Case Title: Unum Life Ins. Co. of America v. Wright

Citation: 897 So. 2d 1059

Docket Number: 1022043, 1022060, 1030066, 1030069

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2004-09-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
897 So. 2d 1059 (2004)
UNUM LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA
v.
Rosemary WRIGHT et al.
Ex parte Unum Life Insurance Company of America.
(In re Rosemary Wright et al.
v.
Unum Life Insurance Company of America et al.)
Unum Life Insurance Company of America
v.
Susan Coleman.
Ex parte Unum Life Insurance Company of America
(In re Susan Coleman
v.
Unum Life Insurance Company of America et al.)
1022043, 1022060, 1030066 and 1030069.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
September 24, 2004.
*1063 James S. Williams, Kaye K. Houser and Kristen S. Cross of Sirote & Permutt, P.C., Birmingham, for petitioner/appellant Unum Life Insurance Company of America.
Christopher E. Sanspree of Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis & Miles, P.C., Montgomery, for respondents/appellees Rosemary Wright and Susan Coleman.
Stephen E. Whitehead and Mark E. Tindal of Lloyd, Gray & Whitehead, P.C., Birmingham, for Mike Howard and Charles Niel.
HARWOOD, Justice.
These four appellate proceedings arise out of two orders entered by the Bullock Circuit Court compelling Unum Life Insurance Company of America ("Unum") to arbitrate the claims asserted against it by more than 400 individuals. One order relates to the proceeding initiated in that court by Rosemary Wright and 413 other claimants ("the Wright case") and the other order relates to the proceeding brought individually by Susan Coleman ("the Coleman *1064 case"). Unum appeals in each case as to that aspect of the orders requiring it to proceed to arbitration (cases no. 1022043 and 1030066) and petitions for a writ of mandamus as to that aspect of each order necessarily, although not explicitly, denying its challenge to venue in Bullock County (cases no. 1022060 and 1030069).
Among the issues presented is one of first impression in this State: What legal procedures may a party seeking enforcement in the circuit court of a contractual obligation to arbitrate a dispute employ when there is no independent court proceeding pending? We must also decide the proper venue for the court filings by the plaintiffs in these cases. We issue the writ of mandamus in case no. 1030069 (the Coleman case); we deny the writ in case no. 1022060 (the Wright case); we dismiss the appeal in case no. 1030066 (the Coleman case); and we affirm the appeal in case no. 1022043 (the Wright case).
Unum and the plaintiffs agree that in order to understand the Bullock County proceedings, one must have a full understanding of prior proceedings in the Sumter Circuit Court. Accordingly, we take note of the following pertinent chronology.
During the first six months of 2002, the law firm of Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis & Mills ("the Beasley firm") filed four single-plaintiff actions in the Sumter Circuit Court against Unum and its alleged agent, Mike Howard, asserting fraud-based claims relating to the plaintiffs' purchase of group long-term disability-insurance coverage in connection with their employment with the Sumter County School Board. All the plaintiffs were residents of Sumter County. In August of that year the Beasley firm filed a similar action in the Sumter Circuit Court involving 13 plaintiffs. Still later in August and then in October, the Beasley firm filed in the Sumter Circuit Court a total of four more essentially identical actions against Unum and Howard; the plaintiffs in those four actions included Sumter County residents and residents of other counties. There were at that point fewer than 200 plaintiffs in the nine cases, and the majority of them were Sumter County residents. Along the way, either Unum, through its attorneys with the law firm of Sirote & Permutt, P.C. (the "Sirote firm"), or the plaintiffs, through the Beasley firm, filed motions to compel arbitration.
On December 9, 2002, Unum served its "Motion to Consolidate and Arbitrate" with respect to all nine of the cases; the motion stated in pertinent part:
Previously, on November 20, 2002, the Beasley firm had filed another action in Sumter County against Unum and Howard on a behalf of Pamela P. McGee and 83 other plaintiffs, only 4 of whom were residents of Sumter County ("the McGee case"). Unum contends that its counsel were unaware of the McGee action at the time they filed the motion to consolidate and arbitrate. On December 18, 2002, the Beasley firm filed another action in Sumter County against Unum and Howard asserting essentially the same claims as before, on behalf of Shirley Larde and 57 other plaintiffs, only 4 of whom were residents of Sumter County ("the Larde case"). The Beasley firm filed motions to compel arbitration in those two cases, but, on January 3, 2003, Unum filed motions to dismiss or for a change of venue in those cases.
On January 22, 2004, Howard's attorney, Stephen E. Whitehead, wrote to Christopher E. Sanspree of the Beasley firm and James S. Williams of the Sirote firm to provide the names of three individuals acceptable to Howard as arbitrators, one of whom was Richard Bell, a Birmingham attorney. On January 28 Williams e-mailed to Sanspree and Whitehead the names of seven acceptable candidates for arbitrators; that list included Bell. The next day Unum filed motions to dismiss or, in the alternative, to sever and to transfer the cases in the other five multi-plaintiff Sumter County cases, seeking to have dismissed or transferred only the claims of the plaintiffs not residing in Sumter County. Howard took the opposite position, moving to compel arbitration in all of the cases.
On January 31, 2003, Sanspree wrote to Williams and Whitehead to advise them that the plaintiffs had selected Bell to serve as the arbitrator in the "Unum cases"; on that same day Sanspree wrote to Sumter County Circuit Judge Eddie Hardaway, Jr., referencing all of the cases preceding those filed by McGee and Larde, to advise Judge Hardaway that "counsel for all parties have agreed to use Richard Bell as arbitrator in the above referenced cases." Sanspree sent copies of that letter to both Williams and Whitehead. The Beasley firm also filed oppositions to Unum's motions to dismiss or to sever and transfer the cases. On February 9, 2003, Judge Hardaway conducted a hearing on the motions, but no transcript of that hearing is contained in the record and there is no attempt pursuant to Rule 10(d), Ala. R.App. P., to reconstruct a record of the proceedings.
In a memorandum of law Unum filed with Judge Hardaway on February 13, 2003, in support of its motions for a dismissal or a transfer of the cases, it argued that the plaintiffs "are all employees of various state school boards throughout Alabama, and their claims against Unum and Howard are exclusively fraud-based claims related to the plaintiffs' purchase of group long-term disability insurance coverage provided in connection with their employment," but that of the "approximately *1066 320[1] plaintiffs" involved, "only about 25% are residents of Sumter County," whereas "220 or more of the 320 plaintiffs reside in one of 16 other counties of Alabama, and there are 19 plaintiffs who reside in Mississippi." Unum explained that in the first seven cases filed, more than 85% of the plaintiffs were either residents of Sumter County or alleged fraud occurring in Sumter County. Unum went on to explain that even after the next two actions were filed adding more nonresidents of Sumter County, the parties still agreed that, in the interest of judicial economy, the claims involved in the nine cases then pending should be consolidated and arbitrated. "At no time, however, did Unum agree to the consolidation and arbitration of any and all subsequent similar cases filed in Sumter County against Unum and Mike Howard." Unum justified its change of position concerning arbitration of the claims of nonresident plaintiffs in the previously filed multi-plaintiff cases and in the cases subsequently filed by McGee and Larde as follows:
On April 25, 2003, Judge Hardaway issued two orders. In the first, pertaining to only the four single-plaintiff cases, he ordered the claims involved to proceed to arbitration before Bell as the arbitrator. His second order, which is at the heart of some of the contentions the parties now present to this Court, reads as follows:
Attached to that order as Exhibit A was a list of 206 plaintiffs, showing his or her respective "City" and "School System." Exhibit B listed the same information for 118 other plaintiffs.
On May 9, 2003, Unum filed a motion for clarification, asking Judge Hardaway to enter an order "clarifying only the Plaintiffs listed in Exhibit `B' attached to Court's Order be compelled to arbitration, *1067 and that Plaintiffs listed in Exhibit `A' be dismissed without prejudice."
On May 14, 2003, Williams wrote to Bell, with copies to Sanspree and Whitehead, to state that Unum's position was that the claims of the 206 plaintiffs identified in Exhibit A to Judge Hardaway's order were not destined for arbitration, enclosing a copy of the motion for clarification. On May 16, Sanspree filed in the Sumter Circuit Court a notice of dismissal, advising that "the Plaintiffs listed in Exhibit `A' hereby dismiss, without prejudice, all claims asserted against the Defendants" in the seven multi-plaintiff cases. Also on that date, counsel for Howard wrote Bell to advise him of Howard's willingness to have "the 206 cases be re-filed with you as the arbitrator." Sanspree filed a petition for arbitration with Bell covering the 206 cases, but Bell refused to take jurisdiction over Unum's objection. The parties advise in briefs that arbitration is proceeding before Bell as to all of the 118 Exhibit B plaintiffs.
On May 23, 2003, Sanspree filed in the Bullock Circuit Court, on behalf of Rosemary Wright and 413 other plaintiffs, a motion to compel arbitration, a petition for arbitration, and a motion to stay proceedings "of this matter." The 206 plaintiffs dismissed from the Sumter County cases were included among the 414 plaintiffs. In addition to Mike Howard, another alleged agent of Unum, Charles Niel, was joined as defendant.[2] The petition for arbitration asserted that during 2000-2002 the defendants had approached the plaintiffs in 26 named counties about purchasing "salary replacement" disability-insurance policies from Unum; that the defendants had misrepresented or suppressed certain information concerning the nature of the coverage afforded by the policies; and that the defendants had thereby fraudulently induced the plaintiffs to purchase the policies and authorize their respective boards of education to withdraw the premium payments from their paychecks. The plaintiffs demanded judgment against the defendants "in such an amount of compensatory and punitive damages as an arbitrator deems reasonable and may award, plus costs." The motion to compel arbitration referenced and attached "the arbitration agreement contained in the certificates of insurance issued to the plaintiffs" by Unum and moved the court to compel arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement and requested that the court choose an arbitrator if the parties could not mutually agree on one. Finally, the motion to stay invoked 9 U.S.C. § 3, a part of the Federal Arbitration Act ("the FAA"), as the basis for an order to stay the proceedings. (Sections of the FAA, codified as 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., are hereinafter cited simply as "FAA § ____.")
On June 10, 2003, the Beasley firm filed in the Bullock Circuit Court a similar motion to compel arbitration, a petition for arbitration, and a motion to stay in the name of a single plaintiff, Susan Coleman; in addition to Unum, only Unum's alleged agent Pat Womack was named as a defendant. The petition averred that in January 2000 Womack had approached Coleman about purchasing "an accidental death and dismemberment insurance policy"; that Womack had represented that the policy would pay a benefit should Coleman or her husband, who was the beneficiary under the policy, ever be injured accidentally; that based on those representations *1068 and ignorant of the material fact allegedly withheld that the policy would not cover her husband as a beneficiary, Coleman purchased the policy and began making premium payments; that in March 2002 her husband was accidentally injured, and Unum refused to pay the benefit as promised; and that Unum's promissory fraud had been discovered only within two years of filing the petition. Like the plaintiffs in the Wright case, Coleman sought such compensatory and punitive damages as an arbitrator might award. Attached to the motion to compel was the arbitration agreement contained in the Unum accidental and dismemberment insurance policy.
On June 19, 2003, the plaintiffs in the Wright case filed a supplement to their motion to compel arbitration, submitting various materials, including filings made in the Sumter County litigation.
On June 25, 2003, Unum filed a motion to dismiss in the Wright case, directed to the petition for arbitration, and an "opposition," directed to the motion to compel arbitration. In both its motion to dismiss and its opposition, Unum challenged the procedural propriety of the filings by the plaintiffs in the Wright case, as hereinafter discussed. Unum also asserted in both filings that venue was improper in Bullock County as to all but two of the plaintiffs, citing Ala.Code 1975, § 6-3-7, and arguing that, because Unum did not have a "principal office" in Alabama, venue would be appropriate only in the county where the alleged fraud occurred, pursuant to § 6-3-7(a)(1), or in the county in which the plaintiff resided, pursuant to § 6-3-7(a)(3). Accordingly, Unum argued that the claims of the plaintiffs who neither resided in Bullock County nor made claims based on the alleged occurrence of events in Bullock County were due to be dismissed without prejudice.
On July 6, 2003, Unum filed similar challenges in the Coleman case.
On July 14, 2003, the plaintiffs in the Wright case filed a "Motion to Compel Arbitration in Accordance to the Agreement Between the Parties and Response to Defendant Unum's Opposition to Arbitration and Motion to Dismiss." In that motion, they detailed at length the prior proceedings in Sumter County and attached as exhibits numerous filings from that litigation, as well as the affidavits of 301 of the plaintiffs in the Wright case attesting that the "Disability-Arbitration" agreement exhibited to each plaintiff's affidavit was, to the best of the affiant's knowledge, a true and complete copy of the arbitration agreement forming a part of his or her insurance policy issued by Unum. Another 48 identical affidavits were subsequently filed.
On August 15, 2003, Unum filed in the Wright case its "Supplemental Brief in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel Arbitration and in Support of Unum's Motion to Dismiss," setting out its version of the events in the Sumter County litigation and taking the position that the voluntary dismissal by 206 of the Sumter County plaintiffs of their claims had mooted the motion for clarification Unum had filed in Sumter County with Judge Hardaway. Pointing out that only two of the plaintiffs in the Wright case resided in Bullock County or alleged that a fraud had occurred there, Unum insisted on the dismissal or transfer of the claims of the other plaintiffs, as to whom they argued that Bullock County was an improper venue.
On August 20, 2003, the plaintiffs in the Wright case filed a response to Unum's supplemental brief, taking the position that because Unum had previously agreed to arbitration, its improper-venue argument was simply "a red herring delay tactic." *1069 Also, on that date, Coleman filed a motion to compel arbitration, the contentions of which paralleled those made by the plaintiffs in the Wright case in their July 14 filing.
On August 22, 2003, Howard and Niel each filed a motion in the Wright case requesting the court to compel the plaintiffs to submit their claims against them to arbitration. Both motions asserted that each plaintiff in the Wright case had been issued a policy by Unum and attached as an exhibit a copy of the "Disability-Arbitration" agreement contained in the policy and alleged to exist "between all of the parties." Howard and Niel, although non-signatories to the agreement, asserted their right to compel arbitration of the claims against them, citing caselaw in support of their assertion.
Also on August 22, 2003, Judge Bert Smithart of the Bullock Circuit Court conducted a hearing with respect to the motions to compel arbitration in the Wright case and the Coleman case. The transcript of that hearing reflects that counsel for all plaintiffs, counsel for Unum, and counsel for Howard were present. (Although the same law firm represents Howard and Niel in the Wright case, the attorney from that firm identified herself to the court only as counsel for Howard; no mention was made at the hearing of Niel or of Womack, a defendant in the Coleman case. According to the case action summary sheet for that case, Womack was never served with process in it.) Counsel for Howard advised the court that Howard joined in the plaintiffs' motion to compel arbitration. Counsel for Unum then explained his view of the Sumter County proceedings, stating that Unum had challenged venue as to 206 of the plaintiffs and that Judge Hardaway had agreed with Unum and had dismissed those plaintiffs. Counsel for Unum asserted that because venue in Bullock County was also improper as to those 206 plaintiffs, and also as to all but two of the other plaintiffs in the Wright case, the Bullock Circuit Court needed to consider the venue issue before it reached the arbitration issue. Counsel for the plaintiffs argued to the contrary, asserting that Judge Hardaway had compelled arbitration for all of the Sumter County plaintiffs, and that because at least one of the plaintiffs was a resident of Sumter County, venue in Sumter County was appropriate as to all under the "joinder" provisions of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure. Counsel for Unum acknowledged that Unum had initially sought arbitration in certain of the Sumter County cases, but stated that it had subsequently concluded that the arbitration agreement might not actually apply. Nonetheless, counsel stated, "[T]hat's another issue. That's not what I am here to argue. My position is venue is the issue that must be looked at first." Counsel for Unum reiterated that because venue in Bullock County was indisputably improper as to all but two of the plaintiffs, the rest of the cases needed to be dismissed, or severed and transferred, and that the joinder rules did not alter that fact. The hearing concluded with counsel for Unum arguing:
On August 27, 2003, Judge Smithart entered the following order in the Wright case:
On September 4, 2003, Judge Smithart entered an order in the Coleman case identical in all respects to the one he entered in the Wright case, except that he phrased the opening paragraph of the order in the Coleman case slightly differently. That opening paragraph reads:
Neither the parties nor the court had expressly referenced "[t]he doctrine of judicial estoppel" at any time before Judge Smithart issued his orders, but counsel for the plaintiffs had argued at the hearing that the position Unum had taken concerning arbitration in the Sumter County litigation ought to bind it in the cases brought in Bullock County. In particular, counsel for the plaintiffs argued at that hearing as follows:
At the hearing before Judge Smithart, counsel and the court seemed to focus exclusively on the Wright case; no express note was taken of the separate status of the Coleman case. Unlike 206 of the plaintiffs in the Wright case, Coleman had never been a party to the Sumter County litigation, her filings in Bullock County were her initial court filings, and she claimed fraud with respect to the sale of a type of Unum policy different from that sold to the other plaintiffs. Also, despite the reference to Howard in the order entered in the Coleman case, he was not a defendant in that action; rather the only individual defendant was Womack.
Unum timely filed notices of appeal and petitions for writ of mandamus. This court has entered orders staying all further proceedings in this case, both in the trial court and in arbitration.
Unum contends that the Bullock Circuit Court erred in not granting its motions to dismiss filed in opposition to the petitions for arbitration because, it argues, the petitions for arbitration are a "pseudo-pleading" not recognized under the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly given that the relief demanded in the petitions could be awarded only by an arbitrator. In its companion oppositions to the motions to compel arbitration, Unum argued that it was "procedurally inappropriate and nonsensical for Plaintiffs to seek [the Bullock Circuit] Court's jurisdiction by filing a pseudo-pleading and then simultaneously seek to have [the] Court to relinquish its jurisdiction to an arbitrator." Building on that contention, Unum argued that "[b]ecause the Plaintiffs in this matter have not filed a Complaint, the Court has no jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' claims." Unum reiterates those contentions to this Court, essentially arguing that the petitions for arbitration were due to be dismissed because they are not countenanced by the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure.
FAA § 3 provides:
FAA § 4 provides:
Although the United States Supreme Court held in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 104 S. Ct. 852, 79 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1984), that an arbitration clause enforceable in an action in federal court is equally enforceable in an action brought in a state court, the Court went on to explain that "we do not hold that §§ 3 and 4 of the [FAA] apply to proceedings in state courts." 465 U.S.  at 16 n. 10, 104 S. Ct. 852. The FAA does not create any independent federal-question jurisdiction, 465 U.S.  at 15, n. 9, 104 S. Ct. 852, and "[i]n controversies involving incomplete diversity of citizenship, there is simply no access to federal court...." 465 U.S.  at 34, 104 S. Ct. 852 (Justice O'Connor dissenting). See also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 291, 115 S. Ct. 834, 130 L. Ed. 2d 753 (1995) (Justice Thomas dissenting). The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 489 U.S. 468, 476-477, n. 6, 109 S. Ct. 1248, 103 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1989), that it had not held that FAA §§ 3 and 4 are applicable in state courts.
In Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 684 So. 2d 102, 106 (Ala.1995), this Court observed that "Alabama has not developed rules of arbitration for dealing with pre-dispute agreements independent from the law that has developed in cases in which the Federal Arbitration Act applied," because of the previously applicable Alabama statutory and caselaw barriers to the enforcement of such agreements. The Court then explained:
684 So. 2d  at 106.
The Court further observed:
684 So. 2d  at 106.
Throughout the remainder of that opinion, this Court discussed the procedures an Alabama circuit court should follow with respect to a "motion" to compel arbitration or a motion for a stay of proceedings pending arbitration, in terms of the formats prescribed by FAA §§ 3 and 4. For instance, the Court instructed that when a circuit court is presented with a motion to compel arbitration, "[t]he court is to hold a hearing and determine whether there are genuine issues concerning the making or performance of an agreement to arbitrate, as a federal court would in proceeding under § 4." 684 So. 2d  at 108. The Court undertook no specific discussion of an Alabama procedural counterpart to an FAA § 4 "petition ... for an order" compelling arbitration, apparently because there was already an underlying action pending, making FAA § 3 the applicable provision.
Although states may not frustrate the enforcement of arbitration agreements by imposing restrictions not generally applicable to any contract, a state's procedures may apply to the enforcement of an arbitration agreement so long as they do not undermine the goals and policies of the FAA. Volt, supra; Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 116 S. Ct. 1652, 134 L. Ed. 2d 902 (1996). Accordingly, this Court is free to apply or to develop procedural rules for the enforcement of arbitration agreements so long as those rules do not undermine the goals and principles of the FAA. See Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B., 363 Md. 232, 768 A.2d 620 (2001), for a helpful survey of the pertinent pronouncements by the United States Supreme Court in this regard and the applications of those pronouncements by various state appellate courts. For example, this Court has recognized a declaratory-judgment action as an acceptable means for obtaining an order compelling arbitration:
Mutual Assurance, Inc. v. Wilson, 716 So. 2d 1160, 1164-65 (Ala.1998).
Both Coleman and the plaintiffs in the Wright case have filed motions to compel arbitration. That is an acceptable, although arguably mislabeled, procedural device for procuring a court order compelling arbitration under the interrelated application of the scheme envisioned by FAA §§ 3 and 4, in a situation where there is no "suit or proceeding" pending. As noted, the nomenclatures applicable to filings paralleling those contemplated by § 3 and § 4 would be a motion to compel arbitration, when filed in connection with a pending action, and a "petition" for an order to compel arbitration, if no action is pending. However, as this Court also explained Dobson:
684 So. 2d  at 106-07.
Furthermore, "[w]e treat a pleading and any other filing according to its substance, rather than its form or style." Ex parte Bender Shipbuilding & Repair Co., 879 So. 2d 577, 584 (Ala.2003).
The filing of the so-called petition for arbitration in these cases simply served to inform the Bullock Circuit Court of the nature of the dispute and controversy proposed to be submitted to an arbitrator. All things considered, we do not find the action of the Bullock Circuit Court in declining to dismiss the arguably superfluous petitions for arbitration to be reversible error in the context of the overall proceedings in these cases.
The plaintiffs in the Wright case and Coleman have filed identical "responses" to Unum's mandamus petitions and argue in those responses two rationales for rejecting Unum's contentions that venue in Bullock County is improper. First, they say, the positions Unum took in the Sumter County litigation were such that the doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes Unum from taking contrary positions in the cases pending in Bullock County. Second, they argue that under the plaintiff joinder provisions of § 6-3-7(c), Ala.Code 1975, venue is proper in Bullock County in any event. Howard and Niel, in their "answer" to Unum's petition in the Wright case make those same two arguments, but they also argue, citing Ex parte Allen, 798 So. 2d 668 (Ala.2001), that "[w]here the FAA applies, as it does here, it is procedurally *1076 proper for a trial court to rule on arbitrability prior to ruling on venue since an affirmative decision on arbitrability renders all venue issues moot." Turning first to this last argument, because, if valid, it would obviate consideration of the other two arguments, we analyze the holdings of Ex parte Allen.
In Ex parte Allen, three defendants to an action arising out of a contract dispute moved for a change of venue. After that motion was denied, two of the defendants moved to compel arbitration of the dispute; that motion was also denied. Those two defendants then petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial court to vacate its order denying their motion for a change of venue and separately appealed from the order denying their motion to compel arbitration. Quoting Thompson v. Skipper Real Estate Co., 729 So. 2d 287, 292 (Ala.1999), this Court declared "`[a] defendant has the right to have the proper venue established before it has any obligation to move to compel arbitration.'" Allen, 798 So. 2d  at 673 (emphasis added in Allen). The Court observed that "if Thompson stands for anything, it stands for the proposition that [the two defendants] had a right to seek a judicial determination that [the proposed transferee court] was the proper forum in which to resolve the arbitration issue." 798 So. 2d  at 675. Having determined, however, that those defendants had in fact established their right to compel arbitration and that the trial court's order denying them that right was therefore due to be reversed in the appeal, the Court concluded that their petition for the writ of mandamus was rendered moot. This was an appropriate disposition under the circumstances of that case, given that the only relief the defendants would have sought from a transferee court would have been the relief they were being given by the ruling in their appeal: compelled arbitration. This Court did not "recognize" in Allen, as Howard and Niel argue in their answer, that "it is more efficient and reasonable for a court to decide issues of arbitrability prior to venue." In the present cases, the party seeking a change of venue (Unum) and the parties seeking to compel arbitration (the plaintiffs and Howard and Niel) are not the same, and affirming the orders compelling arbitration would not obviate Unum's threshold right to a proper venue.
Does Unum's conduct in the Sumter County litigation judicially estop it from challenging venue in Bullock County? In Ex parte First Alabama Bank, 883 So. 2d 1236, 1244-45 (Ala.2003), this Court stated:
883 So. 2d  at 1244-45.
We then declared: "We today embrace the factors set forth in New Hampshire v. Maine and join the mainstream of jurisprudence in dealing with the doctrine of judicial estoppel." 883 So. 2d  at 1246. See also General Motors Corp. v. Stokes Chevrolet, Inc., 885 So. 2d 119 (Ala.2003).
Did Unum successfully take in the Sumter County litigation a position that was clearly inconsistent with the position regarding venue it later took in the Bullock County proceedings? Although Unum did not initially challenge venue in Sumter County as to those plaintiffs who were non-residents, it did eventually protest venue in that county as to nonresident plaintiffs after their numbers and proportions increased. Howard and Niel argue that by that delay Unum waived its right to argue improper venue. Whether a waiver of the right to object to venue occurred as to some of the plaintiffs in the Sumter County litigation would have been an issue for Judge Hardaway to decide upon proper presentation. As it was, no claim of waiver was raised before him, and his final consolidated order granted Unum's motion to dismiss on the basis of improper venue as to the 206 plaintiffs now included in the Wright case. Furthermore, as noted, those same plaintiffs subsequently, if redundantly, dismissed their actions in Sumter County before refiling them in the Wright case. Unum then again, consistent with the position it had been allowed to assert by Judge Hardaway, challenged venue in Bullock County as improper under § 6-3-7. We fail to perceive how its course of conduct in the Sumter County cases judicially estops it from challenging venue in Bullock County as to the 206 former plaintiffs in the Sumter County litigation, who, after being twice dismissed from that litigation, selected an entirely new venue. Likewise, we fail to perceive a basis for estoppel as to the completely different contingent of plaintiffs, including Coleman, who chose to file their actions in Bullock County as their first and only venue. Whatever inconsistency of position Unum might have taken regarding the arbitrability of the claims of the various plaintiffs would have been an issue for Judge Hardaway, or another circuit judge proceeding in a proper venue, to address in the first instance. Unum is not judicially estopped from insisting on proper venue for wherever the former plaintiffs in the Sumter County litigation and the additional "first time" plaintiffs chose to file their actions seeking enforcement of their contractual rights to arbitration.
The only venue statute the parties cited to Judge Smithart and the only one they discuss in their brief to this Court is § 6-3-7, Code of Ala.1975. Substantially revised in 1999, that section now reads, in pertinent part:
Subsection (a)(2) is inapplicable here because Unum, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Portland, Maine, does not have a "principal office" in Alabama. Accordingly, the parties are in agreement that venue of the plaintiffs' claims is governed by subsections (a)(1) and (a)(3), subject to the "joinder" provisions of subsection (c). The plaintiffs in the Wright case concede that venue is directly proper in Bullock County, under (a)(1) or (a)(3) only as to two of their number. Venue manifestly is improper in Bullock County for Coleman's filings, because Coleman alleged in her petition for arbitration that she is a resident of Conecuh County and that defendant Womack "is believed to be a resident citizen of Houston County," and because she made no allegation that any aspect of the alleged fraud occurred in Bullock County. Coleman acknowledges in her response to Unum's petition for a writ of mandamus that "[i]f there were no legal doctrine of judicial estoppel and no statutory law (section 6-3-7(c), Code of Alabama, 1975) to the contrary, then Petitioner Unum's attempts to litigate the issue of arbitration in numerous other Circuit Courts (subsequent to a Court ruling based upon Petitioner Unum's previously pleaded position to the contrary) would be allowed under Alabama stare decisis." Because, as explained, the doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply to prevent Unum from insisting on proper venue for Coleman's court action and because § 6-3-7(c) applies only where there is more than one plaintiff, Unum has shown that it is entitled *1079 to the writ of mandamus directing Judge Smithart to vacate his order denying Unum's motion for a change of venue in Coleman.
There being over 400 plaintiffs in the Wright case, but only two as to whom venue in Bullock County is directly proper, we must consider the effect of § 6-3-7(c) in that case. If the criteria specified in § 6-3-7(c) are met for the remaining plaintiffs, then venue in Bullock County becomes derivatively proper for them. Ex parte Pratt, 815 So. 2d 532 (Ala.2001).
Ex parte Sawyer, 892 So. 2d 898, 901 (Ala.2004).
Section 6-3-7(c) permits joinder of plaintiffs as to whom venue might not be proper if, first, "they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or arising out of the same transaction or occurrence." As noted, the plaintiffs in the Wright case instituted their action to obtain a court order compelling Unum to arbitrate in accord with the arbitration agreement allegedly contained in each of their policies of insurance.
The right to that specific relief (along with the incidental relief of the selection of an arbitrator by the court if the parties could not mutually agree upon one) was the only right to relief asserted. Thus, it is that "right to relief" to which the criteria of § 6-3-7(c) must be applied. The context and positioning of the words "jointly" and "severally" in the phrase found in § 6-3-7(c)  "they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or arising out of the same transaction or occurrence"  clearly indicate that those words are implicitly separated by the coordinating conjunction "or." Therefore, this aspect of the § 6-3-7(c) criteria is satisfied if the plaintiffs in the Wright case assert the right to the relief of arbitration, under identical arbitration provisions in identically framed policies of insurance, either "jointly" or "severally." Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) defines "severally" as follows: "adj. Distinctly; separately ." The American Heritage *1080 Dictionary of the English Language (4th ed. 2000) includes within its definitions of the term the following: "Single; distinct ... Respectively different; various: They parted and went their several ways." The plaintiffs in the Wright case clearly assert "severally" the right to compulsory arbitration, each relying on the same arbitration agreement contained in identically framed Unum insurance policies. Did Judge Smithart exceed his discretion in applying to this severally asserted right to relief the remainder of the § 6-3-7(c) criteria? In other words, can it be reasonably concluded that
§ 6-3-7(c), Ala.Code 1975 (emphasis supplied). In applying these criteria, we must remember that their proper focus is the "right to relief" being asserted in the motion to compel arbitration, i.e., the right under FAA § 4 for "[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration [to] petition [a state court] ... for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement." The focus is not the claim of fraud each plaintiff proposes subsequently to assert before the arbitrator, as those claims are previewed by the plaintiffs in their petition for arbitration. It will be for an arbitrator to decide if those claims will be "consolidated" in some or all respects or if they will be considered strictly on an individual basis. See Birmingham News Co. v. Horn, [Ms. 1020552, June 11, 2004] ___ So.2d ___ (Ala.2004). As to the asserted right to relief of compelled arbitration, it is readily apparent that the answer to the threshold "mixed" questions of law and material fact, established by the relevant caselaw will be determinative:
Hudson v. Outlet Rental Car Sales, Inc., 876 So. 2d 455, 457 (Ala.2003) (emphasis omitted).
We cannot say that Judge Smithart exceeded his discretion in concluding in the Wright case, as he implicitly did in denying Unum's challenge to venue, that those questions of law and fact would predominate over any individualized questions. Similarly, we cannot say that he exceeded his discretion in determining that a simultaneous consideration of all of the essentially identical asserted rights to compel arbitration could be maintained more efficiently and economically than if prosecuted separately, and that the interest of justice supported the joinder in one proceeding of all plaintiffs asserting the right. The only other option available to him, as the parties agree, would be severance and transfer *1081 of the cases asserting the rights to compel arbitration to approximately 26 different Alabama circuit court venues. Having considered all of the criteria prescribed by § 6-3-7(c) in light of the record before the Judge Smithart, we do not find that he exceeded his discretion in denying the motion for severance and in refusing to transfer to other venues the cases of the plaintiffs for whom venue in Bullock County was not directly proper.
Unum argues on appeal in the Wright case (case no. 1022043) that "[t]he party seeking to compel arbitration has the burden of establishing that the scope of arbitration agreement is broad enough to encompass the Plaintiffs' claims," but that the plaintiffs in that case failed to establish "that the scope of the arbitration provision is broad enough to encompass Plaintiffs' claims, much less presented any evidence establishing the existence of an arbitrable claim." Similarly, Unum asserts that the plaintiffs failed to present sufficient evidence to establish the existence of a written contract calling for arbitration. Representative recent discussions by this Court of the relative burdens of production in that regard are as follows:
Ex parte Horton Family Housing, Inc., 882 So. 2d 838, 841 (Ala.2003).
Massey Auto., Inc. v. Norris, 895 So. 2d 215, 218 (Ala.2004)
Premiere Auto. Group, Inc. v. Welch, 794 So. 2d 1078, 1081 (Ala.2001).
As previously discussed, 206 of the plaintiffs in the Wright case were originally plaintiffs in the Sumter County litigation. Judge Hardaway's April 25, 2003, order specifically granted "[a]ll pending Motions to Compel Arbitration" as to each of those plaintiffs, identified by name on Exhibit A attached to his order, along with the other group of plaintiffs identified by name on Exhibit B to the order. Richard W. Bell was designated to serve as arbitrator but, as noted earlier, he thus far has declined to undertake that assignment as to the 206 dismissed plaintiffs. Unum argues that Judge Hardaway's order is "ambiguous" in ordering the 206 plaintiffs to arbitration, because he also granted Unum's motion to dismiss those plaintiffs "without prejudice" on the basis of improper venue. Had an appeal been taken from that order raising the issue whether the order should have stayed the case as to the 206 plaintiffs rather than dismissing them from the case, it would probably have been well-taken. See Porter v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 828 So. 2d 907 (Ala.2002) (but see special concurrence of Justice Houston). In the absence of an appeal raising that issue, dismissal of a civil action after the claims asserted in it have been referred to arbitration does not impair the validity of the aspect of the order compelling arbitration. Porter, 828 So. 2d  at 908; Potts v. Baptist Health Sys., Inc., 853 So. 2d 194, 196 n. 4 (Ala.2002). See also Lewis v. Oakley, 847 So. 2d 307, 330 (Ala.2002).
Although Unum filed a motion seeking clarification of Judge Hardaway's order, it abandoned that motion after the 206 plaintiffs, somewhat redundantly, voluntarily dismissed their civil actions in Sumter County. Unum now argues that this "second" dismissal mooted its motion for clarification. We cannot agree, to the extent Judge Smithart was entitled to accord Judge Hardaway's order, duly before him, force and effect. There is nothing ambiguous, as opposed to perhaps inconsistent, about Judge Hardaway's order granting the motions to compel arbitration for the 206 individually named plaintiffs listed on Exhibit A referenced in, and attached to, the order. Although more properly recognized as an application of the doctrine of "collateral estoppel" rather than "judicial estoppel," the issue was properly before Judge Smithart for consideration. "This Court may affirm a trial court's judgment on `any valid legal ground presented by the record, regardless of whether that ground was considered, or even if it was rejected, by the trial court.' Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. University of Alabama Health Servs. Found., P.C. 881 So. 2d 1013, 1020 (Ala.2003) (citing Ex parte Ryals, 773 So. 2d 1011 (Ala.2000) ...)." General Motors Corp. v. Stokes Chevrolet, Inc., 885 So. 2d 119, 124 (Ala.2003).
For the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, to apply, the following elements are required: "(1) [T]hat an issue in a prior action was identical to the issue litigated in the present action; (2)that the issue was actually litigated in the prior action; (3) that resolution of the issue was necessary to the prior *1083 judgment; and (4) that the same parties are involved in the two actions." Smith v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 653 So. 2d 933, 934 (Ala.1995). "Where these elements are present, the parties are barred from relitigating issues actually litigated in a prior suit." Lott v. Toomey, 477 So. 2d 316, 319 (Ala.1985). See also Biles v. Sullivan, 793 So. 2d 708 (Ala.2000). It is undisputed that the underlying claims the 206 former Sumter County plaintiffs now seek to have Unum compelled to arbitrate in the Wright case are the same claims ordered to arbitration by Judge Hardaway's order. Therefore, Judge Smithart was entitled to accord that order full effect and to accept it as establishing, and precluding further litigation contesting, the existence of a contract between Unum and the 206 plaintiffs containing an arbitration agreement covering the plaintiffs' claims against Unum. Judge Smithart did not err in granting the motion to compel arbitration of the claims of those 206 plaintiffs. Three hundred and forty-nine of the plaintiffs in the Wright case filed identical affidavits, except for the name of the affiant, attesting:
None of the parties to this appeal explain whether any of those affiants were also plaintiffs in the original Sumter County action. Although we could probably make that determination by cross-matching the names of the 206 Sumter County plaintiffs against the 349 affiants, we decline to do the parties' work in that regard. Unum asserts in its brief that, at the time Judge Smithart ruled, "there still remained dozens of Plaintiff who had failed to demonstrate in any way the existence of a written arbitration agreement," but that statement does not attempt to take into account the status of the 206 former Sumter County plaintiffs.
In addition to those affidavits, Judge Smithart had before him the following information from which to determine whether the plaintiffs had made "a prima facie showing" under their burden of production:
We conclude that the combined effect of this body of information before Judge Smithart was sufficient to constitute "a prima facie showing" of the existence of a contract containing an arbitration agreement. Unum does not raise on appeal any issues concerning the plaintiffs' burden of establishing that the contract evidenced a transaction affecting interstate commerce. With respect to the statement by Unum in its opposition that the plaintiffs had failed to provide any written arbitration agreement "executed by the Plaintiffs," which contention was not mentioned during the hearing before Judge Smithart, it suffices to note that "[c]onduct of one party to a contract from which the other may reasonably draw an inference of assent to an agreement is effective as an acceptance." Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Kilgore, 751 So. 2d 8, 11 (Ala.1999). The petition for arbitration advised that the plaintiffs in the Wright case had purchased the disability policies, that they had authorized their respective boards of education to withdraw the necessary premium payments from their paychecks, and that premium payments were thereafter in fact deducted.
Although Unum also asserted in its opposition that the plaintiffs had "failed to demonstrate that the scope of the Arbitration Agreement is broad enough to encompass Plaintiffs' claims against Unum," relying on the fact that the arbitration agreement provided that it covered "[a]ll disputes, claims, and disagreements of any kind or nature that arise out of, or are related in anyway to the summary of benefits" and arguing that the "Plaintiffs' claims relate not to the determinations under the `Summary of Benefits,' but to an alleged misrepresentation regarding the scope of the policy's coverage," this contention was not developed at the hearing. Rather, as noted, counsel for Unum advised Judge Smithart that Unum's position concerning the scope of coverage was "another issue" and one Unum was not "here to argue." The hearing had been convened to consider all of the motions, however, including the motions to compel arbitration; it was not a hearing limited to the issue of venue, although that was necessarily a threshold issue. In the end, Judge Smithart expressly found that "the arbitration agreement is broad enough to encompass the Plaintiffs' claims in this case."
Parkway Dodge, Inc. v. Hawkins, 854 So. 2d 1129, 1132-33 (Ala.2003). As noted, the arbitration agreement covers all disputes, claims, and disagreements of any kind or nature that "arise out of, or are related in anyway to the summary of benefits." Unum argues in its brief:
Although Unum thus characterizes the nature of the "Summary of Benefits," it acknowledges in its brief to this Court that "the Summary of Benefits itself is not a part of the record in this case." The term "arising out of or relating to" has a broad application, and, on the record before us, we cannot say that the plaintiffs' claim of misrepresentation falls outside the ambit of the arbitration clause. See Health Ins. Corp. of Alabama v. Smith, 869 So. 2d 1100, 1109 (Ala.2003).
In light of all that we have discussed above, we affirm that portion of Judge Smithart's order granting the motion of the plaintiffs in the Wright case to compel arbitration.
After granting the motion to compel arbitration, Judge Smithart continued in his order:
In its brief, Unum states that "[t]he arbitration provision at issue in this case" is attached as an exhibit to the plaintiffs' motion to compel arbitration and provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Unum states in its brief that "the contract provides that the arbitration will be conducted according to the AAA's [American Arbitration Association's] dispute resolution procedures for insurance claims. These procedures have been discontinued, however. Pursuant to the AAA, the rules now applicable would be the commercial arbitration rules." The plaintiffs in the Wright case state in their brief to this Court that Unum is correct in pointing out that the American Arbitration Association's dispute-resolution procedures for insurance claims have been "discontinued and are no longer in effect"; they disagree, however, with Unum's contention *1087 that the commercial arbitration rules of the American Arbitration Association would now apply. The arbitration agreement itself does not provide for the eventuality of the discontinuance of the dispute-resolution procedures for insurance claims, and nowhere in the record or in the briefs of any of the parties are any of the rules of the American Arbitration Association quoted or otherwise referenced.
Northcom, Ltd. v. James, 848 So. 2d 242, 245 (Ala.2002). In BankAmerica Housing Services, Division of Bank of America, FSB v. Lee, 833 So. 2d 609 (Ala.2002), the parties' arbitration agreement provided that the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration Association ("the Rules") would apply. The trial court's order compelling arbitration directed that the arbitrator be selected within a specified time and that the arbitration take place within a specified time.
833 So. 2d  at 618.
The arbitration agreement, as presented by the record, provides that the proceedings would "begin within ninety (90) days *1088 from the date" on which notice to arbitrate was given to Unum and would be
As noted, however, there is no copy of the Summary of Benefits in the record and there is no copy of any rules of the American Arbitration Association, commercial or otherwise, in the record. We do not know what procedures the American Arbitration Association prescribes in lieu of the now discontinued dispute-resolution procedures for insurance claims. We have no way of knowing whether, as Unum contends, the Rules should be substituted for those discontinued procedures or what provisions will fill the void. Therefore, at this stage of the proceedings, we are unable to review on the merits the contention that the deadlines imposed by the trial judge are contrary to the procedures prescribed by applicable provisions of the parties' arbitration agreement. We simply have no way of knowing from the record the content of that agreement in its ultimate form. Consequently, we cannot at this point reject the deadlines set by the trial court's order on the assumption that they conflict with those that might otherwise be prescribed by the arbitration agreement, as that agreement might turn out to be constituted.
We affirm the judgment in the Wright case (case no. 1022043). We deny the petition for the writ of mandamus relating to the Wright case (case no. 1022060). We grant the petition for the writ of mandamus in the Coleman case (case no. 1030069); because we thereby direct the trial judge to vacate his order in that case, the appeal in the Coleman case (case no. 1030066) is due to be dismissed.
1022043  AFFIRMED.
NABERS, C.J., and HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, and STUART, JJ., concur.
WOODALL, J., concurs in the judgment.
1022060  PETITION DENIED.
NABERS, C.J., and HOUSTON, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, and STUART, JJ., concur.
SEE, J., concurs specially.
WOODALL, J., concurs in the judgment.
1030066  APPEAL DISMISSED.
NABERS, C.J., and HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur.
1030069  PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
NABERS, C.J., and HOUSTON, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, WOODALL, and STUART, JJ., concur.
SEE, Justice (concurring specially in case no. 1022060).
I concur fully in the main opinion; I write specially only to make clear my understanding of the application of § 6-3-7(c), Ala.Code 1975, to this case.
Each of the plaintiffs in the Wright case has an insurance policy with Unum that was separately negotiated. The plaintiffs in the Wright case moved the trial court to *1089 compel arbitration, citing § 6-3-7(c), Ala.Code 1975.[4]
Section 6-3-7(c), Ala.Code 1975, provides:
Venue, therefore, depends on whether the plaintiffs in the Wright case have "establish[ed] that they assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or arising out of the same transaction or occurrence." (Emphasis added.)
First, the plaintiffs in the Wright case claim that the right to arbitration arises out of their contracts, i.e., their insurance policies with Unum. That right arises in each case out of the particular contract between Unum and that party; therefore, the claims are not joint claims. Second, the claims do not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, because each of the plaintiffs in the Wright case separately negotiated and purchased a policy from Unum. Thus, the remaining question is whether the claims are brought "severally."
The main opinion provides two definitions for the adjective "several"; the adverb "severally" is defined as "[s]eperately, individually, each of a number of persons or things by himself or itself...." XV The Oxford English Dictionary 99 (2d ed. 1989).[6] The meaning of § 6-3-7(c) is plain. Bartlett & Waring v. Morris, 9 Port. 266, 268 (Ala.1839) ("No principle is more firmly established, *1090 or rests on more secure foundations, than the rule which declares, when a law is plain and unambiguous ... the Legislature shall be intended to mean what they have plainly expressed...."). The claims to the right to arbitrate by the plaintiffs in the Wright case are brought "separately" and "individually"; therefore, they are brought severally.[7]
Section 6-3-7(c) further requires that
The plaintiffs in the Wright case bring only contract actions to compel arbitration of their claims. The various contracts are for that purpose identical; therefore, it is reasonable to conclude, and I do not believe that the trial court exceeded its discretion in so concluding, that the legal question of arbitrability under the language of the contract will predominate over individualized questions where the parties do not dispute the validity of their contracts.[8] It is also reasonable under these circumstances for the trial court to have concluded that it is more efficient and economical to allow joinder of the actions to compel arbitration.
Finally, the interest of justice "`is an amorphous, catch-all term, capable of various meanings. Whenever it appears in a statute, however, it inherently"imports the exercise of discretion by a court."'" Ex parte Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 725 So. 2d 955, 957 (Ala.1998)(Cook, J., dissenting) (quoting Ex parte First Family Fin. Serv., Inc., 718 So. 2d 658, 662 (Ala.1998) (Cook, J., dissenting), and citing Bernstein v, Strammiello, 202 Misc. 823, 120 N.Y.S.2d 490, 497 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1952)). "`"[I]t follows that such exercise should not be disturbed merely because it is ... `improvident.'"'" Id. This Court has not been presented with a basis upon which to conclude that the trial court exceeded its discretion in determining that it is in the interest of justice to join these actions for the limited purpose of determining whether to compel arbitration under the insurance contracts.
WOODALL, Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the judgments in part).
Insofar as the Court's opinion resolves the proceedings involving Susan Coleman *1091 (cases no. 1030066 and 1030069), I concur fully. However, insofar as the opinion resolves the proceedings involving the plaintiffs in the Wright case (cases no. 1022043 and 1022060), I concur only in the judgments.
[1]  The number of plaintiffs in the various cases is stated differently by the parties at different points in their trial court filings and their submissions to this Court. We use the figures most frequently referenced; the exact numbers are not significant to the issues involved in these appellate proceedings.
[2]  A third alleged agent was named as a defendant, but he was subsequently dismissed by the plaintiffs before he filed an appearance.
[3]  This Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals in Ex parte First Alabama Bank, 883 So. 2d 1236 (Ala.2003).
[4]  As I understand the main opinion, our holding applies only to the plaintiffs' actions to compel arbitration and not to any other matters, contractual or otherwise, not currently before this Court. The main opinion states, "The right to that specific relief [the motion to compel arbitration](along with the incidental relief of the selection of an arbitrator by the court if the parties could not mutually agree upon one) was the only right to relief asserted. Thus, it is that `right to relief' to which the criteria of § 6-3-7(c) must be applied." ___ So.2d at ___.
[5]  Section 6-3-7(c) continues:

"If venue is improper for any plaintiff joined in the action, then the claim of any such plaintiff shall be severed and transferred to a court where venue is proper. In the event severance and transfer is mandated and venue is appropriate in more than one court, a defendant sued alone or multiple defendants, by unanimous agreement, shall have the right to select such other court to which the action shall be transferred and, where there are multiple defendants who are unable to agree upon a transferee court, the court in which the action was originally filed may transfer the action to any such other court. Transfer of the action and notice thereof shall be in accord with Section 6-3-22."
[6]  See also Kansas v. Groves, 278 Kan. 302, 306, 95 P.3d 95, 98 (2004)("Offenses also do not merge if they are committed separately and severally at different times and at different places....")(emphasis added); Donaldson v. Board of Comm'rs of Rock-Koshkonong Lake Dist., 272 Wis.2d 146, 166, 680 N.W.2d 762, 771 (2004)("[T]he lake district commissioners were directed to `severally and separately consider each parcel of frontage therein ....'")(emphasis added).
[7]  I recognize that "jointly" and "severally" between them appear to cover all conceivable legal actions, thereby rendering the use of those terms in the statute surplusage. I also recognize the rule of statutory construction that "`[a] statute must be considered as a whole and every word in it made effective if possible.'" Custer v. Homeside Lending, Inc., 858 So. 2d 233, 245 (Ala.2003), quoting Alabama State Bd. of Health v. Chambers County, 335 So. 2d 653, 654-55 (Ala.1976); see also McCausland v. Tide-Mayflower Moving & Storage, 499 So. 2d 1378, 1382 (Ala.1986). However, I do not see a way "possible" to give effect to the disjunctive "jointly, [or] severally," and I remain mindful that "`where plain language is used a court is bound to interpret that language to mean exactly what it says....'" Ex parte Dorough, 773 So. 2d 1001, 1003 (Ala.2000), quoting Ex parte Pfizer, Inc., 746 So. 2d 960, 964 (Ala.1999).
[8]  As the main opinion states, "The right to that specific relief (along with the incidental relief of the selection of an arbitrator by the court if the parties could not mutually agree upon one) was the only right to relief asserted. Thus, it is that `right to relief' to which the criteria of § 6-3-7(c) must be applied." ___ So.2d at ___. I note that Unum does not argue that the appointment by the court of an arbitrator raises in this case a significant question of individualized inquiry.