Case Title: In Re J.H.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1990-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.



                                No. 89-394


In re J.H., Juvenile                         Supreme Court

                                             On Appeal from
                                             District Court of Vermont,
                                             Unit No. 2, Franklin Circuit

                                             May Term, 1990


Edward J. Cashman, J.

Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Alexandra N. Thayer,
   Assistant Attorney General, Waterbury, for plaintiff-appellant,
   Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services

Charon A. True, St. Albans, for defendant-appellant, J.H.

Steve Dunham, Public Defender, St. Albans, for defendant-appellant, J.H.'s
   mother


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Peck, Gibson and Dooley, JJ.


     PECK, J.  After an eighteen-month review hearing required by 33 V.S.A.
{ 5531 (formerly 33 V.S.A. { 658), the district court ordered that custody
of J.H. be transferred from the Department of Social and Rehabilitation
Services (SRS) to her mother.  This appeal by SRS turns on the following
issue: who bears the burden of proof at an eighteen-month review hearing?
Because we find that the court allocated the burden of proof improperly, we
remand for a new hearing.
     J.H.'s parents have never been married, and they stopped living
together approximately seven months after J.H.'s birth in June of 1980.
J.H. remained in her mother's care until age three.  On October 31, 1983,
the father suspected neglect and obtained a relief from abuse order and
temporary custody of J.H.  On December 9, 1983, the mother stipulated to
custody remaining with the father.  In August of 1987, the mother, who had
moved to Troy, New York, visited her daughter in Vermont.  Upon learning
that the child's stepmother was being considered for custody, the mother
took the child to Troy.  She was charged with custodial interference, and
the child was returned to her father.  In October of 1987, the father
admitted that he had recently abused his daughter, and, based on this
admission, the juvenile court found J.H. to be in need of care or
         supervision (CHINS) and placed her in the temporary custody of SRS.  At the
disposition hearing in January of 1988, SRS indicated that it would explore
reunification of the child with her father but submitted a plan that called
for continued SRS custody.  The mother, through her attorney, stated that
she did not want custody of J.H. because the child did not want to be placed
with her.  SRS was awarded custody.
     At a March 1989 administrative hearing, the mother indicated that she
had changed her mind and wanted custody of J.H..  Thereupon SRS began
consideration of the mother as a custodial parent but did not rule out the
possibility of returning custody of J.H. to her father.  Because the mother
resides in New York, SRS requested, in April of 1989, that the New York
Department of Social Services perform a home study pursuant to the
Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, 33 V.S.A. {{ 5901-5927
(formerly 33 V.S.A. {{ 3151-3207), to determine the feasibility of placing
J.H. there.
     In July 1989, the court held an eighteen-month review hearing as
required under 33 V.S.A. { 5531.  The home study had not yet been completed.
At the hearing, SRS sought to retain custody of J.H., while it determined
the appropriateness of placing her with either her father or her mother.
J.H. and her father also argued that custody should remain with SRS.  J.H.'s
mother argued that she should be awarded custody of J.H. because Vermont law
favors placement with a child's parent over placement in foster homes and
she was able and willing to take custody of her daughter.  The court awarded
custody to the mother, and this appeal followed.
     The hearing in question was an eighteen-month review hearing "for the
purpose of considering the review of the order of disposition."  33 V.S.A.
{ 5531(c).  At the hearing the court was required to determine whether

          (1) the child or custody thereof shall be returned to his
     [or her] parents or other family members;
          (2) the child shall be continued in the custody of the
     commissioner for a specified period;
          (3) the child, because of exceptional circumstances, shall
     remain in the custody of the commissioner on a long term basis as
     a permanent plan or with a goal of independent living;
          (4) the child should be considered for adoption or legal
     guardianship.

33 V.S.A. { 5531(d).  In making the determination the court was required to
consider the best interests of the child in accordance with the following:

          (1) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with
     his [or her] natural parents, his [or her] foster parents if any,
     his [or her] siblings, and any other person who may significantly
     affect the child's best interests;
          (2) The child's adjustment to his [or her] home, school, and
     community;
          (3) The likelihood that the natural parent will be able to
     resume his [or her] parental duties within a reasonable period of
     time; and
          (4) Whether the natural parent has played and continues to
     play a constructive role, including personal contact and
     demonstrated love and affection, in the child's welfare.

33 V.S.A. { 5540 (formerly 33 V.S.A. { 667).
     This scheme does not clarify which party bears the burden of proof at
eighteen-month review hearings, and we have not had the opportunity to
address the question squarely.  33 V.S.A. { 5531(a) states that disposition
orders "shall be for an indeterminate period" but shall be reviewed every
one and one-half years.  It does not address the allocation of the burden of
proof to the parties at review hearings.  33 V.S.A. { 5532 addresses
modification of orders.  It provides that before a disposition order can be
modified, it must be shown "that changed circumstances so require in the
best interests of the child." { 5532(a).  Although { 5532 has been applied
only when parties seek modification of orders during the interim period
between reviews of the disposition order, the two provisions can and should
be read together as setting forth a scheme whereby, pursuant to { 5531,
disposition orders are reviewed periodically but, pursuant to { 5532, the
orders will be modified only if the proponent of modification can show that
it is warranted by changed circumstances.  This approach ensures that a
child is not subjected to continuous custody shifts and allows long-term
plans to be made for him or her. (FN1)
     The court in this case properly considered the options laid out in 33
V.S.A. { 5531 (FN2) and made findings regarding each of the factors laid out in
33 V.S.A. { 5540 to determine the child's best interests. (FN3) It erred,
however, in allocating to SRS the burden of demonstrating by "'convincing
proof and findings that the parents are unfit and demonstrably incapable of
providing an appropriate home, and that separation is necessary for the
child's welfare or in the interest of public safety'" (quoting In Re M.B.,
147 Vt. 41, 45,