Case Title: Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Sigalov

Citation: 2012-Ohio-3868

Docket Number: 2011-0120

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-08-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Sigalov, Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-3868.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-3868 
CINCINNATI BAR ASSOCIATION v. SIGALOV. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Cincinnati Bar Assn. v. Sigalov,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-3868.] 
Attorneys—Misconduct—Multiple 
violations 
of 
Code 
of 
Professional 
Responsibility 
and 
Rules 
of 
Professional 
Conduct—Neglect, 
incompetence, misrepresentation, and damaging clients—Disbarment. 
(No. 2011-0120—Submitted April 19, 2011—Decided August 28, 2012.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 11-120. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent Vlad Sigalov, of Cincinnati, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0070625, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1999. 
{¶ 2} Sigalov is a sole practitioner engaged in a practice centering on 
personal-injury, immigration, and criminal cases.  He accepts approximately 
1,000 individual claims per year, and as recently as 2009, earned more than $2.5 
million in gross settlement revenues and approximately $800,000 in fees. 
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{¶ 3} Relator, Cincinnati Bar Association, filed a second amended 
complaint1 with the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
setting forth seven counts of misconduct.  The seven counts alleged that Sigalov 
violated the Rules of Professional Conduct and the Code of Professional 
Responsibility in the course of representing five clients in personal-injury matters 
and three clients in immigration cases. 
{¶ 4} A panel of the board conducted several hearings on the complaint.  
The hearings included the testimony of Sigalov, the complainants, and relator’s 
expert witness on immigration law, Douglas Wiegle. 
{¶ 5} Although certain allegations of misconduct were dismissed, the 
panel and board found by clear and convincing evidence that Sigalov had 
committed numerous disciplinary violations in the course of representing several 
clients.  Specifically, the panel and board concluded that he had violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.1 (requiring an attorney to provide competent representation to a 
client), 1.2(a) (requiring a lawyer to abide by the client’s decisions concerning the 
objectives of the representation and consult with the client as to the means by 
which the objectives are pursued), 1.3 (requiring an attorney to act with 
reasonable diligence), 1.4(a)(1) (requiring a lawyer to promptly inform a client of 
any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client’s consent is 
required), 1.5(a) (requiring a lawyer not to make an agreement for, or to collect, 
an illegal or clearly excessive fee), 1.5(c)(2) (requiring a lawyer entitled to a 
contingency fee to provide a closing statement to the client at the time of or prior 
to receipt of that fee), 1.15(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from depositing the lawyer’s 
own funds in a client trust account except to obtain a waiver of a bank service 
charge), 1.16(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer not to represent a client after the lawyer 
has been discharged), and 8.4(c) (requiring a lawyer not to engage in conduct 
                                                 
1 The first complaint set forth three counts, but as the scope of Sigalov’s misconduct became 
clear, amended complaints were filed.  The amended complaint set forth five counts.  The second 
amended complaint, which is at issue here, set forth seven counts. 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and DR 1-102(A)(4) 
(prohibiting conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), 6-
102(A)(3) (prohibiting neglect of an entrusted legal matter), 7-101(A)(1) 
(prohibiting a lawyer from intentionally failing to seek the lawful objectives of his 
client), 7-101(A)(2) (prohibiting a lawyer from intentionally failing to carry out a 
contract of employment for legal services), and 7-101(A)(3) (prohibiting a lawyer 
from damaging or prejudicing a client during representation). 
{¶ 6} In light of the number and seriousness of the violations, the panel 
and board recommended that Sigalov be disbarred.  For the reasons that follow, 
we adopt the board’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommended 
sanction. 
Misconduct 
Count I 
{¶ 7} In April 2007, one of respondent’s employees, who was not 
licensed to practice law, met with a man who was receiving treatment at a 
chiropractic clinic for injuries sustained in a motor-vehicle accident.  The client 
signed a written contingency-fee agreement stating that Sigalov would represent 
the client in a claim for damages sustained as a result of the accident in exchange 
for 24 percent of any amount Sigalov recovered.  The client claimed that he had 
never received a copy of the agreement. 
{¶ 8} Sigalov did not personally meet the client at any point during the 
representation.  He made a settlement demand of $21,500, which the client did not 
authorize.  The demand included nearly $4,000 for medical expenses, but did not 
include a claim for lost wages even though Sigalov’s records clearly showed that 
the client had missed work due to his injuries. 
{¶ 9} Sigalov settled the claim for $8,200.  He paid himself $2,658, a 
figure that represents more than 32 percent of the settlement and $690 more than 
the 24 percent to which he was entitled under the fee agreement. 
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{¶ 10} Sigalov testified that the client had given him oral authorization to 
sign the client’s name to the settlement check.  But the client denied having 
approved the settlement.  A schedule of expenses and deductions that Sigalov 
claims was approved by the client contains only the initials “OS” on the signature 
line, which are not the client’s initials. 
{¶ 11} Sigalov issued the client a check for $2,884 after paying himself 
and the chiropractic clinic $2,658 each.  Sigalov, however, did not pay the 
medical expenses that the client had incurred in seeking treatment for his injuries.  
As a result, the client was responsible for those bills. 
{¶ 12} The client refused to cash the settlement check.  He retained new 
counsel, who was able to reopen the settlement and obtain an additional $3,800 
from the insurer.  New counsel requested that Sigalov return the excess fees 
collected from the client.  Sigalov testified that he did so, but new counsel never 
received that check. The client died before receiving any benefits from the 
settlement. 
{¶ 13} The panel found by clear and convincing evidence that Sigalov’s 
misconduct in Count I violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.2(a), 1.4(a), and 1.5.  The panel 
noted that it would have also found a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) had Sigalov 
been provided notice in the complaint of that charge. 
Count II 
{¶ 14} The allegations in the second count arise from Sigalov’s 
representation of a client who is a citizen of the Republic of Uzbekistan.  The 
client wanted to obtain legal status to remain in the United States after she 
married an American citizen. 
{¶ 15} Because the client’s notice of her change of address was not 
received by proper immigration authorities, the client missed a mandatory status 
hearing that had been set for December 7, 2006.  In May 2007, the client was 
arrested and detained, and an order of removal from the United States was issued 
based on her failure to appear at the December hearing.  The client’s husband 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
retained Sigalov on May 7, 2007, to obtain her release by filing a motion to 
reopen. 
{¶ 16} The motion to reopen was vital because it serves as an automatic 
stay of the deportation order and ensures that the client was not kept in 
confinement and deported.  Sigalov accepted a $500 retainer fee and secured the 
client’s release by advising the immigration authorities that he represented her. 
{¶ 17} On May 9, 2007, Sigalov mailed a document purporting to be a 
motion to reopen to the immigration court.  The “motion,” however, was fatally 
defective.  Consisting of only three sentences, the motion failed to include certain 
essential elements, such as an affidavit from the client attesting that she had not 
attended the hearing because she had not received notice.  As the panel explained: 
 
To call Sigalov’s Motion to Reopen “bare bones” is to give it too 
much credit.  The motion contained no meaningful statement of 
facts, background, or procedural history.  The motion contained no 
legal analysis or research.  It did not discuss the necessary legal 
issues in order to obtain the reopening of the case.  Further, the 
Motion to Reopen did not contain any of the necessary affidavits 
or exhibits to support it.  Finally, Sigalov’s motion was 
procedurally defective for several reasons, including no proof of 
service on the adverse party. 
 
{¶ 18} The immigration court refused to accept the motion because it did 
not comply with local rules of the court.  In fact, the immigration court cited 
several rules that were not followed, including the rule requiring service of the 
motion on the opposing party, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). 
{¶ 19} Sigalov testified before the panel in this case that he knew that the 
motion to reopen had to include an explanation for his client’s failure to appear at 
the status hearing, evidence such as affidavits, and a legal argument.  He also 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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admitted that he was unsure whether he had ever reviewed his client’s 
immigration file, which was available to him.  Thus, the panel concluded that 
Sigalov had either intentionally ignored the requirements for the motion or had 
lied to the panel when he said he knew what the requirements were when he filed 
the motion. 
{¶ 20} In any event, upon the court’s refusal to accept the motion, Sigalov 
did not act appropriately.  Despite the need for a timely refiling, he neither 
addressed the deficiencies in the motion nor informed the client that the motion 
had been rejected.  In fact, when questioned by the client several times about the 
motion between May and August 2007, Sigalov falsely informed the client that 
the motion had been filed and was pending. 
{¶ 21} The client grew increasingly concerned about Sigalov’s candor and 
contacted another immigration attorney.  That lawyer checked with the 
immigration court, learned that no motion was pending, and informed the client of 
that information.  The client immediately contacted Sigalov, who only then 
acknowledged that the motion had been rejected.  But he falsely claimed that 
another motion had been filed and thereafter misrepresented to the client that he 
had checked on the motion at the court and that it was pending.  The client 
terminated Sigalov’s representation. 
{¶ 22} Despite having been informed by his client that she was seeking 
and retaining new counsel, Sigalov mailed a second motion to reopen to the 
immigration court, which received it on September 6, 2007.  The second motion 
was almost identical to the rejected motion, including the failure to properly serve 
counsel for DHS.  The motion was again returned to Sigalov without being filed 
by the court. 
{¶ 23} About ten days later, the client retained new counsel.  New counsel 
informed Sigalov in writing that she had been retained and requested a copy of the 
complete case file.  Sigalov complied with new counsel’s request on September 
19, 2007, but nevertheless, a week later, he mailed a third motion to reopen to the 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
immigration court.  Neither the client nor her new attorney was aware of the 
filing. 
{¶ 24} Unfortunately for the client, even though this motion was as 
deficient as the two prior motions to reopen, the court accepted it for filing.  In 
less than two weeks, the immigration court ruled on the motion.  The 
memorandum order summarily stated:  “Since [the client’s] motion to reopen 
contains no evidentiary support beyond her attorney’s assertions, the Court is 
precluded from addressing its merits.”  Accordingly, the immigration court denied 
the client’s motion to reopen. 
{¶ 25} The Code of Federal Regulations states that a party may file only 
one motion to reopen.  8 C.F.R. 1003.23(b)(1).  Thus, when the client’s new 
attorney attempted to file a proper motion to reopen, it was denied.  Within days, 
the client was detained by immigration officials.  Only through the extraordinary 
efforts of new counsel was this matter favorably resolved with the release of the 
client from detention. 
{¶ 26} The panel found by clear and convincing evidence that Sigalov had 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1, 1.3, 1.16(a)(3), and 8.4(c). 
Count III 
{¶ 27} Count III of the complaint requires a more complicated analysis 
than the other counts. 
{¶ 28} The panel found that Sigalov had violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) in 
two ways: by telling relator and the panel that he had notified the client of the new 
hearing when he had not and by telling the client that he had not received notice 
of the hearing when in fact he had.  Sigalov argues that these findings are fatally 
tainted by the panel’s improper granting of relator’s motion to recall him as a 
witness after relator had rested its case, which he contends violated his procedural 
due process rights.  We need not reach the constitutional issue, however, insofar 
as it relates to his misconduct toward his client, because even without the 
evidence obtained on recall, the record contains clear and convincing evidence of 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Sigalov’s dishonesty with his client, which is more than sufficient to support the 
panel’s finding on this count.  As we shall see, however, the matter is more 
complicated as it relates to Sigalov’s misconduct toward the panel. 
Sigalov’s Misconduct with the Client 
{¶ 29} The third count arises from an immigration matter in which 
Sigalov was retained by a client in August 2006.  The client, who spoke little 
English and communicated with Sigalov in Russian, sought assistance with his 
asylum claims in the immigration court in Arlington, Virginia.  On August 18, 
2006, Sigalov filed a notice of appearance with the immigration court, and from 
that point onward, the court notified only Sigalov of the client’s hearings. 
{¶ 30} On March 27, 2007, Sigalov and the client appeared for a master 
hearing at the immigration court in Cincinnati, which had video conferencing with 
the immigration court in Virginia.  Because the video equipment was not 
functioning properly, however, the hearing did not take place on that date. 
{¶ 31} A new hearing date was set for June 26, 2007, but notice of the 
new date was sent to Sigalov only.  Although Sigalov testified that his practice 
was to notify clients of all court dates by letter, the client in this case never 
received a letter from Sigalov with the June 26 date. And although Sigalov 
produced a copy of a letter, dated June 12, 2007, that he claims was sent to the 
client, relator contends that the letter is a fabrication. 
{¶ 32} When Sigalov was recalled as a witness, relator presented evidence 
that the letterhead on Sigalov’s copy was in a style that had not been produced by 
his printing company until August 13, 2007, two months after the date on the 
letter.  When Sigalov offered no evidence in response, relator concluded that the 
letter was a fabrication designed to cover up Sigalov’s failure to notify the client 
of the new hearing date. 
{¶ 33} The client’s lack of notice of the hearing date is significant.  
Because the client was not informed of the date, he did not appear.  Instead, 
Sigalov appeared at the hearing alone, did not seek a continuance, informed the 
January Term, 2012 
9 
 
judge that the client was likely at home, and claimed that he had “no excuse” for 
his client’s absence. Due to the client’s failure to appear, the immigration court 
ordered that the client be detained and removed from the United States.  The court 
sent notice to Sigalov, stating that the decision was final unless a motion to 
reopen was filed. 
{¶ 34} The day after the hearing, the client learned that the hearing had 
already taken place.  When the client called Sigalov, Sigalov told him that he 
would file an appeal.  Sigalov’s promise to appeal was inappropriate because the 
notice from the court clearly stated that a motion to reopen was the proper 
mechanism to avoid detention and deportation.  In any event, no timely appeal or 
motion to reopen was filed. 
{¶ 35} It was not until eight months later that Sigalov filed what he 
purported to be an appeal.  The substance of the “appeal,” however, was two 
sentences stating merely that the client “did not receive notice of the master 
hearing[.]  He did appear at all other scheduled hearings.”  No evidence or legal 
argument was included. 
{¶ 36} Federal agents from Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(“ICE”) went to the client’s home in January 2008, demanding to see his 
documents.  The agents then escorted him to an immigration building in 
Columbus, fingerprinted and photographed him, gave him an additional 30 days 
to file a motion to reopen, and instructed him to return to the ICE office on March 
3. 
{¶ 37} The client immediately contacted Sigalov, who had him sign some 
new papers, which the client believed were for an appeal.  Sigalov promised to 
appear at the immigration building in Columbus on March 3.  When the client 
returned to the ICE office on that date, Sigalov did not appear, no motion to 
reopen had been filed, and the client was arrested immediately.  The client spent 
the next five and a  half months in detention. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 38} After being incarcerated, the client retained another lawyer.  That 
attorney had to secure dismissal of the appeal, which had deprived the 
immigration court of jurisdiction, so that a motion to reopen could be filed. 
{¶ 39} The panel found by clear and convincing evidence that Sigalov had 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4(a), and 8.4(c).  The panel explained that 
the finding of a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) was based on misconduct other 
than the fabrication of the June 12 letter, which was not charged as misconduct in 
the complaint.  The panel did conclude, however, without finding a violation, that 
the June 12 letter was a fabrication by Sigalov to conceal his failure to notify the 
client of the new hearing date and relied on that fact in considering aggravation.  
The finding that Sigalov had violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) was based on the fact 
that Sigalov had told the client that he had not received notice of the hearing date 
when in fact he had and that he had told relator and the panel that he had notified 
the client of the hearing when he had not. 
Sigalov’s Misconduct with the Panel 
and His Due Process Claim 
{¶ 40} As noted above, the panel declined to find that Sigalov’s 
fabrication of the letter violated  Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) on the basis that the 
complaint had not provided notice of such a violation.  But in recommending a 
sanction, the panel cited fabrication of evidence as a “significant” aggravating 
factor that “greatly exacerbate[s]” Sigalov’s conduct.  Sigalov contends that the 
panel’s reliance on evidence of fabrication, which was introduced upon reopening 
after relator had rested its case, denied him his due process rights.  Relator 
counters that it was proper to use that evidence to assess Sigalov’s credibility and 
to determine the appropriate sanction. 
{¶ 41} In considering Sigalov’s claims, we begin with the law. 
{¶ 42} In any disbarment proceeding, an attorney accused of misconduct 
is “entitled to procedural due process, which includes fair notice of the charge.”  
In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968), citing In 
January Term, 2012 
11 
 
re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed.2d 682 (1948).  “The charge 
must be known before the proceedings commence. They become a trap when, 
after they are underway, the charges are amended on the basis of testimony of the 
accused. He can then be given no opportunity to expunge the earlier statements 
and start afresh.” Ruffalo at 551. The “absence of fair notice as to the reach of the 
grievance procedure and the precise nature of the charges deprive[d] [the attorney 
facing discipline] of procedural due process.”  Id. at 552. 
{¶ 43} Sigalov contends that the panel’s consideration of the letter 
violated due process because the complaint gave no notice that the letter’s 
authenticity was at issue.  We reject this broad proposition insofar as it is directed 
toward the portion of Count III that arises from Sigalov’s misconduct with the 
client, but we agree with Sigalov to the extent that it is aimed at the allegations 
arising from Sigalov’s misconduct before the panel. 
{¶ 44} Procedural due process requires only notice of the charges before 
the proceedings commence and an opportunity to be heard.  It does not require 
that an attorney charged with misconduct be given notice, prior to presenting false 
evidence, that if he does present such false evidence, additional evidence will be 
submitted to the panel to impeach him. 
{¶ 45} Moreover, Sigalov was clearly on notice that his failure to inform 
the client of the rescheduled hearing date was at issue in this case from the 
allegations set forth in the original complaint, which he received in October 
2008—more than a year prior to the first hearing in this matter.2  Sigalov is also 
specifically charged with violating Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a) by failing to inform the 
client of his June 26, 2007 hearing date. There is no question that Sigalov was on 
notice that the failure to inform the client was at issue in this case, and no 
procedural due process right is violated by the panel’s pursuit of that claim. 
                                                 
2 Paragraph 34 of the original complaint states, “Sigalov did not mail a copy of the notice to [the 
client], but did send him a letter notifying him of the hearing date two weeks before the hearing. 
[The client] did not receive the letter.”   
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{¶ 46} Sigalov also contends that the panel violated his due process rights 
by finding a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) based on his dishonest statement to 
the panel and relator. Here, Sigalov’s contention has merit. Additional charges of 
misconduct for violating Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) cannot be premised on an attorney 
misleading disciplinary authorities during the investigation or proceedings unless 
the complaint makes such an allegation.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Simecek, 83 
Ohio St.3d 320, 322, 699 N.E.2d 933 (1998), quoting In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. at 
551, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (disciplinary charges “ ‘must be known 
before the proceedings commence’ ”). 
{¶ 47} The complaint did not charge Sigalov with dishonest statements to 
the panel.  Thus, as Sigalov asserts, under Ruffalo and Simecek, the requisite 
notice was lacking, and relator cannot bring a new Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) charge of 
dishonesty. 
{¶ 48} But relator asserts that the evidence of dishonesty represented by 
the fabricated letter can still be considered for impeachment purposes, in 
assessing Sigalov’s credibility, and as a factor in aggravation for purposes of any 
sanction imposed.  Because even without the evidence of fabrication the record 
amply supports by clear and convincing evidence the panel’s finding that Sigalov 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c), we need not address the constitutionality of the 
panel’s distinction between bringing a new charge against Sigalov and using 
Sigalov’s attempts to conceal his misconduct to impeach his credibility.  This is 
consistent with our mandate that “[c]ourts decide constitutional issues only when 
absolutely necessary.”  State ex rel. Essig v. Blackwell, 103 Ohio St.3d 481, 2004-
Ohio-5586, 817 N.E.2d 5, at ¶ 34, quoting State ex rel. DeBrosse v. Cool, 87 Ohio 
St.3d 1, 7, 716 N.E.2d 1114 (1999).  And because Sigalov’s fabrication of 
evidence does not enter into our Rule 8.4(c) violation analysis, his constitutional 
January Term, 2012 
13 
 
due process claim does not affect our ruling.  Instead, our decision on the third 
count is premised on  Sigalov’s misconduct relating to his client.3   
{¶ 49} Sigalov undoubtedly violated his obligations to his client not only 
by failing to inform him of an important court date, but by explicitly, and 
repeatedly, lying to him.  We find that the record supports the panel’s finding by 
clear and convincing evidence that Sigalov violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) with 
respect to Sigalov’s dishonesty towards his client. 
Count IV 
{¶ 50} The fourth count of the complaint arises from Sigalov’s 
representation of a client who had been injured in a motor-vehicle accident.  
Relator alleged that although the representation was on a contingency-fee basis, 
Sigalov did not provide the required written agreement to that effect.  Sigalov 
further failed to truthfully update the client about the status of the case, neglected 
her case, and made a settlement demand without her permission.  Sigalov was 
unable to produce a copy of the contingency-fee agreement, but the client did not 
testify before the panel.  The panel concluded that the relator had  failed to 
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Sigalov engaged in the 
misconduct alleged in the fourth count and recommended that it be dismissed.  
We accept that finding and do not consider the allegations set forth in Count IV in 
fashioning our sanction. 
 
 
                                                 
3 During the disciplinary hearing, the panel found by clear and convincing evidence that Sigalov 
continually lied to the client by telling him that he had not received notice of a rescheduled 
hearing date, when in fact he had.  When asked if his client had ever explained to Sigalov why he 
did not show up for the hearing, Sigalov admitted that the client “obviously didn’t know about the 
hearing.”  Furthermore, Sigalov conceded that the client called him “at least once every two 
weeks” to find out if a new hearing date had been scheduled.  Sigalov admits that the client had 
called “quite a few times” after he had received notice that the master hearing had been scheduled 
on June 26.  Despite his knowledge of the June 26 hearing date, all the client heard from Sigalov 
was that “nothing is known yet.”   
 
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Count V 
{¶ 51} The fifth count alleges that Sigalov committed misconduct in his 
representation of clients who had been injured when a taxi struck their motor 
vehicle.  At the time of the accident, the vehicle carried a grandmother, her two 
adult daughters, and her grandchild. 
{¶ 52} The grandmother and one of her daughters retained Sigalov in late 
2002 on a contingency-fee basis.  Sigalov could not produce a copy of the 
agreement. 
{¶ 53} After two years of minimal activity on the case, Sigalov sent a 
demand letter to the taxi’s insurer on September 27, 2004.  At that time, the 
statute of limitations was about to expire.  Approximately two weeks later, the 
insurer offered $20,300 to settle the grandmother’s claim and $7,000 to settle her 
daughter’s claim. Without discussing the matter with his clients, Sigalov entered 
into settlement discussions, and the insurer then raised the settlement amounts to 
$33,000 and $10,000, respectively.  Although the record is not perfectly clear, it 
appears that the proposed settlement agreements were drafted without the clients’ 
knowledge and approved without their permission.  In any event, the settlement 
agreements and checks were sent to Sigalov. When Sigalov called the 
grandmother, she unequivocally rejected the settlement and subsequently 
informed him, in writing, of her refusal to settle for anything less than six figures. 
{¶ 54} Sigalov sued the insurer shortly before the limitations period was 
to expire.  But he informed the clerk of court that the claims had been settled and 
instructed the clerk not to serve the complaint because he did not want to disturb 
the alleged “settlement.”  Sigalov continued to block any effort to serve the 
complaint. 
{¶ 55} In 2005, Sigalov dismissed the grandmother’s suit without her 
knowledge or permission.  He continued for some time to discuss the matter with 
the client without telling her that her claims had been extinguished.  On June 16, 
January Term, 2012 
15 
 
2008, Sigalov finally informed the client, via letter, that he had missed the statute 
of limitations and that she should proceed against his malpractice insurer. 
{¶ 56} The panel found by clear and convincing evidence that Sigalov had 
violated DR 1-102(A)(4), 6-102(A)(3), 7-101(A)(1), 7-101(A)(2), and 7-
101(A)(3), and Prof.Cond.R. 1.2(a), 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.16(a)(3), and 8.4(c).  But the 
panel did not find clear and convincing evidence that Sigalov had violated DR 2-
106(A) (prohibiting a lawyer from charging or collecting an illegal or clearly 
excessive fee) or Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(c)(1) (requiring a lawyer to put a contingency-
fee agreement in writing) or 1.5(c)(2).  The board adopted the panel’s findings. 
{¶ 57} We agree that there is clear and convincing evidence of the 
misconduct found by the panel and the board, and we adopt their findings. 
Count VI 
{¶ 58} The sixth count arises from Sigalov’s representation of a client 
who had fled the Republic of Georgia to seek asylum in the United States. 
{¶ 59} The client testified that acting in his official capacity in his native 
Georgia, he had stopped a robbery in progress.  Several of the perpetrators were 
former KGB agents, who threatened the client and his family with retaliation if 
the client called the police and testified against them.  The client nevertheless 
testified.  After he did so, his son was kidnapped and beaten and tortured for three 
days before being released.  The client and his family subsequently fled Georgia. 
{¶ 60} After arriving in this country in September 2002, the client sought 
asylum.  Initially, he represented himself. 
{¶ 61} Sigalov agreed to represent the client in November 2006.  From the 
outset, Sigalov’s performance was problematic. 
{¶ 62} The client testified that he had paid Sigalov $1,400 as a retainer.  
Sigalov contended that the client paid him $1,100, out of which Sigalov paid a 
$110 filing fee for the appeal.  But Sigalov acknowledged that he could not be 
certain of the amounts, because he had no receipts or other documentation. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 63} At some point, the immigration authorities issued an order of 
removal for the client and his family.  After Sigalov assumed representation of the 
client, the immigration court set the case for an evidentiary hearing in September 
2007.  Despite the fact that Sigalov had approximately ten months to prepare for 
the hearing, he failed to do so. 
{¶ 64} Sigalov raised three defenses to the order of removal:  asylum, 
withholding of removal, and the United Nations Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.  But he did not 
perform legal research to prepare for the hearing, did not explain to the client 
what documentation would be needed to prevail on his claim, and did not discuss 
any theories with the client.  In fact, Sigalov met with the client only twice—
including a meeting on the morning of the hearing.  On that day, the client 
presented Sigalov with documents supporting his claims, but the documents were 
written in Georgian and could not be translated in time for the hearing.  The only 
evidence Sigalov presented at the evidentiary hearing was the client’s 
uncorroborated testimony.  Not surprisingly, the immigration court deemed that 
testimony insufficient and denied the application for asylum and for withholding 
of the removal order. 
{¶ 65} In affirming the immigration court’s ruling, the Board of 
Immigration Appeals reached a similar conclusion, noting in its opinion that little 
had been done to challenge the immigration court’s decision and that the case for 
asylum had not been proved. The panel hearing this case reached the same 
conclusion, that is, that “Sigalov did little besides collecting a retainer, showing 
up for the hearing, and winging it.”  Indeed, Sigalov’s appellate brief was a mere 
three paragraphs, repeating a few facts and describing the client’s fears, with no 
legal analysis whatsoever.  When asked about the sufficiency of Sigalov’s appeal, 
the relator’s immigration expert responded: 
 
January Term, 2012 
17 
 
I’m not sure I would dignify calling that a brief.  It cites no 
law.  It doesn’t go into a discussion of the facts.  It doesn’t try to 
link a nexus between one of the enumerated grounds.  I’m not sure, 
looking at it again, I don’t think it even has any discussion as to the 
one-year requirement.  And certainly it doesn’t differentiate 
between the various forms of relief of asylum, withholding or [the] 
Convention Against Torture. 
 
The expert appropriately summarized Sigalov’s representation:  “It is not diligent 
for the same reasons I have said.  Certainly, the submission of exhibits and 
documents for the case were sparse and then the appeal brief was perfunctory 
almost to the point of insult.” 
{¶ 66} Sigalov’s breathtakingly poor representation was fatal to his 
client’s claims.  As relator’s expert explained: 
 
A brief on an asylum case like [this one] would have, of 
course, just the summary of the procedural posture, how it got 
there; a statement of the issues, which basically in that case were 
the one-year filing deadline and then the qualification of the relief; 
legal argument as to why, in fact, the immigration judge erred in 
not giving enough weight to the credible testimony and holding 
that person had a well-founded fear of persecution and that is why 
citing Cardoza-Fonseca [Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 
(1987)]  and the 10 percent rule would be hammered inasmuch as 
possible. 
Then, of course, you know, at the conclusion trying to 
convince the board—or certainly the staff attorneys who read it 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
18 
 
first at the board that you have got something there worthy to look 
at. 
 
{¶ 67} The panel found by clear and convincing evidence that Sigalov had 
violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.1, 1.3, and 1.5(a).  We agree and adopt the panel’s 
finding. 
Count VII 
{¶ 68} The last count arises from Sigalov’s representation of a client who 
had been injured in a motor-vehicle accident on November 30, 2007.  The client 
retained Sigalov on a contingency-fee basis in early December 2007.  Nearly a 
year later, without discussing it with the client, Sigalov wrote the other driver’s 
insurer, asserting that liability was clear and should not be contested.  Although 
the client was in dire financial need and had told Sigalov that she had lost wages 
as a result of the accident, Sigalov did not seek recovery for lost wages and sought 
only $6,135.75 in damages for medical bills associated with treatment for injuries 
sustained from the accident.  When Sigalov informed the client that the insurer 
had offered $5,800 to settle all claims, the client stated that the offer was too low.  
When Sigalov informed her that the offer was all she could get, the client 
accepted a $4,000 check from Sigalov. 
{¶ 69} The check was written on Sigalov’s IOLTA account, as were two 
others—one to Sigalov himself and the other to one of the client’s medical 
providers.  The three checks totaled $5,800—the full amount of the settlement—
but Sigalov had not yet received any settlement proceeds from the insurance 
carrier when he issued the checks.  Sigalov testified that he keeps personal funds 
in his IOLTA account to cover checks he writes before he actually receives 
settlement proceeds. 
{¶ 70} When Sigalov gave the client her settlement check, he also 
presented her with a number of other papers that were stapled together.  The client 
did not focus on those papers at the time, but later realized that the papers may 
January Term, 2012 
19 
 
have included a schedule of expenses and deductions.  The schedule accurately 
indicated that the client, one medical provider, and Sigalov had been paid from a 
gross settlement amount of $5,800. Although the schedule also included a 
signature that was purported to be hers, the client testified that it was a forgery.  
She also testified that her signature had been forged on a power of attorney that 
was used by Sigalov to settle the case and that her signature was forged on a 
document stating that she would be responsible for the outstanding medical bills. 
{¶ 71} In addition, the client testified that Sigalov had lied to her when he 
stated that a mediation had been cancelled due to a death in the mediator’s family. 
That statement was not true, as Sigalov admitted. 
{¶ 72} The panel did not find clear and convincing evidence that Sigalov 
had violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) by lying about the cancellation of the mediation.  
Nor did it find by clear and convincing evidence that he had violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(a) by improperly disbursing funds from the IOLTA to the 
client.  But it did find by clear and convincing evidence that Sigalov had violated 
Prof.Cond.R. 1.15(b) by depositing his own funds into a client trust account.  The 
panel stated that it would have found a violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(c) for 
forging the client’s signature if the complaint had provided notice of any such 
charge. 
{¶ 73} We now turn to the legal ramifications of Sigalov’s misconduct. 
Mitigation 
{¶ 74} In considering any sanction, we consider the aggravating and 
mitigating factors listed in Section 10(B) of the Rules and Regulations Governing 
Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board of Commissioners on 
Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”). The panel found a single factor 
in favor of mitigation:  pursuant to BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2), Sigalov has no 
prior disciplinary record.  The board adopted that finding, as do we. 
{¶ 75} The panel rejected Sigalov’s suggestions of additional mitigating 
factors.  First, Sigalov contends that he made a full and voluntary disclosure to the 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
20 
 
panel and board and had a cooperative attitude toward the proceedings.  But as the 
panel recognized, despite Sigalov’s superficially cooperative attitude, he gave 
false testimony and submitted false evidence in these proceedings.  That 
misconduct cannot be depicted as full and free disclosure or as cooperative with 
the process.  To the contrary, the misconduct impeded, rather than assisted, the 
panel in reaching a full and fair understanding of the incidents and representation 
at issue here.  Sigalov’s actions in providing false testimony and evidence are 
plainly aggravating rather than mitigating.  His assertions to the contrary border 
on the preposterous. 
{¶ 76} Next, Sigalov asserts that he has suffered the imposition of other 
penalties or sanctions outside the disciplinary process because he was sued for 
malpractice by one of the clients at issue in this case.  The panel found that the 
cases cited by Sigalov in an effort to support his contention, Disciplinary Counsel 
v. Gittinger, 125 Ohio St.3d 467, 2010-Ohio-1830, 929 N.E.2d 410, and 
Cleveland Metro. Bar Assn. v. Nance, 124 Ohio St.3d 57, 2009-Ohio-5957, 918 
N.E.2d 1000, were not apposite.  The board adopted that conclusion, and we 
agree. 
{¶ 77} In Gittinger, there were multiple mitigating factors, including 
evidence of good character, full cooperation in the disciplinary process, lack of 
personal gain, and a one-time violation rather than a pattern of misconduct.  Id. at 
¶ 41, 47.  In Nance, mitigating factors included the imposition of other penalties 
or sanctions and the lack of prejudice to the respondent’s clients.  Id. at ¶ 13.  
Here, Sigalov’s clients were all seriously harmed by his misconduct, and his 
misconduct continued over the course of many years.  Furthermore, Sigalov 
profited through his misconduct by accepting his clients’ fees and doing little to 
no work on their cases. 
{¶ 78} Moreover, although his clients may obtain restitution through a 
malpractice action, the public is still left unprotected.  We reject the notion that a 
January Term, 2012 
21 
 
malpractice claim is a punishment or sanction that somehow operates to mitigate 
Sigalov’s misconduct. 
{¶ 79} Finally, Sigalov states that he intends to cease practicing 
immigration law.  This professed moratorium is specious.  It is proffered only in 
the wake of what is at best grossly negligent conduct.  We do not believe that the 
public will be protected by Sigalov’s promise to stop practicing immigration law.  
And the pledge to give up his immigration practice does nothing to address 
Sigalov’s repeated misconduct in personal-injury cases, which comprise an even 
more substantial portion of his practice. 
Aggravation 
{¶ 80} Pursuant to BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1), the panel found six 
aggravating factors:  (1) a dishonest or selfish motive, (2) a pattern of misconduct, 
(3) multiple offenses, (4) the submission of false evidence, false statements, or 
other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process, (5) a refusal to 
acknowledge the wrongful nature of the misconduct, and (6) the vulnerability of 
and resulting harm to victims of the misconduct.  The board adopted these 
findings, and we agree. 
{¶ 81} Much of Sigalov’s misconduct resulted from accepting clients’ 
fees and then doing little or nothing to earn the fee.  Sigalov filed inadequate 
briefs, pursued incorrect legal action, and routinely neglected cases.  He 
repeatedly lied to clients about the progress or status of their cases and conducted 
settlement discussions on their cases without their knowledge or consent. 
{¶ 82} Furthermore, Sigalov committed multiple offenses over a long 
period of time, from a personal-injury case in 2002 to an immigration case in 
2007.  During that time, he violated multiple rules of professional conduct with a 
variety of different clients.  One of Sigalov’s clients died before ever seeing the 
proceeds that resulted from his case.  Almost all of Sigalov’s clients eventually 
sought new counsel to help them recover from the array of additional legal 
problems they faced due to his significant misconduct. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
22 
 
{¶ 83} During the proceedings before the panel, Sigalov showed no 
remorse for his misconduct, maintaining even now that the complaint should be 
dismissed with prejudice.  Furthermore, Sigalov submitted false evidence to the 
panel in an effort to remove the blame from himself and place it on his clients. 
{¶ 84} We are also mindful that many of Sigalov’s clients were unusually 
vulnerable.  Our sister courts have recognized that immigration clients often have 
a heightened susceptibility to attorney misconduct due to language barriers and 
unfamiliarity with the legal system.  See, e.g., People v. Beasley, 241 P.3d 548, 
553 (Colo.2010).  As further explained by the Tennessee high court in Flowers v. 
Bd. of Professional Responsibility, 314 S.W.3d 882, 899 (Tenn.2010), clients in 
immigration proceedings often face a variety of special difficulties due not only to 
language problems, but also to limited financial means, lengthy work hours, lack 
of transportation, and ignorance of the larger culture.  “The importance of quality 
representation is especially acute to immigrants, a vulnerable population who 
come to this country searching for a better life, and who often arrive unfamiliar 
with our language and culture, in economic deprivation and in fear.”  Aris v. 
Mukasey, 517 F.3d 595, 600 (2d Cir.2008). 
{¶ 85} Russian-speaking immigrants sought out Sigalov because he 
speaks Russian.  Instead of helping them, he took their money and did nothing, 
leaving them to deal with the consequences, including arrest and detention. 
{¶ 86} Here, Sigalov selfishly took advantage of immigrant clients who 
were particularly susceptible to victimization.  He repeatedly assured his clients 
that he was filing motions on their behalf or otherwise working on their cases 
when in fact he was doing nothing.  Because Sigalov’s clients were immigrants, 
two of whom barely spoke English, their understanding of the legal process was 
minimal, and they were forced to rely entirely on Sigalov’s false representations 
that he was doing what was necessary for their cases.  One of Sigalov’s clients 
was almost deported, and another was unnecessarily incarcerated for five and a 
half months. 
January Term, 2012 
23 
 
{¶ 87} Sigalov’s other clients were often vulnerable as well.  Sigalov 
admitted that many of his clients are people of limited financial means.  In Count 
VII, the client was about to lose her house and desperately needed money.  
Sigalov pressured her into settling for an amount that she did not approve and that 
did not include compensation for wages lost.  Another client died before receiving 
one penny of a settlement to which he was lawfully entitled. 
{¶ 88} The evidence of mitigation in this case consists only of Sigalov’s 
lack of a prior disciplinary record.  Given the severity of the multiple offenses at 
issue in this case, see BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(d), that mitigation is minimal at 
best. 
{¶ 89} Conversely, the weight of aggravation is substantial.  Not only did 
Sigalov act with a dishonest or selfish motive, BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b), but 
he also presented false evidence and false testimony to the panel.  BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(f). 
{¶ 90} The egregiousness of Sigalov’s misconduct is plain.  But even after 
the extent of his derelictions was brought to light, he continued to insist that he 
has done little wrong, going so far as to request that the complaint be dismissed 
with prejudice. 
{¶ 91} Like the panel and board, we are troubled by Sigalov’s failure to 
appreciate the gravity of his misconduct.  His refusal to acknowledge the harm he 
caused his clients is appalling.  When an attorney engages in multiple wanton acts 
of misconduct for years, lies to multiple clients about their cases, falsifies 
documents in a cover-up effort during the disciplinary proceeding, and then 
denies the wrongful nature of his misconduct, the aggravating factors greatly 
outweigh those in mitigation. 
Sanction 
{¶ 92} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
24 
 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final 
determination, we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors 
listed in BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B).  Disciplinary Counsel v. Broeren, 115 Ohio 
St.3d  473, 2007-Ohio-5251, 875 N.E.2d 935, ¶ 21.  Because each disciplinary 
case is unique, we are not limited to the factors specified in the rule but may take 
into account “all relevant factors” in determining what sanction to impose.  
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B); Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Peskin, 125 Ohio St.3d 244, 
2010-Ohio-1811, 927 N.E.2d 598, ¶ 11. 
{¶ 93} The primary purpose of the disciplinary process in Ohio is to 
“protect clients and the public, to ensure the administration of justice, and to 
maintain the integrity of the legal profession.”  Disciplinary Counsel v. Hunter, 
106 Ohio St.3d 418, 2005-Ohio-5411, 835 N.E.2d 707, ¶ 32.  Our goal in 
imposing disciplinary sanctions is not to punish the offender but to protect the 
public. Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 
815 N.E.2d 286, ¶ 53.  Our disciplinary action in this case bears that purpose in 
mind. 
{¶ 94} The scope and magnitude of Sigalov’s misconduct, encompassing 
fraud, gross neglect, duplicity, incompetence, and the fleecing of clients, are truly 
egregious.  We have little trouble concluding that nothing less than Sigalov’s 
disbarment will protect the public and maintain the integrity of the profession. 
{¶ 95} Accordingly, Sigalov is hereby permanently disbarred from the 
practice of law in Ohio.  Costs are taxed to Sigalov. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, 
LANZINGER, CUPP, and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Gerhardstein & Branch Co., L.P.A., and Jennifer L. Branch; and Graydon, 
Head & Ritchey, L.L.P., and John B. Pinney, for relator. 
January Term, 2012 
25 
 
Dinsmore & Shohl, L.L.P., Mark A. Vander Laan, and Mark G. Arnzen 
Jr., for respondent. 
______________________