Case Title: MEADOWS v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-03-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
MEADOWS v. STATE2003 WY 3765 P.3d 33Case Number: 01-241, 01-242Decided: 03/13/2003
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2002

 

                                                                                                
   

 

JENNIFER 
LYNN MEADOWS,

 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

 

CHARLES 
DAVID FURMAN,

 

Appellant(Defendant) 
,

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 

Appellee(Plaintiff) 
.

 

Appeals 
from the District Court of Crook County

The 
Honorable John R. Perry, Judge

The 
Honorable Dan R. Price II, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant Jennifer Lynn Meadows:

 

Mary 
Guthrie, Cheyenne, Wyoming.

 

Representing 
Appellant Charles David Furman:

 

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Diane E. 
Courselle, Director, Defender Aid Program; and Tracy Lynn Stewart, Student 
Intern.  Argument presented by Ms. 
Courselle.

 

Representing 
Appellee:

 

Hoke 
MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and T. Alan Elrod, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument presented by Mr. Elrod.

 

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      Charles David 
Furman (Furman) and Jennifer Lynn Meadows (Meadows) (collectively Appellants) 
each entered conditional guilty pleas pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2) to one 
count of knowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled substance in excess 
of three grams in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c) (LexisNexis 2001), 
a felony pursuant to § 35-7-1031(c)(ii).  
Appellants' guilty pleas were conditioned on this appeal of the district 
court's denial of their motions to suppress.

 

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      In Case Number 
01-242, Furman presents a single issue for review:

The 
continued detention of Charles Furman exceeded the scope of a permissible 
Terry stop which tainted the subsequent consent to search; hence, any 
evidence recovered was the "fruit of a poisonous tree" and should have been 
suppressed.

 

In 
Case Number 01-241, Meadows offers two issues for 
consideration:

I.                     
Whether 
the trial court erred in denying Meadows' motion to suppress inculpatory 
evidence which was seized when the lawful scope of the traffic stop was 
exceeded.

 

II.                   
Whether 
the trial court erred in denying Meadows' motion to suppress inculpatory 
evidence because consent to search the automobile was not voluntarily 
given.

 

The 
State's statement of the issue is substantially identical in each 
case:

Did 
the district court properly deny Appellant's motion to suppress evidence 
resulting from the consensual search of the vehicle he (she) was driving 
(riding)?

 

FACTS1

 

[¶4]      On July 25, 2001, 
Wyoming Highway Patrolman Earl Gill stopped a vehicle on Interstate 90 near 
Moorcroft, Wyoming for going 100 M.P.H. in a 75 M.P.H. zone.  Furman was driving and Meadows was a 
passenger in the vehicle.  Furman 
identified himself as Peter Benjamin Maxwell but could not produce a driver's 
license or any other form of identification, vehicle registration, or proof of 
insurance.  Initially, Furman told 
the trooper he had identification in the back of the vehicle.  After the trooper told Furman that he 
could wait while the identification was retrieved, Furman claimed he had left 
his wallet in Montana at his girlfriend's sister's home.  Later, Furman indicated that the Montana 
police had taken his license after issuing him a speeding citation.  Indeed, the only information regarding 
his identity that Furman provided to the trooper was a Montana speeding citation 
in the name of Peter Benjamin Maxwell, issued four days 
earlier.

 

[¶5]      Furman told the 
trooper that the car belonged to his brother, Philip Albright.  Dispatch was able to confirm that the 
car was registered to a Philip Albright in Goldbar, Washington.2

 

[¶6]      After dispatch 
could not confirm the existence of a driver's license in Montana for a Peter 
Benjamin Maxwell, the trooper had Furman write his name, date of birth, and 
address on a piece of paper as it appeared on his license.  On the paper, Furman indicated an 
Auburn, Washington address.  
Dispatch initially was unable to locate a Washington license with the 
information provided by Furman.  
Trooper Gill informed him that without computer verification of his 
identity, Furman would have to provide a $200 cash bond for his speeding 
ticket.  Furman indicated that he 
did not have that much cash and did not have an ATM card so he could not access 
any cash either.

 

[¶7]      By this time, 
Wyoming Highway Patrol Trooper Hunt had arrived on the scene and after obtaining 
identification from Meadows, the troopers retired to Gill's patrol car.  The officers concluded that Meadows had 
provided false identification because the photograph bore no resemblance to her 
at all.

 

[¶8]      Dispatch was 
ultimately able to locate the record of a Peter Benjamin Maxwell whose license, 
however, listed a Seattle, not an Auburn, address.  When Trooper Gill approached him about 
the address discrepancy, Furman stated that he had lived in Seattle but now 
resided in Auburn and indicated that he did not know which address was actually 
on his license.  However, when asked 
about his former residence in Seattle, Furman gave a different street address 
than that appearing on the Washington license.

 

[¶9]      The two troopers 
then separately questioned Furman and Meadows about their travel plans.  Furman indicated that they were on their 
way from Washington to his father's funeral in Ohio after stopping in Montana to 
see Meadows' sister.  Meadows 
confirmed that they were going to Ohio for a funeral and also said that they 
planned to stop in Oshkosh3 on the way.  When asked if they planned to stop 
anywhere on the way to Ohio, Furman replied, "No."  The troopers had dispatch attempt to 
contact the sister in Montana through a telephone number given by 
Appellants.  No one was present at 
the number but an answering machine stated that the number was for a 
pawnshop.

 

[¶10]   Trooper Gill proceeded to issue 
Furman three citations.  He asked if 
there were any drugs, weapons, or large sums of currency in the car.  Furman denied the presence of any of 
those items.  Trooper Gill then 
asked if he could search the vehicle. Furman asked if he would be taken to jail 
if he refused.  Trooper Gill said, 
"No," and Furman then denied permission.  
In response, Trooper Gill informed Furman that before he could leave, a 
canine unit was going to be brought to the scene.  While the trooper returned to his patrol 
vehicle, Furman leaned into his car and appeared to have a brief conversation 
with the passenger.  Furman then 
approached Trooper Gill and gave his consent for a search of the vehicle.  The search disclosed the presence of 
various items in the vehicle's trunk consistent with the manufacturing of 
methamphetamine. Accordingly, Furman and Meadows were 
arrested.

 

[¶11]   Separate Informations were filed 
against Furman and Meadows charging each of them with one count of misdemeanor 
interference with a peace officer in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(a) 
(LexisNexis 2001) and one count of either knowingly possessing a List I or II 
controlled substance precursor with the intent to engage in a clandestine 
laboratory operation in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1059(a)(i) 
(LexisNexis 2001) or conspiring with or aiding another to engage in a 
clandestine laboratory operation in violation of § 
35-7-1059(a)(iv).

 

[¶12]   Furman and Meadows each filed a 
motion to suppress the evidence found in their vehicle.  They contended that Trooper Gill did not 
have a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity or probable cause to detain them 
after the traffic citations were issued, and that Furman's consent to search the 
vehicle was not voluntary. After a hearing on the motions, the district court 
issued an order denying them.  The 
court concluded that there were reasonable, articulable suspicions for the 
continued detention of the Appellants after the completion of the traffic 
citation process.  The district 
court cited the complete lack of identification by the driver, and for the 
vehicle, coupled with the obvious heavy load in the trunk, Furman's inability to 
provide a coherent account of where he lived, Furman's nervousness, and the 
conflicting statements from Furman and Meadows about their 
destination.

 

[¶13]   The Appellants subsequently entered 
into a plea agreement whereby they pleaded guilty to one count of knowingly or 
intentionally possessing a controlled substance in excess of three grams in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(ii) in exchange for the State 
dropping the other charges against them.  
Appellants' guilty pleas were conditioned on this appeal of the district 
court's denial of their motions to suppress.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶14]   We have reiterated our standard for 
reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress numerous 
times:

 

We 
generally do not disturb evidentiary rulings made by a trial court unless the 
trial court abused its discretion. Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 
(Wyo. 1994). In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress 
evidence, we do not interfere with the trial court's findings of fact unless the 
findings are clearly erroneous. Gehnert v. State, 956 P.2d 359, 361 (Wyo. 
1998).  We view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the trial court's determination because the trial court 
has an opportunity at the evidentiary hearing to assess "the credibility of the 
witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary inferences, deductions, 
and conclusions." Id. The constitutionality of a particular search or 
seizure is, however, a question of law that we review de novo. Id., 
Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 690 (Wyo. 1995).

 

Putnam 
v. State, 
995 P.2d 632, 635 (Wyo. 2000) (quoting Burgos-Seberos v. State, 969 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Wyo. 1998)).

 

[¶15]   Prior to our discussion of 
Appellants' claims, we must address an issue raised by Furman relating to our 
standard for reviewing the videotape of the traffic stop.  In addition to the testimony of Trooper 
Gill at the suppression hearing, the district court also reviewed the videotape 
of the stop, which was recorded from a camera inside the trooper's patrol 
vehicle.  The district court's 
ultimate decision denying the motions to suppress was based upon its review of 
that videotape in conjunction with the testimony from the 
hearing.

 

[¶16]   On appeal, Furman contends that we 
should review the videotape de novo since the credibility of Trooper Gill 
is not directly at issue through such a review.  He suggests that if the videotape 
conflicts with the trooper's testimony or any of the trial court's findings, 
then this Court should "independently assess the weight and credibility that 
should be given to each" piece of evidence.  Furman cites State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215 (Tenn. 2000) in support of the use of a de novo standard of 
review.  However, the Kansas Court 
of Appeals has pointed out the flaw of relying on that 
case:

 

Freel 
cites State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215 (Tenn. 2000) to support his 
assertion that this court should use a de novo standard of review in evaluating 
the trial court's refusal to suppress the evidence. In Binette, the 
review was de novo because the arresting officer did not testify at trial; 
however, there was a videotape of the incident. The Tennessee Supreme Court held 
that when a court's findings of fact at a suppression hearing are based solely 
on evidence that does not involve issues of credibility, such as a videotape, 
the rationale underlying a deferential standard of review is not implicated. 
Thus, a de novo standard of review was found to be appropriate; however, this 
holding was expressly limited to the facts presented. 33 S.W.3d  at 
217.

 

The 
facts in the instant case differ from Binette. Here, the evidence 
included the videotape and the officers' testimony; therefore, we turn to the 
established standard of review for the suppression of 
evidence.

 

State 
v. Freel, 
32 P.3d 1219, 1223 (Kan. App. 2001).  
Similarly, in this case, we have the testimony of the officer in addition 
to the videotape.  Accordingly, we 
will apply our established standard of review as noted 
above.

 

DISCUSSION

 

[¶17]   An investigatory or Terry 
stop represents a seizure which implicates the Fourth Amendment, requiring the 
presence of specific, articulable facts and rational inferences giving rise to a 
reasonable suspicion that a person has committed or may be committing a 
crime.  Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 219-220 (Wyo. 1994) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)); see also McChesney v. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 
1074 (Wyo. 1999).  There is a dual 
inquiry for evaluating the reasonableness of an investigatory stop: (1) whether 
the officer's actions were justified at the inception; and (2) whether it was 
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first instance.  
Wilson, 874 P.2d  at 223 (quoting United States v. Hensley, 
469 U.S. 221, 228, 105 S. Ct. 675, 680, 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1985) and Terry, 
392 U.S.  at 20-21, 88 S.Ct. at 1879)).  
The conduct of an officer is judged by an objective standard which takes 
into account the totality of the circumstances.  Terry, 392 U.S.  at 21-22, 88 
S.Ct. at 1879-81; United States v. Lang, 81 F.3d 955, 965 
(10th Cir. 1996).

 

Putnam, 
995 P.2d  at 637.  Appellants concede 
the validity of the initial stop.  
Their focus is on the detention subsequent to the issuance of the traffic 
citations. 

 

[¶18]   Once the initial reason for a stop 
has been resolved, an officer must have specific, articulable facts and rational 
inferences giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that another crime has been or 
is being committed to justify a continued detention.  United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528, 1534 (10th Cir. 1996).  
Appellants contend that the district court erred in concluding that 
Trooper Gill had specific, articulable facts supporting a reasonable suspicion 
justifying their continued detention after the traffic citations were issued. 
Initially, Appellants take issue with the court's conclusion that there was a 
"total lack of identification" on Furman and the vehicle.  They note that dispatch confirmed a 
Washington driver's license in the name given by Furman and that the car was 
owned by the person identified by him.  
Appellants insist that the confirmation by dispatch was sufficient to 
dispel any suspicions.  They also 
claim that Furman did not have trouble telling Trooper Gill where he lived  he 
consistently indicated that he resided in Auburn, Washington and that the 
officer was merely confused because the address on the driver's license 
identified by dispatch was an old one.  
Appellants attack the relevance and weight of the officer's observations 
that their car's trunk appeared to be weighted down by pointing out that they 
were on a long distance trip, so it was reasonable to assume that the weighted 
trunk was the byproduct of their luggage.  
Accordingly, they contend that the court should have given the officer's 
observations little, if any, weight.  
They also insist that they offered substantially similar descriptions of 
their destination, and that Trooper Gill failed to ask any clarifying questions 
to resolve the apparent minor discrepancies he perceived.  Finally, Furman contends that he was not 
abnormally nervous during the stop and that there is no evidence from the 
videotape supporting an assertion that he was.  Ultimately, Furman concludes that even 
if the factual conclusions of the district court were correct, they nevertheless 
did not support a finding of a reasonable suspicion that Appellants were engaged 
in the trafficking of illegal drugs, and that their detention based on Trooper 
Gill's decision to call a canine unit was illegal.

 

[¶19]   Our review of the record leads to 
the conclusion that Trooper Gill possessed reasonable articulable suspicions 
justifying the continued detention of Furman and Meadows.  The following facts may be discerned 
from the transcript of the suppression hearing and the videotape of the traffic 
stop:  (1) The driver of the 
vehicle, Furman, did not possess a driver's license or proof of insurance in 
violation of Wyoming law (see Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-7-116 and 31-4-103(a) 
& (b) (LexisNexis 2001)); (2) Furman offered several different explanations 
about where his wallet containing his driver's license was, varying from the 
backseat of the car to Meadows' sister's home in Montana to a claim that the 
Montana police had taken it after issuing him a speeding ticket; (3) The address 
given by Furman was for an Auburn, Washington residence but the driver's license 
located by dispatch bore a Seattle, Washington address; (4) Furman indicated 
that he had lived in Seattle but when asked, gave a different address than that 
appearing on the driver's license; (5) Meadows proffered a driver's license that 
the officers believed was not hers because of the substantial physical 
differences between the photograph on the license and Meadows' appearance; (6) 
Furman identified the owner of the vehicle as his brother although that person 
bore a different surname; (7) Furman was ostensibly traveling cross-country, but 
he was not carrying any cash or an ATM card; (8) Furman and Meadows agreed that 
they were traveling to Ohio for the funeral of Furman's father but disagreed on 
their itinerary; (9) the vehicle appeared to be heavily weighted in the trunk 
area; and (10) Furman appeared to be abnormally nervous, as described by Trooper 
Gill:

 

He 
seemed basically to try to avoid some of the questions I had asked him. Also I 
noticed right away he was about four or five times  his body movement and his 
speech was a lot faster than normal. At one point I considered the fact that he 
was probably taking some type of illegal narcotics because his speech and 
behavior was just entirely too fast. He was extremely hyper, and that stayed 
throughout the course of the time I had dealt with him.

 

. 
. . .

 

There 
was [sic] just a couple times if I would ask him a question, his speech 
would change. He'd hum a lot. And he could answer me, maybe a question. It was 
just the way he was doing it. The speech alone was entirely too fast. He was 
humming, making a lot of gestures, but he wasn't saying either yes, no, giving 
me a straight answer, I guess.

 

. 
. . .

 

He 
 his behavior was just  from the very beginning he was extremely fast in what 
he was doing. He bounced around too much. His behavior was just a little bit 
different as compared to when I stop people on the highway and they are nervous 
because they just got stopped. I've never stopped before, you know, a person who 
isn't a little bit nervous. But when they're answering questions  when I'd ask 
him questions he stuttered. He bounced around. His behavior was just totally 
different. It's hard to describe, but he was just moving in a really fast 
world.

 

[¶20]   Each of these facts considered in 
isolation could be construed as the innocent behavior of cross-country 
travelers.  However, we must look at 
the circumstances in their entirety and when we do so, factors that could be 
indicative of innocent behavior, if considered in isolation, may well support a 
reasonable suspicion of illegal activity when considered in totality.  Putnam, 995 P.2d  at 637.  Our review of the record convinces us 
that the district court's factual conclusions are not clearly erroneous.  Contrary to Appellants' assertions, the 
court correctly noted that there was a "total lack of identification" of the 
vehicle and the driver, Furman.  
There was no proof of insurance or registration on the car.  While Furman gave the officers a name 
that dispatch confirmed was the holder of a valid Washington driver's license, 
he offered no proof that he was, in fact, that person.  Meanwhile, Meadows supplied the officers 
with identification that they concluded was false on its face.  Furman gave conflicting accounts of 
where his identification was and did not identify the address that was listed on 
the Washington driver's license, nor did he offer an explanation for the 
discrepancy between it and the addresses that he did provide.  All of these factors support a 
reasonable suspicion that Furman and Meadows were not who they claimed to 
be.

 

[¶21]   The additional facts noted by the 
court support the decision to detain Appellants after the traffic citations were 
issued.  Appellants' actions were 
not consistent with their claim that they were traveling to Ohio for a 
funeral.  The speeding ticket issued 
to Furman in Montana was dated four days before the stop at issue in this 
case.  Furman acknowledged that he 
was traveling without cash or access to an ATM card.  There were discrepancies between 
Furman's and Meadows' description of their itinerary.  Meadows claimed that they planned to 
stop in Oshkosh before proceeding to Ohio, while Furman insisted that they were 
traveling straight through.  These 
facts combined with the weighted trunk and Furman's abnormal nervousness give 
rise to a reasonable suspicion that they had committed or were committing a 
crime.  Trooper Gill testified that 
among the factors they consider to determine if there is the possibility of drug 
trafficking are: (1) a lack of identification on the vehicle occupants including 
either driver's licenses or credit cards; (2) no identification on the vehicle 
outside of the VIN number; (3) the demeanor of the occupants; and (4) 
discrepancies among the occupants regarding their destination.  Courts have found similar factors 
sufficient to support the continued detention of a vehicle's occupants in order 
to investigate possible drug trafficking.  
See United States v. Zubia-Melendez, 263 F.3d 1155 
(10th Cir. 2001) (Driver could not produce identification or vehicle 
registration and occupants gave conflicting accounts of their travels justifying 
detention pending a canine search.); see also United States v. Kopp, 45 F.3d 1450, 1454 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Finke, 85 F.3d 1275 (7th Cir. 1996).  
Confronted with the lack of evidence of Furman's identification and his 
authority to use the vehicle, Trooper Gill was justified in asking questions 
about the identity and travel plans of him and his passenger.  Zubia-Melendez, 263 F.3d  at 
1161.  Based upon the dubious and 
inconsistent answers to his questions regarding their identification and travel 
plans coupled with Furman's nervousness and the weighted trunk, Trooper Gill was 
justified in detaining Appellants for further investigation.4

 

[¶22]   In their second issue, Appellants 
allege that Furman's consent to search the vehicle was not voluntary.5  Appellants contend that Trooper Gill 
created an atmosphere that effectively coerced Furman's consent to search the 
vehicle.  Appellants point to 
various comments appearing on the videotape made between Trooper Gill and 
Trooper Hunt while they were seated in Gill's patrol car.  These comments included a statement from 
Trooper Gill that he would "bet" a soda that he could get Furman to allow a 
search of his vehicle. Furman also alleges that after he had initially refused 
to allow a search after receiving the traffic citations, Trooper Gill had 
informed him that a canine unit was on the way to the scene when, in fact, no 
unit had been called.  Furman claims 
that Trooper Gill lied about the canine unit as part of the process to coerce 
consent from him.  Furman supports 
his claim of a coercive atmosphere by citing the repeated questioning of him 
regarding his identity and travel plans and the Trooper's disregard of his 
answers or his failure to ask appropriate clarifying questions.  Accordingly, Appellants claim that, 
under the totality of the circumstances, the consent to search the vehicle was 
not voluntary.

 

[¶23]   The question of whether or not 
consent to search a vehicle was voluntary must be determined under the totality 
of the circumstances.  United 
States v. Price, 925 F.2d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235-37, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854 
(1973)).  We have framed the 
standard of review as follows:

 

Subject 
to certain exceptions, warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable 
under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, 
Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution.  
Gronski v. State, 910 P.2d 561, 564 (Wyo. 1996). Among the 
recognized exceptions are searches and/or seizures conducted pursuant to a valid 
consent. Id. "Whether an exception exists in a particular case is a 
question of fact that may be properly resolved by a preponderance of the 
evidence standard in the light of all attendant circumstances."  City of Laramie v. Hysong, 808 P.2d 199, 203 (Wyo. 1991). When this Court reviews questions of fact, we view 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Id. The 
burden of proving that the circumstances of a particular case fit within an 
exception is with the State.  
Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34, 90 S. Ct. 1969, 1972, 26 L. Ed. 2d 409 (1970).

 

Gehnert 
v. State, 
956 P.2d 359, 362 (Wyo. 1998).

 

[¶24]   The record does not support the 
contentions made by Appellants.  
First, they fail to explain how the comments made between Troopers Gill 
and Hunt had any reasonable effect upon Furman's consent.  While the comments may have been 
questionable on a professional level, they were made outside of Appellants' 
presence and could have had no discernible effect on Furman's decision at the 
time it was made.  Second, the 
questions posed by Trooper Gill were a reasonable response to Appellants' 
prevarications on their identities and travel plans.  Finally, Trooper Gill testified that he 
told Furman he was going to call the canine unit  not that he had already done 
so.  There is no evidence that the 
officer was using the prospect of a canine search as a coercive tool to wrest 
consent from Furman.  The State 
satisfied its burden of demonstrating that the search of the automobile was 
justified under the consent exception to the warrant requirement, and the 
district court's denial of Appellants' motions to suppress is 
affirmed.

 

CONCLUSION

[¶25]   Appellants' detention was based on 
specific, articulable facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom that 
formed a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.  The evidence also supports a conclusion 
that Furman's consent to search the vehicle was given voluntarily.  The district court's denial of the 
motions to suppress is affirmed. 

FOOTNOTES

1The 
facts are derived from the transcript of the hearing on the Appellants' motion 
to suppress and the videotape of the stop.

 

2The 
record does not disclose whether there was ever any confirmation that Albright 
was, in fact, Furman's brother.  
However, there is confirmation that Albright had given Furman and Meadows 
permission to use his vehicle.

 

3Meadows never explicitly identified a state.  The State presumes she meant Oshkosh, 
Wisconsin although there is an Oshkosh in Nebraska 
too.

 

4Furman requests that the Court impose a stricter standard under the 
Wyoming Constitution than that embodied under federal case law to specifically 
require a connection between the nature of the investigation and the suspicions 
underlying the reason for a motorist's continued detention.  Furman does not provide a cogent 
argument for why or even what specific criteria would drive such a 
standard.  However, we need not make 
a specific ruling on this issue since we conclude that there was a sufficient 
nexus between the specific, articulable facts and the rational inferences 
derived therefrom and the investigation into whether or not Appellants were 
trafficking illegal drugs.

 

 5To a significant 
degree, Appellants' argument is predicated on the contention that their 
detention was illegal.  We have held 
that the detention was justified under the circumstances and, therefore, to that 
extent Appellants' claim on this point is moot.