Case Title: State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div. v. Sparks

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div. v. Sparks1999 WY 22973 P.2d 507Case Number: 98-6Decided: 03/01/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
STATE of Wyoming, ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND 
COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellant (Petitioner),

v.

Nancy J. SPARKS, Appellee 
(Respondent).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Laramie County, Nicholas G. Kalokathis, J.

William U. Hill, 
Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; Gerald W. Laska, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Bernard P. Haggerty, Assistant Attorney 
General, Cheyenne, Wyoming, Representing Appellant.

George Santini 
of Ross, Ross & Santini, L.L.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming, Representing 
Appellee.

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
oral argument; retired November 2, 1998.

THOMAS, 
Justice.

[¶1]      The issue 
presented by this appeal requires this Court to define the phrase, "the normal 
activities of day-to-day living," that is used in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(G) (Michie Cum.Supp. 1996). We hold that the phrase does not 
include those activities of an employee, while engaged in job-related duties, 
over which the employer has the right to control the details. The Office of 
Administrative Hearings ruled that a back injury sustained by Nancy J. Sparks 
(Sparks), who was working as a hospital nurse when she bent over a cart to 
obtain medication for a patient, was not excluded from coverage under the 
Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act (Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-14-101 through 
27-14-805 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1996 & 1997)). The employer had the right to 
control the details of the work Sparks was performing at the time of her injury, 
and we affirm the Order Awarding Benefits which the Office of Administrative 
Hearings entered.

[¶2]      In the Brief of 
Appellant, filed by the State of Wyoming, as the Wyoming Workers' Safety and 
Compensation Division (Division), the issue before us is stated in this 
way:

The Employee 
hurt her back lifting a pill from a medication cart at work as a nurse. The 
Hearing Examiner did not decide if lifting the pill was a normal activity of 
day-to-day living. Instead, he ruled that activities occurring at work, which 
are required by work, are not subject to the daily living 
exclusion.

A. Was the 
Hearing Examiner's decision contrary to law?

The issues are 
stated in this fashion in the Appellee's Brief, filed for 
Sparks:

1. Did the 
hearing officer correctly interpret the "normal activities of day to day living" 
exception found in § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(G), W.S.1977 (1996 
Repl.)?

2. Does § 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(G), W.S.1977 (1996 Repl.), violate Article 10, § 4 of the 
Wyoming Constitution by exclusion of injuries arising from the normal activities 
of day to day living from the definition of "injury" for purposes of 
compensability under the Wyoming Workers' Compensation 
Act?

[¶3]      There is no 
dispute between the parties about any of the facts in this case. Sparks was 
performing the usual duties assigned to her in her regular employment as a nurse 
at United Medical Center (the hospital) in Cheyenne, on April 13, 1997. She was 
assigned to administer medication to patients in the behavioral health unit at 
the hospital. She bent over to pick up a pill for a patient from the medicine 
cart, and experienced a severe and sudden pain in her lower back. That pain 
dissipated when she stood up, and it did not manifest itself the rest of that 
work day. When Sparks awakened the next morning, she had a stiff back, but she 
reported to work as usual. She experienced increasing pain throughout the course 
of that day, and eventually she reported it to a supervisor, who allowed her to 
leave early and to take the following day off.

[¶4]      Sparks' condition 
had not improved by April 18, 1997, and she went to see a physician recommended 
by the hospital. The physician prescribed muscle relaxants and bed rest. A few 
days later, however, Sparks experienced numbness in her right leg, and she then 
went to a different doctor, who ordered an MRI. The MRI disclosed that Sparks 
suffered from a herniated disc in the lumbar region of her 
spine.

[¶5]      On April 22, 
1997, Sparks completed the employee section of a Report of Occupational Injury 
or Disease, and the hospital completed the employer portion of that report on 
April 23, 1997. The report was received by the Division on April 28, 1997, and 
the following day, the Division issued a Final Determination, denying benefits 
for Sparks' injury. The explanation presented by the Division was that Sparks' 
act of leaning over to pick up the medication from the medicine cart was a 
normal activity of day-to-day living, and that coverage was precluded by Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(G).

[¶6]      Sparks objected 
to the Final Determination, and the matter was referred to the Office of 
Administrative Hearings, which conducted a hearing on Sparks' case on August 25, 
1997. The hearing examiner determined that Sparks' injury was covered and 
compensable. The hearing examiner explained that the phrase "day-to-day living" 
in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(G), while vague, is not intended to deny 
benefits to workers injured even though they were performing actions that they 
also could perform outside of the work environment. The hearing examiner 
addressed the interpretation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(G) in this 
way:

8. The Division 
contends that Claimant suffered her injury by the simple everyday act of bending 
over and therefore her injury is not a compensable one. Claimant argues that she 
was involved in an action required by her job and was performing her job at the 
time she injured her back. This Office is unaware of any Wyoming District or 
Supreme Court decisions dealing with the interpretation to be given Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(G) (1996). Perhaps this case will eventually result in such a 
decision. In any event, this Office is convinced that Claimant's argument is the 
correct one.

The hearing 
examiner did comment that if the interpretation of the statute urged by the 
Division was adopted, there would be very minimal coverage of injuries under the 
worker's compensation system.

[¶7]      The Division 
filed a timely Petition for Judicial Review in the district court, and the 
district court certified the case to this Court in accordance with W.R.A.P. 
12.09(b). The only question to be resolved is the construction of the statute. 
Our standard of review for such cases is quite clear:

The 
interpretation and correct application of the provisions of the Wyoming Workers' 
Compensation Act is a question of law over which our review authority is 
plenary. Tenorio v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 931 P.2d 234, 237 (Wyo. 1997); Claim of Nielsen, 806 P.2d 297, 299 (Wyo. 1991). 
Conclusions of law made by an administrative agency are affirmed only if they 
are in accord with the law. Matter of Corman, 909 P.2d 966, 970 (Wyo. 1996); 
Aanenson v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 842 P.2d 1077, 
1079 (Wyo. 1992). We do not afford any deference to the agency's determination, 
and we will correct any error made by the agency in either interpreting or 
applying the law. Matter of Gneiting, 897 P.2d 1306, 1308 (Wyo. 1995); City of 
Casper v. Haines, 886 P.2d 585, 587 (Wyo. 1994).

Wright v. State 
ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Div., 952 P.2d 209, 211 (Wyo. 
1998).

[¶8]      The statute in 
question reads, in relevant part:

(xi) "Injury" 
means any harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging and 
includes damage to or loss of any artificial replacement and death, arising out 
of and in the course of employment while at work in or about the premises 
occupied, used or controlled by the employer and incurred while at work in 
places where the employer's business requires an employee's presence and which 
subjects the employee to extrahazardous duties incident to the business. 
"Injury" does not include:

* * 
*

(G) Any injury 
resulting primarily from the natural aging process or from the normal activities 
of day-to-day living, as established by medical evidence supported by objective 
findings[.]

Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 27-14-102(a)(xi)(G). In accordance with our standard of review, this Court is 
tasked with interpreting the statute to determine whether the hearing examiner 
correctly construed and applied this language when he ruled that Sparks' injury 
was not excluded from coverage because it did not result primarily from the 
normal activities of day-to-day living.

[¶9]      In its argument 
to this Court, the Division contends that the language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi)(G) is unambiguous, and, consequently, there is no need to 
interpret the statute. The Division's position is that since Sparks was injured 
doing a very simple physical activity that most people accomplish frequently, 
her injury is precisely the kind for which the legislature intended to deny 
benefits. Despite the earnestness of the Division's arguments, we agree with the 
hearing examiner that the language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(G) is 
ambiguous. The phrase "day-to-day living" is extremely broad and essentially 
amorphous. We do not know whether it alludes to the daily activities of the 
employee or the daily activities of the entire population. It indeed is possible 
for that language to encompass almost any possible human physical effort. We do 
not assume that, by adopting this language, the legislature intended to abolish 
worker's compensation benefits in Wyoming. As the hearing examiner pointed out, 
that could be a possible consequence of adopting the Division's view. We hold 
that the language of the statute is ambiguous simply because of its lack of any 
meaningful definitional standards, and we, therefore, proceed to interpret the 
statute.

[¶10]   This Court has considered only one 
other case in which Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(G) was involved. Cabral 
v. Caspar Bldg. Systems, Inc., 920 P.2d 268 (Wyo. 1996). In that case, the 
hearing examiner determined that a back injury caused by bending to pick up a 
pack of cigarettes was not compensable because it was the product of a normal 
activity of day-to-day living. Id. at 270. We said that the plain language of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(G) imposed the burden upon the party 
resisting compensation to produce evidence to demonstrate that the injury was 
the result of normal activities of day-to-day living. Cabral, 920 P.2d  at 270. 
We affirmed the denial of benefits on other grounds, without endeavoring to 
arrive at a definition of what the phrase "normal activities of day-to-day 
living" connotes. Id. at 271.

[¶11]   Decisions of the courts of our 
sister states are persuasive authority, and they are often helpful when we 
address novel questions. However, resort to persuasive authority is not 
available to us in this instance. Kansas is the only one of our sister states 
that has enacted a "day-to-day living" exception to its definition of 
compensable injury. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-508(e) (1998) reads, in relevant 
part:

An injury shall 
not be deemed to have been directly caused by the employment where it is shown 
that the employee suffers disability as a result of the natural aging process or 
by the normal activities of day-to-day living.

No appellate 
court in Kansas has had an occasion to construe this language of the Kansas 
statutes.

[¶12]   Consequently, we turn to analogous 
legal principles in the area of employment law for some guidance in determining 
what the "normal activities of day-to-day living" are. The legislature, by Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 27-14-101(b) (Michie 1997), has specifically renounced any rule 
affording liberal construction to worker's compensation statutes. Our definition 
of the phrase, "normal activities of day-to-day living," must be reached without 
the assistance of any presumption in favor of coverage. In pursuing the task 
confronting us, our goal is to establish a definition that will not foreclose 
compensation for injuries that manifest themselves at work, even though the 
employee may be involved in an activity that most people accomplish on a daily 
basis.

[¶13]   We are persuaded that the best 
analogy is found in the area of master/servant concepts; specifically, the 
doctrine relating to the right of control. We have previously invoked that 
doctrine to distinguish independent contractors from agents and employees for 
purposes of vicarious liability. Krier v. Safeway Stores 46, Inc., 943 P.2d 405, 
411 (Wyo. 1997). It is because of the right to control the details of the 
activities in which the employee is engaged that we impute vicarious liability 
to employers for the acts of their employees. Conversely, vicarious liability 
does not attach to one who hires an independent contractor because of the 
absence of that right of control. The explanation found in a leading treatise 
is:

[S]ince the 
employer has no right of control over the manner in which the work is to be 
done, it is to be regarded as the contractor's own enterprise, and he, rather 
than the employer, is the proper party to be charged with the responsibility for 
preventing the risk * * *.

W. Page Keeton, 
Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 71 at 509 (5th ed. 1984) (footnote 
omitted).

[¶14]   We said, when confronted with a 
claim that coverage for an injured individual was not available because he was 
an independent contractor, alluding to the tests for resolving that 
question:

An outstanding 
one of these is whether the employer has or has not retained the right of 
control over the party whose status is in question. If he has retained such 
right, the party is generally regarded as a servant. Stockwell v. Morris, 46 
Wyo. 1, 22 P.2d 189, 28 R.C.L. 762; 71 C.J. 455, and cases cited.1

 

Fox Park Timber 
Co. v. Baker, 53 Wyo. 467, 84 P.2d 736, 743 (1938). We observe that several of 
our sister states also invoke the right of control test in worker's compensation 
cases for determining the issue of whether a claimant is an employee. Kelley v. 
Rossi, 395 Mass. 659, 481 N.E.2d 1340, 1342 (1985); State v. Turner, 952 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Mo. App. 1997); Oregon Drywall Systems, Inc. v. National Council on 
Compensation Ins., 153 Or. App. 662, 958 P.2d 195, 197 (1998); Glover By and 
Through Dyson v. Boy Scouts of America, 923 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Utah 1996). We deem 
this same doctrine, the right to control the details of the activity in which 
the employee is engaged, an appropriate test to determine whether the activities 
at work are normal activities of day-to-day living. The purpose of the doctrine 
in vicarious liability cases translates readily to worker's compensation issues. 
In both instances, the doctrine identifies the party who is vested with 
discretion over the work environment, and is, therefore, in the best position to 
mitigate the risks. This is an appropriate basis for distinction because the 
party possessing the ability to mitigate the risk normally should bear the cost 
of failing to do so.

[¶15]   We are satisfied that when an 
employee is engaged in activities over which the employer is vested with the 
right of control, these cannot be normal activities of day-today living because 
the employer has no such right with respect to the normal activities of 
day-to-day living. Consequently, the statutory phrase would allude to those 
activities accomplished within the workplace over which the employer is not 
vested with any right of control. We turn then to what the phrase "right of 
control" connotes. In Natural Gas Processing Co. v. Hull, 886 P.2d 1181, 1185 
(Wyo. 1994) (emphasis in original), we quoted this 
language:

"The control of 
the work reserved in the employer which effects a master-servant relationship is 
control of the means and manner of performance of the work, as well as of the 
result * * *." 41 Am.Jur.2d Independent Contractors § 8 
(1968).

It follows that 
when the employer has the right of control and can tell the employee not only 
what to do, but how to do it, that is not one of "the normal activities of 
day-to-day living." When we examine the factual background of this case, it is 
clear that the hospital had the right to control the means and manner of the 
performance of Sparks' tasks as well as the result. We hold that Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 27-14-102(a)(xi)(G) does not exclude from coverage those injuries sustained at 
the workplace when the employer has the right to control the details of the 
activity in which the employee at that time was engaged.

[¶16]   We affirm the decision of the 
hearing examiner.

Footnotes

1 Stockwell 
v. Morris, 46 Wyo. 1, 22 P.2d 189 (1933) was a tort case involving a question of 
vicarious liability.