Case Title: Fortson v. State

Citation: 262 Ga. 3, 412 S.E.2d 833

Docket Number: S92G0090

State: georgia

Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Date: 1992-02-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
262 Ga. 3 (1992) 412 S.E.2d 833 FORTSON v. THE STATE. S92G0090. Supreme Court of Georgia. Decided February 6, 1992. Reconsideration Denied February 26, 1992. F. Robert Raley, for appellant. Robert E. Keller, District Attorney, Albert B. Collier, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. HUNT, Justice. We granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals to consider whether the search in this case violated Fortson's Fourth Amendment rights. As a result of items seized in a search of his vehicle following a routine check of motorists at a police roadblock, Fortson was convicted of trafficking in cocaine, possession of a firearm, driving without a license and proof of insurance, and operating a motor vehicle with an invalid license revalidation sticker. The Court of Appeals held the search of Fortson's vehicle, during which the gun and cocaine were discovered in the passenger compartment, was valid as either an inventory search or a search incident to his arrest on traffic charges. Fortson v. State, 201 Ga. App. 272 (410 SE2d 774) (1991). We do not agree that an inventory search was authorized, but we affirm the judgment. The facts are set out in the Court of Appeals opinion: Id. at 273-274. 1. It is well recognized that although the contents of an impounded automobile may be inventoried to protect the owner's property and to protect the officers from potential danger and claims for lost or stolen property, the police may not make a pretextual inventory search of an arrestee's automobile in violation of his constitutionally protected privacy rights. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 379-380 (96 SC 3092, 49 LE2d 1000) (1976); Goodman v. State, 255 Ga. 226, 229 (336 SE2d 757) (1985). As stated in State v. Ludvicek, 147 Ga. App. 784, 786 (250 SE2d 503) (1978): (Emphasis supplied.) Accord Mulling v. State, 156 Ga. App. 404, 405 (274 SE2d 770) (1980). But, in the case before us, the Court of Appeals sought to distinguish this line of cases by holding that where the police, rather than the arrestee, select the towing service, an inventory search is appropriate "in order to protect the police against claims of lost or stolen property." We disagree. Notwithstanding that the police selected the towing service in this instance, Fortson had a private contract to have his car removed to safety. Thus, we conclude the police inventory search was invalid under the Ludvicek rationale. 2. We, however, agree with the Court of Appeals that the search *5 of the vehicle was nevertheless proper incident to Fortson's arrest. When, after the private tow was arranged, Fortson asked the officer if he could return to the car to secure his personal property, the officer was authorized to insure his own safety by first searching the vehicle. While doing so, the officer found the gun and cocaine in a brown paper bag on the front seat of the automobile. In New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 457 (101 SC 2860, 69 LE2d 768) (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that the contemporaneous, warrantless search of the interior of an automobile recently occupied by an arrestee was justified in order to secure any weapons that might be available to the arrestee and to prevent the concealment or destruction of evidence. Both of these rationales are applicable here. Compare State v. Hopkins, 163 Ga. App. 141, 144 (293 SE2d 529) (1982), where a search incident to an arrest was not allowable after the defendant was safely secured in the back of the police car. Because the search of the car occurred incident to Fortson's arrest, his convictions for possession of a firearm and trafficking in cocaine were properly affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Judgment affirmed. Clarke, C. J., Weltner, P. J., Bell, Benham and Fletcher, JJ., concur.