Case Title: CED Props., LLC v. City of Oshkosh

Citation: 2014 WI 10

Docket Number: 2012AP000005

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2014-03-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
2014 WI 10 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2012AP5   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
CED Properties LLC, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
City of Oshkosh, 
          Defendant-Respondent.   
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 348 Wis. 2d 305, 836 N.W.2d 654 
(Ct. App. 2013 – Published) 
PDC No.: 2013 WI App 75  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 6, 2014 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 18, 2013   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Winnebago 
 
JUDGE: 
Thomas J. Gritton 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Erik S. Olsen and Eminent Domain Services, LLC, Madison, and 
oral argument by Erik S. Olsen. 
 
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief by Richard 
J. Carlson and Silton Seifert Carlson S.C., Appleton, and oral 
argument by Richard J. Carlson. 
 
 
 
2014 WI 10
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2012AP5 
(L.C. No. 
2010CV1866) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
CED Properties, LLC, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
City of Oshkosh, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 6, 2014 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   This is a review of a 
published court of appeals decision that affirmed the circuit 
court.1  This case involves special assessments levied by the 
City of Oshkosh ("the City") against a corner lot property owned 
by CED Properties, LLC ("CED"), which is located at the 
intersection of Jackson Street and Murdock Avenue in Oshkosh, 
Wisconsin.  Specifically, we review whether CED's complaint was 
                                                 
1 CED Properties, LLC v. City of Oshkosh, 2013 WI App 75, 
348 Wis. 2d 305, 836 N.W.2d 654. 
No. 2012AP5   
 
2 
 
sufficient to place the City on notice that CED intended to 
appeal both the Jackson Street and Murdock Avenue special 
assessments.   
¶2 
The City maintains that its typical practice is to 
issue a separate special assessment for each street that abuts a 
property.  The City, therefore, asserts that it issued two 
separate special assessments against CED: one assessment against 
Murdock Avenue and another separate assessment against Jackson 
Street.  In contrast, CED argues that the City issued a single 
special assessment against its property when it adopted Final 
Resolution 10-227, which stated that "the assessments for all 
projects included in said report are hereby combined as a single 
assessment, but any interested property owners shall be entitled 
to object to each assessment separately or both assessments, 
jointly for any purpose or purposes."   
¶3 
Both the circuit court and the court of appeals held 
that the City did, in fact, levy two separate special 
assessments against CED.  CED Properties, LLC v. City of 
Oshkosh, 2013 WI App 75, ¶11, 348 Wis. 2d 305, 836 N.W.2d 654.  
We also conclude that the City issued two special assessments 
rather than a single special assessment against CED's property; 
however, we ultimately conclude that CED's original complaint 
provided the City with reasonable and sufficient notice that CED 
No. 2012AP5   
 
3 
 
intended to appeal the entirety of the special assessments 
levied against its property.2 
¶4 
On November 30, 2011, the Winnebago County Circuit 
Court, the Honorable Thomas J. Gritton presiding, held that Wis. 
Stat. § 66.07033 governed as the specific statute applicable to 
appeals 
of 
special 
assessments. 
 
Under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.0703(12)(a), the circuit court held that CED failed to 
appeal the Jackson Street special assessment within the required 
90-day time limit; therefore, it issued an order granting the 
defendant, the City, partial summary judgment regarding the 
Jackson Street special assessment.  The court of appeals 
affirmed the decision of the circuit court that CED failed to 
timely appeal the Jackson Street special assessment but based 
its holding on different reasoning than the circuit court's.   
                                                 
2 After the City conceded that both special assessments 
failed to include the total cost of the intersection improvement 
project in violation of Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(5)(b), the circuit 
court granted partial summary judgment in favor of CED in regard 
to the Murdock Avenue special assessment.  Our decision today 
does not review the Murdock Avenue special assessment. This 
procedural deficiency, which the City concedes, applies to both 
the Murdock Avenue and the Jackson Street special assessments, 
and CED timely appealed both special assessments.  Therefore, 
summary judgment in favor of CED is also appropriate in regard 
to the Jackson Street special assessment. As a result of our 
decision 
today, 
neither 
of 
the 
July 
27, 
2010, 
special 
assessments against CED's property located at the intersection 
of Jackson Street and Murdock Avenue in Oshkosh, Wisconsin, 
remains valid.   
3 This and all subsequent references to the Wisconsin 
Statutes are to the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 2012AP5   
 
4 
 
¶5 
CED sought review and argues that under Wisconsin's 
rules of notice pleading, its original complaint was sufficient 
to challenge both the Jackson Street and the Murdock Avenue 
special assessments.  Alternatively, CED argues that Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.09(3), Wisconsin's relation back statute, applies to the 
appeal of special assessments and, as a result, CED's amended 
complaint saves its claim regarding the Jackson Street special 
assessment. 
¶6 
We agree with CED's first argument and hold that its 
original complaint was sufficient to appeal not only the Murdock 
Avenue special assessment, but the Jackson Street special 
assessment as well.  Wisconsin has long abandoned rigid pleading 
requirements in favor of liberal civil procedural rules.  Notice 
pleading rules not only simplify pleading in Wisconsin, but also 
favor the resolution of claims on the merits.  CED filed its 
original complaint within the 90-day time period required by 
Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a).  The original complaint included 
the parcel number, 15-1898-1000, which is the only parcel number 
assigned to the property in question.  Furthermore, the original 
complaint included reference to the "Jackson Street - Murdock 
Avenue intersection improvement project," which formed the basis 
for the special assessments levied by the City.   
¶7 
The alleged problem with the complaint was that it 
included only the monetary value, $19,241.73, which corresponds 
with the Murdock Avenue special assessment.  That the complaint 
failed to identify an additional $19,404.93 for the Jackson 
Street special assessment is not detrimental to CED's appeal of 
No. 2012AP5   
 
5 
 
both special assessments.  The parcel number and the reference 
to both street names when identifying the project for which the 
special assessments were levied placed the City on notice that 
CED intended to appeal the total amount of special assessments 
levied against its property.  This notice to the City was 
reasonable and sufficient and, therefore, is all that is 
required 
under 
Wisconsin's 
rules 
of 
notice 
pleadings.  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals. 
I. 
Background 
¶8 
CED owns property situated on the northeast corner of 
Jackson Street and Murdock Avenue in Oshkosh, Wisconsin.  On 
July 27, 2010, the City passed a resolution that levied special 
assessments 
against 
several 
properties, 
including 
CED's 
property, to assist in funding an intersection improvement 
project.  The project consisted of the creation of a multi-lane 
roundabout 
and 
various 
landscape 
improvements 
at 
the 
intersection of Jackson Street and Murdock Avenue.  The City 
levied a total of $38,646.66 in special assessments for the 
"Jackson Street 
- Murdock Avenue intersection improvement 
project," against parcel number 15-1898-1000, CED's property.  
The City levied $19,404.93 against the portion of CED's property 
bordering Jackson Street and assigned an additional $19,241.73 
against the same corner lot property, which also runs alongside 
Murdock Avenue.   
¶9 
While the City issued one final resolution, the final 
resolution included maps indicating, as reference points, both 
Jackson Street and Murdock Avenue.  Most important, two 
No. 2012AP5   
 
6 
 
schedules accompanied the final resolution.  Each schedule 
identified the same parcel I.D., 15-1898-1000, and the same 
description, 1800 Jackson Street, in reference to the owner, 
CED.  However, the schedule immediately following the Jackson 
Street map indicates a concrete paving assessment of $19,404.93, 
while the schedule associated with the Murdock Avenue map lists 
a concrete paving assessment of $19,241.73. 
¶10 On September 23, 2010, CED appealed the special 
assessments by simultaneously filing a notice of appeal and a 
complaint with the circuit court.  Paragraph three of the 
complaint states, "Plaintiff owns property located at 1800 
Jackson Street Oshkosh, WI 54901, City of Oshkosh parcel number 
15-1898-1000."  Paragraph four of the complaint states, "On July 
27, 2010 Oshkosh, by its Common Council, authorized the issuance 
of a $19,241.73 special assessment on parcel number 15-1898-1000 
to help pay for the street repair portion of the Jackson Street 
– Murdock Avenue intersection improvement project."   
¶11 It is undisputed that CED filed its notice of appeal 
and complaint within the 90-day time limit set forth in Wis. 
Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a).  It is also undisputed that CED filed an 
amended complaint on June 28, 2011, well past the 90-day time 
limit to appeal.  In its amended complaint, CED recognized that 
its original complaint did not include the correct monetary 
value for the entirety of the special assessments levied against 
its property.  Therefore, its amended complaint did not include 
the reference to a specific monetary value that previously 
appeared in paragraph four of the original complaint.  The 
No. 2012AP5   
 
7 
 
amended complaint also changed "special assessment" to read 
"special assessment(s)" throughout. 
¶12 The City moved for partial summary judgment arguing 
that CED's claim regarding the $19,404.93 Jackson Street special 
assessment was not filed within the 90-day time limit set forth 
in Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a).  The City did not challenge 
CED's appeal of the Murdock Avenue special assessment, and the 
City conceded that it did not follow procedural requirements set 
forth in Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(5) when issuing the special 
assessments.   
¶13 CED moved for summary judgment arguing that its 
original complaint sufficiently challenged the entirety of the 
special assessments.  Alternatively, CED argued that its amended 
complaint related back to the original complaint and thus saved 
its 
claim 
as 
to 
the 
Jackson 
Street 
special 
assessment.  
Furthermore, CED argued that the City's special assessments were 
invalid for a number of reasons, including that the City failed 
to comply with procedural requirements.4   
¶14 As to the Murdock Avenue special assessment, the 
circuit court agreed with CED and granted it partial summary 
judgment.  In granting CED partial summary judgment, the circuit 
                                                 
4 In addition, CED's original and amended complaints alleged 
that the special assessments were not local in nature, that the 
improvement project failed to benefit CED's property, that the 
special assessments were not reasonably apportioned, that the 
amount of the special assessments exceeded any benefit to CED's 
property, that the special assessments were a violation of equal 
protection, and that CED received untimely notice of the hearing 
in which the City adopted the special assessments. 
No. 2012AP5   
 
8 
 
court relied on the City's concession that it failed to follow 
proper procedure when levying the special assessments at issue.  
Specifically, the City failed to include the total cost of the 
intersection improvement project in the engineer's report as 
required by Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(5) when it issued the special 
assessments. 
 
In 
regard 
to 
the 
Jackson 
Street 
special 
assessment, the circuit court granted the City's motion for 
partial summary judgment.  It held that under Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0703(12)(a), the specific statute governing appeals of 
special assessments, CED failed to appeal the Jackson Street 
special assessment within the 90-day time limit.   
¶15 A majority of the court of appeals agreed; however, 
its reasoning differed from the circuit court's.  First, as a 
preliminary matter, the court of appeals determined that the 
City, did, in fact, issue two separate special assessments 
against CED's property.  Second, the court of appeals, contrary 
to the circuit court, held that the rules of notice pleading and 
the relation back statute, Wis. Stat. § 802.09(3), apply to 
special proceedings such as the appeal of special assessments 
under Wis. Stat. § 66.0703.  However, the court of appeals 
concluded that CED's amended complaint did not save its 
challenge of the Jackson Street special assessment.  It held 
that the amended complaint could not relate back to the original 
complaint because the Jackson Street special assessment did not 
arise 
out 
of 
the 
Murdock 
Avenue 
special 
assessment.  
Furthermore, the court of appeals reasoned that the original 
complaint related only to the Murdock Avenue special assessment; 
No. 2012AP5   
 
9 
 
therefore, appeal of the Jackson Street special assessment 
remained untimely. 
¶16 Judge Paul F. Reilly, who dissented, would have first 
held that the City issued a single special assessment against 
CED.  In addition, Judge Reilly argued in his dissent that CED's 
original complaint gave fair notice to the City that CED 
intended to appeal the entire special assessment levied against 
its property. 
¶17 Before this court, CED asserts that under Wisconsin's 
notice pleading rules, its original complaint was sufficient to 
challenge the entirety of the special assessments levied against 
its property.  As we noted previously, in the alternative, CED 
argues that Wisconsin's relation back statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.09(3), applies to the appeal of special assessments and 
that its amended complaint relates back to its original 
complaint, which saves its appeal of the Jackson Street special 
assessment.   
¶18 Because we conclude that CED's original complaint 
provided reasonable and sufficient notice to challenge the 
entirety of the special assessments levied against its property, 
we do not address its alternative argument. 
II. 
Analysis 
A. Principles of Notice Pleading 
¶19 Wisconsin Stat. § 802.02 sets forth the general rules 
of pleading.  In Wisconsin, a pleading must set forth "[a] short 
and plain statement of the claim, identifying the transaction or 
occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences out of which 
No. 2012AP5   
 
10 
 
the claim arises and showing that the pleader is entitled to 
relief."  Wis. Stat. § 802.02(1)(a).  A pleading must also set 
forth "[a] demand for judgment for the relief the pleader 
seeks."  Wis. Stat. § 802.02(1)(b).  In addition, Wis. Stat. 
§ 802.02(6) 
governs 
"[c]onstruction 
of 
pleadings," 
which 
requires that "[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do 
substantial justice."  Wis. Stat. § 802.02(6).  Finally, the 
Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure "shall be construed to secure 
the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action 
and proceeding."  Wis. Stat. § 801.01(2). 
¶20 The Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure, effective 
January 1, 1976, are patterned after the federal rules of civil 
procedure.  Korkow v. General Cas. Co. of Wis., 117 Wis. 2d 187, 
193, 344 N.W.2d 108 (1984).  In Korkow, this court addressed the 
question of whether an amended complaint that added a separate 
claim by an added plaintiff could relate back to the filing date 
of the original complaint.  Id. at 192.  In interpreting 
Wisconsin's relation back statute, we analyzed "Wisconsin's 
liberal civil procedure rules."  Id.  We noted that Wisconsin 
does not employ rigid civil procedure rules.  See id.  Instead, 
Wisconsin's notice pleading rules "are intended to facilitate 
the orderly adjudication of disputes."  Id. at 193. 
¶21 We have explained that "[t]his functional approach to 
pleading reflects a determination that the resolution of legal 
disputes should be made on the merits of the case rather than on 
the technical niceties of pleading."  Id. at 193.  "A complaint 
which might well have failed under the old procedure for failure 
No. 2012AP5   
 
11 
 
to state sufficient facts now will be sustained if reasonable 
notice is given to the defendant in respect to the nature of the 
claim."  Anderson v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675, 684, 271 
N.W.2d 368 (1978).      
¶22 In Canadian Pac. Ltd. v. Omark-Prentice Hydraulics, 
Inc., 86 Wis. 2d 369, 371, 272 N.W.2d 407 (Ct. App. 1978), the 
court of appeals addressed the issue of whether an "omission in 
the summons of a statement that the answer must be served within 
twenty days after the date of service of the summons and 
complaint deprives the trial court of jurisdiction."  In holding 
that the omission in question did not defeat the circuit court's 
jurisdiction, the court of appeals noted,  
[O]ur Rules of Civil Procedure, like the federal rules 
relating to pleadings, "reject the approach that 
pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by 
counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the 
principle 
that 
the 
purpose 
of 
pleading 
is 
to 
facilitate a proper decision on the merits."  
Canadian Pac. Ltd., 86 Wis. 2d at 373 (Ct. App. 1978)(citing 
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957), abrogated on other 
grounds by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). 
B. Standard of Review 
¶23 Whether a circuit court properly granted a motion for 
summary judgment is reviewed de novo.  Everson v. Lorenz, 2005 
WI 51, ¶9, 280 Wis. 2d 1, 695 N.W.2d 298.  In reviewing a 
previous court's summary judgment decision, this court will 
apply "the same methodology as the circuit court[,] and 
benefit[s] from its analysis."  Id.  Summary judgment "shall be 
rendered 
if 
the 
pleadings, 
depositions, 
answers 
to 
No. 2012AP5   
 
12 
 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law."  Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).   
C. The Sufficiency of CED's Original Complaint 
¶24 CED argues that the City issued a single special 
assessment and that under Wisconsin's rules of notice pleading, 
its original complaint placed the City on notice that it 
intended to challenge the entire amount of that assessment.  In 
addition, CED argues that the City's answer to its original 
complaint supports CED's argument because the City's answer 
makes reference to a single special assessment. 
¶25 The City argues that municipalities customarily issue 
two separate special assessments for corner lots and that the 
City "clearly and unambiguously" levied two special assessments 
as indicated by the assessment schedules.  The City further 
contends that CED appealed only the Murdock Avenue special 
assessment because the original complaint references $19,241.73, 
which corresponds to the Murdock Avenue special assessment.  The 
City concedes that the special assessments were procedurally 
invalid because they failed to include "[a]n estimate of the 
entire cost of the proposed work or improvement" as required by 
Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(5)(b) and also lacked any "statement that 
the property against which the assessments are proposed is 
benefited . . ." as required by Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(5)(d).  
¶26 Despite 
these 
procedural 
inadequacies, 
the 
City 
maintains that CED appealed only the Murdock Avenue special 
No. 2012AP5   
 
13 
 
assessment within the 90-day time limit required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0703(12)(a).  Since the City argues that Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0703(12)(a) is the controlling statute, it asks this court 
to conclude that the Jackson Street special assessment appeal 
was untimely. 
¶27 While we agree with the circuit court and the court of 
appeals that the City issued two special assessments as 
indicated by the assessment schedules, we ultimately conclude 
that CED's original complaint gave the City reasonable and 
sufficient notice that it intended to appeal the entire amount 
of special assessments levied against its property.  First, Wis. 
Stat. § 802.02, governing the general rules of pleadings, 
applies to appeals of special assessments under Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0703.  This result is dictated by the text of Wis. Stat.  
§ 801.01(2), which, in part, provides: "Chapters 801 to 847 
govern procedure and practice in circuit courts of this state in 
all civil actions and special proceedings whether cognizable as 
cases at law, in equity or of statutory origin except where 
different procedure is prescribed by statute or rule."  Wis. 
Stat. § 801.01(2) (emphasis added).   
¶28 Special assessment appeals under Wis. Stat. § 66.0703 
are special proceedings.  Mayek v. Cloverleaf Lakes Sanitary 
Dist. No. 1, 2000 WI App 182, ¶5, 238 Wis. 2d 261, 617 N.W.2d 
235 (interpreting Wis. Stat. § 66.60, the predecessor to Wis. 
Stat. § 66.0703); Outagamie Cnty. v. Town of Greenville, 2000 WI 
App 65, ¶7, 233 Wis. 2d 566, 608 N.W.2d 414 (reviewing the 
No. 2012AP5   
 
14 
 
procedures to appeal a special assessment under Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.60(12)(a)). 
¶29  Since the Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure apply to 
special proceedings such as special assessment appeals under 
Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a), we next consider whether any 
conflict exists between rules of notice pleading and Wis. Stat. 
§ 66.0703. 
 
After 
careful 
consideration 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 802.02, 801.01(2), and 802.02(6), along with review of our 
prior case law on notice pleading, we conclude that nothing in 
Wis. Stat. § 66.0703 conflicts with Wisconsin's notice pleading 
rules.  Furthermore, we find no reason why the principles of 
notice 
pleading 
should 
not 
apply 
to 
appeals 
of 
special 
assessments under § 66.0703. 
¶30 Under principles of notice pleading, we are satisfied 
that CED's original complaint was sufficient to challenge the 
entire amount of the special assessments levied against its 
property.  This is because the original complaint placed the 
City on reasonable and sufficient notice that it intended to 
appeal the entirety of the special assessments. 
¶31 First, the original complaint identified the parcel 
number, 15-1898-1000, against which the City levied the special 
assessments.  The property in question is identified by one and 
only one parcel number.  Second, the original complaint 
identified the improvement project for which the special 
assessments were issued as the "Jackson Street – Murdock Avenue 
intersection improvement project."  Not only does the original 
No. 2012AP5   
 
15 
 
complaint identify the name of the improvement project, but the 
project name itself references both street names in question.   
¶32 The fact that CED included only the amount of the 
Murdock Avenue special assessment in its original complaint does 
not defeat CED's intention to appeal the entire amount of the 
special assessments.  By listing the parcel number and the name 
of the improvement project along with a reference to both street 
names, CED's original complaint placed the City on reasonable 
and sufficient notice that it intended to appeal the entire 
amount of special assessments levied against its property.  To 
conclude otherwise would hold CED to the type of technical 
pleading requirements that we have held no longer apply under 
our rules of civil procedure.   
¶33 Having 
concluded 
that 
CED's 
original 
complaint 
properly appealed both the Murdock Avenue and Jackson Street 
special assessments, we also conclude that CED's appeal was 
timely and that summary judgment in favor of CED is appropriate.  
In its original complaint, CED asserted that the City failed to 
comply with Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(5) when issuing the special 
assessments in question.  As we have previously discussed, the 
City 
conceded 
that 
it 
did 
not 
comply 
with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 66.0703(5).  Due to the City's failure to comply with Wis. 
Stat. § 66.0703(5) in regard to both the Murdock Avenue and the 
Jackson Street special assessments and CED's timely appeal of 
both special assessments, we conclude that no genuine issues of 
material fact remain, and this case is appropriate to resolve, 
No. 2012AP5   
 
16 
 
in favor of CED, on summary judgment, based on the legal issue 
presented.  
¶34 Because 
we 
hold 
that 
CED's 
original 
complaint 
contained sufficient information to place the City on reasonable 
notice of CED's intent to appeal the total amount of special 
assessments, 
we 
do 
not 
reach 
CED's 
alternative 
argument 
regarding the application of Wisconsin's relation back statute 
to special assessment appeals.       
         
III. Conclusion 
¶35 We agree with CED's first argument and hold that its 
original complaint was sufficient to appeal not only the Murdock 
Avenue special assessment, but the Jackson Street special 
assessment as well.  Wisconsin long abandoned rigid pleading 
requirements in favor of liberal civil procedural rules.  Notice 
pleading rules not only simplify pleading in Wisconsin, but also 
favor the resolution of claims on the merits.  CED filed its 
original complaint within the 90-day time period required by 
Wis. Stat. § 66.0703(12)(a).  The original complaint included 
the parcel number, 15-1898-1000, which is the only parcel number 
assigned to the property in question.  Furthermore, the original 
complaint included reference to the "Jackson Street – Murdock 
Avenue intersection improvement project," which formed the basis 
for the special assessments levied by the City.  The alleged 
problem with the complaint was that it included only the 
monetary value, $19,241.73 which corresponds with the Murdock 
Avenue special assessment.  That the complaint failed to 
identify an additional $19,404.93 for the Jackson Street special 
No. 2012AP5   
 
17 
 
assessment is not detrimental to CED's appeal of both special 
assessments.  The parcel number and the reference to both street 
names when identifying the project for which the special 
assessments were levied placed the City on notice that CED 
intended to appeal the total amount of special assessments 
levied against its property.  This notice to the City was 
reasonable and sufficient and, therefore, is all that is 
required 
under 
Wisconsin's 
rules 
of 
notice 
pleadings.  
Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed 
and 
cause 
remanded 
to 
the 
circuit 
court 
with 
instructions 
to 
enter 
summary 
judgment 
in 
favor 
of 
CED 
Properties, LLC in regard to the Jackson Street special 
assessment. 
No. 2012AP5   
 
 
 
1