Case Title: Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Vivo

Citation: 2012-Ohio-5682

Docket Number: 2011-0299

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-12-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Vivo, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5682.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-5682 
MAHONING COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION v. VIVO. 
 [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Vivo,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-5682.] 
(No. 2011-0299—Submitted June 6, 2012—Decided December 6, 2012.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 10-074. 
____________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, James Vivo of Canfield, Ohio, Attorney Registration 
No. 0071891, was admitted to the Ohio bar in 2000.  The Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommends that we suspend 
Vivo’s license to practice law for one year with the entire suspension stayed on 
conditions.  We adopt the findings of professional misconduct and the 
recommended sanction. 
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Background 
{¶ 2} Relator, Mahoning County Bar Association, filed a complaint 
against Vivo on August 16, 2010.  The complaint charged Vivo with several 
violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct stemming from a lawsuit filed 
against Vivo’s clients, Michael and Esther Hayes.  The complaint also charged 
Vivo with failing to cooperate with the relator in its grievance investigation. 
{¶ 3} On November 29, 2010, after several unsuccessful attempts to 
obtain information from Vivo, the relator filed a motion for default judgment.  
The board appointed a master commissioner to consider relator’s motion.  The 
master commission issued a report finding Vivo in default, and made findings of 
fact, conclusions of law, and a recommended sanction, all of which the board 
adopted. 
{¶ 4} The board’s report was certified to this court on February 22, 
2011.1  The board’s report recommended that Vivo be suspended from the 
practice of law for two years, with one year stayed.  The board further 
recommended that Vivo be placed on probation for two years following his year 
of suspension, and that he complete eight hours of continuing legal education in 
law-office management. 
{¶ 5} Vivo filed objections to the board’s report.  The relator filed an 
answer brief and a motion to remand the case to the board.  On April 12, 2011, we 
granted the relator’s motion to remand to the board for consideration of whether 
Vivo “suffers from a medical condition that disabled him from responding to the 
allegations made against him * * * and for further action that the board deems 
necessary.” 
{¶ 6} On remand, relator filed a motion for leave to file an amended 
complaint on August 19, 2011.  The amended complaint charged Vivo with 
                                                 
1 An amended board report was filed in this court on March 4, 2011, that contained non-
substantive revisions. 
January Term, 2012 
 
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additional violations stemming from his representation of Cathy Jupp.  Vivo 
opposed the filing of the amended complaint but the panel overruled those 
objections and allowed the relator to proceed on the additional charges. 
{¶ 7} On November 3, 2011, the parties filed stipulations of facts and 
law and a joint recommended sanction.  The panel held a hearing on November 7, 
2011 to address the issue set forth in our remand order.  The panel received 
evidence regarding Vivo’s mental-health condition and heard testimony from 
Vivo on his handling of the Hayes and Jupp matters. 
{¶ 8} Following the hearing, the panel made findings of fact, conclusions 
of law, and a recommended sanction.  As a result of these proceedings, the panel 
adopted the parties’ recommended sanction of a one-year stayed suspension 
conditioned on Vivo following the course of treatment of his mental-health 
professional.  The board adopted the panel’s findings of misconduct and the 
recommended sanction. 
Misconduct 
The Esther Hayes Matter 
{¶ 9} In April 2007, Esther and Michael Hayes (now divorced) were 
sued in their individual capacities and as joint owners of Star Motors, a used car 
lot.  The Hayeses were served with the complaint on April 18, 2007, and they 
retained Vivo to defend them shortly thereafter. 
{¶ 10} On May 29, 2007, the trial court granted a default judgment in 
plaintiff’s favor because Vivo failed to answer the complaint.  The trial court, 
however, vacated the default judgment entry on August 16, 2007.  Thereafter, 
Vivo and plaintiff’s counsel engaged in negotiations to settle the case.  On 
October 22, 2007, the trial court filed a judgment entry stating that the case had 
been settled and dismissed. 
{¶ 11} On December 5, 2007, the trial court filed an entry granting the 
plaintiff’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement.  In April 2008, the trial 
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court granted the plaintiff’s motion for a debtor’s examination and ordered the 
Hayeses to appear for an examination on May 30, 2008.  The outcome of that 
hearing is not reflected in the record.  Esther Hayes eventually filed for Chapter 
Seven bankruptcy protection and discharged any judgment as to her. 
{¶ 12} On September 16, 2009, Esther Hayes filed a grievance against 
Vivo with the Mahoning County Bar Association.  The Grievance Committee 
conducted an investigation.  Vivo, however, failed to cooperate in the 
investigation. 
{¶ 13} Based on the grievance and Vivo’s failure to cooperate, the board 
in its initial report found that Vivo failed to answer the complaint in the Hayes 
matter, failed to return numerous phone calls from Esther Hayes, and settled the 
case without the authority of Esther or Michael Hayes.  Accordingly, the board 
found that Vivo had committed violations of Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 (requiring lawyer 
to provide competent representation), 1.3 (requiring lawyer to act with reasonable 
diligence in representing client), 1.4(a)(3) (requiring lawyer to keep client 
reasonably informed of the status of a matter), 1.4(a)(4) (requiring lawyer to 
respond to client’s reasonable request for information), 1.2 (requiring lawyer to 
abide by client’s decisions concerning the objects of representation), 4.1 
(prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly making false statements of material fact to 
a third person), and Gov. Bar R. V(4)(G) (requiring lawyer to cooperate in an 
investigation of professional misconduct). 
{¶ 14} The board certified its initial report to this court on February 22, 
2011.  Following this court’s remand order, Vivo began to cooperate in the 
investigation.  Because of Vivo’s cooperation, relator was able to depose Michael 
Hayes.  Hayes testified that Vivo had regularly communicated with him and that 
he had given Vivo authority to settle the case.  Based on Michael Hayes’s sworn 
testimony, relator and Vivo agreed that there was no clear and convincing 
evidence to support the alleged misconduct and they stipulated to dismiss the 
January Term, 2012 
 
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charged violations, except for the failure-to-cooperate charge.  The panel agreed 
and found that the violations should be dismissed. The board accepted the panel’s 
findings. 
{¶ 15} We agree with the board that the record does not contain clear and 
convincing evidence that Vivo’s conduct in the Hayes matter violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(a)(4), 1.2, or 4.1. 
Failure to Cooperate in Disciplinary Investigation 
{¶ 16} On September 21, 2009, relator sent a letter to Vivo notifying him 
that Esther Hayes had filed a grievance against him and that he was required to 
submit a written statement setting forth his position on the matter.  Vivo was also 
advised that failure to promptly respond may be deemed as a failure to cooperate 
in the investigation in violation of Gov. Bar R. V(4)(G). 
{¶ 17} Relator’s investigator wrote three additional letters to Vivo, on 
October 21, November 13, and December 8, 2009, seeking his response to the 
grievance.  Following these unsuccessful attempts to obtain information, a 
probable-cause panel certified a complaint against Vivo.  Vivo did not answer the 
complaint, and relator moved for default. The board referred the matter to a 
master commissioner, who issued a report finding that Vivo failed to cooperate in 
the grievance investigation in violation of Gov. Bar R. V(4)(G).  The board 
accepted this finding in its February 22, 2011 report. 
{¶ 18} Vivo’s failure to cooperate was the focus of this court’s order 
remanding the case to the board.  As noted above, the purpose of our remand was 
for the board to determine whether Vivo suffered from a medical condition that 
prevented him from responding to the allegations made against him in the Hayes 
matter. 
{¶ 19} On remand before the board, the parties agreed that Vivo suffered 
from a mental health condition and that his condition should be considered as a 
mitigating factor to any sanction imposed in the Hayes matter.  The parties, 
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however, disagreed as to whether Vivo’s mental health condition should be 
treated as a defense to the failure-to-cooperate allegation. 
{¶ 20} Following the presentation of evidence, the panel found that 
Vivo’s mental health condition could not serve as a defense to the failure-to-
cooperate charge.  Rather, the mental health condition may be treated only as 
mitigation.  In its April 18, 2012 report, the board adopted the panel’s decision. 
{¶ 21} Before this court, Vivo does not challenge the determination that 
his mental health condition was not a defense to the failure-to-cooperate charge.  
Accordingly, we accept the board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law as to 
this issue. 
{¶ 22} As to the question of whether Vivo failed to cooperate in the 
investigation of the Hayes grievance, the panel and the board found clear and 
convincing evidence to support the charge.  The board cited two factors in 
support: (1) the fact that a master commissioner needed to be appointed to decide 
the default-judgment motion, and (2) the board’s February 22, 2011 report 
certified to this court, which concluded that Vivo had violated Gov. Bar R. 
V(4)(G). 
{¶ 23} Vivo did not object to this determination.  After review of the 
record before us, we agree that Vivo repeatedly ignored the relator’s investigative 
inquiries. Relator submitted the letters sent by its investigator to Vivo requesting a 
response to the grievance, and the investigator’s affidavit attesting to Vivo’s lack 
of response.  Vivo also testified that he failed to respond to relator’s inquiries.  
This evidence, coupled with the findings contained in the board’s February 22, 
2011 report, constitute sufficient evidence that Vivo violated Gov. Bar R. 
V(4)(G). 
The Cathy Jupp Matter 
{¶ 24} Cathy Jupp hired Vivo in April or May 2002 to represent her in a 
medical malpractice claim.  In January 2003, Vivo filed suit against the 
January Term, 2012 
 
7
physicians.  The defendants answered the complaint and submitted affirmative 
defenses.  On June 6, 2003, the defense filed a motion for summary judgment.  
Vivo did not inform Jupp of the motion for summary judgment and he never filed 
any response in opposition.  On July 14, 2003, the trial court granted defendant’s 
unopposed motion for summary judgment. 
{¶ 25} In June 2004, Jupp asked Vivo for assistance in regard to an 
unpaid bill that Jupp owed to a health-care provider.  Vivo did not tell Jupp at this 
time that her case had been dismissed. 
{¶ 26} In July 2005, Vivo again met with Jupp.  This time Vivo told Jupp 
that her case had been dismissed.  He also admitted to Jupp that he was too 
inexperienced to pursue the medical malpractice lawsuit that he filed on her 
behalf.  Vivo acknowledged that he had committed legal malpractice and he 
advised Jupp to hire an attorney to sue him. 
{¶ 27} Jupp followed Vivo’s advice and sued him for malpractice.  The 
record before the board suggests that there was no merit to Jupp’s medical 
malpractice claim.  Before Vivo filed her medical malpractice claim, another 
attorney had filed a personal injury claim on Jupp’s behalf.  Jupp’s injuries from 
the alleged medical malpractice (a missed medical diagnosis) were disclosed to 
the tortfeasor’s insurer.  And, according to Vivo, the damages for the missed 
diagnosis were contemplated in the settlement of the personal injury claim.  
Despite this, Vivo paid Jupp $40,000 to settle the malpractice claim.  Jupp filed 
her grievance against Vivo after she had been paid. 
{¶ 28} The Jupp matter is the subject of relator’s amended complaint, 
which charged Vivo with violating DR 6-101(A)(1) (prohibiting a lawyer from 
accepting a case that the lawyer is not competent to handle), 6-101(A)(2) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from providing representation without adequate 
preparation), 6-101(A)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer from neglecting an entrusted legal 
matter), 7-101(A)(1) (requiring a lawyer to seek the client’s lawful objectives 
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through reasonable means), 7-101(A)(2) (requiring a lawyer to carry out a 
contract of professional employment), 7-101(A)(3) (prohibiting conduct that 
prejudices or damages a client), 1-101(A)(4) (prohibiting conduct involving fraud, 
deceit, dishonesty, or misrepresentation), and 1-101(A)(6) (prohibiting conduct 
that adversely reflects on a lawyer’s fitness to practice law).2 
{¶ 29} Relator and Vivo stipulated that his actions in the Jupp matter 
violated DR 6-101(A)(1) and 6-101(A)(3).  The parties requested that the panel 
and board dismiss the remaining violations.  The panel and board accepted the 
stipulations.  We adopt these findings of fact and misconduct. 
Sanction 
{¶ 30} In recommending a sanction, the board considered the aggravating 
and mitigating factors listed in Section 10 of the Rules and Regulations 
Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”). 
{¶ 31} The parties stipulated that Vivo’s lack of cooperation in the 
disciplinary process was the only aggravating factor.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(e).  They also stipulated to the following mitigating factors under BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2): (a) no prior disciplinary record, (b) lack of dishonest or 
selfish motive, (c) timely good faith effort at restitution, (d) full and free 
disclosure to disciplinary board and cooperative attitude toward proceedings (after 
obtaining counsel and mental-health treatment), (e) character and reputation, and 
(g)(i) through (iv) diagnosed mental disability. 
{¶ 32} The panel and board agreed with the stipulated aggravating and 
mitigating factors.  The panel, however, believed that Vivo’s mental disability 
warranted further discussion.  The panel stated that Vivo was diagnosed with 
depression that stemmed primarily from his failed marriage.  The panel also noted 
                                                 
2 Because the events giving rise to the Jupp matter occurred before the effective date of the Rules 
of Professional Conduct, relator alleged violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
January Term, 2012 
 
9
that Vivo received treatment for his depression long after the events that gave rise 
to the alleged violations.  According to the panel, Vivo’s psychologist and mental-
health counselor were “comfortable concluding the depression significantly 
contributed to [Vivo’s] misconduct in the Jupp matter as well as his failure to 
cooperate.”  The board adopted the panel’s findings and conclusions on this issue.  
The board also accepted the parties’ stipulated recommendation of a one-year 
suspension, stayed in its entirety on the condition that Vivo continue treating his 
depression with a mental health professional. 
{¶ 33} We agree with the panel and the board that Vivo’s depression 
qualified as a mitigating factor as it relates to his failure to cooperate in the Hayes 
matter.  But, contrary to the board’s report, the finding that Vivo’s depression was 
also mitigating as to the Jupp matter finds no support in the record.  In fact, Vivo 
testified before the board that his depression was not a mitigating factor in the 
Jupp matter. 
{¶ 34} Despite this error, we find no reason to alter the sanction 
recommended by the board.  Vivo recognized that his depression prevented him 
from practicing law in a competent and ethical manner.  He has sought out and 
received successful treatment for his depression and continues to meet with his 
treating physician.  Vivo has reintegrated himself with his own family and 
developed a support network to assist in his recovery.  And, according to his 
mental health professionals, Vivo is capable of returning to a competent, ethical 
professional practice. 
{¶ 35} Accordingly, we adopt the board’s recommended sanction.  We 
therefore suspend Vivo from the practice of law in Ohio for a period of one year, 
with the entire suspension stayed on the condition that Vivo continue to follow 
the advice of his treating mental health professional.  If Vivo fails to comply with 
this condition, the stay will be lifted and he will serve the one year suspension.  
Costs are taxed to Vivo. 
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Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
____________ 
 
Ronald E. Slipski and David Comstock, Jr., for relator Mahoning County 
Bar Association. 
 
John J. Juhasz and Lynn Marro, for respondent James Vivo. 
___________