Case Title: Segers v. Industrial Comm'n

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87816

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-05-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Opinion filed May 18, 2000.
JUSTICE HEIPLE delivered the opinion of the court:
Plaintiff brought a declaratory judgment action in Franklin County circuit 
court seeking a declaration that section 9 of the Workers' Occupational Diseases 
Act (820 ILCS 310/9 (West 1998)) does not bar her claim for death benefits under 
the Act, or if it does, that section 9 is unconstitutional. The circuit court 
granted defendant Old Ben Coal Company's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff 
appealed, and the appellate court reversed, holding section 9 does not bar 
plaintiff's claim for death benefits under the Act. 304 Ill. App. 3d 1060. We 
granted Old Ben's petition for leave to appeal and now reverse the appellate 
court and affirm the circuit court's order granting Old Ben's motion for summary 
judgment.
BACKGROUND
Elmer Segers was employed by Old Ben Coal Company as a coal miner. Elmer 
retired in 1979. In 1984, Elmer filed a disability claim in the Industrial 
Commission against Old Ben alleging injuries associated with the inhalation of 
coal and rock dust. Elmer and Old Ben agreed to settle Elmer's claim. The 
settlement agreement provided that Old Ben would pay Elmer $25,664 "in a lump 
sum" for
The settlement agreement further states that it
Elmer died on June 4, 1995. On July 25, 1995, Elmer's widow, Eva, filed a 
claim with the Industrial Commission for death benefits under the Workers' 
Occupational Diseases Act. Old Ben filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that 
pursuant to section 9 of the Act, Elmer's lump sum settlement with Old Ben 
barred Eva from seeking death benefits under the Act. Before the Commission 
could rule on Old Ben's motion to dismiss, Eva filed a declaratory judgment 
action in Franklin County circuit court asking the court to find that section 9 
of the Act does not bar her claim for death benefits, or, in the alternative, if 
section 9 does bar her claim for death benefits, that section 9 is 
unconstitutional.
The circuit court granted Old Ben's motion for summary judgment, holding 
section 9 bars Eva's death benefits claim and that section 9 is constitutional. 
Eva appealed, and the appellate court reversed, holding section 9 does not bar 
her claim for death benefits under the Act. This court granted Old Ben's 
petition for leave to appeal. On appeal to this court, the State defendants in 
the declaratory judgment action, the Industrial Commission and the Treasurer and 
ex-officio Custodian of the Rate Adjustment Fund, have limited their 
arguments to whether section 9 is constitutional.
ANALYSIS
Jurisdiction
Old Ben first argues that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear 
plaintiff's declaratory judgment action. Old Ben argues that by filing her 
declaratory judgment action in circuit court, plaintiff improperly bypassed the 
Industrial Commission, which should have made the initial ruling regarding 
whether section 9 of the Act bars plaintiff's death benefits claim. Old Ben, 
however, emphasizes that it "is not asking the Supreme Court to remand this case 
back to the Circuit Court with instructions to let the claim proceed through 
arbitration and the Industrial Commission before reaching the Circuit Court 
again. This would only cause delay." Old Ben argues that this court should 
address the jurisdiction question, but only with respect to future cases.
Old Ben has waived its jurisdiction argument. It is axiomatic that the 
parties cannot waive an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Currie v. 
Lao, 148 Ill. 2d 151, 157 (1992). The issue in this case, however, is one 
of primary jurisdiction, not subject matter jurisdiction, because Old Ben 
concedes, as it must, that the circuit court has concurrent jurisdiction to hear 
plaintiff's declaratory judgment action. See Employers Mutual Cos. v. 
Skilling, 163 Ill. 2d 284, 287 (1994) (stating Illinois circuit courts have 
original jurisdiction over all justiciable matters). Rather, Old Ben argues that 
plaintiff's claim for death benefits must proceed first before the 
Industrial Commission.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction provides that where "a court has 
jurisdiction over a matter, it should in some instances stay the judicial 
proceedings pending referral of a controversy, or some portion of it, to an 
administrative agency having expertise in the area." Skilling, 163 Ill. 2d  at 288. Since primary jurisdiction only applies where a court has either 
original or concurrent jurisdiction (Skilling, 163 Ill. 2d at 288), 
primary jurisdiction involves a question of timing, not of judicial competence 
to hear a particular case (Kendra Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Homco, Ltd., 
879 F.2d 240, 242 (7th Cir. 1989); Gross Common Carrier, Inc. v. Baxter 
Healthcare Corp., 51 F.3d 703, 706 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Peoples 
Energy Corp. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 142 Ill. App. 3d 917 (1986) 
(noting doctrine of primary jurisdiction is not technically a question of 
jurisdiction at all but rather a question of judicial self-restraint and 
relations between the courts and administrative agencies)). Therefore, primary 
jurisdiction is an issue which can be waived by the parties. Gross, 51 F.3d  at 706; Kendra Oil & Gas, 879 F.2d  at 242.
Old Ben clearly waived its primary jurisdiction argument. Old Ben essentially 
concedes that it does not want this court to address the jurisdiction issue 
in this case because it does not want the relief which would accompany 
resolution of the primary jurisdiction argument in its favor. Old Ben asserts 
that remanding this cause back to the Industrial Commission would cause too much 
delay. Instead, Old Ben argues that this court should address the jurisdiction 
issue only with respect to future cases. We decline Old Ben's invitation to do 
so. This court will not issue advisory opinions merely to set precedent or guide 
future litigation. Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 179 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (1997).
Statutory Issues
Old Ben next argues that section 9 of the Act bars Eva's claim for death 
benefits. Our review of the circuit court's order granting Old Ben's motion for 
summary judgment is de novo. Jackson v. TLC Associates, Inc., 
185 Ill. 2d 418, 424 (1998).
Section 9 provides:
Plaintiff initially responds that Elmer's settlement with Old Ben is not a 
lump sum payment under section 9 because the settlement covered payments to 
Elmer which had already accrued at the time of the settlement. Plaintiff argues 
that since the settlement represents 20% of the man as a whole, and more than 
100 weeks had passed since Elmer's injury, there were no additional future 
payments for the settlement agreement to commute.(1) 
Plaintiff's argument, however, is belied by the language of the settlement 
agreement itself. The settlement agreement states, "I REQUEST THAT A LUMP SUM 
ORDER BE ENTERED ON THE GROUNDS THAT I BELIEVE IT TO BE IN MY BEST INTEREST." 
This provision is immediately followed by Elmer's signature. The settlement 
agreement also contains the following order from the Industrial Commission:
Plaintiff insists that this court should ignore this plain and unambiguous 
language in the settlement agreement because this was the only settlement form 
provided by the Industrial Commission and the form does not accurately reflect 
the settlement entered into by the parties. It must be remembered, however, that 
the settlement agreement is a contract between Elmer and Old Ben. This court has 
repeatedly made clear that parol evidence is inadmissable to vary or contradict 
the clear written provisions of a contract. Kendall v. Kendall, 71 Ill. 2d 374, 377-78 (1978); Department of Transportation v. Western National 
Bank, 63 Ill. 2d 179, 184 (1976); Scholbe v. Schuchardt, 292 Ill. 529, 534 (1920). The settlement agreement clearly and unambiguously states that 
the settlement is a lump sum payment under section 9, and plaintiff cannot rely 
on evidence regarding the kinds of forms used by the Industrial Commission to 
contradict this portion of the settlement agreement.
Since the settlement in this case constitutes a lump sum payment under 
section 9 of the Act, we must now determine whether section 9 bars plaintiff's 
claim for death benefits. This court's role in interpreting statutes is to give 
effect to the intention of the legislature, and the language of the statute is 
the starting point of the court's analysis. Gem Electronics of Monmouth, 
Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 183 Ill. 2d 470, 475 (1998). When the 
language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, it will be given effect 
without resort to other tools of construction. Gem Electronics, 183 Ill. 2d  at 475.
Section 9 provides that "[t]he payment of compensation in a lump sum to the 
employee in his lifetime upon order of the Commission, shall extinguish and bar 
all claims for compensation for death if the compensation paid in a lump sum 
represents a compromise of a dispute on any question other than the extent of 
disability." 820 ILCS 310/9 (West 1998). Old Ben argues that the words "other 
than" in section 9 mean "in addition to." By contrast, plaintiff argues that the 
words "other than" mean "except." Both Old Ben and plaintiff discuss the 
legislative history of section 9 and public policy surrounding the Workers' 
Compensation Act and section 9 to support their interpretations of "other than," 
but we believe the plain and ordinary meaning of the words "other than" is 
sufficiently clear. "Other than" means "existing besides, or distinct from, that 
already mentioned or implied." Oxford English Dictionary 981 (2d ed. 1989).
Both parties concede that the settlement agreement represents a compromise of 
a dispute on a question besides or distinct from the extent of disability. The 
settlement agreement states that the settlement "resolves issues which exist as 
to the existence of any occupational disease, the extent of the Petitioner's 
injuries and conditions, including questions of temporary total disability and 
permanent disability, and whether said injuries and conditions are compensable." 
The settlement agreement also resolves whether Elmer was entitled to medical, 
surgical, and hospital services under the Workers' Compensation Act and the 
Workers' Occupational Diseases Act. Since the settlement agreement represents a 
compromise of a dispute on questions besides or distinct from the extent of 
disability, section 9 of the Workers' Occupational Diseases Act bars plaintiff's 
claim for death benefits under the Act.
In support of her argument, plaintiff cites the following passage from this 
court's decision in American Steel Foundries v. Industrial Comm'n, 361 Ill. 582 (1935):
American Steel Foundries, however, has no bearing on this case 
because that case was decided four years before section 9 was enacted, and at 
least one commentator has noted that the General Assembly enacted section 9 in 
response to this language in American Steel Foundries. 2 T. Angerstein, 
Illinois Workmen's Compensation §1751, at 356 (rev. ed. 1952). Although this 
court has occasionally cited this language from American Steel 
Foundries in cases decided after section 9 was enacted (see, e.g., 
Jarabe v. Industrial Comm'n, 172 Ill. 2d 345, 350-51 (1996)), we have 
never done so in a case involving section 9 and a lump sum payment to an 
employee under the Workers Occupational Diseases Act.
Constitutional Issues
Plaintiff argues that if section 9 does indeed bar her claim for death 
benefits, then section 9 is unconstitutional. All statutes carry a strong 
presumption of constitutionality. Arangold Corp. v. Zehnder, 187 Ill. 2d 341, 351 (1999). The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute 
bears the burden of rebutting this presumption and clearly establishing a 
constitutional violation. Arangold, 187 Ill. 2d  at 351. Plaintiff has 
failed to make such a showing in this case.
Plaintiff first argues that section 9 violates her right to due process. 
Plaintiff argues that section 9 violates substantive due process because it 
arbitrarily limits the employer's liability for death benefits whenever a 
settlement agreement includes a compromise on any question other than the extent 
of disability. We disagree. Where, as here, no fundamental constitutional right 
is implicated, this court reviews the statute under consideration using the 
rational basis test. Russell v. Department of Natural Resources, 183 Ill. 2d 434, 446 (1998). Under this test, the statute must bear a reasonable 
relationship to the public interest intended to be protected, and the means 
adopted must be a reasonable method of accomplishing the desired objective. 
Russell, 183 Ill. 2d  at 447. The State argues that the primary purpose 
of section 9 is to promote settlements between parties with disputes pending 
before the Industrial Commission by providing an incentive to the parties to 
settle weaker claims, i.e., those claims in which the employer contests 
more issues than merely the extent of the employee's disability. Section 9 bears 
a rational relationship to the goal of promoting the settlement of contested 
claims. Section 9 provides incentives to both the employee and employer to 
encourage settlement. The employer concedes its liability for some amount of 
benefits under the Act and agrees to pay the employee the total amount of his or 
her compensation in a lump sum rather than over a period of time. In exchange, 
the employer eliminates its liability for any future death benefits under the 
Act. The employee, on the other hand, receives compensation when, in a case 
where more than just the extent of the employee's disability is at issue, he may 
have received nothing, and he receives his benefits in a lump sum payment. 
Plaintiff has failed to advance any persuasive reason for why this method for 
encouraging the settlement of contested claims is unreasonable. Both the 
employee and the employer give up something and receive something in return.
Plaintiff's procedural due process challenge to section 9 is equally 
meritless. Procedural due process claims concern the constitutionality of the 
specific procedures employed to deny a person's life, liberty or property. 
East St. Louis Federation of Teachers, Local 1220 v. East St. Louis School 
District No. 189 Financial Oversight Panel, 178 Ill. 2d 399, 415 (1997). 
Procedural due process is meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but 
from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty or property. 
East St. Louis Federation of Teachers, 178 Ill. 2d  at 415. This court 
uses a three-part test when considering procedural due process claims:
Plaintiff argues that she was entitled to notice and a hearing before the 
lump sum settlement between Old Ben and Elmer could bar her claim for death 
benefits under section 9. Plaintiff, however, has failed to establish that she 
had a protectable property interest in a death benefits claim at the time Elmer 
and Old Ben entered into the settlement agreement. At the time the parties 
settled Elmer's claim, plaintiff was not entitled to death benefits under the 
Act. In fact, her right to death benefits was anything but certain. There are a 
number of circumstances under which plaintiff would have had no right whatsoever 
to death benefits under the Act. Elmer's death could have been caused by 
something other than his occupational disease; plaintiff could have predeceased 
Elmer; or plaintiff could have divorced Elmer and remarried prior to his death. 
The due process clause protects " 'interests that a person has already 
acquired in specific benefits,' " not merely an expectation or 
abstract need for such benefits. (Emphasis in original.) Polyvend, Inc. v. 
Puckorius, 77 Ill. 2d 287, 294 (1979), quoting Board of Regents of 
State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548, 560, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 2708 (1972). At best, there was a possibility that plaintiff would be 
eligible to receive death benefits under the Act, but her interest in such 
benefits is not sufficiently certain to constitute a protectable property 
interest under the due process clause.
Plaintiff next argues that section 9 violates the right to a certain remedy 
guaranteed by article I, section 12, of the Illinois Constitution. Article I, 
section 12, states, "Every person shall find a certain remedy in the laws for 
all injuries and wrongs which he receives to his person, privacy, property or 
reputation." Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §12. This provision in the Illinois 
Constitution, however, is merely " 'an expression of a philosophy and not a 
mandate that a "certain remedy" be provided in any specific form.' " 
DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hospital, 147 Ill. 2d 57, 72 (1992), quoting 
Sullivan v. Midlothian Park District, 51 Ill. 2d 274, 277 (1972). 
Plaintiff alleges that this court retreated from this understanding of article 
I, section 12, in Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367 (1997). 
Plaintiff's argument is meritless. In fact, the Best court explicitly 
acknowledged that "the certain remedy provision has been referred to in general 
as a statement of philosophy rather than a guarantee of a specific remedy." 
Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 458-59. Moreover, the Best court did not 
rely on article I, section 12, to invalidate any of the provisions of the Civil 
Justice Reform Amendments of 1995 which were at issue in that case.
Plaintiff next argues that section 9 violates equal protection.(2) The 
equal protection clause requires that the government treat similarly situated 
individuals in a similar manner. In re A.A., 181 Ill. 2d 32, 37 (1998). 
The equal protection clause does not forbid the legislature from drawing proper 
distinctions in legislation among different categories of people. A.A., 
181 Ill. 2d  at 37. The level of scrutiny applied in reviewing legislative 
classifications under the equal protection clause depends on the nature of the 
classification: those based on a suspect class or affecting a fundamental right 
receive a heightened level of review under the strict scrutiny standard, whereas 
economic and social welfare legislation is reviewed under the rational basis 
test. See A.A., 181 Ill. 2d  at 37. Section 9 involves neither a suspect 
class nor a fundamental right; therefore, section 9 is subject only to 
deferential review under the rational basis test. The rational basis test 
"requires only that there be a reasonable relationship between the challenged 
legislation and a conceivable, and perhaps unarticulated, governmental 
interest." Cutinello v. Whitley, 161 Ill. 2d 409, 420 (1994).
Plaintiff argues that allowing an employer to immunize itself from death 
benefits claims by the employee's survivors does not serve any legitimate 
purpose or governmental interest. Plaintiff also argues that there is no 
rational justification for denying death benefits to the survivors of employees 
who compromise on issues other than the extent of disability but allowing death 
benefits to those survivors of employees who compromise solely on the extent of 
disability. Both of these arguments are meritless. As we have already discussed, 
section 9 bears a rational relationship to the legitimate governmental interest 
of promoting the settlement of contested claims under the Act. Moreover, there 
is a rational basis for treating the survivors of employees with weaker cases 
(i.e., cases in which the employer contests issues other than the 
employee's extent of disability) differently than the survivors of employees 
with stronger cases (i.e., cases in which the employer is contesting 
solely the extent of the employee's disability). Section 9 provides additional 
incentives to both the employer (no death benefits claims) and the employee 
(payment of compensation in a lump sum rather than in weekly payments) to settle 
these weaker cases.
Finally, plaintiff argues that section 9 constitutes an unconstitutional 
delegation of legislative and judicial powers. Plaintiff argues that section 9 
constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of legislative and judicial power 
because it allows the employer and the employee (and the Industrial Commission 
by virtue of its authority to approve lump sum settlements) to decide whether or 
not the settlement of a claim for compensation under the Act extinguishes a 
survivor's claim for death benefits. This argument is meritless. Section 9 does 
not delegate any legislative power to the employee and employer or the 
Industrial Commission. The legislature, not the employee and the employer or the 
Industrial Commission, has determined which kinds of settlement agreements bar 
future death benefits claims. The mere fact that the parties can fashion a 
settlement agreement in a way which does or does not result in the barring of a 
death benefits claim in a particular case does not make section 9 an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, nor does giving the Industrial 
Commission the authority to approve a settlement agreement that extinguishes 
death benefits claim if such a settlement is in the best interest of the parties 
constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Under 
plaintiff's analysis, even the Workers' Occupational Diseases Act itself would 
constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers because it 
allows the employee to determine whether or not he receives compensation under 
the Act by requiring that the employee file a claim in order to receive 
compensation under the Act. For the same reasons, we reject plaintiff's claim 
that section 9 is an unconstitutional delegation of judicial powers.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and 
affirm the circuit court's order granting Old Ben's motion for summary 
judgment.
Appellate court judgment reversed;
circuit court judgment affirmed. 
1. 1Section 8(d)(2) of the Workers' Compensation 
Act provides that an employee is entitled to compensation for permanent partial 
disability "for that percentage of 500 weeks that the partial disability *** 
bears to total disability." 820 ILCS 305/8(d)(2) (West 1998). Therefore, an 
employee who receives an award of permanent partial disability representing 20% 
of the man as a whole is entitled to weekly compensation for 20% of 500 weeks 
(100 weeks). 

2. 2In a related argument, plaintiff argues that 
section 9 violates the prohibition against special legislation in article IV, 
section 13, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §13). 
Plaintiff, however, acknowledges that this court's analysis under the special 
legislation clause is essentially the same as this court's analysis under the 
equal protection clause. See Best, 179 Ill. 2d  at 393 (stating "[a] 
special legislation challenge generally is judged under the same standards 
applicable to an equal protection challenge"). Therefore, our equal protection 
analysis is equally dispositive of plaintiff's special legislation claim.