Case Title: Osborn v. Painter

Citation: 

Docket Number: 95-58

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-01-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
Osborn v. Painter1996 WY 5909 P.2d 960Case Number: 95-58Decided: 01/08/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming

Richard B. OSBORN, Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v. 

Donald PAINTER and Clarice Lyle Manning, Appellees 
(Defendants).

Appeal from the District Court, Natrona County, Dan 
Spangler, J.

Richard B. Osborn, pro 
se.

Donald L. Painter, Casper, for 
Appellees.

Before GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, 
TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1]      The question 
posed by this case is whether a civil action is subject to dismissal for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted when the action, confessedly, 
is brought to relitigate issues resolved by a final county court judgment 
entered in 1989. Richard B. Osborn (Osborn), who represents himself in all his 
litigation, asserts he is not foreclosed from a collateral attack on the county 
court judgment because Donald L. Painter (Painter), the attorney for Clarice 
Lyle Manning (Manning), made an incorrect and fraudulent statement in pleading 
the county court action; for that reason, the county court judgment is deemed 
void; and, in any event, res judicata would not apply as to Painter, a party in 
this action who was not a party in the county court action. The district court 
dismissed Osborn's complaint, after finding the county court judgment could not 
be attacked by a separate action, and Osborn's only remedies were appeal or a 
motion for relief under the provisions of WYO. R.CIV.P. 60(b). We are satisfied 
as to the finality of the county court judgment, and we agree with the district 
court that the claim is simply an effort to relitigate the issues posed before 
the county court and resolved by a final judgment. We affirm the order of 
dismissal entered in the district court, and we also grant Painter's and 
Manning's Motion for Sanctions.

[¶2]      In the Brief of 
Appellant, Osborn submitted a prolix and rambling statement of issues.1 

 
In the Appellees' Brief, Painter and Manning 
state only one issue:

1. Whether 
Appellant's position in this matter is barred by the Doctrine of res 
judicata.

We deal with the single question of whether 
an action is subject to dismissal when the action on its face is one to 
relitigate a final judgment.

[¶3]      This is the fifth 
appeal taken by Osborn in the last eleven years relating to difficulties between 
him and members of the Manning family.2 In the 
county court case, Manning filed a complaint against Osborn in 1988 for damages 
flowing from a ditch Osborn had dug across a road. The history of the road and 
the easement for the road is outlined in Osborn v. Manning, 812 P.2d 545 (Wyo. 
1991). Manning's complaint sought damages for trespass, malicious trespass, and 
destruction of her property rights. In a decision letter issued on February 9, 
1989, the county court stated:

The court finds and 
concludes that the said roadway is an easement, that the Defendant is the owner 
of the dominant estate, that the Plaintiff is the owner of the servient estate, 
that the roadway serves a two fold purpose, i.e., as the Defendant's means of 
access to the Defendant's property and as the Plaintiff's means of access to the 
Plaintiff's property and buildings, that the construction by the Defendant of 
the ditch in question interfered with the Plaintiff's use of the servient 
estate, that the Plaintiff was thereby damaged and that the amount of the 
damages measured by the cost of returning the ditch to its original condition is 
$1,268.00, that the amount of damages is reasonable, that there are insufficient 
facts from which the Court can conclude that the Defendant's actions were wanton 
and willful and that therefore the Plaintiff is not awarded punitive damages, 
that the Court is in doubt about the basis of awarding a restraining order and 
therefore declines to do so, and finally the Court finds generally for the 
Plaintiff and against the Defendant on the merits of the 
actions.

[¶4]      A judgment was 
entered in the county court consistent with the decision letter, and Osborn 
appealed to the district court of the Seventh Judicial District. The district 
court also authored a decision letter in which it said:

Numerous errors of 
law are asserted in defendant's statement of errors. He contends that there was 
no trial on the merits, there was insufficient evidence, the decision was 
contrary to law, the counter-claim was not heard, defendant was not given the 
opportunity to respond, plaintiff committed procedural error, motions filed by 
the defendant were not ruled upon, res judicata, complaint not verified as to 
truth, unauthorized prosecution of suit in the name of another, and the county 
court used intimidation and coercion against the will of appellant in requiring 
him to withdraw his motion for default.

The district court found the county court 
did not abuse its discretion in holding that Osborn impermissibly burdened the 
easement; the money damages were not excessive or contrary to the evidence; the 
failure to strictly comply with the rules of procedure did not constitute error; 
and the district court refused to consider other allegations not supported by 
the evidence. Osborn sought to appeal that decision to this court but, after 
reviewing the files and the record, we dismissed the appeal and denied his 
request for discretionary review pursuant to our power of 
certiorari.

[¶5]      That brings us to 
the instant suit, which was filed on January 12, 1993. In his complaint, Osborn 
alleged fraud, breach of contract, violation of civil rights, impairment of 
contract (federal issue) and asserted a claim for damages and relief. Osborn 
also alleged Painter committed fraud when he made this comment in a brief filed 
in the 1989 action: "Moreover, an examination of the ditch which is deep and 
wide enough to conceal a small car from view when placed therein will divert at 
least 100 years of runoff condensed into a single day of rainfall." While he 
neglected to make them a part of the record, Osborn apparently obtained Answers 
to Interrogatories from Painter, and he relied upon a statement made by Painter 
with respect to the brief that "the statement was made as an exaggeration for 
the sake of emphasis in directing the judge's attention to the ditch in 
question." Osborn's argument is that, lacking personal knowledge of the facts in 
the case, Painter had exaggerated them to impress the court without 
investigating the facts and that action constituted fraud. The district court 
dismissed Osborn's complaint on the ground that the pleadings failed to state a 
cause of action. Osborn's appeal is taken from that Order of 
Dismissal.

[¶6]      The essence of 
Osborn's position in this appeal is that the county court judgment is void and 
"is open to attack or impeachment in a proceeding, direct or collateral, and at 
any time or place" (State of Wyoming ex rel. TRL by Avery v. RLP, 772 P.2d 1054, 
1057 (Wyo. 1989)). This is the conclusion Osborn draws from the asserted 
fraudulent conduct of Painter. The rule with respect to judgments deemed to be 
void and the availability of collateral attacks is set forth in Hume v. 
Ricketts, 69 Wyo. 222, 240 P.2d 881, 882-83 (1952) (emphasis 
added):

Jurisdiction of the 
court over the parties is an essential to the validity of any judgment and a 
personal judgment rendered without such jurisdiction is void. See 31 Am.Jur. 
"Judgments" Paragraph 409; 49 C.J.S., Judgments, § 19b. However, the judgment is 
presumed to be valid and the presumption in favor of jurisdiction extends to 
jurisdiction of the parties, 31 Am. Jur. "Judgments" Paragraphs 415 and 417. 
By the general rule, a collateral attack may not be made upon a judgment 
where the absence of jurisdiction over the parties does not appear upon the 
record. See 49 C.J.S., Judgments, § 401; 31 Am.Jur. "Judgments" Paragraph 
602, citing numerous cases, some collected in 23 Am.St.Rep. 105 and 44 
Am.St.Rep. 562; Reynolds v. Lloyd Cotton Mills, 177 N.C. 412, 99 S.E. 240, 5 
A.L.R. 284; Murrell v. Stock [Growers'] National Bank, 10 Cir., 74 F.2d 827. 
It seems to be the general rule that a void judgment, such as one wherein the 
court lacks jurisdiction over the parties, can be attacked collaterally only 
where the invalidity appears on the face of the record. Where the invalidity 
does not appear on the face of the record, the proper action is a direct 
attack.

While Hume addresses jurisdiction over the 
parties, the same result would pertain if the court lacked jurisdiction over the 
subject matter.

[¶7]      We find no 
suggestion in the file in this case, however, that any lack of jurisdiction by 
the county court for Natrona County over the parties or over the subject matter 
of the action appeared on the face of the record. In the absence of those 
criteria, the proper action is a direct appeal. In 1990, Osborn did appeal from 
the county court judgment, but there is no indication that he asserted the 
county court judgment was void in the appeal. In the instant case, the district 
court did suggest that the opportunity to raise the question of fraud would 
exist under WYO. R.CIV.P. 60(b), but the record does not demonstrate any effort 
on the part of Osborn to pursue that remedy.

[¶8]      We then are 
confronted almost purely with the effect of the doctrine of res judicata. In the 
case of Osborn v. Manning, 798 P.2d 1208, 1210 (Wyo. 1990), we summarized the 
doctrine of res judicata:

The doctrines of 
res judicata and collateral estoppel

"incorporate a 
universal precept of common-law jurisprudence to the effect that a `right, 
question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of 
competent jurisdiction . . . cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the 
same parties or their privies.'"

Rialto Theatre, Inc. v. Commonwealth 
Theatres, Inc., 714 P.2d 328, 336 (Wyo. 1986) (quoting Delgue v. Curutchet, 677 P.2d 208, 213 (Wyo. 1984)). Res judicata "constitutes an absolute bar to a 
subsequent action involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action." Barrett 
v. Town of Guernsey, 652 P.2d 395, 398 (Wyo. 1982), quoted in Swasso v. State ex 
rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Division, 751 P.2d 887, 890 (Wyo. 1988). See 
Rialto Theatre, Inc., 714 P.2d 328 (defining a cause of 
action).

The criteria used 
to determine res judicata's applicability to a situation are: "(1) the parties 
were identical; (2) the subject matter was identical; (3) the issues were the 
same and related to the subject matter; and (4) the capacities of the persons 
were identical in reference to both the subject matter and the issues between 
them."

Newell v. Trumper, 765 P.2d 1353, 1355 (Wyo. 
1988) (quoting Swasso, 751 P.2d at 890).

Interestingly enough, Osborn prevailed in 
that case because we held that separate claims were asserted in the two 
actions.

[¶9]      While the 
complaint, as against Manning, did seem to revisit the issues in the county 
court case, the district court, out of an abundance of caution, asked the 
parties to submit legal arguments by brief or a memorandum if they chose. 
Osborn, indeed, took advantage of that opportunity and, at one point in his 
Plaintiff's Memorandum - Cause of Action, he concedes: "I chose to attack that 
judgment [the county court judgment] in a seperate [sic] civil action rather 
than an appeal." Apparently, Osborn justified that choice because the time for 
seeking relief from the judgment under WYO.R.CIV.P. 60(b) had expired, which 
indeed it had.

[¶10]   In addressing the effect of 
WYO.R.CIV.P. 60(b), we have regarded it as a statute of limitations, and we have 
said:

In reading 
Wyo.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2) and (c) and 60(b) in conjunction with 7(b)(1), we must be 
conscious of the purpose served by the court's ability to impose default. The 
policy of providing finality to proceedings cannot be 
overlooked.

Similar in 
consequences to default are statutes of limitations which are comparable in 
their finality and concomitant preclusive effect to litigants. Yet they are 
accepted as necessary in a system that must provide a forum for a diligent party 
and, at the same time, recognize that litigation cannot be unendingly 
open. On this issue we have 
said:

Statutes of 
limitation are arbitrary by their very nature and do not discriminate between 
the just and unjust claim. They are not judicially made but represent 
legislative and public policy controlling the right to litigate. The statutes 
operate against even the most meritorious of claims and courts have no right to 
deny their application.

* * 
* * * *

[A] workable system 
of justice requires that litigants not be free to appear at their pleasure. 
We therefore must hold parties and their attorneys to a reasonably high 
standard of diligence in observing the courts' rules of 
procedure.

Vanasse v. Ramsay, 847 P.2d 993, 1000 (Wyo. 
1993) (emphasis added, citations omitted). Osborn correctly understood that he 
had lost this available remedy by the passage of time.

[¶11]   We agree completely with these 
comments of the trial court in its decision letter:

As Plaintiff states 
at of his memorandum, he chose to attack the County Court Judgment by a separate 
civil action rather than an appeal. Plaintiff does not cite any law which allows 
him to do that. My understanding is that a judgment cannot be attacked by a 
separate lawsuit but can only be reviewed on appeal or through Rule 60(b). 
Therefore, the complaint does not state a cause of action and should be 
dismissed.

[¶12]   Osborn does urge that Painter was 
not a party to the county court's action, and therefore, Painter cannot rely 
upon the doctrine of res judicata. We are unable to discern from Osborn's 
pleadings or arguments his theory of a duty owed to him, which Painter violated. 
In Brooks v. Zebre, 792 P.2d 196, 201 (Wyo. 1990), we stated, in accord with the 
trial court, that "an attorney owes no actionable duty to an adverse party 
emanating from the zealous representation of his own client." Clearly, Painter's 
allegedly fraudulent conduct was not the premise for the decision of the county 
court and amounted to no more than zealous representation of Painter's client. 
While Painter perhaps cannot rely on res judicata, nevertheless, it is clear the 
district court properly dismissed the action as to 
Painter.

[¶13]   Painter and Manning assert this 
appeal by Osborn is unfounded and request the court to certify there was no 
reasonable cause for the appeal. They seek attorney fees in defense of the 
appeal and have attached to their Motion for Sanctions an affidavit 
demonstrating attorney fees in the amount of $450. From other cases, we know 
Osborn is familiar with the authority of this court to award attorney fees and 
costs to an appellee because of a frivolous appeal. Osborn v. Pine Mountain 
Ranch, 766 P.2d 1165 (Wyo. 1989); Osborn v. Warner, 694 P.2d 730 (Wyo. 1985). We 
are satisfied that $450 was a reasonable amount to be assessed as attorney fees 
in this case. In this regard, we also are cognizant that Osborn's brief does not 
comply with the WYOMING RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE because he fails to support 
arguments with authority or to state a cogent argument as required by 
WYO.R.APP.P. 7.01. "The failure to comply with any other rule of appellate 
procedure * * * is ground only for such action as the appellate court deems 
appropriate, including * * * refusal to consider the offending party's 
contentions; assessment of costs; dismissal * * *." WYO. R.APP.P. 1.03. Even 
though we acknowledge that, "[t]he litigant acting pro se is entitled to `a 
certain leniency' from the more stringent standards accorded formal pleadings 
drafted by lawyers; however, the administration of justice requires reasonable 
adherence to procedural rules and requirements of the court." Osborn v. Emporium 
Videos, 848 P.2d 237, 240 (Wyo. 1993).

[¶14]   Because Osborn is foreclosed from 
this collateral attack upon the county court judgment which became final in 
1989, we affirm the dismissal by the district court. We grant Painter's and 
Manning's Motion for Sanctions and order Osborn to pay $450 as provided by 
WYO.R.APP.P. 10.05.

Footnotes

1 The 
issues set forth in Osborn's brief read:

1. Under Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rule # 8(a)(1), just what is a "short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief."?

2. Under Wyoming Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rule # 9(b) what is a "statement of the circumstances showing fraud 
stated with particularity."?

Do the facts showing what was 
done, how it was done and the damages or result that it caused, meet the 
requirements of rule # 9(b)?

3. What is a "void judgment" 
and how and who determines a void judgment?

4. Is a "void judgment" one in 
which it is prohibited by law?

5. Where it has been found 
(after the one year limit as stated in W.R.C.P. rule # 60(b)) that a judgment 
was obtained thru fraud, must a litigant be compelled to seek relief thru 
W.R.C.P. rules # 59 and # 60, or may that litigant file a new action based upon 
the evidence which he now has?

6. Where a litigant has a 
judgment entered against him that is contrary to an existing law, may he attack 
this judgment by a new and seperate [sic] action, or must it be brought under 
W.R.C.P. rule # 60 where it is a possibility that there is prejudice against 
this litigant by the court? (prejudice does exist, and not all courts are 
perfect)

7. Must a lower court follow 
the decisions of the (Wyoming) Supreme Court, when those decisions are cited by 
a pro se litigant who is not a member of the Bar?

8. Where a litigant charges a 
lower court with "prejudice" what besides a very high money judgment or one 
which can't be done, is one "which shocks the conscience of the 
court"?

9. Is it mandatory for a judge 
to hear and decide a motion for "Judicial Notice" or does he have a certain 
amount of "lee-way" in that issue?

10. Is it "prejudice" when a 
court requires a pro se litigant, who is not a member of the Bar, to do things 
for which those same things are overlooked when a member of the Bar does them? 
When in fact that there have been several decisions by the Wyoming Supreme 
Court, that a pro se litigant is entitled to same 
privileges.

11. That where a counterclaim 
is not pursued, after a dismissal of the action by the court, it gives rise to 
the question as to why that counterclaim was filed in the first place, and just 
might violate Wyoming Statute # 1-14-128.

12. Where a defendant complies 
to one of the demands for relief in a complaint, does this show that there was 
indeed a claim stated?

Addressing Osborn's issues 
indubitably would involve this court in an effort to organize nonsense, which is 
an adventure normally doomed to futility.

2 Previous 
appeals can be found at Osborn v. Manning, 685 P.2d 1121 (Wyo. 1984); Osborn v. 
Manning, 798 P.2d 1208 (Wyo. 1990); Osborn v. Manning, 812 P.2d 545 (Wyo. 1991); 
and Osborn v. Manning, 817 P.2d 889 (Wyo. 1991). This court denied a 
discretionary review of the county court judgment in 1989.