Case Title: Ex parte Marvin Nikia Gaston.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1130469

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2015-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL:06/12/2015
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2014-2015
____________________
1130469
____________________
Ex parte Marvin Nikia Gaston
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
(In re: Marvin Nikia Gaston
v.
State of Alabama)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CC-10-597;
Court of Criminal Appeals, CR-11-0823)
PER CURIAM.
1130469
WRIT QUASHED. NO OPINION.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Murdock, Shaw, Main, Wise, and
Bryan, JJ., concur.
Moore, C.J., dissents. 
2
1130469
MOORE, Chief Justice (dissenting).
Marvin Nikia Gaston was convicted of felony murder, see
§ 13A-6-2(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975, and first-degree 
assault, 
see
§ 13A-6-20, Ala. Code 1975. Gaston was sentenced to 30 years'
imprisonment on each conviction, the sentences to run
concurrently, and he was ordered to pay $8,140 in restitution
and $50 to the Crime Victims Compensation Fund. On appeal, the
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Gaston's convictions and
sentences 
in 
an 
unpublished 
memorandum, 
reasoning, 
among 
other
things, that Gaston failed to preserve for appellate review
his objection that his accomplice's testimony was not
corroborated. Gaston v. State (No. CR-11-0823, Dec. 13, 
2013),
___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Crim. App. 2014) (table). This Court
issued a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Criminal
Appeals' decision but now quashes the writ. Because I do not
believe the State presented sufficient evidence to convict
Gaston, I respectfully dissent. 
On the evening of June 13, 2009, Marvin Gaston,
Samdriquez Hall, Jemario Mushat, Seandarius Savage, and Pete
Mungro were riding around Montgomery in a blue GMC Yukon
sport-utility vehicle ("the SUV") that belonged to Gaston's
3
1130469
aunt, who had allowed Mungro to borrow it. At approximately
10:00 p.m., Gaston and his companions stopped at a Pace Car
gasoline station on Narrow Lane Road. While they were putting
gasoline into the SUV, Hall was involved in a brief
altercation with LaQuinta Shuford. Hall punched Shuford,
yelling "f[***] Court Block," an apparent reference to a gang
whose area is South Court Street in Montgomery. Shuford's
girlfriend, Kimberly Manor, intervened and stopped the
situation from escalating. 
Shuford testified that he then reached for his cellular
telephone and that, when he did so, Mungro approached Shuford
holding his belt, as if "he had a gun tucked under his belt."
Apparently, Mungro believed that Shuford was reaching for a
gun. Savage intervened and told Mungro that Shuford did not
have a gun and that he was not threatening them. Shuford and
Manor returned to their vehicle, and Mungro, Hall, and their
companions (including Gaston) returned to the SUV. As Manor
was driving her vehicle away from the gas station, the SUV
pulled up beside her vehicle. Manor heard someone yell,
"B[****], pull over." Manor looked to her left, where she saw
Mushat pointing a gun out of the passenger-side front window
4
1130469
of the SUV. Mushat fired a shot, which hit Manor's vehicle.
Nobody was injured, and the SUV sped away. 
Manor testified that she did not know Gaston, that she
could not identify him as an occupant of the SUV, that he did
not threaten her at the gas station, that she did not see him
with a gun, and that he did not aid "in anything that went on"
that night. Likewise, Shuford testified that there was no "bad
blood" between him and Gaston. Shuford also testified that he
could not implicate Gaston in the events of June 13, 2009.
When asked to describe Gaston's involvement in 
the 
gas-station
altercation, Shuford testified that Gaston was merely in the
"[w]rong place at the wrong time." 
Between 30 to 60 minutes after the incident at the Pace
Car gas station, Steve Arrington and Terrance Ponder were
heading westbound on East Boulevard in a Buick Roadmaster
automobile. Arrington testified that, after he and 
Ponder 
went
through a traffic light near the Pace Car gas station on
Narrow Lane Road, the blue SUV carrying Gaston and his
companions came up behind them and tried to run them off the
road. Occupants of the SUV fired shots at the Roadmaster and
eventually came alongside it on the left, at which point the
5
1130469
vehicles collided. More shots were fired into the Roadmaster,
and the SUV then sped away. Arrington was wounded and Ponder
was killed as a result of the shooting. Arrington was unable
to say which occupants of the SUV had fired the shots.
Arrington also testified that he did not know Gaston. 
Mungro returned the SUV to Gaston's aunt sometime between
11:00 p.m. and 12:00 a.m. that night. The SUV had sustained
damage to its right rear-quarter panel. The following day,
Mungro told Gaston's aunt to put the SUV in her backyard and
instructed her not to open the door of her house for anyone. 
Police confirmed that the Roadmaster had been shot 19
times. Police also recovered seven shell casings from the area
in which the shooting occurred. Adam Groom, a forensic
scientist with the Department of Forensic Sciences, testified
that the shell casings appeared to be fired from three
different weapons. However, police were unable to connect the
ejected shells to any firearms that were seized during the
investigation; therefore, they were unable to connect the
shell casings or bullets to any of the occupants of the SUV.
Sgt. Michael Myrick of the Montgomery Police Department
testified that Gaston voluntarily gave a statement to the
6
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police during the investigation of the incident. According to
Sgt. Myrick, Gaston admitted that he had been riding around in
the SUV earlier on the evening of the shooting. However,
Gaston denied any knowledge of the shooting, claiming that he
and Mushat had been dropped off before the time at which the
police indicated the shooting occurred. 
Gaston and his companions were arrested for their
involvement in the shooting. Gaston was charged with the
felony murder of Ponder and with first-degree assault as to
Arrington. The State's theory of the incident was that
Shuford's friends and Gaston's friends were members of rival
groups and that the encounter at the Pace Car gas station
prompted Gaston and his companions to look for other members
of Shuford's group to harm, which led to the shooting of
Arrington and Ponder. Gaston and Hall were tried together but
were represented by different counsel. During her opening
statement, Gaston's counsel told the jury that Gaston would
not dispute either that he was present during the incident at
the Pace Car gas station or that he was in the SUV when
Arrington and Ponder were shot.
7
1130469
Mushat, who had pleaded guilty to Ponder's murder and to
Arrington's assault, testified for the State at Gaston's
trial. Mushat testified that, when the shootings of Arrington
and Ponder occurred, three people were sitting in the backseat
of the SUV, that Gaston was one of them, and that Gaston was
sitting behind the driver. Mushat said he was sitting in the
front passenger seat. Mushat testified that shots were fired
from the backseat out of the rear passenger window (which
could be lowered only halfway), but he was unable to say which
of the three men in the backseat fired the shots. Mushat also
provided the following on cross-examination:
"Q.
You're not saying Mr. Gaston had a gun, are
you?
"A.
No ma'am.
"Q.
You're not saying Mr. Gaston shot at anybody
that night, are you?
"A.
No ma'am.
"Q.
You're not saying that he was the person who
instigated a fight with [Shuford] at Pace Car?
"A.
No ma'am.
"Q.
You're not saying he was the one who was
driving, following Ponder and Arrington in that
car 
after 
[they 
left] 
Front 
Street 
[a
nightclub]?
8
1130469
"A.
No, ma'am.
"....
"Q.
And you're not saying that any time that he
[Gaston] is leaning out of the window or
shooting out of the passenger side of the car?
"A.
No, ma'am.
"Q.
In fact, you never put him on the passenger
side of that vehicle, do you?
"A.
No, ma'am."
The State also introduced a letter Mushat admitted to
authoring in part and sending to Gaston while they were both
in jail. The letter urged Gaston to agree with Mushat that
Mungro was the shooter and that Savage was the driver.
At the close of the State's evidence, Gaston moved for
judgments of acquittal, arguing that the State could not
establish that he was involved in the shootings of Arrington
and Ponder. Specifically, Gaston's counsel commented three
times that the State failed to make a "prima facie showing"
that Gaston was complicit in the shootings of Arrington and
Ponder. Gaston's counsel also presented detailed arguments as
to why the evidence was insufficient to convict Gaston. As
part of the "prima facie showing" argument, Gaston's counsel
also discussed Mushat's 
testimony in detail and concluded that
9
1130469
Mushat "has no information to show that Mr. Gaston or at least
no testimony was solicited that he either encouraged,
promoted, assisted or [in] any other manner was complicit in
the actions –- or the injuries caused to Mr. Ponder and Mr.
Arrington." The trial court denied Gaston's motion. 
As part of his defense, Gaston called Robert Scott, an
automobile mechanic who had worked on the SUV. Scott testified
that the rear driver-side door window on the SUV was
manufactured in such a way that it lowered only about five
inches. Scott also testified that the door handle on the rear
driver-side door was broken and could not be opened from the
inside. Thus, according to the defense, Gaston was unable to
get out of the SUV without assistance from someone outside the
vehicle. 
At the close of all the evidence, Gaston renewed his
motion for judgments of acquittal on both charges. The trial
court again denied Gaston's motion. The jury found Gaston
guilty of first-degree assault and felony murder. The trial
court sentenced Gaston to 30 years' imprisonment on each
conviction, the sentences to run concurrently. 
10
1130469
On appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals, Gaston
argued, among other things, that the trial court erred in
denying his motions for judgments of acquittal. In the
"Statement of the Issues" section of his brief to the Court of
Criminal Appeals, Gaston framed the issue as follows: "The
trial court erred in denying Gaston's motion for a judgment of
acquittal 
where, 
excluding 
the 
accomplice 
testimony, 
the 
State
failed to present legally sufficient evidence that Gaston
acted either as a principal or accessory as to the offenses at
bar." After discussing the applicable law, Gaston began his
analysis by arguing that, "subtracting Jemario Mushat's
accomplice testimony, the State failed to present sufficient
evidence to connect Gaston to the commission of the offense." 
Gaston 
then 
presented 
the 
following supporting 
arguments:
(1) that, although the State presented evidence indicating
that Gaston was in the SUV when the incident at the Pace Car
gas station occurred, it presented no corroborating evidence
to show that Gaston was in the SUV when the shootings of
Arrington and Ponder occurred; (2) that there was no physical
or forensic evidence connecting Gaston to the offenses; (3)
that, even if the jury believed that Gaston was in the vehicle
11
1130469
at the time of the shootings, all the evidence placed him in
the backseat on the driver's side of the SUV, whereas the
gunfire came from the passenger's side of the SUV; and (4)
that none of the remaining evidence, if the accomplice
testimony is subtracted, suggested that Gaston was guilty of
the criminal offenses for which he was charged. Gaston
concluded the argument section of this issue as follows:
"Unlike his codefendant and alleged accomplices, there is no
evidence indicating that Gaston took any action at any point
in the evening, either by cursing, hitting, driving, or
shooting. The evidence does nothing to actually 
connect 
Gaston
to the commission of the offenses." Gaston 
therefore concluded
that his motion for judgments of acquittal should have been
granted and requested that the Court of Criminal Appeals
reverse his convictions and sentences and render judgments of
acquittal in his favor.
In its unpublished memorandum, the Court of Criminal
Appeals framed this issue as follows: 
"Gaston contends that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for judgments of acquittal
because, 
he 
says, 
the 
State's 
evidence 
was
insufficient to support a finding of guilt.
Specifically, Gaston argues that the State did not
produce evidence to corroborate the testimony of
12
1130469
accomplice Jemario Mushat, as required by §
12-21-222, Ala. Code, 1975. ..."
Citing Marks v. State, 20 So. 3d 166, 172 (Ala. Crim. App.
2008), the Court of Criminal Appeals held that Gaston failed
to preserve this issue for appeal because he challenged only
the sufficiency of 
the 
evidence at trial, without specifically
arguing that Mushat's testimony was uncorroborated. 
Gaston petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari,
which this Court granted on August 28, 2014.
"'"Appellate courts are limited in
reviewing a trial court's denial of a
motion for judgment of acquittal grounded
on insufficiency." McFarland v. State, 581
So. 2d 1249, 1253 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991).
"The standard of review in determining
sufficiency 
of 
evidence 
is 
whether 
evidence
existed at the time [the defendant's]
motion for acquittal was made, from which
the jury could by fair inference find the
[defendant] guilty." Linzy v. State, 455
So. 2d 260, 26[2] (Ala. Crim. App. 1984)
(citing Stewart v. State, 350 So. 2d 764
(Ala. Crim. App. 1977), and Hayes v. State,
395 So. 2d 127 (Ala. Crim. App.), writ
denied, 395 So. 2d 150 (Ala. 1981)). In
determining 
the 
sufficiency 
of 
the
evidence, we view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State. Linzy, supra.'
"Ex parte Burton, 783 So. 2d 887, 890-91 (Ala.
2000). 
"'The role of appellate courts is not to say
what the facts are. Our role ... is to judge whether
13
1130469
the evidence is legally sufficient to allow
submission of an issue for decision to the jury.' Ex
parte Bankston, 358 So. 2d 1040, 1042 (Ala. 1978)."
Ex parte Williford, 931 So. 2d 10, 13 (Ala. 2005) (alterations
in original).
Gaston argues, among other things, that Marks and Ex
parte Weeks, 591 So. 2d 441 (Ala. 1991), upon which Marks was
based, are due to be overruled because, he says, they are
inconsistent 
with 
decisions 
of 
this 
Court addressing
preservation of the issue of sufficiency of the evidence for
appellate review. In Ex parte Maxwell, 439 So. 2d 715, 717
(Ala. 1983), this Court stated the general rule for preserving
an objection to the sufficiency of the evidence: 
"To preserve the issue for appeal, it is
necessary for defendant to state his grounds upon
moving to exclude evidence; however, it is not
necessary to draw the trial court's attention to the
particular defect. It is sufficient that the
defendant state the ground that the prosecution has
failed to make a prima facie case." 
This general rule in Maxwell has been cited favorably
many times by this Court. See, e.g., Ex parte Parks, 923 So.
2d 330, 334 (Ala. 2005); Ex parte McNish, 878 So. 2d 1199,
1200-01 (Ala. 2003); Ex parte Hall, 843 So. 2d 746, 748-49
14
1130469
(Ala. 2002); and Ex parte Johnson, 620 So. 2d 665, 668-69
(Ala. 1993).
However, in Ex parte Weeks, 591 So. 2d at 442, this
Court, almost in passing, effectively held that a general
motion for a judgment of acquittal is insufficient to preserve
for appellate review the issue whether an accomplice's
testimony was sufficiently corroborated. Weeks did not quote
from, cite to, or even mention Maxwell. Since Weeks was
decided in 1991, this Court has never cited Weeks again in any
of its decisions involving the issue before us.
The Court of Criminal Appeals examined Weeks carefully in
Marks, interpreting Weeks to mean that an objection to the
sufficiency of the evidence does not preserve the specific
issue of accomplice corroboration. Although the Marks court
held that Weeks was an "anomaly" in the precedent of this
Court, it nevertheless felt bound to follow Weeks on the
specific issue of preservation of the issue of accomplice
corroboration for appellate review. Marks, 20 So. 3d at 172.
As noted above, the Court of Criminal Appeals in the present
case based its decision on Marks and, in turn, on Weeks.
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Section 
12-21-222, 
Ala. 
Code 
1975, 
provides: 
"A
conviction of felony cannot be had on the testimony of an
accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to
connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, and
such corroborative evidence, if it merely shows 
the 
commission
of the offense or the circumstances thereof, is not
sufficient." In other words, if a conviction for a felony is
based on an accomplice's testimony, then there must be
corroborating evidence tending to connect the defendant with
the commission of the offense. It would appear, then, that if
the State does not present such corroborating evidence, it has
not presented sufficient evidence to send the question of the
defendant's guilt to the jury. If this is true, then it is
difficult to justify Weeks (and subsequently Marks).1
In the appropriate case, this Court should consider
overruling Weeks and Marks. However, I believe it is not
necessary in this case to overrule Weeks and Marks because,
even if Mushat's testimony was sufficiently corroborated,  I
2
I note, however, that the State made excellent arguments
1
in response to Gaston's contentions in his brief to this Court
and that Gaston failed to file a reply brief.
"'Corroborate means to strengthen, to make stronger; to
2
strengthen, not the proof of any particular fact to which the
16
1130469
believe that the State still failed to present sufficient
evidence that Gaston was guilty of the crimes with which he
was charged. Mushat testified that Gaston was in the SUV at
the time of the shooting, that Gaston was sitting in the
backseat behind the driver, and that the shots came from the
backseat, although he could not tell who was firing the shots.
Mushat did not testify that Gaston fired the shots that killed
Ponder or wounded Arrington, that Gaston fired any shots at
all, or that Gaston even had a gun. Moreover, Mushat did not
testify to anything from which the jury could reasonably infer
that Gaston aided, abetted, or encouraged those who did fire
the shots. In other words, Mushat testified only that Gaston
was in the SUV when the crimes occurred, and "mere presence at
witness has testified, but to strengthen the probative,
criminating force of his testimony.'" Andrews v. State, 370
So. 2d 320, 322 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979) (citing Malachi v.
State, 89 Ala. 134, 140-41, 8 So. 104, 106 (1889)). "Evidence
of flight or other indications of consciousness of guilt may
be considered as corroborative evidence." Andrews, 370 So. 2d
at 322. In this case, Gaston's apparent lie to the police –-
that he and Mushat were not in the SUV when the shooting
occurred –- tended to corroborate Mushat's testimony that
Gaston was in the SUV when the shooting occurred. Because I
believe 
that 
Mushat's 
testimony 
was 
sufficiently 
corroborated,
I believe that overruling Weeks and Marks would have made no
difference in this case; therefore, it was not necessary to do
so. 
17
1130469
the scene of a crime is not enough to support a conviction."
Ex parte Smiley, 655 So. 2d 1091, 1095 (Ala. 1995). 
Yet even taken together with Mushat's testimony, the
other evidence in this case was also insufficient to allow a
reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Gaston
was guilty of the charged offenses. Shuford testified merely
that Gaston was present at the Pace Car gas station 30 to 60
minutes before the shootings. Shuford testified that there 
was
no "bad blood" between him and Gaston and that Gaston was
merely in the wrong place at the wrong time. Manor likewise
testified that Gaston was not involved in the altercation at
the gas station. Although a jury might reasonably infer that,
based on the gas-station altercation, Gaston would have a
desire to harm others who did have "bad blood" with his
friends, a jury would have to make yet another inference that
Gaston committed the wrongful acts for which he was charged.
See Systrends, Inc. v. Group 8760, LLC, 959 So. 2d 1052, 1074
(Ala. 2006) (noting that an "'"inference" is a reasonable
deduction of fact, unknown or unproved, from a fact that is
known or proved,'" but that an "'"inference cannot be derived
18
1130469
from another inference"'" (quoting Khirieh v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 594 So. 2d 1220, 1224 (Ala. 1992))). 
Also, Sgt. Myrick testified that Gaston admitted to
riding around in the SUV that evening but told him that he and
Mushat were not in the SUV when the shooting occurred. Because
the jury knew that Mushat pleaded guilty, the jury could
reasonably infer that Gaston lied to Sgt. Myrick about that
fact. Nevertheless, the jury would have to make another
inference based on that inference to determine that Gaston was
guilty of the crimes with which he was being charged.
Likewise, even assuming that the shells found at the
scene of the shooting could be connected to the occupants of
the SUV, the evidence showed that the shots came from three
different weapons. Because there were five occupants of the
SUV, the jury would have had to guess which of the occupants
fired the shots. There is a difference between reasonably
inferring guilt from the evidence presented, which is
permissible, and completely guessing, which is not. See
Systrends, 959 So. 2d at 1074 (noting that a jury "might draw
reasonable inferences from the facts established by the
evidence" but that "'"[e]vidence ... which affords nothing
19
1130469
more than mere speculation, conjecture, or guess is
insufficient to warrant the submission of a case to the
jury"'" (quoting Finley v. Patterson, 705 So. 2d 826, 830
(Ala. 1984), quoting in turn Sprayberry v. First Nat'l Bank,
465 So. 2d 1111, 1114 (Ala. 1984))). 
In short, the State wholly failed to present evidence
indicating that Gaston fired the shots that killed Ponder and
wounded Arrington, which are the wrongful acts for which
Gaston was tried. The jury could not reasonably infer that
Gaston shot Arrington and Ponder just because he was present
in the vehicle. "[M]ere presence at the scene of a crime is
not enough to support a conviction." Smiley, 655 So. 2d at
1095. Given the lack of evidence in this case, no jury could
find beyond a reasonable doubt that Gaston committed either of
the crimes with which he was charged; therefore Gaston's
motion for judgments of acquittal was due to be granted.
Likewise, there was not sufficient evidence to find
Gaston guilty under the theory of aiding and abetting.
"A person is legally accountable for the
behavior of another constituting a criminal offense
if, with the intent to promote or assist the
commission of the offense:
"....
20
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"(2) He aids or abets such other person in
committing the offense." 
§ 13A-2-23, Ala. Code 1975.
"In order to convict [a defendant] under this
complicity provision, 'the State must adduce some
legal evidence implying that he either recruited,
helped or counseled in preparing ... [to commit the
crime] or undertook some part in its commission.
Criminal agency in another's offense is not shown
merely by an exhibition of passivity.'"
Jones v. State, 481 So. 2d 1183, 1187 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985)
(quoting Pugh v. State, 42 Ala. App. 499, 502, 169 So. 2d 27,
30 (1964)) (second alteration in the original). 
The prosecutor told the jury during his closing argument: 
"If you don't even want to address the issue of
who pulled the trigger, it does not matter. 
"Under the theory of aiding and abetting ...
when you offer any sort of assistance, support, any
sort of encouragement –- and you don't actually have
to say I hereby assist you, I support you in this,
here use my gun; you don't have to say those things
–- it can be implied –- but with that, that means
you do not have to put a gun in one of their hands."
The State still failed to present evidence indicating that
Gaston provided any assistance, support, or encouragement in
the commission of these crimes.
It is not abundantly clear in this case whether Gaston
was challenging only the Court of Criminal Appeals' holding
21
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that he had waived the argument that Mushat's testimony was
not sufficiently corroborated or whether he was also bringing
to us the ultimate issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to
sustain the convictions. At trial, Gaston argued in his motion
for judgments of acquittal that the State failed to present a
prima facie case. As part of that argument, Gaston argued that
Mushat did not testify to anything that would have established
Gaston's guilt. On appeal, Gaston argued that, if Mushat's
testimony is excluded, the State failed to present sufficient
evidence to convict him. 
The language in Gaston's brief to the Court of Criminal
Appeals was confusing. On the one hand, it could imply that
the evidence presented by the State would have been sufficient
if Mushat's testimony had been corroborated. On the other
hand, it could mean that Mushat's testimony was due to be
excluded because it did nothing to establish Gaston's guilt
and that, if Mushat's testimony is excluded, the State failed
to present sufficient evidence to convict Gaston. I believe
that Gaston meant the latter, especially because (1) this
interpretation is consistent with what Gaston argued at trial
and (2) Gaston concluded his argument before the Court of
22
1130469
Criminal Appeals by arguing that the State presented no
evidence (which necessarily would include Mushat's testimony)
indicating that Gaston committed the offenses in question. I
believe, therefore, that the Court of Criminal Appeals
incorrectly interpreted Gaston's argument to be solely about
corroboration of accomplice testimony when it was 
really 
about
the sufficiency of the evidence as a whole. 
In his petition for a writ of certiorari, Gaston
addressed not only the issue whether his corroboration
argument had been preserved for appeal (which, in turn,
required asking us to overrule Weeks), but also the issue
whether the State presented sufficient evidence to convict
him. Gaston argued that the Court of Criminal Appeals confused
the question of law, which was whether the State presented
sufficient evidence to convict him, with a specific argument,
which dealt with whether Mushat's testimony had been
sufficiently corroborated. Gaston also argued that, once
Mushat's testimony was subtracted, the State 
failed 
to 
present
sufficient evidence to convict him. After this Court granted
certiorari review, Gaston briefed these issues, and the State
made no objection that Gaston was briefing an irrelevant issue
23
1130469
because 
the 
sufficiency-of-the-evidence 
issue 
was 
not 
properly
before us. Thus, I believe the issue of the sufficiency of the
evidence was properly before this Court. 
However, even if it was not, the United States Supreme
Court has held that "a court may consider an issue 'antecedent
to ... and ultimately dispositive of' the dispute before it,
even an issue the parties fail to identify and brief." United
States Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents of
America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 447 (1993) (quoting Arcadia v.
Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73, 77 (1990)).  The present dispute
3
ultimately arose from the question whether the 
State 
presented
sufficient evidence to convict Gaston. The issue of the
See also Planned Parenthood of Kansas & Mid-Missouri v.
3
Moser, 747 F.3d 814, 837 (10th Cir. 2014) (following United
States Nat'l Bank) ("Waiver, however, binds only the party,
not the court. A party that waives an issue is not entitled to
have us consider and rule on it. But it is well-settled that
courts have discretion to raise and decide issues sua sponte,
even for the purpose of reversing a lower-court judgment.");
Belize Telecom, Ltd. v. Government of Belize, 528 F.3d 1298,
1303-04 (11th Cir. 2008) (applying United States Nat'l Bank);
cf. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama v. Hodurski, 899 So.
2d 949, 960 (Ala. 2004) ("'"Appellate review does not consist
of supine submission to erroneous legal concepts .... Our duty
to enunciate the law on the record facts. Neither the parties
nor the trial judge, by agreement or by passivity, can force
us to abdicate our appellate responsibility."'" (quoting
Forshey v. Principi, 284 F.3d 1335, 1357 n.20 (Fed. Cir.
2002), quoting in turn Empire Life Ins. Co. of America v.
Voldak Corp., 468 F. 2d 330, 334 (5th Cir. 1972))).
24
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sufficiency of the evidence is therefore antecedent to the
questions 
whether 
Mushat's 
testimony 
was 
corroborated
sufficiently and whether Gaston preserved that argument for
appellate review. Moreover, if the State failed to present
sufficient evidence to convict Gaston, then Gaston 
is 
entitled
to a judgment of acquittal, which would dispose of the other
issues.
"He that walketh with wise men shall be wise: but a
companion of fools shall be destroyed." Proverbs 13:20 (King
James). Gaston may have been a "companion of fools," but that
is all that the State could prove. Merely being a companion of
fools is not a punishable crime at law. The jury could not
reasonably infer from the fact that Gaston was in the SUV with
four other people that he was the one who fired the shots or
that he aided or abetted those who did. I therefore believe
the 
prosecution 
obtained 
Gaston's 
convictions 
and 
sentences 
by
proving "guilt by association" instead of by proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the State did not meet its
burden, I believe the judgment of the Court of Criminal
Appeals is due to be reversed and that Gaston is due to be
acquitted. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
25