Case Title: Com. v. Barnett

Citation: 398 A.2d 1019, 484 Pa. 211

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1979-03-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
484 Pa. 211 (1979) 398 A.2d 1019 COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Dennis BARNETT. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Argued November 13, 1978. Decided March 16, 1979. *212 Steven H. Goldblatt, Deputy Dist. Atty.-Law, Maxine J. Stotland, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for appellant. Stephen R. Bolden, Philadelphia, for appellee. Before O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, NIX, MANDERINO and LARSEN, JJ. O'BRIEN, Justice. This appeal by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, which suppressed certain physical evidence[1] during the trial of appellee, Dennis Barnett. The suppression court *213 held that appellee's arrest was not based upon probable cause and, therefore, certain physical evidence had to be suppressed. We agree with the holding of the suppression court and will affirm its order. The facts, as found by the Suppression Court, are as follows: A ballistics exam revealed that appellee's gun had been used in the June 6, 1977 shooting death of seven-year-old Kent Bennett. Appellee was subsequently charged with *214 murder and various firearms offenses for the shooting of Bennett. He was also charged with assault, resisting arrest and other firearms violations arising from the June 10, 1977 arrest. While the various charges had been severed for trial, a single suppression hearing was held as only one issue of law was involved. Following the hearing on the motion to suppress, the court ordered both the pistol and the bullets suppressed. It is from this order that the Commonwealth now appeals. In Commonwealth v. Jeffries, 454 Pa. 320, 311 A.2d 914 (1973), we reviewed the following factual situation: There, we held that flight alone was insufficient to constitute probable cause for arrest. Further, we held that the police had no right to stop Jeffries under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), as the officers were unable to articulate any facts which indicated that criminal activity was afoot. We further held that based on this factual setting, the property was abandoned because of unlawful police coercion, and thus the heroin should have been suppressed. We can find no factual distinction between Jeffries and the instant case which is sufficient to *215 allow the Jeffries holding to be distinguished. Jeffries thus supports the finding in the instant case that appellee's arrest was not based on probable cause. The Commonwealth, however, argues that the officers had the right to make a limited investigatory stop. As we stated in Commonwealth v. Berrios, 437 Pa. 338, 340, 263 A.2d 342-343 (1970): We must thus view the totality of the circumstances to determine whether appellee was being "stopped" or was merely approached for allowable questioning by the officers. As we stated in Commonwealth v. Jones, 474 Pa. 364, 371, 378 A.2d 835, 839 (1977): In the instant case, the facts are clear that Officers Devereau and Wallace were attempting to stop appellee. As there was nothing on which to base a belief that criminal activity was afoot, appellee was free to walk away. Yet, when he attempted to leave, the officers chased him down the street. Under these circumstances, the suppression court was correct in finding that the officers did more than merely approach appellee for the purpose of allowable questioning. *216 The police conduct here amounted to a coercive factor which was the main reason that appellee abandoned the weapon. Finally, the Commonwealth argues that appellee's alleged attempt to shoot Officer Wallace allowed the subsequent seizure of both the pistol and the bullets. We need not, however, address the merits of the Commonwealth's position. While Officer Wallace testified that appellee attempted to shoot him, the suppression court evidently chose not to believe him, for the court's findings of fact contain no mention of the alleged attempt to shoot Officer Wallace. Thus, the Commonwealth has no evidence on which to base a claim of intervening criminal conduct which allowed the admission into evidence of the seized material. As we believe Jeffries to be controlling, we must affirm the order of the Suppression Court. See Commonwealth v. Anderson, 481 Pa. 292, 392 A.2d 1298 (1978). Order affirmed. EAGEN, C.J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. POMEROY, former J., took no part in the decision of this case. LARSEN, J., files a dissenting opinion in which NIX, J., joins. LARSEN, Justice, dissenting. I dissent. We are bound to accept explicit findings of facts unless they are wholly lacking support in the record. Commonwealth v. Willis, 483 Pa. 21, 394 A.2d 519 (1978) citing Commonwealth v. Sparrow, 471 Pa. 490, 370 A.2d 712 (1977). In the instant case, the court below made no explicit finding that appellant did not attempt to shoot Officer Watson. Thus, the findings of the suppression court indicate a lacunae regarding this attempted shooting. This case should be remanded to the suppression court for more specific findings on this factual issue. NIX, J., joins in this dissenting opinion. [1] As the suppressed evidence will substantially handicap the instant prosecution, this appeal is properly before the court. Commonwealth v. Wrona, 442 Pa. 201, 275 A.2d 78 (1971); Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963).