Case Title: NYQUIST v NYQUIST

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1981-07-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 80-332 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF T E I E STATE OF MONTANA 1 9 8 1 CARLEY D. NYQUIST, Plaintiff and ellant anti -vs- DONALD H. NYQUIST, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: District Court of the First Judicial District, In and for the County of Lewis & Clark, The Honorable Peter Meloy, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Knight, Dahood, McLean & Everett, Anaconda, Montana For Respondent : Ralph T. Randono; Great Falls,' Montana Submitted on Briefs: May 1, 1981 Decided: July 3 0 1 1981 Piled: JUL 9 0 M r . J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, Jr., delivered t h e Opinion of t h e Court. P l a i n t i f f Carley Nyquist appeals from t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t , conclusions of law and order entered i n the F i r s t J u d i c i a l District Court, Lewis and Clark County. P l a i n t i f f p e t i t i o n e d the c o u r t t o hold defendant i n contempt of c o u r t f o r f a i l i n g t o make maintenance payments. Defendant p e t i t i o n e d t h e c o u r t t o modify t h e maintenance payments due t o p l a i n t i f f under t h e p a r t i e s decree of divorce. The order of t h e D i s t r i c t Court terminated defendant' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r maintenance of t h e p l a i n t i f f . P l a i n t i f f and defendant were married i n September 1949, i n Spokane, Washington. I n September 1973, a decree of divorce was entered by t h e District Court of the F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , L e w i s and Clark County. The decree required defendant t o pay c h i l d support of $100 per month f o r t h e i r minor c h i l d , Dirk Nyquist. The decree f u r t h e r ordered defendant t o pay maintenance t o t h e p l a i n t i f f i n t h e amount of $500 per month from October 1, 1973 u n t i l October 1, 1974, and then $400 per month t h e r e a f t e r . Additionally, defendant w a s required t o pay the premiums necessary t o maintain h e a l t h and h o s p i t a l insurance coverage f o r t h e p l a i n t i f f . When the decree was entered, p l a i n t i f f was employed a s a part-time c l e r k . She subsequently attended and was gradu- a t e d from a beauty school. Presently, she i s employed a s a full-time beautician i n Anaconda, Montana. Her average monthly income from t h i s employment i s approximately $350 t o $400 per month. A t t h e t i m e of the decree, defendant was employed as an o f f i c i a l c o u r t r e p o r t e r f o r the D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l ~ i s t r i c t , Cascade County. Defendant i s c u r r e n t l y employed i n the same capacity and a l s o engages i n a d d i t i o n a l p r i v a t e c o u r t reporting. I n 1979, defendant suffered s e r i o u s medical problems n e c e s s i t a t i n g amputation of one l e g . Defendant was unable t o work f o r a seven-month period from June t o December 1979. The defendant returned t o work as a c o u r t r e p o r t e r part-time i n January 1980. H e resumed full-time employment i n March 1980. Defendant's s a l a r y a s a c o u r t r e p o r t e r i s $18,000 per year. H i s o u t s i d e income v a r i e s from year t o year. Testimony a t t h e hearing e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t defendant's n e t income f o r 1977 was $29,681. For 1978, h i s n e t income w a s $20,694. I n 1979, due t o h i s medical problems, defendant's n e t income dropped t o $15,500. During the f i r s t f i v e months of 1980, defendant's n e t income w a s $7,050. The defendant a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t h i s p r i v a t e work declined as a r e s u l t of t h e amputation of h i s leg. Due t o h i s medical problems, t h e defendant f i l e d a p e t i t i o n f o r modification of t h e decree of divorce on Sep- tember 13, 1979. P l a i n t i f f subsequently f i l e d an a f f i d a v i t i n support of an order t o show cause why the defendant should n o t be held i n contempt f o r f a i l u r e t o comply with t h e decree of divorce. These p e t i t i o n s were heard on June 4 , 1980, and on J u l y 28, 1980. On June 4 , 1980, the defendant appeared and t e s t i f i e d . Neither p l a i n t i f f nor her counsel appeared a t t h i s hearing due t o lack of notice. The p a r t i e s l a t e r s t i p u l a t e d t h a t t h e record could be reopened i n order t o allow t h e p l a i n t i f f t o p r e s e n t her testimony. The p l a i n t i f f appeared and t e s t i f i e d on J u l y 28, 1980. Proposed findings of f a c t and conclusions of law were submitted by the p a r t i e s and on August 26, 1980, t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court entered i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t , conclusions of law and order. The c o u r t found t h a t defendant w a s c u r r e n t i n h i s c h i l d support and l i f e insurance payments and entered f i n d i n g s regarding t h e amount of maintenance defendant had paid t o p l a i n t i f f . The c o u r t f u r t h e r entered f i n d i n g s with regard t o defendant's income and d e b t s and p l a i n t i f f ' s need f o r maintenance. The c o u r t concluded t h a t the p a r t i e s economic circumstances had changed m a t e r i a l l y s i n c e the e n t r y of t h e decree of divorce. The c o u r t then entered t h e following order: "IT IS HEREBY ORDERED t h a t t h e defendant i s no longer responsible f o r t h e maintenance of the p l a i n t i f f herein. "FURTHER I T IS ORDERED t h a t t h e defendant make t h e support payment of $100.00 a month as and f o r support of the minor c h i l d , Dirk Nyquist, t o t h e d a t e the minor c h i l d reaches t h e age of 18. "FURTHER IT IS ORDERED t h a t t h e defendant s h a l l continue t o make t h e premium payments on the p l a i n t i f f ' s l i f e insurance policy." The i s s u e s t o be decided by t h i s Court a r e : 1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n f a i l i n g t o order defendant t o pay delinquent maintenance payments? 2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court e r r e d i n terminating defendant's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o make maintenance payments? The f i r s t i s s u e presented on appeal i s n o t properly before t h i s Court. I t has long been held by t h i s Court t h a t ". . . t h e r e must be a f i n a l judgment from which an appeal may be taken before w e a r e vested with j u r i s d i c t i o n t o make a determination." S t a t e v. City of Helena (1961), 139 Mont. 343, 350, 363 P.2d 720, 723; Rule l ( a ) , M.R.App.Civ.P. I n t h e case a t b a r , t h e i s s u e of maintenance a r r e a r a g e s was presented t o the D i s t r i c t Court by t h e p l a i n t i f f . I n t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t set f o r t h by t h e D i s t r i c t Court, t h e following finding was made: "4. That the defendant was ordered t o pay t h e sum of $400.00 a month a s and f o r maintenance of t h e p l a i n t i f f commencing t h e 1st day of October, 1974. That t h e defendant made a l l of s a i d payments a s required and made a l l t h e payments through 1978 and i n f a c t over paid t h e p l a i n t i f f a s follows: That f o r the year 1979 t h e defendant paid t h e sum of $1,400.00 before becoming ill. That through the years, 1974 through 1978, t h e defendant had over paid alimony i n the amount of $4,153.00." N o conclusion of l a w i s ever drawn from t h i s s p e c i f i c finding. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s only conclusion of law regarding maintenance on t h e p a r t of t h e defendant i s e n t i r e l y prospective. The conclusion reads: "4. That t h e r e a r e m a t e r i a l changes i n the circumstances of t h e defendant's a b i l i t y t o pay and -- t h a t t h e defendant s h a l l no longer be required --- t o pay t h e maintenance -- t o t h e p l a i n t i f f . " (Emphasis added.) From t h i s conclusion, t h e D i s t r i c t Court rendered t h e following order regarding maintenance: "IT IS HEREBY ORDERED t h a t t h e defendant i s no longer responsible f o r t h e maintenance of t h e p l a i n t i f f herein." (Emphasis added.) It i s apparent from t h i s order t h a t t h e maintenance spoken t o i s f u t u r e maintenance, n o t p a s t maintenance. The D i s t r i c t Court made no conclusions with r e s p e c t t o accrued maintenance under t h e decree. N o f i n a l judgment has been rendered. Such a determination i s necessary before t h i s Court i s empowered t o review. A s a r e s u l t , t h i s i s s u e must be remanded f o r f u r t h e r proceedings and f i n a l adjudi- c a t i o n . The second i s s u e presented on appeal s t e m s from t h e D i s t r i c t Court order t h a t ". . . t h e defendant i s no longer responsible f o r t h e maintenance of t h e p l a i n t i f f . . ." This order was based on t h e D i s t r i c t Court's conclusion of law t h a t ". . . m a t e r i a l changes i n t h e circumstances of t h e defendant's ability to pay [maintenance] . . . " existed. This order and conclusion resulted from the District Court's following findings of fact: "5. That the defendant became seriously ill and was hospitalized on April 12, 1979 resulting in the amputation of his leg on June 6, 1979 and continued to be disabled and out of work until January of 1980 when he returned to work part- time and full-time work in March of 1980. "6. That there are material changes in circum- stances in that the defendant testified that his income had drastically diminished. That the net income of the defendant in 1977 was $29,681.38 and in 1978 was $20,694.48 and the net income of 1979 was $15,509.80. That the net income for the defendant for the first five months of 1980 was $7,053.06. "7. That in addition thereto the defendant testified and produced evidence that his take home salary is $880.00 per month and that the defendant's living expenses are approximately $2,000.00 per month. That in addition thereto the defendant is indebted to the Internal Revenue Service in the amount of approximately $6,000.00 and the Department of Revenue in the amount of approximately $800.00 for back taxes. "8. That at the time of the divorce the plaintiff was unemployed. That since that time she has completed beautician school and is employed as a full-time beautician in Anaconda, Montana. "9. That the court finds that there are material changes in circumstances since the entrance of its decree on the 6th day of September, 1973." Modification of maintenance payments, pertinent to this case, is governed by section 40-4-208 (2) (b) (i) , MCA, which provides : "(b) Whenever the decree proposed for modification contains provisions relating to maintenance . . . modification . . . may only be made: "(i) upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unconscionable . . ." In light of the findings of fact made by the District Court, it is apparent that the District Court's decision stemmed primarily from the defendant's decrease in income as a result of his medical problems and the plaintiff's full-time employment as a beautician. However, evidence adduced at the hearings only established the defendant's income from 1977 through May 1980. No evidence was presented regarding the defendant's financial position at the time of divorce decree in September 1973. Thus, although a substantial change is apparent in the defendant's financial position between 1977 and 1980, we are not able to determine the original financial position of the defendant in 1973. Therefore, it is impossible to determine whether the defendant' s ability to pay has substantially changed from the time of dissolution to the time of petition for modification. This same evidentiary deficiency exists for the plaintiff. She testified that at the time of the divorce decree, she was working part-time as a clerk. No evidence was adduced regarding her income from such employment. She testified that following her graduation from beauty school she obtained employment at a beauty salon in Anaconda, and her average monthly salary was $350 to $400. From this evidence, it is impossible to determine whether her degree from the beautician school has substantially changed her ability to earn income. From this evidence, the District Court found that ". . . there are material changes in circumstances since the entrance of its decree on the 6th day of September, 1973." No evidence depicts the situation of the parties as of September 6, 1973. With regard to modifications under section 48-4-208, MCA, the commission comment states that: ". . . the person seeking modification must show that circumstances have changed since -- the date of the original order so that the order is -- unconscionable at the time the motion is made and will continue to be unconscionable unless modified." (Emphasis added.) Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, S316. N o such showing of changed circumstances from the d a t e of o r i g i n a l decree has been made. Additionally, the changed circumstances must continue. Evidence presented a t the hearing by the defendant e s t a b l i s h e d t h a t he had weathered some s e r i o u s medical problems and w a s c u r r e n t l y back t o h i s o f f i c i a l c o u r t r e p o r t i n g job p l u s a d d i t i o n a l p r i v a t e work. A s noted previously, t h e defendant's c o u r t r e p o r t e r employment earned him income of $18,000 per year. H i s o u t s i d e work could only i n c r e a s e t h a t amount. From the evidence, it i s c l e a r t h a t the defendant's circumstances a r e improving from t h e low p o i n t encountered i n 1979. The standard of review applied by t h i s Court i s whether t h e r e i s s u b s t a n t i a l c r e d i b l e evidence t o support t h e D i s t r i c t Court, Rule 5 2 ( a ) , M.R.Civ.P. I n l i g h t of t h e record presented i n t h i s matter, such support i s lacking. Therefore, t h e order of the D i s t r i c t Court must be reversed and t h e c a s e remanded f o r proceedings c o n s i s t e n t with t h i s opinion. J u s t i c e L '