Case Title: State v. McMorrow

Citation: 314 N.W.2d 287

Docket Number: 

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1982-01-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
314 N.W.2d 287 (1982) STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Patrick T. McMORROW, Jr., Defendant and Appellant. Cr. No. 775. Supreme Court of North Dakota. January 13, 1982. *288 Bruce D. Quick, Asst. State's Atty., Fargo, for plaintiff and appellee. Edward J. Murphy, Fargo, for defendant and appellant. ERICKSTAD, Chief Justice. Patrick T. McMorrow, Jr., is appealing from a judgment of conviction entered by the District Court of Cass County, in which he was convicted of the offense of arson. McMorrow was sentenced to four years at the State Penitentiary. The issue on appeal is whether or not the district court erred in allowing testimony regarding a conversation between McMorrow and his wife in the presence of a third party. The testimony was permitted over McMorrow's claim of a husband-wife privilege pursuant to Rule 504 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence. We conclude that the presence of a third party overcomes the presumption that communications between spouses are confidential. We therefore affirm. The charge of arson against McMorrow stems from a fire in the early morning hours of July 7, 1980. An investigation after the fire revealed that the cause of the fire was arson. This conclusion was based in part on the smell and presence of fuel oil at the scene of the fire and the presence of burned matches and a five-gallon container with a small amount of fuel oil in the basement. A small number of "fireruns" and "trailers" were found in the carpet in the north end of the basement that were consistent with the use of an accelerant. The fire officials could find no natural cause for the fire. The house which burned was a two-story house, divided into three apartments. McMorrow had rented the back apartment for approximately two years, until July 1, 1980. Although he was no longer renting the apartment, McMorrow continued to store some of his property in the basement apartment of the house after the first of July. On July 3, 1980, McMorrow obtained an insurance policy with American Family Insurance Company on personal property. That policy contained "off-premises" coverage that included property stored in the basement apartment. The fire occurred on July 7, 1980. Following the fire, McMorrow contacted the insurance company and reported a loss due to fire damage. The testimony at issue in this case concerns a conversation that occurred between McMorrow and his wife on August 24, 1980, in the parking lot at Hardee's, a restaurant in Fargo. At that time, Roger Hagen, a friend of McMorrow's, was seated in the driver's seat of Hagen's car. Mrs. McMorrow was seated in the passenger seat. Patrick McMorrow was standing outside the car near Mrs. McMorrow. McMorrow and his wife had just finished a counseling session with a local priest. The testimony indicates that an argument ensued in which Mrs. McMorrow asked McMorrow why he started the fire. He replied that he did it for the insurance money because of his wife's constant complaints about lack of money. *289 At the trial, the court received, over counsel's objection, the wife's testimony concerning the conversation at the Hardee's parking lot. It ruled that, because of the presence of Roger Hagen, the conversation between McMorrow and his wife was not privileged. The ruling follows: We agree that the conversation between McMorrow and his wife was not confidential and thus was not privileged. Rule 504 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence relates to the husband-wife privilege. It reads: A confidential communication is defined in Section (a) of Rule 504: McMorrow argues that he intended his conversation with his wife to be confidential and that Hagen was an eavesdropper to the conversation. He contends that the following language in the explanatory note to Rule 504 supports his argument: Marital communications are presumed to be confidential. That presumption, however, may be overcome by proof of facts showing that they were not intended to be private. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6, 74 S. Ct. 358, 362, 98 L. Ed. 435 (1954); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 71 S. Ct. 301, 95 L. Ed. 306 (1951); Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 54 S. Ct. 279, 78 L. Ed. 617 (1934); State v. Smith, 384 A.2d 687 (Me.1978). The State urges this court to employ an objective test in determining whether or not a spouse intended the communication to be confidential. Alternatively, it urges that even if we adopt a subjective test that the communication at issue was not subjectively intended to be confidential. We believe that the spouse who seeks to assert the claim of privilege must have acted in reliance upon an expectancy of confidentiality that is reasonable under all the circumstances. We therefore adopt the objective test. In the analogous Fourth Amendment context the United States Supreme Court in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S. Ct. 507, 511, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967), said: The Supreme Court of Maine found that the presence of the parties' children in the camper where the conversation in question *290 occurred, even though asleep, destroyed the defendant's reasonable expectation of confidentiality. State v. Benner, 284 A.2d 91 (Me.1971). The court said: The court reasoned that under the facts of that case the defendant was or should have been aware that his older child might have awakened and, hence, in communicating to his wife, the defendant acted without a reasonable expectation that only his wife would learn of his conduct. Id. at 110. In State v. Smith, 384 A.2d 687, 692 (Me. 1978), the Supreme Court of Maine held that the presumption of confidentiality could be rebutted by the constructive presence of a third party when the husband and wife are communicating. In that case, the defendant showed two stolen objects, a gun and a camera, to his wife while the two were alone in their car. They were parked in a dump site and not within the hearing or eyesight of anyone. The defendant had stolen the gun and camera from a private dwelling. Robert Gilley was present at the breaking and entry and was convicted and testified against the defendant. Gilley testified that he had observed the defendant leave the house with the gun and camera. The court concluded that because Gilley had already seen what would later be communicated to the defendant's spouse, his constructive presence rebutted the presumption of confidentiality. Id. at 693. In the instant case, the trial court ruled that McMorrow's conversation with his wife was not confidential and therefore no husband-wife privilege existed. The trial court as a trier of fact found that the communication between McMorrow and his wife was not made in a low voice but to the contrary was made in a voice that could easily be heard by a third party and that a third party was present to the knowledge of all parties. We are reluctant to reverse the findings of the trial court. As we said in State v. Olmstead, 246 N.W.2d 888, 890 (N.D.1976): When questioned by the State, Roger Hagen described the circumstances under which the conversation occurred, as follows: Elizabeth McMorrow made the following statements on examination by the State: Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the trial court did not err in ruling that the communication between Patrick McMorrow and his wife, Elizabeth McMorrow, was not privileged because of the presence of Roger Hagen. It appears that the trial court properly concluded that McMorrow could not have reasonably believed that the conversation between his wife and himself would not be overheard by Hagen. McMorrow next contends that Hagen was an eavesdropper and therefore the communication should be considered confidential. The explanatory note to Rule 504 explains: We do not believe that Roger Hagen can be considered an eavesdropper under Rule 504. Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, defines "eavesdropping" as follows: That definition requires an intent to listen surreptitiously. Roger Hagen, in the instant case, did not surreptitiously listen in, or "eavesdrop", on the conversation between Pat McMorrow and Elizabeth McMorrow. He simply happened to be *293 seated next to Mrs. McMorrow and was apparently going to drive the vehicle in which she was seated. For the reasons stated in this opinion, we conclude that the communication between McMorrow and his wife was not privileged under Rule 504 of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence. We therefore affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction. VANDE WALLE, PEDERSON, PAULSON and SAND, JJ., concur.