Case Title: Packgen, Inc. v. Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer & Nelson, P.A.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2019 ME 90

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2019-06-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 90 
Docket: 
Cum-18-58 
Argued: 
September 11, 2018 
Decided: 
June 6, 2019 
Revised: 
November 19, 2019 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
Majority: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and MEAD, GORMAN, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
Dissent: 
HJELM, ALEXANDER, and JABAR, JJ. 
 
 
PACKGEN, INC. 
 
v. 
 
BERNSTEIN, SHUR, SAWYER & NELSON, P.A. 
 
 
HUMPHREY, J. 
[¶1]  In Maine, with exceptions not applicable to this appeal, the 
Legislature has spoken—a civil action against an attorney for professional 
negligence, malpractice, or breach of contract for legal services “shall be 
commenced within 6 years after the cause of action accrues,” 14 M.R.S. § 752 
(2018),1 and the cause of action accrues on “the date of the act or omission 
giving rise to the injury, not from the discovery of the [attorney] malpractice, 
negligence or breach of contract.”  14 M.R.S. § 753-B (2018).2  The question we 
                                         
1  Section 752 identifies those exceptions as “actions on a judgment or decree of any court of record 
of the United States, or of any state, or of a justice of the peace in this State, and except as otherwise 
specially provided.”  14 M.R.S. § 752 (2018).   
2  Section 753-B provides that only in actions alleging professional negligence “in the rendering of 
a real estate title opinion” and “in the drafting of a last will and testament that has been offered for 
 
2 
address in this appeal is whether the court-made doctrines of continuing 
representation and continuing negligence should apply in the determination of 
the date on which a cause of action for legal malpractice accrues under section 
753-B. 
 
[¶2]  Packgen, Inc., appeals from a judgment entered by the Superior 
Court (Cumberland County, Warren, J.) granting the motion of Bernstein, Shur, 
Sawyer & Nelson, P.A. (Bernstein Shur), to dismiss Packgen’s complaint for 
legal malpractice because Packgen’s claim is barred by Maine’s six-year statutes 
of limitations for civil actions, 14 M.R.S. § 752, and attorney malpractice actions, 
14 M.R.S. § 753-B.  Packgen argues that its claim is not barred because the 
doctrines of continuing representation3 and continuing negligence4 operate to 
bring the date of the act or omission “giving rise to [its] injury”—Bernstein 
Shur’s failure to serve a proper notice of claim or file a defective-products 
                                         
probate,” the limitation period commences upon the discovery of the cause of action.  14 M.R.S. 
§ 753-B(2)-(3) (2018).   
3  “The premise [of the doctrine of continuing representation] is that the cause of action in an 
attorney malpractice case should not accrue until the attorney’s representation concerning a 
particular transaction is terminated.”  3 Ronald E. Mallen, Legal Malpractice § 23:44 at 543 (2019 ed. 
2019) (quotation marks omitted). 
4  Under a continuing negligence theory, the statute of limitations period does “not begin to run 
until the date of the last act of negligence”—the date of last injury.  See Baker v. Farrand, 2011 ME 91, 
¶ 20, 26 A.3d 806; see also Dickey v. Vermette, 2008 ME 179, ¶ 9, 960 A.2d 1178; 3 J.D. Lee & Barry A. 
Lindahl, Modern Tort Law: Liability and Litigation § 25:123, at 25-242 to -243 (2d ed. 2002) (“Under 
the continuing tort doctrine, if the negligence involves a continuing tort involving a continuing injury, 
the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the wrong terminates.”). 
 
3 
complaint—within the statute of limitations.  14 M.R.S. § 753-B(1).  In the 
context of actions for attorney malpractice, we decline to adopt either doctrine 
and affirm the judgment dismissing the complaint as untimely pursuant to 
14 M.R.S. §§ 752, 753-B. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶3]  The following facts are drawn from Packgen’s amended complaint 
and from documents attached to it whose authenticity is not challenged.  See 
Andrews v. Sheepscot Island Co., 2016 ME 68, ¶ 8, 138 A.3d 1197; see also Moody 
v. State Liquor & Lottery Comm’n, 2004 ME 20, ¶ 11, 843 A.2d 43.  We view the 
facts alleged in the complaint as if they were admitted.  See Andrews, 
2016 ME 68, ¶ 8, 138 A.3d 1197. 
A. 
Underlying Federal Case—Packgen v. Covalence 
 
[¶4]  In 2008, Packgen retained Bernstein Shur to prosecute a 
defective-products claim against Covalence Specialty Coatings, LLC, and Berry 
Plastics Corporation.   
[¶5]  On May 29, 2008, Bernstein Shur sent a letter to Covalence “to 
provide notice of [Packgen’s] claim against Covalence.”5  Although the letter 
                                         
5  Packgen’s amended complaint, from which we draw these facts, alleges only that Bernstein Shur 
sent the letter to Covalence.  It is unclear from the complaint whether Bernstein Shur also sent the 
letter to Berry Plastics.   
 
4 
was signed by a Bernstein Shur attorney, it did not set forth the cause of action 
under oath as is required by 14 M.R.S. § 1602-B(5) (2018).  Bernstein Shur did 
not notice the missing oath, nor did it inform Packgen that a “proper notice of 
claim [was required] to start the accrual of prejudgment interest” or warn 
Packgen of “the adverse consequences of failing to serve such a notice” or the 
need to “promptly file suit . . . in order to protect Packgen’s prejudgment 
interest rights.”  In the three years that followed, Bernstein Shur “made no 
attempt to serve a valid notice of claim that complied with section 1602-B,” 
“failed to file suit or otherwise diligently pursue the case,” and “failed to keep 
Packgen adequately informed about the status of its case.”   
[¶6]  In 2011, Packgen retained new counsel and sued Covalence and 
Berry Plastics in the United States District Court for the District of Maine.  On 
November 13, 2015, a jury rendered a verdict in favor of Packgen in the amount 
of $7,206,646.30, plus interest as allowed by law.  Packgen filed an amended 
motion to alter or amend the judgment to allow post-judgment interest to 
accrue from May 29, 2008, the date that Covalence purportedly received 
Bernstein Shur’s letter on behalf of Packgen.   
[¶7]  On December 11, 2015, while the parties were awaiting the court’s 
decision on the amended motion, Packgen and Bernstein Shur “entered into a 
 
5 
tolling agreement pursuant to which any and all legal defenses based on the 
passage of time and any limitations periods applicable to any claim or cause of 
action Packgen may possess against [Bernstein Shur] arising out of [Bernstein 
Shur’s] representation of Packgen on claims against [Covalence] and other 
responsible parties . . . were tolled and would be deemed suspended from 
running as of December 11, 2015.”   
[¶8]  On March 7, 2016, the federal court (Torresen, J.) denied Packgen’s 
motion to alter or amend the judgment because Bernstein Shur’s letter to 
Covalence failed to comply with the oath requirement in 14 M.R.S. § 1602-B(5) 
and therefore did not constitute a valid notice of claim.  As a result, Packgen was 
permitted to recover prejudgment interest dating only from the filing of the 
complaint in 2011 rather than from May 29, 2008, the date on which Bernstein 
Shur served the unsworn notice.   
B. 
Packgen’s Claim Against Bernstein Shur 
[¶9]  On May 23, 2017, Packgen filed a complaint against Bernstein Shur 
in the Superior Court alleging that the law firm’s failure to send a notice that 
complied with the requirements of section 1602-B caused Packgen to sustain 
an economic loss in the amount of $2,510,293.84—the difference between the 
prejudgment interest actually awarded by the federal court and the 
 
6 
prejudgment interest that would have been awarded but for Bernstein Shur’s 
negligence.   
[¶10]  Bernstein Shur responded with a motion to dismiss the complaint 
on the grounds that Packgen’s claims were barred by the six-year statutes of 
limitations for civil actions, 14 M.R.S. § 752, and attorney malpractice actions, 
14 M.R.S. § 753-B.  Bernstein Shur argued that the act giving rise to Packgen’s 
alleged injury—the basis for Packgen’s cause of action against it—occurred on 
May 29, 2008, the date the defective notice was sent to Covalence, and therefore 
the statute of limitations expired on May 29, 2014, three years before Packgen 
filed its complaint.   
[¶11]  Packgen then filed an amended complaint, asserting that the 
December 2015 tolling agreement suspended the statute of limitations.  
Bernstein Shur countered in an amended motion to dismiss that the tolling 
agreement only saved claims that had not already expired.  Bernstein Shur 
argued that, because the letter was sent on May 29, 2008, the suit alleging 
negligence in that letter was barred by the statute of limitations regardless of 
the tolling agreement, which only preserved claims accruing after 
December 11, 2009, six years prior to the signing of the agreement.   
 
7 
[¶12]  The court concluded that section 753-B(1) barred Packgen’s claim 
and granted Bernstein Shur’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint “as to 
any claim for loss of prejudgment interest prior to the filing of [Packgen’s] 
federal complaint.”   
[¶13]  The court noted that Packgen “appear[ed] to argue that its claim is 
not limited to the loss of prejudgment interest because of [Bernstein Shur’s] 
failure to diligently pursue the case and keep Packgen informed of its status 
constituted legal malpractice ‘which caused additional damage to Packgen.’  
Packgen’s amended complaint, however, in no way specifies what additional 
damage or losses were allegedly caused by [Bernstein Shur’s] lack of diligence.”  
(Citation omitted.)  The court granted Packgen leave to file a motion to file an 
amended complaint if it alleged that Bernstein Shur committed professional 
negligence on or after December 11, 2009, that caused Packgen to incur 
financial losses other than the loss of prejudgment interest.  Packgen did not 
file such a motion, and the court entered its final judgment dismissing the action 
on January 24, 2018.   
[¶14]  The court rejected Packgen’s assertions that the doctrines of 
continuing representation and continuing negligence operate to save its claim 
from Bernstein Shur’s statute of limitations defense because it determined that 
 
8 
such a result would contravene the Legislature’s intent in rejecting the 
discovery rule and adopting the six year statute of limitations in 14 M.R.S. 
§ 753-B(1).  Packgen timely appealed.  M.R. App. P. 2B(c).   
II.  DISCUSSION 
 
[¶15]  Packgen argues that the court erred when it dismissed its claim as 
untimely because the court limited its analysis to Bernstein Shur’s act of 
sending the defective notice of claim to Covalence on May 29, 2008.  It is 
Packgen’s position that Bernstein Shur committed actionable, negligent 
omissions each day that it failed to send a valid notice or take other action in 
the case after December 11, 2009.6 
A. 
Standard of Review  
[¶16]  “A motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint,” 
In re Wage Payment Litig., 2000 ME 162, ¶ 3, 759 A.2d 217 (quotation marks 
omitted), the material allegations of which “must be taken as admitted,” Moody, 
2004 ME 20, ¶ 7, 843 A.2d 43 (quotation marks omitted); see also Ramsey v. 
Baxter Title Co., 2012 ME 113, ¶ 2, 54 A.3d 710.  When reviewing the grant of a 
motion to dismiss, “we examine the complaint in the light most favorable to the 
                                         
6  Packgen asserts that its claim against Bernstein Shur for negligent omissions after 
December 11, 2009, was preserved by the parties’ December 11, 2015, tolling agreement.   
 
9 
plaintiff to determine whether it sets forth elements of a cause of action or 
alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to some legal 
theory.”  In re Wage Payment Litig., 2000 ME 162, ¶ 3, 759 A.2d 217; see also 
McCormick v. Crane, 2012 ME 20, ¶ 5, 37 A.3d 295.  A dismissal is only proper 
“when it appears beyond doubt that [the] plaintiff is entitled to no relief under 
any set of facts that [it] might prove in support of [its] claim.”  Moody, 
2004 ME 20, ¶ 7, 843 A.2d 43 (quotation marks omitted). 
B. 
Statute of Limitations 
[¶17]  In this case, Packgen challenges the court’s interpretation and 
application of the statute of limitations in attorney malpractice cases.  “Whether 
a claim is barred by the statute of limitations is a legal question subject to 
de novo review.”  Estate of Weatherbee, 2014 ME 73, ¶ 14, 93 A.3d 248.  “The 
statute of limitations is an affirmative defense.  Unless it is clear on the face of 
the complaint that the action is barred by the relevant statute of limitations, 
dismissal on limitations grounds is improper.”  Jackson v. Borkowski, 
627 A.2d 1010, 1013 (Me. 1993) (citation omitted). 
[¶18]  In a legal negligence or malpractice action, the six-year statute of 
limitations begins to run from the date the cause of action accrues, 14 M.R.S. 
§ 752—that is, “from the date of the act or omission giving rise to the injury, not 
 
10 
from the discovery of the [attorney] malpractice, negligence or breach of 
contract,” id. § 753-B(1). 
[¶19]  In general, “[w]e construe statutes of limitations narrowly.”  White 
v. McTeague, Higbee, Case, Cohen, Whitney & Toker, P.A., 2002 ME 160, ¶ 8, 
809 A.2d 622.  “When a statute already defines accrual . . . we are not free to 
re-define the term,” Musk v. Nelson, 647 A.2d 1198, 1201 (Me. 1994); however, 
“[a]bsent legislative direction, the decision of when a cause of action accrues is 
a judicial function,” White, 2002 ME 160, ¶ 7, 809 A.2d 622. 
[¶20]  “In interpreting a statute, our single goal is to give effect to the 
Legislature’s intent in enacting the statute.”  Dickau v. Vt. Mut. Ins. Co., 
2014 ME 158, ¶ 19, 107 A.3d 621.  In general, a statute of limitations “should be 
construed strictly in favor of the bar which it was intended to create.”  Harkness 
v. Fitzgerald, 1997 ME 207, ¶ 5, 701 A.2d 370 (quotation marks omitted); see 
also Dickau, 2014 ME 158, ¶ 21, 107 A.3d 621 (“Among [the principles of 
statutory construction] is the principle that we must interpret the plain 
language by taking into account the subject matter and purposes of the statute, 
and the consequences of a particular interpretation.”).  
[¶21]  To determine that legislative intent, “we first look to the plain 
language of the provisions to determine their meaning.”  MaineToday Media, 
 
11 
Inc. v. State, 2013 ME 100, ¶ 6, 82 A.3d 104.  “We seek to discern from the plain 
language of the statute the real purpose of the legislation, avoiding results that 
are absurd, inconsistent, unreasonable, or illogical.  If the statutory language is 
clear and unambiguous, we construe the statute in accordance with its plain 
meaning in the context of the whole statutory scheme.”  Harrington v. State, 
2014 ME 88, ¶ 5, 96 A.3d 696 (alteration, citation, and quotation marks 
omitted).  “If the plain language of a statute is ambiguous—that is, susceptible 
of different meanings—we will then go on to consider the statute’s meaning in 
light of its legislative history and other indicia of legislative intent.”  
MaineToday Media, Inc., 2013 ME 100, ¶ 6, 82 A.3d 104. 
1. 
The Occurrence Rule 
[¶22]  Title 14 M.R.S. § 753-B provides the accrual date for actions against 
attorneys as follows:   
In actions alleging professional negligence, malpractice, or breach 
of contract for legal service by a licensed attorney, the statute of 
limitations starts to run from the date of the act or omission giving 
rise to the injury, not from the discovery of the malpractice, 
negligence or breach of contract, except as provided in this section 
or as the statute of limitations may be suspended by other laws.   
 
 
12 
By its plain language, section 753-B unambiguously divests itself of the 
discovery rule in attorney malpractice cases in all but two circumstances not 
applicable here7 and, instead, adopts an occurrence rule.  14 M.R.S. § 753-B.   
[¶23]  Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations is tolled until 
the injured party knows or should know of the harm caused.  See 3 Ronald E. 
Mallen, Legal Malpractice § 23:54 at 604 (2019 ed. 2019).  In contrast, under 
the occurrence rule, the statute of limitations begins to run on the date of the 
“occurrence of the essential facts that form the cause of action”—i.e., the date 
of the act or omission giving rise to the injury.  See id. § 23:22 at 446-50.  As a 
practical matter, because the clock begins to run on the date that the act or 
omission giving rise to the injury occurred, under the occurrence rule, the 
statute of limitations could begin to run before an injured party becomes aware 
of its injury.  Id. § 23:22 at 454.   
 
[¶24]  Packgen argues that our analysis regarding negligence or 
malpractice actions against attorneys should not be limited to the strictures of 
the occurrence rule and urges us to adopt the doctrines of continuing 
representation and continuing negligence, which would save its claim against 
Bernstein Shur from dismissal resulting from the statute of limitations.   
                                         
7  See supra n.2. 
 
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2. 
The Continuing Representation Doctrine 
[¶25]  The doctrine of continuing representation has been adopted in 
some states.  In those states, the doctrine is applied “only where there are clear 
indicia of an ongoing, continuous, developing and dependent relationship 
between the client and the attorney.”  Smith v. Stacy, 482 S.E.2d 115, 121 
(W. Va. 1996) (quotation marks omitted).  This doctrine is “designed to toll the 
statute of limitations during the continuation of the attorney/client 
relationship . . . until the professional relationship terminates with respect to 
the matter underlying the malpractice action.”  Id. at 120.  The continuing 
representation doctrine was originally used in medical malpractice cases and 
applied in legal malpractice litigation as “a direct reaction to the illogical 
requirement of the occurrence rule, which compels clients to sue their 
attorneys though the relationship continues, and there has not been and may 
never be any injury.”  3 Ronald E. Mallen, Legal Malpractice § 23:44 at 543.  
Relying on this reasoning, Packgen asserts that we should adopt the continuing 
representation doctrine in legal malpractice cases and claims it had an ongoing, 
continuous, developing, and dependent relationship with Bernstein Shur.   
 
[¶26]  Although we have not had the opportunity to determine whether 
the continuing representation doctrine has a place in attorney malpractice 
 
14 
litigation,8 we have had occasion to review the use of this doctrine in the context 
of medical malpractice claims.  See Dickey v. Vermette, 2008 ME 179, 
960 A.2d 1178.  In Dickey, we rejected the application of the continuing course 
of treatment doctrine—as it is called in medical malpractice litigation—
pursuant to which the statute of limitations would not begin to run until the 
end of the doctor-patient relationship.  Id. ¶ 7.  We observed that, when the 
Legislature set “a three-year period of limitations, declaring that the cause of 
action accrues on the date of the act or omission giving rise to the injury and 
carving out a specific exception for foreign objects, the Legislature effectively 
declined to adopt the continuing course of treatment doctrine.”  Id. (quotation 
marks omitted).  Applying the continuous course of treatment doctrine to save 
the plaintiff’s claim would have required “imposing a judicially-created 
exception that is contrary to the plain meaning of [the statute of limitations].”  
Id.; see also Dasha v. Me. Med. Ctr., 665 A.2d 993, 996 (Me. 1995).   
 
[¶27]  The legislative history of section 753-B similarly proscribes our 
ability to define when a legal negligence or malpractice cause of action accrues.  
                                         
8  In Nevin v. Union Tr. Co., 1999 ME 47, ¶ 37, 726 A.2d 694, we declined to determine whether the 
continuing representation doctrine could ever apply in legal malpractice cases because the plaintiffs 
“stipulated away any such claims by waiving claims regarding any representation” in the unexpired 
limitations period.   
 
15 
The Legislature clearly defined the accrual date for actions for legal malpractice 
when it first adopted the occurrence rule, see P.L. 1985, ch. 804, § 2 (effective 
Aug. 1, 1988) (codified at 14 M.R.S. § 753-A (Supp. 1988)).9  This change to the 
legal malpractice statute of limitations was part of a substantial overhaul to the 
laws relating to professional liability generally, and was primarily an effort to 
respond to the high cost of liability insurance for medical practitioners.  See L.D. 
2400 (112th Legis. 1986).  The occurrence rule “comports with a legislative 
intent to limit stale claims against attorneys” and the “policy of repose 
mandated by the Legislature.”  White, 2002 ME 160, ¶ 8, 809 A.2d 622.  When 
the Legislature enacted the statute of limitations for actions involving 
attorneys, it articulated that this law “expands the current ‘discovery rule’ in 
actions . . . by extending it to malpractice actions involving wills as well as title 
searches.  The ‘discovery rule’ will not apply in any other attorney malpractice 
actions.”  L.D. 2400, Statement of Fact (112th Legis. 1986) (emphasis added); 
see also Nevin v. Union Tr. Co., 1999 ME 47, ¶¶ 31, 34-35, 726 A.2d 694.  This 
Legislative action reveals an intent not only to provide repose, but to start the 
statutory clock at the earliest possible moment—when the act or omission 
                                         
9  Title 14 M.R.S. § 753-A has since been repealed and replaced by 14 M.R.S. § 753-B (2018).  See 
P.L. 2001, ch. 114, §§ 1-2 (effective Sept. 21, 2001).   
 
16 
causing the injury occurs.  The Legislature could have chosen to adopt a rule 
that triggered the running of the statute of limitations when the client became 
aware of his or her injury, but it did not.  Instead, it determined that the 
limitations period begins when the act or omission giving rise to the cause of 
action occurs.  14 M.R.S. § 753-B.  This suggests that the Legislature intended 
for legal malpractice claims to begin and be resolved without delay. 
 
[¶28]  Further, as reasoned in Dickey, and correctly recognized by the 
trial court in this case, applying the doctrine of continuing representation in 
attorney negligence or malpractice actions would be tantamount to 
resurrecting the discovery rule, which is clearly foreclosed by the plain 
language of section 753-B.  2008 ME 179, ¶ 7, 960 A.2d 1178.  Adoption of the 
continuing representation doctrine would defer accrual of a cause of action 
until the attorney-client relationship is terminated, potentially tolling the 
statute of limitations through years of trial and appellate review, which would 
contradict the “policy of repose mandated by the Legislature.”  White, 
2002 ME 160, ¶ 8, 809 A.2d 622.   
 
[¶29]  The Legislature has provided a specific six-year period of 
limitations subject to two narrow exceptions.  14 M.R.S. § 753-B(2)-(3).  We are 
not free to carve out additional exceptions to section 753-B and therefore do 
 
17 
not do so here.  See Nevin, 1999 ME 47, ¶ 34, 726 A.2d 694.  (“[W]hen the 
Legislature provides for enumerated exceptions to its definition, those 
exceptions implicitly deny the availability of any other.” (alteration and 
quotation marks omitted)).  While it may seem uncomfortable to potentially 
require that a client, in order to preserve its claim, sue its attorney before the 
relationship has been severed, the Legislature clearly determined that the 
limitations period in legal malpractice cases begins to run on the date of the act 
or omission giving rise to the injury, not the date of the termination of the 
attorney-client relationship.   
C. 
Continuing Negligence Doctrine 
[¶30]  Alternatively, Packgen urges that we apply the continuing 
negligence doctrine to its legal malpractice claim as we applied the doctrine to 
a medical malpractice claim in Baker v. Farrand, 2011 ME 91, ¶ 29, 26 A.3d 806.  
Under the continuing negligent treatment doctrine, the limitations period does 
not begin to run “until the date of the last act of negligence.”  Id. ¶ 20.  In Baker, 
we examined the plain language of 24 M.R.S. § 2902 (2018)—the medical 
malpractice statute of limitations—and relied, in part, on the rule of statutory 
 
18 
construction in 1 M.R.S. § 71(9) (2018),10 to determine that it was consonant 
with the plain meaning of the statute “to define the term ‘act or omission’ as 
used in section 2902 as referring to either a single act or omission, or a series of 
related acts or omissions that proximately cause a harm.”  2011 ME 91, 
¶¶ 27-28, 26 A.3d 806 (emphasis added).  As a result, we held, 
pursuant to section 2902, a plaintiff may bring a single action 
alleging continuing negligent treatment that arises from two or 
more related acts or omissions by a single health care provider or 
practitioner where each act or omission deviated from the 
applicable standard of care and, to at least some demonstrable 
degree, proximately caused the harm complained of, as long as at 
least one of the alleged negligent acts or omissions occurred within 
three years of the notice of claim. 
 
Id. ¶ 29. 
[¶31]  Packgen urges that this reasoning in Baker should also be applied 
to claims of legal malpractice under section 753-B because Bernstein Shur’s 
ongoing failure to send a proper notice of claim, in combination with its failure 
to file suit and adequately advise Packgen up to the date of the termination of 
its representation in 2011, proximately caused the loss of the full amount of 
prejudgment interest to which Packgen was entitled.  See id. ¶¶ 24-25.  In other 
words, Packgen asserts that its cause of action was preserved because the 
                                         
10  “Words of the singular number may include the plural; and words of the plural number may 
include the singular.”  1 M.R.S. § 71(9) (2018). 
 
19 
limitations period did not begin to run until Bernstein Shur allegedly 
committed its last negligent omission.  However, Baker does not control the 
application of the continuing negligence doctrine in legal malpractice actions.   
[¶32]  In Baker, a primary care physician performed six annual tests on a 
patient’s prostate, only two of which fell within the applicable statute of 
limitations.  Id. ¶¶ 3-4.  The physician failed to refer the patient to a specialist 
after three of the tests, even though the results were abnormal and the need for 
further testing was indicated.  Id.  As a result, the patient’s prostate cancer was 
not detected until after it spread considerably and his treatment options were 
substantially limited.  Id.  Because the harm was caused by a continuing course 
of negligent treatment, the patient was permitted to bring a cause of action on 
the basis of each of the occasions on which the physician failed to adhere to the 
standard of care, even though only two of those acts or omissions fell within the 
limitations period.  Id. ¶¶ 3, 29.   
[¶33]  Unlike the continuing course of negligent treatment in Baker, the 
negligence Packgen alleges arises from a single act: Bernstein Shur’s failure to 
send a proper notice of claim on May 29, 2008.  Here, the negligent action was 
singular—an isolated mistake severable from the remainder of Bernstein 
Shur’s representation of Packgen—and substantially dissimilar from the 
 
20 
ongoing treatment and annual testing in Baker.  We understand Packgen’s 
argument that Bernstein Shur committed a new negligent omission each day it 
failed to provide a proper notice of claim or seek another remedy after 
May 29, 2008; however, we were clear in Baker that where it is “reasonably 
probable that one act or omission in a series of acts or omissions was the sole 
proximate cause of the injury complained of, a cause of action would accrue 
from the date of that act or omission, and not from the dates of any subsequent 
acts or omissions.”  Id. ¶ 24.  In this case, it is reasonably probable that the harm 
Packgen complains of occurred as a result of Bernstein Shur’s alleged failure to 
meet the oath requirements for the notice of claim on May 29, 2008.  As such, 
the continuing negligence doctrine is inappropriate in this case.   
 
[¶34]  Moreover, the applicability of the continuing negligence doctrine 
to the medical malpractice statute of limitations was based firmly “on the 
language and authority of the Health Security Act,” to which there are no 
analogous provisions in the attorney malpractice context.  Id. ¶ 30.  In Baker, 
we anchored our holding on two definitions particular to the Health Security 
Act: “action for professional negligence” and “professional negligence.”  Id. ¶ 22 
(citing 24 M.R.S. § 2502(6)-(7) (2018)).  These definitions provided the basis 
for our holding that the act or omission that triggers the statute of limitations 
 
21 
could be a combination of several related acts or omissions, including acts or 
omissions outside the statute of limitations.  The definitions relevant to title 24 
specifically authorize the use of multiple acts or omissions to make out a claim 
of professional negligence; therefore, it was logical for us to conclude in the 
medical malpractice context that the precipitating event for a medical 
malpractice claim could be a series of related events, the combination of which 
proximately caused the patient’s injury.  Id.; see also 24 M.R.S. § 2502(6)-(7).  
This same logic does not apply to claims for attorney malpractice pursuant to 
14 M.R.S. § 753-B.   
[¶35]  There are no congruent definitions in title 14, generally, or in 
chapter 205, specifically.  Without similar authorizing language on which to 
draw, we are unable to conclude that the continuing negligence doctrine is 
applicable to claims for legal malpractice.  Moreover, considering the particular 
language and history of section 753-B, it is clear that the application of the 
continuing negligence doctrine is foreclosed by the Legislature’s intent to 
provide timely repose to claims against attorneys, as discussed above.  White, 
2002 ME 160, ¶ 8, 809 A.2d 622.  While it can be said that section 753-B, like 
any statute of limitations, provides an arbitrary cutoff after which a client’s 
 
22 
claim against his attorney is no longer viable, this was a deliberate choice the 
Legislature made, and we must defer to it.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
[¶36]  Given the legislative history underpinning the adoption of the 
occurrence rule in section 752, the plain language of section 753-B regarding 
actions against attorneys, and the strict construction we apply to statutes of 
limitations, we conclude that the Legislature intended to limit the accrual of a 
cause of action for attorney negligence or malpractice to the “act or omission 
giving rise to the injury”—that is, the attorney’s singular act or omission that 
proximately caused the harm to the client, 14 M.R.S. § 753-B, and not to the 
attorney’s ongoing failure to correct that singular act or omission.  In this case, 
the act giving rise to Packgen’s alleged injury occurred on May 29, 2008, and 
Packgen’s claim expired on May 29, 2014, six years after the service of the 
defective notice letter, and it is now time barred, 14 M.R.S. §§ 752, 753-B.  We 
must effectuate the Legislature’s language and we may not hold otherwise.  See 
Myrick v. James, 444 A.2d 987, 992 (Me. 1982) (“That which we may not do is 
to change such a rule or policy once the Legislature has specifically taken that 
rule or policy out of the arena of the judicial prerogative . . . .”). 
 
23 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HJELM, J., with whom ALEXANDER and JABAR, JJ., join, dissenting. 
 
 
[¶37]  For two fundamental reasons, I disagree with the Court’s 
conclusion that Packgen, Inc.’s claim for professional negligence, filed against 
its former attorneys, Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer & Nelson, P.A., is barred by the 
statute of limitations.  First, in my view, the complaint sufficiently alleges that 
some negligent omissions occurred within the period of limitations, and so that 
part of Packgen’s claim should survive for that reason alone.  Second, the 
doctrine of continuing negligence, which we have adopted in cases involving 
medical negligence, should be applied to claims of legal malpractice and, at this 
very early phase of the case, entitles Packgen to pursue the entirety of its 
negligence claim.  For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. 
 
[¶38]  The narrow issue presented here is the legal viability of Packgen’s 
claim as pleaded in its amended complaint.  The criterion for assessing the 
adequacy of a pleading is familiar and generous.  For purposes of this analysis, 
we take the allegations to be true and “examine the complaint in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether it sets forth elements of a cause 
 
24 
of action or alleges facts that would entitle the plaintiff to relief pursuant to 
some legal theory.”  Argereow v. Weisberg, 2018 ME 140, ¶ 2, 195 A.3d 1210 
(quotation marks omitted).  Because Maine is a notice-pleading jurisdiction, the 
level of scrutiny used to assess the sufficiency of a pleading is “forgiving.”  Howe 
v. MMG Ins. Co., 2014 ME 78, ¶ 9, 95 A.3d 79 (quotation marks omitted).  The 
statute of limitations—an affirmative defense—is the sole basis for Bernstein 
Shur’s motion to dismiss Packgen’s complaint, so dismissal is proper only if “it 
is clear on the face of the complaint” that the claim is time-barred.  Jackson v. 
Borkowski, 627 A.2d 1010, 1013 (Me. 1993). 
 
[¶39]  The relevant facts and chronology of events as alleged in Packgen’s 
amended complaint are not complicated.  Packgen retained Bernstein Shur in 
2008 “to prosecute its legal claims” arising from a commercial dispute.  In late 
May of 2008, Bernstein Shur sent the prospective defendant a notice of claim, 
but the form of the notice was insufficient to trigger the accrual of prejudgment 
interest, see 14 M.R.S. § 1602-B(5) (2018).  Then, over the course of the next 
three years, Bernstein Shur continuously “failed to file suit,” failed to serve the 
prospective defendant with a proper notice of claim, and failed to “otherwise 
diligently pursue the case[,] which caused additional damage to Packgen.”  In 
2011, Packgen terminated its relationship with Bernstein Shur and “retained 
 
25 
new counsel[,] who promptly brought suit on Packgen’s behalf,” resulting in a 
substantial money judgment for Packgen.   
 
[¶40]  Packgen and Bernstein Shur entered into a tolling agreement, 
which, as of December 11, 2015, stopped the clock that would determine the 
timeliness of any claim that Packgen might later assert against Bernstein Shur.  
And, in fact, in May of 2017, Packgen commenced this action.  Because, as the 
parties agree, Packgen’s claim against Bernstein Shur is subject to a six-year 
period of limitations, see 14 M.R.S. § 752 (2018), the tolling agreement renders 
as timely any part of Packgen’s claim that accrued on or after December 11, 
2009. 
 
[¶41]  The interpretation and application of two interrelated statutes are 
integral to this appeal.  The first statute, 14 M.R.S. § 752, applies broadly and 
provides,  
All civil actions shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause 
of action accrues and not afterwards, except actions on a judgment 
or decree of any court of record of the United States, or of any state, 
or of a justice of the peace in this State, and except as otherwise 
specially provided.   
 
The second, 14 M.R.S. § 753-B (2018), applies specifically to actions 
commenced against attorneys and states,  
In actions alleging professional negligence, malpractice or breach 
of contract for legal service by a licensed attorney, the statute of 
 
26 
limitations starts to run from the date of the act or omission giving 
rise to the injury, not from the discovery of the malpractice, 
negligence or breach of contract, except as provided in this section 
or as the statute of limitations may be suspended by other laws. 
 
[¶42]  The facial reach of the six-year limitation period created by 
section 752 covers some, but not all, of the time that Bernstein Shur 
represented Packgen, which was from 2008 into 2011.  Thus, in examining the 
timeliness of Packgen’s claims, there are two different periods to be considered: 
(1) the period beginning December 11, 2009, which is the six-year period that 
ended with the effective date of the parties’ tolling agreement; and (2) the 
period that predates December 11, 2009.  Because the legal considerations 
differ as between these two timeframes, I address them separately. 
A. 
Allegations of Negligence Occurring On and After December 11, 2009 
[¶43]  As I note above, Packgen alleges that throughout the entire course 
of Bernstein Shur’s representation of its interests, which extended until 
sometime in 2011—and includes more than one year within the period of 
limitations prescribed in section 752—the firm was negligent in several 
different ways.  Packgen’s claim includes allegations, not only that Bernstein 
Shur was negligent by issuing the statutorily defective notice of claim, but also 
that the firm negligently failed to file suit on Packgen’s underlying commercial 
claim, which also would have triggered the accrual of prejudgment interest 
 
27 
arising from that claim.  Thus, although the Court focuses exclusively on the 
Bernstein Shur’s allegedly negligent act of issuing a deficient notice of claim in 
May of 2008, there is more to Packgen’s claim. 
[¶44]  Although Bernstein Shur’s issuance of the defective notice of claim 
is a single allegedly negligent act with an ascertainable date,11 the failure to 
commence an action altogether is an allegedly negligent omission—something 
that never happened at all.  And from the allegations contained in the amended 
complaint, it is not possible to assign a date certain to an event that did not 
occur; that omission is temporally indeterminate within the period when 
Bernstein Shur represented Packgen.  In other words, for purposes of 
determining whether the amended complaint is time-barred on its face, 
Packgen’s allegation that Bernstein Shur committed legal malpractice by not 
filing suit does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that the alleged negligence 
associated with that omission necessarily falls entirely outside the period of 
                                         
11  Because the Court should apply the doctrine of continuing negligence in assessing the facial 
viability of Packgen’s complaint, the date of the defective notice may not be the date when Packgen’s 
cause of action itself accrued.  For the reasons I discuss later in this dissent, that will need to be 
determined on the basis of an evidentiary presentation such as summary judgment motion practice.  
But even if—as the Court holds today—the doctrine of continuing negligence is unavailable, the 
amended complaint is still not untimely on its face because, as I explain in the text, it is impossible to 
assign a date outside of the period of limitations to a negligent omission in the form of failing to file 
suit.  This means there is no need to consider whether, as a legal matter, Bernstein Shur could be 
found liable for its failure, continuing past December 11, 2009, to correct its allegedly negligent act 
of issuing the defective notice of claim in May of 2008. 
 
28 
limitations.  The bones of Packgen’s amended complaint are sufficient to 
encompass an assertion, which could only be fleshed out during the evidentiary 
phases of the case, that Bernstein Shur, in the exercise of due care, should have 
commenced the action in the commercial case on or after December 11, 2009.  
Based on this aspect of Packgen’s claim alone, its amended complaint was not 
facially untimely. 
[¶45]  I also note that the trial court’s order dismissing the complaint was 
actually provisional.  While concluding that Packgen’s claim was outside of the 
period of limitations, the court gave Packgen an opportunity to seek leave to 
further amend its amended complaint to allege damages other than those 
allegedly caused by the defective notice of claim sent in 2008.  Although 
Packgen did not file any such motion, the absence of any supplemental filing by 
Packgen is inconsequential.  In its amended complaint, Packgen had already 
alleged a sufficient basis—the failure to file suit, for example—on which 
Bernstein Shur could be determined liable based on negligent acts or omissions 
occurring directly within the six-year limitations period.  Therefore, the court 
erred by requiring Packgen to do something more than it had already done in 
order to avoid dismissal of its complaint. 
 
29 
[¶46]  Because Packgen’s amended complaint alleges negligence that 
occurred within the limitations period, which runs forward from December 11, 
2009, I conclude that the court erred by dismissing that portion of Packgen’s 
claim. 
B. 
Allegations of Negligence Occurring Before December 11, 2009 
[¶47]  In contrast to Packgen’s claim for negligence that occurred on or 
after December 11, 2009, its claim for negligent acts or omissions occurring 
before that date is time-barred pursuant to section 752 unless an appropriate 
legal mechanism brings that part of Packgen’s claim back within the period of 
limitations.  Packgen asserts that two such legal theories preclude the dismissal 
of those older aspects of its claim against Bernstein Shur: continuing 
representation and continuing negligence.12 
[¶48]  I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the mere continuation of 
an attorney’s representation of a client on an ongoing matter extending into the 
                                         
12  There are other legal doctrines that can save an otherwise stale claim from dismissal.  For 
example, in certain limited circumstances, a party may be estopped altogether from asserting the 
statute of limitations as a defense, see Dasha v. Maine Med. Ctr., 665 A.2d 993, 995 (Me. 1995), and a 
period of limitations may run, not for an absolute length of time beginning with the actionable 
conduct, but from the moment the injured party actually or constructively discovers the wrongful 
conduct, see, e.g., 14 M.R.S. § 753-B(2)-(3) (2018) (creating a discovery rule applicable to the statute 
of limitations governing certain types of actions against attorneys); 24 M.R.S. § 2902 (2018) (creating 
a discovery rule for the limitation period in claims of foreign-object surgical malpractice).  Packgen 
has not sought to invoke any of those doctrines here.   
 
30 
limitations period does not preclude the statute of limitations from barring a 
claim based on a negligent act or omission that occurred outside of the 
limitation period.  See Court’s Opinion at ¶¶ 25-29.  We have reached that 
conclusion in the context of a medical malpractice claim, see Dickey v. Vermette, 
2008 ME 179, ¶¶ 4-8, 960 A.2d 1178; see also Baker v. Farrand, 2011 ME 91, 
¶¶ 18-19, 26 A.3d 806, and the same analysis applies to legal malpractice 
claims.  In Dickey, we explained that the “act or omission” phraseology 
contained in 24 M.R.S. § 2902 (2018),13 which is the statute of limitations for 
actions against health care providers and practitioners, does not permit 
time-barred claims to become timely simply because of an ongoing professional 
relationship between the medical provider and the patient.  2008 ME 179, 
¶¶ 7-8, 960 A.2d 1178.  That statutory language is identical to the “act or 
omission” language contained in section 753-B, which applies here.  Therefore, 
our analysis in Dickey is fatal to Packgen’s argument that Bernstein Shur’s 
representation of its interests in the underlying matter within six years of the 
commencement of this action, by itself, precludes dismissal of the action as 
untimely. 
                                         
13  Title 24 M.R.S. § 2902 was amended after our decision in Dickey, see P.L. 2013, ch. 329, § 2 
(effective Oct. 9, 2013), but not in any manner that affects my analysis. 
 
31 
[¶49]  I part ways with the Court, however, when it concludes that this 
case does not allow for the application of a doctrine that is, in effect, a subsidiary 
of the continuing representation theory—namely, the continuing negligence 
doctrine. 
[¶50]  As the Court correctly describes, the continuing negligence 
doctrine prevents the limitations clock from beginning to tick until the date of 
the last negligent occurrence that proximately causes injury.  See Court’s 
Opinion ¶ 2 n.4; see also Baker, 2011 ME 91, ¶ 20, 26 A.3d 806.14  The doctrine 
is a framework for viewing a series of actionable acts or omissions as an 
integrated whole that may be pursued in a single cause of action.  So long as the 
last in that series is within the period of limitations, a claim based on the entire 
incorporated body of negligent acts or omissions is deemed to be timely.  See 
Baker v. Farrand, 2011 ME 91, ¶ 25, 26 A.3d 806 (“In such cases, the cause of 
action ‘accrues’ for the purposes of the . . . limitations period on the date of the 
last act or omission . . . that contributed to the proximate causation of the 
patient’s harm.”). 
                                         
14  Because the doctrine of continuing negligence is a way to determine when a cause of action 
accrues—that is, the time when the limitations clock starts—it does not implicate notions of tolling, 
which would mean stopping a limitations clock that was already ticking.  See also supra n.12.  Because 
of this important analytical distinction, we may have been less than precise in the way, even recently, 
we have characterized the continuing negligence doctrine.  See York Cty. v. PropertyInfo Corp., 
2019 ME 12, ¶ 24, 200 A.3d 803. 
 
32 
[¶51]  We have endorsed the application of the continuing negligence 
doctrine in medical negligence cases.15  In such actions, the plaintiff is entitled 
to 
bring a single action alleging continuing negligent treatment that 
arises from two or more related acts or omissions by a single health 
care provider or practitioner where each act or omission deviated 
from the applicable standard of care and, to at least some 
demonstrable degree, proximately caused the harm complained of, 
as long as at least one of the alleged negligent acts or omissions 
occurred within three years of the notice of claim.16 
 
Baker, 2011 ME 91, ¶ 29, 26 A.3d 806 (emphasis added).  In other words, where 
at least one negligent act or omission that demonstrably and proximately 
contributed to the harm occurred within the period of limitations, but other 
related acts or omissions occurred outside the period of limitations, the 
entirety of the claim may be prosecuted. 
 
[¶52]  Our adoption of the continuing negligence doctrine in Baker 
resulted from two separate analytical strands.  The first draws on an 
examination of statutes that are specific to medical negligence claims.  In 
                                         
15  We did so notwithstanding the general principle that a statute of limitations “should be 
construed strictly in favor of the bar which it was intended to create.”  Harkness v. Fitzgerald, 1997 
ME 207, ¶ 5, 701 A.2d 370 (quotation marks omitted).  As is demonstrated by the very outcome in 
Baker, that principle of statutory construction does not by itself foreclose adoption of the continuing 
negligence principle. 
16  Baker’s claim was governed by a three-year period of limitations.  See 24 M.R.S. § 2902.  Here, 
the applicable statute of limitations is six years.  See 14 M.R.S. § 752. 
 
33 
particular, we noted that 24 M.R.S. § 2902—the statute of limitations for 
“actions for professional negligence” against medical providers and 
practitioners—identifies the event giving rise to the claim as an “act or 
omission” but that the Health Security Act, of which section 2902 is a part, does 
not define the term.  Baker, 2011 ME 91, ¶ 22, 26 A.3d 806.  Elsewhere, 
however, the Act defines “professional negligence” as encompassing the 
pluralized “acts or omissions.”  24 M.R.S. § 2502(7)(A)-(B) (2018).  Partly on 
that basis, we concluded that these statutes reflect a legislative recognition that 
a single cause of action can arise from multiple acts or omissions that contribute 
to an overall harm.  Baker, 2011 ME 91, ¶¶ 23, 29, 26 A.3d 806.  This recognition 
in turn supports the application of the continuing negligence doctrine.  Id. 
¶¶ 23-24.  But, because this portion of the discussion in Baker rests on statutory 
provisions that do not extend to or have analogous counterparts in the statutes 
that govern legal malpractice claims, Packgen does not benefit from it. 
 
[¶53]  That is not true with respect to the second reason why we adopted 
the principle of continuing negligence in Baker.  Our second line of reasoning 
draws on both rules of statutory construction and on jurisprudential principles 
that are of more universal application and persuasively extend to this action for 
legal malpractice.  See id. ¶ 27. 
 
34 
[¶54]  The construction of the phrase “act or omission” was at issue in 
Baker, just as it is here.  As we discussed in that case, the Legislature has 
explicitly stated that “[w]ords of the singular number may include the plural,” 
1 M.R.S. § 71(9) (2018), so the use of “act or omission”—presented in the 
singular—in section 2902 cannot properly be limited to each individual act or 
omission.  Baker, 2011 ME 91, ¶¶ 27-28, 26 A.3d 806.  Rather, as we concluded, 
section 2902’s “plain meaning”—the gold standard of statutory construction, 
see Schwartz v. Unemployment Ins. Comm’n, 2006 ME 41, ¶ 15, 895 A.2d 96517—
encompasses multiple acts and omissions.  Baker, 2011 ME 91, ¶ 28, 26 A.3d 
806.  This construction accommodates the legal principle that “a single cause of 
action may arise from multiple acts or omissions even if each independent act 
or omission, viewed in isolation from the other acts or omissions, constitutes 
an independent deviation from the applicable standard of care.”  Id. ¶ 24.  
Correspondingly, this construction avoids creating a separate cause of action 
based on each and every negligent act or omission arising from an ongoing 
                                         
17  In Schwartz, we stated that “[t]he cardinal rule of statutory construction is that when the words 
of the Legislature are clear, they are to be given their plain meaning and further judicial 
interpretation is not necessary.”  Schwartz v. Unemployment Ins. Comm’n, 2006 ME 41, ¶ 15, 
895 A.2d 965 (quotation marks omitted). 
 
35 
professional relationship, which could be—or would need to be—pursued 
through splintered claims.  Id. ¶¶ 25-26. 
 
[¶55]  This part of Baker’s analysis, which is sufficient to support its 
holding,18 carries over seamlessly to Packgen’s legal malpractice claim against 
Bernstein Shur and the statutes that apply here.  This is true with both the close 
examination in Baker of the words in the phrase “act or omission” and our 
broader discussion in that case of principles governing the way causes of action 
are properly framed. 
[¶56]  First, as to the statutory language itself, Title 14, section 753-B 
contains language defining the event giving rise to Packgen’s claim—an “act or 
omission”—that is identical to the language in 24 M.RS. § 2902, which we 
analyzed in Baker.  There, we applied the rule of statutory construction 
providing that a word in a statute presented in the singular also includes the 
plural, 1 M.R.S. § 71(9), a principle of construction that spans the entirety of 
                                         
18  The Court rejects the applicability of Baker to section 753-B by reading our opinion in that case 
narrowly to say that it is the Health Security Act that allows a single claim to be based on multiple 
acts or omissions.  Court’s Opinion ¶¶ 33, 34.  Although—as I have discussed in the text—Baker rests 
in part on an analysis of provisions contained in the Health Security Act that are not applicable here, 
Baker also makes clear that our rationale for adopting the continuing negligence doctrine is not as 
limited as the Court suggests here.  2011 ME 91, ¶¶ 26-27, 26 A.3d 806 (stating that “our reading of 
the statute must be squared with all applicable rules of statutory construction” (emphasis added) 
(quotation marks omitted)).  And beyond this, as I explain in the text, much of the conceptual 
reasoning that warrants application of the continuing negligence doctrine to medical malpractice 
cases applies with equal persuasiveness to the case at bar. 
 
36 
Maine’s statutory code and informs our construction of section 753-B just as 
much as it did our construction of 24 M.R.S. § 2902.  Therefore, section 753-B 
must be read to encompass multiple acts or omissions to the extent that such 
multiple related occurrences may give rise to a single cause of action. 
[¶57]  Second, and more broadly, the conceptual observations we made 
in Baker apply with equal force in the present context.  As a substantive legal 
principle, multiple acts or omissions that comprise individual deviations from 
the standard of care can combine to proximately cause a discrete harm and give 
rise to a single cause of action.  Baker, 2011 ME 91, ¶ 24, 26 A.3d 806.  Relatedly, 
a plaintiff should not be required to litigate those separate negligent acts or 
omissions in a piecemeal manner.  See id. ¶ 25.  These principles apply directly 
to claims for legal malpractice every bit as much as they do to claims for medical 
negligence. 
[¶58]  All of this—the dry process of statutory interpretation and a 
conceptual consideration of the nature of a professional negligence claim—
demonstrates that, for many of the same reasons we stated in Baker, the 
principle of continuing negligence is readily accommodated by sections 752 
and 753-B in this legal malpractice action.  I would therefore apply Baker’s 
conclusion to this case and—to paraphrase the language in Baker—hold that, 
 
37 
when a single cause of action arises from an attorney’s multiple acts or 
omissions while representing a client, and when the combination of those 
multiple acts or omissions proximately causes the alleged injury, the single 
resulting cause of action accrues on the date of the last act or omission that 
contributed to the alleged injury, because that is when the alleged negligence is 
complete.  See Baker, 2011 ME 91, ¶ 24, 26 A.3d 806. 
 
[¶59]  This statement of the continuing negligence doctrine also 
illuminates its limiting principle—that the claim will be time-barred if the last 
of the negligent acts or omissions that demonstrably and proximately 
contributed to the injury occurred outside of the period of limitations.19  
Consequently, if the case were to proceed on remand, as I believe it should, in 
order for Packgen to recover for negligent acts or omissions that occurred 
before December 11, 2009, Packgen would be required to demonstrate that at 
least 
one 
negligent 
act 
or 
omission 
that 
occurred 
on 
or 
after 
December 11, 2009, demonstrably and proximately contributed to the harm 
also caused by those earlier related acts or omissions.   
                                         
19  This limitation was illustrated in Dickey v. Vermette, which we decided before Baker.  See 
2008 ME 179, 960 A.2d 1178.  In Dickey, we concluded that that case did not present the occasion for 
us to decide whether to adopt the doctrine of continuing negligence because the plaintiffs stipulated 
that they had not sustained any injury from any act or omission occurring within the period of 
limitations.  Id. ¶ 9.  Therefore, a claim for any and all actionable negligence fully accrued outside of 
the limitations period, and adoption of the doctrine would have been unavailing for the plaintiffs. 
 
38 
[¶60]  Based on the amended complaint alone and without the benefit of 
a record, the Court is willing to jump to the conclusion that Packgen will be 
unable to present any evidence sufficient to meet this requirement.  See Court’s 
Opinion ¶ 33.  There, the Court states that Packgen’s claim arose from a single 
act, namely, the defective notice of claim sent in 2008, and that it is “reasonably 
probable” that Packgen’s injury is attributable entirely to that act.  Id. ¶ 33.  This 
is an inappropriately narrow reading of the amended complaint, which alleges 
negligence that continued throughout the period of representation, from 2008 
into 2011.  As is demonstrated by the use of the phrase “reasonably probable,” 
the Court’s assertion embodies a factual assessment that is wholly out of place 
in the procedural context where this case now stands.20  Packgen’s ability to 
present evidence to defeat Bernstein Shur’s limitations defense remains to be 
seen—it is something that is impossible to determine until after Packgen has 
                                         
20  The Court’s reliance on Baker to reach that conclusion is similarly misplaced because the 
judgment appealed in Baker was a summary judgment, issued on the basis of a developed factual 
record.  See 2011 ME 91, ¶ 1, 26 A.3d 806.  Here, there is no record on which to draw the fact-based 
conclusions that the Court reaches in its opinion.  See Bean v. Cummings, 2008 ME 18, ¶ 7, 939 A.2d 
676 (stating that a dismissal pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is appropriate only “when it appears 
beyond doubt that a plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any set of facts that he might prove in support 
of his claim” (emphasis added)); Houde v. Millett, 2001 ME 183, ¶ 11, 787 A.2d 757 (stating that “[t]he 
question of whether a defendant’s acts or omissions were the proximate cause of a plaintiff’s injuries 
is generally a question of fact . . . .”). 
 
39 
the opportunity to present evidence that will put substance on the bones of its 
amended complaint. 
C. 
Conclusion 
[¶61]  For now, the only question before us is whether the allegations in 
Packgen’s amended complaint make clear that the claim is time-barred.  See 
Jackson, 627 A.2d at 1013.  In my view, the amended complaint withstands that 
facial review, particularly given the “forgiving” notice-pleading standard by 
which the sufficiency of a complaint is reviewed, see Howe, 2014 ME 78, ¶ 9, 95 
A.3d 79.  Packgen has alleged negligence within the period of limitations itself, 
through sometime in 2011 when Packgen terminated its relationship with the 
firm.  Further, for purposes of the present pleading stage of the case, pursuant 
to the continuing negligence doctrine the allegations of Bernstein Shur’s 
negligent acts or omissions occurring before December 11, 2009, can properly 
be treated as an integrated part of a claim that did not accrue until on or after 
December 11, 2009—within the period of limitations.  Accordingly, I would 
vacate the judgment and remand for the trial court proceedings to continue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
Phillip E. Johnson, Esq. (orally), Johnson, Webbert & Young, LLP, Augusta, for 
appellant Packgen, Inc.  
 
George T. Dilworth, Esq. (orally), and Jeana M. McCormick, Esq., Drummond 
Woodsum, Portland, for appellee Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer & Nelson, P.A. 
 
 
Cumberland County Superior Court docket number CV-2017-208 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY