Case Title: State v. Shackelford

Citation: 

Docket Number: 49930

State: idaho

Court: Idaho Supreme Court (criminal)

Date: 2024-06-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
1 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Docket No. 49930 
 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
 
     Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
 v.  
 
 DALE CARTER SHACKELFORD, 
 
     Defendant-Appellant. 
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
) 
Boise, April 2024 Term 
 
Opinion Filed: June 20, 2024 
 
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk 
 
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
Latah County. John C. Judge, District Judge.  
 
The decision of the district court is reversed and remanded. 
 
Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for Appellant Dale Carter 
Shackelford. Jason C. Pintler submitted argument on the briefs. 
 
Raúl R. Labrador, Idaho Attorney General, Boise, for Respondent State of Idaho. 
L. LaMont Anderson submitted argument on the briefs. 
 
_____________________ 
 
MEYER, Justice. 
Dale Carter Shackelford appeals from the district court’s denial of his Idaho Criminal Rule 
36 motion to correct a clerical error in his Judgment of Conviction on Resentencing-Counts I and 
II (“the Judgment”). Shackelford argues that the Judgment did not accurately reflect the district 
court’s oral pronouncement of the sentence. For the reasons discussed below, the district court’s 
denial of Shackelford’s Rule 36 motion is reversed, and his case is remanded for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On October 25, 2001, Shackelford was sentenced following a jury verdict of guilty on six 
counts: two counts of murder in the first degree (Counts I and II); one count of first-degree arson 
(Count III); one count of conspiracy to commit first degree murder (Count IV); one count of 
conspiracy to commit first-degree arson (Count V); and one count of preparing false evidence 
(Count VI). The district court sentenced Shackelford to death on Counts I and II and ordered the 
remaining Counts III through VI to be served concurrently. The district court sentenced 
 
2 
Shackelford to twenty-five years fixed on Count III, a fixed life sentence on Count IV, twenty-five 
years fixed on Count V, and five years fixed on Count VI. The district court ordered that “the 
sentences imposed above shall all run concurrent with each other.” Later, this Court affirmed all 
six convictions, but vacated the sentences for Counts I and II pursuant to the United States Supreme 
Court decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), because the decision to impose the death 
penalty was not decided by the jury, and those counts were remanded to the district court for 
resentencing. See State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 388, 247 P.3d 582, 615 (2010).  
Shackelford’s resentencing took place ten years after his original sentence was imposed. 
At the resentencing hearing on September 28, 2011, the district court sentenced Shackelford to 
fixed life sentences on Counts I and II and ordered those sentences to be served consecutively to 
each other. The district court did not address Counts III through VI. The Judgment provided, 
however, that Counts I and II were to run consecutively with each other and with the sentences 
imposed in Counts III through VI.  
Nearly eleven years after his resentencing, on May 2, 2022, Shackelford, representing 
himself, filed a Rule 36 motion to correct a clerical error in the judgment. Shackelford argued that 
the written judgment did not accurately reflect the district court’s oral pronouncement of sentence 
because the district court did not mention Counts III through VI at the resentencing hearing. 
Shackelford contended that the Judgment should be corrected to order that the consecutive 
sentences in Counts I and II run concurrently with the sentences in Counts III through VI. The 
district court denied Shackelford’s Rule 36 motion, determined that the oral pronouncement of 
sentence was unambiguous, and ruled that the written judgment accurately reflected the oral 
pronouncement of sentence. We note that the district judge who heard argument on Shackelford’s 
Rule 36 motion was not the same judge who, many years earlier, orally pronounced Shackelford’s 
sentence at the resentencing hearing and subsequently signed the Judgment. Shackelford timely 
filed a notice of appeal.  
Shackelford argues on appeal that the district court erred when it denied his Rule 36 motion 
because the Judgment does not conform to the oral pronouncement of sentence. The State argues 
that the district court did not err when it concluded that the oral pronouncement of sentence was 
accurately reflected in the written judgment because the district court’s oral pronouncement of 
sentence was unambiguous and consistent with the written judgment. Specifically, the State argues 
that the district court’s use of the word “consecutively” in its oral pronouncement of sentence 
 
3 
meant “not only with each other [Counts I and II], but with the other four prison sentences,” 
because only Counts I and II had been remanded for resentencing. The State also contends that the 
district court’s denial of the Rule 36 motion is “buttressed by the Idaho Supreme Court’s prior 
decisions in Shackelford’s cases,” which referenced Shackelford’s formal sentence.  
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Generally, “a trial court’s interpretation of its orders will be given deference, but only to 
the extent that the interpretation is reasonable.” Vierstra v. Vierstra, 153 Idaho 873, 881, 292 P.3d 
264, 272 (2012) (citing Citizens Against Range Expansion v. Idaho Fish & Game Dept., 153 Idaho 
630, 633-35, 289 P.3d 32, 35-37 (2012)). “The rules of construction applicable to contracts and 
written documents apply to the interpretation of court orders.” Sun Valley Ranches, Inc. v. Prairie 
Power Co-op., Inc., 124 Idaho 125, 131, 856 P.2d 1292, 1298 (Ct. App. 1993) (citation omitted); 
accord State v. Towell, 172 Idaho 648, __, 535 P.3d 624, 629 (Ct. App. 2023). “Under the 
restrained standard of clear error customarily applied to factual issues, a factual finding will not 
be deemed clearly erroneous unless, after reviewing the entire record, an appellate court is left 
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” County of Canyon v. Wilkerson, 
123 Idaho 377, 381-82, 848 P.2d 435, 439-40 (Ct. App. 1993).  
III. 
ANALYSIS 
A. 
The district court erred in denying Shackelford’s motion because the Judgment 
did not accurately reflect the oral pronouncement of sentence.  
The only issue in this appeal is whether the district court erred in denying Shackelford’s 
motion to correct the written Judgment. We hold that the district court erred in denying the motion 
to correct the Judgment to conform to the oral pronouncement of sentence. When there is a 
difference between the oral pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment, the oral 
pronouncement of sentence controls. See State v. Timbana, 145 Idaho 779, 782, 186 P.3d 635, 638 
(2008) (“the sentence orally pronounced by the court controls when there is any disparity between 
it and the written judgment of conviction”). In Idaho, “the only legally cognizable sentence in a 
criminal case is the ‘actual oral pronouncement in the presence of the defendant.’” State v. Wallace, 
116 Idaho 930, 932, 782 P.2d 53, 55 (Ct. App. 1989) (quoting United States v. Bergmann, 836 
F.2d 1220, 1221 (9th Cir. 1988)). “The legal sentence consists of the words pronounced in open 
court by the judge, not the words appearing in the written order of commitment.” Id. It is well 
established that “[i]f a court does not specify whether a sentence is to be served concurrently with 
or consecutive to another sentence, the sentence will be concurrent because, in the absence of a 
 
4 
specification that it is to be consecutive, the defendant’s service of the sentence will begin 
immediately.” State v. Bosier, 149 Idaho 664, 667, 239 P.3d 462, 465 (Ct. App. 2010).  
In Wallace, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision to conform the 
written sentence to the oral pronouncement of sentence, after Wallace filed a motion to correct the 
sentence. State v. Wallace, 116 Idaho 930, 931-32, 782 P.2d 53, 54-55 (Ct. App. 1989). Wallace 
“argued that the first written order of commitment had created an indeterminate sentence and that 
the second order of commitment – following revocation of his probation – could not make the 
sentence ‘determinate.’” Id. at 931, 782 P.2d at 54. The district court reviewed the court minutes 
and court reporter’s notes and determined that the oral pronouncement of sentence was fourteen 
years determinate. Id. As a result, the district court denied Wallace’s motion, finding that the 
second order of commitment was “in compliance with what my order from the bench indicates.” 
Id. at 932, 782 P.2d at 55. The Wallace court explained “[o]ur view concerning the legal effect of 
the orally pronounced sentence is consistent with prior Idaho decisions dealing with ambiguous 
oral pronouncements. In those cases, the appellate courts have remanded to the trial judges for 
clarification of their sentences, rather than simply giving effect to the judgments as written.” Id. 
(citations omitted). The Wallace court held that Wallace’s “orally pronounced sentence was neither 
ambiguous nor legally defective” because the district court “clearly pronounced a fourteen-year 
determinate sentence.” Id. As a result, the district court “properly corrected the order of 
conviction” to match the oral pronouncement of sentence. Id.    
In this case, the district court’s oral pronouncement at Shackelford’s resentencing was not 
ambiguous as far as Counts I and II are concerned. The district court unambiguously sentenced 
Shackelford to two consecutive life sentences on Counts I and II: 
But having found that the ultimate sanction was, or would have been appropriate 
for the crimes that you committed, I don’t think it should come as any surprise that 
I’m imposing fixed life sentences for the murders of Donna Fontaine and Fred 
Palahniuk. 
 
My goal in sentencing, Mr. Shackelford, is that you not be released into society 
again. And I am ordering that those sentences be served consecutively.  So, unless 
there be any confusion on the Department of Parole’s point, I hope you don’t get 
out again. 
In this oral pronouncement of sentence, the district court did not mention Counts III 
through VI or address those counts in any fashion. The district court stated only that Counts I and 
II would run consecutively with each other. Because the oral pronouncement of sentence was 
 
5 
unambiguous, that is the sentence that controls. As a result, while Counts I and II run consecutively 
to each other, because the district court did not state that Counts III through VI were to run 
consecutively to Counts I and II, Counts III through VI will run concurrently with Counts I and II. 
The State argues that the district court’s use of the word “consecutively” at the oral pronouncement 
of sentence extends to Counts III through VI. This, however, reads into the district court’s 
pronouncement of sentence more than was stated, and perhaps more than was intended. The State’s 
argument that the Judgment supports Shackelford’s serving Counts III through VI consecutively 
to Counts I and II is unavailing as the oral pronouncement of sentence controls. In ruling on 
Shackelford’s Rule 36 motion, the district court erred when it determined that the Judgment 
conformed to the oral pronouncement of sentence.  
      
We note that while we agree with Shackelford that his sentence must be corrected, this 
change will not, practically speaking, grant Shackelford any actual relief as he is still serving two 
consecutive life sentences.  
 
Shackelford originally brought the discrepancy between the Judgment and the oral 
pronouncement of sentence to the district court’s attention through a Rule 36 motion, and at that 
time Shackelford was representing himself. Both Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) and Rule 36 allow for 
the correction of a sentence at any time. Rule 35(a) provides that “[t]he court may correct a 
sentence that is illegal from the face of the record at any time.” I.C.R. 35(a). Idaho Criminal Rule 
36 states: “After giving any notice it considers appropriate, the court may at any time correct a 
clerical error in a judgment, order, or other part of the record, or correct an error in the record 
arising from oversight or omission.” I.C.R. 36. We note that Shackelford’s situation points out a 
gap in our rules that Rule 35 and Rule 36 do not neatly address. We dealt with a similar issue in 
State v. Campbell. In that case, the defendant filed simultaneous Rule 35(b) and Rule 36 motions 
to “correct the written judgment to conform to the oral pronouncement of the sentence.” State v. 
Campbell, 170 Idaho 232, 238, 509 P.3d 1161, 1167 (2022). At the time the defendant filed the 
motions, the district court had already determined the sentence it imposed was ambiguous and had 
scheduled a resentencing hearing to correct the ambiguity. In Campbell, we reaffirmed that Rule 
36 is meant to “correct a clerical error in a judgment.” Id. at 241, 509 P.3d at 1170. In other words, 
an error “resulting from a minor mistake or inadvertence and not from judicial reasoning or 
determination[,]” such as “a drafter’s or typist’s technical error that can be rectified without serious 
doubt about the correct reading.” Id. (quoting Clerical Error, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th 
 
6 
ed. 2019)). We held that “Rule 36 does not provide a vehicle by which a trial court may amend a 
sentence to give effect to the court’s previously unstated intent that alters the sentence.” Id. We 
affirmed the district court’s denial of the Rule 36 motion because Rule 36 “was not the appropriate 
mechanism by which to amend a written judgment to conform to the orally pronounced sentence.” 
Id. (citing State v. Allen, 144 Idaho 875, 878, 172 P.3d 1150, 1153 (Ct. App. 2007)).  
 
We made a similar determination in Phillips where we remanded a case for resentencing 
when the oral pronouncement of sentence was ambiguous. State v. Phillips, 99 Idaho 354, 355-56, 
581 P.2d 1173, 1174-75 (1978). Before we remanded the case, we discussed both Rule 35 and 
Rule 36 in the decision. Id. at 355, 581 P.2d at 1174. We rejected the State’s argument to construe 
the written judgment as a “correction of an illegal sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35 since either 
interpretation of the sentence orally imposed would be lawful had either been clearly and 
unambiguously imposed.” Id. We also noted “the inapplicability of I.C.R. 36 since the error here 
was judicial in nature involving the exercise of discretion, and I.C.R. 36 permits correction of 
clerical errors but not judicial errors.” Id.  
 
We note that other courts are divided as to whether Rule 35 or Rule 36 is the appropriate 
vehicle to correct a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of sentence and the written 
judgment. See United States v. Bussey, 543 F. Supp. 981, 984 (E.D. Va. 1982) (discussing Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure 35 and 36 to correct an inconsistency between the oral 
pronouncement of sentence and the written judgment of conviction); See also Cook v. United 
States, 426 F.2d 1358, 1360 (5th Cir. 1970). In United States v. Libby, an unpublished case, the 
Sixth Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to correct “a discrepancy between an oral sentence 
and the written order” under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. See United States v. Libby, 
79 F.3d 1149, 1996 WL 117449 at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 15, 1996) (unpublished) (per curiam). 
However, other courts have agreed that the federal version of Rule 36 “may not be used to correct 
judicial errors in sentencing.” United States v. Penna, 319 F.3d 509, 513 (9th Cir. 2003); see also 
United States v. Werber, 51 F.3d 342, 343 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Rule 36 authorizes a court to correct 
only clerical errors in the transcription of judgments, not to effectuate its unexpressed intentions 
at the time of sentencing.”(footnote omitted)); United States v. Daddino, 5 F.3d 262, 264 (7th Cir. 
1993) (per curiam) (“More recent cases and commentary flesh out the parameters of Rule 36 and 
demonstrate that this exception does not apply to errors made by the court itself.”). These cases 
point to the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 as an alternative means to correcting a 
 
7 
discrepancy between an oral pronouncement of sentence and a written judgment. See Penna, 319 
F.3d at 511-13; Werber, 51 F.3d at 346-49; Daddino, 5 F.3d at 265.  
On balance, Rule 36 is not the appropriate vehicle to correct a discrepancy between an oral 
pronouncement of sentence and a written judgment. Rule 35(a), which is designed to correct illegal 
sentences, does not fully address this situation either. Nevertheless, Rule 35(a) better addresses the 
correction of a written judgment when there is a legal discrepancy between the oral pronouncement 
of sentence and the written judgment. While Shackleford cited Rule 36 rather than Rule 35(a) in 
his motion, we will apply the correct rule since the State did have the opportunity to brief and 
argue whether the district court erred in ruling that the Judgment accurately reflected the oral 
pronouncement of sentence. As a result, the Judgment must be corrected to conform to the oral 
pronouncement of sentence.  
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed above, this case is remanded to the district court to correct the 
Judgment of Conviction on Resentencing to order Counts III through VI to run concurrently with 
Counts I and II and Counts I and II to run consecutively to each other so that the Judgment 
conforms to the oral pronouncement of sentence.  
Chief Justice BEVAN and Justices BRODY, MOELLER and PETTY, J. Pro Tem, 
CONCUR.