Case Title: Pisano v. Shillinger

Citation: 

Docket Number: 91-138

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-07-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Pisano v. Shillinger1991 WY 101814 P.2d 274Case Number: 90-294Decided: 07/26/1991Supreme Court of Wyoming
GEORGE PISANO, 
PETITIONER,

v.

DUANE SHILLINGER, 
RESPONDENT.

Wyoming Public Defender 
Program, Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Mike Cornia, Sr. Asst. 
Public Defender, for petitioner.

Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. 
Gen., Sylvia Lee Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

Before URBIGKIT, C.J., 
and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

THOMAS, Justice.

[¶1.]     The essential question 
in this case is whether an individual who has been released on parole from the 
Wyoming State Penitentiary is entitled to be admitted to bail after his 
apprehension and detention as a parole violator. The case comes before the Court 
as a matter of the original jurisdiction of the Court in habeas corpus. The 
Court holds that there is no right to bail for a parole violator, and that the 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus should be denied.

[¶2.]     The facts can be stated 
briefly. On October 17, 1983, George Pisano (Pisano), having been found guilty 
of the crime of voluntary manslaughter as proscribed by then § 6-4-107, W.S. 
1977, was sentenced to a term of not less than seven years nor more than fifteen 
years at the Wyoming State Penitentiary. By order of the Wyoming State Board of 
Parole entered on September 14, 1988, Pisano was placed on supervised parole. 
During 1989, and more particularly during 1990, a series of events occurred that 
are chronicled in a Petition for Preliminary Hearing to Determine Probable 
Cause/Reasonable Grounds for a Violation of Parole filed by a parole officer on 
November 29, 1990. These events included the presence of Pisano in a place where 
intoxicating beverages were sold, the consumption of alcoholic beverages, 
damaging an automobile, damaging furnishings in a home, leaving the state of 
Wyoming without permission, and failure to attend prescribed mental health 
counseling. On December 6, 1990, the Secretary of the Board of Parole filed a 
verified Recommendation for Revocation of Parole and, on that same day, a member 
of the Board of Parole executed and issued an Order of Arrest. Pisano was 
arrested on that warrant and has been in custody since that time. On December 
10, 1990, a hearing examiner for the Wyoming Department of Probation and Parole 
found that the allegations of parole violation, except for one relating to 
Pisano entering a place where alcoholic beverages were sold and two relating to 
Pisano having left the State of Wyoming without permission, had been sustained 
and that there was probable cause to recommend that Pisano be returned before 
the Wyoming Board of Parole for the hearing.

[¶3.]     On December 19, 1990, 
Pisano presented to this Court a Motion to Set Bail. On December 20, 1990, an 
Order to Show Cause Why the Amount an Appearance Bond Should Not be Set by Order 
of This Court was entered. On December 24, 1990, the State filed a Response to 
Order to Show Cause and in Opposition to Motion to Set Bail together with a 
Memorandum of Law in Support of State's Response to Order to Show Cause and in 
Opposition to Motion to Set Bail. On the same day, an Emergency Petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus was filed on behalf of Pisano and, on December 26, 1990, a 
Motion to Dismiss Emergency Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and a Memorandum 
of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss Emergency Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus were filed on behalf of the Warden of the Wyoming State Penitentiary 
(Warden).

[¶4.]     The only real issue now 
before this court is whether Pisano is unlawfully restrained of his liberty by 
the Warden because he has not been admitted to bail pending a hearing on the 
revocation of his parole.

[¶5.]     We have recognized the 
general rule that there is no right to bail following conviction absent 
statutory authorization. State v. Sorrentino, 32 Wyo. 410, 233 P. 142, 34 A.L.R. 1477 (1925). 
The thrust of Sorrentino and In re Boulter, 5 Wyo. 263, 39 P. 875 (1895), 
together with the views articulated in State v. Crocker, 5 Wyo. 385, 40 P. 681 
(1895), has been to limit the right to bail articulated in Article 1, Section 
14, of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming to bail prior to conviction. 
This is consistent with the majority rule found in the cases cited in 
Annotation: Right of Defendant in State Court to Bail Pending Appeal from 
Conviction - Modern Cases, 28 A.L.R. 4th 227, 237-239 (1984). In State v. 
District Court of Second Judicial District, 715 P.2d 191 (Wyo. 1986), this court 
did hold that the right to bail is a substantive right subject to the will of 
the legislature. Consequently, procedural rules adopted by the court would not 
prevail over statutes that authorized bail following conviction.

[¶6.]     The question of right 
to bail for a parole violation is a novel question in this court. We are 
satisfied that Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 
(1972), in which the Supreme Court of the United States articulated the due 
process rights of a parolee, is not authority for a constitutional right to 
bail. In fact, in that case, the court said that a parolee may be detained 
pending a final revocation hearing. Morrissey. We also are satisfied that Rule 
8, W.R.Cr.P., and the statutes (§§ 7-10-101 and 7-10-104, W.S. 1977 (June 1987 
Repl.)), cited and relied upon by Pisano do not articulate a right to bail 
pending a parole revocation.

[¶7.]     The majority rule with 
respect to bail pending revocation of parole, in the absence of statute 
providing for that opportunity, is that there is no authority for a court to 
order release when bail is sought by a parolee. See, e.g., Aguilera v. 
California Department of Corrections, 247 Cal. App. 2d 150, 55 Cal. Rptr. 292 
(1966); People ex rel. Tucker v. Kotsos, 68 Ill. 2d 88, 11 Ill.Dec. 295, 368 N.E.2d 903 (1977); People ex rel. Calloway v. Skinner, 33 N.Y.2d 23, 347 N.Y.S.2d 178, 300 N.E.2d 716 (1973); Hardy v. Warden of Queens House of 
Detention for Men, 56 Misc.2d 332, 288 N.Y.S.2d 541 (N.Y.Sup. 1968); January v. 
Porter, 75 Wn.2d 768, 453 P.2d 876 (1969); Ogden v. Klundt, 15 Wn. App. 475, 550 P.2d 36 (1976); Gaertner v. State, 35 Wis.2d 159, 150 N.W.2d 370 (1967). See 
also, N. Cohen & J. Gobert, The Law of Probation and Parole § 9.03, at 
417-20 (1983). The pertinent cases are in accord that there is no constitutional 
right to bail under the Eight Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States of 
America. Galante v. Warden, Metropolitan 
Correctional Center and United 
States Parole Commission, 573 F.2d 707 (2nd Cir. 1977); 
Pihakis v. Thomas, 470 F. Supp. 721 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Lee v. Pennsylvania Board of 
Probation & Parole, 467 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D.Pa. 1979); Burgess v. Roth, 387 F. Supp. 1155 (E.D.Pa. 1979); In re Law, 10 Cal. 3d 21; 109 Cal. Rptr. 573, 513 P.2d 621 (1973); People ex rel. Calloway v. Skinner, 33 N.Y.2d 23, 347 N.Y.S.2d 178, 300 N.E.2d 716 (1973); Kunkelman v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Board of Probation and Parole, 40 
Pa. Cmwlth. 
149, 396 A.2d 898 (1979). See, Argro v. United 
States, 505 F.2d 1374 (2nd Cir. 1974); Roberson v. 
Connecticut, 501 F.2d 305 (2nd Cir. 1974); 
Hamilton v. New 
Mexico, 479 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1973); Bloss v. Michigan, 421 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 
1970); In re Whitney, 421 F.2d 337 (1st Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Fink 
v. Heyd, 287 F. Supp. 716 (E.D.La. 1968), aff'd, 408 F.2d 7 (5th Cir. 1969), 
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 895, 90 S. Ct. 192, 24 L. Ed. 2d 172 (1969); Genung v. 
Nuckolls, 292 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1974); Frank v. Pitre, 353 So. 2d 1293 (La. 1977). 
The same construction has attached to the provisions of state constitutions. 
Law; Liistro v. Robinson, 170 Conn. 116, 365 A.2d 109 (1976).

[¶8.]     At best, as the 
foregoing cases establish, the authority to grant bail is discretionary. See 
also, N. Cohen & J. Gobert, The Law of Probation and Parole. We hold that 
Pisano has no right to be admitted to bail and that the record of violations in 
this instance persuades this court that he should not be admitted to bail. 
Pisano's parole violations seem to manifest an accelerating diminution of his 
capacity to control his behavior and to avoid violations of his parole. We 
conclude that we need not decide in this case what the appropriate rule would be 
if another court should set bail for a parole violator. We hold only that Pisano 
has no right to be admitted to bail and, consequently, he is not unlawfully 
detained by the Warden.

[¶9.]     Therefore, his Motion 
to Set Bail and his Emergency Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus appropriately 
are denied. An order shall be entered forthwith denying the Motion to Set Bail 
and the Emergency Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

URBIGKIT, 
C.J., 
files a dissenting opinion.

URBIGKIT, Chief Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶10.]  I dissent from this decision presented 
alternatively by a Motion to Set Bail and by an Emergency Petition for a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus for which this majority denies access to bail following 
reincarceration during the administrative process directed to revoke parole. The 
majority phrases inquiry about entitlement as whether "to be admitted to bail 
after his apprehension and detention as a parole violator." The power of words! 
The actual issue is right to bail until status of violation of parole has 
actually been determined. The majority again rephrases since in this 
case, it actually now determines there is no right for a suspected parole 
violator to have bail during the administrative revocation process. What happens 
if a judicial appeal is taken from that administrative revocation is not now 
addressed.

[¶11.]  This decision is symptomatic, as crime 
increases arithmetically in this nation, of those who find a solution solely 
through throwing people in jail. First jail, then consideration of a hearing and 
possible justice or even, heaven forbid, reformation and prevention. Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 
15.1

[¶12.]  The difference between the majority and 
this writer is my indeterminacy about there having been an actual parole 
violation until the administrative or judicial proceeding has been completed to 
make that determination. I do not preliminarily assume guilt or parole 
violation. I do not accept charges as facts until a hearing is held; otherwise, 
why bother. With the other alternative, government leaves rights to 
reincarcerate in the unsupervised hands of one person before completion of the 
administrative agency hearing overtly necessary to provide constitutional rights 
and protection. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973); 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 (1972).

I.

THE NON-ISSUE OF RIGHT TO 
BAIL DURING APPEAL

[¶13.]  After bypassing non-determined but 
assumed guilt, we are not faced with a constitutional issue hypothesized by the 
majority for application of bail upon appeal. This is true because without 
conjecture, the basic right of bond following conviction within judicial 
discretion exists today in Wyoming and has consistently existed since 
1909. That subject provides no proper precedent for our present 
decision.

[¶14.]  What would occur if "someone" assumed to 
eliminate the existent right of post-conviction bail is at best conjectural. 
Certainly, if the elimination of right to bail on appeal is directed to chill 
the constitutional right to appeal in this state, then at least one valid appeal 
intrinsic to constitutionality of the change would surely be in question. The 
basic teaching on that subject is the simple and direct phraseology of the 
provision of Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 14, which states:

     All persons shall be 
bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when the proof is 
evident or the presumption great. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor shall cruel or unusual punishment be 
inflicted.

[¶15.]  Since an appeal is an intrinsic function 
of guilt determination, it takes activated interpretation by the judiciary in 
constitutional application by using terminology that does not exist or unstated 
exception which is not provided to deny right to bail for appeals at this time 
in this state in 1991.

[¶16.]  That parallel subject of Wyoming law regarding 
post-conviction right to bail has a rather direct and consistent history. In the 
early case of In re Boulter, 5 Wyo. 263, 39 P. 875 (1895), this court 
determined that an express statute forbid admission to bail after sentence. 
Consequently, bail was not judicially granted. The court determined that under 
common law, it was a matter of discretion which had been "taken away" after 
sentence by statutory provision. Id. at 272, 39 P. 875. State v. Sorrentino, 32 
Wyo. 410, 233 P. 142 (1925) was determined after the law had been changed by 
involving a second appeal following remand for correction of the judgment and 
provided no authority on the general issue presented of the right to bail on 
initial appeal.2

[¶17.]  The legislature obviously became 
disenchanted with the In re Boulter result and, in its 1909 session, provided 
that upon appeal "it shall be the duty of the court to fix reasonable bail to be 
given by the defendant" following conviction of a bailable felony, except murder 
in the second degree. Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 136, § 1 (1909), approved Feb. 27, 
1909. This structure of Wyoming law that bail was mandatory following 
conviction, except for non-bailable offenses and second degree murder, was 
visited in State v. Helton, 72 Wyo. 105, 261 P.2d 46 (1953), in the context of 
determining whether the supreme court might grant bail without first having 
consideration given by the trial judge. In Helton, the offense was a second 
degree murder so discretion was involved, and this court, in directing attention 
of the principles for the trial court, related:

[I]n exercising the 
discretion herein mentioned, * * * the court should take into consideration as 
to whether or not the convicted defendant will properly conduct himself in the 
meantime if bail is granted. We might incidentally mention the fact that we have 
found decisions from two courts in which it was held that unless there is good 
reason for refusing bail, it should be granted to the prisoner while an appeal 
is prosecuted in good faith.

Id. 261 P.2d  at 48 
(citing State v. Waterman, 36 Idaho 259, 210 P. 208 (1922) and City of Sioux Falls v. Marshall, 48 S.D. 378, 204 N.W. 999 (1925)). This court further recognized:

It is clear that while 
under this provision, it is mandatory upon the trial judge to grant bail in the 
ordinary felony case [upon appeal], he is not required as a matter of law to 
grant such bail in the case of conviction of second degree murder.

Helton, 261 P.2d  at 47. 
In any case, the amount of the bond was vested in the trial court's discretion. 
State ex rel. Powell v. Ilsley, 387 P.2d 676 (Wyo. 1963). Interestingly enough, the specific 
provisions of the 1909 law continued in effect in the same phraseology and 
considered by this court in State v. District Court of Second Judicial Dist., 
715 P.2d 191 (Wyo. 1986), which determined that a post-conviction right to bail 
was substantive and consequently not repealed by the adoption of rules by the 
supreme court. This last case also recognized priority of the use of habeas 
corpus for a test of the right to bail.

II.

CURRENT WYOMING STATUTORY AND 
RULE PROVISIONS FOR BAIL

[¶18.]  An interesting metamorphosis occurred in 
regard to the 1909 statute with the recodification of the Criminal Procedure 
Code, Title 7, in its 1985, chapter 147, and 1987, chapter 157, enactments. 
Although the phraseology was changed, the statute now provides no overt 
differentiation between pre-conviction and post-conviction application of bail 
in providing:

     a) * * * arrested for an offense not 
punishable by death may be admitted to bail.

     b) * * * arrested for 
an offense punishable by death may be admitted to bail at the 
discretion of the authorized judicial officer * * *, except the defendant 
shall not be admitted to bail if the proof is evident or the presumption great * 
* *.

     c) During the pendency 
of an appeal in a bailable case, [the authorized judicial officer] may admit the 
defendant to bail in any sum he deems proper.

W.S. 7-10-101 (emphasis 
added).3 The significant additional facet of 
Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 147 (1985) was W.S. 7-10-102, entitled "Matters governed by 
rules," wherein it was stated:

     The rules promulgated 
by the Wyoming 
supreme court shall govern in all matters relating to the terms, amount and 
conditions of bail, justification of sureties and procedures for forfeiture, 
enforcement and exoneration upon breach or default of the conditions of 
bail.

In essence, the 
legislature recognized and adopted into statute the procedure and application 
provided for bail by W.R.Cr.P. 8 which had been last amended in 1978. However, 
the statute was not confined to recognition by implied terms of W.R.Cr.P. 8, but 
also included W.R.Cr.P. 33(f) providing that the defendant may be admitted to 
bail pending a proceeding for the revocation of probation. All of this history 
and linguistic development demonstrates that the right to be considered for bail 
exists following conviction with the exception of capital offenses or murder in 
the second degree. A right to bail when revocation of probation is involved also 
exists and we are left to consider, although the trial court has discretion to 
grant bail pending appeal for second degree murder, it has no jurisdiction to 
consider bail in a pending administrative revocation where the offense is the 
possibility that the defendant went into a bar during his period of 
parole.

[¶19.]  In addition to the specific bail right 
resources of Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 14, the Wyoming Constitution contains art. 1, 
§ 2, equality to all; art. 1, § 6, due process; and art. 1, § 34, uniform 
operation of the general law. Furthermore, in this case, Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 
17 has significance:

     The privilege of the 
writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless, when in case of rebellion 
or invasion the public safety may require it.

[¶20.]  The Wyoming Constitution 
provides:

     In their inherent 
right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, all members of the human 
race are equal.

Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 
2.

     No person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 
6.

     All laws of a general 
nature shall have a uniform operation.

Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 
34.

[¶21.]  Applicable statutes include W.S. 
7-13-403, 7-13-404, 7-13-407(a)(iv), and 7-13-408. W.S. 7-13-403 
states:

(a) A parolee is in the 
legal custody and under the control of the board and may be returned to the 
institution from which he was paroled for violation of a condition of his 
parole.

(b) Unless otherwise 
ordered by the board, a parole violator shall be returned to the institution 
from which he was released to serve the remainder of his original 
sentence.

(Emphasis added.) W.S. 
7-13-404 states:

In computing the 
remainder of the sentence to be served by a parole violator, no credit shall be 
given against his original sentence for any portion of the time between his 
release on parole and his return to the institution unless the board directs 
otherwise.

W.S. 7-13-407(a)(iv) 
states:

Under direction and 
supervision of the director, probation and parole agents shall:

* * * * * *

(iv) Supervise the 
conduct of each person on probation, parole or conditional release through 
personal visits, reports and other appropriate means, and report in writing as 
often as required by the court, board or institution[.]

W.S. 7-13-408 
states:

(a) The state probation 
and parole officer shall notify the board or the appropriate court or 
institution if it is determined consideration should be given to retaking or 
reincarcerating a person under the supervision of the department who has 
violated a condition of his probation, parole or other conditional release. 
Prior to notification, a hearing shall be held in accordance with this section 
within a reasonable time, unless a hearing is waived by the probationer, parolee 
or conditional releasee. As soon as practicable, following termination of any 
hearing, the appropriate officer or agent shall report to the court, board or 
institution, furnish a copy of the hearing record and make recommendations 
regarding the disposition to be made of the probationer, parolee or conditional 
releasee. Pending any proceeding pursuant to this section, the appropriate agent 
may take custody of and detain the probationer, parolee or conditional releasee 
involved for a reasonable period of time prior to the hearing. If it appears to 
the hearing officer or agent that retaking or reincarceration is likely to 
follow, the agent may take custody of and detain the probationer, parolee or 
conditional releasee for a reasonable period after the hearing or waiver as may 
be necessary to arrange for the retaking or reincarceration.

(b) Any hearing pursuant 
to this section may be before the state probation and parole officer, his 
designated hearing officer or any other person authorized pursuant to the laws 
of this state to hear cases of alleged probation, parole or conditional release 
violations, except that no hearing officer shall be the person making the 
allegation of violation.

(c) With respect to any 
hearing pursuant to this section, the probationer, parolee or conditional 
releasee:

(i) Shall have reasonable 
notice in writing of the nature and content of the allegations to be made 
including notice that the purpose of the hearing is to determine whether there 
is probable cause to believe that he has committed a violation that may lead to 
a revocation of probation, parole or conditional release;

(ii) Shall be permitted 
to consult with any persons whose assistance he reasonably desires, prior to the 
hearing;

(iii) Shall have the 
right to confront and examine any person who has made allegations against him, 
unless the hearing officer determines that the confrontation would present a 
substantial present or subsequent danger of harm to the person;

(iv) May admit, deny or 
explain the violation alleged and may present proof, including affidavits and 
other evidence, in support of his contentions.

(d) A record of the 
proceedings under this section shall be made and preserved either by 
stenographic means or through the use of a recording machine.

W.R.Cr.P. 8 provides in 
pertinent part:

(a) Right to 
bail.

(1) Before Conviction. - 
A person arrested for an offense not punishable by death shall be admitted to 
bail. A person arrested for an offense punishable by death may be admitted to 
bail by any court or judge authorized by law to do so in the exercise of 
discretion, giving due weight to the evidence and to the nature and 
circumstances of the offense, except that where the proof is evident or the 
presumption great a defendant shall not be admitted to bail.

(2) Upon Review. - During 
the pendency of appeal, a judge or justice of a court having jurisdiction may 
admit a defendant to bail in such sum as shall be deemed proper in all bailable 
cases. The judge or justice allowing bail may at any time revoke or amend the 
order admitting the defendant to bail.

* * * * * *

(c) Terms.

(1) Any person charged 
with an offense other than an offense punishable by death, shall, at his 
appearance before a judicial officer, be ordered released pending trial on his 
personal recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance bond in 
an amount specified by the judicial officer, unless the judicial officer 
determines in the exercise of his discretion that such a release will not 
reasonably insure the appearance of the person as required. When such a 
determination is made the judicial officer shall, either in lieu of or in 
addition to the above methods of relief, impose the first of the following 
conditions of release which will reasonably assure the appearance of the person 
for trial or, if no single condition gives that assurance, any combination of 
the following conditions:

* * * * * *

(2) In determining which 
conditions of release will reasonably assure appearance, the judicial officer 
shall, on the basis of available information, take into account the nature and 
circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against the 
accused, the accused's family ties, employment, financial resources, character 
and mental condition, the length of his residence in the community, his record 
of convictions and his record of appearance at court proceedings or of flight to 
avoid prosecution or failure to appear at court proceedings.

* * * * * *

(h) Habeas corpus. - Any 
accused person aggrieved by the application of this rule may apply for a writ of 
habeas corpus.

W.R.Cr.P. 33(f) 
states:

Revocation of probation. 
- The court shall not revoke probation except after a hearing at which the 
defendant shall be present and apprised of the grounds on which such action is 
proposed. The defendant may be admitted to bail pending such 
hearing.

W.S. 7-10-101 has been 
previously quoted and is followed by W.S. 7-10-102, which states:

The rules promulgated by 
the Wyoming 
supreme court shall govern in all matters relating to the terms, amount and 
conditions of bail, justification of sureties and procedures for forfeiture, 
enforcement and exoneration upon breach or default of the conditions of 
bail.

W.S. 7-10-104 
states:

(a) A person charged with 
the commission of any bailable offense may be admitted to bail by:

(i) A justice of the 
supreme court;

(ii) A district judge or 
district court commissioner of the district in which the person is 
charged;

(iii) A county judge, 
county court commissioner or adjunct county court commissioner of the county in 
which the person is charged; or

(iv) A justice of the 
peace of the county in which the person is charged.

[¶22.]  Two first impression issues in 
application of the Wyoming statutes are defined within the 
question of whether the terminology, "a reasonable period of time," means until 
a reincarceration hearing is completed and whether a petition to revoke 
probation or parole is included in the categorization of a criminal 
offense.

[¶23.]  Parallel to the administrative revocation 
process which relates equally to probation and parole, there is a judicially 
created process through county attorney petition and court decision. See Cooney 
v. ParkCounty, 792 P.2d 1287 (Wyo. 1990), cert. granted and judgment vacated ___ 
U.S. ___, 111 S. Ct. 2820, 115 L. Ed. 2d 965 (1991); Weisser v. State, 600 P.2d 1320 (Wyo. 1979); and Knobel v. State, 576 P.2d 941 (Wyo. 1978).

III.

THE REAL ISSUE OF RIGHT 
TO BE CONSIDERED FOR BAIL DURING PAROLE OR PROBATION REVOCATION

[¶24.]  The decisional process of the 
determination of majority or minority rule within the law is always interesting 
but well illustrated on this issue of states or jurisdictions which deny right 
to bail during revocation of parole or probation processes.

A. The non-bail 
states.

[¶25.]  Jurisdictions cited among the fifty 
states, the District of Columbia and the 
United 
States, where undoubtedly some sort of 
probation or parole exists which deny bail during the revocation process, could 
possibly total three and a fourth in serious question. Washington is the 
principal jurisdiction cited. Ogden v. Klundt, 15 Wn. App. 475, 550 P.2d 36 
(1976); January v. Porter, 75 Wn.2d 768, 453 P.2d 876 (1969). Ogden, 550 P.2d  at 39 determined that "[a]bsent express 
statutory authorization, the courts of Washington are without power to release on 
bail or bond a parolee arrested and held in custody for violating his parole." 
See People ex rel. Calloway v. Skinner, 33 N.Y.2d 23, 347 N.Y.S.2d 178, 300 N.E.2d 716 (1973), based on administrative agency responsibility for parolee 
conduct and Gaertner v. State, 35 Wis.2d 159, 150 N.W.2d 370 (1967), where the 
pending burglary charge and the concurrent parole violation proceeding joined 
bail could be denied. Without specific entitling legislation, parolees are not 
entitled to bail or release pending a hearing. Hardy v. Warden of Queens House of Detention for Men, 56 Misc.2d 332, 288 N.Y.S.2d 541 (N.Y.Sup. 1968). The fourth state cited by the majority and the 
State to justify the same principle is reflected by Kunkelman v. Com., 
Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 40 Pa.Cmwlth. 149, 396 A.2d 898 
(1979). In Kunkelman, the petitioner challenged a detainer by habeas corpus. The 
issue was not revocation but rather detainer from which bail was 
denied.

[¶26.]  In the interest of accuracy and 
completeness, although the cases were not cited by the majority, there are two 
other states which apparently have a different approach between parole and 
probation revocation. In California, where it is determined that a parolee 
technically remains in custody and is serving his sentence although not in 
physical custody, jurisdiction during the revocation process remains in the 
authority and the individual waiting cancellation is not eligible for parole. 
Aguilera v. California Dept. of Corrections, 247 Cal. App. 2d 150, 55 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1966). See similarly, although not directly in 
point since involving a "parole hold" question, In re Law, 10 Cal. 3d 21, 109 Cal. Rptr. 573, 513 P.2d 621 (1973). Illinois seems to follow the same thesis. 
People ex rel. Tucker v. Kotsos, 68 Ill. 2d 88, 11 Ill.Dec. 295, 368 N.E.2d 903 
(1977). The Illinois court addressed an equal protection 
contention by virtue of the different treatment between probation and parole. 
That court found the rights to be protected by constitutional test of mandamus 
to compel action on revocation. What was in effect a "parole hold" status was in 
question for one of the individuals who was included in the appeal.

[¶27.]  Alice would indeed be at home in the 
"Wonderland" we make for the issues here presented of the parolee who asks 
consideration for bail pending completion of the administrative revocation 
proceeding. Obviously by this time, those issues for the case are moot one way 
or another since he is either in the state penitentiary under a revoked status 
or continues on parole with revocation rejected, but we retain an issue of 
significance about which in this odd discussion, significant rights and 
important procedural questions are considered.4

[¶28.]  The issue should be confined to the 
subject presented without flourishes added which have nothing to do with the 
relief requested here. Adjudicatively, this case presents the right of the 
parolee to be judicially considered for bail during administrative revocation 
proceedings, which right is specifically provided by court rules if the process 
is judicial revocation.

[¶29.]  To make some sense out of this 
"Alice in 
Wonderland", it is best to exclude subjects that are not presented. To be 
disconnected as previously discussed in detail is bail after conviction since it 
has existed in Wyoming since 1909. The difference between the 
right to bail pre-conviction with limitations and the right to be considered for 
bail post-conviction as a matter of discretion after conviction are neither 
presented subjects here nor issues reasonably in dispute. If someone finds a way 
to create the issue, time enough in the future can be appropriately assigned for 
judicial review when it has a real issue. Comment, Constitutional Law - Right to 
Bail, 51 Mich.L.Rev. 389, 397 (1953). Identically, this proceeding does not 
present the absolute right to bail by the parolee; it addresses the right to be 
considered for bail pending revocation hearing which the majority now by broad 
language apparently denies. The discretion umbrella generally prevalent is 
converted by the majority's decision into an alternative decision jurisdiction 
of the judiciary to act. Furthermore, this proceeding questions only 
administrative revocation proceedings since, by both rule and case law, this 
court has recognized right and responsibility to consider bail pending judicial 
revocation.

[¶30.]  Finally, this proceeding, although not 
probation revocation, provides no authentication for a different result whether 
the action is administrative or judicial in initiation since the state 
administrative agency revocation statute, W.S. 7-13-408, does not differentiate 
parole or probation, nor does W.R.Cr.P. 8 design a difference to be applied as a 
post-conviction function of the court's responsibility. Clearly, this court in 
Weisser, 600 P.2d 1320 and Knobel, 576 P.2d 941, declined to delineate a 
procedural difference between probation and parole revocation when recognizing 
the identity of application used by the United States Supreme Court in Gagnon, 
411 U.S. 778, 93 S. Ct. 1756 and Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593. We said 
in Weisser, 600 P.2d  at 1321 n. 1:

In Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 
411 U.S. 778, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973), the Court found no important differences between parole and 
probation revocation proceedings and extended the Morrissey due-process 
requirements to probation-revocation proceedings.

The administrative agency 
statute, W.S. 7-13-408, applies indiscriminately and without differentiation to 
"probation, parole or other conditional release."

Having excluded what this 
case is not, we reach the question of what this decision is actually about - 
whether in administrative revocation of either parole or probation, do rights to 
obtain consideration for bail by judicial action exist?

I decline to limit the 
judicial authority to grant bail so that this character of justice is only 
confined to judicial revocation processes. Furthermore, I find no compelling 
precedent addressing this specific issue which requires a conflicting conclusion 
among the many citations provided in the majority or any others which might be 
added. I find authority in the Wyoming Constitution, our state statutes and this 
court's rules buttressed by equal protection and due process requirements which 
provide the right equally with judicial termination procedure or generally the 
category of post-conviction appeal authorization. Until we attempt to throw the 
key away completely for everyone within this broad status, I find no 
adjudicative justification for limitation of rights to be considered for bail 
when administrative action to reincarcerate is commenced.

Before embarking on an 
extensive case analysis, it should be noted that the majority does two things - 
first determines that no right to bail existed for petitioner and then concludes 
that "[a]t best, * * * the authority to grant bail is discretionary." I say at 
worst the authority is discretionary and this court purports to act as a fact 
finder without a properly developed record and without opportunity for the 
petitioner to factually respond where we now exercise a discretionary decision 
for denial. Obviously at this late date, argument about the propriety of 
exercised discretion is like swatting moths in this area's delayed wet spring. 
It does not now reach realism. All anyone ever wanted in this case was bail for 
the few weeks by the petitioner until the final revocation hearing could be 
held, now some months passed. We seem to sample here again the leverage of law 
enforcement - instant incarceration. There is no factual record of any kind here 
presented which can sustain the discretionary denial decision.

Consequently, we consider 
the question: Should a parolee have the right to be considered for bail under 
Wyoming law 
when administrative revocation is the process pursued? Since we know that the 
parole board recision decision is in itself subject to review, we hereby 
determine whether bail is sometimes, always, or never available for 
consideration.5

The fundamental equal 
protection due process law was established for the parolee-probationer by the 
cases of Gagnon, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S. Ct. 1756 and Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S. Ct. 2593. The 
conditional freedom of a parolee (probationer) generated by statute is a liberty 
interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which 
may not be terminated as due process safeguards. The revocation hearing mandated 
by Morrissey is bottomed on the parallel interest of society and the parolee in 
establishing whether a parole violation has occurred and, if so, whether under 
all of the circumstances the quality of that violation calls for parole 
revocation. See Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 85, 97 S. Ct. 274, 50 L. Ed. 2d 236 (1976). These cases establish the existence of basic rights which are 
constitutionally protected by the United States Constitution.

It is with the character 
of those established basic rights as supplemented by due process and equal 
protection considerations that I apply Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 6, 8 and 14, as 
well as art. 2,6 separation of power provision, to 
discern from the somewhat disconnected status of statutes and court rules that 
the right to consideration of bail not only exists but has to exist under our 
own due process and equal protection requirements. See Annotation, Validity, 
Under Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment, of State Statutes 
Relating to Parole or Pardon of Convicted Criminal, 35 L. Ed. 2d 775 (1974) and 
Annotation, Right of Defendant in State Court to Bail Pending Appeal from 
Conviction - Modern Cases, 28 A.L.R. 4th 227 (1984).

The countervailing 
authority to the Washington-New York-Wisconsin rule was formulated with 
extensive discussion in Martin v. State, 517 P.2d 1389 (Alaska 1974), where the 
discretional interest in making bail available during the revocation process was 
affirmatively considered.

While we hold that 
appellant * * * was neither entitled to bail under the Alaska Constitution nor 
the Alaska Bail Act, we suggest bail should be withheld pending revocation 
proceedings only in unusual cases. Trial judges have wide latitude in imposing 
suitable conditions for prehearing release, other than the denial of bail. The 
denial of bail may constitute a needless disruption of the probation process 
negating the program's objectives of rehabilitation and eventual integration 
into society. Furthermore, the recent expansion in the area of probationer's 
rights by the United States Supreme Court in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 
93 S. Ct. 1756, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 (1973) suggests the granting of bail. In Gagnon, 
the Court, inter alia, required as a matter of due process that a probationer be 
afforded a prompt preliminary hearing to determine whether probable cause exists 
to believe a violation of probation has occurred. Following this preliminary 
hearing, a final hearing must be allowed prior to an ultimate determination 
concerning the revocation of probation.

Id. at 1398. See likewise 
Dobrova v. State, 674 P.2d 834 (Alaska App. 1984), aff'd 694 P.2d 157 
(Alaska 
1985).

A similar right to 
discretional consideration was found in Huihui v. Shimoda, 64 Haw. 527, 644 P.2d 968 (1982), where the accused was on bail and recharged with another serious 
offense. A state constitutional violation was found in statutory elimination of 
judicial discretion. The discretionary right of the judiciary to grant bail 
pending completion of the revocation proceeding is also recognized in a series 
of federal cases: Carmine Galante-Appellant v. Warden, Metropolitan Correctional 
Center and the United States Parole Commission-Appellees, 573 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 
1977); Argro v. United States, 505 F.2d 1374, 1377-78 (2d Cir. 1974); and 
Pihakis v. Thomas, 470 F. Supp. 721 (S.D.N Y 1979). In general, bail was 
considered through exercise of the power of habeas corpus. Johnston v. Marsh, 227 F.2d 528 (3rd Cir. 1955); Siegel v. 
United States Parole Com'n, 
613 F. Supp. 127 (S.D.Fla. 1985); United States ex rel. Hebel v. 
Luther, 544 F. Supp. 179 (N.D.Ill. 1982). See likewise Argro, 505 F.2d 1374; 
Genung v. Nuckolls, 292 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1974); 
Bernhardt v. State, 288 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1974); 
and Frank v. Pitre, 353 So. 2d 1293 (La. 1977). Cf. Luther v. Molina, 627 F.2d 71 
(7th Cir. 1980).

It is that subject that 
we address for this appeal as outlined in N. Cohen & J. Gobart, The Law of 
Probation and Parole, § 9.03 at 416-17 (1983) (footnotes omitted and emphasis in 
original):

Of course, the lack of a 
constitutional right to bail does not preclude states from allowing bail in 
revocation proceedings. Most state laws do not address the question of bail 
pending parole or probation revocation. Of those jurisdictions having statutes 
on point, probationers are generally accorded the right to be considered for 
bail. Less frequently, parolees are given the opportunity to be released on 
bail.

This difference in 
treatment has led to litigation in which parolees claim a violation of equal 
protection vis-a-vis probationers. The argument that parolees and probationers 
are functionally similar is somewhat supported by the Supreme Court's dictum in 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli [411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S. Ct. 1756, 1759-60, 36 L. Ed. 2d 656 
(1973)] to the effect that there is no "difference relevant to the guarantee of 
due process between the revocation of parole and the revocation of probation." * 
* *

* * * * * *

* * * In United States v. 
Schrieber, [367 F. Supp. 791, 792 (E.D.N.Y. 1973)], a parole revocation case, 
the court, starting with the general proposition that Morrissey applies 
procedural due process to revocation proceedings, cryptically 
stated:

[D]ue process certainly 
commends if it does not require consideration of the question whether this 
defendant should not be admitted to bail if the individual circumstances of the 
defendant's case make postponement of recommitment until the Board of Parole 
acts the course which a careful weighing of he values involved 
dictates.

That text in addressing 
the subject relates:

[A] few courts, including 
some federal ones, have granted bail to parolees and probationers, irrespective 
of the lack of constitutional or statutory language on point. The source of 
authority for this result is not totally agreed upon, although it appears to be 
based on the court's inherent general powers. One view is that judges have 
common law authority to admit to bail persons under their custody, at least 
until execution of the sentence. While this power may help some probationers, it 
is doubtful if it extends to parolees who are no longer under court 
jurisdiction. A related view is that, absent statutes on point, courts have 
inherent authority to grant bail to persons lawfully before them. Clearly, a 
probationer awaiting a revocation hearing would qualify as being before the 
court. Parolees, on the other hand, may have to use such remedies as habeas 
corpus to come within the ambit of the court's jurisdiction. Finally, some 
courts, subject to no controlling statutes, simply conclude that they have the 
power to grant bail pending revocation proceedings without identifying the 
source of their authority.

Id. at 418.

I undertake the 
evaluation of Wyoming law in recognition of the historical 
stature of habeas corpus to assess why the majority acted inadvisably here, 
first in rejecting jurisdiction and then alternatively considering if 
jurisdiction existed to deny bail by discretionary decision without an 
authenticating factual record.

The initiating remedy 
first found in habeas corpus is recognized by court rule in W.R.Cr.P. 8 and by 
legislative authentication of the constitutional writ by W.S. §§ 7-10-101, 
7-10-102 and 7-3-216 in addition to 1-27-128.

The Wyoming bail 
statutory provision related to habeas corpus, traceable in almost identical form 
to the present, can be first found in 1876 Compiled Laws of Wyoming, ch. 61, § 
37: 

The plaintiff may, also, 
in any case be committed, let to bail, or his bail be mitigated or increased, as 
justice may require.

Now, 115 years later, is 
found as W.S. 1-27-128:

The petitioner may be 
committed, let to bail or his bail be mitigated or increased as justice 
requires.

It is apparent as 
demonstrated from the generally unquestioned federal law previously cited that 
this court, as any habeas court, has authority to grant bail during the pendency 
of the habeas proceeding. Furthermore, as specifically addressed in the 
Wyoming bail 
rule, W.R.Cr.P. 8, the proper proceeding to address bail issues is habeas 
corpus. W.R.Cr.P. 8(h).

Wyoming effectively enforced 
speedy trial at one time which then properly demonstrated the validity of the 
great writ's utilization within this jurisdiction. State v. Keefe, 17 Wyo. 227, 98 P. 122 
(1908). An extended contempt of court case resolved by this court through habeas 
corpus release provides some further valuable review. Miskimins v. Shaver, 8 
Wyo. 392, 58 P. 411 (1899).

I obtain comfortable 
assurance through determined concepts that the judiciary has jurisdiction by 
habeas corpus to grant bail in any reconfinement revocation proceeding as a 
basic constitutional concept of this branch of government and the power of 
habeas corpus. We are then not presented with the parole-administrative agency 
proceeding difference from the probationary-judicial process where a right to 
bail clearly exists under both rule and statute. I find then in Gagnon and 
Morrissey a delineation of equal protection-due process which, under the Wyoming 
Constitution, would properly leave judicial authority to inquire when summary 
reincarceration of the parolee occurs in the same fashion that the probationer, 
who may be equally chargeable with fault or offense, is to be granted access to 
consideration for bail in a judicial proceeding.

I would look further also 
in application of twentieth-century considerations to phraseology that came into 
the law before parole existed or the Wyoming Constitution was adopted. I would 
find the offense (W.S. §§ 7-10-101 and 7-10-104) to equally extend to conduct 
justifying reincarceration of the parolee or the probationer following 
revocation as would be the case for a felony conviction. It is recognized that 
the word "offense" can be traced back to 1876 Compiled Laws of Wyoming, ch. 14, 
§ 42, including the concept for which the prisoner is held to answer, "a 
recognizance shall be taken for his appearance to answer the charge before the 
court in which the same is cognizable[.]" Those words can be fit precisely 
within the parole revocation by administrative agency criteria "to determine 
whether there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a violation 
that may lead to a revocation * * *." W.S. 7-13-408(c)(i).

Noteworthy in statutory 
terminology is the arrest provisions which empower the parole agent a limitation 
of a reasonable time until a legal warrant is obtained or an administrative 
hearing is held under the statute. This process serves the same function as a 
preliminary hearing in the initial criminal trial context. Nowhere in the entire 
probation-parole statute, W.S. 7-13-401, is any suggestion provided that either 
W.R.Cr.P. 8 or the bail statutes, W.S. 7-10-101 and 7-10-104, both of which 
predate the last re-enactment of the probation-parole statute, exclude right to 
bail or serve to differentiate one process from the other.7

Starting with the 
constitution and following with statute, rule and case law, the conjunctive 
application of the authority of the parole board to both the parolee and the 
probationer is at best confused. Out of all of this, I would conclude that an 
offense is an occurrence for which incarceration may result and, as a 
consequence, either in the direct jurisdiction case of probation or through 
habeas corpus intervention with parole, the court has jurisdiction to assure 
that bail is available until a basis for reincarceration is either properly 
established or rejected. In this case there was absolutely no evidence, 
indication, argument or suggestion afforded that this petitioner would not 
voluntarily make himself available for hearing or revocation proceedings. 
Consequently, denial of bail during this decisional period required for final 
determination relegates governmental conduct to the time centuries past when 
bail, at any time and in any form, was unlikely or nonexistent once the 
"authority" determined to impose confinement upon the presentation of the 
initial charge.

IV.

CONCLUSION

I respectfully dissent 
from the denial of the petition for habeas corpus which was filed to obtain bail 
during the administrative revocation proceeding. Hopefully, disregarding what 
occurred in Cooney, 792 P.2d 1287, a right to bail should mean that a right to 
bail would be provided.

The great English legal 
commentators tell us that inherent in the common law is a profound regard for a 
man's personal freedom. Nevertheless, imprisonment is imposed under the premise 
that some good for society will be produced. To suggest that there be an 
absolute exemption from imprisonment under all circumstances would be 
incongruent with every notion of law and political society, and in the end would 
be destructive of all civil liberties. Therefore, only those incarcerations 
which arise from absolute necessity are just. "Every act of authority of one man 
over another, for which there is not absolute necessity is tyrannical." These 
principles are not only the spirit of the common law, but the very foundation 
upon which American political philosophy rests.

* * * * * *

The roots of bail extend 
deep into English law. Bail originated as a device to insure the payment of 
"wergeld." It later developed into a mechanism for freeing untried prisoners. 
Bail's function is not only to give liberty to a prisoner, but to secure the 
extent of the law. Thus, the recurring question for those charged with designing 
the bail system has been where to strike the balance between the individual and 
social character of man.

Duker, The Right to Bail: 
A Historical Inquiry, 42 Alb.L.Rev. 33, 33-119 (1977) (quoting M. Debaccaria, An 
Essay on Crime and Punishment 7 (1768) and footnotes omitted). I do not find 
that balance to have been properly struck here.

Consequently, I 
respectfully dissent.

1 This decision does not 
address an abstract or isolated subject. Dependent on ethnic factors and 
geographical differences, it is foreseeable that the present criminal justice 
system supervision in this country of about five million people, if the rate of 
increase since 1880 continues, may reach ten percent of the adult population 
within present lifetimes. See, for example, the discussion in J. Irwin & J. 
Austin, It's About Time: Solving America's Prison Crowding Crisis (NCCD 1987). 
The interesting thing is that the statistics in the article are outdated, e.g., 
then 850,000 confined - today, just four years later, almost one million. 
"Supervision" cases increased from about 3.2 million to somewhere close to five 
million in number.

We wonder why voter 
participation declines. One significant cause is citizenship right forfeiture by 
felony conviction. See Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401 (Wyo. 1990).

2 The numerous cases cited 
regarding right to the discretionary consideration of bail pending appeal have 
no relevance to the issue presented since Wyoming has provided the right to request bail 
to be determined at the discretion of the trial court by consistent application 
of statutes and court rules since 1909. It is noteworthy that these cases which 
provide no real direction for our decision divide among categories and 
classifications, including right to bail, right to be considered for bail, right 
to be considered for bail dependent on the particular offense involved and 
certain categories of offenses where after conviction, there is no right to bail 
pending appeal. Intermixed are further issues of the process to be used, i.e., 
habeas corpus or otherwise, and the broad question of decision about the 
individual posing "a significant risk of flight." Annotation, Right of Defendant 
in State Court to Bail Pending Appeal from Conviction - Modern Cases, 28 A.L.R. 
4th 227, 284 (1984). See United States v. Hart, 779 F.2d 575 (10th Cir. 1985); 
Roberson v. State of Connecticut, 501 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1974); Hamilton v. State 
of New Mexico, 479 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Fink v. 
Heyd, 287 F. Supp. 716 (E.D.La. 1968), aff'd, 408 F.2d 7 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied 396 U.S. 895, 90 S. Ct. 192, 24 L. Ed. 2d 172 (1969); Shabazz v. State, 440 So. 2d 1200 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983); Stiegele v. State, 685 P.2d 1255 (Alaska App. 
1984); Dobrova v. State, 674 P.2d 834 (Alaska App. 1984), aff'd 694 P.2d 157 
(Alaska 1985); State v. Wassillie, 606 P.2d 1279 (Alaska 1980); In re Pipinos, 
33 Cal. 3d 189, 187 Cal. Rptr. 730, 654 P.2d 1257 (1982); State v. Handa, 66 Haw. 
82, 657 P.2d 464 (1983); Huihui v. Shimoda, 64 Haw. 527, 644 P.2d 968 (1982); 
Fredette v. State, 428 A.2d 395 (Me. 1981); People v. Tate, 134 Mich. App. 682, 
352 N.W.2d 297 (1984); People v. Fikaris, 101 Misc.2d 460, 421 N.Y.S.2d 179 
(1979); Spitznas v. State, 648 P.2d 1271 (Okla. Cr. 1982); City of Warwick v. 
Robalewski, 120 R.I. 119, 385 A.2d 669 (1978); and Ex parte McBride, 108 
Tex.Crim. 618, 2 S.W.2d 267 (1928).

3 If this language is to 
be interpreted to only permissibly grant a right to bail in each case, it is 
overtly unconstitutional when compared with Wyo. Const. art. 1, § 14 where the 
right to bail is clearly absolute "except for capital offenses."

4 Substantively, this case 
involves an important reoccurring issue of law which may be capable of evading 
review. Natrona County School Dist. No. 1 v. Ryan, 764 P.2d 1019, 1032 
(Wyo. 1988); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 108 S. Ct. 592, 595, 
98 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1988); Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce 
Commission, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S. Ct. 279, 283, 55 L. Ed. 310 (1911); State v. Wassillie, 606 P.2d 1279 (Alaska 1980); Liistro v. Robinson, 170 Conn. 116, 365 A.2d 109 
(1976).

5 Clearly, the public 
defender has not provided any significant record nor extended legal research. 
Addressing jurisdiction and approach obviously in accord with case law 
participation of the courts could occur by appeal from the administrative agency 
denial or by habeas corpus which is specifically included as a remedy in 
W.R.Cr.P. 8(h).

6 Wyo. Const. art. 1, §§ 6 
and 14 were previously quoted at pages five and two, respectively, of this 
dissent. Wyo. 
Const. art. 1, § 8 provides:

All courts shall be open 
and every person for an injury done to person, reputation or property shall have 
justice administered without sale, denial or delay. Suits may be brought against 
the state in such manner and in such courts as the legislature may by law 
direct.

Wyo. Const. art. 2, § 1 
provides:

The powers of the 
government of this state are divided into three distinct departments: The 
legislative, executive and judicial, and no person or collection of persons 
charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these 
departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to either of the 
others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or 
permitted.

7 Unquestionably, there is 
a difference in definition between parole and probation under W.S. 7-13-401 and 
other provisions of law. W.S. 7-13-401(a)(vii) states:

"Parole" means permission 
to leave the confines of the institution in which a person is confined under 
specified conditions, but does not operate as a discharge of the 
person[.]

W.S. 7-13-401(a)(x) 
states:

"Probation" means a 
sentence not involving confinement which imposes conditions and retains 
authority in the sentencing court to modify the conditions of the sentence or to 
resentence the offender if he violates the conditions[.]

In a another way, the 
difference is recognized in comment also by this court in Weisser, 600 P.2d at 
1324:

It might be appropriate 
to observe that this statute (§ 7-13-409) is of questionable value where 
probation is the concern, in light of our holdings in Knobel, supra, this case, 
State v. Reisch, 491 P.2d 1254 (Wyo. 1971), and Smith v. State, 598 P.2d 1389 
(Wyo. 1979). In the latter two opinions we said, in essence, that the district 
court never loses jurisdiction over its own probationers. In the Reisch case, we 
held that Rule 33(f) is consistent with the concept that courts which grant 
probation have inherent power to revoke it.

We do not, however, pass 
here upon a possible separation-of-powers issue which might be presented in a 
case where revocation of probation under § 7-13-409 is sought to be effected 
exclusively through the administrative processes.

However, the 
constitutional and statutory concepts are not altered if that conduct 
constituting an offense which endangers the individual with reincarceration is 
appropriately proven in some revocation proceeding:

The state probation and 
parole officer shall notify the board or the appropriate court or institution if 
it is determined consideration should be given to retaking or reincarcerating a 
person under the supervision of the department who has violated a condition of 
his probation, parole or other conditional release.

W.S. 
7-13-408(a).