Case Title: State v. Dunlap

Citation: 2011-Ohio-4111

Docket Number: 20090477

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2011-08-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Dunlap, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-4111.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2011-OHIO-4111 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. DUNLAP, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Dunlap, Slip Opinion No. 2011-Ohio-4111.] 
Criminal law — Gross sexual imposition — Victim under 13 — R.C. 
2907.05(A)(4)  — Mens rea — Statute imposes strict liability on defendant 
in regard to victim’s age — Mens rea for sexual-contact element of offense 
is purpose — Indictment that tracks language of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) is 
sufficient to give defendant adequate notice of offense charged. 
(No. 2009-0477 — Submitted December 16, 2009 — Decided August 23, 2011.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 91165,  
2009-Ohio-134. 
__________________ 
PFEIFER, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we identify the mens rea requirement of R.C. 
2907.05(A)(4), which sets forth the elements of gross sexual imposition involving 
victims under the age of 13.  We hold that the statute establishes strict liability as 
to the defendant’s knowledge of the age of the victim and a mens rea of purpose 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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in regard to the sexual contact between the defendant and the victim.  Further, in 
regard to defendant-appellant’s sex-offender classification, we remand this case to 
the trial court for an application of this court’s decision in State v. Williams, ___ 
Ohio St.3d ___, 2011-Ohio-3374, ___ N.E.2d ___. 
Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 2} After a jury trial, defendant-appellant, Thomas Dunlap, was 
convicted of two counts of gross sexual imposition involving victims under the 
age of 13, in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), and one count of disseminating 
obscene matter to juveniles, in violation of R.C. 2307.31(A)(1).  The court 
sentenced Dunlap to a total of two years in prison: two years on each count of 
gross sexual imposition and 16 months on the obscenity count, to be served 
concurrently.  The court also found Dunlap to be a Tier III sex offender.  Dunlap 
appealed the R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) convictions and his sex-offender classification. 
{¶ 3} The court of appeals affirmed Dunlap’s convictions, rejecting his 
arguments that R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) requires a mens rea element of recklessness 
and that the application of R.C. Chapter 2950, 2007 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 10 (“S.B. 
10”), to offenses committed before its effective date violates the Ex Post Facto 
Clause of the federal Constitution and the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio 
Constitution. 
Sex-Offender Classification 
{¶ 4} Dunlap had been indicted on July 26, 2007, on the charges upon 
which he eventually was convicted.  He was sentenced under S.B. 10 on March 4, 
2008.  Dunlap argues that the application of S.B. 10 to offenders whose crimes 
occurred before its effective date of January 1, 2008, violates the Ex Post Facto 
Clause of the United States Constitution and the Retroactivity Clause of the Ohio 
Constitution. 
{¶ 5} In regard to Dunlap’s sex-offender classification, this case was 
originally held for a decision in State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-
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2424, 933 N.E.2d 753.  However, having determined that this court’s decision in 
Bodyke did not resolve the classification issue in Dunlap’s case, we subsequently 
held this case for a decision in State v. Williams, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2011-Ohio-
3374, ___ N.E.2d ___.  In our recent decision in Williams, we held that S.B. 10, 
“as applied to defendants who committed sex offenses prior to its enactment, 
violates Section 28, Article II of the Ohio Constitution, which prohibits the 
General Assembly from passing retroactive laws.” Id. at syllabus. 
{¶ 6} We therefore reverse that portion of the court of appeals’ judgment 
that upheld the application of S.B. 10 to Dunlap and remand this case to the trial 
court for an application of Williams. 
R.C. 2907.05 Issues 
{¶ 7} R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) states: 
{¶ 8} “No person shall have sexual contact with another, not the spouse of 
the offender; cause another, not the spouse of the offender, to have sexual contact 
with the offender; or cause two or more other persons to have sexual contact when 
any of the following applies: 
{¶ 9} “ * * * 
{¶ 10} “(4) The other person, or one of the other persons, is less than 
thirteen years of age, whether or not the offender knows the age of that person.” 
{¶ 11} Dunlap claims that the indictment failed to set forth the mens rea 
for the R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) charges, specifically regarding the element of sexual 
contact.  The indictment for the R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) violation in Count 1 stated 
that the defendant “had sexual contact with Jane Doe I, not his spouse, whose age 
at the time of the said sexual contact was under 13 years, whether or not the 
offender know [sic, knew] the age of Jane Doe I.”  The indictment used similar 
language in Count 3 for the alleged sexual contact with the other victim, Jane Doe 
II. 
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{¶ 12} In the jury instructions regarding gross sexual imposition, the trial 
court instructed the jury as to the element of “sexual contact,” as defined in R.C. 
2907.01(B):  
{¶ 13} “Sexual contact.  Sexual contact means any touching of an 
erogenous zone of another, including without limitation the thigh, genitals, 
buttock, pubic region, or, if the person is a female, a breast, for the purpose of 
sexually arousing or gratifying either person.” 
{¶ 14} Dunlap concedes that R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) does not require the state 
to prove any mens rea with regard to the defendant’s knowledge of age of the 
victim, i.e., that a defendant is strictly liable as to that element of a violation.  
However, as to the element of sexual contact, Dunlap argues that the indictment 
should have set forth the mens rea of recklessness.  He contends that the 
indictment’s failure to include that mens rea coupled with the trial court’s failure 
to instruct the jury on the culpable mens rea of recklessness constituted structural 
error requiring reversal pursuant to State v. Colon, 118 Ohio St.3d 26, 2008-Ohio-
1624, 885 N.E.2d 917 (“Colon I”), and State v. Colon, 119 Ohio St.3d 204, 2008-
Ohio-3749, 893 N.E.2d 169 (“Colon II”). 
{¶ 15} Dunlap appealed his convictions to the Eighth District Court of 
Appeals, which rejected his mens rea argument, holding that gross sexual 
imposition involving a child under the age of 13 “is a strict liability offense and 
requires no precise culpable state of mind.  All that is required is a showing of the 
proscribed sexual contact.” 
{¶ 16} The cause is before this court upon the acceptance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
Law and Analysis 
{¶ 17} During the pendency of Dunlap’s appeal, this court overruled 
Colon I and overruled Colon II in part, holding that “when an indictment fails to 
charge a mens rea element of the crime, but tracks the language of the criminal 
January Term, 2011 
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statute describing the offense, the indictment provides the defendant with 
adequate notice of the charges against him and is, therefore, not defective.” State 
v. Horner, 126 Ohio St.3d 466, 2010-Ohio-3830, 935 N.E.2d 26, ¶ 45.  Dunlap’s 
indictment tracked the language of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), so, pursuant to Horner, 
even if the indictment failed to charge a mens rea, it was not defective.  However, 
Horner is not dispositive here, because Dunlap further alleges that the jury 
instructions in this case should have included a mens rea of recklessness.  We thus 
address the applicable mens rea of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4). 
{¶ 18} There is no question that the victims’s age is a strict-liability 
element of an R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) violation.  The statute prohibits sexual contact 
with a person less than 13 years of age “whether or not the offender knows the 
age of that person.”  But the fact that defendants are held strictly liable for that 
element of a violation does not mean that R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) lacks a mens rea 
requirement as to all of its elements.  The state concedes that the appellate court 
erred in finding that R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) requires no culpable state of mind. 
{¶ 19} The parties agree that the “sexual contact” element of R.C. 
2907.05(A)(4) has a mens rea separate from the rest of the statute.  “Sexual 
contact” is defined in R.C. 2907.01(B): 
{¶ 20} “ ‘Sexual contact’ means any touching of an erogenous zone of 
another, including without limitation the thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic region, or, 
if the person is a female, a breast, for the purpose of sexually arousing or 
gratifying either person.” 
{¶ 21} Dunlap argues that there is no stated mens rea for the “any 
touching” language in the first phrase of R.C. 2907.01(B) and that the default 
mens rea should therefore be recklessness, pursuant to R.C. 2901.21(B), which 
states that “[w]hen the section [defining an offense] neither specifies culpability 
nor plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict liability, recklessness is sufficient 
culpability to commit the offense.”  Thus, Dunlap would have this court interpret 
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R.C. 2907.01(B) as defining sexual contact as “any reckless touching of an 
erogenous zone of another * * * for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying 
either person.”  Dunlap argues that “for the purpose of sexually arousing either 
person” refers to the motive behind the touching rather than the mens rea behind 
the act of touching. 
{¶ 22} The state, on the other hand, argues that R.C. 2907.01(B) does 
contain an expressly stated mens rea, i.e., purpose.  The state asserts that R.C. 
2907.01(B) provides the mental state by defining “sexual contact” as touching 
“for the purpose” of sexual arousal. 
{¶ 23} We agree with the state that the mens rea of purpose applies to the 
whole of R.C. 2907.01(B), and thus to the sexual-contact element of R.C. 
2907.05(A)(4).  R.C. 2901.22(A) defines the mens rea of purpose: 
{¶ 24} “A person acts purposely when it is his specific intention to cause a 
certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a 
certain nature, regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is 
his specific intention to engage in conduct of that nature.” 
{¶ 25} Through the definition of sexual contact in R.C. 2907.01(B), gross 
sexual imposition as described in R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) requires proof of touching 
“for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person.” (Emphasis 
added.)  The statute requires a specific intent behind the touching – the touching 
must be intended to achieve sexual arousal or gratification.  Since there is a 
specific intent motivating the touching, it follows that the act of touching must be 
intentional. 
{¶ 26} Grammatically, the phrase “for the purpose of sexually arousing or 
gratifying either person” modifies “any touching of an erogenous zone of 
another.”  R.C. 2907.01(B) consists of one simple sentence with no subordinate 
clauses.  Thus, we need not apply the holding from Horner that “[w]hen the 
General Assembly includes a mens rea element in one discrete clause, subsection, 
January Term, 2011 
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or division of a statute, but not in another discrete clause, subsection, or division 
of that statute, courts must apply the analysis in State v. Wac (1981), 68 Ohio 
St.2d 84, 22 O.O.3d 299, 428 N.E.2d 428, and State v. Maxwell, 95 Ohio St.3d 
254, 2002-Ohio-2121, 767 N.E.2d 242, to determine the mental state where none 
is specified.”  Horner, 126 Ohio St.3d 466, 2010-Ohio-3830, 935 N.E.2d 26, at 
paragraph two of the syllabus.  Here, there is only one clause containing one mens 
rea.  We thus conclude that the applicable mens rea of sexual contact, as defined 
in R.C. 2907.01(B), is purpose. 
{¶ 27} The indictment here tracked the language of the charged offenses 
as set forth in R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), and the trial court properly instructed the jury 
on the element of sexual contact as set forth in R.C. 2907.01(B).  Thus, the trial 
court did not err. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 28} Although the court of appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial 
court, it erred in finding that R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) “requires no precise culpable 
state of mind.”  We hold instead that the element of sexual contact in an R.C. 
2907.05(A)(4) violation requires a mens rea of purpose.  However, since we 
conclude that the indictment and jury instructions in this case sufficiently set forth 
the required mens rea, we affirm that portion of the court of appeals’ judgment.  
We reverse that part of the judgment that applied S.B. 10 to Dunlap and remand 
the case to the trial court for reclassification of Dunlap’s sex-offender status in 
light of our decision in Williams, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2011-Ohio-3374, ___ 
N.E.2d ___. 
Judgment affirmed in part 
and reversed in part, 
and cause remanded. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, 
and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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MCGEE BROWN, not participating. 
__________________ 
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and T. Allan 
Regas, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee. 
Robert L. Tobik, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and John T. Martin, 
Assistant Public Defender, for appellant. 
______________________