Case Title: BONNIE A. MCCANN V. CITY OF CODY, WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-08-0134

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2009-07-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
BONNIE A. MCCANN V. CITY OF CODY, WYOMING2009 WY 86210 P.3d 1078Case Number: S-08-0134Decided: 07/06/2009
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2009

 
 
BONNIE 
A. MCCANN,Appellant(Plaintiff),v.CITY OF CODY, 
WYOMING,Appellee(Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Park County

 
 
The 
Honorable Gary P. Hartman, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

 
 
John 
R. Hursh of Central Wyoming Law Associates, P.C., Riverton, 
Wyoming.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

 
 
Tracy 
J. Copenhaver and Scott E. Kolpitcke of Copenhaver, Kath, Kitchen & 
Kolpitcke, LLC, Powell, Wyoming.  
Argument by Mr. Kolpitcke.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
Hill, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; Burke, J., files a dissenting opinion, 
with whom Kite, J., joins.

 
 

HILL, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, Bonnie 
A. McCann (McCann), seeks review of the district court's order granting summary 
judgment in favor of Appellee, City of Cody.  McCann was injured in an automobile 
accident which she claimed was caused by the negligence of the City of Cody and 
its contractor, Harris Trucking and Construction Company (Harris).  The district court granted summary 
judgment in Cody's favor because McCann's complaint did not allege that she had 
complied with the constitutional and statutory requirements of maintaining such 
an action against a governmental entity, as required by our ruling in Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2004 WY 31, 
¶¶ 10-15, 86 P.3d 863, 866-69 (Wyo. 2004) (Beaulieu II).  We affirm the district court's summary 
judgment order.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
 
 
[¶2]      McCann raises 
these issues:

 
 
            
A.  Did the district court err in finding that the 
administrative prerequisites for the filing of a claim under the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act, W.S. § 1-39-101 et seq. could be distinguished from the 
constitutional and statutory prerequisites.

 
 
            
B.  Did the district court err in granting summary judgment for 
a failure to satisfy the pleading mandates of  Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2004 WY 31, 86 P.3d 863 (Wyo. 2004) (Beaulieu II) 
where all of the constitutional and statutory requirements for the filing of a 
claim under the Governmental Claims Act were met by [McCann] and the compliance 
paragraph of the Complaint referred to these requirements as administrative 
prerequisites rather than constitutional and statutory prerequisites, when the 
requirements are the same.

 
 
Cody 
rephrases the issues into this statement:

 
 
            
The district court properly found that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction because [McCann's] complaint failed to allege that she complied 
with the Wyoming Constitution and Wyoming Governmental Claims Act when she filed 
her claim against the City of Cody.

 
 
FACTS 
AND PROCEEDINGS

 
 
[¶3]      McCann filed a 
complaint against Cody on April 6, 2007.  
In that complaint, McCann alleged that on December 15, 2005, a waterline 
was broken in the course of a construction project being done at the behest of 
Cody.  That work was being done by 
Harris Trucking.  Water from the 
broken waterline backed up onto the roadway and instantly froze.  No signage or other warning devices were 
in place when McCann happened onto the scene in her automobile.  The icy conditions caused her car to 
flip over.  McCann suffered 
significant personal injuries and her car was damaged.  McCann further contended that her 
damages were caused, at least in part, by negligent acts committed by Cody.  In her complaint, McCann asserted 
that:

 
 
[T]he 
administrative prerequisites for the filing of this claim have been met inasmuch 
as [McCann's] Verified Notice of Claim was served upon the City of Cody, Wyoming 
at the office of its business manager on December 26, 2006 to which there has 
been no response.

 
 
McCann 
filed an amended complaint adding Harris as a defendant, and that complaint 
contained a provision identical to that quoted above.  The claim McCann filed with the City of 
Cody on December 7, 2006 included a "Verification Affidavit" which attested to 
the truthfulness of her claim "under penalty of perjury."  On December 7, 2006, an identical claim 
was filed with the State of Wyoming, containing the same 
affidavit.

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶4]      In Beaulieu II we held:

 
 
Many 
cases have come before this court involving the statutory and constitutional 
requirements for making a claim against a governmental entity.  In resolving the issues raised in those 
cases, we have created a rule whereby, in order to invoke the jurisdiction of 
the district court, the complaint must allege the filing of a claim with the 
governmental entity and it must allege the date of that filing.  Amrein v. Wyoming Livestock Bd., 851 P.2d 769, 771 (Wyo.1993); Awe v. 
University of Wyoming, 534 P.2d 97, 102 (Wyo.1975), overruled on other 
grounds by Dye by Dye v. Fremont County 
School Dist. No. 24, 820 P.2d 982, 986 (Wyo.1991).

 
 
            
Many of our prior cases have dealt with the necessity of alleging such 
filing and the date of filing under Wyo. Stat.  Ann. § 1-39-113 (LexisNexis 2003), or 
similar statute, as a condition precedent to suit.  However, as early as Utah Const. Co. v. State Highway 
Commission, 45 Wyo. 403, 19 P.2d 951, 953 (1933), we held that statutes 
granting the right to sue the state must be construed in consonance with the 
constitution, and that plaintiffs cannot comply with the constitution by 
reducing a claim to judgment and then filing that judgment as a claim against 
the state.  The gist of that dual 
holding is that a claim filed with the governmental entity must meet the 
constitutional, as well as the statutory, requirements.  In Beaulieu I, 2001 WY 33, ¶ 13, 20 P.3d  at 526, we reiterated that precept:  
"It never has been questioned that a claim against the State must comply 
with the requirements of Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7."  A logical inference from that statement 
is that, just as in the case of a plaintiff's failure to allege his claim's 
compliance with statutory requirements, failure to allege his claim's compliance 
with constitutional requirements results in a lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction.

 
 
            
Unfortunately, our precedent on this issue is not consistent.  Even in Beaulieu I, 2001 WY 33, ¶ 14, 20 P.3d  at 527, where we recognized that governmental claims must meet 
constitutional requirements, we also noted that this court "has ruled that the 
execution requirements of art. 16, § 7 can be waived by failing to assert the 
issue in the trial court...."  That 
suggests that the constitutional requirements are not jurisdictional, because 
the question of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time and is not 
waived even if not raised below.  Boyd, 909 P.2d  at 325 (quoting United Mine Workers of America Local 
1972 v. Decker Coal Co., 774 P.2d 1274, 1283-84 (Wyo.1989); Nicholaus v. Nicholaus, 756 P.2d 1338, 1342 (Wyo.1988); Bell, 662 P.2d  at 
415.  We have, in fact, previously 
stated that the constitutional signature and certification requirements, unlike 
the statutory filing requirements, are not jurisdictional:

 
 
The 
State ... contends that an omission of the correct certification results in a 
failure of subject matter jurisdiction, and the issue can be raised at any time 
in the proceeding.  We do not agree 
with this contention.  The failure 
to verify or certify as the constitution now reads is nothing more than a defect 
or an irregularity that is not jurisdictional.

 
 

Martinez 
v. City of Cheyenne, 
791 P.2d 949, 958 (Wyo.1990).

 
 
            
We now believe that Martinez 
was wrongly decided and that it must be overruled.  The above-quoted statement from Martinez was supported by a citation to 
In re Bear River Irr. Dist., 51 Wyo. 
343, 65 P.2d 686 (1937).  Bear River Irr. Dist., however, did not 
involve the filing of a governmental claim nor did it involve the signature and 
certification requirement of Wyo. Const. art. 16, § 7.  Rather, Bear River Irr. Dist. concerned a 
petition for the organization of an irrigation district, and a provision in the 
statutory Code of Civil Procedure that required pleadings to be verified.  Bear River Irr. Dist.'s holding that the 
failure to meet that statutory verification requirement was "but a defect or 
irregularity" that was not jurisdictional simply should not be equated with the 
failure to comply with a constitutional signature and certification requirement 
for the presentation of a claim against a governmental entity.  In re Bear River Irrigation Dist., 65 P.2d  at 687.  Over a hundred years 
ago, we recognized the special significance of the signature and certification 
requirements when governmental claims are involved:

 
 
[I]t 
is plain that the purpose of requiring a full itemized statement was to hedge a 
county board about with such restrictions in the allowance of bills that the 
individual citizens and taxpayers might have the means of knowing the cause and 
validity of county expenditures, and that the requirement for verification has 
for its object a showing of good faith and honesty in the presentation of the 
bill, and some evidence of the truth, justness, and correctness of the 
claim.  As was said in a recent 
case, the provisions are "designed to protect the board from importunities to 
pass upon claims before they are presented in such a way as to be considered 
intelligently, to enable it to easily eliminate improper charges from claims, 
and to enable taxpayers to detect abuses in the allowance of 
claims."

 
 

Houtz 
v. Board of Com'rs of Uinta County, 
11 Wyo. 152, 70 P. 840, 842 (1902) (quoting Northern Trust Co. v. Snyder, 
113 Wis. 516, 89 N.W. 460 (1902)).

 
 
            
The rule that the timely filing of a proper claim with the 
governmental entity is a condition precedent to suit is a judicially created 
rule.  Awe, 534 P.2d  at 102.  Heretofore, we have limited the 
application of that rule, when determining the presence or absence of subject 
matter jurisdiction, to the statutory requirements; that is, we have required 
only that the complaint allege the filing of the claim and the date of such 
filing.  We now hold, however, that 
the complaint must also allege compliance with the signature and certification 
requirements of the state constitution.  
No proper claim has been filed if it does not meet those constitutional 
requirements, so the district court does not obtain subject matter jurisdiction 
until those constitutional requirements are met.  That, in effect, was the essence of the 
holding in Beaulieu 
I.

 
 
            
It is important to distinguish between the constitutional signature and 
certification requirements and the judicially created condition precedent 
requirement.  While we recognized as 
long ago as Utah Const. Co. that 
governmental claims must meet the constitutional requirements, we have not 
heretofore required that complaints allege such compliance.  It is our intention clearly to do so 
now.  Inasmuch as the courts do 
not have subject matter jurisdiction over a governmental claim that has not met 
the constitutional requirements, it shall henceforth be incumbent upon the 
plaintiff in such a case to allege in his or her complaint not only compliance 
with statutory filing requirements, but compliance with constitutional signature 
and certification requirements.  
This rule shall apply to all complaints filed after the date of 
publication of this opinion.  
[Emphasis added.]

 
 

Beaulieu 
II, 
¶¶ 10-15, 86 P.3d  at 866-869.  
Beaulieu II was published on 
March 25, 2004.

 
 
[¶5]      Wyo. Const. art. 
16, § 7 provides:

 
 
No 
money shall be paid out of the state treasury except upon appropriation by law 
and on warrant drawn by the proper officer, and no bills, claims, accounts or 
demands against the state, or any county or political subdivision, shall be 
audited, allowed or paid until a full itemized statement in writing, certified 
to under penalty of perjury, shall be filed with the officer or officers whose 
duty it may be to audit the same.

 
 
[¶6]      Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
1-39-113 (LexisNexis 2009) provides:

 
 
(a)  No 
action shall be brought under this act against a governmental entity unless the 
claim upon which the action is based is presented to the entity as an itemized 
statement in writing within two (2) years of the date of the alleged act, error 
or omission, except that a cause of action may be instituted not more than two 
(2) years after discovery of the alleged act, error or omission, if the claimant 
can establish that the alleged act, error or omission was:

 
 
(i)  Not 
reasonably discoverable within a two (2) year period; or

 
 
(ii)  The 
claimant failed to discover the alleged act, error or omission within the two 
(2) year period despite the exercise of due diligence.

 
 
            
(b)  The claim shall state:

 
 
(i)  The 
time, place and circumstances of the alleged loss or injury including the name 
of the public employee involved, if known;

 
 
(ii)  The 
name, address and residence of the claimant and his representative or attorney, 
if any; and

 
 
(iii)  The 
amount of compensation or other relief demanded.

 
 
            
(c)  All claims against the state shall be presented to the 
general services division of the department of administration and 
information.  Claims against any 
other governmental entity shall be filed at the business office of that 
entity.  In the case of claims 
against local governments the claim submitted need not be acted upon by the 
entity prior to suit.

 
 
[¶7]      Our decision in 
Beaulieu II is dispositive here.  We have repeatedly upheld the stringency 
of that rule over the intervening years.  
Gose v. City of Douglas, 2008 
WY 126, ¶¶ 14-18, 193 P.3d 1159, 1163-64 (Wyo. 2008); Coffinberry v. Board of County 
Commissioners, 2008 WY 110, ¶ 4, 192 P.3d 978, 980 (Wyo. 2008) (failure 
to comply with statutory requirements; no mention of constitutional 
requirements); Cantrell v. Sweetwater 
County School Dist. No. 2, 2006 WY 57, ¶ 7, 133 P.3d 983, 985-86 (Wyo. 
2006); Hochhalter v. City of 
Gillette, 2005 WY 125, ¶¶ 10-21, 120 P.3d 674, 677-80 (Wyo. 2005); Lavati v. State, 2005 WY 133, 
¶¶ 1-13, 121 P.3d 121, 121-25 (Wyo. 2005) (see especially ¶¶ 8-13 
discussing "substantial compliance"); Wilson v. Town of Alpine, 2005 WY 57, 
¶¶ 5-7, 111 P.3d 290, 291-92 (Wyo. 2005); Jauregui v. Memorial Hospital of Sweetwater 
County, 2005 WY 59, ¶¶ 6-7, 111 P.3d 914, 916 (Wyo. 2005); Wooster v. Carbon County School Dist. No. 
1, 2005 WY 47, ¶¶ 6-22, 109 P.3d 893, 895-900 (Wyo. 2005); Laughter v. Board of County 
Commissioners, 2005 WY 54, ¶¶ 14-16, 110 P.3d 875, 880-81 (Wyo. 2005); 
Bell v. Schell, 2004 WY 153, 101 P.3d 465 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶8]      In the instant 
case, McCann did not include in her complaint an averment that she had complied 
with the requirements we set in the above cited cases.  This was true both with respect to the 
statutory requirement and the constitutional requirement.  For these reasons the district court did 
not acquire subject matter jurisdiction of the complaint and we, likewise, have 
no jurisdiction here.

 
 

BURKE, 
Justice, dissenting, with whom KITE, Justice, 
joins.

 
 
[¶9]      I respectfully 
dissent for three reasons.  First, 
the allegations of the complaint, when reviewed in the light most favorable to 
Ms. McCann, sufficiently allege the prerequisites for the district court's 
subject matter jurisdiction.  
Second, if the complaint is insufficient, the plaintiff should be allowed 
to amend the complaint.  Third, if 
the judicially created rules for pleading a governmental claim lead to the 
conclusion that this complaint is legally insufficient and plaintiff is not 
permitted to amend it, those rules should be abolished.  They serve no useful purpose, and create 
unwarranted obstacles to the determination of governmental claims on their 
merits.

 
 
[¶10]   This is essentially a pleading 
case.1  The Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure 
"govern procedure in all courts of record in the State of Wyoming, in all 
actions, suits or proceedings of a civil nature."  W.R.C.P. 1.  In Beaulieu v. Florquist, 2004 WY 31, 86 P.3d 863 (Wyo. 2004) (Beaulieu II), 
the Court reaffirmed that compliance with the claim requirements of the Wyoming 
Governmental Claims Act and Article 16, § 7 of the Wyoming Constitution were 
conditions precedent to suit.  The 
Court also announced a new pleading requirement mandating that a complaint 
asserting a cause of action under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act must 
allege compliance with the statutory and "constitutional signature and 
certification requirements."  Beaulieu II, ¶ 15, 86 P.3d  at 869.  

 
 
[¶11]   W.R.C.P. 9 specifically addresses 
pleading requirements for conditions precedent.  It states:  "In pleading the performance or 
occurrence of conditions precedent, it is sufficient to aver generally that all 
conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred."  W.R.C.P. 9(c).  The purpose of this rule "is to prevent 
dismissals of meritorious cases if the plaintiff fails specifically to plead 
occurrence of conditions precedent."  
Johnson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co., 608 P.2d 1299, 1304 (Wyo. 1980).  
Rule 9(c) is not restricted to any particular type of action and there is 
no reason that the rule should not be applied to litigation involving the 
Wyoming Governmental Claims Act.  
This Court has never held that the rules of civil procedure should not be 
applied to governmental claims and I can conceive of no justification for 
failure to apply those rules in this case.  
Neither the district court in granting summary judgment, nor the majority 
in upholding that decision, have addressed whether the Rule 9 pleading 
requirements were met.  The 
complaint would have met the requirements of Rule 9 if Ms. McCann had merely 
asserted that "all conditions precedent have been performed or have 
occurred."  

 
 
[¶12]   In her complaint, Ms. McCann 
alleged:

 
 
12.       That the 
administrative prerequisites for the filing of this claim have been met inasmuch 
as the plaintiff's Verified Notice of Claim was served upon the City of Cody, 
Wyoming at the office of it's [sic] business manager on December 26, 2006 to 
which there has been no response.

 
 
In 
determining whether this allegation is sufficient to satisfy the pleading 
requirements, we are required to follow the mandates of Rule 8(f) which states: 
"All pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice."  We do not require technical forms of 
pleading.  Rather, the plaintiff 
need only plead the operative facts of the litigation so that the defendant or 
defendants have fair notice of the claim.  
E.g., Harris v. Grizzle, 599 P.2d 580, 583 
(Wyo. 1979); Washakie County School Dist. 
No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 316 (Wyo. 1980).  When these rules are applied, I would 
hold that the allegations relating to satisfaction of conditions precedent were 
sufficient.

 
 
[¶13]   The City does not contend that it 
lacked "fair notice" and it appears that the jurisdictional allegations were 
initially viewed as sufficient by the City and the district court.  In its answer, the City did not make any 
assertion that the complaint was inadequate or that the plaintiff had failed to 
comply with the judicially created pleading requirement announced in Beaulieu II.2  The City waited more than a year before 
filing its summary judgment motion.3  During that intervening time, the City 
had filed an answer, discovery had taken place, a scheduling conference had been 
held, and plaintiff had been granted leave to file an amended complaint to add 
an additional defendant.  Despite 
these numerous opportunities to review the complaint, the district court 
apparently did not perceive any defect in the jurisdictional allegations.  

 
 
[¶14]   Ms. McCann contends that from a 
common sense and notice pleading perspective, the use of the word 
"administrative" should not result in dismissal of her cause of action.  I agree.  While it may be unclear what Ms. McCann 
meant by use of the term "administrative," the only "prerequisites" that must be 
met are compliance with the claim requirements of the Wyoming Governmental 
Claims Act and Article 16, § 7 of the Wyoming Constitution.  The City views the term "administrative" 
as a term of art.  It asserts that 
"administrative" did not, and could not, mean "statutory" and 
"constitutional."  From my 
perspective, that interpretation is much too narrow and is at odds with our 
jurisprudence requiring liberal construction of pleadings and the requirements 
of the rules of civil procedure.  

 
 
[¶15]   Federal courts, being courts of 
limited jurisdiction, have frequently addressed the question of whether 
jurisdiction has been sufficiently pled.  
As a general proposition, federal courts do not require technical forms 
of pleading when determining whether subject matter jurisdiction has been 
properly pled.

 
 
As 
is true of determining whether a federal district court actually has subject 
matter jurisdiction, compliance with Rule 8(a)(1) is ascertained by looking at 
the entire complaint, not merely to what purports to be the jurisdictional 
statement.

 
 
Thus, 
allegations of the district court's subject matter jurisdiction, which standing 
alone might be sufficient, will not protect the pleader against a motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b) if an examination of the entire complaint reveals that 
the assertion of jurisdiction is not substantial or that the jurisdictional 
statements were not made in good faith.  
Conversely, the district court may 
sustain jurisdiction when an examination of the entire complaint reveals a 
proper basis for assuming subject matter jurisdiction other than one that 
has been improperly asserted by the pleader or otherwise demonstrates that 
jurisdiction exists when the Rule 8(a)(1) allegation is defective in some 
regard.  In some cases federal 
courts have excused the nonexistence of a 
jurisdictional allegation or an insufficient allegation when information outside 
the complaint demonstrates the actual existence of the court's 
jurisdiction.

 
 
Wright 
& Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure: Civil 3d § 1206, at 113 (2004) (footnotes omitted; emphasis 
added).  E.g., Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Johnson, 586 F.2d 1375, 1382 (10th Cir. 1978); Com. of Mass. v. U.S. Veterans Admin., 
541 F.2d 119, 122 (1st Cir. 1976); Kelleam v. Maryland Cas. Co., 112 F.2d 940, 943 (10th Cir. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 312 U.S. 377, 61 S. Ct. 595, 85 L. Ed. 899 (1941).  We 
should not apply a strict interpretation to the jurisdictional allegations 
contained in plaintiff's complaint.  
When the rules of civil procedure are properly applied, the complaint 
satisfies the jurisdictional requirements.

 
 
[¶16]   From a practical perspective, it is 
not necessary to resolve this issue.  
If the pleading is insufficient, Ms. McCann should be permitted to amend 
her complaint.4  W.R.C.P. 15(a) allows pleadings to be 
amended either as a matter of course or with leave of court, depending on the 
circumstances.  The rule 
specifically provides that permission to amend a pleading "shall be freely given 
when justice so requires."  W.R.C.P. 
15(a).  As we long ago 
observed:  

 
 
In 
considering a matter of this character, although it seems almost trite to 
repeat, amendments of pleadings should be freely and liberally allowed in the 
interest of justice.

 
 
* 
* * 

 
 
The 
Supreme Court of the United States, in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, [182], 83 S. Ct. 227, 230, 9 L. Ed. 2d 222, set out what appears to be the proper test as to 
what the trial court should consider when an amendment is proffered as follows: 

 
 
"* 
* * If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a 
proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his 
claim on the merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared reason - such as 
undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated 
failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice 
to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of 
amendment, etc. - the leave sought should, as the rules require, be freely 
given.' * * *"

 
 

Beaudoin 
v. Taylor, 
492 P.2d 966, 968, 970 (Wyo. 1972) (footnote omitted).  Stated more succinctly, amendments 
should be allowed unless it will prejudice the adverse party.  Id. at 970.  There is no suggestion in this case that 
the City would be prejudiced by allowing amendment of the complaint except for 
the obvious fact that they would be required to defend the complaint on the 
merits.  

 
 
[¶17]   Allowing amendment of the complaint 
is not only authorized by the rules, it also prevents gamesmanship such as that 
reflected in Lavatai v. State, 2005 
WY 133, 121 P.3d 121 (Wyo. 2005).  
In Lavatai, the State waited 
until the day after the two-year claim period expired to file a motion for 
summary judgment alleging that the plaintiff's claim was deficient.  ¶ 5, 121 P.3d  at 123.  Justice 
Kite in her concurring opinion commented:

 
 
The 
record is replete with evidence showing that the State willfully withheld the 
information about its defense from Mr. Lavatai, in hopes that the two-year 
period under the Governmental Claims Act would expire before he realized his 
mistake. The State did not respond to his interrogatories in accordance with the 
rules of civil procedure, and, when it did respond on behalf of the snowplow 
operator defendant, it did so in a consciously oblique manner. The State's 
actions, which included conducting discovery, served the purpose of lulling Mr. 
Lavatai into believing there was no statute of limitations problem. This 
implication was strengthened at a scheduling conference in January 2003, when 
the State indicated that it would file a dispositive motion but did not specify 
that the basis for the motion would be a lack of jurisdiction or expiration of 
the statute of limitations. Then, immediately after the two year period ran out, 
the State filed its summary judgment motion challenging the district court's 
subject matter jurisdiction. Obviously, the State deliberately intended to delay 
Mr. Lavatai's discovery of the defect in his claim in order to allow the statute 
of limitations to expire.

 
 
This 
conduct resulted in a "win" for the State, but at what cost?  . . . I do not believe the State's 
actions in this case demonstrate the high standard of candor, honesty, and good 
faith required by our rules of civil procedure, rules of professional conduct, 
and precedent. . . .

 
 
As 
we have recognized in other cases, the government "wins its point whenever 
justice is done its citizens in the courts."   . . . I wonder if the 
State honestly believes Mr. Lavatai was afforded justice in this 
case.

 
 

Id., 
¶¶ 19-21, 121 P.3d  at 126-27 (Kite, J., concurring) (internal citations 
omitted).  

 
 
[¶18]   Although the City denies any 
wrongdoing in this case, the record indicates that the City waited until the 
time for Ms. McCann to file a proper claim and initiate litigation had expired 
before asserting its jurisdictional challenge.  According to the complaint, 
Ms. McCann was injured on or about December 15, 2005.  She had two years from the date of 
injury to file her governmental claim.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-113(a).  
She filed her verified claim with the City on December 26, 2006.  She was required to initiate litigation 
against the City within one year from that date.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-114.  She filed her complaint on April 6, 
2007.  Ms. McCann had until December 
15, 2007 to file a proper governmental claim.  If the governmental claim that she filed 
met the statutory requirements, she had until December 26, 2007 to initiate 
litigation.  

 
 
[¶19]   In response to the complaint, the 
City did not file a Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenging subject matter jurisdiction 
or a Rule 12(b)(6) motion asserting that the complaint failed to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted.  
Instead, the City filed an answer on May 14, 2007 generally denying the 
jurisdictional allegation.  The City 
alleged the following affirmative defense:

 
 
Defendant 
as a governmental entity reserves the right to assert immunity as a defense to 
the claims of Plaintiff, to otherwise assert limitation on damages contained in 
the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, and/or to assert failure of Plaintiff to 
comply with the terms, requirements or conditions for asserting a claim against 
the Defendant City of Cody. 

 
 
The 
City did not raise its jurisdictional challenge until March 4, 2008, and did so 
by motion for summary judgment.  By 
that time, Ms. McCann was precluded by statute from filing a new governmental 
claim or initiating a new lawsuit by the filing of a new complaint containing 
the requisite jurisdictional allegations.5  This appears to be the type of conduct 
condemned in Justice Kite's 
concurring opinion and is easily prevented by proper application of W.R.C.P. 
15.  

 
 
[¶20]   Allowing amendment of the complaint 
to correct a defective jurisdictional averment would remove any incentive for a 
governmental entity to delay raising a jurisdictional defense based on the 
failure to properly present a claim.  
Any amendment that would cure jurisdictional pleading defects would 
relate back to the date when the complaint was filed:  "An amendment of a pleading relates back 
to the date of the original pleading when . . . [t]he claim or defense asserted 
in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set 
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading."  W.R.C.P. 15(c)(2).  In Bell v. Schell, 2004 WY 153, 101 P.3d 465 (Wyo. 2004), plaintiff's attempt to amend a governmental claim after the 
time for filing a valid claim had expired was rejected.  The issue presented involved relation 
back of an amendment to a governmental claim.  Language from the case suggests that, in 
the governmental claims context, W.R.C.P. 15(c) is applicable to amendment of 
pleadings: "[W]e have not been provided with cogent argument or citation to 
controlling authority to convince us that W.R.C.P. 15(c)'s relation back 
provision applies to anything but court pleadings."  Id., ¶ 30, 101 P.3d  at 475.  At issue here is amendment of Ms. 
McCann's complaint, not her governmental claim.  Accord, Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 
2d § 1497, at 80 (1990) ("Amendments curing a defective statement of subject 
matter jurisdiction, venue, or personal jurisdiction will relate back since they 
do not violate the standard prescribed by" Rule 15(a). (footnotes 
omitted)).  Ms. McCann should be 
permitted to file an amended complaint.

 
 
[¶21]   Finally, if our judicially created 
rules regarding subject matter jurisdiction in this context mandate dismissal 
and prevent amendment of the complaint, those rules should be abolished.  The pleading requirements are not 
required by the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act or the Wyoming 
Constitution.  They are judicially 
created.  Beaulieu II, ¶ 15, 86 P.3d  at 
868-69.

 
 
[¶22]   Creation of rules relating to 
subject matter jurisdiction is a questionable judicial function: "Subject matter 
jurisdiction is determined in constitutional conventions and in legislative 
halls, not in courtrooms."  Wooster v. Carbon County School Dist. No. 
1, 2005 WY 47, ¶ 21, 109 P.3d 893, 900 (Wyo. 2005).  Additionally, it is difficult to 
ascertain the purpose to be served by the judicially created rules.  If the purpose is early determination of 
whether the jurisdictional prerequisites have been met, the rules are not well 
designed to achieve that purpose.  
As this case indicates, a dilatory defendant benefits from failing to 
raise the jurisdictional challenge early in the proceedings.  By contrast, the consequences of a 
pleading defect fall solely and very harshly on a plaintiff.  Plaintiffs lose their rights to have 
their statutorily authorized governmental claims determined on the merits simply 
because the complaint did not contain the "magic" jurisdiction allegation.  The judicially created pleading 
requirements are at odds with the intended purpose of the Wyoming Governmental 
Claims Act and the governing principles of the Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure.

 
 
[¶23]   I would reverse and remand for 
trial on the merits.

 
 

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The 
district court granted summary judgment against Ms. McCann solely on the basis 
that Ms. McCann failed to plead compliance with the statutory and constitutional 
requirements.  With the exception of 
Gose v. City of Douglas, none of the 
decisions cited by the majority required the Court to determine whether the 
plaintiff failed to properly plead jurisdiction.  2008 WY 126, 193 P.3d 1159 (Wyo. 
2008).  In Gose, we rejected plaintiffs' contention 
that their complaint met the Beaulieu 
requirements.  The decision in Gose, however, did not deprive the 
plaintiffs of the opportunity to have their case determined on the merits.  We reversed the district court's 
dismissal with prejudice and, although the limitation period had expired, 
remanded with specific instructions that the district court's order of dismissal 
provide the Goses with "a reasonable time . . . to file a new complaint." Id., ¶ 21, 193 P.3d  at 1165. 

 
 

2If 
the complaint was deficient, the City could have, and should have, raised its 
jurisdictional defenses at the outset.  
Where a condition precedent must be satisfied, the Rules impose specific 
pleading requirements upon defendants.  
"A denial of performance or occurrence shall be made specifically and 
with particularity."  W.R.C.P. 
9(c).  It does not appear that the 
City met those requirements.

 
 

3The City offers no explanation for its failure to challenge the 
sufficiency of the complaint until after the statute of limitations had 
expired.  If the City's delay was 
intentional, those tactics should not be condoned.  See infra ¶¶ 
17-19.

 
 

4Ms. 
McCann raised the question of amendment in the district court.  The City responded by statingwithout 
citing any authoritythat "[t]he only appropriate remedy is summary judgment" in 
the City's favor.  It does not 
appear that the court considered allowing amendment as an alternative to 
dismissal. 

 
 

5In 
Gose, the defendant filed its motion 
to dismiss the complaint as its initial response to the pleading.  When the district court entered its 
order of dismissal, the one year limitation period had not yet expired.  Had the district court entered an order 
of dismissal without prejudice, instead of a dismissal with prejudice, the Goses 
could have simply filed a new complaint containing the requisite 
allegations.  In our decision 
reversing and remanding, we placed the Goses in the same position they would 
have been in had the action been dismissed without prejudice.  ¶¶ 20-21, 193 P.3d  at 
1165.

 
 
The 
situation presented here is different.  
Because the City delayed filing its motion for summary judgment until 
after the limitation period had expired, Ms. McCann did not have the opportunity 
to file a new complaint when the district court dismissed her 
complaint.