Case Title: A.H. v. Rockingham Publishing Co.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 961984

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1998-01-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, and  
Kinser, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 
 
A.H.  
                                          OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 961984 
SENIOR JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING 
                                         January 9, 1998 
ROCKINGHAM PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC., ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GREENE COUNTY 
 
Lloyd C. Sullenberger, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, the primary issue is whether a newspaper 
publishing company had a duty to warn a 13 or 14-year-old 
independent contractor of the danger of a criminal assault by a 
third party while delivering newspapers in early morning hours.
1 
 Because the trial court sustained the company's motion to strike 
the evidence, we state the facts in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff.  See Tarmac Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Smiley Block 
Co., 250 Va. 161, 163, 458 S.E.2d 462, 464 (1995). 
 
In May 1988, 13-year-old A.H.
2 and his parents agreed with 
Rockingham Publishing Company, Inc., a newspaper publishing 
company, that A.H. would deliver its newspapers in the City of 
Harrisonburg.  Due to A.H.'s age, under Virginia's child labor 
law Rockingham could only permit A.H. and its other carriers of 
the same age to distribute its "newspapers on regularly 
established routes between the hours of four o'clock ante 
meridian and seven o'clock post meridian, excluding the time 
                     
    
1 Although there may have been an issue whether the plaintiff 
was an employee or an independent contractor, in this opinion, we 
will assume, but not decide, that the plaintiff was an independent 
contractor as he contends. 
    
2 Because this claim arises out of a sexual assault on a minor, 
the plaintiff used a pseudonym to protect his identity. 
public schools are actually in session."  Code § 40.1-109.  
Eighteen months after A.H. started working for Rockingham, while 
delivering newspapers on his regular route between six and six-
thirty a.m. on November 7, 1989, A.H. was sexually assaulted by a 
then-unidentified young man. 
 
There had been three previous pre-dawn assaults of a sexual 
nature upon other young Rockingham carriers while they were 
delivering their newspapers.  None of the three prior assaults 
was shown to have occurred on or near A.H.'s route. 
 
Rockingham knew about all three attacks before the assault 
on A.H.  The first assault was about five years, the second about 
four-and-a-half years, and the third about four months before the 
assault upon A.H.  All three victims gave similar descriptions of 
the young man who assaulted them.  The unknown assailant had not 
been arrested prior to A.H.'s assault. 
 
After he became an adult, A.H. filed this action against the 
company and its circulation manager, K. Gary Anderson 
(collectively, Rockingham).
3  A.H. alleged that the newspaper 
company and Anderson violated a legal duty of care owed him in 
failing to advise him or his parents of the previous attacks or 
to warn them of the danger of being attacked.  Following 
presentation of all parties' evidence before a jury, the trial 
court sustained Rockingham's motions to strike the evidence.  The 
plaintiff appeals. 
                     
    
3 Although there may be differences in the potential liability 
of Rockingham and Anderson, we need not consider them in this 
appeal. 
 
We must first decide whether there was a duty of care upon 
Rockingham in this negligence case.  See Burns v. Johnson, 250 
Va. 41, 44, 458 S.E.2d 448, 450 (1995).  Whether such duty exists 
is "a pure question of law."  Id. at 45, 458 S.E.2d at 451; Acme 
Markets, Inc. v. Remschel, 181 Va. 171, 178, 24 S.E.2d 430, 434 
(1943) ("[t]he law determines the duty, and the jury, upon the 
evidence, determines whether the duty has been performed"). 
 
Familiar principles control our determination of whether 
Rockingham had a duty of care in this case.  Before any duty can 
arise with regard to the conduct of third persons, there must be 
a special relationship between the defendant and either the 
plaintiff or the third person.  Burdette v. Marks, 244 Va. 309, 
312, 421 S.E.2d 419, 420 (1992).  Examples of such a relationship 
between a defendant and a plaintiff include common carrier-
passenger, business proprietor-invitee, and innkeeper-guest.  
Klingbeil Management Group Co. v. Vito, 233 Va. 445, 448, 357 
S.E.2d 200, 201 (1987).  And these examples are not exclusive.  
Gulf Reston, Inc. v. Rogers, 215 Va. 155, 157, 207 S.E.2d 841, 
844 (1974).  Another example of a special relationship is that of 
employer-employee with regard to the employer's potential duty of 
protecting or warning an employee.  Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 302B cmt. e (B) (1965). 
 
Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that 
Rockingham owed the same degree of care to A.H. that it would 
have owed if A.H. had been employed by Rockingham.  See Peele v. 
Bright, 119 Va. 182, 184, 89 S.E. 238, 239 (1916) (instruction 
that degree of care owed to independent contractor less than that 
owed toward employees erroneous and properly refused).  And, 
given the fact that Rockingham assigned a fixed route and time 
for A.H. to distribute its newspapers, we conclude that the 
necessary special relationship existed between Rockingham and 
A.H. with regard to the conduct of third persons. 
 
Even though the necessary special relationship is 
established with regard to a defendant's potential duty to 
protect or warn a plaintiff against the criminal conduct of a 
third party, that duty, as in other negligence cases, is not 
without limitations.  A court must still determine whether the 
danger of a plaintiff's injury from such conduct was known to the 
defendant or was reasonably foreseeable.  "[W]here the duty does 
exist [arising from a requisite relationship], the obligation is 
not an absolute one to insure the plaintiff's safety[;] . . . .  
[t]here is . . . no liability . . . where the defendant neither 
knows nor has reason to foresee the danger or otherwise to know 
that precautions are called for."  W. Page Keeton, et al., 
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 56, at 385 (5th ed. 
1984); see also Burdette, 244 Va. at 312, 421 S.E.2d at 421 
(since citizen being assaulted in police official's presence 
asked for aid, "[defendant] knew or should have known that 
[plaintiff] was in great danger of serious bodily injury"); Gulf 
Reston, 215 Va. at 159, 207 S.E.2d at 845 (insufficient evidence 
to show criminal violence upon tenant reasonably foreseeable by 
landlord); Trimyer v. Norfolk Tallow Co., 192 Va. 776, 785-86, 66 
S.E.2d 441, 446 (1951) (insufficient evidence to show power 
company should have anticipated danger from uninsulated electric 
lines); Lynchburg Cotton Mills v. Stanley, 102 Va. 590, 594, 46 
S.E. 908, 909 (1904) (employer liable for failing to warn boy not 
quite 12 years old of known dangers of revolving wheels, belts, 
and pulleys in place of employment); Linda A. Sharp, Annotation, 
Employer's Liability to Employee or Agent for Injury or Death 
Resulting from Assault or Criminal Attack by Third Person, 40 
A.L.R.5th 1, 14 (1996) ("that a 'special relationship' may exist 
is not dispositive of the duty question because the court must 
also find that the 'harm is foreseeable'").
4
 
We will apply the foregoing principles in this case.  
Despite the special relationship, and even though the plaintiff's 
age may have imposed a greater degree of care upon Rockingham 
than it would have owed an adult in the plaintiff's 
circumstances, Rockingham had no duty to warn or protect him 
against harm unless the danger of an assault on the plaintiff was 
known or reasonably foreseeable to Rockingham.  Since Rockingham 
did not know that the plaintiff was in danger of being assaulted 
                     
    
4 We noted in Gulf Reston that a landlord owed certain duties 
of care to his tenant, 215 Va. at 157, 207 S.E.2d at 844, but held 
that the facts did not establish a sufficient pattern of  prior 
criminal conduct to impose a duty upon the landlord to protect the 
tenant against the criminal acts of third parties.  Our statement 
that "no special relationship existed between Gulf Reston and 
Rogers" was made in the context of that holding.  Id. at 159, 207 
S.E.2d at 845.  
 
In Burdette, we were dealing with a deputy sheriff's duty to 
act in response to a citizen's request for aid when being 
assaulted by a third party in the deputy's presence.  Our 
statement that "[i]n determining whether such a special relation 
existed, it is important to consider whether [the deputy sheriff] 
reasonably could have foreseen that he would be expected to take 
affirmative action to protect [the plaintiff] from harm," was made 
in the context of that situation.  244 Va. at 312, 421 S.E.2d at 
421. 
on that particular paper route, we consider whether the evidence 
is sufficient to raise a jury question whether an assault on him 
was reasonably foreseeable. 
 
In ordinary circumstances, acts of assaultive criminal 
behavior by third persons cannot reasonably be foreseen.  
Burdette, 244 Va. at 311-12, 421 S.E.2d at 420; Marshall v. 
Winston, 239 Va. 315, 318, 389 S.E.2d 902, 904 (1990); Wright v. 
Webb, 234 Va. 527, 531, 362 S.E.2d 919, 921 (1987); Gulf Reston, 
215 Va. at 158-59, 207 S.E.2d at 844-45; Connell v. Chesapeake & 
Ohio Ry., 93 Va. 44, 57-58, 24 S.E. 467, 469 (1896).  
Accordingly, Rockingham's alleged duty to warn the plaintiff of 
the dangers of such an assault would not arise unless the then-
known background of the three prior assaults was sufficient to 
create a reasonable foreseeability of the danger that similar 
criminal acts would be committed upon A.H.  See Gulf Reston, 215 
Va. at 159, 207 S.E.2d at 845; Keeton, supra, § 56, at 385.  
Recognizing his obligation to demonstrate the reasonable 
foreseeability of this danger, the plaintiff claims that the 
facts established at trial imposed a duty of care upon Rockingham 
to warn him of the danger of such an assault.  Rockingham 
responds that the trial court correctly concluded that no such 
duty arose under the circumstances in this case. 
 
In our opinion, the three prior sexual assaults on 
Rockingham carriers in various locations in the City of 
Harrisonburg in the five years preceding the assault on the 
plaintiff were insufficient to raise a jury issue of whether a 
sexual attack on the plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable.  This 
is not a case in which it was shown that the prior assaults were 
at or near the location of the plaintiff's assault, or that they 
occurred frequently or sufficiently close in time to make it 
reasonably foreseeable that the plaintiff would be similarly 
assaulted.
5  Hence, we hold that the trial court correctly 
concluded that Rockingham had no duty to warn the plaintiff or 
his parents of the danger of an attack upon the plaintiff. 
 
Nevertheless, plaintiff claims that his age and relationship 
to Rockingham created an additional duty of disclosure to satisfy 
a requirement that A.H. and his parents give an "informed 
consent" to the alleged risk involved in the performance of 
plaintiff's duties.  We do not reach the merits of this claim, 
however, because the plaintiff has not met his threshold 
obligation of introducing evidence sufficient to create a jury 
issue on the question of whether the assault on him was 
reasonably foreseeable. 
 
Plaintiff also asserts that Rockingham's "method of doing 
business created an environment conducive to assault," basing 
this conclusion on the three prior assaults on Rockingham's 
carriers.  Since those assaults were insufficient to indicate a 
reasonable foreseeability that A.H. was in danger of future 
assaults, we reject this contention. 
 
Next, plaintiff contends that in advising carriers about 
                     
    
5 If the circumstances had been sufficient to suggest that 
there was a reasonable foreseeability that the plaintiff would be 
assaulted while on his early morning route, that issue would have 
been submitted to a jury.  See Page v. Arnold, 227 Va. 74, 80, 314 
S.E.2d 57, 61 (1984) (court decides whether evidence of 
foreseeable danger sufficient to create jury issue). 
safety precautions while on their routes and in equipping them 
with whistles, Rockingham voluntarily assumed a legal duty to (1) 
advise the carriers of the three prior attacks, (2) warn the 
carriers of the possibility of similar attacks, and (3) see that 
all carriers, including the plaintiff, received whistles and 
attended safety lectures.  We decline to impose these additional 
duties upon Rockingham merely because it took precautions not 
required of it. 
 
Duties imposed upon defendants and the violations of those 
duties are premised upon the objective concept of what a 
reasonably prudent person in the exercise of reasonable care 
would have done in similar circumstances.  Hall v. Hall, 240 Va. 
360, 363, 397 S.E.2d 829, 831 (1990).  A defendant ordinarily 
cannot create duties to act merely by taking precautions not 
required of a reasonably prudent person exercising reasonable 
care in the absence of affirmative acts of negligence on his part 
in taking the precautions.  See Keeton, supra, § 56, at 378. 
 
Here, the plaintiff complains that Rockingham gave 
"inadequate" and "deceptive" warnings regarding the risks of 
assaults upon its young carriers while on their early-morning 
deliveries.  Assuming, but not deciding, that Rockingham's safety 
literature, video, and safety whistles were inadequate, we 
conclude that, whatever Rockingham may have voluntarily done in 
providing this material, Rockingham's actions did not give rise 
to a duty to give a more complete warning.  See St. Louis-San 
Francisco Ry. v. Mills, 271 U.S. 344, 347 (1926) (voluntarily 
furnishing one guard to protect strike-breaker did not raise duty 
to provide additional guards).  Moreover, creation of a duty 
under these circumstances would discourage other parties from 
taking extra precautions to avoid being subjected to a liability 
which they otherwise would not have had. 
 
Even if Rockingham's safety materials were deceptive, a 
matter we do not decide, we do not think that a duty was created 
in this case because neither the plaintiff nor his parents had 
seen or read any of the safety literature.  Plaintiff also 
contends that the newspaper published a "deceptive" article about 
a previous attack upon one of Rockingham's carriers.  Although 
the plaintiff's mother testified that she "probably read" the 
article, it was not published as a part of Rockingham's safety 
literature.  Therefore, its publication did not create a duty in 
this case.   
 
In the rest of this opinion, we consider the plaintiff's 
contentions regarding the court's exclusion of certain evidence. 
 At the outset, he notes that the court excluded allegedly 
relevant evidence of prior attacks on non-paper carriers by an 
assailant matching the description and method of operation of the 
person who committed the assaults upon newspaper carriers. 
 
When evidence of prior occurrences is sought to be 
introduced to establish foreseeability of an unreasonable risk of 
harm to others, a trial court must determine whether there is a 
"substantial similarity" between the prior occurrences and the 
occurrence in question.  See General Motors Corp. v. Lupica, 237 
Va. 516, 521, 379 S.E.2d 311, 314 (1989).  In making that 
determination, a trial court exercises its discretion.  See 
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Watson, 243 Va. 128, 138, 413 
S.E.2d 630, 636 (1992).  Absent an abuse of that discretion, we 
will not reverse a trial court's decision in admitting or 
excluding evidence of prior occurrences.  See Roll 'R' Way Rinks, 
Inc. v. Smith, 218 Va. 321, 327, 237 S.E.2d 157, 161 (1977). 
 
The plaintiff proffered a chart prepared by a Harrisonburg 
police sergeant summarizing the facts in five "non-carrier" 
assaults that occurred prior to the assault upon the plaintiff.  
According to the plaintiff, those assaults were "substantially 
similar" to the attack upon him.  In contrast to the early 
morning assault upon the plaintiff, however, three of those 
assaults occurred in the afternoon or evening.  A fourth assault 
took place in the victim's bedroom.  The fifth assault, which 
occurred in the early morning, was upon a 20-year-old female.  In 
view of these dissimilarities, we cannot say that the trial court 
abused its discretion in excluding this evidence. 
 
The court also excluded the proffered testimony of two 
Harrisonburg police officers who investigated the assault upon 
the plaintiff and the prior assaults.  The officers would have 
testified that they believed that all the assaults were committed 
by the same perpetrator and that they closed their investigation 
of all of the assaults upon the 1993 arrest of a young male who 
confessed to many of the assaults, including the attack on the 
plaintiff.   
 
We think that the court correctly excluded this evidence.  
The issue that plaintiff sought to submit to the jury was what a 
reasonably prudent person in the exercise of reasonable care 
should have concluded from the information reasonably available 
to persons in Rockingham's position prior to the assault upon the 
plaintiff.  That issue was not addressed by evidence of what two 
investigators may have concluded from information available to 
them either before or after the assault. 
 
Moreover, the testimony of a lay witness's conclusions from 
certain facts in evidence is not admissible; the jury must draw 
whatever conclusion should be drawn from those facts.  See Lopez 
v. Dobson, 240 Va. 421, 423, 397 S.E.2d 863, 865 (1990).  And 
evidence of what happened or what was discovered after the 
assault upon the plaintiff was not admissible to show what 
Rockingham should have known prior to the assault.  See Turner v. 
Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 216 Va. 245, 253, 217 S.E.2d 863, 
869-70 (1975) (evidence of post-accident change of conditions 
inadmissible to prove negligence). 
 
Finally, the plaintiff contends that the court erred in 
excluding the testimony of the mother of one of Rockingham's 
previously assaulted carriers regarding that assault.  The 
plaintiff contends that this testimony was admissible to show 
that Rockingham was on notice of that assault.  We need not 
consider this contention since other evidence shows what is 
implicit in the trial court's ruling, viz., that Rockingham was 
on notice of the three prior assaults on Rockingham's carriers. 
 
In summary, we conclude that the plaintiff failed to 
establish either that the defendant owed a duty of care to the 
plaintiff under the facts of this case or that the court erred in 
excluding evidence proffered by the plaintiff.  Hence, we will 
affirm the court's judgment. 
 
Affirmed. 
JUSTICE KINSER, with whom JUSTICE LACY joins, concurring in part 
and dissenting in part. 
 
 
 
I agree with the majority opinion except its conclusion that 
the evidence is not sufficient to raise a jury question on 
whether an assault on A.H. was reasonably foreseeable.  In 
reaching this conclusion, the majority emphasizes that the prior 
assaults on Rockingham’s carriers did not occur at or near the 
location of the assault on A.H. and that those assaults did not 
occur frequently or sufficiently close in time.  However, other 
facts, about which Rockingham had knowledge, show that an assault 
on A.H. was reasonably foreseeable.  Thus, I believe the evidence 
provides a sufficient basis upon which to submit to the jury the 
question of whether a sexual assault on A.H. while he was 
delivering papers on his route was reasonably foreseeable.  See 
Page v. Arnold, 227 Va. 74, 80, 314 S.E.2d 57, 61 (1984). 
 
As the majority states, the three prior assaults occurred in 
distinct parts of Harrisonburg, and not on any one paper route.  
Even though the attacks occurred at different locations, they 
shared the common elements of being attacks on carriers while 
delivering papers on routes assigned by Rockingham.  Thus, the 
random locations of the assaults rendered an attack on any given 
paper route more, rather than less, foreseeable.  In other words, 
if the prior assaults had occurred in only one area of the city 
or on a particular paper route, then Rockingham would be 
justified in arguing that it could not have foreseen that A.H.’s 
route would be the site of an assault.  Also persuasive is the 
fact that the assaults occurred in the same type of location, a 
paper route, thereby rendering an attack on A.H.'s route 
foreseeable. 
 
Furthermore, the modus operandi of the prior assaults and 
the three victims’ descriptions of the assailant are significant 
factors in the foreseeability analysis.  With regard to the 
assailant’s modus operandi, all prior attacks occurred in the 
pre-dawn hours while the three victims were delivering 
Rockingham’s papers.  The victims reported that the assailant 
grabbed them from behind and attempted to engage in sexual acts. 
 The victims also gave strikingly similar descriptions of their 
assailant.  All the descriptions included the same attributes as 
to age, gender, race, and physique.  In sum, the time and method 
of the attacks, the sexual nature of the assaults, and the 
similarity in the victims’ descriptions of the assailant are 
facts sufficient to raise a jury question. 
 
Finally, even though the first two assaults occurred four-
and-a-half and five years before the assault on A.H., Rockingham 
knew that the assailant in the first two attacks had never been 
apprehended.  Thus, when the third assault occurred, four months 
before the assault on A.H., and the victim provided a description 
of the assailant remarkably similar to those given by the first 
two victims, it was then reasonably foreseeable that the danger 
to Rockingham's carriers still existed. 
 
For these reasons, I would reverse the trial court’s 
judgment sustaining the motions to strike the evidence and remand 
the case for a new trial.