Case Title: Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. Chase Gardens, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S44281

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1999-05-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed:  May 20, 1999

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

NORTHWEST NATURAL GAS COMPANY,

an Oregon corporation,

	Petitioner on Review,

	v.

CHASE GARDENS, INC.,

	Respondent on Review,

	and

KEY BANK OF OREGON, an Oregon state
banking corporation; WILLAMETTE
PRODUCTION CREDIT ASSOCIATION, an
Oregon business; CENTENNIAL BANK,
an Oregon state banking corporation;
ORIX CREDIT ALLIANCE, INC., an Oregon
corporation; TURCO ENGINEERING, INC., 
an Oregon corporation; BENNO DOBBE, dba
HOLLAND AMERICA BULB FARMS, a Washington
corporation; WESTAR MARKETING COMPANY, dba
OREGON NATURAL GAS DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, an Oregon corporation; and 
>STATE ACCIDENT INSURANCE FUND, an Oregon
corporation,

	Defendants.

(CC 16-91-01370; CA A90481; SC S44281)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*

	Argued and submitted January 7, 1998.

	John R. Faust, Jr., of Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt,
Portland, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on
review.

	Joel DeVore, of Luvass, Cobb, Richards & Fraser, PC, Eugene,
argued the cause for respondent on review.  With him on the
briefs were Joe B. Richards and Robert H. Fraser, Eugene.

	Gina Anne Johnnie and Kenneth Sherman, Jr., of Sherman,
Sherman & Murch, Salem, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae
Oregon Bankers Association.

	Wendell G. Kusnerus, Portland, filed a brief on behalf of
amicus curiae United States National Bank of Oregon.

	David F. Rees, of Stoll Stoll Berne Lokting & Shlachter
P.C., Portland, filed a brief on behalf of amicus curiae Oregon
Trial Lawyers Association.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
and Kulongoski, Justices.**

	VAN HOOMISSEN, J.

	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

	*Appeal from Lane County Circuit Court,

	 Maurice K. Merten, Judge.

	 146 Or App 249, 933 P2d 370 adhered to as modified

	 147 Or App 586, 938 P2d 778 (1997).

	**Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998, and did not
participate in this decision; Graber, J., resigned March 31,
1998, and did not participate in this decision; Durham, J., did
not participate in the decision of this case.

		VAN HOOMISSEN, J.

		Plaintiff Northwest Natural Gas Company (NWNG) filed
this action for breach of contract and open account against
defendant Chase Gardens, Inc. (Chase) and others, seeking to
collect money that Chase owed for natural gas and natural gas
transportation services, and to foreclose agricultural service
liens that NWNG had placed on Chase's crop to secure those
amounts.  Chase counterclaimed to recover from NWNG for breach of
contract and for intentional interference with Chase's
relationship with the Centennial Bank (the bank), Chase's lender. 
		The trial court denied NWNG's motions for directed
verdicts on each count of Chase's counterclaim.  Thereafter, a
jury found that Chase owed NWNG $182,069.09.  The jury further
found that NWNG was liable to Chase for $1,900,000 for breach of
contract, and for $2,151,226 in economic damages and $3,000,000
in punitive damages for intentional interference with Chase's
relationship with the bank.  The trial court entered judgment for
NWNG on its contract claim and for Chase on its intentional
interference claim.  The trial court did not enter a money
judgment on Chase's breach of contract counterclaim, because the
damages duplicated those on the tort claim.  NWNG appealed, and
Chase cross-appealed.  The Court of Appeals affirmed.  Northwest
Natural Gas Co. v. Chase Gardens, Inc., 146 Or App 249, 933 P2d
370, adhered to as modified 147 Or App 586, 938 P2d 778 (1997). 
We allowed NWNG's petition for review.  

		The dispositive issue is whether the evidence at trial
permitted the jury to find that NWNG intentionally interfered
with Chase's business relationship with the bank.  For the
reasons that follow, we reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals and remand this case to that court for consideration of
the issues presented on appeal relating to Chase's breach of
contract claim.

		We view the evidence, and the reasonable inferences to
be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the party in
whose favor the verdict was returned and consider whether there
was any evidence to support the jury's verdict.  Or Const, Art
VII (Amended), § 3; Tadsen v. Praegitzer Industries, Inc., 324 Or
465, 468, 928 P2d 980 (1996); Whinston v. Kaiser Foundation
Hospital, 309 Or 350, 356 n 8, 788 P2d 428 (1990).

		We take the following relevant facts from the Court of
Appeals' opinion:

	"Chase owned * * * 20 acres of heated green houses in
which it grew flowers.  * * * In the mid-1980's Chase's
primary source of heat for the greenhouses was steam
that it purchased from the Eugene Water and Electricity
Board (EWEB).  It also had back-up boilers in which it
could burn various fuels to produce steam at the site.

		"During the mid and late 1980's, Chase experienced
financial difficulties, * * * and had significant
losses in several of those years.  * * * 

		"* * * In late September 1988, Chase signed a
contract to receive natural gas service from NWNG. * *
*  Chase chose interruptible gas service, because the
costs were lower than with firm service.  * * *

		"* * * * *

		"By January 1989, Chase had fallen behind in its
payments to NWNG.  * * *  Beginning in August 1989,
Chase and NWNG agreed on several plans for bringing its
account current, but Chase was never able to eliminate
the entire debt.[(1)]  At the end of November 1990 Chase
made, and NWNG accepted, a late payment that was
sufficient to cover the current billing but that failed
to include the agreed payment on the arrearages.  * * *

		"* * * NWNG's bill for Chase's November usage was
$44,605.17, which brought the total amount owed to
$52,563.04.  * * *  In mid-December, Chase attempted to
get NWNG to agree to modify the repayment schedule and
to allow Chase to defer part of the December and
January bills in anticipation of the [1991] Valentine's
Day harvest.  NWNG's credit manager, who had not been
involved in the discussions before Chase signed the
contract, refused.  Chase made no more payments to
NWNG.

		"During December 1990, the Eugene area experienced
the longest, broadest spectrum cold spell in its
history.  The increased demand for gas led NWNG to
notify Chase to discontinue taking gas so that it could
meet the demands of its firm customers.  * * *  Chase,
however, was unable to get its fuel oil system to work
properly for several days.  It therefore used a large
amount of gas at high penalty rates.  As a result of
the cold and of the penalty rates, Chase's bill for
December, which NWNG prepared in early January, was for
an additional $96,331.92.

		"Chase's failure to make the agreed arrearage
payment in November was a result of renewed cash flow
problems.  In an effort to overcome those problems, it
decided not to emphasize Christmas sales in 1990 but to
focus on its primary sales periods of Valentine's Day,
Easter, and Mother's Day in 1991.  * * *  For cash flow
until Valentine's Day it could rely on its regular bank
line of credit against its receivables and on a special
'bulge' line of $100,000 that was available on February
1 for harvesting the Valentine's Day crop.  Chase
anticipated that sales from that crop both would
finance the remaining holidays' crops and, together
with those crops, would provide money to pay its
creditors, including NWNG.  Its problem was getting to
Valentine's Day.

		"On December 27 [,1990], NWNG's credit manager
wrote Chase that its bill was 'past due in the amount
of $49,832.17,' a figure that included the billing for
November, which was due on December 26, and the
November and December payments on the arrearages.  He
threatened to terminate gas service unless Chase paid
that amount by January 4, 1991.  Before he wrote this
letter, NWNG had also decided to file a lien for the
past due amount; it did so on December 31.  * * *

		"Before NWNG filed the lien, its credit manager
had learned that the bank was Chase's lender.  * * * 
He also knew that it was reasonably foreseeable that
the lien would lead the bank to stop Chase's line of
credit and would thus dry up its cash flow; he was
willing to take that risk.  * * *

		"[Early in January 1991], Chase met with the
credit manager and an NWNG attorney.  Chase proposed to
give NWNG priority over most other unsecured creditors
and to give it a second mortgage on a house that would
secure most of the amount claimed in the lien.  * * * 

		"* * * * *

		"NWNG management did not agree to immediate
termination of gas service.  Instead, on January 9 the
credit manager sent Chase a letter that gave it two
options:

			"'1) Pay Northwest Natural Gas company
$100,000.  If you choose this option, the
Agricultural Services Lien filed on December
31, 1990, for $49,832.17, would be
terminated.

			"'2) Pay Northwest Natural Gas Company
$60,000.  If you choose this option, the
Agricultural Services Lien filed on December
31, 1990, for $49,832.17, would remain in
force.'

	"According to the letter, if Chase did not comply with
either option by January 15, NWNG would terminate gas
service on January 16.  If Chase did comply, NWNG would
require it to pay all future bills within normal terms
and to make and maintain payment arrangements on the
arrears.[(2)] 

		"The bank received formal notice of the lien on
January 9, 1991.  The next day it cut off Chase's line
of credit, solely because of the lien; as of December
1990 it still believed that Chase would be successful. 
Without money from the bank, Chase was unable to meet
either of the conditions in NWNG's letter.  It stopped
taking gas on January 10; on January 11 it shut down
its oil burners rather than take delivery of oil for
which it could not pay.  It immediately laid off most
of its employees and used what money it had available
to pay their wages.  Chase closed its business because
the lien resulted in the bank's withdrawing its line of
credit, not because NWNG threatened to terminate gas
service."  Northwest Natural Gas, 146 Or App at 252-257
(emphasis added; footnotes omitted).

NWNG terminated Chase's gas service on January 22, 1991.(3)

		At trial, at the close of all the evidence, NWNG moved
for directed verdicts on Chase's counterclaims, arguing in part:

		"Turning to Chase Gardens' Counterclaim for
intentional interference with business relationship
with Centennial Bank, there is no evidence of any
intentional interference.  The intentionality
requirement is quite strict and quite high under * * *
Straube v. Larson[, 287 Or 357, 600 P2d 371 (1979)]. 
There simply is no evidence at all to support that
Northwest Natural intentionally interfered with Chase
Gardens' relationship with Centennial Bank.

		"In addition, another element of that [tort] is
that there must be interference committed by either
wrongful means or wrongful purpose.  There is evidence
of neither.  There is no evidence of wrongful means. 
The lien was valid.  There is no evidence of wrongful
purpose or wrongful motive.

		"* * * * * 

		"Finally, against both their claims for * * *
intentional interference and breach of contract; that
is, Chase's counterclaims, there is no evidence of
causation.  Northwest Natural Gas's filing of the lien
did not cause Chase's damage.  In addition, the letter
that we sent on January 9th, 1991 did not cause their
damage.  Chase Gardens turned off its own gas on
January 10, 1991.  In addition, [Defendant] Westar
[Marketing Company] filed its own independent lien on
January 11th, 1991, which would have caused the same
situation for Chase Gardens that they claim was caused
by the filing of a lien by Northwest Natural Gas.
Therefore, Northwest Natural Gas did not cause this
situation." 

The trial court denied NWNG's motions without comment.

		On appeal, NWNG assigned as error, inter alia, the
trial court's denial of its motions for directed verdicts on
Chase's counterclaims, asserting that there was no evidence to
support it.  Relevant to Chase's tort claim, NWNG argued that: 
(1) there was no evidence that NWNG had acted with an improper
motive in filing the lien, (2) there was no evidence that NWNG
had used improper means, and (3) there was no evidence that its
letter caused Chase's loss of bank credit and resulting monetary
damages, because (a) there was no evidence that the bank took any
action as a result of the letter, (b) there was no evidence that
Chase had the financial ability to pay the lien, and (c) as a
matter of law, its letter could not have prevented Chase from
tendering payment of the amount claimed in the lien, which, under
ORS 87.346, would have required NWNG to discharge the lien. 
Chase responded, in part, that NWNG had not preserved its
causation arguments at trial. 

		The decisive issue on appeal was whether the evidence
permitted the jury to find that NWNG intentionally interfered
with Chase's relationship with the bank.  The Court of Appeals
first considered the issue of improper motive in filing the
lien.(4)  The court held that 
the filing was a legitimate exercise
of NWNG's statutory and contractual right to attempt to collect
the debt Chase owed NWNG and that the filing alone could not
create tort liability:

	"To the extent that Chase's counterclaim is based on
NWNG's attempt to improve its position by filing the
lien, it fails.  There is nothing inherently improper
about one creditor seeking to push itself ahead of
other creditors.  In order to establish an improper
purpose, thus, Chase must prove its additional
allegation that NWNG sought to gain a more favorable
position than the law or the agreement of the parties
permitted.  Because the contract, by operation of law,
permitted NWNG to file the lien, its purpose in doing
so cannot be improper and that claim also fails."  146
Or App at 259 (emphasis in original).

Chase does not challenge that holding on review. 

		The Court of Appeals next considered whether NWNG used
improper means or whether it had an improper purpose for its
conduct other than filing and enforcing the lien.  The court
concluded:

	"The jury could find that, although the lien was valid,
NWNG attempted to use it improperly to gain advantages
to which it was not entitled and that it intended to
cause Chase to go out of business if its improper
conditions were not met.  The crucial event in this
regard was the January 9 letter, in which, the jury
could find, NWNG gave Chase the choice of paying
$100,000 in order to have the lien removed or paying
$60,000 and leaving the lien in place."  146 Or App at
261.

The court further concluded:

	"[The jury] could find that the letter also involved
the terms on which NWNG would release the lien.  * * * 
The jury could find that it is reasonable to read the
letter as describing both the conditions for continuing
service and the conditions for removing the lien.  * *
*  The jury could find that the letter indicated that
NWNG would not remove the lien even if Chase paid the
amount of the lien.  The letter was thus an improper
means.

		"* * * * *

		"The jury could also find that NWNG wanted to end
its contractual relationship with a difficult customer
and that it was willing to put Chase out of business to
achieve that goal.  * * *  The jury could find, * * *
that [NWNG's] actions made no business sense if NWNG's
purpose was to collect what Chase owed.  If that had
been its purpose, it would have made it possible for
Chase to get through its upcoming harvests, thus
producing cash flow that would at least have reduced
Chase's debt to NWNG.

		"The jury could find that, instead, NWNG decided
to shut Chase down in order to get out of any
continuing obligations under the contract and that it
used the January 9 letter to achieve that purpose." 
146 Or App at 261-62.

The Court of Appeals summarized its tort analysis as follows:

		"Filing the lien by itself was a legitimate
attempt to collect the debt that Chase owned NWNG. 
Using the lien as a basis for making excessive demands,
with the intent of putting Chase out of business by
interfering with its relationship with the source of
its operating capital, not in order to collect the debt
but in order to get out of an existing relationship,
was not.  The jury could thus have found that the
January 9 letter was an improper means and that the
goal of putting Chase out of business in order to avoid
having to continue an existing relationship was an
improper purpose."  146 Or App at 262.

		The Court of Appeals refused to consider NWNG's
arguments on appeal that its actions did not cause Chase's
damages, concluding that NWNG had failed to preserve those
arguments at trial.  146 Or App at 262 n 10; on recon, 147 Or App
at 589-90.  Because the Court of Appeals held that the evidence
at trial permitted the jury to find that NWNG committed the tort
of intentional interference with Chase's business relationship
with the bank, it did not consider the issues on appeal related
to Chase's breach of contract claim.  

		On review, NWNG contends that the Court of Appeals
erred in affirming the trial court judgment.  Addressing Chase's
intentional interference claim, NWNG argues:  (1) there was no
evidence that it used any means that violated an identifiable,
objective standard of conduct; (2) there was no evidence that it
had an improper purpose to harm Chase, but only evidence that it
was trying to advance its own business interests as it saw them
in collecting the money Chase owed; and (3) the Court of Appeals
erred in concluding that NWNG had not preserved the arguments
that it made on appeal as to why its actions did not cause
Chase's damage.  Chase responds in part that the Court of Appeals
correctly ruled that NWNG had not preserved its causation
arguments on appeal.

		To state a claim for intentional interference with
economic relations, a plaintiff must allege:  (1) the existence
of a professional or business relationship; (2) intentional
interference with that relationship; (3) by a third party; (4)
accomplished through improper means or for an improper purpose;
(5) a causal effect between the interference and damage to the
economic relations; and (6) damages.  McGanty v. Staudenraus, 321
Or 532, 535, 901 P2d 841 (1995); Uptown Heights Associates v.
Seafirst Corp., 320 Or 638, 651, 891 P2d 639 (1995).

		Deliberate interference alone does not give rise to
tort liability.  In Top Service Body Shop v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
283 Or 201, 209-10, 582 P2d 1365 (1973), this court stated:

	"[A] claim [of tort liability for intentional
interference with a contractual or other economic
relations] is made out when interference resulting in
injury to another is wrongful by some measure beyond
the fact of the interference itself.  Defendant's
liability may arise from improper motives or from the
use of improper means.  They may be wrongful by reason
of a statute or other regulation, or a recognized rule
of common law, or perhaps an established standard of a
trade or profession."  (Footnote omitted.)

To be entitled to reach a jury, a plaintiff must not only prove

	"that defendant intentionally interfered with his
business relationship but also that defendant had a
duty of non-interference; i.e., that he interfered for
an improper purpose rather than for a legitimate one,
or that defendant used improper means which resulted in
injury to plaintiff.  Therefore, a case is made out
which entitles plaintiff to go to a jury only 'when
interference resulting in injury to another is wrongful
by some measure beyond the fact of the interference
itself.'"  Straube, 287 Or at 361 (quoting Top Service,
283 Or at 209).

Thus, if liability in tort is to be based on an actor's purpose,
then the purpose must be to inflict injury on the plaintiff "as
such."  Top Service, 283 Or at 211.  And, if liability in tort is
based on an actor's means, then the means must violate some
objective, identifiable standard, such as a statute or other
regulation, or a recognized rule of common law, or, perhaps, an
established standard of a trade or profession.  Id. at 209-10. 
Generally, a defendant's subjective judgment as to its own
business purposes will control.  Top Service, 283 Or at 212.  See
also Wampler v. Palmerton, 250 Or 65, 74, 439 P2d 601 (1968) (a
person "promoting an interest which is equal or superior in
social value to that with which he interferes" is may be
privileged or justified).

		The burden of proof rests with a plaintiff to show both
that a defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's
economic relationship and that the defendant had no privilege to
do so.  North Pacific Lbr. Co. v. Moore, 275 Or 359, 369, 551 P2d
431 (1976). 

		In considering Chase's tort claim, the Court of Appeals
focused on the element of improper means or improper purpose,
refusing to consider NWNG's specific alternative causation
arguments on appeal because, in that court's view, they were not
preserved at trial.  We, however, first address the question
whether NWNG preserved those specific alternative arguments for
appeal by raising the issue of causation at trial. 

		As noted, NWNG's trial counsel argued at trial:

		"Finally, against both their claims for * * *
intentional interference and breach of contract; that
is, Chase's counterclaims, there is no evidence of
causation.  * * *  In addition, the letter that we sent
on January 9th, 1991 did not cause their damage.  * * * 
Therefore, Northwest Natural Gas did not cause this
situation."

		In State v. Hitz, 307 Or 183, 188, 766 P2d 363 (1988)
this court stated:

	"We have previously drawn attention to the distinctions
between raising an issue at trial, identifying a source
for a claimed position, and making a particular
argument. * * *  The first ordinarily is essential, the
second less so, the third least.  (Emphasis in
original; citation omitted.)

See also Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 4J, 301 Or 358, 370 n
12, 723 P2d 298 (1986) (a court is not confined to choosing only
among the arguments and authorities cited by counsel for or
against a properly identified claim).  NWNG argues that, by
arguing at trial that the letter did not cause Chase's damages,
it raised the issue of causation, thereby preserving the specific
alternative arguments that it made on appeal. 

		NWNG preserved the issue of causation at trial.  The
question then is whether NWNG also preserved the specific
alternative arguments about causation that it asserted for the
first time on appeal.  In answering that question, we view the
record in light of the purposes of fairness and efficiency that
underlie the preservation requirement.  See State v. Stevens, 328
Or 116, 122, 970 P2d 215 (1998) (in considering whether an
objection at trial raised the issue being advanced on appeal, an
appellate court must view the facts in light of the purposes of
fairness and efficiency that underlie the requirement).  In Davis
v. O'Brien, 320 Or 729, 737, 891 P2d 1307 (1995), this court
stated:

	"[T]he rules pertaining to preservation of error in
trial courts are intended to advance goals such as
ensuring that the positions of the parties are
presented clearly to the initial tribunal and that
parties are not taken by surprise, mislead, or denied
opportunities to meet an argument." 

See also Shields v. Campbell, 277 Or 71, 77-78, 559 P2d 1275
(1977) (reason for the rule requiring timely objection "is not
merely to promote form over substance but to promote an efficient
administration of justice and the saving of judicial time"). 

		Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or 72, 948 P2d 722 (1997), rejected
the contention that a plaintiff's argument was unpreserved, and
stated:

	"We find that the issue was preserved sufficiently
under the standards set out in [Hitz], because
plaintiff raised and preserved the broader legal issue
[in the Court of Appeals] -- whether the trial court
erred in holding that his claims were barred by the
statute of limitations.  Under the rationale in Hitz, a
specific alternative argument regarding that issue can
be raised for the first time in this court."  Id. at 77
(emphasis added).

See also State v. Bennett, 301 Or 299, 308, 721 P2d 1375 (1986)
(the issue whether the search violated the state constitution
having been raised, the fact that the state argued on appeal that
the search was justified as "incidental to arrest" rather than as
a "mobile automobile exception" was irrelevant, and the state and
defendant were entitled to argue any justification or lack of it
for the search) (Jones, J., concurring); Columbia Boat Sales v.
Island Packet Yachts, 105 Or App 85, 87, 803 P2d 283 (1990)
("Plaintiff raised the issue of personal jurisdiction below and
that is enough.").

		The record shows that NWNG's counsel argued at trial
that NWNG's conduct did not cause Chase's damage.  On this
record, we conclude that permitting NWNG to make specific
alternative arguments on appeal on the issue of causation results
in no fundamental unfairness to Chase, which makes no showing
that it was taken by surprise, misled, or denied any opportunity
to meet NWNG's specific alternative arguments at trial or on
appeal.  Chase does not explain how it might have presented its
case any differently at trial had NWNG's counsel followed up his
assertion that NWNG did not cause Chase's damages with the
specific alternative arguments that NWNG made on appeal. 

		Generally, on appeal, the case should be heard on the
same theory on which it was presented in the court below.  State
v. Hickman, 273 Or 358, 360, 540 P2d 1406 (1975).  Here, NWNG 
moved for a directed verdict on Chase's counterclaim on the
ground that there was no evidence that NWNG caused Chase's
damage.  After reviewing the record, we conclude that the Court
of Appeals raised the preservation bar too high and that the
purposes of the preservation rule will not be frustrated by
allowing NWNG to present its specific alternative arguments on
appeal.  We hold that the Court of Appeals erred in refusing to
consider the specific alternative arguments regarding the element
of causation relied on by NWNG on appeal.  We proceed to consider
the merits of NWNG's arguments concerning the issue of causation. 
		Based on our review of the record, we conclude that
there was no evidence presented at trial that NWNG's conduct
caused Chase's damage.  And, because causation is an element of
the tort, it follows that there is no evidence to support the
tort verdict against NWNG.  As the Court of Appeals concluded,
Chase closed its business because the lien resulted in the bank
withdrawing its line of credit, not because NWNG threatened to
terminate gas service.  146 Or App at 257.  ("Without money from
the bank, Chase was unable to meet either of the conditions in
NWNG's letter.") 

		At trial, the bank's manager testified that the bank's
sole reason for terminating Chase's line of credit was NWNG's
lien.  Bruce Chase testified that NWNG's lien "killed our bank
credit and our cash flow," thus forcing his decision to shut the
business down.  The record also shows that the negotiations
between NWNG and Chase in January 1991 never were about payment
of the amount due under the lien.  Rather, the negotiations
always were about whether NWNG would remove its lien on terms
that Chase could satisfy.  For example, Chase proposed to give
NWNG priority over most of its other unsecured creditors and to
give NWNG a second mortgage on real property that Chase claims
would have secured most of the amount that NWNG claimed in its
lien.  NWNG declined to accept Chase's proposal.  Chase points to
no evidence that NWNG ever was under a duty under penalty of tort
liability to remove its lien on terms that Chase could satisfy. 
Even assuming that there might have been a contractual duty to do
so, a question we specifically do not address here, no duty to do
so under tort is apparent.

		After NWNG filed its lien, it sent Chase a letter
explaining the conditions under which it was willing to continue
providing gas to Chase.  Assuming, arguendo, that NWNG's letter
could be found to be improper, the fact remains that it did not
cause the interference between Chase and the bank; therefore, the
letter could not provide a basis for finding tort liability. 
Chase appears to argue that it should prevail, because there is
evidence in the record that NWNG knew that its actions might put
Chase out of business.  Oregon law, however, will not impose tort
liability merely because a factfinder believes that a creditor
should have abstained from pressing its legal rights against a 
delinquent debtor.  Chase failed to prove that NWNG's letter
caused the bank to revoke Chase's line of credit.  Thus, there is
no causal connection between the letter and any interference.

		We conclude that the trial court erred in denying
NWNG's motion for a directed verdict on Chase's intentional
interference claim.(5)  The Court of Appeals erred in affirming
that ruling.  Because the Court of Appeals held that the evidence
permitted the jury to find that NWNG committed the tort of
intentional interference with Chase's relationship with the bank,
the court did not consider the issue presented on appeal related
to Chase's breach of contract claim.  Accordingly, we reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals as to Chase's claim for
intentional interference and remand this case to that court for
consideration of the issue presented on appeal related to Chase's
breach of contract claim.  As to that issue, we express no
opinion.

		The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and
the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further
proceedings.

1. 	In June 1990, NWNG agreed to allow Chase additional
time to pay its arrears, which at that time were $20,911.25. 
Chase agreed to pay all future monthly billings when due and to
pay monthly installments of $2,614 on its arrears.

2. 	NWNG asserts that its letter was a "work-out" proposal
intended solely to state the conditions under which it was
willing to continue providing gas to Chase.  It argues that, had
Chase merely wanted NWNG to remove the lien, Chase could have
forced NWNG to do so by paying the amount claimed in the lien.

		ORS 87.346 provides in part:

		"(1) When a person claiming a lien under ORS
87.216 to 87.232 receives full payment of the claim * *
* the person shall file with the Secretary of State or
the recording officer of the county in which the claim
of lien is recorded a certificate declaring that full
payment has been received from the lien debtor and that
the claim of lien is discharged.

		"* * * * *

		"(3) If any lien claimant, after full payment of
the claim, within 10 days after being requested
thereto, fails to discharge the claim of lien, the
person is liable to the owner of the chattel formerly
subject to the lien in the sum of $100 damages and for
all actual damages caused by the failure of the lien
claimant to discharge the claim of lien.  The owner of
the chattel shall recover those damages by an action at
law."

3. 	Chase's gas usage in January 1991 resulted in a bill
for an additional $33,174.13.  The total amount Chase owed NWNG
was $182,069.09, which is the amount of the jury's verdict and
resulting judgment on NWNG's claim.

4. 	Filing the lien notice did not create the lien, which
arose by operation of law as NWNG delivered gas to Chase.  ORS
87.226.  The filing only preserved the lien.  ORS 87.256.

5. 	Because Chase's tort claim fails for lack of proof on
the element of causation, we specifically do not consider the
merits of the Court of Appeals' discussion of improper means or
improper purpose.