Case Title: RONALD M NASTAL V HENDERSON & ASSOCIATES INVESTIGATIONS INC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 125069

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2005-01-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 
Chief Justice:  
Justices: 
Clifford W. Taylor  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Opinion 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JANUARY 25, 2005 
RONALD M. NASTAL AND 
IRENE NASTAL, HIS WIFE, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
v 
No. 125069 
HENDERSON & ASSOCIATES 
INVESTIGATIONS, INC., A MICHIGAN
CORPORATION, NATHANIAL STOVALL
AND ANDREW CONLEY, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH 
TAYLOR, C.J. 
In this case, where plaintiff Ronald M. Nastal1 alleges 
stalking by private investigators conducting surveillance, 
we 
granted 
leave 
to 
consider 
if, 
and 
when, 
such 
surveillance falls within the safe harbor in the stalking 
statute that exempts “conduct that serves a legitimate 
purpose.” MCL 750.411h(1)(c). The circuit court concluded 
1 Plaintiff Irene Nastal’s claim is for loss of 
consortium, which is derivative. 
Therefore, we refer to
Ronald Nastal as “plaintiff.” 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
that surveillance could serve a legitimate purpose but 
that, here, there was a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding whether the defendants’ surveillance continued to 
serve a legitimate purpose after it had been discovered. 
It thus determined that the viability of plaintiff’s 
stalking claim depended upon a factual determination by the 
jury. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s 
ruling on that issue.  2
 We conclude that surveillance by 
licensed private investigators that contributes to the goal 
of obtaining information, as permitted by the Private 
Detective License Act, MCL 338.822(b)(i)-(v), is conduct 
that serves a legitimate purpose. 
In the present case, 
plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material 
fact that the conduct here complained of ever ceased 
serving 
such 
purpose, 
notwithstanding 
the 
fact 
that 
plaintiff observed the investigators following him. 
We 
therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
remand this case to the circuit court for entry of summary 
disposition in defendants’ favor. 
I. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY BELOW 
Following a 1997 accident in which a tractor-trailer 
collided with plaintiff Ronald Nastal’s car, Nastal sued 
2 
Nastal v Henderson & Associates Investigations,
unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals,
decided October 30, 2003 (Docket No. 241200). 
2  
 
 
 
 
the 
tractor-trailer’s 
operator 
and 
owner, 
asserting 
negligence by the driver and seeking damages for a closed 
head injury. 
Defense of the action was undertaken by the 
owner’s insurance carrier, Citizens Insurance Company of 
America (Citizens). 
In the course of discovery, neuropsychological and 
neurosurgery 
evaluations 
were 
undertaken. 
The 
neuropsychological expert concluded that Nastal was not 
suffering any residual deficits as a result of a brain 
injury and that he instead possessed a personality disorder 
known as “somatoform pain disorder” that caused him to 
perceive symptoms as being worse than can be objectively 
determined. The neurosurgery evaluation, undertaken at the 
behest of Nastal’s employer, concluded that, although he 
had previously been diagnosed with a remote mild head 
injury, the injury had been totally resolved and Nastal was 
able to return to work. 
Moreover, the physician who 
conducted that evaluation opined that Nastal appeared to be 
suffering from depression and recommended a psychiatric 
examination. 
3  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
The action was referred to case evaluation pursuant to 
MCR 2.403,3 and the panel returned an award of $450,000 for 
plaintiff. 
Citizens rejected the award, deeming it 
excessive. Citizens also decided to again have plaintiff’s 
medical records reviewed, refer plaintiff to Dr. Leon Quinn 
for a psychiatric examination, and have an investigation 
and surveillance of Nastal performed to monitor his 
activities. 
On June 8, 1999, Citizens’ adjuster, Penny Judd, sent 
a fax to Henderson & Associates Investigations, Inc. 
(Henderson), 
a 
licensed 
private 
investigation 
firm, 
requesting a background check, activities check, and 
surveillance of plaintiff. 
The particulars of how the 
surveillance was to be conducted were left to Henderson. 
Conducting the first surveillance on Wednesday, June 
30, 1999, Andrew Conley, one of Henderson’s investigators, 
followed Nastal as he drove from his home. 
After 
surveilling him for forty-five minutes, Conley, because of 
the way Nastal began to drive, thought Nastal may have been 
attempting to determine if he was being followed by 
Conley’s vehicle. 
Following that, Nastal parked his car 
and entered a medical facility. 
Conley, unsure if Nastal 
3 Case evaluation was referred to as mediation at the 
time it was conducted in the action. MCR 2.403, 2000 Staff
Comment. 
4  
 
 
 
 
was aware of the surveillance, waited outside in his car in 
a parking lot across the street. When Nastal did come out, 
he came over to Conley’s car and asked Conley if he was 
following him. 
Conley denied that he was, and Nastal 
replied 
by 
shouting 
profanities 
at 
him. 
Shortly 
thereafter, evidently alerted by the personnel of the 
medical facility, the local police appeared and spoke to 
Conley and Nastal. 
Nastal, agitated and cursing, repeated 
his concerns that he was being followed and that Conley had 
untruthfully denied following him. The officer told Nastal 
to calm down and shortly thereafter Conley left to call his 
supervisor, 
Gregory 
Henderson. 
Gregory 
Henderson 
instructed Conley to terminate the surveillance for that 
day 
because, 
as 
both 
Gregory 
Henderson 
and 
Conley 
testified, when the subject of surveillance has discovered 
the surveillance, there is little purpose in continuing it 
at that time because the subject will not act unaffectedly 
or naturally. 
A week later, on July 6, 1999, Conley and another 
investigator, 
Nathaniel 
Stovall, 
followed 
Nastal 
in 
separate cars as he drove to a number of locations. 
After 
Nastal returned home later in the day, Conley and Stovall 
parked their cars in separate places near his house to 
observe his activities. 
Nastal apparently noticed Conley 
5  
 
 
and Stovall and called the police. 
Conley testified that 
he not only did not speak to the police officers that day, 
but also was unaware of their presence, and further had no 
indication that Nastal had called them or was aware of the 
reactivated surveillance. 
Stovall testified that he spoke 
to the police officers and was told, not that Nastal had 
called, but that someone in the neighborhood had called to 
report a suspicious vehicle. 
Stovall indicated that a 
police inquiry of this sort is a frequent occurrence when 
doing surveillance and, accordingly, it did not cause him 
to 
necessarily 
think 
that 
Nastal 
was 
aware 
of 
the 
surveillance. 
On July 7, 1999, Henderson informed Judd that their 
surveillance had revealed that Nastal had been active, and 
that Nastal had confronted Conley on the first day of 
surveillance. 
Although Judd was concerned that Nastal 
might alter his activities because he was aware of the 
surveillance, she authorized further surveillance. 
On July 8, 1999, an uneventful surveillance was 
conducted because plaintiff stayed at home all day. 
When 
informed of this, Judd stated that, because Nastal had 
confronted Conley at the beginning of the week and might 
suspect that he was being followed, surveillance should be 
discontinued for a few weeks. 
Gregory Henderson described 
6  
 
 
 
 
this period of nonsurveillance as a "cooling off" period, 
and indicated that it is usually employed by private 
investigators when they are concerned that the subject of 
their surveillance has detected their presence. 
Twenty-two days later, on July 31, 1999, Conley and 
Stovall, again in separate cars, followed Nastal to a mall. 
While so engaged, both Conley and Stovall indicated that 
Nastal got behind Conley’s car and appeared to be trying to 
write down Conley’s license plate number. Further, once in 
the parking lot of the mall, plaintiff also turned in tight 
circles and appeared to by trying to get behind Stovall’s 
car. 
Gregory Henderson, when made aware of this by a call 
from Conley, told both investigators to not terminate the 
surveillance because neither man could confirm that Nastal 
was actually aware that a surveillance was being conducted. 
Yet later, when Nastal began to attempt to evade Conley and 
Stovall, Henderson told Conley and Stovall to terminate the 
surveillance for that day because he believed it was no 
longer productive. 
Dr. Quinn’s report was received in Citizens’ mailroom 
on Friday, July 30, 1999, but read by Judd early the next 
week. 
In the report, Dr. Quinn concluded that Nastal was 
primarily suffering from a depressive disorder and that 
there were undoubtedly more factors than just the 1997 
7  
 
 
 
 
accident causing his depression. 
He further recommended 
that plaintiff be referred to a psychiatrist or mental 
health clinic for treatment and that any surveillance being 
conducted be discontinued. 
He later explained that the 
recommendation to discontinue surveillance was based on his 
concern that the continued surveillance could make Nastal 
angry. 
On August 4, 1999, Gregory Henderson called Judd and 
informed her that Nastal had again detected Conley and 
Stovall’s presence during the fourth surveillance on July 
31, 1999. 
Judd told Gregory Henderson to stop conducting 
surveillance on the basis of Quinn’s recommendation and her 
belief that the surveillance was not proving to be 
productive. 
Over a year later on September 19, 2000, plaintiff 
filed a civil action alleging, among others, a claim of 
civil stalking pursuant to MCL 600.2954 against Henderson, 
Conley, 
and 
Stovall. 
Defendants 
moved 
for 
summary 
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), arguing that 
surveillance serves a legitimate purpose pursuant to MCL 
750.411h(1)(c) and, thus, that one engaged in it cannot be 
guilty of stalking. 
They asserted that plaintiff’s 
stalking claim was barred because of immunity granted by 
law. 
They also asserted that Nastal had failed to state a 
8  
 
 
 
 
 
claim on which relief could be granted, MCR 2.116(C)(8), 
and that, in any event, even assuming surveillance could in 
some circumstances be transformed into stalking, Nastal had 
produced no genuine issue of material fact on that point, 
MCR 2.116(C)(10). 
In the alternative, defendants asserted 
that even if Nastal were emotionally distressed by the 
actions of defendants, which constitutes a requirement of 
the statute, MCL 750.411h(1)(c), the requirement that the 
actions also would have emotionally distressed a reasonable 
person could not be shown because no reasonable litigant 
could 
claim 
that 
pretrial 
discovery 
is 
emotionally 
distressing. 
The circuit court denied defendants’ motion on the 
basis of its determination that defendants’ surveillance 
initially served a legitimate purpose but that a genuine 
issue of material fact existed regarding whether the 
surveillance 
continued 
to 
serve 
that 
purpose 
after 
plaintiff discovered it. 
The court did not address 
defendants’ alternative argument. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court’s ruling on that issue, concluding that a genuine 
issue of material fact existed regarding the legitimacy of 
the surveillance after plaintiff confronted Conley during 
the first surveillance because, as the Court of Appeals 
9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
interpreted the record, it had been conceded by defendants 
that surveillance can serve no purpose after the subject 
discovers 
it. 
The 
panel 
also 
rejected 
defendants’ 
alternative argument on the basis that the issue whether a 
reasonable person would have suffered emotional distress as 
a result of defendants’ surveillance was a question for the 
trier of fact. 
We granted defendants leave to appeal. 
470 Mich 869 
(2004). 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
We review de novo the grant or denial of a motion for 
summary disposition. Kreiner v Fischer, 471 Mich 109, 129; 
683 NW2d 611 (2004). Questions of statutory interpretation 
are also reviewed de novo. Id. 
When interpreting statutes, our primary goal is to 
give effect to the intent of the Legislature. 
In re MCI 
Telecom Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). 
In doing so, our first step is to review the language of 
the statute itself. Id. The words used by the Legislature 
are given their common and ordinary meaning. 
Veenstra v 
Washtenaw Country Club, 466 Mich 155, 160; 645 NW2d 643 
(2002); 
MCL 
8.3a. 
If 
the 
statutory 
language 
is 
unambiguous, we must presume that the Legislature intended 
the meaning it clearly expressed and further construction 
10  
 
 
 
 
is neither required nor permitted. 
Sun Valley Foods Co v 
Ward, 460 Mich 230, 236; 596 NW2d 119 (1999). 
Defendants moved for summary disposition pursuant to 
MCR 2.116(C)(7), (8), and (10), but the circuit court 
relied on MCR 2.116(C)(10) in denying defendants’ motion. 
A 
motion 
under 
MCR 
2.116(C)(10) 
tests 
the 
factual 
sufficiency of the complaint. 
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 
109, 120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). 
The trial court must 
consider 
the 
affidavits, 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties, 
MCR 2.116(G)(5), in the light most favorable to the party 
opposing the motion. 
Maiden, supra at 120. 
Where the 
proffered evidence fails to establish a genuine issue 
regarding any material fact, the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law. 
MCR 2.116(C)(10), (G)(4). 
Quinto v Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358; 547 NW2d 314 
(1996). 
III. ANALYSIS 
In the early 1990s, the Legislature sought to address 
the inadequacy of existing criminal law, common-law causes 
of action, and court-ordered personal protection orders in 
protecting those who are maliciously followed, harassed, or 
intimidated by stalkers. 
Therefore, in 1992, it followed 
the lead of approximately two dozen other states that had 
11  
 
 
                                                 
 
enacted legislation specifically aimed at stalking and the 
special problems and circumstances surrounding it by 
criminalizing the offenses of stalking, MCL 750.411h, and 
aggravated stalking, MCL 750.411i. 
The Legislature also 
simultaneously amended the Revised Judicature Act to give a 
victim of stalking a civil action against the stalker, MCL 
600.2954, with the elements of civil stalking being the 
same as those in the criminal statutes, MCL 600.2954(1). 
Stalking is defined in MCL 750.411h(d), which states: 
“Stalking” means a willful course of conduct
involving repeated or continuing harassment of
another individual that would cause a reasonable 
person 
to 
feel 
terrorized, 
frightened,
intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested 
and that actually causes the victim to feel 
terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened,
harassed, or molested. 
Accordingly, 
under 
Michigan 
civil 
and 
criminal 
law, 
stalking constitutes a willful course of conduct whereby 
the victim of repeated or continuous harassment actually 
is, and a reasonable person would be, caused to feel 
terrorized, frightened, intimidated, threatened, harassed, 
or molested. 
In defining harassment, the Legislature stated: 
“Harassment” means conduct directed toward a 
victim that includes, but is not limited to,
repeated or continuing unconsented contact[4] that 
4 “Unconsented contact” is defined as: 
12  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
     
 
 
     
 
 
     
 
 
would cause a reasonable individual to suffer 
emotional distress and that actually causes the
victim to suffer emotional distress. Harassment 
does 
not 
include 
constitutionally 
protected
activity or conduct that serves a legitimate
purpose. [MCL 750.411h(1)(c).] 
Thus, there must be two or more acts5 of unconsented contact 
that actually cause emotional distress to the victim and 
[A]ny contact with another individual that
is 
initiated 
or 
continued 
without 
that 
individual's consent or in disregard of that 
individual's expressed desire that the contact be
avoided or discontinued. 
Unconsented contact 
includes, but is not limited to, any of the
following: 
(i) 
Following or appearing within the
sight of that individual. 
(ii) 
Approaching or confronting that 
individual in a public place or on private
property. 
(iii) 
Appearing at that individual's 
workplace or residence. 
(iv) 
Entering onto or remaining on
property owned, leased, or occupied by that 
individual. 
(v) 
Contacting that individual by
telephone. 
(vi) 
Sending 
mail 
or 
electronic 
communications to that individual. 
(vii) 
Placing 
an 
object 
on, 
or 
delivering an object to, property owned, leased,
or 
occupied 
by 
that 
individual. 
[MCL
750.411h(1)(e).] 
5 MCL 750.411h(1)(a). 
13  
 
 
 
would also cause a reasonable person such distress. In any 
event, however, conduct that is constitutionally protected 
or serves a legitimate purpose cannot constitute harassment 
or, derivatively, stalking. 
It is that safe harbor of “conduct that serves a 
legitimate purpose” that is the linchpin of this case. MCL 
750.411h does not itself define “conduct that serves a 
legitimate purpose.” 
Accordingly, because these are terms 
of common usage, we give them their plain and ordinary 
meaning by consulting dictionary definitions. 
Horace v 
City of Pontiac, 456 Mich 744, 755-756; 575 NW2d 762 
(1998). 
The Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2001) 
defines “serve” as “to answer the purpose,” “to be in the 
service of; work for,” “to answer the requirements of,” or 
“to 
contribute 
to; 
promote.” 
It 
further 
defines 
“legitimate,” in part, as “according to the law; lawful,” 
“in accordance with established rules, principles, or 
standards,” “in accordance with the laws or reasoning; 
valid,” “justified, genuine.” Id. 
Thus, given the plain 
and ordinary import of the terms used by the Legislature, 
we conclude that the phrase “conduct that serves a 
legitimate purpose” means conduct that contributes to a 
14  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
valid purpose that would otherwise be within the law 
irrespective of the criminal stalking statute. 
The defendants here, private investigators licensed 
pursuant to MCL 338.821 et seq., are authorized to 
“obtain[] 
information 
with 
reference 
to 
any 
of 
the 
following”: 
(i) 
Crimes or wrongs done or threatened
against the United States or a state or territory
of the United States. 
(ii) 
The 
identity, 
habits, 
conduct,
business, 
occupation, 
honesty, 
integrity,
credibility, 
trustworthiness, 
efficiency,
loyalty, 
activity, 
movement, 
whereabouts,
affiliations, associations, transactions, acts, 
reputation, or character of a person. 
(iii) 
The 
location, 
disposition, 
or 
recovery of lost or stolen property. 
(iv) The cause or responsibility for fires,
libels, losses, accidents, or damage or injury to
persons or property. 
(v) 
Securing evidence to be used before a
court, 
board, 
officer, 
or 
investigating
committee. [MCL 338.822(b).] 
Accordingly, surveillance,6 when it is conducted to obtain 
evidence concerning a party’s claim in a lawsuit, is valid 
6 See Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2001),
which defines “surveillance” as “a watch kept over someone
or something, esp. over a suspect, prisoner, etc.”, and
Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed), which defines it as 
“Oversight, 
superintendence, 
supervision. 
Police 
investigative technique involving visual or electronic 
observation or listening directed at a person or place
(e.g., stakeout, tailing of suspects, wiretapping). 
Its 
objective is to gather evidence of a crime or merely to
accumulate intelligence about suspected criminal activity.” 
15  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
and well within the law. 
Indeed, once involved in 
litigation, such as here, it is even more reasonable, in 
fact predictable, in a state such as Michigan that has a 
“strong historical commitment to a far-reaching, open and 
effective discovery practice,” Daniels v Allen Industries, 
Inc, 391 Mich 398, 403; 216 NW2d 762 (1974),7 that 
surveillance to secure or even lead to evidence is 
permitted “in order to narrow the range of disputed issues 
which might otherwise needlessly waste the parties’ and 
judicial resources.” Id. at 406, 412. 
It is only when the surveillance ceases to serve or 
contribute to the purpose of securing the information 
permitted by MCL 338.822(b) that conduct would be outside 
the statutory safe harbor of MCL 750.411h(1)(c) and a civil 
action for stalking could be maintained. 
Here, the circuit court and the Court of Appeals 
incorrectly concluded that there was a genuine issue of 
material fact concerning whether defendants’ surveillance 
ceased to serve a legitimate purpose once Nastal discovered 
it. There is no testimony to this effect. Rather, Conley, 
7 See also Dorris v Detroit Osteopathic Hosp, 460 Mich 
26, 36; 594 NW2d 455 (1999), and Domako v Rowe, 438 Mich 
347, 359; 475 NW2d 30 (1991). Discovery was liberalized in
the General Court Rules of 1963 and opened even more
expansively in the Michigan Court Rules of 1985. 
Domako, 
supra at 359. 
16  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
Stovall, and Gregory Henderson stated that once the subject 
of surveillance discovers that he is being observed, and 
the person performing the surveillance knows that the 
subject has detected his presence, any further surveillance 
of the subject at that particular time may serve no further 
purpose because the subject may modify his activities. 
Yet, as the testimony of both Gregory Henderson and Judd 
shows, they believed that further surveillance conducted at 
later times, especially after a cooling off period, could 
produce information useful to the case. Nastal produced no 
evidence to rebut this testimony as required by MCR 
2.116(G)(4) and, therefore, failed to satisfy his burden of 
establishing that a genuine issue of material fact existed 
regarding whether defendants’ surveillance continued to 
serve a legitimate purpose. In such circumstances, summary 
disposition in favor of the moving party is required. 
Maiden, supra at 120.8
 Accordingly, the trial court 
improperly 
denied 
defendants’ 
motion 
for 
summary 
disposition and the Court of Appeals improperly affirmed 
that denial. 
8 The dissent would reverse the burden of proof
requirement and call on the defendants to establish a
legitimate purpose rather than requiring the plaintiff to
create a genuine issue of material fact regarding the
elements of his cause of action. 
In so holding, it is
inconsistent with MCR 2.116(G)(4) and Maiden, supra. 
17  
 
 
 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION  
Surveillance by a licensed private investigator is 
conduct that serves a legitimate purpose as long as the 
surveillance serves or contributes to the purpose of 
obtaining information, as permitted by MCL 338.822(b). 
Thus, surveillance conducted for and contributing to such 
purposes is beyond the stalking statute. 
The conduct at 
issue in this case served a legitimate purpose even after 
plaintiff observed the private investigators following him. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
reversed and the case is remanded to the circuit court for 
the entry of summary disposition in defendants’ favor. 
Clifford W. Taylor
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman 
18  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
RONALD M. NASTAL and IRENE NASTAL, 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
No. 125069 
HENDERSON & ASSOCIATES 
INVESTIGATIONS, INC., NATHANIEL
STOVALL and ANDREW CONLEY, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
CAVANAGH, J. (dissenting). 
The majority’s analysis in this case is flawed for one 
basic reason—it simply misapplies the law to the facts. 
This misapplication results in the majority reaching a 
conclusion that is contrary to the words used by the 
Legislature in the stalking statute, MCL 750.411h(1)(c). 
The majority errs because it does not truly examine whether 
defendants’ conduct served a legitimate purpose. Because I 
believe that a genuine issue of material fact exists 
regarding whether the conduct at issue served a legitimate 
purpose, I respectfully dissent. 
The civil stalking statute, MCL 600.2954, creates a 
civil cause of action for victims of stalking as defined by 
the criminal stalking statute, MCL 750.411h. “Stalking” is 
 
 
 
 
 
 
defined as “a willful course of conduct involving repeated 
or continuing harassment of another individual that would 
cause a reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, 
intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested and that 
actually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, 
intimidated, threatened, harassed, or molested.” 
MCL 
750.411h(1)(d). 
“Harassment” is defined as “conduct 
directed toward a victim that includes, but is not limited 
to, repeated or continuing unconsented contact that would 
cause a reasonable individual to suffer emotional distress 
and that actually causes the victim to suffer emotional 
distress.” MCL 750.411h(1)(c). Notably, MCL 750.411h(1)(c) 
further 
states, 
“Harassment 
does 
not 
include 
constitutionally protected activity or conduct that serves 
a legitimate purpose.” (Emphasis added.) 
Because the statutory language at issue in this case 
is clear and unambiguous, we must enforce the statute as 
written and follow its plain meaning, giving effect to the 
words chosen by the Legislature. People v Barbee, 470 Mich 
283, 286; 681 NW2d 348 (2004). Thus, to give effect to the 
words of the stalking statute, once a legitimate purpose is 
established, the essential question must be how the 
defendant’s 
conduct 
at 
issue 
serves 
that 
legitimate 
purpose. 
In this case, the legitimate purpose was for 
2  
 
 
 
 
defendants to provide information that would assist the 
insurance company that hired them in defending against 
plaintiff’s claim. 
The examination, therefore, entails 
looking at how defendants’ conduct served that legitimate 
purpose. 
After plaintiff filed his underlying lawsuit, Citizens 
Insurance Company of America hired defendant Henderson & 
Associates Investigations, Inc. (Henderson), to conduct an 
“activities check” on plaintiff. 
The purpose of the 
activities 
check 
was 
to 
determine 
what 
plaintiff’s 
activities entailed. 
During one instance of surveillance, 
defendant Andrew Conley, a private investigator working for 
Henderson, 
followed 
plaintiff 
from 
his 
house 
to 
a 
restaurant and then to plaintiff’s appointment with his 
therapist. 
Plaintiff noticed that he was being followed, 
and 
he 
spoke 
to 
his 
therapist 
about 
the 
incident. 
Plaintiff and his therapist went outside where plaintiff 
asked Conley if he was following plaintiff. Conley said he 
was not. 
Plaintiff did not believe this and became upset; 
he also wrote down the license plate number of the car 
Conley was driving. Conley then drove off and parked about 
one hundred to three hundred yards away before ultimately 
terminating the surveillance. 
The critical question in 
this incident is how the private investigator’s actions 
3  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
served the legitimate purpose of gathering information 
about plaintiff to be used to defend against plaintiff’s 
lawsuit. 
For example, how does following plaintiff and 
then lying to plaintiff about being followed serve the 
legitimate purpose of gathering information? 
In some cases, following a person and lying about it 
to the person being followed may indeed be conduct that 
serves a legitimate purpose. For example, if an undercover 
police officer is conducting surveillance of a suspect and 
is then confronted by the suspect, the police officer may 
lie so that the undercover operation is not disclosed. 
However, in this case, defendants contend that plaintiff 
should not have been frightened by being followed because 
plaintiff was a party to a lawsuit. 
Defendants have 
repeatedly 
argued 
that 
“[a] 
reasonable 
person 
would 
understand that he’s going to be under surveillance if that 
person files a lawsuit.”1
 Therefore, I question what 
legitimate purpose was served by following plaintiff and 
then lying to plaintiff and telling him that he was not 
being followed. 
If plaintiff should already know that he 
may be followed because he is a party to a lawsuit, I fail 
1 Again, during oral argument, defendants argued “that
a reasonable person who would be a plaintiff in a personal
injury lawsuit, he or she has an opportunity to know in
fact that at some point during the litigation it may become
an issue where he or she is placed under surveillance.” 
4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
to see how admitting to plaintiff that he is being followed 
because 
of 
the 
pending 
lawsuit 
would 
hamper 
the 
investigation. 
I understand the importance of wanting to 
be as secretive as possible about the actual surveillance, 
but once plaintiff realized that someone was following him, 
I do not see how, in this case, the legitimate purpose was 
served by lying. 
Defendants cannot have it both ways. 
Defendants 
cannot argue that lying to plaintiff is critical in this 
case to keep the surveillance a secret so they can 
ascertain needed information. 
Defendants have already 
argued that plaintiff—by virtue of filing a lawsuit—should 
have known that he was likely to be followed and, 
therefore, should not have been afraid to see someone 
following him. 
Therefore, defendants must explain how, in 
this case, following plaintiff and then lying to him about 
it served a legitimate purpose. 
In another instance, plaintiff was aware of being 
followed, and he detailed defendants’ conduct in following 
him in and out of traffic. 
Another time, plaintiff 
realized he was being followed when he came out of his 
doctor’s office. 
He telephoned his wife and she did not 
believe him when he told her, “half crying,” that he was 
being 
followed. 
Because 
plaintiff 
was 
so 
afraid, 
5  
 
 
 
 
 
plaintiff’s wife was forced to come home. 
When she 
arrived, there were two cars parked near their home. After 
dressing 
like 
the 
plaintiff 
and 
leaving 
her 
home, 
plaintiff’s wife realized that the two cars were following 
her, apparently because the drivers thought they were 
following her husband. 
During the final incident of surveillance, private 
investigators followed plaintiff as he drove around in 
circles in a parking lot attempting to write down the 
license plate numbers of the cars the investigators were 
driving. 
They continued to follow plaintiff as he drove 
through traffic trying to “lose” the men who were following 
him. 
They drove through yellow lights and made an illegal 
right turn to follow plaintiff. 
One of the private 
investigators stated that it was clear plaintiff was trying 
to get away from them, but they continued to follow him 
anyway. 
It is important to note that at no time did 
defendants ever admit to plaintiff that they were indeed 
following him or tell him why he was being followed. 
As stated, the issue is whether the conduct engaged in 
by defendants served a legitimate purpose. It is important 
to not merely examine the conduct at issue in a vacuum. 
Therefore, 
it 
is 
not 
enough 
to 
merely 
argue 
that 
defendants’ conduct was appropriate because they had a 
6  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
legitimate purpose to provide information related to 
plaintiff’s underlying lawsuit. 
Applying the statute in 
this manner disregards the words chosen by the Legislature 
and results in the majority essentially providing a 
generalized exemption for private investigators. 
The 
appropriate 
analysis 
requires 
more 
than 
the 
oversimplification adopted by the majority. 
In following, 
“tailing,” sleuthing, or surveilling, is there no limit on 
an investigator’s tactics? 
I think not. 
A private 
investigator’s conduct—no matter how outrageous—is not 
excused merely because he is gathering information for a 
client. There must be some professional standards that, 
when violated, remove the investigator from the “legitimate 
purpose” shield. 
A proper application of the law indicates that whether 
defendants’ conduct served a legitimate purpose presents a 
genuine issue of material fact. 
Accordingly, because a 
reasonable juror could find that the conduct did not serve 
a legitimate purpose, I must respectfully dissent. 
Michael F. Cavanagh
Marilyn Kelly 
7