Case Title: RITTIERODT v. STATE FARM INS. CO.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-04-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
RITTIERODT v. STATE FARM INS. CO.2000 WY 773 P.3d 841Case Number: 99-30Decided: 04/06/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
JEREMY RITTIERODT, 
Appellant (Plaintiff), v.STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Appellee (Defendant).

Appeal from the District 
Court of Albany County, The Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, 
Judge.

Tony S. Lopez, 
Laramie, Wyoming, Representing Appellant.Julie Nye Tiedeken, 
Cheyenne, Wyoming, Representing Appellee. 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and HILL, JJ.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1] The only 
question in this appeal arises out of the sufficiency of the evidence presented 
by Jeremy Rittierodt (Rittierodt) to justify an instruction to the jury on 
future medical expenses, future pain and suffering, and the loss of enjoyment of 
life. The trial judge refused an instruction on these elements of damage because 
of his view that the evidence was not sufficient to justify a finding of such 
damages by the jury. We have searched the limited record that the parties 
designated to be transmitted to this Court, and we are in accord with the ruling 
of the trial judge. The existence of damages such as these must be demonstrated 
by testimony or other evidence that they will be suffered by the injured person. 
The record presented to this Court does not suffice to demonstrate such damages. 
The Judgment on Verdict entered by the trial court is 
affirmed.

[¶2] This 
statement of the issues is found in the Appellant's Brief:

Did the trial court err 
in ruling as matter of law that the issue of future damages/future pain and 
suffering could not go before the jury?

[¶3] This 
Statement of the Issue is found in the Appellee's Brief:

Did the trial court err 
in determining that there was inadequate medical evidence to submit to the jury 
the question of whether the Plaintiff should be allowed to recover damages for 
future medical expenses, pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of 
life?

[¶4] In July of 
1997, Rittierodt was riding as a passenger with his wife driving when their 
vehicle collided with another vehicle driven by Stacy Hendrickson (Hendrickson) 
at a controlled intersection in Laramie. Rittierodt commenced this action on 
March 2, 1998, naming Hendrickson as the defendant. Hendrickson endeavored to 
represent herself, and she denied the allegations of the Complaint other than 
her residency in Laramie, Albany County. Hendrickson's automobile insurance had 
expired at the time of the collision. Rittierodt had uninsured motorist 
coverage, and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm) was 
his insurance carrier. On March 13, 1998, State Farm filed a Motion to Intervene 
to protect its interests. The trial court entered an Order Allowing Intervention 
of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company on April 16, 1998, which also 
gave State Farm twenty days to file an answer to the complaint. State Farm filed 
its Answer to Complaint on May 13, 1998.

[¶5] State Farm 
conceded the issue of liability, and the only issue at trial was the amount of 
damages Rittierodt suffered as a result of the accident. By the time the 
conference on instructions was held, a specific issue as to the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support future damages was presented to the trial court. The 
evidence in the transmitted record relating to that issue was the testimony of 
two orthopedic surgeons, Dr. B and Dr. J, who testified about Rittierodt's 
injuries. Their testimony was presented through their pre-trial depositions, 
which the trial court accepted as trial testimony.

[¶6] Dr. J 
treated Rittierodt from September through December of 1997. He diagnosed a 
"thoracolumbar strain," which he described as a soft tissue type of injury. His 
conservative treatment of Rittierodt included a recommendation of weight loss, 
therapy in the form of exercises, and prescriptions for an anti-inflammatory 
substance and another substance for the relief of pain. Dr. J also referred 
Rittierodt to a chiropractor, and Rittierodt pursued that treatment. It was Dr. 
J's opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, as of the time of 
Rittierodt's last appointment, that by following the prescribed exercise and 
weight loss regime, Rittierodt would be restored to his condition prior to the 
July collision.

[¶7] Dr. B 
performed an independent medical examination of Rittierodt in November of 1997, 
at the request of State Farm. He reviewed medical and radiographic and physical 
reports as well as taking a history from and performing a physical examination 
of Rittierodt. Dr. B stated that his diagnosis was that Rittierodt had "a 
lumbosacral strain/sprain, * * * which is a sprain or strain, stretching of the 
muscles and ligaments in the low back, * * *." In the course of his examination, 
the doctor determined that Rittierodt had a history of similar complaints that 
were related to a congenital abnormality in his spine. Dr. B testified that in 
his opinion, Rittierodt would have continued intermittent low back pain, but 
that would not be related to the injury suffered in July of 1997. It was Dr. B's 
conclusion that Rittierodt's back pain was not attributable to the car accident, 
but instead to a combination of pre-existing congenital abnormalities and his 
weight. He also testified, using a standard of reasonable medical probability, 
that Rittierodt would not need any future care or treatment that would be 
attributable to the injury in July of 1997. Dr. B stated that Rittierodt had 
reached a point of maximum medical improvement and had returned to the 
pre-accident level in terms of his work and the activities of daily 
living.

[¶8] During the 
trial, Rittierodt requested a jury instruction to allow the jury to award future 
damages for pain and suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and future medical 
expenses. The specific instruction was not a part of the transmitted record. 
State Farm objected on the basis that medical testimony reflected Rittierodt was 
expected to fully recover and did not need future medical treatment. The trial 
judge ruled that there was insufficient evidence to support such an instruction. 
Since the only part of the trial evidence or testimony included in the 
transmitted record is the depositions of Dr. J and Dr. B, we assume that was the 
only evidence that is pertinent to the instruction on future 
damages.

[¶9] A twelve 
person jury returned a verdict awarding Rittierodt damages in the amount of 
$6,451.65, and a Judgment on Verdict was entered on December 2, 1998. Rittierodt 
appealed the Judgment on Verdict, specifying the ruling of the trial court with 
respect to instructing the jury on Rittierodt's future 
damages.

[¶10] A party 
should be afforded the benefit of an instruction explaining that party's case 
and theories to the jury.

[¶11] We 
recognize that a party is entitled to have the jury instructed upon its theory 
of the case, assuming that the theory is supported by competent evidence. 
Thunder Hawk By and Through Jensen v. Union Pacific R. Co., 891 P.2d 773, 783 
(Wyo. 1995); Haderlie v. Sondgeroth, 866 P.2d 703, 718 (Wyo. 
1993).

[¶12] Turcq v. 
Shanahan, 950 P.2d 47, 51 (Wyo. 1997). See also Short v. Spring Creek Ranch, 
Inc., 731 P.2d 1195, 1199 (Wyo. 1987) and Langdon v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton 
Corp., 494 P.2d 537, 541 (Wyo. 1972). It is within the court's discretion to 
present its own instructions which address the defendant's theory of the case, 
and as long as the instructions correctly state the law and the entire charge to 
the jury actually covers the issues reversible error will not be found. Baier v. 
State, 891 P.2d 754, 756 (Wyo. 1995) (citing Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036, 
1053 (Wyo. 1987) and Sanchez v. State, 694 P.2d 726, 729 (Wyo. 
1985)).

[¶13] In State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shrader, 882 P.2d 813, 831 (Wyo. 1994), we described 
our function in reviewing claims of instructional error in this 
way:

In reviewing challenges 
to jury instructions, we are conducting both a procedural review and a 
substantive review. The procedural component is stated by W.R.C.P. 51 which 
requires, in pertinent part: "No party may assign as error the giving or the 
failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before the jury 
retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to and 
the grounds of the objection." Therefore, on appeal, this court considers a 
claim of error in jury instruction only where a proper objection is raised. 
Triton Coal Co., Inc. v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 800 P.2d 505, 510 (Wyo. 
1990) (collecting cases). When a party fails to properly object, our review is 
limited to the application of the plain error doctrine. Id. at 511. The purpose 
of requiring an objection under W.R.C.P. 51 is to inform the district court of 
the nature of the contended error and the specific grounds of objection so that 
the district court may exercise judicial discretion in reconsidering the 
instruction to avoid error. Davis v. Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., 802 P.2d 840, 843 (Wyo. 1990).

[¶14] In Vaughn 
v. State, 962 P.2d 149, 151 (Wyo. 1998), we reaffirmed a definition of judicial 
discretion that we deem appropriate to the exercise of that function in 
instructing the jury:

Henceforth, we will turn 
to a definition adopted in Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo. 1986), in 
which we said:

"Judicial discretion is a 
composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective 
criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under 
the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. Byerly v. 
Madsen, 41 Wn. App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236 (1985)."

[¶15] We have 
invoked that definition in Lee v. Sage Creek Refining Co., 947 P.2d 791, 793 
(Wyo. 1997); Sorensen v. May, 944 P.2d 429, 432 (Wyo. 1997); Punches v. State, 
944 P.2d 1131, 1136 (Wyo. 1997); Brown v. State, 944 P.2d 1168, 1170 (Wyo. 
1997); Vena v. State, 941 P.2d  at 41; Nowotny v. L & B Contract Industries, 
Inc., 933 P.2d 452, 460 (Wyo. 1997); Robinson v. Hamblin, 914 P.2d 152, 155 
(Wyo. 1996); Harston v. Campbell County Memorial Hosp., 913 P.2d 870, 875 (Wyo. 
1996); and Vit v. State, 909 P.2d 953, 957 (Wyo. 1996).

[¶16] Before any 
instruction can be given, there must be evidence before the jury to which it may 
apply the rule of law encompassed by the instruction. Energy Transp. Systems, 
Inc. v. Mackey, 650 P.2d 1152, 1159 (Wyo. 1982); Hernandez v. Gilveli, 626 P.2d 74, 76 (Wyo. 1981); Beard v. Brown, 616 P.2d 726, 733 (Wyo. 1980). In this case, 
the trial judge succinctly captured the state of the evidence when, alluding to 
the testimony of the two physicians, he said during the course of the 
instruction conference:

[T]hey both agree the 
complaints he had up to November of '97 resulted from the accident. There is no 
disagreement there. But [J] said, as I recall, that he expected he would be 
fully resolved by about December. He didn't say anything about anything beyond 
that as far as future pain and suffering. [B] said he reached M.M.I. as of 
November 7; that he would perhaps continue to have intermittent back pain; but 
that would not be the result of the accident. I don't see any real conflict 
there. [J] has not said with respect to future stuff and [B] said, yeah, maybe 
but not from the accident. There is no evidence that I can recall to the 
contrary.

[¶17] This 
analysis of the evidence fits what this Court said in Farmers Ins. Exchange v. 
Shirley, 958 P.2d 1040, 1048 (Wyo. 1998):

We have said that a jury 
is not permitted to speculate or engage in conjecture in awarding damages. 
Martinez v. City of Cheyenne, 791 P.2d 949, 960 (Wyo. 1990); Reposa v. Buhler, 
770 P.2d 235, 238 (Wyo. 1989); Reiman Const. Co. v. Jerry Hiller Co., 709 P.2d 1271, 1277 (Wyo. 1985); Krist v. Aetna Cas. & Sur., 667 P.2d 665, 672 (Wyo. 
1983). Had the jury been properly instructed as to the Shrader [State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shrader, 882 P.2d 813 (Wyo. 1994)] requirement of economic 
damages, the jury could not have determined such damages other than by 
speculation or conjecture.

[¶18] In the 
absence of evidence supporting future damages, the trial judge was foreclosed 
from submitting that issue to the jury because any award for future damages per 
force would have been the product of speculation and 
conjecture.

[¶19] We must 
decide only whether Rittierodt presented sufficient evidence of future damages 
to require the trial court to submit the issue to the jury. Based on the two 
depositions before us, the trial court was correct in finding insufficient 
evidence to justify any proposed instruction concerning future damages. Both 
Drs. J and B agreed, to a reasonable degree of medical probability, Rittierodt 
would not suffer future damages because of the accident with Hendrickson.1 Given that the parties only 
presented this Court with the doctors' depositions, they clearly assumed that 
expert testimony was necessary to prove future pain and 
suffering.

[¶20] State Farm 
cites persuasive authority from other jurisdictions to structure an argument 
that expert testimony is necessary to justify a jury award for future pain and 
suffering. Cain v. Stevenson, 218 Mont. 101, 706 P.2d 128, 131 (1985); Clifford 
v. Opdyke, 156 N.J. Super. 208, 383 A.2d 749, 751-52 (1978); Zegman v. State, 99 
Misc.2d 473, 416 N.Y.S.2d 505, 506 (1979); Coryell v. Conn, 88 Wis.2d 310, 276 N.W.2d 723, 727 (1979); Diemel v. Weirich, 264 Wis. 265, 58 N.W.2d 651, 652-53 
(1953). We, however, have adopted a different rule with respect to damages for 
future pain and suffering. Mariner v. Marsden, 610 P.2d 6, 13-15 (Wyo. 1980). 
There is no occasion here to revisit the rule of Marsden since the record 
designated for transmission to this Court contains no evidence with respect to 
future damages other than the testimony of Dr. J and Dr B. Based on the lack of 
evidence or testimony indicating otherwise, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion when it denied Rittierodt's proposed jury 
instruction.

[¶21] The 
Judgment on Verdict is affirmed.

Footnotes

1 Rittierodt 
certified the depositions of Drs. B and J as well as a transcript of the jury 
instruction conference. Neither Rittierodt nor State Farm provided this Court 
with a transcript of the other trial testimony, Rittierodt's testimony, or the 
proposed instruction that was the subject of the dialogue at the instruction 
conference.