Case Title: Arias-Villano v. Chang & Sons Enterprises, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12548

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-03-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12548 
 
ANA ARIAS-VILLANO & others1  vs.  CHANG & SONS ENTERPRISES, INC., 
& others.2 
 
 
 
Franklin.     November 5, 2018. - March 15, 2019. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, & Kafker, 
JJ. 
 
 
Labor, Overtime compensation.  Agriculture. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on 
November 17, 2015. 
 
 
The case was heard by Michael K. Callan, J., on motions for 
summary judgment. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for 
direct appellate review. 
 
 
 
Susan E. Garcia Nofi (Leticia Medina-Richman also present) 
for the plaintiffs. 
                     
 
1 Jorge Alvarez, Noelia Gomez-Garcia, Beatriz Perez-
Hernandez, Marlyn Sosa-Saucedo, Edwin Merida-Lopez, Jacobo 
Lopez-Funes, Adrian Cervantes-Acosta, Florindo Alvarado-Argueta, 
David Pacheco-Herrera, Maria Soto-Aguilera, Ronaldo Carrillo-
Funes, Edilmar Morales-Matias, Reynaldo Morales-Morales, Rolando 
Alvarado-Argueta, & Paulino Chaparro-Bravo. 
 
 
2 Sidney Chang and Tso-Cheng Chang. 
2 
 
 
 
Sandra E. Lundy (David G. Gabor also present) for the 
defendants. 
 
Christopher J. Schulte, of the District of Columbia, for 
American Mushroom Institute, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
William C. Newman & Harris Freeman, for American Civil 
Liberties Union of Massachusetts & others, amici curiae, 
submitted a brief. 
 
 
BUDD, J.  The issue in this case is whether the plaintiffs, 
who work for the defendants' company that grows, harvests, 
packages, and distributes bean sprouts, are entitled to overtime 
pay for the hours they worked over forty each week under G. L. 
c. 151, § 1A (overtime statute).  A judge of the Superior Court 
determined that the work that the plaintiffs performed fell 
under the agricultural exemption to the overtime statute, G. L. 
c. 151, § 1A (19), and, on cross motions for summary judgment, 
allowed the defendants' motion and denied the plaintiffs'.   We 
conclude that, under the plain language of the statute and the 
legislative history, the agricultural exemption does not apply 
to the plaintiffs, and therefore, they are entitled to overtime 
wages.3  Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment in 
favor of the defendants and the denial of the plaintiffs' 
                     
 
3 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the American 
Mushroom Institute, as well as the amicus brief submitted by the 
American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts, Massachusetts 
Law Reform Institute, Pioneer Valley Workers Center, United Food 
and Commercial Workers Local 1459, University of Massachusetts 
Labor Relations and Research Center, and Michael Wishnie. 
3 
 
 
motion.  The plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment shall be 
allowed. 
1. Background.  We set forth the material facts contained 
in the judge's written decision on the motions for summary 
judgment, supplemented with undisputed facts from the record.  
Boazova v. Safety Ins. Co., 462 Mass. 346, 347 (2012).  The 
defendants grow, harvest, package, and distribute bean sprouts 
in a 44,000 square foot facility that operates year-round.  Ten 
fifteen-by-fifty square foot rooms are dedicated to growing the 
bean sprouts, a hydroponic operation that is mostly automated.  
Beans are fed into machines that pasteurize them and then 
discharge them into containers where they sprout without the use 
of soil.  Computers monitor the sprouts and dispense water and 
fertilizer into the containers when needed. 
The plaintiffs, who were employed by the defendants for 
various periods of time from 2012 to 2015, were not involved in 
the growing operations, but instead cleaned, inspected, sorted, 
weighed, and packaged the bean sprouts.  They also cleaned the 
facility and discarded waste.  The plaintiffs regularly worked 
more than forty hours per week; some weeks they worked as many 
as seventy hours.  However, the plaintiffs were never paid the 
4 
 
 
overtime rate for the hours they worked in excess of forty hours 
weekly.4 
The plaintiffs brought an action in the Superior Court, 
claiming that the defendants, their former employers, failed to 
pay them overtime wages as required by law.  The defendants 
contended that the plaintiffs are not entitled to overtime wages 
because their work falls under the agricultural exemption, which 
states that the overtime pay requirement shall not apply to 
those "engaged in agriculture and farming on a farm."  G. L. 
c. 151, § 1A (19). 
Both parties moved for summary judgment.  The motion judge 
allowed the defendants' motion and denied that of the 
plaintiffs.  We granted the plaintiffs' application for direct 
appellate review. 
2.  Discussion.  As the case was decided below on motions 
for summary judgment on an undisputed record, "one of the moving 
parties is entitled to judgment as a matter of law" (quotation 
and citation omitted).  Massachusetts Insurers Insolvency Fund 
v. Berkshire Bank, 475 Mass. 839, 841 (2016).  "The single issue 
                     
 
4 Some plaintiffs were paid less than minimum wage for up to 
two months at the beginning of their employment.  Although this 
rate would have violated the general minimum wage law and, after 
January 1, 2015, the special minimum wage rate for agricultural 
workers, the plaintiffs only allege violations of the overtime 
statute. 
5 
 
 
raised is one of statutory interpretation, and we review the 
motion judge's decision de novo."  Id. 
a.  The overtime statute.  The overtime statute provides 
that "no employer in the commonwealth shall employ any of his 
employees in an occupation . . . for a work week longer than 
forty hours, unless such employee receives compensation for his 
employment in excess of forty hours at a rate not less than one 
and one half times the regular rate at which he is employed."  
G. L. c. 151, § 1A. 
The overtime statute was enacted in 1960 as a provision of 
the minimum wage law, G. L. c. 151, which until that time did 
not provide for overtime compensation.  See St. 1960, c. 813.  
See also G. L. c. 151, §§ 1, 2, as amended through St. 1959, c. 
190.  The purpose of the overtime statute was three-fold: "to 
reduce the number of hours of work, encourage the employment of 
more persons, and compensate employees for the burden of a long 
workweek."  Mullally v. Waste Mgt. of Mass., Inc., 452 Mass. 
526, 531 (2008). 
However, the overtime statute includes twenty categories of 
exceptions from the overtime pay requirement that exempt work 
performed in certain locations, see, e.g., G. L. c. 151, § 1A 
(13) ("in a gasoline station"); certain types of work, see, 
e.g., G. L. c. 151, § 1A (2) ("as a golf caddy, newsboy or child 
actor or performer"); certain types of businesses, see, e.g., 
6 
 
 
G. L. c. 151, § 1A (11) ("by an employer licensed and regulated 
pursuant to [G. L. c. 159A, motor vehicle common carriers]"); or 
a combination of factors.  The agricultural exemption, at issue 
here, applies to laborers "engaged in agriculture and farming on 
a farm."  G. L. c. 151, § 1A (19).  Thus, the scope of the 
agricultural exemption turns on the meaning of the phrase 
"agriculture and farming." 
 
"Our primary duty is to interpret a statute in accordance 
with the intent of the Legislature."  Pyle v. School Comm. of 
S. Hadley, 423 Mass. 283, 285 (1996).  See Boston Police 
Patrolmen's Ass'n v. Boston, 435 Mass. 718, 719-720 (2002), and 
cases cited.  At the outset, we note that, "as a remedial 
measure, the overtime statute must be broadly construed in light 
of its purpose, which is in part to compensate for a long work 
week."  Casseus v. Eastern Bus Co., 478 Mass. 786, 797 (2018).  
Any exemptions are therefore to be construed narrowly.  See Wood 
v. Executive Office of Communities & Dev., 411 Mass. 599, 604-
605 (1992). 
In determining the meaning of "agriculture and farming" as 
used in G. L. c. 151, § 1A (19), we look first to definitions 
provided in the chapter that apply to the overtime statute.  See 
2A N.J. Singer & S. Singer, Statutes & Statutory Construction 
§ 47:7 (7th ed. rev. 2014) ("When a legislature does define 
statutory language, its definition usually is binding on courts, 
7 
 
 
even if the definition varies from a term's ordinary meaning").  
See also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000).  General 
Laws c. 151, § 2, defines "[a]gricultural and farm work" as 
"labor on a farm and the growing and harvesting of agricultural, 
floricultural and horticultural commodities," "unless the 
context clearly requires otherwise."5 
The definition refers to "growing and harvesting" 
commodities but does not include postharvesting activities.  
Thus, under the plain language of G. L. c. 151, § 2, the type of 
work that the plaintiffs performed, i.e., cleaning, sorting, and 
packaging the sprouts, does not fall within the scope of the 
statute.   See Bulger v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 447 
Mass. 651, 660 (2006), quoting Perez v. Bay State Ambulance & 
Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 413 Mass. 670, 675 (1992) 
("[statutory] definition [that] declares what a term means . . . 
excludes any meaning that is not stated"). 
b.  Legislative history.  A narrow interpretation of the 
agricultural exemption is supported by the legislative history 
of the minimum wage and overtime statutes.  See Commonwealth v. 
Mogelinski, 466 Mass. 627, 633 (2013), quoting Wright v. 
                     
 
5 Although G. L. c. 151, § 1A (19) uses the terms 
"agriculture and farming," and G. L. c. 151, § 2 defines 
"[a]gricultural and farm work," "when similar words are used in 
different parts of a statute, the meaning is presumed to be the 
same throughout."  Booma v. Bigelow-Sanford Carpet Co., 330 
Mass. 79, 82 (1953). 
8 
 
 
Collector & Treas. of Arlington, 422 Mass. 455, 457-458 (1996) 
(ordinary meaning given to words in statute  must be reasonable 
and supported by purpose and history of statute). 
 
When originally enacted in 1947, the minimum wage statute 
was explicitly inapplicable to "domestic service in the home of 
the employer or labor on a farm" (emphasis added).  See St. 
1947, c. 432.  The overtime statute, which was enacted in 1960 
and worked in tandem with the minimum wage statute, similarly 
excluded farm labor.6  See St. 1960, c. 813; G. L. c. 151, §§ 1A, 
2, as amended through St. 1959, c. 190.  The agricultural 
exemption, enacted seven years after the passage of the overtime 
statute, was part of a legislative reform package entitled "An 
act establishing minimum wage for farm workers and providing for 
the annual inspection of farm labor camps."  See St. 1967, 
c. 718.  As the title of the act suggests, the legislation was 
intended to benefit farm workers by, among other things, 
ensuring that they received a minimum wage.  See id. at § 3, 
inserting G. L. c. 151, § 2A. 
 
The legislation was preceded by report of the Legislative 
Research Council that detailed the struggles faced by migrant 
farm laborers in the Commonwealth.  The Legislature commissioned 
                     
 
6 Both the minimum wage and overtime requirements applied to 
those employed only in an "occupation," which the Legislature 
had defined in 1947 to exclude "labor on a farm."  See St. 1947, 
c. 432.  See also St. 1960, c. 813. 
9 
 
 
the report to better understand "what if any changes may be 
necessary to improve the status of the migrant worker without 
creating undue hardship on the Massachusetts farmer."  See 1967 
Senate Doc. No. 1303, at 7.  Because of the seasonal nature of 
the industry, migrant workers faced incomes below the poverty 
level due to the lack of consistent, year-round employment.7  See 
id. at 14-15 ("[the migrant worker] can expect to be unemployed 
for as much as half the year"). 
 
The report acknowledged opposition to providing overtime 
pay to agricultural workers from employers, who argued that a 
forty-hour work week was impractical given the time-sensitive 
nature of growing and harvesting perishable fruits and 
vegetables.  See id. at 28 ("If the overtime provisions of 
current law are applied, employers may avoid night and overtime 
work.  Thus, the full harvest may not be collected and of equal 
importance the worker is denied a chance to earn extra money"). 
Given these competing interests, St. 1967, c. 718, appears 
to have been an attempt to balance the needs of workers and 
employers.  Thus, St. 1967, c. 718, § 3, established a fair 
minimum wage for agricultural workers, but St. 1967, c. 718, 
                     
 
7 Migrant workers also suffered from isolation and 
substandard living conditions in temporary settlements.  See 
1967 Senate Doc. No. 1303, at 14-15. 
10 
 
 
§ 1, exempted them from receiving overtime wages.  See G. L. 
c. 151, §§ 1A (19), 2A. 
c.  Comparison to cognate Federal overtime provision.  The 
defendants argue that this court should adopt the broad 
definition of "[a]griculture" contained in the Federal overtime 
provision.  We decline to do so. 
It is true that the Massachusetts overtime statute is 
analogous to, and was patterned upon, the overtime provision of 
the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which similarly 
requires that covered employees be paid an overtime rate for 
hours worked in excess of forty hours per week, 29 U.S.C. 
§ 207(a)(1).  See Swift v. AutoZone, Inc., 441 Mass 443, 447 
(2004); Valerio v. Putnam Assocs. Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 40 (1st 
Cir. 1999).  Even so, the two are not identical.  In fact, the 
Massachusetts overtime statute was enacted, in part, to provide 
overtime compensation for many of those workers not covered by 
the FLSA.  See Swift, supra at 448-449.  Compare, e.g., G. L. 
c. 151, § 1A (19), with 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(6) and 29 U.S.C. 
§ 213(b)(12)-(13). 
Unlike the minimum wage law, the FLSA defines 
"[a]griculture" to include "farming in all its branches and 
among other things comprises the cultivation and tillage of the 
soil, . . . the production, cultivation, growing, and harvesting 
of any agricultural . . . commodities . . . and any practices 
11 
 
 
. . . performed by a farmer or on a farm as incident to or in 
conjunction with such farming operations, including preparation 
for market, delivery to storage or to market or to carriers for 
transportation to market" (emphasis added).  29 U.S.C. § 203(f).  
See 29 C.F.R. § 780.105 (July 1, 2018 ed.). 
We see no indication that the Legislature intended that the 
FLSA definition of agriculture be applied to the agricultural 
exemption of the Massachusetts overtime statute.  Indeed, the 
history of the legislation leads to the opposite conclusion.  
The House bill first introducing the agricultural exemption in 
1967 referenced a broad definition of agriculture and farming 
found in G. L. c. 128, § 1A, which is nearly identical to the 
definition of agriculture in the FLSA.8  However, the statute 
that was ultimately enacted contained a much more narrow 
                     
8 The House bill that introduced the agricultural exemption 
contained the following language:  "laborer on a farm engaged in 
agriculture and farming as defined in [G. L. c. 128, § 1A]."  
See 1967 House Doc. No. 4653, at 3.  The 1967 version of G. L. 
c. 128, § 1A, defined farming and agriculture to "include 
farming in all of its branches and the cultivation and tillage 
of the soil, dairying, the production, cultivation, growing and 
harvesting of any agricultural, floricultural or horticultural 
commodities, the raising of livestock, the keeping and raising 
of poultry, swine, cattle and other domesticated animals used 
for food purposes, bees, fur–bearing animals, and any practices, 
including any forestry or lumbering operations, performed by a 
farmer, who is hereby defined as one engaged in agriculture or 
farming as herein defined, or on a farm as an incident to or in 
conjunction with such farming operations, including preparations 
for market, delivery to storage or to market or to carriers for 
transportation to market."  See St. 1960, c. 181. 
12 
 
 
definition of "agricultural and farm work," which can now be 
found in G. L. c. 151, § 2, discussed supra.  For this reason, 
we reject the defendants' suggestion that the Legislature 
removed the reference to the broad definition of farming and 
agriculture merely to make the statute "less wordy," and decline 
to adopt the FLSA's definition of "agriculture" for the purposes 
of the agricultural exemption.  See Globe Newspaper Co. v. 
Boston Retirement Bd., 388 Mass. 427, 432-433 (1983), citing 
International Fid. Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 387 Mass. 841, 854-855 
(1983) (Where "the language of a statute differs in material 
respects from a previously enacted analogous Federal statute 
which the Legislature appears to have considered, a decision to 
reject the legal standards embodied or implicit in the language 
of the Federal statute may be inferred"). 
 
3.  Conclusion.  By reading the plain language of the 
exemption in G. L. c. 151, § 1A (19), narrowly to include only 
the work of planting, raising, and harvesting crops,9 we give 
effect to the statutory definition of agricultural and farm work 
in G. L. c. 151, § 2, as well as to the legislative intent to 
balance the interests of workers and employers. 
 
As the plaintiffs here were not "engaged in agriculture and 
farming" within the meaning of the agricultural exemption, we 
                     
 
9 We need not decide how the exemption should apply to 
agricultural operations that do not involve crops. 
13 
 
 
conclude that they were entitled to overtime pay for work 
performed in excess of forty hours per week, as provided by the 
overtime statute.10 
 
The judgment allowing the defendants' motion for summary 
judgment and denying the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment 
is reversed.  The matter is remanded to the Superior Court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
                     
 
10 Having determined that the plaintiffs were not "engaged 
in agriculture and farming" as required by the agricultural 
exemption, we need not here opine on whether the plaintiffs 
performed their work "on a farm."  See Somerset v. Dighton Water 
Dist., 347 Mass. 738, 743 (1964) (conjunction in statute should 
not be read as disjunctive unless it gives effect to recognized 
legislative purpose).