Case Title: Booker v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 071626

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT:  All the Justices 
 
JOSEPH BOOKER 
 
v.   Record No. 071626 
 
 
        OPINION BY 
JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 
 
                       June 6, 2008 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals 
erred in affirming a judgment in a criminal case in which the 
circuit court, in response to a question posed by the jury 
during deliberations in the sentencing phase, instructed the 
jury that the court had the power to reduce but not to increase 
the sentence imposed by the jury. 
 
Joseph Booker was tried by a jury in the Circuit Court of 
Amelia County on indictments charging three counts of cocaine 
distribution, in violation of Code § 18.2-248.  The jury 
convicted Booker of all three charges. 
 
During the sentencing phase of Booker’s trial, the circuit 
court instructed the jury that “[i]n Virginia, which now has no 
parole, the defendant will serve at least 85 percent of any time 
that is ultimately imposed by the [c]ourt.”  In addition, the 
jury was informed that it must impose a sentence of between five 
and 40 years’ imprisonment for each charge. 
 
After the case was submitted to the jury for sentencing 
deliberations, the jury asked the following question, “Can the 
[j]udge alter the sentence[?]”  The circuit court informed the 
parties that it was inclined to tell the jury that the court 
could reduce but could not increase the sentence fixed by the 
jury.  Booker objected to this proposed response, arguing that 
it would send the “wrong message,” and that the court simply 
should instruct the jury that it should not be concerned with 
what might occur after the jury determined Booker’s sentence.  
The circuit court provided the following response to the jury 
over Booker’s objection: “[T]he Court has the power to reduce, 
but not increase the sentence.  However, you shall not concern 
yourselves with what happens after your verdict is returned.” 
The jury fixed Booker’s sentence at 12 years’ imprisonment 
for each of the three convictions.  In accordance with the 
verdict, the circuit court sentenced Booker to three consecutive 
terms of 12 years’ imprisonment. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed Booker’s convictions in an 
unpublished opinion, holding that the circuit court did not err 
in instructing the jury regarding the court’s authority to 
reduce the sentence imposed by the jury.  Booker v. 
Commonwealth, Record No. 1754-05-2 (December 19, 2006).  The 
Court of Appeals concluded that the failure to provide an 
accurate and direct response “could have both engendered further 
speculation by the jury on whether the trial judge would 
increase or decrease [Booker’s] punishment, and caused the jury 
 
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to base [its] determination of [Booker’s] punishment on a 
mistaken belief of the law.”  Id., slip op. at 5.  The Court of 
Appeals held that the instruction was proper because it “was 
neither misleading or confusing and prevented the jury from 
basing its verdict on a misconception of the law.”  Id.  We 
awarded Booker this appeal. 
 
Booker argues that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming 
the circuit court’s judgment because the circuit court 
improperly informed the jury that the court could reduce but not 
increase the sentence set by the jury.  Booker contends that the 
circuit court’s response invited the jury to speculate about 
what action the court might take with regard to the sentence.  
Thus, Booker asserts that the circuit court’s instruction to the 
jury tainted the jury’s decision regarding the appropriate 
punishment for the three offenses. 
 
In response, the Commonwealth first maintains that Booker 
did not adequately preserve his objection to the circuit court’s 
proposed answer to the jury’s question.  According to the 
Commonwealth, Booker’s argument on appeal is barred by Rule 5:25 
because Booker did not argue to the circuit court that the 
court’s proposed answer permitted the jury to speculate 
regarding what action might be taken after the jury made its 
sentencing determination. 
 
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Addressing the merits of the circuit court’s response, the 
Commonwealth contends that the court’s response was a correct 
statement of the law, and was appropriate because the answer was 
given accurately without reference to inappropriate matters such 
as executive clemency.  The Commonwealth also argues that the 
circuit court’s response likely would have reduced the jury’s 
inclination to speculate about the court’s role in determining 
the final sentence, especially in light of the fact that the 
jury already had been informed that Booker would serve at least 
85 percent of any sentence “ultimately imposed by the [c]ourt.”  
Finally, the Commonwealth maintains that because the circuit 
court also instructed the jury not to be concerned with what 
would happen after the jury returned its verdict, the circuit 
court effectively precluded the jury’s further consideration of 
future action the circuit court might take regarding Booker’s 
sentence.  We disagree with the Commonwealth’s arguments. 
 
Initially, we conclude that Booker preserved his objection 
to the circuit court’s response to the jury’s question.  
Although Booker did not argue in the circuit court that the 
court’s response would encourage the jury to speculate about 
future actions the court might take regarding Booker’s sentence, 
the objection nevertheless informed the court that Booker viewed 
the court’s response as providing improper information to the 
jury.  Thus, because the circuit court was informed with 
 
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reasonable certainty of Booker’s concern, the court had the 
ability to evaluate the merits of the objection and to make an 
intelligent decision regarding the potential effect of the 
instruction on the jury’s deliberation process.  See Rule 5:25. 
 
We review the circuit court’s response to the jury’s 
question in the context of the sentencing function performed by 
juries in criminal trials.  When a defendant is found guilty by 
a jury of a felony charge or a Class 1 misdemeanor, a separate 
sentencing proceeding is held before the same jury to determine 
the punishment the defendant should receive for those 
convictions.  Code § 19.2-295.1.  The jury is charged with the 
duty of determining just and proper punishment under the 
evidence and within the penalty limits provided by statute.  
After the jury fixes a sentence, the circuit court may suspend 
that sentence, in whole or in part.  Code § 19.2-303. 
 
As a general rule, in determining a defendant’s sentence, a 
jury is not permitted to consider what may happen to a defendant 
after the jury reaches its verdict.  See Yarbrough v. 
Commonwealth, 258 Va. 347, 370, 519 S.E.2d 602, 614 (1999); 
Jones v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 273, 275, 72 S.E.2d 693, 694 
(1952); Coward v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 639, 646, 178 S.E. 797, 
800 (1935).  We recognized an exception to this general rule, 
however, in our holding in Fishback v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 
104, 532 S.E.2d 629 (2000). 
 
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There, we considered the issue whether a defendant 
convicted of a felony that was not a capital offense was 
entitled to have the jury instructed that parole has been 
abolished in Virginia for offenses committed after January 1, 
1995.  Id. at 108, 532 S.E.2d at 630.  We held that the 
defendant was entitled to such an instruction, and also 
concluded that, when applicable, a jury also shall be instructed 
that a defendant could be eligible for a geriatric release as 
permitted by statute, which determination involves “essentially 
a mathematical calculation.”  Id. at 115, 532 S.E.2d at 634. 
 
At the same time, we held that juries should not be 
instructed on the issue of earned sentencing credits that a 
prisoner may obtain under Code § 53.1-202.2 through –202.4, 
thereby reducing his period of incarceration, because obtaining 
these credits depends on a prisoner’s conduct while 
incarcerated, on his participation in certain programs 
established by the Department of Corrections, and on the 
executive branch’s subjective assessment of the prisoner’s 
progress.  Id.  We observed that a jury would be required to 
speculate in order to consider as part of its sentencing 
determination the possibility that a defendant could earn such 
future credits.  Id.  Thus, we held that juries are not to be 
instructed about the possibility that a defendant will obtain 
this type of future credit.  Id. at 116, 532 S.E.2d at 634. 
 
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These separate holdings in Fishback illustrate an important 
distinction between instructions that properly further the goal 
of “truth in sentencing” by removing the possibility that a jury 
will act upon misconceptions, and those instructions that have 
the improper effect of inviting the jury to speculate concerning 
the likelihood of future actions that may ultimately affect the 
length of a defendant’s incarceration.  See Bell v. 
Commonwealth, 264 Va. 172, 207-08, 563 S.E.2d 695, 718 (2002).  
A jury instruction regarding a defendant’s ineligibility for 
parole is proper, because it serves to eliminate a common 
misconception that a defendant may only serve a small portion of 
a jury’s sentence.  See Fishback, 260 Va. at 113, 532 S.E.2d at 
633.  In contrast, a jury instruction that a defendant may be 
eligible for earned sentencing credits once incarcerated is 
improper, because the jury cannot employ this information in its 
sentencing determination without resorting to speculation about 
the defendant’s future behavior while incarcerated.  See Bell, 
264 Va. at 206-07, 563 S.E.2d at 718; Fishback, 260 Va. at 116, 
532 S.E.2d at 634. 
 
Based on this distinction between instructions that do not 
allow speculation by the jury and those that effectively permit 
such speculation, we conclude that the challenged instruction in 
the present case was improper.  The instruction should not have 
been given because it effectively permitted the jury to consider 
 
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as part of its sentencing determination the speculative factor 
whether the circuit court later would reduce Booker’s sentence 
given the nature of his crimes, the other evidence in the case, 
or factors unknown to the jury at the time it imposed its 
sentence.  Speculation of this nature also could have resulted 
in the jury incorrectly concluding that its role in the 
sentencing process was minimal and, thus, have yielded a result 
“inconsistent with a fair trial both to the defendant and the 
Commonwealth.”  Fishback, 260 Va. at 115, 532 S.E.2d at 634; 
accord Bell, 264 Va. at 207-08, 563 S.E.2d at 718. 
 
We disagree with the Commonwealth’s assertion that the jury 
nevertheless was instructed properly because it also was told 
that it should not concern itself with what might happen after 
returning its verdict.  There is no assurance that the jury 
understood the circuit court’s general admonition against 
considering what might occur afterwards as negating the jury’s 
ability to consider the information directly provided by the 
court that the judge could reduce the sentence imposed by the 
jury.  Therefore, we hold that the circuit court’s action giving 
the improper instruction requires reversal of this case, and 
that the Court of Appeals erred in reaching a contrary 
conclusion. 
 
For these reasons, we will reverse the Court of Appeals’ 
judgment, vacate Booker’s sentences, and remand the case to the 
 
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Court of Appeals for further remand to the circuit court for a 
new sentencing hearing conducted before a new jury pursuant to 
Code § 19.2-295.1. 
Reversed and remanded.