Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Matthew T. Luening

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2023-02-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
2023 WI 12 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2020AP2166-D 
 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Matthew T. Luening, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
         Complainant, 
     v. 
Matthew T. Luening, 
         Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST LUENING 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 24, 2023   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Per curiam.  
NOT PARTICIPATING: 
        
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
      
 
 
 
 
2023 WI 12
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No. 2021AP2166-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Matthew T. Luening, Attorney at Law: 
 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Matthew T. Luening, 
 
          Respondent. 
FILED 
 
FEB 24, 2023 
 
Sheila T. Reiff 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Counts 
one 
through 
seven of complaint dismissed; remanded to referee for further 
proceedings.  
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.  This matter was scheduled for oral 
argument on November 7, 2022, but was removed from the oral 
argument calendar because the court determined that the case 
presented an unresolved choice of law issue. In order to resolve 
that issue, we asked the parties to advise whether Supreme Court 
Rule (SCR) 20:8.5(b)1 required that the counts of misconduct 
                                                 
1 Supreme Court Rule 20:8.5(b)(1) provides in part:  
No. 
2021AP2166-D   
 
2 
 
alleged in the complaint filed by the Office of Law Regulation 
(OLR) 
that 
arose 
out 
of 
Attorney 
Matthew 
Luening’s 
representation of clients before an immigration tribunal should 
have been pleaded under the rules promulgated by the Executive 
Office of Immigration Review (EOIR), as set forth in 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.102, rather than under Wisconsin’s Rules of Professional 
Conduct. Having considered the parties’ submissions on that 
issue, we conclude that OLR should have charged the counts of 
misconduct connected with cases pending before immigration 
tribunals 
under 
EOIR 
rules. 
We 
also 
conclude 
that 
the 
appropriate remedy for OLR’s decision not to do so is to dismiss 
those counts of misconduct and to remand the matter to the 
referee for a recommendation on the appropriate sanction for the 
remaining counts of misconduct found by the referee.  
¶2 
Attorney Luening was admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin in 2010 and practices in Milwaukee. His disciplinary 
history consists of two consensual public reprimands. Public 
Reprimand of Matthew T. Luening, 2017-3; Public Reprimand of 
Matthew T. Luening, 2017-10.  
¶3 
On December 29, 2020, OLR filed a complaint against 
Attorney Luening alleging twelve counts of misconduct. The first 
                                                                                                                                                             
(b) Choice of Law. In the exercise of the disciplinary 
authority of this state, the rules of Professional 
Conduct to be applied shall be as follows:  
(1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending 
before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in 
which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the 
tribunal provide otherwise. . . . 
No. 
2021AP2166-D   
 
3 
 
seven counts of misconduct arose out of Attorney Luening’s 
immigration law practice. Each of those seven counts of 
misconduct cited only the Supreme Court Rule that Attorney 
Luening was alleged to have violated. The immigration-based 
counts of misconduct did not cite EOIR rules.  
¶4 
Attorney Luening filed an answer to the complaint. 
James 
J. 
Winiarski 
was 
appointed 
referee. 
Following 
an 
evidentiary hearing, the referee issued a report finding that 
OLR met its burden of proof with respect to six of the counts of 
misconduct alleged in the complaint, including Counts 3, 4, and 
6, which were immigration-based counts. The referee recommended 
a six-month suspension of Attorney Luening’s license to practice 
law.  
¶5 
Attorney Luening appealed, arguing that a six-month 
suspension was excessive. The OLR cross-appealed, arguing that 
the referee erred in finding that OLR failed to meet its burden 
of proof on one of the alleged counts of misconduct and that a 
six-month suspension was inadequate.  
¶6 
In advance of oral argument, the court learned that on 
the same day it filed the complaint against Attorney Luening, 
OLR filed a complaint in another case involving an attorney’s 
immigration practice.2 See OLR v. Din, No. 2020AP2165-D. The Din 
complaint, unlike the one filed in the instant case, cited both 
the Wisconsin Rules of Professional Conduct alleged to have been 
                                                 
2 Both complaints were signed by the same OLR litigation 
counsel.  
No. 
2021AP2166-D   
 
4 
 
violated as well as EOIR rules. The choice of law issue was 
litigated before the referee appointed in Din, and that referee 
concluded that SCR 20:8.5 unambiguously provided that EOIR rules 
of conduct apply with respect to any conduct in matters pending 
before the EOIR. Neither OLR nor Attorney Din appealed the 
referee’s conclusion on the choice of law issue. The Din matter 
was resolved by an unpublished order issued on November 22, 
2022, in which we relied on the EOIR rules.  
¶7 
On October 24, 2022, this court asked OLR to explain 
why the complaint filed in this matter did not cite the EOIR 
rules, as did the complaint in Din. The OLR filed its response 
on November 3, 2022. It agreed that EOIR is the federal entity 
responsible 
for 
adjudicating 
immigration 
cases 
and 
that 
attorneys 
who 
represent 
clients 
in 
federal 
immigration 
proceedings are subject to EOIR disciplinary sanctions. It 
further agreed that EOIR is a “tribunal” under the meaning of 
SCR 20:8.5 and that EOIR rules may apply to attorneys licensed 
in Wisconsin who practice in immigration courts.  OLR also 
acknowledged “that EOIR rules of conduct potentially governed 
some . . . counts of misconduct arising out of Luening’s 
practices,” but it said the immigration-related counts of 
misconduct were pleaded differently in this case than in Din 
because “[u]nlike Luening, Din had raised the choice of law 
issue before OLR filed its disciplinary complaint and continued 
to do so during the entire proceeding.”  
¶8 
The OLR says, however, that there is no Wisconsin 
precedent addressing the application of EOIR rules in place of 
No. 
2021AP2166-D   
 
5 
 
Wisconsin’s Rules of Professional Conduct, and it says that this 
court has imposed discipline upon attorneys for violations of 
the Wisconsin ethical rules for misconduct in the context of 
immigration proceedings. In support of this statement, OLR cites 
(1) Attorney Luening’s two consensual public reprimands; (2) two 
cases 
that 
were 
prosecuted 
by 
the 
Board 
of 
Attorneys 
Professional Responsibility, the predecessor of OLR, see In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings against Grapsas, 225 Wis. 2d 411, 591 
N.W.2d 862 (1999); In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Grapsas, 230 Wis. 2d 751, 602 N.W.2d 526 (1999); and (3) a 
previous 
disciplinary 
proceeding 
in 
which 
Attorney 
Din 
stipulated to misconduct. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Din, 2015 WI 4, 360 Wis. 2d 274, 858 N.W.2d 654.  
¶9 
In explaining why it cited EOIR rules in Din but not 
in this case, OLR says: 
Din raised the choice of law issue before OLR filed 
its disciplinary complaint. Before filing charges in 
Din, OLR reviewed the issue and concluded that the 
term “tribunal” in SCR 20:8.5 might reasonably include 
federal immigration courts. In the context of the Din 
matter, OLR took the position that EOIR rules might 
apply to conduct that occurred in the context of a 
pending matter before an immigration court and the 
Wisconsin rules of professional conduct would apply to 
other 
conduct. 
Charging 
violations 
under 
the 
alternative 
rules 
was 
consistent 
with 
existing 
Wisconsin 
precedent 
finding 
violations 
of 
the 
Wisconsin rules of professional conduct based on 
conduct 
in 
connection 
with 
federal 
immigration 
proceedings. 
Charging in the alternative also protected OLR from a 
potentially 
negative 
outcome 
based 
on 
Din’s 
anticipated challenge to the choice of law. In 
essence, OLR asserted alternative charges because it 
No. 
2021AP2166-D   
 
6 
 
did not want to risk losing the ability to later amend 
the complaint and possible dismissal of counts if the 
referee concluded that one set of rules did not apply.  
¶10 The OLR noted that its fear of a “potentially negative 
outcome” in Din was precisely what had occurred in a Maryland 
attorney 
disciplinary 
case 
arising 
out 
of 
an 
attorney’s 
immigration practice. See Attorney Grievance Commission of 
Maryland v. Tatung, 476 Md. 45, 258 A.3d 234 (2021). Attorney 
Tatung was licensed to practice law only in Washington D.C., 
maintained an office in Maryland, and practiced exclusively in 
immigration courts. The Maryland Grievance Commission charged 
Attorney 
Tatung 
with 
violations 
of 
Maryland’s 
rules 
of 
professional conduct based on his representation of two clients 
in an immigration court in El Paso, Texas. Maryland’s rules of 
professional conduct have a choice of law provision identical to 
SCR 20:8.5(b). Prior to an evidentiary hearing, Attorney Tatung 
filed a motion in limine arguing that under Maryland’s choice of 
law provision, Maryland’s Commission was required to apply EOIR 
rules to conduct arising out of his practice in immigration 
courts. The hearing judge denied the motion, but the Maryland 
Court of Appeals agreed with Attorney Tatung that EOIR rules 
applied, and it dismissed the charges arising out of the 
immigration court proceeding.  
¶11 The OLR noted that while Attorney Tatung and Attorney 
Din both raised the choice of law issue, Attorney Luening did 
not, and it suggested that Attorney Luening waived application 
of EOIR rules by not affirmatively raising the issue. 
No. 
2021AP2166-D   
 
7 
 
¶12 Attorney Luening filed a response regarding the choice 
of law issue on November 18, 2022. He argues that SCR 20:8.5 
plainly indicates that EOIR rules should have been applied here 
whether or not he affirmatively raised the issue. Attorney 
Luening says, “OLR’s inconsistency in choosing which rules apply 
to attorney misconduct could lead to treacherous results,” and 
he argues that the Tatung court’s rationale should be applied 
here. He goes on to say: 
Even 
more 
troubling 
is 
that 
OLR, 
not 
Luening, 
controlled when the formal complaint would be issued. 
There is nothing that compelled OLR to issue the 
complaint against Luening on the exact same day as it 
issued a complaint against Din. Indeed, the same OLR 
lawyers who filed the complaint against Din are the 
exact same lawyers who filed the complaint against 
Luening. They therefore were aware of the EOIR rules, 
as they admit that Din had raised the issue prior to 
the 
filing 
of 
the 
complaint 
against 
him, 
and 
therefore, they had every opportunity to raise the 
issue as to Luening by noting the rules and OLR’s 
belief and interpretation that those rules purportedly 
did not apply.  
¶13 Attorney 
Luening 
argues 
that 
his 
failure 
to 
affirmatively state his preferred choice of law is irrelevant 
given the clear language of SCR 20:8.5, and he says requiring 
him to make this determination “would place an unnecessary 
burden on the wrong party, . . . .”  
¶14 The OLR is correct that this court has not previously 
interpreted or applied the choice of law provision contained in 
SCR 20:8.5. The current version of SCR 20:8.5, adding a choice 
of law provision, took effect on January 1, 2009. See S. Ct. 
Order 06-06: In the Matter of Petition of the State Bar of 
No. 
2021AP2166-D   
 
8 
 
Wisconsin to Amend Chapter 20 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2008 
WI 109 (issued July 30, 2008). Thus, while OLR’s comment that 
this court resolved the two 1999 Grapsas cases, which arose out 
of an attorney’s practice in immigration proceedings, without 
consideration of the choice of law issue is correct, that fact 
is of little moment since there was no choice of law provision 
in Wisconsin’s professional code of conduct for attorneys at 
that time. It is also not surprising that the choice of law 
issue did not come up in the two consensual reprimands Attorney 
Luening received in 2017 since consensual reprimands are a means 
of resolving a disciplinary matter at an early stage of the 
proceeding, prior to the filing of a complaint, and consensual 
reprimands are issued by a referee without any involvement by 
the court.  See SCR 22.09. It is also not remarkable that 
Attorney Din did not raise the choice of law issue in a case in 
which he entered into a stipulation admitting several counts of 
misconduct and the only contested issue was the appropriate 
sanction. 
¶15 In resolving the choice of law issue presented in this 
case, we find the Maryland court’s Tatung decision to be both 
helpful and persuasive. The Tatung court noted that EOIR 
implemented “Professional Conduct for Practitioners – Rules and 
Procedures” in 2000 “to protect the public, preserve the 
integrity of immigration proceedings and adjudications, and 
maintain 
high 
professional 
standards 
among 
immigration 
practitioners. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.102.” Tatung, 476 Md. 45, 82, 258 
A. 3d 234.  
No. 
2021AP2166-D   
 
9 
 
¶16 The Tatung court said that while the EOIR rules and 
the Maryland rules of professional conduct were generally 
consistent: 
[S]uch a determination does not mean that we may 
ignore the plain language of the word “shall” in the 
choice of law provisions outlined in Rule 8.5(b). . . 
. Through the use of the word “shall,” Rule 8.5(b) 
plainly and unambiguously mandates the application of 
the professional rules of the tribunal where the 
conduct arises in connection with a mater pending 
before a tribunal, and for “other conduct,” the rules 
of the jurisdiction where the conduct occurred, . . . 
the rule does not give the disciplinary authority the 
discretion to apply the rules of another tribunal 
jurisdiction only in the event of a conflict. . . . 
Our interpretation of Rule 8.5(b) also ensures that, 
where an attorney’s misconduct triggers jurisdiction 
and oversight by more than one disciplinary authority, 
the attorney is treated fairly and uniformly by each 
jurisdiction, . . . 
Here, 
the 
federal 
immigration 
professional 
rules 
promulgated under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.102 clearly apply to 
the 
proceedings 
before 
the 
federal 
immigration 
tribunal. Under Rule 8.5(b)(1), any charges filed by 
the Commission for misconduct arising in connection 
with the matter pending before the tribunal should 
have been filed under those rules. . . . Although the 
Maryland disciplinary authority . . . has jurisdiction 
to investigate and ultimately to sanction Mr. Tatung 
for any misconduct pursuant to Maryland Rule 8.5(a), 
under the choice of law provisions set forth in Rule 
8.5(b), [the Maryland code of professional conduct] 
does not apply to the alleged conduct involving Mr. 
Tatung’s representation of his clients in the federal 
immigration proceeding. Under Rule 8.5(b)(1), the 
Commission was required to charge Mr. Tatung under the 
federal immigration professional rules. Because Mr. 
Tatung was improperly charged under [state rules], we 
shall dismiss those charges arising in connection with 
the federal immigration proceeding. 
Id. at 260-262. 
No. 
2021AP2166-D   
 
10 
 
¶17 The OLR’s principal rationale for why it cited EOIR 
rules in Din but did not do so in this case is that Attorney Din 
raised the choice of law issue and Attorney Luening did not. The 
OLR admits that it was concerned that if it cited only the 
Wisconsin rules of conduct in Din and Attorney Din prevailed in 
his argument that his conduct was instead subject to EOIR rules, 
OLR ran the risk of having its complaint dismissed, as occurred 
in Tatung. The OLR was well aware of the choice of law issue 
when it filed the complaint in this matter the same day as it 
filed the complaint in Din, but because Attorney Luening had not 
raised the choice of law issue, OLR made the strategic decision 
not to raise it either.  
¶18 As the Tatung court noted, we may not ignore the plain 
language of SCR 20:8.5(b)(1), which states “the rules of 
Professional Conduct to be applied shall be . . . for conduct in 
connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of 
the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of 
the tribunal provide otherwise. . . .” (emphasis added). As in 
Tatung, we find that the use of the word “shall” unambiguously  
required that Counts one through seven of the complaint, which 
were connected with matters pending before an immigration 
tribunal, be charged under EOIR rules.  
¶19 Attorney Luening’s failure to raise the issue does not 
alter the conclusion that EOIR rules applied. We need not decide 
whether the choice of law issue may ever be waived because we 
find, under the circumstances of this case, that it was not 
waived here. We also agree with the Tatung court that OLR’s 
No. 
2021AP2166-D   
 
11 
 
failure to prosecute the immigration-based misconduct under EOIR 
rules 
mandates 
that 
those 
counts 
of 
misconduct 
must 
be 
dismissed. 
 ¶20 The 
disparate 
treatment 
of 
two 
cases 
involving 
immigration law attorneys, which were being investigated by OLR 
at the same time and in which complaints were filed on the same 
day and signed by the same OLR litigation counsel, threatens to 
undermine confidence in Wisconsin’s attorney regulatory system 
given OLR’s disparate treatment of two similarly situated 
attorneys.  
¶21 The preamble to Wisconsin’s Lawyer Regulation System 
states that the system “is established to carry out the supreme 
court’s constitutional responsibility to supervise the practice 
of law and protect the public from misconduct by persons 
practicing law in Wisconsin.” This court created OLR and 
entrusted it with the authority to investigate and prosecute 
alleged attorney misconduct. See SCR 21.02(1). The OLR has an 
obligation to treat attorneys who are alleged to have committed 
misconduct fairly and uniformly, regardless of whether a 
respondent attorney raises an issue that another does not. The 
OLR’s decision not to raise the choice of law issue in this 
case, 
while 
simultaneously 
litigating 
the 
issue 
in 
Din, 
threatens the public’s confidence that attorneys will in fact be 
treated 
fairly 
and 
uniformly 
since 
it 
appears 
that 
OLR 
unilaterally made prosecutorial decisions based on how it would 
be more likely to prevail on the immigration-based counts of 
misconduct rather than on what the plain language of SCR 
No. 
2021AP2166-D   
 
12 
 
20:8.5(b) required. Like criminal prosecutors, OLR has a duty to 
see that justice is accomplished, not just a duty to “win” at 
all costs. See, e.g., State v. Bell, 2018 WI 28, ¶16, 380 Wis. 
2d 616, 909 N.W.2d 750 (prosecutor must keep in mind that he/she 
represents “a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially 
is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose 
interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it 
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.” (Quoting 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).  
¶22 Counts one through seven of OLR’s complaint should 
have cited EOIR rules, as the Din complaint did. We conclude, as 
did the Tatung court, that the appropriate remedy for OLR’s 
decision not to prosecute Attorney Luening’s immigration-based 
misconduct counts under EOIR rules is to dismiss those counts of 
the complaint. We note that dismissal of those counts will not 
end the matter since the referee also found that OLR met its 
burden of proof on additional misconduct that was not connected 
with a case pending in a federal immigration tribunal. It is 
therefore appropriate to remand the matter to the referee so 
that he may issue a revised recommendation as to the appropriate 
sanction to be imposed for the remaining counts. We will issue 
our final decision in the case in due course, following remand. 
¶23 IT IS ORDERED that counts one through seven of the 
complaint filed on December 29, 2020 are hereby dismissed. 
¶24 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter shall be 
remanded to the referee for the purpose of the referee issuing a 
No. 
2021AP2166-D   
 
13 
 
revised recommendation as to the appropriate sanction for the 
remaining counts of misconduct found by the referee.  
 
 
 
 
No. 
2021AP2166-D   
 
 
 
1