Case Title: James H. Parker, Jr. v. William Leon Williams, Jr.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1050040

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2007-07-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel 07/20/2007
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
229-0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2007
_________________________
1050040
_________________________
James H. Parker
v.
William Leon Williams, Jr.
_________________________
1050100
_________________________
William Leon Williams, Jr.
v.
James H. Parker
Appeals from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-02-3520)
1050040; 1050100
This case was originally assigned to another Justice on
1
this Court; it was reassigned to Chief Justice Cobb on January
18, 2007.
2
COBB, Chief Justice.1
James H. Parker, the plaintiff in a breach-of-contract
and fraud action in the Jefferson Circuit Court, appeals from
a judgment as a matter of law in favor of the defendant,
William Leon Williams, Jr.  Williams cross-appeals from a
judgment as a matter of law entered by the trial court in
favor of Parker on Williams's counterclaim.  We affirm.
I.  Background
Williams is an attorney who has practiced law in
Birmingham for over 40 years.  In December 1997, Robert
Shelborne approached Williams about representing him in a
business transaction in London, England, from which Shelborne
believed he would receive $31 million.  Williams and Shelborne
entered into a written agreement pursuant to which Williams
would receive a fee of $1 million for his services, contingent
upon Shelborne's receiving the $31 million.  Williams
established a "receptacle" account with J.C. Bradford &
Company for Shelborne to deposit the $31 million.  Williams
also provided Shelborne a key to Williams's office and a pager
1050040; 1050100
It appears that this was actually a Nigerian advance fee
2
fraud ("AFF"), commonly referred to as a "419 Scam."  These
AFFs include the transfer of funds from over-invoiced
contracts, contract fraud, conversion of hard currency, sale
of crude oil below market prices, purchase of real estate, and
disbursement of money from wills.  Typically, the victims
either are asked to allow substantial funds to be deposited
into their bank account, for which they will receive a
percentage of the funds, or are told that they are to inherit
a substantial sum.  The victims are informed that they must
pay a tax or transaction fee before the funds are deposited to
their accounts; the funds, of course, are never deposited.
United States Department of State Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Nigerian Advance Fee
Fraud (April 1997). 
3
so the two could remain in contact "in case something broke
fast."
Williams and Shelborne's contact regarding the London
transaction was an individual who identified himself as Robert
Tundy and who said that he was with the "Presidency" in
London.  Tundy informed Williams and Shelborne that Shelborne
would have to pay a tax of $200,010 in order to receive the
$31 million, which appeared to have originated in Nigeria.2
Williams and Shelborne attempted to borrow $200,010 from
various sources but were unsuccessful.  In May 1998, Tundy
told Williams and Shelborne that he would raise $100,000 from
sources in Nigeria if they would pay the balance on the tax of
$100,010.  
1050040; 1050100
Shelborne had previously borrowed $50,000 from another
3
individual and in March or April 1998 had wired those funds to
the "Presidency" in London, albeit to a different account.
4
Shelborne approached Parker about loaning him $50,000 as
partial payment of the tax.  Shelborne and Parker had been
employed by the same insurance agency.  Shelborne twice met
with Parker to discuss the proposed loan.  During the second
meeting Shelborne mentioned that Williams was assisting him
with the transaction, and Parker asked Shelborne to have
Williams meet with him to explain the transaction.  Williams
met with Parker, and Parker alleges that during this meeting
Williams guaranteed the loan.  Parker agreed to loan Shelborne
the $50,000, and on May 4, 1998, Shelborne executed a
promissory note, drafted by Williams, payable to Parker,
pursuant to which Shelborne agreed to pay Parker $100,000
within 72 hours of receiving $50,000 from Parker.  Although
Williams signed the promissory note as a witness, there was no
written agreement indicating that Williams would guarantee the
loan.  After the promissory note was executed, Parker provided
Shelborne a cashier's check in the amount of $50,000.  Parker,
Williams, and Shelborne went to the bank, where the funds were
wired as instructed to an account at Chase Manhattan Bank.  
3
1050040; 1050100
5
After the $50,000 was transferred on May 4, 1998, neither
Shelborne nor Williams heard from Tundy again.  Not
surprisingly, the $31 million was never transferred into the
J.C. Bradford account Williams had established.  On June 1,
1998, Shelborne returned the pager and the key to Williams's
office to Williams's secretary.  Williams testified that
Shelborne then "disappeared" and that he had no further
contact with him.  Subsequently, Williams contacted the United
States Embassy in London and learned that a "Presidency" did
not exist in London.  
Parker contacted Williams numerous times to inquire when
he would receive $100,000 under the promissory note.
According to Parker, each time he inquired Williams promised
that Parker would receive the money soon.  Shelborne, however,
never honored the terms of the promissory note.  
After learning that there was no such entity as a
"Presidency" and that he had been defrauded, Williams, on
behalf of Parker, sued Shelborne, whom he had represented in
the failed transaction, seeking the amount due Parker under
the promissory note and damages.  Williams also named
Shelborne's mother and grandmother as defendants in the
1050040; 1050100
Williams named Shelborne's mother as a defendant because
4
she had given Williams messages she had received from the
"Presidency" and because she had tried to secure from her
credit union the money that was to be sent to the "Presidency"
as payment of the tax.  Williams named Shelborne's grandmother
as a defendant because she owned the house in which Shelborne
and his mother resided.
Although during trial the parties refer to recording the
5
judgment with the circuit court, it is apparent to this Court
that they were referring to the process of recording a
judgment with the probate court to secure a lien.
6
action.   Shelborne did not answer the complaint, and a
4
default judgment was entered against Shelborne for $200,000.
Although Williams and Parker attempted to collect the
judgment, they discovered that there were no assets to attach,
and the record indicates that Williams never recorded the
judgment with the probate court.5
According to Parker, even after a default judgment had
been entered against Shelborne, Williams continued to promise
Parker that he would make good on the promissory note.
Specifically, Parker testified that Williams promised to pay
him once an action settled in which Williams was representing
the City of Birmingham against Browning-Ferris Industries,
Inc. ("BFI").  After reading in the newspaper that the BFI
action had settled and assuming that Williams had received his
attorney fee in the BFI litigation, Parker telephoned Williams
1050040; 1050100
7
and inquired as to when he would receive his $100,000.
According to Parker, Williams told him that he would not pay
him.  Frustrated, Parker filed a complaint with the Alabama
State Bar against Williams, alleging that he had violated the
Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct when he sued Shelborne,
whom he had formerly represented in the transaction, on
Parker's behalf.  Parker testified that he filed the complaint
hoping that the State Bar would be able to force Williams to
pay him.  As a result of the complaint, Williams was publicly
reprimanded by the Alabama State Bar because of the conflict
of interest created when he sued his former client based on
the transaction in which he had represented the client.
Parker then sued Williams in the Jefferson Circuit Court,
alleging breach of contract and fraud.  Williams filed a
counterclaim against Parker seeking $80,000 in unpaid attorney
fees relating to the action Williams filed against Shelborne
on Parker's behalf.  A summary judgment was entered in favor
of Williams on Parker's fraud claim, and the remaining claims
proceeded to trial.  The jury trial began on August 22, 2005.
After Parker presented his case-in-chief, Williams moved for
a judgment as a matter of law on the breach-of-contract claim;
that motion was granted.  The jury was then dismissed, and
1050040; 1050100
8
pursuant to the agreement of the parties, Williams's
counterclaim for attorney fees was adjudicated as a bench
trial.  At the conclusion of the bench trial, the trial court
entered a judgment as a matter of law for Parker on the
counterclaim.  Parker appealed, and Williams cross-appealed.
II.  Case No. 1050040 -– Parker's Appeal
Parker argues that the trial court erred in granting
Williams's motion for a judgment as a matter of law made after
Parker presented his case-in-chief.  He further argues that
the trial court erred to reversal by excluding at trial a tape
recording of a telephone conversation between Parker and
Williams, which Parker asserts would have revealed Williams's
agreement to guarantee Shelborne's loan.
A.  Standard of Review
"'The standard of review applicable to a motion
for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the
verdict [now referred to as a preverdict and a
postverdict motion for a judgment as a matter of
law] is identical to the standard used by the trial
court in granting or denying the motions initially.
Thus, when reviewing the trial court's ruling on
either motion, we determine whether there was
sufficient evidence to produce a conflict warranting
jury consideration. And, like the trial court, we
must view any evidence most favorably to the
non-movant.'"
1050040; 1050100
9
Glenlakes Realty Co. v. Norwood, 721 So. 2d 174, 177 (Ala.
1998) (quoting Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So. 2d 860, 863
(Ala. 1988)).
B. Analysis
During trial and on appeal, Parker concedes that no
written contract exists between Williams and him by which
Williams agrees to guarantee Parker's loan to Shelborne.
Instead, he argues that there was a valid oral agreement by
which Williams agreed to guarantee the loan.  We disagree.
Alabama's 
Statute 
of 
Frauds, 
§ 
8-9-2, 
Ala. 
Code
1975, states, in pertinent part:
"In the following cases, every agreement is void
unless such agreement or some note or memorandum
thereof expressing the consideration is in writing
and subscribed by the party to be charged therewith
or some other person by him thereunto lawfully
authorized in writing:
"....
"3) Every special promise to answer for the
debt, default or miscarriage of another ...."
Parker argues that, as this Court enunciated in Fowler v.
Oliver, 540 So. 2d 54, 55 (Ala. 1989), "[t]he rule in Alabama
is that the Statute of Frauds is applicable only to executory
contracts, not to executed contracts."  Fowler, however, is
distinguishable from this case in that it dealt with an oral
1050040; 1050100
10
contract that exceeded one year.  Our review of this Court's
prior decisions does not indicate that the executed-contract
exception to the Statute of Frauds has been applied to a
guaranty.  Given this Court's holding in Baker v. Hanks, 661
So. 2d 1155 (Ala. 1995), that a purported oral promise by a
third party "to see to it" that a loan was repaid would have
to be in writing to be enforceable, we conclude that this
Court has not extended the executed-contract exception to the
Statute of Frauds to situations involving a guaranty.   See
also Posten v. Clem, 201 Ala. 529, 78 So. 883 (1918).
Extending the executed-contract exception to "promise[s] to
answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another" would
essentially negate the Statute of Frauds in that context
because practically all disputes regarding a guaranty arise
after the debt has been created.  Accordingly, we hold that
the executed-contract exception has no application here.
Because the alleged oral agreement between Williams and
Parker falls within the purview of the Statute of Frauds, we
need not consider Parker's claim regarding the trial court's
refusal to allow the audiotape of the telephone conversation
between him and Williams into evidence.  Indeed, no matter how
compelling Williams's purported promise may have been on the
1050040; 1050100
11
audiotape, the oral promise would be irrelevant because § 8-9-
2(3), Ala. Code 1975, requires such a guaranty to be in
writing.
III.  Case No. 1050100 -– Williams's Cross-Appeal
Williams argues that the trial court erred in determining
that he was not entitled to attorney fees under the theory of
quantum meruit or quasi-contract relating to the action he
filed on Parker's behalf against Shelborne.  We disagree.
A.  Standard of Review
As 
stated 
previously, 
the 
trial 
court 
considered
Williams's counterclaim during a bench trial conducted after
the jury had been dismissed following the entry of a judgment
as a matter of law on Parker's breach-of-contract claim
against Williams.  Our ore tenus standard of review is well
settled.  "'When a judge in a nonjury case hears oral
testimony, a judgment based on findings of fact based on that
testimony will be presumed correct and will not be disturbed
on appeal except for a plain and palpable error.'"  Smith v.
Muchia, 854 So. 2d 85, 92 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Skelton, 675 So. 2d 377, 379 (Ala. 1996)); see also
First Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. Duckworth, 502 So. 2d 709 (Ala.
1987).  As this Court has stated:
1050040; 1050100
12
"'The ore tenus rule is grounded upon the principle
that when the trial court hears oral testimony it
has an opportunity to evaluate the demeanor and
credibility of witnesses.' Hall v. Mazzone, 486 So.
2d 408, 410 (Ala. 1986).  The rule applies to
'disputed issues of fact,' whether the dispute is
based entirely upon oral testimony or upon a
combination 
of 
oral testimony and documentary
evidence.  Born v. Clark, 662 So. 2d 669, 672 (Ala.
1995).  The ore tenus standard of review, succinctly
stated, is as follows:
"'[W]here the evidence has been [presented]
ore tenus, a presumption of correctness
attends the trial court's conclusion on
issues of fact, and this Court will not
disturb the trial court's conclusion unless
it is clearly erroneous and against the
great weight of the evidence, but will
affirm 
the 
judgment 
if, 
under 
any
reasonable aspect, it is supported by
credible evidence.'"  
Reed v. Board of Trs. for Alabama State Univ., 778 So. 2d 791,
795 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Raidt v. Crane, 342 So. 2d 358, 360
(Ala. 1977)).  However, "that presumption [of correctness] has
no application when the trial court is shown to have
improperly applied the law to the facts."  Ex parte Board of
Zoning Adjustment of Mobile, 636 So. 2d 415, 417 (Ala. 1994).
B.  Analysis
Initially we note that the record contains only the court
reporter's transcript of the trial through the entry of the
judgment as a matter of law on Parker's breach-of-contract
1050040; 1050100
13
claim; it does not contain the transcript of the portion of
the bench trial regarding Williams's counterclaim.  A
transcript of that portion of the trial apparently exists
because Williams quotes liberally from it in his brief.
"The law is settled that it is the appellant's
duty to ensure that the appellate court has a record
from which it can conduct a review.  Cooper & Co.[v.
Lester, 832 So. 2d 628 (Ala. 2000)]; [Alfa Mut. Gen.
Ins. Co. v.] Oglesby, [711 So. 2d 938 (Ala. 1997)];
and Gotlieb v. Collat, 567 So. 2d 1302 (Ala. 1990).
Further, in the absence of evidence in the record,
this Court will not assume error on the part of the
trial court.  Browning v. Carpenter, 596 So. 2d 906
(Ala. 1992); Smith v. Smith 596 So. 2d 1 (Ala.
1992); Totten v. Lighting & Supply, Inc., 507 So. 2d
502 (Ala. 1987)."
Zaden v. Elkus, 881 So. 2d 993, 1009 (Ala. 2003).  Williams
(the appellant in this cross-appeal) had the burden of
ensuring that the record on appeal contains sufficient
evidence to warrant a reversal of the judgment he challenges.
Gottlieb v. Collat, 567 So. 2d 1302 (Ala. 1990).  The law in
Alabama is settled that when the record is silent as to
evidence considered by the trial court,  we must presume that
the evidence considered was sufficient to support the trial
court's judgment.  Browning v. Carpenter, 596 So. 2d 906 (Ala.
1992); Smith v. Smith 596 So. 2d 1 (Ala. 1992); and Totten v.
Lighting & Supply, Inc., 507 So. 2d 502 (Ala. 1987).  Because
1050040; 1050100
14
we do not have a complete record to consider, we cannot assume
error on the part of the trial court; thus we must affirm its
judgment for Parker on Williams's counterclaim. 
IV.  Conclusion
Because the trial court correctly determined that the
Statute of Frauds was applicable to the purported oral
agreement between Williams and Parker, we affirm the trial
court's judgment for Williams on Parker's breach-of-contract
claim (case no. 1050040).  Because we do not have a complete
record to review Williams's cross-appeal, we affirm its
judgment for Parker on Williams's counterclaim (case no.
1050100).
1050040 -- AFFIRMED.
1050100 –- AFFIRMED.
See, Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin, and Parker,
JJ., concur.
Murdock, J., concurs in the result.