Case Title: P. v. Kelly

Citation: 

Docket Number: S133114

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2006-11-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 11/27/06 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S133114 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
Ct.App. 6 H027483 
GARY ROGERS KELLY, 
) 
 
) 
Santa Clara County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. CC320855 
___________________________________ ) 
 
Article VI, section 14, of the California Constitution provides that 
“[d]ecisions of the Supreme Court and the courts of appeal that determine causes 
shall be in writing with reasons stated.”  In this case, we consider what this 
constitutional mandate requires in a criminal appeal in which defense counsel files 
a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), raising no 
issue for the appellate court’s review, the defendant files supplemental arguments, 
and the appellate court identifies no arguable issue.   
We conclude that a decision affirming the judgment in a Wende appeal 
disposes of a cause within the meaning of article VI, section 14 of the California 
Constitution, and therefore must be in writing with reasons stated.  Because the 
defendant in a Wende appeal has a right to file supplemental contentions, the Court 
of Appeal must consider these contentions in the course of disposing of the cause.  
Therefore, to comply with the constitutional mandate, the opinion must reflect the 
defendant’s contentions and the reasons that they fail.  We further conclude that, 
 
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in light of Wende’s requirement that Courts of Appeal review the entire record, 
significant efficiency in the processing of subsequent proceedings, including 
future habeas corpus proceedings, can be achieved if the Courts of Appeal include 
in their Wende opinions a brief description of the facts and procedural history of 
the case, the crimes of which the defendant was convicted, and the punishment 
imposed.  Therefore, in the exercise of our supervisory power over the courts of 
this state, we direct the Courts of Appeal to include this information in their 
opinions in Wende appeals.  Finally, we encourage the Courts of Appeal to include 
in their Wende opinions any other information from the record that they anticipate 
will be relevant in further challenges to the judgment.   
The Court of Appeal’s opinion in the present case does not satisfy the 
constitutional requirement of a decision in writing with reasons stated.  Rather 
than reversing the judgment and remanding the matter to that court, however, we 
have undertaken a review of the record and affirm the judgment with reasons 
stated.   
I. 
The facts of the underlying case are fairly straightforward.  On July 21, 
2003, an off-duty San Jose police officer witnessed defendant driving a vehicle in 
a reckless and erratic manner.  The officer followed defendant and called for 
backup assistance.  A uniformed officer arrived just as defendant parked his car.  
Defendant resisted the two officers and was handcuffed.  After refusing to breathe 
into a preliminary alcohol-screening device, he was transported to the police 
department’s alcohol investigation bureau, where he declined tests of his blood, 
breath, or urine. 
At trial, the two police officers testified concerning defendant’s conduct 
and appearance, and an expert testified regarding the effects of alcohol on the 
human body.  In addition, the parties stipulated that defendant had suffered a 
 
3
felony conviction in December 1996 for driving under the influence of an 
alcoholic beverage in violation of Vehicle Code section 23152.  The jury found 
defendant guilty of one felony count of driving under the influence of alcohol after 
having been convicted of a felony within 10 years (Pen. Code, §§ 23152, 23550.5, 
subd. (a)) and one misdemeanor count of resisting, delaying, or obstructing an 
officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)).  The trial court imposed the midterm 
sentence of two years’ imprisonment for the felony, and a six-month term for the 
misdemeanor to be served concurrently with the felony sentence. 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, and the Court of Appeal 
appointed counsel to represent him.  Appointed counsel, having found no arguable 
issue in his own review of the record, filed a brief pursuant to Wende, supra, 25 
Cal.3d 436, setting forth the facts of the case and requesting that the appellate 
court review the entire record on appeal.  The brief indicated that counsel would 
provide further briefing if requested by the court, but raised no specific issue.  
Both counsel and the Court of Appeal advised defendant of his right to file a 
supplemental brief to bring to the court’s attention any issue he believed deserved 
review.  Defendant filed a letter in the Court of Appeal setting forth 15 points for 
the court’s consideration. 
We set forth in its entirety the opinion rendered by the Court of Appeal: 
“Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of one felony count of 
driving under the influence of alcohol with a felony prior within 10 years [citation; 
fn. omitted], and one misdemeanor count of resisting, delaying, or obstructing an 
officer [citation].  As to count one, the jury found true the allegation that defendant 
willfully refused a peace officer’s request to submit to chemical test [citation]. 
“We appointed counsel to represent defendant in this court.  Counsel filed 
an opening brief that stated the case and the facts, but raised no specific issues.  
 
4
Defense counsel requested we review the record pursuant to People v. Wende 
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. 
“We notified defendant of his right to submit written argument on his own 
behalf within 30 days.  We have read and considered defendant’s written 
argument. 
“Pursuant to People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, we have reviewed the 
entire record and have concluded that there are no arguable issues on appeal. 
“Disposition 
“The judgment is affirmed.” 
Defendant then filed, in propria persona, a petition in this court seeking 
review of the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeal, based on its failure to 
address the contentions set forth in his supplemental brief.  We granted 
defendant’s petition, appointed new counsel to represent him, and limited briefing 
and argument to the issue of what is required of the Court of Appeal in this context 
under article VI, section 14, of the California Constitution. 
II. 
In order to construe present article VI, section 14 of the California 
Constitution, we first review the history of that provision.  The California 
Constitution of 1849 established a Supreme Court consisting of a Chief Justice and 
two associate justices, and granted the court appellate jurisdiction in a variety of 
cases.  (Cal. Const. of 1849, art. VI, §§ 1, 2, 4.)  Amendments to the Constitution 
in 1862 expanded the court’s membership to include a Chief Justice and four 
associate justices, and described a wider range of cases in which the court had 
appellate jurisdiction.  (Id., art. VI, §§ 2, 4, as amended in 1862.)  As amended, the 
Constitution continued to require the Legislature to provide for publication of the 
court’s decisions as the Legislature deemed expedient (id., art. VI, § 12), but did 
not impose any requirement upon the court to provide reasons for its decisions. 
 
5
In 1854, the Legislature enacted a statute requiring that “[a]ll decisions 
given upon an appeal in any appella[te] Court of this State, shall be given in 
writing, with the reason therefor, and filed with the Clerk of the Court.”  (Stats. 
1854, ch. 54, § 69, p. 72.)  This court held in Houston v. Williams (1859) 13 Cal. 
24 (Houston) that the Legislature was without authority to require the judicial 
branch to provide reasons for its decisions in written opinions.  “The Legislature 
can no more require this Court to state the reasons of its decisions, than this Court 
can require, for the validity of the statutes, that the Legislature shall accompany 
them with the reasons for their enactment.  The principles of law settled are to be 
extracted from the records of the cases in which the decisions are rendered.  The 
reports are full of adjudged cases, in which opinions were never delivered.  The 
facts are stated by the Reporter, with the points arising thereon, and are followed 
by the judgments rendered, and yet no one ever doubted that the Courts, in the 
instances mentioned, were discharging their entire constitutional obligations.  
[Citations.]”  (Id. at p. 25.) 
The decision in Houston, supra, 13 Cal. 24, acknowledged that the reasons 
underlying the court’s judgments are “of great importance in the information they 
impart as to the principles of law which govern the Court, and should guide 
litigants.”  (Id. at p. 26.)  It added that “right-minded Judges, in important cases — 
when the pressure of other business will permit — will give such opinions.  It is 
not every case, however, which will justify the expenditure of time necessary to 
write an opinion.  Many cases involve no new principles, and are appealed only 
for delay.  It can serve no purpose of public good to repeat elementary principles 
of law which have never been questioned for centuries.”  (Ibid.)  
By the time the state’s second Constitutional Convention was convened in 
1878, the Supreme Court’s workload was overwhelming.  There was no provision 
in either the original 1849 Constitution or the amendments of 1862 for 
 
6
intermediate courts of appeal — all appeals from the “district courts,” as the trial 
courts of general jurisdiction were called, went directly to the Supreme Court.  
During the four years preceding the Constitutional Convention of 1878-1879, the 
court had elected not to provide a written opinion in nearly one quarter of the more 
than 2,200 cases it decided.  (2 Willis & Stockton, Debates and Proceedings, Cal. 
Const. Convention 1878-1879, p. 950 (Willis & Stockton).) 
Although the court’s decision in Houston asserted that no court with “the 
least respect for its own dignity and independence” could acknowledge a 
legislative power to require written reasons for the court’s opinion (Houston, 
supra, 13 Cal. at p. 25), the delegates to the 1878-1879 Constitutional Convention 
concluded that such a requirement should be imposed by the Constitution itself.  
The convention’s Committee on Judiciary and Judicial Department (Committee) 
proposed changes to address both the court’s burgeoning caseload and its practice 
of deciding cases without written opinion.  With some modifications, the 
Committee’s proposals thereafter were adopted by the delegates and subsequently 
by the electorate as part of article VI of the Constitution of 1879. 
In order to increase the court’s capacity to decide cases, the Committee 
proposed a seven-member court with two departments, each comprised of three 
associate justices.  (2 Willis & Stockton, supra, at p. 392.)  Under the proposal, 
each department would have “the power to hear and determine causes and all 
questions arising therein, subject to the provisions hereinafter contained in relation 
to the Court in bank.”  (Ibid.)  That same provision specified that the presence of 
three Justices would be required “to transact any business in either of the 
departments, except as may be done at chambers, and the concurrence of three 
Justices shall be necessary to pronounce a judgment.  The Chief Justice shall 
apportion the business to the departments, and may, in his discretion, order any 
cause pending before the Court to be heard and decided by the Court in bank.”  
 
7
(Ibid.)  Finally, the proposed new article VI also included a provision concerning 
the court’s opinions:  “In the determination of causes, all decisions of the Court in 
bank or in departments shall be given in writing, and the grounds of the decision 
shall be stated.”  (Ibid.) 
At the Constitutional Convention at which these new provisions were 
proposed, delegate Samuel Wilson spoke concerning “the reasons which have 
impelled the majority of the Committee on Judiciary to recommend section two 
for adoption by the Convention as the new judicial system, as far as the Supreme 
Court is concerned.”  (2 Willis & Stockton, supra, at p. 950.)  He explained that 
the five-member court “has been unable to fully dispatch the business before it.”  
(Ibid.)  He noted that the court had decided 2,242 cases during the preceding four 
years, “[b]ut in order to enable the Court to accomplish that work, it had to decide 
five hundred and fifty-nine cases without giving any opinion in writing.  If it is 
proper and right that a Court of last resort should deliver opinions in writing, 
giving the reasons for its decisions, we have it demonstrated that the Court, as 
heretofore constituted and organized, could not possibly perform its duties, for it 
could not have rendered that number of decisions and have delivered written 
opinions upon them.  The importance of requiring the Court to give written 
opinions cannot be overrated.  They not only become the settled law of the State, 
and are precedents for subsequent cases, but in many causes where the litigation is 
not ended by the decision of the Supreme Court, and new trials are consequent 
upon a reversal, the decision of the Supreme Court should be given in writing, and 
reasons assigned, for they are instructions to the Court below, and are the 
controlling rule in the subsequent litigation.”  (Ibid.) 
Delegate Wilson continued:  “Any gentleman who has practiced in the 
Supreme Court knows that cases have been sent back for new trial, without written 
opinions, and the Courts below have been unable to ascertain the full views of the 
 
8
appellate Court upon the case.  Four or five points may be presented.  The 
Supreme Court may reverse the case and send it back for a new trial upon some 
one of these points, but upon which point the lawyers are unable to say — whether 
on five points or on one.  The result is that the new trial in the Court below takes 
place without any light from above, and the case may be appealed a second time, 
and again reversed upon some one of the same points, and so, ad infinitum; 
whereas, if a written opinion were rendered, it might end the case without a second 
appeal.  That practice shows the inefficiency of any system where written opinions 
are not required, and everywhere throughout the United States the courts are 
required to deliver written opinions, stating the grounds of the decision, as we 
have provided in this section.  Undoubtedly it will insure a careful examination of 
the cases, and result in well considered opinions, because they must come before 
the jurists of the country and be subjected to the severest criticism.  I think every 
lawyer will agree with me, that in every case there should be an opinion in writing.  
It tends to purity and honesty in the administration of justice.”  (2 Willis & 
Stockton, supra, at p. 951.) 
Mr. Wilson reiterated that the recommended appellate system would 
“enable the Court to . . . write opinions on all of the cases,” but acknowledged:  
“Of course, there will always be some cases disposed of without written opinions.  
Sometimes a case goes off on some formal motion, or is dismissed on a technical 
question of practice.  But I am speaking generally, of cases argued and submitted 
upon their merits, and there the decision is of little account as settling the law, 
unless the Court gives its reasons for the decision in writing.”  (2 Willis & 
Stockton, supra, at p. 951.) 
Opposition to the Committee’s proposal focused on the power that the 
restructuring of the court into two departments would give to the Chief Justice to 
control which justices decided particular cases.  All competing proposals included 
 
9
the Committee’s requirement that decisions be in writing with reasons stated, 
except one proposal that simply would have retained the existing provisions of the 
Constitution of 1849, as amended in 1862.  No opposition to the requirement of a 
written opinion was expressed during the debates.  (3 Willis & Stockton, supra, at 
pp. 1331-1333, 1447-1448, 1454-1457, 1499.)  In responding to alternative 
proposals concerning the structure of the court, Mr. Wilson focused on the 
asserted “utter inability of the Supreme Court to decide the cases, and keep up 
with the calendar, and write opinions . . . .”  (3 Willis & Stockton, supra, at p. 
1455.) 
In further support of his proposal, delegate Wilson continued:  “Now, 
everybody knows who has reflected at all upon this subject, or knows anything at 
all about it, that opinions must be written by a Court of last resort as matters of 
precedent.  It is a very different thing from sitting down and saying that the 
judgment of the Court below is reversed or affirmed without giving any reasons, 
because when that is published, nobody knows whether that decision is right or 
wrong.  But when the Judge has to sit down and write an opinion, or, in the 
language of this amendment reported by us, that they must give their opinion in 
writing, stating the grounds of the decision, then they are brought before the whole 
bar of the State, and they are bound to present themselves in a position where law 
and reason sustain the adjudication.  Consequently it is the universal practice in 
the Courts of last resort in the States, and the Supreme Court of the United States, 
to render opinions addressing themselves to the intelligent judgment of the bar of 
the State or of the country, and of the Judges of the country.”  (3 Willis & 
Stockton, supra, at p. 1455.)  
Delegate Clitus Barbour, whose competing proposal also would have 
required opinions in writing with reasons stated, offered the following comments 
in that respect:  “Now, when we require them to state the reasons for a decision, 
 
10
we do not mean they shall write a hundred pages of detail.  We [do] not mean that 
they shall include the small cases, and impose on the country all this fine judicial 
literature, for the Lord knows we have got enough of that already.  To give us the 
reason for it does not take three lines.  I maintain that there is hardly a single case, 
many points as may be made, that cannot be cleared up, and reasons given in five 
pages.  Many of the decisions now in the reports contain thirty pages.  Let them 
write short opinions in all cases, and I contend that it will not be difficult for them 
to write up all the decisions of the Court.”  (3 Willis & Stockton, supra, at pp. 
1455-1456.)  
Thereafter, article VI, section 2, was adopted by the Constitutional 
Convention delegates and subsequently approved by the electorate.  It provided for 
two departments within the Supreme Court, and required that “[i]n the 
determination of causes, all decisions of the Court in bank or in department shall 
be given in writing, and the grounds of the decision shall be stated.”  (Cal. Const., 
art. VI, § 2, as adopted 1879.) 
Despite the efforts of the delegates to ease the burden on the Supreme 
Court by providing for decisions to be rendered by three-justice panels in 
departments, the court’s workload and backlog increased in the ensuing two 
decades until finally, in 1903, the Legislature proposed a constitutional 
amendment to add an intermediate Court of Appeal comprised of three appellate 
districts, each with a three-justice District Court of Appeal.  The proposal was 
approved by the voters in 1904, and included a provision that “[i]n the 
determination of causes, all decisions of the Supreme Court and of the District 
Courts of Appeal shall be given in writing, and the grounds of the decision shall be 
stated.”  (Cal. Const., former art. VI, § 24, as amended Nov. 8, 1904, repealed 
Nov. 8, 1966.) 
 
11
As a result of the 1966 repeal and reenactment of article VI of the 
California Constitution, the requirement of opinions in writing is now found in 
article VI, section 14, and reads:  “Decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of 
appeal that determine causes shall be in writing with reasons stated.”  There is no 
indication in the background materials prepared in the 1960’s for the members of 
the California Constitution Revision Commission committee that was responsible 
for proposed revisions to article VI, or elsewhere, that any change in substance 
was intended with respect to the new wording of the “in writing” requirement.1 
From this history, we discern a variety of purposes in the requirement that 
appellate decisions be in writing.  Of course, some decisions establish precedent 
                                              
1  
Background materials prepared for members of the commission’s 
committee on article VI stated that “the written opinion requirement . . . has 
received a narrow interpretation by the courts.”  (Background Study for Cal. 
Const. Revision Com., Com. on article VI, part 3 (Sept. 15, 1964) pp. 4-5.)  None 
of the authority cited in support of this statement suggests that a written decision 
with reasons stated is not required in an appeal from a judgment of conviction 
filed in the Court of Appeal.  (See Funeral Dirs. Assn. v. Bd. of Funeral Dirs. 
(1943) 22 Cal.2d 104, 106 [summary denial of a writ petition does not determine a 
cause for purposes of the written opinion requirement]; Oak Grove School Dist. v. 
City Title Ins. Co. (1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 678, 694 [only after alternative writ has 
been issued does matter become a “cause” requiring a written decision]; People v. 
Brown (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 175, 176 [appellate court summarily denied motion 
to set aside conviction and summarily dismissed appeal from trial court’s denial of 
similar motion; that petitioner filed a motion instead of a writ petition did not 
affect rule that denial of such relief need not be accompanied by a written 
opinion]; People v. Alberts (1956) 138 Cal.App.2d Supp. 909, 912 [written 
opinion requirement does not apply to appellate department of superior court]; 
People v. Corlett (1945) 67 Cal.App.2d 33, 59 [“We assume a court is not 
warranted in extending an opinion to undue length to specifically pass upon 94 
separate assignments [of error in evidentiary rulings], none of which, upon 
examination, appears to have substantial merit”]; 31 Ops.Atty.Gen. 175 (1958) [no 
authority requires a court upon request of a defendant to state its reasons for 
increasing or decreasing bail once bail has been set].)   
 
12
for future cases.  Others provide guidance only to the parties and to the judiciary in 
subsequent litigation arising out of the same “cause.”  In all instances, the 
requirement of a written opinion promotes a careful examination of the facts and 
the legal issues, and a result supported by law and reason. 
III. 
To evaluate the relevance and function of written decisions in the context of 
Wende appeals, we next review the constitutional underpinnings of the 
requirement of independent judicial review in such appeals, and the nature of the 
review required by Wende. 
The federal Constitution does not require a state to afford appellate review 
of a judgment of conviction (McKane v. Durston (1894) 153 U.S. 684), but every 
state has chosen to provide a right of appeal in criminal cases.  (In re Sade C. 
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 966; Pen. Code, § 1237.2)  Having provided criminal 
defendants with an appeal as a matter of right, the states must provide indigent 
defendants with the assistance of counsel on appeal, “[f]or there can be no equal 
justice where the kind of an appeal a man enjoys ‘depends on the amount of 
money he has.’  [Citation.]”  (Douglas v. California (1963) 372 U.S. 353, 355.) 
The right of an indigent defendant to appellate counsel gave rise to the 
issue considered in Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 (Anders):  “the 
                                              
2  
Penal Code section 1237 provides:  “An appeal may be taken by the 
defendant:  [¶]  (a)  From a final judgment of conviction except as provided in 
Section 1237.1 and Section 1237.5.  A sentence, an order granting probation, or 
the commitment of a defendant for insanity, the indeterminate commitment of a 
defendant as a mentally disordered sex offender, or the commitment of a 
defendant for controlled substance addiction shall be deemed to be a final 
judgment within the meaning of this section.  Upon appeal from a final judgment 
the court may review any order denying a motion for a new trial.  [¶]  (b)  From 
any order made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the party.”  
 
13
extent of the duty of a court-appointed appellate counsel to prosecute a first appeal 
from a criminal conviction, after that attorney has conscientiously determined that 
there is no merit to the indigent’s appeal.”  (Id. at p. 739.)  Anders explained that 
“[t]he constitutional requirement of substantial equality and fair process can only 
be attained where counsel acts in the role of an active advocate in behalf of his 
client, as opposed to that of amicus curiae. . . .  Of course, if counsel finds his case 
to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination of it, he should so advise 
the court and request permission to withdraw.  That request must, however, be 
accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably 
support the appeal.  A copy of counsel’s brief should be furnished the indigent and 
time allowed him to raise any points that he chooses; the court — not counsel — 
then proceeds, after a full examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether 
the case is wholly frivolous.  If it so finds it may grant counsel’s request to 
withdraw and dismiss the appeal insofar as federal requirements are concerned, or 
proceed to a decision on the merits, if state law so requires.  On the other hand, if 
it finds any of the legal points arguable on their merits (and therefore not 
frivolous) it must, prior to decision, afford the indigent the assistance of counsel to 
argue the appeal.”  (Id. at p. 744.) 
Our decision in Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, approved a modified 
procedure to ensure an indigent criminal defendant’s right to effective assistance 
of counsel.  In Wende, the defendant’s appointed counsel filed a brief summarizing 
the proceedings and the facts with citations to the record, raised no specific issues, 
and called upon the appellate court to review the entire record in order to 
determine whether there was any arguable issue.  Counsel also advised his client 
of the nature of the brief and informed the defendant that he would be allowed to 
file a brief on his own behalf.  Counsel did not assert that the appeal was frivolous, 
 
14
nor did he request to withdraw, but he did state his intention to advise his client 
that he could move to have counsel relieved.  The defendant did not file a brief. 
This court’s decision in Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, interpreted Anders to 
require the appellate court “to conduct a review of the entire record whenever 
appointed counsel submits a brief which raises no specific issues or describes the 
appeal as frivolous.  This obligation is triggered by the receipt of such a brief from 
counsel and does not depend on the subsequent receipt of a brief from the 
defendant personally.”  (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 441-442.)  The court 
“recognize[d] that under this rule counsel may ultimately be able to secure a more 
complete review for his client when he cannot find any arguable issues than when 
he raises specific issues, for a review of the entire record is not necessarily 
required in the latter situation.  [Citations.]”  (Id. at 442.)  Finally, the decision in 
Wende concluded that “counsel may properly remain in the case so long as he has 
not described the appeal as frivolous and has informed the defendant that he may 
request the court to have counsel relieved if he so desires.”  (Ibid.) 
The United States Supreme Court approved this court’s Wende procedure in 
Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259 (Robbins).  In the course of its analysis, 
Robbins identified four ways in which the Wende procedure is superior to other 
approaches that have been disapproved.  First, Wende “requires both counsel and 
the court to find the appeal to be lacking in arguable issues, which is to say, 
frivolous.”  (Id. at p. 280.)  Second, “the court orders briefing if it finds arguable 
issues.”  (Ibid.)  Third, “[c]ounsel’s summary of the case’s procedural and factual 
history with citations to the record, both ensures that a trained legal eye has 
searched the record for arguable issues and assists the reviewing court in its own 
evaluation of the case.”  (Id. at p. 281.)  Fourth, the Wende procedure requires two 
tiers of review, by counsel and by the appellate court.  (Ibid.) 
 
15
In Robbins the court further concluded that the Wende procedure is in some 
ways superior to Wisconsin’s procedure, which the high court found valid in 
McCoy v. Wisconsin (1988) 486 U.S. 429.  Wisconsin’s Rules of Appellate 
Procedure require counsel to file a brief referring to parts of the record that 
arguably support the appeal and to discuss why the identified issue lacks merit.  
Wende, the high court observed, “requires a more thorough treatment of the record 
by both counsel and the court” than do Wisconsin’s rules.  (Robbins, supra, 528 
U.S. at p. 283.)  The high court also observed that Wisconsin’s procedure “might 
divert the court’s attention from more meritorious unmentioned issues . . . [and] 
may predispose the court to reach the same conclusions [as counsel].  The Wende 
procedure reduces these risks, by omitting from the brief [those] signals that may 
subtly undermine the independence and thoroughness of the second review of an 
indigent’s case.”  (Id. at p. 284.)  
In summary, the constitutional right to assistance of counsel entitles an 
indigent defendant to independent review by the Court of Appeal when counsel is 
unable to identify any arguable issue on appeal.  California’s procedure for 
securing this right requires counsel to file a brief summarizing the proceedings and 
the facts with citations to the record, and requires the appellate court to review the 
entire record to determine whether there is any arguable issue.  The high court’s 
decision in Robbins ⎯ validating California’s procedure ⎯ highlights the 
importance of the appellate court’s responsibility in Wende appeals to perform a 
thorough review of the record. 
IV. 
The independent judicial review mandated by Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, 
applies only to a defendant’s first appeal as of right.  (Pennsylvania v. Finley 
(1987) 481 U.S. 551, 557; In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 972-974.)  The 
right to a direct appeal of a final judgment gives rise to a “cause” within the 
 
16
meaning of California Constitution article VI, section 14.  (See Powers v. City of 
Richmond (1995) 10 Cal.4th 85, 91, fn. 1 [right to “direct appeal” affords right to 
oral argument and written decision on the merits]; id. at p. 141 (dis. opn. by Lucas, 
C.J.) [resolution of an appeal determines a “cause” within the meaning of the “in 
writing” provision]; People v. Medina (1972) 6 Cal.3d 484, 489-490 [important 
incident of right to appeal from a superior court’s judgment is the right to a written 
opinion pursuant to Cal. Const. art. VI, § 14].)  Therefore, when a Court of Appeal 
affirms a judgment in a Wende appeal, it is disposing of a “cause” within the 
meaning of article VI, section 14 of the California Constitution, and must do so “in 
writing with reasons stated.”  (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 14.)   
The Court of Appeal disposed of defendant’s cause in writing, but stated 
only that “there are no arguable issues” — it did not expressly address (or even 
describe) defendant’s contentions.  Both Anders, supra, 386 U.S. 738, 744, and 
Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, 440, recognize the defendant’s right in a Wende 
appeal to file supplemental contentions.  This right stands in contrast to the general 
rule that a represented defendant has no right personally to present supplemental 
arguments.  (In re Barnett (2003) 31 Cal.4th 466, 469.)  Therefore, when a Court 
of Appeal affirms a judgment in a Wende appeal in which the defendant has filed 
supplemental contentions, the appellate court necessarily must have considered 
and rejected those contentions.  In accordance with the constitutional requirement 
of “reasons stated,” such an opinion must reflect the contentions and the reasons 
that they fail, just as the opinion would reflect these points if they were raised by 
counsel. 
Although the written decision in a Wende appeal typically will not be 
certified for publication in the Official Reports and thus will not establish 
precedent for future cases, it will serve the other significant purposes identified in 
the constitutional debates — (1) providing guidance to the parties and the judiciary 
 
17
in subsequent litigation arising out of the same “cause,” and (2) promoting a 
careful examination of each case and a result supported by law and reason.  
Having devoted its resources to reviewing the entire appellate record, the Court of 
Appeal is well positioned to forestall the unnecessary expenditure of additional 
judicial resources by gathering and setting forth in its opinion the bare information 
necessary for other courts to recognize which contentions asserted by the 
defendant have been considered and found lacking in arguable merit and which 
were considered unreviewable due to an inadequate record.  Brief written reasons 
for the appellate court’s decision also may assist federal courts, which otherwise 
would be unable to determine whether claims have been exhausted in the state 
courts.  Finally, the appellate court’s explanation of why the defendant’s 
contentions fail may, in some circumstances, persuade the defendant that counsel’s 
conclusions are correct and thus prompt the defendant to abandon his or her efforts 
to obtain further judicial review.3 
                                              
3  
In addition to promoting the purposes of California Constitution article VI, 
section 14, and conserving judicial resources, our conclusion that this 
constitutional provision applies in the Wende context facilitates the purposes of 
Wende review.  As noted above, our Wende procedure relies on the efforts of the 
appellate court in resolving the appeal to a greater extent than does the United 
States Supreme Court’s Anders procedure, in that our procedure requires counsel 
only to describe the facts and procedures, while calling upon the Court of Appeal 
to review the entire record.  The requirement that the Court of Appeal set forth its 
reasons in writing ensures the fulfillment of the more significant role played by 
that court as contemplated by Wende.  (Cf. Penson v. Ohio (1988) 488 U.S. 75, 81, 
fn. 4 [“simply putting pen to paper can often shed new light on what may at first 
appear to be an open-and-shut issue”].)  Accordingly, the requirement of a written 
opinion with reasons stated fulfills the goal of article VI, section 14, conserves 
public resources in the longer term (cf. Robbins, supra, 528 U.S. 259, 277-278 
[one goal underlying procedures for screening frivolous appeals is to prevent 
needless public expenditures]), and serves Wende’s directive that all appeals 
receive careful examination by our appellate courts.  
 
18
A written decision does not require an extended discussion of legal 
principles.  (See Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1262 [a written 
decision is a statement of conclusions and of principal reasons; an opinion 
sufficiently states reasons if it sets forth grounds or principles]; People v. Rojas 
(1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 278, 289 [brief written decision stating only essential facts 
and deciding only essential legal issues is adequate].)  Moreover, a recitation of 
each of the defendant’s assertions will not be necessary in all cases; the purposes 
of the constitutional requirement may in some circumstances be satisfied by a 
summary description of the contentions made and the reasons they fail.  In order to 
serve the purpose of providing information sufficient to determine the scope of the 
contentions raised and resolved, however, the written decision must disclose 
whether the contentions failed on the merits or for some other specified reasons.  
In doing so, the opinion enables the defendant to learn, and the courts in 
subsequent proceedings to determine, whether particular contentions are subject to 
any procedural bar.  (See, e.g., In re Waltreus (1965) 62 Cal.2d 218, 225 
[arguments raised and rejected on appeal may not be raised again through habeas 
corpus proceeding]; In re Dixon (1953) 41 Cal.2d 756, 759 [“writ [of habeas 
corpus] will not lie where the claimed errors could have been, but were not, raised 
upon a timely appeal from a judgment of conviction”].)4 
                                              
4  
After describing the contention, the written decision’s reasons, concluding 
that no arguable issue is raised by a contention, may consist of a brief statement 
identifying the flaw in the contention.  Alternatively, a citation to pertinent case or 
statutory authority may be a more efficient way of identifying the reason a 
contention raises no arguable issue, as long as the citation clearly reveals the basis 
upon which the Court of Appeal so finds.  For example, if a defendant contends he 
or she desired but was not provided substitute counsel, and it appears the 
defendant failed to indicate on the trial court record a desire for new counsel, the 
court may describe the contention and cite People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 
130, 157 (“Although no formal motion is necessary [to seek substitution of 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
19
The constitutional requirement that an appellate court state reasons for its 
decision does not require the inclusion of information or analysis beyond that 
necessary to apprise the reader of the contention considered and the reasons 
underlying that court’s conclusion that the contention fails.  The constitutional 
language itself refers only to the provision of “reasons,” and the constitutional 
debates of 1878-1879 focused on the purpose of requiring a reasoned basis for the 
judgment rendered by an appellate court.  When this mandate was added to our 
Constitution, there was no intermediate Court of Appeal, no Anders or Wende 
review, and far less habeas corpus litigation.  The delegates thus had no reason to 
propose further requirements in connection with appellate opinions. 
In light of the subsequent evolution of the law and the appellate court 
system, an opinion rendered by the Court of Appeal has come to serve additional 
purposes.  In connection with a petition for review, the intermediate appellate 
court’s opinion informs this court of the nature of the case as well as the 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
counsel], there must be ‘at least some clear indication by defendant that he wants a 
substitute attorney’ ”).  Other examples of cases a court might cite in response to 
common contentions raised on appeal are People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 
Cal.4th 264, 267 (an appellate court should not find ineffective assistance of 
counsel unless all facts relevant to that claim have been developed in the record); 
People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 859-860 (“A disagreement concerning 
tactics is . . . insufficient to compel the discharge of appointed counsel, unless it 
signals a complete breakdown in the attorney-client relationship”); People v. Holt 
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 667 (“the test of whether evidence is sufficient to support a 
conviction is ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt’ ”); and People v. Turner (1985) 171 
Cal.App.3d 116, 125 (“a plea of guilty waives any right to raise questions 
regarding the evidence, including its sufficiency or admissibility, and this is true 
whether or not the subsequent claim of evidentiary error is founded on 
constitutional violations”).  
 
20
contentions considered.  The opinion also may be a significant source of 
information in future collateral proceedings in which only a limited record is 
provided.  A brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case, as 
well as the crimes of which the defendant was convicted and the punishment 
imposed, will allow any court in a subsequent proceeding to focus more quickly 
on the contentions without having to expend resources gathering and reviewing 
the record to apprise itself of this information.  A synopsis of the case will be 
particularly helpful when the defendant, as is frequently the situation, 5 pursues 
challenges in propria persona, after providing an incomplete or confused 
description of the prior proceeding. 
Because the Court of Appeal in a Wende proceeding is required to review 
the entire record, it must perform the essential tasks necessary to gather the 
relevant facts, and it appears that summarizing this basic information in its written 
opinion will add little to the burden imposed upon the appellate court.6  This is 
                                              
5  
Although statistics are not available concerning the total volume of direct 
and collateral proceedings that challenge judgments rendered in Wende appeals, 
the numbers appear to be significant.  This court receives a substantial number of 
petitions for review of Wende opinions each year, despite the absence of any 
arguable issue on appeal and the consequent lack of a right to the assistance of 
counsel.  These petitions seeking review by this court are filed even though the 
time within which to seek review is strictly limited, and even though such 
defendants most likely have been informed by counsel of the decision rendered by 
the Court of Appeal and that their contentions may be raised only by way of a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus.  Moreover, this court regularly receives habeas 
corpus petitions following Wende opinions.  Thus, these litigants have 
demonstrated significant motivation in pursuing their contentions.  Presumably, 
California’s trial courts and Courts of Appeal, as well as the federal courts, also 
receive numerous such filings.  
6  
An amicus curiae brief filed on behalf of retired California appellate 
justices in Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259 described the internal procedures 
for processing Wende appeals as follows:  “When a California appellate court 
(footnote continued on next page) 
 
21
particularly so because, as noted above, counsel’s Wende brief must set forth all of 
this information, with citations to the record.  Finally, our examination of Wende 
opinions from all six appellate districts has disclosed that a large majority of these 
opinions already include most of this information, and many set forth additional 
information and analysis when the nature of the case suggests that a more 
extensive explanation would be useful.  Accordingly, it appears that requiring 
basic information beyond the constitutional minimum to be provided — namely, 
the contentions made and the reasons they fail — has at most a minimal impact on 
the workload of the appellate courts. 
These circumstances establish that significant efficiency in the processing 
of subsequent proceedings, including habeas corpus matters, can be achieved if the 
Courts of Appeal include in their Wende opinions a brief description of the facts 
and procedural history of the case, the crimes of which the defendant was 
convicted, and the punishment imposed.7  Therefore, in the exercise of our 
                                                                                                                                                              
(footnote continued from previous page) 
receives a Wende brief, it assigns the case to a staff attorney who prepares a 
memorandum analyzing all possible legal issues in the case.  Typically, the staff 
attorney then makes an oral presentation to the appellate panel and explains 
whether the case presents any arguable issues for appeal.  See J. Clark Kelso, 
Special Report on California Appellate Justice:  A Report on the California 
Appellate System, 45 Hastings L. J. 433, 461 (1994).  Thus, as Professor J. Clark 
Kelso remarked in a report prepared for California’s Appellate Courts Committee, 
Commission on the Future of the Courts, ‘the Wende process duplicates in all 
relevant aspects the exact process that appellate counsel must follow in evaluating 
the merits of the case.’  (Id.)”  (Smith v. Robbins, supra, 528 U.S. 259, Brief for 
Amici Curiae Retired Justices, 1999 WL 414236.)  
7  
Not only does a description of the punishment imposed provide a useful 
context in which to evaluate the claims raised in subsequent proceedings, but a 
large portion of these claims raise issues challenging the defendant’s sentence or 
asserting his or her right to credits against the prescribed term of imprisonment. 
 
22
supervisory power over the courts of this state (see, e.g., People v. Pena (2004) 32 
Cal.4th 389, 403 [directing the appellate court to refrain from employing a 
particular type of oral-argument-waiver notice]; In re Podesto (1976) 15 Cal.3d 
921 [directing trial courts to render a brief statement of reasons in support of an 
order denying a motion for bail on appeal]), we direct the Courts of Appeal to 
include this information in their opinions in Wende appeals.  We are sensitive to 
the possible burden this rule may impose in some instances, and we emphasize 
that such additional information may be set forth in a very brief manner. 
These minimal requirements are in no way intended to discourage the 
Courts of Appeal from preparing opinions that describe the underlying litigation in 
greater detail and that analyze the contentions at greater length when doing so 
appears to the appellate court to be appropriate and useful.  Depending upon the 
particular facts, procedures, and contentions, a more thorough opinion may 
promote the purposes of explaining why the defendant’s contentions fail and of 
apprising other courts of the facts and principles that establish the correctness of 
the judgment.  Moreover, in the course of reviewing the record, the Court of 
Appeal may discern that certain motions, stipulations, or other aspects of the trial 
court proceedings predictably might become relevant in, for example, a 
subsequent habeas corpus proceeding, if the defendant continues to challenge the 
judgment.  We encourage the Courts of Appeal to include such information in 
their opinions when, in their view, it may be helpful in a future proceeding. 
Finally, as is currently the practice of each of the Courts of Appeal, a 
Wende opinion affirmatively should note that counsel filed a Wende brief raising 
no arguable issue, that the defendant was apprised of his or her right to file a 
supplemental brief, that the defendant did or did not file such a brief, and that the 
court has reviewed the entire record and found no arguable issue.   
 
23
Accordingly, in affirming the judgment rendered in a Wende appeal, the 
Court of Appeal must prepare a written opinion that describes the contentions 
personally raised by the defendant and the reasons those contentions fail.  In 
addition, the Court of Appeal must provide a brief description of the underlying 
facts, the procedural history, the crimes of which the defendant was convicted, and 
the punishment imposed.  Finally, we encourage the Courts of Appeal to include 
any further information they deem appropriate.  We emphasize that what 
constitutes an adequate written opinion “necessarily is a subjective determination.  
[Citation.]  ‘The author of an opinion must follow his [or her] own judgment as to 
the degree of elaboration to be accorded to the treatment of any proposition and as 
to the questions which are worthy of notice at all.’ ”  (Lewis v. Superior Court, 
supra, 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1262.) 
V. 
The decision rendered by the Court of Appeal in the present case did not 
meet the constitutional requirement of a written opinion with reasons stated.  
Although the decision adequately set forth the charges of which defendant was 
convicted, reviewed the Wende procedures followed, and noted that defendant 
exercised his right to submit written argument on his own behalf, it did not 
describe the contentions made by defendant or the reasons why his contentions 
were rejected by the appellate court.  For these reasons, the decision below is 
inadequate.  Rather than remand the appeal, however, we proceed to resolve this 
case on its merits, as we did in Wende.  
As noted above, on July 21, 2003, a police officer witnessed defendant 
driving erratically, and when the officer and a second officer confronted 
defendant, he resisted them and thereafter declined to submit to alcohol tests.  A 
felony complaint was filed three days later, but on October 15, 2003, a 
competency evaluation was ordered and criminal proceedings were suspended.  
 
24
(Pen. Code, § 1368.)  On December 3, 2003, the court found defendant competent 
to stand trial. 
The matter was tried before a jury on January 6, 7, and 8, 2004.  The two 
arresting officers testified concerning defendant’s conduct and appearance, and an 
expert testified as to the effects of alcohol on the human body.  The parties 
stipulated that defendant had suffered a felony conviction in December 1996 for 
driving under the influence of an alcoholic beverage in violation of Vehicle Code 
section 23152.  The jury found defendant guilty on two counts:  (1) driving under 
the influence of alcohol and drugs with a prior felony conviction committed within 
10 years (Veh. Code, §§ 23152, subd. (a), 23550.5, subd. (a)); and (2) resisting, 
delaying, or obstructing an officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)).  In connection 
with the first count, the jury found true the allegation that defendant willfully 
refused a peace officer’s request to submit to a chemical test (Veh. Code, 
§§ 23612, 23577, subd. (a)).  On May 7, 2004, the trial court imposed the midterm 
sentence of two years’ imprisonment for the felony, and a six-month term for the 
misdemeanor to be served concurrently with the felony sentence.  It ordered 
defendant not to possess a firearm, revoked his driving privileges, and imposed a 
$400 general-fund fine plus a penalty assessment, a restitution-fund fine of $200, 
and a $20 court security fee.  An additional restitution-fund fine was imposed, but 
was suspended pursuant to Penal Code section 1202.45. 
On appeal, defendant’s appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to Wende, 
supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, setting forth the facts of the case and requesting that the 
appellate court review the entire record on appeal, but raising no specific issue.  In 
response to notice from his counsel and the Court of Appeal of his right to file a 
supplemental brief, defendant submitted in writing 15 points for the appellate 
court’s consideration.  We have reviewed the entire record and defendant’s written 
contentions, and have not found any arguable issue.  Defendant’s assertions 
 
25
concerning the evidence admitted against him raise only a sufficiency-of-the-
evidence claim.  The evidence in the record is sufficient to support the jury’s 
verdict.  (See People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th 619, 667.)  His assertions 
concerning facts that were not presented to the jury are not part of the appellate 
record and hence cannot be reviewed on the record before us.  To the extent 
defendant challenges his prior felony conviction for driving under the influence of 
an alcoholic beverage, that challenge is barred by his stipulation at trial to that 
conviction.  To the extent his contentions allege ineffective assistance of counsel, 
this claim cannot be resolved on the present record.  (People v. Mendoza Tello, 
supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 267.)  Finally, defendant’s allegation of bias on the part of 
the jurors is not supported by the appellate record. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GEORGE, C. J. 
WE CONCUR: 
 
KENNARD, J. 
WERDEGAR, J. 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY CORRIGAN, J. 
 
 
I concur in part.  I agree with the majority’s conclusions that a Wende 
appeal (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436) constitutes a “cause,” and that a 
Wende opinion must summarily describe and respond to any contentions raised by 
the defendant after counsel fails to find any arguable issues.  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 
1.) 
Where I part company with the majority is in its exercise of this court’s 
supervisory power to impose additional requirements on the Courts of Appeal.  
While I do not object to asking the courts to identify the crimes of which the 
defendant was convicted and the punishment imposed, I would not require them to 
describe any facts or procedural details that are not directly relevant to claims 
made by the defendant.  I would certainly not encourage them to anticipate future 
habeas corpus petitions; in the vast majority of Wende appeals this would simply 
be a waste of time.  Collateral attack is most uncommon in these cases. 
I hesitate to reach back to the 19th century for words of wisdom on a 21st 
century problem; as the majority notes, the constitutional debates of 1878-1879 
involved nothing akin to Wende review.  (Maj. opn., ante, p. 19.)  However, Clitus 
Barbour was onto something when he made the following remarks about the 
requirement of a statement of reasons:  “We [do] not mean that they shall include 
the small cases, and impose on the country all this fine judicial literature, for the 
Lord knows we have got enough of that already.  To give us the reason for it does 
 
 
2
not take three lines.”  (3 Willis & Stockton, Debates and Proceedings, Cal. Const. 
Convention 1878-1879, pp. 1455-1456; see maj. opn., ante, pp. 9-10.) 
We should bear in mind that Wende appeals are by definition meritless.  In 
the exceptional case where Wende review discloses an arguable issue, briefing is 
sought and a conventional opinion is issued.  When there are no arguable issues, 
the reviewing court should be permitted to dispose of the case with a minimum of 
“judicial literature.”  It should be sufficient to note the crimes committed, the 
sentence imposed, the filing of a Wende brief, whether the defendant raised any 
claims of his or her own and if so, the nature of those claims and the reasons they 
fail.  Every case is important, but for these appeals, in which repeated review by 
appointed counsel and the court has revealed no meritorious issue, Mr. Barbour’s 
prescription for a succinct statement of reasons should be followed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRIGAN, J.  
WE CONCUR: 
 
BAXTER, J. 
CHIN, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People  v. Kelly 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion XXX NP opn. filed 3/15/06 – 6th Dist. 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S133114 
Date Filed: November 27, 2006 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Santa Clara 
Judge: James C. Emerson 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
J. Courtney Shevelson, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Thea Greenhalgh, under appointment 
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Manuel M. Medeiros, State Solicitor General, Donald E. de Nicola, 
Deputy State Solicitor General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, 
Assistant Attorney General, Eric D. Share and Kelly M. Croxton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff 
and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
J. Courtney Shevelson 
PMB 187 
316 Mid Valley Center 
Carmel, CA  93923-8516 
9831) 625-6581 
 
Kelly M. Croxton 
Deputy Attorney General 
455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000 
San Francisco, CA  94102-7004 
(415) 703-5970