Case Title: State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Sage

Citation: 2015-Ohio-974

Docket Number: 2013-0945

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2015-03-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Sage, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-974.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-974 
THE STATE EX REL. THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, APPELLEE AND CROSS-
APPELLANT, v. SAGE, JUDGE, ET AL., APPELLANTS AND CROSS-APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Sage,  
Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-974.] 
Public records—Recording of emergency call to crime scene—Records the 
release of which are prohibited by state or federal law—Trial preparation 
record—Nondisclosure order in criminal case—Statutory damages—
Attorney fees—Mandamus—Prohibition. 
(No. 2013-0945—Submitted May 28, 2014—Decided March 19, 2015.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Butler County,  
No. CA2012-06-122, 2013-Ohio-2270. 
_____________________ 
FRENCH, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we determine the fate of a public-records request made 
by appellee/cross-appellant, the Cincinnati Enquirer.  The Enquirer sought the 
recording of an outgoing phone call placed by a Butler County 9-1-1 dispatcher.  
We find that the recording is a public record under R.C. 149.43.  We therefore 
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affirm the court of appeals’ decision holding that the Enquirer was entitled to a 
writ of mandamus releasing the recording.  We also affirm the court’s award of 
statutory damages to the Enquirer.  We find, however, that the court of appeals 
abused its discretion in not awarding attorney fees, and we reverse that holding. 
FACTS 
{¶ 2} On June 17, 2012, Debra Rednour, a 9-1-1 operator for the Butler 
County Sheriff’s Office, answered an incoming 9-1-1 call.  An unidentified 
female caller stated that there had been an accident, that her husband was not 
breathing, and that she needed an ambulance.  Rednour dispatched the St. Clair 
Township Fire Department and a sheriff’s deputy to the address.  Rednour also 
asked the caller several questions, but the caller abruptly hung up the phone 
without providing further information. 
{¶ 3} Rednour immediately attempted a callback to the original number.  
The first call resulted in no answer, so Rednour tried again.  This time, a man 
identifying himself as “Michael Ray” answered the phone.  Rednour told Ray that 
she was with the Butler County Sheriff’s Office and that help was on the way.  
Ray replied, “I’m a murderer, and you need to arrest me.”  Rednour asked him 
what had happened.  Ray stated, “I was caught drinking my dad’s alcohol” and 
“He came in and got mad at me, and I just snapped and stabbed him.”  Rednour 
then proceeded to ask Ray a series of questions, including “where did you stab 
him?”; “[w]here is the knife?”; “was this just a regular kitchen knife[?]”; “[i]s 
your dad breathing?”; “[w]here is your dad right now?”; “[c]an you see if he’s 
breathing?”; and “is the knife still in his chest?”   
{¶ 4} That same day, Sheila McLaughlin, a reporter from the Enquirer, 
submitted a public-records request to the Butler County Sheriff’s Office for 9-1-1 
calls.  The sheriff provided McLaughlin with a copy of the incoming 9-1-1 call 
that Rednour had received.  McLaughlin then submitted a second request for the 
two return calls that Rednour had placed.  Appellant/cross-appellee Butler County 
January Term, 2015 
3 
 
Prosecuting Attorney Michael Gmoser responded, denying McLaughlin’s request.  
Gmoser claimed that the return calls were both trial-preparation records under 
R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(g) and confidential law-enforcement investigatory records 
under R.C. 143.43(A)(1)(h) and thus were exempt from the public-records laws. 
{¶ 5} On June 21, 2012, the Enquirer reiterated its request for recordings 
of Rednour’s two outgoing calls.  Gmoser again asserted that the recordings were 
not public records but nevertheless released the recording of the first outbound 
call that had resulted in no answer.  Gmoser then filed a motion for a protective 
order with appellant/cross-appellee Judge Michael J. Sage, who had just been 
assigned to handle Ray’s then-pending murder trial.  In the motion, Gmoser asked 
the trial court to issue an order precluding dissemination of the second return call. 
{¶ 6} On June 25, 2012, Judge Sage conducted a hearing on the motion.  
He listened to the recording in camera and heard arguments from Gmoser, Ray’s 
counsel, and counsel for the Enquirer and another news organization.  Judge Sage 
granted the motion and issued a protective order prohibiting public dissemination 
of the call. 
{¶ 7} Within days of the ruling, the Enquirer filed a complaint in the 
Twelfth District Court of Appeals.  The Enquirer sought a writ of mandamus 
ordering Gmoser to release the recording.  It also sought a writ of prohibition 
precluding Judge Sage from enforcing the protective order.  The Enquirer also 
asked for attorney fees and statutory damages. 
{¶ 8} On October 11, 2012, four days before Ray’s criminal trial was to 
begin, Judge Sage amended the protective order, permitting the dissemination of 
the recording to the media immediately before its admission into evidence.  
Gmoser released the recording on the day of trial. 
{¶ 9} Following release of the recording, Judge Sage and Gmoser filed a 
motion to dismiss the Enquirer’s mandamus complaint as moot.  The Twelfth 
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District overruled the motion.1  After briefing and oral argument, the court 
granted the writ of mandamus, denied the writ of prohibition, denied attorney 
fees, and awarded statutory damages.  Judge Sage and Gmoser appealed, and the 
Enquirer cross-appealed. 
ANALYSIS 
Writ of Mandamus 
{¶ 10} “Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel compliance with 
R.C. 149.43, Ohio’s Public Records Act.”  State ex rel. Physicians Commt. for 
Responsible Medicine v. Ohio State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 108 Ohio St.3d 288, 
2006-Ohio-903, 843 N.E.2d 174, ¶ 6; see also R.C. 149.43(C)(1).  Thus, 
mandamus is the appropriate cause of action for the Enquirer to bring here.  To be 
entitled to a writ of mandamus, the Enquirer must establish a clear legal right to 
the requested relief and a clear legal duty on the part of Gmoser to provide the 
relief.  State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 
N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6.  The Enquirer must prove that it is entitled to the writ by clear 
and convincing evidence.  Id. at ¶ 13. 
The 9-1-1 Return Call Is a Public Record 
{¶ 11} A “public record” is any record “kept by any public office, 
including, but not limited to, state, county, city, village, township, and school 
district units.”  R.C. 149.43(A)(1).  The return call clearly meets the threshold 
definition of “public record” under R.C. 149.43; it is a record kept by Butler 
                                          
 
1 Neither party discusses the mootness issue here, but we note our agreement with the court of 
appeals.  In general, the provision of requested records to a relator in a public-records case renders 
the mandamus claim moot.  State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer, Div. of Gannett Satellite Info. 
Network, Inc. v. Dupuis, 98 Ohio St.3d 126, 2002-Ohio-7041, 781 N.E.2d 163, ¶ 8.  A claim is not 
moot, however, “if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.”  State ex rel. Dispatch Printing 
Co. v. Geer, 114 Ohio St.3d 511, 2007-Ohio-4643, 873 N.E.2d 314, ¶ 10. This exception “applies 
only in exceptional circumstances in which the following two factors are both present: (1) the 
challenged action is too short in its duration to be fully litigated before its cessation or expiration, 
and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the 
same action again.”  State ex rel. Calvin v. Upper Arlington, 89 Ohio St.3d 229, 231, 729 N.E.2d 
1182 (2000).  Because both factors are present here, this case is not moot.   
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County, which qualifies as a public office under the Public Records Act.  R.C. 
149.011(A) and (G).  Therefore, for Gmoser to withhold the recording from the 
Enquirer, the recording must fit within a statutory exception. 
{¶ 12} Gmoser asserts that the return call falls under three exceptions.  He 
argues that it constitutes a “[t]rial preparation record” under R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(g), 
a 
“confidential 
law 
enforcement 
investigatory 
record” 
under 
R.C. 
149.43(A)(1)(h), and a “[r]ecord[] the release of which is prohibited by state or 
federal law” under R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v).  We find no merit to these claims. 
The Recording Is Not an Exempt Trial-Preparation Record 
{¶ 13} First, the recording of the phone call is not a trial-preparation 
record.  R.C. 149.43(A)(4) defines “trial preparation record” as “any record that 
contains information that is specifically compiled in reasonable anticipation of, or 
in defense of, a civil or criminal action or proceeding, including the independent 
thought processes and personal trial preparation of an attorney.”  The recorded 
call does not meet this definition because it was not “specifically compiled in 
reasonable anticipation of * * * [a] criminal action or proceeding.”  R.C. 
149.43(A)(4).  Rednour testified that when she placed the return call, she had no 
reason to believe that a crime had taken place.  Indeed, the caller had described 
the incident as an accident.  Rednour further testified that the entire purpose of the 
callback and her questions to Ray was to assist the first responders and the victim, 
not to investigate a potential crime. 
{¶ 14} Even if we ignored Rednour’s explicit testimony and generously 
agreed with appellants that Rednour’s call may have had dual purposes, the call 
would still fall outside the definition of a “trial preparation record.”  As we have 
held, “when an investigation has multiple purposes, the records of that 
investigation cannot be said to be trial preparation records.”  Franklin Cty. 
Sheriff’s Dept. v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 63 Ohio St.3d 498, 502, 589 N.E.2d 
24 (1992).  Even general fact-finding investigations do not produce trial-
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preparation records, as “such investigations do not meet the ‘specifically 
compiled’ requirement of the statute.”  State ex rel. Coleman v. Cincinnati, 57 
Ohio St.3d 83, 84, 566 N.E.2d 151 (1991), quoting R.C. 149.43(A)(4). 
{¶ 15} Appellants also argue that the recording must be a trial-preparation 
record because it eventually became a part of the prosecution’s file.  This court 
has explicitly rejected that argument before, holding that “[n]ot every record 
contained within a prosecutor’s file is an exempt ‘trial preparation record.’ ”  
State ex rel. Carpenter v. Tubbs Jones, 72 Ohio St.3d 579, 580, 651 N.E.2d 993 
(1995); see also State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hamilton Cty., 75 Ohio St.3d 
374, 378, 662 N.E.2d 334 (1996) (“the fact that the tapes in question subsequently 
came into the possession and/or control of a prosecutor, [or] other law 
enforcement officials * * * has no significance [to their public-records status]”). 
{¶ 16} Here, the recording is not a trial-preparation record, because 
Rednour did not place the return call or question Ray for the specific purpose of 
preparing for a criminal proceeding.  And the recording could not suddenly 
transform into a trial-preparation record simply because it moved from Rednour’s 
office to the prosecutor’s file.  See Carpenter at 580 (“non-exempt records do not 
become ‘trial preparation records’ simply because they are contained within a 
prosecutor’s file”).  Simply put, the record here fails to show that Rednour was 
even thinking about criminal investigation, let alone that she was specifically 
compiling information for trial.  Accordingly, the recording does not fall under 
the exemption for trial-preparation records contained in R.C. 149.43(A)(4). 
The Recording Is Not an Exempt Confidential  
Law-Enforcement Investigatory Record 
{¶ 17} We similarly reject appellants’ argument that the return call 
qualifies as an exempt “[c]onfidential law enforcement investigatory record.”  
R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(h).  A “confidential law enforcement investigatory record” is  
 
January Term, 2015 
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any record that pertains to a law enforcement matter of a criminal, 
quasi-criminal, civil, or administrative nature, but only to the 
extent that the release of the record would create a high probability 
of disclosure of any of the following: 
(a) The identity of a suspect who has not been charged with 
the offense to which the record pertains, or of an information 
source or witness to whom confidentiality has been reasonably 
promised; 
(b) Information provided by an information source or 
witness to whom confidentiality has been reasonably promised, 
which information would reasonably tend to disclose the source’s 
or witness’s identity; 
(c) Specific confidential investigatory techniques or 
procedures or specific investigatory work product; 
(d) Information that would endanger the life or physical 
safety of law enforcement personnel, a crime victim, a witness, or 
a confidential information source. 
 
R.C. 149.43(A)(2).  Appellants claim that disclosure of the recording would mean 
disclosure of “specific investigatory work product” under subsection (A)(2)(c) of 
the statute.  Beyond this bare assertion, though, appellants make no attempt to 
explain how the recording at issue actually constitutes law-enforcement 
investigatory work product.  And we can find no justification ourselves. 
{¶ 18} Under R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c), “work product” means notes, working 
papers, memoranda, or similar materials prepared by law-enforcement officials in 
anticipation of litigation.  State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson, 70 Ohio St.3d 420, 
434, 639 N.E.2d 83 (1994), citing Black’s Law Dictionary 1606 (6th 
Ed.Rev.1990).  Rednour’s phone call plainly does not meet this definition.  First, 
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Rednour is not a law-enforcement official.  Second, Rednour was not questioning 
Ray in anticipation of future litigation.  Her sole purpose was to protect the first 
responders and the victim.  She testified that she did not place the return call at 
the request of the prosecutor’s office or the sheriff’s office; she placed it as part of 
her routine duties.  She has never had any training in, and has never been involved 
in, criminal investigations.  She further confirmed that she did not “initiate any 
type of criminal investigation” during the callback.  Accordingly, we find no 
merit to appellants’ assertion that the recording constitutes an exempt confidential 
law-enforcement investigatory record under R.C. 149.43(A)(2)(c). 
The Recording Is Not Exempt as a Record Whose Release  
Is Prohibited by State or Federal Law 
The Constitution Does Not Prohibit Release of the Record 
{¶ 19} Finally, appellants argue that the recording is exempt under R.C. 
149.43(A)(1)(v) because it is a “[r]ecord[] the release of which is prohibited by 
state or federal law.”  First, appellants claim that the U.S. Constitution prohibits 
release of the recording.  They argue that public dissemination of the tape would 
create extensive, negative pretrial publicity that would prejudice Ray’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a fair trial. 
{¶ 20} Appellants’ concerns are certainly valid.  We have previously 
recognized that where the release of a record “would prejudice the defendant’s 
rights under the state and federal Constitutions, the information at issue would 
constitute ‘records the release of which is prohibited by state or federal law.’ ”  
State ex rel. Vindicator Printing Co. v. Watkins, 66 Ohio St.3d 129, 138, 609 
N.E.2d 551 (1993).  Specifically, where “release of the records would prejudice 
the right of a criminal defendant to a fair trial, such information would be exempt 
from disclosure pursuant to R.C. 149.43(A)(1) during the pendency of the 
defendant’s criminal proceeding.”  Id. 
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{¶ 21} Yet in evaluating the constitutionality of the record’s release, the 
parties do not focus solely on the Sixth Amendment.  The Enquirer counters that 
we must also consider the First Amendment.  Because of the “right of access” that 
applies to criminal proceedings, the Enquirer believes it has a countervailing 
constitutional claim to the recording.  See State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing 
Co. v. Bond, 98 Ohio St.3d 146, 2002-Ohio-7117, 781 N.E.2d 180, ¶ 15-16.  The 
parties therefore contend that in order to determine whether the Constitution 
prohibits release of the phone call, we must use the balancing test set forth in 
Press-Ent. Co. v. Superior Court of California for Riverside Cty., 478 U.S. 1, 14, 
106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986), and adopted by this court in Bond.  Under 
Press-Enterprise, a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights will trump the media’s 
First Amendment rights, allowing a court to seal certain materials or proceedings, 
only if “there is a substantial probability that the defendant’s right to a fair trial 
will be prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent and, second, reasonable 
alternatives to closure cannot adequately protect the defendant’s fair trial rights.”  
Id. at 14.  Both appellants and appellee proceed as if Press-Enterprise governs our 
inquiry.  We are not convinced. 
{¶ 22} The First Amendment guarantees the press a “right of access to 
criminal proceedings that have ‘ “historically been open to the press and general 
public” and in which “public access plays a significant positive role in the 
functioning of the particular process in question.” ’ ”  Bond at ¶ 15, quoting In re 
T.R., 52 Ohio St.3d 6, 12, 556 N.E.2d 439 (1990), quoting Press-Ent. at 8.  Here, 
the Enquirer was not seeking access to a historically public proceeding.  It was 
asking to examine a physical piece of evidence in the prosecution’s file, even 
before that evidence became part of any criminal proceedings.  The First 
Amendment does not give the Enquirer the right to open the prosecution’s 
evidence locker.  See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9, 98 S.Ct. 2588, 
57 L.Ed.2d 553 (1978) (“This Court has never intimated a First Amendment 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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guarantee of a right of access to all sources of information within government 
control”); Crowe v. San Diego Cty., 210 F.Supp.2d 1189, 1195 (S.D.Cal.2002), 
quoting Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1213-1214 (9th 
Cir.1989) (there is “no ‘historical tradition of public access’ to criminal 
investigations”).  Indeed, even evidence exchanged during pretrial discovery falls 
outside the First Amendment right of access.  Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 
U.S. 20, 33, 104 S.Ct. 2199, 81 L.Ed.2d 17 (1984); see also United States v. 
Smith, 985 F.Supp.2d 506 (S.D.N.Y.2013) (“there is no right of access to 
discovery materials”); United States v. Kravetz, 706 F.3d 47, 54 (1st Cir.2013) 
(“there is no tradition of access to criminal discovery”). 
{¶ 23} So, at the time the Enquirer made its public-records request, it had 
no First Amendment claim to the recording, and the Press-Enterprise balancing 
test is inapplicable.  Instead, the only question we must ask is whether pretrial 
disclosure of the recording would have prejudiced Ray’s Sixth Amendment rights. 
{¶ 24} In determining whether pretrial release of information to the media 
will violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights, judges must (1) “assess the 
probable publicity that would [arise] prior to the time a jury was selected,” 
(2) “examine the probable nature of the publicity,” and (3) “determine how it 
would affect prospective jurors.”  Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 
562, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976).  We are unable to make these 
assessments in this case.  As the court of appeals correctly noted, there is nothing 
in the record regarding whether publicity might result, the probable extent of that 
publicity, the nature of that publicity, or how that publicity would affect the jury 
pool.  2013-Ohio-2270, ¶ 28-30. 
{¶ 25} All we have before us is the recording itself.  And while we can 
certainly agree that the recording contains prejudicial information, that fact alone 
is insufficient for us to predict a Sixth Amendment violation.  We still need to 
know whether this prejudicial information would create extensive publicity and 
January Term, 2015 
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whether this publicity would be so pervasive and negative that it would prevent 
Ray from finding 12 impartial jurors.  See id.  We cannot assume or speculate our 
way to these necessary findings; there must be some evidence in the record that 
speaks to the possible publicity and its effect on the jury pool.  See State ex rel. 
Toledo Blade Co. v. Henry Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 125 Ohio St.3d 149, 
2010-Ohio-1533, 926 N.E.2d 634, ¶ 36, quoting State ex rel. Chillicothe Gazette, 
Inc. v. Ross Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 2 Ohio St.3d 24, 25, 442 N.E.2d 747 
(1982), quoting State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St.2d 
457, 468-469, 351 N.E.2d 127 (1976) (“In the absence of any properly introduced 
evidence, ‘ “there is no reason for a trial court to * * * [conclude] that there will 
be prejudicial publicity * * * and to presume that such publicity will create a * * * 
threat to the administration of justice * * *” ’ ”); see also Nebraska Press at 565 
(“pretrial publicity, even if pervasive and concentrated, cannot be regarded as 
leading automatically and in every kind of criminal case to an unfair trial”).  
Unfortunately, appellants have failed to provide us with any such evidence. 
{¶ 26} We are therefore unable to conclude that pretrial release of the 
recording would have prejudiced Ray’s Sixth Amendment rights. 
Crim.R. 16(C) Does Not Prohibit Release of the Record 
{¶ 27} Second, appellants argue that the recording is exempt under R.C. 
149.43(A)(1)(v) because its release would violate Crim.R. 16(C).  Crim.R. 16(C) 
provides: 
 
The prosecuting attorney may designate any material 
subject to disclosure under this rule as “counsel only” by stamping 
a prominent notice on each page or thing so designated.  * * * 
Except as otherwise provided, “counsel only” material may not be 
shown to the defendant or any other person, but may be disclosed 
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only to defense counsel, * * * and may not otherwise be 
reproduced, copied or disseminated in any way. 
 
Appellants claim that Crim.R. 16(C) is a state law that prohibits the dissemination 
of Rednour’s recording, thereby exempting it from the Public Records Act.  See 
R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v). 
{¶ 28} We summarily reject this argument on two grounds.  First, 
appellants did not raise this claim in the court below, so they have waived it.  
More importantly, though, there is nothing in the record demonstrating that 
Gmoser ever designated the recording as “counsel only.”  Consequently, he 
cannot claim that such a designation would save the recording from public-
records disclosure. 
{¶ 29} Accordingly, we reject appellants’ claim that the recording is not a 
public record under R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v).  They have not shown that release of 
the recording would violate either the Constitution or state law. 
{¶ 30} Having rejected all of appellants’ arguments, we conclude that the 
recorded phone call is a public record not subject to any exemption under R.C. 
149.43.  Given this conclusion, we need not address the question whether 
Rednour’s outgoing call is functionally equivalent to the types of incoming 9-1-1 
calls we have considered in prior cases.  See Hamilton Cty., 75 Ohio St.3d 374, 
662 N.E.2d 334.  Regardless of what we term the recording—a 9-1-1 call or 
something different—it is still a public record in its own right.  On these grounds, 
we affirm the court of appeals’ decision to grant the Enquirer a writ of mandamus 
ordering Gmoser to release the recording. 
Writ of Prohibition 
{¶ 31} The Enquirer also requested a writ of prohibition preventing Judge 
Sage from enforcing the protective order he entered in Ray’s criminal case.  The 
January Term, 2015 
13 
 
Enquirer argued that the protective order has “no force of law” because Judge 
Sage did not have legal authority to issue the order in the first place. 
{¶ 32} We need not address the merits of the Enquirer’s prohibition claim.  
The prohibition action asks us to find the protective order unenforceable.  But the 
writ of mandamus we affirmed above already renders the protective order 
unenforceable.  See Bond, 98 Ohio St.3d 146, 2002-Ohio-7117, 781 N.E.2d 180, 
at ¶ 49-50 (a writ of mandamus compelling the release of a public record is 
sufficient to invalidate a contrary protective order in an underlying criminal case).  
Resolution of the prohibition question is therefore unnecessary; we need not 
consider all the myriad ways of invalidating an already invalidated order.  See 
State ex rel. Asti v. Ohio Dept. of Youth Servs., 107 Ohio St.3d 262, 2005-Ohio-
6432, 838 N.E.2d 658, ¶ 34, quoting PDK Laboratories, Inc. v. United States 
Drug Enforcement Administration (D.C.Cir.2004), 362 F.3d 786, 799 (Roberts, J., 
concurring in part and in the judgment) (“ ‘if it is not necessary to decide more, it 
is necessary not to decide more’ ”). 
{¶ 33} The court of appeals nevertheless took the opposite approach that 
we do here:  it granted the writ of mandamus but then still proceeded to analyze 
the prohibition claim.  This analysis and resolution was unnecessary.  We 
therefore vacate the court of appeals’ decision insofar as it expressed an opinion 
on the writ of prohibition.  That portion of the court’s decision is without 
precedential value. 
Attorney Fees and Statutory Damages 
{¶ 34} Finally, we consider the Enquirer’s requests for attorney fees and 
statutory damages. 
Attorney Fees 
{¶ 35} The court of appeals denied the Enquirer’s request for attorney 
fees.  We review the court’s decision for an abuse of discretion.  State ex rel. Doe 
v. Smith, 123 Ohio St.3d 44, 2009-Ohio-4149, 914 N.E.2d 159, ¶ 15.  “An abuse 
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of discretion means an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable action.”  State 
ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Akron, 104 Ohio St.3d 399, 2004-Ohio-
6557, 819 N.E.2d 1087, ¶ 59. 
{¶ 36} Here, the court of appeals reasoned that attorney fees were 
unwarranted because Gmoser, though he lacked legal justification, still acted 
reasonably and “in good faith” when withholding the record.  2013-Ohio-2270, 
992 N.E.2d 1178, ¶ 54.  The court also concluded that there was little, if any, 
public benefit in releasing the record.  Id. at ¶ 56.  Our precedent explicitly 
approves use of all these considerations—reasonableness, good faith, and public 
benefit—in a court’s attorney-fee determination.  See, e.g., Doe, at ¶ 34-39. 
{¶ 37} The Enquirer nevertheless contends that a good-faith standard is 
inappropriate and that R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(c) supplies the exclusive standard for 
attorney-fee determinations.  On this point, the Enquirer is mistaken.  R.C. 
149.43(C)(2)(c) lists two factors that permit a court to either reduce or eliminate 
an award of attorney fees.  These factors, however, come into play only after a 
court has already made the determination to award fees in the first place.  See 
Doe, at ¶ 33.  As we explained in Doe:  
 
Appellant * * * asserts that insofar as an attorney-fee award 
under R.C. 149.43 is discretionary, courts can consider only the 
factors specified in R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(c)(i) and (ii) to reduce or 
deny an award. * * * [A]ppellant misreads the plain language of 
the statute. Under R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(b), courts in public-records 
cases “may award reasonable attorney’s fees subject to reduction 
as described in division (C)(2)(c).”  (Emphasis added.)  The factors 
specified in R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(c)(i) and (ii) are considered after a 
court makes an initial, tentative decision to award fees. 
 
January Term, 2015 
15 
 
 Id., quoting R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(c).  The Enquirer is therefore incorrect in its 
assertion that R.C. 149.43(C)(2)(c) provides the sole factors a court may consider 
when initially deciding whether to award attorney fees. 
{¶ 38} Nevertheless, while we approve of the court’s enumerated 
considerations, we find the court’s ultimate conclusions to be unreasonable in 
light of the record before us. 
{¶ 39} This saga began with a simple request for recordings of 9-1-1 calls.  
The prosecutor’s office denied the Enquirer’s initial request without giving any 
explanation or citing any legal authority.  It then denied the Enquirer’s follow-up 
request for outgoing calls from the 9-1-1 operator.  The denial letter cited two 
legal bases for withholding the records:  R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(g) (the exemption for 
trial-preparation records) and 149.43(A)(1)(h) (the exemption for confidential 
law-enforcement investigatory records).  Neither has merit, as we detailed above. 
{¶ 40} Rather than rest on its denial and wait for the Enquirer to 
commence a mandamus action, the office went on the offensive, seeking a 
protective order from the trial judge in Ray’s underlying criminal case.  This 
forced the Enquirer into a two-front war:  it now had to both prosecute its own 
mandamus case and defend against the protective order. 
{¶ 41} The protective order had no place in this public-records dispute.  
Mandamus actions resolve public-records matters; criminal trial motions do not.  
See Bond, 98 Ohio St.3d 146, 2002-Ohio-7117, 781 N.E.2d 180, at ¶ 49-50.  
Thus, the protective order only served to saddle the Enquirer with more litigation 
and more attorney fees.  These tactics do not demonstrate good faith by the 
prosecutor’s office, and the court of appeals was unreasonable in concluding 
otherwise.  The office forced the Enquirer to incur additional legal fees.  It should 
be responsible, in some measure, for the extra costs that it created. 
{¶ 42} We also disagree with the court of appeals’ conclusion that release 
of the record would not confer a significant public benefit.  The Enquirer 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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“publishes a newspaper and securing this record enables it to provide ‘complete 
and accurate news reports * * * to the public.’ ”  State ex rel. Beacon Journal 
Publishing Co. v. Maurer, 91 Ohio St.3d 54, 58, 741 N.E.2d 511 (2001), quoting 
State ex rel. Multimedia, Inc. v. Whalen, 51 Ohio St.3d 99, 100, 554 N.E.2d 1321 
(1990).  A free and informed press enables a free and informed public.  Here, as 
in Maurer and Whalen, “the public benefit is manifest.”  Whalen at 100. 
{¶ 43} In light of the record and our precedent, we conclude that the court 
of appeals abused its discretion in denying the Enquirer attorney fees.  The 
prosecutor’s office lacked legal authority for withholding the records, it drove up 
the Enquirer’s burdens and costs by dragging the Enquirer into Ray’s criminal 
case, and it stymied a significant public benefit in the process.  We therefore 
reverse the court of appeals on this issue and remand for a proper determination of 
attorney fees. 
Statutory Damages 
{¶ 44} The court of appeals awarded the Enquirer $1,000 in statutory 
damages, the maximum allowable amount.  R.C. 149.43(C)(1).  Appellants argue 
that the court should not have awarded any statutory damages at all.  Again, we 
review the court’s decision for an abuse of discretion.  See State ex rel. Patton v. 
Rhodes, 129 Ohio St.3d 182, 2011-Ohio-3093, 950 N.E.2d 965, ¶ 12. 
{¶ 45} R.C. 149.43(C)(1) controls damages awards in public-records 
cases.  It provides: 
 
[T]he requestor shall be entitled to recover the amount of statutory 
damages set forth in this division if a court determines that the 
public office or the person responsible for public records failed to 
comply with an obligation in accordance with division (B) of this 
section. 
 
January Term, 2015 
17 
 
R.C. 149.43(C)(1). 
{¶ 46} Here, the court of appeals correctly found that Gmoser withheld 
the recording “without a proper legal justification.”  2013-Ohio-2270, 992 N.E.2d 
1178, at ¶ 57.  Gmoser had a duty to release the public record, and he did not 
comply with this obligation.  Statutory damages were appropriate, and the court of 
appeals did not abuse its discretion in awarding them. 
CONCLUSION 
{¶ 47} The outgoing 9-1-1 call at issue is a public record.  The evidence 
establishes that the call is not exempt from release as either a trial-preparation 
record or a confidential law-enforcement investigatory record.  Appellants have 
also failed to show that release of the record would violate the Constitution or 
state law.  The Enquirer was therefore entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering 
release of the record.  We affirm the court of appeals’ decision in this regard. 
{¶ 48} We do not address the merits of the Enquirer’s request for a writ of 
prohibition or review the propriety of Judge Sage’s protective order.  The writ of 
mandamus already forces release of the record and invalidates the protective 
order, regardless of the order’s underlying legality.  We therefore vacate the 
portion of the court of appeals’ decision addressing the writ of prohibition. 
{¶ 49} And while we affirm the court of appeals’ decision to grant 
statutory damages, we reverse the court’s denial of attorney fees.  We remand this 
matter to the court of appeals so that it may hear evidence and make an 
appropriate award of attorney fees. 
Judgment affirmed in part  
and reversed in part. 
O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER, J., concur in judgment only. 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
_____________________ 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 50} “[O]ur printers raven on the agonies of their victims, as wolves do 
on the blood of the lamb.” Thomas Jefferson, Letter to James Monroe, May 5, 
1811, available at http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-03-02-
0479. 
{¶ 51} I have written previously on the topic of 9-1-1 calls as public 
records that “[t]he public’s right to scrutinize the workings of the government 
should be balanced against an individual citizen’s right to privacy.  A person 
should be able to summon the help of police officers or firefighters without 
having his plea broadcast on the evening news.” State ex rel. Dispatch Printing 
Co. v. Morrow Cty. Prosecutor’s Office, 105 Ohio St.3d 172, 2005-Ohio-685, 824 
N.E.2d 64, ¶ 20 (Pfeifer, J., concurring).  I have attempted to make the case that 
citizens should be free from having to publicize their greatest personal tragedies 
in order to gain the benefit of emergency services their government provides, but I 
have also recognized that addressing that concern is an issue for the General 
Assembly.  Id.; see also State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hamilton Cty., 75 
Ohio St.3d 374, 381, 662 N.E.2d 334 (1996) (Pfeifer, J., concurring). 
{¶ 52} But this case is different.  Here, two specific statutory provisions 
exempt the call in question in this case from the definition of “public record.”  
First, pursuant to R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(g), the recording of the call does not 
constitute a public record because it is a trial-preparation record.  Second, a 
recording of the call is not a public record pursuant to R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v), 
because the release of it is “prohibited by state or federal law.”  Specifically, the 
pretrial release of the recording would have violated the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a fair trial.  Because I would find that the recording of the 
call in question was not a public record, I dissent. 
 
 
January Term, 2015 
19 
 
I 
{¶ 53} The first words Michael Ray heard after he answered the callback 
call from the 9-1-1 operator, Debra Rednour, were “Okay, I have help on the way.  
This is the Butler County Sheriff’s Office.  I need to know what’s going on.”  Ray 
immediately responded, “I’m a murderer, and you need to arrest me.” 
{¶ 54} This was not simply a continuation of the earlier 9-1-1 call.  Ray 
was not a part of the original 9-1-1 call.  He did not voluntarily begin a 9-1-1 call.  
Instead, he answered a call to his home and was told the caller was from the 
Butler County sheriff’s office and that he needed to tell the caller what was going 
on. 
{¶ 55} Here is the way this court described the 9-1-1 calls in State ex rel. 
Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hamilton Cty., 75 Ohio St.3d at 377-378, 662 N.E.2d 334: 
 
Basic 911 systems, including the ones used by [the 
Hamilton County Communications Center (“HCCC”)] and [the 
Cincinnati Police Communications Center (“CPCC”)], are systems 
“in which a caller provides information on the nature of and 
location of an emergency, and the personnel receiving the call 
must determine the appropriate emergency service provider to 
respond at that location.” R.C. 4931.40(B).  For example, HCCC 
automatically records 911 calls, which do not include the personal 
opinions of its employees.  HCCC employees do not act under the 
direction of the county prosecutor or law enforcement officials 
when receiving and responding to 911 calls.  HCCC employees are 
not employees of any law enforcement agency and are not trained 
in criminal investigation. The HCCC 911 operators simply 
compile information and do not investigate. The 911 tapes are not 
made in order to preserve evidence for criminal prosecution. Nine-
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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one-one calls that are received by HCCC are always initiated by 
the callers. According to CPCC Senior Police Sergeant Schrand, a 
911 call involving criminal conduct is essentially a citizen’s initial 
report of the criminal incident, which could typically trigger a 
police investigation. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 56} The call in this case differs in several important regards from the 
description in Hamilton Cty. of what constitutes a 9-1-1 call.  Ray was not the 
caller, the 9-1-1 operator initiated the call in question to investigate a 9-1-1 call 
she had received from a different person, and the operator was an employee of the 
sheriff’s office,  
{¶ 57} Further, the call in question does not fit within 9-1-1-related 
definitions in the Revised Code.  R.C. 128.01(A) defines a “9-1-1 system” as “a 
system through which individuals can request emergency service using the 
telephone number 9-1-1.” In R.C. 128.01(B), a “Basic 9-1-1” system is defined as 
one “in which the caller provides information on the nature of and the location of 
an emergency, and the personnel receiving the call must determine the appropriate 
emergency service provider to respond at that location.”  Again, Ray was not the 
caller in this case.  He initiated no request for emergency service. 
{¶ 58} The call in question was not a 9-1-1 call as defined by the General 
Assembly or as described by this court in Hamilton Cty.  The court below held 
that this court’s determination in Hamilton Cty. that 9-1-1 calls do not qualify as 
trial-preparation records or confidential law-enforcement investigatory records 
under R.C. 149.43 meant that the call in this case could not meet either of those 
exceptions. 2013-Ohio-2270, 992 N.E.2d 1178, ¶ 22. 
{¶ 59} But since the call at issue was not a 9-1-1 call, the record of the 
call could fall under a statutory exception to the public-records law.  The majority 
January Term, 2015 
21 
 
seems to recognize this also, as it ignores the issue of whether the call in question 
was a 9-1-1 call and addresses whether the call constitutes a trial-preparation 
record under R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(g) or a confidential law-enforcement 
investigatory record under R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(h).  I would hold that the recording 
of the call constitutes a trial-preparation record. 
{¶ 60} A trial-preparation record is “any record that contains information 
that is specifically compiled in reasonable anticipation of, or in defense of, a civil 
or criminal proceeding, including the independent thought processes and personal 
trial preparation of an attorney.”  R.C. 149.43(A)(4).  The recording of the call in 
question assuredly contained information that was specifically compiled in 
reasonable anticipation of a criminal proceeding.  Once Michael Ray declared, 
“I’m a murderer, and you need to arrest me,” there could be no doubt in the 
operator’s mind that the recording would be the key piece of evidence in a 
criminal proceeding against Ray.  Rednour, a sheriff’s department employee, 
calmly got Ray to state his name, the basics of what had happened, including why 
he had stabbed his stepfather, where he had stabbed his stepfather, and finally, the 
location of the murder weapon.  These were statements describing past events that 
established Ray’s role as his stepfather’s killer.  Rednour sought out information 
from Ray not specifically related to the medical condition of the victim. 
{¶ 61} In Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 
L.Ed.2d 224 (2006), the United States Supreme Court considered whether 
information provided to a 9-1-1 operator from a domestic-violence victim (as in 
this case, the call was a callback from the operator following a hang-up on the 
original 9-1-1 call) was testimonial.  In making that determination, the court 
recognized that the inquiries of a police operator in the course of a 9-1-1 call can 
constitute an interrogation. Id. at 823.  Rednour, a sheriff’s office employee, 
conducted a skilled interrogation of Ray.  The record of this call identifies the 
killer, the killer’s motive, and the murder weapon, and all of that information 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
followed questioning by Rednour.  I would hold that the information gleaned 
from the call in question was specifically compiled in reasonable anticipation of a 
criminal proceeding.  Thus, I would hold that pursuant to R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(g) 
and (A)(4), the recording of the call is not a public record. 
II 
{¶ 62} R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(v) excludes from the definition of “public 
record” “[r]ecords the release of which is prohibited by state or federal law.”  The 
majority acknowledges that “where ‘release of the records would prejudice the 
right of a criminal defendant to a fair trial, such information would be exempt 
from disclosure pursuant to R.C. 149.43(A)(1) during the pendency of the 
defendant’s criminal proceeding.’ ” Majority opinion at ¶ 20, quoting State ex rel. 
Vindicator Printing Co. v. Watkins, 66 Ohio St.3d 129, 138, 609 N.E.2d 551 
(1993).  Significantly, the majority also acknowledges that the Enquirer had no 
countervailing First Amendment right to the 9-1-1 call that would require a 
balancing of the two rights by the trial court.  The majority writes:  
 
Here, the Enquirer was not seeking access to a historically public 
proceeding.  It was asking to examine a physical piece of evidence 
in the prosecution’s file, even before that evidence became part of 
any criminal proceedings.  The First Amendment does not give the 
Enquirer the right to open the prosecution’s evidence locker.  * * * 
So, at the time the Enquirer made its public-records 
request, it had no First Amendment claim to the recording, and the 
Press-Ent. [Co. v. Superior Court of California for Riverside Cty., 
478 U.S. 1, 14, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986)] balancing 
test is inapplicable.  Instead, the only question we must ask is 
whether pretrial disclosure of the recording would have prejudiced 
Ray’s Sixth Amendment rights. 
January Term, 2015 
23 
 
 
Majority opinion at ¶ 22. 
{¶ 63} But although the majority concludes that the First Amendment is 
not in play in this case, it relies on cases in which First Amendment concerns 
were at issue in concluding that there are insufficient facts in the record to find 
that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial would be jeopardized by 
the pretrial release of the 9-1-1 return call. 
{¶ 64} Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2801, 
49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976), concerned prior restraint of the press, as a trial court 
prohibited reporting on certain information revealed during court hearings 
regarding a multiple-murder case in a small Nebraska town.  The three-part test 
from Stuart relied on by the majority was part of a larger test balancing the rights 
of the accused with the freedom of the press.  The majority writes: 
 
 
In determining whether pretrial release of information to 
the media will violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights, 
judges must (1) “assess the probable publicity that would [arise] 
prior to the time a jury was selected,” (2) “examine the probable 
nature of the publicity,” and (3) “determine how it would affect 
prospective jurors.”  Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 
562, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976). 
 
Majority opinion at ¶ 24.  In applying those factors in Nebraska Press, the United 
States Supreme Court concluded that the trial judge had reasonably concluded 
that the defendant’s right to a fair trial would be jeopardized by pretrial publicity 
and recognized that making such a determination is inherently speculative: 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
 
 
Our review of the pretrial record persuades us that the trial 
judge was justified in concluding that there would be intense and 
pervasive pretrial publicity concerning this case.  He could also 
reasonably conclude, based on common man experience, that 
publicity might impair the defendant’s right to a fair trial.  He did 
not purport to say more, for he found only “a clear and present 
danger that pre-trial publicity could impinge upon the defendant’s 
right to a fair trial.” (Emphasis added.) His conclusion as to the 
impact of such publicity on prospective jurors was of necessity 
speculative, dealing as he was with factors unknown and 
unknowable. 
 
Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 562-563, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 
683. 
{¶ 65} In Nebraska Press, it was not a lack of evidence but rather First 
Amendment implications that led the court to conclude that the orders put into 
place by the trial judge were unlawful, that the high barriers to prior restraint of 
the press had not been overcome. 
 
The state trial judge in the case before us acted responsibly, 
out of a legitimate concern, in an effort to protect the defendant’s 
right to a fair trial.  What we must decide is not simply whether the 
Nebraska courts erred in seeing the possibility of real danger to the 
defendant’s rights, but whether in the circumstances of this case 
the means employed were foreclosed by another provision of the 
Constitution. 
 
Id. at 555-556. 
January Term, 2015 
25 
 
 
{¶ 66} Like Nebraska Press, the other cases cited by the majority on the 
Sixth Amendment issue all involve instances of prior restraint of the press and 
attendant First Amendment implications. 
{¶ 67} In State ex rel. Toledo Blade Co. v. Henry Cty. Court of Common 
Pleas, 125 Ohio St.3d 149, 2010-Ohio-1533, 926 N.E.2d 634, relator sought a 
writ of prohibition to prevent a common pleas court and its judge from enforcing 
a gag order prohibiting the media from reporting about the trial proceedings in 
one criminal case until a jury was impaneled in a separate criminal case.  In State 
ex rel. Chillicothe Gazette, Inc. v. Ross Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 2 Ohio 
St.3d 24, 26, 442 N.E.2d 747 (1982), this court considered the trial court’s order 
prohibiting the appellee from publishing information gathered in open court.  In 
State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Phillips, 46 Ohio St.2d 457, 351 N.E.2d 
127 (1976), this court granted a writ of prohibition to prevent the enforcement by 
a trial court of an order improperly excluding the public and members of the press 
from pretrial hearings on a motion to suppress evidence. 
{¶ 68} Here, there are no First Amendment implications, and, as the 
majority states, the Press-Ent. test is not relevant here.  The onerous requirement 
from Press-Ent. that there must be “substantial probability” of prejudice to the 
defendant is thus absent from this case.  The appellate court found fault with the 
evidence presented in the trial court: 
 
There was no testimony from psychologists, sociologists, 
communications experts, media experts, jury experts, experienced 
trial lawyers, former judges, or others as to how pretrial disclosure 
of the Outbound Call recording would impact Ray’s right to a fair 
trial. 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
26 
 
2013-Ohio-2270, 992 N.E.2d 1178, ¶ 28.  But the appellate court thought that it 
was applying a Press-Ent. balancing test.  Id. at ¶ 26.  It erred in applying that 
test. 
{¶ 69} Here, the trial court heard a recording of a defendant describing 
himself as a murderer, admitting that he stabbed his stepfather, and saying that he 
did so because he had snapped.  This court wrote in Watkins that “[w]here a[n] 
* * * in camera inspection reveals that release of the records would prejudice the 
right of a criminal defendant to a fair trial, such information would be exempt 
from disclosure pursuant to R.C. 149.43(A)(1) during the pendency of the 
defendant's criminal proceeding.” State ex rel. Vindicator Printing Co. v. Watkins, 
66 Ohio St.3d at 138, 609 N.E.2d 551 (1993).  The trial judge here did more than 
simply review the tape in camera; he held a hearing at which both sides were able 
to argue their positions. 
{¶ 70} The judgment the trial judge made in this case was another in the 
innumerable judgments a trial judge must make as part of his or her job.  This 
case required no expert testimony.  It required only a prosecutor trying to do the 
right thing and a trial judge who was willing, if necessary to preserve the Sixth 
Amendment rights of the defendant, to make a decision that would be unpopular 
with the local media.  I would find that the trial judge appropriately attempted to 
preserve the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial in this case, and I 
accordingly dissent. 
_____________________ 
Graydon, Head & Ritchey, L.L.P., and John C. Greiner, for appellee and 
cross-appellant. 
 
Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael A. 
Oster Jr. and Kimberly L. McManus, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for 
appellants and cross-appellees. 
January Term, 2015 
27 
 
 
Baker Hostetler, L.L.P., and David L. Marburger, urging reversal of the 
denial of the writ of prohibition for amicus curiae, Ohio Coalition for Open 
Government.  
_____________________