Case Title: Commonwealth v. Grady

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-11968

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2016-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-11968 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  JUSTIN GRADY. 
 
 
 
Middlesex.     March 7, 2016. - July 12, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ. 
 
 
Controlled Substances.  Evidence, Expert opinion.  Witness, 
Expert.  Practice, Criminal, Objection, Motion in limine, 
Striking of testimony.  "School Zone" Statute.  Statute, 
Amendment, Retroactive application. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on May 6, 2010. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Elizabeth M. Fahey, J. 
 
 
After review by the Appeals Court, the Supreme Judicial 
Court granted leave to obtain further appellate review. 
 
 
 
Michele R. Moretti for the defendant. 
 
KerryAnne Kilcoyne, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth 
 
 
 
DUFFLY, J.  A jury in the Superior Court convicted the 
defendant of operation of a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of liquor (OUI), in violation of G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) 
2 
 
 
(a) (1); possession with intent to distribute a class B 
substance, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32A (c); and 
possession with intent to distribute a class B substance in a 
school zone, in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32J.  The Appeals 
Court affirmed the convictions in an unpublished memorandum and 
order pursuant to its rule 1:28, see Commonwealth v. Grady, 87 
Mass. App. Ct. 1119 (2015), and we allowed the defendant's 
application for further appellate review. 
 
Prior to the start of the trial, the Commonwealth and the 
defendant each filed a motion in limine regarding whether a 
substitute analyst, Kenneth Gagnon, would be allowed to testify 
(the analyst who tested the substance at issue having left the 
testing laboratory and moved out of State).  Concluding that 
Gagnon could testify, the trial judge allowed the Commonwealth's 
motion and denied the defendant's motion.  In response to the 
defendant's request that the judge "please note [his] 
objection," the judge responded "sure."  Subsequently, at trial, 
Gagnon twice testified to the weight of the substance,  which, 
the parties both now recognize, was improper.  A substitute 
analyst may testify to his or her own opinion, but not, on 
direct examination, to the original analyst's test results.  See 
Commonwealth v. Greineder, 464 Mass. 580, 586-587, cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 166 (2013).  See also Commonwealth v. Tassone, 468 
3 
 
 
Mass. 391, 399 (2014).  The defendant, however, did not object 
to or move to strike the testimony. 
 
The question with which we are primarily concerned is what 
standard of review applies to the defendant's claim, on appeal 
to this court, that the erroneously admitted testimony violated 
his confrontation rights pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and art. 12 of the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights.1  If, as the defendant argues, he 
preserved his appellate rights at the motion in limine stage, we 
would review the error to determine whether it was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt; if not, we must instead determine 
whether the error created a substantial risk of a miscarriage of 
justice.  For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that, in 
the circumstances presented here, the defendant did not properly 
preserve his rights, and that therefore we review the error to 
determine whether it created a substantial risk of a miscarriage 
of justice.  Having done so, we conclude that there was no such 
risk.  We also reconsider the distinction drawn in our case law 
between pretrial efforts to preclude evidence on constitutional 
grounds, through a motion in limine or motion to suppress, and 
                                                 
 
1 In the Appeals Court, the defendant did not focus on the 
correct standard of review.  The Appeals Court identified the 
issue, and concluded that the erroneous admission of the 
testimony regarding weight must be reviewed under the 
substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice standard.  One of 
the reasons that we granted further appellate review was to 
elaborate on this point. 
4 
 
 
pretrial efforts to preclude evidence on other grounds, and now 
do away with that distinction. 
 
1.  Background.2  In the early morning hours of February 18, 
2010, State police Trooper Paul Conneely stopped the defendant's 
motor vehicle on Alewife Brook Parkway in Cambridge after he saw 
the defendant turn left at a red light and then proceed over a 
bridge while straddling the roadway's dashed center lane.  
Trooper Conneely subsequently arrested the defendant for OUI and 
arranged to have the defendant's motor vehicle towed to the 
State police barracks in the Brighton section of Boston.  In the 
course of conducting an inventory search of the vehicle, Trooper 
Frank Parker found a plastic bag stowed in the molded 
compartment at the base of the driver's side door.  After he 
found the bag, Trooper Parker brought it to Trooper Conneely, 
who then had the bag submitted to the State police crime 
laboratory (lab) for testing.  The substance contained in the 
bag was analyzed by Gina DeFranco, an employee at the lab. 
  
Because DeFranco was no longer employed at the lab at the 
time of trial, the Commonwealth, through a motion in limine, 
sought to have Gagnon testify as a substitute analyst.  The 
defendant also filed a motion in limine to preclude Gagnon from 
                                                 
 
2 In his appeal to this court, the defendant does not 
challenge his conviction of operation of a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of liquor, and we therefore set forth in 
detail the facts and trial court proceedings relevant only to 
his drug convictions. 
5 
 
 
testifying.  At the hearing on the motions, the defendant 
argued, essentially, that allowing Gagnon to testify in place of 
the analyst who actually tested the substance would "circumvent" 
his confrontation rights because he would have no opportunity, 
and had no previous opportunity, to cross-examine the 
nontestifying analyst.  In response, the Commonwealth argued 
that Gagnon's testimony would not be a "regurgitation" of the 
nontestifying analyst's report; rather, he would testify to his 
own opinion, formed on the basis of his review of the underlying 
data (i.e., the nontestifying chemist's testing and analysis).  
On the basis that the type of testimony outlined by the 
Commonwealth is admissible, the judge allowed the Commonwealth's 
motion and denied the defendant's motion.  After the judge 
issued her ruling, the defendant asked that she note his 
objection, to which she responded "sure." 
 
Subsequently, at trial, Gagnon described his role in the  
case, testifying that he initially performed, at the lab, what 
he referred to as a "technical review."  Thereafter, he reviewed 
the nontestifying analyst's report -- he "made sure that it was 
in conformity with laboratory policies and made sure that, in 
[his] opinion at that time, . . . what was said in the report 
was in fact the results that were reported for the testing on 
the evidence."  After Gagnon provided additional testimony 
detailing what is involved in a technical review, including that 
6 
 
 
he spends a significant amount of his time reviewing drug cases, 
the Commonwealth asked him whether, based on his training and 
experience and his review of the underlying data in this case, 
he had been able to reach an opinion as to what the tested 
substance was.  Gagnon replied "yes."  When the Commonwealth 
then asked for his opinion, the defendant objected.  The judge 
overruled the objection and Gagnon stated that it was his 
opinion "the 4.40 grams of powder was found to contain cocaine" 
(emphasis added).  The defendant did not move to strike the 
testimony.  On redirect examination, the Commonwealth again 
asked Gagnon for his opinion, again over the defendant's 
objection, which the judge overruled, and Gagnon responded that 
in his opinion "the 4.40 grams of powder contain cocaine" 
(emphasis added). 
 
2.  Discussion.  a.  Standard of review.  In the past, we 
have generally required a defendant to object to the admission 
of evidence at trial even where he or she has sought a pretrial 
ruling to exclude the evidence either through a motion in limine 
or by opposing a motion in limine.  See Commonwealth v. Whelton, 
428 Mass. 24, 25 (1998), citing Commonwealth v. Keniston, 423 
Mass. 304, 308 (1996) ("a motion in limine, seeking a pretrial 
evidentiary ruling, is insufficient to preserve appellate rights 
unless there is an objection at trial").  In limited 
circumstances, however, we have forgiven a defendant's failure 
7 
 
 
to raise a contemporaneous objection at trial.  For example, 
when a defendant has sought, through a motion in limine, to 
preclude evidence on constitutional grounds, we have treated the 
motion as if it were a motion to suppress and have considered 
the objection at the pretrial stage sufficient to preserve the 
defendant's appellate rights.  See Whelton, supra at 26.  See 
also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Santana, 465 Mass. 270, 278-280 
(2013) (court reviewed erroneous admission of statements 
defendant made to police for harmless error where defendant 
argued in motion in limine that allowing statements would 
violate his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel but 
did not renew arguments, or object, at trial).3 
 
Going forward, we dispense with any distinction, at the 
motion in limine stage, between objections based on 
constitutional grounds and objections based on other grounds.  
We will no longer require a defendant to object to the admission 
of evidence at trial where he or she has already sought to 
preclude the very same evidence at the motion in limine stage.  
The reason that we did not, in the past, require a defendant to 
object at trial to something that he or she had previously 
                                                 
 
3 In addition, we have allowed a defendant's 
nonconstitutional objection at the motion in limine stage to 
excuse his failure to raise the same objection at trial when the 
pretrial objection was coupled with a judge's indication that 
the judge was "preserving" or "saving" the defendant's rights.  
See Commonwealth v. Aviles, 461 Mass. 60, 66 (2011), and cases 
cited.  We address this issue infra. 
8 
 
 
sought to preclude on constitutional grounds through a motion in 
limine or a motion to suppress is that, in such a case, the 
judge had already been made aware of, and had the opportunity to 
consider, the objection.  For example, in the Santana case, 
where the defendant had filed a motion in limine to suppress 
statements that he made to the police, the motion had been 
denied, and the defendant had not objected when those statements 
were introduced at trial, see Santana, 465 Mass. at 278-279, the 
defendant did not need to object at trial because the judge had 
already considered and rejected the same specific objection at 
the motion in limine stage.  We now recognize that the principle 
applies regardless of whether the objection is based on 
constitutional or other grounds. 
 
We caution, however, that this approach is not as broad as 
it may seem.  An objection at the motion in limine stage will 
preserve a defendant's appellate rights only if what is 
objectionable at trial was specifically the subject of the 
motion in limine.  This case perfectly illustrates this point.4 
 
The defendant argued, at the motion in limine stage, that 
allowing Gagnon to testify as a substitute for DeFranco would 
violate his confrontation rights; he did not make any other 
claim.  Seeking to preclude a witness from testifying altogether 
                                                 
 
4 Commonwealth v. Almele, 474 Mass.     (2016), which 
involves improper expert witness testimony and which we also 
decide today, similarly illustrates the point. 
9 
 
 
(i.e., a challenge to who may testify), however, is not the same 
as seeking to preclude the introduction of specific information 
that the witness might provide (i.e., a challenge to the 
substance of what will be testified to).  In the former 
circumstance, the objection is not to the specific testimony 
that the witness might offer, and the judge, therefore, has not 
had an opportunity, prior to trial, to consider the propriety of 
specific testimony.  Where what is being addressed and resolved 
at the motion in limine stage differs from what occurs at trial, 
the defendant still must object at trial to preserve his or her 
appellate rights. 
 
 This is particularly true where the case involves a 
substitute analyst, as the circumstances of this case make 
clear.  At the hearing on the parties' motions in limine, the 
focus of the discussion was on, and the judge was considering, 
whether Gagnon should be allowed to testify at all.  The judge 
was not considering the specifics of what Gagnon might say, 
other than to determine that, in accordance with existing law, 
he would testify as to his own opinion on the basis of his own 
review of the underlying data.  See, e.g., Greineder, 464 Mass. 
at 584 ("[W]e draw a distinction between an expert's opinion on 
the one hand and the hearsay information that formed the basis 
of the opinion on the other, holding the former admissible and 
the latter inadmissible."); Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 457 Mass. 
10 
 
 
773, 783-784 (2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 990 (2011) 
(Commonwealth expert may testify to own opinion but not, on 
direct examination, to conclusion or opinion of second, 
nontestifying expert).  When the judge ruled that Gagnon would 
be allowed to testify, the presumption was that he would do so 
within the parameters established by our case law.  The 
defendant's objection at the motion stage went only to that 
ruling -- that is, it went only to allowing Gagnon to testify as 
a substitute for DeFranco.  It did not go to the specific 
questions that would be asked or the answers that would be given 
in the course of that testimony. 
 
It was incumbent on the defendant to object at trial to any 
specific testimony that was not directly at issue in the motion 
in limine and that he believed to be improper.  Although the 
defendant objected each time the Commonwealth asked Gagnon for 
his opinion regarding the tested substance, the questions 
themselves were not improper and the judge rightly overruled the 
objections.  Gagnon's answers, to the extent they referred to 
weight, however, were improper, and the defendant should have 
moved to strike them.  Cf. Commonwealth v. Womack, 457 Mass. 
268, 272-273 (2010) (where, in trial for murder in first degree, 
defendant failed to move to strike testimony, court reviewed its 
erroneous admission under standard of substantial likelihood of 
miscarriage of justice).  See also M.S. Brodin & M. Avery, 
11 
 
 
Massachusetts Evidence § 1.3.1, at 6 (8th ed. 2007) ("A motion 
to strike is the proper means of eliminating an answer that is 
objectionable either on substantive grounds . . . or on the 
ground that it is non-responsive").  He did not, in short, lodge 
an objection either before or at trial to the very thing that he 
argues on appeal was improper. 
 
Furthermore, that the judge, at the hearing on the motion 
in limine, responded affirmatively to the defendant's request 
that she note his objection does not aid the defendant where, 
again, the only objection at that time went solely to the 
judge's ruling that Gagnon could testify.  Even in those limited 
circumstances where a defendant's rights have been "preserved" 
or "saved" by a judge noting a particular objection, that 
objection has been to the specific evidence subsequently 
admitted.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kee, 449 Mass. 550, 553 
n.5 (2007) (where judge noted defendant's objection to denial of 
motion in limine and "saved" defendant's rights regarding 
evidence related to marked ten dollar bill, defendant's failure 
to object to that particular evidence at trial was not fatal).  
See also Commonwealth v. Aviles, 461 Mass. 60, 66 (2011), and 
cases cited. 
 
We add a second word of caution here:  a judge ought not to 
engage in the practice of indicating at the motion in limine 
stage that the judge is "saving" or "preserving" a defendant's 
12 
 
 
appellate rights.  Because a defendant must be careful to object 
at trial to anything that was not specifically at issue in the 
motion in limine, an indication from a judge that the 
defendant's objection is "preserved" may lull a defendant into 
failing to raise a necessary objection at trial.  Where the 
better practice is for a defendant to object at trial regardless 
of a motion in limine, any implication that a defendant's rights 
are being "preserved" may inadvertently lead to just the 
opposite. 
 
When Gagnon's testimony fell outside the parameters of what 
was permitted for a substitute witness in the circumstances 
presented here, the defendant was required to move to strike  
that testimony in order to preserve his appellate rights.  
Because he failed to do so, we review the admission of the 
testimony to determine whether it created a substantial risk of 
a miscarriage of justice.  We turn now to that question. 
 
b.  Testimony regarding weight of substance.  In reviewing 
an error to determine whether it created substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice, we review the evidence and the case as a 
whole "to determine 'if we have a serious doubt whether the 
result of the trial might have been different had the error not 
been made.'"  Commonwealth v. Azar, 435 Mass. 675, 687 (2002), 
quoting Commonwealth v. LeFave, 430 Mass. 169, 174 (1999).  We 
are satisfied, on the record here, that the result of the trial 
13 
 
 
would not have been different, and that the jury fairly 
concluded that the defendant was guilty of possession with 
intent to distribute.  The Commonwealth's case was strong, and 
the challenged evidence as to the weight of the cocaine was not 
necessary to prove its case. 
 
At trial, Trooper Parker, who found the plastic bag of 
drugs in the defendant's vehicle, testified that he observed 
that the bag had a twist tie at the top and a number of plastic 
bags inside, each of which had a twist tie and contained a white 
powdery substance.  Trooper Conneely testified similarly.  He 
stated that Trooper Parker brought him a clear plastic bag that 
contained twelve plastic bags, which Trooper Conneely referred 
to as "twists" and which contained a white powder.  Trooper 
Conneely also testified that, on the basis of his training and 
experience, the white powder inside the plastic bags found in 
the defendant's vehicle was consistent with cocaine and that 
"twists" are the most common "street-level" packaging for 
cocaine. 
 
Detective James Hyde of the Somerville police department, 
who was not involved in the defendant's arrest, provided expert 
testimony on the manner in which cocaine is generally packaged 
for street-level distribution.  He stated that small amounts of 
cocaine are packaged in individual plastic bags, and that those 
bags, in turn, may be "double-bag[ged]" in a larger plastic bag.  
14 
 
 
He also stated that the most common amount of cocaine that he 
sees for personal use at the street level in the Cambridge and 
Somerville area (the defendant was arrested in Cambridge) is 
usually one-half gram or one gram, although from time to time he 
might see as much as an "eight-ball" (three and one-half grams).  
He testified that each of the twelve individual bags of cocaine, 
entered as an exhibit at trial, contained in the "ballpark" of 
one-half gram or one gram amounts that would sell for forty to 
sixty dollars (for one-half gram) or as much as one hundred 
dollars (for one gram).  He further indicated that it would not 
be consistent with personal use to purchase twelve individual 
bags of this size because it would not be "cost effective."  A 
personal user could purchase an "eight ball" for $150 to $180, 
but a dealer who has cocaine packaged in one-half gram amounts 
is not going to sell the user seven individual bags (which would 
amount to three and one-half grams, or an "eight ball") for that 
amount when the dealer could instead sell them separately for a 
total of approximately $350.5 
                                                 
 
5 The lack of any personal-use paraphernalia was also, in 
Detective James Hyde's opinion, more consistent with an intent 
to distribute than with personal use.  On cross-examination, 
however, Hyde agreed that, in terms of personal-use 
paraphernalia for powder cocaine, when a user first purchases 
the cocaine, the user does not always have something on his or 
her person for purposes of using the cocaine right away, and, 
further, that something as simple as a dollar bill would suffice 
for ingesting the drug.  The point probably has limited 
significance here because the defendant did not argue at trial 
15 
 
 
 
Furthermore, to the extent that the defendant now argues 
that his conviction cannot stand because there was no evidence 
as to the weight of the drugs other than Gagnon's erroneously 
admitted testimony, the argument is misplaced.  The weight of 
the drugs is not an element of the crime of possession with 
intent to distribute.  This case, then, is not akin to those on 
which the defendant relies involving convictions of drug 
trafficking -- a crime for which weight is an element -- where 
the only evidence as to weight was erroneously admitted, leaving 
the jury with no reliable means to assess an element of the 
crime.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Montoya, 464 Mass. 566, 567 
(2013) (erroneous admission of certificates of drug analysis, 
which were only reliable evidence of weight, not harmless beyond 
reasonable doubt).  We perceive no substantial risk of a 
miscarriage of justice stemming from the erroneous admission of 
the testimony that referred to weight in this case. 
 
c.  Testimony regarding identity of substance.  In addition 
to his argument regarding the erroneous admission of Gagnon's 
testimony regarding weight, the defendant contends that the 
admission of Gagnon's testimony regarding the composition of the 
substance was erroneous.  There was no error.  Our law allows a 
                                                                                                                                                             
that the drugs were intended only for personal use.  Rather, in 
addressing the drug charges in his closing argument, he focused 
mainly on his assertion that the drugs were not his but rather 
belonged to the passenger who was in the motor vehicle with him 
when he was stopped and arrested. 
16 
 
 
witness such as Gagnon, who did not himself conduct the relevant 
tests, to testify to his own opinion based on the data generated 
by the nontestifying analyst.  See, e.g. Greineder, 464 Mass. at 
603.  In the Greineder case, we confirmed established law that 
"[e]xpert opinion testimony, even that which relies for its 
basis on . . . test results of a nontestifying analyst not 
admitted in evidence, does not violate a criminal defendant's 
right to confront witnesses against him under either the Sixth 
Amendment or art. 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights."  Id. 
 
Gagnon properly testified to his own opinion regarding the 
composition of the tested substance.  That opinion was formed on 
the basis of the tests conducted, and the results reached, by 
the nontestifying analyst, which Gagnon reviewed at the time the 
tests were conducted as well as prior to testifying at trial.  
Furthermore, the defendant thoroughly and meaningfully cross-
examined Gagnon.  See Greineder, 464 Mass. at 596-598 
(considering meaningful cross-examination of substitute 
analyst).  He elicited testimony from Gagnon that, among other 
things, Gagnon did not directly observe the testing conducted by 
the nontestifying analyst; that Gagnon did not speak to the 
nontestifying analyst about the steps she had taken in 
conducting her analysis; and that "there is room for human 
error."  Gagnon's opinion testimony regarding the composition of 
17 
 
 
the substance -- that it was cocaine -- did not violate the 
defendant's right to confront the witness against him, and was 
not, thus, erroneously admitted. 
 
d.  School zone violation.  Finally, the defendant urges us 
to revisit our decision in Commonwealth v. Thompson, 470 Mass. 
1008 (2014), considering the retroactivity of St. 2012, c. 192, 
§ 30, which amended G. L. c. 94C, § 32J, the school zone 
statute.  In Commonwealth v. Bradley, 466 Mass. 551, 561 (2013), 
we concluded that the amendment "applies to all cases alleging a 
school zone violation for which a guilty plea had not been 
accepted or conviction entered as of" August 2, 2012, the 
effective date of the amendment.  Subsequently, in the Thompson 
case, we declined to extend that rule to cases where a defendant 
has been tried and convicted before the effective date but whose 
direct appeal was still pending on that date.  Thompson, supra 
at 1010.  The defendant here falls into the Thompson category, 
and we see no reason to revisit our decision.  The amendment 
does not apply to him. 
 
3.  Conclusion.  In the future, a defendant's pretrial 
objection, at the motion to suppress as well as the motion in 
limine stage, will preserve the defendant's appellate rights.  
The basis for the objection -- whether constitutional or not -- 
will no longer matter, but, as has always been the case, the 
preservation of appellate rights will apply only to what is 
18 
 
 
specifically addressed in those proceedings.  In circumstances 
like those presented here, where prior to trial a defendant 
seeks to preclude a particular witness from testifying on 
constitutional grounds, the defendant must also object at trial 
to any questions that seek to elicit testimony that falls 
outside of what was addressed at the pretrial stage and move to 
strike the specific testimony once it has been elicited in order 
to preserve his or her appellate rights.  To the extent that the 
defendant failed to do that, we have reviewed the admission of 
the testimony to determine whether it created a substantial risk 
of a miscarriage of justice.  For the reasons discussed above, 
we conclude that it did not.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed. 
 
                                                 
 
6 The defendant raised additional issues in the Appeals 
Court, regarding the judge's charge to the jury, that he has not 
raised in this court.  Because he has not raised them here, we 
have not considered them.