Case Title: STATE v THOMPSON

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1978-03-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13713 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1978 STATE OF MONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs- STEPHEN A. THOMPSON, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Honorable E. Gardner Brownlee, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Wm. Georqe Harris argued, Missoula, Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Charles R. Anderson, Assistant Attorey General, argued, Helena, Montana Robert Deschamps 111, County Attorney, argued, Missoula, Montana Submitted: March 3, 1978 Decided: MAR 2 P 1978 Filed: MAR ~2 - 1 3 7 8 Mr. Chief Justice Frank I. Haswell delivered the Opinion of the Court. Defendant Stephen A. Thompson was charged with two counts of perjury in the District Court of Missoula County based upon his sworn testimony in the homicide trial of Levi Stump. The jury acquitted defendant Thompson of count I and convicted him of count 11. Following denial of defendant's motion for a new trial on count 11, he appeals. Pursuant to a plea bargaining agreement with the prose- cutor, defendant Thompson agreed to testify for the State in the deliberate homicide trial of Levi Stump who was accused of killing Charles Daniels. On June 25, 1976 defendant Thompson testified in the Stump trial. His direct testimony was that he and Stump had killed Daniels; on cross-e~mination he retracted this testimony by testifying that neither he nor Stump had anything to do with killing Daniels. The Stump trial ended in a mistrial. On July 8, 1976 defendant Thompson was charged with perjury. The amended information charged two counts of perjury: Count I charged perjury based upon defendant's inconsistent statements in a single proceeding; Count I1 charged perjury based on defendant's testimony in the Stump trial that he saw the victim lying on the ground bleeding on April 22 and April 23 near where the body was found on April 25, 1976. Defendant Thompson plead not guilty to each count. Thereafter the District Court denied defendant's motion to dismiss the amended information. Later, following a hearing, the District Court denied defendant's motion to suppress his statements to police following his arrest in the Daniels homicide. Defendant's trial on the perjury charges commenced on October 8, 1976. At the close of the State's case-in-chief, defendant moved f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t i n h i s favor and d i s m i s s a l of t h e amended information which was denied. Defendant o f f e r e d no testimony i n h i s defense and r e s t e d h i s case. The jury a c q u i t t e d defendant of Count I and convicted him of Count 11. Defendant's motion f o r judgment notwith- standing t h e v e r d i c t on Count I1 was denied. Defendant was sentenced t o t e n years i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n with f i v e years suspended. Later an amended judgment was entered whereby defendant was incarcerated a t t h e Swan Lake Youth Correction F a c i l i t y . Following d e n i a l of h i s motion f o r a new t r i a l , defendant appeals. O n appeal, we consolidate t h e i s s u e i n t o s i x s p e c i f i - c a t i o n s of e r r o r r a i s e d by defendant: (1) Denial of h i s motion t o suppress h i s statements given t o p o l i c e following h i s a r r e s t i n t h e ~ a n i e l s ' homicide. ( 2 ) Denial of h i s motion t o dismiss Count I1 of t h e amended information. ( 3 ) Denial of h i s motion f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t a t t h e c l o s e of t h e S t a t e ' s case-in-chief. ( 4 ) Denial of h i s motion f o r judgment notwithstanding t h e v e r d i c t on Count 11. (5) E r r o r s i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e jury. ( 6 ) Denial of a f a i r t r i a l based on t h e S t a t e ' s c l o s i n g argument t o t h e jury. I s s u e 1. Defendant claims t h a t h i s a r r e s t without a warrant i n t h e Daniels' homicide was unlawful s o h i s s t a t e - ments given t o t h e p o l i c e were involuntary and should have been suppressed. The record d i s c l o s e s t h a t none of t h e statements de- fendant sought t o have suppressed w e r e admitted i n evidence i n h i s perjury t r i a l . Under such circumstances, defendant's s p e c i f i c a t i o n of e r r o r l a c k s substance. This Court does n o t decide academic, t h e o r e t i c a l o r moot questions. Adkins v. C i t y of Livingston, (1948), 121 Mont. 528, 194 P.2d 238. Although defendant argues t h a t t h i s i s s u e must be considered because t h e p r e s e n t case was an outgrowth of t h e Daniels' homicide c a s e , we adhere t o t h e r u l e t h a t t h i s Court confines i t s r u l i n g s t o t h e c a s e on appeal. Feely v. Lacey, (1958), 133 Mont. 283, 322 P.2d 1 1 0 4 . A s defendant's statements t o t h e p o l i c e following h i s arrest i n t h e Daniels' homicide were n o t used i n h i s p e r j u r y t r i a l , h i s s p e c i f i c a t i o n of e r r o r lacks relevance i n t h i s appeal. I s s u e 2. Defendant s p e c i f i e s e r r o r i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s r e f u s a l t o dismiss t h e p e r j u r y charge i n Count I1 p r i o r t o t r i a l . He argues t h a t h i s testimony i n t h e Stump t r i a l t h a t he saw t h e v i c t i m l y i n g on t h e ground bleeding two and t h r e e days p r i o r t o discovery of t h e body near t h e same l o c a t i o n was n o t material t o t h e i s s u e i n t h e Stump t r i a l , s p e c i f i c a l l y who k i l l e d Daniels. Montana's perjury s t a t u t e , Section 94-7-202, R.C.M. 1947, provides i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t : "Perjury. (1) A person commits t h e o f f e n s e of p e r j u r y i f i n any o f f i c i a l proceeding he knowingly makes a f a l s e statement under o a t h * * * when t h e statement i s material. " (3) F a l s i f i c a t i o n is m a t e r i a l , r e g a r d l e s s of t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y of t h e statement under r u l e s of evidence, i f it could have a f f e c t e d t h e course o r outcome of t h e proceeding. I t i s no defense t h a t t h e d e c l a r a n t mistakenly believed t h e f a l s i f i c a t i o n t o be immaterial. Whether a f a l s i f i c a t i o n i s m a t e r i a l i n a given f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n i s a question of law." i s The test of materiality/whether i n t h e a c t u a l f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n involved, it would be reasonable t o f i n d t h a t t h e defendant's statement, i f believed, could have a l t e r e d t h e course o r outcome of t h e proceeding. S t a t e v. Scanlon, (1977), 34 St.Rep. 956, Mont. , 569 P. 2d 368; S t a t e v. Hall, (1930), 88 Mont. 297, 292 P.2d 734. This is t h e same t e s t t h a t applied under t h e p r i o r p e r j u r y s t a t u t e . S t a t e v. Scanlon, supra. H e r e defendant's testimony i n t h e Stump t r i a l t h a t he saw Daniels l y i n g bleeding on April 22 and April 23 near t h e place where Daniels' body was found on A p r i l 25 reasonably could have a f f e c t e d t h e outcome of t h e Stump t r i a l . Defendant Thompson's statement, i f believed by t h e j u r y , would f u r n i s h t h a t a b a s i s f o r determining / Daniels died from wounds i n f l i c t e d by someone o t h e r than Stump and Thompson. Stump's defense was t h a t someone e l s e k i l l e d Daniels and n o t him; Thompson's statement, as t h e prosecution's p r i n c i p a l witness, s u b s t a n t i a t e d Stump's defense. Accordingly, we hold t h a t defendant Thompson's sworn statement w a s m a t e r i a l and could have a f f e c t e d t h e outcome of t h e Stump t r i a l . The D i s t r i c t Court was c o r r e c t i n denying defendant's motion t o dismiss Count I1 of t h e amended information. I s s u e 3. Here defendant r e p e a t s h i s argument t h a t h i s testimony was n o t m a t e r i a l and f u r t h e r argues t h a t h i s statement was n o t f a l s e . I n t h i s case t h e jury, i f it believed t h e S t a t e ' s witnesses, could f i n d t h a t Daniels was seen a l i v e and w e l l between A p r i l 22 and A p r i l 25; t h a t defendant Thompson f a l s e l y gave sworn testimony i n t h e Stump t r i a l t h a t he saw Daniels bleeding, i n t h e a r e a where h i s body was l a t e r found some two and t h r e e days p r i o r t o discovery of t h e body. A d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t f o r t h e defendant i n a criminal case can only be given where t h e r e i s no evidence on which t h e jury could base a conviction. S t a t e v. Paulson, (1975), 167 Mont. 310, 538 P.2d 339. The D i s t r i c t Court was c o r r e c t i n denying defendant's motion f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t . I s s u e 4. Defendant next claims e r r o r i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court's d e n i a l of h i s motion f o r judgment notwithstanding t h e g u i l t y v e r d i c t on Count I1 of t h e amended information. H e argues t h a t t h e v e r d i c t s i n t h i s case must be i d e n t i c a l ; t h a t a c q u i t t a l on Count I b a r s conviction on Count 11. H e f u r t h e r contends t h a t because of h i s defense of r e t r a c t i o n , t h e v e r d i c t on both counts must be c o n s i s t e n t and he cannot be charged and convicted of perjury on Count I1 because of h i s r e t r a c t i o n . Consistency i n v e r d i c t s on m u l t i p l e charges i s n o t required i n a l l cases. Dunn v. United S t a t e s (1932), 284 U.S. 390, 52 S.Ct. 189, 76 L.Ed. 356. Defendant recognizes t h i s p r i n c i p l e b u t maintains t h a t i n t h i s case consistency is required because t h e elements of t h e offenses charged i n both counts a r e t h e same and because of h i s defense of r e t r a c t i o n . Where s e p a r a t e a c t s a r e charged i n an information, each a c t i s a s e p a r a t e o f f e n s e and a c q u i t t a l o r conviction of one o r more counts does not a f f e c t t h e o t h e r counts. S t a t e v . Boe, (1963), 143 Mont. 1 4 1 , 388 P.2d 372. Here each count i n t h e amended information f i l e d a g a i n s t t h e defendant s t a t e s a s e p a r a t e offense of perjury. A c q u i t t a l of Count I does not bar conviction of Count I1 because t h e elements charged i n t h e two counts a r e d i f f e r e n t . To prove Count I, t h e S t a t e had t o show t h a t t h e defendant made i n c o n s i s t e n t statements i n t h e Stump t r i a l and t h a t one of t h e i n c o n s i s t e n t statements w a s f a l s e and w a s n o t believed t o be t r u e by t h e defendant. To prove Count 11, t h e S t a t e had t o show t h a t defendant knowingly made a f a l s e and m a t e r i a l statement under oath, n o t t h a t he made i n c o n s i s t e n t s t a t e - ments during t h e Stump t r i a l . A s t h e elements of t h e two o f f e n s e s charged were d i f f e r e n t , consistency of t h e two v e r d i c t s was n o t required. The defense of r e t r a c t i o n i s i r r e l e v a n t t o defendant's conviction of p e r j u r y i n Count I1 of t h e amended information. Count I1 charged defendant with p e r j u r y based upon h i s sworn testimony i n t h e Stump t r i a l t h a t he saw Daniels bleeding on A p r i l 22 and A p r i l 23 i n t h e a r e a where t h e body was found on A p r i l 25. This statement was made on r e d i r e c t examination and was not r e t r a c t e d t h e r e a f t e r . Thus t h e e s s e n t i a l elements of a r e t r a c t i o n of t h i s statement a r e missing, v i z . a d i f f e r e n t and t r u e statement following a p r i o r f a l s i f i c a t i o n i n t h e same proceeding. Section 94-7-202(5), R.C.M. 1947. The D i s t r i c t Court was c o r r e c t i n denying defendant's motion f o r judgment i n h i s favor notwithstanding t h e g u i l t y v e r d i c t on Count 11. I s s u e 5. W e f i n d no substance t o defendant's contention t h a t t h e jury was improperly i n s t r u c t e d . N o e r r o r was committed i n giving S t a t e ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n No. 6 and r e f u s i n g defendant's proposed i n s t r u c - t i o n No. 1 2 . Both r e l a t e t o i n c o n s i s t e n t statements made under o a t h and contain t h e s t a t u t o r y language of s e c t i o n 94- 7-202(6), R.C.M. 1947, except t h a t t h e S t a t e ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n omits t h e words "both having been made w i t h i n t h e period of t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s * * *". Both i n s t r u c t i o n s r e l a t e d t o Count I of which defendant was a c q u i t t e d ; t h e r e w a s never an i s s u e concerning t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s i n t h e case; and t h e i n s t r u c t i o n given is a c o r r e c t statement of t h e law a s applied t o t h e evidence i n t h e case. Nor w a s t h e r e any e r r o r i n r e f u s i n g defendant's proposed i n s t r u c t i o n No. 16 on corroboration of p e r j u r y . C o u r t ' s i n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 3 covering t h i s s u b j e c t was given t o t h e jury; it incorporated t h e requirements of s e c t i o n 94-7- 202(7), R.C.M. 1947, and w a s a c o r r e c t statement of t h e l a w ; and t h e refused i n s t r u c t i o n was redundant. I s s u e 6. Defendant's f i n a l contention i s t h a t t h e S t a t e ' s c l o s i n g argument t o t h e jury denied him a f a i r t r i a l . H e o b j e c t s t o t h e S t a t e ' s arguing t o t h e jury t h a t perjury i n a homicide c a s e could have d i s a s t r o u s e f f e c t s i n t h a t an innocent man could be hanged o r a k i l l e r go f r e e ; t h a t t h e S t a t e attempted t o use information, f a c t s and testimony not i n evidence a t t h e t r i a l ; and t h a t h i s presumption of innocence and h i s r i g h t t o be f a i r l y judged by t h e jury was destroyed. The S t a t e ' s comments i n c l o s i n g argument on t h e e f f e c t of p e r j u r y i n a homicide t r i a l were unobjectionable. The following quotation is a c o r r e c t statement of t h e l a w on t h i s s u b j e c t : "Generally, t h e g r a v i t y of t h e c r i m e charged, t h e volume of t h e evidence, c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e witnesses, inferences t o be drawn from various phases of evidence, and l e g a l p r i n c i p l e s involved, t o be presented i n i n s t r u c t i o n s t o t h e jury, a r e a l l matters w i t h i n t h e proper scope of argument. * * *" [Emphasis supplied.] 23A C.J.S., Criminal Law, Sec. 1090, page 129. Here t h e S t a t e was simply informing t h e jury what e f f e c t perjured testimony could have i n a homicide t r i a l . This i s simply a comment on t h e g r a v i t y of t h e crime charged and w e l l within t h e scope of proper argument t o t h e jury. Nor d i d t h e S t a t e ' s c l o s i n g argument t o t h e jury encompass information, f a c t s o r testimony n o t i n evidence a t t h e t r i a l . W e recognize t h a t discussing f a c t s not i n evidence i n a c l o s i n g argument t o t h e jury i s improper. S t a t e v. Toner,(1953), 127 Mont. 283, 264 P.2d 971. W e a l s o note t h a t repeated attempts t o place excluded evidence before t h e jury i s r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . S t a t e v. Bain, (1978), 35 St.Rep. 257, Mont. - I - P.2d However, i n t h i s c a s e t h e t r a n s c r i p t of testimony i n t h e Stump homicide t r i a l was admitted i n evidence i n t h e perjury c a s e now on appeal. I n t h a t t r a n s c r i p t t h e r e a r e numerous references t o various i n d i v i d u a l s and statements by IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. 13713 . . . . . . . . . . STATE OF NONTANA, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STEPHEN A. THOMPSON, Defendant and Appellant. CLERK OF SUPREME COURT STATE OF MONTANA . . . . . . . . . . . . ORDER AElENDING OPINION . . . . . . . . . . . . The above named opinion, issued March 28, 1978, should be amended by deleting the present Page 9 (except for the signatures of authoring and concurring justices) and replacing it with the attached Page 9. DATED this ~ f & d a y of April, D & $*&- Chief Justice defendant. The State's closing argument attempted to explain that transcript to the jury so they could understand it and not be mis- lead by it. With one exception, the District Court did not sustain defendant's objections to the State's closing argument. Thus, this case does not present the situation where the State made repeated attempts to get inadmissible matters before the jury. Finally, we find no denial of defendant's right to a fair trial in the State's closing argument. A correct general statement of the applicable law has been stated in this language: "The defendant in a criminal case has the right to a fair trial. It is axiomatic that prejudice can be implied from the denial or invasion of that right. However, the defendant must show that his right to a fair trial was denied or invaded." State v. Bradford, (1978), Mont . , 575 P.2d 83, 86, 35 St.Rep. 2 4 1 - Or stated another way: "The rule applicable is that before a judgment in a criminal case will be reversed, prejudice in a criminal case will not be presumed, but rather must appear from the denial or invasion of a sub- stantial right from which the law implies prejudice. The defendant must demonstrate prejudice from the record. (Citation omitted.)" Bradford, 575 P.2d 86. The record in this case fails to show denial or invasion of defendant's right to a fair trial in the State's closing argument. With one exception the State's argument to the jury was unobjection- able; that exception was corrected by the District Court's admonition. A£ f irmed . (Frank I. Haswell) Chief Justice We Concur: (Gene B. Daly) (John Conway Harrison) (Daniel J. Shea) Justices (Bernard W. Thomas) District Judge