Case Title: Lisa Pfenninger, et al. v. Hunterdon Central Regional High School, et als.

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-73-99

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2001-03-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). PER CURIAM This appeal involves a wrongful death action instituted by Lisa Pfenninger (plaintiff) to recover damages resulting from the death of her twenty-nine-year-old husband, Matthew Pfenninger, who was killed when an eight to nine foot deep unbraced trench collapsed on top of him while he was installing drainage pipe. In this appeal, the Court considers three issues: whether the landowner, Hunterdon Central Regional High School District Board of Education (Board) and the architect, A.J. O'Sullivan Architects, P.A. (O'Sullivan) (collectively referred to as defendants ), breached a duty of care to Pfenninger arising out of a responsibility to supervise Pfenninger's company in the excavation and piping of the trench; whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's requests for discovery of other documents involving O'Sullivan's responsibility to the Board on related construction projects; and whether the Board breached its duty to Pfenninger in negligently supplying him with nonconforming drainage pipe that required his entry into the trench to connect it. In 1994, the Board commenced several construction projects at Hunterdon High School, including the installation of a drainage system for the varsity baseball and soccer/lacrosse field. Although the Board hired multiple contractors to perform the various projects, it did not retain a general contractor. Responsibility for coordinating and scheduling the projects was shared by the Board and O'Sullivan, the firm hired by the Board to provide architectural and engineering services. The job for which Pfenninger was hired required excavating an eight to nine-foot deep trench to install drainage piping underneath the field. When Pfenninger was awarded the drainage contract, he agreed to supply labor and equipment. The contract required the Board to supply the necessary materials, including the drainage pipe. According to the design specifications prepared by O'Sullivan, Pfenninger was to be responsible for all safety precautions on the job, which included the placement and maintenance of shoring and supports to prevent movement of the earth that might injure persons in or around the work area. The design plans further specified that O'Sullivan did not have field inspection responsibilities for the job and that Pfenninger was responsible for the methods and means of construction. That notwithstanding, O'Sullivan's project manager, Ken Quabeck, communicated with Pfenninger on several occasions after the project began. Although he once told Pfenninger that he would have to erect safety fencing around the excavation for the students' protection, there was no evidence that he ever looked into the trench or was aware that Pfenninger was not using bracing or shoring. At some point, O'Sullivan became aware that Pfenninger was having difficulty completing the excavation work due to inclement weather and soil conditions. That notwithstanding, it frequently requested that the project be completed as soon as possible. During the course of the drainage project, the Board's representative, Barry Imboden, visited the worksite on a daily basis. That notwithstanding, he never saw the trench completely exposed because Pfenninger backfilled completed sections of the trench with gravel before moving on the next section. The Board experienced some difficulty in procuring the correct drainage pipe. O'Sullivan's design specifications called for perforated, corrugated pipe to be installed in the trench. Perforated pipe would have holes in it, which would allow water to flow freely in and out of the pipe. Corrugated pipe would have alternating larger and smaller diameters to allow for flexibility, which would allow the pipe to be connected on the surface and then lowered into the trench. The non-corrugated pipe is solid and requires a person to enter the trench to connect two or more sections. Pfenninger rejected the pipes. A subsequent attempt by the Board to place a second order for the specified pipes resulted in the delivery of pipes that were perforated, but not corrugated. That notwithstanding, and under pressure by the Board to complete the project before the start of the school year, Pfenninger proceeded to install the non-corrugated pipes. Because the pipes were not corrugated, he was required to enter the trench to connect sections of the pipe. On August 24, 1994, while Pfenninger was working in the trench, the wall suddenly caved in and killed him. The walls were not braced or shored at the time of the accident, as required by the contract. Nearly two years later, plaintiff filed a wrongful death action. Thereafter, because of the absence of any written agreements between the Board and O'Sullivan setting forth their respective duties and obligations on the job Pfenninger was hired to complete, plaintiff filed a motion seeking to expand the scope of discovery to include other construction projects at the school in progress around the time of the trench collapse. Plaintiff contended below that evidence of supervisory responsibilities of the defendants on the related projects would lead a jury to infer that they had a greater managerial role in Pfenninger's project than they acknowledged, and a concomitant duty of care. The trial court denied that request, concluding that expanding discovery would be unduly burdensome and was not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to impose a duty of care on the Board and on O'Sullivan, both of whom filed cross-motions for summary judgment, arguing that they owed Pfenninger no duty of care. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff appealed, challenging the discovery and summary judgment rulings. The Appellate Division reversed the summary judgment ruling, concluding that the defendants each owed Pfenninger a duty of care. However, it affirmed the trial judge's order denying expanded discovery, finding that plaintiff's contentions in that respect were without merit and that the trial court had not abused its discretion. The Supreme Court granted the Board's and O'Sullivan's separate petitions for certification seeking review of the Appellate Division's ruling on the duty of care issue. HELD: The trial court abused its discretion in denying the decedent's widow's request to expand discovery to allow her to discover other documents concerning the architect's responsibility to the school board/landowner on related construction projects; and a reasonable jury could find that the school board/landowner's failure to supply decedent with the correct construction materials constituted a breach of its contractual duty and of its duty of care and that its failure was a proximate cause of the decedent's death. 1. Plaintiff was entitled to attempt to discover evidence concerning related construction projects involving the Board and O'Sullivan that might have a bearing on their general supervisory responsibilities on construction projects then in progress on the Board's property. Thus, on remand, the trial court shall permit plaintiff, through appropriate discovery, to attempt to elicit information concerning the defendants' responsibilities on those related projects. (pp. 4-7) 2. Whether a duty of care exists is ultimately a question of fairness and involves the weighing of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk, and the public interest in the proposed solution. The scope of a duty owed by a defendant is a matter of law. (pp. 11-13) 3. In a contractual relationship, an individual may be liable in tort if he or she undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another that he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or things. (p. 13) 4. O'Sullivan's knowledge that perforated drain pipe could be installed from above the ground can be imputed to the Board because the record demonstrates that O'Sullivan was the Board's agent and presided over the Board's three-phase project to renovate the athletic fields. (p. 14) 5. A reasonable jury could find that the Board's failure to supply the correct pipe to Pfenninger not only constituted a breach of its contractual duty, but also a breach of its duty of care to provide the pipe specified in O'Sullivan's drawings and that its failure was a proximate cause of Pfenninger's death. (pp. 14-15) 7. As modified, the judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed and the matter is remanded to the Law Division for trial on plaintiff's claim that the Board's negligence in providing Pfenninger with nonconforming pipe was a proximate cause of his death. The Law Division is also ordered to provide plaintiff with further discovery relating to her claim that the defendants negligently supervised Pfenninger's company in the excavation and piping of the trench, without prejudice to defendants' right to renew their motion for summary judgement on the issue of negligent supervision at the conclusion of such discovery. (p. 16) As modified, the judgment of the Appellate Division is AFFIRMED. The matter is REMANDED to the Law Division for proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. JUSTICE COLEMAN has filed a separate dissenting opinion in which JUSTICES VERNIERO and LaVECCHIA join. Justice Coleman believed that the Court committed grievous error by reopening discovery even though neither party raised that issue before the Court (plaintiff had not filed a cross-petition to challenge the Appellate Division's affirmance of the trial court's denial of her motion to expand discovery). Justice Coleman further concluded that the undisputed facts of this case disclosed that the Board's failure to supply Pfenninger with non-corrugated pipe did not proximately cause his death. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ and JUSTICES STEIN, LONG and ZAZZALI join in the Court's opinion. JUSTICE COLEMAN has filed a separate dissenting opinion in which JUSTICES VERNIERO and LaVECCHIA join. SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY A-73/ 128 September Term 1999 LISA PFENNINGER, Executrix of the Estate of MATTHEW PFENNINGER, deceased, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. HUNTERDON CENTRAL REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL, HUNTERDON CENTRAL REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, HUNTERDON COUNTY, A.J. O'SULLIVAN ARCHITECTS, ANDREW J. O'SULLIVAN, C.J. O'SULLIVAN, C.J. OSTERGAARD, JOHN STANA, BARRY IMBOWDIN and KENNETH R. QUABECK, Defendants-Appellants, and HUNTERDON COUNTY SOIL CONSERVATION, RARITAN TOWNSHIP, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, FRED CAPPOLA, MARK SYMANCEK, AARON PLUMBING, JOHN DOES 1-10 (said names being fictitious and RICHARD ROES 1-10 (said names being fictitious), Defendants. Argued September 26, 2000 -- Decided March 13, 2001 John H. King argued the cause for appellants A.J. O'Sullivan Architects, Andrew J. O'Sullivan, C.J. O'Sullivan, Kenneth R. Quabeck and C.J. Ostergaard (Marshall, Dennehy, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, attorneys; Mr. King and John H. Osorio, of counsel). Robert A. McLarty, Jr., argued the cause for appellants Hunterdon Central Regional High School, Hunterdon Central Regional High School District Board of Education, Hunterdon County, John Stana and Barry Imbowdin (Romando, Astorino & McLarty, attorneys). Victor A. Rotolo argued the cause for respondent (Mr. Rotolo, attorney; Michael F. Midlige and Matthew F. Richter, on the brief). Arthur Bergman submitted a brief on behalf of amicus curiae, Consulting Engineers Council of New Jersey (Sokol, Behot & Fiorenzo, attorneys). PER CURIAM This wrongful death action was instituted to recover damages resulting from the death of twenty-nine-year-old Matthew Pfenninger who was killed when an eight-to-nine-foot-deep trench collapsed on top of him while he was installing drainage pipe. The appeal presents three primary issues. The first issue is whether the landowner, Hunterdon Central Regional High School District Board of Education (Board) and the architect, A.J. O'Sullivan Architects, P.A. (O'Sullivan), breached a duty of care to Pfenninger arising out of a responsibility to supervise Pfenninger's company in the excavation and piping of the trench. The second issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's requests for discovery of other documents involving O'Sullivan's responsibility to the Board on related construction projects.See footnote 11 The third issue concerns whether the Board breached its duty to Pfenninger in negligently supplying Pfenninger with nonconforming drainage pipe that required his entry into the trench to connect it. The material facts concerning the claim that the Board and O'Sullivan breached a duty of care to Pfenninger arising out of their responsibility to supervise Pfenninger's company in the excavation and piping of the trench are set forth in the Appellate Division's opinion reported at _____ N.J. Super. ___, ___-___ (2001)(slip op. at 3-10), as well as in Justice Coleman's dissenting opinion. Post at ___-___ (slip op. at ___-___). We incorporate the relevant facts by reference. A majority of the Court is substantially in agreement with Justice Coleman's conclusion that, based on the present record, plaintiff has not established that either the Board or O'Sullivan breached a duty of care to Pfenninger because of their failure to supervise Pfenninger's company in the excavation and piping of the trench. In that respect we disagree with the Appellate Division's disposition, that court having found a triable issue of fact on the issue of negligent supervision. Nevertheless, although we modify the Appellate Division's disposition, we affirm its judgment remanding the negligent supervision claim to the Law Division for further proceedings based on our view that the trial court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's request for further discovery. As we understand the record, plaintiff requested a number of documents from O'Sullivan and the Board. The trial court upheld defendants' refusal to supply those documents on the ground that plaintiff's discovery request was unduly burdensome, overly broad, and not reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. Among the items plaintiff sought were the following: Any and all records, notes, correspondence, plans, drawings, sketches, bids, requests for bids, work orders, invoices, or documents of any kind concerning projects involving A.J. O'Sullivan Architects at the Hunterdon Central Regional High School for the period of January 1, 1993 through January 1, 1995, including but not limited to the fountain and scoreboard projects. According to plaintiff, that information was necessary because the initial discovery did not uncover evidence of a written contract between the Board and O'Sullivan setting forth their respective duties and obligations on the job Pfenninger was hired to complete. Thus, evidence of the supervisory responsibilities of the Board and O'Sullivan on the related projects could lead a jury to infer that they had a greater managerial role in Pfenninger's project than they acknowledged, and a concomitant duty of care. Further, that evidence would be critical in assessing the verity of the position advanced by O'Sullivan and the Board that neither was responsible for supervising Pfenninger when he dug the trench and that no one, in fact, oversaw that job. That evidence also may provide an important link to plaintiff's expert's opinions that concluded that the Board and O'Sullivan were engaged in coordination of the work being done by Pfenninger; that both were acting as general contractor/project manager; and that O'Sullivan and the Board fail[ed] . . . to exercise due care in their joint and separate obligations to jobsite workers. In our view, both the Law Division and the Appellate Division erred in their disposition of the discovery issue. Plaintiff was entitled to attempt to discover evidence concerning related construction projects involving the Board and O'Sullivan that might have a bearing on O'Sullivan's and the Board's general supervisory responsibilities on construction projects then in progress on the Board's properties. See In re Liquidation of Integrity Ins. Co., 165 N.J. 75, 82 (2000)(noting that parties may obtain discovery regarding any non-privileged matter that is relevant to subject of pending action or is reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence). Accordingly, on remand, the trial court shall permit plaintiff, through appropriate discovery requests, see R. 4:10-1, to attempt to elicit information concerning O'Sullivan's and the Board's responsibilities on those related projects. The trial court may exercise its discretion, consistently with the views expressed in this opinion, concerning the proper scope and extent of such discovery. We intimate no view whatsoever on whether the documents and information produced in the course of such discovery will lead to evidence establishing a claim of negligent supervision on the part of the Board or O'Sullivan that will survive summary judgment. Our remand to the trial court for further discovery is without prejudice to defendants' right to renew their motion for summary judgment when that discovery has been completed. II We address separately and in detail plaintiff's claim that the Board's negligence in providing Pfenninger with nonconforming pipe was a proximate cause of his death. Pfenninger was the owner of Countywide Excavating Company (Countywide) and he contracted with the Board to install a drainage remediation system for the Hunterdon Central Regional High School's varsity baseball and soccer/lacrosse fields. The installation of the drainage pipe was the last phase of a three- phase construction project to improve the high school's athletic fields. Negligence is conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against an unreasonable risk of harm. Restatement (Second) of Torts 282 (1965). A person acts negligently when he or she does not take reasonable precautions to prevent causing harm to another. Id. 284. To determine whether a defendant's conduct is negligent, we consider what a prudent man would have done in the defendant's circumstances. Weinberg v. Dinger, 106 N.J. 469, 484 (1987). In addition to showing that a defendant failed to act with reasonable care, a plaintiff must show that a defendant owed the injured party a duty of care. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 548 (1984). Traditionally, courts have determined the circumstances under which a defendant owes a legal duty to another. Carvalho v. Toll Bros. & Developers, 143 N.J. 565, 572 (1996). Similarly, the scope of the duty owed is a matter of law. Kelly, supra, 96 N.J. at 552. We recognize that a court should not treat questions of duty in a conclusory fashion because 'whether a duty exists is ultimately a question of fairness. The inquiry involves a weighing of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk, and the public interest in the proposed solution.' Id. at 544 (quoting Goldberg v. Housing Auth. of Newark, 38 N.J. 578, 583 (1962)); see Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 439 (1993); see also Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 205 (1959) (stating that policy considerations and the balancing of conflicting interests are the truly vital factors in the molding and application of the common law principles of negligence ); Wytupeck v. Camden, 25 N.J. 450, 462 (1957) (concluding that duty must of necessity adjust to the changing social relations and exigencies and man's relation to his fellows ). That weighing process is fact-specific and principled; it must lead to solutions that properly and fairly resolve the specific case and generate intelligible and sensible rules to govern future conduct. Hopkins, supra, 132 N.J. at 439. The common law recognizes the differences between civil actions for breach of contract and for tort. Tort obligations are [] obligations that are imposed by law on policy considerations to avoid some kind of loss to others. They are obligations imposed apart from and independent of promises made and therefore apart from any manifested intention of parties to a contract or other bargaining transaction. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 92, at 656 (5th ed. 1984). Thus, if a relation exists which would give rise to a legal duty without enforcing the contract promise itself, the tort action will lie, otherwise not. William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 33, at 205 (1st ed. 1941). Thus, in a contractual relationship, an individual may be liable in tort if he or she undertakes gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other's person or things. Restatement (Second) of Torts 323 (1965). In this case, the Board and Pfenninger entered into a contract for the installation of a drainage remediation system for Hunterdon High School's baseball and soccer/lacrosse fields. As part of that contract, the Board was required to provide Pfenninger with perforated corrugated polyethylene pipe. Although the record is silent on whether the Board knew the purpose for the perforated corrugated polyethylene pipe, the record demonstrates that O'Sullivan, the project's architect, knew that that specific pipe could be installed above ground and without having someone enter the trench. Therefore, O'Sullivan's knowledge can be imputed to the Board because the record demonstrates that O'Sullivan was the Board's agent and presided over the Board's three-phase project to renovate Hunterdon High School's athletic fields. See Handleman v. Cox, 39 N.J. 95, 104 (1963) (stating that it is well settled that a principal is charged with the knowledge of his agent or servant respecting matters lying within the scope of the duties, activities, and responsibilities entrusted to him by the principal ) (citations omitted). Acting within its scope of authority, O'Sullivan not only prepared the plans and specifications for the field drainage project, but it solicited bids from prospective contractors and made recommendations to the Board. Accordingly, a reasonable jury could find that the Board's failure to supply the correct pipe to Pfenninger not only constituted a breach of the Board's contractual duty, but also a breach of the Board's duty of care to provide the pipe specified in O'Sullivan's drawings that would diminish significantly Pfenninger's risk of harm. A jury also could find that the Board's failure to supply Pfenninger with a complete set of perforated corrugated polyethylene pipe was a proximate cause of Pfenninger's death. In tort cases [l]iability depends not only on the breach of a standard of care but also on a proximate causal relationship between the breach of the duty of care and resultant losses. People Exp. Airlines, Inc. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 100 N.J. 246, 264 (1985). Our Court has defined proximate cause as that combination of 'logic, common sense, justice, policy and precedent' that fixes a point in a chain of events, some foreseeable and some unforeseeable, beyond which the law will bar recovery. Ibid. (quoting Caputzal v. Lindsay Co., 48 N.J. 69, 77-78 (1966)). Because the Board failed to supply Pfenninger with flexible, perforated corrugated polyethylene pipe that could be assembled out of the trench, Pfenninger was required to enter the trench to install the non-flexible pipe. Accordingly, a reasonable jury could find that the Board's delivery of rigid, non-flexible pipe created a foreseeable risk of harm to Pfenninger that was not so remote as to bar recovery. We acknowledge that the record suggests that Pfenninger may have been negligent in not bracing or shoring the walls of the trench as required by the contract. Therefore, if a jury found that the Board and Pfenninger were both negligent and that each of their respective negligent conduct constituted a proximate cause of the accident, then the jury would evaluate their conduct and apportion fault accordingly. As modified, the judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed. The matter is remanded to the Law Division for trial on plaintiff's claim that the Board's negligence in providing Pfenninger with nonconforming pipe was a proximate cause of his death. The Law Division is also ordered to provide Pfenninger with further discovery, consistent with this opinion, relating to Pfenninger's claim that the Board and O'Sullivan negligently supervised Pfenninger's company in the excavation and piping of the trench, such further discovery to be without prejudice to defendants' right to renew their motion for summary judgment on the issue of negligent supervision after such discovery has been provided. So ordered. LISA PFENNINGER, Executrix of the Estate of MATTHEW PFENNINGER, deceased, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. HUNTERDON CENTRAL REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL, HUNTERDON CENTRAL REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, HUNTERDON COUNTY, A.J. O'SULLIVAN ARCHITECTS, ANDREW J. O'SULLIVAN, C.J. O'SULLIVAN, C.J. OSTERGAARD, JOHN STANA, BARRY IMBOWDIN and KENNETH R. QUABECK, Defendants-Appellants, and HUNTERDON COUNTY SOIL CONSERVATION, RARITAN TOWNSHIP, STATE OF NEW JERSEY, FRED CAPPOLA, MARK SYMANCEK, AARON PLUMBING, JOHN DOES 1-10 (said names being fictitious and RICHARD ROES 1-10 (said names being fictitious), Defendants. COLEMAN, J., dissenting. I cannot join in the majority's opinion, which give[s] plaintiff yet another bite of this thoroughly-chewed apple, . . . [because] [t]he route to that result converts us from the Court of last resort, to some sort of super-rescue mission. Whitfield v. Blackwood, 101 N.J. 500, 500 (1986) (Clifford, J., concurring) (citation omitted). The majority has concluded that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying plaintiff's request for expanded discovery, and therefore remands this case. The Appellate Division rejected that claim. Yet, the majority's opinion reopens the discovery even though neither party has raised that issue before this Court. Ordinarily, this Court refrains from ruling on issues not raised in a petition or cross- petition for certification. In order to reopen the discovery, the majority's opinion has reinstated the dismissed complaint. Because I believe the majority has committed grievous error, I dissent. . . . All preventive safety measures shall be in compliance with OSHASee footnote 33 and the requirements of the local municipality and the owner. The design plans further specified that O'Sullivan did not have field inspection responsibilities for the job and that Countywide was responsible for the methods and means of construction. The Board's representatives were John Stana, director of plants and facilities, and Barry Imboden, supervisor of grounds and maintenance. Although Stana was the self-acknowledged liaison between the Board, O'Sullivan, and Countywide, he did not visit the athletic field after Countywide commenced the excavation project. Barry Imboden, on the other hand, was on campus daily and recalls having at least two conversations with Matthew Pfenninger after the project began. Imboden peered into the trench on occasion, but never saw it in a fully exposed state because Countywide backfilled completed sections of the trench with gravel before moving on to the next section. O'Sullivan appointed Ken Quabeck as its project manager. Quabeck communicated with Countywide on several occasions after the excavation began. For example, Quabeck instructed Countywide that it would have to erect a temporary fence around the exposed trench during the project for the students' safety. Quabeck may have visited the excavation site once after the project commenced, but there is no evidence that he looked into the trench or was aware that Countywide was not using bracing or shoring. There is evidence that shortly before the trench collapsed O'Sullivan was aware that Countywide was having difficulty completing the excavation work due to inclement weather, machinery problems, and soil conditions. O'Sullivan frequently requested that the project commence and be completed as soon as possible. NO. A-73/128 LISA PFENNINGER, etc., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. HUNTERDON CENTRAL REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL, et al., Defendants-Appellants. DECIDED March 13, 2001 Chief Justice Poritz