Case Title: Urrutia v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 95-201

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1996-09-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
Urrutia v. State1996 WY 124924 P.2d 965Case Number: 95-201Decided: 09/24/1996Supreme Court of Wyoming
Chad 
URRUTIA,

 Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of 
Wyoming,

 Appellee (Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Campbell County, Dan R. Price, II, J.

Sylvia Lee 
Hackl, State Public Defender; Gerald M. Gallivan, Director of the Defender Aid 
Program; and Ryan Cade C. Villet and Daniel Celestino, Student Interns for the 
Defender Aid Program.

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director of the 
Prosecution Assistance Program; and Boyd M. McMaster, Student Intern for the 
Prosecution Assistance Program.

Before 
TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN* and LEHMAN, 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

MACY, Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant Chad 
Urrutia appeals from his convictions for possession with intent to deliver a 
controlled substance and for conspiracy to deliver controlled 
substances.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Appellant 
presents three issues for our review:

ARGUMENT I:

I) There was insufficient 
evidence to convict Appellant, Chad Urrutia, of possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to deliver under Wyoming Statute § 35-7-1031(a)(ii), given 
the fact that the State never proved what the substance was, whether or not 
Urrutia possessed the substance or that delivery was his intended 
action[.]

ARGUMENT II:

I) There was insufficient 
evidence to convict the Appellant, Chad Urrutia, of conspiracy to deliver a 
controlled substance under Wyoming Statute § 35-7-1042 and § 35-7-1031(a)(ii) 
given the fact that the State did not prove that the Appellant ever agreed to 
participate in the conspiracy or that he ever intended to participate in the 
conspiracy[.]

ARGUMENT III:

I) The trial court erred 
in allowing the co-defendant witnesses to testify that they had plead[ed] guilty 
to a charge similar to that for which the Appellant was on trial and which arose 
out of the same set of circumstances[.]

a) State[']s use of 
co-defendant pleas of guilty [was] error and [was] prejudicial to the 
[A]ppellant[.]

b) State[']s use of 
co-defendant pleas of guilty amounted to plain error[.]

FACTS

[¶4]      In September 
1994, Richard Cox, a drug dealer in Gillette, turned himself in to the police. 
Cox told the police that Appellant was involved in Cox's drug selling 
enterprise. In December 1994, Appellant was charged with possession with intent 
to deliver marihuana under WYO. STAT. § 35-7-1031(a)(ii) (Supp. 1995) and with 
conspiracy to deliver marihuana and methamphetamines under § 35-7-1031(a)(ii) 
and WYO. STAT. § 35-7-1042 (1994).

[¶5]      Appellant was 
tried before a jury in April 1995. The State called a number of Appellant's 
acquaintances and co-conspirators as witnesses. Appellant was convicted on both 
counts, and he subsequently perfected his appeal to this Court. A more 
comprehensive statement of the facts is included in the following discussion of 
the issues in this case.

DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of the 
Evidence

A. Standard 
of Review

[¶6]      Our standard for 
reviewing challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence is well 
established.

This Court assesses 
whether all the evidence which was presented is adequate enough to form the 
basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn 
by a finder of fact when that evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to 
the State. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury when we are 
applying this rule; our only duty is to determine whether a quorum of reasonable 
and rational individuals would, or even could, have come to the same result as 
the jury actually did.

Hodges v. State, 
904 P.2d 334, 339 (Wyo. 1995) (citation omitted), quoted in DeVries v. State, 
909 P.2d 977, 979 (Wyo. 1996).

B. Possession 
With Intent to Deliver Marihuana

[¶7]      Appellant 
contends that the State did not present sufficient evidence to support his 
conviction for possession with intent to deliver marihuana. Before Appellant 
could be convicted of that crime under § 35-7-1031(a)(ii), the State had to 
prove that (1) Appellant possessed, (2) with the intent to deliver, (3) 
marihuana, a controlled substance. See Wise v. State, 654 P.2d 116, 118 (Wyo. 
1982).

[¶8]      Appellant argues 
that the State did not prove that he possessed the marihuana. We have previously 
discussed what is required to prove that a defendant possessed a controlled 
substance. Wise, 654 P.2d  at 118-19. The Court must look at the totality of the 
circumstances in determining whether sufficient evidence allowed the jury to 
infer that the defendant had possessed the contraband. 654 P.2d  at 119. The 
State does not have to show that the defendant owned or had exclusive possession 
over the controlled substance. 654 P.2d  at 118-19. Constructive possession of 
the controlled substance is sufficient and may be proven by a showing that the 
defendant had dominion and control over the substance. Id.; Saldana v. State, 
846 P.2d 604, 620 (Wyo. 1993).

In order to convict for 
possession of illicit drugs, the prosecution must establish that the accused 
either individually or jointly with another exercised dominion and control over 
the substance, had knowledge of its presence and knowledge that the substance 
was a controlled substance. . . .

Wise, 654 P.2d  
at 119.

[¶9]      The police did 
not recover marihuana when they arrested Appellant. Appellant, however, admitted 
to them that he had smoked marihuana and that it made him "high." Cox testified 
that he had given marihuana and methamphetamines to Appellant and Rickey Keefe 
on a number of occasions. The State introduced two small black books into 
evidence which contained the records of Cox's drug transactions with Appellant 
and Keefe. Cox's bookkeeper verified the entries. Keefe and another witness 
testified that they had seen Appellant possess marihuana. From this evidence, 
the jury could reasonably conclude that Appellant had dominion and control over, 
and, consequently, possession of, the marihuana.

[¶10]   Appellant also argues that, because 
marihuana was not recovered during the investigation, the State did not present 
adequate evidence for the jury to conclude that the substance he possessed was 
actually marihuana. The prosecution may rely on circumstantial evidence to prove 
the identity of the controlled substance because "unlawful distribution of a 
substance, which by its nature is to be consumed, should not escape prosecution 
because the state could not seize a sample of the substance." Lobatos v. State, 
875 P.2d 716, 720 (Wyo. 1994). In determining whether a particular substance is 
a controlled substance, the jury may consider

"evidence of the physical 
appearance of the substance involved in the transaction, evidence that the 
substance produced the expected effects when sampled by someone familiar with 
the illicit drug, evidence that the substance was used in the same manner as the 
illicit drug, testimony that a high price was paid in cash for the substance, 
evidence that transactions involving the substance were carried on with secrecy 
or deviousness, and evidence that the substance was called by the name of the 
illegal narcotic by the defendant or others in his presence."

State v. 
Northrup, 16 Kan. App. 2d 443, 825 P.2d 174, 180 (1992) (quoting United States 
v. Dolan, 544 F.2d 1219, 1221 (4th Cir. 1976)). See also United States v. 
Baggett, 890 F.2d 1095 (10th Cir. 1989); People v. Steiner, 640 P.2d 250 
(Colo.Ct.App. 1981). This list is not exclusive, and the State is not required 
to prove that all the circumstances were present in order to obtain a 
sustainable conviction. See Northrup, 825 P.2d  at 180.

[¶11]   In addition to admitting that he 
used marihuana, Appellant acknowledged that he was present while marihuana sales 
were being completed. Cox, who was an experienced drug user, testified that he 
knew the green, leafy substance which he delivered to Appellant and Keefe was 
marihuana because he "always did everything [himself] before it ever went on the 
streets." Cox also testified that small amounts of the marihuana were sold for 
substantial amounts of money. We conclude that this evidence was sufficient to 
support the jury's inference that the substance which Appellant possessed was, 
in fact, marihuana.

[¶12]   Appellant further contends that the 
State did not present sufficient evidence to establish that he intended to 
deliver the marihuana. The intent-to-deliver element may be proven by a showing 
that a completed delivery occurred or that the defendant held the specific 
intent to deliver the controlled substance. Dorador v. State, 573 P.2d 839, 843 
(Wyo. 1978); Stuebgen v. State, 548 P.2d 870, 879 (Wyo. 1976).

[¶13]   Cox testified that Appellant and 
Keefe told him that they could get "rid of quite a[l]ot" of drugs for him. He 
also testified that he gave them marihuana and methamphetamines to sell. A 
witness testified that he discussed the drug distribution business with 
Appellant and Keefe and that he witnessed the two men leave their apartment with 
drugs and then return later with money and no drugs.

[¶14]   Cox, Keefe, and the bookkeeper 
stated at the trial that they met with Appellant in July 1994 at the 
bookkeeper's house to discuss how they could more safely distribute the drugs 
and retrieve the money gained from the sale of those drugs. Appellant admitted 
that he attended the meeting, and he also admitted that he directed customers to 
Keefe and was present when the drug sales were being consummated. Viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that the jury 
could determine that Appellant harbored the specific intent to deliver the 
marihuana. Sufficient evidence, therefore, supported Appellant's conviction for 
possession with intent to deliver marihuana.

C. Conspiracy 
to Deliver Controlled Substances

[¶15]   Appellant maintains that the State 
did not prove that he agreed to, or that he intended to, participate in the 
conspiracy to deliver marihuana and methamphetamines. This Court recently 
restated the requirements for obtaining a conviction for the crime of conspiracy 
to deliver controlled substances:

"The State satisfies its 
burden of proof in a conspiracy case involving controlled substances by proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) there existed at least a tacit understanding 
between the defendant and a co-conspirator to commit an act violative of 
Wyoming's Controlled Substances Act; and (2) the defendant intended to commit 
the elements of the offense which was the object of the understanding. 
Circumstantial evidence may be relied upon to establish a conspiracy due to the 
covert nature of the crime."

Gilliam v. 
State, 890 P.2d 1104, 1108 (Wyo. 1995) (quoting Wehr v. State, 841 P.2d 104, 110 
(Wyo. 1992)).

[¶16]   As we noted earlier in this 
opinion, Cox testified that, after Appellant and Keefe approached him and stated 
that they could get rid of a lot of drugs for him, he gave them drugs to sell. 
Appellant admitted that he directed potential customers to Keefe and that he was 
present while the sales were taking place.

[¶17]   Appellant acknowledged that he was 
present at the meeting which was held at the bookkeeper's house. During the 
meeting, the co-conspirators settled on a system for transferring the drugs and 
the money from the drug sales. Cox's black books recorded a number of drug 
transactions between him and Appellant and Keefe. When this evidence is viewed 
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, it was more than adequate for a 
jury to infer that Appellant and his co-conspirators had a tacit agreement to 
deliver controlled substances and that Appellant intended to participate in the 
drug distribution conspiracy. We conclude, therefore, that sufficient evidence 
supported Appellant's conviction on the conspiracy charge.

Statements About 
Co-Conspirators' Guilty Pleas

[¶18]   Appellant asserts that the trial 
court erred by allowing his co-conspirators to testify that they had pleaded 
guilty to charges similar to those for which Appellant was on trial and by 
allowing the prosecutor to use that evidence in his closing argument. During the 
trial, the State asked Cox, Keefe, and the bookkeeper what criminal action had 
been taken against them as a result of their drug activities, and they replied 
that they had pleaded guilty to conspiracy charges. The prosecutor commented 
briefly on the co-conspirators' guilty pleas in his closing 
argument.

[¶19]   Appellant relies upon Kwallek v. 
State, 596 P.2d 1372 (Wyo. 1979), in making his argument that admitting his 
co-conspirators' testimony was a prejudicial error which mandates a reversal. In 
that case, this Court ruled that, "when two persons are indicted for separate 
offenses growing out of the same circumstance, the fact that one has pleaded 
guilty is inadmissible against the other." 596 P.2d  at 1375. "[E]vidence of a 
witness' guilt for an offense which arose out of a circumstance leading to the 
defendant's trial implies that the defendant is also guilty. Such an implication 
violates a defendant's right to have a trial on its own merits." Wells v. State, 
846 P.2d 589, 595 (Wyo. 1992), denial of habeas corpus aff'd sub nom. Wells v. 
Shillinger, 37 F.3d 1510 (10th Cir. 1994). See also Porth v. State, 868 P.2d 236 
(Wyo. 1994); Grable v. State, 601 P.2d 1001 (Wyo. 1979). The defendant in 
Kwallek presented appropriate and timely objections to the testimony which was 
given about his co-conspirator's guilty plea. 596 P.2d  at 1376. The Court 
determined that the trial court's admission of the guilty plea evidence amounted 
to a prejudicial error. Id.

[¶20]   In the case at bar, Appellant did 
not object to the co-conspirators' testimony being admitted or to the State's 
closing argument. We must, therefore, apply the plain error 
standard:

"Plain error exists when 
1) the record is clear about the incident alleged as error; 2) there was a 
transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the party claiming 
the error was denied a substantial right which materially prejudiced 
him."

Hodges, 904 P.2d  
at 341 (quoting Sandy v. State, 870 P.2d 352, 358 (Wyo. 1994)). 

[¶21]   The record reveals the 
co-conspirators' testimony and what occurred during the trial in this case. The 
first prong of the plain error test was, therefore, satisfied. A clear and 
unequivocal rule of law was violated when the witnesses were allowed to testify 
about their guilty pleas. Kwallek and its progeny dictate that such evidence is 
not admissible, and prosecutors should not attempt to elicit this type of 
testimony in their cases in chief.1

[¶22]   Appellant has not shown, however, 
that he suffered material prejudice as a result of the co-conspirators' 
statements being admitted. As we have already explained in this opinion, the 
evidence was more than sufficient to support Appellant's convictions without his 
co-conspirators' statements about their guilty pleas being admitted. The 
questioning with regard to the co-conspirators' pleas was limited in scope, and 
the comments which the prosecutor made in his closing argument were brief. 
Consequently, it is doubtful that the jury took undue notice of the 
evidence.

[¶23]   The fact that the jury's attention 
was not inordinately directed to the improper evidence distinguishes this case 
from Kwallek. In Kwallek, this Court concluded that the defendant was prejudiced 
because the trial court twice overruled the defendant's objections to the 
evidence about his co-conspirator's guilty plea being admitted. 596 P.2d  at 
1376. This Court determined that it was probable that

the jury was left with 
the impression that, since the total evidence connected the defendant with [his 
co-conspirator] in the altercation with [the victim], the court must have wanted 
the jury to understand that, since [the co-conspirator] had pleaded guilty, it 
must be that the defendant is also guilty.

596 P.2d  at 
1376. In this case, by contrast, the jury was not left with such an impression. 
We conclude, therefore, that no plain error occurred because Appellant failed to 
show that he suffered material prejudice as a result of the evidence being 
admitted.

CONCLUSION

[¶24]   The State presented sufficient 
evidence to support Appellant's convictions, and the trial court did not commit 
plain error by allowing the co-conspirators' guilty pleas into evidence at the 
trial.

[¶25]   Affirmed.

GOLDEN, Justice, specially 
concurring.

[¶26]   I concur in those parts of the 
majority opinion treating the sufficiency of evidence issues relating to 
possession with intent to deliver marihuana and conspiracy to deliver controlled 
substances. With respect to the issue concerning the admission of the 
coconspirators' guilty pleas, I concur in the result reached, viz., plain error 
does not exist, but differ from the majority's reasoning. I do not find that 
Kwallek v. State, 596 P.2d 1372 (Wyo. 1979), requires us to hold here that a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated because the prosecution used the 
co-conspirators' convictions on direct examination in the State's case-in-chief 
and briefly on summation and the trial court did not give sua sponte a limiting 
instruction under W.R.E. 105.

[¶27]   The prosecution's use of the 
information was for a proper evidentiary purpose, viz., to lessen the sting of 
the defense's cross-examination trying to discredit these witnesses. See Gentry 
v. State, 806 P.2d 1269 (Wyo. 1991); United States v. Sanders, 893 F.2d 133, 136 
(7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 907, 110 S. Ct. 2591, 110 L. Ed. 2d 272 
(1990) and cases cited therein; and United States v. Davis, 838 F.2d 909, 917 
(7th Cir. 1988) and cases cited therein.

[¶28]   W.R.E. 105 provides that upon 
request the trial court shall restrict evidence to its proper purpose and 
instruct the jury accordingly when evidence is admissible for one purpose but 
not another. Here, the witnesses' convictions were evidence admissible for the 
proper purpose of credibility but not for the improper purpose of inferring 
Urrutia's guilt. In Connolly v. State, 610 P.2d 1008 (Wyo. 1980), and Sybert v. 
State, 724 P.2d 463 (Wyo. 1986), we held that the trial court did not commit 
plain error when it did not give a limiting instruction in the absence of a 
party's request. In situations such as those presented here, I think our rule 
would be, absent timely objection and request for a cautionary or limiting 
instruction, plain error will be considered only in rare instances in which 
egregious aggravating circumstances exist. They do not exist here.

THOMAS, Justice, specially 
concurring and dissenting.

[¶29]   I am in accord with the result 
reached by the majority opinion, and I agree completely with the portions of the 
majority opinion that address the sufficiency of the evidence. On the basis of 
Kwallek v. State, 596 P.2d 1372 (Wyo. 1979), however, I approach the application 
of the plain error doctrine quite differently. I have no disagreement with what 
Justice Golden has offered in his specially concurring opinion, but my approach 
is different from the one he espoused.

[¶30]   The conclusion of the majority 
opinion is that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated, but that 
Urrutia failed to establish material prejudice. I quote from Kwallek, 596 P.2d 
at 1376:

As a general proposition, 
courts have found that prejudice results where the accused made timely 
objection[5] and has requested curative action by the trial court which refused 
or failed to eliminate the disclosure.

[5] It is well 
established that the accused must register timely objection to the disclosure. 
State v. Marshall and Brown-Sidorowicz, P.A., 2 Kan. App. 2d 182, 577 P.2d 803, 
817, and cases cited therein (1978).

[¶31]   I believe the Kwallek rule is clear 
in requiring a timely objection to the disclosure of a guilty plea by another 
person who has been charged with an offense arising out of the same 
circumstances. It is my rationalization of Kwallek that, in the absence of an 
objection by the defendant, there is no error. Hence, under the plain error 
doctrine, no clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated. If 
Kwallek is not as clear as I read it, it is at best equivocal, and for that 
reason the rule of the case does not meet the plain error 
requirement.

[¶32]   The reason, as I see it, why an 
objection is required to such a disclosure is that the circumstances of the 
trial are themselves inherently equivocal. When the prosecution seeks to 
introduce this evidence to blunt the effect of its being introduced on 
cross-examination, the defendant may well prefer that it come in at that point. 
It may be preferable as a matter of tactics to cross-examine about the details 
of the conviction and why the witness was able to make a deal with the 
prosecution. On the other hand, the defense may prefer the opportunity to 
introduce the subject on cross-examination and will object to the use of the 
information by the prosecution. Then, as Kwallek holds, it will be perceived as 
prejudicial error to permit the presentation to proceed. In fact, the defense 
may prefer that the matter not be presented at all, but it is unlikely the trial 
court will foreclose the information completely.

[¶33]   As we said in Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724, 739 (Wyo. 1986), where we specifically were invited to place the 
burden of justifying admissibility of hearsay on the State:

Appellant suggests that 
the State must satisfy its burden and the court make a determination of 
admissibility even though appellee makes no objection to receipt of the hearsay 
evidence. Appellant is not correct in this contention. To hold as suggested 
would impose an impossible burden upon a trial court to, on its own motion, 
require proof that opposing counsel has not demanded. Besides, opposing 
counsel may choose not to object to receipt of the offered evidence for many 
reasons. Trial strategy may dictate no objection; the opposing party may believe 
the offered evidence will be favorable; the opposing party may believe that 
impeachment may be more damaging and choose not to exclude the evidence. 
(Emphasis added.)

The Kwallek 
holding is that prejudice results when the accused has objected and the trial 
court fails to grant relief. It must follow that there is no prejudice to the 
accused when no objection is made. This approach matches the holding of the 
proposed opinion that Urrutia has failed to demonstrate prejudice, but it also 
honors the rule announced in Kwallek.

 

 FOOTNOTE

1 Pursuant to W.R.E. 609, 
such testimony may be admissible to impeach a co-conspirator. See Grable, 601 P.2d  at 1003-04. This exception, however, was not at issue in this 
case.