Case Title: In Re English

Citation: 290 Or. 113, 618 P.2d 1275

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1980-11-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
618 P.2d 1275 (1980)
290 Or. 113
In re Complaint As to the Conduct of Harry A. ENGLISH.
OSB 1360; SC 27186.

Supreme Court of Oregon, In Banc.[*]
Submitted on Record October 14, 1980.
Decided November 4, 1980.
Harry A. English, Bend, pro se.
Richard E. Forcum and M. Max Merrill, Bend, for the Oregon State Bar.
PER CURIAM.
This is a disciplinary proceeding by the Oregon State Bar charging the Accused with (1) Failure to deposit $380 in funds belonging to a client in a client trust account; (2) Commingling in his personal account another $40 in funds belonging to a client; (3) Failing to pay a bill of $319 for services by a doctor as an expert witness, who then sued his client to collect the bill; (4) Neglecting a legal matter entrusted to him by unreasonable delay in the closing of an estate.[1]
The Trial Board found the Accused guilty of all four charges and recommended that the Accused "be suspended from the practice of law for a limited period of time" and "until he is able to demonstrate satisfactorily that he is capable of conducting his practice in such a manner as to avoid problems as demonstrated by this disciplinary proceeding." The Disciplinary Review Board concurred in the findings of guilt by the Trial Board and recommended that the Accused be suspended from the practice of law for "a minimum period of sixty days and thereafter until he meets the standards for reinstatement established by Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure of the Oregon State Bar.[2] By agreement between the Accused *1276 and counsel for the Oregon State Bar, this case was then submitted to this court for decision without briefs or oral argument.
The facts relating to this charge, as found by the Trial Board, are as follows:
We have examined the record and agree with these findings.
The facts relating to this charge, as found by the Trial Board, are as follows:
We also agree with these findings.
The facts relating to this charge, as found by the Trial Board, are as follows:
We have also examined the record on this charge and agree with these findings.
The facts relating to this charge, as found by the Trial Board, are as follows:
Again, we have examined the record and agree with these findings. We believe, however, that the facts relating to the delay in the closing of this estate should be set forth in some further detail, including the facts relating to the letters from the court to the Accused and his lack of response to those letters.
On July 31, 1974 the Accused filed a petition for probate of the will of Etta M. Buckingham, naming the Accused as executor. On July 31, 1974, letters testamentary were issued naming the Accused as executor of the estate. By letters dated October 14, 1974, December 23, 1974 and February 14, 1975, the court requested that the Accused file an inventory. No inventory was filed by the Accused until February 28, 1975, showing real and personal property with a total value of $13,611, including 15 shares of Pacific Power and Light common stock.
By letters dated April 7, 1975, June 9, 1975, July 3, 1975, August 5, 1975, and September 5, 1975, the Court requested that the Accused file income and inheritance tax "clearances" and a final accounting. Nothing in the court file indicates that the Accused responded to any of these letters. The next document filed by the Accused was an amended inventory on October 30, 1975, reassessing the value of the estate at $16,029.
By further letter dated January 16, 1976, the court requested the Accused to advise it when he expected to close the estate and the reasons for delay. Again, the Accused did not respond to either that letter or to a similar letter dated August 30, 1976, until October 4, 1976, when he informed the court that he was "waiting for stock transfers from New York," apparently involving the PP&L stock, and that the estate could then be closed quickly.
On March 21, 1977, the court again wrote to the Accused, asking to be advised whether the stock transfer had been received and whether the estate could be closed. Having received no response, the court on May 3, 1977, wrote a further letter to the Accused stating that unless he complied with that request within 10 days an order would be entered requiring the Accused to appear and show cause why he should not be removed as personal representative.
On May 12, 1977, the Accused responded to that letter by a letter to the court, stating that he had "finally" received the stock certificates that he had been trying to get for over a year and would then "take care of the distribution" and "finally close this long running estate."
Again, more months went by. On October 31, 1977, the court wrote again to the Accused, requesting him to either "close this estate within the next 30 days or advise *1279 in writing as to what is left before the estate can be closed." The Accused did not respond to that letter.
In December 1977 the court wrote a further letter to the Accused, saying that "unless I hear from you within ten days * * * I intend to initiate a formal court order in this matter requiring your appearance." The Accused responded by letter dated December 14, 1977, saying that he was "working on the Buckingham Estate" and would have it ready to close "in the next day or so." On December 21, 1977, the Accused filed a "Statement in Lieu of Final Account-Short Form-Distributors Consenting," on a printed form, together with receipts from some of the beneficiaries of the will, an inheritance tax receipt and an income tax release from the Department of Revenue. On the same date a "Decree of Final Distribution" was entered by the court. On January 2, 1979, the Accused filed a "Final Report Showing Complete Distribution," with a further receipt. The Accused did not, however, submit a proposed order closing the estate.
On March 12, 1979, the court wrote to the Accused, saying that:
Apparently the previous tax release had by then expired.
On June 7, 1979, having received no response from the Accused, the court wrote to him again referring to its previous letter, asking if he had made application for the certificate of release and offering assistance in "getting them to issue a release." On August 6, 1979, the court wrote a similar letter to the Accused, again offering assistance and asking to be advised within thirty days "in writing, as to the status of this estate." Apparently the Accused again did not respond to that letter, at least "in writing," as requested.
As of October 29, 1979, when the deposition of the Accused was taken in this proceeding, the estate had not yet been closed-over five years after it had been opened-despite not only the letters from the court to the Accused, but the service upon the Accused on or about December 15, 1978, of a complaint against him by the Oregon State Bar alleging, among other things, that his conduct in the handling of the Buckingham Estate "constituted unreasonable delay and neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him in violation of Disciplinary Rule No. DR 6-101"-an allegation which the Accused had denied by his answer, filed on January 15, 1979. Indeed, the estate was not closed until November 9, 1979, ten days before the hearing of this proceeding before the Trial Board.
At that hearing the Accused testified that "there was quite a bit of activity in [the] Buckingham Estate right through the year '77"; that the estate "couldn't have been closed until the stock certificates were finally received" from the National City Bank in New York and then sent "to the power company for ultimate transfer" and that
and that:
With reference to the letters sent to him by the court, the Accused testified that he was not sure that he had received all of them; that those letters that he received from the court in 1979 "didn't register in my mind, at least when they came in," and that they may have been "just put aside because of the pressure."
In a "Statement in Opposition to Memorandum Opinion, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Trial Board," filed with the Oregon State Bar prior to the opinion of the Disciplinary Review Board, the Accused states that:
and that:
Of the three charges relating to the Wisbeck case, the first two do not involve substantial amounts of money. They do, however, involve important rules of legal ethics. The maintenance by lawyers of trust accounts into which all monies belonging to clients shall be deposited, as required by DR 9-102(A), is a rule of the utmost importance for the protection of the public and one which must be strictly observed by all lawyers.[5] In this case the Accused failed to deposit $380 of his client's funds in a trust account, which he then did not have. In addition, by "rounding out" his contingent fee at $2,900, as compared with the proper 40% contingent fee in the sum of $2,828 on a judgment in the sum of $7,071, he also put in his personal account monies which belonged to his client.
If these were the only instances of misconduct by the Accused, a reprimand might be appropriate. In this case, however, the Accused was also guilty of two charges of even more serious misconduct, both involving violation of DR 6-101(A)(3), which requires that "[a] lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him."
The failure of the Accused for more than two years to pay the bill of the doctor for testimony in the Wisbeck case-a bill which he acknowledged to be his own and for the payment of which he had withheld money received by him upon payment of the judgment in that case-resulted in his client being sued by the doctor for payment of that bill. Such misconduct by an attorney is so serious as to require more than a reprimand.
The misconduct of the Accused in his handling of the Buckingham estate was even more serious, in our opinion. The Accused was clearly guilty of unconscionable delay in his handling of that estate and his failure to close a routine estate for more than five years. His misconduct was made even more flagrant by his failure, if not refusal, to respond to repeated requests by *1281 the court for an explanation of the reasons for the delay in closing the estate. Indeed, the conduct of the Accused might well have justified contempt proceedings against him.
For many years it has been recognized that delays in litigation have been one of the two primary causes for public dissatisfaction with the administration of justice in America-the other primary cause of dissatisfaction being the cost of litigation. Not only judges, but also lawyers, have the responsibility to eliminate all unnecessary delays in litigation and to expedite the handling of all litigation so far as is reasonably possible. In In re Kraus, 289 Or. 661, 616 P.2d 1173 (1980), this court held (at 666, 616 P.2d 1173) that neglect by an attorney in the handling of matters entrusted to him by his client may be grounds for suspension of the attorney from the practice of law, citing some of the previous decisions by this court to the same effect. See also In re Holm, 285 Or. 189, 193-94, 590 P.2d 233 (1979), and In re Hedges, 280 Or. 155, 570 P.2d 73 (1977), involving neglect by inexcusable delay. As pointed out by Holman, J., concurring in In re Holm, supra, 285 Or. at 194, 590 P.2d 233, the effect upon the client of procrastination and delay by an attorney may be as disastrous as if dishonesty were involved.
We are told by the Accused that he has "suffered enough in these matters"; that he has "corrected whatever procedures need correcting," and that "such activities as I am accused of will never happen again."
It is important for lawyers to bear in mind, however, that the primary purpose of bar disciplinary proceedings is not to punish the lawyers involved, but to protect the public, not only by deterring other lawyers from engaging in misconduct, but by removing lawyers guilty of serious misconduct from the practice of law. See In re Weinstein, 254 Or. 392, 394, 459 P.2d 548 (1969), and In re Moynihan, 166 Or. 200, 226, 111 P.2d 96 (1941). In our opinion this is such a case.
For these reasons, and under the facts and circumstances of this case, we hold that the Accused shall be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three months and until he is able to show that he has the moral character and general fitness required for admission to practice law in Oregon, and that his resumption of the practice of law in this state will be neither detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar or the administration of justice, nor subversive to the public interest, in accordance with Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure of the Oregon State Bar. The Oregon State Bar, as the prevailing party, is also awarded judgment against the Accused for its costs and disbursements.
[*]  Denecke, C.J., did not participate in the decision of this case.
[1]  The complaint also included the usual "cumulative" charge, which we find unnecessary to consider.
[2]  Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure of the Oregon State Bar provides:

"Any person who has been an active member of the bar, but who has resigned (under Appendix B to these rules) or been disbarred, suspended for professional misconduct for a period of more than six months, suspended for any other reason, enrolled voluntarily as an inactive member for a period of more than six months or enrolled involuntarily as an inactive member, and who desires to be reinstated as an active member or to resume the practice of law in this state (except a person who has been suspended under section 4 of these rules solely for conviction of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude or of a felony), may be reinstated, as an active member only, on application and compliance with the rules of the court and these rules of procedure and showing, to the satisfaction of the bar and the court, that he has the good moral character and general fitness required for admission to practice law in Oregon and that his resumption of the practice of law in this state will be neither detrimental to the integrity and standing of the bar or the administration of justice nor subversive to the public interest. No such person shall resume the practice of law in this state without the recommendation of the bar, unless otherwise ordered by the court on its review of the action and recommendation of the bar. A person who has resigned (under Appendix A to these rules) or been suspended for professional misconduct or enrolled voluntarily as an inactive member, for a period of six months or less, and against whom no complaints or charges of professional misconduct were pending and unresolved at the time of such resignation, suspension or voluntary enrollment, and against whom no complaints or charges of professional misconduct are pending and unresolved at the end of such six-month or lesser period, shall be reinstated automatically, without application, unless the court, in any suspension order, shall have directed otherwise. Any such reinstated member shall pay to the Oregon State Bar, prior to reinstatement, the active membership fee and client security fund assessment for the calendar year of reinstatement, less any active or inactive membership fee and client security fund assessment already paid to the Oregon State Bar for the calendar year of reinstatement."
[3]  DR 9-102(A) provides:

"All funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, other than advances for costs and expenses, shall be deposited in one or more identifiable bank accounts maintained in the state in which the law office is situated and no funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm shall be deposited therein * * *." (With two exceptions not relevant in this case.)
[4]  DR 6-101 provides:

"(A) A lawyer shall not:
"* * *
"(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him."
[5]  See note 3, supra.