Case Title: JULIAN v BUCKLEY

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1981-01-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 80-93 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1981 GORDON R . JULIAN, Plaintiff and Respondent, DEARL H. BUCKLEY, and BARBARA M. BUCKLEY, husband and wife, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, In and for the County of Gallatin, The Honorable W. W. Lessley, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: William L. Pepper, Bozeman, Montana For Respondent: Phillip N. Carter, Bozeman, Montana Submitted on Briefs: November 26, 1980 Decided: JAN 2 8 1981 Filed: :fi!j 2 1981 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Plaintiff-respondent brought t h i s a c t i o n t o recover damages f o r breach of c o n t r a c t . Following a nonjury t r i a l , t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , all at in County, entered judgment i n favor of p l a i n t i f f . Defendants-appellants f i l e d a motion f o r reconsideration and l a t e r a motion t o a l t e r and amend t h e judgment. They then f i l e d a n o t i c e of appeal. Thereafter t h e D i s t r i c t Court amended i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law on two s e p a r a t e occasions. Respondent f i l e d a n o t i c e of appeal, and a p p e l l a n t s f i l e d a n o t i c e of cross-appeal. I n 1975 respondent, a s buyer, and a p p e l l a n t s , a s s e l l e r s , entered i n t o negotiations t o purchase and sell a t r a c t of land. These n e g o t i a t i o n s consummated i n t o a c o n t r a c t i n which a p p e l l a n t s agreed t o c o n s t r u c t a roadway from t h e e x i s t i n g Bear Canyon Road t o the e a s t property l i n e of t h e t r a c t of land respondent w a s purchasing. The road was t o be a minimum of twenty f e e t wide and be composed of a minimum of nine inches of p i t run gravel, properly placed and com- pacted s o t h a t it could be used under a l l weather condi- t i o n s . The road was t o be completed by J u l y 1, 1976. During 1976 and 1978 a p p e l l a n t s h i r e d Kardash Construc- t i o n t o b u i l d t h e road. Appellants a l l e g e d t h a t i n 1976 s i x inches of s h a l e m a t e r i a l w a s placed on t h e road and a n a d d i t i o n a l four inches of m a t e r i a l w a s placed on t h e lower one-half t o two-thirds of t h e road. I n 1978, a f t e r being reassured repeatedly by a p p e l l a n t s t h a t t h e road would be completed, respondent began construc- t i o n of h i s home on t h e property. Respondent secured a construction loan of $54,500 from Bozeman Federal c r e d i t union. O n May 17, 1978, respondent secured a commitment letter from Metropolitan Service Mortgage Corporation. Metropolitan agreed t o loan respondent t h e sum of $54,500 a t 9-3/4 percent i n t e r e s t , repayable on a monthly b a s i s over t h i r t y years. This commitment w a s conditioned on t h e road being completed according t o t h e s p e c i f i c a t i o n s contained i n t h e c o n t r a c t and l e g a l access being obtained from t h e S t a t e of Montana. This commitment expired November 17, 1978. On February 1, 1979, respondent was required t o loan t o a p p e l l a n t s $232 before they would agree t o secure t h e ease- ments from t h e S t a t e of Montana. O n A p r i l 5, 1979, another commitment letter was obtained from Metropolitan, i n which Metropolitan again agreed t o loan respondent $54,500. This t i m e , however, t h e only condition was t h a t t h e road be completed according t o t h e same s p e c i f i c a t i o n s contained i n t h e c o n t r a c t . The l e g a l access problem had been resolved when respondent loaned a p p e l l a n t s t h e money so they, a p p e l l a n t s , would purchase t h e easements from t h e S t a t e of Montana. This commitment letter a l s o provided t h a t respondent would have t o pay t h e c u r r e n t i n t e r e s t r a t e , 11-1/2 percent, and n o t 9-3/4 percent a s agreed e a r l i e r . This commitment letter expired October 5, 1979. Appellants refused t o complete construction of t h e road and respondent f i l e d s u i t . A nonjury t r i a l was held on October 9, 1979. O n November 6 , 1979, t h e ~ i s t r i c t Court f i l e d i t s findings of f a c t and conclusions of law i n favor of respondent. O n November 8, 1979, judgment was signed. Also on November 8, 1979, a p p e l l a n t s f i l e d t h e i r motion f o r reconsideration and on November 9, 1979, f i l e d t h e i r motion t o a l t e r o r amend t h e judgment. Both motions a l l e g e d t h e judgment and f i n d i n g s d i d n o t conform t o t h e evidence. On November 30, 1979, a p p e l l a n t s f i l e d t h e i r motion f o r a s t a y of execution. O n December 3, 1979, a hearing was held i n D i s t r i c t Court on a p p e l l a n t s ' motion t o alter o r amend. O n December 4 , 1979, t h e D i s t r i c t Court ordered a p p e l l a n t s n o t t o sell o r i n any way encumber t h e i r r e a l property. On December 5, 1979, a p p e l l a n t s f i l e d t h e i r f i r s t n o t i c e of appeal. Thereafter, t h e following events occurred: (1) December 6, 1979, respondent f i l e d a p e t i t i o n t o have t h e D i s t r i c t Court appoint a p p r a i s e r s . (2) December 10, 1979, t h e D i s t r i c t Court amended i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e . ( 3 ) December 13, 1979, t h e D i s t r i c t Court ordered a s t a y of execution and awarded a t t o r n e y f e e s t o respondent. ( 4 ) December 18, 1979, a p p e l l a n t s f i l e d t h e i r supple- mental motion t o alter o r amend t h e f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of l a w t o r e q u i r e respondent t o use t h e damages awarded him t o complete t h e road. (5) January 1 4 , 1980, t h e above motion was heard and t h e D i s t r i c t Court ordered another hearing t o be held on February 5, 1980. (6) February 5, 1980, a hearing w a s held on above motions and t h e D i s t r i c t Court gave both p a r t i e s twenty days t o submit b r i e f s . (7) February 26, 1980, t h e D i s t r i c t Court amended i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of l a w f o r t h e second t i m e and ordered respondent t o prepare a judgment. (8) March 21, 1980, respondent f i l e d h i s n o t i c e of appeal and t h e r e a f t e r a p p e l l a n t s f i l e d t h e i r n o t i c e of cross-appeal. The first issue is whether the District Court had jurisdiction to amend its findings of fact and conclusions of law, make and enter orders affecting the rights of the parties, and amend its original judgment after December 5, 1979, the date on which appellants' first notice of appeal was filed. Since 1954 it has been an established rule in Montana that when a notice of appeal has been filed, jurisdiction over the parties to the controversy and subject matter passes from the District Court and vests in the Supreme Court. It becomes the Supreme Court's duty to maintain the status quo of the parties until the controversy can be determined. Benolken v. Miracle (1954), 128 Mont. 262, 273 P.2d 667. On November 8, 1979, appellants filed a motion for reconsideration requesting that the court amend its findings of fact and conclusions of law because the same did not conform to the evidence. This motion was noticed for hear- ing on December 3, 1979. On November 9, 1979, appellants filed their motion to alter or amend the judgment because the same did not conform to the weight of the evidence presented at trial. This motion was also noticed for hearing on December 3, 1979. Appellants' memorandum brief in support of their motion to alter or amend the judgment was not signed by appellants' attorney until November 30, 1979, and could not have been filed any earlier than that date. A hearing on these motions was held on Monday, December 3, 1979. On Wednesday, December 5, 1979, and before the court could rule on appellants' motions, appellants filed their notice of appeal. Having done this, appellants stripped t h e D i s t r i c t Court of j u r i s d i c t i o n . The D i s t r i c t Court w a s without a u t h o r i t y and j u r i s d i c t i o n t o make o r e n t e r any f u r t h e r order except i n matters embraced i n t h e a c t i o n and n o t a f f e c t e d by t h e order appealed from. Benolken v. Miracle, supra. I n Bryant Development Association v. Dagel (1974), 166 Mont. 8, 531 P.2d 1319, t h i s Court, i n a p e r curiam o r d e r , s t a t e d : ". . . Under s e c t i o n 93-8011, R.C.M. 1947, w e , have previously held t h a t j u r i s d i c t i o n passes from t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t t o t h i s Court upon ser- v i c e and f i l i n g of t h e n o t i c e of appeal. See Benolken v. Miracle, 128 Mont. 262, 273 P.2d 667; Polson v. Thomas, 138 Mont. 533, 357 P.2d 349. While t h i s s t a t u t e has been superseded by Rules 6 and 7 of t h e Montana Rules of Ap- p e l l a t e C i v i l Procedure t h e former r u l i n g s t i l l a p p l i e s and t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t was without j u r i s d i c t i o n t o make and e n t e r i t s order . . ." 513 P.2d a t 1320. A t no time a f t e r a p p e l l a n t s ' n o t i c e of appeal was f i l e d with t h e D i s t r i c t Court was t h e r e a motion t o dismiss t h e appeal o r t o withdraw t h e n o t i c e of appeal. When t h e D i s - t r i c t Court amended i t s findings of f a c t and conclusions of law on December 1 0 , 1979, and again on February 26, 1980, it d i d s o without t h e necessary j u r i s d i c t i o n . Therefore, t h e s e amendments a r e n u l l and void, and t h e o r i g i n a l judgment stands. On a complete review of t h e record, w e f i n d t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l judgment awarding respondent damages of $34,068 i s n o t j u s t i f i e d . There i s no b a s i s o r evidence i n t h e record f o r such an amount. Respondent concedes t h i s . The D i s t r i c t Court attempted t o c o r r e c t these f i n d i n g s by t h e subsequent amended f i n d i n g s and judgment. Upon remand of the case, t h e D i s t r i c t Court may properly evaluate t h e damages and amend i t s p r i o r findings and judgment. Appellants n e x t argue t h a t t h e i n t e r e s t damage award entered by t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n t h e o r i g i n a l judgment i s s p e c u l a t i v e and incapable of accurate and reasonable d e t e r - mination a s a matter of law. The D i s t r i c t Court awarded i n t e r e s t damages f o r t h e d i f f e r e n c e between t h e i n t e r e s t paid over a thirty-year period on a 9-3/4 percent loan and i n t e r e s t paid over a t h i r t y - y e a r period on a 11-1/2 percent rate. Appellants contend t h a t should i n t e r e s t r a t e s drop below 11-1/2 per- c e n t , respondent could refinance h i s home a t t h e lower r a t e and never i n c u r t h i s damage. Appellants claim t h i s aspect of damages i s speculative, remote and prospective i n n a t u r e and respondent has n o t incurred a p r e s e n t i n j u r y . W e d i s - agree. I n Walton v. C i t y of Bozeman (1978), - Mont. 588 P.2d 518, t h i s Court upheld t h e D i s t r i c t Court's award of f u t u r e o r prospective damages: "'Prospective damages' are those which are rea- sonably c e r t a i n t o follow t h e s t a t e of f a c t s on which p l a i n t i f f ' s s u i t i s based; such dam- ages have n o t y e t accrued a t t h e time of t r i a l , b u t i n t h e n a t u r e [of ] t h i n g s must c e r t a i n l y o r most probably r e s u l t from t h e s t a t e of f a c t s found t o be e x i s t i n g a t t h e t i m e of t r i a l . See S t a t e Highway Board v. Coleman (1948), 77 Ga.App. 756, 50 S.E.2d 262. "Although s p e c u l a t i v e damages may n o t be re- covered, reasonable c e r t a i n t y t h a t f u t u r e damages w i l l occur w i l l s u s t a i n an award f o r f u t u r e damages. This test m e e t s t h e s t a t u t o r y requirements t h a t such must be reasonable. Section 17-607, R.C.M. 1947. See Cruse v. Clawson (1960) , 137 Mont. 439, 352 P.2d 989." Walton, 588 P.2d a t 522. I n t h e p r e s e n t c a s e t h e amount of damages is n o t specu- l a t i v e b u t r a t h e r can be determined. Respondent cannot be expected t o sue a p p e l l a n t s every t i m e t h e i n t e r e s t r a t e changes. There i s s u f f i c i e n t c e r t a i n t y i n t h e record t o make a damage award, a f t e r discounting t h e amount properly. W e w i l l n o t here d i s c u s s t h e amount and t h e accuracy of t h e amount awarded. O n remand t h e D i s t r i c t Court w i l l be allowed t o amend i t s f i n d i n g s of f a c t , conclusions of l a w and judgment i n determining the i n t e r e s t damage amount, discounting properly and awarding such amount. F i n a l l y , a p p e l l a n t s argue t h a t t h e award of reasonable a t t o r n e y f e e s i n t h e o r i g i n a l judgment was e r r o r because t h e D i s t r i c t Court f a i l e d t o allow a hearing on t h e matter. Only i n a subsequent hearing, a f t e r t h e o r i g i n a l judgment w a s entered, w a s t h e r e an opportunity t o address t h a t i s s u e and t o determine an e x a c t amount. Upon remand t h e D i s t r i c t Court s h a l l a l s o e n t e r a proper amended f i n d i n g of f a c t , conclusion of law and judg- ment regarding t h e amount of a t t o r n e y f e e s based on f i n d i n g s it made on subsequent hearings. Attorney f e e s should be awarded t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y i n t h i s l i t i g a t i o n up t o t h e time of t h e o r i g i n a l judgment and n o t i c e of appeal. However, a l l c o s t s and a t t o r n e y f e e s incurred subsequent t o t h e t i m e of f i l i n g of t h e n o t i c e of appeal s h a l l be paid by each p a r t y . Any subsequent c o s t s and a t t o r n e y f e e s from t h e issuance of t h i s opinion s h a l l be determined by t h e D i s t r i c t Court i n accordance with t h e law. The cause i s remanded t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court f o r f u r t h e r proceedings c o n s i s t e n t with t h i s opinion. n W e concur: ? A & Chief J u s t i c e dt &'- This cause was submitted p r i o r t o January 5, 1981.