Case Title: MATHEWSON v. CITY OF CHEYENNE, WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-01-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
MATHEWSON v. CITY OF CHEYENNE, WYOMING2003 WY 1061 P.3d 1229Case Number: 02-187Decided: 01/23/2003
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2002

                                                                                                
    

JAMES 
D. MATHEWSON,

Appellant(Plaintiff),

 

v.

 

CITY 
OF CHEYENNE, WYOMING,

Appellee(Defendant).

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Laramie County

The 
Honorable Nicholas G. Kalokathis, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
James D. Mathewson, Cheyenne, Wyoming, pro se 

 

Representing 
Appellee:

Michael 
D. Basom, City Attorney; Mary B. Guthrie, Assistant City Attorney; and Bill 
Hibbler, Special Assistant City Attorney, Cheyenne, Wyoming  

 

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, 
JJ.

 
 
        

            
KITE, Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      James D. 
Mathewson, a citizen of the City of Cheyenne, objected to the City's 
authorization of the sale of bonds to finance construction of a parking facility 
by resolution instead of by ordinance.  
The district court granted summary judgment to the City finding the 
statutes allowed the use of a resolution.  
We 
affirm.

 
 

ISSUE

 

[¶2]      The issue we must 
decide in this case is whether the district court properly granted summary judgment 
in favor of the City.

 
 
           

FACTS

 

[¶3]      On May 13, 2002, 
the Cheyenne City Council passed Resolution No. 4307 authorizing the sale and 
issuance of Refunding and Improvement Revenue Bonds in the amount of  $9,575,000, the proceeds from which were 
to be used to construct an off-street parking facility in downtown 
Cheyenne.  As authority for the bond 
issue, the resolution cited Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-801(b)(iii) (LexisNexis 
2001), which provides that the procedure for issuing revenue or refunding 
revenue bonds is the same as  
prescribed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-2-424 through 35-2-436 (LexisNexis 
2001). Those statutes provide the procedures for issuance of revenue bonds by 
hospital districts and allow such bonds to be authorized by resolution.  The bonds were to be paid with the 
proceeds from the use of the parking facility. As additional security for the 
payment of the bonds, the City pledged its share of certain federal mineral 
royalties which it was entitled to receive.  However, those royalties were also 
pledged to the repayment of revenue bonds issued by the City eight years earlier 
to finance the construction of the George S. Cox parking facility.  In 1994, when the City issued those 
revenue bonds, it did so by ordinance instead of by resolution.  Some of the 1994 revenue bonds remained 
outstanding, and, therefore, a portion of the proceeds from the sale of the 2002 
revenue bonds was to go toward payment or refunding of those bonds, thereby 
enabling the City to provide the 2002 bond purchasers with a first lien on its 
federal mineral royalties.  The 
closing for the City's bonds was scheduled for May 28, 2002.  However, the filing of this action on May 24, 
2002, prevented the sale from occurring.

 
       
       

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 
 
 

[¶4]      We review summary 
judgments according to the following standards:

 
   
      

Summary 
judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and 
the prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law.  A genuine issue of material fact exists 
when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would have the effect of establishing 
or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense which the 
parties have asserted.  We examine 
the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the 
motion, and we give that party the benefit of all the favorable inferences which 
may fairly be drawn from the record.  
We evaluate the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same 
standards and by using the same materials as were employed and used by the lower 
court.  We do not accord any deference to the district 
court's decision on issues of law.

 
     
         

Andersen 
v. Two Dot Ranch, Inc., 
2002 WY 105, ¶10, 49 P.3d 1011, ¶10 (Wyo. 
2002) (citations omitted).

 
     

DISCUSSION

 

[¶5]      Mr. Mathewson 
objects to the City's use of a resolution instead of an ordinance to authorize 
the parking facility revenue bonds because citizens who opposed such a 
resolution did not have the right to petition for an initiative pursuant to 
which they could have elected to reverse the City's actiona right they would 
have had if the action had been pursuant to an ordinance.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-23-1005 
(LexisNexis 2001).  He bases his 
objection to the City's use of a resolution rather than an ordinance on an 
interpretation of the statutes governing the issuance of those bonds.  He concedes these revenue bonds were not 
subject to the mandatory election requirement established by Article 16, Section 
4 of the Wyoming Constitution because they were payable solely from a special 
fund and not from taxes.  Frank 
v. City of Cody, 572 P.2d 1106 (Wyo. 1977); Snyder v. City of 
Cheyenne, 79 Wyo. 405, 334 P.2d 750 
(1959).

 
 

[¶6]      To determine what the 
statutes require with regard to the issuance of revenue bonds, we must follow 
our well established rules of statutory construction.

 
   
             
       

We 
attempt to interpret statutes in accordance with the legislature's intent.  We begin by making an "inquiry 
respecting the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to 
their arrangement and connection.'"  
Parker Land and Cattle Company v. Wyoming Game and Fish 
Commission, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Rasmussen v. 
Baker, 7 Wyo. 117, 133, 50 P. 819, 823 (1897)).  We construe statutes as a whole, giving 
effect to every word, clause, and sentence, and we construe together all parts 
of the statutes on the same subject.  
We give effect to the plain language of unambiguous statutes.  We resort to extrinsic aids of statutory 
interpretation, such as legislative history or intent, only when statutes are 
ambiguous.  

 

Dike 
v. State, 
990 P.2d 1012, 1018 (Wyo. 1999) (some citations omitted); see also 
Orona-Rangal v. State, 2002 WY 134, ¶18, 53 P.3d 1080, ¶18 (Wyo. 
2002).  Fundamental to this effort is our duty to give effect to the plain 
meaning of the language of the statute.

 
    
               

[¶7]      Without question, 
§ 15-1-801 authorizes the City to issue revenue bonds for parking facilities by 
following the procedures set forth in §§ 35-2-424 through 35-2-436, which 
plainly state bonds shall be authorized "by resolution."  The district court properly found this 
statute is not ambiguous.  No 
credible argument can be made that the term "resolution" is vague or 
ambiguous.  Black's Law Dictionary 
defines resolution as "[a] formal expression of an opinion, intention, or 
decision by an official body or assembly (esp. a legislature)."  Black's Law Dictionary 1313 
(7th ed. 1999).  The 
Collegiate Dictionary defines it as "a formal expression of opinion, will, or 
intent voted by an official body or assembled group."  Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 
997 (10th ed. 1999).  
This court has considered the meaning of the 
term "resolution" as

 
          

"simply 
an expression of opinion or mind or policy concerning some particular item of 
business coming within the legislative body's official cognizance, ordinarily 
ministerial in character and relating to the administrative business of the 
municipality."  5 Eugene McQuillan, Municipal Corporations, 
Nature and Operation of Ordinances § 15.02 P. 59 
(3rd Ed. 1996).

 
  

Cooper 
v. Town of Pinedale, 1 P.3d 1197, 1207 (Wyo. 2000).

 
 
    

[¶8]      Mr. Mathewson 
does not even suggest the term "resolution" itself is ambiguous. Instead, he 
argues that, when § 15-1-801 is read together with § 35-2-425, an ambiguity is 
created.  He contends the ambiguity 
stems from the language "[e]xcept as otherwise provided" which precedes the 
requirement for a resolution to authorize bonds and from the fact that the 
latter statute is directed to hospital trustees.  We must presume that, when the 
legislature imposed the provisions contained in the hospital district statutes 
on municipalities seeking to construct off-street parking, it did so with full 
knowledge of the content of those provisions, and we can glean no ambiguity from 
the statutes themselves.  Mr. 
Mathewson fails to direct us to any provision of § 15-1-801 or §§ 35-2-424 
through 35-2-436 which "otherwise provides" in connection with  procedures for the issuance of revenue 
bonds for off-street parking facilities.  
Consequently, we are left with the clear language of the statute as the 
final statement of legislative intent regarding the procedures to be followed 
in  issuing revenue bonds for that 
purpose.

 
     

[¶9]      Mr. Mathewson 
urges, without authority, the legislature must have intended a municipality 
should use its "highest form of authorization,"e.g., an ordinancebecause a 
resolution is the "highest form of authorization" for a hospital district.  We simply cannot engage in such creative 
reasoning in an effort to insert language into the statutes that the legislature 
omitted.  Miller v. Bradley, 
4 P.3d 882, 888 (Wyo. 2000) (we will not expand the plain language of a statute 
to encompass requirements beyond those clearly set out by the legislature); 
Erhart v. Flint Engineering & Construction, 939 P.2d 718, 722 (Wyo. 
1997) (a basic tenet of statutory construction is that omission of words from a 
statute is considered to be an intentional act by the legislature; this court 
should not read words into a statute when the legislature has chosen not to 
include them).

 
   
              
             
              
  

[¶10]   In a final effort to create 
ambiguity where none existed, Mr. Mathewson points to an entirely different 
statutethe Downtown Development Authority (Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 15-9-201 through 
15-9-223 (LexisNexis 2001))adopted after the statutes upon which the City 
relied for its actions, which allows municipalities through a separate 
development authority or on their own to issue bonds for public parking 
facilities and requires such be done by ordinance.  The City complains Mr. Mathewson did not 
raise this issue below.  A review of 
the record indicates that, although he did not provide the district court with a 
discussion of that statute, he did mention it as an example of other revenue 
bond statutes which required ordinances.  
In the interest of affording this citizen a 
full and complete hearing of his complaints, we will address this 
argument.

 
             
      

[¶11]   Simply because the legislature 
chose to make two different options available to municipalities to construct 
parking facilities does not mean either provision automatically becomes 
ambiguous.  Nor does it mean the 
legislature intended to repeal the original provision.  Had the legislature so intended, it 
could readily have done so.  It did 
not directly repeal the original provision, and, absent such direct repeal, Mr. 
Mathewson has the burden of showing the legislature intended an implied 
repeal.  Shumway v. Worthey, 
2001 WY 130, ¶15, 37 P.3d 361, ¶15 (Wyo. 2001).  

 

[O]ur 
longstanding rule is that repeals by implication are not favored and will not be 
indulged if there is any other reasonable construction.  One asserting implied repeal bears the 
burden of demonstrating beyond question that the legislature intended that its 
later legislative action evinced an unequivocal purpose of affecting a 
repeal.  Furthermore, it must be shown that the later 
statute is so repugnant to the earlier one that the two cannot logically stand 
together, or that the whole subject of the earlier statute is covered by the 
later one having the same object, clearly intending to prescribe the only rules 
applicable to the subject.

 
    
               
            
              
       

Id.  Mr. Mathewson has met no part of this 
burden here.  Looking to the plain 
meaning of the language utilized by the legislature in each case, we find no 
conflict.  Both provisions can be 
given their plain meaning without hindering the application of the other.  The result is the City had the option of 
taking either approach.  Board of 
County Commissioners of County of Albany v. White, 79 Wyo. 420, 335 P.2d 433 
(1959).  Whether this is a wise 
policy, whether it deprives citizens of rights granted by the legislature in 
other statutes, or whether, in the opinion of a citizen, it grants too much 
leeway to the governing body of a municipality is not a question for this 
court.  Instead, Mr. Mathewson and 
other citizens similarly disposed must make their case to the 
legislature.

 

[¶12]   The district court also properly 
concluded our opinion in Cooper, 1 P.3d 1197, "supports the City's use of 
a resolution."  In that case, the 
Town authorized a promissory note for the construction of a water system by 
resolution and not by ordinance.  We 
held the note did not constitute a bond which the statutes required to be 
authorized by an ordinance.  In 
addition, we concluded the resolution which authorized the promissory note did 
not constitute a legislative act which Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-114(a) (LexisNexis 
2001) requires to be authorized by an ordinance.  In discussing the distinction between a 
resolution and a legislative act requiring an ordinance, we relied upon 5 Eugene 
McQuillan, Municipal Corporations § 15.02 at 59 (3d ed. 1996) for the 
proposition that "a resolution deals with matters of a special or temporary 
character; an ordinance prescribes some permanent rule of conduct or government, 
to continue in force until the ordinance is repealed.'"  Cooper, 1 P.3d  at 1207.  When we apply that reasoning here, we 
conclude the resolution authorizing the revenue bonds in question was not a 
permanent rule of conduct contemplated by the term "legislation."  Our holding as stated in Cooper 
applies with equal force in this case.  
"Under these circumstances, we can only conclude that absent a specific 
requirement that it act by ordinance, the Town could act by resolution."  Id.; see also Thomas v. 
Jultak, 68 Wyo. 198, 231 P.2d 974 (1951).

 
 

[¶13]   Finally, Mr. Mathewson argues the 
City's use of an ordinance to authorize the 1994 bond issue for the George S. 
Cox parking facility somehow required that it utilize an ordinance for the 
issuance of the 2002 bond issue.  
Although it is not completely clear from his brief, Mr. Mathewson is 
apparently arguing that, because the proceeds from the 2002 bonds were to be 
used in part to "advance, refund and defease," or repay, the 1994 bonds which 
were still outstanding, the ordinance authorizing those earlier bonds was 
somehow "repealed" by the City's 2002 resolution and an ordinance cannot be 
repealed by a resolution.  The 
district court found "[t]he fact that the City had previously issued off-street 
parking facility revenue bonds by ordinance is irrelevant."  We agree.  The City had the option of using either 
an ordinance or a resolution when the statute did not direct the use of an 
ordinance.  Mr. Mathewson's 
suggestion that the later resolution constructively repealed the 1994 ordinance 
is not persuasive.  He cites 6 
Eugene McQuillan, Municipal Corporations § 21.09 at 260 (3d ed. 1998) for the 
definition of "constructive repeal" which on its face does not apply to the 2002 
resolution.  A constructive repeal 
occurs when the later ordinance "contains provisions so contrary to or 
irreconcilable with those of the earlier ordinance that only one of the two can 
stand in force; . . .  The 
repeal of an ordinance is accomplished when it is destroyed, abolished, 
abrogated, cancelled, annulled, recalled, or rescinded by a later one."  6 Eugene McQuillan, Municipal 
Corporations § 21.09 at 260 (3d ed. 1998).  
The  2002 resolution merely 
authorized the use of the proceeds from the later bond issue to repay the 
outstanding 1994 bonds before they became due.  It in no way annulled or rescinded the earlier 
ordinance which originally authorized the issuance of the 1994 bonds.

 
        
          

[¶14]   Mr. Mathewson cites no authority 
which prohibits the City from utilizing the procedures explicitly authorized by 
§ 15-1-801.  The district court 
found he presented no evidence the City failed to follow the procedures outlined 
in § 15-1-801 and §§ 35-2-424 through 35-2-436.  On appeal, he does not contest that 
finding.  Consequently, we affirm 
the district court's summary judgment and hold the City's use of a resolution to 
authorize the 2002 revenue bonds for a parking facility was in compliance with 
the statutes adopted by the legislature.