Case Title: Town Of Delafield v. Central Transport Kriewaldt

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017AP002525

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2020-06-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
2020 WI 61 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2017AP2525 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
Town Of Delafield, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
Central Transport Kriewaldt, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 388 Wis. 2d 179,932 N.W.2d 423 
PDC No:2019 WI App 35 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 26, 2020   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
March 27, 2020   
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Waukesha   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael J. Aprahamian   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ZIEGLER, and DALLETT, 
JJ., joined. KELLY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined.  
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs 
filed by Pamela M. Schmidt, Michael K. Roberts, and Scopelitis, 
Garvin, Light, Hanson & Feary, P.C., Milwaukee. 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief filed by 
Kimberly M. Kershek and Law Office of Kimberly Kershek, 
Delafield.  
 
 
2020 WI 61 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2017AP2525 
(L.C. No. 
2017CV859) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Town of Delafield, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
Central Transport Kriewaldt, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 26, 2020 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in 
which ROGGENSACK, C.J., ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ZIEGLER, and DALLET, 
JJ., joined.  KELLY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which 
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined. 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed and 
cause remanded. 
 
¶1 
BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.   When spring finally arrives in 
Wisconsin, and roadways begin to thaw from the long winter, many 
municipalities impose weight limitations on certain roads 
especially vulnerable to deterioration during this time.  The 
Town of Delafield did just that in March 2016.  However, the 
federal Surface Transport and Assistance Act (STAA), along with 
No. 
2017AP2525   
 
2 
 
related federal regulations, limits how states may restrict road 
access between interstate highways and certain destinations.  
This case arose when Central Transport Kriewaldt received a 
citation for operating a tractor-trailer in violation of the 
Town's seasonal weight limitation authorized by its ordinance.  
Central Transport contested the citation on the grounds that the 
limitation was preempted, and therefore disallowed, by the STAA. 
¶2 
We conclude that the STAA's reach in this case 
mandates only reasonable access.  The Town's limitation did not 
need to be grounded solely in safety considerations, as Central 
Transport maintains, so long as reasonable access was provided.  
The record in this case reflects that a seasonal weight 
limitation is a normal restriction transport companies would be 
aware of, that adequate notice of the restriction was provided, 
and that a permit to travel the road was readily available.  Put 
together, these facts show reasonable access was provided, and 
the Town's seasonal weight limitation was not preempted by the 
STAA. 
 
I.  LEGAL PRINCIPLES 
¶3 
In order to understand Central Transport's arguments, 
we need to lay some groundwork regarding preemption generally, 
followed by an examination of what the STAA and related federal 
regulations command.  Once we establish what federal law 
requires, we compare that to the Town's implementation and 
enforcement of its ordinance here. 
No. 
2017AP2525   
 
3 
 
¶4 
Preemption presents a question of law we review de 
novo.  Partenfelder v. Rhode, 2014 WI 80, ¶25, 356 Wis. 2d 492, 
850 N.W.2d 896.  We conduct this analysis accepting the circuit 
court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous.  
Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2) (2017-18).1 
 
A.  Preemption Generally 
¶5 
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution 
provides:  "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the 
supreme Law of the Land."  U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.  
Therefore, "state law that conflicts with federal law is 
'without effect'"; it is preempted.  Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 
Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoted source omitted). 
¶6 
Preemption, however, is disfavored "in the absence of 
persuasive reasons——either that the nature of the regulated 
subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress 
has unmistakably so ordained."  Chi. & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo 
Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981) (quoted source 
omitted).  This presumption against preemption is particularly 
strong when dealing with the historic police powers of the 
state.  Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 77 (2008).  
Unless it is the "clear and manifest purpose of Congress," we 
assume these traditional areas of state regulation are not 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2017-18 version. 
No. 
2017AP2525   
 
4 
 
superseded by federal law.  Id.  Laws purporting to preempt 
state police power regulations are therefore given a "narrow 
reading."  Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 518. 
¶7 
The preemptive effect of any given federal law is 
guided by Congress's purpose.  Altria Grp., Inc., 555 U.S. at 
76.  And that purpose is discerned through the text, aims, and 
structure of the federal enactment.  Id.  Sometimes Congress 
sets forth its preemptive purpose in the text of a law itself 
(express preemption).  Id.  Preemptive intent may also be 
implied when the federal legislation occupies the legislative 
field (field preemption) or results in an actual conflict with 
state law (conflict preemption).  Id. at 76-77. 
¶8 
Central 
Transport 
argues 
that 
express 
preemption 
applies here.  And in fact, § 31114(a) of the STAA expressly 
provides: 
 
"A 
State 
may 
not 
enact 
or 
enforce 
a 
law 
denying . . . reasonable 
access 
between" 
certain 
roads 
and 
destinations.  49 U.S.C. § 31114(a) (2012) (emphasis added).  
This is an express preemption clause.  But even when Congress 
expressly preempts state law, "it does not immediately end the 
inquiry because the question of the substance and scope of 
Congress' displacement of state law still remains."  Altria 
Grp., Inc., 555 U.S. at 76.  The relevant question here is what 
exactly this "reasonable access" prohibition means and what it 
applies to.  As discussed more fully below, Central Transport 
argues that any restriction on access must be based on safety 
considerations, and that the Town's seasonal weight limitation 
No. 
2017AP2525   
 
5 
 
is expressly preempted because protecting the roads during the 
spring thaw is not a safety-based regulation. 
¶9 
Central Transport argues in the alternative that the 
STAA and related regulations indirectly preempt the Town's 
enforcement of a seasonal weight limitation because they 
actually conflict.  That is, even if a seasonal weight 
limitation is not expressly preempted, the Town's implementation 
and enforcement of that limitation runs contrary to the 
reasonable access federal law demands.  Conflict preemption 
occurs "when compliance with both the federal and state laws is 
a physical impossibility or when a state law is a barrier to the 
accomplishment and execution of Congress['s] objectives and 
purposes."  Hazelton v. State Pers. Comm'n, 178 Wis. 2d 776, 
787, 505 N.W.2d 793 (Ct. App. 1993). 
 
B.  The STAA and Accompanying Federal Regulations 
¶10 The portion of the STAA that requires states to 
provide reasonable access to commercial motor vehicles is found 
in 49 U.S.C. § 31114.  Subsection (a) provides that a state "may 
not enact or enforce a law denying to a commercial motor vehicle 
subject to this subchapter or subchapter I of this chapter 
reasonable access between" the interstate highway system as 
described in § 31114(a)(1)2 and certain locations described in 
                                                 
2 The specifically covered interstate highways are defined 
as:  "the Dwight D. Eisenhower System of Interstate and Defense 
Highways (except a segment exempted under section 31111(f) or 
31113(e) of this title) and other qualifying Federal-aid Primary 
System highways designated by the Secretary of Transportation."  
49 U.S.C. § 31114(a)(1). 
No. 
2017AP2525   
 
6 
 
§ 31114(a)(2) (and discussed further below).  § 31114(a).  This 
requires some unpacking. 
¶11 Section 31114(a) sets the general legal standard by 
prohibiting states from denying what the law calls "reasonable 
access."  The prohibition applies "to a commercial motor vehicle 
subject to this subchapter or subchapter I of this chapter."  
Id.  And subchapter I defines a "commercial motor vehicle" in 
part as "a self-propelled or towed vehicle used on the highways 
in commerce principally to transport passengers or cargo, if the 
vehicle——(A) has a gross vehicle weight rating or gross vehicle 
weight of at least 10,001 pounds, whichever is greater."  49 
U.S.C. § 31101(1).3  The tractor-trailer in this case fits this 
definition; it was used in commerce to transport cargo and met 
the weight requirement. 
                                                 
3 The full definition of a "commercial motor vehicle" is:   
a self-propelled or towed vehicle used on the highways 
in commerce principally to transport passengers or 
cargo, if the vehicle—— 
(A) has a gross vehicle weight rating or gross vehicle 
weight of at least 10,001 pounds, whichever is 
greater; 
(B) is designed to transport more than 10 passengers 
including the driver; or 
(C) is used in transporting material found by the 
Secretary of Transportation to be hazardous under 
section 5103 of this title and transported in a 
quantity 
requiring 
placarding 
under 
regulations 
prescribed by the Secretary under section 5103. 
49 U.S.C. § 31101(1). 
No. 
2017AP2525   
 
7 
 
¶12 Section 31114(a)(2) details the potential destinations 
from the highway for which states must maintain reasonable 
access:   
terminals, facilities for food, fuel, repairs, and 
rest, 
and 
points 
of 
loading 
and 
unloading 
for 
household 
goods 
carriers, 
motor 
carriers 
of 
passengers, 
any 
towaway 
trailer 
transporter 
combination (as defined in section 31111(a)), or any 
truck tractor-semitrailer combination in which the 
semitrailer has a length of not more than 28.5 feet 
and that generally operates as part of a vehicle 
combination described in section 31111(c) of this 
title. 
49 U.S.C. § 31114(a)(2).  Although its grammatical clarity will 
not win any awards, the sentence structure and punctuation4 
suggest three separate categories of destinations:   
 terminals;  
 facilities for food, fuel, repairs, and rest; and  
 points of loading and unloading for four specific 
types of carriers:   
o household goods carriers,  
o motor carriers of passengers,  
o any towaway trailer transporter combination (as 
defined in § 31111(a)), or  
o any truck tractor-semitrailer combination in 
which the semitrailer has a length of not more 
than 28.5 feet and that generally operates as 
                                                 
4 See Flug v. LIRC, 2017 WI 72, ¶32, 376 Wis. 2d 571, 898 
N.W.2d 91 (relying on the "rules of grammar" to interpret a 
statute); State v. Holcomb, 2016 WI App 70, ¶¶11-12, 371 
Wis. 2d 647, 886 N.W.2d 100 (explaining statutory structure and 
punctuation are important in statutory interpretation). 
No. 
2017AP2525   
 
8 
 
part of a vehicle combination described in 
§ 31111(c). 
¶13 This reading is confirmed by the federal regulation 
tied to this provision, which stands as a near word-for-word 
copy of the statutory language.  The regulation begins, "No 
State may enact or enforce any law denying reasonable access to 
vehicles with dimensions authorized by the STAA between the 
[national highway network] and terminals and facilities for 
food, fuel, repairs, and rest."  23 C.F.R. § 658.19(a) (2018).  
The conjunction "and" separates and therefore categorizes 
terminals on the one hand, and facilities for food, fuel, 
repairs, and rest on the other hand.5  Notably, a period follows, 
and a new sentence begins:   
In addition, no State may enact or enforce any law 
denying 
reasonable 
access 
between 
the 
[national 
highway network] and points of loading and unloading 
to 
household 
goods 
carriers, 
motor 
carriers 
of 
passengers, 
and 
any 
truck 
tractor-semitrailer 
combination in which the semitrailer has a length not 
to exceed 28 feet (28.5 feet where allowed pursuant to 
§ 658.13(b)(5) of this part) and which generally 
operates as part of a vehicle combination described in 
§§ 658.13(b)(5) and 658.15(a) of this part.   
Id.  This confirms that the last category of destinations, 
including its specific application to certain truck tractor-
semitrailer combinations, is separate and apart from the other 
categories of destinations:  terminals and facilities for food, 
fuel, repairs, and rest. 
                                                 
5 See State v. Arberry, 2018 WI 7, ¶19, 379 Wis. 2d 254, 905 
N.W.2d 832 (explaining "[w]ords are to be given the meaning that 
proper grammar and usage would assign them" (quoted source 
omitted)). 
No. 
2017AP2525   
 
9 
 
¶14 As it did before the court of appeals, Central 
Transport contends that its destination was a terminal.  In 
response, the Town inverts the language of 49 U.S.C. § 31114 and 
argues that the four types of carriers enumerated to carry goods 
to "points of loading and unloading" are also the only carriers 
covered by the statute when traveling to "terminals" and 
"facilities for food, fuel, repairs, and rest."  As explained 
above, this is incorrect as a matter of statutory construction.  
The Town develops no further argument to directly contest that 
Central Transport's attempted destination was a terminal.  The 
Town took the same approach below, leading the court of appeals 
to assume without deciding Central Transport's tractor-trailer 
was traveling to a terminal.  See Town of Delafield v. Cent. 
Transp. Kriewaldt, 2019 WI App 35, ¶5 n.2, 388 Wis. 2d 179, 932 
N.W.2d 423.  Without the benefit of a contested argument on this 
point, we too assume without deciding the attempted destination 
was a terminal and therefore covered by the STAA. 
¶15 The destination distinction is also important in light 
of Central Transport's arguments based on 49 U.S.C. § 31114(b), 
which is denominated an "exception" to the STAA's general 
reasonable access requirement under § 31114(a).  It provides:   
Exception.——This section does not prevent a State or 
local 
government 
from 
imposing 
reasonable 
restrictions, based on safety considerations, on a 
truck tractor-semitrailer combination in which the 
semitrailer has a length of not more than 28.5 feet 
and that generally operates as part of a vehicle 
combination described in section 31111(c) of this 
title. 
No. 
2017AP2525   
 
10 
 
§ 31114(b).  By its plain language, this exception only applies 
to a certain type of vehicle, "a truck tractor-semitrailer 
combination in which the semitrailer has a length of not more 
than 28.5 feet and that generally operates as part of a vehicle 
combination described in section 31111(c) of this title."  Id.  
That language exactly mirrors one of the types of carriers under 
§ 31114(a)(2) that may not be denied access to points of loading 
or unloading.6  In the context of an already announced general 
reasonable access requirement, this exception appears to give 
states the authority to impose additional reasonable, safety-
based restrictions on vehicles meeting this specific profile. 
¶16  Central Transport has a different take.  It asks this 
court to read the STAA's reasonable access requirement narrowly 
to only permit restrictions based on safety considerations.  In 
other words, rather than a general reasonable access requirement 
that seems apparent from the text of 49 U.S.C. § 31114(a), 
Central 
Transport 
posits 
that 
§ 31114(b) 
requires 
all 
restrictions on access to be based on safety, and safety alone.  
It asks us to rule in its favor in part on the grounds that the 
seasonal weight limitation authorized by state law and the 
                                                 
6 And "absent textual or structural clues to the contrary" a 
particular word or phrase used more than once in the same act is 
understood "to carry the same meaning each time."  State ex rel. 
DNR v. Wis. Court of Appeals, Dist. IV, 2018 WI 25, ¶30, 380 
Wis. 2d 354, 909 N.W.2d 114.  
No. 
2017AP2525   
 
11 
 
Town's ordinance was not a safety-based restriction and is 
therefore expressly preempted by and in conflict with the STAA.7 
¶17  This argument does not hold water under a plain 
reading of the text.  Nothing in 49 U.S.C. § 31114(b) suggests 
all local restrictions on access to statutorily protected 
destinations must be based on safety considerations.  Rather 
§ 31114(b) 
plainly 
authorizes 
additional 
safety-based 
                                                 
7 For purposes of our examination, the Town's ordinance 
adopts Wis. Stat. § 348.17(1), which provides:   
No person, whether operating under a permit or 
otherwise, shall operate a vehicle in violation of 
special weight limitations imposed by state or local 
authorities on particular highways, highway structures 
or portions of highways when signs have been erected 
as required by [Wis. Stat. §] 349.16(2) giving notice 
of such weight limitations, except when the vehicle is 
being operated under a permit expressly authorizing 
such weight limitations to be exceeded or is being 
operated as authorized under sub. 4. 
The corresponding Town of Delafield, Wis. Ordinance § 7.01(1) 
provides:   
STATUTORY 
REGULATIONS. 
 
Except 
as 
otherwise 
specifically provided in this chapter, all provisions 
of Chs. 340 to 348, Wis. Stats., describing and 
defining regulations with respect to vehicles and 
traffic for which the penalty is a forfeiture only, 
including penalties to be imposed and procedures for 
prosecution, are hereby adopted and by reference made 
a part of this chapter as if fully set forth herein.  
Any act required to be performed or prohibited by any 
statute incorporated herein by reference is required 
or 
prohibited 
by 
this 
chapter. 
 
Any 
further 
amendments, revisions or modifications of statutes 
incorporated herein are intended to be made part of 
this chapter in order to secure uniform statewide 
regulation of traffic on the highways, streets and 
alleys. 
No. 
2017AP2525   
 
12 
 
restrictions on certain types of vehicles.  If Congress intended 
to do what Central Transport suggests, it would have placed the 
safety-based language in § 31114(a), not created an exception in 
a separate subsection.  The primary statutory standard for all 
covered vehicles and destinations is reasonable access. 
¶18 The First Circuit Court of Appeals held likewise in 
affirming a district court's conclusion that a zoning ordinance 
limiting nighttime access to and from a local trucking terminal 
was not preempted.  N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n v. Town of 
Plaistow, 67 F.3d 326 (1st Cir. 1995).  The argument there, as 
here, was primarily that the restriction was not allowable 
because it was not based on safety.  Id. at 329. 
¶19 Looking to the statute as a whole, the First Circuit 
observed that the reasonable access mandate extends far and wide 
to 
many 
local 
roads. 
 
Id. at 
330. 
 
Disallowing 
local 
restrictions other than those based on safety "miles away from 
any interstate or national network highway" would not be 
consistent with the apparent goals of the federal law.  Id.  
Instead, 
as 
the 
court 
explained, 
communities 
have 
many 
legitimate interests outside of safety——assuring quiet in a 
hospital zone, for example.  Id.  "It is difficult to conceive 
that Congress meant to exclude such a concern from the calculus 
used to determine whether a restriction infringes on 'reasonable 
access' to the federal highway system."  Id. 
¶20 The court further pointed to the text itself, along 
with the statutory history, as contrary to a safety-only 
reading, explaining:  "the original 1982 Surface Act contained 
No. 
2017AP2525   
 
13 
 
the reasonable access language with no exception provision; so 
nothing in 1982 suggested that state access restrictions were 
limited to those based on safety."  Id.  The safety-based 
exception, added in 1984, is not worded in such a way and does 
not appear calculated to impose far more dramatic restrictions 
on local regulation.  Id.; Tandem Truck Safety Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 98-554, § 106 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 2312 
(1988)).8  In short, "[s]afety is obviously a paramount reason 
for limiting access; but, in our view, it is not the only reason 
permitted by Congress."  N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n, 67 F.3d at 
331. 
¶21 The 
Seventh 
Circuit 
has 
echoed 
this 
same 
understanding.  Under 49 U.S.C. § 31114, "states are still free 
to exercise their police powers over state highways and local 
roads, so long as these regulations do not impede 'reasonable 
access' for commercial motor vehicles traveling between the 
Interstate and places such as terminals."  Aux Sable Liquid 
Prods. v. Murphy, 526 F.3d 1028, 1036 (7th Cir. 2008).  The 
Seventh Circuit explicitly rejected the notion that permissible 
state or local restrictions must be based on safety, agreeing 
with the First Circuit's decision in New Hampshire Motor 
                                                 
8 This section was later renumbered from 49 U.S.C. § 2312 to 
49 U.S.C. § 31114.  See Act of July 5, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
272. 
No. 
2017AP2525   
 
14 
 
Transport Ass'n.9  Id. at 1036 n.4.  The proper interpretation of 
"§ 31114(a) is that states may exercise their police powers for 
any number of reasons, so long as reasonable access is 
provided."  Id. 
¶22 The statutory text and context, federal regulations, 
and federal circuit court caselaw reject a limitation on local 
restrictions based solely on safety concerns.10  The traditional 
power of state and local governments to regulate travel over 
local roads remains so long as reasonable access is not denied.  
Central 
Transport's 
argument 
that 
the 
Town's 
ordinance 
authorizing seasonal weight limitations is expressly preempted 
based on its safety-focused reading of the STAA is incorrect.11  
                                                 
9 A federal regulation further limits imposing restrictions 
within one mile from the national highway network to "specific 
safety reasons."  23 C.F.R. § 658.19(d).  This constraint is not 
applicable in this case as the Town's seasonal weight limitation 
was implemented more than one mile away from the interstate.  
See Aux Sable Liquid Prods. v. Murphy, 526 F.3d 1028, 1036 n.4 
(7th Cir. 2008). 
10 Only two federal circuit courts have addressed this 
question.  See Aux Sable Liquid Prods., 526 F.3d at 1036 n.4; 
N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n v. Town of Plaistow, 67 F.3d 326, 331 
(1st Cir. 1995).  Prior to these decisions, several federal 
district courts concluded differently.  See A.B.F. Freight Sys., 
Inc. v. Suthard, 681 F. Supp. 334, 345 (E.D. Va. 1988); N.Y. 
State Motor Truck Ass'n Inc. v. City of New York, 654 F. 
Supp. 1521, 1539 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Consol. Freightways Corp. of 
Del. v. Larson, 647 F. Supp. 1479, 1492 (M.D. Pa. 1986), 
reversed on other grounds, 827 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1987). 
11 We therefore need not determine whether an express 
limitation placed on a "State," such as the one found in 49 
U.S.C. § 31114(a), extends to local governments such as the 
Town.  See also Aux Sable Liquid Prods., 526 F.3d at 1034 n.3 
(raising the same question, but determining deciding it was 
unnecessary). 
No. 
2017AP2525   
 
15 
 
Any conflict preemption analysis on these grounds likewise 
fails.  The specific conflict preemption question remaining in 
light of the facts of this case is whether Central Transport was 
denied reasonable access to its destination. 
 
II.  CENTRAL TRANSPORT WAS AFFORDED REASONABLE ACCESS 
¶23 As we have explained, the preemption question under 49 
U.S.C. § 31114, and the specific challenge brought by Central 
Transport, is fact-specific.  Although states are not permitted 
to "define the term however they see fit," the broad and 
undefined phrase "reasonable access" reflects "a recognition on 
Congress's part that the manner and degree of access to and from 
the Interstate necessary to protect Congress's overarching goal 
of uniformity for commercial motor vehicles utilizing the 
Interstate will vary across the country."  See Aux Sable Liquid 
Prods., 526 F.3d at 1036.  "Our task is 'to determine whether, 
under the circumstances of this particular case, [the Town's 
ordinance] stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.'"  
MITE Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486, 491 (7th Cir. 1980) (quoted 
source omitted).  "This inquiry requires us to consider the 
relationship between state and federal laws as they are 
interpreted and applied, not merely as they are written."  Id.  
In that spirit, we turn to the facts precipitating this 
litigation, and the Town's implementation of its seasonal weight 
limitation. 
No. 
2017AP2525   
 
16 
 
¶24 On Monday, March 7, 2016, a Waukesha County deputy 
sheriff cited Central Transport for violating the Town's 
seasonal weight limitation when one of its drivers operating a 
tractor-trailer was on his way to deliver art supplies.  After 
the Lake County Municipal Court assessed a forfeiture in the 
amount of $1,532.50, Central Transport appealed to the circuit 
court.  The circuit court conducted a bench trial and granted 
Central Transport's motion to dismiss on preemption grounds.12  
The court of appeals reversed, concluding the Town's limitation 
afforded reasonable access and was not preempted.  Cent. Transp. 
Kriewaldt, 388 Wis. 2d 179, ¶6.  We granted Central Transport's 
petition for review. 
¶25 While the circuit court made few factual findings, the 
relevant record is based on the testimony of the deputy sheriff 
who issued the citation and the Town's highway department 
superintendent. 
 
This 
testimony 
was 
unrebutted; 
Central 
Transport offered no witnesses or evidence at the trial.  The 
record reflects the following. 
¶26 In 2016, the Town's seasonal weight limitation went 
into 
effect 
when 
the 
superintendent 
believed, 
based 
on 
conditions on the ground during the spring thaw, that excess 
weight left certain roads particularly vulnerable to damage.  
The limitation prohibited vehicles weighing over six tons from 
traveling on certain Town roads.  The record is clear that 
                                                 
12 The Honorable Michael J. Aprahamian, Waukesha County 
Circuit Court, presided. 
No. 
2017AP2525   
 
17 
 
Central Transport's offending tractor-trailer weighed more than 
six tons and traveled on roads where the weight limitation 
applied.13  The limitation was imposed on Monday, March 7, and 
remained in effect until Friday, March 11.14  The Town provided 
notice of the limitation through free-standing road signs posted 
on Friday, March 4.  It was also the Town's practice to post the 
seasonal weight limitation on its website and in a local paper. 
¶27 Despite this one-week weight limitation, the Town's 
roads were not off limits.  The Town offered permits that 
allowed overweight vehicles to drive on otherwise restricted 
roads.  A permit could be obtained by calling the Town and going 
into the superintendent's office.  The superintendent would then 
issue a temporary permit along with a route the driver needed to 
take to minimize travel on restricted roads.  The superintendent 
testified that, to his knowledge, he never denied a request for 
a permit in the fifteen years he served in his role.  He also 
explained that many companies would call the Town to inquire if 
the seasonal weight limitation was in effect.  The Waukesha 
                                                 
13 The superintendent and the deputy sheriff who issued the 
citation offered conflicting testimony with respect to whether 
the weight limitation was in effect on the specific intersection 
where the tractor-trailer was found.  Regardless, no party 
disputes that the tractor-trailer at some point traveled on a 
road with the noticed weight limitation in effect. 
14 The Town had no independent records regarding when the 
2016 limitation was posted or the period it was in effect; the 
records were lost in moving to a new office.  However, the 
superintendent based his testimony on when the City of Pewaukee 
posted its seasonal weight limitation because the Town and City 
coordinated 
the 
implementation 
of 
their 
seasonal 
weight 
limitations. 
No. 
2017AP2525   
 
18 
 
County Sheriff's Office, according to testimony from the deputy 
sheriff who issued the citation, also received phone calls 
inquiring if any seasonal weight limitations were in effect in 
the county.  While the posted signs did not say anything about 
the permitting process,15 the website included information 
regarding how to obtain a permit to travel on weight-limited 
roads and the phone number for the superintendent. 
¶28 We read this record to reflect that at the time 
Central 
Transport 
received 
its 
citation, 
seasonal 
weight 
limitations were normal and known for those making commercial 
deliveries during that time of year in Wisconsin.  Calls to the 
highway department or sheriff's office to determine the nature 
and effective date of any limitations were likewise commonplace.  
The record also indicates that Central Transport's truck could 
have obtained a permit to reach its destination, and if past is 
prologue, likely would have received one if so requested.16 
                                                 
15 The posted signs provided:  "TEMPORARY BY ORDER OF THE 
TOWN OF DELAFIELD WEIGHT LIMIT 6 TONS." 
16 Central 
Transport 
contends 
that 
the 
potential 
of 
patchwork seasonal weight limitations ranging in time, duration, 
and scale presents too much of a burden for commercial trucking 
outfits, especially those, like Central Transport, that do not 
travel regularly in the area.  However, Central Transport 
presented no evidence at trial to substantiate those arguments.  
Our decision here must be made in light of and specific to the 
facts presented at trial.  Our decision is not a review of the 
Town's seasonal weight limitation generally, nor is it an 
opinion regarding seasonal weight limitations that might be 
imposed by other state and local governments.  We review only 
the Town's application under this record and in this instance. 
No. 
2017AP2525   
 
19 
 
¶29 Taken together, we conclude the specific facts of this 
case demonstrate that Central Transport had reasonable access to 
its destination.  Central Transport's driver could have checked 
the 
website 
or 
called 
ahead 
to 
determine 
whether 
any 
restrictions were in effect.  Or, upon seeing the seasonal 
weight limitation was posted, the driver could have contacted 
the Town, driven to the office, and obtained a permit that would 
have allowed the tractor-trailer to lawfully traverse necessary 
roads.  The weight limitation was also based on a reasonably 
tailored and well-founded police power consideration——damage to 
roads that were especially vulnerable during the spring thaw. 
¶30 While such a system did not provide Central Transport 
unfettered access to its delivery point, it also did not 
prohibit all access.  Cf. Aux Sable Liquid Prods., 526 F.3d at 
1037 (holding that a weight restriction prohibiting all access 
to a road was not reasonable access); N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n, 
67 F.3d at 329, 331 (concluding that a limitation of access at 
night, in the interest in curbing noise, odor, and dust in 
residential areas, granted reasonable access).  The weight-
limited roads were, plainly put, reasonably accessible through a 
readily available permit process.17  Central Transport had a 
                                                 
17 Central Transport argues a scheme where permits are 
always granted would have no purpose and is not reasonable.  But 
a 
weight 
limitation 
would 
surely 
discourage 
and 
deter 
unnecessary driving on subject roads.  The permit system 
represented in the record before us would also give a Town-
prescribed route for drivers to take that would minimize road 
damage while still allowing drivers to reach their destination. 
No. 
2017AP2525   
 
20 
 
reasonable means of getting from the highway to its destination, 
the main concern of the STAA.  In light of the presumption that 
the state retains its police powers, and that this federal 
restriction 
should 
be 
read 
narrowly, 
we 
conclude 
the 
implementation and enforcement of the Town's ordinance, which 
Central Transport admits it violated, does not conflict with and 
therefore was not preempted by the STAA and its related 
regulations. 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶31 Central Transport's tractor-trailer had reasonable 
access from the highway to its intended destination when it was 
cited for violating the Town's seasonal weight limitations on 
certain Town roads as authorized by the Town's ordinance.  The 
facts of this case demonstrate Central Transport could have 
lawfully made its delivery by obtaining a permit, which was 
readily available.  Therefore, the Town's implementation of its 
weight-limit ordinance in 2016 was not preempted by the STAA, 
and the citation was permissibly issued to Central Transport.  
This cause is remanded to the circuit court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court. 
 
No.  2017AP2525.dk 
 
1 
 
¶32 DANIEL KELLY, J.   (concurring).  A truck driver for 
Central Transport Kriewaldt ("Central Transport") was delivering 
goods to a customer at a residential address when he was 
ticketed 
for 
violating 
the 
Town 
of 
Delafield's 
seasonal 
permitting system.  Central Transport says Delafield may not 
have such a system because it interferes with its "reasonable 
access" between an interstate freeway and a "terminal" in 
violation 
of 
49 
U.S.C. 
§ 31114 
(2012) 
(the 
Surface 
Transportation Assistance Act ("STAA")).  The court's opinion 
promised it would determine whether the seasonal permitting 
system is consistent with the STAA, but its analysis stopped 
well short of its goal.  So although I concur with the court's 
judgment, I have a different reason for doing so. 
¶33 The goal the court set for itself was not an easy one.  
In fact, unlocking the meaning of "reasonable access" is a bit 
of a paradox, which was succinctly described in Aux Sable Liquid 
Prod. v. Murphy, 526 F.3d 1028 (7th Cir. 2008).  There, the 
court recognized that Congress had made a decision "not to 
define 'reasonable access' more specifically."  Id. at 1036.  
But this, it said, was not an invitation for states "to define 
the term however they see fit" because "[i]f states were truly 
left to define this term on their own, the express preemption 
language 
in 
§ 31114(a) 
would 
be 
rendered 
effectively 
meaningless, since states would be able to define 'reasonable 
access' so as to allow state and local authorities to severely 
impede commercial motor vehicles' access to the Interstate."  
Id. at 1036, 1035.  And that would destroy the uniformity the 
No.  2017AP2525.dk 
 
2 
 
STAA was created to achieve.  That's one side of the paradox.  
Here's the other:   
[T]his broad language can be viewed as reflecting a 
recognition on Congress's part that the manner and 
degree of access to and from the Interstate necessary 
to protect Congress's overarching goal of uniformity 
for commercial motor vehicles utilizing the Interstate 
will vary across the country depending on factors such 
as whether the Interstate is cutting across rural or 
metro areas, traffic density on the road, and other 
considerations. 
Id. at 1036.  So, at least according to Aux Sable Liquid Prod., 
the STAA requires "uniformity for commercial motor vehicles 
utilizing the Interstate" (meaning states may not define 
"reasonable access" for themselves), but the uniformity will 
"vary across the country."  Id.  I'm not saying that circle 
can't be squared, but finding the edges requires work that the 
majority opinion simply didn't do. 
¶34 I suppose the easiest response to a paradox is to 
ignore it, and that seems to have been our choice today.  The 
court 
says 
Delafield's 
seasonal 
permitting 
process 
was 
reasonable, 
but 
did 
so 
without 
discussing, 
or 
even 
acknowledging, the uniformity mandate that is the motivating 
rationale for the STAA's existence.  Instead, we discussed the 
benefits of the permitting system and  made some case-specific 
observations such as that "seasonal weight limitations were 
normal and known for those making commercial deliveries during 
that time of year in Wisconsin[]"; that permits could be 
obtained on a 24/7 basis; and that a permit has never been 
denied.  Majority op., ¶28.  And the court's conclusion was 
explicitly case-specific:  "[T]he specific facts of this case 
No.  2017AP2525.dk 
 
3 
 
demonstrate that Central Transport had reasonable access to its 
destination."  Id., ¶29.  
¶35 If we had been given explicit authority to develop our 
own, state-specific definition of "reasonable access," I don't 
know how it would differ from what we accomplished today.  Every 
consideration used to assess whether the permitting system 
interfered with "reasonable access" comprised nothing but our 
own sense of what is reasonable.  We made no effort to 
demonstrate how this would fit into the Congressionally-mandated 
"uniform standards for commercial motor vehicles,"1 or even what 
the points of reference for such an analysis would be.  What we 
are left with, therefore, is the Wisconsin Supreme Court's own 
sense of what "reasonable access" entails.  That may or may not 
also be consistent with the uniformity required by the STAA, but 
nothing in our opinion explains why it might be.  Therefore, the 
court didn't finish the analysis, and so I cannot join it. 
¶36 I reach the same conclusion as the court, however, for 
a more straightforward reason.  Central Transport had recourse 
to the STAA for the purpose of striking down the ordinance that 
was the source of authority for Delafield's citation.  As the 
proponent 
of 
this 
proposition, 
it 
bore 
the 
burden 
of 
establishing that the STAA preempted that ordinance.  See, e.g., 
Sausen v. Town of Black Creek Bd. of Review, 2014 WI 9, ¶19, 352 
Wis. 2d 576, 843 N.W.2d 39 (quoting Loeb v. Bd. of Regents, 29 
                                                 
1 Aux Sable Liquid Prod. v. Murphy, 526 F.3d 1028, 1036 (7th 
Cir. 2008). 
 
No.  2017AP2525.dk 
 
4 
 
Wis. 2d 159, 164, 138 N.W.2d 227 (1965)) ("[A] party seeking 
judicial process to advance his position carries the burden of 
proof[.]"); see also Upper Lakes Shipping, Ltd. v. Seafarers' I. 
Union, 22 Wis. 2d 7, 17, 125 N.W.2d 324 (1963).   
¶37 The first step in such an undertaking is establishing 
that the route it was driving was covered by the federal 
statutes.  The STAA is applicable to travel between certain 
interstate highways (of which Interstate 94 is one) and 
terminals, facilities for food, fuel, repairs, and 
rest, 
and 
points 
of 
loading 
and 
unloading 
for 
household 
goods 
carriers, 
motor 
carriers 
of 
passengers, 
any 
towaway 
trailer 
transporter 
combination (as defined in section 31111(a)), or any 
truck tractor-semitrailer combination in which the 
semitrailer has a length of not more than 28.5 feet 
and that generally operates as part of a vehicle 
combination described in section 31111(c) of this 
title. 
49 
U.S.C. 
§ 31114(a)(2). 
 
This 
provision 
describes 
two 
categories of potential destinations.  The first is narrow, 
comprising only "terminals, facilities for food, fuel, repairs, 
and rest," but it contains no limitations on the types of 
carriers traveling to those destinations.  Id.  The second 
category 
of 
potential 
destinations 
is 
much 
broader; 
it 
encompasses all "points of loading and unloading."  Id.  But 
this category applies only to a subset of carriers defined as 
"household goods carriers, motor carriers of passengers, any 
towaway trailer transporter combination (as defined in section 
31111(a)), or any truck tractor-semitrailer combination in which 
the semitrailer has a length of not more than 28.5 feet and that 
No.  2017AP2525.dk 
 
5 
 
generally 
operates 
as 
part 
of 
a 
vehicle 
combination 
[colloquially known as a single 'pup' trailer]."  Id. 
¶38 For the STAA to apply in this case, therefore, Central 
Transport had to describe where it fit in the matrix of 
destinations and carrier types.  It settled on the claim that 
its truck was headed to a "terminal" when its driver was 
ticketed.  But the claimed "terminal" was a residence.  At least 
two federal courts have noted that not every delivery address is 
a "terminal" within the meaning of the STAA:  "Points of loading 
and unloading, unlike locations of terminals, necessarily change 
with great frequency and are dependent upon the locations of the 
customers serviced by trucking companies."  A.B.F. Freight Sys., 
Inc. v. Suthard, 681 F.Supp. 334, 344 (E.D. Va. 1988) (quoting 
Consolidated Freightways v. Larson, 647 F.Supp. 1479, 1494 (M.D. 
Pa. 1986).  So although every terminal is a place of loading and 
unloading, not every place of loading and unloading is a 
terminal.2  If it were not so, there would be no point in 
describing the two categories of destinations. 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., 23 C.F.R. § 658.19(a): 
No State may enact or enforce any law denying 
reasonable 
access 
to 
vehicles 
with 
dimensions 
authorized by the STAA between the NN and terminals 
and facilities for food, fuel, repairs, and rest. In 
addition, no State may enact or enforce any law 
denying reasonable access between the NN and points of 
loading and unloading to household goods carriers, 
motor carriers of passengers, and any truck tractor-
semitrailer combination in which the semitrailer has a 
length not to exceed 28 feet (28.5 feet where allowed 
pursuant to § 658.13(b)(5) of this part) and which 
generally operates as part of a vehicle combination 
described in §§ 658.13(b)(5) and 658.15(a) of this 
part. 
No.  2017AP2525.dk 
 
6 
 
¶39 Unfortunately, everyone seems to have just assumed 
that a residence qualifies as a terminal within the meaning of 
49 U.S.C. § 31114(a)(2).  The circuit court did not address this 
question. The court of appeals candidly admitted it wasn't 
deciding it either.  Town of Delafield v. Cent. Transp. 
Kriewaldt, 2019 WI App 35, ¶5 n.2, 388 Wis. 2d 179, 932 N.W.2d 
423 ("Because the Town develops no argument challenging Central 
Transports' position that the residence where the art supplies 
were to be delivered constitutes a 'terminal,' we assume, 
without deciding, that it does.").  Nor did we choose to take it 
up.3  When a party fails to contest an opponent's proposition, we 
quite frequently take it as admitted and proceed with our 
analysis accordingly.  But we don't discern the meaning of 
statutory terms based on whether the parties choose to contest 
them.  We have an independent duty to ensure our understanding 
of the statute is accurate.  A "terminal" does not encompass a 
residential address simply because Delafield chose not to 
contest Central Transport's assertion. 
¶40 I think we should have resolved this case based on 
Central Transport's failure to establish that its destination 
was a terminal.  This is important because what constitutes 
"reasonable access" could be very different depending on which 
of 
the 
STAA-defined 
categories 
of 
destinations 
we 
are 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Emphasis added.) 
3 See majority op., ¶14 ("Without the benefit of a contested 
argument on this point, we too assume without deciding the 
attempted destination was a terminal and therefore covered by 
the STAA."). 
No.  2017AP2525.dk 
 
7 
 
considering.  The categories don't appear to be arbitrary——they 
describe very different types of places that are likely to be 
present in very different parts of a town, village, or city.  
Terminals (that is, fixed points of cargo transfer) as well as 
places where commercial truckers go for food, fuel, repairs, and 
rest are generally physically concentrated near interstate 
freeways, 
and 
are 
consequently 
served 
by 
a 
more 
robust 
infrastructure.  The types of destinations described in the 
second 
category 
can 
be 
anywhere, 
including 
residential 
neighborhoods and other sensitive areas (such as near hospitals, 
playgrounds, etc.) where the infrastructure may not be as 
sturdy.  What constitutes "reasonable access" for one category 
of destinations may be entirely unreasonable for the other.  But 
because we just assumed Central Transport's destination was a 
terminal, our pronouncement on "reasonable access" applies to 
both without the benefit of ever considering what relevant 
distinctions might exist between the two categories.  This is 
especially problematic in light of the paradox that Delafield's 
ordinance (if covered by the STAA) must be in some manner in 
keeping with uniform standards.  Presumably, those uniform 
standards will vary depending on the category of destinations to 
which they apply. 
¶41 For these reasons, I respectfully concur in the 
court's judgment, but I do not join the opinion. 
¶42 I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL 
BRADLEY 
joins 
this 
concurrence.
No.  2017AP2525.dk 
 
 
 
1