Case Title: McKennan v. Newman

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-12-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
McKennan v. Newman1995 WY 158902 P.2d 1285Case Number: 94-244Decided: 09/18/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
Susan 
W. McKENNAN, Personal Representative of the Estate 

of 
Terry Don McKennan, Deceased, 

Appellant 
(Plaintiff),

v.

Richard 
C. NEWMAN; Ron Rabe; Gary Senier; and Terry Caywood, 

Appellees 
(Defendants).

James 
P. Castberg, Sheridan, for appellant.

Kim 
D. Cannon and Anthony T. Wendtland of Davis and Cannon, Sheridan, for 
appellees.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

LEHMAN, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Susan W. McKennan 
(appellant), as personal representative of the estate of her late husband Terry 
McKennan (McKennan), filed a wrongful death action against Richard Newman, Ron 
Rabe, Gary Senier and Terry Caywood (appellees), several employees of her 
husband's employer, alleging culpable negligence on their part in the 
work-related accident which caused her husband's death. Appellant appeals the 
district court's order granting appellees' motion for summary 
judgment.

[¶2]  We affirm.

[¶3]  Appellant raises a single issue for 
review:

The 
District Court erred in granting the Appellees' Motion For Summary Judgment in 
that there are genuine issues of material facts as to the culpable negligence of 
the Defendants which would preclude the granting of a Motion For Summary 
Judgment.

BACKGROUND

[¶4]      Terry McKennan 
was killed in an industrial accident on September 22, 1989, while in the employ 
of Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. McKennan died when he became entangled in a wood 
chip-augur, apparently when he attempted to unclog it. This tragedy has given 
rise to two prior decisions by this court. In the first, McKennan v. Wyoming 
Sawmills, Inc., 816 P.2d 1303, 1304 (Wyo. 1991), we concluded that appellant 
could not maintain an action alleging that McKennan's employment was unlawful in 
that he was required to work in conditions which violated the Wyoming 
Occupational Health and Safety Act because "the existence of OHSA violations 
does not render otherwise lawful employment unlawful."

[¶5]      In the second 
case, and the relevant one for our present purposes, we remanded a dismissal of 
a wrongful death action based on negligence and the failure to act within the 
scope of employment against the appellees to allow appellant an opportunity to 
amend her complaint in accordance with Mills v. Reynolds, 837 P.2d 48 (Wyo. 
1992). McKennan v. Newman, 843 P.2d 602, 603 (Wyo. 1992).

[¶6]      On remand, 
appellant filed a second amended complaint alleging that appellees were guilty 
of culpable negligence in the death of her husband in that they: operated the 
sawmill in a dangerous, unsafe and hazardous manner and knew or should have 
known it was being so operated; failed to maintain and supervise an adequate 
safety program; failed to use "lockout devices" which would lock out the power 
at the main disconnect switch of the equipment; failed to install safety 
guarding on the equipment; and failed to place hazard warnings in the work area. 
Appellees moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted on July 
21, 1994. It is from that order appellant now appeals.

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶7]      Our review of a 
summary judgment in an action alleging culpable negligence by coemployees was 
recently set out in Smith v. Throckmartin, 893 P.2d 712, 714 (Wyo. 1995) 
(quoting Baros v. Wells, 780 P.2d 341, 343 (Wyo. 1989)):

In 
Barnette v. Doyle, Wyo. 622 P.2d 1349, 1362 (1981), we defined the term 
"culpable negligence" as "willful and serious misconduct." We defined the term 
"willful" in this context as "`such as is done purposely, with knowledge - or 
misconduct of such a character as to evince a reckless disregard of 
consequences.'" Id., quoting Hamilton v. Swigart Coal Mine, 59 Wyo. 485, 143 P.2d 203, 206, 149 A.L.R. 998 (1943).

The 
aggravating factor which distinguishes willful misconduct from ordinary 
negligence is the actor's state of mind. In order to prove that an actor has 
engaged in willful misconduct, one must demonstrate that he acted with a state 
of mind that approaches intent to do harm. State of mind, of course, may be 
difficult to prove. Accordingly, courts allow a party to establish that willful 
misconduct has occurred by demonstrating that an actor has intentionally 
committed an act of unreasonable character in disregard of a known or obvious 
risk that is so great as to make it highly probable that harm will 
follow.

Bryant 
v. Hornbuckle, 728 P.2d 1132, 1136 (Wyo. 1986) (quoted in Stephenson v. Pacific 
Power & Light Company, 779 P.2d 1169, 1174-75 (Wyo. 1989), and Johnston [v. 
Conoco], 758 P.2d [566] at 568-69 [(Wyo. 1988)]).

We 
went on in Smith to say that:

In 
prior cases, we have attempted to define culpable negligence by stating what it 
was not. In Barnette v. Doyle, 622 P.2d 1349, 1362 (Wyo. 1981), we said, "[a] 
defendant is not culpably negligent if his misconduct arose from a `thoughtless, 
inadvertent' act, or an error in judgment." We relied upon Hamilton v. Swigart 
Coal Mine, 59 Wyo. 485, 143 P.2d 203 (1943). In Case v. Goss, 776 P.2d 188, 191 
(Wyo. 1989), we said willful misconduct "must be more than mere mistake 
resulting from inexperience, excitement or confusion, and more than mere 
thoughtlessness or inadventure, or simple inattention." We also said culpable 
negligence is recognized as "an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a 
situation where a high degree of danger is apparent."

Smith, 
893 P.2d  at 714.

[¶8]      Summary judgment 
will be proper only if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the 
prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith, 893 P.2d  at 
714 (quoting Baros, 780 P.2d at 342). Our review is in the same light as the 
district court's, using the same materials and following the same standards. Id. 
When examining the record, we do so from the vantage point most favorable to the 
party which opposed the motion, giving that party the benefit of all favorable 
inferences which can fairly be drawn from that record. Id.

DISCUSSION

[¶9]      The focal point 
of our review is upon the materials submitted by both parties in support of, or 
in opposition to, the motion for summary judgment. Smith, 893 P.2d  at 714. From 
these materials we must determine whether there are genuine issues of material 
fact as to whether the appellees "engaged in intentional and unreasonable acts 
in disregard of a known or obvious risk so great as to make it highly probable" 
McKennan's death would follow. Smith, 893 P.2d  at 715.

[¶10]   Appellant makes three contentions 
in her attempt to support her claim of culpable negligence. First, she argues 
that McKennan was inadequately trained in the operation of the chip-augur and in 
unplugging it. Second, she claims that McKennan was not supervised closely on 
the night of the accident. The major thrust of appellant's third claim, however, 
is that the overall lack of safety at the jobsite was such that there was an 
unreasonable disregard of a known and obvious risk which was so great that it 
was highly probable that an injury would occur.

[¶11]   In support of this claim, appellees 
point to an OSHA inspector's report cataloging certain safety deficiencies in 
the sawmill. Appellees also rely on an expert's affidavit concluding that the 
sawmill was operated in an unsafe manner and lacked proper safety operating 
procedures. Appellees further point to the testimony of an employee who stated 
that he had never attended a safety meeting in which all of the employees of the 
plant were involved and that he had been required to sign a statement that said 
he had read the safety manual before he had an opportunity to actually do so. 
The employee also stated that he was never asked whether he understood the 
manual or if he had any questions. Finally, appellees note that the clerk of the 
district court, in an affidavit, stated that there were 125 worker's 
compensation claims filed in a 99-week period from the sawmill. This is 
evidence, appellees contend, that the facility was lacking in safety 
procedures.

[¶12]   In their motion for summary 
judgment, appellees averred that they were not culpably negligent in McKennan's 
death. In support of their contention, appellees noted that: the chip-augur area 
had never been identified as highly dangerous by government inspectors prior to 
the accident; no serious injuries or deaths had occurred in that area; McKennan 
was informed by Caywood that if the augur became plugged he was to turn off the 
machine and report to the chipper station for assistance; and McKennan's job did 
not require him to be on the second level where the accident 
occurred.

[¶13]   Based on a review of the record, we 
conclude that appellant has failed to offer material opposing summary judgment 
which shows the requisite state of mind on behalf of the appellees in order to 
create an issue of material fact. Appellant's claim centers around the alleged 
safety violations. We have said in regard to the invocation of safety manuals 
and regulations in an attempt to show culpable negligence:

While 
these asserted violations [of OHSA] may constitute evidence of ordinary 
negligence, they do not demonstrate a state of mind consistent with culpable 
negligence, which requires knowledge or obviousness of a high probability of 
harm.

Poulos 
v. HPC, Inc., 765 P.2d 364, 366 (Wyo. 1988) (emphasis added). Appellant has 
managed to produce evidence of ordinary negligence; however, she has failed to 
demonstrate that appellees acted with knowledge or that the high probability of 
harm presented by the chip-augur was obvious. In order to succeed, appellant 
needed to introduce evidence that appellees acted with knowledge of the 
particular danger posed to McKennan by the chip-augur or that the danger was so 
obvious that the risk of McKennan's death was highly probable to 
result.

[¶14]   The evidence is uncontroverted that 
there were no previous injuries or deaths associated with the augur which would 
have put appellees on notice of its dangerous nature. Similarly, the statistics 
regarding worker's compensation claims fail to establish culpable negligence 
since there is no evidence that any of those claims were related to the 
chip-augur area. The evidence brought forward by appellant in opposition to the 
motion for summary judgment was insufficient to raise an issue of material fact 
that appellees acted with the state of mind consistent with culpable negligence. 
That there is the potential for inferences to be drawn from her evidence that 
culpable negligence existed, is not enough, by itself, when confronted with the 
uncontroverted evidence that demonstrates that appellees did not act "in 
disregard of a known or obvious risk [that was] so great as to make it highly 
probable" that McKennan's death would follow. Smith, 893 P.2d  at 
715.

CONCLUSION

[¶15]  Appellant failed to meet her burden of 
establishing that appellees had the requisite state of mind in order to present 
a genuine issue of material fact; therefore, the district court's order granting 
summary judgment in favor of appellees is affirmed.