Case Title: In re Gould

Citation: 177 Vt. 7, 2004 VT 46, 852 A.2d 632

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
In re Gould (2002-262); 177 Vt. 7; 852 A.2d 632

2004 VT 46

[Filed 06-Jun-2004]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                 2004 VT 46

                                No. 2002-262

  In re Michael Gould	                         Supreme Court

                                                 On Appeal from
                                                 Chittenden Superior Court

                                                 April Term, 2003

  Mary Miles Teachout, J.

  Allison N. Fulcher, Martin & Associates, Barre, for Petitioner-Appellant.

  Robert Simpson, Chittenden County State's Attorney, and Pamela Hall
    Johnson, Deputy State's Attorney, Burlington, for Respondent-Appellee.

  PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Dooley, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., 
            and Allen, C.J. (Ret.),  Specially Assigned

       ¶  1.  JOHNSON, J.   Petitioner, Michael Gould, appeals the
  Chittenden Superior Court's denial of his post-conviction relief motion. 
  Gould claims that the court violated his statutory right to counsel under
  13 V.S.A. §§ 5231, 5233, when it failed to assign new counsel after
  permitting the previous post-conviction relief counsel to withdraw.  In
  light of the right to counsel afforded by our Public Defender Act, the
  court erred in refusing to appoint new counsel to assist Gould on his first
  post-conviction relief petition.  Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
   
       ¶  2.  Petitioner Michael Gould was arraigned in Chittenden District
  Court and pled not guilty to charges of assault and robbery.  Gould
  subsequently changed his plea to nolo contendere.  At the plea hearing,
  after discussing the plea terms, petitioner stated that he understood that
  he could be sentenced to eighteen to twenty years.  The district judge
  accepted the change of plea, finding it to be voluntary, factually based,
  and made with knowledge and understanding of the consequences and after a
  knowing waiver of constitutional rights. 

       ¶  3.  At the sentencing hearing in August 1999, the trial judge
  imposed a sentence of  between fifteen and twenty years.  The judge
  explained that the ten-year minimum recommended in the presentence
  interview report was too short in light of petitioner's history of felony
  convictions.  On the other hand, the judge credited petitioner's remorse by
  departing downward from the eighteen-year minimum requested by the
  prosecution.  Defense counsel filed a motion to reconsider the sentence in
  November 1999, which the trial judge denied, reasoning that the sentence
  was not imposed in passion, was legal, and was based on petitioner's
  criminal history and the danger he posed to society. 

       ¶  4.  Gould filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief in
  superior court, alleging that his "conviction and/or sentence are in
  violation of the United States and Vermont Constitutions."  In particular,
  he alleged that the trial judge committed judicial misconduct by attempting
  to coerce a plea agreement with off-the-record threats of a lengthy
  sentence if Gould proceeded to trial and was found guilty.  Gould also
  alleged that, in the same discussion, the judge promised a lighter ten-year
  minimum sentence if Gould would plead guilty.  Gould further claimed that
  the failure of his trial attorney and the prosecution to object to the
  alleged coercion constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and
  prosecutorial misconduct. 
   
       ¶  5.  Gould included a request for appointment of counsel in his
  motion.  Because the Prisoner's Rights Office had a conflict of interest,
  the superior court appointed Robert Andres as Gould's counsel.  Attorney
  Andres also had a conflict of interest and was replaced as counsel in
  September by Martin Maley.  By March 2001, attorney Maley had joined the
  Public Defender's Office and had been replaced by William Norful.   

       ¶  6.  After a status conference, Norful told Gould that he would call
  him to follow up about additional witnesses that Gould hoped would have
  information favorable to his petition.  When Norful did not call, Gould
  sent him a letter indicating that there were more witnesses in the case. 
  Norful had decided, however, that to "avoid any misunderstandings" all
  future attorney client communication would be in writing.  Norful replied
  accordingly with a two-page letter that made cursory review of each of
  Gould's three claims.  Norful wrote the letter prior to conferring with
  Gould's trial counsel regarding the events at issue in Gould's petition. 
  In the letter, Norful told Gould that there were insufficient grounds on
  which to present Gould's claims to the court.  In essence, Norful told
  Gould he would not represent him.

       ¶  7.  At that point, Gould apparently became concerned that Norful
  would not zealously advocate on his behalf. Gould filed a pro se motion to
  bar attorney Norful from amending the petition until Norful contacted him
  to talk about the case.  In that motion, petitioner requested the court
  forward a letter to Norful because he claimed that Norful had not contacted
  him and would not return his telephone calls.  The court refused to act on
  the pro se motion or to forward Gould's mail to his attorney.  After
  receiving notice that the superior court would not act on his pro se
  motion, Gould informed the court that he had written a letter to the
  professional conduct board about his attorney.  
   
       ¶  8.  Norful responded by filing a one sentence motion to withdraw
  stating that "counsel and client have divergent theories of case
  progression."  At the hearing on Norful's motion to withdraw, Norful
  informed the judge that Gould's petition alleged prosecutorial and judicial
  misconduct, as well as ineffective assistance of counsel.  Norful then went
  on to state that he could not "find" evidence in the record to support his
  client's claims.  Norful explained that he moved to withdraw because the
  "necessary . . . attorney client relationship" was adversely affected and
  Norful felt he could not "communicate with any competence regarding
  [Gould's] claims."  He continued by stating that, as Gould's appointed
  counsel, he could "not find grounds, not even colorful grounds, not even a
  scintilla of evidence that [he could] come forward and make a plausible
  claim to [the] merits before the court.". 

       ¶  9.  The judge proceeded to explore the steps that Norful had taken
  to investigate Gould's claims.  Norful described his review of the relevant
  transcripts and his approximately forty-five minute discussion with Gould's
  trial counsel.  For his part, Gould tried to provide more detail about the
  communication between him and Norful until the judge interjected that she
  was not going to get into the middle of attorney-client correspondence. 
  She stated that: "[a]ll I'm trying to do is figure out whether or not there
  is either a conflict or a problem of incompetence."  The judge then
  reiterated the actions that Norful claimed he had taken in furtherance of
  Gould's petition, and announced that she was satisfied that Norful had been
  competent, thorough, and responsible.  She then told Gould that he was not
  entitled to more assistance than Norful had already provided him and that
  "based on what [she] had seen, there does not appear to be grounds for the
  Court to appoint another attorney for [Gould]."     
   
       ¶  10.  After noting the lack of objection from the State, the judge
  granted Norful's motion to withdraw.  She then announced that she would not
  appoint another attorney for Gould, even though, as Gould pointed out, he
  had not requested that Norful be removed.  She then told Gould "if you want
  to proceed on your own, that's fine, or get an attorney yourself, that's
  fine."  Later, Gould renewed his motion for appointment of counsel.  The
  judge denied Gould's motion on grounds that the matter was fully considered
  at the hearing on the motion to withdraw.  

       ¶  11.  In January 2002, the State filed a motion for summary judgment
  accompanied by a memorandum of law, a statement of undisputed facts, and
  six exhibits.  The motion raised, among other things, Gould's failure to
  present any nonhearsay evidence in support of his three claims.  In support
  of its argument, the State cited several Vermont cases as well as the text
  of V.R.C.P. 56.  Gould filed a handwritten motion for extension of time to
  respond because he had been moved to another correctional facility in
  Virginia and it did not have any Vermont law books.  The judge granted
  Gould an extension, but Gould was never able to access any legal resources
  and was forced to respond to the State's motion without access to Vermont
  statutes, rules, and case law. 

       ¶  12.  The same judge who granted Norful's motion to withdraw granted
  the State's motion for summary judgment.  Eight months earlier, she had
  heard Gould's court-appointed advocate describe how his review of Gould's
  case had not produced "even a scintilla" of supporting  evidence.  Not
  surprisingly, after reviewing the State's motion for summary judgment, the
  judge concluded that Gould had failed in his unguided attempt to produce
  the evidence necessary to survive summary judgment.  Gould appeals from
  that ruling, asserting solely that the court erred in failing to appoint
  substitute counsel to assist him with the presentation of his petition
  after it allowed Norful to withdraw. 

                                     I.
   
       ¶  13.  Petitioner's statutory right to the assistance of counsel on
  his first PCR motion was improperly denied when the trial court refused his
  request to appoint new counsel after allowing his previous counsel to
  withdraw.  The Public Defender Act (PDA), enacted in 1972, created a
  statutory framework for implementing the constitutional right to counsel
  for accused indigents at trial and on appeal.  1971, No. 161 (Adj. Sess.),
  § 6; see also State v. Wool, 162 Vt. 342, 348-49,