Case Title: JOHN FRANKLIN SPENCER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
JOHN FRANKLIN SPENCER V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 105118 P.3d 978Case Number: 04-100Decided: 08/30/2005
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
JOHN 
FRANKLIN SPENCER,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofNatronaCounty

The 
Honorable W. Thomas Sullins, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender, and Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Domonkos.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling; Senior Assistant Attorney General; Eric Johnson, Director, Prosecution 
Assistance Program; and Scott Dutcher, Student Intern.  Argument by Mr. 
Dutcher.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, John 
Franklin Spencer (Spencer), challenges the district court's decision to impose a 
sentence that was meted out so as to be served consecutive to a sentence 
previously imposed in federal court, but concurrent with a sentence that was 
previously imposed by another NatronaCounty district judge.  The sentence previously imposed in 
NatronaCounty was imposed in such 
a manner so as to be concurrent with the federal sentence.  Spencer entered a plea of guilty 
pursuant to a plea bargain wherein the prosecutor agreed that the sentence in 
this case would be concurrent, and of the same duration, as the other NatronaCounty sentence.  No mention was made of the status of the 
federal case; indeed, the existence of the federal sentence was not broached 
with the district court until the day of sentencing.  Spencer contends that the prosecutor 
breached the plea bargain, that the sentence imposed is illogical and, perhaps, 
illegal (in theory it must be served twice), and that the sentence was otherwise 
improper.  We will reverse and 
remand with directions that the district court impose a sentence consistent with 
the plea agreement (i.e., the sentence in this case must be concurrent with, and 
of the same duration, as Spencer's other state sentence, but not consecutive to 
his federal sentence), or permit Spencer to withdraw his guilty 
plea.

 
 

 
 
[¶2]      Spencer raises 
these issues:

 
 
            
I.  Whether [Spencer] received an illegal sentence when the 
district court ordered that his sentence run concurrently and consecutively in a 
manner which has [Spencer] serving his sentence twice.

 
 
            
II.  Whether [Spencer] is entitled to specific performance on 
his plea agreement or in the alternative whether he should be allowed to 
withdraw his guilty plea.

 
 
The 
State rephrases the issues thus:

 
 
            
I.  Did the trial court exceed its authority when it made 
[Spencer's] sentence in this case concurrent to another state sentence but 
consecutive to his federal sentence; and does the trial court's sentencing order 
require [Spencer] to serve the same sentence twice, in violation of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause?

 
 
            
II.  Did the prosecutor violate the plea agreement by 
recommending that [Spencer's] sentence in this case be concurrent to another 
state sentence but consecutive to his federal sentence?

 
 

 
 
[¶3]      Spencer was 
arrested on February 27, 2003, and charged with violating Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
6-3-403 (LexisNexis 2005) (receiving and disposing of stolen property).  He appeared for arraignment on April 8, 
2003, at which time he entered pleas of not guilty.

 
 
[¶4]      A change of plea 
hearing was held on August 28, 2003.  
At that hearing, the district court asked Spencer's counsel if Spencer 
was going to change his plea.  
Defense counsel replied:

 
 
            
Yes.  Well, Your Honor, the 
plea agreement is that Mr. Spencer will plead guilty to the receiving stolen 
property count, and I'm not positive which number.  I believe it's the first case.  Mr. Schafer has those 
enumerated.

            
The second case would be dismissed.  
But as part of this plea agreement, Mr. Spencer will also plead guilty to 
a charge in front of JudgePark.  The conditions of the plea are that 
these are cold pleas.  The only 
thing is that they will run concurrent between cases in front of both 
Courts.

 
 
[¶5]      The prosecutor 
enlarged on that somewhat:

 
 
            
Yes, Your Honor.  In case 
number 15834-B, the defendant will be pleading guilty and providing a factual 
basis to the count of receiving and concealing stolen property.  And in this file, 15848-B, the State 
will be moving to dismiss in exchange for Mr. Spencer's plea of guilty to the 
other charge as I indicated.

            
And in Judge Park's file, Your Honor, it's case number 15878, we have a 
plea disposition in which defendant would plead guilty to Count II, III, and IV 
and Counts I and V will be dismissed.  
We've agreed that all counts will run concurrent and that after the 
preparation of a presentence investigation, we'll be arguing sentencing at that 
time, each case to run concurrent, Your Honor.

 
 
Spencer 
then changed his plea to guilty.  As 
a part of its advisements to Spencer, the district court stated that it "would 
defer acceptance of the plea agreement pending presentence investigation."  However, no mention was made at these 
proceedings about ongoing criminal charges in a federal court or a sentence 
having been imposed in a federal court.  
A Presentence Investigation Report was filed in the district court on 
October 17, 2003.  No mention is 
made of pending federal charges in the presentence report.

 
 
[¶6]      On November 14, 
2003, Spencer was scheduled to appear before the district court for 
sentencing.  However, at that time 
he was in the custody of federal authorities and not present for 
sentencing.  Sentencing was then 
rescheduled.  On December 9, 2003, 
Spencer again was to appear for sentencing.  Spencer had been brought to Casper for this 
proceeding, but was inexplicably transported back to Wheatland by federal 
authorities before it was convened.  
At this December 9, 2003 proceeding, it became evident that the district 
court would need to issue a Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum and such a 
writ was issued.  Apparently because 
of the difficulty of getting Spencer before the court for sentencing, the 
district court continued sentencing proceedings in this matter until after the 
federal proceedings were concluded.  
Although it must be assumed that Spencer was aware that he had been 
prosecuted and sentenced in federal court, that judgment and associated sentence 
is not a matter of record in this case.

 
 
[¶7]      On March 9, 2004, 
Spencer finally appeared before the district court for sentencing.  The prosecutor made this overture to the 
district court with respect to sentence:

 
 
            
Mr. Spencer comes before the Court on a felony charge of receiving and 
concealing stolen property.  The 
Court can recall the defendant provided a factual basis in which he admitted 
basically to accepting a pool stick, a leather jacket, a western knife, and a 
.357 handgun, and basically attempting to get rid of those particular 
items.

            
Recently, Mr. Spencer was sentenced in front of JudgePark on a charge of two counts of burglary 
and one count of grand larceny.  He 
also, Your Honor, was recently sentenced in federal court for 57 months on a 
drug case.  Our agreement in this 
case essentially is that it's a cold plea, but we have agreed to run it 
concurrent to the sentence that the defendant received in JudgePark's court where he was sentenced last 
month.  And that is docket number 
15878-A.

            
Just for the Court's information, JudgePark did sentence the defendant recently, 
and he received a four- to six-year sentence to run concurrent with this case 
and also to run concurrent with the sentence that he received in federal court 
of 57 months.

            
What I'm recommending to the Court, Your Honor, is that he receive a 
four- to six -year sentence in this court today, that it run concurrent with the 
sentence that JudgePark sentenced the defendant to, but that 
it run consecutive to the sentence that defendant received in federal 
court.

            
As the Court can see, the defendant does have a pretty significant 
criminal record.  Checking that, 
Your Honor, they  his felony convictions started off earlier back in the early 
90s.  He has a record that starts 
in 1991.  I counted up his previous 
felonies which were two prior felonies, one federal felony for a total of three 
felonies.  And then if you count the 
felonies that he was recently sentenced for in JudgePark's court, there are three additional 
felonies.  So technically, this 
would be his seventh felony conviction.

            
I think a four- to six-year sentence is even somewhat low considering 
that number of felonies, but I would have to advise the Court that he did make a 
proffer and did provide information in reference to the felony conviction that 
he was sentenced to.  Most of the 
recent felonies I believe are due to the fact that the defendant was a severe 
substance abuser with the use of methamphetamine.  And it does indicate in the Presentence 
Investigation that he's received treatment.  In fact, he received inpatient treatment 
twice before he got in trouble for these particular 
offenses.

            
The Presentence Investigation does recommend a sentence at the Wyoming 
State Penitentiary with the Intensive Treatment Unit.  We would agree with that, Your 
Honor.  And so I would recommend 
four to six years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary to run concurrent with 
15878-A, that's Judge Park's case, and to run consecutive to the defendant's 
federal sentence.  I would also, 
Your Honor, recommend that the defendant be required to pay restitution as 
indicated in the Presentence Investigation.

            
I recently called the police department evidence room to find out whether 
any of those items were recovered:  
the coat, the pool cue, the gun, or the leather jacket.  None of those items were recovered.  So I would recommend what's outlined in 
the Presentence Investigation, that the defendant pay that specific amount which 
 I can't find it right now, Your Honor, but it is indicated in the Presentence 
Investigation.  Thank 
you.

 
 
[¶8]      Spencer's 
attorney responded:

 
 
            
Your Honor, I don't have any objection and Mr. Spencer has no objection 
to the term of four to six years concurrent with the case in 15878-A.  However, I cannot imagine how that 
sentence can be concurrent, which in that case is concurrent to the federal 
sentence and then be consecutive to the federal sentence in this case.  Our argument is that it should be 
concurrent to the federal case and the other case.  That serves two or three 
purposes.

            
One, it allows the State of Wyoming to avoid any expenses in Mr. 
Spencer's incarceration, but it also takes into consideration the fact that Mr. 
Spencer has from the very beginning cooperated with law enforcement, that he has 
made the proffer, that he has accepted responsibility, and not taken any 
unnecessary time of the Court.

            
And so we would ask, Your Honor, that he be sentenced to four to six 
years in the State Penitentiary, that that is concurrent with 15878, which is 
already concurrent to the federal sentence.

 
 
[¶9]      The district 
court orally pronounced this sentence:

 
 
            
As I see it, the recommendation is generally the same except for the 
concurrency or consecutiveness to the federal sentence that the defendant may 
currently be serving.

            
Taking a look at the factors that I consider relative to whether 
incarceration is needed and whether this sentence should be concurrent or 
consecutive to the federal sentence, I note that there are at least now six 
prior felony convictions; that there is a Presentence Investigation 
recommendation for incarceration; that there have been failures on supervised 
release in the past given the defendant's record; and I think most 
significantly, that there's been a large number of felony-level violations 
within a very short period of time.

            
So it's my impression that there should be some component of additional 
punishment or sentence in connection with this particular case.  And I think having it run consecutive to 
the federal sentence, which is completely different for a separate matter, would 
appear appropriate.

            
It'll be the judgment and sentence of the Court that John Franklin 
Spencer, for his conviction of felony receiving and concealing stolen property, 
be remanded to the custody of the sheriff of Natrona County, Wyoming, by him 
delivered to the custody of the Wyoming Department of Corrections to serve a 
term of not less than 48 months nor more than 72 months at the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary or at such other facility designated by the Wyoming Department of 
Corrections.

            
The Court would order that this sentence be served concurrent with the 
sentences on the  I believe it is three felony counts in Criminal Action 
15878-A, but consecutive to the federal drug conviction and sentence that the 
defendant is currently serving.  And 
I would ask that the DA's Office identify precisely that particular case and 
sentence.

 
 
[¶10]   Before imposing sentence, the 
district court did not indicate that it declined to accept the plea bargain, nor 
did it give Spencer the opportunity to withdraw his plea in light of the readily 
apparent breach of the plea bargain by the prosecutor.  At that time, Spencer did not ask to 
withdraw his guilty plea.

 
 

 
 
Illegal 
Sentence

 
 
[¶11]   An illegal sentence is one which 
exceeds statutory limits, imposes multiple terms of imprisonment for the same 
offense, or otherwise violates constitutions or the law.   The determination of whether a 
sentence is illegal is made by reference to the authorizing statute or 
applicable constitutional provisions and is, therefore, a matter of statutory 
interpretation.  Interpretation of 
statutes is a question of law, which we review de novo.  Bush v. State, 2003 WY 156, ¶8, 
79 P.3d 1178, 1182 (Wyo. 2003) (citing Ryan v. State, 988 P.2d 46, 62-63 
(Wyo. 
1999)).

 
 

 
 
[¶12]   With respect to a plea of guilty 
entered in connection with a plea agreement, we have said:

 
 
"When a 
plea of guilty rests to any significant degree on a promise or agreement by the 
State, that promise must be fulfilled.  
Whether the prosecutor has violated the plea agreement is a question that 
is reviewed de novo."  Herrera v. 
State, 2003 WY 25, ¶8, 64 P.3d 724, ¶8 (Wyo.2003).  A plea agreement is a contract between 
the defendant and the State and thus general principles of contract law apply to 
the agreement.  "When determining 
whether a breach of the plea agreement has occurred we:  (1) examine the nature of the promise; 
and (2) evaluate the promise in light of the defendant's reasonable 
understanding of the promise at the time the plea was entered."  Ford v. State, 2003 WY 65, ¶11, 
69 P.3d 407, ¶11 (Wyo.2003) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).

 
 

Rutti v. 
State, 2004 
WY 133, ¶42, 100 P.3d 394, 410-11 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
[¶13]   In Ford v. State, 2003 WY 
65, ¶18, 69 P.3d 407, 412 (Wyo.2003) we also said:

 
 
Furthermore, 
we have said that the prosecutor may not play fast and loose with the 
established terms of a plea agreement and must explicitly stand by those terms 
agreed upon.  Herrera, at 
¶18.   If the prosecutor's 
performance of the terms of a plea agreement is not possible, a withdrawal of 
the plea is the correct remedy.  The 
prosecutor's remedy was not to violate or mischaracterize the agreement but 
rather move to withdraw the plea agreement if she did not wish to be bound to 
its terms.  Neither the principles 
of fairness nor the principles of contract law allow the State to retain the 
benefit of the agreement while avoiding its obligation.  See  State v. Rardon, 2002 MT 345,¶18, 
313 Mont. 321, 
61 P.3d 132, ¶18 (Mt.2002).  "[I]t 
would be unfair to accept a guilty plea where part of the bargain, upon which 
the plea was based, was breached.  
The defendant had not agreed to plead guilty to charges under terms other 
than those set forth in the agreement."  
Cardenas v. Meacham, 545 P.2d 632, 638 (Wyo.1976) (explaining the 
rationale behind the Santobello decision.)

 
 

Also see 
Browning v. State, 2001 
WY 93, ¶¶26-35, 32 P.3d 1061, 1069-72 (Wyo. 2001).

 
 

 
 
[¶14]   The sentencing scheme imposed by 
the district court is, at best, puzzling.  
More importantly, the position taken by the prosecutor at sentencing 
clearly violated both the letter and the spirit of the plea bargain.  Therefore, we conclude that the sentence 
imposed must be reversed.  
Furthermore, we remand to the district court with directions that the 
district court impose a sentence in this case that is concurrent with, and of 
the same duration as, that imposed in his other state case.  This concurrent sentence may not be 
consecutive to the federal sentence.  
If the district court chooses not to impose such a sentence, then Spencer 
must be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea if he so chooses.  

 
 
[¶15]   A few observations are appropriate 
before we conclude.  It is evident 
from the record that neither the parties, the presiding judge, nor the 
Department of Probation and Parole (which prepared the Presentence 
Investigation) contemplated that Spencer's federal sentence would play a role in 
sentencing for the instant crime.  
Indeed, the first mention of it arose at the March 8, 2004 sentencing 
hearing.  ABA Standards for Criminal 
Justice Pleas of Guilty, Standard 14-3.3(e), at 128 (3rd ed. 1999), 
provides in pertinent part:

 
 
            
(e)  In cases where a defendant offers to plead guilty and the 
judge decides that the final disposition should not include the charge or 
sentence concessions contemplated by the plea agreement, the judge shall so 
advise the defendant and permit withdrawal of the tender of the plea.  In cases where a defendant pleads guilty 
pursuant to a plea agreement and the court, following entry of the plea, decides 
that the final disposition should not include the contemplated charge or 
sentence concessions, withdrawal of the plea shall be allowed 
if:

                        
(i)  the judge had previously concurred, whether tentatively or 
fully, in the proposed charge or sentence concessions; or 

                        
(ii)  the guilty plea is entered upon the express condition, 
approved by the judge, that the plea can be withdrawn if the charge or sentence 
concessions are subsequently rejected by the court.

            
In all other cases where a defendant pleads guilty pursuant to a plea 
agreement and the judge decides that the final disposition should not include 
the contemplated charge or sentence concessions, withdrawal of the plea may be 
permitted as set forth in standard 14-2.1.

 
 
[¶16]   Here, the district court 
tentatively accepted the terms of the plea bargain, subject to review of the 
Presentence Report.  The Presentence 
Report made no mention of the federal sentence.

 
 
[¶17]   The ABA Standards for Criminal 
Justice Prosecution Function and Defense Function, Standard 3-4.1(c), at 85 
(3rd ed. 1993), provides:  "A prosecutor should not knowingly make 
false statements or representations as to fact or law in the course of plea 
discussions with defense counsel or the accused."  That standard is enlarged upon in the 
commentary:

 
 

            

            
Disciplinary sanctions may be imposed against a prosecutor who 
intentionally deceives defense counsel.  
Although the prosecutor is under no obligation to reveal any evidence to 
the defense counsel in the course of plea discussions, truth is required in the 
presentation of facts relating to the case, whether or not they are mitigating 
facts.  The prosecutor during plea 
discussions must also avoid the use of deception in dealing with the evidence 
and must refrain from misrepresenting the law or sentencing practices of the 
court.  Not only does 
misrepresentation reflect on the integrity of the prosecutor and jeopardize the 
achievement of justice, but it also frustrates dispositions by plea since 
lawyers are understandably reluctant to negotiate with a prosecutor who cannot 
be trusted.

 
 

Id. at 
87.

 
 
[¶18]   This Court has a responsibility to 
ensure that sentencing is carried out fairly and in accordance with law.  See ABA Standards Appellate Review of Sentences § 
1.2 at 21 (1967).  As is more fully 
set forth in the commentary, appellate review contributes significantly to the 
criminal justice process because by: "Providing for a check on the exercise of 
the sentencing power should thus increase respect for the system.  The exercise of the power to correct the 
occasional abuse should demonstrate that it works."  Id. at 27; also see ABA Standards 
for Criminal Justice Sentencing, Part VIII, at 247-54 (3rd ed. 1994).

 
 

 
 
[¶19]   The sentence imposed by the 
district court is reversed.  We 
remand this matter to the district court with directions that it impose a 
sentence that conforms to the plea bargain, as we have set out more fully 
above.  Failing that, the district 
court must permit Spencer to withdraw his guilty plea.