Case Title: New Jersey v. Young

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-61-16

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2018-05-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
SYLLABUS

(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the
convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the
interest of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized.)

                                     State v. Isaac A. Young (A-61-16) (078862)

(NOTE: The Court did not write a plenary opinion in this case. Instead, the Court affirms the judgment of
the Appellate Division substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Rothstadt’s written opinion, which is
published at 
448 N.J. Super. 206 (App. Div. 2017).)

Argued April 24, 2018 -- Decided May 24, 2018

PER CURIAM

        An Appellate Division panel vacated defendant’s conviction of permitting or encouraging the release of a
confidential child abuse record in violation of 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10b. The Court considers the panel’s conclusion that
defendant’s conduct is beyond the statute’s reach.

         During the 2012 mayoral election in the City of Salem, defendant Isaac A. Young was the executive
director of the city’s housing authority. Defendant’s friend and political ally, the incumbent-mayor Robert Davis,
was defeated by then-councilman Charles Washington, who was eventually elected mayor. Defendant came into
possession of documents sent by the Division of Youth and Family Services, now designated the Division of Child
Protection and Permanency (Division), to the City’s police chief. The documents advised the chief that the Division
had substantiated allegations of child abuse against Washington. The allegations were later deemed to be
unsubstantiated. Defendant showed the documents to others in his office and gave copies to a police officer,
Sergeant Leon Daniels, so that Daniels could distribute the documents to others for political purposes.

          Washington found out about the letter’s distribution and called the police chief to his home and showed
him the documents that had been mailed out. The chief “recognized the handwriting on the[ ] envelopes” as being
Daniels’s, and reported the incident to the Salem County Prosecutor’s Office (SCPO). The SCPO initiated an
investigation into the release of the confidential documents. Eventually the SCPO determined that Terri Gross, a
civilian clerk with the police department, had obtained the documents from the department and given them to Mayor
Davis, and that defendant “had nothing to do with” Gross’s release of the documents to Davis.

          Defendant was charged with permitting or encouraging the release of a confidential child abuse record, a
fourth-degree offense, 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10b; hindering his own apprehension or prosecution by giving a false
statement to law enforcement, a disorderly persons offense; and fourth-degree false swearing by inconsistent
statements. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the charge relating to the unlawful release of the confidential
documents, arguing that 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10b did not apply to his conduct. The court denied that motion. After a
mistrial and retrial, defendant was convicted of the three offenses.

         Defendant appealed. An Appellate Division panel affirmed defendant’s convictions for hindering and false
swearing. 
448 N.J. Super. 206, 228 (App. Div. 2017). For the reasons that follow, the panel vacated defendant’s
conviction for violating 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10b and dismissed the indictment for that charge. Ibid.

         The panel stressed that, where it is not clear whether something is permitted under a criminal statute, the
benefit of this lack of clarity should accrue to the defendant. If an ambiguity in a criminal statute is not resolved by
reviewing the text and extrinsic sources, the rule of lenity dictates that the ambiguities must be interpreted in favor
of the defendant. (
448 N.J. Super. at 217-19.)

         Reports of abuse made to the Division and “all information obtained by [the Division] in investigating such
reports” must be kept confidential. 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(a). That information, however, “may be disclosed[, but] only
under the circumstances expressly authorized” by the statute. Ibid. The statute specifies various entities and people
to whom disclosure can be made under various conditions. 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b) to (g). Among them is “[a] police

                                                           1
or other law enforcement agency investigating a report of child abuse or neglect.” 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b)(2). The
statute imposes a duty upon authorized recipients to maintain the confidentiality of the information disclosed to
them by the Division. The prohibition against disclosure states: “Any individual, agency, board, court, grand jury,
legislative committee, or other entity which receives from the department the records and reports referred to in
subsection a., shall keep the records and reports, or parts thereof, confidential and shall not disclose the records and
reports or parts thereof except as authorized by law.” 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b) (emphasis added). The statute,
therefore, prohibits the Division or anyone who receives confidential documents in accordance with the statutes
from failing to maintain the documents’ confidentiality. (
448 N.J. Super. at 219-20.)

         The next statute, 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10b, imposes a penalty upon “[a]ny person who willfully permits or
encourages the release of the contents of any record or report in contravention of this act.” (emphasis added). That
statute makes a release “a misdemeanor . . . subject[ing a violator] to a fine of not more than $1,000.00, or to
imprisonment for not more than 3 years, or both.” Ibid. (
448 N.J. Super. at 220-21.)

          Because the Legislature specifically limited culpability under the statute to authorized individuals or
entities that receive confidential documents from the Division but then fail to maintain their confidentiality or
anyone who encourages their improper release, there was no evidence adduced at defendant’s trial that he violated
the plain language of 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10b. It was undisputed that he did not receive any documents from the Division
or from Gross, or encourage Gross to release the documents to him or anyone else. Defendant claimed he received
the documents in an anonymous mailing sent to him and there was no evidence to the contrary. Therefore, applying
the statute’s clear language, the trial court erred by not dismissing the charge that defendant violated 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-
8.10a(b), and defendant’s conviction for that offense must be vacated. (
448 N.J. Super. at 221-22.)

         The Court granted the State’s petition for certification challenging that determination, 
230 N.J. 355 (2017),
but denied defendant’s cross-petition challenging the convictions affirmed by the panel, 
230 N.J. 373 (2017).

HELD: The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge
Rothstadt’s well-reasoned opinion.

1. The Appellate Division panel held that 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10b applies only to the Division and to persons and entities
authorized by 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b) to receive confidential records from the Division. The Appellate Division’s
construction of 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a and -8.10b does not constitute the only reasonable interpretation of the statutory
language. Indeed, the State construes 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(a) to generally impose a confidentiality requirement on all
persons and entities who receive child abuse records governed by the statute. To the State, 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b)
should be viewed to merely clarify that when a confidential child abuse record is disclosed as authorized by that
subsection, anyone given access to it must treat it as confidential. The State’s construction of the statute is
reasonable. That determination, however, does not resolve the statutory construction issue presented by this appeal.
Given that the statutory language is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, and that extrinsic sources do
not resolve the parties’ dispute, the Court finds an ambiguity that cannot inure to the benefit of the State. Applying
the rule of lenity, the Court adopts the Appellate Division panel’s construction of 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a and -8.10b, and
concurs with the panel that defendant’s conduct is beyond the reach of 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10b. The Court stresses that
its holding should not be viewed to minimize the gravity of the acts that led to defendant’s prosecution. (pp. 2-4)

2. It is in the domain of the Legislature to determine whether an individual who is unauthorized to view records
deemed confidential under the statute, but who nonetheless knowingly gains access to such confidential records and
disseminates them to others, is subject to the criminal penalties set forth in 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10b. If the Legislature
concludes that the State’s position represents the better public policy, it has the power to amend 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a
and -8.10b. (p. 4)

         The judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED.

       CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-
VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in this opinion.

                                                           2
                                      SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                        A-
61 September Term 2016
                                                 078862

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

    Plaintiff-Appellant,

         v.

ISAAC A. YOUNG,

    Defendant-Respondent.

         Argued April 24, 2018 – Decided May 24, 2018

         On certification to the Superior Court,
         Appellate Division, whose opinion is
         reported at 
448 N.J. Super. 206 (App. Div.
         2017).

         Carol M. Henderson, Assistant Attorney
         General, argued the cause for appellant
         (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General,
         attorney; Carol M. Henderson, of counsel and
         on the briefs, and Joseph A. Glyn, Deputy
         Attorney General, on the briefs).

         Justin T. Loughry argued the cause for
         respondent (Loughry and Lindsay, attorneys;
         Justin T. Loughry, on the briefs).

         Erin O’Leary, Assistant Attorney General,
         argued the cause for amicus curiae
         Department of Children and Families (Gurbir
         S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney;
         Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
         General, of counsel, and Erin O’Leary, on
         the brief).

PER CURIAM
    The judgment of the Superior Court, Appellate Division is

affirmed, substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge
                                1
Rothstadt’s well-reasoned opinion, reported at 
448 N.J. Super.
 206 (App. Div. 2017).   We add the following comments.

    The Appellate Division panel vacated defendant’s conviction

of permitting or encouraging the release of a confidential child

abuse record in violation of 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10b.    Id. at 228.

The panel held that 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10b applies only to the

Division of Youth and Family Services, now designated the

Division of Child Protection and Permanency (Division), and to

persons and entities authorized by 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b) to

receive confidential records from the Division.     Id. at 218-22.

The panel concluded that “the Legislature specifically limited

culpability under the statute to authorized individuals or

entities that receive confidential documents from the Division

but then fail to maintain their confidentiality or anyone who

encourages their improper release.”   Id. at 221.   Noting that

there was no evidence that defendant received the records at

issue from the Division or was a person or entity authorized by

N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b) to have such records, or that defendant

encouraged such a person or entity to release the documents to

him or anyone else, the panel concluded that defendant’s conduct

is beyond the statute’s reach.   Id. at 221-22.

    We acknowledge that the Appellate Division’s construction

of 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a and -8.10b does not constitute the only

reasonable interpretation of the statutory language.     Indeed,

                                 2
the State presents an alternative view.    It relies on 
N.J.S.A.

9:6-8.10a(a), which provides in part that records of child abuse

made pursuant to 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10 and reports of findings

forwarded to the central registry pursuant to 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.11

“shall be kept confidential and may be disclosed only under the

circumstances expressly authorized under” 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b)

to (f).   
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(a).

    The State construes 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(a) to generally

impose a confidentiality requirement on all persons and entities

who receive child abuse records governed by the statute.     It

acknowledges that 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b) expressly requires

individuals and entities authorized to receive child abuse

records under 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b) to “keep the records and

reports, or parts thereof, confidential,” and prohibits the

disclosure of such materials “except as authorized by law.”

N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b).    To the State, that specific provision

should not abrogate N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(a)’s broad

confidentiality mandate.     It argues that 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a(b)

should be viewed to merely clarify that when a confidential

child abuse record is disclosed as authorized by that

subsection, anyone given access to it must treat it as

confidential.

    We view the State’s construction of the statute to be

reasonable.     That determination, however, does not resolve the

                                   3
statutory construction issue presented by this appeal.      Given

that the statutory language is subject to more than one

reasonable interpretation, and that extrinsic sources do not

resolve the parties’ dispute, we find an ambiguity that “cannot

inure to the benefit of the State.”   State v. Alexander, 
136 N.J. 563, 573 (1994); see also State v. Sumulikoski, 
221 N.J.
 93, 110 (2015) (“To the extent that there is an unresolved

ambiguity in the language of the endangering statute, the rule

of lenity also cautions against reading the law against a

defendant.”).   Applying the rule of lenity, we adopt the

Appellate Division panel’s construction of 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a

and -8.10b, and concur with the panel that defendant’s conduct

is beyond the reach of 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10b.   Our holding,

however, should not be viewed to minimize the gravity of the

acts that led to defendant’s prosecution.

    It is in the domain of the Legislature to determine whether

an individual who is unauthorized to view records deemed

confidential under the statute, but who nonetheless knowingly

gains access to such confidential records and disseminates them

to others, is subject to the criminal penalties set forth in

N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10b.   If the Legislature concludes that the

State’s position represents the better public policy, it has the

power to amend 
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.10a and -8.10b.

                                 4
     CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, ALBIN,
PATTERSON, FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and TIMPONE join in this
opinion.

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