Case Title: AARON EUGENE SMITH V. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-07-0160

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-09-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
AARON EUGENE SMITH V. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 98Case Number: S-07-0160Decided: 09/19/2008NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of typographical or other formal errors so correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 

AARON 
EUGENE SMITH,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 

Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty

The 
Honorable Jeffrey A. Donnell, Judge

 
 
Representing 
Appellant:

Megan 
L. Hayes, Laramie, 
Wyoming.  

 
 
Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Graham M. Smith, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Mr. Smith.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

 
 
KITE, 
Justice.

            

[¶1]      Aaron Eugene 
Smith was convicted after a jury trial of possession, manufacture or disposition 
of a deadly weapon with unlawful intent, use of a firearm while committing a 
felony and first degree murder.  The 
district court denied his motion for a new trial in which he asserted that a 
juror was biased against his defense of not guilty by reason of mental illness 
and did not honestly answer questions about that bias during voir dire.  He appeals from the district court's 
denial of his motion.  Finding no 
error, we affirm.  

 
 
ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Mr. Smith 
presents the following issue on appeal:

 
 
By 
express admission, Juror Hanschen had an actual bias at the time of trial 
against the defendant's mental illness defense.  Because he failed to disclose this bias 
during voir dire, Mr. Smith is 
entitled to a new trial before 12 impartial jurors.  The district court's conclusion that 
Juror Hanschen was not biased at the time of trial should be reversed for clear 
error.

 
 
The 
State articulates two issues:

 
 
            
I.          
Did the trial court have authority to hear appellant's motion for new 
trial under Wyo.R.Cr.P. 33(b)?

 
 
            
II.         Did 
the trial court abuse its discretion when it determined that Juror Hanschen was 
not biased at the time of Appellant's trial?        

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      On August 4, 
2005, Mr. Smith shot and killed Henry McCone in Laramie, Wyoming.  
The State charged him with possession, manufacture or disposition of a 
deadly weapon with unlawful intent, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-103 
(LexisNexis 2007); use of a firearm while committing a felony, in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-8-101 (LexisNexis 2007); and first degree murder, in 
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101 (LexisNexis 2005).  Mr. Smith pleaded not guilty by reason 
of mental illness or deficiency to all counts.  See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-305 (LexisNexis 
2007).  

 
 
[¶4]      The district 
court convened a jury trial.  During 
voir dire, the defense made it clear 
that Mr. Smith was not contesting the fact that he had killed Mr. McCone; 
instead, his entire defense was that he was not legally responsible for the 
crimes because he was mentally ill when he committed them.  Not surprisingly, defense counsel's 
questions during jury selection focused on the venire's opinions about, and 
contact with, mental illness.  At 
the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Mr. Smith guilty of all three counts 
and the district court sentenced him to serve the remainder of his life in 
prison without the possibility of parole.     

 
 
[¶5]      Shortly after he 
was sentenced, an article was published in the Wyoming State Bar magazine, the Wyoming 
Lawyer.  It was written by Mary 
Angell and titled "A Juror's Oath, A Juror's Responsibility."  The article examined juror experiences 
in Wyoming 
trials.  In researching her article, 
Ms. Angell interviewed people who had served on Wyoming juries.  One of the people she interviewed was 
Juror Michael Hanschen, who served on Mr. Smith's jury.  In the resulting article Ms. Angell 
described her discussion with Juror Hanschen as follows:

 
 
            
Because the defense in Smith's trial planned to argue he was not guilty 
by reason of mental illness, jurors in the pool were asked whether they had any 
relatives with a mental illness.  
One juror, Michael Hanschen, indicated that his brother, now deceased, 
was paranoid schizophrenic.  Asked 
if he thought that would impair his ability to be objective, Hanschen said he 
thought it would likely make him more sensitive to Smith's condition.  More pertinent to the case, however, was 
his fierce opposition to the use of the insanity plea, which was not 
revealed.

 
 
            
"During the jury selection, I was sitting next to a person who was a 
psychologist.  (She was not 
selected.)  I whispered to her, Are 
they saying the jury is going to be asked to decide whether the person is 
mentally ill?' and she said, Yes, I think so,'" said 
Hanschen.

 
 
            
"At that point, I actually wanted to be on the jury," he said.  "I answered the questions honestly.  I confess I had a bias that I didn't 
believe the insanity plea should rule out guilt, but they didn't ask me that 
question point blank.  Perhaps they 
should have." 

 
 
[¶6]      Mr. Smith filed a 
motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence of Mr. Hanschen's 
bias as revealed in the article.  
The district court held a hearing and denied Mr. Smith's new trial 
motion.1     

 
 
DISCUSSION 

 
 
1.         
Motion For a New Trial on Basis of Newly Discovered 
Evidence

 
 
[¶7]      Initially, we 
must consider the State's argument that Mr. Smith's allegation of juror 
misconduct was not properly raised in a motion for a new trial on the basis of 
newly discovered evidence.  Wyoming 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 governs new trial motions and states in relevant 
part:

 
 
(a) 
In General. - The court on motion of 
a defendant may grant a new trial to that defendant if required in the interest 
of justice.   

(b) 
Any Grounds Except Newly Discovered 
Evidence. -  A motion for a new 
trial based on any grounds, except newly discovered evidence, shall be made 
within 15 days after verdict or finding of guilty or within such further time as 
the court may fix during the 15 day period;  but the time for filing of motion may 
not be extended to a day more than 30 days from the date the verdict or finding 
of guilty is returned.  

(c) 
Newly Discovered Evidence. - A motion 
for a new trial based on the grounds of newly discovered evidence may be made 
only before or within two years after final judgment but if an appeal is 
pending, the court may grant the motion only on remand of the case.  

 
 
Mr. 
Smith presented his motion pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 33(c), the newly discovered 
evidence provision, presumably because the time limit under Rule 33(b) had 
expired when he filed his motion.

 
 
[¶8]      The State argues 
that only newly discovered evidence concerning the merits of the criminal case 
may be presented under Rule 33(c).  
It claims that Mr. Smith's complaint about juror misconduct should have 
been brought in a petition for post-conviction relief, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 7-14-101, et. seq. (LexisNexis 2007).  

 
 
[¶9]      First, we note 
that, although typically the newly discovered evidence will pertain to the 
merits of the case, Rule 33(c) does not state that it only applies to such 
evidence.  Thus, the plain language 
of the rule does not prohibit use of subsection (c) for claims of juror 
misconduct.  Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 33(b)2 is similar to Wyo.R.Cr.P. 
33(c).  As we have recognized in the 
past, when a federal rule of criminal procedure is similar to our corresponding 
rule, we look to federal case law for guidance in interpreting our rule.  Hoos v. State, 2003 WY 101, ¶ 10, 75 P.3d 609, 611 (Wyo. 2003).

 
 
[¶10]   There are numerous federal court 
cases interpreting Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(b)(1) as allowing a motion for new trial on 
the basis of newly discovered evidence for assertions of juror misconduct.  Many of the cases assume, without 
discussion, that such a complaint may be brought pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 
33(b)(1), provided the evidence is truly "newly discovered."  See, e.g., United States v. McKinney, 952 F.2d 333 
(9th Cir. 1991); United States 
v. Bolinger, 837 F.2d 436 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); United States v. Jones, 597 F.2d 458, 
488 (5th Cir. 1979); United 
States v. Dean, 667 F.2d 729, 732-34 (8th Cir. 1982) (en banc); United States v. Desir, 273 F.3d 39 
(1st Cir. 2001).   
Our own Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals allows a party to file a motion 
for a new trial under Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(b)(1), alleging that a juror lied during 
voir dire.  United 
States v. Apperson, Nos. 04-3375, 04-3376, 153 
Fed. Appx. 507, 2005 WL 2982282 (10th Cir. Nov. 8, 2005) 
(unpublished).  

 
 
[¶11]   The district court relied on United States v. Wander, 465 F. Supp. 1013 (D.C. Pa. 1979), in concluding that an allegation of juror bias may be 
brought under the newly discovered evidence provision of Rule 33.  That case specifically addressed whether 
only newly discovered evidence on the merits of the case was relevant under the 
rule.  The court 
held:

 
 
We 
further considered that "newly discovered evidence" which will support a new 
trial motion is not limited to evidence going to the merits of the case.  It has been held "[s]imilar motions 
founded upon newly discovered evidence affecting the integrity of the jury's 
verdict have been treated as based upon newly discovered evidence within the 
meaning of the procedural rule ([i].e., Rule 33)". . . . Of course, the evidence 
tendered as "newly discovered" must have, in fact, been found after the close of 
the trial, and there is an obligation to bring such matters diligently before 
the trial court.  

 
 

Id. 
at 
1020-21 (some citations omitted).  
See also, United States v. Ramos, 481 F. Supp. 2d 717 (W.D. Tex. 2006). 

 
 
[¶12]   The State points to cases from 
Maine and Vermont for authority that we should refuse to 
allow a motion for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence for 
allegations of juror bias.  See, State v. Sheppard, 582 A.2d 116 
(Vt. 1990); State v. Gatcomb, 478 A.2d 1129 
(Me. 
1984).  The legal rationale provided 
in those decisions is sparse.  The 
Maine Supreme Court simply stated:  

 
 
            
We decline to adopt . . . an expansive definition of "newly discovered 
evidence."  Although we are aware 
other courts have taken a different view, it has always been our position that 
the kind of evidence contemplated by the rule is solely that which bears on the 
guilt or innocence of the accused. 

 
 

Id. 
at 1130.  

 
 
[¶13]   In deciding this issue, it is 
helpful to consider Braley v. State, 
741 P.2d 1061 (Wyo. 1987).  In that case, this Court allowed a 
motion for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence of jury 
tampering.  Id. at 1065-66.  Obviously, jury tampering does not 
pertain to the underlying merits of the criminal case.  Thus, the Braley decision indicates that this 
Court would not limit the application of Rule 33(c) to newly discovered evidence 
pertaining to the merits of the crime.   

 
 
[¶14]   We are persuaded that the federal 
courts have taken the correct position on this issue.  The plain language of the rule does not 
limit its application to "newly discovered" evidence on the merits of the 
case.  Moreover, it may be difficult 
for parties to discover juror misconduct during the 15 day period immediately 
following the verdict in order to bring a motion under W.R.Cr.P. 33(b).  We also see no benefit to requiring 
defendants to wait until the conclusion of their criminal case to file a 
petition for post-conviction relief in order to obtain resolution of their 
concerns about juror misconduct.  In 
fact, the State, while asserting that Mr. Smith's motion was improper, requests 
that we resolve the pending issue without requiring Mr. Smith to bring a 
petition for post-conviction relief "in the interest of judicial expediency and 
economy."  We see no reason to allow 
Mr. Smith to present his claim in a Rule 33(c) motion while denying future 
defendants the same opportunity.  We 
conclude, therefore, that Mr. Smith's motion for a new trial is properly before 
this Court.     

 
 

2.                  
Juror 
Misconduct 

 
 
[¶15]   This Court has adopted the 
following standard for granting a new trial based on newly discovered 
evidence:

 
 
"In 
order to obtain a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence, a 
defendant must establish each of the following factors:  1) he did not become aware of the new 
evidence until after the trial;  2) 
it was not because of lack of due diligence that the new evidence did not come 
to light sooner;  3) the evidence is 
so material that it would probably produce a different result;  and 4) the evidence is not cumulative . 
. . .  If a defendant fails to prove 
any of these factors, the motion is properly denied."  

 
 

Robinson 
v. State, 2003 
WY 32, ¶ 20, 64 P.3d 743, 748-49 (Wyo. 2003), quoting Baumgartner v. State, 7 P.3d 912, 915 
(Wyo. 2000).  While we typically 
review a district court's decision on a motion for a new trial by applying the 
abuse of discretion standard, see, 
e.g., Barker v. State, 2006 WY 
104, ¶ 12, 141 P.3d 106, 112 (Wyo. 2006), the cases pertaining to juror bias and 
failure to answer voir dire questions 
honestly, as described below, direct us to review the legal questions de novo and the factual questions for 
clear error.  See, e.g., Skaggs v. Otis Elevator Co., 164 F.3d 511, 515-17 (10th Cir. 1998).  

 
 
[¶16]   The State does not argue that the 
evidence of juror bias in this case was not newly discovered or that, with due 
diligence, it could have been discovered earlier.  Instead, the State, like the district 
court, focuses on the substantive question of whether Mr. Smith could show that 
Juror Hanschen was biased against his mental illness defense and did not 
honestly answer voir dire questions 
about that bias.  That inquiry is 
relevant to the third element of our new trial test.  

 
 
[¶17]   Mr. Smith argues that the district 
court committed clear error when it found Mr. Hanschen was not biased and had 
not been dishonest during voir 
dire.  Mr. Smith points out that 
the whole thrust of the questions asked by his counsel during jury selection was 
to determine how the prospective jurors felt about the defense of not guilty by 
reason of mental illness.  Defense 
counsel, Tina Kerin, began her voir 
dire questioning with the following:

 
 
By 
Ms. Kerin:

 
 
            
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.  
My name is Tina Kerin.  I'm 
representing Mr. Smith today with Mr. Wolfe.  I want to talk about a number of issues, 
and one issue that [the prosecutor] briefly touched on is very central to this 
case.  You have heard what the 
charges are against Mr. Smith.  What 
you did perhaps not hear or get a chance to understand was what his plea is to 
those charges.  And just as a matter 
of factual background, very briefly, his plea is not guilty by reason of mental 
illness.  And so many of these 
things that [the prosecutor] discussed about the crime and where it occurred, 
those are things that will come up during the trial, but I want to focus more 
not on what happened or where it happened but on your opinions or thoughts about 
this defense, this plea that Mr. Smith has entered in this case, which is not 
guilty by reason of mental illness.  

 
 
            
Just preliminarily, have you heard of that, where they actually committed 
the crime, but they are saying that they don't have the criminal 
responsibility?  Has everybody heard 
about that?  I see a lot of people 
nodding their heads.  Does anyone 
have some strong feelings about that?  
For example, does anyone think it is overused or something that's a 
technicality?  And if you do or if 
you have any leanings that way, I want you to raise your hand so we can talk 
about it.  It is a very important 
matter . . . .

 
 
. 
. . . 

 
 
            
Specifically, with this case, for not guilty by reason of mental illness, 
I anticipate very briefly, without going into the facts, you will hear, in fact, 
that Mr. Smith committed the act that he is accused of committing . . . . Mr. 
McCone is the victim in the matter.  
And I think you won't hear a dispute about Mr. McCone being shot by Mr. 
Smith. 

 
 
. 
. . .

 

            
Okay.  I want to talk for a 
little bit about mental health issues, because I think they are very difficult 
and sensitive areas.  The specific 
diagnosis that you may hear about in the course of the trial is schizophrenia of 
the paranoid type.  And I first want 
to ask you, do any of you know someone or are you related to someone who's had 
severe mental health issues in the past?

 
 
            
[Several jurors raised their hands and were 
questioned]

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
            
            
Ms. Kerin:  Is there anyone 
else?

 
 
            
Juror Hanschen: My brother was diagnosed with 
schizophrenia.

 
 
            
. . . .

 
 
            
Ms. Kerin:  And did you make 
personal observations about his behavior or how he responded to certain 
things?

 
 
            
Juror Hanschen:      
Yes.

 
 
            
Ms. Kerin:  Okay.  The interactions that you had with your 
brother, would those influence how you listen to the evidence in Mr. Smith's 
case?

 
 
            
Juror Hanschen:      
I--I hope it would make me more caring and sensitive to those 
issues.  And I very much want to be 
impartial and listen to all the evidence.

 
 
            
Ms. Kerin:  And, Mr. Hanschen 
brings up a good point.  He says he 
hopes that it would make him more caring as he listens to the evidence.  Mental illness is something that used to 
have quite a stigma on it . . . .

 
 
. 
. . .

 
 
            
Ms. Kerin:      
[T]here will be psychological and psychiatric testimony in the case, and 
that will come, I anticipate from expert witnesses, probably from both sides, 
who will give competing opinions about the mental illness and the effect of the 
mental illness on what occurred the day of Mr. McCone's death.  Does everyone here feel comfortable 
listening to psychiatric and psychological testimony, or do you think that 
that's not something that has proper place in the court 
room?

 
 
            
(No response.)

 
 
[¶18]   After listening to the dialogue, 
one potential juror, Mr. Williams, who had been a school administrator and 
sports referee, stated that he strongly believed in personal responsibility for 
actions and that there should be consequences for those actions.  After he told the defense attorney that 
he had "significant doubt" about whether he could set aside his personal 
feelings and follow the judge's instructions, she asked that he be excused for 
cause.  In response to the 
prosecutor's and the district court's questions, however, Mr. Williams stated 
that he would do his best to follow the judge's instructions.  Given that statement, the judge denied 
the defense motion to excuse him for cause.    

 
 
[¶19]   Defense counsel then continued her 
questioning as follows:

 
 
            
Ms. Kerin:  Does anyone else 
have reservations that have come up as we have had this discussion with Mr. 
Williams?  Is anyone concerned about 
that type of defense now that there's been more conversation about it and Mr. 
Williams has expressed some of his reservations?  

 
 
Juror 
Hanschen did not respond to her question and, shortly thereafter, Ms. Kerin 
passed the jury for cause.  The 
defense used one of its preemptory challenges to remove Juror Williams from the 
jury, but Juror Hanschen remained.   

 
 
[¶20]   As indicated above, the article 
published in the Wyoming Lawyer magazine quoted Juror Hanschen as saying that he 
"had a bias that I didn't believe the insanity plea should rule out guilt, but 
they didn't ask me that question point blank.  Perhaps they should have."    

 
 
[¶21]   At the hearing on Mr. Smith's 
motion for a new trial, Ms. Kerin, Ms. Angell and Mr. Hanschen testified.  Ms. Kerin described her strategy for 
jury selection as follows:

 
 
            
Pretty much the entire focus of my jury selection was on the mental 
illness defense and how jurors felt about that.  From reading and training, I know that 
people have strong opinions about that topic, and I wanted to make sure that we 
seated a jury that could listen to that type of defense and not have any 
predispositions against that type of defense.   

 
 
She 
also testified that if Juror Hanschen had expressed the opinions in voir dire that he expressed in the 
article, she would have "sought to have him removed for cause.  Had I been unsuccessful in that, I would 
have exercised one of our preemptory challenges to remove him from the 
jury."    

 
 
[¶22]   Ms. Angell testified about her 
writing process in general and specifically about her interview with Mr. 
Hanschen.  She stated that when she 
interviewed people for her articles, she took notes by hand and then later 
transcribed them into her computer.  
She referred to these transcribed notes as her "slop file."  Ms. Angell explained that she color 
coded each interviewee's statements and that she would cut out parts of her 
notes to use in her article.  Ms. 
Angell stated that her interview with Mr. Hanschen was much longer than her 
interviews with other jurors.  She 
stated that he engaged in a discussion about the defense of not guilty by reason 
of mental illness and indicated that he opposed it.  In addition to the information in the 
article about Mr. Hanschen's comments, Ms. Angell testified that he had made the 
following comments:

 
 
[H]e 
further said that he doesn't believe the insanity plea should be an admissible 
defense.  He said something about 
Montana and Utah having done away with it.  I don't know whether that's true or not 
and I didn't use that in my story because I don't know if he had the right 
information there.  But he said, I 
think it should be done away with.  
And he objected that jurors had to determine whether somebody was insane 
when he said, "They had expert witnesses who could not agree on his mental 
condition.  So I don't feel that 
jurors should have that responsibility."  
  

 
 
She 
said that she asked him why he had not disclosed those opinions during jury 
selection and he stated that he was not asked "point blank."  Mr. Smith's attorney asked Ms. Angell 
if, based upon her conversation with Mr. Hanschen, she believed he held those 
opinions at the time of trial, and she responded, "Absolutely."    

 
 
[¶23]   Mr. Hanschen also appeared as a 
witness at the motion hearing.   
He testified as follows:

 
 

Q.    
Mr. 
Hanschen, do you have any opinions about the defense of not guilty by reason of 
mental illness?

 
 

A.     
Any 
opinions?

 
 

Q.    
About 
that defense.

 
 

A.     
I 
voted that there was insufficient evidence to show that he was - 
-

 
 
The 
Court:     That's not 
really responsive to the question, Mr. Hanschen.  The question is, do you have any 
opinions generally regarding an insanity defense, not how you voted as a 
juror.

 
 
The 
Witness: I don't like the insanity 
defense, but I fully acted under the  how I was instructed as a 
juror.

 
 

Q.    
I 
 it's a very simple question.  And 
I will let you expound.  I'm just 
trying to get my question answered, which is, do you have opinions about the 
insanity defense?

 
 

A.     
I 
don't think it's swayed me in the least.

 
 
The 
Court:  Mr. Hanschen, do you have an 
opinion, yes or no, generally regarding the insanity 
defense?

 
 
The 
Witness: Since the trial, I have definite opinions.

 
 
The 
Court:  And I assume, [defense 
counsel], that you are talking about opinions at the time of voir dire, not opinions today, which may 
be different.    

 
 
Defense 
Counsel:   I am, sir.  And that was my next question.  I'm just trying to get him to answer my 
question and then 

 
 
The 
Court:     At the time the 
jury selection process took place, did you have opinions, generally, regarding 
the insanity defense?

 
 
The 
Witness: No.  I was very curious, 
and I had no opinions at the time of the jury selection or bias or 
whatever.  But I have since been 
quite interested.  But at the time, 
no.  I was ignorant, in fact, of 
what an insanity defense was all about.  
Curious, yes; but opinion, no, at the time.

 
 
Defense 
counsel then asked Mr. Hanschen about the quotes attributed to him in the 
article.  

 
 

Q.    
Have 
you found where you are quoted in the article?

 
 

A.     
Yes.

 
 
Q. 
I would just direct your attention to the paragraph beginning with a quote from 
you, "At that point."  Do you see 
where I am looking, sir?

 
 
A. 
I think maybe you are the center of what you are asking, I answered the 
questions honestly.  "I confess I 
have a bias that I didn't believe the insanity plea should rule out 
guilt."

 
 
Q.  Correct.  Would you just stop right there, Mr. 
Hanschen?

 
 
A.  Okay.

 
 
Q.  So at that time, you just testified that 
before this trial, you had no opinions about the insanity defense.  But this quote from the article would 
seem to contradict what you just testified to here.  Do you see the quote, "At that time, I 
confess I had a bias"?

 
 
A.  Okay.  I can see where it would seem to 
contradict.  All I can say is, so 
help me God, I acted as I was directed.

 
 
Q.   That's not my question, sir.  

 
 
A.   Okay.  I believe that 

 
 
Q.   There's no question pending at 
this time.

 
 
A.  Oh.

 
 
Q.  Would you just please wait until I ask a 
question, Mr. Hanschen, before you address the Court?

 
 
       At the 
time during jury selection, did you have an opinion about whether or not the 
insanity defense was good or bad for our society?

 
 
A.  No. No. Actually, I have said that, 
no.  Compared to what I have read 
since then, I had no understanding of it, nor did I  nor did I know what states 
or was I  was I to understand the history of it or anything.  I had not researched the insanity 
plea.  It did interest me that  the 
cases are interesting.  There is an 
insanity plea.  What, my goodness, 
is an insanity plea?  Now, it says 
that I said to her that I had a bias.  
I would not have accepted the jury duty if I could not, in all honesty, 
have gone under the directions to judge whether this ---

 
 
Upon 
further questioning, Juror Hanschen admitted that he "probably" made the 
statements attributed to him in the article.  On cross examination by the prosecutor, 
Mr. Hanschen stated that he had not lied or withheld any information during jury 
selection.  He also stated that he 
had followed the judge's instructions on the law.      

 
 
[¶24]   Criminal defendants are 
constitutionally entitled to a fair trial before an impartial jury.  United 
States Constitution, Amendment 6; Wyoming Constitution, 
art. 1, § 10.  In addition, the 
constitutional right to due process of law guarantees a criminal defendant the 
right to an impartial jury.  Miller v. State, 904 P.2d 344, 352 
(Wyo. 1995).  "An impartial jury consists of those 
jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and find the facts."  Id., citing Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423, 105 S. Ct. 844, 852, 83 
L. Ed. 2d. 841 (1985).  See also, Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S. Ct. 940, 946, 
71 L. Ed. 2d. 78 (1982).  

 
 
[¶25]   Voir dire examination helps ensure the 
right to a fair and impartial jury by giving the parties the opportunity to 
discover biases and prejudices of potential jurors.  Miller, 904 P.2d  at 352.  In McDonough Power Equip., Inc., v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554, 104 S. Ct. 845, 849, 
78 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1984), the United States Supreme Court succinctly explained 
the purposes of voir dire 
examination:

 
 
One 
touchstone of a fair trial is an impartial trier of fact-"a jury capable and 
willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it." Smith v. 
Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S. Ct. 940, 946, 71 L. Ed. 2d 78 (1982). Voir dire examination serves to protect that right by 
exposing possible biases, both known and unknown, on the part of potential 
jurors. Demonstrated bias in the responses to questions on voir dire may 
result in a juror being excused for cause; hints of bias not sufficient to 
warrant challenge for cause may assist parties in exercising their peremptory 
challenges. The necessity of truthful answers by prospective jurors if this 
process is to serve its purpose is obvious.

 
 
In 
other words, voir dire examination 
helps the attorneys determine if the potential juror may be challenged for 
cause.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-105 
(LexisNexis 2007) states in pertinent part:  

 
 
(a) 
The following is good cause for challenge to any person called as a juror in a 
criminal case:

            

. 
. . . 

            
     (ii) That 
he has formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the 
accused, or is biased or prejudiced for or against the 
accused;

 
 
. 
. . .     

 
 
(b) 
The same challenges for cause shall be allowed in criminal prosecutions that are 
allowed to parties in civil cases.

 

Since 
§ 7-11-105(b) refers to the challenges allowed in civil cases, we also quote the 
pertinent provision of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-11-203 (LexisNexis 
2007):

 
 
(a) 
Challenges for cause may be taken on one (1) or more of the following 
grounds:

 
 
            
. . . . 

 
 
            
(vi) Having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to 
the merits or the main question of the action. 

 
 
            
(vii) The existence of a state of mind in the juror evincing enmity or 
bias for either party. 

 
 
[¶26]   Requests for a new trial on the 
basis that a juror was not honest during voir dire or was biased may be brought 
in different ways.  First, a claim 
may be brought under the principles articulated by the United States Supreme 
Court in McDonough.   In order to obtain a new trial under McDonough, 464 U.S.  at 556, a 
party must demonstrate

 
 
that 
a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and 
then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for 
a challenge for cause. The motives for concealing information may vary, but only 
those reasons that affect a juror's impartiality can truly be said to affect the 
fairness of a trial.

 
 
[¶27]   In order to satisfy the first part 
of the McDonough test, the party must 
show that the juror intentionally gave an incorrect answer to a voir dire question.  Gonzalez v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 978, 984 
(10th Cir. 1996) (applying the McDonough test to a criminal case).  The question of whether a juror was 
honest during voir dire is a factual 
determination reviewed for clear error.   Skaggs v. Otis Elevator Co., 164 F.3d 511, 515 (10th Cir. 1998).  The district court concluded that Mr. 
Smith did not satisfy the first prong of the McDonough test:

 
 
            
The first McDonough prong 
required a finding that Hanschen failed to answer a material question 
honestly.  The voir dire process in this case was 
thorough and thoughtful.  Potential 
jurors were asked multiple questions regarding their thoughts on mental illness 
and the "insanity defense."  
Hanschen failed to raise any concerns or bias during these 
proceedings.  Accordingly, given the 
questions asked of Smith's potential jurors and Hanschen's failure to reply to 
them, this Court can only conclude that any dishonest answer given by Hanschen 
was intentional.

 
 
            
The fatal flaw in Smith's argument, however, is a required finding that 
Hanschen was, in fact, dishonest.  
The Court finds Hanschen credible in his testimony that he had not formed 
a prejudice or bias at the time of voir 
dire and, even more, that he dutifully followed the direction of this Court 
in serving as a jury member.  
Angell's article might suggest otherwise but, when reconciled with her 
raw notes, there clearly is room for speculation.  Specifically, many of Hanschen's 
comments to Angell were in the present tense and reflected his opinions at the 
time of the interview, not at the time of voir dire six months earlier.  Angell admitted that she failed to 
inquire into the differences in Hanschen's opinions "at present" versus at the 
time of the trial.  Further, her 
rough notes reveal that Hanschen wanted to serve on the jury and "try to be 
fair."  He was asked about his 
ability to be fair and had no concerns about it.  He recognized that he would have 
listened to the "credible" evidence.  
In short, the article, the notes and Angell's testimony, taken together, 
are confused [and] inconclusive as to whether Hanschen had a pre-existing bias 
or prejudice.  This Court simply 
cannot conclude on the basis of this evidence that Hanschen had any pre-existing 
bias or that he provided any dishonest answers or dishonestly failed to provide 
information concerning such at the time of voir dire.  

 
 
[¶28]   The district court also concluded 
that Mr. Smith did not satisfy the second part of the McDonough test because Mr. Hanschen 
consistently stated that he would follow the court's instructions and the court 
found his "explanation of his state-of-mind credible and plausible."   Thus, the district court concluded 
that Mr. Smith would not have been successful in a challenge for cause.3   

 
 
[¶29]   In addition to the McDonough test, a party can obtain a new 
trial by showing that the juror had an actual or implied bias.  Skaggs, 164 F.3d  at 516.  "A finding of actual bias is based upon 
express proof, e.g., . . . admission by the prospective juror of a state of mind 
prejudicial to a party's interest.'"  
Id. at 517, quoting United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d 980, 
984 (2d. Cir. 1968).  "Actual bias 
is a factual finding reviewed for clear error."  Id. at 516.  See also, Gonzalez, 99 F.3d  at 986.   A determination on a claim of 
implied bias, on the other hand, is a question of law reviewed de novo.  Skaggs, 164 F.3d  at 517.  "Implied bias can be proved by showing 
that the juror had a personal connection to the parties or circumstances of the 
trial'" or when there are "similarities between the personal experiences of the 
juror and the issues being litigated."  
Id., quoting Gonzales, 99 F.3d  at 987. The district 
court concluded that Mr. Smith had not shown that Mr. Hanschen was actually or 
impliedly biased.         
         

 
 
[¶30]   Mr. Smith's argument on appeal is 
directed at the district court's determination that Mr. Hanschen was not biased 
at the time of the trial.  He claims 
that the district court committed clear error when it made that ruling.   Mr. Smith asserts that Mr. 
Hanschen's testimony at the new trial motion hearing was implausible, 
contradicted by extrinsic evidence and internally inconsistent.  He relies on Banther v. State, 823 A.2d 467 
(Del. 2003)4 to support his position.  

 
 
[¶31]   In Banther, the Delaware Supreme Court held 
the trial court's finding that the jury forewoman had not been honest in voir dire was clearly erroneous.  Id. 
at 483-84.  During voir dire, she stated that she had never 
been the victim of a violent crime.  
Id. at 476-77.   After the trial, the defendant 
discovered that the forewoman had been sexually abused as a child by her 
grandfather.  Id. at 484.  Following a hearing on the defendant's 
motion for a new trial, the district court apparently ruled that her answers to 
the voir dire questions were not 
purposely dishonest.  Id.  
On appeal, the supreme court concluded that the trial court's 
determination was clearly erroneous because her testimony that she did not 
consider the molestation to be a violent act was implausible, contradicted by 
extrinsic medical records and internally inconsistent.  Id.   

 
 
[¶32]   As in Banther, Mr. Hanschen's statements were 
inconsistent on their face.  The 
statements he made to Ms. Angell, which he confirmed at the motion hearing that 
he had "probably" said, indicated that, at the time of voir dire, he did not believe that the 
mental illness defense should be allowed.  
It would seem logical that, if he held such beliefs at the time of voir dire, he should have responded to 
defense counsel's requests for responses from people who had opinions about the 
mental illness defense.  However, 
the district court specifically found Mr. Hanschen's subsequent explanation 
about his seemingly inconsistent statements to be persuasive.  Mr. Hanschen explained that, at the time 
of voir dire, he was curious about 
the mental illness defense but that he had not formed any specific opinions 
about it.  He indicated that, after 
the trial, he had researched the issue and became convinced that the mental 
illness defense should be repealed in Wyoming.  
Mr. Hanschen stated, unequivocally, that he followed the judge's 
instructions on the law and he wanted Mr. Smith to have a fair trial.  

 
 
[¶33]   Unlike the situation presented in 
Banther, Mr. Hanschen's explanation 
of the inconsistencies in his statements is believable.  Moreover, while Mr. Smith claims that 
Ms. Angell's article is extrinsic evidence that he was dishonest, the article 
did not have the objective indices of truth that the medical records in Banther had.  We have no trouble determining that Banther is distinguishable from the case 
at bar.  On this record, we cannot say that 
the district court's conclusion that Mr. Hanschen was not dishonest in 
responding to the voir dire question 
was clearly erroneous.  Thus, we 
agree with the district court's conclusion that Mr. Smith did not satisfy the 
first part of the McDonough test. 

 
 
[¶34]   The district court also determined 
Mr. Smith did not establish that Mr. Hanschen's correct responses would have 
resulted in a valid challenge for cause.  
We agree.  First of all, we 
have already affirmed the district court's finding that he was not dishonest 
during voir dire, so there are no 
"correct responses" to consider.  
Moreover, he stated repeatedly that he followed the judge's 
instructions.  Even a prospective 
juror who has a bias may be properly seated on a jury if he "can set aside any 
supposed bias and decide a case only on the evidence presented in court."  Klahn v. State, 2004 WY 94, ¶ 10, 96 P.3d 472, 479 (Wyo. 2004).  See also, §§ 7-11-105, 1-11-203.  We cannot, therefore, criticize the 
district court's determination that Mr. Smith did not satisfy the second part of 
the McDonough test.  

 
 
[¶35]   The evidence described above also 
supports the district court's factual determination that Mr. Hanschen was not 
actually biased.  Mr. Smith argues 
that Mr. Hanschen admitted an actual bias to Ms. Angell; consequently, he is 
entitled to a new trial.  However, 
the district court essentially ruled that Mr. Hanschen's comments, as explained 
by him, did not amount to an admission of bias.  We have already said that determination 
was not clearly erroneous.  Thus, 
there is no basis for a finding of actual bias.  

 
 
[¶36]   Mr. Smith does not offer a cogent 
argument that Mr. Hanschen was impliedly biased, in accordance with Skaggs, presumably because there is no 
evidence that he had any personal connection to the parties or circumstances of 
the trial or that there were similarities between Mr. Hanschen's personal 
experiences and the issues being litigated.

 
 
[¶37]   Affirmed.

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Mr. Smith 
filed a notice of appeal after the judgment and sentence was entered by the 
district court.  He requested and 
received a stay of his appeal to allow the district court to hold an evidentiary 
hearing on his motion for a new trial.  
After the district court ruled, the appeals process resumed.    

 
 

2Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 states:

 
 

   (a) 
Defendant's Motion. 
Upon the defendant's motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new 
trial if the interest of justice so requires. If the case was tried without a 
jury, the court may take additional testimony and enter a new 
judgment.

    (b) 
Time to File.

          
(1) Newly Discovered Evidence. 
Any motion for a new trial grounded on newly discovered evidence must be filed 
within 3 years after the verdict or finding of guilty. If an appeal is pending, 
the court may not grant a motion for a new trial until the appellate court 
remands the case.

          
(2) 
Other Grounds. 
Any motion for a new trial grounded on any reason other than newly discovered 
evidence must be filed within 7 days after the verdict or finding of 
guilty.

 
 

3The district 
court remarked that it had denied a motion for removal of Juror Williams for 
cause when he expressed similar sentiments.

 
 

4Mr. 
Smith also cites to State v. Loftin, 
922 A.2d 1210 (N.J. 2007).  Loftin is not persuasive authority on 
the issue presented here.  That 
decision focused on whether a juror, who made comments to his co-workers during 
the trial indicating he had a racial bias and had prejudged the case, should 
have been removed from the jury and whether the trial court erred by failing to 
voir dire the remainder of the jury 
to determine if they were tainted.  
Id. at 1218-19.