Case Title: David White Crane Serv. v. Howell

Citation: 

Docket Number: 100981

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2011-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT: Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims, JJ., 
and Russell and Koontz, S.JJ. 
 
DAVID WHITE CRANE SERVICE, ET AL. 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 100981        SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL 
 
 
 
September 16, 2011 
DAVID L. HOWELL 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SOUTHAMPTON COUNTY 
Rodham T. Delk, Jr., Judge 
 
 
This appeal involves the exclusivity provisions of the 
Virginia Workers' Compensation Act (the Act), Code § 65.2-100 et 
seq.  An employee of the general contractor on a construction 
site was allegedly injured by the negligent act of the employee 
of a subcontractor who carried no workers' compensation 
insurance.  The injured party brought a common-law action 
against the uninsured subcontractor and its employee, the 
alleged tortfeasor.  This appeal presents the question whether 
the circuit court correctly ruled that the common-law action 
could proceed, denying the subcontractor’s plea in bar based on 
the exclusivity provisions of the Act. 
Facts and Proceedings 
 
On May 7, 2007, James S. Green Contractor, Inc. (Green) was 
the general contractor engaged in the construction of an 
industrial facility known as the “Peanut Patch” in Southampton 
County.  Green contracted with David White Crane Service, a 
partnership consisting of David W. White, Sr. and David W. 
White, Jr. (collectively, White Crane) to hoist structural steel 
beams into position at the construction site, a part of Green's 
trade, business or occupation. 
 
On the date in question, David L. Howell (the plaintiff), 
an employee of Green, acting within the scope of his employment, 
was engaged in the placement of the steel beams as they were 
lifted into place by White Crane.  White Crane employed Kenneth 
Burgess (Burgess) as a crane operator to lift the beams.  The 
plaintiff alleges that Burgess negligently operated the crane 
while hoisting a beam, causing the crane to tip over, losing 
control of the beam and allowing it to swing into a man-lift 
upon which the plaintiff was standing, striking and injuring the 
plaintiff. 
 
The plaintiff brought this action in the circuit court 
against White Crane and Burgess (the defendants).  Green is not 
a party.  The defendants filed a plea in bar, asserting that the 
Act provided the plaintiff’s sole remedy.  For the purpose of 
the plea in bar, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts 
relevant to the plea as well as certain conclusions of law to 
which they agreed.  The stipulation stated that the defendants 
were uninsured for workers' compensation liability as required 
by the Act;* the plaintiff had claimed and received workers' 
compensation benefits from his employer, Green; the defendants 
                     
 
* The defendant Burgess, as an employee of White Crane, was 
not, of course, required by the Act to carry such insurance. 
would ordinarily have been deemed to be the plaintiff’s 
statutory co-employees; and, if the defendants had carried 
workers' compensation insurance, this action would have been 
barred by the Act.  The parties agreed in their stipulation that 
the dispositive question on the plea in bar was whether the 
defendants’ lack of workers' compensation insurance deprived 
them of the protection of the exclusivity provisions of the Act. 
 
The court considered the briefs of counsel, the pleadings 
and the stipulations of the parties.  In a letter opinion, the 
court held that the defendants' failure to carry workers' 
compensation insurance deprived them of the protections afforded 
by the Act because they were not participants in the statutory 
workers' compensation system.  The court denied the plea in bar, 
permitting this action to go forward but, with the agreement of 
the parties, certified this case for an interlocutory appeal 
pursuant to Code § 8.01-670.1.  We awarded the defendants an 
interlocutory appeal. 
Analysis 
 
Because no evidence was taken on the plea in bar, we will 
review the circuit court's ruling upon the pleadings, 
supplemented by the facts as stipulated by the parties.  Gray v. 
Virginia Sec'y of Transp., 276 Va. 93, 97, 662 S.E.2d 66, 68 
(2008); Ola v. YMCA of S. Hampton Roads, Inc., 270 Va. 550, 555, 
557-59, 621 S.E.2d 70, 72-74 (2005).  There are no disputed 
facts relevant to the plea in bar and it presents a pure 
question of law, to which we apply a de novo standard of review.  
Hilton v. Martin, 275 Va. 176, 179-80, 654 S.E.2d 572, 574 
(2008).  We are, therefore, not bound by or limited to the 
conclusions of law to which the parties agreed in the circuit 
court. 
 
Code § 65.2-307 provides that the rights and remedies 
granted by the Act to an employee, when he and his employer have 
accepted its provisions, shall exclude all other rights and 
remedies the employee may have on account of injury or death by 
accident.  The injured employee may have a common-law action 
against a third-party tortfeasor for accidental injuries 
sustained while working for his employer, but only if the third-
party tortfeasor is a "stranger to the work."  Whalen v. Dean 
Steel Erection Constr. Co., 229 Va. 164, 167-68, 327 S.E.2d 102, 
104-05 (1985); Slusher v. Paramount Warrior, Inc., 336 F.Supp. 
1381, 1383 (W.D. Va. 1971). 
 
The defendants were not "strangers to the work."  Both the 
plaintiff and the defendants were engaged in the same 
construction project at the time of the accident and both were 
engaged in the trade, business and occupation of Green, the 
general contractor.  The defendants were subcontractors under 
Green and the plaintiff was Green's direct employee.  The 
parties to this action were therefore statutory co-employees.  
Pfeifer v. Krauss Constr. Co. of Va., Inc., 262 Va. 262, 266-67, 
546 S.E.2d 717, 718-19 (2001).  Because the purpose of the Act 
is to bring within its operation all persons who are engaged in 
the trade, business or occupation of the contractor who engages 
to perform the work, all such persons are entitled to the 
protection afforded by Code § 65.2-307.  Id. at 266, 546 S.E.2d 
at 719.  Thus, the parties' agreement, in their stipulation, 
that the plaintiff and the defendants would "ordinarily" be 
deemed statutory co-employees and that the defendants would 
therefore have been entitled to immunity from a common-law 
action in tort if they had carried workers' compensation 
insurance, is based upon correct principles of law. 
 
The dispositive question remains:  Did the defendants 
forfeit that protection by failing to carry insurance as 
required by the Act?  That is a question of first impression, 
but our prior decisions are instructive. 
 
In Virginia Used Auto Parts, Inc. v. Robertson, 212 Va. 
100, 103, 181 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1971), we held that "the 
overriding legislative intent [expressed by the Act is] that an 
uninsured employer shall be liable to his employee injured in an 
accident arising out of and during the course of his 
employment."  In that case, the employee was unsuccessful in a 
common-law action against the employer and thereafter sought an 
award from the Industrial Commission.  We held that the employee 
was not required to make an election of remedies, but could 
proceed under the Act.  In Delp v. Berry, 213 Va. 786, 195 
S.E.2d 877 (1973), we considered a variation on that theme.  
There, an employee received from the Industrial Commission an 
award of benefits under the Act but found it to be uncollectable 
because his employer lacked insurance.  The employee then filed 
a common-law action against the employer, but the circuit court 
sustained the employer's plea of res judicata and held that the 
Industrial Commission had exclusive jurisdiction.  Id. at 786-
87, 195 S.E.2d at 878.  We reversed, holding that the employer's 
failure to carry workers' compensation insurance, as required by 
the Act, forfeited the protection from a common-law action that 
he would otherwise have had under the exclusivity provisions of 
the Act.  Id. at 789, 195 S.E.2d at 879. 
 
Virginia Used Auto Parts and Delp are both cases in which 
an employee asserted a claim against an employer.  The present 
case, like Pfeifer, is one in which an employee asserts a 
common-law action against statutory co-employees. 
 
An independent contractor and his employees, if engaged in 
the same project in which the injured worker is employed and not 
"strangers to the work," are deemed the injured worker's 
statutory co-employees even though he is employed by another 
contractor on the same project.  Although the statutory co-
employees are not the injured worker's statutory employers, and 
are therefore not liable for the payment of workers' 
compensation benefits to him, they come within the canopy of the 
Act.  Because the legislative purpose is to bring within the Act 
all those who are engaged in the work that is a part of the 
owner's or general contractor's trade, business or occupation, 
such statutory co-employees are entitled to the exclusivity 
protections of the Act.  The injured worker's sole remedy for 
job-related injuries caused by statutory co-employees is a claim 
against his own statutory employer for an award of workers' 
compensation benefits.  Evans v. Hook, 239 Va. 127, 130-31, 387 
S.E.2d 777, 778-79 (1990).  He may not bring a common-law action 
against his statutory co-employees.  The statutory co-employees' 
lack of workers' compensation insurance is, in these 
circumstances, immaterial because they would in no event be 
liable to the injured worker for benefits under the Act. 
 
There is a significant difference between the facts in Delp 
and those in the present case.  Delp, having found his award of 
benefits from the Industrial Commission to be uncollectable, 
would not be doubly compensated by pursuing a common-law action 
against his employer.  Addressing that factor in Delp, we said:  
"Appellees argue that Delp is entitled to only one full recovery 
and with this we agree.  He can collect only one time.  The 
problem here is that Delp has effected no recovery."  213 Va. at 
789, 195 S.E.2d at 879.  In the present case, by contrast, the 
plaintiff has made a full recovery of workers' compensation 
benefits under the Act.  Permitting him to proceed in a common-
law tort action against co-employees not only contravenes the 
exclusivity provisions of the Act but also would, if successful, 
result in a double recovery for a single injury. 
Conclusion 
 
For the reasons stated, the defendants were entitled to the 
exclusivity protection provided by the Act notwithstanding their 
lack of workers' compensation insurance, and the circuit court 
erred in denying the defendants' plea in bar.  Accordingly, we 
will reverse the judgment appealed from and enter final judgment 
here, dismissing the case. 
Reversed and final judgment.