Case Title: STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. GLAPION

Citation: 

Docket Number: SCBD-7280

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2023-03-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. GLAPION  STATE ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION v. GLAPION 2023 OK 29 Case Number: SCBD-7280 Decided: 03/28/2023 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL. STATE OF OKLAHOMA ex rel. OKLAHOMA BAR ASSOCIATION, Complainant, v. RAPHAEL THOMAS GLAPION, Respondent. BAR DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING ¶0 The complainant, Oklahoma Bar Association, charged the respondent, Raphael Thomas Glapion, with one count of professional misconduct stemming from incompetent advice, failure to safekeep and timely account for a client's funds, failure to preserve evidence, and neglect and delay of the client's claims. The Professional Responsibility Tribunal recommended that the respondent be disbarred and costs imposed. Upon de novo review we hold that the respondent's license to practice law is suspended for two years and one day. The respondent is assessed costs in the sum of $1,731.28 for payment not later than ninety days after this opinion becomes final. RESPONDENT SUSPENDED; COSTS IMPOSED. Katherine M. Ogden, Assistant General Counsel, Oklahoma Bar Association, for Complainant. Raphael T. Glapion, Midwest City, Oklahoma, Pro Se. KAUGER, J.: ¶1 The complainant, Oklahoma Bar Association (Bar Association), charged the respondent, Raphael Thomas Glapion (Glapion/attorney), with one count of professional misconduct resulting from the neglect and delay of a client's claims, failure to safeguard and timely account for the client's funds, failure to preserve evidence, and incompetent advice.1 The Bar Association alleged that the attorney violated Rules 1.1 (competence),2 1.3 (diligence),3 1.4 (communication),4 1.5 (fees),5 1.15 (safeguard property),6 Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct, 5 O.S. 2011 Ch. 1, App. 3-A (violation of rules), and Rule 1.3(discredit to profession),7 Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings, 5 O.S. 2011 Ch. 1, App. 1-A. ¶2 In its Complaint, the Bar Association sought discipline to be as the "Court finds equitable and proper."8 Upon de novo review, we hold that the respondent's license to practice law should be suspended for two years and one day. The respondent is assessed the costs of this proceeding in the sum of $1,731.28 for payment not later than ninety days after this opinion becomes final. FACTS ¶3 Glapion is currently a member of the Bar Association in good standing. This cause stems from a complaint to the Bar Association made by his client, LaClaudia Samuels (Samuels) in January of 2015, in conjunction with a professional malpractice case which Samuels filed in the Oklahoma County District Court against Glapion. ¶4 In 2014, Samuels was driving her rental car on a highway in Texas when Melissa May Pena (Pena) hit Samuels' car and caused her significant injuries. (Significant enough to preclude her from resuming her occupation as a computer server tech/installer.) Pena had been drinking at a bar, and was legally drunk when she caused the accident. The airbags in Samuels' rental car did not deploy, even though Pena was traveling at a high rate of speed when she hit Samuels. At the time of the accident, General Motors had issued a recall on the make and model of the car Samuels was driving due to malfunctioning airbags on impact. ¶5 In August of 2014, Samuels hired Glapion to represent her interest in claims against Pena, her insurer, the bar who served Pena, the rental car company, and General Motors. The contract for representation identified the defendants and potential claims. The defendants it expressly listed include Pena, GEICO, the bar, Budget Rental Car and General Motors. The claims it mentioned included negligence, dram shop violations, product liability, breach of contract/warranty and related claims. ¶6 The Contract for Professional Services, dated August 18, 2014, did not include any language regarding the respondent's representation of Samuels against her own uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage, ESURANCE. According to Samuels, this was because she had several years of experience dealing with insurance companies through her work in the medical industry and she could handle any claims against Esurance herself. She said she "primarily worked in health insurance." She "started out at Aetna, did a 13-week training program on how not to pay claims." Her "job wasn't to pay your claim, it was to look for any reason to deny your claims."9 ¶7 Fees for respondent's services were listed as: 37% of any gross amount recovered related to the claims; 40% if a pre-trial order is entered for recovery; and 45% of any recovery from a trial. ¶8 On September 24, 2014, GEICO tendered its policy limits of $30,000.00 on behalf of Pena. A portion of the funds went directly to some of Samuels' medical bills. The attorney retained $2,000.00 for legal fees.10 Subsequently, Glapion advised Samuels to execute a release for GEICO, telling her that it was a release for settlement of the claims against Pena. Relying on the attorney's advice, Samuels signed the release. ¶9 Unfortunately, under Texas law, because Samuels settled and released the claims against Pena, Samuels was barred from pursuing against other contributory tortfeasors such as the bar who served Pena. The respondent did not advise Samuels of this ramification when she signed the GEICO release. Meanwhile, the attorney did nothing to preserve any airbag malfunction evidence, and he did not attempt to prevent the car from being destroyed. Consequently, this effectively precluded Samuels from pursuing a products liability claim against General Motors. ¶10 Because of her injuries, Samuels was unable to work, had outstanding medical bills, and needed additional medical treatment. She was eligible to apply for relief from the Texas Crime Victim's Fund, which would have helped with her lost wages. Samuels provided the attorney with information to submit the application, but he neglected to do so for six months. With the help of another attorney, Samuels was eventually able to collect some funds from the Texas Crime Victim's Fund. ¶11 On October 3, 2014, ESURANCE tendered its policy limits of $50,000.00 for the UM coverage. ESURANCE issued the check to the attorney. The attorney gave Samuels $20,000.00 that day, and then later, $2,500.00 and then an additional $4,200.00. The attorney kept $23,300.00 of the ESURANCE proceeds as his attorney fees. Over the next few months, Samuels disputed the respondent's keeping of the money and directed him to pay outstanding medical bills. The attorney's conduct contributed to Samuels' inability to get further necessary medical treatment, pay all of her medical bills, and to recover more eligible funds from the Texas Crime's Victim's Fund. The attorney also commingled the funds with his personal funds and offered no substantiated accounting as to where the money was used. ¶12 By October of 2014, the attorney withdrew from representing Samuels and directed her to contact a Texas lawyer to pursue the claims listed in his contract. This is when she learned that she was precluded from recovery by her GEICO waiver under Texas Law. Samuels sued Glapion for malpractice in the Oklahoma County District Court and the Court awarded her $831,478.47 in damages. ¶13 The Bar Association filed a Complaint with this Court on June 24, 2022, and the attorney responded on August 1, 2022, denying any wrongful conduct. The Professional Responsibility Tribunal (PRT) held a hearing on October 7, 2022 and filed its report with the Court on November 7, 2022. Although the Bar Association gave the attorney notice of the hearing, the attorney did not appear for it. The Bar Association called, left messages, and emailed him. After waiting the morning of the hearing for a response, the PRT finally started the hearing without him. After the hearing, the PRT recommended that the respondent be disbarred and assessed costs. ¶14 On November 7, 2022, the Bar Association requested that costs in the amount of $1,731.28 be assessed against Glapion. The Bar Association filed a brief on November 29, 2022, arguing that prior disciplinary proceedings of other attorneys support that the respondent should be suspended no less than two years and one day, and assessed costs. Glapion did not file a response brief. THE ATTORNEY'S CONDUCT WARRANTS A SUSPENSION OF TWO YEARS AND ONE DAY FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW AND THE ASSESSMENT OF COSTS. ¶15 This Court is the ultimate arbiter of appropriate sanctions in bar discipline.11 We may choose to reject or accept the trial panel's recommendations.12 We are not bound by agreed findings, conclusions of law, or recommendations for discipline.13 Rather, the ultimate responsibility for imposition of professional discipline is ours alone. The Court's review is de novo in considering the record presented as well as the recommendations for discipline.14 ¶16 Discipline is fashioned to coincide with the discipline imposed upon other lawyers for similar acts of professional misconduct.15 Although this Court strives to be evenhanded and fair in disciplinary matters, discipline must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Each situation involves unique transgressions and mitigating factors.16 There can be little doubt that the attorney has brought discredit upon the legal profession by subjecting himself to discipline.17 Discipline should be sufficient to persuade the attorney that such conduct will not be tolerated.18 However, mitigating circumstances may be considered in evaluating both the attorney's conduct and assessing the appropriate discipline.19 ¶17 We have reviewed the record, and the evidence shows that the attorney violated all of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings as alleged. Furthermore, the attorney did not participate in the trial proceedings, or briefing, or offer any mitigating evidence, other than denying the allegations in his response to the complaint. ¶18 In other attorney misconduct neglect cases, discipline has been dependant on the nature of neglect and the response from the attorney. When neglect occurs without affirmative acts of misconduct, a public censure or short suspension has been warranted.20 When an attorney's conduct has resulted in a default judgment or hindered a client's ability to appeal, the suspension has been as little as three months.21 ¶19 We gave a neglectful attorney who did not cooperate with the Bar Association's investigation, and suffered from anxiety, but offered no supporting documentation, a one-year suspension in State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Fields, 2021 OK 34, 489 P.3d 1016. In State ex rel. Hummel, 2004 OK 30, 89 P.2d 1105, the neglectful attorney failed: to communicate with clients; to turn over client files; to disclose facts to clients, and entered into unauthorized settlement agreements; and to return unearned funds. He suffered from clinical depression. He also had previously received two private reprimands, and earned a one-year suspension.22 ¶20 A two-year suspension was warranted in State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Assciation v. Weigel, 2014 OK 4, 321 P.3d 168, for an attorney who took fees from clients, failed to complete work, deposited unearned fees into his general account, failed to act with diligence and provide adequate representation, and violated numerous other rules. ¶21 State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Assciation v. Jenkins, 2001 OK 54, 27 P.3d 91 , and State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. McCoy, 2010 OK 67, 240 P.3d 675, concerned lawyers when the Court suspended from the practice of law for two years and a day for neglecting clients, failing to keep clients informed, charging unreasonable fees, engaging in misrepresentation, and causing incurable harm to clients and discredit to the legal profession. ¶22 The Bar Association likens Glapion's conduct to the attorneys involved in State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Whitebook, 2010 OK 72, 242 P.3d 517; State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Watkins, 2019 OK 76, 461 P.3d 174, and State ex rel. Miller, 2020 OK 4, 461 P.3d 187. In Whitebook, the attorney was hired by two clients to handle the probate of estates. He took a retainer fee, and did not do any work. The attorney also disregarded the Court's authority by failing to appear at his hearing, as well as failures to respond to a grievance, appear for a deposition, to answer the complaint and failed to file a brief. ¶23 In Watkins, the attorney, who had been previously privately reprimanded, withdrew funds from his client's settlement funds and commingled them with his personal funds. He also ignored clients and delayed the case of a client whose wife was killed in an automobile accident. The Court suspended the attorney for two years and one day. In Miller, we disbarred an attorney who lied to her client about paying medical bills from a settlement, and neglected to timely file a client's case within the statute of limitations. ¶24 A lawyer who has been disciplined by a suspension of two year or less may resume practice upon the expiration of the period of suspension.23 A suspension from the practice of law for a period of two years and one day is tantamount to disbarment because the suspended lawyer must follow the same procedures for readmittance as would a disbarred counterpart with the exception of taking the bar examination.24 This means that the "two year and one day" lawyer must follow the procedure for reinstatement of a lawyer whose name has been stricken from the Roll of Attorneys either for non-payment of dues, or through disbarment, or who has resigned membership in the Association.25 ¶25 If the lawyer was disbarred, or resigned pending an investigation or disciplinary proceedings, that lawyer is not allowed to apply for reinstatement for at least five years.26 When a lawyer has been suspended for five years or more, the lawyer is required to take and successfully pass the bar examination to be readmitted.27 However, the lawyer has the opportunity to show by clear and convincing evidence that, notwithstanding the long absence from the practice of law, the lawyer has maintained competency without taking the bar examination.28 But, there is a rebuttable presumption that the lawyer will not possess sufficient competency in the law to be reinstated, absent an extraordinary showing to that effect.29 ¶26 Without doubt, this lawyer has committed acts of client neglect and has violated the public trust. While he initially participated in the disciplinary proceedings, he discontinued participation after filing an answer to the complaint. The attorney's conduct foreclosed the client from being able to pursue both dram shop liability claims as well as product liability claims, thus causing her to lose out on the potential recovery for her injuries. The circumstances of this cause require that the attorney be suspended for two years and one day and assessed the costs of this proceeding in the sum of $1,731.28. CONCLUSION ¶27 The nondelegable, constitutional responsibility to regulate the practice and the ethics, licensure, and discipline of practitioners of the law is solely vested in this Court.30 It is our difficult duty to withdraw or suspend the license to practice law if it is necessary to protect the interests of the public, the legal profession, and this tribunal.31 Upon a de novo review of the record, we determine that the attorney's conduct warrants a two years and one day suspension, and the imposition of $1,731.28 in costs due not later than ninety days after this opinion becomes final. RESPONDENT SUSPENDED; COSTS IMPOSED. Kane, C.J., Kauger, Winchester, Edmondson, Gurich, Darby, and Kuehn, JJ., concur; Rowe, V.C.J., concurs in part; dissents in part; Combs J., dissents. Combs, J., dissenting: "I would disbar the Respondent." FOOT