Case Title: Thomas G. Butler v. Advanced Drainage Systems, Inc.

Citation: 2006 WI 102

Docket Number: 2004AP001991

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2006-07-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
2006 WI 102 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP1991 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Thomas G. Butler, Mary J. Butler, Steven J. 
Grundahl, Nancy J. Grundahl, James A. Gallop, 
Maureen Gallop, Greg Kittelsen, Edith Kittelsen, 
Duane Schwartz, Joan Schwartz, Dewey Mullikin, 
Juanita Mullikin, Helen Brekke, Phillip Jones, 
Susan Jones, Allen Hall, Florence Hall, Michael  
Singer, Noel Singer, H. James Jacobsen, Debby 
Jacobsen, Scott Blanck, Dana Blanck, Larry 
Kinney and Karen Kinney, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
Albert Kempf, Pat Kempf, Dale E. Johnson, Joan 
L. Johnson, Harold M. Flolid, Karen A. Flolid, 
Carolyn Ousdigian, Ted Ousdigian, Jeremy Ferris, 
June Ferris, Suzanne Meland, Michael T. Meland, 
Estate of Maxine Lenz, Daryl Erdman, Audrey 
Erdman, Lawrence J. Jarvela, Patricia D. 
Jarvela, Joann Yohn, Stephen Yohn, Jerry 
Greeley, Karen Greeley, Niel R. Petersen, Marlys 
J. Petersen, Karen Ek, Bill Ek, Charles 
Peterson, Douglas J. Gallop, Shirley Gallop, 
Mike Evavold, Mark R. Parks, Art Kosieradzki, 
Jeanne Kosieradzki, Gary C. Boyum, Eleanor Kay 
Boyum, Beverly Gallop and Bud Gallop, 
          Intervening-Plaintiffs-Appellants-
Petitioners, 
 
Thomas E. Ferris and Joy Linda Ferris, 
          Intervening-Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
Advanced Drainage Systems, Inc., Daniel Kling 
and ECG, Inc., 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
City of Shell Lake, 
          Defendant, 
 
Cincinnati Insurance Company and Gulf 
Underwriters Insurance Company, 
          Intervening-Defendants-Respondents, 
 
 
 
 
 
Bob Thompson & Sons and Thompson Sand & Gravel, 
          Defendants-Third-Party Plaintiffs-
Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Hoffman Construction Company and Wausau 
Insurance Companies, 
          Third-Party Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2005 WI App 108 
Reported at: 282 Wis. 2d 776, 698 N.W.2d 117 
(Ct. App. 2005–Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 13, 2006   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 12, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Washburn   
 
JUDGE: 
Norman L. Yackel 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
BRADLEY, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and BUTLER, JR., J., join the 
dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners 
and 
the 
intervening plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners, there were briefs 
by Steven B. Goff, Tracy N. Tool, and Bye, Goff & Rohde, Ltd., 
River Falls; Matthew A. Biegert, Michael J. Brose, and Doar, 
Drill & Skow, S.C., New Richmond, and oral argument by Matthew 
A. Biegert. 
 
For the defendants-third-party plaintiffs-respondents and 
the third-party defendants-respondents, there was a brief by 
Patrick H. O'Neill, Jr. and O'Neill & Murphy, LLP, Saint Paul, 
MN; J. David Rice and Rice, Heitman & Davis, S.C., Sparta; 
Timothy J. Muldowney and LaFollette Godfrey & Kahn, Madison, and 
oral argument by J. David Rice. 
 
For the defendants-respondents, Daniel Kling and ECG, Inc., 
there was a brief by Thomas J. Graham, Jr., Christine A. Gimber, 
and Weld, Riley, Prenn & Ricci, S.C., Eau Claire. 
 
 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent, Advanced Drainage Systems, 
Inc., there was a brief by William J. Katt, Mark D. Malloy, and 
Leib & Katt, S.C., Milwaukee. 
 
For the intervening defendant-respondent, Gulf Underwriters 
Insurance Company, there was a brief by Mark Rattan, James P. 
Odda, and Litchfield Cavo LLP, Brookfield. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Daniel D. Barker, James 
K. Pease, Jr., Jack D. Walker, Philip J. Bradbury, and Melli, 
Walker, Pease & Ruhly, S.C., Madison, on behalf of Associated 
Builders & Contractors of Wisconsin, Inc., AGC of Wisconsin, 
Inc., and Wisconsin Transportation Builders Association. 
 
 
2006 WI 102
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP1991  
(L.C. No. 
2003CV59) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Thomas G. Butler, Mary J. Butler, Steven J. 
Grundahl, Nancy J. Grundahl, James A. Gallop, 
Maureen Gallop, Greg Kittelsen, Edith 
Kittelsen, Duane Schwartz, Joan Schwartz, Dewey 
Mullikin, Juanita Mullikin, Helen Brekke, 
Phillip Jones, Susan Jones, Allen Hall, 
Florence Hall, Michael Singer, Noel Singer, H. 
James Jacobsen, Debby Jacobsen, Scott Blanck, 
Dana Blanck, Larry Kinney and Karen Kinney, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
Albert Kempf, Pat Kempf, Dale E. Johnson, Joan 
L. Johnson, Harold M. Flolid, Karen A. Flolid, 
Carolyn Ousdigian, Ted Ousdigian, Jeremy 
Ferris, June Ferris, Suzanne Meland, Michael T. 
Meland, Estate of Maxine Lenz, Daryl Erdman, 
Audrey Erdman, Lawrence J. Jarvela, Patricia D. 
Jarvela, Joann Yohn, Stephen Yohn, Jerry 
Greeley, Karen Greeley, Niel R. Petersen, 
Marlys J. Petersen, Karen Ek, Bill Ek, Charles 
Peterson, Douglas J. Gallop, Shirley Gallop, 
Mike Evavold, Mark R. Parks, Art Kosieradzki, 
Jeanne Kosieradzki, Gary C. Boyum, Eleanor Kay 
Boyum, Beverly Gallop and Bud Gallop, 
 
          Intervening-Plaintiffs- 
          Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
Thomas E. Ferris and Joy Linda Ferris, 
 
          Intervening-Plaintiffs, 
 
     v. 
 
Advanced Drainage Systems, Inc., Daniel Kling 
FILED 
 
JUL 13, 2006 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
and ECG, Inc., 
 
          Defendants-Respondents, 
 
City of Shell Lake, 
 
          Defendant, 
 
Cincinnati Insurance Company and Gulf 
Underwriters Insurance Company, 
 
          Intervening-Defendants-Respondents, 
 
Bob Thompson & Sons and Thompson Sand & Gravel, 
 
          Defendants-Third-Party  
          Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
 
     v. 
 
Hoffman Construction Company and Wausau 
Insurance Companies, 
 
          Third-Party Defendants-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   The circuit court 
granted summary judgment of dismissal to the defendants on the 
plaintiffs' negligence and nuisance claims.1  The court of 
appeals affirmed.  Because we conclude that the plaintiffs' 
negligence and nuisance claims are precluded by public policy 
and were properly dismissed, we affirm the court of appeals, 
                                                 
1 Judge Norman L. Yackel presided in the Washburn County 
Circuit Court. 
No. 
2004AP1991   
 
2 
 
albeit on different grounds than those employed by the court of 
appeals.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶2 
This action arises out of a project to design and 
install a system to lower the water level (the Project) of Shell 
Lake (the Lake).  The Lake is a bowl-shaped lake, covering 
approximately 2500 acres.  It is located entirely within the 
boundaries of the City of Shell Lake, Wisconsin (the City).  
There are more than 400 properties abutting the Lake.  The 
plaintiffs and intervening plaintiffs (collectively, plaintiffs) 
own properties on the Lake.   
¶3 
The surface water elevation of the Lake has fluctuated 
significantly over the past century.  In the most recent several 
decades, the water level of the Lake has been rising.  As a 
result, in 1977, the City entered into an agreement with the 
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) to raise the 
ordinary high water mark of the Lake.  This agreement was 
developed to aid the City with adoption and administration of a 
shoreland zoning ordinance, with the understanding that a 
surface water drain would be installed in order to maintain the 
water level at or below the ordinary high water mark set by the 
DNR.   
¶4 
In the meantime, property development surrounding the 
Lake continued.  The water level continued to rise.  In 1987-
1988, the United States Army Corps of Engineers conducted an 
investigation of the problem and issued a report that suggested 
plans for water diversion and associated costs.  The report 
No. 
2004AP1991   
 
3 
 
showed that the water level had risen in the 1980s and 1990s, 
and predicted that the water level would continue to rise.  It 
noted a drop in water level from 1986-1987 due to record low 
precipitation, but it noted:  
Realizing 
the 
potential 
for 
flooding 
of 
their 
properties, area residents continue to be concerned 
despite the fact that the lake level has dropped 
during the past year.  Accordingly, city officials 
continue to express a need for the development of 
measures to alleviate the flooding problem. 
United States Army Corps of Engineers, Reconnaissance Report 
Flood Control 205, p. 11. 
¶5 
The 1988 report ultimately concluded: 
The level of Shell Lake is presently down from the [] 
high level of elevation 1221.99 feet msl reached in 
1986.  However, historical accounts indicate that the 
lake has the potential for rising to much higher 
levels.  With the return of normal precipitation or 
precipitation at levels experienced during the period 
1977-1986, rising lake levels can once again be 
expected.  Any appreciable rise in the lake level 
above the high recorded in 1986 could result in 
catastrophic losses to existing developments. 
Id. at 29.   
¶6 
The water level appeared to stabilize in the years 
immediately following the Army Corps of Engineers report, and 
plans to install a drain were put on hold.  By 1994, the surface 
water drain that was to have been installed as a result of the 
1977 agreement between the DNR and the City was not in place.  
The DNR investigations of the water level determined that the 
ordinary high water mark, based on erosion and analyses of 
vegetation changes, had risen again.  Accordingly, the DNR 
No. 
2004AP1991   
 
4 
 
declared an even higher ordinary high water mark.  The DNR's 
report noted that a substantial amount of development had 
occurred on the Lake in low areas, with much of the development 
occurring below the 100-year floodplain boundary. 
¶7 
In 1997, after the water level had reached 1222.24 
feet, mean sea level (msl), then a record high, the City 
petitioned the DNR to divert water into Sawyer Creek.  However, 
the DNR denied the City's permit application because of the 
expected negative ecological effects the proposed plan would 
have on Sawyer Creek.   
¶8 
In 2000, the City met with the DNR staff to review 
several new options for water diversion.  In 2001, the City 
applied to the DNR for a new permit, this time to divert lake 
water into the Yellow River.  The Project involved placing 
structures on the bed of the Lake and in the Yellow River that 
would facilitate the diversion.  The Project also called for the 
construction 
and 
installation 
of 
drainage 
pipe 
along 
an 
approximately 4.5 mile route from the Lake to the Yellow River.  
The intent of the Project was to maintain the Lake near the 
ordinary high water mark set in 1994.  The DNR granted the 
City's petition for the Project.  The estimated cost exceeded 
$1,600,000.  The City intended to fund the project, in part, 
through $650,000 of special assessments on riparian property 
owners. In the meantime, emergency pumping was undertaken to 
temporarily lower the water level. 
¶9 
The City contracted with engineer Daniel Kling (Kling) 
and 
his 
company, 
Envirosystems 
Consulting 
Group, 
Inc. 
No. 
2004AP1991   
 
5 
 
(Envirosystems), for design and engineering; with Advanced 
Drainage Systems, Inc. (Advanced Drainage) for the supply of 
pipes; and with Bob Thompson & Sons and Thompson Sand & Gravel 
(Thompson) for installation and general contractor services.   
¶10 Envirosystems created the plans and specifications for 
the Project.  The plans called for 24,000 feet of light-weight 
high-density polyethylene pipe rated to withstand 10.8 pounds 
per square inch (psi) of pressure.  Other types of high-density 
pipe that could withstand more pressure were considered, but 
ultimately were rejected.  
¶11 The Project construction proceeded in the late summer 
and fall of 2002 when the water level ranged between 1223.91 and 
1224.44 feet msl.2  When the pipeline opened for the first time 
in November 2002, leaks immediately developed and it was shut 
down for repair.  Subsequently, Advanced Drainage found that 
gaskets on the pipeline had been displaced and that dirt and 
debris had entered the pipeline.  Six attempts were made at a 
minimum flow rate, and all failed.  From November of 2002 to 
June of 2003, Envirosystems, Advanced Drainage, and Thompson 
attempted to repair the pipeline.   
¶12 While the attempted repair was underway, the City 
hired an engineering firm to investigate the Project and to 
propose solutions.  The resulting report concluded that the 
pipeline's failure stemmed from design and material defects, 
                                                 
2 According to the Army Corps of Engineers Report, the 
highest recorded water level was 1228.55 feet msl in 1900.   
No. 
2004AP1991   
 
6 
 
failure to test the materials and problems with installation.  
The 
report 
suggested 
several 
alternative 
solutions 
to 
appropriately 
accommodate 
the 
water 
pressure, 
including 
reconstruction of the pipeline, the use of new types of piping 
made of different materials, and the insertion of a "slip-line" 
within the existing pipe.   
¶13 The City ultimately chose to insert a slip-line of 
solid wall 80 psi pipe.  By March 2004, after the new system of 
pipe had been in place and functioning for several months, the 
water level had receded to 1222.18 feet msl. 
¶14 A group of riparian property owners filed this action.  
They sued the City, Envirosystems, Advanced Drainage, Thompson, 
and their insurers.3  They alleged the following claims for 
relief that are before us on this appeal:4  (1) Advanced 
Drainage, Kling, Envirosystems, Thompson, and the City were 
negligent in performing their contractual obligations for the 
Project, causing property damage, loss of property value and 
loss of enjoyment; and (2) the defendants' negligent actions and 
inactions created and maintained a nuisance, which nuisance 
unreasonably impaired the plaintiffs' right of enjoyment and 
right of reasonable use of their property.   
                                                 
3 Cincinnati 
Insurance 
Company 
and 
Gulf 
Underwriters 
Insurance Company are named as intervening defendants. 
4 The complaint also asserted an inverse condemnation claim 
and claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, which are not 
before us.   
No. 
2004AP1991   
 
7 
 
¶15 The plaintiffs moved for class certification, pursuant 
to Wis. Stat. § 803.08, and the defendants moved to change 
venue, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 801.52.  On October 14, 2003, 
the circuit court denied the request to certify and changed the 
venue to Burnett County.  It also dismissed the City from the 
lawsuit.5  Subsequently, the remaining defendants moved for 
summary judgment, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 802.08.  The circuit 
court granted their motion and dismissed the lawsuit.   
¶16 The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court.  
Butler v. Advanced Drainage Sys., Inc., 2005 WI App 108, ¶2, 282 
Wis. 2d 776, 698 N.W.2d 117.  It declined to address the issues 
of class certification and venue change.  Id., n.1.  In reaching 
its decision, the court of appeals concluded that Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 324A (1965) was the framework for analyzing 
the plaintiffs' negligence claims.6  Id., ¶22.  It concluded that 
                                                 
5 The decision to dismiss all claims against the City has 
not been appealed. 
6 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1965) provides; 
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, 
to 
render 
services 
to 
another 
which 
he 
should 
recognize as necessary for the protection of a third 
person or his things, is subject to liability to the 
third person for physical harm resulting from his 
failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his 
undertaking, if 
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care 
increases the risk of such harm, or 
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by 
the other to the third person, or  
No. 
2004AP1991   
 
8 
 
summary 
judgment 
was 
appropriate 
because, 
based 
on 
the 
undisputed facts, "none of the three alternative conditions for 
liability under § 324A [had] been met."  Id., ¶2.  The court of 
appeals also concluded that an action based on nuisance should 
be dismissed because it was based on allegedly negligent conduct 
and the defendants' conduct is not "otherwise actionable under 
the rules governing liability for negligent conduct."  Id., 
¶¶40-41 (citing Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist. v. City of 
Milwaukee, 2005 WI 8, ¶63, 277 Wis. 2d 635, 691 N.W.2d 658).  
The plaintiffs petitioned for review of the court of appeals 
decision and we granted their petition. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶17 This case requires us to review summary judgment 
dismissing 
the plaintiffs' 
claims 
against 
the 
defendants.  
Whether summary judgment was properly granted is a question of 
law.  Fortier v. Flambeau Plastics Co., 164 Wis. 2d 639, 651-52, 
476 N.W.2d 593 (Ct. App. 1991).  We independently review a grant 
or denial of summary judgment, applying the same methodology as 
the circuit court, although benefiting from the opinions of both 
the circuit court and the court of appeals.  See Cole v. 
Hubanks, 2004 WI 74, ¶5, 272 Wis. 2d 539, 681 N.W.2d 147.  
Whether public policy precludes liability based on a negligence 
                                                                                                                                                             
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of 
the other or the third person upon the undertaking. 
No. 
2004AP1991   
 
9 
 
claim is also a question of law.  Gritzner v. Michael R., 2000 
WI 68, ¶27, 235 Wis. 2d 781, 611 N.W.2d 906. 
B. 
Summary Judgment Principles 
¶18 Every decision on a motion for summary judgment begins 
with a review of the complaint to determine whether, on its 
face, it states a claim for relief.  Hoida, Inc. v. M&I Midstate 
Bank, 2006 WI 69, ¶16, ___ Wis. 2d __, ___ N.W.2d ___ (citing 
Westphal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2003 WI App 170, ¶9, 266 Wis. 2d 
569, 669 N.W.2d 166).  If it does, we examine the answer to see 
if issues of fact or law have been joined.  Hoida, ___ Wis. 2d 
___, ¶16.  After we have concluded that the complaint and answer 
are sufficient to join issue, we examine the moving party's 
affidavits to determine whether they establish a prima facie 
case for summary judgment.  Id.  When they do so, we review the 
opposing party's affidavits to determine whether there are any 
material facts in dispute, or inferences from undisputed 
material facts, that would entitle the opposing party to a 
trial.  Id.  "We will affirm a grant of summary judgment when 
there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  Baumeister 
v. Automated Prods., Inc., 2004 WI 148, ¶11, 277 Wis. 2d 21, 690 
N.W.2d 1.  "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute 
between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly 
supported motion for summary judgment," so long as there is no 
disputed fact that is material to the claim or defense made.  
Id. (quoting City of Elkhorn v. 211 Centralia Corp., 2004 WI App 
139, ¶18, 275 Wis. 2d 584, 685 N.W.2d 874).   
No. 
2004AP1991   
 
10 
 
C. 
Public Policy Factors 
¶19 When liability for negligence is established, we may 
preclude liability based on public policy factors. Coffey v. 
City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 541, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976).  
We do so as a matter of law.  See Alvarado v. Sersch, 2003 WI 
55, ¶¶16-17, 262 Wis. 2d 74, 662 N.W.2d 350 (citing Bowen v. 
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 644, 517 N.W.2d 432 
(1994); A.E. Inv. Corp. v. Link Builders, 62 Wis. 2d 479, 484-
85, 214 N.W.2d 764 (1974)).  The six public policy factors we 
have employed are:  "(1) [t]he injury is too remote from the 
negligence; . . . (2) the injury is too wholly out of proportion 
to the culpability of the negligent tortfeasor; . . . (3) in 
retrospect 
it 
appears 
too 
highly 
extraordinary 
that 
the 
negligence should have brought about the harm; . . . (4) . . . 
allowance of recovery would place too unreasonable a burden on 
the negligent tort-feasor; . . . (5) [to allow recovery] would 
open the way for fraudulent claims; or (6) to allow recovery 
would enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping 
point."  Coffey, 74 Wis. 2d at 541.    
¶20 We have cautioned against applying public policy 
factors 
to 
preclude 
liability 
where 
the 
facts 
are 
too 
complicated and warrant development of the factual basis for the 
negligence claim.  Alvarado, 262 Wis. 2d 74, ¶¶18, 20-26 
(citations omitted).  However, we have also said that a 
reviewing court may preclude liability even when liability for 
negligent conduct has not been fully developed, e.g., on a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  Stephenson v. 
No. 
2004AP1991   
 
11 
 
Universal Metrics, Inc., 2002 WI 30, ¶42, 251 Wis. 2d 171, 641 
N.W.2d 158 (citing Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores, 219 Wis. 2d 250, 
265, 580 N.W.2d 233 (1998)); see also Coffey, 74 Wis. 2d at 541-
42.  When we do so, we assume for purposes of our decision that 
the defendant is liable for negligent conduct, "but for reasons 
of public policy, we prevent the claim from proceeding."  Cole, 
272 Wis. 2d 539, ¶7 (citing Gould v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 
198 Wis. 2d 450, 460, 543 N.W.2d 282 (1996)); see also Smaxwell 
v. Bayard, 2004 WI 101, ¶39, 274 Wis. 2d 278, 682 N.W.2d 923; 
Gritzner, 235 Wis. 2d 781, ¶26. 
D. 
Public Policy Application 
¶21 Here, the complaint states a claim for relief and the 
answer joins issue.  The relevant facts relating to the 
attempted water abatement are not disputed.  They show that the 
City contracted with the defendants to lower the water level in 
the Lake and that the defendants' efforts were not successful.  
Therefore, we conclude that the facts of record are sufficiently 
developed for us to undertake a public policy analysis.  When we 
do so, "we assume there is negligence and that the negligence 
was a cause of the injury, but for reasons of public policy, we 
prevent the claim from proceeding."7  Cole, 272 Wis. 2d 539, ¶7. 
                                                 
7 The dissent takes issue with applying a public policy 
analysis when causation and damages remain.  Dissent, ¶84.  
However, because we assume negligence, cause and injury, 
determining whether there is cause and damages is not necessary 
to a public policy analysis.  Smaxwell v. Bayard, 2004 WI 101, 
¶39, 274 Wis. 2d 278, 682 N.W.2d 923. 
No. 
2004AP1991   
 
12 
 
¶22 Although several of the six public policy factors 
could apply in this case, the sixth public policy factor, that 
imposing liability would enter a field that has no sensible or 
just stopping point, is the factor that compels us to preclude 
liability.  Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 541 N.W.2d 742 
(1995), provides a framework for our discussion. 
¶23 In Rockweit, we determined, based on public policy, 
that a friend who visited a family around a campfire and was the 
last to leave the campfire could not be held liable for injuries 
sustained by a young child, who later fell into the un-
extinguished fire's hot coals.  In explaining our decision, we 
noted that the child's injuries could have occurred in exactly 
the same manner even if the friend had not been present at the 
campground.  Id. at 428.  We also noted that the child's parents 
were aware of the open hazard the fire's coals presented, yet 
they had not secured the child's safety.  Id.  We concluded that 
if liability could be imposed on the visiting friend for failing 
to extinguish the campfire, there would be no sensible or just 
stopping point as to whom could be held liable for a known 
hazard.  Id. at 428-29.  We noted the appropriateness of the 
question asked by the court of appeals:  
. . . [W]hen it comes to fires . . . is it the last 
adult to leave, the last person to put a log in the 
fire?  Or is it the owner of the campsite?  Or the 
person who started the campfire?  
Id. at 428. 
¶24 The principles of Rockweit are similar to those we 
employ to preclude the defendants' liability in this case.  For 
No. 
2004AP1991   
 
13 
 
example, the natural hazard, flooding caused by the rising water 
level of the Lake, has been known for decades.  Just as the 
plaintiffs in Rockweit were aware of the fire hazard, the 
plaintiffs in this case were aware of the flooding hazard 
surrounding the Lake; yet they continued to place themselves in 
harm's way, often by building dwellings below the 100-year 
floodplain for the Lake.  When the potential for damage from the 
Lake's flooding was known and of an ongoing nature, should an 
unsatisfactory 
abatement 
effort 
serve 
as 
the 
source 
of 
recoverable damages?  Just as we determined in our public policy 
analysis in Rockweit, it is probable that absent any act by the 
defendants, the plaintiffs, nevertheless, would have suffered 
damages.   
¶25 If we were to permit liability against the defendants 
before us, we would be opening the door to property owners' 
claims against any contractor who contracts with a municipality 
to remediate a naturally occurring hazard, when the contractor 
fails to completely abate the hazard's effects.  This broad 
exposure to liability would chill municipalities' efforts in 
attempting abatement projects.  It could also chill contractors 
from bidding on those types of municipal projects; where in 
addition to being subject to a breach of contract action by the 
municipality8 for not performing as they had contracted to 
                                                 
8 Here, the contractors were sued by the City for breach of 
contract, and the suit was settled to the satisfaction of the 
City of Shell Lake.  Therefore, the contractors have not escaped 
liability for failing to create and install a system to lower 
the water level in the Lake. 
No. 
2004AP1991   
 
14 
 
perform, the contractors would be subject to litigation by any 
property owner who would have benefited from a successfully 
performed municipal contract.   
¶26 Furthermore, permitting this claim to go forward could 
encourage lawsuits for any number of potentially negligent 
participants who have tried unsuccessfully to prevent flooding, 
over the long history of the Lake's rising water levels.  This 
is a natural hazard that was amplified by development on the 
Lake.  Should every failed effort at controlling the flooding 
bring a lawsuit?  For example, if a retaining wall had been 
constructed in the hope of holding off rising water and the 
property flooded nevertheless, should that contractor also be 
held responsible for the damage to the plaintiff's or to 
neighboring residents' properties because the efforts were 
unsuccessful?   
¶27 As in Rockweit, we conclude that to open the door for 
this type of claim would be to enter a field with no just or 
sensible stopping point.  Therefore, we conclude that the 
defendants may not be held liable for their unsatisfactory 
abatement 
efforts 
and 
the 
dismissal 
of 
the 
plaintiffs' 
negligence claim was proper. 
E. 
Nuisance  
¶28 The plaintiffs also bring a nuisance claim against the 
defendants.  "Liability for a nuisance may be based upon either 
intentional or negligent conduct" and may be grounded in either 
creating or maintaining a nuisance.  Milwaukee Metro, 277 Wis. 
2d 635, ¶33.  "Nuisances come in two varieties, public and 
No. 
2004AP1991   
 
15 
 
private, which are distinguished by the nature of the interest 
invaded."  Id., ¶27.  A private nuisance involves interference 
with or disturbance of the use and enjoyment of an individual's 
land.  Id.  Those who have property rights or privileges with 
regard to the use or enjoyment of land impacted by a nuisance 
may maintain a claim for private nuisance.  Id.  "A public 
nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to 
the general public," and does not necessarily involve the 
interference with the use or enjoyment of land.  Id., ¶28 
(citations omitted).  "In sum, a nuisance exists if there is a 
condition or activity that unduly interferes with the private 
use and enjoyment of land or a public right."  Id., ¶30.   
¶29 When we review an alleged nuisance claim, our first 
step is to determine whether nuisance exists.  Physicians Plus 
Ins. Corp. v. Midwest Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 WI 80, ¶27, 254 Wis. 
2d 77, 646 N.W.2d 777.  Nuisance arises when a particular type 
of harm is suffered, i.e., nuisance refers to the particular 
interest that is invaded.  Milwaukee Metro, 277 Wis. 2d 635, 
¶¶25-26.  If nuisance is present, our second step is to 
determine whether the complained of conduct was a cause of 
creating the nuisance.  Id., ¶64.  Proof that the underlying 
conduct was tortious is necessary to liability predicated on 
nuisance.  Id., ¶32.  If the underlying conduct is not a cause 
of the nuisance, no claim for relief will stand.  Id.  As the 
third step, we decide whether the "defendant's conduct is 
otherwise actionable under the rules governing liability for 
negligent conduct."  Id., ¶63.     
No. 
2004AP1991   
 
16 
 
¶30 The plaintiffs' complaint does not label their claim 
as one for a private or a public nuisance.  However, it does 
refer to the use and enjoyment of their private property, 
implying that it is a private nuisance claim.  The plaintiffs 
use the same conduct as the basis for their nuisance claim, as 
they employed for their negligence claim.  When a nuisance claim 
is predicated on negligent acts, it is necessary for the court 
to separately analyze the nuisance claim for relief from the 
negligence claim for relief.  See id., ¶45.  We have analyzed 
the plaintiffs' negligence claim above. 
¶31 In Physicians Plus, we held that due to the analogous 
relationship between negligence and nuisance, liability for 
maintaining a public nuisance can be limited on public policy 
grounds traditionally used to preclude liability for general 
negligence claims.  Physicians Plus, 254 Wis. 2d 77, ¶2.  
Although Physicians Plus addressed a public nuisance, we have 
held that the Physicians Plus reasoning applies to claims of 
private nuisance as well:   
Since all the underlying rules of negligence are 
applicable to a claim of nuisance based on negligence, 
logically then, the prerequisites for liability should 
not vary depending upon whether the interest invaded 
by the defendant's negligent conduct is public or 
private.    
Milwaukee Metro, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶47 (citations omitted).  We 
further explained, citing our prior ruling in Schiro v. Oriental 
Realty Co., 272 Wis. 537, 76 N.W.2d 335 (1956), that "when a 
nuisance is premised on negligent conduct, failing to allow [a] 
defendant the same defenses as he would have in a negligence 
No. 
2004AP1991   
 
17 
 
action would render liability dependent on the label the 
plaintiff 
used 
on 
the 
pleading 
and 
not 
the 
defendant's 
underlying conduct."  Milwaukee Metro, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶48. 
¶32 The plaintiffs assume the existence of a nuisance when 
they claim that the use and enjoyment of their property is 
invaded by the flooding waters of the Lake.  They also assert 
that a cause of this invasion is the defendants' unsuccessful 
abatement actions.  However, there is no dispute that the 
defendants did nothing to cause the Lake's rising water level; 
the plaintiffs claim against the defendants because they did not 
succeed in causing the water level to recede.  Therefore, it is 
the defendants' unsatisfactory abatement efforts 
that the 
plaintiffs assert as a cause of the nuisance. 
¶33 We have explained that cause-in-fact (a substantial 
factor) and the public policy factors are both used when we 
determine liability.  Fandrey v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2004 
WI 62, ¶14, 272 Wis. 2d 46, 680 N.W.2d 345.   
Even though a jury has found negligence and that such 
negligence was a "cause" (or substantial factor) in 
producing a plaintiff's damages, liability may be 
denied under factors that we have termed public policy 
considerations. 
Id. (quoting Beacon Bowl, Inc. v. Wis. Elec. Power Co., 176 Wis. 
2d 740, 761, 501 N.W.2d 788 (1993)).   
¶34 We have concluded, as a matter of law, that the 
plaintiffs' negligence claim should not go forward because to 
permit the claim would enter a field with no just or reasonable 
stopping point.  When we did so, we were deciding that as a 
No. 
2004AP1991   
 
18 
 
matter of law, the defendants' actions were not sufficient to 
support liability for the plaintiffs' damage.  See Fandrey, 272 
Wis. 2d 46, ¶¶30-34.  The plaintiffs' nuisance claim is based on 
the same allegedly negligent abatement of the flooding around 
the Lake.  Therefore, according to the principles set forth in 
Physicians Plus and Milwaukee Metro, we conclude that even if we 
assume, arguendo, that the plaintiffs were able to prove all of 
their allegations with regard to the private nuisance claim, it 
is appropriate to preclude liability for the nuisance claim 
based on the same public policy factors that limit liability in 
the underlying negligence claim.  Were we not to do so, we would 
cause the potential for liability to be tied to the label the 
plaintiffs applied to each claim.  Permitting the nuisance claim 
to proceed would also be inconsistent with the public policy 
factors on which we have limited liability. 
¶35 Accordingly, we conclude that the court of appeals 
correctly affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment 
in favor of the defendants, although we base our holding on 
different reasoning than the court of appeals employed.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶36  We conclude that the plaintiffs' negligence and 
nuisance claims are precluded by public policy, and were 
properly dismissed.  Therefore, we affirm the court of appeals, 
albeit on different grounds than that employed by the court of 
appeals.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
No. 
2004AP1991.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶37 PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
J. 
(concurring).   The 
majority opinion, which I authored and join, affirms the court 
of appeals decision that in turn affirmed the circuit court's 
grant of summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claims.  The 
court of appeals based its decision on the application of 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A (1965), after concluding 
that § 324A is the appropriate framework for analyzing the 
plaintiffs' negligence claims.   Butler v. Advanced Drainage 
Sys., Inc., 2005 WI App 108, ¶22, 282 Wis. 2d 776, 698 N.W.2d 
117.   
¶38 The majority has chosen to deny liability based on a 
public policy factor.  When we employ public policy factors to 
preclude liability, we engage in judicial line-drawing wherein 
we conclude there is the lack of sufficient cause to hold a 
defendant liable.  Fandrey v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2004 WI 
62, ¶16, 272 Wis. 2d 46, 680 N.W.2d 345.  In so doing, we employ 
a case-by-case analysis that provides little guidance for the 
courts, future litigants, or the public who may face similar 
legal issues in the future.  I write separately because 
analyzing the plaintiffs' claims under Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 324A would have provided more guidance to those who 
assert or defend a tort claim based on the breach of a contract 
to which the plaintiff was not a party.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully concur in the majority opinion affirming the court 
of appeals.  
No. 
2004AP1991.pdr 
 
2 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶39 The court of appeals concluded that the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 324A was the appropriate framework for 
analyzing the plaintiffs' negligence claims.  Butler, 282 
Wis. 2d 776, ¶22.  It concluded that summary judgment was 
appropriate because, based on the undisputed facts, "none of the 
three alternative conditions for liability under § 324A [had] 
been met."  Id., ¶2.  The court of appeals also concluded that 
an action based on nuisance should be dismissed because it was 
based on allegedly negligent conduct and the defendants' conduct 
is not "otherwise actionable under the rules governing liability 
for negligent conduct."  Id., ¶40 (quoting Milwaukee Metro. 
Sewerage Dist. v. City of Milwaukee, 2005 WI 8, ¶63, 277 Wis. 2d 
635, 691 N.W.2d 658). 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶40 This case requires us to review summary judgment 
dismissing the plaintiffs' claims against the defendants.  The 
standard of review in regard to summary judgment decisions is 
fully set forth in the majority op., majority op., ¶17, as are 
the principles that we apply in deciding whether summary 
judgment should have been granted, majority op., ¶18.  
B. 
The Negligence Claim  
¶41 The plaintiffs' negligence claim can be analyzed 
within the framework set out in the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 324A or under the usual four-element negligence test.  
The court of appeals relied on § 324A, and the circuit court 
No. 
2004AP1991.pdr 
 
3 
 
applied the four-element test.  I conclude that the test set out 
in § 324A provides the better framework.    
1. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A  
¶42 The 
court 
of 
appeals 
concluded 
that 
§ 324A 
of 
Restatement (Second) of Torts provided the proper framework in 
which to analyze this tort claim that arose out of a breach of 
contract between the defendants and the city.  Butler, 282 
Wis. 2d 776, ¶22.  Section 324A provides: 
One 
who 
undertakes, 
gratuitously 
or 
for 
consideration, to render services to another which he 
should recognize as necessary for the protection of a 
third person or his things, is subject to liability to 
the third person for physical harm resulting from his 
failure to exercise reasonable care to protect his 
undertaking, if 
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care 
increases the risk of such harm, or 
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by 
the other to the third person, or  
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of 
the other or the third person upon the undertaking. 
¶43 In Miller v. Bristol-Myers Co., 168 Wis. 2d 863, 485 
N.W.2d 31 (1992), we observed that the "word 'protect' in the 
introductory portion [of § 324A] apparently was a typographical 
error 
published 
in 
the 
Restatement 
and 
should 
be 
read 
'perform.'"  Id. at 882 n.7 (citation omitted).  The proposed 
final draft for Restatement (Third) of Torts has re-worded the 
introductory paragraph thereby eliminating this concern.1 
                                                 
1 Restatement of the Law Third, Torts:  Liability for 
Physical Harm, Proposed Final Draft No. 1 (Apr. 6, 2005), 
renumbered § 324A to § 43 and revised the introductory paragraph 
as: 
No. 
2004AP1991.pdr 
 
4 
 
¶44 Wisconsin has a long history of attempting to maintain 
the distinction between contract and tort claims.  Landwehr v. 
Citizens Trust Co., 110 Wis. 2d 716, 720, 329 N.W.2d 411 (1983).  
In Landwehr, the issue presented was whether a breach of 
contract is actionable as a tort.  Id.  There, Oswald Landwehr 
sued his father's estate, claiming his father had been negligent 
in failing to make the will he had promised to make.  Id. at 
717-19.  We reasoned that Landwehr had no tort claim against his 
father's estate because even if we were to assume that there 
were such a promise by his father, in order for a tort claim to 
arise, "there must be a duty [to make a will in favor of 
Landwehr] existing independently of the performance of the 
contract for a cause of action in tort to exist."  Id. at 723.  
By way of further explanation, we quoted William L. Prosser, 
Handbook of the Law of Torts § 92, at 617-18 (4th ed. 1971), 
"[T]here will be liability in tort for misperformance of a 
contract whenever there would be liability for gratuitous 
                                                                                                                                                             
An actor who undertakes to render services to 
another that the actor knows or should know reduce the 
risk of physical harm to which a third person is 
exposed has a duty of reasonable care to the third 
person in conducting the undertaking if: 
(a) the failure to exercise reasonable care 
increases the risk of harm beyond that which existed 
without the undertaking, 
(b) the actor has undertaken to perform a duty 
owed by the other to the third person, or 
(c) the person to whom the services are rendered, 
the third party, or another relies on the actor's 
exercising reasonable care in the undertaking. 
No. 
2004AP1991.pdr 
 
5 
 
performance [of the act] without the contract."  Landwehr, 110 
Wis. 2d at 723.  
¶45 The use of § 324A by Wisconsin courts appears in our 
attempts to sort out when circumstances that began with an 
undertaking of some sort, either gratuitous or for pay, could 
give rise to a tort.  For example, in American Mutual Liability 
Insurance Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 48 
Wis. 2d 305, 179 N.W.2d 864 (1970), we said that § 324A provided 
"the proper rule of law" for analyzing whether an insurance 
company's gratuitous inspection of a boiler, which inspection 
was known to the company and on which the company relied in not 
conducting its own inspection, could result in tort liability 
for the insurance company.  Id. at 313.   
¶46 A similar § 324A approach is found in the analysis of 
the claims in Miller.  There, we used § 324A to determine 
whether a parent company that gave day-to-day advice to a 
subsidiary corporation on safety issues was liable in tort to 
the employees of the subsidiary who were harmed because the 
subsidiary company took the advice of the parent company.  
Miller, 168 Wis. 2d at 883-84.  We explained:   
Section 324A establishes when an assumption of duty 
arises and the grounds for liability thereunder.  The 
introductory portion establishes when an assumption of 
duty arises.  The elements for an assumption of duty 
to arise are that the actor must:  (1) undertake to 
render services, (2) to another, (3) which such actor 
should recognize as necessary for the protection of a 
third person.  
Id.  We noted that once it has been shown that a defendant 
assumed a duty with regard to another, "the remaining portion of 
No. 
2004AP1991.pdr 
 
6 
 
the introduction and subsections (a), (b), and (c) [of § 324A], 
establish when liability for assuming such a duty arises."  Id. 
at 884.    
¶47 In Gritzner v. Michael R., 2000 WI 68, 235 Wis. 2d 
781, 611 N.W.2d 906, an adult offered to take care of a young 
girl.  The defendant left the young girl unsupervised in the 
company of a boy known to have behaved in inappropriate ways, 
sexually, and she was assaulted.  Id., ¶2.  We evaluated the 
adult's failure to control the children at his home under the 
provisions of § 324A.  In so doing, we explained that "[t]his 
court has adopted the theory of negligence set forth in the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A."  Id., ¶56.  We directed 
that the standard of conduct set out in § 324A "applies to 
anyone 'who, having no duty to act, gratuitously undertakes to 
act and does so negligently.'"  Id.  We concluded that the 
adult's inadequate control of a boy known to have inappropriate 
sexual propensities by leaving him unsupervised with the young 
girl in his care increased her risk of harm and therefore, he 
was liable for her injuries.  Id., ¶57.    
¶48 In Stephenson v. Universal Metrics, Inc., 2002 WI 30, 
251 Wis. 2d 171, 641 N.W.2d 158, we once again employed the 
provisions of § 324A.  In Stevenson, a fellow employee offered 
to give a co-employee who was intoxicated a ride home.  Based on 
that 
offer, 
the 
bartender 
continued 
to 
provide 
alcohol.  
However, when it was time to go home, no ride was given and a 
terrible accident occurred where two people died.  Id., ¶2.  
When suit was brought, the defendants argued that there was no 
No. 
2004AP1991.pdr 
 
7 
 
duty to give the drunken employee a ride home; therefore, the 
complaint should be dismissed.  Id., ¶14.  We disagreed, 
pointing out that we have applied § 324A in numerous cases and 
as we have applied it, "the framework of § 324A comports with 
Wisconsin's principles of negligence law."  Id., ¶23.  This is 
so because although a person may have no duty to perform an act, 
if he undertakes to do so, he must exercise reasonable care in 
performing it.  Id. 
¶49 Our use of § 324A comports with general negligence 
principles because it does not preclude a tort claim where one 
would otherwise exist.  Rather, it assists in maintaining an 
analysis that preserves the differences between contract and 
tort claims, while recognizing that some factual circumstances 
can give rise to both types of claims. 
2. 
The application of § 324A 
¶50 In the case now before us, none of the defendants had 
an obligation to enter into a contract with the City.  None had 
any obligation to attempt to correct the Lake's flooding 
problem.  They are sued by the plaintiffs solely because they 
contracted with the City to construct a system to reduce 
naturally occurring flooding and the system they constructed 
failed to do so.  Therefore, the defendants have undertaken to 
render services that they should recognize as necessary to 
protect the property owners at the Lake's edge.  Accordingly, 
they come within the ambit of the introductory paragraph of 
§ 324A.  They are liable to the property owners if the 
conditions contained in one of the three subsections of § 324A 
No. 
2004AP1991.pdr 
 
8 
 
are met and the plaintiffs suffered physical harm.  See Miller, 
168 Wis. 2d at 884-86.   
¶51 Subsection (a) involves increased risk of harm.2  The 
property owners claim their risk of harm was increased because 
the water level continued to rise when the defendants breached 
their contracts with the City to lower the Lake's water level.  
The plaintiffs do not claim that some act of the defendants 
caused more water to enter the Lake; they claim only that the 
defendants were ineffective in lowering the water level.  There 
is nothing in the record to imply that the defendants' failure 
to exercise reasonable care in their undertakings for the City 
increased the risk of harm to the property owners beyond that 
which was present before the defendants began their contracts 
with the City.  Therefore, because § 324A(a) is not satisfied, 
no liability arises under that subsection.   
¶52 Subsection (b) requires that the defendants perform a 
duty owed by another.3  The property owners claim that the City 
had a legal duty to lower the water level because of agreements 
the City made with the DNR.  I see no merit in this argument, 
and I agree with the conclusion of the court of appeals that any 
obligation of the City to the DNR does not translate into a duty 
of the City to the property owners.  The plaintiffs point to 
nothing in the record that would infer that the City had an 
                                                 
2 Section 324A(a) provides:  "his failure to exercise 
reasonable care increases the risk of such harm." 
3 Section 324A(b) provides:  "he has undertaken to perform a 
duty owed by the other to the third person." 
No. 
2004AP1991.pdr 
 
9 
 
obligation to the plaintiffs to reduce the Lake's flooding, 
although it repeatedly tried to do so.  Further, as we have 
repeatedly held, "[d]ecisions concerning the adoption, design, 
and implementation of a public works system are discretionary, 
legislative decisions."  Milwaukee Metro, 277 Wis. 2d 635, ¶9.  
Accordingly, because the City had no duty to the plaintiffs to 
lower the water level in the Lake, the defendants were not 
performing a duty owed by the City to the property owners when 
they attempted to lower the water level.  Therefore, liability 
will not arise under § 324A(b). 
¶53 Subsection (c) requires a finding of harm due to 
reliance.4  Reliance has a factual foundation.  Kaloti Enters., 
Inc. v. Kellogg Sales Co., 2005 WI 111, ¶26, 283 Wis. 2d 555, 
699 N.W.2d 205.  However, there is not one affidavit from one 
property owner or from the City averring that any one of them 
was harmed because of reliance on the undertakings of the 
defendants.  For example, there is no affidavit asserting that 
the plaintiffs refrained from efforts they would otherwise have 
undertaken to hold back the rising Lake water level because of 
the contract between the City and the defendants.   
¶54 In addition, the City claims to have suffered no 
"harm" because of the defendants' unsuccessful efforts.5  The 
                                                 
4 Section 324A(c) provides:  "the harm is suffered because 
of reliance of the other or the third person upon the 
undertaking." 
5 This is likely true because the City sued the defendants 
for breach of contract and a settlement was achieved that was 
satisfactory to the City. 
No. 
2004AP1991.pdr 
 
10 
 
plaintiffs contend that because they were assessed to pay a 
portion of the costs 
of 
the City's 
contracts 
with the 
defendants, the assessments they paid were a "harm" as they did 
not get the benefit expected.  However, even if we assume that 
were so, the plaintiffs would have suffered only an economic 
harm and the introductory paragraph to § 324A requires that a 
"physical harm" result from the failed undertaking.  Therefore, 
the criteria of § 324A(c) are not fulfilled by the facts before 
the court.  Accordingly, applying § 324A leads me to the 
conclusion that the plaintiffs have presented no evidence that 
would create a disputed issue of material fact entitling them to 
a trial on their negligence claims when analyzed under § 324A.    
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶55 The majority has chosen to deny liability based on a 
public policy factor.  When we employ public policy factors to 
preclude liability, we engage in judicial line-drawing wherein 
we conclude there is the lack of a sufficient legal cause to 
hold a defendant liable.  Fandrey, 272 Wis. 2d 46, ¶16.  In so 
doing, we employ a case-by-case analysis that provides little 
guidance for the courts, future litigants, or the public that 
may face similar legal issues in the future.  I write separately 
because I conclude that the court should have analyzed the 
plaintiffs' claims under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A.  
In my view, doing so would have provided more guidance to those 
who assert or defend a tort claim based on the breach of a 
contract to which the plaintiff was not a party.  Accordingly, I 
No. 
2004AP1991.pdr 
 
11 
 
respectfully concur in the majority opinion affirming the court 
of appeals.   
 
 
No.  2004AP1991.awb 
 
1 
 
¶56 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  This court has 
repeatedly explained that only in those cases where the facts 
are simple to ascertain and the public policy questions have 
been fully presented may a court review public policy and 
preclude liability before trial.  Gritzner v. Michael R., 2000 
WI 
68, 
¶26, 
235 
Wis. 2d 781, 
611 
N.W.2d 906; 
Sawyer 
v. 
Midelfort, 227 Wis. 2d 124, 141, 595 N.W.2d 423 (1999); Bowen v. 
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 655, 517 N.W.2d 432 
(1994); Schuster v. Altenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 223, 241, 424 N.W.2d 
159 (1988); Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 542, 
247 N.W.2d 132 (1976). 
¶57 Thus, the better practice is generally to submit a 
case to the jury before determining whether public policy 
factors should preclude liability.  Smaxwell v. Bayard, 2004 WI 
101, ¶41, 274 Wis. 2d 278, 682 N.W.2d 923.  "The cases in which 
a causally negligent tort-feasor has been relieved of liability 
are infrequent and present unusual and extreme considerations."  
Stewart v. Wulf, 85 Wis. 2d 461, 479, 271 N.W.2d 79 (1978). 
¶58 "The 
court 
has 
stated 
the[] 
public 
policy 
considerations that may preclude liability in capsule form as 
follows:  When it would shock the conscience of society to 
impose liability, the courts may hold as a matter of law that 
there is no liability."  Bowen, 183 Wis. 2d at 656; see also 
Fandrey ex rel. Connell v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2004 
WI 62, ¶15, 272 Wis. 2d 46, 680 N.W.2d 345. 
¶59 The majority's conscience is easily shocked. 
No.  2004AP1991.awb 
 
2 
 
¶60 I dissent for three reasons.  First, I would follow 
the better practice and decline to apply the public policy 
factors on the summary judgment record before us.  Second, even 
if I were to attempt an application of the factors on the 
present record, that application would not justify limiting 
liability at this stage of proceedings.  Third, I write to 
observe that this case illustrates why there is often an 
uncomfortable fit between summary judgment methodology and 
application of the public policy factors. 
I 
¶61 In order to determine whether liability for negligence 
should be limited, Wisconsin courts apply six public policy 
factors.  The courts are to ask whether: 
(1) the injury is too remote from the negligence; (2) 
the injury is too wholly out of proportion to the 
tortfeasor's culpability; (3) in retrospect it appears 
too highly extraordinary that the negligence should 
have resulted in the harm; (4) allowing recovery would 
place too unreasonable a burden on the tortfeasor; (5) 
allowing recovery would be too likely to open the way 
for fraudulent claims; [or] (6) allowing recovery 
would enter a field that has no sensible or just 
stopping point. 
See, e.g., Gritzner, 235 Wis. 2d 781, ¶27. 
¶62 The majority ignores the better practice and applies 
only one of the six public policy factors to preclude liability 
for negligence.  It does so on summary judgment even though the 
facts are not yet well developed and not simple to ascertain.  
The majority thereby cuts off the potential for liability before 
No.  2004AP1991.awb 
 
3 
 
the public policy questions this case might raise are even fully 
presented.1 
¶63 Given that it is too early to effectively apply the 
public policy factors, I am not surprised that the majority's 
analysis of public policy amounts to essentially no analysis 
whatsoever. 
¶64 The reader can decide whether the majority's public 
policy "analysis" is convincing to anyone other than the 
majority.  In order to assist the reader, I will summarize the 
majority's analysis.  This is easily done because its entire 
analysis consists of six paragraphs amounting to two reasons for 
its conclusion to limit liability for negligence:  (1) its 
assertion that this case is similar to Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 
Wis. 2d 409, 541 N.W.2d 742 (1995), and (2) its application of 
one of the six public policy factors to conclude that allowing 
liability here would have no just or sensible stopping point.  
See majority op., ¶¶21-26. 
¶65 The majority's assertion that this case is similar to 
Rockweit is curious.  Why?  Because Rockweit was a case in which 
the court followed the better practice, applying the public 
policy factors after the facts were fully developed at a jury 
trial.  Rockweit, 197 Wis. 2d at 416-17, 426-29. 
                                                 
1 I need not and do not separately address the majority's 
analysis of the landowners' nuisance claims.  As the majority 
correctly recognizes, liability for a nuisance claim based on 
negligence is subject to limitation based on the same public 
policy factors.  See majority op., ¶32. 
No.  2004AP1991.awb 
 
4 
 
¶66 There is no shortage of cases in which this court has 
declined to apply the public policy factors to preclude 
liability before a case has been tried.  See, e.g., Alvarado v. 
Sersch, 2003 WI 55, ¶30, 262 Wis. 2d 74, 662 N.W.2d 350; Sawyer, 
227 Wis. 2d at 151; Bowen, 183 Wis. 2d at 660; Schuster, 144 
Wis. 2d at 262-63; Coffey, 74 Wis. 2d at 541-43; cf. Stewart, 85 
Wis. 2d at 481 (in which the court determined after a trial that 
"[t]his is not a case in which public policy considerations 
dictate that one should be relieved of liability").  
¶67 Why does the majority fail to discuss any of these 
cases?2   
¶68 As for the majority's two-paragraph discussion of one 
of the six public policy factors, it is wholly unpersuasive.  I 
begin by quoting the majority's central rationale, and then 
explain why it is so unconvincing: 
If we were to permit liability against the 
defendants before us, we would be opening the door to 
property owners' claims against any contractor who 
contracts with a municipality to remediate a naturally 
occurring 
hazard, 
when 
the 
contractor 
fails 
to 
completely abate the hazard's effects.  This broad 
exposure to liability would chill municipalities' 
efforts in attempting abatement projects.  It could 
also chill contractors from bidding on those types of 
municipal projects; where in addition to being subject 
to a breach of contract action by the municipality for 
not performing as they had contracted to perform, the 
contractors would be subject to litigation by any 
property owner who would have benefited from a 
successfully performed municipal contract. 
Majority op., ¶25. 
                                                 
2 The majority cites some of these cases in passing when it 
sets forth the public policy factors.  Majority op., ¶¶19-20. 
No.  2004AP1991.awb 
 
5 
 
¶69 There are at least three reasons why the majority's 
application of this public policy factor is unconvincing.3    
¶70 First, the majority comes perilously close to setting 
forth a blanket rule of immunity from liability for all 
contractors that contract with municipalities.  It is difficult 
to imagine how the majority's reasoning can be limited in any 
principled 
manner 
to 
contractors 
who 
contract 
with 
municipalities "to remediate a naturally occurring hazard."  Id.  
Are contractors who contract with municipalities for purposes 
other than remediation of a "naturally occurring hazard" really 
situated any differently under the majority's rationale?  I am 
concerned that there are ramifications to the majority's cursory 
analysis that may reverberate well beyond the facts of this case 
to provide immunity where none previously existed. 
¶71 Second, the blanket rule of immunity that the majority 
comes close to adopting seems to render superfluous case law 
providing that private contractors who contract with the 
government may be entitled to immunity when certain conditions 
are met.  See Estate of Lyons v. CNA Ins. Cos., 207 Wis. 2d 446, 
457-58, 558 N.W.2d 658 (Ct. App. 1996); see also Jankee v. Clark 
County, 2000 WI 64, ¶44, 235 Wis. 2d 700, 612 N.W.2d 297. 
                                                 
3 I acknowledge case law stating that liability may be 
denied solely on the basis of one public policy factor.  See 
Smaxwell v. Bayard, 2004 WI 101, ¶41, 274 Wis. 2d 278, 682 
N.W.2d 923.  The controlling nature of one or more factors under 
the facts of a particular case should not mean, however, that 
the court simply abdicates all responsibility to inquire into 
the remaining factors. 
No.  2004AP1991.awb 
 
6 
 
¶72 Under Lyons, an independent contractor who follows 
governmental directives can be entitled to immunity when:  
(1) the 
governmental 
authority 
approved 
reasonably precise specifications;  
(2) the contractor's actions conformed to those 
specifications; and  
(3) the 
contractor 
warned 
the 
supervising 
governmental authority about the possible dangers 
associated with those specifications that were known 
to 
the 
contractor 
but 
not 
to 
the 
governmental 
officials.  
Lyons, 207 Wis. 2d at 457-58.  The court of appeals has 
explained "[t]his three-part test will ensure that state and 
municipal government, and the public at large, is able to make 
the best use of professional design assistance, but that 
professional contractors are not unfairly burdened by lawsuits 
when they follow governmental directives."  Id. at 458. 
¶73 The majority fails to explain how its opinion squares 
with the Lyons rule.  Indeed, it fails to even acknowledge that 
the Lyons rule exists.  Is it sub silentio overruling Lyons? 
¶74 Third, the majority cites no facts of record for its 
speculative assertion that imposing liability here would chill 
municipalities' efforts in attempting abatement projects and 
would chill contractors from bidding on those types of projects.  
Just as likely, imposing liability would chill tortious conduct. 
¶75 The reader can now decide whether the majority's six- 
paragraph analysis analogizing to Rockweit and applying one of 
the six public policy factors is persuasive to anyone but the 
majority.  
 
No.  2004AP1991.awb 
 
7 
 
II 
¶76 To the extent possible on the limited record before 
us, I now turn to address the public policy factors that the 
majority ignores.  To the extent those factors can be applied on 
the present record, they do not justify limiting liability.   
¶77 Whether the injury is too remote from the negligence 
and whether in retrospect it appears too highly extraordinary 
that the negligence should have resulted in the harm.  The 
application of each of these two factors weighs in favor of 
liability.  There can be no real dispute that everyone involved 
was keenly aware of what would happen if the defendants 
negligently failed to perform their contract obligations.  The 
lake would continue to rise resulting in damages to surrounding 
landowners.  It is not highly extraordinary that the defendants' 
negligence in designing or constructing the drainage system in 
this case would result in property damage to the landowners. 
¶78 Whether the injury is too wholly out of proportion to 
the tortfeasor's culpability and whether allowing recovery would 
place too unreasonable a burden on the tortfeasor.  It is too 
early in this litigation to apply these factors in any 
meaningful sense because the extent of the damages to the 
property owners remains unknown.  Also unknown at this stage in 
the proceedings is how comparative negligence principles may 
affect the extent of any liability burden on the defendants.  
See Stewart, 85 Wis. 2d at 480-81 (declining to apply public 
policy factors and distinguishing cases that applied the factors 
No.  2004AP1991.awb 
 
8 
 
because those cases did not involve issues of comparative 
negligence). 
¶79 Whether allowing recovery would be too likely to open 
the way for fraudulent claims.  The majority recites no facts of 
record suggesting that to allow recovery in this case would 
likely open the way for fraudulent claims.  This is because 
there are no such facts.  Given the facts that we know, it is 
difficult to conceive how allowing recovery would be too likely 
to open the way for fraudulent claims. 
¶80 Having addressed all six public policy factors to the 
extent possible on the limited record before us, I conclude that 
their application does not justify limiting liability at this 
stage of the proceedings.  Rather, the case before us is one 
where "[a] trial court or jury finding as to actual negligence, 
damage and the causal relationship between them would be 
material 
and 
helpful 
in 
evaluating 
the 
public 
policy 
considerations."  Coffey, 74 Wis. 2d at 543. 
III 
¶81 Finally, I write because this case illustrates why 
there will often be an uncomfortable fit between summary 
judgment methodology and application of the public policy 
factors.  This uncomfortable fit further highlights why it is 
typically ill-advised to limit liability using those factors at 
the summary judgment stage of proceedings. 
¶82 As the majority knows, the cardinal principles of 
summary judgment methodology include that "[s]ummary judgment 
should not be granted, unless the facts presented conclusively 
No.  2004AP1991.awb 
 
9 
 
show that the plaintiff's action has no merit and cannot be 
maintained."  Mrozek v. Intra Fin. Corp., 2005 WI 73, ¶14, 281 
Wis. 2d 448, 699 N.W.2d 54 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted).  The court is required to "view the summary judgment 
materials in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."  
Id.  Stated another way, all reasonable inferences to be drawn 
from the evidence of record must be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party.  Johnson v. Rogers Mem'l 
Hosp., Inc., 2005 WI 114, ¶30, 283 Wis. 2d 384, 700 N.W.2d 27. 
¶83 The outcome of this case would be different if the 
majority were actually to apply these cardinal summary judgment 
principles.  Instead, the majority stops with rote recitation of 
summary judgment principles.  See majority op., ¶18. 
¶84 The majority assures the reader that the "relevant 
facts relating to the attempted water abatement are not 
disputed."  Id., ¶21.  It also assures the reader that "the 
facts of record are sufficiently developed . . . to undertake a 
public policy analysis."  Id.  How can the majority make these 
assurances when facts material to cause, damages, and a 
meaningful application of the public policy factors remain 
disputed in this case? 
¶85 The parties dispute whether the defendants' negligence 
was a cause of the landowners' damages.  The engineering firm 
hired by the City to investigate the failed drainage project 
concluded that the pipeline failure stemmed from design and 
material defects along with failure to test the materials. 
No.  2004AP1991.awb 
 
10 
 
¶86 The defendants in this case undertook to control the 
lake's water level.  The landowners maintain that if the 
defendants had exercised ordinary care in the design and testing 
of the pipeline, then the water level would have receded.  They 
assert that the defendants' negligence thus caused the lake 
level to rise which, in turn, caused the damage to their 
property.  The defendants dispute the allegations of negligence 
and assert that the facts reveal the exercise of ordinary care. 
¶87 The uncomfortable fit is further illustrated by the 
rationale focusing on cause (a substantial factor) employed by 
the majority.  In essence, the majority's position is that the 
defendants' negligence did not cause any injury because it would 
have happened anyway.  See id., ¶24 ("[i]t is probable that 
absent any act by the defendants, the plaintiffs, nevertheless, 
would have suffered damages."). 
¶88 The majority takes the plaintiffs to task for their 
assertion that "a cause of this invasion is the defendants' 
unsuccessful abatement actions."  Id., ¶32.  Ultimately the 
majority concludes that "there is no dispute that the defendants 
did nothing to cause the Lake's rising water level."  Id.  It is 
with this ultimate conclusion that the inconsistency of the 
majority's position is highlighted. 
¶89 How can the majority on the one hand conclude that 
there are no facts which would support a finding of causation, 
while on the other hand state that in its public policy 
determination it assumes the defendants' negligence caused the 
damages?  See id., ¶21 ("[W]e assume there is negligence and 
No.  2004AP1991.awb 
 
11 
 
that the negligence was a cause of the injury" when we apply 
public policy factors.). 
¶90 The majority cannot have it both ways.  It cannot both 
assume that the defendants' negligence was a cause of the 
plaintiffs' damages while at the same time conclude that there 
are no facts in dispute that would support a finding of causal 
negligence. 
¶91 In addition, factual disputes remain as to the amount 
of damages, apportionment of liability, and mitigation of 
damages, all of which implicate the magnitude of the injury and 
the consequent burden on the defendants.   One of the defendants 
explains in its brief that the circuit court denied class 
certification to the landowners because of: 
concern over the number of plaintiffs who would have 
to testify, the proof of individual damage claims[,] 
and how the affirmative defenses of contributory 
negligence and mitigation of damages would be dealt 
with as a class action.  
 
¶92 Another defendant, in discussing why the circuit court 
properly denied class certification, explains similarly: 
Each of those issues [apportionment of liability, 
mitigation, 
and 
the 
landowners 
divergent 
damages 
claims] involves complex and disputed sets of fact[s] 
that 
are 
unique 
to 
each 
particular 
property 
owner . . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶93 As already explained, the court cannot meaningfully 
apply the public policy factors of whether the injury is too 
wholly out of proportion to the tortfeasor's culpability or 
whether allowing recovery would place too unreasonable a burden 
on the tortfeasor when it does not know the extent of the 
No.  2004AP1991.awb 
 
12 
 
requisite injuries or burdens.  The myriad factual disputes 
likely implicate additional public factors as well.  Yet the 
majority assures us that the "relevant facts relating to the 
attempted water abatement are not disputed" and that "the facts 
of record are sufficiently developed . . . to undertake a public 
policy analysis."  Majority op., ¶21.   
¶94 The remaining factual disputes preclude a meaningful 
application of the public policy factors.  Moreover, if the 
majority were to construe reasonable inferences from the 
disputed material facts in favor of the landowners as it is 
required to do, it could not apply the factors to preclude 
liability on summary judgment.  This case is a prime example of 
the uncomfortable fit between summary judgment methodology and a 
proper application of the public policy factors.4   
IV 
¶95 In sum, I would follow the better practice and decline 
to apply the public policy factors on the summary judgment 
record before us.  Even if I were to attempt an application of 
the factors on the present record, however, that application 
                                                 
4 I do not maintain that it is never correct to apply the 
public policy factors to preclude liability at the summary 
judgment or earlier stage of proceedings.  Such application is 
appropriate, however, only when the facts are simple to 
ascertain and the public policy questions have been fully 
presented.  Alvarado v. Sersch, 2003 WI 55, ¶18, 262 Wis. 2d 74, 
662 N.W.2d 350; Gritzner v. Michael R., 2000 WI 68, ¶26, 235 
Wis. 2d 781, 
611 
N.W.2d 906; 
Sawyer 
v. 
Midelfort, 
227 
Wis. 2d 124, 141, 595 N.W.2d 423 (1999); Bowen v. Lumbermens 
Mut. Cas. Co., 183 Wis. 2d 627, 655, 517 N.W.2d 432 (1994); 
Schuster v. Altenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 223, 241, 424 N.W.2d 159 
(1988); Coffey v. City of Milwaukee, 74 Wis. 2d 526, 542, 247 
N.W.2d 132 (1976). 
No.  2004AP1991.awb 
 
13 
 
would 
not 
justify 
limiting 
liability 
at 
this 
stage 
of 
proceedings.    Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
¶96 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justice LOUIS B. BUTLER join this dissent.  
 
 
 
No.  2004AP1991.awb 
 
 
 
1