Case Title: Martin v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC18-214, SC18-1696

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2020-01-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC18-214 
____________ 
 
ARTHUR JAMES MARTIN, 
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA, 
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC18-1696 
____________ 
 
ARTHUR JAMES MARTIN, 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
MARK S. INCH, etc., 
Respondent. 
 
January 16, 2020 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Arthur James Martin appeals an order of the circuit court denying in part his 
third amended motion to vacate his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence 
of death filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  He further 
 
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petitions this Court for a writ of habeas corpus.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, 
§ 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const.1  For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the order of 
the postconviction court and deny the habeas petition. 
FACTS AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
 
Martin was convicted of the 2009 first-degree murder of Javon Daniels.  
Martin v. State, 151 So. 3d 1184, 1187 (Fla. 2014).  The jury recommended the 
death penalty by a vote of nine to three.  Id. at 1189.  The trial court followed that 
recommendation and sentenced Martin to death.  Id. at 1190.  In the opinion on 
direct appeal, the Court detailed the facts surrounding the crime: 
Two days before the murder, Martin’s friend and codefendant 
Franklin Batie (Batie) was involved in a shooting where he was 
grazed on the back of the head and neck.  On October 28, 2009, the 
day of the murder, Batie drove Martin to the Weber 5B Apartments in 
Jacksonville so that Martin could visit someone.  Batie drove his car, a 
white Ford, to the apartment complex, and he remained in the car 
while Martin got out of the car and engaged in conversation.  In the 
back seat of the Ford was Batie’s loaded .45 caliber handgun.  The 
gun was equipped with a thirty-round magazine. 
While Batie remained in the car and waited for Martin, he 
noticed a white [Toyota] sport utility vehicle (SUV) and thought that 
he recognized the driver of the SUV as the person who shot him days 
earlier.  Batie retrieved his gun from the backseat and mentioned to 
Martin that he possibly recognized the driver as having tried to shoot 
him.  Martin then took Batie’s gun and went to the driver’s side of the 
                                          
 
 
1.  The State questions whether this Court has jurisdiction over Martin’s 
appeal because the postconviction court granted Martin a new penalty phase 
pursuant to Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016).  However, we rejected a 
similar assertion in Merck v. State, 260 So. 3d 184, 188 n.1 (Fla. 2018) (“[T]he 
pending resentencing does not affect our exclusive jurisdiction over this appeal.”). 
 
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SUV and began firing multiple shots at the driver, nineteen-year-old 
Daniels.  When Daniels tried to escape through the passenger side of 
the SUV, Martin walked around the front of the SUV to the passenger 
side and continued firing.  Eyewitness Sebastian Lucas testified that 
upon reaching the passenger side, Martin “shot him [Daniels] back 
down in the car.”  When Martin finished shooting, he walked back to 
the Ford, and Batie drove Martin home.  Daniels died at the scene. 
Batie drove home to Starke, Florida, where he disposed of his Ford 
and began driving another vehicle.  The murder weapon was never 
located. 
Following the murder, detectives interviewed multiple 
eyewitnesses who viewed photospreads of possible suspects and 
identified Martin as the shooter.  Some of the witnesses did not know 
Martin by his given name but by his nicknames, “Beer Belly” or 
“Shorty Fat.”  Martin was arrested several days after the murder, and a 
grand jury later indicted him for first-degree murder.  Three days after 
Martin’s arrest, Batie was arrested in Starke.  Batie later entered a 
guilty plea to second-degree murder.  After the conclusion of Martin’s 
trial, Batie was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment for his role in 
the murder. 
. . . Multiple eyewitnesses, including codefendant Batie, 
testified and identified Martin as the person who shot Daniels.  One of 
the eyewitnesses, Tasheana Hart, testified that in the days following 
the murder, Martin asked her “not to tell” what she saw on the day of 
the murder and offered her money in exchange for her silence. 
The medical examiner, Dr. Valerie Rao, testified that Daniels 
sustained a total of twelve gunshot wounds.  Daniels was shot in his 
left hand, left arm, right arm, left side, right side, right thigh, and 
chest.  Four of the gunshot wounds produced fatal injuries to Daniels’ 
lungs, heart, liver, and stomach. . . .  The gunshot wounds to each of 
Daniels’ arms broke the humerus in each arm, and the gunshot wound 
to his left hand broke two of the bones in his hand.  These broken 
bones incapacitated Daniels and left him incapable of completing his 
attempted escape from the SUV. 
 
Id. at 1187-88. 
 
 
In imposing a sentence of death, the trial court found the existence of three 
aggravating factors: (1) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated, and 
 
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premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal justification (CCP); 
(2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (HAC); and (3) prior 
violent felony (based upon a prior conviction for second-degree murder).  Id. at 
1188, 1190.  Each aggravating factor was given great weight.  Id. at 1190.  The 
trial court found one statutory mitigating circumstance: Martin’s age (forty years 
old at the time of the murder), which was given slight weight “based on minimal 
evidence of Martin’s significant emotional immaturity.”  Id.  With respect to the 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances proposed by Martin, the trial court found as 
follows: 
(1) Martin is functionally illiterate (slight weight); (2) Martin has a 
learning disability (slight weight); (3) Martin has low cognitive 
functioning (some weight); (4) Martin suffered a lifetime of poor 
health, including asthma, diabetes, and sleep apnea (slight weight); 
(5) Martin was a loving and caring son (slight weight); (6) Martin 
was a hard worker (slight weight); (7) Martin was generous (slight 
weight); (8) Martin was reverent (slight weight); (9) Martin was a 
loving and caring brother (slight weight); (10) Martin’s love of 
work was often thwarted by his poor physical health (very slight 
weight); (11) Martin’s childhood was plagued by the excessive 
alcohol consumption and fighting of his parents (some weight); 
(12) Martin was respectful to the judge and other officers of the 
court (very slight weight); (13) sentencing Martin to death is 
disproportionate and disparate given Batie’s sentence to life 
imprisonment (rejected as not proven); and (14) the jury 
recommendation was not unanimous (proven, but no weight 
assigned). 
 
Id. at 1190 n.4.  The trial court also found and gave slight weight to two 
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances that were not proposed by Martin: 
 
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(1) Martin had “temper issues”; and (2) when Martin was a child, he was attacked 
by other children.  Id. at 1190 n.5. 
On direct appeal, Martin raised four issues: (1) whether the trial court made 
improper findings of fact and gave insufficient consideration in mitigation to 
Martin’s intellectual functioning; (2) whether the trial court failed to consider, find, 
and weigh as a mitigating circumstance that Martin had a history of drug and 
alcohol abuse; (3) whether the trial court erred in finding the CCP and HAC 
aggravating factors; and (4) whether Florida’s death penalty sentencing scheme 
was unconstitutional under Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  151 So. 3d at 
1190.  We rejected each claim, concluded there was sufficient evidence to sustain 
the conviction, and determined the death sentence was proportionate.  Id. at 1190-
99.  Accordingly, we affirmed Martin’s conviction and sentence.  Id. at 1199.2 
 
Martin filed his initial rule 3.851 motion for postconviction relief on 
February 18, 2016, but it was stricken.  His first amended motion was also 
stricken.  On March 31, 2016, Martin filed his second amended motion for 
postconviction relief, raising nine claims: (1) Martin is intellectually disabled and, 
therefore, his execution would violate the United States and Florida Constitutions; 
                                          
 
 
2.  We noted the sentencing order contained a factual error regarding which 
doctor administered to Martin the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, Revised 
Edition, but concluded the error was harmless.  Id. at 1191. 
 
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(2) trial counsel was ineffective during jury selection by (a) failing to conduct a 
meaningful death qualification of the jury, (b) failing to educate the jury on the 
penalty-phase process, (c) failing to inquire about racial bias, and (d) diminishing 
the jury’s role in sentencing in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 
(1985), and failing to object to comments that minimized the role of the jury; 
(3) trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase by failing to (a) conduct an 
adequate investigation, (b) adequately argue pretrial motions in limine, 
(c) effectively cross-examine guilt-phase witnesses, (d) present the testimony of 
two eyewitnesses, (e) litigate and challenge the photographic identifications, 
(f) hire a forensic consultant or ballistics expert, and (g) adequately challenge the 
evidence during closing statements and present a viable defense; (4) prosecutorial 
misconduct during the guilt phase; (5) trial counsel was ineffective during the 
penalty phase by failing to (a) conduct an adequate mitigation investigation, 
(b) adequately prepare the defense expert who evaluated Martin for intellectual 
disability, and (c) challenge aggravating factors and present mitigating 
circumstances; (6) Martin was denied his right to a qualified mental health expert 
pursuant to Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); (7) cumulative error; 
(8) Florida’s lethal injection protocol is cruel and unusual punishment; and 
(9) Martin’s death sentence violates Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and 
Caldwell. 
 
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The postconviction court scheduled an evidentiary hearing on claims (1), 
(2)(b), (3)(a), (3)(c)-(g), (5)(a), 5(b), and all but one subpart of (5)(c)—the failure 
to challenge the prior violent felony aggravating factor.  Thereafter, the court 
allowed Martin to file a third amended motion for postconviction relief to add a 
tenth claim alleging Brady and Giglio violations.3  During a status conference, the 
court noted that Martin is entitled to a new penalty phase pursuant to Hurst v. State 
(Hurst), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016).  As a result, the evidentiary hearing addressed 
only guilt-phase claims. 
Martin presented as witnesses trial counsel Francis Shea (who primarily 
handled the guilt phase) and Christopher Anderson (who primarily handled the 
penalty phase); Anderson’s office manager, Deirdre Berger Anderson; Liza Catron, 
Bruce Robinson, Kenneth Moncrief, and Fred Hillerich, who were appointed as 
investigators for the defense at different times prior to trial; trial witness Tasheana 
                                          
 
 
3.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 
150 (1972).  In the same order, the postconviction court disallowed Martin from 
amending claims (1), (3), and (5), but allowed him to present additional witnesses 
with respect to those claims. 
 
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Hart;4 Tasheana’s mother, Pamela Hart;5 Corey Davis,6 who lived at the apartment 
complex where the murder occurred; and Christopher Robinson, who provided 
expert testimony with respect to forensics.  The State presented Robert Nelson, 
who previously worked for the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office; current Jacksonville 
Sheriff’s Office detectives Mitchell Chizik and Stephanie Strawn; and then-
assistant state attorneys Richard Mantei and Richard Komando.  On January 8, 
2018, the postconviction court issued an order that granted the Hurst claim, denied 
the guilt-phase claims, and declined to consider the claims related to the penalty 
phase. 
 
This appeal follows.  Martin has also filed a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. 
MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF 
The majority of the claims presented in Martin’s appeal allege ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel.  To demonstrate entitlement to relief on such a claim, a 
defendant must meet the following requirements: 
                                          
 
 
4.  In the postconviction record, Tasheana’s name is also spelled Tasheanna 
and Tashianna.  To maintain consistency with our opinion on direct appeal, the 
spelling Tasheana will be used. 
 
5.  Because mother and daughter have the same surname, they will be 
referred to by their first names. 
 
6.  Davis’s first name is spelled both Corey and Cory in the postconviction 
record. 
 
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First, counsel’s performance must be shown to be deficient.  
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. 
Ed. 2d 674 (1984).  Deficient performance in this context means that 
counsel’s performance fell below the standard guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment.  Id.  When examining counsel’s performance, an 
objective standard of reasonableness applies, id. at 688, 104 S. Ct. 
2052, and great deference is given to counsel’s performance.  Id. at 
689, 104 S. Ct. 2052.  The defendant bears the burden to “overcome 
the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 
‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ”  Id. (quoting Michel v. 
Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S. Ct. 158, 100 L. Ed. 83 (1955)).  
This Court has made clear that “[s]trategic decisions do not constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel.”  See Occhicone v. State, 768 So. 2d 
1037, 1048 (Fla. 2000).  There is a strong presumption that trial 
counsel’s performance was not ineffective.  See Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 669, 104 S. Ct. 2052. 
Second, the deficient performance must have prejudiced the 
defendant, ultimately depriving the defendant of a fair trial with a 
reliable result.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052.  A 
defendant must do more than speculate that an error affected the 
outcome.  Id. at 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052.  Prejudice is met only if there is 
a reasonable probability that “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome.”  Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052.  Both deficient performance 
and prejudice must be shown.  Id.  Because both prongs of the 
Strickland test present mixed questions of law and fact, this Court 
employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the circuit court’s 
factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence, 
but reviewing the circuit court’s legal conclusions de novo. 
 
Bradley v. State, 33 So. 3d 664, 671-72 (Fla. 2010).  Because Strickland requires a 
defendant to establish both prongs, if one prong is not met, “the court is not 
required to analyze whether the defendant has established the other prong.”  
Frances v. State, 143 So. 3d 340, 347 (Fla. 2014). 
 
 
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Communication 
 
In his first claim, Martin contends that trial counsel Shea was ineffective 
because Shea maintained only sparse communication with him.  Martin notes that 
on at least two occasions, he complained to the trial court that Shea was not 
meeting with him.  Martin also presented Shea’s billing records, submitted to the 
Justice Administrative Commission (JAC), which indicated he only visited Martin 
seven times for a total of less than nine hours from the date of appointment until 
trial. 
 
During the evidentiary hearing, Shea testified that the billing records he 
submitted to the JAC were not an accurate reflection of all the time he spent on 
Martin’s case.  He explained: 
Although I keep an accurate time of the official documents we file 
with the Court there are many times that we meet or I meet with a 
client either at the courthouse or in a private session that was set aside 
up at the old courthouse.  At the old courthouse the bailiffs would 
provide us with a jury room during the trial—pretrial proceedings 
where we could sit down and confidentially talk with our client and I 
would do that almost every occasion that I was there on a pretrial, and 
I just didn’t bill for that because I would have my time in court and so 
I didn’t bill for those meetings specifically. 
 
There are other times when I would be at the Duval County Jail 
on other cases and instead of spending an hour with a client [as] I 
anticipated might only take 20 minutes and while I was there I would 
go over and see Mr. Martin or another client. 
 
Although Shea did not bill for every moment he worked on Martin’s case, he 
verified that the billing he did submit was accurate with respect to the work he 
 
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performed in reference to that billing.  Shea testified that he and penalty-phase 
counsel Anderson met with Martin and thoroughly discussed the evidence and the 
content of the law enforcement reports to determine the strategy in the case.  In 
Shea’s words, “I wanted [Martin] to understand what we’re faced with and then 
give me any feedback as to what his response would be.” 
 
Martin has failed to demonstrate either prong of Strickland.  The 
postconviction record reflects that Shea met with Martin and thoroughly discussed 
the case with him and the strength of the evidence against him.  Further, Shea 
testified his JAC billing records are often not an accurate reflection of how 
frequently he meets with clients.  Therefore, Martin has failed to meet his burden 
of demonstrating that Shea was deficient in his communication with Martin.  
Further, even if there had been any deficiency, we have explained that brevity of 
consultation alone is not grounds for postconviction relief.  Kilgore v. State, 55 So. 
3d 487, 501 (Fla. 2010).  To be entitled to relief, actual prejudice must be shown.  
Id.  Although Martin may have expressed frustration with the frequency of visits 
by Shea, he has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that had Shea met 
with him more often, the result of the guilt phase would have been different and, 
thus, confidence in the outcome has not been undermined. 
 
Accordingly, Martin is not entitled to relief on this claim. 
 
 
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Use of Court-Appointed Investigators 
Martin next alleges that Shea was ineffective for failing to use the 
investigators who were appointed to work on Martin’s case.  We disagree.  During 
the evidentiary hearing, Shea testified that he did not use the investigators for the 
guilt phase because he concluded he could conduct the investigation himself: 
I don’t need an investigator if I’m doing the things myself unless 
there’s something specifically that I want the investigator to do . . . .  
[T]he J.A.C. doesn’t want me just to hire an investigator to go out and 
ride around the streets looking for stuff.  He’s got to have an issue 
and—in order to get paid and that’s a requirement of the J.A.C. and a 
proper requirement. 
 
 . . . .  
 
. . . I knew that the investigator was going to be used at this 
point to develop our mitigation based on all the facts that we had 
about the case. 
 
. . . .  
 
I had enough information to do the investigation and the one 
critical question which came really on that was from my conversation 
with [Martin]. 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Over objection and on cross-examination, Shea described the 
following interaction with Martin:7 
 
When I told [Martin] that—that Batie had put the gun down on 
the passenger seat and he reached in and grabbed it his response—his 
response was I didn’t do that.  [Martin] said [Batie] handed me the 
gun, and then we talked about running around the vehicle.  He didn’t 
make any admissions there but then I said, also, that witnesses are 
                                          
 
 
7.  We have explained that “[a] defendant may not invoke the attorney-client 
privilege to preclude trial counsel from testifying about their conversations when 
those discussions relate to the defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance.”  
Arbelaez v. State, 775 So. 2d 909, 917 (Fla. 2000). 
 
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saying that you . . . shot through the—the window, the passenger 
window, and he indicated that he didn’t shoot through the passenger 
window.[8] 
 
So I was working with those facts in—in going forward with 
my defenses, and I was working against all these eyewitnesses 
identifying him from his weight, height and so forth and now the issue 
was was he the person out there, and after my discussions with him I 
had no other choice but to know that he was the person out there, so it 
changed my strategy in trying to put this claim off on some other 
person of a similar weight and height because there was no indication 
or evidence that anybody else other than him was out there. 
 
Based upon the information Shea had, we conclude it was a reasonable strategic 
decision to focus investigator efforts on collecting mitigation evidence for a 
potential penalty phase while Shea conducted the guilt-phase portion of the 
investigation.  See Occhicone, 768 So. 2d at 1048 (“Counsel cannot be deemed 
ineffective merely because current counsel disagrees with trial counsel’s strategic 
decisions.”). 
 
Based upon the foregoing, this claim is denied. 
Investigation of Eyewitnesses 
 
 
During the evidentiary hearing, Shea explained that one element of his 
defense was misidentification.  Martin contends Shea was ineffective for failing to 
investigate two eyewitnesses who would have supported the misidentification 
defense by testifying that Martin was not the shooter.  The first witness was Willie 
                                          
 
 
8.  Penalty-phase counsel Anderson testified he was present during this 
discussion. 
 
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McGowan, who rode to the apartment complex with Daniels, but was outside of 
the vehicle when the shooting began.  The other witness was Larry Jones, who was 
riding a bicycle in the area at the time of the shooting.  Both men are now 
deceased.  As we explain below, Martin has failed to demonstrate ineffectiveness 
with respect to either witness. 
Willie McGowan 
According to a police report, McGowan and Daniels traveled to the 
apartment complex to purchase marijuana.  When they arrived, McGowan asked a 
“short fat dude”9 if he had any marijuana.  The individual told McGowan 
marijuana was available and pointed him toward a certain apartment.  McGowan 
exited the vehicle to purchase the marijuana.  According to the police report: 
McGowan said as he approached the apartment, he heard 
several gunshots.  He said [he] ran across the courtyard towards the 
Toyota where the victim was sitting.  McGowan said he saw the short, 
fat black male shooting into the driver’s side of the vehicle with a 
“machine” type pistol.  He said he watched as the victim crawled over 
into the front passenger’s seat and kick[ed] out the passenger window 
in an attempt to escape the gunfire.  McGowan told us that as the 
victim was trying to get out of the Toyota through the passenger 
window, the suspect walked around the front of the vehicle and 
continued to fire rounds at the victim.  He said he watched the suspect 
shoot into the passenger side until the victim did not move any more. 
McGowan said as the shooting was happening, the driver of the 
Ford[] Crown Victoria pulled it in front of the Toyota and waited for 
the shooter.  [McGowan] said as he ran towards the Toyota to help the 
                                          
 
 
9.  At the time of Martin’s arrest, he was 5’3” and the circumference of his 
waist was forty-eight inches. 
 
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victim, the driver yelled out to the shooter to “watch his back.”  
McGowan said the shooter then fired a round at him and he ducked 
behind the rear of the Toyota.  McGowan said he then watched as the 
shooter calmly walked up the sidewalk (east bound) on W. 22nd 
Street.  He said the shooter walked passed [sic] the Ford[] Crown 
Victoria and the driver called him back to get in the car. 
 
. . . .  
 
McGowan described the shooter to us as a black male, who was 
“really short.”  He estimated that the shooter was approximately 5’0” 
to 5’3” tall.  McGowan said the shooter was “fat” with a very “big 
stomach.”  He said he was wearing a white tank top with brown 
(khaki) shorts and he had dark skin.  He further told us that he “looked 
right into his (shooter’s) eyes” and that he would be able to identify 
him. 
 
During a meeting with law enforcement, McGowan was presented with two 
photospreads.  McGowan said of Martin’s photographs, “this looks like the guy, 
but it’s not him.”  Despite McGowan’s statement that Martin was not the shooter, 
Shea never spoke with him.  Instead, Shea’s investigation with respect to 
McGowan consisted of reviewing the statements to police and the outcome of the 
photographic identification. 
We conclude Shea was deficient for failing to investigate McGowan further. 
When a witness to a homicide states that he looked the suspect in the eye and could 
identify him again, and then fails to identify the defendant from photospreads, any 
reasonable trial counsel whose defense strategy is based upon misidentification 
would at least speak to that witness, even if counsel ultimately decides not to call 
him for strategic reasons.  Shea’s decision not to speak to McGowan may have 
been based in part upon the conversation Shea had with Martin in which Martin 
 
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admitted he was the shooter, but because misidentification was part of the defense 
theme, Shea should have at least inquired into McGowan’s failure to identify 
Martin as the shooter. 
Even though Shea was deficient in this respect, Martin nonetheless is not 
entitled to relief because he has not demonstrated prejudice.  To demonstrate 
prejudice in this context, Martin would first have to show that Shea’s personal 
contact with McGowan would have uncovered additional information that could 
have influenced Shea’s strategic decision not to call McGowan as a witness.  
Martin did not present any evidence suggesting that McGowan’s trial testimony 
would have differed from his statements to police, and the trial court correctly 
concluded that Shea’s decision to avoid calling McGowan as a witness constituted 
reasonable trial strategy given the information known to Shea. 
First, McGowan’s statements to the police were consistent with how other 
witnesses described the shooter and the execution style of the shooting.  Second, 
according to McGowan’s statement to police, the shooter told him where in the 
apartment complex he could buy marijuana.  Shea testified during the evidentiary 
hearing that he believed it would be detrimental to Martin’s defense if the jury 
were to hear that this case involved illegal drugs, or that Martin used illegal drugs 
heavily.  Further, McGowan provided another highly unfavorable detail to the 
police—the shooter fired at him as he was running towards the vehicle to help 
 
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Daniels.  Given these facts, Shea concluded that having McGowan testify “would 
never have benefitted [Martin].”  For these reasons, we hold there is no reasonable 
probability that, but for Shea’s failure to further investigate McGowan, the 
outcome of the guilt phase would have been different, and confidence in the 
outcome has not been undermined. 
Larry Jones 
In a police report, Jones described the shooter as a “short, fat, black male.”  
However, in a different police report, Jones described the shooter as 5’8” and 160 
pounds.  In both statements, Jones informed detectives he would not be able to 
identify the shooter if he saw him again.  Prior to his death, Jones signed an 
affidavit stating he “had a very good look at the shooter[,]” he was only 
interviewed once by the police, his description of the shooter as 5’8” and 160 
pounds was the only description he gave, he had “no idea” where the other 
description came from, he was “100% certain [Martin] is not the man I saw doing 
the shooting that day,” and defense counsel never contacted him. 
Shea testified during the evidentiary hearing that he did speak with Jones, 
and Jones’ description of the shooter matched that of Martin.  In denying this 
claim, the postconviction court credited Shea’s testimony: “Shea clearly 
investigated Jones, and Shea’s decision not to call Jones as a witness was 
reasonable.  Jones’ original description of the shooter, documented in the police 
 
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reports and confirmed in his phone call with Shea, matched Defendant’s 
appearance and corroborated testimony of other witnesses.”  (Emphasis added.)  
This Court will defer to a postconviction court’s findings where they are supported 
by competent, substantial evidence because that court has a “superior vantage point 
in assessing the credibility of witnesses and in making findings of fact.”  Moore v. 
State, 132 So. 3d 718, 727 (Fla. 2013) (quoting Porter v. State, 788 So. 2d 917, 
923 (Fla. 2001)).  Because Shea contacted Jones and learned that what Jones saw 
was consistent with what was described by the other witnesses, Shea’s 
investigation as to Jones was not deficient. 
Based upon the foregoing, Martin is not entitled to relief on this claim. 
Forensic Experts 
 
Martin next asserts that Shea was ineffective for failing to hire forensic 
experts to challenge the State’s evidence.  According to Martin, the State’s 
depiction of Martin tracking Daniels around the vehicle while firing the weapon 
was used to support the assertion that the murder was premeditated, and also in 
support of the CCP and HAC aggravators. 
During trial, Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) laboratory 
analyst Maria Pagan testified that she received thirteen fired shell casings and four 
fired bullets.  Although she was able to determine that the thirteen casings were 
fired from the same weapon, the results on the four bullets were inconclusive.  
 
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However, she testified that the barrels of firearms have grooves cut out “that also 
twist so that when the bullet travels down the barrel it imparts spin to the bullet 
which helps it travel.”  According to Pagan, the four bullets had six grooves with a 
right twist, and this is consistent with the type of firearm that was in codefendant 
Batie’s vehicle on the day of the murder. 
During the evidentiary hearing, defense expert Christopher Robinson 
testified that, based on his review of the materials in Martin’s case, not all bullets 
recovered from the crime scene were submitted to the FDLE crime laboratory.  
Robinson found this “incredibly problematic because we need to know were all the 
bullets from the same weapon . . . .  [A]ccording to the findings of the lab[,] they 
can’t even match the four that they already have to each other.”  According to 
Robinson, the failure to conclusively match the bullets raised the possibility that 
there was a second weapon at the scene. 
Robinson further explained that more than a single trajectory rod should 
have been used, given the multiple bullet holes in the vehicle.  Had the proper 
number of rods been used, “you would have been able to triangulate exactly where 
the shooter was as they were moving across the scene.”  Robinson testified that 
based upon his reconstruction, the shooter did not fire directly into the passenger-
side door.  Instead, based upon the angles, the shooter was “firing along the 
passenger side from the front edge of the car.”  Robinson admitted that, even 
 
- 20 - 
without trajectory rods, he could see nine bullets were fired into the driver side, 
one was fired into the front windshield, and three bullets were fired from the front 
edge of the passenger side.  When asked by the State, “[s]o if a witness testified 
that they saw [the shooter] shooting into the driver’s side and move around to the 
front of the car and then shot into the passenger side,”10 that would be a matter of 
phrasing, Robinson agreed. 
With respect to blood spatter, Robinson testified that an expert could have 
performed an analysis “to give the position of the individual in the vehicle that’s 
been shot as they moved across the vehicle to their final resting place.”  Based 
upon the directionality of the bullets through Daniels’ body, Robinson concluded 
every one of the bullets that hit Daniels had been fired through the driver-side 
door.  On cross-examination, Robinson agreed with the State’s depiction of events 
that “the victim would have been sitting in the driver’s seat.  He would have been 
hit while sitting in the driver’s seat and then there are wounds that indicate that he 
at some point moved from the driver’s seat to attempt to get out the passenger side 
window, passenger side.” 
                                          
 
 
10.  Witness Lauren Burns testified that she first saw Martin shooting into 
the driver side of the SUV and “then he walked around and went to the passenger 
side and continued shooting.” 
 
- 21 - 
Shea testified it would not have been helpful to hire an expert to conduct an 
analysis as to where the shooter was standing and from where the shots were fired.  
Shea based his conclusion on “the Medical Examiner’s report of the entry of the 
shots and the witnesses describing where the victim was in the cab of the vehicle 
and the location of the bullet holes that indicate entry into the cab and so forth.”  
He similarly concluded that trajectory, casings, or blood spatter experts would not 
have made a difference in Martin’s case: 
I’ve done a lot of cases where trajectory is important, the number of 
the shooters, the direction of the bullets, the type of bullets being 
used, the entry locations on the victim and all of that.  There’s nothing 
in this case that would benefit me from a trajectory.  All it would do is 
support the state’s case of how it happened, what happened and how 
the victim died. 
 
Shea testified there was “never any indication there was possibly a second shooter 
out there, nothing.  There was nothing that would even—no witness at all could 
substantiate that.” 
 
Martin has failed to demonstrate that Shea was ineffective for failing to hire 
forensic experts.  First, it would not have been helpful to have an expert testify that 
the shooter did not fire directly into the passenger-side door.  The evidence 
presented during trial—including crime scene photos—reflects that the shooter 
fired into the SUV from the driver side, then the front, and finally from the front 
edge of the passenger side.  This demonstrates the shooter moved around the car 
and shot at Daniels from multiple directions. 
 
- 22 - 
 
Second, Martin fails to show how a trajectory or blood spatter analysis 
would have helped defeat premeditation.  Even if all the shots that hit and killed 
Daniels were fired from the driver side and no shots were fired directly through the 
passenger-side door, this does not change the fact that the shooter moved around 
the vehicle.  The evidence reflects that during the shooting Daniels was trying to 
escape the SUV from the passenger side.  Arguably, the shooter did not know 
which, if any, fired shots were fatal and continued to follow Daniels around the car 
to prevent his escape.  Thus, the fact that Daniels was not hit by any bullets fired 
from the front or the front edge of the SUV would not negate the fact that the 
shooter followed Daniels around the vehicle intending to shoot him until he 
stopped moving. 
 
We deny this claim. 
Cross-Examination of Witnesses 
 
 
Martin next claims Shea was ineffective for failing to adequately cross-
examine several guilt-phase witnesses.  We commence the analysis of this claim by 
noting that Shea’s defense strategy was two-fold: (1) present a misidentification 
defense and (2) eliminate premeditation.  With respect to the latter, Shea explained 
that in capital cases, “you’re always thinking of the second part of the case and is 
this gentleman going to be facing death from the testimony that’s given during his 
trial.”  He stated: 
 
- 23 - 
[O]ne of the issues I was looking at with the jury obviously is—is that 
[the State] didn’t prove the premeditation of this case and hopefully 
we can get a second[-]degree conviction if—if—if the evidence 
showed that or even a manslaughter because that’s one of the things 
that I plead to the jury in my closing . . . . 
Additionally, as previously discussed, Martin disclosed to Shea that he was the 
shooter, so this changed Shea’s trial strategy “in trying to put this claim off on 
some other person of a similar weight and height because there was no indication 
or evidence that anybody else other than him was out there.” 
Lauren Burns 
During trial, eyewitness Lauren Burns testified that she had never seen 
Martin before the shooting.  However, in an earlier statement to police, she stated 
she knew the shooter as “Shorty Fat” and that he had previously expressed interest 
in her, but she was not interested in him because he was a cocaine user.  Further, 
Burns testified during trial that she saw the shooter fire into the driver side of the 
vehicle and then walk around to the passenger side and continue shooting.  
However, during her deposition, she said she heard a gun cock and then observed 
the shooter firing at the vehicle from the driver side.  At that time, she picked up 
her children and ran into her apartment.  According to the deposition, she did not 
see the shooter fire into the passenger-side door. 
Martin contends Shea should have impeached Burns’ trial testimony with 
her statement that she previously knew Martin.  He also asserts her trial testimony 
 
- 24 - 
could have been impeached with her statement that she only saw the shooter fire 
through the driver side and not into the passenger side.  According to Martin, while 
the physical evidence reflects that all of the shots that actually hit Daniels were 
fired through the driver-side door, Burns’ trial testimony painted a more sinister 
picture of the shooter “tracking” Daniels, which was used to support the CCP and 
HAC aggravators. 
 
Shea was not ineffective in his cross-examination of Burns.  First, Shea had 
a strategic reason not to bring up her statement to police that she knew Martin prior 
to the murder but was not interested in him because he was a cocaine user.  As 
previously discussed, Shea wanted to avoid any evidence specifically tying Martin 
to drug use or reflecting that he used illegal drugs heavily.  When asked if he could 
have voir dired the prospective jurors on this issue, Shea responded, “Why do I 
want to voir dire?  I don’t want the jury to know there’s a drug transaction 
involved here so, no, I don’t think that’s beneficial to the defendant.”  Moreover, 
had Shea introduced this prior statement by Burns, it could have had the opposite 
effect of bolstering her identification of Martin as the shooter, thereby 
strengthening the State’s case. 
 
With regard to the failure to impeach Burns on her deposition testimony that 
she saw Martin shoot into the driver-side door, but not into the passenger-side 
door, this statement is not inconsistent with the evidence at trial, nor with the 
 
- 25 - 
postconviction testimony of Robinson.  Robinson testified that bullets were not 
fired directly into the passenger-side door but were fired from the front edge of the 
passenger side of the vehicle.  This is consistent with Martin “walk[ing] around 
and [going] to the passenger side and continu[ing] shooting,” as Burns testified.  
We agree with the postconviction court that “[i]t is logical Burns may not have 
seen Defendant shoot into the passenger’s door but could see Defendant shoot 
along the passenger’s side of the SUV when Defendant walked to the passenger 
side of the front of the vehicle.” 
However, even if Shea was deficient for failing to impeach Burns on any 
purported inconsistencies, Martin cannot demonstrate prejudice.  First, Burns 
picked Martin’s photograph out of a photospread and, in the courtroom, she 
identified Martin as the shooter.  Second, Sebastian Lucas, Tasheana Hart, and 
codefendant Franklin Batie also identified Martin as the shooter.  Third, witness 
testimony and the physical evidence reflected that Martin did not simply stand in 
one place while he shot Daniels; rather, after firing multiple shots into the driver-
side door, Martin moved to the front of the vehicle, fired a bullet into the front 
windshield near the roof, and then proceeded to the front edge of the passenger 
side where he continued shooting.  Thus, the evidence is consistent with Martin 
“tracking” Daniels around the vehicle.  Accordingly, there is no reasonable 
probability that but for any deficiency by Shea in his cross-examination of Burns, 
 
- 26 - 
the result of the guilt phase would have been different, and confidence in the 
outcome has not been undermined. 
Sebastian Lucas 
 
When first spoken to after the murder, Sebastian Lucas informed an officer 
that “he heard the shooting, but he did not see anything that would assist with the 
investigation.”  However, a number of days later, Lucas approached officers and 
said he had information: 
Mr. Lucas told Detective Nelson that he was sitting out in front 
of the apartments prior to the shooting.  Mr. Lucas told Detective 
Nelson that his sister-n-law [sic], Lauren Burns, yelled out, “He’s got 
a gun.”  Mr. Lucas said he looked up and observed a short, fat guy, 
with a low haircut holding a handgun. 
Mr. Lucas told Detective Nelson that he lost sight of the suspect 
because the apartment building blocked his view.  Mr. Lucas said he 
heard some gunshots so he got up to see what was going on.  He told 
Detective Nelson that he observed the victim attempting to get out of 
the vehicle (white sport utility vehicle) through the passenger’s door. 
Mr. Lucas said he watched the suspect walk around to the passenger’s 
side of the vehicle and “execute” the victim.  Mr. Lucas said the 
suspect appeared to be armed with a “Mac-10 or Mac-11 handgun 
with an extended clip.”  Mr. Lucas told Detective Nelson the suspect 
then walked over and got in a white Ford Crown Victoria that fled the 
scene. 
Mr. Lucas told Detective Nelson that the day of the shooting 
was the first time that he had ever seen the suspect.  Mr. Lucas further 
described the suspect as wearing a “tank top type t-shirt and Fila 
brand tennis shoes.” 
Mr. Lucas was shown a photo spread that contained Martin’s 
photograph and he positively identified Martin as the person he saw 
shooting the victim. 
 
 
- 27 - 
On November 3, 2009, Lucas gave a sworn statement.  He described the shooter’s 
facial hair as “patchy” and confirmed that after the shooter began firing, the victim 
“was trying to get out [of] the passenger’s side.”  He stated the shooter went 
around the vehicle and continued to fire at the person inside.  When asked if there 
was any question in his mind as to whether the person he picked out of the 
photospread was the shooter, Lucas replied, “[I]t’s vague because, you know, I 
walked past him, I seen him, and he just—you know you just glimpse—as you 
walk past somebody, you see them . . . and keep going because you don’t know 
them.  Exactly like that.”  However, Lucas then stated he obtained a sufficient look 
at the shooter to pick him out of a lineup. 
Lucas gave a deposition on March 6, 2012.  He stated he was certain the 
person he picked out of the photospread was the shooter.  Lucas stated that, after 
the shooting, he learned of a nickname (Shorty Fat) for the shooter from another 
resident of the apartment complex. 
 
During trial, Lucas described the shooter as a heavyset black male with a full 
beard who was “[m]edium, short” in height.  Lucas testified that he saw the shooter 
“walk from the Ford Crown Vic to the SUV and open fire.”  According to Lucas, 
the shooter began firing from the driver side, and “[a]fter he shot through the 
driver’s side the victim tried to escape out the passenger side and he walked around 
and opened fire and shot him back down in the car.”  On cross-examination, Lucas 
 
- 28 - 
stated he saw the shooter “face on” because Lucas “walked past him twice going to 
and coming from the store,” but he did not see him for long, “probably five, ten 
seconds.”  Lucas testified he had not seen the shooter in that area before, and 
“there’s no other heavyset low cut dude in that area.”  Lucas admitted he learned of 
the nickname Shorty Fat through “[h]earsay, around the apartment complex.” 
Martin asserts that Shea was ineffective for failing to impeach Lucas with 
respect to (1) inconsistencies as to the shooter’s facial hair, (2) learning the 
nickname of the shooter from a secondhand source (which Martin asserts could 
indicate that Lucas learned details about the murder from sources other than 
personal observation), and (3) Lucas’s initial statement that “he did not see 
anything that would assist with the investigation.”  First, Shea was not deficient in 
his failure to address Lucas’s inconsistencies with respect to the shooter’s facial 
hair.  Shea testified during the evidentiary hearing that he did not want to call 
attention to the fact that Martin had shaved his beard after the murder because a 
change in appearance would suggest consciousness of guilt.  This is not an 
objectively unreasonable strategy.  During trial, photographs of Martin taken 
immediately after his arrest were introduced into evidence, and he did not have a 
full beard.  Impeaching Lucas’s trial testimony that the shooter had a full beard 
with an earlier description of the shooter possessing “patchy” facial hair could 
 
- 29 - 
have brought to the jury’s attention that Martin had shaved his beard after the 
murder, and this could have been detrimental to his defense. 
Second, the fact that Lucas later learned the shooter was nicknamed Shorty 
Fat from someone in the apartment complex does not demonstrate he learned about 
the shooting from someone else or somehow identified the wrong person.  
Therefore, Shea was not deficient in failing to address this point during cross-
examination. 
However, Shea was deficient when he failed to cross-examine Lucas with 
respect to his initial statement to police that he did not possess any information 
relevant to the investigation.  This statement did not include damaging facts or a 
physical description of the shooter.  It simply stated that Lucas heard the shooting 
but did not see anything that would assist in the investigation.  The change in 
Lucas’s version of events is dramatic—from seeing nothing to providing 
compelling testimony of an execution-style murder.  Given the lack of damaging 
information in Lucas’s initial statement, there was no reasonable basis for Shea not 
to address the inconsistencies between this statement and his trial testimony. 
 
However, despite this deficiency, Martin cannot demonstrate prejudice.  
Lucas (as well as Burns, Tasheana, and codefendant Batie) identified Martin as the 
person who shot Daniels.  Second, other witnesses and the physical evidence 
reflected that the shooter moved around the SUV as Daniels tried to escape and 
 
- 30 - 
continued to fire at him.  Accordingly, there is no reasonable probability that but 
for any deficiency by Shea, the result of the guilt phase would have been different, 
and confidence in the outcome has not been undermined. 
Ronnie McCrimager 
 
Witness Ronnie McCrimager provided the following account to law 
enforcement: 
Mr. McCrimager told Detective Nelson that he was inside his home 
cooking when he heard what sounded like gunshots.  Mr. McCrimager 
said that as he looked out of his kitchen window, in the direction of 
the sound of the gunshots, he observed an unknown black male 
shooting into a white sport utility vehicle.  Mr. McCrimager told 
Detective Nelson that he did not see who was sitting in the vehicle.  
He said that he did observe the shooter walk from the driver’s side of 
the vehicle around to the passenger’s side of the vehicle, shooting at 
the occupant.  Mr. McCrimager told Detective Nelson that he got 
down on the floor as the shooter began to walk away from the vehicle.  
Mr. McCrimager described the shooter to Detective Nelson as being a 
black male, who was approximately 30 to 40 years of age.  He said the 
shooter was short and stocky with a low afro hairstyle.  Mr. 
McCrimager told Detective Nelson that he did not know the suspect, 
but if he saw him again, he might be able to identify him.  Mr. 
McCrimager described the suspect’s firearm to Detective Nelson as 
possibly being a “Mac 10.” 
 
McCrimager was shown a photospread.  According to the police report, he “was 
unsure of his identification, but the person he saw shooting strongly resembled the 
photograph of Martin.”  McCrimager wrote on the photograph of Martin that he 
“look[ed] like the guy.” 
 
- 31 - 
In a March 6, 2012, pretrial deposition, when asked if he personally saw the 
shooter walking around the truck or if he learned this fact later, McCrimager 
stated, “I learned that later.”  According to McCrimager, when the shooting started, 
“I looked out my window[] when he was to the side shooting, the driver’s side.  
After that, I just ducked down, you know.”   
 
During trial, McCrimager testified that he did not see the shooter’s face, and 
“all [he] could see is [the shooter] shooting at the white truck that was parked in 
front of the house.”  McCrimager described the shooter as 5’7” or 5’8” “and sort of 
round-shaped, heavyset.”  He estimated the shooter’s weight at 200-300 pounds.  
McCrimager explained that he was facing the shooter’s back and the shooter was 
facing the driver-side door.  McCrimager testified that he saw the shooter walk 
around the car. 
When presented with the photograph of Martin that he wrote upon, 
McCrimager said he did not remember the document.  McCrimager acknowledged 
that his handwriting was on the photograph, and recognized his name, but when 
asked if he wrote anything else on the page, McCrimager responded, “I have a 
problem.  I don’t have any glasses and I can’t see out [of] one eye so it’s really 
hard for me to see this.”  When asked if he recalled telling law enforcement that 
the photograph of Martin looked like the shooter, McCrimager reiterated that he 
had not seen the shooter’s face and “I don’t want to accuse no one and make a 
 
- 32 - 
mistake.”  On cross-examination, when asked about the photograph of Martin, 
McCrimager asserted, “the officer just insisted I know this guy.  He continued 
hassling me about it . . . after I done told him I’m not sure about it.” 
 
During the evidentiary hearing, Shea stated McCrimager’s testimony 
proceeded exactly as he had hoped.  McCrimager’s poor eyesight was mentioned 
during direct examination, so the jury was aware of it.  According to Shea, there 
was nothing to follow up on other than the fact that McCrimager did not see the 
shooter’s face and that he felt pressured into signing a photograph. 
Shea was not ineffective in his cross-examination of McCrimager.  As Shea 
explained, on direct examination McCrimager emphasized that his vision was 
poor, so there was no need to follow up on this point.  Further, Shea elicited that 
McCrimager did not see the shooter’s face and that he felt “hassled” by an officer 
who allegedly insisted he could identify Martin as the shooter.  This cross-
examination further called into question McCrimager’s identification of Martin 
beyond his poor vision.  As to Shea’s failure to cross-examine McCrimager on his 
deposition testimony that he learned the shooter walked around the car “later,” 
Martin cannot demonstrate prejudice because other trial witnesses testified the 
shooter walked around the vehicle.  Accordingly, there is no reasonable probability 
that had Shea cross-examined McCrimager on this point, the result of the guilt 
 
- 33 - 
phase would have been different, and confidence in the outcome has not been 
undermined. 
Tasheana Hart 
 
Tasheana initially told Detective Nelson that she “was outside when the 
shooting occurred.  She . . . thought she recognized the suspect as someone who 
used to hang out in the neighborhood.  Ms. Hart said she had further information 
and would speak with Detective Nelson if he came back the next day.”  During that 
later interview: 
Ms. Hart told Detective Nelson that she saw the shooting.  She said 
the shooter was visiting Cory Davis and Filette Kirkland [neither of 
whom testified during trial] at their apartment just prior to the murder.  
. . .  [Tasheana] described the suspect as [a] short, fat, black male with 
a beard.  She told Detective Nelson that she watched the suspect 
retrieve a gun from the white[] Ford Crown Victoria and shoot the 
victim.  Detective Nelson said Ms. Hart did not recognize the driver of 
the Ford Crown Victoria, but she said the shooter had been in the 
apartment complex on previous occasions.  [Tasheana] further told 
Detective Nelson that she saw the shooter at [a store] the morning 
before the shooting. 
Officers reviewed surveillance footage from the store but did not locate anyone 
who matched the description of the shooter.  Tasheana subsequently spoke with 
detectives again, advising them that she personally knew the shooter because her 
mother was friends with him, and Tasheana referred to him as “Beer Belly.”  
Tasheana was shown two photospreads and picked a photograph of Martin out of 
the photospread which depicted him without facial hair. 
 
- 34 - 
 
During a November 3, 2009, sworn statement, Tasheana stated she had 
known Martin “from like since I was 11 [years old].”  She stated that at the time of 
the shooting “Beer Belly” had a beard, but when she saw him later by the Emmett 
Reed Community Center in Jacksonville, it was shaved off.  She further testified: 
He was like, did you hear what happened.  I was like, what you 
talking about, that shooting over there on 22nd.  He was like, yeah, 
that was me.  I was like, you the one that made our street hot . . . .  
And he was like, yeah. 
 
. . . .  
I wasn’t yelling at him.  I was just asking because he was like, 
that was me.  He was bragging about it, so I’m like, hey, you made 
our street that hot.  We ain’t never had that many police[] since like 
2004, 2003.  So he was like real excited.   
 
And this is something he do, so it ain’t nothing for him to just 
take a life.  He’s a natural killer. 
During this statement, Tasheana did not mention any offers of money in exchange 
for silence. 
 
At trial, Tasheana testified that she knew Martin for a couple of years prior 
to the shooting through her family, and that she witnessed Martin shoot Daniels.  
She further stated that when she saw Martin after the shooting, he offered her 
money “[n]ot to tell.”  On cross-examination, Shea began an inquiry as to where 
Tasheana had met Martin, and the State asked to approach the bench.  The State 
noted that Tasheana “knows he has been in prison for murder.  She knows he has 
done this before.  She said it in her deposition, and what I want to make sure is if 
he keeps pushing her about how long [she has] known [him] and the nature of the 
 
- 35 - 
connection she is going to say it and she has been instructed not to.”  The trial 
court put Shea on notice that he was “to move away from this area,” and Shea did 
not inquire further. 
 
Martin has failed to demonstrate Shea was ineffective in his cross-
examination of Tasheana.  First, it was revealed during the evidentiary hearing 
that, based upon Martin’s prison release records, Tasheana could have known 
Martin for “a couple of years.”  Accordingly, there was no need to pursue this line 
of questioning.  Second, during trial, Shea suggested on cross-examination that it 
was Tasheana who asked Martin to pay her to keep silent, and not vice versa, and 
highlighted that she could not specify an amount that Martin purportedly offered to 
pay her.  Third, any decision by Shea not to cross-examine Tasheana with respect 
to her 2009 sworn statement would have been consistent with his strategy of 
keeping out details that would harm the defense.  The 2009 statement contained 
highly damaging information, such as that Martin had bragged about the crime and 
that Tasheana described him as a “natural killer.”  Further, even though Tasheana 
failed to mention an offer of money in that statement, in a 2010 deposition she 
testified that Martin offered her “a couple of grand[]” to keep silent.  Finally, the 
failure of Shea to question Tasheana on the largely irrelevant point of seeing the 
shooter the morning before the shooting at a particular store does not demonstrate 
any deficiency.  In sum, there is no reasonable possibility that had Shea cross-
 
- 36 - 
examined Tasheana differently, the result of the guilt phase would have been 
different, and confidence in the outcome has not been undermined. 
Detective Mitchell Chizik 
 
 
Martin claims that Shea was ineffective for failing to cross-examine 
Detective Chizik on why the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office failed to check the alibi 
for a second individual who had been shot at the same time as codefendant Batie 
while he and Batie were walking to a gas station two days before the murder.  
Martin also asserts that if Shea was not planning to present Willie McGowan or 
Larry Jones as defense witnesses, he should have elicited their failure to identify 
Martin as the shooter through the cross-examination of Chizik. 
 
With respect to cross-examining Chizik on the failure to personally verify 
the alibi of the second individual who had been shot at the same time as Batie, 
Shea was not deficient.  It was revealed during the evidentiary hearing that this 
person was 6’3” inches tall and weighed 250 pounds.  There was no testimony 
from any of the witnesses that the shooter matched this description or that there 
was a second shooter matching this description.  Further, prosecutor Richard 
Mantei had spoken by telephone with this other person and “learned that he was 
released from hospital prior to the victim’s murder and transported to his parents’ 
home in south Florida to recover from his injuries.  He was not in Jacksonville at 
the time of the victim’s death and he was not aware of the investigation.”  Thus, 
 
- 37 - 
the other individual had an alibi, and Martin has provided no evidence to suggest 
this individual was in Jacksonville at the time of the homicide. 
 
With respect to cross-examining Chizik on the failure of Willie McGowan to 
identify Martin, Shea was also not deficient.  Despite McGowan’s inability to 
identify the shooter from the photospreads, his statements to the police were 
consistent with how other witnesses described the shooter, as well as the shooting.  
Further, cross-examining Chizik about McGowan’s failure to identify Martin could 
have opened the door to unfavorable elements of the police report, including that 
the shooter instructed McGowan as to where in the apartment complex to buy 
marijuana and that the shooter fired at McGowan as McGowan was running 
towards the SUV.  Both would have been more harmful to Martin’s case than 
helpful. 
Finally, with respect to the failure to cross-examine Chizik as to the 
investigation of Larry Jones, Shea was not deficient.  Although Jones described the 
shooter as 5’8” and 160 pounds, he also described the shooter as a short, heavyset 
black male.  Thus, his statements were internally inconsistent.  Moreover, Jones 
informed detectives he would not be able to identify the shooter if he saw him 
again.  Therefore, showing Jones a photospread would not have been productive.  
Instead, as with McGowan, it could have brought in damaging information, in that 
 
- 38 - 
what Jones stated confirmed the other witnesses’ testimony with respect to the 
murder.11 
Maria Pagan 
 
Martin contends that Shea was ineffective for failing to cross-examine Pagan 
on various aspects of the investigation, such as why she did not receive all the 
bullets recovered from the scene, the lack of trajectory analysis performed on the 
vehicle, and how being provided with all of the recovered bullets would have 
affected her analysis and the conclusions she reached.  However, Shea was not 
deficient with respect to Pagan.  First, Pagan is employed by FDLE, and the bullets 
and casings were submitted for analysis by the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office.  
These are two different entities, and if asked why she did not receive all the bullets 
recovered from the scene, Pagan likely would not have been able to answer the 
question.  Further, asking Pagan how possessing all the bullets would have affected 
her analysis would have necessitated Pagan engaging in speculation.  Similarly, 
had Shea questioned Pagan with respect to the trajectory analysis, it is unclear that 
                                          
 
 
11.  Jones informed police that he observed the shooter fire approximately 
six shots into the driver-side door of the vehicle with a weapon resembling a 
TEC-9 pistol, walk around the vehicle to the passenger side, and fire three 
additional shots, after which the shooter entered the passenger side of the Ford 
Crown Victoria and fled the scene. 
 
- 39 - 
she would have been qualified to offer an opinion on this matter because her 
testimony was limited to comparison of the shell casings. 
In conclusion, we hold that Shea was not ineffective in his cross-
examination of these trial witnesses, and we deny relief on this claim. 
Eyewitness Testimony 
 
 
Martin next contends that Shea was ineffective for failing to present Willie 
McGowan and Larry Jones as witnesses because they could have testified that 
Martin was not the shooter and this would have supported Martin’s defense of 
misidentification.  In rejecting this claim, much of our analysis is duplicative to the 
claim that Shea was ineffective for failing to further investigate Jones and 
McGowan.  As previously discussed, the postconviction court credited Shea’s 
testimony that he spoke to Jones.  Jones’ description of the shooter both during that 
telephone call and in one police report matched that of Martin.  So, if presented as 
a witness, Jones would have been another person to testify that a short, heavyset 
black male was the shooter.  Therefore, Shea had a valid strategic reason not to 
present Jones as a witness. 
 
With respect to McGowan, Shea concluded calling McGowan as a witness 
“never would have benefitted [Martin]” because it would have revealed the 
execution-style nature of the murder, and it would have brought in other damaging 
elements of the crime.  Given that part of Shea’s trial strategy was to negate 
 
- 40 - 
premeditation in hopes of obtaining a conviction for second-degree murder (or 
manslaughter), his decision not to present McGowan was reasonable. 
Accordingly, we deny this claim. 
Photographic Identifications 
 
 
Martin next contends that Shea was ineffective for failing to challenge the 
photographic identifications of Martin, and how the photospreads were 
conducted.12  Martin asserts that elements of the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office’s 
protocol for use of photospreads were not followed, such as “[t]he photographs 
will be shown one at a time, not the six (6)-pack style,” and “[t]he victim(s) or 
witness(es) shall be advised the person suspected of committing the crime may or 
may not be contained in the photospread.”  We conclude that Shea either 
adequately challenged the photospreads or had a strategic reason for not 
challenging how they were conducted.   
First, as previously discussed, Shea challenged the validity of McCrimager’s 
identification and elicited from him that he felt pressured to select Martin’s 
photograph.  Shea cannot be deficient for failing to do what he actually did.  Banks 
v. State, 219 So. 3d 19, 29 (Fla. 2017).  Second, witness Sebastian Lucas testified 
he was given a stack of photographs to review during the photographic 
                                          
 
 
12.  The identifications introduced into evidence during trial were those by 
Lauren Burns, Tasheana Hart, Sebastian Lucas, and Ronnie McCrimager. 
 
- 41 - 
identification—they were not laid out side-by-side.  Therefore, one of the key 
complaints by Martin with regard to the photospreads did not apply to Lucas.  
Further, although witness Lauren Burns testified the detectives “said they had 
some photos that they wanted me to look at and out of the photos they asked me to 
identify the person that did the shooting,” according to her 2012 deposition, a 
detective advised her that “if anyone of those looked familiar, pick them out.”  
Therefore, Burns’ trial testimony was likely a matter of phrasing, and not 
indicative that the police instructed her to identify the shooter.  Moreover, she 
specifically identified Martin in the courtroom as the shooter. 
Third, Shea did point out inconsistencies with Detective Chizik’s testimony.  
Chizik testified that the procedure for conducting a photospread is to 
print six individual photos. . . .  We take those six photographs and 
shuffle them upside down.  We place the photographs onto a table.  
We instruct the witness that the individual that committed this 
particular offense may or may not be contained in the photospread.  
We ask the witness to look at each and every photo and identify 
anybody they recognize within the photospread. 
He testified he had personal knowledge that the photospreads were done this way 
in Martin’s case and that he was present for all four photospreads.  However, he 
later stated he was not present for the identification by Lucas.  Further, Shea 
elicited from Burns and Tasheana that, contrary to Chizik’s testimony, the 
photographs were not presented in a stack, but were laid side-by-side.  
 
- 42 - 
Additionally, Tasheana testified that only Detective Nelson was present during her 
photospread. 
 
With respect to challenging precise details of the way each photospread was 
conducted, Shea explained during the evidentiary hearing why he did not do so: 
[H]aving worked with juries over the years[,] unless the police 
procedure is planting evidence, is something of substance[,] if there’s 
so much other evidence before a jury, juries somewhat resent 
challenging the police work, I mean to put [it] kind of bluntly, I guess. 
We have explained that trial counsel is not ineffective for failing to impeach a 
witness where it “would have been of little value compared with the risk of 
alienating the jury.”  Branch v. State, 952 So. 2d 470, 479 (Fla. 2006).  Shea 
concluded that based upon his experience, challenging how the photospreads were 
conducted without alleging actual police misconduct would not have benefitted 
Martin and could have caused juror resentment.  Shea’s decision not to challenge 
the photographic identifications on this basis was not an objectively unreasonable 
strategy. 
This claim of ineffectiveness is denied. 
Closing Statements 
 
Finally, Martin contends Shea was ineffective during closing statements 
because he purportedly undermined the defense’s own theories; failed to present a 
viable, cohesive theory to the jury; argued facts outside of the record by stating that 
the individual who had been shot at the same time and in the same location as 
 
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codefendant Batie was not at the scene of the murder; and failed to correct a 
misattribution by the prosecutor.  We reject this claim. 
In evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance, “[a] fair assessment of 
attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting 
effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged 
conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.  
Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge 
a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  Shea was 
presented with a challenging case—a murder during daylight hours with multiple 
eyewitnesses, including a codefendant who testified that the murder weapon 
belonged to him.  Further, Shea had to craft a defense aware of the fact that his 
client had admitted to being the shooter. 
Shea testified that his defense strategy was twofold—attack the witness 
identifications and negate premeditation.  In essence, his trial strategy was first to 
argue that the State had not established that Martin was the shooter beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Part of this was addressed by calling into question the police 
investigation.  For example, during closing statements, Shea pointed out that 
McCrimager felt pressured into picking Martin’s picture out of a photospread and 
then suggested Tasheana similarly could have felt pressured into identifying 
 
- 44 - 
Martin in a photospread.  He also suggested it was Tasheana who told Martin that, 
if he paid her money, she would not speak to the police, but Shea also questioned 
her credibility as to the entire encounter: 
 
She couldn’t even tell us what the words were, that there was a 
specific conversation, just this general thing that he came to me and—
I went to him and he offered me money to go away.  What does that 
mean?  What was said?  She could never testify . . . of any specific 
words that Mr. Martin may have used to influence her not to proceed 
against him . . . . 
Shea further noted that according to FDLE laboratory analyst Pagan, the casings 
were sent to the biological department of the FDLE for DNA analysis, but there 
was no further information about any testing completed.  Shea described the case 
to the jury as “a large mosaic that’s missing big chunks out of the middle of that 
picture.” 
If the jury concluded Martin was the shooter, Shea then aimed to persuade 
the jury the murder was not premeditated to avoid the death penalty.  Toward this 
end, Shea spent a significant part of his closing statement on codefendant Batie.  
Shea suggested that the shooting was planned by Batie, and that Batie, not Martin, 
had the motive to kill Daniels.  Shea argued the State had failed to prove 
premeditation by the shooter, and he also discussed the lesser included offenses of 
second-degree murder and manslaughter.  Thus, while Shea’s closing statement 
may not have been as eloquent or as organized as Martin would have preferred, 
counsel did have a strategy and he argued that strategy in his closing statement. 
 
- 45 - 
 
Martin’s attacks on Shea’s failure to object to comments by the prosecutor, 
and on comments by Shea himself, are without merit.  To the extent the State 
during closing statements incorrectly attributed to Lauren Burns the fact that 
Daniels attempted to escape from the vehicle, another witness—Sebastian Lucas—
testified to this.  Therefore, objecting to any accidental misattribution would not 
have had an impact on the guilt phase.  Second, it is true that Shea stated, “the 
state’s asking you to find Mr. Martin guilty of premeditated first degree murder 
and they’re asking—going to be asking you to make a recommendation about a 
sentence to the Court.”  However, to claim that Shea assumed the jury would or 
should find Martin guilty of first-degree murder takes this statement out of context.  
As previously discussed, Shea challenged the premeditation element.  He also 
challenged the witness testimony and identifications.  Third, Shea in no way 
eliminated a possible suspect by mentioning that the individual who was shot at the 
same time and in the same location as codefendant Batie was not present at the 
scene of the Daniels murder.  As previously discussed, not only did the individual 
not match the description of the shooter, but it was confirmed he was not in 
Jacksonville at the time of the murder. 
Lastly, it was a challenge to address Batie’s damaging testimony because 
much of it matched the testimony of other witnesses as to how the shooting 
occurred.  However, other parts were of questionable logic.  For example, Batie 
 
- 46 - 
testified that after the shooting, while Batie was driving Martin home, he and 
Martin never spoke about what happened.  Shea’s cautioning of the jury in relying 
on Batie’s testimony was reasonable because “there’s a lot of things that we don’t 
know about Mr. Batie as to his involvement in this which he has not shared with us 
and was reluctant to share after he’d already plead[ed] to second degree murder in 
this case as to what was really going on out there and why this shooting really 
occurred.” 
We reject Martin’s claim of ineffectiveness on this basis. 
Cumulative Error 
Because the two deficiencies we identified in the performance of counsel 
taken together are not sufficient to establish the requisite prejudice, Martin’s claim 
of cumulative error fails. 
Brady/Giglio 
 
In his final claim on appeal, Martin contends that the State committed Brady 
violations with respect to Tasheana Hart and Corey Davis (who did not testify 
during trial) and a Giglio violation with respect to Tasheana.  We have explained 
the standards applicable to these claims as follows: 
To demonstrate a Brady violation, a defendant has the burden to 
establish (1) that favorable evidence, either exculpatory or 
impeaching, (2) was willfully or inadvertently suppressed by the State, 
and (3) because the evidence was material, the defendant was 
prejudiced.  See Hurst v. State, 18 So. 3d 975, 988 (Fla. 2009) (citing 
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 144 L. Ed. 
 
- 47 - 
2d 286 (1999)). . . .  Questions of whether evidence is exculpatory or 
impeaching and whether the State suppressed evidence are questions 
of fact, and the trial court’s determinations of such questions will not 
be disturbed if they are supported by competent, substantial evidence.  
See Way v. State, 760 So. 2d 903, 911 (Fla. 2000).  To satisfy the 
materiality prong of Brady, a defendant must prove that there is a 
“reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A 
‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.”  Guzman v. State, 868 So. 2d 498, 506 
(Fla. 2003) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 
S. Ct. 3375, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985) (plurality opinion)).  . . .  
. . .  To demonstrate a Giglio violation, a defendant must prove 
that (1) the prosecutor presented or failed to correct false testimony; 
(2) the prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and (3) the false 
evidence was material.  See San Martin v. State, 995 So. 2d 247, 254 
(Fla. 2008).  If the defendant establishes that a prosecutor has 
knowingly presented false testimony, the burden then shifts to the 
State to prove that there is not any reasonable possibility that the false 
testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.  See Guzman, 
868 So. 2d at 506 (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 
S. Ct. 2392, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976)).  While materiality is a 
component of both a Giglio and Brady claim, the Giglio standard of 
materiality is more defense friendly.  See Guzman, 868 So. 2d at 507. 
 
Taylor v. State, 62 So. 3d 1101, 1114-15 (Fla. 2011). 
Tasheana Hart 
 
On August 24, 2016, Tasheana Hart executed an affidavit in which she 
stated that, contrary to her trial testimony, she did not see who shot Daniels.  She 
stated: 
4.  . . .  I was outside when [Daniels, Willie McGowan, and] 
Cory were talking with another man who I did not recognize.  Then, 
[Daniels] went into his car.  The man I didn’t recognize got into his 
car a couple minutes later.  That car then started driving away, and 
when it was right next to [Daniels’] car, the shooting happened. 
 
- 48 - 
 
5.  I did not see who did the shooting.  It looked like it came 
from the car that started driving away with the man I did not 
recognize. 
 
Tasheana contended that Daniels’ vehicle was blocking her view of the shooter, 
but the shooter never walked to the passenger side of the vehicle. 
According to the affidavit, Detective Nelson insisted Tasheana saw who shot 
Daniels and threatened to arrest her if she did not pick Martin out of the 
photospread.  Tasheana stated that Nelson later told her she “needed to say certain 
things, like that I saw the shooter a few days after the shooting, and that he offered 
me money to stay quiet.  This was a lie.”  She stated it was Nelson who offered her 
money if she testified as he wished, and he also offered to erase her juvenile 
record.  According to Tasheana, she also told the prosecutor, “I didn’t see anything 
but he told me it was too late, and I had to say what I already said.” 
 
During the evidentiary hearing, Tasheana testified that she did not know 
Martin personally, but only “knew of him.”  She also testified, consistent with her 
affidavit, that Nelson threatened her.  She stated Nelson would drive around her 
neighborhood often, confronting her by “throwing Arthur in my face[,] like[,] 
here’s his pictures.  You better pick him and just making sure that you’re still 
going to get [sic] him.”  Tasheana testified that prior to trial she approached 
someone from the prosecution team and advised she “[r]eally didn’t feel too well 
doing this.  Like I told him most of the things that was said I didn’t see or they 
 
- 49 - 
didn’t occur . . . .  I still had to testify so he brushed it over his shoulder 
obviously.”  She later expressed her belief that the person who told her she “had to 
testify anyway” was then-assistant state attorney Richard Mantei.  She said that 
other than Mantei, she did not speak to anyone from the prosecutor’s office. 
 
Pamela Hart testified that she had introduced Tasheana to Martin “as a 
friend” and she knew him “from the neighborhood.”  She verified that Tasheana 
came to her at one point saying “something about she would be—if she didn’t do 
something that she will be charged with—with I guess contempt of court or 
whatever you want to call it because at first she didn’t want to testify . . . .”  
However, Pamela said she couldn’t recall exactly what Tasheana said.  She also 
stated that they really did not discuss Martin’s case because they were both going 
through their “own little personal issues.” 
 
Detective Nelson denied threatening Tasheana with arrest if she did not 
identify Martin as the shooter.  He denied offering Tasheana money in exchange 
for her testimony or telling her he would have her misdemeanor charge dropped if 
she testified.  Detective Chizik denied that Tasheana was offered money in 
exchange for a statement.  He testified that when he met with Tasheana at her 
home, she did not seem frightened, as if she had been threatened.  Detective 
Strawn, who accompanied Nelson and Chizik to Tasheana’s home to speak with 
her, testified that Tasheana was cooperative during the meeting.  Strawn further 
 
- 50 - 
stated that although the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office has funds for confidential 
informants, there is a procedure to register a person as a confidential informant.  
She stated the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office does not have access to a fund where 
“we just give people money to provide us with information.”  Strawn testified that 
because Tasheana was a voluntary witness, there was no need to register her as a 
confidential informant, and she was “absolutely not” offered money in exchange 
for providing a statement. 
 
Richard Mantei testified that he was assigned to the Martin case from the 
beginning.  He testified that he never received any indication Tasheana was not 
being truthful or that she was being forced to testify against her will.  He stated he 
did not have the impression that Tasheana was misleading him in any way.  
Richard Komando, who served as second chair in the Martin trial, testified that he 
never spoke to or met with Tasheana. 
Martin’s Brady and Giglio challenges with respect to Tasheana fail.  The 
postconviction court rejected Tasheana’s testimony as not credible, and we defer to 
findings of credibility by the factfinder where they are supported by competent 
substantial evidence.  Moore, 132 So. 3d at 726.  In reaching its conclusion, the 
postconviction court noted Tasheana was argumentative and uncooperative during 
her evidentiary hearing testimony, even going so far as to say she did not recall 
having testified previously before a jury.  While being cross-examined, Tasheana 
 
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accused the State of “twisting [her] words.”  The court noted Tasheana’s testimony 
conflicted with that of her own mother, who stated that she introduced Martin to 
Tasheana and that Martin would “hang out” in their neighborhood.  The court 
concluded the State’s witnesses were more credible and persuasive than Tasheana.  
As a result, there was no evidence to support Martin’s claim that Nelson threatened 
Tasheana into implicating Martin, or that she informed the prosecution prior to trial 
that her statements were untrue and was instructed she had to testify nonetheless. 
 
Accordingly, Martin has failed to demonstrate that the State willfully or 
inadvertently suppressed favorable evidence or knowingly presented false 
testimony with respect to Tasheana. 
Corey Davis 
 
On December 15, 2016, Davis executed an affidavit in which he stated that 
when the police initially spoke to him, he advised he did not see anything because 
he was inside his apartment when the shooting occurred.  Davis contended that 
Detective Nelson then began harassing his sister, informing her that if Davis did 
not help solve the murder, Nelson would “charge” him.  According to Davis, when 
he met Nelson later, Nelson began “mentioning ‘Shorty Fat’ as a suspect.”  The 
affidavit provides that during a third meeting, Davis told Nelson that he sold 
Martin marijuana and saw him drive off prior to the shooting.  According to Davis, 
“Nelson told me I better change this part of the story.”  Davis stated that “Nelson 
 
- 52 - 
continually told me that Arthur was the shooter and asked me if I knew anything 
about it.  I repeatedly told Detective Nelson no, but Nelson continued to pressure, 
coerce, and harass me into giving him a statement.”  Martin contends that, had the 
evidence of Detective Nelson’s alleged harassment been disclosed to the defense, 
Davis could have been called as a defense witness.  According to Martin, doing so 
would have introduced further evidence of the questionable police tactics in this 
case, thereby causing the jury to doubt the validity of the investigation. 
During the evidentiary hearing, Davis testified that he had been convicted of 
ten felonies, one of which involved a crime of dishonesty.  Davis admitted to 
knowing Martin because they had been in prison together and because Davis had 
dated Martin’s niece.  Davis testified that the first time he spoke with Detective 
Nelson about the murder, he was not asked questions specific to it, just “my name, 
things like that there for that matter.”  Davis testified that Nelson later contacted 
his sister, and “[h]e kept calling her, harassing her and telling—telling her like if 
she don’t get in touch with me that they was going to charge me with the crime or 
whatever.”  Davis said he then met with Nelson and told him that on the day of the 
murder, Martin came to the apartment complex, purchased marijuana, and drove 
away.  According to Davis, during a third meeting with Nelson, “he asked me the 
same questions over and over again and like I told him I didn’t see anything.” 
 
- 53 - 
 
Martin has failed to demonstrate a Brady violation with respect to Corey 
Davis.  The postconviction court found “[t]here [was] no evidence to show Nelson 
threatened or harassed Davis at any of their meetings.”  In the three encounters 
with Nelson that Davis described, the first encompassed only basic information, 
the second reflected Davis recounting what he knew about the day of the murder, 
and the third involved Nelson requestioning Davis as to what he saw.  Davis’s only 
testimony with respect to intimidation involved his sister.  However, Davis’s sister 
did not testify during the evidentiary hearing, and what Nelson allegedly said to 
her constitutes inadmissible hearsay.  Accordingly, as with Tasheana, Martin failed 
to demonstrate that favorable evidence was willfully or inadvertently suppressed, 
and his Brady claim fails. 
 
This claim is denied. 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
Racial Stereotypes 
 
Martin contends that various comments made by the prosecutor tapped into 
racial stereotypes, and this constitutes fundamental error that can be reviewed at 
any time.  Claims of improper argument should be raised on direct appeal and are 
therefore procedurally barred in postconviction proceedings.  Jennings v. State, 
123 So. 3d 1101, 1121-22 (Fla. 2013).  This claim was not raised on direct appeal 
and therefore is procedurally barred.  Moreover, even if it had been raised on direct 
appeal, for Martin to obtain relief, the improper argument must rise to the level of 
 
- 54 - 
fundamental error where, as here, the comments either were not objected to by trial 
counsel or were objected to, but on a different basis than that raised on appeal.  
That being said, where a claim of fundamental error is not raised on direct appeal, 
it is procedurally barred as well.  See Franqui v. State, 965 So. 2d 22, 35 (Fla. 
2007) (concluding that claim of fundamental error in an initial postconviction 
motion with respect to prosecutor’s remark was procedurally barred because it 
could have been raised as fundamental error on direct appeal).  Because Martin is 
attempting to raise his claim for the first time in a habeas proceeding, any 
challenge to the comments or to the assertion that they constitute fundamental error 
is procedurally barred. 
 
Moreover, even if we were to review the comments for fundamental error, 
Martin is not entitled to relief.  This Court has explained that for error to be 
fundamental, it 
must “reach down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a 
verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance 
of the alleged error.”  [Harrell v. State, 894 So. 2d 935, 941 (Fla. 
2005)] (quoting Brown v. State, 124 So. 2d 481, 484 (Fla. 1960)). We 
have also defined it as “error which goes to the foundation of the 
case.”  Ray v. State, 403 So. 2d 956, 960 (Fla. 1981) (quoting Sanford 
v. Rubin, 237 So. 2d 134, 137 (Fla. 1970)).  We have cautioned 
appellate courts to “exercise their discretion concerning fundamental 
error ‘very guardedly.’ ”  Id.  “[F]undamental error should be applied 
only in the rare cases where a jurisdictional error appears or where the 
interests of justice present a compelling demand for its application.” 
Id.  “Specifically, prosecutorial misconduct constitutes fundamental 
error when, but for the misconduct, the jury could not have reached 
 
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the verdict it did.”  Miller v. State, 782 So. 2d 426, 432 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2001). 
 
Farina v. State, 937 So. 2d 612, 629 (Fla. 2006) (emphasis added). 
 
In this case, the murder occurred in a public place during daylight hours.  
Multiple individuals (including Martin’s codefendant) identified Martin as the 
person who shot Daniels by walking around the SUV and repeatedly firing into it 
as Daniels attempted to escape.  Martin, 151 So. 3d at 1188.  Martin also offered 
Tasheana Hart money to not speak about what she saw on the day of the murder.  
Id.  Based upon the evidence offered during trial, Martin cannot demonstrate that 
but for the challenged comments, the jury would not have convicted him of 
premeditated murder.  Moreover, we have reviewed the comments carefully, and 
most of them do not remotely hint at racial stereotypes.  Further, even those that 
could be perceived to have a racial connotation also can be interpreted in a 
noninvidious manner. 
Based upon the foregoing, this claim is procedurally barred, and further does 
not rise to the level of fundamental error. 
Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
 
Martin claims that counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for failing to 
challenge numerous comments by the State during closing statements and for using 
a visual aid.  When considering such claims, the Court evaluates: 
 
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[F]irst, whether the alleged omissions are of such 
magnitude as to constitute a serious error or substantial 
deficiency falling measurably outside the range of 
professionally acceptable performance and, second, 
whether the deficiency in performance compromised the 
appellate process to such a degree as to undermine 
confidence in the correctness of the result. 
Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 (Fla. 1986).  It is the 
defendant’s burden to allege a specific, serious omission or overt act 
upon which the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be 
based.  If a legal issue “would in all probability have been found to be 
without merit” had counsel raised the issue on direct appeal, the 
failure of appellate counsel to raise the meritless issue will not render 
appellate counsel’s performance ineffective.  Rutherford v. Moore, 
774 So. 2d 637, 643 (Fla. 2000). 
Frances v. State, 143 So. 3d 340, 357 (Fla. 2014) (citation omitted) (alteration in 
original). 
 
Here, all but one of the challenged comments were not objected to by 
defense counsel.  With respect to the objected-to comment, counsel asked for a 
curative instruction, and the trial court gave one, directing the jury to disregard the 
comment.  Thus, trial counsel received the relief he requested, and appellate 
counsel was not deficient for failing to raise this claim.  Because Martin did not 
object to the remainder of the comments, he must demonstrate that a claim of 
fundamental error on direct appeal would in all probability have been successful to 
demonstrate entitlement to habeas relief.  See Conahan v. State, 118 So. 3d 718, 
733 (Fla. 2013) (“[A]ppellate counsel cannot be deemed deficient for failing to 
 
- 57 - 
raise meritless issues or issues that were not properly raised in the trial court and 
are not fundamental error.”). 
The prosecutor’s use of a visual aid which allegedly depicted a cartoon of a 
man with his head in the sand13 is clearly a questionable choice in the context of a 
capital murder trial.  However, while unnecessary, its use cannot be said to rise to 
the level of fundamental error.  The State used the visual aid to argue the evidence 
supported the conclusion that Martin committed the murder, and the jury should 
not “bury their heads in the sand [and] ignore the evidence.” 
 
With respect to the other challenged comments by the prosecutor, we have 
considered them and agree that some are concerning.  For example, the prosecutor 
stated that Martin turned Daniels into “target practice,” and that the presumption of 
innocence “has now been blown away just like [Martin] did to Javon Daniels.”  
Further, we have held the use of the pronoun “you” may rise to a “golden rule” 
violation, and the prosecutor in Martin’s case used this pronoun in describing 
Daniels’ final moments prior to his death: 
[W]hen you’ve got two arms that are broken by bullets in multiple 
places you can’t work the door handles.  You can’t work the locks.  
You can’t manipulate anything because you can’t move your arms, so 
what are you left to do?  You’re left to shove with all your might your 
body weight into a window to try to get the heck out of what is 
becoming a tomb, and that’s exactly what that picture shows.  It 
                                          
 
 
13.  Martin concedes this visual aid did not become part of the record on 
appeal. 
 
- 58 - 
shows you how Javon Daniels tried even with two fractured arms, 
even having taken fire and being bloody tried to get away. 
In Braddy v. State, 111 So. 3d 810 (Fla. 2012), during guilt-phase closing 
statements, the prosecutor used the pronoun “you” in describing the experience of 
the child victim. 
You’re five.  You’d just seen what he’s done to your mother.  
You’re falling out of a moving car, you’re five and it’s dark.  That’s 
terrifying.  
. . . .  
You’re five.  You jumped out of a moving car.  You seen [sic] 
what he’s done to your mother, and you’re terrified. 
 
111 So. 3d at 842-43 (alterations in original).  We rejected a challenge to this 
argument, which was not preserved: 
The State was certainly entitled to make comments recounting [the 
child victim’s] last hours alive as supported by the evidence.  But the 
form in which this recounting of the victim’s last hours was presented 
arguably “cross[ed] the line by inviting jurors to place themselves in 
the position of the victim.”  Mosley [v. State], 46 So. 3d [510,] 521 
[(Fla. 2009)].  The repeated use of the pronoun “you” suggests such 
an invitation.  Assuming that these comments crossed the line to 
become an improper golden rule argument, those comments—in light 
of the totality of evidence presented at Braddy’s penalty phase trial—
do not constitute fundamental error. 
Id. at 843 (citations omitted) (second alteration in original).  Here, the prosecutor’s 
use of the term “you,” in describing how Daniels attempted to escape from the 
vehicle with two broken arms while Martin tracked him by walking around the 
vehicle, can be read to invite the jurors to put themselves in Daniels’ place.  
However, as in Braddy, even if this comment crossed the line and became an 
 
- 59 - 
impermissible Golden Rule argument, it cannot be said that, but for this comment, 
the jury would not have convicted Martin of premeditated murder. 
 
We conclude that the challenged comments, when considered individually or 
cumulatively, do not amount to fundamental error.  Therefore, had appellate 
counsel attempted to raise this claim on direct appeal, it would not have been 
successful.  Accordingly, Martin’s claim of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel fails. 
Remaining Claims 
The remainder of Martin’s habeas claims relate to his initial penalty phase.  
Because Martin is receiving a new penalty phase, we decline to address these 
claims. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Based upon the foregoing, we affirm the order of the postconviction court 
and deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and POLSTON, LABARGA, LAWSON, and MUÑIZ, JJ., 
concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION AND, 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Duval County,  
Linda McCallum, Judge - Case No. 162009CF014374AXXXMA 
And an Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus  
 
 
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Robert S. Friedman, Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Dawn B. Macready and 
Elizabeth Spiaggi, Assistant Capital Collateral Regional Counsel, Northern 
Region, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Lisa A. Hopkins, Assistant Attorney 
General, Tallahassee, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent