Case Title: Matter of Gneiting

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-06-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Matter of Gneiting1995 WY 101897 P.2d 1306Case Number: 94-190Decided: 06/28/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming

In 
the Matter of the Worker's Compensation Claim of: Dale L. GNEITING,

 Appellant 
(Employee-Claimant),

 and SALT 
CREEK WELDING, INC.,

 Appellant 
(Employer),

v.

STATE of Wyoming ex rel. WYOMING WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION DIVISION, 

Appellee (Objector).

 

Appeal 
from District Court, Natrona County, Dan Spangler, J.

Timothy W. Miller, Casper, 
for appellant 
Gneiting.

James Richard McCarty, 
Casper, for appellant Salt Creek 
Welding, Inc.

Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., 
John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., Gerald W. Laska, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., 
Jennifer Evans, Asst. Atty. Gen. and Drew A. Perkins, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen. of 
Brown & Drew, Casper, for 
appellee.

Before THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ., and 
KENNETH E. STEBNER, District Judge.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The hearing 
examiner denied Appellant Dale Gneiting's claim for worker's compensation 
benefits. Both Gneiting and Appellant Salt Creek Welding, Inc. filed petitions 
for review of the hearing examiner's decision with the district court, and that 
court certified the case to the Wyoming Supreme Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b).

[¶2]      We affirm the 
hearing examiner's decision.

Issues

[¶3]      Gneiting presents 
the following issues for our review:

1. Whether Dale Gneiting would have been entitled to 
worker['s] compensation benefits if his injuries had occurred in 
Wyoming.

2. Whether Chapter VIII, § 5 of the Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Rules, Regulations and Fee Schedules applies to a claimant who is 
employed by a resident employer.

3. Whether the Division met its burden of proving 
that it determined Gneiting was "permanently assigned" outside the state within 
the meaning of Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-204(a) (1977 & 1993 
Cum.Supp.).

4. Whether the record contains substantial evidence 
in support of the Hearing Examiner's finding that Gneiting was "permanently 
assigned" outside the state.

[¶4]      Salt Creek 
presents somewhat different issues on appeal:

A. Whether the decisions set forth in the Order 
Denying Benefits are arbitrary, capricious, characterized by an abuse of 
discretion and are not otherwise in accordance with the law or are contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity.

B. Whether the decisions set forth in the Order 
Denying Benefits were issued without observance of the procedures required by 
law.

C. Whether the decisions set forth in the Order 
Denying Benefits are unsupported by substantial evidence.

D. Whether the decisions set forth in the Order 
Denying Benefits should be set aside upon the ground that the parties had 
insufficient notice of the issues and contentions upon which the decisions were 
based.

Facts

[¶5]      Salt Creek was a 
Wyoming corporation which had its only permanent office located in Evansville, 
Wyoming. On or about December 20, 1993, Salt Creek hired Gneiting to perform 
welding work on a project it was working on in Blackfoot, Idaho (the Idaho 
project). The actual hiring took place at the Idaho project location. Salt 
Creek's foreman directed Gneiting to list a Mills, Wyoming, post office box on 
his federal income tax withholding form (Form W-4) as being his permanent 
address. Even though Gneiting maintained a home and resided in Idaho, he 
complied with the foreman's direction. He listed the same Mills address on his 
Department of Justice Employment Eligibility Verification 
form.

[¶6]      Gneiting was 
seriously injured in an accident on February 3, 1994, while he was working on 
the Idaho project. Appellee Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division denied 
Gneiting's application for Wyoming worker's compensation benefits. The 
appellants both objected to the Workers' Compensation Division's determination. 
After holding a hearing, the hearing examiner entered his order in which he made 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and ultimately denied Gneiting's 
application for benefits.

[¶7]      The appellants 
filed separate petitions for review of the hearing examiner's decision with the 
district court. The district court certified the case to the Wyoming Supreme 
Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b).

Standard of 
Review

[¶8]      When we are 
reviewing cases which have been certified to us pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b), 
we apply the appellate standards which are applicable to the reviewing court of 
the first instance. Hepp v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division, 881 P.2d 1076, 1077 (Wyo. 1994).

[¶9]      We review an 
administrative agency's findings of fact under the substantial evidence 
standard:

"Our task is to examine the entire record to 
determine if substantial evidence exists to support the hearing examiner's 
findings. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the hearing examiner 
if his decision is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is 
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept in support of the 
agency's conclusions."

Romero v. Davy McKee Corporation, 854 P.2d 59, 61 
(Wyo. 1993) (citing Farman v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Division, 841 P.2d 99, 102 (Wyo. 1992)).

Bearden v. State ex rel. 
Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division, 868 P.2d 268, 269 (Wyo. 1994). When we 
review an agency's conclusions of law, we correct its errors "if the `correct 
rule of law has not been invoked and correctly applied.'" Thunder Basin Coal 
Company v. Study, 866 P.2d 1288, 1291 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting Devous v. Wyoming 
State Board of Medical Examiners, 845 P.2d 408, 414 (Wyo. 
1993)).

Sufficiency 
of the Evidence

[¶10]   The appellants both assert that the 
hearing examiner erred by denying Gneiting's claim for benefits. The hearing 
examiner relied upon WYO. STAT. § 27-14-204(a) (Supp. 1994) in making his 
decision:

(a) If an employee while working outside of the 
territorial limits of this state and within the territorial limits of any other 
state or United States possession, or in Canada or Mexico if employed by a 
qualified resident or nonresident employer operating in interstate or 
international commerce in Canada and Mexico, suffers an injury on account of 
which the employee or in the event of death, the employee's dependents, would 
have been entitled to the benefits provided by this act had the injury occurred 
within this state, the employee or his dependents are entitled to the benefits 
provided by this act if the injury occurs in a state, United States possession, 
Canada or Mexico and the employee or his dependents are not entitled to benefits 
in the state or United States possession where the injury occurred or in Canada 
or in Mexico, and if at the time of the injury, the employee is under a contract 
of hire, oral or written, with a qualified resident or nonresident employer. 
This section shall not entitle any employee to benefits under this act if the 
division determines the employee is permanently assigned or transferred outside 
the state.

[¶11]   In Wessel v. Mapco, Inc., 752 P.2d 1363 (Wyo. 1988), we construed an earlier version of this statute and stated: 
"[O]ur cases have long held that Wyoming Worker's Compensation statutes should 
be applicable extraterritorially for injuries to a Wyoming worker occurring 
outside this state." 752 P.2d  at 1369. The Workers' Compensation Division found 
that Gneiting was not a Wyoming resident and that he was not permanently 
assigned to Wyoming. The hearing examiner concluded: "Determining whether 
[Gneiting] was a Wyoming resident would be a natural first step in determining 
whether or not [Gneiting] was permanently assigned or transferred outside of 
Wyoming."

[¶12]   Some controversy existed at the 
contested case hearing as to whether it was the employee or the Workers' 
Compensation Division which bore the burden of proving where Gneiting was 
permanently assigned. The hearing examiner concluded that he did not need to 
decide that question because, "[r]egardless of which party had the burden of 
proof, the evidence was very clear and convincing [Gneiting] was permanently 
assigned outside of Wyoming." He found: "Even assuming the Division had the 
burden of proof, the burden [had] been met."

[¶13]   The legal question of which party 
bore the burden of proof on the permanent assignment issue is not specifically 
presented to us on appeal. We will, therefore, adopt the same reasoning as was 
adopted by the hearing examiner and assume, without deciding, that the Workers' 
Compensation Division had the burden of proof. Even with that assumption in 
place, substantial evidence was presented at the hearing to support the hearing 
examiner's conclusion that Gneiting was permanently assigned outside the state 
of Wyoming:

· 
Gneiting resided in Idaho;

· 
Gneiting had never resided in Wyoming;

· 
Gneiting maintained a home in Idaho;

· 
Gneiting's children resided with him and attended school in 
Idaho;

· 
Gneiting obtained his driver's license, vehicle registration, and social 
security number in Idaho;

· Salt 
Creek hired Gneiting in Idaho;

· 
Gneiting performed all his work for Salt Creek in Idaho; 
and

· 
Gneiting was injured in Idaho while he was working for Salt 
Creek.

[¶14]   Under the provisions of § 
27-14-204(a), Gneiting was not entitled to be awarded Wyoming worker's 
compensation benefits.1 Since this ruling is dispositive, 
we do not need to address the issue of whether sufficient evidence supported the 
hearing examiner's conclusion that Gneiting would not have been entitled to 
receive benefits even if his accident had occurred in Wyoming or Gneiting's 
concern with regard to whether the hearing examiner's finding that the 
appellants had attempted to mislead the Workers' Compensation Division as to his 
permanent address was appropriate.

Notice

[¶15]   Salt Creek contends that we should 
set aside the order which denied Gneiting's application for benefits because the 
appellants did not receive sufficient notice of the issues upon which the 
hearing examiner based his decision.

[¶16]   Under the principles of due process 
of law, Gneiting was entitled to have notice and an opportunity to be heard at 
the contested case hearing. Devous, 845 P.2d  at 416. The record, however, does 
not support Salt Creek's contention that the appellants did not have notice that 
the Workers' Compensation Division would rely upon § 27-14-204(a) in arguing 
that Gneiting was not entitled to be awarded worker's compensation 
benefits.

[¶17]   The order which set the hearing 
before the hearing examiner provided: "The issues to be heard and the matter 
asserted are contained in the objections and reasons [therefor] filed with the 
Office of the Clerk." In its final determinations, the Workers' Compensation 
Division stated that Gneiting was not entitled to be awarded worker's 
compensation benefits because he was not a Wyoming resident and because he was 
not permanently assigned to Wyoming pursuant to WYO. STAT. § 27-14-306(a) 
(1991). Even though the Workers' Compensation Division did not specifically cite 
§ 27-14-204(a), the language of the determinations was sufficiently similar to 
the statutory language of § 27-14-204(a) to put Gneiting on notice that the 
provision would be at issue at the hearing.

[¶18]   The parties' actions at the hearing 
also indicated that they had notice that Gneiting's right to extraterritorial 
benefits pursuant to § 27-14-204(a) would be at issue. In their opening 
statements, counsel for both of the appellants focused on whether Gneiting was a 
Wyoming employee and on whether he was entitled to receive extraterritorial 
benefits. Also, when the hearing examiner asked the Workers' Compensation 
Division which statutes it would be relying upon and the division included § 
27-14-204(a) in its recitation, neither Gneiting nor Salt Creek made any 
objection which would have indicated that either of them did not know that § 
27-14-204(a) would be at issue at the hearing.

Estoppel

[¶19]   Salt Creek claims that the Workers' 
Compensation Division should be estopped from denying benefits to Gneiting under 
the rationale of Wessel because the division accepted the premiums which Salt 
Creek paid on behalf of Gneiting.

[¶20]   In Wessel, this Court stated: "[A]n 
estoppel [was] created when this employer paid and the state fund accepted the 
premiums for the employment as intended to include as covered duties the job 
duties in an adjacent state." 752 P.2d  at 1373. The facts in this case do not 
support a conclusion that the Workers' Compensation Division should be estopped 
from denying coverage to Gneiting. The Workers' Compensation Division did not 
knowingly accept premiums to cover Gneiting, who was an Idaho resident, while he 
was performing work in Idaho. The Workers' Compensation Division had no idea 
that Gneiting resided in Idaho. The doctrine of estoppel did not prevent the 
Workers' Compensation Division from denying Gneiting's application for Wyoming 
worker's compensation benefits.

Conclusion

[¶21]   The hearing examiner's decision to 
deny Gneiting's claim for worker's compensation benefits 
is

[¶22]   Affirmed.

FOOTNOTE

1 Considering the wealth of evidence 
which supported the hearing examiner's conclusion that Gneiting was permanently 
assigned outside the state of Wyoming, we perceive no need to determine whether 
the presumptions contained in Chapter VIII, Section 4 of the WYOMING WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION RULES, REGULATIONS AND FEE SCHEDULES apply in this 
case.