Case Title: Ramos v. Franklin

Citation: 139 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 6

Docket Number: 84520

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2023-03-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
490New, Advance Opinion (9
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

 

CAROLYN RAMOS; AND PHILLIP No. 84520
RAMOS,

Appellants, FILE
ASHLEY DAWN FRANKLIN; AND :
JOHN BRYAN FRANKLIN wa 15a
Respondents. ig Ht

Appeal from a district court order denying a petition for
grandparent visitation. Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division,
Clark County; Amy Mastin, Judge.

Affirmed.

Robert W. Lueck, Ltd., and Robert W. Lueck, Las Vegas,
for Appellants,

McFarling Law Group and Emily M. McParling and Ashlee N. Vazquez, Las
Vegas,
for Respondent Ashley Dawn Franklin.

 

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, STIGLICH, C.J., HERNDON, J., AND
SILVER, Sr. J.!

 

‘The Honorable Abbi Silver, Senior Justice, participated in this

decision under a general order of assignment.

23-ovosd

  

 
OPINION
By the Court, STIGLICH, C.J.

NRS 125C.050 permits grandparents and others to petition for
visitation with a minor child when “a parent of the child has denied or
unreasonably restricted visits with the child.” Here, the district court
denied a petition for grandparent visitation after concluding that one of the
parents provided the grandparents with reasonable visitation. The
grandparents now challenge that conclusion, asserting that the
requirement was met because the other parent denied them visitation
entirely and the district court incorrectly found that the visitation they
received was reasonable

We conclude that the relevant inquiry, in the context of a
petition for visitation in joint custody situations, is whether the petitioners’
visits with the children overall have been denied or unreasonably restricted.
Because the district court in this case did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that visits with the children were not denied or unreasonably
restricted, we conclude that the district court properly denied the
grandparents’ petition for visitation. Accordingly, we affirm

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Respondents Ashley Franklin and John Franklin divorced in

 

2022. WI

 

le the divorce proceedings were ongoing, Ashley and John

voluntarily signed a six-month guardianship agreement providing

appellant Carolyn Ramos, Ashley's mother, with temporary legal and
physical custody of their two minor children, A.F. and K.P. Although

 

 
Carolyn's husband, Philp Ramos, was not named in the agreement, the
parties understood that he was also responsible for the children.
‘The children returned to their parents’ care in August 2020,

while the divorce proceedings were still pending.* Ashley and John agreed

 

to a partial parenting agreement, which the district court adopted. In the
agreement, Ashley and John “agree{d] that no other person, including
maternal grandparents, shall have court-ordered permanent custody of or
visitation with their children.”

‘The grandparents moved to intervene in the divorce case and
petitioned for visitation under NRS 125C.050 in September 2020, arguing
that the parents had “unreasonably restricted their ability to visit with the
minor children” and citing the partial parenting agreement as evidence. In
November 2020, they petitioned for immediate visitation and for an
evidentiary hearing, seeking one weekend with their grandchildren each
month, twe weeks with their grandchildren every summer, and potentially

overnight visitation on Christinas Eve. The district court granted the

 

’We refer to Carolyn and Phillip collectively as “the grandparents.”

 

8On appeal, the grandparents argue that the order terminating their
temporary custody of the children, which led to the children returning to
their parents’ care, was made in error The six-month guardianship
agreement was entered on December 26, 2019, and thus expired on June
26, 2020. See NRS 159A.205(6) (“The short-term guardien appointed
pursuant to this section serves as guardian of the minor for 6
months...."). Accordingly, the grandparents’ arguments regarding the
order terminating their temporary custody are moot because they admit
that at the time they were not seeking permanent physical custody, and,
regardless of any alleged error in how the district court terminated their
temporary custody, the temporary guardianship had already expired. See
NCAA v. Univ. of Nev., Reno, 97 Nev. 56, 58, 624 P.2d 10, 11 (1981)
(describing mootness). Thus, we decline to reach these arguments.

 

 

 
motion to intervene but deferred ruling on the grandparents’ visitation
petition until after the divorce was settled.

Ultimately, the divorce decree ‘awarded Ashley and John joint
legal and physical custody of the children. Thereafter, in February 2022,
the district court held an evidentiary hearing on the grandparents’ petition

for visitation. Ashley, John, and the grandparents testified. The district

 

court found that Ashley was not a credible witness and relied instead on
John’s and the grandparents’ testimony

Jobn testified that he did not allow the grandparents contact
with the children when they initially returned to his and Ashley's care.
John said that he did not permit contact because he believed that Phillip
was responsible for his fiancé’s arrest. When he learned that was not true,
he allowed the grandparents to visit the children. According to John, the
grandparents (1) visited the children during his weekends for “an afternoon,

maybe’; (2) picked up the children from school occasionally; (3) hosted the

 

children overnight on Christmas Eve 2021; (4) arranged a spring-break trip
involving the grandparents, John, his fiancé, and the children; and (5) had
three overnight stays with the children while he was working

John also expressed that he was willing to agree to the
grandparents visiting with the children during his weekends. When asked
about the partial parenting agreement, he testified that he understood the
difference between court-ordered contact and contact that he decides to
allow. However, John also said, “I can't guarantee time with the
[grandparents]. I work a lot.”

Phillip testified that there was a period of about “five months,

maybe—maybe a little bit less” when John denied the grandparents contact

with the children. After John apologized to Phillip for his mistaken belief

 

 
one

 

that Phillip was responsible for his fiancé’s arrest, Phillip said, they “got to
see them for—occasionally. Not very often.” Phillip provided a list of the
dates, times, and duration of his visits with the children since August 2020,
reporting 196 hours spent with the children in 2021.

Carolyn testified that, since August 2020, she had no contact
with the children via Ashley. She said that when she reached out to Ashley,
Ashley responded with “T'll let you know” but did not follow up. Carolyn
recognized that there could be additional days when she had contact with
the children that are not on Phillip’s list. For example, she helped the
children with virtual schooling for a few days at her home in 2021. Carolyn
said, “If the Court doesn’t grant us any time with these kids, there-—there
isn't any guarantee these children will ever see us again, from either
parent.” She continued, “We can't—we can't count on either one.”

‘The district court denied the grandparents’ petition, concluding
that “although the grandparents’ contact is timited to the alternating weeks
that John has custody of the children, the amount of time spent with the
girls is sufficient to defeat a finding that the [grandparents'] contact is being
denied or unreasonably restricted.” Although the court acknowledged the
partial parenting agreement and the fact that the grandparents were
“denied nearly all contact for a five month period,” by time of the February
2022 hearing, circumstances had changed—the grandparents had ongoing

contact with A.F. and K.P. ‘The grandparents appealed.

 

‘John consents to the idea of court-ordered visitation insofar as it
forces Ashley to give up some of her custodial time to the grandparents.
Accordingly, he did not respond to the grandparents’ fast track statement
or otherwise communicate with this court about the response. Asa result,
we resolve this appeal without his response. Ramos v. Franklin, Docket No.
84520 (Order, August 24, 2022),

 
DISCUSSION
Petitioners’ visits with the children must have been denied or unreasonably
restricted to warrant reluef in a petition for visitation

 

with the children were

 

‘The grandparents argue that their visit
‘denied or unreasonably restricted.”> They contend that the district court's
finding that they were not denied or unreasonably restricted visits “rubber
stamped” Ashley’s decision to deny them contact with the children during
her time. We disagree and take this opportunity to clarify NRS
1250.050(8).

We have not addressed whether NRS 125C.050(8) requires each
parent, rather than just one, to have denied or unreasonably restricted
contact. Here, the district court focused on the contact that the
grandparents had with the children, not which parent provided it. Because
the grandparents had regular access to the children, it was irrelevant to the
district court that Ashley allegedly denied visits. We agree and clarify that
in a petition for visitation, where the parents have joint custody and
participate in resolving the petition, the focus is on petitioners’ access to the
children, As a result, if one parent has not denied or unreasonably
restricted visits, then the petition fails, and the district court does not need.

to address the actions of the other parent.

 

 

*We decline to consider the grandparents’ arguments that Ashley is
an unfit parent and that we should adopt the functional-parent theory
because they are waived. See Old Aztec Mine, Inc. v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52,
623 P.2d 981, 983 (1981) ("A point not urged in the trial court . .. 18 deemed
to have been waived and will not be considered on appeal”). Although
Carolyn argued in an earlier motion that Ashley was unfit, she abandoned
that argument by failing te raise it in subsequent petitions for visitation,
and the district court did not address it. Thus, this argument is waived.
Likewise, the grandparents did not raise the functional-parent theory
below, so it also is waived. Id.

 

 
Although we generally review decisions regarding visitation
rights for an abuse of discretion, Rennels v. Rennels, 127 Nev. 564, 568-69,
257 P.3d. 396, 399 (2011), we review a district court's interpretation of a
statute de novo, Potter v. Potter, 121 Nev. 613, 616, 119 P.3d 1246, 1248

(2008); see Rennels, 127 Nev. at 568-69, 257 P.3d at 399 (providing that even

 

in the context of a child visitation case, we review questions of law de novo).
“When the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, its apparent
intent must be given effect.” Potter, 121 Nev. at 616, 119 P.3d at 1248. But
iffa statute is ambiguous, “we then look beyond the statute to the legislative
history and interpret the statute in a reasonable manner in light of policy
and the spirit of the law.” Pawlik v. Shyang-Fenn Deng, 134 Nev. 83, 85,
412 P.3d 68, 71 (2018) (internal quotations omitted). A statute is ambiguous
if it“is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations.” Id.

NRS 125C.050 provides that certain relatives or other persons
may petition for visitation with minor children. Ifa parent of a minor child
is deceased, divorced or separated from the parent who has custody of the
child, no longer has parental rights, or was never married to the other
parent but cohabitated with the other parent and is deceased or separated
from the other parent, then the grandparents, great-grandparents, or other
children of either parent may petition for a reasonable right to visit the
child. NRS 125C.050(1). Alternatively, regardless of biological relation, a
person who has lived with and established a meaningful relationship with

the child may petition for visitation.® NRS 125C.050(2).

Although the district court acknowledged NRS 125C.050(1) and (2),
it did not address which category the grandparents fell into. The parties
agree that the grandparents were eligible to petition for visitation.
Regardless of whether the grandparents fell under NRS 125C.050(1) or (2),

 

 
 

Visitation under these provisions may be ordered “only if a
parent of the child has denied or unreasonably restricted visits with the
child.” NRS 125C,050(3). If visits have been denied or unreasonably
restricted, “there is a rebuttable presumption that the granting of a right to
visitation to a party seeking visitation ... is not in the best interests of the
child.” NRS 125C.050(4). “To rebut this presumption, the party seeking
visitation must prove by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best
interests of the child to grant visitation.” Id. NRS 125C.050(6) provides
factors that the district court must consider in determining whether the
petitioners rebutted the presumption.

NRS 125C.050(3) is ambiguous

Here, there are two reasonable ways to interpret NRS
125C,050(3). On the one hand, NRS 125C.050(3) refers to “a parent,” which
is singular, so it can be read as allowing the court to consider ordering
visitation when only one parent denies or unreasonably restricts visits. On
the other hand, where two parents have joint custody, NRS 125C.050(3) can
be read to apply to each parent, so that the inquiry is whether, overall, the
petitioners’ visits have been denied or unreasonably restricted. Thus, NRS
125C.050(3) is ambiguous, and we must “look beyond the statute.” Pawlik,
134 Nev. at 85, 412 P.3d at 71

Reason and policy suggest that NRS 125C.050(3), in a petition for
visitation, refers to the actions of both parents collectively, not to
those of just one parent

In 2001, the Nevada Legislature amended NRS 125C.050 in

response to the United States Supreme Court case Troxel v. Granville, 530

 

in order for a petition for visitation to proceed the district court must find
that a parent denied or unreasonably restricted visits under NRS
125C.050(3). Accordingly, we only address NRS 125C.050(3)

 
   

US. 57 (2000). 2001 Nev. Stat., ch 547, § 1, at 2712-14; Hearmg on S.B. 25

Before the S. Comm. on Juidiciary, 71st Leg. (Nev. Feb. 13,

 

101) (noting
that “language might need to be added to S.B. 25 to meet the constitutional
challenge of Troxel” (statement of Senator Ann O'Connell)). In Troxel, a
plurality of the Supreme Court held that a Washington State visitation
statute was unconstitutional because it infringed on the parents’
fundamental rights to make decisions on the care, custody, and control of
their child. Troxel, 530 U.S. at-60, 75, NRS 125C.050(3), along with the
presumption in NRS 125C.050(4), were added to strengthen the
constitutionality of NRS 125C.050 by protecting the parents’ fundamental
interests, See Hearing on S.B. 25 Before the Assemb. Comm. on Judiciary,
71st Leg., Exh. D (Nev. May 7, 2001) (advising that “NRS 125C.050 would
be less vulnerable to constitutional challenge if the statute were amended
to require a threshold showing of harm or potential harm to the child before
visitation may be sought” and listing denial of visits and the parental
presumption as examples); compare NRS 125C.050 (1999) (containing no
parental presumption or “denied or unreasonably restricted” language),

with NRS 125C.050 (2001) (adding NRS 125C.050(3), (4))

 

We are persuaded that interpreting “a parent” to refer to each
parent rather than just one parent serves both the interests of the child and
the parents’ interests. NRS 125C.050 recognizes that the best interests of
the child may be contact with grandparents in some circumstances. The
proper focus then is whether the child has reasonable contact with the
grandparents, not which parent provides that contact. The “each” parent
interpretation properly focuses on what contact the child actually receives,

and if one parent is providing reasonable contact, then the petition for

visitation fails. This result serves the best interests of the child because the

 

 
 

child is receiving contact with the grandparents while the parents’ rights to.
determine those interests are also being recognized

In contrast, interpreting “a parent” to refer to only one parent
unreasonably burdens the parents’ interests without furthering the child's
interests. Under this interpretation, one parent may provide the
grandparents with regular, reasonable contact with the child, which serves
the child's best interest, but the petition may nonetheless proceed just
because the other parent denies or unreasonably restricts additional
contact. This interpretation does not further the child's best interests
because the child's best interests are already met via the contact that one
parent provides and thus undermines a parent's interest in the care,
custody, and control of his or her child for no justifiable reason.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the parents did
not unreasonably restrict visits with the children

‘The grandparents argue that the record does not support the
district court’s finding that their visits with the children have not been
unreasonably restricted. However, the grandparents do not allege that the
district court got the facts wrong by relying on visits that did not actually
happen. Instead, they disagree with how the district court determined that,
the visits did not amount to an unreasonable restriction.

A district court decision regarding visitation rights is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. Rennels, 127 Nev. at 568-69, 257 P.3d at 399.
We uphold the district court's factual findings if they are supported by
substantial evidence and not clearly erroneous. Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev.

660, 668, 221 P.3d 699, 704 (2009),

 

Here, the grandparents do not dispute the facts, and the visits
relied on by the district court in making its findings are supported by

testimony at the evidentiary hearing. Although Ashley and John agreed to

10

 
oppose court-ordered visitation, an agreement against court-ordered
visitation is not the same thing as an agreement that the grandparents will
not have any contact with the children, Instead, Ashley and John seek to
retain their discretion as parents to decide who has contact with their
children and the circumstances under which such contact occurs

‘The grandparents appear to assert that the volatility of their
relationships with both John and Ashley warrant court-ordered visitation.
But this volatility, this uncertainty, is inherent in parent-child
relationships. Without more, anxiety about what the future may hold, or
uncertainty about how relationships will play out in the future, does not
constitute an unreasonable restriction. Based on these facts, where the
grandparents are receiving fairly regular visits with the children, we cannot
say that the district court abused its discretion by finding that the parents
ct the grandparents’ visits with the children.?

CONCLUSION

In a petition for visitation under NRS 125C.050, where the

did not unreasonably restr

 

parents of minor children have joint custody, the district court must
determine whether the parents have denied or unreasonably restricted
petitioners’ visits with the children. If one parent provides the petitioners
with sufficient contact with the children so that their visits are not denied
or unreasonably restricted under NRS 125C.050(3), the petition fails,
regardless of whether the other parent provides contact. Here, one parent
permitted regular contact between the grandparents and the children and
thus the grandparents were not denied or unreasonably restricted

Visitation. ‘The grandparents’ concern for the volatility of their

We decline Ashley's request for monetary sanctions on appeal.

 

 

 
 

relationships with either parent does not constitute an unreasonable

restriction. Accordingly, we affirm,

— Aig __. c4

Stiglich

We concur

 

Herndon

AS Lyer)—s.3

Silver