Case Title: State v. Forrest

Citation: 2013-Ohio-2409

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2013-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Forrest, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-2409.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-2409 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. FORREST, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State v. Forrest, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-2409.] 
Because App.R. 26(A)(2) is silent on the issue of who must make the initial 
determination whether an intradistrict conflict exists, either an en banc 
court or a panel of the court may make the determination. 
(Nos. 2012-0415 and 2012-0416—Submitted February 5, 2013—Decided  
June 12, 2013.) 
APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 11AP-291, 2012-Ohio-280 and 2012-Ohio-938. 
____________________ 
 
FRENCH, J. 
{¶ 1} This case presents the question whether a three-judge panel of 
appellate judges—instead of the full court—may review a party’s application for 
en banc consideration in order to determine whether an intradistrict conflict exists.  
We hold that it may. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} On May 16, 2009, appellee, Al E. Forrest, was sitting in a parked 
vehicle on Omar Drive in Columbus.  A Columbus police officer approached the 
vehicle, observed Forrest’s behavior, and ordered Forrest to exit the car.  Forrest 
ignored the officer, so the officer opened the door and pulled Forrest out.  As he 
did so, he saw a clear plastic baggie of heroin in the seat next to Forrest.  He 
placed Forrest under arrest, searched the vehicle, and found cocaine. 
{¶ 3} Following his indictment on drug-related charges, Forrest filed a 
motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the search.  The trial court granted 
the motion, finding that the search violated the Fourth Amendment.  A three-
judge panel of the Tenth District Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.  State 
v. Forrest, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-291, 2011-Ohio-6234, ¶ 20. 
{¶ 4} The state then filed simultaneous applications for reconsideration 
and en banc consideration.  The state also moved to have all eight judges of the 
Tenth District rule on the state’s application for en banc consideration.  The three-
judge panel that heard the original appeal denied the motion for participation of 
all eight judges and reviewed the application for en banc consideration.  State v. 
Forrest, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-291, 2012-Ohio-280, ¶ 1, 16.  The panel found that 
its initial decision did not conflict with prior Tenth District cases and that en banc 
consideration was therefore unwarranted under App.R. 26(A)(2).  Id. at ¶ 15.  The 
panel also denied the state’s motion for reconsideration.  Id. at ¶ 16. 
{¶ 5} We accepted the state’s discretionary appeal on its fifth proposition 
of law, regarding whether it was proper for only the panel—and not the en banc 
court—to review and deny the application for en banc consideration.  State v. 
Forrest, 131 Ohio St.3d 1553, 2012-Ohio-2263, 967 N.E.2d 764.  We also 
determined that a conflict exists between Forrest and two other cases, Kelley v. 
Ferraro, 8th Dist. No. 92446, 2010-Ohio-4179, and State v. Morris, 9th Dist. No. 
09CA0022-M, 2010-Ohio-5973.  State v. Forrest, 131 Ohio St.3d 1551, 2012-
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
Ohio-2263, 967 N.E.2d 763.  The certified-conflict matter and the state’s 
discretionary appeal were consolidated for review.  Id. 
Question Presented 
{¶ 6} The certified-conflict question states as follows:  “Whether the 
entire en banc court as defined in App.R. 26(A)(2) must participate in the decision 
whether to grant or deny an application for en banc consideration.”  Id.  After 
reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the parties do not 
actually dispute that only the en banc court has the power to ultimately grant an 
application and order en banc consideration of a case.  What the parties disagree 
about is whether a panel of the court may make the initial determination regarding 
whether a conflict exists.  We will therefore consider the following modified 
question that more accurately reflects the issue at stake:  Does App.R. 26(A)(2) 
allow a panel of district court judges, instead of the en banc court, to review an 
application for en banc consideration and make the initial mandatory 
determination of whether an intradistrict conflict exists? 
Analysis 
{¶ 7} An en banc proceeding is one in which all full-time judges of a 
court who have not recused themselves or otherwise been disqualified participate 
in the hearing and resolution of a case.  App.R. 26(A)(2)(a); McFadden v. 
Cleveland State Univ., 120 Ohio St.3d 54, 2008-Ohio-4914, 896 N.E.2d 672, 
¶ 10.  The purpose of en banc proceedings is to resolve conflicts of law that arise 
within a district.  App.R. 26(A)(2)(a); McFadden at ¶ 10, 15-16.  These 
intradistrict conflicts develop when different panels of judges hear the same issue, 
but reach different results.  McFadden at ¶ 15.  This “create[s] confusion for 
lawyers and litigants and do[es] not promote public confidence in the judiciary.”  
In re J.J., 111 Ohio St.3d 205, 2006-Ohio-5484, 855 N.E.2d 851, ¶ 18.  
Resolution of intradistrict conflicts promotes uniformity and predictability in the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
 
law, and a larger appellate panel provides the best possible means of resolution.  
McFadden at ¶ 15-16. 
{¶ 8} App.R. 26(A)(2) governs en banc procedure in the courts of 
appeals.  The rule provides: 
 
(2) En banc consideration 
(a) Upon a determination that two or more decisions of the 
court on which they sit are in conflict, a majority of the en banc 
court may order that an appeal or other proceeding be considered 
en banc. * * * Consideration en banc is not favored and will not be 
ordered unless necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of 
decisions within the district on an issue that is dispositive in the 
case in which the application is filed. 
(b) The en banc court may order en banc consideration sua 
sponte.  A party may also make an application for en banc 
consideration.  An application for en banc consideration must 
explain how the panel’s decision conflicts with a prior panel’s 
decision on a dispositive issue and why consideration by the court 
en banc is necessary to secure and maintain uniformity of the 
court’s decisions. 
 
Under the rule, applications for en banc consideration progress through the 
following three-step process:  (1) a party files the application, (2) a determination 
is made regarding whether an intradistrict conflict exists, and (3) if a conflict is 
found, a majority of the full court may order en banc consideration of the case.  
App.R. 26(A)(2)(a) and (b). 
{¶ 9} The parties do not dispute that only the en banc court has the 
power to grant an application and order en banc consideration of a case.  What the 
January Term, 2013 
5 
 
parties disagree about is whether the en banc court must also review all 
applications and make the predicate determination that a conflict exists.  Forrest 
argues that the rule is silent as to who must make the initial conflict 
determination.  Therefore, he concludes, a panel of judges may perform that task.  
The state, on the other hand, maintains that the en banc court must review all 
applications and determine, by majority vote, whether a conflict exists.  The state 
argues that the plain language of the rule, as well as the policies behind en banc 
review, demand this interpretation. 
{¶ 10} Based on our reading of the rule, we agree with Forrest’s 
interpretation.  The rule does not explicitly state who must review an application 
for en banc consideration or determine whether an intradistrict conflict exists.  
Section (A)(2)(b) of the rule, which summarily explains the application process, 
states only that a party may file an application and that the application must 
include certain information.  App.R. 26(A)(2)(b).  It does not say that the en banc 
court must be the body to review the application. 
{¶ 11} Section (A)(2)(a) of the rule also provides no guidance as to who 
must determine whether the decision in a case conflicts with another decision 
from the same district.  The pertinent language simply provides, “Upon a 
determination that two or more decisions of the court on which they sit are in 
conflict, a majority of the en banc court may order that an appeal or other 
proceeding be considered en banc.”  (Emphasis added.)  App.R. 26(A)(2)(a).  
Here, the rule states only that “a determination” must be made; it does not state 
who must make the determination.  In fact, the rule never uses the verb 
“determine,” only the noun “determination.”  Because the rule does not assign a 
subject to make the “determination,” we cannot agree with the state that the en 
banc court must handle the initial conflict determination.  The rule expressly gives 
just one task to the en banc court, i.e., to “order” the en banc proceeding, and the 
rule assumes that the conflict “determination” has already taken place at that 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
 
point.  We therefore conclude that App.R. 26(A)(2) is silent as to who must 
participate in the initial review of an application for en banc consideration and the 
assessment whether an intradistrict conflict exists.  It permits, but does not 
require, the en banc court to undertake these tasks. 
{¶ 12} Given the rule’s silence as to who reviews applications and 
determines potential conflicts, a court should be free to undertake these tasks by 
reasonable means that are not otherwise contrary to the Rules of Appellate 
Procedure.  This court has recognized that “each Court of Appeals is in a much 
better position than we are to decide how, in light of its internal organization and 
docket considerations, it may best proceed to expedite the orderly flow of its 
business.”  DeHart v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 69 Ohio St.2d 189, 191, 431 N.E.2d 
644 (1982).  The rule itself suggests as much, as it grants to the courts of appeals 
discretion over procedures governing “determination of en banc proceedings.”  
App.R. 26(A)(2)(e) (“Other procedures governing the initiation, filing, briefing, 
rehearing, reconsideration, and determination of en banc proceedings may be 
prescribed by local rule or as otherwise ordered by the court”). 
{¶ 13} Here, the panel employed a procedure by which it, as the panel that 
originally decided the case, reviewed the application to ascertain whether there 
was arguable merit to the state’s contention that the panel’s decision resulted in an 
intradistrict conflict.  State v. Forrest, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-291, 2012-Ohio-938, 
at ¶ 2.  The panel stated that this procedure “is more efficient” than submitting the 
application to the full court, “especially in the vast majority of cases where no 
arguable merit is present,” as well as in “cases where one of the parties simply 
wants to delay.”  Id. at ¶ 4.  This procedure is not an unreasonable exercise of the 
court’s discretion under App.R. 26(A)(2). 
{¶ 14} We do not share the state’s concerns regarding panel review of en 
banc applications.  The state worries that panel review deprives the other district 
judges of their prerogative to grant or deny en banc consideration, thereby 
January Term, 2013 
7 
 
defeating the goal of majority control.  Panel consideration does not, however, 
deprive the en banc court of its ultimate authority to grant en banc review.  It 
simply allows the panel to perform the preliminary layer of review. 
{¶ 15} It is true that when the panel finds that there is no merit to a party’s 
application, the panel may deny the application without submitting it to the full 
court.  But even this act does not deprive the en banc court of any authority.  The 
ability of a court to order en banc consideration arises only if and when there is an 
intradistrict conflict.  App.R. 26(A)(2)(a).  If there is no conflict, then the en banc 
court has no need to consider the application.  Moreover, a majority of the en 
banc court is always free to order en banc consideration sua sponte, regardless of 
the panel’s assessment.  App.R. 26(A)(2)(b).  In the end, a panel can never take 
away the en banc court’s ability to order an en banc proceeding. 
{¶ 16} The state also argues that panels cannot be trusted to fairly review 
applications for en banc consideration.  The state claims that panels have an 
interest in denying applications because a panel will not want to admit when its 
decision conflicts with other decisions within the district.  We easily dispense 
with this concern.  We presume that a judge is “fair and impartial and able to 
decide cases pending before him or her in accordance with the law and without 
regard to personal considerations.”  In re Disqualification of Sadler, 100 Ohio 
St.3d 1220, 2002-Ohio-7472, 798 N.E.2d 7, ¶ 2. 
{¶ 17} Finally, although App.R. 26(A)(2) permits panel review of 
applications for en banc consideration, it does not demand that approach.  Under 
the rule, courts may still choose to send applications directly to the full court for 
review and assessment of whether an intradistrict conflict exists, bypassing the 
panel altogether.  The Eighth and Ninth District Courts of Appeals chose such an 
approach in Kelley v. Ferraro, 8th Dist. No. 92446, 2010-Ohio-4179, and State v. 
Morris, 9th Dist. No. 09CA0022-M, 2010-Ohio-5973, the cases that formed the 
basis for the certified conflict here.  In both Kelley and Morris, the court of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
appeals convened en banc to review a party’s application for en banc 
consideration.  In each case, the full court assessed the merits of the applicant’s 
conflict claim, and a majority of the en banc court voted to deny the application 
based on the absence of an intradistrict conflict.  Kelley at ¶ 19; Morris at ¶ 14.  
This practice of immediate full-court participation is permissible under the rule 
and under our holding today.  It is simply not required. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 18} App.R. 26(A)(2) requires an intradistrict conflict before a court 
may grant an application for en banc consideration.  The rule does not, however, 
state who must determine whether a conflict actually exists.  Because the rule is 
silent on the issue, either the en banc court or a panel of the court may perform 
this task.  If a panel performs this task, the panel may find that no intradistrict 
conflict exists and deny the application without submitting it to the full court.  If, 
however, the panel determines that a conflict does exist, the matter must then be 
submitted to the en banc court for a final determination of whether to order en 
banc consideration. 
{¶ 19} For these reasons, we conclude that the Tenth District’s handling 
of the state’s application for en banc consideration was permissible under App.R. 
26(A)(2).  Accordingly, we affirm the Tenth District’s judgment denying the 
state’s motion to have the en banc court rule on the state’s application for en banc 
consideration, and we answer the certified conflict question, as we have modified 
it, in the affirmative. 
Judgment affirmed. 
PFEIFER, LANZINGER, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, J., concur in part and dissent in part. 
O’DONNELL, J., dissents. 
____________________ 
 
 
January Term, 2013 
9 
 
O’DONNELL, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 20} Respectfully, I dissent. 
{¶ 21} I would permit each member of a multijudge appellate court to 
decide whether an intradistrict conflict exists on a decision reached by an 
appellate court panel.  This view, I believe, is embodied in the language of App.R. 
26(A)(2)(a), which reads, “Upon a determination that two or more decisions of 
the court on which they sit are in conflict, a majority of the en banc court may 
order that an appeal or other proceeding be considered en banc.”  (Emphasis 
added.)  The view that the hearing panel of the three appellate court judges who 
heard the case at issue should make the decision regarding an intradistrict conflict 
contravenes App.R. 26. 
{¶ 22} The rule’s statement that “other procedures” regarding “en banc 
proceedings may be prescribed by local rule or ordered by the court,” id. at 
(A)(2)(e), does not permit a court to promulgate a local rule that conflicts with 
App.R. 26, which, after all, has been promulgated to achieve statewide uniformity 
and clarity and also to prevent idiosyncratic differences from permeating the 
appellate process.   
{¶ 23} Accordingly, I dissent. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
 
KENNEDY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. 
{¶ 24} I agree that App.R. 26(A)(2)(a) requires an initial determination as 
to whether an intradistrict conflict exist.  However, I believe that the rule requires 
that the en banc court, not just a panel of judges, make that initial determination.  
Therefore, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. 
{¶ 25} App.R. 26(A)(2)(a) provides: 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
Upon a determination that two or more decisions of the 
court on which they sit are in conflict, a majority of the en banc 
court may order that an appeal or other proceeding be considered 
en banc. The en banc court shall consist of all full-time judges of 
the appellate district who have not recused themselves or otherwise 
been disqualified from the case. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  
{¶ 26} App.R. 26(A)(2)(a) is not a model of clarity with regard to who 
makes the determination whether an intradistrict conflict exists.  However, when 
App.R. 26 is construed as a whole, it is more reasonable to interpret App.R. 
26(A)(2)(a) as indicating that the en banc court makes the determination whether 
an intradistrict conflict exists.  See generally State v. Everette, 129 Ohio St.3d 
317, 2011-Ohio-2856, 951 N.E.2d 1018, ¶ 26 (court construed App.R. 9(A) by 
examining it “as a whole”). 
{¶ 27} App.R. 26(A)(1) addresses applications for reconsideration of “any 
cause or motion submitted on appeal.”  An application for reconsideration is 
considered “by the panel that issued the original decision.”  (Emphasis added.)  
App.R. 26(A)(1)(c). 
{¶ 28} In contrast, App.R. 26(A)(2) addresses “en banc consideration.”  
“The en banc court shall consist of all full-time judges of the appellate district 
who have not recused themselves or otherwise been disqualified from the case.”  
App.R. 26(A)(2)(a).  The word “panel” never appears in App.R. 26(A)(2)(a).  The 
only subject in the first sentence of App.R. 26(A)(2)(a) is “majority of the en banc 
court.”  Therefore, I believe that the more logical and reasonable interpretation of 
App.R. 26(A)(2)(a) is that the en banc court makes the initial determination 
whether an intradistrict conflict exists. 
January Term, 2013 
11 
 
{¶ 29} This interpretation is consistent with the purpose of the en banc 
consideration.  This court has recognized that the primary purpose of en banc 
review is to allow a court of appeals to use a “ ‘ “majority of its judges * * * to 
control and thereby * * * secure uniformity and continuity in its decisions [and to 
use] * * * panels of three judges [to] hear and decide the vast majority of cases as 
to which no division exists within the court.” ’ ”  McFadden v. Cleveland State 
Univ., 120 Ohio St.3d 54, 2008-Ohio-4914, 896 N.E.2d 672, ¶ 16, quoting United 
States v. American–Foreign Steamship Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 689-690, 80 S.Ct. 
1336, 4 L.Ed.2d 1491(1960), quoting Maris, Hearing and Rehearing Cases in 
Banc, 14 F.R.D. 91, 96 (1954).  Panel-only review deprives the en banc court of 
the opportunity to exercise this institution-wide control. 
{¶ 30} The majority states, “Panel consideration does not * * * deprive 
the en banc court of its ultimate authority to grant en banc review.  It simply 
allows the panel to perform the preliminary layer of review.”  Majority opinion at 
¶ 14. 
{¶ 31} Aside from an en banc court’s sua sponte ordering consideration of 
an intradistrict conflict, a party’s application for en banc consideration is the only 
method by which a potential intradistrict conflict may reach a court of appeals.  
App.R. 26(A)(2)(b).  Allowing panel-only review of these applications may 
permit a legitimate intradistrict conflict to escape consideration.  Just as different 
panels of judges may reach different results in addressing the same issue, thereby 
creating an intradistrict conflict, it is entirely possible that one panel would 
identify an intradistrict conflict between two cases, while another panel would 
not.  Sometimes determining whether a conflict exists is a difficult question to 
answer, and reasonable minds occasionally may differ on the answer.  See, e.g., 
Blair v. Sugarcreek Twp. Bd. of Trustees, 129 Ohio St.3d 1447, 2011-Ohio-4217, 
951 N.E.2d 1045 (three justices dissented from the court’s determination that a 
conflict between appellate districts existed); see also State v. Baker, 126 Ohio 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
St.3d 1215, 2010-Ohio-3235, 931 N.E.2d 122 (three justices dissented from the 
court’s court sua sponte dismissal of the cause for “want of conflict”).  While 
these cases may be more the exception than the rule, they nevertheless prove that 
deciding whether a conflict exists is not necessarily a cut-and-dried determination.  
Having the en banc court examine all alleged conflicts would decrease the chance 
that an intradistrict conflict would escape review. 
{¶ 32} Permitting panel-only determinations as to whether intradistrict 
conflicts exist is not only an unreasonable interpretation of the language in App.R. 
26(A)(2)(a), but also undermines the purpose of en banc consideration.  
Therefore, I would answer the certified question, as modified by the majority 
opinion, in the negative and hold that App.R. 26(A)(2)(a) requires the en banc 
court to make the initial determination as to whether an intradistrict conflict 
exists.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
 
Ron O’Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. 
Taylor, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellee. 
________________________