Case Title: Dickens v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 707, 2002

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2003-04-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
LAWRENCE B. DICKENS,
Defendant Below-
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff Below-
Appellee.
§
§
§  No. 707, 2002
§
§
§  Court Below—Superior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for New Castle County
§  Cr.A. Nos. IN79-08-0371; 0372
§                               0376; 0377
§
Submitted:  March 20, 2003
  Decided:  April 21, 2003
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and STEELE, Justices
O R D E R
This 21st day of April 2003, upon consideration of the appellant’s
opening brief and the appellee’s motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The defendant-appellant, Lawrence B. Dickens, filed an appeal
from the Superior Court’s December 6, 2002 order denying his third motion for
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  The
plaintiff-appellee, the State of Delaware, has moved to affirm the judgment of
1SUPR. CT. R. 25(a).
2Dickens v. State, 437 A.2d 159 (Del. 1981).
3Dickens v. State, Del. Supr., No. 453, 1989, Christie, C.J. (Mar. 22, 1990); Dickens
v. State, Del. Supr., No. 118, 1994, Walsh, J. (Aug. 25, 1994).
-2-
the Superior Court on the ground that it is manifest on the face of Dickens’
opening brief that the appeal is without merit.1  We agree and AFFIRM.
(2)
In February 1980, a Superior Court jury convicted Dickens of
Murder in the First Degree, Attempted Murder in the First Degree, Assault in
the First Degree and Possession of a Deadly Weapon During the Commission
of a Felony.  He was sentenced on the murder conviction to a life sentence and
on the remaining convictions to additional time at Level V.  Dickens’
convictions and sentences were affirmed by this Court on direct appeal.2
Dickens subsequently filed two motions for postconviction relief.  The Superior
Court denied both motions and this Court affirmed.3 
(3)
In this appeal, Dickens claims that the Superior Court should not
have denied his postconviction motion as untimely because: a) his failure to
timely file the motion was the fault of court-related personnel; and b) his
attorney’s ineffective assistance excuses any procedural default.
4Dickens’ conviction became final in 1981.  SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (1).
5SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (5).
6SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (4).
-3-
(4)
Dickens’ claims are unavailing.  The Superior Court correctly
ruled that his postconviction motion was time-barred4 and there is no evidence
either that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to try Dickens or that there
was a miscarriage of justice due to a constitutional violation.5  Dickens’ claims
of error on the part of court-related personnel and his counsel lack factual
support.  Moreover, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
procedurally barred as formerly adjudicated and there is no evidence that
reconsideration of that claim is warranted in the interest of justice.6
(5)
It is manifest on the face of Dickens’ opening brief that this appeal
is without merit because the issues presented on appeal are controlled by settled
Delaware law and, to the extent that judicial discretion is implicated, clearly
there was no abuse of discretion.
-4-
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to Supreme Court
Rule 25(a), the State of Delaware’s motion to affirm is GRANTED.  The
judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Carolyn Berger
Justice