Case Title: State ex rel. Brown v. Ashtabula County Bd. of Elections

Citation: 2014-Ohio-4022

Docket Number: 2014-1405

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2014-09-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State ex rel. Brown v. Ashtabula Cty. Bd. of Elections, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-4022.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2014-OHIO-4022 
THE STATE EX REL. BROWN ET AL. v. ASHTABULA COUNTY  
BOARD OF ELECTIONS ET AL. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State ex rel. Brown v. Ashtabula Cty. Bd. of Elections,  
Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-4022.] 
Elections—Mandamus—R.C. 3513.04—Writ sought to compel county board of 
elections to place relator’s name on ballot as judicial candidate—Writ 
denied. 
(No. 2014-1405—Submitted September 3, 2014—Decided September 16, 2014.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
____________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Relators, 
Thomas 
Brown, 
Clifford 
Henry, 
and 
Michael 
Vandervort,1 seek a writ of mandamus compelling respondents, the Ashtabula 
County Board of Elections and its director, Duane Feher, to place Brown’s name 
                                                 
1 Henry and Vandervoort are registered voters in Ashtabula County. 
 
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2 
 
on the November 4, 2014 ballot as a judicial candidate for the Ashtabula County 
Western Area Court.  Because relators have not shown a clear entitlement to this 
extraordinary relief, we deny the writ. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} Brown ran unsuccessfully to become the Democratic nominee for a 
seat on the Ashtabula County common pleas court in the Democratic Party 
primary election held on May 6, 2014. 
{¶ 3} On July 21, 2014, he filed nominating petitions to be a candidate 
for judge on the Ashtabula County Western Area Court in the November 4, 2014 
general election.  The Ashtabula County Board of Elections, relying solely on 
R.C. 3513.04, rejected Brown’s petitions. 
{¶ 4} Relators filed this action seeking a writ of mandamus to compel 
the board to certify his candidacy for the Western Area Court, asserting that R.C. 
3513.04 is unconstitutional.  We permitted Ohio Attorney General Michael 
DeWine to intervene as a respondent to defend the constitutionality of the statute. 
Laches 
{¶ 5} The attorney general asserts that relators unreasonably delayed in 
seeking relief and that this action is barred by the doctrine of laches.  He suggests 
that Brown knew or should have known that he intended to challenge the 
constitutionality of R.C. 3513.04 on May 6, 2014, when he lost the primary 
election, and that relators failed to exercise utmost diligence by not filing suit on 
July 24, 2014, when Brown first learned that the board would not certify his 
candidacy. 
{¶ 6} “The elements of laches are (1) unreasonable delay or lapse of time 
in asserting a right, (2) absence of an excuse for the delay, (3) knowledge, actual 
or constructive, of the injury or wrong, and (4) prejudice to the other party.”  State 
ex rel. Polo v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 74 Ohio St.3d 143, 145, 656 
N.E.2d 1277 (1995).  Laches may bar relief in an election-related matter if the 
January Term, 2014 
3 
 
person seeking relief fails to act with the “ ‘utmost diligence.’ ”  State ex rel. 
Monroe v. Mahoning Cty. Bd. of Elections, 137 Ohio St.3d 62, 2013-Ohio-4490, 
997 N.E.2d 524, ¶ 30, quoting State ex rel. Fuller v. Medina Cty. Bd. of Elections, 
97 Ohio St.3d 221, 2002-Ohio-5922, 778 N.E.2d 37, ¶ 7. 
{¶ 7} Relators could not have filed this action on May 6, 2014, when 
Brown lost the primary election, because relators had no claim for relief until the 
board of elections refused to place Brown’s name on the ballot.  State ex rel. 
Linnabary v. Husted, 138 Ohio St.3d 535, 2014-Ohio-1417, 8 N.E.3d 940, ¶ 16 
(“Linnabary did not have a claim to assert until [the secretary of state] removed 
his name from the ballot”).  Nor were respondents prejudiced by the failure to file 
suit on July 24, 2014, when Brown learned that the board would not certify his 
candidacy.  Had relators filed suit at that time, this mandamus action would not 
have been docketed as an expedited election action, and the case might not have 
been decided before the September 20, 2014 deadline for sending absentee ballots 
to military and overseas voters, potentially placing the board in a significantly 
worse position. 
{¶ 8} We therefore reject the claim that laches bars this action. 
Mandamus 
{¶ 9} The requirements for a writ of mandamus are well established: (1) 
the relator must demonstrate a clear legal right to relief, (2) the respondent must 
have a clear legal duty to perform the requested relief, and (3) there must be no 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. State ex rel. Harris v. Rhodes, 54 
Ohio St.2d 41, 374 N.E.2d 641 (1978). 
{¶ 10} And as we explained in State ex rel. Pressley v. Indus. Comm., 11 
Ohio St.2d 141, 228 N.E.2d 631 (1967), 
 
“the issuance of a writ of mandamus rests, to a considerable extent 
at least, within the sound discretion of the court to which 
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4 
 
application for the writ is made. The writ is not demandable as a 
matter of right, or at least is not wholly a matter of right; nor will it 
issue unless the relator has a clear right to the relief sought, and 
makes a clear case for the issuance of the writ. The facts submitted 
and the proof produced must be plain, clear, and convincing before 
a court is justified in using the strong arm of the law by way of 
granting the writ.” 
 
Id. at 161, quoting 35 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d, Discretion as to Issuance, 
Generally, Section 37, at 285. 
{¶ 11} A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, exercised by this 
court with caution and issued only when the right is clear.  State ex rel. Taylor v. 
Glasser, 50 Ohio St.2d 165, 166, 364 N.E.2d 1 (1977); State ex rel. Shafer v. 
Ohio Turnpike Comm., 159 Ohio St. 581, 589, 113 N.E.2d 14 (1953). 
{¶ 12} But relators are not only required to prove clear entitlement to 
relief, they must also overcome the presumption of constitutionality afforded to 
all acts of the General Assembly and demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that 
R.C. 3513.04 is unconstitutional.  State ex rel. Purdy v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of 
Elections,, 77 Ohio St.3d 338, 345-346, 673 N.E.2d 1351 (1997); State ex rel. 
Watson v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 88 Ohio St.3d 239, 261, 725 N.E.2d 
255 (2000) (applying presumption of constitutionality to statute setting forth 
qualifications for office of sheriff). 
{¶ 13} The United States Constitution provides that states may prescribe 
“[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and 
Representatives,” Article I, Section 4, cl. 1, and the Supreme Court has 
recognized that states retain the power to regulate their own elections.  Burdick v. 
Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992). 
January Term, 2014 
5 
 
{¶ 14} To assess the constitutionality of a state election law, the court 
must first “consider the character and magnitude of” the claimant’s alleged injury.  
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 
(1983).  If the regulation severely restricts voting rights, then strict scrutiny 
applies and the law must be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state 
interest.  Burdick at 434. We have explained that “a law severely burdens voting 
rights if it discriminates based on political content instead of neutral factors or if 
there are few alternative means of access to the ballot.”  Watson, 88 Ohio St.3d at 
243, 725 N.E.2d 255.  But “not every statutory restriction limiting the field of 
candidates need advance a compelling state interest,” id., and if the regulation is 
minimally burdensome and nondiscriminatory, then “ ‘the State’s important 
regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify’ the restrictions,”  Burdick at 
434, quoting Anderson at 788. 
{¶ 15} Notably, we applied these standards to a prior version of R.C. 
3513.04 in Purdy and upheld the statute against constitutional challenge.  At that 
time, paragraph three of the statute stated: “No person who seeks party 
nomination for an office or position at a primary election * * * shall be permitted 
to become a candidate by nominating petition * * * at the following general 
election for any office by nominating petition or by declaration of intent to be a 
write-in candidate.”  Sub.S.B. No. 261, 146 Ohio Laws, Part VI, 10605, 10608.  
We concluded that this statute imposed only a “very limited” and slight burden on 
potential candidates, Purdy, 77 Ohio St.3d at 344, 673 N.E.2d 1351, “[did] not 
unreasonably interfere with the right of voters to have candidates of their choice 
placed on the ballot,” id., and was nondiscriminatory, id. at 343, and we explained 
that “Ohio clearly has a legitimate interest in preventing potential conflicts among 
party members, an interest in preventing the possibility of voter confusion, and an 
interest in preventing candidacies that may conceivably be prompted by short-
range goals,”  id. at 346. 
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6 
 
{¶ 16} Following our decision in Purdy, the General Assembly enacted a 
number of amendments to R.C. 3513.04, and the statute now states: 
 
No person who seeks party nomination for an office or 
position at a primary election * * * shall be permitted to become a 
candidate by nominating petition * * * at the following general 
election for any office other than the office of member of the state 
board of education, office of member of a city, local, or exempted 
village board of education, office of member of a governing board 
of an educational service center, or office of township trustee. 
 
(Emphasis added for new material since 1997.)   
{¶ 17} Relators maintain that these amendments cannot survive strict 
scrutiny, because these provisions arbitrarily and invidiously discriminate against 
Brown and similarly situated individuals and severely burden fundamental rights 
to associate and vote by limiting the field of candidates available to voters.  And, 
they contend, the restrictions imposed by the statute are purposeless; relators 
claim that any state interest in regulating partisan elections does not apply to 
candidates for nonpartisan office, that Brown’s candidacy was not short-sighted, 
and that there is no chance of voter confusion or intraparty conflict in these 
circumstances. 
{¶ 18} The attorney general responds that our decision in Purdy provides 
the rule of decision in this case, that the rational-basis test should guide our 
analysis, and that the legislature could reasonably conclude that “the risks 
associated with second-chance/sore-loser candidacies (and the overall effect on 
Ohio’s electoral integrity) are lessened within the context of educational and/or 
highly localized positions” and that “there was more need to encourage and 
incentivize candidacy for such positions.” 
January Term, 2014 
7 
 
{¶ 19} It is not clear on this record that the amendments enacted in 1998 
are unconstitutional solely because the statute now permits unsuccessful primary 
candidates the opportunity to file nominating petitions for some nonpartisan 
offices—member of the state board of education, member of a city, local, or 
exempted village board of education, member of a governing board of an 
educational service center, or township trustee.  These amendments increase voter 
access and lessen the burdens on candidates who have run in a primary and who 
have elected to refile for the above designated offices.  See McDonald v. Bd. of 
Election Commrs. of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802, 811, 89 S.Ct. 1404, 22 L.Ed.2d 739 
(1969) (Illinois statute allowing some but not all inmates to receive absentee 
ballots was constitutional, and the fact “[t]hat Illinois has not gone still further, as 
perhaps it might, should not render void its remedial legislation”).  And the statute 
remains nondiscriminatory; although these amendments may treat offices 
differently, all candidates are treated equally.  Thus, any burden on voting rights 
remains, as the court in Purdy put it, “slight” and “very limited,” and the state 
interest required to justify it is correspondingly small. 
{¶ 20} There may be legitimate reasons that motivated the General 
Assembly to designate certain offices for different treatment, and we lack the 
benefit of a sufficiently developed record in this expedited election matter to 
definitively state that the legislature lacked any basis for its actions.  For example, 
in this instance, having lost a primary election for common pleas court judge, 
relator Brown seeks the opportunity to run for a different judicial office at the 
general election held in the same year, which may be confusing to voters and 
provide an advantage over other judicial candidates; but because there are no 
primary elections for state board of education, there is no possibility of voter 
confusion in that instance.  See R.C. 3513.259 (“Nominations of candidates for 
the office of member of the state board of education shall be made only by 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
 
nominating petition”).  These are policy considerations that belong with the 
General Assembly, not the judiciary. 
{¶ 21} It is not sufficient for relators to cast doubt on the constitutionality 
of this statute, nor is it the attorney general’s burden to prove the statute 
constitutional; rather, relators must show beyond a reasonable doubt that R.C. 
3513.04 is unconstitutional.  This is so, because “[t]he ability to invalidate 
legislation is a power to be exercised only with great caution and in the clearest of 
cases.” Yajnik v. Akron Dept. of Health, Hous. Div., 101 Ohio St.3d 106, 2004-
Ohio-357, 802 N.E.2d 632, ¶ 16. 
{¶ 22} The opinion concurring in judgment misses the point.  Relators 
seek extraordinary relief in this court and can obtain it only if they demonstrate 
clear entitlement to the writ.  The standards articulated by the Supreme Court in 
Anderson and Burdick that apply in civil litigation challenging the 
constitutionality of ballot restrictions inform our analysis, but those cases are not 
writ actions and do not involve the unique burdens that control the adjudication of 
original actions in this court.  Otherwise, this case would present nothing more 
than an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the statute is unconstitutional, 
and we lack original jurisdiction to grant a declaratory judgment.  State ex rel. 
Ministerial Day Care Assn. v. Zelman, 100 Ohio St.3d 347, 2003-Ohio-6447, 800 
N.E.2d 21, ¶ 22.  Rather, the function of mandamus is to compel the performance 
of a present existing duty.  State ex rel. Willis v. Sheboy, 6 Ohio St.3d 167, 451 
N.E.2d 1200 (1983), paragraph two of the syllabus. 
{¶ 23} The opinion concurring in judgment conflates the legal standards 
at issue here.  Although it purports to apply the principles of the ballot-access 
cases in determining that R.C. 3513.04 is unconstitutional, it points to nothing in 
the post-1998 amendments to the statute that burdens the right to vote or access to 
the ballot.  And it presumably agrees that any burden on Brown’s candidacy is 
outweighed by the state’s legitimate interests, because it would uphold the ballot 
January Term, 2014 
9 
 
restrictions if severed from the post-1998 amendments.  Rather, the opinion 
concurring in judgment purports to resolve an equal protection claim by severing 
language from the statute, and equal protection claims are subject to rational-basis 
review because “there is no fundamental right to run for public office.”  State ex 
rel. Keefe v. Eyrich, 22 Ohio St.3d 164, 165, 489 N.E.2d 259 (1986).  This is the 
reason why relators have the burden to do more than simply cast doubt on the 
constitutionality of the statute to succeed. 
{¶ 24} For these reasons, relators have not overcome the presumption of 
constitutionality, 
nor 
have 
they 
demonstrated 
that 
R.C. 
3513.04 
is 
unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.  Hence, they have not shown a clear 
entitlement to extraordinary relief.  No writ will issue in such doubtful 
circumstances.  Accordingly, we deny the requested writ of mandamus. 
Writ denied. 
O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, and FRENCH, JJ., concur. 
 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and LANZINGER, J., concur in judgment only. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
 
O’NEILL, J., not participating. 
___________________ 
O’CONNOR, C.J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 25} I concur in the judgment of the court that relators are not entitled to 
a writ of mandamus.2  However, the opinion adopted by a plurality of the court 
employs the wrong legal standard to decide the case.  I therefore write separately 
to clarify the constitutional issues at play in this case. 
{¶ 26} We first considered the constitutionality of R.C. 3513.04 in State 
ex rel. Purdy v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections, 77 Ohio St.3d 338, 673 N.E.2d 
1351 (1997).  As written at the time, R.C. 3513.04 operated to prevent 
                                                 
2 I join the portion of the plurality opinion analyzing—and rejecting—the applicability of laches. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
 
unsuccessful primary candidates from seeking election to a different office in the 
same election cycle, with no exceptions.  The relators in Purdy challenged the 
statute as violating ballot-access rights protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution.  Id. at 341. 
{¶ 27} To decide the case, we applied the “modified balancing test” 
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 
780, 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983), and Burdick v. Takushi, 504 
U.S. 428, 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992).  Purdy at 342-343.  We 
held that R.C. 3513.04 was constitutional because it imposed only a “slight” 
burden on First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, which was outweighed by 
legitimate state interests promoted by the law.  Id. at 346. 
{¶ 28} The constitutionality of R.C. 3513.04 is before us again because 
the statute was modified in 1998 and subsequent years.  The statute previously 
allowed no exceptions; the amended law now permits “sore-loser” candidates to 
launch second-chance campaigns for some, but not all, nonpartisan offices. 
 
No person who seeks party nomination for an office or 
position at a primary election * * * shall be permitted to become a 
candidate by nominating petition * * * at the following general 
election for any office other than the office of member of the state 
board of education, office of member of a city, local, or exempted 
village board of education, office of member of a governing board 
of an educational service center, or office of township trustee. 
 
(Emphasis added for new material since 1997.) 
{¶ 29} The addition of a limited pool of exempt offices to R.C. 3513.04 
raises two distinct constitutional questions, which the parties’ briefs unfortunately 
conflate.  The obvious question is whether the exceptions create an equal-
January Term, 2014 
11 
 
protection problem, an issue that was not before the Purdy court.  But this case 
also requires us to revisit the question whether the statute, as amended, continues 
to promote state interests sufficient to outweigh the burden on relators’ First and 
Fourteenth Amendment ballot-access rights. 
First Amendment rights: Anderson/Burdick balancing 
{¶ 30} Ballot-access restrictions place burdens on two different, but 
overlapping, rights enjoyed by electors such as relators Clifford Henry and 
Michael Vandervort: “the right of individuals to associate for the advancement of 
political beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political 
persuasion, to cast their votes effectively.”  Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30, 
89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968).  These rights are protected against state 
encroachment by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.  Id. at 30-31.  The First 
Amendment also protects the parallel rights of candidates, such as relator Thomas 
Brown, affected by ballot-access regulations.  “[B]allot access cases based on 
First Amendment grounds have rarely distinguished between the rights of 
candidates and the rights of voters.”  Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 531, 121 
S.Ct. 1029, 149 L.Ed.2d 44 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment), 
citing Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972). 
{¶ 31} To assess the constitutionality of a ballot-access law under the First 
Amendment, a reviewing court engages in the balancing inquiry described in 
Anderson and Burdick.  Anderson/Burdick balancing is a “two-step” inquiry.  See 
Navarro v. Neal, 716 F.3d 425, 430 (7th Cir.2013); Coalition for Free & Open 
Elections, Prohibition Party v. McElderry, 48 F.3d 493, 497 (10th Cir.1995). 
{¶ 32} First, the court must “consider the character and magnitude of the 
asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments 
that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate.”  Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 
75 L.Ed.2d 547.  Second, the court must weigh the character and magnitude of 
that constitutional injury against “ ‘the precise interests put forward by the State 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
12 
 
as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.’ ”  Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 
112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245, quoting Anderson at 789. 
{¶ 33} The magnitude of the burden determines the appropriate level of 
scrutiny the statute will receive.  Purdy, 77 Ohio St.3d at 343, 673 N.E.2d 1351; 
Burdick at 434.  If an election regulation severely burdens the plaintiff’s rights, 
then the statute is subject to strict scrutiny, which is to say the regulation must be 
narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling interest.  Burdick at 434.  
In all other cases, where the ballot-access regulation imposes some burden on 
First Amendment rights, however minimal, the court must weigh those burdens 
against the interest asserted by the state.  “However slight [the] burden [that a 
state law imposes] may appear, * * * it must be justified by relevant and 
legitimate state interests ‘sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation.’ ”  
Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 191, 128 S.Ct. 1610, 170 
L.Ed.2d 574 (2008) (lead opinion), quoting Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288-
289, 112 S.Ct. 698, 116 L.Ed.2d 711 (1992); see also Crawford at 211 (Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
Equal protection: Anderson/Burdick balancing 
{¶ 34} Equal protection applies not just to the initial allocation of the 
franchise, but also to the manner of its exercise.  Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104, 
121 S.Ct. 525, 148 L.Ed.2d 388 (2000).  The court made clear in Crawford that 
equal-protection election challenges are subject to the same Anderson/Burdick 
analysis as are First Amendment ballot-access challenges.  See Northeast Ohio 
Coalition for the Homeless v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580, 592 (6th Cir.2012). 
{¶ 35} The state argues that rational-basis review should apply because 
the classifications at issue are neutral.  The state’s position misconstrues the law.  
Rational-basis review applies to laws that draw nondiscriminatory classifications 
and impose no burden on the right to vote.  McDonald v. Bd. of Election Commrs. 
of Chicago, 394 U.S. 802, 807-809, 89 S.Ct. 1404, 22 L.Ed.2d 739 (1969).  But 
January Term, 2014 
13 
 
where a plaintiff alleges that the state has burdened voting rights through 
disparate treatment, the Anderson/Burdick balancing test is applicable.  Obama 
for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 429 (6th Cir.2012). 
The plurality erroneously utilizes rational-basis scrutiny 
{¶ 36} Despite paying lip service to the Anderson/Burdick test, the 
plurality proceeds to analyze the statute under a conventional “rational basis” 
standard that affords “substantial deference” to the legislature.  State v. Williams, 
88 Ohio St.3d 513, 531, 728 N.E.2d 342 (2000).  Consistent with this standard, 
the plurality opinion rejects relators’ challenge because the record will not permit 
the court “to definitively state that the legislature lacked any basis for its actions.”  
Plurality opinion at ¶ 20.3   
{¶ 37} However, rational-basis review is not appropriate in ballot-access 
cases.  In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court rejected the suggestion that 
Burdick allows for any “deferential” standard for a state’s important regulatory 
interests.  553 U.S. at 190, 128 S.Ct. 1610, 170 L.Ed.2d 574, fn. 8.  Thus, 
traditional rational-basis review does not apply to the review of ballot-access 
statutes.  Price v. New York State Bd. of Elections, 540 F.3d 101, 108-109 (2d 
Cir.2008); Am. Civ. Liberties Union of New Mexico v. Santillanes, 546 F.3d 1313, 
1321-1322 (10th Cir.2008); Rogers v. Corbett, 468 F.3d 188, 194 (3d Cir.2006); 
see also Credico v. New York State Bd. of Elections, E.D.N.Y. No. 10 CV 4555, 
2013 WL 3990784 (Aug. 5, 2013), * 20 (“The Court should not apply rational 
basis review to a challenged law that burdens First Amendment rights * * *”); 
Green Party of Arkansas v. Daniels, 733 F.Supp.2d 1055, 1062 (E.D.Ark.2010) 
(review of a ballot-access restriction that imposes minimal burdens “is not the 
rational-basis inquiry advocated by the State”); Am. Assn. of People with 
Disabilities v. Herrera, 580 F.Supp.2d 1195, 1216 (D.N.M.2008) (“a district 
                                                 
3 To ask whether the state had “any” basis to justify the statute arguably imposes an even more 
permissive standard of review than rational-basis scrutiny. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
 
court, to be faithful to the Supreme Court’s language and standard in Anderson v. 
Celebrezze, must be careful not to transform the Anderson test into a de facto 
form of strict scrutiny or rational basis test, but must carefully and faithfully apply 
the two stages that the Anderson test requires”). 
{¶ 38} The more serious legal error in the plurality opinion lies in its 
misallocation of the burden of proof.  Traditional rational-basis review imposes 
no burden upon the state to prove that the legislation is justified.  Williams, 88 
Ohio St.3d at 531, 728 N.E.2d 342.  Rather, the burden falls upon the party 
challenging the legislation “ ‘to negative every conceivable basis which might 
support it.’ ”  State v. Thompson, 95 Ohio St.3d 264, 2002-Ohio-2124, 767 
N.E.2d 251, ¶ 27, quoting Madison v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88, 60 S.Ct. 406, 84 
L.Ed. 590 (1940).  The plurality opinion reflects this standard.  Plurality opinion 
at ¶ 21 (“It is not sufficient for relators to cast doubt on the constitutionality of 
this statute, nor is it the Attorney General’s burden to prove the statute 
constitutional; rather, relators must show beyond a reasonable doubt that R.C. 
3513.04 is unconstitutional” [emphasis added]). 
{¶ 39} This is simply an incorrect statement of law.  Anderson instructs 
courts to weigh “the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for 
the burden imposed by its rule.”  (Emphasis added.)  Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789, 
103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547.  “The State need not provide empirical evidence 
justifying its interest; however, the State cannot rely on hollow or contrived 
arguments as justifications.”  Trudell v. State, 193 Vt. 515, 2013 VT 18, 71 A.3d 
1235, at ¶ 21; Price v. New York State Bd. of Elections, 540 F.3d at 110.  Thus, 
the state plainly has a burden to proffer justifications for the law, along with an 
explanation of how the law satisfies that state interest. 
{¶ 40} The plurality’s attempt to distinguish this case based on the 
specific relief sought—mandamus—ignores 20 years of jurisprudence from this 
court.  In Purdy, we discussed the fact that the relief sought was closer in nature 
January Term, 2014 
15 
 
to declaratory judgment and prospective injunction, because in order to establish 
his “clear right to relief,” the relator first needed a declaration that the statute was 
unconstitutional.  Purdy, 77 Ohio St.3d at 341-342, 673 N.E.2d 1351.  However, 
we held that it was permissible in limited circumstances, especially in elections 
matters, to seek mandamus instead of declaratory judgment.  Id. at 341 (“certain 
election matters may present extraordinary circumstances. In this regard, 
declaratory judgment might not provide an adequate remedy in the ordinary 
course of law”). 
{¶ 41} The plurality opinion cites absolutely no authority for its 
proposition that because this case arises in mandamus, relators must satisfy a 
greater burden to secure ballot access.  And in fact, there is no such authority.  
Relators established that the statute burdened their constitutional rights and that 
the state could present no justification for that burden.  Based on Crawford, 
Burdick, Anderson, and our own decisions, by prevailing on these points, relators 
established a clear legal right to relief. 
{¶ 42} At the heart of the plurality opinion lies a great mystery: what 
greater showing could relators muster to overcome the plurality’s agnosticism?   
{¶ 43} Of greater concern is the plurality’s complete lack of 
comprehension of what constitutes a ballot-access law.  The plurality opinion 
clings to the fiction that it is only the pre-1998 statute that deals with ballot 
access, whereas “nothing in the post-1998 amendments to the statute * * * 
burden[s] the right to vote or access to the ballot,” as if the two functioned 
independently. 
{¶ 44} This argument is a celebration of form over substance.  
Apparently, if the statute were drafted to say that “no one is subject to the sore-
loser restriction except county court candidates,” the plurality would recognize 
the change as a ballot-access restriction.  But because the law is written inversely, 
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to say who may run a second-chance campaign instead of who may not, it ceases 
to be a ballot-access limitation, even though it achieves exactly the same result. 
{¶ 45} Moreover, the plurality’s determination to divorce this case from 
its election-law roots, so as to employ a conventional “rational-basis” analysis, 
ignores the fact that Crawford occupies the field when it comes to elections laws.  
“To evaluate a law respecting the right to vote—whether it governs voter 
qualifications, candidate selection, or the voting process—we use the approach set 
out in Burdick * * *.”  Crawford, 553 U.S. at 204, 128 S.Ct. 1610, 170 L.Ed.2d 
574 (Scalia, J., concurring).  To pretend that this case is something other than an 
elections case governed by Anderson/Burdick is to deny the obvious. 
Legal analysis 
{¶ 46} The state has made no effort to satisfy its burden to put forward 
justifications for the burdens imposed by amended R.C. 3513.04.  Instead, the 
state offers mere speculation.  “[T]he legislature could rationally have decided 
that the risks associated with second-chance/sore-loser candidacies (and the 
overall effect on Ohio’s electoral integrity) are lessened within the context of 
educational and/or highly localized positions.” 
{¶ 47} The notion that boards of education are somehow immune from 
intraparty conflict is unsupported by evidence, experience, or common sense.  To 
the contrary, boards of education, like every other elected office, are susceptible 
to the same partisan and political maneuvering that the “sore-loser” statute is 
designed to prevent.  And “highly localized position” is an apt description of the 
judicial seat for the western division of Ashtabula County. 
{¶ 48} Alternatively, the attorney general offers an argument in defense of 
the statute that is even more speculative and unconvincing: “the legislature could 
also reasonably think that there was more need to encourage and incentivize 
candidacy for such positions.”  A hypothetical desire to “incentivize” people to 
serve on school boards should not outweigh Brown’s First Amendment rights, at 
January Term, 2014 
17 
 
least not in the absence of any evidence that R.C. 3513.04 was causing an actual 
shortage of candidates for these positions. 
{¶ 49} The undeniable fact is that the decision to exempt some, but not 
all, nonpartisan offices from the “sore-loser” statute was arbitrary.  There appears 
to be no articulable reason why these offices were selected or why others were 
omitted.  And when it comes to election laws, it is precisely this sort of arbitrary 
regulation that the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution 
forbids. 
{¶ 50} In addition, the statute, as amended, no longer justifies the burden 
on relators’ First Amendment rights.  The plurality suggests that the amendments 
have lessened the burden, insofar as more offices are now available to second-
chance candidates.  But as applied to Brown, as a candidate for this particular 
judicial office, the burden remains the same. 
{¶ 51} Moreover, even if the “slight” burden has now become “slighter,” 
it must still be outweighed by some legitimate state interest that the law furthers.  
The interests that were deemed adequate in Purdy—avoiding confusion caused by 
second-chance candidates—no longer has force when second-chance candidates 
are able to run for some, though not all, offices in the general election. 
{¶ 52} The plurality speculates that confusion could result from a second-
chance candidate such as Brown seeking a judicial office in the primary and then 
a different judicial office in the general election.  The plurality notes that the same 
risk of confusion does not exist for second-chance candidates for state board of 
education, because nomination for that position is by petition only, not by 
primary.  R.C. 3513.259. 
{¶ 53} The flaw in this argument is that primaries are possible, though not 
automatic, for all the other positions listed in the exception portion of R.C. 
3513.04.  Trustee offices can be subject to primary election if a majority of the 
electors petitions for a primary.  R.C. 3513.253.  And a board of education of a 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
city, local, or exempted village school district or governing board of an exempted 
educational service may establish a nonpartisan primary by resolution.  R.C. 
3513.256(A).  So the same possibility of confusion exists with second-chance 
candidates running for one board of education in a primary and a different board 
of education in the general election. 
{¶ 54} Even though the burden on relators’ constitutional rights is slight, 
the state has not presented any interest to justify the distinction drawn by the 
amended statute.  I would therefore hold that the language added to R.C. 3513.04 
renders the statute unconstitutional. 
Remedy 
{¶ 55} Having determined that R.C. 3513.04 is unconstitutional, I address 
the question of remedy. 
{¶ 56} The dissent agrees that amended R.C. 3513.04 is unconstitutional 
and would therefore grant the writ and place Brown’s name on the general 
election ballot.  But there is no explanation for how this result has been reached.  
Rewriting the statute to include county courts on the list of excepted offices 
would be an exercise of power that this court does not possess.  So the only 
alternative is that the dissent must consider R.C. 3513.04 unconstitutional in its 
entirety, but the dissent has not established that such a broad remedy is necessary. 
{¶ 57} R.C. 1.50 provides that statutory provisions are presumptively 
severable.  The test of severability is “ ‘whether the remaining parts of the article, 
standing alone and without reference to the unconstitutional sections, can be 
effective and operable.’ ”  State ex rel. Doersam v. Indus. Comm., 45 Ohio St.3d 
115, 121, 543 N.E.2d 1169 (1989), quoting State ex rel. King v. Rhodes, 11 Ohio 
St.2d 95, 101, 228 N.E.2d 653 (1967).  The remainder of R.C. 3513.04 is plainly 
capable of standing alone without the arbitrary list of exemptions that have 
created the constitutional problem. 
January Term, 2014 
19 
 
{¶ 58} I would therefore strike the language added in the 1998 
amendment and return to the statute that existed at the time that this court decided 
Purdy, 77 Ohio St.3d 338, 673 N.E.2d 1351.  And once this is done, the pyrrhic 
nature of Brown’s victory becomes apparent.  R.C. 3513.04 would still bar Brown 
from the November ballot; even though his constitutional argument is 
meritorious, he would nevertheless not be entitled to a writ of mandamus. 
{¶ 59} For these reasons, I concur in the judgment reached by the 
plurality. 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 
____________________ 
PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 60} There is no legitimate reason to allow respondent Ashtabula 
County Board of Elections to refuse to place relator Thomas Brown’s name on the 
November 4, 2014 ballot.  In State ex rel. Purdy v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Elections, 
77 Ohio St.3d 338, 347, 673 N.E.2d 1351 (1997) (Moyer, C.J., dissenting), Chief 
Justice Moyer stated that “application of the [sore-loser] statute burdened Purdy’s 
and Tighe’s constitutional rights by prohibiting their candidacies.”  The same is 
true of Brown. 
{¶ 61} Brown’s constitutional right to ballot access, when he is an 
otherwise eligible candidate, is being infringed by the application of R.C. 
3513.04.  There is no great principle behind the statute and it ought not be entitled 
to a presumption of constitutionality.  See Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 
265, 297, 8 S.Ct. 1370, 32 L.Ed. 239 (1888), overruled on other grounds, 
Milwaukee Cty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 56 S.Ct. 229, 80 L.Ed. 220 
(1935); Ohio Grocers Assn. v. Levin, 123 Ohio St.3d 303, 2009-Ohio-4872, 916 
N.E.2d 446, ¶ 70-81 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).  When a statute infringes on a 
fundamental constitutional right, we ought not acquiesce because of an 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
unwarranted presumption of constitutionality.  Indeed, the presumption should go 
the other way; the statute should be presumed unconstitutional. 
{¶ 62} Election laws that limit ballot access for prospective candidates are 
subject to review depending on the level of the limitation.  Purdy, 77 Ohio St.3d 
at 343, 673 N.E.2d 1351.  If we assume, as the plurality opinion does, that R.C. 
3513.04 is a reasonable, nondiscriminatory restriction, then it can be justified by 
an important regulatory interest.  Id., citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 
788, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983).  As support for the interests that 
justify R.C. 3513.04, the attorney general cites the following statement from 
Purdy:  “Ohio clearly has a legitimate interest in prevent potential conflicts 
among party members, an interest in preventing the possibility of voter confusion, 
and an interest in preventing candidacies that may conceivably be prompted by 
short-range goals.”  Id. at 346. 
{¶ 63} The importance of these interests is a chimera.  Preventing 
potential conflicts among party members may be a legitimate interest, but how 
preventing an eligible candidate from appearing on the ballot for a nonpartisan 
office advances that interest is obscure and unexplained.  Minimizing the 
possibility of voter confusion may also be a legitimate interest, but not enough to 
prevent an eligible candidate from running for office.  Moreover, only the most 
well-informed voters are likely to realize that a candidate for one of the offices in 
this case had been a candidate for the other office earlier in the year and, because 
they are well-informed, they are unlikely to be confused.  The claim that Ohio has 
an interest in preventing candidacies that may conceivably be prompted by short-
term goals is absurd, and that interest is clearly unmanageable.  For one thing, 
politics is increasingly an endeavor devoted to short-term goals; for another, who 
is to judge whether a goal is short term?  In short, none of the arguments 
suggested by the attorney general advance important regulatory interests—and 
they are insufficient to justify burdening the constitutional right to ballot access. 
January Term, 2014 
21 
 
{¶ 64} There is no legitimate reason to prevent Brown’s name from 
appearing on the ballot in a nonpartisan election.  I would grant the writ of 
mandamus.  If the only way to do that is to overrule Purdy, then I would do that.  
I dissent. 
____________________ 
Louis E. Grube, for relators. 
Nicholas A. Iarocci, Ashtabula County Prosecuting Attorney, and Shelley 
M. Pratt, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for respondents. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Zachary P. Keller, Assistant 
Attorney General, for intervening respondent. 
Taft, Stettinius and Hollister, L.L.P., and Donald C. Brey, urging denial of 
the writ for amicus curiae, David Schroeder. 
_________________________