Case Title: Ex parte Tyson Chicken, Inc. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Anna Ruth Guyton v. Tyson Chicken, Inc.)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1090866

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2011-04-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: 04/15/2011
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2010-2011
____________________
1090866
____________________
Ex parte Tyson Chicken, Inc.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Anna Ruth Guyton
v.
Tyson Chicken, Inc.)
(Etowah Circuit Court, CV-09-900357)
PARKER, Justice. 
Tyson Chicken, Inc. ("Tyson"), petitioned this Court for
a writ of mandamus directing the Etowah Circuit Court to
transfer the worker's compensation action brought by Anna Ruth
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2
Guyton to the Marshall Circuit Court where, it says, venue is
proper.
Facts and Procedural History
The facts of this case, as described by Tyson, are
undisputed.  Guyton, who lived in Etowah County, was an
employee of Tyson's at its production facility in Marshall
County.  On August 5, 2009, she was apparently injured on the
job, and she subsequently filed a claim for worker’s
compensation benefits on August 19, 2009, in the Etowah
Circuit Court. 
Tyson filed its answer on August 21, 2009, asserting,
among other things, that venue in Etowah County was improper.
On September 15, 2009, Tyson filed a motion to transfer the
action to Marshall County.  Guyton argued in response that her
residence in Etowah County made venue there proper.  
Tyson’s motion was denied on October 26, 2009.  The trial
court's order reads in full: "It appearing that [Guyton]
resides in Etowah County, [Tyson's] Motion to Transfer Venue
is hereby DENIED."  Tyson petitioned the Court of Civil
Appeals for a writ of mandamus.  That court denied the
petition without an opinion on March 11, 2010.  Ex parte Tyson
1090866
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Chicken, Inc. (No. 2090197, March 11, 2010), __ So. 3d __
(Ala. Civ. App. 2010)(table).  Tyson subsequently petitioned
this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the Etowah Circuit
Court to transfer the case to the Marshall Circuit Court.  We
grant the petition and issue the writ. 
Standard of Review
"'The proper method for obtaining review of a
denial of a motion for a change of venue in a civil
action is to petition for the writ of mandamus.'  Ex
parte Alabama Great Southern R.R., 788 So. 2d 886,
888 (Ala. 2000).  'Mandamus is a drastic and
extraordinary writ, to be issued only where there is
(1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the
order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the
respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to
do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and
(4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court.'  Ex
parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala.
1995). Moreover, our review is limited to those
facts that were before the trial court.  Ex parte
National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So. 2d 788, 789 (Ala.
1998).
"'The burden of proving improper venue is on the
party raising the issue and on review of an order
transferring or refusing to transfer, a writ of
mandamus will not be granted unless there is a clear
showing of error on the part of the trial judge.' Ex
parte Finance America Corp., 507 So. 2d 458, 460
(Ala. 1987).  In addition, this Court is bound by
the record, and it cannot consider a statement or
evidence in a party’s brief that was not before the
trial court.  Ex parte American Res. Ins. Co., 663
So. 2d 932, 936 (Ala. 1995)."
1090866
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Ex parte Pike Fabrication, Inc., 859 So. 2d 1089, 1091 (Ala.
2002).
As the party moving for the transfer, Tyson has the
burden of demonstrating that venue in Etowah County was
improper. Once Tyson made that prima facie showing, the burden
then shifted to Guyton to rebut Tyson's prima facie showing.
See Ex parte Movie Gallery, Inc., 31 So. 3d 104, 109 (Ala.
2009).
Discussion
The sole issue in this case is whether Tyson does
business in such a way in Etowah County as to make venue
proper there.  Venue in the courts of this State is a matter
of statute, not judicial discretion. See § 6-3-1 et seq., Ala.
Code 1975.  Tyson and Guyton agree that venue in this case is
governed by § 6-3-7(a) Ala. Code 1975, which states:
"All civil actions against corporations may be
brought in any of the following counties: 
"(1) 
In 
the 
county 
in 
which 
a
substantial part of the events or omissions
giving rise to the claim occurred, or a
substantial part of real property that is
the subject of the action is situated; or
"(2) 
In 
the 
county 
of 
the
corporation's principal office in this
state; or 
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"(3) In the county in which the
plaintiff resided ... at the time of the
accrual of the cause of action, if such
corporation does business by agent in the
county of the plaintiff's residence; or 
"(4) If subdivisions (1), (2), or (3)
do not apply, in any county in which the
corporation was doing business by agent at
the time of the accrual of the cause of
action."
 
The parties agree that all the events related to this
litigation occurred in Marshall County, where Guyton was
employed by Tyson in its production facility, and that venue
in Marshall County is therefore proper under § 6-3-7(a)(1).
They also agree that Tyson's principal place of business in
Alabama is in Calhoun County and that venue would also be
proper in that county under § 6-3-7(a)(2).  Finally, it is
undisputed that Guyton is a resident of Etowah County, where
she filed her claim.  The only issue before this Court is
whether Tyson does business by agent in Etowah County within
the language of § 6-3-7(a)(3) and, thus, whether venue under
subsection (a)(3) is proper in Etowah County. 
The undisputed facts in this case, as presented by Tyson
and agreed to without exception by Guyton, show no activity by
Tyson in Etowah County sufficient to meet this standard.
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Tyson's principal place of business in Alabama is in Calhoun
County; its production facility is in Marshall County.  Tyson
specifically claims that it does no business by agent in
Etowah County, a claim Guyton did not refute before the trial
court.  Guyton argues that placing a product into the
intrastate stream of commerce, hiring employees who reside in
Etowah County, and having an agent for service of process in
the State are sufficient to meet the statutory requirement of
doing "business by agent in the county of the plaintiff's
residence" and therefore makes venue proper in Etowah County.
Guyton argues that Tyson puts its product, processed
chicken, into the intrastate stream of commerce with the
knowledge that some of that product will almost certainly
appear for sale at retail locations in Etowah County.
Guyton's 
stream-of-commerce 
argument 
is 
an 
incorrect
understanding of the venue statute, confusing venue with the
due-process standards for personal jurisdiction.  In support
of her argument, Guyton cites no cases regarding venue. She
instead cites famous cases regarding personal jurisdiction,
including Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), International
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and Asahi Metal
1090866
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Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102
(1987). Because jurisdiction is not contested here, however,
those cases are inapt. 
Neither the language of § 6-3-7(a)(3) nor the decisions
of this Court support Guyton's argument.  The language of the
statute -- "does business by agent in the county of
plaintiff's residence" -- implies more than the undirected
arrival in the county of the plaintiff's residence of products
produced by the defendant corporation; this Court has
previously interpreted that language to mean that the
corporation, "with some regularity, ... performs there some of
the business functions for which it was created."  Ex parte
SouthTrust Bank of Tuscaloosa County, N.A., 619 So. 2d 1356,
1358 (Ala. 1993).  There is, by contrast, no evidence
indicating that Tyson performs any business functions at any
time in Etowah County.  Guyton does not even allege that those
entities selling Tyson's products are agents of Tyson through
whom it does business, as required by the language of the
statute.
Guyton asks this Court to consider expanding venue to
make venue proper in any county in which a court has personal
1090866
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jurisdiction, but the legislature, not this Court, is the
proper forum to consider such changes to the venue statute as
Guyton suggests.  See § 43, Ala. Const. 1901 ("In the
government of this state ... the judicial [department] shall
never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either
of them ....").
Guyton's other arguments are equally unconvincing.
First, the fact that Tyson has a registered agent in the State
cannot be sufficient to make venue in Etowah County proper
because, if that were so, venue for an action against a
corporation would then be proper in any and every county, and
the statute would be rendered meaningless.  See Chism v.
Jefferson County, 954 So. 2d 1058, 1074 (Ala. 2006)("'It is
presumed that the legislature does not enact meaningless,
vain, or futile statutes.'" (quoting Druid City Hosp. Bd. v.
Epperson, 378 So. 2d 696, 699 (Ala. 1979))).  Second, our
decisions do not indicate that hiring employees constitutes
doing business by their employer in the county where those
employees choose to live; venue is dependent on the decisions
of the defendant corporation, not on the personal choices of
its employees independent of their employment.  See, e.g., Ex
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parte 
Greenetrack, 
Inc., 
25 
So. 
3d 
449, 
454 
(Ala.
2009)(holding that an inter-county bus service transporting
gaming customers from Pickens County to Greene County, where
gaming 
facility 
was 
located, 
was 
"'incidental 
to
[Greenetrack's] corporate business functions'" and therefore
did not constitute "doing business" in Pickens County as those
words were used in the venue statute, even though Greenetrack
also had employees in Pickens County and advertised there
(quoting Ex parte Scott Bridge Co., 834 So. 2d 79, 81-82 (Ala.
2002))).  Similarly, the consideration of the appropriate
weight to be given to the plaintiff’s residency in choosing
between multiple appropriate venues does not arise in this
case, because, as already discussed, Etowah County is not a
proper venue.  Finally, the fact that the courthouse in Etowah
County and the courthouse in Marshall County are only 30 miles
apart and the parties and their counsel would only have to
travel a relatively short distance to Etowah County does not
make venue proper in a county where the requirements of the
venue statute are not met.  
We therefore conclude that venue in Etowah County was
improper as to this case and that the trial court erred in
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refusing to transfer the case to Marshall County.  Tyson has
a legal right to have the case transferred to another circuit
where venue was proper.  Because Tyson properly invoked the
jurisdiction of this Court in its petition, the writ of
mandamus will issue in this case.
Conclusion
Venue in this State is controlled by statute. Although,
as Guyton points out, it is not "set ... into stone," the
proper forum for any change in the law of venue is the
legislature, not this Court.  In the case before us today,
application of the language of the venue statute, as
previously interpreted by this Court, to the facts before us
can lead to only one conclusion: venue is improper in Etowah
County and is proper in Marshall County.  Tyson has
established a clear legal right to have this case transferred.
Therefore, we grant the petition and issue the writ directing
the Etowah Circuit Court to transfer this case to the Marshall
Circuit Court. 
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Cobb, C.J., and Stuart, Shaw, and Wise, JJ., concur.