Case Title: Ruth M. Schwister v. Daniel V. Schoenecker

Citation: 2002 WI 132

Docket Number: 2001AP002621

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2002-12-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
2002 WI 132 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
01-2621 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Ruth M. Schwister,  
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Daniel V. Schoenecker,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 27, 2002   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 7, 2002   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Kathryn W. Foster   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant there were briefs (in the court 
of appeals) by David W. Neeb, Daniel J. Borowski, and Davis & 
Kuelthau, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Daniel J. 
Borowski. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief (in the 
court of appeals) by Robert G. Pyzyk, James J. Carrig, and 
Niebler, Pyzyk, Klaver & Wagner LLP, Menomonee Falls, and oral 
argument by Robert G. Pyzyk. 
 
 
2002 WI 132 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  01-2621  
(L.C. No. 
00-CV-874) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Ruth M. Schwister,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Daniel V. Schoenecker,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 27, 2002 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Waukesha 
County, Kathryn W. Foster, Judge.  Affirmed.  
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE   This case comes 
before the court on certification from the court of appeals 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 809.61 (1999-2000).1  It is an appeal 
                                                 
1 On certification, all issues raised on appeal are before 
this court.  State v. Stoehr, 134 Wis. 2d 66, 70, 396 N.W.2d 177 
(1986); Wis. Stat. §§ 808.05(2) and (Rule) 809.61.  The court of 
appeals, 
however, 
identified 
two 
specific 
issues 
for 
certification:  (1) whether a suggestion of death filed by a 
surviving 
party 
to 
an 
action 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 803.10(1)(a) (1999-2000), prior to the appointment 
of 
a 
personal 
representative, 
begins 
tolling 
the 
90-day 
substitution period when it is served upon counsel for the 
deceased party; and (2) whether a suggestion of death filed by a 
surviving party to an action must identify a proper party to 
substitute. 
No. 
01-2621   
 
2 
 
from an order issued by the Circuit Court for Waukesha County, 
Kathryn W. Foster, Judge, granting the motion of Richard 
Schoenecker, personal representative of the Estate of Ruth 
Schwitzer, to be substituted as the plaintiff in this action.  
Ruth Schwitzer, the plaintiff, died after she brought this 
action against her son, the defendant, Daniel Schoenecker, for 
the return of funds that he was to manage on her behalf.  We 
affirm the order of the circuit court and remand the cause for 
further proceedings.   
¶2 
The issue in this case is whether the motion for 
substitution was timely.  Wisconsin Stat. § 803.10(1)(a) directs 
that a motion for substitution of a deceased party be dismissed 
when it is made more than 90 days after the death is suggested 
on the record by service of a statement of the facts of the 
death as provided by the statute.  The specific question of law 
presented here is whether the defendant's suggestion of death, 
served only on the deceased plaintiff's attorney prior to the 
appointment 
of 
a 
personal 
representative, 
satisfied 
§ 803.10(1)(a) and thereby activated the 90-day time period in 
which a motion for substitution was to be filed.   
¶3 
We hold, on the facts of this case, that service of 
the suggestion of death only on the deceased plaintiff's 
attorney of record was insufficient to activate the 90-day time 
period in which a motion for substitution is to be filed under 
                                                                                                                                                             
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 1999-2000 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
01-2621   
 
3 
 
Wis. Stat. § 803.10(1)(a).  To trigger the 90-day time period in 
the present case the defendant was obliged to serve his brothers 
as nonparties.  Serving his brothers was necessary to reasonably 
protect their interests and the interests of the decedent when 
no personal representative had yet been appointed.  Moreover, 
requiring the defendant, the surviving party in the present 
case, to locate and serve his brothers, who were known to the 
defendant to be potential successors or representatives of the 
decedent, would not unduly burden the defendant or unreasonably 
delay the litigation.2 
¶4 
Wisconsin  Stat. § 803.10(1)(a) governs substitution 
for a deceased party and provides as follows: 
803.10. Substitution of parties. 
(1) Death. (a) If a party dies and the claim is 
not 
thereby 
extinguished, 
the 
court 
may 
order 
substitution of the proper parties.  The motion for 
substitution may be made by any party or by the 
successors or representatives of the deceased party 
and, together with the notice of hearing, shall be 
served on the parties as provided in s. 801.14 and 
upon persons not parties in the manner provided in 
s. 801.11 for the service of a summons.  Unless the 
motion for substitution is made not later than 90 days 
after the death is suggested on the record by service 
of a statement of the facts of the death as provided 
herein for the service of the motion, the action shall 
be dismissed as to the deceased party.   
                                                 
2 Because we hold that service of the suggestion of death on 
only the deceased plaintiff's attorney did not activate the 90-
day period for filing a motion for substitution in this case, we 
address neither the second issue certified by the court of 
appeals, whether the suggestion of death must identify a proper 
party to substitute, nor the relevant case on that issue, Wick 
v. Waterman, 143 Wis. 2d 676, 421 N.W.2d 872 (Ct. App. 1988). 
No. 
01-2621   
 
4 
 
¶5 
A procedure for substitution of a deceased party is 
needed when an action survives the decedent's death.  This 
concept is neither complicated nor controversial.  Yet the 
number of reported cases and commentaries on the process of 
substitution suggest that Wis. Stat. § 803.10(1)(a) and the 
federal rule upon which it is based are neither simple nor 
uniformly interpreted. 
I 
¶6 
The 
following 
timeline 
presents 
the 
pertinent 
undisputed facts in this case: 
April 28, 2000: The complaint is filed by the 
plaintiff mother, Ruth M. Schwister, against one of 
her sons, Daniel V. Schoenecker.  She is represented 
by Attorney Robert Pyzyk. 
May 6, 2000: The parties agree to try to resolve the 
dispute and suspend the defendant's obligation to file 
an answer. 
November 4, 2000: The plaintiff mother dies. 
November 6, 2000: The circuit court dismisses the 
action for failure to prosecute.   
December 13, 2000: The circuit court vacates its 
dismissal order and orders the defendant to file an 
answer prior to mid-February.3 
February 8, 2001: The defendant files an answer and a 
suggestion of death with the Waukesha County Clerk of 
                                                 
3 Attorney Pyzyk wrote the circuit court, explaining that he 
was not notified that the case was on the dismissal calendar.  
The attorney requested that the circuit court reopen the case 
and schedule a pretrial conference.  The attorney also requested 
that defense counsel file his responsive pleading. 
No. 
01-2621   
 
5 
 
Circuit Court,4 serving both documents on Attorney 
Pyzyk by mail. 
May 10, 2001: More than 90 days have elapsed since the 
suggestion of death was filed in circuit court on 
February 8, 2001. 
June 18, 2001: Attorney Pyzyk informs the circuit 
court and defendant's attorney at a status conference 
that the plaintiff died and that a request for 
substitution will be filed.5  The circuit court sets 
August 
1, 
2001, 
as 
the 
date 
for 
amending 
the 
pleadings. 
July 
5, 
2001: 
Richard 
Schoenecker, 
one 
of 
the 
plaintiff's three sons, petitions the probate court to 
appoint him personal representative of his mother's 
estate 
in 
accordance 
with 
her 
will. 
 
Richard 
Schoenecker is represented in the probate proceedings 
by Attorney Pyzyk.  Copies of the petition and will 
are forwarded to the defendant.  
July 16, 2001: The defendant files a motion to dismiss 
the 
action 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 803.10(1)(a), 
claiming that a motion for substitution was not 
properly filed within 90 days of his service of the 
suggestion of death on Attorney Pyzyk.   
July 30, 2001: Richard Schoenecker files a motion for 
substitution requesting that he be substituted as 
plaintiff.  The affidavit of Attorney Pyzyk attached 
to the motion for substitution states that the only 
assets of the estate are the current claims pending in 
this appeal. 
                                                 
4 Wisconsin Stat. § 803.10(1)(a) describes the suggestion of 
death as "a statement of the facts of death."  The suggestion of 
death in the present case states that Ruth M. Schwister died on 
November 4, 2000.  Nothing is mentioned about surviving heirs, 
beneficiaries, a will, or a personal representative. 
5 An informal reference to the death of the plaintiff is not 
a 
formal 
suggestion 
of 
death 
as 
required 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 803.10(1)(a).  Wheeler v. Gen. Tire & Rubber Co., 
142 Wis. 2d 798, 808, 419 N.W.2d 331 (1987). 
No. 
01-2621   
 
6 
 
July 31, 2001: The probate court appoints Richard 
Schoenecker 
the 
personal 
representative 
of 
the 
plaintiff's estate. 
August 6, 2001: The circuit court conducts a hearing 
on the defendant's motion to dismiss the action and on 
the personal representative's motion for substitution. 
September 17, 2001: The circuit court issues an order 
substituting 
Richard 
Schoenecker, 
the 
personal 
representative of the plaintiff's estate, for the 
deceased plaintiff.  The circuit court holds that the 
defendant's service of the suggestion of death on the 
attorney who had represented the deceased plaintiff 
did not trigger the 90-day substitution period under 
Wis. Stat. § 803.10(1)(a). 
November 8, 2001: The court of appeals grants the 
defendant leave to appeal this order. 
June 26, 2002: The court of appeals certifies the 
appeal to this court. 
II 
¶7 
The interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 803.10(1)(a) and 
its application to the undisputed facts in the case at bar 
present questions of law that this court determines independent 
of the circuit court, but benefiting from its analysis.6 
¶8 
Wisconsin Stat. § 803.10(1)(a) is a rule adopted by 
the supreme court in 1975.  When this court interprets court 
rules, it turns to the rules of statutory interpretation for 
guidance.  The goal of interpreting a court rule is to ascertain 
and give effect to the intent of the supreme court in adopting 
                                                 
6 State v. Leitner, 2002 WI 77, ¶16, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 646 
N.W.2d 341. 
No. 
01-2621   
 
7 
 
the rule.7  The first step in ascertaining the intent of the 
supreme court is to look to the language adopted.  When the 
language of the court rule does not give sufficient guidance, we 
must look to rules of interpretation for assistance.  We may 
look to the history, the objective, and the subject matter of 
the rule to divine its meaning. 
¶9 
The language of Wis. Stat. § 803.10(1)(a) provides 
little guidance for ascertaining who must be served with a 
suggestion of death in order to trigger the 90-day period for 
filing a motion for substitution.  The second sentence of 
§ 803.10(1)(a) governs the filing of a motion for substitution.8  
A motion for substitution may be made by any party or by 
representatives or successors of the deceased party.9 
                                                 
7 Split Rock Hardwoods, Inc. v. Lumber Liquidators, Inc., 
2002 WI 66, ¶15, 253 Wis. 2d 238, 646 N.W.2d 10; Jadair Inc. v. 
United 
States 
Fire 
Ins. 
Co., 
209 
Wis. 2d 187, 
194, 
562 
N.W.2d 401 (1997); County of Door v. Hayes-Brook, 153 Wis. 2d 1, 
21-22, 449 N.W.2d 601 (1990)(Abrahamson, J., concurring). 
8 The second sentence of Wis. Stat. § 803.10(1)(a) reads: 
The motion for substitution may be made by any party 
or by the successors or representatives of the 
deceased party and, together with the notice of 
hearing, shall be served on the parties as provided in 
§ 801.14 and upon persons not parties in the manner 
provided in § 801.11 for the service of a summons. 
9 The words "representatives" and "successors" are not 
defined in Wis. Stat. § 803.10(1)(a).  "Representative" likely 
means a person who acts on behalf of another and probably refers 
to the legal personal representative appointed by the probate 
court.  Similarly, "successor" likely means a person who 
succeeds to the rights and responsibilities of another.  A 
successor might include, for example, heirs or beneficiaries of 
a will or distributees of an estate that had been distributed.  
Rende v. Kay, 415 F.2d 983, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
No. 
01-2621   
 
8 
 
¶10 The notice of the motion for substitution is served, 
along with a notice of hearing, on the parties pursuant to 
§ 801.14 (service by mail on the party or party's attorney) and 
on persons who are not parties pursuant to § 801.11 (personal 
service or by leaving document at usual place of abode).10   
¶11 Since the parties will ordinarily be named and known, 
service by mail on them or their attorneys should present little 
difficulty.  Serving nonparties, however, raises difficulties; 
Wis. Stat. § 803.10(1)(a) does not explain who are nonparties to 
be served.  
¶12 The next sentence in Wis. Stat. § 803.01(1)(a) governs 
the service of the suggestion of death, which may, but need not, 
precede the motion for substitution.  It is this sentence in 
§ 803.10(1)(a) that is specifically at issue in the present 
case.11 
¶13 The service of the suggestion of death is significant 
because 
it 
limits 
the 
time 
within 
which 
a 
motion 
for 
substitution can be made.  Wisconsin Stat. § 803.10(1)(a) 
provides that an action shall be dismissed against the deceased 
                                                 
10 3 Jay E. Grenig & Walter L. Harvey, Wisconsin Practice 
§ 310.2 (2d ed. 1994). 
11 The third sentence of the rule reads: 
Unless the motion for substitution is made not later 
than 90 days after the death is suggested on the 
record by service of a statement of the facts of the 
death as provided herein for the service of the 
motion, the action shall be dismissed as to the 
deceased party. 
No. 
01-2621   
 
9 
 
party unless a motion for substitution is made within 90 days 
after the fact of death is "suggested" on the court record by 
service in the same manner as a motion for substitution.12 
¶14 Wisconsin Stat. § 803.10(1)(a) 
therefore 
appears to 
require that the suggestion of death, like the motion to 
substitute, be served on the parties and on persons who are not 
parties.  Consequently, the language on filing a suggestion of 
death is not helpful.  Like the language in the first part of 
the court rule relating to the motion for substitution, it does 
not state which nonparties are to be served. 
¶15 Without clear language in Wis. Stat. § 803.10(1)(a) 
identifying the nonparties who must be served with a suggestion 
of death, we turn our attention to the history and purpose of 
the court rule for guidance.   
¶16 The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court 
adopted 
the current 
version of § 803.10(1)(a) in 1975 by copying, almost verbatim, 
the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1) as 
amended in 1963.13  The Wisconsin Judicial Council Committee's 
                                                 
12 Wheeler, 142 Wis. 2d at 807 (citing Rende, 415 F.2d at 
985); see also 3 Jay E. Grenig & Walter L. Harvey, Wisconsin 
Practice § 310.2 & n.6 (2d ed. 1994)(citing Charles Alan Wright 
et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1955 (2d ed. 1986); 
Advisory Committee Note to F. R. Civ. P. 25). 
Although § 803.10(1)(a) does not state who may serve a 
suggestion of death, no one challenges the defendant's service 
of the suggestion of death in the present case. 
13 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1) reads as 
follows: 
If a party dies and the claim is not thereby 
extinguished, the court may order substitution of the 
No. 
01-2621   
 
10 
 
Notes to § 803.10 expressly state that the section is based on 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1) and "provides a simpler 
method for substitution of parties after death than is found in 
[Wis. Stat.] §§ 269.14 through 269.24."14 
¶17 Because Wis. Stat. § 803.10(1)(a) is based on Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 25(a)(1), we look to the history of the 
federal rule and the decisions of federal courts regarding the 
substitution 
process 
of 
Rule 
25(a)(1) 
for 
guidance 
in 
interpreting § 803.10(1)(a).15   
¶18 The history of Federal Rule 25 demonstrates that the 
goal of the 1963 version of Rule 25(a)(1) that Wisconsin adopted 
was 
to 
provide 
courts 
with 
a 
flexible 
method 
for 
the 
substitution of a party after death, alleviating the "hardships 
                                                                                                                                                             
proper parties.  The motion for substitution may be 
made 
by 
any 
party 
or 
by 
the 
successors 
or 
representatives of the deceased party and, together 
with the notice of hearing, shall be served on the 
parties as provided in Rule 5 and upon persons not 
parties in the manner provided in Rule 4 for the 
service of a summons, and may be served in any 
judicial district.  Unless the motion for substitution 
is made not later than 90 days after the death is 
suggested upon the record by service of a statement of 
the fact of the death as provided herein for the 
service of the motion, the action shall be dismissed 
as to the deceased party. 
14 Wisconsin Stat. § 803.10 is based on Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 25 except for subsection (5), which is based on 
former § 269.22.  Charles D. Clausen & David P. Low, The New 
Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure Chapters 801-803, 59 Marq. L. 
Rev. 1, 111 (1975). 
15 See Wheeler, 142 Wis. 2d at 807 (federal case law on Rule 
25(a)(1) "may be persuasive"). 
No. 
01-2621   
 
11 
 
and inequities" created by the previous rule.  Before the 1963 
amendment, a federal trial court was required to dismiss a case 
if no motion for substitution was filed within two years after 
the date of death regardless of notice (or lack thereof) to any 
successors or representatives of the deceased.16  No extensions 
of this two-year period were allowed.  This rule was rigorously 
applied with harsh results and was described as "easily the 
poorest rule of all Federal Rules."17  Thus, the 1963 amendment 
was aimed at moving away from rigid deadlines for dismissing 
actions upon the death of a party.18   
¶19 Although the 1963 amendment provides that the action 
shall be dismissed if the 90-day period is not honored, 
dismissal is not mandatory and lies within the discretion of the 
trial court.19  A trial court may extend the time in which to 
file a motion for substitution before or after the expiration of 
the 90-day period.20  As one federal court stated: "In making 
this determination the Court is mindful of the underlying 
purpose of Rule 25(a)(1) which is to allow flexibility in 
                                                 
16 Rende, 415 F.2d at 985 (citing Advisory Committee Notes 
to F. R. Civ. P. 25(a)). 
17 Rende, 415 F.2d at 984 (quoting 4 James Wm. Moore, 
Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 25.01(7)(2d ed. 1950)). 
18 Rende, 415 F.2d at 985 (citing Advisory Committee Notes 
to F. R. Civ. P. 25(a)). 
19 6 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice 
§ 25.13(3)(3d ed. 2002). 
20 See 7C Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 1955 (2d ed. 1986). 
No. 
01-2621   
 
12 
 
substitution."21  Another federal court explained that "[t]he 90 
day period was not intended to act as a bar to otherwise 
meritorious actions."22  Further discretion is granted to the 
trial court in the first sentence, which provides that a "court 
may order substitution of the proper parties." 
¶20 The objective of the suggestion of death set forth in 
Rule 25(a)(1) is to alert nonparties to the consequences of the 
death of a party in a pending lawsuit and to signal them that 
they must act if they desire to preserve the decedent's claim.23  
Moreover, federal courts have concluded that the purpose of Rule 
25(a)(1) is to establish a procedure that protects those who 
have an interest in the litigation and authority to act on 
behalf of the decedent by permitting substitution for the 
deceased party without unduly burdening the surviving party and 
without unreasonably delaying the litigation. 
                                                 
21 Kasting v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 196 F.R.D. 595, 601 
(D. Kan. 2000); see also Grandbouche v. Lovell, 913 F.2d 835, 
836 (10th Cir. 1990). 
22 Rende, 415 F.2d at 986. 
23 See, e.g., Fariss v. Lynchburg Foundry, 769 F.2d 958, 962 
(4th Cir. 1985)("[T]he rule [25(a)] seeks 'to assure the parties 
to the action and other concerned persons of notice of the death 
so that they may take appropriate action to make substitution 
for the deceased party.'" (citation omitted)); Barlow v. Ground, 
39 F.3d 231, 233-34 (9th Cir. 1994)("[T]he present Rule 25 was 
designed 'to inform all interested persons of the death so that 
they may take appropriate action.'" (quoting 3B James Wm. Moore 
et al., Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 25.06(2)(2d ed. 1991))); 
Kasting, 196 F.R.D. at 599 ("Rule 25(a)(1) is designed to 
prevent a situation in which a case is dismissed because a party 
never learned of the death of an opposing party."). 
No. 
01-2621   
 
13 
 
¶21 Federal courts have consistently held that when the 
suggestion of death is served after a personal representative 
has been appointed for a deceased plaintiff's estate, service 
must be on that representative to trigger the 90-day time 
period.24  Service on the personal representative of the deceased 
plaintiff's estate adequately protects those who succeed to the 
interests of the decedent without unduly burdening the surviving 
defendant.25 
¶22 When no personal representative has been appointed, as 
in the present case, some courts have concluded that a 
defendant's service of a suggestion of death upon counsel of 
record for the deceased plaintiff will trigger the 90-day time 
period.26  In these cases, the courts similarly balanced the 
serving party's duty of notice to appropriate nonparties against 
the burden on the serving party of locating and serving 
                                                 
24 When the surviving party knows the identity of the 
executor of the deceased plaintiff's estate, the executor must 
be served to trigger the 90-day time period.  Barlow, 39 F.3d at 
233-34.  See also Fariss, 769 F.2d at 961 ("Where, as here, a 
personal representative has been appointed following the death 
of a party, the suggestion of death must be personally served on 
that representative.  Because Mrs. Fariss never received such 
service, the substitution was timely."); Grandbouche, 913 F.2d 
835 (no formal suggestion of death was filed but the court also 
commented that because the personal representative of decedent's 
estate did not receive service of any purported suggestion of 
death, the 90-day limitations period did not begin to run). 
25 See, e.g., Fariss, 769 F.2d 958. 
26 See, e.g., Yonofsky v. Wernick, 362 F. Supp. 1005 
(S.D.N.Y. 1973); Chobot v. Powers, 169 F.R.D. 263 (W.D.N.Y. 
1990). 
No. 
01-2621   
 
14 
 
appropriate nonparties and concluded that locating those with an 
interest in the deceased plaintiff's estate imposed an undue 
burden on the surviving party.27  Therefore, service on the 
deceased party's former attorney was sufficient in these cases. 
¶23 In Yonofsky v. Wernick, 362 F. Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 
1973), for example, the plaintiff passed away while his claim 
alleging wrongful exclusion from a joint venture or partnership 
was pending.  The defendant, a former business acquaintance of 
the plaintiff, served a suggestion of death on the deceased 
plaintiff's attorney just two days after his death.  The 
Yonofsky 
court 
noted 
that 
normally 
the 
"executor 
or 
administrator of a deceased party's estate is the individual 
substituted and upon whom service is effected."28  However, under 
the circumstances of the Yonofsky case, in which little 
relationship or familiarity 
existed 
between 
the 
plaintiff 
decedent and the surviving defendant, the court concluded, "it 
would be difficult for defendant to know whom else to serve 
                                                 
27 Some courts, by contrast, impose a burden on the serving 
party to wait until a personal representative has been appointed 
and, if none is appointed, to take steps to have one appointed 
for purposes of the litigation.  See, e.g., Kaldawy v. Gold 
Service Movers, Inc., 129 F.R.D. 475, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
28 Yonofsky, 362 F. Supp. at 1011. 
No. 
01-2621   
 
15 
 
beside plaintiff's former counsel" and therefore service on the 
plaintiff's attorney activated the 90-day period.29 
¶24 In contrast to these cases, in Fariss v. Lynchburg 
Foundry, 769 F.2d 958 (4th Cir. 1985), the court explained that 
when a personal representative has not yet been appointed, the 
serving party should normally bear the burden of determining 
whom to serve given the goal of Rule 25(a)(1) to alert 
interested nonparties to the consequences of the death of a 
party in a pending suit before it is too late.  In Fariss, a 
personal representative had been appointed, but the court 
commented on the obligation of the defendant in serving the 
suggestion of death as follows: 
In some instances, it may prove more difficult to 
determine 
whom 
to 
serve, 
but 
it 
is 
generally 
appropriate to require the serving party to shoulder 
that burden, rather than permitting the absence of 
notice 
to 
decedent's 
representative 
to 
lead 
to 
forfeiture of the action.  Absent personal service, 
there is no reason to presume that the successor or 
                                                 
29 Yonofsky, 362 F. Supp. at 1012; see also Chobot, 169 
F.R.D. at 267 (holding that the defendant correctional facility 
had triggered the 90-day period for substitution by serving the 
deceased pro se prisoner plaintiff's last known address because 
the "practical burden" of following the typical requirements for 
service of a suggestion of death and petitioning the probate 
court to have a personal representative appointed "would be 
significant" and "unduly burdensome"). 
Compare Jones v. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 725 P.2d 836 
(N.M. Ct. App. 1985), in which no personal representative had 
been appointed and the court held that the deceased plaintiff's 
attorney was not the proper party to receive service of the 
suggestion of the plaintiff's death to trigger the 90-day period 
for substitution of plaintiff. 
No. 
01-2621   
 
16 
 
representative, who must decide whether to pursue the 
claim, is aware of the substitution requirement.30 
 
¶25 Moreover, 
in 
Kasting 
v. 
American 
Family 
Mutual 
Insurance Co., 196 F.R.D. 595, 601 (D. Kan. 2000), the court 
concluded that a defendant's service of a suggestion of death on 
the widow of the deceased plaintiff prior to her appointment as 
personal representative was sufficient under Rule 25(a)(1).   
¶26 Immediately after the death of the plaintiff in 
Kasting, American Family, the defendant, served the suggestion 
of death on the attorney for the deceased plaintiff.  Three 
months 
later, 
when 
no 
personal 
representative 
had 
been 
appointed, American Family served the deceased plaintiff's 
widow.   
¶27 The Kasting court concluded that requiring an opposing 
party to await the formal determination of who the decedent's 
successors or representatives are before filing a suggestion of 
death would delay serving the suggestion of death, and likely 
all other legal proceedings in the case, for an inordinate 
period of time.31  The Kasting court also concluded that the 
widow of the deceased plaintiff was a nonparty within the 
meaning of Rule 25(a)(1) for service of a suggestion of death 
and further opined that the 90-day period was triggered by the 
service of the suggestion of death on the widow.32 
                                                 
30 Fariss, 769 F.2d at 962 (citations omitted).   
31 Kasting, 196 F.R.D. at 598.   
32 Id. at 601. 
No. 
01-2621   
 
17 
 
 
¶28 None of the cases cited by the parties, or cited 
above, provides clear guidance on the application of the 
nonparty service requirements for the suggestion of death under 
Wis. Stat. § 803.10(1)(a) to the facts of this case.  Yet the 
message delivered by these cases and the history, objectives, 
and subject matter of Federal Rule 25(a)(1) is that courts have 
wide discretion to look to the facts of each case to decide 
which nonparties need to be served with the suggestion of death 
in order to trigger the 90-day period.  And when making this 
determination regarding a deceased plaintiff, a court considers 
such factors as: (1) whether the suggestion of death has been 
served on nonparties who may have a right or interest in 
deciding whether a motion for substitution should be filed; (2) 
how substantial the burden is on the person serving the 
suggestion of death to identify nonparties who have the right or 
interest to move for substitution and to serve them with the 
suggestion of death; and (3) whether the service of the 
suggestion of death protects the circuit court's control over 
the docket and the court's and parties' need for the fair and 
expeditious resolution of the case. 
III 
¶29 Guided by these three factors, we conclude that in the 
present case the suggestion of death served only on the deceased 
plaintiff's attorney, when no personal representative had been 
appointed, was not sufficient to trigger the 90-day period under 
Wis. Stat. § 803.10(1)(a). 
No. 
01-2621   
 
18 
 
¶30 First, serving the suggestion of death on Attorney 
Pyzyk alone did not necessarily alert persons who may have a 
right or interest in deciding whether a motion for substitution 
should be filed of the need to protect their interests or the 
interests of the decedent.   
¶31 The defendant argues that as a matter of policy, 
Wis. Stat. § 803.10(1)(a) should be interpreted to allow service 
on the deceased plaintiff's attorney because the attorney is in 
the best position to inform interested persons that they must 
substitute for the decedent or risk losing any interest they may 
have in the litigation.  The defendant contends that the 
language of Wis. Stat. § 803.10(1)(a) does not require that he 
serve the suggestion of death on the decedent's personal 
representative, and nothing in § 803.10(1)(a) prohibits service 
on the attorney for the deceased plaintiff when no personal 
representative has been named.   
¶32 We agree with the defendant that the suggestion of 
death should be served on the deceased plaintiff's attorney, 
even though the attorney is not a party to the action33 and is 
not 
necessarily 
the 
attorney 
for 
the 
representatives 
or 
                                                 
33 An attorney for a deceased plaintiff is not a party to 
the action.  Kasting, 196 F.R.D. at 598. 
No one complains in the present case that service on the 
attorney for the deceased plaintiff, a nonparty, was improper 
because the service was by mail rather than by personal service.  
In Barlow, the court held that service by mail upon the deceased 
plaintiff's attorney did not trigger the 90-day time period.  
Barlow, 39 F.3d at 234.    
No. 
01-2621   
 
19 
 
successors of the deceased plaintiff.  The attorney for a 
deceased plaintiff has a professional obligation to "take steps 
to the extent reasonably necessary to protect a client's 
interests,"34 and, as an officer of the court, to advise the 
court of a change in his or her authority to act on behalf of 
the client.  Thus, serving the attorney enlists the assistance 
of that attorney to protect the deceased's rights and interests 
to the extent that it is reasonably practicable for the attorney 
to do so.35  Moreover, the burden on the serving party to serve 
the deceased plaintiff's attorney is minimal.   
¶33 We disagree with the defendant, however, that serving 
Attorney Pyzyk alone was sufficient in the present case to 
trigger the 90-day period.  An attorney's agency to act on 
behalf of a client ends with the death of the client.36  Attorney 
                                                 
34 See SCR 20:16(d), providing that "upon termination of 
representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent 
reasonably necessary to protect a client's interests . . . ." 
A 
lawyer 
must 
take 
steps 
to 
the 
extent 
reasonably 
practicable to protect the client's interests, such as allowing 
time for employment of other counsel and giving notice that the 
lawyer lacks authorization to act.  1 Restatement (Third), Law 
Governing Lawyers § 33 cmt. e, g (2000). 
35 A lawyer for a deceased client must cooperate in any 
transition and seek to protect the deceased client's property 
and other rights.  1 Restatement (Third), Law Governing Lawyers 
§ 31 cmt. e (2000). 
36 Restatement 
(Second) 
of 
Agency 
§ 120(1)(b) 
(1958) 
("[A]fter notice of the principal's death, the agent has no 
power to bind the estate of the principal.").   
No. 
01-2621   
 
20 
 
Pyzyk was not a person with a right to decide or an interest in 
deciding whether a motion for substitution should be filed; the 
rights and interests of a deceased client do not pass to the 
attorney.  Rather, the deceased plaintiff's rights and interests 
pass to other persons, such as the personal representative of 
her estate or to the heirs or beneficiaries of her estate.37  
Here, while Attorney Pyzyk later represented Richard Schoenecker 
as personal representative of the deceased plaintiff's estate, 
nothing in the record shows that this relationship existed at 
the time of service of the suggestion of death or that Attorney 
Pyzyk and Richard Schoenecker had any relationship prior to the 
service of the suggestion of death.38   
¶34 Second, the burden on the defendant, the serving party, 
to identify and serve appropriate persons with the suggestion of 
death was minimal in this case.  The defendant argues that even 
if, in this case, he was in a better position than Attorney 
Pyzyk to identify and serve heirs, beneficiaries, successors, 
and representatives of the deceased plaintiff, that will not 
                                                                                                                                                             
For a discussion of an attorney's responsibility after the 
death of a client, see J. Kenin Webb, Until Death Do We Part?: 
An Attorney's Responsibility After the Death of the Client, 25 
J. Legal Prof. 239 (2001). 
37 1 Restatement (Third), Law Governing Lawyers § 31 cmt. e 
(2000). 
38 "Non-party successors or representatives of the deceased 
party, however, may not be protected by the attorney of the 
deceased party.  It is entirely possible that no relationship 
will 
exist 
between 
them, 
and 
that 
the 
successor 
or 
representative will be represented by other counsel or by no 
counsel at all."  Barlow, 39 F.3d at 233. 
No. 
01-2621   
 
21 
 
always be true in other cases.  The defendant rightly notes that 
the number of possible "successors or representatives" of a 
deceased party could be large under Wisconsin law.   
 
¶35 We agree with the defendant that in other cases it 
might be unreasonable to read Wis. Stat. § 803.10(1)(a) as 
requiring service on "potential" successors or representatives.  
But we are not dealing with "other cases" or "every case."  We 
are applying Wis. Stat. § 803.10(1)(a) to the facts of the 
present case.   
¶36 On the facts of this case, it is not an unreasonable 
burden on the defendant to require that he serve the suggestion 
of 
death 
on 
his 
brothers, 
two 
individuals 
with 
readily 
identifiable interests in the deceased plaintiff's estate.  
Although the defendant did not have a copy of his mother's will 
when he served the suggestion of death and therefore did not 
know his brother Richard was named as personal representative,39 
the defendant conceded to the circuit court that he knew that 
his two brothers were very likely beneficiaries under his 
mother's 
will.40  
Indeed, 
there is 
nothing 
difficult or 
                                                 
39 The defendant did not receive a copy of the will until 
five months after the suggestion of death was served. 
40 In the defendant's Reply Brief supporting his motion to 
dismiss and opposing the personal representative's motion for 
substitution at the circuit court, he states, "[O]n the facts of 
this case, because it involves a dispute among family members, 
defendant Daniel Schoenecker obviously was aware that his two 
brothers might be beneficiaries under Ruth Schwister's Last Will 
and Testament" (emphasis added). 
No. 
01-2621   
 
22 
 
burdensome about serving them, in addition to Attorney Pyzyk, in 
the case at hand. 
¶37 Third, to declare that service of the suggestion of 
death triggered the 90-day period in the present case would not 
further the goal of fair and expeditious resolution of the case.   
¶38 The defendant argues that to hold that service on the 
attorney alone in the present case is insufficient to trigger 
the 90-day period would inordinately delay litigation and 
require the surviving party to continue to incur expenses 
associated with defending the action.  The defendant objects to 
forcing a surviving party to wait to file a suggestion of death 
until a personal representative is appointed or to petition the 
probate court to appoint a personal representative. 
 ¶39 We are not requiring the defendant to wait until a 
personal representative is appointed or to petition the probate 
court to appoint a personal representative.  The defendant here 
need serve only his brothers, and this requirement causes no 
inordinate delay.  In any event, here, the litigation proceeded 
without interruption and without objection by the defendant.  
¶40 From the time the plaintiff died until the time the 
personal representative of her estate was named, the case 
actively continued with the defendant's full participation.  On 
January 25, 2001, nearly three months after the plaintiff's 
death, the defendant, through his attorney, advised the court 
that he would answer the complaint on or before February 7, 
2001.  The answer was filed on February 8, 2001, at the same 
No. 
01-2621   
 
23 
 
time that the suggestion of death was filed with the court and 
served on Attorney Pyzyk. 
¶41 On June 18, 2001, a status conference was held.  The 
defendant's counsel appeared and agreed to the terms of a 
scheduling order requiring, among other things, that he submit 
pleadings before August 1, 2001, and witness lists by November 
7, 2001.  At that same status conference, both the court and the 
defendant's counsel were informed that a motion for substitution 
of the plaintiff would be filed.  Not until July 17, 2001, after 
the petition to the probate court was filed to appoint Richard 
Schoenecker the personal representative for the estate of the 
deceased plaintiff, did the defendant finally file his motion to 
dismiss the action for failure to substitute within 90 days of 
the suggestion of death.  The motion to substitute followed on 
July 30, 2001, just two weeks after the motion to dismiss and 
only six months after the defendant filed his answer. 
¶42 The 
federal 
rule 
adopted 
by 
Wisconsin 
in 
Wis. Stat. § 803.10(1)(a) was a response to a two-year statute 
of limitations that ran from the date of death and was thought 
harsh and oppressive.  In this case, less than a year passed 
between the plaintiff's death and the appointment of a personal 
representative and the motion for substitution.  To hold that 
service was proper under the circumstances of the present case 
to trigger the 90-day period and that the case should be 
dismissed against the deceased plaintiff because waiting for the 
appointment of a personal representative inordinately delays 
No. 
01-2621   
 
24 
 
litigation 
is 
to 
ignore 
the 
history 
and 
purpose 
behind 
Wis. Stat. § 803.10(1)(a).  
¶43 Wisconsin 
Stat. § 803.10(1)(a) 
merely 
states 
that 
service be on parties and persons not parties of record without 
identifying these nonparties.  The court rule does not state who 
is required to be served.  It allows a trial court to determine 
whether the appropriate nonparties were served according to the 
totality of the circumstances.  Reading § 803.10(1)(a) to permit 
service on Attorney Pyzyk alone, under the circumstances of the 
present case, would fail to satisfy the objectives of the rule: 
to start the 90-day time period within which to make a motion 
for substitution only after notice is given to interested 
nonparties without unduly burdening the serving party while 
allowing a court to move the litigation toward fair and 
expeditious resolution. 
¶44 Wisconsin 
Stat. § 803.10(1)(a) 
does 
not 
require 
service 
of 
the 
suggestion 
of 
death 
on 
all 
potential 
beneficiaries, heirs, successors, or representatives in every 
case.  We merely hold that the court rule requires the person 
serving the suggestion of death and the court to examine the 
facts of the case in order to determine what interested 
nonparties should be served in each particular case and how 
burdensome the task will be in order to protect the interests of 
all persons and move 
the 
litigation 
toward 
a 
fair and 
expeditious 
resolution. 
 
If 
Wis. Stat. § 803.10(1)(a) 
were 
designed to trigger the 90-day period upon service of the 
suggestion 
of 
death 
on 
the 
personal 
representative, 
if 
No. 
01-2621   
 
25 
 
appointed, or on the attorney of record of the deceased party, 
when no personal representative was appointed, it would have so 
stated.   
IV 
¶45 For the foregoing reasons, we hold, on the facts of 
this case, that service of the suggestion of death only on the 
deceased plaintiff's attorney of record was insufficient to 
activate 
the 
90-day time 
period 
in 
which 
a motion for 
substitution is to be filed under Wis. Stat. § 803.10(1)(a).  To 
trigger the 90-day time period in the present case the defendant 
was obliged to serve his brothers as nonparties.  Serving his 
brothers was necessary to reasonably protect their interests and 
the interests of the decedent when no personal representative 
had yet been appointed.  Moreover, requiring the defendant, the 
surviving party in the present case, to locate and serve his 
brothers, who were readily known to the defendant to be 
potential successors or representatives of the decedent, would 
not 
unduly 
burden 
the 
defendant 
as 
surviving 
party 
or 
unreasonably delay the litigation.  We therefore affirm the 
order of the circuit court holding that the motion for 
substitution was timely.   
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed. 
No. 
01-2621   
 
 
 
1