Case Title: Tarvan Gulley v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC95-392

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2000-03-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida
 
____________
No. SC95392
____________
TARVAN GULLEY,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondent.
[March 30, 2000]
PER CURIAM.
We initially accepted for review the Third District Court of Appeal’s
decision in Gulley v. State, 730 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), based on certified
conflict with the Second District Court of Appeal’s decision in Thompson v. State,
708 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998).  As explained below, after carefully reviewing
the limited record in this case, we determine the review in this case has been
improvidently granted.
The State charged Gulley with one count of burglary of an occupied
1 The record before us does not contain a transcript of the sentencing hearing.
-2-
structure and one count of resisting an officer without violence, with such offenses
occurring on October 7, 1995.  Gulley was tried and found guilty of (1) the lesser
included offense of attempted burglary of an occupied structure, a third-degree
felony; and (2) resisting an officer without violence offense, a first-degree
misdemeanor.  The trial court adjudicated Gulley guilty on both offenses and,
according to the written sentencing order in the record,1 sentenced him on the
attempted burglary charge as a habitual violent felony offender to five years in
prison with a five-year mandatory minimum term, while suspending his sentence
on the resisting an officer charge.  The record does not indicate whether Gulley
filed a direct appeal.  Gulley later filed a motion pursuant to rule 3.800(a) of the
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, in which he challenged the validity of his
habitual violent felony offender sentence by arguing that chapter 95-182, Laws of
Florida, violates the single subject rule.  The circuit court summarily denied
Gulley’s motion, and he appealed.
On appeal, the Third District ordered the State to show why Gulley should
not be granted relief, and the State argued that Gulley was not entitled to relief
because (1) he was sentenced as a habitual violent felony offender, not a violent
career criminal, and was therefore not entitled to relief under the Second District’s
2 It is perplexing that the State has not asserted this particular argument before this Court.
-3-
decision in Thompson;2 and (2) even if Gulley had been sentenced as a violent
career criminal, the Third District’s own decision in Higgs v. State, 695 So. 2d 872
(Fla. 3d DCA 1997), precluded relief.  The Third District initially issued a per
curiam opinion affirming the summary denial of Gulley’s rule 3.800(a) motion, but
the court granted Gulley’s  motion for rehearing and issued a subsequent opinion
affirming the summary denial and certifying conflict with Thompson.  See Gulley,
730 So. 2d at 386-87.
The record before us clearly shows that the trial court sentenced Gulley as a
habitual violent felony offender, not a violent career criminal.  Tellingly, the
sentence imposed on Gulley--five years in prison with a five-year mandatory
minimum term--is consistent with the portion of the sentencing statute relating to
habitual violent felony offenders and inconsistent with the portion of the statute
relating to violent career criminals.  Compare § 775.084(4)(b)3., Fla. Stat. (1995)
(stating that a trial court may sentence a habitual violent felony offender on a third-
degree felony “for a term of years not exceeding 10” with a five-year mandatory
minimum term), with § 775.084(4)(c)3., Fla. Stat. (1995) (stating that a trial court
may sentence a violent career criminal on a third-degree felony “for a term of years
not exceeding 15” with a ten-year mandatory minimum term).  While a person who
-4-
has been sentenced as a habitual violent felony offender may be entitled to relief
pursuant to this Court’s decision in State v. Thompson, 25 Fla. L. Weekly S1, S3
(Fla. Dec. 22, 1999) (stating that “persons who committed their offenses during the
applicable window period and were sentenced as habitual violent felony offenders
based on the qualifying offense of aggravated stalking” may be entitled to relief
pursuant to Thompson), the limited record now before us does not contain
sufficient information to establish whether the trial court could have sentenced
Gulley as a habitual violent felony offender even without the amendments to
section 775.084, Florida Statutes, made by chapter 95-182, Laws of Florida. 
Accordingly, we dismiss review as improvidently granted in this case, without
prejudice for Gulley to seek a determination in the trial court as to whether our
decision in Thompson applies to him, and if so, what relief he should be afforded.
It is so ordered.
HARDING, C.J., and SHAW, WELLS, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, LEWIS and
QUINCE, JJ., concur.
NO MOTION FOR REHEARING WILL BE ALLOWED.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Certified
Direct Conflict of Decisions
Third District - Case No. 3D98-2848
-5-
(Dade County)
Tarvan Gulley, pro se, Madison, Florida,
for Petitioner
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Michael J. Neimand, Bureau Chief,
Assistant Attorney General, and Lara J. Edelstein, Assistant Attorney General, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida,
for Respondent