Case Title: Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Company v. Belk

Citation: 269 So. 2d 637

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1972-11-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
269 So. 2d 637 (1972) GRAIN DEALERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. Gertrude BELK. No. 46856. Supreme Court of Mississippi. November 27, 1972. Eaves & Eaves, Louisville, for appellant. J. Hoy Hathorn, Louisville, for appellee. *638 JONES, Justice: Mrs. Belk, a widow, eighty-eight years old, owned her home in Louisville, Winston County, Mississippi. At all times hereafter mentioned there was in existence an insurance policy covering damage to the house from windstorm. This appeal flows from a judgment for her rendered in the Circuit Court of said county on a jury's verdict. We affirm. The insuring clause read: "This Policy is Extended to Insure Against Direct Loss by Windstorm, ... except... ." [Exceptions not here involved.] In August, 1969, a great storm known as "Camille" hit the Mississippi Coast and traveled north and northeast to the City of Louisville and beyond. Near the corner of the house, there stood a huge oak tree many years of age. A limb from it was blown until it scraped the roof. A smaller branch from the limb punched a hole through the roof causing a leak. The proof shows this was caused by the storm. The policy prohibited abandonment of the property to the Company, and the record indicates the owner was undertaking, in good faith, to minimize the loss, when she undertook to prevent further damage by removal of the tree as hereafter shown. The Company denied liability, stating: Mrs. Belk spent some time in an effort to locate a person to remove the tree. The ones experienced in that type of work were hard to find available. She did finally secure the services of one Richard Griffith, *639 an employee of Louisville Electric System, whose duty it was to cut trees and limbs from power lines, and whom the court recognized as an expert. The tree was rotten on the inside and hollow so that during the efforts to remove it, it broke and fell on the house causing considerable damage. This is the basis of the Company's defense of no direct relationship between this damage and the wind. A portion of Mr. Griffith's testimony is: He also said: It is argued that the damage was the result of negligence of appellee's agent or employee rather than a direct loss from the wind. It is mainly argued that the hazards causing the loss were not covered by the policy. There are various interpretations of the words "Direct Loss" in insurance policies. One is that it means a "proximate" cause. Dixie Pine Products Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 133 F.2d 583 (5th Cir.1943). Our Court said: In Evana Plantation, Inc. v. Yorkshire Insurance Company, Ltd., 214 Miss. 321, 325, 58 So. 2d 797, 798 (1952), this Court said: Negligence clause, if any in policy, does not apply to efforts to save property. Glens Falls Insurance Co. v. Linwood Elevator, supra. In Kemp v. American Universal Insurance Company, 391 F.2d 533 (5th Cir.1968), syllabus 2, it was said: *640 In Grace v. Lititz Mutual Insurance Company, 257 So. 2d 217, 218 (Miss. 1972), syllabus 4, it is stated: In Grace v. Lititz Mutual Insurance Company, supra, this Court said: As to windstorm, the rule is stated in 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 888, pages 962-963 (1946) as follows: As to negligence on the part of the insured, the holdings of the various courts are collated in 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 822, page 870 (1946): However, the entire matter was submitted to the jury by instructions which left to the jury: (1) Whether the damages resulted directly and proximately from the storm and whether appellee and her agents were negligent; (2) Whether the falling of the tree directly caused the damages and not the wind; (3) Whether the damages were a direct or consequential result of the wind; (4) Whether appellee was entitled to any damages caused by, resulting from, contributed to or aggravated by an improper or negligent cutting of the tree; and *641 (5) Whether the loss was as likely caused by the cutting of the tree and not by the wind, and other similar instructions. We are unable to find that appellee or her agents neglected to use all reasonable means to preserve the property, after the wind had proximately damaged it, and the jury's verdict absolved appellee of any negligence. We do not deem it necessary to discuss the other assignments. The case is affirmed. RODGERS, P.J., and INZER, SUGG, and BROOM, JJ., concur.