Case Title: State v. William Carpenter

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1994AP001898

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1995-12-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
Nos.  94-1898, 94-2024 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
William Carpenter, 
 
 
Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 
DEC 8, 1995 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                
   
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
 
v. 
 
William A. Schmidt, 
 
 
Respondent-Respondent. 
                                                                   
 
 
APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Dane County, Mark 
A. Frankel, Judge.  Affirmed in part, reversed in part and cause 
remanded.  APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Sauk 
County, James Evenson, Judge.  Reversed and cause remanded. 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   These cases are before the court on 
certification by the court of appeals from orders of the Circuit 
Court for Dane County, Mark A. Frankel, Judge, and the Circuit 
Court for Sauk County, James Evenson, Judge, holding Wisconsin's 
 
Nos. 94-1898, 94-2024 
 
 
 
2 
Sexually Violent Person Commitments statute, Wis. Stat. ch. 980 
(1993-94)1 unconstitutional.  The respondents in these cases and 
the companion cases2 decided today argue that ch. 980 violates the 
Equal Protection, Due Process, Double Jeopardy, and Ex Post Facto 
Clauses of the Wisconsin and United States Constitutions.  We 
conclude in this opinion that ch. 980 creates a civil commitment 
procedure primarily intended to protect the public and to provide 
concentrated treatment to convicted sexually violent persons, not 
to punish the sexual offender.  Therefore, we hold that ch. 980 
does not violate either the Ex Post Facto or the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.  Accordingly, we reverse the trial courts' orders 
determining that ch. 980 is unconstitutional on these grounds and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with ch. 980.  We also 
affirm the trial court's order in Carpenter finding probable cause 
that he is a sexually violent person. 
 
This opinion is limited to the question of whether ch. 980 
violates the Double Jeopardy or Ex Post Facto Clauses of the 
Wisconsin and United States Constitutions.  Our determination of 
the due process and equal protection issues is set forth in the 
companion cases.  See State v. Post, No. 94-2356 and State v. 
Oldakowski, No. 94-2357 (S. Ct. Dec. 8, 1995). 
                     
     1  All future statutory references are to the 1993-94 volume 
unless otherwise indicated. 
     2  See State v. Post, No. 94-2356 and State v. Oldakowski, 
No. 94-2357 (S. Ct. Dec. 8, 1995). 
 
Nos. 94-1898, 94-2024 
 
 
 
3 
    We begin with a brief overview of the statute.3  Chapter 980 
provides for the involuntary commitment of certain individuals who 
are found to be sexually violent persons.  Section 980.01(7) 
defines a "sexually violent person" in part as "a person who has 
been convicted of a sexually violent offense . . . and who is 
dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder that 
makes it substantially probable that the person will engage in 
acts of sexual violence."   
 
When a petition is filed alleging that a person is sexually 
violent, the court must review the petition to determine whether 
to issue an order detaining the person and must hold a hearing to 
determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the 
person named in the petition is sexually violent.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.04.  If a court or jury determines that the person is 
sexually violent as defined by the statute, the person is 
committed to the Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) 
"for control, care and treatment until such time as the person is 
no longer a sexually violent person."  Wis. Stat. § 980.06. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
The 
facts 
and 
procedural 
history 
in 
both 
cases 
are 
undisputed.  We will address each in turn. 
                     
     3  A comprehensive analysis of the requirements and 
procedures of Wis. Stat. ch. 980 is set forth in the companion 
cases, supra note 2. 
 
Nos. 94-1898, 94-2024 
 
 
 
4 
 
A.  State v. Carpenter 
 
Carpenter was convicted of first-degree sexual assault of a 
seven-year-old in 1984 and was sentenced to 12 years in prison.  
The court stayed the sentence and placed him on probation for 10 
years.  His probation was initially revoked in 1986 for engaging 
in sexual intercourse with his 14-year-old daughter.  The 
revocation was vacated but reinstated in 1988 based on an 
allegation that he violated parole by associating with minors. 
 
Carpenter was paroled in 1993 and out on parole for nine 
months before being reincarcerated based on the Department of 
Corrections' (DOC) recalculation of his mandatory release date 
pursuant to State ex rel. Parker v. Fiedler, 180 Wis. 2d 438, 509 
N.W.2d 440 (Ct. App. 1993), rev'd, State ex rel. Parker v. 
Sullivan, 184 Wis. 2d 668, 517 N.W.2d 449 (1994).  Although this 
court overturned the court of appeals' decision in Parker and 
provided that the prisoners detained pursuant to that decision be 
released by July 15, 1994, Carpenter was not released.   
 
Instead, on July 14, 1994, the State filed a petition against 
Carpenter pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 980.02(1)(b), alleging that he 
is a sexually violent person.  The petition also summarized the 
opinions of Dr. Lawrence Kane, who concluded that Carpenter 
suffers from pedophilia and an antisocial personality disorder.  
Kane opined that there is a substantial probability that Carpenter 
will engage in future acts of sexual violence.   
 
Nos. 94-1898, 94-2024 
 
 
 
5 
   
Carpenter filed a motion challenging the constitutionality of 
ch. 980 on the grounds of due process, equal protection, 
vagueness, ex post facto, and double jeopardy.  He also attacked 
the factual basis for the petition.  The trial court held that ch. 
980 was unconstitutional because it violated the Ex Post Facto, 
Double Jeopardy, and Substantive Due Process Clauses of the 
Wisconsin and Federal Constitutions and therefore did not reach 
Carpenter's factual challenge to the petition.   
 
The State requested and received a stay pending appeal of the 
trial court's order holding the statute unconstitutional and 
releasing Carpenter from custody.  In the meantime, the court of 
appeals granted Carpenter's motion to remand for a probable cause 
hearing, after which the trial court found probable cause to find 
that 
Carpenter 
is 
a 
sexually 
violent 
person 
pursuant 
to 
§ 980.01(7).  Carpenter appeals this order, arguing that probable 
cause was lacking because he was not within 90 days of discharge 
or release as required by Wis. Stat. § 980.02(2)(ag), and 
asserting that the petition was deficient because the State failed 
to allege an overt act.4 
 
B.  State v. Schmidt 
 
In March 1992, Schmidt was convicted of two counts of fourth-
degree sexual assault and placed on probation for three years as a 
                     
     4  In granting Carpenter's motion to remand, the court of 
appeals expressly allowed him the right to appeal any issue 
arising from the probable cause hearing within the scope of the 
State's appeal. 
 
Nos. 94-1898, 94-2024 
 
 
 
6 
result 
of 
having 
sexual 
intercourse 
with 
his 
14-year-old 
girlfriend.  That probation was subsequently revoked.  In late 
1992, he was convicted of two counts of first-degree sexual 
assault and sentenced to three years in prison as a result of 
digitally penetrating the anus of his two-year-old nephew. 
 
The State filed a petition against him pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 980.02(1)(a).  In addition to the sexual assaults for which 
Schmidt was incarcerated, the petition alleged that Schmidt was 
found to have engaged in penis-to-anus penetration of a five-year-
old boy in 1985 and that he had not successfully completed a sex 
offender treatment program offered while in prison.  The petition 
also summarized the opinion of Dr. Ken Lerner, who diagnosed 
Schmidt as suffering from the mental disorder, pedophilia.  Lerner 
concluded that Schmidt was dangerous to others because he suffered 
from a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that 
he would engage in acts of sexual violence.   
 
The trial court subsequently found probable cause to believe 
that Schmidt is a sexually violent person pursuant to § 980.01(7). 
 Schmidt then filed motions challenging the constitutionality of 
the statute.  The court granted Schmidt's motion to dismiss on the 
grounds that the statute violated both the Double Jeopardy and the 
Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States Constitution.   The 
State sought and obtained from the court of appeals a stay of 
Schmidt's release pending appeal.  
 
Nos. 94-1898, 94-2024 
 
 
 
7 
 
II.  DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
 
Both the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions protect 
criminal defendants from being subjected to double jeopardy.5   
Because these provisions are the same in scope and purpose, we 
have routinely followed decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court as governing the double jeopardy provisions of both 
constitutions.  State v. Killebrew, 115 Wis. 2d 243, 246 n.2, 340 
N.W.2d 470 (1983).  
 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the 
Double Jeopardy Clause protects against three distinct abuses:  a 
second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; a second 
prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple 
punishments for the same offense."  United States v. Halper, 490 
U.S. 435, 440 (1989).  Respondents argue that ch. 980 subjects 
them to multiple punishment for the same underlying sexual 
offense. 
 
A party challenging the statute must show it to be 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  State v. Iglesias, 
185 Wis. 2d 117, 133, 517 N.W.2d 175 (1994), cert. denied, 115 
S. Ct. 641 (1994).  In doing so, the challenging party must 
                     
     5 The Federal Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause provides: 
"[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . ."  U.S. Const. amend. 
V.  Wisconsin's analogous provision states:  "[N]o person for the 
same offense may be put twice in jeopardy of punishment . . . ."  
Wis. Const. art. I, § 8(1).  
 
Nos. 94-1898, 94-2024 
 
 
 
8 
overcome the presumption that the statute is constitutional, which 
we have summarized as follows: 
Every presumption must be indulged to sustain the law if at 
all possible and, wherever doubt exists as to a 
legislative enactment's constitutionality, it must be 
resolved in favor of constitutionality.  The court 
cannot reweigh the facts found by the legislature.  If 
the 
court 
can 
conceive 
any 
facts 
on 
which 
the 
legislation could reasonably be based, it must hold the 
legislation constitutional. 
State v. McManus, 152 Wis. 2d 113, 129, 447 N.W.2d 654 (1989) 
(citations and quotations omitted).  Therefore, respondents bear 
the burden of overcoming the strong presumption that ch. 980 does 
not subject a person to multiple punishment. 
 
In determining whether a sanction constitutes punishment for 
the purposes of double jeopardy, we must assess "the purposes 
actually served by the [statute], not the underlying nature of the 
proceeding giving rise to the sanction . . . ."  Halper, 490 U.S. 
at 447 n.7.  We consider whether the statutory scheme is so 
punitive 
either 
in 
purpose 
or 
effect 
as 
to 
negate 
the 
legislature's remedial purpose.  See United States v. Ward, 448 
U.S. 242, 248 (1980).  
 
 "Governmental action is punishment under the double jeopardy 
clause if its principal purpose is punishment, retribution or 
deterrence.  When the principal purpose is nonpunitive, the fact 
that a punitive motive may also be present does not make the 
action punishment."  Killebrew, 115 Wis. 2d at 251.  Therefore, a 
civil sanction is violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause if it 
 
Nos. 94-1898, 94-2024 
 
 
 
9 
"may not fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a 
deterrent or retribution."6  Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49. 
                     
     6  In an effort to find ch. 980 violative of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause, the dissent improperly relies on the following 
language in Halper to set forth a stricter standard: "[A] civil 
sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial 
purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either 
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment . . . ."  Halper, 
490 U.S. at 448 (emphasis added).  Post and Oldakowski, supra note 
2, Dissent at 6-7 (Post Dissent).  To the extent the dissent is 
suggesting that a civil sanction containing any punitive purpose 
is punishment, it is erroneous.  Halper unequivocally limited its 
holding as follows: 
 
We therefore hold that under the Double Jeopardy Clause a 
defendant who already has been punished in a criminal 
prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil 
sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not 
fairly be characterized as remedial, but only as a 
deterrent or retribution. 
 
Id. at 448-49 (emphasis added).  Curiously, while the dissent 
relies on the Halper language that a civil sanction must be solely 
remedial to survive double jeopardy scrutiny, it recognizes as 
correct our contrary holding in State v. Killebrew, 115 Wis. 2d 
243, 251, 340 N.W.2d 470 (1983) (the fact that a punitive motive 
may also be present does not make an action punishment).  Post 
Dissent at 3 (quoting Killebrew, 115 Wis. 2d at 251). 
 
 
We further note that the Supreme Court has since reaffirmed 
the strict holding of Halper.  The Court in Department of Revenue 
v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1946-47 (1994), ruling on the 
constitutionality of a drug tax, recognized that the existence of 
punishment aspects in a statute does not necessarily make it 
punishment.  The Court stated: 
 
We begin by noting that neither a high rate of taxation nor 
an obvious deterrent purpose automatically marks this 
tax a form of punishment . . . .  [W]hile a high tax 
rate 
and 
deterrent 
purpose 
lend 
support 
to 
the 
characterization of the drug tax as punishment, these 
features, in and of themselves, do not necessarily 
render the tax punitive. 
 
Id. See also State v. McMaster, No. 95-1159-CR (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 
8, 1995) (holding that a sanction that primarily serves a 
nonpunitive goal but has a secondary deterrent purpose may be 
 
Nos. 94-1898, 94-2024 
 
 
 
10 
 
  Respondents argue that despite the legislature's effort to 
create a "civil" or "remedial" statute, ch. 980 is so punitive in 
its effect that it negates the State's intention.  They 
acknowledge that treatment is a component of ch. 980, but contend 
that it is merely a pretense and secondary in purpose to 
punishment.  We disagree.  The emphasis on treatment in ch. 980 is 
evident from its plain language.  For example, the notice 
provision in Wis. Stat. § 980.015(3)(b)7 requires the agency with 
jurisdiction over the person to provide the appropriate district 
attorney and the Department of Justice with documentation of any 
prior treatment that the subject received while in prison.  Under 
Wis. Stat. § 980.06(1), a person found to be sexually violent is 
committed to the custody of DHSS for control, care, and treatment, 
as opposed to the DOC for imprisonment.  Further, DHSS is required 
to "arrange for control, care and treatment of the person in the 
least restrictive manner consistent with the requirements of the 
person . . . ."  Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(b). 
(..continued) 
properly characterized as remedial). 
     7  Wisconsin Stat. § 980.015(3)(b) states: 
 
 
(3)  The agency with jurisdiction shall provide the 
district attorney and department of justice with 
all of the following:  
 
 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
(b)  If applicable, documentation of any treatment and 
the 
person's 
adjustment 
to 
any 
institutional 
placement. 
 
Nos. 94-1898, 94-2024 
 
 
 
11 
 
When determining whether commitment is to a secure mental 
health facility or supervised release, § 980.06(2)(b)8 directs the 
court to consider what arrangements are available to ensure that 
the person has access to and will participate in necessary 
treatment.   Further, if the court finds supervised release to be 
appropriate, Wis. Stat. § 980.06(2)(c)9 requires the county where 
the person resides to prepare a plan that identifies the treatment 
that the person will receive in the community and must specify who 
                     
     8  Wisconsin Stat. § 980.06(2)(b) states in relevant part: 
 
In determining whether commitment shall be for institutional 
care in a secure mental health unit or facility or 
other facility or for supervised release, the court 
may 
consider, 
without 
limitation 
because 
of 
enumeration, the nature and circumstances of the 
behavior that was the basis of the allegation in 
the petition under s. 980.02(2)(a), the person's 
mental history and present mental condition, where 
the person will live, how the person will support 
himself or herself, and what arrangements are 
available to ensure that the person has access to 
and will participate in necessary treatment.   
     9  Wisconsin Stat. § 980.06(2)(c) states in relevant part: 
 
If the court finds that the person is appropriate for 
supervised release, the court shall notify the 
department. 
 
The 
department 
and 
the 
county 
department under s. 51.42 in the county of 
residence of the person shall prepare a plan that 
identifies the treatment and services, if any, that 
the person will receive in the community.  The plan 
shall address the person's need, if any, for 
supervision, 
counseling, 
medication, 
community 
support services, residential services, vocational 
services, 
and 
alcohol 
or 
other 
drug 
abuse 
treatment. . . .  The plan shall specify who will 
be responsible for providing the treatment and 
services identified in the plan. 
 
Nos. 94-1898, 94-2024 
 
 
 
12 
will be responsible for providing the treatment identified in the 
plan.  These provisions lead us to conclude that the statute is 
aimed primarily at treating the sexually violent person, not 
punishing the individual.   
 
In addition to the explicit language pertaining to treatment 
within the statute, the undisputed record in this case indicates 
that the State is prepared to provide specific treatment to those 
committed under ch. 980 and not simply warehouse them, as 
suggested by respondents.  All persons committed under ch. 980 who 
are not immediately placed on supervised release are placed at the 
Wisconsin Resource Center, a mental health facility run by DHSS 
that contracts with DOC to provide mental health services to 
inmates.  The committed persons are not part of the general inmate 
population and are not staffed by prison guards but by psychiatric 
care technicians, psychologists and clinical nurses.  They receive 
more intensive treatment than that provided to prison inmates.  As 
the population increases, plans exist to increase the staff 
proportionately.  
 
  Respondents rely heavily on the fact that those committed 
under ch. 980 face an indefinite period of confinement in a secure 
facility as evidence that the true intent of the statute is 
punishment.  However, ch. 980 expressly provides for supervised 
release 
either 
at 
the 
time 
of 
commitment, 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 980.06(2)(b) and (c), or upon the person's subsequent petition 
after receiving treatment, Wis. Stat. § 980.08(4).  Further, the 
 
Nos. 94-1898, 94-2024 
 
 
 
13 
person is entitled to discharge as soon as his or her 
dangerousness or mental disorder abates.  See Wis. Stat. § 980.09.  
 
We conclude that these provisions significantly detract from 
respondents' argument that the statute's primary purpose is 
punishment.  Schmidt's counsel conceded in arguments to this court 
that the supervised release provisions "certainly" took some of 
the onus away from the notion of punishment.  However, counsel 
viewed this as an "afterthought" and argued that the legislature 
merely included such nonpunitive components "to make it appear 
more palatable from a constitutional sense."10   
 
We decline to engage in such speculation.  We are mindful of 
the heavy presumption in favor of constitutionality that must be 
afforded statutes: 
Judicial inquiries into [legislative] motives are at best a 
hazardous matter, and when that inquiry seeks to go 
behind objective manifestations it becomes a dubious 
affair indeed. . . .  "[I]t is not on slight implication 
and vague conjecture that the legislature is to be 
                     
     10  Schmidt's counsel was questioned in relevant part: 
 
Q.  The point is that people are able to get out on 
supervised release.  Doesn't that take some of the 
onus away from the punishment . . . ? 
 
 
 
A.  It certainly does.  However, the way I view that is . . . 
an afterthought or some sort of protective measure 
that was thrown in there to make it appear more 
palatable from a constitutional sense . . . .  
 
Nos. 94-1898, 94-2024 
 
 
 
14 
pronounced to have transcended its powers, and its acts 
to be considered as void." 
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960) (quoted source 
omitted).  Our task is not to search for sinister ulterior motives 
underlying the legislature's acts in order to find statutes 
unconstitutional.11  Rather, we look to the plain language of the 
statute as evidence of the legislature's intent. 
 
Respondents argue that various provisions in ch. 980 provide 
evidence of the legislature's punitive intent.  We are persuaded 
that the principles underlying the Supreme Court's decision in 
Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986), apply in this case to 
                     
     11  The dissent argues that the majority misconstrues U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent in determining that ch. 980 passes 
constitutional 
muster 
by 
"ignoring 
its 
legislative 
history . . . ."  Post Dissent at 3-4.  The dissent relies heavily 
on 
legislative 
history 
to 
conclude 
that 
ch. 
980 
is 
unconstitutional.  Post Dissent at 8-13.  In doing so, the dissent 
infers that the majority erred in not considering legislative 
history to glean its principal purpose. 
 
 
While we agree that legislative history may shed light on a 
statute's purpose in certain instances, we disagree with the 
dissent's reliance on selected statements made by a few officials 
to indicate that the legislature intended to enact a punitive 
statute.  Selected statements, even those made by the sponsor of 
the legislation, that reflect a punitive motivation for the 
statute are not sufficient to overcome the presumption of 
constitutionality which attends the statute.  Wiley v. Bowen, 824 
F.2d 
1120, 
1122 
(D.C. 
Cir. 
1987). 
 
In 
judging 
the 
constitutionality of a statute, we cannot assume that the 
statements of a few constitute the motivation of the entire 
legislature.  "[W]e are left with the rule that 'only the clearest 
proof could suffice to establish the unconstitutionality of a 
statute' on the ground 'that a punitive purpose in fact lay behind 
the statute.'"  Id., quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 
(1960). 
 
Nos. 94-1898, 94-2024 
 
 
 
15 
effectively refute respondents' arguments that various other parts 
of ch. 980 support the notion that its primary purpose is criminal 
punishment. 
 
For example, respondents assert that ch. 980 is punitive 
because it employs procedural safeguards typically reserved for 
criminal matters.  These include the right to a twelve-person 
jury, the right to counsel, the right against self-incrimination, 
and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  Respondents also point to 
the fact that the statute is located within the criminal code as 
further evidence of the legislature's punitive intent.  However, 
as the Supreme Court concluded in Allen, the legislature's 
decision "to provide some of the safeguards applicable in criminal 
trials cannot itself turn these proceedings into criminal 
prosecutions."  Id. at 372. 
 
Respondents point to the fact that ch. 980 applies only to 
those already convicted of a crime.  We agree with Allen that 
simply because "the State has chosen not to apply [ch. 980] to the 
larger class of mentally ill persons who might be found sexually 
dangerous does not somehow transform a civil proceeding into a 
criminal one."  Id. at 370. 
 
In Allen, the Supreme Court held that an Illinois statute 
which provided for civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons 
was properly categorized as civil, not criminal.  Id. at 369.  In 
holding the statute civil, the Court deemed significant many of 
the same factors that we have relied on, such as the fact that the 
 
Nos. 94-1898, 94-2024 
 
 
 
16 
state was obligated to provide treatment designed to effect 
recovery for those committed, conditional release was available, 
and committed persons were discharged when no longer dangerous.  
Id. at 369. 
 
We acknowledge that Allen is distinguishable from the present 
case because the Illinois statute at issue in Allen provides for 
commitment in lieu of serving a criminal sentence.  While this is 
a distinguishing factor, we do not deem it to be fatal.  
 
We are unpersuaded that the indicia of punishment in ch. 980 
identified by respondents is so punitive in purpose or effect as 
to negate the statute's remedial purpose and transform the State's 
intent to treat into an intent to punish.  Ward, 448 U.S. at 248. 
 As we have already stated, the relevant inquiry is directed 
towards the principal purposes served by the sanction, not the 
underlying nature of the proceedings giving rise to the sanction. 
 Halper, 490 U.S. at 447 n.7. 
 
We conclude that the principal purposes of ch. 980 are the 
protection of the public and the treatment of convicted sex 
offenders who are at a high risk to reoffend in order to reduce 
the likelihood that they will engage in such conduct in the 
future.  These constitute significant nonpunitive and remedial 
purposes.  Chapter 980 cannot be characterized as only serving the 
punishment goals of deterrence or retribution.  See Halper, 490 
U.S. at 448-49.  It is undeniable that the statute is penal to a 
certain degree in that it potentially subjects individuals to an 
 
Nos. 94-1898, 94-2024 
 
 
 
17 
affirmative restraint.  However, where the principal purpose of a 
civil sanction is nonpunitive, the fact that a punitive motive may 
also be present does not make the action punishment.  Killebrew, 
115 Wis. 2d at 251. 
 
Respondents have failed to show that the principal purpose of 
the statute is punishment, retribution, or deterrence so as to 
render it punishment.  Further, respondents have failed to show 
that the statute has sufficient punitive characteristics and 
insufficient civil commitment characteristics such that it has 
ceased to be a civil commitment and has become punishment.  
Accordingly, respondents have failed to meet their burden to 
overcome the strong presumption in favor of constitutionality.  
 
III. EX POST FACTO 
 
The United States and Wisconsin Constitutions prohibit ex 
post facto laws.12  It is well established that the constitutional 
prohibition on ex post facto laws applies only to penal statutes. 
 Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41 (1990); Wisconsin Bingo 
Supply & Equip. Co. v. Bingo Control Board, 88 Wis. 2d 293, 305, 
276 N.W.2d 716 (1979).  In construing the Ex Post Facto Clause of 
the Wisconsin Constitution, we look to the United States Supreme 
Court decisions construing the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Federal 
Constitution.  State v. Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d 695, 699, 524 N.W.2d 
641 (1994). 
                     
     12  See United States Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 and § 10, cl. 
1; Wis. Const. art. I, § 12. 
 
Nos. 94-1898, 94-2024 
 
 
 
18 
 
We recently determined in Thiel that the Supreme Court's 
decision in Collins, 497 U.S. at 42, provides the proper analysis 
applicable to Wisconsin's Ex Post Facto Clause.  See Thiel, 188 
Wis. 2d at 703.  An ex post facto law is any law "'which punishes 
as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when 
done; which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, 
after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of 
any defense available according to law at the time when the act 
was committed . . . .'"  Id., quoting Collins, 497 U.S. at 42.  
Respondents specifically argue that ch. 980 makes more burdensome 
the punishment for their past sexual offenses.   
 
We have repeatedly stated the test of what constitutes 
punishment in the context of determining whether a law is an ex 
post facto law as follows: 
The question in each case where unpleasant consequences are 
brought to bear upon an individual for prior conduct, is 
whether 
the 
legislative 
aim 
was 
to 
punish 
that 
individual for past activity, or whether the restriction 
of the individual comes about as a relevant incident to 
a regulation of a present situation . . . . 
See, e.g., Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d at 704, quoting Wisconsin Bingo 
Supply, 88 Wis. 2d at 305, quoting DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 
144, 160 (1960) (plurality opinion).  Therefore, we must consider 
the language and structure of the statute to determine whether it 
serves 
a 
legitimate 
regulatory 
public 
purpose 
apart 
from 
punishment for the predicate act.  
 
Nos. 94-1898, 94-2024 
 
 
 
19 
 
For the same reasons mentioned above with respect to our 
double jeopardy analysis, we conclude that ch. 980 is aimed at 
protecting the public by providing concentrated treatment for 
convicted sex offenders who are at a high risk to reoffend based 
upon a mental disorder which predisposes them to commit acts of 
sexual violence.  The focus of the statute is on the offender's 
current mental condition and the present danger to the public, not 
punishment.  As we recognized in Thiel, the mere fact that a prior 
conviction is a predicate of the current sanction does not render 
the current sanction punishment for the past offense.  Thiel, 188 
Wis. 2d at 703-05.  The legislative aim is not punishment but 
regulation of a present situation. 
 
Where a statute serves a legitimate, regulatory, nonpunitive 
purpose, it only violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if the 
regulatory sanction "bears no rational connection to the purposes 
of the legislation . . . ." See Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617.   Here, 
there clearly is a rational connection between the restriction on 
the sexually violent person's liberty and the statute's purpose of 
protecting the public from dangerous sex offenders by providing 
treatment for those offenders in order to reduce the likelihood 
they will engage in such acts in the future.     
 
We conclude that ch. 980 was not enacted to punish convicted 
sex offenders but rather to protect public safety and treat 
sexually violent persons.  The restriction on such persons comes 
 
Nos. 94-1898, 94-2024 
 
 
 
20 
about 
incident 
to 
a 
regulation 
of 
a 
present 
situation.  
Accordingly, we hold that ch. 980 is not an ex post facto law.  
 
IV.  PROBABLE CAUSE DETERMINATION 
 
In order to be a proper subject of a ch. 980 petition, a 
person must be "within 90 days of discharge or release, on parole 
or otherwise, from a sentence that was imposed for a conviction 
for a sexually violent offense[,] from a secured correctional 
facility . . . ."  § 980.02(2)(ag).  Whether this requirement was 
met in Carpenter's case requires us to interpret and apply 
§ 980.02(2)(ag) to an undisputed set of facts.  These are 
questions of law that we review de novo.  See Swatek v. County of 
Dane, 192 Wis. 2d 47, 57, 531 N.W.2d 45 (1995). 
 
Carpenter does not dispute that DOC had the authority to 
reincarcerate him in January 1994 based on the court of appeals' 
Parker decision.  Rather, he contends that because this court 
ultimately reversed the court of appeals, his original June 1993 
release date is the date that applies in relation to the 90-day 
requirement in § 980.02(2)(ag).  We do not read the statute so 
narrowly.  Upon reincarcerating Carpenter, DOC recalculated a new 
parole date based on his conviction for a sexually violent 
offense.  At the time the petition was initiated, therefore, 
Carpenter was within 90 days of discharge from imprisonment based 
on that sentence.   The fact that this court ultimately reversed 
the court of appeals' decision does not render the DOC action 
"illegal."   
 
Nos. 94-1898, 94-2024 
 
 
 
21 
 
Carpenter also argues that there was no probable cause 
because the State failed to allege an overt act.  Carpenter 
contends that the State must establish an overt act in order to 
establish probable cause of dangerousness because he had been 
released from custody prior to the filing of the petition.  See In 
re Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1009 (Wash. 1993) (holding that for non-
incarcerated individuals, a sex predator petition must include an 
allegation for a recent overt act), rev'd, Young v. Weston, No. 
C94-480C, 1995 WL 529429 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 25, 1995).  We disagree. 
 Carpenter's reliance on Young is misplaced because, unlike the 
defendant in Young, Carpenter was incarcerated when the petition 
was filed.  Therefore, we affirm the trial court's order finding 
probable cause. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Respondents carry a heavy burden when making a constitutional 
challenge to a statute because we must afford the statute a strong 
presumption in favor of constitutionality.  Thiel, 188 Wis. 2d at 
706.  They must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
legislature's intent in enacting ch. 980 was to punish sexually 
violent persons.  See id.; see also Iglesias, 185 Wis. 2d at 133. 
 Based upon our above discussion, we conclude that respondents 
have not met their burden. 
 
  Federalism dictates that states may develop a variety of 
solutions to problems with varying standards and procedures 
provided that they meet the constitutional minimum.  Addington v. 
 
Nos. 94-1898, 94-2024 
 
 
 
22 
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979).  The legislature in enacting ch. 
980 has attempted to deal with the legitimate public concern over 
the danger posed by sexually violent persons.  We conclude that 
this method chosen by the legislature was not enacted to punish 
convicted felons but rather to protect the public and to provide 
treatment to convicted sexually violent persons.  
 
By the Court.—In State v. Carpenter, orders affirmed in part, 
reversed in part and cause remanded.  In State v. Schmidt, order 
reversed and cause remanded. 
 
No. 94-1898, 94-2024.wab 
 
 
 
23 
  
 
William A. Bablitch, J.  (Concurring).    I join the majority 
opinion in both its reasoning and result.  I write only to address 
what I perceive to be a fundamental flaw in the analysis contained 
in the dissent.  
 
The fundamental flaw in the dissent is that it confuses 
"ends" with "means," and thereby concludes its analysis at a point 
where it should begin.  The dissent states that the purpose (i.e. 
ends) of the legislation in question is punishment, "namely the 
ongoing incarceration of convicted sex offenders who might 
otherwise be released."  Dissent at 12.  That so-called purpose 
is, I submit, the means to the end.  The underlying purpose of the 
sexual predator legislation is protection of the public and the 
treatment of convicted sex offenders who are at a high risk to 
reoffend.  The means used to accomplish this underlying purpose is 
affirmative restraint with a strong component of treatment.  As 
stated in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989), for 
purposes of ex post facto and double jeopardy analysis, we must 
assess "the purposes actually served by the [statute] in question, 
not the underlying nature of the proceeding giving rise to the 
sanction . . . ." Id. at 447, n. 7.   
 
The dissent addresses the legislative history of the passage 
of this legislation to buttress its conclusion that the purpose is 
incarceration.  But again, the analysis is flawed for the same 
 
No. 94-1898, 94-2024.wab 
 
 
 
2 
reason stated above.  One can scarcely expect silence from the 
legislature and the governor with respect to how they intend to 
accomplish their underlying purpose of public protection against 
further offenses.  A close examination of the quotes contained in 
the dissent show that these statements are nothing more than just 
that. 
 
The dissent's analysis is much akin to saying that a person 
goes to his or her car in the morning for the purpose of taking a 
ride.  That is correct as far as it goes---but not when it can be 
demonstrated that the underlying purpose of going to the car is to 
get to the office. 
 
 
The underlying purpose here is public protection.  The means 
chosen to accomplish that purpose is affirmative restraint with a 
strong component of treatment.  The majority opinion amply and 
persuasively demonstrates a rational connection between the 
affirmative restraint and treatment required by the statute and 
its purpose of protecting the public.  See Fleming v. Nestor, 363 
U.S. 603, 617 (1960).  Accordingly, a challenge based on ex post 
facto and double jeopardy considerations must fail.   
 
Nos. 94-1898, 94-2024.ssa 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.  (dissenting).   I dissent for the 
reasons set forth in State v. Post, ___ Wis. 2d ___ (1995), of 
even date.   
 
Nos. 94-1898, 94-2024.ssa 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
94-1898 and 94-2024 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
94-1898- 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
William Carpenter, 
 
 
 
 
Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
________________________________ 
 
 
 
94-2024- 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
 
 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
William A. Schmidt, 
 
 
 
 
Respondent-Respondent. 
 
 
 
___________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
December 8, 1995 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
September 5, 1995 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane and Sauk 
 
JUDGE: 
MARK A. FRANKEL and JAMES EVENSON 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
BABLITCH, J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
Dissented: 
ABRAHAMSON, J., dissents (opinion filed) 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
94-1898:  For the petitioner-appellant the cause 
was argued by Sally L. Wellman, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
Nos. 94-1898, 94-2024.ssa 
 
 
94-1898 and 94-2024  State v. Carpenter/Schmidt  
 
 
94-1898 continued: 
 
 
For the respondent-respondent there were briefs by Bill 
Ginsberg, Rick B. Meier and Mandell & Ginsberg Law Offices, 
Madison and oral argument by Bill Ginsberg. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed by Christopher L. Wolle, 
Madison for State Representatives David Prosser, Jr. and Lolita 
Schneiders. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed (in the court of appeals) by 
Jeffrey J. Kassel and LaFollette & Sinykin, Madison for the 
American Civil Liberties Union of Wisconsin Foundation. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed (in the court of appeals) by 
Herbert S. Bratt and John D. Schrager, Milwaukee for the Wisconsin 
Psychiatric Assocation, Inc. 
 
 
Amicus curiae brief was filed (in the court of appeals) by 
Dianne Greenley, Madison for the Wisconsin Coalition for Advocacy, 
Inc. 
 
 
94-2024: 
 
 
For the petitioner-appellant the cause was argued by Sally L. 
Wellman, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the respondent-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument by Daniel M. Berkos, Mauston.