Case Title: Vazquez v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 302, 2014

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2014-11-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
CARLOS VAZQUEZ, 
 
Defendant Below, 
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
Appellee. 
§ 
§  No. 302, 2014 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§  Court Below—Superior Court 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
§  in and for New Castle County 
§  Cr. ID No. 1201019507 
§ 
§ 
 
Submitted:  October 1, 2014 
Decided: 
 November 25, 2014 
 
Before HOLLAND, RIDGELY, and VALIHURA, Justices. 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
This 25th day of November 2014, upon consideration of the appellant's 
Supreme Court Rule 26(c) brief, his attorney’s motion to withdraw, the State's 
response, supplemental submissions of the parties, and the record below, it appears 
to the Court that:   
(1) 
In February 2012, the appellant, Carlos Vazquez, was indicted on 
charges of Drug Dealing, two counts of Conspiracy in the Second Degree, 
Possession of a Firearm During Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”), Aggravated 
Possession, and two counts of Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited 
(“PFBPP”).   
 
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(2) 
On May 2, 2012, Vazquez pled guilty to Drug Dealing and PFBPP.  
The State agreed to recommend no more than eight years of Level V incarceration 
at sentencing and to dismiss the remaining charges.  When the Superior Court read 
Count VI of the indictment (the count number listed in the Plea Agreement) and 
asked Vazquez if he understood that charge (PFBPP based upon Vazquez’s 
possession of heroin), his counsel and the prosecutor interrupted to state that the 
charge did not sound correct.  The prosecutor stated that Count VIII was the 
correct count (PFBPP based upon Vazquez’s 2005 conviction for PFDCF).  The 
Superior Court then read Count VIII of the indictment to Vazquez, who indicated 
that he understood the charge and committed the offense of possessing a firearm 
after having been convicted of PFDCF in 2005.  In supplemental submissions 
requested by this Court, the State and Vazquez’s counsel agree that Vazquez pled 
guilty to Count VIII of the indictment.          
(3) 
At Vazquez’s sentencing hearing on July 27, 2012, the State indicated 
that although the intent had been for Vazquez to plead guilty to Count VIII of the 
indictment (a Class D felony under 11 Del. C. 1448(c) subject to a Level V 
sentence of three to eight years), it would not challenge the investigative services 
report finding that Vazquez had pled guilty to Count VI (a Class F felony under 11 
Del. C. 1448(c) subject to a Level V sentence of up to three years).  The State 
continued to recommend that Vazquez be sentenced to eight years of Level V 
 
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incarceration.  The Superior Court sentenced Vazquez to twenty years of Level V 
incarceration, suspended after six years for decreasing levels of supervision, on the 
Drug Dealing charge and three years of Level V incarceration, suspended after two 
years for one year of Level III supervision, on the PFBPP charge.  Vazquez was 
also sentenced to three years of Level V incarceration for a violation of probation.  
Vazquez did not file a direct appeal. 
(4) 
On August 15, 2013, Vazquez filed a pro se motion for postconviction 
relief.  Vazquez claimed that he was coerced into pleading guilty because his 
counsel failed to investigate his criminal history and incorrectly informed him that 
he could be found a habitual offender and sentenced to life imprisonment.  After 
the filing of the motion, counsel was appointed to represent Vazquez and 
Vazquez’s former counsel submitted an affidavit responding to Vazquez’s claims.  
The State also responded to Vazquez’s motion.  According to Vazquez’s former 
counsel, he investigated Vazquez’s criminal history, determined Vazquez would 
not be eligible for sentencing as a habitual offender, convinced the State that 
Vazquez would not be eligible for sentencing as a habitual offender, and informed 
Vazquez that he faced a substantial sentence even though he was not eligible for 
sentencing as a habitual offender.   
(5) 
On May 22, 2014, the Superior Court denied Vazquez’s motion for 
postconviction relief.  The Superior Court concluded that Vazquez’s ineffective 
 
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assistance of counsel claim was contrary to the record and without merit.  This 
appeal followed.     
(6) 
Vazquez’s postconviction counsel (“Counsel”) has filed a no-merit 
brief and motion to withdraw under Supreme Court Rule 26(c) on the ground that 
that the appeal is without merit.  Counsel has identified errors relating to the 
statutory penalties, minimum mandatory penalties, and Truth-in-Sentencing 
(“TIS”) guidelines that appeared in the TIS Guilty Plea Form.  By letter, counsel 
informed Vazquez of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided Vazquez with a 
copy of the motion to withdraw and the accompanying brief.   
(7) 
Counsel also informed Vazquez of his right to identify any points he 
wished this Court to consider on appeal.  Vazquez provided no points for the 
Court’s consideration.  The State has responded to the errors identified by 
Vazquez’s counsel and moved to affirm the Superior Court's judgment.   
(8) 
When reviewing a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief 
under Rule 26(c), this Court must: (i) be satisfied that defense counsel has made a 
conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable claims; and (ii) 
must conduct its own review of the record and determine whether the appeal is so 
totally devoid of at least arguably appealable issues that it can be decided without 
an adversary presentation.1   
                                                 
1 Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); Leacock v. State, 690 A.2d 926, 927-28 (Del. 1996). 
 
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(9) 
The Superior Court did not err in denying Vazquez’s motion for 
postconviction relief.  Vazquez’s claim that his counsel failed to investigate his 
criminal background and misinformed him that he would be eligible for sentencing 
as a habitual offender is contradicted by the record and the affidavit of his former 
counsel.   
(10) The penalty and guideline errors in TIS Guilty Plea Form identified 
by Vazquez’s counsel also do not raise an appealable issue. The TIS Guilty Plea 
form set forth the following penalties and guidelines: (i) for Drug Dealing, a 
statutory penalty of two to twenty-five years incarceration, a minimum mandatory 
penalty of two years, and a TIS guideline of two to ten years Level V 
incarceration; (ii) for PFBPP, a statutory penalty of three to eight years, a 
minimum mandatory penalty of three years, and a TIS guideline of three years 
Level V incarceration.  According to Vazquez’s counsel, the pre-sentencing 
investigation report stated that the TIS guideline for Drug Dealing was actually 
two to twenty-five years because Vazquez had two prior violent felonies and the 
penalty and guidelines for the PFBPP charge would apply to PFBPP based on 
violation of 11 Del. C. § 1448(a)(1) (a class D felony), but not PFBPP based on 
violation of 11 Del. C. § 1448(a)(9) (a class F felony).  Vazquez was indicted for 
PFBPP based on his 2005 conviction for PFDCF in Count VIII of the indictment (a 
violation of 11 Del. C. § 1448(a)(1) and PFBPP based on his possession of heroin 
 
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in Count VI of the indictment (a violation of 11 Del. C. § 1448(a)(9)).  The 
statutory penalty of three to eight years and minimum mandatory penalty of three 
years listed in the TIS Guilty Plea Form are consistent with PFBPP based on 
violation of 11 Del. C. § 1448(a)(1) by a person with a violent felony conviction in 
the past ten years.2   
(11) At the May 2, 2012 plea hearing, Vazquez pled guilty to Count VIII 
of the indictment, a PFBPP charge based on Vazquez’s 2005 conviction for 
PFDCF.  Vazquez also stated that he was not under the influence of alcohol or any 
drugs, he wished to plead guilty to Drug Dealing and PFBPP, he had not been 
promised anything to plead guilty that was not in the written plea agreement, he 
was not promised what his sentence would be, and he understood there was a 
minimum mandatory sentence of five years and that he could receive up to thirty-
three years in jail.  Vazquez was thus informed of the “maximum possible sentence 
provided by law” for Drug Dealing and PFBPP based on his 2005 conviction for 
PFDCF.3   
(12) At the sentencing hearing, the State stated that it would not challenge 
the investigative services report finding that Vazquez had pled guilty to a PFBPP 
                                                 
2 11 Del. C. § 1448(e)(1)(a) (2012) (providing that prohibited person who knowingly possesses 
firearm shall receive minimum mandatory sentence of three years at Level V if person does so 
within ten years of date of conviction for any violent felony); 11 Del. C. § 4205(b) (providing 
that penalty for Class D felony is up to eight years of Level V incarceration).  
 
3 Wells v. State, 396 A.2d 161, 162 (Del. 1978) (“The maximum possible sentence provided by 
law for conviction of the offense charged is the most important ‘consequence of the plea.’”). 
 
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charge that was a class F felony, with no minimum mandatory penalty, rather than 
a class D felony with a minimum mandatory penalty of three years.  On the PFBPP 
charge, the Superior Court sentenced Vazquez to three years of Level V 
incarceration, suspended after two years for one year of Level III probation.  This 
sentence did not exceed the statutory penalty for a class F felony and was less than 
the maximum penalty for a class D felony.  Vazquez thus benefitted from being 
sentenced for a class F felony.   
(13) The Drug Dealing sentence (twenty years of Level V incarceration, 
suspended after six years for fourteen years of decreasing supervision) was also 
within statutory limits.  The Superior Court identified aggravating factors (prior 
violent criminal activity, need for correctional treatment, and repetitive criminal 
conduct) that supported sentences in excess of the TIS guidelines.  Under these 
circumstances, we do not believe that the penalty and guideline points identified by 
Vazquez’s counsel raise an appealable issue. 
(14) This Court has reviewed the record carefully and has concluded that 
the remainder of Vazquez’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any 
arguably appealable issue.  We also are satisfied that Vazquez’s counsel has made 
a conscientious effort to examine the record and the law and has properly 
determined that Vazquez could not raise a meritorious claim in this appeal.   
 
 
 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior  
Court is AFFIRMED.  The motion to withdraw is moot.   
BY THE COURT: 
 
/s/ Randy J. Holland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Justice