Case Title: MODESTO MENDICOA v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-10-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
MODESTO MENDICOA v. THE STATE OF WYOMING1989 WY 181780 P.2d 1346Case Number: 88-260Decided: 10/02/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming

MODESTO MENDICOA, APPELLANT 
(PETITIONER),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(RESPONDENT).

Michael D. 
Newman, Rock 
Springs, for 
petitioner.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Karen A. Bryne, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for 
respondent.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal arises from 
a criminal action originally brought in SweetwaterCounty court. On a petition for review on 
certiorari from the county court, after an initial appeal to the district court, 
petitioner Modesto Mendicoa (Mendicoa) seeks reversals of his convictions on two 
counts of "importing" livestock into Wyoming without valid health certificates, 
in violation of W.S. 11-19-111 (1977), and the Governor's Livestock Import 
proclamation.

[¶2.]     Mendicoa's issues 
are:

1. Did the District Court 
err in not ruling that W.S. 11-19-111 and the Governor's Livestock Import 
proclamation are unconstitutional in that the legislative branch has improperly 
delegated to the executive branch the authority to establish a new and distinct 
crime for shipping and transporting livestock through Wyoming to a destination 
in another state?

2. Did the District Court 
err in not finding that the Governor's Livestock Import proclamation was 
unconstitutional because it unlawfully burdened interstate 
commerce?

3. Did the District Court 
err in not finding that the trial court's instructions to the jury gave the 
impression that it is unlawful and a violation of W.S. 11-19-111 to ship, 
transport or move any livestock into or within the State of Wyoming unless the 
livestock are accompanied by an official health certificate in possession of the 
driver?

4. Did the District Court 
err in affirming the trial court's denial of Defendant's Motion for Acquittal 
concerning the weight, sufficiency and admissibility of the evidence presented 
at trial, notwithstanding the jury's verdict?

[¶3.]     We reverse Mendicoa's 
convictions on the grounds of insufficiency of the 
evidence.

[¶4.]     In December, 1985, 
Kimball Call purchased 189 cattle from the Cattle Owners Association in 
Grantsville, Utah, with a check from Mendicoa. Shortly 
after the purchase, Call arranged to sell the cattle to Albert Bouziden from 
Oklahoma. Call 
obtained Utah health certificates on the cattle 
and loaded them onto trucks for transportation to Oklahoma. When the trucks 
carrying the cattle reached the Wyoming state 
line, they were rerouted to Manila, Utah, 
to be reweighed because of a dispute over the weighing process that occurred in 
Grantsville. Due to the time delay caused by the rerouting, the sale fell 
through with Bouziden and the cattle were released into Mendicoa's corrals, 
where they were kept separate from Mendicoa's herds.

[¶5.]     Call renegotiated the 
sale with Bouziden and, on January 5, 1986, made a second attempt to ship the 
cattle. The trucks were again stopped at the Wyoming border, this time due to questions about the brand 
inspections of the cattle, and were forced to return to Manila where the cattle 
were again placed in Mendicoa's corrals. Due to this second delay, the deal with 
Bouziden again fell through.

[¶6.]     Call renegotiated yet 
another deal with Bouziden and made arrangements with Ray Widmer, an independent 
trucker, to transport fifty-three of the Grantsville cattle to Oklahoma on January 23, 
1986. After loading these cattle, Widmer went to McKinnon, Wyoming, where an 
additional thirty-nine cattle were loaded onto the truck, and then to Mountain 
View, Wyoming, where another twenty-seven cattle were loaded. While on his way 
to Rock Springs, Wyoming, to have health inspections performed on all the 
cattle, Widmer's truck was stopped by the then Deputy Sheriff of Sweetwater 
County, Detective Paine. When asked to produce brand and health inspections on 
the cattle, Widmer produced only Utah brand inspections for the fifty-three 
Grantsville cattle.1 Widmer was directed to go to 
Rock Springs, 
where health inspections were conducted on all the cattle by Veterinarian Paul 
Zancanella. After the inspections were completed, health certificates were 
issued for all the cattle, and Widmer proceeded with the cattle to Oklahoma, where Bouziden received the cattle and paid 
Mendicoa for the cattle owned by Call and for the additional cattle picked up in 
McKinnon and Mountain View, 
Wyoming.

[¶7.]     At the end of February, 
1986, Bouziden hired Widmer to haul more cattle to Oklahoma. Widmer loaded 
sixty cattle in Idaho and another twenty-eight 
at Mendicoa's ranch in Utah. Because he did not receive health 
certificates on the twenty-eight Utah cattle, 
Widmer contacted Zancanella and arranged to have health inspections performed on 
them in Rock 
Springs. Widmer was again stopped by Paine before 
arriving in Rock 
Springs and requested to produce health certificates. 
Because Widmer did not have valid health certificates for the Utah cattle, Paine impounded the cattle and ordered them 
shipped to Rock 
Springs, where Zancanella performed the inspections and 
issued health certificates for twenty-four of the cattle; four of the cattle 
were detained because of questionable ownership. The twenty-four Utah cattle and sixty Idaho cattle were then transported to Bouziden in 
Oklahoma.

[¶8.]     On March 18, 1986, 
Mendicoa was criminally charged with two counts of importing livestock into 
Wyoming 
without valid health certificates, in violation of W.S. 11-19-111, resulting 
from the January 23, and March 5, 1986, shipments of cattle by Widmer. A jury 
trial was held on March 24, and 25, 1987. At the close of the state's case, 
Mendicoa argued that the state had failed to produce sufficient evidence to 
support a conviction of the counts against him and moved to dismiss. The trial 
court treated the motion as a motion for acquittal and denied it. The jury found 
Mendicoa guilty. On April 3, 1987, Mendicoa moved for acquittal and for a new 
trial, which motions were denied by the county court on April 16, 1987. Mendicoa 
appealed his convictions to the district court, which affirmed his convictions 
on September 14, 1988. Mendicoa then filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari 
with this court, which we granted.

I. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
PROCLAMATION

[¶9.]     W.S. 11-19-111 
authorizes the Governor to regulate by proclamation the importation into 
Wyoming of 
livestock or anything suspected of being infected with livestock disease germs. 
The pertinent portions of the statute read:

(a) The governor, upon 
recommendation of the Wyoming livestock board, may regulate by proclamation the 
importation into Wyoming from any other state any livestock, or any virulent 
blood or live virus of any disease affecting livestock, or anything suspected of 
being infected with livestock disease germs, except under such conditions as he 
deems proper for the protection of the livestock of Wyoming. All requirements in 
the governor's proclamation shall be enforced by the Wyoming livestock 
board.

(b) After a proclamation 
is issued by the governor it is unlawful for any person to import into Wyoming 
or receive imports within this state from any other state any livestock, 
virulent blood or live virus or diseases affecting livestock, or any product or 
thing suspected of being infected with livestock disease germs, except under 
such conditions as may be imposed by the proclamation. Any person who violates 
this section shall be punished as provided in W.S. 11-1-103. The violator is 
civilly liable for all damages and loss sustained by any person by reason of 
violation of the proclamation.

[¶10.]  Pursuant to the statute the Governor 
issued a proclamation in 1984, which reads in pertinent 
part:

(2)(d) All livestock 
shipped or in any manner transported or otherwise moved or received into 
Wyoming * * * 
shall be accompanied by an official health certificate which shall be in the 
possession of the driver of the vehicle or person in charge of the livestock. 
Such livestock shall not be diverted from destination for any 
purpose.

* * * * * 
*

(iv) Health certificates 
shall be valid for ten days following date of inspection and issuance. All 
health certificates shall be issued to comply in all respects with requirements 
of the State of Wyoming unless specifically authorized in 
writing by the Wyoming State Veterinarian.

[¶11.]  In his first issue Mendicoa contends that 
the proclamation expands on the activities intended by the legislature to be 
regulated under W.S. 11-19-111, by including within its scope shipping and 
transporting of livestock through 
Wyoming to a destination in another state, as 
opposed to the mere importation into 
Wyoming. 
He argues that the statute constitutes an improper delegation of legislative 
authority to the executive branch, which enabled the Governor to exceed his 
authority by establishing a new and distinct crime for shipping and transporting 
livestock through the state. We disagree.

When interpreting a 
statute or provision we search for legislative intent. Department of 
[¶12.]            
Revenue and Taxation of the State of Wyoming v. Hamilton, 743 P.2d 877, 879 (Wyo. 1987). We always begin that search by 
focusing on the language of the legislative enactment, giving that language 
plain and ordinary meaning unless otherwise indicated. Schultz v. State, 751 P.2d 367, 370 (Wyo. 1988); Hamilton, 743 P.2d  at 879; Mahoney v. L.L. Sheep Company, 
79 Wyo. 293, 
333 P.2d 712, 715 (1958).

Department of 
Revenue and Taxation v. Casper Legion Baseball 
Club, 767 P.2d 608, 610 (Wyo. 1989). W.S. 8-1-103(a)(i) (1977) 
provides: "Words and phrases shall be taken in their ordinary and usual sense, 
but technical words and phrases having a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law 
shall be understood according to their technical import."

[¶13.]  The words and phrases used in the statute 
and the proclamation are not technical, and their meanings are easy to 
understand. W.S. 11-19-111 uses the word "importation" to denote the activity to 
be regulated. Black's Law Dictionary defines "importation" as the "act of 
bringing goods and merchandise into a country from a foreign country." Black's 
Law Dictionary 680 (5th ed. 1979) (citing Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 43 S. Ct. 504, 67 L. Ed. 894 
(1923)). Similarly, Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1135 (1966) 
defines "importation" as "the act or practice of bringing in (as merchandise) 
from an outside or foreign source."

[¶14.]  On the other hand, the Governor's 
proclamation uses the phrase "shipped or in any manner transported or otherwise 
moved or received into." The word "ship" is defined as "to transport; * * * [t]o 
send by established mode of transportation, as to `carry,' `convey,' or 
`transport,' which are synonymous and defined, respectively, as `to bear or 
cause to be borne as from one place to another,' and `to carry or convey from 
one place to another.'" Black's at 1235 (citing Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. 
v. Petroleum Refining Co., D.C.Ky, 39 F.2d 629, 630 (1930)). To "transport," one 
must "carry or convey from one place to another." Black's at 1344 (citing 
Sacramento Nav. Co. v. Salz, 273 U.S. 326, 47 S. Ct. 368, 71 L. Ed. 663 
(1927); People v. One 1941 Cadillac Club Coupe, 63 Cal. App. 2d 418, 147 P.2d 49, 
51 (1944)). "Move" is defined as "to leave one point or place and go on to a new 
one." Webster's at 1479. Finally, "receive" means "to take into possession and 
control" or "take possession or delivery of; to take in." Black's at 1140; 
Webster's at 1894.

[¶15.]  Standing alone the words "shipped," 
"transported," "moved" and "received" could denote movement through a state, as 
Mendicoa argues. However, with the addition of the word "into," which modifies 
each of the words used in the phrase, the words take on specific meanings 
entirely consistent with the definition of "importation": the act of being 
brought into the State of Wyoming. In defining the word "into," the 
United States Supreme Court stated:

[T]here is no ground for 
the holding that the prohibition of the statute against transporting liquor in 
interstate commerce "into any State or Territory the laws of which prohibit the 
manufacture," includes the movement in interstate commerce through such a State 
to another. * * * [T]he context makes clear that the word "into" as used in the 
statute, refers to the State of destination, and not to the means by which that 
end is reached, the movement through one State as a mere incident of 
transportation to the State into which it is shipped.

United 
States v. Gudger, 249 U.S. 373, 374-75, 39 S. Ct. 323, 63 L. Ed. 653 (1919). Consistent with Gudger, the Federal District Court for the District of 
Montana stated:

To be "imported," it must 
be of foreign situs, and brought hither by the owner, or with his consent, with 
the intent to be here held, used, consumed, or enjoyed, or to be here 
incorporated in the general mass of property. If brought hither by accident, 
great, if not inevitable, necessity, superior force, or by a trespasser, and 
timely removed hence, it is not "imported" nor dutiable, nor subject to 
forfeiture against the owner.

United 
States v. Eighty-Five Head of 
Cattle, 205 F. 679, 681 (D.Mont. 1913). 

[¶16.]  The phrase used in the proclamation, 
"shipped or in any manner transported or otherwise moved or received into," has 
the same meaning as the word "importation" used in the statute. As such, the 
proclamation tracks the statute and regulates only that which was intended by 
the legislature to be regulated, the importation into Wyoming of livestock. It 
does not enlarge on the activities to be regulated by including transportation through the state. 
Because the proclamation only regulates the importation of livestock into 
Wyoming, the Governor did not exceed his 
authority in its promulgation; he did not establish a new and distinct crime for 
the transportation of livestock through Wyoming.

[¶17.]  Whether it was proper for the legislature 
to delegate the authority to the Governor to promulgate the proclamation turns 
on the distinction between the delegation of the power to make law and 
delegation of the power to execute a law properly made. This distinction has 
been recognized in Wyoming cases involving livestock. Arbuckle v. 
Pflaeging, 20 Wyo. 351, 373-74, 123 P. 918, 924 
(1912); Richter v. State, 16 Wyo. 437, 443, 95 P. 51, 52 
(1908).

[¶18.]  This true distinction, upheld by the 
United States Supreme Court, "is between the delegation of power to make the 
law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and 
conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under 
and in pursuance of the law." (emphasis added.) J.W. Hampton, & Co. v. 
United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407, 48 S. Ct. 348, 351, 72 L. Ed. 624, 629-30 (1928); St. Louis Merchants' Bridge T. Ry. Co. v. 
United States, 188 F. 191, 
195 (8th Cir. 1911) (quoting Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693, 12 S. Ct. 495, 36 L. Ed. 294 (1892)); State v. McCarty, 5 Ala. App. 212, 59 So. 543, 546 (1912); C.W. 
& Z. Rail Road Co. v. Commissioners of Clinton County, 1 Ohio 77, 88-89 
(1852). The first cannot be done, but there is no valid objection to the latter. 
J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S.  at 407, 48 S. Ct.  at 351, 72 
L.Ed. at 629-30; C.W. & Z, 1 Ohio at 88-89; McCarty, 59 So.  at 546. 
SeeState ex rel. Stocker v. City of Laramie, 737 P.2d 746, 750 (1987); Eastwood v. Wyoming 
Highway Department, 76 Wyo. 247, 301 P.2d 818, 
823 (Wyo. 
1956). So long as the legislature "`shall lay down by legislative act an 
intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to (exercise the 
delegated authority) is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a 
forbidden delegation of legislative power.'" Mistretta v. United States, ___ 
U.S. ___, ___, 109 S. Ct. 647, 654, 102 L. Ed. 2d 714, 730-31 (1989) (quoting J.W. 
Hampton, 276 U.S.  at 409, 48 S. Ct.  at 352, 72 L.Ed. at 630). The power to 
delegate authority to the executive branch to execute the various statutes is a 
recognition of the great disadvantage to the legislature "in solving many of the 
complex and difficult problems with which it is confronted," if it were 
prohibited from delegating such ministerial authority. State v. Kellogg, 98 
Idaho 541, 568 P.2d 514 (1977) (quoting Boise 
Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., 94 Idaho 876, 499 P.2d 575 
(1972)).

[¶19.]  Here, the proclamation tracks W.S. 
11-19-111. It does not regulate activities the legislature did not intend to 
regulate, but provides regulatory procedures that conform with the purpose of 
the statute. Moreover, the proclamation does not create a new and distinct 
crime. As such, the legislature did not improperly delegate its authority to the 
executive branch and the proclamation is not 
unconstitutional.

II. INTERSTATE 
COMMERCE

[¶20.]  Mendicoa's next argument that the 
proclamation burdens interstate commerce is premised on his contention that the 
proclamation goes beyond the scope of the statute by regulating the 
transportation of cattle through the state rather than simply regulating their 
importation into the state. Because the proclamation does not go beyond the 
scope of activities regulated by the statute, Medicoa's premise does not exist; 
the proclamation regulates only the importation of cattle into Wyoming and, therefore, 
does not burden interstate commerce. The power of a state to regulate products 
imported into its boundaries, as opposed to products being transported through 
the state, has long been recognized in cases involving interstate commerce. As 
stated in Grimes v. Eddy, 126 Mo. 168, 28 S.W. 756, 26 L.R.A. 638, 645 
(1894):

The power to prevent the 
importation of diseased or infected 
cattle into the state, and the power to prevent the transportation of such cattle through 
the state over the great thoroughfares, - railroads, - or by river, rests upon 
very different principles. The one [importation into the state] * * * may be 
regulated or prohibited by the state, in the exercise of its police power; while 
the other [transportation through the state] is a plain regulation of interstate 
commerce, a regulation extending to prohibition. (emphasis 
added).

Here, only the 
importation of cattle into Wyoming is being regulated by the 
proclamation; within the general police power, this is 
permitted.

III. 
INSTRUCTIONS

[¶21.]  Mendicoa next argues that jury 
instructions nos. 6, 8, 9 and 10 were improper because they created the 
impression that it is unlawful and a violation of W.S. 11-19-111 to ship, 
transport or move any livestock into or within the State of Wyoming unless 
accompanied by a valid health certificate. We disagree. A close reading of the 
challenged instructions reveals that they in essence mirror the language of the 
proclamation and W.S. 11-19-111. Our holding that the proclamation does not go 
beyond the scope of activities intended to be regulated in W.S. 11-19-111 makes 
further discussion of this assignment of error 
unnecessary.

IV. SUFFICIENCY OF 
EVIDENCE

[¶22.]  The final question to be addressed is 
whether sufficient evidence was presented to convict Mendicoa of "ship[ping] or 
in any manner transport[ing], or otherwise mov[ing], or receiv[ing]" cattle into 
the State of Wyoming without valid health certificates. We 
hold that sufficient evidence was not presented, and 
reverse.

[¶23.]  The standard for reviewing the 
sufficiency of the evidence in criminal cases is

not whether the evidence 
establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for us, but rather whether it is 
sufficient to form the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt to be drawn by the [trier of fact] when the evidence is viewed 
in the light most favorable to the State.

* * * * * 
*

It is not our function to 
weigh the evidence for a determination as to whether or not it is sufficient to 
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We have consistently held that even 
though it is possible to draw other inferences from the evidence presented, it 
is the responsibility of the [trier of fact] to resolve the conflicts in the 
evidence.

Righter v. 
State, 752 P.2d 416, 420 (Wyo. 1988) (quoting 
Broom v. State, 695 P.2d 640, 642 (Wyo. 1985)).

[¶24.]  Pursuant to the instructions, the state 
had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mendicoa imported (consistent with 
the plain meaning of that word) cattle into Wyoming without valid health certificates. 
Before determining whether the state met its burden, we first recognize a 
concern as stated by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
1911:

A penal statute which 
creates and denounces a new offense, and the act under consideration is such a 
statute, should be strictly construed. A man ought not to be punished unless he 
falls plainly within the class of persons specified as punishable by such a law. 
The definition of offenses and the classification of offenders are legislative 
and not judicial functions, and where, as in the case at bar, a penal statute is 
plain and unambiguous, the courts may not lawfully extend it to a class of 
persons who are excluded from its effects by its terms * * 
*.

In United States v. 
Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 5 L. Ed. 37 (1820), Chief Justice Marshall 
said:

"The case must be a 
strong one, indeed, which would justify a court in departing from the plain 
meaning of words, especially in a penal act, in search of an intention which the 
words themselves did not suggest. To determine that a case is within the 
intention of a statute, its language must authorize us to say so. It would be 
dangerous, indeed, to carry the principle that a case, which is within the 
reason or mischief of a statute, is within its provisions, so far as to punish a 
crime not enumerated in the statute, because it is of equal atrocity, or of 
kindred character, with those which are enumerated."

St. 
Louis Merchants' Bridge T. Ry. 
Co., 188 F.  at 193-94. We are guided by the principle that the court may not 
construe a statute in such a manner as will enlarge, stretch, expand or extend 
it to matters not falling within its express provisions. Department of Revenue 
and Taxation, Motor Vehicle Division v. Andrews, 671 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Wyo. 1983); Matter of TRG, 665 P.2d 491, 498 (Wyo. 1983). It is our 
duty to ascertain the intention of the legislature as completely as possible 
from the language used in the statute itself. Having done so above we can only 
conclude that the trial court permitted the prosecution of a person, Mendicoa, 
who was clearly not covered by the language of the statute and attendant 
proclamation, which is clear and unambiguous. This action was 
error.

[¶25.]  The evidence presented at trial by the 
state established that Mendicoa's actions constituted only transportation of cattle through the State of Wyoming, not the importation of cattle into the state. At the close of the 
state's case, Mendicoa moved for acquittal on the basis of insufficiency of the 
evidence. A motion to acquit

must be granted when the 
evidence is such that a reasonable juror must have a reasonable doubt as to the 
existence of any of the essential elements of the crime. Further, if the 
evidence is such as to permit the jury to merely conjecture or speculate as to 
the Defendant's guilt, the trial judge should not allow the case to go to the 
jury.

Chavez v. State, 
601 P.2d 166, 170 (Wyo. 1979). Under this standard, Mendicoa's 
motion should have been granted. This record is completely devoid of any 
evidence showing or tending to show that the cattle were ever intended by 
Mendicoa to be held, used, consumed or enjoyed in Wyoming or incorporated 
into its general mass of property. Eighty-Five Head of Cattle, 205 F.  at 681. 
The uncontroverted testimony of every witness showed that the cattle were 
intended to be transported through the State of Wyoming to Albert Bouziden in Kansas or Oklahoma, and were in fact transported to 
him.

[¶26.]  To uphold the conviction of Mendicoa in 
light of this evidence would be to permit the conviction of a person innocent of 
the crime charged. Mendicoa was charged with and convicted of importing cattle 
into the state, when all the evidence proves that he did not import the cattle 
into Wyoming, 
as the word "import" is plainly understood, but rather transported them through 
the state. By denying Mendicoa's motion for acquittal, the trial court enlarged, 
stretched, expanded or extended the statute to matters not falling within its 
express provisions to include the transportation of cattle through the state. 
Andrews, 671 P.2d  at 1246; Matter of TRG, 665 P.2d  at 498. We cannot permit this 
conviction to stand because in doing so we would be condoning the regulation of 
interstate commerce, which is not allowed. Grimes, 126 Mo. at 188, 28 S.W. 756, 
26 L.R.A. at 645.

[¶27.]  Mendicoa's conviction is reversed as his 
actions did not fall within the confines of the statute and proclamation under 
which he was charged and convicted.

CARDINE, C.J., files a 
dissenting opinion with whom THOMAS, J., joins.

THOMAS, J., files a dissenting 
opinion, with whom CARDINE, C.J., joins.

FOOTNOTES

1 Utah requires only that official state brand certificates 
be obtained before cattle can be transported out of Utah. Utah Code Ann. §§ 4-24-15 
and 17. While there is no requirement that the cattle to be exported from the 
State of Utah be accompanied by a health 
certificate, Utah statutes require written certification 
that any cattle imported into the State be free of tuberculosis. Utah Code Ann. § 4-31-5. 
Finally, while Utah owners or possessors of cattle known to be diseased are not 
permitted to let the diseased cattle to run at large, nor to "sell, ship, trade, 
or give away an infected animal without disclosing that it is diseased or has 
been exposed to disease," there is no specific requirement that such disclosure 
be in the form of an official health certificate. Utah Code Ann. § 
4-31-14.

THOMAS, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom CARDINE, C.J., 
joins.

[¶28.]  Like Chief Justice Cardine, I am 
persuaded that this case is erroneously decided. Consequently, I join in his 
dissenting opinion and add these comments.

[¶29.]  It is important to remember that this is 
the Supreme Court of the State of Wyoming. While our oath of office calls us to 
support and defend the Constitution of the United States of 
America, our primary obligation still is 
service to the citizens of this state. Their interests deserve priority in this 
court so long as it is possible to serve them without contravening the 
Constitution of the United 
States of America.

[¶30.]  In this instance, I detect a sense by the 
majority that somehow it is compelled to refuse to include cattle that are 
intended to simply pass through the state of Wyoming within the phrase "import 
into" because of the Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the United States of 
America. I do not believe that compulsion is present and, consequently, I would 
include the cattle that are involved in these facts within the reach of the 
legislation and the executive order. It is important to remember that, even 
though the cattle are intended to simply travel through the state of Wyoming, fortuitous 
events may cause them to come to rest here. A breakdown or wreck of a truck or a 
train, bad weather, or, perhaps, even the seizure of the cattle as evidence are 
all examples of fortuitous events that could cause diseased cattle to come to 
rest within this state. Perceived in that light, I am satisfied that the 
requirement for a health certificate for such animals is not such a burden on 
interstate commerce that it cannot be justified as a reasonable exercise of the 
police power of the state.

[¶31.]  In Duckworth v. State of Arkansas, 201 Ark. 1123, 148 S.W.2d 656 (1941), the court 
held, in essence, that "into" includes "through." The case was reviewed by the 
Supreme Court of the United 
States, and that concept was affirmed. The 
court addressed the commerce clause from the perspective that exercise of the 
police power may be invoked to regulate matters of local concern. Duckworth v. 
State of Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 62 S. Ct. 311, 86 L. Ed. 294, 138 A.L.R. 1144 (1941). It would not seem to make any 
difference that the subject matter of the transportation is cattle and the local 
concern is health matters relating to livestock, rather than liquor. Johnson v. 
Yellow Cab Transit Company, 137 F.2d 274 (10th Cir. 1943), aff'd., 321 U.S. 383, 64 S. Ct. 622, 88 L. Ed. 814 
(1944), is authority for the requirement of a permit for the transportation of 
liquor in interstate commerce through the state. The state of Oklahoma was upheld in 
the exercise of a reasonable restriction on transportation through the state 
that was found not to be an impermissible burden on interstate 
commerce.

[¶32.]  The events in this case are not 
significantly different from those in the cases cited, and I would hold that the 
phrase "import into" includes livestock that are intended to simply pass through 
the state of Wyoming to another destination. Viewed from 
that perspective, I would find the evidence in this case to be sufficient to 
affirm the conviction of Mendicoa.

CARDINE, Chief Justice, 
dissenting, with whom THOMAS, J., 
joins.

[¶33.]  This case turns on the interpretation of 
the phrase "import into" in the enabling legislation. The central dispute is 
whether "import into" includes cattle intended to be delivered outside 
Wyoming but 
transported through the state. I believe the opinion reaches a bad result as a 
matter of law and policy for it holds that the State of Wyoming must allow the transportation of diseased cattle 
"into" the State of Wyoming if they are only passing 
through.

[¶34.]  The opinion, citing United States v. Gudger, 249 U.S. 373, 39 S. Ct. 323, 63 L. Ed. 653 (1919) - a case involving transportation of healthy 
liquor - and United States v. Eighty-five Head of Cattle, 205 F. 679 (D.Mont. 
1913), holds that all words and phrases involved in the statute and executive 
order are used in their ordinary and usual sense, i.e., their "plain meaning." I 
do not believe the phrase "import into" is accorded its "plain meaning" by the 
court. The dictionary plain meaning of the word "into" is "indicating place 
entered," Webster's New International Dictionary (2nd ed. 1957), "denoting * * * 
entrance in respect of a place," Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary 
(1944), and "used to indicate entry," Random House Dictionary (1966). "Import" 
is generally defined as "to bring in from a foreign or external source." 
Webster's, supra. If these plain meanings are accepted, Mendicoa violated 
Wyoming law when the cattle were "transported 
into" Wyoming, and it was not relevant that 
they were then "transported through" Wyoming. In other words, it is more consistent 
with the common usage of the phrase "import into Wyoming" to say it means to bring something across the 
state line into Wyoming. Not surprisingly, this was apparently 
the interpretation given by the trial court where Mendicoa was 
convicted.

[¶35.]  I would affirm because I believe the 
legislature intended and the governor's proclamation provides that only healthy 
cattle be brought into the State of Wyoming. I have no problem requiring a health 
certificate for a product entering Wyoming which may bring with it infectious 
disease. I cannot help wondering about the states that inspect for diseased 
plants and fruit at their border. If the fruit is passing through rather than 
coming to rest, are the states powerless to take this 
action?