within the Regional District as follows:  
[T]he RDA divides broadly authority related to zoning, planning, and other 
land use matters between the county (district) councils, the Maryland-
National Capital Park & Planning Commission, and the county planning 
boards.  
 
The district councils for Prince George’s County and Montgomery County 
consist of their respective county councils.  LU §§ 22-101, 14-101.  They 
have primary legislative authority.  The district councils are authorized to 
adopt and amend zoning ordinances and the accompanying zoning maps for 
their counties, LU §§ 22-104, 22-201, and to develop processes and 
procedures to ensure that development complies with zoning requirements, 
see, e.g., LU §§ 20-503(a), 22-214(e).  They have a role also in the creation 
of plans by establishing procedures for the planning process, see LU 
§ 21-208(a), and approving master plans for their counties, see LU § 21-212.  
 
5 The Regional District encompasses “the entire area of Prince George’s County, 
except for the City of Laurel as it existed on July 1, 2013.”  LU § 20-101(b).   
12 
 
Moreover, the district councils may delegate certain responsibilities and 
authority to other local governmental units or tribunals, subject to limitations 
as may appear in the RDA.   
 
444 Md. at 525–26 (footnote omitted). 
 
The Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission is an agency of the 
State that is comprised of a total of ten members—five of whom are residents of 
Montgomery County and five of whom are residents of Prince George’s County.  LU 
§§ 15-101–15-102.  The commission members from each county are designated as “the 
Montgomery County Planning Board or the Prince George’s County Planning Board, 
respectively.”  LU § 20-201; see also LU § 14-101(b)–(c).  The county planning board “is 
responsible for the planning, subdivision, and zoning functions that are primarily local in 
scope[.]”  LU § 20-202(a)(1)(i).  It has “exclusive jurisdiction over: (i) local functions, 
including: 1. the administration of subdivision regulations; [and] 2. the preparation and 
adoption of recommendations to the district council with respect to zoning map 
amendments[.]”  LU § 20-202(b)(1)(i). 
The district council for each jurisdiction has legislative authority to adopt and 
amend zoning laws and zoning maps for the portion of the Regional District located within 
their respective counties.  LU § 22-104(a).  The RDA also establishes procedures for the 
amendment of zoning laws and zoning maps, which I discuss in more detail infra.  The 
land use tools and procedures established in the RDA are not unique to the counties 
comprising the Regional District.  To the contrary, the zoning tools established in the RDA 
have been around since the establishment of the first zoning laws in this country, and have 
universal application, not only in Maryland, but in our sister states.   
13 
 
B. 
Local Land Use Tools—Planning, Zoning, and Subdivision 
Generally speaking, there are three integral parts of land use management: 
(1) planning; (2) zoning; and (3) subdivision regulation.6  In Wesley Chapel Bluemount 
Association v. Baltimore County, this Court described these distinct, but complementary 
components, as follows: 
Governmental control over land development is effected principally in three 
ways—through the adoption of (1) master plans delineating the desired uses 
for all land within the planning area, both for development and for roads, 
parks, schools, and other public purposes, (2) zoning regulations designed to 
implement the master plans by placing legal restrictions on the use of land 
by non-governmental persons and entities, and (3) subdivision and other 
development regulations designed to ensure that private development of the 
land is consistent with the applicable master plan and zoning regulations.  
Although each of these devices has an independent purpose and may be 
subjected to a separate development and approval procedure, their functions, 
to some extent, coalesce, in that they are all designed to assure that land 
development occurs in a manner that is consistent with overall legislative 
policy and community welfare.   
 
347 Md. 125, 129 (1997) (citing generally Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Gaster, 285 Md. 233 
(1979)).  The General Assembly has adopted various enabling statutes that authorize local 
governments to enact local legislation to carry out each of these functions.   
1. 
Planning Authority   
The enabling statutes that govern the planning functions for most counties are found 
primarily in LU §§ 1-401–1-418 and §§ 3-101–3-304, et. seq.  Under these statutes, 
counties and municipal corporations having planning and zoning authority are required to 
adopt a “comprehensive plan.”  LU §§ 1-405, 3-101.  “Plans are developed to guide the 
 
6 I mention subdivision regulations simply to identify the three components of land 
use planning.  Because subdivision is not involved in this case, I do not discuss it further. 
14 
 
implementation of land use controls and zoning in a rational way that is beneficial to the 
public.”  Zimmer, 444 Md. at 520 (citations omitted).  A comprehensive plan generally 
applies to a substantial area and is the product of years of study and public input.  Id. 
at 520–21.  The preparation of a comprehensive plan is undertaken by the planning 
commission of the local jurisdiction and presented to the local legislature for adoption.  See 
LU §§ 1-406(a), 1-415(b), 3-102(a), 3-202(a).  The legislative body is required to adopt a 
comprehensive plan by legislative act.  See LU §§ 1-415(b), 3-202(a).  The county is 
charged with ensuring the implementation of the comprehensive plan through zoning, 
subdivision, and other land use regulations.  See LU §§ 1-415(b), 3-303(b).   
 
The process for creating a plan within the Regional District is slightly different than 
elsewhere in the State.  Zimmer, 444 Md. at 521.  Specifically, under the RDA, “two types 
of plans are required: (1) a ‘general plan’ containing, at a minimum, recommendations for 
development in the respective county and supporting analysis; and, (2) ‘area master plans’ 
pertaining to local planning areas into which each county is divided.”  Id. at 521–22.  “The[] 
plans are prepared by the Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Commission (which 
is composed of separate planning boards for each county; the two boards sit together on bi-
county issues and separately on matters that pertain purely to its respective county) and 
must be approved by the local legislature of the respective county.”  Id. at 522 (citing LU 
§§ 14-101(b), 14-101(f), 21-202, 21-208(a)).   
The purpose of the general plan is to:  
(1) guide and accomplish a coordinated, comprehensive, adjusted, and 
systematic development of the regional district; (2) coordinate and adjust 
the development of the regional district with the public and private 
15 
 
development of other parts of the State and of the District of Columbia; 
and (3) protect and promote the public health, safety, and welfare.  
 
LU § 21-101(b).  “Master plans differ from General Plans in that master plans govern a 
specific, smaller portion of the County and are often more detailed in their 
recommendations than the countywide General Plan as to that same area.”  Maryland-Nat’l 
Capital Park & Planning Comm’n v. Greater Baden-Aquasco Citizens Ass’n, 412 Md. 73, 
89 (2009) (cleaned up).   
2. 
Euclidean Zoning Principles Generally  
Whereas planning concepts are more abstract, zoning concepts are concrete.  
Euclidean zoning has its roots in the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, which was 
written in the 1920’s.  See Zimmer, 444 Md. at 512 n.14; 1 Arden H. Rathkopf, et al., 
Rathkopf’s The Law of Zoning and Planning § 1:3 (4th ed. rev. 2023) (hereinafter 
Rathkopf’s).  Its name is derived from the Supreme Court case, Village of Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), that upheld a basic zoning ordinance.  Zimmer, 444 Md. 
at 511 n.13.  “Euclidean zoning is a fairly static and rigid form of zoning[.]”  Mayor & 
Council of Rockville v. Rylyns Enters., Inc., 372 Md. 514, 534 (2002).  The General 
Assembly enacted Maryland’s first local zoning enabling statute in 1927.  Zimmer, 444 
Md. at 507 (citing Ch. 705, 1927 Md. Laws).7   
 
7 The statute authorized Baltimore City and other municipalities with more than 
10,000 inhabitants to enact zoning regulations.  County Council of Prince George’s County 
v. Zimmer Dev. Co., 444 Md. 490, 507 (2015) (citing Ch. 705, 1927 Md. Laws).  Since 
then, the General Assembly has delegated zoning powers to charter and non-charter 
counties and municipalities.  Id. (citing LU §§ 4-102, 22-104).  
16 
 
Euclidean zoning has been described as “a legislative method or device for 
controlling land use by establishing zoning districts with set boundaries and providing for 
specific regulations as to type or nature of permitted and prohibited land uses, height of 
structures, lot sizes and restrictions, building coverage limitations and similar regulations.”  
Stanley D. Abrams, Guide to Maryland Zoning Decisions § 1.01 n.1 (5th ed. LexisNexis 
2012 & 2022 Cum. Supp.).  Euclidean zoning regulations are legislatively established in 
the text of the zoning ordinance, with a corresponding zoning map that identifies the 
particular areas to which the zoning laws apply.  Id. 
3. 
Enabling Statutes Governing the Text of Zoning Laws   
Maryland counties and municipalities with planning and zoning authority have the 
authority to adopt zoning laws within their territorial boundaries.  See LU §§ 4-102, 22-
104.  For that portion of Prince George’s County that is located within the Regional 
District, the General Assembly has given the District Council the authority to “adopt and 
amend the text of the zoning law[s]” by local law.  LU § 22-104(a)(1).  The local zoning 
laws may regulate, among other things, the location, height, bulk, and size of buildings and 
structures on property, the size of lots, and the density and distribution of population.  LU 
§ 22-104(b).  The District Council’s authority to enact Euclidean zoning laws within 
separate zoning districts is set forth in LU § 22-201, which states as follows:  
(a) In general. — A district council may divide the portion of the regional district 
located within its county into districts and zones of any number, shape, or 
area it may determine. 
 
(b) Zoning laws. — (1) Within the districts and zones, the district council may 
regulate the construction, alteration, and uses of buildings and structures and 
the uses of land, including surface, subsurface, and air rights.  
17 
 
 
(2) (i) Zoning laws shall be uniform for each class or kind of development 
throughout a district or zone.  
 
(ii) The zoning laws in one district or zone may differ from those in other 
districts or zones. 
 
(Emphasis added).  The language described above is “commonly referred to as the 
‘uniformity requirement’ of Euclidean zoning” and “has its roots in the Standard State 
Zoning Enabling Act, which states, at § 2, that applicable zoning ‘regulations shall be 
uniform for each class or kind of buildings throughout each district, but the regulations in 
one district may differ from those in other districts.’”  Anderson House, 402 Md. at 713 
(footnote omitted) (quoting 1 Robert M. Anderson, American Law of Zoning 3d § 5.25 
at 417 (1986)).  “This or a similar limitation appears in the state zoning enabling acts of 
nearly every state.”  Id. (citation omitted).  I will return to a discussion of the uniformity 
requirement, as well as our case law discussing this principle, in part III.A.  
4. 
Applying Euclidean Zoning to Properties in Maryland  
 
The above-described enabling statute describes the authority of the local 
jurisdiction—in this case, Prince George’s County—to adopt zoning laws.  In Maryland, 
Euclidean zoning laws are applied to properties located in zoning districts through three 
primary legislative zoning processes: “(1) original zoning; (2) comprehensive rezoning; 
and (3) piecemeal rezoning.”  Rylyns, 372 Md. at 532.  The fundamental distinction 
between these zoning processes “is that the first two are purely legislative processes, while 
piecemeal rezoning is achieved, usually at the request of the property owner[s], through a 
quasi-judicial process leading to a legislative act.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
18 
 
a. 
Original and Comprehensive Rezoning 
As noted above, “the act of zoning either may be original or comprehensive 
(covering a large area and ordinarily initiated by local government) or piecemeal (covering 
individual parcels, lots, or assemblages, and ordinarily initiated by the property owner).”  
Rylyns, 372 Md. at 535.  For a zoning action to qualify as a comprehensive zoning or 
rezoning,  
the legislative act of zoning must: 1) cover a substantial area; 2) be the 
product of careful study and consideration; 3) control and direct the use of 
land and development according to present and planned future conditions, 
consistent with the public interest; and, 4) set forth and regulate all permitted 
land uses in all or substantially all of a given political subdivision, though it 
need not zone or rezone all of the land in the jurisdiction. 
 
Id. (citations omitted).  The legislative body’s motive or wisdom “in adopting an original 
or comprehensive zoning enjoy a strong presumption of correctness and validity[.]”  Id. 
(citing Norbeck Vill. Joint Venture v. Montgomery County Council, 254 Md. 59, 65–66 
(1969)).  Once zoning is established, it may only be changed “by the adoption of a 
subsequent comprehensive rezoning, or, in the case of a piecemeal Euclidean zoning 
application, upon a showing that there was a mistake in the prior original or comprehensive 
zoning or evidence that there has been a substantial change in the character of the 
neighborhood since the time the original or comprehensive zoning was put in place.”  Id. 
at 535–36 (citing Stratakis v. Beauchamp, 268 Md. 643, 652–53 (1973); Anne Arundel 
County v. Maryland Nat’l Bank, 32 Md. App. 437, 440 (1976)).  “The scope of review by 
Maryland courts of the legislative decisions embodied in original zonings and 
comprehensive rezonings is quite narrow.”  Zimmer, 444 Md. at 509 (footnote omitted).  
19 
 
Specifically, judicial review is limited to “whether the local zoning authority: (1) followed 
the appropriate procedure designated by the zoning enabling statute and its own 
ordinances; (2) comported with the requirements of due process; (3) aimed to achieve a 
valid public purpose; and (4) did not otherwise exceed its police powers.”  Id. (footnote 
and citation omitted). 
The rigidity of Euclidean zoning, and the presumption of correctness arising from 
an original or comprehensive rezoning, may feel “unduly harsh to the landowner who finds 
that planned uses of a property are no longer allowed under the zoning classification into 
which the land has been placed.”  Rylyns, 372 Md. at 536.  In Rylyns, we explained: 
The presumption performs, however, and perhaps somewhat ironically, a 
critically essential function to the benefit of the property owner.  Because 
zoning necessarily impacts the economic uses to which land may be put, and 
thus impacts the economic return to the property owner, the requirement that 
there be uniformity within each zone throughout the district is an important 
safeguard of the right to fair and equal treatment of the landowners at the 
hands of the local zoning authority.  Frankly put, the requirement of 
uniformity serves to protect the landowner from favoritism towards certain 
landowners within a zone by the grant of less onerous restrictions than are 
applied to others within the same zone elsewhere in the district, and also 
serves to prevent the use of zoning as a form of leverage by the local 
government seeking land concession, transfers, or other consideration in 
return for more favorable treatment.   
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 
In other words, the uniformity requirement protects landowners by ensuring that a 
neighboring or nearby property will not be used in a manner that is inconsistent with the 
uses permitted in that zone. 
20 
 
b. 
Piecemeal Zoning 
As noted above, “the original or comprehensive zoning may be changed (unless by 
a subsequent comprehensive zoning) only by a subsequent piecemeal zoning, which in the 
case of a Euclidean zone may be granted” by satisfying what is commonly referred to as 
the “change-mistake rule.”  Rylyns, 372 Md. at 538 (citations omitted). 
The “change-mistake rule” is an either/or rule.  Id.  To establish the “change” side 
of the equation for a piecemeal zoning, “there must be a satisfactory showing that there has 
been a significant and unanticipated change in a relatively well-defined area (the 
‘neighborhood’) surrounding the property in question since its original or last 
comprehensive rezoning, whichever occurred most recently.”  Id.  The “mistake” side of 
the rule “requires a showing that the underlying assumptions or premises relied upon by 
the legislative body during the immediately preceding original or comprehensive rezoning 
were incorrect.”  Id. at 538–39.  Stated another way, “there must be a showing of mistake 
of fact[,]” not a mistake of judgment.  Id. at 539. 
In addition, even where the standard for change or mistake has been satisfied, “there 
is no reciprocal right to a change in zoning, nor is there a threshold evidentiary standard 
which when met compels a rezoning.”  Rylyns, 372 Md. at 539.  Where strong evidence 
exists to support a determination of change or mistake, “piecemeal zoning may by granted, 
but it is not required to be granted, except where a failure to do so would deprive the owner 
of all economically viable use of the property.”  Id. (citations omitted).  “In Maryland, the 
change-mistake rule applies to all piecemeal zoning applications involving Euclidean 
zones[.]”  Id.; see also Hardesty v. Dunphy, 259 Md. 718, 720, 725–26 (1970) (reversing 
21 
 
a zoning board’s grant of an application to rezone properties in an agricultural-residential 
area for commercial use because there was no “legally sufficient change or mistake” and 
therefore a comprehensive rezoning was the only method available for the rezoning).  “The 
change-mistake rule does not apply . . . to changes in zoning made in a comprehensive 
rezoning[.]”  Rylyns, 372 Md. at 539. 
Piecemeal rezonings are quasi-judicial in nature and are “reviewed most frequently 
under the substantial evidence test.”  Zimmer, 444 Md. at 510 (citation omitted).  In Prince 
George’s County, “[a] contested application for a map amendment . . . may not be granted 
or denied without written findings of material facts and conclusions.”  LU § 25-204.  “All 
witnesses appearing in a hearing before the [D]istrict [C]ouncil are subject to cross-
examination.”  LU § 25-203.8 
 
8 For the sake of completeness, I briefly mention two other types of zoning—
contract zoning and conditional zoning, neither of which are applicable in this case.  
Contract zoning “occurs when an agreement is entered between the ultimate zoning 
authority and the zoning applicant/property owner which purports to determine 
contractually how the property in question will be zoned, in derogation of the legal 
prerequisites for the grant of the desired zone.”  Mayor & Council of Rockville v. Rylyns 
Enters., Inc., 372 Md. 514, 547 (2002).  In the absence of “valid legislative authorization, 
it is impermissible because it allows a property owner to obtain a special privilege not 
available to others, disrupts the comprehensive nature of the zoning plan, and, most 
importantly, impermissibly derogates the exercise of the municipality’s powers.”  Id. 
(cleaned up).  Conditional zoning is permitted in Prince George’s County pursuant to LU 
§ 22-214(a), which allows the placement of conditions on the grant of piecemeal zoning of 
a subject property, in a manner that may be more limited or restricted than the standards 
that are generally applicable to all land zoned similarly in the district.  “Although 
conditional zoning introduces flexibility” as far as the zoning authority’s ability to place 
limitations or restrictions on the property, it “does not obviate the necessity for the zoning 
authority to make the underlying legislative findings required for the grant” of the rezoning, 
i.e., a determination that the change-mistake rule has been satisfied in the case of a 
piecemeal zoning application.  Zimmer, 444 Md. at 519.  
22 
 
c. 
Spot Zoning 
“Spot zoning occurs when a small area in a district is placed in a different zoning 
classification than the surrounding property.”  Tennison v. Shomette, 38 Md. App. 1, 8 
(1977) (citation omitted); see also 3 Rathkopf’s § 41:1 (stating that illegal spot zoning 
claims “arise when a tract of land is upzoned to allow a higher density or more intensive 
use or development”). 
In Cassell v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, this Court described spot zoning 
in connection with a challenge to a city ordinance which created a separate commercial 
district consisting of a single property to permit that property to be used for a funeral home.  
195 Md. 348, 352 (1950).  Prior to the enactment of the ordinance, the property had been 
zoned in a residential district, and would continue to be surrounded by residentially zoned 
properties.  See id. at 353.  We concluded that the rezoning constituted an illegal spot 
zoning and invalidated the ordinance.  Id. at 357–58. 
We explained that “[t]he State Zoning Enabling Act demands that all zoning 
regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind of buildings throughout each district,” 
and that “[i]nvidious distinctions and discriminations in zoning cannot be allowed, for the 
very essence of zoning is territorial division according to the character of the land and the 
buildings, their peculiar suitability for particular uses, and uniformity of use within the use 
district.”  Id. at 354 (citations omitted).  This Court described “spot zoning” as follows: 
“Spot zoning,” the arbitrary and unreasonable devotion of a small area 
within a zoning district to a use which is inconsistent with the use to which 
the rest of the district is restricted, has appeared in many cities in America as 
the result of pressure put upon councilmen to pass amendments to zoning 
ordinances solely for the benefit of private interests. . . . It is, therefore, 
23 
 
universally held that a “spot zoning” ordinance, which singles out a parcel 
of land within the limits of a use district and marks it off into a separate 
district for the benefit of the owner, thereby permitting a use of that parcel 
inconsistent with the use permitted in the rest of the district, is invalid if it is 
not in accordance with the comprehensive zoning plan and is merely for 
private gain. 
 
On the other hand, it has been decided that a use permitted in a small area, 
which is not inconsistent with the use to which the larger surrounding area is 
restricted, although it may be different from that use, is not “spot zoning” 
when it does not conflict with the comprehensive plan but is in harmony with 
an orderly growth of a new use for property in the locality.  The courts have 
accordingly upheld the creation of small districts within a residential district 
for use of grocery stores, . . . and even gasoline filling stations, for the 
accommodation and convenience of the residents of the residential district.   
 
Cassell, 195 Md. at 355–56 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
The Court held that the ordinance, which reclassified a single lot to allow a use that 
was not permitted in the surrounding residential district, was “an arbitrary and 
unreasonable discrimination for the reason that it d[id] not operate alike on all persons 
residing in the residential area.”  Id. at 358.  This Court concluded that the ordinance was 
“beyond the statutory power of the City Council” and declared it to be invalid.  Id.; see 
also Hewitt v. County Comm’rs of Balt. County, 220 Md. 48, 52, 64 (1959) (holding that 
the County Commissioners’ action rezoning two residentially improved lots totaling 19 
acres from a residential-use classification to a commercial-use classification constituted 
“invalid ‘spot zoning’” because it was “an arbitrary and unreasonable devotion of a small 
area to a use inconsistent with the uses to which the rest of the district [was] restricted, 
made for the sole benefit of the private interests of the owner and not in accordance with 
[the] comprehensive plan”). 
24 
 
5. 
Land Use Tools that Provide Relief and Flexibility from Euclidean Zoning  
 
To address the tension between the “stability and predictability of Euclidean 
zoning[,]” on the one hand and its “undesirable rigidity” on the other, Maryland, like our 
sister states, has created zoning tools—special exceptions,9 variances,10 floating zones,11 
 
9 “The terms ‘special exception’ and ‘conditional use’ are essentially 
interchangeable.”  People’s Counsel for Balt. County v. Loyola Coll. in Md., 406 Md. 54, 
71 n.19 (2008) (citations omitted).  Special exception uses are identified by the legislative 
body as uses that are “conditionally compatible in [a] zone,” but not permitted “unless 
specific statutory standards . . . are met” to ensure that the use on a particular property is 
compatible with the surrounding neighborhood.  Rylyns, 372 Md. at 541.  These uses are 
specifically identified as “special exception” uses in a zoning ordinance and are considered 
to be “a middle ground between permitted and prohibited uses.”  Zimmer, 444 Md. at 513 
n.17.  Stated another way, special exception uses are “prima facie compatible for a given 
zone, subject to a case-by-case evaluation to determine whether the use would result in an 
adverse effect on the neighborhood (other than any adverse effect inherent in that use 
within the zone), such that would make the use actually incompatible.”  Id. (citation 
omitted).  “Because special exceptions are legislatively-created within the comprehensive 
zoning regulatory scheme, they enjoy the presumption of correctness[.]”  Rylyns, 372 Md. 
at 542 (citation omitted).  Accordingly, the application for a special exception is not 
required to make any showing of a change or mistake.  Id. at 543.  
 
10 “‘A variance refers to administrative relief which may be granted from the strict 
application of a particular development limitation in the zoning ordinance (i.e., setback, 
area and height limitations, etc.).’”  Rylyns, 372 Md. at 537 (quoting Stanley D. Abrams, 
Guide to Maryland Zoning Decisions § 11.1 (3d ed. Michie 1992)); see also 3 Rathkopf’s 
§ 58:1 (“A variance is the right to use or to build on land in a way prohibited by strict 
application of a zoning ordinance.  It is permission given to a property owner to depart 
from the applicable zoning requirements by constructing or maintaining a building or 
structure, or establishing or maintaining a use of land that otherwise would not be 
allowed.”).  “Although different jurisdictions use slightly different standards for granting 
a variance, there is a common purpose behind allowing variances:  The variance is a means 
of correcting occasional inequities that may be created under general Euclidean zoning 
ordinances.”  Md. Reclamation Assocs., Inc. v. Harford County, 468 Md. 339, 402 (2020) 
(footnote omitted). 
 
11 A floating zone allows the local zoning authority to establish in its zoning 
ordinance “a specific zoning classification for a specific purpose or a class of purposes, but 
 
25 
 
and overlay zones12—that provide flexibility or relief from the rigidity of Euclidean zoning 
in certain circumstances.  Zimmer, 444 Md. at 513–14 (footnotes omitted) (citations 
omitted).  In this case, the District Council did not employ any of these tools as part of its 
effort to introduce townhouse uses within the R-A Zone.  For this reason, it is unnecessary 
to discuss them further other than to point out that: (1) none of these zoning procedures 
requires the application of the change-mistake rule; (2) each of them involves the filing of 
an application for a specifically identifiable property or properties; and (3) the approval 
process for each involves a quasi-judicial proceeding, with findings of fact that must be 
made by the approving authority prior to granting the application. 
 
[] not assign on the zoning map the classification to any property[.]”  Zimmer, 444 Md. 
at 515 (citation omitted).  This type of zone is said “to ‘float’ above the local jurisdiction 
to which the zone may be applied through the grant of a piecemeal zoning map 
amendment[.]”  Id. at 516 (citations omitted).  “To rezone a property to a floating zone, the 
zoning authority must find generally that the legislative prerequisites for the zone are met 
and the rezoning is compatible with the surrounding neighborhood (much as required to 
grant a special exception).”  Id. (citations omitted). 
 
12 An overlay zone “has been described as a mapped district superimposed on one 
or more established zoning districts, which may be used to impose supplemental 
restrictions on uses in these districts, permit uses otherwise disallowed, or implement some 
form of density bonus or incentive zoning program.”  City of Hyattsville v. Prince George’s 
County Council, 254 Md. App. 1, 45 (2022) (cleaned up).  “A property located in an overlay 
zone is simultaneously in two zones, both the overlay zone and the underlying zone.”  Id. 
(cleaned up).  Although overlay zones do not fit within the description of a floating zone 
(given that they do not float, but are pre-mapped), like floating zones they do not require a 
showing of change or mistake.  Id. at 50–52.  The rationale for floating zones and overlay 
zones is the same—the local legislature establishes a detailed process in its zoning 
ordinance to approve these zones, which include definite, concrete standards, which make 
the process more akin to the special exception process.  Id.   
26 
 
 
Having reviewed the nature of Euclidean zoning, and various tools that permit 
flexibility from the rigidity of Euclidean zoning, I turn to the process that the District 
Council used here—the adoption of a text amendment that permitted townhouses to be 
constructed in a Euclidean zone under “certain circumstances” where a property satisfied 
enumerated criteria. 
III. 
Analysis 
It is undisputed that the R-A Zone is a Euclidean zone.  The applicable State 
enabling statute requires that zoning laws enacted by the District Council in traditional 
Euclidean Zones “shall be uniform for each class or kind of development throughout a 
district or zone.”  LU § 22-201(b)(2)(i) (emphasis added).  If the zoning text amendment 
violates the “uniformity” requirement of the enabling statute, it is invalid.  As previously 
mentioned, there is little case law discussing the uniformity requirement under the enabling 
statute.  Two of this Court’s cases discussing uniformity in detail, Anderson House, LLC 
v. Mayor & City Council of Rockville and Montgomery County v. Woodward & Lothrop, 
Inc., arose in different contexts than this case.  As discussed below, in those cases, 
landowners challenged the rezoning of their properties as part of a comprehensive 
rezoning.  In connection with the rezoning, the landowners alleged that the zoning 
regulations that applied to their properties (and which undisputedly had general application 
within the zoning district) violated the uniformity requirement. 
27 
 
A. 
Case Law Describing the Uniformity Requirement 
In Montgomery County v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280 Md. 686, 689–92 (1977), 
ten property owners challenged the rezoning of their properties to a new zoning 
classification within a newly modified central business district (“CBD”).  The Montgomery 
County Council (“the Council”) had adopted zoning text amendments that corresponded to 
the modifications of the CBD and “regulated the height, area and use of permissible 
development and thereby sharply reduced the densities and floor area that could be built” 
in the CBD.  Id. at 691–92.  The development criteria established by the zoning text 
amendments had been recommended by, and were the product of, a years-long study 
undertaken by a blue-ribbon committee formed to study development in the area.  Id. 
at 694–97.  The new zone and development standards were in conformity with the 
recommendation of the General Plan and a local Master Plan for the planning area.  See id. 
at 694.  The Council then undertook a sectional map amendment process in which it 
assigned the new zoning classification to 37 properties.  Id. at 691–92, 715.   
Several of the affected property owners challenged the rezoning and text 
amendments adopted by the Council, asserting that the sectional map amendment process 
did not constitute a comprehensive rezoning, and that the associated text amendment 
violated the uniformity requirement.  Id. at 692.  We determined that the establishment of 
the modified zone, and its application to 37 identified properties pursuant to the sectional 
map amendment process, constituted a comprehensive rezoning, and as such, “enjoy[ed] a 
strong presumption of validity.”  Id. at 706 (citations omitted). 
28 
 
The property owners argued that the Council violated the uniformity requirement 
by adopting zoning regulations for the new CBD that: (1) adopted a computation for 
parking requirements that was different than for other business districts; (2) permitted 
properties that were 22,000 square feet or more to be developed at higher densities; 
(3) vested “complete authority” in the Planning Board to allocate floor area ratio 
requirements to different parcels; and (4) created a different standard for when property 
owners were required to conform to the new code for buildings that had use permits prior 
to 1959.  Id. at 718–19, 721–22. 
This Court rejected the property owners’ uniformity challenges.  Id. at 721–23.  We 
determined that the parking requirements applied to “all property uses” sharing the same 
characteristics identified in the ordinance.  Id. at 721.  With respect to the minimum size 
requirement for additional densities, we observed that “[t]he zoning regulations apply 
uniformly to all parcels less than 22,000 square feet as well as those in excess of that area.” 
Id.  We determined that the property owners’ third challenge, to the Planning Board’s 
authority, was premature.  Id. at 721–722.  Finally, we determined that the differential 
treatment of nonconforming uses based upon the date that the use commenced was “neither 
arbitrary nor invidiously discriminatory, but affect[ed] alike all properties similarly 
situated.”  Id. at 723.   
More recently, in Anderson House, LLC v. Mayor & City Council of Rockville, this 
Court engaged in a more in-depth discussion of the uniformity requirement in connection 
with a landowner’s challenge to the rezoning of its property.  In that case, the city enacted 
legislation creating a new commercial transition zone and implemented a comprehensive 
29 
 
rezoning.  402 Md. 689, 696 (2008).  As part of a comprehensive map amendment process, 
the landowner’s property was rezoned into the new commercial transition zone, which the 
landowner contended would deny it the ability to subdivide the property, “and thus 
preclude additional development.”  Id. at 696, 699. 
Like the property owners in Woodward & Lothrop, the property owner in Anderson 
House challenged on uniformity grounds the rezoning of the property, as well as the text 
of the zoning regulations that applied as a result of the rezoning.  Id. at 701.  The 
landowner’s property was rezoned along with approximately 20 other properties as part of 
a comprehensive rezoning.  Id. at 699–700, 725 n.27.  The landowner’s property was the 
largest property that was subject to the rezoning.  Id. at 697.  The landowner argued that, 
as a result of the size of the property, the zoning regulations would impact its property in a 
manner different from smaller properties.  Id. at 725.   
Writing for this Court, Judge Harrell explained the history and rationale of the 
“uniformity requirement” in Euclidean zoning, which “has its roots in the Standard State 
Zoning Enabling Act, which states, at § 2, that applicable zoning ‘regulations shall be 
uniform for each class or kind of buildings throughout each district, but the regulations in 
one district may differ from those in other districts.’”  Anderson House, 402 Md. at 713 
(citing 1 Anderson, supra, § 5.25 at 417).  The Court noted that “[t]his or a similar 
limitation appears in the state zoning enabling acts of nearly every state.”  Id. (citation 
omitted). 
We explained that “[t]he apparent motive for including the uniformity requirement 
in the early days of the introduction of zoning controls was appeasement of potentially 
30 
 
hostile landowners.”  Id. (citing 1 Anderson, supra, § 5.25 at 418).  The Court stated that 
the uniformity requirement assured property owners “that similarly situated properties 
would be subject to similar regulation.”  Id. at 713–14 (citation omitted).  In other words, 
we noted, “the uniformity requirement springs less from pure legal necessity, but more 
from a policy desire to give notice to property owners that ad hoc discriminations will not 
be tolerated by the law.”  Id. at 714 (citation omitted).  We also noted that courts “have 
been somewhat reluctant to elaborate on or supply judicial gloss to the meaning of the 
uniformity requirement, perhaps due to the original policy purpose for its inclusion.”  Id. 
(citation omitted). 
Nevertheless, we observed that “[t]rends as to its application . . . appear in a number 
of states.”  Anderson House, 402 Md. at 714.  We stated that “[m]any jurisdictions agree 
that the kind of discrimination violative of the uniformity requirement occurs when a 
zoning ordinance singles out a property or properties for different treatment than others 
similarly situated.”  Id. (emphasis added).  We undertook an analysis of case law from New 
Jersey and Connecticut to “provide a useful ‘side by side’ illustration of the application of 
the uniformity requirement.”  Id. 
 
We noted that in New Jersey, a court found a violation of the uniformity requirement 
“when an ordinance imposed a setback requirement of 25 feet throughout a business 
district[,]” with the exception of a single block in which the regulations imposed a 67-foot 
setback.  Id. (citing N.T. Hegeman Co. v. Mayor & Council of Borough of River Edge, 6 
N.J. Super. 495, 69 A.2d 767 (Law Div. 1949)).  On the other hand, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court found no violation of the uniformity requirement where an ordinance “used 
31 
 
a mathematical formula to determine minimum lot sizes and maximum lot coverage based 
upon the steepness of slopes on properties[,] . . . even though it created varying results 
based upon a parcel’s physical conditions or characteristics.”  Id. (citing Rumson Estates, 
Inc. v. Mayor & Council of Borough of Fair Haven, 177 N.J. 338, 828 A.2d 317 (2003)).  
That court “emphasized that uniformly applicable regulations could result in different 
conditions without violating the requirement.”  Id. at 714–715 (citing Rumson Estates, 828 
A.2d at 329–30).  Based upon our review of the New Jersey cases, we explained that “[t]he 
crux of the [uniformity] requirement is only that similarly situated properties are treated 
the same under the zoning regulations.”  Id. at 715 (citations omitted).  
 
We also noted that cases from Connecticut recognized the same distinction.  For 
example, we pointed out that the Connecticut Supreme Court held that an ordinance was 
discriminatory and violated the uniformity requirement where the legislation required a 
buffer strip for one specific parcel of property, while failing to impose the same 
requirement on similarly situated properties in the same zone.  Id. (citing Veseskis v. Bristol 
Zoning Comm’n, 168 Conn. 358, 362 A.2d 538 (1975)).  On the other hand, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court found that an amendment to a town zoning regulation did not violate the 
uniformity requirement by creating different minimum lot sizes within a particular zone 
depending on various factors such as lot slope, and whether and the extent to which a 
property was covered by wetlands or watercourses.  Id. (citing Harris v. Zoning Comm’n 
of Town of New Milford, 259 Conn. 402, 788 A.2d 1239 (2002)).  In this latter case, Harris, 
the Connecticut Supreme Court distinguished the first case, Veseskis, by noting that “the 
regulation in Veseskis affected only one specific parcel of land,” where in Harris, the 
32 
 
amendment to the regulation had general application within the zoning district.  Id. (citing 
Harris, 788 A.2d at 1258).  The court in Harris stated that “‘the thrust of the statutory 
requirement of uniformity is equal treatment’ and concluded that ‘the fact that the 
amendment has [a] differing effect on parcels of land throughout the town does not render 
its application inconsistent or unequal’ because it is applied to ‘every parcel within its 
purview consistently and equally.’”  Id. (quoting Harris, 788 A.2d at 1258) (alteration in 
original). 
 
After reviewing the case law from these two states, we stated that “Maryland’s 
common law conforms to the trend.”  Anderson House, 402 Md. at 716.  We noted that 
“[a]s with other states, Maryland’s limited case law on the uniformity requirement 
demonstrates that it is discrimination in favor of, or against, particular properties that will 
not be tolerated.  In contrast, uniformly applicable regulations that produce disparate 
results in application do not violate the uniformity requirement.”  Id. at 717 (emphasis 
added).  We proceeded to contrast two Maryland cases that had considered challenges to 
zoning regulations based on the uniformity requirement—Board of County Commissioners 
of Washington County v. H. Manny Holtz, Inc., 65 Md. App. 574 (1985), and Woodward 
& Lothrop, 280 Md. 686.  We observed that in Manny Holtz, the Appellate Court of 
Maryland “found a violation of the uniformity requirement where a particular property was 
limited to half of the uses ordinarily allowed in the zone.”  Id. at 717 (citing Manny Holtz, 
65 Md. App. at 576–77).  “Specifically, the Holtz property was rezoned from residential to 
business.”  Id. (citing Manny Holtz, 65 Md. App. at 576–77).  During the rezoning process, 
in an effort to appease certain protestors, the county limited the uses that could be 
33 
 
established on the Holtz property.  Id. (citing Manny Holtz, 65 Md. App. at 577).  In other 
words, the property was “singled-out and treated differently by the terms of the . . . 
reclassification.”  Id.  We noted that the Appellate Court “aptly found that such a limitation 
would create a ‘mini-district’ within the relevant business zoning district[,]” and correctly 
concluded that permitting the county to limit or restrict the uses in the zone “‘would have 
the power to destroy the uniformity of the district’” and “‘emasculate’ the requirement.”  
Id. (quoting Manny Holtz, 65 Md. App. at 583) (additional citations omitted).13 
We contrasted the text amendment at issue in Manny Holtz with the text amendment 
associated with the zoning regulations that were challenged by the property owners in 
 
13 The Majority attempts to distinguish this case from two Maryland cases where 
legislative enactments improperly singled out properties for different treatment—Board of 
County Commissioners of Washington County v. H. Manny Holtz, 65 Md. App. 574 (1985) 
and Cassel v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 195 Md. 348 (1950).  The Majority 
asserts that, in Manny Holtz and Cassel, the zoning actions “reduced uniformity” whereas 
in the action here, the text amendment “could be seen as increasing uniformity by 
encouraging an out-of-place airport to redevelop as housing in a largely residential area.”  
Maj. Slip Op. at 27–28.  The Majority is mistaken.  It loses sight of the fact that residential 
development is already permitted on the Freeway Property.  In other words, Freeway did 
not need a text amendment to enable the property’s use as an airport to be discontinued and 
to allow it to be developed at the same residential density generally applicable in the zone.   
 
In both Manny Holtz and Cassel, the Appellate Court and this Court invalidated the 
zoning legislation in question because it singled out the properties for different treatment.  
As we explained in Anderson House, in both cases the property in question “was singled-
out and treated differently by the terms of the act of reclassification[,]” thereby 
“‘destroy[ing] the uniformity of the district[.]’”  Anderson House, LLC v. Mayor & City 
Council of Rockville, 402 Md. 689, 717 (2008) (quoting Manny Holtz, 65 Md. App. at 583) 
(citing Cassel, 195 Md. at 354) (additional citations omitted); see id. at 717–18 (“‘The 
regulations for the use of property within the various use districts are supported upon the 
basic theory that they apply equally and uniformly . . . . Invidious distinctions and 
discriminations in zoning cannot be allowed . . . .’” (emphasis added) (quoting Cassel, 195 
Md. at 354)).   
34 
 
Woodward & Lothrop.  Anderson House, 402 Md. at 718.  In the latter case, we explained 
that “this Court found that no violation of the uniformity requirement occurred when 
properties within a zoning district were subjected to uniformly applicable regulations that 
created in application disparate results for individual properties.”  Id.  We explained that 
“regulations concerning a zoning district that are uniformly applicable may result in 
application in varying restrictions for individual properties without violating the uniformity 
requirement.  ‘This difference in treatment is neither arbitrary nor invidiously 
discriminatory, but affects alike all properties similarly situated.’”  Id. at 718–19 (quoting 
Woodward & Lothrop, 280 Md. at 723). 
Applying the above uniformity principles to the facts at issue in Anderson House, 
we noted that, like Woodward & Lothrop, the ordinance established “uniformly applicable 
regulations throughout the [] zoning district.”  Anderson House, 402 Md. at 719.  We 
explained that:  
The Anderson House property is but one property to which the uniform 
regulations applied and for which the uniform regulations created a unique 
result.  It was not, according to this record, a property singled out by the 
terms of the legislation for disparate treatment.  All properties included 
within the [zoning district] are limited by the terms of the legislation.  
Although the Anderson House property may have been the largest property 
in gross lot size [zoned in the district], this does not make it a “mini-district,” 
as in Manny Holtz, 65 Md. App. 583–84[ ].  Thus, on the record before us, 
we conclude that there was no unfair or unequal treatment, no arbitrary or 
invidious distinction or discrimination, and, indeed, no emasculation of the 
uniformity requirement.  
 
Id. at 720 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
The text amendment at issue here arises in a very different procedural posture than 
the uniformity challenge in Anderson House and Woodward & Lothrop—a crucial 
35 
 
distinction that the Majority opinion completely ignores.  In those cases, the properties of 
the landowners challenging the zoning text amendments were rezoned as part of a 
comprehensive rezoning, and it was undisputed that the language used in the zoning 
regulations had general application to all the properties in the zone.  In other words, there 
was no allegation that the zoning regulations at issue applied only to one property or singled 
out a particular property for favorable or unfavorable treatment.14  Here, Concerned 
Citizens argues that the text amendment does not have uniform application throughout the 
R-A Zone.  Instead, it asserts, the text amendment is “site-specific” and applies to only the 
Freeway Property.   
 
14 In addition to failing to appreciate the very different circumstances presented in 
the Woodward & Lothrop and Anderson House cases—both of which involved text 
amendments having general application that were applied to properties within the context 
of a comprehensive rezoning—the Majority relies on cases involving zoning principles that 
have no application here.  For example, the Majority quotes the dissenting opinion in 
Rylyns, in which Judge Cathell discusses out-of-state cases involving conditional zoning.  
Maj. Slip Op. at 37, 41 (citing 372 Md. at 593 (Cathell, J., dissenting)).  Conditional zoning 
concepts, which I discuss in note 8, supra, have no application here. 
 
The Majority also relies upon MBC Realty, LLC v. Mayor & City Council of 
Baltimore, 192 Md. App. 218 (2010).  That case is also inapposite.  The text amendment 
in that case permitted billboards to be constructed by special exception or conditional use 
on publicly owned stadia and arenas in a particular zoning district.  Id. at 226.  First, as the 
Majority points out, Maj. Slip Op. at 35, the case did not involve a uniformity challenge 
and the uniformity requirement was not discussed.  Second, there was no determination 
that the facially neutral criteria were pretextual, nor was there any argument that the zoning 
criteria would not have any potential prospective application to other similarly situated 
properties.  See generally MBC Realty, 192 Md. 218.  As I explain more fully herein, the 
criteria in CB 17-2019 were not only pretextual, they also had no general prospective 
application because they were grafted into an Old Zoning Ordinance that would have no 
application upon the completion of the ongoing comprehensive rezoning.  In other words, 
under the legislative record presented here, there was no scenario in which the carefully 
crafted criteria would have general application beyond the Freeway Property.   
36 
 
The Majority’s opinion cannot be squared with this Court’s comprehensive analysis 
of Maryland case law (as discussed in Anderson House) and case law from other states 
involving uniformity challenges associated with illegal spot zonings and text amendments.  
See 402 Md. at 713–20.  Those cases “demonstrate[] that . . . discrimination in favor of, or 
against, particular properties . . .  will not be tolerated.”  Id. at 717 (emphasis added).  To 
satisfy the uniformity requirement, the text of a zoning ordinance must use facially neutral 
criteria that are not simply pretextual.  Where an ordinance does so, it may satisfy the 
uniformity requirement even if, in practice, it affects only one property or a small number 
of properties.  An ordinance does not use facially neutral or generally applicable criteria, 
and does not satisfy the uniformity requirement, where it specifically identifies the property 
or properties to which it applies.  This is true whether the ordinance identifies the property 
on its face (i.e., by address or block or plat), or, as the Majority acknowledges, Maj. Slip 
Op. at 32, and I discuss further below, through facially neutral but pretextual criteria (i.e., 
criteria that, together, serve no zoning purpose other than to identify the individual 
property). 
The difference between an ordinance that uses facially neutral criteria and one that 
uses facially property-specific criteria was explained in Anderson House by comparing 
cases involving uniformity challenges (as discussed above).  There, we pointed to New 
Jersey and Connecticut decisions that upheld zoning requirements that applied based on 
“the steepness of slopes on properties” and “whether, and how much, of a property is 
covered by wetlands or watercourses,” 402 Md. at 714–15 (citing Rumson Estates, 828 
A.2d at 329–30; Harris, 788 A.2d at 1258), and vacated zoning requirements that applied 
37 
 
based on whether a property was located on a specific block or a specific plot of land, id. 
(citing N.T. Hegeman, 69 A.2d 767; Veseskis, 168 Conn. 358).  See also id. at 715 n.21 
(listing cases from other states that draw the same distinction).15 
As discussed below, this case involves an ordinance that uses facially neutral but 
pretextual criteria.  Despite the Majority’s acknowledgement that facial neutrality is not 
dispositive, it does not actually engage in an analysis to determine whether the seemingly 
facially neutral language here is in fact pretextual.  By contrast, I would analyze the text 
amendment as follows. 
B. 
The Facially Neutral Text Is Not Dispositive  
Prior to the enactment of CB 17-2019, townhouses were not permitted in the R-A 
Zone.  The text amendment enacted by CB 17-2019 permitted townhouses to be 
constructed at a density of up to 4.5 dwelling units per acre in “certain circumstances.”  
Those circumstances are that the townhouses could be constructed “on an assemblage of 
adjacent properties” that: (1)(a) is no less than 100 acres and no more than 150 acres in 
size, or (b) “was formerly used as an airport”; (2) is located entirely within one mile of a 
 
15 These cases can also help illustrate how generally applicable criteria can apply 
only to one property and satisfy the uniformity requirement.  Imagine a hypothetical 
property that is located on the only steep slope in a zoning district.  The municipality might 
reasonably believe that the steep slope demanded heightened construction requirements.  If 
a zoning ordinance stated that such requirements applied to all properties located on slopes 
in excess of a certain grade, the ordinance would likely satisfy the uniformity requirement 
even though only one property was subject to the construction requirements.  But, if the 
implementing ordinance stated that the construction requirements applied to the property 
located at 123 Black Acre Road, the ordinance would not satisfy the uniformity 
requirement.  The fact that the local government had a reasonable motive for implementing 
different construction requirements could not alone save the property-specific ordinance. 
38 
 
municipal boundary; (3) is located “entirely within 2,500 feet of land owned by a regulated 
public utility and used for purposes of electrical generation, transmission, or distribution 
in connection with providing public utility service in the County by a regulated public 
utility”; and (4) “has frontage on a public right-of-way classified as a freeway or higher in 
the Master Plan of Transportation and is maintained by the State Highway Administration.” 
It is undisputed that Freeway Property satisfies all of the criteria in terms of its size 
(it is more than 100 acres and less than 150 acres), its location (it is entirely within one 
mile of a municipal boundary), and the uses of the adjacent properties along its northern 
and western boundaries (having frontage on a public right-of-way and being “entirely 
within 2,500 feet of land owned by a regulated public utility and used for purposes of 
electrical generation [or] transmission”).  In fact, the criteria generally describe the 
Freeway Property as far as its size, location, and borders.  
It is also undisputed that the text of the criteria is facially neutral.  In other words, 
the text, on its face, appears to generally apply to similarly situated properties within the 
zoning district.  Stated another way, the text does not expressly state that only one property 
in the R-A Zone—the Freeway Property—may be developed for townhouse uses, and 
similarly situated properties may not be developed for the same use.  Obviously, the latter 
example would violate the uniformity requirement as described in Anderson House.   
Nevertheless, the facially neutral language of the text may not, in fact, satisfy the 
uniformity requirement of the enabling statute.  If the criteria are pretextual and, by their 
terms, apply to only one property in the R-A Zone—the Freeway Property—in a way that 
39 
 
singles it out for favorable disparate treatment, then the Bill violates the uniformity 
requirement.16  
I disagree with Freeway’s argument that, in determining whether the criteria apply 
to “similarly situated properties,” our inquiry must end with a determination that the text 
of CB 17-2019 is facially neutral.  Such a limited inquiry would enable legislators to 
perform an end-run around the uniformity requirement by adopting criteria that are facially 
neutral but, when taken together, are not in fact generally applicable zoning criteria and 
have no purpose other than to identify one particular property and exclude similarly 
situated properties, thereby singling out the property for favorable or unfavorable treatment 
and resulting in an “emasculation of the uniformity requirement.”  Anderson House, 402 
Md. at 720 (citations omitted). 
As Rathkopf’s explains, “[d]iffering treatment of lands within a zoning district or of 
lands similarly situated has given rise to discrimination claims based on the lack of . . .  
‘uniformity.’”  1 Rathkopf’s § 4:8.  Courts generally interpret the uniformity requirement 
to prohibit unreasonable discrimination.  Id.  This is the same standard used in equal 
protection claims.  Id.17 
 
16 As noted above, if criteria are generally applicable and not pretextual, they may 
still satisfy the uniformity requirement even if in practice they affect only one property or 
a small number of properties. 
 
17 In this case, we are concerned with whether the text amendment violated the 
uniformity requirement under the State enabling statute.  Zoning laws may also be subject 
to constitutional challenges alleging equal protection claims.  In Village of Willowbrook v. 
Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 563–65 (2000) (per curiam), the United States Supreme Court held 
that the Equal Protection Clause gives rise to a cause of action when a plaintiff alleges that 
 
40 
 
In the context of constitutional challenges to ordinances arising under the Equal 
Protection and Free Exercise Clauses, both of which prohibit different types of 
discrimination, the United States Supreme Court has stated that “facial neutrality is not 
determinative.”  Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
534 (1993).  In both types of constitutional challenges, the Supreme Court has stated that 
a court may determine whether a public law was adopted to discriminate unlawfully “from 
both direct and circumstantial evidence.”  Id. at 540 (citing Arlington Heights v. Metro. 
Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)).  “Relevant evidence includes, among other 
things, the historical background of the decision under challenge, the specific series of 
events leading to the enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative or 
administrative history, including contemporaneous statements made by the members of the 
decisionmaking body.”  Id. (citing Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267–68).  In the context 
of a challenge to a developer’s denial of a rezoning on racial discrimination grounds, the 
Court also noted that  
[d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence . . .  might afford evidence 
that improper purposes are playing a role.  Substantive departures too may 
be relevant, particularly if the factors usually considered important by the 
decisionmaker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached. 
 
The legislative or administrative history may [also] be highly relevant, 
especially where there are contemporary statements by members of the 
decisionmaking body, minutes of its meetings, or reports.  
 
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 254, 267–68 (footnote omitted). 
 
the government has intentionally and arbitrarily treated an individual differently from 
others similarly situated, even if it is not alleged that the individual is a member of a 
vulnerable group or class.   
41 
 
To determine whether the text amendment applies to “all present and future 
properties in the R-A Zone, including, as argued by Freeway, all other properties that 
potentially qualify under the criteria set forth” in the text amendment, I would consider the 
broader legislative context in which this text amendment arose, as well as its legislative 
history.  When one considers CB 17-2019 within the legislative context and history 
presented in this record, it is clear that the text amendment, while appearing to have facially 
neutral application, did not in fact use generally applicable criteria and instead applied to—
and was carefully crafted to apply to—only one property, the Freeway Property.   
C. 
Broader Legislative Context—Prince George’s County’s Adoption of a 
New Zoning Ordinance and Comprehensive Rezoning  
During the time when the District Council was considering the text amendment in 
question, Prince George’s County was, as noted above, in a transitional period from the 
Prince George’s County Zoning Ordinance that was in effect at that time (the “Old Zoning 
Ordinance”), to a new Zoning Ordinance that became effective April 1, 2022 (the “New 
Zoning Ordinance”).   
1. 
The Old Zoning Ordinance 
a. 
The Residential-Agricultural (“R-A”) Zone  
The Old Zoning Ordinance contained 17 classes of residential zones that were 
organized based upon their intensity of use.  Prince George’s County Code (“PGCC”) 
§ 27-109(a)(1).  The R-A Zone was the third least intense residential use.  PGCC 
§ 27-109(b)(1).  The purposes of the R-A Zone were: “(A) To provide for large-lot one-
family detached residential subdivisions, while encouraging the retention of agriculture as 
42 
 
a primary land use; (B) To encourage the preservation of trees and open spaces; and (C) 
To prevent soil erosion and stream valley flooding.”  PGCC § 27-426(a)(1).  The land use 
table sets forth the uses permitted in the R-A Zone.  PGCC § 27-426(b)(1).  The maximum 
density in the R-A Zone was one dwelling unit on a two-acre lot.18  PGCC § 27-442(h) 
(Table VII).  Prior to the text amendment in question, townhouses were not permitted in 
the R-A Zone.19  Id. 
b. 
The Townhouse (“R-T”) Zone 
Whereas the purpose of the R-A Zone was to encourage detached single-family 
residences on large, two-acre lots, the general purpose of the R-T Zone under the Old 
Zoning Ordinance was “to provide for . . . a variety of dwelling types” including 
“townhouses and other attached dwellings[.]”  PGCC § 27-433(a)(1), (2)(A).  The R-T 
Zone primarily permitted the construction of six townhouses per net acre.  See PGCC 
§ 27-442(h) (Table VII).   
2. 
The New Zoning Ordinance 
In September 2018, the District Council introduced legislation—CB 13-2018—to 
adopt a new zoning ordinance.  Prince George’s County District Council, CB 13-2018 
(2018).  The purpose of CB 13-2018 was to repeal in its entirety the Old Zoning Ordinance, 
 
18 The land use table permits 0.5 dwelling units per net acre.  PGCC § 27-442(h) 
(Table VII). 
 
19 The Old Zoning Ordinance defined “Townhouse” as “[o]ne (1) of a group of 
three (3) or more attached ‘Buildings’ arranged or designed as ‘One-Family Dwellings’ 
which: (A) Are entirely separated from each other by walls extending from the lowest floor 
to the roof; and (B) Have separate entrances from the outside.”  PGCC § 27-107.01(240). 
43 
 
Subtitle 27, and to replace it with a new zoning ordinance, to be codified in Subtitle 27 of 
county code.  Id.  After public hearings, the New Zoning Ordinance was adopted in October 
2018.  Id.  In connection with the adoption of the New Zoning Ordinance, the District 
Council undertook a comprehensive rezoning by a Countywide Sectional Map Amendment 
(“CMA”) process “to apply the appropriate zoning classification within the new Ordinance 
to each parcel of real property in the County.”  CB 13-2018.  To make sure that the effective 
date of the New Zoning Ordinance would be consistent with the adoption of the new zoning 
maps, CB 13-2018 specified that its effective date would be the same date that the District 
Council approved the CMA.  Id. 
 
With the adoption of the New Zoning Ordinance, the R-A Zone was redesignated 
as the Agricultural-Residential (“AR”) Zone.  See 2022 PGCC § 27-4201(d).20  The 
purposes of the AR Zone are identical to its predecessor R-A Zone: “[t]o provide for large-
lot single-family detached residential subdivisions, while encouraging the retention of 
agriculture as a primary land use; [] [t]o encourage the preservation of trees and open space; 
and [] [t]o prevent soil erosion and stream valley flooding.”  2022 PGCC § 27-4201(d)(1).  
The maximum dwelling unit per acre in the AR Zone is also the same as under the previous 
R-A Zone—a single family residence located on a two-acre lot.21  2022 PGCC § 27-
4201(d)(2).  Townhouses are not permitted in the AR Zone.  2022 PGCC § 27-5101(c).  
 
20 To differentiate New Zoning Ordinance citations from Old Zoning Ordinance 
citations, I refer to the New Zoning Ordinance with “2022” prior to the acronym “PGCC.” 
 
21 The AR Zone contains the same maximum density/minimum net lot area as the 
former R-A Zone—0.5 dwelling units per net lot area and the minimum net lot area is 
two acres.  2022 PGCC § 27-4201(d)(2).   
44 
 
3. 
Comprehensive Rezoning of the Parts of Prince George’s County Located 
Within the Regional District 
In July 2019, the District Council initiated the CMA process, which took over two 
years and involved the rezoning of all Prince George’s County properties located within 
the Regional District.  With an undertaking of this magnitude, on July 23, 2019, the District 
Council enacted resolution CR 27-2019, which adopted certain goals, concepts and 
guidelines, a public participation program, a project schedule, and a proposed guide to the 
new zones.  Prince George’s County District Council, CR 27-2019 (2019).  
After two years of public hearings and meetings, the countywide comprehensive 
rezoning was completed in November 2021 with the District Council’s adoption of CR 
136-2021.22  Prince George’s County District Council, CR 136-2021 (2021).  With the 
adoption of the CMA, all properties located within Prince George’s County that are part of 
the Regional District were rezoned under the zoning classifications set forth in the New 
Zoning Ordinance.  See id.  The New Zoning Ordinance and its classifications, as 
designated on the CMA maps, became effective on April 1, 2022.  Id. 
The unique timing of CB 17-2019’s consideration and adoption is notable and 
speaks volumes on the issue of whether it was intended to have general application to 
 
22 The Maryland General Assembly also enacted legislation to ensure that the 
District Council’s Comprehensive Map Amendment (“CMA”) process was transparent and 
complied with certain ethical requirements.  Specifically, on May 31, 2021, the General 
Assembly enacted H.B. 980, which prohibited the Prince George’s County Planning Board 
from recommending, and the District Council from approving, “any request made by or on 
behalf of any person for zone intensification that differs substantially from the applicable 
zoning category or classification recommended in the Proposed Guide to New Zones 
adopted by the District Council” as part of CR 27-2019.  Ch. 429, 2021 Md. Laws. 
45 
 
similarly situated properties in the R-A Zone.  It is significant that, while the District 
Council was considering this amendment to the use table in its Old Zoning Ordinance, it 
was aware that: (1) properties located in the R-A Zone (including the Freeway Property) 
would be rezoned to the AR Zone as part of the ongoing comprehensive rezoning; and 
(2) townhouses were not a permitted use in the AR Zone.  In other words, the District 
Council was aware that the text amendment permitting townhouse uses would have a very 
limited shelf-life—it would be available to a qualifying property only until the New Zoning 
Ordinance became effective.  It was highly unlikely that any “assemblage of properties” 
that did not already satisfy CB 17-2019’s requirements could have been pulled together in 
time to take advantage of the townhouse uses before those uses were superseded by the 
New Zoning Ordinance.  The unusual timing of this text amendment, in the context of the 
ongoing zoning ordinance and map amendment process, belies the notion that the District 
Council intended it to have general, prospective application to “similarly situated 
properties.”  It reflects a significant “[d]eparture[] from the normal procedural sequence[,]” 
which, in my view, “afford[s] evidence that improper purposes are playing a role.”  
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267.  In making its conclusory determination that CB 17-
2019 treats similarly situated properties the same, the Majority ignores this highly unusual 
sequence of events.   
Turning to the legislative history contained in this record, I view the events leading 
up to the enactment of the final legislation, and contemporaneous statements by the Bill 
sponsor as highly relevant to whether CB 17-2019 was enacted to confer special treatment 
on the Freeway Property.   
46 
 
D. 
The Legislative Record   
1. 
A General Overview  
The first reading of the initial draft of CB 17-2019 occurred at a District Council 
meeting on April 30, 2019.  The Bill sponsor was Derrick L. Davis, the Councilmember 
representing District 6.  From the first reading of the initial draft of the Bill until the 
adoption of its final iteration, CB 17-2019 was the subject of discussion at five District 
Council meetings—a first reading on April 30, 2019; a second reading on July 2, 2019; a 
public hearing on September 19, 2019; a discussion on October 8, 2019; and a public 
hearing on November 19, 2019. 
During the seven months the Bill was under consideration, it was revised four times.  
Each draft contained a reference to “DR” with a corresponding number, so that DR-1 
reflects “Draft 1,” and so on, until the final enacted version, which was identified as DR-4.  
The various drafts of the Bill were the subject of public hearings and review, except DR-4, 
which contained revisions that the Bill sponsor proposed after the public hearings closed 
and immediately prior to the final vote. 
After the first reading of the Bill, it was referred to the Planning, Housing and 
Economic Development Committee (“PHEDC”).23  The PHEDC discussed Draft 1 at its 
meeting on June 6, 2019, and at a hearing held on June 20, 2019. 
 
23 The Planning, Housing and Economic Development Committee (“PHEDC”) is a 
committee comprised of a subset of members of the District Council.  At the time that this 
Bill was being considered by the Committee, the members of the PHEDC were Dannielle 
M. Glaros, Calvin S. Hawkins, II, Derrick L. Davis, Thomas E. Dernoga, and Jolene Ivey. 
47 
 
The Prince George’s County Planning Board also reviewed Draft 1 at its meeting 
on May 2, 2019, and reviewed Draft 3 at its meeting on November 7, 2019.  In each 
instance, the Planning Board opposed the Bill and provided written comments to the 
District Council explaining its position.  The County’s Office of Law provided “legislative 
comment” on Draft 1 on June 11, 2019, and on Draft 3 on November 13, 2019.  
The public hearings and meetings extending over seven months share some common 
themes.  First, each public proceeding focused on the Freeway Property.  Kim Rodenhauser 
and the Rodenhauser family attorney, Robert Antonetti, spoke at length about the history 
of the property’s use as an airport, its status as a legal, nonconforming use, the dangers and 
difficulties of the continued operation of the airport, the fact that it was no longer 
economically feasible to continue its operation, and the Rodenhauser family’s intention to 
develop the Freeway Property for townhouses under the proposed text amendment. 
Second, each proceeding was well attended by citizens who resided along Church 
Road and  were concerned about the traffic and development potential of the Freeway 
Property for townhouse uses.  The record contains not only verbal comments (in the allotted 
three minutes that the citizens were given to comment on this draft legislation), but also 
considerable written comments in the form of letters and emails.24   
 
24 In addition to the comments from the public, the City of Bowie also opposed the 
amendment.  The City of Bowie Planning Director, Joe Meinert, spoke in opposition to the 
Bill at two proceedings.  He noted that the Bowie City Council conducted its own public 
hearing on CB 17-2019 on June 3, 2019 and voted to recommend an unfavorable vote to 
the District Council.  In a separate letter dated June 11, 2019, the Bowie City Council 
pointed out that the text amendment would be inconsistent with “the newly created 
Agricultural Residential (A-R) Zone” and would “disrupt the established pattern of 
 
48 
 
Third, as I will describe in more detail below, in the seven months of public 
proceedings, aside from the Freeway Property, neither the District Council nor the Planning 
Board identified any other eligible property that could satisfy all the criteria in the various 
iterations of the text amendment.  Although members of the public and one councilmember, 
Councilmember Dernoga, repeatedly questioned whether the text amendment would apply 
to any property other than the Freeway Property, neither the Bill sponsor nor anyone else 
on the Planning Board or District Council could identify any other specific properties.25 
Unable to obtain answers from the Bill sponsor or the Planning Board (which 
opposed the text amendment), Councilmember Dernoga and a citizen, Michael Bridges, 
attempted to find other properties that satisfied the criteria by searching PGAtlas, the 
County’s public Geographic Information System (“GIS”) web mapping application.26  As 
I describe more fully below, the record reflects that, toward the end of the public process, 
 
development that has occurred” within the low-density zones along the Church Road 
corridor.  The City Council also observed that the proposed text amendment was not 
compatible with either the Old Zoning Ordinance, which was in the process of being 
phased out, or the New Zoning Ordinance that the District Council adopted in 2018. 
 
 
25 At the last public hearing on November 19, 2019, Michael Bridges, a resident of 
Woodmore Highlands, commented that “[f]or seven months, the Bill sponsors have been 
going through the torturous exercise of contorting the language to avoid the appearance of 
spot zoning[,]” and that despite requests for information concerning whether any other 
properties would satisfy the criteria, the Council had been unable to provide that 
information. 
 
26 PGAtlas is a web mapping application maintained by the Maryland-National 
Capital Park & Planning Commission and Prince George’s County.  See PGAtlas, 
https://www.pgatlas.com/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2023), available at https://perma.cc/P8PC-
JV2A.  It provides access to Geographic Information System (“GIS”) web applications and 
digital maps, including layers of County GIS data and imagery, such as tax and parcel 
identifiers, distances, and zoning overlays.   
49 
 
two citizens, Mr. Bridges and James Davis, identified one other property—described as the 
Hidden Pond parcel—that might fall within the criteria parameters and therefore be eligible 
for townhouse use.  As the Council was getting ready to vote on the final iteration of the 
draft Bill, and after the public hearing had closed, the Bill sponsor proposed final 
“clarifying” amendments to make sure that the text amendment would exclude the Hidden 
Pond parcel—the only other property believed at the time to satisfy CB 17-2019’s criteria. 
Finally, from the first reading of the initial draft of the Bill until its final enactment, 
the comments made by and discussion between two Councilmembers—Davis and 
Dernoga—deserve significant weight in analyzing whether the text amendment provided 
favorable treatment to the Freeway Property.  Their contemporaneous statements are 
instructive when considering the reasons that the Bill had so many iterations.  As the Bill 
sponsor, Councilmember Davis wholeheartedly supported it, and was the individual who 
requested the various revisions to the Bill.  Councilmember Dernoga opposed the Bill from 
the outset and continued to be a vocal critic until its final enactment.  In addition, these two 
councilmembers were also members of the PHEDC, and participated in the discussion of 
the Bill at the PHEDC meetings.   
The public dialogue between these two Councilmembers reveals the true legislative 
intent behind, and effect of, the revisions—adoption of a text amendment that appeared to 
have general application, but in fact, would permit only the Freeway Property to be 
developed for townhouse uses, instead of requiring that the Freeway Property be rezoned 
through a comprehensive rezoning process or piecemeal rezoning to a higher-intensity 
zoning district.  As I outline below, it is clear from both the text of the various iterations of 
50 
 
the Bill, as well as the legislative record, that the Bill sponsor was attempting to water 
down the text of the proposed legislation by making the criteria vague enough to appear  
generally applicable while using unique and carefully tailored criteria to ensure that the 
Bill would apply to only the Freeway Property. 
2. 
The Various Iterations of the Legislation and Related Discussions  
a. 
Draft 1 
As noted above, a first reading of Draft 1 of the Bill occurred on April 30, 2019.  
The stated purpose of the Bill was to permit townhouses to be constructed in the R-A Zone 
“under certain circumstances”  Under Draft 1, townhouses could only be constructed “on 
an assemblage of land” that: (1) was no more than one hundred forty acres in size; (2) was 
located within one mile of a municipal boundary; (3) “all or a portion of the land was 
formerly used as an airport”; and (4) had “frontage on a public right-of-way classified as 
an arterial or higher in the Master Plan of Transportation and [was] maintained by the State 
Highway Administration.”  Provided that the property met these conditions, the property 
could be developed for townhouse uses “pursuant to the density and net lot area 
requirements of the R-T Zone[.]”  Draft 1 also stated that certain regulatory requirements 
of the R-A Zone (such as density, net lot area, and building height) would not apply.  In 
other words, under Draft 1, a property located in the R-A Zone that satisfied all four of the 
conditions would be permitted to be developed for townhouses under the R-T Zone 
requirements of the Old Zoning Ordinance, but without undergoing a rezoning.  
 
After the first reading, Draft 1 was reviewed by the Planning Board, which opposed 
the Bill because it believed that the Bill was drafted for a specific property—the Freeway 
51 
 
Property.  In a letter dated May 2, 2019, the Planning Board explained that, although 
approximately 262 properties would meet three of the four criteria (i.e., less than 140 acres 
in size, located within one mile of a municipal boundary, and having frontage on a public 
highway maintained by the State Highway Administration), only one property—the 
Freeway Property—would meet all the criteria.  The Office of Law shared the same 
concern, stating that the Bill might be “subject to challenge as it appear[ed] to be drafted 
for a specific parcel.” 
 
In addition to pointing out that the text amendment would only apply to one 
property, the Planning Board noted that permitting townhouses in the R-A Zone was not 
consistent with the purposes of that zone and was an inappropriate use in that zoning 
district.  The Planning Board pointed out that “[t]he purposes of the R-A Zone are to 
provide large lot one-family detached dwellings, while encouraging the retention of 
agriculture as a primary land use; and to encourage the preservation of trees and open 
spaces.  Permitting townhouses in this zone is not appropriate.” 
b. 
Draft 2 
i. 
Discussion of Draft 2 by the PHEDC 
 
At the PHEDC meeting on June 6, 2019, the Bill was put on hold by members of 
that committee.  At the PHEDC meeting on June 20, 2019, the members discussed Draft 
2, which had been revised at the direction of the Bill sponsor, Councilmember Davis, in an 
attempt to address the concerns expressed by the Planning Board and the Office of Law.  
 
Draft 2 did not change two of the four conditions from Draft 1—specifically, that 
the property be located within one mile of a municipal boundary and have frontage on a 
52 
 
public highway maintained by the State Highway Administration (although it changed the 
language describing the public highway).  Draft 2 changed the overall acreage size from 
being “no more than one hundred forty” acres to “no more than one hundred fifty” acres.  
And, significantly, Draft 2 removed the condition that “all or a portion of the land was 
formerly used as an airport[.]”  Instead of making specific reference to the airport, Draft 2 
substituted a new condition—that the property be located “within 2,500 feet of land used 
for purposes of electrical generation, transmission, and distribution in connection with 
providing public utility service in the County by a regulated public utility[.]” 
 
At the outset of the meeting, Councilmember Dernoga noted that Draft 2 appeared 
to have been “finalized yesterday” and asked whether the Planning Board had an 
opportunity to comment on it.  Ms. Hightower, a member of the Planning Board’s staff, 
responded that the Planning Board had not had an opportunity to review Draft 2. 
 
The PHEDC Chair asked Karen Zavakos, the PHEDC Legislative Officer and the 
individual who compiled Draft 2, to explain the revisions.  Ms. Zavakos explained that “in 
the interest of expediency,” the Bill sponsor, Councilmember Davis, asked her to prepare 
Draft 2 “in the interest of tempering the concerns raised by the Planning Board[.]”  She 
then provided the following explanation for the changes in Draft 2:  
The “formerly used as an airport” language is stricken and is, there was 
concern that that may have been too specific, and so, therefore, to make it 
more facially neutral and in response to the Planning Board’s comments, the 
new language reads, “is within 2500 feet of land used for”—and I apologize.  
This is wrong, but it actually serves as consistent language so that you don’t 
call out Pepco or BGE specifically.  So, what they’re saying is basically an 
electrical generation or transmission plant, but that long language is how it 
is styled in our Code.  
53 
 
The other change, in addition to trying to temper the concerns, is to change 
the functional transportation classification designation from arterial to 
freeway in an attempt to expand it.  And then the following changes were in 
response to [the] Planning Board as to how they would review (inaudible) 
application as to regulations concerning lot coverage, lot width frontage, 
building height and making sure that it is all considered in a generally 
approved detailed site plan and is subject to certain requirements that are set 
forth in the Code and are consistent.   
 
(Emphasis added).  In other words, the Bill drafter’s testimony unequivocally reflects that 
the airport language was struck because it was “too specific.”  In an attempt make the Bill 
“more facially neutral,” Ms. Zavakos removed the specific reference to the airport and 
inserted a description of a property adjoining the Freeway Property—the public-utility-
company-owned property used for electrical transmission.  However, Ms. Zavakos noted 
that she had used general references to the adjoining property “so that you don’t call out 
Pepco or BGE specifically.” 
 
After staff comments and prior to public comment, the Bill sponsor offered the 
following explanation:  
Draft 2 was something—and, as everyone knows, any piece of legislation I 
work with I measure very well for a long period of time.  This is no short 
measure and no short order, so the Draft 2 actually took into consideration 
lots of comments, both by Park and Planning Commission, as well as the 
County Executive’s office, and also the perspectives that we received in the 
mail.  Many of them—the history on this piece of property and this 
legislation or this idea, and it is better to call it an idea—I could give a 
history lesson on it, but I won’t. 
 
(Emphasis added).  He then stated that he was “fortunate enough to be involved in the 
[S]mall Airports Advisory Committee two decades ago, fortunate enough to watch the area 
develop and also fortunate enough to be in a position to essentially look at new 
opportunities as they come to us.” 
54 
 
The PHEDC had received numerous letters in opposition to the initial draft of the 
bill and several constituents spoke.  Most speakers brought up concerns with allowing the 
Freeway Property to be developed for townhouse uses.  There was no discussion of other 
properties.   
At the conclusion of the PHEDC meeting, the Chair asked the Planning Board staff 
member, Ms. Hightower, how many properties would fall within the criteria set forth in 
Draft 2.  She replied that her office did not “ha[ve] the opportunity to do that research 
between last night and this morning[,]” but stated that she would provide that information 
“as soon as possible.” 
After the public comments, members of the PHEDC continued to discuss Draft 2.  
Councilmember Dernoga expressed several concerns about the legislation.  He pointed out 
that there was no precedent in the Old Zoning Ordinance for applying the densities and 
uses that are permitted in the R-T Zone to properties in the R-A Zone.  He noted that, 
instead of expressing a maximum size of the property as being “no more than one hundred 
fifty” acres, the requirement could be revised to establish a minimum size of “at least” one 
hundred fifty acres to address any concern that it “could apply to a five-acre property or a 
ten-acre property.”  Councilmember Davis then asked staff whether the minimum size 
requirement could be established after the Bill’s introduction.  Ms. Zavakos replied that 
the acreage range was “something that could be considered up to and until the close or after 
the close of the public hearing on th[e] legislation.”  Councilmember Davis explained that  
55 
 
the only reason I’m asking . . . is a lot—many times, we don’t do things like 
that because we are trying not to spot zone.  So, we don’t want to make it so 
tight that it looks like we’re trying one thing.  So, I mean, I was concerned 
with that. 
 
(Emphasis added).  Councilmember Dernoga responded, “Lord knows, we would never 
spot zone, not this (inaudible) body.” 
Councilmember Dernoga also asked whether the geographic proximity to land used 
for transmission lines could be reduced from 2,500 feet to 2,000 feet.  Councilmember 
Dernoga stated that he had measured the distance from the Freeway Property to the 
transmission-line property using the PGAtlas database, and that, based upon his 
measurements, the entire Freeway Property was “within 2,000 feet of the power line.”  
Councilmember Dernoga asked whether there would be “any problem with reducing that 
number[.]”  Mr. Davis replied that he “note[d] Mr. Dernoga’s request.”  He then stated 
“[l]et’s make sure we look at it specifically, and if it’s something that lessens, then it’s 
possible.  If it’s acceptable, then we can do it[.]” 
By a vote of 3-2, the PHEDC members voted to favorably recommend Draft 2, with 
amendments to incorporate a minimum acreage size (instead of solely a maximum size) 
and to apply certain R-T Zone regulations to the townhouse development.  Based upon this 
discussion, Draft 2 was revised to reflect that the “assemblage of land” eligible for 
townhouse uses must be “no less than one hundred (100) acres and no more than one 
hundred (150) acres in size[.]” 
56 
 
ii. 
Second Reading of Draft 2 and First Public Hearing Before the District 
Council 
Draft 2 with the above-described revision was the subject of a second reading at the 
District Council meeting on July 2, 2019.  Thereafter, on September 10, 2019, the District 
Council held a public hearing on Draft 2.  Once again, all of the public comment was 
directed toward the fact that the text amendment would permit townhouse uses on the 
Freeway Property, contrary to the permitted uses in the R-A Zone.27  The District Council’s 
targeted efforts to draft a text amendment that would only apply to the Freeway Property 
were not lost on those members of the public who testified in opposition to the Bill.28 
 
After the public comments were received, Councilmember Davis and 
Councilmember Dernoga once again expressed their competing views on the legislation.  
Councilmember Davis reiterated his belief that the text amendment did not constitute 
illegal spot zoning.  He asked the Chair to refrain from calling for a vote on the Bill because 
 
27 Representatives from the City of Greenbelt and the City of Bowie also made 
comments in opposition to the draft.  Colin Byrd, Councilman from the City of Greenbelt, 
stated that the Greenbelt City Council voted unanimously to oppose the Bill.  Councilman 
Byrd pointed out that the Bill could be challenged under “spot zoning” case law from the 
Supreme Court of Maryland.  Mr. Meinert, the City of Bowie Planning Director, also spoke 
in opposition to the Bill, reiterating the City of Bowie’s opposition to the legislation. 
 
28 Milly Hall, a party to this suit, observed that “[t]he Bill’s intended purpose was 
to aid the owner of a specific parcel of 129 acres known as Freeway Airport at Church 
Road and Route 50.”  Michael Bridges, a resident of Woodmore Highlands, a residential 
community on Church Road, stated that the text amendment “seems to bypass the more 
transparent zone map amendment process.”  In his view the text amendment was akin to 
illegal “spot zoning” because the Bill would permit a use on “a small area within a zoning 
district” that was “inconsistent with the use[s]” permitted in “the rest of the district[.]” 
57 
 
there were “substantive amendments to the Bill” that were being contemplated to address 
“the legalities” of the Bill “as well as the community input that we’ve heard today.”   
 
Councilmember Dernoga made extensive comments expressing his “concern [] 
about the process.”  He explained that he was opposed to site-specific text amendments, 
and that he shared the view of the “the Park and Planning Staff and the Office of Law that, 
generally speaking, when this is done, it’s spot zoning and is really not proper.”  
Councilmember Dernoga pointed out some of the procedural differences between a text 
amendment and a rezoning application.  He mentioned that, with a text amendment, there 
are no limitations on ex parte communications.  He stated that, in a rezoning application, 
there would be a technical staff report, a description of the properties to be affected, and 
the application would be considered in the context of a quasi-judicial proceeding that would 
involve a Zoning Hearing Examiner, sworn witness testimony, and expert testimony, and 
for which the ultimate decision would need to satisfy legal criteria.  Councilmember 
Dernoga stated that, by contrast, “[t]he only legal criteria basically for a legislative text 
amendment is that you have the majority of the County Council supporting it.”  
Mr. Dernoga then asked Freeway’s attorney, Mr. Antonetti, rhetorically why his client did 
not “go through the rezoning process[,]” commenting that Freeway “could have started this 
five, six, seven months ago.” 
 
With the Bill being held for further review and revisions, the District Council 
concluded the public hearing.   
58 
 
iii. 
Amendments to Draft 2 
 
At a District Council meeting on October 8, 2019, Councilmember Davis proposed 
another amendment to Draft 2.  Councilmember Davis explained that the amendment 
would reinsert the “formerly used as an airport” language back into the text but would 
express that criterion in the alternative or disjunctive.  Specifically, the first requirement 
was rewritten to state that an eligible assemblage of properties must be “no less than one 
hundred (100) acres and no more than one hundred fifty (150) acres in size or was formerly 
used as an airport[.]”  (Emphasis added). 
 
Once again, Councilmember Dernoga asked Councilmember Davis whether the text 
amendment would apply to any properties other than the Freeway Property, and questioned 
the necessity of adding a reference to the airport use back into the text.  They had the 
following exchange: 
MR. DERNOGA: Just for clarification, I’m assuming Park and Planning 
hasn’t had time to review this.  We haven’t gotten the memo, so I was looking 
at the Bill, obviously, before the airport language was put in, and I was trying 
to ascertain whether there was other sites in the County it might apply to.  
And some came to mind but then, I mean frankly, the only place it would 
seem that it might come—I was doing that here on my computer—was off 
of 214 at the end of Central Avenue because they’re within a mile of the City 
of Bowie.  There may be a power line over there.  It’s hard to figure out on 
the fly.  So it looked like it was either just the airport or no property, and 
maybe some other properties there, maybe not.  So we’re putting in “or an 
airport.”  Is that really needed too?  
 
MR. DAVIS: Yeah.  
 
MR. DERNOGA: Okay.  
 
CHAIR: And what we can request, Mr. Dernoga, is for Park and Planning to 
review the amendment prior to the public hearing as well.   
 
59 
 
MR. DERNOGA: Yeah, I’m just curious trying to figure out what we’re 
talking about.   
 
The Council then voted 7-1 to incorporate the amendments that were discussed and 
schedule the matter for a public hearing.  Because the amendments were determined to be 
“substantive amendment[s],” the Chair designated Draft 2 with the approved amendments 
as Draft 3. 
c. 
Draft 3 
i. 
Discussion by the Planning Board 
The Planning Board considered Draft 3 at its meeting on November 7, 2019.  The 
Planning Board voted to oppose the Bill.  The Planning Board maintained its position that 
the text amendment was drafted for a specific property and that the Board was unable to 
identify any other properties that would meet the criteria.  In its written comments to the 
District Council, the Planning Board stated: 
The purposes of the R-A Zone are to provide large lot One-Family Detached 
dwellings, while encouraging the retention of agriculture as a primary land 
use; and to encourage the preservation of trees and open spaces.  Permitting 
townhouses in this zone is not appropriate.  The Planning Board believes this 
bill was drafted for a specific property.  The Planning Board has been unable 
to identify all properties meeting the criteria of footnote 134 because the 
Planning Department does not have records which list land “formerly used 
as an airport” and we cannot determine what is meant by “assemblages of 
properties.”  This language could apply to an infinite number of properties.  
The Planning Board believes there are four (4) operating airports in the 
County currently.  One operating airport, Freeway Airport contains land 
zoned R-A and would meet the criteria of CB 17-2019 (DR-3) if the airport 
ceased to operate.   
 
(Emphasis added).  In other words, the Planning Board was able to identify only one 
property in its current configuration—the Freeway Property—that satisfied all of the 
60 
 
conditions in the text amendment.  Instead of adopting a text amendment to permit 
townhouses on the Freeway Property, the Planning Board recommended that the Freeway 
Property “go through the Sectional Map or Zoning Map Amendment process to rezone the 
property to an appropriate zone that would permit townhouses.” 
Notably, the Planning Board also pointed out that the text amendment was “contrary 
to the intent” of the newly adopted Zoning Ordinance.  (Emphasis added).  The Planning 
Board stated:  
Townhouses are prohibited in the Agricultural Residential (AR) Zone, which 
will replace the R-A Zone.  Permitting townhouses in the AR Zone would 
contradict the purpose statements for the zone.  The [text amendment], if 
carried forward to the new Zoning Ordinance, would add complexity to the 
adopted Zoning Ordinance through the incorporation of locational criteria.   
 
(Emphasis added).  
ii. 
Notable Comments on Draft 3 
On November 13, 2019, the County Office of Law conducted its review of Draft 3 
and made the following comments:  
The bill appears to be drafted for a specific parcel contained within an R-A 
zone.  R-A zones are meant “to provide large lot One-Family Detached 
dwellings, while encouraging the retention of agriculture as the primary use 
of the land.”  
 
Townhomes are not “One Family Detached dwellings” and therefore are not 
permitted in the R-A zone.  However, this bill would permit for Townhomes 
to be built on this specific parcel of land as only one parcel meets the 
requirements set forth.   
 
(Emphasis added).  The Office of Law expressed concerns that the text amendment would 
violate the uniformity requirements of the State enabling statute. 
61 
 
Because neither the Planning Board nor the District Council could identify any other 
property other than the Freeway Property that might qualify under the criteria for 
townhouse development in the R-A Zone, Michael Bridges, a resident of the Woodmore 
Highlands community on Church Road, conducted a search in PGAtlas.  Using the criteria 
in Draft 3, Mr. Bridges identified one property other than the Freeway Property that might 
satisfy the criteria—a parcel of approximately 137 acres commonly referred to as the 
Hidden Pond parcel.  Mr. Bridges provided this information to the clerk of the District 
Council in a written email comment on October 29, 2019 and inquired whether the text 
amendment would apply to this property if the legislation was enacted. 
iii. 
District Council Public Hearing on Draft 3 
The District Council held a public hearing on Draft 3 on November 19, 2019.  Many 
of the same individuals who previously commented on earlier drafts also presented public 
comments at the hearing.  Like the previous public discussions, the comments all centered 
around Freeway Property, the development of the airport property for townhouse uses, and 
the traffic congestion on Church Road.   
 
Other members of the public expressed frustration over the fact that neither the 
District Council nor the Planning Board had identified other properties to which this text 
amendment might possibly apply, and the potential consequences of the District Council’s 
attempt to use ostensibly generally applicable criteria.  A member of the public, James 
Davis, the President of the Woodmore Homeowner’s Association, pointed out (like Mr. 
Bridges in his October 29 email to the District Council) that the text amendment might 
apply to the Hidden Pond parcel.  Mr. Davis stated that “Woodmore has [a] 138-acre 
62 
 
underdeveloped parcel of land just north between it and Route 50 that we refer to as Hidden 
Pond or the Back 9 parcel that is zoned R-A.”  He stated that, to the extent that the Bill 
“would apply to Hidden Pond,” the Woodmore Homeowner’s Association would object. 
d. 
Draft 4 
 
Notably, after the public hearing closed, the Bill sponsor proposed a final 
amendment, which he characterized as “clarifying and non-substantive.”  In considering 
the final amendment, it is important to keep in mind the following events that occurred 
leading up to the public hearing.  First, six days earlier, the Office of Law stated in a written 
memo that “only one parcel meets the requirements” of Draft 3.  Second, members of the 
public had identified one additional property—the Hidden Pond parcel—that might satisfy 
the criteria in Draft 3. 
Based upon the Bill sponsor’s comments below, there is no doubt that he was aware 
of these facts when he proposed the final amendment after the public hearing had closed.  
He stated that at each hearing and committee meeting he was “very attentive to what was 
said by the people who came to present, and at each opportunity, when [he] heard 
something that could clarify or something that could be substantially invited into the text 
amendment process, [he] asked [his] colleagues to support amendments.”  He then stated:  
I am very comfortable that we are at a place where a non-substantive 
amendment to clarify one more piece [] may be necessary.  And that piece is 
the one that describes the parcel of land or sliver that was discussed from 
the gentleman from Woodmore about Hidden Pond.  Now, all of the legal 
team that has looked at it has said there was really no need for this clarifying 
amendment to be introduced, but out of an abundance of caution and 
everyone’s understanding of what it is that this allows, I wanted to offer this 
last clarifying amendment. 
 
63 
 
And it essentially, and I’m having it passed out to my colleagues now, i[t] 
just simply strikes a few words, the word “located” on page two in Footnote 
134, and inserts, it’s after the word “is” and inserts the word “entirely.”  And 
the reason is that there were debates about whether or not this word 
“entirely” would eliminate a parcel of land from being considered.  We 
concluded that it didn’t help.  It didn’t hurt, and so we accepted yet another 
amendment.   
 
And then, also, we wanted to clarify that, after the word “is,” insert “entirely” 
again, and after the word “land,” insert “owned by a regulated public utility.”  
There was discussion about the power lines, and so this language would 
essentially define what the parameters are again.  So, this amendment, while 
we feel it’s clarifying and non-substantive, and I can turn to our legal team 
just to make sure.   
 
(Emphasis added) (cleaned up).  The Council then voted to adopt the “clarifying and non-
substantive” amendment and proceeded to adopt the final version of the Bill with these 
revisions—which became Draft 4—by a vote of 7-4.  It is clear from the Bill sponsor’s 
comments that the language of the final proposed amendment was intended to tighten the 
parameters of the Bill’s criteria to make sure that the Hidden Pond parcel would be 
excluded.  In other words, the language was inserted to make sure that similarly situated 
properties would be excluded.29 
 
 
29 In the face of this uncontroverted evidence that the criteria were drafted to ensure 
that the text amendment would apply to only the Freeway Property, at oral argument, 
Freeway’s counsel mentioned that previous iterations of the Bill would have encompassed 
262 properties.  Those figures were generated when the criteria included all properties that 
were less than 140 acres in size.  As enacted, the acreage requirement was modified to be 
a minimum of 100 acres and a maximum of 150 acres.  
 
 
Nor is there any other evidence in this record that supports Freeway’s contention 
that the text amendment applies to “similarly situated properties.”  At the public hearing 
on November 19, 2019, the Rodenhauser family’s counsel, Mr. Antonetti, submitted 
“Exhibit 6,” into the legislative record, titled “Limits of CB-17-2019.”  The exhibit 
emphasized that, to qualify for townhouse uses under CB 17-2019, the property had to 
 
64 
 
The Majority acknowledges the fact that the text of CB 17-2019 was tightened up 
after the public hearing to eliminate the Hidden Pond parcel from its application.  It views 
this as an ordinary, run-of-the mill amendment to appease citizens’ concerns.  Maj. Slip 
Op. at 36.  The Majority fails to appreciate the true purpose behind the “clarifying 
amendment”—to eliminate the only other qualifying property from the carefully crafted 
pretextual criteria that were made to appear to have general application, when, in fact, they 
applied to only the Freeway Property.  The Majority turns a blind eye to the fact that the 
legislative record in this case does exactly what the Majority claims is impermissible—that 
is, the Majority condones the District Council’s use of “clever drafting” to “circumvent the 
uniformity requirement[.]”  Maj. Slip Op. at 32.  The Majority makes a conclusory 
determination that, “[h]ere, CB [17-2019] discriminates between properties, but Concerned 
Citizens has not shown that CB [17-2019] discriminates between similarly situated 
properties.  Concerned Citizens has not identified any actual, or even hypothetical, 
properties similarly situated to the Freeway Airport that the qualifying criteria of  CB [17-
 
meet “all of the [] criteria.”  (Emphasis in original, capitalization omitted).  The exhibit 
featured an aerial photograph purporting to identify the area within which the “limits of 
CB 17-2019” would apply, which included the Freeway Property.  The aerial photograph 
identifies Waterford Estates, a residential development of single family homes.  The aerial 
photograph also identifies the undeveloped portions of the Woodmore and Waterford 
Estates residential communities as being “not eligible” for townhouse development under 
the criteria established by CB 17-2019.  Freeway’s exhibit confirms that the only existing 
assemblage between 100 and 150 acres that meets all of CB 17-2019’s criteria is the 
Freeway Property. 
 
The Planning Department and Office of Law were able to identify only one specific 
property that satisfied all of the criteria—the Freeway Property.  When citizens identified 
the Woodmore “Hidden Pond” parcel, it was excluded by Councilmember Davis’s last-
minute amendments.   
65 
 
2019] excluded from higher-density development opportunities.”  (Footnote omitted).  
Maj. Slip Op. at 41.  The Majority ignores two undisputed facts in this legislative record: 
first, that the peculiar timing of this text amendment in the context of the recently adopted 
New Zoning Ordinance means that the text amendment could not even have conceivable 
application to any other “similarly situated properties”; and second, the 11th hour 
“clarifying” amendment ensured that the only other similarly situated property was 
excluded from the scope of the legislation. 
3. 
Summary of Legislative History 
 
To summarize, the legislative record and various drafts of the Bill clearly establish 
the following.  Draft 1 was crafted to ensure that the criteria permitting townhouse uses 
would only apply to one property in the R-A Zone—the Freeway Property.  When the 
Planning Board and the Office of Law pointed out that the Bill singled out a particular 
property for favorable or different treatment in violation of the uniformity requirement, the 
Bill sponsor proposed various amendments loosening the criteria’s language to give the 
impression the Bill applied to more than one property.  After the Bill’s language was 
modified in Drafts 2 and 3 in a manner that might cause it to apply to another property—
the undeveloped Hidden Pond parcel—the Bill sponsor added “clarifying” language to 
exclude the only other identified property.  The legislative record clearly reflects that these 
“non-substantive” amendments were intended to tighten up the criteria to ensure that they 
would only apply to the Freeway Property.   
 
Reading the language of the Bill’s criteria against the legislative record in this case, 
including the comments by the Bill sponsor and drafter, as well as the various iterations of 
66 
 
the Bill, it is clear that the text of the criteria, while written in generalities, was intended to 
specifically describe the Freeway Property in terms of its size (no less than 100 acres and 
no more than 150 acres), location (entirely within one mile of a municipal boundary), and 
the adjacent properties and uses on its northern and western boundaries (having “frontage 
on a public right-of-way” and being “entirely within 2,500 feet of land owned by a 
regulated public utility and used for purposes of electrical generation [or] transmission”).  
That the drafter used general language to describe this property does not somehow 
transform the text into having general application.   
 
The effect of this text amendment is to permit a single property to be developed for 
uses, and at densities, that are not permitted elsewhere in the Zone.  It creates a “mini-
district” consisting of a single property—the Freeway Property—in which townhouses are 
permitted in the R-A Zone.  It enables the Freeway Property to be developed using the R-T 
Zone standards under the Old Zoning Ordinance while bypassing the comprehensive 
rezoning process (that was ongoing when this text amendment was being considered) and 
failing to comply with the piecemeal rezoning requirements (i.e., satisfying the change-
mistake rule in connection with a quasi-judicial proceeding).  The effect of the text 
amendment was the same as the illegal spot rezoning that this Court rejected in Cassell.  It 
created a “mini-district” consisting of the Freeway Property, which was singled out for 
favorable treatment. 
E. 
Some Final Thoughts About the Majority Opinion  
I agree with the Majority that it is not the Court’s role to determine whether the 
Freeway Property should continue to be used as an airport, or whether it should be 
67 
 
developed at a higher density townhouse use.  For example, it would be entirely within the 
District Council’s prerogative to encourage the elimination of nonconforming uses—such 
as a small airport surrounded by residences—by adopting development standards that 
permit townhouses or bonus densities on such properties.  Those are public policy decisions 
that the General Assembly has placed squarely within the authority of local governments 
under the enabling statutes pertaining to zoning.  Those statutes provide local governments 
with a multitude of zoning tools that would allow them to effectuate these public policies.  
Those tools include: (1) rezoning the parcels as part of a comprehensive rezoning, see 
supra, Part II.B.4.a; (2) establishing a floating zone, see supra, at n.11, or an overlay zone, 
see supra, at n.12, that specifically permits bonus densities; (3) adopting a text amendment 
that permits uses or bonus densities by special exception or conditional use, see supra, at 
n.9; or (4) adopting a text amendment that, in fact, has general application within a 
particular zone—even if they “produce disparate results in [their] application[,]” Anderson 
House, 402 Md. at 717. 
In this case, the District Council did not utilize any of the zoning tools established 
by the Maryland General Assembly to accomplish the goal of permitting townhouse 
development on the Freeway Property.  Indeed, the Majority points out that the 
Rodenhausers’ attorney admitted that his client could have pursued a rezoning, but instead 
pursued a text amendment because it was faster and more direct.  Maj. Slip Op. at 6.  The 
Majority’s opinion in this case sanctions in the name of expediency site-specific text 
amendments, which violate the uniformity requirement, over the zoning tools established 
by the General Assembly.  With the Majority’s holding—sanctioning the use of zoning text 
68 
 
amendments with nonsensical criteria having no planning purpose aside from targeting a 
specific property—I have no doubt that we will see future cases involving landowners 
lobbying their local elected officials to sponsor zoning text amendments (for which there 
is no prohibition on ex parte communications).  The local municipalities will of course cite 
to public policy reasons when enacting the resulting legislation, but the text amendments 
will contain pretextual criteria to allow a use or density on one property that is different 
from other similarly situated properties in a Euclidean zone.  Such a process will be far 
easier than utilizing the existing zoning tools established by the General Assembly 
mentioned above, such as a special exception or overlay zoning process.  
I also anticipate that the Majority’s uniformity standard could create adverse 
consequences for landowners.  As this Court explained in Rylyns, 372 Md. at 536, the 
uniformity requirement “also serves to prevent the use of zoning as a form of leverage by 
the local government seeking land concessions, transfers, or other consideration in return 
for favorable treatment.”  This protection is jeopardized by the Majority’s opinion, which 
creates significant fairness concerns.  This case involves singling out a particular property 
for favorable treatment.  Suppose, however, that a local government singles out a particular 
property for unfavorable treatment—by taking away uses or permitted densities, for 
example—on the grounds of public policy?  Under the Majority’s analysis, such treatment 
effectively satisfies the uniformity requirement if the legislative body can articulate a valid 
public purpose for the different treatment.  I expect we will see equal protection challenges 
in the zoning arena given the Majority’s hollowing out of the uniformity requirement. 
69 
 
The Majority opinion views CB 17-2019 as “just another ordinance in a long line of 
exceptions, carveouts, and workarounds to Prince George’s County’s antiquated zoning 
ordinance (the Old Zoning Ordinance).”  Maj. Slip Op. at 28 n.23.  The Majority 
characterizes the enactment of Prince George’s County’s New Zoning Ordinance as being 
“largely motivated by a desire to streamline zoning and do away with such exceptions.”  
Id.  The Majority’s cavalier approach to this State’s zoning laws, and its decision to 
embrace Prince George’s County’s “workarounds” to them, is unfortunate.  Respectfully, 
it is the General Assembly’s prerogative to delegate planning and zoning authority to the 
local governments.  As noted above, local governments do not have inherent powers to 
enact these laws in any manner they choose.  Zoning laws must be enacted pursuant to the 
State’s enabling laws, which are established by the General Assembly, and not by the 
courts. 
Finally, as the Majority opinion points out, Concerned Citizens raised additional 
legal arguments before the circuit court and the Appellate Court concerning the District 
Council’s enactment of CB 17-2019.  See Maj. Slip Op. at 14 n.12 & 15 n.13.  The 
Appellate Court reached and entered judgment on only one of the issues raised by 
Concerned Citizens—the uniformity requirement.  The Majority has reversed that 
judgment.  However, rather than remanding this case for the Appellate Court to consider 
the four other legal arguments that were raised by Concerned Citizens, the Majority 
chooses to dismiss those arguments out-of-hand with one sentence.  Maj. Slip Op. at 44 
(“With respect to the issues that Concerned Citizens raised but were not reached by the 
70 
 
Appellate Court, our analysis here substantially answers those questions and renders a 
remand unnecessary.” (citation omitted)). 
I disagree with the Majority’s decision not to remand this case.  I highlight two 
examples of legal issues Concerned Citizens raised but were not decided by the Appellate 
Court and are not addressed here.  First, given the Majority’s conclusion that the State’s 
uniformity requirement permits a text amendment to single out a particular property for 
special treatment despite the overwhelming evidence in this record that the zoning criteria 
were pretextual and had no application beyond the Freeway Property, Concerned Citizens 
should be permitted to have the Appellate Court determine whether CB 17-2019 was a 
“special law” in violation of Maryland’s Constitution.  Second, before the Appellate Court, 
Concerned Citizens also raised the issue of whether CB 17-2019 was properly enacted 
given the Bill sponsor’s 11th hour amendments to the legislation that occurred after the 
public hearing had closed.  Concerned Citizens should have the right to pursue the legal 
arguments that Councilmember Davis’s self-described “non-substantive” and “clarifying” 
amendments, which he distributed to his fellow-Councilmembers after the public hearing 
closed, were, in fact, substantive amendments, and therefore, a hearing was required on 
those amendments prior to the enactment of CB 17-2019.  I see no valid basis for the 
Majority’s cursory conclusion that a “remand [is] unnecessary.”   
IV. 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, I would hold that CB 17-2019 violates the uniformity requirement 
because it singles out the Freeway Property “for disparate treatment.”  Anderson House, 
71 
 
402 Md. at 720.  This is borne out by: (1) the text of the criteria contained in the Bill, which 
carefully tracks unique characteristics of the Freeway Property; (2) the context that 
CB 17-2019 amended the Old Zoning Ordinance after the adoption of the New Zoning 
Ordinance but prior to its effective date, thereby ensuring that the text amendment would 
have a very limited shelf life; and (3) the various drafts of the Bill that were clearly intended 
to give the appearance of having a more general application, but, in fact, when considered 
in the aggregate, applied to only the Freeway Property.  The legislative record clearly 
reflects that the criteria were pretextual and designed to target the Freeway Property for 
preferential treatment.  Under the facts of this case, the District Council’s enactment of a 
text amendment that singled out one property in the former R-A Zone to allow townhouse 
use was arbitrary and discriminatory and ran afoul of the uniformity requirement. 
 
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
Chief Justice Fader and Justice Watts have authorized me to state that they join this 
opinion. 
The correction notice(s) for this opinion(s) can be found here:  
https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/appellate/correctionnotices/coa/23a22cn.pdf 
https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/appellate/correctionnotices/coa/23a22cn2.pdf