Case Title: In re L.A.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1990-01-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.
 
 
                           Nos. 89-044 & 87-039
 
 
In re L.A., III, J.A. & D.A.,                Supreme Court
Juveniles
                                             On Appeal From
                                             District Court of Vermont
                                             Unit No. 1, Windham Circuit
 
                                             January Term, 1990
 
 
Paul F. Hudson, J.
 
Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Martha Csala,
  Assistant Attorney General, and Paul H. Erlbaum, Special Assistant
  Attorney General, Waterbury, for plaintiff-appellee
 
Michael Rose, St. Albans, for defendant-appellant father
 
Martin & Paolini, Barre, for defendant-appellant mother
 
 
PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson and Dooley, JJ.
 
 
     DOOLEY, J.   Appellants, the parents of L.A., III, J.A., and D.A.,
appeal the findings and orders of the juvenile court adjudging their
children to be children in need of care and supervision (CHINS) and
transferring legal custody over them to the Commissioner of Social and
Rehabilitation Services (SRS) with residual parental rights and
responsibilities remaining with the parents.  The court later terminated all
residual parental rights, and the parents appealed that order.  The parents
raise six issues on appeal, the first two of which relate to the initial
merits and disposition orders and the last four of which relate to the
termination of parental rights order.  The parents' claims are:  (1) the
merits adjudication was flawed because there was insufficient evidence
before the juvenile court to establish CHINS with respect to D.A. and J.A.,
and, therefore, all subsequent orders must be vacated; (2) the disposition
hearing order must be vacated because the court failed to consider the least
restrictive alternative for the disposition of the children; (3) it was
reversible error when the court, in the termination proceeding, qualified
the guardian ad litem as an expert witness for reasons not admitted into
evidence; (4) the court erred in terminating the mother's parental rights
because she was not able to resume her parenting duties within a reasonable
period of time since this conclusion was not based on clear and convincing
evidence; (5) the court failed to give adequate consideration to the
father's visitation rights; and (6) the court prematurely terminated the
father's parental rights.  We affirm.
     This case involves the disposition of three children, L.A., III (L.A.),
J.A., and D.A., who were born on December 3, 1979, July 14, 1981, and
December 29, 1982, respectively.  These children first came to the attention
of SRS in July of 1986, after two of the boys informed their mother that
they had been sexually abused by their father.  The mother immediately
notified SRS, and together they took steps to protect the children from
further abuse.  SRS filed a petition in the Windham District Court,
pursuant to 33 V.S.A. { 645, alleging that the children were children in
need of care and supervision (CHINS), as defined under 33 V.S.A. {
632(a)(12).  Additionally, the mother filed a petition for relief from
abuse.
     A merits hearing was held on August 18, 1986, after which the juvenile
court rendered its findings of fact and conclusions of law on the record.
The court, finding that the oldest boy, L.A., had been sexually molested by
his father, concluded that he was an abused child and was without proper
parental care as defined in 33 V.S.A { 632(a)(12)(A) and (B).  The court
also found that "[t]here is a very high risk of permanent damage to each of
[the children] if they are left in an environment where there is not
intervention and control to protect them against further physical violations
such as those which we find have been committed against [L.A.]."  The court
therefore adjudicated all three boys CHINS.
     The children were placed in SRS custody pending the disposition
hearing.  SRS in turn placed D.A. and J.A. with the mother because the
father had moved out of the family house after the disclosures of abuse and
because the mother had acted in a reasonable manner to protect the children.
L.A. remained with his maternal uncle in Massachusetts where he had been
placed by his mother earlier in the summer.  The mother reached an agreement
with SRS that she would not permit any unsupervised contact between the
children and the father; nevertheless, she allowed such contact on three
separate occasions before the disposition hearing.  As a result of these
contacts, SRS placed the two younger boys in a foster home on September 2,
1986.
     The disposition hearing began on October 3, 1986, and the juvenile
court issued its disposition order on December 15, 1986.  Although the
mother sought the return of her children with conditions to assure their
safety and services to help them deal with the abuse, the court rejected her
proposal without specifically addressing it.  Instead, the court concluded
that neither parent was capable of caring for the children at that time.
The court stated that the father was "unfit and demonstrably incapable of
providing an appropriate home and care for his children," and the mother
could not "safely and adequately protect her children from the sexual abuse
which their father has committed and could in the future commit against the
children."   The court transferred legal custody of the children to SRS and
left residual parental rights with the mother and father.  Additionally, the
court approved SRS's plan for services and supervision with the goal of
eventual reunification of the family.  SRS placed the children in a foster
home.  Both parents filed a notice of appeal from the disposition order.
     Initially, SRS directed its efforts towards reunification of the
family.  In March of 1988, however, SRS noted the lack of progress towards
this objective and changed its goal to termination of parental rights.  On
May 10, 1988, while the parents' appeal of the disposition order was still
pending, SRS filed a "Petition to Terminate Residual Rights."  A hearing on
SRS's petition commenced on September 26, 1988, and lasted for five days.
On December 19, 1988, the court issued extensive findings of fact and
conclusions of law stating that neither parent was capable of resuming
parental responsibilities within a reasonable time.  Therefore, the court
terminated the parents' residual rights and transferred custody to SRS
without limitation as to adoption.  Both parents filed notices of appeal
from the termination order.  The appeal from the disposition order has been
consolidated with the appeal from the termination order.
     The parents' first claim is that the juvenile court failed to make
adequate merits findings regarding J.A. and D.A. to support its conclusion
that they were CHINS and that there was insufficient evidence to support the
conclusion.  The parents do not appeal the CHINS adjudication with respect
to L.A. because he testified that he was sexually abused by his father and
the court made specific findings and conclusions to that effect.  They
argue, however, that there is no evidentiary support for the conclusion
that the younger boys were CHINS.  SRS counters that this issue is not
before this Court because the merits order was not properly appealed.  We
need not address this contention, however, because we find that the court's
findings were sufficient to support its CHINS adjudication and were
supported by sufficient evidence.
     Several witnesses testified during the CHINS proceeding.  The court,
however, relied primarily on the testimony of L.A., the only one of the
three boys to testify, in which he stated that his father sexually abused
him.  L.A. also testified that his father touched his sister (FN1) and brothers
in a way that he did not like.  He said he saw his father touch each of his
siblings and described the touching of the sister in some detail.  He
further stated that his uncle told him about his father touching D.A. and
J.A.  Although SRS attempted on several occasions to introduce other
evidence pertaining to D.A., the court ruled that this evidence was
inadmissible hearsay.  Thus, the only evidence that either D.A. or J.A. were
abused comes from the statements of L.A.
     At the conclusion of the hearing, the court determined that all three
boys were CHINS.  The court made specific findings of abuse with regard to
L.A.  These findings were based upon the testimony of both L.A. and his
father.  The court's findings with respect to J.A. and D.A. were as follows:
	   These children, each of them . . . are children in
	need of care and supervision.  There is a very high risk
	of permanent damage to each of them if they are left in
	an environment where there is not intervention and con-
	trol to protect them against further physical violations
	such as those which we find have been committed against
	[L.A.].
 
	   Therefore, we adjudicate that these children . . .
	are children in need of supervision and we will award
	custody of the children to [SRS] with placement at the
	discretion of [SRS] and until further order of this
	Court.
 
     The juvenile court may conclude that a child is a CHINS if it finds by
a preponderance of the evidence that the child "[h]as been abandoned or
abused by his parents," 33 V.S.A. { 632(12)(A), or that the child "[i]s
without proper parental care or subsistence, education, medical, or other
care necessary for his well-being."  33 V.S.A. { 632(12)(B); In re M.B., 147
Vt. 41, 43,