Case Title: State v. Novy

Citation: 2013 WI 23

Docket Number: 2011AP000409-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2013-03-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
2013 WI 23 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2011AP407-CR, 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Brent T. Novy, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 338 Wis. 2d 439, 809 N.W.2d 889 
(Ct. App. 2012 - Published) 
PDC No: 2012 WI App 10 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
March 14, 2013 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 9, 2012 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha 
 
JUDGE: 
Barbara A. Kluka 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
Abrahamson, C.J., Bradley, J., concur (Opinion 
filed).    
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: Prosser, J., did not participate.    
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Gerald P. Boyle and Boyle, Boyle & Boyle, S.C., 
Milwaukee, and oral argument by Gerald P. Boyle.   
For the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was argued by 
Christine A. Remington, assistant attorney general, with whom on 
the brief was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
 
 
2013 WI 23
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2008CF500, 2008CF1307 & 2009CF58) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Brent T. Novy, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
MAR 14, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.   This is a review of a 
decision of the court of appeals1 that affirmed a judgment of the 
circuit court for Kenosha County.2  Novy raises two issues.  
First, Novy claims that the trial court erred when it allowed 
the State to use certain fingerprint evidence and related 
testimony in rebuttal, which the court had previously excluded 
from the State's case-in-chief due to a Wis. Stat. § 971.23 
                                                 
1 State v. Novy, 2012 WI App 10, 338 Wis. 2d 439, 809 N.W.2d 
889. 
2 The Honorable Barbara A. Kluka presided. 
No. 
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2 
 
(2009–10) discovery violation.3  Second, Novy asserts that he was 
deprived of his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury 
because, he claims, one of the jurors was sleeping during a 
portion of defense counsel's closing argument. 
¶2 
We conclude that, with regard to the admission of 
fingerprint-related testimony on rebuttal, the circuit court did 
not erroneously exercise its discretion.  The circuit court 
initially determined that the State had failed to comply with 
its discovery obligations under Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1); and 
therefore, the court excluded fingerprint evidence and related 
testimony 
from 
the 
State's 
case-in-chief 
pursuant 
to 
§ 971.23(7m)(a).  However, after Novy testified such that the 
excluded 
fingerprint evidence and related testimony would 
controvert his testimony, the circuit court concluded that it 
could be presented in rebuttal.  The circuit court properly 
interpreted § 971.23 under the facts of this case, and given the 
significant discretion afforded circuit courts on evidentiary 
matters, we cannot say that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in permitting the rebuttal use of the 
fingerprint evidence and related testimony. 
¶3 
With regard to the circuit court's treatment of the 
allegedly sleeping juror, the circuit court did not find that 
the juror was sleeping; therefore, Novy failed to establish a 
                                                 
3 Although the charged events occurred between 2007 and 
2009, the relevant statutory provisions are identical to the 
current version of the statutes, and therefore, all subsequent 
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2009—10 edition 
unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
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3 
 
finding necessary to his contention.  The circuit court's 
findings are not clearly erroneous, and therefore, we will not 
overturn the circuit court's refusal to strike the juror.  
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND4 
¶4 
For conduct that occurred between May 2008 and January 
2009, Novy was charged in Kenosha County with two counts of 
stalking, 11 counts of felony bail jumping, and one count of 
violating a harassment injunction.  All of the charges related 
to Novy's conduct toward his ex-fiancé, Julie N.  The two had 
dated on and off for approximately five years, until September 
of 2007, when Julie ended the relationship.  After the 
relationship ended, Novy continued to contact Julie, to the 
point where, in November 2007, Julie sought and obtained a 
harassment 
injunction 
against 
Novy 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 813.125(4).  The injunction prohibited Novy from contacting 
Julie in any way, and required that he avoid her residence. 
¶5 
In early May 2008, Novy was charged with one count of 
stalking, in violation of Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2)(a), (b), and 
(c).  The complaint (case no. 08-CF-500) alleged that, between 
October 17, 2007, and February 4, 2008, Novy had engaged in a 
                                                 
4 Novy's trial involved 14 separate charges, but only two of 
those charges are relevant to this appeal:  one count of bail 
jumping and one stalking charge.  Therefore, we will briefly 
summarize the facts leading up to and including the trial, 
focusing on the two relevant charges, as well as the facts 
related to Novy's allegation that a juror was sleeping during 
defense counsel's closing argument. 
No. 
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4 
 
course of conduct, directed at Julie, which had caused Julie to 
suffer serious emotional distress, and that Novy knew or should 
have 
known 
that 
his 
conduct 
would 
cause 
such 
distress.  
Generally, 
Novy's 
alleged 
conduct 
included 
following 
and 
harassing Julie in public places, calling Julie at work and 
hanging up, accessing Julie's voicemail and prowling around 
Julie's house.  Novy was released on a $1,000 signature bond, 
which provided that he was to have "No [c]ontact w/ Julie [N.]; 
not to be within 1000 feet of her residence." 
¶6 
Then, on November 12, 2008, Novy was charged with 
another count of stalking under Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2) and eight 
counts of felony bail jumping, in violation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 946.49(1)(b).  These charges (case no. 08-CF-1307) all 
involved a course of conduct in which Novy allegedly had engaged 
between May 4, 2008, and November 10, 2008.  Similar to the 
conduct underlying the previous stalking charge, the alleged 
conduct involved hang-up calls to Julie's home, following her in 
public (including waiting for her outside her place of work), 
lurking around Julie's house and in her neighborhood, and 
repeatedly calling Julie's friends.  Again, Novy was released on 
bond, this time a $5,000 cash bond, which also provided that he 
was to have no contact with Julie or her residence. 
¶7 
Relevant for purposes of this appeal, one of the eight 
counts of bail jumping in case number 08-CF-1307 (Count 7) 
alleged that, on the night of November 9, 2008, Julie received a 
hang-up call from a payphone at L&M Meats in Kenosha, which was 
close to Novy's residence.  Julie had previously noticed Novy's 
No. 
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5 
 
vehicle near L&M Meats, and had called her sister from that 
payphone to determine the phone number associated with that 
phone.  After receiving the hang-up call on the night of 
November 9, Julie called the police, who went to the payphone at 
L&M Meats and verified that was the number from which Julie had 
recently received the phone call.  Officers also lifted 
fingerprints from the receiver of the payphone.  Police analysts 
later 
determined 
that 
these 
fingerprints 
matched 
Novy's 
fingerprints. 
¶8 
On January 14, 2009, Novy was charged with three 
additional bail jumping counts, as well as one count of 
violating the harassment injunction, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§ 813.125(7).  The complaint (case no. 09-CF-58) alleged that 
Novy had been seen driving slowly past Julie's house, in 
violation of the harassment injunction and the conditions of his 
bonds for the prior charges.  Novy was again released on a cash 
bond ($20,000), which reiterated the prohibition on contacting 
Julie or being within 1,000 feet of her residence. 
¶9 
In late May 2010, a jury trial was held in Kenosha 
County, wherein the three separate cases were joined and Novy 
was tried on all 14 counts.  During opening statements, counsel 
for the State referred to testimony about fingerprint evidence 
that would tend to show that Novy had called Julie from L&M 
Meats on November 9, 2008.  After opening statements, defense 
counsel moved to exclude the fingerprint evidence and related 
testimony on the ground that the defense had requested all 
evidence subject to disclosure under Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1), but 
No. 
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6 
 
the State failed to provide access to the cards on which the 
fingerprints were exhibited.5   
¶10 The circuit court concluded that the State had failed 
in its obligation to properly disclose the fingerprint evidence, 
as required by Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(g).  Therefore, the court 
granted the defendant's motion to exclude the evidence.  When 
counsel for the State asked whether the fingerprint evidence 
would be available for rebuttal, Judge Kluka responded, "I don't 
know." 
¶11 After the State completed its case-in-chief, the 
defense moved to dismiss Count 7 in case number 08-CF-1307, the 
bail jumping charge relating to the alleged phone call from the 
L&M Meats payphone, arguing that without fingerprint-related 
testimony, the State no longer had any evidence linking Novy to 
the phone on the night in question.  The State conceded that, 
without the fingerprint-related testimony, the State would be 
unable to prove the elements of bail jumping for Count 7.  
Accordingly, the circuit court granted the defendant's motion to 
dismiss that count. 
¶12 During the defense case, Novy chose to testify.  Prior 
to his testimony, defense counsel sought to prevent any 
questions regarding the phone call from L&M Meats on November 9, 
2008, on the ground that the alleged call related solely to the 
                                                 
5 Although the State had provided defense counsel with an 
expert's report relating to the fingerprint evidence, the actual 
fingerprint cards were not available when defense counsel went 
to review the materials at the evidence bureau. 
No. 
2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR 
 
7 
 
dismissed bail jumping charge.  The State responded that the 
phone call from L&M Meats was a proper subject for questioning 
because the call related to the course of conduct supporting the 
second count of stalking, which allegedly occurred between 
May 4, 2008, and November 10, 2008 (case no. 08-CF-1307).  The 
circuit court agreed with the State and concluded that such 
questioning was relevant to the second stalking count. 
¶13 During cross-examination of Novy, counsel for the 
State asked Novy, "[D]id you call Julie from L and M Meats here 
in Kenosha on November 9th of 2008 at approximately 8:00 p.m.?"  
Novy responded, "No, I did not."  During Novy's redirect, 
defense counsel did not ask Novy any clarifying questions 
regarding his use of the payphone at L&M Meats on the night in 
question. 
¶14 As the State prepared to present its case-in-rebuttal, 
counsel for the State asked whether the fingerprint evidence 
from L&M Meats and related testimony would be allowed at that 
point, given Novy's denial of having called Julie from that 
phone.  Defense counsel protested, arguing that the fingerprint-
related testimony showed only that Novy had at some point used 
the payphone at L&M Meats, not that he had necessarily used it 
that night.  Additionally, defense counsel argued that the 
discovery statute, Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1) and (7m), mandated 
that evidence that had been excluded for discovery violations be 
excluded throughout the trial, not solely for the State's case-
in-chief.  The circuit court, however, disagreed and allowed the 
State to present the fingerprint evidence and related testimony, 
No. 
2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR 
 
8 
 
calling it "bona fide rebuttal evidence" as to the second 
stalking charge. 
¶15 In its case-in-rebuttal, the State presented the 
testimony of two officers from the Kenosha Police Department, 
Officers Hamilton and Primmer.  Officer Hamilton testified that 
he was an evidence technician; that he had been dispatched to 
examine the payphone at L&M Meats on the night of November 9, 
2008; and that he had recovered two fingerprints from that 
phone.  Additionally, Officer Primmer testified that he had 
conducted an analysis of the fingerprints that had been lifted 
from the payphone at L&M Meats, and that he had determined that 
those prints matched the fingerprints that the department had on 
file for Novy. 
¶16 Defense counsel did not cross-examine Officer Primmer.  
On surrebuttal, however, defense counsel re-called Novy.  Novy 
testified that, although he had previously denied calling Julie 
from the payphone at L&M Meats, he had used that phone "quite a 
few times" in the past.  In particular, Novy stated that he had 
used the phone to call a friend in the Philippines because his 
cell phone did not have an international calling plan. 
¶17 After closing arguments and immediately before the 
selection of the alternate juror, defense counsel sought a 
sidebar.  The record reflects that defense counsel alleged that 
one of the jurors had been sleeping during the defense's closing 
argument, and that the juror therefore should be struck.  The 
circuit court denied the motion, and noted that she makes an 
No. 
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9 
 
effort "to keep track of what's going on with the jurors," and 
that she had not seen the juror sleeping. 
¶18 The jury found Novy guilty of both counts of stalking, 
six counts of bail jumping, and the one count of violating the 
harassment injunction.  Novy was sentenced to 90 days in jail 
for violating the injunction, and two years of imprisonment for 
the 
second 
stalking 
offense, 
consisting 
of 
one 
year 
of 
confinement and one year of extended supervision.  For the 
remainder of the charges, Novy was placed on probation for five 
years, with the sentences withheld. 
¶19 On appeal to the court of appeals, Novy raised the two 
issues currently before this court, seeking vacation of his 
sentence and a remand for a new trial.6  The court of appeals 
affirmed the circuit court's decision regarding the rebuttal 
evidence and the allegedly sleeping juror, concluding that both 
matters were within the broad discretion of the circuit court, 
and that there was nothing in the record to suggest that the 
court had erroneously exercised its discretion.  See State v. 
Novy, 2012 WI App 10, ¶¶18, 23, 338 Wis. 2d 439, 809 N.W.2d 889. 
¶20 Novy petitioned for review, and we granted his 
petition. 
                                                 
6 In the court of appeals, Novy also raised another issue 
relating to "other acts" evidence that he has not raised before 
this court. 
No. 
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II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Standard of Review 
¶21 Novy raises two issues for review.  The first issue——
whether the circuit court erred by allowing the State to present 
evidence in rebuttal when that evidence previously had been 
excluded as a sanction for a discovery violation——relates to the 
circuit 
court's 
decision 
on 
an 
evidentiary 
matter.  
Consideration of this issue begins with statutory interpretation 
and application, which present questions of law for our 
independent review, although we benefit from the previous 
interpretations of the court of appeals and the circuit court.  
Richards v. Badger Mut. Ins. Co., 2008 WI 52, ¶14, 309 Wis. 2d 
541, 749 N.W.2d 581.  In addition, whether to admit or deny 
evidence rests in the sound discretion of the circuit court, 
which we will not overturn absent an erroneous exercise of 
discretion.  See State v. Smith, 2005 WI 104, ¶28, 283 Wis. 2d 
57, 699 N.W.2d 508.   
¶22 Second, Novy argues that the circuit court erred by 
failing to strike a juror whom defense counsel alleged was 
sleeping during the defense's closing argument. The circuit 
court did not find that the juror was sleeping.  We will uphold 
a circuit court's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  See State v. Funk, 2011 WI 62, ¶¶29–30, 335 Wis. 2d 
369, 799 N.W.2d 421. 
B.  Rebuttal Evidence 
¶23 Novy argues that the circuit court erred when it 
allowed the State to rebut Novy's testimony using fingerprint 
No. 
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11 
 
evidence and related testimony that the court had previously 
excluded 
for 
a 
discovery 
violation 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ § 971.23(1) and (7m)(a).  The State contends that its use of 
the fingerprint-related evidence is clearly permitted under 
§ 971.23(1)(d).  We therefore begin our discussion with the 
relevant portions of the discovery statute, § 971.23, which 
provide in relevant part: 
 
(1) What a district attorney must disclose to a 
defendant.  Upon demand, the district attorney shall, 
within a reasonable time before trial, disclose to the 
defendant or his or her attorney and permit the 
defendant or his or her attorney to inspect and copy 
or photograph all of the following materials and 
information, if it is within the possession, custody 
or control of the state: 
. . . . 
(d) A list of all witnesses and their addresses 
whom the district attorney intends to call at the 
trial. This paragraph does not apply to rebuttal 
witnesses or those called for impeachment only. 
(e) Any relevant written or recorded statements 
of a witness named on a list under par. (d), including 
. . . any reports or statements of experts made in 
connection with the case . . . and the results of any 
physical 
or 
mental 
examination, 
scientific 
test, 
experiment or comparison that the district attorney 
intends to offer in evidence at trial. 
. . . . 
(g) Any physical evidence that the district 
attorney intends to offer in evidence at the trial. 
. . . . 
No. 
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(7m) Sanctions for failure to comply.  (a) The court 
shall exclude any . . . evidence not presented for 
inspection or copying required by this section, unless 
good cause is shown for failure to comply. 
(Emphasis added.) 
1.  General principles 
¶24 When interpreting the meaning of Wis. Stat. § 971.23, 
we begin with the language of the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal 
v. Circuit Court for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 
633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  "If the meaning of the statute is plain, 
we ordinarily stop the inquiry," and the statute will be applied 
according to that plain meaning.  Id., ¶¶45–46 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Statutes are interpreted in context, 
as they relate to each other.  Id., ¶46.  
¶25 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.23(1)(d) has an exception for 
disclosure of rebuttal evidence that has been interpreted by 
appellate courts on other occasions.  Such interpretations have 
concluded that the plain meaning of § 971.23(1)(d) does not 
require the State to disclose "rebuttal witnesses or those 
called for impeachment only."  See Lunde v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 
80, 91, 270 N.W.2d 180 (1978).   
¶26 Appellate courts also have concluded that the State 
has no obligation under Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(d) to disclose 
rebuttal evidence, even when the State anticipates before trial 
that certain evidence may be used for rebuttal.  State v. 
Konkol, 2002 WI App 174, ¶1, 256 Wis. 2d 725, 649 N.W.2d 300.   
¶27 Notwithstanding that the State has no statutory 
discovery obligation to disclose rebuttal evidence, where the 
No. 
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13 
 
circuit court determines that the State has failed to comply 
with 
the 
initial 
requirements 
set 
forth 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.23(1), the court "shall exclude any witness not listed or 
evidence not presented for inspection or copying required by 
this section, unless good cause is shown for failure to comply."  
§ 971.23(7m)(a).   
¶28 Such an initial order under Wis. Stat. § 971.23(7m)(a) 
was made by the circuit court in this case when the fingerprint 
evidence and related testimony that would have been used for the 
State's case-in-chief was excluded.  Notwithstanding this order, 
after Novy testified, the State asserts that the fingerprint 
evidence and related testimony became rebuttal evidence.  No 
appellate court has determined what, if any, effect paragraph 
(7m)(a) has on paragraph (1)(d)'s exception for discovery of 
rebuttal testimony.   
¶29 Furthermore, 
in 
addition 
to 
statutory 
provisions 
governing disclosure of evidence by the State, we have long 
recognized 
the 
circuit 
court's 
discretion 
on 
evidentiary 
matters, including the exclusion and admission of evidence on 
rebuttal.  See Howard v. Beldenville Lumber Co., 129 Wis. 98, 
110-11, 108 N.W. 48 (1906); McGowan v. Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co., 91 
Wis. 147, 153–54, 64 N.W. 891 (1895).   
¶30 We have set forth a relatively broad general rule to 
define rebuttal evidence.  We have explained that rebuttal 
evidence is that "which squarely meets and controverts some 
affirmative fact or facts which the adversary has attempted to 
No. 
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14 
 
prove."  State v. Watson, 46 Wis. 2d 492, 499, 175 N.W.2d 244 
(1970) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
¶31 Furthermore, even with this general rule for rebuttal 
evidence, we have consistently reaffirmed a circuit court's 
broad discretion to admit "evidence of any acts or circumstances 
which are inconsistent with the relevant testimony of [a] 
witness.  Any evidence, otherwise proper, which in any respect 
tends to contradict the witness, is admissible for this 
purpose."  Id. at 500 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
¶32 Indeed, we have affirmed circuit courts' discretion to 
admit evidence in rebuttal even if the evidence tends to 
corroborate the case-in-chief, see McGowan, 91 Wis. at 154, and 
where the evidence could have been submitted in the State's 
case-in-chief, see Watson, 46 Wis. 2d at 500.  In those 
instances, we have recognized that the admission of such 
evidence may be "necessary to achieve justice," and the 
determination of what is necessary in those instances is subject 
to the circuit court's discretion.  Id. at 499 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
¶33 However, appellate courts have implied that evidence 
is not appropriate in rebuttal where it is plain that the 
evidence was withheld from the case-in-chief for dramatic effect 
or to ambush the defendant, although this rule would be subject 
to the necessities of justice.  See Lunde, 85 Wis. 2d at 91–92; 
McGowan, 91 Wis. at 154; cf. Konkol, 256 Wis. 2d 725, ¶¶15–19 
(rejecting 
circuit 
court's determination that an expert's 
No. 
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15 
 
testimony was "not really rebuttal" and that it "could have been 
proffered during the case in chief"). 
¶34 Wisconsin courts have come to refer to evidence that 
is proper for rebuttal as "bona fide rebuttal evidence."  See 
Lunde, 85 Wis. 2d at 91; State v. Sandoval, 2009 WI App 61, ¶30, 
318 Wis. 2d 126, 767 N.W.2d 291.  Specifically, appellate courts 
have defined bona fide rebuttal evidence as that which (1) was 
not necessary to the State's (or plaintiff's) case-in-chief, and 
(2) which became necessary and appropriate when the defense made 
its case.  See Lunde, 85 Wis. 2d at 91–92.  Bona fide rebuttal 
evidence is not determined by asking whether the evidence could 
have been admitted in the State's case-in-chief, but rather 
whether the evidence became necessary and appropriate because it 
controverts the defendant's case.  See Konkol, 256 Wis. 2d 725, 
¶18; Lunde, 85 Wis. 2d at 91–92.   
¶35 Moreover, rebuttal evidence is no less bona fide when 
the State is able to anticipate the defense's theory or 
particular pieces of evidence.  See Konkol, 256 Wis. 2d 725, 
¶15.  Once the defendant raises a particular theory, the 
defendant's veracity and the credibility of that theory become 
relevant issues in the case.  See id., ¶17.  The State's ability 
to predict or anticipate the defendant's theory does not 
diminish the necessity or propriety of otherwise bona fide 
rebuttal evidence.  See id., ¶17 & n.6.  To the extent that the 
State is better able to prepare a strong rebuttal to the defense 
theory, the truth-seeking function of litigation is better 
served, in that the possibility of such rebuttal will keep the 
No. 
2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR 
 
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defendant honest, or at least afford the State an opportunity to 
shed light upon questions raised by the defense's case.  See 
id., ¶17 n.6. 
2.  Application 
¶36 As we apply the principles set out above, we will 
uphold a circuit court's decision to admit or exclude evidence 
if the circuit court examined the relevant facts, applied a 
proper legal standard, and, using a demonstrated rational 
process, reached a reasonable conclusion.  Miller v. Hanover 
Ins. Co., 2010 WI 75, ¶29, 326 Wis. 2d 640, 785 N.W.2d 493. 
¶37 The 
circuit 
court's 
discussion 
of 
whether 
the 
fingerprint evidence and related testimony was proper rebuttal 
evidence shows consideration of the relevant facts and is 
consistent with the discovery statute, Wis. Stat. § 971.23, as 
interpreted by appellate courts.  Following opening statements, 
Novy objected to the use of the fingerprint evidence and related 
testimony based on the State's failure to provide the defense 
with access to the fingerprint cards that were to be used by the 
State's witnesses.7  The circuit court agreed with Novy and held 
that, under § 971.23(7m)(a), the State could not use the 
                                                 
7 The parties do not dispute that the State provided the 
defense with a report of the State's expert, Todd Thorne, 
detailing the conclusions of his analysis of the fingerprints.  
The circuit court concluded, however, that the report was 
insufficient under Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(g), which requires the 
State to provide access to "[a]ny physical evidence that the 
district attorney intends to offer in evidence at the trial."  
On that basis, the court excluded from the State's case-in-chief 
both the physical fingerprint evidence and the State's expert's 
testimony. 
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2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR 
 
17 
 
fingerprint evidence in its case-in-chief, although the court 
reserved judgment on whether the evidence would be admissible in 
rebuttal. 
¶38 The circuit court's interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.23——including the State's discovery obligations and the 
applicable sanctions for discovery violations——is supported by 
the plain meaning of the statute as interpreted by appellate 
courts.  Section 971.23(1)(g) requires the State to disclose 
"any physical evidence" that the State intends to offer in 
evidence at trial, and upon failure to comply with that 
provision, 
§ 971.23(7m)(a) requires that the court "shall 
exclude any . . . evidence not presented for inspection or 
copying required by [§ 971.23]."  Accordingly, the court's 
initial decision to exclude the fingerprint evidence and related 
testimony from the State's case-in-chief was in accord with the 
plain language of the statute. 
¶39 Novy contends that once the circuit court excluded the 
fingerprint evidence and related testimony, the court was 
without discretion to allow the evidence or testimony on 
rebuttal.  Novy relies on Wis. Stat. § 971.23(7m)(a)'s statement 
that, upon finding that the State has violated its discovery 
obligations, "[t]he court shall exclude any witness not listed 
or evidence not presented for inspection . . . unless good cause 
is shown for failure to comply."  He asserts that this provision 
withdraws the circuit court's discretion to later allow such 
evidence for purposes of rebuttal.  Appellate court decisions, 
however, have suggested otherwise. 
No. 
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18 
 
¶40 As noted above, the discretion afforded circuit courts 
has been reaffirmed numerous times since the enactment of the 
discovery statute.  See Konkol, 256 Wis. 2d 725, ¶¶15–18.  In 
Konkol, the court of appeals determined that the circuit court 
had erroneously excluded rebuttal evidence, where the circuit 
court had concluded that the State's use of the evidence in 
rebuttal 
was 
an 
attempt 
to 
circumvent 
the 
disclosure 
requirements of Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(d).  Id., ¶¶5–7, 18.  
Relying on our decision in Lunde, 85 Wis. 2d at 91–92, the court 
of appeals in Konkol reaffirmed the principle that the proper 
analysis for determining whether evidence is "bona fide rebuttal 
evidence" is not whether the evidence could have been admitted 
in the State's case-in-chief, but rather whether the evidence 
became necessary and appropriate upon presentation of the 
defense's case.  Konkol, 256 Wis. 2d 725, ¶18. 
¶41 This test for bona fide rebuttal evidence effectively 
harmonizes the plain language of the sanctions provision in the 
discovery statute and the discretion of the circuit court.  The 
sanctions provision of the discovery statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.23(7m)(a), provides that "[t]he court shall exclude" 
evidence for which the State failed to comply with the 
disclosure requirements.  Here, the circuit court did just that:  
upon determining that the State failed to provide proper access 
to the fingerprint cards, that evidence and related testimony 
was excluded from the State's case-in-chief.   
¶42 However, notwithstanding the initial exclusion, such 
an exclusion need not be absolute because circuit courts retain 
No. 
2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR 
 
19 
 
significant discretion to admit rebuttal evidence, even when 
such evidence was not disclosed for use in the case-in-chief.  
See id. (relying on Lunde, 85 Wis. 2d at 91–92); cf. Wold v. 
State, 57 Wis. 2d 344, 355, 204 N.W.2d 482 (1973) (recognizing 
that in the context of impeachment of a defendant by a prior 
inconsistent statement that was obtained in violation of the 
warnings required under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), 
the proper focus is on the statement's trustworthiness, or lack 
thereof, not on whether the statement was excluded from the 
State's case-in-chief).  Moreover, as relevant here, the circuit 
court's discretion to admit evidence on rebuttal is particularly 
broad "when the evidence is necessary to achieve justice."  
Watson, 46 Wis. 2d at 499 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
¶43 During the defense's case, Novy testified that he did 
not call Julie from the payphone at L&M Meats on the night of 
November 9, 2008.  This statement raised an issue of credibility 
between Novy's and Julie's accounts of what occurred that 
evening because Julie had previously testified that she had 
received such a phone call and implicated Novy.  Accordingly, 
after Novy's testimony, admission of testimony related to the 
fingerprint 
evidence 
became 
necessary 
and 
appropriate 
as 
rebuttal testimony to contradict Novy's testimony. 
¶44 Furthermore, neither the State's pointed question 
(whether Novy called Julie from the payphone that night) nor the 
fact that Novy might have used the phone on other occasions 
diminished the propriety of the State's use of the fingerprint 
evidence and related testimony in rebuttal.  As we have said, 
No. 
2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR 
 
20 
 
the standard for rebuttal evidence is quite broad:  any evidence 
otherwise admissible that "in any respect tends to contradict 
the witness, is admissible" for rebuttal.  Id. at 500 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  On this standard, we cannot say that 
the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in 
allowing the State to offer testimony that tended to undermine 
or contradict Novy's testimony regarding his use of the payphone 
at L&M Meats on November 9, 2008.8 
¶45 Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court's 
interpretation 
of 
the 
statute 
was 
consistent 
with 
prior 
appellate decisions, and that the circuit court's decision to 
allow testimony relating to fingerprint evidence on rebuttal was 
not an erroneous exercise of discretion. 
C.  Juror Inattentiveness 
¶46 The second issue Novy raises is that the circuit court 
erred by denying Novy's motion to strike a juror whom defense 
counsel claimed was sleeping during the defense's closing 
                                                 
8 Novy also argues that the fingerprint-related testimony  
became irrelevant once the applicable bail jumping charge (Count 
7) was dismissed.  However, the nature of the offense of 
stalking suggests that Novy's conduct relevant to the bail 
jumping charge (viz., calling Julie at home) was equally 
relevant to demonstrate the course of conduct for stalking.  See 
State v. Conner, 2011 WI 8, ¶28, 331 Wis. 2d 352, 795 N.W.2d 750 
(discussing the nature of the offense of stalking).  This is so 
because if the jury believed that Novy called Julie from L&M 
Meats on the night in question, such facts would tend to support 
the State's theory that Novy had engaged in a course of conduct 
that Novy knew or should have known would cause Julie to suffer 
serious emotional distress, and that did in fact cause such 
distress.  See Wis. Stat. § 940.32(2)(a), (b), and (c) (setting 
forth elements of the offense of stalking). 
No. 
2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR 
 
21 
 
argument.  This argument is based on the constitutional right to 
an impartial jury and due process, as guaranteed by the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution.  See State 
v. Kettner, 2011 WI App 142, ¶23, 337 Wis. 2d 461, 805 N.W.2d 
132. 
1.  General principles 
¶47 The right to a fair trial by an impartial jury 
underlies the requirement that jurors have heard all of the 
material portions of the trial.  See id.  "The absence of this 
condition, whether it is due to a hearing deficiency or a state 
of 
semi-consciousness, 
could 
imperil 
the 
guarantees 
of 
impartiality and due process."  Id. (quoting State v. Hampton 
(Hampton I), 201 Wis. 2d 662, 668, 549 N.W.2d 756 (Ct. App. 
1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Review of an 
allegation of juror inattentiveness involves a twofold inquiry:  
First, the circuit court must determine, as a question of fact, 
whether the juror was actually inattentive to the point of 
potentially undermining the fairness of the trial; here, whether 
the juror was sleeping.  See State v. Hampton (Hampton II), 217 
Wis. 2d 614, 621, 579 N.W.2d 260 (Ct. App. 1998).  Second, if 
the circuit court finds that the juror was in fact sufficiently 
inattentive, the court must determine whether the defendant 
suffered prejudice as a result of the juror's inattentiveness.  
See id. 
¶48 As with evidentiary issues, questions involving juror 
conduct and attentiveness implicate the circuit court's broad 
No. 
2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR 
 
22 
 
discretion.  See id.  Accordingly, although we review a circuit 
court's prejudice analysis as a matter of law, we will uphold a 
circuit court's factual findings regarding the conduct and 
attentiveness of the jurors, unless those findings are clearly 
erroneous.  See Kettner, 337 Wis. 2d 461, ¶12.  
2.  Application  
¶49 Our decision on this issue rests on the absence of a 
necessary factual finding by the circuit court that a juror was 
sleeping.  See id.  Without such a finding, we need not address 
the question of law this issue presents, i.e., whether the 
juror's alleged sleeping prejudiced Novy. 
¶50 After completion of closing arguments, defense counsel 
sought a sidebar during which he moved to strike the allegedly 
sleeping juror.  Judge Kluka denied the motion and, after the 
jury left the courtroom, counsel was afforded an opportunity to 
make a record of his objection.  During that discussion, Judge 
Kluka noted that she considered the defense counsel's request, 
but that she did not see the juror sleeping.  Additionally, 
Judge Kluka also noted that she had kept "track of what's going 
on with the jurors fairly well," and that she had "paid very[,] 
very close attention to the demeanor and conduct of the jurors."   
¶51 In explaining the reason for her ruling, the circuit 
court did not find that the juror was sleeping, and therefore, 
Novy did not establish a fact necessary to his motion to strike.  
On this record, we cannot say that the circuit court's findings 
are clearly erroneous because they did not include a finding 
that the juror was sleeping.  Because we accept such findings, 
No. 
2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR 
 
23 
 
we do not discuss this legal challenge further.9  Accordingly, we 
affirm the circuit court's denial of Novy's motion to strike the 
allegedly sleeping juror from further participation in his 
trial. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶52 We conclude that, with regard to the admission of 
rebuttal fingerprint-related testimony, the circuit court did 
not erroneously exercise its discretion.  The circuit court 
initially determined that the State had failed to comply with 
its discovery obligations under Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1); and 
therefore, the court excluded fingerprint evidence and related 
testimony 
from 
the 
State's 
case-in-chief 
pursuant 
to 
                                                 
9 At oral argument,  counsel for Mr. Novy was questioned 
about whether the circuit court made findings regarding the 
allegedly sleeping juror.  Justice Roggensack said that it 
seemed "the trial court made a finding that she didn't see that 
there was any juror sleeping."  Counsel for Mr. Novy responded, 
"You know, judge, I read that, and that certainly is true, but I 
don't think the judge in [her] decision made that the issue.  I 
think [she] made the issue that you just don't have to have a 
juror listen to closing arguments if they choose not to listen."  
Oral Argument at 4:40, State v. Novy, 2011AP407-CR, available at 
http://www.wiseye.org/Programming/VideoArchive/ArchiveList.aspx?
cv=34.   
Counsel for the State noted defense counsel's concession on 
the trial court's finding, and reiterated that it was the 
State's position that "the circuit court made a finding that the 
juror was not sleeping," but that the court also "went that step 
further and said 'Even if the juror was sleeping, then [the 
court 
doesn't] 
find 
any 
prejudice 
because 
this 
wasn't 
testimonial.'"  Underscoring this point, counsel for the State 
concluded 
that 
"On 
these 
facts, 
[although] 
there 
was 
no . . . explicit finding, . . . I think it can definitely be 
interpreted as a finding of fact that the juror was not asleep."  
Id. at 27:00. 
No. 
2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR 
 
24 
 
§ 971.23(7m)(a).  However, after Novy testified such that the 
excluded 
fingerprint evidence and related testimony would 
controvert his testimony, the circuit court concluded that it 
could be presented in rebuttal.  The circuit court properly 
interpreted § 971.23 under the facts of this case, and given the 
significant discretion afforded circuit courts on evidentiary 
matters, we cannot say that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised its discretion in permitting the rebuttal use of the 
fingerprint evidence and related testimony. 
¶53 With regard to the circuit court's treatment of the 
allegedly sleeping juror, the circuit court did not find that 
the juror was sleeping; and therefore, Novy failed to establish 
a finding necessary to his contention.  The circuit court's 
findings are not clearly erroneous; and therefore, we will not 
overturn the circuit court's refusal to strike the juror.  
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
¶54 DAVID T. PROSSER, J., did not participate.   
 
 
No.  2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶55 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.  (concurring).  I write 
separately for two reasons.  First, I disagree with the majority 
opinion's interpretation and application of Wis. Stat. § 971.23 
to the undisputed facts in the present case.  Second, I disagree 
with the majority opinion's approach to the second issue, namely 
the allegedly sleeping juror. 
I 
¶56 The majority opinion does not address the difficult 
issue of law facing the court, namely interpreting and applying 
the text of Wis. Stat. § 971.23 to the undisputed facts of the 
case.  The majority opinion carefully reprints the text of the 
statute but then ignores the words themselves.  Indeed, the 
majority opinion masks, avoids, and seems oblivious to the 
difficult 
statutory 
interpretation 
issue 
by 
failing 
to 
distinguish between witness testimony, which is governed by Wis. 
Stat. § 971.23(1)(d) and physical evidence, which is governed by 
§ 971.23(1)(g).  
¶57 The question presented in the instant case is, 
according to the court of appeals,1 the State, and the defendant, 
whether fingerprint evidence (physical evidence)2 excluded from 
the State's case-in-chief as a discovery sanction may later be 
                                                 
1 State v. Novy, 2012 WI App 10, ¶9, 338 Wis. 2d 439, 809 
N.W.2d 889. 
2 It is undisputed that the fingerprint evidence in this 
case is "physical evidence."  Fingerprint evidence has been 
categorized as "physical evidence" on multiple occasions.  See, 
e.g., State v. Martin, 2012 WI 96, ¶63, 343 Wis. 2d 278, 816 
N.W.2d 270; 
State 
v. 
Armstrong, 
2005 
WI 
119, 
¶63, 
283 
Wis. 2d 639, 700 N.W.2d 98; State v. Stuart, 2005 WI 47, ¶54, 
279 Wis. 2d 659, 695 N.W.2d 259. 
No.  2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
used by the State in its rebuttal witnesses' testimony to 
challenge the defendant's testimony.  In other words, the issue 
is not whether the expert witnesses can be rebuttal witnesses.  
They can under the statute at issue and relevant case law.  The 
issue, rather, is whether the State can, while questioning its 
rebuttal expert witnesses, introduce into evidence and have the 
witnesses testify about the physical fingerprint evidence that 
has been excluded under Wis. Stat. § 971.23.   
¶58 The majority opinion does not directly answer the 
question presented in the instant case.  Instead, the majority 
opinion states a different question:  whether the trial court 
erred when it allowed the State to use certain fingerprint 
evidence and related testimony in rebuttal.  Majority op., ¶1.  
The majority opinion seems to answer yet another question 
(changing 
the 
phrase 
"fingerprint 
evidence 
and 
related 
testimony" in the question to "fingerprint-related testimony" in 
the answer):  "We conclude that, with regard to the admission of 
fingerprint-related testimony on rebuttal, the circuit court did 
not erroneously exercise its discretion [to admit the rebuttal 
testimony]."  Majority op., ¶2.3 
¶59 The majority opinion meshes physical evidence (the 
fingerprint cards) and the witnesses' testimony and thus shifts 
the focus of inquiry from physical evidence to testimony.   
                                                 
3 Yet sometimes the majority opinion seems to address the 
admissibility of the fingerprint evidence itself.  See, e.g., 
majority op., ¶37. 
No.  2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶60 Throughout the opinion the majority uses the words 
"testimony" 
and 
"evidence" 
either 
interchangeably4 
or 
in 
combination in some phrase,5 all the while stating that it is 
applying the plain meaning of Wis. Stat. § 971.23.  The case law 
upon which the majority relies, case law that is pre- and post- 
the present version of § 971.23, addresses only testimony; the 
case law does not address physical evidence or testimony related 
to physical evidence.  Yet § 971.23 treats testimony and 
physical evidence separately——and differently.  That's the rub. 
¶61 I look first at Wis. Stat. §§ 971.23(1)(d) and (1)(g).6  
Wisconsin Stat. § 971.23(1)(d) requires that before trial, the 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., majority op., ¶25, in which the majority states 
that Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(d) "has an exception for disclosure 
of rebuttal evidence."  Not true.  Section 971.23(1)(d) excepts 
rebuttal testimony. 
5 The majority opinion repeatedly refers to the State's use 
of "certain fingerprint evidence and related testimony in 
rebuttal" or some such mixed reference to fingerprint physical 
evidence and testimony of a witness.  See, e.g., majority op., 
¶¶1, 2, 11, 14, 23, 28, 37, 39, 43, 44, 52. 
6 Wis. Stat. § 971.23, Discovery and Inspection:  
(1) What a district attorney must disclose to a 
defendant.  Upon demand, the district attorney shall, 
within a reasonable time before trial, disclose to the 
defendant or his or her attorney and permit the 
defendant or his or her attorney to inspect and copy 
or photograph all of the following materials and 
information, if it is within the possession, custody 
or control of the state: 
 
 . . . . 
(d) A list of all witnesses and their addresses whom 
the district attorney intends to call at the trial.  
This paragraph does not apply to rebuttal witnesses or 
those called for impeachment only. 
No.  2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
district attorney must disclose to the defendant a list of all 
witnesses whom the district attorney intends to call at trial.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 971.23(1)(g) requires the district attorney to 
disclose any physical evidence that the district attorney 
intends to use at trial.   
¶62 The statute governing discovery of the witness list, 
§ 971.23(1)(d), makes an exception for a rebuttal or impeachment 
witness.  Such a witness need not be included on the list of 
witnesses disclosed before trial.   
¶63 In 
contrast, 
the 
statutory 
provision 
governing 
discovery of physical evidence, § 971.23(1)(g), does not provide 
a similar exception for rebuttal or impeachment evidence.   
¶64 What are we to make of this different treatment in the 
statute of testimony and physical evidence?  Testimony and 
physical evidence are not synonymous.  "Testimony" and "physical 
evidence" are different types of evidence.     
¶65 I begin my discussion by reciting what happened at the 
trial court.  
¶66 The physical evidence at issue was two "cards" 
containing fingerprints.  One card contained the defendant's 
known fingerprints; the other card contained fingerprints lifted 
from the pay phone.  Prior to trial, the State failed to 
disclose to the defendant the physical evidence——the fingerprint 
cards——it intended to use at trial.  Disclosure of physical 
                                                                                                                                                             
. . . . 
(g) Any physical evidence that the district attorney 
intends to offer in evidence at trial. 
No.  2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
evidence 
prior 
to 
trial 
is 
required 
by 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.23(1)(g).   
¶67 The 
defendant 
moved 
to 
exclude 
the 
physical 
fingerprint evidence.  The trial court granted the defendant's 
motion and prohibited the State from introducing this physical 
fingerprint evidence at trial.  The ruling comports with Wis. 
Stat. § 971.23(1)(g), although the circuit court did not 
specifically refer by number to this paragraph of the statute.  
The State does not challenge the trial court's exclusion of the 
physical fingerprint evidence from its case-in-chief.            
¶68 Even though the trial court had excluded the physical 
fingerprint evidence from the State's case-in-chief, the State 
still sought to call the fingerprint experts in its case-in-
chief.  The experts would have testified about their examination 
of the fingerprints on the two cards and their conclusion that 
the known fingerprints matched the fingerprints lifted from the 
pay phone.  The trial court refused to allow the experts to 
testify in the State's case-in-chief because their testimony 
relied on the physical fingerprint evidence that had been 
excluded.  The trial court concluded that without the physical 
fingerprint evidence, none of the experts' testimony was 
relevant to the case.  The State does not challenge the trial 
court's exclusion of the witnesses from its case-in-chief.  
¶69 Indeed, the majority opinion concludes, as do I, that 
the trial court validly excluded the fingerprint cards and the 
expert testimony that would have been based on the cards from 
the State's case-in-chief.  Majority op., ¶38.     
No.  2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
¶70 The problem arose when the State sought to introduce 
the 
previously 
excluded 
physical 
fingerprint 
evidence 
in 
rebuttal.  According to the text of the statute, Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.23(7m)(a) provides the sanction for failure to disclose 
physical evidence:  "The court shall exclude any witness not 
listed or evidence not presented for inspection or copying 
required by this section, unless good cause is shown for failure 
to comply.  The court may in appropriate cases grant the 
opposing party a recess or a continuance" (emphasis added).    
¶71 Despite 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.23(7m)(a) 
excluding 
the 
physical 
fingerprint 
evidence 
that 
wasn't 
presented 
for 
inspection, the circuit court, without any analysis of the 
statute or case law, simply announced that there was no 
distinction between a witness and physical evidence and that a 
rebuttal witness can bring in any kind of physical evidence that 
the State may wish to use in connection with that witnesses' 
testimony.7  The circuit court laid down a rule of law that the 
bench and bar could readily apply.   
¶72 Because the majority opinion does not analyze the 
relationship between testimony and physical evidence and the 
application of the text of Wis. Stat. § 971.23(7m)(a) to both, 
                                                 
7 The defendant did not see the fingerprint cards before 
they were introduced into the record on rebuttal, and therefore 
the defendant was unable to procure his own expert to challenge 
the State's experts' testimony. 
Although the State had not listed the names of the 
witnesses 
who 
would 
testify 
about 
the 
fingerprints, 
the 
defendant had a copy of the fingerprint report and knew the 
names of the fingerprint experts.   
No.  2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
the majority opinion, unlike the ruling of the circuit court, is 
muddled and fails to give proper guidance to the bench and bar.   
¶73 For help in interpreting the present statute, I have 
examined the cases cited in the majority opinion.  Although past 
cases upon which the majority opinion relies sometimes used the 
words "testimony" and "evidence" interchangeably in rebuttal 
witness cases,8 none of the cases is relevant for resolving the 
issue presented here because each case dealt with testimony, not 
physical evidence.9   
                                                 
8 That the words "testimony" and "evidence" are sometimes 
used interchangeably should not be surprising.  After all, 
testimony is one type of evidence.  In many instances it might 
not matter whether a court uses the word "evidence" or 
"testimony." In the present case, however, the applicable 
statute treats the two separately and differently. 
9 See, e.g., cases cited at majority op., ¶¶25, 26, 29-35, 
40, 42, 44.  
State v. Lunde, 85 Wis. 2d 80, 270 N.W.2d 180 (1978) (State 
was permitted to present bona fide rebuttal witness testimony 
from a witness who had not been previously identified to the 
defendant because the rebuttal witness's testimony was only 
necessary and appropriate once the defendant testified.  State 
action was permitted under old Wis. Stat. § 971.23(3)(a), which 
is now § 971.23(1)(d)). 
State v. Watson, 46 Wis. 2d 492, 499-500, 175 N.W.2d 244 
(1970) (Decided before the statute was enacted.  State could 
present "rebuttal evidence" through "rebuttal witnesses" to 
impeach the credibility of a testifying defendant). 
Howard v. Beldenville Lumber Co., 129 Wis. 98, 108 N.W. 48 
(1906) (Decided before the statute was enacted.  The plaintiff 
had wide discretion to present rebuttal testimony to contradict 
the defendant's testimony.  The court used the term "evidence" 
to refer to rebuttal "testimony" that did not include any 
"physical evidence."). 
No.  2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
¶74 I have also reviewed the history of Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.23 going back to the 1969 enactment of the first version 
of the statute.10  What is clear from the statutory history is 
that since the statute's enactment, the defendant's discovery of 
the list of witnesses and discovery of physical evidence were 
treated differently in two distinct statutes.11  The statute 
                                                                                                                                                             
McGowan v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 91 Wis. 147, 64 N.W. 891 
(1895) (Decided before the statute was enacted.  The plaintiff 
could call witnesses on rebuttal even though the plaintiff had 
known the witnesses existed before trial and had considered 
calling them in the case-in-chief.). 
State 
v. 
Sandoval, 
2009 
WI 
App 
61, 
¶¶30-31, 
318 
Wis. 2d 126, 767 N.W.2d 291 (State could call a rebuttal witness 
whose testimony about what he saw included exculpatory evidence 
that had not been disclosed to the defendant before trial 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(h)). 
State v. Konkol, 2002 WI App 174, ¶18, 256 Wis. 2d 725, 649 
N.W.2d 300 (State had no duty to list a rebuttal witness under 
Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(d) even if the prosecutor knew before 
trial that the witness would be called.  Testimony, not physical 
evidence, was admitted.). 
10 The current statute requiring a district attorney to 
provide pretrial discovery to a defendant was created by ch. 
255, Laws of 1969, a complete redraft of the criminal procedure 
statutes undertaken by the Criminal Rules Committee established 
by the Judicial Council. 
11 Wis. Stat. § 971.23(3)(a) (1969-70), List of Witnesses: 
A defendant may, not less than 15 days nor more than 
30 days before trial, serve upon the district attorney 
an offer in writing to furnish the state a list of all 
witnesses the defendant intends to call at the trial, 
whereupon within 5 days after the receipt of such 
offer, 
the 
district 
attorney 
shall 
furnish 
the 
defendant a list of all witnesses and their addresses 
whom he intends to call at the trial.  Within 5 days 
after the district attorney furnishes such list, the 
defendant shall furnish the district attorney a list 
of 
all 
witnesses 
and 
their 
addresses 
whom 
the 
defendant intends to call at the trial.  This section 
No.  2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
governing discovery of witnesses included an exception for 
rebuttal and impeachment witnesses, while the statute governing 
discovery 
of 
physical 
evidence 
did 
not 
include 
such 
an 
exception.12  The 1969 statute and the revisions, including the 
present version, preserve this distinction.    
¶75 I conclude that Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1) does not 
explicitly authorize a trial court to admit physical evidence on 
rebuttal.  Perhaps other legal principles can support the 
admission 
of 
the 
previously excluded physical fingerprint 
evidence in the State's case on rebuttal.  The majority opinion 
hints 
that 
perhaps 
admissibility 
should 
hinge 
on 
trustworthiness, and that the general principles of impeachment 
                                                                                                                                                             
shall not apply to rebuttal witnesses or those called 
for impeachment only. 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.23(4) 
(1969-70) 
Inspection 
of 
Physical 
Evidence: 
On a motion of a party subject to s. 971.31(5), all 
parties shall produce at a reasonable time and place 
designated by the court all physical evidence which 
each 
party 
intends 
to 
introduce 
in 
evidence.  
Thereupon, any party shall be permitted to inspect or 
copy such physical evidence in the presence of a 
person designated by the court.  The order shall 
specify the time, place and manner of making the 
inspection, copies or photographs and may prescribe 
such terms and conditions as are just. 
12 The current criminal discovery statute took its present 
form in 1996 after the enactment of 1995 Wisconsin Act 387, 
which repealed, renumbered, and recreated certain portions of 
the old statute.  The analysis of 1995 Assembly Bill 721 (which 
became 1995 Act 387) by the Legislative Reference Bureau 
indicates that the new bill aimed to eliminate old arduous 
procedure requirements in favor of simpler, more responsive 
discovery of witness lists and physical evidence. 
No.  2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
testimony should apply to the present case.  See majority op., 
¶42.13  
¶76 In any event, I concur in the mandate because I agree 
with the State that if the admission of the fingerprint evidence 
in rebuttal was error, it was harmless error in the present 
case.  
II 
¶77 I turn now to the second issue, the allegedly sleeping 
juror.  
¶78 The majority embarks on its own new theory about the 
allegedly sleeping juror——a theory that was neither briefed nor 
argued by the parties.  This theory asserts that the circuit 
court based its decision on findings of fact.  I disagree with 
the majority opinion.  
¶79 The circuit court did not base its decision on any 
factual findings.  Rather, the circuit court based its decision 
on a legal conclusion:  Even if the defendant's factual 
allegations that the juror was sleeping were true, the defendant 
was not prejudiced.   
¶80 Rather than addressing the actual legal basis of the 
decision of the circuit court, the majority opinion fails to 
even mention it.  Because the majority opinion's analysis 
arrives at conflicting conclusions, mischaracterizes the circuit 
court record and ultimately fails to provide guidance to circuit 
courts on how they should proceed when confronted with a 
                                                 
13 See also Novy, 338 Wis. 2d 439, ¶¶14, 15. 
No.  2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
challenge that a juror was sleeping, I write separately to 
address this issue.  
A 
¶81 The majority's theory and analysis of the sleeping 
juror issue rests on its discussion of the circuit court's 
findings of facts——findings that the circuit court never made. 
¶82 At the outset of its discussion of the sleeping juror 
issue, the majority opinion states that review of the issue 
involves a twofold inquiry.  First, the circuit court must 
determine, as a question of fact, whether the juror was 
sleeping.  Majority op., ¶47.  Second, the circuit court must 
determine whether the defendant suffered prejudice as a result 
of the juror's inattentiveness.  Id. 
¶83 After this set-up of the inquiry, the majority opinion 
then provides the standard of review: "[A]lthough we review a 
circuit court's prejudice analysis as a matter of law, we will 
uphold a circuit court's factual findings regarding the conduct 
and attentiveness of the jurors, unless those findings are 
clearly erroneous."  Majority op., ¶48. 
¶84 Throughout 
its 
opinion, 
the 
majority 
repeatedly 
concludes that the circuit court "did not find that the juror 
was sleeping."  Majority op., ¶¶3, 22, 51, 53.  The majority 
opinion also states that its decision "rests on the absence of a 
necessary factual finding by the circuit court that a juror was 
sleeping."  Majority op., ¶49.  Nevertheless, the majority 
opinion simultaneously applies the standard of review to the 
non-existent finding and concludes that the circuit court's 
No.  2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
"findings are not clearly erroneous."  See majority op., ¶¶3, 
22, 51, 53.   
¶85 The majority opinion emphasizes that the circuit court 
"had not seen the juror sleeping," majority op., ¶¶17, 50, and 
mentions the circuit court's statement that it tries "to keep 
track of what's going on with the jurors."  Majority op., ¶17.  
Ultimately, the majority opinion concludes that "[o]n this 
record, we cannot say the circuit court's findings are clearly 
erroneous because they did not include a finding that the juror 
was sleeping."  Majority op., ¶51.   
¶86 Thus, on the one hand, the majority opinion concludes 
that the circuit court made no finding that the juror was  
sleeping.  Majority op., ¶¶3, 22, 51, 53.  The circuit court 
also made no finding that the juror was not sleeping.  In other 
words, the circuit court made no finding of fact about whether 
the juror was or was not sleeping.  Nevertheless, the majority 
opinion 
paradoxically 
concludes 
that 
the 
circuit 
court's 
findings on the issue are not clearly erroneous.       
¶87 In order to determine whether a finding of historical 
fact is clearly erroneous, it is axiomatic that there must first 
be a finding of historical fact.14  Yet the majority opinion does 
not mention any other findings of fact that the circuit court 
made related to this issue of juror inattentiveness.  The 
                                                 
14 See, e.g., State v. Owens, 148 Wis. 2d 922, 926-27, 436 
N.W.2d 869 (1989).   
No.  2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
majority opinion appears to review a sole finding of fact that 
it acknowledges never occurred.15   
¶88 Even a cursory review of the record reveals that the 
circuit court undertook no factual inquiry into whether the 
juror was sleeping.  The circuit court did not voir dire the 
allegedly sleeping juror, did not take any testimony, and did 
not consider other admissible evidence in the record on this 
fact.   
¶89 Furthermore, the majority opinion's reliance on the 
circuit court's statements that it did not see the juror 
sleeping 
similarly 
cannot 
be 
the 
basis 
for 
the 
elusive 
"findings" on which the majority opinion rests its conflicting 
conclusions.  This court has held that a "circuit court may not 
rely on its own personal observations of events not contained in 
the record."  State v. Anson, 2005 WI 96, ¶33, 282 Wis. 2d 629, 
698 N.W.2d 776.  Furthermore, a judge presiding at a trial 
cannot testify as a witness.16   
¶90 It is the majority's misplaced focus on non-existent 
findings of fact that gets the majority into analytical trouble.  
The only reference to a finding of fact related to a sleeping 
                                                 
15 "On this record, we cannot say that the circuit court's 
findings are clearly erroneous because they did not include a 
finding that the juror was sleeping.  Because we accept such 
findings, we do not discuss this legal challenge further."  
Majority op., ¶51. 
16 State v. Anson, 282 Wis. 2d 629, ¶¶33, 34 & n.3, 698 
N.W.2d 776 (citing Wis. Stat. §§ 906.05 & 902.01(2)); State v. 
Hampton (Hampton I), 201 Wis. 2d 662, 672-73, 549 N.W.2d 756 
(Ct. App. 1996).  For additional discussion on the issue of a 
circuit court's personal observation and judicial notice, see 
¶¶105-119, infra. 
No.  2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
juror in the majority's entire opinion is its reference to what 
it describes as a non-existent finding. 
¶91 Although the majority acknowledges that the first step 
when presented with an sleeping juror issue is to determine 
whether the juror was in fact sleeping, the majority fails to 
acknowledge that such a determination never occurred in the 
present case.   
B 
¶92 The 
majority's 
approach 
to 
"facts" 
and 
its 
contradictory 
conclusions 
appear 
to 
stem 
from 
its 
mischaracterization of the record.  The circuit court determined 
that "even assuming what [the defense attorney alleged about the 
sleeping juror] is correct," the law does not automatically 
require the juror's removal.  
¶93 The majority selectively quotes the circuit court to 
make it appear as if the circuit court found that the juror was 
not sleeping, without actually stating that the circuit court 
found that the juror was not sleeping.  However, the context of 
what occurred before the circuit court is different from what 
the majority appears to describe.   
¶94 The defendant's attorney raised the issue about the 
juror before the circuit court by advising the court that he had 
seen a juror sleeping during his closing argument.  The 
defendant's attorney described what he saw as follows: 
MR. CICCHINI:  Just for the record.  I saw his eyes 
closed and his head nod down on one occasion[], and I 
saw his eyes closed on several occasions. 
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15 
 
¶95 In response, the State acknowledged that the juror may 
not have been paying rapt attention during closing arguments, 
but noted that she had not seen any indication that the juror 
was sleeping during the presentation of evidence: 
MS. JAY:  I certainly observed that he was not paying 
rapt attention, but I——I'll just take it personally.  
I didn't see anything during the trial during evidence 
that indicated to me that he was asleep during the 
evidence portion.  So, I just didn't think it was 
necessary to make him the 13th juror. 
¶96 The circuit court then stated its reasoning for 
denying the defendant's motion to strike the alleged sleeping 
juror. It observed that it was aware of case law that may 
require removal if the juror is sleeping during the presentation 
of evidence.  Here, however, the allegation was that the juror 
was sleeping during closing arguments.  The circuit court 
determined that "even assuming what [the defendant's attorney 
alleged about the sleeping juror] is correct," the law does not 
automatically 
require 
the 
juror's 
removal. 
 
Counsels' 
presentation and the full reasoning of the circuit court are as 
follows: 
MR. CICCHINI:  Would you like to do the juror issue 
real quick?  I'd like to make a record real quick that 
I brought up at the side bar? 
THE COURT:  Oh, sure. 
MR. CICCHINI:  During the side bar, I made a motion to 
strike as the——or have removed or strike as the 13th 
juror——Miss Jay [the prosecuting attorney] can maybe 
confirm this——I think his name was [juror's name]? 
MS. JAY:  Correct. 
MR. CICCHINI:  Okay.  He was in the lower right hand 
corner.  He had a Cubs shirt on, dark hair; and 
No.  2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
noticed him sleeping during the closing——my closing 
argument——and because I——I was trying to make eye 
contact with him, and I noticed that.  I move to 
strike.  I believe that Miss Jay concurred that she——
well she can speak for herself; but she noticed 
similar and opposed the motion.  The court denied the 
motion.  And I think that summarizes it. 
THE COURT:  The motion to strike him as the alternate 
juror. 
MR. CICCHINI:  Yes, alternate juror. Yes. 
THE COURT:  Attorney Jay. 
MS. JAY:  I certainly observed that he was not paying 
rapt attention, but I——I'll just take it personally.  
I didn't see anything during the trial during evidence 
that indicated to me that he was asleep during the 
evidence portion.  So I just didn't think it was 
necessary to make him the 13th juror. 
MR. CICCHINI:  Oh, I'm sorry.  I guess——could I just 
describe in brief detail what I saw? 
THE COURT:  Sure. 
MR. CICCHINI:  Just for the record.  I saw his eyes 
closed and his head nod down on one occasion, and I 
saw his eyes closed on several occasions. 
THE COURT:  During your closing. 
MR. CICCHINI:  Yes.  Thank you. 
THE COURT:  Did you see it during Attorney Jay's 
closing? 
MR. CICCHINI:  I——one time what I think I first 
noticed that his——his head was down but he was rubbing 
his forehead and came up back up, and I did not see it 
then.  I saw it during my closing. 
THE COURT:  Okay.  Your observations are noted.  I did 
consider this request at the side bar just before 
sending the jurors out to deliberate.  I myself [] 
didn't notice it.  I try to keep track of what's going 
on with the jurors fairly well.  I am aware of case 
law 
which 
says 
if 
a 
juror 
is 
sleeping 
during 
testimony, during the presentation of evidence, that 
No.  2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR.ssa 
 
17 
 
can warrant the dismissal of that juror or [] raise 
some issues with respect to deliberations in the sense 
that the juror [] doesn't have the same basis for 
deliberations as the other jurors. 
I——I didn't notice any of those kinds of problems 
while testimony was coming in during which I think I 
paid very——very close attention to the demeanor and 
conduct of the jurors.   
So, even assuming what you say is correct, it does not 
automatically require removal of that juror; and for 
that reason I did not grant your request and we 
selected the alternate randomly instead (emphasis 
added). 
¶97 Both parties describe the circuit court's statement as 
a legal conclusion reached by the circuit court's assuming the 
factual question.  Indeed, when pressed at oral argument before 
this court about whether the circuit court based its decision on 
factual findings, the defendant's attorney rebuffed such an 
assertion.  He responded that the issue the circuit court 
addressed was not the factual question of whether the juror was 
sleeping, but rather it was the legal question addressing the 
import of any juror sleeping when it allegedly occurred during 
closing arguments.17   
                                                 
17 The complete exchange occurred as follows: 
Justice 
Roggensack: 
 
Counselor, 
as 
I 
read 
the 
arguments and the materials provided, I thought that 
the trial court made a finding that she didn't see 
that there was any juror sleeping.   
Defendant's Attorney:  You know, [Justice Roggensack], 
I read that and um, that certainly is true but I don't 
think the judge in [her] decision made that the issue.  
I think [s]he made the issue that you just don't have 
to have a juror listen to closing argument if they 
choose not to listen.  I mean, let's face facts, 
jurors may be thinking about the Green Bay Packer game 
during the entire closing argument and we wouldn't 
No.  2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR.ssa 
 
18 
 
¶98 After Justice Roggensack raised the issue with the 
defendant's attorney, the State's attorney briefly addressed the 
issue.  The State concluded that the circuit court did not make 
an "explicit finding" of fact on the record regarding the 
sleeping juror and asked the court "to conclude that there was 
no prejudice."18 
                                                                                                                                                             
know that but it wouldn't really make any difference 
because what's important is that they listen to all 
the testimony and then make their decision on the 
testimony.  Does that answer your honor's . . . ? 
Justice Roggensack:  Well, I thought that, to me it 
was a finding and we adhere to the findings of the 
circuit court, unless they are clearly erroneous and I 
thought the judge was asked about this, it was brought 
to her attention and she said she didn't see any 
jurors sleeping and I thought she said she watched the 
jury quite closely.  So if it's a finding of fact, 
that's a different kind of an issue than if it's a 
question of law about whether we want to do something 
with a juror who was sleeping, you gotta get over the 
first step which was, was there a juror sleeping 
before you can get to the second step? 
Defendant's Attorney:  I understand that, [Justice 
Roggensack].  I'm not gonna disagree with that.  Thank 
you.  [The defendant's attorney proceeded to argue the 
issue of the rebuttal evidence.] 
18 The Assistant Attorney General's full statement is as 
follows:   
I will do the same as defense counsel did and start 
with the sleeping juror issue.  There weren't many 
questions on it but I did want to clear up something.  
I think he [the defendant's attorney] made the 
statement that it was obvious or something to that 
effect that the juror was sleeping or appeared to be 
sleeping in this case.  To Justice Roggensack's point, 
I do believe that the circuit court made a finding 
that the juror was not sleeping but went that step 
further and said that even if the juror was sleeping, 
I [the circuit court] don't find any prejudice because 
No.  2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR.ssa 
 
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¶99 In any event, whether a circuit court can make a 
finding of fact regarding the attentiveness of a juror under the 
circumstances of the present case is problematic.  No evidence 
was presented on the issue, and it is ordinarily inappropriate 
for a circuit court to take judicial notice of the fact that a 
juror was inattentive without further inquiry.  See ¶¶105-122, 
infra. 
C 
¶100 The majority's mischaracterizations do not stop with 
the record and the circuit court's decision.     
¶101 The majority opinion declares:  The court of appeals 
concluded that the issue of the allegedly sleeping juror was 
"within the broad discretion of the circuit court, and that 
there was nothing in the record to suggest that the court had 
erroneously exercised its discretion."  Majority op., ¶19 
(citing Novy, 338 Wis. 2d 439, ¶23).  
¶102 Not so!  The court of appeals treated the circuit 
court as having based its conclusion on prejudice, not on any 
finding of whether the juror was in fact sleeping.  The court of 
appeals stated:  "We know of no Wisconsin case, and Novy has not 
cited one, in which a juror was removed for nodding off during 
                                                                                                                                                             
this wasn't testimonial.  On these facts, there was 
no, it was not an explicit finding but I think it can 
definitely be interpreted as a finding of fact that 
the juror was not asleep and I think, so I just wanted 
to clear up that the State on the sleeping juror issue 
would ask this court to affirm and conclude that there 
was no prejudice and that the defendant failed to meet 
his burden on that issue.  [The State then proceeded 
to argue the rebuttal evidence issue].  (Emphasis 
added.) 
No.  2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR.ssa 
 
20 
 
closing arguments.  We therefore reject Novy's argument that the 
trial court erred in failing to conduct a further inquiry into 
whether the juror was sleeping."19   
D 
¶103 As a result of relying on a finding of fact that does 
not exist and mischaracterizing the record and the decisions of 
the circuit court and court of appeals, the majority opinion 
ultimately fails to undertake the ultimate question of whether 
the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial was 
violated by juror inattentiveness.   
¶104 By short-circuiting the analysis, the majority further 
fails to provide guidance on how circuit courts are to handle an 
allegation of a sleeping juror.   
E 
¶105 Unlike the majority opinion, I acknowledge the circuit 
court's stated reasoning for denying the defendant's motion to 
strike.  The circuit court did not determine whether the 
defendant's allegation of a sleeping juror was true.  Instead 
the circuit court determined that "even assuming what [Novy's 
attorney alleged about the sleeping juror] is correct," the law 
does not automatically require the juror's removal.  The circuit 
                                                 
19 Novy, 338 Wis. 2d 439, ¶23. 
After reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals went 
on to state that defense counsel did not ask the circuit court 
to conduct further inquiry into whether the juror was asleep; 
that it would not fault the circuit court for failing to 
undertake a further inquiry under the circumstances of the 
present case; and that the circuit court did not erroneously 
exercise its discretion in failing to conduct a further inquiry 
into whether the juror was sleeping.  Id. 
No.  2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR.ssa 
 
21 
 
court concluded that even if the juror was sleeping, as alleged, 
it did not prejudice the defendant. 
¶106 Here, the defendant's attorney alleged that he "saw 
[the juror's] eyes closed and his head nod down on one 
occasion[]" and "saw his eyes closed on several occasions."  The 
alleged 
inattentiveness 
occurred 
during 
defense 
counsel's 
closing argument. 
¶107 The constitutional right to an impartial jury requires 
that the jurors "have heard all of the material testimony."20  
When a party seeks to have a juror discharged, whether it is due 
to sleep or for another cause, it is the circuit court's duty to 
"make careful inquiry into the substance of the request and to 
exert reasonable efforts to avoid discharging the juror."21  
Upholding juror integrity is a task assigned to the courts.22  
The ultimate question of whether the defendant's constitutional 
right to a fair trial was violated by juror inattentiveness is a 
question 
of 
law 
that 
a 
reviewing 
court 
determines 
independently.23    
¶108 A circuit court must "approach the issue [of a 
sleeping juror] with extreme caution."24   
                                                 
20 Hampton I, 201 Wis. 2d at 668. 
21 State v. Lehman, 108 Wis. 2d 291, 300, 321 N.W.2d 212 
(1982). 
22 State v. Gonzalez, 2008 WI App 142, ¶9, 314 Wis. 2d 129, 
758 N.W.2d 153. 
23 State v. Hampton (Hampton II), 217 Wis. 2d 614, 621-22, 
579 N.W.2d 260 (Ct. App. 1998).   
24 Lehman, 108 Wis. 2d at 300. 
No.  2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR.ssa 
 
22 
 
¶109 As a threshold issue, parties must timely object in 
order to properly raise the issue before the circuit court.  
When parties notice a sleeping juror, they must bring the issue 
to the circuit court's attention during trial "as soon as 
practicable" after they notice the sleeping juror.25  If the 
objection is not timely, it may be considered "waived" or 
"forfeited".26  No one argues that the objection was not timely 
in the instant case. 
¶110 When a timely objection is made, the circuit court may 
proceed in different ways depending on the circumstances of the 
case.  The circuit court may have to decide whether the juror 
was sleeping.  Because the circuit court in the instant case did 
not address this question, the parties did not argue in their 
briefs how the circuit court should have handled the question.  
I write to remind the bench and bar that Hampton I27 and Hampton 
II28 are instructive about what a circuit court is to do to make 
a finding about juror attentiveness.29 
                                                 
25 State v. Saunders, 2011 WI App 156, ¶32, 338 Wis. 2d 160, 
807 N.W.2d 679.   
26 See Hampton I, 201 Wis. 2d at 669. 
27 Id. 
28 Hampton II, 217 Wis. 2d at 621-24.  See also Anson, 282 
Wis. 2d 629, ¶¶33-34. 
29 For a discussion of the numerous cases across the country 
on juror inattentiveness, see George L. Blum, Annotation, 
Inattention of Juror from Sleepiness or Other Cause As Ground 
for Reversal or New Trial, 59 A.L.R. 5th 1 (2003) (made current 
by weekly addition of relevant new cases). 
No.  2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR.ssa 
 
23 
 
¶111 The issue in the present case was raised in a 
substantially similar manner to that which occurred in Hampton 
I, in which the defendant also raised the issue orally at trial 
outside the presence of a jury.  The Hampton I court determined 
that when there is a "sufficient demonstration of juror 
sleepiness," the circuit court should undertake further factual 
inquiry.30   
¶112 In Hampton I, the attorney noticed a juror sleeping 
during witness testimony and raised the issue outside the 
presence of the jury.31  Although the circuit court acknowledged 
that the juror was "drowsy" during portions of the testimony, it 
did not undertake any further inquiry into whether the juror was 
actually sleeping.  The court of appeals concluded that there 
was a sufficient demonstration of juror sleepiness to warrant 
further factual inquiry and remanded the matter to the circuit 
court for an evidentiary hearing.32   
¶113 Following a remand for an evidentiary hearing in 
Hampton I, the circuit court found that the juror was drowsy for 
ten minutes and fell asleep for one or two minutes.33  On appeal 
from the evidentiary hearing, the court of appeals concluded in 
Hampton II that Hampton's due process rights to a fair trial 
                                                 
30 Hampton I, 201 Wis. 2d at 673.  
31 Id. at 666-67.   
32 Id. at 673-74. 
33 Hampton II, 217 Wis. 2d at 622. 
No.  2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR.ssa 
 
24 
 
were not violated because the testimony that was missed was not 
pivotal to the case.34     
¶114 In order for a circuit court to make a finding of fact 
regarding the inattentiveness of a juror, there must be facts in 
the record to support such a finding.     
¶115 It is problematic for a circuit court to take judicial 
notice of the juror's inattentiveness or to rely on its own 
observations. 
¶116 Case law from other jurisdictions suggests that a 
trial court may on "informed judicial knowledge" take judicial 
notice of the fact that a juror was sleeping when the circuit 
judge actually observes the juror sleeping.35  Wisconsin case 
law, including Hampton I, warns that taking judicial notice of 
the fact that a juror was or was not sleeping without further 
inquiry is ordinarily inappropriate.36   
¶117 The procedures for judicial notice are set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 902.01 (2009-10).  Judicial notice of whether a 
juror is sleeping does not fit easily with the kinds of 
adjudicative facts that may be judicially noticed under Wis. 
Stat. § 902.01(2).  See Anson, 282 Wis. 2d 629, ¶33 & n.3 
(holding that a circuit court cannot take judicial notice of 
facts it observes); Lemke v. Lemke, 2012 WI App 96, ¶21, 343 
                                                 
34 Id. at 624. 
35 Hampton I, 201 Wis. 2d at 669 n.5. 
36 Id. at 671-72 (quoting United States v. Barrett, 703 
F.2d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 1983)).  See also Anson, 282 
Wis. 2d 629, ¶¶33-34.  Compare Hampton II, 217 Wis. 2d at 619-
20. 
No.  2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR.ssa 
 
25 
 
Wis. 2d 748, 820 N.W.2d 470 (declaring that "[a] trial court 
sitting as a fact-finder may derive inferences from the 
testimony and take judicial notice of a fact that is not subject 
to 
reasonable 
dispute, but it may not establish as an 
adjudicative fact that which is known to the judge as an 
individual."); State v. Peterson, 222 Wis. 2d 449, 457-58, 588 
N.W.2d 84 (Ct. App. 1998) (stating a trial court "may not 
establish as an adjudicative fact that which is known to the 
judge as an individual."); II McCormick on Evidence § 329 at 373 
(John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999) ("What a judge knows and what 
facts a judge may judicially notice are not identical data 
banks."). 
¶118 In making the required factual determinations, circuit 
courts should take care not to act as witnesses.  Although a 
circuit court may make credibility determinations when making 
its factual findings, the case law indicates a circuit court may 
not rely on its personal knowledge of events not appearing in 
the record.37  A circuit court that relies on its own personal 
observations of events not in the record as the basis for a 
                                                 
37 An example of this principle is set forth in Anson, which 
stated that a circuit court may not state "its opinion [that] 
the witness was being intimidated by the presence of several 
well-known gang members in the courtroom, if the presence and 
behavior of these individuals was not documented in the record."  
Anson, 282 Wis. 2d 629, ¶34 (emphasis in original).   
Compare and contrast Hampton II, in which the court of 
appeals concluded that the circuit court's opinion about the 
attentiveness of the juror did not transform the circuit court 
into a material witness, requiring the judge's disqualification 
under Wis. Stat. § 757.19(2)(b).  Hampton II, 217 Wis. 2d at 
619-20. 
No.  2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR.ssa 
 
26 
 
factual finding "is essentially acting as a witness in the case 
by providing testimony."38  Acting as a witness is contrary to 
Wis. Stat. § 906.05, which provides that a judge "presiding at 
the trial may not testify in that trial as a witness." 
¶119 I recognize there is some tension within the case law 
regarding the circuit court's role in determining the fact of 
whether a juror was inattentive.  I conclude that the safest and 
best 
practice 
is 
for 
the 
party 
challenging 
the 
juror's 
attentiveness to put evidence in the record so that the circuit 
court 
may 
make 
a 
factual 
determination 
of 
a 
juror's 
attentiveness (or lack thereof) on the basis of evidence in the 
record. A circuit court may then have to determine whether a 
juror's inattention prejudiced the defendant to the extent that 
the defendant did not receive a fair trial.   
F 
¶120 Here, the circuit court did not undertake any factual 
inquiry about the juror sleeping.  It did not have to do so. 
Instead the circuit court determined that even if the juror were 
sleeping, the defendant was not prejudiced.  In making that 
determination, the circuit court recognized that the ultimate 
focus of the analysis is to determine whether a defendant is 
prejudiced.39  As the Hampton I court noted, "it is universally 
recognized that before inattentiveness warrants a mistrial, 
                                                 
38 Anson, 282 Wis. 2d 629, ¶33. 
39 Hampton I, 201 Wis. 2d at 668. 
No.  2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR.ssa 
 
27 
 
there must be a determination regarding prejudice."40  The same 
logic holds true regarding a motion to strike a sleeping juror. 
¶121 To satisfy the prejudice requirement, a defendant must 
establish that the juror missed enough of the proceeding to 
prejudice the defense.41  Generally, a defendant is prejudiced if 
a juror misses hearing "material testimony."42  Likewise, a 
defendant can be prejudiced by a sleeping juror if the juror 
misses a "pivotal" or "significant" part of the case.43   
¶122 In the present case, there is no indication that the 
sleeping juror missed a pivotal or significant portion of the 
proceeding.  Furthermore, it is undisputed that the juror heard 
all material testimony.  The defendant has therefore failed to 
establish that the allegedly sleeping juror was prejudicial to 
the defense.   
¶123 Because there is no indication that the defendant was 
prejudiced, the circuit court's discretionary refusal to strike 
the juror was reasonable.  Therefore, I conclude that the 
circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion when 
it denied the defendant's motion to strike.  
¶124 Unfortunately, the majority opinion's analysis is 
confusing and fails to provide guidance on how circuit courts 
should proceed when confronted with the challenge that the 
                                                 
40 Id. at 670.   
41 Id. at 668.   
42 Id. at 668.   
43 Hampton II, 217 Wis. 2d at 621, 624.   
No.  2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR.ssa 
 
28 
 
defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury is being 
denied based on an assertion that a juror was sleeping.  
¶125 For the reasons set forth, I write separately. 
¶126 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins this opinion. 
No.  2011AP407-CR & 2011AP408-CR & 2011AP409-CR.ssa 
 
1