Case Title: Toledo Bar Assn. v. Rust

Citation: 2010-Ohio-170

Docket Number: 20091171

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-01-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Toledo Bar Assn. v. Rust, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-170.] 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-170 
TOLEDO BAR ASSOCIATION v. RUST. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Toledo Bar Assn. v. Rust, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-170.] 
Attorneys — Misconduct — Complaint dismissed when respondent had arguably 
viable legal support for his actions. 
(No. 2009-1171 ⎯ Submitted September 29, 2009 ⎯ Decided January 28, 2010.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 08-026. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, John G. Rust of Toledo, Ohio, Attorney Registration 
No. 0000098, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1948.  The Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommends that we suspend 
respondent’s license to practice for six months, but stay the suspension on 
conditions, including a two-year monitored probation.  The recommendation is 
based on findings that respondent agreed to file a wrongful-death action at the 
behest of the decedent’s heir, but then brought the suit on behalf of the 
administrator of the decedent’s estate, the proper party-plaintiff, without obtaining 
the administrator’s authority for the suit. 
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{¶ 2} The board found a single violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.16(a)(1), 
which requires a lawyer to decline or terminate representation if “the 
representation will result in the violation of the Ohio Rules of Professional 
Conduct or other law.”  Respondent objects to this finding, citing precedent that 
he insists allows a beneficiary to file a wrongful-death claim in the name of 
administrator when the administrator has refused to pursue the action.  Without 
deciding the viability of his legal strategy, we find that respondent initiated the 
wrongful-death action in good faith and that he had an arguable basis in law and 
fact that was not frivolous for filing the claim.  Because lawyers may permissibly 
advance such claims in attempting to extend, modify, or reverse existing law, we 
hold that respondent committed no ethical impropriety and dismiss the complaint 
against him. 
{¶ 3} Relator, Toledo Bar Association, charged respondent in a single 
count with multiple violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, including 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.16(a)(1).  A panel of three board members heard the case, found 
the Prof.Cond.R. 1.16(a)(1) violation, and recommended both the dismissal of all 
other charges and a one-year suspension of respondent’s license, with the 
suspension stayed on conditions of (1) participation in the Ohio Lawyers 
Assistance Program (“OLAP”), (2) completion of a two-year probation, and (3) 
no further misconduct.  The board adopted the panel’s finding of misconduct, but 
recommended a six-month suspension, stayed on the listed conditions. 
Alleged Misconduct 
Facts 
{¶ 4} In early 2007, Duane Tillimon1 consulted respondent about 
bringing a wrongful-death action to recover for his mother’s death on January 20, 
                                                 
1.  {¶ a} Later that year, the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas declared Tillimon a vexatious 
litigator.  Under R.C. 2323.52(A)(3), a “vexatious litigator” means: 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
2005.  Tillimon, the sole beneficiary of his mother’s estate, suspected that her 
former guardian and the nursing home where she died contributed to the cause of 
her death. 
{¶ 5} Tillimon had already filed one wrongful-death complaint against 
the guardian and the nursing home while being represented by another lawyer.  
The previous lawyer filed the complaint in mid-January 2006, naming the 
administrator initially appointed to oversee the decedent’s estate as plaintiff.  
Later, when that administrator was replaced by a successor due to a conflict, the 
complaint was amended to name the successor administrator as the plaintiff.  But 
then the guardian’s counsel discovered that the successor administrator had not 
authorized the filing of the wrongful-death suit.  The guardian’s counsel obtained 
an affidavit from the administrator disavowing the wrongful-death claim and 
moved to dismiss, asserting that Tillimon had no authority to sue.  Tillimon’s 
previous lawyer responded in April 2006 by voluntarily dismissing the complaint 
without prejudice, thereby allowing the action to be refiled later. 
{¶ 6} When Tillimon retained respondent, the statute of limitations on 
the wrongful-death action was within a week or ten days of expiring.  Respondent 
concluded from the administrator’s affidavit that the administrator had not and 
would not authorize the pursuit of a wrongful-death claim against the former 
guardian and nursing home.  Respondent nevertheless refiled the case in late 
March 2007 in the Lucas County Common Pleas Court.  To do so, he used a 
slightly modified version of the complaint that Tillimon’s former counsel had 
filed, still naming the successor administrator as plaintiff. 
                                                                                                                                     
      {¶ b} “[A]ny person who has habitually, persistently, and without reasonable grounds engaged 
in vexatious conduct in a civil action or actions, whether in the court of claims or in a court of 
appeals, court of common pleas, municipal court, or county court, whether the person or another 
person instituted the civil action or actions, and whether the vexatious conduct was against the 
same party or against different parties in the civil action or actions.”   
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{¶ 7} The guardian, who had refused service of the complaint, monitored 
the proceedings from the common pleas court’s online docket.  In early April 
2007, the guardian’s counsel obtained a second affidavit from the estate’s 
administrator indicating that the administrator had not authorized a wrongful-
death action on behalf of the estate.  At the same time, the administrator wrote to 
respondent and demanded that the suit be dismissed. 
{¶ 8} Respondent responded by asking the common pleas court to 
substitute Tillimon as plaintiff in the case, which the court did.  In his motion, 
respondent alleged that the decedent’s guardian had wrongfully failed to authorize 
surgery for the decedent; that respondent’s client, the decedent’s sole heir, wanted 
to pursue a wrongful-death action against the guardian and others; and that the 
administrator of the decedent’s estate had indicated that he was not interested in 
pursuing the action.  Respondent obtained an affidavit from a physician who had 
treated the decedent that supported respondent’s theory as to her death. 
{¶ 9} The guardian then moved for reconsideration of the substitution 
order.  Respondent, in turn, asked for a stay of the common pleas court 
proceedings to obtain an order from the probate court substituting his client as 
administrator of the estate.  In July 2007, the common pleas court vacated its 
substitution order and reinstated the estate administrator as plaintiff, holding that 
the probate court had exclusive jurisdiction to replace an estate fiduciary. 
{¶ 10} The guardian next filed a memorandum opposing the motion to 
stay and moved for dismissal, arguing again that respondent lacked authority to 
sue.  The court denied the stay.  That August, respondent filed a notice, advising 
the court: 
{¶ 11} “SON AND SOLE HEIR DUANE J. TILLMON, BY HIS 
COUNSEL, ADVISING COURT OF OUR ‘FOLLOWUP’ TO MOVE 
PROBATE COURT TO ACT ON MR. TILLMON’S MOTION FOR 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
APPOINTMENT 
AS 
EXECUTOR 
OR 
SPECIAL 
ADMINISTRATOR, 
PROMPTLY.” 
{¶ 12} The common pleas court dismissed the wrongful-death action 
several days later without addressing the notice. 
Analysis 
{¶ 13} The board found respondent in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 
1.16(a)(1) because he filed a wrongful-death action that named as plaintiff the 
administrator of the decedent’s estate, even though respondent knew that the 
administrator did not want to pursue the action.  In objecting to the board’s 
finding, respondent claims that he had to file the action as he did because (1) his 
client, the decedent’s only heir, wanted to file the action, but the administrator, 
the proper party-plaintiff, opposed the action, and (2) the statute of limitations 
was about to expire.  Respondent insists that his filing on behalf of the estate 
administrator was permissible under Douglas v. Daniel Bros. Coal Co. (1939), 
135 Ohio St. 641, 15 O.O. 12, 22 N.E. 195, Burwell v. Maynard (1970), 21 Ohio 
St.2d 108, 50 O.O.2d 268, 255 N.E.2d 628, and R.C. 2113.18.  Because this 
precedent and its progeny at least arguably permitted respondent to file the action 
to avoid the statute of limitations for wrongful-death actions and to then obtain his 
client’s appointment under the statute as the administrator of his mother’s estate, 
we sustain the objection and find no misconduct. 
{¶ 14} R.C. 2113.18 authorizes a probate court to remove the 
administrator of decedent’s estate under circumstances that respondent claims are 
present here⎯when the administrator refuses to bring a wrongful-death action 
and a prima-facie case for wrongful-death exists.  That statute provides: 
{¶ 15} “(B) The probate court may remove any executor or administrator 
upon motion of the surviving spouse, children, or other next of kin of the 
deceased person whose estate is administered by the executor or administrator if 
both of the following apply: 
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{¶ 16} “(1) The executor or administrator refuses to bring an action for 
wrongful death in the name of the deceased person; 
{¶ 17} “(2) The court determines that a prima-facie case for a wrongful 
death action can be made from the information available to the executor or 
administrator.” 
{¶ 18} In authorizing wrongful-death actions, R.C. 2125.02(A)(1) 
provides that in general: 
{¶ 19} “[A] civil action for wrongful death shall be brought in the name of 
the personal representative of the decedent for the exclusive benefit of the 
surviving spouse, the children, and the parents of the decedent, all of whom are 
rebuttably presumed to have suffered damages by reason of the wrongful death, 
and for the exclusive benefit of the other next of kin of the decedent.”  (Emphasis 
added.) 
{¶ 20} Respondent’s defense implicates whether this statute (1) allows 
only the personal representative of the estate to file the wrongful-death action or 
(2) allows, as an initial matter, a beneficiary or other party in interest to initiate 
the proceeding in the name of the personal representative.  Over the years, courts 
have often followed the latter interpretation and acknowledged that it is not 
necessarily fatal to the wrongful-death claim for a party other than the fiduciary 
appointed by the probate court to file the action.  Respondent relies on two of 
these cases⎯Douglas v. Daniel Bros. Coal Co. (1939), 135 Ohio St. 641, 15 O.O. 
12, 22 N.E. 195, and Burwell v. Maynard (1970), 21 Ohio St.2d 108, 50 O.O.2d 
268, 255 N.E.2d 628⎯both of which offer the same explanation: 
{¶ 21} “The requirement of the wrongful death statute that the prosecution 
of the action be in the name of the personal representative is no part of the cause 
of action itself, but relates merely to the right of action or remedy.  That 
requirement was obviously intended for the benefit and protection of the 
surviving spouse, children and next of kin of a decedent, the real parties in 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
interest. The personal representative is only a nominal party.  Wolf, Adm'r, v. Lake 
Erie & W. Ry. Co., 55 Ohio St. 517, 45 N.E. 708, 36 L.R.A. 812.  Nor does the 
statute require that the personal representative shall bring the action (Wolf, 
Adm’r., v. Lake Erie & W. Ry. Co., supra), but merely provides that the action, if 
brought, shall be brought in the name of the personal representative.  The only 
concern defendants have is that the action be brought in the name of the party 
authorized so that they may not again be haled [sic] into court to answer for the 
same wrong.”  Burwell at 110, 50 O.O.2d 268, 255 N.E.2d 628, quoting Douglas 
at 647, 15 O.O. 12, 22 N.E. 195. 
{¶ 22} Douglas is most specifically on point.  In that case, a widow 
instituted an action alleging her husband’s wrongful death.  Douglas, 135 Ohio St. 
at 641, 15 O.O. 12, 22 N.E. 195.  Though the widow had not been appointed 
administrator, she filed the action as the decedent’s personal representative under 
the mistaken impression that she had been appointed.  Id. at 645.  Thus, like 
respondent, the widow filed the case without the authority of a validly appointed 
personal representative.  She discovered her error after expiration of the 
applicable statute-of-limitations period and amended her petition to show her later 
appointment as administrator.  Id.  Allowing the amendment to relate back and 
preserve the claim, the court held: 
{¶ 23} “Where a widow institutes an action, as administratrix, for 
damages for the wrongful death of her husband, under the mistaken belief that she 
had been duly appointed and had qualified as such, thereafter discovers her error 
and amends her petition so as to show that she was appointed administratrix after 
the expiration of the statute of limitation applicable to such action, the amended 
petition will relate back to the date of the filing of the petition, and the action will 
be deemed commenced within the time limited by statute.”  Id. at paragraph one 
of the syllabus. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 24} Respondent argues that this authority allowed him to bring a 
wrongful-death action by filing a complaint naming the administrator as plaintiff.  
In fact, he took this precedent so literally that he represented himself to be the 
plaintiff’s lawyer on the pleading.  The board found respondent’s argument 
“certainly worthy of consideration” but nevertheless found that the filing of a 
wrongful-death action required approval of the administrator or executor of the 
decedent’s estate. 
{¶ 25} Precedent following Douglas and Burwell, however, suggests 
otherwise.  In Kyes v. Pennsylvania RR. Co. (1952), 158 Ohio St. 362, 363, 49 
O.O. 239, 109 N.E.2d 503, for example, a trial court permitted the substitution of 
the administrator, who lived in Pennsylvania, as the named plaintiff after the 
ancillary administrator failed to qualify, even though the two-year statute of 
limitations for a wrongful-death suit had passed.  Finding no error in the trial 
court’s refusal to dismiss the case as time-barred, this court quoted the first 
syllabus paragraph in Douglas and then noted: 
{¶ 26} “In the opinions in the Wolf and Douglas cases, supra, it is 
observed that under the provisions of the statute it is not even necessary that the 
representative bring the action.  The requirement is merely that the action be 
brought in his name.”  (Emphasis sic.)  Kyes, 158 Ohio St.2d at 365, 49 O.O. 239, 
109 N.E.2d 503. 
{¶ 27} More recently, the rule was discussed in In re Estate of Ross 
(1989), 65 Ohio App.3d 395, 400, 583 N.E.2d 1379:  
{¶ 28} “R.C. 2125.02(A) provides that a wrongful death action ‘shall’ be 
brought in the name of the deceased's personal representative.  This and similar 
language has been interpreted to mean that only the personal representative has 
the legal capacity to sue under this statutory cause of action.  Moss v. Hirzel 
Canning Co. (1955), 100 Ohio App. 509, 60 O.O. 397, 137 N.E.2d 440.  If the 
action is brought by the beneficiaries, it must be dismissed or the correct party 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
substituted. Sabol v. Pekoc (1947), 148 Ohio St. 545, 36 O.O. 182, 76 N.E.2d 84.  
Usually, the personal representative is the executor or administrator of the estate. 
{¶ 29} “Yet it is equally settled that the representative is a nominal party, 
unless he is also a beneficiary, and that the beneficiaries are the real parties in 
interest.  Kyes v. Pennsylvania Rd. Co. (1952), 158 Ohio St. 362, 49 O.O. 239, 
109 N.E.2d 503; Burwell v. Maynard (1970), 21 Ohio St.2d 108, 50 O.O.2d 268, 
255 N.E.2d 628. Thus, it has been stated that the statute is satisfied if the action is 
merely brought in the representative's name, Kyes, supra, and that the name 
requirement was designed to avoid multiple actions for the same wrong.  Burwell, 
supra.” 
{¶ 30} This court again considered who may file a wrongful-death action 
under R.C. Chapter 2125 in Ramsey v. Neiman (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 508, 634 
N.E.2d 211.  There, a decedent’s father, who had not been appointed 
administrator, executor, or other fiduciary of his daughter’s estate, argued that he 
qualified as the decedent’s personal representative and had authority to sue for his 
daughter’s wrongful death.  Id. at 511.  We first observed that R.C. 2125.02(A)(1) 
has “remained virtually unchanged since the date the statute was originally 
enacted in 1851” and that it was modeled after Lord Campbell’s Act, passed by 
Parliament in 1846.  Id. at 509-510.  In creating a cause of action for wrongful 
death, Lord Campbell’s Act authorized executors and administrators to bring the 
new action, providing: 
{¶ 31} “ ‘And be it enacted, That every such Action shall be for the 
Benefit of the Wife, Husband, Parent, and Child of the Person whose Death shall 
have been so caused, and shall be brought by and in the Name of the Executor or 
Administrator of the Person deceased * * *.’  (Emphasis added.) 9 & 10 Vict. Ch. 
93, 86 Eng. Stat. at Large 531 * * * ” Ramsey, 69 Ohio St.3d at 510, 634 N.E.2d 
211, quoting 86 Eng.Stat. at Large 531. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 32} Ramsey thus held that the reference in R.C. 2125.02(A)(1) to a 
“personal representative” required “an executor or administrator, i.e., an 
individual appointed by a court, to bring the cause of action.”  Id. at 510.  This 
conclusion is consistent with the language in Lord Campbell’s Act requiring that 
the wrongful-death action be brought by and in the name of the executor or 
administrator.  But according to the concurring opinion, joined by three other 
justices, the lead opinion incorrectly construed the statute to “mandate[] that the 
personal representative be appointed before he or she can enter the courthouse to 
file a wrongful death complaint.”  Id. at 513. As the opinion points out, this 
requirement is not specified anywhere in the statute: 
{¶ 33} “The language in R.C. 2125.02(A)(2) and 2125.02(C) indicates 
that the personal representative must be court-appointed after the complaint has 
been filed, but before any judgment is entered or any settlement is reached. 
{¶ 34} “Summary judgment would provide the appropriate mechanism to 
screen out those plaintiffs who have not received court appointment after filing 
their complaints.  In the present case, the plaintiff was not appointed as the 
decedents' personal representative after he filed his complaint.”  Id. at 514. 
(Pfeifer, J., concurring). 
{¶ 35} The Ramsey court distinguished Douglas and Kyes on the bases 
that the father in Ramsey had not been appointed administrator and the record did 
not show “any attempt on his part to become appointed.”  69 Ohio St.3d at 513, 
634 N.E.2d 211.  But here, respondent pursued the wrongful-death claim in the 
name of the proper party.  The common pleas court initially granted respondent’s 
motion to substitute his client for the administrator.  And when the common pleas 
court reconsidered its authority to remove a probate-court-appointed fiduciary as 
the named party and reinstated the administrator as the plaintiff, respondent gave 
notice that he intended to petition the probate court to have his client appointed as 
January Term, 2010 
11 
 
a special administrator.2  He did request that his client be named a special 
administrator, but the probate court denied the request, and as of the panel 
hearing, that decision was on appeal. 
{¶ 36} At least one court has even advocated filing a wrongful-death 
action in the name of the personal representative under the circumstances facing 
respondent and his client.  In Gottke v. Diebold, Inc. (August 9, 1990), Licking 
App. CA-3484, 1990 WL 120801, *1, a daughter filed suit against two 
defendants, alleging the wrongful death of her mother and that she was the 
personal representative of her mother’s estate.  As in respondent’s case, the 
probate-court-appointed executor opposed the claim.  Id.  The court concluded: 
{¶ 37} “[A]n action for wrongful death must be brought in the name of the 
personal representative of the decedent; Civ.R. 17 [precluding dismissal of actions 
not filed in the name of the real party in interest without allowing reasonable time 
after objection to permit for ratification by or joinder or substitution of the real 
party] may not be used to, in effect, extend the applicable statute of limitations; 
and the doctrine of relation back does not apply where the plaintiff misrepresents 
his/her capacity, and fails to procure appointment within the time prescribed by 
the appropriate statute of limitations, or file ‘in the name of’ the personal 
representative.”  (Emphasis added.)  Id. at *3. 
{¶ 38} The court of appeals in Gottke affirmed the dismissal of the 
daughter’s action as to both defendants because she filed the complaint in her own 
name and not in the name of the personal representative.  Citing to the Kyes, 
Wolfe and Douglas decisions, the court faulted the daughter for not taking the 
very action that respondent took to preserve his client’s claim: 
                                                 
2.  The guardian’s attorney testified that even if respondent’s client had been appointed special 
administrator, he still would not have had the authority to prosecute the wrongful-death action.  
This witness admitted, however, that if the probate court had substituted the client as the “regular” 
administrator, and the common pleas court had not dismissed the action, the appointment would 
have related back to and saved the complaint.   
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 39} “Appellee correctly argues that rather than mislead the defendants 
and the court [the daughter] could have brought the action in the name of the 
actual fiduciary. That would have accomplished the statutory intent of focusing 
the response of the court and the adverse parties upon the probated estate. 
{¶ 40} “Under the provisions of the statute it is not even necessary that the 
representative bring the action. The requirement is merely that the action be 
brought in his name.”  Id. at *4. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 41} In his zeal to file a complaint “in the name” of this decedent’s 
personal representative, respondent did initially represent himself to be the 
plaintiff-administrator’s lawyer on the pleading.  This discrepancy, however, is 
not the focus of either relator’s complaint or the board’s report.  Moreover, little 
harm came of his mistake, inasmuch as the client notified the decedent’s guardian 
the day after the suit was filed that he had retained respondent, and respondent 
properly identified himself as his client’s lawyer in later filings. 
{¶ 42} In any event, we need not decide here whether respondent 
correctly interpreted precedent.  As stated in Prof.Cond.R. 3.1, lawyers are 
permitted to advance claims and defenses for which “there is a basis in law and 
fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an 
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.”  And under DR 7-102(A)(2), 
the predecessor to Prof.Cond.R. 3.1, a lawyer could not “[k]nowingly advance a 
claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law”; however, “the lawyer 
could “advance such claim or defense if it can be supported by good faith 
argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” 
{¶ 43} The comment to Prof.Cond.R. 3.1 embellishes these standards: 
{¶ 44} “[1] The advocate has a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest 
benefit of the client’s cause, but also a duty not to abuse legal procedure.  The 
law, both procedural and substantive, establishes the limits within which an 
January Term, 2010 
13 
 
advocate may proceed.  However, the law is not always clear and never is static.  
Accordingly, in determining the proper scope of advocacy, account must be taken 
of the law’s ambiguities and potential for change. 
{¶ 45} “[2] The filing of an action or defense or similar action taken for a 
client is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully 
substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence only by 
discovery.  What is required of lawyers, however, is that they inform themselves 
about the facts of their clients’ cases and the applicable law and determine that 
they can make good faith arguments in support of their clients’ positions.  Such 
action is not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client’s position 
ultimately will not prevail.  The action is frivolous, however, if the lawyer is 
unable either to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to 
support the action taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, 
or reversal of existing law.” 
{¶ 46} Respondent’s strategy may have been flawed, but the fact that he 
had some arguably viable legal support for his actions is enough to avoid 
disciplinary sanction.  We therefore find no violation of the ethical standards 
incumbent upon Ohio lawyers.  The complaint against respondent is dismissed. 
Judgment accordingly. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
LANZINGER, J., dissents and would impose a stayed six-month suspension. 
__________________ 
Jonathan B. Cherry, Bar Counsel, Yvonne Tertel, and Paul D. Giha, for 
relator. 
Kerger & Hartman, L.L.C., and Richard M. Kerger, for respondent. 
______________________