Case Title: State v. Finley

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2014AP002488-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2016-07-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
2016 WI 63 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2014AP2488-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Timothy L. Finley, Jr., 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
(Reported at 365 Wis. 2d 275, 872 N.W.2d 344) 
(Ct. App. 2015 – Published) 
PDC No: 2015 WI App 79 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 12, 2016 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 7, 2016 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Brown 
 
JUDGE: 
William M. Atkinson 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
      
 
DISSENTED: 
ZIEGLER, J. dissents (Opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, R. G., J. dissents (Opinion filed). 
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:          
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, the cause was 
argued by Thomas J. Balistreri, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was Brad D. Schimel, attorney general.   
 
 
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief by Catherine 
R. Malchow, assistant state public defender, and oral argument 
by Catherine R. Malchow. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 WI 63
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2014AP2488-CR 
(L.C. No. 
2011CF671) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Timothy L. Finley, Jr., 
 
          Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 12, 2016 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed and 
cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals, State v. Finley, 
2015 WI App 79, 365 Wis. 2d 275, 872 N.W.2d 344.  The court of 
appeals reversed a judgment and order of the Circuit Court for 
Brown County, William M. Atkinson, Judge, and remanded the cause 
to the circuit court with directions to permit the defendant, 
Timothy L. Finley, Jr., to withdraw his plea of no contest to 
first-degree recklessly endangering safety as domestic abuse.   
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
2 
 
¶2 
The court of appeals ordered the remedy of plea 
withdrawal, relying on the remedy set forth in State v. Bangert, 
131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986), for cases in which a 
circuit court fails to comply with Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1) (2011-
12) or other mandatory duties at a plea colloquy and the 
defendant does not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
enter his or her plea.1  
¶3 
Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08(1)(a) provides that before 
the circuit court accepts a plea of guilty or no contest, it 
shall, among other things, "address the defendant personally and 
determine that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding 
of the nature of the charge and the potential punishment if 
convicted."  Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a) (emphasis added).2 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2011-12 version unless otherwise indicated. 
2 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08(1)(a) provides in relevant part: 
(1) 
Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or no 
contest, it shall do all of the following: 
(a) Address the defendant personally and determine 
that 
the 
plea 
is 
made 
voluntarily 
with 
understanding of the nature of the charge and the 
potential punishment if convicted. 
State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 261-62, 389 N.W.2d 12 
(1986), sets forth six mandatory duties of circuit courts in 
accepting a plea.  State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶35, 293 
Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906, restates and supplements the 
mandatory duties set forth in Bangert.  Only the circuit court's 
duty to advise the defendant of the punishment is at issue in 
the instant case.   
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
3 
 
¶4 
This case involves felonies.  Throughout this opinion, 
we use the statutory phrase "potential punishment" to describe 
the felony sentencing information a circuit court is required to 
impart to a defendant under the statute and case law.  The 
phrase "potential punishment" has not been defined in the 
statutes or the case law.  In analyzing whether a defendant was 
correctly advised of the potential punishment, our cases have 
looked to the maximum statutory penalty, that is, the maximum 
sentence provided for by statute.  Some cases use the phrase 
"range of punishments" in addition to or in lieu of the 
statutory 
phrase 
"potential 
punishment." 
 
"Range 
of 
punishments," "potential punishment," and "maximum statutory 
penalty" are used synonymously in the cases.3  The case law also 
uses other phrases to mean "potential punishment."4   
¶5 
Wisconsin Stat. § 939.50(3) sets forth the maximum 
statutory penalty for felonies.5  Other statutes add enhancements 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶35; Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d at 262; see also State v. Cross, 2010 WI 70, ¶50, 326 
Wis. 2d 492, 
786 
N.W.2d 64 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
concurring) 
("Bangert 
and 
Brown 
interpreted 
'potential 
punishment 
if 
convicted' to mean 'the range of punishments to which he [the 
defendant] is subjecting himself by entering a plea.'") (citing 
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 261-62; Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶35).   
4 See Attachment A, Glossary, at item 4 (collecting cases 
using the terms "maximum term of imprisonment," "maximum 
penalty," 
"maximum 
potential 
sentence," 
"maximum 
potential 
imprisonment," "maximum initial sentence," "actual allowable 
sentence," and "precise maximum sentence" as synonyms of 
"potential punishment" and "maximum statutory penalty").   
5 Wisconsin Stat. § 939.50(3) provides: 
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
4 
 
to the penalties specified in Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3).  For 
example, there are enhancements for repeat offenses, domestic 
abuse offenses, and offenses committed with the use of a 
dangerous weapon.  See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 939.62, 939.621, 
939.63. 
                                                                                                                                                             
(3) 
Penalties for felonies are as follows: 
(a) For a Class A felony, life imprisonment. 
(b) For a Class B felony, imprisonment not to exceed 
60 years. 
(c) For a Class C felony, a fine not to exceed 
$100,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 40 years, 
or both.  
(d) For a Class D felony, a fine not to exceed 
$100,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 25 years, 
or both.   
(e) For a Class E felony, a fine not to exceed 
$50,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 15 years, 
or both.   
(f) For a Class F felony, a fine not to exceed 
$25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 12 years 
and 6 months, or both.  
(g) For a Class G felony, a fine not to exceed 
$25,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 10 years, 
or both.   
(h) For a Class H felony, a fine not to exceed 
$10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 6 years, or 
both.  
(i) For a Class I felony, a fine not to exceed 
$10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 3 years and 
6 months, or both.   
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
5 
 
¶6 
This opinion uses the phrase "maximum statutory 
penalty" interchangeably with the statutory phrase "potential 
punishment."  We do so because, as already explained, our cases 
refer to the "maximum statutory penalty" (or similar phrase) in 
describing potential punishment.  Furthermore, the issue in the 
instant case is the remedy when the circuit court misstates the 
potential punishment by telling the defendant an incorrect 
maximum statutory penalty for his offense.    
¶7 
Before we continue, we note that circuit courts, the 
court of appeals, and this court have not used consistent 
terminology in discussing the duty of circuit courts to advise a 
defendant of the potential punishment before accepting a plea.  
We have therefore appended a glossary of terms to assist the 
reader and the courts in using and understanding the correct 
terminology.  Throughout our opinion, terms that are included in 
the glossary are identified by an asterisk to call attention to 
their meaning, a meaning that may not be obvious to the reader.6  
The glossary includes references to statutes and case law that 
should be consulted for further and more precise information.  
¶8 
The "potential punishment," that is, the maximum 
statutory penalty Finley faced in entering his plea, is 23 
years, 6 months' imprisonment.*  The circuit court advised Finley 
during the plea colloquy accepting Finley's no contest plea that 
                                                 
6 We do not use an asterisk each time we use the statutory 
phrase "potential punishment" or "maximum statutory penalty" 
because these terms have been defined in the text.  See supra 
¶4.   
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
6 
 
the potential punishment was confinement* in prison for 19 years, 
6 months rather than imprisonment* for 23 years, 6 months.  
Nowhere in the circuit court record was this misinformation 
corrected.  Thus, the circuit court misstated the potential 
punishment if Finley were convicted.   
¶9 
The issue presented in the instant case does not focus 
on whether the circuit court erred during the plea colloquy by 
misstating the potential punishment.  The State concedes that 
the circuit court erred.7  Instead, the focus in the instant case 
is on the remedy for the circuit court's misstatement of the 
potential punishment if convicted, when Finley lacked knowledge 
of the potential punishment.  Thus, we are reviewing the plea 
colloquy in the instant case in a unique posture——we are asked 
to decide what remedy should be provided in the circumstances of 
the instant case.      
¶10 The State's petition for review and the parties' 
briefs state the issue of the remedy as follows:  When a 
defendant who pleads guilty or no contest is misinformed that 
                                                 
7 The State acknowledges that the circuit court misinformed 
Finley about the potential punishment he faced if convicted.  
The State also acknowledges that it was not able to prove (after 
being given the opportunity to do so at an evidentiary hearing) 
that Finley knew the maximum statutory penalty when he entered 
his plea.  As the State put it in its opening brief, "The issue 
on this appeal is not whether Finley knew the correct maximum 
penalty.  The state has acknowledged that he did not. The record 
shows that Finley was erroneously informed and believed that the 
maximum penalty was 19.5 years rather than the actual maximum of 
23.5 years."  Brief of Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner at 7-8 
(emphasis added). 
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
7 
 
the maximum statutory penalty is lower than the maximum actually 
allowed by law, and the sentence imposed is more than the 
defendant was told he could get, can the defect be remedied by 
reducing the sentence to the maximum the defendant was informed 
and believed he could receive instead of letting the defendant 
withdraw his plea?8    
¶11 This 
court 
has 
advised 
circuit 
courts 
of 
the 
importance 
of 
discharging 
the 
statutorily 
and 
judicially 
mandated requisites of the plea colloquy:  "The faithful 
discharge of these duties is the best way we know for courts to 
demonstrate the critical importance of pleas in our system of 
justice and to avoid constitutional problems."9 
¶12 A violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a) may have 
constitutional ramifications.10  A defendant's understanding of 
                                                 
8 The parties view this case as presenting a fact situation 
in which the circuit court understated the potential punishment 
if convicted.  One may, however, view the circuit court as 
having overstated the potential punishment if convicted.  The 
record shows that Finley was erroneously informed that he faced 
a potential punishment of 19 years, 6 months of confinement in 
prison.*  The actual maximum statutory penalty was 23 years, 6 
months of imprisonment,* consisting of 18 years, 6 months of 
confinement in prison* and 5 years of extended supervision.*   
Whether the circuit court's statement of the potential 
punishment should be characterized as having over or understated 
the potential punishment is not relevant to the disposition of 
the instant case.  See infra ¶¶88-95.    
9 Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶23 (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 
U.S. 238, 242 (1969)).   
10 See Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 261 n.3 ("A violation of 
section 971.08, though itself not constitutionally significant, 
may have constitutional ramifications.").     
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
8 
 
the 
potential 
punishment 
if 
convicted 
is 
relevant 
for 
determining whether the plea was knowingly, intentionally, and 
voluntarily entered.11  "The United States Constitution sets 
forth the standard that a guilty or no contest plea must be 
affirmatively shown to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary."12  
¶13 The court has declared that "[w]hen a guilty plea is 
not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, a defendant is entitled 
to withdraw the plea as a matter of right because such a plea 
'violates fundamental due process.'"13    
¶14 The 
State 
argues 
that 
Finley 
entered 
his 
plea 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily in the constitutional 
sense because his sentence was ultimately reduced (commuted)14 to 
the maximum penalty of which he was advised.  The State is 
proposing a novel interpretation of the due process requirement 
                                                 
11 In Bangert, the court stated that "[a]lthough section 
971.08 is not a constitutional imperative, the procedure of the 
statute nevertheless is designed to assist the trial court in 
making the constitutionally required determination that a 
defendant's plea is voluntary."  131 Wis. 2d at 261 (citing 
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 465 (1969)).   
12 Brown, 
293 
Wis. 2d 594, 
¶25 
(citing 
Bangert, 
131 
Wis. 2d at 260) (emphasis in original).    
13 Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶19 (quoting State v. Van Camp, 
213 Wis. 2d 131, 139, 569 N.W.2d 577 (1997)).  See also State v. 
Cross, 2010 WI 70, ¶20, 326 Wis. 2d 492, 786 N.W.2d 64.  
14 We use the phrase "reduced (commuted)" because the 
parties use both "reduced" and "commuted" in discussing the 
remedy in the instant case.  As we explain further below, the 
use of the word "commuted" is apparently derived from Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.13, a statute that is not implicated in the instant case.  
See infra n.31.   
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
9 
 
that 
a 
plea 
be 
entered 
knowingly, 
intelligently, 
and 
voluntarily, without support in the United States Supreme 
Court's case law.   
¶15 The following exchange at oral argument is instructive 
regarding the State's position in the instant case and the focus 
of the parties and this court on the remedy for the circuit 
court's misstatement to Finley:  
State:  
And I want -- and as long as you're bringing 
that up, I made this absolutely clear in my 
petition for review, I made this absolutely 
clear in my brief, . . . we are not 
contesting Finley's assertion that his plea 
was not . . . entered with an understanding 
of the correct maximum penalty. 
Justice Ziegler: That's the question, why are you 
conceding 
that? . . . . 
 
Counsel 
that's 
really the question that's behind these 
questions, if I'm reading my colleagues 
correctly . . . . 
 
I'm 
just 
asking 
why 
you're conceding that.  That's really what's 
behind their questions I think.  Why are you 
making that concession?   
State:   Because the evidence -- and I want to make 
clear what we are conceding, that's my whole 
point -- I am not . . . conceding that this 
plea 
was 
not 
knowingly 
entered, 
I 
am 
absolutely not conceding that.  That's my 
entire 
argument, 
that 
it 
was 
knowingly 
entered.  What I am conceding is that the 
defendant did not know the correct maximum 
penalty when he pleaded guilty.   
Justice 
Ziegler: 
Well, 
how 
can 
you 
knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily plead if you 
don't know the penalty to which you plead? 
State:  
You can do it if you know the penalty that 
you actually get, and that is the whole 
point of my argument.  If you are told that 
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
10 
 
you can get a certain penalty . . . and 
understand that you can get that penalty 
when you plead guilty, and you in fact wind 
up getting that penalty that you know you 
could get when you plead guilty, your plea 
is in fact knowing in the constitutional 
sense.  Now there's an error, no question 
about that, and we're conceding this, there 
is an error, he was misadvised of the 
correct maximum penalty, but that error was 
harmless.  It was harmless because he did 
not get the actual maximum.  
¶16 In addressing the remedy for the circuit court's 
misstating the potential punishment Finley faced if convicted, 
Finley relies on Bangert, "a timeless primer on the foundation 
principles of the plea colloquy,"15 and State v. Brown, 2006 WI 
100, 
¶¶22, 
34, 
293 
Wis. 2d 594, 
716 
N.W.2d 906, 
which 
"reexamine[d] the legal tenets fundamental to guilty pleas" and 
"restate[d] and supplement[ed] the Bangert outline."   
¶17 Bangert and Brown are the seminal cases analyzing the 
requirements for plea colloquies set forth in Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(1) and the case law, as well as the remedy when a 
defendant entered his plea not knowing the information (here the 
potential punishment) that circuit courts are required to impart 
to a defendant.  
¶18 Finley argues that under Bangert and Brown his failure 
to know the potential punishment if convicted (after the State 
                                                 
15 See Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶24. 
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
11 
 
was given the opportunity to prove at an evidentiary hearing 
what he knew) entitles him to withdraw his plea.16    
¶19 In contrast, relying on State v. Cross, 2010 WI 70, 
326 Wis. 2d 492, 786 N.W.2d 64, and State v. Taylor, 2013 WI 34, 
347 Wis. 2d 30, 829 N.W.2d 482, the State contends that plea 
withdrawal is not the sole remedy when a defendant is 
misinformed about the potential punishment he faces and alleges 
that he did not know the potential punishment when he entered 
his plea.  The State argues that the proper remedy in the 
instant case and others like it is reduction (commutation) of 
the sentence to the potential punishment the defendant was told 
he could receive.17  In the instant case, the State argues the 
                                                 
16 See Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶6 ("If the State cannot 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that Brown understood the 
nature of the charges and the constitutional rights he gave up, 
the circuit court shall grant Brown's motion to withdraw his 
guilty pleas."); Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274 ("Whenever the 
Section 971.08 procedure is not undertaken or whenever the 
court-mandated duties are not fulfilled at the plea hearing, the 
defendant may move to withdraw his plea.").   
17 The 
State's 
brief 
(Brief 
for 
Plaintiff-Respondent-
Petitioner) at page 8 asserts:  "The single issue presented for 
decision is whether the only remedy for this error is plea 
withdrawal, or whether the error can be better remedied by 
reduction of [the defendant's] sentence to the maximum penalty 
he was informed and believed he could receive." 
In a very different context than the instant case, this 
court concluded that due process required a defendant be 
permitted to keep the sentence he was told he could receive (and 
did receive).  See State v. Chamblis, 2015 WI 53, ¶¶54-55, 362 
Wis. 2d 370, 864 N.W.2d 806.   
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
12 
 
circuit court correctly reduced Finley's sentence from the 
maximum statutory penalty, 23 years, 6 months' imprisonment,* to 
19 years, 6 months' imprisonment* (even though during the plea 
colloquy the circuit court advised Finley that he was subject to 
19 years, 6 months' confinement in prison*).            
¶20 Upon consideration of Bangert, Brown, Cross, and 
Taylor, for the reasons set forth we conclude that under the 
                                                                                                                                                             
In State v. Chamblis, the defendant was advised of the 
correct potential punishment for the charged offense prior to 
entering a guilty plea.  Chamblis, 362 Wis. 2d 370, ¶1.  After 
his plea was entered and he was sentenced, however, the State 
appealed, arguing that the circuit court should have considered 
evidence showing the defendant should have faced a more serious 
charge with a higher potential punishment.  Chamblis, 362 
Wis. 2d 370, ¶2.   
The State argued that the remedy for the circuit court's 
failure to consider the evidence of the more serious charge 
should be mandatory plea withdrawal.  Chamblis, 362 Wis. 2d 370, 
¶53.  The defendant argued he should be permitted to keep the 
sentence he received and that he did not seek plea withdrawal.  
Chamblis, 362 Wis. 2d 370, ¶52.   
The court agreed with the defendant, holding that forcing 
the defendant to withdraw his plea and face a more serious 
charge with a higher potential punishment would violate due 
process.  Chamblis, 362 Wis. 2d 370, ¶54.     
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
13 
 
circumstances of the present case, Bangert and Brown govern.  
Finley is entitled to withdraw his plea.18         
¶21 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court, as did the 
court of appeals, with instructions to grant Finley's motion to 
withdraw his plea.    
I 
 
¶22 The facts and lengthy procedural history are not in 
dispute for purposes of this review.  Since sentencing, the 
instant case has been before the circuit court twice and the 
court 
of 
appeals 
twice. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
held 
two 
postconviction 
hearings——one 
non-evidentiary 
and 
the 
other 
evidentiary——and the court of appeals has twice reversed the 
circuit court's denials of Finley's motion for withdrawal of his 
plea.  
¶23 We discuss the proceedings before the circuit court 
and the court of appeals because these proceedings are relevant 
to our resolution of the instant case.   
                                                 
18 Some members of the court have in previous cases 
expressed concern that there should be (at least in certain 
circumstances) a time limit on motions for plea withdrawal.  
See, e.g., State v. Romero-Georgana, 2014 WI 83, ¶67 n.14, 360 
Wis. 2d 552, 849 N.W.2d 668 (suggesting that a time limit may be 
necessary for motions for plea withdrawal based on Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(2)).  We do not address whether there is such a time 
limit for motions for plea withdrawal because Finley's motion 
for plea withdrawal is timely.  Finley filed his motion for plea 
withdrawal less than two months after the circuit court entered 
its amended judgment of conviction.    
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
14 
 
¶24 We begin with the criminal complaint.  Finley was 
charged with four counts stemming from an assault of his 
girlfriend:  (1) first-degree reckless endangerment with use of 
a dangerous weapon; (2) substantial battery; (3) strangulation 
and suffocation; and (4) false imprisonment.19  The four counts 
were charged as acts of domestic abuse.   
¶25 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Finley agreed to plead 
no 
contest 
to 
the 
first 
count, 
first-degree 
reckless 
endangerment as domestic abuse with enhancers for habitual 
criminality and use of a dangerous weapon.  In exchange, the 
State agreed that the remaining charges would be dismissed and 
read 
in, 
and 
that 
the 
State 
would 
cap 
its 
sentencing 
recommendation at ten years' initial confinement.*   
¶26 The maximum statutory penalty of imprisonment* (with 
applicable enhancers) Finley faced if convicted was 23 years, 6 
months.   
                                                 
19 The criminal complaint stated the potential punishment 
for the first count, first-degree reckless endangerment with use 
of a dangerous weapon, was a fine of not more than $25,000, 
"imprison[ment of] not more than twelve (12) years and six (6) 
months, or both."  The criminal complaint also noted that "the 
maximum term of imprisonment for the felony may be increased by 
not more than 5 years" for the use of a dangerous weapon.   
In 
the 
information, 
the 
State 
listed 
the 
potential 
punishments identified in the criminal complaint and added a 
habitual criminality enhancer under Wis. Stat. § 939.62(1)(c).  
Based on Finley's prior convictions, this enhancement could 
increase "the maximum term of imprisonment for the underlying 
crime . . . by not more than 6 years."   
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
15 
 
¶27 On at least two occasions in the circuit court 
proceedings, however, Finley was misinformed that he faced 
potential punishment of 19 years, 6 months' confinement.*  The 
plea questionnaire/waiver of rights form stated (with emphasis 
added) 
that 
Finley 
faced 
"19 
years, 
6 
months 
confinement . . . ."* The circuit court's misstatement of the 
potential 
punishment 
referred 
to 
both 
"confinement"* 
and 
"imprisonment,"* which have different meanings.     
¶28 First, the plea questionnaire/waiver of rights form 
completed by the Finley's attorney and signed by Finley 
incorrectly stated the potential punishment was "19 years, 6 
months confinement."*   
¶29 Second, before accepting Finley's no contest plea, the 
circuit court engaged in a colloquy with Finley regarding the 
potential punishment he faced if convicted.  The colloquy 
(repeated here with emphasis added) advised Finley of each of 
the component parts of the potential punishment Finley faced if 
convicted and referred (without explaining the use of the terms) 
to two different concepts——imprisonment* and confinement*——as 
follows:20 
Court: 
The maximum penalty for the offense would be 
a 
fine 
of 
not 
more 
than 
$25,000 
or 
imprisonment* not more than twelve years and 
six months or both.   
                                                 
20 The pre-sentencing investigation report, completed after 
the circuit court had already accepted Finley's plea, similarly 
stated the potential punishment broken down into its component 
parts.   
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
16 
 
Finley: 
Yes, sir. 
Court: 
Okay.  I take it -- are we pleading as a 
repeater?  
State: 
Yes, Your Honor. 
Court: 
Okay.  That will be the base penalty.  Then 
because you are a repeater, then they could 
increase the incarceration period21 by not 
more than an additional six years.  And they 
are 
basing 
the 
repeater 
enhancement 
provision 
on 
the 
fact 
that 
you 
were 
convicted of possession of cocaine as a 
subsequent offender, and possession of THC 
as a subsequent offender on September 12th, 
2008, in Brown County.  Do you remember 
those felonies?   
Finley: 
Yes, sir.   
Court: 
Okay.  And they are also charging that you 
used a dangerous weapon.  And for the 
enhancement provision of using a dangerous 
weapon then the term of imprisonment* can be 
increased by not more than five years for 
that.  Do you understand that then?   
Finley: 
Yeah. 
 
¶30 Immediately following this piecemeal recitation of the 
component parts of the potential punishment, the circuit court 
incorrectly totaled the component parts of the potential 
punishment (with emphasis added) informing the defendant of only 
the term of confinement:* 
Court: 
All right.  So, the maximum you would look 
at then [is] nineteen years six months 
                                                 
21 "Incarceration period" is not a defined term in the 
statutes.  It might be interpreted to mean the statutory words 
"imprisonment"* or "confinement in prison."* 
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
17 
 
confinement.*  Do you understand the maximum 
penalties?   
Finley: 
Yes, sir. 
¶31 Adding these penalties and enhancements together——the 
12 year, 6 month base penalty, the 6 year repeater enhancement, 
and the 5 year dangerous weapon enhancement——yields the maximum 
statutory 
penalty 
if 
convicted 
of 
23 
years, 
6 
months' 
imprisonment.*  
¶32 Neither the circuit court, the prosecuting attorney, 
defense counsel, nor Finley corrected the circuit court's 
misstatement of Finley's potential punishment if convicted.   
¶33 Subsequently, at the sentencing hearing, the circuit 
court imposed the maximum statutory penalty of 23 years, 6 
months' imprisonment* (divided between 18 years, 6 months' 
initial confinement* and five years' extended supervision*).  
¶34 After sentencing, Finley moved to withdraw his plea, 
arguing that he was misinformed, when he entered his plea, of 
the potential punishment he faced if convicted and that he did 
not know the potential punishment.22  As a result, Finley sought 
                                                 
22 Bangert and Brown set forth the procedures applicable 
when a defendant seeks plea withdrawal based on an alleged 
violation of a circuit court's statutory or other mandatory 
duties pertaining to the taking of a defendant's plea.      
First, the defendant must make a prima facie case showing 
that his or her plea was accepted without the circuit court's 
compliance 
with 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.08 
or 
other 
mandatory 
procedures.  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274. 
Second, the defendant must allege that he or she did not 
"know or understand the information that should have been 
provided at the plea hearing."  Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶39.   
(continued) 
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
18 
 
plea withdrawal on the grounds that his plea was not entered 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  In the alternative, 
Finley requested reduction (commutation) of his sentence to the 
maximum sentence he was told he could receive, 19 years and 6 
months.     
¶35 The circuit court held a non-evidentiary hearing on 
Finley's motion.  The State argued that Finley had not stated a 
prima facie violation of the statutory or judicially mandated 
plea hearing procedure, that is, the State argued that no 
Bangert violation occurred.   
¶36 Finley argued that he had stated a prima facie Bangert 
violation:  The transcript of the plea colloquy demonstrated 
that the circuit court misinformed him of the maximum statutory 
penalty and that defense counsel misinformed him of the maximum 
statutory penalty in the plea questionnaire/waiver of rights 
form.  Finley alleged that he was unaware of the potential 
punishment he faced if convicted.   
¶37 The circuit court denied Finley's motion to withdraw 
his plea, holding that he failed to state a prima facie Bangert 
violation because he was correctly advised of each of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
When the defendant has made a prima facie showing and 
adequately alleged that he or she did not know or understand the 
information that should have been provided at the plea hearing, 
the burden shifts to the State to show by clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendant's plea was knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily entered despite the inadequacy of the record 
when the plea was entered.  See Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶40 
(citing Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274).   
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
19 
 
component parts of the 23 year 6 month maximum potential 
punishment of imprisonment.*  As the circuit court put it:  
I'm satisfied the defendant has not made a prima facie 
case that the plea was made anything but knowingly and 
voluntarily.  I think he knew fully well.  I think if 
you look at that transcript, I went piecemeal by 
piecemeal, twelve point five, five, six, I went 
through exactly why it was being added on.  He knew 
his base and he knew exactly each reason why the 
numbers would be added on.  They are consistent with 
the information placed in the information. 
Now, in essence what he wants to claim is, oh, in that 
case it should get me out of this plea.  I think where 
the information is provided clearly orally, and I 
think I'm required to provide the length of the 
sentence orally . . . I think I'm required actually to 
tell him what his maximum penalty is orally on the 
offense. 
So, I orally have him sitting in that chair exactly 
right there.  We are this distance apart, and I went 
over the base penalty and the reason why he was 
receiving each of the enhancements and what the 
enhancement was.  Now, clearly he hasn't made a prima 
facie case to this Court that he didn't make that plea 
knowingly and voluntarily. 
 
¶38 Finley appealed the circuit court's denial of his 
motion.  The court of appeals reversed and remanded the matter 
to the circuit court in an unpublished per curiam decision.23   
¶39 In this first appeal to the court of appeals, the 
court of appeals held that Finley had established a Bangert 
violation as a matter of law: (1) Finley made a prima facie 
showing that both the circuit court and defense counsel 
                                                 
23 See State v. Finley, No. 2013AP1846-CR, unpublished slip 
op., ¶16 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2014). 
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
20 
 
misinformed him of the potential punishment he faced if 
convicted; and (2) Finley alleged that he did not know or 
understand the information regarding the potential punishment——
information that should have been provided to him at the plea 
hearing.24   
¶40 The court of appeals also rejected as undeveloped the 
State's arguments that "'[t]he present case involves small 
deviations [from the correct maximum potential punishment] that 
are insufficient to establish a prima facie Bangert violation,'" 
and that Finley should be presumed to have understood the 
potential punishment, based on the circuit court's recitation of 
the component parts of the maximum statutory penalty.25  
¶41 As the court of appeals explained, the State's 
argument that Finley was correctly advised of the potential 
punishment he faced by pleading no contest would require Finley 
to do more than simply add up the parts of the sentence listed 
                                                 
24 See Finley, No. 2013AP1846-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶16 
(citing Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶21).  
A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea when (1) the 
defendant makes a prima facie showing that the circuit 
court's plea colloquy did not conform with § 971.08 or 
other procedures mandated at a plea hearing; and (2) 
the defendant alleges he did not know or understand 
the information that should have been provided at the 
plea hearing. 
Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶2 (citations omitted).   
25 See Finley, No. 2013AP1846-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶¶8-
13.   
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
21 
 
by the circuit court.  Instead, Finley would have to first 
recognize and differentiate between numerous undefined terms 
used 
by 
the 
circuit 
court 
(i.e., 
"maximum 
penalty," 
"imprisonment,"* 
"base 
penalty," 
"incarceration 
period," 
"enhancement," "term of imprisonment," and "confinement"*), then 
add up the component parts listed by the circuit court, finally 
disregarding the circuit court's statement that he faced 
"nineteen years six months confinement."26   
¶42 The court of appeals concluded:  "Thus, even if the 
GED-holding Finley was sophisticated enough to do the math 
himself, he, and we, would have to conclude that he knew better 
than both his attorney and the court."27  
¶43 As a result, the court of appeals "remand[ed] [the 
matter to the circuit court] to allow the State the opportunity 
to prove that Finley nonetheless knew the maximum [statutory] 
penalty he faced at the time he entered his plea."28     
¶44 On remand, the circuit court held an evidentiary 
hearing on Finley's motion to withdraw his plea.  At the 
hearing, as Bangert directs, the State bore the burden of 
proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that Finley knew the 
                                                 
26 Finley, No. 2013AP1846-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶12.   
27 Finley, No. 2013AP1846-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶12.   
28 Finley, No. 2013AP1846-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶16.   
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
22 
 
potential punishment he faced despite the inadequacy of the 
record at the time of the plea acceptance.29    
 
¶45 As the court of appeals put it, "[T]he State's efforts 
with regard to this directive were minimal; so much so that, on 
appeal, the State has now abandoned any argument that it met its 
burden, at least with respect to Finley's knowledge, at the time 
he pled, of the correct maximum penalty he faced."30   
 
¶46 At the evidentiary hearing, the State called just one 
witness, Finley's defense counsel.  Finley did not testify.  
Defense counsel testified that his usual practice was to cover 
the maximum statutory penalty with a defendant when discussing a 
plea offer and that he believed Finley was aware of the 
potential 
punishment 
he 
faced 
if 
convicted. 
 
On 
cross-
examination, however, defense counsel stated as follows: 
Q: 
Would it be your practice when meeting with your 
client to go through the plea questionnaire line 
by line? 
A: 
Yes. 
Q: 
And when you got to the understandings, would it 
be your practice to read off for him the 
"nineteen years six months confinement?" 
A: 
Yes.   
                                                 
29 "In essence, the state will be required to show that the 
defendant in fact possessed the constitutionally required 
understanding and knowledge which the defendant alleges the 
inadequate plea colloquy failed to afford him."  Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d at 275 (citation omitted).   
30 Finley, 365 Wis. 2d 275, ¶21.   
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
23 
 
¶47 Moreover, trial counsel stated that he had no specific 
recollection of advising Finley of the maximum statutory 
penalty.    
¶48 Although 
Finley's 
postconviction 
motion 
argued 
primarily for plea withdrawal, Finley included an alternative 
argument that his sentence should be reduced (commuted) to the 
maximum he thought he could receive, 19 years 6 months, based on 
Taylor.  Finley withdrew this alternative argument at the 
hearing, stating that plea withdrawal "is the only claim that we 
are making."   
¶49 Despite 
Finley's 
withdrawal 
of 
the 
reduction 
(commutation) request, the circuit court concluded that Finley 
"is entitled to have his sentence modified to no more than the 
amount that was represented to him by the Court and stated on 
his Plea Questionnaire and Waiver of Rights Form and that was 
nineteen years and six months."  After reducing Finley's 
sentence from the maximum statutory penalty of 23 years, 6 
months' imprisonment to 19 years, 6 months' imprisonment, the 
circuit court denied Finley's motion for plea withdrawal.   
¶50 Although the circuit court made minimal findings at 
the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court subsequently issued a 
more fully developed written decision/order reducing Finley's 
sentence and denying Finley's motion for plea withdrawal.  In 
the circuit court's written decision/order, the circuit court 
found "that the State met its burden of establishing that Finley 
knew the maximum penalty he faced at the time he entered his 
plea.  However, the Court also believes that it is in the 
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
24 
 
interest of justice to commute Finley's sentence to the maximum 
represented to him by the Court at the time of sentencing." 
¶51 In reducing (commuting) Finley's sentence and denying 
Finley's motion to withdraw his plea, the circuit court relied 
on this court's decisions in Bangert, Cross, and Taylor as well 
as Wis. Stat. § 973.13.31   
¶52 Again, Finley appealed the circuit court's denial of 
his motion for plea withdrawal.  In this second appeal, Finley 
asserted that the circuit court erred in finding that the State 
had met its burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, 
that Finley knew the potential punishment he faced when he 
entered his plea.  
¶53 In the second appeal in the court of appeals, the 
court of appeals viewed the State as having abandoned the 
argument that it satisfied its burden of establishing that 
                                                 
31 Finley appears to fall outside the plain text of Wis. 
Stat. § 973.13.  The provision states: 
In any case where the court imposes a maximum penalty 
in excess of that authorized by law, such excess shall 
be void and the sentence shall be valid only to the 
extent of the maximum term authorized by statute and 
shall stand commuted without further proceedings. 
In the instant case, the circuit court imposed the maximum 
statutory penalty, 23 years, 6 months' imprisonment.  The 
circuit court did not impose a maximum penalty in excess of that 
authorized by law, despite what the circuit court stated at the 
plea colloquy.      
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
25 
 
Finley knew, when he entered his plea, the potential punishment 
he faced if convicted.32   
¶54 The court of appeals reversed the circuit court's 
decision/order denying Finley's motion for plea withdrawal; this 
is the published decision that we are now reviewing.33  The court 
of appeals relied on its previous conclusion that Finley had 
established a Bangert violation as a matter of law as well as 
the State's concession that it failed, at the evidentiary 
hearing, to show that despite the Bangert violation Finley knew, 
when he entered his plea, the potential punishment he faced if 
convicted.    
¶55 The court of appeals discussed the State's reliance on 
Cross and Taylor at length and distinguished these cases from 
the instant case.  According to the court of appeals, because 
Finley's plea was not entered knowingly, intentionally, and 
voluntarily, the Bangert violation was not curable after the 
fact by reducing (commuting) the sentence to the maximum amount 
Finley was told that he faced if convicted.  The court of 
appeals 
remanded 
the 
matter 
to 
the 
circuit 
court 
with 
instructions to grant Finley's motion for plea withdrawal.     
¶56 This court granted the State's petition for review.   
                                                 
32 Finley, 365 Wis. 2d 275, ¶3.  The court of appeals also 
concluded that the State had conceded that it did not satisfy 
its burden at the evidentiary hearing in the circuit court.  
Finley, 365 Wis. 2d 275, ¶9.      
33 See 
State 
v. 
Finley, 
2015 
WI 
App 
79, 
¶37, 
365 
Wis. 2d 275, 872 N.W.2d 344. 
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
26 
 
II 
 
¶57 Whether a plea colloquy violates Wis. Stat. § 971.08 
or other mandatory duty is a question of law that this court 
determines independently of the circuit court or court of 
appeals but benefiting from their analyses.34      
¶58 When a defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty or no 
contest plea after sentencing, he or she must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that refusing to allow plea withdrawal would 
result in a "manifest injustice."35  One way to show manifest 
injustice is to show that the plea was not entered knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily.36   
 
¶59 Whether a defendant's plea was entered knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily is a question of constitutional 
fact.37  An appellate court upholds the circuit court's findings 
of historical fact unless they are clearly erroneous.38  This 
court independently determines as a matter of law whether the 
circuit court's findings of historical fact demonstrate that the 
                                                 
34  Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶21; see also Taylor, 347 
Wis. 2d 30, ¶26.   
35 Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶18; see also Taylor, 347 
Wis. 2d 30, ¶24.    
36 Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶18; see also Taylor, 347 
Wis. 2d 30, ¶24.   
37 State v. Dillard, 2014 WI 123, ¶38, 358 Wis. 2d 543, 859 
N.W.2d 44 (citing Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶14). 
38 Dillard, 358 Wis. 2d 543, ¶38 (citing State v. Dawson, 
2004 WI App 173, ¶7, 276 Wis. 2d 418, 688 N.W.2d 12).   
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
27 
 
defendant's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, while 
benefiting from the analyses of the circuit court and the court 
of appeals.39   
 
¶60 Determining the remedy when the State fails to 
demonstrate that it met the constitutional requirement that the 
defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered his 
plea presents a question of law.  Withdrawal of the plea is a 
matter of right under these circumstances.40       
III 
¶61 We begin by examining the remedies the State and 
Finley propose in the instant case.  As we explained previously, 
in the State's view, a plea is knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary in the constitutional sense (as the State views this 
phrase) even if the defendant is misinformed about the potential 
punishment if convicted, so long as the sentence the defendant 
                                                 
39 Dillard, 358 Wis. 2d 543, ¶38 (citing State v. Hoppe, 
2009 WI 41, ¶61, 317 Wis. 2d 161, 765 N.W.2d 794).   
40 See Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 283 ("When a defendant 
established a denial of a relevant constitutional right, 
withdrawal of the plea is a matter of right."); Brown, 293 
Wis. 2d 594, 
¶19 
("When 
a 
guilty 
plea 
is 
not 
knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary, a defendant is entitled to withdraw 
the plea as a matter of right because such a plea 'violates 
fundamental due process.'") (quoting Van Camp, 213 Wis. 2d at 
139); see also Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶20 ("If the State cannot 
meet its burden [of proving by clear and convincing evidence 
that the plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent despite 
the deficiencies of the plea hearing,] the defendant is entitled 
to withdraw his plea as a matter of right.") (citing Van Camp, 
213 Wis. 2d at 139).  
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
28 
 
ultimately receives does not exceed the maximum sentence the 
circuit court told the defendant he could receive.   
¶62 The 
State 
urges 
that 
this 
remedy 
of 
reducing 
(commuting) the sentence to fit what the defendant was told he 
faced is appropriate in the instant case.   
¶63 According to the State, Finley knew, based on the 
circuit court's colloquy, that he faced a sentence of 19 years, 
6 months' confinement in prison.*  The circuit court ultimately 
imposed a sentence of 19 years, 6 months' imprisonment* (after 
his Bangert motion and a successful appeal).  The State 
concludes 
that 
this 
reduction 
(commutation) 
remedy 
is 
appropriate:  Finley knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
entered a plea that he knew exposed him to a potential 
punishment of 19 years, 6 months' confinement in prison,* and he 
ultimately 
received 
a 
sentence 
of 
19 
years, 
6 
months' 
imprisonment,* which is less than 19 years, 6 months' confinement 
in prison.*    
 
¶64 The State asserts that State v. Cross, 2010 WI 70, 326 
Wis. 2d 492, 786 N.W.2d 64, and State v. Taylor, 2013 WI 34, 347 
Wis. 2d 30, 829 N.W.2d 482, suggest that when a defendant is 
misinformed about the potential punishment, sentence reduction 
(commutation) is an appropriate remedy.   
 
¶65 Thus, we examine Cross and Taylor to determine whether 
they govern the instant case.     
¶66 We begin with Cross.  Prior to entering a guilty plea, 
the defendant was misinformed by the State, the circuit court, 
and Cross's attorney that he faced a higher potential punishment 
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
29 
 
than the law actually authorized——40 years' imprisonment* with a 
maximum initial confinement* of 25 years, rather than the 30 
years' imprisonment* with 20 years' maximum initial confinement* 
set forth in the statute.41   
¶67 After the circuit court imposed a sentence of 40 years 
imprisonment,* Cross discovered that his offense should have 
carried a maximum penalty of 30 years' imprisonment* with 20 
years' maximum initial confinement.*42   
¶68 Cross moved to withdraw his plea, arguing that it was 
not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered because he 
was misinformed of a higher potential punishment than was 
allowable 
by 
statute 
and 
was 
unaware 
of 
the 
potential 
punishment.43  Cross sought an evidentiary hearing under Bangert.  
The circuit court denied an evidentiary hearing and Cross's 
motion to withdraw his plea.44  The circuit court resentenced 
Cross to the correct maximum statutory penalty.45   
¶69 On appeal to this court, Cross argued that he had made 
a prima facie showing of a Bangert violation because the 
potential punishment was incorrectly communicated and he was 
unaware of the potential punishment if convicted.  Cross argued 
                                                 
41 Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶1.   
42 Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶¶10-11.     
43 Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶11.   
44 Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶12.   
45 Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶12.   
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
30 
 
that under these circumstances his plea was not knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily entered and that he was entitled 
to withdraw his plea as a matter of right.   
¶70 This court disagreed with Cross.  The court concluded 
that it is not necessarily a Bangert violation when a defendant 
is told that he faces a higher "but not substantially higher" 
potential punishment than is, in fact, available.46  The Cross 
court stated that although the circuit court misinformed Cross 
about the maximum statutory penalty, the circuit court had 
"fulfilled its duty to inform the defendant of the range of 
punishments;"47 that Cross understood the potential punishment;48 
and that the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
entered.49  The Cross court also concluded that "a defendant's 
due process rights are not necessarily violated when he is 
incorrectly informed of the maximum potential imprisonment."50  
As the Cross court noted, "[w]hen given a greater sentence than 
that authorized by law, which presumably would also involve an 
error in the understanding of the possible maximum penalty, the 
                                                 
46 Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶30.   
47 Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶4. 
48 Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶41. 
49 Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶41. 
50 Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶37.   
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
31 
 
remedy here is a commuted sentence, not plea withdrawal," under 
Wis. Stat. § 973.13.51   
¶71 To quote Cross,  
[A] defendant can be said to understand the range of 
punishments as required by § 971.08 and Bangert when 
the maximum sentence communicated to the defendant is 
higher, but not substantially higher, than the actual 
allowable sentence.  This accords with common sense; 
not all small deviations from the requirements in our 
Bangert line of cases equate to a Bangert violation 
and require a formal evidentiary hearing.52   
As a result, the court in Cross did not allow the defendant to 
withdraw his plea.   
¶72 The Cross court did, however, qualify its conclusion, 
noting that "when the defendant is told the sentence is lower 
than the amount allowed by law, a defendant's due process rights 
are 
at 
greater 
risk 
and 
a 
Bangert 
violation 
may 
be 
established."53   
¶73 In sum, the key facts in Cross leading to denial of 
plea withdrawal were that the penalty communicated to the 
defendant was not substantially higher than the potential 
punishment and the court viewed the defendant as having 
understood the potential punishment as required by Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08 and Bangert.   
                                                 
51 Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶34.   
52 Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶38.   
53 Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶39 (emphasis added). 
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
32 
 
¶74 In the instant case, the facts are substantially 
different from those in Cross.  Finley was mistakenly informed 
by the circuit court that he faced a different potential 
punishment than the maximum statutory penalty, and Finley did 
not know the maximum statutory penalty.  Moreover, unlike in 
Cross, Wis. Stat. § 973.13, which commutes a sentence imposed 
that exceeds the maximum statutory penalty, does not provide a 
remedy in the instant case, in which the sentence initially 
imposed (although at the plea colloquy the circuit court advised 
otherwise) did not exceed the maximum statutory penalty.54 
¶75 We turn now to the Taylor case.  The facts in Taylor 
appear (at first blush) to be an example of what the Cross court 
foresaw as a "greater risk" to due process rights, that is, 
telling a defendant the maximum potential punishment is lower 
than it actually is.55   
¶76 In Taylor, the defendant was a repeat offender facing 
an eight-year sentence——six years' imprisonment* for uttering a 
forgery plus a two-year enhancement for prior offenses.56  Taylor 
pleaded no contest to the offense at a plea hearing at which the 
circuit court stated that it "could impose the maximum penalty 
here of a $10,000 fine or six years in prison or both."57  
                                                 
54 See supra ¶¶9, 12 n.11, 33.   
55 Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶39 (emphasis added). 
56 Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶1. 
57 Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶16.   
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
33 
 
Although the circuit court's colloquy mentioned the repeater 
allegation several times, the circuit court did not explicitly 
inform Taylor that he faced an additional two-year enhancement 
as a repeater.58 
 
¶77 After the circuit court sentenced Taylor to six years' 
imprisonment,* Taylor moved to withdraw his no contest plea, 
arguing, among other things, that his plea was not entered 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.59  The circuit court 
denied Taylor's motion, and this court affirmed the circuit 
court.   
 
¶78 The Taylor court concluded that the circuit court 
record was "replete with evidence" that Taylor was informed and 
aware of the potential punishment of 8 years' imprisonment* he 
faced 
if 
convicted.60 
 
Among 
other 
things, 
the 
plea 
questionnaire/waiver of rights form, information, and criminal 
complaint 
all 
informed 
Taylor 
of 
the 
maximum 
potential 
punishment of 8 years' imprisonment.*61    
 
¶79 We held that Taylor's "plea was entered knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily [because] the record makes clear 
that the defendant knew the maximum penalty that could be 
                                                 
58 Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶2.   
59 Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶3.   
60 Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶35. The State may use any 
evidence in the record to prove a defendant's understanding at 
the time of entry of the plea.  Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶32.  
61 Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶¶35-38. 
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
34 
 
imposed and was verbally informed at the plea hearing of the 
penalty that he received.  Therefore, the circuit court did not 
err by denying Taylor's postconviction motion to withdraw his no 
contest plea."62   
¶80 In 
sum, 
in 
Taylor, 
the 
potential 
punishment 
communicated to the defendant was lower than the maximum 
statutory penalty.  The record demonstrated, however, that 
Taylor knew the potential punishment when he entered his plea, 
even though the circuit court's plea colloquy did not correctly 
advise him of the potential punishment.  Under these facts, the 
Taylor court agreed with the circuit court's decision that the 
plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered:  The 
defendant knew the potential punishment and was given the 
sentence the circuit court advised.  Taylor was not entitled to 
withdraw his plea.63   
¶81 Cross and Taylor demonstrate that a circuit court's 
failure to correctly advise a defendant in the plea colloquy of 
the potential punishment he faces does not automatically permit 
a defendant to withdraw his or her plea.  In these cases, the 
defendants knew the potential punishment and were given the 
sentence the circuit court described.   
 
¶82 Although Cross and Taylor have some similarities to 
the 
instant 
case, 
the 
facts 
in 
Cross 
and 
Taylor 
are 
                                                 
62 Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶8. 
63 Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶42.   
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
35 
 
significantly different from the facts in the instant case and 
therefore do not govern our decision.   
 
¶83 In Cross, this court held that the insubstantial 
misstatement of the potential punishment did not constitute a 
Bangert violation.64  In Taylor, the court held that the circuit 
court record made clear that the defendant knew the potential 
punishment.65 
 
¶84 As a result, in both Cross and Taylor, no evidentiary 
hearing was needed.66    
 
¶85 In the instant case, there was a Bangert violation and 
an evidentiary hearing was held.67  The record in the instant 
case does not establish that Finley knew the information about 
potential punishment about which he was misinformed during the 
plea colloquy.  On the contrary, after the evidentiary hearing, 
the State "abandoned any argument that it met its burden, at 
least with respect to Finley's knowledge, at the time he pled, 
of the correct maximum penalty he faced."68  In this court, the 
                                                 
64 Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶4.   
65 Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶34.   
66 See Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶¶4, 38, 41; Taylor, 347 
Wis. 2d 30, ¶¶4, 8, 18.   
67 The State did not seek review of the court of appeals' 
decision that there was a Bangert violation in Finley's case.  
The 
State 
further 
acknowledges 
that 
the 
plea 
colloquy 
misinformed Finley of the potential punishment he faced if 
convicted, and the State acknowledges that Finley did not 
otherwise know, when he entered his plea, of the potential 
punishment he faced if convicted.   
68 Finley, 365 Wis. 2d 275, ¶21.   
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
36 
 
State acknowledges that Finley did not know the potential 
punishment he faced when he entered his plea.   
 
¶86 The State argues that the remedy in Finley's case is 
sentence reduction (commutation).  The State asserts that as 
long as Finley ultimately receives a sentence that he was 
informed he could get and that sentence is less than or equal to 
the maximum statutory penalty, Finley's plea was knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary for constitutional purposes.  No 
Wisconsin or United States Supreme Court case supports the 
State's proposition.69   
 
¶87 The State relies on Taylor in proposing its resolution 
of the instant case despite the differences between the instant 
case and Taylor that we outlined above.  In Taylor, unlike in 
the instant case, the circuit court record revealed that the 
defendant knew the potential punishment he faced if convicted.  
 
¶88 We conclude that the facts and circumstances of 
Finley's case are more like those in Bangert and Brown than 
those in Cross or Taylor. 
 
¶89 As in Bangert and Brown, Finley's plea colloquy was 
deficient and his postconviction motion demonstrated a prima 
facie Bangert violation.   
                                                 
69 In a per curiam opinion predating Bangert and Brown, this 
court did allow reduction (commutation) of a sentence to the 
sentence a defendant was told he could receive.  The court also 
noted, however, that the defendant's plea was entered knowingly 
and voluntarily.  See Preston v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 728, 729, 206 
N.W.2d 619 (1973) (per curiam).   
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
37 
 
 
¶90 In Bangert, the circuit court's plea colloquy failed 
to adequately establish that the defendant understood the nature 
of the charges to which he pleaded.70  An evidentiary hearing was 
held at which the State met its burden of proving that the 
defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered his 
plea.71  Thus, the defendant in Bangert was not entitled to 
withdraw his plea.72  Had the State not met its burden, however, 
it appears that the defendant would have been entitled to 
withdraw his plea.73   
 
¶91 In Brown, the circuit court's plea colloquy failed to 
adequately establish that the defendant understood the nature of 
the charges to which he pleaded as well as the constitutional 
rights he waived.74  The Brown court concluded that Brown 
adequately alleged that he did not understand the nature of the 
charges to which he pleaded or the constitutional rights he 
waived.75  As a result, the Brown court remanded the cause for an 
evidentiary hearing, at which the State had the burden of 
proving that Brown understood the charges to which he pleaded 
and the constitutional rights he waived despite the deficiencies 
                                                 
70 Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 251.   
71 Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 284-86.   
72 See Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 285-86.   
73 See Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 283.   
74 Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶5.   
75 Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶79.   
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
38 
 
at the plea hearing.76  If the State did not meet its burden at 
the evidentiary hearing, it appears the defendant would have 
been entitled to withdraw the plea.77  
 
¶92 Bangert and Brown stand for the proposition that when 
a plea colloquy is deficient and the defendant alleges that he 
did not know or understand the information that should have been 
provided in the plea colloquy, the defendant is entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing at which the State has an opportunity to 
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered his plea.78  If 
                                                 
76 Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶79.  The Brown court rejected, 
however, the defendant's argument that the circuit court 
violated Wis. Stat. § 971.08 and Bangert by failing to state in 
the plea colloquy that the punishment for each charge could run 
consecutively, stating:  
Although 
the 
better 
practice 
is 
to 
advise 
the 
defendant of the cumulative maximum sentence he could 
receive from consecutive sentences, we do not believe 
the omission of such information should allow a 
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea in the absence of 
any allegation that the defendant did not understand 
the effect of multiple charges on his sentence. 
Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶78.   
77 Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶36 ("Assuming the defendant's 
postconviction motion is adequate to require a hearing, he may 
withdraw his plea after sentencing as a matter of right unless 
the 
state 
can 
show 
the 
plea 
was 
entered 
knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily, despite the deficiencies in the 
plea hearing.") (citing State v. Trochinski, 2002 WI 56, ¶17, 
253 Wis. 2d 38, 644 N.W.2d 891; Van Camp, 213 Wis. 2d at 139).   
78 See 
Brown, 
293 
Wis. 2d 594, 
¶¶58-59; 
Bangert, 
131 
Wis. 2d at 274.   
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
39 
 
the State fails to meet its burden at the evidentiary hearing, 
the defendant is entitled to withdraw his plea.79     
 
¶93 In the instant case, Finley had an evidentiary 
hearing.  The State does not contest that Finley did not know, 
when he entered his plea, of the potential punishment if 
convicted.    
 
¶94 In sum, in the posture of the instant case, Finley did 
not know when he entered his plea of the potential punishment he 
faced if convicted.  As in Bangert and Brown, the State had the 
opportunity in the instant case to prove the defendant's 
knowledge 
of 
the 
information 
set 
forth 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.08(1)(a) and the case law.  A defendant's lack of 
understanding of the potential punishment when he or she enters 
a guilty or no contest plea is relevant for determining whether 
the plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  
The rule in Bangert and Brown is that if the State cannot meet 
its burden of proof, the defendant is entitled to withdraw his 
plea.   
¶95 Under the circumstances of the instant case, Bangert, 
Brown, Cross, and Taylor lead us to conclude that Finley is 
entitled to withdraw his plea: The circuit court misinformed 
Finley of the potential punishment he faced if convicted, 
information 
the 
circuit 
court 
was 
required 
to 
give 
the 
defendant; and the State failed to prove that when Finley 
                                                 
79 See Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶36; Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 
283; Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶20.   
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
40 
 
entered his plea he knew the potential punishment he faced if 
convicted.  The case law tells us that under these circumstances 
Finley was entitled to withdraw his plea.  Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d at 283 ("When a defendant established a denial of a 
relevant constitutional right, withdrawal of the plea is a 
matter of right."); Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶19 ("When a guilty 
plea is not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, a defendant is 
entitled to withdraw the plea as a matter of right because such 
a plea 'violates fundamental due process.'") (quoting Van Camp, 
213 Wis. 2d at 139); see also Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶20 ("If 
the State cannot meet its burden [of proving by clear and 
convincing evidence that the plea was knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent despite the deficiencies of the plea hearing,] the 
defendant is entitled to withdraw his plea as a matter of 
right.") (citing Van Camp, 213 Wis. 2d at 139).   
¶96 Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals and remand the cause to the circuit court with 
instructions to grant Finley's motion to withdraw his plea.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court.   
 
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
41 
 
ATTACHMENT A: GLOSSARY 
 
1. 
Indeterminate sentencing and Truth in Sentencing:  
Although Wisconsin's sentencing system shifted from 
indeterminate sentencing to truth in sentencing in 
1998, see 1997 Wis. Act 283, the requirements of 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a) and the case law regarding 
the circuit court's duties in a plea colloquy have 
remained substantially the same over the years.  
Compare, e.g., Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 260-62 
(discussing the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 971.08 
and the general duties of the trial court prior to 
accepting 
a 
guilty 
or 
no 
contest 
plea 
under 
Wisconsin's indeterminate sentencing system), with 
Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶¶22-35 ("[R]estat[ing] and 
supplement[ing] the Bangert outline" under the truth 
in sentencing system).   
2. 
Truth in Sentencing Terminology: 
A. 
Bifurcated Sentence.  A bifurcated sentence is a 
sentence that consists of a term of confinement 
in 
prison 
followed 
by 
a 
term 
of 
extended 
supervision.  The total length of a bifurcated 
sentence may not exceed the maximum period of 
imprisonment set forth in § 939.50(3) (and other 
statutes).  See Wis. Stat. § 973.01(1), (2). 
"Imprisonment;" 
"Confinement 
in 
Prison;" 
"Extended Supervision." "Imprisonment" refers to 
both parts of a bifurcated sentence: the period 
of initial confinement in prison plus the period 
of extended supervision.  "Imprisonment" and 
"confinement in prison" are thus not synonymous.  
See Wis. Stat. § 973.01(1); State v. Jackson, 
2004 
WI 
29, 
¶5 
n.4, 
270 
Wis. 2d 113, 
676 
N.W.2d 872 
("Under 
Truth-in-Sentencing 
legislation, the term 'imprisonment' does not 
mean time in prison.  Rather, 'imprisonment' 
consists of both the time of confinement (in 
prison) and the time following the confinement 
spent on extended supervision."); State v. Cole, 
2003 WI 59, ¶16, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 N.W.2d 700 
("Section 973.01 used the word 'imprisonment' to 
refer to a 'bifurcated sentence' consisting of 'a 
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
42 
 
term of confinement in prison followed by a term 
of extended supervision . . . .'") (quoting Wis. 
Stat. § 973.01(1)). 
Extended supervision may be imposed in addition 
to confinement in prison and is part of the total 
period 
of 
imprisonment. 
 
Wisconsin 
Stat. 
§ 973.01(2)(d) sets the minimum and maximum term 
of extended supervision as follows:  
The term of extended supervision may not be less 
than 
25% 
of 
the 
length 
of 
the 
term 
of 
confinement in prison imposed under par. (b) 
and, for a classified felony, is subject to 
whichever of the following limits is applicable: 
1. 
For a Class B felony, the term of extended 
supervision may not exceed 20 years. 
2. 
For a Class C felony, the term of extended 
supervision may not exceed 15 years. 
3. 
For a Class D felony, the term of extended 
supervision may not exceed 10 years. 
4. 
For a Class E, F, or G felony, the term of 
extended supervision may not exceed 5 years. 
5. 
For a Class H felony, the term of extended 
supervision may not exceed 3 years. 
6. 
For a Class I felony, the term of extended 
supervision may not exceed 2 years. 
3. 
Potential 
Punishment: 
 
The 
statutory 
phrase 
"potential punishment" has not been defined in the 
statutes or the case law.  In analyzing whether a 
defendant was correctly advised of the potential 
punishment, our cases have looked to the maximum 
statutory penalty, that is, the maximum sentence 
provided for by statute.   
Wisconsin Stat. § 939.50(3) sets forth the maximum 
statutory penalty for felonies.  Other statutes add 
enhancements to the penalties specified in Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 939.50(3). 
 
For 
example, 
there 
are 
enhancements for repeater offenses, domestic abuse 
offenses, or for offenses committed with the use of 
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
43 
 
a 
dangerous 
weapon. 
 
See, 
e.g., 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 939.62, 939.621, 939.63.  
4. 
Range of Punishments: Some cases use the phrase 
"range of punishments" in addition to or in place of 
"potential punishment."  "Range of punishments," 
"potential punishment," "maximum statutory penalty," 
and various other phrases are used synonymously in 
the cases to mean "potential punishment." 
See, e.g., State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 260-61 
(quoting Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a)'s reference to 
"potential punishment," and referring to the "range 
of punishments"); State v. Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 
¶¶3, 35, 44 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(a)'s 
reference to "potential punishment" and  referring 
to the "range of punishments"); State v. Taylor, 
2013 WI 34, ¶¶31, 33, 37, 41, 42 n.12, 347 
Wis. 2d 30, 
829 
N.W.2d 482 
(referring 
interchangeably 
to 
the 
"potential 
punishment," 
"maximum term of imprisonment," "maximum penalty," 
"range of punishments," and "sentence"); State v. 
Cross, 2010 WI 70, ¶¶3, 11, 28, 35, 37-38, 326 
Wis. 2d 492, 
786 
N.W.2d 64 
(referring 
interchangeably to "range of punishments," "maximum 
potential 
sentence," 
"maximum 
potential 
imprisonment," "maximum initial sentence," "actual 
allowable 
sentence," 
and 
"precise 
maximum 
sentence"). 
Circuit courts do not usually advise a defendant of 
the 
minimum 
statutory 
penalty, 
for 
example, 
probation 
if 
applicable, 
through 
the 
various 
possible sentences up to the maximum statutory 
penalty (including any enhancements) set forth in 
the felony statutes.  Circuit courts do, however, 
generally advise a defendant of a presumptive or 
mandatory minimum sentence.  See State v. Chamblis, 
2015 WI 53, ¶24, 362 Wis. 2d 270, 864 N.W.2d 806 
(citing State v. Mohr, 201 Wis. 2d 693, 700, 549 
N.W.2d 497 (Ct. App. 1996)); see also State v. 
Thompson, 2012 WI 90, ¶51, 342 Wis. 2d 674, 818 
N.W.2d 904.  A circuit court need not advise a 
defendant of the division between confinement in 
prison and extended supervision.  See Taylor, 347 
Wis. 2d 30, ¶42 n.12 ("We have never held, and we do 
not hold today, that the court must parse out and 
specifically advise the defendant of the potential 
No. 
2014AP2488-CR   
 
44 
 
term of confinement and also the potential term of 
extended supervision at the plea colloquy."). 
 
 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
1 
 
¶97 ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, J.   (dissenting).  I do 
not join the majority opinion because I would not allow 
defendant Timothy Finley ("Finley") to withdraw his plea of no 
contest, for three reasons.  First, the two misstatements in 
this case as to the maximum penalty applicable to Finley's plea, 
taken together, do not constitute a Bangert violation.  Second, 
even if a Bangert violation could be said to have occurred in 
this case, the circuit court's finding subsequent to the Bangert 
hearing that Finley knew the maximum applicable penalty is not 
clearly erroneous.  Third, even if a Bangert violation could be 
said to have occurred in this case, and even if the circuit 
court's finding subsequent to the Bangert hearing that Finley 
knew the maximum applicable penalty is clearly erroneous, plea 
withdrawal should not be the only available remedy; Finley's 
sentence can be reduced to a 19.5-year term of imprisonment. As 
will be shown, the entirety of the record in this case 
demonstrates that Finley's motion is really based upon the fact 
that he did not receive the sentence he hoped he would receive 
pursuant to his plea negotiations.1 
I 
¶98 Although the majority focuses on the two errors that 
occurred during the proceedings below, an understanding of the 
                                                 
1 Additionally, the court's opinion should not be read as 
deciding any more than is necessary to resolve this case 
properly, and its purported need to define numerous terms raises 
unnecessary questions.   
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
2 
 
entire record is crucial to the correct disposition of this 
case.  Thus, I provide certain additional facts. 
¶99 On June 5, 2011, and according to the criminal 
complaint filed against him, Finley brutally beat K.A.G., an 
adult female with whom he lived, for a period of about five 
hours.  The complaint alleges that Finley held a 10- to 12-inch 
butcher knife to K.A.G.'s throat, continuously struck her with a 
closed fist, and choked her until she lost consciousness.  
K.A.G. alleges that she sustained bruises, a broken nose, cuts 
to her hands from when she tried to pull the butcher knife away 
from her throat, cuts "all over [her] entire neck" and on her 
stomach, and a "deep" cut on her wrist that "was bleeding pretty 
bad" and that allowed her to "see some of the tendons in [her] 
arm."  According to K.A.G., her medical treatment required, 
among other things, staples to her head. 
¶100 On June 7, 2011, a criminal complaint was filed 
against Finley charging him with four offenses: (1) first-degree 
reckless endangerment, domestic abuse, use of a dangerous 
weapon, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 941.30(1), 968.075(1)(a), and 
939.63(1)(b); (2) substantial battery, domestic abuse, contrary 
to Wis. Stat. §§ 940.19(2) and 968.075(1)(a); (3) strangulation 
and 
suffocation, 
domestic 
abuse, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 940.235(1) and 968.075(1)(a); and (4) false imprisonment, 
domestic 
abuse, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 940.30 
and 
968.075(1)(a).  The complaint stated in part that, upon 
conviction, Finley could be imprisoned: (1) up to 12.5 years for 
the reckless endangerment charge, which could be increased by up 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
3 
 
to 5 years because Finley committed the offense while using a 
dangerous weapon; (2) up to 3.5 years for the substantial 
battery charge; (3) up to 6 years for the strangulation and 
suffocation charge; and (4) up to 6 years for the false 
imprisonment charge.2 
¶101 On June 27, 2011, an information was filed at the 
close of Finley's preliminary hearing.  The State provided 
Finley's first attorney3 with two copies.  The attorney orally 
acknowledged receipt of the information.  
¶102 The information repeated the charges listed in the 
complaint against Finley, but additionally charged Finley as a 
repeater under Wis. Stat. § 939.62(1)(c) as to the first-degree 
reckless endangerment count and under § 939.62(1)(b) as to the 
other three counts.  The information stated in part that, upon 
conviction, Finley could be imprisoned: (1) up to 12.5 years for 
the reckless endangerment charge, which could be increased by up 
to 5 years because Finley committed the offense while using a 
dangerous weapon, and up to an additional 6 years because Finley 
was a repeater; (2) up to 3.5 years for the substantial battery 
                                                 
2 I do not mention any applicable fines in this separate 
writing. 
3 In order to differentiate this attorney from the attorney 
who represented Finley during plea negotiations, the plea 
hearing, and the sentencing hearing, this attorney will be 
referred to as Finley's "first attorney." The attorney who 
represented Finley during plea negotiations, the plea hearing, 
and the sentencing hearing will be referred to simply as 
Finley's attorney. The record suggests that Finley was briefly 
represented by a third attorney during the earliest of the 
proceedings below, but that attorney will not be referenced.  
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
4 
 
charge, which could be increased by up to 4 years because Finley 
was a repeater; (3) up to 6 years for the strangulation and 
suffocation charge, which could be increased by up to 4 years 
because Finley was a repeater; and (4) up to 6 years for the 
false imprisonment charge, which could be increased by up to 4 
years because Finley was a repeater. 
¶103 On August 1, 2011, Finley's arraignment was held.  The 
following conversation took place: 
THE COURT: Defendant appears in person with [his 
attorney].  So, we are here for arraignment on the 
felony? 
[FINLEY'S FIRST ATTORNEY]: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Has your client received a copy of the 
information? 
[FINLEY'S FIRST ATTORNEY]: We have received a 
copy of the information, four-count information.  I 
have provided a copy to Mr. Finley.  We discussed the 
nature of the charges and the maximum penalties.  We 
waive a formal reading of the information . . . . 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶104 Plea negotiations ensued.  On June 24, 2012, the day 
before Finley's plea hearing, and according to postconviction 
testimony from Finley's attorney,4 Finley's attorney met with 
Finley for one to two hours and discussed a plea offer made by 
the State.  Finley chose not to accept the offer.  He had been 
hoping to be found eligible by the court for the Earned Release 
and Challenge Incarceration programs, and accepting the State's 
offer would have made him ineligible for those programs.  See 
                                                 
4 See supra, n.3. 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
5 
 
generally Wis. Stat. §§ 973.01(3g)-(3m), 302.05(3), 302.045.  
Specifically, three out of the four crimes with which Finley was 
charged——substantial battery, strangulation and suffocation, and 
false imprisonment——are all crimes under chapter 940 of the 
Wisconsin Statutes, "Crimes Against Life and Bodily Security."  
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 940.19(2), 
940.235(1), 
940.30. 
 
Those 
convicted of chapter 940 crimes are statutorily ineligible for 
the Earned Release and Challenge Incarceration programs.  See 
§ 973.01(3g)-(3m).  Although the specifics of the State's offer 
are not in the record, Finley's attorney testified that the 
State asked for Finley to plead to charges that would have 
rendered him statutorily ineligible for these programs. 
¶105 Finley and his attorney thus discussed a counter-
offer, according to which Finley would plead to first-degree 
reckless endangerment.  First-degree reckless endangerment is a 
crime under chapter 941 of the Wisconsin Statutes, "Crimes 
Against Public Health and Safety."  See Wis. Stat. § 941.30(1).  
Although first-degree reckless endangerment is classified as a 
more serious crime than the other crimes with which Finley was 
charged, see Wis. Stat. 
§§ 940.19(2), 940.235(1), 940.30, 
941.30(1), Finley and his attorney believed that pleading to a 
chapter 941 crime in exchange for dismissal of the other crimes 
left Finley statutorily eligible for the Earned Release and 
Challenge Incarceration programs.  Finley's attorney testified 
as follows: 
Q:  So, on that date, which was the eve before 
the plea hearing? 
A:  That is my recollection, yes. 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
6 
 
Q:  [Finley] indicated that he would be willing 
to plead to that first-degree recklessly endangering 
safety charge? 
A:  Yes. 
Q:  And that had enhancers, did it not? 
A:  Yes, it did. 
Q:  And was it also the proposal it would include 
the repeater and the dangerous weapon enhancers? 
A:  That was based on what [the State] was asking 
for, and I don't remember the specifics of that most 
recent offer.  But I do remember that what he would 
have been pleading to, what I was going to take to 
[the State], had higher penalties than what [the 
State] was asking for, but it was only the one charge 
and it had the eligibility determination. 
Q: . . . Ultimately [the State] accepted your 
proposal; is that correct? 
A:  Yes. 
Q:  And it, in fact, was to that one charge with 
both those enhancers, correct? 
A:  Yes. 
Q:  So, with your usual practice would you then 
explain the pitfalls of going back and specifically 
detail what the maximum exposure would have been? 
A:  Yes. 
Q:  Did you -- would you have done that then 
prior, the day before prior to the plea hearing? 
A:  We did.  I remember we did discuss the fact 
that it would have been a higher penalty.  So, I 
expect we did discuss that.  Because I remember that 
was one of the specifics, that is what we were 
proposing had a higher maximum penalty. 
Q:  And in your usual practice would you ever 
have someone agree to plead to something where they 
were not aware of what the maximum exposure was? 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
7 
 
A:  No.  
Q:  So, that would have been something you would 
have covered with [Finley] so he knew, okay, you may 
become eligible, but now you are looking at this 
specific exposure; is that correct?  
A:  Yes. 
Q:  And on that date is there any reason to 
believe that you didn't give him the correct maximum 
exposure? 
A:  No. 
Q:  You did not do the plea form on that date; is 
that correct? 
A:  No.  . . .  
Q:  So, to the best of your knowledge, the day 
before [the plea hearing] when [Finley] was willing to 
plead to this charge with these enhancers, he was 
fully aware of the maximum potential penalties? 
A:  Yes. 
. . .  
Q:  . . . [T]he evening before [the plea hearing] 
[Finley] had already been told the correct amount, 
that would have been your practice? 
A:  That would have been my practice. 
(Emphases added.) 
¶106 Consequently, as of June 24, 2012——the day before 
Finley's plea hearing——there is no evidence in the record to 
suggest that Finley had been misinformed or was otherwise 
unaware of the maximum applicable penalty for first-degree 
reckless endangerment, domestic abuse, use of a dangerous 
weapon, as a repeater.  To the contrary: (1) Finley had received 
a copy of the information, which correctly stated the maximum 
applicable penalties; (2) Finley had reviewed the nature of the 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
8 
 
charges against him and maximum applicable penalties with his 
first attorney; (3) Finley had waived a formal reading of the 
information at his arraignment; and (4) Finley's attorney 
testified that, to the best of his knowledge, Finley was aware 
of the maximum applicable penalty relevant to his plea the day 
before his plea hearing.  
¶107 On June 25, 2012, Finley's plea hearing was held.  Two 
actions relevant to this case occurred prior to the hearing.  
First, Finley's attorney presented the State with Finley's 
counter-offer.  Second, Finley's attorney and Finley filled out 
and reviewed Finley's Plea Questionnaire and Waiver of Rights 
form.  
¶108 For the first time, and at most hours before his plea 
hearing, Finley was presented with an erroneous statement of the 
maximum applicable penalty.  The plea form stated in part, "The 
plea agreement . . . is as follows: Plea to count one as 
charged.  State will dismiss and read in the remaining charges 
in 2011-CF-671 as well as the charges in 2011-CM-953.  The State 
will cap its recommendation at 10 years initial confinement.  We 
are free to argue."  Unfortunately, the form also stated: "The 
maximum penalty I face upon conviction is 19 years, 6 months 
confinement . . . ." (Emphasis added.)  This is incorrect.  Upon 
conviction, 
Finley 
faced 
a 
total 
bifurcated 
sentence 
of 
imprisonment of 23.5 years: 18.5 years of initial confinement 
and 5 years of extended supervision (12.5 years for the first-
degree reckless endangerment charge, 5 years for the dangerous 
weapon enhancer, and 6 years for the repeater enhancer).  See 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
9 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§§ 941.30(1) 
("Recklessly 
endangering 
safety"), 
939.50(3) 
("Classification 
of 
felonies"), 
939.63(1)(b) 
("Penalties; 
use 
of 
a 
dangerous 
weapon"), 
939.62(1)(c) 
("Increased 
penalty 
for 
habitual 
criminality"), 
973.01 
("Bifurcated 
sentence 
of 
imprisonment 
and 
extended 
supervision").5  Finley's attorney testified that it would have 
been his practice to have proceeded line by line through the 
plea questionnaire with Finley and to have read the 19.5-year 
figure to him. 
¶109 Importantly, however, Finley's attorney also testified 
as follows: 
Q:  So, the erroneous amount of nineteen and a 
half, that was first introduced after the defendant 
had already proposed [his] offer to the State on the 
day of the plea hearing? 
A:  Yes. 
(Emphasis added.) 
¶110 At 
the 
plea 
hearing, 
the 
error 
on 
the 
plea 
questionnaire was repeated, but not until after the circuit 
                                                 
5 Finley's attorney could not determine, in retrospect, the 
origin of the erroneous 19.5-year figure.  One possibility comes 
to mind, however.  As stated, Finley faced a term of 
imprisonment of up to 12.5 years for the reckless endangerment 
charge and up to 5 years for the use of a dangerous weapon 
enhancer; these numbers add to 17.5 years.  The habitual 
criminality statute provides enhancements of 2, 4, or 6 years 
depending on the applicable maximum term of imprisonment and on 
whether the prior convictions were for misdemeanors or felonies.  
See Wis. Stat. § 939.62(1).  If Finley's attorney incorrectly 
applied the repeater enhancer from Wis. Stat. § 939.62(1)(a) 
rather than from § 939.62(1)(c), he would have added 2 years to 
Finley's term of imprisonment rather than 6.  This would result 
in an erroneous maximum term of imprisonment of 19.5 years. 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
10 
 
court correctly discussed the maximum applicable penalty.  The 
following exchange occurred: 
THE COURT:  The maximum penalty for the offense 
would be 
a fine of not more than $25,000 or 
imprisonment not more than twelve years and six months 
or both. 
MR. FINLEY:  Yes, sir. 
THE COURT:  Okay. I take it -- are we pleading as 
a repeater? 
[THE STATE]:  Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT:  Okay.  That will be the base penalty.  
Then because you are a repeater, then they could 
increase the incarceration period by not more than an 
additional six years.  And they are basing the 
repeater enhancement provision on the fact that you 
were 
convicted 
of 
possession 
of 
cocaine 
as 
a 
subsequent offender, and possession of THC as a 
subsequent offender on September 12th, 2008, in Brown 
County.  Do you remember those two felonies?  
MR. FINLEY:  Yes, sir. 
THE COURT:  Okay.  And they are also charging 
that you used a dangerous weapon.  And for the 
enhancement provision of using a dangerous weapon then 
the term of imprisonment can be increased by not more 
than five years for that.  Do you understand that 
then? 
MR FINLEY:  Yeah. 
THE COURT:  All right.  So the maximum you would 
look at then nineteen years six months confinement.  
Do you understand the maximum penalties? 
MR. FINLEY:  Yes, sir. 
THE COURT:  Now, did -- were you able to read the 
criminal complaint in the past or have the criminal 
complaint read to you in the past? 
MR. FINLEY:  Yeah. 
(Emphasis added.)  
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
11 
 
¶111 Despite the fact that, on the date of his plea 
hearing, Finley was given information that conflicted with what 
he had been told prior to that date, the record does not contain 
evidence that Finley then informed either the court or his 
attorney that he was confused by the inconsistency.6  In fact, 
the circuit court asked Finley, shortly after the exchange just 
provided: 
THE 
COURT:  Is 
there 
anything 
on 
the 
plea 
questionnaire form that you didn't understand that 
you'd like to ask your attorney questions or you would 
like to ask me questions about it? 
MR. FINLEY:  No, sir. 
¶112 The circuit court accepted Finley's plea of no contest 
to first-degree reckless endangerment, domestic abuse, use of a 
dangerous weapon, as a repeater. 
¶113 On August 22, 2012, an agent at the Department of 
Corrections prepared a presentence investigation report ("PSI") 
for Finley's sentencing.  The "Recommendation" portion of the 
PSI, which appears on page 18 of that document, states in part: 
Mr. Finley is facing sentencing for 1st Degree 
Reckless Endangerment, Domestic Abuse, Use of a 
Dangerous Weapon, Repeater, with this offense being 
defined 
as 
a 
Class 
F 
felony 
with 
a 
maximum 
imprisonment 
term 
of 
12.5 
years 
and 
a 
maximum 
confinement term of 7.5 years coupled with a maximum 
extended supervision term of 5 years.  Further 
invoking the provisions of 939.63(1)(b) because the 
defendant 
committed 
this 
offense 
while 
using 
a 
                                                 
6 Finley's attorney testified that Finley said "something" 
to him when the court advised him of the maximum applicable 
penalty, but Finley's attorney could not recall what Finley had 
said. 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
12 
 
dangerous weapon the maximum term of imprisonment may 
be increased by not more than 5 years.  Further 
invoking the provisions of 939.62(1)([c]) because the 
defendant 
is 
a 
repeater 
the 
maximum 
term 
of 
imprisonment may be increased by not more than 6 
years.  Based upon the risk to re-offend as well as 
the treatment needs it is therefore respectfully 
recommended that Mr. Finley be sentenced to 10 to 12 
years 
confinement 
followed 
by 
5 
years 
extended 
supervision.  
¶114 In a letter dated September 19, 2012, Finley's 
attorney informed the circuit court: 
My client and I have had the opportunity to 
review the Pre-Sentence Investigation prepared by the 
Department of Corrections in this case.  At this time 
we are requesting that the Sentencing Hearing . . . be 
adjourned. . . .  It appears as if some of the 
information 
presented 
in 
the 
PSI 
may 
be 
incorrect . . . . 
(Emphasis added.)  
¶115 On September 21, 2012, the sentencing hearing was 
adjourned to October 19, 2012.  On October 19, 2012, at 
sentencing, proceedings began with a discussion of some of the 
alleged errors in the PSI.  Finley's attorney explained in part: 
[FINLEY'S ATTORNEY]:  I'll just note on page 12 
there is a statement by Mr. Finley's father.  The 
first paragraph on page 12 where his father is 
claiming that he broke [N.H.'s] jaw.  There is nothing 
here to support that.  My client denies that. 
. . .  
[FINLEY'S ATTORNEY]:  The other thing I wanted to 
address is more of a legal issue would be on page 18 
regarding 
the 
Challenge 
Incarceration 
and 
Earned 
Release.  Agent says that [Finley is] not eligible 
because this is a Chapter 940 offense.  My independent 
presentence writer made the same mistake. This is a 
Chapter 941 offense, so he is statutorily eligible for 
those programs. 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
13 
 
(Emphasis added.)  In other words, the record suggests that 
Finley and his attorney closely reviewed the PSI.  In fact, they 
challenged information on the same page upon which appeared a 
detailed explanation of Finley's maximum exposure.  They did not 
challenge the explanation of Finley's maximum exposure. 
¶116 Eventually the circuit court sentenced Finley.  The 
court was clearly disgusted by the "horrific" nature of the 
offense charged, observing that the injuries sustained by K.A.G. 
"show[ed] a total, utter disregard for human life."  The court 
noted before pronouncing sentence:  
I know that the Court of Appeals . . . looks 
disfavorably upon maximum sentences, and they really 
strictly review those sentences when judges impose 
them.  But I've been here on the bench twenty-one 
years, and I've done criminal cases for most of those 
twenty-one years. . . .  And I don't know what cases 
require the maximum if this one doesn't.  
If you take time to go look at these photographs 
and understand clearly what this victim endured, I 
don't know if it takes thirty, forty, forty-nine, 
slits of the knife for someone to realize that this 
case is worth the maximum? 
¶117 The court also reviewed Finley's decades-long criminal 
history, noting the "variety of significant and serious criminal 
convictions, many that show again [Finley's] disregard for other 
human beings." 
¶118 When the court eventually sentenced Finley, it stated: 
I am going to impose the maximum sentence in this 
case.  I calculate that to be twenty-three point five 
years consisting of eighteen point five years of 
initial 
confinement 
and 
five 
years 
of 
extended 
supervision. 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
14 
 
Moreover, the court informed Finley, "I can't think of any 
reason . . . that 
you 
should 
be 
entitled 
to 
Challenge 
Incarceration or [Earned] Release, therefore I'm going to deny 
both."  
¶119 At no time during the sentencing hearing did Finley's 
attorney or Finley express any confusion as to the maximum 
applicable penalty as meted out by the court.  Indeed, at the 
end of the hearing, the court verified: 
THE 
COURT:  . . . Anything 
the 
State 
didn't 
consider -- or the Court didn't consider the State 
would like addressed . . . ? 
[THE STATE]:  No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT:  [Finley's attorney]? 
[FINLEY'S ATTORNEY]:  No, Your Honor. 
¶120 As the opinion of the court explains, on June 5, 2013, 
Finley filed a postconviction Bangert motion alleging that 
Finley's plea questionnaire misstated the applicable maximum 
penalty, that the circuit court repeated this error, and that 
Finley "did not know at the time of the plea hearing that the 
court could impose a total of 23.5 years, consisting of 18.5 
years of initial confinement and five years of extended 
supervision."  See State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 389 
N.W.2d 12 (1986).  Finley requested "that the court enter an 
order permitting Finley to withdraw his no contest plea; or 
alternatively, that the court modify the judgment of conviction 
to a maximum bifurcated sentence of 19.5 years, in keeping with 
the information Finley received at the plea hearing."  
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
15 
 
¶121 On July 19, 2013, a nonevidentiary hearing on Finley's 
motion was held.  The State acknowledged the errors that had 
occurred but argued that Finley was nevertheless aware of the 
maximum applicable penalty and had not made a prima facie 
showing under Bangert.  The State pointed in part to the 
criminal 
information 
that 
Finley 
had 
received, 
to 
representations on the record by Finley's attorneys7 that they 
had reviewed with Finley the charges against Finley and the 
maximum penalty associated with those charges, and to the 
circuit court's piecemeal recitation to Finley of the maximum 
penalty 
for 
first-degree 
reckless 
endangerment 
and 
the 
additional penalties Finley faced when the dangerous weapon and 
repeater enhancers were added.  The State argued that Finley was 
simply taking advantage of his attorney's mistake. 
¶122 The postconviction court——the same court that had 
sentenced Finley and that had interacted with Finley in the 
courtroom——denied Finley's motion.  The court concluded that 
Finley "knew fully well" the maximum applicable penalty at the 
time he entered his plea and that he had not made a prima facie 
Bangert showing.  Finley appealed.  
¶123 On March 18, 2014, the court of appeals determined 
that Finley had "established a Bangert violation as a matter of 
law" and remanded for an evidentiary hearing.  State v. Finley, 
                                                 
7 The State was likely referring to the statement at 
Finley's 
arraignment. 
 
It 
is 
unclear 
to 
which 
other 
representations the State was referring, given that Finley's 
attorney had not yet presented any postconviction testimony. 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
16 
 
No. 2013AP1846-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶16 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Mar. 18, 2014). 
¶124 On June 13, 2014, at the resultant hearing, the State 
called Finley's attorney to testify as to his interactions with 
Finley.  Much of this testimony has already been recounted, 
including testimony of Finley's discussion with his attorney the 
night before Finley's plea hearing.  The State noted that Finley 
made no objections at sentencing when the court pronounced 
sentence.  For his part, Finley decided to withdraw his request 
for modification of his sentence; his attorney stated that 
Finley only wished to withdraw his plea.  On October 8, 2014, in 
a written order, the court determined that the "State met its 
burden of establishing that Finley knew the maximum penalty he 
faced at the time he entered his plea."  The court added that it 
was "satisfied based on the testimony of [Finley's attorney] 
that Finley actually knew the correct penalty at the time he 
offered to enter a plea."  Nevertheless, the court reduced 
Finley's term of imprisonment to 19.5 years "in the interest of 
justice."  Finley appealed. 
¶125 On appeal, the State did not attempt to argue that it 
had met its burden at the Bangert evidentiary hearing.  Instead, 
it argued that, because the circuit court had reduced Finley's 
sentence to what he had been told he could receive, no manifest 
injustice resulted and Finley was not entitled to withdraw his 
plea.  On September 30, 2015, the court of appeals rejected the 
State's argument and concluded that, given the fact that the 
State did not attempt to argue it had met its burden at the 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
17 
 
Bangert evidentiary hearing, Finley was entitled to withdraw his 
plea.  State v. Finley, 2015 WI App 79, ¶¶36-37, 365 
Wis. 2d 275, 872 N.W.2d 344.  The State petitioned this court to 
review the decision of the court of appeals, and we granted that 
petition. 
II 
¶126 "When a defendant seeks to withdraw a guilty plea 
after sentencing, he must prove, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that a refusal to allow withdrawal of the plea would 
result in 'manifest injustice.'"  State v. Taylor, 2013 WI 34, 
¶24, 347 Wis. 2d 30, 829 N.W.2d 482 (citation omitted).  Barring 
a defendant from withdrawing a plea that was not entered 
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily would result in a 
manifest injustice.  Id. (citation omitted). 
¶127 This is so because "[u]nder the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a 
defendant's guilty plea must be affirmatively shown to be 
knowing, voluntary, and intelligent."  State v. Cross, 2010 WI 
70, ¶16, 326 Wis. 2d 492, 786 N.W.2d 64 (citing State v. Brown, 
2006 WI 100, ¶25, 293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906).  "A plea not 
entered 
knowingly, 
intelligently, 
and 
voluntarily 
violates 
fundamental due process, and a defendant therefore may withdraw 
the plea as a matter of right."  Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶25. 
¶128 "The duties established in Wis. Stat. § 971.08, in 
Bangert, and in subsequent cases are designed to ensure that a 
defendant's plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary."  
Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶23.  Our case law thus dictates that, 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
18 
 
after sentencing, if a defendant "(1) make[s] a prima facie 
showing of a violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1) or other court-
mandated duties by pointing to passages or gaps in the plea 
hearing transcript; and (2) allege[s] that the defendant did not 
know or understand the information that should have been 
provided at the plea hearing," the defendant is entitled to a 
postconviction evidentiary hearing at which the State must "show 
by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's plea was 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary despite the identified 
inadequacy of the plea colloquy."  Id., ¶¶39-40 (citations 
omitted).  If, at the hearing, the State fails to meet its 
burden, "the defendant is entitled to withdraw his plea as a 
matter of right."  Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶20.  On the other 
hand, if the State meets its burden, then "withdrawal of the 
plea is left to the discretion of the circuit court and will not 
be disturbed unless the defendant demonstrates a manifest 
injustice will result from the court's refusal to allow the plea 
to be withdrawn."  Id. (citation omitted). 
¶129 Importantly, an "identified inadequacy" in a plea 
colloquy——a "Bangert violation," Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶19——is 
not itself a constitutional violation requiring plea withdrawal.  
See, e.g., Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 273 ("[A] trial judge's 
failure to personally ascertain a defendant's understanding of 
the nature of the charge at the plea hearing constitutes a 
violation 
of 
sec. 
971.08, 
Stats., 
not 
a 
constitutional 
violation."); 
id. 
at 
261 
("[S]ection 
971.08 
is 
not 
a 
constitutional imperative . . . ."); Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶19 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
19 
 
("If the circuit court fails at one of [its] duties . . . the 
defendant may be entitled to withdraw his plea" (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted).).  Instead, identification of an inadequacy, 
combined with the defendant's allegation that "the defendant did 
not know or understand the information that should have been 
provided at the plea hearing," puts the court on notice that the 
defendant's 
plea 
may 
not 
have 
been 
entered 
knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily——thus the need for an evidentiary 
hearing to resolve that question.  See, e.g., id., ¶¶19-20 
(citation omitted). 
¶130 We must always keep in mind that, ultimately, our 
sometimes elaborate postconviction procedures are designed to 
ensure that defendants are afforded their constitutional rights. 
In further developing and refining the Bangert framework, this 
court should not countenance its mechanical application——to the 
detriment 
of 
the 
public——when 
it 
is 
apparent 
that 
the 
defendant's constitutional rights have not been violated.  See 
id., ¶32 ("[R]equiring an evidentiary hearing for every small 
deviation from the circuit court's duties during a plea colloquy 
is simply not necessary for the protection of a defendant's 
constitutional rights.  The Bangert requirements exist as a 
framework to ensure that a defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently enters his plea.  We do not embrace a formalistic 
application of the Bangert requirements that would result in the 
abjuring of a defendant's representations in open court for 
insubstantial defects.").  "[I]f a defendant does understand the 
charge and the effects of his plea, he should not be permitted 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
20 
 
to game the system by taking advantage of judicial mistakes."  
Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶37 (emphasis added). 
¶131 The 
record 
in 
this 
case, 
taken 
as 
a 
whole, 
demonstrates what is really going on in this case: Finley is 
simply unhappy with the sentence he received.  First, he thought 
he negotiated an outcome that would not approach the maximum 
potential penalty.  Second, he thought he negotiated an outcome 
that would allow him to be found eligible for the Earned Release 
and Challenge Incarceration programs.  Unfortunately for Finley, 
the court exercised its discretion to impose the maximum 
sentence without eligibility for those programs. 
¶132 Finley now seeks to escape the consequences of his 
plea, and seizes upon a pair of errors in the proceedings below 
to achieve this goal.  Had the circuit court and counsel been 
more careful in determining the actual maximum penalty, this 
case would not even be pending on appeal.  We do not conclude 
that such errors will always pass constitutional muster, but for 
the reasons that follow, the court errs in permitting Finley to 
withdraw his plea. 
 
A.  The Two Misstatements In This Case, Taken Together,  
Do Not Constitute A Bangert Violation. 
¶133 As stated, a post-sentencing Bangert motion requires a 
defendant to "(1) make a prima facie showing of a violation of 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1) or other court-mandated duties by 
pointing to passages or gaps in the plea hearing transcript; and 
(2) allege that the defendant did not know or understand the 
information that should have been provided at the plea hearing."  
Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶39 (citation omitted).  Relevant to 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
21 
 
this case, Wis. Stat. § 971.08 states in part: "(1) Before the 
court accepts a plea of guilty or no contest, it shall do all of 
the 
following: 
(a) 
Address 
the 
defendant 
personally 
and 
determine that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding 
of the nature of the charge and the potential punishment if 
convicted." 
 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 971.08(1)(a) 
(emphasis 
added).  
Similarly, Bangert requires trial courts, before accepting pleas 
of 
guilty 
or 
no 
contest, 
"[t]o 
establish 
the 
accused's 
understanding of the nature of the crime with which he is 
charged and the range of punishments which it carries."  
Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 262 (emphasis added). 
¶134 Despite these general rules, we recently clarified in 
Cross that "not all small deviations from the requirements in 
our Bangert line of cases equate to a Bangert violation and 
require a formal evidentiary hearing."  Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, 
¶38.  More specifically, we concluded that "a defendant's due 
process 
rights 
are 
not 
necessarily 
violated 
when 
he 
is 
incorrectly informed of the maximum potential imprisonment."  
Id., ¶37.  
¶135 In Cross the defendant was told by his attorney, the 
State, and the circuit court that the maximum penalty applicable 
to the offense to which the defendant pleaded was higher than it 
actually was.  Id., ¶1.  We concluded that Cross was not 
entitled to withdraw his plea, even though we determined that 
Cross 
"pled 
guilty 
under 
the 
belief 
that 
he 
faced 
a 
higher . . . maximum penalty."  Id., ¶5.  We instead held: 
[W]here a defendant is told that he faces a maximum 
possible 
sentence 
that 
is 
higher, 
but 
not 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
22 
 
substantially higher, than that authorized by law, the 
circuit court has not violated the plea colloquy 
requirements outlined in Wis. Stat. § 971.08 and our 
Bangert line of cases.  In other words, where a 
defendant pleads guilty with the understanding that he 
faces a higher, but not substantially higher, sentence 
than the law allows, the circuit court has still 
fulfilled its duty to inform the defendant of the 
range of punishments.   
Id., ¶4.  Put yet another way, we concluded that "a defendant 
can be said to understand the range of punishments as required 
by [Wis. Stat.] § 971.08 and Bangert when the maximum sentence 
communicated to the defendant is higher, but not substantially 
higher, than the actual allowable sentence."  Id., ¶38. 
¶136 In Taylor, decided a few years later, we confronted 
what was in some ways the opposite situation as that which 
occurred in Cross: the circuit court in Taylor suggested to the 
defendant that the maximum penalty applicable to the offense to 
which the defendant pleaded was lower than it actually was, 
because the court failed to discuss fully a two-year repeater 
penalty enhancer.  Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶¶1-2, 34.  Although 
we acknowledged a statement in Cross that, unlike the situation 
in Cross, "when the defendant is told the sentence is lower than 
the amount allowed by law, a defendant's due process rights are 
at greater risk and a Bangert violation may be established," we 
nevertheless concluded that the circuit court did not err in 
denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea.  Id., ¶¶8-
9, 34.  Specifically, we characterized the circuit court's 
omission as an "insubstantial defect," concluding that a 
"defendant's plea [is] entered knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily when the record makes clear that the defendant knew 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
23 
 
the maximum penalty that could be imposed and was verbally 
informed at the plea hearing of the penalty that he received." 
Id., ¶8.  We noted that the record in that case was "replete 
with evidence" that the defendant was aware of the maximum 
applicable penalty.  Id., ¶35. 
¶137 Cross and Taylor demonstrate that the nature and 
effect of an alleged error and what the record demonstrates 
about a defendant's understanding of any omitted information are 
factors relevant to a court's consideration of a Bangert motion.  
This stands to reason, as the Bangert procedures are designed to 
ensure than an error does not result in an unknowing, 
unintelligent, or involuntary plea.  See, e.g., Taylor, 347 
Wis. 2d 30, ¶30.  An evidentiary hearing is often needed in 
order 
to 
resolve 
allegations 
that 
a 
plea 
was 
entered 
unknowingly, unintelligently, or involuntarily, but not always. 
"Courts must not be rendered powerless to reject a conclusory 
allegation——'I didn't know'——that is disproven by the existing 
record."  Id., ¶82 (Prosser, J., concurring).  Put differently, 
if it is obvious from a record that a defendant's plea was 
entered 
knowingly, 
intelligently, 
and 
voluntarily, 
an 
evidentiary hearing should not be required to determine whether 
a plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  
See id., ¶¶34, 39, 42.  
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
24 
 
¶138 The record in the current case establishes that no 
Bangert violation occurred below.8  The two misstatements in this 
case amount to an "insubstantial defect" given the enormous 
amount of evidence in the record indicating that Finley was 
fully aware of the maximum applicable plea.  
¶139 First, Finley received a copy of the information, 
which 
correctly 
stated 
the 
maximum 
applicable 
penalties.  
Second, Finley reviewed the information, including maximum 
penalties, with his first attorney, a fact the attorney 
confirmed in court with no objection from Finley.  Third, 
Finley's attorney waived a formal reading of the information at 
Finley's arraignment, again with no objection from Finley.  
Fourth, the circuit court below correctly stated the maximum 
applicable penalty for the offense to which Finley pleaded no 
contest, correctly stated the maximum additional exposure 
because of the dangerous weapon penalty enhancer, and correctly 
stated the maximum additional exposure because of the repeater 
penalty enhancer.  Fifth, after Finley's plea was entered, 
Finley and his attorney received a PSI that correctly stated the 
maximum applicable penalty, and Finley's attorney represented to 
the circuit court in a letter that he and Finley had had an 
opportunity to review the PSI.  In fact, the transcript of the 
sentencing hearing suggests that Finley and his attorney 
                                                 
8 For purposes of this section of my analysis, I do not rely 
on testimonial evidence in the record provided by Finley's 
attorney at the postconviction hearing, because without a 
finding of a Bangert violation this hearing would not have 
occurred. 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
25 
 
reviewed the PSI quite closely, including the specific page upon 
which the correct maximum penalty appeared.  Yet, although 
Finley and his attorney challenged specific portions of the PSI, 
they never raised any concerns about the statement of the 
maximum applicable penalty as stated on the PSI.  Finally, 
neither Finley nor his attorney objected when the circuit court 
announced the incorrect maximum applicable penalty at the plea 
hearing.  Nor did they do so when the circuit court pronounced 
sentence and announced the correct maximum applicable penalty.  
¶140 Given this evidence, Finley's claim that he "did not 
know" the maximum applicable penalty in light of one erroneous 
statement on the plea questionnaire and one erroneous statement 
by the circuit court below is simply not believable.  In light 
of the many different times that Finley was correctly informed 
of the maximum potential penalty——before, during, and after he 
entered his plea——with no protestation from Finley, the error 
that occurred in this case 
is, on review of this record, an "insubstantial 
defect" such that an evidentiary hearing is not 
required to determine if [Finley] entered his plea 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  A Bangert 
violation occurs, and a hearing is required, when the 
plea is not entered knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily.  No such hearing is required here because 
this 
record 
reflects 
that 
[Finley] 
indeed 
pled 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  
Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶39.  Simply put, "[a] court is not 
obligated to accept a defendant's statement if the record 
demonstrates that the statement is not credible."  Id., ¶83 
(Prosser, J., concurring).  Cf. State v. Howell, 2007 WI 75, 
¶¶75-77, 301 Wis. 2d 350, 734 N.W.2d 48. 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
26 
 
¶141 Thus, as the State originally argued before the 
circuit court below, and as the circuit court correctly 
determined, no Bangert violation occurred in this case.  The 
record demonstrates that Finley's plea was made knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily.  Because no Bangert violation 
occurred, the circuit court was not required to grant Finley an 
evidentiary hearing on his postconviction motion and had 
discretion to grant or deny Finley's motion for plea withdrawal, 
assuming that Finley could not otherwise establish a manifest 
injustice (and Finley has not argued that he can).  See Cross, 
32 Wis. 2d 492, ¶¶4, 41-44; Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶¶34-35, 39, 
50 n.18. 
 
B.  The Circuit Court's Finding That Finley Knew The Maximum 
Penalty Applicable To His Plea Is Not Clearly Erroneous. 
¶142 Despite the foregoing, Finley was in fact granted an 
postconviction evidentiary hearing, at which the State bore the 
burden of showing "by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant's plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently 
entered, despite the inadequacy of the record at the time of the 
plea's acceptance."  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 274 (citation 
omitted).  At the hearing, the State called Finley's defense 
counsel as a witness and questioned him about his meeting with 
Finley the day before the plea hearing.  The State also noted 
the lack of objection from Finley at sentencing when the circuit 
court sentenced him. 
¶143 The circuit court concluded in its written order that 
the State had met its burden of showing that Finley knew the 
maximum penalty he faced at the time he entered his plea.  The 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
27 
 
court was "satisfied based on the testimony of [Finley's 
attorney] that Finley actually knew the correct penalty at the 
time he offered to enter a plea."  It denied Finley's motion to 
withdraw his plea. 
¶144 "Whether a plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily is a question of constitutional fact that is 
reviewed independently.  'In making this determination, this 
court accepts the circuit court's findings of historical or 
evidentiary facts unless they are clearly erroneous.'"  Taylor, 
347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶25 (citation omitted). 
¶145 The court's finding that Finley knew the maximum 
penalty he faced at the time he entered his plea is not clearly 
erroneous.  The evidence in the record supporting this finding, 
now including additional evidence provided by the testimony of 
Finley's attorney——the fact that Finley was given a copy of the 
information; the representation by Finley's attorney in court 
that he had given Finley a copy of the information and had 
reviewed with Finley the nature of the charges against him and 
the maximum applicable penalties; Finley's waiver of a formal 
reading of the information; testimony from Finley's own attorney 
that, to the best of the attorney's knowledge, Finley was aware 
of the maximum applicable penalties the day before his plea 
hearing; the fact that the plea agreement eventually reached 
between Finley and the State stemmed from an offer made by 
Finley and his own attorney, an offer made before the plea 
questionnaire 
form 
was 
completed; 
the 
correct 
piecemeal 
explanation of the maximum applicable penalty at Finley's plea 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
28 
 
hearing; Finley's failure to object at the plea hearing when the 
incorrect maximum applicable penalty was provided; the correct 
statement of the maximum applicable penalty on Finley's PSI; 
Finley's failure to object to that statement despite his other 
PSI-related objections; and Finley's failure to object at 
sentencing to the sentence he was given by the circuit court——is 
overwhelming.  See, e.g., State v. Denson, 2011 WI 70, ¶73, 335 
Wis. 2d 681, 799 N.W.2d 831; State v. Hoppe, 2009 WI 41, ¶50, 
317 Wis. 2d 161, 765 N.W.2d 794. 
¶146 As if this were not enough, the record demonstrates a 
history of deceitful behavior on the part of Finley.  Early on 
in the case, Finley's competency was examined by Dr. Richard 
Hurlbut and by Dr. James Armentrout.  Although Dr. Hurlbut 
concluded "to a reasonable degree of professional certainty that 
[Finley] . . . lack[ed] 
the 
substantial 
mental 
capacity 
to 
understand the proceedings and assist in his own defense," 
Dr. Armentrout concluded "to a reasonable degree of professional 
certainty" that Finley was "malingering cognitive disability in 
an attempt to evade legal accountability for his charged 
offenses," and that Finley did not "lack competency to proceed 
in court."  Dr. Armentrout later testified,  
Malingering refers to the intentional production 
or exaggeration of symptoms of either physical or 
psychological problems with the motivation to gain 
something the person wants to gain. . . . And in this 
case certainly I thought Mr. Finley was doing that 
because he hoped to evade accountability for the 
charges that had been made against him. 
The circuit court eventually stated that it accepted the 
testimony of Dr. Armentrout and made a finding that Finley was 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
29 
 
competent to proceed.  At sentencing, the State reminded the 
circuit court of the "incompetency sort of fiasco that we all 
went through."  
¶147 Finally, at sentencing, the circuit court noted 
Finley's "twenty to thirty aliases" and concluded that these 
aliases indicated Finley was "willing to change [his] name to 
try to avoid responsibility."  It also noted Finley's "criminal 
record that goes back into the mid-1990's." 
¶148 These 
additional 
facts 
about 
Finley's 
character, 
combined 
with 
the 
other 
evidence 
in 
the 
record 
already 
discussed, establish that it was entirely reasonable for the 
circuit court, which had spent extensive time with Finley, to 
have concluded that Finley was not telling the truth about what 
he knew at the time of his plea hearing.9  Again, the circuit 
court's determination is entitled to deference.  See, e.g., 
Moonen v. Moonen, 39 Wis. 2d 640, 646, 159 N.W.2d 720 (1968) 
("The trial court is in better position than the supreme court 
to make a judgment concerning credibility and a judgment so made 
should not be disturbed."); Onalaska Elec. Heating, Inc. v. 
Schaller, 94 Wis. 2d 493, 501, 288 N.W.2d 829 (1980) ("It is 
                                                 
9 Finley claimed he did not know the applicable maximum 
penalty at the time he entered his plea.  The court found that 
he did, and thus implicitly found Finley's claim not credible.  
See State v. Echols, 175 Wis. 2d 653, 673, 499 N.W.2d 631 (1993) 
("Where it is clear under applicable law that the trial court 
would have granted the relief sought by the defendant had it 
believed the defendant's testimony, its failure to grant the 
relief 
is 
tantamount 
to 
an 
express 
finding 
against 
the 
credibility of the defendant" (citing Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 
U.S. 422, 433 (1983).). 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
30 
 
well established that when the trial judge acts as the finder of 
fact, he is the ultimate arbiter of the credibility of the 
witnesses when there is a conflict in the testimony, and his 
findings will be sustained unless they are against the great 
weight and clear preponderance of the evidence.  Also when more 
than one reasonable inference can be drawn from the evidence, 
this court is obliged to support the finding made by the trial 
court."); Trible v. Tower Ins. Co., 43 Wis. 2d 172, 180, 168 
N.W.2d 148 (1969) ("The trial court obviously believed the 
testimony of the plaintiff.  It was his function to determine 
the credibility of the witnesses."). 
¶149 In sum, although Finley was not entitled to an 
evidentiary hearing, he was granted one.  The circuit court 
determined subsequent to that hearing that Finley actually knew 
the correct penalty at the time he offered to enter a plea.  
This finding was not clearly erroneous, and should not be 
upset.10  Given this finding, there is no basis for concluding 
that Finley's plea was anything but knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary. 
                                                 
10 Although the State now agrees with Finley that Finley did 
not know the maximum applicable penalty at the time of his plea, 
the State did not do so below, and the circuit court found that 
Finley knew the maximum applicable penalty.  In conducting our 
inquiry in this case, "this court accepts the circuit court's 
findings of historical or evidentiary facts unless they are 
clearly erroneous."  State v. Taylor, 2013 WI 34, ¶25, 347 
Wis. 2d 30, 829 N.W.2d 482 (emphases added) (citation omitted).  
The circuit court's finding has never been displaced; the court 
of appeals did not determine that the finding was clearly 
erroneous.  State v. Finley, 2015 WI App 79, ¶23, 365 
Wis. 2d 275, 872 N.W.2d 344.  
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
31 
 
 
C.  Plea Withdrawal Is Not The Only Available  
Remedy In This Case. 
¶150 Finally, even if this court were to discard the record 
in this case and accept that Finley did not know the maximum 
applicable penalty at the time he entered his plea, plea 
withdrawal is not the only available remedy in this case. 
Specifically, the circuit court's decision to reduce Finley's 
term of imprisonment to the amount he was told he could receive, 
19.5 years, remedied any error that had occurred.11  A number of 
propositions, considered together, explain why a sentence-
reduction remedy best fits the alleged wrong that occurred in 
this case. 
¶151 First, the "high standard" that must be met by 
defendants wishing to withdraw pleas after sentencing——proof by 
clear and convincing evidence that refusal to allow withdrawal 
would result in a manifest injustice——stems from the State's 
interest in the finality of convictions.  State v. Black, 2001 
WI 31, ¶9, 242 Wis. 2d 126, 624 N.W.2d 363 (citations omitted).  
In other words, we do not uproot convictions without adequate 
reason.  If there is a means of correcting errors below without 
                                                 
11 The plea questionnaire and circuit court informed Finley 
he faced a potential of "19 years, 6 months confinement."  While 
the word "confinement" might be construed to mean initial 
confinement, Finley's postconviction motion confirms that he 
understood it to mean "term of imprisonment," as he requested in 
that motion "that the court enter an order permitting Finley to 
withdraw his no contest plea; or alternatively, that the court 
modify the judgment of conviction to a maximum bifurcated 
sentence of 19.5 years, in keeping with the information Finley 
received at the plea hearing." (Emphasis added.) 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
32 
 
disturbing a settled conviction and without violating the 
constitutional rights of the defendant, this court should not 
hesitate to use it.  As is said in the broader context of the 
manifest injustice test, the question is "not . . . whether the 
circuit court should have accepted the plea in the first 
instance, but rather . . . whether the defendant should be 
permitted to withdraw the plea."  State v. Cain, 2012 WI 68, 
¶30, 342 Wis. 2d 1, 816 N.W.2d 177. 
¶152 Second, although Bangert made clear that "[w]hen a 
defendant establishes a denial of a relevant constitutional 
right, withdrawal of the plea is a matter of right," Bangert, 
131 Wis. 2d at 283 (emphasis added), we also explained in Cross 
that "the great weight of authorities from other state and 
federal courts reject the notion that the failure to understand 
the precise maximum punishment is a per se due process 
violation."  Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶33.  Likewise, Bangert 
stated that, although a violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08 "may 
have constitutional ramifications," such a violation is "itself 
not constitutionally significant."  Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 261 
n.3 (emphasis added).  
¶153 There is a principle present in both Cross and  
Taylor——namely, that incorrect or insufficient knowledge about 
an aspect of a plea does not necessarily invalidate the entire 
plea——that this court should apply here.  In Cross, for 
instance, in explaining that a "defendant who has been told a 
maximum punishment higher, but not substantially higher, than 
that authorized by law, has not necessarily made a prima facie 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
33 
 
case that the requirements of [Wis. Stat.] § 971.08 and our case 
law have been violated," we reasoned that "a defendant who 
believes he is subject to a greater punishment is obviously 
aware that he may receive the lesser punishment.  Thus, [a] 
defendant . . . who was told he faced 19 years, six months 
maximum exposure, was certainly aware that he faced 16 years 
imprisonment."  Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶¶30-31.  And in Taylor 
where, again, the defendant was verbally informed of the maximum 
applicable penalty for the charge of uttering forgery, but not 
of the additional two-year repeater penalty, we stated: 
We 
reject 
[the 
defendant's] 
argument——that 
because he was not specifically, verbally advised by 
the 
circuit 
court 
at 
the 
plea 
hearing 
of 
the 
potential, additional two-year term of imprisonment 
from the alleged repeater, his entire plea is not 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary——because he did in 
fact plead knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
to the underlying crime of uttering a forgery.  At the 
plea hearing, the court did verbally inform [the 
defendant] 
that 
he 
faced 
a 
maximum 
term 
of 
imprisonment of six years for the underlying charge of 
uttering a forgery.  
Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶45. 
¶154 Finally, "[t]he concern of due process is fundamental 
fairness.  '[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such 
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.'"  
State v. Chamblis, 2015 WI 53, ¶54, 362 Wis. 2d 370, 864 
N.W.2d 806.  The "arid logic" of the majority opinion, see North 
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 39 (1970)——the formulaic 
assessment that two misstatements in the record, plus Finley's 
allegation that he did know the omitted information, plus a lack 
of argument from the State on appeal that Finley knew the 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
34 
 
omitted 
information, 
equals 
automatic 
plea 
withdrawal——is 
inconsistent with these maxims. 
¶155 In summary, three propositions are relevant here: (1) 
we do not permit withdrawal of plea without adequate reason; (2) 
failure of a defendant to understand the precise maximum 
punishment is not a per se due process violation, and incorrect 
or insufficient knowledge about an aspect of a plea does not 
necessarily invalidate the entire plea; and (3) due process is 
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the 
particular situation demands.  These propositions suggest the 
appropriate remedy: reduce Finley's sentence to that which he 
alleges he knew he could receive, a 19.5-year term of 
imprisonment.  "In order to prevent the continuation of unjust 
sentences, the circuit court has inherent authority to modify a 
sentence."  State v. Ninham, 2011 WI 33, ¶88, 333 Wis. 2d 335, 
797 N.W.2d 451.  And reduction cures any "manifest injustice"——
Finley does not receive a sentence lengthier than he was 
informed he could receive and which he believed he could receive 
at the time he entered his plea.  Finley can then be said to 
have had an "understanding of . . . the potential punishment if 
convicted" at the time he entered his plea.  Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.08(1)(a). 
¶156 The propriety of this solution is confirmed by the 
fact that this precise remedy has been used by this court in the 
past.  In Preston v. State, the defendant was erroneously 
informed by the circuit court that he could receive a maximum 
sentence of 20 years on an attempted murder charge; the 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
35 
 
defendant eventually received a sentence of 25 years.  Preston 
v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 728, 729, 206 N.W.2d 619 (1973) (per 
curiam).  We stated: 
Under the circumstances of this case, this error 
reaches constitutional proportions . . . . [S]ince the 
defendant was informed prior to his plea that he could 
receive a maximum sentence of only [20] years on the 
attempted murder charge, fundamental fairness requires 
that he not receive a greater sentence on that charge.   
 
The sentence imposed on the attempted murder 
charge is hereby reduced from [25] years to [20]. 
Id. at 729-30 (citation omitted).  In Garski v. State, 75 
Wis. 2d 62, 248 N.W.2d 425 (1977), we discussed the requirement 
"that the defendant be informed of the full range of statutorily 
authorized penalties for commission of the crime charged, 
particularly the maximum sentence possible," Garski, 75 Wis. 2d 
at 76 (citation omitted), and cited Preston for the proposition 
that "where a trial court misinforms the defendant as to the 
maximum penalty in accepting a guilty plea, the court cannot 
then impose a greater sentence than that of which he was 
informed."  Id. (citation omitted).  
¶157 We also explained that the statement above regarding 
the requirement that a defendant be provided with information 
about 
the 
"maximum 
sentence 
possible" 
derived 
from 
an 
interpretation of the standard set forth in State v. Reppin, 35 
Wis. 2d 377, 385 n.2, 151 N.W.2d 9 (1967) (which was in turn 
taken from a list of standards promulgated by the American Bar 
Association) that "a defendant might be permitted to withdraw 
his plea of guilty if he is able to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that his plea was made under the following 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
36 
 
circumstances: 
'(3) 
the 
plea . . . was 
entered 
without 
knowledge . . . that the sentence actually imposed could be 
imposed.'"  Garski, 75 Wis. 2d at 75-76 (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted).  The phrasing of this standard is notable 
for present purposes, because if a defendant's sentence is 
reduced to that which he believed he could receive, then his 
plea is no longer one "entered without knowledge . . . that the 
sentence actually imposed could be imposed." 
¶158 Our plea withdrawal procedures may have changed since 
Preston and Garski, but the constitutional guarantee of due 
process has not.  This court should use the remedy set forth in 
Preston in this case. 
¶159 Further, reducing Finley's sentence to what he was 
told he could receive is perfectly consistent with the logic of 
Taylor: 
a 
"defendant's 
plea 
[is] 
entered 
knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily when the record makes clear that 
the defendant knew the maximum penalty that could be imposed and 
was verbally informed at the plea hearing of the penalty that he 
received."  Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 30, ¶8.  If Finley's sentence is 
reduced, then he both knew the maximum penalty that could be 
imposed and was verbally informed at the plea hearing of the 
penalty that he received. 
¶160 Finally, a sentence-reduction remedy finds analogy in 
this court's decision last year in Chamblis.  In that case, we 
assumed without deciding that a circuit court had erred in 
excluding evidence that might have changed the charge faced by 
the 
defendant 
from 
operating 
with 
a 
prohibited 
alcohol 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
37 
 
concentration ("PAC") as a sixth offense to operating with a PAC 
as a seventh offense and that might have enhanced the applicable 
penalty from a maximum of 6 years imprisonment to a maximum of 
10 years imprisonment.  Chamblis, 362 Wis. 2d 370, ¶¶1-5.  
Nevertheless, we concluded that the court of appeals' proposed 
remedy——"remanding 
the 
case 
to 
the 
circuit 
court 
with 
instructions to enter an amended judgment of conviction for 
operating with a PAC as a seventh offense and impose sentence 
for a seventh offense"——violated the defendant's right to due 
process.  Id., ¶¶6, 40.  The defendant "entered a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea to operating with a PAC 
as a sixth offense, not as a seventh offense," we explained, and 
"[b]ecause a seventh offense carries a greater range of 
punishment than does a sixth offense, the court of appeals' 
remedy renders [the defendant's] plea unknowing, unintelligent, 
and involuntary."  Id., ¶6.  In effect, we recognized that 
although the defendant should have faced a maximum of 10 years, 
rather than 6 years, we would allow the defendant to keep his 6-
year-maximum plea because that was the maximum he believed he 
could receive.  The corollary of this holding is that where, as 
here, the defendant should have faced a maximum of 23.5 years 
imprisonment, rather than 19.5 years, we can allow the defendant 
to "keep" the 19.5-year-maximum sentence he was informed he 
might receive by reducing the sentence to that amount. 
¶161 The State's proposed remedy in this case also comports 
with precedent outside of Wisconsin.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Perez-Carrera, 243 F.3d 42, 42-44 (1st Cir. 2001) (defendant 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
38 
 
who was misinformed that a count carried a mandatory 5-year 
penalty rather than a mandatory 10-year penalty and who was 
sentenced was not entitled to withdraw his plea; the district 
court was instructed, on remand, to modify the sentence imposed 
by reducing the incarcerative term to 5 years); Moore v. United 
States, 592 F.2d 753, 754-56 (4th Cir. 1979) (defendant who 
claimed he understood maximum penalty for offense to be 15 years 
and who was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment plus a 3-year 
special parole term not entitled to withdraw plea; court 
remanded to district court to allow it, in its discretion, to 
either reduce the prison sentence to 12 years such that "the 
combined sentence of prison and parole will correspond to what 
[the defendant] claims he understood to be the maximum penalty," 
or to allow the defendant to "set aside the plea and allow [the 
defendant] to plead again."). 
¶162 Plea 
agreements 
are 
often 
referred 
to 
as 
plea 
"bargains."  E.g., Chamblis, 362 Wis. 2d 370, ¶56.  If Finley 
indeed was unaware of the maximum applicable penalty, he should 
not be deprived of the "benefit of his bargain"——he is entitled 
to some kind of remedy.  Id., ¶55.  But that does not mean that 
Finley is entitled to plea withdrawal. 
¶163 Finley 
alleges 
he 
pleaded 
no 
contest 
with 
the 
understanding that he would not be sentenced to more than a 
19.5-year term of imprisonment.  He was sentenced to a 23.5-year 
term of imprisonment.  Assuming that Finley actually did not 
know the maximum applicable penalty, I would affirm the circuit 
court's decision to reduce Finley's sentence to a 19.5-year term 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
39 
 
of imprisonment, which eliminates any "manifest injustice" that 
might result in refusing to allow Finley to withdraw his plea.  
I do not join the majority, which concludes that plea withdrawal 
is the only appropriate remedy, and which therefore "embrace[s] 
a formalistic application of the Bangert requirements" without 
proper regard for what the Constitution actually requires in 
this scenario.  Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶32. 
III 
¶164 The majority's decision to allow Finley to withdraw 
his plea is particularly tragic given the circumstances of this 
case.  In a letter to the circuit court prior to sentencing, 
K.A.G.'s father wrote, "[P]lease help [K.A.G.] and our family 
heal by issuing the maximum penalty allowed by law. . . . I 
cannot describe to you how this would help my daughter.  It 
would give all of us faith in the justice system . . . ." 
¶165 Further, the circuit court below considered the need 
to protect the public "the most significant factor in this 
case."  The court told Finley:  
I believe your next victim will not survive. . . .  
[T]he fact that you keep endearing yourself to these 
women who then will allow you to father their children 
and you go from one to one to the next to the other, 
and you've got this history of violence and being 
abusive to them . . . tells me that you're going to 
find another woman. . . .  
And 
my 
fear 
is 
your 
next 
victim 
will 
not 
survive. . . .  
I cannot impose a sentence on you that allows you to 
get back on the streets and have another victim.   
No.  2014AP2488-CR.akz 
 
40 
 
¶166 Perhaps it goes without saying, but it has now been 
five years since the complaint in this case was filed. Quite 
obviously, the decision of the court——that Finley is allowed to 
start over——may very well raise significant issues as to whether 
this case can even be tried. Concluding that this is a 
constitutional violation and that plea withdrawal is the remedy 
may have profound impact on the viability of the case. The 
reality, however, highlights the need for courts and counsel to 
get it right.  
¶167 I do not join the majority opinion because I would not 
allow Finley to withdraw his plea of no contest, for three 
reasons.  First, the two misstatements in this case as to the 
maximum penalty applicable to Finley's plea, taken together, do 
not constitute a Bangert violation.  Second, even if a Bangert 
violation could be said to have occurred in this case, the 
circuit court's finding subsequent to the Bangert hearing that 
Finley knew the maximum applicable penalty is not clearly 
erroneous.  Third, even if a Bangert violation could be said to 
have occurred in this case, and even if the circuit court's 
finding subsequent to the Bangert hearing that Finley knew the 
maximum applicable penalty is clearly erroneous, plea withdrawal 
should not be the only available remedy; Finley's sentence can 
be reduced to a 19.5-year term of imprisonment. The entirety of 
the record in this case demonstrates that Finley's motion is 
really based upon the fact that he did not receive the sentence 
he hoped he would receive pursuant to his plea negotiations. 
¶168 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.rgb 
 
1 
 
¶169 REBECCA G. BRADLEY, J.   (dissenting).  We are asked 
to decide whether Finley should be allowed to withdraw the plea 
that he entered on June 25, 2012 pursuant to a plea agreement he 
not only made but actively negotiated.  In exchange for a plea 
of no contest to one count of first-degree reckless endangerment 
as an act of domestic abuse, while using a dangerous weapon and 
as a repeat offender, the State agreed to dismiss and read-in 
three additional domestic abuse charges:  substantial battery, 
strangulation and suffocation, and false imprisonment.  The 
criminal complaint and information contained the correct range 
of punishment:  first-degree reckless endangerment carried the 
potential maximum penalty of up to twelve years, six months and 
a fine of not more than $25,000; the use of a dangerous weapon 
added up to an additional five years and because he was charged 
as a repeat offender, he could receive up to another six years.  
No cumulative total was listed in the complaint or information.  
The plea questionnaire did list the "maximum penalty" "upon 
conviction" as "19 years, 6 months confinement and $25,000 fine 
and court costs."  (Emphasis added.)  Adding together 12.5 + 6 + 
5, the correct total maximum sentence including both confinement 
and extended supervision is 23.5 years. 
¶170 At the plea hearing, the circuit court established 
Finley's understanding of the range of punishments at issue when 
it specifically referred to each crime's range by asking Finley 
to confirm he understood the maximum of each charge: 
THE COURT:  The maximum penalty for the offense would 
be a fine of not more than twenty-five thousand or 
imprisonment for not more than twelve years six months 
or both. 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.rgb 
 
2 
 
MR. FINLEY:  Yes sir. 
 . . .  
THE COURT: . . . Then because you are a repeater, then 
they could increase the incarceration period by not 
more than an additional six years.  And they are 
basing the repeater enhancement provision on the fact 
that you were convicted of possession of cocaine as a 
subsequent offender on September 12th, 2008, in Brown 
County.  Do you remember those felonies? 
MR. FINLEY:  Yes, sir. 
THE COURT:  Okay.  And they are also charging that you 
used a dangerous weapon.  And for the enhancement 
provision of using a dangerous weapon, then the term 
of imprisonment can be increased by not more than five 
years for that.  Do you understand that then? 
MR. FINLEY:  Yeah. 
¶171 This recitation correctly informed Finley of the 
maximum range of punishments for each of the crimes to which he 
was pleading.  The circuit court, however, went on to recite an 
incorrect confinement cumulative total by referring to the 19.5 
years listed on the plea questionnaire:  "So, the maximum you 
would look at then nineteen years six months confinement.  Do 
you understand the maximum penalties?"  Finley answered, "Yes, 
sir." 
¶172 The circuit court accepted Finley's plea.  Finley 
returned to circuit court on October 19, 2012 for sentencing.  
The circuit court determined based on the proper sentencing 
factors that Finley should be sentenced to the maximum.  This 
time, however, the circuit court added the numbers correctly and 
imposed a 23.5 year sentence, consisting of 18.5 years' initial 
confinement followed by 5 years' extended supervision.  There 
were no objections by Finley at sentencing to the maximum 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.rgb 
 
3 
 
sentence of 23.5 years, even though the circuit court, after 
imposing the sentence, asked Finley's lawyer if there was 
anything the court did not consider or Finley would like 
addressed. 
¶173 Finley filed a postconviction motion seeking two 
remedies:  (1) plea withdrawal or (2) commutation of his 
sentence from 23.5 years to 19.5 years.  The circuit court, 
based on its review of the portion of the plea hearing where  
Finley acknowledged he understood the correct individual maximum 
punishments, denied the motion: 
I'm satisfied the defendant has not made a prima facie 
case that the plea was made anything but knowingly and 
voluntarily.  I think he knew fully well.  I think if 
you look at that transcript, I went piecemeal by 
piecemeal, twelve point five, five, six, I went 
through exactly why it was being added on.  He knew 
his base and he knew exactly each reason why the 
numbers would be added on.  They are consistent with 
the information placed in the information. 
Now, in essence what he wants to claim is, oh, in 
that case it should get me out of this plea.  I think 
where the information is provided clearly orally, and 
I think I'm required to provide the length of the 
sentence orally. . . .  
So, I orally have him sitting in that chair 
exactly right there.  We are this distance apart, and 
I went over the base penalty and the reason why he was 
receiving each of the enhancements and what the 
enhancement was.  Now, clearly he hasn't made a prima 
facie case to this Court that he didn't make that plea 
knowingly and voluntarily. 
The circuit court also denied Finley's request to commute the 
sentence. 
¶174 Finley appealed the circuit court's decision to the 
court of appeals, which held Finley made a prima facie case 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.rgb 
 
4 
 
because the two references to the 19.5 years of confinement 
constituted a Bangert deficiency.1  It remanded the case to the 
circuit court for an evidentiary hearing to give the State the 
chance to prove despite the Bangert violation, Finley entered 
his plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.  See State 
v. Finley, No. 2013AP1846-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶16 (Wis. 
Ct. App. Mar. 18, 2014) (per curiam).  This step is required to 
ensure a defendant does not "game the system by taking advantage 
of judicial mistakes."  See State v. Brown, 2006 WI 100, ¶37, 
293 Wis. 2d 594, 716 N.W.2d 906. 
¶175 Upon remand, the circuit court held the hearing as 
directed.  The State called Finley's trial counsel to testify.  
He testified: 
 A number of plea proposals went back and forth and he 
remembers meeting with Finley in the county jail the day 
before the plea hearing. 
 Finley did not like the plea proposal from the State 
because he wanted to be eligible for the Challenge 
Incarceration or Earned Release Programs.  Finley made a 
counter proposal to plead to a charge that would make him 
statutorily 
eligible 
even 
though 
Finley's 
proposal 
carried higher maximum penalties than what the State had 
proposed. 
 He specifically remembers discussing with Finley the day 
before the hearing that Finley's proposal carried a 
                                                 
1 See State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 260-62, 389 N.W.2d 
12 (1986). 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.rgb 
 
5 
 
higher maximum penalty and he would not have a client 
plead unless the client was aware of the maximum 
exposure. 
The prosecutor questioned Finley's trial lawyer further on 
this: 
Q 
So, that would have been something you would have 
covered with him so he knew, okay, you may become 
eligible, but now you are looking at this 
specific exposure; is that correct? 
A 
Yes. 
Q 
And on that date is there any reason to believe 
that you didn't give him the correct maximum 
exposure? 
A 
No. 
Q 
You did not do the plea form on that date; is 
that correct? 
A 
No.  Because we didn't have any chance on a 
Sunday evening to discuss the matter with [the 
prosecutor]. 
Q 
So, to the best of your knowledge, the day before 
when he was willing to plead to this charge with 
these enhancers, he was fully aware of the 
maximum potential penalties? 
A 
Yes. 
Q 
At the plea hearing at the time the [circuit 
court], 
utilizing 
the 
document 
that 
was 
incorrect, 
indicated 
the 
potential 
maximum 
sentence, did the defendant turn to you and say, 
wow, that's lower than what you told me? 
A 
He said something to me.  I don't recall what. 
Q 
But the evening before he had already been told 
the correct amount, that would have been your 
practice? 
A 
That would have been my practice. 
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Q 
And you, of course, were present in the courtroom 
when the Judge detailed the correct maximum 
penalties separately which were just hearing the 
numbers; is that correct? 
A 
Yes. 
Q 
So, as you entered into the plea hearing, would 
it be your opinion at this point in time that the 
defendant was fully apprised of the maximum -- 
correct maximum exposure? 
A 
That would be my practice, yes. 
¶176 Cross-examination of Finley's attorney, as material, 
provided: 
Q 
[Counsel], do you have a specific recollection of 
telling Mr. Finley the maximum penalties in this 
case? 
A 
Not a specific recollection, no. 
 . . .  
Q 
Now, 
I 
would 
draw 
your 
attention 
to 
the 
understandings 
where 
it 
says, 
"The 
maximum 
penalty I face upon conviction is nineteen years 
six months confinement and $25,000 fine and court 
costs."  That's typewritten, correct? 
A 
The nineteen -- yes. 
Q 
It was typed in.  Where the math came from, I 
have no idea. 
Q 
I just mean -- 
A 
I've racked my brain to try and figure out where 
that number came from.  I have no recollection. 
¶177 Finley's lawyer continued that he believed someone 
from his office typed that information on the form as well as 
the information regarding the plea agreement: 
Plea to count one as charged.  State will dismiss and 
read in the remaining charges in 2011 CF 671 as well 
as the charges in 2011 CM 953.  The State will cap its 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.rgb 
 
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recommendation at ten years initial confinement.  We 
are free to argue. 
¶178 Finley's lawyer clarified that the State's cap was on  
confinement not the entire sentence, and then answered a series 
of questions about the last-minute plea negotiations, and 
whether he recalls when and where he went over the plea 
questionnaire form with Finley.  Finley's lawyer did not 
remember the exact time or location.  The cross-examination 
concluded with two questions and answers, which the court of 
appeals used in its decision: 
Q 
Would it be your practice when meeting with your 
client to go through the plea questionnaire line 
by line? 
A 
Yes. 
Q 
And when you got to the understandings, would it 
be your practice to read off for him the 
"nineteen years six months confinement"? 
A 
Yes. 
¶179 Re-direct examination provided: 
Q 
But the plea form itself was not utilized when 
you met with him for this lengthy meeting the day 
before the plea hearing; is that correct? 
A 
No.  It wouldn't have been prepared by then for 
the reason we didn't have the discussion with the 
[prosecutor]. 
Q 
So, the erroneous amount of nineteen and a half, 
that was first introduced after the defendant had 
already proposed this offer to the State on the 
day of the plea hearing? 
A 
Yes. 
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¶180 In arguments, the State argued it had met its burden 
to prove Finley knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily 
entered into the plea: 
The plea offer was from the defendant.  It took 
place as negotiations were considered.  It sounds like 
they were consider[ed], meeting took place where many 
factors had to be considered and really with the idea 
that you were trading the possibility of being 
eligible for a program and risking further exposure.  
Any defense attorney would make sure that the client 
was clear on that point. 
[Finley's lawyer] has been in these courts many 
many times, many many years.  His usual practice would 
be, well, if you are willing to plead to this, you 
certainly need to know what the maximum is.  There is 
no suggestion that he was given the wrong maximum on 
the date that he met with him to discuss what should 
they offer to [the prosecutor].  That's not at all in 
evidence. 
The sums are not difficult.  There was not 
sixteen counts that one has to figure it all out.  It 
was basic mathematics and presented, the record would 
indicate, based on his normal practice, correctly to 
the defendant.  At the time the defendant said, yes, 
go offer this.  This is what I plead to.  So, at that 
point the State has established that he understood the 
maximums, the correct maximums, as he indicated he 
would plead to the charge as it was and see if [the 
prosecutor] would take that. 
. . . . 
It's unfortunate the wrong number got put down.  
[Finley's trial lawyer] doesn't remember the defendant 
at any point in time -- I don't see any record such as 
when the presentence was done where people were 
saying, well, wait a minute, we were expecting it to 
be much lower.  The maximums are usually outlined in 
the presentence report. 
I don't remember and I haven't seen all the 
transcripts, but was there any exclamations when the 
sentence was given out, judge, you can't do that.  We 
all thought it was going to be the nineteen because 
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nobody relied on that.  It was an erroneous number 
that was just unfortunately set there.  The defendant 
already knew the accurate penalty at the time he 
offered to make the plea. 
¶181 Finley's postconviction lawyer then argued the State 
failed to prove Finley knew the correct maximum sentence and 
asked the court to consider commuting Finley's sentence under 
State v. Taylor, 2013 WI 34, 347 Wis. 2d 30, 829 N.W.2d 482: 
Now, I did want to also mention, Your Honor, the 
other issue that's been in this litigation that no 
court has ruled on yet, and that is that if this Court 
concludes that Mr. Finley -- I'm sorry.  It's a 
separate type of relief based on Taylor.  And that is 
that the Court was bound by the number that was given 
to Mr. Finley on the plea questionnaire and out loud 
in court, that being nineteen and a half years. 
The claim is based on a footnote in this Taylor 
decision.  It's suggested that -- well, the problem in 
Taylor was a different one than the one here.  The 
Court seemed to suggest in this footnote that if the 
defendant is told a number, that's the most he can 
get.  It's a little unclear to me what the Supreme 
Court meant when they said that. 
It's -- let's see if I can find it -- actually 
it's paragraph 40, I believe, of the decision.  And 
what they seem to be saying is that if the defendant -
- just to use a hypothetical, let's say the real 
maximum penalty is twenty years and the defendant is 
told the maximum is fifteen years and gets fourteen 
years, that there would be no problem with that 
because he got less than he was told.  By suggestion 
they are saying that if he gets more than what he was 
told, the sentence must be commuted to what he was 
informed.  I have not seen any cases since Taylor that 
deal with that issue, but I think that it is one 
that's suggested by the decision. 
So, if the -- however, the Court rules on our 
motion to withdraw his plea, and that is what Mr. 
Finley wants, wishes to withdraw his plea, that there 
is also this other issue that the sentence should be 
commuted to a total of nineteen and a half years 
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bifurcated 
between 
both 
initial 
confinement 
and 
extended supervision. 
¶182 At this point, the circuit court asked if it would 
have to deny Finley's motion to withdraw his plea in order to 
reduce his sentence to the amount he was told at the plea 
hearing.  Finley's postconviction lawyer asked for a short 
recess to speak with Finley.  After the recess, Finley's lawyer 
withdrew "the second claim based on Taylor" and explained "Mr. 
Finley is maintaining that he would like to withdraw his plea 
and so that is the only claim that we are making."  The circuit 
court asked the State its position on this, and the State 
advised that "if the Court is going to rule that we haven't met 
our burden," "[b]ased on the Taylor case, we would ask [the 
sentence] be modified as such." 
¶183 The circuit court then denied the motion to withdraw 
the plea and ordered Finley's sentence modified to 19.5 years, 
consisting of 14.5 years of initial confinement followed by 5 
years of extended supervision.  There were no objections and 
Finley's lawyer offered to prepare an order. 
¶184 The written order following this hearing contained the 
following: 
 "The Court now finds that the State met its burden of 
establishing that Finley knew the maximum penalty he 
faced at the time he entered his plea.  However, the 
Court also believes that it is in the interest of justice 
to commute Finley's sentence to the maximum represented 
to him by the Court at the time of sentencing." 
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 "While the Court is satisfied based on the testimony of 
[Finley's trial lawyer] that Finley actually knew the 
correct penalty at the time he offered to enter a plea, 
the Court erred when it told Finley that 19.5 years was 
the maximum penalty possible and then imposed a sentence 
in excess of that amount.  Therefore, the Court believes 
that it is in the interest of justice to commute Finley's 
sentence to the maximum represented to him at the time of 
sentencing." 
¶185 Finley appealed a second time to the court of appeals, 
which reversed the circuit court's determination that the State 
proved Finley knew the correct maximum and that he entered a 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea.  See State v. Finley, 
2015 WI App 79, 365 Wis. 2d 275, 872 N.W.2d 344.  Its reversal 
was based on two things:  (1) it suggested the circuit court's 
finding that Finley was aware of the correct maximum penalty was 
clearly erroneous; and (2) the State's appellate argument 
focused on its request for a new remedy in plea withdrawal cases 
where the error relates only to the correct maximum penalty——
commutation of the sentence to the amount the defendant was 
told.  Id., ¶¶2-3, 22-23, 32.  The court of appeals reversed the 
circuit court and ordered plea withdrawal. 
¶186 We accepted the State's petition for review and heard 
oral argument in this case on April 7, 2016.  At oral argument, 
the assistant attorney general (AAG) representing the State did 
not remember that the circuit court found that Finley entered 
his plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily or that the 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.rgb 
 
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circuit court found Finley knew the correct maximum at the plea 
hearing.  The AAG was not interested in discussing that issue, 
but 
instead 
argued 
for 
an 
alternative 
remedy 
under 
the 
circumstances here——that of sentence commutation rather than 
plea withdrawal. 
¶187 I would reverse the court of appeals' decision 
ordering plea withdrawal.  My position is based on:  (1) the 
circuit court finding that the State proved Finley knew the 
correct maximum sentence at the time of the plea hearing through 
the testimony of his trial lawyer; and (2) this court's duty to 
apply the pertinent law to the facts of record in this case even 
when a party's attorney is not well-versed in the record and not 
interested in discussing the dispositive issue. 
I.  APPLICABLE LAW 
¶188 A 
defendant 
seeking 
to 
withdraw 
a 
plea 
after 
sentencing must prove by clear and convincing evidence that 
withdrawal is required to prevent a manifest injustice.  See 
Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶18.  Plea withdrawal is within the 
discretion of the circuit court.  See State v. Garcia, 192 
Wis. 2d 845, 860, 532 N.W.2d 111 (1995).  The manifest injustice 
test is satisfied if a plea was not knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily entered.  Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶18.  This 
presents an issue of constitutional fact.  Id., ¶19.  "We accept 
the circuit court's findings of historical and evidentiary facts 
unless they are clearly erroneous but we determine independently 
whether those facts demonstrate that the defendant's plea was 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary."  Id. 
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¶189 Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08 and State v. Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d 246, 260-62, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986), establish duties to 
ensure a defendant enters a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
plea.  Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶23.  Wisconsin Stat. § 971.08 
provides: 
(1) Before the court accepts a plea of guilty or no 
contest, it shall do all of the following: 
(a) Address the defendant personally and determine 
that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding 
of the nature of the charge and the potential 
punishment if convicted. 
(b) Make such inquiry as satisfies it that the 
defendant in fact committed the crime charged. 
(c) Address the defendant personally and advise the 
defendant as follows:  "If you are not a citizen of 
the United States of America, you are advised that a 
plea of guilty or no contest for the offense with 
which you are charged may result in deportation, the 
exclusion from admission to this country or the denial 
of naturalization, under federal law." 
(d) Inquire of the district attorney whether he or she 
has complied with s. 971.095 (2). 
When a defendant files a motion to withdraw a plea, after 
sentencing, based on an allegedly deficient plea colloquy, the 
motion is reviewed to determine whether the defendant has 
established a prima facie violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08 or 
Bangert, and whether the defendant has alleged he or she "did 
not know or understand the information that should have been 
provided at the plea hearing."  Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶39.  If 
the defendant meets both burdens, "the court must hold a 
postconviction evidentiary hearing at which the state is given 
an opportunity to show by clear and convincing evidence that the 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.rgb 
 
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defendant's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary despite 
the identified inadequacy of the plea colloquy."  Id., ¶40.  If 
the State meets its burden, the circuit court denies the 
defendant's motion for plea withdrawal.  Id., ¶41.  If the State 
does not meet its burden, the circuit court grants the 
defendant's motion for plea withdrawal unless the circumstances 
fall under Wis. Stat. § 973.13, State v. Cross, 2010 WI 70, 326 
Wis. 2d 492, 786 N.W.2d 64, or Taylor, in which case the 
sentence may stand or be modified.  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.13 
provides: 
Excessive sentence, errors cured.  In any case where 
the court imposes a maximum penalty in excess of that 
authorized by law, such excess shall be void and the 
sentence shall be valid only to the extent of the 
maximum term authorized by statute and shall stand 
commuted without further proceedings. 
¶190 Cross involved a defendant who was incorrectly told 
the maximum penalty was 40 years total with a maximum of 25 
years' initial confinement. Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶1.  The 
correct maximum was 30 years total with a maximum of 20 years' 
initial confinement.  The circuit court sentenced Cross to 40 
years, 
but 
after 
Cross's 
postconviction 
motion 
for 
plea 
withdrawal pointed out the error, the circuit court modified the 
sentence to 30 years with 20 years of initial confinement.  Id., 
¶2.  We held that despite the incorrect information, Cross's 
plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent and there was no 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08 or Bangert violation.  We also upheld the 
modified sentence because no manifest injustice occurred.  
Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶¶3-5.  We did observe in Cross that 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.rgb 
 
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when the misinformation on the maximum sentence is "significant, 
or when the defendant is told the sentence is lower than the 
amount allowed by law, a defendant's due process rights are at 
greater risk and a Bangert violation may be established" and if 
that is the case, the burden shifts to "the State to prove at an 
evidentiary hearing that the plea was knowing, voluntary, and 
intelligent."  Cross, 326 Wis. 2d 492, ¶39. 
¶191 Taylor involved a defendant who faced a maximum 
penalty of six years on the underlying charge, plus two 
additional years for a repeater enhancer.  Taylor, 347 Wis. 2d 
30, ¶1.  At the plea hearing, the circuit court told Taylor the 
maximum penalty was six years and referred to the repeater 
enhancer, 
but 
did 
not 
specifically 
explain 
it 
added 
an 
additional two years.  Id., ¶2.  Nonetheless, we concluded that 
the plea in Taylor was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent 
because the circuit court informed Taylor of the repeater 
enhancer at the plea hearing, Taylor understood he was charged 
with the repeater enhancer, the record demonstrated that Taylor 
knew the repeater enhancer could tack on an additional two 
years, and ultimately he was only sentenced to six years.  Id., 
¶42. 
II.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Circuit Court's Finding 
¶192 The circuit court, after conducting the evidentiary 
hearing, specifically found that the State proved Finley knew 
the correct maximum penalty and entered his plea knowingly, 
intelligently, and voluntarily.  In addition, the circuit court 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.rgb 
 
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modified Finley's sentence to a term of 19.5 years.  This, in my 
opinion, should end the matter and result in reversal of the 
court of appeals and a denial of Finley's request to withdraw 
his plea. 
¶193 The circuit court's finding is not clearly erroneous 
as the direct testimony of Finley's lawyer supports it.  
Finley's lawyer testified that Finley proposed the plea he took 
and that Finley knew the maximum penalty associated with that 
proposal.  Finley's lawyer testified about how Finley's proposal 
carried a longer sentence than the one proposed by the State but 
Finley chose the lengthier sentence with the hope of being 
eligible for Challenge Incarceration and other programs.  The 
testimony elicited on cross-examination, although inconsistent 
with the direct testimony, does not operate to erase the direct 
testimony or the circuit court's reliance on it.  The circuit 
court saw and heard Finley's lawyer testify live.  It observed 
the demeanor, facial expressions, tone, and inflection of 
Finley's lawyer.  It assessed whether Finley's lawyer's answers 
were an emphatic or reluctant "yes" as to whether Finley knew 
the correct maximum.  The circuit court, as the factfinder here, 
is in a better position to assess credibility and resolve any 
inconsistencies in the testimony.  This is why appellate courts 
defer to the factfinder on witness credibility.  See Gauthier v. 
State, 28 Wis. 2d 412, 415, 137 N.W.2d 101 (1965).  An appellate 
court should not substitute its judgment unless the circuit 
court relied on "inherently or patently incredible" evidence.  
Id. at 416.  As an appellate court, we review a black and white 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.rgb 
 
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transcript of words.  This puts us at a disadvantage in 
assessing credibility and resolving inconsistencies.  Id.  Here, 
the circuit court found Finley's lawyer's direct testimony 
credible to show Finley knew the correct maximum despite the 
double reference to "19.5 years confinement."  Finley's lawyer 
explained why:  it was Finley's proposal, they had a lengthy 
discussion about it, it was his normal practice, and he 
specifically remembers discussing the penalties with Finley.  
Further, the record shows no objection, discussion, or confusion 
when the sentencing court imposed 23.5 years instead of 19.5.  
The reasonable inference from the record suggests that both 
Finley and his lawyer knew 23.5 was the correct amount.2 
                                                 
2 Although my position does not require an analysis of State 
v. Cross, 2010 WI 70, 326 Wis. 2d 492, 786 N.W.2d 64, or State 
v. Taylor, 2013 WI 34, 347 Wis. 2d 30, 829 N.W.2d 482, or the 
fact the incorrect 19.5 referred only to confinement rather than 
the 
full 
sentence, 
I 
address 
them 
briefly. 
 
The 
plea 
questionnaire and the reference to it at the plea hearing note 
that the maximum penalty Finley faced was 19.5 years of 
confinement.  While this amount was wrong, it was only off by 
one year, not four, because it referred to confinement time, not 
total length of sentence.  Finley's total length of sentence was 
23.5 years, which consisted of a maximum of 18.5 years of 
confinement and 5 years of extended supervision.  Moreover, the 
correct 
individual 
amounts 
were 
accurately 
described 
and 
acknowledged by Finley.  Like the defendants in Cross and 
Taylor, Finley knew the amount he faced and entered a knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary plea.  Under such circumstances, 
Finley's due process rights were not violated and no manifest 
injustice occurred; consequently, the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion when it denied Finley's plea 
withdrawal motion. 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.rgb 
 
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B.  Our Duty to Follow the Law 
¶194 The law is clear in this case.  The circuit court 
found the State met its burden of proving Finley knew the 
correct maximum and entered his plea knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily.  That finding is not clearly erroneous.  It was 
based on the testimony of Finley's trial lawyer who negotiated 
the plea and would certainly be the one to know if Finley had 
the correct penalty information at the time of his plea.  Thus, 
under Bangert and Brown, that ends the matter.  Finley is not 
entitled to withdraw his plea.  How the AAG handled or argued 
this case on appeal does not alter the law.  Although we are 
entitled to accept concessions by a party, we are not required 
to do so.  See State v. St. Martin, 2011 WI 44, ¶13 n.6, 334 
Wis. 2d 290, 800 N.W.2d 858 (we are "not bound by the parties' 
interpretation of the law or obligated to accept a party's 
concession [on the] law") (citation and one set of quotation 
marks omitted).  Justice should not depend on how adeptly or 
ineptly a party's arguments are presented.  It should depend on 
what the law is.  Here, the law says a defendant may only 
withdraw a plea after sentencing if the defendant establishes a 
manifest injustice.  A manifest injustice occurs when a plea is 
not entered knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.  The 
circuit court, which is charged with deciding whether the State 
proved that Finley's plea was so entered, heard the testimony 
and argument and reached a reasonable determination based on the 
facts and law.  It held that Finley did know the correct range 
of punishment because he discussed it with his trial lawyer the 
No.  2014AP2488-CR.rgb 
 
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night before the plea hearing and the range of punishment for 
the plea agreement Finley wanted was greater than that being 
proposed by the State.  The majority casts aside the circuit 
court's ruling as if it does not exist because the State 
meandered down a different path on appeal.  I will not do so.3  
¶195 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 It also appears to me that Finley played fast and loose 
with the system, which is something this court frowns upon.  See 
State v. Petty, 201 Wis. 2d 337, 346-47, 548 N.W.2d 817 (1996). 
Finley argued in his postconviction motion, on his first appeal 
and through most of the evidentiary hearing that he wanted 
sentence modification under Taylor.  When it appeared the 
circuit court was leaning toward that remedy, Finley reversed 
course and insisted solely on a remedy of plea withdrawal.  
Although this scenario does not fit precisely into judicial 
estoppel, it definitely smells like an intentional manipulation 
of the judicial system.  See Petty, 201 Wis. 2d at 346-47. 
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