Case Title: State v. Sparks

Citation: 

Docket Number: S46773

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2004-01-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED:  January 23, 2004
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
Respondent,
v.
JEFFERY DANA SPARKS,
Appellant.
(CR98326; SC S46773)
En Banc
On automatic and direct review of the judgment of conviction
and sentence of death imposed by the Yamhill County Circuit
Court.
John W. Hitchcock, Judge.
Argued and submitted September 8, 2003.
Dan Maloney, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause
and submitted the brief for appellant.  With him on the opening
brief was David E. Groom, State Public Defender, and on the reply
brief was Peter A. Ozanne, Executive Director.
Kathleen Cegla, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondent.  With her on the
brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Mary H. Williams,
Solicitor General, and Robert B. Rocklin, and Steven R. Powers,
Assistant Attorneys General.
DURHAM, J.
The judgment of conviction and sentence of death are
affirmed.
DURHAM, J.
This case is before the court on automatic and direct
review of defendant's judgment of conviction and sentence of
death.  Former ORS 163.150(1)(g) (1997), repealed by Or Laws
1999, ch 1055, § 1; ORAP 12.10(1). (1)  On review, defendant
asks this court to reverse his convictions for 15 counts of
aggravated murder, or, in the alternative, to vacate his sentence
of death and remand the case for resentencing.  For the reasons
set out below, we affirm defendant's convictions and the sentence
of death.
Because the jury found defendant guilty, we review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the state.  State v.
Thompson, 328 Or 248, 250, 971 P2d 879, cert den, 527 US 1042
(1999).
On April 20, 1998, the victim, who was 12 years old,
left her home on her bicycle.  At about 6:00 p.m. the victim's
mother and her friend, Blake, saw the victim with some friends
near the local post office.  Defendant also was present.  After
speaking with her mother, the victim returned home for a short
time and then left again to retrieve her bicycle, which had a
flat tire.  At about 8:30 p.m., the victim's grandmother saw the
victim walking her bicycle with a man with long dark hair similar to defendant's hair.
That night, according to Keith, defendant and the
victim entered the trailer where Keith and defendant lived. 
Defendant took the victim into the back bedroom and told Keith
that he was "not home."  An hour later, defendant came out of the
bedroom and told Keith to go buy him condoms and a douche. 
Defendant had a cut on the right side of his face that had not
been there before.  Keith also heard what sounded like sexual
sounds coming from the back bedroom.
At some point that night, Keith saw the victim come out
of the bedroom and go into the bathroom.  Defendant followed her
into the bathroom and Keith heard water running.  At about 12:30
a.m., defendant told Keith that he was taking the victim home,
and left with her.  Defendant returned alone about an hour later
and seemed agitated.  Defendant left again at 3:00 a.m. and
returned at 6:00 a.m.
Rodriguez, an acquaintance of defendant, saw defendant
at approximately 4:00 a.m. walking from the park or the railroad
tracks.  Defendant was wearing a black trenchcoat and a black
stocking hat.  When Rodriguez saw defendant again at 5:30 a.m.,
he was not wearing the coat or hat, and appeared to be nervous
and sweating.
The victim did not return home.  Throughout the night,
the victim's mother and Blake drove around and visited the
victim's friends in attempt to locate her.
On the morning of April 21, 1998, while operating a
train, an engineer observed what appeared to be a sleeping
transient on the side of the railroad embankment.  He called his
dispatcher, who then notified the Yamhill County Sheriff's
Office.  The police responded to the call and discovered the
partially nude body of the victim.  Someone had strangled her
both manually and by ligature.  There was a small bruise to the
entrance of her vagina consistent with sexual assault.  Swabs of
the victim's body were negative for the presence of semen and
defendant's DNA.  However, police found a Band-Aid near the
victim's body that contained DNA that was consistent with
defendant's DNA and that could not have come from the victim.
On the morning of April 21, defendant told Keith to
clean the trailer because the police would be searching it. 
Keith burned drug paraphernalia behind the trailer, and defendant
also may have burned some items.  Defendant told Keith not to
tell the police that he had left at 3:00 a.m.  After the police
interviewed Keith on April 22, defendant tried to convince Keith
that the victim had not been at the trailer and he threatened to
kill Keith if he caused any problems.
On April 21, Detectives Runyon and Crabtree interviewed
defendant.  Defendant had a fresh scratch on the right side of
his face, fresh scratches on his arm, and bruising around his
biceps.  During the interview, defendant repeatedly changed his
story.  After initially denying that he knew the victim or had
had any contact with her, defendant admitted to meeting her once
on April 20 in front of the market.
Runyon, Crabtree, and Detective Ludwig interviewed
defendant a second time on April 23.  They confronted defendant
with the information that Keith had provided.  Defendant admitted
that he was with the victim in his bedroom and had fondled her
buttocks, breasts, and vagina.  However, defendant denied having
sex with her.
The state charged defendant with 15 counts of
aggravated murder, ORS 163.095; one count of first-degree sexual
abuse, ORS 163.427; one count of first-degree kidnaping, ORS
163.235; one count of second-degree kidnaping, ORS 163.225; one
count of first-degree attempted rape, ORS 163.375 and ORS
161.405; and one count of second-degree attempted rape, ORS
163.365 and ORS 161.405.
The jury found defendant guilty of all 20 counts in the
indictment. (2)  In a separate sentencing proceeding on the
counts of aggravated murder, the jury determined that defendant
had acted deliberately, that defendant posed a continuing risk to
society, and that defendant should receive a death
sentence. (3)  The trial court then entered a sentence of
death.
On review, defendant raises 33 assignments of error,
most of which are not well taken and do not require separate
discussion.  We analyze defendant's remaining arguments in the
order that he presents them:  pretrial issues, guilt-phase
issues, and penalty-phase issues.
I.  ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR REGARDING PRETRIAL ISSUES
Defendant raises 13 assignments of error that pertain
to his pretrial motions and jury voir dire.  Seven of those
assignments raise facial challenges to the constitutionality of
Oregon's death-penalty statute.  This court previously has
considered and rejected defendant's constitutional challenges to
the statute. (4)  Another assignment of error presents a
challenge to the constitutionality of excluding convicted felons
and nonregistered voters from the jury pool.  This court
previously has considered and rejected that challenge.  We adhere
to those prior rulings and, because further discussion would not
benefit the public, bench, or bar, we decline to address those
assignments of error in detail.  
In two assignments of error, defendant argues that the
trial court erred in overruling his objections and in refusing to
grant a mistrial on the basis of questions and statements that
the prosecutor presented to prospective jurors during voir dire. 
On review, we conclude that, in the context of this case, the
trial court's rulings do not reflect an abuse of discretion.  A
detailed discussion of our reasons for reaching that conclusion
would not serve the interests of the public, bench, or bar.
However, two issues that defendant raises in three assignments of
error regarding pretrial matters warrant further discussion. 
A.  Venue
We first address defendant's argument that the trial
court erred in denying his motion for a change of venue.  ORS
131.355 provides the standard for a motion for change of venue:  
"The court, upon motion of the defendant, shall
order the place of trial to be changed to another
county if the court is satisfied that there exists in
the county where the action is commenced so great a
prejudice against the defendant that the defendant
cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial." 
Defendant argues that prejudicial pretrial publicity made it
impossible for him to receive a fair trial in Yamhill County and
that holding the trial in that venue violated his rights under
ORS 131.355 and under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon
Constitution and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution. (5)  Defendant has not offered a
different analysis under the statute than under the state or
federal constitutions.  In construing the meaning and application
of Oregon's statute and state constitution in this context, we
consider and give due weight to federal court interpretations of
federal law on the same subject based on the pertinence and
persuasiveness of the reasoning offered.  We review a trial
court's denial of a motion for change of venue for an abuse of
discretion.  Id. at 260. 
In this case, defendant moved for a change of venue
before the start of jury selection.  He argued that the pretrial
publicity detailing his personal history, his criminal record,
and the effect of the murder on Yamhill County communities had
made it impossible for him to receive a fair and impartial trial
in Yamhill County.  In support of that motion, defendant
submitted copies of four newspaper articles published about the
case and provided the court with an opinion poll of 250 Yamhill
County residents taken within one month of the victim's murder. 
That poll purported to show that 75 percent of residents recalled
hearing about a case in which the authorities had accused
defendant of raping and murdering a 12-year-old girl and, of
those residents, 51 percent had an opinion that defendant was
guilty, and 54 percent had an opinion that, if defendant was
found guilty after a fair trial, he should receive the death
penalty.
The trial court denied defendant's motion.  The court
determined that the views shown by the poll, although somewhat
useful, were "given in response to fairly general questions and
do not appear to the [c]ourt to be so fixed as to foreclose a
fair consideration of all the evidence in the case."  The court
concluded that the jury selection process would provide a
sufficient safeguard to ensure that defendant obtained a fair and
impartial jury.  Defendant did not renew his motion for change of
venue.
On review, defendant asserts that he was entitled to a
change of venue because the opinion poll demonstrated that there
was a "reasonable likelihood that pretrial publicity w[ould]
prevent defendant from obtaining a fair trial." (6)  However,
the applicable standard is not whether there is a "reasonable
likelihood" that defendant cannot obtain a fair trial.  Rather,
under ORS 131.355, the standard is whether 
"the court is satisfied that there exists ** *so
great a prejudice against the defendant that the
defendant cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial." 
Here, the trial court reviewed the newspaper articles and the
opinion poll that defendant submitted, and concluded that
defendant had not demonstrated that the residents of Yamhill
County had such a fixed opinion about the case that defendant
could not obtain a fair trial.
We recently addressed similar arguments raised by the
defendant in State v. Fanus, 336 Or 63, 79 P3d 847 (2003).  In
that case, the defendant submitted several television news
reports and newspaper articles, including 41 articles from the
local newspaper.  He also submitted an opinion poll that
purported to show that, in the county where the state would try
him, 94 percent of voters recognized his case, 71 percent
believed that he was guilty, and 58 percent believed that, if
found guilty, he should receive the death penalty.  Id. at 75. 
At the hearing on his motion for change of venue, the defendant
also submitted expert testimony that "several factors created
heightened prejudice against [the] defendant in that venue[.]" 
Id.  The defendant renewed his motion during, and at the close
of, jury voir dire.  This court concluded that the trial court
had not abused its discretion in denying those motions.  In doing
so, this court explained that, in contrast to Irvin v. Dowd, 366
US 717, 81 S Ct 1639, 6 L Ed 2d 751 (1961), "the record of
publicity d[id] not disclose a community sentiment of 'deep and
bitter prejudice' against [the] defendant."  Fanus, 36 Or at 80.
In this case, defendant does not claim, nor do we
conclude, that the pretrial publicity here was comparable to the
inflammatory publicity that denied the defendant a fair trial in
Irwin v. Dowd.  Further, defendant did not present evidence that
the denial of his motion for a change of venue caused him to be
unable to obtain an impartial jury or that he actually was
deprived of a fair and impartial jury.  To the contrary, the
trial court presided over a lengthy jury selection process that
included an extensive juror questionnaire and three days of
individual voir dire questioning.  Of the 13 jurors that actually
served, (7) six disclosed that they either had seen some form
of pretrial publicity about the case or had talked to a friend or
family member who had seen publicity about the case.  However,
none of those jurors could remember details about that publicity
and each stated that he or she could decide the case based solely
on the evidence presented at trial.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying defendant's motion for change of venue.
B.  Post-Mortem Photographs
In another assignment of error, defendant argues that
the trial court erred in denying his supplementary motion in
limine to exclude post-mortem photographs of the victim and
portions of the videotape of the crime scene that depicted the
victim's body.  Defendant argues that, because he had offered to
stipulate to the facts that the photographs would tend to show as
true, the photographs were inadmissible as irrelevant and
unfairly prejudicial. (8)  After a hearing, the trial court
denied defendant's motion. (9)
We first address defendant's argument that, in light of
his offered stipulation, the post-mortem photographs were
irrelevant to any material issue in the case.  OEC 401 provides:  
"'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence."
OEC 401 establishes a "very low threshold" for the admission of
evidence, that is, "evidence is relevant so long as it increases
or decreases, even slightly, the probability of the existence of
a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action."  State v. Barone, 329 Or 210, 238, 986 P2d 5 (1999),
cert den, 528 US 1086 (2000).  We review a trial court's
determination of relevance under OEC 401 for errors of law. 
State v. Titus, 328 Or 475, 481, 982 P2d 1133 (1999).
We first note that, without the stipulation, the
photographs of the victim's body were relevant.  The state sought
to admit the photographs to illustrate the testimony of several
witnesses, to prove the nature and circumstances of the victim's
death, and to prove that defendant had acted intentionally. 
Defendant asserts, however, that the photographs became
irrelevant once he offered to stipulate to the facts that the
state sought to prove with the photographs.  Defendant's argument
is not well taken.  His proposed stipulation only provides an
alternate form of proof.  It did not have the effect of making
otherwise relevant evidence irrelevant.  Laird C. Kirkpatrick,
Oregon Evidence §401.02, Art IV-4 (4th ed 2002) (quoting 1981
Conference Committee to OEC 401) addresses that point:  
"'The fact to which the evidence is directed need
not be in dispute.  While situations will arise which
call for the exclusion of evidence offered to prove a
point conceded by the opponent, the ruling should be
made on the basis of *** considerations [set forth
in] Rule 403, rather than under any general requirement
that evidence is admissible only if directed to matters
in dispute.'"
We conclude that the mere availability of defendant's offered
stipulation as an alternate form of proof did not render the
photographs irrelevant.
We next turn to defendant's argument that the trial
court should have excluded the photographs because, in light of
his offered stipulation, they were unfairly prejudicial.  OEC 403
provides:  
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
"In the context of OEC 403, 'unfair prejudice' means 'an undue
tendency to suggest decisions on an improper basis, commonly
although not always an emotional one.'"  State v. Moore, 324 Or
396, 407-08, 927 P2d 1073 (1996).  We review a trial court's
decision under OEC 403 for an abuse of discretion.  Id. at 407.
Defendant argues that the photographs depicting the
victim's body were unfairly prejudicial because they had a
tendency to "evok[e] a visceral, emotional response" from the
jurors.  Defendant further argues that, because his offered
stipulation covered the facts that the state sought to prove with
the photographs, the court should have excluded them.  
In support of his argument, defendant relies on Old
Chief v. United States, 519 US 172, 117 S Ct 644, 136 L Ed 2d 574
(1997); State v. Zimmerlee, 261 Or 49, 492 P2d 795 (1972); and
State v. McKendall, 36 Or App 187, 584 P2d 316 (1978), overruled
on other grounds by State v. Lopez, 147 Or App 314, 936 P2d 386
(1997).  In particular, defendant points to the following
statement that the Court of Appeals made in McKendall:  
"[W]hen a defendant offers to stipulate to a fact,
proof of the fact would be prejudicial to the
defendant, and the evidence offered in proof is not
probative of any issue other than that which the
stipulation addresses, the evidence is inadmissible."
McKendall, 36 Or App at 198.  However, as we explain below,
defendant's reliance on those cases is misplaced.
In McKendall, the authorities charged the defendant
with murder under an accomplice theory.  At trial, the defendant
sought to exclude photographs of the murder victim's body by
stipulating that someone had murdered the victim.  The court
determined that, other than the fact that someone had murdered
the victim, photographic evidence of the murder victim's body was
irrelevant to the issues in the case.  Because the defendant's
stipulation covered that fact and because the photographic
evidence of the victim's murder would be unfairly prejudicial to
the defendant, the court concluded that the trial court should
have excluded the evidence.  Id. at 197-98.  In reaching that
conclusion, the Court of Appeals relied on this court's decision
in Zimmerlee.
In Zimmerlee, the state charged the defendant with
armed robbery of Palmer.  In the course of the robbery, the
defendant had pointed a pistol at Palmer.  Later the same
evening, the defendant had pointed a pistol at Charley before
provoking a fight with him.  The defendant sought to exclude
evidence of his encounter with Charley by stipulating to the fact
that he was in possession of the pistol when he first pursued
Charley.  This court determined that "evidence of [the]
defendant's encounter with Charley was relevant to the issue of
[the] defendant's possession of the gun at the time of the
robbery."  Zimmerlee, 261 Or at 53.  However, the court explained
that 
"[o]nce [the] defendant offered to stipulate that he
had possession of the gun subsequent to the alleged
robbery, the only purpose that would be served by
permitting the state to prove the subsequent crime
would be to show that because [the] defendant had
committed another crime he was a bad man and therefore
probably committed the crime for which he was charged." 

Id. at 54.  Thus, the court concluded that the unfairly
prejudicial effect of the evidence of the defendant's encounter
with Charley outweighed its probative value and was not
admissible.
Defendant also relies on Old Chief, in which the United
States Supreme Court addressed, under the Federal Rules of
Evidence (FRE), (10) an issue similar to the one presented in
Zimmerlee.  In Old Chief, the defendant was charged with, among
other things, being a felon in possession of a firearm.  The
defendant had sought to exclude the evidence of the name and
nature of his prior felony by stipulating that he previously had
been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment exceeding
one year.  The Court determined that the trial court should have
excluded the evidence.  The Court concluded that the defendant's
stipulation provided evidence of equal evidentiary significance
as the prosecutor's reading of defendant's official record of
conviction.  Old Chief, 519 US at 191.  However, the defendant's
stipulation did not present the tendency of unfair prejudice that
the name and nature of his conviction presented. (11)  The
Court emphasized that the case was unique in that the fact to be
proven was the defendant's "legal status" and that 
"[p]roving status without telling exactly why that
status was imposed leaves no gap in the story of a
defendant's subsequent criminality, and its
demonstration by stipulation or admission neither
displaces a chapter from a continuous sequence of
conventional evidence nor comes across as an officious
substitution, to confuse or offend or provoke
reproach."
Id.
In all three of the cases discussed above, the excluded
evidence was relevant only to prove a discrete fact in the case. 
Further, even without the defendants' offered stipulations, the
excluded evidence in those cases had an undue tendency to suggest
a decision on an improper basis.  By offering to stipulate to the
discrete fact that the prejudicial evidence was offered to prove,
the defendants were able to tip the balance in favor of excluding
the prejudicial evidence, because the stipulation provided a
nonprejudicial alternate form of proof.
In contrast to those cases, defendant here sought to
replace the state's photographic evidence with a lengthy series
of terse stipulations.  Those stipulations were not of equal
evidentiary significance, because they would have left gaps in
the prosecution's narrative of the crime.  In addition, although
defendant's stipulations would have covered much of what the
state sought to prove with the photographs of the victim's body,
those stipulations could not replace the demonstrative value of
the photographic evidence.  The photographs illustrated the
testimony of several of the state's witnesses and helped to
clarify that testimony for the jury.  The principles discussed in
Old Chief, Zimmerlee, and McKendall are not applicable in this
context.
We also note that this court previously has stated that
photographs of a victim's body that are relevant are not unfairly
prejudicial solely because they are graphic.  See State v.
Barone, 328 Or 68, 88, 969 P2d 1013 (1998), cert den, 528 US 1135
(2000) ("Although the photographs in question were graphic, they
could not be said to be remarkable in the context of a murder
trial.").  Defendant has not suggested that the photographs in
this case created a danger of undue prejudice other than to evoke
a person's natural revulsion to death.  We conclude that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
photographs and video of the victim's body.
II.  GUILT-PHASE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Defendant presents seven assignments of error that
pertain to the guilt phase of his trial.  Two of those
assignments address comments that the prosecutor made during
closing arguments.  Defendant's arguments regarding those
assignments are not well taken, and an extended discussion of
them would not benefit the public, bench, or bar.  Thus, we
decline to address them further.
In five assignments of error, defendant argues that the
trial court erred in failing to ensure jury unanimity on the
charges of aggravated murder set out in counts 2 through 15 of
the indictment. (12)  With respect to counts 2, 6, and 11,
which are based on the underlying crime of first-degree sexual
abuse, defendant argues that the court should have instructed the jury
that it must agree unanimously on the same incident of first-degree sexual abuse to find defendant guilty of aggravated murder
as charged in those counts.  Defendant contends that the court's
failure to do so violated the constitutional jury unanimity
requirements under Article I, section 11, of the Oregon
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. (13)  Defendant makes identical arguments with
respect to those aggravated murder counts that are based on the
commission of the crime of first-degree kidnaping (counts 3, 7,
and 12), second-degree kidnaping (counts 4, 8, and 13), first-degree attempted rape (counts 5, 9, and 14), and second-degree
attempted rape (counts 10 and 15).
In a combined argument, defendant contends that the
evidence presented at trial could have supported more than one
instance of each of the five underlying crimes.  Specifically, he
argues that the state presented sufficient evidence to establish
that each crime could have occurred at either, or both, of two
distinct locations -- defendant's bedroom, where he first brought
the victim, or the railroad embankment, where police found the
victim's body.  Under those circumstances, defendant argues that
there was a substantial likelihood of jury confusion and,
therefore, that the trial court was required to instruct the jury
that it must agree unanimously on the factual circumstances that
constituted the elements of each underlying crime to convict
defendant on a particular count of aggravated murder based on
that crime.  Defendant acknowledges that he did not object at
trial to the jury instructions in that regard.  However, he
argues that this court should exercise its discretion to review
the error as apparent on the face of the record, citing State v.
Lotches, 331 Or 455, 472, 17 P3d 1045 (2000), cert den, 534 US
833 (2001).
In Lotches, this court addressed the jury unanimity
rule in the aggravated murder context.  In that case, the state
had charged the defendant with three counts of aggravated murder
of a single victim.  Those counts were based on the underlying
crimes of attempted first-degree robbery, attempted second-degree
kidnaping, and attempted murder.  The evidence presented at the
defendant's trial would have supported more than one charge of
each of the underlying crimes, because the defendant could have
perpetrated each crime against more than one victim.  The trial
court did not identify for the jury the victim or attendant
circumstances of any of the underlying crimes supporting each
count of aggravated murder.  The trial court also did not
instruct the jury that it had to agree on the same set of facts
to convict the defendant of each count of aggravated murder.
The court began by examining whether the instructions
were adequate in light of State v. Boots, 308 Or 371, 780 P2d 725
(1989).  In Boots, the state charged the defendant with
aggravated murder based on two separate subsections of the
aggravated murder statute -- that defendant committed the murder
in the course of and in the furtherance of robbery and that
defendant committed the murder to conceal the identity of the
robbers.  The trial court had instructed the jury that the law
did not require it to agree unanimously on either theory, so long
as all 12 jurors agreed that the state had proven some
combination of one or the other (or both) of the two alleged
aggravating factors.  On review, this court held that the
instruction was erroneous because "[it] relieves the jury from
seriously confronting the question whether they agree that any
factual requirement of aggravated murder has been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, so long as each juror is willing to pick one
theory or another."  Id. at 375.  The court, however, explained
that "[w]e are not speaking here of factual details, such as
whether a gun was a revolver or a pistol and whether it was held
in the right or the left hand.  We deal with facts that the law
(or the indictment) has made essential to a crime."  Id. at 379.
Applying Boots to the aggravated murder charges in
Lotches, this court held that, "because the aggravated murder
instructions that were given did not either limit the jury's
consideration to a specified underlying felony or require jury
unanimity concerning a choice among alternate felonies, each
instruction carried the same danger that this court had condemned
in Boots."  Lotches, 331 Or at 469.  The court illustrated the
problem presented in that case:  
"It is plain from the foregoing that the jury in
the present case properly could not have convicted
defendant of aggravated murder, for example, based on
murder committed to conceal one's identity as the
perpetrator of attempted murder, if half the jurors
thought that defendant had attempted to murder Riley
and half thought that he had attempted to murder
Edwards.  *** [T]he unanimity rule requires that the
jury agree as to 'just what defendant did' to bring
himself within the purview of the particular subsection
of the aggravated murder statute under which he was
charged."
Id. at 468-69.
The court in Lotches also determined that, although the
defendant had not raised the error at trial, the error was
"apparent on the face of the record."  The elements of plain
error are: (1) the error must be one of law; (2) the legal point
must be obvious, that is, not reasonably in dispute; and (3) to
reach the error, "[w]e need not go outside the record or choose
between competing inferences to find it[.]"  State v. Brown, 310
Or 347, 355, 800 P2d 259 (1990).  In Lotches, the court
determined that the first and third elements were satisfied
because "the question of what must be included in a jury
instruction is a question of law, and what was or was not
included is determined readily by examining the instructions that
were given."  Lotches, 331 Or at 472.  The court also concluded
that the legal point was "obvious" because Boots had established
that a jury must be instructed on "the necessity of agreement on
all material elements of a charge in order to convict."  Id. 
Because the factual distinctions between Lotches and Boots were
not so significant "that a court reasonably could doubt what its
duties respecting jury instructions would be[,]" the court
concluded that the trial court's failure to provide an
instruction on jury unanimity was error apparent on the face of
the record.  Id.
This court recently addressed the same issue as "error
apparent on the face of the record" in State v. Hale, 335 Or 612,
75 P3d 448 (2003).  In Hale, the state charged the defendant with
six counts of aggravated murder based on the underlying crime of
third-degree sexual abuse and four counts of aggravated murder
based on the underlying crime of murder.  At trial, the state
presented evidence that the defendant or the co-defendant (or
both) could have committed the crime of third-degree sexual abuse
against one or more victims.  Similarly, for the counts based on
the underlying crime of murder, there were three murder victims
and two possible perpetrators of that crime.  This court
concluded that 
"because the instructions that the jury was given with
respect to each of the aggravated murder counts based
on the crimes of third-degree sexual abuse and murder
did not either limit the jury's consideration to a
specific instance of third-degree sexual abuse or
murder, committed by a particular perpetrator against a
particular victim, or require jury unanimity concerning
a choice among alternative scenarios, each instruction
carried an impermissible danger of jury confusion as to
the crime underlying each count."
Hale, 335 Or at 627.  This court then concluded that it should
address the error as "apparent on the face of the record" for the
same reasons stated in Lotches.  Id. at 630.
In this case, because it is the dispositive inquiry, we
first address whether the error, if any, was "apparent on the
face of the record."  We agree that, as in Lotches and Hale, the
first and third elements of the plain error doctrine are
satisfied -- that the error is one of law and that it appears "on
the face of the record."  However, unlike the error addressed in
Lotches and Hale, we conclude that the legal point raised in this
case was not "obvious."
Defendant asserts that, in light of Lotches and Boots,
"the requirement of jury unanimity in aggravated murder cases is
apparent."  We agree with that statement as far as it goes. 
However, we disagree with defendant that the error in this case
is obvious because it "suffers from the same defect identified in
Lotches."  In Lotches, there were multiple possible victims for
each of the underlying crimes.  Similarly, in Hale, there were
multiple possible victims and two possible perpetrators of each
of the underlying crimes.  In both of those cases, the jury was
presented with multiple factual theories for each of the
underlying crimes.  It is not reasonably in dispute that a jury's
failure to agree unanimously on either the victim or the
perpetrator of the crime would violate the jury unanimity rule,
because both those facts are material elements of the underlying
crimes.  
In this case, however, it is not "obvious" that a
jury's failure to agree unanimously on the precise location where
defendant may have perpetrated the underlying crimes against the
single victim would violate the jury unanimity rule.  Nothing
about the crimes charged in this case demonstrates that the
precise location of the underlying crimes constitutes a material
element of those crimes on which the jury must agree unanimously. 
In fact, the location of those crimes more logically constitutes
a "factual detail" that does not require jury unanimity.  See
Boots, 308 Or at 379.  The line between those facts that are
essential to the crime and those that are merely factual details
may not always be clear.  However, defendant does not explain why
the location of the underlying crimes constitutes a fact that the
law makes essential to those crimes, as Boots discussed, and we
cannot agree, without more, that defendant's legal proposition is
"obvious," as this court applied that standard in Hale and
Lotches.  Because we conclude that the specific error alleged by
defendant is not "error apparent on the face of the record," we
do not address whether the trial court erred in the manner that
defendant contends.  See State v. Reyes-Camarena, 330 Or 431,
436, 7 P3d 522 (2000) (declining to address asserted error as
apparent on face of record because legal point raised was not
obvious).
III.  PENALTY-PHASE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Defendant raises 11 assignments of error that pertain
to the penalty phase of his trial.  Two of those assignments
raise issues that this court previously has answered contrary to
defendant's position. (14)  Therefore, we do not discuss them
further.  However, defendant's remaining assignments of error
present issues that warrant further discussion.
A.  Victim Impact Evidence
In two assignments of error, defendant argues that the
trial court erred in allowing non family members of the victim to
present victim impact evidence during the penalty phase.  ORS
163.150(1)(a) provides, in part:  
"In the [sentencing] proceeding, evidence may be
presented as to any matter that the court deems
relevant to sentence including, but not limited to,
victim impact evidence relating to the personal
characteristics of the victim or the impact of the
crime on the victim's family and any aggravating or
mitigating evidence relevant to the issue in paragraph
(b)(D) of this subsection[.]"
Before the penalty phase began, defendant moved to
exclude witnesses who were not family members of the victim, but
who defendant expected would testify as to the personal
characteristics of the victim.  Defendant argued that ORS
163.150(1)(a) does not permit persons who are not "victims," as
defined in ORS 131.007, (15) to present victim impact evidence. 
 Defendant also asserted that the evidence was not relevant to
the three questions that the court submitted to the jury under
ORS 163.150(1)(b), because the victim's character was not at
issue.  
The trial court determined that the evidence of the
victim's personal characteristics was admissible regardless of
whether defendant attacked the victim's character.  The court
further stated that the statute did not prohibit the state "from
introducing appropriate character evidence regarding the victim
from third persons who are not members of the victim's family
[or] otherwise legally defined as a victim."  After the court
ruled, defendant moved for a mistrial on the same grounds, which
the trial court denied.
On review, defendant argues that the legislative
history of the 1995 amendments to ORS 163.150(1)(a) show that the
legislature intended that the trial court would allow only
members of the victim's family to present victim impact evidence
during the penalty-phase proceeding.  Defendant contends that
such a limitation would keep victim impact evidence within the
bounds of the type of evidence contemplated in Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 US 808, 111 S Ct 2597, 115 L Ed 2d 720 (1991). 
Defendant also argues that victim impact evidence presented by
non family members is not relevant to the question set out in ORS
163.150(1)(b)(D), that is, whether defendant should receive the
death penalty. (16)
The arguments that defendant raises require us to
discern the intent of the legislature when it enacted the 1995
amendments to ORS 163.150(1)(a). (17) In doing so, we first
examine the text and context of the statute, and, if the
legislature's intent is clear, we look no further.  See PGE v.
Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-11, 859 P2d 1143
(1993) (providing template for statutory construction). 
ORS 163.150(1)(a) allows the introduction of "victim
impact evidence relating to the personal characteristics of the
victim or the impact of the crime on the victim's family        
* * *[.]"  The statute limits the scope of victim impact evidence
that the court may deem relevant to sentencing.  However, the
statute contains no limitations regarding the relationship
between the victim and a witness who may present victim impact
evidence.  As a general rule, the Oregon Evidence Code does not
limit the witnesses who may present relevant and otherwise
admissible evidence, as long as any witness is competent to
testify about the matter.  See OEC 601 (providing that any person
who can perceive and communicate may be witness); OEC 602
(providing that witness may testify to matter of which witness
has personal knowledge).  Those provisions stand in contrast to
other provisions of law that do specify who has a right to
present information to the court.  See, e.g., Or Const, Art I, §
42 (granting to "victims," in prosecutions for crime, the right
"to be heard at * * * the sentencing * * *").
We conclude that ORS 163.150(1)(a) does not limit the
witnesses who may present victim impact evidence as long as the
evidence that they present is within the permissible scope of
what constitutes victim impact evidence that is relevant to
sentencing.  That is, the evidence must pertain, in the words of
the statute, to "the personal characteristics of the victim or
the impact of the crime on the victim's family."  Because
defendant does not argue that the victim impact evidence actually
presented during his penalty-phase proceeding was not within the
scope of the statute, we conclude that the trial court did not
err in allowing non family members of the victim to present
victim impact evidence.
B.  Future Dangerousness
In three assignments of error, defendant argues that
the trial court erred in overruling his relevance objections to
the admission of (1) photographs of display boards of knives,
drug paraphernalia, and tattoo guns that corrections officers had
confiscated from inmates at the Oregon State Penitentiary; (2)
testimony about gang violence in prison; and (3) testimony about
inmate violence used to enforce the "inmate code." (18) 
Defendant also assigns error to the trial court's denial of his
motion for mistrial based on the admission of the photographs of
confiscated items.
To be admissible under OEC 401, (19) evidence
presented in a death penalty sentencing proceeding must be
relevant to one or more of the statutory questions that ORS
163.150(1)(b) requires the jury to answer.  State v. Wright, 323
Or 8, 15, 913 P2d 321 (1996).  Those questions are:  
"(A) Whether the conduct of the defendant that
caused the death of the deceased was committed
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that
death of the deceased or another would result;
"(B) Whether there is a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing threat to society;
"*****
"(D) Whether the defendant should receive a death
sentence."  
ORS 163.150(1)(b).  We review trial court determinations of
relevance under OEC 401 for errors of law.  Titus, 328 Or at 481.
Before the presentation of evidence in the penalty-phase proceeding, defendant made an oral motion in limine to
exclude the photographs of items confiscated from prison inmates. 
Defendant argued that that evidence was not relevant to the
question of defendant's future dangerousness and was unfairly
prejudicial.  Defendant contended that the state was offering the
evidence to imply improperly that, because other inmates had made
weapons in prison, defendant would make a weapon in prison.  The
state responded that it was offering the evidence to illustrate
its witness's testimony about opportunities for inmate violence
in prison.  
The trial court disagreed with defendant and stated
that
"I think that the jury is entitled to see what it is
like there [in prison] and decide whether or not
regardless of whether [defendant] makes a knife,
whether he is going to be dangerous to some other
inmate.
"I think you made it pretty clear in your opening
statement your intention is to show he is not dangerous
to the people he is going to be around which are adult
males.
"So, I think they [the jury] are entitled to see
what opportunities, if any, there are for him within
the context of prison life * **."
After reviewing the photographs of the confiscated items, the
court denied defendant's motion.  The court concluded:
"I think, generally speaking, the availability of an
opportunity to make a weapon in prison is all we are
talking about here.
"Obviously, you will be able to argue whether or
not [defendant] is so inclined, but I think probably
the State, well, the general perception of the public
is that people in prison don't have access to weapons
and consequently they can't be dangerous.
"And I think the State is entitled to offer
evidence to suggest if they are creative and decide
they want to make a weapon, they can.  Now, whether or
not [defendant] will be one of those people will be
something the jury will have to decide.  Your motion on
those photo[s] is denied."
Before the testimony of the state's witness, Detective
Hepler, defendant renewed his objection and moved for mistrial. 
The court overruled those objections and denied defendant's
motion.  
Hepler then testified about many aspects of life in
prison, including prisoners' use of weapons, prison gangs, and
the "inmate code."  During that testimony, defendant objected, on
the grounds of relevance, to Hepler's testimony that there are
gangs in prison and that, on occasion, prison officials have had
to transfer inmates between facilities to equalize the size of
rival gangs to reduce violence.  Defendant argued that that
testimony was not relevant to the question of his future
dangerousness because it was not connected to defendant's own
conduct.  Defendant also objected, on the grounds of relevance,
to Hepler's testimony that inmates use violence to enforce the
"inmate code." (20)  The court overruled those objections.
On review, defendant argues that the evidence reviewed
above allowed the state to prove his future dangerousness through
evidence that was probative only of the bad acts of others.  He
contends that the state offered the evidence to show that,
because prison is dangerous and some inmates are violent,
defendant will be violent in prison.  However, defendant asserts
that only evidence that relates to his past conduct in prison is
relevant to the question of whether he will be dangerous in the
future in prison.  Defendant further argues that it is necessary
to limit the evidence considered relevant to the future
dangerousness question, because, otherwise, courts will allow the
state to introduce evidence that constitutes an impermissible
aggravating factor on the question of whether a defendant should
receive the death penalty.
The state responds that it presented the evidence for
the purpose of explaining to the jurors that inmates have many
opportunities to inflict injuries or death on other inmates and
that prison staff cannot always control the violence that occurs
in prison.  Because defendant argued that he would not be
dangerous in "prison society," the state argues that a
description of that society was relevant to the jury's
determination of defendant's future dangerousness. 
In addressing defendant's contentions, we begin with
the question set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B), which asks the jury
to decide "[w]hether there is a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society[.]"  This court previously has held
that whether a defendant will be a danger to "society" includes
the consideration of whether that defendant will be a danger to
prison society.  State v. Douglas, 310 Or 438, 450, 800 P2d 288
(1990) ("Society includes prison society, as well as society at
large.  When the jury considers the threat that the defendant
might pose because of future violent crimes, it may consider the
threat to prison society.").
Our inquiry whether the state's evidence was relevant
to the question of defendant's future dangerousness begins, and
ends, with the proper characterization of the purpose for which
the state offered Hepler's testimony and the photographs of
confiscated items.  The state offered that evidence to explain
and demonstrate the nature of "prison society" and the
opportunities for violence within that setting.  Because the
statutory question required the jury, in the context of this
case, to decide the disputed fact of whether defendant would be
dangerous in prison society, the jury necessarily needed to
understand the nature of that society.  In contrast to a juror's
knowledge of "outside" society, jurors ordinarily will not have
the personal experience or expertise to know what opportunities
for violence exist in the prison setting.  In general, background
information that a party offers as an aid to understanding a
disputed issue is admissible.  See Kirkpatrick, Oregon Evidence
§401.02 at Art IV-4 ("Evidence which is essentially background
in nature can scarcely be said to involve disputed matter, yet it
is universally offered and admitted as an aid to
understanding.").
In our view, defendant's argument is incorrect because
it assumes that Hepler's testimony and the challenged photographs
solely pertained to the potential dangerousness of other prison
inmates.  To the contrary, that evidence described part of the
violent characteristics of the institution in which defendant
would be confined in the immediate future.  Evidence of that
violent institutional environment can assist jurors in
understanding whether defendant would face a significant risk in
prison of involvement in violent acts against others and,
perhaps, the use of weapons that the environment affords.  Thus,
the state's evidence, properly understood, does pertain to
defendant, and helps the jury understand, at least to some
degree, the probability that defendant will commit criminal acts
of violence in the future.
Moreover, defendant made the distinction between prison
society and outside society relevant to the question of his
future dangerousness by arguing that he would not be a danger in
prison.  It follows that the background information that provided
the necessary context for the jury to resolve that disputed issue
also was relevant. 
We conclude that the evidence to which defendant
objected was properly admissible as relevant to the question of
his future dangerousness under ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B).  The trial
court did not err.
C.  State's Closing Arguments
In two assignments of error, defendant contends that
the trial court erred in failing to act sua sponte by giving a
curative instruction or by granting a mistrial because of the
following remarks that the prosecutor made during closing
arguments:
"[PROSECUTOR]:  ***
"Is it more likely than not Defendant will commit
criminal acts of violence that will constitute a
continuing threat to society?
"What is society, Ladies and Gentlemen?  What did
the legislature mean when they wrote that word into the
statute?  Did they mean [a] group of people that have
been exiled from the community to prison?
"Or did they mean the place where you and I live,
where a system of community of life which individuals
form a continuous and regulatory association for their
mutual benefit and protection.  Webster indicates this
is a voluntary association of people.  Prison is not a
voluntary association of people.
"[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Objection.  Webster is not in
evidence.
"THE COURT:  Overruled.
"[PROSECUTOR]:  Community or nation or broad
grouping of people having traditions, institutions and
collective activities or interest.
"That is not a prison.  What the normal ordinary
common meaning of that word is that community in which
we live in, does the Defendant justify in receiving the
death penalty because he is a continuing threat to live
anyplace where people congregate.
"Words have their ordinary and common meaning. 
The question to be addressed is [defendant] a danger to
this community out here?  And that is the issue that
the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, is he a
danger to the areas where we live?
"* * * * *
"So, I am going to argue in the alternative maybe
one of you is thinking it might be okay to leave him in
prison.  Maybe that would be a sufficient society. 
That is not what the legislature intended, but maybe
you are thinking that." 
Defendant argues, and the state concedes, that the
prosecutor misstated the law on what constitutes "society" under
the future dangerousness question, because this court has held
that "society" includes prison society.  See, e.g., Douglas, 310
Or at 450.  Because defendant's argument in the penalty phase of
his trial was that he would not be dangerous in prison and,
therefore, should receive a sentence less than death, defendant
asserts that the prosecutor's deliberate misstatement of the law
deprived him of a fair sentencing proceeding.
The state responds that, in the context of the
prosecutor's entire closing arguments, defense counsel's closing
arguments, and the jury instructions, defendant was not denied a
fair trial.  The state first points out that, although the
prosecutor argued that "society" does not include prison, the
prosecutor acknowledged that prison "society" might be relevant
to the question of future dangerousness and, at length, argued to
the jury that defendant would be dangerous in prison.  In
addition, the state points out that defense counsel told the jury
that it had the power to define "society," and that it could
decide that prison society was a sufficient society for
defendant.  Finally, the state argues that, in light of the trial
court's instructions to the jury that they "must follow these
instructions[,]" that "[y]our answers to the questions should be
based on only the evidence and these instructions[,]" and that
"[t]he attorneys' statements and arguments are not evidence[,]"
the prosecutor's arguments did not deny defendant a fair trial.
Defendant acknowledges that he took no action during
the proceeding to preserve this claim of error. (21)  However,
he requests that we exercise our discretion to consider it as an
"error apparent on the face of the record[.]"  ORAP 5.45(6);
Brown, 310 Or at 355.  Defendant asserts that this court may
address the error as apparent on the face of the record because
it is not reasonably in dispute that "society," under ORS
163.150(1)(b)(B), includes prison society.  
A trial court's failure to grant a mistrial sua sponte
constitutes error apparent on the face of the record "only if it
is beyond dispute that the prosecutor's comments were so
prejudicial as to have denied defendant a fair trial."  State v.
Montez, 324 Or 343, 357, 927 P2d 64 (1996), cert den, 520 US 1233
(1997).  See also State v. Smith, 310 Or 1, 24, 791 P2d 836
(1990) ("Even if we find the prosecutor's remarks to be improper,
tasteless, or inappropriate, we will not find an abuse of
discretion in the trial court's denial of the motion for a
mistrial unless the effect of the prosecutor's remarks is to deny
a defendant a fair trial.").  We have reviewed defendant's claim
of error, and we conclude that the prosecutor's argument was not
so prejudicial that "it is beyond dispute" that this court can
say that the trial court's failure to give a curative instruction
or grant a mistrial sua sponte denied defendant a fair trial.
D.  Judgment of Conviction
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court
improperly entered more than one sentence of death, because the
judgment of conviction stated that defendant "is sentenced to
death on all fifteen counts [of aggravated murder] as provided in
ORS 163.150(1)(f)." (22)  The state responds that the trial
court only sentenced defendant to a single sentence of death,
because the phrase "on all fifteen counts" indicates only the
reason for the sentence -- it does not impose multiple sentences
of death.
Defendant is correct that the court may sentence him to
only a single sentence of death for the aggravated murder of a
single victim.  See State v. Barrett, 331 Or 27, 37, 10 P3d 901
(2000) (holding that "appropriate procedure would have been to
enter one judgment of conviction reflecting the defendant's guilt
on the charge of aggravated murder, which judgment separately
would enumerate each of the existing aggravating factors"); Hale,
335 Or at 631 (holding that "[e]ach judgment should enumerate
separately the aggravating factors on which each conviction was
based *** [and] each judgment entering a single conviction for
aggravated murder for each victim should impose a single sentence
of death.").  However, here, the judgment of conviction does not
purport to impose multiple sentences of death on defendant. 
Rather, it states that defendant "is sentenced to death on all
fifteen counts as provided in ORS 163.150(1)(f)."  (Emphasis
added.)  We read the judgment to conform with the law, which
allows a single sentence of death under the circumstances of this
case.  Thus, we conclude that it is not necessary to remand for
entry of a corrected judgment.
IV.  CONCLUSION
We conclude that none of defendant's assignments of
error is well taken.  Accordingly, we affirm defendant's
conviction and sentence of death.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence of death
are affirmed.
1. ORS 138.012 now provides for this court's automatic and
direct review of a judgment of conviction and sentence of death.
2. The trial court merged the convictions on counts 16
through 20 -- the underlying felonies of first-degree sex abuse,
first- and second-degree kidnaping, and first- and second-degree
attempted rape -- with the aggravated murder convictions.
3. Oregon law requires the court, in a death-penalty sentencing proceeding, to submit the
following four questions to the jury after the presentation of the evidence:
"(A) Whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the
death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the
reasonable expectation that death of the deceased or another would
result;
"(B) Whether there is a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society;
"(C) If raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the
defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to
the provocation, if any, by the deceased; and
"(D) Whether the defendant should receive a death
sentence." 
ORS 163.150(1)(b).  The jury considers the third question set out in paragraph (b)(C), regarding
provocation by the victim, only when that question is relevant under the facts of the case.  See
State v. Terry, 333 Or 163, 182-83 n 12, 37 P3d 157 (2001), cert den, 536 US 910 (2002)
(question set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(C) not submitted to jury).  In this case, the parties
stipulated that the facts did not raise the issue of provocation by the victim and, thus, the jury did
not consider the third question.
4. Defendant also raises two supplemental assignments of
error, in which he attacks the facial constitutionality of the
future dangerousness question, set out in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(B),
and its accompanying jury instruction.  Because defendant did not
preserve those arguments and they do not qualify as error
apparent on the face of the record, we do not address them.  
5. Article I, section 11, provides, in part, that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to public
trial by an impartial jury * * *."  The Sixth Amendment provides,
in part, that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury ***."  The Sixth Amendment is made applicable to the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 US 145, 88 S Ct 1444, 20 L
Ed 2d 491 (1968).
6. Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred by
failing to apply different considerations in determining whether
he could obtain a fair penalty-phase proceeding if he were
convicted.  However, we decline to address that argument, because
defendant did not present it to the trial court.  See State v.
Fanus, 336 Or 63, 77-78, 79 P3d 847 (2003) (declining to address
same argument because the defendant had not presented it below).
7. The court excused one juror after the guilt phase of defendant's trial and replaced that juror
with the first alternate juror in the penalty phase.
8. In his motion, defendant offered to stipulate (1) that
whoever killed the victim "did so intentionally, first by manual
strangulation and then with a belt belonging to her mother"; (2)
that the victim was found lying face down near the railroad
tracks; (3) that the victim was partially nude and her shorts
were found on the embankment of the railroad tracks; (4) that
somebody had cut or torn the victim's shorts off her body; (5)
that a Band-Aid containing blood on the gauze pad was found near
the victim's body; and (6) that the victim's bicycle was found
down the railroad track embankment a short distance from the
victim's body.  At the hearing on defendant's motion, defendant
further offered to stipulate (1) that "somebody intended to
sexually abuse and rape [the victim]"; (2) that "somebody
intended to physically harm [the victim]"; (3) that "somebody
attempted to conceal the body, the commission of the crimes, and
the identity of the individual"; and (4) that the victim "was
nude from the waist down and that the clothing on her upper body
had [been] forced upwards * ** to expose her breasts."
9. During the trial, defendant objected to the admission of
several photographs based on his motion in limine.  The trial
court overruled all but two of those objections, determining that
those two photographs were needlessly cumulative.  Defendant has
not assigned error to those rulings.
10. FRE 401, which is identical to OEC 401, provides:
"'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence."
FRE 403 provides:
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence."
Although not identical in all respects to OEC 403, FRE 403 is
identical in the respect addressed in Old Chief.
11. In Old Chief, the defendant's previous felony was assault
causing serious bodily injury, which was similar to the current
charge against the defendant of assault with a dangerous weapon. 
The Court had determined that the name of the prior offense
presented a risk of unfair prejudice, because it had the tendency
to suggest to the jury that, because the defendant had committed
the prior assault, he was more likely to have committed the
assault in case before it.  Old Chief, 519 US at 185.
12. Defendant concedes that those assignments of error do not
pertain to count 1 of the indictment, which alleged that
defendant committed the crime of aggravated murder by unlawfully
and intentionally causing the death of the victim, who was a
person under the age of 14 years.  ORS 163.095(1)(f).
13. Article I, section 11, provides, in part, that "a verdict
of guilty of [capital] first degree murder ** * shall be found
only by a unanimous verdict, and not otherwise[.]"  The
Fourteenth Amendment provides, in part, that "nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law[.]"  See Schad v. Arizona, 501 US 624, 634 n 5,
111 S Ct 2491, 115 L Ed 2d 555 (1991) (stating that right to
unanimous verdict is due process right).
14. In one of those assignments of error, defendant argues
that the trial court erred in admitting as victim impact evidence
the diary of the victim's mother.  Defendant argues that the
diary was hearsay not admissible under the prior recollection
recorded exception.  See OEC 802 ("Hearsay is not admissible
except as provided in * ** [OEC 801 to 806] or as otherwise
provided by law."); OEC 803(5) (providing hearsay exception for
"[a] memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a
witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection
to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately ***."). 
However, the trial court also had admitted the diary under the
state of mind exception.  See OEC 803(3) (providing hearsay
exception for "[a] statement of the declarant's then existing
state of mind ***.").  Because defendant does not argue that
the trial court improperly admitted the diary under the state of
mind exception, we decline to address that assignment of error
further.
15. ORS 131.007 provides:
"As used in ORS 40.385, 135.230, 135.406, 135.970,
147.417, 147.419 and 147.421 and in ORS chapters 136,
137 and 144, except as otherwise specifically provided
or unless the context requires otherwise, 'victim'
means the person or persons who have suffered
financial, social, psychological or physical harm as a
result of a crime and includes, in the case of a
homicide or abuse of corpse in any degree, a member of
the immediate family of the decedent and, in the case
of a minor victim, the legal guardian of the minor. In
no event shall the criminal defendant be considered a
victim."
16. Defendant also argues that, as a matter of
statutory interpretation, the court must limit the
scope of victim impact evidence, because otherwise
"unlimited, unreliable and impermissible factors" come
into the death decision.  However, defendant does not
argue that the scope of the victim impact evidence here
was impermissible.  Rather, he objected to the victim
impact evidence on the basis of who presented it. 
Thus, we do not address the aspect of defendant's
argument related to the scope of the victim impact
evidence.
17. In 1995, the legislature amended ORS
163.150(1)(a) to include the text pertaining to victim
impact evidence.  Or Laws 1995, ch 531, §2; Or Laws
1995, ch 657, §23.
18. Detective Hepler testified for the state that
the phrase "inmate code" refers to the tendency of some
prison inmates to retaliate against other inmates for
perceived insults and other transgressions by ganging
up on and assaulting an offending inmate when prison
guards are not present.
19. OEC 401 provides:
"'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence."
20. Following much of Hepler's testimony, defendant
also moved to strike that testimony and moved for a
mistrial, on the ground that the evidence was not
relevant to the question of defendant's future
dangerousness.  The trial court denied those motions. 
However, defendant does not now assign error to those
rulings.
21. Defendant, however, did object to the
prosecutor's use of Webster's Dictionary and he assigns
error to the trial court's decision to overrule that
objection.  However, defense counsel stated that the
grounds for that objection was that Webster's "[wa]s
not in evidence."  On review, defendant does not appear
to argue that the prosecution's reference to Webster's
was improper because it "[wa]s not in evidence." 
Rather, defendant now argues that the court should have
sustained his objection because the prosecution, by
referring to Webster's, provided the jury with an
incorrect definition of "society."  However, defense
counsel did not alert the trial court that he objected
to the prosecutor's comment on the ground that the
definition of "society" was incorrect or that the
prosecutor's argument was improper.
22. On review, defendant does not argue that the
trial court improperly entered 15 convictions of
aggravated murder.  Rather, he argues only that the
trial court improperly entered multiple sentences of
death.