Case Title: Alvarado v. Industrial Comm'n

Citation: 

Docket Number: 98464

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2005-10-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 98464-Agenda 11-May 2005.
ANGEL ALVARADO, Appellee, v. THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION et al., Appellants.
Opinion filed October 6, 2005.
CHIEF JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the court:
At issue in this case is whether the Illinois Industrial 
Commission (the Commission) may award attorney fees to a claimant's former 
attorneys several months after the Commission approves a settlement between the 
claimant and his employer. The trial court confirmed the Commission's decision 
to award attorney fees to the former attorneys. The appellate court reversed. 
For the reasons that follow, we reverse the decision of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND
Angel Alvarado, the claimant, was injured on August 19, 
1996, while working for his employer, Central Die Casting. On December 16, 1996, 
the law firm of Goldstein, Fishman, Bender & Romanoff (Goldstein) filed an 
application for adjustment of claim on Alvarado's behalf pursuant to the 
Workers' Compensation Act (the Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 
2002)). The matter was assigned to arbitrator Reichart and was designated case 
number 96 WC 066576. In March 1997, Alvarado also entered into an 
attorney-client agreement with the law firm of Ribbeck Maravi, P.C. (Ribbeck), 
although this attorney-client agreement was not filed with the Commission until 
August 11, 1997. Goldstein did not learn that Alvarado had retained Ribbeck 
until August 8, 1997. Alvarado filed a substitution of attorneys with the 
Industrial Commission on August 15, 1997, naming Ribbeck as his attorneys and 
stating that he no longer wanted Goldstein to represent him.
On October 31, 1997, Goldstein filed a petition for 
attorney fees with the Commission, seeking fees in the amount of $1,350. On 
January 5, 1998, arbitrator Reichart continued Goldstein's fee petition and 
entered an order directing Alvarado and his employer, Central Die Casting, to 
immediately notify Goldstein of the settlement or other resolution of the case, 
and ordering Central Die Casting not to issue any drafts in payment of a 
settlement or other resolution until Goldstein's petition for fees had been 
finally and fully resolved.
On August 11, 1999, Alvarado, through Ribbeck, filed a 
second application for adjustment of claim with the Commission. The injury 
alleged in the second claim was the same injury alleged in the original claim 
filed by Goldstein. The second claim was designated case number 99 WC 42929 and 
was assigned to arbitrator Kane. Despite the existence of the 1996 claim, the 
1999 application for adjustment of claim stated that no prior application had 
been filed concerning the injury at issue.
Alvarado then filed a motion to consolidate the 1996 
action and the 1999 action. Notice of this motion was not served on Goldstein. 
The motion to consolidate was allowed on August 31, 1999, and the consolidated 
cases were assigned to arbitrator Reichart. On December 8, 2000, Ribbeck moved 
to voluntarily dismiss the 1996 claim. Goldstein did not receive notice of the 
motion to dismiss. Arbitrator Reichart granted the motion to dismiss the 1996 
claim on January 17, 2001.
The parties then reached a settlement of the 1999 claim. 
The settlement contract provided for attorney fees in the amount of $19,413.33. 
Arbitrator Reichart approved the settlement on March 14, 2001. Goldstein was not 
given notice of the settlement.
Upon learning of the settlement, Goldstein filed a motion 
for fees pursuant to sections 16 and 16a of the Act (820 ILCS 305/16, 16a (West 
2002)). Goldstein's motion was filed on August 9, 2001, five months after the 
settlement was approved and seven months after the 1996 claim was dismissed. At 
the hearing on Goldstein's motion for fees, Alvarado objected to the 
Commission's jurisdiction to consider the motion, arguing that Goldstein should 
have challenged the dismissal of the 1996 action when the dismissal order was 
entered. The Commission rejected Alvarado's challenge, finding that it had 
jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for fees under section 16a of the 
Act. The Commission noted that Goldstein had filed its petition for fees 
immediately after it was discharged by Alvarado and while the 1996 claim was 
still pending. Goldstein took the steps necessary to protect its claim by 
bringing it before arbitrator Reichart on December 2, 1997. The Commission also 
found that the 1999 claim was identical in all respects to the 1996 claim, and 
that the dismissal of the 1996 claim was a mere technicality that could not be 
used to defeat jurisdiction. The Commission further held that Alvarado was 
estopped by his own conduct from claiming that Goldstein's fee petition was 
barred. Accordingly, on January 8, 2002, the Commission ordered Ribbeck to pay 
Goldstein fees in the amount of $1,350 pursuant to section 16a of the Act. In 
addition, the Commission found that the matter should be referred to the 
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission for investigation into whether 
Ribbeck's conduct in the matter was a violation of the Illinois Rules of 
Professional Conduct. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 1.1 et seq.
Alvarado sought judicial review of the Commission's 
decision.(1) The circuit court confirmed the 
Commission's fee apportionment. Alvarado then appealed the circuit court's 
judgment, again arguing that the Commission lacked jurisdiction to reopen its 
final decision to award Goldstein its attorney fees. The appellate court, 
Industrial Commission division, with two justices dissenting, reversed the 
circuit court's judgment and vacated the Commission's award of attorney fees to 
Goldstein. 347 Ill. App. 3d 352. In vacating the Commission's award of attorney 
fees to Goldstein, the appellate court held that the case before it was 
indistinguishable from the appellate court's decision in Hoshor v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 283 Ill. App. 3d 295 (1996). In Hoshor, the 
court held that because the Commission's approval of a settlement, including an 
attorney fee provision, has the same legal effect as an award, the approved 
settlement is final unless a petition for review is filed within 20 days. 
Hoshor, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 298. Once an award becomes final, the 
Commission lacks jurisdiction to reopen the award and apportion attorney fees in 
a manner inconsistent with the original decision. Hoshor, 283 Ill. App. 
3d at 298.
Applying Hoshor, the appellate court in this case 
held that, because no petition for review had been filed following the 
Commission's approval of the settlement, there was no basis for the Commission 
to reopen the settlement to award Goldstein its attorney fees. 347 Ill. App. 3d 
at 357. The appellate court further held that fraud is not a sufficient basis 
for extending the subject matter jurisdiction of an administrative agency. 347 
Ill. App. 3d at 357. Rather, the appropriate method for seeking relief under the 
circumstances was for Goldstein to file an equitable action to set aside the 
Commission's judgment based upon fraud. 347 Ill. App. 3d at 357.
The dissenting justices argued that the Commission was 
properly authorized to enter the order for compensation. 347 Ill. App. 3d at 
358. The dissenting justices stated that support for the Commission's 
jurisdiction could be found in section 7080.10 of the Administrative Code (50 
Ill. Adm. Code §7080.10(a)(1) (2003)), which provides that, when a dispute 
arises between a petitioner and his attorney or former attorney, either party 
may file a petition to fix fees with the Commission. 347 Ill. App. 3d at 358.
Goldstein then petitioned the appellate court for 
rehearing. The appellate court denied the petition for rehearing, but did file a 
statement that the case involves a substantial question that warrants 
consideration by this court. This court granted Goldstein's petition for leave 
to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). This court also allowed the Commission's (now 
known as the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission) motion for leave to be 
aligned as an appellant and to file a brief.

ANALYSIS
As noted, the parties' dispute in this case centers on the 
Commission's authority to apportion attorney fees after a settlement award has 
become a final award. Because the issue of whether the Commission had the 
authority to award Goldstein's fees raises a question of law, our review is 
de novo. Lyon v. Department of Children & Family Services, 209 Ill. 2d 264, 271 (2004).
The Commission is an administrative agency, and therefore, 
it has no general or common law powers. Chicago v. Fair Employment Practices 
Comm'n, 65 Ill. 2d 108, 113 (1976). The Commission's powers are limited to 
those granted by the legislature, so that any action taken by the Commission 
must be specifically authorized by statute. Business & Professional People 
for the Public Interest v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 136 Ill. 2d 192, 243 
(1989). Consequently, when an administrative agency acts outside its specific 
statutory authority, it acts without "jurisdiction." Business & Professional 
People, 136 Ill. 2d  at 243. Although the term "jurisdiction" is not 
strictly applicable to an administrative body, this court has held that the term 
may be employed to designate the authority of an administrative body to act. 
Business & Professional People, 136 Ill. 2d  at 243. Where an agency enters 
a decision that it has no statutory power to enter, the decision is void. 
Business & Professional People, 136 Ill. 2d  at 244.
With regard to attorney fees, the Act does authorize the 
Commission to award attorney fees and to resolve fee disputes. For example, 
section 16 of the Act states that "[t]he Commission shall have the power to 
determine the reasonableness and fix the amount of any fee of compensation 
charged by any person, including attorneys ***, for any service performed in 
connection with this Act, or for which payment is to be made under this Act or 
rendered in securing any right under this Act." 820 ILCS 305/16 (West 2002). 
Section 16a of the Act provides that:
"Any and all disputes regarding attorneys' fees, whether 
such disputes relate to which one or more attorneys represents the claimant or 
claimants or is entitled to the attorneys' fees, or a division of attorneys' 
fees where the claimant or claimants are or have been represented by more than 
one attorney, or any other disputes concerning attorneys' fees or contracts for 
attorneys' fees, shall be heard and determined by the Commission after 
reasonable notice to all interested parties and attorneys." 820 ILCS 305/16a(J) 
(West 2002).
Although the preceding statutory sections specifically 
provide that the Commission is authorized to award attorney fees and to resolve 
fee disputes, those sections do not specify time frames for filing fee 
petitions, resolving fee disputes, or reviewing fee petitions. Consequently, the 
appellate court in this case, relying on Hoshor v. Industrial Comm'n, 
283 Ill. App. 3d 295 (1996), looked to the statutory provisions setting forth 
the procedures for review of a Commission decision. With regard to review of a 
Commission decision, the Act states that "[t]he decision of the Commission 
acting within its powers *** shall, in the absence of fraud, be conclusive 
unless reviewed as in this paragraph hereinafter provided." 820 ILCS 305/19(f) 
(West 2002). The Act further provides that "[a] proceeding for review shall be 
commenced within 20 days of the receipt of notice of the decision of the 
Commission." 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(1) (West 2002). A settlement contract approved 
by the Commission has the same legal effect as an award by the Commission. 
Ahlers v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 73 Ill. 2d 259 (1978).
The Act specifies two instances where the Commission may 
reopen or modify a final award. Section 19(f) provides that the Commission or a 
party may move to "correct any clerical error or errors in computation within 15 
days after the date of receipt of any award by such Abitrator or any decision on 
review of the Commission." 820 ILCS 305/19(f) (West 2002). In addition, section 
19(h) provides that where an employee's disability has recurred, increased, 
diminished or ended, an agreement or award under the Act may be reviewed by the 
Commission. 820 ILCS 305/19(h) (West 2002).
Hoshor held that the Commission's authority to 
consider and allow fee petitions was limited by the preceding provisions 
providing for review of Commission decisions. In Hoshor, the claimant 
was represented by the law firm of Kanoski & Associates (Kanoski), with attorney 
Patricia Hayes handling the case. Hoshor, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 296. When 
Hayes left Kanoski to start her own firm, Kanoski reassigned claimant's case to 
another attorney in the firm. Hoshor, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 296. Kanoski 
later received a letter from claimant stating that she had retained Hayes as her 
attorney. Hoshor, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 296. Claimant later advised 
Kanoski that Hayes had obtained a settlement offer of more than $5,000, which 
was higher than the settlement offer of $4,405 that Kanoski had previously 
obtained. Hoshor, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 296. When Kanoski telephoned the 
insurance adjuster to confirm the higher offer and to inform the adjuster that 
Kanoski was transferring the file to Hayes, the insurance adjuster raised the 
settlement offer to $6,500. Hoshor, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 296. Claimant 
authorized Kanoski to settle for $6,500, but after Kanoski had prepared the 
settlement papers, claimant told Kanoski that she wanted Hayes to complete the 
settlement. Hoshor, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 296. The parties thereafter 
signed and filed an attorney substitution form. Hoshor, 283 Ill. App. 
3d at 296. The settlement contract for $6,500, less $975 in attorney fees, was 
signed by claimant, Hayes and the claims adjuster in June 1992. Hoshor, 
283 Ill. App. 3d at 296. The Commission approved the settlement agreement in 
July 1992. Hoshor, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 296.
Eight months later, on March 5, 1992, Kanoski filed a 
petition for fees pursuant to section 16a(J) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/16a(J) 
(West 2002)). Hoshor, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 296. Following a hearing, the 
Commission awarded fees to Kanoski and ordered Hayes to tender fees to Kanoski 
in the amount of $881, along with costs in the amount of $35.40. Hoshor, 
283 Ill. App. 3d at 296-97. The circuit court confirmed the Commission's award, 
but the appellate court reversed. Hoshor, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 297.
On appeal, Hayes argued that the award of attorney fees to 
Kanoski was void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because there was no 
provision in the Act that permitted the reopening of a case to award fees eight 
months after a final order had been entered. Hoshor, 283 Ill. App. 3d 
at 297. The appellate court agreed with Hayes. The appellate court first noted 
that neither the Act nor the Commission rules set a time frame within which an 
attorney must petition for fees. Hoshor, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 297. The 
appellate court noted that the settlement contract, which was approved by the 
Commission, clearly set forth the amount to be paid claimant and the amount 
deducted for attorney's fees. Hoshor, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 297-98. The
Hoshor court held that because no petition for review had been filed, 
the Commission's decision, which included the award of attorney fees, became 
final 20 days after approval. Hoshor, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 298. The 
appellate court held that absent a timely application for review, the Commission 
was without jurisdiction to reopen its final decision in order to grant 
Kanoski's petition for attorney fees. Hoshor, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 298. 
Specifically, the court stated that:
"In sum, we hold that an approved settlement agreement by 
the Commission becomes a final award after 20 days, where no petition for review 
is filed. 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(1) (West 1994). Such finality precludes reopening 
to reconsider a previous award of disability or attorney fees, except as 
provided by the Act. Recognizing that the Commission cannot exercise perpetual 
and unlimited jurisdiction to reopen claims, the Act has placed severe 
limitations on the Commission's power to reopen awards. As such, we cannot find 
any statutory authority that would permit the Commission to reopen an approved 
settlement award after eight months to hear a petition for fees, where fees were 
already granted in the final decision." Hoshor, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 
299.
Alvarado argues that this court should apply the reasoning 
of Hoshor and affirm the appellate court's decision in this case. 
Although conceding that Goldstein was never given notice of the motion to 
consolidate, the motion to dismiss the 1996 claim, or the settlement of the 
claim, Alvarado nonetheless argues that the Commission lacked authority to 
reopen the settlement award because Goldstein did not commence a proceeding for 
review within 20 days of the Commission's decision. Alvarado contends that in 
the absence of a timely petition for review, the Commission erred in reopening 
the award to grant Goldstein's untimely petition for fees.
Goldstein and the Commission respond that the settlement 
award was not a final award because it did not resolve Goldstein's fee petition, 
which was pending prior to the settlement of the claim. Because the fee petition 
remained pending, the approval of the 1999 settlement was not final and 
reviewable until the Commission resolved Goldstein's fee petition. In the 
alternative, Goldstein and the Commission argue that the Commission had 
jurisdiction to consider Goldstein's fee petition because the fee petition was a 
collateral matter distinct from the claim between Alvarado and his employer.(2)
Upon review, we agree with Alvarado and the Hoshor 
court that the Commission's approval of a settlement agreement becomes a final 
award after 20 days if no petition for review is filed, and that the Commission 
no longer has jurisdiction to reopen or reconsider an award beyond that date 
except as specifically provided in the Act. We disagree, however, that 
Goldstein's fee petition in this case required the Commission to reopen or 
reconsider its final award. The settlement award at issue was between Alvarado 
and his employer, Central Die Casting, and included an award of $19,413.33 in 
attorney fees to Ribbeck. Once that award became final, the Commission was 
without jurisdiction to order Alvarado or Central Die Casting to pay attorney 
fees to Goldstein. In determining the fee dispute in this case, however, the 
Commission did not reopen or modify the final settlement to provide for an 
additional $1,350 in attorney fees. The Commission did not order Alvarado to pay 
Goldstein $1,350 in attorney fees, nor did the Commission order Central Die 
Casting to pay Goldstein $1,350 in attorney fees. Rather, pursuant to section 
16a, the Commission ordered Ribbeck to pay Goldstein $1,350 from the 
$19,413.33 in attorney fees that Ribbeck had received pursuant to the 
settlement. This was a collateral matter that was distinct from the settlement 
between Alvarado and Central Die Casting. Under the circumstances, we hold that 
the Commission acted within its jurisdiction pursuant to sections 16 and 16a of 
the Act in ordering Ribbeck to pay Goldstein its fees. To the extent that the 
appellate court's decision in Hoshor holds that once a settlement award 
becomes a final award, the Commission does not have jurisdiction to consider fee 
petitions or fee disputes between attorneys that are collateral to the approved 
settlement, that decision is hereby overruled.
In so holding, we caution that our decision today does not 
grant attorneys license to do nothing to protect their interest in attorney fees 
pending settlement of a claimant's workers' compensation claim. Although the 
Commission may have jurisdiction to consider a former attorney's fee petition 
after an approved settlement or award becomes a final award, the Commission may 
nonetheless hold that the attorney failed to adequately protect his right to 
claim a portion of the attorney fees and deny that petition. Ultimately, the 
question of whether an attorney unreasonably delayed in filing a petition for 
attorney fees is a fact question for the Commission to decide. Our holding today 
is that, even where a settlement or award has become a final award, the 
Commission does have jurisdiction to resolve fee disputes pursuant to sections 
16 and 16a of the Act as long as those disputes are collateral to the final 
award in the workers' compensation claim.
Finally, we note that there is some merit to the argument 
of Goldstein and the Commission that the March 14, 2001, settlement of 
Alvarado's claim was not final because Goldstein's fee petition remained 
pending, so that the Commission retained jurisdiction to consider that petition. 
Indeed, the fact that Goldstein filed its fee petition prior to the settlement 
of Alvarado's claim distinguishes this case from Hoshor. We decline to 
decide the case on that basis, however, because the ramifications of such a 
holding would be contrary to the intent of the Act, as set forth in section 
16a(A). Section 16a(A) provides that:
"In the establishment or approval of attorney's fees in 
relation to claims brought under this Act, the Commission shall be guided by the 
provisions of this Section and by the legislative intent, hereby declared, to 
encourage settlement and prompt administrative handling of such claims and 
thereby reduce expenses to claimants for compensation under this Act." 820 ILCS 
305/16a(A) (West 2002).
See Board of Education of the City of Chicago v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 93 Ill. 2d 1, 14 (1982) (overriding purpose of the Act 
"is to compensate claimants as early and as thoroughly as possible for income 
lost due to job-related injuries").
As the Commission itself acknowledged during oral 
argument, it would be contrary to the intent of the Act to allow disputes 
between attorneys over fees to delay final settlement of an injured employee's 
claim. Our holding, that disputes between attorneys over fees is a collateral 
matter which does not interfere with the finality of a settlement agreement, is 
consistent with the intent of the Act to encourage prompt settlement of workers' 
compensation claims.

CONCLUSION
We find that the Commission had jurisdiction pursuant to 
sections 16 and 16a of the Act to consider Goldstein's fee petition. The 
Commission, therefore, properly ordered Ribbeck to pay Goldstein $1,350 in 
attorney fees. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court, 
which vacated the judgment of the circuit court. We affirm the circuit court's 
judgment confirming the Commission's fee apportionment.



Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed.



JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring:
At issue is whether the Illinois Industrial Commission 
could award attorney fees to a claimant's former attorneys several months after 
the Commission approved a settlement between the claimant and his employer. The 
majority holds that the Commission had jurisdiction to consider the former 
attorneys' fee petition. In the majority's view, the Commission properly ordered 
the claimant's current attorney to pay the former attorneys a portion of the 
attorney fee award that the current attorney received pursuant to the 
settlement. I, too, believe that the Commission had jurisdiction to consider the 
fee petition at issue. Thus, I join in the result reached by the majority. I 
write separately, however, to distance myself from the majority's analysis. In 
particular, under the majority's analysis, the Commission's jurisdiction hinges 
upon the source of payment of the attorneys' fees rather than the type of action 
at issue. I believe that the majority's solution to the question of jurisdiction 
is both incomplete and unworkable.

ANALYSIS
Goldstein filed an application for adjustment of claim on 
Alvarado's behalf for injuries that Alvarado sustained while working for Central 
Die Casting. Subsequently, Alvarado retained new counsel, Ribbeck, who settled 
the claim for a lump-sum payment. As noted above, the majority holds that the 
Commission had jurisdiction to award Goldstein attorney fees several months 
after the Commission approved the lump-sum settlement between Alvarado and 
Central Die Casting. The majority reasons that the hearing on the fee petition 
was a collateral proceeding which did not require that the award to Alvarado be 
reopened. The majority emphasizes that the Commission ordered Ribbeck to pay the 
fees rather than Alvarado or Central Die Casting:
"The settlement award at issue was between Alvarado and 
his employer, Central Die Casting, and included an award of $19,413.33 in 
attorney fees to Ribbeck. Once that award became final, the Commission was 
without jurisdiction to order Alvarado or Central Die Casting to pay attorney's 
fees to Goldstein. In determining the fee dispute in this case, however, the 
Commission did not reopen or modify the final settlement to provide for an 
additional $1,350 in attorney fees. The Commission did not order Alvarado to pay 
Goldstein $1,350 in attorney fees, nor did the Commission order Central Die 
Casting to pay Goldstein $1,350 in attorney fees. Rather, pursuant to section 
16a, the Commission ordered Ribbeck to pay Goldstein $1,350 from the 
$19,413.33 in attorney fees that Ribbeck had received pursuant to the 
settlement. This was a collateral matter that was distinct from the settlement 
between Alvarado and Central Die Casting. Under the circumstances, we hold that 
the Commission acted within its jurisdiction pursuant to sections 16 and 16a of 
the Act in ordering Ribbeck to pay Goldstein its fees." (Emphases in original.) 
Slip op. at 9.
I reiterate my agreement with the result reached by the 
majority. Pursuant to section 16 of the Workers Compensation Act (820 ILCS 
305/16 (West 2002)), the Commission may determine the reasonableness and fix the 
amount of any fee of compensation charged by any person, including attorneys, 
for any service performed in connection with the Act. Further, section 16a of 
the Act provides that "[a]ny and all disputes regarding attorneys' fees, whether 
such disputes relate to which one or more attorneys represents the claimant or 
claimants or is entitled to the attorneys' fees, or a division of attorneys' 
fees where the claimant or claimants are or have been represented by more than 
one attorney, or any other disputes concerning attorneys' fees or contracts for 
attorneys' fees, shall be heard and determined by the Commission after 
reasonable notice to all interested parties and attorneys." 820 ILCS 305/16a 
(West 2002). I believe that a hearing on an attorney's fee petition is in the 
nature of a supplemental proceeding, authorized by the Act, which does not 
affect the validity of the underlying compensation award to the claimant. So 
long as the attorney's fee petition is pending at the time that the Commission 
makes its decision on the compensation award to the claimant, the Commission 
retains jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness and fix the amount of the 
fee charged by the attorney for services performed in connection with the 
application for adjustment of claim. The jurisdiction of the Commission is 
determined by the type of action at issue, a supplemental hearing on a petition 
for attorney fees.
In the present case, Goldstein filed its petition for fees 
on August 31, 1997. Thus, Goldstein's petition was pending at the time the 
arbitrator approved the settlement agreement between Alvarado and Central Die 
Casting.(3) Because Goldstein's fee petition was 
not resolved at the hearing on the settlement agreement, I believe that the 
Commission retained jurisdiction to fix the amount of Goldstein's fee at a later 
date and provide either for payment of the fee from the compensation award or 
from monies already paid to Ribbeck from the compensation award. These payment 
options would not reopen the final settlement to increase the total compensation 
paid by Central Die Casting. Rather, the total compensation would be 
reapportioned in order to provide for payment of Goldstein's fees by Ribbeck, if 
payment had already been forwarded to him, or by Alvarado.
While I agree with the majority that the Commission 
retained jurisdiction to consider Goldstein's fee petition, for several reasons 
I believe that the majority's analysis is problematic. First, the majority 
apparently makes subject matter jurisdiction in this case hinge upon the 
source of payment of the attorneys' fees rather than the type of action at 
issue. According to the majority, the Commission had jurisdiction because the 
Commission was dealing only with Goldstein and Ribbeck, and the Commission 
ordered Ribbeck to pay Goldstein's fees. I do not believe, however, that section 
16a of the Act is limited to disputes between attorneys. See 820 ILCS 305/16a 
(West 2002). The section specifically refers to disputes relating to "which one 
or more attorneys represents the claimant or claimants or is entitled to the 
attorneys' fees," and disputes relating to "a division of attorneys' fees where 
the claimant or claimants are or have been represented by more than one 
attorney." But the section also refers to "any other disputes 
concerning attorneys' fees or contracts for attorneys' fees." (Emphasis added.) 
It is not inconceivable that such other disputes might involve the 
claimant and an attorney.
Limiting the Commission's jurisdiction to disputes between 
attorneys is an incomplete and unworkable solution to the question of 
jurisdiction. Consider the scenario where a claimant discharges his attorney; 
the attorney files a fee petition; the claimant follows the same course of 
conduct as in the case at bar; and the arbitrator approves the lump-sum 
settlement without resolving the attorney's fee petition. Is the Commission 
without jurisdiction thereafter to order the pro se claimant to pay the 
attorney's fees from the settlement amount? Also, consider a scenario similar in 
all ways to the facts of the present case, with the exception that the 
settlement agreement provides for payment of all monies to the claimant.(4) A side agreement between the claimant and his 
attorney provides for payment of the attorney's fees. Does the Commission lack 
authority to order the claimant to pay a portion of the compensation received 
through the settlement to the attorney who initially represented the claimant? 
Lastly, in making the second attorney liable to the first attorney for payment 
of the first attorney's fees, I believe the majority is ignoring a problem that 
may be caused by slow, or nonexistent, payments from either the employer or the 
claimant to the second attorney. The second attorney will certainly not want to 
pay the first attorney monies that the second attorney has not yet received. 
Even considering that the second attorney may have a cause of action for his 
fees, will the second attorney necessarily pursue that cause of action, thereby 
protecting the first attorney's share of the fees? I believe that it is 
problematic to tie jurisdiction to the source of payment rather than 
the type of action involved, that is, an action for attorney fees.
The position of the majority would also seem contrary to 
this court's opinion in Collins v. Industrial Comm'n, 12 Ill. 2d 200 
(1957). In Collins, U.S. Collins and George Traicoff, attorneys, 
represented the claimant before the Commission in proceedings arising out of the 
death of her husband. The arbitrator awarded the claimant compensation benefits 
on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children, as well as medical and 
hospital expenses. No appeal being taken, the awards became final. On its own 
motion, on February 1, 1955, the Commission gave notice that a hearing would be 
set for the determination of attorney fees. Thereafter, on March 2, 1955, the 
claimant filed a petition for a lump-sum settlement in order to buy a house and 
to pay attorney fees. On March 4, 1955, the Commission sent separate notices for 
the hearing on the petition for lump-sum settlement and the hearing on attorney 
fees. The notice for the fee hearing designated the claimant as petitioner, and 
Collins and Traicoff as respondents. Following the hearing, on May 13, 1955, the 
Commission rejected the petition for lump-sum settlement. Two months later, on 
July 12, 1955, the Commission entered an order fixing the reasonable value of 
the services rendered by Collins and Traicoff at $300. Collins and Traicoff 
filed a writ of certiorari to review the Commission's order. The 
circuit court quashed the writ upon the claimant's motion.
On appeal, the court reversed, finding proper 
jurisdiction. We noted that by statute the circuit court has the " 'power to 
review all questions of law and fact presented' " by the record before the 
Commission. Collins, 12 Ill. 2d  at 202, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, 
ch. 48, par. 138.19. The Commission is expressly authorized to fix the fees of 
attorneys for services performed in connection with the Act. The Act "thus 
contemplates that the matter of fees of attorneys is one of the questions of law 
or fact that may arise and be 'presented by [the] record.' " Collins, 
12 Ill. 2d  at 202. We also rejected the claim that judicial review is limited to 
"parties" and that the attorneys are not parties. We characterized the hearing 
on attorney fees as a supplemental hearing before the Commission, and 
judged that Collins and Traicoff were parties to the supplemental hearing at 
which their fees were determined. Collins, 12 Ill. 2d  at 202-03.
The majority cites Collins for the proposition 
that the circuit court has jurisdiction under the Act to review an award of 
attorney fees but fails to grasp two matters of import in the opinion. First, 
the Collins court would not have determined that the circuit court had 
jurisdiction to review the Commission's fee award unless the court was also of 
the opinion that the Commission had jurisdiction to consider and determine the 
fees of Collins and Traicoff for the services rendered to the claimant. Second, 
the Commission designated the claimant and her attorneys as parties to 
the hearing on attorney fees; the attorneys sought judicial review; and the 
claimant opposed the circuit court's jurisdiction. The real significance of 
Collins, as it applies to the case at bar, is that after the arbitrator's 
awards became final, the Commission retained jurisdiction to determine the 
attorneys' fee issue in a proceeding which did not involve a dispute between 
attorneys but rather a dispute between the claimant and her attorneys.
Second, the majority opinion is incomplete in that it does 
not address the lack of notice to Goldstein. There was a dispute as to the 
proper division of attorney fees since Alvarado was represented by two law 
firms, both of which were petitioning for fees. Where a fee dispute exists, 
section 16a(J) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/16a(J) (West 2002)) requires that notice 
be given to all interested parties and attorneys. Goldstein did not receive the 
required notice, and thus was unaware of the proceedings wherein the arbitrator 
approved the settlement agreement, awarding Ribbeck $19,413.33 in fees. An 
argument can be made that the Commission did not have the authority to approve 
the settlement agreement's provision for attorney fees precisely because 
Goldstein was never notified of the proceedings.
Third, in outlining the instances when the Commission may 
reopen or modify a final award, the majority opinion fails to distinguish 
between decisions involving lump-sum awards or settlement contracts approved by 
the Commission, and decisions involving awards or settlement contracts approved 
by the Commission where payments are to be made in installments. See slip op. at 
6 ("section 19(h) provides that where an employee's disability has recurred, 
increased, diminished or ended, an agreement or award under the Act may be 
reviewed by the Commission"). A more accurate statement of the law is that an 
agreement or award providing for compensation in installments may, at any time 
within 18 months after such agreement or award, be reviewed by the Commission on 
the ground that the disability of the employee has recurred, increased, 
diminished or ended. However, when compensation that is payable in accordance 
with an award or settlement contract approved by the Commission is ordered paid 
in a lump sum by the Commission, no review is available. See 820 ILCS 305/19(h) 
(West 2002). The appropriate distinction is particularly necessary to avoid 
confusion since the present case involves a lump-sum settlement.

CONCLUSION
I join in the result reached by the majority, but not in 
its analysis. I believe that the jurisdiction of the Commission must turn upon 
the type of action at issue. To base the Commission's jurisdiction upon the 
source of payment of the attorneys' fee is to needlessly limit the Commission's 
jurisdiction to fee disputes between attorneys, leaving aside other fee disputes 
that may arise under the Act. I also believe that the majority analysis is 
incomplete without a discussion of the lack of notice. Lastly, the majority sows 
confusion by failing to recognize the distinction between lump-sum settlements 
and settlements based upon installment payments. For these reasons, I cannot 
join fully the majority opinion.
JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this special concurrence.
 
 
1. 
Despite the fact that Alvarado remains the named plaintiff-appellee, review of 
the Commission's apportionment of attorney fees involves a dispute between the 
Commission, Goldstein and Ribbeck. For purposes of consistency, our opinion 
references the named appelleeAlvaradoeven though the interests at issue in 
this appeal are primarily the interests of Ribbeck. Although Goldstein and 
Ribbeck were not parties to the underlying workers' compensation claim, this 
court has recognized that the question of attorney fees is one of the questions 
of law or fact that might arise under the Act. Collins v. Industrial Comm'n, 
12 Ill. 2d 200, 202 (1957). Consequently, the circuit court has jurisdiction 
under the Act to review an award of attorney fees and, for purposes of such 
review, attorneys are "parties to the supplemental hearing at which their fees 
were determined." Collins, 12 Ill. 2d  at 203.
2.  In their briefs, Goldstein and the Commission also argued that 
Alvarado was equitably estopped from claiming that Goldstein's fee petition was 
barred. At the oral argument of the case, however, the parties stated that they 
have elected to waive that argument.
3.  I agree with the majority that the subterfuge of filing a new, but 
identical, claim in 1999 and dismissing the 1996 claim should not impact the 
1997 fee petition in any way.
4.  It should be noted that, by statute, all attorneys' fees for 
representation of an employee shall only be recoverable from compensation 
actually paid to the employee. See 820 ILCS 305/16a(I) (West 2002).