Case Title: Stevens v. Radey

Citation: 2008-Ohio-291

Docket Number: 20062343

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2008-02-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Stevens v. Radey, 117 Ohio St.3d 65, 2008-Ohio-291.] 
 
 
STEVENS ET AL., APPELLEES, v. RADEY, TRUSTEE, APPELLANT, ET AL. 
[Cite as Stevens v. Radey, 117 Ohio St.3d 65, 2008-Ohio-291.] 
Wills – Testamentary trusts – Trust for life of beneficiary with no provision for 
remainder – Assignment of interest in remainder occurs at death of 
testator – When testator manifests no contrary intent, vesting of estate 
occurs at death of testator, not of  beneficiary of life interest. 
(No. 2006-2343 – Submitted November 7, 2007 – Decided February 6, 2008.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County,  
Nos. 87273 and 87274, 2006-Ohio-5579. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
Unless a testator manifests a contrary intent in a will, the preference for the 
immediate vesting of estates requires interests to be assigned at the testator’s 
death, not held in abeyance until a future uncertain date. 
__________________ 
 
 
MOYER, C.J. 
I 
{¶ 1} This appeal requires us to determine whether the residue of a 
testamentary trust passing through intestate succession belongs to the settlor’s 
heirs living at the time of the settlor’s death or the settlor’s heirs living at the time 
of the trust beneficiary’s death.  For the following reasons, we hold that the 
residuary estate of a testamentary trust belongs to the settlor’s heirs living at the 
time of the settlor’s death. 
II 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 2} Andrea Sangrik was the only child of Andrew and Helen Sangrik.  
She never married and had no children.  After Helen’s death, Andrea executed a 
will in 1993, which stated that, in the event that she predeceased her father, her 
entire estate was to pass to her cousin, appellant Carole Radey, in trust for the 
benefit of her father.  The will specified that Radey, as trustee, was to provide as 
much of the income and principal of the trust estate as she determined to be 
necessary for Andrew’s support, care, and maintenance.  Unfortunately, Andrea’s 
will did not provide a residuary clause for property remaining in the trust after 
Andrew’s death. 
{¶ 3} Andrea died in 1997 and was survived by Andrew.  After Andrea’s 
property was transferred into the testamentary trust created in her will, Radey 
used the trust property for Andrew’s benefit until his death in 2003.  Andrew’s 
will stated that Radey would inherit his entire estate if Andrea predeceased him. 
{¶ 4} After Andrew’s death, approximately $680,000 remained in the 
trust.  Given the lack of a residuary clause, Radey filed a complaint for 
declaratory judgment in the probate court of Cuyahoga County requesting the 
court to determine who should receive the remaining funds.  The probate court 
ordered that the residue be distributed to Andrea’s heirs in accordance with the 
laws of descent and distribution under R.C. 2105.06. 
{¶ 5} After that decision was rendered, appellees Jessica R. Stevens et al. 
(collectively, “Stevens”), six of Andrea’s maternal cousins, filed a separate 
declaratory action in the probate court seeking a determination that they qualified 
as Andrea’s heirs at law and were thus entitled to the residue.  Radey objected, 
arguing that Andrew was Andrea’s sole heir at the time of Andrea’s death, and 
thus the remainder of Andrea’s estate passed to Andrew at her death and then to 
Radey upon Andrew’s death in accordance with Andrew’s will.  The trial court 
adopted Radey’s argument and ordered the residue to pass to Andrew’s estate. 
January Term, 2008 
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{¶ 6} The court of appeals for Cuyahoga County reversed the trial court, 
and we accepted Radey’s discretionary appeal.  For the following reasons, we 
reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
III 
A. 
Intestate Succession 
{¶ 7} Before we address the central issue in this case, it will be 
beneficial to examine the intestate succession process.  When a court interprets a 
will, it should first look to the intent of the testator and divide property in 
accordance with it.  See Polen v. Baker (2001), 92 Ohio St.3d 563, 565, 752 
N.E.2d 258.  However, where a decedent fails to dispose of some or all of his or 
her property through a testamentary transfer, the statute of descent and 
distribution, R.C. 2105.06, governs who receives the unaccounted-for property.  
See Oglesbee v. Miller (1924), 111 Ohio St. 426, 145 N.E. 846, paragraph two of 
the syllabus; see also Mathews v. Krisher (1899), 59 Ohio St. 562, 53 N.E. 52, at 
syllabus. 
{¶ 8} The statute provides a default distribution scheme to resolve the 
uncertainty created by intestacy.  Under it, a decedent’s surviving spouse, 
children, or their lineal descendents inherit intestate property first.  R.C. 
2105.06(A) through (E). If no such heirs survive the decedent, then the property 
passes to the decedent’s surviving parents.  Id. at (F).  If the decedent does not 
have a surviving parent, the property passes to various other relatives, including 
cousins, in a statutorily defined order.  Id. at (G) through (J).  If no relatives 
survive, the property escheats to the state.  Id. at (K).  With that order in mind, we 
proceed to the merits of this case. 
B. 
Determination of Heirs 
{¶ 9} The issue in dispute is the point at which the heirs are determined 
when a testamentary trust is not exhausted at the beneficiary’s death and the will 
lacks a residuary clause.  Radey argues that to determine who has the right to the 
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residue, R.C. 2105.06 should be applied at the date of Andrea’s death.  Thus, 
because Andrea died unmarried and childless, her father, Andrew, inherited the 
right to the entire residuary through intestate succession. 
{¶ 10} Stevens argues that the possibility of a residue does not arise until 
the purposes of the testamentary trust are fulfilled, and thus the heirs should not 
be determined until that time.  Under this position, the determination of heirs 
occurs at the time of Andrew’s death; because Stevens and the other cousins were 
Andrea’s closest remaining relatives at that time, they share the residue equally. 
{¶ 11} We adopt Radey’s position.  It is well settled that “the law strongly 
favors the immediate vesting of estates.”  Ohio Natl. Bank of Columbus v. Boone 
(1942), 139 Ohio St. 361, 370, 22 O.O. 414, 40 N.E.2d 149.  The rights of the 
beneficiaries become fixed and certain at the death of the testator unless a 
contrary intent is manifested.  Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus; see also Tax 
Comm. v. Oswald (1923), 109 Ohio St. 36, 52, 141 N.E. 678.  Thus, in the 
absence of some contrary intent expressed by the testator to postpone vesting, we 
abide by the preference for the vesting of all interests, including residuary 
interests, in the testator’s heirs at the earliest possible time.  See R.C. 2131.04 
(“Remainders * * * and other expectant estates are descendible, devisable and 
alienable in the same manner as estates in possession”). 
{¶ 12} Although we have never encountered the factual circumstances 
presented in this case, we addressed a similar issue in Gilpin v. Williams (1874), 
25 Ohio St. 283.  In that case, the testator’s will created a real estate trust and a 
subsequent life estate for his daughter “and to her children after her death 
forever,” but contained no residuary clause in case his daughter, then childless, 
remained so until her death.  We were asked to determine whether fee-simple title 
had vested and in whom.  “We do not believe [that the property] is in abeyance, 
or that it rests in nubibus. * * * The fee-simple title was in the testator until his 
death, and if it did not pass by his will to any devisee therein named, it either 
January Term, 2008 
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ceased to exist in any one, or it passed by way of descent to his heirs at law.  In 
our opinion, it descended to the heirs,” i.e., those living at the time of his death, 
subject to divestment if the daughter had children.  (Emphasis sic.)  Id. at 295–
296. 
{¶ 13} The same result applies to this case.  Because Andrea’s will did not 
dispose of the residue of her estate and did not express a specific intent for it, the 
residue was intestate property at the time of her death.  Unless a testator manifests 
a contrary intent in a will, the preference for the immediate vesting of estates 
requires such interests to be assigned at the testator’s death, not held in abeyance 
until a future uncertain date.  While the residue held an uncertain value at 
Andrea’s death because the amount depended on the amount of the trust estate 
that would be used for Andrew’s care, that uncertainty does not prevent the 
interest in the residue from being assigned under the laws of descent and 
distribution. 
{¶ 14} Under these laws, the right to the residue passed to Andrea’s father 
Andrew upon her death, and he could dispose of it as he saw fit.  R.C. 2105.06(F).  
Because Andrew left his entire estate to Radey in his will, the residue belongs 
solely to her. 
C. 
Resulting Trusts 
{¶ 15} In coming to the opposite conclusion, the court of appeals relied 
upon the concept of a resulting trust.  A resulting trust is defined as “one that the 
court of equity declares to exist where the legal estate in property is transferred or 
acquired by one under circumstances indicating that the beneficial interest is not 
intended to be enjoyed by the holder of the legal title.”  Univ. Hosps. of 
Cleveland, Inc. v. Lynch, 96 Ohio St.3d 118, 2002-Ohio-3748, 772 N.E.2d 105, ¶ 
56.  These equitable constructs can be created to transfer the surplus of a trust to 
the settlor’s next of kin or residuary legatee after the purposes of the original trust 
are fulfilled.  See Restatement of the Law 2d, Trusts (2001), Section 430. 
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{¶ 16} However, a party seeking recognition of a resulting trust bears the 
burden of justifying its existence with clear and convincing evidence.  See Univ. 
Hosps. of Cleveland, Inc., 96 Ohio St.3d 118, 2002-Ohio-3748, 772 N.E.2d 105, 
at ¶ 55.  “ ‘ “If the evidence is doubtful or capable of reasonable explanation upon 
a theory other than the existence of the trust, it is not sufficient to support a decree 
declaring and enforcing the trust.” ’ ”  Id., quoting 10 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees 
(2d Ed.Rev.1978) 44-49, Section 472, quoting Catherwood v. Morris (1931), 345 
Ill. 617, 636, 178 N.E. 487. 
{¶ 17} For a resulting trust to be created, Stevens would have to prove, 
through clear and convincing evidence, that Andrea did not intend for her father 
to receive the residue of her estate.  Stevens argues that the will created a trust to 
provide for the care of Andrew solely during his life and thus infers that Andrea 
would not have wanted him to receive additional property through intestate 
succession.  Radey counters that Andrea wanted her entire estate to be used for 
her father. 
{¶ 18} However, Andrea’s will provides no guidance regarding the 
residue of her estate, and Stevens cites no evidence to support her position.  
Stevens may or may not be correct in her interpretation of Andrea’s intent, but 
such speculation is not sufficient to fulfill the clear-and-convincing-evidence 
standard necessary to create a resulting trust.  Without evidence justifying the use 
of an equitable remedy, we apply the law favoring the immediate vesting of 
estates and the normal flow of intestate succession. 
IV 
{¶ 19} For the above reasons, we reverse the judgment of the court of 
appeals and hold that the residue of Andrea’s estate passed wholly to Andrew, her 
father, pursuant to intestate succession as measured at the time of her death.  
When Andrew died, the residuary passed to Radey pursuant to Andrew’s will. 
Judgment reversed. 
January Term, 2008 
7 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and 
CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Widder & Widder, John M. Widder, and Peggy Widder, for appellees. 
Weston Hurd L.L.P, Angela G. Carlin, Gregory E. O’Brien, and Shawn 
W. Maestle; and John P. Koscianski, for appellant. 
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