Case Title: Ingram v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 4/18

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2018-11-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Philip Paul Ingram, Jr., v. State of Maryland, 
No. 4, September Term 2018.  Opinion by 
Harrell, J. 
 
CRIMINAL LAW – THEFT – RESTITUITION 
Section 7-104(g)(1)(i)(2) of the Md. Code’s Criminal Law Article, which requires 
restitution in a theft case, provides a court authority to order such, independent of the 
presence or absence of a request for same from the State or victim.  This section creates a 
“theft exception” to the restitution provision found in the Md. Code’s Criminal Procedure 
Article, § 11-603(b)(1), requiring a request from the State or the victim generally.   
 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – THEFT – RESTITUTION 
The general restitution provisions found in the Criminal Procedure Article, § 11-603(b)(1), 
govern ordinarily court-ordered restitution.  This provision grants discretion to order 
restitution generally, provided the State or victim requests it.  An exception to this 
provision exists for defendants convicted of theft under Criminal Law Article § 7-104, 
which requires restitution in theft cases, regardless of whether the State or victim requests 
it.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Circuit Court for Baltimore County 
Case No. 03-K-16-001755 
Argued: September 12, 2018 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF MARYLAND 
 
No. 4 
 
SEPTEMBER TERM, 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PHILIP PAUL INGRAM JR. 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF MARYLAND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Barbera, C.J., 
 
Greene 
*Adkins 
McDonald 
 
Hotten 
 
Getty 
Harrell, Glenn T., Jr., 
(Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) 
 
  
JJ. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Opinion by Harrell, J. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Filed: November 19, 2018 
*Adkins, J., now retired, participated in the 
hearing and conference of this case while an 
active member of this Court; after being recalled 
Pursuant to the MD. Constitution, Article IV, 
Section 3A, she also participated in the decision 
and adoption of this opinion.  
  
 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal  
Materials Act   
(§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document " authentic.   
  
 
  
  
Suzanne C. Johnson, Acting Clerk  
2018-11-19 10:17-05:00
 
 
Ask, and it will be given to you. . . . 
Matthew 7:7 (King James). 
and 
MD. CODE, CRIM. PROC. § 11-603(b)(1). 
 
vs. 
 
Even if you don’t ask, “sometimes you get what you need.” 
THE ROLLING STONES, You Can’t Always Get What You Want, LET IT BLEED album 
(Decca Records 1969). 
and 
 MD. CODE, CRIM. LAW § 7-104(g)(1)(i)(2). 
 
 
We are called upon here to construe (based on purely secular legal principles) 
assertedly opposing statutory provisions of the Maryland Code regarding court-ordered 
restitution in theft cases.  Petitioner, Philip Ingram Jr. (“Ingram”), urges us to find that 
orders of restitution in all criminal cases, including a prosecution for theft under Criminal 
Law Article, § 7-104 (“§ 7-104”), are governed exclusively by the procedural requirements 
of Title 11 of the Criminal Procedure Article (“Title 11”).  Ingram seeks to overturn a 
restitution order, stemming from his theft conviction, requiring him to pay his victim the 
value of the goods he stole, i.e., $18,964.55.  Ingram points out specifically that Title 11 
contains a provision (§ 11-603(b)(1)) that obliges the victim or State to request restitution 
in order to trigger a presumed right to receive restitution, a prerequisite not satisfied in his 
case.  The State retorts that, in theft cases, § 7-104(g)(1)(i)(2) of the Criminal Law Article 
provides independent authority (indeed, a mandate) for a court to order restitution as part 
of a sentence for a theft conviction, regardless of a request for that relief.  For reasons to 
be explained, we hold that the restitution requirement in § 7-104(g)(1)(i)(2) authorizes a 
2 
 
court in a theft case to award restitution, regardless of whether the State or the victim 
requests that relief.  Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. 
 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Ingram was employed by BJ’s Wholesale Club (“BJ’s”) from 1 October 2015 until 
17 November 2015 in its Baltimore County store.  On multiple instances during his 
relatively brief tenure at BJ’s, Ingram was observed (on store surveillance video) stealing 
new automobile tires.  When confronted ultimately by BJ’s Loss Prevention Department, 
Ingram admitted to the theft.  His employment was terminated.  He was also arrested by 
local law enforcement.  In all, Ingram stole approximately 120 tires, having a total value 
of $18,964.55, as attested by a BJ’s representative, Derek Schreck (“Schreck”), its 
Regional Asset Protection Manager.   
Ingram was charged initially in the District Court of Maryland, sitting in Baltimore 
County, with two counts, theft and theft scheme of property having a value of at least 
$10,000, but less than $100,000.  He declined to provide information to either the police 
or BJ’s regarding the party or parties to whom he transferred the tires. 
In the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Ingram entered a guilty plea to an 
amended count of theft of property valued of at least $1,000, but less than $10,000.  The 
State agreed to nol pros the theft scheme count.  It agreed additionally to “submit on the 
Defendant’s record and victim impact” statement, in exchange for the guilty plea.   
 
3 
 
In an on-the-record exchange, defense counsel demonstrated Ingram’s 
understanding of the charge to which he was pleading guilty.  Counsel informed Ingram 
that the charge “carries a maximum penalty of up to 10 years” and that the judge was free 
to “impose up to 10 years of incarceration.”  Neither defense counsel, the State, nor the 
court advised Ingram at that time that his sentence could (or could not) contain also an 
order to pay restitution.  The court accepted Ingram’s plea and found him guilty.   
During sentencing, defense counsel noted that Ingram suffered from drug addiction.  
In view of this, his counsel requested the court to impose a partially-suspended sentence 
and allow Ingram to participate in a drug treatment program during his incarceration.  The 
State abstained from making a specific sentencing recommendation.  Rather, the State 
submitted Ingram’s criminal record, which included misdemeanor theft convictions from 
2012 and 2015.   
Schreck testified during sentencing as the victim’s representative.  He stated that 
BJ’s missed by $21,331 its budgeted profit plan, for that part of the store’s department that 
included tire sales, and attributed the shortfall to Ingram’s theft.  Schreck expressed 
sympathy for Ingram, stating that “I just hope that he learns a lesson and, you know, gets 
himself treatment.”  Schreck did not request restitution for the $18,964.55 described earlier 
as the value of the tires or the asserted “lost profit” number.   
The court sentenced Ingram to 10 years of incarceration, with all but 18 months 
suspended in favor of three years of probation.  The judge ordered also Ingram to pay to 
BJ’s $18,964.55 in restitution.  Defense counsel remonstrated that there had been no 
request for restitution.  The court explained:  
 
4 
 
I know this is a large company, but when things like this happen companies 
go out of business, then all of those other people who work there who need 
those jobs to pay for their mortgage, to pay for their rent, to pay for the food 
for their kids don’t have those jobs.  So it’s not a victimless crime because 
it’s a company.  I expect restitution in the amount of $18,964.55.  
 
Ingram moved for modification of his sentence, renewing his objection to the order 
of restitution on the ground that neither the State nor the victim requested restitution.  The 
court denied this motion.   
Ingram filed an application for leave to appeal from his guilty plea.  He argued that 
the circuit court erred in ordering restitution because neither the State nor the victim 
requested such relief.  He maintained additionally that the guilty plea was not entered 
knowingly and voluntarily because he relied assertedly on the prosecutors’ alleged oral 
representation during plea negotiations that restitution would not be sought.  The Court of 
Special Appeals granted Ingram’s application for leave to appeal.  
On appeal, Ingram argued that the circuit court was not permitted to order him to 
pay restitution without a request from the victim or the State, as provided under Title 11, § 
11-603(b)(1) of the Criminal Procedure Article of the Maryland Code.  The State countered 
that restitution was proper because restitution was not ordered under Title 11 of the 
Criminal Procedure Article, but rather under § 7-104(g)(1)(i)(2) of the Criminal Law 
Article, which mandates restitution in theft cases.  In affirming the order of restitution, the 
Court of Special Appeals concluded, in a per curiam opinion, that the sentencing judge was 
obliged to order restitution pursuant to § 7-104(g)(1)(i)(2) of the Maryland Criminal Law 
Article.   
 
5 
 
We granted Ingram’s petition for writ of certiorari.  Ingram advanced for our 
consideration a bifurcated inquiry,1 which we reconstruct as three catechisms for analysis: 
1. Does § 7-104(g)(1)(i)(2) of the Criminal Law Article provide authority, 
independent of § 11-603 of the Criminal Procedure Article, for a court to 
order restitution in a theft case? 
2.  Is a court’s authority to order restitution governed pre-eminently by the 
restitution provision in the Criminal Procedure Article? 
3. Where a defendant is convicted of theft, may a court order the defendant 
to pay restitution when neither the victim nor the State request it? 
 
With regard to the first two questions, we hold that Criminal Law Article § 7-
104(g)(1)(i)(2) provides independent authority for a court to order restitution in a theft case 
as a specific “theft exception” to the general restitution provision, § 11-603(b)(1), found in 
the Criminal Procedure Article.  A court’s authority to order restitution is governed 
ordinarily by the general restitution provisions in Title 11 of the Criminal Procedure 
Article, subject however to the theft exception noted above.  As to question three, because 
§ 7-104(g)(1)(i)(2)  provides independent authority for a court to order restitution in a theft 
case, a court may order a defendant convicted of theft to pay restitution as authorized by 
the penalty provision of that section, regardless of whether the State or the victim requested 
specifically that relief.   
 
                                                     
 
1 Ingram framed the questions as follows: 
1. Does § 7-104 of the Criminal Law Article provide independent authority for a 
court to order restitution in a theft case, or, alternatively, is a court’s authority to 
order restitution governed by the restitution provisions in Title 11 of the 
Criminal Procedure Article? 
2. Where a defendant is convicted of theft, may a court order the defendant to pay 
restitution when neither the victim nor the State has requested it? 
 
6 
 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
We review a trial court’s restitution order ordinarily for abuse of discretion.  Silver 
v. State, 420 Md. 415, 427, 23 A.3d 867, 874 (2011).  When determining the propriety of 
a restitution order requires the Court to engage in statutory interpretation, however, the 
review is conducted without deference to the trial court’s action.  Harrison-Solomon v. 
State, 442 Md. 254, 265, 112 A.3d 408, 415 (2015). 
 
III. RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
As noted earlier, Ingram plead guilty to theft of property having a value of at least 
$1,000, but less than $10,000, in violation of Criminal Law Article § 7-104.  That section 
reads, in relevant part: 
(a)  Unauthorized control over property. -- A person may not willfully or 
knowingly obtain or exert unauthorized control over property, if the person: 
(1)  intends to deprive the owner of the property; 
(2)  willfully or knowingly uses, conceals, or abandons the property in 
a manner that deprives the owner of the property; or 
(3)  uses, conceals, or abandons the property knowing the use, 
concealment, or abandonment probably will deprive the owner of the 
property. 
… 
 
(g)  Penalty. --  
(1)  A person convicted of theft of property or services with a value of: 
(i)  at least $ 1,[000] but less than $ [10,000]2 is guilty of a felony and: 
1.  is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 5 years or a fine not 
exceeding $ 10,000 or both; and 
                                                     
 
2  Section 2, ch. 515, Acts 2016, effective October 1, 2017, substituted “$1,500” for 
“$1,000” and “$25,000” for “$10,000.”  MD. CODE, CRIM. LAW § 7-104.  This substitution 
was not in effect when Ingram pleaded guilty, so we refer to the version of § 7-104 under 
which he was charged.  The remaining relevant portions of § 7-104 were unaffected by the 
2016 change.   
 
7 
 
2.  shall restore the property taken to the owner or pay the owner 
the value of the property or services. . . . 
 
MD. CODE, CRIM. LAW § 7-104 (emphasis added).    
 
Ingram argues that § 7-104(g)(1)(i)(2) cannot be read harmoniously with the general 
restitution provision in Title 11, § 11-603(b)(1).  Section 11-603 of that Title states, in 
relevant part:  
(a)  Conditions for judgment of restitution. -- A court may enter a judgment 
of restitution . . . in addition to any other penalty for the commission of a 
crime or delinquent act, if: 
(1)  as a direct result of the crime or delinquent act, property of the victim 
was stolen, damaged, destroyed, converted, or unlawfully obtained, or 
its value substantially decreased; 
(2)  as a direct result of the crime or delinquent act, the victim suffered: 
… 
(ii)  direct out-of-pocket loss 
 
(b)  Right of victims to restitution. --  A victim is presumed to have a right to 
restitution under subsection (a) of this section if: 
(1)  the victim or the State requests restitution; and 
(2)  the court is presented with competent evidence of any item listed in 
subsection (a) of this section. 
 
MD. CODE, CRIM. PROC. § 11-603 (emphasis added).  In addition, § 11-619 of the Crim. 
Proc. Article states:  
(a) Operation of subtitle in general. -- Subject to subsection (b) of this section, 
any order of restitution made by a court shall be governed by the provisions 
of this subtitle. 
(b) Subtitle not construed to limit authority of court. -- This subtitle may not be 
construed to limit the authority of a court to direct a defendant . . . to make 
restitution or to perform certain services, as specified by the court, for the 
victim as an alternative means of restitution. 
 
MD. CODE, CRIM. PROC. § 11-619 (2018).   
 
8 
 
III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
 
Our inquiry in the matter of this statutory interpretation begins with recalling that:  
The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the 
General Assembly’s intent. “[O]ur primary goal is always to discern the 
legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied 
by a particular provision, be it statutory, constitutional or part of the Rules.”  
The starting point of any statutory analysis is the plain language of the statute, 
viewed in the “context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs.”  We 
presume, moreover, that the General Assembly “intends its enactments to 
operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law, and, thus, we 
seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the extent possible 
consistent with the statute’s object and scope.”  We do that “by first looking 
to the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute, reading the statute 
as a whole to ensure that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered 
surplusage, superfluous, meaningless or nugatory.” 
 
It is also settled that when a statute’s language is “clear and unambiguous, 
we need not look beyond the statute’s provisions and our analysis ends.”  Yet, 
it is equally “well settled that the purpose of the plain meaning rule is to 
ascertain and carry out the real legislative intent.”  We have emphasized that 
“[w]hat we are engaged in is the divination of legislative purpose or goal. . . 
. the plain-meaning rule is not a complete, all-sufficient rule for ascertaining 
a legislative intention.  The meaning of the plainest language is controlled by 
the context in which it appears.”  To that end, “we may find useful the context 
of a statute, the overall statutory scheme, and archival legislative history of 
relevant enactments.”  
 
Kranz v. State, 459 Md. 456, 474-75, 187 A.3d 66, 76-77 (2018) (internal citations 
omitted).   
 
A.  Plain Meaning. 
 
The first encounter in the statutory interpretation gauntlet is the “plain meaning 
rule.”  If statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the examining court is not obliged 
to look ordinarily beyond the statutes in question.  Opert v. Criminal Injuries Comp. Bd., 
 
9 
 
403 Md. 587, 593, 943 A.2d 1229, 1232 (2008).  The meaning of the plainest language is 
controlled, however, by the context in which it appears.  Kaczorowski v. Baltimore, 309 
Md. 505, 514, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987). 
The language of § 11-603(b)(1), read in isolation, is not ambiguous, nor is the 
language of § 7-104(g)(1)(i)(2) when considered similarly.  Title 11 supplies a general 
statutory scheme which governs seemingly any order of restitution in criminal and juvenile 
cases.  Section 7-104 contains, however, a specific restitution provision mandating 
seemingly restitution for any theft crime.  When read in conjunction, there seems to be, at 
first blush, conflict between the two statutory schemes.  Title 11, according to § 11-619, 
applies to “any order of restitution made by a court,” but it “may not be construed to limit 
the authority of a court to direct a defendant . . . to make restitution.”  To determine whether 
there can be a harmonious reading of § 11-603(b)(1) and § 7-104(g)(1)(i)(2), we embark 
on this quest to divine the intent of the Legislature in maintaining those provisions “on the 
books.” 
 
B. Divining Legislative Intent. 
As noted earlier, our goal in statutory construction analysis is to discern and carry 
out the intent of the Legislature.  Blue v. Prince George’s Cty., 434 Md. 681, 689, 76 A.3d 
1129, 1133 (2013).  Legislation, for the most part, has an objective, goal, or purpose.  It 
seeks to remedy some evil, advance some interest, or attain some end.  Kaczorowski v. 
Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987).  Identifying the particular 
purpose, goal, or objective may be found in a variety of places: the language of the statute 
 
10 
 
or statutes in question; their bills’ titles, preambles, or amendments; their bills’ relationship 
to earlier and subsequent legislation; legislative history; and “other material that fairly 
bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose.”  Id. at 515, A.2d 632.   
 
Ingram argues that the Legislature “clearly and unmistakably evinced an intent that 
all orders of restitution be governed by CP Title 11.”  The Legislature’s intent, as diagnosed 
by Ingram, is clear because § 11-619(a) states: “[s]ubject to subsection (b) of this section, 
any order of restitution made by a court shall be governed by the provisions of this 
Subtitle.”  Section 11-619, in subsection (b), continues, however: “[t]his Subtitle may not 
be construed to limit the authority of a court to direct a defendant or a child found to have 
committed a delinquent act to make restitution or to perform certain services as specified 
by the court, for the victim as an alternative means of restitution.”   
Ingram directs next the spotlight on former Senator John Giannetti, one of the co-
sponsors of Senate Bill 428 in the 2003 Regular Session of the Legislature, when he stated 
then that provisions were being added to Title 11, Subtitle 6, to clarify generally that 
restitution falls under that title.  Senator Giannetti continued that his bill was intended to 
clarify that Subtitle 11 may not limit the authority of a court to direct a defendant or child 
to make restitution by performing certain services.3  Ingram concludes from this that, 
because the Legislature included alternative means of restitution in the bill, it could have 
recognized explicitly an exception for theft cases if it intended there to be such an 
exception.   
                                                     
 
3 To illustrate this point, Senator Giannetti used the example of requiring a vandal who 
cannot afford to pay monetary restitution to mow the lawn of the victim.   
 
11 
 
 
Ingram turns a jaundiced eye on the “legislative history” of § 7-104, which he 
regards as murky, at best.  The restitution provision in that section is traceable to 1809.  
Accordingly, there is scant evidence of what the Legislature intended when it enacted that 
law originally because no records regarding the enactment exist from that time.  The only 
reasonable inference, according to Ingram, is that the Legislature intended thereby merely 
to authorize restitution, in the discretion of a court, when a defendant commits theft, rather 
than to compel it.   
Ingram relies also on Chaney v. State, 397 Md. 460, 918 A.2d 506 (2007).  Chaney 
involved an altercation culminating in conviction of the defendant for second-degree 
assault, with restitution as a condition attached to the probation portion of his sentence.  Id. 
at 462-63, A.2d 507.  Neither the victim (in his victim-impact statement) nor the State 
requested the restitution ordered by the trial court.  We found, pursuant to the requirements 
in Title 11, that the restitution order lacked an evidentiary basis, the defendant was given 
no opportunity to contest or defend against the restitution order, and, thus, it was ordered 
erroneously.  Id. at 473, A.2d 513.  We vacated the order.  Id., A.2d 514.  
Chaney is distinguishable materially from the present case.  The main reason is that 
Chaney did not involve a theft conviction, where the defendant was required to restore the 
stolen goods or their value.  Rather, Chaney involved medical expenses, in an unproven 
amount.  We found no basis for the amount of the restitution order and noted that it was 
pulled “entirely out of thin air.”  Id.  In the present case, a specific substantive criminal law 
statute, to which Ingram plead guilty, § 7-104, requires restitution in theft cases.   To state 
the obvious, assault and theft are different crimes.  Chaney, after being convicted of assault 
 
12 
 
(not theft), was ordered to pay restitution, which we rejected for stated reasons that are not 
germane to the scope of our analysis in the present case.  
It is obvious that the Legislature intended Title 11 of the Crim. Proc. Article to apply 
as broadly as possible to restitution orders. It seems also that the Legislature did not intend 
§ 11-603(b)(1) to apply to restitution orders in sentencing for convictions of theft.  
Although § 11-619 of Title 11 states that Title 11 applies to all orders of restitution, it 
contains a subsection which states that Title 11 shall not be construed to limit the authority 
otherwise of a court to order restitution.   Although we acknowledge Ingram’s argument 
that some legislative history suggests that § 11-619(b) was included to provide alternative 
means of restitution in circumstances where a defendant cannot pay, the language of the 
statute does not support unequivocally that conclusion.  The plain language of § 11-619(b) 
states that it shall not limit the authority of the court “to direct a defendant or a child found 
to have committed a delinquent act to make restitution or to perform certain services as 
specified by the court, for the victim as an alternative means of restitution.”  It is unclear 
whether the end clause, “for the victim as an alternative means of restitution[,]” modifies 
the entire sentence, or merely the “or to perform certain services as specified by the court” 
portion of the sentence.  At best, this section of Title 11 strikes us as drawn inartfully.  We 
must turn in aid of our mission to other principles of statutory interpretation in our judicial 
tool box. 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
C.  Specific Versus General Statutory Language. 
 
One such principle is the degree of specificity of the statutory sections under 
consideration.  “When two statutes, one general and one specific, are found to conflict, the 
specific statute will be regarded as an exception to the general statute.”  State v. Roshchin, 
446 Md. 128, 142, 130 A.3d 453, 461 (2016).  Additionally, “[w]hen two statutes cover 
similar subject matter, even if neither makes reference to the other, [the Court] must 
construe the statutes to give as full effect to each other as possible.”  Oglesby v. State, 441 
Md. 673, 687, 109 A.3d 1147, 1155 (2015).    
 
This principle of statutory construction assists us in untangling the seeming 
confrontation between § 11-603(b)(1) and § 7-104(g)(1)(i)(2).  Title 11 is a general 
procedural statute governing restitution that grants a court discretion to order restitution for 
statutory and common law crimes in criminal and juvenile cases.  Section 7-104, however, 
is a substantive criminal law statute that directs restitution, but only with regard to theft 
crimes.  Although theft falls within the ambit of statutory crimes covered by Title 11, the 
matter of restitution in such cases is addressed more specifically in § 7-104.  Therefore, § 
7-104(g)(1)(i)(2) is “an exception to the general statute” and creates therefor a “theft 
exception” to the restitution general provision in § 11-603(b)(1) with regard to whether the 
State or the victim are obliged to ask for restitution as a threshold trigger for the exercise 
of the court’s power to order restitution. 
 
Because § 11-603(b)(1) and § 7-104(g)(1)(i)(2) both address restitution in a criminal 
law context, we must strive to construe harmoniously the statutes to give as full effect to 
each as possible.  Holding that all restitution orders are governed by Title 11, without 
 
14 
 
exception (as Ingram would have us do), would render a portion of § 7-104 nugatory, 
specifically § 7-104(g)(1)(i)(2), a part of the penalty section of the theft statute, which 
requires a person convicted of theft to be subject to imprisonment and/or a fine and requires 
the thief to restore the stolen property or pay the owner the value of the property.  To 
construe § 7-104(g)(1)(i)(2) as authorizing merely a court to exercise discretion to order 
restitution in a theft case, as Ingram argues, strains its language too greatly.  Additionally, 
the effect of § 11-619(b) of the Criminal Procedure Article would be circumscribed were 
we to hold that all restitution orders are governed by Title 11, § 7-104(g)(1)(i)(2) 
notwithstanding.  Section 11-619(b) of Title 11 states expressly that the provisions of Title 
11 do not limit otherwise the authority of a court to direct a defendant to make restitution.4   
Treating Crim. Law § 7-104(g)(1)(i)(2) as a theft exception to Crim. Proc. § 11-
603(b)(i) allows both statutes to give as full effect to each other as possible.  Title 11 
remains the general restitution statute and applies to orders of restitution, except as held in 
the present case or as may be held similarly in a future case regarding other explicit 
contradictory statutory provisions.  The exception carved-out by § 7-104(g)(1)(i)(2) applies 
only to a particular crime: theft.  Holding that § 7-104(g)(1)(i)(2) gives the court authority 
otherwise to order restitution in theft crimes allows both § 7-104 and Title 11 to give as 
full effect to each other as possible.  It preserves the obligatory restitution scheme for theft 
offenses while recognizing the otherwise general applicability of the other limitations and 
requirements to restitution found in Title 11.   
                                                     
 
4 See supra Part III B.   
 
15 
 
D. Relative Time of Enactment. 
 
Another principle of statutory construction marshalled by Ingram relates to the 
relative recency of adoption of competing statutes.  If two statutes present an irreconcilable 
conflict, “the statute whose relevant substantive provisions were enacted most recently may 
impliedly repeal any conflicting provision of the earlier statute.”  Atkinson v. Anne Arundel 
Cty., 428 Md. 723, 743, 53 A.3d 1184, 1196 (2012).    
 
Ingram points out that Title 11 was enacted more recently than Crim. Law § 7-104 
and therefore reflects more accurately and across-the-board the contemporary expression 
of legislative intent on the subject of restitution.  He argues that full effect cannot be given 
to § 7-104(g)(1)(i)(2) and § 11-603(b)(1), because they present an irreconcilable conflict.  
The statutes are irreconcilable, as this argument goes, because it cannot be the case that a 
court must order restitution in every theft case (regardless of whether the State or the victim 
seek it) where the Criminal Procedure Article, which makes restitution discretionary, 
requires a request from the victim or the State.  The Legislature, when enacting originally 
in 1977 the provisions of Title 11, is presumed to have acted with knowledge of the pre-
existing § 7-104.  Thus, the restitution provisions in Title 11 should repeal impliedly the 
restitution provision contained in § 7-104.     
 
The doctrine of recency does not advance Ingram’s cause.  Crim. Proc. §§ 11-
603(b)(1) and 11-619 on the one hand and Crim. Law § 7-104(g)(1)(i)(2) on the other do 
not present an irreconcilable conflict.  Title 11 is limited in application by § 11-619(b).  As 
discussed above, § 7-104(g)(1)(i)(2) exists as an exception to § 11-603(b)(1).  Because § 
 
16 
 
7-104(g)(1)(i)(2) is an exception to the restitution requirement in § 11-603(b)(1), the two 
statutes can operate harmoniously in their respective spheres.   
 
E. Constitutional Avoidance. 
Constitutional avoidance is a further principle of statutory interpretation which 
Ingram invokes and attempts to bend to his service.  Regarding this precept, we have stated: 
Whatever the intention of the Legislature with regard to CP § 3-122, it must 
comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and its 
counterpart provision in Maryland, Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration 
of Rights.  Under what the United States Supreme Court termed “the canon 
of constitutional avoidance,” we will construe a statute to avoid conflict with 
the Constitution whenever it is reasonably possible to do so, even to the 
extent of applying a judicial gloss to interpretation that skirts a constitutional 
confrontation.  We do not presume that the Legislature intended to enact 
unconstitutional legislation and, if it did so intend, we would limit a statute 
to only those situations in which it would pass constitutional muster.    
 
Harrison-Solomon v. State, 442 Md. 254, 287, 112 A.3d 408, 428 (2015) (internal citations 
omitted).   
 
As a matter of both constitutional due process and Maryland criminal procedure, 
restitution orders may be entered if: 
(1) the defendant is given reasonable notice that restitution is being sought 
and the amount that is being requested, (2) the defendant is given a fair 
opportunity to defend against the request, and (3) there is sufficient 
admissible evidence to support the request - evidence of the amount of a loss 
or expense incurred for which restitution is allowed and evidence that such 
loss or expense was a direct result of the defendant’s criminal behavior. 
 
Chaney v. State, 397 Md. 460, 470, 918 A.2d 506, 512 (2007).   
 
17 
 
 
Ingram argues that potential due process issues regarding restitution are more 
poignant when a guilty plea is involved.  Md. Rule 4-242(c) ensures that a defendant, when 
entering a guilty plea, is acting knowingly and voluntarily with an understanding of the 
consequences.5   He claims that the court-ordered restitution here raises serious due process 
issues because there was no notification that the punishment potential for his plea would 
include an order of restitution.  
 
Ingram claims additionally that construing § 7-104 to authorize restitution without 
the constraint of the procedural requirement in § 11-603(b)(1), discussed in Chaney, 
renders § 7-104(g)(1)(i)(2) amenable to constitutional challenge.  As this argument goes, 
requiring a request by the State or the victim for restitution serves as explicit notice to a 
defendant that restitution is in play.  With such reasonable notice, a defendant will have a 
fair opportunity to defend against such a request.  Without that reasonable notice, potential 
due process issues may arise, which render the statute vulnerable to constitutional attack.   
 
The State counters Ingram’s gloomy forecast by arguing that the three prerequisites 
for restitution outlined in Chaney are met as a consequence of a valid theft conviction, 
whether by plea or trial.  The first requirement, that the defendant be given reasonable 
notice that restitution is in play and in what claimed amount, is fulfilled by the fact that 
restitution is required by the very statute, § 7-104, underlying the conviction.6  Because an 
                                                     
 
5 Ingram argued in the circuit court and Court of Special Appeals that he did not enter his 
guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily.  This argument, however, was not advanced for our 
review so we will not consider it further.   
6 The State details also a brief history of the concept of restitution, spanning from the Code 
of Hammurabi to 1809 when the General Assembly enacted originally the precursor to § 
7-104.  Presumably, this narrative is intended to support the contention that restitution is 
 
18 
 
order of restitution is linked inextricably to the underlying theft charge (which requires 
proof of the value of the property stolen and restitution to be made), the State argues that 
the second Chaney requirement is satisfied.  The opportunity to defend against an order of 
restitution is coupled inherently with the defendant’s opportunity to defend against a theft 
charge or plead guilty to it.  A plea to a charge under § 7-104 implies the defendant is aware 
of the terms of that statute.  The third requirement outlined in Chaney, sufficient admissible 
evidence to support the amount of the request for restitution, is satisfied because proof of 
valuation regarding the underlying theft conviction stands-in for the burden otherwise of 
adducing sufficient admissible evidence for establishing the amount of restitution.   
Ingram did not seek review of his restitution order on constitutional grounds.  
Rather, Ingram spun-up potential constitutional challenges to reading § 7-104 as requiring 
restitution in theft crimes and how that interacts with the restitution provisions of Title 11.   
  It seems to us that the specter of any constitutional concerns that might hover in 
this case are stifled by the “ghostbuster” fact that Ingram plead guilty to § 7-104, 
demonstrating constructive notice that he would be subject to make restitution.  Defense 
counsel elicited, on the record of the plea, the specifics of the charge to which Ingram was 
pleading and the associated consequences.7  The trial court determined that Ingram 
                                                     
 
neither a new nor novel concept.  Thus, a defendant has reasonable notice that restitution 
accompanies a conviction of theft.  Although we enjoy a good history lesson, we do not 
agree that a defendant convicted of theft is on notice of restitution simply because that 
concept has existed since at least the 18th century B.C.   
7 In addition to ensuring Ingram’s understanding of the theft crime to which he was 
pleading guilty, defense counsel informed Ingram that he would not have the right to 
withdraw his plea after sentencing, that he had a right to a trial and associated rights, such 
as the State’s burdens, and that his plea could violate earlier probation if he was on 
 
19 
 
understood fully the charge to which he was pleading guilty and associated consequences.  
Because Ingram was not forthcoming as to whom he gave the purloined tires, the only form 
restitution could take was reimbursement of a sum equal to the value of the tires.  There 
was an opportunity for Ingram to contest the charge, including the value of the stolen tires 
attested to by BJ’s representative.  He chose to plead guilty.  The evidentiary burden of 
sufficient admissible evidence to support the request was satisfied by Ingram’s confession, 
subsequent guilty plea, and Schreck’s statement regarding the valuation of the tires.8   
 
F. Rule of Lenity. 
The rule of lenity is a principle of statutory construction that may aid a defendant in 
the event of an ambiguous penal statute.  “An ambiguous penal statute is subject to ‘the 
rule of lenity,’ which requires that such statutes be strictly construed against the State and 
in favor of the Defendant.  This means that it must be ‘strictly construed so that only 
punishment contemplated by the language of the statute is meted out.’”  Gardner v. State, 
344 Md. 642, 651, 689 A.2d 610, 614 (1997) (internal citations omitted).   
                                                     
 
probation between October and December of 2015.  Then, counsel asked a series of 
questions to make sure that the plea was voluntary and Ingram’s individual decision.  The 
trial judge found that Ingram freely, knowingly, and voluntarily agreed to enter a guilty 
plea.  The judge found additionally that Ingram entered his plea with a “full understanding 
of the nature of the charge, the possible consequences of the plea, and all of the rights that 
he is waiving.”  (emphasis added).   
8 Ingram, in his brief, alleges that the State expressed in the course of the plea negotiations 
between counsel that it would not seek restitution.  The record contains no corroboration 
or evidentiary support for this claim.  We cannot consider this allegation.  Regardless, the 
argument is irrelevant because a court has authority, under § 7-104(g)(1)(i)(2), to order 
restitution, notwithstanding the absence of a request from the State or a victim.   
 
20 
 
 
Ingram argues finally that, to the extent that § 7-104(g)(1)(i)(2) is ambiguous, when 
considered in light of § 11-603(b)(1), the rule of lenity should apply.  We iterated 
previously that the language of § 7-104(g)(1)(i)(2) is not ambiguous.  For the reasons 
stated, it can be read in conjunction with Title 11 harmoniously to give maximum possible 
effect to both.   
JUDGMENT 
OF 
THE 
COURT 
OF 
SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED.  COSTS 
TO BE PAID BY PETITIONER.