Case Title: Zabel v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87-195

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1988-11-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Zabel v. State1988 WY 131765 P.2d 357Case Number: 87-195Decided: 11/01/1988Supreme Court of Wyoming
GEORGE ZABEL, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, UintaCounty, John D. Troughton, 
J.

James E. 
Phillips of Phillips, Lancaster & Thomas, Evanston, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Terry L. Armitage, Asst. 
Atty. Gen., (argued), for 
appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., THOMAS, URBIGKIT and MACY, 
JJ., and BROWN, J. Retired.*

* Retired June 30, 1988, 
but continued to participate in the decision of the court in this case pursuant 
to order of the court entered July 1, 1988.

CARDINE, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     Appellant George Zabel 
was charged with four counts of taking immodest, immoral and indecent liberties 
with a minor, § 14-3-105, W.S. 1977. A jury found him guilty on one charge and 
not guilty of the remaining three charges, and he was sentenced to a term of two 
to five years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. Although appellant raises 
several issues on appeal, we conclude that the trial court committed plain error 
by allowing the State's expert witness to testify to the credibility of the 
alleged victims, and we reverse appellant's conviction on that ground. 
Accordingly, we do not address appellant's other issues.

[¶2.]     Appellant George Zabel 
is an elderly, self-employed carpenter who has three children and four 
grandchildren. At the time of the trial in this case, Mr. Zabel and his wife 
lived in Lyman, Wyoming. The alleged victims are two girls, 10 
and 13 years old, whose family lived on a ranch between Lyman and Mountain View. The Zabels 
met the alleged victims' grandparents through a mutual acquaintance. When the 
girls' grandmother died of cancer, the Zabels began caring for them. The Zabels 
developed a close relationship with the girls; in 1982 or 1983 the girls told 
their mother that they wanted to adopt the Zabels as 
grandparents.

[¶3.]     The alleged victims' 
mother testified that sometime during the first week of December 1986 the older 
of the two girls began crying after a family meeting and said the reason she was 
crying was that George Zabel had been "doing things to her." She then told her 
mother the things Mr. Zabel allegedly had done. The younger girl then related 
similar incidents involving Mr. Zabel. Following these conversations, the girls' 
parents reported the alleged incidents to the county attorney's office. On 
January 28, 1987, an information was filed alleging that Mr. Zabel took indecent 
liberties with the older of the alleged victims between the dates of January 1, 
1980 and November 27, 1986. An amended information was filed February 9, 1987, 
alleging four counts. The first two counts charged appellant with taking 
indecent liberties with the older alleged victim between the dates of October 
13, 1986 through October 19, 1986 and between November 26, 1986 through November 
30, 1986. The third and fourth counts charged appellant with taking indecent 
liberties with the younger alleged victim during the same time 
periods.

[¶4.]     The case went to trial 
on April 16, 1987. The jury began deliberating at approximately 11:20 a.m. on 
April 22 and returned a verdict the next afternoon at 1:50 p.m., finding 
appellant guilty on Count III and not guilty on the remaining three counts. On 
June 30, 1987, the court sentenced appellant to a term of two to five years in 
the state penitentiary. This appeal followed.

[¶5.]     Our decision in this 
case centers upon the testimony of Dr. Mercedes Reisinger, a clinical 
psychologist who testified for the State. Dr. Reisinger testified that she 
evaluated the two alleged victims on January 16, 1987. Her examination included 
a test for mental age, the Thematic Apperception Test (TAT), a Sentence 
Completion Test, a "Draw Person" test, a "Self Report," the Rosenwide Picture 
Frustration Study, and a clinical interview. In explaining her evaluation of the 
two young girls, Dr. Reisinger gave the following 
testimony:

"Q. Now, with [the older 
girl] and [the younger girl] and I suppose with all of your children that you 
evaluate, are you concerned about whether or not the children are 
fabricating?

"A. 
Absolutely.

"Q. Is that one of your 
primary concerns that you're concerned about?

"A. Treatment is my 
primary concern.

"Q. Treatment. Excuse me, 
I'm sorry. Treatment is your primary concern?

"A. Yes. I generally am 
looking at what sort of treatment does this child need. My evaluations are more 
geared to treatment planning, you know, rather than 
investigation.

"Q. And I understand 
that. But you [have] to have some sort of verification process built into your 
testing procedures, do you not?

"A. Generally, what I'm 
looking for is authenticity of the reporting.

"Q. 
Uh-huh.

"A. I'm looking for 
emotionality linked to the reporting. I'm looking for some inconsistencies in 
the reporting.

"Q. You're looking for 
some inconsistencies?

"A. That's 
correct.

"Q. Why is 
that?

"A. Because the stories 
that are to be fabricated are very consistent from person to person to person, 
from time to time to time. The other thing I'm also looking for is the amount of 
anxiety around the reporting. There is - Children, if they are fabricating at 
this age, in the latency age, -

"Q. 
Uh-huh.

"A. - cannot keep up the 
act for too long, because of the fact that it is not something, an experience 
that they can attach to reality. So if someone has told them to say something or 
if they have decided to say something, you will, after time, find that there 
will be breakdown in the facts, that the stories are very inconsistent from time 
to time to time and then those breakdowns are very 
noticeable.

"Q. 
Uh-huh.

"A. They either knowingly 
say `No, this didn't happen' or they stick to their story. But they break down 
in other areas and say - give you clues that, in fact, it didn't 
happen.

"When children are lying, 
when people are lying in general, you will find that the authenticity is limited 
by the fact that there aren't other details provided. For example, if they were 
in a bathroom, if they say they were in a bathroom when the occurrence - the 
situation took place and they say that they were sitting on a couch, it's very 
unlikely that there would be a couch in a bathroom. So those are the kinds of 
things that I'm looking for.

"The other thing I look 
for is in the test results, in particular, if there is any psycho - any 
antisocial psychopathic tendencies that the children may have. I use an example 
children out to harm someone. I very much look at those ambivalent feelings 
because if, in fact, the issue is `Let's get this person,' there may be a motive 
behind it and I look for what's known as secondary gains.

"Q. Now, a secondary gain 
-

"A. A motive 
-

"Q. - is a motive to 
fabricate?

"A. That is correct, 
something that the child is going to gain, in fact, in reporting this. Taking 
[the younger girl] as an example, in her case it was extremely difficult for her 
to be able to report this, so it was actually a detriment to her to report, 
-

"Q. 
Uh-huh.

"A. - not a 
gain.

"Q. What about with [the 
older girl]?

"A. The ambivalence was 
clear there and the emotionality was there. She provided details, you know, 
which were consistent with what she was saying. Holding back, protectiveness of 
the person, even though they were greatly hurt. 

"Q. Again, would either 
of these children - Did you see any secondary gain -

"A. 
No.

"Q. - that could be 
gained or secondary gain with these children?

"A. No, nothing was 
apparent.

"Q. Now, people - 
children - Let me see here.

"Children that are 
telling the truth have various characteristics; is that 
correct?

"A. 
Uh-huh.

"Q. Children that are 
telling lies have various characteristics?

"A. Generally, 
yes.

"Q. And what you are 
talking about, then, is when a child is telling the truth, you look for 
emotionality?

"A. (The Witness 
nodded.)

"Q. Small 
inconsistencies?

"A. 
Uh-huh.

"Q. Because they are - 
you just can't - The memory fades?

"A. Right. It's not a pat 
or response story.

"Q. The amount of anxiety 
that is present with the child when he's telling the 
story?

"A. (The Witness 
nodded.)

"Q. Okay. That sort of 
thing?

"A. That is 
correct.

"Q. Any other 
characteristics?

"A. Antisocial 
tendencies.

"Q. Antisocial 
tendencies?

"A. Yes, that's an 
individual who doesn't feel much remorse and doesn't care who it is that they 
stick in the back with a knife, basically.

"Q. That's the child 
that's telling the lie?

"A. 
Uh-huh.

"Q. Did you see any 
antisocial tendencies in [the younger girl] or in [the older 
girl]?

"A. 
No.

"Q. Did you see any 
psychopathic tendencies in either of these children?

"A. 
No.

"Q. And psychopathism 
(sic)?

"A. [It] goes hand in 
hand.

"Q. During your interview 
with the children, specifically, the clinical interview with the children, I 
take it you talked about the events; is that correct?

"A. They talked about the 
events.

"Q. And those 
discussions, you listed from each of the children their explanation of what had 
happened to them; is that correct?

"A. That's 
correct.

"Q. 
Okay.

"A. Briefly, because they 
had already been interviewed. So my purpose was not necessarily to get the 
details of the incident as much as the treatment, so I was focusing on the test 
results."

Although the 
defense did not object during this testimony, appellant now contends that its 
admission amounted to plain error because Dr. Reisinger was allowed to testify 
to the alleged victims' credibility.

[¶6.]     It is well established 
in Wyoming 
that an expert witness cannot vouch for the truthfulness or credibility of an 
alleged victim. Lessard v. State, Wyo., 719 P.2d 227, 233 (1986). In Lessard, we 
explained that the question of credibility is for the jury, who are themselves 
expert in that area. Consequently, the testimony of a psychologist or other 
expert on the issue of credibility does not assist them and therefore does not 
satisfy the requirements of Rule 702, W.R.E.1

[¶7.]     On several occasions, 
this court has addressed the propriety of expert testimony on the credibility of 
sexual assault victims. In Lessard, supra, a rape crisis counselor testified 
that most rape victims ask their assailants not to tell anyone about the 
incident. Id. 
at 233. We held that this testimony was permissible because it helped the jury 
understand one aspect of the evidence - the victim's request to her assailant - 
and because the expert's explanation did not constitute testimony with respect 
to the veracity of the victim. Id. at 234. In Scadden v. State, Wyo., 732 P.2d 1036 (1987), a police detective testified that victims often delay in 
reporting sexual abuse or assault, and she went on to explain the reasons for 
this delay. Id. at 1044-45. We held her testimony 
admissible because it was "offered to rebut the implication by the defense that 
the victims' delay in reporting the incident was inconsistent with their claims 
of nonconsensual sexual relations." Id. at 1046. In Griego v. State, Wyo., 761 P.2d 973 (1988), a rape crisis counselor testified that when the adolescent 
victim did not immediately flee the scene and report the incident, her behavior 
was consistent with the typical behavior pattern of adolescent victims of sexual 
assault. We observed that this testimony helped explain the victim's behavior 
and held that its admission did not constitute plain 
error.

[¶8.]     In all three of these 
cases, the challenged testimony was allowed because it assisted the jury in 
understanding some peculiar aspect of the victim's behavior and because it did 
not involve a comment on the credibility or truthfulness of the victim. Case law 
from other jurisdictions supports our conclusion that expert testimony which 
meets these two criteria does not invade the province of the jury. See, e.g., 
People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450, 681 P.2d 291 (1984); 
United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336 (8th Cir. 1986); State v. Kennedy, 320 N.C. 20, 357 S.E.2d 359 (1987); 
State v. Moran, 151 Ariz. 378, 728 P.2d 248 
(1986); State v. Catsam, 148 Vt. 366, 534 A.2d 184 (1987); Commonwealth v. Ianello, 401 Mass. 197, 515 N.E.2d 1181 (1987). We realize 
that in many instances, testimony of this nature will have the incidental effect 
of supporting or bolstering the credibility of the witness. Griego, supra. 
Nevertheless, that effect alone need not render the testimony inadmissible, as 
"[m]ost testimony, expert or otherwise, tends to support the credibility of some 
witness." State v. Kennedy, supra, 357 S.E.2d  at 367.

[¶9.]     In another recent 
sexual misconduct case, we examined expert testimony which was not offered to 
explain the victim's post-incident behavior. In Brown v. State, Wyo., 736 P.2d 1110 (1987), Dr. Mercedes Reisinger, the same expert who testified in this case, 
testified that she administered several personality tests to the victim. One of 
these tests was the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). Dr. 
Reisinger was asked if there were any measures of reliability built into the 
MMPI, and she identified three validity scales. She was then asked if there were 
any significant results from any of the three scales. Her response was that all 
three scales were "within normal limits" and this meant that "the individual 
approached the test from a very truthful fashion." When this testimony was 
challenged on appeal, we concluded that it did not concern the victim's version 
of the incident and that it was merely offered to demonstrate the reliability of 
the test administered by the psychologist. Accordingly, we concluded that the 
admission of the testimony was not plain error because appellant failed to 
demonstrate that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was transgressed in a clear 
and obvious, not merely arguable, way. Id. at 1115.

[¶10.]  In contrast to the testimony challenged 
in Brown, the testimony given by Dr. Reisinger in the present case did not 
concern any built-in reliability scales in any specific, standardized test. 
Moreover, unlike the expert testimony in Lessard, Scadden and Griego, supra, the 
disputed testimony was not linked to any peculiarities in the alleged victims' 
behavior following the incidents. Instead, the testimony was directed to whether 
the children were "fabricating" and toward Dr. Reisinger's search for 
"authenticity of the reporting," "inconsistencies in the reporting," "anxiety 
around the reporting," a "breakdown in the facts," and "sufficient detail." 
Despite the State's thinly-veiled attempt to characterize Dr. Reisinger's 
testimony as mere verification of testing procedures, it is abundantly clear 
that she was discussing truthfulness criteria in connection with the alleged 
victims' reports of the incidents of sexual abuse.

[¶11.]  Dr. Reisinger, in effect, led the jury 
through her truthfulness evaluation, including her conclusions. She stated that 
she looked for "secondary gains," which she described as "something that the 
child is going to gain, in fact, in reporting this." Secondary gain, she 
explained, may provide a motive for fabrication. She indicated that she saw no 
secondary gain in these particular children. She was asked about "various 
characteristics" which are seen in "children that are telling lies." She said 
that one of these characteristics was "antisocial tendencies." She stated that 
she saw no antisocial tendencies in these children.

[¶12.]  In order to establish plain error, 
appellant must demonstrate a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of 
law in a clear and obvious way which adversely affects a substantial right. 
Jones v. State, Wyo., 580 P.2d 1150 (1978). A clear and 
unequivocal rule of law exists concerning this type of testimony: The 
credibility of witnesses is the exclusive province of the jury and may not be 
the subject of expert testimony. Lessard, supra 719 P.2d 227. Dr. Reisinger's 
testimony clearly and obviously transgressed this rule of law, as it constituted 
a psychologist's evaluation of whether the alleged victims were lying in their 
"reporting." The only question remaining under the plain error test is whether 
the error affected a substantial right or, in other words, whether the error was 
harmful.

[¶13.]  For an error to be regarded as harmful, 
there must be a reasonable possibility that in the absence of the error the 
verdict might have been more favorable to the defendant. Bishop v. State, 
Wyo., 687 P.2d 242 (1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 1219, 105 S. Ct. 1203, 84 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1985). It has been said that "[p]erhaps the single most significant factor 
in weighing whether an error was harmful is the strength of the case against the 
defendant." 3A Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 854 at 305 
(1982). We have, on several occasions, concluded that an error was harmless when 
the evidence of a defendant's guilt was overwhelming. See, e.g., Ramirez v. 
State, Wyo., 739 P.2d 1214 (1987); Stinehart v. 
State, Wyo., 727 P.2d 1010 (1986); Story v. 
State, Wyo., 
721 P.2d 1020, cert. denied 479 U.S. 962, 107 S. Ct. 459, 93 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1986). 
This case does not fall into that category. The State provided no physical 
evidence to support its case; it relied solely on testimonial evidence. The case 
involved a close factual dispute. The jury, after deliberating for a full day, 
acquitted appellant on three of the four counts charged. We cannot conclude that 
the strength of the State's case rendered the error 
harmless.

[¶14.]  When reviewing an erroneous ruling 
admitting or excluding evidence, the following considerations, among others, may 
aid in determining whether the error is harmless: (1) whether the evidence 
furnished important corroboration of other testimony; (2) whether it related to 
a material, consequential fact; (3) whether counsel relied on the evidence in 
argument; (4) whether the evidence was cumulative; and (5) the effect of any 
instructions given to the jury. 1 Weinstein's Evidence, ¶ 103[06] (1986). In 
this case, these considerations compel us to conclude that the error was indeed 
harmful:

1. The tainted evidence 
unquestionably furnished important corroboration of the children's 
testimony.

2. It related to a 
material and consequential fact - the credibility of the children. The trial 
judge correctly observed, more than once, that the case turned on the question 
of whether the jury believed the children or the defendant. The prosecutor 
concurred with this assessment of the case in his closing statement when he 
said:

"This case is about 
victimization and this case, when everything is said and done, comes down to 
this. There are three witnesses: [the two girls] and George Zabel. Which of 
those three are you going to - are you going to believe? Which of those three 
testimonies are you going to believe and which of those three are you going to 
discard? That's all this case comes down to. Who do you believe and who don't 
you believe."

3. During his closing 
argument, the prosecutor relied on Dr. Reisinger's testimony concerning the 
credibility of the children:

"And Mercedes Reisinger 
talked about secondary gain. Secondary gain. What do these children have to gain 
by fabrication, by lying? What could possibly motivate these children? What 
false motive could - could possibly cause them to come into this courtroom and 
testify falsely? She saw none."

4. Cumulativeness is not 
an important consideration in this case, as the introduction of additional 
expert testimony on the credibility of the children would have only compounded 
the error.

5. We recognize that the 
court instructed the jury that expert testimony should not be used as evidence 
of truthfulness or untruthfulness of any witness.2 In prior cases we have stated that 
the jury is presumed to follow its instructions. See, e.g., Ramirez v. State, 
supra 739 P.2d 1214. Yet "it would be wrong to think that curative action can 
take the sting out of every mistake." Wright, supra, at 316-19. The United 
States Supreme Court has said:

"Not every admission of 
inadmissible hearsay or other evidence can be considered to be reversible error 
unavoidable through limiting instructions; instances occur in almost every trial 
where inadmissible evidence creeps in, usually inadvertently. * * * It is not 
unreasonable to conclude that in many such cases the jury can and will follow 
the trial judge's instructions to disregard such information. Nevertheless * * * 
there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, 
follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the 
defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be 
ignored." (Citations omitted.) Bruton v. United 
States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 1627, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1968).

When an error is 
so prejudicial that we cannot be sure the jury was not influenced by it, we will 
reverse despite curative instructions from the judge. See Wright, supra, at 321 
and cases cited.

[¶15.]  Credibility was the central issue for the 
jury in this case. In our view there exists a reasonable possibility that in the 
absence of the erroneously admitted expert testimony on credibility the verdict 
might have been more favorable to appellant. The error was not 
harmless.

[¶16.]  REVERSED.

FOOTNOTES

1 Rule 702, W.R.E. 
provides:

"If scientific, 
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as 
an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."

2 The instruction 
provided:

"During this trial you 
have heard testimony from psychologists regarding the psychological aspects of 
sexually abused children and those who sexually abuse children. This evidence 
was admitted for the limited purpose of providing information of the 
psychological aspects of this type of offense.

"This evidence was not 
admitted, nor should it be used by you as evidence of truthfulness or 
untruthfulness of any witness. The truthfulness or untruthfulness of witnesses 
is for the jury to decide after consideration of all of the evidence in the 
case."

THOMAS, Justice, dissenting, 
with whom BROWN, Justice, Retired, 
joins.

[¶17.]  I would affirm the conviction in this 
case. Had the challenged testimony been admitted over the objection of Zabel, I 
would agree that the trial court had erred. I am not satisfied, however, that 
the record in this instance truly discloses that a clear and unequivocal rule of 
law was transgressed in a "clear and 
obvious way." (Emphasis added.) Certainly, what occurred in the courtroom 
did not induce counsel to complain.

[¶18.]  In my judgment, the decision of the court 
in this instance really is designed to address an unarticulated claim of 
inadequate representation. Because I do not feel that I am in a position to 
second guess the tactical or strategic decisions of counsel in this particular 
instance, I conclude that, if Zabel was damaged by the failure of his counsel to 
object, it would be better to permit that issue to be raised in a proceeding 
which would involve a hearing to determine whether Zabel's attorney had some 
valid ground for not raising an appropriate objection.

[¶19.]  In this instance, the court is 
substituting its strategic and tactical judgment for that of defense counsel in 
the exercise of hindsight. I am not satisfied that the criteria for addressing 
plain error are met in this case and, for that reason, I would 
affirm.