Case Title: In re Parental Rights as to J.D.N.

Citation: 128 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 44

Docket Number: 

State: nevada

Court: Nevada Supreme Court

Date: 2012-08-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
428 Nev, Advance Opinion 4144
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN THE MATTER OF THE PARENTAL | No. 57746
RIGHTS AS TO J.D.N., QE.T., G.M.T,,
FILED

 

D.A-T., J.L-T., AND J.F-T., MINORS.

QUIANA M. B; AND ARTHUR L. T.

 

Appellants, aug 392012
vs. moe;

STATE OF NEVADA DEPARTMENT

OF FAMILY SERVICES, Ce

Respondent.

Appeals by natural parents from a district court order
terminating their parental rights as to the minor children. Eighth
Judicial District Court, Family Court Division, Clark County; William S.
Potter, Judge.

Affirmed.

David M. Schieck, Special Public Defender, and Melissa Elaine Oliver,

Deputy Special Public Defender, Clark County,
for Appellant Quiana M. B.

Mills & Mills Law Group and Gregory S. Mills and Daniel W. Anderson,
Las Vegas,
for Appellant Arthur L. T.

Steven B, Wolfson, District Attorney, and Ronald L. Cordes and Jennifer I.
Kuhlman, Deputy District Attorneys, Clark County,
for Respondent.

BEFORE DOUGLAS, GIBBONS and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ.

 

 
 

OPINION

By the Court, GIBBONS, J.:

In this appeal, we address several issues relating to a
tormination-of-parental-rights proceeding. First, we determine whether
‘an objection to the admission of the entire juvenile file (“J file) as hearsay
preserved the issue for appeal. Next, we consider the applicable burden
of proof imposed upon a parent in order to rebut the parental-fault and
child’s-best-interest presumptions contained in NRS 128.109. Finally, we
decide whether substantial evidence supports the family division of the
district court's order terminating appellants Quiana M. B.’s and Arthur
L. Ts parental rights.

We conclude that (1) Arthur waived his hearsay arguments
regarding the
portions of the “J” file he believed contained hearsay; (2) after it is
determined that a presumption under NRS 128,109 applies, a parent can

 

” file by failing to lodge objections at trial to the specific

rebut that presumption by a preponderance of the evidence; and (3)
substantial evidence supports the family division of the district court's
order terminating Quiana’s and Arthur's parental rights.

"The term “J” file is used to refer to all of the documents filed with
the juvenile division of the district court in an underlying NRS Chapter
432B proceeding, including the case plan and the Department of Family
Service's semiannual reports indicating the parents’ and children's
progress under the case plan.

 
os

 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Quiana is the biological mother of six minor children. Arthur
is the biological father of all of the children except J.D.N.?

On May 13, 2007, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police
Department (LVMPD) and a specialist from respondent State of Nevada

 

Department of Family Services (DFS) responded to reports that Quiana
had physically disciplined two of her children, G.M.T. and D.A.T., with a
belt for soiling themselves. During their investigation, the LVMPD and
the DFS specialist discovered marks and bruises on G.M.T. and D.A.T.
consistent with the design of a belt. Quiana admitted to whipping the
children with a belt when they soiled themselves during potty training.
Based on these findings, the LVMPD arrested Quiana for child abuse and
the DFS specialist placed all six children in protective custody. After
conducting a background check and home visit, DFS placed the children in
the care of Quiana’s mother. During this time, Arthur was in prison for
drug-related charges and was not set to be released until August 2009.
Following DFS's filing of an NRS Chapter 432B child abuse
and neglect petition in the juvenile division of the district court, the court
found that it would be contrary to the children’s welfare to reside with
Quiana. Accordingly, the juvenile division of the district court ordered

 

°The family division of the district court also terminated the
parental rights of J.D.N.’s putative father in the order being appealed in
this matter. However, J.D.N’'s putative father did not file an appeal. Any
discussion of Arthur's parental rights is limited to the five remaining
minor children,

 
om

 

that the children remain in the custody of Quiana’s mother under the
supervision of DFS. The next day, Quiana pleaded no contest to the child
abuse charges brought against her. DFS then filed a case plan for Quiana
with the ultimate goal of reunifying Quiana and her children. DFS did not
file a case plan for Arthur, From November 2007 to May 2010, DFS filed
seven reports with the juvenile division of the district court on a biannual
basis updating the court on the family’s progress with the ease plan.

While Quiana initially demonstrated progress in completing
her case plan, DFS's fourth report indicated that Quiana failed to show
any further improvement. Quiana failed to provide DFS with proof of
‘employment and failed to demonstrate sufficient housing for her and her
children, Quiana also had yet to complete her individual counseling
sessions, and her visitation with the children had become inconsistent.
Consequently, DFS changed the permanency plan’s goal to terminating
parental rights, which the juvenile division of the district court approved.
In August 2009, DFS petitioned the family division of the district court to
terminate Quiana’s and Arthur's parental rights.

Prior to the hearing on DFS's petition to terminate parental

 

rights, DFS filed two more reports with the juvenile division of the district
court concerning the family’s progress. By this time, Arthur had been
released from prison. Because Quiana’s and Arthur's supervised
visitations with their children had been going well, DFS allowed them to
have two unsupervised home visits with the children, At the second visit,
Arthur choked Quiana on two separate occasions in front of the children.
Arthur later pleaded guilty to domestic violence charges and began taking
domestic violence classes, Following the incident, DFS recommended that

Quiana receive a domestic violence assessment, but Quiana did not begin

 
ome a

 

the domestic violence classes until just before trial due to a scheduling
conflict with her visitation days.

On October 7, 2010, the family division of the district court
held a hearing on DFS's petition to terminate Quiana’s and Arthur's
parental rights. DFS called Quiana as its only witness. Quiana testified
that she was seeking employment and living with a friend. While Quiana
stated that she loved her children, she also expressed no concern over the
children being around Arthur following the domestic violence incident and
was unsure as to why all the children were in therapy.

Because the children were removed from their home pursuant
to NRS Chapter 432B and had resided outside of the home for at least 14
of 20 consecutive months, the family division of the district court applied
NRS 128,109(1Xa)’s presumption that Quiana and Arthur had
demonstrated only token efforts to care for the children, and NRS
128.109(2)s presumption that the best interest of the children would be
served by the termination of Quiana’s and Arthur's parental rights. The
family division of the district court further found that pursuant to NRS
128.109(1Xb), Quiana’s and Arthur's failure to substantially comply with
the terms and conditions of the reunification plan within six months of the
date the case plan commenced was evidence of a failure of parental
adjustment. Thus, the family division of the district court allowed Quiana
and Arthur to present evidence that would rebut these presumptions. The
family division of the district court heard testimony from two DFS
specialists, Arthur, and Quiana’s counselor. During the termination
proceeding, the family division of the district court also admitted the
entire juvenile court record (“J” file) into evidence over Arthur's general
hearsay objections.

 
ne

 

  

Following the hearing, the family division of the district court
granted DFS's petition. ‘The family division of the district court found that
neither Quiana nor Arthur rebutted NRS 128.109's presumptions.
However, the family division of the district court did not articulate the
burden of proof required for Quiana and Arthur to rebut those
presumptions. ‘The family division of the district court also did not
expressly refer to NRS 128.107, which sets forth certain factors that a
court must consider before terminating parental rights when children are
not in the physical custody of a parent. The family division of the district
court then determined that clear and convineing evidence established that,
parental fault existed in that Quiana and Arthur demonstrated only token
efforts to care for the children, and that they failed to substantially comply
with the plan to reunite the family, evidencing a failure of parental
adjustment. Specifically, the family division of the distriet court found

that Quiana failed to demonstrate any appreciation as to what had

 

occurred in the children’s lives over the past several years and only began
to actively participate in counseling as the termination hearing
approached. ‘The family division of the distriet court further determined
that Arthur had failed to show any i
only had done what his mother had asked him to do with regard to the
children. Lastly, the family division of the district court concluded that

 

ative in caring for the children and

the termination of Quiana’s and Arthur's parental rights was in the
children’s best interest. In reaching this conclusion, the family division of
the district court found that while the parents and children loved each
other, neither parent was prepared to take care of all six children and
prolonging the termination process would only cause more harm to the
children.

 
on a

 

Both Quiana and Arthur now appeal this decision, Arthur

 

argues that (1) the family division of the district court improperly
admitted the entire

 

file even though it contained hearsay and double
ion of the district court failed to
consider the factors contained in NRS 128.106 through NRS 128.108, and
(3) substantial evidence does not support the family division of the district
court's order terminating his parental rights.° Quiana contends that (1) a

  

hearsay statements, (2) the family di

parent may rebut NRS 128.109's presumptions by a mere preponderance
of the evidence, (2) the family division of the district court failed to
consider NRS 128.107(4) before terminating her parental rights, and (3)
because she rebutted the presumptions by a preponderance of the
evidence, substantial evidence does not support the family division of the
district court’s decision to terminate her parental rights,

DISCUSSION

 

ling to
state a proper objection

Arthur argues that the family division of the district court
abused its discretion by admitting the entire “J” file because the “J” file
contains hearsay. DFS responds that the “J” file cannot be excluded as
evidence based on a hearsay objection because the “J” file already
constitutes part of the family division of the district court record. DFS
further asserts that Arthur failed to preserve this issue for appeal because

“During oral argument, DFS requested that this court take judicial
notice of facts pertaining to Arthur that occurred after the family division
of the district court’s order terminating Quiana’s and Arthur's parental
rights. Given that NRAP 27(a\1) requires such requests to be made by a
written motion, we deny DFS's request.

 

 
mn

 

Arthur did not specifically state which portions of the “J” file constitute
hearsay.

We review a district court’s determination regarding the
admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Matter of Parental
Rights as to NJ., 116 Nev. 790, 804, 8 P.3d 126, 135 (2000), When
“objecting to the admission of evidence, a party must state the specific
grounds for the objection, NRS 47.040(1\ a). This specificity requirement
applies not only to the grounds for objection, but also to the particular part
ion. 1 George E. Dix et al.,
‘McCormick on Evidence § 52 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 6th ed. 2006). For
example, a party may seek to introduce evidence that consists of several

 

of the evidence being offered for admis

  

statements, some of which are subject to an objection, others which are
not. Id. In such a case, it is the responsibility of the party opposing the
evidence's admission to object to the specific parts of the evidence that are
inadmissible, Id, Thus, when a party fails to make a specific objection
before the district court, the party fails to preserve the issue for appeal.
‘Thomas v, Hardwick, 126 Nev. _, _, 231 P.3d 1111, 1120 (2010).

We conclude that Arthur failed to properly object to the
admission of the “J” file. Arthur objected to the entire “J” file on the basis

 

of hearsay, but never specifically stated what portions or documents of the
“J” file were inadmissible as hearsay. Without a more specific objection, it
is impossible for the family division of the district court to make a proper
ruling because it is unclear what evidentiary question is at issue. See
‘Thomas, 126 Nev. at _, 231 P.3d at 1120 (stating that a proper objection
pursuant to NRS 47,040(1) serves to educate both the trial court and the
opposing party). By failing to lodge a proper objection to specific portions

 
of the “J” file allegedly containing hearsay, Arthur waived his hearsay
arguments pertaining to the “J” filet

Nevertheless, given the seriousness of the rights at issue in a
termination-of:parental-rights case, we believe that it is appropriate for us
to review this issue for plain error. NRS 47.040(2); see Lioce v. Cohen, 124
Nev. 1, 19, 173 P.3d 970, 981-82 (2008) (recognizing that this court may
review unobjected-to attorney misconduct for plain error on appeal
relating to a motion for new trial); see also Bradley v, Romeo, 102 Nev.
103, 105, 716 P.2d 227, 228 (1986) (“The ability of this court to consider
relevant issues sua sponte in order to prevent plain error is well
established.”); 5 Am, Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 720 (2007) (“Relief under
the plain error standard is rarely granted in civil eases and is reserved for
those situations where it has been demonstrated that the failure to geant
relief will result in a manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice.”
(footnotes omitted).

DFS relies upon our decision in Matter of Parental Rights as
t0.N.D.O, to assert that the “J” file cannot be excluded as evidence based

on a hearsay objection because the “J” file already constitutes part of the

‘Arthur further argues that the family division of the district court
abused its discretion in admitting the “J” file because DFS failed to
authenticate the “J” file. However, Arthur also waived this argument
because he did not raise it before the family division of the district court.
See Old_Aztec Mine, Inc, v. Brown, 97 Nev. 49, 52, 623 P.2d 981, 983
(1981) A point not urged in the trial court, unless it goes to the
Jurisdiction of that court, is deemed to have been waived and will not be
considered on appeal.”

 

 
 

family division of the district court record. See 121 Nev. 379, 115 P.3d 223
(2005). We disagree. Matter of Parental Rights as to N.D.O, related to
whether due process mandates the appointment of counsel for a parent
during a termination-ofparental-rights proceeding. 121 Nev. at 382-83,
116 P.3d at 225, In reaching its conclusion, this court evaluated the risk
of an erroneous decision if the appellant had not received counsel during
. at 384-86, 115 P.3d at 226-27. While the
appellant pointed out that her attorney had not objected to hearsay

the termination proceeding. I.

 

statements included in testimony by DFS workers, this court determined
that these statements were already part of the record because they
appeared in DFS's reports that it submitted to the juvenile division of the
district court. Id. at 384-85, 115 P.3d at 226-27, However, this conclusion
does not mean that the “J” file always forms part of the family division of
the district court record in a termination proceeding. Instead, the “J” file
is part of DFS's file. DFS submits the various documents and semiannual
reports that make up the “J” file with the juvenile division of the district
court as part of an NRS Chapter 432B proceeding. ‘Thus, DFS submits the
documents of the “J” file to a separate court in a separate proceeding. As a
result, the entire “J” file does not already form part of the family division
of the district court record during a termination-of-parental-rights
proceeding.

Because the entire “J” file does not automatically form part of

 

the family division of the district court record, the “J” file is only
admissible if it complies with Nevada's statutes and rules of evidence,
including the hearsay rule and any hearsay exception, In light of this
requirement, we note that the family division of the district court may
admit the entire “J” file subject to specific objections lodged by either

10

 
party, Here, the family division of the district court admitted the entire
“J” file into evidence without considering any further, specific objections.
NRS 128.090(3) also provides that “{iJnformation contained in a report
filed pursuant to NRS 432.0999 to 432.130, inclusive, or chapter 432B of
NRS may not be excluded from the proceeding by the invoking of any
privilege.” ‘Thus, NRS 128.090(3) expressly allows the family division of
the district court to admit reports from an NRS Chapter 432B proceeding
contained in a “J” file without complying with Nevada's privilege
requirements. However, NRS 128.090(3) does not extend this exception
beyond privileges, and the “J” file still must comply with the rest of
‘Nevada's statutes and rules on evidence, including the hearsay rule,
During Quiana’s and Arthur's termination proceeding, the
family division of the district court admitted the “J” file in its entirety.
Despite this admission of the entire “J” file, we conclude, as discussed
below, substantial evidence beyond the inadmissible portions of the “J”
file, if any, supports the family division of the district court’s finding that
parental fault exists and that the termination of Quiana’s and Arthur's
parental rights would serve the children’s best interest. MeMonigle v.
McMonigle, 110 Nev. 1407, 1409, 887 P.2d 742, 744 (1994) (presuming
district court disregarded improper evidence when there is other
substantial evidence upon which the court based its findings). ‘Thus, the
family division of the district court's admission of the entire “J” file did not

result in a manifest injustice that would constitute plain error.

mreponderance of nce
A party petitioning to terminate parental rights must
establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the

 

 
children’s best interest and that parental fault exists. In re Parental
Rights as to N.J., 125 Nev. 835, 843, 221 P.3d 1255, 1261 (2009); NRS
128.0902); see NRS 128.105. On appeal, we review purely legal questions
de novo. Rennels v. Rennels, 127 Nev. _, __, 257 P.3d 396, 399 (2011).
Determining the appropriate burden of proof to rebut NRS 128.109's

 

presumptions is a question of law subject to de novo review.

Quiana argues that she rebutted NRS 128.109’s presumptions
by a preponderance of the evidence. Quiana points out that NRS
128,090(2) only raises the burden of proof for petitioners in cases involving
the termination of parental rights, and otherwise, states that termination
proceedings are civil in nature, ‘Therefore, Quiana contends that NRS
47.180 applies and only requires a party to a civil case to rebut a
presumption by a preponderance of the evidence. However, DFS
interprets NRS 128,090(2) as requiring both the petitioner and the
parents in a termination proceeding to satisfy a clear and convincing
burden of proof.

‘The family division of the district court did not articulate the
burden of proof it relied upon when determining that Quiana and Arthur
failed to rebut NRS 128.109's presumptions. We conclude that the proper
burden of proof required for a parent to rebut NRS 128.109’s presumptions
is a preponderance of the evidence, and that Quiana and Arthur failed to
‘meet this burden.

NRS 128.109 sets forth presumptions that the family division
of the district court must apply in certain termination proceedings.

However, the statute is silent with regard to the burden of proof necessary
to rebut these presumptions. While NRS 128.109 does not address the
appropriate burden of proof for rebuttal, NRS 128.090(2) explains that

 

 
os

 

termination-of-parental-rights cases are civil in nature. We have
previously stated that in civil matters, presumptions can be rebutted by a
preponderance of the evidence. NRS 47.180(1);° see Construction Indus. v.
Chalue, 119 Nev. 348, 353, 74 P.3d 695, 598 (2003) (requiring a workers’
compensation claimant to rebut the presumption that a controlled

 

substance caused his work-related injuries by @ preponderance of the
evidence).

While DFS admits that NRS 47.180 applies to civil cases in
general, DFS asserts that NRS 128,090(2) creates an exception to NRS
47.180 by raising the burden of proof in termination proceedings to clear
and convincing evidence for both the petitioner and a parent. Specifically,
DFS relies upon NRS 128,090(2)'s language that a court “shall in all cases
require the petitioner to establish the facts by clear and convincing
evidence and shall give full and careful consideration to all of the evidence
presented, with regard to the rights and claims of the parent of the child.”
We agree that NRS 128.090 clearly requires the petitioner, the party
moving to terminate parental rights, to satisfy a clear and convincing
burden of proof. See In re Parental Rights as to C.C.A., 128 Nev. _,
273 P.3d 852, 854 (2012) (citing Santosky v, Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769
(1982). However, we disagree with DFS that NRS 128.090’s language

 

SNRS 47.180(1) states, “A presumption, other than a presumption
against the accused in a criminal action, imposes on the party against
whom it is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the
presumed fact is more probable than its existence,

13

 
also raises the burden of proof for a parent attempting to rebut a
presumption set forth in NRS 128.109. Because NRS 128.109 is silent on
the appropriate burden of proof for rebutting its presumptions and a
termination proceeding is civil in nature, we conclude that NRS 48.170
applies, and thus, the burden of proof for a parent attempting to rebut an
NRS 128.109 presumption is a preponderance of the evidence.

This conclusion is also consistent with the constitutional
concerns that are implicated during termination proceedings. See Matter
of Parental Rights as to D.R.HL., 120 Nev. 422, 426-27, 92 P.3d 1230, 1233
(2004) (stating that parental termination proceedings involve a parent's
fundamental right to raise his or her child). While we recognize that NRS
128.109's presumptions promote DFS’s compelling interest of providing a
safe and stable environment for abused and neglected children, we also
recognize that the parent-child relationship is a fundamental liberty
interest. See id, Due to this fundamental liberty interest, a party secking
to terminate parental rights must prove its petition by clear and
convincing evidence. See In re Parental Rights as to C.C.A,, 128 Nev. at
_. 273 P.3d at 854, The United States Supreme Court has explained
that this higher burden of proof is necessary in order to adequately convey
to a fact-finder that the risk of erroneously terminating parental rights
must be lower than the risk of erroneously failing to terminate them.
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 765-66. If we were to adopt DFS's theory that a
parent must rebut NRS 128.109's presumptions by clear and convincing
evidence, the risk to a petitioner and parent in a termination proceeding
would be equally allotted. See In re Interest of Kyle S.-G,, 533 N.W.2d
794, 797-99 (Wis. 1995) (rejecting argument that a parent must rebut a

presumption in a termination proceeding by clear and convincing evidence

 

 
 

oe

as being contrary to the allocation of risk between a parent and a
petitioner seeking to terminate parental rights). ‘Therefore, we cannot
agree with DFS that a parent must rebut NRS 128.109's presumptions by
clear and convincing evidence.

Other states addressing this issue have reached a similar
conclusion. See, e.g., Interest of L.D.B., 891 P.2d 468, 471 (Kan. Ct. App.
1995) (holding that a parent must rebut a presumption of parental
unfitness during a termination proceeding by a preponderance of the
evidence); In re Interest of Kyle §.-G., 583 N.W.2d at 797 (concluding that
‘4 parent must rebut a presumption of abandonment by a preponderance of
evidence during a termination proceeding); ef, In re A.M., 831 N.E.2d 648,
653-55 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (determining a parent must rebut a
presumption in a termination proceeding by introducing sufficient
evidence to the contrary of the presumption); In re Welfare of J.W., 807
N.W.2d 441, 445-46 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (requiring a parent to rebut a
presumption in a termination proceeding by presenting evidence “that
would justify a finding of fact contrary to the assumed fact” (quoting
Minn. R. Evid. 301)). Based on our review of the pertinent statutes, we
conclude that Nevada law requires a parent to rebut NRS 128.109's

presumptions by a preponderance of the evidence.

‘We also note that this conclusion is distinguishable from our
general statement in Rivera v. Phillips Morris, Inc., that the burden of
persuasion remains with one party throughout a case. 125 Nev. 185, 191,
209 P.3d 271, 275 (2009). Rivera involved the applicability of a heeding
presumption in a strict product liability failure-to-warn case. Id, at 187,
209 P.3d at 272, In this case, we are discussing specific statutes, NRS
128.090 and NRS 128.109, relating to the unique context of proceedings to
terminate parental rights. Therefore, our conclusion here applies in cases,

continued on next page...

 

15

 
co nn Be

 

The family division of the district court considered the appropriate factors
and_ite onder tenminating-Guiana’s and Arthur's parental rights is

Having determined the appropriate burdens of proof, we now
turn to Quiana’s and Arthur’s arguments regarding whether the family
division of the district court properly considered the relevant factors in
determining if their parental rights should be terminated and whether
substantial evidence supports the order terminating their parental rights.
When reviewing a family division of the distriet court's order terminating
parental rights, we closely scrutinize the order to determine if substantial
evidence supports the district court’s factual findings. Matter of Parental
Rights as to AJ.G., 122 Nev. 1418, 1423, 148 P.3d 759, 763 (2006)
However, we will not substitute our own judgment for that of the district

 

court. Id.
‘The family division of the district court properly considered NRS
128,107,

Where a child is not in the parent's physical custody in a
parental rights termination case, NRS 128.107 contains specific factors
that the family division of the district court must consider before
terminating parental rights. When the petitioner has demonstrated that
NRS 128.109’ presumptions apply, the burden to present evidence
regarding NRS 128.107's factors lies with the parent. See Matter of
Parental Rights as to AJ.G., 122 Nev. at 1426, 148 P.3d at 765.

 

++ -continued

involving the termination of parental rights and does not affect our
decisions in other contexts involving the rebuttal of a presumption.

16

 
ome

 

After the family division of the district court determined that
NRS 128,109's presumptions applied, Quiana and Arthur bore the burden
of presenting evidence relating to NRS 128.107’s factors that would help
rebut those presumptions. The family division of the district court did not
expressly refer to NRS 128,107 in its order terminating Quiana’s and
Arthur's parental rights. As the consideration of NRS 128.107’s factors is
mandatory, it must be clear from the termination order that the family
division of the district court applied NRS 128.107's factors. Here, the
family division of the district court did not explicitly refer to NRS 128.107,
but the order demonstrates that the court applied the required NRS
128.107 factors when finding that Quiana and Arthur failed to rebut NRS
128.109's presumptions, At the termination proceeding, the family
division of the district court heard evidence regarding the services that
DFS had provided to Quiana and Arthur, the children’s needs, the efforts
that Quiana and Arthur had made to reunite with the children, and
whether additional services would bring about any change in Quiana and
Arthur. See NRS 128.107. In light of this evidence, the family
the district court found that Quiana and Arthur had not made sufficient
efforts to reunite with their children. ‘The family division of the district

 

sion of

court also was not convinced that either Quiana or Arthur were capable of
raising all six children, even with the help of continued services. ‘Thus,
the family division of the district court properly considered NRS 128.107's
factors when determining that Quiana and Arthur failed to rebut NRS
128.109's presumptions.”

‘Arthur further argues that the family division of the district court
erred by failing to consider the factors contained in NRS 128.106 and NRS
continued on next page . . .

aw

 
Substantial evidence supports the family division of the district
court's finding that parental fault existed based on token efforts

Based on the time that the children had resided outside of the
home, the family division of the district court also applied NRS
128.109(1{aY's presumption of parental fault based on token efforts.
Parental fault exists if a parent engages in only token efforts to care for a
child. NRS 128.105(2Xf). A petitioner must demonstrate that a parent
has only made token efforts “(1) [t]o support or communicate with the
child; (2) [t]o prevent neglect of the child; (3) [tlo avoid being an unfit
parent; or (4) {to eliminate the risk of serious physical, mental or
emotional injury to the child.” Id.

‘The family division of the district court found that the
evidence presented by Quiana and Arthur was insufficient to overcome the
presumption of parental fault based on token efforts. At the conclusion of
the trial, the family division of the distriet court expressed its uncertainty
as to whether Quiana had addressed the issues that had caused her to

-- continued

128.108. We disagree. NRS 128.106 does not apply because the family
division of the district court did not make a finding of parental fault based
on neglect or unfitness. See NRS 128.106 (requiring a district court to
consider certain factors before making a finding of parental fault based on
neglect or unfitness). NRS 128.108 also does not apply because DFS did
not petition to terminate the parental rights of Quiana and Arthur with
the ultimate goal of having the foster parents adopt the children. See
RS 128.108 (requiring a district court to consider certain factors when a
child resides in a foster home and the ultimate goal of the termination
process is to have the foster parents adopt the child).

 

 

 
whip her two children in the first place. In the order terminating Quiana’s
parental rights, the family division of the district court further stated that
Quiana made only token efforts to care for her children, which were too
little too late, as she did not meaningfully participate in any of the
bonding or counseling sessions until 2010. Indeed, the appellate record
shows that DFS removed the children from Quiana’s care in May 2007 and
Quiana was required to attend parenting classes and anger management
classes. While Quiana initially complied with these case plan objectives,
Quiana never completed all of the required individual anger management
sessions. In September 2009, Quiana reinitinted attempts to complete her
required counseling by attending a parent-bonding group and individual
therapy. However, Quiana was uncooperative and resistant during these
sessions. According to the testimony of Quiana’s counselor, Quiana only
began to actively participate in January 2010, shortly before trial.

‘The family division of the distriet court further found that
Arthur had made only token efforts to care for his children that were,
likewise, too little too late. ‘The family division of the district court
recognized that Arthur had made some efforts to support the children, but
also determined that Arthur failed to take any initiative in raising the
children and deferred to his mother regarding the care of the children.
‘The appellate record supports these findings as well. During Arthur's
testimony, Arthur explained how one of his children had lived with him

and his mother following his release from prison, Arthur stated that when
his mother asked him to help care for the child, he did so. Arthur also
explained that if his mother was to receive custody of all the children, he
would do anything that she asked him to do in order to help care for the
children. Thus, most of Arthur's statements regarding the care of his

 

 
one

 

children related back to his mother. Furthermore, Arthur failed to
actively participate in his domestic violence classes following the choking
incident with Quiana, While Arthur attended the domestic violence
classes, he received poor evaluations regarding his participation in these
classes. Therefore, we conclude that Quiana and Arthur failed to rebut
the presumption of token efforts and that substantial evidence supports
the family division of the district court's finding that parental fault
existed.
Substantial evidence supports the family division of the district
court's finding-that_termination of parental rights_was_in_the
In determining whether the termination of parental rights is

in a child's best interest, the Legislature has recognized that a child's
continuing need for proper physical, mental, and emotional growth and
development are relevant considerations, Matter of Parental Rights as to
., 120 Nev. at 433, 92 P.3d at 1237 (quoting NRS 128.005(2\c)).

Due to the time period that the children had been removed
from the home, the family division of the district court applied NRS
128.109(2)'s presumption that termination would serve the children's best
interest. At the conclusion of the trial, the family division of the district

 

court determined that neither parent had rebutted the presumption that
termination would be in the best interest of the children, The family
division of the district court found that neither Quiana nor Arthur was
prepared to receive custody of all six children. ‘The family division of the
district court stated that DFS was raising the children instead of the
parents. While the family division of the district court believed that
Quiana and Arthur eventually would be able to apply the lessons they

20

 
om <a

 

were learning from services, the court also found that the longer the
process was delayed, the more harmful it would be to the children.

‘The appellate record supports these findings. By the time of
the termination proceeding, the children had been living outside of the
home for more than three years. Since the children’s removal from the
home, Quiana’s testimony indicated that she had been unable to secure
stable housing or employment for more than a short period of time.
Although Quiana’s counselor testified that Quiana and the children were
very bonded and that termination would not be in the children’s best
interest, the counselor also admitted that it would be very difficult for
Quiana to receive custody of all six children at once. Instead, the
counselor suggested that Quiana should receive custody of the children
one at a time over a year with the help of continued services. Ultimately,
the family division of the district court did not give much weight to the
testimony of Quiana’s counselor. As the family division of the district
court is in a better position to weigh the credibility of witnesses, we will
not substitute our judgment for that of the district court. See Matter of
Parental Rights as to C..M,, 118 Nev. 724, 732, 58 P.3d 188, 194 (2002)
(recognizing that a district court is in the best position to observe the
demeanor of parties and assess their credibility).

‘The family division of the district court also found that
Quiana’s testimony was so evasive and her recollection so faulty that she
her

 

failed to demonstrate any appreciation for what had gone on
children since their removal from her home back in 2007, During her
testimony, Quiana expressed uncertainty as to why her children were in
need of therapy. Quiana testified that she had no concerns about Arthur
being around the children, even though Arthur had recently committed

21

 
domestic violence against Quiana in front of the children. Quiana also
stated that she was unsure as to how much more time she would need
before she would be able to care for the children on her own. Given this
testimony and the fact that the family division of the district court is in a
better position to observe the parties, we again will not substitute the
court's judgment with our own.

‘The record also supports the family division of the district
court’s finding that Arthur was not prepared to receive custody of his
children, During trial, Arthur testified regarding the time that one of his
children had lived with him and his mother. However, Arthur stated that
as soon as his mother was unable to care for the child, DFS removed the
child from the home. Furthermore, when DFS granted Arthur an
unsupervised visit with Quiana and the children, Arthur committed
domestic violence against Quiana twice in front of the children. Therefore,
substantial evidence supports the family division of the district court’s
finding that the termination of Quiana’s and Arthur's parental rights

would serve the children’s best interest.’

*Quiana and Arthur also contend that substantial evidence does not
support the family division of the district court’s finding of parental fault
based on a failure of parental adjustment. However, because we
determine that substantial evidence supports the family division of the
district court's finding of token efforts, we need not consider further
whether substantial evidence supports the court's finding that Quiana and
Arthur failed to make parental adjustments. See NRS 128.105 (stating
that in order to terminate parental rights, a district court must find that
termination is in the child's best interests and that at least one parental
fault factor exists).

 

 
In light of the foregoing, we affirm the family division of the district
court's order terminating Quiana's and Arthur's parental rights.

Ho,

Gibbons
We concur:

Lege Ls
Dopelas

Parraguirre