Case Title: State ex rel. Grissom v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 1997-Ohio-369

Docket Number: 19950742

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 1997-07-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
THE STATE EX REL. GRISSOM, APPELLEE, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, 
APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Grissom v. Indus. Comm. (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 311.] 
Workers’ compensation — Industrial Commission improperly orders permanent 
total disability compensation suspended while claimant is incarcerated in a 
penal institution, when. 
(No. 95-742 — Submitted June 11, 1997 — Decided July 30, 1997.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 94APD02-269. 
 
Appellee-claimant, George Grissom, was injured in 1973 in the course of 
and arising from his employment with Acme Wrecking Company.  His workers’ 
compensation claim was allowed by appellant, Industrial Commission of Ohio, 
and, in 1984, claimant was awarded permanent total disability compensation. 
 
On January 20, 1988, claimant was incarcerated and the commission 
suspended permanent total disability compensation as of that date.  On December 
15, 1993, this court held in State ex rel. Brown v. Indus. Comm. (1993), 68 Ohio 
St.3d 45, 623 N.E.2d 55, that incarceration could not be used to terminate the 
permanent total disability benefits of a claimant who had been adjudicated as 
permanently and totally disabled prior to imprisonment.  This, in turn, prompted 
claimant to seek reinstatement of his compensation. 
 
After receiving no response from the commission, claimant filed a 
complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County.  The court 
ultimately granted the writ, which vacated the commission’s order and directed it 
to issue a new order in compliance with Brown. 
 
This cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right. 
___________________ 
 
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Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Diane S. Meftah, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellant. 
___________________ 
 
Per Curiam.  The commission does not dispute Brown’s applicability.  It 
instead asserts that the criminal activities that led to the claimant’s incarceration 
may be so inconsistent with his allegation of an inability to perform sustained 
remunerative employment as to warrant further commission investigation.  We 
find that the commission’s position lacks merit. 
 
We acknowledge at the outset that the payment of workers’ compensation 
benefits to an imprisoned claimant is offensive to many.  Legislation has since 
eliminated the ability of more recently injured claimants to receive workers’ 
compensation while jailed.  R.C. 4123.54.  In this case, however, the unpopularity 
of claimant’s receiving compensation is insufficient to sustain the commission’s 
position. 
 
The record is very sparse.  Claimant was originally charged with drug 
trafficking, aggravated robbery, and attempted murder.  The offenses for which he 
was convicted are not known, nor are the details of the crime(s).  However, even if 
claimant were convicted of all the aforementioned charges, it does not necessarily 
follow that claimant’s commission of drug trafficking, aggravated robbery, or 
attempted murder establishes a physical ability to perform sustained remunerative 
employment. 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., DOUGLAS, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER and COOK, JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK and LUNDBERG STRATTON, JJ., dissent. 
 
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LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., dissenting.  The majority concedes that the record 
in this case is sparse and that very little detail is known about the claimant’s 
criminal activities.  Yet, given that observation, the majority declines to find that 
the commission should be entitled to conduct further investigation.  Therefore, I 
must respectfully dissent. 
 
When the claimant brought the fact of his incarceration to the commission’s 
attention seeking reinstatement of his permanent total disability benefits, his 
criminal record suggested that he was physically able to participate in physical 
activities, albeit criminal ones, inconsistent with permanent total disability.  The 
commission elected to exercise its continuing jurisdiction over the claim for 
further investigation as to the extent of claimant’s permanent total disability.  The 
commission has continuing jurisdiction over each claim, and it may change or 
modify its former findings if justified.  R.C. 4123.52.  Evidence of Grissom’s 
criminal activities was certainly justification for the commission to investigate the 
status of his disability. 
 
To justify a change or modification of its earlier order of permanent total 
disability, the commission would be required to produce evidence other than just 
Grissom’s criminal record.  Evidence of Grissom’s conviction, his incarceration, 
or his criminal activity, alone, does not warrant a change in his disability status 
merely to avoid reinstatement of permanent total disability benefits pursuant to 
State ex rel. Brown v. Indus. Comm., supra.  As the majority states, even if the 
claimant committed all the crimes with which he was charged, that alone would 
not establish that he had the physical ability to work on a sustained basis. 
 
The commission would have to produce evidence that the physical activities 
involved in his criminal enterprise were inconsistent with permanent total 
disability.  The record below contains insufficient evidence on which to make that 
 
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conclusion.  But it is also mere speculation to assume that the claimant remains 
permanently and totally disabled.  Based on the claimant’s conviction, the 
commission is entitled to investigate further and to seek additional evidence. 
 
The commission had begun the administrative process toward further 
investigation when the process was stayed by the filing of Grissom’s petition for 
writ of mandamus.  The court of appeals should have denied the writ in order to 
allow the commission to complete its administrative investigation.  This court 
should find that the commission is authorized to exercise its continuing 
jurisdiction over this claim in order to investigate and seek additional evidence as 
to the permanent total disability of Grissom.  For these reasons, I dissent. 
 
RESNICK, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.