Case Title: Gray v. Mobile Greyhound Park, Ltd.

Citation: 370 So. 2d 1384

Docket Number: 

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 1979-05-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
370 So. 2d 1384 (1979)
Esther GRAY
v.
MOBILE GREYHOUND PARK, LTD., a partnership composed of Franklin D. Brown, et al.
Max GRAY
v.
MOBILE GREYHOUND PARK, LTD., a partnership composed of Franklin D. Brown, et al.
77-671, 77-672.

Supreme Court of Alabama.
May 25, 1979.
*1385 Richard Bounds and Anthony L. Cicio of Cunningham, Bounds, Byrd, Yance and Crowder, Mobile, for appellants.
Michael D. Knight of Hand, Arendall, Bedsole, Greaves & Johnston, Mobile, for appellees.
SHORES, Justice.
These are appeals by Max and Esther Gray, plaintiffs below, from jury verdicts in favor of defendant, Mobile Greyhound Park, Ltd. Mrs. Gray sued for personal injuries sustained when she slipped and fell in the grandstand area of defendant's dog track. Her husband claimed damages for medical expenses and loss of consortium.
On March 22, 1976, Max and Esther Gray, along with their son Terry, attended the dog track owned and operated by Mobile Greyhound Park, Ltd. They paid a general admission fee and were admitted to the grandstand area of the facility at approximately 7:00 p. m., prior to the start of the races. When the Grays entered the grandstand area, it was substantially free of litter. It had been thoroughly cleaned that morning.
The defendant had no employee in the grandstand area who was assigned the task of cleaning the floor during the races; there were two full-time restroom attendants either in or near the grandstand area restrooms throughout the evening. Additionally, there were 25 to 30 trash receptacles in the grandstand area; and defendant's employees in the area were instructed to report safety hazards to the dog track's maintenance personnel.
During the course of the evening's races, there was a gradual accumulation of debris on the floor of the grandstand area which consisted of ticket stubs, paper, racing programs, plastic beverage cups and assorted other trash. This accumulation was a normal occurrence during racing events, largely *1386 because the spectators did not utilize the available trash receptacles.
At trial, Mrs. Gray testified as follows:
". . .
Shortly after the 6th dog race of the evening, at approximately 10:00 p. m., Mrs. Gray slipped and fell on a plastic cup near the winning ticket window. She had been to this same row of windows earlier that same evening but had not noticed the plastic cup upon which she slipped.
As part of its instruction to the jury, the trial court gave defendant's requested charge 5 which reads:
In a discussion between the trial court and counsel regarding the written requested charges of all parties, the following exchange occurred:
". . .
After the noon recess, counsel for all parties gave closing arguments and the trial court instructed the jury, including the reading of defendant's requested charge 5, whereupon the following exchange occurred:
"THE COURT: All right, put your exceptions in there.
"MR. BOUNDS: We don't have any"
The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant Mobile Greyhound Park, Ltd. The trial court entered this verdict and subsequently denied the Grays' motions for new trial or for entry of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Grays appealed and argue that the judgment must be reversed because the court gave charge 5 at the request of the defendant. We affirm.
Initially, we must consider whether the Grays have sufficiently complied with the letter and spirit of ARCP 51 so as to preserve their allegation of error for review by this court. This evaluation must be made in the light of our recent decision in Lollar v. Alabama Power Company, 371 So. 2d 9 (Ala.1979). In Lollar, there was an extended colloquy between the trial court and Lollar's counsel concerning several of the Power Company's proposed written charges. Although the discussion was lengthy, there is no single exchange between counsel and court from which one could specifically glean an objection comporting with the requirements of ARCP 51. After the trial court delivered its charge to the jury, including the defendant's requested written charge, Lollar's counsel stated that he had "no objection." We held that Lollar had failed to properly satisfy Rule 51 and, therefore, had not preserved error for review.
In this case, the Grays' counsel registered his objection to the defendant's charge 5. The objection satisfied the requirements of Rule 51. See Lollar v. Alabama Power Company, supra; Odom v. Linsey, 365 So. 2d 664, (Ala.1978); Hogan v. Alabama Power Company, 351 So. 2d 1378 (Ala.Civ.App. 1977), cert. denied, 351 So. 2d 1388 (Ala. 1977).
We do not agree with the assertion that charge 5 was so misleading or confusing as to require reversal. ARCP 51 states, in part:
As a refused instruction must be evaluated in view of the entire jury charge, so also must a given requested charge be considered as a part of, and not separate from, the entire charge to determine whether it is misleading or confusing. See: Underwriters Nat'I Assurance Co. v. Posey, 333 So. 2d 815 (Ala.1976); Alabama Power Co. v. Tatum, 293 Ala. 500, 306 So. 2d 251 (1975). Charge 5 is neither misleading nor confusing when read as an integral part of the whole.
The Grays argue that charge 5 was not only misleading but also improperly stated the duty owed by Mobile Greyhound Park, Ltd. to business invitee, Mrs. Gray.
In Tice v. Tice, 361 So. 2d 1051, 1052 (Ala.1978), we restated the duty owed an invitee.
Charge 5 addresses the absence of a duty of an invitor to safeguard the invitee against an open and obvious danger or defect in the premises. This absence of duty is commonly referred to as the "no duty" rule and has been thoroughly discussed in 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 63(53), at pages 764-68, as follows:
We find no error in charge 5 as it relates to the absence of duty in the invitor to warn or protect the invitee against open and obvious dangers.
The Grays argue that the littered condition of the floor could not, as a matter of law, be an obvious danger because the hazard did not exist when they were admitted to the area. We disagree. At such places of public amusement as race tracks, dog tracks, ball parks, stadiums and the like, an accumulation of debris upon the walkways during the course of the event is not unlike the build-up of rain water on a storekeeper's floor during storms. In both cases, the accumulation may adversely affect *1389 foot traffica fact with which the invitee is or should be aware. As stated by the court in Terrell v. Warehouse Groceries, 364 So. 2d 675, 677 (Ala.1978), in addressing the gradual accumulation of rain upon floor surfaces:
Similarly, it would be unreasonable to require the owners-operators of public amusement facilities to keep their walkways completely free from litter during the course of an amusement event.
Of course, it is a matter of degree. At some point, a duty to remove the litter obviously arises; and, as in the rain water cases, each case must be decided on its own facts. Under the facts here, however, we cannot say that it was error to give defendant's charge 5.
The judgments appealed from are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
TORBERT, C. J., and MADDOX, ALMON and BEATTY, JJ., concur.