Case Title: The People v. Guiseppe D'Alessandro

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: new-york

Court: New York Appellate Court

Date: 2009-10-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
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This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before
publication in the New York Reports.
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No. 143  
The People &c., 
            Respondent, 
        v. 
Guiseppe D'Alessandro, 
            Appellant.
Brian Gardner, for appellant.
Hilary Hassler, for respondent.
LIPPMAN, Chief Judge:
Nearly twelve years after his conviction for kidnapping
in the first degree and other related crimes was affirmed on
direct appeal (People v D'Alessandro, 230 AD2d 656 [1st Dept
1996], lv denied 89 NY2d 863 [1996]), defendant, represented by
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No. 143
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counsel, petitioned the Appellate Division for a writ of error
coram nobis on the ground that his appellate counsel had been
ineffective for failing to raise a speedy trial argument on the
appeal.  The Appellate Division deemed the application a motion
to reargue an order of that court denying a previous coram nobis
application -- brought by defendant pro se nine years earlier --
and denied reargument.  
Initially, the People argue that defendant's appeal to
this Court must be dismissed, as no appeal lies from an Appellate
Division order denying reargument.  While we acknowledge this
limitation on our jurisdiction, it is not dispositive in this
case, given our inherent authority to look beyond the Appellate
Division's recital in the decretal clause of the order to
determine if defendant's petition in actuality sought coram nobis
relief, the denial of which is reviewable by this Court (see CPL
450.90 [1]).  We have previously exercised this power -- albeit
in a different context -- in People v Giles (73 NY2d 666, 669-670
[1989]), where we held that this Court is not bound by the
Appellate Division's characterization of the order, and must
"determine for itself" whether a reviewable legal question exists
(id. at 670 [citation omitted]).  Any other interpretation would
allow a mislabeled or wrongly denominated order of the Appellate
Division to bar appellate review of "real issues of law," thereby
interfering with this Court's "[unique] authority  . . . to
determine [its] jurisdictional range" (id.).  
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No. 143
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Exercising that authority here, the essential inquiry
on this appeal thus becomes whether the Appellate Division
properly characterized defendant's petition as a motion to
reargue.  Pursuant to CPLR 2221 (d) (2), a motion to reargue must
"be based upon matters of fact or law allegedly overlooked or
misapprehended by the court in determining the prior motion."  It
is well settled that a motion to reargue "is not an appropriate
vehicle for raising new questions . . . which were not previously
advanced" (People v Bachert, 69 NY2d 593, 597 [1987] [internal
quotation marks and citation omitted]).  Necessarily, where a new
argument is presented on the motion, that argument could not have
been "overlooked or misapprehended" by the Appellate Division in
the first instance. 
No reasonable view of defendant's application supports
the Appellate Division's conclusion that it sought relief in the
form of reargument.  Defendant did not identify any points
overlooked or misapprehended by the Appellate Division in its
previous order denying his first petition for a writ of error
coram nobis.  Rather, defendant raised the novel argument that
appellate counsel had been ineffective for failing to argue that
the trial court improperly denied his motion to dismiss the
indictment on speedy trial grounds in light of this Court's
decisions in People v McKenna (76 NY2d 59 [1990]) and People v
Correa (77 NY2d 930 [1991]), both of which were decided before
defendant's trial and appeal.  Specifically, defendant argued
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that, under this Court's decision in McKenna, the period of delay
during which the People failed to turn over the grand jury
minutes in response to defendant's motion to dismiss the
indictment for legal insufficiency -- a total of 196 days --
should have been charged to the People.  Further, in reliance on
Correa, defendant argued that two specific time periods -- 11
days between the original indictment and the arraignment thereon
and 21 days between the superceding indictment and the subsequent
arraignment -- should have been charged to the People.  Although
defendant's first petition for a writ of error coram nobis also
argued that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise a speedy trial claim, it was based on an entirely different
theory, namely, that the time period between the defendant's
arrest and the return of the second indictment -- a total of 357
days -- should have been charged to the People.   Significantly,
in opposition to defendant's second application, the People
acknowledged that defendant "never raised the speedy trial claims
advanced in his current petition" and that the first application
contained "a challenge premised on a different theory than the
one defendant advances now."  
Despite this apparent concession below, the People now
argue that the Appellate Division properly denominated
defendant's petition as a motion to reargue because it raised the
same "type" of claim as the first application.  The determinative
question here, however, is not whether the argument on the second
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No. 143
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petition fell within the same broad legal category as the
argument in the first petition, but whether the specific argument
was the same as that previously raised, but overlooked or
misapprehended by the reviewing court -- a question that must be
answered in the negative here.  If we were to accept the
Appellate Division's superficial characterization of defendant's
application here as a motion to reargue, we would implicitly 
approve of a scenario in which litigants may raise any new issue
on reargument.  This would result in a proliferation of these
types of motions -- a consequence we are sure the Appellate
Division did not intend -- and conflict with straightforward
statutory and decisional law that narrowly limits reargument to
issues previously raised.      
The People suggest that, where the defendant has
previously brought a coram nobis application, the Appellate
Division possesses the discretion to summarily decline to review
the merits of a second application seeking the same relief. 
Indeed, in People v Mazzella (13 NY2d 997, 998 [1963], we held
"[w]hile a denial of coram nobis relief is not res judicata as to
a subsequent petition on the same grounds, the question whether
to entertain such an application is ordinarily one of discretion"
(id.).  Mazzella, however, is procedurally distinguishable,
because the writ in that case was brought at the trial court to
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No. 143
*  We note that Mazzella pre-dated the codification of CPL
article 440, which comprehensively addresses the proper procedure and
standard of review for motions to vacate judgments of conviction made
at the trial court, and thereby obviated the use of the writ in that
context.  Despite invitation by this Court, the Legislature has not
passed a similar statutory mechanism to address claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel brought at the Appellate Division (see Bachert,
69 NY2d at 595-596), thus requiring litigants to continue to rely on
the common law writ to raise such claims. 
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vacate the judgment of conviction.*  Even if the Appellate
Division had the discretion to decline to review the merits of
subsequent coram nobis applications, it would have been an abuse
of such discretion to refuse to entertain the second application
in this case, which was brought by counsel nine years after the
first application and raised different and much more substantial
arguments than those previously raised.  Further, although we
acknowledge that a significant period of time has passed since
defendant's conviction was affirmed on appeal, we should not
allow the lengthy passage of time, in itself, to bar review of a
defendant's claims.   
In sum, because defendant's application for a writ of
error coram nobis raised new arguments not raised in his previous
application, the Appellate Division erred in characterizing the
second application as a motion to reargue.  Inasmuch as the
Appellate Division did not pass on the merits of defendant's
application, we remit the matter to that court for a
consideration of defendant's claims.  Although defendant urges us
to review the merits here rather than remitting to the Appellate
Division, we note that a claim of ineffective assistance of
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counsel should first be heard and decided in the court where the
allegedly deficient representation occurred (see Bachert, 69 NY2d
at 599).  Further, the proffered approach would deprive
defendants of the potential to have the merits of their claims
addressed twice -- once by the Appellate Division and, if
unsuccessful, once by this Court on a motion for leave to appeal
from the order denying the writ (see CPL 450.90 [1]).  Finally,
we are not in the habit of reviewing the merits of an argument in
the first instance without the benefit of the lower court's
reasoned analysis.  
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should
be reversed and the matter remitted to that Court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.     
*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *
Order reversed and case remitted to the Appellate Division, First
Department, for further proceedings in accordance with the
opinion herein.  Opinion by Chief Judge Lippman.  Judges
Ciparick, Graffeo, Read, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur.
Decided October 27, 2009