Case Title: KIM E. ASKVIG; JULAINE L. ASKVIG; and PAUL R. LEWIS v. WELLS FARGO BANK WYOMING, N.A., as successor in interest to WELLS FARGO BANK NORTHWEST, N.A., f/k/a FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.C.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-10-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
KIM E. ASKVIG; JULAINE L. ASKVIG; and PAUL R. LEWIS v. WELLS FARGO BANK WYOMING, N.A., as successor in interest to WELLS FARGO BANK NORTHWEST, N.A., f/k/a FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.C.2005 WY 138121 P.3d 783Case Number: No. 04-230Decided: 10/25/2005
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
                                                                                                            

KIM E. 
ASKVIG; JULAINE L. ASKVIG; and PAUL R. LEWIS,    

Appellants 
(Defendants),     

 
 
  v.       

 
 
WELLS FARGO 
BANK WYOMING, N.A., as successor in interest to 
WELLS FARGO BANK NORTHWEST, N.A., f/k/a FIRST SECURITY BANK, N.C.,            

Appellees 
(Plaintiffs).           

 
 
Appeal from 
the District Court of Big HornCounty

The 
Honorable H. Hunter Patrick, Judge 

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

James P. 
Castberg of Castberg Law Office, Sheridan, Wyoming

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Steven T. 
Waterman of Ray Quinney & Nebeker, P.C., Salt Lake City, Utah

 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 

[¶1] Kim 
Askvig and his wife Julaine Askvig obtained a commercial loan from Wells Fargo 
Bank (hereinafter referred to as the bank). 1  Mrs. Askvig's father, Paul Lewis, 
guaranteed the loan.  The purpose of 
the loan was to allow the Askvigs to buy a residential property, remodel and 
resell it.  As collateral security 
for the loan, the Askvigs executed a mortgage providing the bank a first 
priority purchase money lien on the real property.  Ultimately the Askvigs and Mr. Lewis 
defaulted on the loan and the bank initiated a judicial foreclosure 
proceeding.  After a bench trial, 
the district court granted the foreclosure.  The appellants appeal from the judgment 
granting foreclosure.  We 
affirm.

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2] The 
appellants filed a joint brief presenting the following issues for this Court's 
review:

 
 
I. The 
trial judge committed error when he granted the appellee's motion to dismiss 
appellant Julaine L. Askvig's counterclaim.

 
 
II. The 
trial judge committed error when he granted the appellee's motion for partial 
summary judgment and dismissing the counterclaims of appellant Kim E. Askvig and 
appellant Paul R. Lewis.

 
 
III. The 
trial judge committed error when he granted the appellee's motion and entered an 
order striking jury demand.

 
 
IV. The 
trial judge committed error when he entered judgment and decree of 
foreclosure.

 
 
V. The 
trial judge committed error when he entered supplemental judgment awarding 
appellee $169,424.62 plus interest as attorney's fees and 
costs.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3] The 
Askvigs decided to purchase a residential property they thought they could 
remodel and resell for a profit.  
Towards this end, on October 29, 1999, the Askvigs, each individually, 
entered into a commercial loan transaction with the bank.  The Askvigs borrowed $80,000 from the 
bank, granting the bank a first mortgage on the real property bought with the 
money.  Mrs. Askvig's father, Mr. 
Lewis, executed a Guaranty in favor of the bank as further security for the 
loan.  

 
 
[¶4] 
Needless to say, things did not go the way the Askvigs had envisioned.  The bank extended the maturity date of 
the loan twice to accommodate the Askvigs.  
The second extension expired March 5, 2001, with no payment from the 
Askvigs or Mr. Lewis.  The bank did 
not grant a further extension of the maturity date. Ultimately, on November 21, 
2001, the bank filed the initial complaint in the instant foreclosure 
action.  The initial complaint did 
not include Mrs. Askvig as a party, but she was added as a party in an amended 
complaint filed March 3, 2003.  
Ultimately the district court entered a Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure, from which the Askvigs and Mr. Lewis appeal.

 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
I.  
Jurisdiction

 
 
[¶5] 
Earlier in the instant appellate proceeding, the bank moved to dismiss several 
issues identified by appellants in their notice of appeal, claiming that the 
notice of appeal was untimely as to those issues.  This Court denied the motion without 
discussion.  The bank renews its 
jurisdictional argument in its appellate brief.  Questions of subject matter jurisdiction 
are matters of law which this Court reviews de novo.  Messer v. State, 2004 WY 98, ¶ 8, 
96 P.3d 12, 15 (Wyo. 2004). 

 
 

[¶6] Two 
judgments were entered below.  A 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure was filed on June 8, 2004.  Within the Judgment, the district court 
ordered "that the monetary Judgment awarded herein against [appellants] will be 
augmented by the sum of costs and attorney's fees to be allowed by this Court 
pursuant to Wyo.R.Civ.P. 54(b) in a Supplemental Judgment."2  On September 13, 2004, a Supplemental 
Judgment was filed awarding contractually based costs and attorney's fees to the 
bank.  The Supplemental Judgment 
again referenced W.R.C.P. 54(b).  
The appellants filed their notice of appeal within the time allowed after 
the entry of the Supplemental Judgment.

 
 
[¶7] The 
bank argues that the June Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure is a final order 
from which the appellants did not timely appeal.  Therefore, according to the bank, issues 
regarding the foreclosure proceeding and the judgment of foreclosure are not 
properly before this Court.  
Instead, the only issues properly before this Court are issues concerning 
the award of contractual attorney's fees and costs, the only subject addressed 
in the Supplemental Order.  

 
 

[¶8] We 
disagree.  When the district court 
referenced Rule 54(b), it declared that the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure 
was not a final order, and thus not appealable. 3  It was not until the Supplemental 
Judgment was entered that all the claims for relief presented to the district 
court were finally adjudicated, making the Supplemental Judgment the final 
appealable order.

 
 
[¶9] In 
arguing that the June Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure is a final order, the 
bank consistently treats the reference by the district court to W.R.C.P. 54(b) 
as a mistake and relies instead upon its preferred reading that the district 
court really meant W.R.C.P. 54(d)(2).  
We find no basis for this rewriting of the district court's 
judgments.  The notice of appeal was 
timely filed.  

 
 
 
 
II.  Dismissal of Juliane Askvig's 
counterclaim

 
 
[¶10] When 
Mrs. Askvig was finally joined in the instant foreclosure action, she filed a 
counterclaim against the bank.  The 
bank filed a motion to dismiss the counterclaim for failure to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).  The district court granted the bank's 
motion and dismissed Mrs. Askvig's counterclaim. 

 
 
 
 
Standard of 
Review

 
 
[¶11] A 
motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6) admits the truth of all the relevant and material factual allegations 
in the complaint but asserts that no cause of action arises from these 
facts.  Since no issue of fact 
exists, our review is de novo.  This 
Court evaluates the propriety of a dismissal by employing the same standards and 
by examining the same material as the district court, without a presumption of 
correctness to the conclusions reached below.  Wilson v. Town of Alpine, 2005 WY 
57, ¶ 4,  111 P.3d 290, 291 (Wyo. 
2005).  

 
 
 
 
Dismissal

 
 

[¶12] In 
its motion to dismiss, the bank claimed that Mrs. Askvig's counterclaim failed 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  The reason argued by the bank was that 
Mrs. Askvig was barred from bringing any counterclaim against it on the grounds 
of judicial estoppel.  The bank 
based its judicial estoppel argument on the fact that Mrs. Askvig filed two 
separate Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings prior to the bank filing a complaint 
against her and she did not disclose that she had a potential counterclaim 
against the bank in either filing.  
The bank alleged that Mrs. Askvig's failure to disclose this potential 
asset to the bankruptcy court judicially estopped her from filing a counterclaim 
in the instant action.  We need not 
address the legal merits of the bank's argument because in support of this 
argument the bank relied upon matters outside Mrs. Askvig's pleading, including 
documents submitted by Mrs. Askvig to the bankruptcy court.  If the district court relied upon this 
extraneous information, the motion to dismiss was converted into a motion for 
summary judgment by operation of W.R.C.P. 12(b). 4  A judgment of dismissal would be 
procedurally improper.  See 
Coones v. F.D.I.C., 848 P.2d 783, 806-07 (Wyo. 1993).

 
 
[¶13] This 
Court is not convinced, however, that the district court based its decision to 
dismiss solely on the grounds of judicial estoppel.  The district court, after a hearing on 
the matter, dismissed the counterclaim

 
 
[b]ased 
upon the arguments of counsel, the papers filed herein, e ach of the parties 
having had sufficient time to file memoranda, the law cited to this Court, this 
Court's review of the record, this Court's prior rulings on judicial estoppel 
and good cause otherwise appearing[.]   

 
 
The 
district court clearly cites grounds other than judicial estoppel in support of 
its decision dismissing Mrs. Askvig's counterclaim.  From this order it can be concluded that 
the district court properly dismissed Mrs. Askvig's counterclaim because, on its 
face, it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.  There is nothing in the record 
suggesting otherwise.

 
 
[¶14] As 
noted, this Court's review of a dismissal is de novo.  Review by this Court, however, must be 
properly invoked.  "In the 
presentation of an appeal to our court, it is inadequate simply to allude to an 
issue or identify only a potential issue.  
The appellant must make some attempt to relate the applicable law to the 
facts."  Kipp v. Brown, 750 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Wyo. 1988).  Unfortunately, in her brief, Mrs. Askvig 
presents no argument supporting the merits of her counterclaim.  Indeed, there is only a single sentence 
in her argument declaring that her counterclaim "asserted facts upon which 
relief could be granted." She presents no legal argument supporting this 
statement.  Absent any argument on 
the merits of her counterclaim, this Court will not address the propriety of the 
dismissal by the trial court of Mrs. Askvig's counterclaim further.  See Jones v. Schabron, 
2005 WY 65, ¶ 12, 113 P.3d 34, 38 (Wyo. 2005) (This Court will not frame 
appellant's arguments and will not address issues not supported by cogent 
argument or citation to pertinent authority .); see also Kelley v. 
Watson, 2003 WY 127, ¶ 4, 77 P.3d 691, 692 (Wyo. 2003); State v. Campbell 
County School Dist., 2001 WY 90, ¶ 35, 32 P.3d 325, 333 (Wyo. 2001).  

 
 
 
 
III.  Propriety of the grant of partial 
summary judgment dismissing Mr. Askvig's and Mr. Lewis' respective 
counterclaims  

 
 
[¶15] The 
bank moved for partial summary judgment against Mr. Askvig and Mr. Lewis, 
asserting that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the respective 
counterclaims of both men.  The 
district court granted the bank's motion and dismissed the respective 
counterclaims.  On appeal, Mr. 
Askvig and Mr. Lewis present separate and distinct arguments as to why the grant 
of partial summary judgment was improper as to them 
individually.

 
 
[¶16] Mr. 
Askvig argues, as he did below, that the bank could not challenge the merits of 
his counterclaim because default had been entered against the bank 
thereupon.  Procedurally, the bank 
did not timely answer Mr. Askvig's counterclaim.  Upon motion, the clerk of court entered 
a default against the bank.  As far 
as the record shows, although no judgment of default was entered, the 
preliminary entry of default was in effect until the district court granted 
partial summary judgment in favor of the bank.  Mr. Askvig essentially asserts that the 
bank's motion for partial summary judgment against him should have been stricken 
because the entry of default barred the bank from disputing any issues except 
those relating to damages under the doctrine of judicial estoppel.  Except for the bald statement declaring 
such a prohibition, Mr. Askvig presents no cogent argument or citation to 
pertinent legal authority in support of his argument.  We therefore decline to address his 
estoppel argument further.  
Cathcart v. Meyer, 2004 WY 49, ¶ 20, 88 P.3d 1050, 1060 (Wyo. 
2004). 

 
 
[¶17] In 
contrast to Mr. Askvig, Mr. Lewis filed a response to the bank's motion for 
partial summary judgment requesting the district court either deny the motion or 
permit him to amend his counterclaim.  
On appeal, Mr. Lewis does not directly challenge the propriety of the 
district court's dismissal of his counterclaim.  Rather, Mr. Lewis' only sustained 
appellate argument is that his motion for leave to amend his counterclaim should 
have been granted.  

 
 
[¶18] The 
decision to allow amendment to pleadings is vested within the sound discretion 
of the district court and subject to reversal on appeal only for an abuse of 
that discretion.  Johnson v. Sikorski, 2004 WY 137, ¶ 12, 100 P.3d 420, 423 (Wyo. 2004); Breazeale v. Radich, 500 P.2d 74 (Wyo. 1972).  An 
abuse of discretion must be shown by Mr. Lewis by clear evidence.  
Ekberg, v. Sharp, 2003 WY 123, ¶ 9, 76 P.3d 1250, 1253 (Wyo. 2003). 
 Mr. Lewis presents no record evidence to this Court which identifies the 
reasons the district court invoked in denying his motion to amend.  This Court therefore has no way of 
scrutinizing the propriety of the district court's actions.  In the absence of a showing that would 
assist us in this regard, the denial of the motion to amend by the district 
court must be affirmed.  Dynan v. Rocky Mountain Federal Sav. and 
Loan, 792 P.2d 631, 640 (Wyo. 1990).

 
 
 
 
IV.  Jury 
demand

 
 
[¶19] All 
three appellants filed a demand for trial by jury.  The district court entered an order 
striking all three jury demands.  On 
appeal, the appellants do not argue that the district court erred in striking 
the jury demand with respect to the trial on the merits of the claims in the 
bank's complaint.  Rather, the 
appellants only take issue with the district court's orders striking their jury 
demands on their respective counterclaims.  
Because this Court has affirmed the district court's dismissal of their 
counterclaims, the appellants' argument is moot.

 
 
 
 
V.  Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure

 
 
[¶20] The 
appellants argue that the district court erred in entering its Judgment and 
Decree of Foreclosure.  Initially 
they argue that they were denied the opportunity to be properly heard when the 
district court dismissed their respective counterclaims and struck their demands 
for jury trial.  Because the 
appellants have not shown any error in the district court's actions relating to 
these decisions, this argument is moot.

 
 

[¶21] 
Appellants also argue that the warranty deed of record should have been found to 
be fraudulent.  The appellants find 
relevance in this issue by claiming that a fraudulent warranty deed of record 
somehow renders the mortgage and guaranty invalid.  The appellants fail to present a cogent 
legal argument or citation to legal authority explaining their conclusion.  As stated above, this Court will not 
address issues that are not properly presented.  In this context, this means that we will 
not address the general legal question of whether a fraudulent warranty deed 
invalidates loan documents.  Thus, 
the underlying issue of whether the warranty deed of record was fraudulent is 
immaterial to our resolution of this appeal and will not be considered 
further.5

 
 
 
 
VI.  Attorney's fees and 
costs

 
 
[¶22] n a 
supplemental judgment, the district court awarded the bank contractual 
attorney's fees and costs.  On 
appeal, the appellants do not challenge the bank's contractual right to 
attorney's fees and costs.  The 
appellants only argue that the amount awarded as attorney's fees is 
excessive.  This Court reviews a 
district court's decision awarding attorney's fees under an abuse of discretion 
standard.  The appellants bear the 
burden of establishing that the trial court abused its discretion.  Johnston v. Stephenson, 938 P.2d 861, 862 
(Wyo. 
1997).  

 
 
[¶23] In 
support of their argument that the fee award is excessive, the appellants simply 
repeat the argument they presented to the district court.  While they raised several factors to the 
district court, their ultimate argument on appeal is that the amount awarded as 
attorney's fees is excessive because the amount is too high when compared to the 
original loan amount.  The 
appellants point out that the award represents 194% of the original loan 
amount.  The appellants argue the 
amount should be limited to 15% of the amount of the loan to be reasonable.  They present no citation to pertinent 
authority supporting their theory that the ratio of the amount of the award to 
the amount of the loan is the determinative factor in establishing the amount of 
attorney's fees to be awarded.

 
 

[¶24] In 
actual fact, Wyoming law does not support the appellants' 
argument.  Wyoming has adopted the 
two-factor federal lodestar test for determining attorney's fees.  The first factor is whether the fee 
charged represents the product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate.  The second factor allows the district 
court to determine whether other factors of discretionary application should be 
considered to adjust the fee either upward or downward.  Schlesinger v. Woodcock, 2001 WY 
120, ¶ 21, 35 P.3d 1232, 1239 (Wyo. 2001).  
Section 1-14-126(b)6 suggests 
eight different factors that a court may consider in determining appropriate 
contractual attorney's fees.  Under 
neither the lodestar test nor the statute is any single factor 
determinative.  The district court, 
therefore, was not limited to the mathematical limitation put forth by the 
appellants.  

 
 
[¶25] The 
bank presented the district court with extensive documentation supporting its 
request for attorney's fees.  The 
appellants presented the district court with the same arguments they present on 
appeal.  After reviewing the 
arguments and the bank's documents, the district court held that the fees 
requested were founded upon a reasonable hourly rate.  The district court further held that the 
time expended by the bank's counsel was well documented and that the time was 
reasonable and necessary given the defenses raised by the appellants.  The district court was in the best 
position to review the details of the bank's fee application in light of the 
objections raised by the appellants, including the argument that the fees 
requested were too high in proportion to the initial loan amount.  Cline v. Rocky Mountain, Inc., 
998 P.2d 946, 951 (Wyo. 2000).  The 
appellants have presented no argument convincing this Court that the district 
court abused its discretion in its award of fees.  Further, this Court finds nothing in the 
record suggesting that the district court's award was 
unreasonable.

 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶26] The 
appellants have not presented any arguments meriting the reversal of the 
district court's holdings in this case.  
The Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and the Supplemental Judgment are 
affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1  .The Askvigs initially procured the loan through 
First Security Bank, the predecessor in interest to Wells Fargo 
Bank.

 
 

2 
"Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) 
states:

(b) 
Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties.  When more than one claim for relief is 
presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or 
third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct 
the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims 
or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for 
delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.  In the absence of such determination and 
direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which 
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer 
than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or 
parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any 
time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and 
liabilities of all the parties.

 
 
 
 

3 
.No argument is presented that proceeding 
under Rule 54(b) was improper under the circumstances.

 
 

4 
.Rule 12(b) states in pertinent 
part:

If, 
on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the 
pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the 
pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be 
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and 
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made 
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.

 
 

5 
.In any event, the appellants present a 
factual argument as to why the warranty deed of record was fraudulent.  The appellants failed to designate the 
transcripts of the bench trial as part of the record on appeal.  Lacking an adequate record, this Court 
will assume that the evidence presented was sufficient to support the district 
court's findings and summarily affirm the district court's decision.  Beeman v. Beeman, 2005 WY 45, ¶ 
10, 109 P.3d 548, 551 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 

6Wyo). 
Stat. Ann. § 1-14-126(b) states:

(b) 
In civil actions for which an award of attorney's fees is authorized, the court 
in its discretion may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party 
without requiring expert testimony.  
In exercising its discretion the court may consider the following 
factors:

            
(i) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the 
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service 
properly;

            
(ii) The likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment 
precluded other employment by the lawyer;

                        
(iii) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal 
services;

                        
(iv) The amount involved and the results obtained;

                        
(v) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the 
circumstances;

                        
(vi) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the 
client;

            
(vii) The experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers 
performing the services;  
and

                        
(viii) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.