Case Title: Raymond McGrogan v. Peter W. Till

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-119-99

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2001-05-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). LAVECCHIA, J., writing for a unanimous Court. The issue before the Court is whether the two-year statute-of-limitations period for injury to the person, or the six-year statute-of-limitations period usually applied to legal-malpractice actions, should apply to a claim of legal malpractice allegedly committed by defense counsel in the context of a criminal prosecution. Raymond McGrogan hired attorney Peter Till to represent him in a criminal investigation into charges that McGrogan, while a member of the Wayne Township Planning Board, conspired with other Township officials to extort money from developers. On February 2, 1989, McGrogan was indicted and charged with one count of extortion and three counts of concealing or failing to disclose someone else's felony. A superseding indictment filed in April 1989 charged McGrogan with six counts of extortion. At the end of April 1989, the federal court granted Till's application to be relieved as counsel. An order was entered appointing a federal public defender to represent McGrogan. McGrogan entered into a written plea agreement with the Department of Justice dated December 4, 1989, wherein McGrogan agreed to plead guilty to Count Three of the superseding indictment and to cooperate with the government's investigation in exchange for a dismissal of the remaining charges. Count three alleged conspiracy with the mayor of Wayne Township and another Planning Board member to extort money from a joint venture constructing residential apartment buildings. McGrogan admitted that he received a $10,000 bribe from the joint venture, portions of which he allocated to the mayor and the planning-board member. Sentencing was adjourned while McGrogan was cooperating with the investigation. In a letter to the federal trial court dated March 22, 1991, McGrogan complained about Tills's legal representation. In January 1992, McGrogan was sentenced to an eighteen-month prison term on condition that he serve four months in a half-way house. The remainder of the term was suspended, and McGrogan received a five- year period of probation, community service, and relevant fines. On September 2, 1997, McGrogan and his wife filed a seventeen-count complaint against Till and his law firm, alleging that Till committed legal malpractice for, among other things, failing to inform McGrogan of available opportunities for immunity and cooperation with investigation authorities that may have prevented McGrogan's indictment and incarceration. Till moved for summary judgment, asserting that McGrogan's claim was barred by the six-year statute of limitations governing actions for legal malpractice. The trial court agreed, holding that the action filed in September 1997 was time barred because the six-year statute of limitations began to run no later than March 22, 1991 when McGrogan revealed in his letter to the court his knowledge of Till's malpractice. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the decision that the legal-malpractice action was time barred. However, the court went further, addressing the question of whether the two-year statute of limitations should apply. The court noted that legal malpractice occurring in the context of a criminal prosecution causes primarily personal injury; any economic injuries are incidental and flow from the personal injury. Citing Montells v. Haynes for the proposition that the nature of the injury is determinative of which statute of limitations applies, the Appellate Division held that the two-year limitations period for injury to the person should govern. The Supreme Court granted certification. HELD: A single statute of limitations controls the timeliness of all legal-malpractice actions, regardless of the specific injuries asserted. The six-year limitations period continues to govern legal-malpractice actions. 1. For more than twenty-five years, it has been an uncontested principle of New Jersey decisional law that the six- year statute of limitations applies to legal-malpractice actions. There is no published decision holding that legal- malpractice actions have differing limitations periods that are dependent on the setting in which the alleged malpractice arose. (Pp. 6-8) 2. In Montells, this Court ended an ongoing disagreement regarding the appropriate statute of limitations applicable to claims filed under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. The Court reasoned that a single statute of limitations applicable to such claims would generate predictability of results, uniformity of application, and efficiency in litigation. In determining which statute of limitations was appropriate to all LAD claims, the Court looked to the nature of the injury, not to the underlying legal theory of the claim. Because the typical injuries in an LAD claim are more like an injury to the person, the Court determined that the two year statute of limitations should apply, rather than the six-year statute, relating to tortious injury to the rights of another. (Pp. 8-11) 3. In the analysis of which statute of limitations period should apply to a cause of action, the concept of 'nature of the injury should not be subjected to a complaint-specific inquiry. The nature of the injury should be used to determine the nature of the cause of action or the general characteristics of that class of claims in the aggregate. Montells outlined an approach designed to promote predictability and uniformity through the determination of a single statute of limitations period for a cause of action where a limitations period had not yet existed. It did not suggest that different statutes of limitations should apply within a category of action depending on the precise injury alleged in a specific case. Nor did Montells suggest the need to revisit previously established holdings concerning applicable limitations periods. (Pp. 11-14) 4. Different limitations periods should not be applied in different cases dependent on the specific injury pled. What is important is that the gravamen of legal-malpractice actions is the injury to the rights of another; therefore, the applicable statute-of-limitations period for legal-malpractice actions is six years. (Pp. 14-18) Judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, COLEMAN, LONG, VERNIERO and ZAZZALI join in JUSTICE LAVECCHIA'S opinion. RAYMOND McGROGAN and PAULINE McGROGAN, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PETER W. TILL, an Attorney at Law of the State of New Jersey; ANDREW J. GOLDSTEIN, Esq., an Attorney at Law of the State of New Jersey; ALLYN Z. LITE, Esq., an Attorney at Law of the State of New Jersey and the firm of GOLDSTEIN LITE & DePALMA, LLC Successor Firm of GOLDSTEIN, TILL, LITE & REIKEN, Defendants-Respondents, and SAMUEL N. REIKEN, Esq., an Attorney at Law of the State of New Jersey, Defendant. ___________________________________ Argued January 2, 2001 -- Decided May 24, 2001 On certification to the Superior Court, Appellate Division, whose opinion is reported at 327 N.J. Super. 595 (App. Div. 2000). All legal-malpractice actions should be governed by the same statute of limitations. We hold that that limitations period for all legal malpractice actions is the six-year statute of limitations contained in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-1 for actions involving tortious injury to the rights of another NO. A-119 RAYMOND McGROGAN and PAULINE McGROGAN, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. PETER W. TILL, etc., et al. Defendants-Respondents. DECIDED May 24, 2001 Chief Justice Poritz