Case Title: Phil Johnson v. J. Edward McCullough, M.D., and Mid-America Gastro-Intestinal Consultants, P.C.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC90401

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2010-03-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
PHIL JOHNSON,    
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Respondent,  
  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC90401 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
J. EDWARD McCULLOUGH, M.D., and 
) 
MID-AMERICA GASTRO-INTESTINAL 
)  
CONSULTANTS, P.C.,  
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Appellants.  
 
 
 
) 
 
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY 
The Honorable Gary D. Witt, Judge 
 
Opinion issued March 9, 2010 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
J. Edward McCullough and Mid-America Gastro-Intestinal Consultants 
(collectively “Defendants”) appeal from the trial court’s judgment granting Phil 
Johnson’s motion for a new trial alleging intentional nondisclosure by a juror. After 
disposition by the court of appeals,1 this Court granted transfer. MO. CONST. art. V, sec. 
10.  
                                                 
1 Portions of the court of appeals opinion authored by the Honorable Harold L. Lowenstein are 
incorporated in this opinion without further attribution. 
 
1
 
This Court affirms the trial court’s judgment. Counsel’s question during voir dire 
regarding jurors’ prior involvement in litigation was clear and unambiguous, triggering 
the jurors’ duty to respond. Moreover, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
finding intentional nondisclosure and ordering a new trial. Contrary to Defendants’ 
argument, Johnson was not required to present either an affidavit or testimony to support 
a finding of intentional nondisclosure. Lastly, this Court finds that the trial court did not 
err in finding that the juror intentional nondisclosure argument was timely raised. Under 
the case law at the time of trial, it was timely raised. However, this Court will adopt a 
formal rule requiring litigants to promptly bring to the trial court’s attention information 
about jurors’ prior litigation history. Until that time, a party must use reasonable efforts to 
examine the litigation history on Case.net2 of those jurors selected but not empanelled 
and present to the trial court any relevant information prior to trial, as set out in this 
opinion. 
I. Background  
 
 Johnson brought a medical malpractice lawsuit against Defendants alleging he 
received negligent medical treatment from Defendants for a throat condition. According 
to Johnson, Defendants’ negligent medical care, in which surgery was performed, 
resulted in permanent throat injuries.  
 
During voir dire, Johnson’s counsel asked about prior involvement in litigation by 
any venire member. Specifically, counsel asked, “Now not including family law, has 
anyone ever been a plaintiff or a defendant in a lawsuit before?” Although numerous 
                                                 
2 Case.net can be accessed using the following web address: https://www.courts.mo.gov/casenet.  
 
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members of the panel responded affirmatively, venire member Mims did not respond to 
the question and eventually was chosen to sit on the jury. 
 
At the close of a six-day trial, the jury deliberated for 40 minutes and returned a 
verdict in Defendants’ favor. Mims signed the verdict. After the trial, Johnson’s counsel 
investigated Mims’ civil litigation history using Missouri’s automated case record 
service, Case.net, and discovered that Mims previously had been a defendant in multiple 
debt collection cases and in a personal injury case. At least three of the lawsuits against 
Mims were recent, as they were filed within the previous two years. 
 
Johnson filed a motion for new trial alleging Mims intentionally failed to disclose 
her prior litigation experience when asked during voir dire. The trial court conducted a 
hearing on the motion. Johnson supported his allegation of intentional nondisclosure by 
presenting the litigation records he discovered on Case.net. Johnson did not call Mims or 
any other witnesses to testify at the hearing, nor did he obtain an affidavit from Mims to 
support his argument. 
 
After the hearing concluded, the trial court granted Johnson’s motion and ordered 
a new trial. The court determined that counsel’s question during voir dire was clear and 
unambiguous and that Mims’ involvement in prior litigation was recent. As a result, her 
failure to respond constituted an intentional nondisclosure. The court inferred prejudice 
from the intentional concealment. The court reached no decision as to Johnson’s 
additional arguments in support of his motion for new trial, finding the issue of 
intentional nondisclosure dispositive. Defendants appeal.  
 
 
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II. Analysis 
A. Standard of Review 
This Court will not disturb the trial court’s ruling on a motion for a new trial based 
on juror nondisclosure unless the trial court abused its discretion. Wingate by Carlisle v. 
Lester E. Cox Med. Ctr., 853 S.W.2d 912, 917 (Mo. banc 1993). A trial court abuses its 
discretion if its “ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the 
court and so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a 
lack of careful consideration.” Id.  
B. Clarity of Question 
 
A member of the venire has a duty during voir dire examination to give full, fair, 
and truthful answers to all questions asked of him or her specifically, as well as those 
asked of the panel generally, so that his or her qualifications may be determined and 
challenges may be posed. Williams by Wilford v. Barnes Hosp., 736 S.W.2d 33, 36 (Mo. 
banc 1987). The duty to disclose is triggered only after a clear question has been asked. 
Brines by Harlan v. Cibis, 882 S.W.2d 138, 139 (Mo. banc 1994). The question asked 
during voir dire must clearly and unambiguously trigger the juror’s obligation to disclose 
the information requested. See Carlisle, 853 S.W.2d at 916. In reviewing the grant of a 
motion for new trial based on a claim of juror nondisclosure, this Court first must 
determine, from an objective standpoint, whether the question asked of the prospective 
juror was sufficiently clear in context to have elicited the undisclosed information. See 
Brines, 882 S.W.2d at 139. Whether a question was sufficiently clear is a threshold issue 
 
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that this Court reviews de novo. Kelter v. K-Mart Corp., 42 S.W.3d 716, 723 (Mo. App. 
2001).  
 
During voir dire, Johnson’s counsel asked the venire members, “Now not 
including family law, has anyone ever been a plaintiff or a defendant in a lawsuit 
before?” Several venire members disclosed prior involvement in lawsuits. One venire 
member mentioned her involvement as a defendant in a personal injury suit against a 
limited liability company she owned with her husband. Another venire member disclosed 
a “dog-bite” lawsuit when, as a child, her parents sued the dog owner on her behalf. 
Numerous other venire members disclosed lawsuits in which they acted as a plaintiff or a 
defendant. Among the various disclosures were a class action lawsuit, a property dispute, 
a car accident case, and a discrimination lawsuit. After each individual disclosure, 
counsel merely asked the responding venire members whether the experience would 
affect his or her ability to be a fair and impartial juror in this case. Counsel did not delve 
further into each venire member’s response. Upon eliciting all of the preceding 
disclosures, counsel asked, “Now did I miss anyone here? I just want to make sure. No 
other people that have been, not including family law, a plaintiff or a defendant on any 
case? Let the record reflect that I see no additional hands.” Juror Mims remained silent 
throughout this line of questioning. 
 
Defendants contend that the inquiry at issue was unclear because the phrase “now 
not including family law” renders the question ambiguous and confusing. “The issue is 
whether a reasonable venire member would have understood what counsel intended.” 
McBurney v. Cameron, 248 S.W.3d 36, 42 (Mo. App. 2008). “The duty of counsel to 
 
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show that the question was clear is not satisfied when some venire members could 
reasonably think one thing, and some other venire members could reasonably think the 
opposite.” Id. at 46. The record must demonstrate that, from an objective standpoint, the 
question was clear in the total applicable context. Id. Here, the total applicable context 
does not render counsel’s inquiry unclear. The question generally asked about prior 
litigation experience and specifically excluded any litigation involving domestic 
relations. In cases where counsel’s question during voir dire regarding prior litigation 
experience has been deemed unclear, a general question is typically followed or 
surrounded by more detailed questions “honing in” on specific lawsuits. Id. For example, 
in Payne v. Cornhusker Motor Lines, Inc., the court found that, taken in context, 
counsel’s question asking venire members to disclose claims made “for personal injuries 
or monetary damages” did not clearly require disclosure of a property-damage lawsuit in 
which a venire member was a plaintiff. 177 S.W.3d 820, 842-43 (Mo. App. 2005). 
Additionally, in McBurney v. Cameron, the court determined that, in context, counsel’s 
general question regarding prior litigation experience was extensively surrounded with 
questions about personal injury claims and litigation. 248 S.W.3d at 45. The majority in 
McBurney could not isolate the general question regarding prior litigation experience 
from its surrounding context and, therefore, could not find that a reasonable venire 
member would have understood counsel’s general question about prior litigation 
experience was intended to solicit information about “all kinds of claims and cases.” Id. 
at 46. 
 
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Here, the inquiry into prior litigation experience is similar to counsel’s questioning 
in Massey v. Carter, in which counsel asked generally, “Have any of you ever filed a 
lawsuit?” 238 S.W.3d 198, 201 (Mo. App. 2007). After a venire member mentioned 
filing a claim “as a homeowner,” and after finding out the venire member was satisfied 
with how things were resolved in that case, counsel asked, “Have any of you ever been 
sued by anyone?” Id. The juror in question failed to disclose he had been sued five times 
in collection lawsuits. Id. at 200. The court in Massey pointed out that, after the question 
about having been “sued by anyone,” there were no follow-up questions “honing in” on a 
specific kind of lawsuit, as there was in Payne. Id. at 201. The court determined that 
counsel’s question “remained a general question.” Id.  
Applying the objective standard of clarity developed in prior case law, this Court 
agrees with the trial court’s assessment that the voir dire question was reasonably clear 
and triggered Mims’ duty to disclose the multiple debt collection lawsuits against her and 
the suit for personal injuries. The question remained a general question and was not 
rendered confusing or ambiguous by surrounding context. Counsel’s question clearly 
indicated that he was not interested in disclosure of “family law” disputes. From the 
standpoint of a reasonable lay person, debt collection lawsuits and suits for personal 
injuries are not excluded by counsel’s general inquiry into prior litigation experiences. 
With the question so narrowed, counsel’s question unequivocally triggered Mims’ duty to 
disclose. However, Mims remained silent. Failure to answer a clear question is 
considered a nondisclosure. Id. Accordingly, the trial court correctly determined that 
counsel’s question was reasonably clear. 
 
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C. Intentional Nondisclosure  
After it is objectively determined that the question was reasonably clear in context 
and that a nondisclosure occurred, this Court reviews whether the trial court abused its 
discretion in deciding whether the nondisclosure was intentional or unintentional. 
McBurney, 248 S.W.3d at 42. Here, the trial court determined that Mims’ nondisclosure 
of her involvement in prior litigation was intentional and, therefore, inferred prejudice 
from her concealment. The distinction between intentional and unintentional 
nondisclosure is significant. As this Court explained in Wilford, this distinction 
determines whether prejudice can be inferred from a nondisclosure. 736 S.W.2d at 37. If 
the nondisclosure was unintentional, a new trial is not warranted unless prejudice resulted 
from the nondisclosure. Id. On the other hand, bias and prejudice is presumed if a juror 
intentionally withholds material information. Harlan ex rel. Brines v. Cibis, 882 S.W.2d 
138, 140 (Mo. banc 1994). “[Q]uestions and answers pertaining to a prospective juror’s 
prior litigation experience are material.” Brines, 882 S.W.2d at 140. A finding of 
intentional concealment of material information has “‘become tantamount to a per se rule 
mandating a new trial.’” Id. (quoting Wilford, 736 S.W.2d at 37).  
Although Johnson did not provide the trial court with any direct evidence 
explaining why Mims failed to answer the pertinent questions as to a material matter, the 
trial court’s determination that Mims’ nondisclosure was intentional is not an abuse of 
discretion. “The determination of whether concealment is intentional or unintentional is 
left to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Wilford, 736 S.W.2d at 36. The record 
establishes that a nondisclosure occurred, as Mims did not respond to counsel’s clearly 
 
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asked question, and that Mims’ involvement in prior litigation is both extensive and 
recent, as demonstrated by counsel’s litigation records search via Case.net. Defendants 
cite no case law supporting their argument that either an affidavit or testimony is 
necessary to support a finding of intentional nondisclosure. In this case, the trial court 
based its findings on the Case.net litigation records submitted by Johnson, which 
demonstrated Mims’ involvement as a defendant in multiple recent lawsuits. At least 
three of the lawsuits against Mims were filed within the previous two years.3
Although the better practice here would have been for the party seeking a new trial 
to have deposed Mims, obtained an affidavit, or had her testify, under these facts there 
was no reasonable inability to understand the question, as several venire members 
provided relevant disclosures of prior litigation experience, and Mims’ litigation history 
was of such significance that forgetfulness is unreasonable, as her experiences were both 
numerous and recent. The trial court properly found that Mims’ nondisclosure was 
intentional. Because Mims’ nondisclosure was intentional, bias and prejudice are 
presumed. See Brines, 882 S.W.2d at 140. A finding of intentional concealment of 
material information has “‘become tantamount to a per se rule mandating a new trial.’” 
Id. (quoting Wilford, 736 S.W.2d at 37). “[Q]uestions and answers pertaining to a 
prospective juror’s prior litigation experience are material.” Id. The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in finding intentional nondisclosure and ordering a new trial.  
 
                                                 
3 There was no dispute that the Mims contained in the Case.net records was in fact the same person as the 
juror empanelled.  
 
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D. Timeliness of Challenge 
 
Finally, Defendants contend that the trial court erred in granting a new trial 
because Johnson’s juror nondisclosure argument was untimely, as it was brought after 
Johnson received an adverse verdict following a six-day jury trial. In support, Defendants 
point to McBurney, where that court commented in dicta about the issue. 248 S.W.3d at 
41. 
 
In McBurney, the court of appeals noted that the issue of timeliness and waiver 
was first raised by this Court in Brines. In Brines, those plaintiffs appealed an adverse 
verdict on the basis of one juror’s failure to disclose during voir dire that he had been a 
defendant in multiple collection cases. Id. at 139. The defendant argued a claim based on 
litigation history must be raised before submission, and if it is not, it is untimely and 
waived. Id. at 140. The Court rejected the defendants’ argument that an issue regarding 
prior litigation experience must be raised before submission. Id.  
The court of appeals resurrected the issue in McBurney, stating that “the issue may 
not necessarily be settled forever in view of the technological advances in the thirteen 
years since Brines.” 248 S.W.2d at 41. McBurney displayed the court of appeals’ 
willingness to delve into a claim about the issue of timeliness and waiver, “at least with 
regard to cases that extend beyond a short time.” Id. With the relative present day ease of 
procuring the venire member’s prior litigation experiences, via Case.net, “[w]e encourage 
counsel to make such challenges before submission of a case whenever practicable.” Id. 
at 41.  
 
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This Court cannot convict the trial court of error in following the law in existence 
at the time of trial. See, e.g., McCracken v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 298 S.W.3d 473, 
479-80 (Mo. banc 2009). Further, there was no evidence that it was practicable for the 
attorneys in this case to have investigated the litigation history of all of the selected jurors 
prior to the jury being empanelled. Accordingly, there was no error in the trial court’s 
determination that Johnson’s juror nondisclosure argument was timely.  
However, in light of advances in technology allowing greater access to 
information that can inform a trial court about the past litigation history of venire 
members, it is appropriate to place a greater burden on the parties to bring such matters to 
the court’s attention at an earlier stage. Litigants should not be allowed to wait until a 
verdict has been rendered to perform a Case.net search for jurors’ prior litigation history 
when, in many instances, the search also could have been done in the final stages of jury 
selection or after the jury was selected but prior to the jury being empanelled. Litigants 
should endeavor to prevent retrials by completing an early investigation. Until a Supreme 
Court rule can be promulgated to provide specific direction, to preserve the issue of a 
juror’s nondisclosure, a party must use reasonable efforts to examine the litigation history 
on Case.net of those jurors selected but not empanelled and present to the trial court any 
relevant information prior to trial.4 To facilitate this search, the trial courts are directed to 
ensure the parties have an opportunity to make a timely search prior to the jury being 
                                                 
4 Because Case.net is not an official record, this Court recognizes its limitations. First, Case.net may 
contain inaccurate and incomplete information. Second, Case.net may have limited usefulness in searches 
involving common names or when a person's name has changed. Until a more specific rule is 
promulgated, the trial court must determine whether a party has made a reasonable effort in determining a 
juror’s prior litigation history by searching Case.net. Searches of other computerized record systems, such 
as PACER, are not required. 
 
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empanelled and shall provide the means to do so, if counsel indicates that such means are 
not reasonably otherwise available.  
III. Conclusion 
 
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.  
 
All concur. 
 
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