Case Title: Shabazz v. Keating

Citation: 

Docket Number: 87948

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 1999-04-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
Shabazz v. Keating  Shabazz v. Keating 1999 OK 26 977 P.2d 1089 70 OBJ 1069 Case Number: 87948 Decided: 04/06/1999 Modified: 07/14/1999 Supreme Court of Oklahoma ISA ABD'ALLAH RAMADAN SHABAZZ, a/k/a Jimmy Phillips, Petitioner/Appellant, v. FRANK KEATING, Governor of the State State of Oklahoma; RAY PAGE, ANITA M. BRIDGES, C. MICHAEL ZACHARIAS, NADINE McPHERSON, and SUSAN B. LOVING, members of the Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board; STEVE HARGETT, Warden of the Lexington Correctional Center; PHILLIP L. STAMBECK, Assistant District Attorney of Oklahoma County; and/or the STATE OF OKLAHOMA, Respondents/Appellees. [977 P.2d 1091] ON CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS, DIV. IV. ¶0 A penitentiary inmate sought release from imprisonment by habeas corpus proceeding, claiming the Pardon and Parole Board's denial of his quest for parole (from 1991 through 1996) was based on a prosecutor's "vindictive protest letter" placed of record with the board. The board's actions were characterized as having deprived the prisoner of some federally protected liberty interest. The District Court, Oklahoma County, Niles Jackson, trial judge, found inmate's habeas corpus proceeding to be frivolous and imposed sanctions. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. On certiorari, granted upon inmate's petition, to review a single issue - the legal correctness of trial court's sanctions, THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS' OPINION IS VACATED; INSOFAR AS THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER ON CERTIORARI REVIEW IMPOSES SANCTIONS ON SHABAZZ FOR FILING A FRIVOLOUS ACTION, IT IS REVERSED WITH DIRECTIONS TO EXPUNGE THE ORDER'S SANCTIONING PORTION FROM THE RECORD Isa Abd'Allah Ramadan Shabazz, Karnes City, Texas, pro se W. A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General, Steven E. Lohr and Patrick Crawley, Assistant Attorneys General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for Respondents OPALA, J. ¶1 The dispositive issue tendered is whether sanctions may be imposed under the provisions of I THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION ¶2 Isa Abd'Allah Ramadan Shabazz [Shabazz or inmate], an incarcerated prisoner, became aware in January 1996 that at the time of his personal appearances before the Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board [board], beginning in 1991 and continuing annually until 1996, board members reviewed and considered, as a part of his file, a 1991 letter written by Assistant District Attorney Phillip [977 P.2d 1092] L. Stambeck [Stambeck]. The letter included multiple references to Shabazz's alleged abuse of the writ of habeas corpus and of proceedings for post-conviction relief as well as to his use of many variations of his original surname. Stambeck's letter implored, on behalf of all "law abiding citizens," that Shabazz not be paroled because he should "never be allowed to pray [sic] upon the peaceful members of the human race again" (emphasis in original). ¶3 Shabazz sought immediate release by habeas corpus pressed against the Governor, parole board members, warden of the Lexington Correctional Center and Stambeck. Advising Shabazz that his plea was frivolous, the Attorney General's office afforded him an opportunity to withdraw it. Shabazz refused and the district court ruled his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus to be frivolous. The State moved against Shabazz for imposition of sanctions under the authority granted by the provisions of ¶4 The district court (a) imposed as a sanction a counsel-fee award of $1,298.68, court costs of $81.00, and a revocation of 720 earned credits, (b) determined the sanctioning statute (§566(C)) to be valid against Shabazz's constitutional attack and (c) adopted for Shabazz's future filings in the state court the same preconditions that stood imposed on him by the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. ¶5 Certiorari was granted to review a single issue - the legal correctness of sanctions. We hold that insofar as the order on review imposes sanctions on Shabazz, it must be reversed with directions to expunge them from the trial court's record. II THE ESSENCE OF SHABAZZ'S CLAIM ¶6 According to Shabazz's amended petition, Stambeck's letter in the prisoner's file, with its references to his alleged "writ writing" activities and legal surname changes, is the reason for his parole's denial. The board's consideration of Stambeck's tainted letter, Shabazz claims, (1) deprives him of "substantive due process," (2) offends the equal-protection guarantee of the fundamental law and (3) denies his constitutional right of access to the courts. Shabazz's quest for release by habeas corpus is based on what he suggests to be "the vindictive nature of the letter" and the improper weight given its text by the board. The vindictive letter, we are urged, supplies an impermissible motive for denial of his parole. III THE PAROLE BOARD'S RESPONSE ¶7 Through its counsel, the Attorney General [AG], the board argues that habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy only when a prisoner is being held illegally. According to the AG, habeas corpus relief cannot lie because Shabazz has provided no support for his claim that the board took into account the [977 P.2d 1093] content of Stambeck's letter. Even a mandamus remedy would not be available to Shabazz, the AG asserts, because he has no clear legal right to parole. In short, the AG contends that because Shabazz can demonstrate no entitlement, either by habeas corpus or by mandamus, to the remedy he sought, his petition was facially frivolous within the meaning of 57 O.S.Supp.1995 § 566(B)(1).6 As the AG analyzes the problem, Shabazz was advised to correct the noted deficiencies in his petition, but failed to do so. By willfully ignoring the warnings, as well as by filing numerous other frivolous petitions, the AG argues that Shabazz has demonstrated malicious intent in pressing for the relief sought. IV OKLAHOMA'S PAROLE PROCESS IS UTTERLY FREE FROM THE RESTRAINT OF THOSE CONSTITUTIONAL STRICTURES THAT SURROUND WITH PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS A PERSON'S LIBERTY INTEREST A. No Part Of The Parole Process May Be The Subject Of The Courts' Due Process Scrutiny ¶8 Federal jurisprudence teaches that an Oklahoma prisoner has no constitutionally protected claim to be released on parole before the expiration of his sentence.7 Due process will attach its shield to parole determination procedures only if the statutory and regulatory framework of the state system is sufficient to fashion a liberty interest within the meaning of fundamental federal law.8 A parole regime which provides for the mere possibility of earlier than the end-of-sentence release does not create a constitutionally protected liberty interest.9 ¶9 In short, there is no protectible liberty interest in an Oklahoma parole. According to the teachings of Phillips v. Williams,10 this State's parole release procedure,11 which affords no more than an expectation (or hope) of parole,12 is not surrounded with due process protection.13 No due process strictures can be applied to test the permissible parameters of the parole process. This is so because the parole function neither leads to nor may ripen into a liberty interest. Shabazz's argument must hence be rejected. He clearly is not entitled to be protected against routine agency recordkeeping that may consist of material which could have been excludable from decisionmakers' access if an Oklahoma parole quest were a liberty interest.14 [977 P.2d 1094] B. The Board's Consideration Of The Offending Letter Is Impervious To Adversarial Testing In A Judicial Forum ¶10 An inmate cannot confront the board in the context of an adversarial proceeding. None is statutorily provided. The board is explicitly exempted from compliance with the adjudicative process in Art. II of the Administrative Procedures Act [APA].15 A trial-type hearing is neither mandated nor appropriate for review of the board's use of material placed in a prisoner's file. Because no trial-type procedure governs a parole consideration16 and there is no protectible liberty interest in one's earlier than his end-of-sentence release,17 the board is the sole judge of what materials may be considered in the decision-making process.18 In short, this court cannot dictate to the board what information may be taken into account in the course of its deliberations. No action will hence lie against the board either for expungement of public documents from the prisoner's file or for invalidation of a parole's denial. ¶11 Shabazz incorrectly targeted the board for that body's wrongful consideration of the allegedly vindictive and irresponsibly placed material in the prisoner's file. V GAUGED BY THE BREWINGTON STANDARD FOR PERMISSIBLE LIMITS ON PENALIZING FRIVOLOUS LITIGATION, SANCTIONS WILL NOT LIE AGAINST SHABAZZ FOR FILING THE PROCEEDING UNDER REVIEW ¶12 The trial court found Shabazz's habeas corpus petition to be frivolous and imposed sanctions in reliance on the provisions of 57 O.S.Supp.1995 § 566(C)19 and of 12 O.S.Supp.1994 § 2011(C).20 Both statutes authorize the imposition of sanctions for filing frivolous pleadings. Section 566(B)(1) defines as a "frivolous" claim one "having no reasonable basis in law or fact, or lacking any good faith legal argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law."21 A. The Brewington Standard ¶13 In TRW/Reda Pump v. Brewington22 the court announced the standards for imposition of a counsel-fee award for lodging a "patently frivolous appeal" within the meaning of 20 O.S. 1991 § 15.1.23 Because [977 P.2d 1095] the language of § 15.1 is similar to that in § 566, the teachings of Brewington are instructive here. A patently frivolous appeal is one having no legitimate legal or factual basis and is so totally devoid of merit as to be regarded as facially unworthy of consideration.24 All doubts concerning whether the appeal is frivolous must be resolved in appellant's favor.25 B. Excessive Use of Sanctions To Punish An Inmate's Efforts to Clarify the Law For The Purpose Of Preventing Irresponsible Documents To Cloud the Legitimacy of Parole Process Would Place An Impermissible Burden On Prisoners' Access To The Courts ¶14 Sanctions are appropriate when a prisoner's pleading is unreasonable under all the circumstances in existence at the time of filing. Excessive use of sanctions to punish litigants for a legitimate effort to clarify existing law has a negative impact on a prisoner's unimpeded access to the courts. It is in violation of Art. 2, § 6, Okl.Const. 26 ¶15 Oklahoma jurisprudence is silent on what impact the absence of liberty-interest characteristics in the State's parole process will have upon the contents of material the board could use in considering a prisoner for parole. There is no extant decisional law clearly pronouncing that since an Oklahoma prisoner's quest for parole is no more than a mere expectation, the entire process by which it is granted or withheld is freed from due process strictures. ¶16 Shabazz had no means of learning from available (or accessible) legal sources (or literature) at hand that a prosecutor's act of placing a highly prejudicial instrument on file with the Oklahoma parole board would go unprotected by the constitutional safeguards of due process. His exercise of the right of access to the courts ¶17 Resolving as we must all doubts in Shabazz's favor, we hold today that, when measured by the standards of Brewington, [ 977 P.2d 1096 ] VI SUMMARY ¶18 There is no extant jurisprudence pronouncing that since an Oklahoma parole quest is no more than a prisoner's expectation of an earlier than his end-of-sentence release, the entire process by which it is granted or withheld is freed from those due process strictures that surround a liberty interest. The parole board is explicitly exempted from compliance with the APA's Art.II trial-type adjudicative process. The board's access to and consideration of an offending letter is impervious to judicial scrutiny in a prisoner's action. The sanctions imposed on Shabazz place an impermissible burden on his access to the courts in a legitimate, first-impression quest to clarify a prisoner's due process protection against parole decisionmakers' use of records that may contain irresponsible content. ¶19 On certiorari granted to review a single issue in an inmate's petition - the legal correctness of imposed sanctions - the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion is vacated; insofar as the trial court's order, now on certiorari review, imposes sanctions on Shabazz for filing a frivolous action, it is reversed with directions to expunge from the record the order's sanctioning portion. ¶20 SUMMERS, C.J., HARGRAVE, V.C.J., and LAVENDER, SIMMS, OPALA, WILSON, and KAUGER, JJ., concur; ¶21 WATT, J., concurs in Parts I, II, III and IV; dissents from Part V; ¶22 HODGES, J., dissents. FOOT