Case Title: People v. Pearson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 97832

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2005-07-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 97832-Agenda 8-November 2004.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, 
Appellant, v. DEON L. PEARSON, Appellant.
Opinion filed July 21, 2005.
JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Deon L. Pearson, filed a petition in the 
circuit court of Winnebago County for relief from judgment, pursuant to section 
2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2000)). The 
circuit court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that it was a successive 
petition for postconviction relief (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 
2000)). The appellate court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 345 
Ill. App. 3d 191. We granted the State's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 
2d R. 315(a)). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the 
appellate court on different grounds.

BACKGROUND
On June 6, 1994, defendant pled guilty to a charge of 
first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2) (West Supp. 1993)). As part of the 
plea bargain, the State recommended that the circuit court cap defendant's 
prison sentence at 40 years. The court admonished defendant of his rights and 
received a stipulation as to the factual basis for defendant's plea. The court 
also informed defendant of the possible sentencing range for the offense. 
However, the court failed to inform defendant that his sentence would be 
followed by a three-year period of mandatory supervised release. See 730 ILCS 
5/5-8-1(d)(1) (West Supp. 1993). At subsequent hearings, the court sentenced 
defendant to 34 years of imprisonment, and denied defendant's motion for 
reconsideration of sentencing.
On direct appeal, defendant argued that the circuit court 
abused its discretion in imposing sentence. Defendant maintained that the 
circuit court failed to give adequate weight to the substantial mitigation 
evidence, and, instead, relied on an aggravating factor which was implicit in 
the definition of the offense. The appellate court affirmed defendant's 
sentence. People v. Pearson, 283 Ill. App. 3d 1117 (1996) (unpublished 
order under Supreme Court Rule 23).
In September 1997, defendant filed a "Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief and as an Alternative for Time Cut." Defendant argued 
that the circuit court failed to consider his rehabilitative potential in 
imposing sentence. Defendant also argued that his sentence was not in line with 
the sentences imposed in other cases of homicide, and his sentence constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment. On October 15, 1997, the court appointed the 
public defender's office to represent defendant. At a status hearing two weeks 
later, the following occurred:
"[Public Defender]: I was just appointed on the 
post-conviction relief petition recently and haven't had a chance to speak with 
Mr. Pearson in the Department of Corrections.
[State's Attorney]: I don't have a copy of any kind of 
post-conviction petition.
[Public Defender]: It appears there was one filed in 
September, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I see one. You don't have a copy?
[State's Attorney]: No.
[Public Defender]: I have a copy, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. You will furnish the State with a copy?
[Public Defender]: Certainly.
THE COURT: How much time do you want? The next status is 
November 12. I guess that's not enough time. Two weeks after that would be 
Thanksgiving Day, so we have to go to December, if you don't mind.
[Public Defender]: No Your Honor.
THE COURT: Can you be here on status December 10 at 9 
o'clock.
[State's Attorney]: That's on defendant's motion.
THE COURT: Yes.
[State's Attorney]: Thank you."
Although the status hearing was set for December 10, 1997, 
the docket contains the following entry for November 12, 1997:
"No parties appear. Cause comes on as to Deft's Post 
Conviction Petition. Said Petition heard and denied. Motion for Time Cut denied. 
Clerk to notify Deft."
The court record does not contain either a written order 
dismissing defendant's petition or a report of proceedings for November 12, 
1997. Also, the record does not indicate that there were any proceedings on 
December 10, 1997.
In August 2002, defendant filed a petition for relief from 
judgment pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 
ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2000)). In the 2002 petition, defendant complained that the 
circuit court did not properly admonish him regarding his sentence. In 
particular, defendant maintained the court failed to inform him that his 
sentence of 34 years would be followed by a three-year period of mandatory 
supervised release. Defendant argued, inter alia, that the court failed 
to comply with the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 402 (134 Ill. 2d R. 402); 
that in the absence of appropriate admonishments he could not be said to have 
intelligently and voluntarily entered his plea of guilty; and that the sentence 
he received exceeded the maximum possible sentence that the court advised him he 
would receive, in violation of due process. Defendant requested that the court 
reduce his sentence by three years so as to conform to the court's admonishments 
on sentencing.
On September 12, 2002, a different trial judge considered 
and summarily dismissed defendant's 2002 petition:
"The court has read the Petition for Relief from Judgment 
filed under 735 ILCS 5/1401, et seq., and finds that it is in the nature of a 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief under the Criminal Code of procedure. The 
court finds that defendant is precluded from filing a second petition for 
post-conviction relief. In 1997 he filed a petition for post-conviction relief 
and that was heard and denied. Further, the court finds that the Petition herein 
is patently without merit, as the issue of whether a failure to advise defendant 
of the fact that he would be subject to a period of mandatory supervised relief, 
deprived him of a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights to trial and pleas of 
guilty was waived by defendant by failing to file a motion to withdraw his plea 
of guilty and consequent failure to raise said issue at the Appellate Court when 
he appealed herein.
Further, it is without merit because defendant is 
petitioning for a reduction in sentence as his prayer for relief. Said relief is 
not the kind of post-conviction relief that a trial court may grant.
Further, the alleged failure to advise regarding the 3 
year mandatory supervision release and the consequent imposition of the sentence 
of 34 years did not exceed the maximum sentence authorized by law to which 
defendant was advised he could receive upon his plea, 60 years. Nor did it 
exceed the sentencing cap agreed upon by defendant and the State, 40 years.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that defendant's Petition for 
Relief from Judgment be and is hereby denied. A copy of this Order shall be sent 
to defendant by certified mail pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2)."
Defendant filed a notice of appeal on October 4, 2002. 
Defendant argued that his sentence was void because it did not conform to 
statutory requirements. Defendant also maintained that the circuit court erred 
in construing his 2002 petition as a petition for postconviction relief and 
dismissing the petition.
On October 3, 2002, the circuit court held a hearing on 
defendant's 1997 petition for postconviction relief and as an alternative 
petition for "time cut." The public defender's office requested, and was 
granted, a brief extension of time to determine whether defendant still sought 
relief as outlined in the petition. On November 7, 2002, counsel informed 
defendant that the 1997 petition had "disappeared from our court docket for a 
period of several years. The Clerk of Courts recently placed this matter on *** 
status call." The public defender suggested that defendant withdraw the petition 
because it was not timely when filed in 1997; the appellate court had "ruled" on 
defendant's motion to reduce sentence; and the circuit court did not have the 
power to grant defendant's request. In response, defendant requested that the 
court appoint new counsel to represent him because of present counsel's 
"unwillingness to be a true advocate." Defendant noted that the role of counsel 
in a postconviction proceeding is to correct and amend the pro se 
petition. At a hearing on January 13, 2003, the court denied defendant's request 
as moot. The court stated that it had already appointed the office of the 
appellate defender to represent defendant on appeal.
On January 21, 2003, defendant filed an "Amended Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief or in the Alternative for Sentence Reduction." On 
January 30, 2003, yet another judge of the circuit court considered the amended 
petition for postconviction relief. The court reviewed the memorandum of 
decision issued upon the summary dismissal of the 2002 petition, and indicated 
that it was striking and dismissing the amended petition for postconviction 
relief "on the same grounds." Defendant appealed the dismissal of the amended 
postconviction petition and the appellate court consolidated the appeal with 
defendant's appeal from the order dismissing the 2002 petition.
On appeal, the court affirmed the dismissal of the amended 
petition for postconviction relief because defendant failed to present argument 
for reversal of the circuit court's order. 345 Ill. App. 3d at 193. Turning to 
the dismissal of the 2002 petition, the appellate court noted that summary 
dismissal of a petition is a procedure available under the Post-Conviction 
Hearing Act. 345 Ill. App. 3d at 193. The Code of Civil Procedure, however, does 
not provide for summary dismissal of a complaint or petition. 345 Ill. App. 3d 
at 193. The court reasoned:
"The process of judicial review of a petition under the 
[Post-Conviction Hearing] Act-without comment by either party-is a significant 
and unusual departure from the adversary process. The legislature has mandated 
that departure in the specific context of the Act. We see no possible basis for 
importing such an unusual procedure into matters governed by the Code of Civil 
Procedure." 345 Ill. App. 3d at 194.
The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 
345 Ill. App. 3d at 199.
We granted the State leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315. 
We now affirm the judgment of the appellate court for different reasons.

ANALYSIS
In this court, defendant notes that his pleading was 
clearly labeled as a petition for relief from judgment pursuant to section 
2-1401 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2000)). Defendant also notes that he 
filed a petition for postconviction relief in 1997, and presumably understood 
the difference between a section 2-1401 petition and one filed pursuant to the 
Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 
2000)). Defendant maintains that he should have been considered "master" of his 
claim and the circuit court should not have overridden his choice of a 
procedural vehicle by which to seek relief. We disagree.
In People v. Shellstrom, No. 97831 (July 21, 
2005), this court considered whether a defendant's pro se pleading, 
which specifically invoked the mandamus statute (735 ILCS 5/14-101 
et seq. (West 2002)), could be considered a postconviction petition. 
Initially we noted that, under established precedent, where a pro se 
pleading alleges a deprivation of constitutional rights cognizable under the 
Act, a trial court may treat the pleading as a postconviction petition. 
Shellstrom, slip op. at 4. We also noted that, contrary to the defendant's 
argument, recharacterization of a pleading as a postconviction petition is 
allowed where the pro se pleading is labeled differently. 
Shellstrom, slip op. at 4-5. We reasoned the same lack of legal knowledge 
which causes a pro se defendant to draft an inadequate postconviction 
petition might result in the defendant selecting the wrong method of 
collaterally attacking his conviction. Shellstrom, slip op. at 5, 
quoting People ex rel. Palmer v. Twomey, 53 Ill. 2d 479, 484 (1973). 
Thus, the salutary purpose of the Act is achieved if the circuit court, upon 
finding that a pro se petition, however labeled, alleged violations of 
rights cognizable in a postconviction proceeding, would thereafter treat it as 
such. Shellstrom, slip op. at 5, quoting Palmer, 53 Ill. 2d  at 
484.
Having determined that a trial court may treat a pro 
se pleading as a postconviction petition, even where the pleading is 
labeled differently, we considered in Shellstrom whether it was proper 
to recharacterize the defendant's pleading and dismiss it summarily. We noted 
that the Act allows the filing of only one postconviction petition without leave 
of court. For a subsequent filing, the petitioner must demonstrate cause for the 
failure to bring a claim in the initial postconviction proceeding and prejudice 
resulting from that failure. Shellstrom, slip op. at 8-9. In light of 
the obstacles associated with a successive postconviction petition, we ruled 
that a trial court must give a pro se petitioner notice before 
recharacterizing a pleading as a first postconviction petition:
"Pursuant to our supervisory authority, we hold that, in 
the future, when a circuit court is recharacterizing as a first postconviction 
petition a pleading that a pro se litigant has labeled as a different 
action cognizable under Illinois law, the circuit court must (1) notify the 
pro se litigant that the court intends to recharacterize the pleading, (2) 
warn the litigant that this recharacterization means that any subsequent 
postconviction petition will be subject to the restrictions on successive 
postconviction petitions, and (3) provide the litigant an opportunity to 
withdraw the pleading or to amend it so that it contains all the claims 
appropriate to a postconviction petition that the litigant believes he or she 
has. If the court fails to do so, the pleading cannot be considered to have 
become a postconviction petition for purposes of applying to later pleadings the 
Act's restrictions on successive postconviction petitions." Shellstrom, 
slip op. at 9-10.
See also Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375, 
157 L. Ed. 2d 778, 124 S. Ct. 786 (2003). We remanded in Shellstrom for 
further proceedings because, prior to recharacterizing his pleading, the trial 
court had not given the defendant an opportunity to withdraw the pleading or to 
amend it to include whatever additional postconviction claims the defendant 
thought fit. Shellstrom, slip op. at 10.
In the case at bar, the circuit court recharacterized 
defendant's 2002 petition as a postconviction petition and dismissed it 
summarily. Although the circuit court recharacterized the 2002 petition as a 
second, not a first, postconviction petition, the rationale of Shellstrom 
applies. The 2002 petition that was recharacterized into a second postconviction 
petition presented only those arguments that defendant had chosen to include 
before realizing that he was, in effect, filing a successive postconviction 
petition. See Shellstrom, slip op. at 10. Defendant did not know to 
include additional factors that might have shown an impediment in his ability to 
raise a claim during the initial postconviction proceedings. Nor did defendant 
know to demonstrate that the claims not raised during his initial postconviction 
proceedings were such that the resulting conviction or sentence violated due 
process. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f) (West Supp. 2003). The circuit court subjected 
the 2002 petition to the rigorous standards of a successive postconviction 
petition without giving defendant notice and an opportunity to either withdraw 
the pleading or amend it to comply with the restrictions on a successive 
petition.
As in Shellstrom, we hold that prior to 
recharacterizing as a successive postconviction petition a pleading that a 
pro se litigant has labeled as a different action cognizable under Illinois 
law, the circuit court must (1) notify the pro se litigant that the 
court intends to recharacterize the pleading, (2) warn the litigant that this 
recharacterization means that the petition will be subject to the restrictions 
on successive postconviction petitions, and (3) provide the litigant an 
opportunity to withdraw the pleading or to amend it so that it contains all the 
factors and arguments appropriate to a successive postconviction petition that 
the litigant believes he or she has.
In light of the record before us, we conclude that 
defendant has received part 1 of the notice and admonishment necessary for 
recharacterization. Defendant is aware that the circuit court intends to 
recharacterize his section 2-1401 petition as a successive postconviction 
petition. However, defendant has not been warned that the recharacterization 
means that the petition will be subject to the restrictions on successive 
postconviction petition, and defendant has not been given an opportunity to 
withdraw his pleading or to amend it to include the factors and arguments that 
are appropriate to a successive postconviction petition. Accordingly, we vacate 
the circuit court's judgment summarily dismissing defendant's section 2-1401 
petition and we direct the circuit court, on remand, to provide the appropriate 
warning and an opportunity to withdraw or amend the pleading.
On remand, we also instruct the circuit court to consider 
the appropriate classification for the section 2-1401 petition in light of the 
seeming improprieties in the rulings on defendant's first postconviction 
petition and amended postconviction petition. From the record, it appears that 
the circuit court appointed counsel for defendant and gave counsel time to talk 
with defendant to determine the claims to pursue, and, presumably, file an 
amended postconviction petition. The court scheduled a status hearing for 
December 10, 1997. However, no court proceedings took place on December 10, 
1997. Instead, a docket entry in the record indicates that the court dismissed 
the petition on November 12, 1997, with no parties present. The record does not 
contain a summary dismissal order as required by section 122-2.1 of the Act (725 
ILCS 5/122-2.1 (West 1996)), specifying the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law the court made in reaching its decision.
If the docket entry correctly reflects that the circuit 
court summarily dismissed the postconviction petition on November 12, 1997, such 
dismissal was improper given the appointment of counsel and the previously 
scheduled status hearing. The Act does not authorize appointment of counsel at 
the first stage of the proceedings for a petitioner who is not under a sentence 
of death. See 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1 (West 1996); People v. Rivera, 198 Ill. 2d 364, 369 (2001). The record would indicate that the circuit court moved 
the proceedings to the second stage but then summarily dismissed the petition as 
in the first stage of a postconviction proceeding.
Also, the circuit court informed the parties that the next 
court date, set for status hearing, would be December 10, 1997. Understandably, 
neither the State nor the defense appeared before the court on November 12, 
1997. In People v. Bounds, 182 Ill. 2d 1 (1998), this court found a 
violation of due process where the trial court ruled on the merits of a 
postconviction petition without prior notice:
"A trial court's discretion in resolving post-conviction 
petitions does not allow the court to convert a status call to a hearing on the 
merits without notice to the parties. The scheduled hearing in the case was for 
a status report only. There was no notice to defendant's counsel that 
defendant's post-conviction petition would be ruled upon. The procedure followed 
thus violated defendant's right to procedural due process under the Illinois 
Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2." Bounds, 182 Ill. 2d  at 5.
As in Bounds, defendant could properly rely on 
the circuit court's instruction that the next court date would be for status 
hearing on December 10, 1997.
Subsequent proceedings on the 1997 postconviction petition 
would seem to indicate, however, that the circuit court did not dismiss the 
petition on November 12, 1997. The circuit court held status hearings in the 
postconviction proceedings on October 3, 2002, October 24, 2002, December 5, 
2002, and January 16, 2003. On January 21, 2003, defendant filed his "Amended 
Petition for Post-conviction Relief or in the Alternative for Sentence 
Reduction," clearly intending to amend the 1997 postconviction petition. The 
circuit court, however, struck and summarily dismissed the pleading "on the same 
grounds" as it had dismissed the 2002 petition, that is, as a meritless, 
successive postconviction petition. Thus, it appears that, although the circuit 
court may never have dismissed the 1997 postconviction petition, the court 
summarily dismissed both the 2002 petition and the amended postconviction 
petition as successive postconviction petitions. Moreover, the circuit court 
could not summarily dismiss the postconviction proceedings in 2003 in light of 
the fact that more than 90 days had elapsed since the initiation of the 
proceedings. See 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1 (West 1996). The proceedings were at the 
second stage, not the first stage, of a postconviction proceeding.
The circuit court either committed error in summarily 
dismissing the 1997 petition as indicated in the docket entry for November 12, 
1997, or in summarily dismissing the postconviction proceedings at the second 
stage. The court should reconsider its classification of the 2002 petition in 
light of its rulings on the postconviction proceedings.

CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the judgment of 
the appellate court. We vacate the judgment of the circuit court, and remand the 
cause to the circuit court with instructions to reconsider its classification of 
the 2002 petition and to afford defendant an opportunity to withdraw his pro 
se pleading or, in the alternative, to amend it.
 
Appellate court judgment affirmed;
circuit court judgment vacated;
cause remanded with directions.