Case Title: Croom v. Younts

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1996-01-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Wendell CROOM v. Kathie YOUNTS, Individually
and as Parent and Next Friend of Rachel
Younts, a Minor

95-814                                             ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
               Opinion delivered January 16, 1996


1.   Torts -- outrage -- elements. -- To succeed on a claim of
     intentional infliction of emotional distress, or outrage, the
     plaintiff must prove that (1) the actor intended to inflict
     emotional distress or wilfully and wantonly knew or should
     have known that emotional distress was the likely result of
     his conduct; (2) the conduct was extreme and outrageous, was
     beyond all possible bounds of decency, and was utterly
     intolerable in a civilized community; (3) the actions of the
     defendant were the cause of her distress; and (4) the
     emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was so severe
     that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.

2.   Torts -- outrage -- willful and wanton conduct defined --
     extreme and outrageous conduct defined. -- Under Arkansas
     Model Instruction 404, a person acts willfully and wantonly
     when he knows or should know in the light of surrounding
     circumstances that his conduct will naturally and probably
     result in emotional distress (and bodily harm) and continues
     such conduct in reckless disregard of the consequences;
     extreme and outrageous conduct is conduct that is so
     outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
     beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as
     atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.

3.   Torts -- outrage -- standard of review. -- To determine
     whether sufficient evidence exists to support a judgment in
     tort-of-outrage cases, the supreme court assesses whether the
     evidence is substantial and, in doing so, considers it in the
     light most favorable to the appellee.

4.   Appeal & error -- denial of motion for new trial -- standard
     of review. -- Whether there is substantial evidence to support
     the verdict is the standard of review for the denial of a
     motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and new
     trial; substantial evidence is evidence that is of sufficient
     certainty and precision to compel a conclusion one way or
     another, forcing or inducing the mind to pass beyond suspicion
     or conjecture; on review of a denial of a motion for new
     trial, the appellate court gives the verdict the benefit of
     all reasonable inferences permissible in accordance with the
     proof.

5.   Torts -- outrage -- clear-cut proof required to establish. --
     The supreme court requires clear-cut proof to establish the
     elements in tort-of-outrage cases; clear-cut proof, however,
     does not mean proof greater than a preponderance of the
     evidence; the supreme court takes a strict approach and gives
     a narrow view to the tort of outrage; hence, in considering
     whether evidence is sufficient in tort-of-outrage cases, the
     supreme court must determine whether it is substantial in
     light of these standards.

6.   Torts -- outrage -- test for substantial evidence of
     appellant's willful and wanton conduct met. -- Where it was
     undeniable that appellant's age (51) and relationship (second
     cousin) exerted considerable influence over his minor cousin
     (15), who stated that appellant had used wine and medication
     in his home to wear down her defenses and forced sex upon her;
     the minor described her state of mind at the time as "chaotic"
     and attempted suicide twice; and it was clear that appellant,
     who, by his own admission, relentlessly pursued his minor
     cousin, was fomenting a schism in the family relationship,
     forcing the minor girl to break with her mother and side with
     him; the supreme court held that there was substantial
     evidence that appellant should have known emotional distress
     to the minor girl would occur because of his actions but that
     he acted in reckless disregard of the consequences to her.

7.   Torts -- outrage -- test for substantial evidence of
     appellant's extreme and outrageous conduct met. -- The supreme
     court held that, even under the restrictive standards used in
     tort-of-outrage cases, the test for substantial evidence of
     appellant's extreme and outrageous conduct was met; the use of
     wine and medication by a vastly older and more experienced
     relative to foist sex on a minor cousin in his home offends
     all sense of decency as it is commonly understood and cannot
     be tolerated.

8.   Jury -- instructions -- instruction couched in alternative --
     jury could readily have discerned that tort of outrage is
     intentional tort. -- Where appellant contended that the trial
     court erred in giving a jury instruction on punitive damages
     that included a paragraph relating to negligence cases, the
     supreme court held that no error was committed because the
     instruction was clearly couched in the alternative, and  the
     jury could readily have discerned that the tort of outrage is
     an intentional tort and that the second paragraph of the
     instruction applied.


     Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court; David Bogard, Judge;
affirmed.
     Huckabay, Munson, Rowlett & Tilley, P.A., by:  John E. Moore
and Julia L. Busfield; and Crockett & Brown, by:  R.J. Brown, for
appellant.
     Dodds, Kidd, Ryan & Moore, by:  Greg Alagood, for appellee.

     Robert L. Brown, Justice.
Associate Justice Robert L. Brown
January 16, 1996






WENDELL CROOM,
                    APPELLANT,

V.

KATHIE YOUNTS, INDIVIDUALLY &
AS PARENT & NEXT FRIEND OF
RACHEL YOUNTS, A MINOR,
                     APPELLEE,

95-814




APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY
CIRCUIT COURT,
NO. CIV 94-1135,
HON. DAVID BOGARD, JUDGE,




AFFIRMED.






     The appellant in this case, Wendell Croom, urges two points in
his appeal: (1) evidence of the tort of outrage was insufficient,
and (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury.  We agree
with the appellee, Kathie Younts, on both points and affirm the
judgment.
     Kathie Younts is the mother of Rachel Younts, who at the time
of the events in question in 1993, was age 15.  (Rachel Younts's
date of birth was October 2, 1977.)  Younts is also the first
cousin of Wendell Croom, who in the summer of 1992 lost his wife to
cancer.  During the time of the events leading to this litigation,
Croom was 51.  In January of 1993, Younts planned to go to Hawaii
and visit a man whom she was engaged to marry.  She needed someone
to watch over her daughter Rachel and her younger daughter, Katie,
while she was away.  Croom first volunteered to do this but then
attempted to renege the day before she left on the basis that he
was inclined to drink alcoholic beverages and something might
happen to the girls or someone might make an insinuation about the
appearance of Younts's daughters staying in his home.  Younts
implored him to reconsider which he did, and she left for her visit
to Hawaii which was to last from January 6, 1993, to January 16,
1993.
     While in Hawaii, Younts telephoned home on a daily basis but
noticed that towards the end of her trip Rachel had been reluctant
to come to the phone.  When Younts returned, she observed that her
children had become very attached to Croom, especially Rachel. 
Croom would call regularly and invite the girls over.  Though
Younts would refuse Croom's offer to drive Rachel home from her
school, Croom would on occasion pick her up anyway.  Younts
initially attributed this to Croom's loneliness and lack of social
friends.  She urged Croom to stop intruding in her daughter's life
with offers of transportation and dinners, but Croom persisted.
     The matter came to a head when Croom asked Younts if he could
take Rachel to visit his wife's and father's graves.  She balked at
the invitation but eventually relented on the condition that Rachel
would be home for church services at 5:00 p.m.  Croom did not meet
the deadline but rather called about 7:00 p.m. and told Younts that
he and Rachel were having dinner at a restaurant. She demanded that
Croom bring Rachel home, and he responded, according to Younts:
"I'm getting sick and tired of you telling Rachel what to do. 
She's a grown woman, I'm a grown man and to hell with you."  Croom
brought Rachel home at midnight.  There was a confrontation between
Younts and Croom at that time, during which Croom expressed his
love for Rachel.  He refused to leave until he found out what
punishment Younts was going to mete out to Rachel.  Younts finally
got a knife from the kitchen and threatened Croom with it, and he
left.  Younts then told her daughter that she was not to see Croom
again, and later that night, Rachel attempted suicide by ingesting
her brother's asthma medicine.  She was taken to Children's
Hospital and admitted on March 8, 1993.  On the night of admission,
Croom showed up at Children's Hospital intoxicated, accused Younts
of precipitating the suicide attempt, and professed that he was the
only one who truly cared for Rachel.  He had to be escorted from
the hospital by security personnel.
     At the hospital, Rachel initially denied that she had had a
sexual relationship with Croom but then admitted it to a staff
social worker on April 4, 1993.  She stated that it began while her
mother was in Hawaii and that Croom had forced sexual activity upon
her.  During the course of Rachel's treatment, she was prescribed
the antidepressant medication, Prozac, and on April 14, 1993, she
was discharged from the hospital.  On June 17, 1993, she was
readmitted to Children's Hospital after superficially slashing her
wrists.  She remained at the hospital until July 6, 1993.
     On February 3, 1994, Younts brought suit against Croom and
alleged violations of the torts of seduction and outrage.  Before
the trial, the trial court dismissed the seduction claim.  At
trial, Rachel explained how her sexual relationship with Croom
developed.  She testified that Croom had plied her with wine during
a cookout with neighbors, and after they had left, he asked her
into his bedroom and gave her a prescription medicine, Xanax.  He
then took her to bed and had sexual relations with her.  She
testified that following that first experience she had sexual
relations with Croom 10 or 15 times.  During this period, she
described her state of mind as being "mad" and "just chaotic."  She
added that she was "sad" and "hated" herself.  Following the
confrontation between her mother and Croom, during which Younts
pulled the kitchen knife, Rachel decided to take all of the
medicine in the medicine cabinet, including her brother's asthma
medication, and "lay down and just go to sleep."
     Croom's defense at trial was that he was abusing alcohol daily
and that Rachel initiated the sexual contact and told him he would
never have to worry about getting into trouble.  Before the
relationship with Rachel developed, he testified that he was
impotent.  He also testified that after she was hospitalized, he
sent her dimes, and she called him twice a day.  Croom admitted at
trial that he had been convicted of sexual misconduct, a class B
misdemeanor, for having sexual contact with Rachel but stated that
the matter was on appeal to circuit court.  He further admitted
that he had lied at the criminal proceeding, and in his deposition
as well, about not having sex with Rachel.  Sue Laneer, a
psychotherapist, testified on behalf of Croom and stated that he
was experiencing an adjustment disorder at the time of his
relationship with Rachel and that this affected his ability to cope
and make judgments.  This condition, according to Laneer, caused
him to "rationalize" his relationship with Rachel on the basis that
she was intelligent and mature for her age.
     The jury found for Younts on the tort of outrage and awarded
her $15,286.96 for Rachel's medical expenses, $60,000 in
compensatory damages, and $25,000 in punitive damages.  Judgment
was entered, and Croom filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict or, alternatively, for a new trial on the basis that
the evidence for the tort of outrage was insufficient and that the
trial court erroneously instructed the jury on negligent conduct. 
The motion was denied.  Croom appealed, and Younts cross-appealed
on the dismissal of her seduction claim.  Younts abandoned her
cross-appeal in her brief filed in this appeal.
     For his first point on appeal, Croom argues that there was no
substantial evidence to support Younts's claim of outrage.  He
concedes that his conduct was wrong, but he vigorously contends
that it did not meet the test of outrageous conduct.  He
specifically urges that he lacked the requisite intent to inflict
emotional distress on Rachel.    
     To succeed on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, or outrage, Younts had to prove these elements: 
     (1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress
     or wilfully and wantonly knew or should have known that
     emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct;
     (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous, was
     beyond all possible bounds of decency, and was utterly
     intolerable in a civilized community; (3) that the
     actions of the defendant were the cause of her distress;
     and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the
     plaintiff was so severe that no reasonable person could
     be expected to endure it.
Hunt v. Riley, 322 Ark. 453, ___ S.W.2d ___ (1995); Perrodin v.
Rooker, 322 Ark. 117, ___ S.W.2d ___ (1995); Hollingsworth v. First
Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 311 Ark. 637,