Case Title: In re Adoption of Daphne

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12846

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2020-04-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  All slip opinions and orders are subject to formal 
revision and are superseded by the advance sheets and bound 
volumes of the Official Reports.  If you find a typographical 
error or other formal error, please notify the Reporter of 
Decisions, Supreme Judicial Court, John Adams Courthouse, 1 
Pemberton Square, Suite 2500, Boston, MA, 02108-1750; (617) 557-
1030; SJCReporter@sjc.state.ma.us 
 
SJC-12846 
 
ADOPTION OF DAPHNE. 
 
 
 
Norfolk.     January 6, 2020. - April 2, 2020. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Lenk, Gaziano, Lowy, Budd, Cypher, 
& Kafker, JJ. 
 
 
Adoption.  Minor, Adoption.  Parent and Child, Adoption.  
Jurisdiction, Probate Court, Personal, Equitable.  Probate 
Court, Jurisdiction, General equity power.  Practice, 
Civil, Adoption, Dismissal. 
 
 
 
 
Petition for adoption filed in the Norfolk Division of the 
Probate and Family Court Department on November 7, 2018. 
 
 
Judgment of dismissal was ordered by Patricia A. Gorman, J. 
 
 
The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative 
transferred the case from the Appeals Court. 
 
 
 
Kathleen A. DeLisle for the father. 
 
Patience Crozier & Mary L. Bonauto, for GLBTQ Legal 
Advocates & Defenders, amicus curiae, submitted a brief. 
 
Dean J. Hutchison, Natalie A. Kanellis, & Katelin P. 
Gaskill, for Circle Surrogacy, LLC, amicus curiae, submitted a 
brief. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  In this case we determine whether, under G. L. 
c. 210, § 1, the Norfolk Division of the Probate and Family 
2 
 
 
Court Department has jurisdiction over a petition for adoption 
(petition) where the petitioner, who is the child's biological 
father (father) and is named as the child's parent on her birth 
certificate, lives outside the United States with the child and 
his same-sex partner, and where the child was born outside of 
marriage to a gestational carrier (mother) who lives in 
Massachusetts.  The father's first petition was rejected by a 
clerk for lack of jurisdiction, and his second was returned 
because it was completed on an outdated form.  After the father 
filed his third petition, a judge dismissed the petition with 
prejudice due to lack of jurisdiction.  We conclude that the 
Probate and Family Court has both subject matter jurisdiction 
under G. L. c. 210, § 1, and personal jurisdiction over the 
parties in this case.  On January 8, 2020, we issued an order 
vacating the judgment of dismissal and instructing the Probate 
and Family Court to accept the petition for immediate filing.  
This opinion states the reasons for that order.1 
 
Background.  The petition is uncontested, and the facts of 
this case are undisputed.  We now summarize those facts and 
provide an overview of the case's procedural background. 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus briefs submitted in support of 
the father by GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders (GLAD) and 
Circle Surrogacy, LLC. 
 
3 
 
 
 
The father,2 the intended and genetic father of the child, 
together with his same-sex partner (partner), entered into a 
gestational carrier agreement with the mother, the child's birth 
mother.  The child was conceived as the result of an in vitro 
fertilization procedure.  During the procedure, eggs were 
retrieved from an egg donor selected by the father and partner 
and then fertilized with the father's sperm.  One of the 
resulting embryos was transferred to the uterus of the mother on 
June 28, 2017.  The embryo transfer procedure resulted in a 
successful clinical pregnancy, and the child was born on 
February 17, 2018, in Weymouth. 
 
Shortly after the child's birth, the father and mother 
executed a voluntary acknowledgement of paternity (VAP) 
recognizing that the father is the genetic father of the child.  
The child's birth certificate lists both the father and mother 
as the child's parents.  For the child to become a citizen of 
the father's home country, he would have to submit a birth 
certificate as part of the child's application for registration.  
Therefore, the mother agreed to forgo a prebirth determination 
of parentage pursuant to Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. 
Ctr., 435 Mass. 285 (2001), and instead agreed to allow the 
father to pursue a postbirth adoption of the child in 
                     
 
2 The father is not a resident or citizen of the United 
States. 
4 
 
 
Massachusetts to terminate the mother's parental rights and 
responsibilities, to remove her name from the child's birth 
certificate, and to establish the father as the child's sole 
legal parent.3 
 
On April 14, 2018, the mother signed a surrender form, 
pursuant to G. L. c. 210, § 2, indicating her desire to 
"voluntarily and unconditionally" surrender the child to the 
care and custody of the father.  On April 30, 2018, the father 
filed the first of three petitions in the Probate and Family 
Court to establish his status as the child's sole legal parent.  
Following the birth, the father, partner, and child remained in 
Massachusetts pending the finalization hearing on the underlying 
petition.  On May 22, 2018, the petition was rejected on the 
ground that "[i]n accordance with [G. L. c. 210, § 1], we do not 
have jurisdiction to accept the adoption of [the child]."  In 
June 2018, the father, partner, and child returned to their home 
country.4 
 
On July 18, 2018, the father filed a second petition in the 
Probate and Family Court, adding a memorandum of law addressing 
                     
 
3 The father's home country does not allow unmarried couples 
to adopt.  However, it is a signatory to the Hague Convention 
and therefore will recognize a decree of adoption from the 
United States. 
 
 
4 The mother consented to the child traveling to this 
country with the father and partner. 
5 
 
 
the jurisdiction issue previously raised by a clerk of that 
court.  On August 9, 2018, the petition again was returned, this 
time because the father had not used the most updated petition 
form.5  On November 7, 2018, the father filed his third petition, 
this time using the new petition for adoption and affidavit of 
petitioner(s) form.  On March 8, 2019,6 a judge dismissed the 
adoption with prejudice for the reason that the court lacked 
jurisdiction.7  The father filed a notice of appeal on March 26, 
2019.  The case is now before this court on sua sponte transfer 
from the Appeals Court. 
 
Discussion.  Ultimately, the father's claim on appeal is an 
issue of statutory interpretation.  Review of a question of 
                     
 
5 According to the return form, the petition for adoption 
(petition) was last updated on March 31, 2014.  Court staff 
could have and should have assisted the father in avoiding this 
mistake by informing him in the previous rejection that he also 
had filed the incorrect form. 
 
 
6 This was a delay of more than four months between the 
filing of the petition and its rejection.  The Probate and 
Family Court Department's time standards require action on 
uncontested adoptions within thirty days of filing.  Standing 
Order 1-06:  Case Management and Time Standards for Cases Filed 
in the Probate and Family Court Department (2006) ("If a 
Petition is filed as uncontested, due to the filing of necessary 
surrenders or termination decrees, and notice is not required, a 
hearing shall be scheduled within thirty [30] days of the filing 
of the Petition"). 
 
 
7 The judgment of dismissal does not contain an explanation 
for the judge's determination.  Rather, it states, "after review 
of submissions it is determined that Massachusetts does not have 
jurisdiction over the matter." 
6 
 
 
statutory interpretation is de novo.  Chin v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 
527, 531 (2015).  Additionally, the petition was dismissed 
without any evidentiary hearing or oral argument.  "[W]here 
review is wholly based on documentary evidence, an appellate 
court stands in the same position as the . . . judge" in 
determining whether jurisdictional requirements are met 
(quotation and citation omitted).  Commonwealth v. Moffat, 478 
Mass. 292, 298 (2017) (in appeal from denial of G. L. c. 278A, 
§ 3, motion, de novo review appropriate because review limited 
to consideration of motion and supporting documents). 
 
"Under well-established principles of statutory 
construction, 'a statute must be interpreted according to the 
intent of the Legislature ascertained from all its words 
construed by the ordinary and approved usage of the language, 
considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the 
mischief or imperfection to be remedied and the main object to 
be accomplished, to the end that the purpose of its framers may 
be effectuated.'"  Chin, 470 Mass. at 532, quoting Commonwealth 
v. Figueroa, 464 Mass. 365, 368 (2013).  "Although we look first 
to the plain language of the provision at issue to ascertain the 
intent of the Legislature, we consider also other sections of 
the statute, and examine the pertinent language in the context 
of the entire statute."  Chin, supra.  "Courts must ascertain 
the intent of a statute from all its parts and from the subject 
7 
 
 
matter to which it relates, and must interpret the statute so as 
to render the legislation effective, consonant with sound reason 
and common sense."  Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows 
of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745, 749 (2006). 
 
1.  Subject matter jurisdiction under G. L. c. 210, § 1.  
We begin with the plain language of G. L. c. 210, § 1,8 which 
provides in relevant part: 
"A person of full age may petition the probate court in the 
county where he resides for leave to adopt as his child 
another person younger than himself, unless such other 
person is his or her wife or husband, or brother, sister, 
uncle or aunt, of the whole or half blood. . . .  If the 
petitioner has a husband or wife living, competent to join 
in the petition, such husband or wife shall join therein 
                     
 
8 Because of the unavailability of a prebirth determination 
in the circumstances presented here, we are forced to decide 
this case under the adoption statute.  As previously stated in 
Culliton v. Beth Israel Deaconess Med. Ctr., 435 Mass. 285, 291 
(2001), "[a]s is evident from its provisions, the adoption 
statute was not intended to resolve parentage issues arising 
from gestational surrogacy agreements."  Culliton, supra at 290-
291, specifically highlights the delay in time that often 
accompanies adoption proceedings; this can impose legal and 
custodial responsibilities on a gestational carrier who has no 
genetic or intended relationship with a child.  In this case, 
for example, the child is now over two years old, and the 
initial petition was filed six weeks after her birth.  We 
strongly urge the Legislature to consider a more expedient 
process for obtaining postbirth judgments of parentage in the 
context of gestational surrogacy.  Under the Uniform Parentage 
Act, which has not been adopted in Massachusetts, parental 
rights are automatically assigned to the intended parents, 
provided that the gestational surrogacy agreement is 
enforceable.  See Uniform Parentage Act § 809, 9B U.L.A. 260 
(Master ed. 2001).  Other New England States have adopted 
similar legislation allowing for replacement certificates of 
birth and postbirth orders.  See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-
48a; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 19-A, § 1934; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
§ 168-B:12; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 15C, § 804. 
8 
 
 
. . . .  If a person not an inhabitant of this commonwealth 
desires to adopt a child residing here, the petition may be 
made to the probate court in the county where the child 
resides." 
 
This section establishes five jurisdictional requirements before 
the final provision allowing for adoption by an out-of-State 
resident.  Id.  A petitioner must be (1) of "full age" adopting 
(2) a child younger than the petitioner, and (3) the child 
cannot be in one of the familial relationships to the petitioner 
as enumerated by the statute.  Id.  If the petitioner has a 
husband or wife, and he or she is competent to join the 
petition, (4) the spouse must join unless the court determines 
that the three conditions described by the statute are met.9  Id.  
The petitioner also must file (5) in "the probate court in the 
county where he resides," unless the petitioner is "not an 
inhabitant of this commonwealth," in which case the petition 
must be filed in the probate court in the county where the child 
"resides."  Id. 
                     
 
9 "[T]he prayer of the petition may be granted although the 
spouse of the petitioner is not a party to the petition if the 
court finds:  (i) the failure of the spouse to join in the 
petition or to consent to the adoption is excused by reason of 
prolonged unexplained absence, legal separation, prolonged 
separation, incapacity or circumstances constituting an 
unreasonable withholding of consent; (ii) the husband and wife 
are not in the process of an ongoing divorce; and (iii) the 
granting of the petition is in the best interests of the child."  
G. L. c. 210, § 1. 
 
9 
 
 
 
Here, the father was thirty-nine years old (i.e., of "full 
age") at the time he filed his third petition,10 and the child 
was eight months old.  The child is his biological child, and 
this is the only familial relationship; none of the 
relationships prohibited by the statute applies.  The father is 
unmarried, so there is no requirement that his partner be 
joined.11  Because the father is not a Massachusetts resident, 
his petition must be filed according to the final provision of 
§ 1.  Therefore, the only ambiguities are in the definitions of 
the words "residing" and "resides," which are each used once in 
§ 1's final sentence:  "If a person not an inhabitant of this 
commonwealth desires to adopt a child residing here, the 
petition may be made to the probate court in the county where 
the child resides" (emphases added). 
 
In Krakow v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 326 Mass. 452, 454 
(1950), this court defined residency under G. L. c. 210, § 1, as 
the child's domicil.  The court in Krakow determined that the 
                     
 
10 Although many of the father's arguments are based on the 
filing date of the first adoption petition, we conduct our 
analysis based on the third petition.  We note that the first 
petition should not have been rejected for the same reasons 
articulated here, but because the father did not appeal from 
that denial, we do not address it. 
 
 
11 The father lives in a country that criminalizes 
consensual same-sex intercourse and does not allow or recognize 
marriage equality.  Therefore, he and his partner are not 
married. 
10 
 
 
child's domicil was the domicil of his mother based on the 
ground that the child had been "abandoned by his father" or 
because the child was born outside of marriage.  Id.  See 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 14 (1971).  The 
domicil of the child is "the same as the domicil of their parent 
who has lawful custody of them."  Gil v. Servizio, 375 Mass. 
186, 189 (1978).  Under the Massachusetts statute governing the 
custody of children born outside of marriage, "[p]rior to or in 
the absence of an adjudication or voluntary acknowledgement of 
paternity, the mother shall have custody of a child born out of 
wedlock."  G. L. c. 209C, § 10 (b).  See Smith v. McDonald, 458 
Mass. 540, 545 (2010) ("Prior to a legal determination of 
paternity, the child's mother is vested with sole physical and 
legal custody, and that custody arrangement continues even after 
paternity is established until modified by a court").12 
 
Here, the child was born to an unmarried gestational 
carrier, the mother, domiciled in Weymouth.  Because the child's 
birth mother is domiciled in Weymouth, the child's domicil at 
birth was also Weymouth. 
                     
 
12 The father's postbirth signing of the voluntary 
acknowledgement of paternity (VAP) did not change the child's 
custody status or domicil at birth.  We discuss what impact, if 
any, a VAP may have on a child's domicil infra. 
 
11 
 
 
 
There are three questions remaining:  whether the mother's 
postbirth surrender affected the child's domicil; whether the 
father's postbirth VAP changed the child's domicil; and whether 
the father's removal of the child to his home country changed 
the child's domicil.  Because a domicil of origin is not lost 
until a new domicil is acquired,13 the question actually is 
whether any of these actions caused the child to acquire a new 
domicil. 
 
The mother's postbirth surrender would not cause the child 
to acquire a new domicil, as this would frustrate the primary 
purpose of the adoption statute.  See Adoption of Tammy, 416 
Mass. 205, 210 (1993) ("The primary purpose of the adoption 
statute, particularly with regard to children under the age of 
fourteen, is undoubtedly the advancement of the best interests 
of the subject child").  "The change in phrasing 'Any inhabitant 
of this Commonwealth' . . . to 'Any person' . . . manifestly was 
intended to permit the adoption of resident children by 
petitioners who were domiciled in another State . . . ."  
Farnsworth v. Goebel, 240 Mass. 18, 21 (1921).  Because of this 
express desire that resident children may be adopted by 
petitioners domiciled in another State, as reflected in the 
                     
 
13 See Tuells v. Flint, 283 Mass. 106, 109 (1933) ("A 
domicil once established continues until a new one is acquired 
regardless of changes in temporary sojourn"). 
12 
 
 
language of G. L. c. 210, § 1, it would be illogical to 
interpret that the mother's surrender, pursuant to G. L. c. 210, 
§ 2, would have any impact on the child's domicil without 
further court proceedings. 
 
Additionally, although the father's signing of the VAP, 
which occurred before the mother's surrender, grants him "a 
constitutionally protected right to parent and maintain a 
relationship with his child," thereby making him a "legal 
parent," this does not change the child's domicil.  Smith, 458 
Mass. at 544.  Even if we determined that signing the VAP alone, 
and without further adjudication, granted the father shared 
legal custody of the child, this could not mean that the child 
acquired a new domicil as a result.  To declare so would mean 
that each time a court granted any custodial rights to a 
noncustodial parent, it would change a child's domicil.14 
 
The final question is whether the father's removal of the 
child from Massachusetts in June 201815 changes the domicil of 
the child.  Similar circumstances were presented in Krakow, 326 
Mass. at 453, where the adopting parents took the child to live 
                     
 
14 We also note that our inquiry into subject matter 
jurisdiction could have stopped here had the Probate and Family 
Court appropriately determined it had jurisdiction over the 
first petition filed two weeks after the child's birth. 
 
 
15 The father's exact date of departure with the child is 
not in the record before us. 
13 
 
 
with them in New York "a few weeks" after the child's birth, and 
filed the petition in Massachusetts a month after that.  As we 
noted in Krakow, "the temporary abode of the minor with the 
[out-of-State] petitioners" did not change the child's domicil 
because "no decree granting the [adoption] petition could have 
been entered unless the minor had lived with the petitioners for 
at least six months" according to G. L. c. 210, § 5A (requiring 
that child reside in home of adoption petitioner for six months 
prior to petition decree).  Krakow, supra at 454.  Therefore, 
"[c]ompliance with this residential requirement, if held to 
effect a change in the child's domicil, would bar all petitions 
by nonresident petitioners.  That result could not have been 
intended by the Legislature."  Id. at 454-455.  Consequently, 
despite the child's removal to the father's home country during 
the adoption proceedings, the child's domicil remained in 
Weymouth.16  Because the child was "residing" in Weymouth, as 
defined under G. L. c. 210, § 1, we hold that the Probate and 
Family Court had subject matter jurisdiction to conduct a 
hearing on the father's petition.17 
                     
 
16 To be clear, the child will acquire a new domicil with 
her legal and custodial parent pursuant to Gil v. Servizio, 375 
Mass. 186, 189 (1978), when the adoption is finalized. 
 
 
17 This result is further supported by examining the 
adoption statute in conjunction with the Massachusetts Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act, G. L. c. 209B, § 2 (a).  According to 
the statute, 
14 
 
 
                     
 
"Any court which is competent to decide child custody 
matters has jurisdiction to make a custody determination by 
initial or modification judgment if:  (1) the commonwealth 
(i) is the home state of the child on the commencement of 
the custody proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home 
state within six months before the date of the commencement 
of the proceeding and the child is absent from the 
commonwealth because of his or her removal or retention by 
a person claiming his or her custody or for other reasons, 
and a parent or person acting as parent continues to reside 
in the commonwealth; or . . . (4) (i) it appears that no 
other state would have jurisdiction under prerequisites 
substantially in accordance with paragraph (1), (2) or (3), 
or another state has declined to exercise jurisdiction on 
the ground that the commonwealth is the more appropriate 
forum to determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is 
in the best interest of the child that a court of the 
commonwealth assume jurisdiction. . . ." 
 
If this matter were a custody proceeding, the Probate and Family 
Court would have jurisdiction under G. L. c. 209B, § 2 (a) (1) 
(ii), if the father and the child left the United States as 
early as May 8, 2018, because Massachusetts would have been the 
child's home State "within six months" before the petition was 
filed and the mother still resides in the Commonwealth.  As 
mentioned previously, we do not know the father's exact date of 
departure; however, the court also would have jurisdiction under 
G. L. c. 209B, § 2 (a) (4), because there is no other State that 
would have jurisdiction to determine the custody of the child 
and it is in the best interest of the child that a Massachusetts 
court assume jurisdiction.  See, e.g., Adoption of Anisha, 89 
Mass. App. Ct. 822, 832 (2016).  The term "best interest of the 
child" as found in § 2 (a) (4) is defined according to the 
requirements set forth in § 2 (a) (2) of the statute:  (i) that 
the child and at least one parent have a significant connection 
to the Commonwealth and (ii) that "there is available in the 
commonwealth substantial evidence concerning the child's present 
or future care, protection, training, and personal 
relationships."  See Redding v. Redding, 398 Mass. 102, 105-106 
(1986).  Here, the mother still resides in the Commonwealth, 
where she gave birth to the child, and the child has legal 
domicil here, so the statutory requirements are met. 
15 
 
 
 
2.  Personal jurisdiction over the parties.  Because we do 
not know precisely on what ground the petition was dismissed, we 
also address the Probate and Family Court's jurisdiction over 
the parties. 
 
Given that we already have established that both the mother 
and child were domiciled in Weymouth, they are both subject to 
the Probate and Family Court's jurisdiction.  Although the 
father is not domiciled in Massachusetts, nor did he reside 
here, he consented to the court's personal jurisdiction by 
filing his petition in that court.  See Stearns v. Allen, 183 
Mass. 404, 407 (1903) ("persons domiciled in another State 
voluntarily bring themselves within the jurisdiction of the 
court by filing their petition, and therefore there can be no 
question as to jurisdiction of the adopting parent[]"). 
 
3.  Equity jurisdiction.  In a situation such as the one 
presented here, the Probate and Family Court also could have 
exercised equity jurisdiction pursuant to G. L. c. 215, § 6.  
See Hodas v. Morin, 442 Mass. 544, 547 (2004) ("as a general 
matter, the Probate and Family Court has subject matter 
jurisdiction in questions of law and equity concerning 
parentage").  In Hodas, we were asked to decide whether a 
Probate and Family Court judge had authority pursuant to G. L. 
c. 215, § 6, to issue a prebirth judgment of parentage where 
neither the genetic parents nor the gestational carrier with 
16 
 
 
whom they contracted resided in Massachusetts.  Hodas, supra at 
544-545.  The only connection to Massachusetts was that the 
gestational carrier agreement specified that the birth occur at 
a Massachusetts hospital.  Id. at 546.  We noted that the 
"equity statute poses no residency requirement" nor is there a 
"statutory directive [that] limits the court's jurisdiction in 
actions relating to gestational agreements to Massachusetts 
residents."  Id. at 547 & n.6.  We see no reason to hold 
otherwise here. 
 
Conclusion.  For the foregoing reasons, we issued an order 
on January 8, 2020, vacating the judgment of dismissal.  The 
Probate and Family Court has both subject matter jurisdiction 
under G. L. c. 210, § 1, and personal jurisdiction over the 
parties in this case.