Case Title: Ex parte Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: State of Alabama v. Par Pharmaceutical, Inc.)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1090992

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2010-09-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:  09/30/2010
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
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the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2010
____________________
1090992
____________________
Ex parte Par Pharmaceutical, Inc.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: State of Alabama
v.
Par Pharmaceutical, Inc.)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CV-05-219.57)
____________________
1090994
____________________
2
Ex parte Mylan Inc., Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., and UDL
Laboratories, Inc.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: State of Alabama
v.
Mylan Inc., Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc., and UDL
Laboratories, Inc.)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CV-05-219.50, CV-219.51, and
CV-05-219.72)
SMITH, Justice.
In two separate petitions, Par Pharmaceutical, Inc., and
Mylan Inc. (formerly known as Mylan Laboratories, Inc.), Mylan
Pharmaceuticals Inc., and UDL Laboratories, Inc., petition
this Court for a writ of mandamus, asking us to vacate an
order of the Montgomery Circuit Court that consolidates for a
single trial under Rule 42, Ala. R. Civ. P., the cases filed
against the petitioners by the State of Alabama as a part of
cases the State has filed against multiple pharmaceutical
companies.  See generally AstraZeneca LP v. State, [Ms.
1071439, Oct. 16, 2009] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2009).  We deny
the petitions.  
1090992, 1090994
3
Facts and Procedural History
This opinion represents the fourth opinion from this
Court addressing some aspect of the underlying litigation by
the State against the pharmaceutical companies.  See Ex parte
Novartis Pharm. Corp., 975 So. 2d 297 (Ala. 2007) ("Novartis
I"); Ex parte Novartis Pharm. Corp., 991 So. 2d 1263 (Ala.
2008) ("Novartis II"); and AstraZeneca, supra.   The following
background as stated in Novartis II is relevant to the present
petitions:
"This action is part of the Alabama Medicaid
Pharmaceutical 
average 
wholesale 
price 
('AWP')
litigation, 
in 
which 
the 
State 
has 
sued 
73
pharmaceutical 
companies, 
including 
AstraZeneca
[AstraZeneca LP and AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP],
GSK 
[SmithKline 
Beecham 
Corporation 
d/b/a
GlaxoSmithKline], 
and 
Novartis 
[Pharmaceuticals
Corporation].  According to Novartis, the State
alleges 
that 
each 
pharmaceutical 
company
independently 'engaged in false, misleading, wanton,
unfair, and deceptive acts and practices in the
pricing and marketing of their prescription drug
products' by reporting false pricing benchmarks and
by failing to disclose to Alabama Medicaid the
discounts 
or 
rebates 
made 
available 
by 
the
pharmaceutical companies to Alabama physicians and
pharmacies 
who 
dispensed 
the 
drugs 
('the
providers').  Novartis's petition at 2-3.  The State
asserts that [the] Alabama Medicaid [program] relied
on these allegedly false disclosures and deceptive
nondisclosures, and that, as a result, Alabama
Medicaid compensated the providers more for the
prescription drugs than the drugs actually cost the
providers.  Id.  Thus, according to the State, these
1090992, 1090994
4
fraudulent practices by the pharmaceutical companies
caused 
the 
State 
to 
overpay 
for 
Medicaid
prescription drugs.  The State alleges that each
defendant 
pharmaceutical 
company 
marketed 
this
profit margin or 'spread' (the difference between
what the providers actually paid for the drugs and
the amounts reimbursed to providers by Alabama
Medicaid) to the providers to encourage them to use
that company's products rather than those of its
competitors.  See generally Novartis I, 975 So. 2d
297.
"Originally, the State brought a single action
against all 73 defendant pharmaceutical companies.
Many of the defendant pharmaceutical companies moved
to sever the claims against them from those of the
other defendants; however, the trial court summarily
denied the motions to sever.  Forty-four defendant
pharmaceutical companies filed mandamus petitions in
this Court challenging the trial court's ruling on
the severance issue; those petitions resulted in the
opinion in Novartis I.  At issue in Novartis I was
whether joinder of all 73 defendants in a single
action was improper under Rule 20(a), Ala. R. Civ.
P., which permits joinder of multiple defendants in
a single action when the two requirements of Rule
20(a) are met.  First, 'the plaintiff must assert
against each defendant a "right to relief in respect
of 
or 
arising 
out 
of 
the 
same 
transaction,
occurrence, 
or 
series 
of 
transactions 
or
occurrences,"' and, second, 'there will arise in the
action "any question of law or fact common to all
defendants."'  Novartis I, 975 So. 2d at 299
(quoting Rule 20(a), Ala. R. Civ. P.).  In Novartis
I, this Court found that the joinder of all the
defendants was improper because the facts of the
case did not satisfy the first requirement of
permissive joinder.  We concluded that the State was
not asserting a right to relief against all
defendants arising out of the same transaction or
occurrence; rather, the State was suing each
defendant pharmaceutical company for independently
1090992, 1090994
5
committing logically unrelated, yet 'coincidentally
similar,' fraudulent acts that were not part of a
conspiracy or a series of coordinated transactions
or occurrences.  Novartis I.  Because the State's
claims against the pharmaceutical companies did not
satisfy the first requirement of permissive joinder,
this Court did not reach the second requirement;
thus, it did not decide in Novartis I whether 'any
question of law or fact common to all defendants
[would] arise in the action.'  See Ala. R. Civ. P.
20(a).
"Justice Lyons concurred specially in Novartis
I and was joined by Chief Justice Cobb; he noted
that the Court's finding of misjoinder in Novartis
I did not preclude the prospect of consolidated
trials under Rule 42(a), Ala. R. Civ. P.  Rule 42(a)
vests trial courts with the discretion to order a
joint trial 'of any or all the matters in issue' in
'actions involving a common question of law or
fact,' whether or not the right to relief asserted
by the plaintiff against all defendants arises out
of the same transaction or occurrence.  Ex parte
Flexible Prods. Co., 915 So. 2d 34, 43 (2005).
Justice 
Lyons 
encouraged 
the 
trial 
court 
to
consider, in response to Novartis I, 'the extent to
which some number of trials less than 73 might be
appropriate,' 975 So. 2d at 305, but cautioned the
trial court against the opaque manner in which it
had arrived at an earlier 'consolidation' order
grouping the defendant pharmaceutical companies into
four tracks for trial:
"'In the proceedings that led to the
present petitions, the trial court, as best
I can determine, announced that there would
be four trials consisting of four tracks of
defendants.  The trial court then sought
the assistance of two special masters,
placing them in what appears to be a
procrustean bed of four trials.  The
special masters' report and any bases
1090992, 1090994
6
therein for selecting the parties for the
four trials was not made available to the
parties.  The trial court entered an order
based upon the report in which it created
four 
tracks 
of 
defendants 
without
identifying its rationale for clustering
various defendants in the various tracks.
"'The validity of the prior order of
consolidation is not before us because we
have 
found 
a 
misjoinder 
of 
parties,
necessitating our setting aside the trial
court's order.  I will not speculate on the
result that might have been reached had it
been necessary to address the order of
consolidation.  Suffice it to say that,
upon remand, a more transparent proceeding
not so ostensibly lacking in a principled
basis would better serve the ends of
justice.  For example, if the trial court
once again seeks the input of special
masters, its announcement of the number of
tracks without stating any basis therefor
before the masters' participation, its
failure to disclose to the parties the
recommendation of the masters, and its
failure to identify the reasoning upon
which any clusters of defendants are
created for resolution of this proceeding
in any order calling for fewer than 73
trials will substantially increase the
State's 
burden 
in 
sustaining 
its
protestations 
against 
this 
Court's
micromanagement 
of 
the 
trial 
court's
exercise of discretion should there be a
subsequent mandamus proceeding challenging
consolidation.'
"Novartis I, 975 So. 2d at 305 (Lyons, J.,
concurring specially).
1090992, 1090994
AstraZeneca's petition was dismissed as moot because
1
after AstraZeneca filed its petition but before this Court
issued the opinion in Novartis II "the trial court proceeded
... with a trial of the State's claims against AstraZeneca
alone, without consolidating that trial with the trials of GSK
and Novartis and without awaiting this Court's resolution of
7
"After this Court issued its opinion in Novartis
I, the trial court ordered a joint trial of
AstraZeneca LP and AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP,
to begin on February 11, 2008.  AstraZeneca did not
object to the order scheduling the joint trial of
the State's claims against it.  Subsequently, the
State moved the trial court to consolidate the
AstraZeneca trial with 14 similar fraud cases
against other defendant pharmaceutical companies,
including GSK and Novartis.  The various defendant
pharmaceutical 
companies 
opposed 
the 
State's
consolidation motion, and the trial court conducted
a hearing on the motion.  After the hearing, the
trial court issued a nine-page order that granted
the State's motion in part and consolidated the
trial of the State's claims against AstraZeneca with
the trials of the State's claims against GSK and
Novartis. ... The trial court denied the State's
consolidation 
motion 
as 
to 
the 
remaining 
12
pharmaceutical companies the State had sought to
join in a single trial.
"AstraZeneca, GSK, and Novartis (collectively
'the pharmaceutical manufacturers') each petitioned
this Court for the writ of mandamus directing the
trial court to vacate its order consolidating the
cases. ..."
Novartis II, 991 So. 2d at 1267-70 (footnotes omitted). 
In Novartis II, this Court held that the trial court had
not exceeded its discretion in consolidating for trial the
claims against GSK and Novartis.   We first held that there
1
1090992, 1090994
these petitions for the writ of mandamus."  991 So. 2d at
1271.
8
were common questions of law and fact in the State's
fraudulent-misrepresentation 
and 
fraudulent-suppression 
claims
against GSK and Novartis.  Specifically, we noted, as to the
fraudulent-misrepresentation claim, that 
"The 
factual 
basis 
of 
the 
State's
fraudulent-misrepresentation 
claim 
against 
the
pharmaceutical manufacturers is that they 'reported
or caused to be reported AWP [average wholesale
price], WAC [wholesale acquisition cost], and Direct
Price for their products ... for publication and
dissemination to state Medicaid agencies such as
Alabama 
Medicaid.' 
 
State's 
second 
amended
complaint, Appendix, Vol. 1 at Exhibit 1, at 38.
The State asserts that 'Alabama Medicaid reasonably
relied on the false pricing data in setting
prescription drug reimbursement rates and making
payment on such rates.' State's second amended
complaint, Appendix, Vol. 1 at Exhibit 1, at 38.
Thus, it appears that in this case there will be a
common question of fact as to whether the pricing
information 
published 
in 
the 
third-party
publications was material and whether the State, in
fact, relied on that information.  Although the
other elements of the State's claim may 'produce
proof pertaining to individual actors and actions,'
Novartis's petition at 11, whether the prices
submitted to and published in the third-party
publications were material and whether the State
relied 
on 
the 
third-party 
publications 
in
calculating the amounts to reimburse the providers
appear to be questions common to both GSK and
Novartis."
991 So. 2d at 1275. 
1090992, 1090994
9
As to the fraudulent-suppression claim, we stated:
"The 
State 
specifically 
alleges 
that 
the
pharmaceutical manufacturers 'voluntarily undertook
to report or cause to be reported AWP, WAC, and
Direct Price for their products ... for publication
and 
dissemination 
to 
state 
Medicaid 
agencies
including Alabama Medicaid' and that they 'had a
duty under the particular circumstances to provide
accurate and complete AWP, WAC, and Direct Price
information.'  State's second amended complaint,
Appendix, Vol. 1 at Exhibit 1, at 39.  In its
answer, GSK admits that it 'distributes, markets or
sells certain prescription drugs that are reimbursed
by Alabama Medicaid' and that 'from time to time,
GSK provided price communications to third party
publications 
which 
contained 
"WACs" 
[wholesale
acquisition costs] or similar list prices for
wholesalers for certain of its drugs.'  GSK's
answer, Appendix, Vol. 1 at Exhibit 4, pp. 7 and 19.
Similarly, Novartis admits that 'it distributes,
markets or sells ... prescription drugs that are
reimbursed by Alabama Medicaid' and that 'from time
to time during the relevant period, Novartis
provided price lists to third party publications
which 
contained, 
inter 
alia, 
"AWPs" 
[average
wholesale prices] and "WACs" [wholesale acquisition
costs] for certain of its drugs ....'  Novartis's
answer, Appendix, Vol. 1 at Exhibit 3, pp. 6 and 12.
"'[T]he existence of a duty is a question of law
to be determined by the trial judge.  State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co. v. Owen, 729 So. 2d 834, 839 (Ala.
1998).  Thus, it appears that there is a common
question of law as to whether the pharmaceutical
manufacturers, 
in 
participating 
in 
Alabama's
Medicaid program and reporting prescription drug
prices to the third-party reporting services, had a
duty to accurately disclose their prescription drug
prices to the third-party publications.
1090992, 1090994
10
"Similarly, it appears that common to both
actions on this claim is the question whether the
State, in fact, acted to its injury with regard to
the 
information 
provided 
to 
the 
third-party
publications."
991 So. 2d at 1276.
We rejected the pharmaceutical companies' alternative
argument that consolidation was "inappropriate because, they
sa[id], the consolidation [would] prejudice the parties,
confuse the jury, and waste judicial resources."  991 So. 2d
at 
1277. 
 
We 
concluded 
that 
under 
the 
particular
circumstances, "any prejudice and/or confusion [could] be
avoided or minimized by careful trial management."  991 So. 2d
at 1280.
The present petitions involve the State's claims against
Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. ("Par"), and Mylan Inc. (formerly
known as Mylan Laboratories, Inc.), Mylan Pharmaceuticals
Inc., and UDL Laboratories, Inc. ("UDL") (collectively
"Mylan").  As noted above in Novartis II, the State's second
amended complaint sets forth the same basic allegations
against the 73 pharmaceutical companies.  Both Par and Mylan
were named as defendants in that complaint; thus, the basic
1090992, 1090994
11
allegations against the defendants in Novartis II appear to be
the same basic allegations against Par and Mylan.
On March 30, 2010, the trial court ordered, under Rule
42(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., consolidation of the actions against
Par and Mylan.  On April 15, 2010, Par and Mylan separately
petitioned this Court for the writ of mandamus, asking us to
vacate the trial court's consolidation order and to stay all
proceedings in this matter in the trial court.  On April 27,
2010, Par and Mylan filed summary-judgment motions in the
trial court.  On May 12, 2010, the State filed a brief and
materials in opposition to those motions, and on May 18, 2010,
the trial court held a hearing on the pending summary-judgment
motions.  On May 25, 2010, this Court stayed all proceedings
in the trial court.  
Standard of Review
"'"'Mandamus 
is 
a 
drastic 
and
extraordinary writ, to be issued only where
there is (1) a clear legal right in the
petitioner to the order sought; (2) an
imperative duty upon the respondent to
perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so;
(3) the lack of another adequate remedy;
and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of
the court.'"'  
"Novartis I, 975 So. 2d at 299 (quoting Ex parte
Perfection Siding, Inc., 882 So. 2d 307, 309-10
1090992, 1090994
12
(Ala. 2003), quoting in turn Ex parte Integon Corp.,
672 So. 2d 497, 499 (Ala. 1995)).  '"'In cases
involving the exercise of discretion by an inferior
court, [the writ of] mandamus may issue to compel
the exercise of that discretion.  It may not,
however, issue to control or review the exercise of
discretion, except in a case [where the trial court
exceeds its discretion].'"'  Ex parte Monsanto Co.,
794 So. 2d 350, 351-52 (Ala. 2001) (quoting Ex parte
Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 548 So. 2d 1029, 1030 (Ala.
1989), quoting in turn Ex parte Edgar, 543 So. 2d
682, 685 (Ala. 1989))."
Novartis II, 991 So. 2d at 1270.
Discussion
I.
Par and Mylan argue first that based on this Court's
decision in AstraZeneca, a common question of law or fact no
longer exists because AstraZeneca, they contend, considered
the reliance and causation issues central to the State's
misrepresentation and fraudulent-suppression claims and found
them without merit based on the documentary evidence in
AstraZeneca 
detailing 
the 
State's 
knowledge, 
policy 
decisions,
surveys, and calculations.  That evidence in AstraZeneca, this
Court 
held, 
conclusively 
demonstrated 
that 
"the 
State
determined for itself the appropriate reimbursement formulas
based on its own surveys and calculations," ___ So. 3d at ___,
and therefore "[t]he State failed to produce substantial
1090992, 1090994
In its materials opposing the summary-judgment motions,
2
a copy of which the State has provided with its answer to this
Court, the State more extensively addresses Par's and Mylan's
substantive arguments regarding the applicability of the
AstraZeneca decision and cites evidence that it contends
distinguishes AstraZeneca.  In sum, the State's position as to
the applicability of the AstraZeneca decision is that 
13
evidence that it reasonably relied on the misrepresentations
and/or fraudulent suppression it alleged AstraZeneca, GSK, and
Novartis engaged in in these cases." ___ So. 3d at ___.  Par
and Mylan contend that the same evidence regarding the State's
conduct will be admissible in the underlying actions and will
be dispositive of the State's claims against them.
In response, the State asserts generally that AstraZeneca
is limited to its particular facts.  However, the State
focuses its arguments primarily on whether Par's and Mylan's
arguments--and the ultimate relief they seek of a declaration
from this Court that the AstraZeneca decision disposes of the
State's claims against Par and Mylan--are properly reviewable
on a petition for the writ of mandamus.  The State contends
that Par's and Mylan's arguments as to the applicability of
the AstraZeneca decision are "summary-judgment arguments"--
i.e., arguments that would be better addressed by the trial
court when it rules on the pending summary-judgment motions.2
1090992, 1090994
"[t]he AstraZeneca opinion turned on the factual
issue of reasonable reliance based on the specific
evidence in that case.  Short of trial or a ruling
on summary judgment, the evidence against Mylan has
yet to be presented or established. Mylan's petition
requests the impossible: that this Court speculate
on the evidence to be admitted at trial against
Mylan and then hold in advance of trial that the
AstraZeneca opinion disposes of any factual issues
against Mylan."
14
The State argues that the petitions in this Court are an
attempt to perform "an end-run on the summary-judgment process
and violate[] the rule that this Court will not review on
mandamus the denial of summary judgment (which has not yet
even occurred)."  (State's answer, p. 12.)  Further, the State
contends: "If the trial court ruled in favor of Mylan and Par
on summary judgment, there would have been no need for a
mandamus petition by them.  If the trial court ruled against
them, then they would have had no legal grounds to seek
mandamus."  (State's answer, p. 4.)  
In their petitions
to this Court, Par and Mylan acknowledged that although they
had not yet done so, they would file motions arguing that the
decision in AstraZeneca entitles them to a summary judgment.
As noted above, since petitioning this Court for mandamus but
before this Court stayed the proceedings in the trial court,
both Par and Mylan indeed have moved for a summary judgment.
1090992, 1090994
The State contends, for example, that Par and Mylan are
3
taking inconsistent positions by arguing "on the one hand,
that [the cases against them] are separate and distinct cases
which cannot be consolidated" but arguing "on the other hand
that [the cases] should be considered exactly the same as
AstraZeneca and Sandoz[, Inc. v. State (No. 1081402)] for the
purposes of claim preclusion."  (State's answer, p. 19.)  In
the trial court, the State cited Mylan's earlier contention
that there are "significant, substantive differences between
the Medicaid reimbursement of brand and generic pharmaceutical
products under the rules of the Alabama Medicaid Program."
State's Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Vacate or Stay
Order Setting Mylan Defendants for Trial on June 14, 2010.
Additionally, the State contended that 
"[b]ecause Mylan's drugs are almost entirely generic
and 
not 
brands, 
there 
is 
no 
mathematical
relationship between the AWP and WAC prices reported
by Mylan and used by [Alabama Medicaid] to reimburse
pharmacies.  Unlike brand drugs where reported AWP
prices generally exceed reported WAC prices by
either 20% or 25%, there is no such connection
15
At the time this Court stayed the trial-court proceedings, the
trial court had not yet ruled on those motions.  
The parties in the present petitions have attached as
exhibits the pending summary-judgment motions and the State's
responses, and we express no opinion as to the merits of the
matters raised in those materials.  We do note, however, that
it is clear from those materials as well as the other
materials before us that the parties vigorously dispute
whether the AstraZeneca decision disposes of the State's
claims in the underlying cases.   
3
1090992, 1090994
between AWP and WAC for generic drugs.  That is,
there was no rhyme or reason to the percentage
markup of AWP over WAC for any particular Mylan
drug, and there was certainly no mathematical
relationship between Mylan's AWP and WAC prices
across the board. Therefore, even assuming that the
State knew that Mylan's reported AWP prices were
inflated (which the State did not), it would be
absolutely impossible for the State to conclude from
such knowledge alone that Mylan's WAC prices were
also inflated or to estimate the amount of such
inflation."  
Id.
16
The State correctly points out that a denial of a motion
for a summary judgment is, with limited exceptions not
applicable here, not reviewable on a petition for the writ of
mandamus.  In Ex parte Liberty National Life Insurance Co.,
825 So. 2d 758 (Ala. 2002), we stated:  
"Subject to certain narrow exceptions not applicable
here, we have held that, because an 'adequate
remedy' exists by way of an appeal, the denial of a
motion to dismiss or a motion for a summary judgment
is not reviewable by petition for writ of mandamus.
See Ex parte Jackson, 780 So. 2d 681, 684 (Ala.
2000) (quoting Ex parte Empire Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 720 So. 2d 893, 894 (Ala. 1998), quoting in
turn Ex parte Central Bank of the South, 675 So. 2d
403 (Ala. 1996), for the general rule that '"'a writ
of mandamus will not issue to review the merits of
an order denying a motion for a summary judgment,'"'
but noting that narrow exceptions exist, such as in
cases involving governmental immunity); Ex parte
Newco Mfg. Co., 481 So. 2d 867, 870 (Ala. 1985) ('In
its Mandamus petition as addressed to its motion for
1090992, 1090994
17
summary judgment based on the statute of repose
contained in the Tennessee products liability act,
Newco seeks "to do by mandamus that which can be
done on appeal."' (quoting Ex parte South Carolina
Ins. Co., 412 So. 2d 269 (Ala. 1982))); see also Ex
parte Mobile County Dep't of Human Res., 815 So. 2d
527 (Ala. 2001) (issuing writ of mandamus to reverse
an order denying a motion to dismiss asserting
defense of immunity); Ex parte Alabama Dep't of
Forensic Sciences, 709 So. 2d 455 (Ala. 1997)
(permitting review by petition for a writ of
mandamus in case involving immunity).  Because the
relief Liberty National seeks in its mandamus
petition can be adequately attained by an appeal,
Liberty National is not entitled to a writ of
mandamus to review the denial of its motion."
825 So. 2d at 761-62 (emphasis added).  See also Ex parte
Griffin, 4 So. 3d 430, 435 (Ala. 2008) ("Generally, the denial
of a motion for a summary judgment is not reviewable by a
petition for a writ of mandamus.").
We agree with the State that the instant petitions are
analogous to a petition for the writ of mandamus seeking
review of the denial of a motion for a summary judgment.  If
the AstraZeneca decision indeed is dispositive of the State's
claims against Par and Mylan--a question as to which we
express no opinion here--and the trial court rules erroneously
on that issue, Par and Mylan will be able to obtain adequate
relief by an appeal.  To the extent that Par and Mylan are
asking us to create a new exception to the rule that we do not
1090992, 1090994
18
review such questions on a petition for the writ of mandamus,
we decline the request.  Moreover, the underlying proceedings
have not progressed to the procedural stage at which such a
review on the merits would be possible, nor is the evidentiary
record in the present petitions developed sufficiently for us
to review the substantive merits of Par's and Mylan's
contentions regarding the applicability of AstraZeneca to the
underlying cases. 
Thus, Par and Mylan have not demonstrated that they are
entitled to the writ of mandamus on the alleged basis that
AstraZeneca is dispositive of the State's claims against them.
See Ex parte Liberty Nat'l, supra;  Ex parte Griffin, supra.
See also Novartis II, 991 So. 2d at 1280 ("'"This Court does
not issue the writ of mandamus based on mere speculation as to
the possible occurrence of future events."'" (quoting Ex parte
Flexible Prods. Co., 915 So. 2d 34, 41 (Ala. 2005), quoting in
turn Ex parte Vance, 900 So. 2d 394, 398-99 (Ala. 2004))). 
II.
Par and Mylan contend that the trial court exceeded its
discretion in finding the existence of a common issue of law
or fact.  In Novartis II, we stated:
1090992, 1090994
19
"Rule 42(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides:
"'When actions involving a common question
of law or fact are pending before the
court, it may order a joint hearing or
trial of any or all the matters in issue in
the actions; it may order all the actions
consolidated; and it may make such orders
concerning proceedings therein as may tend
to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.'
"'We have said that "[c]ircuit judges have broad
powers under the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure
... to order actions consolidated."'  Ex parte
Flexible Prods. Co., 915 So. 2d at 39 (quoting State
v. Reynolds, 887 So. 2d 848, 854 (Ala. 2004)).
'[Rule 42(a) ] specifically recognizes the propriety
of consolidation, as well as the trial court's
discretion to order consolidation as necessary to
reduce costs or delay.'  Owens-Corning Fiberglass
Corp. v. James, 646 So. 2d 669, 674 (Ala. 1994)."
991 So. 2d at 1274.  We then stated the following regarding
the existence of a common question of law or fact:
"Rule 42(a) permits joint trials when the cases
share 'a common question of law or fact.' Ala. R.
Civ. P. 42(a).  One of either--law or fact--will
suffice as the basis for invoking the rule.  See
also 33 Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 77:44 (1995) ('Actions
involving the same parties are likely candidates for
consolidation, but a common question of law or fact
is enough; if a common question exists, courts often
consolidate 
actions 
despite 
differences 
in
parties.'); 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2382 (3d
ed. 2008) ('The existence of a common question by
itself is enough to permit consolidation under Rule
42(a), [Fed. R. Civ. P.,], even if the claims arise
out 
of 
independent transactions.').  Further,
consolidation under Rule 42 does not require that
1090992, 1090994
20
common issues predominate over other issues. See Ex
parte Flexible Prods. Co., 915 So. 2d at 42
('Moreover, we reject the argument presented by the
defendants 
that 
the 
propriety 
of 
the
[case-management order] rests upon a determination
of whether any common issues "predominate" over the
other issues in the actions to be consolidated.  A
weighing of the relative dominance of the particular
issues presented by actions to be consolidated (an
exercise that would be speculative in actions such
as this where the common issues have yet to be
framed) is not required by Rule 42.')."
991 So. 2d at 1277.
In its consolidation order, the trial court found the
following common issues of fact and law in the actions against
Par and Mylan:
"•
That each defendant allegedly participates in
Alabama's Medicaid program;
"•
That each defendant allegedly reported the
prices for its drug(s) at issue to First
DataBank ('Blue Book') and Medical Economics,
Inc. ('Red Book');
"•
That each defendant allegedly knew that Alabama
Medicaid relied upon and utilized the prices
reported by such defendant to Blue Book and Red
Book as the basis to reimburse providers making
Medicaid claims;
"•
That each defendant allegedly gave undisclosed
discounts, rebates, and other inducements to
medical providers (which had the effect of
lowering the actual wholesale or sale price
charged to its customers);
"•
That each defendant allegedly falsely reported
1090992, 1090994
Mylan admits that it reported its WACs to third-party
4
publishers.
21
inflated prices to Blue Book and Red Book and
allegedly concealed its actual, lower prices;
"•
That each defendant allegedly knew that its
price 
reporting 
would 
result 
in 
Alabama
Medicaid 
paying 
excessive 
amounts 
for
reimbursement of those drugs;
"•
That Alabama Medicaid allegedly relied upon
each defendant to report its prices in a
truthful manner to the price reporting services
used 
by 
Alabama 
Medicaid 
to 
reimburse
providers;
"•
That 
each 
defendant's 
alleged 
wrongful
reporting of price information resulted in
monetary damages to the State."
Par and Mylan focus primarily on Par's contention that it
did not routinely report its wholesale acquisition costs
("WACs") to third-party publishers.   Par and Mylan point out
4
that in Novartis II both GSK and Novartis admitted that they
provided information to third-party publishers.  See Novartis
II, 991 So. 2d at 1276 ("GSK admits that .... 'from time to
time, GSK provided price communications to third party
publications which contained "WACs" [wholesale acquisition
costs] or similar list prices for wholesalers for certain of
its drugs.' ... Similarly, Novartis admits that .... 'from
time to time during the relevant period, Novartis provided
1090992, 1090994
Par concedes in its petition that it "is aware of
5
isolated 
occasions on which 
a 
Par employee mistakenly 
provided
WACs to, or verified WACs already possessed by, a publisher."
(Par's petition, p. 9 n.3.)  However, Par contends that its
"evidence would show that, upon learning of such
instances, Par would contact the relevant publisher
and ask it to remove the Par WAC from its
publication. Moreover, such isolated mistakes were
irrelevant 
to 
[Alabama 
Medicaid's] 
standard,
continuously applied reimbursement methodology."
(Par's petition, p. 9 n.3 (emphasis added).)
22
price lists to third party publications which contained, inter
alia, "AWPs" [average wholesale prices] and "WACs" [wholesale
acquisition costs] for certain of its drugs ....'").  If
indeed this difference between the reporting practices of
Mylan and Par exists,  we disagree that it means that the
5
trial court exceeded its discretion in finding a common issue
of law or fact under Rule 42(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., at this
stage in the proceedings.
In addition to the above-listed common issues of law or
fact, the trial court in another part of its order noted:
"Evidence concerning the reimbursement formulas and
the State's purported use and/or reliance on
defendants' reported prices will not differ among
[Mylan and Par] as each defendant either reported,
caused to be reported or engaged in conduct with a
reckless disregard to the truth of the prices
allowed to be published for its drugs to First
1090992, 1090994
This 
statement 
from 
the 
trial 
court's 
order 
is 
consistent
6
with, as Par states in its petition, "the State['s]
suggest[ion] [that] it would seek to hold Par responsible for
WACs supplied to First DataBank not by Par, but by 'somebody
else.'" (Par's petition, p. 23.)
The 
trial 
court 
cited 
the 
following 
affirmative 
defenses:
7
the statute of limitations, the statute of repose, laches,
estoppel, waiver, standing, the failure to satisfy federal
regulatory requirements, federal preemption, the political-
question doctrine, and the filed-rate doctrine.
23
DataBank, which, in turn, transmitted the prices to
Alabama Medicaid for its use."6
(Emphasis added.)  The trial court's order also states that
the State plans to present as to all defendants (1) the same
expert testimony at trial and (2) the same model and
methodology for proving its alleged damage.  Further, the
trial court's order notes that both Par and Mylan have
asserted common affirmative defenses to the State's claims.7
The trial court also found it particularly significant that
both Par and Mylan "manufacture[], distribute[], market[],
and/or 
offer[] 
for 
sale 
almost 
exclusively 
generic
prescription drugs" (emphasis added).  Based on the foregoing,
the trial court did not exceed its discretion in finding the
existence of a common issue of law or fact under Rule 42(a),
Ala. R. Civ. P.
Par and Mylan contend alternatively that even if the
1090992, 1090994
24
State's cases against them present a common question of law or
fact, consolidation is inappropriate because, they say, the
consolidation will prejudice the parties, confuse the jury,
and 
waste 
judicial 
resources. 
 
In 
support 
of 
their
contentions, Par and Mylan make the following contentions:
--
"The State's claims against Par and its separate
claims against Mylan would take multiple weeks to
try, and it is likely that the volume of evidence
presented during that time would overwhelm the
jury's ability to give full and fair consideration
to the evidence presented against and by each
defendant."  (Par's petition, p. 24.)
--
The State's allegations against Par relate to the
pricing and marketing of 23 drugs associated with
158 unique "National Drug Code" numbers ("NDCs").
According to Par, each of its drugs "was priced and
marketed in light of competitive pressures and other
variables 
in each individual product market."
(Par's petition, p. 8.)  Thus, the number of
distinct NDCs for drugs Par priced and marketed
represents roughly 20% of the NDCs involved in the
State's claims against Par and Mylan.
--
The State's allegations against Mylan relate to 153
separate drugs, associated with 633 distinct NDCs.
Thus, the number of distinct NDCs for drugs that
Mylan priced and marketed represents about 80% of
the NDCs involved in the State's claims against Par
and Mylan.  Par asserts that "the presentation of
the vastly larger body of evidence against or for
Mylan would unfairly dominate the jury's time and
attention. ... Par's story would be lost in this
deluge of evidence."  (Par's petition, p. 26.)
--
As noted above, Par contends that its policy and
practice was to not submit WAC pricing for its
1090992, 1090994
25
generic drugs to industry publishers.  Mylan,
however, supplied the WAC prices for its generic
drugs to such publishers.
--
Par asserts that "at least seven of the generic
drugs at issue in this case were independently
marketed and sold by both Par and Mylan.  These
overlapping drugs--each pair of which shares the
same generic name--aggravate the likelihood that the
jury would become confused and fail to recall the
distinctions between the defendants.  No such
problem was present when this Court upheld [in
Novartis II] the consolidation of Novartis and GSK--
who had no product overlap."  (Par's petition, p.
27; cf. Mylan's petition, p. 19.)
The trial court found that consolidation of the trials
against Par and Mylan would be "the most efficient and
economical disposition of this action."  The trial court
rejected as "premature and without merit" Par's and Mylan's
claims that they would be prejudiced by the consolidation.
The trial court cited its own experience in trying the
consolidated cases against GSK and Novartis, and it stated
that during that the trial of the GSK and Novartis cases
"the jury repeatedly was made aware, from the
outset, that there were two separate cases for its
consideration.  Special notebooks were prepared,
special jury instructions were given, exhibits were
separately marked, and numerous other precautionary
measures were taken to avoid juror confusion." 
The trial court further found that 
"not granting the State's motion to consolidate will
1090992, 1090994
In Novartis II, the trial court's consolidation order
8
stated:
"'The Court further finds that consolidation of
these actions promotes effective case management and
avoids needlessly duplicative trials.  Consolidation
of these actions will conserve judicial resources,
alleviate unnecessary delay and expense, reduce the
burden on witnesses and the parties, and result in
the most efficient and economical disposition of
these actions.  Moreover, the Court finds that the
parties will not suffer prejudice as a result of
consolidation of the trials of the Consolidated
Defendants as these defendants are members of the
"Track 1" grouping of cases for trial, originally
set for trial in November 2007, and for which the
discovery deadline has expired.  Finally, the
logical grouping of the Consolidated Defendants--all
of which manufacture, market and sell brand-name
drugs and similarly report prices--minimizes the
risk of any prejudice or confusion which could
potentially result from consolidation.'"
26
prejudice the State in that multiple, individual
trials will require the State to present its
witnesses and evidence in staggering repetition.
Separate trials for each Defendant could take years
to complete, would impose tremendous economic burden
on the State, and would constitute an onerous and
unnecessary burden on the State's witnesses, as well
as third-party witnesses who would he forced to
testify repeatedly.  Additionally, the Court finds
that multiple trials greatly increase the risk of
inconsistent rulings on common issues regarding
common questions of law and fact."
The trial court's stated reasons supporting consolidation
are similar to and expand upon the reasons the trial court
identified in Novartis II as supporting consolidation.8
1090992, 1090994
991 So. 2d at 1278.
27
Moreover, in Novartis II the pharmaceutical companies'
contentions were similar to those outlined above; in that
case, the pharmaceutical companies argued:
"[T]he trial court exceeded its discretion in
ordering a joint trial because 'a joint trial of
claims against [two] individual manufacturers, each
of which, over a 15 year period, sold hundreds of
different products that were priced, marketed, and
reimbursed in different ways will numb jurors to key
distinctions among the defendants, their products,
and their marketing practices.'  Novartis's petition
at 
18. 
 
Specifically, 
the 
pharmaceutical
manufacturers 
argue 
that 
their 
cases 
involve
hundreds of drugs and that the State's claims
necessitate demonstrating proof regarding intent,
falsity, and reliance as to each defendant that will
create an inordinately complex evidentiary record.
They further argue that 'paralyzed by confusion,
jurors will, by default, treat all of the disparate
evidence as if it were relevant to all of the
defendants. 
The 
inevitable 
prejudice 
will 
be
substantial.'  Novartis's petition at 18.
"In 
support 
of 
their 
argument, 
the
pharmaceutical manufacturers point to statements
made by Judge Patti B. Sardis, the Boston-based
federal district judge handling the multidistrict
aspects of the AWP litigation. The pharmaceutical
manufacturers note that Judge Sardis's experience
'led her to conclude that the evidentiary records in
[AWP 
litigation] 
are 
simply 
too 
complex 
and
confusing 
for 
multi-defendant 
jury 
trials.'
Novartis's 
petition 
at 
14. 
Similarly, 
the
pharmaceutical manufacturers point to statements of
Circuit Court Judge Richard G. Niess of Dance
County, Wisconsin, who noted:
1090992, 1090994
28
"'[I]t is not at all apparent ... that any
defendant could have its case fairly
considered by the jury if not in a separate
trial.  Defendants present a compelling
argument for insurmountable jury confusion
with their proof on differing corporate
practices among the defendants, multiple
claims 
against 
each 
defendant 
each
consisting of multiple elements and each
portending multiple verdict questions both
on these claims and defendants' affirmative
defenses.'
"Novartis's 
petition 
at 
17. 
 
Finally, 
the
pharmaceutical manufacturers note that '"[t]he very
purpose of consolidation is to expedite litigation
and save money."'  Novartis's petition at 26
(quoting Teague v. Motes, 57 Ala. App. 609, 613, 330
So. 2d 434, 439 (Ala. Civ. App. 1976)).  However,
they argue that a consolidated trial does not
promote judicial economy because, the pharmaceutical
manufacturers say, consolidation will require the
trial court and the defense attorneys to spend an
inordinate amount of time keeping separate the
claims and evidence attributable to the respective
defendants and claims.  Novartis's petition at 27.
The pharmaceutical manufacturers further argue that
'separate trials also minimize the threat of
long-term inefficiencies in the form of appellate
reversals and retrials.'  Novartis's petition at
28."
991 So. 2d at 1278-80.
We held that these contentions did not demonstrate that
the pharmaceutical companies were entitled to the writ of
mandamus.  We stated:
"In Quintel Corp., N.V. v. Citibank, N.A., 100
F.R.D. 695, 697 (D.C.N.Y. 1983), the federal
1090992, 1090994
29
district court in New York recognized:
"'This type of danger [jury confusion]
exists, of course, in many multidefendant,
multicount trials.  It is a tenet of the
jury system that jurors follow the court's
instructions 
and 
can 
apply 
different
standards to several defendants.  There is
nothing extraordinary about these cases,
such as inevitably conflicting findings,
that would make the danger of confusion
paramount.'
"As the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted in
Hendrix [v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 776 F.2d 1492
(11th Cir. 1985)], the Court must keep in mind 'the
extent to which the risks of prejudice and confusion
that might attend a consolidated trial can be
alleviated by utilizing cautionary instructions to
the jury during the trial and controlling the manner
in which the plaintiffs' claims (including the
defenses thereto) are submitted to the jury for
deliberation.'  Hendrix, 776 F.2d at 1495.
"Although this Court recognizes that the facts
and evidentiary record in these cases may be
complex, we cannot conclude that the trial court
exceeded its discretion when it consolidated these
cases for trial.  With the trial of AstraZeneca
already having concluded, the remaining consolidated
action has only two defendants, Novartis and GSK,
and the State has asserted only four claims against
each defendant.  Under these circumstances, we agree
with the State that any prejudice and/or confusion
can be avoided or minimized by careful trial
management."
991 So. 2d at 1279-80.  
The primary difference between the present petitions and
the petitions in Novartis II is that, as discussed above, Par
1090992, 1090994
30
contends that it did not routinely report pricing information
to third-party publishers.  However, Par concedes that there
were at least isolated instances in which its employees
provided that information or confirmed its existence.  See
supra note 5.  At this juncture in the proceedings below, we
see no reason why the trial court through careful management
will not be able to avoid or minimize any prejudice or
confusion that might result from the alleged differences in
Par's and Mylan's reporting policies and practices.  
As noted above, the trial court cited, in support of
consolidation, its experience in managing the previous trials
related to this litigation.  Par and Mylan attempt to
discredit the trial court's 
experience, 
however, 
with
arguments like the following: 
"Previous [average wholesale price] trials have
demonstrated that the cases are too complex for
case-management tools to mitigate adequately these
prospects of jury confusion and prejudice. ... In
[the GSK/Novartis joint trial] and in the separate
AstraZeneca trial, however, the two juries both
returned verdicts for the State that this Court
later held erroneous as a matter of law. ... Thus,
two separate juries failed to weigh the evidence
properly."  
(Par's petition, pp. 28-29.)  This argument, however,
misapprehends what the AstraZeneca decision held.  AstraZeneca
1090992, 1090994
31
did not hold, as the petitioners suggest, that the juries
"failed to weigh the evidence properly."  Rather, AstraZeneca
held that "the State failed to produce substantial evidence
that it reasonably relied on the misrepresentations and/or
fraudulent suppression it alleged AstraZeneca, GSK, and
Novartis engaged in in these cases."  ___ So. 3d at ___.
Thus, this Court held that the trial court in AstraZeneca
should have granted the defendants' motions for a judgment as
a matter of law and that the cases should not have been
submitted to the jury for consideration.  Id.
Finally, Par asserts that in January 2001 Mylan settled
a lawsuit brought against it relating to its version of the
drug lorazepam.  Par contends that "if evidence about the
settlement were admitted at a consolidated trial involving
Par, it would create a substantial risk of 'guilt by
association,' and work to Par's prejudice."  (Par's petition,
p. 28.)  However, Par concedes that the trial court has not
yet even addressed the admissibility of that alleged
settlement.  Consequently, Par's argument that it will be
prejudiced 
by 
evidence 
of 
the 
alleged 
settlement 
is
speculative at best.
1090992, 1090994
Nothing before us indicates that Par has requested the
9
trial court to stay the proceedings pending resolution of
Sandoz.
32
III.
Both Par and Mylan suggest that this Court should stay
the proceedings against them in the trial court pending this
Court's resolution of the appeal that has been filed in this
Court in Sandoz, Inc. v. State (No. 1081402).  Sandoz, Inc.,
is one of the defendants named in the State's second amended
complaint.  Par and Mylan contend "[a]ny even arguable
questions about the applicability of [the evidence in
AstraZeneca regarding Alabama Medicaid's knowledge of drug
pricing] to [Alabama Medicaid's] knowledge of generic drug
pricing will be resolved when this Court rules on the pending
appeal in" Sandoz.  The State contends that this aspect of the
trial court's ruling--i.e, the denial of Mylan's motion to
stay  the proceedings pending resolution of the appeal in
9
Sandoz--is not reviewable on a petition for the writ of
mandamus.  For the reasons expressed in Part I of this
opinion, 
we 
agree 
with 
the 
State 
that 
under 
these
circumstances this issue is not appropriate for review on a
petition for the writ of mandamus.  The stay of the trial
1090992, 1090994
33
court proceedings that this Court ordered on May 25, 2010, is
hereby lifted.
Conclusion
The petitions for the writ of mandamus are denied.
1090992--PETITION DENIED; STAY LIFTED.
1090994--PETITION DENIED; STAY LIFTED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Bolin, Parker,
and Shaw, JJ., concur.  
Murdock, J., dissents.
1090992, 1090994
34
MURDOCK, Justice (dissenting).
I respectfully dissent for the same reasons I dissented
in  Ex parte Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., 991 So. 2d 1263
(Ala. 2008), upon which the main opinion relies.  That is,
"because of the factual complexity of the claims and defenses
of the parties and the likelihood of substantial confusion on
the part of the jury and of prejudice to the defendants as a
result 
of 
the 
consolidation, I respectfully dissent."
Novartis, 991 So. 2d at 1280 (Murdock, J., concurring in case
no. 1070312 and dissenting in cases no. 1070310 and
no. 1070311).