Case Title: Commonwealth v. Andrade

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12088

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2018-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12088 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  HERICO ANDRADE. 
 
 
 
Plymouth.     October 5, 2018. - December 21, 2018. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lowy, Budd, & Cypher, JJ. 
 
 
Homicide.  Evidence, Testimony before grand jury, Prior 
inconsistent statement.  Practice, Criminal, Instructions 
to jury, Capital case. 
 
 
 
 
Indictments found and returned in the Superior Court 
Department on July 1, 2011. 
 
 
The cases were tried before Richard J. Chin, J. 
 
 
 
James W. Rosseel for the defendant. 
 
Laurie Yeshulas, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
 
 
BUDD, J.  In June 2015, a jury convicted the defendant, 
Herico Andrade, of murder in the first degree on a theory of 
deliberate premeditation, in connection with the shooting death 
of Jose Lobo in April 2011.1  In this direct appeal, the 
                     
 
1 The defendant was also convicted of unlawful possession of 
a firearm. 
2 
 
 
defendant asserts error in the method the prosecutor used to 
offer grand jury testimony as prior inconsistent statements, and 
in supplemental instructions that the judge provided to the 
jury.  He also seeks relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  For the 
reasons that follow, we affirm the judgments and decline to 
grant extraordinary relief under § 33E. 
 
Background.  We summarize the facts as the jury could have 
found them, reserving certain details for discussion below.  On 
April 4, 2011, a sport utility vehicle (SUV) stopped outside a 
house in Brockton where several people were congregated.  The 
men in the SUV, including the defendant, stopped to speak to 
some young women who were present.  Shortly thereafter, one of 
the men standing outside approached the vehicle and argued with 
the defendant.  The defendant said, "I'll go and come back," 
before the SUV pulled away.  Approximately thirty-three minutes 
later, shots were fired in the vicinity of the area where the 
people had been gathered.  When police arrived, they found the 
victim lying on the front porch of the home with a gunshot wound 
to his temple.  He later was pronounced dead at a hospital. 
 
A surveillance video recording captured two individuals 
approaching the scene on foot and reaching for their waistbands 
around the time of the shooting.  The figures reappeared in the 
video recording fleeing the scene moments later.  One witness, 
Antonio Silva, saw two individuals running away.  Silva 
3 
 
 
identified one of the individuals as the defendant and observed 
that the defendant held a revolver while running from the scene.  
A baseball hat containing the defendant's deoxyribonucleic acid 
(DNA) was recovered from the street in front of the porch where 
the victim was killed.  Days after the murder, the defendant was 
interviewed by the Brockton police.  During that interview, the 
defendant admitted to being a passenger in the SUV that stopped 
near the congregated group on the night of the shooting, but 
denied being present at the time of the shooting.  Approximately 
one and one-half weeks later, the defendant left the country.  
He was indicted for murder, and he was arrested upon his return 
nearly one year later. 
 
Discussion.  The defendant argues that the prosecutor's 
method of presenting grand jury testimony was flawed.  The 
defendant claims that, as a result, the judge improperly allowed 
the jury to consider the testimony as substantive evidence, and 
that the judge erred in considering the evidence himself in 
ruling on the defendant's motion for a required finding of not 
guilty.  The defendant also contends that erroneous jury 
instructions entitle him to a reversal of his convictions. 
1.  Presentation of grand jury testimony.  Four percipient 
trial witnesses called by the Commonwealth claimed that they 
could not recall the testimony they had given to the grand jury, 
the events and facts underlying those prior statements, or both.  
4 
 
 
Three of the four witnesses were found by the judge to be 
feigning memory loss, and the Commonwealth was permitted to 
present their grand jury testimony as prior inconsistent 
statements admissible as substantive evidence.  See Commonwealth 
v. Neves, 474 Mass. 355, 366-367 (2016); Mass. G. Evid. 
§ 801(d)(1)(A) (2018). 
 
For each witness, rather than reading the relevant portions 
of the grand jury transcripts directly into the record (with or 
without the assistance of co-counsel), the prosecutor chose to 
read relevant excerpts from the transcripts, punctuated by 
questions to the witness as to whether he or she recalled giving 
the grand jury testimony.  At the close of evidence, the 
defendant's attorney moved for a required finding of not guilty, 
arguing that because the prosecutor had presented the grand jury 
testimony in a question and answer format, the testimony was 
part of the prosecutor's leading questions to the witnesses, and 
therefore the testimony could not be considered for substantive 
purposes.  See Commonwealth v. Judge, 420 Mass. 433, 452 n.12 
(1995).  The defendant claimed that without the evidence from 
the three percipient witnesses, there was insufficient evidence 
to find him guilty. 
The judge considered the matter and ultimately denied the 
defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty.  He 
ruled that the method the prosecutor had used was "sufficient" 
5 
 
 
to have the jury consider the prior testimony substantively.  In 
his jury charge, the judge instructed that questions put to 
witnesses were not themselves evidence, but that the grand jury 
testimony could be considered for its substantive value. 
On appeal, the defendant claims, among other things, that 
the judge erred in considering the grand jury testimony as 
substantive evidence when he ruled on the defendant's motion for 
a required finding of not guilty and in instructing the jury to 
do the same.  As the defendant did not object to the admission 
of the grand jury testimony for substantive purposes when it was 
read by the prosecutor in posing his questions, and waited to 
object until after the close of evidence, we review any error 
for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.2  See 
Commonwealth v. Comtois, 399 Mass. 668, 674 (1987), quoting 
Commonwealth v. Gallison, 383 Mass. 659, 669 (1981) ("It is a 
fundamental principle of appellate review that a prompt 
objection at trial is a prerequisite to the presentation of an 
                     
 
2 Because the trial judge had allowed the prosecutor to 
present the testimony for substantive purposes, there was no 
question that the prosecutor was offering the grand jury 
testimony for its substantive value during the direct 
examination of the witnesses who were found to have feigned 
memory loss.  Prompt objections by parties allow judges to cure 
any defects in the proceedings when they occur.  See 
Commonwealth v. Fowler, 431 Mass. 30, 36 (2000), citing 
Commonwealth v. Sherick, 401 Mass. 302, 305 (1987).  To preserve 
the issue, it was thus incumbent upon defense counsel to object 
in the moment, rather than to wait until the close of evidence. 
6 
 
 
issue for appellate review").  See also Commonwealth v. Silvia, 
343 Mass. 130, 135-136 (1961).  We conclude that, although the 
method the Commonwealth used to introduce the evidence was 
somewhat unusual, the testimony was properly admitted for 
substantive purposes.  There was no error. 
The judge properly found that the witnesses in question 
were feigning memory loss, which entitled the Commonwealth to 
have the testimony admitted for substantive purposes.3  See 
Commonwealth v. Sineiro, 432 Mass. 735, 742-743 (2000) ("when a 
witness does not deny his probable cause testimony, nor its 
truth, but chooses to feign an inability to recall the testimony 
in an attempt to avoid giving evidence that might send another 
to jail, a judge should not be without recourse").  The 
defendant does not dispute the judge's decision to allow the 
grand jury testimony in evidence substantively; instead, he 
claims that the prosecutor's method of presenting that evidence 
was flawed and that as a result the testimony should not have 
been considered for its truth. 
We have held that when a witness feigns memory loss, that 
witness's grand jury testimony may be admitted substantively as 
a prior inconsistent statement if certain requirements are met:  
                     
 
3 Finding that a witness is feigning memory loss is within 
the sound discretion of a trial judge.  See Commonwealth v. 
McGhee, 472 Mass. 405, 422-423 (2015). 
7 
 
 
(1) the prior statement must clearly be that of the witness 
rather than the questioner; (2) the statement must be free from 
coercion; (3) the defendant must have an opportunity for 
effective cross-examination of the witness at trial, and (4) 
some corroborative evidence must be presented when the prior 
testimony concerns an essential element of the crime.  See 
Sineiro, 432 Mass. at 743-744, citing Commonwealth v. Noble, 417 
Mass. 341, 345 (1994), and Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 
74 (1984).  See also Mass. G. Evid. § 801(d)(1)(A).  Here, each 
of the requirements was met. 
For each witness, the prosecutor indicated that the prior 
testimony had been before a grand jury, and each witness 
confirmed that his or her testimony had not been coerced.  
Further, as the prosecutor read the prior testimony of each 
witness, he took care to identify which portions of the excerpts 
were questions and which were the witness's responses. 
The defendant claims that the witnesses' claimed loss of 
memory made it impossible for defense counsel to effectively 
cross-examine them.  This claim lacks merit.  We have held that 
"any limitation on the effectiveness" of a cross-examination of 
a witness who has been found to have feigned memory loss 
"generally does not implicate the confrontation clause."  
Commonwealth v. DePina, 476 Mass. 614, 622 (2017). 
8 
 
 
Finally, the defendant contends that there was no 
corroborating evidence for the witnesses' grand jury testimony, 
and that therefore it should not have been used substantively.  
See Sineiro, 432 Mass. at 741 (corroboration required for grand 
jury testimony relating to essential element of crime); Noble, 
417 Mass. at 345 (same).  We disagree.  Silva, one of the trial 
witnesses found to have feigned memory loss, testified in the 
grand jury that, moments after the shooting, he observed the 
defendant running from the scene with a revolver in his hand.  
This testimony was corroborated by surveillance video footage of 
the crime scene that showed two figures reaching for their 
waistbands as they approached the location of the shooting, and 
then running away soon thereafter. 
In addition, a baseball hat was located in the street in 
front of the house where the victim was shot.  The hat, which 
was not in the street prior to the shooting, was analyzed for 
the presence of DNA.  The major DNA profile obtained from the 
hat was consistent with the DNA profile of the defendant.  In 
short, there was ample corroboration of Silva's prior testimony.4  
                     
 
4 The grand jury testimony of the other two witnesses who 
were found to have feigned memory loss concerned the defendant's 
initial arrival as a passenger in the sport utility vehicle.  
Although the testimony did not concern an essential element of 
the crime (and therefore did not require corroboration as did 
Silva's testimony), the defendant himself corroborated the two 
witnesses' testimony in his statement to police. 
9 
 
 
See Noble, 417 Mass. at 346 (corroboration can be drawn from 
reasonable inferences). 
It would have been apparent to the jurors at the time, as 
it is apparent to us now, that the prosecutor was reading 
relevant excerpts from grand jury testimony into the record, and 
occasionally asking each witness whether he or she recalled the 
testimony.  Thus, although the prosecutor's method was 
unconventional, the judge did not err in allowing the jury to 
consider the grand jury testimony as substantive evidence, nor 
did he err in considering it himself in ruling on the 
defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty.  
Nonetheless, to avoid confusion when offering grand jury 
testimony in evidence, we suggest that it be read directly into 
the record either by one person reading the questions and a 
colleague reading the answers, or by one person reading the 
entire excerpt but making clear which portions are questions and 
which are answers. 
As we find no error, the defendant's related claims are 
fruitless.  That is, because the grand jury testimony was 
admitted properly as substantive evidence, the defendant's 
argument that there was insufficient evidence to find him guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt without the grand jury testimony 
fails.  And as we conclude that the prosecutor's method of 
presenting the grand jury testimony was not error, we reject the 
10 
 
 
defendant's arguments that the prosecutor committed misconduct 
in so doing, and that the prosecutor improperly referred to the 
grand jury testimony during his closing argument. 
 
2.  Supplemental jury instructions.  The defendant also 
claims error with respect to supplemental instructions provided 
to the jury in response to a question the jury submitted during 
deliberations.  The jury asked, "With respect to the charge of 
first-degree murder and its three elements, is it necessary that 
the intent to kill be specific to the named victim or is it 
sufficient that the intent to kill refer to anyone on the 
porch?"  Over the defendant's objection, the judge gave the 
following instruction:  "You may find deliberate premeditation 
if you find that the defendant deliberately decided to kill 
someone in a group regardless of whether the defendant intended 
to kill the actual victim, who was among the target group."  The 
defendant argues that because there was no evidence that the 
individual with whom the defendant argued was on the porch (or 
that there was a group of people on the porch at all) at the 
time of the shooting, the instruction was erroneous and he is 
entitled to a reversal of his convictions. 
The instruction that the judge gave in response to the 
jury's question was a correct statement of the law.  See 
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 463 Mass. 857, 863 (2012) (where there 
is sufficient evidence, jury can be instructed that element of 
11 
 
 
deliberate premeditation is met if they find that defendant 
intended to kill someone else in same group as victim).  It was 
also an appropriate response given the evidence presented at 
trial.  Although there was no testimony that a group of 
individuals remained on the porch when the defendant returned, 
there is no dispute that at least one person -- the victim -- 
was there at the time of the shooting.  The judge correctly 
instructed the jury that they could find deliberate 
premeditation if they found that the defendant intended to kill 
someone other than the victim.  See Commonwealth v. Van Bell, 
455 Mass. 408, 420 (2009), quoting Commonwealth v. Robinson, 449 
Mass. 1, 7-8 (2007) (within discretion of judge to tailor 
supplemental jury instructions).  There was no error.5 
 
3.  Review under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  Finally, the 
defendant asks us to exercise our extraordinary power to grant 
relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  We have reviewed the record 
                     
5 The defendant also argues that after giving the 
supplemental jury instruction, the judge erred by failing to 
instruct the jury that all the instructions are to be considered 
as a whole.  See Commonwealth v. Hicks, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 139, 
144-145 (1986) (recommending that judges instruct that 
supplemental instructions are to be considered along with main 
charge).  Such an instruction is recommended, not mandated.  
Neither we nor the Appeals Court have ever held that the failure 
to give such an instruction warrants the reversal of a 
conviction.  See Commonwealth v. Conley, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 50, 
59 (1993). 
12 
 
 
in its entirety and see no basis to set aside or reduce the 
verdict of murder in the first degree or to order a new trial. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judgments affirmed.