Case Title: Laboratory Corp. of America v. Davis

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC19-1923, SC19-1936

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2022-05-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC19-1923 
____________ 
 
LABORATORY CORPORATION OF AMERICA, et al., 
Petitioners, 
 
vs. 
 
PATTY DAVIS, etc., et al., 
Respondents. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC19-1936 
____________ 
 
SHERIDAN RADIOLOGY SERVICES OF PINELLAS, INC., et al., 
Petitioners, 
 
vs. 
 
PATTY DAVIS, etc., et al., 
Respondents. 
 
May 26, 2022 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
In this case we consider the interaction between the statutory 
remedy for prohibited consumer debt collection practices provided 
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by the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act (FCCPA)1 and the 
provision of the Workers’ Compensation Law (WCL)2 vesting the 
Department of Financial Services (DFS) with exclusive jurisdiction 
to decide matters concerning workers’ compensation 
reimbursement.  Before the Court for review is the decision of the 
Second District Court of Appeal in Davis v. Sheridan Healthcare, 
Inc., 281 So. 3d 1259 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019), in which the court held 
the WCL exclusive jurisdiction provision to be inapplicable as a bar 
to suit by an injured worker against a health care provider for 
prohibited debt collection practices.  Id. at 1261.  The Second 
District certified the following question to be of great public 
importance: 
DOES SECTION 440.13(11)(c) OF THE WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION LAW PRECLUDE CIRCUIT COURT 
JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS UNDER SECTION 
559.77(1) OF THE FLORIDA CONSUMER COLLECTION 
PRACTICES ACT? 
 
Id. at 1267.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.   
 
 
1.  §§ 559.55-559.785, Fla. Stat. (2014). 
 
2.  Ch. 440, Fla. Stat. (2014). 
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We answer the certified question in the negative and approve the 
result reached by the Second District.  
I 
Patty Davis was injured during the course of her employment.  
Subsequently, Davis utilized workers’ compensation benefits to 
receive medical care for her work-related injuries.  Davis received 
medical care from two providers: Sheridan Radiology Services of 
Pinellas, Inc., a subsidiary of Sheridan Healthcare, Inc. (Sheridan); 
and Laboratory Corporation of America and Laboratory Corporation 
of America Holdings (Labcorp).  Thereafter, Sheridan and Labcorp 
repeatedly billed Davis directly for the medical care that she 
received. 
Davis then filed two separate actions against Sheridan and 
Labcorp under section 559.77(1), Florida Statutes (2014), of the 
FCCPA.  Davis argued that as an injured employee under the 
WCL—chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2014)—she was not to be 
billed for seeking medical care for her work-related injuries.  
Instead, according to Davis’s claim, her employer’s workers’ 
compensation carrier, Commercial Risk Management, Inc. (CRM), 
was responsible for reimbursing Sheridan and Labcorp.  In turn, 
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Davis maintained that Sheridan and Labcorp’s attempts to collect 
the debt from her constituted an attempt to collect an illegitimate 
debt, violating section 559.72, Florida Statutes (2014), of the 
FCCPA. 
In response, Sheridan and Labcorp asserted that the trial 
courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction for the alleged FCCPA 
violations.  Under Sheridan and Labcorp’s reasoning, section 
440.13(11)(c) of the WCL unequivocally states that DFS “has 
exclusive jurisdiction to decide any matters concerning 
reimbursement.”  Consequently, Sheridan and Labcorp claimed, 
because their billing Davis was merely a “matter[] concerning 
reimbursement,” exclusive jurisdiction over the matter was vested 
in DFS. 
The trial courts agreed with Sheridan and Labcorp and 
dismissed Davis’s FCCPA claims.  Davis appealed.  In its 
consolidated opinion, the Second District held that “the WCL does 
not preclude Davis’s claims filed against her workers’ compensation 
medical providers under section 559.77(1) of the FCCPA,” reversed 
both trial court dismissals, and certified to this Court the question 
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of great public importance set forth above.  Davis, 281 So. 3d at 
1261, 1267. 
II 
Section 559.72 of the FCCPA prohibits various debt collection 
practices.  Subsection (9) provides that “no person shall . . . [c]laim, 
attempt, or threaten to enforce a debt when such person knows 
that the debt is not legitimate, or assert the existence of some other 
legal right when such person knows that the right does not exist.”  
Section 559.77 contains provisions authorizing and governing civil 
remedies for violations of the FCCPA.  Subsection (1) provides that 
“[a] debtor may bring a civil action against a person violating the 
provisions of s. 559.72.”  Subsection (2) provides for the award of 
“actual damages and for additional statutory damages . . . not 
exceeding $1,000.”  Punitive damages and other equitable relief are 
also authorized. 
Section 440.13 of the WCL establishes the framework for the 
provision of medical services to injured workers and for the 
reimbursement of medical providers by carriers and employers for 
those services.  Subsection (3)(g) provides that “[t]he employee is not 
liable for payment for medical treatment or services provided 
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pursuant to this section except as otherwise provided in this 
section.”  In addition, subsection (13)(a) provides that “provider[s] 
may not collect or receive a fee from an injured employee within this 
state” unless otherwise provided and that “providers have recourse 
against the employer or carrier for payment for services rendered in 
accordance with [the WCL].”3 
 Subsection (11)(a) of section 440.13 grants DFS the power to 
“investigate health care providers to determine whether providers 
are complying with [the WCL] and with rules adopted by [DFS],” 
including “whether the providers are engaging in overutilization, 
 
 
3.  Under subsection (5)(a) of section 440.13, an employee 
“requesting and selecting [an] independent medical examination 
shall be responsible for all expenses associated with said 
examination, including, but not limited to, medically necessary 
diagnostic testing performed and physician or medical care provider 
fees for the evaluation,” but “[i]f the employee prevails in a medical 
dispute as determined in an order by a judge of compensation 
claims or if benefits are paid or treatment provided after the 
employee has obtained an independent medical examination based 
upon the examiner’s findings, the costs of such examination shall 
be paid by the employer or carrier.”  Subsection (5)(d) provides that 
an employee who without justification and proper notice fails to 
appear for an independent medical examination properly scheduled 
by a carrier or employer “shall reimburse the employer or carrier 50 
percent of the physician’s cancellation or no-show fee.” 
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[and] whether providers are engaging in improper billing practices.”4  
“If [DFS] finds that a health care provider has improperly billed, 
overutilized, or failed to comply with [DFS] rules or the 
requirements of [the WCL]” DFS “may determine that the health 
care provider may not receive payment from the carrier or may 
impose penalties as set forth [elsewhere in the WCL].”  If a provider 
has received improper payments “from a carrier,” the provider 
“must return those payments to the carrier.”  DFS is authorized to 
impose “a penalty not to exceed $500” for overpayments that are 
not timely refunded. 
Subsection (11)(c)—which is the focus of the issue presented 
by this case—provides that DFS “has exclusive jurisdiction to decide 
any matters concerning reimbursement, to resolve any overutilization 
dispute under subsection (7), and to decide any question 
concerning overutilization under subsection (8).”  (Emphasis 
 
 
4.  Undergirding the authority of DFS regarding providers is 
the provision of subsection (3)(f) of section 440.13 that “[b]y 
accepting payment under [the WCL] for treatment rendered to an 
injured employee, a health care provider consents to the jurisdiction 
of [DFS] as set forth in subsection (11)” and to the submission of 
records relevant to “a reimbursement dispute, audit, or review.” 
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added.)  The first mentioned subsection provides for remedies 
against carriers that improperly deny reimbursement, and the 
second subsection provides penalties against providers that engage 
in overutilization. 
Subsection (7) establishes the administrative process for 
resolving “utilization and reimbursement disputes” between carriers 
and providers.  Subsection (1)(q) defines “[r]eimbursement dispute” 
as “any disagreement between a health care provider or health care 
facility and carrier concerning payment for medical treatment.”  
Subsection (7)(d) provides that when DFS “finds an improper 
disallowance or improper adjustment of payment by an insurer, the 
insurer shall reimburse the health care provider, facility, insurer, or 
employer.”  Provision is made in subsection (7)(f) for the imposition 
of various penalties on “[a]ny carrier that engages in a pattern or 
practice of arbitrarily or unreasonably disallowing or reducing 
payments to health care providers.”  The authorized penalties are 
“[r]epayment of the appropriate amount to the . . . provider,” 
administrative fines by DFS of up to $5,000 for each improper 
disallowance or reduction of payments, and the award of the 
provider’s costs, including a reasonable attorney’s fee. 
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Subsection (8) establishes the process for the determination by 
DFS that a provider has engaged in a pattern or practice of 
overutilization.  Subsection (8)(b) enumerates penalties that may be 
imposed on a provider that “has engaged in a pattern or practice of 
overutilization or a violation of [the WCL] or rules adopted by 
[DFS]”: “[a]n order barring the provider from payment;” 
“[d]eauthorization of care under review;” “[d]enial of payment for 
care rendered in the future;” “[a]n administrative fine of $5,000;” 
and “[n]otification of and review by the appropriate licensing 
authority” of licensed practitioners as provided by the WCL. 
III 
According to the petitioner healthcare providers, the claim 
made by Davis under the FCCPA that the providers had improperly 
billed her—rather than the workers’ compensation carrier—in 
violation of the WCL fell within the scope of section 440.13(11)(c)’s 
provision vesting “exclusive jurisdiction” in DFS “to decide any 
matters concerning reimbursement.”  The petitioners contend that 
the only basis for Davis’s claim under the FCCPA was the WCL’s 
“particularized reimbursement requirements,” i.e., the general 
prohibition on charging injured workers. 
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The petitioners also assert that the use of the words “any” and 
“concerning” indicate that the exclusive jurisdiction provision is 
designed to sweep broadly.  And they contend that there is “no 
third-party requirement inherent in the word ‘reimburse.’ ”  
Accordingly, they argue that a direct payment from a patient to a 
provider is a reimbursement so that the term “reimbursement” is 
essentially synonymous with “payment.” 
Finally, the petitioners contend that the WCL’s specific “self-
contained system for dealing with covered workers’ compensation 
issues” is not altered by the subsequently enacted generally 
applicable provisions of the FCCPA.  In making this argument, they 
invoke the specific-controls-the-general canon and the presumption 
against implied repeals. 
Respondent Davis’s core argument is that the reference in 
section 440.13(11)(c) to “any matters concerning reimbursement” 
cannot be understood to include the matter at issue here, which 
arises from claims for payment by providers directly from a patient.  
Davis relies on the ordinary meaning of “reimbursement,” which she 
asserts does not encompass a payment made directly from a patient 
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to a provider, as well as the manner in which the term is used in 
the WCL. 
Invoking the whole-text canon and the consistent-usage 
canon, Davis points to the use of “reimbursement” and “reimburse” 
in numerous provisions of the WCL to designate a payment made 
by a carrier to a provider for services rendered to an injured worker.  
Davis also points to the absence of any provision of the WCL in 
which “reimbursement” or “reimburse” refers to “a payment sought 
by a provider from an employee, or a payment owed by an employee 
to a provider.” 
Finally, based on this reading of the statute, Davis argues that 
there is no conflict between the WCL and the FCCPA.  In the 
absence of such conflict, Davis contends there is no need to resort 
to the canons relied on by the petitioners to resolve the conflict they 
assert exists.5 
 
 
5.  We decline to address other arguments that have been 
presented. 
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IV 
Answering the certified question requires us to determine the 
scope of the “exclusive jurisdiction” provision of section 
440.13(11)(c).  The standard of review for such issues of statutory 
interpretation is de novo.  Lopez v. Hall, 233 So. 3d 451, 453 (Fla. 
2018). 
In interpreting a statute, our task is to give effect to the words 
that the legislature has employed in the statutory text.  “The words 
of a governing text are of paramount concern, and what they 
convey, in their context, is what the text means.”  Ham v. Portfolio 
Recovery Assocs., LLC, 308 So. 3d 942, 946 (Fla. 2020) (quoting 
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation 
of Legal Texts 56 (2012)).  As it was long ago observed: “The words 
of a statute are to be taken in their natural and ordinary 
signification and import; and if technical words are used, they are 
to be taken in a technical sense.”  James Kent, Commentaries on 
American Law 432 (1826), quoted in Scalia & Garner, Reading Law 
at 69 n.1.  “[T]he goal of interpretation is to arrive at a ‘fair reading’ 
of the text by ‘determining the application of [the] text to given facts 
on the basis of how a reasonable reader, fully competent in the 
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language, would have understood the text at the time it was 
issued.’ ”  Ham, 308 So. 3d at 947 (quoting Scalia & Garner, 
Reading Law at 33).  Such a fair reading will always be mindful of 
the “fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, 
of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined 
in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is 
used.”  Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993).  “Context is 
a primary determinant of meaning.”  Scalia & Garner, Reading Law 
at 167.  Under the whole-text canon, proper interpretation requires 
consideration of “the entire text, in view of its structure and of the 
physical and logical relation of its many parts.”  Id. 
Here, we must determine the meaning of the phrase “exclusive 
jurisdiction to decide any matters concerning reimbursement.”  
§ 440.13(11)(c), Fla. Stat.  We consider first the ordinary meaning of 
the verb “reimburse,” from which the noun “reimbursement” is 
derived.  We then look to the way “reimbursement” and “reimburse” 
are used in the WCL.  We then determine how the scope of the 
“exclusive jurisdiction” provision is affected by the phrase “any 
matters concerning” as the final step in resolving the dispositive 
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question whether the matter at issue in this case is within the 
scope of “any matters concerning reimbursement.” 
Reimburse means “1. To repay (money spent); refund.  2. To 
pay back or compensate (another party) for money spent or losses 
incurred.”  The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language 1522 (3d ed. 1992).  This does not encompass a payment 
for services made by the recipient of services to the provider of 
those services.  The ordinary meaning of the term thus is not 
consistent with the meaning urged by the petitioners.  Contrary to 
the line of analysis advanced by the petitioners, “reimburse” is not a 
synonym for “pay.”  In common usage, all reimbursements are 
payments but not every payment is a reimbursement.  Similarly, 
the fact that a provision of the WCL—section 440.13(13)(a), for 
example—refers to reimbursement using the term “payment” does 
not establish that reimbursement and payment are synonymous 
terms in the WCL.  And there is no basis for concluding that any 
relevant “technical sense” of the term “reimburse” or 
“reimbursement” supports the petitioners’ position on this point. 
The use of “reimburse” and “reimbursement” throughout the 
WCL is similarly inconsistent with the meaning advanced by the 
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petitioners.  And it is fully consistent with the meaning advanced by 
Davis.  As is apparent from the foregoing review of the relevant 
provisions of the WCL, in the overwhelming number of instances 
when those words appear in the WCL, they refer to payment made 
by a carrier to a provider for services rendered to an injured worker.  
The definition of “reimbursement dispute” in section 440.13(1)(q) as 
“any disagreement between a health care provider or health care 
facility and carrier concerning payment for medical treatment” sets 
the stage for the usage of the terms “reimbursement” and 
“reimburse” throughout the section.  (Emphasis added.)  And not 
once do the terms “reimbursement” or “reimburse” refer to a 
payment made to a provider by a worker for services rendered to the 
worker.  The position advanced by the petitioners thus runs up 
against the “presumption of consistent usage:” “A word or phrase is 
presumed to bear the same meaning throughout a text . . . .”  Scalia 
& Garner, Reading Law at 170.  No basis is apparent for defeating 
this presumption here.  It is thus entirely implausible that the term 
“reimbursement” in the “exclusive jurisdiction” provision should be 
given a meaning different not only from its ordinary meaning but 
also from the meaning it has elsewhere in the WCL. 
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It would indeed be a very odd choice for the Legislature to use 
the term “reimbursement” in a sense in the exclusive jurisdiction 
provision different from the word’s meaning throughout the WCL.  If 
the Legislature had meant to say “payment,” that term was readily 
available.  Given the statutory context, it is unreasonable to 
conclude that the phrase “any matters concerning reimbursement” 
is equivalent to the phrase “any matters concerning payment.” 
We also reject the petitioners’ claim that the dispute here is 
within the scope of “any matters concerning reimbursement” even if 
the dispute is not a dispute over reimbursement.  We have 
recognized that terms such as “concerning” frequently have a broad 
reach and should not be subjected to an unduly narrow 
interpretation.  See Ham, 308 So. 3d at 948-50.  But we have never 
suggested that terms such as “concerning” should be interpreted in 
the most expansive manner possible in every context.  A “fair 
reading” of such terms to understand their proper reach will 
necessarily be sensitive to the full statutory context.  
It is obvious that a direct connection exists between the 
dispute in this case and the WCL.  Davis’s claim is based on an 
alleged violation of specific provisions of the statutory scheme that 
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prohibit the billing of injured workers by providers.  Absent those 
provisions of the WCL, Davis would have no claim.  But that is a 
different issue than the question we must decide—whether the 
matter here is a “matter[] concerning reimbursement.”  The dispute 
here arises from alleged prohibited billing, which involves the 
relationship between the billing provider and the billed injured 
worker.  This is distinct from reimbursement matters, which involve 
the relationship between the provider and the carrier.  Given this 
context, we conclude that it is most reasonable to understand the 
“exclusive jurisdiction” provision as covering “any matters 
concerning” payments by a carrier to a provider but not applicable 
to the dissimilar matters that involve improper billing of a worker by 
a provider.  In essence, the petitioners contend that the “exclusive 
jurisdiction” provision should be read to vest jurisdiction in DFS of 
all matters arising from a violation of the WCL concerning payments 
or charges for medical services, except matters subject to 
determination by a judge of compensation claims.  The Legislature 
could have adopted such an expansive statutory provision, but it 
did not do so. 
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Given our interpretation of the scope of the “exclusive 
jurisdiction” provision, there is no need to address the arguments of 
the petitioners based on the presumption against implied repeals 
and the specific-controls-the-general canon. 
V 
We conclude that the matter at issue here under the FCCPA is 
not a “matter[] concerning reimbursement” subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of DFS.  The jurisdiction of the circuit court is 
undisturbed by the provisions of the WCL.  We therefore answer the 
certified question in the negative and approve the result reached by 
the Second District. 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, MUÑIZ, 
COURIEL, and GROSSHANS, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION 
AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal 
Certified Great Public Importance 
 
 
Second District – Case Nos. 2D17-829 and 2D17-1790 
 
 
(Hillsborough County) 
 
James L. VanLandingham of Hogan Lovells US LLP, Miami, Florida, 
Catherine E. Stetson of Hogan Lovells US LLP, Washington, District 
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of Columbia, and Steven F. Barley of Hogan Lovells US LLP, 
Baltimore, Maryland, 
 
for Petitioners Laboratory Corporation of America and 
Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings 
 
Jane Kreusler-Walsh, Rebecca Mercier Vargas, and Stephanie L. 
Serafin of Kreusler-Walsh, Vargas & Serafin, P.A., West Palm 
Beach, Florida, on behalf of Sheridan Radiology Services of Pinellas, 
Inc. and Sheridan Healthcare, Inc; David S. Johnson and Scott W. 
Anderson of Johnson Daboll Anderson, PLLC, Tampa, Florida, on 
behalf of Sheridan Radiology Services of Pinellas, Inc; and Susan N. 
Eisenberg and Jennifer T. Williams of Cozen O’Connor, Miami, 
Florida, on behalf of Sheridan Healthcare, Inc, 
 
for Petitioners Sheridan Radiology Services of Pinellas, Inc. 
and Sheridan Healthcare, Inc. 
 
Kristin A. Norse and Stuart C. Markman of Kynes, Markman & 
Felman, P.A., Tampa, Florida; Bryan S. Gowdy of Creed & Gowdy, 
P.A., Jacksonville, Florida; and Christa L. Collins of Collins Law PL, 
Saint Petersburg, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondents 
 
Paul Michael Anderson of Anderson & Hart, P.A., Tallahassee, 
Florida, 
 
for Amici Curiae Workers’ Compensation Section of The 
Florida Bar and Florida Workers’ Advocates