Case Title: ANDREWS v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-02-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
ANDREWS v. STATE2002 WY 2840 P.3d 708Case Number: 99-332Decided: 02/15/2002

October Term, A.D. 2001

 

STANISLAUS 
PATRICK ANDREWS, 

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sheridan County:

The 
Honorable John C. Brackley, Judge

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Sylvia 
Lee Hackl, Public Defender; Donna Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Diane E. 
Courselle, Director, Wyoming Defender Aid Program; Gordon Ellis, Student Intern; 
and Casey Martin, Student Intern.  
Argument by Mr. Martin.

 Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Kimberly A. Baker, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Baker.

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, and KITE, JJ. 

*This 
case was originally assigned to Justice Thomas on October 23, 2000, for the 
rendering of a proffered majority opinion.  
This case was reassigned to Chief Justice Lehman on February 5, 
2001.

  

LEHMAN, 
Chief Justice. 

[¶1]      A Sheridan County 
jury convicted appellant Stanislaus Patrick Andrews of two counts of 
burglary.  Andrews complains that 
the State conducted illegal searches of a duffel bag and his wallet and that the 
trial court erred by failing to suppress the evidence seized as a result of 
those searches.  Andrews also claims 
that the trial court erred by refusing to give the jury his proposed 
lesser-included offense instructions and by recommending that, upon commutation 
or parole, the Department of Corrections require him to register as if he were a 
sex offender.  This court concludes 
that the searches did not violate Andrews' constitutional rights and that he was 
not entitled to have the jury instructed on the lesser-included offense.  Andrews' conviction is, therefore, 
affirmed.  We do, however, modify 
his sentence to remove the recommendation that he be required to register as a 
sex offender.

 

 

ISSUES

 

[¶2]      Andrews presents 
the following issues on appeal:

 

[I]  Was Mr. Andrews denied his right against 
un­­reasonable search and seizure, as guaranteed by the U.S. 
Constitution and the Wyoming Constitution, when his duffel bag was searched 
with­out a warrant and Mr. Andrews had not consented to the search nor 
physically abandoned the duffel bag?

 

[II]  Was Mr. Andrews denied his right against 
un­­reasonable search and seizure as guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution 
and the Wyoming Constitution when his wallet was searched without a warrant, 
after he had placed it out of reach and was kneeling on the ground with his 
hands cuffed behind his back?

 

[III]  Did the trial court commit reversible 
error when it refused to instruct the jury on the lesser-included charge of 
criminal entry for both counts of the indictment against Mr. 
Andrews?

 

[IV]  Did the trial court impose an illegal 
sentence when it instructed the Department of Corrections that Mr. Andrews 
should be required to register as a sex offender as a condition of 
com­mutation or parole?

 

  
FACTS

 

[¶3]      On February 25, 
1999, Donna Woody reported to the Sheridan County Sheriff's Department that her 
trailer house had been burglarized.  
The front door was broken, and Ms. Woody was missing $400 in cash.  Ms. Woody subsequently reported that a 
camera, a jacket, and a black bra had also been taken in the February 25th 
burglary.  

 

[¶4]      On March 2, 1999, 
Robin Wendling reported a burglary at her trailer house, which was located in 
close proximity to Ms. Woody's home.  
The exterior doors were damaged, and there were a number of items missing 
from the Wendlings' home, including women's underwear, bras, a dress, a slip, a 
pair of shoes, nylons, and an "Outdoor Products" brand backpack.  Ms. Wendling also found some articles of 
clothing and shoes in her bedroom which did not belong to her, including a navy 
blue dress, women's underwear, bras, nylons, and a pair of ladies' black pumps. 

 

[¶5]      On March 23, 
1999, Ms. Woody's home was burglarized for a second time.  She reported that some jewelry, various 
coins and paper money, and a bra were missing after the second burglary of her 
home.  A deputy sheriff questioned 
Ms. Woody about whether she was missing any other items of clothing.   Ms. Woody searched and discovered 
that she was missing a pair of black pumps and a navy blue dress.  A few days later she reported that she 
was also missing an Oneida silverware set which had the letter "T" engraved on 
each piece.  

 

[¶6]      On March 26, 
1999, officers met with Andrews' parents, Joyce and Gerald Willis, at the 
sheriff's office.  Andrews had been 
staying at the Willises' home which was located in the same trailer park as the 
victims' homes.  During the 
interview, the Willises gave the officers permission to search their home. 

 

[¶7]      Deputy Jenkins 
proceeded to the Willis home and knocked at the door.  Andrews answered, and they conversed on 
the front deck.  Deputy Jenkins 
questioned Andrews about the burglaries, but he denied any involvement in the 
crimes.  Andrews informed Deputy 
Jenkins that he slept in the living room and kept his belongings in the dining 
room.  Deputy Jenkins repeatedly 
asked Andrews for permission to search his belongings.  Andrews finally agreed to allow Deputy 
Jenkins to search, on the condition that the Willises would allow the deputy to 
enter the house.  Andrews asked his 
parents, and they invited the deputy into the house.  

 

[¶8]      Andrews took the 
deputy into the dining room and handed him two duffel bags.  Deputy Jenkins searched the two bags and 
discovered that one contained dirty laundry and the other contained clean 
laundry.  The deputy also discovered 
a screwdriver, which was consistent with the shape and size of the tool used on 
the victims' doors to gain access to their homes, and a blue "Outdoor Products" 
backpack during his search of the two duffel bags.  

 

[¶9]      Deputy Jenkins 
asked Andrews about a third duffel bag which was located in the same area as the 
other two duffel bags.   
Andrews stated that the bag did not belong to him.   Deputy Jenkins questioned 
Andrews:  "Do you understand that if 
it's not yours you have no standing to object to me searching it?"  Andrews affirmed his understanding.  

 

[¶10]   The deputy requested and received 
consent from Mr. Willis to search anything  
in the house that did not belong to Andrews.  Deputy Jenkins opened the third duffel 
bag and discovered a folder which contained papers with Andrews' name.  Andrews stated that those items belonged 
to him, but the remainder of the contents of the bag were not his.  During his search of the third duffel 
bag, Deputy Jenkins discovered a number of items of sig­­nificance to 
the investigation of the burglaries, including various coins meeting the 
description of those stolen from the Woody residence, Ms. Wendling's birth 
certificate, and a pair of shoe liners for women's shoes. 

 

[¶11]   Deputy Jenkins informed Andrews 
that he was under arrest.  Andrews 
immediately removed his wallet from his back pocket and placed it on the kitchen 
counter directly in front of him.  
Deputy Jenkins handcuffed Andrews and retrieved the wallet.  Andrews told the deputy that he wanted 
to leave his wallet at the house, but the officer opened it and discovered some 
silver dollars and fifty-cent pieces.  
The officer seized the wallet as evidence.  

 

[¶12]   Andrews was transported to 
jail.  Deputy Jenkins also took the 
third duffel bag and the wallet and conducted a full inventory search of 
them,  discovering more coins of the 
type that had been stolen from Ms. Woody's home and credit cards and a receipt 
containing the Wendlings' names.    

 

[¶13]   The State charged Andrews with two 
counts of burglary.  Count I 
pertained to the February 25, 1999 burglary of the Woody home, and Count II 
involved the burglary of the Wendling home.  Andrews moved to suppress the evidence 
discovered during the searches of the third duffel bag and his wallet.  The trial court held a hearing, and 
Andrews testified at the hearing that the third duffel bag did, in fact, belong 
to him.  The trial court denied 
Andrews' motion to suppress.  

 

[¶14]   Andrews was subsequently tried 
before a jury.  During the trial, 
the State elicited testimony from an Oregon police officer, showing that Andrews 
had committed similar crimes in that state.  He apparently broke into homes to steal 
items and to try on wo­­men's clothing.  Ms. Woody and Ms. Wendling testified 
about the burglaries of their homes and the items missing after the 
burglaries.  The defense presented 
proposed jury instructions on the lesser-included offense of criminal entry, but 
the trial court refused to give those instructions.  The jury found Andrews guilty of both 
counts of burglary.  

 

[¶15]   The trial court sentenced Andrews 
to serve consecutive terms of imprisonment in the Wyoming State 
Penitentiary.  The trial court also 
included the following statement in the Judgment and Sentence:  

 

THE 
COURT RECOMMENDS to the Department of Corrections that if the Defendant should 
be considered for a commutation or parole, a condition of his release should 
require the Defendant to register with the County Sheriff where the Defendant 
intends to live within five days of his release from custody, as if he were a 
sex offender under Wyoming laws, pursuant to W.S. 7-19-302.  

 

Andrews 
subsequently appealed his conviction and sentence. 

 

 

DISCUSSION

 

A.  Search and Seizure of 
Evidence

 

[¶16]   Andrews challenges the searches of 
the third duffel bag and his wallet as being in violation of the United States 
and Wyoming constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  He  maintains, therefore, that the trial 
court erred when it refused to suppress the evidence seized during the search of 
the third duffel bag and his wallet. 

 

            
When reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress evidence, the 
findings of the trial court regarding the motion to suppress are binding on this 
Court unless clearly erroneous.  Neilson v. State, 599 P.2d 1326, 
1330 (Wyo. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1079, 100 S. Ct. 1031, 62 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1980).  Whether an unreasonable search or 
seizure occurred in violation of constitutional rights presents a question of 
law and is reviewed de novo.  Gronski v. State, 910 P.2d 561, 563 
(Wyo. 1996).

 

Vasquez 
v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 480 (Wyo. 1999).  

 

[¶17]   The Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution provides:

 

            
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.

 

U.S. 
Const. amend. IV.  The Wyoming 
Constitution, art. 1, § 4 grants:

 

The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant 
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly 
describing the place to be search­ed or the person or thing to be 
seized.

 

[¶18]   Under both the United States and 
Wyoming constitutions, warrantless searches and seizures are per se 
unreasonable, except in a few specific instances.  Morris v. State, 908 P.2d 931, 935 (Wyo. 
1995).  The recognized exceptions to 
the warrant requirement include:

 

1) 
search of an arrested suspect and the area within his control; 2) a search 
conducted while in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect; 3) a search and/or seizure 
to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence; 4) a search and/or seizure of 
an automobile upon probable cause; 5) a search which results when an object is 
inadvertently in the plain view of police officers while they are where they 
have a right to be; 6) a search and/or seizure conducted pursuant to consent; 
and 7) a search which results from an entry into a dwelling in order to prevent 
loss of life or property.

 

Dickeson 
v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 610 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting Ortega v. 
State, 669 P.2d 935, 940-41 (Wyo. 1983)). "Whether an exception exists in a 
particular case is a question of fact that may be properly resolved by a 
preponderance of the evidence standard in the light of all attendant 
circumstances."  Gehnert v. State, 956 P.2d 359, 362 
(Wyo. 1998) (quoting City of Laramie v. 
Hysong, 808 P.2d 199, 203 (Wyo. 1991)).  The State bears the burden of proving 
that the circumstances of a case place it within one of the recognized 
exceptions to the prohibition against warrantless searches and seizures.  Gehnert, 956 P.2d  at 362; Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34, 90 S. Ct. 1969, 1972, 26 L. Ed. 2d 409 (1970).  

 

1.   Duffel 
Bag

 

[¶19]  Andrews maintains that the trial court erred by 
denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized from the third duffel 
bag.  The State argues that the 
trial court's decision was correct because Andrews did not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the duffel bag, and the search was further justified 
by consent.

 

[¶20]   A defendant may challenge a search 
as being unconstitutional only if he can demonstrate that he had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the property searched.  Putnam v. State, 995 P.2d 632, 636 (Wyo. 
2000); Dean v. State, 865 P.2d 601, 
613 (Wyo. 1993) (abrogated on other 
grounds by Vigil v. State, 926 P.2d 351 (Wyo. 1996)).  The defendant must show "both an actual 
subjective expectation of privacy and a reasonable expectation of privacy that 
society is prepared to recognize."  
Dean, 865 P.2d  at 613; Pellatz v. State, 711 P.2d 1138, 1141 
(Wyo. 1986).  There are four factors 
that courts consider to determine whether an individual possesses a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the property searched:  

 

(1) the 
precautions taken in order to maintain one's privacy; (2) the likely intent 
of the drafters of the United States and Wyoming Constitutions; (3) the property 
rights a claimant possesses in the invaded area; (4) the legitimacy of the 
individual's possession of or presence in the property which was searched or 
seized.  

 

Dean, 
865 P.2d  
at 613 (quoting Pellatz, 711 P.2d at 
1141).  See also Putnam, 995 P.2d  at 636.  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
consistently held that a defendant abandons any expectation of privacy when he 
unequivocally denies ownership of the property.  See e.g., United States v. Garzon, 119 F.3d 1446, 
1449-52 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Jones, 707 F.2d 1169, 
1172-73 (10th Cir.), cert. 
denied 464 U.S. 859, 104 S. Ct. 184, 78 L.Ed.2d  163 (1983).  

 

[¶21]   In this case, Andrews repeatedly 
renounced ownership of the third duffel bag.   When Deputy Jenkins initially 
questioned him about the third duffel bag, Andrews stated that it was not 
his.  Deputy Jenkins informed 
Andrews that, if he was not the owner of the bag, then he did not have standing 
to object to the search of it.  
Andrews said that he un­­derstood and continued to deny ownership 
of the third bag.  Deputy Jenkins 
then requested and received permission from Mr. Willis to search anything in the 
house that did not belong to Andrews.  

 

[¶22]   Deputy Jenkins opened the third 
duffel bag and found the folder with documents containing Andrews' name.  Andrews acknowledged that the documents 
were his but continued to disclaim own­ership of the remainder of the 
contents of the bag.  Andrews did 
not attempt to limit the deputy's search or profess ownership of the bag at any 
time during the search.  

 

[¶23]   Clearly, Andrews did not take any 
precautions to maintain his privacy in the duffel bag.  To the contrary, his words and actions 
demonstrated that he disavowed any ownership or interest in the bag.  The framers of the United States and 
Wyoming constitutions and the citizens who ratified them surely did not intend 
that a defendant could unequivocally renounce any interest in the property and 
then later claim a constitutional violation when the officer relies on the 
defendant's statement and searches the property.  Although Andrews subsequently stated 
that the duffel bag was his at the suppression hearing, we conclude that he 
abandoned his reasonable expectation of privacy in the third duffel bag at the 
time of the search.  He did not, 
therefore, have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the search of the 
third duffel bag.  

 

[¶24]   Even if we were to conclude that 
Andrews had standing to challenge the search of the duffel bag, we would still 
affirm the trial court's decision to deny the motion to suppress.  The trial court ruled that the search 
was justified because there was a valid consent to the search.  Many of the same facts we considered in 
ruling that Andrews abandoned his expectation of privacy in the duffel bag are 
also important in determining whether or not Deputy Jenkins properly relied upon 
the Willises' apparent authority to consent to the search of the bag.  See United States v. Langston, 970 F.2d 692, 
697-98 (10th Cir.), cert. denied Francis v. United States, 
506 U.S. 965, 113 S. Ct. 439, 121 L. Ed. 2d 358 (1992), and cert. denied McIlroy v. United States, 
506 U.S. 979, 113 S. Ct. 479, 121 L. Ed. 2d 384 (1992), and cert. denied Ross v. United States, 506 U.S. 986, 113 S. Ct. 495, 121 L. Ed. 2d 433 (1992), and cert. denied 
McIlroy v. United States, 507 U.S. 1040, 113 S. Ct. 1872, 123 L. Ed. 2d 491 
(1993). 

 

[¶25]   Gehnert, 956 P.2d  at 361, provides guidance in resolving the 
consent issue because the facts of that case are similar to those presented in 
the case at bar.  Gehnert challenged 
the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress the evidence seized during a 
search of her car.  She claimed that 
the search of her car was illegal because neither she nor anyone with authority 
consented to the search.  Id.  
The State argued that the search was justified because the detective 
had obtained consent from Gehnert's fiancé.  Id.  We quoted the United States Supreme 
Court case entitled Illinois v. 
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990) as 
follows:

 

As with 
other factual determinations bearing upon search and seizure, determination of 
consent to enter must "be judged against an objective standard:  would the facts available to the officer 
at the moment . . . warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief'" that 
the consenting party had authority over the premises?  
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 
(1968).  If not, then warrantless 
entry without further inquiry is unlawful unless authority actually exists.  But if so, the search is 
valid.

 

Gehnert, 956 P.2d  at 362 (quoting Rodriguez, 497 U.S.  at 188-89, 110 S.Ct. at 2801).   
See also Jones v. State, 
902 P.2d 686, 690 (Wyo. 1995).  

 

[¶26]   Gehnert led the detective to 
believe that her fiancé owned the car and that she did not possess authority to 
consent to the search of the car.  
Gehnert, 956 P.2d  at 361.  Gehnert's fiancé told the detective that 
he was buying the car for her, but he was still technically the owner because he 
paid for the car and Gehnert's name was not yet on the title.  Id.  
He then gave consent to search the car.  Id.  
On appeal, Gehnert asserted that the car actually belonged to her and 
that she was the only person with the authority to consent to a search of 
it.  Id.  
We ruled that the search was valid because the officers reasonably 
believed that Gehnert's fiancé had the authority to consent to it.  956 P.2d  at 
362-63.

 

[¶27]   
In the case at bar, the Willises gave the officers permission to search 
their home when they were interviewed at the sheriff's office, and Mr. Willis 
reaffirmed his consent to search while Deputy Jenkins was at their home.  The Willises were the owners of the 
residence and, therefore, had the authority to consent to the search of their 
home and belongings.  See Jones, 902 P.2d  at 690.  

 

[¶28]   Andrews repeatedly denied any 
ownership or interest in the duffel bag, even after Deputy Jenkins explained 
that if he denied ownership of the property, he did not have standing to object 
to the search.  Considering the 
facts available to Deputy Jenkins at the time, it was reasonable for him to rely 
on the Willises' apparent authority to consent to the search of the third duffel 
bag.  The trial court correctly 
denied Andrews' motion to suppress.  

 

            
2.  Wallet 

 

[¶29]   Andrews also argues that the trial 
court erred by refusing to suppress the evidence seized from his wallet.  He claims that the search violated the 
United States and Wyoming constitutional provisions, prohibiting 
unreason­able searches and seizures.  
The State argues that the search was justified because it was 
con­­ducted incident to his lawful arrest.

 

[¶30]   One of the exceptions to the 
warrant requirement is a search conducted incident to a lawful arrest.1  Vasquez v. State, 990 P.2d 476, 480 
(Wyo. 1999).  The test under the 
United States Con­stitution for a valid search incident to an arrest was 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, reh. 
denied 396 U.S. 869, 90 S. Ct. 36, 24 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1969).  Under the Chimel ruling, law enforcement officials are allowed 
to search the area which is within the im­mediate control of the arrested 
person.  Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 480.  This court quoted Chimel in Roose v. State, 759 P.2d 478, 482 (Wyo. 
1988) as follows:

 

When an 
arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person 
arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in 
order to re­sist arrest or effect his escape.  Otherwise, the officer's safety might 
well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated.  
In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to 
search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent 
its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee 
might reach in or­der to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, 
be governed by a like rule.  A gun 
on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to 
the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested.  
There is ample justification, therefore, for a search of the 
arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate control"construing that 
phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon 
or destructible evidence.  

 

Roose, 
759 
P.2d  at 482 (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S.  at 762-63, 89 S.Ct. at 
2040) (emphasis added).

 

[¶31]   Andrews also advances an argument 
based specifically upon the Wyoming Constitution.  He claims that this court's decision in 
Vasquez, established a more rigorous test for 
searches incident to arrest.  In Vasquez, we examined and compared the 
protections secured by the United States and Wyoming constitutions concerning 
searches of automobiles and the containers found within automobiles when 
suspects are arrested.  990 P.2d  at 
482-89.  This court held that the Wyoming 
Constitution offers broader protection than the United States Constitution.  Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 488-89.  After reviewing earlier Wyoming Supreme 
Court decisions, we stated:

 

These 
past decisions establish that [Wyoming Constitution] Article 1, § 4 allows 
searches incident to arrest and can be said to allow automobile searches because 
arrest­ees had possession of it, and the arrest authorizes law enforcement 
to search it for evi­dence related to the crime.  The provision requires, however, that 
searches be reasonable under all of the circumstances.  

 

Vasquez, 
990 P.2d  
at 488 (citation omitted).  We 
continued by stating that searches incident to arrest which are performed for 
the permissible reasons of locating weapons or evidence related to the crime are 
reasonable.  Vasquez, 990 P.2d  at 488-89.  

 

[¶32]   In this case, Deputy Jenkins told 
Andrews he was under arrest, and Andrews removed the wallet from his pocket and 
laid it on the kitchen counter directly in front of him.  Consequently, at the time when 
An­drews was informed he was under arrest, the wallet was still on his 
person.  Ms. Woody had reported that 
cash and coins were stolen from her home.  
Such items could, of course, be concealed in a wallet and easily lost or 
destroyed.  It was, therefore, 
reasonable and appropriate for the officer to seize the wallet and search it for 
weapons and/or evidence.  

 

[¶33]   The fact that, after being placed 
un­der arrest, Andrews placed the wallet on the kitchen counter is 
irrelevant to the validity of the search and seizure.  The wallet was obviously still within 
Andrews' immediate area.  We agree 
with the trial court's observations on this matter:  

 

THE 
COURT: . . . In this case the wallet clearly was on the person of the 
Defendant.  His attempt to distance 
himself from the wallet does not preclude the officer from search­ing it 
incident to the arrest.  

 

The 
trial court correctly denied Andrews' motion to suppress the evidence seized 
from his wallet.

 

B.  Jury Instructions

 

[¶34]   Andrews contends that the trial 
court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense 
of criminal entry for both counts against him.  The State argues that the trial court 
properly refused to give Andrews' proposed lesser-included jury instructions 
because they were not sup­­ported by the evidence presented at the 
trial.

 

[¶35]   The Wyoming Supreme Court reviews 
the trial court's refusal of proposed lesser-included offense instructions by 
applying the following test:

 

The 
trial judge must first determine if all the elements of the lesser offense are 
found within the greater; and, if so, is there some evidence that would 
rationally permit the jury to find the accused guilty of the lesser and not 
guilty of the greater offense.  If 
such evidence is present, the instruction should be given.

 

Sanders 
v. State, 7 P.3d 891, 894 (Wyo.), cert. denied Sanders v. 
Wyoming, 531 U.S. 1024, 121 S. Ct. 594, 148 L. Ed. 2d 508 (2000) (quoting State v. Keffer, 860 P.2d 1118, 1140 
(Wyo. 1993) (Cardine, J., concurring)).  
See also Paramo v. State, 896 P.2d 1342, 1344 (Wyo. 1995); Eatherton v. State, 761 P.2d 91, 95 
(Wyo. 1988).  

 

[¶36]   The parties agree that the elements 
of the lesser offense of criminal entry2 are found within the greater 
offense of burglary.3  They disagree, how­ever, about 
whether the evidence presented at trial supported the lesser-included 
instructions.  Andrews was entitled 
to have the jury instructed on criminal entry only if there was some 
evi­dence presented at the trial which would have permitted the jury to 
rationally acquit him of bur­glary and convict him of criminal entry.  Sanders, 7 P.3d  at 894.  The element which differentiates 
burglary from criminal entry is the intent to commit larceny or a felony within 
the area wrongfully entered.  Collins v. State, 854 P.2d 688, 698 
(Wyo. 1993).   In this case the 
burglary instructions given to the jury stated that the State was required to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Andrews entered the victims' homes with the 
intent to commit larceny.  

 

[¶37]   The evidence upon which Andrews 
relies is the fact that some items of clothing he removed from the Woody home 
were found in the Wendling home.  
Because of that, Andrews claims he did not harbor the requisite intent to 
permanently deprive Ms. Woody of her property.  We do not believe that evidence would 
rationally permit the jury to find the accused guilty of the lesser offense of 
breaking and entering and not guilty of burglary.  Support for this conclusion can be found 
not only in the fact that the clothes were removed from the Woody home, but that 
in at least seven prior burglaries committed by Andrews in the state of Oregon, 
in addition to removing items of value as he did in this case, he would dress in 
the clothing of women victims, sometimes replacing the clothing before 
leaving.

 

[¶38]   The jury could not have rationally 
acquitted Andrews of the greater offense of burglary and convicted him of the 
lesser offense of criminal entry on either count.  The trial court, therefore, 
prop­erly denied Andrews' request for the lesser-included jury 
instructions.  

 

C.  Sentence

 
[¶39]   Andrews maintains that the sentence 
imposed against him was illegal because the trial court included a 
recommendation to the Department of Correction that, if Andrews were considered 
for commutation or parole, he be required to register with the appropriate 
sheriff's office as if he were a sex offender.  The State seems to concede that the 
trial court did not have the legal authority to impose a registration 
re­quirement on Andrews but argues that the sentence was not per se illegal because it was simply a 
recommendation to the Department of Corrections.  The State does advise, however, it would 
not object if this court deleted that portion of Andrews' sentence.   

 

[¶40]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-19-301 
et seq. require sex offenders to register with the appropriate 
en­tity and provide penalties for failure to comply.  At the time of Andrews' offense, "sex 
offender" was defined as "a person who has been convicted of a sex offense in 
which the victim was less than sixteen (16) years of age and the offender was at 
least four (4) years older than the victim."  § 7-19-301(a)(viii) (Michie 1997).  "Sex offense" was defined as "felony 
offenses limited to sexual assault under W.S. 6-2-302 through 6-2-304, attempted 
sexual assault, conspiracy to commit sexual assault, incest under W.S. 6-4-402, 
or indecent liberties under W.S. 14-3-105."  § 7-19-301(a)(v) (Michie 1997).  Andrews' burglary convic­tions do 
not fall within the statutory definition of  "sex offense."  

 

[¶41]   We, therefore, agree with Andrews 
that the registration requirement for sex offenders does not apply in this 
case.  Because the State has agreed 
to revision of Andrews' sentence, we need not determine whether, in light of the 
fact that the trial court's statement was only a recom­mendation, the 
sentence was actually illegal.   
We will simply strike that portion of Andrews' sentence.  

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶42]   The deputy did not violate Andrews' 
constitutional rights when he searched the duffel bag and wallet.  Andrews did not have standing to 
challenge the search of the duffel bag, and, furthermore, the search of the 
duffel bag was justified by consent.  
The search of the wallet was a legitimate search pursuant to a lawful 
arrest.  In addition, the trial 
court properly refused to in­struct the jury on the lesser-included offense 
of criminal entry because the trial evidence did not support the 
instructions.  Finally, we hold that 
Andrews' sentence should be revised to delete the trial court's recommendation 
that he be required, upon commutation or parole, to register as a sex 
offender.  

 

[¶43]   Affirmed, as modified.  

FOOTNOTES

1Andrews does not argue that Deputy 
Jenkins acted illegally when he arrested him.  We will not, therefore, analyze the 
legality of his arrest in resolving this issue.  

2Criminal entry is prohibited by Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-3-302 (LexisNexis 2001), which states in relevant 
part:

 

(a) A person is guilty of criminal 
entry if, without authority, he knowingly enters a building, occupied structure, 
vehicle or cargo portion of a truck or trailer, or a separately secured or 
occupied portion of those enclosures.

 

3Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-3-301 
(LexisNexis 2001) defines the crime of burglary.  That statutes states in pertinent 
part:

 

(a) A person is guilty of burglary 
if, without authority, he en­ters or remains in a building, occupied 
structure or vehicle, or sepa­rately secured or occupied portion thereof, 
with intent to commit larceny or a felony therein.

 

Larceny 
is defined as follows:

 

(a) A 
person who steals, takes and carries, leads or drives away property of another 
with intent to deprive the owner or lawful pos­sessor is guilty of larceny.  

 

Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 6-2-402 (a) (LexisNexis 2001).