Case Title: Sally Sarkis v. Allstate Insurance Company

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC02-428

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2003-10-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
_____________
No. SC02-428
_____________
SALLY SARKIS,
Petitioner,
vs.
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Respondent.
[October 2, 2003]
PER CURIAM.
We have for review Allstate Insurance Co. v. Sarkis, 809 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2001), which expressly and directly conflicts with Pirelli Armstrong Tire
Corp. v. Jensen, 752 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), review dismissed, 777 So.
2d 973 (Fla. 2001), and Collins v. Wilkins, 664 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). 
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We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
The petitioner, Sally Sarkis (Sarkis), was involved in an automobile accident,
as a result of which she suffered damages.  Sarkis brought an action against her
insurer, respondent Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), requesting
compensation based on her uninsured motorist coverage.
Prior to trial, Sarkis filed an offer of judgment for $10,000, pursuant to
section 768.79, Florida Statutes (1997), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442. 
This offer was rejected by Allstate.  The case proceeded to trial, and Sarkis was
ultimately awarded a net judgment of $87,700, which was twenty-five percent
greater than her offer of judgment.  Sarkis therefore moved for an award of attorney
fees and costs.
The trial court found that the jury verdict returned on behalf of Sarkis was
twenty-five percent greater than the offer of judgment, thereby entitling Sarkis to an
award of attorney fees pursuant to section 768.79 and rule 1.442.  In considering
whether to apply a contingency risk multiplier to Sarkis’s award of attorney fees,
the trial court stated:
4.  The Court has also reviewed a number of attorney’s fee
orders awarding Robert M. Moletteire, Esquire a reasonable hourly
rate of $350.00.  More particularly, two of the orders that are a part of
this file contain stipulations by ALLLSTATE INSURANCE
COMPANY that a reasonable hourly rate for Robert M. Moletteire in
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the handling of a personal injury protection lawsuit was $350.00 per
hour.
5.  The Court further finds, based upon the testimony of Robert
M. Moletteire, Esquire, counsel for Plaintiff, and O. John Alpizar,
Esquire, that the relevant market in Brevard County required a
multiplier in order for Plaintiff, SALLY SARKIS, to obtain competent
counsel to try this underinsured motorist claim.  Plaintiff has presented
substantial evidence in the record that she would otherwise [have]
been unable to afford competent counsel.  The Court finds that
counsel for the Plaintiff was unable to mitigate the risk of nonpayment
in any way.
6.  The Court finds that Plaintiff has presented ample testimony
from the record that Defendant, ALLSTATE INSURANCE
COMPANY, as a practice on a national level as well as more
particularly in Brevard County, vigorously defends claims of the nature
brought by the Plaintiff in this case.  Plaintiff presented ample
testimony in the record that there is a strong likelihood that any claim
made against Defendant, ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, will
require a trial.  Counsel for Plaintiff was aware of that at the outset of
accepting to represent the Plaintiff in this claim.
7.  The Court further finds that the record speaks for itself that
Plaintiff obtained a successful result in the trial of this case.
8.  The Court further finds the following facts presented at trial
to be important additional factors in determining a contingency risk
multiplier:
a.  Plaintiff, SALLY SARKIS, had a pre-
existing complaint of low back pain prior to the accident
that gave rise to this lawsuit.
b.  That the jury heard testimony that Ms. Sarkis had
been involved in 2 to 3 prior accidents involving personal injury
to her neck and back.
c.  That Defendant vigorously argued Plaintiff’s low back
injury was not due to the automobile accident that was the
subject matter of this lawsuit, but instead was due to
degeneration and prior traumatic events.
1.  In Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.
1985), modified by Quanstrom, this Court established the criteria that must be
proven for a contingency risk multiplier to be applied.  For a trial court to apply a
contingency risk multiplier in tort and contract cases, the party seeking use of a
multiplier must present evidence of the following factors:  (1) whether the relevant
market requires a contingency risk multiplier to obtain competent counsel; (2)
whether the attorney was able to mitigate the risk of nonpayment in any way; and
(3) whether any of the factors set forth in Rowe are applicable, especially the
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the
following attorney’s fees award be made.
1.  
Hours reasonably incurred:
167 hours
Reasonable hourly rate:
350.00 per hour
Lodestar:
$58,450.00
Contingency Risk Multiplier:
1.5
Total Attorney’s Fees:
$87,675.00
Sarkis v. State, No. 97-10784-CA-H (Fla. 18th Cir. Ct. order filed July 11, 2000).
Allstate appealed the trial court’s award of attorney fees to the Fifth District
Court of Appeal.  The district court, sitting en banc, reversed the trial court’s
order, holding as a matter of law that contingency risk multipliers are not to be used
to compute attorney fees under section 768.79, Florida Statutes.  Sarkis, 809 So.
2d at 8.  The court adopted the dissenting view of Judge Casanueva in Pirelli
Armstrong Tire, 1275 So. 2d at 1277 (Casanueva, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), that neither Standard Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Quanstrom, 555
So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990), nor section 768.79 authorizes the use of contingency risk
multipliers in calculating attorney fees awarded under the offer of judgment statute.1 
amount obtained, and the type of fee arrangement between the attorney and his
client.  Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d at 834; see also Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1150-52.
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In so holding, the court receded from its prior decisions in Garrett v. Mohammed,
686 So. 2d 629 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996); Strahan v. Gauldin, 756 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 5th
DCA 2000); and Internal Medicine Specialists, P.A. v. Figueroa, 781 So. 2d 1117
(Fla. 5th DCA 2001).  The district court further acknowledged conflict with Pirelli
and Collins.
The issue of the use of a multiplier to calculate the amount of an award of
reasonable attorney fees on the basis of the authority of section 768.79 and rule
1.442 has been the subject of a multiplicity of opinions in the district courts.  In
1995, the Fourth District Court of Appeal issued its opinion in Collins v. Wilkins,
664 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).  In a brief opinion, the district court stated:
The statute provides:
When determining the reasonableness of an award
of attorney’s fees pursuant to this section, the court shall
consider, along with all other relevant criteria, the
following additional factors:
§ 768.79(7)(b), Fla. Stat. (1993) (emphasis supplied).  The statute
follows with enumerated additional factors for the court to consider. 
However, these are not exclusive but, as the statute says, must be
considered with the other relevant criteria.  Since the statute also refers
the court to the guidelines promulgated by the supreme court in
determining a reasonable fee, see section 768.79(6)(a), (b), Florida
Statutes (1993), we look to the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule
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4-1.5, Fees for Legal Services, for the factors to be considered in
determining a reasonable fee.  These include whether or not the fee is
fixed or contingent.  Rule 4-1.5(b)(8).  The rule also specifies that all
factors should be considered in setting a reasonable fee, “and may be
applied, in justification of a fee higher or lower than that which would
result from application of only the time and rate factors.”  Rule 4-
1.5(c).  Therefore, we conclude that the legislature authorized a trial
court to consider the application of a contingency risk factor as one
criterion which may be applied in determining a reasonable fee under
section 768.79.  See also Standard Guaranty Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom,
555 So. 2d 828, 831 (Fla. 1990).
Collins, 664 So. 2d at 15.
Recently, in Island Hoppers, Ltd. v. Keith, 820 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 4th DCA
2002), the Fourth District again considered the application of a multiplier in this
context and provided a more extensive analysis.  The district court wrote:
This court addressed the applicability of a contingency risk
multiplier in the offer of judgment context in Collins v. Wilkins, 664
So. 2d 14 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). . . .  [W]e concluded that the
legislature had authorized a trial court to consider the application of a
contingency risk factor as one criterion which may be applied in
determining a reasonable fee under section 768.79.  Collins, 664 So.
2d at 15.
. . . .
. . . We see no reason to recede from our prior holding,
especially where Judge Casanueva expressly admits in his dissenting
opinion, “[B]y referring to the fees for legal services rule, the Fourth . .
. assert[s] that the legislature statutorily authorized trial courts to apply
a contingency risk multiplier in determining a reasonable fee under
section 768.79 . . . arguably, a reading of the fee factors promulgated
by our supreme court could support this holding. . . .”  Pirelli
Armstrong, 752 So. 2d at 1277.  Thus, we maintain trial courts are
legally authorized (by the legislature) to consider application of a
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contingency risk multiplier under the offer of judgment statute.
Furthermore, we find no logical inconsistency in the application
of the Quanstrom factual requirements in the offer of judgment
context.  We recognize whenever a potential client walks through an
attorney’s door for the first time, a wide array of factors enter the
calculus as to whether or not counsel will in fact decide to undertake
that representation.  Rowe and Quanstrom recognized potential clients
whose cases seem to have a relatively low likelihood of success at the
outset, may face considerable difficulties in securing counsel, and may
often be unable to afford competent counsel.  As such, the multiplier
was established, to serve as an incentive of sorts, for attorneys to
undertake representation where a risk of nonpayment was established. 
Although an attorney contemplating representation of a particular client
can never “know” for certain whether or not entitlement to a fee award
under 768.79 will ultimately be established, surely skilled counsel can,
contrary to the words of Chief Judge Schwartz in Gonzalez,
“anticipate” such.  Offers of judgment, as well as requests to apply
multipliers, have clearly become part and parcel of litigation in the state
of Florida; this court need only look to any monthly docket to
recognize such.  We find no inconsistency in holding competent
counsel can “anticipate” the eventual filing of a 768.79 offer of
judgment, “anticipate” the possible entitlement to fees if the statutory
prerequisites are met, and “anticipate” the possibility said fee award
will be multiplied.  Accordingly, we find no logical inconsistency in
application of the Quanstrom requirements to the offer of judgment
context, and move to consider the application of said requirements to
the instant case.
Island Hoppers, 820 So. 2d at 973-75 (footnote omitted).
The use of a multiplier in section 768.79 circumstances has also been both
denied and questioned in the district courts.  In Pirelli Armstrong Tire, the Second
District Court of Appeal aligned with the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s
decision in Collins and the Fifth District Court of Appeal’s then existing decision in
2.  This figure was ultimately reduced by twenty-five percent to take into
account the other criteria in section 768.79(7)(b), resulting in a total fee award of
$777,695.95.
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Garrett, and approved the use of a multiplier of 2.5 to increase the lodestar figure of
$414,000 to over $1 million.2  In a dissent, Judge Casanueva found that the use of a
contingency risk multiplier in the context of section 768.79 violated the
constitutional principle of equal protection because only one side in a civil
action—the plaintiff—is eligible under a rule 4-1.5 analysis to receive a contingency
risk multiplier since it is the plaintiff that is taking the risk of commencing the action. 
Judge Casanueva concluded that this Court’s decisions in Quanstrom and Rowe
did not justify the multiplier’s use in this manner.  As a second basis for his dissent,
Judge Casanueva concluded that the statutory language of section 768.79 does not
expressly provide judicial authority to use a multiplier.  Judge Casanueva wrote:
Without this express directive, the court lacks the authority to use a
multiplier.  In subsection (1), where it created the statutory entitlement
to an attorneys’ fee, the legislature defined and limited the award of
fees to those incurred within a specified period.  Fees are only
awardable for services rendered between the date of filing an offer or
demand that was subsequently rejected and the conclusion of the
litigation.  The rejected demand or offer, the legislature decreed, was
admissible only to pursue the statute’s penalty provisions.  The fees
for legal services performed during this period were to be calculated in
accordance with supreme court guidelines.  Rules 4-1.5(b) and (c) of
the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar identify factors to be considered
in determining a reasonable fee.  Nowhere in rule 4-1.5 is there a
specific mention of a multiplier.  Attorneys’ fees are authorized only
3.  We interpret the reference to a “clean slate” to mean that if the panel was
not bound by the majority’s decision in Pirelli Armstrong Tire.
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by statute or contract.  Because a supreme court rule is neither, it
cannot authorize a fee.  It is the legislature’s task to enact substantive
law, see TGI Friday’s Inc. v. Dvorak, 663 So. 2d 606, 611 (Fla.
1995), and even though it created a substantive right to an attorney’s
fee calculated between two points in time, it did not create a
substantive right to have that fee multiplied.
In addition to providing for a penalty or sanction in subsection
(7), the legislature specifically granted a trial court the authority to
disallow the entitlement to attorneys’ fees where it concluded the offer
was not made in good faith.  The interplay between the subsections
evinces a clear legislative intent to penalize where appropriate and to
provide a mechanism to deny a fee where the offer was not made in
good faith.  That same clarity of expression could have been used to
authorize a multiplier but was not.
Pirelli Armstrong Tire, 752 So. 2d at 1278-79 (Casanueva, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
Then, in Doyle-Vallery v. Aranibar, 838 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003), a
case in which the majority noted that Judge Casanueva’s dissent in Pirelli
Armstrong Tire “presents a strong argument” and that this Court had accepted
review of this issue in the present case, Judge Altenbernd wrote a concurring
opinion.  Judge Altenbernd stated that “if this panel were writing on a clean slate
and if the issue were not already before the supreme court, I would vote to prohibit
the use of a multiplier in determining a reasonable fee under section 768.79, Florida
Statutes (2001).”  Doyle-Vallery, 838 So. 2d at 1198 (Altenbernd, J., concurring).3 
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Judge Altenbernd stated that he would hold that the multiplier was not applicable on
the basis that the use of a multiplier to enhance fees awarded pursuant to section
768.79 would be contrary to legislative intent.  Judge Altenbernd wrote:
Although I agree with most of Judge Casanueva’s dissent in
Pirelli, I am not convinced this issue necessitates a constitutional
ruling.  The matter should be resolved as a matter of statutory
interpretation.  The courts should interpret the reach of this statute to
assure that the statute achieves its intended purpose and only that
purpose.
The legislature created this statute to reduce the costs and the
length of litigation while maintaining a neutral playing field.  When the
legislature inserted the phrase, “along with all relevant criteria,” into
section 768.79(7)(b), it intended to incorporate those criteria relevant
to these goals.  The legislature did not intend for courts to use criteria
that favor one side in the litigation over the other.  As explained below,
the multiplier has that effect.  The legislature also did not intend for the
courts to use criteria designed to promote more litigation rather than to
limit existing litigation.  It is beyond dispute that the multiplier was
created to promote litigation, not to limit it.  Thus, as a matter of
simple statutory construction, the multiplier is not a “relevant
criterion.”
Judge Casanueva is correct in his two most important
observations.  First, the multiplier was created primarily to promote
the goal of access to courts.  See Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v.
Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828, 833 (Fla. 1990); Fla. Patient’s Comp.
Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145, 1151 (Fla. 1985).  Using a multiplier
encourages lawyers to accept representation at the inception of certain
cases when lawyers might not otherwise accept such cases.  The
legislature and the courts apply a multiplier to assure that lawyers
receive a sufficient economic incentive to represent clients who need
access to the courts and cannot achieve that access without such
incentives.  Thus, the multiplier is designed to achieve a public policy
that is separate and distinct from the policy of encouraging early
settlement of lawsuits.  If anything, by encouraging the filing of more
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lawsuits, the multiplier creates congestion in the judicial system that
makes it more difficult for section 768.79 to achieve the goal of
quicker, less expensive litigation.
Second, defense attorneys have no feasible means of entering
into employment contracts based upon a contingency fee.  As a result,
the existing rules would rarely, if ever, permit the defendant to recover
a fee that included a multiplier.  This may not violate equal protection,
but it does affect the workings of this statute.  Because the multiplier
benefits only the plaintiff, if it applies to the fees imposed under
section 768.79, that statute will necessarily shift the value of lawsuits in
favor of the plaintiff.
Doyle-Vallery, 838 So. 2d at 1198-99 (Altenbernd, J., concurring) (footnote
omitted).
In 1999, the Third District Court of Appeal, in Gonzalez v. Veloso, 731 So.
2d 63 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), affirmed a trial court’s denial of a multiplier in a case in
which the plaintiff’s offer of judgment exceeded the section 768.79 twenty-five-
percent requirement.  In writing for the court, Judge Schwartz stated:  “[T]here [is
no] evidence in the record that the prevailing party would have been unable to
obtain competent counsel.”  Id. at 64 (quoting Askowitz v. Susan Feuer Interior
Design, Inc., 563 So. 2d 752, 754 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)).  Judge Schwartz further
questioned
[w]hether any such showing can ever be made, and thus whether a
multiplier is ever appropriate when fees are awardable only when a
reasonable offer is not accepted under § 768.79, an eventuality which
obviously cannot be anticipated when counsel is obtained.
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Gonzalez, 731 So. 2d at 64 n.2.
In Amisub (American Hospital), Inc. v. Hernandez, 817 So. 2d 870 (Fla. 3d
DCA 2002), the Third District Court of Appeal again reviewed the application of a
multiplier in a section 768.79 situation.  The court wrote:
Our inquiry in this case, based on the Quanstrom criteria, is
“whether the relevant market requires a contingency fee multiplier to
obtain competent counsel” when fees are awarded for failure to accept
an offer under Section 768.79.  Although three law firms refused
Hernandez’s case, Charlip accepted the case based on a forty-five
percent contingency fee arrangement.
Hernandez contends that although Charlip originally agreed to a
contingency fee, the litigation became overbearing.  Therefore, the
availability of a contingency fee multiplier became essential to
Charlip’s continued representation.
We reject this argument for two reasons.  First, in Quanstrom,
the Court specifically refers to obtaining counsel in the first instance,
not whether counsel continues the case after prolonged litigation.
Second, the record does not support Hernandez’s argument. 
After the first trial ended in an adverse directed verdict, Charlip and
Hernandez renegotiated their fee and cost arrangement.  If Charlip had
made the determination to proceed with the case in the hope of
obtaining a contingency fee multiplier, he would not have renegotiated
the fee agreement with Hernandez.  Clearly, Charlip was willing to
continue representing Hernandez once he revisited the fee arrangement
and mitigated his risk.
Charlip’s failure to satisfy two of the Quanstrom requisites, the
ability to obtain competent counsel in the relevant market and the
ability to mitigate the risk of nonpayment in any way, negate the
application of a multiplier.  Therefore, we reverse that portion of the
trial court’s order applying a 2.5 multiplier to the attorney’s fees
award.  See Gonzalez v. Veloso, 731 So. 2d at 64.
Id. at 873.
4.  The First District’s decision followed the decision by this Court to strike
the multiplier in the award of appellate attorney fees.  Carter v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., No. SC94797 (Fla. order filed Dec. 13, 2002).
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The First District Court of Appeal has held that a trial court should have
considered the applicability of a contingency risk multiplier in connection with a
section 768.79 attorney fee award in Lewis v. Bondy, 752 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2000), and subsequent cases.  In Lewis, the court aligned with the majority in
Pirelli Armstrong Tire, but did not set forth independent analysis.  However, in
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Carter, 848 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1st DCA
2003),4 the court reversed the trial court’s application of the multiplier in a section
768.79 attorney fee award.
Finally, prior to its decision in the present case, the Fifth District Court of
Appeal had also held that a multiplier was applicable under section 768.79.  See
Tetrault v. Fairchild, 799 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).  We find, however, that
Judge Harris’s concurring opinion in this case is noteworthy.  In his opinion, Judge
Harris wrote an extensive analysis concerning the application of a multiplier in a
section 768.79 attorney fee award.  In part, Judge Harris wrote:
[Another] reason for denying application of the multiplier in
offer of judgment cases was well developed by Judge Casanueva in
his dissent in Pirelli Armstrong Tire Corp. v. Jensen, 752 So. 2d 1275
(Fla. 2d DCA 2000).  Judge Casanueva based his opinion on equal
protection guarantees.  It can just as well be argued that to apply the
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multiplier in offer of judgment cases is contrary to clear legislative
intent.  The legislature in section 768.79 carefully crafted a party
neutral fee provision to encourage settlement by assessing identical
risks against each party if an offer is improperly rejected.  By applying
the multiplier (applicable only to plaintiffs), the courts will have
destroyed the neutrality intended by the legislature and will have given
great advantage to plaintiff:  "If I lose, I must pay your reasonable fee;
if you lose, you must pay up to two-and-a-half times my reasonable
fee."  The supreme court emphasized that the "criteria and factors"
utilized in setting a reasonable attorney's fee "must be consistent with
the purpose of the fee-authorizing statute or rule."  Quanstrom, 555
So.2d at 834.  Granting a multiplier for only one of the parties would
not be consistent with the purpose of the offer of judgment statute
which is to put both parties on the same footing when reasonably
evaluating the case.
Tetrault, 799 So. 2d at 235 (Harris, J., concurring and concurring specially).
ANALYSIS
We approve the Fifth District Court of Appeal’s decision.  We hold that the
use of a multiplier in awarding attorney fees authorized by section 768.79, Florida
Statutes, is error.  This conclusion follows this Court’s precedent in which we have
construed the offer of judgment statutes since their adoption in 1986, ruled upon
their constitutionality, and adopted rules of civil procedure implementing them.
In sum, we have recognized that attorney fees awarded pursuant to the offer
of judgment statutes are sanctions.  These fees are awarded as sanctions for
unreasonable rejections of offers of judgment.  We have set forth in rule 1.442 the
factors to be considered in determining a reasonable amount of attorney fees
5.  In this original rule, costs were the only sanction.  There was no
authorization in this rule for attorney fees as a sanction.  This rule was changed
immaterially for present purposes in 1980.  The Florida Bar, 391 So. 2d 165 (Fla.
1980).
6.  Section 45.061 was a similar offer-of-judgment statute, which was
repealed with respect to actions accruing after October 1, 1990.  Ch. 90-119, § 22,
Laws of Fla.  Section 768.79 was therefore left as the only statute applicable to
actions accruing after that date.
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awarded as sanctions.  We have not included the use of a multiplier in the rule as a
factor to be considered in the award of attorney fees.  Because attorney fees
awarded under the offer of judgment statute are sanctions against the party against
whom the sanction is levied, we have held that the statute and rule must be strictly
construed.  We here examine our precedent.
We first adopted an offer of judgment rule of procedure in 1972.  In re the
Florida Bar, 265 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1972).  That rule was the same as Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 68 and provided that if the judgment finally obtained by the adverse
party was not more favorable than the offer of judgment, the adverse party had to
pay the costs incurred after making the offer.5
Thereafter, the Legislature enacted two offer of judgment statutes.  In 1986,
the Legislature enacted section 768.79, and in 1987, the Legislature enacted section
45.061, Florida Statutes (1987).6  In 1988, we requested the Civil Procedure Rules
Committee to examine any conflict between sections 45.061 and 768.79 and rule
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1.442.  In response, the Committee petitioned for adoption of a new rule of civil
procedure.
In its petition, the majority of the Committee proposed a sanction for the
failure to accept a bona fide offer of settlement of fifteen percent of an unaccepted
offer to pay.  The Committee contended that the then existing sanction, consisting
only of costs, was inadequate to deter unnecessary litigation.  The Committee also
urged this Court to declare unconstitutional sections 768.79 and 45.061, Florida
Statutes.  A minority of the Committee and the Board of Governors of The Florida
Bar urged this Court to return to the then current rule’s sanctions of costs only and
to declare the statutes unconstitutional.
In ruling upon the petition and adopting a new rule, we stated:
The proposal submitted by the Committee raises a serious
question of whether this Court impinges upon the legislative
prerogative to enact substantive law if we adopt a “procedural”
sanction of this type. . . .  [I]t is not so clear that a sanction is
“procedural” when it imposes a “fine” based on a percentage of an
unaccepted offer, especially when a party may have done nothing
more serious than guessing wrong about a jury verdict.
We do not find it necessary, however, to reach this question. . .
.  We believe it is wiser policy to have a sanction based on costs and
attorneys fees.  This is what the legislature did in both of the statutes
under review in this opinion, and this legislative determination is
persuasive.  Accordingly, we have modified the proposed rule as set
forth in the appendix to this opinion to reflect the major components
of the statutes in question.
. . . Our final rule imposes a sanction based entirely on costs
7.  In pertinent part, the new rule stated:
(h) Sanctions.
(1) Upon motion made within 30 days after the return of the
verdict in a jury action or the date of filing of the judgment in a
non-jury action, the court may impose sanctions equal to reasonable
attorneys fees and all reasonable costs of the litigation accruing from
the date the relevant offer of judgment was made whenever the court
finds both of the following:
(A) that the party against whom sanctions are sought has
unreasonably rejected or refused the offer, resulting in unreasonable
delay and needless increase in the cost of litigation; and
(B) that either
(I) an offer to pay was refused and the damages awarded
in favor of the offeree and against the offeror are less than 75
percent of the offer; or
(ii) an offer to accept payment was refused and the
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and attorneys fees, but strengthens the existing rule to permit sanctions
whenever an offer of judgment is unreasonably refused and the
subsequent judgment is disproportionate to that offer by more than
25%.  For instance, we have added extensive new language defining
what can constitute an unreasonable refusal and clarifying the extent of
the trial court's discretion on this question.
Florida Bar re Amendment to Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1.442 (Offer of
Judgment), 550 So. 2d 442, 442-43 (Fla. 1989) (emphasis added).  We then
declined to address the statutes’ constitutionality in the nonadversarial rules
proceeding.  We did, however, recognize the confusion by reason of the difference
between the statutes and the then existing rule 1.442.  We thus withdrew the then
existing rule 1.442, effective January 1, 1990, and replaced it with a new rule 1.442.7 
damages awarded in favor of the offeror and against the offeree
are more than 125 percent of the offer.
(2) In determining entitlement to and the amount of a sanction,
the court may consider any relevant factor, including:
(A) the merit of the claim that was the subject of the offer;
(B) the number, nature and quality of offers and counteroffers
made by the parties;
(C) the closeness of questions of fact and law at issue;
(D) whether a party unreasonably refused to furnish information
necessary to evaluate the reasonableness of an offer;
(E) whether the suit was in the nature of a test case presenting
questions of far-reaching importance affecting nonparties;
(F) the fact that, at the time the offer was made and rejected, it
was unlikely that the rejection would result in unreasonable cost or
delay;
(G) the fact that a party seeking sanctions has himself
unreasonably rejected an offer or counteroffer on the same issues or
engaged in other unreasonable conduct;
(H) the fact that the proceeding in question essentially was
equitable in nature;
(I) the lack of good faith underlying the offer; or
(J) the fact that the judgment was grossly disproportionate to
the offer.
(3) No sanction under this rule shall be imposed in any class
action or shareholder derivative suit, nor in any proceeding involving
dissolution of marriage, alimony, nonsupport, child custody or
eminent domain.
(Footnotes omitted.)
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We held that, to the extent the new rule’s procedural aspects were inconsistent with
the statutes, the rules superseded the statutes.
Shortly after our adoption of the new rule 1.442, we considered a decision of
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the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Milton v. Leapai, 562 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1990), in which the district court held section 45.061, Florida Statutes (1987),
unconstitutional concerning offers of settlement because the statute infringed upon
the exclusive rule-making authority of the Supreme Court.  The district court had
reached its conclusion in answering two certified questions from a county court. 
The first certified question was whether the statute was constitutional.  The second
certified question was whether attorney fees could be imposed as sanctions under
the statute where the offer of settlement was made subsequent to the enactment of
the statute but where the cause of action accrued prior to the enactment of the
statute.  Id.
We reversed the district court as to its holding of the offer of settlement
statute unconstitutional and remanded with directions that the county court’s award
of attorney fees be reinstated.  We then addressed the second certified question
from the county court.  That answer is important in respect to the issue which we
now decide.  We stated:
Having found the statute constitutional as modified by our rule,
we next must address the question of whether section 45.061, Florida
Statutes (1987), is constitutional as applied.  In this instance, we agree
with Leapai that the statute was not applied retroactively since the right
to recover attorney fees attaches not to the cause of action, but to the
unreasonable rejection of an offer of settlement.  As noted in our
statement of facts, the offer and rejection of the offer occurred after
8.  See supra note 6.
9.  Ch. 90-119, § 48, Laws of Fla.
10.  This case was decided under section 768.79 as it existed prior to its
1990 amendments, and under rule 1.442 as it existed in 1990, prior to this Court’s
repeal of the rule in Timmons.
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the act had been adopted by the legislature.
Leapai v. Milton, 595 So. 2d 12, 15 (Fla. 1992) (emphasis added).
Later, in 1992, we considered the interplay between sections 45.061 and
768.79 in Timmons v. Combs, 608 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1992).  We noted that the
Legislature had repealed section 45.061 with respect to causes of action accruing
after October 1, 1990,8 and had amended section 768.79 in 1990.9  We then found
that section 768.79 contained procedural aspects which were subject to this
Court’s rule-making authority.  We therefore repealed the then existing rule 1.442
and adopted the procedural portions of section 768.79 as a rule of this Court,
effective as of the date of the Timmons opinion.  Timmons, 608 So. 2d at 3.  In a
supplemental order, we requested the Civil Procedure Rules Committee to address
the adoption of a new rule and authorized the submission of a proposed rule
outside of the four-year cycle.  Timmons, 608 So. 2d at 3.
In 1995, we again considered the statutes and rule in TGI Friday’s, Inc. v.
Dvorak, 663 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 1995).10  In that case, the Fourth District Court of
11.  TGI Friday’s was decided under the 1987 version of section 768.79. 
The statute was amended in 1990, wherein the factors of subsection (2)(b) in the
1987 version (incorporated into rule 1.442) were moved to subsection (7)(b) of the
amended statute.  See ch. 90-119, § 48, Laws of Fla.  The substance of the
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Appeal had made four holdings, which we expressly approved.  Id. at 611.  We
stated:
In Leapai, this Court upheld the constitutionality of section 45.061 and
found that the statute did not infringe on the rule-making authority of
the Court.  Finding no relevant distinction between section 45.061 and
section 768.79, the district court ruled that section 768.79 was likewise
constitutional.
Second, the district court held that rule 1.442 could be applied
to this case despite the fact that Dvorak's cause of action preceded the
effective date of the rule.  The district court once again relied on this
Court's decision in Leapai and our holding that section 45.061 could
be retroactively applied to a cause of action so long as the statute was
enacted before the offeree's rejection of the offer of judgment. The
district court held that the same reasoning should apply to rule 1.442,
and found that the rule would apply in this instance because TGI
Friday's rejected Dvorak's offer after rule 1.442 became effective.
TGI Friday’s, 663 So. 2d at 610 (emphasis added).  In its third and fourth
holdings, the district court held that under the statutes and rule, the issue of whether
TGI Friday’s had unreasonably rejected the offer of judgment had no bearing on
whether Dvorak was entitled to an award of attorney fees.
We noted that while the reasonableness of the rejection of an offer had no
bearing on the issue of entitlement to fees, the factors set forth in section
768.79(2)(b),11 which had been incorporated into rule 1.442, would have a bearing
subsection remained the same.
12.  The Committee recommended that rule 1.442(h)(2) provide guidelines
for determining the “entitlement to and the reasonableness of” the amount of an
award of attorney fees.  This Court rejected including the words “the entitlement
to” because use of those words would infringe upon the Legislature’s exclusive
authority to enact substantive law.  The Committee also recommended adding
whether the proposal was reasonably rejected to the factors to be considered in
respect to the award of attorney fees.  This Court rejected that recommendation,
reasoning that such a consideration was inconsistent with this Court’s opinion in
TGI Friday’s, in which this Court noted that the Legislature, by enacting section
768.79, did not give judges the discretion to determine whether it is reasonable to
reject an offer of judgment.  This consideration would therefore also impinge upon
the Legislature’s prerogative to enact substantive law.  In re Amendments to Fla.
Rules of Civ. Proc., 682 So. 2d at 105-06.
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on the amount of attorney fees awarded by the court.  We stated:
[I]t is equally clear that these enumerated factors are intended to be
considered in the determination of the amount of the fee to be
awarded. Thus, in a given case, the court could justifiably reduce the
amount of the attorney's fee to be assessed against a severely injured
plaintiff who suffered an adverse verdict after rejecting a small
settlement offer.  By the same token, the court could reasonably
conclude that a defendant with a small liability potential who rejected a
large settlement offer should pay only a reduced fee even though the
verdict ultimately exceeded the offer by more than twenty-five percent.
TGI Friday’s, 663 So. 2d at 613.
In 1996, in In re Amendments to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 682 So.
2d 105 (Fla. 1996), we adopted rule 1.442 in a form recommended by the Civil
Procedure Rules Committee, except for two recommendations which we
determined were in conflict with TGI Friday’s.12  By its express statement in
13.  The factors are as follows:
(h) Costs and Fees.
(1) If a party is entitled to costs and fees pursuant to applicable
Florida law, the court may, in its discretion, determine that a proposal
was not made in good faith. In such case, the court may disallow an
award of costs and attorneys' fees.
(2) When determining the reasonableness of the amount of an
award of attorneys' fees pursuant to this section, the court shall
consider, along with all other relevant criteria, the following factors:
(A) The then-apparent merit or lack of merit in the claim.
(B) The number and nature of proposals made by the parties.
(C) The closeness of questions of fact and law at issue.
(D) Whether the party making the proposal had unreasonably
refused to furnish information necessary to evaluate the
reasonableness of the proposal.
(E) Whether the suit was in the nature of a test case presenting
questions of far-reaching importance affecting nonparties.
(F) The amount of the additional delay cost and expense that
the party making the proposal reasonably would be expected to incur
if the litigation were to be prolonged.
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subdivision (a), the rule applies to all proposals for settlement authorized by Florida
law regardless of the terms used to refer to the proposals.  Subdivision (a) also
expressly provides that the rule superseded all other provisions of rules and statutes
inconsistent with the new rule that we adopted by the opinion.  The new rule was
therefore made applicable to an award of attorney fees pursuant to section 768.79. 
Subdivision (h)(2) of the rule provides the factors that a court is to use in
determining the amount of attorney fees awarded for refusal to accept a proposal
for settlement.13
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As noted at the beginning of this analysis, the detailed history of our cases
construing the offer of judgment statutes and the adoption of rule 1.442 reflect that
an award of attorney fees authorized by section 768.79 is a sanction against the
rejecting party for the refusal to accept what is presumed to be a reasonable offer. 
This is a sanction levied against the rejecting party for unnecessarily continuing the
litigation.  The statute specifically limits the attorney fees to fees incurred after the
date the offer was served upon the rejecting party.  § 768.79(6)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat.
(1997).  The right to the award of attorney fees attaches to the rejection of the offer
of judgment, not to the cause of action.  Leapai, 595 So. 2d at 15.  The factors
specified in rule 1.442 each have to do with the evaluation and nature of the offers
and the case in litigation.
We have recognized that the use of a multiplier must be consistent with the
purpose of the fee-authorizing statute or rule.  Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d at 834; see
also Bell v. U.S.B. Acquisition, Inc., 734 So. 2d 403, 408-09 (Fla. 1999).  The
reason for an award of attorney fees authorized as a sanction for the rejection of an
offer to settle is very different from the reason that we authorized the use of a
multiplier in Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d at 833, and Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1151.  In
those cases, we authorized the use of a multiplier to promote access to courts by
encouraging lawyers to undertake representation at the inception of certain cases. 
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See Doyle-Vallery, 838 So. 2d at 1198-99 (Altenbernd, J., concurring).  We agree
with the Third District Court of Appeal’s analysis in Amisub that Quanstrom
specifically refers to obtaining counsel in the first instance.  Amisub, 817 So. 2d at
872-73.  It is self-evident that attorney fees awarded as a sanction under section
768.79 and rule 1.442 are awarded after an attorney has already been obtained and
agreed to undertake the case, and thus the use of a multiplier is not consistent with
the purpose of the fee-authorizing statute.  Quanstrom and Rowe do not justify the
use of a multiplier in awards of attorney fees authorized by section 768.79 and
made in compliance with rule 1.442.
Furthermore,  we have recognized that statutory authorization for attorney
fees is to be strictly construed.  Gershuny v. Martin McFall Messenger Anesthesia
Prof. Ass’n, 539 So. 2d 1131, 1132 (Fla. 1989).  We have also recognized that a
statute imposing a penalty must be strictly construed in favor of the one against
whom the penalty is imposed and is never extended by construction.  Hotel &
Restaurant Comm’n v. Sunny Seas No. One, Inc., 104 So. 2d 570, 571 (Fla.
1958).  We have recently applied this rule of strict construction to section 768.79. 
See Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 2003).
Throughout the statutory and rule history of offers of judgment, the use of a
multiplier has never been expressly authorized.  Neither section 768.79 nor rule
14.  In determining attorney fee awards pursuant to rule 1.442, trial courts
should make specific findings with respect to the factors provided in rule
1.442(h)(2).
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1.442 authorizes the use of a multiplier in determining the amount of attorney fees
as a sanction for the rejection of an offer.  Applying a strict construction of the
statute and rule, a multiplier therefore cannot be applied under section 768.79 or
rule 1.442, and the trial court’s application of a multiplier in this case was error. 
From our reading of the trial court’s “Judgment Award of Attorney’s Fees and
Costs” in the present case, we do not see that the trial court used the factors of rule
1.442(h)(2) to determine the amount of the attorney fees award.  Upon remand, the
trial judge should use these factors in calculating the award, as well as the
reasonable hourly rate and time, which the judge had already determined.14  A
multiplier is not authorized.
We therefore approve the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in
this case and remand for further proceedings in accord with this opinion.  We
disapprove Pirelli Armstrong Tire from the Second District, Island Hoppers from
the Fourth District, and Lewis from the First District.  The decisions in those cases
failed to consider the 1996 version of rule 1.442 and approved the use of a
multiplier though rule 1.442 did not.
It is so ordered.
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ANSTEAD, C.J., and LEWIS, QUINCE, and BELL, JJ., concur.
WELLS, J., concurs with an opinion, in which BELL, J., concurs.
PARIENTE, J., dissents with an opinion.
CANTERO, J., recused.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, J., concurring.
I write to state the reasons that I do not agree with Justice Pariente’s analysis
in her dissenting opinion.
(1)  In this case, as with all cases in which a trial court is to consider attorney
fees under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442, counsel agreed to the
representation of the client and entered into a contract with the client for the
representation prior to the offer of judgment.  Therefore, in these cases, the very
first factor set forth in Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d
1145 (Fla. 1985), and Standard Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d
828 (Fla. 1990), justifying a fee multiplier, which is whether a fee enhancement is
required to obtain competent counsel, cannot be met because when an offer of
judgment is made and rejected, counsel has already been obtained.  This is the
essential point made by the Third District in Amisub, Inc. v. Hernandez, 817 So. 2d
870 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), and quoted by the majority.  Majority op. at 12.  Rowe
and Quanstrom, therefore, do not support a multiplier under the offer of judgment
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statute and rule.
In her dissent, Justice Pariente relies on this Court’s decision in Bell v.
U.S.B. Acquisition Co., 734 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 1999).  However, Bell was a case in
which this Court emphasized that the use of the multiplier in contract cases was
limited to those cases in which it was demonstrated that counsel could not have
been obtained without the inducement of the fee multiplier.  This was the basis
upon which this Court distinguished the denial of the use of a fee multiplier in Sun
Bank of Ocala v. Ford, 564 So. 2d 1078 (Fla. 1990).  In offer of judgment cases,
since counsel is already obtained, Bell does not apply.
(2)  The fees authorized by section 768.79, Florida Statutes, and rule 1.442
are expressly authorized as sanctions against the party who rejects a reasonable
offer of judgment, not as an inducement to obtain counsel.  This fact is plain
because section 768.79(1), Florida Statutes, expressly states that the attorney fees
are “penalties.”  Rule 1.442(g) expressly states that the fees are “sanctions,” and
this Court has recognized that the fees are “sanctions” as set forth by the majority
in the detailed history of the statute and rule.  Moreover, the statute clearly
authorizes attorney fees for only those fees incurred after the date the offer was
served upon the rejecting party, not from the date the offering party’s counsel
agreed to undertake the representation.  § 768.79(6)(a), (b), Fla. Stat.  This Court
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made the specific point in Leapai v. Milton, 595 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1992), that the right
to recover attorney fees does not attach the to the cause of action but to the
unreasonable rejection of an offer of settlement.  Id. at 15.
(3)  The reason that the statute and rule are to be strictly construed is not
because either is ambiguous but because the statute authorizes and the rule
implements an award of attorney fees and because the assessment of attorney fees
pursuant to the statute and rule is a sanction.  It is the long-standing precedent of
this Court that statutes and rules authorizing attorney fees or imposing penalties are
to be strictly construed as written and not extended by implication.  Since neither
the statute nor the rule authorizes a fee multiplier, an authorization for the use of a
multiplier would have to be by implication in violation of both long-standing and
very recent precedent of this Court.  See majority op. at 26.
(4)  In delineating the criteria for a trial judge to use in determining the amount
of attorney fees, the statute and rule set forth criteria that focus exclusively upon
issues concerning the evaluation and rejection of the offer of judgment.  Thus, the
reasonable construction of the phrase “along with all other relevant criteria” in the
introductory part of rule 1.442(h)(2) is that the other relevant criteria are similar
considerations related to the evaluation and rejection of the offer of judgment.  It is
an unreasonable construction to read into the statute and rule an authorization for a
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fee multiplier as an inducement to obtaining counsel to undertake the representation
in the first place.  Again, the statute only authorizes fees “incurred from the date the
offer was served.”  § 768.79(6)(a), (b), Fla. Stat.
(5)  As stated above in paragraph (1), in cases in which the offer-of-judgment
statute and rule apply, counsel has already agreed by contract to represent the client
before the offer of judgment is made.  In this case, counsel agreed to this
representation before any offer of judgment was made on the basis of a thirty-three
and one-third percent contingency fee, meaning that counsel agreed to accept a fee
of thirty-three and one-third percent of the amount received by settlement or
judgment.  Counsel made an offer of judgment of $10,000, which, if accepted,
would have resulted in a fee of approximately $3333 according to counsel’s
contract.  The offer was of course not accepted and, after trial, a net judgment of
$87,700 was entered.  According to counsel’s contract with his client, he was
entitled to a fee of approximately $29,230.41 for the representation from the
inception of the representation, which was the date of the contract through the entry
of the final judgment.  Because of the rejection of the offer of judgment, the court
was authorized to consider the number of hours counsel reasonably expended on
the case and the reasonable hourly rate of counsel of like competence and skill
“incurred from the date of the offer.”  According to the trial court, these two
15.  It is unclear whether the trial court calculated the hours from the
inception of the representation or from the date of the offer of judgment.  The
statute only authorized the fees from the date the offer of judgment was made.
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considerations produced a fee of $58,450.15  To further enhance this amount by the
use of a multiplier so that the fee becomes $87,675 is not a sanction authorized by
the statute.  Rather, the trial court must use the criteria expressly provided in rule
1.442 and any other relevant criteria related to evaluating the offer of judgment to
adjust the $58,450 so as to determine a reasonable fee.
BELL, J., concurs.
PARIENTE, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.  In my view, the contingent nature of the representation
is an appropriate consideration in an award of attorney's fees under the offer of
judgment statute, section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2002).  A contingent fee
arrangement comes within the plain language of "all relevant criteria" in section
768.79(7)(b), and is not contrary to the underlying policy of the statute, which is to
promote settlements. 
Section 768.79(7)(b) of the offer of judgment statute provides that a trial
court shall consider six "additional" factors and "all other relevant criteria" in
determining the reasonableness of an award of attorney's fees to a party whose
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recovery exceeds a rejected offer of judgment by at least twenty-five percent.  The
majority in this case interprets this statutory language as authorizing consideration
of only those criteria that serve the statute's purpose of promoting settlements and
discouraging unnecessary litigation, and concludes that allowing the trial judge to
consider the contingent nature of the representation contravenes this purpose.
I disagree.  Whenever a trial court bases a fee award in part on the multiplier,
its determination must take into account the necessary factual predicates set forth in
Standard Guaranty Insurance Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990), and
Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985), i.e.,
that the attorney representing the party who made the offer of judgment would not
have taken the case, nor would any other competent attorney in that legal
community, without the availability of the multiplier.  Thus circumscribed, the use
of the contingency risk factor, in tandem with the six statutory criteria and other
relevant considerations, serves the goals of both ensuring access to the courts by
potential litigants and encouraging settlement of claims. 
The prospect of a fee award under the offer of judgment statute can be a
significant consideration in an attorney's decision to undertake representation of
certain individuals with prospective claims, especially when the total amount of the
potential claim is small as compared to the number of hours that will be expended if
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the case goes to trial.  Thus, the fact that counsel has already been obtained, relied
on in the majority and concurring opinions, should not preclude the trial court from
finding that the prospect of a multiplier was a substantial reason why counsel
agreed to undertake representation.  
In addition, the adverse party's knowledge that the representation is
contingent and the prospect of an enhanced fee award would be additional factors
in promoting settlement.  The defendant in a contingent fee case knows that no
matter how many hours the plaintiff's attorney works, the recovery of a fee is
contingent on whether the plaintiff prevails.  Thus, in many circumstances, there is
little incentive for a defendant to settle early on.  Once the plaintiff makes an offer
of judgment, the defendant must assess the likelihood that the verdict will be
twenty-five percent less than the offer of judgment and what the liability for
attorney's fees will be.  The knowledge that the attorney's fees awarded will include
the possibility of an enhanced fee due to the contingent nature of the representation
is a factor for the adverse party to consider in assessing whether to settle the case
in a timely fashion.
The Fourth District has recognized that in the context of the offer of
judgment statute, the prospect that an award of fees will include a contingency risk
multiplier may be a significant consideration in an attorney's initial decision to
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represent a client on a contingency fee basis:
[W]e find no logical inconsistency in application of the Quanstrom
factual requirements in the offer of judgment context.  We recognize
whenever a potential client walks through an attorney's door for the
first time, a wide array of factors enter the calculus as to whether or
not counsel will in fact decide to undertake that representation.  Rowe
and Quanstrom recognized potential clients whose cases seem to have
a relatively low likelihood of success at the outset, may face
considerable difficulties in securing counsel, and may often be unable
to afford competent counsel.  As such, the multiplier was established,
to serve as an incentive of sorts, for attorneys to undertake
representation where a risk of nonpayment was established.  Although
an attorney contemplating representation of a particular client can
never know for certain whether or not entitlement to a fee award under
768.79 will ultimately be established, surely skilled counsel can . . .
anticipate such.  Offers of judgment, as well as requests to apply
multipliers, have clearly become part and parcel of litigation in the state
of Florida;  this court need only look at any monthly docket to
recognize such.  We find no inconsistency in holding competent
counsel can "anticipate" the eventual filing of a 768.79 offer of
judgment, "anticipate" the possible entitlement to fees if the statutory
prerequisites are met, and "anticipate" the possibility said fee award
will be multiplied.  Accordingly, we find no logical inconsistency in
application of the Quanstrom requirements to the offer of judgment
context.
Island Hoppers, Ltd. v. Keith, 820 So. 2d 967, 975 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (footnote
and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis supplied).  
I agree with this assessment of the practical realities of the role that the
multiplier plays in the initial decision to undertake representation in a case.  These
realities are illustrated by the record in this case.  
16.  The first trial resulted in a mistrial in October 1998, through no fault of
the parties.
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In July 1998, plaintiff Sarkis made a reasonable offer of $10,000, which was
not accepted.  The ultimate net judgment for Sarkis was $87,700, following a
verdict in her favor in February 2000.16  The trial court found a reasonable hourly
rate to be $350 per hour.  The trial court further found that  
Defendant, Allstate Insurance Company, as a practice on a national
level as well as more particularly in Brevard County, vigorously
defends claims of the nature brought by the Plaintiff in this case. 
Plaintiff presented ample testimony in the record that there is a strong
likelihood that any claim against Defendant, Allstate Insurance
Company will require a trial.
In applying a multiplier of 1.5, the trial court awarded fees corresponding to an
hourly rate of $525.  Additionally, as the Fifth District itself noted:
Sarkis made a strong showing to support the award of a multiplier. 
One of her attorney expert witnesses testified that the possibility of
obtaining a multiplier fee award in this case was "absolutely something
that any competent attorney would be taking into consideration and
expect."  In accepting this case, he said, an attorney would have to
consider the need to recover more than $35,000 because of the PIP,
medical payments and tortfeasor setoffs, and the attorney would have
to prove permanent injury for a plaintiff with a history of prior
accidents and pre-existing conditions--not a promising case from the
outset.  Further, because the case involved Allstate as the
insurer/defendant and it has a firm policy to not settle cases, this case
would likely go to trial, with the attorney having to finance costs. 
There was no way to mitigate the risk of nonpayment in any way.
Sarkis' attorney testified:
17.  Although, as Justice Wells points out, an award under section 768.79
applies only to fees incurred from the date the offer was served, this limitation does
not preclude the trial court from considering, in determining whether to apply a
multiplier to those fees, the circumstances that led counsel to agree to represent the
plaintiff.
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[I]t is very tough to find competent counsel unless that
counsel has an understanding that if we succeed at tilting
the windmill [Allstate] and doing that successfully that
there will be a reward at taking the risk on a contingency
fee.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sarkis, 809 So. 2d 6, 7-8 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).  In my view, the
fee awarded was consistent with the offer of judgment statute.17
Paragraphs (6)(a) and (b) of section 768.79 both state that in awarding
attorney's fees, the trial court should calculate the fee award in accordance with the
guidelines promulgated by the Supreme Court.  As the Fourth District explained in
Collins v. Wilkins, 664 So. 2d 14, 15 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), the guidelines that
should be considered in determining a reasonable fee are the factors contained in
Rule Regulating the Florida Bar 4-1.5.  These factors specifically include whether
or not the fee is fixed or contingent.  See R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.5(b)(8).  The
rule also specifies that all factors should be considered, "and may be applied, in
justification of a fee higher or lower than that which would result from application
of only the time and rate factors."  R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-1.5(c).  
In Bell v. U.S.B. Acquisition Co., 734 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 1999), we rejected an
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argument that the contingent nature of the representation should not be considered
in awarding reasonable attorney's fees under a contractual prevailing party
provision.  We specifically referred to the criteria in rule 4-1.5 in holding that a
contingency fee multiplier may be applied to court-awarded attorney's fees that are
authorized by a contractual provision rather than a statute.  Significantly, we stated:
Even if we were to dispense with utilizing a multiplier in a contract
case, one of the factors set forth in rule 4-1.5(b) . . . is whether the fee
is fixed or contingent.  Thus, even without a multiplier, the court
would be authorized to award a greater fee based on the contingent
nature of the fee agreement, or reduce a fee award where there was no
risk of nonpayment.  In fact, an upward adjustment of a fee under
these circumstances would be analogous to a court's application of a
multiplier.
Id. at 411.
Further, the Court has adopted a forced, rather than a strict, construction of
an unambiguous statute in rejecting the contingent nature of the representation as
one of the "relevant criteria" in determining the reasonableness of a fee award under
section 768.79(7)(b).  Strict construction in favor of a party receiving a sanction is
required only when the statutory language being construed is ambiguous.  When
there is no ambiguity, there is no need to resort to principles of statutory
construction.  See Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1984) ("[W]hen the
language of the statute is clear and unambiguous . . . there is no occasion for
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resorting to rules of statutory interpretation and construction . . . .").  In that
instance,"strict" construction is the same as simply applying a statute as it is
written.  
This commonsense observation is reflected in one of the cases cited by the
majority to show that statutes imposing fees as a sanction must be strictly
construed.  In Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc., 849 So. 2d 276 (Fla.
2003), this Court held that "under the plain language" of rule 1.442(c)(3), which
provides that a joint proposal for settlement "shall state the amount and terms
attributable to each party," "an offer from multiple plaintiffs must apportion the
offer among the plaintiffs."  Id. at 279 (emphasis supplied).  As in Willis Shaw
Express, there is no ambiguity in the language of section 768.79(7)(b) that requires
a construction different from simply applying the plain language of the statute.
The majority also cites to Gershuny v. Martin McFall Messenger Anesthesia
Professional Ass'n, 539 So. 2d 1131, 1132 (Fla. 1989), for the proposition that
statutory authorization for attorney's fees is to be strictly construed.  In Gershuny,
this Court relied in part on its decision in Finkelstein v. North Broward Hospital
District, 484 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 1986), which applied the principles of strict
construction and the implied exclusion of one thing by the mention of another to
hold that a nurse could not recover under a fee-shifting statute that authorized an
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award to the prevailing party in a malpractice action against any physician,
podiatrist, hospital, or health maintenance organization.  Unlike the list of specific
entities in the statute discussed in Finkelstein, the inclusion of "all other relevant
criteria" in section 768.79(7)(b) does not imply the exclusion of a contingency fee
multiplier.   
Although the term "all other relevant criteria" is intentionally open-ended and
nonspecific, it is not ambiguous in the sense of being susceptible to two opposing
constructions.  Cf. State v. Jefferson, 758 So. 2d 661, 663 (Fla. 2000) (finding
ambiguity in a provision that appeared to create both a jurisdictional and procedural
bar to raising unpreserved, nonfundamental errors in direct criminal appeals).  One
need not resort to implication in order to construe "all other relevant criteria" to
include the contingency fee multiplier.  As the Second District held in Pirelli
Armstrong Tire Corp. v. Jensen, 752 So. 2d 1275 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2000), review
dismissed, 777 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 2001), in agreeing with the Fourth District's
opinion in Collins:
Section 768.79(7)(b) directs the trial court to consider, in determining
the reasonableness of the fee, certain enumerated factors "along with
all other relevant criteria" (emphasis ours).  The statute also refers the
trial court to the guidelines promulgated by the supreme court.  See §
768.79(6)(a), (b).  These guidelines include the Rules Regulating the
Florida Bar, one of which, rule 4-1.5, fees for legal services, refers to
whether or not the fee is fixed or contingent.  See R. Regulating Fla. 
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Bar 4-1.5(b)(8).  Additionally, in setting a reasonable fee, rule 4-1.5(c)
provides that all factors in this rule should be considered, "and may be
applied, in justification of a fee higher or lower than that which would
result from application of only the time and rate factors."  Thus, it is
clear that the legislature authorized trial courts to consider and apply a
contingency risk multiplier when awarding an attorneys' fee under
section 768.79.  See also Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555
So.2d 828, 831 (Fla.1990).  Inasmuch as the procedure is clearly
outlined in the statute, we decline to construe it in a manner
inconsistent with its directive, despite the fact that it enhances the
award in such a generous manner.  The trial court properly applied the
statute as written.
Id. at 1276 (second emphasis supplied).  
In contrast, we have restricted the use of the contingent risk multiplier only
when the fee statute has specifically stated that only the enumerated factors shall be
considered.  See, e.g., Schick v. Dep't of Agric. & Consumer Servs., 599 So. 2d
641, 644 (Fla. 1992) (construing section 73.907, Florida Statutes (1987), which lists
the factors to be considered in awarding fees for eminent domain proceedings). 
Therefore, in my view, the majority's act of excluding a contingency risk multiplier
from consideration as a relevant criterion is an unwarranted exercise in statutory
construction.
Nor can I find a foundation for the Court's exclusion of a contingency risk
multiplier in the history of the offer of judgment statute.  Although the Court has
detailed the lengthy history of the offer of judgment statute, it is noteworthy that the
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term "all other relevant criteria" has been part of section 768.79 since its enactment
in 1986.  See ch. 86-160, § 58, Laws of Fla.  In 1985, this Court, in holding the fee-
shifting provisions of a different statute constitutional, first authorized a
contingency risk multiplier for fee awards to prevailing parties.  See Rowe, 472 So.
2d at 1151.  When the Legislature enacted the offer of judgment statute during its
next regular session after Rowe, it did not specifically exclude an attorney's
contingency risk from the consideration of "all relevant criteria" in determining a
reasonable attorney's fee award.  Instead, it granted trial courts broad discretion to
consider "all other relevant criteria" in addition to the six factors specifically
enumerated.  This language remained intact through a substantial revision of section
768.79 in 1990.  See ch. 90-119, § 48, Laws of Fla.  
Further, the Legislature has not abrogated Collins, the first appellate decision
applying the multiplier to section 768.79.  Cf. City of Hollywood v. Lombardi, 770
So. 2d 1196, 1202 (Fla. 2000) (stating that the Legislature is presumed to know and
to have adopted prior judicial constructions of a law when enacting a new version
of that law unless a contrary intention is expressed in the new version).   In Collins,
the Fourth District expressly concluded "that the legislature authorized a trial court
to consider the application of a contingency risk factor as one criterion which may
be applied in determining a reasonable fee under section 768.79."  664 So. 2d at 15.
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 As we stated in Bell in discussing the many public policy considerations
behind statutorily authorized attorney's fees:
It is true that one of the purposes of certain statutory attorney's fees
provisions is to obtain public enforcement of legislative acts through
private lawsuits.  See Quanstrom, 555 So.2d at 833.  However, as we
made clear in Quanstrom, public policy enforcement cases are treated
differently from other court-awarded fee cases.  In public policy
enforcement cases, the contingency fee agreement is only one of many
factors to consider in awarding a reasonable attorney's fee, and the fee
is not capped by the fee agreement between attorney and client.  See
id. at 833-34.
There are many other types of statutes that authorize attorney's
fees but are not considered public policy enforcement cases as
contemplated by Quanstrom.  While some attorney's fees statutes may
have a broader policy purpose, see, e.g., § 627.428, Fla. Stat.  (1997)
(attorney's fees against insurer), many involve only private disputes
between parties.  See, e.g., § 506.16, Fla. Stat.  (1997) (awarding
reasonable attorney's fees in actions to recover milk bottles); 713.29,
Fla. Stat. (1997) (attorney's fees for enforcement of a lien).
Nevertheless, consideration of a multiplier is authorized by Rowe and
Quanstrom in these cases.
. . . .
We perceive no policy concern that would prevent a court's
consideration of a contingency multiplier when the parties to a contract
agree to have the court award reasonable attorney's fees.  Instead, we
find that the primary policy that favors the consideration of the
multiplier is that it assists parties with legitimate causes of action or
defenses in obtaining competent legal representation even if they are
unable to pay an attorney on an hourly basis.  In this way, the
availability of the multiplier levels the playing field between parties with
unequal abilities to secure legal representation.  While a prevailing
party's attorney's fee provision in a contract may be a powerful sword
in the hands of those who can afford an attorney, a party who would
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be faced with substantial difficulties in obtaining an attorney without a
contingency arrangement ought to be able to claim a multiplier in the
appropriate case, if the evidence justifies it.
734 So. 2d at 410-11 (footnotes omitted). 
In sum, I conclude that allowing the trial court to consider the contingent
nature of the representation in calculating an award of a reasonable attorney's fees
award is consistent with the language of the offer of judgment statute and not
inconsistent with its underlying policy of promoting settlements.  Accordingly, I
dissent.  
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct
Conflict
Fifth District - Case No. 5D00-2217
(Brevard County)
Julie H. Littky-Rubin of Lytal, Reiter, Clark, Fountain & Williams, LLP, West Palm
Beach, Florida; and Robert M. Moletteire of Graham, Moletteire & Torpy, P.A.,
Melbourne, Florida,
for Petitioner
Charles W. Hall of Fowler White Boggs Banker P.A., St. Petersburg, Florida; and
Richard A. Sherman, Fort Lauderdale, Florida,
for Respondent
Philip M. Burlington of Caruso, Burlington, Bohn & Compiani, P.A., West Palm
-44-
Beach, Florida,
for The Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, Amicus Curiae
Roy C. Young of Young, Van Assenderp, Varnadoe & Anderson, P.A.,
Tallahassee, Florida,
for Florida Chamber of Commerce, Amicus Curiae
Wendy F. Lumish of Carlton Fields, P.A., Miami, Florida,
for Florida Defense Lawyers Association, Amicus Curiae