Case Title: In re Disqualification of Zmuda

Citation: 2017-Ohio-317

Docket Number: 16-AP-105

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2017-01-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as In re Disqualification of Zmuda, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2017-Ohio-317.] 
 
 
 
IN RE DISQUALIFICATION OF ZMUDA. 
THE STATE OF OHIO v. SLEDGE. 
[Cite as In re Disqualification of Zmuda, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2017-Ohio-317.] 
Judges—Affidavits 
of 
disqualification—R.C. 
2701.03—Affiant 
failed 
to 
demonstrate bias or prejudice—Disqualification denied. 
(No. 16-AP-105—Decided January 9, 2017.) 
ON AFFIDAVIT OF DISQUALIFICATION in Lucas County Court of Common Pleas 
Case No. CR 2014-01185. 
____________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J. 
{¶ 1} Defendant, Bryan Sledge, through his attorney, Kurt Bruderly, has 
filed an affidavit with the clerk of this court under R.C. 2701.03 seeking to 
disqualify Judge Gene Zmuda from presiding over any further proceedings in the 
above-captioned case. 
{¶ 2} In 2014, Mr. Sledge entered a plea of no contest to two counts of gross 
sexual imposition and one count of rape stemming from allegations that he sexually 
abused two of his ex-girlfriend’s daughters when they were seven and four years 
old.  After finding Mr. Sledge guilty, Judge Zmuda sentenced him to 17 years in 
prison.  In 2016, the Sixth District Court of Appeals vacated Mr. Sledge’s no-
contest plea, finding that it had not been knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 
made.  See State v. Sledge, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-15-1109, 2016-Ohio-4904.  The 
case is now pending for trial before Judge Zmuda. 
{¶ 3} In his affidavit of disqualification, Mr. Sledge claims that Judge 
Zmuda is biased and prejudiced against him because the judge repeatedly called 
him a “predator” and a “vile human being” at his initial sentencing hearing. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 4} Judge Zmuda has responded in writing to the affidavit, denying any 
bias or prejudice against Mr. Sledge and explaining the basis for his comments at 
the initial sentencing hearing. 
{¶ 5} For the reasons explained below, no basis has been established to 
order the disqualification of Judge Zmuda. 
{¶ 6} “Because a sentencing judge must ordinarily explain the reasons for 
imposing a sentence, judicial comments during sentencing, even if disapproving, 
critical, or heavy-handed, do not typically give rise to a cognizable basis for 
disqualification.”  In re Disqualification of Winkler, 135 Ohio St.3d 1271, 2013-
Ohio-890, 986 N.E.2d 996, ¶ 9.  As the United States Supreme Court explained, 
 
[t]he judge who presides at trial may, upon completion 
of the evidence, be exceedingly ill disposed towards the 
defendant, who has been shown to be a thoroughly reprehensible 
person.  But the judge is not thereby recusable for bias or 
prejudice, since his knowledge and the opinion it produced were 
properly and necessarily acquired in the course of the 
proceedings, and are indeed sometimes (as in a bench trial) 
necessary to completion of the judge’s task. 
 
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550-551, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 
(1994). 
{¶ 7} Here, Judge Zmuda explains that he made the unfavorable sentencing 
comments to Mr. Sledge based on the record before him—including Mr. Sledge’s 
convictions and courtroom behavior—and while he was attempting to explain his 
rationale for imposing consecutive sentences.  Judge Zmuda affirms that 
notwithstanding his prior comments, Mr. Sledge is now before him having not been 
January Term, 2017 
 
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found guilty of any criminal conduct in this proceeding, and therefore the burden 
is on the state to demonstrate guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
{¶ 8} Based on this record, Judge Zmuda’s isolated sentencing comments 
do not establish that he is unable to fairly and impartially preside over the 
underlying trial.  It is not unusual for trial judges to use strong language when 
sentencing defendants who have been convicted of sexual crimes against children.  
But as noted above, a judge’s harsh sentencing comments will not ordinarily lead 
to disqualification.  “This is so in part because a sentencing judge is the embodiment 
of public condemnation and social outrage * * *.”  Flamm, Judicial 
Disqualification, Section 16.4, at 397 (2d Ed.2007, Supp.2016).  Further, there is 
nothing to suggest that Judge Zmuda’s prior comments were not based on the record 
before him, and most importantly, he has affirmed that on remand, Mr. Sledge will 
once again maintain a presumption of innocence.  Compare Winkler (disqualifying 
a judge from resentencing a defendant because, among other reasons, the judge’s 
descriptions of the defendant and other comments at the initial sentencing might 
have caused an objective observer to question whether the judge could fairly weigh 
any arguments that the defendant may offer on resentencing); In re Disqualification 
of Sutula, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2016-Ohio-____, __ N.E.3d __ (disqualifying a judge 
from resentencing a defendant based on the judge’s comments and conduct at the 
initial sentencing, including her apparent reliance on extrajudicial sources to justify 
her sentence). 
{¶ 9} “A judge is presumed to follow the law and not to be biased, and the 
appearance of bias or prejudice must be compelling to overcome these 
presumptions.” In re Disqualification of George, 100 Ohio St.3d 1241, 2003-Ohio-
5489, 798 N.E.2d 23, ¶ 5.  Those presumptions have not been overcome in this 
case. 
{¶ 10} Accordingly, the affidavit of disqualification is denied.  The case 
may proceed before Judge Zmuda. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
 
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{¶ 11} Finally, it is important to note that in his response to Mr. Sledge’s 
affidavit of disqualification, Judge Zmuda states that the process under R.C. 
2701.03 is “the only avenue to challenge a trial judge based on bias or prejudice, 
because a party cannot challenge bias or prejudice on appeal.”  To support this 
view, Judge Zmuda cites State v. Earls, 1st Dist. No. C-040531, 2006-Ohio-4029.  
Earls, however, misquoted (and misinterpreted) the Ohio Constitution by stating 
that it gives the chief justice “exclusive jurisdiction to determine a claim that a 
common pleas judge is biased or prejudiced.”  Id. at ¶ 16.  Instead, the Ohio 
Constitution, Article IV, Section 5(C) provides that the chief justice “shall pass 
upon the disqualification of any judge of the courts of appeals or courts of common 
pleas.”  It is well settled that “a criminal trial before a biased judge is fundamentally 
unfair and denies a defendant due process of law.”  State v. LaMar, 95 Ohio St.3d 
181, 2002-Ohio-2128, 767 N.E.2d 166, ¶ 34, citing Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 
577, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986).  And an appellant forfeits a claim of 
judicial bias if it is not raised in an appeal to the courts of appeal.  Id. at ¶ 35.  Thus, 
contrary to Judge Zmuda’s contention, an affidavit of disqualification is not the 
“only avenue” to raise a claim of judicial bias. 
________________________