Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V BRIAN LEE HILL

Citation: 

Docket Number: 138668

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2010-07-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED JULY 23, 2010 
 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No. 138668
 
BRIAN LEE HILL, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
 
MARKMAN, J.  
 
This case presents the question whether a defendant who downloads child sexually 
abusive material from the Internet and “burns” that material to a CD-R1 may be convicted 
of violating MCL 750.145c(2), which provides that any person who “arranges for, 
produces, makes, or finances . . . any . . . child sexually abusive material,” is guilty of a 
                                              
1 CD stands for “compact disc.”  A CD-R (compact disk-recordable) is a blank 
compact disc that an individual can purchase and onto which pictures, movie or video 
files, and various other digital images, information, and data can be “burned,” or saved 
permanently, through the use of a computer.  One definition of the term “burn” is “to 
record data on (a compact disc).”  Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2001). 
 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Opinion 
 
Chief Justice: 
Marilyn Kelly 
 
 
Justices: 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Stephen J. Markman 
Diane M. Hathaway 
 
 
 
 
2
felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years or whether the defendant 
may only be convicted of violating MCL 750.145c(4), which makes the knowing 
possession of child sexually abusive material a felony punishable by imprisonment for 
not more than 4 years.   
The Court of Appeals held that a defendant, even if his intent in burning the 
prohibited images to a CD-R was to retain those images for personal use, may be 
convicted of the 20-year felony under MCL 750.145c(2).  We respectfully disagree.  
MCL 750.145c has a graduated scheme of offenses and punishments.  It punishes (1) 
those who are responsible for the origination of child sexually abusive material (a 20-
year felony), (2) those who are responsible for the distribution and promotion of the 
prohibited material (a 7-year felony), and (3) those who are responsible for the knowing 
possession of the prohibited material (a 4-year felony).  From these three tiers of offenses 
and punishments, we conclude that the Legislature did not intend the imposition of the 
same maximum punishment on a person who downloads a prohibited image from the 
Internet and burns it to a CD-R for personal use as on the person who is responsible in the 
first instance for the creation and existence of the pornographic images of minors.  The 
person who is responsible for bringing the prohibited images into existence is obviously 
more morally, and under the statute, more criminally, culpable than the person who 
downloads an image and saves it to another medium for personal use.   
We hold that when the terms “produces” and “makes” in MCL 750.145c(2) are 
construed in accordance with their immediately surrounding text and with a view toward 
the statute’s overall organization, including a graduated scheme of offenses and 
 
 
3
punishments, a defendant may not be convicted of the 20-year felony when there is not 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that he had a criminal intent to do something other than 
possess the CD-Rs for his own personal use.  Just as a person who downloads a song 
from the Internet and burns it to a CD-R is not considered to have produced or made a 
song, so a person who burns a prohibited image to a CD-R for his personal use has not 
produced or made the image.   
It is clear that the Legislature intended only that defendant could be convicted of 
the 4-year felony of knowingly possessing child sexually abusive material under MCL 
750.145c(4).  Those who copy or duplicate existing prohibited images for personal use do 
not produce or make child sexually abusive material under MCL 750.145c(2); rather, 
they are only in possession of it.  MCL 750.145c(2) is primarily applicable to those who 
originate child sexually abusive material.  Therefore, we reverse in part the judgment of 
the Court of Appeals, vacate defendant’s convictions under MCL 750.145c(2), and 
remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.2  
I.  FACTS AND HISTORY 
As relevant here, defendant was charged with five counts of “arrang[ing] for, 
produc[ing], mak[ing], or financ[ing]” child sexually abusive material, in violation  
of MCL 750.145c(2), after a search of his two laptop computers and approximately 50 
                                              
2 Defendant was also convicted of five counts of using a computer to commit a 
crime, MCL 752.796 and MCL 752.797(3)(f), and three counts of installing a device for 
observing, photographing, or eavesdropping in a private place, MCL 750.539d.  These 
convictions are not before us. 
 
 
4
CD-Rs found in his bedroom.  After being bound over for trial, defendant moved to 
quash the information with regard to these charges, arguing that the burning or saving of 
images or data to a CD-R does not rise to the level of producing or making child sexually 
abusive material.  He further argued that the transfer of images from the Internet to his 
computer’s hard drive and then to the CD-Rs constituted nothing more than the storage of 
data.  Thus, he contended that he should only be charged with “knowingly possess[ing]” 
child sexually abusive material under MCL 750.145c(4) because he had not originated 
the prohibited images.   
The trial court denied this motion, stating: 
[T]he only question, one of apparent first impression, is whether the 
act of downloading the image from the internet and “burning” (recording) 
the image to a CD constitutes the “making” or “production” of such 
materials.   
The dictionary . . . contains several definitions of the word “make.”  
Among them are: 
To cause to exist, occur, or appear; create; to fit, intend, or destine 
by, or as if by creating; to bring into being by forming, shaping, or altering 
material; to put together from components. 
Applying this definition here, the “bottom line” is that, after the 
requisite, mechanical, and technical functions, some things exist (CD-Rs 
with these images on them) that did not exist prior to that act. 
Defendant appealed by leave granted, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in a published 
opinion, stating: 
The term “make” is defined as follows: “to bring into existence by 
shaping, changing, or combining material[.]”  Random House Webster’s 
College Dictionary (2001).  Defendant acquired child sexually abusive 
material through the Internet, and he shaped, formed, and combined the 
material through placement of various selected pictures, videos, and images 
onto specific CD-Rs, bringing into existence something that had not 
 
 
5
previously existed, i.e., distinctly created and compiled child-pornography 
CD-Rs.  [People v Hill, 269 Mich App 505, 518; 715 NW2d 301 (2006).] 
The Court of Appeals also stated: 
Regardless of whether defendant’s actions are viewed as copying the 
original photographs and videos, or copying electronic or computer visual 
images of the downloaded photographs and videos, the fact remains that 
copies and reproductions were made.  Defendant’s argument that use of the 
CD-Rs was just a mechanism by which to store possessed child 
pornography ignores the reality that the storing of the images was 
accomplished through the copying or duplication of already existing images 
that continued to exist after the images were burned onto the CD-Rs.  The 
language of the statute is clear and unambiguous.  The decision by the 
Legislature to specifically include reproductions or copies in defining 
“child sexually abusive material,” which term is then incorporated into 
[MCL 750.145c(2)], leaves no room for a contrary judicial construction.  
[Id. at 517.] 
We denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal, with three justices 
indicating that they would grant leave to appeal.  477 Mich 897 (2006).  We also denied 
defendant’s motion for reconsideration, with three justices indicating that they would 
grant reconsideration and, on reconsideration, would grant leave to appeal.3  477 Mich 
1016 (2007).  Defendant next unsuccessfully sought relief in federal court.  Hill v People, 
2007 US Dist LEXIS 47700 (WD Mich, July 2, 2007, Case No 1:07-CV-271), and then 
proceeded to a bench trial.  As relevant to the convictions under review, the evidence 
demonstrated that defendant had downloaded and copied to CD-Rs five specific images 
                                              
3 See also People v Hartman, 480 Mich 1058 (2008), in which three justices 
indicated that they would grant leave to appeal to consider whether someone who 
downloaded child sexually abusive material from the Internet and saved it to a “flash 
drive” could properly be convicted of violating MCL 750.145c(2).   
 
 
6
depicting child sexually abusive material.4  The trial court found defendant guilty of five 
counts of violating MCL 750.145c(2), stating: 
The proofs show a repeated pattern of taking an image off the 
computer and moving it or saving it somewhere else where it did not 
previously exist. . . .  Mr. Hill is guilty of . . . making, producing etc. child 
sexually abusive materials . . . [that] were created by affirmative action by 
the user. 
Defendant appealed in the Court of Appeals, which affirmed his convictions and declined 
his request to reconsider its earlier published decision holding that the downloading and 
burning of child sexually abusive material to a CD-R constitutes making or producing 
child sexually abusive material.  People v Hill, unpublished opinion per curiam of the 
Court of Appeals, issued February 19, 2009 (Docket No. 281055).5  This Court then 
granted leave to appeal.  485 Mich 911 (2009). 
II.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether conduct falls within the scope of a penal statute, in this case MCL 
750.145c(2), is a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo.  People v 
Stone, 463 Mich 558, 561; 621 NW2d 702 (2001).   
 
 
                                              
4 Although the convictions under review pertained only to 5 images, the evidence 
here showed that defendant possessed 50 CD-Rs containing approximately 100,000 
images and that an estimated 70 percent of these constituted child sexually abusive 
material.    
5 The Court of Appeals did, however, identify errors in the scoring of defendant’s 
offense variables under the sentencing guidelines and remanded for resentencing. 
 
 
7
III.  RULES OF INTERPRETATION 
MCL 750.145c is a relatively lengthy statute.  Most relevant for present purposes 
are subsections (2) through (4), which provide: 
(2) A person who persuades, induces, entices, coerces, causes, or 
knowingly allows a child to engage in a child sexually abusive activity for 
the purpose of producing any child sexually abusive material, or a person 
who arranges for, produces, makes, or finances, or a person who attempts 
or prepares or conspires to arrange for, produce, make, or finance any child 
sexually abusive activity or child sexually abusive material[6] is guilty of a 
felony, punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or a fine of 
not more than $100,000.00, or both, if that person knows, has reason to 
know, or should reasonably be expected to know that the child is a child or 
that the child sexually abusive material includes a child or that the depiction 
constituting the child sexually abusive material appears to include a child, 
or that person has not taken reasonable precautions to determine the age of 
the child.  
(3) A person who distributes or promotes, or finances the 
distribution or promotion of, or receives for the purpose of distributing or 
promoting, or conspires, attempts, or prepares to distribute, receive, 
finance, or promote any child sexually abusive material or child sexually 
abusive activity is guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment for not 
more than 7 years, or a fine of not more than $50,000.00, or both, if that 
                                              
6 MCL 750.145c(1)(m) defines “child sexually abusive material” as follows: 
“Child sexually abusive material” means any depiction, whether 
made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, including a 
developed or undeveloped photograph, picture, film, slide, video, electronic 
visual image, computer diskette, computer or computer-generated image, or 
picture, or sound recording which is of a child or appears to include a child 
engaging in a listed sexual act; a book, magazine, computer, computer 
storage device, or other visual or print or printable medium containing such 
a photograph, picture, film, slide, video, electronic visual image, computer, 
or computer-generated image, or picture, or sound recording; or any 
reproduction, copy, or print of such a photograph, picture, film, slide, 
video, electronic visual image, book, magazine, computer, or computer-
generated image, or picture, other visual or print or printable medium, or 
sound recording.   
 
 
8
person knows, has reason to know, or should reasonably be expected to 
know that the child is a child or that the child sexually abusive material 
includes a child or that the depiction constituting the child sexually abusive 
material appears to include a child, or that person has not taken reasonable 
precautions to determine the age of the child. This subsection does not 
apply to the persons described in section 7 of 1984 PA 343, MCL 752.367. 
(4) A person who knowingly possesses any child sexually abusive 
material is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 
4 years or a fine of not more than $10,000.00, or both, if that person knows, 
has reason to know, or should reasonably be expected to know the child is a 
child or that the child sexually abusive material includes a child or that the 
depiction constituting the child sexually abusive material appears to include 
a child, or that person has not taken reasonable precautions to determine the 
age of the child. 
 
The issue here is how the terms “produces” and “makes” in subsection (2) should be 
interpreted. 
The rules of statutory construction are well established.  As this Court explained in 
G C Timmis & Co v Guardian Alarm Co, 468 Mich 416, 420-422; 662 NW2d 710 
(2003):  
When construing a statute, the Court's primary obligation is to 
ascertain the legislative intent that may be reasonably inferred from the 
words expressed in the statute.  If the language of the statute is 
unambiguous, the Legislature is presumed to have intended the meaning 
expressed.   
*   *   * 
The doctrine of noscitur a sociis, i.e., that “a word or phrase is given 
meaning by its context or setting,” affords us assistance in interpreting 
[statutes]. . . . 
 
. . . “[Statutes] exist[] and must be read in context with the entire act, 
and the words and phrases used there must be assigned such meanings as 
are in harmony with the whole of the statute . . . .”  “[W]ords in a statute 
should not be construed in the void, but should be read together to 
harmonize the meaning, giving effect to the act as a whole.”  Although a 
 
 
9
phrase or a statement may mean one thing when read in isolation, it may 
mean something substantially different when read in context.  “In seeking 
meaning, words and clauses will not be divorced from those which precede 
and those which follow.”  “It is a familiar principle of statutory 
construction that words grouped in a list should be given related meaning.”  
[Citations omitted.]  
We are also instructed to give undefined statutory terms their plain and ordinary meaning 
unless the undefined word or phrase is a term of art.7   
The Legislature did not specifically define the terms “produces” or “makes.”  
Therefore, it is appropriate to consider dictionary definitions to discern the meanings of 
these terms.  Oakland Co Bd of Co Rd Comm’rs v Mich Prop & Cas Guaranty Ass’n, 456 
Mich 590, 604; 575 NW2d 751 (1998).  
 
From all of this, it is clear that what a court should do in construing a term in a 
criminal statute for which there are a variety of potential definitions is to determine from 
among those definitions which the Legislature most reasonably intended by the specific 
context in which the term is found.   
IV.  APPLICATION 
 
This Court first considered MCL 750.145c in People v Tombs, 472 Mich 446; 697 
NW2d 494 (2005).  In Tombs, the defendant turned in a company laptop computer, and 
more than 500 images of child pornography were found on it in a file location not readily 
                                              
 
7 MCL 8.3a provides: 
All words and phrases shall be construed and understood according 
to the common and approved usage of the language; but technical words 
and phrases, and such as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate 
meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such 
peculiar and appropriate meaning. 
 
 
10
or easily locatable.  The defendant was convicted of violating MCL 750.145c(3), 
promoting or distributing child sexually abusive material.  This Court first recognized the 
longstanding principle that a criminal statute is presumed to include a criminal intent or 
mens rea absent an express or implied indication that the Legislature wanted to dispense 
with it.  Id. at 456-457 (opinion by KELLY, J.); id. at 466 (TAYLOR, C.J., concurring).8  
We then held that the criminal intent to possess child sexually abusive material was not 
the same as the criminal intent to promote or distribute child sexually abusive material.  
Id. at 448 (opinion by KELLY, J.).  We affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals that 
reversed the defendant’s conviction for distributing or promoting child sexually abusive 
material, stating: “Although defendant intended to distribute the laptop containing child 
sexually abusive material to his former employer, no evidence suggests that he 
distributed the material with a criminal intent.”  Id. at 459-460. 
The lead opinion in Tombs examined MCL 750.145c and proceeded to summarize 
the Court’s position as follows: “The Legislature expressly separated the crimes of 
                                              
8 As explained in People v Beaudin, 417 Mich 570, 574; 339 NW2d 461 (1983): 
“Performance of the physical act proscribed in the statute is not enough to sustain a 
conviction.  The act must be coincident with an intent to bring about the particular result 
the statute seeks to prohibit.”  It is also the case that common-law defenses are “read 
into” criminal statutes.  See, e.g., United States v Panter, 688 F2d 268, 271 (CA 5, 1982), 
which explained that a legislature’s 
failure to provide specifically for a common-law defense in drafting a 
criminal statute does not necessarily preclude a defendant charged with 
violating that statute from relying on such a defense.  This conclusion is 
unassailable; statutes rarely enumerate the defenses to the crimes they 
describe. 
 
 
11
production of child sexually abusive material, distribution or promotion of the material, 
and simple possession.”  Id. at 464.  It further stated:  
Possession is not the same as promotion.  The prosecutor blurs the 
two, asserting that by obtaining the material from the Internet, defendant 
promoted it.  To accept that argument, this Court would have to ignore the 
express language of the Legislature that created a graduated scheme of 
offenses and punishments regarding child sexually abusive material.  [Id.][9] 
 
Tombs recognized that MCL 750.145c clearly establishes three tiers in its graduated 
scheme of both offenses and punishments.  Those who are involved in the production of 
child sexually abusive material are subject to a maximum sentence of 20 years, those who 
distribute or promote such material are subject to a maximum sentence of 7 years, and 
those who knowingly possess such material are subject to a maximum sentence of 4 
years.   
There is an inherent logic to this scheme.  The Legislature reasonably concluded 
that those who distribute or promote child sexually abusive material are more morally 
and criminally culpable than those who possess such material and that those who create 
or originate such material are the most morally and criminally culpable.  The case at bar 
requires us to determine whether defendant’s act of downloading and burning child 
                                              
9 Accord People v Adkins, 272 Mich App 37, 40; 724 NW2d 710 (2006) (“We 
conclude that the language of [MCL 750.145c(2)] clearly and unambiguously imposes 
criminal liability on three distinct groups of ‘person[s],’ provided that at the time of their 
actions, the persons met the requisite knowledge element.”).  See also People v Ward, 
206 Mich App 38, 42-43; 520 NW2d 363 (1994), in which the Court of Appeals observed 
that MCL 750.145c(2) “focuses on protecting children from sexual exploitation, 
assaultive or otherwise” and that the purpose of the statute is “to combat the use of 
children in pornographic movies and photographs, and to prohibit the production and 
distribution of child pornography.”   
 
 
12
sexually abusive material to CD-Rs falls within the top tier or the bottom tier; it is not 
argued by either party that it falls within the middle tier, and we also do not believe that it 
does, for what defendant has done does not constitute the promotion or distribution of 
child sexually abusive material.  That is, unlike Tombs, this case does not involve 
determining whether a defendant’s conduct falls within adjacent tiers and whether it is 
punishable as a 4-year or 7-year felony.  Rather, this case involves determining whether 
defendant’s conduct falls within the lowest or the highest tier and thus whether defendant 
has committed a 4- or 20-year felony.   
 
We keep the graduated scheme of MCL 750.145c and the magnitude of the 
potential disparity in defendant’s criminal liability in mind as we attempt to discern the 
most reasonable definitions for “produces” and “makes” as used in MCL 750.145c(2).  
Again, the pertinent language of that subsection is “arranges for, produces, makes, or 
finances” any child sexually abusive material.  On the basis of the previously stated 
principles, we must consider MCL 750.145c as a whole in determining the meaning of 
“produces” and “makes” in this statutory context.  Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a 
sociis, these words must be viewed in light of the surrounding terms employed in MCL 
750.145c(2), i.e., “arranges for” and “finances,” because the latter supply guidance 
regarding what the former mean in context.   
 
“Makes” and “produces” are used in MCL 750.145c(2) as verbs that may 
communicate a variety of different concepts.  The Court of Appeals adopted the first 
definition of “make” in the Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2001)-- “to 
bring into existence by shaping, changing, or combining material[.]”  Hill, 269 Mich App 
 
 
13
at 518.  But this is only one of many definitions for “make” in that dictionary.  The 
second and third definitions are as follows: “2. to cause to exist or happen . . . . 3. to 
cause to become . . . .”  The same dictionary also provides the following relevant 
definitions of “produce”: “1. to cause to exist; give rise to . . . . 2. to bring into 
existence . . . . 7. to bring (a play, movie, opera, etc.) before the public.”  We also 
consider the surrounding words, “arranges for” and “finances.”  The dictionary offers the 
following relevant definitions of “arrange” as in “arranges for”: “3. to prepare or 
plan . . . .  5. to make plans or preparations . . . .”  For “finances,” it offers the following 
relevant definition: “3. to supply with money or capital . . . .”   
The definitions of “arranges for,” “finances,” and “produce” afford obvious insight 
into how the adjoining term “make” should be interpreted.  When these four words are 
viewed together, their relatedness or common meaning becomes increasingly apparent-- 
each constitutes a verb selected by the Legislature to communicate that persons included 
within this subsection are those who are somehow responsible for the creation or 
origination of child sexually abusive material.  Those who arrange for child sexually 
abusive material are involved at the front end of the process by identifying and 
coordinating the participants, equipment, and locations.  That is, the arranger has 
undertaken actions that lead to the actual production of the child sexually abusive 
material.  Those who finance child sexually abusive material provide funding that leads 
to the same result.  The terms “arranges for” and “finances” suggest that the most 
reasonable understanding of “produce” is “to bring (a play, movie, opera, etc.) before the 
public.”  In other words, one should envision a producer as a person similar to the 
 
 
14
producer of a play, movie, or opera who is directly responsible for the creation or 
origination of a particular production, in this case child sexually abusive material.  
“Produce” refers to the conduct of those persons but for whom the production (the 
material) would not exist in the first place, i.e., those who have transformed an idea into a 
reality.  Without those who have arranged for, financed, or produced, there would be no 
child sexually abusive material at all.  
This leaves the term “makes.”  Given the related definitions and understandings of 
“arranges,” “produces,” and “finances,” we believe that “makes” should be interpreted in 
a similar manner as meaning “to cause to exist or happen” or “to cause to become.”10  
That is, “makes” should be interpreted in the common fashion as referring to someone 
who is primarily involved in the creation or origination of the child sexually abusive 
material.11   
                                              
10 While we agree with the first part of the definition adopted by the Court of 
Appeals, “to bring into existence,” we reject the second half of that definition, “by 
shaping, changing, or combining material,” Hill, 269 Mich App at 518, because it adds a 
limiting dimension to “makes” that is inconsistent with the meanings of the surrounding 
terms, “arranges for,” “produces,” or “finances.”   
11 This understanding of “produces” and “makes” is consistent with the opening 
clause of MCL 750.145c(2), which describes other individuals subject to punishment 
under that subsection: “[a] person who persuades, induces, entices, coerces, causes, or 
knowingly allows a child to engage in a child sexually abusive activity for the purpose of 
producing any child sexually abusive material[.]”  The terms used in the opening clause 
clearly refer to those who have had direct contact with a minor, either through the 
minor’s recruitment or through the minor’s “performance” in the prohibited material.  
While those identified in the opening clause definitely are persons who directly deal with 
the children, those identified in the second clause, the arrangers, producers, makers, and 
financers, may also on frequent occasion have direct contact with the children.   
 
 
15
When the terms “produces” and “makes” are understood in this light, it is simply 
untenable to conclude that downloading an existing image from the Internet and burning 
it to a CD-R for personal use constitutes producing or making child sexually abusive 
material under MCL 750.145c(2).  While such conduct certainly constitutes proof of 
knowing possession of such material, it does not constitute sufficient proof of the making 
or producing of that material.  Thus, when we consider the statute as a whole, especially 
the maxim of noscitur a sociis in conjunction with the graduated scheme of offenses and 
punishment, we conclude that MCL 750.145c(2) is primarily concerned with punishing 
those who are involved in the creation or origination of child sexually abusive material 
and not those who download and maintain that material for personal use.12   
The Court of Appeals held that defendant had made child sexually abusive 
material, in violation of MCL 750.145c(2), because he brought into existence something 
that had not previously existed.  We respectfully disagree with this analysis.  While the 
                                              
12 Indeed, we note that before the instant Court of Appeals opinion, all published 
Michigan caselaw only applied the portion of MCL 750.145c(2) concerning a person who 
“produces” or “makes” child sexually abusive material to those involved in the creation 
or origination of prohibited images.  See, e.g., People v Heim, 206 Mich App 439; 522 
NW2d 675 (1994) (defendant who photographed his 16-year-old niece), People v Hack, 
219 Mich App 299; 556 NW2d 187 (1996) (defendant who coerced two children to 
engage in sexual acts that he videotaped), People v Riggs, 237 Mich App 584; 604 NW2d 
68 (1999) (defendant who photographed and videotaped four young girls), People v 
Harmon, 248 Mich App 522, 526-528; 640 NW2d 314 (2001) (defendant who 
photographed two minors engaged in sexual acts), and People v Wilkens, 267 Mich App 
728; 705 NW2d 728 (2005) (defendant who recorded himself and two minors engaging 
in sexual acts).  Thus, those who originate or create child pornography are guilty of 
violating MCL 750.145c(2), even if they only intend to keep the material for personal 
use. 
 
 
16
burned CD-Rs may not have previously existed, this does not mean, in our judgment, that 
defendant made child sexually abusive material within the scope of MCL 750.145c(2).  
The fact that defendant placed prohibited images from different websites onto CD-Rs 
does not by itself rise to the level of making child sexually abusive material within the 
scheme enacted by the Legislature.13  Rather, such a reading of the statute can only be 
reached if one fails to give full consideration to the statute’s graduated scheme of 
offenses and punishments and if the term “makes” is read in isolation and without 
considering the immediately surrounding words.  When “makes” is given a meaning 
reasonably compatible with those companion terms, its most reasonable interpretation 
pertains to the creation or origination of the child sexually abusive material in the first 
instance. 
                                              
13 In Tombs, we held that the criminal intent to knowingly possess child sexually 
abusive material was not the same as the criminal intent to promote or distribute child 
sexually abusive material.  Tombs, 472 Mich at 448 (opinion by KELLY, J.).  Similarly, 
we hold here that the criminal intent to knowingly possess child sexually abusive 
material, when the possession is accomplished by burning a CD-R for the purpose of 
possessing the prohibited images and not for future distribution or promotion, does not 
establish the criminal intent to produce or make child sexually abusive material.  In 
Tombs, we also held that one who handed a computer containing child pornography to 
someone else did not distribute child pornography, even though the act of handing a 
computer to another person would satisfy a dictionary definition of “distribute.”  The 
Court held that the act of intentionally handing a computer over to another was 
insufficient by itself to constitute distributing child pornography.  Rather, there had to be 
some criminal intent to distribute, and the defendant in Tombs did not possess that intent.  
Similarly, defendant here burned CD-Rs, and these acts by themselves did not constitute 
making or producing child pornography because there was no proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt that this was defendant’s intent when he burned the CD-Rs for his personal use. 
 
 
17
We believe our conclusion is reinforced by consideration of the manner in which 
most persons ordinarily think about other types of Internet downloading.  It is common 
today for computer users to legally, and sometimes illegally, download songs, movies, 
television shows, music videos, and books from the Internet.  When such materials are 
subsequently burned to a CD-R or recordable DVD or some other storage device, as they 
often are, few would be inclined to characterize that conduct as the making or producing 
of that song, movie, television show, music video, or book.  Such a characterization 
would, to say the least, be strained and incompatible with the “common and approved 
usage of the language . . . .”  MCL 8.3a.14  
The Court of Appeals and the dissents focus on the fact that MCL 750.145c(1)(m) 
defines “child sexually abusive material” as “any depiction,” including any “reproduction 
[or] copy,” of a “computer-generated image, or picture . . . .”  Thus, they read the 
prohibition against making or producing child sexually abusive material in conjunction 
with the fact that a reproduction or copy of a computer-generated image falls within the 
ambit of prohibited images in concluding that burning a prohibited image to a CD-R 
                                              
14 We further believe the Court of Appeals’ analysis produces highly anomalous 
results.  Consider two persons, one of whom downloads and burns child sexually abusive 
material to a CD-R for his personal possession and one of whom takes that CD-R and 
attempts to sell it.  Under the dissents and the Court of Appeals’ decision, the downloader 
has committed a 20-year felony while the seller has committed only a 7-year felony.  We 
do not believe that this is consistent with the Legislature’s intentions because the three 
tiers of MCL 750.145c instead suggest that the distributor is more criminally culpable 
than the downloader who, in order to obtain possession, has burned the prohibited images 
to a CD-R.  When the Legislature has deemed the maker more culpable than the 
distributor, we disagree with the dissents’ broad interpretation of “make,” which we 
believe casts a far broader net than intended by the Legislature. 
 
 
18
constitutes making prohibited material.  Again, we respectfully disagree.  If an image 
constitutes child sexually abusive material, this is true without regard to whether a 
defendant is someone who arranges for, produces, makes, or finances, or who distributes 
or promotes, or who only knowingly possesses.  In other words, once it is determined that 
an image constitutes child sexually abusive material, it must then be determined into 
which of the statute’s three tiers the defendant’s conduct falls.   
The fact that the definition of “child sexually abusive material” in MCL 
750.145c(1)(m) includes copies of computer-generated images does not provide 
particular insight into what either “makes” or “produces” means in MCL 750.145c(2).  
Rather, the fact that child sexually abusive material includes not just originals but also 
copies simply communicates that a person may be charged with knowingly possessing a 
copy of a computer-generated image, or with promoting or distributing a copy of a 
computer-generated image, or with arranging for, producing, making, or financing a copy 
of a computer-generated image, in a manner indistinguishable from the person engaged in 
those same activities in connection with an original image.  
Defendant here was convicted of five counts of producing or making child 
sexually abusive material on the basis of 5 specific images.  A review of his 2 laptop 
computers and 50 CD-Rs revealed 5 copies of one of the images and fewer, or no, 
duplicates of the other images that sustained his convictions.  The fact that 5 copies of a 
single prohibited image were found after searching 52 different locations containing 
approximately 70,000 images is insufficient, in our judgment, in the absence of other 
evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt a criminal intent on defendant’s part to 
 
 
19
produce or make this material.15  Since a common definition of “child sexually abusive 
material” applies to all three tiers of MCL 750.145c, we conclude that the Legislature did 
not intend that burning, or copying, images to a CD-R would have any special 
significance when determining which particular tier had been violated by that burning or 
copying. 
We are persuaded that the Legislature did not intend to impose the same maximum 
penalty on a person who downloads a prohibited image from the Internet and burns it to a 
CD-R for personal use as on the person who is responsible for the creation of the 
pornographic images of children.  The latter is obviously more morally and criminally 
culpable than the person who downloads an image and saves it to another medium for 
personal use; at least, this is what the Legislature, in our judgment, has communicated by 
its enactment of MCL 750.145c.  Those who arrange for, produce, make, or finance child 
sexually abusive material are punished more severely because they are the reason the 
images exist in the first place.   
While the Court of Appeals’ definition of “makes” has some dictionary support, 
its analysis was incomplete because it did not consider the statute as a whole and because 
it did not consider that “makes” should be given a meaning compatible with its 
                                              
15 Cf. People v Peterson, 63 Mich App 538, 548; 234 NW2d 692 (1975): 
[T]he quantity of [marijuana] seeds possessed was so slight that we 
are constrained to find that reasonable jurors could not infer the intent to 
deliver from that quantity.  There was no other evidence on the question of 
defendant's intent.  It was therefore error for the trial judge to deny 
defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on the charged 
offense. 
 
 
20
surrounding words.  When properly construed, the terms “produces” and “makes” are 
best understood as addressing those who are involved in the creation or origination of 
child pornography, and not those who download and burn a CD-R of prohibited images 
for personal use. 
V.  RESPONSE TO THE DISSENTS 
The dissents obscure the issue before the Court by emphasizing the large quantity 
of prohibited images found in defendant’s possession.  There is no doubt that defendant 
possessed a very considerable amount of child sexually abusive material.  However, the 
question before this Court is not whether defendant was a committed user of child 
sexually abusive material-- he was-- or whether he criminally violated MCL 750.145c--  
he did-- but whether burning even a single prohibited image to a CD-R constitutes 
producing or making child sexually abusive material in violation of MCL 750.145c(2).16   
The dissents fail to adequately consider the statute’s overall organization and 
graduated scheme of offenses and punishments.  As a consequence, the dissents end up 
blurring, and eventually ignoring altogether, the very distinct criminal definitions and 
requisite states of mind necessary to obtain a conviction under MCL 750.145c when they 
interpret “makes” as encompassing the conduct of a person who burns a prohibited image 
to a CD-R for the purpose of storing, or making permanent, his possession of that image.  
                                              
16 Even Justice YOUNG recognizes this in asserting in his dissent that “[m]aking 
even a single copy of child pornography violates the statute.”  Whether there is a large 
number of prohibited images in defendant’s possession may well be a factor for the trial 
court to consider at sentencing; however, this does not transform a violation of subsection 
(4) of MCL 750.145c into a violation of subsection (2) of that statute. 
 
 
21
Contrary to Justice YOUNG’s assertion that the majority “would prefer that the statute 
cease” after its most severe violation has been defined, it is the dissenting justices who 
inappropriately read this language in isolation, ignoring the overall structure and 
organization of the statute, ignoring the distinct offenses that the statute defines, and 
ignoring the gradations of punishment that the statute establishes.  It is the dissents that 
distort what is manifest in the statute-- that distinctions are to be made among criminal 
violators, distinctions predicated on whether the violator has created or originated the 
material, distributed the material, or merely possessed the material.   
The dissents would compress nearly every criminal violator into the category of 
“creator” or “originator” on the basis of their having made a copy of material created or 
originated by others.  Thus, to the dissenters, there is no distinction, as we believe is 
manifest in the statute, between a person who downloads and burns child sexually 
abusive material to a storage device and the person who procures the seven-year-old girl, 
pays her parents, and then produces a film or image in which she is depicted in sexual 
poses.17  However, these are distinctions that the Legislature has made, and they are 
reasonable distinctions.  The dissents notwithstanding, we do not “relieve[] . . . of 
criminal responsibility” the computer downloader when we recognize that the Legislature 
drew distinctions in MCL 750.145c between types of misconduct.  No criminal 
responsibilities are being “relieved” when legislative distinctions are respected and the 
                                              
17 The question of what offense a mass producer of copies of a single prohibited 
image would be guilty is not before us, and we do not address it in this case.  
 
 
22
computer downloader of prohibited material is made subject to a 4-year term of 
imprisonment and the distributor of the same material is made subject to a 7-year term of 
imprisonment instead of the 20-year term of imprisonment reserved for the producer of 
the material, but for whose actions the material would never have existed in the first 
place.  The Legislature is entitled to draw distinctions in its definitions of criminal 
activity, and this Court is obligated as a general matter to abide by those distinctions.    
Given that various things can be downloaded from the Internet and burned to other 
media, the dissents’ strained interpretation of the term “makes” would have consequences 
far beyond the instant case.  A person can download-- legally or illegally-- songs, books, 
music videos, television shows, or movies from the Internet and burn them to another 
medium such as a CD-R or recordable DVD.  Yet virtually no one beyond the dissenting 
justices would consider such a person to have “made” or “produced” those songs, books, 
music videos, television shows, or movies.  The legal or illegal downloader of Star Wars 
is not the equivalent of Stephen Spielberg, the legal or illegal downloader of The Da 
Vinci Code is not the equivalent of Dan Brown, and the legal or illegal downloader of the 
Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band album is not the equivalent of John Lennon or 
Paul McCartney.  Even if these downloaders preserve the materials on a CD or DVD, 
they have not “made” those movies, “made” those books, or “made” that music in the 
same way as the creators of the materials.18  Similarly, we are satisfied that a person who 
                                              
18 That the illegal downloading and burning of a song, movie, or book may 
constitute a violation of federal copyright law, as Justice YOUNG asserts, post at 9 n 8, 
bears little relevance to whether a person who downloads and burns for personal use a 
 
 
 
23
burns a prohibited image to a CD-R or recordable DVD for his personal use is not the 
equivalent of the person who procured the child, placed the cameras in front of her, and 
created or originated child sexually abusive material.  While both are criminally liable, 
they are liable under different sections of the statute. 
Indeed, under the dissents’ interpretations, one might argue that someone who 
only viewed a prohibited image on a computer screen is guilty of making child 
pornography, given that computers themselves automatically store viewed images in 
temporary files.  In other words, if Justice YOUNG genuinely believes that burning even a 
single prohibited image to a CD-R always constitutes making child pornography because 
it increases “the net amount of child pornographic images in existence,” it would seem 
that consistency would require that a defendant who is merely aware of such temporary 
files would also be guilty of making child sexually abusive material whenever he views 
those images. 
Finally, the dissents also assert that the majority has created “out of whole cloth” 
an “additional hurdle” by requiring proof of a defendant’s intent.  This is plainly 
incorrect.  There is nothing at all remarkable in a court’s reading a criminal intent into a 
criminal statute, given that such statutes are generally presumed to include a criminal 
intent.  See Morissette v United States, 342 US 246; 72 S Ct 240; 96 L Ed 288 (1952); 
Staples v United States, 511 US 600; 114 S Ct 1793; 128 L Ed 2d 608 (1994); Tombs, 
                                              
song, movie, or book and thereby infringes on the copyright is making or producing the 
song, movie, or book under MCL 750.145c(2). 
 
 
24
472 Mich at 452-456 (opinion by KELLY, J.); id. at 465-468 (TAYLOR, C.J., concurring).  
Absent any state-of-mind requirement, a wife who transported her husband’s laptop to 
the police station because she suspected that it contained child sexually abusive material 
would herself arguably be a possessor and distributor of the material.  See Tombs, 472 at 
458-459 (opinion by KELLY, J.).  Similarly in this case, absent any state-of-mind 
requirement, a wife who downloaded a child sexually abusive image from her husband’s 
computer and brought it to the police would herself run the risk of being characterized as 
a maker of the material under the dissents’ interpretations of MCL 750.145c.  Contrary to 
the dissents, it does not create an “additional hurdle” to prosecutions, or create a new 
statute “out of whole cloth,” to require proof of a criminal intent in a criminal statute.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
A defendant who downloads child sexually abusive material from the Internet and 
burns the images to a CD-R, when there is no evidence the defendant had a criminal 
intent to do something other than possess the CD-R for his own personal use, may not be 
convicted of violating MCL 750.145c(2), which makes it a 20-year felony for any person 
who “arranges for, produces, makes, or finances” “any child sexually abusive 
material . . . .”  Rather, that person is properly convicted of knowing possession of child 
sexually abusive material in violation of MCL 750.145c(4), a 4-year felony.  The three 
tiers of offenses and punishments in MCL 750.145c compellingly indicate the Legislature 
did not intend to impose the same maximum penalty on a person who downloads a 
prohibited image from the Internet and burns it to a CD-R for personal use as on a person 
who is involved in the creation or origination of child sexually abusive material.  
 
 
25
Therefore, we reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate defendant’s 
convictions under MCL 750.145c(2), and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent 
with this opinion. 
KELLY, C.J., and CAVANAGH and HATHAWAY, JJ., concurred with MARKMAN, J. 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No. 138668 
 
BRIAN LEE HILL, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
WEAVER, J. (dissenting). 
 
I dissent from the majority opinion, which reverses in part the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals and vacates defendant’s convictions under MCL 750.145c(2).  I would 
affirm defendant’s convictions under MCL 750.145c(2) because defendant intentionally 
made copies of child sexually abusive material. 
In this case, police officers obtained two laptop computers and numerous 
recordable compact discs from defendant’s home containing approximately 70,000 to 
80,000 pornographic images of boys ranging in age from “toddlers to teens.”  Within 
defendant’s immense collection of pornographic images, authorities found multiple 
copies of a single pornographic image.  The copies created the basis for charging 
defendant with making child sexually abusive material. 
I agree with Justice YOUNG’s statement in his dissent: “[T]he majority opinion 
relieves a defendant of criminal responsibility for making copies of child pornography 
 
 
2
‘for personal use’ and creates out of whole cloth an additional hurdle for those 
prosecuting individuals who make child pornography . . . .”  
 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
S T A T E  O F  M I C H I G A N 
 
SUPREME COURT 
 
 
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
 
 
v 
No. 138668 
 
BRIAN LEE HILL, 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
YOUNG, J. (dissenting).   
 
In this case, defendant admitted making 50 recordable compact discs (CD-Rs) 
containing approximately 70,000 to 80,000 pornographic pictures depicting boys from 
“toddlers to teens,” as well as videos depicting 12- to 13-year-old boys engaged in sexual 
acts.  Within this compendious library of child pornography, multiple copies of one 
particular pornographic image formed the basis of the charges that were lodged against 
defendant for making child sexually abusive material.1 
                                              
1 Five images, described as “Jeff0015.jpg,” were created on defendant’s laptop 
computer on October 5, 2002, and September 9, 2003, and found on three separate  
CD-Rs created April 15, 2003, April 26, 2003, and June 11, 2003. The record also 
indicates that the Jeff0015.jpg file was attached to a November 28, 2003, e-mail. 
However, a computer forensic examiner testified that she was unable to determine 
whether defendant sent the e-mail or received it.  
 
 
2
The statute under which defendant was convicted plainly applies to any person 
who “makes” copies of child pornography.2  Here, despite the uncontested proof that 
defendant made numerous copies of one particular pornographic image, the majority 
opinion reverses defendant’s convictions because it contends that he merely intended to 
possess the copied images “for personal use” and because the majority opinion finds it 
“simply untenable” that the Legislature would punish “those who download and maintain 
that material for personal use” as harshly as those involved in the “creation or 
origination” of child pornography. 
However, the straightforward language of the statute is not limited to the original 
creator of the child pornography.  Rather, MCL 750.145c(2) explicitly criminalizes 
making copies of child pornography, without requiring the prosecution to prove what the 
defendant intended to do with the child pornography once the crime had been committed, 
that is, once the copies had been made.  Because the majority opinion relieves a 
defendant of criminal responsibility for making copies of child pornography “for personal 
use” and creates out of whole cloth an additional hurdle for those prosecuting individuals 
who make child pornography, I vigorously dissent. 
The relevant portions of MCL 750.145c provide: 
(2) A person who persuades, induces, entices, coerces, causes, or 
knowingly allows a child to engage in a child sexually abusive activity for 
the purpose of producing any child sexually abusive material, or a person 
who arranges for, produces, makes, or finances, or a person who attempts 
or prepares or conspires to arrange for, produce, make, or finance any child 
                                              
2 MCL 750.145c(1)(m); MCL 750.145c(2). 
 
 
3
sexually abusive activity or child sexually abusive material is guilty of a 
felony, punishable by imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or a fine of 
not more than $100,000.00, or both . . . .  
 
(3) A person who distributes or promotes, or finances the 
distribution or promotion of, or receives for the purpose of distributing or 
promoting, or conspires, attempts, or prepares to distribute, receive, 
finance, or promote any child sexually abusive material or child sexually 
abusive activity is guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment for not 
more than 7 years, or a fine of not more than $50,000.00, or both . . . .  
 
(4) A person who knowingly possesses any child sexually abusive 
material is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 
4 years or a fine of not more than $10,000.00, or both . . . .  [Emphasis 
added.]  
 
Also critical to interpreting the prohibition against making child pornography is 
the statutory definition of two relevant terms.  “Child sexually abusive activity” is 
defined as “a child engaging in a listed sexual act,”3 while “child sexually abusive 
material” is statutorily defined as 
any depiction, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or 
other means, including a developed or undeveloped photograph, picture, 
film, slide, video, electronic visual image, computer diskette, computer or 
computer-generated image, or picture, or sound recording which is of a 
child or appears to include a child engaging in a listed sexual act; a book, 
magazine, computer, computer storage device, or other visual or print or 
printable medium containing such a photograph, picture, film, slide, video, 
electronic visual image, computer, or computer-generated image, or picture, 
or sound recording; or any reproduction, copy, or print of such a 
photograph, picture, film, slide, video, electronic visual image, book, 
magazine, computer, or computer-generated image, or picture, other visual 
or print or printable medium, or sound recording.[4] 
                                              
3 MCL 750.145c(1)(l).  When defendant created the images at issue, the definition 
was codified at MCL 750.145c(1)(k). 
4 MCL 750.145c(1)(m) (emphasis added).  When defendant created the images, 
this definition was codified at MCL 750.145c(1)(l). 
 
 
4
I agree with the majority opinion that MCL 750.145c establishes a graduated 
scheme of offenses and punishments. Broken down into its simplest terms, the statute 
provides a 20-year maximum sentence for those who make child pornography, a 7-year 
maximum sentence for those who distribute child pornography, and a 4-year maximum 
sentence for those who knowingly possess child pornography.  It is the most severe 
sanction—the 20-year maximum sentence for those who make child pornography—that 
is at issue in this case.  
MCL 750.145c(2) contains two distinct clauses, separated by the conjunction “or.” 
The first clause covers a person who “persuades, induces, entices, coerces, causes, or 
knowingly allows a child to engage in a child sexually abusive activity for the purpose of 
producing any child sexually abusive material . . . .”  This clause penalizes those who 
cause a child to engage in a sexual act for the purpose of producing child pornography.  
These are the “creators” or “originators” of the child pornography, those whom the 
majority opinion acknowledges as having “direct contact with a minor.”  
While the majority would prefer that the statute cease at the creators or originators 
of the child pornography, it does not. The second clause of MCL 750.145c(2) imposes 
criminal sanctions on a person who “arranges for, produces, makes, or finances . . . any 
child sexually abusive activity or child sexually abusive material . . . .”5  (Emphasis 
added.)  The latter portion of the statutory provision pertains to more than the child 
                                              
5 The statute also imposes criminal sanctions on one who “attempts or prepares or 
conspires to” arrange for, produce, make, or finance any child sexually abusive activity or 
child sexually abusive material.  MCL 750.145c(2). 
 
 
5
sexually abusive activity—significantly, it also relates to the child sexually abusive 
material.  And that is a critical point in any effort to give full meaning to this statute. 
As noted, “child sexually abusive material” is statutorily defined as any depiction 
of a child engaged in a sexual act.  The statute uses broad language to cover a wide range 
of image formats, including images produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, 
photographs, pictures, films, slides, videos, electronic visual images, books, and 
magazines. It also includes depictions on a computer diskette, a computer, or a computer 
storage device. Significantly, “child sexually abusive material” includes “any 
reproduction, copy, or print of such a photograph, picture, film, slide, video, electronic 
visual image, book, magazine, computer, or computer-generated image, or picture, other 
visual or print or printable medium, or sound recording.”6  
The definitive question in this case is quite simple: did defendant “produce [or] 
make” a “reproduction [or] copy” of an “electronic visual image,” a “computer, or 
computer-generated image,” or other “visual or print” medium when he took the 
deliberate action of copying “Jeff0015.jpg” to his computer hard drive?  Unquestionably, 
the answer is yes.  Defendant then took the additional, volitional steps of copying that 
image to his computer a second time, as well as copying it to several CD-Rs.  
The majority opinion’s conclusion that MCL 750.145c(2) is “primarily concerned” 
with punishing “the creation or origination” of child pornography and “not those who 
download” it “for personal use” has no basis in the language of the statute. Indeed, the 
                                              
6  MCL 750.145c(1)(m). 
 
 
6
majority opinion takes great pains to avoid noting or giving significance to the fact that 
by downloading and successively copying child pornography, defendant intentionally 
produced or made a “reproduction [or] copy” of the same illicit pornographic image five 
distinct times.  
Forced to acknowledge that the plain language of the statute says what it says and 
that “a person may be charged with” “producing, making, or financing a copy of a 
computer-generated image” in a “manner indistinguishable from the person” who created 
the original image, the majority opinion nevertheless proceeds to write the second clause 
of MCL 750.145c(2) out of existence by concluding that a defendant’s ultimate plans for 
the child pornography negate the criminal prohibition regarding the method of 
acquisition.7  Presumably, a defendant copying child pornography would only ever do so 
for one of two purposes—either to possess it for himself or to distribute it to others.  Both 
of these purposes are reflected in MCL 750.145c(3) and (4), which provide for a 7-year 
maximum sentence for those who distribute child pornography and a 4-year maximum 
sentence for those who possess child pornography.  Under the majority opinion, despite 
the clear mandate imposing a 20-year sentence on those who make copies of child 
                                              
7 Our criminal code is replete with examples of crimes that have heightened 
consequences because of a defendant’s chosen method of committing the crime.  For 
example, one who commits an assault is generally subject to a 93-day jail term for that 
misdemeanor.  MCL 750.81.  However, if the same assault is committed with a 
dangerous weapon, the crime is a four-year felony.  MCL 750.82.  If the analysis used in 
the majority opinion were applied to a felonious assault case, one would be forced to 
conclude that the defendant merely intended to commit a 93-day misdemeanor, not a 
four-year felony, despite the uncontested evidence that a dangerous weapon was used 
during the assault.   
 
 
7
pornography, a defendant who makes copies of child pornography will never face more 
than either 4 or 7 years’ imprisonment.  
By holding that a defendant who makes copies of child pornography is guilty of 
only a 4-year felony when the copies are made “for personal use,” the majority opinion 
essentially holds that defendant’s criminal liability is limited to that of a mere possessor 
under MCL 750.145c(4).  However, under the plain language of the statute, defendant is 
more than a mere possessor of child pornography.  The majority’s holding is especially 
hard to square with the fact that defendant took the additional, volitional steps of copying 
the images to his computer and separately to CD-Rs.  I believe that these actions fall 
squarely under MCL 750.145c(2) rather than MCL 750.145c(4).  As the Court of Appeals 
opinion noted, it is certainly possible to possess child pornography without copying or 
reproducing the images.  Indeed, defendant could have satisfied his yen for “personal 
use” of child pornography and “merely possessed” the images by viewing them on the 
Internet without actually copying the images to his computer twice and recopying the 
images to several entirely separate compact discs.  However, once he copied an image, he 
clearly violated MCL 750.145c(2).  While the majority opinion maintains that the 
originator of child pornography is “obviously more morally” and “more criminally” 
culpable than the copier of child pornography, nothing in the statutory scheme indicates 
that the Legislature shares the majority’s culpability assessment.  Indeed, the clear 
language of the statute indicates that the Legislature has deemed that both are equally 
culpable, and certainly more culpable than a defendant who possesses an illicit image 
without having taken the additional step of copying it.  
 
 
8
The majority opinion also indicates that defendant’s making “5 copies of a single 
prohibited image” is insufficient as a matter of law to sustain defendant’s convictions.  
This is a conclusion that has absolutely no basis in the text of the statute.  It is unclear to 
me why making five copies of an identical pornographic image of a minor is insufficient 
to sustain defendant’s convictions because the entirety of MCL 750.145c(2) contains no 
numerical minimum requirement concerning copies of child pornography.  Making even 
a single copy of child pornography violates the statute.  The reason the majority opinion 
makes no effort to explain the calculus involved in determining that making five copies is 
insufficient is because it simply cannot justify such a conclusion. 
The majority opinion runs far afield in responding to this dissent—and naturally so 
because the statutory language is clear and the majority is forced to strain in order to 
justify its conclusion.  Central to the majority opinion’s argument is its false conclusion 
that MCL 750.145c(2) is limited to the originator of child pornography.  Thus, only those 
defendants having “direct contact with a minor” may be charged with violating MCL 
750.145c(2).  Not surprisingly, the majority opinion gives absolutely no meaning to the 
fact that the statute also encompasses those who make copies of child pornography, not 
merely those who “procured the child” and “placed the cameras in front of her.” 
While the hyperbole comparing child pornography to downloading materials from 
the Internet in violation of federal copyright laws certainly makes for entertaining 
reading, it is equivalent to comparing apples to orangutans.  The federal copyright laws 
encompass those who willfully infringe a copyright, which includes making copies of the 
 
 
9
creator’s copyrighted material.8  By including a “reproduction [or] copy” of pornographic 
child images in the definition of “child sexually abusive material,” the very material 
prohibited under MCL 750.145c(2), the Legislature has unambiguously indicated that 
one need not be the Cecil B. DeMille of child pornography in order to run afoul of MCL 
750.145c(2) for "mak[ing]" child sexually abusive material.  
I find nothing vexing, much less “simply untenable,” about our Legislature’s 
decision to place an increased sanction on defendants who make copies of child 
pornography, thereby increasing the net amount of child pornographic images in 
existence.  Because there is no question that defendant intentionally made multiple copies 
of child pornography, his convictions were proper and should be affirmed.  Because the  
 
 
                                              
 
8 Title 17 of the United States Code establishes a creator's intellectual property 
rights in original works. 17 USC 102(a).  The owner of the copyright has “the exclusive 
rights to do and to authorize . . . to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies,” 17 USC 
106(1), and “to distribute copies” of the copyrighted work, 17 USC 106(3).  Federal law 
also establishes penalties for copyright infringement.  It allows the copyright owner “to 
institute an action for any infringement,” 17 USC 501(b), including injunctive relief (17 
USC 502), impounding prohibited material (17 USC 503), and damages (17 USC 504). 
Federal law also criminalizes an intentional copyright infringement committed 
“for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain[.]”  17 USC 
506(a)(1)(A).  There is a three-tiered system of punishment, as provided in 18 USC 
2319(b): a 5-year maximum sentence for reproducing or distributing at least 10 copies 
of one or more copyrighted works whose total retail value is greater than $2,500, a 10-
year maximum for repeat felony offenders, and a 1-year maximum for any other case.  
Thus, making unauthorized “copies” is precisely the nature of a copyright infringement 
claim. 
 
 
10
majority opinion concludes otherwise, and because it creates additional hurdles to the 
prosecution of those who copy child pornography, I dissent. 
CORRIGAN, J., concurred with YOUNG, J.