Case Title: In re Tolen

Citation: 

Docket Number: 106224

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2011-12-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS  
No.  106,224 
 
In the Matter of ERIC T. TOLEN, 
Respondent. 
 
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN DISCIPLINE 
 
Original proceeding in discipline. Opinion filed December 2, 2011. Disbarment. 
 
Kimberly L. Knoll, Deputy Disciplinary Administrator, argued the cause, and Stanton A. Hazlett, 
Disciplinary Administrator, was with her on the formal complaint for the petitioner. 
 
Respondent argued the cause pro se. 
 
Per Curiam:  This is an original proceeding in discipline filed by the office of the 
Disciplinary Administrator against the respondent, Eric T. Tolen, of Jefferson City, 
Missouri, an attorney admitted to the practice of law in Kansas in 1987. 
 
 
On June 12, 2009, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal 
complaint against the respondent alleging violations of the Kansas Rules of Professional 
Conduct (KRPC). The respondent filed an answer on July 17, 2009. A hearing was held 
on the complaint before a panel of the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys on 
January 21, 2011, where the respondent was not personally present and was not 
represented by counsel. The hearing panel determined that respondent violated KRPC 
8.4(b) (2010 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 603) (commission of a criminal act reflecting adversely 
on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer); Supreme Court Rules 
203(c)(1) (2010 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 276) (failure to notify Disciplinary Administrator of 
felony charge); and 208(c) (2010 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 320) (failure to notify Clerk of the 
Appellate Courts of change of address). 
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Upon conclusion of the hearing, the panel made the following findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, together with its recommendation to this court: 
 
"FINDINGS OF FACT 
 
. . . . 
 
 
"2. 
On June 13, 2007, authorities in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, 
Missouri, charged the Respondent with 18 felony counts of statutory sodomy in the 
second degree, in case number 07SL-CR02791. 
 
 
"3. 
On June 21, 2007, the Respondent was released from custody after 
having posted a $200,000 property bond. 
 
 
"4. 
On August 14, 2007, the prosecutor filed a motion to revoke the 
Respondent's bond because he violated the order to have no contact, direct or indirect, 
with any of the alleged victims, their families, or other witnesses in the case. 
 
 
"5. 
On September 21, 2007, the Court concluded that the Respondent 
violated the conditions of the bond, the Court revoked the bond, and the Court ordered 
that the Respondent be remanded to custody. The Court set bond at $1 million, cash only. 
Following the revocation of his property bond, the Respondent remained incarcerated. 
 
 
"6. 
The prosecutor subsequently filed a superseding indictment which 
included a total of 38 charges, including two counts of statutory sodomy, first degree, 
unclassified felonies, 34 counts of statutory sodomy, second degree, class C felonies, one 
count of attempted statutory sodomy, second degree, class C felony, and one count of 
victim tampering, class D felony. 
 
 
"7. 
On September 26, 2007, the Supreme Court of Missouri suspended the 
Respondent's license to practice law on an interim basis due to his incarceration.  
 
 
"8. 
At trial, the evidence established the following:   
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'. . . [The Respondent] met several teenage boys and encouraged them to 
work at his home. The boys initially would do yard work or cleaning for 
[the Respondent] and ultimately he began spending more time with them. 
Eventually, [the Respondent] offered the boys bikes, cars, cell phones, 
and cigarettes in exchange for sexual "work." According to the victims, 
[the Respondent] would allow them to "pay" for the items they wanted 
with oral and anal sex and other sexual acts.' 
 
 
"9. 
Following trial, on September 19, 2008, a jury convicted the Respondent 
of two counts of statutory sodomy, first degree, unclassified felonies, 34 counts of 
statutory sodomy, second degree, class C felonies, and one count of victim tampering, a 
class D felony. The Respondent was found not guilty of attempted statutory sodomy, a 
class C felony. 
 
 
"10. 
Thereafter, on November 7, 2008, the Court sentenced the Respondent to 
serve 65 years in prison. The Respondent remains in prison in Missouri. 
 
 
"11. 
On June 12, 2009, the Disciplinary Administrator filed a Formal 
Complaint in this matter. On July 20, 2009, the Respondent filed a written Answer. The 
Respondent asserted that he was not guilty of the criminal offenses and alleged that he 
was not afforded a fair trial. The Respondent also requested that the Kansas disciplinary 
proceedings be stayed pending the appellate review in Missouri. 
 
 
"12. 
On August 18, 2009, the Kansas Supreme Court temporarily suspended 
the Respondent's license to practice law, pending the outcome of the disciplinary 
proceedings. The Respondent's license remains suspended. Given the Respondent's 
temporary suspension, the Hearing Panel in the instant case agreed to wait to have the 
disciplinary hearing until after the appellate process in Missouri was completed. 
 
 
"13. 
On December 22, 2009, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed the 
Respondent's convictions. The Respondent requested that the Missouri Supreme Court 
rehear his appeal on January 6, 2010. The Missouri Supreme Court denied his request. 
Then, on February 8, 2010, the Respondent requested that his case be transferred to the 
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Missouri Supreme Court. Again, the Missouri Supreme Court denied the Respondent's 
request. 
 
 
"14. 
On June 2, 2010, the Missouri Supreme Court disbarred the Respondent. 
 
"CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
 
 
"1. 
Based upon the findings of fact, the Hearing Panel concludes as a matter 
of law that the Respondent violated Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 203, Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 208, and 
KRPC 8.4, as detailed below. 
 
 
"2. 
The Respondent failed to appear at the hearing on the Formal Complaint. 
It is appropriate to proceed to hearing when a Respondent fails to appear only if proper 
service was obtained. Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 215 governs service of process in disciplinary 
proceedings. That rule provides, in pertinent part as follows: 
 
'(a) 
Service upon the respondent of the formal complaint in 
any disciplinary proceeding shall be made by the Disciplinary 
Administrator, either by personal service or by certified mail to the 
address shown on the attorney's most recent registration, or at his or her 
last known office address. 
 
. . . . 
 
'(c) 
Service by mailing under subsection (a) or (b) shall be 
deemed complete upon mailing whether or not the same is actually 
received.' 
 
In this case, the Disciplinary Administrator complied with Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 215(a) by 
sending a copy of the Formal Complaint and the Notice of Hearing, via certified United 
States mail, postage prepaid, to the address shown on the Respondent's most recent 
registration. The Respondent's most recent registration address continues to be his former 
residence. The Respondent no longer owns the residence. Additionally, the Disciplinary 
Administrator sent a copy of the Formal Complaint, the Notice of Hearing, and the 
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Amended Notice of Hearing to the Respondent in prison. The Respondent received the 
Formal Complaint and filed an Answer to the Formal Complaint. The Hearing Panel 
concludes that the Respondent was afforded the notice that the Kansas Supreme Court 
Rules requires. 
 
"3. 
It is appropriate to consider violations not specifically included in the 
Formal Complaint under certain circumstances. The law in this regard was thoroughly 
examined in State v. Caenen, 235 Kan. 451, 681 P.2d 639 (1984), as follows: 
 
'Supreme Court Rule 211(b) (232 Kan. clxvi), requires the 
formal complaint in a disciplinary proceeding to be sufficiently clear and 
specific to inform the respondent of the alleged misconduct. 
 
'The seminal decision regarding the applicability of the due 
process clause to lawyer disciplinary proceedings is found in In re 
Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 88 S. Ct. 1222, 20 L. Ed. 2d 117, reh. denied 391 
U.S. 961, 88 S. Ct. 1833, 20 L. Ed. 2d 874 (1968). There the United 
States Supreme Court held that a lawyer charged with misconduct in 
lawyer disciplinary proceedings is entitled to procedural due process, and 
that due process includes fair notice of the charges sufficient to inform 
and provide a meaningful opportunity for explanation and defense. 
 
'Decisions subsequent to Ruffalo have refined the concept of due 
process as it applies to lawyer disciplinary hearings, and suggest that the 
notice to be provided be more in the nature of that provided in civil 
cases. The weight of authority appears to be that, unlike due process 
provided in criminal actions, there are no stringent or technical 
requirements in setting forth allegations or descriptions of alleged 
offenses. . . . Due process requires only that the charges must be 
sufficiently clear and specific to inform the attorney of the misconduct 
charged, but the state is not required to plead specific rules, since it is the 
factual allegations against which the attorney must defend. . . . However, 
if specific rules are pled, the state is thereafter limited to such specific 
offenses. . . . 
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'Subsequent to the Ruffalo decision, the due process 
requirements in lawyer disciplinary proceedings have been given 
exhaustive treatment by this court. In State v. Turner, 217 Kan. 574, 538 
P.2d 966 (1975), 87 A.L.R.3d 337, the court summarized prior Kansas 
and federal precedent on the question, including Ruffalo, and held in 
accordance with established precedent that the State need not set forth in 
its complaint the specific disciplinary rules allegedly violated . . . , nor is 
it required to plead specific allegations of misconduct. . . . What is 
required was simply stated therein: 
 
"'We must conclude that where the facts in 
connection with the charge are clearly set out in the 
complaint a respondent is put on notice as to what 
ethical violations may arise therefrom. . . . 
 
. . . . 
 
"'It is not incumbent on the board to notify the 
respondent of charges of specific acts of misconduct as 
long as proper notice is given of the basic factual 
situation out of which the charges might result.'" 
 
235 Kan. at 458-59 (citations omitted). In this case, the Respondent was given proper 
notice that the disciplinary case was based upon his criminal conduct, criminal 
convictions, and related matters. Thus, in the opinion of the Hearing Panel, it is proper to 
consider whether the Respondent failed to properly report his criminal conviction to the 
Disciplinary Administrator and whether the Respondent failed to properly provide the 
Clerk of the Appellate Courts with his current address. 
 
"4. 
Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 202 provides, in part, as follows: 
 
'A certificate of a conviction of an attorney for any crime or of a 
civil judgment based on clear and convincing evidence shall be 
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conclusive evidence of the commission of that crime or civil wrong in 
any disciplinary proceeding instituted against said attorney based upon 
the conviction or judgment. A diversion agreement, for the purposes of 
any disciplinary proceeding, shall be deemed a conviction of the crimes 
originally charged. All other civil judgments shall be prima facie 
evidence of the findings made therein and shall raise a presumption as to 
their validity. The burden shall be on the respondent to disprove the 
findings made in the civil judgment.' 
 
The Hearing Panel concludes that, pursuant to Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 202, the Respondent's 
convictions for 36 charges of criminal sodomy and one charge of victim tampering are 
conclusive evidence of his misconduct. 
 
"5. 
Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 203(c)(1) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
 
'(c) 
Automatic temporary suspension of attorneys convicted 
of a felony crime. 
 
(1) 
Duty of attorney to report. An attorney 
who has been charged with a felony crime (as hereinafter 
defined) in Kansas or with an equivalent offense in any 
federal court of the United States or the District of 
Columbia or in any other state, territory, commonwealth, 
or possession of the United States shall promptly inform 
the Disciplinary Administrator in writing of the charge. 
The attorney shall thereafter promptly inform the 
Disciplinary Administrator of the disposition of the 
matter.' 
 
Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 203(c)(1) requires attorneys to notify the Disciplinary Administrator 
after being charged with a felony crime. The Respondent never notified the Disciplinary 
Administrator of the charges nor did he notify the Disciplinary Administrator of the 
convictions. Accordingly, the Hearing Panel concludes that the Respondent violated Kan. 
Sup. Ct. R. 203(c)(1). 
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"6. 
Kansas attorneys are required to annually register with the Clerk of the 
Appellate Courts. See Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 208(a). Each attorney required to register 'shall 
within thirty days after any change of address notify the Clerk of such change.' Kan. Sup. 
Ct. R. 208(c). After his incarceration, the Respondent failed to change his registration 
address. The Respondent's registration address remains as his residential address where 
he lived prior to his incarceration. Thus, the Hearing Panel concludes that the Respondent 
violated Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 208(c). 
 
"7. 
'It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . commit a criminal act 
that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in 
other respects.' KRPC 8.4(b). In this case, the Respondent committed criminal acts—36 
counts of statutory sodomy and one count of victim tampering—that reflect adversely on 
the Respondent's fitness in other respects. Accordingly, the Hearing Panel concludes that 
the Respondent violated KRPC 8.4(b). 
 
"AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 
"STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 
 
 
"In making this recommendation for discipline, the Hearing Panel considered the 
factors outlined by the American Bar Association in its Standards for Imposing Lawyer 
Sanctions (hereinafter 'Standards'). Pursuant to Standard 3, the factors to be considered 
are the duty violated, the lawyer's mental state, the potential or actual injury caused by 
the lawyer's misconduct, and the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. 
 
 
"Duty Violated. The Respondent violated his duty to the public to maintain 
personal integrity. 
 
 
"Mental State. The Respondent knowingly and intentionally violated his duty. 
 
 
"Injury. As a result of the Respondent's misconduct, the Respondent caused 
actual injury to the public and the legal profession. 
 
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"Aggravating or Mitigating Factors. Aggravating circumstances are any 
considerations or factors that may justify an increase in the degree of discipline to be 
imposed. In reaching its recommendation for discipline, the Hearing Panel, in this case, 
found the following aggravating factors present: 
 
 
"Dishonest or Selfish Motive. The criminal sodomy convictions evidences a 
selfish motivation and the victim tampering conviction evidences a dishonest motivation. 
Accordingly, the Hearing Panel concludes that the Respondent's misconduct was 
motivated by dishonesty and selfishness. 
 
 
"A Pattern of Misconduct. The jury convicted the Respondent of 36 charges of 
criminal sodomy. Clearly, the Respondent engaged in a pattern of misconduct. 
 
 
"Multiple Offenses. The Respondent violated Kan. Sup. Ct. R. 203, Kan. Sup. Ct. 
R. 208, and KRPC 8.4. As such, the Hearing Panel concludes that the Respondent 
committed multiple offenses. 
 
 
"Vulnerability of Victim. The Respondent's victims, troubled teenage boys aged 
13 through 17, are some of the most vulnerable of victims. 
 
 
"Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law. The Kansas Supreme Court 
admitted the Respondent to the practice of law in 1987. At the time the criminal charges 
were brought against the Respondent, he had been engaged in the practice of law for 20 
years. 
 
 
"Illegal Conduct, Including that Involving the Use of Controlled Substances. The 
Respondent committed illegal conduct—he was convicted of 36 charges of criminal 
sodomy and one charge of victim tampering.  
 
 
"Mitigating circumstances are any considerations or factors that may justify a 
reduction in the degree of discipline to be imposed. In reaching its recommendation for 
discipline, the Hearing Panel, in this case, found the following mitigating circumstances 
present: 
 
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"Absence of a Prior Disciplinary Record. The Respondent has not previously 
been disciplined. 
 
 
"Imposition of Other Penalties or Sanctions. The Respondent was sentenced to 
serve 65 years in prison for the criminal convictions. 
 
 
"In addition to the above-cited factors, the Hearing Panel has thoroughly 
examined and considered the following Standards: 
 
 
'5.11 
Disbarment is generally appropriate when: 
 
(a)  a lawyer engages in serious criminal conduct a 
necessary element of which includes intentionally 
interference with the administration of justice, false 
swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, extortion, 
misappropriation, or theft; or the sale, distribution or 
importation of controlled substances; or the intentional 
killing of another; or an attempt or conspiracy or 
solicitation of another to commit any of these offenses; 
 
(b)  a lawyer engages in any other intentional conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation 
that serious adversely reflects on the lawyer's fitness to 
practice. 
 
'5.12 
Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly 
engages in criminal conduct which does not contain the elements listed 
in Standard 5.11 and that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer's 
fitness to practice. 
 
'6.31 
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer: 
 
(a)  intentionally tampers with a witness and causes 
serious or potentially serious injury to a party, or causes 
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significant or potentially significant interference with the 
outcome of the legal proceeding; or 
 
(b)  makes an ex parte communication with a judge or 
juror with intent to affect the outcome of the proceeding, 
and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a 
party, or causes significant or potentially significant 
interference with the outcome of the legal proceeding; or 
 
(c)  improperly communicates with someone in the legal 
system other than a witness, judge, or juror with the 
intent to influence or affect the outcome of the 
proceeding, and causes significant or potentially 
significant interference with the outcome of the legal 
proceeding. 
 
'7.1 
Disbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly 
engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed as a professional 
with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or another, and causes 
serious or potentially serious injury to a client, the public, or the legal 
system.' 
 
"RECOMMENDATION 
 
 
"The Disciplinary Administrator recommended that the Respondent be disbarred. 
 
 
"Based upon the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and the Standards listed 
above, the Hearing Panel unanimously recommends that the Respondent be disbarred." 
 
 
"Costs are assessed against the Respondent in an amount to be certified by the 
Office of the Disciplinary Administrator." 
 
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DISCUSSION 
 
In a disciplinary proceeding, this court considers the evidence, the findings of the 
disciplinary panel, and the arguments of the parties and determines whether violations of 
KRPC exist and, if they do, what discipline should be imposed. Attorney misconduct 
must be established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Foster, 292 Kan. 940, 945, 
258 P.3d 375 (2011); see Supreme Court Rule 211(f) (2010 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 327). 
Clear and convincing evidence is "'evidence that causes the factfinder to believe that "the 
truth of the facts asserted is highly probable."'" In re Lober, 288 Kan. 498, 505, 204 P.3d 
610 (2009) (quoting In re Dennis, 286 Kan. 708, 725, 188 P.3d 1 [2008]). The evidence 
before the hearing panel establishes the charged misconduct of the respondent by clear 
and convincing evidence and supports the panel's conclusions of law. We therefore adopt 
the panel's findings and conclusions. 
 
The respondent filed no exceptions to the hearing panel's final hearing report. As 
such, the findings of fact are deemed admitted. Supreme Court Rule 212(c), (d) (2010 
Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 344). Respondent was given adequate notice of the formal complaint, 
to which he filed an answer, and adequate notice of  both the hearing before the panel and 
the hearing before this court. We conclude the hearing panel's findings are supported by 
clear and convincing evidence. Thus, the only issue before us is the appropriate 
discipline. 
 
At the hearing before this court, at which the respondent was excused due to his 
incarceration, the office of the Disciplinary Administrator recommended that the 
respondent be disbarred. In his answer to the formal complaint, the respondent argued 
against disbarment and requested a stay of these proceedings pending the outcome of his 
appeal to the Missouri appellate courts. The Missouri Court of Appeals has affirmed his 
sentence, and the Missouri Supreme Court has denied his request for a rehearing. See 
State v. Tolen, 304 S.W.3d 229 (Mo. App. 2009).  
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As the hearing panel noted, the respondent has been disbarred by the Missouri 
Supreme Court for his criminal convictions in that state. When this action is considered 
along with the respondent's multiple offenses in this case, including violations of KRPC 
8.4(b) (2010 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 603); Kansas Supreme Court Rules 203(c)(1) (2010 Kan. 
Ct. R. Annot. 276); and 208(c) (2010 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 320), we find disbarment is the 
appropriate discipline. 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCIPLINE 
 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Eric T. Tolen be disbarred from the practice of 
law in the state of Kansas, effective on the filing of this opinion, in accordance with 
Supreme Court Rule 203(a)(1) (2010 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 276). 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the respondent shall comply with Supreme Court 
Rule 218 (2010 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 370). 
 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of these proceedings be assessed to the 
respondent and that this opinion be published in the official Kansas Reports.