Case Title: City of St. Paul v. Sutherland

Citation: 132 N.W.2d 280

Docket Number: 

State: minnesota

Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Date: 1964-12-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
132 N.W.2d 280 (1964) CITY OF ST. PAUL, Respondent, v. Edward H. SUTHERLAND, Relator. No. 39707. Supreme Court of Minnesota. December 31, 1964. John S. Connolly, St. Paul, for relator. Stephen A. Maxwell, City Atty., Daniel A. Klas, Asst. City Atty., St. Paul, for respondent. *281 PER CURIAM. This matter is before the court on an alternative writ of mandamus requiring the municipal court of the city of St. Paul to show cause why it should not approve the bond required by Minn.St. 633.20 on defendant's appeal to the District Court of Ramsey County from a judgment of conviction for disorderly conduct in violation of a city ordinance. Defendant was found guilty by the municipal court on September 15, 1964, and was sentenced on October 15, 1964. A notice of appeal to the district court was served and filed on October 22, 1964. The question is whether under existing statutes the 10-day period within which to appeal began to run on the date when defendant was convicted or on the date when he was sentenced. Minn.St. 488 A. 18, subd. 12, which governs appeals to the district court from the municipal court of the city of St. Paul, provides as follows: Section 488.20 contains the following language: Procedure for appeals from justice court to district court referred to in § 488.20 are governed by § 633.20 as follows: It is the contention of the city that the "conviction" referred to in § 633.20 is defined in L.1963, c. 753, § 609.02, subd. 5, as the finding of guilty by the court, which in the instant case occurred on September 15, 1964. The defendant, on the other hand, asserts that the provision in § 488.20 that the appeal shall not start to run until the judgment has been perfected requires a holding that his appeal was timely, since under our law the judgment from which an appeal may be taken is the sentence which is imposed. State v. Lindquist, 254 Minn. 28, 93 N.W.2d 521. While we acknowledge there is an inconsistency in these two statutes, we are of the opinion that the explicit language of § 488.20, stating that the time for appeal shall not start to run until the judgment has been perfected, governs and prevails over the more remote reference to the date of conviction contained in § 633.20. These statutes are remedial in nature and should be liberally construed to avoid forfeiting the appeal rights they purport to confer. Stebbins v. Friend, Crosby & Co., 191 Minn. 561, 564, 254 N.W. 818, 820; Gelin v. Hollister, 222 Minn. 339, 345, 24 N.W.2d 496, 500, 168 A.L.R. 195. Let peremptory writ of mandamus issue.