Case Title: Feaster v. Feaster

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-07-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Feaster v. Feaster1986 WY 149721 P.2d 1095Case Number: 85-261Decided: 07/09/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
William James FEASTER, 
Appellant (Plaintiff),

v.

Susan Rene FEASTER, 
Appellee (Defendant).

Appeal from District 
Court, SheridanCounty, James N. Wolfe, 
J.

Julie Nye 
Tiedeken, of Southeast Wyoming Law Offices of Rodger McDaniel, Cheyenne, for appellant 
(plaintiff).

Mark J. Murphy, 
of Shoumaker & Murphy, Sheridan, submitted on brief on behalf of appellee (defendant). 

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This case involved an 
action to modify the child custody provisions of a divorce decree. In their 
original settlement, which the court incorporated into the decree, appellant 
William Feaster and appellee Susan Feaster agreed that Mr. Feaster should have 
custody of their daughter, Elissa. Mrs. Feaster received visitation rights. A 
year and a half later, Mrs. Feaster, who had remarried and changed her name to 
Susan Ferguson, filed a petition for modification in which she requested sole 
custody of Elissa. We will refer to appellee as Mrs. Ferguson in the remainder 
of this opinion.

[¶2.]     After a hearing, the 
court determined that there was a change of circumstances; but, instead of 
granting Mrs. Ferguson's petition, the court ordered joint custody. On appeal 
Mr. Feaster claims that the court abused its discretion when it found a 
substantial change of circumstances and when it ordered joint custody without 
the consent of both parties.

CHANGE OF 
CIRCUMSTANCES

[¶3.]     A district court's 
modification decision will be reversed only if the court abused its discretion. 
Lewis v. Lewis, Wyo., 716 P.2d 347 
(1986).

"`A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of 
discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably 
conclude as it did. * * *'

"An abuse of discretion 
is that which shocks the conscience of the court and appears so unfair and 
inequitable that a reasonable person could not abide it. The decision of the 
trial judge will not be reversed unless there is a firm conviction that a clear 
error of judgment was committed." (Citations omitted.) Waldrop v. Weaver, 
Wyo., 702 P.2d 1291, 1293 (1985) (quoting 
Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831, 838 
(1980)).

Mr. Feaster 
alleges that the "trial court could not reasonably conclude that there had been 
a material change of circumstances that would justify taking Elissa from [his] 
custody." He claims that there was no testimony "that Elissa's living situation 
had deteriorated or become worse since the time of the divorce" or that her 
"well-being and emotional stability had * * * substantially 
changed."

[¶4.]     To accept Mr. Feaster's 
argument and hold that the trial court abused its discretion, we must review all 
of the proceedings at which the court heard evidence of changed circumstances. 
Without a review of all relevant proceedings, we would have to assume that the 
district court heard evidence from which it could find a change. See Sharp v. 
Sharp, Wyo., 
671 P.2d 317, 318 (1983) (and cases cited therein).

[¶5.]     The responsibility for 
presenting a sufficient record fell on Mr. Feaster. "`It is properly an 
appellant's burden to bring to us a complete record on which to base a 
decision.'" Matter of Estate of Manning, Wyo., 646 P.2d 175, 176 (1982) (quoting 
Scherling v. Kilgore, Wyo., 599 P.2d 1352, 1357 (1979)); see also Salt River 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Heiner, Wyo., 663 P.2d 518, 520 
(1983).

"If an appellant intends 
to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by the evidence * 
* * he shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such 
finding or conclusion." Rule 4.02, W.R.A.P. (Cum. Supp. 
1985).

[¶6.]     The district court held 
two modification hearings - one on July 3 and another on September 16, 1985. 
Both hearings centered on the change-of-circumstances issue, and it is clear 
that some evidence on that issue was presented at each hearing.1 Neither party requested a court 
reporter for the July 3 hearing, and consequently there is no transcript of 
testimony.

[¶7.]     Mr. Feaster attempted 
to correct the deficiency by submitting a statement of the proceedings to the 
district court as permitted by Rule 4.03, W.R.A.P., which 
states:

"If no report of the 
evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is 
unavailable, the appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or 
proceedings from the best available means, including his recollection. The 
statement shall be served on the appellee, who may serve objections or propose 
amendments thereto within ten (10) days after service. Thereupon the statement 
and any objections or proposed amendments shall be submitted to the district 
court for settlement and approval and as 
settled and approved shall be included by the clerk of the district court in 
the record on appeal." (Emphasis added.)

Mrs. Ferguson 
objected to appellant's proposed statement on the grounds that it was 
"inaccurate and incomplete." The court refused approval, and in its "Statement 
of Conclusions and Proceedings" stated:

"The Court feels 
constrained to [neither] accept [nor] reject either the Plaintiff's or 
Defendant's Statement of Evidence and Proceedings inasmuch as the Court has very 
limited independent recollection of the testimony of the various witnesses 
inasmuch as several similar cases have been heard by the Court both before and 
since the time of this trial and it is hard for the Court to sort out all of 
those cases and recall specific testimony in any one after the 
fact.

* * * * * 
*

"The Court does recall 
its conclusion from all of the testimony that the Defendant at the time of the 
divorce felt that due to her circumstances that her daughter would be better 
cared for and supported by the Plaintiff. It was the Court's conclusion from the 
testimony that at the time of the divorce the Plaintiff's situation was more 
stable due to his life style and ability to generate an income. The Court's 
recollection of the testimony is that all of that changed. At the present time 
the Defendant's circumstances and life style are much more stable and 
Plaintiff's situation is now unstable and income very limited. The Court 
concluded based upon the testimony that it heard that there had been a material 
change of circumstances since the time of the divorce and that Elissa's best 
interests would be served by placing her with her mother at this 
time."

[¶8.]     Rule 4.03, W.R.A.P., 
clearly implies that a statement becomes part of the record only to the extent 
that it is settled and approved by the court. If a court states that it cannot 
recall the true facts from a proceeding, then the statement has not, and cannot, 
be approved or settled. In Maynard v. Maynard, Wyo., 
585 P.2d 1201, 1202 (1978), we stated:

"Because the trial court 
did not approve or settle this portion of the statement as it refers to the 
evidence question, it is therefore no part of the record and cannot be accepted 
as such. It was not error for the judge to fail to settle the record insofar as 
he did not remember the matters suggested, and the judge's statement that he has 
no such recollection is conclusive." (Citations omitted.)

[¶9.]     Mr. Feaster's attempt 
to settle the record was unsuccessful, and we have no way of knowing what 
evidence was actually presented to the district court at the July 3 hearing. 
Without either a transcript or an approved statement of the hearing we cannot 
assume that the court's findings were unsupported. We cannot find an abuse of 
discretion.

JOINT 
CUSTODY

[¶10.]  In its modification order the district 
court decreed "that the child shall be placed in the joint custody of both parties." 
(Emphasis added.) The court then set forth a very detailed plan by which the 
actual physical custody of Elissa would be divided. After an eleven-month 
period, during which the parties would alternate custody three times, Elissa 
would be placed in Mrs. Ferguson's custody during the school year and in Mr. 
Feaster's custody during the summer.

[¶11.]  Mr. Feaster contends that the district 
court abused its discretion when it granted joint custody without the approval 
of the parties. According to Mr. Feaster, joint custody depends on the 
cooperation of the parties and should not be imposed unless the parties 
demonstrate their cooperative spirit by agreeing to such a plan. He presumes 
that the court used the phrase "joint custody" to mean an arrangement in which 
the parties make shared decisions on matters affecting the child's 
welfare.

[¶12.]  We are not sure whether the court order 
provided for joint custody as Mr. Feaster defines that term or instead provided 
split custody which is relatively common when the parties will reside in 
different towns, as here. In either case, we cannot say that the district court 
necessarily abused its discretion. Although divided child custody is disfavored, 
there are some circumstances in which a district court can order such custody in 
its discretion. And, of all the joint custody arrangements, the one ordered in 
this case is the most likely to withstand appellate review. In Ayling v. 
Ayling, Wyo., 661 P.2d 1054, 1055 n. 3 (1983), we 
stated:

"As a general rule, 
divided child custody arrangements are not favored absent a good reason 
therefor, but they are often upheld on appeal when the division places the child 
with one parent during the school year and with the other parent during summer 
vacations. See Annotation: `Split,' `divided' or `alternate' custody of 
children, 92 A.L.R.2d 695 (1963)."

[¶13.]  We do not know what evidence was before 
the district court at the July 3 hearing; so we, therefore, cannot say that 
there was an abuse of discretion.

[¶14.]  Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Although we have no 
transcript or approved statement of the July 3 hearing, it is clear from the 
district court's "Statement of Conclusions and Proceedings" that most, if not 
all, of the evidence at that hearing involved the change-of-circumstances 
issue.

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶15.]  Recognizing the validity of the court's 
concern about the lack of a proper record, it is with reluctance that the facts 
(as available) and the pleading status of this custody controversy must be 
additionally addressed.

[¶16.]  More to be emphasized than anything else 
to be discussed, is the lesson for Wyoming attorneys: clients do not arrange for 
court reporters; that obligation falls within the responsibility of the practice 
of law.

[¶17.]  In consideration of the proliferation, if 
not the explosion, of divorce-modification cases now appearing in the courts of 
this state, a major risk exists in any contested hearing where a court reporter 
is not engaged.

[¶18.]  It is apparent that an agreement today 
may be a strongly pursued disagreement tomorrow. Alimony, custody and 
child-support decisions can be modified and the comparison record should be 
established anticipatorily.1 In divorce cases, it is not 
necessarily today but tomorrow that may be catastrophic to the client and the 
attorney.

[¶19.]  This case personifies many of the current 
litigious proclivities of our society, particularly in domestic-relations 
conflicts. Disregarding, as I must, appellant's statements of evidence and 
proceedings, at least to the extent as to the facts stated or denied, because of 
nonconcurrence by either opposing counsel or the court, I would find the 
following established.

[¶20.]  A divorce action was filed by appellant, 
William Feaster, against Susan Feaster, now Susan Ferguson, on October 24, 1983. 
Elissa, then nearly four years of age, is the parties' child and is the subject 
of the custody decision. Susan Ferguson was generally unrepresented in the 
divorce process and did not contest; service of process was waived and 
comprehensive agreements for custody and visitation, one dated and filed 
November 2, 1983, and a second for property settlement dated and filed January 
5, 1984, were executed.

[¶21.]  Pursuant to those agreements, the divorce 
was heard on the waived appearance of the mother, on January 12, 1984, and a 
decree entered in favor of the father, providing for custody, visitation and 
property settlement. Custody was granted to the father, and (incidentally in 
accord with the agreement) the mother's maiden name was restored, even though 
Elissa had been born during the marriage.

[¶22.]  Having accepted paternal custody in the 
divorce negotiation, Susan Ferguson, on June 6, 1985, approximately 17 months 
after entry of the decree, filed a motion for change of custody. She had 
remarried in May, 1984, and a second child was born on November 18, 1984. The 
basis of the petition to modify was that

"* * * the circumstances 
of the parties have changed so that it would be in the best interests of the 
child to be placed in the custody of the mother."

[¶23.]  A hearing was held on the motion to 
modify on July 3, 1985, and an order was entered modifying the original decree 
and affording a summer custody arrangement to Susan Ferguson with reciprocal 
visitation for the period for William Feaster, and:

"The Court further finds 
that a social summary should be prepared by the Sheridan County DEPASS [Division 
of Public Assistance and Social Services]. Copies to be furnished to the 
parties, such social summary to advise the Court of the living conditions of 
both the plaintiff and the defendant, the parenting skills of both parties, and 
all other matters pertaining to the best interest and well being of the minor 
child and that such report be furnished to the Court as soon as it is 
completed.

"D. The Court holds in 
abeyance its determination of whether or not additional modifications as to 
custody and visitation should be made pending the review of the social summary 
by the Court. If after such review the Court feels that further revision should 
be made, notice will be given to the parties and a further hearing shall be had 
on the matter."

[¶24.]  As appropriately recognized in the 
majority decision, unfortunately neither attorney then representing the 
litigants requested a court reporter to provide a record of that 
hearing.

[¶25.]  On September 16 the recessed hearing was 
reconvened for a two-hour session at which the mother, father and a third 
witness (the DPASS representative who conducted the social survey) testified, 
and the DPASS report was introduced into evidence. The only witness who had 
testified in July and not in September was Cindy Hopkins, from the preschool 
where the child had been placed for attendance by the father. This hearing was 
reported. Practically speaking, no factual change between July and September is 
suggested by either party.

[¶26.]  After the second hearing, a letter 
opinion and order were entered modifying the divorce decree. Upon finding a 
change of circumstances, the court revoked the primary custody awarded to 
William Feaster, found both parents to be fit and proper parents, enumerated a 
joint-custody arrangement, and reversed exactly the July order of custody for 
the father during the school year and the mother during the summer by granting 
custody to the mother during the school year and to the father during the 
summer.

[¶27.]  The custody arrangement, by stated 
provision, is subject to reconsideration if the father discontinues his present 
educational pursuit which is planned to continue in Sheridan until the Fall of 
1986 at Sheridan College and then in Laramie at the University of Wyoming 
commencing in September, 1986, until a degree in veterinary medicine is 
achieved.

[¶28.]  William Feaster filed a notice of appeal 
pro se, after which present counsel entered an appearance in an attempt to 
settle the record pursuant to Rule 4.03, W.R.A.P., and to pursue the briefing 
process for presentation to this court. 

[¶29.]  A comprehensive statement was served in 
behalf of William Feaster on counsel for Susan Ferguson, which resulted in 
objections and proposed amendments filed by the mother, and a further response 
by the father of comments to defendant's objection and proposed amendments to 
the statement of evidence and proceedings submitted by the 
plaintiff.

[¶30.]  The three documents were taken under 
consideration by the trial court, and we would agree with the majority that the 
trial court

"`* * * feels constrained 
to either [neither] accept or [nor] reject either the Plaintiff's or Defendant's 
Statement of Evidence and Proceedings * * *,'"

but the trial 
judge recalled substantively his conclusion that with the present situation a 
change of circumstance had occurred and the child's best interest would be 
served by placement with her mother.

[¶31.]  The trial court further noted in its 
Statement of Conclusions and Proceedings:

"The Court would note 
that the Court Reporter was available on the date of this trial, but neither 
party requested that the proceedings be transcribed."

[¶32.]  First concern arises with this appellate 
decision that if through misadventure no verbatim record is available, upon 
partial agreement and disagreement of counsel for litigants, under Rule 4.03, 
and unless the court can recall the specific facts sufficiently to realistically 
resolve the collective differences, no appellate record will be established. The 
effect of some adequate appeal record is unquestionable. Scherling v. Kilgore, Wyo., 599 P.2d 1352 
(1979).

[¶33.]  Restated, the issue is whether the result 
produces no record or whether the result only produces no record on disputed 
facts. I would submit that the latter should apply. The result in this case 
starkly demonstrates the significance of this subject 
matter.

[¶34.]  The normal appellate rule of considering 
only the evidence of the appellee and disregarding the evidence of the 
appellant2 can fruitfully be applied by 
analogy to this situation.

[¶35.]  Application of this standard would afford 
a record of facts admitted by the parties or contended by appellee against which 
the decision of the trial court in modifying the decree could be weighed. When 
the standard is applied that the facts admitted by the parties and the 
additional statements of appellee are considered to be true, there is an 
appellate record.

[¶36.]  In this case, however, the assumption of 
the majority will allow indeterminate facts not suggested by anyone, and 
consequently the decision of the trial court is accepted whether or not either 
party provided evidence for support. This contemplates affirmation on a 
conjectural assumption of that indefinite something.

[¶37.]  I would conclude that where the complete 
record is not available and the parties do not agree to the settlement of the 
record, the following logical result should be applied as an issue and not a 
document result.3

1. If appellee does not 
respond after proper service under Rule 4.03, W.R.A.P., the statement of facts 
or events is admitted, providing submission to the court is made for settlement 
at his election for correction.

2. If the appellee does 
respond by denial or affirmative contention, questions of dispute should be 
settled by the trial court. 

3. If the trial court 
does not or cannot settle the dispute, agreed facts and affirmative allegations 
of facts by appellee are accepted for appellate consideration as true, and all 
disputed facts are disregarded as unsupported by either 
party.

4. Consequently, where 
the court does not or will not settle the record, the admitted facts and 
affirmative allegations of appellee constitute a record for appeal 
consideration.

5. Additional facts 
admitted by the briefs of the parties filed in this court also may but not 
necessarily will constitute a basis of fact upon which the decision of this 
court could be premised.

[¶38.]  Surprisingly, there is little case law on 
the subject of Rule 4.03, W.R.A.P. (Rule 10(c), F.R.A.P.) and essentially none 
that finitely addresses the specific approach considered 
here.

[¶39.]  Maynard v. Maynard, Wyo., 
585 P.2d 1201 (1978), is not contrary. That case was remanded for record 
supplementation since a transcript was not available. Appellant filed a motion 
for settlement of record in the trial court, and appellee promptly filed a 
resistance. The trial court, lacking recollection, considered the issue raised 
of an evidentiary motion addressed by appellant to have been denied. Obviously, 
without a record, admission-of-evidence questions could not be considered by 
this court on appeal.

[¶40.]  In Sharp v. Sharp, Wyo., 671 P.2d 317 (1983); Matter of Parental Rights of 
SCN, Wyo., 659 P.2d 568 (1983); Lapp v. 
City of Worland, Wyo., 612 P.2d 868 (1980); Petersen v. State, Wyo., 594 P.2d 978 (1979); and Minnehoma Financial Co. v. 
Pauli, Wyo., 565 P.2d 835 (1977), there was no Rule 
4.03 effort made by appellant. See also Matter of Estate of Manning, Wyo., 646 P.2d 175 (1982); Cole v. United States, D.C.App., 478 A.2d 277 (1984); 
United 
States v. Dunham Concrete Products, Inc., 475 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1973), reh. denied 477 F.2d 596, cert. denied 414 U.S. 832, 
94 S. Ct. 65, 38 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1973), and cases cited therein; Carson Ready Mix, 
Inc. v. First National Bank of Nevada, 97 
Nev. 474, 635 P.2d 276 (1981).

[¶41.]  The other specifically involved 
Wyoming case, Jackson v. State, Wyo., 624 P.2d 751 (1981), included a 
preliminary Rule 4.03 effort with no submission to the trial court. The 
instrument was consequently stricken by this court for failure of appellant to 
comply with the rule condition. See Baker v. Baker, Fla.App., 366 So. 2d 873 
(1979).

[¶42.]  No question is raised with regard to the 
principle of general Wyoming law that error must be preserved by a 
supporting record. Scherling v. Kilgore, supra; Matter of Estate of Reed, 
Wyo., 566 P.2d 587 (1977); Kelly v. 
United States, 300 U.S. 50, 57 S. Ct. 335, 81 L. Ed. 507 
(1937); Clawans v. White, 71 App.D.C. 362, 112 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied 311 U.S. 646, 61 S. Ct. 16, 85 L. Ed. 412 
(1940).

"`In the absence of [a 
record] we indulge the presumption that the evidence supports the judgment and 
warrants its affirmance.'" Kelly v. United 
States, supra, 300 U.S.  at 54, 57 S. Ct.  at 
337.

[¶43.]  What is involved here is the attempted 
use of Rule 4.03, with partial rejection by appellee and the inability of the 
trial court to recollectively settle those matters in conflict between the 
parties. Obviously, also, what the trial court does reject as facts in any 
submission under the rule is excluded as trial evidence. Cox v. General Electric 
Co., 302 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1962); Camps v. New York 
City Transit Authority, 261 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1958); Hawkins v. 
Missouri Pacific R.R., 188 F.2d 348 (8th Cir. 1951); Graham v. Carr, 112 F.2d 908 (9th Cir. 1940); Joiner v. Illuminating Co., 9 Ohio Op.3d 340, 55 Ohio App.2d 187, 380 N.E.2d 361 (1978). For 
the effect of approval or use, see Zahorik v. Cornell University, 729 F.2d 85 
(2d Cir. 1984); Baker v. Estelle, 711 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied in 
Baker v. McKaskle, 464 U.S. 1048, 104 S. Ct. 724, 79 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1984); Brody v. 
President & Fellows of Harvard College, 664 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied 455 U.S. 1027, 102 S. Ct. 1731, 72 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1982). 

[¶44.]  Surprisingly, no case was found which 
considered whether only the denied (by appellee) or rejected (by the court) 
evidence is discarded or whether the entire document, which included admitted 
facts not rejected or denied, is proscribed and rejected.4

[¶45.]  Moore states:

"* * * If the district 
court approves a statement as thus determined upon, the statement is to be 
included as a part of the record on appeal. Indeed, even if the district court 
fails to approve the statement, it becomes part of the record, together with any 
supporting papers and any objections and amendments offered by the appellee, 
under the original papers rule, but only for the limited purpose of showing what 
occurred below. Unless a Rule 10(c) statement is approved by the district court, 
the court of appeals will not consider matters set forth in the statement, 
absent a showing of misconduct on the part of the district judge in refusing to 
approve the statement." 9 Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 
210.06[2].

[¶46.]  Authority for the latter contentions made 
by Moore are the cases of United States v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Co., 281 F.2d 698 (4th Cir. 1960); Hawkins v. Missouri Pacific R.R., supra; and Clawans 
v. White, supra. None of these three citations relates to the circumstance where 
the litigants partially agreed and partially disagreed and the judge lacked 
recollective capacity to resolve the disagreement. Cox v. General Electric Co., 
supra; Lillycrop v. Kinsky, 112 App.D.C. 144, 300 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1962). 
Other cited authorities on the general principles involving Rule 10(c), F.R.A.P. 
also do not address this situation. A rule is assumed that is not addressed by 
supporting case citation. See 4B Bender's Federal Practice Forms 
AR10-15.

[¶47.]  Lacking cogent authority to the contrary, 
this court should do what is reasonable, fair and directed toward applications 
of rules to achieve reasonable justice. Rule 1, W.R.C.P., should be applied to 
all adopted rules of procedure:

[¶48.]  "* * * They shall be construed to secure 
the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every 
action."

[¶49.]  Consequently, I would find a record in 
this case derived from admitted facts and the second-hearing recorded testimony 
(see however, United States v. Renton, 700 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1983); Cole v. 
United States, supra; State v. De Leon, 127 Wis.2d 74, 377 N.W.2d 635 
(1985)):

1. The mother remarried 
within six months of the divorce, had a child within eleven months of the 
divorce, and now has a stable household, is not working, and desires changed 
custody contrary to the pre-divorce settlement agreement.

2. The father is 
attending school, has sufficient funds to support himself and the 
child.

3. The change of 
circumstance for the mother is remarriage and a stable, well-funded home 
relationship with her present husband. The change of circumstance for the father 
is educational pursuit although retaining adequate resources for education and 
support during the period of college attendance.

[¶50.]  It should also be recognized that the 
appealed order of the trial court, however designated, did not in final analysis 
really create joint custody.

"* * * `Joint custody' as 
currently effectuated is a misnomer and could be described as sole custody with 
liberal visitation, access, and parenting rights - an arrangement my office has 
set up for years." Golden, Contested Custody, Oversimplification is Public Enemy 
Number 1, Trial, June 1986, at 28, 31.

See Nation v. 
Nation, Wyo., 
715 P.2d 198 (1986). See also Butcher v. Butcher, Wyo., 363 P.2d 923 
(1961).

[¶51.]  Joint custody contemplates day-to-day 
concurrent responsibility. Also to be recognized is that the summer arrangement 
first provided for Susan Ferguson and now provided for William Feaster is not a 
visitation provision but is a partial custody arrangement for the nonschool 
period. 24 Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation § 990, p. 983. See Nation v. 
Nation, supra; Commonwealth ex rel. McDonald v. Smith, 170 Pa. Super. 254, 85 A.2d 686 (1952); Annot., 92 A.L.R.2d 695, 726, "Split," "divided," or "alternate" custody of 
children.

[¶52.]  Essentially, what has occurred is that in 
the original decree the first trial judge accepted the agreement of the parties 
in providing for custody for the father and visitation for the mother. The first 
modification of July, 1985, provided for partial custody for the mother during 
the summer and retained custody for the father during the school year. The 
present order from which this appeal now arises grants custody to the mother 
during the winter and summer custody to the father.

[¶53.]  The perceived problem is not the absence 
of a factual basis for the trial court's discretionary decision. What is 
occurring in jurisprudence in this state is first that pre-divorce agreements no 
longer mean anything to the litigants except to buy time for later conflicts, 
and second that a tendency is developing that stare decisis and the significant 
change-of-circumstance rules really mean little in applied 
result.

[¶54.]  I would not find an abuse of discretion 
as a decisional question in regard to custody in this case, but would reverse 
the change-of-custody order on the basis of the lack of proof of change of 
circumstance as defined by our prior decisions. The only real fact in this case 
of changed circumstance is the remarriage of the mother and her consequent 
improved circumstance versus the continued status of the father. Johnson v. 
Johnson, Wyo., 
717 P.2d 335 (1986); Ayling v. Ayling, Wyo., 
661 P.2d 1054 (1983).

[¶55.]  If we are going to reverse prior law and 
permit or premise change of circumstance on remarriage, then the judicial system 
should be prepared for a significantly expanded case load of modification 
motions. Coincidentally, what is fair for the mother should also be available 
for the remarried father.

[¶56.]  I would reverse the changed custody order 
in recognition of the parties' original agreement and subsequent lack of 
demonstrated change in circumstance sufficient to justify modification of the 
original court decree.

FOOTNOTES

1 A sage senior Wyoming attorney once 
said that if you have the time to go to court then you have the responsibility 
to have a court reporter present to listen.

2 See extended list of 
citations of the appellate standard, 1 West's Wyoming Digest Key 1011 at 
402-405, and id., appendix at 110-111.

3 Constitutional questions 
for the missing-record questions that may additionally exist in criminal cases 
are not separately considered. See United States v. Smaldone, 583 F.2d 1129 
(10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 1073, 99 S. Ct. 846, 59 L. Ed. 2d 40; and 
cert. denied in Foderado v. United States, 439 U.S. 1119, 99 S. Ct. 1029, 59 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1979); United States v. Garner, 581 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1978); Cole 
v. United States, D.C.App., 478 A.2d 277 (1984); State v. De Leon, 127 Wis.2d 
74, 377 N.W.2d 635 (1985). See also State v. Perry, 128 Wis.2d 297, 381 N.W.2d 609 (1985).

4 An obvious difficulty in 
research is that few states (including Wyoming) use the federal appellate rules 
numbering system, as is more currently done with the rules of civil 
procedure.