Case Title: State v. Kenosha County Board of Adjustment

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1996AP001235

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1998-05-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-1235 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Kenosha County Board of Adjustment,  
 
Defendant-Respondent.  
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 
212 Wis. 2d 310, 569 N.W.2d 54 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-UNPUBLISHED) 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
May 27, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
March 3, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha 
 
JUDGE: 
Michael Fisher 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Lorraine C. Stoltzfus, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by 
Debra S. Bursinger, senior assistant corporation counsel, and 
Kenosha County Corporation Counsel’s Office, Kenosha and oral 
argument by Debra S. Bursinger. 
 
 
 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by William P. O’Connor, 
Jennifer s. McGinnity, and Wheeler, Van Sickle & Anderson, S.C., 
Madison for The Wisconsin Association of Lakes, Inc. 
 
No.  96-1235  
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-1235  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
 
v. 
 
KENOSHA COUNTY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT, 
 
 
Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
MAY 27, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded. 
¶1 
JANINE P. GESKE, J.   On this review we consider 
whether the Kenosha County Board of Adjustment (Board) properly 
applied the legal standard for determining unnecessary hardship 
in order to grant a petition for an area variance.  The Board 
determined that the variance applicant, Ms. Janet Huntoon, would 
suffer unnecessary hardship if she were denied a variance 
enabling her to build a deck extending into the protected 
shoreyard of Hooker Lake.  The circuit court, the Honorable 
Michael Fisher presiding, upheld the Board's decision, and the 
court of appeals affirmed.1  We conclude that the legal standard 
of unnecessary hardship requires that the property owner 
demonstrate that without the variance, he or she has no 
                     
1 State v. Kenosha County Bd. of Adjustment, 212 Wis. 2d 
310, 569 N.W.2d 54 (Ct. App. 1997).  
No.  96-1235  
 
2 
reasonable use of the property.  We conclude that the Board did 
not properly apply this legal standard and that its decision to 
grant the variance was not reasonably based on the evidence.  We 
therefore reverse the decision of the court of appeals and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
¶2 
Janet Huntoon owns six adjoining parcels of land on 
property abutting Hooker Lake, a navigable body of water located 
in the town of Salem, in the county of Kenosha, Wisconsin.  Five 
of the lots in this unincorporated area are undeveloped; a house 
was built on the sixth lot in 1936 by Huntoon's grandfather.  
The home is in the R-4 Urban Single Family Residential zoning 
district.  The land running between the house and the lake is 
sloped.  When the house was built, 33 concrete steps were laid 
along the slope down to the lake.  Huntoon's family has 
continuously owned the house and the parcels. 
¶3 
In anticipation of her move into the house, Huntoon 
sought to construct a deck facing the lake.  Huntoon had all of 
the pine trees and shrubs on the slope in front of her house and 
facing the lake removed, based on her builder's statement that 
she would not need a variance to build the deck. 
¶4 
After clearing the vegetation in the area and making 
measurements, Huntoon discovered that she would need a zoning 
variance.  Without the deck, the existing house sits 78 feet 
away from the ordinary high-water mark of Hooker Lake.  As 
proposed, the 14-foot by 23-foot deck would violate both the 
state statute and the county ordinance requiring a 75-foot 
No.  96-1235  
 
3 
setback for all structures adjacent to navigable bodies of water 
in unincorporated areas. 
¶5 
Sections 59.9712 and 144.263 of the Wisconsin Statutes 
require counties to zone the shorelands of navigable waters.  
                     
2 Wis. Stat. § 59.971 (1993-94) Zoning of shorelands on 
navigable waters. (1) In this section: . . . 
(b) “Shorelands” means the area within the following 
distances from the ordinary high-water mark of navigable 
waters, as defined under s. 144.26(2)(d): . . . 
(1m) To effect the purposes of s. 144.26 and to promote the 
public health, safety and general welfare, each county 
shall 
zone 
by 
ordinance 
all 
shorelands 
in 
its 
unincorporated area. . . . 
(4)(b) Variances and appeals regarding shorelands within a 
county are for the board of adjustment for that county 
under s. 59.99 and the procedures of that section apply. 
Section 59.971, Stats., has been renumbered and is currently 
designated Wis. Stat. § 59.692 in the 1995-96 volume.  See 1995 
Wis. Act 201.  The substance of the statute has not been 
changed.  Throughout this opinion, we refer to the volume of 
statutes in effect at the time of the Board of Adjustment's 
action on Huntoon's application. 
3 Wis. Stat. § 144.26 (1993-94) Navigable waters protection 
law. (1)  To aid in the fulfillment of the state's role as 
trustee of its navigable waters and to promote public health, 
safety, convenience and general welfare, it is declared to be in 
the public interest to make studies, establish policies, make 
plans and authorize municipal shoreland zoning regulations for 
the efficient use, conservation, development and protection of 
this state's water resources.  The regulations shall relate to 
lands under, abutting or lying close to navigable waters.  The 
purposes of the regulations shall be to further the maintenance 
of safe and healthful conditions; prevent and control water 
pollution; protect spawning grounds, fish and aquatic life; 
control building sites, placement of structure and land uses and 
reserve shore cover and natural beauty. 
No.  96-1235  
 
4 
Pursuant to those provisions, the Kenosha County General Zoning 
and 
Shoreland/Floodplain 
Zoning 
Ordinance 
(Kenosha 
County 
Shoreland Ordinance) was adopted.  Section 12.21-4(g)2 of the 
ordinance requires that structures in the R-4 zoning district be 
no less than 75 feet away from the ordinary high-water mark of 
any 
navigable 
water. 
 
This 
provision 
tracks 
Section 
NR 
115.05(3)(b)1 (1985) of the Wisconsin Administrative Code, a 
statewide 
provision 
applying 
to 
unincorporated 
areas 
and 
requiring a minimum setback of 75 feet from the ordinary high-
water mark of an adjacent body of water to the nearest part of a 
building or structure, except piers, boathouses, and boat 
hoists.  The 75-foot setback provision is an environmental 
conservation measure.  See Wis. Stat. § 144.26; Wis. Admin. 
Code. § NR 115.01(2); and Kenosha County Shoreland Ordinance at 
12.01-2(a). 
¶6 
On March 22, 1995, Huntoon filed an application with 
the Kenosha County Office of Planning and Development requesting 
approval of her plans to construct a 14-foot by 23-foot attached 
deck, and to reduce her shoreline setback to 64 feet.  The 
Office of Planning and Development denied the application 
because the proposed deck would violate the setback requirement. 
  
                                                                  
Wis. Stat. § 144.26 has been renumbered and is currently 
designated Wis. Stat. § 281.31 in the 1995-96 volume.  See 1995 
Wis. Act 227.  The substance of the statute has not been 
changed.  
No.  96-1235  
 
5 
¶7 
Huntoon then petitioned the Kenosha County Board of 
Adjustment for a zoning variance to allow construction of the 
deck.4  The Department of Natural Resources (DNR) reviewed the 
request and recommended that the Board deny it.  The DNR 
asserted that Huntoon could not meet the statutory requirement 
of unnecessary hardship, and that constructing the deck would be 
contrary to the purpose of the shoreland zoning statutes and the 
public interest. 
¶8 
On May 4, 1995, the Board conducted a public hearing 
on Huntoon's petition.  Huntoon explained that she intended to 
move into the house in the near future.  She testified that a 
deck 
would update 
the house, make 
the house 
look 
more 
attractive, and be used for recreational purposes and a view of 
the lake. According to the transcript of that hearing, neither 
Huntoon nor her representative Phillip Cayo mentioned any 
concern about a safety problem.  
¶9 
The Board unanimously voted to grant the variance 
request.  The hearing minutes show that the Board approved the 
variance for the following reasons: 
 
1. 
There are many properties surrounding the lake 
that are much closer than the petitioner proposes, 
including a number of homes on the north side of the 
lake which is the same side as the petitioner and 
further west who are almost right up to the lake. 
 
. . .  
 
                     
4 Huntoon had previously received approval to build the deck 
from the Town of Salem Plan Commission and the Town Board.   
No.  96-1235  
 
6 
3.  Homes built prior to the enactment of the 
ordinance should be granted special consideration 
particularly when we are dealing with the lake view, 
which is why taxes are higher.  To deny this request 
would be confiscatory and unreasonable. 
 
4. The owner did not cause the situation, therefore 
the problem is not self created. 
 
5. The petitioner's request is modest. 
 
6. The steep incline from the waters edge to the 
subject residence is dangerous and the construction of 
a deck as proposed would provide greater safety. 
 
7. The variance, if granted, meets all the standards 
and guidelines set forth in 12.36-13 of the Kenosha 
County Zoning ordinance.  
¶10 At the DNR's request, the State initiated a certiorari 
proceeding, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 59.99(10),5 in Kenosha 
County Circuit Court on June 5, 1995, for review of the Board’s 
action.  On July 6, 1995, the Board conducted a public hearing 
to reconsider its grant of the variance.  In the interim between 
the two Board meetings, Huntoon's deck was built.  
¶11 The Board took testimony from Huntoon and Cayo at this 
second hearing.  Huntoon testified that "I believe the steep 
slope limits the use of the property because there's no room 
there for anything as far as like a table or chairs or anything 
at the top of that hill."  Huntoon also stated "I can't use that 
front area of the house without something there as far as to use 
to walk on and things like that.  So, and as valuable as that 
property is, I would like to have some reasonable use out of it 
                     
5 Wis. Stat. § 59.99(10) (1993-94) has been renumbered to 
Wis. Stat. § 59.694(10) in the 1995-96 volume.  The substance of 
the statute has not been changed. 
No.  96-1235  
 
7 
rather than just leave it bare in the front and not even be able 
to walk out there."  
¶12 Huntoon's representative, Cayo, also testified at the 
second Board meeting.  His remarks included the following: 
 
"Even though we created a deck for pleasure, we did 
not impact any way on the lake, which was one of our 
big concerns. . . . All of a sudden now we have a home 
that was built and to replace the front stoop and make 
it look like a more modern, a more, a home that's 
where you can enjoy yourself at the lake . . . 
¶13 The only reference to safety by either witness was 
Cayo's remark that 
 
"[i]n this case, that little bitty front porch, I 
would call it just a stoop, a step off was removed and 
a nice, a nice deck put on.  The old stoop that was 60 
years we figure . . . sixty, sixty some five years 
old, it was about time somebody took it off, off the 
front of that house before somebody fell off of it and 
got hurt, so . . ." 
¶14 After taking testimony, the Board supplemented its 
previous reasoning with the following findings of fact and 
analysis: 
 
1. Unnecessary Hardship— 
 
Petitioner has stated the house was built in the 
1930's prior to shoreland zoning setbacks by her 
mother's family.  She also stated that approximately 
15' of shoreline has been lost since then, due to 
erosion.  She has further stated that there are other 
structures directly in her view across the lake with 
less setback from the lake. 
 
The Board finds that strict conformity with the 
ordinance 
in 
Janet 
Huntoon's 
case 
would 
be 
unnecessarily burdensome because she would be denied a 
use that a great many other lakefront property owners 
No.  96-1235  
 
8 
do enjoy at a much closer setback than the 64' in 
question. (emphasis in original) 
 
Janet Huntoon has not had a real estate appraiser give 
a value loss should a deck be denied, but it is the 
Board's belief that there would be a loss of value if 
setback relief is denied. 
 
2. Unique Property Limitation— 
 
The petitioner has stated that the property in 
question is situated on a hill overlooking the lake.  
The steep slope to the lake is covered with mature 
trees and vegetation except for the portion in a 
direct line to the lake from her house and proposed 
deck.  She has also stated that there is not a flat 
area on the lake front side of her house and that the 
existing door faces the lake. 
 
The Board finds that the petitioner is faced with 
unique limitations caused by: 
 
a. The steep slope to the lake which begins as 
you exit the house, the deck will provide a 
safety barrier 
 
b. An estimated 15' of shoreline has been lost 
due to erosion. 
 
3. Protection of the Public Interest— 
 
The Board believes that the public interest is served 
best and the spirit of the ordinance followed when 
citizens are allowed a reasonable use of existing 
structures, that are in good condition, for a project 
that does not cause harm to the public. 
 
The Board further believes that the buffer to the lake 
will remain intact with no loss of mature trees and 
vegetation and that there will be no impact on water 
quality, habitat or esthetics.  To further protect the 
public interest this Board does stipulate following: 
 
(various 
conditions 
on 
the 
deck 
design 
and 
landscaping).  
The Board again unanimously approved the variance. 
No.  96-1235  
 
9 
¶15 On July 31, 1995, the State filed a second certiorari 
review action.  The circuit court, the Honorable Michael Fisher 
presiding, consolidated the two certiorari actions.  Considering 
the briefs and the record before the Board, on March 5, 1996, 
the circuit court affirmed the Board's decision.  The circuit 
court rejected the DNR's arguments that the Board had proceeded 
on an incorrect theory of law and that the Board's decision was 
unreasonable because it was not supported by the evidence 
presented.  The State appealed.  The court of appeals affirmed 
the judgment of the circuit court.  We granted the State's 
petition for review. 
I. 
¶16 "Wisconsin has a long history of protecting its water 
resources, its lakes, rivers, and streams, which depend on 
wetlands for their proper survival."  Zealy v. City of Waukesha, 
201 Wis. 2d 365, 382, 548 N.W.2d 528 (1996).  To ensure this 
protection, the legislature has authorized the DNR to develop 
water conservation standards, and to "disseminate these general 
recommended standards and criteria to local municipalities."  
State v. Winnebago County, 196 Wis. 2d 836, 847, 540 N.W.2d 6 
(Ct. App. 1995).  The purpose of state shoreland zoning 
standards is to "further the maintenance of safe and healthful 
conditions; 
prevent 
and 
control 
water 
pollution; 
protect 
spawning grounds, fish and aquatic life; control building sites, 
placement of structure and land uses and reserve shore cover and 
natural beauty."  Wis. Stat. § 144.26; Wis. Adm. Code § NR 
115.01(2).  The basic purpose of a shoreland zoning ordinance 
No.  96-1235  
 
10
"is to protect navigable waters and the public rights therein 
from the degradation and deterioration which results from 
uncontrolled use and development of shorelands."  Just v. 
Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7, 10, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).  
¶17 The State, through an enabling statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 59.99(7),6 has given county boards of adjustment the power to 
grant exceptions to zoning regulations known as "variances."  
The boards are empowered: 
 
To authorize upon appeal in specific cases such 
variance from the terms of the ordinance as will not 
be contrary to the public interest, where, owing to 
special conditions, a literal enforcement of the 
provisions of the ordinance will result in unnecessary 
hardship, and so that the spirit of the ordinance 
shall be observed and substantial justice done. 
Wis. Stat. § 59.99(7)(c). 
¶18 The Kenosha County Board of Supervisors has authorized 
the use of that state-granted power by its Board of Adjustment 
through the Kenosha County Shoreland Ordinance, at 12.36-1, 
which reads: 
 
It is the intent of this section of the Ordinance to 
recognize 
that 
under 
certain 
conditions 
and 
circumstances, it may be necessary to obtain a 
variance from the terms of this Ordinance so long as 
said variance will not be contrary to the public 
interest, and where, owing to special conditions, a 
literal enforcement of the provisions of the Ordinance 
will result in unnecessary hardship or practical 
difficulties and where the granting of such variance 
will 
uphold 
the 
spirit 
of 
this 
Ordinance 
and 
contribute to the justice of the particular case in 
                     
6 Wis. Stat. § 59.99(7) (1993-94) has been renumbered to 
Wis. Stat. § 59.694(7)(1995-96) without a change in substance.  
No.  96-1235  
 
11
question.  Any variance granted under the terms of 
this ordinance shall, however, relate only to area 
requirements and not to use. 
¶19 The language used in the county ordinance setting 
forth the conditions under which variances may be granted is 
virtually identical to the language used in the statute 
providing for variances.  Both the statute and the ordinance 
specify that a variance may be granted only where it is not 
"contrary to the public interest."  Wis. Stat. § 144.26; Kenosha 
County Shoreland Ordinance 12.36-1.  The legislature has defined 
the public's interest in restricting shoreland development as 
several interests, including maintaining health and safety, 
minimizing pollution, sustaining aquatic life, and preserving 
natural beauty. 
¶20 Both the statute and the ordinance also specify that 
the variance applicant demonstrate "special conditions" to 
justify  granting the variance.  The county ordinance sets out 
more fully several standards and guidelines for the Board to 
consider7 in determining whether to grant a variance: 
 
1)  The existence of special conditions or exceptional 
circumstances on the land in questions [sic]. 
                     
7 It is not clear from the language of the Kenosha County 
ordinance whether it meant the "standards" and "guidelines" to 
be directory or mandatory.  The prefatory language of the 
ordinance subsection states: "In determining whether a variance 
is to be granted, the following standards and guidelines must be 
met in view of the evidence presented and in making its 
decision, these standards and guidelines shall be addressed by 
the Board of Adjustment."  Kenosha County Shoreland Ordinance 
12.36-13(a). 
No.  96-1235  
 
12
2) The experiencing 
of 
unnecessary hardships or 
practical difficulties on the land in question either 
presently or in the future. 
3)  That these hardships or difficulties are the 
result 
of 
the 
aforementioned 
special 
conditions 
existing on the land and are not self-inflicted. 
4)  That the existence of these special conditions 
will restrict the use of the land if the Ordinance is 
applied 
 
literally 
so 
as 
to 
render 
the 
land 
useless. . . . 
7)  That the variance(s) requested are the minimum 
variance(s) 
needed 
to 
alleviate 
difficulties 
or 
hardships. . . . 
9)  That granting the variance applied for will not 
affect the public health, safety, morals and welfare 
of the community and other properties in the area. . . 
.  
 
(b) Variances may be granted for example for reasons 
of 
topography, 
environmental 
protection 
or 
where 
permitted by state statute but in no event may a 
variance be granted where the primary reason for 
obtaining a variance is to obtain a more profitable 
use 
of 
the 
property, 
personal 
inconvenience, 
construction errors, economic reasons, self-created 
hardship, or where the property is presently a non-
conforming use. . . . 
Kenosha County Shoreland Ordinance at 12.36-13. 
¶21 Both the statute and the  ordinance specify that a 
variance 
applicant 
show 
"unnecessary 
hardship" 
to justify 
receiving the variance.  Only the county ordinance defines that 
term: 
UNNECESSARY HARDSHIP 
 
The circumstance where special conditions, which were 
not self-created, affect a particular property and 
make strict conformity with restrictions governing 
dimensional standards (such as lot area, lot width, 
setbacks, 
yard 
requirements, 
or 
building 
height) 
unnecessarily burdensome or unreasonable in light of 
the purpose of this Ordinance.  Unnecessary hardship 
is present only where, in the absence of a variance, 
no feasible use can be made of the property. 
No.  96-1235  
 
13
Kenosha County Shoreland Ordinance, definitions. 
¶22 While the county ordinance permits the granting of a 
variance upon the showing of either "unnecessary hardship or 
practical difficulties," this court has already decided that 
there is no significant distinction between the meaning of the 
two terms.  See Snyder v. Waukesha County Zoning Bd. of 
Adjustment, 74 Wis. 2d 468, 474, 247 N.W.2d 98 (1976).  As such, 
the Kenosha County Shoreland Ordinance does not actually impose 
a standard different than that imposed by the statute. 
¶23 Proof of unnecessary hardship includes the burden of 
proving "uniqueness."  See Arndorfer v. Board of Adjustment, 162 
Wis. 2d 246, 254, 469 N.W.2d 831 (1991).  We take the ordinance 
requirement 
in 
12.36-13(a)1 
of 
"special 
conditions 
or 
exceptional circumstances on the land" in question to be 
analogous to the statute's requirement of uniqueness.  See, 
e.g., Winnebago County, 196 Wis. 2d at 846 n.10.  In Winnebago 
County, the county ordinance required the board to find a 
condition of the lot "exceptional, extraordinary or unusual" 
before it could grant the variance.  The court of appeals, 
relying on our decision in Arndorfer, 162 Wis. 2d at 255-56, 
concluded 
that the 
ordinance's standard was 
substantially 
analogous to a finding of uniqueness, as required by statute. 
¶24 Huntoon sought a variance from the Kenosha County 
Shoreland Ordinance.  A variance applicant has the burden to 
prove that a literal application of the zoning ordinance will 
result in unnecessary hardship.  See Arndorfer, 162 Wis. 2d at 
253. 
No.  96-1235  
 
14
II. 
¶25 On statutory certiorari review, when the circuit court 
does not take additional evidence, we limit our review to 1) 
whether the Board kept within its jurisdiction; 2) whether it 
proceeded on a correct theory of law; 3) whether its action was 
arbitrary, oppressive or unreasonable and represented its will 
and not its judgment; and 4) whether the Board might reasonably 
make the order or determination in question, based on the 
evidence.  See Arndorfer, 162 Wis. 2d at 254.  In this case, the 
State's challenge focuses on the second and fourth criteria. 
 
¶26 The State first asserts that the Board failed to 
proceed on a correct theory of law by incorrectly applying the 
legal standard for what constitutes "unnecessary hardship."  
Because the statute does not define "unnecessary hardship," the 
State relies on case law to contend that the test for whether an 
ordinance imposes an unnecessary hardship on an area variance 
petitioner is whether the property owner will have no reasonable 
use of the property without the variance.8  In this case, the 
State disputes that Huntoon has suffered an unnecessary hardship 
because she maintains a reasonable use of her property.  The 
home has been used as a residence for over 60 years.  Instead of 
establishing unnecessary hardship, according to the State, 
                     
8 In its briefs to the court of appeals, the State contended 
that the standard for determining "unnecessary hardship" was "no 
feasible use."  In its briefs to this court and at oral 
argument, the State modified its terminology to contend that the 
proper standard was "no reasonable use in the absence of a 
variance."  
No.  96-1235  
 
15
Huntoon has only established that her reasons for seeking a 
variance are reasons of personal inconvenience. 
¶27 The Board contends that the standard is neither "no 
feasible use"9 nor "no reasonable use" but instead is whether 
strict compliance with the ordinance will be "unnecessarily 
burdensome."  The State and the Board also disagree whether the 
same statutory standard applies to area variances as applies to 
use variances.10 
¶28 The 
rules 
for 
interpretation 
of 
ordinances 
and 
statutes are the same.  See State v. Ozaukee County Board of 
Adjustment, 152 Wis. 2d 552, 559, 449 N.W.2d 47 (Ct. App. 1989). 
 Interpretation of statutes presents a question of law that 
reviewing courts decide independently.  See id. 
                     
9 The Board apparently is not relying on the definition of 
unnecessary hardship as found in the ordinance: "unnecessary 
hardship is present only where, in the absence of a variance, no 
feasible use can be made of the property."  Emphasis added.  The 
terms of the Kenosha County Shoreland Ordinance are arguably 
more restrictive than the statute permitting variances.  This 
court has previously concluded that "counties in this state have 
broad authority to zone shoreland area in a manner that is more 
restrictive than the minimum standards set forth by the DNR."  
County of Adams v. Romeo, 191 Wis. 2d 379, 384 n.1, 528 N.W.2d 
418 (1995).  Nonetheless, because the Board's argument is 
focused on the statutory standard, and because the statute and 
ordinance 
do 
not 
conflict, 
our 
analysis 
is 
limited 
to 
application of the statutory standard.   
10 Both parties, and the court of appeals, have spent some 
time trying to differentiate, either in words or in application, 
the tests for granting a use variance and an area variance.  
Neither party disputes that Huntoon has requested an area 
variance.  Thus, for purposes of this case, we need not decide 
whether there is a difference between the two types of 
variances, and what that difference may be.  
No.  96-1235  
 
16
¶29 In a previous application of the zoning statute, we 
described an unnecessary hardship as where "compliance with the 
strict letter of the restrictions governing area, set backs, 
frontage . . . would unreasonably prevent the owner from using 
the property for a permitted purpose or would render conformity 
with such restrictions unnecessarily burdensome."   Snyder, 74 
Wis. 2d at 475, citing 2 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and 
Planning, 45-28 (3d ed. 1972).  The Snyder court also pointed 
out that whether a particular hardship is unnecessary or 
unreasonable is judged against the purpose of the zoning law.  
See id. at 473.  Later, in Arndorfer, we also emphasized that 
the unnecessary hardship test, and in particular its requirement 
of a unique condition facing the property owner's land, is 
essential to "prevent the purposes of the zoning regulations 
from being undermined by the granting of piecemeal exceptions to 
those regulations."  162 Wis. 2d at 255.   
¶30 The 
fundamental 
difference 
between 
the 
parties' 
definitions of the unnecessary hardship standard is the extent 
to which those definitions incorporate the purpose of the 
shoreland zoning regulationsto enforce a uniform setback that 
preserves the public's interest in shoreland and the navigable 
waters of the state.  Under the State's definition, the issue is 
whether the Board and reviewing courts look first to the purpose 
of the shoreland zoning ordinance and then at the applicant's 
request.  The Board seems to argue that the reviewing bodies 
look at the applicant's request primarily in terms of the burden 
on the applicant.  In both our Snyder and Arndorfer decisions, 
No.  96-1235  
 
17
we emphasized that the purpose of the zoning regulations, 
including uniformity, should not be lost in the determination of 
whether to grant a variance.  
¶31 We agree that the State's definition of unnecessary 
hardshipno reasonable use of the property without a variance 
is compatible with the concerns we expressed in Snyder.  This 
articulation is also consistent with the recent decision in 
Winnebago County, 196 Wis. 2d 836, where the court of appeals 
held that the proper test is not whether a variance would 
maximize the economic value of the property, but whether a 
feasible use is possible without the variance.  
¶32 This definition also clarifies that in Snyder we did 
not mean that a variance could be granted when strict compliance 
would prevent the property owner from undertaking any of a 
number of permitted purposes.  Rather, when the record before 
the Board demonstrates that the property owner would have a 
reasonable use of his or her property without the variance, the 
No.  96-1235  
 
18
purpose of the statute takes precedence and the variance request 
should be denied.11 
¶33 We turn to consider the record before the Board.  The 
State contends that the record is inadequate in several respects 
to support a conclusion that Huntoon would have no reasonable 
use of her property without the variance, and we agree.   
                     
11 Other states have used the "no reasonable use" standard 
as part of their test for determining unnecessary hardship.  
See, e.g., Thompson v. Planning Comm'n of City of Jacksonville, 
464 So. 2d 1231, 1237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (hardship 
necessary to obtain a variance may not be present unless there 
is a showing that no reasonable use can be made of the property 
without the variance); Parkview Colonial Manor Inv. Corp. v. 
Board of Zoning Appeals of City of O'Fallon, 388 N.E.2d 877, 881 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (variance may not be granted absent a 
showing that the practical difficulty or unnecessary hardship 
would deprive the owner of the reasonable use of his property); 
Your Home, Inc. v. Town of Windham, 528 A.2d 468, 471 (Me. 1987) 
(in determining whether property owner would suffer undue 
hardship in absence of zoning variance, property owner not 
entitled to maximum return on his or her investment but to some 
reasonable use); Husnander v. Town of Barnstead, 660 A.2d 477, 
478 (N.H. 1995) (where application of ordinance prevents 
property owner from making any reasonable use of the land, 
sufficient hardship exists to grant variance); Gadhue v. 
Marcotte, 446 A.2d 375, 376 (Vt. 1982) (if any reasonable use 
could be made of property, where the use is in strict conformity 
with the zoning regulations, the requirements for granting 
variance are not satisfied); Buechel v. State Dep't. of Ecology, 
884 P.2d 910, 918 (Wash. 1994) (where the ordinance required the 
landowner to show he or she could not make any reasonable use of 
a small lot without a variance, but the record demonstrated that 
the land had potential recreational uses, the variance request 
was denied).  But cf., Currey v. Kimple, 577 S.W.2d 508, 513 
(Tex. App. 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (fact that property owner 
had reasonable use of property as a residence under existing 
ordinance did not require denial of variance for purpose of 
constructing a tennis court on irregularly shaped lot because 
owners were entitled to use their property to its fullest as a 
family dwelling and place for family recreation). 
No.  96-1235  
 
19
III. 
¶34 The Board granted Huntoon's petition for four reasons. 
 First, the Board considered that other structures on Hooker 
Lake have shorter setbacks, and thus it would be unduly 
burdensome to deny Huntoon something that other property owners 
enjoy.  Second, the Board assumed that Huntoon would suffer a 
loss of value if her variance request was denied.  Third, the 
Board determined that Huntoon's property had a unique limitation 
because of the steep slope from her house to the lake shore.  
Fourth, the Board concluded that the public interest is served 
when citizens are permitted a reasonable use of their property 
that is not harmful to the public. 
¶35 Reviewing courts accord a decision of a board of 
adjustment a presumption of correctness and validity.  See 
Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 476; Arndorfer, 162 Wis. 2d at 253.  A 
reviewing court may not substitute its discretion for that 
committed to the Board by the legislature.  See Arndorfer at 
253.  However, when a Board of Adjustment acts on an application 
for a variance, it acts in a quasi-judicial capacity.  See 
Schalow v. Waupaca County, 139 Wis. 2d 284, 289, 407 N.W.2d 316 
(Ct. App. 1987), citing 3 Rathkopf, The Law of Zoning and 
Planning, § 37.02(6), p. 37-35 (1987).  The Board’s action must 
be based upon evidence.  See id.  On certiorari review, a 
reviewing court applies the substantial evidence test to 
ascertain whether the evidence before the Board was sufficient. 
 See Clark v. Waupaca County Bd. of Adjustment, 186 Wis. 2d 300, 
304, 519 N.W.2d 782 (Ct. App. 1994).  If any reasonable view of 
No.  96-1235  
 
20
the evidence would sustain the findings of the Board, the 
findings are conclusive.  See id.  However, a board may not find 
the existence of the elements of hardship, uniqueness, a 
necessity to preserve the comprehensive plan of zoning, and 
substantial justice "merely because no persons appeared to 
object to the grant [of the variance] or because objectors 
neither presented evidence showing that the converse of the 
claims [of the] applicant is true nor refuted the evidence of 
the applicant."  3 Ziegler, Rathkopf's The Law of Zoning and 
Planning, § 37.06, p. 37-82 (4th ed. 1993). 
¶36 The State first argues that the Board should not have 
based its grant of a variance in part on the fact that many 
other lakefront property owners enjoy a much closer setback than 
the 64-foot setback requested by Huntoon.12  Evidence of such 
"neighborhood character," according to the State, is not part of 
the statutory or ordinance test, nor is it part of the area 
variance analysis set out in case law.  Area variances control 
restrictions on chiefly dimensional elements, such as setback, 
frontage, height, bulk or density, and area.  See Snyder 74 
Wis. 2d at 475; see also, Ozaukee County, 152 Wis. 2d at 560.   
¶37 The statute authorizes boards to consider a property 
owner's appeal for a variance "in specific cases."  Section 
59.99(7)(c), Wis. Stats.  In Arndorfer, we cautioned against the 
                     
12 The court of appeals agreed only that evidence of short 
setbacks for other structures, because it is evidence of the 
"character of the neighborhood," was relevant to determining 
whether the test of "no feasible use" or "unnecessarily 
burdensome" applied.  Kenosha County, 212 Wis. 2d at 319-20.    
No.  96-1235  
 
21
"piecemeal" granting of exceptions to zoning regulations. 162 
Wis. 2d at 255.  The fact that Huntoon's home and deck may be 
visually compatible with the character of other homes on Hooker 
Lake is not a factor for the Board to use in determining, in 
this specific case, whether Huntoon has a reasonable use of her 
property without the deck.   
¶38 Even if the Board could look beyond Huntoon's property 
in deciding whether to grant the variance, there is nothing in 
the transcripts of either Board hearing upon which the Board 
could reasonably rely that other property owners actually have 
shorter setbacks, or the reasons why they have them if they do. 
Testimony that is little more than guessing about setback 
measurements is insufficient to constitute evidence upon which a 
board of adjustment could reasonably rely.13  While a board 
hearing is not an adversarial proceeding with formal rules of 
evidence, see Arndorfer, 162 Wis. 2d at 254, permitting a 
variance based on "eyeballing" yardage in neighboring parcels 
would lead to piecemeal, if not wholesale, exceptions to 
shoreland zoning ordinances.  
¶39 The Board's second reason for granting the variance 
was that Huntoon would suffer a loss of value if her variance 
                     
13 Neither Huntoon nor Cayo offered any evidence of setback 
variances granted to other Hooker Lake property owners.  No 
evidence was offered of measurements of specific instances of 
shorter setbacks.  As the court of appeals points out, the 
record does not disclose whether the perceived shorter setbacks 
on other properties are legal nonconforming uses, legal uses for 
which variances have been granted, or outright violations of the 
setback ordinance.  See Kenosha County, 212 Wis. 2d at 320 n.5.  
No.  96-1235  
 
22
request was denied. Similarly, the State contends that the 
Board’s finding that a variance would allow Huntoon to better 
enjoy a view of the lake is based on personal convenience, and 
not unnecessary hardship.  See, e.g., Ozaukee County, 152 
Wis. 2d at 563 (holding that deprivation of a spectacular view 
of the river is not recognized in Wisconsin law as a hardship, 
but is a condition personal to the owner). 
¶40 The Board also reached its conclusion on loss of value 
without substantial evidence.  Indeed, neither Huntoon or Cayo 
ever raised this issue.  The Board chair herself raised it, 
admitting "[a] real estate appraisal probably could give us a 
value loss of a house with a deck, without a deck if that's you 
know, but we haven't done that . . ."  The Board found that 
Huntoon "has not had a real estate appraiser give a value loss 
should a deck be denied, but it is the Board's belief that there 
would be a loss of value if setback relief is denied."  Not only 
was there no evidence presented to the Board about this 
perceived loss of value, but the Kenosha ordinance specifically 
prohibits granting variances where the primary reason is one of 
more profitable use of the property, or other economic reasons. 
 See Kenosha Shoreland Zoning Ordinance 12.36-13(b). 
¶41 The State characterizes the potential for additional 
value as simply another aspect of "personal inconvenience," a 
factor rejected by this court in Snyder as a basis for granting 
a variance.  Similarly, this court in Winnebago held that 
maximizing economic value of the property is not a proper test 
No.  96-1235  
 
23
for determining unnecessary hardship.  See 196 Wis. 2d at 844-
45. 
¶42 That the Board here injected factual issues, and then 
made factual findings based on those issues it raised, is 
reminiscent of board conduct criticized in Ozaukee County, 152 
Wis. 2d 552.  In that case, as described by the court of 
appeals, “the board appeared singularly unconcerned with holding 
[the applicant] to his burden of proof.”  Id. at 558.  Members 
of the board made statements in favor of a use variance 
permitting the proposed riverside development, and stated that 
the applicant’s plans were “probably the best possible use of 
that piece of property.”  Id.  The court of appeals held that 
standing alone, the purpose of economic gain is an insufficient 
basis for granting a variance.  See id. at 563.  While loss of 
economic value is not the sole reason why the Board granted the 
variance in this case, Huntoon's projected loss of value cannot 
be bootstrapped to a deck that is merely a personal convenience, 
and form a sufficient basis for a variance. 
¶43 The third reason the Board identified was that 
Huntoon's property bore a unique limitation by virtue of the 
steep slope from the house to the lake shore.  The Board 
considered this feature a hardship because, in the Board's view, 
the slope presented a safety hazard.  As with the economic 
concern discussed above, Huntoon herself offered no testimony on 
any safety hazard presented by her property in the absence of a 
variance.  Her representative Cayo mentioned the age of the 
stoop that had been built in front of the lake side door to the 
No.  96-1235  
 
24
house, but it was a Board member who characterized the slope as 
a safety concern.  The record demonstrates that the house on 
Huntoon's property had been used for residential purposes for 
over 60 years.  Huntoon has not claimed that the property could 
not continue to be used safely as a residence if the variance 
were denied.  Consideration of safety, when the applicant has 
offered no testimony on that aspect, ignores the fact that the 
applicant has the burden of proof of all the essential elements 
of his or her right to relief.  See Arndorfer, 162 Wis. 2d at 
254.14  We conclude that the Board lacked substantial evidence to 
make the finding that the hardship related to a unique condition 
of a dangerous slope. 
¶44  The Board may have also made a finding of uniqueness 
limitations because of the combination of the steep slope, which 
begins at the door facing the lake, and the estimated 15 feet of 
shoreline that has been lost since 1936 due to erosion.  This 
combination of factors does not rise to the level of uniqueness 
to form an unnecessary hardship.  As the court of appeals 
recently stated, "where the hardship imposed on the applicant's 
land is shared by nearby land, relief should be addressed 
through 
legislative, 
rather 
than 
administrative 
means."  
Winnebago, 196 Wis. 2d at 846, quoting Arndorfer.  The Board 
                     
14 In Arndorfer we recognized that a hearing before a board 
of adjustment is not necessarily an adverse proceeding, see 162 
Wis. 2d at 254, citing 
McQuillin, 
Municipal 
Corporations, 
§ 25.167 at 337 (3d ed. 1983), but we did not waver from the 
requirement that the applicant must comply with the burden of 
proof required by the statute and the ordinance.  See id.  
No.  96-1235  
 
25
itself noted that Huntoon's complaint about loss of shoreline 
due to erosion was likely a condition shared by other Hooker 
Lake property owners.  In any event, no evidence was offered to 
demonstrate that the erosion, even in combination with the 
slope, formed a unique condition, one which prevents Huntoon 
from enjoying a reasonable use of her property. 
¶45 As a final basis for its decision to grant the 
variance, the Board reasoned that the public interest is served 
when citizens are allowed a reasonable use of their property 
that does not cause harm to the public.  This statement 
overlooks the fact that Huntoon has a reasonable use of the 
property without the variance.  The record demonstrates that the 
house has been used as a residence since it was first built.  
Further, the Board's final reason appears to approve of any of a 
number of reasonable uses, so long as it does not cause harm to 
the public.  The Board's statement is too accommodating. 
¶46 Charged with protecting the public interest, the 
legislature has determined that variance requests will be 
considered in light of the purposes of the shoreland protection 
statutes.  See Snyder, 74 Wis. 2d at 473.  Both the statutes and 
the ordinance in this case call for a uniform 75-foot setback 
from the ordinary high-water mark of navigable waters in 
unincorporated areas.  One of the purposes of zoning laws is 
that variances should be granted sparingly.  See 3 Rathkopf's, 
§ 37.06 at 37-81.  Only when the applicant has demonstrated that 
he or she will have no reasonable use of the property, in the 
absence of a variance, is an unnecessary hardship present. 
No.  96-1235  
 
26
 
¶47 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the Board did 
not properly apply the legal standard for unnecessary hardship 
when it granted Huntoon a variance to build a deck extending 
into the shoreyard of Hooker Lake.  Further, the Board lacked 
substantial evidence on which to base its conclusion of 
unnecessary hardship.  We therefore reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals, and remand to the circuit court for remand and 
rehearing by the Board of Adjustment consistent with the legal 
standard as described in this opinion. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
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