Case Title: People v. Wilson

Citation: 

Docket Number: 84692

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-05-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Opinion filed May 18, 2000.
JUSTICE RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant, Glenn Wilson, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his 
post-conviction petition. Because defendant was sentenced to death for the 
underlying murder conviction, he appeals directly to this court. See 134 Ill. 2d 
R. 651(a).
BACKGROUND
A jury in the circuit court of McLean County convicted defendant of the armed 
robbery of the S&S Liquor Store in Bloomington and of three counts of 
murder. The same jury found defendant eligible for the death penalty. Defendant 
waived his right to a jury for the aggravation-mitigation phase of the death 
penalty hearing. The trial court found that there were no mitigating factors 
sufficient to preclude a sentence of death and sentenced defendant to death. 
Defendant appealed, and we affirmed his convictions and death sentence. 
People v. Wilson, 164 Ill. 2d 436 (1994).
Thereafter, defendant filed a timely pro se post-conviction 
petition. Subsequently, the trial court appointed counsel for defendant, and he 
filed an amended petition. Three of defendant's claims involve the assertion 
that his attorney was ineffective for failing to properly investigate 
defendant's psychological testimony. To pursue these claims, defendant sought 
funds to hire an expert. The trial court denied defendant's request for funds. 
The State moved to dismiss defendant's petition, and the trial court granted the 
State's motion.
Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying defendant's request for funds; (2) the trial court erred in dismissing 
defendant's petition; (3) defendant was denied the effective assistance of 
appellate counsel when counsel failed to argue that the State was precluded from 
seeking the death penalty; (4) the trial court arbitrarily and capriciously 
imposed a premature deadline for the filing of defendant's amended petition; and 
(5) this court should adopt a uniform test governing when an expert should be 
appointed during both trial and post-conviction proceedings.
ANALYSIS
Appointment of an Expert
Defendant alleges that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when 
his attorney failed to investigate defendant's mental condition and to use the 
evidence he would have discovered (1) to support defendant's motion to suppress 
statements; (2) to present an insanity defense; and (3) as mitigation during 
defendant's sentencing hearing. To support these claims, defendant requested 
that the trial court appropriate funds to allow him to hire an expert. Defendant 
explained that his medical records and examinations by other experts reveal that 
he needs to be examined by a neuropsychiatrist.
In support of his motion, defendant attached medical records that include a 
notation that defendant should be evaluated for temporal lobe epilepsy "as a 
possible cause of rage attacks." Defendant also attached affidavits from Harry 
Gunn, a clinical psychologist, and Jonathan Hess, a clinical neuropsychologist. 
Gunn's affidavit states that "neuropsychological testing is highly recommended." 
Hess's affidavit states that, since childhood, defendant has suffered from a 
seizure disorder and that defendant has never been diagnosed or treated by a 
behavioral neurologist or neuropsychiatrist who is "educated in the psychiatric 
consequences of seizure disorders." Defendant's history reveals that violent 
behavior often follows one of his seizures. Based upon his examination of 
defendant, Hess believes that defendant suffers from "episodic discontrol," or 
rage attacks. A person suffering from a rage attack "would be unable to control 
his behavior or to conform his behavior to the requirements of the law." 
Finally, Hess states that, to properly diagnose defendant, "either a behavioral 
neurologist (who is also an epileptologist) or a neuropsychiatrist" will have to 
conduct a 24-hour ambulatory EEG.
Defendant therefore requested funding for an ambulatory EEG. Defendant's 
attorney averred that he had contacted Dr. Lyle Rossiter, Jr., who had agreed to 
perform an ambulatory EEG and to examine and evaluate defendant. The cost for 
the test, test interpretation, and evaluation of defendant totaled $3,786. The 
trial court denied defendant's motion to retain Dr. Rossiter. On appeal, 
defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying this 
motion.
Trial courts are permitted to exercise a great deal of discretion in 
resolving post-conviction petitions. People v. Wright, 149 Ill. 2d 36, 
54 (1992). This is done to ensure that defendants are permitted an opportunity 
to advance claims of constitutional deprivation. Wright, 149 Ill. 2d  at 
54. Whether to allow a defendant's motion for the appointment of an expert in a 
post-conviction proceeding is a matter that lies within the trial court's 
discretion. People v. Hall, 157 Ill. 2d 324, 339 (1993), 
Wright, 149 Ill. 2d  at 58. The key question to consider is whether the 
testimony would assist the court in deciding the question before it. 
Hall, 157 Ill. 2d  at 339-40.
To decide that question here, we must consider the claims under which 
defendant's request for an expert arises. Defendant alleges that the expert is 
needed to allow him to demonstrate that his attorney was ineffective for failing 
to investigate defendant's mental condition. In particular, defendant contends 
that, had trial counsel properly investigated defendant's mental health, counsel 
could have (1) presented evidence during the hearing on defendant's motion to 
suppress to demonstrate that defendant's statements should have been suppressed; 
(2) presented an insanity defense; and (3) demonstrated during the sentencing 
hearing that a statutory mitigating factor was present.
To succeed in his claims that he was denied the effective assistance of 
counsel, defendant must allege facts to demonstrate that his attorney's 
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). Because a 
defendant must satisfy both prongs of the test, the failure to satisfy either 
prong precludes a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel under 
Strickland. People v. Shaw, 186 Ill. 2d 301, 332 (1998).
We now address individually each of defendant's claims.
Motion to Suppress
Defendant alleges that his mental problems, which include attention and 
short-term memory problems, "make it extremely doubtful that [defendant's] 
statements were made knowingly, understandingly, and voluntarily." Defendant 
contends that, had his trial counsel properly investigated defendant's mental 
history, counsel would have discovered evidence that would have supported the 
allegation that defendant was unable to knowingly and intelligently waive his 
Miranda rights.
Defendant contends that the reports from Hess and Gunn reveal mental problems 
affecting defendant's attention and thinking problems. He asserts that an 
examination by Dr. Rossiter is necessary to "establish the etiology" of 
defendant's mental problems. While both Hess and Gunn agree that Dr. Rossiter's 
report is necessary to reveal the cause of defendant's mental problems, neither 
asserts that this information is necessary to ascertain the effect of 
defendant's mental problems on his ability to waive his Miranda rights. 
Because defendant has failed to demonstrate that the etiology of his mental 
problems is necessary to demonstrate how those problems affect his ability to 
waive his Miranda rights, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying defendant's request for funding to investigate this claim.
Insanity Defense
Defendant argues that the evidence that Dr. Rossiter could provide would 
establish that he was prejudiced by defense counsel's failure to present an 
insanity defense. Before addressing this question, however, we turn our 
attention to whether defendant has pleaded sufficient facts to demonstrate that 
the actions of his trial counsel fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.
Strickland requires attorneys to render reasonably effective 
assistance that is within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in 
criminal cases. The standard is one of objective reasonableness, under 
"prevailing professional norms." Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 687-88, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 693-94, 104 S. Ct.  at 2064-65.
Here, defendant has failed to plead facts that demonstrate that his 
attorney's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness when the 
attorney failed to investigate and present an insanity defense. Defendant's 
alleges that his attorney knew that when defendant was first arrested on the 
weapons charge he tried to hang himself. Further, a mitigation report that trial 
counsel may or may not have seen before trial revealed that defendant suffered 
from epilepsy, was probably mildly retarded, and "could be suffering from [an] 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance." Defendant asserts that these facts are 
sufficient to have required trial counsel to investigate the possible existence 
of an insanity defense. We disagree.
Even if we accept defendant's unsupported contention that trial counsel was 
able to review the mitigation report before trial, we do not believe that the 
sum of the evidence available to trial counsel would have placed a reasonable 
attorney on notice that an insanity defense was a possibility. Except for his 
statements to the police, defendant has continually and steadfastly denied 
participating in the crime. Additionally, nothing in defendant's records 
provides any indication that his mental problems would meet the definition of 
legal insanity (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 38, par. 6-2(a) (explaining that a 
defendant is not criminally responsible for his conduct if "as a result of 
mental disease or mental defect, he lacks substantial capacity either to 
appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law") (now codified, as amended, at 720 ILCS 5/6-2(a) (West 
1998))). At best, the records available to counsel at the time of trial revealed 
that defendant is probably mildly retarded and that he suffers from epilepsy. We 
are simply unable to agree with defendant that this limited information, which 
in no way indicates that defendant was unable to appreciate the criminality of 
his conduct or unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, was 
sufficient to require trial counsel to investigate the possibility of an 
insanity defense.
Because trial counsel's actions did not fall below an objective standard of 
reasonableness, we must reject defendant's argument that his attorney was 
ineffective. Moreover, because defendant's ineffective assistance claim fails, 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to appropriate funds for 
an expert to examine defendant to determine whether an insanity defense could 
have reasonably been expected to be successful.
Mitigation Evidence
Defendant also argues that his attorney was ineffective for failing to 
investigate and introduce evidence of defendant's extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance. To support this claim, defendant again relies upon the mitigation 
report. The person who prepared this report stated, in conclusion, that "it is 
possible, given Glenn's history of mental problems, he could be suffering from 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance." In his post-conviction petition, 
defendant asserts that his attorney was ineffective because "trial counsel 
presented no evidence that Glenn Wilson was under extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance at the time of the murders." See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(c)(2) (West 1998) 
(noting that a mitigating factor is that "the murder was committed while the 
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, 
although not such as to constitute a defense to prosecution"). Defendant asserts 
that, had evidence of this extreme mental or emotional disturbance been 
discovered and presented to the trial court, a reasonable probability exists 
that he would not have been sentenced to death.
We note that defendant limits his argument to the statutorily identified 
mitigating factor relating to an extreme mental or emotional disturbance. This 
factor requires defendant to prove not only that he suffers from an extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance, but also that he was under the 
influence of that disturbance when he committed the murders. See 
720 ILCS 5/9-1(c)(2) (West 1998); People v. Johnson, 183 Ill. 2d 176, 
206 (1998); see also People v. Smith, 176 Ill. 2d 217, 256 (1997); 
People v. Phillips, 127 Ill. 2d 499, 534 (1989). Significantly, 
defendant could have argued, but chose not to argue, the presence of a 
nonstatutory mitigating factor; specifically, defendant could have argued that 
he suffers from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance, without arguing that 
he was under the influence of that disturbance when he committed the murders. 
Because defendant chose to invoke only the statutory mitigating factor, an 
essential element of defendant's claim is that he was under the influence of his 
alleged extreme mental or emotional disturbance when he murdered three persons 
in the liquor store.
Here, even if defendant has the frontal lobe damage that he alleges Dr. 
Rossiter could diagnose, no evidence exists that would support a conclusion 
that, when defendant committed the murders, he was under the influence of a 
mental or emotional disorder. Nothing in the record supports a conclusion that 
the robbery of the liquor store was anything other than a calculated plan to rob 
the store. Admittedly, defendant told the police that the shootings were "a spur 
of the moment thing" and "not supposed to happen." These statements, however, 
indicate only that, although the robbery was planned, the murders were not. 
These statements do not indicate that when defendant shot the people he was 
under the influence of a "rage attack." Stated simply, defendant alleges that 
his alleged disorder causes him to suffer uncontrollable "rage attacks." Here, 
no facts exist or are alleged that would support a finding that the murders were 
committed by an individual under the influence of a rage attack.
Defendant has not demonstrated that, even if he suffers from an extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance, he was under the influence of this disturbance 
when he committed the murders. Because defendant has not demonstrated that the 
alleged mental disturbance meets the criteria of the mitigating factor upon 
which he relies, we must conclude that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying defendant's motion to appropriate funds for an examination 
by Dr. Rossiter.
Due Process
Defendant also asserts that the trial court violated his due process rights 
when it denied defendant's motion to appoint an expert. Defendant claims that, 
by refusing to appropriate funds to employ Dr. Rossiter, the trial court 
effectively precluded him from arguing that he received the ineffective 
assistance of counsel. As we explained above, however, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion when it denied defendant's motion to appropriate funds to 
employ Dr. Rossiter.
Because defendant has failed to demonstrate that the examination is necessary 
to present his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the trial court did 
not deprive defendant of his due process rights by denying defendant's motion to 
appropriate funds to employ Dr. Rossiter.
Dismissal of Defendant's Petition
Defendant next argues that his petition substantially alleges a deprivation 
of his constitutional rights and that, therefore, the trial court erred in 
dismissing the petition. As noted above, defendant has failed to demonstrate 
that his attorney's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 
when he failed to investigate and present an insanity defense. Moreover, 
defendant has failed to plead facts that demonstrate that he was operating under 
a mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the murders. Because defendant 
has failed to plead facts that would support his arguments, the trial court did 
not err in dismissing these two claims.
We turn now to the other two claims raised by defendant. In so doing, we note 
that we review de novo the trial court's dismissal of defendant's 
petition. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 389 (1998). Defendant is 
entitled to a hearing on his post-conviction petition if his allegations of fact 
make a substantial showing that he is imprisoned in violation of the state or 
federal constitution. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 382.
Motion to Suppress
As we explained earlier, the basis for this claim is that trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to investigate defendant's mental history and mental 
abilities and that this failure to investigate prevented trial counsel from 
adequately presenting and prevailing on defendant's motion to suppress 
statements. Defendant asserts that, if evidence of his mental problems would 
have been presented, a reasonable probability exists that his statements would 
have been suppressed.
The evidence defendant now relies upon reveals that defendant suffers from 
depression and seizures and is a suicide risk. Additionally, defendant has 
suffered from seizures since he was a child and he has taken anticonvulsant and 
psychotropic medication. Hess' report reveals that defendant has attention and 
concentration problems that may make him appear to be following a conversation 
when he actually is not. Moreover, defendant has "marked" memory deficits, 
"inconsistent memory," and "anterograde amnesia" and is "unlikely to reconstruct 
any prior events with any accuracy." Gunn's report states that defendant is a 
"very slow thinker" who shows "borderline intellectual functioning" and who has 
a very weak short term memory and a weak memory overall.
Significantly, the reports from Hess and Gunn do not assert that defendant is 
incapable of understanding his Miranda rights or of waiving those 
rights. Instead, they simply reveal that he has memory and mental problems. 
These facts, without more, are insufficient to require the trial court to hold 
an evidentiary hearing. Without presenting some explanation of why defendant's 
mental problems render him incapable of either understanding or waiving his 
Miranda rights, defendant has failed to present sufficient facts to 
make a substantial showing that he is imprisoned in violation of his 
constitutional rights.
Michele Ritza
Defendant also contends that his attorney was ineffective for failing to 
investigate the existence of and to present Michele Ritza as a witness during 
the aggravation-mitigation phase of his sentencing hearing. Ritza has been 
defendant's friend since they were children. Her affidavit reveals that she 
would have testified that defendant is a decent and caring person. Further, she 
would have corroborated evidence that defendant has difficulty following 
conversations.
Defendant's petition, however, never explains why trial counsel would have 
any reason to know that Ritza exists. Without some explanation from defendant as 
to why counsel would have been expected to know of Ritza and that she might be a 
favorable witness, we are simply unable to conclude that counsel's actions fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness when he did not interview her. 
Consequently, we must conclude that the trial court did not err when it 
dismissed defendant's post-conviction petition without an evidentiary 
hearing.
State's Alleged Promise Not to Seek the Death Penalty
Defendant next argues that his appellate attorney in his direct appeal was 
ineffective for failing to argue that the State was precluded from seeking the 
death penalty. The basis for defendant's argument arises from an alleged 
agreement between defendant and the State. Defendant asserts that this agreement 
provided that he would tell the State what he knew of the robbery of the liquor 
store and, in exchange, the State would agree not to seek the death penalty 
against him.
Before defendant's trial, trial counsel moved to preclude the State from 
seeking the death penalty. At the hearing on defendant's motion, Officer Jeff 
Sanders testified that he arrested defendant on an unrelated weapons charge. 
After taking defendant to the hospital because defendant had attempted to hang 
himself, Sanders began talking with defendant in an attempt to calm him. During 
this time, defendant stated that he wanted to go home. Sanders told defendant 
that defendant should consider working as an informant for the police. 
Eventually, the discussion turned to the S&S murders. Defendant told Sanders 
that "everyone knew who did that."
John Schwulst, who represented defendant on the unlawful use of weapons 
charge, testified that he was asked to go to the police station because law 
enforcement officials wished to speak to defendant about the S&S murders. 
Although Schwulst had difficulty remembering what exactly was said, he testified 
that the general terms of the deal that was discussed were that defendant would 
tell the police what he knew about the S&S murders. If defendant told the 
truth and cooperated, the State would not seek the death penalty. Schwulst 
conceded that defendant did not reveal any inculpatory information and told the 
police "nothing of any value."
Assistant State's Attorney John Campbell testified that he told defendant 
that, if defendant told everything that he knew and if he was truthful and if he 
was not the person who "pulled the trigger," then defendant "may be in a 
position where he could possibly save his life." Campbell made clear to 
defendant, however, that he was making no specific promises. Campbell also 
testified that, while defendant was speaking with the State, Schwulst said to 
defendant, "Don't B.S. the police. They want the truth." Sergeant Dennis O'Brien 
corroborated Campbell's testimony.
State's Attorney Charles Reynard testified that he discussed the ground rules 
of the interview with Campbell. They agreed that, if defendant was not the 
shooter and if he told the complete truth, he would be given "unspecified 
considerations with regard to the possible penalty imposed."
Officer Dan Katz testified that defendant had been arrested for unlawful use 
of weapons and wanted to get out of jail. Katz told defendant that he could not 
promise or guarantee defendant anything. Defendant responded, "If you'd have 
answered that question any other way I would have known that you were lying." 
Eventually, defendant agreed to talk about the S&S murders. Katz 
corroborated Campbell's testimony about the ground rules of Campbell's interview 
of defendant.
After considering this evidence and hearing argument, the trial court, 
without explanation, denied defendant's motion. Defendant's trial counsel again 
raised this issue in his post-trial motion. On appeal, however, appellate 
counsel did not raise this argument. Defendant now contends that his appellate 
counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this argument. In particular, 
defendant argues that "no public defender would have allowed his client to talk 
to the police in a capital case under the circumstances present on June 9, 1989, 
in this case, without having an agreement in principle that if the client talked 
he would not be charged with the death penalty."
The Strickland analysis governs claims of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel as well as trial counsel. People v. Coleman, 168 Ill. 2d 509, 523 (1995). Thus, to succeed in this claim, defendant must show that 
counsel's failure to raise the issue on direct appeal was objectively 
unreasonable and that, but for this failure, a reasonable probability exists 
that defendant's conviction or sentence would have been reversed.
After reviewing the evidence, we do not believe that a reasonable probability 
exists that, had appellate counsel raised this issue, this court would have 
concluded that the trial court erred in finding that the State was not precluded 
from seeking the death penalty. Here, the trial court held an evidentiary 
hearing and found that the State should not be precluded from seeking the death 
penalty. If appellate counsel had raised this issue on appeal, we would not have 
reversed the trial court's finding unless defendant had demonstrated that the 
trial court's findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. See 
People v. Brown, 169 Ill. 2d 132, 144 (1996).
Had we reviewed this issue on direct appeal, we would likely not have found 
that the trial court's finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 
Even if the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, the 
best that can be said is that the agreement was that, if defendant was not the 
shooter and if he told the truth, the State would not seek the death penalty. 
Here, however, the evidence reveals that defendant was the shooter and that the 
statements he made to the State were not truthful. Consequently, no reasonable 
probability exists that, had this issue been raised on direct appeal, we would 
have found that the trial court's finding was against the manifest weight of the 
evidence. Because defendant has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by 
appellate counsel's failure to raise this issue, defendant's argument must 
fail.
Arbitrary and Capricious Deadline
Defendant next contends that the trial court violated his right to due 
process by arbitrarily and capriciously imposing a deadline for filing an 
amended petition and for refusing to appoint an expert to evaluate defendant. 
Defendant's argument is nothing more than an alternative repetition of his first 
argument. Essentially defendant is asserting that the deadline for filing his 
amended petition was arbitrary and capricious because it had to be filed without 
defendant's attorneys having the benefit of a neuropsychiatrist examining 
defendant.
Defendant does not argue that the lack of time prevented him from presenting 
an adequate petition. Rather, he asserts that the trial court's refusal to 
appoint funds for an expert and to grant him additional time to obtain the 
expert's opinion prevented him from presenting an adequate petition. Because we 
have concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to 
appropriate funds to hire an expert, we must also conclude that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion when it refused to extend the deadline for filing 
defendant's amended petition.
Uniform Test for the Appointment of Experts
Defendant's final argument is that this court should adopt a uniform test to 
guide trial courts in deciding whether to appoint an expert for trial or 
post-conviction proceedings. Defendant contends that the appropriate standard is 
known as the "truth-seeking" theory, which requires the appointment of an expert 
if the expert could provide the fact finder with information that, standing 
alone or in combination with other information, would form the basis for a 
reasonable doubt. See D. Harris, The Constitution and Truth Seeking: A New 
Theory on Expert Services for Indigent Defendants, 83 J. Crim. L. & 
Criminology 469, 492 (1992). This approach requires the trial court to ask two 
questions: (1) is the issue in dispute; and (2) would the expert bring helpful 
information to the fact finder. 83 J. Crim. L. & Criminology at 492-93.
Defendant does not explain how this test is either different in application 
from or superior to the test we established in Hall. In Hall 
we explained that an expert should be appointed if the testimony would assist 
the court in deciding the question before it. Hall, 157 Ill. 2d  at 
339-40. If defendant can demonstrate that the expert testimony is relevant and 
material to the trial court's consideration of his post-conviction petition and 
if the court believes that the expert's opinion would be of assistance in 
deciding the issues before the court, then the trial court should appoint the 
expert. If these conditions are not met, then the trial court does not abuse its 
discretion by failing to appoint the expert. Additionally, we question 
defendant's concerns relating to uniformity. The test we established in 
Hall for post-conviction purposes is the same test that is used in 
determining whether the trial court should appoint an expert for trial purposes. 
See Hall, 157 Ill. 2d at 339-40; People v. Mack, 128 Ill. 2d 231, 250 (1989).
Without some explanation by defendant as to why the test he proposes is 
different from and, more importantly, superior to the test we adopted in 
Hall, we must decline defendant's invitation to adopt a new test.
CONCLUSION
After reviewing defendant's petition, we conclude that the circuit court of 
McLean County did not err in denying defendant's motion for the appropriation of 
funds to hire an expert and in dismissing defendant's post-conviction petition. 
Therefore, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
The clerk of this court is directed to enter an order setting Wednesday, 
November 29, 2000, as the date on which the sentence of death entered by the 
circuit court shall be implemented. Defendant shall be executed in the manner 
provided by law (725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1998)). A certified copy of the mandate 
of this court shall be transmitted by the clerk of this court to the Director of 
Corrections, to the warden of Tamms Correctional Center, and to the warden of 
the institution wherein defendant is confined.
Affirmed.
JUSTICE McMORROW, dissenting:
In this appeal, defendant Glenn Wilson asks the court to reverse the circuit 
court's order dismissing defendant's amended post-conviction petition. As 
finally revised by court-appointed counsel, defendant's petition asserts that 
his trial counsel neglected to investigate evidence of defendant's mental and 
neurological deficiencies, and failed to present expert testimony concerning 
these deficiencies at trial and during defendant's sentencing hearing. Defendant 
additionally claims that he received ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel. Defendant maintains that his attorneys' neglect violated defendant's 
sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Defendant asserts that 
he made a "substantial showing" of these alleged constitutional violations and, 
therefore, that the trial court erred by dismissing his amended petition without 
conducting an evidentiary hearing.
Defendant also argues that the circuit court abused its discretion by 
refusing to appropriate funds for defendant to obtain additional expert analysis 
of his post-conviction claims. Finally, defendant insists that the circuit court 
erred by refusing to extend the deadline for the filing of defendant's amended 
post-conviction petition, as well as the circuit court's denial of the motions 
for funding and for extensions of time.
The majority affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of defendant's amended 
petition without an evidentiary hearing. I disagree with the majority's 
disposition of two issues presented for review. I believe that defendant made a 
substantial showing of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Trial counsel's 
failure to present mitigating evidence, at defendant's sentencing hearing, of 
defendant's mental disabilities denied defendant his constitutional right to 
effective representation. Defendant has made the necessary showing to qualify 
for an evidentiary hearing on his post-conviction petition. I also conclude that 
the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant's request for 
additional funds. Accordingly, I dissent.
At this stage of the post-conviction proceedings, this court's inquiry is 
narrowly focused. Our limited mission is to determine whether defendant is 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on allegations raised in the post-conviction 
petition. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 381 (1998). In deciding 
whether defendant deserves an evidentiary hearing, the court accepts as true all 
well-pleaded facts in defendant's petition and any attached affidavits 
(People v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 528 (1999)), and determines whether 
defendant has made a substantial showing of a deprivation of a constitutional 
right at trial (Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 381). Defendant makes a 
"substantial showing" when the allegations in the petition are supported by the 
trial record or by affidavits accompanying the petition. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 528; Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 381; People v. 
Erickson, 161 Ill. 2d 82, 108 (1994) (McMorrow, J., dissenting) ("The 
proper question is whether the defendant's allegations, when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the defendant, are sufficient to demonstrate that the 
defendant should receive an evidentiary hearing to prove his allegations").
Defendant alleges in his petition that he suffers from a rage disorder which 
causes him to respond to excitement with uncontrollable anger. Defendant 
attached to his post-conviction petition the affidavits of psychologist Harry 
Gunn and neuropsychologist Jonathan Hess. Both Hess and Gunn examined defendant. 
They found that defendant had a history of violent, explosive behavior. Hess 
described defendant as subject to "episodic discontrol, or rage attacks." The 
nature of this rage, which is triggered when defendant becomes "excited," "is 
well beyond anything a person without episodic discontrol could imagine. A 
person in such a rage attack would be unable to control his behavior or to 
conform his behavior to the requirements of the law." Hess hypothesized that 
defendant's rage attacks were the product of defendant's epilepsy, or other 
physical brain damage caused by numerous injuries to the head that defendant 
sustained since childhood.
Defendant argues that evidence of the rage disorder, and its likely organic 
origins in defendant's brain, was available to defendant's trial attorney before 
and during the trial of this case. Defendant argues that had trial counsel 
retained an expert to analyze defendant and his medical history, trial counsel 
could have introduced evidence at sentencing that defendant committed the 
murders while "under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance" 
(720 ILCS 5/9-1(c)(2) (West 1998)), and thus defendant would have received a 
sentence of life imprisonment instead of a death sentence. Defendant concludes 
that his lawyer's failure to investigate this defense, and failure to present 
evidence of the rage disorder at the sentencing hearing, deprived defendant of 
his sixth amendment right to counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Cuyler v. 
Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333, 343-44, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 
1716 (1980).
As the majority notes, legal representation fails to satisfy the sixth 
amendment when the representation falls below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and when defendant can show a reasonable probability that, but 
for the counsel's alleged errors, the result of the sentencing proceeding would 
have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 
548. Further, in light of the extreme importance of mitigation evidence at a 
capital sentencing hearing, courts require defense counsel to make a reasonable 
investigation to uncover mitigating facts, or at least articulate a plausible 
reason for the failure to conduct such an investigation. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 541; People v. Perez, 148 Ill. 2d 168, 187-91 (1992).
If, as it must, the majority viewed the allegations of the amended petition 
in a light most favorable to defendant, it would have to conclude that trial 
counsel's representation fell below the reasonableness standard. Evidence of 
defendant's emotional and neurological disorders was readily available to 
defendant's trial attorney before defendant's sentencing hearing, but never 
adequately investigated.
Prior to sentencing, defendant retained Douglas Crossman, a mitigation 
expert, to gather evidence in support of mitigation. The written mitigation 
report prepared by Crossman included copies of psychological and medical 
examinations performed on defendant as an adolescent and as an adult. 
Collectively, these documents contained several references to epilepsy, and 
repeated episodes of unusually violent behavior. An interview with defendant's 
mother revealed, for example, that he had suffered from "seizures" from 
childhood. An examination in 1974 stated that defendant was subject to "spells," 
and other records from 1976 noted the fact that defendant suffered from temporal 
lobe epilepsy. In 1989, a social worker interviewing defendant after a suicide 
attempt indicated that defendant had ceased taking his dilantin. Dilantin is 
prescribed to treat epilepsy. EEG's conducted in 1974 showed abnormalities, 
albeit mild ones, in defendant's brain function.
Concerning defendant's conduct, these records also noted defendant's 
"uncontrolled behavior" and spells of "tearing up the furniture" and "fighting." 
One psychologist noted defendant's "long history of violence and total lack of 
self control," which the psychologist also described as an "explosive 
personality."
Crossman gathered these records and reviewed them for the defense in 
preparation for the capital sentencing hearing. Defendant's trial attorney 
examined Crossman as one of only two witnesses presented by the defense at the 
aggravation/mitigation stage of the hearing, and the trial court admitted the 
mitigation report into evidence. The theory behind defense counsel's examination 
of Crossman at trial seemed to be that "society" failed to give defendant the 
psychiatric aid a troubled person like defendant needed. However, counsel never 
used the information, readily available in the report, to suggest that defendant 
acted under an extreme mental or emotional disturbance when the murders were 
committed in this case. Further, the mere fact that the trial court had 
defendant's medical records before it was not the equivalent of expert testimony 
regarding defendant's neurologically based personality disorder. The medical 
records furnished only the symptoms and possible causes of the behavior. The 
onus remained on trial counsel, however, to pursue the evidence regarding 
defendant's behavior provided by the records and to obtain an expert opinion 
regarding the significance of the medical evidence. Counsel's failure to 
investigate the medical defense suggested by the mitigation report deprived 
defendant of valuable mitigation evidence.
At this stage of the post-conviction proceedings, moreover, we do not 
interpret the attorney's strategy at sentencing as a reasonable exercise of 
professional judgment. Although a trial lawyer may reasonably decide not to 
introduce mitigating evidence after thoroughly investigating that evidence 
(People v. Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d 368, 385 (1997)), the record in this 
appeal shows that the trial attorney never made a preliminary investigation into 
the nature of defendant's neurological disorders. To have never attempted the 
investigation is, according to prior decisions of this court, a serious lapse in 
trial counsel's professional obligations. Perez, 148 Ill. 2d  at 187-91. 
The evidence of defendant's "discontrol" and the fact he suffered neurological 
infirmities-most likely epilepsy-was literally handed to counsel in the form of 
the mitigation report. It would have required little effort on counsel's part to 
retain, or seek funds from the court to retain, a medical expert to decipher the 
significance of the information in defendant's records and determine whether the 
bursts of anger exhibited by defendant had any organic origin. Counsel's 
inactivity in this regard evidences a breach of his duty to investigate and 
present a mitigation defense. Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d  at 385.
Additionally, the facts of record yield a "substantial showing" of a 
violation of the second prong of the Strickland test. Had trial counsel 
presented expert evidence of defendant's rage disorder, a reasonable probability 
exists that the trial judge would have concluded that the balance of aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances did not warrant imposition of the death sentence. 
Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 548. Expert evidence of defendant's 
neurologically based difficulties would have significantly affected both the 
amount and nature of the mitigation evidence presented on defendant's behalf. At 
the conclusion of the aggravation/mitigation hearing, the trial judge addressed 
the aggravating and mitigating factors adduced during the sentencing hearing. 
The judge's summary of the aggravating evidence covers 6½ pages of trial 
transcript. The judge's remarks concerning the mitigation evidence was limited 
to one sentence: "As I have reviewed this evidence, I find almost no mitigating 
evidence." Indeed, defendant presented only two witnesses, Douglas Crossman, the 
mitigation expert, and Willie May Bryson, defendant's mother. Bryson's brief 
testimony was tailored to show that defendant was one of many children, and that 
he grew up in a family without the consistent presence of a father-figure. Her 
testimony was also apparently intended to support Crossman's statements that, 
although defendant needed psychiatric care from a very early age, he did not 
receive it.
While I am aware that proof of a psychological problem in defendant does not 
automatically preclude imposition of the death penalty (People v. 
Wilson, 164 Ill. 2d 436, 460 (1994)), evidence of defendant's rage disorder 
is directly probative of defendant's mental state at the time he committed the 
murders in question, as well as other crimes introduced in aggravation. Proof 
that defendant would predictably lose control of his behavior in certain 
situations undermines the suggestion that defendant's criminal acts were the 
product of deliberate, preconceived plans. It would also place defendant in a 
far more sympathetic light before the trier of fact. In previous decisions, this 
court has conceded that evidence of psychological and emotional disturbances 
figures prominently in the decision of whether to impose the death penalty. See 
Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d  at 552; Perez, 148 Ill. 2d at 194-95; 
Ruiz, 177 Ill. 2d  at 387.
I do not agree with the majority's assessment that defendant failed to show 
he committed the murders "under the influence of a 'rage attack.' " Slip 
op. at 7. I believe that the majority dismisses too easily defendant's 
statements to the police that the shootings were "a spur of the moment thing" 
that "weren't supposed to happen." The very essence of Hess' assessment of 
defendant is that, when in an excitable situation, defendant will lose control 
of himself in a manner not comprehensible to people who do not share the same 
condition. A reasonable inference may be drawn that the robbery constituted an 
instance of excitement that could have triggered a rage attack and prompted an 
action that, in defendant's words, "[was not] supposed to happen."
Moreover, the majority's contention that defendant did not suffer a "rage 
attack" at the time of the murder ignores this court's obligation to accept 
defendant's factual assertions as true. He alleges, with affidavits in support, 
both an incident that was, by its nature, charged with excitement, and how his 
behavior is transformed by such an event. These allegations are more than 
adequate to satisfy the requirements established by this court to earn an 
evidentiary hearing. In sum, defendant has made a substantial showing that he 
was deprived of his sixth amendment right to counsel. On this basis, the 
judgment of the circuit court should be reversed, and the cause remanded for an 
evidentiary hearing on defendant's amended post-conviction petition.
Finally, the necessity of an evidentiary hearing on defendant's 
post-conviction petition requires this court to reexamine defendant's request 
for additional funding for medical expert witnesses and medical tests. 
Specifically, defendant sought additional funding from the trial court so that 
defendant could obtain an ambulatory EEG and an examination by a 
neuropsychiatrist or a behavioral neurologist. Dr. Hess recommended the test and 
exam in his affidavit attached to defendant's amended post-conviction 
petition.
Defendant cannot claim a constitutional right to investigative resources for 
his attorney, because defendant has no constitutional right to appointed counsel 
at the post-conviction stage. People v. Richardson, No. 83579 (February 
17, 2000), slip op. at 14-15. "Where no constitutional right is implicated, the 
decision to appoint an expert, or to authorize funds to hire an expert, rests 
within the sound discretion of the circuit court." Richardson, slip op. 
at 15. Whether the trial court should have funded an additional medical work-up 
depends primarily on whether the trial court concludes that the proposed tests 
and exams would be of assistance to the court. People v. Hall, 157 Ill. 2d 324, 339-40 (1993).
In the present case, the trial court's failure to grant defendant's request 
for funds constituted an abuse of discretion. I have already described how the 
expert opinions tendered at the post-conviction stage illuminated the failings 
in defendant's legal representation during the capital sentencing hearing. 
According to these same experts, the additional medical procedures would 
solidify the experts' opinions. The requested funds would yield evidence 
directly relevant to the issue of counsel's competence at the capital sentencing 
stage. Therefore, on remand, I would order the trial court to fund the 
supplementary tests and exams recommended by Dr. Hess.
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON and JUSTICE FREEMAN join in this 
dissent.