Case Title: 624 Broadway, LLC v. Gary Housing Authority

Citation: 

Docket Number: 22S-CT-00140

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2022-08-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
I N  T H E  
Indiana Supreme Court 
Supreme Court Case No. 22S-CT-140 
624 Broadway, LLC, 
Appellant (Plaintiff below), 
–v– 
Gary Housing Authority, 
Appellee (Defendant below). 
Argued: June 9, 2022 | Decided: August 29, 2022 
Appeal from the Lake Superior Court 
No. 45D05-1910-CT-1085 
The Honorable Stephen E. Scheele, Judge 
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals 
No. 21A-CT-653 
Opinion by Justice Massa 
Rush, C.J., and David, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur. 
 
 
 
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Aug 29 2022, 10:20 am
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Massa, Justice. 
The Gary Housing Authority acquired 624 Broadway, LLC’s property 
through an administrative taking. It only provided notice of its taking and 
hearings by publication, despite knowing how to contact 624 Broadway. 
And it refused to postpone its final meeting—when it awarded damages—
to allow 624 Broadway to obtain an appraisal. 624 Broadway alleges the 
notice was constitutionally deficient. Because we agree and cannot deem it 
harmless, we reverse and remand.  
Facts and Procedural History 
624 Broadway owned commercial property in downtown Gary. The 
Housing Authority wanted the property as part of its plan to redevelop 
the area for mixed residential (i.e., affordable housing) and commercial 
uses. In March 2019, it sued 624 Broadway to acquire the property but 
soon successfully moved to dismiss the suit. It then initiated an 
administrative taking under Indiana Code chapter 32-24-2. An 
administrative taking—an alternative to the “traditional” lawsuit route—
occurs when an authorized governmental body condemns property and 
awards damages through resolutions. See Ind. Code § 36-7-18-28(a)(2) 
(2019); I.C. §§ 32-24-2-6, -10. Under the statutes then in effect, a non-
resident owner like 624 Broadway, located in nearby Schererville, was 
entitled only to notice by publication.1 See I.C. §§ 32-24-2-6(b), -8(c).  
On August 15, the Housing Authority adopted a resolution to acquire 
the property and set September 19 as the day to receive and hear 
remonstrances.2 It twice published notice of the resolution and upcoming 
meeting in two area newspapers of general circulation. Around September 
 
1 The statutes were subsequently amended to require that all owners receive, at a minimum, 
notice by mail during an administrative taking. See Ind. Code §§ 32-24-2-6(b), -8(b) (2020). 
2 Remonstrance is defined as “[a] formal protest against governmental policy, actions, or 
officials.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1486–87 (10th ed. 2014).  
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-140 | August 29, 2022 
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9, John Allen, 624 Broadway’s registered agent, learned of the upcoming 
meeting from a reporter. He attended and spoke at it. During the meeting, 
the Housing Authority adopted resolutions confirming the taking, 
assessing $75,000 in damages, and setting a meeting on written 
remonstrances for October 17. Again, it only provided notice by 
publication. When Allen learned of the upcoming meeting, he and 624 
Broadway submitted written remonstrances.   
624 Broadway unsuccessfully requested the Housing Authority 
postpone the meeting so 624 Broadway’s appraiser could assess the 
property. On October 16, it sued the Housing Authority and sought a 
temporary restraining order preventing the meeting. The trial court 
denied its request, and the Housing Authority proceeded to award 
$75,000 in damages. One day after the meeting, the appraiser inspected 
the property. He issued his report on October 28, valuing the property at 
$325,000. 
624 Broadway later amended its complaint and alleged, among other 
things, that the Housing Authority’s decision to only provide notice by 
publication violated its federal due process rights and deprived it of the 
ability to adequately prepare for the hearings. Both parties moved for 
summary judgment; the trial court granted it for the Housing Authority 
and denied it for 624 Broadway. 624 Broadway appealed. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. 
Although it rejected most of 624 Broadway’s arguments, it found the 
notice was constitutionally deficient because it “was not reasonably 
calculated to reach Allen.” 624 Broadway, LLC v. Gary Hous. Auth., 181 
N.E.3d 1013, 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). And this deficient notice was not 
harmless error because it “contributed to 624 Broadway’s inability to 
obtain its own appraisal of the property expediently, which in turn 
contributed to 624 Broadway’s inability to present competing evidence of 
its damages.” Id. at 1025. The panel remanded with instructions to enter 
summary judgment for 624 Broadway and vacate the taking. Id. 
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The Housing Authority petitioned for transfer, which we granted.3 624 
Broadway, LLC v. Gary Hous. Auth., 188 N.E.3d 842 (Ind. 2022). 
Standard of Review 
We review summary judgment decisions de novo, applying the same 
standard as the trial court. Serv. Steel Warehouse Co., L.P. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 
182 N.E.3d 840, 842 (Ind. 2022). Summary judgment is appropriate only “if 
the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as 
a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). Constitutional claims are questions 
of law, which we review de novo. See Larkin v. State, 173 N.E.3d 662, 667 
(Ind. 2021).  
Discussion and Decision 
The federal Constitution establishes important limits on the 
government’s ability to take private property for public use: It must 
provide just compensation, a hearing on just compensation, and sufficient 
notice. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. XIV, § 1; Mullane v. Cent. Hanover 
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). The Housing Authority only 
provided notice of the taking and its hearings by publication—even 
though it knew how to provide personal notice. Its deficient notice 
deprived 624 Broadway of a meaningful damages hearing. 
 
3 We address only 624 Broadway’s constitutional due process claim. We otherwise summarily 
affirm the Court of Appeals. See Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A)(2). 
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I. The Housing Authority provided 
constitutionally deficient notice to 624 
Broadway, which was prejudicial. 
The government can only take property through eminent domain if it 
provides “just compensation” and “due process of law.” U.S. Const. 
amend. V; id. XIV, § 1. This means “an owner whose property is taken for 
public use must be given a hearing in determining just compensation.” 
Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 115 (1956); see also Bragg v. 
Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 59 (1919) (“[I]t is essential to due process that the 
mode of determining the compensation . . . afford the owner an 
opportunity to be heard.”). Because “[t]he right to a hearing is 
meaningless without notice,” the government must provide notice 
“reasonably calculated to inform” a property owner of the proceeding. 
Walker, 352 U.S. at 115; see also Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. 
Here, the Housing Authority complied with the governing statutes 
when it provided notice by publication. See I.C. §§ 32-24-2-6(b), -8(c). 
Statutory requirements, however, are not necessarily “constitutionally 
sound.” Solarize Ind., Inc. v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 182 N.E.3d 212, 221 (Ind. 
2022) (Slaughter, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). “[N]otice . . . 
that may technically comply with a state statute . . . does not necessarily 
comport with due process.” In re Adoption of L.D., 938 N.E.2d 666, 669 (Ind. 
2010). Certainly, a statute can provide more protection than the 
Constitution. But when a statute provides less, the government must do 
more. 4 
Notice by publication may be sufficient “where it is not reasonably 
possible or practicable to give more adequate warning,” like when the 
intended recipient is missing. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 317. But it “is not 
enough with respect to a person whose name and address are known or 
 
4 Contrary to what Hagemann v. City of Mount Vernon, 238 Ind. 613, 619–22, 154 N.E.2d 33, 36–
37 (1958), may convey, notice by publication at a proceeding’s outset is not adequate simply 
because the legislature deems it so or because personal notice will be given later. See Schroeder 
v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 211–13 (1962). 
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very easily ascertainable and whose legally protected interests are directly 
affected by the proceedings in question.” Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 
U.S. 208, 212–13 (1962). 
The Housing Authority admittedly knew the identity and address of 
624 Broadway’s registered agent. Indeed, its September 19 damages 
resolution included his address. 624 Broadway’s articles of organization, 
filed with the Indiana Secretary of State, listed its registered agent, his 
address, and an email address for service. Further, the Housing Authority 
demonstrated its ability to successfully communicate with 624 Broadway 
during its eminent domain lawsuit. See L.D., 938 N.E.2d at 671 (finding 
notice by publication insufficient when a party “had successfully given 
notice” in a previous case but “made no attempt to do so” in the instant 
case). Yet once it transitioned to an administrative taking, it apparently 
became incapable of sending a letter or email to 624 Broadway. An 
administrative taking may be a “streamlined procedure for taking private 
property,” Util. Ctr., Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne, 985 N.E.2d 731, 736 (Ind. 
2013), but it cannot circumvent the Constitution. “[W]hen notice is a 
person’s due, process which is a mere gesture is not due process.” 
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315. Because the Housing Authority knew how to 
provide personal notice, its notice by publication was a “mere gesture.” 
Despite the insufficient notice, 624 Broadway still learned of the 
Housing Authority’s meetings, attended and spoke at them, and 
submitted written remonstrances. But we cannot say 624 Broadway was 
not prejudiced: under our harmless error standard, an error’s “probable 
impact” is “sufficiently minor” if it did not “affect the substantial rights of 
the parties.” Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A). The Housing Authority passed its 
first resolution on August 15. More than three weeks later, Allen learned 
of the September 19 meeting. Had the Housing Authority provided 
constitutionally sufficient notice at the outset, it is probable that 624 
Broadway would have presented its appraisal before or at the final 
meeting. Instead, 624 Broadway’s appraiser issued his report less than two 
weeks after that meeting. Ultimately, the Housing Authority must 
persuade us that the probable impact of its deficient notice was so minor 
that it did not affect 624 Broadway’s substantial rights. But given the 
significant disparity between the owner’s $325,000 appraisal, the Housing 
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Authority’s $24,000 appraisal (which lacked an updated interior 
inspection), and the final $75,000 award, we are not confident that 624 
Broadway’s appraisal did not affect the Housing Authority’s decision on 
just compensation. Thus, we decline to hold that the deficient notice was 
harmless. 
II. 
624 Broadway is entitled to a damages hearing. 
When the Court of Appeals reversed, it ordered vacatur of the taking. 
624 Broadway, LLC, 181 N.E.3d at 1025. However, just compensation is 
generally the appropriate remedy when the government, duly authorized 
by law, takes property for a public purpose. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 
467 U.S. 986, 1016 (1984); Murray v. City of Lawrenceburg, 925 N.E.2d 728, 
732 (Ind. 2010); cf. Dible v. City of Lafayette, 713 N.E.2d 269, 274 (Ind. 1999) 
(acknowledging “injunctive relief may be necessary to remedy 
interference with landowner rights for a private purpose”). A court cannot 
enjoin or reverse a lawful taking when an adequate legal remedy—
compensation—is available. See Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 
2167–68 (2019); Murray, 925 N.E.2d at 732; United States v. Herring, 750 F.2d 
669, 674 (8th Cir. 1984).   
The General Assembly authorized the Housing Authority to conduct 
administrative takings to provide affordable housing. See I.C. §§ 36-7-18-2, 
-28(a)(2). Here, the Housing Authority strictly followed the statutory 
procedures (to a fault in terms of notice) when it took 624 Broadway’s 
property for community redevelopment that includes affordable 
housing—plainly a public purpose. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33–36 
(1954); I.C. § 36-7-18-2. And nothing indicates the taking was “subterfuge . 
. . to convey private property to a private individual for private use” or 
that the Housing Authority acted arbitrarily and capriciously. Derloshon v. 
City of Fort Wayne Dep’t of Redevelopment, 250 Ind. 163, 170–71, 234 N.E.2d 
269, 273 (1968). To the contrary, it became interested in the property in 
2017, and by the time it took 624 Broadway’s property it had already 
acquired other land necessary for its redevelopment.   
We cannot vacate the Housing Authority’s taking—statutorily 
authorized and for a public purpose—simply because insufficient notice 
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may have impacted the damages award. 624 Broadway’s sole remedy is 
just compensation, and it is entitled to a hearing on damages where it can 
present its appraisal and other pertinent evidence. 
Conclusion 
We reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment for the 
Housing Authority on 624 Broadway’s due process claim. We remand for 
it to enter summary judgment in favor of 624 Broadway on that claim and 
hold a damages hearing.  
Rush, C.J., and David, Slaughter, and Goff, JJ., concur. 
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LA N T  
Robert A. Welsh 
Connor H. Nolan 
Harris Welsh & Lukmann 
Chesterton, Indiana  
A TT O R N E YS F O R  AP P EL LE E  
Tramel R. Raggs 
Harris Law Firm, P.C. 
Crown Point, Indiana 
Jenny R. Buchheit 
Thomas A. John 
Sean T. Dewey 
Ice Miller LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
 
 
Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-140 | August 29, 2022 
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A TT O R N E YS F O R  AM IC I CU R IA E  A N D ER S O N  H O US IN G  
A UT H O R IT Y , EAS T C H I CA G O H O USI N G AU TH O R I T Y, EL K HA R T 
H O US I N G AUT H O R IT Y , I N DI AN A P OL IS H O US I N G A GE NC Y , 
J E FF E RS O N VI LLE  HO U SI N G AU TH O R I TY ,  L I NT O N H OU SI NG  
A UT H O R IT Y , S O UTH  BE N D H OU SI N G A UT H O R IT Y , H OU SIN G  
A UT H O R IT Y  O F THE  C IT Y  O F S ULL I VAN , A N D T H E  H OUS IN G  
A N D D E VEL O P ME NT  L AW  I NS T ITU TE  
Eric J. McKeown 
Alexandria H. Pittman 
Ice Miller LLP 
Indianapolis, Indiana