Case Title: City of Miami v. Rosenberg

Citation: 396 So. 2d 163

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 1981-03-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
396 So. 2d 163 (1981)
CITY OF MIAMI, Petitioner,
v.
Montague ROSENBERG et al., Respondents.
No. 57643.

Supreme Court of Florida.
March 12, 1981.
George F. Knox, Jr., City Atty., and Joseph Hackney, Jr., Asst. City Atty., Miami, for petitioner.
Brumer, Cohen, Logan, Kandell & Redlus and Sharon L. Wolfe of Greene & Cooper, Miami, for respondents.
BOYD, Justice.
This is an appeal of an Industrial Relations Commission order reversing the recommendation of the Judge of Industrial Claims and granting workers' compensation benefits to claimant who suffered a myocardial infarction. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.
*164 The facts in this case are not in dispute. Claimant was sixty-nine years old at the time of the incident and had been an attorney for almost fifty years. In 1972 he began work as an assistant city attorney for the City of Miami. In early 1976 the claimant began to experience stress at his job because of pressure from his superiors to retire. In denying the claim the Judge of Industrial Claims specifically found:
The Industrial Relations Commission reversed, finding that claimant had moved some heavy boxes the week immediately preceding his heart attack. Since the commission departed from the essential requirements of law in finding this activity precipitated the heart attack, we reverse.
Workers are entitled to compensation for heart attacks
*165 Victor Wine & Liquor, Inc. v. Beasley, 141 So. 2d 581, 589 (Fla. 1962). In a case very similar to this one the issue was raised whether a claimant was entitled to compensation if "his myocardial infarction was precipitated by a series of unusual, non-routine, work-related, emotionally traumatic events and circumstances compressed within a specific period of time, rather than a single isolated event." Richards Department Store v. Donin, 365 So. 2d 385, 386 (Fla. 1978). We held that "for a heart attack occurring during the course of employment to be compensable, it must have been caused by the unusual strain or overexertion of a specifically identifiable effort not routine to the work the employee was accustomed to performing." Id. at 386.
The reason for requiring a specifically identifiable event was explained in Richard E. Mosca & Co., Inc. v. Mosca, 362 So. 2d 1340, 1342 (Fla. 1978):
In finding that claimant's moving the boxes precipitated his heart attack, the commission erred in two major respects. First, the temporal relationship between the two events does not suggest a causal connection. Contrary to the commission's statement, there was no evidence that claimant had moved the boxes in the week immediately preceding his heart attack. Instead claimant testified that he had moved the boxes some time during the six months prior to having his heart attack.
Second, there is no medical testimony linking claimant's heart attack to any physical activity. The medical evidence merely established a link between claimant's heart attack and his psychological and emotional stress. Dr. Neer testified that the pressure on the job "would have some influence in precipitating the myocardial infarction, but it would not be the sole cause." (Tr. 193) Since the Judge of Industrial Claims was correct in finding no evidence that the heart attack was caused by a specifically identifiable event, the commission departed from the essential requirements of law in reversing his order.
We therefore reverse the commission's order and remand this case with instructions that the Judge of Industrial Claims' order be reinstated.
It is so ordered.
SUNDBERG, C.J., and OVERTON, ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ., concur.