Case Title: Harold E. Smith v. Alan L. Whitaker, Jr. et al

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-15-98

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 1999-07-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). Stein, J., writing for a unanimous Court. The issues presented in this appeal are: whether evidence of conscious pain and suffering is necessary to sustain a cause of action under the Survivor's Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-3, or more precisely, whether a survival action will lie where the death appears to have been actually or nearly simultaneous with injury-causing conduct; and whether a claim for punitive damages may be asserted when no compensatory damages have been awarded for pain and suffering in the underlying survival action. On January 4, 1990, Helen Robbins was killed when her car was hit by a 36,000-pound oil truck owned by Coastal Oil Company of New York (Coastal) and driven by Alan L. Whitaker, Jr. (Whitaker). The accident occurred in the intersection of County Route 649 and County Road 633 in Commercial Township, Cumberland County. Whitaker was unable to stop the truck as he approached the intersection, causing him to strike the Robbins vehicle and "overtop" it. A State Trooper who had arrived at the seen shortly after the accident observed that Robbins appeared to be unconscious and did not appear to be breathing. Robbins never regained consciousness. In June 1990, Harold E. Smith, executor of Robbins' estate, sued Whitaker and Coastal pursuant to the Wrongful Death Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:31-1 to -6, and the Survivor's Act. Smith claimed that the Coastal truck had been negligently and improperly maintained. Smith alleged both punitive damages and compensatory damages, including direct pecuniary loss for support and maintenance, funeral expenses, pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life (hedonic damages). The trial court separated the trial into two phases: a trial on the compensatory damage claims and a separate trial to address the punitive damage claims. Before the start of the compensatory damage trial, Coastal moved to bar Smith's presentation of evidence to support pain and suffering and hedonic damages. Coastal conceded that Robbins died as a result of the injuries she sustained in the accident as well as its liability for causing the accident. However, Coastal claimed that hedonic and pain and suffering damages were unavailable since there was no proof that Robbins suffered any conscious pain after the accident. Over Smith's objection, the court dismissed the pain and suffering and hedonic damages claims. The trial court ruled that the claim for punitive damages could go forward in the second phase of the trial. In May 1995, the first phase of the trial began, limited to the claims asserted in the wrongful death action. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Coastal and Whitaker liable and rendered a verdict of $40,178 in pecuniary damages. In addition, the parties consented to the addition of $3939, reflecting the net funeral bill and related expenses, for a total judgment of $44,117. Thereafter, Coastal filed a motion to dismiss the punitive damages claim and Smith cross-moved for a new trial on the wrongful death claim. Coastal argued that punitive damages are not recoverable under the Wrongful Death Act, and that any award of punitive damages under the Survivor's Act had to be based on a valid underlying judgment of compensatory damages, which were unavailable because it was conceded that Robbins suffered no conscious pain and suffering prior to her death. The trial court denied both motions, ruling that Smith's claim could go forward under the Survivor's Act. The punitive damages trial began in July 1996 before a new jury. The evidence adduced at trial demonstrated, among other things, that Coastal, after having received an "out-of-service" rating from the State Police, knowingly and deliberately allowed the truck to remain in that condition for several weeks. Evidence was also presented that Whitaker and Coastal were aware that the brakes were not working properly. At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Coastal liable for punitive damages in the amount of $1,250,000. The court molded the verdict to reflect that the funeral and burial expenses were recovered under the Wrongful Death Act. Both parties appealed to the Appellate Division. That court affirmed, concluding that the punitive damages claims were sustainable even in the absence of an underlying award of compensatory damages. The court also rejected Coastal's contentions that the punitive damages awarded were not based on an adequate factual record and were excessive. The Supreme Court granted Coastal's petition for certification. HELD: In an action under the Survivor's Act, a claim for punitive damages may be sustained even absent an award of compensatory damages for pain and suffering. 1. The purpose of a wrongful death action is to compensate survivors for the pecuniary losses they suffer because of the wrongful conduct of others. Damages under the Wrongful Death Act are expressly limited to the economic losses resulting from the death, together with hospital, medical and funeral expenses incurred for the decedent; punitive damages are not recoverable. On the other hand, the Survivor's Act preserves for the decedent's estate any personal cause of action the decedent would have had if he or she had survived. The Survivor's Act contains no express limitation on the type of damages recoverable. (pp. 8-16) 2. Ordinarily, punitive damages are recoverable only where there is a valid underlying cause of action. The Court has held that a defendant should not be freed of responsibility for aggravated conduct because of the fortuitous circumstance that the injured plaintiff cannot prove compensatory damages. Punitive damages are a permissible form of recovery under the Survivor's Act. The Act must be broadly construed in order to further its remedial purposes. Because Robbins would have had a claim for punitive damages had she survived her injuries, she should not be deprived of that claim by virtue of her death. This interpretation is in accord with a majority of states. (pp. 16-28) 3. The absence of compensatory damages is not necessarily fatal to the assertion of a punitive damage claim. Although an award of at least nominal damages is ordinarily required to sustain a punitive damages award, that deficiency is not significant where causation and negligence were established in the related wrongful death action. An award of funeral expenses, recoverable under the Survivor's Act, comprises sufficient damages to sustain a survival cause of action. It is not necessary to reallocate those expenses from the wrongful death action to the survival action in order to conclude that a valid cause of action has been established. Nor is it necessary to rely on the legal fiction of a presumption of continuing life in order to support a finding of conscious pain and suffering. (pp. 29-30) 4. Where the other elements of a survival cause of action have been established in a related wrongful death action, to require an award of funeral expenses, compensatory damages for pain and suffering, or even nominal damages to support a claim for punitive damages under the Survivor's Act would be superfluous. Accordingly, where all of the essential elements of a punitive damages claim are established, such a claim may be sustained without proof of pain and suffering. (pp. 31) 5. The recent amendments to the Punitive Damages Act, requiring an award of compensatory damages as a predicate for a punitive damages award, are inapplicable to a survival action where the decedent was killed instantly. The Legislature could not have intended to bar a punitive damage claim where the victim suffers a grievous injury because of the fortuitous circumstance that the victim died instantly. That result would be inconsistent with the purposes of punitive damages and would provide an unwarranted benefit to those defendants who inflict the most profound harm. (pp. 31-33) 6. The Court rejects Coastal's contentions that there was inadequate factual support for the imposition of punitive damages and that the amount of those damages were excessive. (pp. 33) Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. JUSTICE GARIBALDI, concurring, would not have addressed the issue of whether the Legislature intended to foreclose punitive damages as a remedy for death by egregious conduct pursuant to the Punitive Damages Act. Such a decision should not be made unless the issue is before the Court and is fully argued and briefed. This is particularly so when the Court's interpretation appears to be contrary to the clear legislative mandate indicating that the purpose of the Punitive Damages Act was to restrict, rather than expand, punitive damages. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE STEIN'S opinion. JUSTICE GARIBALDI filed a separate concurring opinion. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A- 15 September Term 1998 HAROLD E. SMITH, Executor of the Estate of Helen V. Robbins, Deceased, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ALAN L. WHITAKER, JR., Defendant, and COASTAL OIL OF NEW YORK, INC. (incorrectly pled as COASTAL OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC. and formerly known as BELCHER COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC.), Defendant-Appellant. Argued March 16, 1999 -- Decided July 20, 1999 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 313 N.J. Super. 165 (1998). John C. Eastlack, Jr., argued the cause for appellant (Poplar & Eastlack, attorneys). Theodore E. Baker argued the cause for respondent (Lummis, Krell & Baker, attorneys). STEIN, J. This appeal concerns the availability of punitive damages under the Survivor's Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-3, and requires us to determine whether evidence of a plaintiff's conscious pain and suffering is necessary to sustain a cause of action under the Act. More precisely, because a plaintiff's pain, suffering and apprehension of impending death form the usual measure of damages under the Survivor's Act, the issue is whether a survival action will lie where, as here, the plaintiff's death appears to have been actually or nearly simultaneous with defendant's injury causing conduct. We also must determine whether a claim for punitive damages may be asserted when no compensatory damages have been awarded for pain and suffering in the underlying survival action. In addition to those legal issues, we address factual disputes concerning whether defendant's conduct justified the imposition of punitive damages in this case and, if so, whether the amount of punitive damages awarded was excessive. On January 4, 1990, Helen V. Robbins, a sixty-year-old widow, was killed when her 1979 Lincoln Town Car was hit by a 36,000-pound oil truck owned by defendant Coastal Oil Company of New York (Coastal) and driven by defendant Alan L. Whitaker, Jr. (Whitaker). At the time of the collision, Robbins was driving north on County Route 649 in Commercial Township, Cumberland County, and Whitaker was traveling south on County Road 633. The southbound lane of County Route 633 is governed by two yield signs at the point where it intersects County Route 649. Due to maladjusted brakes, Whitaker was unable to stop the truck as he approached the intersection even though he was standing on the brakes. The truck crossed the intersection, struck Robbins's automobile, and overtopped it. A state trooper responded to the scene within approximately five minutes of the accident. The trooper observed that Robbins did not appear to be breathing and that she appeared to be unconscious. Robbins was transported to a nearby hospital, where she was pronounced dead. In June 1990, Harold E. Smith,See footnote 11 the nominal plaintiff and executor of Robbins's estate, filed an action against Whitaker and Coastal pursuant to the Wrongful Death Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:31-1 to -6, and the Survivor's Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-3. Plaintiff claimed that the Coastal oil truck had been improperly serviced and maintained, in that the brake systems, air hoses and braking mechanisms were faulty, defective and not in proper working order. By way of damages, plaintiff alleged direct pecuniary loss for support and maintenance, funeral expenses, pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life (hedonic damages). In addition, plaintiff sought punitive damages, alleging that defendants' negligent maintenance of the vehicle was "willful, wanton, and with knowledge of a high degree of probable harm to others." IV We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES HANDLER, POLLOCK, O'HERN, and COLEMAN join in JUSTICE STEIN's OPINION. JUSTICE GARIBALDI has filed a separate concurring opinion. HAROLD E. SMITH, Executor of the Estate of Helen V. Robbins, Deceased, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ALAN L. WHITAKER, JR., Defendant, and COASTAL OIL OF NEW YORK, INC. (incorrectly pled as COASTAL OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC. and formerly known as BELCHER COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC.), Defendant-Appellant. GARIBALDI, J., concurring. I agree that plaintiff established a valid claim for punitive damages under the Survivor's Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-3 for the tragic accident that occurred in 1990. As the Court observed, effective October 27, 1995, the Legislature enacted the Punitive Damages Act (the "Act"), N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.9 to -5.17. The Legislature's purpose in enacting the Act was to establish more restrictive standards with regard to the awarding of punitive damages. See N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.9; Assembly Insurance Committee Statement, Senate, No. 1496-L. 1995, c. 142 (stating the restrictions imposed on the awarding of punitive damages). For example, that Act requires an award of compensatory damages as a statutory precedent for an award of punitive damages and disallows nominal damages as a basis for a punitive damages claim. N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.13(b) and (c). The Court properly recognized that the Act did not govern the disposition of this appeal, as it did not take effect until October 27, 1995. The parties, also recognizing that the Act was not applicable, did not argue or brief whether the Act would be applicable in future matters where circumstances were as egregious as those presented in this appeal. Nevertheless, the Court reached out for that issue and concluded that the Legislature did not intend to foreclosure punitive damages as a remedy for death caused by egregious conduct. I would not have reached that issue. I recognize that the Court's holding in that regard is dicta. Nevertheless, such an important decision should not be made unless the issue is before the Court, and is fully argued and briefed. That is particularly true when the Court's interpretation appears to be contrary to the clear legislative mandate indicating that the purpose of the Act was to restrict punitive damages, rather than expand them. NO. A-15 HAROLD E. SMITH, Executor of the Estate of Helen V. Robbins, Deceased, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ALAN L. WHITAKER, JR., Defendant, and COASTAL OIL OF NEW YORK, INC. (incorrectly pled as COASTAL OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC. and formerly known as BELCHER COMPANY OF NEW YORK, INC.), Defendant-Appellant. DECIDED probably . . . a product of the felony-merger rule -- a doctrine that disallowed recovery for an act that constituted both a tort and a felony. Summerfield v. Superior Court, Maricopa Cty., 144 Ariz 467, 471, 698 P.2d 712, 716 (1985). Under this rule a tort was considered less important than an offense against the Crown and, as a result, was merged into, or pre-empted by, a felony. As noted in Moragne v. State Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 382, 90 S. Ct. 1772, 1778, 26 L.Ed 2d 339, 346 (1970), [t]he doctrine found practical justification in the fact that the punishment for the felony was death of the felon and the forfeiture of his property to the Crown; thus, after the crime had been punished, nothing remained of the felon or his property on which to base a civil action.