Case Title: State v. Floyd

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2015AP001294-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2017-07-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
2017 WI 78 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2015AP1294-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Lewis O. Floyd, Jr., 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 371 Wis. 2d 404, 885 N.W.2d 156  
PDC No:  2016 WI App 64 - Published 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 7, 2017 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 19, 2017 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Racine 
 
JUDGE: 
Allan B. Torhorst 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
A.W. BRADLEY, J. dissents, joined by ABRAHAMSON, 
J. (opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs 
by Michael G. Soukup and Pinix & Soukup, LLC, Milwaukee, and 
oral argument by Michael G. Soukup. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by 
Luke N. Berg, deputy solicitor general, Brad D. Schimel, 
attorney general, and Misha Tseytlin, solicitor general, and 
oral argument by Luke N. Berg. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Kelli S. Thompson, 
state public defender, and L. Michael Tobin, deputy state public 
defender.
 
 
2017 WI 78
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.    2015AP1294-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2013CF982) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,   
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent,   
 
 
v. 
 
Lewis O. Floyd, Jr.,   
 
 
Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.   
FILED 
 
JUL 7, 2017 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
DANIEL 
KELLY, 
J.   A 
law 
enforcement 
officer 
discovered a cache of controlled substances when he performed a 
warrantless——but allegedly consensual——search of Lewis O. Floyd, 
Jr. during a traffic stop.  Mr. Floyd says that because the 
officer 
extended 
the 
traffic 
stop 
without 
the 
necessary 
reasonable suspicion, his alleged "consent" was void and the 
evidence obtained from the search should have been suppressed.  
Mr. Floyd also says he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel at the suppression hearing because his trial counsel 
No.  2015AP1294-CR 
 
2 
 
failed to present testimony Mr. Floyd believes would have 
established he was not asked to consent to a search.1  
I. 
BACKGROUND 
A. 
The Traffic Stop 
¶2 
On an early July evening in 2013, Deputy Troy Ruffalo 
of the Racine County Sheriff's Office stopped Mr. Floyd near 
16th and Racine Streets in the City of Racine because his car 
registration had been suspended for emissions violations.  
Deputy Ruffalo, a six-year veteran law enforcement officer, 
believed this to be a "high crime" part of the city known for 
frequent drug and gang activity.   
¶3 
When Deputy Ruffalo approached Mr. Floyd's car, he 
noted it had tinted windows and "air fresheners in every vent of 
the vehicle as well as hanging off the rear view mirror and air 
fresheners up on the -- where the vents were."  This, he said, 
is 
often 
an 
indicator 
of 
drug-related 
activity 
because 
"[u]sually the air fresheners or the amount of them are -- is an 
agent that is used to mask the smell of narcotics."2 
¶4 
Deputy Ruffalo's initial contact with Mr. Floyd lasted 
approximately two to three minutes, during which he discovered 
                                                 
1 This is a review of a published decision of the court of 
appeals, State v. Floyd, 2016 WI App 64, 371 Wis. 2d 404, 885 
N.W.2d 156, affirming the judgment and order of the circuit 
court for Racine County, as well as the denial of Mr. Floyd's 
motion for postconviction relief, the Hon. Allan B. Torhorst, 
presiding.   
2 The record does not identify the exact number of air 
fresheners present in Mr. Floyd's vehicle. 
No.  2015AP1294-CR 
 
3 
 
Mr. Floyd had no driver's license or insurance information with 
him.  After obtaining Mr. Floyd's Wisconsin State identification 
card, Deputy Ruffalo returned to his squad car to draft Mr. 
Floyd's citations and contact dispatch to ask for a canine unit 
or other "cover" squad.  No canine units were available, and 
Officer Aaron White, an officer with the City of Racine Police 
Department, arrived on the scene while Deputy Ruffalo was 
completing Mr. Floyd's citations. 
¶5 
Deputy Ruffalo reestablished contact with Mr. Floyd 
approximately five or six minutes after pulling him over and, 
while maintaining possession of Mr. Floyd's identification card 
and the multiple citations, asked Mr. Floyd to exit the vehicle 
so he could explain the citations.  After Mr. Floyd complied, 
Deputy Ruffalo asked him if he had any weapons or anything that 
could harm him.  After Mr. Floyd indicated he did not, Deputy 
Ruffalo asked if he could perform a search for his safety.  Mr. 
Floyd responded "yes, go ahead."3  During the ensuing search, 
Deputy Ruffalo discovered the illegal drugs that led to the 
charges in this case.   
B. 
Procedural Background 
¶6 
The State filed a criminal complaint against Mr. Floyd 
alleging:  (1) possession with intent to deliver non-narcotic 
controlled substances, second 
and subsequent offense; (2) 
                                                 
3 To the extent there is a dispute as to whether Mr. Floyd 
voluntarily consented to the search, we address that question in 
Section III.B, infra.  
No.  2015AP1294-CR 
 
4 
 
misdemeanor bail jumping, repeater; (3) possession with intent 
to deliver or manufacture THC <= 200 GMS, second and subsequent 
offense; and (4) misdemeanor bail jumping, repeater.  The 
subsequent Information alleged the same four counts. 
¶7 
Mr. Floyd moved to suppress the evidence seized during 
the search, but the circuit court denied the motion.  It found 
that at the time Deputy Ruffalo contacted dispatch for backup, 
he had suspicions Mr. Floyd was involved in criminal drug-
related activity based on several factors, including the 
numerous air fresheners and the vehicle's tinted windows.  It 
also found that Deputy Ruffalo did not unnecessarily prolong the 
traffic stop by requesting backup because the cover squad 
arrived while he was in the process of drafting the citations——a 
process that took only five to six minutes.  The circuit court 
accepted Deputy Ruffalo's explanation that having Mr. Floyd step 
out of his vehicle was important because he did not have a valid 
driver's license and therefore could not drive away when the 
traffic stop ended. 
¶8 
Mr. Floyd pled no-contest to possession with intent to 
deliver non-narcotic controlled substances as a repeat offender.  
He moved for postconviction relief, alleging his trial counsel 
was 
ineffective 
for 
failing 
to 
present 
evidence 
at 
the 
suppression hearing that (he says) would have proved Deputy 
Ruffalo did not ask for his consent to perform the search.  The 
circuit court observed that Officer White's testimony showed 
"some dichotomy" with respect to whether Deputy Ruffalo had 
asked for Mr. Floyd's consent to the search or instead had 
No.  2015AP1294-CR 
 
5 
 
advised him it was going to happen.  Ultimately, the circuit 
court found Deputy Ruffalo did, in fact, ask Mr. Floyd whether 
he would consent to the search.  Thus, the court concluded Mr. 
Floyd did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel because 
the testimony was insufficient to demonstrate he had not 
consented to the search, and so denied the motion. 
¶9 
The court of appeals affirmed in a published opinion, 
concluding that denial of the suppression motion was proper 
because Mr. Floyd was lawfully detained when Deputy Ruffalo 
asked to search him and Mr. Floyd voluntarily consented to the 
search.  See State v. Floyd, 2016 WI App 64, ¶¶12, 20, 371 
Wis. 2d 404, 885 N.W.2d 156.  Relying on Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 
434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam), the court of appeals concluded 
that Deputy Ruffalo's request that Mr. Floyd exit his vehicle 
during the ongoing traffic stop was per se lawful, and it also 
pointed out that Mr. Floyd could not drive away because he did 
not have a valid driver's license.  Floyd, 371 Wis. 2d 404, ¶12.  
The court of appeals further held that even if Deputy Ruffalo 
had extended the traffic stop, the extension was nevertheless 
reasonable because Deputy Ruffalo reasonably suspected criminal 
drug-related activity.  Id., ¶13.  As to the postconviction 
motion, the court of appeals determined there was no reasonable 
probability the result at the suppression hearing would have 
been any different had Officer White been called to testify; 
therefore, it affirmed the circuit court's denial of the 
postconviction motion.  Id., ¶27. 
No.  2015AP1294-CR 
 
6 
 
¶10 We accepted Mr. Floyd's petition for review and now 
affirm the decision of the court of appeals. 
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶11 "Whether evidence should be suppressed is a question 
of constitutional fact."  State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶19, 285 
Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899 (quoting State v. Samuel, 2002 WI 34, 
¶15, 252 Wis. 2d 26, 643 N.W.2d 423).  We review the circuit 
court's findings of historical fact under the clearly erroneous 
standard.  State v. Turner, 136 Wis. 2d 333, 343-44, 401 
N.W.2d 827 (1987).  But the circuit court's application of the 
historical facts to constitutional principles is a question of 
law we review independently.  Id.  While we are not bound by the 
circuit court's or court of appeals' decisions on questions of 
law, we benefit from their analyses.  State v. Kyles, 2004 
WI 15, ¶7, 269 Wis. 2d 1, 675 N.W.2d 449. 
¶12 We review the voluntariness of consent to a search in 
a similar fashion.  See State v. Artic, 2010 WI 83, ¶23, 327 
Wis. 2d 392, 786 N.W.2d 430.  We review the circuit court's 
findings of historical fact to determine whether they are 
clearly 
erroneous. 
 
Id. 
 
We 
then 
independently 
apply 
constitutional principles to those facts.  Id. 
¶13 Whether trial counsel's actions constitute ineffective 
assistance of counsel presents a mixed question of fact and law.  
State v. Tourville, 2016 WI 17, ¶16, 367 Wis. 2d 285, 876 
N.W.2d 735.  We will not reverse the circuit court's findings of 
fact unless they are clearly erroneous.  Id.  However, we 
No.  2015AP1294-CR 
 
7 
 
independently review, as a matter of law, whether those facts 
demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.  Id. 
III. DISCUSSION 
¶14 We must determine whether the drug-disclosing search 
of Mr. Floyd was consonant with the constitutional mandate that 
we be free of unreasonable searches and seizures.  The State 
says the search was proper because it occurred during a lawful 
traffic stop and Mr. Floyd consented to it.  Mr. Floyd says this 
is not so——the search took place after the traffic stop should 
have ended, and so he was unlawfully seized when it took place, 
which rendered any alleged "consent" void as a matter of law.  
In any event, he says, he did not actually consent to the 
search, and if his counsel had not been ineffective the court 
would have heard testimony to prove that point. 
¶15 The disagreement between the State and Mr. Floyd is 
really quite narrow, although no less important for that.  The 
parties 
agree 
that 
Mr. 
Floyd's 
expired 
tags 
provided 
a 
sufficient basis for Deputy Ruffalo to initiate the traffic 
stop.  And Mr. Floyd did not contest an officer's authority to 
ask a driver to exit his vehicle during such an encounter.  Nor 
did he offer any argument against an officer's authority to ask 
a lawfully-seized person to consent to a search.  Their 
disagreement centers on where we draw the line separating 
traffic stops of acceptable duration from those that have been 
impermissibly extended.  A motorist is lawfully seized during 
the proper duration of a traffic stop, but unlawfully seized if 
it lasts longer than necessary to complete the purpose of the 
No.  2015AP1294-CR 
 
8 
 
stop.  So the location of the line is important because of the 
constitutional rights affected.  As we discuss below, if Mr. 
Floyd was unlawfully seized when Deputy Ruffalo requested 
permission 
to 
search 
him, 
his 
"consent" 
would 
be 
constitutionally invalid, and the evidence discovered during the 
search would need to be suppressed. 
¶16 Mr. Floyd says the court of appeals drew the line in 
the wrong place.  He argues that when Deputy Ruffalo finished 
writing the citations, the Constitution permitted no further 
interaction between the two of them beyond Deputy Ruffalo 
explaining the citations and informing him he was free to go.  
So when Deputy Ruffalo instead asked him if he would consent to 
a search, Mr. Floyd says Deputy Ruffalo extended the traffic 
stop with no justifiable basis. 
¶17 The 
State 
says 
the 
constitutionally-permissible 
duration of the traffic stop did not conclude before Deputy 
Ruffalo asked Mr. Floyd if he would consent to a search.  Thus, 
as the fruit of a consensual search, the illegal drugs comprised 
proper evidence against Mr. Floyd.  And even if Deputy Ruffalo 
extended the stop, the State says, the totality of the 
circumstances gave him reasonable suspicion to believe Mr. Floyd 
had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. 
¶18 Thus, our task is to espy the point at which the 
traffic stop should have ended and assess how the search related 
to that point.  Because the purpose of the stop determines its 
proper scope, we must identify what an officer may lawfully do 
when detaining someone for a suspended vehicle registration.  
No.  2015AP1294-CR 
 
9 
 
See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. ___, 135 
S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) ("the tolerable duration of police 
inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the 
seizure's 'mission'——to address the traffic violation that 
warranted 
the 
stop, . . . and 
attend 
to 
related 
safety 
concerns . . . . Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks 
tied to the traffic infraction are——or reasonably should have 
been——completed." (internal citations omitted)). 
 
A. Constitutional Implications Of Traffic Stops 
¶19 We begin where we should, with the constitutional 
prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures.  The 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution says: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const. amend. IV.  Its Wisconsin counterpart, found in 
Article I, section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution,4 is 
substantively 
identical, 
and 
we 
normally 
interpret 
it 
coextensively 
with 
the 
United 
States 
Supreme 
Court's 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.  See, e.g., State v. 
                                                 
4 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons 
or things to be seized."  Wis. Const. art. I, § 11. 
No.  2015AP1294-CR 
 
10 
 
Dumstrey, 2016 WI 3, ¶14, 366 Wis. 2d 64, 873 N.W.2d 502 (citing 
State 
v. 
Arias, 
2008 
WI 84, 
¶20, 
311 
Wis. 2d 358, 
752 
N.W.2d 748). 
¶20 It is an unremarkable truism that a traffic stop is a 
seizure within the meaning of our Constitutions.  "'The 
temporary detention of individuals during the stop of an 
automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and 
for a limited purpose, constitutes a seizure of persons within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.'"  State v. Popke, 2009 
WI 37, ¶11, 317 Wis. 2d 118, 765 N.W.2d 569 (citations and one 
set of quotations omitted).  Reasonable suspicion that a driver 
is violating a traffic law is sufficient to initiate a traffic 
stop.  State v. Houghton, 2015 WI 79, ¶30, 364 Wis. 2d 234, 868 
N.W.2d 143 ("[R]easonable suspicion that a traffic law has been 
or is being violated is sufficient to justify all traffic 
stops.").  Reasonable suspicion requires that "[t]he officer 
must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, 
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warrant the intrusion of the stop."  Popke, 317 
Wis. 2d 118, ¶23 (two sets of quotation marks and citation 
omitted). 
¶21 Traffic stops are meant to be brief interactions with 
law enforcement officers, and they may last no longer than 
required to address the circumstances that make them necessary.  
"A routine traffic stop . . . is a relatively brief encounter 
No.  2015AP1294-CR 
 
11 
 
and 'is more analogous to a so-called Terry[5] stop . . . than to 
a formal arrest.'"  Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117 (quoting 
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984)) (footnote added; 
second ellipses in Knowles; one set of quotation marks omitted).  
"Because addressing the infraction is the purpose of the stop, 
it may 'last no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] 
purpose.'"  Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614 (citation omitted; 
alteration in Rodriguez).  "Authority for the seizure thus ends 
when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are——or reasonably 
should have been——completed."  Id. 
¶22 Thus, we draw the line between traffic stops of proper 
duration and those that extend into unconstitutional territory 
according to functional considerations.  We assess those 
considerations 
in 
the 
context 
of 
the 
"totality 
of 
the 
circumstances."  See, e.g., United States v. Everett, 601 
F.3d 484, 493-94 (6th Cir. 2010).  And while the temporal 
duration of the stop may inform those considerations, it is not 
in itself dispositive.  See United States v. Sharpe, 470 
U.S. 675, 686 ("In assessing whether a detention is too long in 
duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider 
it appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued 
a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel 
their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to 
detain the defendant."); see also United States v. Peralez, 526 
                                                 
5 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
No.  2015AP1294-CR 
 
12 
 
F.3d 1115, 1119 (8th Cir. 2008) ("Whether a traffic stop 'is 
reasonable in length is a fact intensive question, and there is 
no per se time limit on all traffic stops.'" (citation 
omitted)).  Generally speaking, an officer is on the proper side 
of the line so long as the incidents necessary to carry out the 
purpose of the traffic stop have not been completed, and the 
officer has not unnecessarily delayed the performance of those 
incidents. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
Rodriguez, 
135 
S. Ct. at 
1614-15 
(explaining that authority for a traffic-stop based seizure ends 
when tasks related to the infraction are, or should have been, 
completed). 
 
He 
steps 
across 
that 
line 
(again 
speaking 
generally) when he maintains the seizure after he has completed 
all the necessary functions attendant on the traffic stop.  See 
State v. Malone, 2004 WI 108, ¶26, 274 Wis. 2d 540, 683 N.W.2d 1 
(a reasonable seizure can become unreasonable if the officer 
"extends the stop beyond the time necessary to fulfill the 
purpose of the stop." (citation omitted)). 
¶23 Mr. Floyd's stop was not complicated——his vehicle's 
registration was suspended.  Deputy Ruffalo then learned Mr. 
Floyd had neither insurance nor a valid driver's license.  At a 
minimum, this authorized Deputy Ruffalo to take the time 
reasonably necessary to draft the appropriate citations and 
explain them to Mr. Floyd.  See, e.g., Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 
1614 (explaining that in the traffic stop context, "addressing 
the infraction is the purpose of the stop . . . .").  Until that 
is done, and so long as Deputy Ruffalo does not unnecessarily 
delay the process, the permissible duration of the traffic stop 
No.  2015AP1294-CR 
 
13 
 
has not elapsed.   Id. at 1615 ("The seizure remains lawful only 
'so long as [unrelated] inquiries do not measurably extend the 
duration of the stop.'" (quoting Arizona v. Johnson 555 
U.S. 323, 333 (2009); alteration in Rodriguez)).   
¶24 We note that before Deputy Ruffalo asked Mr. Floyd to 
consent to a search, he asked him to step out of his vehicle.  
During 
a 
valid 
traffic 
stop, 
this 
is 
a 
matter 
of 
no 
constitutional moment:  "[O]nce a motor vehicle has been 
lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers 
may order the driver to get out of the vehicle without violating 
the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and 
seizures."  Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111 n.6.  In an area of the law 
where bright lines are rare, we have had no difficulty 
discerning one here.  In State v. Johnson we recognized that 
Mimms "established a per se rule that an officer may order a 
person out of his or her vehicle incident to an otherwise valid 
stop 
for 
a 
traffic 
violation." 
 
2007 
WI 32, 
¶23, 
299 
Wis. 2d 675, 729 N.W.2d 182. 
¶25 That brings us to the nub of the dispute between the 
State and Mr. Floyd.  After writing the citations, Deputy 
Ruffalo returned to Mr. Floyd's car and asked him if he would 
submit to a search.  Mr. Floyd says this request extended the 
stop beyond its permissible duration.  The only thing Deputy 
Ruffalo could lawfully do after writing the citations, Mr. Floyd 
says, was explain them to him and bid him good day. 
¶26 Although 
Mr. 
Floyd's 
argument 
incorporates 
the 
principle that the "mission" of the traffic stop defines its 
No.  2015AP1294-CR 
 
14 
 
acceptable duration, he does not account for how the officer's 
safety fits within that mission.  "Traffic stops are 'especially 
fraught with danger to police officers . . . .'"  Rodriguez, 135 
S. Ct. at 1616 (quoting Johnson, 555 U.S. at 330); see also 
Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110 ("We think it too plain for argument that 
the State's proffered justification——the safety of the officer——
is both legitimate and weighty.").  That makes officer safety an 
integral part of every traffic stop's mission.  Rodriguez, 135 
S. Ct. at 
1616 
("Unlike 
a 
general 
interest 
in 
criminal 
enforcement, however, the government's officer safety interest 
stems from the mission of the stop itself.") 
¶27 The danger inherent to traffic stops authorizes an 
officer "to take certain negligibly burdensome precautions in 
order to complete his mission safely."  Id.; see also Mimms, 434 
U.S. at 110-11 (discussing inherent risks a police officer faces 
during a traffic stop, such as assault by seated suspects and 
accidental injury from passing traffic, in concluding the 
request that a person exit the vehicle during a traffic stop is 
justifiable and de minimis); Johnson, 299 Wis. 2d 675, ¶¶25-27, 
(acknowledging "the serious risks law enforcement officers must 
undertake whenever they initiate contact with a suspect who is 
seated in a vehicle").  Thus, the questions to which Mr. Floyd 
objects are appropriate if they are negligibly burdensome 
precautions to ensure the officer's safety during the stop. 
¶28 Deputy Ruffalo asked Mr. Floyd if he had any weapons 
or anything that could harm him.  When Mr. Floyd said he didn't, 
Deputy Ruffalo asked if he could perform a search for his 
No.  2015AP1294-CR 
 
15 
 
safety.  Both questions specifically related to the officer's 
safety.  According to Mr. Floyd, however, the second question 
was not negligibly burdensome:  "What the State entirely ignores 
is that unlike questions seeking information, a request to 
conduct a frisk involves 'a severe, though brief, intrusion upon 
cherished personal security . . . [that] must surely be an 
annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience.'" 
(Quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968)).  While it is 
true that such a search can be all of that, a request to conduct 
such a search cannot.  In fact, that request is just like 
"questions seeking information" because it is just seeking 
information——to wit, whether Mr. Floyd would agree to be 
searched.  What follows the answer to the question may be a non-
negligible burden, but that says nothing about the nature of the 
question itself.  Mr. Floyd provided no other argument that the 
questions imposed a burden forbidden by Rodriguez, and nothing 
about them immediately suggests a disqualifying characteristic.  
Therefore, because the questions related to officer safety and 
were negligibly burdensome, they were part of the traffic stop's 
mission, and so did not cause an extension.6 
                                                 
6 The dissent  misreads our opinion with respect to whether 
Deputy Ruffalo extended the stop.  It says: 
The majority concludes that the traffic stop was 
not 
extended 
because 
Mr. 
Floyd 
freely 
and 
voluntarily consented to the search. It then 
determines that there is no need to consider 
whether there was reasonable suspicion because it 
has already concluded that the traffic stop was 
not extended. 
(continued) 
No.  2015AP1294-CR 
 
16 
 
B. 
Constitutional Consent 
¶29 Whatever additional time the actual search consumed, 
or the burden it imposed, is irrelevant so long as Mr. Floyd 
consented to it.  Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 242-
43 (1973) ("While the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments limit the 
circumstances under which the police can conduct a search, there 
is nothing constitutionally suspect in a person's voluntarily 
allowing a search.").  When we inquire into the legitimate scope 
of 
a 
traffic 
stop's 
mission, 
its 
duration, 
and 
the 
burdensomeness of its incidents, we do so because these are 
nonconsensual aspects of the interaction between a citizen and a 
law enforcement officer.  But when a person consents, the Fourth 
Amendment does not bar the search (so long as it does not exceed 
the scope of the person's consent).  Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 
U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (explaining that although the Fourth 
Amendment 
generally 
prohibits 
warrantless 
searches, 
"[t]he 
prohibition 
does 
not 
apply . . . to 
situations 
in 
which 
                                                                                                                                                             
Dissent, ¶46 (citation omitted). 
Actually, our conclusion that Deputy Ruffalo did not extend 
the stop is based first and foremost on his interactions with 
Mr. Floyd before he consented to the search.  But the dissent 
does not engage this part of our opinion at all.  This is not a 
small oversight.  Beginning with ¶15 and ending with this note, 
that has been the sole subject of our discussion.  Measured by 
paragraphs, that's 48% of our opinion's entire analysis.  The 
reason we didn't address "reasonable suspicion" is because that 
is necessary only if Deputy Ruffalo extended the stop.  As the 
first half of our opinion demonstrates, he did not.  As for the 
effect of Mr. Floyd's consent to the search, that is the topic 
of the next subpart. 
No.  2015AP1294-CR 
 
17 
 
voluntary 
consent 
has 
been 
obtained . . . ."); 
see 
also 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219 ("It is equally well settled that 
one 
of 
the 
specifically 
established 
exceptions 
to 
the 
requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search 
that is conducted pursuant to consent."); United States v. 
Strickland, 902 F.2d 937, 941 (11th Cir. 1990) ("When an 
individual gives a general statement of consent without express 
limitations, the scope of a permissible search is not limitless.  
Rather it is constrained by the bounds of reasonableness:  what 
a police officer could reasonably interpret the consent to 
encompass.").  Thus, we inquire now into whether Mr. Floyd 
provided constitutionally-valid consent to Deputy Ruffalo's 
search. 
¶30 The circuit court found that after Deputy Ruffalo 
asked whether Mr. Floyd would consent to a search, Mr. Floyd 
said "yes, go ahead."  This is an unequivocal assent, and so it 
is sufficient to authorize the search so long as Mr. Floyd's 
response was given "freely and voluntarily."  Johnson, 299 
Wis. 2d 675, ¶16 ("When the purported legality of a warrantless 
search is based on the consent of the defendant, that consent 
must be freely and voluntarily given.").  The State bears the 
burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that a 
person's consent to a search was voluntary.  State v. Phillips, 
218 Wis. 2d 180, 197, 577 Wis. 2d 794 (1998).  Generally, a 
response is voluntary if it "was given in the absence of duress 
or coercion, either express or implied."  State v. Bons, 2007 
No.  2015AP1294-CR 
 
18 
 
WI App 124, ¶17, 301 Wis. 2d 227, 731 N.W.2d 367 (quoting 
Phillips, 218 Wis. 2d at 196).  Relevant considerations include: 
[W]hether any misrepresentation, deception or trickery 
was used to persuade the defendant to consent; whether 
the 
defendant 
was 
threatened 
or 
physically 
intimidated; the conditions at the time the search was 
made; the defendant's response to the officer's 
request; 
the 
defendant's 
physical 
and 
emotional 
condition and prior experience with police; and 
whether the officers informed the individual that 
consent could be withheld. 
Bons, 301 Wis. 2d 227, ¶17. 
¶31 Mr. Floyd argued his "consent" was not valid because 
the circumstances demonstrate it was not voluntarily given.  
Specifically, he argued that because Deputy Ruffalo had not 
returned his identification card prior to asking whether he 
would consent to a search, his response could not be voluntary 
because he was unlawfully seized.  He said "the record shows 
that Floyd's consent was not voluntary, where in the absence of 
any suspicion, the deputy withheld [his] documents to prevent 
the stop from terminating in order to procure [his] agreement to 
the pat-down."  It is true that these facts can be useful in 
determining the voluntariness of someone's consent.  But it is 
useful to a part of the analysis we have already resolved 
against Mr. Floyd's position.  If an officer withholds a 
person's documents, there is good reason to believe the person 
was not "free to leave" at that time.  That, in turn, helps us 
decide whether the person was seized.  See, e.g., State v. 
Hogan, 2015 WI 76, ¶63, 364 Wis. 2d 167, 868 N.W.2d 124 ("a 
traffic stop ends when a reasonable person, under the totality 
No.  2015AP1294-CR 
 
19 
 
of the circumstances, would feel free to leave.").  If the 
seizure is unlawful, the consent is invalid.  See, e.g., State 
v. Jones, 2005 WI App 26, ¶9, 278 Wis. 2d 774, 693 N.W.2d 104 
("a search authorized by consent is wholly valid unless that 
consent is given while an individual is illegally seized." 
(citing State v. Williams, 2002 WI 94, ¶¶19-20, 255 Wis. 2d 1, 
646 N.W.2d 834)); see also United States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684, 
694-96 (7th Cir. 1997).  Here, however, we have concluded the 
traffic stop was not extended and that Mr. Floyd was seized——
lawfully——when Deputy Ruffalo requested his consent to the 
search.7 
¶32 Requesting permission to search a person who has been 
lawfully seized does not invalidate the person's consent.  See 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248-49 (consent given while seized 
pursuant to a traffic stop was constitutionally valid); United 
States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 424 (1976) ("[T]he fact of 
custody alone has never been enough in itself to demonstrate a 
coerced confession or consent to search.").  The routine act of 
retaining an identification card or driver's license during a 
                                                 
7 The cases on which Mr. Floyd relies to invalidate his 
consent all address the effect of an illegal seizure on the 
voluntariness of the subject's consent.  See Rodriguez v. United 
States, 575 U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015) (unlawful seizure 
because traffic stop impermissibly extended); State v. Hogan, 
2015 WI 76, 364 Wis.2d 167, 868 N.W.2d 124 (illegal extension of 
traffic stop can negate consent to a search); State v. Luebeck, 
2006 WI App 87, ¶17, 292 Wis. 2d 748, 715 N.W.2d 639 ("[C]onsent 
to search was tainted by the illegal seizure.").  These cases 
have no instructive value here because Mr. Floyd's seizure was 
not unlawful. 
No.  2015AP1294-CR 
 
20 
 
traffic stop, without more, is insufficient evidence of the type 
of duress or coercion capable of making consent something less 
than voluntary.  If it were otherwise, it would be virtually 
impossible to obtain consent to a search during a traffic stop.  
We see no authority to support such a proposition, and Mr. Floyd 
offers none.  So retaining the identification card presented no 
structural impediment to Deputy Ruffalo's request for permission 
to perform a search; we continue with the inquiry into the 
voluntariness of Mr. Floyd's response.  
¶33 The record does not indicate Deputy Ruffalo employed 
any misrepresentation, deception, or trickery in seeking Mr. 
Floyd's consent.  There is likewise nothing in the record 
suggesting 
Deputy 
Ruffalo 
used 
any 
threats 
or 
physical 
intimidation of any type in seeking Mr. Floyd's consent.  Deputy 
Ruffalo was the only officer conducting the search, there is no 
indication Mr. Floyd was handcuffed or that Deputy Ruffalo 
threatened to use them, there is no suggestion Deputy Ruffalo 
drew his weapon, and the traffic stop and search occurred during 
daylight hours with pedestrian and vehicular traffic nearby.  As 
to the remaining factors we are to consider, there is no 
evidence regarding Mr. Floyd's physical or emotional condition 
at the time.  Similarly, there is nothing in the record 
indicating Deputy Ruffalo informed Mr. Floyd he could withhold 
No.  2015AP1294-CR 
 
21 
 
consent, but this factor is not sufficient, in and of itself, to 
question the voluntariness of Mr. Floyd's consent.8 
¶34 Under the totality of these circumstances, we conclude 
the search was constitutionally sound because Mr. Floyd freely 
and voluntarily consented to it.  Deputy Ruffalo discovered the 
illegal drugs while conducting a lawful search, so there was no 
reason to suppress that evidence.  Because we conclude Deputy 
Ruffalo did not extend the traffic stop, we do not address the 
State's alternative argument that Deputy Ruffalo had reasonable 
suspicion of illegal drug activity sufficient to support an 
extension.9 
C. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
¶35 Mr. Floyd claims he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel because his trial counsel failed to call Officer White 
(the "cover" officer) as a witness at the suppression hearing.  
According to Mr. Floyd, Officer White's testimony would have 
                                                 
8 Although this is a factor to consider, it is not a sine 
qua non to the voluntariness of a subject's consent to a search.  
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973).  
9 The dissent focuses on whether the circumstances of Mr. 
Floyd's stop were sufficient to create reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity.  But there is no reason at all to address 
this question unless Deputy Ruffalo extended the stop.  The 
dissent says he did, and he did it by calling and waiting for a 
cover squad to arrive.  Dissent, ¶80.  But the dissent misses a 
critical part of the factual record.  The uncontradicted facts  
show that the cover squad arrived while Deputy Ruffalo was still 
filling out the citations.  So it is impossible for this to have 
extended the stop.  Thus, the dissent lacks a raison d'être, and 
so we do not address it further. 
No.  2015AP1294-CR 
 
22 
 
revealed that Deputy Ruffalo did not ask Mr. Floyd for his 
consent to the search, but rather that he advised Mr. Floyd he 
was going to perform the search, thus rendering any consent 
involuntary.  See Johnson, 299 Wis. 2d 675, ¶16 ("Acquiescence 
to an unlawful assertion of police authority is not equivalent 
to consent." (quoting State v. Wilson, 229 Wis. 2d 256, 269, 600 
N.W.2d 14 (Ct. App. 1999))). 
¶36 The 
Sixth 
Amendment10 
guarantees 
to 
a 
criminal 
defendant "the effective assistance of counsel."  Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).  We apply the two-prong 
Strickland test when assessing a claimed violation of that 
right.  See, e.g., State v. Maday, 2017 WI 28, ¶54, 374 
Wis. 2d 164, 892 N.W.2d 611.  A successful attack on counsel's 
performance requires that the defendant establish both that 
trial counsel performed deficiently and that the deficiency was 
prejudicial.  See State v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 628, 633, 369 
N.W.2d 711 (1985); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 
¶37 The first prong requires us to compare counsel's 
performance to the "wide range of professionally competent 
assistance."  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.  Only if his conduct 
falls outside that objectively reasonable range will we find 
deficient performance.  State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, ¶19, 264 
Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305.  To show prejudice (the second 
prong), a defendant must establish "a reasonable probability 
                                                 
10 See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Wis. Const. art. I, § 7. 
No.  2015AP1294-CR 
 
23 
 
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different."  Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d at 
642 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).  If the defendant 
fails to prove one element, it is unnecessary to address the 
other.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 
¶38 Although trial counsel did not have Officer White 
testify at the suppression hearing, he did offer the essence of 
his story in his brief.  Counsel juxtaposed Deputy Ruffalo's 
report that he asked Mr. Floyd if he would allow a search with 
Officer White's report that Mr. Floyd was told he would be 
searched: 
Deputy Ruffalo indicates he asked Mr. Floyd whether he 
had any weapons and if he could search Mr. Floyd for 
his 
(Deputy 
Ruffalo's) 
safety. 
 
Deputy 
Ruffalo 
indicates that Mr. Floyd stated, "yeah, go ahead."  
City of Racine Police Officer White (the cover 
officer) 
reports 
something 
slightly 
different 
in 
regards to the search.  Officer White reports that 
after having Mr. Floyd exit the vehicle, Deputy 
Ruffalo told Mr. Floyd that before he could explain 
the citations he was going to pat down Mr. Floyd for 
weapons.  Officer White indicates that after being 
told he was going to be searched, Mr. Floyd stated 
something similar to "go ahead." 
The circuit court was not persuaded, instead finding as a 
factual matter that Deputy Ruffalo asked for Mr. Floyd's 
consent, and that Mr. Floyd consented. 
¶39 At the postconviction hearing, Officer White reprised 
the contents of his report and offered some related commentary.  
He testified that, after arriving on the scene, he accompanied 
Deputy Ruffalo to Mr. Floyd's vehicle where Deputy Ruffalo asked 
Mr. Floyd to step outside.  He then explained that "[Deputy] 
No.  2015AP1294-CR 
 
24 
 
Ruffalo, he -- he asked him if he could do an external pat down 
for weapons and which he consented."  When asked whether this 
was consistent with the report's indication that Mr. Floyd had 
been "advised"11 he would be searched, Officer White responded 
that Deputy Ruffalo "said he was going to pat him -- asked him 
to pat him down for weapons . . . .  He asked him for the most 
part."  He could not, however, remember the specific words 
Deputy Ruffalo used, explaining that a cover officer "can't 
always hear what's exactly going on between the officer and who 
they are making contact with" because the cover officer 
generally "kind of watch[es] who's driving the vehicle, you 
watch the passengers inside the vehicle."  When asked whether he 
recalled Mr. Floyd's response to Deputy Ruffalo, he testified it 
was his recollection that Mr. Floyd said something along the 
lines of "go ahead." 
¶40 Trial counsel also testified at the postconviction 
hearing.  He said he included information about Officer White's 
incident report in the suppression motion but ultimately chose 
not to call him as a witness because he was "happy as far as how 
the evidence came out from the deputy, from Deputy Ruffalo, and 
that he did not have a basis to continue his stop of Mr. Floyd."  
                                                 
11 The draft copy of Officer White's report in the Record 
uses the word "advised" in reference to the pre-search exchange 
between Deputy Ruffalo and Mr. Floyd; however, throughout his 
briefing, Mr. Floyd states the report indicated Deputy Ruffalo 
"told" Mr. Floyd he was going to perform a pat-down search.  For 
the purpose of this opinion, we use "advised" and "told" 
interchangeably. 
No.  2015AP1294-CR 
 
25 
 
He was concerned Officer White's testimony would "potentially 
giv[e] additional information that potentially damaged where I 
thought I was."  Counsel further explained he thought he was 
"doing pretty well" in terms of arguing Mr. Floyd could not 
voluntarily consent because he was illegally seized at the time 
Deputy Ruffalo requested consent.  Although counsel could not 
recall whether he discussed the ultimate decision not to call 
Officer White with Mr. Floyd, he indicated it would have been 
his normal practice to do so. 
¶41 At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court 
acknowledged "some dichotomy from [Officer] White's [incident] 
report . . . as to what it meant" in terms of Deputy Ruffalo's 
exchange with Mr. Floyd, but concluded that trial counsel's 
decision not to call Officer White was "his tactical approach; 
it was a reasonable approach . . . ."  The circuit court also 
acknowledged that "[w]e know now after Mr. White testified that 
whatever [trial counsel] thought, [Officer] White would have 
corroborated [Deputy] Ruffalo's version to that extent." 
¶42 Trial counsel's performance was not deficient.  It was 
the State's burden to prove Mr. Floyd freely and voluntarily 
consented to a search.  We recognize that Officer White's report 
created a potential ambiguity with Deputy Ruffalo's testimony, 
something Mr. Floyd's counsel ably (albeit unsuccessfully) 
exploited.  And calling Officer White to the stand may have 
removed the potential ambiguity——but this was a task for the 
No.  2015AP1294-CR 
 
26 
 
State, if anyone.  Mr. Floyd's counsel is not responsible for 
clarifying the State's evidence.12  Indeed, had he done so, Mr. 
Floyd might now be arguing his counsel was deficient because he 
helped the State defeat his motion to suppress.  We agree with 
the circuit court that trial counsel's decision not to call 
Officer White was a valid tactical choice and did not fall 
outside "the wide range of professionally competent assistance."  
See, e.g., State v. Felton, 110 Wis. 2d 485, 502, 329 N.W.2d 161 
(1983) (explaining that where "tactical or strategic decisions" 
are "based upon rationality founded on the facts and the law[,]" 
counsel will not be deemed to have provided ineffective 
assistance of counsel).  Therefore, Mr. Floyd did not suffer 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
 
¶43 Deputy Ruffalo did not extend Mr. Floyd's traffic stop 
because the request to perform a search of his person was part 
of the stop's mission.  Mr. Floyd was lawfully seized at the 
time of the request, and he provided his consent to the search 
freely and voluntarily.  This constitutionally-valid search 
revealed illegal drugs in Mr. Floyd's possession, so the circuit 
court properly denied his motion to suppress.  And because Mr. 
                                                 
12 The seeming ambiguity created by Officer White's report 
favored Mr. Floyd's argument because it was the State's burden 
to demonstrate free and voluntary consent.  If Mr. Floyd's 
counsel had called Officer White to the stand, the seeming 
ambiguity could have resolved against Mr. Floyd's position (as 
it eventually did).  Mr. Floyd's counsel was not responsible for 
clarifying ambiguities that would assist the State's case. 
No.  2015AP1294-CR 
 
27 
 
Floyd's trial counsel did not perform deficiently with respect 
to Officer White's testimony, Mr. Floyd did not receive 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the 
court of appeals. 
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
No.  2015AP1294-CR.awb 
 
1 
 
 
¶44 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  The court of 
appeals acknowledged that the question of reasonable suspicion 
here "is a very close call."  State v. Floyd, 2016 WI App 64, 
¶16, 371 Wis. 2d 404, 885 N.W.2d 165.  I land on one side of the 
line and the court of appeals' decision falls on the other. 
¶45 Rather than focus on the "close call" of reasonable 
suspicion, the majority avoids it entirely.  Instead, it focuses 
primarily on the case specific fact of whether Floyd gave actual 
consent to the search.  Majority op., ¶29 ("[W]hen a person 
consents, 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
does 
not 
bar 
the 
search . . . ."). 
¶46 The majority concludes that the traffic stop was not 
extended because Mr. Floyd freely and voluntarily consented to 
the search.  Majority op., ¶34.  It then determines that there 
is no need to consider whether there was reasonable suspicion 
because it has already concluded that the traffic stop was not 
extended.  Id. 
¶47 Yet, the strictures of the Fourth Amendment remain.  
If the stop was unlawfully extended, then the consent was 
likewise unlawful. 
¶48 I write separately not merely because I disagree with 
the court of appeals as to where the line should be drawn under 
the facts of this case.  Rather, I write also to express my 
concern that the majority opinion, in lockstep with this court's 
jurisprudence, continues the erosion of the Fourth Amendment.  
It is through such erosion that implicit bias and racial 
No.  2015AP1294-CR.awb 
 
2 
 
profiling are able to seep through cracks in the Fourth 
Amendment's protections. 
¶49 Because I conclude that the traffic stop was extended 
beyond what was reasonably necessary to complete its mission and 
because I determine that there was no articulable reasonable 
suspicion of additional illegal activity to otherwise justify 
the extension, I respectfully dissent. 
I 
¶50 The Fourth Amendment to the Unites States Constitution 
provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
person, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . ."  As the United 
States Supreme Court has observed, "[n]o right is held more 
sacred, or is more carefully guarded . . . than the right of 
every individual to the possession and control of his own 
person, free from all restraint or interference by others, 
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."  Union 
Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). 
¶51 Implicit in the Fourth Amendment's protection from 
unreasonable searches and seizures is its recognition of 
personal liberty interests.  Ker v. State of Cal., 374 U.S. 23, 
32 (1963).  Indeed, the Fourth Amendment "is to be liberally 
construed and all owe the duty of vigilance for its effective 
enforcement lest there shall be impairment of the rights for the 
protection of which it was adopted."  Id. at 33 (quotations and 
citation omitted). 
No.  2015AP1294-CR.awb 
 
3 
 
¶52 In this case, we address the Fourth Amendment's 
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures in the 
context of a traffic stop.  "A routine traffic stop . . . is a 
relatively brief encounter and 'is more analogous to a so-called 
"Terry stop" . . . than to a formal arrest.'"  Knowles v. Iowa, 
525 U.S. 113, 117 (1998). 
¶53 A Terry stop is a brief investigatory seizure of an 
individual based on an officer's reasonable and articulable 
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968).  Balancing public safety and personal 
liberty, the Terry court required that an investigative stop be 
based on "specific and articulable facts, which, taken together 
with 
rational 
inferences 
from 
those 
facts, 
warrant 
that 
intrusion."  Id. at 21. 
¶54 The 
Terry 
doctrine 
sprouted 
from 
the 
blatantly 
suspicious behavior of two would-be jewelry thieves.  Id. at 5.  
Over the course of an afternoon, the defendants in Terry took 
turns walking past a jewelry store, peering inside, and then 
returning to their original spot on a nearby street corner.  Id. 
¶55 Based on this pattern of behavior and thirty years of 
experience detecting thievery in the neighborhood, the police 
officer in Terry suspected that the men were "casing" the store.  
Id.  Believing that a "stick-up" was imminent and knowing that 
"American criminals have a long tradition of armed violence," 
the officer seized and searched the men.  Id. 
¶56 Given these particularized facts, the Terry court 
concluded that "where a police officer observes unusual conduct 
No.  2015AP1294-CR.awb 
 
4 
 
which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his 
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the 
person with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently 
dangerous . . . he is entitled for the protection of himself and 
others 
in 
the 
area 
to 
conduct 
a 
carefully 
limited 
search . . . ."  Id. at 30.  Under Terry, the inquiry focused on 
the officer's "reasonable fear for his own or others' safety" 
and allowed "a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of 
such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be 
used to assault him."  Id. 
¶57 This court, in State v. McGill, 2000 WI 38, ¶21, 234 
Wis. 2d 560, 
609 
N.W.2d 795, 
explained 
that 
"Terry 
does 
not . . . authorize officers to conduct a protective frisk as a 
part of every investigative encounter."  Accordingly, "Terry 
limits the protective frisk to situations in which the officer 
is 'justified in believing that the individual whose suspicious 
behavior he is investigating at close range is armed and 
presently dangerous to the officer or to others.'"  Id. (citing 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 24). 
¶58 In this case, we consider Terry in the context of a 
traffic stop. When a traffic stop concludes or is extended 
beyond what is reasonably necessary to complete its mission, 
continued seizure becomes unlawful.  Illinois v. Caballes, 543 
U.S. 405, 
407 
(2005); 
Rodriguez 
v. 
United 
States, 
135 
S. Ct. 1609, 1614–15 (2015).  An officer may expand the scope of 
the inquiry "only to investigate 'additional suspicious factors 
[that] come to the officer's attention.'"  State v. Hogan, 2015 
No.  2015AP1294-CR.awb 
 
5 
 
WI 76, ¶35, 364 Wis. 2d 167, 868 N.W.2d 124 (quoting State v. 
Betow, 226 Wis. 2d 90, 94, 593 N.W.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1999)). 
¶59 Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police 
inquiries in the traffic stop context is determined by the 
seizure's "mission," which is to address the traffic violation 
that warranted the stop and attend to related safety concerns.  
Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614.  On-scene investigation into 
other unrelated crimes deviates from the mission of the stop.  
Id. at 1616.  "So too do safety precautions taken in order to 
facilitate such detours."  Id. 
¶60 Indeed, even a de minimus extension that is not made in 
furtherance of the mission of the traffic stop is an unlawful 
extension.  Id.  As the Rodriguez court explained, common 
seizure techniques may unlawfully extend a stop when they are 
employed for reasons beyond the scope of the original stop.  Id. 
¶61 Having set forth the law that is to guide our inquiry, 
I turn now to the facts of this case. 
 
II 
 
¶62  Deputy Ruffalo ran Floyd's license plate at a 
stoplight and discovered that the vehicle's registration was 
suspended for an emissions violation.  During this initial 
contact, the deputy asked for Floyd's license and insurance 
information.  Floyd did not have either, but provided a 
Wisconsin identification card.  The deputy returned to his squad 
car and asked dispatch if a canine unit or "cover squad" was 
available while also processing citations for the registration, 
license, and insurance violations. 
No.  2015AP1294-CR.awb 
 
6 
 
¶63 The dispatcher informed the officer that a canine unit 
was not available, but that a patrol officer would arrive to 
serve as a "cover squad."  When the second officer arrived at 
the scene, the deputy explained that he wanted to have Floyd 
exit the car because he "had some indications that there might 
be some criminal activity going on in the vehicle as well as 
explain the citations to him." 
¶64 After the second officer arrived, the deputy returned 
to Floyd's vehicle and asked him to get out of the car.  Floyd 
complied and the deputy then asked him if he had any weapons.  
Floyd stated that he did not have any weapons.  The deputy then 
either asked for Floyd's consent to conduct a weapons pat down 
or advised Floyd that he was going to conduct a weapons pat 
down.1 
¶65 According to the deputy's testimony at the suppression 
hearing, he "assume[s] everybody has a weapon, everyone I come 
in contact with."  He further testified that every time he asks 
a driver to step out of the vehicle, the first thing he does is 
ask if he can search them. 
¶66 The 
deputy 
patted 
Floyd 
down 
and 
found 
a 
bag 
containing a small amount of marijuana and 15 pills of Vicodin.  
Floyd filed a motion to suppress this evidence, arguing that the 
                                                 
1 Officer White, the second officer at the scene, wrote in 
his original report that Deputy Ruffalo "advised" Floyd that he 
would conduct a weapons search.  He testified that his report 
was accurate, but later testified that the deputy asked Floyd's 
consent to conduct a search. 
No.  2015AP1294-CR.awb 
 
7 
 
deputy illegally extended the stop and searched his person 
without his voluntary consent. 
¶67 At the suppression hearing, the deputy testified that 
he had reasonable suspicion to request a canine unit and a 
backup officer based on the following factors: 
 Floyd was from Kenosha, WI; 
 Floyd was alone in his vehicle; 
 The time of day (6:45 p.m. during the summer); 
 Floyd was stopped in a high crime area; 
 Floyd's car had air fresheners in every vent; and 
 The vehicle's windows were tinted. 
Relying on these factors as a basis for reasonable suspicion, 
the circuit court denied Floyd's motion to suppress. 
III 
 
¶68 In applying the law to the above facts, I begin with 
an examination of whether there was reasonable and articulable 
suspicion as to whether criminal activity was afoot.  I address 
next whether the traffic stop was extended beyond the scope of 
the mission. 
¶69 I quickly dispatch with the first three factors 
proffered as support for reasonable suspicion because they 
border on the ridiculous.  If residing in Kenosha can serve as a 
factor supporting reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is 
afoot, then lord help us (and Kenosha).  Likewise, warnings 
should issue to all of those who drive alone in their vehicle, 
lest it serve as a basis for a traffic stop.  Finally, the 
No.  2015AP1294-CR.awb 
 
8 
 
assertion that the time of 6:45 p.m. during the summer can serve 
as a factor for reasonable suspicion is bewildering. 
¶70 At the outset the first three factors fail because 
they are simply unpersuasive in fact.  The next three factors 
fail because they are also unpersuasive under the law. 
¶71 It 
is 
well 
established 
that 
"some 
quantum 
of 
individualized 
suspicion 
is 
usually 
a 
prerequisite 
to 
a 
constitutional search or seizure."  United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560 (1976).  Thus, "circumstances must not 
be so general that they risk sweeping into valid law-enforcement 
concerns persons on whom the requisite individualized suspicion 
has not focused."  State v. Gordon, 2014 WI App 44, ¶12, 353 
Wis. 2d 468, 846 N.W.2d 483. 
¶72 This case raises concern regarding whether generic and 
innocent 
factors 
may 
support 
reasonable 
and 
articulable 
suspicion without the presence of particularized behaviors or 
characteristics.  Take, for example, the fact that the deputy 
stopped Floyd in a high crime area.  As this court has 
recognized, "many persons 'are forced to live in areas that have 
"high crime" rates or they come to these areas to shop, work, 
play, transact business, or visit relatives or friends.  The 
spectrum of legitimate human behavior occurs every day in so-
called high crime areas.'"  State v. Morgan, 197 Wis. 2d 200, 
212, 539 N.W.2d 887 (1995) (quoting People v. Bower, 597 
P.2d 115, 119, (Cal. 1979)). 
¶73 In Illinois v. Wardlow, the Unites States Supreme 
Court reasoned that "it was not merely respondent's presence in 
No.  2015AP1294-CR.awb 
 
9 
 
an area of heavy narcotics trafficking that aroused the 
officers' suspicion but his unprovoked flight upon noticing the 
police."  528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000).  It instructed that "[a]n 
individual's presence in an area of expected criminal activity, 
standing 
alone, 
is 
not 
enough 
to 
support 
a 
reasonable, 
particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime."  
Id.  Importantly, the Wardlow court did not just consider the 
generic factor of the location of the stop, but also the 
defendant's individualized flight behavior supporting reasonable 
suspicion.  Id. 
¶74 Likewise, when considering the presence of "an unusual 
number" of air fresheners in a vehicle, this court determined 
that when "combined with other facts," this may raise suspicion 
and justify further inquiry.  State v. Malone, 2004 WI 108, ¶36, 
274 Wis. 2d 540, 683 N.W.2d 1.  As in Wardlow, however, the 
other 
facts 
considered 
by 
the 
Malone 
court 
involved 
particularized conduct and circumstances. 
¶75 When the defendants' vehicle in Malone was stopped for 
speeding, the occupants appeared nervous and gave inconsistent 
accounts of where they were going.  Id., ¶¶36-39.  Additionally, 
one occupant said that the group was en route to a rave party 
and that he was on probation for drug charges.  Id.; see also 
Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct at 1622-23 (noting the presence of 
individualized circumstances in addition to air fresheners, such 
as driving onto the shoulder of the road, the nervousness of the 
passenger, and the passenger's improbable explanation of the 
travel itinerary). 
No.  2015AP1294-CR.awb 
 
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¶76 Finally, legally tinted windows ought not be a factor 
when considering whether the totality of the circumstances 
support a finding of reasonable suspicion.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Diaz, 977 F.2d 163, 165 n.5 (5th Cir. 1992).  Indeed, 
tinted windows are the epitome of a generic and innocent factor.  
As the court of appeals acknowledged here, "a significant 
portion of the population purchases vehicles with tinted windows 
for completely lawful reasons, including a desire to protect the 
interior of the vehicle from the sun and for greater privacy of 
innocent occupants."  Floyd, 371 Wis. 2d 404, ¶16 n.3.  Although 
it may have been a relevant factor before tinted windows became 
commonplace, it no longer is today.2 
¶77 Equally important to the factors that were present in 
this case (a high crime area, air fresheners, and tinted 
windows) are the factors that were absent.  There is no evidence 
in the record that Floyd exhibited any particularized behaviors 
that factored into the totality of the circumstances here.  
Unlike in Wardlow and Malone, there is no testimony of flight or 
that Floyd was nervous or evasive.  Indeed, Deputy Ruffalo 
                                                 
2 In writing this footnote, I observe the ten vehicles 
parked outside the State Capitol Building beneath my chamber's 
window.  They include a Volvo, Mercedes, Plymouth, Chrysler, 
Ford, Nissan, Hyundai, Lexus, Kia and Chevrolet.  All of the 
vehicles, save the Nissan, have noticeably tinted windows.  
Indeed, all of the vehicles belong to elected public officials 
or their staff.  Once upon a time, tinted windows may have been 
a useful factor to establish reasonable suspicion that criminal 
activity was afoot.  Because of the omnipresence of legally 
tinted windows, that time has long since passed.  For further 
details regarding what constitutes an illegally tinted window, 
see Wis. Admin. Code Trans. 305.32 and 305.34. 
No.  2015AP1294-CR.awb 
 
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testified at the suppression hearing that Floyd was compliant 
and cooperative with his orders and that Floyd made no furtive 
movements at any point during the initial portion of the stop. 
¶78 Ultimately, I part ways with the court of appeals 
because all of the factors relied upon by the deputy are either 
baseless or are generic and innocent factors.  Additionally, the 
record in this case is devoid of any particularized conduct or 
circumstances that would support reasonable and articulable 
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.   
¶79 Absent such reasonable and articulable suspicion, the 
extension of the stop was unlawful.  Pursuant to Rodriguez, "the 
tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic stop 
context is determined by the seizure's 'mission,'" which is to 
address the traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend 
to related safety concerns.  135 S. Ct. at 1614.  Neither 
calling dispatch for a canine unit nor calling and waiting for 
backup was done in furtherance of the mission of the stop.  This 
began the stop's extension and set the stage for the later 
chronological delays of the exit order and request for consent 
to search.  
¶80 Even a de minimus extension that is not made in 
furtherance of the mission of the traffic stop is an unlawful 
extension.  Id.  Not only was involving a second officer beyond 
the scope of the traffic stop, but the deputy specifically 
testified that he did not want to order Floyd out of his vehicle 
or request consent to search until after the "cover squad" had 
arrived.  See id. (explaining that an investigation into other 
No.  2015AP1294-CR.awb 
 
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crimes deviates from the mission of the stop, as do safety 
precautions taken in order to facilitate such detours).  By the 
time that the deputy ordered Floyd out of his vehicle and 
reportedly requested consent to search, the scope of the stop 
had been extended beyond its original mission——to issue Floyd a 
citation for a suspended registration due to an emissions 
violation. 
¶81 Contrary to the majority, I do not address the issue 
of whether Floyd voluntarily consented to the search.  In fact, 
the majority's reliance on consent is misplaced.  "Consent, even 
when voluntary, is not valid when obtained through exploitation 
of an illegal action by the police."  Hogan, 364 Wis. 2d 167, 
¶57.  When consent to search is obtained after a Fourth 
Amendment violation, evidence seized as a result of that search 
"must be suppressed as 'fruit of the poisonous tree' unless the 
State can show a sufficient break in the causal chain between 
the illegality and the seizure of evidence."  Id. (citation 
omitted).  The State has made no such showing here. 
¶82 In sum, I conclude that the traffic stop was extended 
beyond what was reasonably necessary to complete its mission.  
Further, 
I 
determine 
that 
there 
was 
no 
reasonable 
and 
articulable 
suspicion 
of 
additional 
illegal 
activity 
to 
otherwise justify the extension. 
IV 
¶83 I turn now to address my concerns about the erosion of 
the Fourth Amendment that may give rise to implicit bias and 
racial profiling. 
No.  2015AP1294-CR.awb 
 
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A 
¶84 We've come a long way since Terry v. Ohio, but we're 
headed in the wrong direction.  Originally intended to prevent 
crime and protect officers through investigatory stops and 
protective frisks based on reasonable and articulable suspicion, 
Terry's legacy is becoming a progression of thinly veiled 
refusals to meaningfully check the exercise of police power. 
¶85 The continual dilution of Terry has led this court far 
astray from individualized suspicion.  The individualized facts 
in Terry stand in stark contrast to the generic and innocent 
factors present in this case.  In Terry, the blatantly 
suspicious behavior of two would-be jewelry thieves supported 
reasonable suspicion after they spent an afternoon taking turns 
walking past a jewelry store and peering inside.  Here, the 
traffic stop extension was justified not on the basis of any 
particularized behavior, but on factors that might be present in 
any case. 
¶86 Although this court routinely pays homage to the 
importance of Fourth Amendment protections, it appears often to 
be only lip service.  See, e.g., State v. Dumstrey, 2016 WI 3, 
¶22, 366 Wis. 2d 64, 873 N.W.2d 502 ("[I]t is axiomatic that the 
physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the 
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.") (quotations and 
citations omitted); State v. Kozel, 2017 WI 3, ¶40 ("Virtually 
any intrusion[n] into the human body will work an invasion of 
cherished personal security that is subject to constitutional 
scrutiny.") (quotations and citations omitted). 
No.  2015AP1294-CR.awb 
 
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¶87 In the last two terms, this court is batting nearly 
zero when it comes to upholding Fourth Amendment challenges in 
criminal cases.  Even if the challenge initially meets with 
success, it ultimately loses because of an asserted subsequent 
consent, 
or 
community 
caretaker 
exception 
or 
inevitable 
discovery rule, or whatever.3 
                                                 
3 Fourth Amendment challenges in criminal cases include:  
State v. Howes, 2017 WI 18, 373 Wis. 2d 468, 893 N.W.2d 812 (a 
warrantless blood draw was constitutional under the exigent 
circumstances exception); State v. Kozel, 2017 WI 3, 373 
Wis. 2d 1, 889 N.W.2d 423 (a warrantless blood draw was lawful 
because the EMT who drew the blood was acting under a 
physician's direction, the blood was drawn in a constitutionally 
reasonable manner, and the defendant did not object to the blood 
draw); State v. Weber, 2016 WI 96, 372 Wis. 2d 202, 887 
N.W.2d 554 (an officer's entry into the defendant's garage was 
constitutionally reasonable under the hot pursuit exception); 
State v. Jackson, 2016 WI 56, 369 Wis. 2d 673, 882 N.W.2d 422 
(the 
inevitable 
discovery 
doctrine 
applied 
because 
those 
portions of the warrant affidavit that were not tainted 
established constitutionally sufficient probable cause to search 
the residence); State v. Parisi, 2016 WI 10, 367 Wis. 2d 1, 875 
N.W.2d 619 (a warrantless blood draw was constitutional under 
the exigent circumstances exception); State v. Matalonis, 2016 
WI 7, 366 Wis. 2d 443, 875 N.W.2d 567 (a warrantless search of a 
home was constitutional pursuant to the community caretaker 
exception); State v. Dumstrey, 2016 WI 3, 366 Wis. 2d 64, 873 
N.W.2d 502 (the locked parking garage underneath the defendant's 
building 
was 
not 
curtilage 
and 
therefore 
the 
officer's 
warrantless entry before the seizure did not occur in a 
constitutionally protected area); State v. Iverson, 2015 WI 101, 
365 Wis. 2d 302, 871 N.W.2d 661 (an officer may constitutionally 
conduct a traffic stop for non-traffic civil forfeitures that do 
not constitute crimes); but see State v. Blackman 2017 WI __, __ 
Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __ (declining to apply the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule).  For a more comprehensive 
history 
of 
this 
court's 
Fourth 
Amendment 
decisions, 
see 
http://www.scowstats.com/2015/06/22/how-effective-are-fourth-
amendment-arguments-in-the-wisconsin-supreme-court/. 
No.  2015AP1294-CR.awb 
 
15 
 
¶88 The Fourth Amendment's protections, particularly its 
warrant requirement, are not some left over relics of the 18th 
century.  Rather, they are as vital today as when they were 
created.  Yet, I have concerns that the Fourth Amendment's right 
of freedom from warrantless search and seizures has become a 
second class right, or worse, meaningless prose. 
¶89 The Fourth Amendment is intended to provide a check on 
the unbridled exercise of police power.  It grew out of a demand 
that search and seizure powers be restrained.  The amendment 
presents a reasonable yet delicate balance between the exercise 
of police power against the exercise of personal liberty.  
Courts are imbued with the responsibility to oversee this 
balance and to provide this check——not a blank check. 
B 
¶90 Having addressed the erosion of the Fourth Amendment 
and the dilution of the Terry doctrine, I turn to the concern 
that this trajectory may be allowing implicit bias and racial 
profiling to seep through cracks in the Fourth Amendment's 
protections.  Indeed, amicus in this case advances that the 
requirement 
that 
reasonable 
suspicion 
be 
supported 
by 
individualized, particularized circumstances discourages the use 
of generic and innocent factors.  It contends that such factors 
perpetuate and magnify the effects of implicit racial bias.4  As 
one commentator explained, Terry's focus on individualized facts 
can be viewed as a "commitment and promise to minority 
                                                 
4 The Office of the Wisconsin State Public Defender filed a 
helpful amicus brief.  
No.  2015AP1294-CR.awb 
 
16 
 
communities around the nation that the Supreme Court was 
seriously concerned about police practices which rode roughshod 
over individual rights."  Gregory Howard Williams, The Supreme 
Court and Broken Promises:  The Gradual but Continual Erosion of 
Terry v. Ohio, 34 Howard L. J. 567, 576 (1991). 
¶91 In his concurring opinion in the court of appeals, 
Judge Reilly also raised the concern that the trajectory of our 
Fourth 
Amendment 
jurisprudence 
"has 
tacitly 
accepted 
the 
profiling of suspects in the application of our reasonable 
suspicion test."  Floyd, 371 Wis. 2d 404, ¶29-30 (Reilly, J., 
concurring).  He provided the following example: 
Applying 
the 
Floyd 
facts 
to 
the 
'objectively 
reasonable suspicion' test dictates that a white, 
suburban, soccer mom from Kenosha, driving alone at 
6:45 p.m. in the month of July near the S.C. Johnson 
plant 
in 
Racine, 
Wisconsin, 
with 
multiple 
air 
fresheners (perhaps to mask the smell of old happy 
meals, spilled milk, and soiled athletic gear), and 
tinted 
windows 
(to 
protect 
the 
privacy 
of 
her 
children) evidences reasonable suspicion that she is 
involved 
in 
drug-related 
criminal 
activity.  
Substitute young, black male for soccer mom in this 
hypothetical and we have the facts of this case. 
Id.  He further cautioned that: 
The issue is whether we as a judicial system have 
tacitly accepted, condoned, and blessed the profiling 
of our citizens by taking age and color of skin into 
the 'objectively reasonable suspicion test' in order 
to combat crime.  An effective judicial system must be 
true to its ideals; ideals which rest upon the 
constitutional 
protection 
against 
unreasonable 
government searches and seizures regardless of age or 
skin color. 
Id.  I share Judge Reilly's concern and join in his caution. 
No.  2015AP1294-CR.awb 
 
17 
 
¶92 For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully 
dissent. 
¶93 I am authorized to state that Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON joins this dissent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No.  2015AP1294-CR.awb 
 
 
 
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