Case Title: Four Oaks Conservation Trust v. Bianco

Citation: 179 Vt. 597, 2006 VT 6, 892 A.2d 258

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2006-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
Four Oaks Conservation Trust v. Bianco (2004-357); 179 Vt. 597; 892 A.2d 258

2006 VT 6

[Filed 12-Jan-2006]

                                 ENTRY ORDER

                                  2006 VT 6

                      SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2004-357

                               JUNE TERM, 2005

  Four Oaks Conservation Trust,	       }	APPEALED FROM:
  Thomas Laddie Lushin, Trustee	       }
                                       }
       v.	                       }	Orange Superior Court
                                       }	
  Gene Bianco	                       }
                                       }	DOCKET NO. 96-5-01 Oecv

                                                Trial Judge: Alan W. Cheever

             In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

       ¶  1.  In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred in
  interpreting the terms of a lease agreement between plaintiff Thomas Laddie
  Lushin, acting as trustee for Four Oaks Conservation Trust, and defendant
  Gene Bianco.  Although defendant breached the parties' lease agreement,
  plaintiff asserted that defendant remained obligated to use and maintain an
  easement described in the lease.  The trial court rejected plaintiff's
  claim.  On appeal, plaintiff asserts that the court erred in: (1)
  concluding that the lease agreement was not a divisible contract; (2)
  making unsupported and unnecessary findings of fact; and (3) ignoring the
  plain language of the lease.  We affirm. 

       ¶  2.  Plaintiff and defendant are neighboring landowners. 
  Defendant has a deeded easement that runs across plaintiff's property and
  travels very close to plaintiff's home.  In 1999, plaintiff agreed to lease
  a barn and a portion of real property to defendant for farming purposes;
  defendant agreed to extend and maintain a driveway on plaintiff's property
  and use this road as the exclusive method of traversing plaintiff's
  property.  The easement identified in the lease is located much farther
  away from plaintiff's house than defendant's deeded easement.  The lease
  specifically stated: 

    As an inducement for [plaintiff] to enter into this Lease on the
    terms and conditions stated herein, [defendant] agrees to extend
    at his expense the driveway servicing the adjoining Nature
    Conservancy property so that it connects to Braintree Hill Road
    north of the barn in a manner acceptable to [plaintiff], and to
    properly maintain such driveway at all times, so that such new
    portion of the driveway will be, and will be used as, the
    exclusive means of accessing both the barn and the Nature
    Conservancy property.  

  Defendant was not obligated under the agreement to pay rent to plaintiff
  for leasing the barn or land. 

       ¶  3.  In October 2001, plaintiff filed a quiet title action seeking
  to terminate the lease, and  defendant filed a counterclaim.  In October
  2002, the court granted plaintiff's request for partial summary judgment,
  finding that defendant had breached the lease agreement by failing to
  purchase insurance for the property.  The court considered the parties'
  remaining claims in March 2004.  In a written order, the court rejected
  plaintiff's claim that, despite the termination of the lease,  defendant
  remained obligated to use and maintain the new easement.  The court found
  the terms of the lease agreement unambiguous.  It rejected plaintiff's
  assertion that the lease agreement was a divisible contract, finding no
  possible way that the agreement could be divided into multiple parts of
  performance by each party.  The court also rejected plaintiff's claim that
  the use of the phrase "at all times" in the lease agreement reflected the
  parties' intent that defendant would be obligated to use and maintain the
  new easement indefinitely.  Finally, the court found no merit in
  plaintiff's assertion that defendant had implicitly agreed to relinquish
  his deeded easement when he signed the lease.  Plaintiff filed a motion for
  reargument, which the court denied.  This appeal followed.

       ¶  4.  On appeal, plaintiff argues that the court erred in
  interpreting the terms of the lease agreement.  He asserts that the lease
  is a divisible contract and defendant remains obligated to use and maintain
  the new easement rather than his deeded easement.  Plaintiff also asserts
  that the court erred in interpreting the plain language of the agreement
  and made insupportable and unnecessary findings of fact.  

       ¶  5.  We review the trial court's construction of the parties'
  agreement de novo,  Downtown Barre Dev. v. C & S Wholesale Grocers, Inc.,
  2004 VT 47, ¶ 8, 177 Vt. 70,