Case Title: Ex Parte Rhea

Citation: 807 So. 2d 541

Docket Number: 1990623

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2001-05-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
807 So. 2d 541 (2001)
Ex parte Neale RHEA.
(Re Diamant Boart American Wheel Trueing Tool Company v. Neale Rhea).
1990623.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 11, 2001.
*542 E.L. Brobston of Brobston & Brobston, Bessemer, for petitioner.
John W. Clark, Jr., and Tommy C. Ritter, Jr., of Clark & Scott, P.C., Birmingham, for respondent.
WOODALL, Justice.
This Court granted Neale Rhea's petition for certiorari review of a judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals, which reversed the trial court's award of permanent partial disability benefits pursuant to the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act, Ala. Code 1975, § 25-5-1 et seq. Broadly stated, the dispositive issue is whether the Court of Civil Appeals, contrary to the well-established rule set forth in this Court's decisions, independently weighed the evidence that was before the trial court. We hold that it did, and we reverse and remand.
Rhea's petition, which he copiously supplemented with facts pursuant to Ala. R.App. P. 39(k), reveals that this dispute arises out of two automobile accidents in which he was involved while working in the line and scope of his employment as a salesman for the respondent, Diamant Boart American Wheel Trueing Tool Company ("Diamant"). The first accident occurred in 1981; the second, in 1987.
In the first accident, Rhea was thrown into the steering wheel, where he incurred injuries to his head, knees, and chest. A few days later, he began to experience spontaneous "muscular contractions," that is, a facial "tic," on the right side of his face. Between 1981 and 1987, Rhea consulted a number of physicians for the facial contractions, as well as for pain in his neck and lower back. However, he neither sought, nor received, workers' compensation benefits or payment of his medical expenses.
The second automobile accident occurred on July 16, 1987. Once again, Rhea was thrown into the steering wheel and received injuries to his head, knees, and *543 chest. On July 14, 1989, Rhea sued Diamant, seeking workers' compensation benefits based on the 1987 accident, and alleging that the accident had rendered him totally and permanently disabled. The basis for his disability claim was primarily the spontaneous facial spasms. He asserted that the injuries he received in the second accident "accelerated," or exacerbated, the spasm, to such an extent that he was unable to perform his duties as a salesman.
On the basis of evidence presented ore tenus, the trial court found that Rhea received as the result of the 1987 accident a "permanent partial disability resulting in a 27% loss of earning capacity." Diamant appealed. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed, stating: "The record contains no evidence indicating that the hemifacial spasms following the 1987 injury were worse or were aggravated." Diamant Boart American Wheel Trueing Tool Co. v. Rhea, 807 So. 2d 537, 539 (Ala.Civ.App. 1999). Finding, in other words, that all of Rhea's impairment resulted from the 1981 accident, it held that Rhea's claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to workers' compensation claims in Ala.Code 1975, § 25-5-80. Rhea then petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari. We granted his petition.
Although his petition alleges two grounds for review, one ground is dispositive, namely, that the Court of Civil Appeals erroneously "substituted its [view of the evidence] for that of the trial court." Petition, at 6. In that connection, it is well established that "[t]he Court of Civil Appeals is authorized to determine whether the trial court's decision is supported by sufficient evidence, but it is not authorized to independently weigh the evidence." Ex parte Golden Poultry Co., 772 So. 2d 1175, 1177 (Ala.2000).
Because the injury occurred before the 1992 amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act, we review this case according to the following additional rules:
Ex parte Eastwood Foods, Inc., 575 So. 2d 91, 93 (Ala.1991). Otherwise stated, the issue is whether there was any legal evidence upon which the trial court could reasonably have concluded that Rhea suffered a permanent partial disability as a result of the 1987 accident.
In setting forth its findings of fact, the trial court stated:
(Emphasis added.)
These findings were based, in part, on the following testimony:
(Reporter's Transcript, at 28, 139-40.)
The trial judge also heard the expert testimony of Dr. Mary Kessler, a "vocational rehabilitation specialist," who stated as follows:
(Reporter's Transcript, at 79-80.) In short, the record contains legal evidence upon which the trial court could reasonably have concluded that Rhea suffered a partial permanent disability as a result of the 1987 accident.
"The measure of [workers'] compensation for permanent partial disability is loss of earning capacity." City of Gadsden v. Johnson, 706 So. 2d 1268, 1270 (Ala. Civ.App.1997). Significantly, Rhea never alleged a loss of earning capacity as a result of the 1981 accident. Instead, he soughtand the trial court awardedpermanent partial disability arising out of the 1987 accident. The trial court expressly found "that although the initial accidental injury predisposed toward the second injury, there was no impaired loss of earning capacity until the second accident and that the loss of earning capacity did not occur until that incident." (Emphasis added.) Thus, the trial court found Rhea had incurred none of his loss of earning capacity in the 1981 accident. The Court of Civil Appeals, however, "found" that Rhea had incurred all of his impairment in the 1981 accident. In doing so, it necessarily reweighed the evidence that was before the trial court and violated the principle expressed in Ex parte Golden Poultry Co., supra, and in cases similarly holding. See Ex parte Alabama Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 667 So. 2d 97 (Ala.1995); Williams v. Lee Apparel Co., 610 So. 2d 410 (Ala.Civ.App. 1992).
Because the trial court found that Rhea's permanent partial impairment arose out of the accident that occurred on July 16, 1987, and his complaint was filed on July 14, 1989, his claim for benefits arising out of the 1987 accident was not barred by the statute of limitations. The Court of Civil Appeals erred in holding that it was. The judgment is, to that extent,[1] reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
MOORE, C.J., and HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, HARWOOD, and STUART, JJ., concur.
[1]  The issue discussed in this opinion is not the only aspect of the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals. It is, however, the only aspect that is properly before this Court for certiorari review. Our holding is, therefore, strictly limited to that portion of the judgment holding that § 25-5-80 barred the award of permanent partial disability benefits arising out of the 1987 accident.