Case Title: In the Matter of Claude David Grayer

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12642

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-12-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12642 
 
IN THE MATTER OF CLAUDE DAVID GRAYER. 
 
 
December 2, 2019. 
 
 
Attorney at Law, Disciplinary proceeding, Suspension. 
 
 
 
The respondent, Claude David Grayer, appeals from an order 
of a single justice of this court, acting on an information 
filed by the Board of Bar Overseers (board), suspending him from 
the practice of law for one year and a day.  We affirm.1 
 
 
1.  Background.  Bar counsel filed a five-count petition 
for discipline with the board, alleging the respondent's 
misconduct in connection with his representation of four 
clients.  That misconduct included failure of competence and 
diligence; negligence resulting in harm to clients; intentional 
disobedience of a subpoena and an order of the court; and 
failure to communicate the scope and basis of his fees, to 
provide an accounting on request, and to account for or return 
unearned fees when the representation concluded.  The petition 
also charged that the respondent failed to cooperate with bar 
counsel's investigation of these matters.  After requesting and 
receiving several extensions of time to answer, the respondent 
filed an answer on his own behalf. 
 
 
A hearing committee of the board conducted a two-day 
evidentiary hearing, at which five witnesses testified and 
twenty-four exhibits were received in evidence.  The hearing 
                     
 
1 This bar discipline appeal is subject to S.J.C. Rule 2:23 
(b), 471 Mass. 1303 (2015).  Pursuant to the rule, we dispense 
with oral argument, and decide the case on the basis of the 
respondent's preliminary memorandum and other materials filed by 
the respondent. 
2 
 
 
 
committee determined that bar counsel proved the petition's 
allegations and issued a report recommending that the respondent 
be suspended for one year and one day.  The respondent appealed 
to the board.  The board adopted the hearing committee's 
findings and its recommendation, and voted to file an 
information to that effect in the county court. 
 
 
After a hearing, a single justice accepted the hearing 
committee's findings, as adopted by the board, and entered an 
order suspending the respondent from the practice of law for one 
year and one day.  The respondent appeals. 
 
 
2.  Disciplinary violations.  The single justice reviewed 
the record establishing the respondent's misconduct, accepted 
the hearing committee's role as the "sole judge of the 
credibility of the testimony presented at the hearing," S.J.C. 
Rule 4:01, § 8 (5) (a), as appearing in 453 Mass. 1310 (2009), 
and determined that the board's findings of misconduct were 
supported by substantial evidence.  See Matter of Moran, 479 
Mass. 1016, 1017 (2018).  On review, we summarize the hearing 
committee's subsidiary findings of facts concerning each count 
of the petition, which were adopted by the board.2  See S.J.C. 
Rule 4:01, § 8 (6).  The hearing committee's ultimate "findings 
. . . , as adopted by the board, are entitled to deference, 
although they are not binding on this court."  Matter of Ellis, 
457 Mass. 413, 415 (2010).  We conclude that the respondent's 
claim that the hearing committee's findings are flawed is 
without merit.  There was no error in the single justice's 
determination that the respondent violated multiple rules of 
professional conduct.  See Matter of Weiss, 474 Mass. 1001, 1002 
(2016). 
 
 
a.  Count one.  In 2014, the respondent agreed to represent 
a client charged with criminal violation of a restraining order.  
The client paid the respondent a total of $3,000 in connection 
with the representation.  The respondent neither provided the 
client with a written fee agreement nor explained the basis for 
his fee in writing. 
 
The client informed the respondent that he was not a 
citizen of the United States, and expressed his concern that the 
disposition of the charge could adversely affect his immigration 
status.  The respondent understood the client's concern.  The 
                     
 
2 The board adopted the hearing committee's findings, and 
its memorandum briefly summarizes those findings. 
3 
 
 
 
respondent nonetheless advised the client to admit to sufficient 
facts to establish violation of the restraining order, and to 
accept disposition of the case with a continuance without a 
finding.  In the plea colloquy, the judge informed the client of 
the possible immigration consequences of the plea.  When asked, 
the respondent assured the client that it was "okay," and 
explained that the judge was using terminology read to everyone.  
The respondent did not fully explain to the client the potential 
immigration consequences of the plea that the respondent advised 
the client to accept.  An admission to sufficient facts is 
considered a conviction under Federal law.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(48)(A). 
 
 
In July 2015, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
arrested the client due to his admission to sufficient facts for 
violating the restraining order.  The client retained 
postconviction counsel to vacate the admission to sufficient 
facts on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel.  See 
Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko, 473 Mass. 42, 53 (2015).  The 
respondent failed to cooperate with the client and the client's 
successor counsel, and gave inconsistent descriptions of his 
communications with and advice to the client.  The client's 
motion initially was denied on the ground that the "defendant 
has not provided an affidavit from his plea counsel addressing 
counsel's alleged strikingly deficient advice." 
 
The client's second postconviction attorney subpoenaed the 
respondent to testify at a hearing to reconsider the denial of 
the client's motion to vacate the plea.  Although the respondent 
first was served with a subpoena containing an incorrect date, a 
corrected subpoena was served on the respondent by a constable, 
in hand, directing him to appear in court on December 14, 2015.  
Despite service of the corrected subpoena, and despite a 
telephone call from counsel confirming the hearing date, the 
respondent did not move to quash the subpoena, and failed to 
appear in court.  Instead, the respondent appeared the following 
day, purporting to comply with the misdated subpoena.  The 
hearing committee found that the respondent did not want to 
appear at the December 14 hearing, and that his failure to do so 
was intentional.  The judge allowed the client's motion to 
vacate the plea, crediting the client's testimony, "bolstered by 
the failure of plea counsel to cooperate."  The judge found that 
"[i]t has been clearly demonstrated that plea counsel is 
uncooperative.  Plea counsel failed to attend the hearing.  The 
court credits the detailed affidavit of efforts made to obtain 
4 
 
 
 
cooperation and of plea counsel's failure to cooperate."  The 
client spent six months in ICE detention before he was released. 
 
 
On appeal, the respondent contends that he adequately 
communicated with the client concerning the immigration 
consequences associated with his admission to sufficient facts.  
The respondent argues that, in light of his own substantial 
experience in immigration matters, and the judge's plea 
colloquy, the hearing committee ought to have credited his 
testimony rather than that of the client.3  He also challenges 
the hearing committee's rejection of his assertion that he 
informed successor plea counsel that he was unable to attend the 
hearing on December 14.  The hearing committee, however, is the 
"sole judge of credibility, and arguments hinging on such 
determinations generally fall outside the proper scope of our 
review."  Matter of McBride, 449 Mass. 154, 161-162 (2007).  
S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 8 (5) (a).  The hearing committee's 
credibility determinations "will not be rejected unless it can 
be said with certainty that the finding was wholly inconsistent 
with another implicit finding" (quotations and alteration 
omitted).  Matter of Murray, 455 Mass. 872, 880 (2010).  See 
Matter of Finneran, 455 Mass. 722, 730 (2012); S.J.C. Rule 4:01, 
§ 8 (4).  We therefore decline to consider those credibility 
determinations further. 
 
                     
 
3 The respondent also claims that the single justice 
inaccurately described the advice given to the client.  The 
client testified that the respondent advised him that, if he 
accepted a continuance without a finding, and stayed away from 
the victim, "everything will go away after a year. . . .  If I 
did everything I was asked by the court that I was going to be 
fine," and "everything was going to be 'all right.'"  After the 
plea colloquy, the client testified, he asked the respondent 
about the immigration warning the judge gave.  The client 
testified that the respondent told him, "Don't worry about it, 
that's just terminology they use.  They usually read that to 
everybody, that it was like a formality type thing."  The client 
also said the respondent told him, "Yes, that is okay.  That is 
just terminology they use.  They read it to everyone."  The 
single justice's description of the communication is consistent 
with the testimony. 4 There is no dispute that the respondent 
satisfied the judgment after the hearing before the hearing 
committee. 
5 
 
 
 
 
The respondent's failure to determine, understand, and 
advise the client of the immigration consequences of an 
admission to sufficient facts, despite knowing the client's 
immigration status, violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.1, as appearing 
in 471 Mass. 1311 (2015) (competence); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2 
(a), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1313 (2015) (seeking lawful 
objectives); and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4 (a), as appearing in 471 
Mass. 1319 (2015) (communication with client).  The respondent 
also violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (d), as appearing in 471 
Mass. 1483 (2015) (conduct prejudicial to administration of 
justice), and Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (h) (conduct adversely 
reflecting on fitness to practice), by failing to comply with 
the subpoena served on him; and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (b) (1), 
as appearing in 463 Mass. 1302 (2012), by failing to describe to 
the client the basis of his fee in writing. 
 
 
b. Count two.  In October 2016, a second client obtained a 
default judgment against the respondent in the amount of $7,150 
for costs associated with the respondent's failure to properly 
conclude a divorce settlement.  On October 4, 2016, the court 
ordered the respondent either to pay that amount by November 3, 
2016, or to appear for a payment review on November 4, 2016.  
The respondent did neither, and a capias issued against him.  
Between December 2016 and January 2017, bar counsel notified the 
respondent four times about the capias.  Represented by counsel, 
on January 17, 2017, the respondent moved for relief from the 
default judgment, but he neglected to state any grounds.  After 
a hearing, the judge denied the motion, observing that no 
grounds were stated and that there was a "lack of any credible 
testimony at the hearing from [the respondent]" regarding his 
failure to appear.4 
 
 
On appeal, the respondent contends that he was not served 
with proper notice of the October 4, 2016, order.  The hearing 
committee's contrary finding is supported by substantial 
evidence.  While the court's docket does not contain a separate 
docket entry with respect to notice, the board's investigator 
testified that a copy of the notice sent to the parties was in 
the court's file, and that there was no indication that any mail 
had been returned to the court.  In addition, the respondent 
testified that he was "unsure" about whether he received notice 
and, notably, the respondent did not support his motion to 
                     
 
4 There is no dispute that the respondent satisfied the 
judgment after the hearing before the hearing committee. 
6 
 
 
 
vacate the default judgment by claiming lack of notice.  As the 
motion judge ruled, the respondent did not produce any credible 
testimony regarding his failure to appear. 
 
 
By knowingly failing to appear at the payment review 
hearing without having appealed or satisfied the judgment, the 
respondent knowingly disobeyed the court's rules, in violation 
of Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.4 (c), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1425 
(2015).  The respondent's conduct also violated Mass. R. Prof. 
C. 8.4 (d) (conduct prejudicial to administration of justice) 
and 8.4 (h) (conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice 
law). 
 
 
c. Count three.  In April 2016, the respondent agreed to 
represent a third client in an uncontested divorce.  The client 
told the respondent that "she had major financial concerns and 
that she just needed to know how much money this was going to 
cost her."  She also told him that she wanted the divorce 
expeditiously.  The client paid the respondent $700 by check, 
and she sent multiple electronic mail messages to him concerning 
the cost of the divorce, the fees incurred, and the timing of 
her payments.  The respondent did not provide a written 
description of the scope of the representation, the basis for 
the fee, or the expenses for which she would be responsible. 
 
 
On April 14, 2016, the respondent filed a joint petition 
for divorce and an affidavit attesting to the irretrievable 
breakdown of the marriage, which had been previously prepared by 
the client and her spouse.  The respondent reviewed the 
documents with the client.  As filed, the petition was 
internally inconsistent:  it requested both that the parties' 
separation agreement be merged into the judgment and that the 
agreement not be merged and survive as an independent agreement.  
In addition, the client's spouse was on active military duty and 
stationed in another State.  Although the spouse was 
cooperative, the respondent failed to obtain both an original 
signed financial statement from him and an affidavit of 
inability to attend the hearing on the divorce.  The respondent 
did not file a motion to waive the spouse's appearance. 
 
 
In June 2016, the respondent instructed the client to meet 
him at the court house.  When she arrived at the court house on 
June 9, 2016, accompanied by her pastoral counsellor, the 
respondent gave vague explanations to the client and the 
counsellor about the status of the proceedings, would not answer 
7 
 
 
 
directly questions concerning whether the divorce would be 
finalized that day, and then went to "file something."  When he 
returned, he informed the client and the counsellor that the 
divorce could not be finalized because of court congestion that 
day.  He also said that the proceeding might become adversarial. 
 
 
After several weeks, the client and the counsellor went to 
the court house.  They were told that the respondent had not 
filed anything on June 9, and that three documents were 
necessary to finalize the divorce:  the spouse's original signed 
financial statement; the spouse's original signed affidavit of 
unavailability; and a motion to waive the spouse's appearance.  
The client obtained the documents, and she discharged the 
respondent on July 18, 2016.  She appeared in court on August 1, 
2016, with the necessary documents, and obtained a judgment of 
divorce nisi. 
 
 
The respondent's claim on appeal that a written fee 
agreement was not required because the client paid him $500 for 
attorney services and $250 for court filing fees, rather than 
$700 as the hearing committee determined, is unavailing.  See 
Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (b) (2) (writing not required where total 
fee expected to be "less than $500").  The evidence supports the 
conclusion that the client gave the respondent a check for $700, 
they had no discussion about the basis for the fee, and the 
check was not for "expenses or fees."  Likewise, the hearing 
committee was not required to credit the respondent's testimony 
that, when he reviewed the petition with the client, the 
"petition merger check boxes" were unchecked and remained 
unchecked when he filed the petition for divorce; the filings 
demonstrate otherwise.5 
                     
 
5 We acknowledge the respondent's claim that the notice he 
received from bar counsel concerning the client's unavailability 
(due to illness) to testify at the hearing was inadequate to 
permit him to prepare for cross-examination of the pastoral 
counsellor, whom bar counsel called as a witness instead.  
Nonetheless, the respondent could have caused a subpoena to 
issue to compel the client's attendance, but he did not; 
further, he did not seek to preserve and present the witness's 
testimony through a deposition, and he has not alleged any 
resulting prejudice.  See Rules of the Board of Bar Overseers §§ 
4.5, 10 (2009); id. at § 4.5B (2011).  The respondent did not 
object to the pastoral counsellor's testimony.  The respondent 
has not demonstrated error in the single justice's conclusion 
8 
 
 
 
 
 
By failing diligently to represent the client, to carry out 
her lawful instructions, and to adequately communicate with and 
advise her what was required to finalize her divorce, the 
respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.2 (a) (seek client's 
lawful objectives); Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.3, as appearing in 471 
Mass. 1318 (2105) (diligence); and Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.4 (a) 
(communication with client).  In addition, by failing to provide 
the client with a written statement of the basis of his fee and 
the scope of his work, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 
1.5 (b) (1). 
 
 
d. Count four.  In January 2015, the respondent agreed to 
represent a fourth client in connection with two matters:  a 
request for a restraining order, and defense of the client 
against a charge that he violated a restraining order.  The 
client paid the respondent $2,500, and an additional $300 as a 
"consultation fee."  As with the other matters described supra, 
there was no written fee agreement, nor did the respondent 
provide the client with a written description of the fee and 
scope of the representation.  The respondent appeared with the 
client in court on June 7, 2015, and said he would reschedule 
the trial.  At that time, he requested an additional $2,500 from 
the client.  The client discharged the respondent before the 
matter was scheduled for trial.  Successor counsel filed his 
appearance on July 8, 2015.  The client requested a bill from 
the respondent for services rendered, and a refund for the 
balance.  He received neither. 
 
 
By failing to comply with the client's request to provide 
an accounting, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 
1.15 (d), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1380 (2015).  By failing, 
upon termination of the representation, to return any unearned 
portion of the prepaid fees, the respondent violated Mass. R. 
Prof. C. 1.16 (d), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1396 (2015).  By 
failing to communicate in writing the basis of the fee, the 
respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 1.5 (b) (1). 
 
 
e. Count five.  After the respondent failed to comply with 
bar counsel's requests for information in two matters, bar 
                     
that "proceedings before the board and hearing committee need 
not comply with the rules of evidence."  Matter of Strauss, 479 
Mass. 294, 299 (2018).  The respondent points to no fact found 
by the board that was not supported by substantial evidence. 
9 
 
 
 
counsel compelled his attendance, by means of a subpoena, at a 
meeting on June 14, 2016.  Bar counsel requested additional 
information and records both orally and in writing, and provided 
a deadline of July 10, 2016.  When the deadline was not met, the 
respondent was administratively suspended from the practice of 
law on August 12, 2016.  With bar counsel's assent, the 
respondent was reinstated on September 20, 2016.  Over the 
course of the next few months, the respondent failed to comply 
with bar counsel's requests for information, and failed to 
respond to bar counsel's request for an answer to a complaint 
filed by the client referenced in count two of the petition. 
 
 
By failing without good cause to cooperate with bar 
counsel, and by failing to respond to bar counsel's requests for 
information, the respondent violated Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.4 (g) 
and S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 3, as amended, 430 Mass. 1314 (1999). 
 
 
3.  Appropriate sanction.  The findings adopted by the 
board demonstrate that the respondent violated multiple rules of 
professional conduct, spanning his representation of four 
different clients.  While many of those violations, viewed 
individually, would not warrant a suspension, our task is to 
view them collectively.  See Matter of Zak, 476 Mass. 1034, 1039 
(2017). 
 
 
In considering the appropriate choice of sanction, we 
consider whether the sanction imposed by the single justice is 
"markedly disparate from those ordinarily entered by the various 
single justices in similar cases."  Matter of Alter, 389 Mass. 
153, 156 (1983).  See Matter of Goldberg, 434 Mass. 1022, 1023 
(2001).  "While the review is de novo in the sense that no 
special deference is given to the single justice's 
determination, we, like the single justice before us, must be 
'mindful that the board's recommendation is entitled to special 
deference.'"  Matter of Doyle, 429 Mass. 1013, 1013 (1999), 
quoting Matter of Tobin, 417 Mass. 81, 88 (1994).  Ultimately, 
we strive to "decide every case on its own merits such that 
every offending attorney receives the disposition most 
appropriate in the circumstances" (quotation and alterations 
omitted).  Matter of Lupo, 447 Mass. 345, 356 (2006).  A 
suspension for one year and one day is appropriate here. 
 
 
When an attorney has engaged in misconduct "involving 
repeated failures to act with reasonable diligence, or when a 
lawyer has engaged in a pattern of negligence, and the lawyer's 
10 
 
 
 
misconduct causes serious injury or potentially serious injury 
to a client or others," a suspension is warranted.  Matter of 
Kane, 13 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 321, 328 (1997).  In this 
case, the respondent failed to provide competent representation 
in one matter, and neglected another.  At least one client was 
harmed.  The respondent also failed to communicate reasonably 
with his clients and successor counsel, and to cooperate with 
bar counsel.  See Matter of Scannell, 21 Mass. Att'y Discipline 
Rep. 580, 582-584 (2005) (suspension for one year and one day 
for neglect, including failure to provide competent 
representation and to act with reasonable diligence, involving 
three client matters, where aggravating factors present).  See 
also Matter of Garabedian, 416 Mass. 20, 25 (1993) (six-month 
suspension for failure to cooperate, where previously 
disciplined for same conduct).  In addition, the respondent 
failed to comply with a court order, and knowingly failed to 
appear in response to a subpoena.  See Matter of Cohen, 435 
Mass. 7, 13-17 (2001) (suspension for one year and one day based 
on multiple violations of orders restraining class action 
lawsuits); Matter of Kersey, 432 Mass. 1020, 1020-1021 (2000) 
(three-month suspension where attorney found in contempt three 
times for violation of orders in his divorce proceeding).  In 
two matters, he failed to provide an accounting when requested 
by his clients and, in one, to return an unearned portion of the 
fee.  See Matter of Disaia, 33 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 131, 
132-133 (2017) (suspension for one year and one day for neglect 
in two matters, failure to maintain reasonable communication 
with client, failure to have written contingent fee agreement, 
failure to provide client files to successor counsel, and 
intentional violation of court orders to appear); Matter of 
Manoff, 32 Mass. Att'y Discipline Rep. 366 (2016) (suspension 
for one year and one day for neglect of two matters, failure to 
communicate with clients, failure to return unearned portion of 
fee, failure to comply with order of administrative suspension, 
and material misrepresentations to two clients, aggravated by 
prior public reprimand). 
 
 
Neither the hearing committee, the board, nor the single 
justice found special factors to be weighed in mitigation of 
sanction.  See Matter of Alter, 389 Mass. at 156-157.  Several 
factors, however, properly were weighed in aggravation.  The 
respondent is an experienced attorney, having been admitted to 
the bar in 1973.  See Matter of Crossen, 450 Mass. 533, 574 
(2008); Matter of Luongo, 416 Mass. 308, 312 (1993).  He 
committed multiple violations of the rules of professional 
11 
 
 
 
conduct, involving multiple clients.  See Matter of Saab, 406 
Mass. 315, 326-327 (1989).  One client was vulnerable because of 
his immigration status, and another was financially vulnerable.  
See Matter of Zak, 476 Mass. at 1039; Matter of Green, 476 Mass. 
1006, 1010 (2016).  At least one client was harmed.  See Matter 
of Pike, 408 Mass 740, 745 (1990) (harm to client correctly 
weighed in aggravation of sanction).  As the hearing committee 
found, and the board accepted, the respondent's misconduct 
demonstrated a lack of understanding of his obligations to his 
clients.  See Matter of Clooney, 403 Mass. 654, 657 (1988).  See 
also Matter of Cobb, 445 Mass. 452, 480 (2005).  He also has a 
history of prior discipline.  See Matter of Grayer, 23 Mass. 
Att'y Discipline Rep. 215 (2007) (one-year suspension for 
misconduct including delegation of client matters to 
unaffiliated attorneys, collecting excessive fees, division of 
fees without client consent, commingling client funds, failing 
to return unearned fees, and failing to comply with client 
requests for accountings).  See also Matter of Chambers, 421 
Mass. 256, 260 (1995) ("in the absence of mitigating factors, 
discipline should proceed in increments of escalating 
severity"). 
 
 
4.  Conclusion.  Considering the respondent's misconduct as 
a whole, weighing in aggravation the factors described supra, 
and giving due deference to the board's recommendation, we 
conclude that a suspension for one year and one day is 
appropriate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Order of term suspension 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  affirmed. 
 
 
 
The case was submitted on the record, accompanied by a 
memorandum of law. 
 
Claude David Grayer, pro se. 
 
Bruce T. Eisenhut, Assistant Bar Counsel.