Case Title: Rudolph v. Commonwealth (order)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 080794

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2009-02-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
VIRGINIA: 
 
 
In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme Court 
Building in the City of Richmond on Friday, the 27th day of 
February, 2009. 
 
Demetres Jerrod Rudolph, 
 
 
 
Appellant, 
 
   against        Record No. 080794 
 
 
 
     Court of Appeals No. 0240-07-1 
 
Commonwealth of Virginia, 
 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
Upon an appeal from a judgment rendered by the 
Court of Appeals of Virginia. 
 
Upon consideration of the record, briefs, and argument of 
counsel, the Court is of opinion that there is reversible error in 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals.  
Demetres J. Rudolph was charged with and found guilty of 
possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute in the 
Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach.  By an unpublished 
memorandum opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed Rudolph’s 
conviction.  Rudolph claims that he was stopped in violation of his 
rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and that all evidence obtained as a result of that stop should have 
been suppressed.  The Commonwealth contends that, under the 
circumstances, the police officer’s investigatory stop was 
constitutionally permissible. 
 
On January 23, 2006, at approximately 8 p.m., Officer Jeremy P. 
Latchman was patrolling the Cypress Point Plaza Shopping Center 
 
2
area.  Multiple burglaries of closed businesses and robberies of 
individuals had occurred in that area.  Latchman saw a "vehicle with 
no lights on parked parallel in the rear of [a] Citgo Gas Station," 
located on an outparcel of the shopping center.  The gas station was 
open for business, and there was an entry door for customers in the 
"rear," which is the side of the building that is opposite the side 
of the building where the gas pumps are located.  Latchman thought 
the circumstance of the vehicle being parked in that location was 
unusual because he did not believe that customers used the station’s 
rear entry in the nighttime.  In addition, while there are parking 
spaces on that side of the building, the vehicle was not parked in a 
marked parking space. 
 
There were two people in the parked vehicle.  Rudolph was in 
the driver’s seat.  In the few seconds he observed the parked 
vehicle from about a car length and a half away from Rudolph’s 
vehicle, Latchman saw Rudolph moving around in the vehicle and saw 
Rudolph’s head "[go] down a couple of times and back up."  Latchman 
testified that Rudolph appeared to be looking or reaching for 
something inside the vehicle.  Latchman decided to drive his marked 
police vehicle around the gas station to "make sure everything was 
fine."  In doing so, he did not observe anything unusual.  While 
Latchman was circling around the gas station, Rudolph began to drive 
away. 
 
Latchman stopped Rudolph’s vehicle.  During the stop, Rudolph 
was asked to exit the vehicle; marijuana was found at the center 
floor divider where Rudolph’s right leg had been.  The discovery of 
 
3
that marijuana led to the conviction that is the subject of this 
appeal. 
A defendant’s claim that evidence was seized in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment presents a mixed question of law and fact that 
we review de novo on appeal.  Bolden v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 465, 
470, 561 S.E.2d 701, 704 (2002).  In making such a determination, 
we give deference to the factual findings of the circuit court, but 
we independently determine whether the manner in which the evidence 
was obtained meets the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.  
McCain v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 546, 552, 659 S.E.2d 512, 515 
(2008). 
In order to conduct an investigatory stop, a police officer 
need not have probable cause; he must have a reasonable suspicion, 
based on objective facts, that the person is involved in criminal 
activity.  Ewell v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 214, 217, 491 S.E.2d 721, 
722 (1997).  To establish reasonable suspicion, an officer must be 
able to articulate more than an unparticularized suspicion or 
"hunch" that criminal activity is afoot.  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 
U.S. 119, 123-24 (2000).  A court must consider the totality of the 
circumstances when determining whether a police officer had a 
particularized and objective suspicion that the person stopped was 
involved in criminal activity.  Ewell, 254 Va. at 217, 491 S.E.2d 
at 722-23.  The fact that the stop occurred in a "high crime area" 
 
4
is a relevant factor; however, this fact is insufficient to supply 
a particularized and objective basis for suspecting criminal 
activity on the part of the particular person stopped.  Wardlow, 
528 U.S. at 124; McCain, 275 Va. at 552-53, 659 S.E.2d at 516. 
We hold that the circumstances and actions observed by 
Latchman were not enough to create a reasonable articulable 
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.  Viewing the totality 
of the circumstances objectively, even though it was 8:00 p.m. and 
there had been robberies and burglaries in the area, the 
circumstances did not supply a particularized and objective basis 
to suspect that Rudolph’s observed behavior was a precursor to a 
break-in, robbery, or any other criminal activity on his part.  
Therefore, Latchman stopped Rudolph in violation of Rudolph’s 
rights under the Fourth Amendment.  Because the marijuana was 
discovered as a result of an illegal stop, the trial court should 
have granted Rudolph’s motion to suppress. 
Rudolph entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to Code 
§ 19.2-254, which provides in part that "[i]f the defendant 
prevails on appeal, he shall be allowed to withdraw his plea."  
Rudolph has prevailed on appeal regarding suppression of the 
evidence in this case.  He is, therefore, entitled by statute to 
withdraw his plea of guilty.  Rudolph must be given the opportunity 
to reassess the admissible evidence that may be used against him 
 
5
and, if the Commonwealth wishes to continue its prosecution, 
Rudolph may demand a trial if he so desires.  See Code § 19.2-254; 
Hasan v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 674, 681, 667 S.E.2d 568, 572 
(2008). 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, 
Rudolph’s conviction in the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia 
Beach, case number CR06-1036, is vacated, and we will remand this 
case to the Court of Appeals with direction that the Court of 
Appeals remand the case to the circuit court for proceedings 
consistent with the views expressed in this order if the 
Commonwealth be so advised.  
_______________ 
 
 
JUSTICE LEMONS, with whom JUSTICE KINSER and SENIOR JUSTICE CARRICO 
join, dissenting. 
 
 
The jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court dealing 
with searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment has always 
sought to strike the correct balance between protecting the 
constitutional rights of citizens and ensuring that law enforcement 
officers can take necessary action to protect the public and ensure 
compliance with the law. 
 
I believe the majority today has misapplied the law relating to 
investigatory stops under the Fourth Amendment, both in discounting 
the cumulative effect of the circumstances encountered by the police 
officer here, and in misconstruing the degree of suspicion required 
 
6
to justify such stops under Terry v. Ohio in a way that imposes a 
much heavier burden on police than the constitution warrants. 
I. Principles of Law 
 
Under the Fourth Amendment, brief stops by law enforcement 
officers to investigate the possibility of criminal behavior may be 
justified by a lower standard of suspicion than is required for "a 
'technical arrest' or a 'full-blown search,'" in the words of Terry 
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968). 
The Fourth Amendment prohibits "unreasonable 
searches and seizures" by the Government, and its 
protections extend to brief investigatory stops of 
persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional 
arrest.  Because the "balance between the public 
interest and the individual’s right to personal 
security" tilts in favor of a standard less than 
probable cause in such cases, the Fourth Amendment 
is satisfied if the officer’s action is supported by 
reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal 
activity " 'may be afoot.' " 
 
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (citations 
omitted).  This doctrine, which was recognized as to pedestrians in 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, has been extended to stops of vehicles whose 
drivers are suspected of engaging in wrongdoing.  United States v. 
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648, 663 (1979).  We have also recognized and applied this 
lower standard to vehicle stops.  Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 
666, 673, 594 S.E.2d 595, 598 (2004). 
 
While "reasonable suspicion" must be based on more than an 
"inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' " Terry, 392 
U.S. at 27, the United States Supreme Court has also made clear that 
the standard only requires "some minimal level of objective 
 
7
justification" for making the stop in question, INS v. Delgado, 466 
U.S. 210, 217 (1984) (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 
544, 554 (1980); Terry, 392 U.S. at 21).  Indeed, the Court has 
often reemphasized the significant difference between the low 
threshold of "reasonable suspicion" on the one hand, and the 
considerably more demanding requirements of "probable cause," "a 
preponderance of the evidence," and "beyond a reasonable doubt" on 
the other.  For example, in United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 
(1989), the Court noted that reasonable suspicion is "considerably 
less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence," 
and "obviously less demanding than that for probable cause."  And in 
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990), the Court further explained 
that  
reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard 
than probable cause not only in the sense that 
reasonable suspicion can be established with 
information that is different in quantity or content 
than that required to establish probable cause, but 
also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise 
from information that is less reliable than that 
required to show probable cause. 
 
Id. at 330. 
 
Whether officers making an investigatory stop are presented 
with circumstances sufficiently suspicious to satisfy this minimum 
standard is determined by examining the totality of the 
circumstances in the context of the officer’s experience and 
training.  United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).  As 
the Supreme Court has noted, "[t]his process allows officers to draw 
on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences 
 
8
from and deductions about the cumulative information available to 
them that 'might well elude an untrained person.' "  Arvizu, 534 
U.S. at 273 (quoting Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418).  
 
And, as the Court has insisted since it first recognized the 
constitutionality of reasonable investigative stops in Terry, "it is 
imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard," 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, meaning that the officer’s actual conclusion 
in the particular case at issue is irrelevant.  Instead, reviewing 
courts must ask: "would the facts available to the officer at the 
moment of the [stop] 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the 
belief' that the action taken was appropriate?"  Id. at 21-22. 
 
This legal framework exists to guide trial courts in ruling on 
challenges invoking the Fourth Amendment, and to guide appellate 
courts in reviewing the constitutionality of those rulings.  In our 
constitutional order, some (but not all) violations of the Fourth 
Amendment trigger an extreme remedy: the exclusionary rule, which, 
if applicable, provides that the improperly obtained evidence is 
inadmissible against the defendant.  See, e.g., id. at 12-13. 
 
The Supreme Court has recently reemphasized the severity of the 
exclusionary rule and the resulting restraint courts must show when 
invoking it.  "[E]xclusion 'has always been our last resort, not our 
first impulse.' "  Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. ___, ___, 129 
S.Ct. 695, 700 (2009) (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 
(2006)).  " '[T]he rule’s costly toll upon truth-seeking and law 
enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those urging 
[its] application.' "  Id. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 701 (quoting 
 
9
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 
364-65 (1998)). 
 
The "major thrust" of the rule is "a deterrent one," Terry, 392 
U.S. at 12 (citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629-35 
(1965)), targeting "police conduct which is overbearing or 
harassing, or which trenches upon personal security without the 
objective evidentiary justification which the Constitution 
requires," id. at 15.  In contrast, the rule is abused where it is 
"invoked to exclude the products of legitimate police investigative 
techniques."  Id. at 13. 
 
When applied to evidence recovered pursuant to an investigatory 
stop, the exclusionary rule is best equipped to deter stops made not 
because of legitimate suspicion, but because the stop was motivated 
by some pernicious reason (such as racial profiling, personal 
animus, or the like), or by arbitrariness evidencing a genuine abuse 
of police power.  Such a wrongful basis for the stop warrants the 
application of the exclusionary rule’s severe penalty. 
 
But not all investigatory stops arise from such base 
motivations.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized 
that conduct observed by police may be "ambiguous and susceptible of 
an innocent explanation" and yet still justify an investigatory 
stop, allowing the officers to "detain the individuals to resolve 
the ambiguity."  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000).  The 
Court in Wardlow continued: 
In allowing such detentions, Terry accepts the risk 
that officers may stop innocent people.  Indeed, the 
Fourth Amendment accepts that risk in connection with 
more drastic police action; persons arrested and 
 
10
detained on probable cause to believe they have 
committed a crime may turn out to be innocent.  The 
Terry stop is a far more minimal intrusion, simply 
allowing the officer to briefly investigate further.  
If the officer does not learn facts rising to the 
level of probable cause, the individual must be 
allowed to go on his way. 
 
Id. at 126.  Applied injudiciously, the exclusionary rule improperly 
deters this kind of legitimate police conduct, conduct that strikes 
the appropriate balance between respecting the privacy citizens 
enjoy under our Constitution, and preserving the state’s interest in 
preventing crime. 
II. Error in Application of Law to Facts 
 
The majority today holds that the circumstances here were 
insufficient to provide a reasonable suspicion for the stop that led 
to Rudolph’s arrest.  In my view, the majority has reached the 
incorrect conclusion given the facts of this case, in part because 
it ignores repeated admonishments from the United States Supreme 
Court and our prior cases that the constitutionality of such stops 
must be evaluated by examining the collective weight of the totality 
of the circumstances. 
 
Here, at least four circumstances could have reasonably lent 
support to Officer Latchman’s conclusion that criminal activity may 
have been afoot.  First, the encounter at issue here occurred in the 
parking lot of a shopping center that had recently experienced a 
significant rise in criminal activity.  As the Supreme Court has 
held, "officers are not required to ignore the relevant 
characteristics of a location in determining whether the 
circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to warrant further 
 
11
investigation. . . . [T]he fact that the stop occurred in a 'high 
crime area' [is] among the relevant contextual considerations in a 
Terry analysis."  Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (citing Adams v. 
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, 147-48 (1972)).  And indeed, the 
majority here concedes that "[t]he fact that the stop occurred in a 
'high crime area' is a relevant factor" in the reasonable suspicion 
analysis.  In the period leading up to this encounter, police "had 
beefed up a lot of extra patrol and a lot of overtime due to the 
fact that there w[ere] a lot of break-ins and robberies in that 
specific shopping center." 
 
Second, the location of the car was unusual, and inconsistent 
with where and how a typical patron of the service station would be 
parked.  The car was located on the side of the building opposite 
the gas pumps and main entrance to the station.  Furthermore, the 
car was "parked parallel," not in any of the marked spaces nearby.  
This location was particularly odd because of the time of day; 
although there was a door to the station on that side of the 
building, in the officer’s experience (unquestionably a permissible 
consideration in evaluating reasonable suspicion), such back doors 
were rarely if ever used by customers, especially at night.  
Finally, although it was after dark, the car’s lights were off. 
 
Third, the "furtive gestures" of the car’s occupants could 
reasonably have raised questions about their activities and intent.  
We have previously recognized that furtive gestures are relevant in 
determining whether probable cause exists for an arrest, see, e.g., 
 
12
Hollis v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 874, 877, 223 S.E.2d 887, 889 
(1976), and therefore they are unquestionably relevant when 
evaluating the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion.  Here, when 
the officer pulled his vehicle within approximately one and a half 
car lengths behind the parked car, he observed two individuals 
within.  The driver, who later turned out to be Rudolph, was 
"moving around in the vehicle" in a way that suggested to the 
officer that he might be "looking around for something."  The other 
occupant was also "moving around in the vehicle;" the officer 
described the occupants’ actions as "furtive movements," "reaching 
for stuff," and "ben[ding] down a couple of times." 
 
Finally, the occupants’ decision to depart the parking lot 
after encountering the officer could have been reasonably 
interpreted as evasion, or at least raised the possibility that was 
their motive.  "[N]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor 
in determining reasonable suspicion."  Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 
(citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975); 
Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 6 (1984) (per curiam); Sokolow, 
490 U.S. at 8-9).  This is especially true when coupled with other 
factors.  See, e.g., United States v. Briggman, 931 F.2d 705, 709 
(11th Cir. 1991) (defendant was parked in lot adjacent to closed 
businesses and attempted to evade police); Losee v. Dearinger, 911 
F.2d 48, 49-50 (8th Cir. 1990) (defendants were parked illegally 
 
13
behind closed business in high-crime area, and attempted to evade 
police).  Here, after observing the car from close distance, the 
officer decided to "go around the vehicle" and around the gas 
station building to "make sure everything was fine."  As he rounded 
the building on the opposite side from where Rudolph was parked, 
the officer immediately saw the parked car starting to drive away. 
 
It is of course true that each of these circumstances might be 
wholly innocent.  Indeed, when viewed in isolation from one another, 
it is doubtful that any of them could provide police with a 
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.  However, 
engaging in such an exercise, as the majority implicitly does, 
ignores the correct application of a totality-of-circumstances test.  
As the Supreme Court has made clear, 
Terry, however, precludes this sort of divide-and-
conquer analysis.  The officer in Terry observed the 
petitioner and his companions repeatedly walk back 
and forth, look into a store window, and confer with 
one another.  Although each of the series of acts was 
"perhaps innocent in itself," we held that, taken 
together, they "warranted further investigation."  
392 U.S. at 22.  See also Sokolow[, 409 U.S.] at 9 
(holding that factors which by themselves were "quite 
consistent with innocent travel" collectively 
amounted to reasonable suspicion). 
 
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274-75.  The point, again, is that when viewed 
together, circumstances – even if wholly innocent – may be 
suspicious enough to warrant a reasonable officer in conducting a 
Terry stop in order to "resolve the ambiguity."  Our cases are in 
perfect accord on this point.  See, e.g., Moore v. Commonwealth, 276 
Va. 747, 757, 668 S.E.2d 150, 156 (2008); Harris v. Commonwealth, 
 
14
276 Va. 689, 695-98, 668 S.E.2d 141, 145-47 (2008); Buhrman v. 
Commonwealth, 275 Va. 501, 505, 659 S.E.2d 325, 327 (2008); Bass v. 
Commonwealth, 259 Va. 470, 475, 525 S.E.2d 921, 924 (2000).  Viewed 
together, the circumstances here could reasonably be considered 
suspicious. 
 
In a remarkably similar case, United States v. Dawdy, 46 F.3d 
1427 (8th Cir. 1995), the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
considered a Terry stop based on an officer’s observation of a 
vehicle parked, late at night, behind a closed pharmacy at which 
there had been prior reported false burglary alarms.  46 F.3d at 
1428.  The car’s lights were off but it was occupied, and when the 
officer entered the parking lot to investigate, the driver of the 
car started the vehicle and began to drive toward the exit of the 
lot, at which point officers stopped the car to investigate.  Id. at 
1428-29.  The Eight Circuit held that the stop was valid, 
emphasizing "not merely the presence of two men sitting in a parked 
automobile at night," but also the prior suspicious activity in the 
area, the occupants’ apparent lack of a legitimate business purpose, 
and the occupants’ potentially evasive behavior.  Id. at 1430. 
 
The similar circumstances here suggest the same result.  Like 
the occupants in Dawdy, Rudolph and his companion were parked, late 
at night and with the lights off, behind a business.  In Dawdy, 
there had merely been prior false burglary alarms, which could be 
seen as less suspicious than the confirmed robberies and break-ins 
here.  In both cases, the likelihood of a legitimate business 
purpose was slight: in Dawdy, the officer reasonably believed the 
 
15
pharmacy was closed, while here Officer Latchman knew from 
experience that gas station customers seldom used back entrances, 
especially at night.  When they encountered law enforcement 
officers, both sets of occupants attempted to make a quick exit.  
And the furtive gestures of Rudolph here – a factor not present in 
Dawdy, in which the stop was deemed valid – lends further support to 
the reasonableness of the stop here. 
III. Error in Legal Standard Applied 
 
In this case, the majority’s error may reach deeper than merely 
misunderstanding the way the circumstances here work together to 
provide a reasonable suspicion.  In reaching its conclusion, the 
majority appears to have applied a more exacting legal standard than 
the Fourth Amendment permits, declaring legitimate police activity 
unconstitutional and upsetting the delicate balance between 
individual privacy and community safety. 
 
It is possible that this divergent standard has its genesis in 
a slight discrepancy in the language used by the United States 
Supreme Court, and subsequently in our cases, in describing the 
reasonable suspicion standard under the Fourth Amendment.  In Terry, 
the Supreme Court explicitly stated its holding, including the 
following language:  "We merely hold today that where a police 
officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to 
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be 
afoot," an investigatory stop is warranted.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 
(emphasis added).  Some later cases utilize the same conditional 
language.  See, e.g., Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7 ("may be afoot"); 
 
16
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 ("may be afoot"). 
 
However, other reasonable suspicion cases have included more 
definitive language, suggesting that circumstances must indicate 
that criminal activity is afoot, or that a suspect is involved in 
criminal activity.  These cases include Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 
51 (1979) ("is involved in criminal activity") and Wardlow, 528 U.S. 
at 123 ("criminal activity is afoot"). 
This disparity is reflected in our cases.  Compare, e.g., 
Moore, 276 Va. at 757, 668 S.E.2d at 155 ("may be afoot"); McCain v. 
Commonwealth, 275 Va. 546, 552, 659 S.E.2d 512, 516 (2008) ("may be 
afoot") with Harris, 276 Va. at 697, 668 S.E.2d at 147 ("is involved 
in criminal activity"); Bass, 259 Va. at 475, 525 S.E.2d at 923 ("is 
afoot").  In at least one case, both kinds of language are used in 
subsequent sentences.  See Ewell, 254 Va. at 217, 491 S.E.2d at 722-
23 ("In order to justify the brief seizure of a person by an 
investigatory stop, a police officer . . . must have a reasonable 
suspicion, based on objective facts, that the [person] is involved 
in criminal activity.  In determining whether a police officer had a 
particularized and objective basis for suspecting that the person 
stopped may be involved in criminal activity, a court must consider 
. . . ." (emphases added) (citations and quotation marks omitted)). 
 
These examples suggest that there may be little theoretical 
difference between the two constructions.  However, semantic 
differences can come to acquire great practical importance over 
time.  The more definite language of the latter line of cases could 
be easily misconstrued as a requirement that police officers have 
 
17
some certainty that criminal activity in fact is about to commence, 
is already underway, or has recently concluded.  Terry and its 
progeny do not go so far, but the conclusion reached by the majority 
here suggests that it has. 
If so, this heightened requirement forecloses a vast range of 
legitimate investigatory practices, authorized by Terry, that result 
in only "minimal intrusion."  Far from allowing officers the limited 
ability to request clarification when confronted with ambiguous 
circumstances, it places a weighty and unwarranted burden of proof 
on police to postpone any encounter until criminal culpability, or 
at the very least probable cause to suspect a crime is underway, can 
be conclusively established.  This is not the holding of Terry or 
the cases that have followed it, and the majority’s implementation 
of this foreign requirement, which is implicit in its resolution of 
this case, is error. 
In this case, the majority does not properly apply the 
principles articulated by the United States Supreme Court in 
evaluating Terry stops.  The United States Supreme Court has long 
made clear that states are permitted to provide greater protections 
to their citizens than the minimal levels guaranteed by the federal 
Constitution; however, they must do so by means of state law, 
whether embodied in state statute or state constitution.  Danforth 
v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. ___, ___, 128 S.Ct. 1029, 1046 (2008) (citing 
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. 397 
(1872); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1859)).  States are free to 
"impose higher standards on searches and seizures than required by 
 
18
the Federal Constitution," but this must be accomplished by state 
law.  Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. ___, ___, 128 S.Ct. 1598, 1604 
(2008) (quoting Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967)). 
IV. Conclusion 
 
For all the forgoing reasons, I believe the Court of Appeals 
was correct in affirming the trial court’s denial of Rudolph’s  
motion to suppress and in affirming his conviction.  Accordingly, I 
would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 
 
This order shall be published in the Virginia Reports and 
shall be certified to the Court of Appeals and the said circuit 
court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Copy, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Teste: 
 
 
 
 
 
Patricia L. Harrington, Clerk