Case Title: State v. Pollander

Citation: 167 Vt. 301, 706 A.2d 1359

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1997-12-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
State v. Pollander  (96-387); 167 Vt. 301; 706 A.2d 1359

[Filed 5-Dec-1997]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                            No. 96-387

State of Vermont                             Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
    v.                                       District Court of Vermont
                                             Unit No. 3, Lamoille Circuit

Robert Pollander                             April Term, 1997

Ronald F. Kilburn, J.

       Lee Dow, Lamoille County Deputy State's Attorney, Hyde Park, for
  plaintiff-appellee

       David G. Miller of Brown, Cahill, Gawne & Miller, St. Albans, for
  defendant-appellant

PRESENT:  Amestoy, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.

       AMESTOY, C.J.   Defendant Robert Pollander appeals the Lamoille
  District Court's denial of his motion to dismiss in a civil
  license-suspension proceeding, and challenges adverse findings by the
  court.  Defendant argues that (1) the issue of his blood-alcohol content
  (BAC) on the night of his arrest was resolved in his favor by an earlier
  criminal jury verdict and was thus precluded from reconsideration at the
  civil suspension hearing; and (2) the district court erred by failing to
  consider defendant's necessity defense.  We affirm.

       Defendant was stopped by a law enforcement officer while driving in
  Morristown in August 1995 and processed for driving under the influence
  (DUI).  Test results revealed defendant's BAC to be over the legal limit of
  .08%.  Defendant was subsequently arraigned on criminal DUI charges.  The
  State also moved to suspend defendant's driver's license in a civil action
  pursuant to 23 V.S.A. § 1205(a).  Defendant requested a civil suspension
  hearing in district court.  See 23 V.S.A. § 1205(f).

 

       In response to various motions filed by defendant, the district court
  continued the civil suspension proceeding until after the criminal DUI
  trial was held in July 1996.  At the criminal trial, defendant attacked the
  validity of the State's evidence concerning his BAC and presented the
  affirmative defense of necessity.  As a basis for his necessity defense,
  defendant stated that he was driving in his car to intervene in a friend's
  potential suicide and that any alleged violation of the DUI statute was
  necessary to save a human life.(FN1)  The jury returned a general verdict of
  not guilty.  It did not identify the grounds upon which the verdict rested.

       The civil suspension hearing was held in August 1996.  Central to the
  State's case was evidence that defendant's BAC was .08% or more on the
  night of his arrest.  Defendant argued that the State should have been
  precluded from relitigating the issue of his BAC because that issue had
  been resolved in his favor at the criminal trial.  Defendant also sought to
  introduce his defense of necessity.  The court ruled that the State should
  not be precluded from relitigating the BAC issue and denied defendant's
  request to introduce the necessity defense.  The court made the findings
  required under the civil suspension statute, see id. § 1205(h), and entered
  judgment for the State.  Defendant appeals.

                                     I.

       Defendant first argues that the criminal trial verdict precludes the
  State from relitigating at the civil suspension hearing whether defendant's
  BAC was .08% or more on the night of his arrest.(FN2)  Defendant contends
  that his acquittal at the criminal trial establishes a jury finding that

 

  his BAC was not .08% or more, and therefore, the issue of defendant's BAC
  should not have been considered at the summary suspension hearing.

       We note initially that the applicability of collateral estoppel to a
  given set of facts is a question of law.  See, e.g., Emich Motors Corp. v.
  General Motors Corp.,