Case Title: R.O. CORPORATION v. JOHN H. BELL IRON MOUNTAIN RANCH COMPANY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1989-10-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
R.O. CORPORATION v. JOHN H. BELL IRON MOUNTAIN RANCH COMPANY1989 WY 189781 P.2d 910Case Number: 89-56Decided: 10/26/1989Supreme Court of Wyoming
R.O. CORPORATION, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

JOHN H. BELL IRON 
MOUNTAIN RANCH COMPANY, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, AlbanyCountyArthur T. Hanscum. 
J.

Stanley K. 
Hathaway and Rick A. Thompson of Hathaway, Speight, Kunz, Trautwein and Barrett, 
Cheyenne, for appellant.

Robert G. 
Pickering and Henry F. Bailey, Jr. of Bailey, Pickering & Stock, Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before CARDINE, C.J., and THOMAS, URBIGKIT, MACY 
and GOLDEN, JJ.

MACY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
an award of damages to appellee John H. Bell Iron Mountain Ranch Company on the 
basis of the unjust enrichment of appellant R.O. Corporation for permitting its 
livestock to run at large on the unfenced pastures of 
appellee.

[¶2.]     We 
reverse.

[¶3.]     Appellant presents the 
following issues for our consideration:

I.

Did the trial court 
commit error by awarding damages under an equitable theory of unjust enrichment 
when a specific rule of law prohibits those damages?

II.

If unjust enrichment does 
apply, did the trial court use the proper measure of 
damages?

[¶4.]     Appellee commenced this 
action on October 29, 1987, by filing a complaint which alleged that appellant 
knowingly and intentionally grazed cattle upon appellee's land. The complaint 
also alleged that appellant refused to remove the cattle after appellee's 
demand, resulting in appellee's entitlement to a grazing fee in excess of 
$20,000. Appellant's motion to dismiss was converted to a motion for summary 
judgment and denied after the court concluded that genuine issues of material 
fact existed involving the fence-out doctrine. Appellant answered appellee's 
complaint, alleging several defenses in addition to the fence-out doctrine. The 
matter was tried before the court on November 9, 1988, on appellee's trespass 
theory.

[¶5.]     The evidence produced 
at trial revealed the following relevant facts. Appellant is the owner of ranch 
land in Albany County, 
Wyoming, commonly referred to as 
the Peden Ranch. Appellee is the owner of contiguous ranch lands commonly 
referred to as the Pasco Ranch. Prior to 1987, Marie J. Bell owned both ranches, 
and they were operated as a single family unit. A complete division fence was 
not maintained between the ranches. In 1987, the parties inherited their 
respective ranches and operated them as separate units.

[¶6.]     Appellant contracted 
with Byron Nelson in May 1987 to pasture Nelson's cattle on appellant's ranch 
during the 1987 grazing season for the receipt of twelve and one-half cents per 
pound of weight gain. Appellant released approximately 543 Nelson heifers onto 
his ranch lands on or about July 5, 1987, and removed them on or about September 
15, 1987. During the grazing season, the Nelson heifers migrated onto and 
depastured approximately two sections of appellee's unfenced lands which joined 
and were enclosed by appellant's land.

[¶7.]     Appellee's agent, John 
Morris, testified that the Nelson heifers strayed onto his land because his land 
had better water and grass; that he did not put his cattle onto these two 
sections because, "You can't tell a cow where to go and where not to go," and he 
did not want his cattle to drift onto appellant's land; and that he demanded 
that the Nelson heifers be removed, but Melvin Wright, appellant's agent, 
refused, stating, "`I need the grass and I'm going to use 
it.'"

[¶8.]     Melvin Wright testified 
that, when he released the Nelson heifers onto the lands controlled by 
appellant, he felt the heifers would graze appellee's unfenced pasture and that, 
when he was confronted by John Morris, "I told him that's the only way I could 
use my grass, was to put the cattle on it."

[¶9.]     On February 13, 1989, 
the court entered judgment for appellee in the amount of $6,000, finding that, 
while appellee failed to prove its trespass claim, the evidence supported an 
award on the theory of unjust enrichment. In its decision letter of December 14, 
1988, which was incorporated by reference into the order and judgment, the court 
stated in part:

Plaintiff had the burden 
to prove that the defendant intentionally drove and kept his cattle onto 
plaintiff's property. Under Wyoming case law 
there is no trespass when animals lawfully running at large wander upon and 
depasture the unenclosed lands of a private owner - this generally known as the 
Wyoming "fence 
out doctrine." Plaintiff has not met his burden of proving a knowing and 
intentional trespass. The most telling evidence came in the form of testimony 
from John Morris who said, "You can't tell a cow where to go and where not to 
go." This testimony forms the basis and rational for the age old "fence out" 
doctrine in Wyoming. To rule in favor of the plaintiff in 
this case on the trespass theory would do violence to this rule of law. The 
evidence does, however, support an award for the plaintiff on a theory of unjust 
enrichment.

* * * Here, the defendant 
continued to depasture plaintiff's property after having been notified that the 
cattle were present on plaintiff's land and consuming plaintiff's grass. 
Notwithstanding the notification, the defendant continued the depasturization 
thus deriving a benefit at plaintiff's loss.

All the requisite 
elements of unjust enrichment are met in this case. Defendant was enriched; 
plaintiff was impoverished; the connection between the enrichment and 
impoverishment is identical; after receiving notice, defendant was no longer 
justified in continuing the depasturization and since Wyoming's "fence out" law 
does not provide a remedy at law, then the court's equity jurisdiction is 
triggered.

 

[¶10.]  It is firmly settled in Wyoming that no trespass 
or liability for damages exists when livestock running at large stray upon and 
depasture the unenclosed lands of a private owner. Hardman v. King, 14 
Wyo. 503, 85 P. 382 (1906); Haskins v. Andrews, 
12 Wyo. 458, 76 P. 588 (1904); Martin v. Platte 
Valley Sheep Company, 12 Wyo. 432, 76 P. 571 
(1904); Cosgriff Brothers v. Miller, 10 Wyo. 190, 68 P. 206 (1902). This is commonly 
known as the "fence-out doctrine."

[¶11.]  In the decision letter denying 
appellant's motion to dismiss, the court stated that our case law has carved out 
an exception to this rule, and:

It seems the exception to 
the general rule applies when the owner of cattle has knowledge of the presence 
of his cattle on his neighbor's land and knows that his neighbor objects and 
over his objection the cattle owner expresses his intention to continue the 
depasturage. At that point, the cattle do not appear to be "strays" and an 
actionable trespass lies. They are not strays in the sense that the cattle are 
no longer "roving about at their own will." It is the exertion of the will of 
the cattle owner to permit them to remain on the neighbor's land with the 
expressed determination to continue the depasturage that takes the case out of 
the general rule.

(Emphasis in 
original.) We disagree that Cosgriff Brothers and its progeny carved out such an 
exception to the fence-out rule. The court in Cosgriff Brothers, 10 Wyo. at 223, 68 P. 206 (quoting Harrison v. Adamson, 76 
Ia. 337, 41 N.W. 34, 35 (1888)), merely pointed out that:

"[I]t is quite a 
different thing when cattle not running at large, but in the charge and 
under the control of a herdsman, the employee and agent of their owner are driven and kept upon unenclosed land 
against the will of the land owner, and with full knowledge of the owner of the 
cattle. In that case the trespasser 
takes and appropriates the use of the land for pasture, and is held by the law liable 
therefor."

(Emphasis 
added.) In this case, the court went beyond carving out an exception to the 
fence-out doctrine when it ruled that an owner of cattle is liable for damages 
under the equitable theory of unjust enrichment if the owner's stray cattle 
depasture the unfenced land of a neighbor and if he knowingly permits them to 
remain against the neighbor's will.

[¶12.]  In Martin, 12 Wyo. at 454, 76 P. 571, 
we stated:

Every person knows that 
his cattle and horses permitted to run at large are liable to roam upon and 
depasture unenclosed premises. One who turns cattle upon his own unenclosed 
ground to graze at will must know that they will probably wander upon the 
adjoining unenclosed premises of his neighbor, if there be such; and yet that 
fact has not been deemed sufficient to constitute him a wilful trespasser. It is 
in just such cases, under the doctrine prevalent here, that the owner of the 
animals has been held not liable for the injury claimed by 
them.

In Rocky 
Mountain Turbines, Inc. v. 660 Syndicate, Inc., 623 P.2d 758, 763 (Wyo. 1981), and in Bereman v. Bereman, 645 P.2d 1155, 1160 
(Wyo. 1982), 
we quoted with approval the statement from 66 Am.Jur.2d, Restitution and Implied 
Contracts § 3 at 945 (1973), that:

The phrase "unjust 
enrichment" is used in law to characterize the result or effect of a failure to 
make restitution of, or for, property or benefits received under such 
circumstances as to give rise to a legal or equitable obligation to account 
therefor. It is a general principle, underlying various legal doctrines and 
remedies, that one person should not be permitted unjustly to enrich himself at 
the expense of another, but should be required to make restitution of or for 
property or benefits received, retained, or appropriated, where it is just and 
equitable that such restitution be made, and where such action involves no violation 
or frustration of law or opposition to public policy, either directly or 
indirectly.

(Emphasis 
added.) See also Horseshoe Estates v. 2M Company, Inc., 713 P.2d 776 (Wyo. 1986). Clearly, the 
award of damages under the theory of unjust enrichment frustrates and violates 
the fence-out doctrine and is in opposition to the public policy upon which that 
doctrine is founded.

[¶13.]  Appellee contends that the award of 
damages was proper under a "use and occupation" cause of action even though it 
is not entitled to damages in its trespass action. For this proposition, 
appellee cites Haskins, 12 Wyo. at 472, 76 P. 588, wherein it is 
stated:

[W]here the cattle owner 
takes and holds exclusive possession of the unfenced lands of another situated 
in the same general enclosure with his own land, and by depasturing the same 
with his cattle appropriates to himself the benefits thereof, he will be liable 
for the value of the use and occupation of the premises.

Appellee did not 
plead such a cause of action, nor was the case presented or tried on that 
theory. The court did allow appellee to recover damages under the doctrine of 
unjust enrichment after determining that all the requisite elements were met. 
The court, however, did not find that the requisite elements to recover under 
use and occupation were met, particularly the essential element of exclusive 
possession, and we will not do so on appeal. We have previously stated that 
issues not raised or argued to the trial court will not be considered for the 
first time on appeal. Doud v. First Interstate Bank of Gillette, 769 P.2d 927 
(Wyo. 1989); Thatcher & Sons, Inc. v. 
Norwest Bank Casper, N.A., 750 P.2d 1324 
(Wyo. 
1988).

[¶14.]  We hold that the court erred as a matter 
of law when it awarded appellee damages under the equitable theory of unjust 
enrichment. Our holding negates the necessity to determine whether there was a 
proper measure of damages.

[¶15.]  Reversed.