Case Title: Salinger v. Salinger

Citation: 100 So. 2d 393

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1958-02-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
100 So. 2d 393 (1958)
Rolf Peter SALINGER, Appellant,
v.
Naomi Mildred SALINGER, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Florida.
February 5, 1958.
J. Rex Farrior, Jr. (of Shackleford, Farrior, Shannon & Stallings), Tampa, for appellant.
Feinberg & Sparkman, Tampa, for appellee.
DREW, Justice.
The trial court entered a final decree awarding a divorce, alimony and attorneys' fees to the appellee wife on the 29th of June, 1955. The decree was recorded the following day.
On August 2, 1955, the parties stipulated for the entry of an order "amending the final decree previously entered in this cause so as to provide that the effective date of such final decree shall for all purposes be August 1, 1955." An order was duly entered by the trial court on the same day amending such decree in accordance with the stipulation.
Thereafter, on September 28, 1955, appellant husband filed his notice of appeal "to review the final decree * * * effective August 1, 1955." (Emphasis supplied.)
The statute in effect at the time this appeal was taken provides that "Appeals * * * shall be taken or filed within sixty days from and after the entry of the * * * decree appealed from." Section 59.08, F.S.A. 1955. We have held in numerous cases that the recording of the final decree in a chancery case constitutes "entry" from which the time for taking the appeal begins to run. In Schneider v. Cohan, Fla. 1954, 73 So. 2d 69, 70, we said:
And, in the later case of Brenner v. Gelernter, Fla. 1956, 90 So. 2d 306, 307, we held that:
A trial court has no power to extend the time prescribed by statute for taking an appeal. 2 Fla.Jur. para. 93, page 373. Cates v. Heffernan, 1944, 154 Fla. 422, 18 So. 2d 11. It was pointed out in Cates v. Heffernan, supra, that compliance with the statute with respect to the time for taking an appeal was necessary to confer jurisdiction on the appellate court; and that therefore a stipulation consenting to an extension of time for such purpose followed by an order of the court granting such extension was, in effect, an attempt to confer jurisdiction by consent and therefore invalid.
The holdings of this Court with respect to this matter are in accord with the firmly established rule that a trial court may not grant, directly or indirectly, an extension of time for taking an appeal. See the annotation in 89 A.L.R. 941, 149 A.L.R. 740. Cf. Lalow v. Codomo, Fla. 1956, 88 So. 2d 752.
The notice of appeal, not having been filed within the time prescribed by statute, is ineffective to confer jurisdiction on this Court to entertain the cause. It is, therefore, dismissed.
TERRELL, C.J., THOMAS and ROBERTS, JJ., and HARRIS, Circuit Judge, concur.