Case Title: Pyramid Development v. D&J Associates

Citation: 

Docket Number: 002784

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2001-11-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
PYRAMID DEVELOPMENT, L.L.C., 
 
v.  Record No. 002784 
OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
November 2, 2001 
 
D&J ASSOCIATES 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 
Theodore J. Markow, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred 
in admitting parol evidence to aid in interpreting the terms 
of an easement, and in granting an injunction against Pyramid 
Development, L.L.C. (“Pyramid”) to prevent it from interfering 
with D&J Associates’ (“D&J”) use of an easement over certain 
property (“the property”) owned by Pyramid. 
I. Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
On March 30, 1984, D&J acquired title to a building 
located at 1719 and 1721 Summit Avenue in the City of 
Richmond.  The building’s public entrances are located on 
Summit Avenue, with the commercial entrances and loading bays 
for shipping and receiving located at the rear of the 
building.  Another row of connected buildings runs parallel to 
Summit Avenue fronting on Altamont Avenue to the south.  The 
property in question lies between both rows of buildings. 
 
The deed conveying the property to D&J includes the 
building and an easement to use railroad spur tracks located 
behind each row of buildings.  The easement provides in 
pertinent part: 
[T]he right, privilege and easement to use in 
common the said spur tracks and sidings, and so 
much of the property of Davis Brothers, 
Incorporated, in the block bounded by Patton 
Avenue, the Boulevard, Altamont Avenue, Norfolk 
Street, and Summit Avenue, and abutting said spur 
tracks and sidings as may be necessary to afford 
the property hereby conveyed and the improvements 
thereon free and convenient access to and use of 
the said spur tracks and sidings. . . . 
 
 
The deed refers to “the location of said spur tracks and 
sidings” on a particular plat which identifies an “easement to 
use in common spur tracks.”  The railroad spur tracks 
referenced in the deed branched from a main railroad line 
nearby, entered the property, and ran along the rear of each 
row of buildings.  The rail service was discontinued sometime 
in the 1970’s.  The parties agree that if D&J’s easement has 
not been extinguished, then it encumbers the property owned by 
Pyramid. 
 
Beginning before the rail service was discontinued and 
continuing to the present, the property was used by motor 
vehicles for deliveries and for parking by the occupants of the 
building.  After Pyramid purchased the property in 1998, it 
wished to improve the property by paving it and adding parking 
spaces and asked the owners of the other buildings, including 
D&J, to enter into an agreement to defray the costs involved in 
 
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exchange for the use of parking spaces.  Pyramid planned to 
rent the spaces to those owners who chose not to enter into the 
agreement. 
 
D&J did not enter into the agreement or pay for parking 
spaces.  Instead, D&J filed a bill of complaint requesting 
injunctive relief to prevent Pyramid from restricting access to 
the property.  D&J asserted in the bill of complaint that the 
easement in its deed allowed for ingress and egress to its 
building and for the parking of vehicles.  In response, Pyramid 
maintained that when the rail service was discontinued, the 
essential purpose of the easement was abandoned. 
 
The trial court found the language of the easement 
ambiguous and permitted the introduction of parol evidence to 
determine whether the scope of the easement allowed for the use 
of trucks and other vehicles.  At trial, D&J’s evidence 
demonstrated that it regularly used the property for loading 
and unloading trucks and other vehicles.  The trial court found 
that the easement granted to D&J included the “use of the way 
to access [its] building in a reasonable manner in the ordinary 
course of [its] business.”  Relying on our decision in Wagoner 
v. Jack’s Creek Coal Corp., 199 Va. 741, 744-45, 101 S.E.2d 
627, 629 (1958), the trial court found that “the more modern 
use of motor vehicles to access plaintiff’s building instead of 
 
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the spur tracks [did] not violate the terms of the easement at 
issue.”  
 
The trial court enjoined Pyramid from impeding D&J’s 
access to the property.  Following issuance of the trial 
court’s order, both parties requested clarification.  After a 
hearing, the trial court entered a subsequent order to clarify 
the rights of the parties.  The revised order provided D&J with 
“the non-exclusive right of ingress and egress over and across” 
the property for access to its building and for loading and 
unloading vehicles, delivery and shipment of goods, placement 
of a dumpster, and the non-exclusive right to park motor 
vehicles at the rear of its building.  Pyramid appeals the 
adverse judgment of the trial court. 
II. Standard of Review 
 
The trial court’s finding of facts are binding upon this 
Court unless they are plainly wrong or unsupported by the 
evidence.  Quantum Dev. Co. v. Luckett, 242 Va. 159, 161, 409 
S.E.2d 121, 122 (1991).  However, “[t]he question whether a 
writing is ambiguous is not one of fact but of law.”  Langman 
v. Alumni Assoc. of the Univ. of Virginia, 247 Va. 491, 498, 
442 S.E.2d 669, 674 (1994).  On appellate review, we are not 
bound by the trial court’s conclusions regarding an 
instrument’s ambiguity because we are provided with the same 
opportunity as the trial court to consider the written 
 
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provisions of the deed in question.  Id.  If the trial court 
errs in admitting parol evidence, its findings of facts based 
upon improperly admitted evidence are plainly wrong.  Id. 
III. Analysis 
 
On appeal, Pyramid argues that the trial court erred in 
allowing the introduction of parol evidence to aid in 
determining the scope of the easement.  Additionally, Pyramid 
argues that the easement was extinguished because the subject 
of the easement, rail service, ceased to exist. 
 
When an easement is granted by deed, unless it is 
ambiguous, “the rights of the parties must be ascertained from 
the words of the deed, and the extent of the easement cannot 
be determined from any other source.”  Gordon v. Hoy, 211 Va. 
539, 541, 178 S.E.2d 495, 496 (1971).  We have held that when 
the language of a deed is “clear, unambiguous, and explicit,” 
a court interpreting it “should look no further than the four 
corners of the instrument under review.”  Langman, 247 Va. at 
498-99, 442 S.E.2d at 674.  Only when the language is 
ambiguous may a court look to parol evidence, or specifically, 
to the language employed “in light of the circumstances 
surrounding the parties and the land at the time the deed was 
executed.”  Hoy, 211 Va. at 541, 178 S.E.2d at 496. 
 
The trial court, citing reliance on our decision in 
Strickland v. Barnes, 209 Va. 438, 164 S.E.2d 768 (1968), 
 
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concluded that the language used in D&J’s grant was ambiguous 
and therefore determined it was appropriate to utilize parol 
evidence.  In Strickland, the grant at issue was made subject 
to easements and restrictions indicated on a plat.  Id. at 
441, 164 S.E.2d at 770.  The plat showed several easements, 
including a 25-foot strip “reserved for future R.R. Siding.”  
Id.  The crucial question in the case was, “[w]hat easement or 
right of way . . . was intended by the words ‘Reserved for 
future R.R. Siding?’ "  Id. at 442, 164 S.E.2d at 770.  No 
railroad siding had been constructed, so the Court was called 
upon to decide whether any right had been granted in the 25-
foot strip pending the construction of the siding.  Id.  In 
Strickland, we agreed with the trial court that both the deed 
and the plat were ambiguous; therefore, parol evidence was 
proper to aid in the trial court’s determination.  Id. at 442, 
164 S.E.2d at 770-72. 
 
The present case is different from Strickland.  The deed 
at issue in Strickland referenced an easement to a railroad 
siding that was not yet constructed, and the intended use of 
the easement prior to construction of the siding rendered the 
language in the deed ambiguous.  In the present case, however, 
the deed unambiguously granted an easement “to use in common 
the said spur tracks and sidings, and so much of the property 
. . . abutting said spur tracks and sidings as may be 
 
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necessary to afford the property hereby conveyed . . . free 
and convenient access to and use of the said spur tracks and 
sidings.”  The language employed in D&J’s deed is not 
ambiguous; the purpose of the easement was expressly limited 
to allowing access to the spur tracks and sidings, and nothing 
more.  Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erroneously 
admitted parol evidence to determine the scope of the 
unambiguous easement. 
 
The trial court also relied on our decision in Wagoner; 
however, the present case differs from Wagoner as well.  The 
easement at issue in Wagoner granted a right of way across a 
road described as “a wagon haul road.”  Wagoner, 199 Va. at 
744, 101 S.E.2d at 629.  We recognized that “where a right of 
way is granted or reserved it may be used for any purpose to 
which the land accommodated thereby may reasonably be devoted 
unless the grant or reservation specifically limits the use 
. . . .”  Id. at 744, 101 S.E.2d at 629.  We further held that 
use of the easement by trucks, the modern substitute for 
wagons, did not violate the easement.  Id. at 745, 101 S.E.2d 
at 629.  The easement involved in the present case is 
different from the easement in Wagoner. In Wagoner, the 
easement was not limited as to use and the road continued in 
existence.  Id. at 744-45, 101 S.E. 2d at 629.  However in the 
case before us, D&J’s easement is specifically limited to 
 
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allowing access to the spur tracks and sidings.  The spur 
tracks and sidings are no longer in use; therefore, the 
limited purpose of the easement is no longer in existence. 
 
Finally, based on the unambiguous language in the deed, 
the easement to use the spur tracks and sidings was 
extinguished when rail service was discontinued.  “If the 
particular purpose for which [an] easement is granted is 
fulfilled or otherwise ceases to exist, the easement . . . 
falls to the ground.”  1 FREDERICK D.G. RIBBLE, MINOR ON REAL 
PROPERTY § 107.1, at 145-46 (2d ed. 1928).  Accord American Oil 
Co. v. Leaman, 199 Va. 637, 652, 101 S.E.2d 540, 552 (1958).  
When the rail service was discontinued, the purpose of the 
easement, which was to allow access to the spur tracks and 
sidings, ceased to exist. 
IV. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court 
erred in finding the language of the deed ambiguous and in 
permitting the introduction of parol evidence.  The trial 
court further erred in finding that an easement continued to 
exist over the property, despite the discontinuance of rail 
service.  Because the injunction was based upon an erroneous 
 
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premise, the trial court further erred in granting injunctive 
relief.*
 
Accordingly, we will reverse and vacate the judgment of 
the trial court, and will enter final judgment for Pyramid 
dismissing the Bill of Complaint. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
                     
* Pyramid also asserted that the trial court erred in 
finding that the easement included the use of delivery 
vehicles and parking privileges, and the placement of a 
dumpster on the property.  Because we find that the easement 
was extinguished, we need not address this assignment of 
error. 
 
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