Case Title: Adkins v. Dixon

Citation: 

Docket Number: 960327

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1997-02-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, and 
Koontz, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice 
 
JEFFREY S. ADKINS 
 
OPINION BY SENIOR JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING 
v.   Record No. 960327          February 28, 1997 
 
THOMAS W. DIXON, JR., ET AL. 
 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF AUGUSTA COUNTY 
 
Duncan M. Byrd, Jr., Judge 
 
 
In separate attorney malpractice cases, Jeffrey Scott 
Adkins, a convicted felon, seeks damages from Thomas W. Dixon, 
Jr., his former defense counsel, and from Dixon's employer.  By 
agreement of the parties, the trial court consolidated both cases 
"for all purposes."  
 
Adkins's actions are based on multiple claims arising from 
Dixon's alleged negligence and breach of contract in failing to 
properly defend the felony charges that resulted in Adkins's 
convictions.  The dispositive issues are (1) whether a court-
appointed attorney and his employers are entitled to governmental 
immunity in these actions and, if not, (2) whether the actions 
can be maintained without allegations that Adkins was innocent 
and that Adkins's convictions were set aside in post-trial 
proceedings. 
 
The consolidated cases were decided on the defendants' 
demurrers and special pleas.  Therefore, we state as true the 
facts alleged in the motions for judgment and all reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom.  Covington v. Skillcorp 
Publishers, 247 Va. 69, 70, 439 S.E.2d 391, 391 (1994).
1   
                     
     
1We have not considered any of the facts set forth in the 
 
 
 
 
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(..continued) 
 
Adkins, an indigent, was arrested, incarcerated, and charged 
with ten felonies "all stemming from a single criminal episode" 
that occurred in Augusta County.
2  Thomas W. Dixon, Jr., an 
employee of the law firm of Richard F. McPherson, Frank L. 
Summers, Jr., Victor M. Santos, and Thomas P. McPherson, partners 
trading as Nelson, McPherson, Summers and Santos, was appointed 
by the court to represent Adkins. 
 
At a preliminary hearing on December 7, 1989, the General 
District Court of Augusta County found sufficient cause to 
certify the ten charges to the circuit court for consideration.  
On January 22, 1990, the grand jury of Augusta County returned 
indictments against Adkins on the ten original charges and on six 
additional felony charges arising from the same episode.  No 
preliminary hearings had been held on these six charges.  
 
The circuit court fixed the trial dates as May 31, 1990 for 
plaintiff's admissions in response to the defendants' requests 
for admission since the parties have not stipulated their use in 
deciding the demurrers.  Elder v. Holland, 208 Va. 15, 18, 155 
S.E.2d 369, 372 (1967); see Flippo v. F & L Land Co., 241 Va. 15, 
17, 400 S.E.2d 156, 156-57 (1991). 
     
2The motions for judgment do not state the nature of the 
crimes charged.  Adkins's appellate brief states that they were 
the armed robberies and abductions of four persons, the unlawful 
wearing of a mask, and sexual offenses.   
 
 
 
 
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the six additional charges and June 15, 1990 for the ten original 
charges.  Adkins, who had been incarcerated on the ten charges 
since his initial arrest, filed a pro se motion on May 23, 1990 
to dismiss all 16 charges based upon asserted violations of the 
speedy trial provisions of Code § 19.2-243, which provides in 
pertinent part: 
 
 
Where a general district court has found that 
there is probable cause to believe that the accused has 
committed a felony, the accused, if he is held 
continuously in custody thereafter, shall be forever 
discharged from prosecution for such offense if no 
trial is commenced in the circuit court within five 
months from such date such probable cause was found by 
the district court. 
 
 
Adkins claimed that his speedy trial rights would be 
violated by trials on May 31 and June 15, which were more than 
five months after his preliminary hearing.  Although the six 
additional charges had not been considered in the preliminary 
hearing, Adkins contended that all sixteen charges were subject 
to the same five-month speedy trial limitation since they arose 
"from a single criminal episode."  The court overruled Adkins's 
motion.   
 
At jury trials commencing on the previously fixed trial 
dates, Adkins was found guilty of all charges and the court 
entered judgments on those verdicts.  The jury's verdicts on the 
six charges recommended punishments of two life sentences plus 45 
years.
3  
                     
     
3The record does not disclose the punishments recommended or 
 
 
 
 
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Adkins's appeal to the Court of Appeals filed by Dixon 
asserted the speedy trial defense only as to the convictions 
arising from the ten original charges.  The Court of Appeals 
reversed the judgments of convictions on that ground and 
discharged Adkins from further prosecution on those ten charges. 
 Adkins v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 519, 523, 414 S.E.2d 188, 
190 (1992).  Dixon's appeal to this Court raised the speedy trial 
defense to the six additional charges for the first time and was 
denied for that reason.  
 
Thereafter, Adkins filed an action pro se against Dixon, 
claiming that Dixon was guilty of attorney malpractice in failing 
to raise the speedy trial issue as to the six additional charges 
in the Court of Appeals.  Dixon filed a pro se demurrer and plea 
of the statute of limitations in defense of this action.   
 
Almost a year later, Adkins employed counsel and sued 
Dixon's employers, alleging vicarious liability for Dixon's acts. 
 Dixon's employers retained counsel for themselves and Dixon.  
Defendants' counsel sought leave to amend and supplement Dixon's 
pro se pleadings by asserting a special plea of governmental 
immunity arising from Dixon's representation of Adkins as court-
appointed counsel, and by setting forth that:   
 
"[Adkins] has not alleged, as he must, that (a) he is 
innocent of the charges that resulted in his 
conviction; and (b) he has secured reversal of his 
conviction in post-trial proceedings."   
 
(..continued) 
imposed for the ten felony convictions. 
 
 
 
 
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After permitting the amendments, the court sustained the 
special plea and ground (b) of the demurrer and overruled ground 
(a) of the demurrer.  Adkins appeals the rulings adverse to him 
and the defendants assign cross-error to the ruling adverse to 
them.
4   
 
First, we consider whether the court abused its discretion 
in permitting Dixon to amend his pleadings.  Adkins's present 
counsel properly admits in his brief that the decision to permit 
amendments of pleadings rests in the sound discretion of the 
trial court and will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse 
of discretion.  Brown v. Brown, 244 Va. 319, 324, 422 S.E.2d 375, 
378 (1992). 
 
Noting that Dixon had failed to raise either ground at issue 
in his initial pleadings, Adkins claims such failure was a waiver 
of those grounds.  Adkins concludes that permitting the 
amendments more than a year after the case had been filed was an 
abuse of the trial court's discretion.   
 
In response, the defendants assert:  both Dixon and Adkins 
were pro se litigants during the first 11 months of Adkins's 
action against Dixon; when Adkins retained counsel and sued 
Dixon's employers, the employers retained counsel to represent 
                     
     
4Adkins asserts a number of other errors in his appeal which 
are not material to the issues involved here.  Accordingly, they 
are not considered in this appeal. 
 
 
 
 
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both Dixon and themselves; promptly thereafter, the defendants 
sought the amendment in question, mirroring the same defense as 
that asserted by the employers; the proposed amendments were not 
sought just before trial; and Adkins could show no actual 
prejudice as a result of the amendments.  The defendants conclude 
that Adkins failed to show that the court abused its discretion. 
  
Rule 1:8 provides in pertinent part that "[l]eave to amend 
[pleadings] shall be liberally granted in furtherance of the ends 
of justice."  This language is from a predecessor rule which we 
quoted in Herndon v. Wickham, 198 Va. 824, 826, 97 S.E.2d 5, 7 
(1957).  In Herndon, we sustained a trial court's exercise of 
discretion in permitting a plea of the statute of limitations to 
be filed more than 11 months after the action was instituted and 
eight days before trial.  Additionally, we held that the delayed 
filing of the plea of the statute of limitations was not a waiver 
of its provisions.  Id. at 827, 97 S.E.2d at 7.   
 
We perceive no significant difference between the facts in 
this case and those in Herndon.  Applying the Herndon rationale, 
we conclude that Adkins has not shown that the trial court abused 
its discretion in permitting the amendment.  See also Nelson v. 
Commonwealth, 235 Va. 228, 244, 368 S.E.2d 239, 248 (1988) 
(amendment thirteen days before trial). 
 
Next, we consider whether the court erred in sustaining the 
pleas of governmental immunity, a ruling which, if correct, 
renders the remaining issues moot.  Adkins contends that court-
 
 
 
 
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appointed counsel have no such immunity in these actions because, 
except for the court's appointment of counsel and payment of 
counsel's fees by the state, court-appointed counsel have the 
same relationship to their clients as all other counsel.  The 
defendants respond that court-appointed counsel are engaged in a 
governmental objective that meets the criteria for governmental 
immunity under the four-part test of James v. Jane, 221 Va. 43, 
53, 282 S.E.2d 864, 869 (1980).  We disagree with the defendants. 
 
One part of the Jane test relates to "the degree of control 
and direction exercised by the state over the employee whose 
negligence is involved."  Id.   "A high level of control weighs 
in favor of immunity; a low level of such control weighs against 
immunity."  Lohr v. Larsen, 246 Va. 81, 88, 431 S.E.2d 642, 646 
(1993) (citing Jane, 221 Va. at 53-54, 282 S.E.2d at 869).  In 
contrast to Lohr, in which the Commonwealth controlled the 
medical procedures the state-employed doctor could perform, id., 
the Commonwealth had almost no control over the pleadings and 
defense tactics employed by Dixon.  Indeed, Dixon had an 
adversarial relationship to the Commonwealth in defending Adkins. 
  
Nor do we agree with the defendants' contention that 
sufficient control is found in Dixon's "status as an officer of 
the Court" and by the "Code of Professional Responsibility, as 
administered by the State Bar."  The difficulty with this 
contention is that the Commonwealth had no more control of the 
manner in which Dixon represented Adkins as court-appointed 
 
 
 
 
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counsel than it would have had if Dixon were retained counsel.  
Indeed, had Dixon permitted the Commonwealth to control his 
defense tactics in any manner beyond that of requiring ethical 
conduct, he may well have violated Canon 5 of the Virginia Code 
of Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to 
"exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a 
client."   
 
For these reasons, we conclude that there is no such 
immunity in these cases.  Therefore, the court erred in 
sustaining the plea of immunity. 
 
This brings us to a consideration of the court's rulings on 
the defendants' demurrers.  The court sustained ground (b) of the 
defendants' demurrers and dismissed the cases.
5  In ground (b) 
the defendants claim that Adkins was required to allege that he 
had successfully obtained post-conviction relief.
6  
 
Citing Massachusetts and Ohio cases, Adkins claims that most 
 
     
5Adkins did not ask for leave to amend his motions for 
judgment to allege that he had obtained habeas corpus relief. 
     
6Although the motions for judgment make no mention of a 
habeas corpus proceeding, the trial court's opinion indicates 
that Adkins's petition for habeas corpus based on ineffective 
assistance of counsel was denied in Adkins v. Murray, 872 F. 
Supp. 1491 (W.D. Va. 1994), aff'd sub nom. Adkins v. Attorney 
General, 97 F.3d 1446 (4th Cir. 1996).   
 
 
 
 
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jurisdictions do not require attorney malpractice plaintiffs to 
demonstrate, as an element of their prima facie case, success in 
post-conviction reviews.  As defendants note, Adkins is mistaken. 
 
The following cases hold that a decision adverse to a 
criminal defendant in post-conviction proceedings bars a recovery 
for the defense attorney's malpractice.  Shaw v. State, 816 P.2d 
1358, 1360 (Alaska 1991); Johnson v. Schmidt, 719 S.W.2d 825, 826 
(Mo. App. 1986); State ex rel. O'Blennis v. Adolf, 691 S.W.2d 
498, 503-04 (Mo. App. 1985); Morgano v. Smith, 879 P.2d 735, 738-
39 (Nev. 1994); Carmel v. Lunney, 511 N.E.2d 1126, 1128 (N.Y. 
1987); Stevens v. Bispham, 851 P.2d 556, 566 (Or. 1993); Peeler 
v. Hughes & Luce, 909 S.W.2d 494, 497-98 (Tex. 1995). 
 
We agree with the majority of these foreign jurisdictions. 
As we said in Zysk v. Zysk, 239 Va. 32, 34, 404 S.E.2d 721, 722 
(1990), "courts will not assist the participant in an illegal act 
who seeks to profit from the act's commission."  Therefore, we 
conclude that a post-conviction ruling adverse to the defendant 
will prevent a recovery for legal malpractice. 
 
Also, we think that a plaintiff in a case like the present 
should have the burden of alleging and proving as a part of his 
cause of action that he has obtained post-conviction relief.  
Shaw, 816 P.2d at 1360; Carmel, 511 N.E.2d at 1128; Stevens, 851 
P.2d at 566.  Therefore, we conclude that the trial court 
correctly sustained ground (b) of the defendants' demurrers. 
 
Nor do we agree with Adkins's contention that under our 
 
 
 
 
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rationale the statute of limitations may bar his malpractice     
  action before the post-conviction proceedings are terminated.  
Since successful termination of such a proceeding is a part of 
Adkins's cause of action, he has no right of action until that 
time and, thus, the statute of limitations does not begin to run 
until termination of the post-conviction proceeding.  See Locke 
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 221 Va. 951, 957, 275 S.E.2d 900, 904 
(1981)(cause of action for injury accrues when plaintiff incurs 
positive, physical or mental hurt); McKay v. Citizens Rapid 
Transit Co., 190 Va. 851, 858, 59 S.E.2d 121, 124 (1950)(in 
action for contribution, statute of limitations does not begin to 
run until payment made by plaintiff). 
 
Next, we consider the court's action in overruling ground 
(a) of the demurrers in which the defendants contend that Adkins 
was required to allege his innocence of the six additional 
charges.  Adkins argued, and the court agreed, that if the speedy 
trial defense did apply to the six additional charges, Adkins 
could have been discharged from further prosecution on those 
charges without a determination of his actual guilt.  
 
We agree with the defendants' claim that Adkins's actual 
guilt is a material consideration since courts will not permit a 
guilty party to profit from his own crime.  Zysk, 239 Va. at 34, 
404 S.E.2d at 722.  And, contrary to the opinion of the trial 
court, we think that Adkins's guilt, not Dixon's alleged failure 
to assert the speedy trial defense, was the proximate cause of 
 
 
 
 
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the convictions.  Peeler, 909 S.W.2d at 497.  Hence, we think 
that the court erred in overruling this ground of the demurrers.
7 
 
Since the court correctly sustained ground (b) of the 
demurrers, we will affirm the judgment of the court dismissing 
the case. 
 
Affirmed. 
                     
     
7We express no opinion as to what vicarious liability, if 
any, employers of court-appointed counsel might have to indigent 
clients of such counsel since that issue is not before us.