Case Title: Hughes v. State

Citation: 589 So. 2d 112

Docket Number: 90-KA-0172

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1991-11-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
589 So. 2d 112 (1991) Ethel L. HUGHES v. STATE of Mississippi. No. 90-KA-0172. Supreme Court of Mississippi. November 6, 1991. *113 Terry M. Haimes, Picayune, for appellant. Mike C. Moore, Atty. Gen., Ellen Y. Dale, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee. En Banc. SULLIVAN, Justice, for the Court: Ethel L. Hughes was convicted of selling less than an ounce of marijuana, as prohibited by Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-139(a)(1), (b)(3), in the Circuit Court of Winston County, Mississippi. On the day following her trial, the circuit court entered a written order sentencing Ms. Hughes to three (3) years' confinement in the custody of the Department of Corrections, with two (2) years suspended. The sentencing order incorrectly stated that Ms. Hughes had been convicted of selling cocaine, rather than marijuana. Feeling aggrieved, Ms. Hughes appeals, asserting the following four assignments of error: 1. The trial court erred in failing to grant the defendant's motion for continuance to allow additional time to prepare for trial; 2. The trial court erred in failing to grant the defendant's motion for continuance in order to allow time to secure an independent analysis of the alleged marijuana after granting the defendant's motion to produce; 3. The trial court erred in allowing testimony concerning an electronic listening device used in the alleged buy of marijuana from the defendant because the existence of the device was not revealed in discovery and it was not produced to the defense for inspection; and 4. The trial court erred in sentencing the defendant for sale of cocaine after indictment and trial for sale of marijuana. Because we find the failure to grant a continuance deprived this defendant of a fair trial, it is not necessary that assignment of error No. 4 be discussed. In considering whether the lower court has abused its discretion in denying a motion for a continuance, we have said that "where the trial record reveals a statement of facts indicating a lack of fair trial, it becomes the duty of this Court to insure such trial by granting a new trial," especially where the evidence which has been presented leaves considerable doubt that the defendant received a fair trial. Barnes v. State, 249 So. 2d 383, 385 (Miss. 1971). An examination of the record in this case reveals the following facts (some of these facts were not before the court when the motion for a continuance was first considered but were made a part of the record at the hearing on the defendant's motion for a new trial): Haimes, a sole practitioner, had eight days to prepare for trial. In those eight days, he had to prepare pleadings and motions, do research, attend court, and interview witnesses all while running his law practice. Is it any wonder that he did not have adequate time to prepare for trial? In larger law firms, an attorney often does none of this work himself. He has someone who does the research, someone who does the typing, and often someone who interviews his witnesses or conducts an investigation of the case. In effect, the defendant is being penalized for hiring a sole practitioner to represent her in this matter. Especially troubling is the fact that the court granted the defendant's motion for an independent analysis and in so holding, put the burden on the district attorney to supply Haimes with the name of the analyst at Mississippi State and then when the district attorney failed to supply that name, found no impropriety in the failure. *115 The court said that its earlier remarks were just a suggestion. However, the actual statement of the court as revealed by the record was, "I will ask that you tell him the name and phone number of the analyst that is commonly used at Mississippi State his name escapes me at the moment so that he will at least know immediately who is available to do that... ." The statement was much more than a suggestion by the court; it imposed an affirmative duty requiring the State to provide Haimes with the name. Clearly, Haimes considered it so. Because the State failed to fulfill that duty, the judge should have granted a continuance when that fact was brought to his attention just prior to trial. The identification of Ethel Hughes was based on the testimony of two witnesses. The agent who was actually involved in the transaction made a visual identification of Ethel Hughes. Lieutenant McCart with the Louisville Police Department, who was listening to the transaction via a body transmitter with which the agent was equipped, could not see the person with whom the agent was dealing but was able to hear the transaction. Based on that, he identified Ethel Hughes' voice as the voice he heard. The testimony of these two witnesses was vital to the State's case against Ethel Hughes. Rule 901(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence provides, "The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." By way of illustration, 901(b)(5) allows "[i]dentification of a voice, whether heard firsthand or through mechanical or electronic transmission or recording, by opinion based upon hearing the voice at any time under circumstances connecting it with the alleged speaker." Comment (a) to the Rule stresses the importance of the genuineness of the evidence. "The authentication and identification aspects of evidence are central to the concept of relevancy. Unless it be satisfactorily shown that an item of evidence is `genuine,' the item is irrelevant and should be excluded." There is a significant difference between aural identification based on a recording and one which is made of a voice which has not been recorded. J. Carr, The Law of Electronic Surveillance § 7.5(c)(1) (1989). The validity of voice identification testimony is within the province of the jury. Gray v. State, 549 So. 2d 1316, 1319 (Miss. 1989). The defendant should have been allowed to test the listening device. The credibility of Lieutenant McCart's identification of the voice he heard as that of Ethel Hughes was clearly a relevant issue in this case. Testing the equipment is one way in which to attack that credibility. Considering all these facts together, it is obvious that the defendant received less than a fair trial. That inadequate preparation might have made a difference to this case is supported by the fact that at the close of the evidence, the jury deliberated for thirty minutes after which they returned to the courtroom and said that they had not reached a verdict. The judge asked how they stood numerically, and they indicated the vote was eight to four. The jury then retired to continue deliberations. Approximately an hour later, the jury brought in a verdict of guilty. In Barnes, supra, we said: Barnes, 249 So. 2d at 385. Because the defendant was denied her constitutional right to a fair trial, this case is reversed and remanded for a new trial. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, PITTMAN, BANKS and McRAE, JJ., concur.