Case Title: Robinson v. Safeway Stores, Inc.

Citation: 113 Wash. 2d 154, 776 P.2d 676

Docket Number: 55806-0

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1989-07-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
113 Wn.2d 154 (1989) 776 P.2d 676 MARIE N. ROBINSON, Petitioner, v. SAFEWAY STORES, INC., Respondent. No. 55806-0. The Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc. July 27, 1989. *155 Levinson, Friedman, Vhugen, Duggan, Bland & Horowitz, by David W. Soukup and Charles R. Jones, for petitioner. David C. Pearson (of Madden & Crockett), for respondent. PEARSON, J. Petitioner, Marie N. Robinson, brought this negligence action for injuries she sustained at a Safeway grocery store located in Seattle, Washington. The jury returned a verdict in her favor in the amount of $9,278.31. The trial court, finding juror misconduct, ordered additur or, in the alternative, a new trial on the issue of damages. The Court of Appeals reversed, remanding the case to the trial court with instructions to reinstate the jury's original verdict. This court granted review. At issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in ordering additur or, in the alternative, a new trial based on juror misconduct and bias. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial; thus, we reverse the Court of Appeals in part and remand, ordering the modified reinstatement of the trial court's order. On May 28, 1983, Marie Robinson was a patron at a Seattle Safeway grocery store. While reaching into a refrigeration unit, she was struck in the head and back by a small, metal, product display rack that fell when she brushed against it. Following a verdict in her favor in the amount of $9,278.31, Robinson brought a motion for additur or, in the alternative, a new trial as to damages, claiming juror misconduct had resulted in an inadequate award of damages. *156 Upon review of both juror and counsel affidavits, the trial court entered its findings of fact on Robinson's motion, stating in part: Thus, there are two grounds upon which the court based its order of new trial: the misconduct of a juror, as articulated in findings 1 through 5; and the inadequacy of the jury's verdict, as articulated in findings 6 through 9. Based on these findings, the trial court entered an order increasing the award of damages to $27,000 or, in the alternative, a new trial on the issue of damages. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the record does not establish the jury foreman dishonestly answered the questions posed during voir dire. On this issue we reverse. [1] The trial court's findings of fact are subject to the substantial evidence test upon review by an appellate court: *158 (Citations omitted.) Holland v. Boeing Co., 90 Wn.2d 384, 390-91, 583 P.2d 621 (1978). We hold the trial court's finding that the foreman of the jury failed to disclose his prior involvement as a defendant in a suit brought by a California resident is supported by substantial evidence. The record further supports the court's finding that the foreman made numerous remarks regarding his perception of the "California litigation process", revealing the foreman's bias. CR 59(a) provides: [2] To the extent it is based upon questions of fact, the trial court's order granting a new trial must stand, absent an abuse of discretion: Coleman v. George, 62 Wn.2d 840, 841, 384 P.2d 871 (1963). [3] As to the question of law, this court has held it is not an abuse of discretion to grant a new trial where a juror has provided false answers on voir dire: Nelson v. Placanica, 33 Wn.2d 523, 528-29, 206 P.2d 296 (1949). Robinson contends she was deprived of her right to a trial by an impartial jury when the foreman failed to disclose his bias toward California residents, particularly his *159 perception of their role in the legal process. Robinson's argument is well taken. "The right to trial by jury includes the right to an unbiased and unprejudiced jury. A trial by a jury, one or more of whose members are biased or prejudiced, is not a constitutional trial." Allison v. Department of Labor & Indus., 66 Wn.2d 263, 265, 401 P.2d 982 (1965). A juror's misrepresentation or failure to speak when called upon during voir dire regarding a material fact constitutes an irregularity affecting substantial rights of the parties. When the failure to respond in voir dire relates to a material question, the appropriate remedy is to grant a new trial. Gordon v. Deer Park Sch. Dist. 414, 71 Wn.2d 119, 122, 426 P.2d 824 (1967). In Smith v. Kent, 11 Wn. App. 439, 523 P.2d 446 (1974), the plaintiff was injured by a rock that was thrown from a dump truck traveling in front of the plaintiff's automobile. During voir dire, one juror failed to reveal his experience as a truck driver when asked about previous employment. The court found this misrepresentation warranted the granting of a new trial. We quote generously from the Court of Appeals decision in that case, as it is dispositive of the issue at hand: Smith v. Kent, 11 Wn. App. at 441, 443-45. [4] Nevertheless, Safeway contends it is an invasion of the deliberative process to rely upon the affidavits of the jurors to subsequently challenge the verdict. However, such an argument fails to distinguish between relying upon a juror's affidavit for the purpose of establishing juror misconduct and relying upon a juror's affidavit to subsequently contest the thought processes involved in reaching a verdict. Only the former is permissible. Hendrickson v. Konopaski, 14 Wn. App. 390, 393, 541 P.2d 1001 (1975). In Allison v. Department of Labor & Indus., supra, this court held it was proper to rely upon the affidavit of a juror to establish that another juror had provided false information on voir dire. Reliance upon the juror's affidavit is not violative of the deliberative process, as the information does not inhere in the jury's verdict. Accord, Gardner v. Malone, 60 Wn.2d 836, 841, 376 P.2d 651, 379 P.2d 918 (1962); Byerly v. Madsen, 41 Wn. App. 495, 499-500, 704 P.2d 1236, review denied, 104 Wn.2d 1021 (1985). Thus, we reverse the Court of Appeals on this issue and affirm the trial court's ruling that Robinson was denied a fair trial as to damages as the result of juror bias and misconduct. In a de novo review of the record, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order granting additur, holding the jury verdict was not so inadequate as to indicate passion or prejudice. The trial court's authority for an award of additur is legislatively prescribed: RCW 4.76.030. Upon review by an appellate court of an award of additur, the Legislature has additionally provided that RCW 4.76.030. [5] It is apparent from this provision the determinative factor in awarding additur is not merely the existence of jury passion or prejudice. For, if that were the case, the existence of juror misconduct and bias, as discussed above, would leave the trial court free to fashion its remedy according to its own sense of justice regardless of whether that misconduct affected the verdict. Such a practice would ignore our reverence for the verdict of the jury. Under the statutory scheme, to justify an award of additur, as distinguished from an award of a new trial under CR 59, the verdict on its face must be so inadequate as to unmistakably indicate the amount was the result of passion or prejudice. In an instance where the jury verdict is within the range of credible evidence, the trial court has no discretion to find *162 passion or prejudice affected the verdict for the purpose of ordering additur. James v. Robeck, 79 Wn.2d 864, 490 P.2d 878 (1971); Hendrickson v. Konopaski, supra. In considering the extent of Robinson's injuries, the jury's award is within the range of credible evidence. The expert medical testimony of Dr. McDermott, if believed, established that Robinson's current symptoms and many of her medical bills were not related to the accident at issue. Thus, it cannot be said the jury's verdict is "so inadequate as unmistakably to indicate that the amount of the verdict must have been the result of ... prejudice." Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the trial court's order of additur. Accordingly, the unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals is reversed in part, and affirmed in part, and this case is remanded for a new trial as to damages. CALLOW, C.J., and UTTER, BRACHTENBACH, DOLLIVER, DORE, ANDERSEN, DURHAM, and SMITH, JJ., concur. Reconsideration denied October 4, 1989.