Case Title: State of Oregon v. McCowan

Citation: 203 Or. 551, 280 P.2d 976

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1955-03-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
203 Or. 551 (1955)
280 P.2d 976
STATE OF OREGON
v.
McCOWAN

Supreme Court of Oregon.
Submitted on briefs March 2, 1955.
Affirmed March 9, 1955.
*552 John P. Hannon, Portland, filed a brief for appellant.
*553 John B. McCourt, District Attorney for Multnomah County, and James J. Kennedy, Deputy District Attorney, filed a brief for respondent.
AFFIRMED.
TOOZE, J.
The defendant, L.B. McCowan, was convicted in the circuit court for Multnomah county, Oregon, of the crime of "Receiving the earnings of a common prostitute" and was sentenced to imprisonment in the Oregon State Penitentiary for a maximum term of two years. He appeals.
The indictment against defendant is based upon the alleged violation of § 23-922, OCLA (ORS 167.120), and, omitting formal parts, reads as follows:
Section 23-922 OCLA (ORS 167.120) provides:
On this appeal, defendant sets forth six alleged assignments of error, as follows:
1. As to his first and sixth assignments of error, defendant contends that it was prejudicial error to permit the complaining witness to testify as to her age, because the evidence might tend to establish a separate and independent crime, viz., contributing to the delinquency of a minor. The assignments of error are without merit. The age of a witness is one of the many things to be considered by a jury in weighing his testimony. 58 Am Jur 498, Witnesses, § 869.
*555 Upon conclusion of the testimony in chief on behalf of the state, and when the state rested, the defendant, without having first rested his case, moved the court as follows:
2. The denial of this motion is the basis of defendant's second assignment of error. In the assignment of error, the motion is designated as "a motion for a directed verdict", and we shall so consider it. The motion was premature. It could not properly be made before defendant himself had rested his case. State v. Jeannet, 183 Or 354, 360, 192 P2d 983; State v. Reynolds, 164 Or 446, 479, 100 P2d 593; State v. Adler, 71 Or 70, 142 P 344.
However, upon denial of the motion, defendant presented evidence on his own behalf and, upon conclusion of the trial, requested the court to instruct the jury to *556 return a verdict of not guilty, which requested instruction the court refused. The basis of this requested instruction was the same as urged upon the abortive motion for a directed verdict, and so the question presented upon the motion has been saved.
Considering assignments of error numbered 2 and 4 together, we are presented with the question whether there is substantial and competent evidence in the record to sustain the conviction. We have carefully read the entire record. Passing for the moment defendant's contention respecting the necessity of corroboration of the testimony of the complaining witness, there is an abundance of substantial and competent evidence in the record to sustain every material allegation of the indictment.
Defendant's principal contention in this court, as it was in the trial court, is that Lila Victor, the common prostitute involved, was an accomplice in the crime committed and, therefore, in order to sustain a conviction, the record must contain substantial evidence, independent of her own testimony, to corroborate her.
3. Defendant cites no authority in support of his contention. The statute under which the indictment against defendant was brought does not of itself require corroboration. Corroboration is unnecessary to sustain a conviction unless required by statute. 73 CJS 251, Prostitution, § 11(3).
ORS 136.550 provides:
*557 ORS 167.140 provides:
4, 5. This latter statute does not apply to the crime charged in the indictment in this case. It applies only to the crimes defined in ORS 167.125, ORS 167.130, and ORS 167.135, viz., (1) procuring female to engage in prostitution; (2) transporting female for prostitution purposes; and (3) procuring or transporting female under 18 for prostitution purposes.
If corroboration is necessary in the instant case, it is so by virtue of the provisions of ORS 136.550, and not otherwise.
6. The question then necessarily arises: who is an accomplice within the meaning of the statute? Courts of last resort have differed as to their definition of the word "accomplice". Some courts have held that an accomplice is one who has participated in the commission of the offense, or who, while not being present, nevertheless, in some manner, aided, advised or encouraged the defendant to commit the crime. Other courts have held that an accomplice is one who can be indicted and punished under the same statute which has been invoked against the defendant. The rule in this state is firmly established. In State v. Coffey, 157 Or 457, 475, 72 P2d 35, Mr. Justice ROSSMAN, after an exhaustive review of all the authorities, concluded:
7. Under the particular statute, for a violation of which defendant was convicted, could Lila Victor be indicted and punished? The answer is that she could not. In the recent case of State v. Goesser, 203 Or 315, 280 P2d 354, in speaking of this statute, we said:
The statute condemns, and is limited to, certain acts on the part of a man. By the very words of the statute, women are necessarily excluded from its prohibitions. The statute is not directed to the unlawful acts of "any person", as is the case in most criminal statutes, but is confined exclusively to the acts of one type of person, viz., a man. The intent of the statute is plain. Male panderers were to be dealt with severely.
Moreover it could hardly be contended that the complaining witness could be tried for receiving the earnings of a prostitute from herself. State v. Green, 60 Ariz 63, 131 P2d 411; People v. Simpson, 79 Cal App 555, 250 P 403.
8. It follows, therefore, that defendant could be convicted for a violation of this particular statute upon the uncorroborated testimony of the complaining witness. There was no error in denying the motion for a directed verdict nor in the refusal by the trial court to instruct the jury to return a verdict of not guilty.
*559 9. The cross-examination of the defendant as to number of times he had been convicted of crime, and the nature of the crimes committed, which, under assignment of error numbered 3, defendant claims constituted prejudicial error, was proper cross-examination, and no error was committed by the trial court in overruling defendant's objections thereto. State v. Wilson, 182 Or 681, 697, 189 P2d 403; 70 CJ 854, Witnesses, § 1053.
The rule is stated in 70 CJ 854, Witnesses, § 1053, as follows:
Defendant assigns as error the refusal of the trial court to give to the jury the following requested instruction:
10. The court did not err in refusing to give this instruction exactly in the words as requested. In its instructions to the jury, the subject-matter of the requested instruction was fully covered. Among other instructions, the court instructed the jury as follows:
The assignment of error is without merit.
The able and experienced trial judge fully and fairly instructed the jury upon all phases of the law involved in the case. Defendant had a fair and impartial trial in which no prejudicial error occurred.
Judgment affirmed.