Case Title: State v. Crystal Harrell

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1994AP001655-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1996-03-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
 
 
 
No.  94-1655-CR 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN             :                IN SUPREME COURT 
                                                                   
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
v. 
 
Crystal Harrell a/k/a Crystal Parker, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
FILED 
 
 
MAR 28 1996 
 
 
 Marilyn L. Graves 
  Clerk of Supreme Court 
  
Madison, WI  
                                                                 
  
 
 
 
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court for 
Dane County, Robert A. DeChambeau, Judge.    Affirmed. 
 
DONALD W. STEINMETZ, J.   The issue before us is whether, in 
a case tried by the district attorney's office, a circuit court 
judge, whose spouse is an assistant district attorney in the same 
county, is required to disqualify himself or herself under either 
Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(a) (1993-94),
1--prohibiting a judge from 
                     
     
1  Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(a) (1993-94) provides as follows:   
 
(2) Any judge shall disqualify himself or herself from 
any civil or criminal action or proceeding when one of 
the following situations occurs: 
 
(a)  When a judge is related to any party or counsel 
thereto or their spouses within the 3rd degree of 
kinship. 
 
 
 
 
All future reference to Wisconsin Statutes will be to 
the 1993-94 version.   
 
No. 94-1655-CR 
 
 
 
2 
hearing a case when a close relative is "counsel thereto" for 
either party--or Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g),
2--prohibiting a judge 
from hearing a case when the judge determines he or she cannot 
retain his or her impartiality.  We hold that neither Wis. Stat. § 
757.19(2)(a) nor Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g) requires a judge to 
disqualify himself or herself in such a situation as long as his 
or her spouse did not participate in, or help prepare, the case. 
 
Crystal Parker (a/k/a Crystal Harrell) was charged with two 
counts of retail theft in violation of Wis. Stat. § 943.50(1m) and 
(4)(a).
3  Since Parker was on parole for a 1991 felony retail 
theft conviction in Dane County, she was charged as a repeat 
                     
     
2  Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g) provides as follows:   
 
 
(2) Any judge shall disqualify himself or herself from 
any civil or criminal action or proceeding when one of 
the following situations occurs: 
 
 
. . . . 
 
(g)  When a judge determines that, for any reason, he or 
she cannot, or it appears he or she cannot, act in an 
impartial manner. 
     
3  Wis. Stat. § 943.50(1m) and (4)(a) provide as follows:   
 
 
(1m) Whoever intentionally alters indicia of price or 
value of merchandise or who takes and carries away, 
transfers, conceals or retains possession of merchandise 
held for resale by a merchant or property of the 
merchant without his or her consent and with intent to 
deprive the merchant permanently of possession, or the 
full purchase price, of the merchandise may be penalized 
as provided in sub. (4). 
 
. . . . 
 
 
(4) Whoever violates this section is guilty of: 
 
(a)  A Class A misdemeanor, if the value of the 
merchandise does not exceed $1,000. 
 
No. 94-1655-CR 
 
 
 
3 
offender under Wis. Stat. § 939.62(1)(a).
4  She entered a plea of 
no contest to count 1 and guilty to count 2 of the complaint in 
Dane County Circuit Court, Judge Robert A. DeChambeau.  
 
Parker then moved to vacate the conviction and disqualify the 
judge based on Judge DeChambeau's marriage to Gretchen Hayward, an 
Assistant District Attorney in the Dane County District Attorney's 
office.  Judge DeChambeau denied Parker's motion for relief 
without a hearing and Parker appealed.  The court of appeals 
certified the appeal to this court pursuant to Wis. Stat. 
§ 809.61.     
 
Wisconsin Statutes § 757.19(2) provides seven situations 
where it is mandatory that judges disqualify themselves from a 
case.  In State v. American TV & Appliance, 151 Wis. 2d 175, 182, 
443 N.W.2d 662 (1989), we found that this subsection contains six 
fact-specific situations, the existence of which can be determined 
objectively, and one general subjective situation which is based 
solely upon the judge's state of mind.  As to the objective 
situations, "the very existence of [such a] relationship creates a 
                     
     
4  Wis. Stat. § 939.62(1)(a) provides as follows:   
 
 
939.62 Increased penalty for habitual criminality.  (1) 
If the actor is a repeater, as that term is defined in 
sub. (2), and the present conviction is for any crime 
for which imprisonment may be imposed (except for an 
escape under s. 946.42 or a failure to report under s. 
946.425) the maximum term of imprisonment prescribed by 
law for that crime may be increased as follows: 
 
(a)  A maximum term of one year or less may be increased 
to not more than 3 years. 
 
No. 94-1655-CR 
 
 
 
4 
disqualification by law."  Id.  Whether the general subjective 
situation exists and requires disqualification, however, is based 
upon the judge's own determination of whether he or she may remain 
impartial.  See id.  Parker challenges Judge DeChambeau's decision 
on both grounds:  she asserts that his spouse's position violated 
one of the objective situations and that it should not have been 
possible for him to have subjectively determined that he could 
remain impartial. 
 
In order to determine the merit of Parker's claims, this 
court must interpret both Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(a) and (2)(g).  
Statutory interpretation is a question of law which we review de 
novo.  See Rolo v. Goers, 174 Wis. 2d 709, 715, 497 N.W.2d 724, 
726 (1993).  The ultimate goal of statutory interpretation is to 
ascertain the intent of the legislature.  See id.  The first step 
of this process is to look at the language of the statute itself. 
 See In Interest of Jamie L., 172 Wis. 2d 218, 225, 493 N.W.2d 56, 
59 (1992).  If the statute is ambiguous, this court must look 
beyond the statute's language and examine the scope, history, 
context, subject matter and purpose of the statute.  See Rolo, 174 
Wis. 2d at 715.  
 
Parker's first argument is based upon one of the objective 
situations, 
specifically, 
disqualification 
based 
upon 
consanguinity.  See Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(a).  Subsection 2(a) 
requires disqualification when "a judge is related to any party or 
counsel thereto . . . within the 3rd degree of kinship."  Id.   
 
No. 94-1655-CR 
 
 
 
5 
Parker asserts that the language "counsel thereto" must include 
any member of the law firm representing a party to the suit.  In 
the context of a government prosecutor, Parker's interpretation 
would include all members of the government office which was 
trying the case. 
 
Parker's reading of the statute, however, is too broad.  The 
only practical interpretation of the language "counsel thereto" as 
it applies to government attorneys is to restrict its scope to 
only the attorney of record and any other attorneys who appear or 
participate in the case.
5  It certainly does not include every 
government attorney who happens to be employed in the same county 
office or governmental department.   
 
Although 
the 
language 
"counsel 
thereto" 
is 
clearly 
ambiguous,
6 and the legislative history not particularly helpful,
7 
                     
     
5  We do not reach the question in this case of whether a 
similar interpretation would be appropriate if Judge DeChambeau's 
spouse was a partner in a private law firm that represented one of 
the parties. 
     
6 It is undisputed by either party that the language is 
ambiguous and that reference to external sources is necessary to 
determine the statute's proper interpretation. 
     
7  Although the legislative history does not speak directly 
to this question, it certainly does not evidence any intention by 
the legislature to define the term "counsel thereto" as broadly as 
suggested by Parker.  In 1951, the precursor to Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.19(2)(a) was codified, with the emphasized language being 
added by a Supreme Court Rule, as:   
 
Sec. (Rule) 256.21.  Judge not to have Partner or be 
Interested in Costs . . . Whenever the judge of any 
court is related within the third degree of kinship to 
any attorney or agent of his spouse appearing for one of 
the litigants in any matter, he shall disqualify himself 
from acting in any such matter, and a qualified judge 
 
No. 94-1655-CR 
 
 
 
6 
there is significant persuasive authority which supports this 
position.
8   First, the commentary to Canon 3E(1)(d)(ii) (1990)
9 of 
the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, which contains similar, 
though not identical, language states, "[t]he fact that a lawyer 
in a proceeding is affiliated with a law firm with which a 
relative of the judge is affiliated does not of itself disqualify 
(..continued) 
shall be called, in such manner as provided by statute 
upon the filing of an affidavit of prejudice. 
Wis. Stat. § 256.21 (1950-51) (italics omitted, emphasis added).  
In 1977, the legislature repealed this provision and recreated it 
at Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(a) in its present form.  See Laws of 
1977, ch. 135 § § 8, 9; Laws of 1977, ch. 187, sec. 96. 
 
During the 1977 redraft, the phrase "appearing for one of the 
litigants in any matter" was removed.  However, there is no 
indication that the legislature sought through this deletion to 
broaden the meaning of "attorney" or "counsel" to include 
attorneys other than those actually participating in the matter.  
     
8 It is true that there is a split in the authorities.  
Parker sets forth in her brief a number of ethics opinions and at 
least one legal decision which support her position.  However, 
this court is not bound by opinions of foreign courts and is 
certainly not bound by the advisory ethics opinions of other 
states.  After carefully considering the arguments presented by 
all of the authorities, we are persuaded that those cited and 
discussed in the body of this opinion reach the sounder and more 
practical result. 
     
9  ABA Canon 3E(1)(d)(ii) (1990) Model Code:   
 
 
E. Disqualification.   
 
(1) a judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a 
proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to 
instances where:   
 
. . . . 
 
(d) the judge or the judge's spouse, or a person within 
the third degree of relationship to either of them, or 
the spouse of such a person;  
 
. . . . 
 
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding.   
 
 
No. 94-1655-CR 
 
 
 
7 
the judge."  ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3E(1)(d)(ii) 
cmt. (1990).  The State Bar of Wisconsin has endorsed this reading 
of the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct concluding that "when a 
relative's associate appears as counsel the judge may not have to 
disqualify him/herself."  State Bar of Wisconsin Standing Comm. on 
Professional Ethics, Memorandum Opinion 12/76-A (1990) (emphasis 
added).   
 
Second, at least one state court has come to the same 
conclusion.  The Michigan Court of Appeals interpreted a similar 
statute, 
which 
required 
disqualification 
if 
there 
was 
a 
relationship between the judge and "any of the attorneys or 
counselors for any party," to only include "the prosecuting 
attorney [who] appears personally . . . ."  People v. Dycus, 246 
N.W.2d 326, 327 (Mich. App. 1976).  The court specifically found 
that the fact that a judge was related to an attorney who worked 
in the prosecutor's office in no way raised any "taint, or 
suspected taint, of bias or prejudice" in the judge in question.  
Id.  
 
Finally, the special characteristics of government attorneys 
make it unlikely that a judge's relationship with one would affect 
his or her impartiality.  For example, a member of a government 
prosecutor's office does not have the same type of interest in the 
outcome of a trial as does a member of a private law firm.  See 
Advisory Committee on Judicial Activities for the Judicial 
Conference of the United States, Advisory Op. 38, II-104 (1974).  
 
No. 94-1655-CR 
 
 
 
8 
The prosecutor has no financial interest in the outcome of the 
case and any reputational interest "without the financial 
interest, is not enough to create [even] an appearance of 
partiality [in the judge]."  State v. Logan, 689 P.2d 778, 785 
(Kan. 1984).  The thought that a judge would have an increased 
propensity to convict criminals because of such a relationship is 
equally "preposterous."  People v. Moffat, 560 N.E.2d 352, 361 
(Ill. App. 1990).  Furthermore, a government prosecutor's sole 
goal is not simply to convict criminals.  Discussing the United 
States Attorney's office, the United States Supreme Court stated 
that: 
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an 
ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty 
whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling 
as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, 
therefore, in criminal prosecution is not that it shall 
win a case, but that justice shall be done. 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).  Government 
prosecutors in this state hold true to similar ideals.  See O'Neil 
v. State, 189 Wis. 259, 261, 207 N.W.2d 280 (1926) ("A prosecutor 
should not act as a partisan eager to convict, but as an officer 
of the court, whose duty it is to aid in arriving in the truth in 
every case . . . .").      
  
It is clear from the record that Judge DeChambeau's spouse 
neither actually appeared in this case nor involved herself in its 
preparation.  In fact, according to court records, Attorney 
Gretchen Hayward has never appeared in court before Judge 
 
No. 94-1655-CR 
 
 
 
9 
DeChambeau.  As such, their relationship does not fall within the 
scope of Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(a).  
 
Parker's second argument is based upon the subjective portion 
of the judicial disqualification statute.  Wisconsin Statutes 
§ 757.19(2)(g) requires disqualification when a judge determines 
that he or she cannot, or that it appears that he or she cannot, 
act impartially in a case.  In American TV we stated that 
subsection (2)(g) concerns "not what exists in the external world 
. . . but what exists in the judge's mind."  American TV, 151 
Wis. 2d at 182-83.  We explained:   
 
Section 
757.19(2)(g), 
Stats., 
mandates 
a 
judge's 
disqualification 
only 
when 
that 
judge 
makes 
a 
determination that, in fact or in appearance, he or she 
cannot act in an impartial manner.  It does not require 
disqualification in a situation where one other than the 
judge objectively believes there is an appearance that 
the judge is unable to act in an impartial manner; 
neither does it require disqualification . . . in a 
situation in which the judge's impartiality 'can  
reasonably be questioned' by someone other than the 
judge.' 
 
Id. at 183.  Appellate review of this subjective determination is 
"limited to establishing whether the judge made a determination 
requiring disqualification."  Id. at 186.  See also City of 
Edgerton v. General Cas. Co., 190 Wis. 2d 510, 521-22, 527 N.W.2d 
305 (1995); Disciplinary Proc. Against Crosetto, 160 Wis. 2d 581, 
584, 466 N.W.2d 879 (1991).  The reviewing court must objectively 
decide if the judge went through the required exercise of making a 
subjective determination.   
 
No. 94-1655-CR 
 
 
 
10 
 
We find that Judge DeChambeau clearly made a subjective  
determination regarding his ability to proceed in the case.  He 
stated on the record: 
Gretchen Hayward made no appearance on behalf of the State in 
the present case.  Indeed, she has never appeared on 
behalf of the State before this court.  Accordingly, the 
court finds that there is no reason to believe, nor is 
there an appearance of a reason to believe, that this 
court could not act, or did not act, in an impartial 
manner. 
Obviously, he felt that he could be impartial in light of his 
wife's nonparticipation in the case.  This is all that is required 
by Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g).  
 
Although Parker encourages us to provide an objective 
standard of review for the initial subjective decision by a judge 
not to disqualify himself or herself, we decline to do so.  
Wisconsin Statute § 757.19(2)(g) is clearly drafted so as to place 
the determination of partiality solely upon the judge.  See 
American TV, 151 Wis. 2d at 182-83.  In fact, the legislature 
specifically 
included 
six 
other 
objectively 
determinable 
situations in subsection (2) which require withdrawal.  These are 
the six situations on which it chose to focus.  It is not this 
court's role under subsection (2)(g) to expand this list by 
requiring a judge to recuse himself or herself in all situations 
where an objective basis of impropriety may exist.  If the general 
prohbition in (2)(g) were read so broadly, the six specific 
situations enumerated in the statute would become superfluous. 
 
No. 94-1655-CR 
 
 
 
11 
 
In sum, Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g) leaves the responsibility 
of withdrawal to the integrity of the individual judge or justice. 
 To imply that the judges or justices of this state are not able 
to make such a determination honestly, openly and fairly is a 
great disservice to the quality men and women who serve this state 
in a judicial capacity.  
 
 
By the Court.—The judgment and order of the Dane County 
Circuit Court are affirmed.   
 
No. 94-1655-SSA 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J. (concurring).   I agree with the 
majority opinion's conclusion that the circuit court judge in this 
case was not required to disqualify himself under Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.19(2)(a) (1993-94).  I also agree with the majority 
opinion's conclusion that the circuit court judge made the 
requisite subjective determination regarding his ability to 
proceed with the case pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g).
10   
 
But the court's analysis should not stop there, any more than 
does Wisconsin's judicial disqualification statute.  As I read it, 
Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g) also requires an objective assessment of 
whether or not it appears that a challenged judge can act in an 
impartial manner.  The objective test prescribed by § 757.19(2)(g) 
requires a reviewing court to assess whether a reasonable, well-
informed observer familiar with judicial ethical standards, the 
                     
     
10  Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2) provides:  
 
Any judge shall disqualify himself or herself from any civil 
or criminal action or proceeding when one of the 
following situations occurs:  
 
(a) When a judge is related to any party or counsel thereto 
or their spouses within the 3rd degree of kinship. 
 
. . . . 
 
(g) When a judge determines that, for any reason, he or she 
cannot, or it appears he or she cannot, act in an 
impartial manner. 
 
 
All future statutory references are to the 1993-94 volume of 
the Wisconsin Statutes.  
 
No. 94-1655-SSA 
 
 
 
2 
judicial system, and the facts and circumstances of the case would 
harbor reasonable doubts about a judge's ability to be impartial 
under the circumstances.   
 
While an assessment of whether a judge appears partial might 
initially seem to be open-ended, this objective test, properly 
understood and applied, does not give litigants license to ferret 
out anything which might appear suspicious and use it as a basis 
for demanding a judge's disqualification.  Instead the objective 
test commands that a reviewing court make a reasonable assessment 
of the risk that a judge, despite the very best of intentions, 
might not be capable of holding "the balance nice, clear and true" 
under the facts and circumstances.  Aetna Life Ins. v. LaVoie, 475 
U.S. 813, 825 (1986) (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 
(1927)).  
 
My conclusion that Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g) incorporates an 
objective test rests on four grounds.  First, notwithstanding the 
majority opinion's conclusory assertion that the statute is 
"clearly drafted so as to place the determination of partiality 
solely upon the judge," Majority op. at 10, the plain language of 
the statute demonstrates that the legislature intended to 
promulgate an objective test.  By its plain language and 
grammatical 
structure, 
the 
statute 
requires 
a 
judge's 
disqualification either when a judge determines or when it appears 
that he or she cannot act in an impartial manner. 
 
No. 94-1655-SSA 
 
 
 
3 
 
Second, the court's own precedent requires an objective test. 
When the court first had occasion to interpret Wis. Stat. 
§ 757.19(2)(g), it made clear that the statute required an 
objective as well as a subjective test.  State v. Walberg, 109 
Wis. 2d 96, 325 N.W.2d 687 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 766 
F.2d 1071 (1985).  In determining whether a judgment of the court 
should be vacated on the grounds of judicial disqualification, the 
Walberg court examined the Wisconsin Code of Judicial Ethics, SCR 
60.01(3),
11 as well as Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g).  The court 
concluded that both the Code and the statute required "[a] 
subjective test based on the judge's own determination of his or 
her 
impartiality 
and 
an 
objective 
test 
based 
on 
whether 
impartiality can reasonably be questioned."  Walberg, 109 Wis. 2d 
at 106; see id. at 106 n.13.
12  
 
In the subsequent case of State v. American TV & Appliance, 
151 Wis. 2d 175, 182, 443 N.W.2d 662 (1989), the court mistakenly 
failed to follow the precedent it had established in Walberg and 
thereby failed to abide by the doctrine of stare decisis.  The 
                     
     
11  SCR 60.01(3) provides, in pertinent part, that "[a] judge 
should administer the law free of partiality and the appearance of 
partiality." 
     
12  The court drew support for its position from its prior 
decision in State v. Asfoor, 75 Wis. 2d 411, 436, 249 N.W.2d 529 
(1977), in which the court had determined that the Code of 
Judicial Ethics required a judge to recuse himself or herself 
whenever "there was any appearance of impartiality." 
 
No. 94-1655-SSA 
 
 
 
4 
doctrine of stare decisis requires courts to "'stand by things 
decided'" and is "fundamental to 'a society governed by the rule 
of law' . . . . A court's decision to depart from precedent is not 
to be made casually.  It must be explained carefully and fully to 
insure that the court is not acting in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner."  State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 441-42, 511 N.W.2d 
591 (1994), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2245 (1995) (Abrahamson, J., 
concurring) (citation omitted).  Changing the law is justified 
only when "precedent has become detrimental to coherence and 
consistency in the law."  Id. at 442.   
 
Without explanation, the American TV court stated that "[t]he 
Code of Judicial Ethics governs the ethical conduct of judges; it 
has no effect on their legal qualification or disqualification to 
act and a judge may be disciplined for conduct that would not have 
required disqualification under sec. 757.19, Stats."  American TV, 
151 Wis. 2d at 185.
13  But while the American TV court declined to 
                     
     
13  The American TV court tried to circumvent the Walberg 
court's 
explicit 
conclusion 
that 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 757.19(2)(g) 
required both an objective and subjective test by claiming that 
Walberg was relying on the Code of Judicial Ethics rather than the 
statute.  American TV, 151 Wis. 2d at 185.  Even assuming arguendo 
that this assessment of the Walberg decision is correct, it is 
immaterial.  The Walberg court stated explicitly that an objective 
test was required under Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g).  As the court 
has previously stated, "when a court of last resort intentionally 
takes up, discusses, and decides a question germane to, though not 
necessarily decisive of, the controversy, such decision is not a 
dictum but is a judicial act of the court which it will thereafter 
recognize as a binding decision."  State v. Kruse, 101 Wis. 2d 
387, 392, 305 N.W.2d 85 (1981) (quoting Chase v. American Cartage, 
176 Wis. 235, 238, 186 N.W. 598 (1922)). 
 
No. 94-1655-SSA 
 
 
 
5 
explain its departure from precedent, there is ample reason to 
depart from American TV.  By eliminating the objective standard 
from Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g) while reaffirming the importance of 
that standard in Wisconsin's Code of Judicial Ethics, American TV 
created an unnecessary conflict between how judges' appearance of 
partiality 
should 
be 
assessed, 
respectively, 
under 
the 
disqualification statute and the Code.  As the court of appeals 
observed shortly after American TV was decided, the "supreme court 
has decided that even when a judge commits ethical violations by 
presiding over a case, his actions do not constitute grounds for 
recusal."  State v. Carivou, 154 Wis. 2d 641, 644, 454 N.W.2d 562 
(Ct. App. 1990).  
 
Third, a judge's subjective assessment of whether he or she 
should be disqualified is not subject to meaningful appellate 
review.  The majority opinion acknowledges that review of a 
judge's subjective determination is "limited to establishing 
whether 
the 
judge 
made 
a 
determination 
requiring 
disqualification."  Majority op. at 9, (quoting American TV, 151 
Wis. 2d at 186).  Under this standard a reviewing court has little 
choice but to confer its imprimatur on a challenged judge's 
decision to hear a case.
14 
                     
     
14  See Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the 
Federal Courts, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 736, 741 (1973), which criticized 
a similarly subjective standard in an earlier version of the 
federal disqualification statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970), noting 
that "[r]eviewing courts can of course be of little assistance in 
 
No. 94-1655-SSA 
 
 
 
6 
 
Fourth, an objective test promotes confidence in the 
integrity of the judicial system.  As the Committee on the 
Judiciary of the United States House of Representatives stated in 
explaining the 1974 revisions to the federal disqualification 
statute, the addition of an objective standard was "designed to 
promote public confidence in the impartiality of the judicial 
process by saying, in effect, if there is a reasonable factual 
basis for doubting the judge's impartiality, he should disqualify 
himself and let another judge preside over the case."
15   
(..continued) 
either defining the elements of impropriety or enforcing any such 
standards once formulated, since the statute requires a judge to 
avoid participation only when it is improper 'in his opinion.'"   
 
 
Congress amended the statute in 1974 so that it would conform 
to revisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct enacted in 1972.  One 
of those revisions, incorporating Canon 3C of the revised Code, 
requires a judge's disqualification in any proceeding in which a 
judge's "impartiality might reasonably be questioned."  Compare 28 
U.S.C. § 455 (1970) with 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1993).  See also H.R. 
Rep. No. 1453, 93d. Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3 (1974) (discussing P.L. 
93-512, which revised 28 U.S.C. § 455); Karen Nelson Moore, 
Appellate Review of Judicial Disqualification Decisions in the 
Federal Courts, 35 Hastings L.J. 829, 832-35 (1984) (discussing 
legislative history of 28 U.S.C. § 455); Note, Disqualification of 
Federal Judges, supra, at 238-42, 246-59 (discussing legislative 
history of 28 U.S.C. § 455).  
     
15  H.R. Rep. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pt.3, at 6355 
(1974).  Members of the subcommittee of the Judicial Council 
charged 
with 
the 
revision 
of 
Wisconsin's 
disqualification 
procedures which resulted in Wis. Stat. § 757.19 were mailed a 
copy of the law amending 28 U.S.C. § 455 in July 1975.  The text 
of what is now Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g) was approved at the 
Judicial Council meeting on December 19, 1975.  See Minutes of the 
Judicial Council meeting of 12/19/75 at 4; Letter from Judicial 
Council executive secretary Richard R. Malmgren to members of the 
New Civil Rules Committee of 7/18/75.  Hence the drafters of Wis. 
Stat. § 757.19(2)(g) were aware that an objective test had 
 
No. 94-1655-SSA 
 
 
 
7 
 
Promoting "a government of law and not of men," SCR 60.01(1), 
Wisconsin's Code of Judicial Ethics requires that judges place the 
duty to be impartial "above all" other duties.  SCR 60.01(3).  
Because the duty of impartiality is paramount, "the Code measures 
judicial conduct by an objective standard . . . in the provision 
that a judge should administer the law free of 'the appearance of 
partiality,'" American TV, 151 Wis. 2d at 185.   
 
Finally, I conclude that apart from Wis. Stat. § 757.19 and 
the Wisconsin Code of Judicial Ethics, an objective test is 
required by the due process guarantees of the federal and state 
constitutions.  The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly 
made clear that the due process guarantees inscribed in the 
federal Constitution require application of an objective test to 
determine whether a judge should have been disqualified from 
hearing a case.  The Court has stated that "[t]he Due Process 
Clause may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias 
and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice 
equally between contending parties.  But to perform its high 
function in the best way, justice must satisfy the appearance of 
justice."  LaVoie, 475 U.S. at 825 (1986) (quoting In re 
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
16 
(..continued) 
recently 
been 
incorporated 
in 
the 
federal 
disqualification 
statute, bolstering the inference that Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(g) 
also requires an objective test. 
     
16  As the LaVoie Court observed, not all matters that might 
 
No. 94-1655-SSA 
 
 
 
8 
 
Because I believe that a reasonable, well-informed observer 
of the judicial system would conclude that the circuit court judge 
in this case was not partial and that there was no appearance of 
partiality, I concur in the decision reached by the majority.  But 
because I also believe that Wisconsin's disqualification statute, 
the Code of Judicial Ethics, prior decisions of this court, 
federal constitutional law and the integrity of the judicial 
system require the application of an objective test, I would have 
arrived at that decision differently.  I agree with Chief Justice 
Rehnquist that "just as Clemenceau counseled that war was too 
(..continued) 
require judicial disqualification under federal or state statutory 
standards would necessarily give rise to constitutional questions 
warranting disqualification under the due process clause.  LaVoie, 
475 U.S. at 820; see also Walberg, 109 Wis. 2d 96, 111 & n.19 
(distinguishing appearances of partiality sufficient to warrant 
disqualification under, respectively, a statutory provision and a 
constitutional provision); Note, Disqualification of Federal 
Judges for Bias or Prejudice, 46 U. Chi. L. Rev. (1978) 236, 237 
n.6 (federal constitutional standard for judicial disqualification 
not well defined by federal courts because federal statutes 
establish a more stringent standard than the Constitution 
demands).  
 
No. 94-1655-SSA 
 
 
 
9 
important a matter to be left to the generals, so judicial 
disqualification is too important a matter to be left entirely to 
the judges."
17  
                     
     
17  William H. Rehnquist, Sense and Nonsense About Judicial 
Ethics, 28 Rec. Ass'n of the Bar, N.Y.C., 694, 695-96 (1973). 
 
No. 94-1655-AWB 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.  (concurring).   I agree with the 
majority opinion's conclusion that § 757.19(2)(g) involves a 
subjective test and that the circuit court judge in this case made 
the requisite determination that he could remain impartial.  The 
subjective nature of § 757.19(2)(g) was decided by this court in 
State v. American TV & Appliance, 151 Wis. 2d 175, 182, 443 N.W.2d 
662 (1989).  This court should not abandon such precedent without 
strong 
justification, 
because 
adherence 
to 
precedent 
is 
fundamental to "a society governed by the rule of law."  City of 
Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 
420 (1983). 
 
The Supreme Court has recognized certain factors which may 
provide significant justification for departure from precedent,  
including:  (1) the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in 
defying practical workability; (2) the rule is subject to a kind 
of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences 
of overruling; (3) related principles of law have changed or 
developed such that the rationale behind the old law has been 
undermined; (4) facts have changed, or come to be seen so 
differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant 
application or justification.  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992)(joint opinion 
of O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)(citations omitted).   We 
 
No. 94-1655-AWB 
 
 
 
2 
have not been presented with any of these justifications in the 
intervening years since American TV was decided. 
 
  
Therefore, I acknowledge that review under § 757.19(2) 
is "limited to establishing whether the judge made a determination 
requiring disqualification."  American TV, 151 Wis. 2d at 186.  
However, I write separately to emphasize that due process requires 
that every person has a right to a fair trial by an impartial and 
unbiased judge.  State v. Walberg, 109 Wis. 2d 96, 105, 325 N.W.2d 
687 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 766 F.2d 1071 (1985).  I agree 
with Justice Abrahamson that § 757.19(2)(g) does not foreclose 
consideration of this fundamental due process right.  Aetna Life 
Ins. v. LaVoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986).  However, as the Aetna 
court recognized, only in the most extreme cases does the Due 
Process Clause require disqualification for general allegations of 
bias.  Aetna, 475 U.S. at 821.  I concur, that judged by this 
standard, there is no due process violation in this case.   
 
I am authorized to state that Justice JANINE P. GESKE joins 
this opinion. 
 
No. 94-1655-AWB 
 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
                                                              
 
Case No.: 
 
94-1655-CR 
                                                              
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 
 
 
v. 
 
 
 
Crystal Harrell a/k/a Crystal Parker, 
 
 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
______________________________ 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
                                                              
 
Opinion Filed:  
March 28, 1996 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
January 11, 1996 
 
                                                              
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Dane 
 
JUDGE: 
ROBERT DE CHAMBEAU 
 
                                                              
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
Concurred: 
ABRAHAMSON, J., concurs (opinion filed) 
 
 
 
BRADLEY, J., concurring (opinion filed) 
 
 
 
 
GESKE, J., joins opinion 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating: 
 
                                                              
 
ATTORNEYS:  
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs and 
oral argument by David D. Cook, Argyle. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued by James M. 
Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
James E. Doyle, attorney general.