Case Title: Greer v. Hampton

Citation: 240 So. 2d 253

Docket Number: 

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1970-10-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
240 So. 2d 253 (1970) Ruthie Lee GREER v. Mary W. HAMPTON, Administratrix of Estate of Maddie Laron, Deceased. No. 45908. Supreme Court of Mississippi. October 19, 1970. Rehearing Denied November 2, 1970. *254 Sam P. Cooper, Jr., Picayune, Williams & Williams, Joe H. Montgomery, Poplarville, for appellant. Stewart & Prichard, Picayune, for appellee. JONES, Justice: The controversy arose in Pearl River County. The issue is whether certain property owned by the decedent had been given to appellant and was her property and not that of the estate. The lower court held for appellee, and we affirm. The appellant filed a sworn "accounting" in which she charged that Maddie Laron, the decedent, had given to appellant all her personal property except two bank accounts which appellant was instructed to give, after Maddie's death, to Viola Jenkins and Minnie Edwards, sisters of decedent. The appellant claimed she was also given all the United States savings bonds except one which bears the name, Mrs. Minnie Lee Edwards. The two bank books and one bond above mentioned were tendered into court as all the property in appellant's possession belonging to the estate. Appellee responded with a sworn denial alleging appellant had in her possession belonging to the estate: (a) $7,000 cash, (b) certain jewelry, (c) dining table & chairs, (d) two bank savings books of First National Bank of Picayune other than the two above discussed, (e) seventeen $25 Series E United States savings bonds and one $100 Savings bond, all in name of decedent. Both instruments bore affidavits of the parties. The chancellor held: As to the bank accounts and bonds in the name of decedent, the chancellor held no valid gift was shown. Here there is presented only the issue as to the bank accounts and United States bonds. Appellant was called by appellee as an adverse witness, and appellee in her pleadings, failed to waive answer under oath. It is claimed these facts constituted a waiver of the incompetency of appellant to testify to establish her claim against the estate. We agree with this contention. Coney v. Coney, 249 Miss. 561, 163 So. 2d 692 (1964); Manning v. Hammond, 234 Miss. 299, 106 So. 2d 51 (1958); Stuckey v. Sallis, 221 Miss. 698, 74 So. 2d 749 (1954). However, there is no record for appellate review of what appellant would have testified. Manning v. Hammond, supra. Furthermore in view of what we find to be the law and what is established *255 by the record beyond peradventure of doubt, we think this error as well as the error, if any, in not admitting testimony of Jewel Patterson, whose evidence that she saw Maddie when she (Maddie) had an envelope in her hand, contents unknown to the witness, and said she was carrying them to appellant, becomes harmless. Just before the close of the trial, the parties stipulated: It thus appears that appellant was in possession of the bank books and the bonds, which were still in the name of decedent. Because of this stipulation and other proof, it can be conceded that the instruments had been delivered to appellant, possibly two years before, but nothing else was done. Conceding, but not deciding there was an intent to make a gift, were the facts shown sufficient to establish a gift to the bank accounts? There is required clear and convincing evidence to establish the gifts. As was said in Sunflower Farms, Inc. et al. v. McLean et al., 238 Miss. 168, 117 So. 2d 808 (1960): See also Stepson v. Brand, 213 Miss. 826, 58 So. 2d 18; Tipton v. Saulsberry, 223 Miss. 763, 78 So. 2d 893. It is said in 38 Am.Jur.2d Gifts section 74 (1968): The chancellor held on the evidence that appellant had not met the burden as to the bank accounts or the bonds. We find that he was correct. In Pace v. Pace, 107 Miss. 292, 65 So. 273 (1914), this Court held that it made no difference whether the gift was inter vivos or causa mortis, the result would be the same under the facts, and then the Court held: The Pace case was cited with approval in Godwin v. Godwin, 141 Miss. 633, 107 So. 13 (1926) and Gidden v. Gidden, 176 Miss. 98, 167 So. 785 (1936). In Gidden, the attempted donor, with other property, owned 136 bales of cotton for which he held negotiable warehouse receipts. There was involved the validity of the gift of the cotton by a written deed. The Court in considering whether the law of Tennessee or Mississippi applied stated this: The negotiable warehouse receipts were not delivered but only a deed of gift was given. In Yates' Estate v. Alabama-Mississippi Conference Ass'n of Seventh-Day Adventists, Inc., 179 Miss. 642, 176 So. 534 (1937) the decedent had delivered money to a friend to be sent to appellee in event of decedent's death. The friend deposited the money in the bank and issued a duplicate deposit to the donor. The Court said: The Pace case was also cited with approval in Re Lewis' Estate, 194 Miss. 480, 13 So. 2d 20 (1943). In Gilder v. First National Bank of Greenville, 214 So. 2d 681 (Miss. 1968), checks were written as well as a note. The check was not cashed until afer the donor died. This Court said: The bank books here involved were delivered long before Maddie Laron died and there was plenty of time for appelant and deceased to perfect the gift if it were intended to be a gift of the money. They did not. As to the bonds, we repeat we are in accord with the lower court's finding that appellant did not meet the burden of proof resting upon her, either as to the bonds or the bank accounts. Appellant admits there is a division among the courts as to whether United States savings bonds, Series E are subject to gift by delivery only. 161 A.L.R. 174. Our Court has not passed upon this question. The decisions of this Court heretofore mentioned are persuasive that under our law delivery and intent alone is insufficient to constitute a gift such as this. The bonds, as shown by the stipulations, were payable to Maddie Laron. They were not payable to bearer. There were regulations of the United States as to their transfer. They should have been surrendered and reissued in the name of appellant in order to complete the gift. Although it is indicated appellant had the bonds in her possession for two years, no steps were *258 taken to effectuate the transfer and the gift, if intended, was not perfected. The case is affirmed. Affirmed. GILLESPIE, P.J., and RODGERS, BRADY and INZER, JJ., concur.