Case Title: RICHARD DALE BECK V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2005-05-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
RICHARD DALE BECK V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2005 WY 56110 P.3d 898Case Number: 04-84Decided: 05/03/2005
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2005

 
 
                                                                                                            

 
 
RICHARD 
DALE BECK,

 
 
Appellant

(Defendant),

 
 
v.

 
 
THE STATE OFWYOMING,

 
 
Appellee

(Plaintiff).

 
 
 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofFremontCounty

The 
Honorable Nancy Guthrie, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

            
Pro se. 

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; and D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General. 

 
 
 
 
Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, KITE, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; VOIGT, J., files a specially concurring 
opinion.

 
 
 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Richard Dale Beck 
pled guilty to one count of felony interference with a peace officer and one 
count of using a firearm in the course of committing a felony.  He was sentenced to two consecutive 
terms of imprisonment, and did not appeal that judgment and sentence.  Mr. Beck subsequently sought a sentence 
reduction to concurrent terms, which was denied.  He then filed a motion to correct a 
clerical mistake pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 36, requesting the same relief, which the 
district court also denied.  We 
affirm.

 
 
 
 

 
 
[¶2]      The issue before 
this Court is whether the district court properly denied Mr. Beck's motion to 
correct a clerical mistake.

 
 

 
 
[¶3]      On July 30, 2001, 
Patrol Sergeant Glasgow of the Fremont County Sheriff's Office went to Mr. 
Beck's residence to arrest him pursuant to an order entered in an unrelated 
civil domestic relations matter.  
When the officer began to handcuff Mr. Beck outside of his home, Mr. Beck 
broke free and ran toward his front door.  
A struggle ensued, and the officer managed to get his foot in the door 
and sprayed Mr. Beck with pepper spray.  
Mr. Beck then ran to his bedroom, produced a revolver from under some 
pillows, and pointed it at the officer.  
The two men struggled before the officer wrestled the gun from Mr. Beck. 
In doing so, the officer injured his left hand.  The officer then drew his own weapon and 
ordered Mr. Beck to the floor, handcuffed him, and escorted him to his patrol 
car.

 
 
[¶4]      As a result of 
this altercation, Mr. Beck was charged with attempted second-degree murder 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-104(b) and 6-1-301(a)(i) (LexisNexis 
2003).  However, he later pled 
guilty to one count of felony interference with a peace office, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 6-5-204 (LexisNexis 2003), and one count of using a firearm in the course of 
committing a felony, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-101(a) (LexisNexis 2003), each of 
which carry a maximum sentence of 10 years imprisonment.  As part of the plea agreement, the 
parties stipulated that, given the facts of the case, the doctrine of merger, 
addressed in Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249, 255 (Wyo. 2000), did not 
apply.  After accepting the plea 
agreement and Mr. Beck's plea, the district court sentenced Mr. Beck to two 
terms of 9-10 years of imprisonment to be served consecutively.  

 
 
[¶5]      Mr. Beck did not 
appeal the district court's judgment and sentence.  However, in  January 2003, he filed a pro se 
motion for sentence 
reduction seeking to have his sentence reduced to two concurrent terms of 3 to 5 
years.  Mr. Beck also filed an 
amended motion for sentence reduction1 in which he further claimed that 
his sentences violated Bilderback, and should have merged.  His motions were denied and no appeal 
was filed. 

 
 
[¶6]      On September 26, 
2003, Mr. Beck filed a motion entitled "Motion to Correct Clerical Mistake 
Pursuant to Wy.R.Crim.P. Rule 36 [sic]."  
In that motion, he argued that the district court's imposition of 
consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences was a clerical mistake and also 
was in violation of Bilderback's merger rule.  The district court denied Mr. Beck's 
motion and he filed a timely notice of appeal.

 
 
 
 

 
 
[¶7]      W.R.Cr.P. 36 
applies to clerical mistakes.  It 
provides:

 
 
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts 
of the record and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be 
corrected by the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court 
orders.

 
 

[¶8]      This rule is 
intended to correct clerical, not judicial, errors. Kearns v. 
State, 
2002 WY 97, ¶27, 48 P.3d 1090, ¶27 (Wyo. 
2002).   We must, therefore, determine whether the judge's 
order constituted a clerical error or a judicial error, the latter of which does 
not fall within the remedial provisions of W.R.Cr.P. 36.  Id.  If the error was clerical, we then 
review the trial court's order to ascertain whether it altered or modified the 
original judgment.  This Court has 
previously distinguished the two types of errors by explaining that "'all 
errors, mistakes, or omissions which are not the result of the exercise of the 
judicial function' may be called clerical errors, while a judicial error is one 
that is the deliberate result of judicial reasoning and determination.'"  Id.  We have further illuminated the 
difference between the two types of errors:

 
 
It is said in 30 Am.Jurisprudence 876: "The authority 
of the court in this connection does not extend beyond the power to make the 
journal entry speak the truth, and may be exercised only to supply omissions in 
the exercise of functions which are clerical merely. It is, however, 
often difficult to distinguish between clerical and judicial errors. The 
distinction between a clerical error and a judicial one is 
not dependent upon its source. Clerical errors may include mistakes 
in papers evidencing the judgment of the court made by the court itself." In 126 
A.L.R. 977, it is stated: "Clerical errors in judgments, orders, 
or decrees are not, by the majority rule, limited to mistakes of the clerk, but 
include also errors made by the judge where of a clerical or ministerial nature." In 
126 A.L.R.  978, it is stated: 
"Although an error in a judgment, order, or decree was originally made by an 
attorney when preparing the same for the signature of the judge or clerk, it may 
none the less be a 'clerical' error." In Sec. 146, Freeman 
on Judgments, 5th Ed., the author states: "But 'clerical' is employed in a broad sense 
as contradistinguished from 'judicial' error and covers all errors, mistakes, or 
omissions which are not the result of the exercise of the judicial function. In 
other words, the distinction does not depend so much upon the person making the 
error as upon whether it was the deliberate result of judicial reasoning and 
determination, regardless of whether it was made by the clerk, by counsel or by 
the judge. Mistakes of the court are not necessarily judicial error. Thus if the 
judgment or some provision in it was the result of inadvertence, as where the 
court was laboring under a mistake or misapprehension as to the state of the 
record or as to some extrinsic fact, but for which a different judgment would 
have been rendered, the judgment may be vacated or may be corrected to 
correspond with what it would have been but for the inadvertence or 
mistake."

 
 

Holmes v. Holmes, 66 Wyo. 317, 211 P.2d 946, 953 (Wyo. 1949).

 
 
[¶9]      The action to 
which Mr. Beck objects, namely the imposition of consecutive terms instead of 
concurrent terms, is a result of judicial, not clerical, action. In addition, 
Mr. Beck's asserted "mistake" was not a mistake at all, but the product of a 
written and signed plea agreement, which Mr. Beck approved.  Thus, Rule 36 provides Mr. Beck no 
relief. 

 
 

[¶10]   In his motion, Mr. Beck also 
attempted to raise the issue of double jeopardy contending the merger rule of 
Bilderback 
should 
apply to his case and would have resulted in one sentence instead of two.  That effort must fail for three 
reasons.  First, the issue is barred 
by the doctrine of res judicata which prevents the relitigation of claims raised 
and determined in earlier proceedings.  
Dolence 
v. State, 2005 WY 
27, ¶6, 107 P. 3 176, ¶6 (Wyo. 2005).   Mr. Beck did not challenge his 
sentence or the denial of his motion for sentence reduction, in which he 
asserted double jeopardy, and he cannot do so now. 

 
 
[¶11]   
Second, Bilderback would not have applied to Mr. Beck even if he 
had properly raised the issue because, in his case, different acts resulted in 
separate and distinct violations of two different statutes, felony interference 
with a peace office and using a firearm in the course of committing a 
felony.  

 
 
[¶12]   
Third, Mr. Beck waived any merger claim when he entered his guilty pleas 
pursuant to his plea agreement with the State.  A criminal defendant may waive any 
personal right "so long as there is no violation of public policy and the 
public's interests are not thereby jeopardized."  Meerscheidt v. State, 931 P.2d 220, 225 (Wyo. 
1997) (citation omitted).  Such a 
waiver must be knowingly and intelligently given. Id.  Mr. Beck signed the written plea 
agreement, after consultation with his attorney, which explicitly 
stated:

 
 
It is further understood and agreed by the parties, 
in the context of the decision of the court in Bilderback v. State, 13 P.3d 249 (Wyo. 2000) that the doctrine of merger does not apply under the facts 
of this case.  The parties stipulate 
and agree that the acts by the defendant constituting Felony Interference With a 
Police Officer commenced when the defendant and Deputy Glasgow initially engaged 
in a physical confrontation and struggle at the front door of the defendant's 
residence, continued with the defendant's obtaining and threatening Deputy 
Glasgow with a pistol in the living room, and ended only when the defendant was 
disarmed and subdued by Deputy Glasgow in the bedroom portion of the 
residence.

 
 
Furthermore, 
the following exchange occurred between the district court and Mr. Beck at the 
change of plea hearing:

 
 
THE 
COURT:  And you have stipulated that 
the acts by you constituting felony interference with the officer, and also the 
acts which constituted using a firearm while committing a felony are separate 
acts, and they don't merge into each other.  They don't merge.  Maybe I am just confusing you 
more.

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

 
 
THE 
COURT: And do you understand that?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT: Yes.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  And I'm certain that you  
do you have any questions about that?

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  No, Your 
Honor.

 
 
THE 
COURT: Because there are some instances where people can plead or be found 
guilty of two felonies.  And for 
purposes of sentencing, they can merge into one crime.  And so the defendant can only be 
sentenced on one crime.

 
 
THE 
DEFENDANT:  Yes, Your 
Honor.

 
 
THE 
COURT:  But you have agreed that 
this is not the case in your case?

 
 
DEFENDANT'S 
ATTORNEY:  Specifically, Your Honor, 
we have agreed that there are two offenses.  The State reserves the right to argue 
that those sentences be imposed consecutively, and we reserve the right to argue 
that they should be imposed concurrently.

 
 
THE 
COURT: Okay. Thank you for clarifying that.

 
 
DEFENDANT'S 
ATTORNEY:  And I have gone over that 
several times with [Mr. Beck].

 
 
THE 
COURT: And you understand that, Mr. Beck?

 
 
DEFENDANT:  Yes, Your Honor.

 
 
As the 
record shows, Mr. Beck fully understood his right to argue merger and knowingly 
and intelligently waived it.

            

 
 
CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶13]   The district court's denial of Mr. 
Beck's motion to correct a clerical mistake was proper and the decision is 
affirmed.

 
 
  
            
VOIGT, Justice, specially concurring.

 
 

[¶14]   I concur in the result, but this 
appeal should be dismissed.  
See Patrick v. State, 
2005 WY 32, ¶¶ 19-21, 108 P.3d 838, 844 (Wyo. 2005) (Voigt, J. dissenting).  The appellant filed his motion to 
correct a clerical mistake on September 26, 2003.  Neither W.R.Cr.P. 36, nor W.R.Cr.P. 47, 
establishes a procedure for the district court's timely determination of such a 
motion.  In such event, W.R.Cr.P. 
1(a) leads to the application of W.R.C.P. 6(c)(2), which states that a motion 
not determined within ninety days of filing is deemed denied.  W.R.A.P. 2.01(a), in turn, requires that 
an appeal be filed within thirty days from entry of the appealable order.  The appellant's motion was deemed denied 
on December 26, 2003, and the time for appealing that denial expired on January 
26, 2004.  See Paxton Resources, L.L.C. v. Brannaman, 
2004 WY 93, ¶¶ 4-18, 95 P.3d 796, 798-802 (Wyo. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 976 
(2005) (application of W.R.A.P. 2.01 and 2.02 in 
a deemed-denied situation).  The 
district court's purported denial of the motion on February 27, 2004, had no 
effect because the district court lacked jurisdiction.

 
 
 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1He titled this second motion 
"Amended Post-Conviction 35(b) Pursuant to W.R.Cri.P. 
[sic]."