Case Title: State v. Jaime Romero

Citation: 2009 WI 32

Docket Number: 2007AP001139-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2009-05-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
2009 WI 32 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2007AP1139-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Jaime Romero, 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 311 Wis. 2d 490, 750 N.W.2d 519 
(Ct. App. 2008-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
May 7, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 5, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Dennis P. Moroney   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ROGGENSACK, J., concurs (opinion filed). 
ZIEGLER and GABLEMAN, JJ., join the concurrence.  
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by Michael J. Losse, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by Thomas E. 
Hayes, and the Law Offices of Michael E. Hayes, Milwaukee, and 
oral by Thomas E. Hayes. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 32
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
 
No.  2007AP1139-CR    
(L.C. No. 
2006CF3659) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,   
 
 
v. 
 
Jaime Romero, 
 
 
Defendant-Appellant.   
FILED 
 
MAY 7, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   The State seeks review 
of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals reversing a 
judgment of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Dennis P. 
Moroney, Judge.1  The circuit court denied defendant Jaime 
Romero's motion to suppress evidence that law enforcement 
officers seized during the execution of a search warrant at the 
defendant's residence.  The defendant was convicted of the 
manufacture, distribution, or delivery of more than 40 grams of 
                                                 
1 State v. Romero, No. 2007AP1139-CR, unpublished slip op. 
(Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2008). 
No.  2007AP1139-CR 
2 
 
cocaine as a party to a crime contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 961.41(1m)(cm)4. and 939.05 (2005-06).2    
¶2 
The single issue on review is whether probable cause 
existed for issuance of the warrant to search the defendant's 
residence when the affidavit in support of the search warrant 
was based in part on statements of an unnamed participant in a 
police sting.  We refer to this participant as Mr. X for ease of 
discussion.3  Mr. X is quoted in the affidavit as saying that the 
cocaine he furnished to a confidential informant (who was 
cooperating with the police) was supplied by the defendant.   
¶3 
In deciding whether probable cause exists for the 
issuance of a search warrant, the reviewing court examines the 
totality of the circumstances presented to the warrant-issuing 
commissioner 
to 
determine 
whether 
the 
warrant-issuing 
commissioner had a substantial basis for concluding that there 
                                                 
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
3 The record and the decision of the court of appeals refer 
to this participant as an "unwitting," apparently meaning a 
person who provides information to law enforcement but who does 
so 
unwittingly, 
that 
is, 
without 
the 
intent 
to 
provide 
information to law enforcement or the knowledge that he or she 
is doing so. 
The participant in the present case is distinguished from a 
citizen informer who by happenstance finds himself or herself in 
the position of a victim of or a witness to criminal conduct and 
relates the matter to the police.  2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 3.3 at 98 (4th ed. 2004).  
No.  2007AP1139-CR 
3 
 
was a fair probability that a search of the specified premises 
would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.4  
¶4 
We conclude that the affidavit supporting the warrant 
to search the defendant's residence resting in part on the 
statements of Mr. X meets the totality of the circumstances 
test.  The warrant-issuing commissioner had a substantial basis 
for concluding on the totality of the circumstances that there 
was a fair probability that a search of the specified premises 
would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.  We therefore sustain the 
warrant-issuing commissioner's determination that probable cause 
existed for issuance of the warrant in the instant case.    
¶5 
Having concluded that the warrant to search the 
defendant's residence was supported by probable cause, we need 
not decide the other issue the parties address in their briefs 
to this court, namely whether the "good faith" exception to the 
exclusionary rule would apply if probable cause did not exist 
for issuance of the warrant in the instant case.5   
¶6 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals reversing the circuit court's judgment of conviction and 
affirm the judgment of conviction.   
I 
¶7 
We summarize the facts relating to the circuit court's 
order denying the defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized 
                                                 
4 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983). 
5 For a discussion of the good faith exception under Article 
I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution, see State v. Eason, 
2001 WI 98, ¶3, 245 Wis. 2d 206, 629 N.W.2d 625. 
No.  2007AP1139-CR 
4 
 
during the execution of the search warrant at the defendant's 
residence.   
¶8 
On July 13, 2006, law enforcement officers in the city 
of Milwaukee applied for a warrant to search the defendant's 
residence.  The application was supported by an affidavit of 
Officer Miguel Correa of the Milwaukee Police Department.   
¶9 
Officer 
Correa's 
seven-page 
affidavit 
largely 
describes a law enforcement operation in which a confidential 
police informant purchased cocaine from an unnamed individual, 
referred to herein as Mr. X.  Mr. X claimed that he had obtained 
the cocaine from the defendant.  Neither the confidential 
informant nor any police officer witnessed Mr. X acquire the 
cocaine from the defendant.  In other words, Officer Correa's 
affidavit contains no affirmative allegation that he, any other 
law 
enforcement 
officer, 
or 
the 
confidential 
informant 
cooperating with the police had personal knowledge that the 
defendant furnished the cocaine to Mr. X, who in turn gave the 
cocaine to the confidential informant. 
¶10 Officer Correa's affidavit sets forth the following 
assertions of fact, among many others: 
 
• A confidential informant told Officer Correa that 
within the last 72 hours the confidential informant 
had spoken with an unnamed individual (Mr. X) who 
claimed that he could purchase cocaine for the 
confidential informant from an unnamed third party.   
 
• Officer Correa monitored a telephone call in which the 
confidential informant called Mr. X and ordered 
cocaine.  Mr. X directed the confidential informant to 
No.  2007AP1139-CR 
5 
 
meet him so that the two could go to the home of the 
unnamed third party to purchase cocaine.  
 
• Officer Correa provided the confidential informant 
with money to buy the cocaine.  Officer Correa 
searched 
the 
confidential 
informant's 
person 
and 
automobile for money, drugs, or other contraband 
before and after the confidential informant met with 
Mr. X.6    
 
• Officer Correa and other law enforcement officers 
followed the confidential informant's vehicle to a 
place where the officers observed Mr. X enter the 
confidential informant's vehicle. 
 
• Officer Correa and the other officers followed the 
confidential informant and Mr. X to an area near 205 
E. Montana Street.   
 
• A law enforcement officer named Corporal DiTorrice 
informed 
Officer 
Correa 
that 
shortly 
after 
the 
informants and law enforcement officers arrived at the 
area near 205 E. Montana Street, Corporal DiTorrice 
observed a person later identified as the defendant 
exit through the front door of 205 E. Montana Street, 
motion to Mr. X to go towards the alley/garage 
directly behind 205 E. Montana Street, and then walk 
towards that alley/garage area himself.   
 
• A law enforcement officer named Detective Dalland 
informed Officer Correa that he observed  Mr. X enter 
the garage through the open garage door; that after a 
short while he also observed Mr. X exit the garage and 
enter the confidential informant's automobile; and 
that he finally observed the confidential informant 
and Mr. X drive away and the garage door close.   
 
• Corporal DiTorrice informed Officer Correa that he 
observed the person later identified as the defendant 
walk back to the front door of 205 E. Montana Street, 
look around before entering, and walk through the 
front door without waiting to be let in.   
                                                 
6 Officer Correa did not, of course, have an opportunity to 
search Mr. X at any time.   
No.  2007AP1139-CR 
6 
 
 
• Officer Correa personally observed the confidential 
informant travel with Mr. X and then let Mr. X out of 
his car.   
 
• Officer Correa followed the confidential informant to 
a predetermined location, where he met and spoke with 
the confidential informant.   
 
• The confidential informant told Officer Correa that 
Mr. 
X 
had 
entered 
the 
confidential 
informant's 
automobile and had directed the confidential informant 
to drive to the area of 205 E. Montana Street.   
 
• The confidential informant told Officer Correa that 
while en route to 205 E. Montana Street, Mr. X ordered 
cocaine over the telephone.   
 
• The confidential informant told Officer Correa that 
when the confidential informant and Mr. X arrived at 
their destination, Mr. X directed the confidential 
informant to stay in the car and that the confidential 
informant gave Mr. X money to buy cocaine. 
 
• The confidential informant told Officer Correa that 
Mr. X exited the automobile and walked towards the 
garage behind a tan and brown house. 
 
• The confidential informant told Officer Correa that 
Mr. X returned to the automobile a short time later 
and handed the confidential informant a clear sandwich 
bag 
containing 
material 
which 
the 
confidential 
informant believed to be cocaine.   
 
• The confidential informant turned this sandwich bag 
over to Officer Correa.  The bag contained an off-
white, chalky substance which Officer Correa also 
believed to be cocaine. 
 
• A sample of the material in the bag later tested 
positive for the presence of cocaine.  
 
• The confidential informant told Officer Correa that 
Mr. X had referred to the person later identified as 
the defendant by the name "Jaime."   
 
No.  2007AP1139-CR 
7 
 
• Officer Correa discovered an active utilities account 
for 205 E. Montana Street in the name of "Jaime 
Romero," that is, the defendant's name.   
 
• The confidential informant told Officer Correa that 
the defendant drove a Lincoln Navigator. 
 
• Officer Correa, within 72 hours prior to signing his 
affidavit, 
personally 
observed 
a 
green 
Lincoln 
Navigator parked directly in front of 205 E. Montana 
Street. 
 
• The license plate on the green Lincoln Navigator 
listed to the defendant, Jaime Romero of 205 E. 
Montana Street. 
 
• Officer Correa showed the confidential informant a 
driver's license photo of the defendant, and the 
confidential informant identified the defendant as the 
person 
whom 
the 
confidential 
informant 
observed 
exiting the front door of 205 E. Montana Street and 
proceeding toward the garage which Mr. X entered. 
 
• Officer Correa believed the confidential informant to 
be a credible person because Officer Correa knew that 
the 
confidential 
informant 
had 
assisted 
law 
enforcement 
officers 
in 
purchasing 
controlled 
substances on more than three prior occasions and 
because the confidential informant's assistance had 
resulted in more than three drug convictions.  
¶11 Court Commissioner Barry Slagle authorized the search 
warrant.  The warrant describes the premises to be searched as 
205 East Montana Street, the lower unit of a beige-and-tan 
colored, two-story duplex residence in Milwaukee.  The warrant 
describes the objects of the search as cocaine, several items 
related to the use or sale of cocaine, documents identifying the 
person in control of 205 E. Montana Street, weapons, and certain 
telecommunication devices. 
No.  2007AP1139-CR 
8 
 
¶12 Law enforcement officers executed the search warrant 
and seized over 147 grams of cocaine from the defendant's 
residence. 
 
The 
State 
charged 
the 
defendant 
with 
the 
manufacture, distribution, or delivery of more than 40 grams of 
cocaine as a party to a crime.   
¶13 The defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized 
during execution of the search warrant, arguing that probable 
cause did not exist for issuance of the warrant.  The circuit 
court denied the defendant's motion. 
¶14 After his motion to suppress evidence was denied, the 
defendant entered a plea of guilty to the crime charged.  The 
circuit court accepted the defendant's plea and rendered a 
judgment of conviction. 
¶15 The 
defendant appealed from the circuit court's 
judgment of conviction pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 971.31(10),7 
based on the circuit court's order denying the defendant's 
motion to suppress evidence.  A divided court of appeals 
reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the cause to 
the circuit court. 
II 
¶16 A search warrant may issue only on probable cause.  
Thus we begin by setting forth the standards implicated in our 
                                                 
7 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.31(10) provides in full that "[a]n 
order denying a motion to suppress evidence or a motion 
challenging the admissibility of a statement of a defendant may 
be 
reviewed 
upon 
appeal 
from 
a 
judgment 
of 
conviction 
notwithstanding the fact that such judgment was entered upon a 
plea of guilty." 
No.  2007AP1139-CR 
9 
 
review of probable cause in the context of a warrant for the 
search of a residence.  We then apply these standards to the 
affidavit in the instant case. 
A 
¶17 The United States Supreme Court has adopted a totality 
of circumstances standard for determining whether probable cause 
exists in an application for a search warrant.8  The Court has 
explained 
that 
"the 
probable 
cause 
standard . . . is 
a 
practical, nontechnical conception" requiring a court to deal 
with "the factual and practical considerations of everyday life 
on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, 
act."9   
¶18 This court "accord[s] great deference to the warrant-
issuing judge's determination of probable cause, and that 
determination will stand unless the defendant establishes that 
the facts are clearly insufficient to support a finding of 
probable cause."10  This "deferential standard of review is 
                                                 
8 State v. Kerr, 181 Wis. 2d 372, 380, 511 N.W.2d 586 (1994) 
(citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1982)); State v. 
Lopez, 207 Wis. 2d 413, 425, 559 N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1996).   
9 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983) (quotation 
marks and citations omitted).   
See 
also 
State 
v. 
Kerr, 
181 
Wis. 2d 372, 
379, 
511 
N.W.2d 586 
(1994) 
("Probable 
cause 
is 
not 
a 
technical, 
legalistic concept but a flexible, common-sense measure of the 
plausibility of particular conclusions about human behavior." 
(quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
10 State v. Kerr, 181 Wis. 2d 372, 380, 511 N.W.2d 586 
(1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted); State v. Lopez, 
207 Wis. 2d 413, 425, 559 N.W.2d 264 (Ct. App. 1996). 
No.  2007AP1139-CR 
10 
 
appropriate to further the Fourth Amendment's strong preference 
for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant."11  
¶19 The task of the warrant-issuing commissioner "is 
simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given 
all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit . . . , 
including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons 
supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that 
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular 
place."12   
¶20 The veracity of a hearsay declarant and the basis of 
the declarant's knowledge are "highly relevant in determining 
the value of his report" but "these elements should [not] be 
understood as entirely separate and independent requirements to 
be rigidly exacted in every case."  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 
                                                 
11 State v. Kerr, 181 Wis. 2d 372, 379, 511 N.W.2d 586 
(1994) (citations omitted); Lopez, 207 Wis. 2d at 425. 
When addressing whether probable cause for the issuance of 
a search warrant existed, this court is "confined to the record 
that was before the warrant-issuing commissioner."  Kerr, 181 
Wis. 2d at 378.   
12 State v. Kerr, 181 Wis. 2d 372, 379, 511 N.W.2d 586 
(1994) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1982) 
(quotation marks omitted; ellipsis in Kerr)).  See also State v. 
McAttee, 2001 WI App 262, ¶9, 248 Wis. 2d 865, 637 N.W.2d 774 
("probable cause to arrest may be based on hearsay information 
that is 'shown to be reliable and emanating from a credible 
source'" (quoted source omitted))0; Lopez, 207 Wis. 2d at 425 
(trial court must consider all circumstances including the 
veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay 
information). 
No.  2007AP1139-CR 
11 
 
213, 230 (1983).13  These elements should instead "be understood 
simply 
as 
closely 
intertwined 
issues 
that 
may 
usefully 
illuminate the commonsense, practical question whether there is 
'probable cause' to believe that contraband or evidence is 
located in a particular place."  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 
230.  
¶21 To demonstrate a declarant's veracity, facts must be 
brought to the warrant-issuing officer's attention to enable the 
officer to evaluate either the credibility of the declarant or 
the reliability of the particular information furnished.14  A 
declarant's credibility is commonly established on the basis of 
the declarant's past performance of supplying information to law 
enforcement.15  Even if a declarant's credibility cannot be 
established, the facts still may permit the warrant-issuing 
officer to infer that the declarant has supplied reliable 
information on a particular occasion.16  The reliability of the 
                                                 
13 The United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213 (1982), adopted the totality of the circumstances test 
in place of the rigidly applied two-prong test in Aguilar v. 
Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States, 393 
U.S. 410 (1969).  See State v. Richardson, 156 Wis. 2d 128, 140-
41 & n.4, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990) (explaining the Gates test). 
14 2 LaFave, supra note 3, § 3.3(a), at 100. 
15 State v. Reed, 156 Wis. 2d 546, 555, 457 N.W.2d 494 (Ct. 
App. 
1990) 
(confidential 
informant's 
reliability 
may 
be 
established by evidence that the informant "ha[s] provided 
reliable information in the past."); 2 LaFave, supra note 3, 
§ 3.3(a), at 100. 
16 2 LaFave, supra note 3, § 3.3(a), at 101. 
No.  2007AP1139-CR 
12 
 
information may be shown by corroboration of details; this 
corroboration may be sufficient to support a search warrant.17  
If a declarant is shown to be right about some things, it may be 
inferred that he is probably right about other facts alleged.18   
¶22 To demonstrate the basis of a declarant's knowledge, 
facts must be revealed to the warrant-issuing officer to permit 
the officer to reach a judgment whether the declarant had a 
                                                                                                                                                             
The word "reliability" is put to different uses in the case 
law.  The standard practice, which we employ here, is to 
consider the reliability of information supplied on a particular 
occasion as a component part of a declarant's "veracity."  See 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 230 n.4 (stating that courts have 
interpreted the "veracity" of an informant to "[have] two 
'spurs'——the informant's 'credibility' and the 'reliability' of 
his information[.]"); 2 LaFave, supra note 3, § 3.3(a), at 100-
01 (same).  But some cases also appear to speak of a declarant's 
"reliability" as a synonym for the declarant's "veracity."  See, 
e.g., State v. Reed, 156 Wis. 2d 546, 554-55, 457 N.W.2d 494 
(Ct. 
App. 
1990) 
(examining 
whether 
an 
informant 
was 
"sufficiently reliable to support issuance of the warrant"). 
It is not surprising that the courts are inconsistent in 
their use of the term "reliability."  As we have stated, the 
Gates Court held that the concepts of "veracity," "reliability," 
and "basis of knowledge" are "closely intertwined" and serve 
simply to 
"illuminate the commonsense, practical question 
whether there is 'probable cause' to believe that contraband or 
evidence is located in a particular place."  Gates, 462 U.S. at 
230.  The Court has not required that these concepts be given 
precise definitions or that the courts adhere to a rigid 
analytical procedure when examining a warrant that is based on 
information supplied by a hearsay declarant.    
17 Lopez, 
207 
Wis. 2d at 
426 
(independent 
police 
corroboration of the declarant's information imparts a degree of 
reliability to unverified details); State v. Richardson, 156 
Wis. 2d 128, 141, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990) (citing Alabama v. 
White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990)).  
18 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 244. 
No.  2007AP1139-CR 
13 
 
basis for his or her allegations that evidence of a crime would 
be found at a certain place.19  The basis of a declarant's 
knowledge is most directly shown by an explanation of how the 
declarant came by his or her information.20  The basis of a 
declarant's knowledge also may be shown indirectly.  The wealth 
of detail communicated by a declarant, for example, may be 
sufficient to permit an inference that the basis of the 
declarant's knowledge is sound.21   
¶23 The veracity and basis of knowledge of a declarant are 
relevant whether the declarant communicates directly to the 
police or indirectly through another.  Any declarant is a 
"person[] supplying hearsay information," and his or her 
veracity and the basis of his knowledge accordingly are within 
the totality of the circumstances relevant to the probable cause 
determination.22  It would make little sense for the veracity of 
                                                 
19 2 LaFave, supra note 3, § 3.3(a), at 100. 
20 Id. at 102. 
21 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244-46 (1983) 
(wealth 
of 
detail 
supplied 
by 
an 
anonymous 
informant 
demonstrated a fair probability that the anonymous informant had 
obtained his information either directly from the Gateses or 
from someone they trusted); 2 LaFave, supra note 3, § 3.3(a), at 
102. 
22 State v. Kerr, 181 Wis. 2d 372, 379, 511 N.W.2d 586 
(1994) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1982)).  
See also State v. Falbo, 190 Wis. 2d 328, 337, 526 N.W.2d 814 
(Ct. App. 1994) (trial court must consider all circumstances set 
forth in affidavit, including the veracity and basis of 
knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information). 
No.  2007AP1139-CR 
14 
 
a declarant or the basis of the declarant's knowledge to be 
relevant 
to 
the 
probable 
cause 
determination 
when 
law 
enforcement officers obtain information directly from the 
declarant yet not relevant to the probable cause determination 
when officers obtain information from the declarant indirectly 
through another declarant.  The extent to which a search 
warrant's supporting affidavit must demonstrate the veracity and 
basis of knowledge of a declarant may vary depending on the 
circumstances specific to each case.23  
¶24 We reject the State's offer of a bright-line rule, 
namely that for purposes of an affidavit for a search warrant 
law enforcement officers "are not required to validate [the] 
                                                                                                                                                             
See also United States v. Satterwhite, 980 F.2d 317, 322 
(5th Cir. 1992) ("Where an informant's report is not based on 
personal knowledge, but rather on the information of a second 
individual, we must determine whether a substantial basis exists 
for crediting the second individual's information."); People v. 
Pate, 878 P.2d 685, 690 n.10 (Colo. 1994) ("[W]hen a magistrate 
receives an affidavit which contains hearsay upon hearsay, he 
need not categorically reject this double hearsay information.  
Rather, he is called upon to evaluate this information as well 
as other information in the affidavit in order to determine 
whether it can be reasonably inferred that the informant had 
gained his information in a reliable way." (quotation marks and 
citation omitted)); State v. Niehaus, 452 N.W.2d 184, 190 (Iowa 
1990) ("The magistrate must be presented with a means of 
assessing the credibility of both the individual who spoke with 
the affiant, as well as a means of assessing the initial source 
of the information."); 2 LaFave, supra note 3, § 3.3(c), at 142 
("In the hearsay-upon-hearsay situation, as where an informant 
of established reliability tells police what someone else has 
told him, there is a need to establish veracity with respect to 
each person in the hearsay chain." (footnote omitted)). 
23 See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983).   
No.  2007AP1139-CR 
15 
 
reliability of a reliable informant's source" in attempting to 
demonstrate probable cause for the issuance of a search 
warrant.24  The State relies on State v. McAttee, 2001 WI App 
262, 248 Wis. 2d 865, 637 N.W.2d 774, for this bright-line rule, 
especially the following sentences: "[F]or purposes of probable 
cause to arrest, the police were entitled to rely on information 
from a known and reliable informant without independently 
determining the reliability of the informant's source or the 
source's information. . . . McAttee cites no authority requiring 
police to 
gain additional information, corroborating that 
received from a reliable informant, before making an arrest."25   
¶25 These sentences should not be taken out of context. 
The officers in McAttee (who arrested McAttee with probable 
cause but without a warrant) relied on the statements of a 
reliable confidential source about what other persons had told 
her about the crime.  The reliable confidential source in 
McAttee (who was not present at the scene of the crime) provided 
the police with detailed information about her various sources 
                                                 
24 Brief and Appendix of Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner 
State of Wisconsin at 15. 
25 State v. McAttee, 2001 WI App 262, ¶¶12, 14, 248 
Wis. 2d 865, 637 N.W.2d 774. 
In 
these 
sentences, 
the 
McAttee 
court 
speaks 
of 
a 
declarant's "reliability" when we and other cases would refer to 
the declarant's "veracity."  As we explain at note 16, supra, 
this distinction in terminology does not reflect a substantive 
difference in the analytical framework. 
No.  2007AP1139-CR 
16 
 
supporting their veracity and the basis of their knowledge.26  
This detailed information provided corroboration.  Furthermore, 
the law enforcement officers had independent corroboration of 
the reliable confidential source's statements.27  The State's 
brief in McAttee correctly argued that "police had reasonable 
grounds to credit both the veracity and basis of knowledge of 
the persons supplying hearsay information."28  Finally, if 
McAttee were interpreted as the State requests, McAttee would 
silently reverse several other cases,29 which the court of 
appeals does not have the power to do. 
¶26 The McAttee decision does not create a bright-line 
rule that probable cause may be established without considering 
the reliability of the source of a reliable confidential 
informant.  We agree with the court of appeals that the State's 
reliance on McAttee is misplaced.  The court of appeals 
explained that "Wisconsin courts require some evidence of 
                                                 
26 The 
reliable 
confidential 
informant's 
sources 
were 
identified as family members of the defendant, one of whom also 
was the confidential informant's best friend and all of whom 
inculpated the defendant in the same murder.  McAttee, 248 
Wis. 2d 865, ¶3. 
27 McAttee, 248 Wis. 2d 865, ¶13. 
28 State's brief to the court of appeals at 20 (citing State 
v. Falbo, 190 Wis. 2d 328, 337, 56 N.W.2d 814 (Ct. App. 1994)).   
29 See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 207 Wis. 2d at 425-26 
(considering relevant the reliability of information that a 
police informant received from a third person; stating that "the 
trial court must consider all of the circumstances set forth in 
the affidavit, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of 
persons supplying hearsay information").  
No.  2007AP1139-CR 
17 
 
reliability of the proffered hearsay, even when it comes from a 
reliable CI [confidential informant]. . . . Hence, in McAttee, 
the third party hearsay, although reported by a reliable CI, 
established probable cause because it was corroborated in 
significant part by police investigation."30  As the court of 
appeals explained, the McAttee court of appeals held only that 
the law enforcement officers under the circumstances of that 
case were entitled to rely on information from a known and 
reliable 
informant 
without 
independently 
determining 
the 
reliability 
of 
the 
informant's 
source 
or 
the 
source's 
information.31   
¶27 In sum, a reviewing court must conclude that the 
totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the warrant-
issuing commissioner had a substantial basis for concluding that 
there was a fair probability that a search of the specified 
premises would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.32   
B 
                                                 
30 State v. Romero, No. 2007AP1139-CR, unpublished slip op., 
¶¶10-11 (Wis. Ct. App. March 18, 2008). 
31 State v. McAttee, 2001 WI App 262, 248 Wis. 2d 865, 637 
N.W.2d 774. 
32 State v. Anderson, 138 Wis. 2d 451, 469, 406 N.W.2d 398 
(1987) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983)).  
See also State v. Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d 978, 989, 471 
N.W.2d 24 (1991) ("The duty of the reviewing court is to ensure 
that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that 
the probable cause existed." (citation omitted)). 
No.  2007AP1139-CR 
18 
 
¶28 We examine the affidavit in light of the defendant's 
arguments that the affidavit is insufficient to establish 
probable cause. 
¶29 In the instant case a confidential informant told a 
law enforcement officer what someone else had told him.  In such 
a case, the veracity of each person in the chain is relevant.  
The defendant, in challenging the warrant-issuing commissioner's 
probable cause determination, does not contest the veracity of 
the confidential informant or the basis of his knowledge.  
Rather, the defendant challenges the veracity of Mr. X.33   
¶30 The defendant thus focuses on the statements in the 
affidavit attributed to Mr. X, particularly Mr. X's claim to 
have purchased cocaine from the defendant.  The defendant 
contends that the affidavit sets forth no basis for finding Mr. 
X credible or for finding reliable Mr. X's statement that the 
defendant furnished the cocaine.   
¶31 The defendant points out that the affidavit does not 
state that the confidential informant or any law enforcement 
officer observed the alleged transaction between Mr. X and the 
defendant; does not state that the confidential informant or any 
law enforcement officer observed the defendant enter the garage 
where the drug transaction purportedly occurred; does not 
identify Mr. X or describe Mr. X's relationship to the defendant 
                                                 
33 The defendant does not challenge the basis of Mr. X's 
knowledge.  Mr. X purported to pass on first-hand information to 
the confidential informant, that is, Mr. X's personal knowledge 
that the defendant supplied the cocaine.   
No.  2007AP1139-CR 
19 
 
or to the confidential informant; and does not state that either 
law enforcement officers or the confidential informant knew Mr. 
X's identity.   
¶32 We agree with the defendant that Officer Correa's 
affidavit is heavily dependent upon the veracity of Mr. X.  We 
also agree with the defendant that although the affidavit 
describes Mr. X as representing that he had purchased cocaine in 
a garage behind the defendant's residence from a person later 
identified as the defendant, the affidavit does not show that 
any person other than Mr. X witnessed any part of this alleged 
drug transaction between Mr. X and the defendant.  Neither the 
confidential informant nor any law enforcement officer directly 
witnessed any criminal activity in the defendant's garage or any 
criminal activity involving the defendant.   
¶33 We also acknowledge that information concerning Mr. X 
is sparse indeed.  Officer Correa's affidavit does not furnish 
Mr. X's name and does not describe Mr. X's relationship with 
either the confidential informant or the defendant.   
¶34 Nevertheless 
we 
conclude 
that 
Officer 
Correa's 
affidavit passes muster as support for the warrant issued to 
search the defendant's residence.  Reliance on information 
provided to a confidential informant by a participant in a crime 
has been approved by several courts even in the absence of 
constant visual contact with the participant conducting the 
transaction.34  Facts set forth in the affidavit demonstrate Mr. 
                                                 
34 See United States v. Artez, 389 F.3d 1106, 1112-13 (10th 
Cir. 2004), and cases cited therein. 
No.  2007AP1139-CR 
20 
 
X's veracity to a degree sufficient to show, considering the 
totality of the circumstances presented to the warrant-issuing 
commissioner, that the commissioner had a substantial basis for 
concluding that there was a fair probability that a search would 
uncover evidence of wrongdoing at the defendant's residence.   
¶35 First, 
the 
affidavit 
tends 
to 
establish 
the 
reliability of the information that Mr. X imparted (and thus Mr. 
X's veracity) by showing that law enforcement officers were able 
to corroborate some of Mr. X's assertions prior to seeking the 
warrant. 
 
It 
is 
established 
that 
"[i]ndependent 
police 
corroboration of [an] informant's information imparts a degree 
of reliability to unverified details."35  In the present case, 
Mr. X predicted that a person would be waiting to meet him near 
the defendant's residence, that this person was named "Jaime," 
and that Jaime would supply cocaine to Mr. X.  Law enforcement 
officers corroborated these assertions when they observed the 
defendant, Jaime Romero, emerge from the front door of his 
residence, motion to Mr. X to go toward the alley/garage 
directly behind the defendant's residence, and then proceed 
toward that area himself.  The law enforcement officers verified 
                                                 
35 State v. Jones, 2002 WI App 196, ¶15, 257 Wis. 2d 319, 
651 N.W.2d 305 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
See also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244-45 (1983) 
("It is enough, for purposes of assessing probable cause, that 
corroboration through other sources of information reduced the 
chances of a reckless or prevaricating tale, thus providing a 
substantial basis for crediting the hearsay." (quotation marks, 
brackets, and citation omitted)).   
No.  2007AP1139-CR 
21 
 
that Jaime Romero lived at that address and that the substance 
Mr. X claimed he got from Jaime was in fact cocaine.   
¶36 Second, the affidavit tends to establish Mr. X's 
credibility (and thus his veracity) by describing numerous 
statements that Mr. X made against his penal interest.  When a 
declarant makes statements against his penal interest that are 
closely related to the criminal activity being investigated,36 
                                                 
36 See 
2 
LaFave, supra note 3, § 3.3(c), at 143-44 
("[W]hether the admission is by a secondary source or by an 
informant speaking directly to the police, it must appear that 
the declaration against penal interest has a sufficient nexus to 
the 
information 
critical 
to 
the 
probable 
cause 
determination. . . . What is needed is a showing that the 
informant's statements against his own penal interest were 
closely related to the criminal activity for which probable 
cause 
to 
arrest 
or 
search 
is 
being 
established . . . ." 
(quotation marks and footnote omitted)).   
See also United States v. Jackson, 818 F.2d 345, 349 (5th 
Cir. 1987) (concluding that an informant's self-incriminating 
statements provided "no significant indicia of [the informant's] 
reliability as to the charges he [made] against [the defendant]" 
because the informant's "information regarding [the defendant's] 
participation is not the part of the [informant's] confession 
that primarily incriminate[d] [the informant]" and because "[the 
informant's] inculpation of [the defendant] could reasonably be 
viewed as an attempt to curry favor and receive more lenient 
treatment from police officials"); United States v. Miller, 753 
F.2d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir. 1985) (rejecting "the contention that 
[an informant's] statements could be credited because they were 
against his penal interest" on the ground that "the affidavit 
does not show any nexus between [the informant's] statements and 
the criminal activity occurring" on the property subject to a 
search warrant in that case); Galgano v. State, 248 S.E.2d 548, 
550 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978) (concluding that under circumstances in 
which "there is no connection . . . between the information 
provided by [an] informant and the prior criminal activity to 
which [the informant] confesse[s]," the informant's admission of 
criminal 
activity 
"damages 
rather 
than 
supports 
his 
credibility.").   
No.  2007AP1139-CR 
22 
 
under circumstances providing the declarant with no apparent 
motive to speak dishonestly,37 such statements may be taken as 
establishing the declarant's credibility and thus his veracity.  
¶37 In the present case, Mr. X's statements against his 
penal interest were made under circumstances permitting an 
inference of credibility and thus veracity.  Mr. X's statements 
inculpated both himself and the defendant in the same crime——a 
drug transaction occurring in a garage behind the defendant's 
residence——and related very closely to the State's allegation 
that the defendant possessed cocaine in his home.  Moreover, the 
facts asserted in Officer Correa's affidavit do not suggest that 
Mr. X had any motive to falsely inculpate the defendant when 
speaking to the confidential informant, who had presented 
himself to Mr. X as nothing other than a purchaser of unlawful 
narcotics.   
¶38 Although a person should not be deemed trustworthy 
merely because he admits that he is a criminal,38 under the 
proper circumstances "the credibility of an informant, for the 
                                                 
37 See 2 LaFave, supra note 3, § 3.3(c), at 134 ("[A] 
person's statement against his penal interest carries with it an 
indicia of reliability if it may also be said that the statement 
was made under circumstances when he would have no reason to 
lie." (citing and quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) 
(quotation marks omitted)).   
38 See 
2 
LaFave, 
supra 
note 
3, 
§ 3.3(c), 
at 
134 
("Unquestionably, the admission-against-penal-interest concept 
should not be applied in such a casual fashion that criminals 
are thereby deemed more credible than disinterested 'citizen-
informers,' for this would turn established Fourth Amendment 
doctrine on its head."). 
No.  2007AP1139-CR 
23 
 
purpose of finding probable cause, is established by the fact 
that his or her statement is against his or her penal 
interest."39  In the present case nothing would alert the 
warrant-issuing commissioner that Mr. X had a motive to falsely 
accuse the defendant.  Nothing in the affidavit would alert the 
warrant-issuing commissioner that Mr. X would get anything from 
law enforcement in return for asserting that he could get and 
did get cocaine from the defendant.   
¶39 "[S]tatements against penal interests may be used to 
establish reliability even when the declarant is not aware that 
the listener is a police officer."40  Indeed, the case can be 
made that a declarant's unwitting participation in a police 
sting serves to bolster his credibility.  Professor LaFave, for 
example, contends that "as a general proposition there is more 
reason 
to 
rely 
upon 
[admissions 
made 
to 
a 
confidential 
informant] than admissions made directly to police, for in the 
latter situation there is always the chance that the informer is 
a stoolie who perceives he can admit to criminality without 
significant risk."41   
                                                 
39 State v. Anderson, 138 Wis. 2d 451, 470, 406 N.W.2d 398 
(1987). 
40 State v. Anderson, 138 Wis. 2d 451, 471, 406 N.W.2d 398 
(1987).   
41 2 LaFave, supra note 3, § 3.3(c), at 142-43.  
No.  2007AP1139-CR 
24 
 
¶40 We agree with the defendant that Officer Correa's 
affidavit does not conclusively rule out the hypothesis that Mr. 
X implemented a ruse for the purpose of fooling the confidential 
informant into believing that Mr. X was obtaining cocaine from 
the defendant when it fact he already had obtained it from 
another source.  Arguably, the inference that Mr. X tricked the 
confidential informant in this manner might be a reasonable one. 
¶41 Nevertheless, "[t]he test is not whether the inference 
drawn 
[by 
the 
warrant-issuing 
commissioner] 
is 
the 
only 
reasonable inference.  The test is whether the inference drawn 
is a reasonable one."42  The warrant-issuing commissioner's 
inference from the affidavit that Mr. X got the cocaine from the 
defendant is reasonable. 
* * * * 
¶42 In deciding whether probable cause exists for the 
issuance of a search warrant, the reviewing court examines the 
totality of the circumstances presented to the warrant-issuing 
commissioner 
to 
determine 
whether 
the 
warrant-issuing 
                                                                                                                                                             
See also United States v. Castillo, 866 F.2d 1071, 1077-78 
(9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that an affidavit provided a 
substantial basis for crediting a hearsay statement because the 
declarant "was not aware that [the person to whom he spoke] was 
a DEA agent and had no apparent reason to give him false 
information . . ."); State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 818 (Wash. 
1986) (concluding that a declarant was credible because she made 
several statements against her penal interest to undercover 
officers whom she "had no reason to view . . . as anyone other 
than private citizens").   
42 State v. Ward, 2000 WI 3, ¶30, 231 Wis. 2d 723, 604 
N.W.2d 517.   
No.  2007AP1139-CR 
25 
 
commissioner had a substantial basis for concluding that there 
was a fair probability that a search of the specified premises 
would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.43  
¶43 We conclude that the affidavit supporting the warrant 
to search the defendant's residence resting in part on the 
statements of Mr. X meets the totality of the circumstances 
test. The warrant-issuing commissioner had a substantial basis 
for concluding on the totality of the circumstances that there 
was a fair probability that a search of the specified premises 
would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.  We therefore sustain the 
warrant-issuing commissioner's determination that probable cause 
existed for issuance of the warrant in the instant case.   
¶44 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of 
appeals reversing the circuit court's judgment of conviction and 
affirm the judgment of conviction.   
By the Court.—The decision of the Court of Appeals is 
reversed. 
                                                 
43 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983). 
No.  2007AP1139.pdr 
 
1 
 
¶45 PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
J. 
(concurring).   The 
majority opinion affirms the conviction of Jaime Romero for the 
manufacture, distribution or delivery of more than 40 grams of 
cocaine, 
party 
to 
the 
crime, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 961.41(1m)(cm)4. and § 939.05 (2005-06).1  I agree with this 
conclusion.   
¶46 I write separately for two reasons:  (1) I conclude 
that the majority opinion could be read, mistakenly, as re-
establishing 
a 
rigid 
two-prong 
test 
for 
evaluating 
the 
sufficiency of the allegations in a warrant affidavit, similar 
to the test employed in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).  
The United States Supreme Court set aside Aguilar in Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), when Gates established the totality 
of the circumstances approach for assessing the sufficiency of 
the information provided to obtain a search warrant.2  (2) I 
conclude that the majority opinion could be read, mistakenly, as 
requiring a determination of the veracity, i.e., truthfulness, 
of a person who is not a known confidential informant, here 
Mr. X,3 
rather 
than assessing the reliability of Mr. X's 
statements through a common sense interpretation of the record 
before the magistrate.  Accordingly, I respectfully concur. 
                                                 
1 Majority op., ¶1. 
2 It is the totality of the circumstances approach that we 
employ in ascertaining whether the guarantees of the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and of Article I, 
Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution are observed when a 
search warrant is issued.  State v. Anderson, 138 Wis. 2d 451, 
469, 406 N.W.2d 398 (1987). 
3 The majority opinion employs this shorthand, so I do as 
well.  Majority op., ¶9.   
No.  2007AP1139.pdr 
 
2 
 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶47 This case turns on whether the search warrant issued 
for Romero's home was based on sufficient evidence to show that 
probable cause existed that evidence of wrongdoing would be 
found therein.  The evidentiary record to support the search 
warrant consists of the affidavit of Officer Miguel Correa.  His 
affidavit 
incorporates 
hearsay 
from 
a 
known 
confidential 
informant, which includes hearsay statements from Mr. X, who was 
not a confidential informant.4  Officer Correa also based his 
affidavit on observations of law enforcement that were present 
at the scene of what turned out to be a controlled buy of 
cocaine from Romero.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶48 We accord great deference to a magistrate's decision 
to issue a search warrant.  Gates, 462 U.S. at 236; State v. 
Anderson, 138 Wis. 2d 451, 469, 406 N.W.2d 398 (1987).  In so 
doing, we review as a matter of law whether the magistrate had a 
substantial basis for concluding that a search of Romero's 
residence would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.  Anderson, 138 
Wis. 2d at 469.  
B. 
Sufficiency of the Affidavit 
1. 
General principles 
¶49 An affidavit to support a search warrant may be based 
on hearsay.  Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 (1960), 
                                                 
4 It appears that Mr. X did not realize he was providing 
information to an informant for law enforcement when he spoke 
with the confidential informant. 
No.  2007AP1139.pdr 
 
3 
 
overruled on other grounds, U.S. v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 
(1980).  When reviewing the factual context to determine if 
probable cause to issue the search warrant existed, a court will 
sustain a magistrate's ruling "so long as the magistrate had a 
'substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing]' that a search would 
uncover evidence of wrongdoing."  Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (citing 
Jones, 362 U.S. at 271).  "[T]he Fourth Amendment requires no 
more."  Id.   
¶50 In the 19 years immediately prior to Gates, the United 
States 
Supreme 
Court 
interpreted 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment's 
requirement of a "substantial basis" to support probable cause 
to issue a search warrant under a "two-prong test," established 
in Aguilar, for occasions when the affiant did not have personal 
knowledge of the facts asserted in the affidavit.  Both prongs 
of the Aguilar test had to be satisfied before probable cause to 
issue a warrant was established.  Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114-15.  
The two prongs of Aguilar are:  (1) the basis of the information 
prong, which was explained as the factual circumstances that 
showed the basis for the knowledge of the informant; and (2) the 
veracity of the information prong, which was explained as a 
showing of the underlying circumstances that led the affiant to 
believe either that the "informant . . . was 'credible' or his 
information 'reliable.'"  Id. at 114 (emphasis added).   
¶51 The veracity of the information prong of the Aguilar 
test did not require two determinations——one for the credibility 
(sometimes referred to as the veracity) of the informant and one 
for the reliability of his information.  Rather, it could be 
No.  2007AP1139.pdr 
 
4 
 
satisfied by determining "either the inherent credibility of the 
informant [i.e., his truthfulness,] or the reliability of his 
information on this particular occasion."  2 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 3.3(a), at 100 (4th ed. 2004) (emphasis in 
LaFave) (citing Charles E. Moylan, Jr., Hearsay and Probable 
Cause:  An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 Mercer L. Rev. 741, 
773 (1974)).   
¶52 In Gates, the United States Supreme Court abandoned 
the formalistic two-prong test of Aguilar and determined that 
the 
"totality-of-the-circumstances 
approach 
is 
far 
more 
consistent with our prior treatment of probable cause than is 
any rigid demand that specific 'tests' be satisfied by every 
informant's tip."  Gates, 462 U.S. at 230-31.  The Supreme Court 
also explained that in addressing determinations of probable 
cause, a court is dealing with probabilities, not absolutes.  
Id. at 231.  The Supreme Court directed that during this 
process, "factual and practical considerations of everyday life 
on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act" 
should be a court's guide.  Id.  The Court also cautioned that 
"probable cause is a fluid concept——turning on the assessment of 
probabilities in particular factual contexts——not readily, or 
even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules."  Id. at 
232.   
¶53 The Court in Gates explained that one of its reasons 
for abandoning the two-pronged test of Aguilar was because the 
two prongs had been analyzed independently, rather than as 
potential parts of the totality of the circumstances that a 
No.  2007AP1139.pdr 
 
5 
 
court should review in determining the reliability of the 
information upon which the affiant sought a search warrant.  Id. 
at 233.  The Court explained that while the credibility of the 
informant or the reliability of his information may be factors, 
as may the basis for the informant's knowledge, they were not 
tests that needed to be satisfied.  Id.  Accordingly, "a 
deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the 
overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the 
other, or by some other indicia of reliability."  Id. (emphasis 
added).  
¶54 We have employed the approach of Gates, as we must for 
the Fourth Amendment, but we also employ the Gates approach in 
ascertaining whether the guarantees of Article I, Section 11 of 
the Wisconsin Constitution have been preserved.  Anderson, 138 
Wis. 2d at 461-62, 468-69. 
¶55 As the Supreme Court stepped away from the rigidity of 
the two-prong test of Aguilar, it provided suggestions that 
could assist a court in assessing the reliability of the 
information presented in an application for a search warrant.  
The Supreme Court instructed that if the veracity, i.e., 
truthfulness, of an informant was known to law enforcement due 
to past interactions, that was significant evidence of the 
reliability of the information currently provided.  See Gates, 
462 U.S. at 243.  However, if the veracity, i.e., truthfulness, 
of the informant was not known to law enforcement, then a court 
could 
examine 
the 
reliability 
of 
the 
information 
by 
corroborating it with other observations.  See id. at 243-44.  
No.  2007AP1139.pdr 
 
6 
 
Or, a court could conclude that based on a common sense 
interpretation 
of 
surrounding 
facts, 
the 
information 
was 
reliable.  See id. at 244.  Or, a court could conclude that 
because the statement was an admission against penal interests, 
it was reliable.  See LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.3(c), at 
131.  The determination of the reliability of the information 
requires the court to focus on the nature of the information 
given and the circumstances under which it was provided.  Id. 
¶56 When 
the 
information 
relayed 
by 
a 
confidential 
informant 
to 
law 
enforcement 
contains 
factual 
assertions 
obtained 
from 
a 
person 
unknown 
to 
law 
enforcement, 
the 
confidential 
informant's 
veracity, 
i.e., 
truthfulness, 
is 
established 
by 
evidence 
that 
he 
has 
provided 
reliable 
information to law enforcement in the past.  State v. Reed, 156 
Wis. 2d 546, 555, 457 N.W.2d 494 (Ct. App. 1990); see also State 
v. McAttee, 2001 WI App 262, ¶11, 248 Wis. 2d 865, 637 N.W.2d 
744 (concluding that in assessing whether there was probable 
cause to arrest based on information provided by a known 
confidential informant, the first question is whether law 
enforcement was entitled to rely on the confidential informant's 
statement).  Furthermore, in the context of determining whether 
probable cause to arrest exists, the hearsay statements of one 
unknown to law enforcement, which are relayed by a known 
confidential 
informant, 
may 
be 
relied 
upon 
"without 
independently determining the reliability of the informant's 
source or the source's information."  McAttee, 248 Wis. 2d 865, 
¶12.  Law enforcement has "discretionary authority" to determine 
No.  2007AP1139.pdr 
 
7 
 
whether additional information or corroboration is needed before 
deciding whether to execute an arrest.  Id.  "Rigid legal rules 
[for determining probable cause] are ill-suited to an area of 
such diversity."  Gates, 462 U.S. at 232.   
2. 
Application of Gates/Anderson 
¶57 The information that was supplied by the confidential 
informant in the case now before us was provided by one whom law 
enforcement knew to be truthful.  The confidential informant had 
provided tips about drug trafficking on more than three 
occasions.  All of those tips had proved reliable.  Therefore, 
all of the facts asserted by the confidential informant based on 
his own knowledge pass muster under Gates and Anderson as 
reliable information.  Our major focus, then, is on the 
statements attributed to Mr. X as repeated by the confidential 
informant.   
¶58 The confidential informant said that he contacted 
Mr. X, who said he could get cocaine from an unnamed person.  
The confidential informant communicated this to law enforcement, 
who provided buy-money for a controlled buy of cocaine.  The 
confidential informant said he picked up Mr. X, who told the 
confidential informant to drive to 205 East Montana Street.  
While driving, the confidential informant heard Mr. X call and 
order cocaine from someone named "Jaime."  The confidential 
informant was observed by officers driving Mr. X to 205 East 
Montana Street.  When the confidential informant and Mr. X 
reached 205 East Montana Street, the confidential informant said 
that Mr. X asked for money, and he gave Mr. X a quantity of the 
No.  2007AP1139.pdr 
 
8 
 
buy-money law enforcement had provided.  The confidential 
informant said that Mr. X told him to remain in the car, which 
he did.   
¶59 Law enforcement observed Mr. X exit the confidential 
informant's automobile and an unnamed Hispanic male come out of 
the front door of 205 East Montana Street and motion Mr. X to go 
to the garage at the rear of the lot.  Law enforcement also 
observed the unnamed Hispanic male walk toward the garage.  Law 
enforcement observed the garage door that faced the alley open 
and Mr. X walk into the garage and a short time later, Mr. X 
exit the garage by the same door.  Shortly thereafter, law 
enforcement observed the garage door close and the unnamed 
Hispanic male walk back to the front of 205 East Montana Street 
and enter the house.   
¶60 The confidential informant said that when Mr. X re-
entered his vehicle, Mr. X gave the confidential informant a 
clear sandwich bag that contained a white powdery substance, 
which the confidential informant subsequently gave to law 
enforcement.  Law enforcement determined that the substance was 
cocaine.  Law enforcement also corroborated through various 
official records that the defendant, Jaime Romero, resided at 
205 East Montana Street; that Romero matched the physical 
description of the unidentified Hispanic male law enforcement 
observed at 205 East Montana Street; and that all of the events 
set out in the affidavit had occurred within the last 72 hours.   
¶61 The facts supplied by Mr. X are:  (1) the supplier of 
the cocaine was named "Jaime"; (2) Jaime had cocaine to sell at 
No.  2007AP1139.pdr 
 
9 
 
205 East Montana Street; and (3) Jaime sold him the baggie of 
cocaine that Mr. X gave to the confidential informant.  That a 
Jaime Romero was a resident of 205 East Montana Street was 
corroborated by law enforcement through independent records.  No 
one saw Romero inside of the garage, except Mr. X, and no one 
saw Romero sell Mr. X the cocaine that Mr. X gave to the 
confidential informant, except Mr. X.  However, there are also 
the 
following 
law 
enforcement 
observations: 
 
(1) 
Romero 
motioning Mr. X to the garage; (2) Romero walking to the garage; 
(3) the opening of the garage door and Mr. X's entry into the 
garage and exit from it; and (4) Romero returning from the area 
of the garage to the front of the house.  If these facts, 
together with the facts supplied by the confidential informant, 
are given a common sense interpretation, they are sufficient to 
conclude that Mr. X's assertion that Romero sold cocaine to him 
in the garage at the rear of 205 East Montana Street is 
reliable.  Because this occurred within 72 hours of the petition 
for a search warrant, the magistrate had a substantial basis for 
concluding that evidence of wrongdoing would be found at 205 
East Montana Street.   
C. 
Majority Opinion 
¶62 The term, "veracity," can be understood in more than 
one way.  Veracity can be understood as referring to:  (1) a 
person's general propensity for truthfulness; or (2) the 
reliability of the information a person provided on a particular 
occasion.  Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114.  The majority opinion could 
be misread to require satisfaction of a two-part test that we do 
No.  2007AP1139.pdr 
 
10 
 
not intend to create.  To explain further, the majority opinion 
could be misread as requiring both a finding of the veracity, 
i.e., truthfulness, of Mr. X and a finding that the information 
he provided on this occasion was reliable before the magistrate 
would have sufficient evidence to issue a search warrant.5   
¶63 For example, the majority opinion states, "Facts set 
forth in the affidavit demonstrate Mr. X's veracity to a degree 
sufficient 
to 
show, 
considering 
the 
totality 
of 
the 
circumstances presented to the warrant-issuing commissioner, 
that the commissioner had a substantial basis for concluding 
that there was a fair probability that a search would uncover 
evidence of wrongdoing at the defendant's residence."6  The 
majority opinion, repeatedly, does not distinguish between the 
"veracity of Mr. X" and the reliability of his information.7  
However, 
a 
determination 
of 
Mr. X's 
veracity, 
i.e., 
his 
truthfulness, was not necessary to the sufficiency of the 
affidavit that was presented to the magistrate.  Gates, 462 U.S. 
at 244.  Under the totality of the circumstances set out in 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., majority op., ¶¶32, 34-36. 
6 Id., ¶34.   
7 Id., ¶¶35-36.  In ¶21 n.16 of the majority opinion, it is 
acknowledged that the veracity (truthfulness) of a declarant is 
sometimes confused with the reliability of the information 
provided.  I agree that may have occurred, as precise terms have 
not been central to many opinions.  However, when one has no 
basis for ascertaining whether the declarant is a truthful 
person, 
the 
distinction 
between 
the 
truthfulness 
of 
the 
declarant and the reliability of the information he has supplied 
will affect the analysis.  That is why I bring this concern to 
the reader's attention.   
No.  2007AP1139.pdr 
 
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Gates, a common sense approach is applied to determine the 
reliability of Mr. X's statements, which were repeated by a 
known confidential informant.  Id.  Under that approach, Mr. X's 
statements may be utilized by the magistrate who issued the 
warrant without an inquiry into Mr. X's general propensity for 
truthfulness.  See id.; see also McAttee, 248 Wis. 2d 865, ¶12.   
¶64 It is important to keep in mind that a court's review 
of a magistrate's decision is confined to the record before the 
magistrate when he issued the search warrant.  Reed, 156 Wis. 2d 
at 554.  The veracity of a person, when understood as his 
truthfulness, may be established by evidence that in past 
dealings 
with 
law 
enforcement 
he 
has 
provided 
reliable 
information.  Id. at 555.  However, Mr. X had no prior dealings 
with law enforcement.  Accordingly, based on the affidavit of 
Officer Correa, upon which the magistrate relied in deciding to 
issue the search warrant, it is not possible to determine 
Mr. X's veracity, i.e., his truthfulness.  All that can be 
determined is that under the totality of the circumstances, the 
information Mr. X provided on that occasion probably was 
reliable.   
¶65 Mr. X may be a person who generally is not truthful.  
The magistrate had no way of knowing, nor do we.  Rather, the 
magistrate was to interpret the reliability of the information 
Mr. X provided as part of a common sense interpretation of the 
totality of the circumstances set forth in Officer Correa's 
affidavit.  He did so. 
No.  2007AP1139.pdr 
 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
¶66 Because the majority opinion may be read, mistakenly, 
as requiring a finding of both the veracity, i.e., truthfulness, 
of Mr. X and the reliability of the information he provided 
before a search warrant may issue, I respectfully concur.  I do 
so in order to set aside any potential misunderstanding that 
Mr. X's general propensity for truthfulness is necessary to the 
conclusions reached in the majority opinion, which I join.   
¶67 I am authorized to state that Justices ANNETTE 
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and MICHAEL J. GABLEMAN join this concurrence. 
 
 
No.  2007AP1139.pdr 
 
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