Case Title: Wagner v. J & B Contractors, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: 300, 2021

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2022-06-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
STEPHANI BALLARD WAGNER; 
JAMES AND LINDA 
FRIEDRICHSEN; CARL 
GOLDSTEIN & JUDITH ANNE 
HOUGH-GOLDSTEIN; JOHN AND 
CELIA HUBER; and JAMES RENE 
KANICKY & ELKE ANJA 
MICHALAK, 
 
Petitioners Below, 
Appellants, 
 
v. 
 
J & B CONTRACTORS, LLC; NEW 
CASTLE COUNTY, Department of 
Land Use; and NEW CASTLE 
COUNTY BOARD OF 
ADJUSTMENT,  
 
Respondents Below,  
Appellees. 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
 
 
No.  300, 2021 
 
Court Below:  Superior Court  
of the State of Delaware 
 
C.A. No. N19A-09-003  
 
Submitted:  April 20, 2022 
Decided:  June 15, 2022 
 
Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; VALIHURA, and VAUGHN, Justices.  
O R D E R 
On this 15th day of June 2022, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the 
record on appeal, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The Appellee, J & B Contractors, LLC (“J & B”), petitioned the New 
Castle County Board of Adjustment (the “Board”) for variances that would allow it 
to divide a 1.48-acre parcel into two lots and build a single-family dwelling on each 
2 
 
lot.  The minimum lot size for a single-family dwelling at the property’s location is 
0.5 acre.  However, J & B could not count all of the 1.48 acres toward the minimum 
lot size for the two lots.  The 1.48 acres first had to be reduced by 0.16 acre that lies 
within a Delaware Department of Transportation right-of-way for road purposes, 
leaving 1.32 acres for the two lots.  J & B proposed to divide the remaining 1.32 
acres into a 0.6-acre lot (Lot 1) and a 0.72-acre lot (Lot 2).  A further reduction in 
the calculation of minimum lot size was required, however, because the property sits 
in a “Water Resource Protected Area” (“WRPA”) known as the Cockeysville 
Formation Drainage Area (the “CFDA”).  The CFDA is a large water table in 
northwestern New Castle County that drains to grounds underlain by the 
Cockeysville Formation.  To preserve the County’s water resources, development 
within the CFDA triggers several open space requirements:  1) any “disturbances” 
to land within the CFDA may not exceed 50% of the total lot area and 2) the amount 
of impervious coverage (the total horizontal area of all buildings and paved surfaces) 
is limited to 20%.1  The New Castle County Unified Development Code (the 
“UDC”) requires that lot area be calculated by excluding the preserved space from 
the total lot area.2  When the CFDA requirements were factored into the calculation 
of minimum lot size, Lot 1 was left with a lot size of only 0.10 acre and Lot 2 was 
 
1 Opening Br. Ex. B at 2 [hereinafter Bd. of Adjustment Op.]; Opening Br. Ex. C at UDC § 
40.01.100 [hereinafter UDC]. 
2 UDC § 40.04.110(D). 
3 
 
left with 0.22 acre.  As a result, J & B needed variances from the 0.5-acre minimum 
lot size requirement for each lot.  After a hearing, the Board voted unanimously to 
approve the variances.   
(2) 
The Appellants are neighboring or nearby property owners who have 
opposed J & B’s request for variances.  After the Board approved the variance 
requests, the Appellants filed a Petition for Review by Writ of Certiorari in the 
Superior Court.    The Superior Court affirmed the Board’s decision.  On appeal to 
this Court, the Appellants make two claims.  The first claim has a number of 
subparts.  The Appellants first argue that the Board erred by failing to find that the 
variances were not “contrary to the public interest,”3 a finding, they assert, that is 
required by the UDC.  They also argue that the Board erred by failing to find that 
the variance requests were “owing to special conditions or exceptional situations,”4 
a finding they also assert is required by the UDC.  They further argue that the Board 
erred by calculating lot area in an arbitrary manner, in gross derogation of the plain 
language of the UDC, for the sole purpose of approving the variance requests.  
Finally, as part of their first claim, they argue that the Board erred by considering 
the variance requests under the “exceptional practical difficulties” legal standard for 
 
3 Opening Br. at 13. 
4 Id. at 15. 
4 
 
“area” variances, rather than the more stringent standard of “unnecessary hardship” 
for “use” variances.5   
(3) 
As their second claim, the Appellant’s argue that even if the area 
variance standard is the correct standard to apply to consideration of the requested 
variances, the Board erred by failing to make findings that the UDC created 
“exceptional practical difficulties” for J & B’s use of the property.  They argue that 
the evidence would not support such a finding, if such a finding had been made.   For 
the reasons that follow, we have concluded that the Superior Court’s judgment 
should be affirmed. 
(4) 
The property in dispute is at the intersection of Sharpless Road and 
Melson Way in Hockessin, Delaware.  At the Board’s hearing on the variance 
requests, an issue was raised as to whether J & B was requesting area variances or 
use variances.  The Board concluded that J & B was requesting area variances 
because its proposed use of the premises was residential, which was a permitted use, 
and it was seeking only variances from dimensional requirements.  The Board 
accordingly rejected the Appellants’ argument that the standard for a use variance 
applied.  In approving the variances, the Board noted the following factors:  each of 
the proposed lots, inclusive of the protected resources, was larger than the required 
minimum lot size in that residential zone and larger than the lots across Melson Way; 
 
5 Id. at 20-34. 
5 
 
each lot met the UDC’s limitations on impervious cover and disturbance; there was 
no increased traffic burden on Melson Way; and denial of the variances would 
prevent J & B from making normal improvements to its lands. 
(5) 
In the Superior Court, the Appellants raised three issues: 1) the Board 
erred when using the legal standard for an area variance instead of the standard for 
a use variance; 2) there was no substantial evidence showing the UDC lot size 
restrictions would create “exceptional practical difficulties;” and 3) the New Castle 
County Department of Land Use failed to provide adequate public notice of J & B’s 
petition.  The Superior Court rejected the Appellants’ contentions and affirmed the 
Board’s decision.  The Appellants appeal the Superior Court’s findings on the first 
two issues. 
(6) 
“The common law writ of certiorari lies to review acts that are judicial 
or quasi-judicial in nature.  The purpose of certiorari is ‘to correct errors of law, to 
review proceedings not conducted according to law, and to refrain an excess of 
jurisdiction.’”6  It is “the appropriate cause of action for determining whether”7 the 
Board “exceeded its powers or failed to conform to the requirements of law.”8  This 
Court reviews the Superior Court’s legal rulings de novo.9  “We limit our review to 
 
6 Dover Hist. Soc’y v. Dover Plan. Comm’n, 838 A.2d 1103, 1106 (Del. 2003) (citations omitted).  
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 CCS Invs., LLC v. Brown, 977 A.2d 301, 319-20 (Del. 2009) (en banc). 
6 
 
correcting errors of law and determining whether substantial evidence exists to 
support the Board’s findings of fact.”10   
(7) 
Appellants’ first arguments are that the Board erred as a matter of law 
by failing to find that the variances were not “contrary to the public interest;” by 
failing to find that the variance requests were “owing to special conditions or 
exceptional situations;” by calculating the lot areas in an arbitrary manner, in gross 
derogation of the plain language of the UDC, for the sole purpose of approving the 
variance requests; and by applying the standard for approving an area variance rather 
than the standard for a use variance.  Pursuant to 9 Del. C. § 1313(a), the Board is 
vested with the power to hear and decide:  
In specific cases, such variance from any zoning 
ordinance, code or regulation that will not be contrary to 
the public interest, where, owing to special conditions or 
exceptional situations, a literal interpretation of any 
zoning ordinance, code or regulation will result in 
unnecessary hardship or exceptional practical difficulties 
to the owner of property so that the spirit of the ordinance, 
code or regulation shall be observed and substantial justice 
done, provided such relief may be granted without 
substantial detriment to the public good and without 
substantially impairing the intent and purpose of any 
zoning ordinance, code, regulation or map. 
 
(8) 
We first address the Appellants’ argument that the Board did not make 
a determination as to whether the variances would “not be contrary to the public 
 
10 Rehoboth Art League, Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 991 A.2d 1163, 1166 (Del. 2010). 
7 
 
interest,” a consideration required by Section 1313(a).  Because the variances would 
“circumvent”11 environmental regulations, Appellants argue, public interest is 
implicated, and the Board had a duty to make specific findings as to how the 
variances would affect public interest.  The record, however, shows that the approval 
of the variances would not be contrary to public interest, and the Board made 
findings to that end.  These findings include that the proposed lots, inclusive of the 
preserved areas, have a bulk size larger than the size required by the zoning in that 
area and larger than the lots lying directly across Melson Way; each lot met the 
UDC’s limitations on impervious cover and disturbance; there was no increased 
traffic burden on Melson Way; and the nonconformities would be visually 
imperceptible.  The record also shows that the need for variances was owing to 
special conditions or exceptional situations; specifically, the combined effect of the 
minimum lot size and the requirements of the WRPA  would prevent the property 
from division into developable lots “that otherwise comply with the U.D.C.’s 
environmental standards that protect WRPAs.”12 
(9) 
Appellants next argue that the Board arbitrarily calculated the lot areas 
in “gross derogation”13 of the UDC.  In its decision, the Board wrote that the 
“Applicant plans to create two lots exceeding 0.5 acre inclusive of the protected 
 
11 Opening Br. at 15. 
12 Bd. of Adjustment Op. at 6. 
13 Opening Br. at 15. 
8 
 
resources, but the net size of the lots is reduced to 0.1 and 0.22 acre when the 
protected resources are excluded.”14  Appellants argue that the Board fashioned an 
arbitrary calculation of lot area out of whole cloth, essentially meeting the lot area 
and then “accommodate[ing]”15 the protected resources—which is in derogation of 
the UDC’s requirement that lot areas “must be met exclusive of protected 
resources.”16  Appellants argue that J & B incorrectly argued, and the Board 
incorrectly found, that J & B actually met the lot size requirements, and that the 
CFDA triggered additional requirements.  The CFDA, Appellants contend, does not 
create additional requirements; rather, the incorporation of the protection levels is 
an integral part of all calculations, and the Board is required to calculate lot area after 
excluding the percentage of land required to be protected.   
(10) We do not believe that the Appellants have made a convincing 
argument that the Board’s lot calculation was arbitrary or contrary to the UDC.  The 
UDC tracks both gross and net lot area.17  When the protected resources are 
subtracted from the gross lot area, one arrives at what the UDC considers the net lot 
area.18  UDC § 40.04.110A provides that in subdivisions of less than 5 lots, protected 
resource land is preserved by conservation easements.  Thus, while protected 
 
14 Bd. of Adjustment Op. at 3. 
15 Opening Br. at 18. 
16 UDC § 40.04.110(D). 
17 See Answering Br. Ex. 1 at UDC Table 40.05.420. 
18 Id.; see also Bd. of Adjustment Op. at 3. 
9 
 
resources in a subdivision such as this one remain part of the physical lot and are 
maintained by the property owner, they are subtracted from the net lot area 
calculation.  Therefore, the physical boundary of each lot in this case, inclusive of 
the protected land, remains as stated from the outset, 0.72 and 0.6 acre.  When 
protected resources are subtracted from the gross lot area, one arrives at the what the 
UDC considers the net lot area, leading to a need for the variance.  We find nothing 
in the manner in which the Board calculated the lot area that is arbitrary or contrary 
to the UDC. 
(11) Appellants’ next argument is that the Board erred by considering J & 
B’s variance requests under the legal standard for area variances, rather than the 
more stringent standard for use variances.  In Board of Adjustment v. Kwik-Check 
Realty, Inc., this Court held that the language in 9 Del. C. § 1313(a) separates 
variances into two categories: “use” and “area,” and that a less burdensome test of 
“exceptional practical difficulties” applies to area variances and that a more stringent 
“unnecessary hardship” standard applies to use variances.19  A use variance, this 
Court explained, “changes the character of the zone district by permitting an 
otherwise proscribed use.”20  An area variance, on the other hand, “concerns only 
the practical difficulty in using the particular property for permitted use.”21   
 
19 389 A.2d 1289, 1291 (Del. 1978).  
20 Id.  
21 Id. 
10 
 
(12) Appellants contend that the variances sought in this case “are the type 
of major deviations from the letter and spirit of the zoning code that could only be 
granted . . . by meeting the ‘unnecessary hardship’ criteria for what has been termed 
a ‘use variance.’”22  To support their argument, Appellants first point to Jenney v. 
Durham.23  In Jenney, the applicant wished to build two homes on a 5-acre portion 
of land that included an erosion-prone “steep slope district” protected by the Steep 
Slope Ordinance.24  Under the Slope Ordinance, construction of a single-family 
home was prohibited in a steep sloped district.25  The proposed homes would have 
been “located in a prohibitive steep slope district,” but “at least one home could be 
built on a level portion outside the prohibitive district.”26  This Court affirmed the 
Superior Court’s holding that a variance to allow two homes to be built on this land 
constituted a use variance because construction of a single-family home was a 
proscribed use of the steep sloped district.27  The Appellants argue that J & B’s 
request for “drastic deviations”28 from the UDC’s requirements is akin to a rezoning, 
like the variance request in Jenney, and should be considered under the test for use 
variances.   
 
22 Opening Br. at 25. 
23 707 A.2d 757 (Del. Super. 1997), aff’d, 696 A.2d 396 (Del. 1997).  
24 Id. at 753-54. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 753. 
28 Opening Br. at 22. 
11 
 
(13) Appellants also rely on Wawa Inc. v. New Castle County Board of 
Adjustment.29  In that case, Wawa sought to retrofit an existing convenience store—
a permitted use for the land—by adding gasoline pumps and storage tanks.30   
However, WRPA restrictions on the land prohibited storage and sale of petroleum 
products.31  This Court found that a variance to allow for the construction of a gas 
station on the property required the heightened use variance standard.32  Appellants 
argue that Wawa is similar to the case we have here—although the construction of 
single-family homes is a permitted use of the land in this case, additional 
environmental requirements have made the construction of two single-family homes 
a proscribed use of the land.   
(14) We find Appellants’ reliance on these cases to be unpersuasive.  In both 
Jenney and Wawa, the Steep Slope Ordinance and the WRPA regulations established 
additional restrictions and unequivocally prohibited the sought-after uses of the land.  
In Jenney, the ordinance prohibited the development of single-family homes on the 
prohibitive slope district, and in Wawa, the WRPA regulations restricted the storage 
and sale of petroleum.  In this case, no provision specifically proscribes the 
construction of two single-family homes.  As this Court noted in Kwik-Check, a 
 
29 929 A.2d 822 (Del. Super. 2005). 
30 Id. at 825-26. 
31 Id. at 826. 
32 Id. at 827-38. 
12 
 
fundamental aspect of the analysis is whether the variance would change the 
character of the zoning district.33  Here, building single-family homes is permitted 
within the zoning district, and the lot sizes inclusive of the protected area are in 
keeping with the surrounding lots.  Only dimensional variances are requested.  
Therefore, the Board acted appropriately in applying the exceptional practical 
difficulties test. 
(15) Finally, Appellants argue that even assuming arguendo that an area 
variance standard was appropriate, there was not substantial evidence in the record 
to meet the exceptional practical difficulties test.  The test for an area variance 
considers the following: 1) the nature and zone in which the property is located; 2) 
the character of the immediate vicinity; 3) the uses in that vicinity; 4) if the 
restrictions were removed, whether there would be a serious effect on neighborhood 
property and uses; and 5) if the restrictions were not removed, whether there would 
be a hardship on the owner to make normal improvements in the use of the property 
that is permitted under the code.34 
(16) Appellants contend that the application fails this test because the record 
is devoid of any evidence of “hardship”35 to J & B.  However, the Board did find 
evidence of exceptional practical difficulties.  That evidence included that the 
 
33 389 A.2d 1289, 1291 (Del. 1978). 
34 Id. 
35 Opening Br. at 38. 
13 
 
variances were in keeping with the nature and zone of the property, as the zoning 
designation was intended to protect the residential character of the existing 
neighborhood; the proposed buildings were in line with the character of the 
surrounding neighborhood because the lots, inclusive of the protected areas, are very 
similar in size to lots on the opposite side of Melson Way, which are also used for 
residential purposes; the requested variances would not have a serious adverse effect 
on the surrounding properties because the resulting “nonconformities”36 would be 
visually imperceptible; and, if the variances were not granted, J & B “would be 
prohibited from the normal and reasonable subdivision of the Subject Property into 
developable, residential lots that otherwise comply with the U.D.C.’s environmental 
standards that protect WRPAs.”37   
(17) Appellants seem to argue that the Board cannot simply find that 
exceptional practical difficulties exist where the code prohibits certain actions; 
otherwise, every variance would be granted.  However, the Board’s decision was not 
made simply because the UDC’s provision prevented the planned subdivision.  The 
Board looked at the record as a whole and found that the proposed plan complied 
with all UDC requirements except the minimum lot size, was consistent with the 
surrounding community character, and was unlikely to create significant adverse 
 
36 Bd. of Adjustment Op. at 6. 
37 Id. 
14 
 
impacts on the neighboring properties.  Without the variances, it would be 
impossible for J & B to make the “normal improvement” of subdivision of the land.  
We find that the there was sufficient evidence for the Board to make its finding that 
exceptional practical difficulties existed in this case. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior 
Court is AFFIRMED. 
BY THE COURT: 
/s/  James T. Vaughn, Jr. 
Justice