Case Title: ANTHONY J. LINDSAY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-03-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
ANTHONY J. LINDSAY V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 34108 P.3d 852Case Number: 04-52Decided: 03/28/2005
 
 
October 
Term, A.D. 2004

 
 
­

ANTHONY 
J. LINDSAY,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofUintaCounty

The 
Honorable Dennis L. Sanderson, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Kenneth 
M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and 
Marion Yoder, 
Senior Assistant Public Defender.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael 
Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Georgia L. Tibbetts, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General.

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, JJ., and STEBNER, D.J., 
Retired.

 
 
            
STEBNER, District Judge, Retired.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, 
Anthony J. Lindsay, entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere to possession 
of methamphetamine in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c) (LexisNexis 
2003).  On appeal, Lindsay asserts 
that evidence obtained from the search of his person upon his arrest, after a 
traffic stop, should have been suppressed.  
Finding that the search of Lindsay's person was proper, we 
affirm.

 
 
FACTS1

 
 
[¶2]      On July 2, 2003, 
at 3:28 p.m., Trooper Mrnsy pulled over the vehicle that Lindsay was driving 
because he witnessed that vehicle following another automobile too closely when 
apparently attempting to pass in a "no-pass" zone.2  During Trooper Mrnsy's initial 
inquiries, he learned that the vehicle Lindsay was driving was a rental car that 
was to be driven solely in California and only by Paula Griego, who 
Lindsay asserted was his mother, who was not in the vehicle.  Trooper Mrnsy also obtained the driver's 
license of both Lindsay and a male passenger riding in the vehicle.3 

 
 
[¶3]      Based on the 
rental car situation and Lindsay's responses to questions involving his travel 
plans, Trooper Mrnsy asked if he could search the vehicle.  Lindsay refused this request.  Subsequently, Trooper Mrnsy asked 
dispatch to check on the status of the drivers' licenses of Lindsay and the male 
passenger in the vehicle and requested that a drug dog be sent to the 
scene.  At 3:36 p.m., it was learned 
that the driver's license of Lindsay was suspended.  However, dispatch could not advise 
Trooper Mrnsy of the exact reason for suspension.  A minute later, Trooper Mrnsy found it 
necessary to waive away an automobile, from the traffic stop scene, that had 
been traveling with the vehicle driven by Lindsay. 

 
 
[¶4]      Trooper Mrnsy 
again asked Lindsay if he could search the vehicle and Lindsay again 
refused.  Trooper Mrnsy then asked 
Lindsay to accompany him to his patrol vehicle to which Lindsay complied.  Lindsay further advised Trooper Mrnsy 
that he did not have any weapons or drugs in his possession. 

 
 
[¶5]      Twelve minutes 
after the stop, Trooper Mrnsy asked if Lindsay was financially able to pay a 
$410.00 bond on a citation for driving while his license was under 
suspension.  Over the next several 
minutes, Trooper Mrnsy and Lindsay discussed how Lindsay might pay the bond 
amount and the rental car situation.  
Lindsay also provided Trooper Mrnsy with information necessary to issue 
Lindsay a citation for driving while under suspension.  At 3:54 p.m., dispatch informed Trooper 
Mrnsy that the driver's license of Lindsay was suspended for insurance 
reasons.  Ultimately, Trooper Mrnsy 
reduced the citation for driving under suspension by $10.00 indicating that 
Lindsay was wearing his seat belt, although Lindsay was not wearing his seat 
belt when pulled over.  Lindsay 
signed the driving under suspension citation and Trooper Mrnsy collected the 
necessary bond from Lindsay. 

 
 
[¶6]      At 4:02 p.m., 
Trooper Mrnsy spoke with his supervisor via cellular telephone for five 
minutes.  Trooper Mrnsy stated that 
he telephoned his supervisor to obtain advice on how to handle the situation. 
During the conversation, Trooper Mrnsy's supervisor apparently suggested that 
Trooper Mrnsy consider whether Lindsay had violated Wyoming's unauthorized 
use of a vehicle statute and further assisted Trooper Mrnsy with respect to 
other issues surrounding the traffic stop.  
Trooper Mrnsy indicated during his testimony at the suppression motion 
hearing that he had never before charged a person with the unauthorized use of a 
vehicle. 

 
 
[¶7]      After this 
telephone conversation, Trooper Mrnsy asked to review the rental car agreement 
again.  Trooper Mrnsy then began to 
prepare the warning citation for following too closely.  Forty-eight minutes into the traffic 
stop, the warning citation was issued to Lindsay.

 
 
[¶8]      Fifty minutes 
into the traffic stop, Trooper Mrnsy asked dispatch to contact the rental car 
company to determine how it wanted to deal with the situation.  Initially, the rental car company did 
not want to file charges but simply wanted the car seized.  However, the rental car company was 
informed that the car could not be seized unless the rental car was reported as 
stolen.4  At approximately 4:45 p.m., the rental 
car company advised that it was going to report the vehicle as 
stolen.

 
 
[¶9]      Trooper Mrnsy's 
supervisor then requested over the radio that Trooper Mrnsy telephone him.  Trooper Mrnsy complied and spoke with 
his supervisor via cellular telephone for a few minutes.  Lindsay was then arrested for unlawful 
use of the vehicle one hour and sixteen minutes into the traffic stop. 

 
 
[¶10]   Thereafter, Lindsay advised Trooper 
Mrnsy that he was carrying a concealed loaded weapon.  A loaded and chambered Walther P38 9 mm 
pistol without the safety engaged was located on Lindsay's person upon a 
pat-down search.  A later more 
thorough search of Lindsay, after he was arrested but while he was still at the 
scene of the traffic stop, rendered three glass pipes used to smoke 
methamphetamine and 12.4 grams of methamphetamine.  As a result, Lindsay was charged with 
the unlawful possession of methamphetamine. 

 
 
[¶11]   Lindsay filed a motion to suppress 
the methamphetamine evidence found in his possession.  After hearing, the district court denied 
the motion.  Lindsay later pled nolo 
contendere to the methamphetamine charge conditioned on his right to 
appeal.  This appeal 
followed.

 
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶12]   We reiterated in Guzman v. 
State, 2003 WY 118, ¶11, 76 P.3d 825, ¶11 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Hughes v. State, 2003 WY 35, ¶10, 65 P.3d 378, ¶10 (Wyo. 2003)):

            

      When reviewing a 
trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply the following 
standard:

 
 
We generally do not 
disturb evidentiary rulings made by a trial court unless the trial court abused 
its discretion.  Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 218 (Wyo. 1994).  In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a 
motion to suppress evidence, we do not interfere with the trial court's findings 
of fact unless the findings are clearly erroneous.  Gehnert v. State, 956 P.2d 359, 361 
(Wyo. 
1998).  We view the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the trial court's determination because the trial court 
has an oppor­tunity at the evidentiary hearing to assess "the credibility of 
the witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary infer­ences, 
deductions, and conclusions."  
Id.  The constitutionality of a particular 
search or seizure is, however, a question of law that we review de novo.  Id.; Jones v. State, 902 P.2d 686, 690 
(Wyo. 1995). 

 

Martindale v. 
State, 
2001 WY 52, ¶9, 24 P.3d 1138, ¶9 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Putnam v. State, 995 P.2d 632, 635 (Wyo. 
2000)).

 
 
See also, Campbell v. 
State, 2004 WY 106, ¶9, 97 P.3d. 781, ¶9 (Wyo. 2004). 

 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
Waiver Via Entry of 
Plea.

 
 
[¶13]   The State initially argues that 
Lindsay waived appellate review of all non-jurisdictional claims when he pled 
nolo contendere to the charge.  We 
do not find the State's argument to be persuasive.  It is true that we have consistently 
held that a plea of guilty or nolo contendere generally waives appellate review 
of all non-jurisdictional claims, which may include constitutional challenges to 
pre-trial proceedings.  Morgan v. 
State, 2004 WY 95, ¶23, 95 P.3d 802, ¶23 (Wyo. 2004); Bailey v. 
State, 12 P.3d 173, 177 (Wyo. 2000); Smith v. State, 871 P.2d 186, 
188 (Wyo. 1994).  However, an 
exception to this rule is found in W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2) which allows a defendant 
to plead guilty or nolo contendere while reserving the right to seek review on 
appeal of any specified pretrial motion.  
Morgan, ¶23 (citing Bailey, 12 P.3d at 177); W.R.Cr.P. 
11(a)(2).5  See also generally, Gordon v. 
State, 2004 WY 105, 97 P.3d 64 (Wyo. 2004); Goulart v. State, 2003 WY 
108, 76 P.3d 1230 (Wyo. 2003); Hart v. State, 2002 WY 163, 57 P.3d 348 
(Wyo. 2002).

 
 
[¶14]   Lindsay expressly conditioned his 
plea of nolo contendere to the methamphetamine charge upon his ability to bring 
this appeal.  This conditional plea 
was accepted by the district court with approval by the prosecutor.  Thus, Lindsay cannot be said to have 
waived his right to bring those instant issues before this court through entry 
of his nolo contendere plea.

 
 
State Constitutional 
Issues.

 
 
[¶15]   Lindsay contends that the 
methamphetamine evidence found on his person, after his arrest, is a product of 
an illegal detention unsupported by reasonable articulable suspicion thus, 
violating his constitutional rights.   
In making this argument, Lindsay asks this court to review this matter 
under both the state and federal constitutions.  Lindsay concedes that he failed to 
present an independent state constitutional analysis to the district court 
regarding his motion to suppress.  
Nevertheless, Lindsay asks this court to provide a state constitutional 
ruling with respect to the suppression issues presented, in light of the 
district court's expressed wish for assistance in the area, and despite the 
state of the record.6 

 
 
[¶16]   Upon our careful review, we decline 
to rule on the state constitutional issues presented by Lindsay, for the first 
time, on appeal.  We recently held 
in State v. Williams, 2004 WY 53, ¶16, 90 P.3d 85, ¶16 (Wyo. 2004) 
(citing Bailey, 12 P.3d at 177-78; Doles v. State, 994 P.2d 315, 
319-20 (Wyo. 1999); Gronski v. State, 910 P.2d 561, 565-66 (Wyo. 1996); 
and Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 219 (Wyo. 1994)) that when a 
defendant fails to assert a cogent independent state constitutional based 
argument before the district court, a defendant fails to preserve such issues 
for appellate review.  See also, 
Campbell, 
¶10 fn.2.

 
 
[¶17]   In the same vein, upon addressing 
the fact that W.R.Cr.P. 11(a)(2) allows a defendant to plead guilty or nolo 
contendere while reserving the right to seek review on appeal of any specified 
pretrial motion, we set forth in Morgan,  ¶24:

 
 
In Bailey, we 
ruled that a conditional plea of guilty does not provide carte blanche 
permission for the appellant to present any and all arguments on appeal.  12 P.3d  at 177-78.   Instead, the appellant may only 
raise those issues on appeal which were clearly called to the attention of the 
district court.  Id.;  see also, Elder v. Jones, 608 P.2d 654, 660 (Wyo.1980).  In other 
words, "[w]e will not consider non-jurisdictional issues on appeal unless they 
have been raised before the lower court with at least a minimum effort to 
present a cogent legal argument." Bailey, 12 P.3d  at 
178.

 
 
Federal Constitutional 
Issues.

 
 
[¶18]   In Campbell, this court recently assessed 
an argument that a defendant's constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution were violated through the illegal detention of 
the defendant in an alleged effort to conduct a canine sniff of his 
vehicle.  Therein, this court, at 
¶11, recognized:

            

            
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects "[t]he 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures[.]" U.S. Const. amend. IV.  A traffic stop amounts to a seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment.  
Damato [v. State, 2003 WY 13,] ¶9, [64 P.3d 700, ¶9 
(Wyo. 2003)]; 
Innis v. State, 2003 WY 66, ¶14, 69 P.3d 413, ¶ 14 (Wyo. 2003).  See also United States v. Wood, 
106 F.3d 942, 945 (10th Cir.1997).  
Under the principles of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), a court must determine whether the detention 
was reasonable by applying a two-part analysis.  Damato, ¶9. First, this Court 
considers whether the initial stop was justified.  Id. Secondly, we determine whether the 
officer's actions during the detention were "reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the interference in the first instance."  Id.; see also Innis, ¶14; 
Wood, 106 F.3d  at 945.

 
 
[¶19]   Here, just as in Campbell, Lindsay 
did not challenge the reasonableness of the initial stop while before the 
district court; therefore, we must turn directly to the second part of the 
analysis  the reasonableness of the detention.7  In Campbell, ¶12, we 
noted:

 
 
            
. . . "An investigative detention must be temporary, lasting no longer 
than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, and the scope of the 
detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification."  Wood, 106 F.3d  at 945 (citing 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 
1325-26, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983)).  
During a routine traffic stop, a law enforcement officer may request the 
driver's proof of insurance, operating license, and vehicle registration, run a 
computer check, and issue a citation or warning.  Damato, ¶13; Burgos-Seberos v. 
State, 969 P.2d 1131, 1133 (Wyo.1998).  
See also United States v. Elliott, 107 F.3d 810, 813 (10th 
Cir.1997); Wilson [v. 
State], 874 P.2d [220,] 224 (Wyo. 1982)].  The officer may detain the driver and 
his vehicle only for the period of time reasonably necessary to complete these 
routine matters.  Damato, 
¶13; Burgos-Seberos, 969 P.2d  at 1133; Wood, 106 F.3d  at 945.  Once the driver has produced a valid 
driver's license and proof that he is entitled to operate the vehicle, he must 
be allowed to proceed without further delay.  Damato, ¶ 13; 
Burgos-Seberos, at 1133; Wood, at 945.  . . . 

            

It has also been 
recognized that the basis for and the circumstances surrounding the stop, rather 
than an arbitrary time limit, govern a stop's permissible length.  Hence, a stop's duration and whether it 
was unreasonably extended is analyzed in terms of the length necessary for its 
legitimate purpose. United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 fn. 8 
(1998) (citing United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, [685  87,] 105 S. Ct. 1568, [1574  76,] 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, [614  16] 
(1985)).  In assessing the scope of 
the intrusion, we must examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of 
investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly and 
without undue delay in detaining a defendant.  Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 218, 
223  234 (Wyo. 1994) (quoting United States 
v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, [685  87,] 105 S. Ct. 1568, 
[1574  76,] 84 L. Ed. 2d 605, [614  16] (1985)).  

 
 
[¶20]   At the suppression hearing, the 
district court heard testimony from Trooper Mrnsy and was presented with both 
stipulated facts and other stipulated evidence.  In doing so, the district court assessed 
the credibility of the witnesses, weighed the evidence, and found that Trooper 
Mrnsy had the right to detain Lindsay in order to issue the citations for 
driving while under suspension and following too closely, and to investigate 
whether the vehicle was stolen.  The 
district court further ruled that although Lindsay's detention over the extended 
time period was somewhat suspect as 1) Lindsay's detention appeared to be 
motivated, in part, by Trooper Mrnsy's desire to hold Lindsay so that a drug dog 
could arrive at the scene, and 2) that there did not exist specific and 
articulable facts justifying Trooper Mrnsy's suspicion that illegal drugs might 
be in the vehicle driven by Lindsay, Trooper Mrnsy's investigation concerning 
whether the vehicle was stolen did not take an unreasonable length of time.  Specifically, the district court 
indicated in its order when determining if the delay in arresting Lindsay was a 
pretext to permit an otherwise unauthorized search:

            

            
. . . It appears that [Trooper] Mrnsy did not want to investigate the 
possibility of an unauthorized use or stolen car and delayed doing so until it 
became apparent that there would be a long delay before the drug dog would 
arrive and [Lindsay] would not consent to a search of the car.  The delay came about from [Trooper] 
Mrnsy's decision to not begin the investigation of the possible auto theft until 
after the citations were issued and the video shows that Trooper Mrnsy was very 
deliberate in issuing the citations.  
Trooper Mrnsy could have began the process of contacting [the rental car 
company] to find out if they wanted to press charges earlier in the stop.  However, whether and (sic) 
officer should investigate potential crimes concurrently or in a sequential 
fashion is an area where deference should be given to an officer.  It took only twenty-seven minutes after 
[Trooper] Mrnsy requested that [the rental car company] be contacted to see if 
they wanted to press criminal charges until he learned that a stolen car report 
would be filed and an arrest was made.  
This is not an unreasonable length of time.

 
 
            
Even if the charge of unauthorized use was a pretext to allow [Trooper] 
Mrnsy to gain entrance into the car, the rule under the Fourth Amendment is that 
"[S]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable cause analysis." 
Damato v. State, 64 P.2d 705, quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774, 35 L.Ed.2d 89[, 98] (1996)    . . . 
.

            

[¶21]   Upon our review of the record, we 
hold the district court's decision is supported by the evidence received at 
hearing.  As indicated previously, 
when reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, 1) we will not 
interfere with the trial court's findings of fact unless the findings are 
clearly erroneous, and 2) we must view the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the trial court's determination because the trial court has an 
oppor­tunity at the evidentiary hearing to assess the credibility of the 
witnesses, weigh the evidence, and make the necessary infer­ences, 
deductions, and conclusions.  
Guzman, ¶11 (quoting Hughes, ¶10); Campbell, 
¶9.

 
 
[¶22]   Further, upon our independent 
review, we hold that Lindsay's constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution were not violated under these circumstances, 
as a matter of law.  In this 
instance, Trooper Mrnsy reasonably detained Lindsay and the vehicle he was 
driving only for a period of time sufficiently necessary to issue Lindsay the 
driving while under suspension citation, the following too closely warning, and 
to complete an investigation into Lindsay's ability to operate the rental 
car.   With respect to the 
unauthorized use of vehicle investigation, we find convincing those statements 
made by Trooper Mrnsy at hearing.  
Trooper Mrnsy stated that he was compelled to complete his investigation 
in the area because the rental contract clearly indicated that the rental car 
was to be driven solely in California and only by Ms. Griego. Further, 
Trooper Mrnsy stated that his lack of investigation might risk the continued 
improper use of the rental vehicle by allowing Lindsay and his passenger to 
leave the traffic stop scene.  
Looking at the totality of the circumstances, we hold that Trooper Mrnsy 
had a reasonable articulable suspicion that Lindsay was not authorized by the 
rental car company to operate the rented automobile and necessarily detained 
Lindsay to complete such investigation.  
We likewise find Lindsay's argument that Trooper Mrnsy should have 
allowed Lindsay's passenger to drive the rental car vehicle away from the scene, 
once Lindsay's traffic violations were addressed, to be questionable because the 
vehicle was only to be operated by Ms. Griego under the terms of the rental 
agreement.  

 
 
[¶23]   We also note the male passenger of 
the vehicle advised Trooper Mrnsy that his driver's license had expired.  Lindsay further personally presented 
Trooper Mrnsy with the limiting rental agreement language at issue and was found 
to have been driving while his driver's license was suspended.  Therefore, Lindsay, himself, must be 
attributed with causing the investigation to take place that unarguably resulted 
in the delay.  Moreover, Trooper 
Mrnsy was faced with the somewhat unique occurrence of whether the unauthorized 
use of a vehicle statute applied to an occasion where a rental car was being 
used beyond the specified contract terms.  
Finally, the record evidences that Trooper Mrnsy acted diligently under 
the circumstances and did not unnecessarily prolong Lindsay's detention beyond 
that required to issue the traffic citations and to investigate the rental car 
situation. 

 
 
[¶24]   Furthermore, we do not find 
Lindsay's implied argument compelling that under our holding in Campbell the entire 
traffic stop must be invalidated because Trooper Mrnsy questioned Lindsay about 
drugs outside the scope of detention.  
In Campbell, ¶12, citing United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860, 872 (10th Cir. 1995), we did recognize 
that during a stop an officer generally may not ask a detained motorist 
questions unrelated to the purpose of the stop, including questions about 
controlled substances, unless the officer has reasonable suspicion of other 
illegal activity.8   However, we find our holding in 
Campbell to be 
distinguishable.

 
 
[¶25]   In the instant case, Trooper Mrnsy 
had a reasonably sufficient reason to continue to detain Lindsay after issuance 
of the traffic citations, i.e., to investigate the potential unauthorized use of 
the rental vehicle.  In Campbell there 
existed no reasonable articulable suspicion to detain the defendant after the 
purpose of the traffic stop was completed upon issuance of the driver contact 
form.  The discovery of illegal 
contraband in Campbell was ultimately made as a 
result of an unlawful detention followed by the defendant's "voluntary" consent 
to a search.   In this case, 
Lindsay continuously rebuffed Trooper Mrnsy's requests to search the vehicle he 
was driving and the discovery of the methamphetamine on Lindsay's person was 
made only after Lindsay's lawful arrest.  
Moreover, we clearly set forth in Damato, ¶10 (citing Whren v. 
United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 98 
(1996), Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771-72, 121 S. Ct. 1876, 1878, 
149 L. Ed. 2d 994, 998 (2001) (per curiam), Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 149 L. Ed. 2d 549 (2001), and United States v. 
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n. 1, 94 S. Ct. 467, 470 n. 1, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427, 
432 - 433 n. 1 (1973)), that ulterior motives do not invalidate police conduct 
that is justifiable on the basis of probable cause to believe that a violation 
of law has occurred.

 
 
[¶26]   Finally, Lindsay contends that he 
should have been given his Miranda rights by Trooper Mrnsy immediately 
after he was asked to accompany Trooper Mrnsy to the patrol vehicle, asserting 
that he was then taken into formal "custody."9   The State citing Morgan, ¶¶22  25, as authority, argues 
that Lindsay failed to raise this issue to the attention of the district court 
and has, therefore, waived appellate review in this area.  We agree.  Our review of the record evidences that 
Lindsay did not address this issue with sufficient particularity at the district 
court level.   

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶27]   As indicated above, we find no 
error in the proceedings.  We, 
therefore, affirm the judgment and sentence of the district 
court.

 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES

 

1Many 
facts in this case were formally stipulated to by the parties.  In addition, the parties presented a 
stipulated exhibit list to the district court.  Additional facts contained herein are 
gleaned from transcripts of hearings held in this matter and other documents 
contained within the record on appeal.  

2All time 
designations, as well as, elapsed time denotations are approximate in 
nature.  

3At this 
time, the male passenger of the vehicle advised Trooper Mrnsy that his driver's 
license had expired.

4During this time, another 
Trooper with a drug dog arrived at the scene.  Lindsay again refused to allow the 
Troopers to search the vehicle upon request.  A drug dog sniff of the outside of the 
vehicle was then conducted, but the drug dog did not detect any drugs.  This occurred one hour and twelve 
minutes after the stop of the vehicle. 

 
 
 
 

5W.R.Cr.P. 
11(a)(2) provides:

 
 
(2) 
Conditional Pleas. - With the approval of the court and the consent of the 
attorney for the state, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or 
nolo contendere, reserving in writing the right, on appeal from the judgment, to 
seek review of the adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion.  A defendant who prevails on appeal shall 
be allowed to withdraw the plea.    

 
 

6In its 
order denying Lindsay's motion to suppress, the district court included a 
footnote which it characterized as a dissent to its ruling.  In that footnote, the district court 
requested sua sponte that this court address the issues posed by Lindsay 
under the Wyoming Constitution and gave its own observations and recommendations 
to this court.

7In his brief and for the 
first time on appeal, Lindsay summarily infers that he challenges the 
reasonableness of the initial stop.  
This newly asserted argument contradicts Lindsay's position before the 
district court that he did not contest the reasonableness of the initial stop. 
Again, pursuant to our well-established precedent, we refuse to address 
non-jurisdictional issues on appeal when they have not been raised before the 
lower court with at least a minimum effort to present a cogent legal argument. 
Morgan, ¶24 (quoting Bailey, 12 P.3d at 
178).

8As an 
aside, we find that Trooper Mrnsy's questions regarding whether Lindsay 
possessed any weapons on his person to be acceptable.  As set forth in Campbell, at ¶12 
fn. 3, citing United States v. Holt, 264 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2001), on rehearing en 
banc, an exception to the general 
rule exists when questions are asked of a motorist about the presence of weapons 
in order to reasonably assure officer safety.

9See, 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), and its progeny.