Case Title: People v. Beltran

Citation: 

Docket Number: S192644M

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2013-08-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed 8/28/13  (unmodified opinion attached) 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S192644 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
 
TARE NICHOLAS BELTRAN, 
) 
 
) 
San Francisco City & County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. Nos. 175503, 203443 
 ___________________________________ ) 
 
ORDER MODIFYING OPINION AND  
DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING 
THE COURT: 
 
The opinion in this matter filed on June 3, 2013, and appearing at 56 
Cal.4th 935, is modified as follows: 
At 56 Cal.4th, page 958, the disposition is modified to read as follows:  “The 
judgment is reversed and the matter remanded to the Court of Appeal for further 
proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.” 
The modification changes the judgment. 
 
The petition for rehearing is denied. 
 
2 
 
 
Filed 6/3/13  (unmodified opinion) 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S192644 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 1/4 A124392 
TARE NICHOLAS BELTRAN, 
) 
 
) 
San Francisco City & County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. Nos. 175503, 203443 
 
____________________________________) 
 
Here we clarify what kind of provocation will suffice to constitute heat of 
passion and reduce a murder to manslaughter.  The Attorney General argues the 
provocation must be of a kind that would cause an ordinary person of average 
disposition to kill.  We disagree.  Nearly one hundred years ago, this court 
explained that, when examining heat of passion in the context of manslaughter, the 
fundamental “inquiry is whether or not the defendant‟s reason was, at the time of 
his act, so disturbed or obscured by some passion . . . to such an extent as would 
render ordinary men of average disposition liable to act rashly or without due 
deliberation and reflection, and from this passion rather than from judgment.”  
(People v. Logan (1917) 175 Cal. 45, 49 (Logan).)  The proper standard focuses 
upon whether the person of average disposition would be induced to react from 
passion and not from judgment.   
 
3 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Defendant Tare Nicholas Beltran and Claire Joyce Tempongko met in 
November 1998 and began dating.  In January 1999, defendant moved into the San 
Francisco apartment Tempongko shared with her nine-year-old son J.N. and her 
younger daughter.  J.N. called defendant “dad.”  In several incidents, defendant 
physically abused Tempongko.  In April 1999, he threw her to the ground and 
dragged her by the hair.  Three weeks later, he grabbed her and tried to remove her 
from a friend‟s apartment.  In November 1999, he took her into the bedroom and 
barricaded the door.  The police were summoned and forced the door open.   
At some point, defendant moved from the apartment but retained a key.  
Tempongko obtained a protective order requiring him to stay 100 yards away from 
the residence.  In September 2000, defendant, who was drunk, was arrested 
outside of the apartment.   
Tempongko began dating Michael Houtz.  She once told Houtz that 
defendant said their relationship would end over his dead body or hers.   
On October 22, 2000, Houtz, Tempongko and the children went shopping 
in Sacramento.  When Tempongko received a call on her cell phone, J.N. 
answered, then handed the phone to his mother, saying, “Dad is mad.”  The heated 
conversation ended after Tempongko yelled into the phone and hung up.  Houtz 
testified that he could not understand Tempongko‟s side of the interaction because 
she was not speaking in English.  Tempongko explained that “he” was bothering 
her, and Houtz believed she was referring to defendant.  After the call, 
Tempongko‟s demeanor changed completely and she became quite upset.  On the 
drive home, Tempongko received several more calls, some of which she answered.  
Tempongko became “fidgety” and appeared nervous about getting home by 7:00 
p.m. as planned.   
 
4 
As they neared her apartment, Tempongko saw a green Honda parked 
nearby and told Houtz to drive around the block.  Houtz saw a “Caucasian or 
Hispanic” man slumped down in the Honda‟s driver‟s seat.  Tempongko became 
very frightened and repeatedly scanned the area.  She told Houtz to drive around 
the block three additional times.  The green Honda was gone when Houtz parked 
in front of the apartment building.  Tempongko and the children ran inside without 
saying goodbye.  Shortly thereafter, Houtz phoned Tempongko on both her cell 
and home phones.  No one accepted the cell call.  J.N. answered the home phone 
and said Tempongko was not there.  Houtz drove back to the building and saw a 
man running across the street.  Houtz checked the front door of the apartment.  
Seeing nothing amiss, he headed home to Vallejo.  He called Tempongko‟s cell 
phone several times during his drive but could not reach her.   
Tempongko‟s apartment building had three units.  Christina Maldonado 
lived on the top floor.  On the evening of October 22, 2000, she heard sounds of a 
physical altercation coming from Tempongko‟s apartment.  There was a muffled 
male voice and children screaming that they loved their mother.  She did not hear 
an adult female voice.  When Maldonado left her apartment and looked down the 
stairs, she saw J.N. run out of Tempongko‟s unit.  Another neighbor caught up 
with J.N., who was crying.  J.N. said that his “dad” stabbed his mother and ran 
away.  The neighbors found Tempongko in her apartment bloody and 
unresponsive.  The apartment was in disarray; the phone had been unplugged from 
the wall.  An autopsy revealed several blunt force injuries and 17 stab wounds to 
Tempongko‟s face, upper body, arms, and hands.  After running from the scene, 
defendant fled to Mexico where he was arrested six years later.   
J.N. was 18 years old at the time of trial.  He testified that, after the family 
got home on October 22, 2000, Tempongko received several cell phone calls.  
Tempongko was “frantic,” arguing with someone on the phone, and telling the 
 
5 
caller not to come to the apartment.  Thirty to 45 minutes later, defendant banged 
loudly on the front door, then entered without being let in.  He began yelling and 
asking Tempongko where she had been and with whom.  The two argued for five 
or 10 minutes.  Defendant then walked briskly to the kitchen, returned to the living 
room with a large knife, and repeatedly stabbed Tempongko.  She futilely raised 
her arms in self-defense.  Defendant continued to stab her as she slumped to the 
floor, then fled, taking the knife with him.  Nearby, police later recovered a knife 
with Tempongko‟s blood on it.   
Defendant testified that he and Tempongko had an up and down 
relationship.  While they discussed having their own children, Tempongko was 
concerned that defendant would leave her as the fathers of her two other children 
had done.  At some point, they decided Tempongko would try to become pregnant, 
but defendant believed she was unsuccessful.  Defendant acknowledged he had 
grabbed Tempongko on several occasions but denied pulling her hair.   
On the day of the killing, defendant and Tempongko had planned to have 
lunch together.  However, she called him and said she was going shopping in 
Vallejo with a female friend.  She offered to meet defendant after she returned.  At 
her request, defendant called Tempongko at about 3:00 p.m. to see if they were on 
their way back to San Francisco.  He denied being upset or demanding that she be 
home by 7:00 p.m.  That evening, he went to the apartment and let himself in with 
a key because Tempongko was expecting him.  Defendant was calm but 
Tempongko was upset, asking why he was late.  The argument became heated.  
Tempongko hurled insults, calling defendant a “ „fucking illegal‟ ” and a 
“ „nobody.‟ ”  She said she “ „could get better than [him].‟ ”  Defendant said he 
was leaving, which upset Tempongko further.  She stated:  “ „Fuck you.  I was 
right.  I knew you were going to walk away someday.  That‟s why I killed your 
bastard.  I got an abortion.‟ ”  Defendant was shocked; Tempongko had never 
 
6 
mentioned an abortion.  He remembered nothing else until he found himself 
standing in the living room with a bloody knife.  He admitted that he discarded the 
knife and fled to Mexico.   
Defendant was charged with murder and use of a deadly weapon.1  The trial 
court gave instructions on first and second degree murder, as well as voluntary 
manslaughter based upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.2  The jury found 
defendant guilty of second degree murder with the use enhancement.   
A divided Court of Appeal concluded the voluntary manslaughter 
instruction was prejudicially erroneous and reversed defendant‟s conviction.  We 
clarify the appropriate standard and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Legal Introduction 
“ „Homicide is the killing of a human being by another . . . .‟ ”  (People v. 
Antick (1975) 15 Cal.3d 79, 87.)  Criminal homicide is divided into two types:  
murder and manslaughter.  “Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a 
fetus, with malice aforethought.”  (§ 187, subd. (a).)  Malice aforethought may be 
express or implied.  (§ 188.)  “Express malice is an intent to kill. . . .  Malice is 
implied when a person willfully does an act, the natural and probable 
consequences of which are dangerous to human life, and the person knowingly 
acts with conscious disregard for the danger to life that the act poses.”  (People v. 
Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th 643, 653.)  A killing with express malice formed 
willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation constitutes first degree murder.  
(People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653, 662.)  “Second degree murder is the 
unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought but without the 
                                            
1  
Penal Code, sections 187, subdivision (a), 12022, subdivision (b)(1).  Subsequent statutory 
references will be to the Penal Code unless noted.   
2  
Section 192, subdivision (a).   
 
7 
additional elements, such as willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation, that 
would support a conviction of first degree murder.”  (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 
Cal.4th 139, 151.)   
Manslaughter is a lesser included offense of murder.  (§ 192; People v. 
Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 771, 813.)  The mens rea element required for murder is 
a state of mind constituting either express or implied malice.  A person who kills 
without malice does not commit murder.  Heat of passion is a mental state that 
precludes the formation of malice and reduces an unlawful killing from murder to 
manslaughter.3  Heat of passion arises if, “ „at the time of the killing, the reason of 
the accused was obscured or disturbed by passion to such an extent as would cause 
the ordinarily reasonable person of average disposition to act rashly and without 
deliberation and reflection, and from such passion rather than from judgment.‟ ”  
(People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 201.)  Heat of passion, then, is a state of 
mind caused by legally sufficient provocation that causes a person to act, not out 
of rational thought but out of unconsidered reaction to the provocation.  While 
some measure of thought is required to form either an intent to kill or a conscious 
disregard for human life, a person who acts without reflection in response to 
adequate provocation does not act with malice.   
This case involves the nature of provocation required to give rise to the heat 
of passion that obscures reason and precludes the mental state of malice.  The 
People propose a test that would require a finding not only that an ordinary person 
of average disposition would be liable to act rashly and without reflection, but that 
such a person would act rashly in a particular manner, namely, by killing.  We 
decline to adopt that test.   
                                            
3  
A killing committed under the unreasonable but good faith belief in the need to act in self-defense 
is a killing done without malice and also constitutes voluntary manslaughter.  (People v. Blacksher (2011) 
52 Cal.4th 769, 832.)  That form of manslaughter is not at issue here.   
 
8 
B.  Trial Court Proceedings 
The prosecutor argued that defendant, motivated by jealousy, went to 
Tempongko‟s apartment intending to kill her, thus acting with express malice 
formed after premeditation and deliberation.  The sole defense theory was that 
defendant killed in the heat of passion.  When the victim said she had aborted her 
pregnancy, the news was so disturbing that defendant acted not from reflection but 
in reaction to the provocation.4  The prosecutor urged the jury to reject that 
argument.  She maintained that there was no credible evidence showing the victim 
had said anything about an abortion.  Alternatively, even if the victim did mention 
an abortion, the alleged statements did not amount to adequate provocation.5   
During the settling of instructions, the trial court told the parties it would 
give CALCRIM No. 570 (2006 version) explaining voluntary manslaughter based 
on heat of passion.  Defense counsel requested the instruction be modified to 
clarify that the jury could find defendant acted in the heat of passion even if he 
intended to kill the victim.  The trial court and the parties properly agreed that heat 
of passion could still apply in such a circumstance.  (See People v. Lasko (2000) 
                                            
4  
Defense counsel argued in part:  “A lot of times when you have these homicide cases, there is this 
mistake and the prosecutor likes to argue, „Well, if someone said that to me, “I killed your bastard; I had an 
abortion,[] I was right to do that,[”] then I wouldn‟t jump up and kill the person.  That‟s not how a 
reasonable person acts.  That‟s not how an average person reacts.‟  That‟s not the law.  [¶] Look at this very 
carefully.  The provocation would have caused a person of average disposition to act rashly and without 
due deliberation.  If the provocation causes a person to act rashly and without thinking, that‟s what this 
provocation is under the law.  It doesn‟t say the provocation would have caused a person of average 
disposition to kill.  If that were the law, then that would be the argument, well, if someone said that to me, 
„I wouldn‟t kill the person.‟  And instead the law is provocation that causes a person to act rashly 
impulsively without thinking.”   
5  
The prosecutor argued with respect to heat of passion in part:  “And the provocation has to be such 
that a person of average disposition to act with passion rather than judgment [sic].  We would have 
probably millions more homicides a year if everyone could use words that may be—although I don‟t 
disbelieve.  I don‟t agree that this is what happened.  It‟s an illogical interpretation of the facts.  You stub 
your toe.  You‟re angry, might cuss a few words.  You don‟t go out and kill somebody.  [¶] We‟ve all 
gotten cut off in traffic.  We say the few choice words, „Oh, my God.‟  We don‟t gun the pedal and start 
trying to hit the car in front of us to try to kill the person who cut us off.  Can you imagine if that was 
permissible, „Oh, my God, I acted [] without judgment and rash.  I got so angry.  I was insulted.‟  That‟s 
not the standard.  It‟s a reasonable person, and you‟re all reasonable people and you know that it‟s illogical 
that even these words were uttered.”   
 
9 
23 Cal.4th 101, 108 (Lasko) [“a person who intentionally kills as a result of 
provocation, that is, „upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion,‟ lacks malice and is 
guilty not of murder but of the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter”].)  
Although the prosecutor argued the standard version of CALCRIM No. 570 
already covered the point, the trial court agreed to modify the instruction by 
adding language taken from CALJIC No. 8.40 (Voluntary Manslaughter—Defined 
[2004 rev.]).6  The final instruction given to the jury was as follows:   
 
“A killing that would otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary 
manslaughter if the defendant killed someone because of a sudden quarrel 
or heat of passion.   
 
“The defendant killed someone because of sudden quarrel or in the heat of 
passion if, number one, the defendant killed another human being without 
malice aforethought but either with an intent to kill or with a conscious 
disregard of human life; number two, the defendant was provoked; number 
three, as a result of provocation, the defendant acted rashly and under the 
influence of intense emotion that obscured his reasoning or judgment; and, 
number four, the provocation would have caused a person of average 
disposition to act rashly and without due deliberation.  That is, from passion 
rather than from judgment. 
 
“Heat of passion does not require anger, rage, or any specific emotion.  It 
can be any violent or intense emotion that causes a person to act without 
due deliberation and reflection.   
 
“Now, in order for heat of passion to reduce a murder to voluntary 
manslaughter, the defendant must have acted under the direct and 
immediate influence of provocation as I‟ve defined it above.   
 
                                            
6  
The CALCRIM User‟s Guide expressly cautions that “[t]he CALJIC and CALCRIM instructions 
should never be used together.  While the legal principles are obviously the same, the organization of 
concepts is approached differently.  Mixing the two sets of instructions into a unified whole cannot be done 
and may result in omissions or confusion that could severely compromise clarity and accuracy.”  (Jud. 
Council of Cal. Crim. Jury Instns. (2012) Guide for Using Jud. Council of Cal. Crim. Jury Instns., p. xxvi.)  
Of course, the trial court may modify any proposed instruction to meet the needs of a specific trial, so long 
as the instruction given properly states the law and does not create confusion.   
 
10 
“While no specific type of provocation is required, slight or remote 
provocation is not sufficient.  Sufficient provocation can occur over a short 
or a long period of time. 
 
“Now, it is not enough that the defendant simply was provoked.  The 
defendant is not allowed to set up his own standard of conduct.  You must 
decide whether the defendant was provoked and whether the provocation 
was sufficient.   
 
“In deciding whether the provocation was sufficient, consider whether a 
person of average disposition would have been provoked and how such a 
person would react in the same situation knowing the same facts.  [¶] . . . 
[¶] 
 
“The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant did not kill as [the] result of sudden quarrel or heat of passion.  If 
the People . . . have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not 
guilty [of murder].”  (Italics added.)   
During deliberations, the jury sent out the following note:  “In instruction 
570:  „In deciding whether the provocation was sufficient, consider whether a 
person of average disposition would have been provoked and how such a person 
would react in the same situation knowing the same facts.‟  Does this mean to 
commit the same crime (homicide) or can it be other, less severe, rash acts[?]”  
After consulting counsel, the trial court responded:  “The provocation involved 
must be such as to cause a person of average disposition in the same situation and 
knowing the same facts to do an act rashly[7] and under the influence of such 
intense emotion that his judgment or reasoning process was obscured.  This is an 
                                            
7  
The clerk‟s transcript contains the written draft of the trial court‟s response, which we quote here.  
The reporter‟s transcript ungrammatically renders the phrase “knowing the same facts to do an act rashly” 
as “knowing the same facts to do and act rashly.”  We assume this rendering resulted from a transcription 
error.  (See People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599 [“ „It may be said . . . as a general rule that when, as 
in this case, the record is in conflict it will be harmonized if possible; but where this is not possible that part 
of the record will prevail, which, because of its origin and nature or otherwise, is entitled to greater 
credence [citation].  Therefore whether the recitals in the clerk‟s minutes should prevail as against contrary 
statements in the reporter‟s transcript, must depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.‟ ”]; 
People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 747, 750, fn. 2 [“When a clerk‟s transcript conflicts with a 
reporter‟s transcript, the question of which of the two controls is determined by consideration of the 
circumstances of each case.”].)   
 
11 
objective test and not a subjective test.”  As noted, the jury convicted defendant of 
second degree murder.   
C.  Court of Appeal Opinion 
On appeal, defendant argued the instruction given was misleading.  
Defendant claimed that telling jurors to consider how “a person would react” in 
the face of the provocation led them to question whether an average person would 
react physically and kill, as opposed to reacting mentally, experiencing obscured 
reason precluding the formation of malice.  Defendant further argued that the 
prosecutor‟s comments during closing arguments exacerbated the error by 
suggesting the ordinary person‟s conduct in reaction to provocation was relevant 
in determining whether provocation was legally adequate.   
The Court of Appeal agreed with defendant that the given instruction was 
ambiguous and rejected the Attorney General‟s argument that the relevant 
standard was whether an ordinary person of average disposition would kill under 
the same circumstances.  A majority of the Court of Appeal concluded the 
ambiguity in the instruction prejudiced defendant and reversed his murder 
conviction.  (See discussion, post.)   
D.  The Proper Standard for Provocation 
The People argue the proper standard for assessing the adequacy of 
provocation is whether an ordinary person of average disposition would be moved 
to kill.  They urge that juries should be expressly told to consider whether an 
ordinary person would kill under the circumstances at issue.   
The People assert their view is supported by the common law.  However, a 
review of the common law, from which our manslaughter statute originally 
derived,8 undermines their argument.  Originally at common law, voluntary 
                                            
8  
Cf. People v. Cox (2000) 23 Cal.4th 665, 671 (§ 192, subd. (b) “codifie[d] the traditional common 
law form of involuntary manslaughter”); Lasko, supra, 23 Cal.4th at page 110 (noting that “[o]ur 
 
12 
manslaughter did not refer to a person of average disposition.  Rather, the early 
cases simply defined voluntary manslaughter as occurring under specified 
circumstances.  Those circumstances did not justify the killing but, nevertheless, 
rendered it less blameworthy than murder because of adequate provocation.  In the 
seminal case of Regina v. Mawgridge (1707) 84 Eng.Rep. 1107, Lord Holt 
explained at length what particular circumstances would and would not constitute 
voluntary manslaughter at common law.  “Provocations which are not sufficient 
were said by Lord Holt to be (1) words of reproach or infamy; (2) affronting 
gestures; and (3) trespasses upon one‟s land.  On the other hand, provocations 
which may under the circumstances be adequate were said to be (1) angry and 
sudden assaults upon one; (2) similar assaults upon one‟s friend who is with one at 
the time; (3) seeing any person abused by force and going to his rescue; (4) 
unlawful arrest; and (5) seeing one‟s wife in an act of adultery.”  (2 Burdick, The 
Law of Crime (1946) § 426a, p. 188; see Mawgridge, supra, 84 Eng.Rep. at pp. 
1112-1115; see also Manning’s Case (1670) 83 Eng.Rep. 112 [concluding the 
defendant‟s killing of a man “committing adultery with his wife in the very act” 
constituted “but manslaughter” and ordering the defendant‟s hand be burned as 
punishment but directing “the executioner to burn him gently, because there could 
not be greater provocation than this”].)   
At some point, cases introduced the concept of the ordinary person of 
average disposition to the analysis, not only to generalize the circumstances that 
would mitigate murder to manslaughter, but also to allow the jury to determine 
what circumstances would constitute adequate provocation.  One of the earliest 
cases recognizing the role of the person of average disposition in voluntary 
manslaughter jurisprudence was Maher v. People (Mich. 1862) 10 Mich. 212 
                                                                                                                                  
conclusion that voluntary manslaughter does not require an intent to kill is consistent with the common 
law”).   
 
13 
(Maher).  Maher explained why a killing resulting from adequate provocation 
should result in mitigated punishment:  “[I]f the act of killing, though intentional, 
be committed under the influence of passion or in heat of blood, produced by an 
adequate or reasonable provocation, and before a reasonable time has elapsed for 
the blood to cool and reason to resume its habitual control, and is the result of the 
temporary excitement, by which the control of reason was disturbed, rather than of 
any wickedness of heart or cruelty or recklessness of disposition; then the law, out 
of indulgence to the frailty of human nature, or rather, in recognition of the laws 
upon which human nature is constituted, very properly regards the offense as of a 
less heinous character than murder, and gives it the designation of manslaughter.”  
(Id. at p. 219.)  Maher examined what level of provocation was necessary, noting 
that “[i]t will not do to hold that reason should be entirely dethroned, or 
overpowered by passion so as to destroy intelligent volition” since “[s]uch a 
degree of mental disturbance would be equivalent to utter insanity, and, if the 
result of adequate provocation, would render the perpetrator morally innocent.”  
(Id. at p. 220.)  However, because manslaughter remains a felony, Maher 
recognized that a killing in response to adequate provocation is a less serious 
crime than murder.  (Ibid.)  Thus, as Maher reasoned, adequate provocation must 
“never [be] beyond that degree within which ordinary men have the power, and 
are, therefore, morally as well as legally bound to restrain their passions.  It is only 
on the idea of a violation of this clear duty, that the act can be held criminal.”  
(Ibid.)  Maher concluded adequate provocation means “that reason should, at the 
time of the act, be disturbed or obscured by passion to an extent which might 
render ordinary men, of fair average disposition, liable to act rashly or without 
due deliberation or reflection, and from passion, rather than judgment.”  (Ibid., 
first and third sets of italics added.)   
 
14 
The development of the law in California tracks this move away from 
specified categories of provocation to a more generalized standard based on the 
concept of an ordinary person of average disposition, leaving for the jury whether 
the given facts show adequate provocation.  Before the enactment of the Penal 
Code in 1872, the Crimes and Punishments Act of 1850 defined voluntary 
manslaughter as “upon a sudden heat of passion, caused by a provocation 
apparently sufficient to make the passion irresistible . . . .”  (Stats. 1850, ch. 99, 
§ 22, p. 231.)  The act further required that “[i]n cases of voluntary manslaughter 
there must be a serious and highly provoking injury inflicted upon the person 
killing, sufficient to excite an irresistible passion in a reasonable person, or an 
attempt by the person killed  to commit a serious personal injury on the person 
killing.”  (Ibid.)   
Thus, although this statute incorporated the concept of a reasonable person, 
it also limited the adequate provocation to an attempt by the victim to cause 
serious bodily injury.  Our Penal Code subsequently did away with this limitation, 
simply defining voluntary manslaughter as a killing without malice “upon a 
sudden quarrel or heat of passion.”  (§ 192, subd. (a).)  We recognized in Logan, 
supra, 175 Cal. 45, that this change removed the “injury to the killer” restriction:  
“In the present condition of our law it is left to the jurors to say whether or not the 
facts and circumstances in evidence are sufficient to lead them to believe that the 
defendant did, or to create a reasonable doubt in their minds as to whether or not 
he did, commit his offense under a heat of passion.”  (Id. at pp. 48-49.)  This 
change was consistent with Maher‟s observation that jurors were better equipped 
to make this determination than judges:  “Besides the consideration that the 
question is essentially one of fact, jurors, from the mode of their selection, coming 
from the various classes and occupations of society, and conversant with the 
practical affairs of life, are . . . much better qualified to judge of the sufficiency 
 
15 
and tendency of a given provocation, and much more likely to fix, with some 
degree of accuracy, the standard of what constitutes the average of ordinary 
human nature, than the judge whose habits and course of life give him much less 
experience of the workings of passion in the actual conflicts of life.”  (Maher, 
supra, 10 Mich. at p. 222.)  In articulating the proper standard, we cited Maher, 
essentially quoting verbatim the standard articulated there, that the fundamental 
“inquiry is whether or not the defendant‟s reason was, at the time of his act, so 
disturbed or obscured by some passion—not necessarily fear and never, of course, 
the passion for revenge—to such an extent as would render ordinary men of 
average disposition liable to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, 
and from this passion rather than from judgment.”  (Logan, supra, 175 Cal. at p. 
49.)   
We reaffirmed the Logan standard in People v. Valentine (1946) 28 Cal.2d 
121 (Valentine).  Valentine addressed whether the trial court properly instructed 
the jury that adequate provocation could not be shown “ „by words only, however 
opprobrious, nor contemptuous or insulting actions, or gestures without an assault 
upon the person . . . .‟ ”  (Id. at p. 137.)  This limitation applied at common law 
and was incorporated into the manslaughter statute under the 1850 Crimes and 
Punishments Act.  (Valentine, at pp. 138-139; People v. Butler (1857) 8 Cal. 435, 
441-443 [approving a similar instruction under the Crimes and Punishments Act].)  
Valentine observed that, although Logan‟s statement of the proper standard was “a 
clear and correct statement of the law,” cases nevertheless continued to apply the 
common law limitation that mere words could not constitute adequate 
provocation.  (Valentine, at p. 139.)  Valentine concluded the common law 
limitation regarding mere words had no application under section 192, subdivision 
(a), which “omit[ted] the more stringent language of the Crimes and Punishments 
Act of 1850” (Valentine, at p. 141) and was “obviously substantially different” 
 
16 
from the former enactment (id. at p. 142).  In affirming the Logan standard, 
Valentine reasoned that “repeal of the statute which incorporated” the common 
law limitation, “together with enactment of a new law on the same subject with the 
important limitation deleted, strongly suggests that the Legislature intended a 
more liberal rule.”  (Id. at p. 143.)  After Valentine, we have repeatedly quoted the 
Logan standard as a correct statement of law.9   
The Attorney General‟s position, that adequate provocation for voluntary 
manslaughter requires a finding that an ordinary person of average disposition 
would kill, is inconsistent with the Logan standard.  It is also inconsistent with the 
conceptual underpinnings of heat of passion as a circumstance which mitigates 
culpability for a killing but does not justify it.  As Maher suggested, society 
expects the average person not to kill, even when provoked.  As Professor Dressler 
stated, we punish a person who kills in the heat of passion or upon provocation 
because “[h]e did not control himself as much as he should have, or as much as 
common experience tells us he could have, nor as much as the ordinarily law-
abiding person would have.”  (Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion:  A Defense in 
Search of a Rationale (1982), 73 J. Crim.L. & Criminology 421, 467, original 
italics.)  However, if one does kill in this state, his punishment is mitigated.  Such 
a killing is not justified but understandable in light of “the frailty of human 
nature.”  (Maher, supra, 10 Mich. at p. 219.)  The killing reaction therefore is the 
extraordinary reaction, the unusual exception to the general expectation that the 
ordinary person will not kill even when provoked.   
Adopting a standard requiring such provocation that the ordinary person of 
average disposition would be moved to kill focuses on the wrong thing.  The 
                                            
9  
See People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 584; People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 
1143-1144; People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1252-1253 (Steele); People v. Wharton (1991) 53 
Cal.3d 522, 570; People v. Rich (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1036, 1112; People v. Morse (1969) 70 Cal.2d 711, 734-
735; People v. Borchers (1958) 50 Cal.2d 321, 329; People v. Danielly (1949) 33 Cal.2d 362, 377-378.   
 
17 
proper focus is placed on the defendant‟s state of mind, not on his particular act.  
To be adequate, the provocation must be one that would cause an emotion so 
intense that an ordinary person would simply react, without reflection.  To satisfy 
Logan, the anger or other passion must be so strong that the defendant‟s reaction 
bypassed his thought process to such an extent that judgment could not and did not 
intervene.  Framed another way, provocation is not evaluated by whether the 
average person would act in a certain way:  to kill.  Instead, the question is 
whether the average person would react in a certain way:  with his reason and 
judgment obscured.   
The Attorney General argues that if provocation is adequate without 
reference to whether an ordinary person of average disposition would be moved to 
kill, then the standard would be too low.  She asserts that “ „acting rashly‟ means 
nothing more than acting hastily or imprudently, without consideration” and 
“[t]here are countless experiences in everyday life which would cause an ordinary 
person to act „rashly,‟ such as being cut off on the road by an inattentive driver, 
having coffee spilled on him by a careless waiter, receiving a negative evaluation 
from a supervisor, or observing an umpire‟s bad call at his child‟s little league 
game.”  The argument misconstrues the standard.  One does not act rashly under 
Logan simply by acting imprudently or out of anger.  Even imprudent conduct 
done while angry is ordinarily the product of some judgment and thought, 
however fleeting.  This is not the type of truly reactive conduct contemplated by 
the Logan standard.  This standard does not mean that a defendant does not form 
malice unless he thinks rationally or exercises sound judgment.  In other words, 
provocation is sufficient not because it affects the quality of one‟s thought 
processes, but because it eclipses reflection.  A person in this state simply reacts 
from emotion due to the provocation, without deliberation or judgment.  If an 
 
18 
ordinary person of average disposition, under the same circumstances, would also 
react in this manner, the provocation is adequate under Logan.   
 
19 
 
The Attorney General‟s concern that the proper standard is too low is 
unfounded for two reasons.  First, case law and the relevant jury instructions make 
clear the extreme intensity of the heat of passion required to reduce a murder to 
manslaughter.  This passion must be a “ „ “ „[v]iolent, intense, high-wrought or 
enthusiastic emotion‟ ” ‟ [citation].”  (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 
163 (Breverman).)  The emotional response required goes far beyond the type of 
irritation a person of ordinary disposition would be prompted to feel by the 
mundane annoyances described above.   
Second, Logan emphasized that the relevant standard is an objective one.  
Logan recognized that “no defendant may set up his own standard of conduct and 
justify or excuse himself because in fact his passions were aroused, unless further 
the jury believe that the facts and circumstances were sufficient to arouse the 
passions of the ordinarily reasonable man.  Thus, no man of extremely violent 
passion could so justify or excuse himself if the exciting cause be not adequate, 
nor could an excessively cowardly man justify himself unless the circumstances 
were such as to arouse the fears of the ordinarily courageous man.  Still further, 
while the conduct of the defendant is to be measured by that of the ordinarily 
reasonable man placed in identical circumstances, the jury is properly to be told 
that the exciting cause must be such as would naturally tend to arouse the passion 
of the ordinarily reasonable man.  But as to the nature of the passion itself, our law 
leaves that to the jury, under these proper admonitions from the court.”  (Logan, 
supra, 175 Cal. at p. 49.)  As the court long ago explained in People v. Jones 
(1911) 160 Cal. 358, 368, “it is not a matter of law but a matter of fact for the jury 
in each case to determine under the circumstances of the case whether the assault 
or whether the blow, or whether the indignity or whether the affront, or whatever 
the act may be, was such as is naturally calculated to arouse the passions, and so 
 
20 
lessen the degree of the offense by relieving it from the element of malice.”  
Maher similarly explained that if the standard for provocation was purely 
subjective, “then, by habitual and long continued indulgence of evil passions, a 
bad man might acquire a claim to mitigation which would not be available to 
better men, and on account of that very wickedness of heart which, in itself, 
constitutes an aggravation both in morals and in law.”  (Maher, supra, 10 Mich. at 
p. 221.)   
The Logan standard is further limited by the requirement that a defendant 
actually be motivated by passion in committing the killing.  “[I]f sufficient time 
has elapsed between the provocation and the fatal blow for passion to subside and 
reason to return, the killing is not voluntary manslaughter — „the assailant must 
act under the smart of that sudden quarrel or heat of passion.‟  [Citation.]”  
(People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 327, disapproved on another ground 
in People v. Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 201; see also People v. Moye (2009) 47 
Cal.4th 537, 550 (Moye).)  Thus, it is insufficient that one is provoked and later 
kills.  If sufficient time has elapsed for one‟s passions to “cool off” and for 
judgment to be restored, Logan provides no mitigation for a subsequent killing.   
This understanding of the Logan standard is consistent with the other 
recognized form of voluntary manslaughter:  a killing in the actual but 
unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense.  (§ 192; People v. Booker (2011) 
51 Cal.4th 141, 182.)  Unreasonable self-defense, also called imperfect self-
defense, “obviates malice because that most culpable of mental states „cannot 
coexist‟ with an actual belief that the lethal act was necessary to avoid one‟s own 
death or serious injury at the victim‟s hand.”  (People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 
450, 461.)  A killing in imperfect self-defense constitutes, by definition, 
unreasonable conduct because the belief in the need to defend is not reasonable.  
The killing is nevertheless mitigated because of the defendant‟s misguided but 
 
21 
good faith belief.  Thus, the societal recognition of mitigation is the same.  In both 
heat of passion and imperfect self-defense scenarios, the killer who acts 
unreasonably commits a crime.  Yet the degree of culpability is reduced from 
murder to manslaughter.  Adequate provocation or an unreasonable but good faith 
belief in the need to defend operates on the killer‟s mental state to prevent the 
formation of malice.   
To support her argument that provocation is adequate only if an ordinary 
person of average disposition would kill in response to it, the Attorney General 
cites California cases, both from this court and the Courts of Appeal, containing 
different statements of the Logan standard.  For example, the Attorney General 
cites several cases that stated or suggested without elaboration that adequate 
provocation was that which would induce in the ordinary person of average 
disposition a “homicidal rage” or “deadly passion.”  These isolated passages did 
not change the established understanding of the heat of passion principle.  The 
cited cases did not purport to explain or elaborate upon the Logan standard, much 
less change it.  The vast majority of the cases cited by the Attorney General 
properly state or quote the full Logan standard, or cite cases that may be traced 
back to Logan, supra, 175 Cal. 45.10   
                                            
10  
See People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1306; People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 
1086; People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 59; People v. Fenenbock (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1688, 1704; 
People v. Dixon (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1551; see also People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 706 
(citing Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1252, which quoted Logan); People v. Kanawyer (2003) 113 
Cal.App.4th 1233, 1243-1244 (quoting Steele). 
 
Two exceptions are People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, and People v. Superior Court (Henderson) 
(1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 516.  In rejecting the defendant‟s claim that the trial court should have instructed on 
heat of passion voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder, Pride did not state or quote 
the relevant standard and concluded the evidence was “insufficient as a matter of law to arouse feelings of 
homicidal rage or passion in an ordinarily reasonable person.”  (Pride, at p. 250, italics added.)  For this 
proposition, however, Pride cited only People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, which quoted People v. 
Berry (1976) 18 Cal.3d 509, 515, and stated that adequate provocation “must be such as would arouse 
feelings of pain or rage in „an ordinarily reasonable person‟ or „an ordinary man of average disposition.‟ ”  
(Balderas, at p. 196.)  Similarly, Henderson stated in a footnote:  “The concept of „heat of passion‟ allows a 
defendant to reduce a killing from murder to manslaughter only in those situations where the provocation 
would trigger a homicidal reaction in the mind of an ordinarily reasonable person under the given facts and 
 
22 
The Attorney General cites other cases, including out-of-state authorities, 
which have suggested that provocation is adequate when it stirs in the ordinary 
person an “irresistible” passion or impulse.11  None of these cases call our analysis 
into question.  Hurtado, which first suggested the “irresistible passion” standard in 
California, cited no case in support of that standard.  (People v. Hurtado, supra, 63 
Cal. at p. 292.)  As such, Hurtado hardly calls into question Maher‟s statement of 
the relevant standard, which we later approved in Logan, supra, 175 Cal. 45 and 
Valentine, supra, 28 Cal.2d 121.  In any event, as a short-hand description of the 
proper standard, these statements are not inconsistent with Logan.  The relevant 
passion is “irresistible” in the sense that adequate provocation would induce the 
ordinary person of average disposition to react from that passion and not from 
judgment.  The passion is “irresistible” to the restraining effect of judgment.  This 
understanding is consistent with Logan as we have described it.   
The Attorney General maintains that out-of-state authorities suggest the 
relevant standard is that which would cause in an ordinary person a “resentment to 
violence”12 or induces the ordinary person to commit “the act” or “deed.”13  To 
                                                                                                                                  
circumstances.”  (Henderson, at p. 524, fn. 4, italics added.)  For this proposition, Henderson cited only 
People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 305, which, in turn, quoted the standard enunciated in Berry.  
Nothing in Balderas‟s and Jackson‟s citations of Berry suggested any attempt to depart from the Logan 
standard.   
11  
See, e.g., People v. Hurtado (1883) 63 Cal. 288, 292 (a killing is reduced to voluntary 
manslaughter “when it is committed under the influence of passion caused by an insult or provocation 
sufficient to excite an irresistible passion in a reasonable person; one of ordinary self-control”); State v. 
Wheat (La. 1903) 35 So. 955, 960 (adequate provocation is such as “ „to excite an irresistible passion in a 
reasonable person‟ ”).   
12  
See State v. Rollins (Me. 1972) 295 A.2d 914, 920-921 (“provocation must be „. . . of that 
character which would, in the mind of a just and reasonable man, stir resentment to violence, endangering 
life . . . .‟ ” [italics added by Rollins]); Freddo v. State (Tenn. 1913) 155 S.W. 170, 172 (adequate 
provocation is “a provocation of such a character as would, in the mind of an average reasonable man, stir 
resentment likely to cause violence, obscuring the reason, and leading to action from passion rather than 
judgment”); Holmes v. State (Ala. 1890) 7 So. 193, 194 (adequate provocation is that “which would, in the 
mind of a just and reasonable man, stir resentment to violence, endangering life”). 
13  
See, e.g., Dennis v. State (Md. 1995) 661 A.2d 175, 179 (“ „ “The law contemplates the case of a 
reasonable man—an ordinary reasonable man—and requires that the provocation shall be such as might 
naturally induce such a man, in the anger of the moment, to commit the deed.” ‟ ”); State v. Watkins (Iowa 
1910) 126 N.W. 691, 692 (same); Regina v. Welsh (1869) 11 Cox‟s Crim. Cases 336, 338 (“The law 
 
23 
the extent that these authorities describe a standard contrary to Maher, supra, 10 
Mich. 212, or Logan, supra, 175 Cal. 45, they are not persuasive.   
The Attorney General also cites federal cases construing the federal 
manslaughter statute (18 U.S.C. § 1112(a)), which have suggested adequate 
provocation is such that would “ „arouse a reasonable and ordinary person to kill 
someone.‟ ”  (United States v. Wagner (9th Cir. 1987) 834 F.2d 1474, 1487, 
quoting United States v. Collins (5th Cir. 1982) 690 F.2d 431, 437; see also United 
States v. Roston (9th Cir. 1993) 986 F.2d 1287, 1291 [quoting Collins]; United 
States v. Eagle Hawk (8th Cir. 1987) 815 F.2d 1213, 1216 [citing Collins].)  First, 
these authorities deal with a different, although similarly worded, statute.  Second, 
“lower federal decisional authority is neither binding nor controlling in matters 
involving state law.”  (Stone Street Capital, LLC v. California State Lottery Com. 
(2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 109, 123, fn. 11.)  Third, Collins, from which this 
statement derives, cited only United States v. Chapman (10th Cir. 1980) 615 F.2d 
1294, but that case nowhere suggested that an ordinary person must be aroused to 
kill.  (See id. at p. 1300 [describing passion as that which “ „would be aroused 
naturally in the mind of the ordinary reasonable person under the same or similar 
circumstances‟ ”].)   
E.  Instructional Error and Prejudice 
As noted, the version of CALCRIM No. 570 given by the trial court stated 
in relevant part:  “In deciding whether the provocation was sufficient, consider 
whether a person of average disposition would have been provoked and how such 
a person would react in the same situation knowing the same facts.”  The Court of 
Appeal properly rejected the Attorney General‟s claim that this instruction did not 
go far enough by failing to expressly tell the jury to consider the conduct the 
                                                                                                                                  
contemplates the case of a reasonable man, and requires that the provocation shall be such as that such a 
man might naturally be induced, in the anger of the moment, to commit the act”).   
 
24 
provocation might cause in an ordinary person of average disposition and whether 
such a person would kill in the face of the same provocation.  However, the Court 
of Appeal reasoned the given instruction was potentially ambiguous because it 
“did not expressly limit the jurors‟ focus to whether the provocation would have 
caused an average person to act out of passion rather than judgment” and 
“allowed, and perhaps even encouraged, jurors to consider whether the 
provocation would cause an average person to do what the defendant did; i.e., 
commit a homicide.”   
We disagree that the instruction is ambiguous as written.  Indeed, under 
ordinary circumstances, the instruction‟s statement that the jury should consider 
how a person of average disposition “would react” under the same circumstances 
would have been unproblematic.  As noted, the court instructed that the heat of 
passion principle came into play if defendant acted under the influence of intense 
emotion that obscured his reasoning or judgment.  Telling the jury to consider how 
a person of average disposition “would react” properly draws the jury‟s attention 
to the objective nature of the standard and the effect the provocation would have 
on such a person‟s state of mind.14   
However, the parties‟ closing arguments muddied the waters on this point.  
As the Court of Appeal majority observed, the prosecutor‟s examples that a 
reasonable person would not kill if “[y]ou stub your toe” or get “cut off in traffic,” 
although hardly clear, seemed to suggest that the jury should consider the ordinary 
person‟s conduct and whether such a person would kill.  As discussed, this was not 
the correct standard.15  Defense counsel‟s jury argument countered the 
                                            
14  
CALCRIM No. 570 has subsequently been revised to replace this language with the following:  
“In deciding whether the provocation was sufficient, consider whether a person of average disposition, in 
the same situation and knowing the same facts, would have reacted from passion rather than from 
judgment.”  (CALCRIM No. 570 [2008 rev.].) 
15  
The prosecutor‟s jury argument arguably approached the improper argument condemned in People 
v. Najera (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 212.  In that murder case, the prosecutor argued against a finding of heat 
 
25 
prosecutor‟s statements and suggested the law “doesn‟t say the provocation would 
have caused a person of average disposition to kill. . . .  [I]nstead the law is 
provocation that causes a person to act rashly impulsively without thinking.”  
These competing formulations by the advocates may have confused the jury‟s 
understanding of the court‟s instructions.   
A majority of the Court of Appeal concluded the potential ambiguity 
prejudiced defendant.  First, the majority observed that the jury‟s note highlighted 
the ambiguity but that the trial court‟s response “did not really focus on the jury‟s 
question, and did not really clarify the aspect of the instruction at issue.”  Second, 
the majority noted that the prosecutor‟s closing argument “used the examples of 
stubbing a toe, getting cut off in traffic, or being jealous to argue that minor 
provocation is not sufficient to cause a reasonable person to kill someone.”  The 
majority reasoned that, although the prosecutor‟s argument “may not have risen to 
the level of misconduct, [] it did serve to reinforce the problem with the jury 
instruction on provocation . . . .”  The majority concluded the instructional error 
was prejudicial under these circumstances.  That analysis falls short.   
Preliminarily, defendant argues the standard for evaluating federal 
constitutional errors applies here, i.e., “before a federal constitutional error can be 
held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24.)  He 
asserts the ambiguity introduced into the instructions here deprived him of his 
federal constitutional rights to a jury trial and due process.  We have previously 
rejected this argument.  In noncapital cases, “the rule requiring sua sponte 
                                                                                                                                  
of passion voluntary manslaughter, stating:  “ „Would a reasonable person do what the defendant did?  
Would a reasonable person be so aroused as to kill somebody?  That‟s the standard.‟ ”  (Id. at p. 223, italics 
omitted.)  Although finding these comments misstated the law, Najera concluded the defendant forfeited 
any prosecutorial misconduct claim by failing to object.  (Id. at pp. 223-224.)  Najera did not consider the 
instructional claim before us.   
 
26 
instructions on all lesser necessarily included offenses supported by the evidence 
derives exclusively from California law.”  (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 
169.)  As such, “in a noncapital case, error in failing sua sponte to instruct, or to 
instruct fully, on all lesser included offenses and theories thereof which are 
supported by the evidence must be reviewed for prejudice exclusively under 
[People v.] Watson [(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836].”  (Breverman, at p. 178; see 
Moye, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 555.)  “ „[M]isdirection of the jury, including 
incorrect, ambiguous, conflicting, or wrongly omitted instructions that do not 
amount to federal constitutional error are reviewed under the harmless error 
standard articulated‟ in Watson.”  (People v. Larsen (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 810, 
830; see People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174, 214.)  “[U]nder Watson, a 
defendant must show it is reasonably probable a more favorable result would have 
been obtained absent the error.”  (People v. Mena (2012) 54 Cal.4th 146, 162.)   
The prejudice analysis of the majority below overlooks an important 
circumstance:  The jury asked for additional guidance and the trial court gave it.  It 
was not reasonably probable that the jury here was misled to defendant‟s 
detriment.  Although counsel‟s argument may have created ambiguity about the 
nature of sufficient provocation, the jury directly requested clarification of the 
standard.  The jury‟s note pinpointed the issue, inquiring if it should consider 
whether an ordinary person would “commit the same crime (homicide) or can it be 
other, less severe, rash acts.”  The trial court responded with a correct statement of 
law, that “[t]he provocation involved must be such as to cause a person of average 
disposition in the same situation and knowing the same facts to do an act rashly 
and under the influence of such intense emotion that his judgment or reasoning 
process was obscured.”  This response properly refocused the jury on the relevant 
mental state, properly set out in CALCRIM No. 570, and away from whether an 
ordinary person of average disposition would kill in light of the provocation.  
 
27 
Because of the trial court‟s clarifying instruction, it was not reasonably probable 
that any possible ambiguity engendered by counsel‟s argument misled the jury.   
Further, the Watson test for harmless error “focuses not on what a 
reasonable jury could do, but what such a jury is likely to have done in the absence 
of the error under consideration.  In making that evaluation, an appellate court 
may consider, among other things, whether the evidence supporting the existing 
judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different outcome 
is so comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable probability the error of which 
the defendant complains affected the result.”  (Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 
177; see People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1267-1268.)   
As the Court of Appeal dissent suggested below, evidence of provocation 
was both weak and contradicted.  Defendant testified that he went to the apartment 
at the victim‟s invitation.  He claimed they only argued because Tempongko was 
angry with him for being late for their agreed-upon dinner engagement.  He denied 
being angry earlier in the day when he called on her cell phone.   
This recitation is not only uncorroborated, it is at odds with a great deal of 
other evidence.  Michael Houtz testified that Tempongko took the cell phone call 
after J.N. had answered it and told her, “Dad is mad.”  The call devolved into 
yelling.  Thereafter, Tempongko was very upset.  When they arrived at the 
apartment, Tempongko appeared frightened and did not get out of the car until 
Houtz drove around the block four times, while she repeatedly scanned the area.  
Tempongko had an active restraining order barring defendant from the residence.  
He had violated the order a month before and was arrested.  The only noises the 
neighbor, Maldonado, heard coming from the victim‟s apartment were a muffled 
male voice and children screaming.  Contrary to defendant‟s claim that 
Tempongko was the source of the yelling and hurled insults at him, Maldonado 
did not hear an adult woman‟s voice.  J.N. testified his mother was “frantic” upon 
 
28 
their return home and repeatedly told a caller, “Please don‟t come to the house.”  
Thereafter, J.N. heard loud banging after which defendant let himself into the 
apartment.  He was angry and began yelling at Tempongko as he entered, quizzing 
her on where she had been and with whom.  J.N., who witnessed the argument and 
stabbing, did not testify he heard anything about a purported abortion.  
Defendant‟s departure from the scene, disposal of the knife, and flight to a foreign 
country, where he was arrested six years later, all reflected consciousness of guilt.  
(See People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 376; People v. Garcia (2008) 
168 Cal.App.4th 261, 292; People v. Siravo (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 555, 563.)  
Given the strong evidence supporting defendant‟s murder conviction and the 
comparatively weak evidence of any legally adequate provocation, a different 
result was not reasonably probable.   
Defendant argues the trial court‟s response to the jury‟s question did not 
resolve the ambiguity because the trial court directed the jury to consider whether 
the provocation would cause a person of average disposition “to do an act rashly” 
rather than “to act rashly.”  Defendant suggests the former formulation continued 
to improperly focus the jury on the “act” performed, i.e., the act of killing, and 
whether an ordinary person would commit the act of killing in response to 
provocation.  The trial court‟s response, taken as a whole, cannot support such a 
strained interpretation.  As discussed, the trial court told the jury to consider 
whether a person of average disposition would “do an act rashly and under the 
influence of such intense emotion that his judgment or reasoning process was 
obscured.”  This instruction properly focused upon the rashness of the act, not on 
the act alone.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
We reaffirm today the standard for determining heat of passion that we 
adopted nearly a century ago.  Provocation is adequate only when it would render 
 
29 
an ordinary person of average disposition “liable to act rashly or without due 
deliberation and reflection, and from this passion rather than from judgment.”  
(Logan, supra, 175 Cal. at p. 49.)  We decline the Attorney General‟s invitation to 
deviate from this venerable understanding that has been faithfully applied by juries 
for decades.  Although the former version of CALCRIM No. 570 properly 
conveyed the Logan test, the argument of counsel may have introduced ambiguity.  
However, the jury asked a clarifying question and the trial court‟s response 
dispelled any confusion.   
IV.  DISPOSITION 
We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.   
 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
CHIN, J. 
LIU, J.   
 
1 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Beltran 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 3/30/11, 1st Dist., Div. 4 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S192644 
Date Filed: June 3, 2013 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: San Francisco 
Judge: Robert L. Dondero 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Linda M. Leavitt, under appointmetn by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Mary Greenwood, Public Defender (Santa Clara) and Michael Ogul, Deputy Public Defender, for 
California Public Defenders Association, California Attorneys for Criminal Justice and Santa Clara County 
Public Defender as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and Kamala D. Harris, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant 
Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Assistant Attorney General, Stan Helfman, Laurence K. Sullivan and 
Jeffery M. Laurence, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
W. Scott Thorpe; Brian Feinberg, Laura Delehunt and Jay Melaas, Deputy District Attorneys (Contra 
Costa), for California District Attorneys Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
 
Bay Area Legal Aid, Minouche Kandel; Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Cynthia E. Tobisman, Kent J. 
Bullard and Lara M. Krieger for San Francisco Domestic Violence Consortium, California Women 
Lawyers, California Partnership to End Domestic Violence, Queen‟s Bench Bar Association and Women 
Lawyers of Sacramento as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Linda M. Leavitt 
PMB 312 
5214-F Diamond Hts. Blvd. 
San Francisco, CA  94131 
(415) 682-7000 
 
Jeffery M. Laurence 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5897