Case Title: SHERIDAN COUNTY, SHERIDAN COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, AND W.B. FRITH, BURTON KERNS, AND LOAL R. LORENZEN, INDIVIDUALLY v. PEGGY C. SPIRO, RAYMOND M. SPIRO, AND DONIS S. KLEPINGER

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-03-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
SHERIDAN COUNTY, SHERIDAN COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, AND W.B. FRITH, BURTON KERNS, AND LOAL R. LORENZEN, INDIVIDUALLY v. PEGGY C. SPIRO, RAYMOND M. SPIRO, AND DONIS S. KLEPINGER1985 WY 41697 P.2d 290Case Number: 84-121Decided: 03/15/1985Supreme Court of Wyoming

SHERIDAN COUNTY, SHERIDANCOUNTYCOMMISSIONERS, AND W.B. FRITH, BURTON KERNS, AND LOAL R. LORENZEN, 
INDIVIDUALLY, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS),

v. 

PEGGY C. SPIRO, RAYMOND 
M. SPIRO, AND DONIS S. KLEPINGER, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS).

Appeal from the District 
Court, SheridanCounty, Paul T. Liamos, 
Jr., J.

Henry A. Burgess 
of Burgess & Davis, Sheridan, for 
appellants.

R.E. Rauchfuss 
of Beech Street Law Office, Casper, for appellees.

Before THOMAS*, C.J., and ROSE, ROONEY**, BROWN and CARDINE, 
JJ.

* Became Chief Justice 
January 1, 1985.

** Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal by 
Sheridan County, the Sheridan County Commissioners and Commissioners W.B. Frith, 
Burton Kerns and Loal R. Lorenzen, individually, from a judgment entered against 
them in the Sheridan County district court in favor of Peggy C. Spiro, Raymond 
M. Spiro and Donis S. Klepinger, plaintiffs-appellees, who collaterally attacked 
the establishment of a county road1 and asked and have received 
equitable and other forms of relief from the trial court.

[¶2.]     Our principal concern 
is whether - at the time judgment was entered - a certain North Piney Creek 
roadway (hereinafter "Piney Creek Road") in Sheridan County, which traverses 
very rough and rugged canyon terrain and where a mountain stream rushes and 
flows, was or was not an existing county road. If Piney Creek 
Road, 
which is the only access to the appellees' properties, was a lawfully 
established and existing county road at the time of the court's decision, the 
judgment must be reversed and other issues raised by appellants need not be 
considered.

FACTS

[¶3.]     On September 10, 1910, 
under statutory provisions then in force, the county commissioners of SheridanCounty undertook to establish the county 
road in issue here.

[¶4.]     The history of the Piney 
Creek Road reveals that in 1911, one year following its purported establishment, 
approximately two miles of the west end of the roadway was abandoned by the 
Sheridan County Commissioners through appropriate statutory abandonment 
proceedings, leaving the road to terminate approximately three quarters of a 
mile west of the properties of the appellees (see plat    
            
            
         
         
            , infra, 
indicating the location of the Spiro gate). The sole access to the land of the 
owners known as the North Piney Group, which land lies to the west of the 
appellees' property, is also by way of the road in controversy here. In 1966 the 
commissioners received and in 1967 denied a petition to vacate a portion of the 
road including a section which proceeded through the claimants' properties in 
the NorthPineyCreekCanyon. These county-commissioner actions, 
which have involved various abandonment proceedings, speak forcefully to the 
effect that the road in issue here has long been regarded by the county 
commissioners and the public at large as a county road. The record further 
discloses that the county has maintained the road for many years and has, on 
numerous occasions, done maintenance work in response to the appeals of the 
appellees - although admittedly not as well or as often as they and some of the 
adjoining and otherwise affected landowners would have liked.2 Further, the record shows that the 
county shaled the road across appellees' property at their request, repaired the 
bridge where the road crosses the creek, and, as the recognized owner of the 
road, responded to other of appellees' inquiries and requests concerning the 
way.

[¶5.]     On August 2, 1983, the 
commissioners considered a petition by Gulf Oil Company to upgrade a bridge over 
North Piney Creek and improve the Piney Creek 
Road so that oil-well drilling 
equipment might be hauled safely. This request was denied. However, on August 9, 
1983, the North Piney Group appeared before the commissioners to support Gulf 
Oil Company's request. It was the position of these landowners that the 
upgrading of the road would encourage the development of their properties for 
recreational purposes and would insure wintertime access to their 
holdings.

[¶6.]     On August 10, 1983 the 
county commissioners met to consider whether the road was a county or private 
road, but no resolution of the issue was had at this meeting. On August 30, 1983 
another meeting was held, and owners of land adjacent to the road (Spiro and 
Robinson) disputed the county engineer's contention that the road was lawfully 
established as a county road. Evidence was taken, and the board agreed to hear 
the matter again.

[¶7.]     The board met again in 
early September to consider the ownership of the road. Numerous landowners were 
present at this meeting, including the appellees who asked that the road west of 
the Spiro gate be declared a private road or that it be abandoned. The board 
adjourned, advising they would consult with the county attorney, and on 
September 7, 1983, by letter to Mr. and Mrs. Spiro, informed them that it was 
the commissioners' decision that the Piney Creek 
Road was a duly established and 
existing county road. This decision was spread upon the minutes of the meeting 
of the commissioners dated September 13, 1983, which minutes read in part as 
follows:

"`The above referenced 
subject (North Piney Road) was established as a county road on September 
6, 1910. We (the Board) have carefully reviewed the records and information 
available to us as well as public testimony and we are of the opinion that, due 
to public usage and county maintenance of the road, it is, in fact, a county 
road. Therefore, it is our determination that the above subject road remains a 
county road. Consequently, we must insist you remove your private gate and sign 
before September 15, 1983.'"

[¶8.]     When the September 15 
deadline, mentioned in the commissioners' minutes, had passed, and the sheriff 
found the gate referred to above to be locked, thus denying public access, the 
county road crew undertook to remove it. The gate was replaced by the appellees, 
and in early October of 1983 the commissioners again ordered the county 
employees to remove the gate. This was accomplished by excavating the gate posts 
so that the gate would present no further obstruction to 
travel.

[¶9.]     On October 12, 1983, 
the action out of which this appeal grows was filed and the plaintiffs, 
appellees here, sought injunctive relief as well as actual and punitive damages. 
Following a trial of the issues, the court entered a judgment in their favor on 
April 25, 1984, from which this appeal is taken.

[¶10.]  The judgment contains the following 
language:

"* * * [T]he road in 
contention in this lawsuit was not established lawfully west of the Spiros' gate 
at any time by the Sheridan Board of County Commissioners and in any event, any 
rights that the County may or may not have had in the road were abandoned by the 
County and that the County never constructed or substantially maintained any 
roadway on or near that in contention in this lawsuit."

[¶11.]  This court cannot agree with the trial 
court in its decision concerning the establishment, the purported abandonment, 
and the effect of the variance between the physical location as compared to the 
surveyor's location of the Piney Creek Road as reflected by the county 
records.

[¶12.]  We will reverse.

Plat 
of Roadway in Dispute
 
 

Who Owns the Piney 
Creek Road?
Who Owns the Piney 
Creek Road?

The Questions for 
Resolve

[¶13.]  The appellants define the principal 
proposition for our consideration as follows:

"It was an error of law 
for the District Court to determine the North Piney Road was not a county road 
and to `quiet the title to the road west of the Spiro gate' in the Appellees * * 
*."

[¶14.]  We see the dispute raised by this 
assertion as centering upon a question which asks whether the Piney Creek Road, as 
it presently appears upon the surface of the ground, is in fact and in law the 
road which was purportedly established in 1910 as a county road. An answer to 
this inquiry must necessarily take into account the fact that, notwithstanding 
appellees' efforts at dominion, the road has, for more than 70 years, been used 
by the public and, from time to time, maintained and repaired by the County of Sheridan. The response to the inquiry is 
further bound to assume that any present or recent survey of the road 
necessarily will not coincide with the description contained in the county 
commissioners' final authorizing resolution and that modern-day expert 
surveyors, with all of their experience and equipment, cannot say whether the 
road, as it appeared upon the surface of the ground at the time of trial, did or 
did not track the locations described by the notes of the surveyor who layed out 
the Piney Creek Road in 1910.

The 
Law

[¶15.]  Up until the time when, in 1983, Gulf Oil 
Company petitioned the county to upgrade a bridge and improve the North Piney 
Creek Road, this roadway was considered and, in all respects, treated as a 
county road by the County of Sheridan, its citizens and the adjoining 
landowners, including the appellees and their predecessors in interest. This 
perception of the road's ownership has prevailed ever since September 6, of 
1910, when the Sheridan county commissioners adopted this 
following resolution:

"It was thereupon duly 
moved, seconded and carried that the following road, to-wit: - Beginning at the end of the present County 
Road being N. 1065 feet, * * * which road has been designated the North Fork 
Piney Road, be and the same is hereby established as and declared to be a county 
road and the same is hereby ordered opened to the use of the public." (Emphasis 
added.)

The Commissioners' 
Resolution

[¶16.]  While the appellees do not contend that 
the proceedings of 1910 were defective for failure to follow the appropriate 
statutory requirements, they do urge that the resolution of the commissioners, 
which undertook to finally establish and locate the road, contained a 
description which fatally varied from the way described by the surveyor's field 
notes, thus rendering the actions of the county commissioners a 
nullity.

[¶17.]  It is conceded that the plats, maps and 
relevant writings which are of record in this appeal disclose that the road as 
platted from the county commissioners' minutes does not begin "at the end of the 
present County Road," and thus the 1065 feet figure is in error (see plat, 
supra). The figure should be 1605, instead of 1065, in order that it comport 
with physical landmarks, the intent and purpose of the commissioners' 
formulating resolution and published notice descriptions. That this was simply a 
transposition error is borne out by the fact that the old road was stated to be 
1605 on the official plat and this point represented a definite physical 
location which has been established on the ground. Consistent with these 
observations is the testimony of appellees' land surveyor, David Graham, who 
testified that the discrepancy appears because "[s]omebody reversed the 
numbers." He went on to say:

"The original legal 
description calls for 1605 and the minutes call for 1065. It's the zero and the 
six which are reversed."

[¶18.]  It is said in 39A C.J.S. Highways § 94, 
pp. 801-802:

"Where it is shown that 
the authorities which established the road had jurisdiction, every presumption 
thereafter is in favor of the legality and regularity of their proceedings * * 
*. Also, where ancient records are offered as proof of the existence of a way, 
all reasonable presumptions are to be taken in favor of their 
validity."

[¶19.]  In matters of this nature, where the 
establishment of a road or highway is under collateral attack, we have long held 
that the commissioners enjoy a presumption in favor of the validity of their 
proceedings. In Miller v. Hagie, 59 
Wyo. 383, 140 P.2d 746 (1943), we quoted 13 R.C.L. 56, Section 447, to the following 
effect:

"`Where the body to which 
the statute intrusts the matter orders the opening of the way, and in doing so 
necessarily passes on the facts essential to its jurisdiction, every presumption 
is in favor of its jurisdiction and the validity of its proceedings on 
collateral attack.'" 140 P.2d  at 750.

[¶20.]  We will, therefore, not further concern 
ourselves with appellees' contention that the road, the establishment of which 
was undertaken according to statutes in force in 1910, was a road described by 
commencing at a point indicated by the erroneous figure contained in the 
commissioners' resolution. This was simply a transposition printing error, and 
when the facts upon which the appellees rely are taken into account, they fail 
to overcome the presumption of legality and regularity of the commissioners' 
proceedings by which presumption this court is bound.

[¶21.]  We hold, therefore, that this contention 
has no viability and does not serve to adversely affect the proceedings of the 
county commissioners.

[¶22.]  Within the context of the facts and law 
of this appeal, three other issues are presented for our consideration which may 
be described in the following way:

1. What is the legal 
effect of a fact situation which shows that present-day land surveyors cannot 
tell whether the Piney Creek 
Road across the surface of the land follows the 1910 
survey notes?3

2. What is the effect of 
user in ascertaining the existence and location of a county 
road?

3. What conclusions must 
be reached as to ownership if it is to be assumed that there does, in fact, 
exist a variance between the course laid out by the field notes of the 1910 
survey and the roadway as it appeared upon the surface of the ground at the time 
of trial?

Issue No. 
1

What is the effect of 
present-day surveyors not being able to tell whether the physical Piney Creek Road 
follows the course shown by the 1910 survey notes?

[¶23.]  It was said in Merrill v. Hutchins, 180 Iowa 1276, 164 N.W. 184 
(1917), where the location of a road laid out in 1856 was in 
issue:

"* * * [B]ut it does not 
follow that every resurvey after long intervals of time is to be accepted as 
correct, and all highways affected thereby are to be moved to correspond to the 
latest conclusions of a civil engineer. If such were the case, no highway would 
ever have a fixed or permanent location, for it seldom happens that two surveys, 
which attempt to retrace original government lines to any considerable distance, 
ever fully coincide. That general recognition and public usage of public ways 
are proper to be considered in such cases, whether it be to ascertain the true 
line, or to show the existence of a highway dedication or prescription, or to 
establish an estoppel of the public, see Orr v. O'Brien, 77 Iowa, 253, 42 N.W. 183, 14 Am.St.Rep. 277; Smith v. Gorrell, 
81 Iowa, 218, 46 N.W. 992; Rector v. 
Christy, 114 Iowa 471, 87 N.W. 489; Heller v. Cahill, 138 Iowa, 301, 115 N.W. 1009; Lucas v. Payne, 141 Iowa, 
592, 120 N.W. 59; Weber v. Iowa City, 
119 Iowa, 633, 93 N.W. 637; Carter v. 
Barkley, 137 Iowa, 510, 115 N.W. 21; Larson v. Fitzgerald, 87 Iowa, 402, 54 N.W. 441." 164 N.W.  at 185.

[¶24.]  The professional land-survey and engineer 
witnesses in this case testified that it would be difficult, if not impossible, 
to trace the original 1910 survey; therefore, notwithstanding the plat which was 
offered and received in evidence and which is reproduced in this opinion, these 
professional witnesses could not know whether the physical Piney Creek Road and 
a course described by the original survey notes coincide. Typical of this 
testimony is that of the appellees' witness, County Engineer 
Hollingsworth.

[¶25.]  Preliminarily, Mr. Hollingsworth 
testified that there was nothing about his investigation that would lead him to 
the conclusion that the existing road through the appellees' properties in 
Section 11 (see plat, supra) was not the same county road which was established 
by the proceedings of 1910. 

He then 
testified that any present survey would not be capable of proving or disproving 
whether the roadway upon the surface of the ground was the same way as outlined 
by the notes of the original survey. The county engineer testified on direct 
examination that he advised the county commissioners as 
follows:

"I told them that due to 
the age of the survey that there could be, that there was not any practical way 
of retracing that survey because it was not tied to a second land corner in any 
way."

He went on to 
respond to counsel's questioning:

"Q Okay. Did you make any 
recommendations to the commissioners to survey or check this problem 
out?

"A I think my 
recommendation was that it would be a very expensive job and there probably 
would not be a significant result because of the inability to trace the old 
survey accurately.

"Q And it goes back to 
your original assessment that the notes which were on file in the county you 
could not survey the road from those?

"A That's 
right."

On 
recross-examination, Mr. Hollingsworth testified:

"Q Could you explain 
further why there is a difficulty retracing the original 
survey?

"A There are several 
reasons. The old survey was probably done with - on a magnetic, with a magnetic 
needle, making the turns to the angles very probable. It was also - it was not 
tied with any other land corner which makes it impossible to check that work so 
you are sure when you get to the other end that it ties in 
properly."

The county 
surveyor was then asked and he answered:

"Q Considering the 
difficulty of retracing the original survey because of the difference in methods 
and other factors described, does that lead you to the conclusion that this is 
not a county road?

* * * * * 
*

"A * * * No, it does 
not."

[¶26.]  We have seen that the presumption of the 
validity of the establishment of the Piney Creek Road favors the authorities who 
undertook to establish it, and that where ancient records are offered in proof 
of the existence of a way, all reasonable presumptions are to be taken in favor 
of their validity. 39A C.J.S. Highways § 94, pp. 801-802. Our opinion in Miller v. Hagie (a collateral-attack 
case), supra, adopts this presumption of validity where the opening of public 
ways is at issue. In Board of County 
Com'rs of Sheridan County v. Patrick, 18 Wyo. 130, 104 P. 531 (1909), reh. denied 107 P. 748 (1910), where the map and field notes had been on record for more than 20 
years and the road had been, for that period of time, publicly used, we held 
that there would be grounds for a presumption that it had been legally 
established. As applied to this case, these rules say that, since a resurvey 
utilizing present-day surveying methods cannot determine whether or not the 
physical road follows the course described by the 1910 surveyor's notes, the 
physical road will be regarded in the law to be consistent with the course 
originally laid out unless the presumption is overcome. This burden becomes the 
obligation of the appellees.

[¶27.]  In Central Pacific Railway Company v. 
County of Alameda, 284 U.S. 463, 52 S. Ct. 225, 76 L. Ed. 402 (1932), where the issue was, in all relevant ways, the 
same as that which concerns this court, Justice Sutherland, speaking for the 
Court, said:

"* * * That is to say, 
the respondents say, the respondents having shown the establishment by the 
county of a road through Niles Canyon in 1859, the continuing identity of that 
road must be presumed until overcome by proof to the contrary, the burden of 
which rests upon the petitioners. Barnes 
v. Robertson, 156 Iowa, 730, 733, 137 N.W. 1018; Beckwith v. Whalen, 65 N.Y. 322, 332; Eklon v. Chelsea, 223 Mass. 213, 216, 
111 N.E. 866; Taeger v. Riepe, 90 
Iowa, 484, 487, 57 N.W. 1125; Oyster Bay 
v. Stehli, 169 App. Div. 257, 262, 154 N.Y.Supp. 849. 

This is in accordance 
with the general principle that a condition once shown to exist is presumed to 
continue." 284 U.S.  at 468, 52 S. Ct.  at 
227.

[¶28.]  The appellees in the case at bar have not 
discharged their burden of proving that the roadway crossing their property does 
not follow the 1910 survey since their proof only goes to establish that their 
engineers, using other methods, and not having conducted an actual survey, have 
platted a course for the roadway which is different than the physical road. This 
is not sufficient to show that the Piney Creek Road and the 1910 survey are at 
variance, especially in view of their own expert's testimony to the effect that 
it cannot be said that the physical road and the 1910 survey do not describe one 
and the same course.

Issue No. 
2

What is the effect of 
user in ascertaining the existence and location of a county 
road?

[¶29.]  Not only must it be presumed that the 
established road still retains its identity until the presumption is overcome by 
proof to the contrary, but, even if we were to assume the location of the road 
to be indefinite as the appellees in the case at bar contend, a showing of long 
public use in the area where the road was purportedly located by statutory 
officers acting by authority of law will bear heavily in favor of a conclusion 
that the physical location of the roadway will determine the limits and 
boundaries of the way.

[¶30.]  In 1 Elliott, The Law of Roads and 
Streets (4th ed. revised and enlarged, 1926), the author states in § 
441:

"If the location of the 
way is indefinite and uncertain, but there has been a user of a way answering in 
a general manner to the line described, the user will ordinarily determine the 
limits and boundaries of the road. The line opened by the highway officers, and 
used by the public without objection from the property owners, may be regarded 
as the road established, although it may deviate somewhat from the line 
described in the order. If public user has located a way under color of an order 
laying it out, the fact that the highway officers charged with the duty of 
surveying it and of preparing it for the public use fail to discharge their duty 
will not destroy the character of the way as a public 
road."

[¶31.]  In Merrill v. Hutchins, supra, 164 N.W.  at 
185, the court said:

"* * * It satisfactorily 
appears that if an engineer were to attempt to retrace the lines given in the 
original record, following literally and exactly the description there given, 
the location thus found would not correspond with either the present traveled 
road or the location to which the defendants propose to move it, and except for 
the fact that the public for more than half a century have used, accepted, and 
recognized the present way as the one intended by the order of the court, the 
proper location would be involved in great, if not insolvable, uncertainty. 
Under such circumstances, the court ought to and will give much weight to the 
practical construction which the public generally, the people owning the 
property immediately affected thereby, and the public officers having charge of 
the highways have during all these years placed upon said order of 
establishment. Such was the rule applied in Taeger v. Riepe, 90 Iowa, 484, 57 N.W. 1125, 
and we regard it as reasonable and just."

[¶32.]  In Brammer v. Iowa Telephone Co., 182 Iowa 
865, 165 N.W. 117, 1 A.L.R. 400 (1917), the telephone company engineer 
authorized construction upon what appeared to him to be the highway right-of-way 
but which way the plaintiff alleged was illegally upon his land. In holding that 
the telephone company was not a trespasser, the court 
said:

"Taeger v. 
Riepe, 
90 Iowa, 484, 
57 N.W. 1125, is no warrant for putting defendant into such a position. In that 
case the landowner claimed that a highway through his land which had been used 
as a traveled road for 45 years was from 80 to 230 feet to one side of where it 
should be. To prove this he introduced an old survey in which the magnetic 
variations had been omitted, and as to which survey competent surveyors 
testified they were unable to locate it on the ground from the plat and notes. 
The decision was just this and no more: That where it is uncertain where the 
exact situation of an established highway is, a finding that it is the traveled 
way, used and worked as such highway for many years, and with reference to which 
houses and fences have been built, will not be disturbed, though some facts 
appear which cannot be reconciled with such finding, other facts being 
irreconcilable with any other findings suggested." 165 N.W.  at 
118.

[¶33.]  The rule is, then, that where a way has 
been established by the appropriate officials under permissive statutes, has 
been opened for public use, and has, for a substantial period of time, in fact 
been used by the public on a course which is generally in accord with the line 
described in the location procedures, the user will in most instances determine 
the limits and boundaries of the road. Applied to this case, this rule points to 
a conclusion that the Piney Creek Road, having been laid out in 1910 by the 
proper authorities under statutes in force at the time, and the public having 
used the road for more than 70 years, the physically established way will not, 
absent overriding factors which do not appear in the case at bar, be disturbed 
by the court in a collateral attack such as that mounted by the appellees 
here.

Issue No. 
3

What conclusions must be 
reached as to ownership if it is to be assumed that there does, in fact, exist a 
variance between the course laid out by the field notes of the 1910 survey and 
the roadway as it appeared upon the surface of the ground at the time of 
trial?

[¶34.]  Even if we were to assume that there 
exists a variance between the 1910 survey and the physical road - all as 
exemplified by the plat which appears in this opinion, supra - it is the 
physical road which the law holds to be the established county 
road.

[¶35.]  In this western country, it is more usual 
than unusual that county roads do not follow the platted course. The appellees' 
land surveyor testified as follows in the trial court:

"Q Mr. Graham, is it 
common in your experience for a county road to vary somewhat from the lines laid 
out by the original surveyor?

"A 
Yes.

"Q What is the reason for 
these variations?

"A There could be a 
number of reasons. One, somebody might have taken a road around a natural 
obstacle that was more convenient; or a change in the creek might make it 
necessary to move a road out of what the original survey said it was in. And it 
may have been a poor survey to begin with. So, any one of 
those.

"Q Thus, the variations 
from a survey in the North Piney Creek 
Road are not unusual; are 
they?

"A 
No.

"Q Isn't it true in the 
surveying profession that a public road is normally recognized as the roadway 
which is actually occupied?

* * * * * 
*

"A (By Mr. Graham) I 
would say so, yes."

[¶36.]  Mr. Carl Oslund, the appellees' surveyor 
and witness, testified on cross-examination:

"Q In your 40 years of 
experience as a surveyor, have you learned that public roads often do not follow 
the original surveys?

"A That is 
correct.

"Q Could you explain to 
the court why public roads sometimes do not follow original 
surveys?

"A Mostly because of 
physical conditions. If I may give an example. Let's take the Powder River. The Powder River in its many, many years has moved from bank to bank, 
increasing on one and secretions [accretions] on the other. 

When we had the 
secretions [accretions] it would cut into possibly a roadway and the roadway had 
to be moved and those changes have not been recorded.

"Also, you'll find that 
condition prevailing where roads were established without study of snows and 
when the snows do come they found out there was movement. It would be 
visible.

"You'll also find that 
many times they went through a creek bottom or a wet bottom where changes were 
visible.

"Q In your experience, 
can you tell me how many roads you found in SheridanCounty which do precisely follow the 
original survey?

* * * * * 
*

"A * * * I can't tell you 
the number. I will say many.

"Q Do or do not? Many do 
or do not follow the original surveys?

"A Many do 
not.

"Q In fact, to your 
knowledge, there isn't a single road in Sheridan that precisely follows the original 
survey, is there, to your knowledge?

"A I would say that there 
probably is not one that does follow it.

* * * * * 
*

"Q Have you reviewed the 
county records with respect to the establishment of the North Piney Creek Road?

"A I 
have.

"Q Do you have an opinion 
as to whether there is a public road dedicated through the property where the 
Spiros and Klepingers are?

* * * * * 
*

"A * * * 
Yes.

"Q What is your 
opinion?

"A North Piney Road or 
the Nameless Road, as it was referred to, was established by the 
county, by the county commissioners.

"Q Do you have an opinion 
as to whether that road proceeds through the property of the Spiros and 
Klepingers?

`A I would judge offhand 
that it does.

"Q In your opinion, if an 
existing county road varies from the original survey notes, what would you 
consider to be the public road?

* * * * * 
*

"A The road as 
used."

Walter Pilch, a 
professional engineer and land surveyor, testified as 
follows:

"Q. In the course of your 
experience have you found that county roads tend to follow survey lines without 
variation?

"A. My experience 
indicates that they vary generally very considerably, they vary from the 
original surveys.

"Q. Is it feasible today 
to follow precisely a survey made 70 or 80 years 
previously?

* * * * * 
*

"A. My experience tells 
me it's, it's almost impracticable or impossible to retrace the original 
surveys."

[¶37.]  Under the statutes in force at the time 
the Piney 
Creek Road was established in 1910, the county 
commissioners were authorized to establish county roads (§ 2514, W.C.S. 1910). 
When a petition to open a road was filed as required by statute, the 
commissioners were directed to appoint a viewer. If the viewer found the road to 
be required, and the commissioners decided to lay it out, a survey was to be 
ordered (§ 2523, W.C.S. 1910), and a notice of the location of the road 
published (§ 2525, W.C.S. 1910). Significantly, this notice to affected property 
owners was duly required to indicate where the road was to commence and then to 
describe "in general terms" (emphasis 
added) the points and courses thereof (§ 2525, W.C.S. 
1910).

[¶38.]  This review of the statutes indicates 
that the county commissioners had broad, general powers to establish and locate 
county roads in 1910, and that in the discharge of this authority the surveyor 
was to utilize the then existing, acceptable surveying procedures to locate the 
roadway in a manner that would permit a notice to be given to the public and the 
affected landowners so that all could know in a general way - i.e., "in general 
terms" - where the road was to be located. Given these authorities and 
directives, the appropriate rule is:

"It is usually held that 
a substantial compliance with a statute describing the route of a road is all 
that is required. Sale v. Road Dist. (1923) 156 Ark. 501, 246 S.W. 843; Currie v. Glasscock County (1916; 
Tex.Civ.App.) 183 S.W. 1193; State ex 
rel. McGill v. HamiltonCounty (1882) 8 Ohio Dec. Reprint, 457, 8 Ohio 
L.J. 83 (affirmed in (1883) 
39 Ohio St.
 58); Stahr 
v. Carter (1902) 116 Iowa, 380, 90 N.W. 64." Annot., 63 A.L.R. 
516.

[¶39.]  It has been held that where there is a 
variance between the road as it was surveyed and as it was laid out, the road as 
it was opened and used will control, since it is presumed that a public highway 
was opened as legally directed. In Kamerer v. Commonwealth, 364 Pa. 120, 70 A.2d 305, 307 
(1950), the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said:

"* * * But, in 
ascertaining the center lines and sides of a highway, it is the road as actually 
laid out and opened to public travel that determines its location rather than 
the courses and distances designated by the report of viewers appointed by a 
court or of commissioners directed by the legislature to lay out and open the 
highway."

[¶40.]  Where a party relies upon the position 
that the establishment of a road by the county is of no force and effect for the 
reason that the physical way and the way as laid out by the county authorities 
are in fatal variance, it is that party's burden to overcome a presumption of 
validity. Central Pacific Railway Company 
v. County of 
Alameda, 
supra.

Our inquiry 
reveals that reasonable variations between the original survey and the way the 
road is laid out upon the ground and used by the public is permissible and that 
the roadway, as it appears upon the surface, will be held to be the official 
road. This is particularly true where it is necessary to procure a more 
practicable route. Hotovy v. Town of 
UlyssesTownship, 197 Neb. 16, 246 N.W.2d 718 (1976). Even in the 
flatlands of Nebraska, where physical obstacles such as mountainous canyon 
passages, with their changing creek beds, snow and ice erosions and other 
obstacles such as those with which this appeal concerns itself are not present, 
the court recognized that variations in order to procure a more practical 
passageway would not destroy the road's characteristic as a public way, citing 
as authority State ex rel. Draper v. 
Freese, 147 Neb. 147, 22 N.W.2d 556 (1946); Richardson v. Frontier County, 94 Neb. 
27, 142 N.W. 528 (1913); Brandt v. 
Olson, 79 Neb. 612, 113 N.W. 151 (1907), on rehearing, 79 Neb. 617, 114 N.W. 587 (1908).

[¶41.]  In Richardson v. Frontier County, supra, 
the court said, with reference to a fact situation in which the road, as its 
pathway traversed the surface, was found to vary from the descriptions approved 
in the survey:

"* * * The mere fact that 
the line of road was not in exact accordance with the line prayed for is 
immaterial." 142 N.W.  at 529.

[¶42.]  In State ex rel. Draper v. Freese, supra, 
it was shown that the road was assigned to be laid out along the section line. 
Because of a meandering creek, the placement of the roadway on the section line 
was highly impractical. Therefore, a deviation for the creek was made by the 
surveyor and no part of the road described by the authorizing documents was ever 
made a roadway. In response to a complaint that the roadway was never 
established since it does not follow the section line, the court 
said:

"The evidence shows that 
RoseCreek meanders down the 
section line and that it would be extremely difficult and very expensive to 
cross it on the section line. However, the commissioner's report together with 
the plat and field notes show a deviation from the section line apparently to 
avoid that very condition. As we have said in Richardson v. Frontier County, 94 Neb. 
27, 142 N.W. 528: `It is not essential that a public road be laid out upon the 
exact line prayed for in the petition, and slight variations in order to procure 
a more practicable route, are permissible.'" 22 N.W.2d  at 
560.

[¶43.]  After describing the statutory steps to 
be followed in locating and establishing a road, the court, in Wallace v. Desha County, 194 Ark. 848, 
109 S.W.2d 950, 951 (1937), said:

"This does not 
necessarily mean that in the location or establishment of the road that all 
portions of it shall conform with perfect exactitude to the description called 
for in the petition. The court may vary from the line to avoid unnecessary 
inconvenience, unreasonable costs of location or construction, or for other 
reasons justifiable as may be found and determined upon final hearing. Of 
course, it was never contemplated that if the line petitioned for ran into a bog 
or morass where it would be impracticable to build a road at such point, the 
line might not be varied, or if a massive boulder were found in the line or 
survey that the road might not be turned aside rather than encounter unnecessary 
expense, but such variations as these are not substantial, but may be said to 
be, strictly speaking, another method of locating and establishing the road as 
petitioned for. Section 132, 29 C.J. 457."

[¶44.]  In Skinner v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 65 S.W. 1073, 1074-1075 (1901), where the issue was whether the defendant had obstructed 
a county road in violation of the criminal statutes, and resolution turned on 
which was the true road, the court said:

"* * * Where the line of 
a road as actually used by the public differs from the line laid out by the 
commissioners' court at the time of establishing it, the former is the true 
road. Dodson v. State (Tex. Cr.App.) 49 S.W. 78. 
It follows, therefore, that the commissioners' court in the present instance did 
designate the line between appellant and other parties as the line upon which 
the road should run, but if, as a matter of fact, said road did not run exactly 
upon that line, though maintained as a public road for a number of years, 
designated as such by the commissioners' court, worked by hands assigned for 
that purpose, this would make the land actually used by the public the public 
road, regardless of whether or not it exactly corresponded with the order of the 
commissioners' court designating the line."

[¶45.]  In Central Pacific Railway Company v. County of 
Alameda, supra, the facts reveal that the county laid a road through the 
bottom of a canyon in 1859 in compliance with law and subsequently, by authority 
of land grants from the United 
States, the railroad was given 
a right-of-way which embraced part of the land occupied by the highway. By 
reason of flooding of the creek running down the canyon, the highway was washed 
out in places. The washed-out areas were abandoned and the road was moved from 
one side of the creek to the other, where it then coursed upon the railroad 
right-of-way along lines that were not contemplated when the road was originally 
established.

[¶46.]  The California court had found the question to be 
this:

"* * * [W]hether there 
had been such substantial departures from portions of the line of the road 
established in 1859 as to constitute an abandonment of those portions of that 
road and the substitution, pro tanto, of a new one so removed in location as to 
cause it to depend for its legality not upon the original establishment but upon 
independent facts and considerations." 284 U.S.  at 467-468, 
52 S. Ct.  at 227.

[¶47.]  Upon appeal, the United States Supreme 
Court held that, even though the roadway was moved to the other side of the 
creek to accommodate the flooding, there had not been such departures from the 
original road as would prevent the county from relying upon the roadway's 
original establishment.

Conclusion

[¶48.]  Given these rules of law as applied to 
the evidence of appellees' own expert witnesses, and given the terrain which 
passage is forced to accommodate as the road works its way up the canyon and 
along Piney Creek, we find, in the first place, that the record does not 
establish that the way in question does not follow the 1910 survey. Secondly, 
under the facts of this case, user clearly puts the established and existing 
county road through appellees' properties and the road is not a private way as 
the appellees contend. Lastly, under the facts of record in this appeal, even if 
the "physical road" and the "road as platted by survey notes" (see plat, supra) 
are at variance in the eyes of the law, the road as it appears upon the surface 
must be held to be in substantial compliance with the field notes upon which the 
commissioners and landowners relied in 1910 when the officials undertook to 
establish the Piney Creek Road. It follows, then, that the road, as used, is a 
county road, and that the county officials were within their rights when they 
removed the gate and exercised affirmative ownership responsibilities with 
respect to the way in question.

Abandonment

[¶49.]  The trial court held that any rights that 
the county may have had in the road were abandoned. There are no proceedings of 
record in this litigation which support such a finding. In Board of County Commissioners, Carbon County 
v. White, Wyo., 547 P.2d 1195 (1976), we held that, since the traveling 
public has a vested right in the use of public roads, county roads cannot be 
vacated without compliance with the appropriate statutes, citing Board of Com'rs of Sheridan County v. 
Patrick, supra, 104 P.  at 532. There is no showing in this case that 
vacation or abandonment proceedings were undertaken in compliance with relevant 
statutes and there is no citation of authority which supports a contention that 
the road, once acquired by the county, was or can be vacated or abandoned by 
failure to adequately maintain or by operation of law. Therefore, since we hold 
that the road in question was originally established as a county road and it has 
never been vacated or - as the trial court says - "abandoned by the County," it 
follows that it still exists as a road owned by the county for the use of the 
public.

[¶50.]  Other issues raised by the appellants 
need not be addressed in view of our holding concerning the ownership of the 
road.

[¶51.]  Reversed.

1 In North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 30 
Wyo. 238, 219 P. 561, aff'd 268 U.S. 276, 45 S. Ct. 491, 69 L. Ed. 953 (1923), we 
held that a suit by the owner of land through which a county road is located 
against the county commissioners is a collateral attack.

2 A January 19, 1968 
letter from Mrs. Q.L. Klepinger, one of the appellees here, to County 
Commissioner Byron Collins states:

"As you recall, a 
petition was brought before the CountyCommissioners last May, requesting 
abandonment of the North Piney road above (west) of a wire gate bordering C.L. 
Crawford's land in the canyon. * * *

* * * * * 
*

"Since this is a County 
road, and since the petition of last May was denied, we assume that the County 
would plan on at least some maintenance. * * *

* * * * * 
*

"* * * And incidentally, 
it is a fact that no one, on any sort of official business, including 
fire-fighting, of course, has ever been denied access to this canyon by my 
father, C.L. Crawford, or by us. And this will continue to be the case, 
regardless of whether or not the road past the gate is 
abandoned."

A November 29, 1969 
letter from Mr. and Mrs. Q.L. Klepinger to County Commissioner Byron Collins 
says:

"* * * Since the County 
has determined that the road in question is to remain a County road, then we 
residents are surely entitled to some maintenance, at least as far as the wire 
gate.

"If it were not for the 
unpaid efforts of our neighbor, E.A. Robinson, this road would be impassable for 
the major part of each winter. But since the road is used year around by seven 
families, it is not right or just to expect Mr. Robinson to donate his time and 
equipment to do a job the County should be doing - keeping the road in usable 
condition."

3 Actually, the evidence 
reveals that an on-the-ground survey was never made by either side in 
preparation for this case.