Case Title: Leonardo Marrero v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2011-05-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-2390 
____________ 
 
LEONARDO MARRERO,  
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Respondent. 
 
[May 5, 2011] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Leonardo Marrero (Marrero) seeks review of the decision of the Third 
District Court of Appeal in Marrero v. State, 22 So. 3d 822 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009), 
asserting that it expressly and directly conflicts with decisions of the First and 
Second District Courts of Appeal in T.B.S. v. State, 935 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2006), S.P. v. State, 884 So. 2d 136 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), A.D. v. State, 866 So. 2d 
752 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), Wingfield v. State, 751 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), 
remanded, 799 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 2001), Clark v. State, 746 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 1999), approved, 783 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 2001), and Miller v. State, 667 So. 2d 
325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), along with decisions of this Court in Negron v. State, 
 
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306 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1974), and Carnley v. State, 89 So. 808 (Fla. 1921).  We have 
jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. 
FACTS 
Marrero drove his Ford F150 pickup truck through the entrance of the 
Miccosukee Casino building located in Miami-Dade County.  The entrance 
consisted of four impact-resistant glass doors, each of them sixteen or seventeen 
feet tall, each framed in special aluminum materials, and one of which was 
equipped with a handicap accessible automatic entry system.  The crash required 
each of the four doors to be replaced and resulted in the injury of one casino 
patron.  The State charged Marrero, as relevant here, with felony criminal 
mischief.     
The State attempted to introduce costs associated with the temporary repair 
of the damaged property, but defense counsel, relying on R.C.R. v. State, 916 So. 
2d 49 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), objected to the introduction of evidence of temporary 
repair costs because such costs may be rendered inadmissible if the permanent 
repair costs are also introduced, as the sum of these costs may exceed the fair 
market value of the doors.  The trial court sustained the objection.  Thereafter, the 
State failed to present any evidence of the repair or replacement costs of the 
damaged property.  The State did present a surveillance videotape of Marrero‟s 
truck crashing through the doors.  The State also presented the testimony of the 
 
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facilities director of the casino, but when asked questions concerning the cost of 
the damaged property he had no knowledge of the cost or dollar amount of 
damage. 
At the conclusion of the State‟s case, Marrero requested a judgment of 
acquittal on the charge of felony criminal mischief.  In support of the motion for 
judgment of acquittal, defense counsel argued, in part, that the State “failed to 
establish a prima facie case that the damage was one thousand dollars or more,” the 
threshold amount for the felony charge.  The judge ultimately reserved ruling on 
Marrero‟s motion for judgment of acquittal, and after the defense declared that it 
would not offer additional evidence, defense counsel again requested the entry of a 
judgment of acquittal.  The judge, despite saying, “I am concerned about the lack 
of evidence of value,” again reserved ruling on the motion. 
During closing arguments, the State did not discuss the monetary amount of 
damage to the property.  The defense, however, argued at great length that the 
State had failed to prove that the amount of damage resulting from the crash 
exceeded $1,000.  At the conclusion of the closing arguments, the trial court 
provided, in part, the following instruction concerning criminal mischief: 
The punishment provided by law for the crime of criminal 
mischief is greater depending on the value of the property damage.  
Therefore, if you find the defendant guilty of criminal mischief, you 
must determine by your verdict whether: 
A, The damage to the property was a thousand dollars or 
greater. 
 
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B, the damage to the property was greater than two hundred 
dollars but less than one thousand dollars. 
And, three, the damage to the property was two hundred dollars 
or less. 
 
During deliberations, the jury asked the following two-part question: “Can 
we enter a verdict for [criminal mischief] without rendering an opinion on the 
value of the property?  Was there testimony about the amount of damage to 
property?”  In response, the judge, explicitly relying on Florida Standard Jury 
Instruction 14.1—which concerns charges of criminal theft, not criminal 
mischief—provided the following instruction to the jury: 
If you find the defendant guilty of criminal mischief, you must 
make a determination of the value of the property damaged.  Your 
verdict with regard to the value must be for the highest amount which 
was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  If the exact value of the 
property damage cannot be ascertained, you should attempt to 
determine a minimum value.  If you cannot determine the minimum 
value, then you must find the value is less than two hundred dollars. 
 
 
A few minutes after the judge provided the supplemental instruction to the 
jury, the jury found Marrero guilty of criminal mischief.  The jury explicitly found 
that “the property was one thousand dollars or more.”  In her final ruling on the 
defendant‟s motion for judgment of acquittal, the trial judge stated:  
What I‟m going to do is that I am going to deny it at this time, 
but I want you, if you are going to be filing a motion for new trial, I 
think that it is something that both sides need to brief, all right.  I am 
not going to schedule it because I will let you file it.  You have ten 
days to file a motion for new trial and, you know, I do have a concern 
about the value and the jury expressed their concern for the value.  
That one case that I pointed out . . . suggests that there has to be some 
 
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evidence for them to base it on.  I think you all should look at the case 
law on whatever it is you‟re going to file.  You might want to begin 
researching since you know what the issue is. 
 
On appeal, the Third District recognized that, “as a general rule, it will be 
necessary for the State to present evidence of the cost of repair or replacement in a 
criminal mischief case, if the State wishes to convict the defendant of mischief 
exceeding either the $200 or $1000 threshold.”  Marrero, 22 So. 3d at 823 (citing § 
806.13(1)(b)2.-3., Fla. Stat. (2006)).  However, the Third District continued that “a 
trial court may conclude that certain repairs are so self-evident that the fact-finder 
could conclude based on life experience that the statutory damage threshold has 
been met.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting T.B.S. v. State, 935 So. 
2d 98, 99 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006)).  The district court ultimately applied a “life 
experience” exception to this case and concluded: 
In this case the jury had a videotape of the collision which 
destroyed four extremely tall impact-resistant doors, including one 
door with a special mechanism for handicapped entry.  We agree with 
the trial court that based on common experience, the jury could 
reasonably conclude that the cost of repair or replacement easily 
exceeded $250 per door or $1000 in the aggregate.  We therefore 
affirm the conviction and the restitution order.  
 
Id. 
This Court granted review of the decision below based on express and direct 
conflict with decisions of this Court and other district courts of appeal.  First, the 
decision below is in conflict with Carnley v. State, 89 So. 808 (Fla. 1921), and 
 
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Negron v. State, 306 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1974), receded from on other grounds by 
Butterworth v. Fluellen, 359 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1980), which hold that essential 
elements of a crime must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and cannot be left 
to inference or conjecture.  Further, the decision below is in conflict with Miller v. 
State, 667 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), and Wingfield v. State, 751 So. 2d 134 
(Fla. 2d DCA 2000), remanded on other grounds, 799 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 2001), 
which hold that an adjudication of guilt of a third-degree felony or first-degree 
misdemeanor charge of criminal mischief, both of which require a specific 
monetary amount of damage to be established, must be reversed if no evidence of 
the amount of damage to the property is presented during trial.  Finally, the 
decision below is in conflict with T.B.S. v. State, 935 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 2d DCA 
2006), A.D. v. State, 866 So. 2d 752 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), S.P. v. State, 884 So. 2d 
136 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), and Clark v. State, 746 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), 
approved on other grounds, 783 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 2001), each of which provides 
limitations on any “life experience” exceptions that are not recognized by the 
decision below. 
ANALYSIS 
Due process guarantees that the State must prove each essential element of 
an offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  See State v. Barnum, 921 So. 2d 513, 519 
 
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(Fla. 2005) (citing Fiore v. White, 531 U.S. 225, 229 (2001)).  Section 806.13, 
Florida Statutes (2006), provides, in part: 
(1)(a) A person commits the offense of criminal mischief if he 
or she willfully and maliciously injures or damages by any means any 
real or personal property belonging to another, including, but not 
limited to, the placement of graffiti thereon or other acts of vandalism 
thereto. 
(b)1. If the damage to such property is $200 or less, it is a 
misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 
775.082 or s. 775.083. 
2. If the damage to such property is greater than $200 but less 
than $1,000, it is a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as 
provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083. 
3. If the damage is $1,000 or greater, or if there is interruption 
or impairment of a business operation or public communication, 
transportation, supply of water, gas or power, or other public service 
which costs $1,000 or more in labor and supplies to restore, it is a 
felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 
775.083, or s. 775.084. 
 
(Emphasis supplied.)  Surprisingly, there is some conflict among our district courts 
as to whether the amount of damage is an essential element of a felony criminal 
mischief charge.  The Fourth District Court of Appeal has explicitly stated that the 
amount of damage is an essential element of the crime of felony criminal mischief.  
See Zanger v. State, 42 So. 3d 944, 945 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (“In prosecutions for 
criminal mischief in excess of $1000—a felony of the third degree—an essential 
element of the crime is the amount of damage in value or cost to the property 
damaged.”)  (citing § 816.13(1)(a), (b)3., Fla. Stat. (2005); Meenaghan v. State, 
601 So. 2d 307, 308 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)) (emphasis supplied).  The First, Second, 
 
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and Third Districts, however, have refrained from declaring amount of damage to 
be an essential element of felony criminal mischief and have merely referred to the 
“severity” of the crime.  See S.P. v. State, 884 So. 2d 136, 137 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) 
(“[E]ven though the damage amount is not an element of the offense of 
criminal mischief, it is relevant to the severity of the crime.” (citing Valdes v. 
State, 510 So. 2d 631, 632 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (emphasis supplied))); J.R.S. v. 
State, 569 So. 2d 1323, 1325 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (“Damage to the property of 
another is an essential element of the offense of criminal mischief.  However, the 
specific value of the property damage is relevant only to the severity of the 
crime.”) (citations omitted) (citing Valdes, 510 So. 2d at 632)); Valdes, 510 So. 2d 
at 632 (“While damage to property is an essential element of the crime of criminal 
mischief, once it is established that the defendant damaged another‟s property, the 
value of the property damage is relevant only to the severity of the crime.” (citation 
omitted)).  
This Court has not previously addressed whether the amount of damage is an 
essential element of a felony criminal mischief charge.  To determine the 
parameters of a specific element of a crime we first examine the plain language of 
the statute.  See State v. Hubbard, 751 So. 2d 552, 561-62 (Fla. 1999).  When a 
statute is clear, we do not look behind the statute‟s plain language for legislative 
intent or resort to rules of statutory construction to ascertain intent.  See State v. 
 
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Burris, 875 So. 2d 408, 410 (Fla. 2004) (citing Lee County Elec. Coop., Inc. v. 
Jacobs, 820 So. 2d 297, 303 (Fla. 2002)). The plain and ordinary meaning of the 
words of a statute must control.  Finally, our interpretation of a statute is a purely 
legal matter and therefore subject to a de novo standard of review.  See Curd v. 
Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, 39 So. 3d 1216, 1220 (Fla. 2010) (citing Kephart v. Hadi, 
932 So. 2d 1086, 1089 (Fla. 2006)).   
Here, a plain reading of the criminal mischief statute reveals that the amount 
of damage is an essential element of the crime of felony criminal mischief.  The 
only difference between second degree misdemeanor mischief and third-degree 
felony mischief is the value of the damaged property.  Felony criminal mischief 
requires proof of the amount of damage, whereas second-degree misdemeanor 
mischief does not.  Absent proof of the amount of damage, an act of criminal 
mischief, as defined by the criminal mischief statute, is a misdemeanor of the 
second degree.  The value of damage, therefore, is clearly an essential element of 
felony criminal mischief. 
 
This reading of the criminal mischief statute is consistent with prior 
decisions of this Court interpreting other crimes involving degrees of severity.  The 
criminal theft statute, similar to the criminal mischief statute, relies on the value of 
property to distinguish between degrees of theft.  See § 812.014, Fla. Stat. (2010).  
Similarly, the criminal trafficking statute relies on the quantity of drugs to 
 
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distinguish between degrees of criminal trafficking.  See § 893.135, Fla. Stat. 
(2010).  Although before today we have not explicitly held that value is an 
essential element of felony criminal mischief, we have held that value is an 
essential element of grand theft.  See Negron v. State, 306 So. 2d 104, 108 (Fla. 
1974) (“Proof of the element of value is essential to a conviction for grand larceny 
and must be established by the State beyond and to the exclusion of every 
reasonable doubt.”) (citing Carnley v. State, 89 So. 808 (Fla. 1921)), receded from 
on other grounds by Butterworth v. Fluellen, 389 So. 2d 968 (Fla. 1980); see also 
State v. Hawthorne, 573 So. 2d 330, 332 (Fla. 1991) (“[T]he rule announced in 
Negron is an appropriate standard for those cases where the determination of value 
is an element of the crime.”).  We have also held that the quantity of drugs is an 
essential element of first-degree felony trafficking.  See Hernandez v. State, 35 Fla. 
L. Weekly S714, S716 (Fla. Dec. 9, 2010) (citing Snell v. State, 939 So. 2d 1175, 
1179 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)).  The essential nature of value in the criminal theft 
context and quantity in the criminal trafficking context applies equally to the 
amount of damage in the felony criminal mischief context. 
 
Value is an essential element of felony criminal mischief and the legislature 
certainly has the prerogative to define the elements of any crime.  See State v. 
Hubbard, 751 So. 2d 552, 561-62 (Fla. 1999) (citing Perkins v. State, 682 So. 2d 
1083 (Fla. 1996); State v. Hamilton, 660 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1995); Chapman v. 
 
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Lake, 151 So. 399 (Fla. 1932)).  The absence of any qualification whatsoever in 
the criminal mischief statute, however, reinforces the premise that the State must 
prove the essential element of amount of damage to establish a prima facie case of 
felony criminal mischief.   
To support its approval of the conviction below, the Third District expressly 
relies on a “life experience” exception to the general rule that the State must 
establish the amount of damage to prove felony criminal mischief.  The “life 
experience” exception, however, is actually derived from a totally different 
discrete statutory provision of the criminal theft statutes.  Under Florida law the 
degree of grand theft committed depends on the “value” of the property stolen.  
See § 812.014, Fla. Stat. (2010).1  Section 812.012, Florida Statutes (2010), which 
defines specific terms used in sections 812.012-812.037, Florida Statutes (2010), 
provides: 
(10) “Value” means value determined according to any of the 
following: 
                                          
 
1.  If the value of the property stolen is valued at $100,000 or more, the 
offender commits grand theft in the first degree, punishable as a felony of the first 
degree.  See § 812.014(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010).  If the value of the property stolen 
is valued at $20,000 or more but less than $100,000, the offender commits grand 
theft in the second degree, punishable as a felony of the second degree.  See § 
812.014(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2010).  If the value of the property stolen is valued at 
$300 or more but less than $20,000, the offender commits grand theft in the third 
degree, punishable as a felony of the third degree.  See § 812.014(2)(c), Fla. Stat. 
(2010).  Finally, the “[t]heft of any property not specified in [section 812.014(2)] is 
petit theft of the second degree and a misdemeanor of the first degree . . .”  § 
812.014(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2010). 
 
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(a)1. Value means the market value of the property at the time 
and place of the offense or, if such cannot be satisfactorily 
ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property within a 
reasonable time after the offense. 
2. The value of a written instrument that does not have a readily 
ascertainable market value, in the case of an instrument such as a 
check, draft, or promissory note, is the amount due or collectible or is, 
in the case of any other instrument which creates, releases, discharges, 
or otherwise affects any valuable legal right, privilege, or obligation, 
the greatest amount of economic loss that the owner of the instrument 
might reasonably suffer by virtue of the loss of the instrument. 
3. The value of a trade secret that does not have a readily 
ascertainable market value is any reasonable value representing the 
damage to the owner, suffered by reason of losing an advantage over 
those who do not know of or use the trade secret. 
(b) If the value of property cannot be ascertained, the trier of 
fact may find the value to be not less than a certain amount; if no such 
minimum value can be ascertained, the value is an amount less than 
$100. 
(c) Amounts of value of separate properties involved in thefts 
committed pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct, whether the 
thefts are from the same person or from several persons, may be 
aggregated in determining the grade of the offense. 
 
(Emphasis supplied.) 
In Jackson v. State, 413 So. 2d 112, 114 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), the Second 
District interpreted section 812.012(9)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), to allow a 
defendant to be found guilty of theft of property valued at $100 or more “absent 
any specific proof of value by the state . . . when, by the very nature of the property 
stolen, reasonable persons could not doubt that its value exceeded $100.”  The 
Jackson court did note, however, that “[i]n doing so, we stress the fact that this 
should occur only in those rare instances when the minimum value is undisputable 
 
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and the jury cannot ascertain a specific value from the evidence or lack of evidence 
before it.”  Id. (emphasis supplied).   
Jackson improperly breathes an extremely broad interpretation of a narrow 
statutory provision into the criminal theft statute.  Section 812.012(10)(b) provides 
that “[i]f the value of property cannot be ascertained, the trier of fact may find the 
value to be not less than a certain amount.”  (Emphasis supplied.)  A plain reading 
of this criminal theft provision reveals that a jury is only allowed to determine a 
minimum value instead of an actual value if the value of property cannot be 
ascertained.  Jackson replaces the requirement that the value of the stolen property 
be impossible to ascertain with a completely unrelated condition of the State‟s 
failure to present evidence of value (although capable of valuation) and jurors 
“could not doubt that its value exceeded” the required amount.  See Jackson, 413 
So. 2d at 112.  This misinterpretation of the criminal theft statute is not supported 
by any authority whatsoever and in fact runs contrary to the plain language of the 
criminal theft statute and the criminal mischief statute.  We therefore disapprove of 
Jackson‟s disregard of the impossibility prerequisite articulated in section 
812.012(10)(b). 
Further, it would be problematic to leave the significant determination of 
whether a Florida citizen is deemed a convicted felon to the arbitrary and 
unpredictable “life experience” of a jury.  The “life experience” of individual jury 
 
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members varies widely within individual communities, and even more so 
throughout this very diverse State.  A contractor living in Miami-Dade County may 
have a very different understanding of the costs associated with hurricane resistant 
doors than a retired grandmother living in Pensacola.  Branding a Florida citizen 
with the label “convicted felon” must be approached with care and extreme 
caution, based only on evidence and facts from which conclusions can be drawn, 
not these widely varying “life experiences.”  The application of a “life experience” 
exception to any criminal statute, including the criminal theft statute, is 
inconsistent with the uniform system of justice that both the Florida and Federal 
Constitutions require and should not be left to the whim of individual jury 
members.   
Moreover, even if Jackson had correctly applied the narrow statutory 
exception articulated in the criminal theft statute, that exception has never before 
been applied in the criminal mischief context because the concept is not part of the 
criminal mischief statute.  In Clark v. State, 746 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), 
which involved a charge of criminal mischief, the First District relied on Jackson 
to recognize that “in theft cases, where the value of an item is so self-evident as to 
defy contradiction, specific evidence of value need not be introduced.”  Id. at 1241 
(citing Jackson, 413 So. 2d at 114).  The First District continued: “Here, however, 
we cannot agree that the cost of motor vehicle body repair is so self-evident that a 
 
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jury could simply use its life experience or common sense to determine whether 
the $1,000 damage threshold was met.”  Id. (emphasis supplied).  Accordingly, 
Clark, which served as the basis for the “life experience” exception articulated by 
the Third District in the case presently before us, referenced “life experience” of a 
jury in refusing to apply the exception articulated in Jackson to a charge of felony 
criminal mischief.  The First District ultimately held that the defendant could only 
be found guilty of the lowest degree of criminal mischief allowed under the 
statutory scheme. 
 
In the decision below, the Third District relied on Clark and three additional 
decisions of the Second District to support its use of a “life experience” exception: 
It has been said that “a trial court may conclude „that certain 
repairs are so self-evident that the fact-finder could conclude based on 
life experience that the statutory damage threshold has been met . . . .‟  
”  T.B.S. v. State, 935 So. 2d 98, 99 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006) 
(quoting A.D. v. State, 866 So. 2d 752, 753 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)); S.P. 
v. State, 884 So. 2d 136, 138 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Clark v. State, 746 
So. 2d 1237, 1241 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). 
 
Marrero, 22 So. 3d at 823.  In each of those decisions, however, the Second 
District actually held that the State had failed to meet its burden of establishing a 
felony criminal mischief amount and ordered the trial court to reduce the charge to 
the only degree of criminal mischief that does not require the State to prove value.  
See T.B.S., 935 So. 2d at 99 (“[A] trial court may conclude „that certain repairs are 
so self-evident that the fact-finder could conclude based on life experience that the 
 
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statutory damage threshold has been met . . . .‟  The trial court articulated no life 
experience or other basis that would constitute sufficient evidence to support its 
finding that the damage to the victim‟s car exceeded $1000.”) (quoting A.D., 866 
So. 2d at 753); S.P., 884 So. 2d at 138 (“We recognize that in some circumstances, 
the fact-finder can infer from life experience and from the self-evident nature of 
the repairs that a statutory damage threshold has been met.  In this case, however, 
the fact-finder did not have before it sufficient evidence from which to infer that 
the „$1000 or greater‟ threshold had been met.”) (citing A.D., 866 So. 2d at 753-
54); A.D, 866 So. 2d at 753-54 (“Although it is permissible, pursuant to [Clark], 
for the trial court to conclude that certain repairs are so self-evident that the fact-
finder could conclude based on life experience that the statutory damage threshold 
has been met, we do not believe that is the case here.”). 
The decision below is the first time that a district court has actually applied a 
“life experience” exception to affirm a conviction of felony criminal mischief.   A 
comparison of a “life experience” exception, as articulated by the Third District 
below, to that originally articulated by the Second District in Jackson reveals a 
significant analytical gap between the two.  The rule articulated in Jackson 
explicitly relied on section 812.012(10)(b) to justify the application of the “life 
experience” exception to the criminal theft context.  In contrast, the Third District 
does not provide any statutory basis for the application of the exception to the 
 
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criminal mischief context.  Section 812.012(10), which provides a definition for 
“value” as utilized in the criminal theft statute, allows a jury to “find the value to 
be not less than a certain amount” if the value of the item stolen cannot be 
ascertained.  Unlike the definition of “value” in the criminal theft statute, which 
serves as the basis for the application of the “life experience” exception to the 
criminal theft statute when the value cannot be ascertained, the criminal mischief 
statute does not provide a definition for “damage,” or any phrase similar to the 
criminal theft statute.  The absence of a definition of “damage” from the criminal 
mischief statute, along with the absence of a provision that allows “the trier of fact 
[to] find the value to be not less than a certain amount,” § 812.012(10)(b), renders 
the application of a “life experience” exception to the felony criminal mischief 
context improper.   
 
The State asserts that section 812.012(10)(b) is applicable to the criminal 
mischief statute because the latter lacks a definition for the term “damage.”  This 
argument is without merit because section 812.012(10) does not provide a 
definition for the term “damage”; rather, it defines “value,” a term noticeably 
absent from the criminal mischief statute.    
CONCLUSION 
A defendant can only be convicted of felony criminal mischief if the damage 
in question is $1,000 or greater.  Absent evidence of the amount of damage, the 
 
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State has failed to prove an essential element of the crime: the amount of damage.  
Here, the Third District noted that “the State did not present any evidence of the 
cost of repair or replacement of the four doors.”  Marrero, 22 So. 3d at 823.  
Accordingly, the State has failed to prove an essential element of felony criminal 
mischief, and, as a matter of law, Marrero‟s conviction is improper. 
 
In accordance with our analysis above, we hold that before a defendant can 
be convicted of felony criminal mischief, the State must prove the amount of 
damage associated with the criminal conduct.  Accordingly, we quash the decision 
of the Third District below.  We also disapprove of Jackson v. State, 413 So. 2d 
112, 114 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), and the other decisions in this context that apply a 
“life experience” exception. 
 
It is so ordered. 
PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
POLSTON, J., concurs in result. 
CANADY, C.J., dissents. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal - Direct 
Conflict of Decisions 
 
 
Third District - Case No. 3D08-188 
 
 
(Dade County) 
 
 
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Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Robert Kalter, Assistant Public Defender, 
Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Petitioner 
 
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, Richard L. Polin, Bureau 
Chief, Forrest L. Andrews, Jr., and Lunar Claire Alvey, Assistant Attorneys 
General, Miami, Florida, 
 
 
for Respondent