Case Title: State ex rel. United States Steel Corp. v. Zaleski

Citation: 2003-Ohio-1630

Docket Number: 20021551

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2003-04-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. United States Steel Corp. v. Zaleski, 98 Ohio St.3d 395, 2003-Ohio-1630.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, F.K.A. 
U.S.X CORPORATION, APPELLANT, v. ZALESKI, JUDGE, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. United States Steel Corp. v. Zaleski, 98 Ohio St.3d 395, 
2003-Ohio-1630.] 
Workers’ compensation — Prohibition — Writs sought prohibiting common 
pleas court judge from exercising any further jurisdiction over 
claimants’ appeals from Industrial Commission’s orders denying claims 
for the occupational disease asbestosis and asbestos-related pleural 
disease on the ground that claimants’ filing of joint notices of appeal 
failed to comply with R.C. 4123.512 — Court of appeals’ dismissal of 
complaints affirmed. 
(Nos. 2002-1551 and 2002-1669 — Submitted February 25, 2003 — Decided 
April 16, 2003.) 
APPEALS from the Court of Appeals for Lorain County, Nos. 02CA008083, 
02CA008095 and 02CA008097. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶1} 
Joe McLendon, Ralph William Jr., Joseph Makuch, Franklin 
Wilson, Richard Reinoehl, Robert Mustard, Howard Carter, and Carl 
McDonaldson each worked at a plant in Lorain, Ohio, owned and operated by 
appellant, United States Steel Corporation, f.k.a., USX Corporation (“U.S. 
Steel”).  Each of these workers claimed that he was diagnosed with the 
occupational diseases asbestosis and asbestos-related pleural disease, and each 
worker filed a workers’ compensation claim.  The district hearing officer of the 
Industrial Commission denied the claims, the commission’s staff hearing officer 
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affirmed the district hearing officer’s orders and denied the claims, and the 
commission refused the claimants’ further appeals. 
{¶2} 
On January 4, 2002, Carter and McDonaldson filed in the Lorain 
County Court of Common Pleas a joint notice of appeal from the commission’s 
orders as well as a complaint for a judgment declaring that they are entitled to 
participate in the workers’ compensation fund for asbestosis and asbestos-related 
pleural disease.  On February 26, 2002, Wilson, Reinoehl, and Mustard filed a 
comparable joint notice of appeal and complaint in the common pleas court.  On 
March 7, 2002, McLendon, William, and Makuch filed a similar joint notice of 
appeal and complaint in the common pleas court.  The notices of appeal stated the 
names of the claimants and their employer, the numbers of their claims, the dates 
of the commission orders appealed from, and the fact that the claimants were 
appealing therefrom.  U.S. Steel moved to dismiss the appeals, claiming that 
because the claimants’ notices had been filed jointly, they failed to comply with 
R.C. 4123.512.  In April and May 2002, appellee, Judge Edward M. Zaleski of the 
common pleas court, denied the motions. 
{¶3} 
U.S. Steel subsequently filed complaints in the Court of Appeals 
for Lorain County for writs of prohibition to prevent Judge Zaleski from 
exercising any further jurisdiction over the claimants’ appeals and to dismiss the 
cases with prejudice.  Judge Zaleski filed Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motions to dismiss the 
complaints for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  In July 
and August 2002, the court of appeals granted Judge Zaleski’s motions and 
dismissed the complaints. 
{¶4} 
In its appeals as of right, U.S. Steel asserts that the court of appeals 
erred in dismissing its prohibition actions.1 
                                                 
1  We grant U.S. Steel’s motion to consolidate these cases because 
they involve the same background facts and they raise identical legal 
January Term, 2003 
3 
Request for Oral Argument 
{¶5} 
U.S. Steel requests oral argument for these appeals pursuant to 
S.Ct.Prac.R. IX(2).  “Among the factors we consider in determining whether to 
grant oral argument in appeals in which oral argument is not required is whether 
the case involves a matter of great public importance, complex issues of law or 
fact, a substantial constitutional issue or a conflict between courts of appeals.”  
Clark v. Connor (1998), 82 Ohio St.3d 309, 311, 695 N.E.2d 751. 
{¶6} 
Oral argument is not warranted here.  Although the underlying 
issue of whether R.C. 4123.512 prohibits joint notices of appeal may be 
significant, the court of appeals did not expressly determine that issue, nor need 
we; our review is instead restricted to whether extraordinary relief in prohibition 
is warranted.  The parties’ briefs are sufficient to resolve this limited issue.  No 
issues of legal or factual complexity are involved, no constitutional issue is 
implicated, and no conflict between courts of appeals is claimed. 
{¶7} 
Therefore, we deny U.S. Steel’s request for oral argument. 
Prohibition 
{¶8} 
The dismissals of the prohibition complaints were warranted if, 
after all factual allegations of the complaints were presumed true and all 
reasonable inferences were made in U.S. Steel’s favor, it appeared beyond doubt 
that U.S. Steel could prove no set of facts warranting the requested extraordinary 
relief in prohibition.  State ex rel. Suburban Constr. Co. v. Skok (1999), 85 Ohio 
St.3d 645, 646, 710 N.E.2d 710.  “In the absence of a patent and unambiguous 
lack of jurisdiction, a court having general subject-matter jurisdiction can 
determine its own jurisdiction, and a party challenging that jurisdiction has an 
                                                                                                                                     
issues.  See State ex rel. Lemmon v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. (1997), 
78 Ohio St.3d 186, 187, 677 N.E.2d 347, fn. 1. 
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adequate remedy by appeal.”  State ex rel. Nalls v. Russo, 96 Ohio St.3d 410, 
2002-Ohio-4907, 775 N.E.2d 522, ¶ 18. 
{¶9} 
U.S. Steel claims that Judge Zaleski patently and unambiguously 
lacked jurisdiction over the appeals because the notices of appeal did not comply 
with R.C. 4123.512.  More specifically, U.S. Steel asserts that R.C. 4123.512 
prohibits joint notices of appeal by multiple claimants from multiple common 
pleas court decisions.  Based on the following, U.S. Steel’s prohibition claim is 
meritless. 
{¶10} Under R.C. 4123.512(A), “[t]he claimant or the employer may 
appeal an order of the industrial commission made under division (E) of section 
4123.511 of the Revised Code in any injury or occupational disease case, other 
than a decision as to the extent of disability to the court of common pleas of the 
county in which the injury was inflicted * * *.”  In these appeals, R.C. 
4123.512(B) requires the following contents for the notice of appeal: 
{¶11} “The notice of appeal shall state the names of the claimant and the 
employer, the number of the claim, the date of the order appealed from, and the 
fact that the appellant appeals therefrom.” 
{¶12} Notwithstanding U.S. Steel’s claims to the contrary, a combined or 
joint notice of appeal by multiple claimants pursuant to R.C. 4123.512 does not 
patently and unambiguously divest a common pleas court of jurisdiction over the 
appeal.  In construing the statute, our paramount concern is legislative intent, and 
words and phrases must be read in context.  State ex rel. Moss v. Ohio State Hwy. 
Patrol Retirement Sys., 97 Ohio St.3d 198, 2002-Ohio-5806, 777 N.E.2d 259, ¶ 
20-21.  No language in R.C. 4123.512 expressly precludes joint appeals or 
combined notices of appeal. 
{¶13} Moreover, U.S. Steel’s assertion that the language of R.C. 
4123.512 referring to the claimant and the order appealed from prohibits 
claimants from filing a joint notice of appeal ignores applicable rules of statutory 
January Term, 2003 
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interpretation.  R.C. 1.43(A) provides that “[t]he singular includes the plural, and 
the plural includes the singular.” 
{¶14} In Republic Steel Corp. v. Quinn (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 57, 58-59, 
12 OBR 49, 465 N.E.2d 413, we relied on R.C. 1.43(A) to reject a comparable 
argument in a case in which an employer sought a writ of prohibition to prevent a 
common pleas court from considering a combined appeal by a single claimant 
from two separate workers’ compensation decisions by the Industrial 
Commission:  
{¶15} “Appellant contends that R.C. 4123.519[2] does not authorize two 
or more decisions of the commission to be appealed to the court of common pleas 
in a single action.  Instead, appellant contends that Gordon was required to 
institute a separate appeal from each claim addressed by the commission. 
{¶16} “In support of this contention, appellant relies upon the language 
of R.C. 4123.519 providing for an appeal of ‘a decision’ of the commission within 
sixty days of having received the ‘decision,’ as it pertains to a ‘claim’ made due to 
the infliction of an ‘injury.’  Since Gordon initiated a single appeal involving two 
decisions of the commission, appellant argues that R.C. 4123.519 was not adhered 
to and that, as such, [the court of common pleas] is wholly without jurisdiction to 
consider the appeal. 
{¶17} “We are unpersuaded by appellant’s argument which completely 
overlooks the provisions of R.C. 1.43(A) wherein the General Assembly has 
stated, with respect to statutory construction, that ‘[t]he singular includes the 
plural, and the plural includes the singular.’ 
{¶18} “* * *  
                                                 
2  Former R.C. 4123.519 was amended and recodified as R.C. 
4123.512, 145 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2990, 3153. 
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{¶19} “* * * [T]he application of R.C. 1.43(A) is neither prohibited by 
the provisions of R.C. 4123.519, nor does it conflict with related provisions 
contained in R.C. Chapter 4123, as long as any and all decisions sought to be 
appealed are instituted within the sixty-day limitation period prescribed by R.C. 
4123.519.  In the subject cause, each decision was appealed within the sixty-day 
limitation period.  Accordingly, [the common pleas court] is not exercising 
jurisdiction unauthorized by law and, therefore, the court of appeals properly 
denied the writ [of prohibition].”  See, also, Akers v. Johnson Controls, Inc. (June 
27, 1997), Highland App. No. 96CA900, 1997 WL 360569, which reached a 
similar conclusion. 
{¶20} Furthermore, we have expressly noted that the “jurisdictional 
requirements of R.C. [4123.512] are satisfied by the filing of a timely notice of 
appeal which is in substantial compliance with the dictates of that statute.”  
(Emphasis added.)   Fisher v. Mayfield (1987), 30 Ohio St.3d 8, 30 OBR 16, 505 
N.E.2d 975, paragraph one of the syllabus, construing former R.C. 4123.519.  
“Substantial compliance for jurisdictional purposes occurs when a timely notice 
of appeal filed pursuant to R.C. [4123.512] includes sufficient information, in 
intelligible form, to place on notice all parties to a proceeding that an appeal has 
been filed from an identifiable final order which has determined the parties’ 
substantive rights and liabilities.”  Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶21} The claimants’ joint notices contained all of the information 
required by R.C. 4123.512(B), notifying all parties, including U.S. Steel, of the 
appeals and orders being appealed.  See, e.g., Fisher at paragraph two of the 
syllabus; Holmes v. Pipeline Dev. Co. (Feb. 17, 2000), Cuyahoga App. No. 
76835, 2000 WL 193254.  U.S. Steel does not assert that the combined notices 
misled or prejudiced them in preparing a defense.  In fact, U.S. Steel readily 
concedes that the notices of appeal “contain sufficient information, without 
January Term, 2003 
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misstatement or technical error, to put all parties on notice of the workers’ 
compensation claims being appealed.” 
{¶22} Notably, U.S. Steel cites no appellate case holding that R.C. 
4123.512 requires an individual notice of appeal for each claimant. 
{¶23} Therefore, Judge Zaleski does not patently and unambiguously 
lack jurisdiction over the claimants’ appeal.  In so holding, we need not expressly 
rule on U.S. Steel’s jurisdictional claims because our review is limited to 
determining whether Judge Zaleski patently and unambiguously lacks 
jurisdiction.  State ex rel. Shimko v. McMonagle (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 426, 431, 
751 N.E.2d 472. 
{¶24} Based on the foregoing, the court of appeals properly dismissed 
U.S. Steel’s prohibition actions.  U.S. Steel has adequate legal remedies by appeal 
to raise its jurisdictional claims.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of the 
court of appeals. 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, COOK, LUNDBERG 
STRATTON and O’CONNOR, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Rademaker, Matty, McClelland & Greve, Robert C. McClelland and 
Jennifer L. Whitt; and Roberta K. Spurgeon, for appellant. 
 
Gregory A. White, Lorain County Prosecuting Attorney, and M. Robert 
Flanagan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
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