Case Title: Sully Station v. Dye

Citation: 

Docket Number: 991078

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2000-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton,* Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, Koontz, 
and Kinser, JJ. 
 
SULLY STATION II 
COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, INC. 
 
 
                                OPINION BY 
v. 
Record  No. 991078    
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRY L. CARRICO 
 
 
March 3, 2000 
REGINALD W. DYE, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY 
Jonathan C. Thacher, Judge 
 
 
This case involves a dispute between Sully Station II 
Community Association, Inc. (the Association) and eight of its 
members, Reginald W. Dye, Lory L. Cournoyer, Joseph C. Mallon, 
Joyce A. Mallon, Steven M. Serio, Elizabeth A. Serio, Ellwood S. 
Crick, and Catherine M. Reese (the Complainants).  The dispute 
concerns a policy adopted by the Association’s board of trustees 
with respect to parking in a common area of Section 8 of Sully 
Station II residential community in Fairfax County.  From a 
final decree declaring the policy void and unenforceable, we 
awarded the Association this appeal.  Finding that the trial 
court did not err in its declaration, we will affirm. 
 
In their bill of complaint, the Complainants prayed for 
declaratory and injunctive relief establishing their right to 
use the common area for parking “on the basis of equality with 
other unit owners” in Section 8 of Sully Station II.  Following 
                     
* Justice Compton participated in the hearing and decision of 
this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on 
February 2, 2000. 
the filing of the Association’s answer and grounds of defense, 
the parties entered into Joint Stipulations of Fact, which 
revealed the following situation. 
 
The Association is a non-stock corporation subject to the 
provisions of the Virginia Property Owners’ Association Act, 
Code §§ 55-508 through –516.2.  The Association serves as a 
community association for the Sully Station II residential 
development.  The Association’s executive body is its board of 
trustees, and the Association’s governing documents include a 
Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions (the 
Declaration) and a Supplementary Declaration of Covenants and 
Restrictions (the Supplementary Declaration), both of which were 
recorded among the land records of Fairfax County. 
 
As the Association points out, the Declaration and the 
Supplementary Declaration “collectively represent a contract 
entered into by all owners” of townhouses in Section 8 of Sully 
Station II.  See Unit Owners Ass’n v. Gillman, 223 Va. 752, 766, 
292 S.E.2d 378, 385 (1982).  As with other contracts, effect 
must be given to the intention of the parties.  Foti v. Cook, 
220 Va. 800, 805, 263 S.E.2d 430, 433 (1980).  When the meaning 
of language in a contract is clear and unambiguous, as it is 
here, the contract needs no interpretation, and “[t]he intention 
of the parties must be determined from what they actually say 
and not from what it may be supposed they intended to say.”  
 
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Carter v. Carter, 202 Va. 892, 896, 121 S.E.2d 482, 485 (1961).  
Finally, the meaning of a contract “is to be gathered from all 
its associated parts assembled as the unitary expression of the 
agreement of the parties.”  Berry v. Klinger, 225 Va. 201, 208, 
300 S.E.2d 792, 796 (1983). 
 
The Sully Station II development is comprised of a number 
of “sections” or “clusters.”  The present controversy involves 
Section 8 (Truitt Farm Cluster) of Sully Station II.  Section 8 
contains seventy-seven townhouses, thirty-eight with garages and 
driveways and thirty-nine without garages or driveways.  The 
Complainants own townhouses in Section 8 with garages and 
driveways. 
 
Included in Section 8 is a common area with ninety-four 
parking spaces.  The parking lot is both “a ‘Common Area’ and a 
‘Cluster Common Area’ as defined by the Declaration and 
Supplementary Declaration.” 
 
Prior to October 1, 1997, all common area parking spaces 
were on a first-come, first-served basis.  Effective on that 
date, the board of trustees adopted a new parking policy that 
assigned two reserved parking spaces in the common area to each 
non-garaged townhouse.  Under the new policy, no parking spaces 
were assigned to garaged townhouses, and the remaining spaces 
were “allotted for overflow and/or visitor parking on a first-
come, first-served basis.”  As a result, seventy-eight of the 
 
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ninety-four parking spaces previously available in the common 
area on a first-come, first-served basis were reserved for the 
thirty-nine non-garaged townhouses and sixteen were left 
unassigned for use on a first-come, first-served basis. 
 
The matter was heard below on the Association’s motion for 
partial summary judgment and the Complainants’ motion for 
summary judgment.  The debate between the parties centered upon 
the question whether the Association’s parking policy 
represented a licensing of a portion of the common area, as the 
Complainants contended, or a rule or regulation governing the 
use of the common area, as the Association contended.  This 
question stemmed from the following language in Article IV of 
the Declaration: 
Section 2.  Easement of Enjoyment. 
 
(a) Common Areas.  Subject to the provisions herein, 
every Owner shall have a right and easement of enjoyment in 
and to the Common Area which shall be appurtenant to and 
shall pass with the title to every Lot . . . . 
 
 
(b) Cluster Common Areas.  Subject to the provisions 
herein, and in addition to the right and easement of 
enjoyment in and to the Common Area provided in Article IV, 
Section 2(a) above, the Owners of Lots within a Cluster 
shall have a priority right and easement of enjoyment in 
and to the areas designated as Cluster Common Areas . . . . 
 
 
Section 3.  Extent of Members’ Easement.  The Members’ 
easement of enjoyment created hereby shall be subject to 
the following: 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
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(e) The right of the Association to license portions 
of the Common Area to Members on a uniform, non-
preferential basis. 
 
 
(f) The right of the Association to establish rules 
and regulations to regulate the use of the Common Area for 
the benefit of Members. 
 
 
In a memorandum filed in support of its motion for partial 
summary judgment, the Association made this concession: 
 
The Association . . . concedes that the parking policy 
assigning two Common Area spaces to non-garage owners, and 
no assigned Common Area spaces to garage owners, does not 
treat the Owners on a ‘uniform non-preferential basis.’  
Therefore, if the policy at issue represents the licensing 
of a portion of the Common Area, the parking policy would 
violate the Declaration . . . . 
 
 
The trial court found in a letter opinion that the 
Association’s parking policy resulted in “a licensing not on a 
uniform basis” of portions of the common area.  In a final 
decree, the trial court granted the Complainants’ motion for 
summary judgment and declared that the parking policy was 
“invalid and unenforceable . . . as being an ultra vires act in 
violation of the Declaration.” 
 
The Association contends that the trial court erred in 
finding that the parking policy in question was a license 
subject to the “uniform, non-preferential” language in Article 
IV, Section 3, Subsection (e), rather than a rule or regulation 
within the contemplation of Subsection (f).  The Association 
says that the drafters of the Declaration “chose to omit any 
uniformity requirement in Subsection (f),” thus evidencing “the 
 
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specific intent to exclude any . . . limitation on the 
Association’s broad power to adopt rules and regulations.”  For 
this proposition, the Association cites First National Bank v. 
Roy N. Ford Co., 219 Va. 942, 946, 252 S.E.2d 354, 357 (1979) 
(omission of particular covenant or term from contract reduced 
to writing shows intent to exclude it). 
 
Furthermore, the Association states, “unambiguous 
provisions found elsewhere in the Declaration and the 
Supplementary Declaration” demonstrate the trial court’s error 
in determining that “the Parking Policy was the licensing, not 
the regulating, of [the] Common Area.”  In this connection, the 
Association cites Article III, Section 3 of the Declaration, 
which deals with the Association’s board of trustees and 
provides in pertinent part as follows:  
 
(c) Powers and Duties.  Without limiting the 
generality thereof, the Board shall have the power and 
obligation to perform the following duties: 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
(2) Rule Making.  To establish rules and regulations 
for the use of property as provided in Articles IV and VI 
. . . . 
 
 
Article IV, mentioned in (2), is quoted supra.  It deals 
with the right of the Association to license portions of the 
common area “on a uniform, non-preferential basis” and to 
establish rules and regulations for the use of the common area.  
 
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Article VI, also mentioned in (2), provides in pertinent part as 
follows: 
 
Section 1.  Protective Covenants. 
 
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
(d) Rules.  From time to time the Board of Trustees 
shall adopt general rules, including but not limited to 
rules to regulate potential problems relating to the use of 
property and the well-being of Members, such as . . . 
storage and use of all vehicles . . . . 
 
 
The Association also cites Article IV of the Supplementary 
Declaration, which is titled “Parking” and  provides as follows: 
 
The Association shall promulgate such rules and 
regulations as needed to regulate the use of any parking 
areas that may be constructed or authorized on Cluster 
Common Area for the benefit of all Owners, which rules and 
regulations may include assignment of parking spaces. 
 
 
Finally, the Association cites Article V, Section 3, of the 
Supplementary Declaration, which is titled “Protective 
Covenants” and provides in pertinent part as follows: 
 
Vehicles.  Use and storage of all vehicles and 
recreational equipment upon the Common Area and Lots or 
upon any street, public or private, adjacent thereto shall 
be subject to rules promulgated by the Board of Trustees as 
provided herein. 
 
 
The Association says that in all the provisions of the 
Declaration and Supplementary Declaration, reference to the  
authority of the board of trustees with respect to parking in 
common areas is “solely in the context of rules or regulations” 
and not licensing.  Hence, the Association concludes, the trial 
court’s finding that the parking policy represented a licensing 
 
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of a portion of the common area “is simply contrary to the 
unambiguous language in both the Declaration and Supplementary 
Declaration showing that the drafters intended the assignment of 
parking spaces to be considered rules and regulations.” 
 
The Association also maintains that Virginia case law 
supports the proposition that the assignment of parking spaces, 
or the establishment of policies relating thereto, constitutes 
the exercise of regulatory power by a community association and 
not the granting of a license.  Quoting Bunn v. Offutt, 216 Va. 
681, 222 S.E.2d 522 (1976), the Association says a license is 
“a right, given by some competent authority to do an act 
which without such authority would be illegal, a tort, or 
trespass.”  12 M.J., License to Real Property, § 2, p. 148.  
A license is personal between the licensor and the licensee 
and cannot be assigned. 
 
Id. at 683, 222 S.E.2d at 525.1
 
The Association argues that its parking policy “did not 
provide ‘competent authority’ for anyone to park where it would 
otherwise have been ‘illegal, a tort or a trespass’ and, 
therefore, the Parking Policy is not a license.”  The 
Association then engages in the following hypothetical exercise: 
                     
1 The Association also cites this Court’s decision in Unit Owners 
Ass’n v. Gillman, 223 Va. 752, 292 S.E.2d 378 (1982), for the 
proposition that a policy with respect to the allocation of 
parking within common areas is the exercise of regulatory power 
by an association and not the granting of a license.  However, 
the case did not involve the regulation-licensing dichotomy in 
any way. 
 
 
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Assume, arguendo, that a Mr. Smith owns a non-garaged 
townhouse in Section 8 and that, pursuant to the Parking 
Policy, the Association assigned two reserved parking 
spaces in front of his house to his lot.  If the policy 
granted Mr. Smith a license, as the Trial Court found, 
under Bunn it would have had to have been illegal, a tort 
or a trespass for Mr. Smith to have parked in either of 
those two parking spaces prior to the adoption of the 
Parking Policy.  However, Mr. Smith already had the right 
to park in those parking spaces prior to the Parking Policy 
because prior to any particular parking space being 
assigned to a particular non-garage townhouse, the space 
was available for parking for everyone on a first come, 
first served basis. . . .  Therefore, since his lot’s 
assigned parking space had previously been open to 
everyone, it certainly would not have been illegal, a tort 
or a trespass for Mr. Smith to have parked there. 
 
 
Undoubtedly, it would not have been illegal, a tort, or a 
trespass for the hypothetical Mr. Smith to have parked in a 
common area parking space in front of his lot prior to the 
Association’s adoption of the parking policy.  But that begs the 
question.  The real question is whether, prior to the adoption 
of the parking policy, it would have been legal for Mr. Smith to 
exclude his garaged townhouse neighbors from parking in the 
spaces now assigned to him, and that question must be answered 
in the negative.  In other words, the parking policy was an act 
in the nature of a special privilege, entitling the owners of 
non-garaged townhouses to do something they would not have been 
entitled to do without the policy, i.e., to exclude the owners 
of garaged townhouses from the use of seventy-eight parking 
spaces in the common area.  That is the very essence of a 
license, as the trial court indicated in its letter opinion and 
 
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is implicit from a reading of Bunn.  216 Va. at 683, 222 S.E.2d 
at 525.  And because the parking policy does not treat the 
owners on a uniform, non-preferential basis, as the Association 
has conceded, the policy is violative of the Declaration. 
 
The Association cites the following out-of-state decisions 
which, it says, support its argument that the adoption by an 
association of a parking policy is the exercise of regulatory 
power and not the granting of a license:   Juno By the Sea North 
Condominium Ass’n v. Manfredonia, 397 So.2d 297 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1980); Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So.2d 
180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Alpert v. Le’Lisa Condominium, 
667 A.2d 947 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995);2 Board of Managers of 
Surf East Condominium v. Cohn, 90 Misc.2d 1054, 396 N.Y.S.2d 999 
(N.Y. City Ct. 1977).  The Complainants say these decisions are 
inapposite and actually “support [their] arguments.”  We find 
the decisions unpersuasive. 
 
For the reasons assigned, we will affirm the judgment of 
the trial court. 
Affirmed. 
 
JUSTICE COMPTON, with whom JUSTICE LACY joins, dissenting. 
 
                     
2 Alpert has been overruled by the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland.  Sea Watch Stores v. Council of Unit Owners of Sea 
Watch Condominium, 691 A.2d 750, 759-60 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1997).  
 
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In my opinion, the Association's parking policy is a rule 
or regulation managing use of the common area, and is not a 
licensing of a portion of the area violative of the 
Association's governing documents. 
 
Unambiguous language in these documents plainly indicates 
the intent of the drafters to treat actions by the Board of 
Trustees, in regard to parking, as rules or regulations, rather 
than licenses.  For example, the Supplementary Declaration at 
Article IV, titled "Parking," states clearly that the 
"Association shall promulgate such rules and regulations as 
needed to regulate the use of any parking areas . . . which 
rules and regulations may include assignment of parking spaces."  
(Emphasis added.)  This specific language refers to the 
assignment of parking spaces as "rules and regulations," not 
licenses, expressly recognizing the Board of Trustees' power to 
assign parking, and is consistent with the provisions of the 
governing documents as a whole. 
 
Consequently, I would reverse the judgment below and 
dismiss the bill of complaint. 
 
 
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