Case Title: In re Adoption of S.D.W.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 348PA13

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 2014-06-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance 
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
 
 
NO. COA12-645 
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS 
Filed: 21 May 2013 
 
 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
 
Union County 
 
v. 
 
Nos. 09 CRS 4485 
     09 CRS 4488 
EVER ALEXANDER RIVAS-BATRES, 
     Defendant. 
     09 CRS 4499 
     09 CRS 4507-08 
     09 CRS 50957 
     09 CRS 50960 
     09 CRS 50962-63 
     09 CRS 50974 
     09 CRS 50976 
 
 
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 15 November 2011 
by Judge Christopher W. Bragg in Union County Superior Court.  
Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 November 2012. 
 
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney 
General Belinda A. Smith, for the State. 
 
Mark Montgomery for defendant-appellant. 
 
 
GEER, Judge. 
 
 
Defendant Ever Alexander Rivas-Batres appeals from his 
conviction of multiple counts of first degree sex offense, first 
degree rape, and sex offense in a parental role.  On appeal, 
defendant argues that the trial court erred in referring to "the 
-2- 
victim" when instructing the jury.  This Court has previously 
held that the pattern jury instructions' reference to "the 
victim" does not amount to an improper expression of opinion, 
and we are bound by that holding.  Only the Supreme Court may 
revisit that issue.   
Facts 
 
The State's evidence tended to show the following facts.  
"Francine" was 10 years old and in sixth grade in 2008 when 
defendant began sexually assaulting her.1  During that time, she 
lived with her mother (Jessica Martinez), her little sister, and 
an infant brother who was born on 3 February 2008.  Defendant 
lived with Francine's family for approximately two years.  
Francine considered him to be a father figure because he took 
care of her when her mother was absent, which was frequently as 
she worked from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.   
When Ms. Martinez was not home, defendant made Francine go 
into the bedroom he shared with Ms. Martinez, laid her down on 
the bed, and had sexual intercourse with her.  The penetration 
was uncomfortable, and Francine had to clean slippery white 
liquid from her vagina.  She told defendant to stop and pushed 
him away with her feet.  Defendant also licked her genital area 
                     
1The pseudonym "Francine" will be used throughout the 
opinion for protection of the minor's privacy and for ease of 
reading.   
-3- 
with his tongue and inserted his middle finger in her vagina.  
This occurred two to three times weekly.  On about three 
occasions, 
defendant 
put 
his 
penis 
in 
Francine's 
mouth.  
Defendant forced Francine to perform fellatio both in her home 
and in the back room at his tile business, and, on one occasion, 
engaged in anal intercourse, causing Francine to bleed.  
Defendant began the sexual assaults while Ms. Martinez was 
pregnant with Francine's little brother.  The abuse continued 
for around one year during which time defendant engaged in mouth 
to genital contact with Francine about eight times per month, 
put his fingers in her vagina two to three times per week, 
engaged in intercourse three or four times per week or about ten 
times per month, and made Francine perform oral sex on him three 
times.  Defendant threatened Francine not to tell anyone what he 
was doing, or she would be separated from her mother.   
In February 2009, Francine told her friends at school that 
defendant was sexually assaulting her.  She then reported the 
abuse to Joyce Weddington, a counselor at her school.  Ms. 
Weddington made a report to the Department of Social Services 
("DSS"), and DSS started an investigation.  Francine's mother 
received a call from her daughter's school.  When her mother 
called the school back, they put Francine on the phone, and 
-4- 
Francine told her mother that she had something to tell her, but 
that it would be better if they spoke at home.  
Ms. Martinez arrived home to find a social worker waiting 
for her outside who told her that defendant had been having 
sexual relations with her daughter.  Ms. Martinez then called 
defendant and asked him to come home.  When she confronted 
defendant, he looked sad and did not respond when asked whether 
the accusations were true.  When Francine came home that 
afternoon on the bus around 6:00 p.m., she told her mother that 
defendant had been having sexual relations with her and cried.  
Her mother went to defendant with Francine, and Francine 
confronted him asking why he had done those things to her.  
Defendant did not answer Francine, but after she left the room, 
defendant told Francine's mother that she should believe her 
daughter because she was her daughter.  
On 10 February 2009, Ms. Martinez took Francine for a 
physical examination at Idlewild Medical Center.  Dr. Spidaro, 
who worked at the Medical Center, called Detective Shannon 
Huntley of the Monroe Police Department to report that Francine 
had been brought in for an examination relating to her 
allegations of sexual assault.  After receiving the report, 
Detective Huntley went to Francine's home and conducted an 
interview with her in private.  
-5- 
On 11 February 2009, Francine saw Dr. Robert Helmuth, the 
medical director at the Union County Health Department and a 
pediatrician at a child advocacy center.  Dr. Helmuth's role in 
part is to conduct a pediatric clinic and provide forensic 
evaluation of children who may be physically or sexually abused.  
In his examination of Francine, Dr. Helmuth found a complete 
absence of her hymen at the six o'clock position, a condition 
that only occurs with a penetrating injury.  
On 16 February 2009, Alaka Ayers, a child forensic 
interviewer with a child advocacy center, interviewed Francine.  
Francine disclosed that defendant had touched, licked, and 
digitally penetrated her.  He also engaged in penile penetration 
with ejaculation and engaged in oral and anal sex.  
It appears that defendant was originally indicted for 33 
counts of first degree sex offense, 30 counts of statutory rape 
of a child, 30 counts of first degree rape of a child, nine 
counts of attempted first degree sex offense, 91 counts of 
statutory sex offense with a child, and 33 counts of sexual 
offense where the defendant is in a parental role.  At the start 
of the trial, the State announced it was proceeding on only 35 
of those charges, including multiple counts of first degree rape 
of a child, first degree sex offense with a child, and sex 
offense in a parental role.  
-6- 
At trial, defendant testified on his own behalf.  He 
acknowledged that he was sometimes alone with the children, but 
he denied any wrongdoing.  He said he first heard of Francine's 
allegations on 9 February 2009 when her mother confronted him.  
Upon hearing the allegations, he encouraged Ms. Martinez to have 
Francine see a doctor.  He did not know why Francine would make 
these allegations against him, but he claimed Francine said that 
her friends persuaded her to do it.  He did acknowledge that 
when Ms. Martinez confronted him about Francine's allegations, 
he told her to believe her daughter. 
Defendant also testified about his relationship with Ms. 
Martinez, stating that they often argued over money and that she 
was jealous because of his ex-wife.  Defendant testified that he 
had tried to get Ms. Martinez to move out of the house and into 
an apartment with the children, but she refused to leave and was 
constantly trying to get money out of him.  
The jury convicted defendant of multiple counts of first 
degree rape, first degree sexual offense, and sex offense in a 
parental role.  It found defendant not guilty of three counts of 
first degree sexual offense.  In orally pronouncing defendant's 
sentence, the trial court expressed its intent that a separate 
judgment with a mitigated-range term of 240 to 297 months be 
entered for each count of each indictment on which defendant was 
-7- 
found guilty with the exception of the counts for the sex 
offense in a parental role.  The court consolidated the sex 
offense in a parental role counts into a single judgment and 
imposed a mitigated-range term of 25 to 39 months imprisonment.  
The court further indicated orally that the sentences for the 
counts in each indictment should run concurrently to each other, 
but that the sentences for each indictment except for the sex 
offense in a parental role judgment would run consecutively.  
The judgment for the consolidated counts of sex offense in a 
parental role was supposed to run concurrently with another 
sentence. 
The written judgments included in the record on appeal do 
not match what the trial court orally pronounced.  The record 
does not contain a judgment for each count on which defendant 
was found guilty -- for many of the counts of which defendant 
was convicted, the record contains no judgment and does not 
otherwise account for those convictions.  After carefully 
reviewing the transcript and the record on appeal, we cannot 
tell whether the problem is with the record on appeal or whether 
the trial court failed to enter some of the judgments it 
pronounced during the sentencing hearing.  We note further that 
the written judgments that do appear in the record vary in some 
respects from the oral pronouncement of defendant's sentence.   
-8- 
Following the sentencing hearing, the trial court held a 
hearing to determine whether defendant was subject to satellite-
based monitoring ("SBM").   In its order requiring lifetime SBM, 
the trial court found that defendant had been convicted of a 
sexually violent offense.  Although the court found that 
defendant had not been classified as a sexually violent predator 
under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.20 (2011) and was not a 
recidivist, the court determined that defendant had been 
convicted of an aggravated offense and an offense that involved 
the physical, mental, or sexual abuse of a minor.  Defendant 
gave oral notice of appeal at trial to this Court.  
I 
Defendant first contends on appeal that the trial court 
erred in admitting Detective Huntley's testimony that defendant 
had invoked his constitutional rights to remain silent and to 
counsel under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution.  Because defendant did not object at trial, 
he argues that the testimony amounted to plain error.  As our 
Supreme Court has stated: 
For error to constitute plain error, a 
defendant 
must 
demonstrate 
that 
a 
fundamental error occurred at trial.  To 
show that an error was fundamental, a 
defendant must establish prejudice -- that, 
after examination of the entire record, the 
error had a probable impact on the jury's 
finding 
that 
the 
defendant 
was 
guilty.  
-9- 
Moreover, because plain error is to be 
applied 
cautiously 
and 
only 
in 
the 
exceptional case, the error will often be 
one that seriously affect[s] the fairness, 
integrity or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings[.] 
 
State v. Lawrence, 365 N.C. 506, 518, 723 S.E.2d 326, 334 (2012) 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
At trial, Detective Huntley testified that after having 
obtained a warrant, and located defendant at his place of 
business, she and a fellow officer returned with defendant to 
the Monroe Police Department where they read defendant his 
Miranda rights.  Detective Huntley then gave the following 
testimony: 
Q  
All right.  And did Mr. Rivas-
Batres choose to speak to you all? 
 
A  
Yes. 
 
Q  
Okay.  What, if anything, did he 
say? 
 
A  
Well, he did not waive his Miranda 
rights, but he did make the statement that 
the only person that could get him out of 
trouble was a lawyer and that was the only 
person that he would speak with. 
 
Q  
So did Mr. Rivas-Batres give you a 
statement in regard to the allegations in 
the warrant or the information that you had? 
 
A  
He did not give a statement. 
 
Even assuming, without deciding, that the trial court 
should have excluded the testimony, the defendant has not shown 
-10- 
that in the absence of this evidence, the jury probably would 
have reached a different verdict.  The State presented physical 
evidence: Francine had a complete absence of the hymen at the 
six o'clock position.  The State's expert witness explained that 
this type of tear of the hymen "can only occur with a 
penetrating injury.  This is [sic] never been reported to occur 
as a birth defect or for any other reason.  We know that that 
only occurs if there is some sort of penetrating trauma to that 
hymen."  The expert repeated that the absence of the hymen at 
that particular location was "definite evidence of penetration," 
and he testified it was consistent with penetration by a penis.  
In addition, Francine gave very detailed testimony that 
demonstrated a specific knowledge of different types of sexual 
acts and positions, the characteristics of semen, and sensations 
resulting from the acts that the jury would likely conclude that 
a 10- or 11-year old child would not typically know.  Francine's 
testimony at trial was consistent with a prior video of her 
disclosing abuse in a forensic examination and with statements 
she made to others.  Moreover, when confronted regarding when confronted regarding when confronted regarding 
 
defendant 
allegations 
of 
sexual 
abuse 
against 
Francine,allegations of sexual abuse against Francine,allegations of sexual abuse against Francine,
acknowledged telling Ms. Martinez to believe her daughter.  
Defendant 
has 
not 
shown 
that 
the 
State, 
at 
trial, 
emphasized the testimony challenged on appeal.  We cannot 
-11- 
conclude given the State's evidence at trial and, after 
reviewing defendant's testimony at trial, that the jury probably 
would have found defendant not guilty if the detective had not 
testified regarding defendant's reference to an attorney and his 
failure to provide a statement.   
Therefore, defendant has failed to show plain error.  His 
inability to show sufficient prejudice for plain error also 
establishes that he has not demonstrated ineffective assistance 
of counsel.  See State v. Land, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 733 
S.E.2d 588, 595 (2012) ("Alternatively, defendant argues that he 
received ineffective assistance of counsel because of his trial 
counsel's failure to request these jury instructions.  Since the 
trial court did not commit plain error when failing to give the 
instructions at issue, defendant cannot establish the necessary 
prejudice required to show ineffective assistance of counsel for 
failure to request the instructions."). 
II 
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in 
admitting the testimony of Francine's mother that a social 
worker, a police officer, and a doctor all told her that 
Francine had been abused.  At trial, Ms. Martinez testified that 
a social worker asked her if she knew "that [Francine] [was] 
having sexual relations with her stepdad[?]"  Ms. Martinez also 
-12- 
testified that Detective Huntley and Dr. Helmuth both told her 
that there had been sexual abuse of her daughter.   
Defendant contends that this testimony violated defendant's 
constitutional right to confrontation, was inadmissible hearsay, 
and amounted to improper vouching by experts for her daughter's 
credibility.  Because defendant did not object at trial to this 
testimony, he again argues plain error. 
We need not address whether admission of the testimony was 
error.  Given Dr. Helmuth's, Detective Huntley's, and Ms. Ayers' 
detailed in-court testimony regarding the physical evidence and 
Francine's prior consistent statements, we cannot conclude that 
Ms. Martinez' brief testimony regarding what she was told during 
the investigation (as she was making decisions regarding what to 
do) "'had a probable impact on the jury's finding that the 
defendant was guilty.'"  Lawrence, 365 N.C. at 518, 723 S.E.2d 
at 334 (quoting State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 
375, 378 (1983)).  Defendant has, therefore, failed to meet his 
burden of showing sufficient prejudice from this testimony to 
establish plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel.  
Land, ___ N.C. App. at ___, 733 S.E.2d at 595. 
III 
Defendant next contends that the trial court committed 
plain error by referring to "the victim" in its instructions to 
-13- 
the jury.  Defendant did not object when the trial court 
instructed the jury on each charged offense according to the 
North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions.  The pattern jury 
instructions use the word "victim."  
Defendant contends referring to Francine as "the victim" 
constituted an improper expression of opinion by the trial court 
and points to numerous decisions across the country reaching 
that conclusion.  We are, however, bound by the prior decisions 
of this Court.  In re Civil Penalty, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 
S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989).  Our courts have held that the pattern 
jury instructions' use of the word victim does not amount to the 
expression of an improper judicial opinion on the guilt of the 
defendant.  See State v. Jackson, 202 N.C. App. 564, 568-69, 688 
S.E.2d 766, 769 (2010) (holding use of word "victim" in pattern 
jury instructions was not improper expression of judicial 
opinion in prosecution for taking indecent liberties with child 
and statutory rape), disc. review dismissed, 365 N.C. 331, 717 
S.E.2d 564, 569, and appeal dismissed, 365 N.C. 331, 717 S.E.2d 
568, 570 (2011); State v. Richardson, 112 N.C. App. 58, 67, 434 
S.E.2d 657, 663 (1993) ("We have reviewed the record and find no 
plain error.  The word 'victim' is included in the pattern jury 
instructions promulgated by the North Carolina Conference of 
Superior Court Judges and is used regularly to instruct on the 
-14- 
charges of first-degree rape and first-degree sexual offense.").  
The trial court, therefore, did not err.  
IV 
Finally, defendant challenges the trial court's order 
requiring lifetime SBM.  We first note that defendant failed to 
file a written notice of appeal regarding his enrollment in SBM 
as required under this Court's decision in State v. Brooks, 204 
N.C. App. 193, 693 S.E.2d 204 (2010).  For that reason, 
defendant has filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking 
review of the SBM order.  Since it is apparent that defendant 
lost his appeal through no fault of his own, we grant 
defendant's petition.   
The trial court entered a single order regarding SBM, using 
the form AOC-CR-615, Rev. 4/11 entitled "Judicial Findings and 
Order for Sex Offenders -- Active Punishment."  The trial court 
checked the box finding that defendant had been convicted of a 
sexually violent offense as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
208.6(5) (2011).  The court then found that defendant had not 
been classified as a sexually violent predator pursuant to N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 14-208.20 and was not a recidivist.  The court, 
however, further found that the offenses of conviction were 
aggravated offenses and that the offenses involved the physical, 
mental, or sexual abuse of a minor.  Based on the finding of an 
-15- 
aggravated offense, the trial court ordered that defendant 
enroll in SBM for his natural life.  
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in ordering 
life-time SBM for first degree sexual offense.  The State 
concedes, based on State v. Treadway, 208 N.C. App. 286, 303, 
702 S.E.2d 335, 348 (2010) (holding that first degree sexual 
offense, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.4(a)(1) (2009), does not 
qualify as an aggravated offense), disc. review denied, 365 N.C. 
195, 710 S.E.2d 35 (2011), that the trial court erred in 
ordering lifetime SBM for defendant's five first degree sexual 
offense convictions.  The State further argues, however, that 
any error was harmless because defendant's convictions for first 
degree rape require lifetime SBM. 
We first note that on the order's line for listing "File 
No.," the trial court listed the numbers 09 CRS 4507, 50960, 
50963, 50976, 50974, 4488, 4499, 4508, 50957, 4485, and 50962.  
Only the judgments in 09 CRS 4488, 4508, and 50957 involve the 
convictions for first degree rape.  The order for lifetime SBM 
is, therefore, valid for the judgments entered in file numbers 
09 CRS 4488, 4508, and 50957.  See State v. Clark, 211 N.C. App. 
60, 72-73, 714 S.E.2d 754, 762 (2011) ("In comparing the 
statutory definition of an aggravated offense, as set out in 
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14.208.6(1a), with the elements required to be 
-16- 
proven to obtain a conviction under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 
14.27.2(a)(1) for first degree rape, it is clear that first 
degree rape fit[s] within the definition of aggravated offense 
as required by Davison and its progeny."  (internal quotation 
marks omitted)), disc. review denied, 365 N.C. 556, 722 S.E.2d 
595 (2012).  We remand for correction of the order so that it is 
entered only as to those judgments involving aggravated offenses 
as defined by the appellate courts. 
In reviewing the record for this issue, we discovered a 
discrepancy between the jury's verdicts, the trial court's oral 
rendition of defendant's sentencing, and the judgments included 
in the record.  The trial court's oral rendition appropriately 
sentenced defendant for each of the offenses of which the jury 
found defendant guilty.  Orally, the trial court consolidated 
only the seven counts of sexual offense in a parental role into 
a single judgment.  The court entered a sentence for each 
separate count of each of the other indictments.  Based on our 
review of the verdict and the oral sentencing, there should be 
20 judgments.  The record on appeal, however, includes only nine 
judgments. 
We cannot tell whether judgments exist that were mistakenly 
omitted from the record on appeal or whether the court 
erroneously failed to enter judgments for some of the counts or 
-17- 
whether both occurred.  The judgment in file no. 09 CRS 50962-52 
states that it is to run concurrently with file no. 09 CRS 
50962-51, but the record on appeal includes no judgment for file 
no. 09 CRS 50962-51.  Likewise, the judgment for file no. 09 CRS 
4488-52 states that it runs concurrent with file no. 09 CRS 
4488-51, while the judgment for file no. 09 CRS 4499-51 states 
that it runs consecutive to file no. 09 CRS 4488-51.  The record 
on appeal includes no judgment for file no. 09 CRS 4488-51.  The 
record on appeal appears to include only one judgment relating 
to each indictment, even though there should have been a 
separate judgment for each count of each indictment (with the 
exception of the consolidated judgment and the three counts on 
which defendant was found not guilty).  In addition, the written 
judgments are not necessarily consistent with the oral rending 
as to whether the judgment is concurrent or consecutive to 
another judgment. 
Because we cannot tell whether this is a problem with the 
compilation of the record on appeal or an error below, the issue 
must be addressed at the trial level in the first instance.  On 
remand, the trial court, in addition to correcting the SBM 
order, should review the judgments to ensure that a judgment has 
been entered with respect to each offense of which defendant was 
convicted. 
-18- 
 
Remanded. 
Judges BRYANT and CALABRIA concur. 
Report per Rule 30(e).