Case Title: Williams v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 490, 2013

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2014-06-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
MICHAEL W. WILLIAMS,
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No. 490, 2013
Defendant Below,
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Appellant,
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Court Below:  Superior Court
v.
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of the State of Delaware,
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in and for Sussex County
STATE OF DELAWARE,
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Cr. I.D. No. 1203004885
Plaintiff Below, 
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Appellee.
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Submitted:  April 30, 2014
Decided:  June 17, 2014
Before BERGER, JACOBS and RIDGELY, Justices.
O R D E R
This 17th day of June 2014, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the
record on appeal, it appears to the Court that:
(1) Michael W. Williams appeals from his convictions, following a jury trial,
of two counts of first degree reckless endangering and related charges.  Williams
argues that:  (a) the prosecutor improperly vouched for the strength of the State’s
case; and (b) the trial court committed reversible error by providing an incorrect
supplemental jury instruction.  We find no merit to these arguments and affirm.
(2) On March 6, 2012, Delaware State Police Corporal Michael Dill saw the
vehicle Williams was driving run a stop sign.  Dill attempted a traffic stop by
activating his emergency lights.  Williams did not stop.  Instead, he continued
driving, and a 23-mile chase ensued.  Dill testified that Williams drove erratically,
passed many vehicles on both the left and right, and failed to stop at two additional
stop signs.
(3) The police used spike strips three times in an attempt to stop Williams. 
In one attempt, the police placed spike strips on Route 404.  Two probation officers
happened to be driving in the area, and joined the effort to stop Williams.  They
stopped oncoming traffic about 100 yards from the spike strips, and one probation
officer got out of the vehicle.  Williams steered around the spike strips and
narrowly avoided a collision with the two probation officers.  Dill testified that
Williams was driving over 89 miles per hour on Route 404.
(4) Williams first claims that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the
strength of the State’s case by emphasizing parts of Dill’s testimony and by
discussing facts not in evidence.  Because Williams did not raise this issue at trial,
this Court reviews for plain error.1  Under that standard, we review the record de
novo to determine whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred.2  If the Court finds
no misconduct, the analysis ends.3  “If, however, the trial prosecutor did engage in
1 Torres v. State, 979 A.2d 1087, 1093–94 (Del. 2009).
2 Id. at 1094.
3 Ibid.
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misconduct we move to the second step in the plain error analysis by applying the
familiar Wainwright standard.”4  In this case, we need not reach the second step
because there was no misconduct.
(5) “Conceptually, improper vouching occurs when the prosecutor implies
personal superior knowledge, beyond that logically inferred from the evidence at
trial.”5  This can occur where the prosecutor provides an official endorsement of a
witness, or where the prosecutor “vouches for the State’s case.”6  In short, the
prosecutor must “avoid improper suggestions, insinuations, and assertions of
personal knowledge in order to ensure that guilt is decided only on the basis of
sufficient evidence.”7  But “[t]he prosecutor is allowed to argue all legitimate
inferences of the defendant’s guilt that follow from the evidence.”8
(6) Williams takes issue with the following statement made by the
prosecutor on rebuttal:
Corporal Dill testified that the defendant passed countless
vehicles.  He was passing vehicles on the left; he was passing vehicles
on the right.  We are here today for six of those charges, not for every
single time he passed a vehicle on the right, just for six of the charges.
Corporal Dill did testify that Route 13 was very busy that afternoon.
And he did testify that the defendant passed multiple vehicles unsafely
on the left and he also passed vehicles on the right and the shoulder.
Corporal Dill didn’t testify that the defendant hit another car or hit a
tree or hit someone on the road.  But Corporal Dill did testify that
4 Baker v. State, 906 A.2d 139, 150 (Del. 2006).
5 Burns v. State, 76 A.3d 780, 789–90 (Del. 2013) (citations omitted).
6 Kirkley v. State, 41 A.3d 372, 377 (Del. 2012).
7 Ibid.
8 Burns, 76 A.3d at 789 (citations omitted).
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there were multiple cars that pulled over out of the way as they saw
the defendant approaching.  They pulled over to save themselves from
being hit.9
Williams notes that Dill did not interview all of the drivers he passed to ask them
why they pulled off the road.  For that reason, Williams argues that the
prosecutor’s statement that “[t]hey pulled over to save themselves from being hit”
was improper because it was based on facts not in evidence and, therefore, implied
that the prosecutor had superior personal knowledge about the case.  Further,
Williams contends that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the strength of the
State’s case by stating that Williams was only charged with six unsafe passing
charges even though he “passed countless vehicles.”  According to Williams, this
improperly suggested to the jury that the State only brought charges when it knew
Williams was guilty.  
(7) The prosecutor’s comments, when viewed in context, either stated a fact,
or were directly tied to and based on a logical inference from the evidence.  First,
the prosecutor’s statement that many cars “pulled over to save themselves from
being hit” was supported by Dill’s testimony describing Williams passing many
cars throughout the chase.  The prosecutor made the logical inference that vehicles
pulled over due to safety concerns upon seeing an approaching high-speed chase.
Second, the prosecutor did not improperly vouch for the State’s case when she
9 Appellant’s Appendix at A-172–73.
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stated that Williams had only been charged with six unsafe passing offenses.  That
statement does not imply that Williams must be guilty.  At most, it implies that
Williams could have been charged with many more unsafe passing offenses.  In
sum, the prosecutor did not make improper statements to the jury.
(8)  Williams also claims that the Superior Court erred when it failed to
correct an oral, supplemental jury instruction regarding the difference between
reckless endangering first and second degree.  “As a general rule, a defendant is
not entitled to a particular instruction, but he does have the unqualified right to a
correct statement of the substance of law.”10  Further, “[a] trial court’s jury
instructions are not a ground for reversal if they are reasonably informative and not
misleading when judged by common practices and standards of verbal
communication.”11
(9) “A person is guilty of reckless endangering in the first degree when the
person recklessly engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of death to
another person.”12  Reckless endangering in the second degree is an identical
crime, except that the risk referred to is one of “physical injury” as opposed to
“death.”13  “A person acts recklessly with respect to an element of an offense when
10 Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d 104, 128 (Del. 1984).
11 Burrell v. State, 953 A.2d 957, 963 (Del. 2008).
12 11 Del. C. § 604.
13 Id. § 603.
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the person is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the element exists or will result from the conduct.”14
(10) Prior to closing arguments, the trial court instructed the jury on reckless
endangering first degree:
In order to find the defendant guilty of reckless endangering in
the first degree, you must find that all of the following elements have
been met and proven beyond a reasonable doubt:  One, the defendant
engaged in conduct which created a substantial risk of death to
another person . . . .  And two, the defendant acted recklessly; that is,
the defendant was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that the death of another person would result
from his conduct.15
The trial court provided a similar instruction for reckless endangering second
degree, and the jury received a written copy of those instructions.
(11) During deliberations, the jury requested clarification on the difference
between reckless endangering first and second degree.  The trial court provided the
following oral clarification:
Reckless endangering in the first degree and reckless
endangering in the second degree have a common element . . . .  The
common element is that the defendant acted recklessly; that is, the
defendant was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that, in reckless endangering, first, the death of
another person would result from his conduct.  In reckless
endangering, second, the substantial and unjustifiable risk would be
that physical injury would occur to another person as a result of the
conduct.
 . . . .
14 Id. § 231(e).
15 Appellant’s Appendix at A-134.
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The State’s allegation is that . . . the manner in which the
defendant operated that motor vehicle; engaged in that conduct
created a substantial and unjustifiable risk—reckless endangering in
the first degree—that death may have happened to the persons in the
information . . . or, if not death, substantial risk of physical injury.
. . . .
I don’t know how much I’ve moved the ball because I,
basically, have referred to the instruction.  But that is the difference
between the two.  The state of mind—the recklessness—is the same
for Count 1 and 2.  What potentially could happen out of that conduct,
whether it’s the risk that somebody would get killed is one; or the risk
that somebody wouldn’t get killed but could be injured is reckless
endangering in the second degree.16
(12)Williams argues that the substitution of the words “may have happened”
or “potentially could happen” for the words “would result” in the trial court’s oral
clarification was erroneous.  Williams contends that this substitution lowered the
State’s burden and undermined the jury’s ability to perform its duty.  A fair reading
of the entire supplemental instruction belies this argument.  The trial court’s use of
slightly different words in explaining the difference between first and second
degree reckless endangering did not misstate the law.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgments of the Superior
Court are AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Carolyn Berger
Justice
16 Appellant’s Appendix at 178–79 (emphasis added).
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