Case Title: Richard Vultaggio v. Caryl Yasko

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1996AP000651

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1998-01-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-0651 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
Richard Vultaggio, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Caryl Yasko, 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
January 16, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
September 3, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Walworth 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael S. Gibbs 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
Bablitch, J. (opinion filed) 
 
Dissented: 
Bradley, J. (opinion filed) 
 
 
Abrahamson, C.J. and Steinmetz, J., join. 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs (in 
the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court) by James A. Friedman, 
Robert J. Dreps and LaFollette & Sinykin, Madison and Michael D. 
Brennan and Garczynski & Brennan Law Offices, S.C., Elkhorn and 
oral argument by James A. Friedman. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief 
and oral argument by Terry P. Race, Whitewater. 
 
No. 96-0651 
 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-0651 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Richard Vultaggio, 
 
  
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Caryl Yasko, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 16, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Walworth 
County, Michael S. Gibbs, Judge.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This case is before the court on 
certification from the court of appeals following an order of 
the Circuit Court for Walworth County, Michael S. Gibbs, Judge, 
denying the defendant, Caryl Yasko's ("Yasko") motion for 
summary judgment and her subsequent motion for reconsideration. 
 Yasko petitioned the court of appeals for leave to appeal the 
circuit court's order. 
¶2 
On certification, we consider whether Wisconsin law 
should afford an absolute privilege, or a conditional privilege, 
for witnesses testifying in legislative proceedings.  We hold 
that under the circumstances presented here, such witnesses are 
not entitled to an absolute privilege.  However, we do hold that 
testimony given under these circumstances is entitled to a 
No. 96-0651 
 
 
2 
conditional privilege.  Therefore, we affirm the order of the 
circuit court denying Yasko's motion for summary judgment. 
¶3 
On October 18, 1994, the Whitewater City Council held 
a 
public 
meeting 
to 
consider, 
among 
other 
things, 
a 
recommendation of the Ad Hoc Municipal Building and Facilities 
Committee pertaining to the city's need for additional office 
and meeting space.  The committee had recommended that the 
council accept a proposal which provided for an addition to the 
public safety building and increased space for the police and 
fire departments. 
¶4 
Ms. Yasko attended this meeting and testified in favor 
of a different proposal that would have remodeled a former 
middle school for the office space.  She felt that renovating 
the middle school would reverse the "destabilization" of her 
neighborhood.  During her testimony, Yasko highlighted her 
neighborhood's transition from family housing to college student 
housing, and openly criticized the upkeep of several buildings 
owned by the plaintiff, Richard Vultaggio ("Vultaggio").1  There 
is no evidence in the record that Ms. Yasko was subpoenaed or 
                     
1 Referring to one home in the area, Yasko said "It's one of 
our pig sties.  It was designed to house pigs.  It's owned by 
Richard Vultaggio."  Pertaining to another she announced, 
"[L]ast year it was a pool hall, for pay.  That belongs to 
Richard Vultaggio.  He's real proud of our community.  He 
respects the people who built those houses."  Concerning still 
another, Yasko posed "Guess what?  It belongs to Richard 
Vultaggio, the proud owner of this slum property.  This house 
has been now three years with students and it's on its last 
stages.  I call them parasites of the university."  Finally, 
"for a further glimpse of the destabilization of our community," 
Yasko directed her audience's attention to "another sub-human 
habitation place" that was "owned by Richard Vultaggio." 
No. 96-0651 
 
 
3 
invited2 to appear at the meeting, that she was sworn under oath 
before testifying, or that she was directed in her testimony by 
questions from the council.  The meeting was broadcast in its 
entirety on a local television station. 
¶5 
Approximately three months later, Mr. Vultaggio sued 
Ms. Yasko for defamation based on the statements she made during 
the city council meeting on October 18, 1994.  Ms. Yasko moved 
for summary judgment, arguing that her statements before the 
Whitewater City Council were absolutely privileged, or in the 
alternative, that they were conditionally privileged without any 
abuse of that privilege.  The circuit court denied her motion, 
holding that Yasko had failed to show the court that an absolute 
privilege extended to speakers before city council meetings 
under current Wisconsin law.  Upon motion for reconsideration, 
the circuit court held that such testimony is afforded neither 
an absolute, nor a conditional privilege in the state of 
Wisconsin.  Ms. Yasko appealed the circuit court's non-final 
order. 
 
 
I. 
                     
2 In both his briefs and at oral argument, counsel for the 
defendant maintained that Ms. Yasko was invited to the October 
18, 1994, city council meeting to offer testimony.  To the 
contrary, the only evidence in the record on this point suggests 
that Yasko was invited to an August 29, 1994, meeting held by 
the Ad Hoc Municipal Building and Facilities Committee.  There 
is no evidence to suggest that the city council requested her 
attendance at the October 18, 1994, meeting that is the subject 
of this action, nor is there any evidence that she actually 
attended the August 29, 1994, meeting to which she was 
specifically invited. 
No. 96-0651 
 
 
4 
¶6 
The issue that we address is a question of first 
impression in the state of Wisconsin: whether witnesses should 
be afforded an absolute privilege, or a conditional privilege, 
when testifying at legislative proceedings.  This is a question 
of law to be decided without deference to the circuit court's 
conclusion of law.  See Kensington Development Corp. v. Israel, 
142 Wis. 2d 894, 899-900, 419 N.W.2d 241 (1988); see also Rady 
v. Lutz, 150 Wis. 2d 643, 647, 444 N.W.2d 58 (Ct. App. 1989). 
¶7 
A communication is defamatory if it tends to harm the 
reputation of another so as to lower that person in the 
estimation of the community or deter third persons from 
associating or dealing with him or her.  See Zinda v. Louisiana 
Pacific Corp., 149 Wis. 2d 913, 921, 440 N.W.2d 548 (1989).  
"However, not all defamations are actionable.  Some defamations 
fall within a class of conduct which the law terms privileged." 
 Id.  A complex structure of privileges has developed in the law 
to protect and advance the societal and individual interests in 
the free flow of ideas and information.  See W. Page Keeton et 
al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 114, at 815 (5th 
ed. 1984). 
¶8 
Privileged 
communications 
are 
either 
absolute 
or 
conditional.  See Lathan v. Journal Co., 30 Wis. 2d 146, 151-52, 
140 N.W.2d 417 (1966).  The defendant asks us to adopt the 
Restatement standard for absolute privilege in legislative 
proceedings, whereby a witness's statement is subject to only 
two restrictions: it must be made as "part of a legislative 
proceeding," and it must have "some relation to the proceeding." 
No. 96-0651 
 
 
5 
 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 590A (1977).3  Once a statement 
has met these two standards, the witness is clothed with 
complete immunity from liability, even if the witness is 
motivated by malice or ill will toward the plaintiff and knows 
the statement to be false.  See Lathan, 30 Wis. 2d at 151; see 
also Zinda, 149 Wis. 2d at 922 ("Absolute privileges give 
complete protection without any inquiry into the defendant's 
motives."). 
¶9 
A conditional privilege, on the other hand, is not 
absolute and may be forfeited if the privilege is abused.  See 
Zinda, 149 Wis. 2d at 924 (citing Ranous v. Hughes, 30 Wis. 2d 
452, 467, 141 N.W.2d 251 (1966)); Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 599 (1977).  The Restatement lists five conditions which may 
constitute an abuse of the privilege, and the occurrence of any 
one causes the loss of the privilege.  See Zinda, 149 Wis. 2d at 
924-25.  The privilege may be abused, (1) because of the 
publisher's knowledge or reckless disregard as to the falsity of 
the 
defamatory 
matter 
(see 
§§ 600-602); 
(2) 
because 
the 
defamatory matter is published for some purpose other than that 
for which the particular privilege is given (see § 603); (3) 
because the publication is made to some person not reasonably 
believed to be necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose 
of the particular privilege (see § 604); (4) because the 
                     
3 The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 590A (1977) provides: 
A 
witness 
is 
absolutely 
privileged 
to 
publish 
defamatory matter as part of a legislative proceeding 
in which he is testifying or in communications 
preliminary to the proceeding, if the matter has some 
relation to the proceeding. 
 
No. 96-0651 
 
 
6 
publication includes defamatory matter not reasonably believed 
to be necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the occasion 
is privileged (see § 605); or (5) the publication includes 
unprivileged matter as well as privileged matter (see § 605A). 
¶10 In determining whether to apply an absolute or 
conditional privilege to legislative proceedings, we are faced 
with a conflict between two American principles equally regarded 
in the law: the right of an individual, on the one hand, to 
enjoy his reputation unimpaired by defamatory attacks, and on 
the other hand, the necessity in the public interest of a free 
and full disclosure of facts in the operation of government.  
See Van Vechten Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: 
Judicial Proceedings, 9 Colum. L. Rev. 463, 463 (1909).  Compare 
Schier v. Denny, 12 Wis. 2d 544, 550-51, 107 N.W.2d 611 (1961) 
(fostering the free filing of complaints with administrative 
agencies outweighs private right to compensation) with Ranous, 
30 
Wis. 
2d 
at 
466-67 
(protecting 
private 
citizens 
from 
defamation outweighs need to insulate school board members from 
liability). 
¶11 The parties rely heavily upon these countervailing 
proclamations of public policy.  Ms. Yasko argues that the same 
policy supporting the extension of absolute privilege to 
parties, witnesses and their counsel in judicial proceedings 
compels its application to legislative proceedings.  See 
Bussewitz v. Wisconsin Teachers Ass'n, 188 Wis. 121, 127, 205 
N.W. 808 (1925).  In Bussewitz, we stated: 
 
If parties are shadowed by the fear that by some 
mistake as to facts or some excess of zeal, or by some 
error of counsel, they may be subjected to harassing 
No. 96-0651 
 
 
7 
litigation in an action for slander or libel, they may 
well feel that justice is too dearly bought and that 
it is safest to abandon its pursuit. 
Id.  See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 590A cmt. a (1977) 
("The absolute privilege of witnesses in legislative hearings 
and other legislative proceedings is similar in all respects to 
that of witnesses in judicial proceedings . . . .").  Yasko 
contends that the risk of uncompensated reputational harm from 
even false and malicious testimony is outweighed by the strong 
public 
policy 
of 
encouraging 
citizen 
participation 
in 
legislative proceedings. 
¶12 On the other hand, Mr. Vultaggio asks us to recognize 
that the right to use the judicial system for redress will be 
significantly impaired if an absolute privilege is extended to 
witnesses testifying at legislative proceedings.  According to 
the plaintiff, the policy of protecting citizens from having 
their private or professional reputations damaged outweighs the 
concern for inhibiting the free exchange of views on legislative 
issues. 
II. 
¶13 It is against this background of public policy that we 
make our decision.  We now consider the application of an 
absolute privilege to statements made at legislative proceedings 
such as the city council meeting at hand.  First, however, it 
will be helpful to examine how far we have previously gone to 
bestow the absolute privilege upon otherwise actionable public 
statements. 
 
A. 
No. 96-0651 
 
 
8 
¶14 The law of absolute privilege is not new to the state 
of Wisconsin.  Where the statements bear a proper relationship 
to the issues addressed, we have extended the absolute privilege 
to the statements of parties, witnesses and their counsel in 
judicial proceedings.  See Bussewitz, 188 Wis. at 127; see also 
Spoehr v. Mittelstadt, 34 Wis. 2d 653, 661, 150 N.W.2d 502 
(1967) (statement by counsel in pre-trial conference absolutely 
privileged); Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wis. 215, [*193], 220-21, 
[*198] 
(1860) 
(witness 
statements 
at 
trial 
absolutely 
privileged); Jennings v. Paine, 4 Wis. 372, [*358], 375, [*360-
61] (1855) (counsel's statements to jury regarding witness 
absolutely privileged). 
¶15 We have also extended the absolute privilege to 
participants in quasi-judicial and investigatory proceedings, 
such as statements made to a grand jury or to a district 
attorney 
relating 
to 
matters 
pending 
for 
grand 
jury 
investigation, see Bergman v. Hupy, 64 Wis. 2d 747, 221 N.W.2d 
898 (1974), statements made to a real estate broker's board, see 
Schier, 12 Wis. 2d 544, and petitions to a governor for removal 
of a sheriff, see Larkin v. Noonan, 19 Wis. 93 (1865).  Whether 
witnesses 
should 
be 
afforded 
an 
absolute 
privilege 
for 
statements made while testifying at legislative proceedings is, 
No. 96-0651 
 
 
9 
as we have indicated, a question of first impression in this 
state.4 
¶16 However, other states have explicitly addressed this 
question. 
 
The 
defendant 
cites 
case 
law 
from 
multiple 
jurisdictions to support her contention that courts throughout 
the country recognize the absolute privilege for a witness's 
testimony at legislative proceedings.  We now address those 
claims. 
B. 
¶17 Whether the privilege applicable 
is 
absolute or 
conditional requires an analysis of the particular situation 
involved.  See Bergman, 64 Wis. 2d at 749.  Here we must decide 
whether 
to 
extend 
an 
absolute 
privilege 
to 
Ms. 
Yasko's 
                     
4 Citing Zinda, counsel for the defendant contends that we 
have explicitly recognized that an absolute privilege extends to 
legislative proceedings.  Zinda v. Louisiana Pacific Corp., 149 
Wis. 2d 913, 922, 440 N.W.2d 548 (1989) ("[The absolute] 
privilege has been extended to judicial officers, legislative 
proceedings, and to certain governmental executive officers."). 
 We are not persuaded that this statement should have any 
bearing on the decision that we reach today.  The decision 
rendered in Zinda did not rely upon an absolute privilege—a fact 
made apparent by the sentence immediately following that cited 
by counsel: "The arguments in this case, however, are concerned 
only with conditional privilege."  Id. at 922.  Moreover, the 
sentence referred to by counsel cites Prosser and Keeton on 
Torts, indicating that we were simply commenting on the state of 
the law generally, not necessarily that in Wisconsin.  Finally, 
the dicta in Zinda did not specify whether the absolute 
privilege 
is 
afforded 
to 
statements 
made 
by 
members 
of 
legislative bodies, or witnesses appearing before them.  This 
distinction is an important one.  See Wis. Const. art. IV, § 16 
(members of legislature not liable for words spoken in debate); 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 590 (1977) (member of state or 
local 
legislative 
body 
absolutely 
privileged 
to 
publish 
defamatory matter concerning another in performance of his 
legislative functions); 50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander §§ 294-
295 (1995). 
No. 96-0651 
 
 
10
statements before a city council meeting, when there is no 
evidence to suggest that she was subpoenaed to testify, sworn 
under oath or that she was responding to particular questions 
posed by the council members.  We make this decision knowing 
full well that the occasions upon which freedom of speech is 
placed at so high a value are "few in number and quite 
exceptional in character" and should be "fixed with some 
hesitation."  Veeder, 9 Colum. L. Rev. at 463. 
¶18 Although 
many 
states 
have 
extended 
an 
absolute 
privilege to legislative proceedings, they have often done so 
under circumstances that are remarkably different from the 
present situation.  See, e.g., Kelly v. Daro, 118 P.2d 37 (Cal. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1941) (absolute privilege extended to witnesses 
subpoenaed to testify by reading from books produced under 
subpoena duces tecum who answered specific questions posed by 
legislative committee); Sheppard v. Bryant, 78 N.E. 394 (Mass. 
1906) (absolute privilege extended to summoned witness's duly 
sworn testimony given in response to question asked by chairman 
of legislative committee). 
¶19 However, several states have held that a witness's 
testimony before legislative bodies is absolutely privileged 
regardless of such considerations.  For example, New Jersey 
courts have explicitly held, both at the federal and state 
levels, that the absolute privilege applies even when a witness 
is not subpoenaed to appear and gives unsolicited, unsworn 
testimony that does not respond to particular questions of the 
legislative bodies.  See Yip v. Pagano, 606 F. Supp. 1566 
(D.N.J. 1985) (testimony before House Subcommittee on Crime), 
No. 96-0651 
 
 
11
aff'd, 782 F.2d 1033 (3d Cir. 1986); DeSantis v. Employees 
Passaic County Welfare Ass'n, 568 A.2d 565 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1990) (testimony before advisory commission of town board). 
¶20 Other states have employed similar reasoning.  See, 
e.g., North Coast Cable Ltd. Partnership v. Hanneman, 648 N.E.2d 
875 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (witness not subpoenaed to appear 
before committee of city council, but who received letter asking 
him to appear afforded absolute privilege); Jennings v. Cronin, 
389 A.2d 1183 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (possible lack of subpoena 
irrelevant in determination that testimony before legislative 
committee absolutely privileged); Logan's Super Markets, Inc. v. 
McCalla, 343 S.W.2d 892 (Tenn. 1961) (voluntary appearance 
before 
committee 
of 
Tennessee 
legislature 
absolutely 
privileged).5 
¶21 Just as these states have done, the defendant invites 
this court to extend an absolute privilege to statements made at 
a city council meeting where she and the other members of the 
audience were allowed to speak at their own discretion, without 
the compulsion of a subpoena, without the control of having 
their testimony sworn and without the supervision of direct 
questions from the council. 
                     
5 Several other states to which the defendant refers have 
been less precise as to the factual basis for their decisions.  
See, e.g., Joseph v. Collis, 649 N.E.2d 964 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) 
(statements made by private citizen before finance committee 
meeting of city council are absolutely privileged); Domestic 
Linen Supply & Laundry Co. v. Stone, 314 N.W.2d 773, 777 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1981) (members of city administration who made 
statements concerning matters "about which the officials were 
called upon to comment" at a legislative session were entitled 
to absolute privilege). 
No. 96-0651 
 
 
12
C. 
¶22 We decline the invitation to stretch the absolute 
privilege to such lengths.  "[T]he effect of an absolute 
privilege is to give lavish support to the social interest in 
obtaining complete disclosures of facts from witnesses, and to 
ignore completely the predicament of the maligned and remediless 
individual whose reputation may be harmed."  Ysrella Weinblatt, 
Case Note, 15 S. Cal. L. Rev. 276, 277 (1942).  We are troubled 
by the fact that in a situation with little guidance, structure 
or control for the witness's testimony, an absolute privilege 
eliminates a defamed citizen's right of redress, despite the 
falsity of the statements, and the malice or ill will of those 
who make them. 
¶23 Although not dispositive to our holding, we find this 
result particularly inequitable where, as here, the statements 
are published immediately to the surrounding community—not only 
to those who choose to attend the meeting, but to anyone who 
might watch television that evening.  The flow of information in 
today's 
society 
is 
virtually 
unimpeded—so 
much 
so 
that 
scurrilous 
lies 
and 
defamatory 
statements 
can 
be 
heard 
instantaneously by the public, regardless of whether the 
community deliberately seeks out that information.  Such a 
powerful weapon can be lethal in the hands of one who chooses to 
defame. 
¶24 At oral argument, counsel for defendant set forth at 
least five reasons why our concerns are unwarranted in this 
instance: (1) the requirement that the statement have "some 
relation to the proceeding" affords sufficient protection to 
No. 96-0651 
 
 
13
those who might be defamed; (2) the plaintiff may testify at the 
same legislative proceeding or at a later meeting to rebut the 
testimony; (3) the plaintiff may choose to write letters to 
editors or city council members to rebut the testimony; (4) the 
legislative body has the authority and duty to control the 
meeting; and (5) the credibility of speakers is at stake to 
deter them from defaming others.  We will address these 
arguments in turn. 
¶25 Should we afford an absolute privilege to testimony of 
this sort, anything goes.  Only two prerequisites must be 
satisfied in order to meet the Restatement standard for absolute 
privilege: the statements must be part of a legislative 
proceeding, and they must "relate to" the substance of that 
proceeding.  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 590A (1977).  We 
have explicitly held that the "relevancy" standard for absolute 
privilege is to be liberally construed, and that all doubts must 
be resolved in favor of relevancy.  See Spoehr, 34 Wis. 2d at 
661-63 (statement relevant to the proceedings if the remark has 
"any pertinence, no matter how remote"); Bussewitz, 188 Wis. at 
125. 
¶26 Undaunted, the dissent also contends that "the liberal 
relevancy test is not a superficial doctrine providing no 
protection to the allegedly defamed."  Dissent at 9.  The 
following example will help clarify why we are not persuaded: if 
the Whitewater City Council had met that evening to discuss 
different ways to improve and beautify the city, a city resident 
would be completely without redress if a witness falsely and 
No. 96-0651 
 
 
14
maliciously accused the resident of owning and operating a child 
pornography business, or of selling drugs from his or her home. 
¶27 Pursuant to the dissent's rationale, the witness could 
continue this line of testimony by alleging that his or her 
neighbor is a prostitute, a sexual predator, or even a 
pedophile—all in the name of "improving" or "cleaning up" the 
city of Whitewater.  In this example, the statements would be 
part of a legislative proceeding, and under any court's 
interpretation, would almost certainly "relate to" the subject 
matter of the meeting.  See Snow v. Koeppl, 159 Wis. 2d 77, 81, 
464 N.W.2d 215 (Ct. App. 1990) (relevancy requirement is a 
question of law for the court).  Permitting such a result is not 
only 
bad 
public 
policy, 
but 
also 
defies 
common 
sense.  
Therefore, the "relate to" provision of the Restatement does 
little to assuage our fears. 
¶28 The next two arguments are equally unpersuasive.  
Rebuttal testimony often affords the injured party little 
relief.  As soon as the defamatory matter has been circulated, 
the damage has been done, regardless of counterattacks that may 
be made in the future.  This is particularly true where, as 
here, the plaintiff is not present at the meeting to hear the 
accusations against him.  Testimony at a later meeting may not 
be possible if that subject is not addressed again, letters to 
editors may not be published and are not certain to reach the 
defamed party's intended audience, and letters to the city 
council members would  do little to restore the injured party's 
reputation throughout the remainder of the community.  In any 
event, we decline to hold that a defamed person's only form of 
No. 96-0651 
 
 
15
relief is to wait for an opportunity to clear his or her name in 
the public eye. 
¶29 The defendant next argues that just as a judge 
controls the nature and scope of testimony in a judicial 
proceeding, so too does the presiding official at a city council 
meeting of this sort keep a "tight rein" on the testimony and 
debate.  We disagree.  In a judicial proceeding, witnesses will 
be sworn under oath, will be directed by questions from counsel 
and can be reined in by the judge should they stray from the 
subject at hand.  See Veeder, 9 Colum. L. Rev. at 471 ("Jurors, 
witnesses, counsel and parties litigant who overstep the bounds 
of 
decorum 
may 
be 
reprimanded, 
fined 
or 
punished 
by 
imprisonment, and the defamatory utterance may be expunged from 
the record.").  Furthermore, witnesses in judicial proceedings 
would face perjury charges should they lie before the court, and 
can 
be 
held 
in 
contempt 
should 
they 
persist 
in 
their 
uncooperative ways. 
¶30 Here we find no evidence of such control by the 
Whitewater City Council.  Ms. Yasko appears to have spoken at 
the meeting without any supervision from the council itself.  
There was no fear of punishment should she lie, she was not 
sworn to tell the truth, nor was her testimony limited by 
questions from members of the council.  Should we afford Ms. 
Yasko's statements an absolute privilege, the last conceivable 
restraint on her testimony would disappear when she approaches 
the podium to make her "relevant" statement, no matter how 
attenuated it might be.  Although it is clear that some 
legislative bodies may have the authority and duty to control 
No. 96-0651 
 
 
16
legislative 
hearings, 
the 
controls 
present 
under 
these 
circumstances were not enough to warrant adoption of the 
absolute privilege. 
¶31 This proceeding was also different from a quasi-
judicial proceeding.  "[I]t is true that there seems to be 'no 
clear 
definition' 
of 
what 
constitutes 
a 
quasi-judicial 
proceeding before a quasi-judicial body,"  DiMiceli v. Klieger, 
58 Wis. 2d 359, 365, 206 N.W.2d 184 (1973) (citation omitted), 
yet it is apparent that we often extended an absolute privilege 
to quasi-judicial proceedings because protections similar to 
those offered in judicial proceedings ensured the pertinency and 
propriety of the testimony before such bodies.  See Schier, 12 
Wis. 2d at 551; Larkin, 19 Wis. at 98-99; see also Note, 
Defamation—Absolute Privilege in Administrative Proceedings, 97 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 877, 879, 880-83 (1949) ("though [it is] seldom 
expressly articulated," the adequacy of procedural safeguards 
which will minimize the occurrence of defamatory statements is a 
factor used in many cases to determine whether to grant or 
withhold absolute privilege); Nedwyn R. Nelkin, Recent Case, 13 
Mo. L. Rev. 320, 321 (1948) ("Invariably, the extension of the 
rule of absolute privilege to most quasi-judicial bodies is said 
to be based upon the same considerations as exist in strictly 
judicial proceedings.").  Compare Bergman, 64 Wis. 2d 747 with 
State v. Peterson, 195 Wis. 351, 359, 218 N.W. 367 (1928) (in 
investigation of alleged offense, district attorney holds a 
position analogous to judge who presides at trial because he 
No. 96-0651 
 
 
17
must consult those who know the facts and thereby determine what 
course to pursue).6 
¶32 Applying the cases and commentary to the situation at 
hand, we are therefore convinced that the Whitewater City 
Council meeting was sufficiently distinct from a quasi-judicial 
proceeding 
as 
to 
withhold 
the 
absolute 
privilege. 
 
The 
proceeding involved here is even difficult to compare to a 
legislative hearing in which the witness might be subpoenaed to 
testify, would be sworn under oath, and would be controlled by 
the direction of questions from the legislative body. 
¶33 Finally, counsel for defendant asserts that the risk a 
speaker faces of losing his or her credibility will serve as a 
                     
6 Contrary to the dissent's position, we do not assert that 
the absolute privilege has been adopted in the judicial/quasi-
judicial context because the witness was always subpoenaed, 
sworn to tell the truth and was channeled by questions from the 
supervising body.  Instead, we illustrate that a fundamental 
basis 
for 
extending 
the 
absolute 
privilege 
to 
witnesses 
testifying at judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings is that 
alternate protections of a judicial or quasi-judicial nature, 
such as those we highlight today, exist so as to satisfy the 
judiciary that its grant of complete and total immunity is 
appropriate.  See, e.g., Schultz v. Strauss, 127 Wis. 325, 329 
(1906) ("The proceedings of a grand jury are unquestionably 
judicial in character . . . ."); Calkins v. Sumner, 13 Wis. 215, 
[*193], 220-21, [*197-98] (1860) (witness "not answerable in 
damages for any statements he may make which are responsive to 
questions put to him . . . . [Witnesses] may be compelled to 
attend and give evidence, and when duly notified, the law makes 
it their unavoidable duty to do so; and to make them responsible 
in damages . . . for such obedience to a legal requirement, 
would be a most wicked and intolerable outrage."); William H. 
Bezold, Comment, The Privilege Barring Civil Liability for Libel 
in Pleadings, 36 Marq. L. Rev. 299, 300 (1953) ("A judicial 
proceeding is not limited to trials of civil actions, but 
includes within its scope all proceedings in law of a judicial 
nature either before a court or a tribunal having judicial or 
quasi-judicial powers.") (citing Larkin v. Noonan, 19 Wis. 93 
(1865)) (emphasis added). 
No. 96-0651 
 
 
18
deterrent to defaming others.  This argument is perhaps the most 
troublesome.  In today's society, more focus is typically placed 
on the accusations that are in circulation than the individuals 
who originally set them in motion.  As a result, the speaker's 
credibility will often remain totally unscathed, even in the 
face of shameless and offensive lies.  In a society where 
personal accountability has diminished, we find it less than 
comforting to leave such responsibility in the hands of those 
who wield the power to defame. 
¶34 These considerations lead us to conclude that, under 
these circumstances, any "chilling effect" upon a citizen's 
participation in the legislative process that might result 
without the exhaustive protection of an absolute privilege 
cannot outweigh a citizen's right to redress.  "For while 
society is reaping a doubtful benefit from immunizing a 
malicious slanderer from suit, some individual whose reputation 
has suffered has been deprived of a remedy for the wrong done 
him."  Weinblatt, 15 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 278.  Therefore, we 
decline to adopt the absolute privilege for witness testimony at 
legislative proceedings of this sort.7  
                     
7 A persistent theme of the dissent is that we employ 
reasoning that contradicts Wisconsin's jurisprudence in the area 
of privileged communications.  "The majority misses the mark 
because it analyzes the case not in terms of whether policies 
supporting an absolute privilege exist, but rather in terms of 
whether certain safeguards such as subpoena, sworn testimony, 
and supervision exist."  Dissent at 2-3.  Therefore, the dissent 
contends that we have adopted a new approach to privilege law.  
We disagree. 
No. 96-0651 
 
 
19
III. 
¶35 However, we conclude that testimony at a legislative 
proceeding of this sort is deserving of a conditional privilege. 
 We therefore adopt the conditional privilege ("abuse of 
occasion") test as set forth in Zinda v. Louisiana Pacific 
Corp..  149 Wis. 2d at 924-25.8  In doing so, we provide 
protection for an individual who may be defamed at a legislative 
proceeding which lacks sufficient protections to ensure that a 
witness's testimony remains relevant and appropriate. 
¶36 In Zinda, we expressly adopted the most recent version 
of Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 600-605A (1977) to determine 
                                                                  
In its myopic focus on the safeguards that we highlight 
today, the dissent fails to realize that we explicitly engage in 
the public policy analysis that has characterized our privilege 
jurisprudence to date.  Due to the lack of procedural safeguards 
in this case, however, we conclude that the public policy 
favoring a citizen's right to redress outweighs the policy 
concerned with discouraging a citizen's participation in the 
democratic process.  Contrary to the dissent's position, all 
public policy determinations are affected by the facts of a 
particular case; the facts of this case were simply insufficient 
to warrant the adoption of an absolute privilege. 
Indeed, a close examination of these issues reveals that 
our approach to privilege law is less troubling to the dissent 
than the actual difference in result.  The dissent would have us 
adopt an across-the-board absolute privilege rule for all 
legislative proceedings, regardless of the facts of each 
individual case.  Dissent at 1-2.  Much to the contrary, we 
decline to ignore the facts of the case before us in determining 
whether 
to 
adopt 
the 
absolute 
privilege 
at 
legislative 
proceedings. 
8 Zinda involved the common interest privilege in the 
employer-employee context.  See Zinda v. Louisiana Pacific 
Corp., 149 Wis. 2d 913, 922-24, 440 N.W.2d 548 (1989); see also 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 596 (1977).  Therefore, we rely 
upon Zinda in this decision only to the extent that it employed 
the Restatement standard for the abuse of a conditional 
privilege. 
No. 96-0651 
 
 
20
whether a conditional privilege has been abused, and we do so 
again today.  See Zinda, 149 Wis. 2d at 925 n.1.  Doing so will 
avoid confusion over previously inconsistent applications of the 
conditional privilege test, which often included considerations 
of "malice" or "good faith without malice."  Compare Bergman, 64 
Wis. 2d at 749, 751 and Hett v. Ploetz, 20 Wis. 2d 55, 59, 121 
N.W.2d 270 (1963) with Hartman v. Buerger, 71 Wis. 2d 393, 398, 
238 N.W.2d 505 (1976) (referring to such considerations but 
acknowledging disapproval of the word "malice") and Ranous, 30 
Wis. 2d at 468 (criticizing and avoiding use of the term 
"malice"). 
¶37 Therefore, 
a 
witness's 
testimony 
at 
legislative 
proceedings such as the city council meeting involved here will 
be conditionally privileged when the statements are made during 
that proceeding.  However, as we have stated, the witness's 
privilege may be forfeited if any of the following occur: (1) 
the witness knows the defamatory matter to be false, or acts in 
reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity (see Restatement 
(Second) of Torts §§ 600-602 (1977)); (2) the defamatory matter 
is published for some purpose other than that for which the 
particular privilege is given (see § 603); (3) the publication 
is made to some person not reasonably believed to be necessary 
for the accomplishment of the purpose of the particular 
privilege (see § 604); (4) the publication includes defamatory 
matter not reasonably believed to be necessary to accomplish the 
purpose for which the occasion is privileged (see § 605); or (5) 
the 
publication 
includes 
unprivileged 
matter 
as 
well 
as 
privileged matter (see § 605A). 
No. 96-0651 
 
 
21
¶38 The defendant argues that a conditional privilege is 
not enough, because citizens will still have to "think twice" 
before testifying, knowing that they may face a jury trial on 
the abuse standards set forth above.  See Zinda, 149 Wis. 2d at 
924-26 (question whether a conditional privilege has been abused 
is a factual question for the jury, unless facts are such that 
only one conclusion can be reasonably drawn) (citing Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 619(2) cmt. b (1977)).  To the contrary, we 
view our decision today as a necessary and sufficient bridle 
upon a witness's testimony at a legislative proceeding of this 
sort.9 
¶39 We note that a significant body of case law has 
developed to support the position that witnesses who supply 
voluntary testimony to a legislative body are entitled only to a 
conditional privilege.  See Fiore v. Rogero, 144 So. 2d 99, 103 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962) (testimony given before legislative 
body conditionally privileged where witness appeared voluntarily 
without having been subpoenaed); Adserv Corp. v. Lincecum, 385 
So. 2d 432, 433, 435 (La. Ct. App. 1980) (witness who appeared 
voluntarily 
before 
legislative 
committee 
afforded 
only 
a 
qualified privilege); Wright v. Lathrop, 21 N.E. 963, 966 (Mass. 
1889) 
(unsworn 
witness 
who 
appeared 
voluntarily 
before 
legislative committee and who made the statement in question 
without being asked a question on the subject is entitled to 
                     
9 In concluding that the absolute privilege does not apply 
to legislative proceedings of this sort, we do not decide 
whether the absolute privilege would apply to witness testimony 
that is compelled by a subpoena, given under oath, or directed 
and supervised by questions from the legislative body. 
No. 96-0651 
 
 
22
conditional privilege only); Bell v. Horton, 669 N.E.2d 546, 
549, n.3 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (distinguishing North Coast Cable 
Ltd. Partnership v. Hanneman, 648 N.E.2d 875 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1994), to hold that unsolicited statements made at meeting of 
union township board of trustees entitled to qualified privilege 
only); see also 50 Am. Jur. 2d Libel and Slander § 296 (1995).  
These cases illustrate that others have walked before us on the 
path that we choose today. 
¶40 Because 
a 
conditional 
privilege 
will 
adequately 
protect the witness, yet still afford an injured party the 
opportunity to secure redress in an action for defamation, Mr. 
Vultaggio is entitled to have a jury determine whether Ms. Yasko 
abused her privilege at the Whitewater City Council meeting.  
The case is remanded to the circuit court for a determination of 
this issue. 
By the Court.— The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
No. 96-0651.wab 
 
1 
¶41 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J.    (Concurring).   I join the 
majority opinion.  I write only to answer the dissent. 
¶42 Stripped to its core, the dissent would give absolute 
privilege to anyone to say anything about anybody at a school 
board proceeding, a city council proceeding, a county board 
proceeding, or any other legislative type proceeding, as long as 
the accusation was even remotely relevant. 
¶43 Free speech is not and should not be without its 
limits.  Newspapers, radio, television, even the tabloids, have 
limits.  They cannot accuse anybody about anything without 
facing consequences for malicious untruths.  And with good 
reason.  In an ordered society, in a society that should insist 
that people accept responsibility for their actions, reasonable 
limits must be imposed.   
¶44 Unfortunately, the dissent would remove those limits 
at legislative type proceedings, thereby creating a loophole 
through which the most irresponsible among us could drive an 
army.  What is there to stop the simultaneous broadcast or the 
reporting of the vicious untruths to the general public?  
Reputations could be destroyed overnight while the dissent takes 
solace in cold, mechanical legal analysis and dubious authority. 
See, e.g., Hartman v. Buerger, 71 Wis. 2d 393, 238 N.W.2d 505 
(1976). 
¶45 As the majority opinion points out, the flow of 
information in today’s society has changed enormously since the 
authority relied upon by the dissent.  So too has the level of 
public discourse.  Society has come a long way from the alleged 
No. 96-0651.wab 
 
2 
defamatory “no good” reference in the 1976 Hartman case on which 
the dissent relies.  In today’s tabloid world, accusing someone 
of being no good is almost tantamount to a compliment.   
¶46 The dissent fails to address the reality of the 
tabloid world set out in the example provided in the majority 
opinion because they cannot.  As the example makes clear, the 
dissent’s position would allow a knowingly false accusation of 
pedophilia or prostitution to be uttered with impunity in the 
name of “cleaning up the city” on a zoning petition. 
¶47 Nor does the dissent provide a reasoned application of 
its proposed holding to the principles justifying an absolute 
privilege:  
1.  The dissent correctly states that the first principle 
justifying an absolute privilege is that it ensures that 
decision makers will be more fully informed.  It fails to 
discuss 
how 
allowing 
an 
utterly 
false, 
malicious, 
and 
destructive accusation furthers that end.  It does not because 
it self-evidently cannot.   
2.  The dissent correctly states that the second principle 
justifying an absolute privilege is that it eliminates the 
chilling effect of defamation law and ensures that citizens will 
not be discouraged from participating in the democratic process 
by fear of later lawsuit.  It fails to discuss how allowing an 
utterly false, malicious, and destructive accusation furthers 
that end.  It does not because it self-evidently cannot.   
3.  The dissent correctly states that the third principle 
justifying an absolute privilege is that it encourages the free 
No. 96-0651.wab 
 
3 
expression of ideas as part of the political process.  It fails 
to discuss how allowing an utterly false, malicious, and 
destructive accusation furthers that end.  It does not because 
it self-evidently cannot.  
¶48 Have we come to a point in society where we will allow 
absolute protection to a knowingly false accusation, no matter 
how vicious, untrue, malicious, and destructive it is?   As long 
as the accusation is, at its tenuous best “relevant,” the 
dissent says we have.  Fortunately, the majority disagrees.    
 
96-0651.awb 
 
1 
¶49 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. (Dissenting).  The question 
certified to this court is whether the statements of witnesses 
at 
legislative 
proceedings 
are 
entitled 
to 
absolute 
or 
conditional privilege for purposes of defamation law.  To this 
certified 
question 
the 
majority 
answers 
an 
unpredictable 
"Maybe." 
¶50 Although at the outset the majority opinion purports 
to hold that testimony at a legislative proceeding is entitled 
only to conditional privilege, the real holding of the case 
appears to be that it could be either absolute or conditional 
privilege, depending on the individual circumstances of each 
case.  This appearance is underscored throughout the opinion 
when the majority ties its decision not to the general 
principles involved, but to the facts specific in this case.   
¶51 In ignoring these principles, the analysis of the 
majority 
is 
misdirected 
and 
it 
arrives 
at 
an 
erroneous 
conclusion.  Because an analysis of the policies underlying our 
adoption 
of 
absolute 
privilege 
for 
judicial 
proceedings 
demonstrates that those policies are equally applicable to 
declarants at legislative proceedings, I would apply absolute 
privilege to statements made at legislative proceedings for 
purposes of defamation law.  
¶52 The majority analyzes this case as if our task is to 
decide 
where 
to 
draw 
a 
line 
between 
those 
legislative 
proceedings deserving of application of absolute privilege and 
those hearings sufficiently 
untrustworthy to 
deserve 
only 
conditional 
privilege. 
 
Admittedly, 
conducting 
such 
a 
96-0651.awb 
 
2 
demarcation would be a difficult task.  It would require us to 
choose between the interests of society and the interests of the 
individual based on the circumstances of each proceeding.  
Depending on the nature of the government body, the parties to 
be 
examined, 
and 
the 
issues 
presented, 
the 
procedural 
requirements may vary dramatically.  Testimony may be voluntary 
or subpoenaed, invited or unsolicited.  Witnesses may be sworn 
or testify without oath.  Inquiries may be by panel members, or 
comments accepted without specific direction. 
¶53 The majority conducts just such an analysis of this 
case, focusing on the absence of procedural requirements 
affecting testimony before the Whitewater City Council and on 
the dearth of outside remedies available to the allegedly 
defamed individual.  Ultimately, the majority determines that 
the defendant may only be entitled to conditional privilege for 
her statements. 
¶54 Both the analysis and the conclusion provided by the 
majority are unsatisfactory.  The majority misses the mark 
because it analyzes the case not in terms of whether policies 
supporting absolute privilege exist, but rather in terms of 
whether certain safeguards such as subpoena, sworn testimony, 
96-0651.awb 
 
3 
and supervision exist.  In doing so, the majority paints itself 
into an untenable and unworkable corner.10 
¶55 The majority concludes that absolute privilege will 
not attach in this case because it lacks all of the procedural 
safeguards of the subpoena, sworn testimony, and supervision.  
Yet, the conclusion is untenable since the very cases relied 
upon by the majority in its analysis contradict this conclusion. 
  
¶56 If a subpoena is an essential safeguard for absolute 
privilege, then how can the cases cited by the majority in which 
                     
10 The majority attacks this dissent as being "myopic" in 
its interpretation of the majority opinion.  In developing this 
attack, the majority asserts at footnote 7 that its conclusions 
are based on a weighing of public policy and not on the presence 
of alternative procedural safeguards such as the subpoena power, 
potential supervision, or sworn testimony.  However, proclaiming 
in a footnote that the majority analysis is really a policy 
discussion does not make it so. 
The majority's repeated focus on potential alternative 
protections throughout the opinion, and offer of statements such 
as, "[d]ue to the lack of procedural safeguards in this case, 
however, we conclude that the public policy favoring a citizen's 
right 
to 
redress 
outweighs 
the 
policy 
concerned 
with 
discouraging 
a 
citizen's 
participation 
in 
the 
democratic 
process," contradicts the majority's footnote proclamation.  
Majority op. at n.7.  The strength of the public policy argument 
for protecting an individual's reputation from "scurrilous 
attack," to use the majority's terms, is not now, and never will 
be, dependent upon the presence or absence of alternative 
protections. 
Reasonable judges may differ on the conclusion of a policy 
debate.  However, such an analysis should be conducted based on 
the independent merits of the opposing policy positions, not on 
whether the existence of alternative protections obviates the 
need for such a discussion.  
96-0651.awb 
 
4 
no 
subpoena 
was 
present 
be 
aligned 
with 
the 
majority's 
conclusion?  See Spoehr v. Mittelstadt, 34 Wis. 2d 653, 150 
N.W.2d 502 (1967)(extending absolute privilege to comments of 
counsel at preliminary conference); Bussewitz v. Wisconsin 
Teachers Ass'n, 188 Wis. 121, 205 N.W. 808 (1925)(applying 
absolute privilege to allegations in pleadings); Jennings v. 
Paine, 4 Wis. 372 [*358] (1855)(applying absolute privilege to 
statements of counsel).   
¶57 If supervision is a critical safeguard to the grant of 
absolute privilege, then how can the majority justify this 
court's grant of absolute privilege in cases where there was no 
presiding officer to supervise the statement made?  See Hartman 
v. Buerger, 71 Wis. 2d 393, 238 N.W.2d 505 (1976)(applying 
absolute privilege to defamatory telegram of county sheriff 
responding to character check as part of town board tavern 
licensing process); Werner v. Ascher, 86 Wis. 349, 56 N.W. 869 
(1893)(holding 
absolute 
privilege 
probably 
applicable 
to 
unsolicited petition to town board to revoke liquor license); 
Larkin v. Noonan, 19 Wis. 93 [*82] (1865)(applying absolute 
privilege to statements in an unsolicited petition to the 
governor asking for the removal of a county sheriff). 
¶58 If sworn testimony is necessary, then how can this 
court rationalize the grant of absolute privilege where the 
testimony is not sworn?  See Schier v. Denny, 12 Wis. 2d 544, 
107 N.W.2d 611 (1961)(granting absolute privilege to allegations 
made in a complaint against a real estate broker to State Real 
Estate Broker's Board); Schultz v. Strauss, 127 Wis. 325, 327, 
96-0651.awb 
 
5 
106 N.W. 1066 (1906)(extending absolute privilege to statements 
made to district attorney acting in official capacity). 
¶59 Indeed, there are cases within this jurisdiction in 
which absolute privilege has been applied and none of the 
essential safeguards espoused by the majority were present.  See 
Hartman, 71 Wis. 2d at 398-400; Bergman v. Hupy, 64 Wis. 2d 747, 
221 N.W.2d 898 (1974)(holding that statements to an assistant 
district attorney while seeking issuance of a criminal complaint 
are absolutely privileged); Schultz, 127 Wis. at 327. 
¶60 Equally problematic, the majority opinion fails to 
acknowledge that we have already applied absolute privilege to 
legislative proceedings in a number of instances.  Although 
Wisconsin courts have not addressed the specific question of 
whether witnesses should be given absolute privilege when 
testifying before a legislative body, we have acknowledged 
application of absolute privilege to town boards in Werner, 
DiMiceli v. Klieger, 58 Wis. 2d 359, 206 N.W.2d 184 (1973), 
Bergman and Hartman.11  Town boards, like city councils, are 
                     
11 This court has noted that the "[absolute] privilege has 
been extended to judicial officers, legislative proceedings, and 
to certain governmental executive officers."  Zinda v. Louisiana 
Pacific Corp., 149 Wis. 2d 913, 440 N.W.2d 548 (1989)(finding 
communications between employer and employees concerning ex—
employee's dismissal only conditionally privileged); see, e.g., 
Yip v. Pagano, 606 F. Supp. 1566 (D. N.J. 1985); DeSantis v. 
Employees Passaic County Welfare Ass'n, 568 A.2d 565 (N.J. App. 
1990); North Coast Cable Ltd. Partnership v. Hanneman, 648 
N.E.2d 875 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994); Jennings v. Cronin, 389 A.2d 
1183 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978); Logan's Super Markets, Inc. v. 
McCalla, 343 S.W.2d 892 (Tenn. 1961).  
96-0651.awb 
 
6 
subsidiary legislative bodies constituted pursuant to authority 
delegated from the state legislature. 
¶61 In Werner, the plaintiff claimed defamation based on 
written statements provided to a town board as part of a liquor 
license revocation proceeding.  While the court disposed of the 
case on evidentiary grounds, the court noted that if the 
statement had been made only to the town board, it was probably 
absolutely privileged.  See Werner, 86 Wis. at 351.  Subsequent 
case law has relied upon this statement and further established 
the rule that town board liquor license proceedings are to be 
absolutely privileged.  See DiMiceli, 58 Wis. 2d at 364 ("[S]uch 
absolute 
privilege 
has 
been 
extended 
to 
quasi-judicial 
proceedings, including . . . town board proceedings concerning a 
tavern license."); see also Bergman, 64 Wis. 2d at 751.  In 
addition, in Hartman, this court explicitly refused to abrogate 
this application of absolute privilege, and applied it to a town 
board meeting to which a defamatory telegram had been submitted 
as evidence.  See Hartman, 71 Wis. 2d at 397-400. 
¶62 In each of these cases we have justified application 
of the privilege to the town board meeting on the grounds that 
the town board was determining matters in the public interest 
and thus was "quasi-judicial" in nature.  In extending absolute 
privilege to such proceedings, we did not consider what 
alternate safeguards existed against defamation.  Indeed, even 
had such safeguards been our primary concern, the presiding 
officer of a city council proceeding would seem to have equal, 
if not greater, control and supervision as officers of town 
96-0651.awb 
 
7 
boards in liquor license proceedings.  Thus, the majority's 
conclusion that statements made to the Whitewater City Council, 
a municipal subsidiary of the legislature, are not privileged, 
appears inconsistent with our previous application of absolute 
privilege to other legislative subsidiaries. 
¶63 Having pointed out these threshold inconsistencies, it 
is also significant that in none of the cases in which we have 
adopted absolute privilege has our decision been based on 
whether an otherwise defamatory statement was made under 
subpoena, while under oath, or while otherwise supervised.  We 
have instead adopted absolute privilege based on our balancing 
of the important public policy interests at stake.  Thus, any 
attempt to draw a line between the adoption of absolute or 
conditional privilege based on whether a witness is subpoenaed, 
sworn, 
or 
supervised12 
while 
making 
comments 
ignores 
the 
fundamental policy 
reasons 
behind 
application 
of absolute 
privilege to defamation actions.   
¶64 The 
absolute 
privilege 
affirmative 
defense 
is 
justified "where the interests and necessities of society 
require that the time and occasion of the publication or 
utterance, even though it be both false and malicious, shall 
protect the defamer from all liability to prosecution for the 
sake of the public good."  Bacon v. Michigan Central R. Co., 33 
                     
12 Examples of such supervision include a member of the 
legislative body asking specific questions of the witness, or 
rules limiting the scope of a witness's comments. 
96-0651.awb 
 
8 
N.W. 181, 183 (Mich. 1887).  The interests and necessities 
referred to take three basic forms.   
¶65 First, by eliminating the potential for personal 
liability 
of 
declarants, 
absolute 
privilege 
ensures 
that 
decision makers will be more fully informed.  See Kensington 
Development Corp. v. Israel, 142 Wis. 2d 894, 900, 419 N.W.2d 
241 (1988).  Second, absolute privilege eliminates the chilling 
effect of defamation law and ensures that citizens will not be 
discouraged from participating in the fundamental democratic 
process by fear of later suit.  As we have noted in the past, 
"If parties are shadowed by the fear that by some mistake as to 
facts or some excess of zeal, or by some error . . . they may be 
subjected to harassing litigation . . . they may well feel that 
justice is too dearly bought and that it is safest to abandon 
its 
pursuit. . . ." 
 
Bussewitz 
v. 
Wisconsin 
Teachers' 
Association, 188 Wis. 121, 124-25, 205 N.W. 808, 810 (1925).   
¶66 Finally, 
absolute 
privilege 
encourages 
the 
free 
expression of ideas as part of the political process.  See 
DeSantis v. Employees Passaic County Welfare Ass'n, 568 A.2d 
565, 567 (N.J. App. 1990). Accordingly, the issue of whether 
this privilege should be applied to witnesses before legislative 
bodies 
requires 
a 
determination 
of 
whether 
the 
risk 
of 
uncompensated reputational harm is outweighed by the public 
policy of encouraging citizen participation in such proceedings. 
  
96-0651.awb 
 
9 
¶67 Where the balance tips in favor of the societal 
interests, absolute privilege, as set out in Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 590A (1977) provides that: 
 
A 
witness 
is 
absolutely 
privileged 
to 
publish 
defamatory matter as part of a legislative proceeding 
in which he is testifying or in communications 
preliminary to the proceedings, if the matter has some 
relation to the proceeding. 
Such statements are subject only to the procedural safeguards 
that they be made in a context to which the privilege has been 
applied, and the substantive safeguard that the statement be 
relevant to the matter being considered.  See Snow v. Koeppl, 
159 Wis. 2d 77, 81, 464 N.W.2d 215 (Ct. App. 1990).  To promote 
the public interest, relevancy is to be liberally construed.  
See id. 
 
¶68 Despite the majority's contention to the contrary, the 
liberal relevancy test is not a superficial doctrine providing 
no protection to the allegedly defamed.  Statements which have 
no relation to the issues under discussion do not receive the 
benefit of the privilege.  Indeed, this court has explicitly 
relied upon the relevancy requirement to reject arguments that a 
conditional privilege was necessary to prevent hearings from 
becoming "forum[s] for unfettered character assassination."  See 
Hartman, 71 Wis. 2d at 400 (rejecting arguments based on Melton 
v. Slonsky, 504 P.2d 1288, 1291 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973)). 
¶69 In rejecting the "relate to" requirement of absolute 
privilege, the majority asserts its view that accusations of 
pedophilia, prostitution or purveyance of pornography against a 
96-0651.awb 
 
10
local resident sufficiently "relate to" a hearing on municipal 
beautification to invoke the privilege.  I disagree with the 
majority's conclusion that "any court's interpretation would 
almost certainly" find that calling a neighbor a pedophile 
relates to the issue of municipal beautification.  Majority op. 
at 14.  Not only is the conclusion incorrect, but such a blanket 
assertion does a disservice to the courts in this state that may 
not be inclined to embrace the majority's conclusion that 
pedophilia relates to municipal beautification. 
¶70  Where statements are relevant to issues arising in a 
judicial proceeding, this court has recognized the importance of 
protecting the societal interest in obtaining full disclosure of 
facts and in hearing arguments from interested parties.  See 
Bussewitz, 188 Wis. at 127-28.  Our recognition of this societal 
interest is equally, if not more, applicable to proceedings 
before legislative entities. 
¶71 Judicial 
proceedings 
resolve 
questions 
of 
rights 
between a small number of parties and are protected by absolute 
privilege. 
 
Quasi-judicial 
proceedings 
also 
receive 
the 
privilege, in part because the societal interests upon which 
absolute privilege is based are even more forceful where a 
quasi-judicial 
proceeding 
is 
deciding 
between 
the 
public 
interest and a private interest.  See Schier, 12 Wis. 2d at 548. 
¶72 This same justification argues in favor of applying 
absolute 
privilege 
to 
legislative 
hearings. 
 
Legislative 
entities are the arbiters of the public interest, after input 
and argument through the democratic process.  Cf. Schier, 12 
96-0651.awb 
 
11
Wis. 2d at 548.  The very interests that make absolute privilege 
necessary for communications made in judicial and quasi-judicial 
proceedings are also essential to the legislative process.  The 
legislature 
must 
be 
fully 
informed 
to 
enact 
suitable 
legislation.  See Yip v. Pagano, 606 F. Supp. 1566, 1571 (D. 
N.J. 1985). 
¶73 This is true regardless of the size or scope of 
authority of the particular legislative body in question.  See 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 590 cmt.c (1977); Kelly v. Daro, 
118 P.2d 37, 38 (Cal. App. 1941).  Whether the declarant is 
speaking before the state legislature, a county board, or a 
committee of a municipal council, the democratic process 
requires an atmosphere of openness wherein citizen participants 
can petition their government officials without fear of being 
forced to defend their statements later in court.  See Webster 
v. Sun Company, Inc., 731 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  The 
majority's holding does not create such an open and democratic 
environment. 
¶74 Compounding the majority's error in refusing to apply 
absolute privilege is the majority's advocacy of an unworkable 
frame of analysis.  The opinion is unworkable since it provides 
little guidance to courts and its result impedes the democratic 
process.  By applying conditional privilege to this case and 
refusing even to elucidate a standard of application for future 
cases, the majority leaves the trial court without direction as 
to how to apply absolute or conditional privilege, except on a 
case-by-case 
basis. 
 
The 
majority 
also 
leaves 
open 
the 
96-0651.awb 
 
12
possibility that a citizen who might otherwise offer information 
on important local issues will remain silent because of a fear 
of reprisal.  
¶75 Under 
conditional 
privilege, 
the 
target 
of 
a 
declarant's comments at a legislative hearing may respond by 
filing suit for defamation.  As recently noted in the cover 
story of the ABA Journal: 
 
Increasingly, Americans who speak out in opposition to 
private development plans before local zoning boards, 
testify 
at 
school 
board 
meetings 
or 
circulate 
petitions to their elected officials are finding 
themselves in court, defending themselves against 
lawsuits by developers, landowners . . . claiming to 
have been defamed or otherwise injured by public 
comment. 
See Alexandra D. Lowe, The Price of Speaking Out, 82 A.B.A. J. 
48, 48-49, Sept., 1996. 
 
¶76 Regardless 
of whether such 
suits 
are 
legitimate 
grievances or SLAPP suits ("Strategic Lawsuit Against Public 
Participation"), the possibility of 
a 
multimillion 
dollar 
lawsuit may chill democratic participation and keep citizens out 
of committee rooms.  A grant of only conditional privilege to 
witnesses at legislative proceedings impedes the workings of our 
democratic process: 
 
"[B]oth individuals and groups are now being routinely 
sued in multimillion-dollar damage actions for such 
"All-American" political activities as circulating a 
petition, writing a letter to the editor, testifying 
at a public hearing, reporting violations of law, 
lobbying for legislation, peacefully demonstrating, or 
otherwise attempting to influence government action."  
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13
See id. at 48 (quoting George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, SLAPPs: 
Getting Sued for Speaking Out (1996)). 
¶77 Defamation suit defendants and observers of those 
suits may choose in the future not to be involved and to remain 
silent.  The more emotional energy and financial capital 
expended to defend such suits, the less incentive or energy 
there is to contest the underlying project.  Accordingly, to 
promote the policies that ensure democratic participation and a 
free and frank discussion of issues, absolute privilege should 
protect statements made in legislative proceedings from the 
threat or reality of a defamation lawsuit. 
¶78 Foreign jurisdictions also do not provide the majority 
analysis with sufficient cover from the legitimate policy 
objectives just discussed.  Citing four cases from foreign 
jurisdictions, the majority proclaims that "a significant body 
of case law has developed to support the position that witnesses 
who supply voluntary testimony to a legislative body are 
entitled only to a conditional immunity."  See Majority op. at 
22.  While a grant of conditional privilege may be the ultimate 
holding of a very limited number of cases cited by the majority 
in support of its result, their number is far less than the 
"significant body of cases" claimed by the majority.  More 
importantly, 
the 
reasoning 
they 
employ 
is 
contrary 
to 
Wisconsin's established privilege jurisprudence and unsupportive 
of the majority's rationale. 
¶79 In Adserv Corp. v. Lincecum, 385 So.2d 432 (La. Ct. 
App. 1980), the court applied conditional privilege to a 
96-0651.awb 
 
14
legislative hearing only after acknowledging that Louisiana, 
unlike 
Wisconsin, 
applies 
only 
conditional 
privilege 
to 
statements at judicial proceedings.  In Bell v. Horton, 669 
N.E.2d 546 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995), the court did not even consider 
whether statements of legislative witnesses were subpoenaed or 
sworn, and ignored the issue presented here by instead applying 
conditional privilege based on statements made to a public 
officer with the authority to take action in the public 
interest.   
¶80 Wright v. Lathrop, 21 N.E. 963 (Mass. 1889) was 
resolved in a similar manner, with the court refusing to label 
as a witness an unsubpoenaed declarant at a legislative 
committee 
meeting. 
 
That 
court 
also 
applied 
conditional 
privilege to statements made to public officers in the public 
interest.  Finally, in Fiore v. Rogero, 144 So.2d 99 (Fla. Ct. 
App. 1962), the court did apply conditional privilege to 
statements of witnesses at legislative hearings.  However, in 
taking this action, the Fiore court failed to consider and 
balance the public interest in unconstrained statements and the 
individual's interest in protection of reputation. 
¶81 Thus, the reasoning employed by the foreign cases 
around which the majority rallies does not align with this 
court's prior focus on the public policy merits of adopting 
absolute or conditional privilege.  Accordingly, we should not 
then deviate from our prior case law and adopt the majority's 
new framework of analysis.  
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15
¶82 In addition, the majority's extensive evaluation of 
the alternative remedies available to an allegedly defamed 
individual misses the point that absolute privilege was created 
to address.  Admittedly, the application of absolute privilege 
to defamation actions arising out of legislative proceedings, 
just like the application of absolute privilege to defamation 
actions arising out of judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, 
results in a limitation of remedies to the allegedly defamed in 
those proceedings.  By focusing on the alternative remedies 
offered by the plaintiffs in response to a question at oral 
arguments, the majority obfuscates the proper focus of inquiry. 
¶83 When absolute privilege is applied to a proceeding, it 
is because the public interest in disclosure of statements at 
those proceedings outweighs the private interest in protecting 
one's reputation.  Although tort remedies may still be available 
to the alleged victim, the public interest in preserving 
participation 
and 
exposing 
the 
truth 
trumps 
suits 
for 
defamation. 
 
The 
individual's 
right 
of 
redress 
is 
thus 
purposefully subservient to the public interest protected by the 
privilege, 
and 
the 
absence 
of 
alternative 
remedies 
is 
irrelevant. 
¶84 The concurring opinion, like the majority, espouses 
conditional 
privilege, 
but 
fails 
to 
engage 
in 
a 
policy 
discussion weighing these competing public interests.  Like the 
majority, the concurrence fails to address the invidious effects 
of conditional privilege upon the democratic process.  Like the 
majority, the concurrence fails to acknowledge that we have 
96-0651.awb 
 
16
previously 
applied 
absolute 
privilege 
to 
witnesses 
in 
legislative proceedings and that the application of absolute 
privilege to legislative witnesses is consistent with our prior 
case law. 
¶85 More 
importantly, 
it 
is 
noteworthy 
that 
the 
concurrence does not consider the full scope of its own 
argument.  If this court is to apply conditional privilege to 
the situation presented here based on a perceived threat to 
America's "ordered society" by the tabloid media, how then can 
the majority not agree to abrogate all applications of absolute 
privilege in situations, including judicial proceedings where 
defamatory statements might be uttered?  The arguments of the 
concurrence could be cited as support for eliminating absolute 
privilege currently enjoyed by parties to a judicial proceeding 
or the privilege accorded legislators and city council members 
at legislative hearings.  Legislators have far greater access to 
the media than has an individual homeowner commenting at a city 
council meeting.  Yet, this court endorses the protections of 
absolute privilege for legislators and city council members at 
legislative meetings but allows no such protection for witnesses 
at such meetings.  If indeed the tabloid media is going to rule 
our law, why should it not then rule it uniformly? 
¶86 Further attacking the dissent for using "cold" legal 
analysis 
in its approach 
to this 
question 
of 
law, the 
concurrence fails to cite any authority in support of its 
conclusion.  Instead, it substitutes hypotheticals for legal 
analysis. 
96-0651.awb 
 
17
¶87 After raising the specter of tabloid journalism run 
amok, the concurrence attacks this dissent as "fail[ing] to 
discuss 
how 
allowing 
an 
utterly 
false, 
malicious, 
and 
destructive accusation furthers" the three policy justifications 
for absolute privilege.  Concurrence at 2.  In making this 
assertion, the concurrence missteps in resting its argument on 
the extreme case, an alleged statement that is by definition 
defamatory, rather than looking to the value of unfettered 
discourse. 
¶88 I agree that allowing such a statement, with the full 
prior knowledge of all concerned that the statement is "utterly 
false," would do a disservice.  However, neither this court, nor 
the parties to this case, have the benefit of such prescience or 
the luxury of such a narrow perspective.  As discussed above, we 
must instead be concerned with the effects our adoption of 
conditional privilege will have on the democratic process, 
decision makers and free expression, where there are witnesses 
who would comment in a truthful manner but for fear of a 
meritless suit for defamation. 
¶89 Finally, 
without 
explanation 
and 
again 
without 
offering any legal analysis in support of the assertion, the 
concurrence offers a sweeping assertion that the authority 
relied upon by the dissent is "dubious."  Apparently resting its 
"dubious" authority conclusion upon the age of the case, the 
concurrence cites Hartman as the lone example of its sweeping 
assertion.  Hartman is of a 1976 vintage. If the concurrence 
applied the same reasoning to the cases cited in the majority 
96-0651.awb 
 
18
opinion, almost one-half of the majority's cited authority would 
be deemed "dubious."  Hartman and the other cases cited in this 
dissent are the controlling legal precedent of this court until 
they are overruled by the court—an action not taken by the 
majority today. 
¶90  This court is asked to decide whether statements of 
witnesses at legislative proceedings are entitled to absolute or 
conditional privilege for purposes of defamation law.  The 
majority focuses on procedural safeguards and the right to 
redress.  In applying absolute privilege to judicial and quasi-
judicial proceedings, Wisconsin courts have never held the 
existence of alternative safeguards to be determinative.  The 
majority's concern for the right of redress is no different than 
arguments rejected by this court each time it has adopted or 
applied absolute privilege to defamation actions.  Because I 
believe 
that 
adopting 
absolute 
privilege 
for 
legislative 
witnesses is consistent with our prior decisions and supported 
by public policy, I respectfully dissent. 
  
¶91 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Shirley S. 
Abrahamson and Justice Donald W. Steinmetz join this opinion.