Case Title: MELISSA GARVIN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING; MARC A. LOCKWOOD V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0101

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-12-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
MELISSA GARVIN V. THE STATE OF WYOMING; MARC A. LOCKWOOD V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2007 WY 190172 P.3d 725Case Number: S-07-0101, S-07-0102Decided: 12/06/2007
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2007

 
 
MELISSA 
GARVIN,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OFWYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 

MARC 
A. LOCKWOOD,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty

 
 

Representing 
Appellants:

R. 
Michael Vang of Brown & Hiser LLC, Laramie, Wyoming. 

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Patrick 
J. Crank, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; James Michael Causey, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Causey.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice. 

 
 
[¶1]      Appellants 
Melissa Garvin and Marc A. Lockwood entered conditional pleas of guilty to the 
charge of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance.  They reserved the right to appeal the 
district court's denial of their respective motion to suppress the marijuana 
evidence discovered in Garvin's rental vehicle following a traffic stop.  In this consolidated appeal, both Garvin 
and Lockwood claim the evidence should have been suppressed as the fruit of 
Garvin's unlawful detention under both the United States 
and Wyoming Constitutions.  Finding 
the detention was proper, we affirm.

 
 

ISSUE

 
 
[¶2]      The sole issue 
presented for our review is as follows:

 
 
Were the 
Defendants' rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under 
Article 1 § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution violated that would require suppression of evidence and 
dismissal of charges?

 
 

FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      The basic facts 
in this case are not in dispute.  On 
January 19, 2006, at approximately 1:10 p.m., Lockwood and Garvin were traveling 
eastbound on Interstate 80 in AlbanyCounty, en route from Ukiah, California, to 
Chicago, Illinois.  Lockwood was driving his pickup truck, 
while Garvin followed closely behind in a rented Chevrolet Trailblazer.  Wyoming State Trooper Timothy Boumeester 
observed Garvin following Lockwood's vehicle too closely and stopped her.  Lockwood continued on the highway for a 
short distance and eventually returned to the location of the stop, parking his 
truck in front of Garvin's vehicle.  

 
 
[¶4]      Trooper 
Boumeester informed Garvin of the reason for the stop.  Garvin explained she was trying to keep 
up with the pickup, which was being driven by her fiancé.  Upon request, Garvin provided her 
driver's license and a one-way rental agreement, which indicated the vehicle was 
rented in Santa Rosa, California, and would be returned in Chicago on January 13, 
2006.  As he spoke with Garvin, 
Trooper Boumeester observed a large crucifix on the seat next to Garvin, a Bible 
on the dashboard, an air freshener hanging from the rear-view mirror, and a 
dryer sheet laying on the floor.  He 
also smelled a strong odor of air fresheners and dryer sheets emanating from 
inside the vehicle.  Trooper 
Boumeester had Garvin join him in his patrol car while he verified her driver's 
license and prepared a warning ticket.  

 
 
[¶5]      While waiting for 
dispatch to report on Garvin's driver's license, Trooper Boumeester asked Garvin 
about her travel plans and the rental vehicle, including the fact the vehicle 
was past due according to the rental agreement.  The trooper noticed Garvin seemed 
extremely nervous during the questioning, being unable to sit still and 
constantly moving and wiping the palms of her hands on her pants.  Garvin told Trooper Boumeester that she 
and Lockwood were driving to see Lockwood's sick father in Chicago.  Garvin explained that they had left 
California 
later than expected, and she had already contacted the rental agency to extend 
the return date on the vehicle.  

 
 
[¶6]      Once dispatch 
confirmed Garvin had a valid driver's license, Trooper Boumeester issued her a 
warning ticket for the traffic violation, returned her driver's license and 
rental agreement, and told her she was free to leave.  As Garvin was walking back to her 
vehicle, Trooper Boumeester inquired if he could ask her a few more questions, 
and Garvin agreed.  The trooper 
asked Garvin if she had anything illegal in her vehicle, such as marijuana, 
methamphetamine or cocaine.  
Garvin's face immediately turned red, and she denied possessing any 
illegal substance.  Trooper 
Boumeester noticed Garvin looked away and avoided eye contact with him when 
questioned about the presence of marijuana, but maintained eye contact when 
asked about other illegal drugs.  
The trooper then asked for Garvin's consent to conduct a search of the 
vehicle.  Garvin denied the 
trooper's request.

 
 
[¶7]      Based upon 
several factors which led him to believe Garvin was transporting marijuana, 
Trooper Boumeester informed Garvin that he was requesting a drug dog to do an 
external sniff of the car, and she was no longer free to leave.  When the dog arrived at the scene, it 
immediately alerted to the presence of drugs in Garvin's vehicle.  A search of the vehicle revealed 
approximately twenty-eight pounds of "high grade" marijuana.  

 
 
[¶8]      Garvin and 
Lockwood were arrested and subsequently charged with three felony drug 
offenses:  (1) possession with 
intent to deliver a controlled substance in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
35-7-1031(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2007); (2) felony possession of a controlled 
substance in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c)(iii) (LexisNexis 2007); 
and (3) conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance as proscribed by Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 35-7-1031(a)(ii) and 35-7-1042 (LexisNexis 2007). Each filed a motion to 
suppress the drug evidence, claiming it was the product of Garvin's unlawful 
detention under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 
Art. 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution. After a hearing, the 
district court denied their motions, concluding reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity existed to further detain Garvin pending the drug sniff.  

 
 
[¶9]      Thereafter, 
Garvin and Lockwood entered into a plea agreement wherein they conditionally 
pled guilty to the possession with intent to deliver charge while reserving the 
right to appeal the district court's suppression ruling.  In exchange for the pleas, the State 
dismissed the remaining charges against them.  The district court sentenced Garvin to a 
term of imprisonment of two to five years, but suspended execution of that 
sentence in favor of four years supervised probation.  The court sentenced Lockwood to three to 
six years imprisonment, but ordered the sentence be split, with 180 days to be 
served in the AlbanyCountyDetentionCenter and the remaining time to be 
suspended in favor of four years of supervised probation.  These appeals followed. 

 
 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

 
 
[¶10]   The standard employed for reviewing 
a district court's suppression ruling is well established:

 
 
When 
reviewing a district court's decision on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer 
to the court's findings on factual issues unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  Campbell v. State, 2004 WY 106, ¶ 9, 97 P.3d 781, 784 (Wyo. 2004).  We view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's decision because it 
is in the best position to assess the witnesses' credibility, weigh the evidence 
and make the necessary inferences, deductions and conclusions.  Id. 
The constitutionality of a particular search or seizure, however, is a question 
of law that we review de novo.  Id.

 
 

Hembree 
v. State, 2006 
WY 127, ¶ 7, 143 P.3d 905, 907 (Wyo. 2006); see also Custer v. State, 2006 WY 72, ¶ 9, 135 P.3d 620, 623 (Wyo. 2006); Gompf v. 
State, 2005 WY 112, ¶ 14, 120 P.3d 980, 984-85 (Wyo. 2005); Lindsay v. State, 2005 WY 34, ¶ 12, 108 P.3d 852, 855 (Wyo. 2005).

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 
[¶11]   In this consolidated appeal, both 
Garvin and Lockwood contend the district court erred in denying their motions to 
suppress the marijuana evidence seized during a search of the rental vehicle 
Garvin was driving.  In particular, 
they argue the district court erred in concluding the observations of Trooper 
Boumeester constituted reasonable suspicion to detain Garvin pending the arrival 
of the canine unit.  Thus, they 
claim the marijuana evidence obtained during the search was the product of an 
unlawful detention under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Art. 1, § 4 of the Wyoming Constitution and should be 
suppressed.1

 
 
[¶12]   Before considering the merits of 
this appeal, we must address an initial matter.  Despite the phrasing of his issue, 
Lockwood presents no argument on appeal that he was illegally detained or 
searched.  He does, however, make a 
cursory argument that, should it be determined Garvin was illegally detained and 
the evidence therefore excluded, he should receive the same benefit of 
exclusion.  This argument 
fails.  The rights guaranteed by the 
Fourth Amendment are personal rights.  
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34, 99 S. Ct. 421, 425, 
58 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1978).  Only persons 
whose Fourth Amendment rights have been infringed may claim the benefits of the 
exclusionary rule.  Simmons v. United 
States, 390 U.S. 377, 389, 
88 S. Ct. 967, 974, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1247 (1968).  
Since Lockwood's Fourth Amendment rights were never violated, he has no 
standing to invoke the protections of that rule.  Consequently, our further analysis 
applies only to Garvin.

 
 
[¶13]   The Fourth Amendment protects 
individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures.  U.S. Const. amend IV. A routine traffic 
stop constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment "even 
though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite 
brief."  Damato v. State, 2003 WY 13, ¶ 9, 64 P.3d 700, 704 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396, 
59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979)).  Because a 
traffic stop is more analogous to an investigative detention than a custodial 
arrest, the reasonableness of such stops are analyzed under the two-part test 
articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968):  (1) whether the initial stop was 
justified; and (2) whether the officer's actions during the detention were 
"reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the 
interference in the first instance."  
Damato, ¶ 9, 64 P.3d  at 705; 
see also Campbell, ¶ 11, 97 P.3d  at 784; Barch v. State, 2004 WY 79, ¶ 8, 92 P.3d 828, 832 (Wyo. 2004).  In this 
case, Garvin does not challenge the appropriateness of the initial stop.  Consequently, our analysis focuses on 
the second prong of the Terry 
analysis -- the reasonableness of the detention. 

 
 
[¶14]   During a routine traffic stop, a 
law enforcement officer may request a driver's license, proof of insurance and 
vehicle registration, run a computer check, and issue a citation.  Campbell, ¶ 12, 97 P.3d  at 785; Damato, ¶ 13, 64 P.3d  at 706 (citing Burgos-Seberos v. State, 969 P.2d 1131, 
1133 (Wyo. 
1998); United States v. Elliott, 107 F.3d 810, 813 (10th Cir. 1997)).  Generally, the driver must be allowed to 
proceed on his way without further delay once the officer determines the driver 
has a valid driver's license and is entitled to operate the vehicle.  Damato, ¶ 13, 64 P.3d  at 706; see also United 
States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 945 
(10th Cir. 1997); Barch, ¶ 
9, 92 P.3d  at 832.  In the absence 
of consent, an officer may expand the investigative detention beyond the purpose 
of the initial stop only if there exists an "objectively reasonable and 
articulable suspicion' that criminal activity has occurred or is 
occurring."  Damato, ¶ 13, 64 P.3d  at 706 (quoting United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1267 (10th Cir. 2001)).  
The existence of objectively reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is 
determined by evaluating the totality of the circumstances.  Damato, ¶ 16, 64 P.3d  at 707.  The "whole picture" must be considered, 
"[c]ommon sense and ordinary human experience are to be employed, and deference 
is to be accorded a law enforcement officer's ability to distinguish between 
innocent and suspicious actions."  
Id. (citing Wood, 106 F.3d at 
946).

 
 
[¶15]   In concluding Trooper Boumeester 
had reasonable suspicion to detain Garvin, the district court 
stated:

 
 
In this 
case, Trooper Boumeester, a Wyoming Highway Patrolman with many years of 
experience in detecting criminal activity, with substantial training specific to 
drug traffic interdiction on major interstates, articulated several factors 
that, when considered in their totality, led him to develop a reasonable 
suspicion that Defendant was engaged in illegal activity.  First, Defendant had a one-way rental 
agreement, which Highway Patrol, through experience and training, know to be a 
feature common to drug traffickers.  
Second, Trooper Boumeester detected a strong odor of air-freshener and 
dryer sheets, another factor WHP has been alerted to, especially in the case of 
rental cars which typically do not need strong air fresheners.  These items are often used to mask the 
order [sic] of large amounts of marijuana.  
Third, Defendant had a large wooden crucifix and Bible in plain 
view.  The open display of religious 
symbols has been identified by drug interdiction specialists as a sign that the 
trafficker is attempting to put on an air of piety and innocence, and thereby 
deflect suspicion.  Fourth, 
Defendant was coming from a town in Northern California, a known area of drug 
production, and driving to Chicago, Illinois, a known area of drug 
distribution.  Fifth, Defendant was 
extremely nervous through the entire process, even after she was told she would 
only be issued a warning.  Sixth, 
Defendant's rental agreement stated the car was to be returned six days prior to 
the day in question.  While none of 
these factors may be sufficient alone, and perhaps some might seem immaterial to 
an untrained observer of drug interdiction, when considered in their totality 
from the point of view of a trained and experienced Highway Patrolman, these 
factors add up to reasonable suspicion.  

 
 
 [¶16]  Garvin argues these factors are 
insufficient to give rise to objectively reasonable suspicion of illegal 
activity.  According to Garvin, each 
individual factor is innocuous and, because no individual factor supports a 
finding of reasonable suspicion, a combination of all the factors is likewise 
insufficient.  We disagree with her 
categorization of the factors as innocuous, but in any event, her argument 
ignores the fundamental tenet that the entirety of the circumstances must be 
considered in determining the existence of a Fourth Amendment 
violation:

 
 
The 
Supreme Court has instructed that we not examine each factor adding up to 
reasonable suspicion individually, but that we evaluate how convincingly they 
fit together into a cohesive, convincing picture of illegal conduct.  In [United 
States v.] Arvizu, [534 U.S. 266, 122 S. Ct. 744, 
151 L. Ed. 2d 740 (2002)], the Court rejected what is called a "divide-and-conquer 
analysis," noting that reasonable suspicion may exist even if "each observation" 
is "susceptible to an innocent explanation."  Arvizu, 534 U.S.  at 274, 122 S. Ct. 744.

 
 

United 
States v. 
Guerrero, 472 F.3d 784, 787 (10th Cir. 2007). 

 
 
[¶17]   Looking at the whole picture we 
agree with the district court's legal conclusion that Trooper Boumeester had 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to detain Garvin until the arrival of 
the canine unit.  In addition to the 
factors articulated by the district court, our review of the record indicates 
Trooper Boumeester had been involved in two previous traffic stops of 
individuals from Ukiah, 
California, during which he 
discovered large quantities of marijuana.  
Thus, rather than dealing with generalities of a known drug source 
region, Trooper Boumeester was presented with a specific small town known to him 
as a source point for marijuana.  
Further, during the discussion with Trooper Boumeester outside the patrol 
car following the issuance of the warning ticket, when asked about the presence 
of controlled substances, Garvin's face immediately flushed.  Garvin was evasive and looked away from 
Trooper Boumeester when answering questions about marijuana, but maintained eye 
contact when questioned about other controlled substances.  We believe the aggregate of all the 
information available to Trooper Boumeester created reasonable suspicion that 
criminal activity was afoot, thus warranting Garvin's further 
detention.

 
 
[¶18]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Although a 
violation of both constitutions is asserted, no separate state constitutional 
analysis is provided concerning the legality of Garvin's detention.  Accordingly, we will analyze this 
complaint solely under federal constitutional principles.  Marinaro v. State, 2007 WY 123, ¶ 8, 163 P.3d 833, 835 (Wyo. 2007); Campbell v. 
State, 2004 WY 106, ¶ 10 n.2, 97 P.3d 781, 784 n.2 (Wyo. 2004); Barch v. State, 2004 WY 79, ¶ 6, 92 P.3d 828, 831 (Wyo. 2004).