Case Title: Wallace v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: CR96-367

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-10-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Byron Lamont WALLACE and Rodney Fitzgerald
Bledsoe v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 96-367                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered October 21, 1996


1.   Appeal & error -- issues may not be raised for first time on
     appeal. -- It is blackletter law that issues may not be raised
     for the first time on appeal.

2.   Evidence -- determination of no unfair prejudice under A.R.E.
     Rule 403 not reversed absent manifest abuse of discretion. --
     A determination by the trial court of no unfair prejudice
     under A.R.E. Rule 403 will not be reversed absent a manifest
     abuse of discretion.

3.   Evidence -- flight to avoid arrest or trial admissible in
     corroboration of evidence tending to establish guilt. --
     Flight to avoid arrest or trial is admissible as a
     circumstance in corroboration of evidence tending to establish
     guilt; where one appellant asked the supreme court to rule
     differently, based in part on the fact that he was arrested
     approximately two days after the events at the victim's house
     as opposed to being caught immediately fleeing the scene, the
     court noted that it had previously rejected this argument.

4.   Evidence -- credibility of appellant's alibi defense and
     belief concerning officers were matters for trier of fact. --
     The credibility of appellant's alibi defense and belief that
     the arresting officers were not authentic were matters to be
     weighed by the trier of fact; there was no abuse of
     discretion.

5.   Appeal & error -- appellant must bring up sufficient record --
     jury instruction must be proffered and included in record. --
     It is the appellant's duty to bring up a record sufficient to
     show that the trial court erred; to preserve an objection to
     an instruction for appeal, the appellant must make a proffer
     of the instruction to the judge; that proffered instruction
     must then be included in the record and abstract to enable the
     appellate court to consider it; an instruction that is not
     contained in the record is not preserved and will not be
     addressed on appeal.

6.   Appeal & error -- first appellant's abstract flagrantly
     deficient -- issue not decided. -- Where one appellant argued
     that a one-year probationary sentence relating to a previous
     misdemeanor conviction for one count of third-degree battery
     was revoked as if the conviction had been for two counts of
     second-degree battery, a felony, and the judgment reflected
     that appellant was sentenced to six years in prison for one
     count of second-degree battery on the revocation of the
     probationary sentence, though the trial court in its ruling
     referred to two counts, the supreme court, noting that the
     circumstances surrounding the issue were confused, declined to
     reach the point; the abstracted docket sheet for the battery
     charge reflected a misdemeanor conviction; appellant also
     abstracted the judgment relating to the revocation itself,
     which referred to second-degree battery and imprisonment of
     six years, but failed to abstract the judgment for the
     underlying battery conviction for which he received a
     probationary sentence; moreover, the judgment contained in the
     record that related to the previous battery conviction was
     virtually illegible; the supreme court declared that it could
     not decide this issue without an abstract of the material
     evidence and that it deemed the abstract on this point to be
     flagrantly deficient.

7.   Appeal & error -- second appellant's abstract fatally
     deficient -- argument not reached. -- The supreme court held
     that the second appellant's abstract was fatally deficient and
     declined to reach his argument that two victims'
     identification of him from a photo lineup should have been
     suppressed because the lineup did not include the photograph
     of a man bearing a different first name who had been named by
     the victim as one of the offenders; the abstract not only
     lacked a motion to suppress the lineup predicated on this
     point, but there was no ruling from the trial court in the
     abstract concerning the issue; the supreme court could not
     tell from the abstract whether this precise issue was raised
     to and considered by the trial court and, therefore, affirmed
     the trial court on the point.


     Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court; Marion Humphrey, Judge;
affirmed.
     Jeff Rosenzweig, for appellant Byron Lamont Wallace.
     Bailey Law Firm, by: Rita F. Bailey, for appellant Rodney
Fitzgerald Bledsoe.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  J. Brent Standridge, Asst.
Att'y Gen., for appellee.

     Robert L. Brown, Justice.
     This is a consolidated appeal by appellants Byron Lamont
Wallace and Rodney Fitzgerald Bledsoe.  Wallace was convicted of
residential burglary, four counts of aggravated robbery, and two
counts of theft.  He was sentenced to 27 years in prison.  A
probationary sentence pertaining to Wallace was also revoked and a
six-year sentence to run concurrently was assessed.  Bledsoe was
convicted of the same crimes as Wallace and was sentenced, as a
habitual offender, to 45 years in prison.  We find the points
raised by Wallace and Bledsoe on appeal to be without merit, and we
affirm.
     On the evening of December 7, 1993, Marcus Sanders, Steven
Campbell, Anthony Hatchett, Marvin Weathersby, and Juan Boykins
were in Sanders's Little Rock home playing Nintendo and working on
music for their rap band.  At approximately 6:50 p.m., a man later
identified as Wallace knocked on the door and asked if Joe was
there.  After Sanders went to the door and answered that no such
person was present, Wallace forced his way into the house with two
other men, pulled out a handgun, and announced that it was a
robbery.  One of the men, later identified as Bledsoe, brandished
a pipe bomb.  The third robber was never identified and was not
tried with Wallace and Bledsoe.
     Once inside, Wallace led Sanders at gunpoint into the bedroom,
where Sanders gave him $500 in cash.  Sanders was then taken back
into the living room, where he and the other men were forced to
remove their clothes and lie down on the floor.  Wallace and the
third man then proceeded to go through the victims' pockets and
take jewelry and $300 or $400 in additional cash.  According to
Marcus Sanders, Bledsoe stood by the front door, yelled, and
punched holes in the wall with the pipe bomb.
     After the money and jewelry were taken, the robbers began to
leave, but on the way out, Bledsoe lit the pipe bomb and threw it
on the floor between Sanders and Juan Boykins.  Campbell testified
that Wallace then fired two shots back into the house as the five
victims scattered for cover.  The pipe bomb detonated.  Although
none of the men was seriously injured, windows were broken,
furniture was destroyed, and the ceiling and walls buckled from the
explosion.        
     Wallace and Bledsoe were charged with counts of residential
burglary, aggravated robbery, and theft.  Bledsoe was further
charged as a habitual offender.  The men were convicted and
sentenced as set out above.

                      I. Appellant Wallace
     Wallace first contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in allowing testimony of his flight and arrest.  At
trial, the State called Officer David Smith of the Little Rock
Police Department to describe the events surrounding Wallace's
arrest.  Officer Smith stated that he was working with the Street
Crimes Unit, a squad of five patrolmen and one sergeant that
operated in plain clothes and unmarked cars to assist in the
service of arrest warrants.  On December 9, 1993, at 11:00 p.m., he
testified that he received information that detectives were
attempting to serve a warrant on Wallace.  At this point, Wallace's
defense counsel objected to Officer Smith's testimony based on
relevance and unfair prejudice.  The objection was overruled.
     Officer Smith continued that he and his partner first made
contact with Wallace at 11:20 p.m. in the College Station area of
Little Rock.  He stated that he pulled up beside an unknown car,
and a young man, whom the police officer identified as Wallace,
stepped half-way out of his car.  The police officer stated that
Wallace asked them where Stout Street was, which was the street
they were on.  Officer Smith testified that he told Wallace that he
was lost.  He did not identify himself as a police officer. 
Wallace then got in his car and proceeded along Stout Street ahead
of Officer Smith's car.  Officer Smith called for assistance. 
Sergeant Wilson, also of the Little Rock Police Department, arrived
in an unmarked car and attempted to stop Wallace's car as he turned
from Stout Street to Avant Street by turning on his blue lights. 
Officer Smith testified that Wallace spun his tires and "took off." 
The police officer followed down the three-block road whereupon
Wallace and a passenger left his car and fled on foot.  Officer
Smith testified that he and other police officers identified
themselves as police officers.  They followed Wallace and his
companion into a wooded area.  Officer Smith stated that he
apprehended Wallace, and in the course of doing so, Wallace lunged
at him and attempted to grab his gun.
     Wallace argues that this testimony was admitted in violation
of Rule 403 of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence.  Wallace also
requests that we reverse the trial court because Officer Smith's
testimony was evidence of "other crimes, wrongs, or acts" under
Ark. R. Evid. 404(b).  We do not address this latter issue because
it was not raised before the trial court.  It is blackletter law
that issues may not be raised for the first time on appeal.  See,
e.g., Hill v. State, 325 Ark. 419,     S.W.2d     (1996); Stewart
v. State, 320 Ark. 75,