Case Title: Cranfield v. Industrial Com.

Citation: 399 N.E.2d 1316, 78 Ill. 2d 251

Docket Number: 

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1980-01-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
78 Ill. 2d 251 (1980)
399 N.E.2d 1316
THOMAS CRANFIELD, Appellant,
v.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Uniroyal Company, Appellee).
No. 52056.

Supreme Court of Illinois.
Opinion filed January 23, 1980.
*252 Charles Kraut Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.
Terrance J. Van Driska and Mark A. Potter, of Chicago, for appellee.
Judgment affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE UNDERWOOD delivered the opinion of the court:
Claimant, Thomas Cranfield, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County confirming the Industrial Commission's decision denying the reinstatement of his case, which had been dismissed by the arbitrator for want of prosecution.
On March 24, 1976, claimant filed an application for adjustment of claim with the Industrial Commission for alleged injuries sustained while employed by Uniroyal Company. After having been assigned to an arbitrator, the case was set for hearing on five different dates. On the final date, September 15, 1977, claimant failed to appear and his counsel stated that he was unable to proceed. The arbitrator refused to grant another continuance and, after hearing argument on the employer's motion to dismiss for want of prosecution, dismissed the case by a written order dated September 23. The relevant argument there presented was as follows:
Notice of that decision was received by the parties on October 3.
On October 19 claimant filed a document, apparently a Commission form entitled "petition for review" and customarily used for the review of arbitrators' decisions. A hearing on that petition was set for five different dates. On the last of those dates, June 26, 1978, the Industrial Commission conducted a hearing and found that the petition for review had not been filed within 15 days after receipt of a copy of the arbitrator's decision as required by statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 48, par. 138.19(b)). However, the Commission concluded that the document filed by claimant was in substance a petition for reinstatement, and found satisfactory compliance with Rule No. 4-(1) of the rules governing practice before the Industrial Commission, which permits a petition for reinstatement to be filed within 60 days from receipt of the dismissal order. (Rules Governing Practice Before the Industrial Commission Under the Workmen's Compensation *254 and Occupational Diseases Act sec. 4, Rule 4-(1) (1977).) After a hearing during which both parties presented argument, the Commission denied claimant's petition for reinstatement. The relevant portion of that argument follows:
In this appeal respondent contends that the Commission had no jurisdiction to review the arbitrator's decision since the claimant failed to file his petition for review *255 within the 15-day limitation period (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 48, par. 138.19(b)). Had claimant in fact sought review of an arbitrator's award or other disposition of the case on the merits, we would agree. (City of Chicago v. Industrial Com. (1976), 63 Ill. 2d 99, 103; Sweitzer v. Industrial Com. (1946), 394 Ill. 141, 146-47; Dyer v. Industrial Com. (1936), 364 Ill. 161, 163.) Here, however, the arbitrator had simply dismissed the case for want of prosecution. In these circumstances a claimant is entitled to seek reinstatement within 60 days of receipt of the dismissal order under Rule 4-(1) of the Commission's rules of practice (Rules Governing Practice Before the Industrial Commission Under the Workmen's Compensation and Occupational Diseases Act sec. 4, Rule 4-(1) (1977)). In this situation, we find no error in the Commission's consideration of claimant's petition for review as a petition for reinstatement.
Claimant also contends that it was an abuse of discretion for the arbitrator to have refused another continuance and for the Commission to have denied reinstatement of his case. In response to similar claims this court has held: "`In a petition for reinstatement before the Industrial Commission, the burden is on the petitioner to allege and prove facts justifying the relief prayed. The granting or denying of the petition to reinstate rests in the sound discretion of the Commission.'" Shiffer v. Industrial Com. (1973), 53 Ill. 2d 519, 521; quoting Zimmerman v. Industrial Com. (1972), 50 Ill. 2d 346, 349; see also South Chicago Community Hospital v. Industrial Com. (1969), 44 Ill. 2d 119, 123.
The record indicates that the arbitrator initially accommodated claimant's repeated requests for continuances. When, however, claimant failed to appear for the September 15, 1977, hearing and respondent moved to dismiss for want of prosecution, counsel for claimant gave no persuasive reason for further delay. In the hearing before the Commission on the motion to reinstate, claimant's *256 counsel emphasized the activity of Joshua Landau in filing and handling the case, his subsequent illness and his withdrawal. We note, however, that counsel's only reference to attorney Landau in his argument before the arbitrator was that he and Joshua Landau were "co-counsel." The factual discrepancies in the arguments before the arbitrator and the Commission, coupled with the vagueness of the references to another case and the time of Landau's illness and withdrawal, when considered with the absence of supporting testimony which the Commission invited, all militate in favor of the Commission's ruling. Rather clearly there has been no abuse of discretion.
The judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.