Case Title: 260 North 12th St., LLC v. Dep't of Transp.

Citation: 2011 WI 103

Docket Number: 2009AP001557

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2011-12-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
2011 WI 103 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2009AP1557 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
260 North 12th Street, LLC and Basil E. Ryan, 
Jr., 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
     v. 
State of Wisconsin Department of Transportation, 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 329 Wis.2d 748, 792 N.W.2d 572  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 22, 2011   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 16, 2011 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
William Sosnay 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C. J. concurs. (Opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiffs-appellants-petitioners there were briefs 
by Dan Biersdorf, E. Kelly Keady and Biersdorf & Associates, 
S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Dan Biersdorf. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief by Charlotte 
Gibson, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief was 
J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general and oral argument by Charlotte 
Gibson. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Grant F. Langley, city 
attorney and Gregg C. Hagopian, assistant attorney general for 
the City of Milwaukee. 
 
 
2011 WI 103
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2009AP1557 
(L.C. No. 
2005CV5482) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
260 North 12th Street, LLC  
and Basil E. Ryan, Jr., 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants-Petitioners, 
 
     v. 
 
State of Wisconsin Department of 
Transportation, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 22, 2011 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals, 260 North 12th 
Street, LLC v. Wisconsin DOT, 2010 WI App 138, 329 Wis. 2d 748, 
792 N.W.2d 572, that affirmed a judgment entered by the 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
2 
 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court1 on a jury verdict in favor of 260 
North 12th Street, LLC and Basil E. Ryan, Jr. (collectively, 
Ryan).   
¶2 
Pursuant to its power of eminent domain, the Wisconsin 
Department of Transportation (DOT) acquired Ryan's property as 
part of a plan to reconstruct a major freeway interchange in 
downtown Milwaukee, commonly known as the Marquette Interchange.  
A jury awarded Ryan $2,001,725 as just compensation for the 
taking of his property.  Over Ryan's objection, the jury was 
presented evidence concerning the environmental contamination of 
Ryan's property and the cost to remediate it. 
¶3 
Ryan 
moved 
the 
circuit 
court 
for 
a 
judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial, 
maintaining that evidence of environmental contamination and of 
remediation costs are inadmissible in condemnation proceedings 
as a matter of law.  In addition, Ryan argued that the circuit 
court erroneously exercised its discretion when it (1) admitted 
speculative testimony by the DOT's appraiser, (2) excluded 
                                                 
1 The Honorable Francis T. Wasielewski presided over this 
case from the filing of the Wis. Stat. § 32.05(11) (2005-06) 
appeal on June 22, 2005, until August 1, 2007, when the case was 
transferred to the Honorable Michael B. Brennan because of 
judicial rotation.  Judge Brennan presided over many of the 
proceedings pertaining to the instant appeal, including the pre-
trial motions and the jury trial.  On December 1, 2008, the case 
was transferred to the Honorable William Sosnay who entered the 
judgment. 
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
3 
 
Ryan's expert witnesses, and (3) rejected Ryan's proposed jury 
instructions.   
¶4 
The circuit court denied Ryan's motion and entered 
judgment on the jury verdict.  The court of appeals affirmed. 
¶5 
We granted Ryan's petition for review and now affirm. 
¶6 
This case presents the following four issues: 
(1) 
Are evidence of environmental contamination and of 
remediation 
costs 
admissible 
in 
condemnation 
proceedings under Wis. Stat. ch. 32? 
(2) 
Assuming evidence of environmental contamination and 
of remediation costs were admissible in this case, did 
the circuit court erroneously exercise its discretion 
when it admitted at trial testimony by the DOT's 
appraiser over Ryan's objection that the testimony was 
speculative? 
(3) 
Did 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercise 
its 
discretion when it excluded Ryan's expert witnesses as 
a result of Ryan's failure to timely disclose the 
witnesses in accordance with the court's scheduling 
order? 
(4) 
Did 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
exercise 
its 
discretion when it rejected Ryan's proposed jury 
instructions in favor of the standard jury instruction 
on fair market value in the case of a total taking? 
¶7 
First, we conclude that evidence of environmental 
contamination and of remediation costs are admissible in 
condemnation proceedings under Wis. Stat. ch. 32, subject to the 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
4 
 
circuit court's broad discretion.  Such evidence is admissible 
in condemnation proceedings in the circuit court's discretion so 
long as it is relevant to the fair market value of the property.  
A property's environmental contamination and the costs to 
remediate it are relevant to the property's fair market value if 
they would influence a prudent purchaser who is willing and 
able, but not obliged, to buy the property.   
¶8 
We emphasize that our holding speaks only to a circuit 
court's 
discretionary 
authority 
to 
admit 
evidence 
of 
environmental 
contamination 
and 
of 
remediation 
costs 
in 
condemnation proceedings.  We take no position on how the 
admission of such evidence in a condemnation proceeding may 
affect the property owner in a future environmental action, if 
one should occur. 
¶9 
Second, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
appropriately exercised its discretion when it admitted at trial 
testimony by the DOT's appraiser over Ryan's objection that the 
testimony was speculative.  Ryan does not take issue with the 
appraiser's qualifications or the relevance of his testimony; 
rather, Ryan objects to the method by which the appraiser valued 
Ryan's property.  However, any flaws in the appraiser's 
methodology properly went to the weight of his testimony, not 
its admissibility. 
¶10 Third, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
appropriately exercised its discretion when it excluded Ryan's 
expert witnesses as a result of Ryan's failure to timely 
disclose the witnesses in accordance with the court's scheduling 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
5 
 
order.  The circuit court acted under its express statutory 
authority to sanction Ryan and made a reasoned decision to 
exclude the expert witnesses after carefully considering the 
facts of record. 
¶11 Fourth and finally, we conclude that the circuit court 
appropriately exercised its discretion when it rejected Ryan's 
proposed jury instructions in favor of the standard jury 
instruction on fair market value in the case of a total taking.  
Ryan's bald assertion that the given jury instructions were 
insufficient does not meet the standard for reversal. 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
¶12 Pursuant to its power of eminent domain under Wis. 
Stat. § 32.05, the DOT acquired Ryan's property as part of a 
plan to reconstruct the Marquette Interchange.  Exercising his 
right under § 32.05(2)(b), Ryan obtained his own appraisal of 
his property, completed by Wisconsin-certified general appraiser 
Lawrence R. Nicholson (Nicholson).  Nicholson valued Ryan's 
property at $3,497,000.  However, based upon its own appraisal, 
the 
DOT 
offered 
Ryan 
compensation 
of 
$1,348,000. 
 
See 
§ 32.05(3).  Ryan rejected the DOT's offer.  Consequently, on 
March 30, 2005, the DOT recorded in the office of the Register 
of Deeds of Milwaukee County an award of damages equal to the 
jurisdictional offer and took Ryan's property.  See § 32.05(7). 
II. PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶13 On June 22, 2005, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.05(11), 
Ryan appealed the DOT's award of damages to the Milwaukee County 
Circuit Court.  The sole issue on appeal was the amount of just 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
6 
 
compensation owed to Ryan by the DOT, as determined by a jury.  
See § 32.05(11). 
¶14 On December 13, 2005, the Honorable Francis T. 
Wasielewski conducted the case's first scheduling conference.  
Ryan's counsel, Attorney Alan Marcuvitz, was present.  Judge 
Wasielewski issued a scheduling order, which, inter alia, set 
February 15, 2006, as the date by which Ryan was required to 
disclose his witnesses, including experts.2  The order explicitly 
provided, in bold-faced type, "Witnesses not timely named and 
described shall not be called as witnesses at trial, except for 
good cause shown." 
¶15 Adhering to the scheduling order, Ryan submitted his 
list of witnesses on February 15, 2006.  His list disclosed two 
expert witnesses: Nicholson and an unnamed "Surveyor/Engineer" 
from Kapur & Associates.  In addition, at the end of his witness 
list, Ryan "reserve[d] the right . . . to name witnesses to be 
called in rebuttal including, but not limited to" appraisers 
Stuart M. Fritz and Mark A. Athanas. 
                                                 
2 Specifically, paragraph 2 of the scheduling order stated:  
Counsel shall provide in writing to opposing counsel: 
(a) the name and addresses of lay witnesses (with a 
brief statement as to their testimony); (b) the names, 
addresses, and resumes together with a written report 
for 
each 
expert 
named; 
[Failure 
to 
provide 
a 
permanency report from a witness shall preclude that 
witness 
from 
expressing 
an 
opinion 
regarding 
permanency, except for good cause.] and (c) an 
itemized statement of damages claimed, including any 
special damage claims and permanency, on or before  
Feb. 15, 2006 by Plaintiff . . . . 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
7 
 
¶16 On May 8, 2006, the DOT filed its list of witnesses.  
The DOT named 17 expert witnesses, including Wisconsin-certified 
general 
appraiser 
Scott 
L. 
MacWilliams 
(MacWilliams) 
and 
professional engineer and geologist Kenneth S. Wade (Wade).  The 
DOT explained that MacWilliams was expected to testify as to the 
value of Ryan's property, and Wade was expected to testify as to 
the discovery of environmental contamination on Ryan's property 
and the estimated costs of remediation.  At that time, the DOT 
served upon Ryan copies of both MacWilliams' appraisal report 
and Wade's memorandum. 
¶17 Nicholson and MacWilliams were deposed on July 12, 
2006, and August 30, 2006, respectively.  Nicholson testified 
that his appraisal of Ryan's property assumed that the property 
was environmentally clean.  Still, Nicholson conceded that a 
prudent buyer of property would deduct from his or her offer 
price the cost to remediate any environmental contamination.  
MacWilliams, in turn, confirmed that his appraisal of Ryan's 
property included a deduction for environmental contamination 
and the estimated costs of remediation. 
¶18 On May 23, 2007, notice was sent to the parties that 
effective August 1, 2007, the case would be transferred to the 
Honorable Michael B. Brennan because of judicial rotation.  Soon 
after August 1, 2007, Attorney Marcuvitz informed Judge Brennan 
that he intended to withdraw as Ryan's counsel.  Based on that 
information, on August 27, 2007, Judge Brennan suspended the 
court's scheduling order, pending the resolution of the status 
of Ryan's counsel.  However, the court's order specifically 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
8 
 
provided, "It is the present understanding of the Court that the 
deadlines for disclosure of lay and expert witnesses, which 
deadlines have been met in this matter, will not be reset at 
[the] new scheduling conference." 
¶19 On October 4, 2007, the circuit court granted Attorney 
Marcuvitz's motion to withdraw as Ryan's counsel.  By that time, 
Ryan had yet to secure new counsel. 
¶20 On January 10, 2008, the circuit court held a status 
conference and issued an amended scheduling order.  The order, 
in relevant part, set March 15, 2008, as the date by which Ryan 
was required to respond to written discovery requests; May 15, 
2008, as the date by which the parties had to file any 
dispositive motions; and June 30, 2008, as the date by which 
discovery had to be completed.  The order did not, however, 
amend Ryan's deadline for disclosure of witnesses. 
¶21 On 
March 
17, 
2008, 
Ryan 
retained 
Attorney 
Dan 
Biersdorf as his new counsel.  Subsequently, Ryan and the DOT 
reached a stipulation that Ryan would have an additional three 
weeks to respond to written discovery requests.  The circuit 
court 
approved 
the 
parties' 
stipulation 
and 
amended 
the 
scheduling order accordingly.  Again, the court's order did not 
amend Ryan's deadline for disclosure of witnesses. 
¶22 On May 15, 2008, Ryan filed a motion for partial 
summary judgment,3 seeking to exclude from trial any evidence 
                                                 
3 While Ryan referred to his motion as a motion for partial 
summary judgment, the motion more accurately functioned as a 
motion in limine. 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
9 
 
concerning the impact of environmental contamination on the 
value of Ryan's property.  Relying on his right to due process 
and the concept of fundamental fairness, Ryan argued that 
evidence of environmental contamination and of remediation costs 
are inadmissible in condemnation proceedings as a matter of law.  
Specifically, 
Ryan 
alleged 
that 
admitting 
such 
evidence 
improperly subjects the property owner to a "double-take," in 
which the condemnor acquires the contaminated property at a 
discounted rate while still retaining the right to pursue the 
responsible party for cleanup costs. 
¶23 In the alternative, assuming evidence of environmental 
contamination and of remediation costs are admissible in 
condemnation proceedings, Ryan argued that the circuit court 
must preclude MacWilliams from testifying on the grounds that 
his appraisal is speculative.  In particular, Ryan maintained 
that MacWilliams failed to apply the proper methodology for 
valuing contaminated properties as provided by the Uniform 
Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP).4  In 
support, Ryan relied upon the opinions of two experts, certified 
                                                 
4 More specifically, Ryan alleged that MacWilliams failed to 
apply the impaired analysis methodology prescribed by USPAP 
Advisory Opinion 9 (AO-9), which governs the appraisal of real 
property impacted by environmental contamination.  See generally 
Appraisal 
Standards 
Board, 
USPAP: 
AO-9 
(2010-11), 
http://www.uspap.org/AO/ao01_10/ao_09.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 
2011).  According to Ryan, AO-9 provides that an appraiser must 
first determine the clean, uncontaminated value of the property 
and then make deductions for three components of contamination: 
cost effects (the costs of remediation), use effects (the 
effects on site usability), and risks effects (stigma). 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
10 
 
general appraiser Jason Messner (Messner) and professional 
engineer Joe Michaelchuck (Michaelchuck). 
¶24 Five days later, on May 20, 2008, the DOT moved the 
circuit court to exclude Ryan's newly disclosed expert witnesses 
on the grounds that neither Messner nor Michaelchuck were named 
in Ryan's February 15, 2006, witness list. 
¶25 In opposition to the DOT's motion, Ryan asserted that 
he permissibly retained Messner and Michaelchuck to rebut 
MacWilliams' testimony.  Ryan noted that the scheduling order 
was silent as to rebuttal witnesses specifically, and, moreover, 
he expressly reserved the right to name rebuttal witnesses.  In 
any 
event, 
Ryan 
argued, 
the 
relevance 
of 
Messner 
and 
Michaelchuck's testimony outweighs any prejudice suffered by the 
DOT.  
¶26 On June 4, 2008, the circuit court held a hearing and 
granted the DOT's motion to exclude Messner and Michaelchuck as 
a result of their untimely disclosure.  Acting pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. §§ 802.10, 804.12(2), and 805.03, the circuit court 
concluded that Ryan failed to demonstrate good cause for relief 
from the scheduling order.  In a lengthy oral ruling, the court 
reasoned that its August 27, 2007, order memorialized the 
parties' agreement not to amend their respective deadlines for 
the disclosure of witnesses, and Ryan never sought leave to add 
any witnesses.  Furthermore, the circuit court determined that 
permitting 
Messner 
and 
Michaelchuck 
to 
testify 
would 
substantially prejudice the DOT because discovery was set to 
close, and the DOT would have to radically alter its defense 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
11 
 
strategy.  Conversely, the court explained, excluding Messner 
and Michaelchuck would result in only minor prejudice to Ryan 
since he had already submitted a comprehensive witness list with 
an eye towards trial. 
¶27 Ryan moved for reconsideration, which the circuit 
court denied on July 22, 2008.  On that same date, the circuit 
court also denied Ryan's motion for partial summary judgment.  
Persuaded by the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in 
Northeast CT Economic Alliance, Inc. v. ATC Partnership, 776 
A.2d 1068 (Conn. 2001), the circuit court concluded that 
evidence of environmental contamination and of remediation costs 
are admissible in condemnation proceedings because they bear on 
the fair market value of the subject property: "Excluding 
contamination 
evidence 
as 
the 
Connecticut 
Court 
points 
out . . . would likely result in a fictional property value, a 
result that would be inconsistent with the principles by which 
just compensation is calculated."  The circuit court further 
rejected Ryan's argument that MacWilliams should be precluded 
from testifying, reasoning that any flaws in MacWilliams' 
methodology go 
to 
the weight of the evidence, not its 
admissibility. 
¶28 The 
case 
proceeded 
to 
a 
seven-day 
jury 
trial, 
beginning on August 25, 2008.  The jury was presented evidence 
that Ryan's property was located in Milwaukee's Menomonee 
Valley, a largely abandoned industrial area contaminated with 
pollutants, including lead, benzene, arsenic, diesel range 
organics, 
and 
polychlorinated 
biphenyls. 
 
Among 
others, 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
12 
 
Nicholson and MacWilliams testified as to the value of Ryan's 
property, taking into consideration the property's environmental 
contamination and the estimated costs of remediation.  
¶29 The 
circuit court rejected Ryan's proposed jury 
instructions on remediation costs and impaired versus unimpaired 
market value and instead provided to the jury Wis JI——Civil 
8100, the standard jury instruction on fair market value in the 
case of a total taking.  The special verdict asked the jury to 
determine the fair market value of Ryan's property at the time 
of the taking on March 30, 2005.  The jury answered, $2,001,725. 
¶30 On September 22, 2008, Ryan moved the circuit court 
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, alternatively, 
for a new trial, raising the same issues as argued in his pre-
trial motions.  The circuit court denied Ryan's motion. 
¶31 On April 30, 2009, the Honorable William Sosnay 
entered judgment on the jury verdict and awarded Ryan $653,725 
in damages, the difference between the jury verdict and the 
March 30, 2005, award of damages; $268,000 in attorney's fees; 
and $48,019.40 in costs. 
¶32 Ryan appealed from the judgment, and the court of 
appeals affirmed.  260 N. 12th St., 329 Wis. 2d 748.  First, the 
court of appeals concluded that evidence of environmental 
contamination and of remediation costs are admissible in 
condemnation proceedings under Wis. Stat. ch. 32.  Id., ¶23.  
The court reasoned that "[e]nvironmental contamination and the 
need to remediate the contamination is relevant to fair market 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
13 
 
value and, therefore, it is relevant to a determination of just 
compensation pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.09(5)(a)."  Id. 
¶33 Second, the court of appeals determined that the 
circuit court appropriately exercised its discretion when it 
excluded Messner and Michaelchuck.  Id., ¶38.  As a preliminary 
matter, the court of appeals agreed with the circuit court that 
Ryan violated the scheduling order by his untimely disclosure of 
Messner and Michaelchuck.  Id., ¶33.  Furthermore, the court of 
appeals 
found 
no 
reason 
to 
disturb 
the 
circuit 
court's 
discretionary decision to exclude the two expert witnesses, 
noting that the circuit court carefully balanced the purported 
relevance of the testimony against the threat of substantial 
prejudice to the DOT.  See id., ¶34. 
¶34 Third, the court of appeals rejected Ryan's argument 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
erroneously 
admitted 
MacWilliams' 
testimony.  Id., ¶41.  The court of appeals explained that 
Ryan's challenges to MacWilliams' methodology went to the weight 
of the testimony, not its admissibility.  Id., ¶40.  As the 
court of appeals pointed out, the jury was able to consider any 
flaws 
in 
MacWilliams' 
appraisal 
through 
Ryan's 
cross-
examination.  Id., ¶41. 
¶35 Finally, the court of appeals declined to address 
Ryan's claim that the circuit court erroneously rejected his 
proposed jury instructions, reasoning that Ryan's brief was 
devoid of any explanation as to how the jury was misled by the 
instruction actually given.  Id., ¶43. 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
14 
 
¶36 Ryan petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on March 16, 2011.  We now affirm. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶37 The 
four 
issues 
in 
this 
case 
implicate 
varied 
standards of review.  We discuss them by issue. 
¶38 First, we must determine whether the circuit court 
appropriately 
admitted 
at 
trial 
evidence 
concerning 
the 
environmental contamination of Ryan's property and the cost to 
remediate it.  "'The admission of evidence touching upon the 
value of property appropriated in condemnation cases must be 
left largely to the discretion of the trial judge.'"  Leathem 
Smith Lodge, Inc. v. State, 94 Wis. 2d 406, 409, 288 N.W.2d 808 
(1980) (quoting 5 Nichols on Eminent Domain, § 18.1[3], at 18-
38-40); see also Arents v. ANR Pipeline Co., 2005 WI App 61, 
¶12, 281 Wis. 2d 173, 696 N.W.2d 194.  We will not disturb a 
circuit court's decision to admit evidence unless the court 
erroneously exercised its discretion.  State v. Ringer, 2010 WI 
69, ¶24, 326 Wis. 2d 351, 785 N.W.2d 448.  A circuit court 
erroneously exercises its discretion if it applies an improper 
legal standard or makes a decision not reasonably supported by 
the facts of record.  Id.   
¶39 In this case, Ryan argues that the circuit court erred 
as a matter of law when it admitted at trial evidence of 
environmental contamination and of remediation costs.  Whether 
such evidence is inadmissible in condemnation proceedings as a 
matter of law requires us to interpret and apply Wis. Stat. ch. 
32.  Statutory interpretation and application present questions 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
15 
 
of law that we review de novo while benefiting from the analyses 
of the court of appeals and circuit court.  E-L Enters., Inc. v. 
Milwaukee 
Metro. 
Sewerage 
Dist., 
2010 
WI 
58, 
¶20, 
326 
Wis. 2d 82, 785 N.W.2d 409. 
¶40 Second, 
assuming 
evidence 
of 
environmental 
contamination and of remediation costs were admissible in this 
case, we must determine whether the circuit court appropriately 
admitted at trial MacWilliams' testimony.  Like the decision to 
admit evidence, the decision to admit expert testimony is 
reviewed under the standard of erroneous exercise of discretion.  
See Hoekstra v. Guardian Pipeline, LLC, 2006 WI App 245, ¶14, 
298 Wis. 2d 165, 726 N.W.2d 648; Arents, 281 Wis. 2d 173, ¶13. 
¶41 Third, we must determine whether the circuit court 
appropriately excluded Messner and Michaelchuck.  A circuit 
court's decision to impose sanctions for a violation of the 
court's scheduling order, and the decision of which sanction to 
impose, is, again, within the circuit court's sound discretion.  
Hefty v. Strickhouser, 2008 WI 96, ¶28, 312 Wis. 2d 530, 752 
N.W.2d 820. 
¶42 The fourth and final issue relates to the circuit 
court's decision to reject Ryan's proposed jury instructions.  
The decision of which jury instructions to give is also 
discretionary.  See State v. Burris, 2011 WI 32, ¶24, 333 
Wis. 2d 87, 797 N.W.2d 430; Kolpin v. Pioneer Power & Light Co., 
162 Wis. 2d 1, 32, 469 N.W.2d 595 (1991). 
IV. ANALYSIS 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
16 
 
A. Admission of Evidence of Environmental Contamination 
and of Remediation Costs 
¶43 The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, made applicable to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536 (2005) (citing Chicago, Burlington & 
Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897)), 
mandates that private property shall not "be taken for public 
use, without just compensation."  Similarly, Article I, Section 
13 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides that "[t]he property 
of no person shall be taken for public use without just 
compensation therefor."  See also E-L Enters., 326 Wis. 2d 82, 
¶21; City of Milwaukee Post No. 2874 Veterans of Foreign Wars of 
the U.S. v. Redevelopment Auth. of Milwaukee, 2009 WI 84, ¶35, 
319 Wis. 2d 553, 768 N.W.2d 749.  As the text of those 
provisions make clear, the federal and state constitutions do 
not prohibit the taking of private property for public use but 
rather "'place[] a condition on the exercise of that power.'"  
Lingle, 544 U.S. at 536 (quoting First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, Cal., 482 
U.S. 304, 314 (1987)).  Namely, the government must justly 
compensate the property owner for the taking.  See id. at 537. 
¶44 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.09 codifies the constitutional 
requirement that a property owner receive just compensation for 
the taking of his or her property.  Because § 32.09 is a statute 
intended to benefit an owner whose property is taken against his 
or her will, we afford it liberal construction.  See Spiegelberg 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
17 
 
v. State, 2006 WI 75, ¶31, 291 Wis. 2d 601, 717 N.W.2d 641; 
Standard Theatres, Inc. v. DOT, 118 Wis. 2d 730, 742-43, 349 
N.W.2d 661 (1984). 
¶45 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.09(1) provides, in relevant part, 
that "[t]he compensation so determined . . . shall be as of the 
date 
of 
evaluation 
as 
fixed 
by 
s. 32.05(7)(c) . . . ."  
Wisconsin Stat. § 32.05(7)(c), in turn, defines the "date of 
evaluation," or the "date of taking," as the date on which the 
condemnor records its award of damages in the office of the 
register of deeds of the county wherein the property is located.   
¶46 In addition, in the case of a total taking, as is the 
case with Ryan's property, Wis. Stat. § 32.09(5)(a) provides 
that "the condemnor shall pay the fair market value of the 
property taken . . . ."   
¶47 "Fair market value" is well-defined by our case law.  
"Fair market value is 'the amount for which the property could 
be sold in the market on a sale by an owner willing, but not 
compelled, to sell, and to a purchaser willing and able, but not 
obliged, to buy.'"  Spiegelberg, 291 Wis. 2d 601, ¶21 (quoting 
Pinczkowski 
v. 
Milwaukee 
Cnty., 
2005 
WI 
161, 
¶18, 
286 
Wis. 2d 339, 706 N.W.2d 642); see also City of Milwaukee Post 
No. 2874, 319 Wis. 2d 553, ¶4; Arents, 281 Wis. 2d 173, ¶14; Wis 
JI——Civil 8100.  Consistent with that definition, we have said 
that when determining the value of property in a condemnation 
proceeding, "'every element which affects value and which would 
influence a prudent purchaser should be considered.'"  Clarmar 
Realty Co. v. Redevelopment Auth. of Milwaukee, 129 Wis. 2d 81, 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
18 
 
91, 383 N.W.2d 890 (1986) (quoting Herro v. DNR, 67 Wis. 2d 407, 
420, 227 N.W.2d 456 (1975)); see also Ken-Crete Prods. Co. v. 
State Highway Comm'n, 24 Wis. 2d 355, 359-60, 129 N.W.2d 130 
(1964); Hoekstra, 298 Wis. 2d 165, ¶33; Arents, 281 Wis. 2d 173, 
¶15.  Wisconsin JI——Civil 8100, the standard jury instruction on 
fair market value in the case of a total taking, incorporates 
that rule.  See Wis JI——Civil 8100 (instructing jurors that they 
"should consider every element that establishes the fair market 
value of the property").   
¶48 In this case, we are called upon to determine whether 
evidence of environmental contamination and of remediation costs 
are admissible in condemnation proceedings under Wis. Stat. ch. 
32.  In light of the above rule, the answer is quite simply, 
yes.  Subject to the circuit court's discretion, evidence of 
environmental 
contamination 
and 
of 
remediation 
costs 
are 
admissible in condemnation proceedings so long as they are 
relevant to the fair market value of the property.5  A property's 
environmental contamination and the costs to remediate it are 
relevant to the property's fair market value if they would 
                                                 
5 We do not, and cannot, detail every scenario in which 
evidence of environmental contamination and of remediation costs 
may or may not be admissible in a condemnation proceeding.  
Indeed, we could envision a scenario in which one is admissible 
while the other is not.  Suffice it to say that in each 
condemnation proceeding, the circuit court must exercise its 
discretion in admitting or excluding evidence of environmental 
contamination and of remediation costs, in accordance with our 
rules of evidence governing relevance and the admissibility of 
expert testimony.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 904.01, 904.02, 904.03, 
907.02. 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
19 
 
influence a prudent purchaser who is willing and able, but not 
obliged, to buy the property.  To conclude, as a matter of law, 
that environmental contamination and remediation costs are not 
relevant to a property's fair market value, in the words of the 
Connecticut Supreme Court, "blinks at reality."  Ne. CT Econ. 
Alliance, 776 A.2d at 1080 ("Excluding contamination evidence, 
as a matter of law, is likely to result in a fictional property 
value——a result that is inconsistent with the principles by 
which just compensation is calculated.  It blinks at reality to 
say that a willing buyer would simply ignore the fact of 
contamination, 
and 
its 
attendant 
economic 
consequences, 
including specifically the cost of remediation, in deciding how 
much to pay for property.").  Indeed, in this context, we view 
evidence of environmental contamination no differently than 
evidence of a leaky basement, a cracked foundation, or a 
dilapidated roof: in each case, if the damage and the attendant 
costs 
of 
repair 
would 
influence 
a 
prudent 
purchaser 
in 
determining how much to pay for the property, then evidence of 
such damage and repair costs is relevant to fair market value 
and therefore admissible in condemnation proceedings. 
¶49 Ryan asks us not to view these issues so simply.  
Relying in large part on the Minnesota Supreme Court's recent 
decision in Moorhead Economic Development Authority v. Anda, 789 
N.W.2d 860 
(Minn. 
2010), 
Ryan 
argues 
that 
evidence 
of 
environmental contamination and of remediation costs should be 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
20 
 
excluded in condemnation proceedings as a matter of law.6  Citing 
fairness considerations and due process concerns, the Anda court 
held that evidence of environmental contamination and of 
remediation costs are generally inadmissible in condemnation 
proceedings.7  Id. at 878.  According to the Anda court, 
admitting such evidence would unfairly subject the property 
owner to "double liability" or a "double-take," in which the 
property owner must first pay for the contamination through a 
reduced condemnation award while still remaining potentially 
liable for the contamination under environmental law.  Id.  Such 
double 
liability, 
the 
court 
reasoned, 
violates 
the 
constitutional requirement that when the government condemns 
property, the property owner must be put in as good of a 
                                                 
6 It should be noted that Ryan changed course at oral 
argument, taking no issue with the idea that environmental 
contamination and remediation costs are relevant to a property's 
fair 
market 
value 
and 
therefore 
generally 
admissible 
in 
condemnation proceedings.  Instead, Ryan's focus at oral 
argument was the alleged speculative nature of the particular 
evidence in his case. 
We view Ryan's concessions at oral argument as further 
support 
for 
our 
holding 
that 
evidence 
of 
environmental 
contamination and of remediation costs are admissible in 
condemnation proceedings under Wis. Stat. ch. 32, subject to the 
circuit court's discretion.  Still, we analyze the issues as 
they were originally appealed and briefed to us. 
7 See also DOT v. Parr, 633 N.E. 2d 19, 23 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1994), superseded by statute, 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 30/10-5-50 
(2007); Aladdin, Inc. v. Black Hawk Cnty., 562 N.W.2d 608, 615-
16 (Iowa 1997); Hous. Auth. of New Brunswick v. Suydam 
Investors, L.L.C., 826 A.2d 673, 687 (N.J. 2003); City of New 
York v. Mobil Oil Corp., 783 N.Y.S.2d 75, 79 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2004). 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
21 
 
position pecuniarily as if his or her property had not been 
taken.  See id. (citing Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 
255 (1934)).  In addition, the Anda court maintained that a rule 
of law excluding evidence of environmental contamination and of 
remediation costs more adequately protects a property owner's 
right to procedural due process.  Anda, 789 N.W.2d at 882.  
Specifically, the court noted that in a condemnation proceeding, 
a property owner lacks the ability to contest liability for the 
contamination or implead other potentially responsible parties.  
Id.  In the end, the Anda court acknowledged its departure from 
the usual standard applied in condemnation proceedings but 
deemed it necessary in the interests of fairness: 
Although condemnation awards are usually based on the 
fair 
market 
value 
of 
the 
property 
in 
whatever 
condition the property is at the time of the taking, 
the constitutional standard that courts must adhere to 
is "just compensation."  Courts can be fluid in the 
standards they apply to determine "just compensation" 
when fairness so requires.   
Id. at 880. 
¶50 Turning to the instant case, Ryan invites us to adopt 
the Minnesota Supreme Court's exclusion approach in Anda, 
arguing that it is consistent with our policy of liberally 
construing 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 32.09. 
 
See 
Spiegelberg, 
291 
Wis. 2d 601, ¶31; Standard Theatres, 118 Wis. 2d at 742-43.  We 
decline Ryan's invitation. 
¶51 The concerns raised by Ryan and the Minnesota Supreme 
Court do not go unnoticed.  However, for purposes of the instant 
case, 
they 
miss 
the 
mark. 
 
Liability 
for 
environmental 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
22 
 
contamination has no place in a condemnation proceeding under 
Wis. Stat. ch. 32.  The purpose of a condemnation proceeding is 
to ensure that the property owner receives just compensation.  
As our preceding analysis makes clear, in the case of a total 
taking, the property owner is justly compensated when he or she 
receives an amount equal to the property's fair market value on 
the date of taking.  See § 32.09(1), (5)(a).  To determine the 
property's fair market value, "'every element which affects 
value and which would influence a prudent purchaser should be 
considered.'"  Clarmar Realty, 129 Wis. 2d at 91 (quoting Herro, 
67 Wis. 2d at 420).  Environmental contamination and remediation 
costs unquestionably affect a property's value and thus should 
be considered.  How the property came to be contaminated on the 
date of taking, or who is responsible, are different questions.8  
See Ne. CT Econ. Alliance, 776 A.2d at 1083.  As articulated by 
the Connecticut Supreme Court, "[t]o deny the condemnor the 
right to put on evidence as to one of the significant 
determinants of that condition——and hence value——because it may 
not reflect the owner's degree of responsibility for the 
                                                 
8 For this very reason, we reject Ryan's argument that even 
if evidence of environmental contamination and of remediation 
costs are admissible in condemnation proceedings, such evidence 
must be limited to the extent of the property owner's liability. 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
23 
 
condition misses the point of an eminent domain valuation 
process."9  Id. 
¶52 Furthermore, the concerns raised by Ryan and the 
Minnesota Supreme Court are based on an assumption that a 
subsequent environmental action is a certainty.  It is not.  In 
fact, in the instant case, Ryan has not been pursued in a 
remediation action and, at least according to the DOT, will not 
be. 
 
We 
decline 
to 
exclude 
evidence 
of 
environmental 
contamination 
and 
of 
remediation 
costs 
in 
condemnation 
proceedings as a matter of law, and thereby require the 
condemnor to always pay more than the property's fair market 
value, based on the mere possibility of a "double-take."  
Indeed, in the case of a taking, fairness to the property owner 
is 
only 
half 
the 
equation. 
 
"Whatever 
the 
circumstances . . . the dominant consideration always remains 
the same: What compensation is 'just' both to an owner whose 
property is taken and to the public that must pay the bill?"  
United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 
                                                 
9 Several other courts have similarly concluded.  See 
Redevelopment Agency of Pomona v. Thrifty Oil Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 687, 689 n.9 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Fla. Dep't of Transp. v. 
Finkelstein, 629 So.2d 932, 934 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); 
Stafford v. Bryan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 466 S.E.2d 637, 640-41 
(Ga. Ct. App. 1995); City of Olathe v. Stott, 861 P.2d 1287, 
1290 (Kan. 1993); La. Dep't of Transp. & Dev. v. La.-Ark. Ry. 
Co., 704 So.2d 822, 823 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Silver Creek Drain 
Dist. v. Extrusions Div., Inc., 663 N.W.2d 436, 437 (Mich. 
2003); Or. Dep't of Transp. v. Hughes, 986 P.2d 700, 703 (Or. 
Ct. App. 1999); Tennessee v. Brandon, 898 S.W.2d 224, 227 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 1994). 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
24 
 
(1950); see also 
City of Milwaukee Post No. 2874, 319 
Wis. 2d 553, ¶50. 
¶53 In summary, we conclude that evidence of environmental 
contamination and of remediation costs are admissible in 
condemnation proceedings under Wis. Stat. ch. 32, subject to the 
circuit court's broad discretion.  Accordingly, in this case, 
the circuit court applied a proper legal standard and did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion when it admitted at trial 
evidence concerning the environmental contamination of Ryan's 
property and the cost to remediate it.  How the admission of 
such evidence in this condemnation proceeding may affect Ryan in 
a future environmental action, if one should occur, is not 
before us. 
B. Admission of MacWilliams' Testimony 
¶54 In the alternative, Ryan argues that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion when it admitted at trial 
MacWilliams' testimony.  Specifically, Ryan contends that 
MacWilliams' appraisal testimony was speculative and therefore 
inadmissible because MacWilliams failed to apply the proper 
methodology for valuing contaminated properties as provided by 
USPAP.   
¶55 Assuming for the sake of argument that MacWilliams' 
methodology was in fact flawed, we still do not agree with Ryan 
that the circuit court erred when it admitted MacWilliams' 
testimony.  A circuit court has broad discretion to admit expert 
testimony if the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education, and if the testimony 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
25 
 
is relevant, that is, if the testimony will assist the trier of 
fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in 
issue.  Wis. Stat. § 907.02;10 State v. Kandutsch, 2011 WI 78, 
¶26, 336 Wis. 2d 478, 799 N.W.2d 865; Hoekstra, 298 Wis. 2d 165, 
¶14; Arents, 281 Wis. 2d 173, ¶13.  Here, Ryan does not claim 
that MacWilliams, a Wisconsin-certified general appraiser, was 
not qualified to provide testimony on the value of Ryan's 
property.  Ryan also does not claim that MacWilliams' testimony 
was not helpful to the jury in its determination of the fair 
market value of Ryan's property.  Instead, Ryan takes issue with 
the method by which MacWilliams appraised Ryan's property.  
However, any flaws in MacWilliams' methodology properly went to 
the weight of his testimony, not its admissibility:  
In a state such as Wisconsin, where substantially 
unlimited 
cross-examination 
is 
permitted, 
the 
underlying theory or principle on which admissibility 
is based can be attacked by cross-examination or by 
other types of impeachment.  Whether a scientific 
witness whose testimony is relevant is believed is a 
question of credibility for the finder of fact, but it 
clearly is admissible.   
State v. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d 483, 519, 351 N.W.2d 469 (1984).   
C. Exclusion of Messner and Michaelchuck 
                                                 
10 Effective February 1, 2011, the legislature amended Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 907.02 
to 
adopt 
the 
Daubert 
v. 
Merrell 
Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), reliability standard 
as stated in Federal Rule of Evidence 702.  See 2011 Wis. Act. 
2, §§ 34m, 45(5); State v. Kandutsch, 2011 WI 78, ¶26 n.7, 336 
Wis. 2d 478, 799 N.W.2d 865.  The instant case was brought on 
June 22, 2005, and is therefore governed by the then-existing 
standard for admitting expert testimony. 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
26 
 
¶56 Ryan also argues that the circuit court erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion 
when 
it 
excluded 
Ryan's 
expert 
witnesses, Messner and Michaelchuck, as a result of their 
untimely 
disclosure. 
 
Ryan 
denies 
violating 
the 
court's 
scheduling order in the first place but maintains that even if 
he did, the circuit court's decision to exclude Messner and 
Michaelchuck was an unreasonably harsh sanction.  We disagree 
with Ryan on both counts. 
¶57 A circuit court has both statutory and inherent 
authority to control its docket through a scheduling order, 
provided that the court first consults with the parties' counsel 
and any unrepresented party.  See Wis. Stat. § 802.10(3); Hefty, 
312 Wis. 2d 530, ¶31.  Wisconsin Stat. § 802.10(3)(f) explicitly 
states that a scheduling order may address "[t]he limitation, 
control and scheduling of depositions and discovery, including 
the identification and disclosures of expert witnesses . . . ." 
¶58 A party's failure to follow a scheduling order is 
grounds for sanctions at the circuit court's discretion.  Wis. 
Stat. § 802.10(7); Hefty, 312 Wis. 2d 530, ¶76.  Wisconsin Stat. 
§ 802.10(7) provides, in relevant part, that violations of a 
scheduling order are subject to Wis. Stat. §§ 804.12 and 805.03.  
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 804.12(2)(a)2. 
grants 
a 
circuit 
court 
discretionary authority, inter alia, to prohibit a party "from 
introducing designated matters in evidence" for the failure to 
obey a scheduling order.  Wisconsin Stat. § 805.03 grants a 
circuit court even broader discretionary authority to make such 
orders "as are just" for the failure to obey an order of the 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
27 
 
court.  See also Hefty, 312 Wis. 2d 530, ¶74.  This court has 
recognized 
that 
"[a] 
court's 
discretionary 
sanction 
for 
violation of a scheduling order is generally well grounded when 
a scheduling conference has taken place at which all interested 
parties were present to be heard."  Id., ¶33.  Active 
participation in a scheduling conference ensures knowledge of 
deadlines and hence leaves little room for tardiness or claimed 
ignorance.  Id. 
¶59 In this case, the circuit court's first scheduling 
order, entered after a scheduling conference at which Attorney 
Marcuvitz was present, set February 15, 2006, as the date by 
which Ryan was required to disclose his witnesses, including 
experts.  The order explicitly provided, "Witnesses not timely 
named and described shall not be called as witnesses at trial, 
except for good cause shown."  Evidently cognizant of the 
deadline, Ryan submitted his list of witnesses on February 15, 
2006.  It is undisputed that Messner and Michaelchuck were not 
included within that list.  In fact, Ryan did not disclose 
Messner and Michaelchuck until May 15, 2008, when he filed his 
motion for partial summary judgment.  Consequently, pursuant to 
the scheduling order's explicit directive, Ryan was precluded 
from calling Messner and Michaelchuck as witnesses at trial 
absent "good cause shown." 
¶60 While the circuit court amended the scheduling order 
on 
several 
occasions, 
including 
after 
Attorney 
Marcuvitz 
withdrew as Ryan's counsel and again after Ryan retained 
Attorney Biersdorf, the court never amended Ryan's February 15, 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
28 
 
2006, deadline for the disclosure of witnesses.  In fact, the 
circuit court's August 27, 2007, order explicitly confirmed that 
the deadline had been met and would not be reset.  At no time 
did Ryan ever move the court for relief from the deadline and, 
at least according to the record, never so much as objected to 
the deadline until after the circuit court excluded Messner and 
Michaelchuck. 
¶61 Still, Ryan denies violating the court's scheduling 
order, noting that the scheduling order was silent as to 
rebuttal witnesses specifically and that he expressly reserved 
the right to name rebuttal witnesses.   
¶62 Ryan's points are unavailing.  The scheduling order 
applied Ryan's February 15, 2006, disclosure deadline to both 
lay witnesses and expert witnesses, without singling out 
rebuttal witnesses.  Moreover, at the end of his witness list, 
Ryan 
specifically 
named 
two 
"witnesses 
to 
be 
called 
in 
rebuttal," neither of which were Messner or Michaelchuck.  As 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
pointed 
out, 
the 
fact 
that 
Ryan 
specifically named two rebuttal witnesses in his witness list 
"belies his assertion that he did not believe the 2005 
Scheduling Order applied to rebuttal witnesses."  See 260 N. 
12th St., 329 Wis. 2d 748, ¶31.  In addition, the fact that 
Ryan, in his witness list, expressly reserved the right to name 
other rebuttal witnesses cannot save him from his untimely 
disclosure of Messner and Michaelchuck.  To conclude otherwise 
would "entirely defeat[] the very purpose of the witness list 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
29 
 
requirement."  See Estate of Hegarty v. Beauchaine, 2006 WI App 
248, ¶188, 297 Wis. 2d 70, 727 N.W.2d 857. 
¶63 Pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 802.10, 804.12(2), and 
805.03, the circuit court exercised its discretion to sanction 
Ryan for his failure to abide by the scheduling order, excluding 
Messner and Michaelchuck as expert witnesses.  The circuit court 
concluded that Ryan failed to demonstrate good cause as to why 
Messner and Michaelchuck should be called at trial.  Ryan 
maintains that the circuit court's decision to exclude Messner 
and Michaelchuck was unreasonably harsh. 
¶64 The question before us is not whether we would have 
granted the same sanction but instead whether the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion when it made its decision.  
Hefty, 312 Wis. 2d 530, ¶71.  In this case, the answer is quite 
clearly, no.  The circuit court acted under its express 
statutory authority to sanction Ryan and, in a 24-page decision, 
reasonably excluded Messner and Michaelchuck after carefully 
considering the facts of record.  The circuit court considered 
both the fact that the August 27, 2007, order memorialized the 
parties' agreement not to amend their respective deadlines for 
the disclosure of witnesses and the fact that Ryan never sought 
leave to add any witnesses.  The court then exhaustively 
balanced any perceived prejudices that could result from its 
decision.  First, the court acknowledged that Ryan would suffer 
"minor prejudice" if Messner and Michaelchuck were excluded; 
namely, Ryan would be restricted to calling only those expert 
witnesses named by his former counsel.  However, the circuit 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
30 
 
court determined that Ryan's mere preference for Messner and 
Michaelchuck's testimony did not rise to good cause for relief 
from the scheduling order:  
[There is] no question that previous opinion 
testimony proffered on behalf of [Ryan] went to the 
issues at trial.  It's just it's not the opinion 
testimony that [Ryan's] new counsel wants to put on, 
and what the Court has to be satisfied here with is 
that there would be some kind of good cause as to why 
Mr. Messner or Mr. Michaelchuck should be allowed to 
offer these opinions notwithstanding the fact that 
it's outside of the scheduling order, and the Court 
doesn't see that. 
Conversely, the circuit court concluded that the DOT would be 
"substantial[ly] prejudice[d]" if Messner and Michaelchuck were 
permitted to testify.11  The court explained that discovery was 
set to close, pretrial reports were soon due, and the DOT would 
                                                 
11 Citing Wis. Stat. § 904.03, Ryan argues that the circuit 
court should have balanced the danger of prejudice against the 
probative 
value 
of 
Messner 
and 
Michaelchuck's 
testimony, 
maintaining that the court's failure to do so was erroneous as a 
matter of law.  As a preliminary point, we disagree with Ryan 
that the circuit court did not consider the relevance of Messner 
and Michaelchuck's testimony.  In fact, the court expressly 
considered 
the 
relevance 
of 
Messner 
and 
Michaelchuck's 
testimony, along with the relevance of Nicholson's testimony.  
In the end, the court determined that Ryan's mere preference for 
Messner and Michaelchuck's testimony, over Nicholson's, did not 
rise to good cause for relief from the scheduling order.   
Regardless, the circuit court did not err by not applying 
Wis. Stat. § 904.03.  Section 904.03 is a rule of evidence 
governing the exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence on the 
grounds of "the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence."  Here, however, the circuit court was excluding 
Messner and Michaelchuck as a sanction for Ryan's failure to 
obey the scheduling order pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 802.10. 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
31 
 
have to drastically alter its defense strategy, "notwithstanding 
the fact that the [DOT] here followed the scheduling order."  
The court ultimately concluded that the prejudice to the DOT 
would be too great if Ryan were to be granted relief from the 
scheduling order, and we see no reason to disturb the circuit 
court's thoughtful determination.12  
D. Rejection of Ryan's Proposed Jury Instructions 
¶65 Finally, Ryan argues he is entitled to a new trial on 
the grounds that the circuit court improperly rejected his 
proposed jury instructions on remediation costs and impaired 
versus unimpaired market value.  Ryan's argument is unsupported 
by the law. 
¶66 A circuit court has wide discretion in determining 
which jury instructions to give.  Fischer v. Ganju, 168 
Wis. 2d 834, 849, 485 N.W.2d 10 (1992); Kolpin, 162 Wis. 2d at 
32.  If the given jury instructions adequately communicated the 
law and were applicable to the facts, no grounds for reversal 
exist.  Fischer, 168 Wis. 2d at 850.  Moreover, even if the 
circuit court rejected proposed jury instructions that were 
arguably appropriate, we will not reverse unless the court's 
                                                 
12 In his brief, in mere passing, Ryan argues that he should 
be relieved from the circuit court's order excluding Messner and 
Michaelchuck on the grounds that Attorney Marcuvitz's failure to 
timely secure an expert witness to address the contamination 
issue 
constituted 
"excusable 
neglect" 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 806.07(1)(a).  However, the operative word in "excusable 
neglect" is "excusable."  See Casper v. Am. Int'l S. Ins. Co., 
2011 WI 88, ¶37, 336 Wis. 2d 267, 800 N.W.2d 880.   
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
32 
 
failure 
to 
include 
the 
proposed 
jury 
instructions 
was 
prejudicial.  Kolpin, 162 Wis. 2d at 32. 
¶67 In this case, the circuit court instructed the jury 
according to Wis JI——Civil 8100, the standard jury instruction 
on fair market value in the case of a total taking.  Ryan does 
not 
argue 
that 
the 
given 
jury 
instructions 
incorrectly 
communicated the law.  Ryan also does not argue that he was 
prejudiced by the circuit court's failure to include his 
proposed jury instructions on remediation costs and impaired 
versus unimpaired market value.  Rather, Ryan merely asserts 
that the given jury instructions "were insufficient for a 
complicated trial such as in this case."  As the preceding 
standard makes clear, Ryan's bald assertion that the given jury 
instructions were insufficient does not meet the standard for 
reversal. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶68 First, we conclude that evidence of environmental 
contamination and of remediation costs are admissible in 
condemnation proceedings under Wis. Stat. ch. 32, subject to the 
circuit court's broad discretion.  Such evidence is admissible 
in condemnation proceedings in the circuit court's discretion so 
long as it is relevant to the fair market value of the property.  
A property's environmental contamination and the costs to 
remediate it are relevant to the property's fair market value if 
they would influence a prudent purchaser who is willing and 
able, but not obliged, to buy the property. 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
33 
 
¶69 We emphasize that our holding speaks only to a circuit 
court's 
discretionary 
authority 
to 
admit 
evidence 
of 
environmental 
contamination 
and 
of 
remediation 
costs 
in 
condemnation proceedings.  We take no position on how the 
admission of such evidence in a condemnation proceeding may 
affect the property owner in a future environmental action, if 
one should occur. 
¶70 Second, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
appropriately exercised its discretion when it admitted at trial 
testimony by the DOT's appraiser over Ryan's objection that the 
testimony was speculative.  Ryan does not take issue with the 
appraiser's qualifications or the relevance of his testimony; 
rather, Ryan objects to the method by which the appraiser valued 
Ryan's property.  However, any flaws in the appraiser's 
methodology properly went to the weight of his testimony, not 
its admissibility. 
¶71 Third, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
circuit 
court 
appropriately exercised its discretion when it excluded Ryan's 
expert witnesses as a result of Ryan's failure to timely 
disclose the witnesses in accordance with the court's scheduling 
order.  The circuit court acted under its express statutory 
authority to sanction Ryan and made a reasoned decision to 
exclude the expert witnesses after carefully considering the 
facts of record. 
¶72 Fourth and finally, we conclude that the circuit court 
appropriately exercised its discretion when it rejected Ryan's 
proposed jury instructions in favor of the standard jury 
No. 
2009AP1557   
 
34 
 
instruction on fair market value in the case of a total taking.  
Ryan's bald assertion that the given jury instructions were 
insufficient does not meet the standard for reversal. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
 
No.  2009AP1557.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶73 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring).  I would 
have the court either dismiss this matter as improvidently 
granted (thereby letting the decision of the court of appeals 
stand as precedent) or adopt the court of appeals decision 
without further writing.  Why?  Because the property owner 
conceded at oral argument that evidence of contamination and 
anticipated remediation costs is admissible in valuation of 
condemned property.1  This court is not bound by this concession 
of law, but the result of the concession is that the court did 
not have the benefit of exploring with both the condemnor and 
condemnee the difficult issues that arise in valuing condemned 
contaminated property.     
¶74 The majority opinion agrees with the court of appeals 
decision, which rests on Wis. Stat. § 32.09 and case law 
defining fair market value.  The majority opinion reaches the 
same conclusion as the court of appeals:  Admission of evidence 
is a matter of a circuit court's discretion.  Evidence of 
contamination and anticipated remediation costs is admissible if 
the circuit court in the proper exercise of its discretion 
determines that the evidence is relevant to the fair market 
value of the condemned property in the particular case.    
¶75 As I see it, the value added by a decision from this 
court over the published decision of the court of appeals in the 
present case would be to explore, at least preliminarily, issues 
a circuit court may face in exercising its discretion in 
                                                 
1 The other two issues about the circuit court's exercise of 
discretion are run-of-the-mill issues that do not warrant 
review; they do not raise any new issues of law.   
No.  2009AP1557.ssa 
 
2 
 
admitting or excluding evidence of contamination and anticipated 
remediation costs as relevant to fair market value in a 
condemnation case.  The majority opinion does not do this and 
cannot because of the concession and the limited oral argument.   
¶76 The valuation of condemned contaminated property is a 
developing area of the law.2  Only 12 states seem to have 
addressed the issue and only a slim majority of these states 
adhere 
to 
the 
rule 
that 
contamination 
and 
anticipated 
remediation costs are admissible as affecting the fair market 
value of condemned property.3  A slim minority of states exclude 
evidence 
of 
contamination 
and 
evidence 
of 
anticipated 
remediation costs, and some exclude only the latter.4  At least 
two 
state 
courts 
have adopted a rule that evidence of 
contamination and anticipated remediation costs is excluded but 
the condemnation award is held in escrow, allowing the condemnor 
to 
initiate a later action to recover actual costs of 
remediation from the escrow account.5  
                                                 
2 For discussions of this area of the law, see, e.g., Andrea 
L. Reed, Note, Cleaning Up Condemnation Proceedings: Legislative 
and Judicial Solutions to the Dilemma of Admitting Contamination 
Evidence, 93 Iowa L. Rev. 1135 (2009); Michael L. Stokes, 
Valuing Contaminated Property in Eminent Domain: A Critical Look 
at Some Recent Developments, 19 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 221 (2006); 4 
Nichols on Eminent Domain § 13.10, at 13-96 (3d ed. 2007); 7A 
Nichols on Eminent Domain § G13B.03[1] (3d ed. 2007). 
3 See Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 877 
n.10 (Minn. 2010). 
4 Id. at 878. 
5 See Housing Auth. of City of New Brunswick v. Suydam 
Investors, LLC, 826 A.2d 673, 687 (N.J. 2003); City of New York 
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 783 N.Y.S.2d 75, 80 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004). 
No.  2009AP1557.ssa 
 
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¶77 In a footnote, the majority opinion reveals that 
evidence of contamination or anticipated remediation costs will 
not be relevant in every condemnation case.  See majority op., 
¶48 n.5.   
¶78 The fair market value of contaminated property is 
often 
very 
difficult 
to 
determine 
and 
when 
evidence 
of 
contamination is admitted, inconsistent valuation methodologies 
appear in the case law.6 
¶79 Neither the majority opinion nor the court of appeals 
decision helps circuit courts to decide when evidence of 
contamination and anticipated remediation costs may or may not 
be relevant to determine fair market value in condemnation 
cases.  Cases in other jurisdictions have grappled with a 
circuit court's exercise of discretion in admitting evidence of 
contamination and anticipated remediation costs, considering, 
for example, the difference between evidence of contamination 
and evidence of anticipated remediation costs, liability for 
remediation, 
availability 
of 
public 
remediation 
funds, 
indemnification from other parties, stigma of contamination even 
after remediation, fairness of the valuation to the condemnor 
                                                 
6 See 7A Nichols on Eminent Domain § G13B.03[2][i], at G13B-
59–G13B61 (3d ed. 2007).   
No.  2009AP1557.ssa 
 
4 
 
and condemnee,7 and other contamination-related effects on the 
market value of condemned property.  
¶80 Under the circumstances of the instant case, the court 
should not address these significant issues.  I would therefore 
not have this court write at length on the valuation of 
contaminated property in condemnation proceedings.  I would 
either dismiss this matter as improvidently granted so that the 
decision of the court of appeals will stand as precedent or 
adopt the decision of the court of appeals, noting that there 
are many challenges in implementing this decision.  
¶81 The majority opinion unfortunately makes the answer to 
the complex question of valuing contaminated condemned property 
deceptively simpler than it is, and therefore may lull litigants 
and courts into overlooking the complexities and possible 
injustices presented when valuing contaminated property in 
condemnation proceedings.  
¶82 For the reasons set forth, I concur. 
                                                 
7 See United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 
121, 123 (1950) ("Fair market value has normally been accepted 
as a just standard.  But when market value has been too 
difficult to find, or when its application would result in 
manifest injustice to owner or public, courts have fashioned and 
applied other standards. . . .  Whatever the circumstances under 
which 
such 
constitutional 
questions 
arise, 
the 
dominant 
consideration always remains the same:  What compensation is 
'just' both to an owner whose property is taken and to the 
public that must pay the bill?"). 
No.  2009AP1557.ssa 
 
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