Case Title: People v. Reed

Citation: 

Docket Number: 81422

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 1997-09-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
People v. Reed, Nos. 81422, 81683 cons. (9/25/97) 
 
NOTICE: Under Supreme Court Rule 367 a party has 21 days after 
the filing of the opinion to request a rehearing. Also, opinions 
are subject to modification, correction or withdrawal at anytime 
prior to issuance of the mandate by the Clerk of the Court. 
Therefore, because the following slip opinion is being made 
available prior to the Court's final action in this matter, it 
cannot be considered the final decision of the Court. The 
official copy of the following opinion will be published by the 
Supreme Court's Reporter of Decisions in the Official Reports 
advance sheets following final action by the Court. 
 
        Docket Nos. 81422, 81683 cons.--Agenda 10--May 1997. 
         THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
        DERRICK REED, Appellant.--THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF 
          ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. DAVID TURNER, Appellant. 
                 Opinion filed September 25, 1997. 
 
          JUSTICE NICKELS delivered the opinion of the court: 
          The sole issue presented in these consolidated 
     appeals is whether the 1993 amendment to section 5--8-- 
     1(c) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5--8- 
     -1(c) (West 1994)) requires that a defendant file a 
     written post-sentencing motion in the trial court to 
     preserve sentencing issues for appellate review. We 
     conclude that it does. 
 
                           BACKGROUND 
                         Defendant Reed 
          After a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook 
     County, Derrick Reed was convicted of reckless homicide 
     and aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol. 
     Reed was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment for the 
     reckless homicide offense to be served concurrently with 
     a four-year sentence for driving under the influence. 
     Reed did not file a post-sentencing motion in the trial 
     court, but challenged his sentence as excessive on 
     appeal. 282 Ill. App. 3d 278. The appellate court 
     concluded that the 1993 amendment to section 5--8--1(c) 
     requires a written post-sentencing motion be made in the 
     trial court in order to preserve sentencing issues for 
     appeal. The court reasoned that the plain language of the 
     amendment made a written post-sentencing motion the 
     functional equivalent of a post-trial motion. Thus, the 
     appellate court found defendant's sentencing challenge 
     waived and further found no plain error. We granted 
     Reed's petition for leave to appeal. 155 Ill. 2d R. 315. 
 
                        Defendant Turner 
          After a bench trial in the circuit court of Cook 
     County, David Turner was convicted of first degree murder 
     and aggravated kidnapping. Turner was sentenced to 
     consecutive prison terms of life in prison for the murder 
     and 30 years for the aggravated kidnapping. Defendant did 
     not file a motion in the trial court challenging his 
     sentence. On appeal, Turner argued that the trial court 
     considered factors during sentencing that were not 
     supported by the record. 282 Ill. App. 3d 770. Relying on 
     People v. McCleary, 278 Ill App. 3d 498, 501 (1996), the 
     appellate court concluded that the amendment to section 
     5--8--1(c) requires sentencing issues be raised in a 
     written post-sentencing motion. Thus, the appellate court 
     found Turner's sentencing issues waived and further found 
     no plain error. We granted Turner's petition for leave to 
     appeal (155 Ill. 2d R. 315) and consolidated his appeal 
     with Reed's appeal. 
 
                            ANALYSIS 
          In People v. Lewis,  158 Ill. 2d 386  (1994), this 
     court analyzed the preamendment version of section 5--8-- 
     1(c). The statute at issue in Lewis provided in part: 
                    "A motion to reduce a sentence may be 
                    made, or the court may reduce a sentence 
                    without motion, within 30 days after the 
                    sentence is imposed. However, the court may 
                    not increase a sentence once it is imposed." 
                    (Emphasis added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 
                    38, par. 1005--8--1(c). 
          Applying settled principles of statutory 
     construction, this court determined that the statutory 
     language did not show a legislative intent to make post- 
     sentencing motions a prerequisite to appealing sentencing 
     issues. The conclusion reached in Lewis rested primarily 
     on the permissive language contained in the first 
     sentence of the statute. Lewis, 158 Ill. 2d  at 390. This 
     court specifically noted that this language was very 
     different from the mandatory language found to require a 
     written post-trial motion to preserve trial issues for 
     appeal. Lewis, 158 Ill. 2d  at 390. In addition, this 
     court also noted that no other language in section 5--8-- 
     1(c) suggested a legislative intent to require a post- 
     sentencing motion to preserve sentencing issues for 
     appellate review. Lewis, 158 Ill. 2d  at 390. 
          In Lewis, this court did not consider the 1993 
     amendment to section 5--8--1(c) at issue here, because 
     the amendment applied only to sentences imposed on or 
     after August 11, 1993. Both of the present defendants 
     were sentenced after the effective date of the amendment 
     to section 5--8--1(c). The amendment adds one sentence: 
                    "A motion to reduce a sentence may be 
                    made, or the court may reduce a sentence 
                    without motion, within 30 days after the 
                    sentence is imposed. A defendant's challenge 
                    to the correctness of a sentence or to any 
                    aspect of the sentencing hearing shall be made 
                    by a written motion filed within 30 days 
                    following the imposition of sentence. However, 
                    the court may not increase a sentence once it 
                    is imposed." (Emphasis added.) 730 ILCS 5/5-- 
                    8--1(c) (West 1994) (emphasized language added 
                    by Pub. Act 88--311, eff. August 11, 1993). 
          The defendants note that the amendment leaves intact 
     the first sentence of section 5--8--1(c). Defendants 
     argue that the conclusion reached in Lewis was based 
     primarily on the permissive language contained in the 
     first sentence of the statute. Therefore, defendants 
     contend the conclusion reached in Lewis remains sound. 
     Defendants further argue that the amended portion of the 
     statute merely provides for the procedure to be followed 
     if a defendant should choose to file a motion challenging 
     his sentence in the trial court, but it does not require 
     such a motion be filed to preserve sentencing issues for 
     appeal. See People v. Cook, 279 Ill. App. 3d 718 (1995). 
     The State responds that the amendment demonstrates a 
     clear legislative intent to require sentencing issues be 
     raised by motion in the trial court as a prerequisite to 
     appeal. 
          In determining the intent of the legislature 
     concerning the amendment to section 5--8--1(c), we apply 
     the same familiar rules of statutory construction applied 
     in Lewis. In examining a statute, it must be read as a 
     whole and all relevant parts should be considered. Lewis, 
     158 Ill. 2d  at 389. Whether a statutory provision is 
     mandatory or merely directory depends upon the intent of 
     its drafters. People v. Youngbey,  82 Ill. 2d 556 , 562 
     (1980). An important aid in determining legislative 
     intent is the nature of the auxiliary verb used in the 
     statute. Youngbey, 82 Ill. 2d  at 562. Legislative use of 
     the word "may" is generally regarded as indicating a 
     permissive or directory reading, whereas use of the word 
     "shall" is generally considered to express a mandatory 
     reading. Youngbey, 82 Ill. 2d  at 562. 
          Applying these principles, we conclude that the 
     legislative purpose behind section 5--8--1(c) was to 
     require sentencing issues be raised in the trial court in 
     order to preserve those issues for appellate review. In 
     Lewis, we noted that the precatory language at issue in 
     the preamendment version of section 5--8--1(c) was very 
     different from the mandatory statutory language found in 
     People v. Enoch,  122 Ill. 2d 176  (1988), to require a 
     written post-trial motion to preserve trial issues for 
     appeal. In contrast, the new mandatory language presently 
     contained in section 5--8--1(c) is nearly identical in 
     substance to the statutory language at issue in Enoch. 
     Compare 725 ILCS 5/116--1(b) (West 1994) ("A written 
     motion for a new trial shall be filed by the defendant 
     within 30 days following the entry of a finding or the 
     return of a verdict") with 730 ILCS 5/5--8--1(c) (West 
     1994) ("A defendant's challenge to the correctness of a 
     sentence or to any aspect of the sentencing hearing shall 
     be made by a written motion filed within 30 days 
     following the imposition of sentence"). 
          In addition, the policy considerations supporting 
     the requirement of a written post-trial motion to 
     preserve trial error are equally applicable in the 
     context of sentencing. Requiring a written post- 
     sentencing motion will allow the trial court the 
     opportunity to review a defendant's contention of 
     sentencing error and save the delay and expense inherent 
     in appeal if they are meritorious. Such a motion also 
     focuses the attention of the trial court upon a 
     defendant's alleged errors and gives the appellate court 
     the benefit of the trial court's reasoned judgment on 
     those issues. We therefore agree with the appellate court 
     that the plain language now contained in section 5--8-- 
     1(c) shows a clear legislative intent to make a post- 
     sentencing motion the functional equivalent of a post- 
     trial motion for purposes of preserving issues for 
     appeal. 
          We reject defendants' contention that the conclusion 
     reached in Lewis remains sound because it was based on 
     the permissive language contained in the first sentence 
     of section 5--8--1(c), which was unchanged by the 
     amendment. As stated in Lewis, the statute must be read 
     as a whole. Lewis, 158 Ill. 2d  at 389-90. When read as a 
     whole, the first sentence provides that the trial court 
     "may" reduce a sentence or the defendant "may" file a 
     motion to reduce a sentence, but obviously neither is 
     required to do so. The second sentence now provides that 
     a defendant who decides to challenge his sentence "shall" 
     file a written motion in the trial court. Even without 
     changing the language in that first sentence, the 
     legislature changed the result reached in Lewis. 
          We also reject the defendants' contention that the 
     additional sentence in section 5--8--1(c) was intended 
     merely to describe the manner in which a defendant who 
     chooses to challenge his sentence in the trial court may 
     do so. The language in the second sentence of section 5-- 
     8--1(c) does not limit the mandatory filing of a post- 
     sentencing motion to only those defendants wishing to 
     challenge their sentences in the trial court. The 
     statutory language on its face applies to all defendants 
     who wish to challenge the correctness of their sentences 
     or any irregularities in their sentencing hearings. 
 
                           CONCLUSION 
          For the reasons stated, we find that defendants 
     waived their contentions of error by failing to raise 
     those issues in a post-sentencing motion in the trial 
     court. Defendants do not argue that their sentencing 
     challenges amount to plain error. Accordingly, the 
     judgments of the appellate court are affirmed. 
 
                                                        Affirmed.