Case Title: KOSTBADE v BUCKINGHAM

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1979-01-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
N o . 14370 IN THE SUPREME COUEiT OF THE STATE OF M O N J ! A N A 1978 HOWARD KOSTBADE, Plaintiff and Appllant, -vs- laxrLxE BucKlxHAM, Defendant ard Wspndent. Appeal from: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, Honorable Jack Shanstrm, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: . - Longan and Holmstroan, Billings, Wntana For Respondent: Anderson, Symnes, Brown, Gerbase, Cebull and Jones, Billings, b ! k m t a n a SuSHnitted on briefs: N o v * 3, 1978 Decided: JAN 18 1 9 7 9 Filed: JAN 1 $ 1979 d-f Clerk M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court . This is an appeal from a judgment on a breach of con- t r a c t case involving t h e feeding of c a t t l e . T r i a l was held on February 16, 1978, before t h e Honorable Jack D. Shanstrom, s i t t i n g without a jury, i n t h e District Court of t h e Thir- t e e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t . The c o u r t f i l e d its f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of l a w on March 29, 1978, and a judg- ment f o r p l a i n t i f f i n t h e amount of $1,712.69 p l u s c o s t s w a s entered on A p r i l 25, 1978. P l a i n t i f f appeals t h e judgment inasmuch as he sought judgment i n t h e amount of $4,690.26. P l a i n t i f f - a p p e l l a n t owns a commercial f e e d l o t near Laurel, Montana, which is managed and operated by A 1 Herden, a copartner. During e a r l y November 1976, defendant-respondent contacted Herden with regard t o feeding a number of respon- d e n t ' s c a l v e s during t h e winter months of 1976-77. A s a r e s u l t of t h e conversation, respondent, who l i v e s i n t h e White Sulphur Springs, Montana, area, t r a v e l e d t o Laurel and discussed with Herden, a s agent f o r a p p e l l a n t , t h e various t e r m s and conditions of t h e feeding operation. A t t h a t t i m e Herden and respondent entered i n t o an o r a l c o n t r a c t f o r t h e feeding of respondent's c a t t l e . Pursuant t o t h e o r a l c o n t r a c t respondent d e l i v e r e d t o t h e Laurel f e e d l o t 109 head of steers on November 19, 1976; 12 head of s t e e r s and 77 head of h e i f e r s on November 23, 1976; and 46 head of h e i f e r s and 71 head of s t e e r s on December 31, 1976. On December 11, 1976, 88 head of steers w e r e s o l d from t h e f e e d l o t and t h e remaining c a t t l e w e r e removed on January 26, 1977. The 88 head of steers s o l d from t h e f e e d l o t w e r e t h e b e t t e r cattle, and many of them had been on t h e f e e d l o t only a period of approximately 20 days. In the l i f e of the contract respondent was b i l l e d f o r appellant's services i n feeding h i s c a t t l e on a semi-monthly basis. s ills f o r the periods ending November 30, December 15, and December 31, 1976, t o t a l i n g $5,048.57 were paid by respondent without protest. When respondent received these b i l l s he a l s o received a breakdown showing the t o t a l weight and c o s t of each feed ingredient which was fed t o h i s c a t t l e f o r t h a t period. After receiving a feed statement and b i l l f o r the period ending January 15, 1977, respondent called and then went t o Laurel on January 25 t o obtain a check weight on h i s c a t t l e , believing t h a t they could not possibly have consumed the amount of feed f o r which he had been charged f o r t h a t period. There was considerable discussion between Herden and respondent a t t h a t time. Respondent alleged t h a t the amount charged, by h i s figures over 90$ per cow, violated t h e i r agreement. Herden figured the c o s t a s approximately 45$ per head. According t o respondent's testimony, when h i s wife f i r s t called the feedlot and when he f i r s t talked t o Herden, they had been assured t h a t the c o s t would not be above 36g! per pound of gain. This alleged assurance on the p a r t of Herden was t h e reason f o r t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s which arose, and a t t h e end of t h i s discussion on the 25th, respondent decided t o remove h i s c a t t l e from appellant's feedlot. Respondent then made arrangements f o r trucks t o remove t h e c a t t l e from appellant's feedlot and take them t o another feedlot i n the same area. After the removal of approximately two loads of c a t t l e , Herden would not permit respondent t o remove any more c a t t l e u n t i l the t o t a l b i l l was paid. Respondent issued a check made o u t t o appellant i n t h e amount of $4,690.26. This check was tendered t o Herden and the remaining c a t t l e removed from the feedlot. Shortly t h e r e a f t e r respondent stopped payment on the check. H e l a t e r tendered t o appellant a check i n t h e amount of $2,180.16, t h e amount he alleged was o r would have been due appellant a t t h e r a t e of 366 per pound of gain. This check was not negotiated by appellant. I n h i s s u i t appellant sought the t o t a l amount of $4,690.26. The s o l e i s s u e before t h i s Court is whether the t r i a l c o u r t ' s findings of f a c t , conclusions of law, and judgment a r e substantiated by substantial evidence. Rule 5 2 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P., s t a t e s i n pertinent part: "Findings of f a c t s h a l l not be s e t aside unless c l e a r l y erroneous, and due regard s h a l l be given t o the opportunity of the t r i a l court t o judge of the c r e d i b i l i t y of the witnesses." This Court, i n describing i t s function i n reviewing the findings of f a c t and conclusions of law of a D i s t r i c t Court s i t t i n g without a jury, has many times s e t f o r t h the following: "This Court's function . . . i s not t o s u b s t i t u t e i t s judgment i n place of the t r i e r of f a c t s , but r a t h e r it is 'confined t o determining whether there i s substantial credible evidence t o support' the findings of f a c t and conclusions of law. (Citations omitted. ) Although c o n f l i c t s m a y e x i s t -- i n t h e evidence presented, it is t h e duty and function of t h e t r i a l judge t o resolve such - -- conflicts. H i s findings w i l l n o t b e disturbed on appeal where they a r e based on s u b s t a n t i a l though conflicting evidence. (Citations omitted.)" Olson v. Westfork Properties (1976), 171 Mont. 154, 557 P.2d 821, 823, 33 St.Rep. 1133, 1135. (Emphasis added. ) The Court then went on t o define s u b s t a n t i a l evidence: "Substantial evidence has been defined by t h i s Court a s such a s w i l l convince reasonable men and on which such men may not reasonably d i f f e r a s t o whether it establishes the p l a i n t i f f ' s case, and, i f a l l reasonable men must conclude t h a t the evi- dence does not e s t a b l i s h such case, then it is not substantial evidence. The evidence may be inherently weak and s t i l l be deemed ' s u b s t a n t i a l ' , and one witness may be s u f f i c i e n t t o e s t a b l i s h the preponderance of a case. (Citations omitted.)" Olson, 557 P.2d a t 823, 33 St.Rep. a t 1136. With the above guidelines i n mind, we note t h a t the t r i a l court was required t o decide whether o r not appellant met the burden of proving the t e r m s he claims t o have com- prised t h e contract. Respondent denied having agreed t o pay a p r i c e per pound of gain i n excess of 36$. The t r i a l court did not rewrite the contract between appellant and respon- dent; it simply found from the testimony t h a t appellant through h i s agent and respondent entered i n t o an o r a l contract and agreed t h a t t h e maximum p r i c e per pound of gain would not exceed 36$ per pound. The t r i a l court a l s o determined t h a t the amount charged by appellant did i n f a c t exceed the maximum p r i c e of 366 per pound of gain and awarded judgment t o appellant i n t h e amount equivalent t o the agreed upon p r i c e of 36$ per pound of gain a f t e r deducting monies previously paid by respondent. Appellant recognizes the function of t h i s Court i n reviewing the findings of f a c t and conclusions of law of the D i s t r i c t Court. Yet, a f t e r recognizing t h a t authority, he denies t h a t the findings and conclusions show a c l e a r preponderance of evidence. A t t h e very most, a l l t h a t can be s a i d i n the i n s t a n t case is t h a t the evidence was con- f l i c t i n g . I n attacking the c o u r t ' s conclusion t h a t the o r a l contract between the p a r t i e s contained a maximum c o s t per pound of gain of 362, appellant sets f o r t h the testimony of respondent given on cross-examination. However, on d i r e c t examination, respondent did t e s t i f y t h a t appellant's agent Herden told him t h a t the "maximum would be 366 per pound." I n addition respondent's wife t e s t i f i e d she was concerned about the c o s t of feeding c a t t l e i n a commercial f e e d l o t and t e s t i f i e d t h a t on several occasions Herden advised her the maximum c o s t would not exceed 362 per pound. The t r i a l court, i n its findings of f a c t , found the maximum t o be 366 per pound, the f i g u r e it found Herden used i n advising respondent. Appellant alleges t h a t the t r i a l court erred i n i t s award of $1,712.69 plus c o s t s i n view of the f a c t t h a t respondent had tendered a payment of $2,800 t o resolve the c o n f l i c t . However, t h i s tendered o f f e r of respondent, refused by appellant, was merely t o resolve the c o n f l i c t between the p a r t i e s . W e find no e r r o r i n the sum arrived a t by the t r i a l court i n f i x i n g the $1,712.69 figure. The weight of t h e evidence and the c r e d i b i l i t y of the witnesses, where t h a t evidence was conflicting, was a matter f o r the t r i a l c o u r t ' s determination. W e find no c l e a r preponderance of evidence against its findings. Judgment i s affirmed. \,J W e Concur: