Case Title: Jones v. Town of Woodway

Citation: 425 P.2d 904, 70 Wash. 2d 977

Docket Number: 

State: washington

Court: Washington Supreme Court

Date: 1967-03-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
70 Wn.2d 977 (1967) 425 P.2d 904 REBECCA JONES, as Executrix, et al., Appellants, v. THE TOWN OF WOODWAY, Respondent.[*] No. 38506. The Supreme Court of Washington, Department Two. March 31, 1967. Hullin, Ehrlichman, Carroll & Roberts, for appellants. Broz, Long & Mikkelborg, Jacob A. Mikkelborg, and Robert O. Wells, Jr., for respondent. OTT, J. The town of Woodway was incorporated in the year 1958 as a municipal corporation of the fourth class. On March 4, 1963, Rebecca Jones, executrix of the estate of Josine Erdevig, and Josine Stone filed a proposed plat with *978 the city council of Woodway. This plat subdivided Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4, each containing 2.5 acres in Olympic Park Addition to the town of Woodway, into 25 single residence lots of various sizes. The town council and planning commission, after several public hearings, denied the request to adopt the plat submitted by the owners. In denying the proposed plat, they ordered that single residence properties in the area in question must contain at least one acre. After the town council refused to approve the proposed plat, the council adopted a zoning ordinance "consisting of text and map entitled `Town of Woodway Comprehensive Plan'." (Ordinance No. 31.) The property here in question, together with 30 acres adjacent thereto, was zoned as R 43, requiring one acre or more for single residence properties. (Ordinance No. 34.) Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Olympic Park Addition had been previously platted into 2.5 acre lots which conformed with a previous zoning ordinance requiring single residence lots to contain two or more acres. In a previous action commenced in the Superior Court for Snohomish County, Cause No. 73502, the court, on January 11, 1963, declared the two acre single residence zoning provision to be unreasonable and null and void in so far as it purported to zone this property. The decree further provided, "Nothing contained herein shall prohibit defendant [town of Woodway] from duly imposing new, reasonable zoning or other land use controls upon plaintiff's property." The town of Woodway did not appeal. (We narrate the facts as they relate to the Snohomish County Cause No. 73502, and the adjudication of the invalidity of the prior zoning ordinance only in so far as these facts have a bearing on the issues raised in this appeal.) The owners of the Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Olympic Park Addition March 13, 1964, sought in the Superior Court for Snohomish County in Cause No. 79088 a review of the council's refusal to approve their proposed plat, and on March 27, 1964, in Cause No. 79220, sought a review of the validity of the enactment of the town's zoning ordinances. *979 The two certiorari proceedings were consolidated for trial and heard by the court. On April 13, 1965, the court, after delineating the facts concerning which there was no controversy, entered inter alia the following findings of fact: From a judgment of dismissal entered in accordance with the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law in these consolidated cases, the property owners have appealed. On appeal, appellants assign error to the entry of the decree of dismissal and to the entry of the court's findings of fact enumerated above, except 11, 13 and 15. *982 Const. art 11, § 11 provides: RCW 58.16.030 provides: RCW 58.16.060 provides: RCW 58.15.110 provides, inter alia: [1] Appellants assert that they had a vested right to have their proposed plat approved by the town of Woodway, contending that, at the time they filed the plat, the legislative authority for the town of Woodway had not adopted any valid platting regulations as provided by RCW 58.16.110. We do not agree. When the approval of a proposed plat is sought, the legislature, by the enactment of RCW 58.16.060, has mandated the town authorities to "inquire into the public use and interest proposed to be served by the establishment of the plat ... and shall consider all other facts deemed by it relevant and designed to indicate whether or not the public interest will be served by the plating...." By virtue of the cited statute, the appellants acquired no right to have their property subdivided as they saw fit simply because they filed a plat. By RCW 58.16.030, the legislature has further mandated that any plat "shall be submitted for approval to the council" and whenever a planning commission shall have been granted authority to take appropriate action thereon, the planning commission has authority to act in lieu of the council. Since it is evident from the quoted legislative enactments that a platter must seek approval of his plat from the town authorities, the discretionary power to disapprove a plat inheres in its statutory power to approve it. Appellants contend that the adoption of platting rules and regulations is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the council's power to function on the merits or demerits of a proposed plat. Appellants further contend that since no such regulations had been previously adopted by the town of Woodway, the town council had no other alternative except to approve any plat which a platter might submit. RCW 58.16 grants discretionary power to the town authorities to consider all facts deemed by it relevant and designed to further the public interest in the adoption or rejection of a *984 plat. We find nothing in the provisions of RCW 58.16 which indicates that the approval of a proposed plat by the town council is mandatory in the absence of an ordinance defining the scope by which the exercise of the town council's discretion will be governed. Appellants rely upon State ex rel. Ogden v. Bellevue, 45 Wn.2d 492, 275 P.2d 899 (1954); Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wn.2d 125, 331 P.2d 856 (1958); and Pierce v. King Cy., 62 Wn.2d 324, 382 P.2d 628 (1963). We have reviewed each of the cited cases and find that they do not support appellants' contention that the town council must approve a plat in the absence of any ordinance establishing standards for platting. The town council by RCW 58.16 has statutory authority to exercise its discretion in the field of platting, without the necessity of adopting an ordinance proscribing the rules by which its discretion would be exercised. We conclude that the trial court did not err in sustaining the council's refusal to adopt appellants' proposed plat. In Snohomish County Superior Court by Cause No. 79220, appellants challenged the constitutionality of the one acre single residence zoning restriction contending (1) that ordinance Nos. 31 and 34 were not legally adopted, for the reason that the required statutory notice was not given prior to enactment, and (2) that the zoning restriction is unreasonable, and is an improper exercise of the town's police power. As to (1), appellants contend that the town of Woodway, in adopting the ordinances here challenged, did not comply with the jurisdictional requirements of RCW 35.27.300 (town ordinances) and RCW 35.63.100 (zoning). RCW 35.27.300 provides: RCW 35.63.100 provides in part: In this regard, the trial court found that notice of the adoption of ordinance No. 31 had been properly posted in three public places in the town as required by RCW 35.27.300, and that notice of the public hearing by the planning commission was duly published in the Edmonds Tribune, a publication of general circulation in the municipality in accordance with RCW 35.63.100. The trial court, after weighing the conflicting evidence, found in findings of fact Nos. 7 and 8, quoted above, that the statutory procedural notices were given prior to the adoption of ordinance Nos. 31 and 34. The court held these ordinances to have been regularly adopted and in full force and effect. Our review of the record convinces us that the trial court's findings in this regard are supported by the evidence. [2] As to (2), we have consistently held that zoning by municipalities is a proper exercise of police power. Lillions v. Gibbs, 47 Wn.2d 629, 289 P.2d 203 (1955), and cases cited. Was the one acre single residence zoning as provided in ordinance No. 34 a reasonable regulation, and does the regulatory restriction bear a substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare? We have found no case in this state nor in any other state which holds that one acre residential zoning per se is an unreasonable regulatory restriction. Other jurisdictions have approved single residence zoning up to five acres per unit. Levitt v. Village of Sands Point, 6 N.Y.2d 269, 160 N.E.2d 501 (1959); Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516, 141 A.L.R. 688 (1942); Flora Realty & Inv. Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 246 S.W.2d 771 (1952); Levy v. Board of Adjustment of Arapahoe Cy., 149 Colo. 493, 369 P.2d 991 (1962); Senior v. Zoning Comm'n of New Canaan, 146 Conn. 531, 153 A.2d 415 (1959); Cobble Close Farm v. Board of Adjustment of Township of Middleton, *986 10 N.J. 442, 92 A.2d 4 (1952); Fisher v. Township of Bedminster, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952). [3] Whether a one acre single residence zoning restriction is reasonable and bears a substantial relationship to health, safety, morals and general welfare is a factual issue. The trial court resolved this issue in its finding of fact No. 9, quoted above. We conclude that the one acre zoning restriction upon appellants' property is reasonable and that the regulation bears a substantial relationship to the health, safety, morals and general welfare of the town of Woodway. [4] Finally, appellants contend that since the town of Woodway did not appeal from the judgment entered in Snohomish County Cause No. 73502, in which the court struck down Woodway's prior zoning ordinance which provided for two acre single residence properties, the decision in that case is res judicata of the issue here presented. We do not agree. The court in the cited case invited the town of Woodway to impose new and more reasonable zoning restrictions. The new restrictions enacted by the town of Woodway were considered by the trial court and found to be reasonable. Judgment is affirmed. FINLEY, C.J., DONWORTH, HAMILTON, JJ., and BARNETT, J. Pro Tem., concur. August 18, 1967. Petition for rehearing denied. [*] Reported in 425 P.2d 904.