Case Title: In Re Garrison Diversion Conservancy District

Citation: 144 N.W.2d 82

Docket Number: 

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1966-06-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
144 N.W.2d 82 (1966) In the Matter of the Confirmation and Approval of the Master Contract between the GARRISON DIVERSION CONSERVANCY DISTRICT and the United States and of the Four Three-way Contracts among the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District, the United States, and respectively, the Dickey-Sargent, the Lincoln Valley, the Warwick-McVille and the James River Irrigation Districts. No. 8326. Supreme Court of North Dakota. June 30, 1966. Rehearing Denied July 20, 1966. *84 Helgi Johanneson, Atty. Gen., and Paul M. Sand, Asst. Atty. Gen., Bismarck, for Garrison Diversion Conservancy District. Roy A. Holand, LaMoure, amicus curiae. KNUDSON, Judge. This matter comes to us pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 32-24, North Dakota Century Code, upon four questions certified by the District Court of LaMoure County, the Honorable Adam Gefreh, Judge, presiding. The four questions certified to this Court by the District Court are as follows: The District Court answered all of these questions in the affirmative. This proceeding was initiated by the Board of Directors of the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District by a petition presented to the District Court for LaMoure County praying that the proceedings preliminary and incident to the making of the Master Contract between the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District and the United States, and of the Four Three-way Contracts among the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District, the United States, and respectively, the Dickey-Sargent, the Lincoln Valley, the Warwick-McVille and the James River Irrigation Districts, and the assessment and levy of a tax to meet the obligations of said Garrison Diversion Conservancy District under said contracts, and all special actions taken in connection therewith, be examined, approved and confirmed by the court. A hearing was held thereon, as provided by law upon due notice, at which time testimony and documentary evidence was introduced and received by the court. No adverse appearance was made or filed in writing or in person by anyone. The proceedings taken by the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District were reviewed and approved by the District Court. The Court, upon the motion of the petitioner, certified the four questions to this Court for determination "deeming the issues before it to depend principally or wholly upon the applicable law thereto, and that the construction or interpretation of the applicable laws are of great moment and of vital importance to the cause before the Court." The District Court answered the questions in the affirmative and said "that the proper answers are in doubt but are vital and of great moment in the cause and will be principally determinative of said cause and are not frivolous or interlocutory in nature." The petitioners set forth in their brief the reasons for presenting these certified questions to this Court, as follows: The necessity for obtaining approval and confirmation of this contract by the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota *86 is stated by Mr. Roy A. Holand, amicus curiae, as follows: Accordingly, the proceedings for the approval and confirmation of this contract were brought in the District Court under the provisions of § 61-24-15, and certified questions presented to this Court under the provisions of Chapter 32-24, entitled "Certification of Question of Law to Supreme Court." Any question may be certified in any cause in the district court, where the issue of the same will depend principally or wholly on the construction of law applicable thereto and such construction or interpretation is in doubt and vital, or of great moment in the cause, in accordance with the provisions of § 32-24-01, as follows: The certification of the question is in the sound discretion of the trial judge, and the supreme court may refuse to consider the same if it is frivolous, or is merely interlocutory in its nature, or otherwise not of sufficient importance to determine the issue in the cause at bar, as provided by § 32-24-02, as follows: *87 We have considered heretofore what is required in the consideration of certified questions of law permitted under Chapter 32-24. In City of Grand Forks v. Grand Forks County, (N.D.1965), 139 N.W.2d 242, at 248, we said: We are of the opinion that the proceedings here met with the requirements of Chapter 32-24, N.D.C.C., and we will therefore proceed to answer the questions. The pertinent parts of the Findings of Fact which set out concisely the factual background of this matter are as follows: The Garrison Diversion Conservancy District was created by the Legislature under the provisions of § 61-24-02, wherein it was provided "[s]uch district shall be a governmental agency, body politic and corporate with the authority to exercise the powers specified in this chapter, or which may be reasonably implied." The Legislature declared that the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District is for a public purpose in § 61-24-01, wherein the Legislature said: The declaration of our Legislature that such projects are devoted to the public use, while not necessarily conclusive upon the courts, is entitled to great weight. It is not the prerogative of courts to interfere with the legislative finding unless it clearly appears to be erroneous and without reasonable foundation. Ferch v. Housing Authority of Cass County, 79 N.D. 764, 59 N.W.2d 849. Irrigation districts established under the laws of the State are generally upheld as constitutional. 30 Am.Jur., Irrigation, § 60. The establishment of housing authority to cooperate with municipal authorities in slum clearance and with the aid afforded by the Federal Act to build sanitary, lowrent dwellings, has been upheld as constitutional. Ferch v. Housing Authority of Cass County, supra. The powers and duties conferred upon the district board of directors by § 61-24-08, necessary for our consideration, are as follows: The first question raises the inquiry whether Chapter 61-24 of the North Dakota Century Code, particularly as to § 61-24-08, vesting certain powers and duties upon the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District and the manner in which such powers are being exercised, is valid under the provision of § 25 of the North Dakota Constitution as being an unlawful delegation of legislative power; and under the provision of § 13 of the North Dakota Constitution as being in violation of the due process of law clause of the North Dakota Constitution. We will first consider the first part of question No. 1 whether Chapter 61-24 of the North Dakota Century Code is an unlawful delegation of legislative powers under § 25 of the North Dakota Constitution, which vests legislative power in the Legislature, and in the people by the initiative and the referendum. In 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 138b, relating to the delegation of legislative powers, it is said: The Legislature may delegate to local governmental agencies the power to legislate as to local affairs in the absence of a prohibition in the Constitution. In 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 140, the delegation to legislate as to local affairs is discussed: Article V, § 130 of the North Dakota Constitution provides for the organization of municipal corporations and fixes their powers. There is nothing in this Section of the Constitution restricting the Legislature in the exercise of that duty. It may limit such powers or withdraw any power vested in a municipality and place it with another public agency if it so desires. Ferch v. Housing Authority of Cass County, supra. A further review and discussion of the unlawful delegation of legislative power is contained in 16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, § 250, page 500: We will now consider that part of question No. 1 whether Chapter 61-24, North Dakota Century Code, violates the due process provision of the North Dakota Constitution, § 13, relating particularly to the powers and duties conferred upon the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District and its directors by § 61-24-08 and the manner in which such powers are being exercised by such District in the Master Contract. The Constitution of North Dakota, in § 13, provides that "no person shall be * * * deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." A review of the record indicates that the due process requirement has been met in all respects. The Garrison Diversion Conservancy District has been organized in compliance with the provisions of Chapter 61-24. The formation of the Master Contract and the Four Three-way Contracts has been accomplished in strict compliance with the statutes. We are of the opinion that the provisions of Chapter 61-24, North Dakota Century Code, and particularly § 61-24-08, which vests certain powers and duties in the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District, and the manner in which such powers are being exercised by said Garrison Diversion Conservancy District in the Master Contract, are not in violation of § 25 of the North Dakota Constitution as being an unlawful delegation of legislative power, nor in violation of § 13 of the North Dakota Constitution as depriving a person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The answer to question No. 1 is, yes. Question No. 2 inquires whether the levy of a one mill tax promulgated by paragraph 4 on page 2 of the Resolution adopted by the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District, in compliance with § 61-24-14, and as authorized by § 61-24-08(9), is valid under the provisions of § 176 of the North Dakota Constitution, where all lands located within the Conservancy District will be subject to the tax whether or not such lands are within an established irrigation district of the Conservancy District. The levy of this tax is authorized by §§ 61-24-14 and 61-24-08, subsection 9. However, it is not necessary for us to pass on the validity of the levy of this tax as the Master Contract does not require that this tax be levied. The answer to this question would not be determinative of the issue but would be merely advisory. Therefore, we decline to answer this question. Question No. 3 relates to the exercise of the power of eminent domain vested in the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District by § 61-24-08 for the purpose of taking or the exercise of eminent domain to provide waterways and canals and for other purposes conferred upon the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District by statute, and as provided for in the Master Contract. We have heretofore held the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District is a governmental agency, body politic and corporate with the authority to exercise the powers specified in this Chapter as provided by § 61-24-02, that it is for a public purpose, and as such it has the same power to exercise eminent domain as the State itself, or any department thereof. In Kuecks v. Cowell, (N.D.1959), 97 N.W.2d 849; in Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Wentz, (N.D.1960), 103 N.W.2d 245; and in Chandler v. Hjelle, (N.D.1964), 126 N.W.2d 141, the State Highway Department's right to exercise eminent domain was upheld. The answer to question No. 3 is, yes. Question No. 4 relates to the authority of the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District to carry out the provisions of the Master Contract under the provisions of Chapter 61-24 of the North Dakota Century Code. Having heretofore held that the Master Contract is valid it naturally follows that the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District, which is a party to the Contract, has the power to carry it out. Therefore, the answer to question No. 4 is, yes. Questions numbered 1, 3 and 4 are answered in the affirmative. Question numbered 2 we decline to answer. The case is remanded for further proceedings conformable to law. TEIGEN, C. J., and ERICKSTAD, STRUTZ and MURRAY, JJ., concur. KNUDSON, Judge. The petitioners request a rehearing or a reconsideration of certified question No. 2 which we declined to answer in the opinion for the reason stated therein that the Master Contract did not require the levy of the tax levied by the resolution, and that any answer to this question would not be determinative of the issue but would be merely advisory. However, the petitioners inform us that the term "assessment," as used in paragraph 24 of the Master Contract is meant to include "general property taxes," as well as assessments for local improvements. Paragraph 24, on page 16 of the Master Contract, reads as follows: The term "assessment" in this instance is used in a broad sense. It includes general property taxes and is not limited to assessments normally made in special improvement districts, even though some are included herein. As the term "general property taxes" comes within the meaning of the term "assessment" as used in the above paragraph it *95 was intended by this language to require the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District to use its full authority and resources to levy the general property tax of not more than one mill in compliance with § 61-24-14, and as authorized by § 61-24-08(9). The term "assessment" coupled with the language, "and will use all of the authority and sources of C-District * * *." leaves no doubt that one of the conditions of the contract is that the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District will assert all of its taxing power to meet the obligations of the contract. It is called to our attention that question No. 2 contains several phases, portions or questions which may be stated separately as follows: We have already indicated that subsection 9 of § 61-24-08 is valid, as we held § 61-24-08 to be a valid delegation of legislative power in our affirmative answer to question No. 1 in the main opinion. However, a further discussion concerning the delegation by the legislature of the power of taxation to minor political subdivisions of the state would be appropriate. The right of taxation, inherent in the people, has been vested in the legislature by the Constitution. As a general rule this sovereign power of taxation is incapable of being delegated by the legislature. It is, however, a well-recognized exception of the rule in the case of minor political subdivisions of the state, which are usually vested with the power of providing revenue to defray the expenses of the local governments and to pay for local improvements made for the public use and benefit. In North Dakota this power to tax has been delegated to counties, cities, villages and townships. This court has passed upon this question in Vallelly v. Board of Park Commissioners, 16 N.D. 25, 111 N.W. 615, 15 L.R.A.,N.S., 61, wherein we said: The directors of the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District are elected by the people of the several counties within the District, thus constituting a board of a body politic elected by the people to whom may be delegated the authority to levy taxes, within the limits prescribed by the legislature. The answer to part 1 of question No. 2 is, yes; we hold that the power and *96 authority conferred on the directors of the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District by subsection 9 of § 61-24-08 to levy a tax of not to exceed one mill annually on each dollar of taxable valuation in the district is a valid delegation of legislative power and not in violation of § 25 of the North Dakota Constitution. The proceedings for the adoption of the resolution by the directors of the Garrison Diversion Conservancy District levying a general property tax of one mill annually on each dollar of taxable valuation in the district in conformance with the requirement of § 61-24-14, and as authorized by subsection 9 of § 61-24-08, have been examined and we find were held in strict compliance with the statutes providing the procedure to be followed and were in accordance with due process. The answer to part 2 of question No. 2 is, yes. We come now to part 3 of question No. 2 posing the question whether the tax on each piece of property is valid even though the property is not located within an irrigation district of the Conservancy District. The answer to this question involves special rights reserved to aggrieved parties under § 176 of the North Dakota Constitution requiring that taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property within the territorial limits of the taxing district. This is not at issue in the proceeding and any answer we may give to the question would be merely advisory and would not be determinative of the issue. Therefore, we decline to answer part 3 of question No. 2. To summarize our answer to question No. 2 we say: The levy of the general property tax was pursuant to §§ 61-24-14 and 61-24-08(9) which we have held to be a constitutional delegation of power, the exercise of which was in accordance with due process. However, whether in specific instances the enforcement of the levy would be violative of certain rights reserved to aggrieved parties under § 176 of the North Dakota Constitution is not at issue in this proceeding and any opinion at this time would therefore be merely advisory. The petition for rehearing is denied. TEIGEN, C. J., and MURRAY and STRUTZ, JJ., concur. ERICKSTAD, J., being absent from the State did not participate.