Case Title: In re Lundgren - Disbarment video

Citation: 

Docket Number: 117201

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2017-05-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No.  117,201 
 
In the Matter of ALVIN R. LUNDGREN, 
Respondent. 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE 
 
Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed May 26, 2017. Disbarment. 
 
Kimberly L. Knoll, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and Stanton A. Hazlett, 
Disciplinary Administrator, was with her on the formal complaint for the petitioner. 
 
Respondent did not appear. 
 
Per Curiam:  This is an uncontested original proceeding in discipline filed by the 
office of the Disciplinary Administrator against respondent, Alvin R. Lundgren, of Veyo, 
Utah, an attorney admitted to the practice of law in Kansas in 1990. 
 
 
On July 20, 2016, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal 
complaint against respondent alleging violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional 
Conduct (KRPC). Respondent filed an answer on August 15, 2016. A hearing was held 
on the complaint before a panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys on 
October 6, 2016, at which the respondent appeared pro se. The hearing panel determined 
that respondent violated KRPC 1.15(a) and (d) (2017 Kan. S. Ct. R. 326) (safekeeping 
property); 8.3(a) (2017 Kan. S. Ct. R. 378) (reporting professional misconduct); 8.4(c) 
(2017 Kan. S. Ct. R. 379) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation); Kansas Supreme Court Rule 207(c) (2017 Kan. S. Ct. R. 246) (failure 
to report action); and Kansas Supreme Court Rule 208(c) (2017 Kan. S. Ct. R. 246) 
(failure to notify Clerk of the Appellate Courts of change of address). 
 
2 
 
Upon conclusion of the hearing, the panel made the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, together with its recommendation to this court: 
 
"Findings of Fact 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"6. 
In August 1989, the Utah Supreme Court admitted the respondent to the 
practice of law in Utah. 
 
 
"7. 
The Kansas Supreme Court admitted the respondent to the practice of 
law in the State of Kansas on September 20, 1990. 
 
 
"8. 
The Missouri Supreme Court also admitted the respondent to the practice 
of law in 1990. 
 
 
"9. 
On April 12, 1994, the California Supreme Court admitted the 
respondent to the practice of law. Prior to his admission to the practice of law in the State 
of California, the respondent engaged in misconduct. 
 
'Count One: 
 
'In November 1992, Respondent was hired by Checkrite to perform debt 
collection work. Checkrite hired Respondent to recover debts from 
checks written on insufficient funds and closed bank accounts that had 
been issued to California merchants. At the time, Respondent was 
working as an attorney in Utah. 
 
'Between April 1993 and August 1993, Respondent sent letters to debtors 
on letterhead which stated "Lundgren & Associates, P.C. Attorneys at 
Law." The letterhead listed an address in Sacramento, California. At the 
time, Respondent was not admitted to practice law in the State of 
California. The letterhead did not mention the jurisdictions that 
Respondent was admitted as a member of the bar. 
3 
 
 
'In June 1993, Respondent sent a check to the State Bar's Committee of 
Bar Examiners to pay fees associated with his application for admission 
to the State Bar of California. The check was imprinted with 
Respondent's Sacramento address and indicated that the account 
belonged to "Lundgren & Associates, P.C., Attorneys at Law." 
Respondent was not admitted to the practice of law in California until 
April 12, 1994. 
 
'By sending out letters and issuing checks imprinted with "Attorney at 
Law," Respondent held himself out as being entitled to practice law in 
the State of California in violation of Business and Professions Code 
sections 6125(a) and 6126. 
 
'Conclusions of Law: By the foregoing conduct, Respondent committed a 
willful violation of Business and Professions Code section 6068(a). 
 
'Counts Five and Eight: 
 
'In 1993, a civil complaint was filed against Respondent and other 
defendants for violations of the federal Fair Debt Collections Act and the 
California Unfair Business Practices Act, in a suit entitled Newman v. 
Checkrite, Eastern District Court of California, U.S. District Court case 
number CIV-S-93 1557 LKK PAN. 
 
'On January 25, 1994, Respondent appeared at a scheduling conference 
acting as the attorney for defendant [D.K.] in the Newman case. Prior to 
February 18, 1994, Respondent negotiated with plaintiff's counsel to 
obtain an extension of time for [D.K.] to respond to plaintiff's discovery. 
 
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'Respondent was not admitted to practice law in the U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of California until May 18, 1994. Respondent did 
not seek pro hac vice status to practice in the court pending his admission 
to this State Bar of California. He also did not inform the court that he 
was not admitted to practice in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of California at the time that he made the appearance on behalf 
of [D.K.]. 
 
'By making an appearance in court on behalf of a client in negotiating an 
extension of time prior to being admitted to the practice of law before the 
federal court, Respondent engaged in the practice of law in a jurisdiction 
while he was not licensed to do so. 
 
'Conclusions of Law:  By the foregoing conduct, Respondent committed 
a willful violation of Rules 1-300(B) and 5-200(B) of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct.' 
 
 
"10. 
On July 13, 1998, the California Supreme Court entered an order 
suspending the respondent's license to practice law in that state for a period of 18 months. 
After serving 1-month suspension, the respondent was placed on probation. 
 
 
"11. 
On February 22, 2000, the Missouri Supreme Court entered an order 
concluding that the respondent violated Rule 4-5.5 (a) for engaging in the unauthorized 
practice of law in California. That court entered an order indefinitely suspending the 
respondent from the practice of law in Missouri. Thereafter, on May 30, 2000, the 
Missouri Supreme Court reinstated the respondent's license to practice law. 
 
 
"12. 
J.B. filed a complaint against the respondent with the Utah State Bar, 
Office of Professional Conduct ('OPC'). Thereafter, on October 31, 2012, the OPC filed a 
motion for summary judgment in the second district court for Morgan County, Utah. 
 
 
"13. 
On February 1, 2013, the second district court for Morgan County, Utah, 
granted the OPC's motion for summary judgment. Later, the court entered an order which 
included findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court concluded that the respondent 
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violated Rule 1.15(a) (safekeeping property), Rule 1.15(d) (safekeeping property), Rule 
8.1(b) (bar admission and disciplinary matters), and Rule 8.4(a) (misconduct). 
 
 
"14. 
Thereafter, on June 5, 2013, the court held a sanctions hearing. During 
the sanctions hearing, the respondent stated, 'I have no prior record [of attorney 
discipline].' 
 
 
"15. 
In an order memorializing its findings and conclusions, the court found 
that the respondent misappropriated client funds. The court ordered the respondent be 
disbarred from the practice of law in Utah. 
 
 
"16. 
While the Utah disciplinary case was pending, on July 22, 2014, the 
respondent relinquished his license to practice law in California. In the voluntary 
resignation, the respondent declared the following: 
 
'1. 
I am not currently suspended from the practice of law as a result 
of the imposition of discipline by the California Supreme Court, 
nor subject to (a) a period of disciplinary probation; (b) 
conditions attached to a public or private reproval; or (c) the 
terms of an agreement in lieu of discipline with the Office of the 
Chief Trial Counsel; 
 
'2. 
To my knowledge, I am not currently the subject of any 
disciplinary complaint, investigation or proceeding by any 
professional licensing agency in California or another 
jurisdiction; 
 
'3. 
I am not currently charged with the commission of any felony or 
misdemeanor and have no knowledge that I am the subject of a 
current criminal investigation or grand jury proceeding for the 
alleged commission of a felony or misdemeanor in any 
jurisdiction; 
 
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'4. 
I have not been convicted of any crime for which I have failed to 
notify the State Bar pursuant to Business and Professions Code 
section 6068(a)(5). (Emphasis added.)' 
 
The California Supreme Court accepted the voluntary resignation on October 21, 2014. It 
appears that the respondent never informed the bar authorities of California that, in fact, 
he was the subject of a disciplinary complaint in Utah at the time he relinquished his 
license. 
 
 
"17. 
The respondent appealed the second district court's decision to the Utah 
Supreme Court. On July 21, 2015, the Utah Supreme Court entered its opinion, which 
provided as follows: 
 
'INTRODUCTION 
 
'¶ 1 Intentionally misappropriating a client's money is at or near the top 
of the list of things a lawyer should never do. But that is what Alvin 
Lundgren did when he took [J.B.]'s money from his client trust account 
for his own purposes. Upon discovering the defalcation, [J.B.] reported 
Mr. Lundgren to the Utah State Bar Office of Professional Conduct 
(OPC). Following an investigation, the OPC filed a complaint in district 
court against Mr. Lundgren. Based on his admitted misconduct, the 
district court granted the OPC's motion for summary judgment and 
disbarred Mr. Lundgren. Mr. Lundgren timely appealed. We affirm his 
disbarment and state again that a Utah attorney who intentionally 
misappropriates client funds will be disbarred unless the attorney can 
show truly compelling mitigating circumstances. 
 
'BACKGROUND 
 
'¶ 2 Mr. Lundgren had been practicing law for twenty years when [J.B.] 
hired him to pursue a workers' compensation claim. In February 2009, 
[J.B.] settled her claim for $24,906. Per her instructions, Mr. Lundgren 
retained $2,500 of [J.B.]'s share of the settlement proceeds in his client 
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trust account in order to pay her outstanding medical bills. However, in 
July of 2010, [J.B.]'s doctor, Carl Mattson, informed her that her medical 
bills remained outstanding. [J.B.] called Mr. Lundgren numerous times 
and left several messages, but Mr. Lundgren failed to respond. 
 
'¶ 3 Ultimately, in December of 2010, [J.B.] sent Mr. Lundgren a letter 
asking him to account for her settlement funds. She attached a copy of 
Dr. Mattson's bill. Mr. Lundgren did not reply, nor did he account for the 
$2,500 entrusted to him. 
 
'¶ 4 He later claimed to have lost [J.B.]'s case file. As a result of Mr. 
Lundgren's failure to respond and failure to use the settlement funds as 
directed, [J.B.] filed a complaint with the Utah State Bar. On August 12, 
2011, the OPC sent Mr. Lundgren notice of [J.B.]'s informal complaint. 
As part of its investigation, the OPC asked Mr. Lundgren to provide bank 
records of the deposits and withdrawals made to and from his client trust 
account from March 2009 through October 2010. The OPC did not 
receive this information, although Mr. Lundgren claims that he sent it. 
 
'¶ 5 The OPC referred the case to a screening panel of the Ethics and 
Discipline Committee, which heard the matter on January 26, 2012. At 
the hearing, Mr. Lundgren admitted under oath that he had taken [J.B.]'s 
money from his client trust account for his own personal use. He further 
testified that over the course of about four years, he had taken money 
belonging to other clients from his client trust account to cover business 
and personal expenses. None of Mr. Lundgren's clients authorized him to 
take their money from the trust account for his benefit. 
 
'¶ 6 At some point after receiving notice of [J.B.]'s complaint, but prior to 
the hearing before the screening panel, Mr. Lundgren set up monthly 
payments of $300 to Dr. Mattson to pay [J.B.]'s medical expenses—
ostensibly because he did not have enough money to pay [J.B.]'s medical 
bill in full. Mr. Lundgren ultimately accounted for [J.B.]'s full settlement 
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monies by paying Dr. Mattson's bill and reimbursing the rest of the 
money to her. 
 
'¶ 7 Following the hearing, the screening panel directed the OPC to file a 
formal complaint in district court against Mr. Lundgren, and the OPC 
did. The OPC then moved for summary judgment, which the district 
court granted. The court concluded that Mr. Lundgren violated rules 
1.15(a) and (d) of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct by 
misappropriating client funds and rule 8.1(b) by "knowingly fail[ing] to 
respond to a lawful demand for information" made by the OPC. 
 
'¶ 8 Thereafter, the district court conducted a sanctions hearing "to 
receive relevant evidence in aggravation and mitigation." SUP. CT. R. 
PROF'L PRAC. 14-511(f). Following the Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions of the Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice—
rule 14-607—the district court considered various mitigating factors, 
including Mr. Lundgren's (1) "absence of a prior record of discipline," 
(2) "good character and reputation," and (3) "remorse." The court then 
determined that none of the evidence presented was "truly compelling," 
and thus did not justify departure from the presumptive sanction of 
disbarment. See SUP. CT. R. PROF'L PRAC. 14-605. The court 
explicitly rejected Mr. Lundgren's claim that his financial hardship 
should be considered a mitigating factor. Before imposing sanctions, the 
court also considered aggravating factors, which included Mr. 
Lundgren's dishonesty, his pattern of misconduct, and his extensive 
experience in practicing law. The court imposed the sanction of 
disbarment for Mr. Lundgren's misconduct. He timely appealed. 
 
'STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
'¶ 9 Mr. Lundgren does not challenge the grant of summary judgment 
with regard to his violation of rule 1.15(a) and (d). Accordingly, we are 
asked to review only the district court's decision to disbar Mr. Lundgren. 
Under the Utah Constitution, this court has the duty and the authority to 
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"govern the practice of law, including admission to practice law and the 
conduct and discipline of persons admitted to practice law." UTAH 
CONST. art. VIII, § 4. Generally, we do not overturn a district court's 
findings of fact unless they are "arbitrary, capricious, or plainly in error." 
In re Discipline of Babilis, 951 P.2d 207, 213 (Utah 1997). However, "in 
light of our constitutional mandate and the unique nature of disciplinary 
actions," we review district court findings in attorney discipline matters 
with less deference. Id. In this area, we retain "the right to draw different 
inferences from the facts" in order to "make an independent 
determination" of the correctness of the discipline the district court 
imposed. In re Discipline of Crawley, 2007 UT 44, ¶ 17, 164 P.3d 1232; 
see also In re Discipline of Corey, 2012 UT 21, ¶ 23 n. 13, 274 P.3d 972. 
 
'ANALYSIS 
 
'I. 
DISBARMENT WAS THE APPROPRIATE SANCTION FOR 
MR. LUNDGREN'S MISCONDUCT 
 
'¶ 10 The Utah Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice govern, 
among other things, the ethical practice of law in the State of Utah and 
provide the standards for imposing sanctions on attorneys who violate 
the rules. See SUP. CT. R. PROF'L PRAC. 1.0 to 8.5 ("Rules of 
Professional Conduct"), 14-601 to 14-607 ("Standards for Imposing 
Lawyer Sanctions"). Chapter fourteen, article 6 provides the Utah State 
Bar with rules for imposing sanctions on attorneys who have "engaged in 
professional misconduct." Id. 14-603(a). These rules are designed to 
"maintain the high standard of professional conduct required of those 
who undertake the discharge of professional responsibilities as lawyers." 
Id. 14-602(b). Further, the rules allow judges "flexibility and creativity in 
assigning sanctions" when a lawyer has committed misconduct. Id. 14-
602(d). A court should consider specific factors when imposing 
sanctions, including "(a) the duty violated; (b) the lawyer's mental state; 
(c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and 
(d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors." Id. 14-604(a)-(d). 
10 
 
 
'¶ 11 Though the rules allow for flexibility in most cases, there are 
presumptive sanctions for the most egregious types of misconduct. 
Disbarment is the presumptive sanction when a lawyer either "knowingly 
engages in professional misconduct . . . with the intent to benefit the 
lawyer . . . and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a party" or 
"engages in serious criminal conduct, a necessary element of which 
includes . . . misappropriation, or theft." Id. 14-605(a)(1), (2). And 
though disbarment is the harshest sanction available in the realm of 
attorney misconduct—"the proverbial professional death-sentence," In re 
Discipline of Corey, 2012 UT 21, ¶ 40, 274 P.3d 972—we have long said 
that intentional misappropriation of client funds is one of, if not the most 
"severe" kind of misconduct in the legal profession. In re Discipline of 
Grimes, 2012 UT 87, ¶ 15, 297 P.3d 564. Misappropriation of client 
funds undermines the relationship between attorney and client and 
damages the legal profession as a whole. Indeed, this court and others 
have not minced words when addressing it, describing it as "always 
indefensible," In re Discipline of Babilis, 951 P.2d 207, 217 (Utah 1997); 
something "we cannot tolerate," In re Discipline of Johnson, 2001 UT 
110, ¶ 14, 48 P.3d 881; a form of "ethical dereliction," In re Blumenstyk, 
152 N.J. 158, 704 A.2d 1, 4 (1997); "the gravest form of professional 
misconduct," Att'y Grievance Comm'n v. Pattison, 292 Md. 599, 441 
A.2d 328, 333 (1982); and an act that "reflects poorly on the entire legal 
profession and erodes the public's confidence in lawyers." In re 
Disciplinary Action Against Rooney, 709 N.W.2d 263, 270 (Minn. 2006). 
As we explained in Babilis, a seminal Utah case in this area, intentional 
misappropriation of client funds "strikes at the very foundation of the 
trust and honesty that are indispensable to the functioning of the 
attorney-client relationship and, indeed, to the functioning of the legal 
profession itself." 951 P.2d at 217. 
 
'¶ 12 Because intentional misappropriation of client funds is so deeply 
concerning and intolerable to our profession, an attorney who is guilty of 
it should be disbarred. The only exception to this rule occurs if an 
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attorney can show "truly compelling mitigating circumstances." In re 
Discipline of Ince, 957 P.2d 1233, 1237 (Utah 1998); Babilis, 951 P.2d at 
217. We have never explicitly defined the phrase "truly compelling 
mitigating circumstances," but we have said that the "mitigating factors 
must be significant," Ince, 957 P.2d at 1237-38, and should be construed 
"relatively narrowly." Grimes, 2012 UT 87, ¶ 40, 297 P.3d 564; see also 
Corey, 2012 UT 21, ¶ 37 n. 17, 274 P.3d 972. Again, the standard for 
sanctioning such behavior is purposely strict in order to serve the public 
and the profession by maintaining the trust that is so critical to the 
attorney-client relationship. 
 
'A. 
The "Truly Compelling Mitigating Circumstances" Standard Is 
Not "Illusory" 
 
'¶ 13 The modern standard for attorney sanctions in cases of intentional 
misappropriation was first set out by this court in Babilis, where we 
adopted the rule that "intentional misappropriation of client funds will 
result in disbarment unless the lawyer can demonstrate truly compelling 
mitigating circumstances." 951 P.2d at 217. Mr. Lundgren argues that the 
truly compelling mitigating circumstances standard is "illusory" and that 
we should depart from it in favor of a "balancing" or rehabilitative 
approach. However, his briefing on this point is unpersuasive and largely 
inadequate. See UTAH R. APP. P. 24(a)(9) ("The argument shall contain 
the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented . . . ."); State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) 
("[R]ule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority but 
development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that 
authority."); see also Water & Energy Sys. Tech., Inc. v. Keil, 2002 UT 
32, ¶ 21, 48 P.3d 888 ("[T]his court will not become simply a depository 
in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research." He fails to provide a reasoned argument for the reversal of our 
existing standard. We therefore decline to abrogate it. 
 
12 
 
'¶ 14 Mr. Lundgren's argument begins with a list of various "background 
illustrative cases"—cases that are summarized without further exegesis. 
He asserts that the district court below was "unable" to find truly 
compelling mitigating circumstances "because there is no precedent in 
recent Utah Supreme Court case history." But in fact there have been a 
number of cases applying the "truly compelling mitigating 
circumstances" standard in recent years, though it is true that no attorney 
has yet met that standard. See, e.g., In re Discipline of Ennenga, 2001 
UT 111, 37 P.3d 1150; Corey, 2012 UT 21, 274 P.3d 972. Mr. 
Lundgren's primary argument appears to be, in essence, because no 
attorney who has misappropriated client funds since 1997 has been able 
to escape the presumptive sanction of disbarment by showing truly 
compelling mitigation, "there may be a problem with" the standard. We 
disagree. 
 
'¶ 15 The fact that no attorney in Utah to date has been able to show that 
he acted under truly compelling mitigating circumstances when he 
misappropriated client funds does not indicate that there is a problem 
with the standard, nor does it render the standard "illusory," "vague," or 
unenforceable. Nor do we agree with Mr. Lundgren that the standard is 
"worthless and of no material benefit." To the contrary, we find our strict 
standard for imposing sanctions in cases of intentional misappropriation 
to be extremely explicit, worthy, and highly beneficial to the legal 
profession and the public. 
 
'¶ 16 In arguing that our standard is "illusory," Mr. Lundgren grasps at a 
variety of sources, none of which are on point. Mr. Lundgren asserts that 
our standard sets the bar for showing mitigation "so impossibly high" 
that no attorney will ever meet it. We disagree, but in any event we need 
not address the question of a hypothetical case of truly compelling 
mitigation because Mr. Lundgren has not shown that he acted under 
mitigating circumstances. We agree with the OPC that the truly 
compelling mitigation standard "is a high burden for attorneys to meet. 
That does not mean it is an illusion." 
13 
 
 
'¶ 17 Mr. Lundgren asserts that this case presents us with "an 
opportunity" to "abandon" the truly compelling mitigation standard "and 
return to a more rational" test. We decline this opportunity because we 
find the test perfectly rational. As we explained when we adopted the 
standard, 
 
"[t]he honesty and loyalty that all lawyers owe their 
clients are irrevocably shattered by an intentional act of 
misappropriation, and the corrosive effect of such acts 
tends to undermine the foundations of the profession and 
the public confidence that is essential to the functioning 
of our legal system. Lawyers should be on notice that an 
intentional act of misappropriation of a client's funds is 
an act that merits disbarment." 
 
Babilis, 951 P.2d at 217. We uphold that standard today and reiterate that 
an attorney who intentionally misappropriates client funds will be 
disbarred unless he or she can show truly compelling mitigating 
circumstances. 
 
'B. 
Mr. Lundgren Failed to Present Any Truly Compelling 
Mitigating Circumstances 
 
'¶ 18 Mr. Lundgren testified under oath that he misappropriated unearned 
money from his client trust account for his business and personal use. On 
appeal, Mr. Lundgren appears to argue that he showed truly compelling 
mitigating circumstances in two ways:  (1) his conduct was not as bad as 
other disbarred attorneys and (2) he "repaid all amounts." We uphold the 
district court's determination that Mr. Lundgren has failed to show truly 
compelling circumstances that would mitigate his misconduct. 
 
'¶ 19 "[T]he standard for departing from the presumptive sanction of 
disbarment is a 'truly compelling' mitigating factor in the circumstances 
14 
 
of [this] case, not the comparative seriousness of other cases." Ennenga, 
2001 UT 111, ¶ 16, 37 P.3d 1150. Mr. Lundgren argues that because 
other attorneys have misappropriated more money than he did, he should 
not be disbarred. He contends the "relative severity" of his conduct was 
less than that of other attorneys who have been disbarred—because he 
took less money—and therefore he should receive a lesser punishment 
than disbarment. These arguments fail. Rule 14-605, which governs the 
imposition of sanctions, does not suggest that the amount of money 
misappropriated has any bearing on the seriousness of the misconduct. 
See SUP. CT. R. PROF'L PRAC. 14-605(a)(2)-(3) (calling for 
disbarment when a lawyer "engages in serious criminal conduct . . . 
which includes . . . misappropriation" or "engages in any other 
intentional misconduct involving . . . deceit"). Moreover, we review each 
case of misconduct individually—the relative seriousness of other cases 
of attorney misconduct has no bearing on the proper resolution of this 
case. Ennenga, 2001 UT 111, ¶ 16, 37 P.3d 1150. 
 
'¶ 20 Mr. Lundgren points to Utah State Bar v. Jardine, a case in which 
the attorney, Mr. Jardine, charged unreasonable fees, deposited client 
retainers in his operating account before they were earned, and 
committed various other violations, but was only suspended. 2012 UT 
67, ¶¶ 1, 83, 289 P.3d 516. Mr. Lundgren claims that his own misconduct 
"was far less severe." We are not persuaded by this argument. Again, as 
we explained in Ennenga, we do not compare severity across cases. 2001 
UT 111, ¶ 16, 37 P.3d 1150. Mr. Lundgren cannot justify his unlawful 
and unethical conduct by noting that he could have done worse. 
 
'¶ 21 Moreover, Jardine is distinguishable because Mr. Jardine's 
misconduct, though unacceptable, did not rise to the level of knowing 
and intentional misappropriation of client funds. 2012 UT 67, ¶¶ 10, 31-
32, 289 P.3d 516. Mr. Jardine's case involved mishandling client funds—
not stealing them (a subtle nuance perhaps, but an important one). Id. ¶¶ 
48-50. Mr. Jardine was charging his clients large "nonrefundable" 
retainers, which he would deposit directly into his operating account—
15 
 
and which he argued were earned upon receipt. Id. ¶ 48. In deeming this 
misconduct, we explained that although it is conceivable that an 
attorney—perhaps due to the benefit conferred by the person's "towering 
reputation"—might earn a client's retainer fee the moment she receives it, 
Mr. Jardine did not. Id. ¶ 50. We thus concluded it was misconduct under 
rule 1.15(a) for Mr. Jardine to deposit client retainers directly into his 
operating account. Id. ¶ 53. Mr. Lundgren, unlike Mr. Jardine, knowingly 
took funds that were not only unearned, but would never be earned, and 
were in fact earmarked for another purpose, namely, to pay [J.B.]'s 
medical bills. 
 
'¶ 22 It is true that Mr. Lundgren ultimately restored [J.B.]'s funds, but 
this factor is not mitigating where there is no evidence to show that 
remorse was his motivation for restoring the funds. Tellingly, Mr. 
Lundgren did not self-report his unethical conduct or restore the funds to 
[J.B.] until after she had lodged a complaint with the OPC. Thus, it 
seems likely that his restoration of the funds was merely an attempt to 
avoid punishment. Under rule 14-607(c)(1) of the Supreme Court Rules 
of Professional Practice, "compelled restitution" cannot be considered a 
mitigating factor. 
 
'¶ 23 And Mr. Lundgren misses the ethical point entirely when he 
attempts to minimize his misappropriation by asserting that it is 
"philosophically debatable if the client does not know of the removal of 
funds over which the client does not have control, whether there is actual 
injury." It is not philosophically debatable whether stealing money is 
okay so long as the victim never finds out. And in any event, [J.B.] did 
find out and was certainly inconvenienced in a variety of ways. Not least 
of these is the fact that Mr. Lundgren did not pay her medical bills as he 
was instructed (he was instead forced to set up a payment plan with the 
doctor much later), and [J.B.] had to endure the disappointment and 
frustration of dealing with the doctor's collection attempts. We are glad 
that Mr. Lundgren was ultimately able to pay [J.B.] back, but "he did not 
make repayment until he was forced to do so by threat of suit . . . and 
16 
 
after [the client] had made an informal complaint." Ennenga, 2001 UT 
111, ¶ 13, 37 P.3d 1150. "The repaying of [J.B.]'s] money, though the 
right thing to do, was not accomplished in a way that mitigates the 
misappropriation." Id. 
 
'¶ 24 Because Mr. Lundgren has failed to show truly compelling 
mitigating circumstances, we need not discuss the aggravating factors in 
detail. Although we do note that Mr. Lundgren's dishonesty, his pattern 
of misappropriation, his long experience in the practice of law, his 
inability to accept the consequences of his actions, and his attempts to 
justify his misconduct are all aggravating factors. In sum, disbarment is 
the appropriate sanction for Mr. Lundgren's misconduct. 
 
'CONCLUSION 
 
'¶ 25 Today we reaffirm that the sanction for intentional 
misappropriation of client funds is disbarment unless an attorney can 
show truly compelling mitigating circumstances. Mr. Lundgren 
intentionally misappropriated client funds and failed to show any truly 
compelling mitigation. We therefore affirm the district court's order of 
disbarment.' 
 
In re Lundgren, 355 P.3d 984, 791 Utah Adv. R. 5, 2015 UT 58 (2015). The respondent's 
disbarment in Utah was effective September 20, 2015. 
 
 
"18. 
Following his disbarment in Utah, the respondent failed to notify the 
Kansas disciplinary administrator of the discipline imposed. 
 
17 
 
 
"19. 
On October 19, 2015, the disciplinary administrator's office received a 
letter from the OPC regarding the respondent's disbarment. On October 22, 2015, the 
disciplinary administrator's office docketed a complaint for investigation, wrote to the 
respondent informing him that the case had been docketed for investigation, provided the 
respondent with a copy of the correspondence from the OPC, and directed the respondent 
to provide a written response to the complaint within 20 days. The respondent failed to 
provide a written response to the complaint as directed. 
 
 
"20. 
On November 23, 2015, Terry Morgan, special investigator with the 
disciplinary administrator's office, wrote to the respondent. In the letter, Mr. Morgan 
pointed out that the respondent failed to provide a timely written response to the 
complaint as directed in previous correspondence. Mr. Morgan provided the respondent 
with 10 additional days to forward a written response to the initial complaint. 
 
 
"21. 
On December 3, 2015, the respondent wrote to the disciplinary 
administrator's office. The respondent did not provide a written response to the 
complaint, rather the respondent stated: 
 
 
'I am a former member of the Kansas Bar, #14733, but have not 
been active nor paid bar dues for many years. I was recently disbarred in 
Utah, and notice thereof being cause for instigating this action. 
 
 
'Please advise whether under the Kansas Rules I can qualify for 
ongoing bar membership. If I am no [sic] precluded, I will submit a plan.' 
 
 
"22. 
On December 9, 2015, the disciplinary administrator's office responded 
to the respondent's letter, stating: 
 
 
'This will acknowledge receipt of your letter dated December 3, 
2015, regarding the referenced disciplinary action. In response to your 
inquiry, I have included a copy of Kansas Supreme Court Rule 202. 
Pursuant to the rule, a finding of misconduct in another jurisdiction shall 
be deemed conclusive evidence of misconduct for purposes of a 
disciplinary action pending in this state. If you have questions 
18 
 
concerning the application of the rule in this case, I would refer you to 
private counsel. 
 
 
'I also enclose a copy of Supreme Court Rule 217 providing for 
the surrender of a law license during the pendency of a disciplinary 
matter. A surrender of license results in an immediate Order of 
Disbarment when a disciplinary action is pending. You may also want to 
discuss a surrender of license with private counsel. 
 
 
'I anticipate that this matter will be submitted to the Review 
Committee for the Kansas Board for the Discipline of Attorneys in the 
very near future. If you have information that you would like submitted 
for consideration prior to presenting the matter to the review [sic] 
committee [sic] I encourage you to contact me or Terry Morgan, 
investigator, of this office.' 
 
 
"23. 
On January 28, 2016, Mr. Morgan again wrote to the respondent. In the 
letter, Mr. Morgan again pointed out that the respondent failed to provide a written 
response to the complaint as directed in previous correspondence. Mr. Morgan again 
provided respondent with 10 additional days to submit a written response to the 
complaint. 
 
 
"24. 
On March 17, 2016, the respondent provided a response to the complaint. 
The respondent's letter provided: 
 
 
'Your office was provided notice of disciplinary action against 
me. You have generously requested input from [me] regarding the action. 
Please consider my response below. 
 
 
'I was licensed to practice law in the State of Utah in 1989. Later 
I was admitted to Kansas, Missouri and California. My history in all 
states was clean, except for an incident in California in 1993-1994 prior 
to my admission to the California Bar. In that incident my firm and one 
non-attorney employee had been sued in Federal Court for the Central 
19 
 
District of California. I attended an informal planning conference. At that 
conference I stated I appeared on behalf of the employee. The judge 
reported me to the California Bar for appearing for the client prior to 
being admitted to the bar. I was admitted to the California bar shortly 
thereafter. That issue was resolved with the California Bar. 
 
 
'There are no other incidents until the Utah Bar sought sanctions 
against me for failure to properly maintain a trust account in 2012 (Case 
#024500019, 2d District Court, Morgan County, Utah.) In short those 
allegations surrounded a complaint by a client that a medical bill had not 
been paid upon the completion of her case. The client's complaint was 
correct. Her bill had not been timely paid, partly due to office problems 
(a flood had destroyed many office records, including computer copies.) 
The bill was paid after the client filed the complaint. Nevertheless, the 
Utah Bar proceeded with prosecution for violations of the client's trust 
account. I admitted to the violation, and paid the client the full amount to 
which she was entitled. 
 
 
'Utah takes a very strict position against any kind of violation of 
client trust funds. Notwithstanding that the client was fully 
reimbursed prior to the filing of the bar complaint, the State bar 
prosecuted this transgression aggressively claiming that the strict liability 
sanction of disbarment applies in all cases without exception. I argued 
that [sic] the facts that I took responsibility for the failure to timely pay, 
but then paid in full the client amounts due (about $1500.) 
 
 
'The Utah Supreme Court concluded that there was no mitigation 
sufficient to deny disbarment. While I disagree with the rationale used in 
the Supreme Court opinion, that basically states that there is no 
mitigation sufficient to avoid the presumptive sanction of disbarment, I 
am subject to their final decision. 
 
 
'I was disbarred effective the summer of 2015. 
 
20 
 
 
'I had no Kansas clients during the time of the pendency of the 
Utah action. I have not attempted to solicit any other clients since the 
Utah action. 
 
 
'I understand that the Kansas rules assume that a violation in a 
foreign jurisdiction is conclusive of a violation in Kansas, I would be 
extremely grateful for an opportunity to further defend myself before the 
State [sic] Kansas to preserve my right to practice law in Kansas, or seek 
reinstatement.' 
 
The two highlighted statements above are worth commenting on. First, the respondent 
stated, '[t]hat issue was resolved with the California bar.' The respondent's statement is 
misleading. The respondent's unauthorized practice of law in California resulted in a 
suspension from the practice in California and later, on a reciprocal basis, in Missouri. 
Second, the respondent asserted that J.B. was fully reimbursed prior to the filing of the 
bar complaint. This statement is false. 
 
 
"25. 
On March 29, 2016, the respondent sent a follow-up letter. In the 
respondent's follow-up letter, he pointed out mitigating circumstances that apply.  
Additionally, the respondent stated: 
 
 
'As mentioned in the prior letter, the Supreme Court does not 
recognize mitigation in a cognizable form. That court stated:  that an 
attorney must demonstrate "truly compelling mitigating circumstances." 
However that court has not been able to articulate what that phrase 
means. That court has not recognized any truly compelling mitigating 
circumstances since that standard was articulated in In Re: The 
Discipline Of Jean Robert Babilis (951 P.2d 207 Utah 1997). 
 
 
'Kansas has not adopted this strict liability standard. Wherefore, I 
respectfully request that your office consider a path to allow me to 
practice law in Kansas under such guidelines as you may direct.' 
 
21 
 
 
"26. 
On April 6, 2016, the disciplinary administrator's office sent a letter to 
the respondent, informing the respondent that the disciplinary case had been submitted to 
the review committee and that the review committee directed a formal hearing. 
 
 
"27. 
On July 20, 2016, the disciplinary administrator filed a formal complaint 
in the instant case. Thereafter, on August 15, 2016, the respondent filed an answer to the 
formal complaint. 
 
 
"28. 
On October 6, 2016, the hearing panel conducted a hearing on the formal 
complaint. 
 
 
"29. 
While this action was pending, on October 26, 2016, the Missouri 
Supreme Court issued an order disbarring the respondent. 
 
"Conclusions of Law 
 
 
"30. 
Based upon the findings of fact, the hearing panel concludes as a matter 
of law that the respondent violated KRPC 1.15(a), KRPC 1.15(d), KRPC 8.3(a), KRPC 
8.4(c), Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 207(c), and Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 208(c), as detailed below. 
 
"KRPC 1.15 
 
 
"31. 
Lawyers must keep the property of their clients safe.  KRPC 1.15 
specifically provides: 
 
'(a) 
A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in 
a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from 
the lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account 
maintained in the state of Kansas. Other property shall be identified as 
such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account 
funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be 
preserved for a period of five years after termination of the 
representation.  
 
22 
 
. . . .  
 
'(d) Preserving identity of funds and property of a client.  
 
. . . .  
 
(2) The lawyer shall:  
 
(i) 
Promptly notify a client of the receipt of the client's funds, 
securities, or other properties. 
 
(ii) 
Identify and label securities and properties of a client promptly 
upon receipt and place them in a safe deposit box or other place 
of safekeeping as soon as practicable. 
 
(iii) 
Maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other 
properties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer 
and render appropriate accountings to the client regarding them. 
 
(iv) 
Promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by a client the 
funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the 
lawyer which the client is entitled to receive. 
 
(v) 
Produce all trust account records for examination by the 
Disciplinary Administrator upon request of the Disciplinary 
Administrator in compliance with Rule 216A.' 
 
In this case, the respondent failed to properly safeguard his client's property when he took 
J.B.'s money from his client trust account and converted it to his own personal use. The 
respondent failed to properly safeguard his clients' property when, over the course of 
about 4 years, he took money belonging to other clients from his client trust account to 
cover business and personal expenses. The respondent failed to properly safeguard his 
clients' property when he failed to maintain complete records of his clients' funds. 
Finally, the respondent failed to properly safeguard his clients' funds when he failed to 
23 
 
promptly pay or deliver funds to the client as requested. Therefore, the hearing panel 
concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 1.15(a) and KRPC 1.15(d). 
 
"KRPC 8.4(c) 
 
 
"32. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.' KRPC 8.4(c). The respondent 
engaged in conduct that involved dishonesty when he converted J.B.'s funds and other 
clients' funds to his own use. Additionally, the respondent engaged in dishonest conduct 
when he executed the voluntary resignation form in California in 2014, which included a 
false statement. Finally, the respondent violated KRPC 8.4(c) when he made false and 
misleading statements in his correspondence with the disciplinary administrator's office. 
As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated KRPC 8.4(c). 
 
"KRPC 8.3(a) and Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 207(c) 
 
 
"33. 
Lawyers must report misconduct. KRPC 8.3(a) and Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 
207(c) provide the requirements in this regard. 'A lawyer having knowledge of any 
action, inaction, or conduct which in his or her opinion constitutes misconduct of an 
attorney under these rules shall inform the appropriate professional authority.' KRPC 
8.3(a). Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 207(c) provides: 
 
 
'It shall be the further duty of each member of the bar of this 
state to report to the Disciplinary Administrator any action, inaction, or 
conduct which in his or her opinion constitutes misconduct of an attorney 
under these rules.' 
 
The respondent failed to inform the Kansas disciplinary administrator following his 
disbarment in Utah. As such, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent violated 
KRPC 8.3(a) and Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 207(c). 
 
24 
 
"Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 208(c) 
 
 
"34. 
Attorneys must provide the Clerk of the Appellate Courts with current 
contact information. Specifically, all attorneys must 'within thirty days after any change 
of address notify the Clerk of such change.' Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 208(c). After vacating 5015 
W. Old Highway 30, Mt. Green, Utah 84050, the respondent failed to notify the Clerk of 
the Appellate Courts. It is unclear when the respondent moved from that address, 
however, it was sometime prior to the hearing on the formal complaint. The respondent's 
current address is 220 South Stagecoach Drive, Veyo, Utah 84782. The hearing panel, 
therefore, concludes that the respondent failed to provide the Clerk of the Appellate 
Courts with the respondent's current address in violation of Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 208(c). 
 
"American Bar Association 
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 
 
 
"35. 
In making this recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel 
considered the factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for 
Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors 
to be considered are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual 
injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating 
factors. 
 
 
"36. 
Duty Violated.  The respondent violated his duty to his clients to properly 
safeguard their property. 
 
 
"37. 
Mental State.  The respondent knowingly and intentionally violated his 
duty. 
 
 
"38. 
Injury.  As a result of the respondent's misconduct, the respondent caused 
actual injury to his client and the legal profession. 
 
25 
 
"Aggravating and Mitigating Factors 
 
 
"39. 
Aggravating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 
aggravating factors present: 
 
 
"40. 
Prior Disciplinary Offenses.  The respondent has been previously 
disciplined. In 1994, the California Supreme Court suspended the respondent from the 
practice of law after the respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. The 
Missouri Supreme Court entered a reciprocal suspension for that same conduct. Then, in 
2015, the respondent was disbarred by the Utah Supreme Court for the underlying 
conduct in this case. Finally, in 2016, the Missouri Supreme Court also disbarred the 
respondent for the conduct which gave rise to this case. 
 
 
"41. 
Dishonest or Selfish Motive.  The respondent converted client property to 
his own use, provided a document to the California Supreme Court which contains false 
information, and provided false information to the disciplinary administrator's office in 
written correspondence. Accordingly, the hearing panel concludes that the respondent's 
misconduct was motivated by dishonesty. 
 
 
"42. 
Multiple Offenses.  The respondent committed multiple rule violations. 
The respondent violated KRPC 1.15(a), KRPC 1.15(d), KRPC 8.3(a), KRPC 8.4(c), Kan. 
Sup. Ct. R. 207(c), and Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 208(c). Accordingly, the hearing panel 
concludes that the respondent committed multiple offenses. 
 
 
"43. 
Bad Faith Obstruction of the Disciplinary Proceeding by Intentionally 
Failing to Comply with Rules or Orders of the Disciplinary Process.  The respondent 
failed to provide a timely written response to the complaint in this case. The respondent's 
failure to provide a timely written response to the complaint amounts to bad faith 
obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules 
and orders of the disciplinary process. 
 
26 
 
 
"44. 
Refusal to Acknowledge Wrongful Nature of Conduct.  Throughout the 
proceedings in Utah, the respondent minimized the significance of his misconduct. The 
respondent's minimization of his conduct continued in this case. 
 
 
"45. 
Vulnerability of Victim.  J.B. was vulnerable to the respondent's 
misconduct. 
 
 
"46. 
Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law.  The Kansas Supreme 
Court admitted the respondent to practice law in the State of Kansas in 1990. At that 
time, the respondent had already been admitted to practice in the State of Utah. At the 
time of the misconduct, the respondent had been practicing law for more than 20 years. 
 
 
"47. 
Illegal Conduct, Including that Involving the Use of Controlled 
Substances.  The respondent admitting using funds belonging to J.B. and other clients 
over a period of years. This conduct constitutes theft. Further, it should be noted that 
while the respondent fully repaid J.B., it is impossible to determine whether all his clients 
were repaid. The record is clear that no other clients complained that the respondent 
failed to provide them with funds to which they were entitled. 
 
 
"48. 
Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may 
justify a reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its 
recommendation for discipline, the hearing panel, in this case, found the following 
mitigating circumstances present: 
 
 
"49. 
The Present and Past Attitude of the Attorney as Shown by His or Her 
Cooperation During the Hearing and His or Her Full and Free Acknowledgment of the 
Transgressions.  Despite his minimization, the respondent admitted the underlying facts 
of the case. 
 
 
"50. 
Imposition of Other Penalties or Sanctions.  The Utah Supreme Court 
and the Missouri Supreme Court have disbarred the respondent for the misconduct. 
 
 
"51. 
Remorse.  At the hearing on this matter, the respondent expressed 
genuine remorse for having engaged in the misconduct. 
27 
 
 
 
"52. 
Remoteness of Prior Offenses.  The discipline imposed in California in 
1998 and in Missouri in 2000 is remote in character and in time to the misconduct in this 
case. 
 
 
"53. 
In addition to the above-cited factors, the hearing panel has thoroughly 
examined and considered the following Standards: 
 
'4.11 
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer 
knowingly converts client property and causes injury or 
potential injury to a client.' 
 
'5.11 
Disbarment is generally appropriate when: 
 
(a) 
a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct a 
necessary element of which includes intentional 
interference with the administration of justice, 
false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, 
extortion, misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, 
distribution or importation of controlled 
substances; or the intentional killing of another; 
or an attempt or conspiracy or solicitation of 
another to commit any of these offenses; 
  
(b) 
a lawyer engages in any other intentional 
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation that seriously adversely 
reflects on the lawyer's fitness to practice.' 
 
"Recommendation 
 
 
"54. 
The disciplinary administrator recommended that the hearing panel reject 
the respondent's request for probation and instead recommend that the respondent be 
disbarred. In his answer, the respondent included a request for probation. At the hearing, 
28 
 
the respondent recommended that the hearing panel give him 'an opportunity to retain or 
reinstate' his license to practice in Kansas. The respondent argued that he has a financial 
need to practice law. Finally, the respondent asked to be allowed to prove himself to the 
community that he is responsible. 
 
 
"55. 
According to Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 211(g)(3), a hearing panel may not 
recommend that a respondent be placed on probation unless: 
 
'(i) 
the Respondent develops a workable, substantial, and detailed 
plan of probation and provides a copy of the proposed plan of 
probation to the Disciplinary Administrator and each member of 
the Hearing Panel at least fourteen days prior to the hearing on 
the Formal Complaint; 
 
'(ii) 
the Respondent puts the proposed plan of probation into effect 
prior to the hearing on the Formal Complaint by complying with 
each of the terms and conditions of the probation plan; 
 
'(iii) 
the misconduct can be corrected by probation; and 
 
'(iv) 
placing the Respondent on probation is in the best interests of the 
legal profession and the citizens of the State of Kansas.' 
 
 
"56. 
The respondent's request for probation is fraught with problems. Initially, 
it is worth noting that the respondent could not recall whether he first read the rule which 
sets forth the procedure for probation. The respondent's plan is not workable, substantial, 
or detailed. The respondent failed to put his plan of probation into effect. While the 
respondent argued that he could not put it into effect, there are certainly steps he could 
have taken which he did not take. Next, the respondent's misconduct included dishonest 
conduct and dishonest conduct cannot be corrected by probation. In re Stockwell, 296 
Kan. 860, 295 P.3d 572 (2013). Finally, placing the respondent on probation is not in the 
best interests of the legal profession nor the citizens of the State of Kansas. 
 
29 
 
 
"57. 
The respondent has played fast and loose with the truth in the 
disciplinary proceedings in Utah, in his voluntary resignation in California, and during 
the disciplinary proceedings here in Kansas. Despite the 1998 order suspending his 
license to practice law in California, during the Utah sanctions hearing, the respondent 
testified that he had not previously been disciplined. In the voluntary resignation of his 
license to practice law in California, despite the pending complaint in Utah, the 
respondent asserted that he had no disciplinary complaints pending in any jurisdiction. 
Finally, in correspondence with the disciplinary administrator's office, the respondent 
falsely claimed that J.B. was fully reimbursed before the bar complaint was filed. 
Regarding his misconduct in California, the respondent stated that the 'issue was resolved 
with the California bar,' when in fact, in 1998, his license to practice law in California 
had been suspended. Further, the respondent failed to report his 2000 reciprocal 
suspension in Missouri and his 2015 disbarment in Utah. 
 
 
"58. 
Accordingly, based upon the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the 
Standards listed above, the hearing panel unanimously recommends that the respondent 
be disbarred. 
 
 
"59. 
Costs are assessed against the respondent in an amount to be certified by 
the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator." 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence, the findings of the 
disciplinary panel, and the arguments of the parties and determines whether violations of 
KRPC exist and, if they do, what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292 Kan. 940, 945, 
258 P.3d 375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 211(f) (2017 Kan. S. Ct. R. 251). Clear 
and convincing evidence is "'evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that "the truth 
of the facts asserted is highly probable."'" In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498, 505, 204 P.3d 610 
(2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725, 188 P.3d 1 [2008]). 
 
30 
 
 
Respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint, to which he filed 
an answer. Respondent was also given adequate notice of the panel hearing where he 
appeared in person. He filed no exceptions to the panel's final hearing report. With no 
exceptions before us, the panel's findings of fact are deemed admitted. Supreme Court 
Rule 212(c), (d) (2017 Kan. S. Ct. R. 255). Furthermore, the evidence before the hearing 
panel establishes the charged misconduct in violation of KRPC 1.15(a) and (d) (2017 
Kan. S. Ct. R. 326) (safekeeping property); 8.3(a) (2017 Kan. S. Ct. R. 378) (reporting 
professional misconduct); 8.4(c) (2017 Kan. S. Ct. R. 379) (engaging in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); Kansas Supreme Court Rule 
207(c) (2017 Kan. S. Ct. R. 246) (failure to report action); and Kansas Supreme Court 
Rule 208(c) (2017 Kan. S. Ct. R. 246) (failure to notify Clerk of the Appellate Courts of 
change of address) by clear and convincing evidence and supports the panel's conclusions 
of law. We therefore adopt the panel's findings and conclusions. 
 
The only remaining issue before us is the appropriate discipline for respondent's 
violations. At the panel hearing, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator 
recommended that the respondent be disbarred. The hearing panel also unanimously 
recommended that the respondent be disbarred. The respondent requested probation, that 
he be given an opportunity to retain or reinstate his license, and that he be allowed to 
prove to the community that he is a responsible person. 
 
The day prior to the hearing before this court, the respondent notified the office of 
the Clerk of the Appellate Courts that he would not appear in person or by counsel. The 
clerk informed him that pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 212(e)(5) he was required to 
appear and that any response from him must be submitted in writing; the clerk gave 
respondent the clerk's office fax number.  
 
At the hearing before this court, the respondent did not appear. The Disciplinary 
Administrator recommended that the respondent be disbarred. We agree with the 
31 
 
recommendation of both the Disciplinary Administrator and the panel, and we hold that 
respondent is disbarred from the practice of law in the state of Kansas. 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE 
 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Alvin R. Lundgren be and he is hereby disbarred 
in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 203(a)(1) (2017 Kan. S. Ct. R. 234), effective 
upon the date of the filing of this opinion. 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to 
respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports. 
 
BEIER, J., not participating. 
 
KATHRYN GARDNER, J., assigned.1 
 
                                                 
 
 
1REPORTER'S NOTE:  Judge Gardner, of the Kansas Court of Appeals, was appointed 
to hear case No. 117,201 vice Justice Beier under the authority vested in the Supreme 
Court by K.S.A. 20-3002(c).