Case Title: Crown Commc'n, Inc. v. Testa

Citation: 2013-Ohio-3126

Docket Number: 2012-0780

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2013-07-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Crown Communication, Inc. v. Testa, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-3126.] 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-3126 
CROWN COMMUNICATION, INC., ET AL., APPELLANTS, v. TESTA, TAX COMMR., 
APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Crown Communication, Inc. v. Testa,  
Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-3126.] 
Taxation—Personal 
property—Appeal—Procedure—R.C. 
5703.51(D)—R.C. 
5711.31—Final assessments by tax commissioner appealable directly to 
Board of Tax Appeals—Effect of tax commissioner’s erroneous instruction 
to taxpayer that review of final assessments is obtained through petition 
for reassessment to tax commissioner—Taxpayer has option in such a case 
to treat final assessment as preliminary and to obtain further review by 
filing petition for reassessment. 
(No. 2012-0780—Submitted June 4, 2013—Decided July 23, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2009-A-3187. 
____________________ 
KENNEDY, J. 
{¶ 1} Crown Communication, Inc., and Crown Castle GT Company 
(collectively, “Crown”) appeal from a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals 
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(“BTA”) that affirmed the tax commissioner’s final determination of a personal-
property tax assessment for tax year 2006.  The tax commissioner and the BTA 
both held that Crown had not timely pursued an appeal from final-assessment 
certificates previously issued by the tax commissioner.  Under this determination, 
the commissioner lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits of Crown’s petition for 
reassessment, and the BTA lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits of Crown’s 
challenge to the assessment on appeal. 
{¶ 2} Before the court, Crown asserts that the BTA did possess 
jurisdiction to reach the merits on appeal because the tax commissioner misled 
Crown by sending the wrong instructions for appeal with the final-assessment 
certificates.  Crown advances four propositions of law:  
 
Proposition of Law No. 1: Until proper written instructions 
explaining the steps required to perfect a tax appeal are provided or 
the taxpayer waives his right to receive the instructions, any 
personal 
property 
assessment 
remains 
preliminary. 
R.C. 
5703.51(D) (applied and followed). 
Proposition of Law No. 2: If the tax commissioner mails an 
assessment labeled as final but then encloses the wrong appellate 
instructions, he has created an ambiguity and the taxpayer may 
treat the assessment as either preliminary or final. 
Proposition of Law No. 3: When the tax commissioner 
provides advice to taxpayers, he must not affirmatively mislead 
taxpayers and, if he does, he is estopped from relying on any error 
that he induced. 
Proposition of Law No. 4: If a taxpayer pays a disputed 
assessment based upon his right to prosecute a refund claim, the 
state may not, without violating the taxpayer’s right to due process 
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
of law, eliminate the taxpayer’s ability to prosecute the claim by 
providing erroneous appellate instructions. 
 
{¶ 3} We reject Crown’s estoppel theory set forth in the third proposition 
of law and do not reach its due process argument in the fourth proposition of law.  
We also disagree with Crown’s first proposition of law, which would have the 
effect of holding assessments open indefinitely. 
{¶ 4} We do agree with Crown’s second proposition of law.  We hold 
that by labeling the assessment as final while also including instructions for 
appealing a preliminary assessment, the tax commissioner conferred on Crown 
the option to treat the assessment as either preliminary or final.  Although Crown 
has not articulated a detailed argument in support of this proposition, our review 
of the statutes and the case law persuades us that Crown’s actions in following the 
appeal instructions preserved the jurisdiction of both the tax commissioner and 
the BTA to consider the merits of Crown’s challenge to the assessment. 
{¶ 5} Because Crown had the option to treat the assessment as 
preliminary, and because Crown timely pursued review first by the Department of 
Taxation and then by the BTA, we reverse the BTA’s decision and remand the 
cause for further proceedings. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 6} Crown, which owns cellular telephone towers in Ohio, was subject 
to an increased personal-property tax assessment for tax year 2006.  Despite 
multiple efforts to obtain review of the increase in its assessment, Crown 
ultimately faced a dismissal on jurisdictional grounds without any further 
consideration of the merits of its claim. 
{¶ 7} In late May 2008, two years after Crown filed its 2006 tax return, 
the tax commissioner issued amended preliminary-assessment certificates for tax 
year 2006, which increased the listed value of the cell towers.  By letter dated 
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August 7, 2008, shortly before the increased assessment would have become final 
and uncontestable under R.C. 5711.25, Crown disputed the increase by requesting 
a final assessment.  In May of the following year, the commissioner issued final-
assessment certificates, which did not reduce the assessment as requested. 
{¶ 8} With the final-assessment certificates, the commissioner included 
instructions for appealing the assessment.  Crown asserts that the instructions it 
received called for filing a petition for reassessment with the tax commissioner.  
This is the correct procedure for obtaining review of a preliminary assessment 
under R.C. 5711.31.  However, the issuance of a final assessment is appealable 
directly to the Board of Tax Appeals pursuant to R.C. 5711.26 and 5717.02. 
{¶ 9} Instead of appealing to the BTA, Crown followed the instructions 
and filed a petition for reassessment on July 10, 2009.  Internal documents of the 
Department of Taxation noted that Crown had “appealed Final Assessment to the 
Tax Commissioner” and that Crown “should [have] appeal[ed] to BTA” and 
contained the notation “Docket to Dismiss per-JAN 7/17/09.”  Thus, the 
commissioner was aware of Crown’s mistake.  Nevertheless, instead of notifying 
Crown of the defect, the commissioner issued a letter dated July 20, 2009, which 
acknowledged the filing and assigned a case number, implying that the 
commissioner intended to conduct a substantive review of the petition. 
{¶ 10} Events showed that the commissioner had no such intention.  On 
September 8, 2009, the commissioner issued a final determination dismissing the 
petition.  The commissioner concluded that because the assessment had been final 
rather than preliminary, Crown should have appealed to the BTA. 
{¶ 11} When Crown appealed the final determination to the BTA, the 
commissioner moved to affirm, arguing that the BTA had no jurisdiction to 
consider the appeal because it was untimely filed.  Crown’s appeal had not been 
taken within 60 days of the issuance of the final-assessment certificates as 
January Term, 2013 
5 
 
required by R.C. 5717.02.  The BTA agreed and affirmed the dismissal of 
Crown’s petition. 
{¶ 12} In opposing the commissioner’s motion at the BTA, Crown offered 
the affidavit of Carmen Ospina.  She asserted that she was associated with a 
property-tax consultancy and that since 2006, she had been an authorized 
representative of Crown.  The affidavit recited that on May 22, 2009, Crown 
received the final assessments and that each of the assessments included the same 
attachment, entitled “Notice to Taxpayer,” a copy of which Ospina attached as an 
exhibit.  That notice instructs the taxpayer who wishes to contest the increased 
value to file a petition for reassessment with the tax commissioner, not an appeal 
to the BTA. 
{¶ 13} The tax commissioner filed a reply brief in response, but that reply 
does not challenge the Ospina affidavit or deny her assertion that the wrong 
instructions had been sent.  Instead, the commissioner argues that even if the 
instructions were wrong, Crown has no recourse, because estoppel cannot apply 
against the state.1  Attached to the reply brief was an affidavit from Deborah 
Pearson, a longtime Taxation Department employee responsible for printing and 
preparing the final-assessment certificates in the Crown case.  The affidavit 
recited that “[a]s part of the preparation, instructions regarding the appeal of the 
assessments were to be included in the envelope.  See attached Ex. 1 (Notice to 
Taxpayer).”  The attached “Notice to Taxpayer” instructs the aggrieved taxpayer 
to appeal directly to the BTA.  She also testified that it had been her practice, as 
well as the  Department of Taxation’s “long-standing, established administrative 
practice and policy, to send the taxpayer information in writing of the steps 
                                                 
1 At oral argument, counsel for the tax commissioner responded to the question “You didn’t object 
in any way to the evidence below” by saying, “That’s actually not true.”  What counsel proceeded 
to refer to at oral argument was the Pearson affidavit, which was the commissioner’s attempt to 
controvert the Ospina affidavit.  In fact, no objection of any kind was lodged to the Ospina 
affidavit.  Obviously, it is one thing to object to an opponent’s evidence, and quite another to offer 
contrary evidence of one’s own. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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necessary to appeal the final assessment to the Board of Tax Appeals.”  Notably, 
Pearson’s affidavit does not state that the attached “Notice to Taxpayer” was in 
fact the form that was sent to Crown.  Thus, the Pearson affidavit does not 
effectively controvert the Ospina affidavit. 
{¶ 14} The BTA predicated its decision on Crown’s assertion that the 
commissioner had transmitted the wrong appeal instruction and then considered 
whether that error by the commissioner allowed Crown to obtain review on the 
merits despite the untimely appeal.  Crown Communication, Inc. v. Levin, BTA 
No. 2009-A-3187, 2012 WL 1257412 (Apr. 5, 2012).  Because Crown relied on 
an estoppel theory, the BTA resolved the case against Crown by considering and 
rejecting that theory.  The BTA did not question the assertion that the 
commissioner had in fact transmitted the wrong instructions. 
{¶ 15} In rejecting the estoppel theory, the BTA distinguished Ormet 
Corp. v. Lindley, 69 Ohio St.2d 263, 431 N.E.2d 686 (1982), which Crown had 
cited as authority for an exception to the rule against estoppel.  The BTA noted 
that Ormet involved a long-standing administrative practice by the commissioner, 
not a single instance of sending a misleading communication.  Because of the 
general rule that estoppel does not apply against the state, id. at *2, quoting 
Sekerak v. Fairhill Mental Health Ctr., 25 Ohio St.3d 38, 39, 495 N.E.2d 14 
(1986), and because Crown had not brought itself within the narrow Ormet 
exception, the BTA ordered that the tax commissioner’s dismissal for lack of 
jurisdiction be affirmed. 
Analysis 
{¶ 16} We affirm BTA decisions if they are “reasonable and lawful.”  
Satullo v. Wilkins, 111 Ohio St.3d 399, 2006-Ohio-5856, 856 N.E.2d 954, ¶ 14.  
Since the BTA is responsible for determining factual issues, we will affirm the 
BTA’s findings if they are supported by reliable and probative evidence.  Id.  But 
the question before us is an issue of law, which we review de novo.  Toledo v. 
January Term, 2013 
7 
 
Levin, 117 Ohio St.3d 373, 2008-Ohio-1119, 884 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 26, fn. 3; Akron 
Centre Plaza, L.L.C. v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Revision, 128 Ohio St.3d 145, 2010-
Ohio-5035, 942 N.E.2d 1054, ¶ 10. 
A. There was no plain error in the BTA’s reliance 
on the Ospina affidavit 
{¶ 17} The tax commissioner contests the evidentiary basis for Crown’s 
jurisdictional argument.  The commissioner challenges Ospina’s assertion in her 
affidavit that the final assessments arrived at Crown with the wrong appeal 
instructions attached.  The commissioner asserts that Ospina’s affidavit cannot 
have been from personal knowledge because the assessments were delivered 
directly to Crown, not to Ospina.  Thus, she could have learned of the contents of 
the mailing only from a third person. 
{¶ 18} The tax commissioner’s contentions in this regard are unavailing.  
Although the Ospina affidavit may fall short of the ideal, the tax commissioner 
did not object to the affidavit in the proceedings before the BTA.  Because the 
evidentiary challenge has thus been waived, the court will correct only a plain 
error.  See Plain Local Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 130 
Ohio St.3d 230, 2011-Ohio-3362, 957 N.E.2d 268, ¶ 20. 
{¶ 19} There is no plain error in relying on the uncontroverted affidavit of 
a taxpayer’s consultant and representative with respect to the content of tax 
documents used in processing a tax appeal, particularly when the document is 
attached and authenticated.  Nor can the commissioner claim the benefit of the 
presumption that a public official has duly performed the function that the law 
requires.  Toledo v. Levin, 117 Ohio St.3d 373, 2008-Ohio-1119, 884 N.E.2d 31, 
¶ 28.  Crown has rebutted the presumption that the commissioner sent the proper 
instructions by showing that the wrong instructions were sent. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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B. The BTA correctly rejected Crown’s estoppel argument 
{¶ 20} On appeal, Crown’s third proposition of law advances its estoppel 
argument.  We find that the BTA correctly rejected it. 
{¶ 21} In general, a taxpayer may not apply estoppel against the state.  
Gen. Motors Corp. v. Limbach, 67 Ohio St.3d 90, 92, 616 N.E.2d 204 (1993) (the 
court has “consistently held that equity does not apply to the state as to taxing 
statutes”), citing Recording Devices, Inc. v. Bowers, 174 Ohio St. 518, 190 
N.E.2d 258 (1963), paragraph one of the syllabus (no estoppel against the state 
under a taxing statute).  Notwithstanding that general disfavor of equitable relief 
in tax cases, we have in a very limited context applied a kind of estoppel against 
the state.  See Ormet, 69 Ohio St.2d 263, 431 N.E.2d 686, and Recording Devices.  
In both Ormet and Recording Devices, the tax commissioner had in writing 
committed himself over an extended period to a particular construction of tax law 
as applied to the taxpayer; this court held in each case that the commissioner 
could not change position and then retroactively assess tax on transactions that 
had previously been found by the commissioner to be exempt. 
{¶ 22} The BTA correctly determined that the doctrine of those cases does 
not apply to this case.  There was no retroactive assessment based on a change in 
the tax commissioner’s long-held view on a matter of tax law. 
C. The Sun Refining doctrine does not apply because Crown received 
notice of the assessment plus instructions for appeal 
{¶ 23} As an alternative argument, Crown asserts under its first 
proposition of law that the 60-day period for appealing the final-assessment 
certificates to the BTA never began to run because the wrong appeal instructions 
were sent.  In support, Crown cites Sun Refining & Marketing Co. v. Brennan, 31 
Ohio St.3d 306, 511 N.E.2d 112 (1987). 
{¶ 24} In that case, a state agency sent its decision in uncertified form to 
the corporation’s attorney, rather than sending a certified copy to the corporation 
January Term, 2013 
9 
 
as required by R.C. 119.09.  The corporation appealed.  When the agency later 
complained that the appeal was untimely, the corporation pointed to the agency’s 
failure to send a certified copy to the affected party as required by R.C. 119.09 
and argued that agency compliance with the statute is a condition precedent to the 
commencement of the appeal period.  This court agreed and held that the time for 
appealing from the agency decision would not begin to run until the agency 
complied with R.C. 119.09. 
{¶ 25} Sun Refining is inapposite.  There is no contention that the 
Department of Taxation failed to properly serve its final assessment on the 
affected party in this case, nor does this case involve R.C. Chapter 119.  Instead, 
this case presents the incongruity of labeling the assessment as final while 
providing an appeal instruction as though the assessment were preliminary under 
R.C. Chapter 5711.  Crown obtained both notice of the assessment and 
instructions for appeal, which it followed.  As discussed below, Crown’s 
compliance with those instructions preserved jurisdiction over its challenge to the 
assessment. 
{¶ 26} Additionally, there is a practical reason for not applying Sun 
Refining in this context.  It is important not only for the taxpayer but the local 
taxing districts for tax assessments to attain finality:  the taxpayer needs to know 
the extent of its obligation, and local taxing authorities need to know how much 
revenue they have.  Applying the Sun Refining doctrine would have the negative 
effect of holding the assessment open for an indefinite period, which would 
thwart the important interest in achieving finality. 
D. Under the tax statutes and administrative-law principles, 
Crown had the option to treat the assessment as preliminary 
{¶ 27} Crown’s second proposition of law states that it had the option of 
“treat[ing] the assessment as either preliminary or final.”  Although Crown has 
not provided a detailed argument in support of this proposition, our review of the 
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statutes and the case law persuades us that Crown’s actions in following the 
appeal instructions preserved the jurisdiction, both of the tax commissioner and 
the BTA, to consider the merits of Crown’s challenge to the assessment.  Crown’s 
failure to fully articulate this argument does not by itself prevent us from 
considering it, because we exercise plenary authority to consider issues that 
concern the jurisdiction of the tax tribunals.  See Elyria v. Lorain Cty. Budget 
Comm., 117 Ohio St.3d 403, 2008-Ohio-940, 884 N.E.2d 553, ¶ 13, citing 
Colonial Village Ltd. v. Washington Cty. Bd. of Revision, 114 Ohio St.3d 493, 
2007-Ohio-4641, 873 N.E.2d 298, ¶ 2; Worthington City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. 
Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 124 Ohio St.3d 27, 2009-Ohio-5932, 918 N.E.2d 
972, ¶ 17 (court possesses authority to consider an issue not specified in the notice 
of appeal because “[a]n issue that pertains to the BTA’s jurisdiction to hear the 
merits of an appeal thereby pertains derivatively to our own jurisdiction”); Brown 
v. Levin, 119 Ohio St.3d 335, 2008-Ohio-4081, 894 N.E.2d 35, ¶ 23, fn. 4 (tax 
commissioner’s failure to file cross-appeal to preserve jurisdictional objection 
does not prevent this court from considering issues bearing on the BTA’s 
jurisdiction and, derivatively, our own); Gaston v. Medina Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
133 Ohio St.3d 18, 2012-Ohio-3872, 975 N.E.2d 941, ¶ 12, fn. 1. 
1. By statute, the commissioner has authority to issue assessments 
and the obligation to provide correct appeal instructions 
{¶ 28} The preliminary assessment of the value of personal property is the 
value reported on the taxpayer’s intercounty tax return showing the value of 
property in different taxing districts of different counties in Ohio.  R.C. 5711.24.  
When administering the personal-property tax, the tax commissioner issues three 
types of assessments:  a preliminary assessment based on the return, an amended 
preliminary assessment, or a final assessment.  R.C. 5711.24; 5711.31; 5711.26. 
{¶ 29} If the tax commissioner issues a preliminary assessment that makes 
changes to the taxpayer’s reported taxable value, that is an “amended preliminary 
January Term, 2013 
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assessment,” and the taxpayer has the right to file a “petition for reassessment,” 
which initiates further review by the Department of Taxation itself.  R.C. 5711.31.  
On the other hand, a final assessment may or may not make changes to the earlier 
assessments and, as its name suggests, it is the Department of Taxation’s “last 
word” on value, which gives rise to a right of appeal to the BTA.  R.C. 5711.26. 
{¶ 30} When the tax commissioner issues an assessment, be it an 
amended preliminary assessment pursuant to R.C. 5711.31 or a final assessment 
pursuant to R.C. 5711.26, the commissioner has the obligation to furnish correct 
appeal instructions to the taxpayer.  First, R.C. 5703.51(C)(2) requires the 
commissioner to furnish, “[w]ith or before the issuance of an assessment,” a 
“written description of the taxpayer’s right to appeal the assessment and an 
explanation of the steps required to request administrative review by the 
commissioner.”  This provision refers to both the “taxpayer’s right to appeal” and 
to “administrative review by the commissioner,” and R.C. 5703.50(D)’s definition 
of “assessment” makes clear the legislative intent that the requirement apply to 
final assessments issued pursuant to R.C. 5711.26.  Second, R.C. 5711.31 
explicitly requires, in the context of a notice of an amended preliminary 
assessment, “instructions on how to petition for reassessment and request a 
hearing on the petition.”  The crucial question in this case is the jurisdictional 
effect of the commissioner’s sending the wrong instructions. 
2. The taxpayer may rely on appeal instructions with respect to 
determining whether an assessment is preliminary or final 
{¶ 31} We hold that by including instructions for filing a petition for 
reassessment with an assessment that identified itself as “final,” the commissioner 
conferred on Crown the option to follow the instructions and thereby treat the 
assessment as preliminary rather than final for appeal purposes.2  There is no 
                                                 
2 Of course, Crown also had the option of treating the assessment as final and appealing directly to 
the BTA. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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reason—and certainly nothing in the statutes—that compels us to make the 
taxpayer suffer adverse consequences because of the commissioner’s own 
statutory transgressions. 
{¶ 32} Potentially significant to our holding is R.C. 5703.51(H):  the 
statute states that the commissioner’s “failure * * * to comply with a provision of 
this section shall neither excuse a taxpayer from payment of any taxes shown to 
be owed by the taxpayer nor cure any procedural defect in a taxpayer’s case.”  
The tax commissioner reads this provision as meaning that omissions and errors 
committed by him have no jurisdictional significance; in other words, under the 
commissioner’s view, a taxpayer relies on the appeal instructions that the tax 
commissioner is required to provide at its own peril.  That Crown did not appeal 
directly to the BTA, contrary to the appeal instructions provided, constitutes an 
insuperable procedural defect in the commissioner’s view. 
{¶ 33} It is certainly true that the statutes detail the means by which 
appeals may be perfected and that a taxpayer must follow the statutes to perfect an 
appeal properly.  But the issue before us does not concern whether an appeal was 
perfected in accordance with statute; it concerns whether Crown had the option to 
treat the assessment as preliminary rather than final for purposes of obtaining 
further review. 
{¶ 34} Contrary to the commissioner’s argument, R.C. 5703.51(H) does 
not bar our holding.  The commissioner’s errors in giving appeal instructions 
cannot cure a procedural defect in the taxpayer’s appeal, but that begs the 
question whether Crown’s filing a reassessment petition, as it was instructed to do 
by the tax commissioner himself, constituted a procedural defect.  Under our 
holding, it did not.  Because there was no procedural defect to cure, R.C. 
5703.51(H) does not apply. 
January Term, 2013 
13 
 
3. Under these circumstances, R.C. 5711.26 imposes an obligation 
on the commissioner, but does not limit the taxpayer’s right to review 
{¶ 35} It could be argued that because R.C. 5711.26 required the tax 
commissioner to issue a final, rather than a preliminary, assessment upon Crown’s 
application, Crown may not treat the assessment as preliminary rather than final.  
We reject that argument.  We reiterate that we will not inflict the adverse 
consequences of the tax commissioner’s own violation of the statutes on the 
taxpayer. 
{¶ 36} R.C. 5711.26 does state that the commissioner “shall * * * finally 
assess” personal property when a taxpayer has filed a petition for reassessment.  
That means that the commissioner had the obligation by statute in this case to 
issue a final assessment rather than a preliminary one.  But that obligation is 
intended to serve the interest of the taxpayer by releasing the case from the 
Department of Taxation and permitting the taxpayer to obtain review by the BTA.  
And the burden of properly issuing a final assessment—which by statute includes 
the burden of providing correct appeal instructions—falls squarely on the 
commissioner, not on the taxpayer. 
{¶ 37} When the commissioner issued appeal instructions calling for the 
assessment to be treated as if it were preliminary and the taxpayer followed those 
instructions, the taxpayer did not suffer the loss of its right to obtain further 
review.  To the contrary, Crown had a right to receive a final determination that 
would address the assessment and that Crown could then appeal to the BTA.  On 
remand, the commissioner shall issue that determination.  Crown will then have 
the right to appeal to the BTA, specifying whatever errors it perceives in the 
determination. 
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4. The tax commissioner’s errors did not create a jurisdictional bar 
to further review of Crown’s assessment 
{¶ 38} Our holding in this case should be understood as an application of 
general principles of administrative law to the particular circumstances we 
confront here.  As a general matter, an administrative determination remains 
within the jurisdiction of the administrative agency for at least the duration of the 
appeal period.  See Hal Artz Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 28 Ohio 
St.3d 20, 502 N.E.2d 590 (1986), paragraph three of the syllabus.  The procedures 
that relate to amended preliminary assessments under R.C. 5711.31 fall within 
this doctrine in the specific context of personal-property tax assessments. 
{¶ 39} Indeed, with respect to tax assessments, the commissioner’s 
authority is even broader:  under R.C. 5703.05(H), the tax commissioner as tax 
assessor possesses the authority, “on the commissioner’s own motion” and within 
“time limitations provided by law,” to “review[], redetermin[e], or correct[] any 
tax assessments” that have previously been issued.  The tax commissioner has no 
authority to redetermine or correct existing assessments when (1) the assessments 
are under review on appeal from a determination of the commissioner or (2) 
further action is statutorily time-barred. 
{¶ 40} These statutes confer a general power on the commissioner to 
reconsider the assessment (at least within the appeal period) after it has been 
issued.  Under the particular circumstances of this case, the inclusion of the wrong 
appeal instructions, together with Crown’s compliance, operated in the same way 
the reconsideration order did in Hal Artz:  it preserved the commissioner’s 
jurisdiction, and hence Crown’s right to obtain review of the assessment by the 
BTA, once the commissioner issued the final determination.  Because the statutes 
afford Crown a procedural remedy, we do not reach the constitutional due process 
argument under Crown’s fourth proposition of law. 
January Term, 2013 
15 
 
Conclusion 
{¶ 41} For the foregoing reasons, the BTA erred by determining that 
Crown had committed a fatal procedural error when it followed the appeal 
instructions furnished by the tax commissioner.  We therefore reverse the decision 
of the BTA and remand to the tax commissioner with instructions to issue a final 
determination that addresses the assessment on the merits.  Thereafter, Crown will 
have the right to appeal to the BTA in accordance with R.C. 5717.02. 
Decision reversed 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, FRENCH, and 
O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
____________________ 
 
Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, L.L.P., Steven A. Dimengo, and 
Jason M. Weigand, for appellants. 
 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Barton A. Hubbard and Sophia 
Hussain, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee. 
________________________