Case Title: State v. Bruyette

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1991-09-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revisions before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
 that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

                                 No. 90-098


 State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

      v.                                      On Appeal from
                                              District Court of Vermont,
 Joseph Bruyette                              Unit No. 1, Rutland Circuit

                                              September Term, 1991


 Paul F. Hudson, J.

 James P. Mongeon, Rutland County State's Attorney, Rutland, for plaintiff-
    appellee

 Robert Katims of Martin & Paolini, Barre, for defendant-appellant



 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.



      JOHNSON, J.  We decide today that, in a prosecution for sexual assault,
 evidence of a defendant's prior consensual sexual relations may be admitted,
 under V.R.E. 404(b), to show identity.
      Defendant was tried by a jury for sexual assault, pursuant to 13 V.S.A.
 { 3252(a)(1)(C), and for burglary, pursuant to 13 V.S.A. { 1201.  The
 evidence established that on April 21, 1987, at approximately 1:00 a.m.,
 defendant forcibly entered the victim's apartment, threatened her with a
 razor-knife, threatened her infant son who was sleeping in a nearby room,
 and repeatedly forced her to perform oral sex, engage in sexual intercourse,
 and perform various degrading acts more particularly described below.
      Although the victim was blindfolded throughout much of the ordeal, she
 provided the police with details that caused the investigation to focus on
 defendant.  Later, defendant's  girlfriend, who had read about the incident
 in the newspaper, provided the police with additional incriminating
 evidence.  On April 27, the police obtained a search warrant to monitor and
 tape-record conversations between defendant and his  girlfriend through a
 concealed transmitter.  During these conversations, defendant made
 statements that police considered sufficiently incriminating to justify his
 immediate arrest.
      Defendant was arraigned on April 28, 1991, before a district court
 judge, who found that probable cause supported the State's informations
 charging defendant with burglary, kidnapping, and sexual assault.  He pled
 not guilty to the charges.  Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the
 tape-recorded conversations and certain physical evidence; these motions
 were denied by the trial court.
      A central issue at trial was identity.  To prove identity, the State
 introduced evidence indicating that defendant's prior distinctive sexual
 conduct with his girlfriend matched the aberrant sexual conduct in which
 the victim was forced to engage.  Over objection, the girlfriend testified
 about specific sexual activities that she engaged in with defendant,
 specific words and phrases that he asked her to repeat, role-playing,
 bondage, illegal drug use during sex, and defendant's sexual fantasies about
 abducting a blonde woman, forcing her to use cocaine and to perform various
 sexual acts.  The evidence was graphic and very specific.  She testified:

              [Defendant] was very into control.  He liked to do
           role-playing, master-slave like.  He [would] be the
           master and I would be the slave . . . .  He would say
           things, he wanted me to talk dirty to him and when I
           wouldn't say the things that he thought I should say, he
           would tell me, repeat after me, tell me that you are my
           horny, little slut . . . .  He used to like to say he
           wanted me to be his lady on the street and his whore at
           home . . . .

      She also detailed specific sexual practices that she engaged in with
 defendant.  For example, she testified that defendant often used cocaine
 during sexual relations and would interrupt their sexual activity and leave
 to "get high."  He would grab her hair and manipulate her head during oral
 sex and tell her that if she did not "do this right . . . he was going to
 jam it so far down my throat that I would throw up and he would make me lick
 it up."  Defendant also threatened her with anal sex.
      The victim testified that her assailant repeatedly forced her to engage
 in oral sex and sexual intercourse.  He blindfolded her, tied her up, and
 threatened her with anal sex.  He also manipulated her head during oral sex
 by grabbing and pulling her hair.  When she gagged and vomited during oral
 sex, he forced her to lick up her vomit.  The victim was also forced "to
 say that I was his dirty slave and that he was my master . . . [and] that I
 was a nasty slut . . . [and] I would be his whore in the bedroom . . .  but
 when I was out in public I . . . would look and act like a lady."
      According to the victim, her assailant forced her to swallow cocaine,
 which she spit out.  He interrupted his assault on several occasions to "get
 high."  After several hours of repeated sexual activity, he left the
 apartment.  The victim was then able to report the incident to the police.
      The trial court held that the sexual conduct, statements, and
 fantasies described by defendant's girlfriend demonstrated a pattern that
 was "very close to the testimony of [the victim] as to what happened in her
 case . . . [one that is] so idiosyncratic that with reasonable probability
 it points to the identity of the assailant . . . [and] amounts to something
 like a signature."  Thus, the court admitted the testimony to show the
 assailant's identity and to show that he had planned to commit the offenses.
      Defendant alleges four errors below: (1) evidence of his prior
 consensual sexual activity with his girlfriend was erroneously admitted for
 the purpose of showing identity; (2) his motion to suppress his tape-
 recorded conversations with his girlfriend should have been granted; (3) his
 conviction for a third sexual assault should be reversed because he was not
 properly arraigned on the charge, and because the charge was not supported
 by probable cause; and (4) certain physical evidence was illegally seized.
                                     I.
                                     A.
      The first issue is whether evidence of defendant's prior consensual
 sexual conduct with his  girlfriend, which was strikingly similar to the
 conduct perpetrated on the victim, is relevant and admissible to show
 identity.  Defendant argues that this testimony was inadmissible under
 V.R.E. 404(b), that it was irrelevant, and that its prejudicial effect
 outweighed its probative value.
      V.R.E.  404(b) states:
           Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
           admissible to prove the character of a person in order
           to show that he acted in conformity therewith.  It may,
           however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof
           of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, know-
           ledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

      The rule operates to exclude evidence of prior acts that are similar to
 the charged crime, if the evidence is introduced for the purpose of showing
 a general propensity to commit the acts in question.  See State v. Parker,
 149 Vt. 393, 397,