Case Title: Ex parte Alabama Department of Transportation. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Good Hope Contracting Company, Inc. v. Alabama Department of Transportation)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1060078

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2007-07-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 07/20/07
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
SPECIAL TERM, 2007
____________________
1060078
____________________
Ex parte Alabama Department of Transportation
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Good Hope Contracting Company, Inc.
v.
Alabama Department of Transportation)
(Montgomery Circuit Court, CV-05-2781)
SEE, Justice.
The Alabama Department of Transportation ("ALDOT")
petitions this Court for the writ of mandamus directing the
1060078
2
Montgomery Circuit Court to enter an order dismissing the
complaint of Good Hope Contracting Company, Inc. ("Good
Hope"), on the grounds of sovereign immunity.  Because ALDOT
has demonstrated a clear legal right to this relief, we grant
the petition and issue the writ of mandamus.
Facts and Procedural Background
Between March 2002 and January 2003, Good Hope entered
into three contracts with ALDOT pursuant to which Good Hope
was 
to 
undertake 
various 
roadway-construction 
projects. 
 
Those
contracts contained similar liquidated-damages clauses that
allowed ALDOT to assess liquidated damages against Good Hope,
calculated on the basis of the number of days Good Hope
exceeded the time allotted under the contract for the
completion of the project.  The contracts, however, give Good
Hope the right to request an extension of time in which to
complete the project.  They provide that the "Director [of
ALDOT] shall have final authority to approve or disapprove the
request for an extension of time" and to decide "any question
connected with ... delay in the prosecution of the Work."
Petition at 7.  Based upon these contract provisions, ALDOT
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3
withheld 
approximately 
$600,000 
in 
liquidated 
damages 
from 
the
contract price owed to Good Hope on the three contracts.
Good Hope sued ALDOT, alleging that the liquidated
damages had been wrongfully assessed and seeking damages for
breach of contract, negligence, and unjust enrichment and
asserting a claim based on quantum meruit.  Good Hope also
sought a judgment declaring that the liquidated-damages
provision in each contract was a penalty and was therefore
void, and it sought a writ of mandamus from the trial court
directing ALDOT to pay for the services Good Hope had
performed under the contracts.  ALDOT moved the trial court to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that ALDOT, as an agency
of the State of Alabama, is entitled to sovereign immunity
under § 14, Ala. Const. 1901.  The trial court set the case
for trial without ruling on ALDOT's motion to dismiss.
ALDOT petitioned this Court for the writ of mandamus
directing the trial court to dismiss Good Hope's action
against it.  ALDOT also moved this Court to stay the
proceedings in the trial court pending this Court's
consideration of ALDOT's petition.  We ordered answer and
1060078
4
briefs, and we stayed the proceedings in the trial court
pending disposition of the petition for the writ of mandamus.
Issue
The issue is whether the trial court erred in failing to
dismiss Good Hope's claims against ALDOT on the basis of
sovereign immunity. 
Standard of Review
As this Court has consistently held, the writ of mandamus
is a
"'drastic and extraordinary writ that will be issued
only when there is: 1) a clear legal right in the
petitioner to the order sought; 2) an imperative
duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by
a refusal to do so; 3) the lack of another adequate
remedy; and 4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the
court.'"
Ex parte Wood, 852 So. 2d 705, 708 (Ala. 2002) (quoting Ex
parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So. 2d 501, 503 (Ala.
1993)).  "'In reviewing the denial of a motion to dismiss by
means of a mandamus petition, we do not change our standard of
review ....'"   Drummond Co. v. Alabama Dep't of Transp., 937
So. 2d 56, 57 (Ala. 2006) (quoting Ex parte Haralson, 853 So.
2d 928, 931 (Ala. 2003)).  
"In Newman v. Savas, 878 So. 2d 1147 (Ala.
2003), this Court set out the standard of review of
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5
a ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-
matter jurisdiction:
 
"'A ruling on a motion to dismiss is
reviewed 
without 
a 
presumption 
of
correctness.  Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d
297, 299 (Ala. 1993).  This Court must
accept the allegations of the complaint as
true.  Creola Land Dev., Inc. v. Bentbrooke
Housing, L.L.C., 828 So. 2d 285, 288 (Ala.
2002).  Furthermore, in reviewing a ruling
on a motion to dismiss we will not consider
whether 
the 
pleader 
will 
ultimately 
prevail
but whether the pleader may possibly
prevail.  Nance, 622 So. 2d at 299.' 
"878 So. 2d at 1148-49."
Pontius v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 915 So. 2d 557,
563 (Ala. 2005).  We construe all doubts regarding the
sufficiency of the complaint in favor of the plaintiff.
Drummond Co., 937 So. 2d at 58.
Analysis
This Court has long held that "'"the circuit court is
without jurisdiction to entertain a suit against the State
because of Sec. 14 of the Constitution."'"  Larkins v. Dep't
of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 806 So. 2d 358, 364
(Ala. 2001) (quoting Alabama State Docks Terminal Ry. v.
Lyles, 797 So. 2d 432, 435 (Ala. 2001), quoting in turn Aland
v. Graham, 287 Ala. 226, 229, 250 So. 2d 677, 678 (1971)).
1060078
See infra note 3.
1
6
"[A]n action contrary to the State's immunity is an action
over which the courts of this State lack subject-matter
jurisdiction."  Larkins, 806 So. 2d at 363.
There are exceptions to the State's sovereign immunity.
"A state official is not immune from an action that
(1) seeks to compel a state official to perform his
or her legal duties, (2) seeks to enjoin a state
official from enforcing unconstitutional laws, (3)
seeks to compel a state official to perform
ministerial acts, or (4) seeks a declaration under
the Declaratory Judgments Act, § 6-6-220 et seq.,
Ala. Code 1975, construing a statute and applying it
in a given situation."
Latham v. Department of Corr., 927 So. 2d 815, 821 (Ala.
2005).   Other actions that are not prohibited by § 14
1
include:
"(5) valid inverse condemnation actions brought
against State officials in their representative
capacity; and (6) actions for injunction or damages
brought 
against 
State 
officials 
in 
their
representative capacity and individually where it
was alleged that they had acted fraudulently, in bad
faith, beyond their authority or in a mistaken
interpretation of law." 
 
Drummond Co., 937 So. 2d at 58 (emphasis omitted).  In this
case, ALDOT, as the party asserting the defense of immunity,
bore the burden of demonstrating that Good Hope can prove no
1060078
7
set of facts establishing one of the exceptions to the State's
sovereign immunity.  See Ex parte Butts, 775 So. 2d 173, 177
(Ala. 2000) ("As a general rule, a motion to dismiss '"for
failure to state a claim is properly granted only when it
appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts entitling him to relief."'" (quoting Patton v. Black,
646 So. 2d 8, 10 (Ala. 1994), quoting in turn Winn-Dixie
Montgomery, Inc. v. Henderson, 371 So. 2d 899 (Ala. 1979))).
I.  Claims for Damages and Equitable Relief
This Court has repeatedly held that § 14, Ala. Const.
1901, "affords the State and its agencies an 'absolute'
immunity from suit in any court."  Haley v. Barbour County,
885 So. 2d 783, 788 (Ala. 2004); see also Ex parte Mobile
County Dep't of Human Res., 815 So. 2d 527, 530 (Ala. 2001)
("Pursuant to § 14, Ala. Const. of 1901, the State of Alabama
and its agencies have absolute immunity from suit in any
court."); Ex parte Tuscaloosa County, 796 So. 2d 1100, 1103
(Ala. 2000) ("Under Ala. Const. of 1901, § 14, the State of
Alabama has absolute immunity from lawsuits.  This absolute
immunity extends to arms or agencies of the state ....").
This absolute immunity from suit also bars suits for relief by
1060078
8
way of mandamus or injunction.  Ex parte Troy Univ., [Ms.
1051318, Dec. 22, 2006] ___ So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. 2006).
Because the immunity of the State is absolute, this Court
has usually provided that any exceptions to that immunity
extend only to suits naming the proper State official in his
or her representative capacity.  See Latham, 927 So. 2d at 821
(laying out the exceptions to sovereign immunity).  Even when
an action names the proper State official in his or her
representative capacity, such an action will be barred if it
is, in substance, an action against the State for damages.
See Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro, 950 So. 2d 1203, 1206 (Ala.
2006) ("Additionally, a party may not indirectly sue the State
by suing its officers or agents '"when a result favorable to
plaintiff would be directly to affect the financial status of
the state treasury."'" (quoting Patterson v. Gladwin Corp.,
835 So. 2d 137, 142 (Ala. 2002), quoting in turn State Docks
Comm'n v. Barnes, 225 Ala. 403, 405, 143 So. 581, 582 (1932))
(emphasis added in Patterson)).
Good Hope argues that this Court, in Milton Construction
Co. v. State Highway Department, 568 So. 2d 784 (Ala. 1990)
("Milton I"), and State Highway Department v. Milton
1060078
9
Construction Co., 586 So. 2d 872 (Ala. 1991) ("Milton II"),
allowed a plaintiff to bring a breach-of-contract action
against the State Highway Department, the predecessor agency
to ALDOT, notwithstanding the absolute immunity of the State
agency.  In Milton I, the plaintiff, Milton Construction
Company, sought a judgment declaring that the disincentive
clause 
of 
an 
incentive/disincentive-payments 
provision 
in 
each
of 
two highway-construction contracts it had 
entered 
into with
the Highway Department was void and unenforceable as a
penalty.  On these grounds, Milton asked the trial court to
order the Highway Department to pay it the amounts of
disincentive payments that the Highway Department had
allegedly wrongfully withheld.  This Court held that the
disincentive clause in the highway-construction contracts was
"void as a penalty and therefore unenforceable."  568 So. 2d
at 791.  We remanded the case to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this Court's opinion.
In Milton II, the Highway Department argued that the
doctrine of sovereign immunity barred the trial court from
ordering it to repay the money that it had withheld from the
plaintiff under the void disincentive clause.  This Court
1060078
10
stated that "actions brought to force state employees or
agencies to perform their legal duties" are among the
"established exceptions to the protection afforded the state
or its agencies by sovereign immunity."  Milton II, 586 So. 2d
at 875 (emphasis added).  We held that sovereign immunity
would not bar an action to compel State officials to perform
a legal duty, and in this case the Highway Department had
incurred a legal duty to pay money owed under the highway-
construction contracts.  
In Milton II, notwithstanding the language suggesting
that the exceptions to sovereign immunity apply to State
agencies, the Court held "that this lawsuit is not barred by
the doctrine of sovereign immunity, because it is in the
nature of an action to compel state officers to perform their
legal duties and pay Milton Construction for services
contracted for and rendered."  586 So. 2d at 875.  The case
the Court relied on in Milton II, Ex parte Carter, 395 So. 2d
65, 
68 
(Ala. 
1980), 
restricts 
the sovereign-immunity
exceptions, except for declaratory-judgment actions, to suits
against State officials.  In Milton I and Milton II, the
plaintiff had named the director of the Highway Department, in
1060078
Although 
the 
case 
is 
styled 
State 
Board 
of 
Administration
2
v. Roquemore, the summary of the case states that "[t]he
petition is for a writ of mandamus to C.A. Moffett, as
11
his official capacity, as a party to the action, along with
the Highway Department.  Milton I and Milton II thus do not
support Good Hope's claim that it has a right to sue a State
agency in the agency's own right on a breach-of-contract
theory, and we disavow any contrary implication of the
language of those opinions.  As we noted above, a State agency
is absolutely immune from suit.
Good Hope also argues that it is entitled to "[a] writ of
mandamus from the trial court directing ALDOT to perform its
contractual and legal duties ...."  Good Hope's answer at 15.
Again, Good Hope has named as a party only the State agency;
it has not named any State official.  The absolute immunity of
the State agency from suit bars actions for relief by mandamus
or injunction.  Ex parte Troy Univ., ___ So. 2d at ___.  Each
of the cases Good Hope cites, Dampier v. Pegues, 362 So. 2d
224, 225-26 (Ala. 1978), Hardin v. Fullilove Excavating Co.,
353 So. 2d 779, 780 (Ala. 1977), and State Board of
Administration v. Roquemore, 218 Ala. 120, 121, 117 So. 757,
758 (1928),  is a case in which a plaintiff sought the writ of
2
1060078
president of the state board of administration, and to Woolsey
Finnell, as president of the state highway commission, to
audit and voucher for payment the petitioner's account for hay
sold and delivered to the state highway department."  218 Ala.
at 121, 117 So. at 758. 
12
mandamus directing a State official, not the State agency
itself, to act.  
Because the immunity of a State agency is "absolute"
under § 14, Ala. Const. 1901, ALDOT is also immune from the
counts 
in 
Good 
Hope's 
complaint 
alleging 
negligence 
and 
unjust
enrichment and seeking recovery under a theory of quantum
meruit.  See § 14, Ala. Const. 1901 ("[T]he State of Alabama
shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or
equity."); Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Mental Health & Mental
Retardation, 837 So. 2d 808, 810-11 (Ala. 2002) (dismissing an
action alleging negligence against a State agency on the
ground of the agency's absolute immunity from suit).  In
short, there is no set of facts that will support the
negligence, unjust-enrichment, and quantum meruit allegations
of the complaint; therefore, Good Hope cannot prevail on those
claims.
II.  The Declaratory-Judgment Aspect of Good Hope's
Complaint
 
1060078
13
Good Hope argues that it is entitled to a declaratory
judgment against ALDOT notwithstanding the doctrine of
sovereign immunity.  Implicit in this argument is the
proposition that Good Hope can sue the State agency directly
instead of naming as a defendant the relevant State official.
We discussed the declaratory-judgment exception to State
immunity in Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro.  In that case, the
Town of Lowndesboro and a landowner filed a declaratory-
judgment 
action 
against 
the 
Alabama 
Department 
of
Environmental Management ("ADEM") seeking to invalidate a
permit issued by ADEM to operate a solid-waste landfill.
Ultimately, 
the trial court declared the 
landfill 
permit void,
and it awarded the plaintiffs interim attorney fees and
expenses.  ADEM appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals, which
reversed the trial court's judgment on the ground of sovereign
immunity.  On certiorari review, we affirmed the judgment of
the 
Court 
of 
Civil 
Appeals. 
 
Although 
the 
declaratory-judgment
action named only the State agency, and not a State official,
we "express[ed] no opinion" regarding whether the underlying
declaratory-judgment action was permissible under § 14.  We
1060078
It may be argued that language from some of our cases
3
would permit a declaratory-judgment action directly against
the State or its agencies, because those cases do not
expressly 
limit 
declaratory-judgment 
actions 
to 
State
officials.  See, e.g, Drummond Co., 937 So. 2d at 58 ("'There
are four general categories of actions which in Aland v.
Graham, 287 Ala. 226, 250 So. 2d 677 (1971), we stated do not
come within the prohibition of § 14: (1) actions brought to
compel State officials to perform their legal duties; (2)
actions brought to enjoin State officials from enforcing an
unconstitutional law; (3) actions to 
compel 
State 
officials to
perform ministerial acts; and (4) actions brought under the
Declaratory Judgments Act, Tit. 7, § 156, et seq., seeking
construction of a statute and its application in a given
situation.'" (quoting Ex parte Carter, 395 So. 2d at 68));
Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So. 2d at 142 ("This Court has
recognized several species of action that are not 'against the
State' for § 14 purposes.  They include: '(1) Actions brought
to compel State officials to perform their legal duties. (2)
Actions brought to enjoin State officials from enforcing an
unconstitutional 
law. 
(3) 
Actions 
to 
compel 
State 
officials 
to
perform ministerial acts. (4) Actions brought under the
Declaratory Judgments Act, [Ala. Code 1975, § 6-6-220 et
seq.], seeking construction of a statute and how it should be
applied in a given situation." (citations omitted) (quoting
14
concluded that the award of attorney fees and costs was
prohibited by the State's sovereign immunity.  
Similarly, we express no opinion regarding whether the
declaratory-judgment exception allows Good Hope to name a
State agency as a defendant notwithstanding that agency's
"absolute immunity" under § 14, Ala. Const. 1901.  Even if we
were to assume that the declaratory-judgment exception could
apply to an action naming a State agency,  the exception would
3
1060078
Aland v. Graham, 287 Ala. at 229-30, 250 So. 2d at 679));
Aland v. Graham, 287 Ala. at 229-30, 250 So. 2d at 679
("Without professing 
to 
cover 
every 
situation 
that has 
arisen,
there are four general categories of actions that we have held
do not come within the prohibition of Sec. 14.  (1) Actions
brought to compel State officials to perform their legal
duties. (2) Actions brought to enjoin State officials from
enforcing an unconstitutional 
law. (3) 
Actions 
to 
compel State
officials to perform ministerial acts. (4) Actions brought
under the Declaratory Judgments Act, Tit. 7, § 156 et seq.,
Code 1940, seeking construction of a statute and how it should
be applied in a given situation." (citations omitted)).  But
see Latham v. Department of Corr., 927 So. 2d at 821 (limiting
the declaratory-judgment exception to actions against State
officials).  The case cited by Aland as authority for the
declaratory-judgment 
exception, 
Curry 
v. 
Woodstock 
Slag 
Corp.,
242 Ala. 379, 381, 6 So. 2d 479, 480-81 (1942), explains that,
"[w]hen [a declaratory judgment] is only sought to construe
the law and direct the parties, whether individuals or State
officers, what it requires of them under a given state of
facts, to that extent it does not violate section 14 ...."
(Emphasis added.)  Nonetheless, we do not here address whether
the 
declaratory-judgment 
exception 
applies 
to 
actions 
 
against
a State agency, and not against a State official, because the
case before us does not require us to address that issue.
15
be of no help to Good Hope.  The declaratory-judgment
exception to sovereign immunity applies when the declaratory-
judgment action seeks no relief other than the "'construction
of a statute and how it should be applied in a given
situation.'"  Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro, 950 So. 2d at 1211
(quoting Aland v. Graham, 287 Ala. at 230, 250 So. 2d at 679).
Good Hope's complaint does not ask the trial court to construe
a statute and declare how it should be applied.  Instead, it
1060078
16
asks the trial court to declare the liquidated-damages
provision of its contracts with ALDOT illegal as an
unenforceable penalty.  For the first time in this Court, Good
Hope argues that in its complaint it was seeking a declaratory
judgment 
construing 
§ 
41-16-3(a), 
Ala. 
Code 
1975, 
which 
reads,
in pertinent part, as follows: 
"Whenever the State of Alabama is a party to any
contract, the contract shall be executed by all
parties in a timely fashion. When a party to a
contract, other than the state, has fully executed
the responsibility under the contract and there
remains only the payment of funds by the state,
payment shall be made in a timely manner." 
Good Hope does not explain how this statute is legally
relevant to its claim.
Moreover, "[s]ection 14 bars an action characterized as
a declaratory-judgment action 'when it is nothing more than an
action for damages.'"  Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro, 950 So.
2d at 1211 (quoting Lyons v. River Road Constr., Inc., 858 So.
2d 257, 263 (Ala. 2003)).  It is not at all apparent how our
construction of § 41-16-3(a) could benefit Good Hope unless,
in construing it, we also concluded that the liquidated-
damages provision in the contracts is void as a penalty or
that ALDOT otherwise breached its contractual obligations.  A
1060078
ALDOT 
apparently 
concedes 
that 
the 
exception 
to 
sovereign
4
immunity for declaratory-judgment actions may apply to it.
Petition at 17; see also Drummond Co., 937 So. 2d at 58
(laying out exceptions to sovereign immunity and not limiting
the exception for declaratory-judgment actions to State
17
result favorable to Good Hope, however, would then directly
affect a contract right of ALDOT and would "necessarily open
the doors of the State treasury to legal attack."  Ex parte
Town of Lowndesboro, 950 So. 2d at 1211.  Good Hope has gone
beyond "pray[ing] for guidance both to complainant and the
State officers trying to enforce the law so as to prevent them
from 
making 
injurious 
mistakes 
through 
an 
honest
interpretation of the law ...."  Curry v. Woodstock Slag
Corp., 242 Ala. 379, 381, 6 So. 2d 479, 481 (1942).  For this
reason, even though Good Hope's complaint is styled in part as
seeking a declaratory judgment, it is nonetheless barred by
the immunity provision of § 14, Ala. Const. 1901.
III.  Proper Parties
Good Hope has named only ALDOT, and not its director, as
a party to this case.  ALDOT argues that, because no State
official has been named as a defendant in the action, the
exceptions relating to State officials do not apply, and the
action should be dismissed.  
4
1060078
officials).  
18
Good Hope argues that, if this Court concludes that ALDOT
is not a proper party, we should direct the trial court to
allow Good Hope to amend its complaint to add the proper
party.  Good Hope cites Drummond Co., 937 So. 2d at 58, for
the proposition that this Court may order the trial court to
add the director of ALDOT as the defendant and to permit the
litigation to proceed accordingly.  However, in Drummond Co.,
ALDOT had moved, as an alternative to granting its motion to
dismiss, to substitute the director of the agency as a
defendant.  Nothing in the materials before this Court
suggests that either ALDOT or Good Hope has moved to
substitute the director for ALDOT.  In fact, ALDOT argued in
its motion to dismiss that, as a State agency, it was not the
proper party to be sued, and it pointed out that Good Hope had
failed to name any State official as a party.  ALDOT's
supplemental submission and brief in support of motion to
dismiss, tab 3 at 8.  
Further, in Ex parte Blankenship, 893 So. 2d 303, 306-07
(Ala. 2004), this Court held that, if a trial court lacks
subject-matter jurisdiction, it has no power to take any
1060078
Rule 25(d), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides:
5
"(1) When a public officer is a party to an
action in an official capacity and during its
pendency dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold
office, the action does not abate and the officer's
successor is automatically substituted as a party.
Proceedings following the substitution shall be in
the name of the substituted party, but any misnomer
19
action other than to dismiss the complaint.  A trial court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction if the defendant is immune
under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.  Larkins, 806 So. 2d
at 364 ("'Article I, § 14, of the Alabama Constitution of 1901
thus removes subject-matter jurisdiction from the courts when
an action is determined to be one against the State.'"
(quoting Lyles, 797 So. 2d at 435)).  Thus, this Court cannot
order the trial court to allow Good Hope to amend its
complaint because the trial court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction.
Good Hope also apparently suggests that this Court may
order a substitution of the parties.  It cites Rule 25(d),
Ala. R. Civ. P., and Rule 43(c), Ala. R. App. P., in support
of its argument that its failure to add the director of ALDOT
as a party to this action does not necessitate a dismissal.
However, Rule 25(d), Ala. R. Civ. P.,  deals only with the
5
1060078
not affecting the substantial rights of the parties
shall be disregarded. An order of substitution may
be entered at any time, but the omission to enter
such an order shall not affect the substitution. 
"(2) A public officer who sues or is sued in an
official capacity may be described as a party by the
officer's official title rather than by name; but
the court may require the officer's name to be
added."
20
situation in which a public official leaves office during the
pendency of an action; it provides that the public official's
successor is automatically substituted as a party in the case.
Rule 25(d) thus does not provide for the automatic
substitution of a public official for a State agency because
the plaintiff failed to join the public official as the proper
party.  
Good Hope also argues that Rule 43(c), Ala. R. App. P.,
gives this Court the authority to order a substitution of
parties in this case.  Rule 43(c), Ala. R. App. P., provides
that "[a]n order of substitution may be entered at any time,
but the omission to enter such an order shall not affect the
substitution."  However, reading this subsection in the
context of the rest of the rule suggests that it relates only
to substitutions made by operation of law under Rule 43, such
1060078
"'Where an appellant fails to cite any authority for an
6
argument, this Court may affirm the judgment as to those
issues, for it is neither this Court's duty nor its function
to perform all the legal research for an appellant.'"
Birmingham News Co. v. Horn, 901 So. 2d 27, 78 (Ala. 2004)
(quoting Sea Calm Shipping Co. v. Cooks, 565 So. 2d 212, 216
(Ala. 1990)).
21
as when a party to an appeal dies or a public official who is
a party to an appeal leaves office.  It does not specifically
allow this Court to substitute parties at its discretion, and
Good Hope has not presented any authority suggesting that we
have the authority to do so.6
Conclusion
Because no exception to ALDOT's sovereign immunity
applies in this case, the trial court erred in denying ALDOT's
Rule 12(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss.  Because
the complaint purported to effect an action against the State
in violation of § 14, Ala. Const. 1901, the trial court
acquired no subject-matter jurisdiction over this action.
"'"Lacking subject matter jurisdiction [a court] may take no
action other than to exercise its power to dismiss the action
.... Any other action taken by a court lacking subject matter
jurisdiction is null and void."'"  Ex parte Blankenship, 893
So. 2d at 307 (quoting State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow
1060078
22
Drive, 740 So. 2d 1025, 1029 (Ala. 1999), quoting in turn
Beach v. Director of Revenue, 934 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1996)).  ALDOT has demonstrated a clear legal right to an
order directing the trial court to dismiss Good Hope's
complaint.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Stuart, Smith, Bolin,
Parker, and Murdock, JJ., concur.