Case Title: State v. Iran D. Evans

Citation: 2004 WI 84

Docket Number: 2002AP001869-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2004-06-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
2004 WI 84 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-1869-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Iran D. Evans,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:  266 Wis. 2d 1060, 668 N.W.2d 562 
(Ct. App. 2003-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 29, 2004   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
April 7, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Victor Manian   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
CROOKS, J., concurs (opinion filed).   
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, J., joins Part I of dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING: ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate.   
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Robert R. Henak and Henak Law Office, S.C., Milwaukee, and oral 
argument by Robert R. Henak. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent-cross-petitioner the cause was 
argued by James M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with 
whom on the briefs was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney 
general. 
 
 
 
2004 WI 84 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  02-1869-CR  
(L.C. No. 
96CF962007) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent- 
          Cross Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Iran D. Evans,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 29, 2004 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   The State and the defendant, Iran 
D. Evans (Evans), both appeal from an unpublished court of 
appeals decision, State v. Evans, No. 02-1869-CR, unpublished 
slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. July 24, 2003).  The court of appeals 
affirmed in part and reversed in part an order of the Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court, Victor Manian, Judge, denying Evans's 
motion for postconviction relief.  Evans appeals from the 
portion of the court of appeals decision that upheld his 
conviction for first-degree reckless injury and the State cross-
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
2 
 
appeals from the portion of the decision reversing Evans's 
conviction for first-degree attempted homicide.   
I. 
ISSUES 
¶2 
Evans raises the following issues in his appeal: 
1. 
Whether exclusion of evidence that Evans was 
elsewhere at or around the time of the shooting 
was reversible error and deprived him of his 
rights to present a defense, due process, and a 
fair trial? 
2. 
Whether Evans was denied due process by the 
admission of a confession that he claims was 
fabricated by the police? 
3. 
Whether quashing Evans's subpoena duces tecum 
denied him due process and a fair hearing on the 
issue of whether the confession was fabricated by 
police? 
4. 
Whether Evans was entitled to postconviction 
discovery of the victim's medical records, the 
personnel records of the detective who allegedly 
fabricated his confession, and prior statements 
taken by the detective in other cases? 
5. 
Whether the exclusion of testimony from alleged 
alibi witnesses and evidence that the detective 
who purportedly fabricated his confession had 
previously been disciplined for untruthfulness 
resulted in the real controversy not being tried, 
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
3 
 
thereby justifying reversal in the interest of 
justice? 
6. 
Whether Evans was denied the effective assistance 
of trial counsel if this court deems that trial 
counsel failed to preserve any of the above 
issues? 
¶3 
The State raises two issues on its cross-appeal: 
1. 
Whether the court of appeals erred in reinstating 
Evans's direct appeal on a claim of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel four and one-half 
years after his direct appellate rights had 
lapsed and after Evans had already filed two 
previous postconviction motions? 
2. 
Whether the court of appeals erred in concluding 
that Evans was entitled to an instruction of 
recklessly 
endangering 
safety 
as 
a 
lesser-
included 
offense 
of 
attempted 
first-degree 
intentional homicide? 
If we agree with the State that the court of appeals erred in 
reinstating Evans's direct appeal rights, it is unnecessary to 
reach the numerous other issues presented in this case.   
¶4 
We reaffirm our holding in State v. Knight, 168 
Wis. 2d 509, 522, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992), that a claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must be brought by a 
petition 
for 
writ 
of 
habeas 
corpus. 
 
Utilizing 
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
4 
 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.82(2),1 a procedural mechanism, as a 
substitute for a Knight petition for habeas corpus, so as to 
avoid making a substantive determination that a defendant was 
denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel constitutes 
an erroneous exercise of discretion.  Therefore, we hold that 
the court of appeals erroneously exercised its discretion when 
it reinstated Evans's direct appeal rights by granting his 
§ (Rule) 809.82(2) motion to extend the time for filing his 
direct appeal because the basis of the motion was a claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  As such, we do not 
reach the other issues presented in this case.  Evans remains 
free to file a Knight petition with the court of appeals. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶5 
On June 26, 1996, a jury found Evans guilty of one 
count first-degree reckless injury and one count attempted 
first-degree intentional homicide, arising from an incident 
where Evans allegedly shot an acquaintance on the street 
multiple times at close range.  The circuit court sentenced 
Evans to 35 years in prison on the attempted first-degree 
homicide charge and 10 years in prison on the first-degree 
reckless injury charge, the sentences to run concurrently.  On 
                                                 
1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2000-
01 version unless otherwise noted.  Several of the relevant 
statutes in this case have undergone revisions over the course 
of the lengthy procedural history of this case.  Unless 
otherwise 
noted, 
those 
changes 
are 
not 
material 
to 
the 
determination of the matter before us. 
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
5 
 
August 2, 1996, Evans's trial counsel filed a notice of intent 
to pursue postconviction relief.   
¶6 
On August 27, 1996, Assistant State Public Defender 
Patricia Flood was appointed to represent Evans for purposes of 
postconviction proceedings.  According to an affidavit later 
filed by Attorney Flood, after discussing the case with Evans, a 
disagreement arose concerning the challenges to be raised on 
appeal.  Evans informed Attorney Flood that he wanted her to 
close his file, as he wished to obtain private counsel to 
represent 
him. 
 
On 
February 
27, 
1997, 
Attorney 
Flood 
successfully 
sought 
an 
extension 
of 
time 
for 
filing 
a 
postconviction motion or notice of appeal.  Thereafter, on March 
10, 1997, Attorney Flood sent Evans a letter advising him of the 
consequences of closing his file.  The contents of the letter 
are as follows: 
When we spoke, I told you that I was concerned 
that if I closed your case before you actually hired 
an attorney, and it turned out that you were unable to 
hire one, you would be left without representation.  I 
did not want to send you the transcripts directly, 
because I would need them in the event that your plans 
to hire an attorney did not work out and I did not 
want to take the chance that something would happen to 
the transcripts. 
You have made it clear that you want your 
transcripts and that you want me to close your case 
now.  I am doing so, but advise you again that if you 
are unsuccessful in obtaining private counsel, you 
will be on your own because the public defender will 
not appoint a different attorney to represent you.   
Your transcripts and the court of appeals order 
extending your 809.30 deadline for filing a notice of 
appeal or post-conviction motion are enclosed. 
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
6 
 
¶7 
Attorney Flood did not file a motion to withdraw as 
counsel for Evans.  On May 6, 1997, and June 23, 1997, the court 
of appeals granted Evans's pro se motions to extend the time for 
filing a postconviction motion or notice of appeal.  The court 
of appeals noted in its June 23, 1997, order that no further 
extensions would be granted.  Evans did not obtain private 
counsel, and his direct appeal rights lapsed.   
¶8 
On 
April 
15, 
1999, 
Evans 
filed 
a 
motion 
for 
postconviction relief pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 974.06, seeking a 
new trial.  In his motion, Evans alleged that his trial counsel 
was ineffective and that the State withheld crucial exculpatory 
information.  Evans also alleged that the circuit court 
erroneously exercised its discretion by:  a) failing to submit a 
lesser-included offense instruction to the jury; b) excluding 
the testimony of alleged alibi witnesses; and c) admitting 
Evans's confession, which he alleged was fabricated by the 
police.  By order dated April 19, 1999, the Honorable Dennis P. 
Moroney denied Evans's motion.   
¶9 
On May 26, 1999, five weeks after the circuit court 
had already ruled on his previous motion, Evans filed a 
"supplemental" motion for postconviction relief wherein he again 
sought a new trial.  In his supplemental motion, Evans alleged 
that the circuit court failed to provide an alibi instruction to 
the jury.  By order dated May 27, 1999, the circuit court denied 
Evans's "supplemental" motion for postconviction relief on the 
ground that Evans's previous § 974.06 motion had already been 
adjudicated over a month earlier and he could have and should 
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
7 
 
have raised the issue in his previous motion.  The court's order 
stated that any further § 974.06 motions would be denied on the 
basis of State v. Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 517 N.W.2d  
157 (1994).2   
¶10 The court of appeals subsequently affirmed the circuit 
court on all grounds in an unpublished per curiam opinion.  
State v. Evans, No. 99-1147, unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. 
October 3, 2000).  The court of appeals held that any deficient 
performance of Evans's trial counsel was not prejudicial because 
there was substantial evidence supporting his guilt.  Id., ¶10.  
The court of appeals also held that no exculpatory evidence was 
withheld by the State and that even if such evidence was 
withheld, there was no violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
83 (1963), because the result of the proceeding would have been 
the same.  Evans, No. 99-1147, unpublished slip op., ¶¶11-14.  
Moreover, the court of appeals held that the circuit court did 
not err in making certain evidentiary rulings and therefore did 
not violate Evans's constitutional rights.  Id., ¶¶16-23.  
Finally, the court of appeals rejected Evans's claims regarding 
jury instructions for a lesser-included offense and alibi, 
noting that a motion for postconviction relief under § 974.06 
                                                 
2  Absent a showing of a "sufficient reason," "[a]ll grounds 
for relief under sec. 974.06 must be raised in a petitioner's 
original, 
supplemental, 
or 
amended 
motion. . . . [I]f 
the 
defendant's grounds for relief have been finally adjudicated, 
waived or not raised in a prior postconviction motion, they may 
not become the basis for a sec. 974.06 motion."  State v. 
Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d 168, 181, 517 N.W.2d 157 (1994). 
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
8 
 
may raise only constitutional and jurisdictional issues.  Id., 
¶¶24-26.  The court of appeals also noted Evans's "supplemental" 
§ 974.06 motion was actually his second § 974.06 motion because 
the circuit court had already denied his first § 974.06 motion 
when he filed his "supplemental" motion.  Id., ¶26.  The court 
explained that the first time Evans raised his alibi instruction 
claim was in his second § 974.06 motion, and he provided no 
reason why that claim was not raised in the previous motion.  
Id.  This court denied Evans's petition for review on November 
6, 2000.  
¶11 Over two years later, Evans obtained private counsel 
and sought to have his direct appeal rights reinstated by filing 
a motion under § (Rule) 809.82(2)3 to extend the time for filing 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.82(2) provides, in pertinent 
part: 
(a) Except as provided in this subsection, the 
court upon its own motion or upon good cause shown by 
motion, may enlarge or reduce the time prescribed by 
these rules or court order for doing any act, or waive 
or permit an act to be done after the expiration of 
the prescribed time.   
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of par. (a), 
the time for filing a notice of appeal or cross-appeal 
of a final judgment or order other than in an appeal 
under s. 809.30 or 809.32 may not be enlarged. 
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
9 
 
a postconviction motion or notice of appeal.4  The court of 
appeals received his motion on March 11, 2002.  In his motion, 
Evans alleged that he did not waive his right to appellate 
counsel and that he was denied the right to counsel on appeal.  
Specifically, Evans's motion alleged that following his two pro 
se motions to extend the time to file his direct appeal, he was 
in segregation and had insufficient access to required legal 
materials.  He also alleged that Attorney Flood failed to advise 
him of the dangers of proceeding pro se on appeal, failed to 
advise him that he still had the right to her services if he was 
unable to obtain private counsel, and failed to file a motion to 
withdraw.   
¶12 Evans attached to his motion an affidavit by Attorney 
Flood, wherein she stated that she withdrew as counsel in 
response to Evans's demand that she do so.  Attorney Flood noted 
that she filed a motion to extend the time for him to file his 
notice of appeal and warned him that the State Public Defender 
(SPD) would not appoint different counsel to represent him 
should he be unsuccessful in obtaining private counsel.  She 
                                                 
4 The dissent fails to appreciate the significance of the 
procedural facts in this case.  Dissent, ¶70.  As discussed 
infra, Evans did not file his contingent habeas petition until 
November, 2002, almost 8 months after the court of appeals 
summarily granted his § (Rule) 809.82(2) motion on March 13, 
2002.  Thus, Evans's contingent habeas petition was filed long 
after his direct appellate rights were reinstated and after the 
circuit court had rejected his § 974.02 motion.  Indeed, Evans 
filed his contingent petition for habeas corpus only after the 
State questioned the propriety of reinstating his direct appeal 
rights via a § (Rule) 809.82(2) motion. 
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
10 
 
stated that she did not recall whether she advised Evans of the 
dangers of proceeding pro se but that there was no reason to do 
so because Evans had informed her he was obtaining private 
counsel.  Finally, Attorney Flood stated that she never filed a 
formal motion to withdraw as appellate counsel.   
¶13 Two days after receiving Evans's motion, without 
seeking a response from the State, a one-judge panel of the 
court of appeals granted Evans's motion to extend the time to 
file his direct appeal in a two-sentence order.  The order 
simply acknowledged that Evans had filed such a motion and that 
the motion was granted.  Although the State was served with a 
copy of the motion, it failed to move for reconsideration after 
the order was granted within the 11-day time frame set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.14(2).  
¶14 On May 10, 2002, Evans, by his attorney, moved the 
circuit 
court, 
Victor 
Manian, 
Judge, 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. §§ 974.02 and (Rule) 809.30(2)(h), for the entry of 
an order vacating his convictions and granting him a new trial.  
Evans alleged that the circuit court erred during his trial by 
refusing to permit his alibi witnesses to testify, failing to 
suppress his confession, and by failing to give a lesser-
included offense instruction.  Evans further alleged that his 
trial counsel was deficient for not objecting to these errors.  
Finally, Evans sought an order for postconviction discovery 
allowing him access to the victim's medical records and written 
statements from other criminal cases taken by the detective who 
allegedly 
fabricated 
Evans's 
confession, 
as 
well 
as 
the 
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
11 
 
detective's personnel file.  By written decisions and order 
dated May 29, 2002, the circuit court denied Evans's motion for 
postconviction relief and postconviction discovery.   
¶15 After the circuit court denied Evans's motion, he 
obtained, via an open records request, evidence that the 
detective who allegedly fabricated his confession had been 
disciplined in 1985 for untruthfulness.  On August 12, 2002, 
Evans filed a motion for reconsideration of that portion of his 
motion 
for 
postconviction 
relief 
seeking 
postconviction 
discovery 
of 
the 
detective's 
personnel 
file 
and 
written 
statements.  On August 16, 2002, the circuit court denied 
Evans's 
motion 
for 
reconsideration. 
 
Evans 
appealed 
his 
conviction, the circuit court's order denying his § 974.02 
motion for postconviction relief, and the circuit court order 
denying his motion for reconsideration. 
¶16 The State filed a motion in the court of appeals for 
clarification of its March 13, 2002, order,5 questioning whether 
the court of appeals reinstated Evans's direct appeal rights.  
The same one-judge panel that granted Evans's motion to extend 
time denied the State's motion for clarification, stating that 
Evans's extension motion did seek reinstatement of his direct 
                                                 
5 At oral argument before this court, the State explained 
that its usual practice is not to oppose extension motions 
because most are filed before the time to file an appeal has 
expired or shortly thereafter.  The State claims that it did not 
realize until later that Evans was seeking an extension to file 
his direct appeal four and one-half years after his direct 
appellate rights had lapsed and six years after he was 
convicted. 
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
12 
 
appeal rights.  However, the order noted that the State was free 
to argue on appeal that the court of appeals was without 
authority to reinstate Evans's direct appeal rights in the 
absence of a petition for habeas corpus.  Evans also filed a 
contingent petition for writ of habeas corpus asking for his 
direct appellate rights to be reinstated retroactive to the date 
counsel filed his postconviction motion on May 10, 2002.  The 
court of appeals denied Evans's petition as premature on 
November 6, 2002.   
¶17 In its July 24, 2003, unpublished decision, the court 
of appeals concluded that Evans's extension motion was properly 
granted.  The court reasoned that even if Evans should have 
proceeded via a Knight petition,6 there was no substantive 
difference between a habeas petition and the procedure actually 
utilized.  Evans, No. 02-1869, unpublished slip op., ¶4.  Also, 
the court stated that while Evans was proceeding pro se he "was 
apparently not aware" that he had a claim for ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel and there was no reason why he 
"should have been aware of the claim."  Id., ¶5.7   Finally, the 
                                                 
6 In State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 522, 484 N.W.2d 540 
(1992), this court held that "to bring a claim of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel, a defendant must petition the 
appellate court . . . for a writ of habeas corpus."  
7 As the dissent recognizes, dissent, ¶73, the court of 
appeals never actually addressed the merits of the substantive 
issue of whether Evans's appellate counsel was ineffective.  It 
merely speculated as to whether Evans may have known he had such 
a claim. 
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
13 
 
court of appeals noted the State's failure to object when it 
granted Evans's extension motion.  Id. 
¶18 Regarding Evans's substantive claims, the court of 
appeals reversed Evans's conviction for attempted first-degree 
homicide after concluding the circuit court erred in failing to 
submit to the jury a lesser-included offense instruction.  Id., 
¶¶7-15.  The court of appeals rejected Evans's remaining claims 
of error and did not disturb his conviction for first-degree 
reckless injury, although it remanded for resentencing.  Id., 
¶¶16-25.  
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶19 We review the court of appeals' decision to grant or 
deny a § (Rule) 809.82(2) motion to extend time under an 
erroneous exercise of discretion standard.  State ex rel. Breier 
v. Milwaukee County Cir. Ct., 91 Wis. 2d 833, 835-36, 284 
N.W.2d 102 (1979).  See also State v. Argiz, 101 Wis. 2d 546, 
561, 305 N.W.2d 124 (1981)(concluding that the court of appeals 
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow late appeal).  
"[T]he 
exercise 
of 
discretion 
is 
not 
the 
equivalent 
of 
unfettered 
decision-making." 
 
Hartung 
v. 
Hartung, 
102 
Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16 (1981).  To be upheld on appeal, a 
discretionary act "must demonstrably be made and based upon the 
facts appearing in the record and in reliance on the appropriate 
and 
applicable 
law." 
 
Id. 
 
Moreover, 
"a 
discretionary 
determination must be the product of a rational mental process 
by which the facts of record and law relied upon are stated and 
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
14 
 
are considered together for the purpose of achieving a reasoned 
and reasonable determination."  Id.   
¶20 Therefore, 
a 
court 
erroneously 
exercises 
its 
discretion when it fails to set forth its reasoning and the 
facts of record do not support its decision.  McCleary v. State, 
49 Wis. 2d 263, 282, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971).  Further, a court 
erroneously exercises its discretion when it proceeds under a 
mistaken view of the law.  Cook v. Cook, 208 Wis. 2d 166, 171-
72, 560 N.W.2d 246 (1997).  This court has held that it is an 
erroneous exercise of discretion for the court of appeals to 
utilize § (Rule) 809.82(2) to shortcut procedures established 
for granting writs when there is no apparent reason for doing 
so.  Breier, 91 Wis. 2d at 835-36.  Conversely, the court of 
appeals does not erroneously exercise its discretion by refusing 
to allow a defendant to pursue a late appeal when the defendant 
fails to establish any exceptional circumstances that would 
warrant such action.  Argiz, 101 Wis. 2d at 561.  
IV. ANALYSIS 
¶21 The State argues that the court of appeals erred in 
reinstating Evans's direct appeal rights.  First, the State 
notes that Evans's motion to extend time was premised on a claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal and argues 
such a claim is properly addressed by a habeas petition under 
Knight.  The State asserts that a § (Rule) 809.82(2) motion 
filed after the time for appeal has expired cannot be based upon 
a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for a 
number of reasons.  The State contends that in many cases a 
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
15 
 
claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel will 
require fact-finding, a process generally not required for 
determining motions to extend time.  The State notes that the 
first prong of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel 
will usually require testimony from appellate counsel as to why 
no appeal was filed in order to determine whether appellate 
counsel was deficient.  Further, because a habeas petition is 
subject to the defense of laches, the State asserts that 
testimony will usually be required from the defendant as to why 
he waited a lengthy period of time before bringing a habeas 
motion.  In addition, the State notes that a habeas petition 
will better put the State on notice that the defendant is making 
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  The State also 
suggests that Evans waived his right to appellate counsel by 
directing Attorney Flood to close his file, not objecting when 
she did so, and not informing the court of appeals that he 
failed to secure private representation.   
¶22 Second, the State asserts that regardless of whether a 
habeas petition was the proper vehicle for bringing Evans's 
claims, his current appeal should be barred as a successive 
collateral 
postconviction 
action. 
 
The 
State 
notes 
that 
Wisconsin 
has 
a 
strong 
policy 
of 
barring 
successive 
postconviction motions and habeas petitions absent extraordinary 
circumstances and contends that utilizing § (Rule) 809.82(2) to 
reinstate a direct appeal years after it has expired and after 
the defendant has previously filed other postconviction motions 
defeats this policy. 
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
16 
 
¶23 Third, the State argues that Evans should be deemed to 
have waived any claim of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel because he brought two previous postconviction motions 
where he said nothing about his lack of direct appeal.  Further, 
the State contends that Evans has not given any reason as to why 
it took him over four years to first assert the claim.  Finally, 
the State asks us to institute a pleading requirement for 
§ (Rule) 809.82(2) motions that would force defendants to 
explain why they did not have a direct appeal, how they 
discovered the basis for this allegation, and explain any delay 
in bringing the claim.  
¶24 Evans responds by first arguing that the State waived 
any argument that the court of appeals erred in granting his 
§ (Rule) 809.82(2) motion by not objecting within the 11-day 
time frame provided by Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.14(2) and first 
raising its argument in its motion for clarification five months 
later.  Second, Evans argues that the court of appeals did not 
err in granting his § (Rule) 809.82(2) motion because a Knight 
petition is not the exclusive method for seeking an extension of 
time for direct appeal based on ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel.  Evans contends that § (Rule) 809.82(2) 
specifically allows a court to extend the time for filing a 
direct appeal after the time for filing such an appeal has 
passed and does not contain an exception for requests based on 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.   
¶25 Further, Evans contends that in Knight, this court was 
concerned over the forum in which an ineffective assistance of 
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
17 
 
appellate counsel claim was heard, not the procedural mechanism 
by which the claim was brought.  Evans argues that a § (Rule) 
809.82(2) motion provides adequate opportunity for the State to 
raise any legal or factual disputes relating to the underlying 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim and that, in any event, 
factual disputes are rare.  In those cases where there is a 
legitimate factual dispute, Evans argues that the court of 
appeals may refer the matter to the circuit court for an 
evidentiary hearing.  
¶26 Moreover, Evans argues that any procedural default on 
his behalf should be imputed to the State under Coleman v. 
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 754 (1991).  Evans asserts that there is 
no question he was deprived of effective assistance of counsel 
on his direct appeal because counsel abandoned him and such 
conduct is a per se violation of the right to counsel.  Evans 
contends that this violation deprived him of the information 
necessary for him to know that he had a viable claim for 
ineffective assistance of counsel.  Finally, Evans claims that 
he did not waive his right to appellate counsel during his 
direct appeal and that the doctrine of laches does not bar his 
claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  
¶27 In order to address the procedural issue raised in 
this appeal and give context to the unique procedural posture of 
this case, it is necessary to briefly summarize the rules of 
appellate procedure for postconviction proceedings.  A criminal 
defendant has a right to postconviction relief that encompasses 
both 
bringing 
a 
postconviction 
motion 
and 
an 
appeal.  
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
18 
 
Wis. Stat. §§ 973.18 & (Rule) 809.30.8  The circuit court judge 
must inform the defendant at sentencing of these rights and the 
right to the assistance of the SPD if he is indigent.  
Wis. Stat. § 973.18.    
¶28 A defendant's first option for postconviction relief 
is a motion under Wis. Stat. § 974.02.  The procedures and 
timelines governing postconviction relief for felony cases are 
set forth in § (Rule) 809.30.  See Wis. Stat. § 974.02(1).  
Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.30(2) sets 
forth 
a 
series of 
procedures and timelines with which a defendant must comply in 
filing a notice of intent to pursue postconviction relief and 
securing representation by the SPD.  It is the responsibility of 
trial 
counsel 
to 
file 
the 
notice 
of 
intent 
to 
pursue 
postconviction relief.  Wis. Stat. § 973.18(5).  Section (Rule) 
809.82(2) allows the court, upon its own motion or upon good 
cause shown, to enlarge or reduce any time period, including the 
time for filing an appeal under § (Rule) 809.30.   
¶29 A § 974.02 motion for postconviction relief may be 
filed in place of or prior to a notice of appeal.  See 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.30(2)(h), (j). 
 
However, 
while no 
postconviction motion is needed prior to an appeal if the 
                                                 
8 For the purposes of chapter 809, "postconviction relief" 
is defined as "an appeal or a motion for postconviction relief 
in a criminal case, other than an appeal, motion, or petition 
under ss.302.113(7m), 302.113(9g), 973.19, 973.195, 974.06 or 
974.07(2)."  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.30(1)(c).  However, a 
motion to collaterally attack a conviction under § 974.06 is 
commonly referred to as a postconviction motion.  See, e.g., 
Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d at 181.   
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
19 
 
grounds are sufficiency of the evidence or issues previously 
raised, a postconviction motion is required prior to an appeal 
for issues not previously raised.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 974.02(2) & 
(Rule) 809.30(2)(h).  If the circuit court denies a defendant's 
§ 974.02 motion, the defendant may appeal to the court of 
appeals.  
¶30 During postconviction proceedings, a defendant must 
choose between being represented by the SPD, proceeding pro se, 
or securing private representation.  State v. Redmond, 203 
Wis. 2d 13, 19, 552 N.W.2d 115 (Ct. App. 1996).  A defendant 
does not have the right to hybrid representation on appeal.  
State v. Debra A.E., 188 Wis. 2d 111, 138, 523 N.W.2d 727 
(1994).  The right to counsel on direct appeal is a fundamental 
right and includes the guarantee of effective assistance of 
counsel on appeal.  State ex rel. Flores v. State, 183 
Wis. 2d 587, 604-05 & n.3, 516 N.W.2d 362 (1994).  While a 
defendant has the right to counsel on direct appeal, he does not 
have the right to counsel of his choice, or the right to insist 
that particular issues be raised.  Oimen v. McCaughtry, 130 F.3d 
809, 811 (7th Cir. 1997).  It is the duty of appellate counsel 
to decide what issues have merit for appeal.  Jones v. Barnes, 
463 U.S. 745, 751-53 (1983).  If appellate counsel concludes 
that an appeal would be frivolous, he may file a no merit report 
after following the procedures outlined in Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.32 and seek to withdraw.  Flores, 183 Wis. 2d at 605.  A 
defendant has a right to be informed of the right to a no merit 
report and that he has a right to insist that such report be 
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
20 
 
filed if he disagrees with counsel's opinion that the appeal 
would have no merit.  Id. at 607, 610.9  The defendant also has 
the option, if he agrees with counsel that the appeal is without 
merit, to waive the right to appeal.  Id. at 616. 
¶31 If, however, the defendant merely disagrees with 
counsel as to which issues will be raised, he has the choice of 
terminating counsel's representation and proceeding pro se or 
proceeding with counsel and later seeking relief on the grounds 
of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  Debra A.E., 188 
Wis. 2d at 138.  If a defendant elects the former option and 
desires to proceed pro se, the defendant must be provided clear 
warnings 
regarding 
the 
dangers of 
self-representation and 
waiving the right to appellate counsel before appellate counsel 
may withdraw.  State v. Thornton, 2002 WI App 294, ¶21, 259 
Wis. 2d 157, 656 N.W.2d 45.10  Moreover,  
[t]he state public defender will not appoint 
successor counsel where a defendant disagrees with the 
legal conclusions of appointed counsel or when a 
defendant wants a second opinion as to the merits of 
an appeal.  
To do 
so 
would unduly 
delay the 
                                                 
9 The present case does not appear to involve the no merit 
report procedure.   
10 Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 
809.30(4) 
establishes 
the 
procedures appellate counsel must follow in making a motion to 
withdraw. This provision was not in effect when Attorney Flood 
closed Evans's case in 1996.  See Supreme Court Order No. 00-02, 
effective July 1, 2001, 2001 WI 39, 242 Wis. 2d xxviii, xlvii 
(creating § (Rule) 809.30(4)).  The Judicial Council Note to the 
rule explains that "[t]his rule does not change existing law 
concerning when a withdrawal motion is necessary."  Judicial 
Council Committee Note, 2001, Rule 809.30, Stats.  
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
21 
 
disposition of the appeal, and would be contrary to 
the interests of justice.   
Judicial Council Committee Note, 2001, Rule 809.30, Stats. 
(citing Wis. Admin Code § PD 2.04).  
¶32 Once a defendant's direct appeal rights are exhausted 
or the time for filing an appeal has expired, the defendant may 
collaterally 
attack 
his 
conviction 
via 
a 
motion 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06.  Peterson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 370, 381, 
195 N.W.2d 837 (1972).  An appeal under § 974.06 is a civil 
proceeding, Wis. Stat. §§ 974.06(6) & (Rule) 809.30(2)(L), and 
it is essentially the statutory substitute for a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus.  Escalona-Naranjo, 185 Wis. 2d at 176; 
Peterson, 54 Wis. 2d at 381.11  There is no constitutional right 
to counsel on a § 974.06 motion.  Peterson, 54 Wis. 2d at 381-
82; State v. Alston, 92 Wis. 2d 893, 288 N.W.2d 866 (Ct. App. 
1979).   
¶33 A 
defendant 
may 
only 
raise 
constitutional 
or 
jurisdictional issues in a § 974.06 motion; thus, a § 974.06 
motion may not be used to raise challenges to sufficiency of the 
evidence, jury instructions, evidentiary rulings, or procedural 
matters.  Peterson, 54 Wis. 2d at 381.  See also State v. 
Nicholson, 148 Wis. 2d 353, 369, 435 N.W.2d 298 (Ct. App. 
1988)(noting that the circuit court erred in failing to submit a 
                                                 
11 However, 
in 
most 
instances, 
a 
motion 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06 is a necessary prerequisite to a petition 
for writ of habeas corpus.  See Wis. Stat. § 974.06(8).  A 
§ 974.06 motion must be made in the court that imposed the 
sentence.  Wis. Stat. § 974.06(1). 
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
22 
 
lesser-included offense instruction, but ruling that this claim 
could not be brought under § 974.06).  In addition, under 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06(4), issues that were raised or could have 
been raised during the direct appeal or in a previous § 974.06 
motion may not be brought in a subsequent § 974.06 motion absent 
a showing of a "sufficient reason."  Escalona-Naranjo, 185 
Wis. 2d at 181-84.  This rule is designed to ensure finality in 
prisoner litigation and to "compel[] a prisoner to raise all 
grounds regarding postconviction relief in his or her original, 
supplemental or amended motion.  Successive motions and appeals, 
which all could have been brought at the same time, run counter 
to the design and purpose of the legislation."  Id. at 185.  The 
circuit court's order on a § 974.06 motion may be appealed to 
the court of appeals.  Wis. Stat. § 974.06(7).    
¶34 While 
a 
§ 974.06 
motion 
may 
be 
the 
statutory 
equivalent of a petition for writ of habeas corpus, this court 
has held that it cannot be used to bring a claim of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel.  Knight, 168 Wis. 2d at 522.  
In Knight, we addressed the question of "the appropriate vehicle 
of relief for a criminal defendant who asserts that his or her 
appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance."  Id. at 512.  
This court held that "to bring a claim of ineffective assistance 
of appellate counsel, a defendant must petition the appellate 
court that heard the appeal for a writ of habeas corpus."  Id. 
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
23 
 
at 522.12  Further, because a defendant should petition the court 
of appeals for a writ of habeas corpus when pursuing a claim of 
ineffective assistance 
of 
appellate 
counsel, 
we 
expressly 
overruled a case that sanctioned a "contrary procedure."  Id. at 
520 n.6.   
¶35 Similar to § 974.06 motions, "a defendant may file 
only one habeas petition under Knight unless that defendant can 
adequately explain why all issues relating to the representation 
of appellate counsel were not raised in the first petition."  
State ex rel. Schmidt v. Cooke, 180 Wis. 2d 187, 190, 509 
N.W.2d 96 (Ct. App. 1993).  However, unlike § 974.06 motions, a 
                                                 
12 Subsequently, the court of appeals has held that a Knight 
petition is not proper when the defendant claims ineffective 
assistance of postconviction counsel.  State ex rel. Rothering 
v. McCaughtry, 205 Wis. 2d 675, 683-84, 556 N.W.2d 136 (Ct. App. 
1996).  In Rothering, the defendant brought a Knight petition 
after his direct appeal, alleging that his appellate counsel was 
ineffective for failing to raise certain claims on appeal.  Id. 
at 676-77.  Noting that these claims required a postconviction 
motion to be filed in the circuit court before being heard on 
appeal, the court of appeals concluded that these issues were 
waived because no such postconviction motion was filed.  Id. at 
677-78.  Thus, the court of appeals concluded that the defendant 
was really attempting to challenge the performance of his 
postconviction counsel.  Id. at 679.  After distinguishing 
Knight, id. at 679-80, 683, the court of appeals concluded that 
"a claim of ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel 
should be raised in the trial court either by a petition for 
habeas corpus or a motion under § 974.06, Stats."  Id. at 681.   
However, the court of appeals has held that a Knight 
petition is the appropriate procedure to use when counsel 
altogether fails to commence an appeal under § (Rule) 809.30 or 
809.32, "regardless of whether such an appeal had to be preceded 
by a postconviction motion[.]"  State ex rel. Smalley v. Morgan, 
211 Wis. 2d 795, 798-99, 565 N.W.2d 805 (Ct. App. 1997). 
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
24 
 
habeas petition under Knight is subject to the doctrine of 
laches because a petition for habeas corpus seeks an equitable 
remedy.  State ex rel. Smalley v. Morgan, 211 Wis. 2d 795, 800, 
565 N.W.2d 805 (Ct. App. 1997). 
¶36 We now turn to the merits of the procedural issue 
presented in this case.  The issue in this case is whether the 
court of appeals erroneously exercised its discretion in 
granting Evans's § (Rule) 809.82(2) motion wherein he sought an 
extension of time to file his direct appeal four and one-half 
years after the time for doing so had expired, on the ground 
that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate 
counsel.  First, we reject Evans's argument that the State 
waived any challenge to this issue.  Although it is true that 
the State did not move for reconsideration of the court of 
appeals' order granting Evans's motion to extend time within the 
11-day time frame provided by § (Rule) 809.14(2), in its 
September 
3, 
2002, 
response 
to 
the 
State's 
motion 
for 
clarification, the court of appeals specifically stated that the 
State was free to argue on appeal that the court of appeals was 
without the authority to reinstate Evans's direct appeal rights 
in the absence of a Knight petition.  Evans has not challenged 
this portion of the court of appeals' order.  Therefore, we 
conclude that the issue has not been waived and is properly 
before us.    
¶37 Evans argues that a Knight petition is not the 
exclusive method of raising a claim of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel.  Further, he contends that even if he were 
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
25 
 
required to file a Knight petition, the end result would be the 
same as the present posture of the case and that it would be a 
waste of time to go back and file a Knight petition.  While 
Evans is correct that § (Rule) 809.82(2) does not contain any 
exception for enlarging the time for appeal when the basis of 
the extension is ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, 
Evans's argument overlooks the fundamental difference between a 
§ (Rule) 
809.82(2) 
motion 
and 
a 
Knight 
petition.13 
 
As 
demonstrated below, the nature of § (Rule) 809.82(2) and the 
procedures utilized in granting such motions are not congruent 
with the amount of time and type of analysis necessary to 
properly adjudicate the types of substantive issues presented in 
                                                 
13 The issue presented is not whether, under the language of 
§ (Rule) 809.82, a defendant can bring a motion to extend the 
time for filing his direct appeal based on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel or whether the 
express language of § (Rule) 809.82 gives an appellate court the 
power to grant such a motion.  There is no doubt that under 
§ (Rule) 809.82, the court of appeals has the power to grant a 
motion to extend time for any number of reasons that may 
constitute "good cause."  Our decision today does not purport to 
carve out an exception to the power granted to the court of 
appeals under § (Rule) 809.82.  See dissent, ¶82.  Thus, the 
issue 
here 
does 
not 
involve 
a 
matter 
of 
statutory 
interpretation; rather, the issue is whether the court of 
appeals erroneously exercises its discretion when it grants a 
§ (Rule) 
809.82 
motion 
based 
on 
a 
claim 
of 
ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel so as to circumvent the 
procedure we promulgated in Knight for resolving such claims.  
As discussed infra, discretion must be exercised "consonant with 
the purposes of the established law."  State ex rel. Plotkin v. 
DHSS, 63 Wis. 2d 535, 545, 217 N.W.2d 641 (1974).  We merely 
determine that if, in exercising its power under § (Rule) 
809.82, the court of appeals contravenes our mandate in Knight, 
such exercise of power constitutes an erroneous exercise of 
discretion.   
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
26 
 
a habeas petition.  In addition, utilizing § (Rule) 809.82(2) in 
such a manner runs contrary to our decision in Knight. 
¶38 A § (Rule) 809.82(2) motion is a procedural mechanism 
for enlarging the time to accomplish any act prescribed by 
judicial order or the rules of appellate procedure.  However, a 
§ (Rule) 809.82(2) motion does not resolve the merits of an 
underlying claim or appeal; rather, it allows for time to be 
extended to present a claim or appeal.  Section (Rule) 809.82(2) 
permits the court of appeals to enlarge or reduce the time for 
doing such an act for good cause shown or upon its own motion.  
The rule specifically allows a court to permit an act to be done 
after the time for doing so has expired.  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.82(a).  One secondary authority has noted that "[t]he court 
of appeals has a generally lenient policy about granting 
extensions that will enable a criminal defendant to prosecute an 
appeal."  Michael S. Heffernan, et al., Appellate Practice and 
Procedure in Wisconsin § 19.29 (3d. ed. 2003).  As happened 
here, § (Rule) 809.82(2) motions can be resolved fairly quickly; 
Evans's § (Rule) 809.82(2) motion was decided only two days 
after it was filed.  In addition, a § (Rule) 809.82(2) motion 
may be granted without a response from an adverse party.  See 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.14(2)("A motion for a procedural order 
may be acted upon without a response to the motion.").  Further, 
under § (Rule) 809.14(2), an adverse party has a mere 11 days 
from the service of the order to move for reconsideration.  
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.14(2).  In addition, the State noted at 
oral argument that it generally does not oppose extension 
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
27 
 
motions because most are filed before the time for filing an 
appeal has run or shortly thereafter.   
¶39 In contrast, a Knight petition is a substantive motion 
challenging the lawfulness of an individual's imprisonment based 
on the denial of effective assistance of counsel on direct 
appeal:   
The purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is to require 
the petitioner to be brought before the court to 
determine the lawfulness of his or her imprisonment.  
Habeas corpus is intended as a method of vindicating a 
person's right to personal liberty by freeing the 
person from illegal restraint.   
Patrick J. Devitt & L. Michael Tobin, Wisconsin Criminal Defense 
Manual § 9-31 (2003 ed.).  In Knight, this court stated 
unequivocally that "to bring a claim of ineffective assistance 
of appellate counsel, a defendant must petition the appellate 
court that heard the appeal for a writ of habeas corpus."  
Knight, 168 Wis. 2d at 522 (emphasis added).14  Further, we 
expressly disavowed language from the court of appeals' decision 
in State v. Flores, 158 Wis. 2d 636, 462 N.W.2d 899 (Ct. App. 
1990), which allowed such a claim to be made via a § 974.06 
motion:  "Because we conclude that the defendant should pursue 
an 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
appellate 
counsel 
claim 
by 
petitioning the appellate court for a writ of habeas corpus, we 
                                                 
14 A Knight petition, rather than a § 974.06 motion under 
Rothering, would have been appropriate in this case.  See 
Smalley, 211 Wis. 2d at 798-99 (clarifying that a Knight 
petition is the proper procedure for challenging appellate 
counsel's failure to commence an appeal altogether, regardless 
of whether a postconviction motion needed to be filed in the 
circuit court).   
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
28 
 
expressly overrule any language in Flores that might sanction a 
contrary procedure."  Knight, 168 Wis. 2d at 520 n.6.   
¶40 We reasoned that a habeas petition was the appropriate 
vehicle to bring a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel because, while § 974.06 could theoretically be used to 
indirectly remedy the consequences of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel, the legislature did not intend "the circuit 
courts to utilize sec. 974.06 in this oblique manner."  Id. at 
519.  We noted that habeas corpus is an equitable doctrine that 
would allow the court of appeals to tailor a remedy for the 
specific facts of each case; whereas § 974.06 provided only 
limited remedies.  Id. at 519-21.  Further, we explained that a 
claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel involves 
questions of law that are within the court of appeals' expertise 
and authority to decide.  Id. at 521.  Moreover, noting that 
fact-finding 
is 
often 
necessary 
to 
evaluate 
claims 
of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, we stated that the 
court of appeals would be able to submit the matter to a referee 
or circuit court should fact-finding be necessary.  Id.  We 
concluded that the appellate court could best judge the conduct 
of counsel on such a claim.  Id. at 518-19.   
¶41 The essential problem in this case is that because 
Evans utilized a § (Rule) 809.82(2) motion rather than a Knight 
petition, and because the court of appeals granted the motion ex 
parte two 
days later, 
there has 
never been 
a judicial 
determination as to whether Evans's appellate counsel was 
actually ineffective.  While Evans argues that the court of 
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
29 
 
appeals' decision to extend the time for filing his direct 
appeal necessarily involved a determination that his appellate 
counsel was ineffective, the court of appeals' order consisted 
of only two sentences and never addressed the underlying merits 
of Evans's claim; it simply acknowledged that Evans filed a 
motion to extend time and granted the motion.  In addition, 
while the court of appeals did address whether Evans was 
required to file a Knight petition in its decision on Evans's 
"direct appeal," it never addressed the State's argument that 
Evans had waived the right to appellate counsel.  In other 
words, there has never been a determination that Evans was 
denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel.  As will 
be demonstrated below, due to the factual and legal complexities 
of this case, it is not a foregone conclusion that Evans would 
have prevailed on a Knight petition. 
¶42 As noted in Knight, 168 Wis. 2d at 521, a claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel involves legal 
issues within the purview of the court of appeals.  Under the 
two-part test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687 (1984), a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of 
counsel must demonstrate both that counsel's performance was 
deficient 
and 
that 
he 
was 
prejudiced 
by 
this 
deficient 
performance.  While a complete denial of appellate counsel 
obviates the need to prove prejudice——prejudice is presumed in 
this instance——a defendant is not relieved of the obligation of 
proving deficient performance.  Flores, 183 Wis. 2d at 620.    
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
30 
 
¶43 Here, there was never a judicial determination that 
Evans's appellate counsel was deficient.  A determination that 
counsel's performance was deficient is often a fact-intensive 
inquiry: 
"[A] court deciding an actual ineffective assistance 
claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's 
challenged conduct on the facts of the particular 
case, 
viewed 
as 
of 
the 
time 
of 
counsel's 
conduct . . . . 
The 
reasonableness 
of 
counsel's 
actions may be determined or substantially influenced 
by the defendant's own statements or actions." 
Id. at 621 (quoting State v. Pitsch, 124 Wis. 2d 628, 636-37, 
369 N.W.2d 711 (1985)).  The precise communications between 
Evans and his attorney would be essential in determining whether 
Attorney Flood provided ineffective assistance and whether Evans 
waived his right to counsel on direct appeal.15 
¶44 In addition, a 
determination of 
whether Evans's 
appellate counsel was ineffective would involve the resolution 
of several important and novel questions of law.  First, the 
State suggests that Evans waived his right to appellate counsel.  
In order to conclude that a defendant has waived his right to 
counsel on direct appeal, a court must find that the defendant 
was aware:   
                                                 
15 Regardless of whether the court of appeals may appoint a 
referee to hold an evidentiary hearing for a § (Rule) 809.82(2) 
motion, dissent, ¶84, the fact remains that the court of appeals 
did not do so here.  The court of appeals simply accepted the 
allegations in Evans's motion as true without determining their 
factual accuracy or legal sufficiency in regard to whether his 
appellate counsel was ineffective.  
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
31 
 
(1) of the Flores rights (to an appeal, to the 
assistance of counsel for the appeal, and to opt for a 
no-merit report); (2) of the dangers and disadvantages 
of proceeding pro se; and (3) of the possibility that 
if 
appointed 
counsel 
is 
permitted 
to 
withdraw, 
successor counsel may not be appointed to represent 
the defendant in the appeal. 
Thornton, 259 Wis. 2d 157, ¶21 (footnote omitted). 
¶45 In his motion to extend time, Evans alleged that 
Attorney Flood never informed him of the dangers of proceeding 
pro se.  However, in Thornton, the defendant affirmatively 
sought to proceed pro se.  See id., ¶¶3-4.  Evans, in contrast, 
did not seek to proceed pro se.  Rather, in her affidavit 
attached to Evans's motion to extend time, Attorney Flood 
indicated that after a disagreement between the two regarding 
issues to be raised on appeal, Evans informed her that he wanted 
her to close his file so he could obtain private counsel.  
Attorney Flood's letter to Evans indicates that she did not want 
to 
close 
his 
file 
until 
he 
actually 
obtained 
private 
representation 
and 
that 
she 
warned 
him that 
if he was 
unsuccessful in obtaining private counsel, the SPD would not 
appoint another attorney and he would be forced to proceed pro 
se.  Her letter also demonstrates that she closed his file only 
at his continued insistence.  In her affidavit, Attorney Flood 
stated that she could not recall advising Evans of the dangers 
and consequences of proceeding pro se, but because he indicated 
that he was obtaining private counsel "there would have been no 
reason for me to advise him regarding the dangers of proceeding 
without counsel."   
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
32 
 
¶46  Most claims of waiver of appellate counsel involve 
defendants who indicate they wish to proceed pro se after a 
disagreement with appointed counsel.  See, e.g., Oimen, 130 F.3d at 
810-11; Thornton, 259 Wis. 2d 157, ¶3.  Thus, the facts of this 
case present novel legal questions not present in Thornton or 
Oimen, namely:  1) whether a defendant waives his right to 
appellate counsel when he directs his appointed counsel to close 
his file and intends to secure private representation; 2) 
whether appointed counsel is required to inform the defendant of 
the dangers of proceeding pro se when he intends to seek private 
counsel, such that failure to do so constitutes deficient 
performance; 3) whether appointed counsel renders ineffective 
assistance by closing the client's file before he secures 
private representation, when she did so only at the client's 
demand and after informing him of the dangers of closing the 
file before the defendant obtained new counsel.  
¶47 Another issue that would be raised by the facts of 
this case is whether Attorney Flood was required to file a 
motion to withdraw before closing Evans's file.  In Flores, this 
court specifically declined to adopt a per se rule that counsel 
must always file a motion to withdraw before closing a case 
file.  Flores, 183 Wis. 2d at 622-23.  Although not in existence 
at 
the 
time 
Attorney 
Flood 
closed 
Evans's 
case 
file, 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.30(4) 
currently 
sets 
forth 
the 
procedures appellate counsel must follow in making a motion to 
withdraw.   
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
33 
 
¶48 While one secondary authority suggests that this rule 
makes a formal withdrawal motion mandatory, see Heffernan, et 
al., Appellate Practice and Procedure in Wisconsin at § 19.4, 
the 
Judicial 
Council 
Committee 
Note 
to 
§ (Rule) 
809.30 
specifically states that § (Rule) 809.30(4) was not intended to 
change when a motion to withdraw is necessary.  Judicial Council 
Committee Note, 2001, Rule 809.30, Stats.  Indeed, the court of 
appeals has recently held, in spite of § (Rule) 809.30(4), that 
when a defendant agreed to have counsel close the file, 
"counsel . . . did not render ineffective assistance simply 
because he 'closed the file' without first obtaining court 
permission to withdraw or otherwise seeking a contemporaneous 
judicial determination that his client had knowingly waived 
either the right to appeal or the right to counsel."  State ex 
rel. Ford v. Holm, 2004 WI App 22, ¶31, ___Wis. 2d ___, 676 
N.W.2d 500.  
¶49 Additionally, even if it is determined that appellate 
counsel was deficient, a claim of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel is subject to the defense of laches:  "Where 
the delay on the petitioner's part was unreasonable and the 
State suffers actual prejudice from the delay in its ability to 
respond to the petition, dismissal on the grounds of laches may 
be warranted."  Smalley, 211 Wis. 2d at 800.  Similar to the 
case at bar, the defendant in Smalley agreed to have his file 
closed, and his appointed counsel withdrew.  Id. at 800-01.  The 
defendant filed a petition for habeas corpus over seven years 
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
34 
 
later.  In determining that his claim was barred by laches, the 
court of appeals reasoned: 
The petition states no grounds for waiting until 1996 
to seek the intervention of this or any court for 
purposes of obtaining a direct appeal from a 1988 
conviction.  The petition does not indicate that 
Smalley was under any disability which precluded him 
from learning that counsel did not bring an appeal or 
complaining about the same to a court prior to 1996.  
Smalley 
does 
not 
contend 
that 
counsel 
ignored 
inquiries from him, led him to believe that appellate 
or postconviction proceedings were underway, or failed 
to advise him of his options on appeal, including his 
right to request a no merit report.  Smalley does not 
allege that he instructed counsel to pursue an appeal 
or file a no merit report.   
Smalley, 211 Wis. 2d at 801-02(citations omitted).  
¶50 The court of appeals in the case at bar apparently 
considered that determining whether good cause had been shown 
for an extension of time is equivalent to a laches analysis, 
noting that a consideration of unreasonable delay was "inherent" 
in its order to extend time.  Evans, No. 02-1869-CR, unpublished 
slip op., ¶4.  However, the two-sentence order granting Evans's 
extension motion failed to even mention Evans's delay.  While 
the court of appeals, in its decision on his "direct appeal," 
did engage in post hoc speculation as to why Evans might not 
have brought his claim earlier, it failed to substantiate these 
claims in the record.  Also, the court of appeals failed to 
discuss the fact that Evans had filed two motions to extend the 
time for his direct appeal and had filed two § 974.06 motions.  
In addition, even if the court of appeals had discussed Evans's 
delay in bringing the extension motion in its order granting the 
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
35 
 
motion, unreasonable delay is only part of the laches analysis; 
it must also be determined whether such delay prejudiced the 
State.  Smalley, 211 Wis. 2d at 800.  Thus, contrary to the 
court of appeals, we do not believe that the decision to grant a 
§ (Rule) 809.82(2) motion is the equivalent of addressing the 
doctrine of laches in the context of a Knight petition.16   
¶51 By raising these questions, we do not decide whether 
Evans's appellate counsel was deficient or whether his claim 
would have been barred by laches; rather, we raise these 
questions merely to demonstrate that there was never a judicial 
determination as to whether Evans's appellate counsel was 
deficient and that it is not a foregone conclusion that Evans 
would have prevailed on a Knight petition.  More importantly, 
the foregoing discussion illustrates why § (Rule) 809.82 is ill 
suited to adjudicate a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel.   
¶52 Because 
a 
determination 
of 
whether 
counsel 
was 
ineffective involves an inquiry into whether counsel's actions 
were reasonable under the case specific facts, it often is 
necessary for the court of appeals to appoint a referee to hold 
a fact-finding hearing in order to take testimony from the 
attorney and the defendant.  Flores, 183 Wis. 2d at 621; Knight, 
                                                 
16 The court of appeals' decision to grant Evans's motion to 
extend the time for filing his direct appeal over four years 
after his direct appeal rights lapsed is also perplexing in 
light of its earlier order granting Evans's second pro se motion 
to extend time, in which it noted that no further extensions 
would be granted.  
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
36 
 
168 Wis. 2d at 521.  In addition, claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel often raise complex and novel legal 
issues.  In Knight, 168 Wis. 2d at 521, we noted that legal 
questions such as these are "within the appellate court's 
expertise and authority to decide de novo."  However, § (Rule) 
809.82(2) is not a mechanism for adjudicating substantive legal 
issues; it is a procedural mechanism allowing for time to be 
extended upon a showing of good cause. 
¶53 Moreover, due to the legal issues involved and the 
possible need for fact-finding, a Knight petition may take a 
substantial amount of time to resolve.  See Knight, 168 
Wis. 2d at 521 (noting that the resolution of a habeas petition 
may take longer than a § 974.06 motion).  However, as indicated 
by the fact that Evans's § (Rule) 809.82(2) motion was decided 
only two days after it was filed, § (Rule) 809.82(2) motions can 
be resolved fairly quickly.17  A § (Rule) 809.82(2) motion may be 
granted without a response from an adverse party and an adverse 
party has a mere 11 days from the service of the order to move 
for reconsideration.  Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.14(2).  Where, as 
here, the order did not indicate the reason why the motion was 
granted, an adverse party may not be aware that the basis of the 
motion was a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel.  Even if the party was so aware, a mere 11 days would 
                                                 
17 At oral argument, Evans's counsel stated that the reason 
he brought a § (Rule) 809.82 motion instead of a Knight petition 
was that § (Rule) 809.82 motions are generally decided in a much 
quicker fashion than habeas petitions. 
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
37 
 
not provide a sufficient amount of time to gather the relevant 
facts, research the pertinent issues, and present the court of 
appeals with an adversarial brief.18   
¶54 We noted in Knight that habeas corpus is an equitable 
remedy that allows the court of appeals to tailor a remedy for 
the particular facts of each case.  Knight, 168 Wis. 2d at 520-
21.  Section (Rule) 809.82 does not allow such flexibility; it 
allows only for the extension of time.  Finally, another reason 
exists why it is improper for the court of appeals to grant a 
§ (Rule) 809.82(2) motion when a defendant alleges ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel.  Most, if not all, of Evans's 
substantive claims on this appeal had been previously raised and 
dismissed in his prior § 974.06 motions and appeal.  By granting 
Evans's § (Rule) 809.82 motion, the court of appeals essentially 
nullified Evans's previous postconviction motions and appeal.  
Without ever properly determining that his appellate counsel was 
ineffective, the court of appeals allowed Evans to utilize 
§ (Rule) 809.82(2) to avoid the Escalona-Naranjo rule and raise 
issues previously adjudicated.  Allowing such a practice would 
render our decision in Escalona-Naranjo meaningless.  Thus, the 
nature of § (Rule) 809.82(2) and the procedures utilized in 
granting 
a 
§ (Rule) 
809.82(2) 
motion 
make 
such 
motions 
inappropriate substitutes for Knight petitions.    
                                                 
18 Generally, a responding party has 30 days to file a brief 
in the court of appeals.  See Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.19(3).   
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
38 
 
¶55 In Knight, we determined that a claim of ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel could not be brought under a 
§ 974.06 motion because, while a circuit court could indirectly 
remedy the denial of effective assistance of appellate counsel 
through a § 974.06 motion, we did not believe the legislature 
"intended the circuit courts to utilize sec. 974.06 in this 
oblique manner."  Knight, 168 Wis. 2d at 519.  Likewise, we do 
not believe that our mandate in Knight is compatible with the 
court of appeals' utilization of § (Rule) 809.82(2) to reinstate 
a defendant's direct appeal rights when the "good cause" alleged 
is denial of effective assistance of appellate counsel because 
§ (Rule) 809.82 does not allow for the proper adjudication of 
such a claim.  The concerns that led us to reject the use of a 
§ 974.06 motion in Knight are even more poignant here because, 
unlike § (Rule) 809.82, § 974.06 was designed to adjudicate the 
substantive constitutional issues.  See Wis. Stat. § 974.06(1).  
Section (Rule) 809.82(2) is a procedural mechanism.  Unlike a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, it is not designed to 
"vindicate[] a person's right to personal liberty by freeing the 
person from illegal restraint."  Patrick J. Devitt & L. Michael 
Tobin, Wisconsin Criminal Defense Manual § 9-31 (2003 ed.).   
¶56 Further, allowing the procedure the court of appeals 
utilized would eviscerate our decision in Knight.  Because "[i]t 
is most likely that the Rule 809.30 deadlines will have expired 
before a defendant complains to [the court of appeals] that 
counsel abandoned him or her[,]" Smalley, 211 Wis. 2d at 799, 
most defendants claiming ineffective assistance of appellate 
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
39 
 
counsel could proceed under § (Rule) 809.82(2).  Given that the 
court of appeals has a generally lenient policy in granting 
§ (Rule) 809.82(2) motions, the court of appeals could routinely 
allow defendants to circumvent Knight by granting § (Rule) 
809.82(2) motions without properly adjudicating the underlying 
claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  Indeed, 
given the volume of the appellate caseload and the complexities 
in adjudicating Knight petitions, it may be attractive both to 
defendants and to appellate courts to utilize the abbreviated 
§ (Rule) 809.82 proceedings to reinstate direct appeal rights 
anytime a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
is asserted.19  However, while expeditiousness may often be 
                                                 
19 We 
note 
that 
in 
State 
v. 
Guerard, 
2004 
WI 
85, 
¶17,___Wis. 2d ___, ___N.W.2d ___, the court of appeals sua 
sponte construed the defendant's petition for writ of habeas 
corpus alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as a 
request to extend the time to file a notice of appeal or motion 
for postconviction relief.  In doing so, the court of appeals 
was able to directly address the defendant's underlying claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel without ever addressing 
whether the defendant's appellate counsel was ineffective.  
State v. Guerard, No. 02-2404-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶¶1, 9 
(Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2003).  However, in Guerard, the State 
never objected to the court of appeals' "end-run" around Knight.  
Guerard, ___Wis. 2d ___, ¶17 n.3, and thus waived the issue.  As 
noted supra, the court of appeals in the present case allowed 
the State to argue the § (Rule) 809.82(2)/Knight issue, and this 
issue was therefore preserved for appeal in this court.   
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
40 
 
desirous, celerity is no substitute for reasoned judicial 
analysis of significant legal issues.20   
                                                                                                                                                             
In short, this court reached the defendant's underlying 
substantive claims in Guerard because the State never objected 
to the court of appeals' utilization of § (Rule) 809.82(2) and 
failure to resolve the predicate ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel issue.  Unlike Guerard, the State in the 
present case did raise the § (Rule) 809.82(2)/Knight issue at 
the court of appeals.  Further, here the State raised the issue 
in its petition for review, and the issue was fully briefed by 
both parties before this court.  As such, the present case is 
distinguishable 
from 
Guerard, 
where 
the 
§ (Rule) 
809.82(2)/Knight issue was not at issue because it was waived at 
the court of appeals and never raised or briefed before this 
court.   
20 While the dissent is correct that filing a habeas 
petition may result in greater delay, dissent, ¶79, what the 
dissent apparently fails to appreciate is that the determination 
of whether Evans's appellate counsel was ineffective is a 
necessary prerequisite to addressing Evans's substantive claims 
and deciding whether he is entitled to a new trial.  Evans is 
not entitled to a new trial unless it is first established that 
his appellate counsel was deficient.  The issue here is not 
merely one of form, that is, what document needs to be filed.  
Rather, the issue is one of substance.  The dissent states that 
"[t]he court of appeals apparently frequently and almost 
automatically grants defendants extensions of time for filing a 
postconviction 
motion 
and 
appeal 
under 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.82(2) . . . ."  Dissent, ¶80 (emphasis added).  Therein lies 
the problem.   
If a defendant seeks review of claims of circuit court 
error long after his direct appeal rights have expired (some of 
his claims having been previously raised) and asserts as a 
reason for the delay that his appellate counsel was ineffective, 
there must be a substantive determination that counsel was 
ineffective before the underlying claims of error can be 
addressed.  Under Knight, the appropriate vehicle for addressing 
whether counsel was ineffective is a petition for habeas corpus 
filed in the court of appeals.  Not only was the appropriate 
vehicle for making such a determination not utilized in this 
case, 
but 
more 
importantly, 
there 
was 
never 
actually 
a 
substantive determination that Evans's appellate counsel was 
ineffective.   
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
41 
 
¶57 In Breier, this court determined that the court of 
appeals erroneously exercised its discretion when it utilized 
§ (Rule) 809.82(2) to schedule oral argument on a petition for a 
supervisory writ the day after the petition was filed, contrary 
to the time limits set forth in Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.51(2).  
Breier, 91 Wis. 2d at 834-37.  We reasoned that "[t]o shortcut 
the procedure prescribed by the rules when no apparent reason 
for doing so exists, amounts to an abuse of discretion."  Id. at 
836.  Here, well aware of our mandate in Knight that a claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel must be brought via 
a petition for habeas corpus, the court of appeals granted a 
§ (Rule) 809.82(2) motion that was based on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, thereby eschewing the need to 
appoint a fact-finding referee and analyze important novel legal 
issues.  The court of appeals utilized § (Rule) 809.82 to 
reinstate Evans's direct appeal rights four and a half years 
                                                                                                                                                             
Also, while we are sensitive to the concurrence's concern 
over judicial resources, concurrence, ¶62, even addressing the 
substantive 
issues 
Evans 
raises 
at 
this 
point 
renders 
meaningless the procedure we prescribed in Knight.  If this 
court were to ignore the issue of whether appellate counsel was 
ineffective and address every important issue of criminal law 
despite the fact that a determination as to whether the 
defendant's appellate counsel was ineffective was a logical and 
necessary predicate to reaching the underlying issues, claims of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel would cease to be 
substantive claims of constitutional dimension and would become 
merely a label utilized by litigants on their pleadings to 
ensure appellate review of stale and/or previously raised 
underlying claims of circuit court error. 
 
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
42 
 
after his rights had lapsed without ever determining that his 
appellate counsel was deficient.  In essence, the court of 
appeals allowed a procedural rule to obviate the need for 
determining the substantive issue of whether Evans's appellate 
counsel was deficient, a determination that was a necessary 
perquisite to adjudicating Evans's numerous, previously-raised 
claims of circuit court error.   
¶58 "Discretion . . . requires 
that 
the 
decision 
be 
consonant with the purposes of the established law . . . ."  
State ex rel. Plotkin v. DHSS, 63 Wis. 2d 535, 545, 217 
N.W.2d 641 (1974).  The purpose of § (Rule) 809.82(2) is to 
provide a procedural mechanism whereby the times for doing acts 
prescribed by the rules of appellate procedure can be modified 
upon a showing of good cause.  Section (Rule) 809.82(2) was not 
designed to serve as a vehicle to adjudicate substantive claims 
of constitutional dimension, such as claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel.  In Knight, we specifically established a 
uniform procedure for bringing and adjudicating claims of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel by stating that such 
claims must be brought via a petition for habeas corpus and 
expressly disavowing an alternative procedure.  By granting 
Evans's § (Rule) 809.82(2) motion and reinstating his direct 
appeal rights when his motion was premised on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the court of 
appeals contravened the purpose of § (Rule) 809.82(2) and our 
decision in Knight.  Therefore, its actions constitute an 
erroneous exercise of discretion.   
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
43 
 
¶59 As a § (Rule) 809.82(2) motion does not contemplate 
the resolution of substantive legal issues, it is ill suited to 
act as a vehicle for claims of ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel, and utilizing it in such a fashion is 
incompatible with our decision in Knight.  We reaffirm our 
holding in Knight that a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel must be brought via a petition for habeas corpus in the 
court of appeals.  Utilizing § (Rule) 809.82(2), a procedural 
mechanism, as a substitute for a Knight petition for habeas 
corpus, so as to avoid making a substantive determination that a 
defendant was denied the effective assistance of appellate 
counsel constitutes an erroneous exercise of discretion.21  
                                                 
21 Evans argues that such a conclusion is contrary to our 
decision in State v. Harris, 149 Wis. 2d 943, 947 & n.5, 440 
N.W.2d 364 (1989), wherein we opined that failure to allow the 
extension of a deadline to file an appeal under § (Rule) 809.82 
when the defendant was deprived of counsel would implicate due 
process concerns because "a criminal defendant's right to appeal 
cannot 
be 
extinguished 
because 
of 
his 
attorney's 
incompetence . . . ."  However, Harris was decided before we 
concluded in Knight that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
was the proper vehicle to challenge ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel.   
Our holding today does not implicate due process concerns 
because if a defendant files a Knight petition and it is 
determined that his appellate counsel was deficient, his direct 
appeal rights may be reinstated.  Thus, a defendant's right to 
appeal will not be extinguished; on the contrary, a Knight 
petition provides the appropriate vehicle to determine if 
counsel was deficient so that a defendant's direct appeal rights 
can be reinstated.  In addition, our decision in Harris did not 
involve ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; rather, the 
defendant timely filed an appeal but did not receive appointed 
representation because the clerk of court failed to send a copy 
of the postconviction notice to the SPD's office.  Harris, 149 
Wis. 2d at 945. 
No. 
02-1869-CR   
 
44 
 
Therefore, we hold that the court of appeals erroneously 
exercised its discretion when it reinstated Evans's direct 
appeal rights by granting his § (Rule) 809.82(2) motion to 
extend the time for filing his direct appeal because the basis 
of the motion was a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel.22  As such, we do not reach the other issues presented 
in this case.  Evans remains free to file a Knight petition with 
the court of appeals.  
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed.   
¶60 PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate. 
 
                                                 
22 Even if we were to conclude that the court of appeals can 
legitimately utilize § (Rule) 809.82(2) to adjudicate a claim 
for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, we would 
nonetheless conclude that the court of appeals erroneously 
exercised its discretion in granting Evans's motion because the 
court of appeals failed to set forth its reasoning in its order 
granting the motion.  McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 282, 
182 N.W.2d 512 (1971).  Given the numerous legal issues that 
would be involved in a habeas petition in this case, as well as 
the lack of testimony, other than unchallenged affidavits, we 
cannot conclude that the facts of record support the court of 
appeals' actions.  See id.   
No.  02-1869-CR.npc 
 
1 
 
 
¶61 N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   (concurring).  In the present 
case, 
the 
majority 
correctly 
concludes 
that 
Evans 
inappropriately 
brought 
his 
motion 
claiming 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel using Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.82(2) (2001-
02)23. The majority, however, then declines to address the 
remaining issues raised before this court.  Majority op., ¶59.  
While I agree with the majority that Evans should have brought 
his ineffective assistance of counsel claim using a habeas 
petition in accord with State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 522, 
484 N.W.2d 540 (1992), I would not resolve this case based on 
the procedural issue alone.  Instead, I would address the 
remaining issues in this case, especially the issue of the 
lesser-included offense jury instruction, which the court of 
appeals decided in favor of Evans in reversing his conviction.   
¶62 The majority wastes limited judicial resources by 
deciding this case solely on the procedural issue, and failing 
                                                 
23 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to Wisconsin 
Statutes 
are 
to 
the 
2001-02 
edition.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 809.82(2) 
states, 
in 
relevant 
part, 
as 
follows: 
(a) Except as provided in this subsection, the court 
upon its own motion or upon good cause shown by 
motion, may enlarge or reduce the time prescribed by 
these rules or court order for doing any act, or waive 
or permit an act to be done after expiration of the 
prescribed time. 
(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of par. (a), the 
time for filing a notice of appeal or cross-appeal of 
a final judgment or order other than in an appeal 
under s. 809.30 or 809.32 may not be enlarged. 
No.  02-1869-CR.npc 
 
2 
 
to address the other issues presented in this case.  The 
question involving the jury instruction is likely to be 
presented to this court again, and I would take the opportunity 
to clarify that issue now, and also to address the other issues 
raised and discussed in the court of appeals' opinion. 
¶63 In its decision in this case, the court of appeals 
correctly set forth the applicable standard when deciding 
whether a jury should have been instructed on a lesser-included 
offense: 
"A challenge to a trial court's refusal to submit 
a 
lesser-included 
offense 
instruction 
presents 
a 
question of law which we review de novo.  'The 
submission of a lesser-included offense instruction is 
proper only when there exists reasonable grounds in 
the evidence both for acquittal on the greater charge 
and conviction on the lesser offense.'  In determining 
the propriety of a defendant's request for a lesser 
included offense instruction, the evidence must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant 
and the requested instruction.  Further, 'the lesser-
included offense should be submitted only if there is 
a reasonable doubt as to some particular element 
included in the higher degree of crime.'  'If the 
court improperly fails to submit the requested lesser 
included offense to the jury, it is prejudicial error 
and a new trial must be ordered.'" 
State v. Evans, No. 02-1869-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶8 (Wis 
Ct. App. 
July 24, 2003) 
(quoting 
State 
v. 
Foster, 191 
Wis. 2d 14, 23, 528 N.W.2d 22 (Ct. App. 1995) (citations 
omitted)). 
 
¶64 I agree with the State that the court of appeals erred 
in holding that the circuit court, during the trial of Evans on 
the charge of attempted first-degree intentional homicide, 
should have granted Evans's request for a lesser-included 
No.  02-1869-CR.npc 
 
3 
 
offense jury instruction on first-degree recklessly endangering 
safety, as set forth in Wis. Stat. § 941.30(1).  The decision of 
whether or not to give such an instruction turns on whether 
there was evidence presented that created reasonable doubt as to 
whether Evans intended to kill Devine.  In this case, the 
evidence presented established that Devine was shot at by Evans 
at close range from four to six times.  Devine was wounded in 
the left buttock, the upper and lower left leg, and the right 
bicep.  Importantly, the evidence presented by a third-party 
eyewitness reasonably leads to the conclusion that Devine 
sustained the wound to his right bicep while shielding his head 
from the shooter's bullets. 
¶65 The court of appeals improperly relied on a string of 
cases focusing on whether the victim was wounded in a vital part 
of his or her body.  Id., ¶¶10-15.  See also Hawthorne v. State, 
99 Wis. 2d 673, 299 N.W.2d 866 (1981); Terrell v. State, 92 
Wis. 2d 470, 285 N.W.2d 601 (1979); and State v. Leach, 122 
Wis. 2d 339, 363 N.W.2d 234 (Ct. App. 1984).  Here, but for 
Devine's act of shielding himself with his right arm, he would 
have been shot in the head.  Moreover, the State aptly points 
out that no evidence was presented that Evans was a marksman 
deliberately aiming with such precision that he intended to and 
did cause only non-fatal wounds.  Given the facts of this case, 
the circuit court appropriately refused to give the jury the 
lesser-included offense instruction.  The facts do not lead to a 
conclusion that there was reasonable doubt on the element of 
intent.  There were not reasonable grounds in the evidence both 
No.  02-1869-CR.npc 
 
4 
 
for acquittal on the attempted first-degree intentional homicide 
charge and conviction on the lesser charge.  
 
¶66 Although I am in disagreement with the court of 
appeals' 
treatment 
of 
the 
lesser-included 
offense 
jury 
instruction issue, I agree with its resolution of the remaining 
issues.  I agree that any error that may have been committed by 
the circuit court in refusing to admit the testimony of two 
witnesses who, it was claimed, would have provided an alibi for 
Evans was harmless error. Devine identified Evans as the 
shooter, and Evans himself admitted, in his written statement, 
to the shooting.  Evans, ¶17.  I also agree with the court of 
appeals' decision that Evans's voluntary statement to the police 
was properly admitted into evidence.  Id., ¶18.  Moreover, the 
court of appeals correctly concluded that the circuit court did 
not err when it denied Evans's subpoena duces tecum for the 
detective who took his statement, since introduction of evidence 
concerning other statements taken by him would provide more 
confusion than clarity.  Id., ¶¶19-20.  I further agree that the 
court of appeals was correct in its conclusion that a new trial 
should not be granted in the interest of justice pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 752.35.24  Id., ¶21.  Finally, the court of appeals 
                                                 
24 Wisconsin Stat. § 752.35 states, in relevant part, as 
follows: 
In an appeal to the court of appeals, if it appears 
from the record that the real controversy has not been 
fully tried, or that it is probable that justice has 
for any reason miscarried, the court may reverse the 
judgment or order appealed from, regardless of whether 
the proper motion or objection appears in the record 
and may direct the entry of the proper judgment or 
No.  02-1869-CR.npc 
 
5 
 
correctly decided that Evans's request for post-conviction 
discovery was properly denied, because the evidence sought would 
not have changed the outcome of the trial.  Id., ¶¶22-24. 
 
¶67 While 
it 
is 
appropriate 
to 
resolve 
whether 
Wis. Stat. § 809.82(2) was used correctly here, or whether the 
right procedure was to bring a habeas petition in accord with 
State v. Knight, the other issues raised in this case should 
also be resolved by this court.  Precious judicial resources are 
wasted by the majority's failure to address those issues here 
and now. 
¶68 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
remit the case to the trial court for entry of the 
proper judgment or for a new trial . . . . 
No.  02-1869-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶69 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  Enough 
already!  I get it.  Defendants should use habeas to claim 
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  If they do not, 
their claim is dismissed, and they have to start anew with a 
petition for a writ of habeas.   
¶70 The 
defendant 
alleged 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
appellate counsel, namely that counsel failed to proceed with 
the appeal based on circuit court errors that trial counsel had 
preserved.  The majority opinion fixates on the issue of the 
necessity 
of 
claiming 
ineffective 
assistance 
of 
appellate 
counsel by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 
State v. Knight,25 not by a Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.82(2) motion.  
As Justice Crooks's concurrence points out, because the court of 
appeals dismissed the defendant's habeas petition and instead 
addressed 
the 
defendant's 
§ (Rule) 
809.82(2) 
motion, 
the 
majority opinion refuses to resolve the substantive issues in 
the case. 
¶71 Yet in a case mandated this very day, State v. 
Guerard,26 this court ignores the fact that the court of appeals 
sua sponte interpreted Guerard's petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus as a request to extend time under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.82(2) to file a motion for direct appeal or postconviction 
relief, and extended the time for appeal or postconviction 
                                                 
25 State v. Knight, 168 Wis. 2d 509, 484 N.W.2d 540 (1992).   
26 2004 WI 85, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.   
No.  02-1869-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
relief.  Guerard alleged ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel, namely failure to complete the appeal based on 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel.   
¶72 On Guerard's postconviction motion, new appellate 
counsel alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel in a 
Machner27 hearing.  The court of appeals and this court address 
the merits of Guerard's claim of ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel.  Yet if we were to apply the Evans majority opinion to 
Guerard, neither the court of appeals nor the supreme court 
could address Guerard's substantive issues.  I do not see a 
difference between this case and the Guerard case that justifies 
our reaching the merits of the substantive issues of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel in Guerard, but not in this case.   
¶73 The majority does not address Evans's substantive 
claims because the court of appeals never made a determination 
of whether Evans's appellate counsel was ineffective.28  Yet, in 
Guerard, 
where 
this court 
addresses Guerard's 
substantive 
claims, the court of appeals never made a determination of 
whether 
Guerard's 
appellate 
counsel 
rendered 
ineffective 
assistance of counsel.29   
¶74 The court of appeals acted under Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.82(2) in Guerard.  Under the holding of the present case, 
the court of appeals cannot, under § (Rule) 809.82(2), extend 
the time for appeal or postconviction relief and cannot address 
                                                 
27 State v. Machner, 101 Wis. 2d 79, 303 N.W.2d 633 (1981). 
28 Majority op., ¶56 n.20.   
29 Guerard, 2004 WI 85, ¶17; majority op., ¶56 n.19.   
No.  02-1869-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
substantive allegations of errors relating to the trial.  Just 
what is the difference between Guerard and the present case that 
justifies this different result?  A full explanation is, I 
think, due and owing to the litigants, the circuit courts, and 
the court of appeals.30   
I 
¶75 I address first the procedural issue, Wis. Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.82(2) versus habeas corpus (Knight), that occupies 
the full attention of the majority opinion.   
¶76 To say that the history and procedural posture of this 
case 
are 
convoluted 
and 
peculiar 
is 
a 
significant 
understatement.  The case has extended over several years and 
has been before circuit courts and the court of appeals several 
times.  
¶77 On 
March 
11, 
2002, 
Evans 
filed 
a 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ (Rule) 809.82(2) motion in the court of appeals.  The court of 
appeals granted the motion on March 13, 2002, extending the time 
for filing his postconviction motion or notice of appeal, and 
the case proceeded in circuit court.  Evans never got a hearing 
                                                 
30 The majority opinion attempts to distinguish this case 
from the Guerard case by noting that the State did not object to 
the procedure in Guerard but in the present case objected to the 
procedure.  Majority op., ¶56 n.19.  So what, I say.   
The same problem appears in both cases (as far as the 
majority opinion is concerned):  The court of appeals never 
determined whether appellate counsel was ineffective.  The court 
of appeals' finding on the ineffective assistance of appellate 
counsel is, according to the reasoning of the majority opinion, 
a predicate finding, and the failure of the court of appeals to 
make this finding is, under the majority opinion's reasoning, 
fatal and not waivable.  
No.  02-1869-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
in circuit court; his motion in circuit court was summarily 
denied.  On July 12, 2002, Evans filed his notice of appeal to 
the court of appeals.  The State objected on September 2, 2002 
to the court of appeals' extension of time granted in March 
2002.  The court of appeals allowed the State to brief the 
issue.  After the State's objection, Evans filed a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus in the court of appeals.  On November 6, 
2002, the court of appeals denied Evans's habeas petition as 
premature and proceeded to address the appeal and the State's 
objection to the extension of time under § (Rule) 809.82(2).  
This court of appeals decision, dated July 24, 2003, is now 
before us.   
¶78 The majority opinion concludes that the court of 
appeals, not the defendant, erred.  The court of appeals erred 
in using the defendant's Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.82(2) motion 
instead of allowing the defendant to proceed on his habeas 
petition.  Now the majority opinion holds that Evans must 
proceed by a habeas petition.   
¶79 The State argues that because the defendant's direct 
appeal was not properly reinstated via a Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.82(2) motion, the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction or 
competency to entertain several allegations of circuit court 
error 
asserted 
by 
the 
defendant. 
 
The 
majority 
opinion 
apparently agrees with the State in the case at bar but ignores 
the jurisdictional issue in Guerard.  In any event, the majority 
opinion suggests that the defendant may file a petition for a 
No.  02-1869-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
writ of habeas corpus again.31  That means another two or so 
years in the judicial system before the defendant and the State 
will know whether the defendant is entitled to a new trial.   
¶80 The court of appeals apparently frequently and almost 
automatically grants defendants extensions of time for filing a 
postconviction 
motion 
and 
appeal 
under 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
809.82(2), and the State generally does not object.  That's the 
way defendants, the State, and the court of appeals seem to be 
doing appellate court business.32  This procedure apparently 
fills a need.  If it's working, then let it be, I say.   
¶81 In keeping with the general rule that this court 
ordinarily does not review an exercise of discretion by the 
court of appeals,33 I would not review the court of appeals' 
exercise of discretion relating to appellate practice in the 
court of appeals.  I would treat this case just like the court 
treats the Guerard case. 
¶82 In any event, I conclude that the court of appeals 
properly exercised its discretion in extending the defendant's 
time to file a postconviction motion and appeal in the present 
case.  Wisconsin Stat. § (Rule) 809.82(2)(b) explicitly empowers 
                                                 
31 See majority op., ¶4. 
32 For cases noting that the court of appeals granted a 
criminal defendant's motion to extend time for filing a notice 
of appeal, see, e.g., State v. Guerard, 2004 WI 85, ¶17 n.3, ___ 
Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___; State v. Smith, 207 Wis. 2d 258, 
266-67, 558 N.W.2d 379 (1997); Biel v. Biel, 130 Wis. 2d 335, 
337, 387 N.W.2d 295 (Ct. App. 1986).  
33 State v. Smythe, 225 Wis. 2d 456, 462-63, 592 N.W.2d 628 
(1999); State v. McConnohie, 113 Wis. 2d 362, 368-70, 334 
N.W.2d 903 (1983). 
No.  02-1869-CR.ssa 
 
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the court of appeals to extend a defendant's time to file a 
postconviction motion and appeal under § (Rule) 809.30.  The 
rule makes no exception for Knight claims, that is, for claims 
of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.  By judicial 
fiat the majority opinion reads a Knight exception into this 
simply 
stated, 
uncluttered 
rule.34 
 
The 
majority 
opinion 
apparently reads the Knight exception into the text of the rule 
because it concludes that the textual reading of the rule has 
consequences the majority concludes will be troublesome.35 
¶83 There 
is 
no 
need 
to 
read 
this 
exception 
into 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.82(2)(b).  The Knight case addresses the 
question of which court is the proper forum to hear ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel claims, the circuit court or 
court of appeals.  The Knight court answered the question: the 
court of appeals.   
¶84 Here the defendant sought relief in the proper court, 
the court of appeals.  The court of appeals concluded that even 
if habeas is the exclusive procedure for ineffective assistance 
of appellate counsel claims, little substantive difference 
                                                 
34 The majority opinion concludes that the court of appeals 
erroneously 
exercised 
its 
discretion 
in 
ruling 
under 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.82 instead of requiring a defendant to 
use the Knight procedure.  Majority op., ¶37 n.13.  The court of 
appeals has, according to the majority opinion, erroneously 
exercised its discretion under § 809.82 because it erroneously 
interpreted its powers under § 809.82.  Denying that this case 
involves an interpretation of § 809.82 or trying to recast the 
issue as one of discretion not connected to an interpretation of 
§ 809.82 will not fool anybody about what the majority opinion 
is really doing.  
35 See, e.g., majority op., ¶¶37, 56-59.   
No.  02-1869-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
exists between a petition for habeas and a motion under 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.82(2), and reaffirmed that its granting 
of the extension was reasonable in the present case.36  Under 
either procedure, the court of appeals could have referred the 
matter for an evidentiary hearing if one was needed.37 
¶85 I would hold the State to its waiver as this court 
does in Guerard.38  This court frequently holds individuals to 
waiver.39 
II 
¶86 The court of appeals proceeded to the merits of the 
defendant's and the State's arguments on defendant's appeal.  I 
                                                 
36 The 
question 
whether 
counsel's 
actions 
constitute 
ineffective assistance is a mixed question of law and fact.  
Findings of fact will not be reversed unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  The ultimate conclusion of whether counsel's conduct 
violated the defendant's right to effective assistance of 
counsel is a question of law for an appellate court to determine 
independently of other courts.  State v. Smith, 207 Wis. 2d 258, 
266-67, 558 N.W.2d 379 (1997).      
37 A former defense counsel's affidavit in the present case 
supported the defendant's factual assertions about the conduct 
of defense counsel on appeal.  Although often a claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial or appellate counsel requires a 
fact-finding hearing, such a hearing is not always required to 
grant the claim.  See, e.g., Smith, 207 Wis. 2d at 271, 275, 282 
(Machner hearing on ineffectiveness of trial counsel not 
necessary under the facts of the case; supreme court determines 
deficient performance and prejudice to the defendant). 
38 2004 WI 85, ¶17 n.3.   
39 See, e.g., Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 2004 WI 79, 
¶3, ___ Wis. 2d ___, ___ N.W.2d ___.   
No.  02-1869-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
agree with the court of appeals' approach, and I turn to the 
merits of the substantive issues.40 
¶87 With regard to the conviction for attempted first-
degree homicide, the defendant asserted that the circuit court's 
failure to give the defendant's 
requested 
lesser-included 
instruction constituted reversible error.  After reviewing the 
applicable case law regarding both when a lesser-included 
instruction must be given and shooting at a non-vital part of 
the victim's body, the court of appeals concluded that on the 
basis of this record the lesser-included instruction should have 
been given.  The court of appeals reversed the conviction for 
attempted first-degree homicide.  I agree with the reasoning of 
the court of appeals; I do not agree with Justice Crooks's 
concurrence on this substantive issue. 
¶88 With 
regard 
to 
the 
conviction 
for 
first-degree 
reckless injury, I disagree with the court of appeals.  The 
court of appeals refused to reverse the conviction for first-
degree reckless injury (except to require resentencing).   
¶89 The court of appeals never decided whether the circuit 
court erred in excluding defense witnesses who would have 
testified that the defendant was with them at or near the time 
of the shooting.  This testimony would have corroborated the 
defendant's account of his whereabouts.   
¶90 Upon examination of the record I conclude that the 
excluded testimony was relevant and necessary to the defendant's 
                                                 
40 See also Guerard, 2004 WI 85 (in which the court proceeds 
to the merits of the case).   
No.  02-1869-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
case and the State's interest in excluding the evidence failed 
to outweigh the defendant's constitutionally protected interest 
in presenting a defense.41  I therefore conclude that the circuit 
court erred in excluding the testimony.  
¶91 The 
circuit 
court 
concluded 
that 
any 
error 
in 
excluding the testimony was harmless error.  This court applies 
the Chapman standard for harmless error.  The standard is 
"whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."42     
¶92 Under the Chapman standard, courts inquire into the 
nature of all the evidence heard to assess whether the error in 
excluding evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  As 
the Chapman court stated, a court cannot give too much emphasis 
to "overwhelming evidence" of guilt.43  The Chapman standard is 
not a sufficiency of evidence test.   
¶93 This 
court has 
posited 
guidelines 
for 
assessing 
whether an error was harmless.44  A reviewing court should 
consider a variety of factors, including but not limited to the 
                                                 
41 The admission of evidence is generally reviewed for 
erroneous exercise of discretion.  State v. Guzman, 2001 WI App 
54, 241 Wis. 2d 310, 624 N.W.2d 717.  Whether the exclusion of 
evidence denies an accused the right to present a defense is a 
question of constitutional due process and is determined by this 
court.  See State v. St. George, 2002 WI 50, ¶¶16, 38, 52, 252 
Wis. 2d 499, 643 N.W.2d 777.  
42 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), reh'g 
denied, 386 U.S. 987 (1967) (internal quotations omitted).   
43 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23.    
44 See, e.g., State v. Billings, 110 Wis. 2d 661, 668-69, 
329 N.W.2d 192 (1983). 
No.  02-1869-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
frequency of the error, the nature of the State's case, the 
nature of the defense, the importance of the erroneously 
included or excluded evidence to the prosecution's or defense's 
case, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or 
contradicting the erroneously included or excluded evidence, 
whether 
erroneously 
admitted 
evidence 
merely 
duplicates 
untainted 
evidence, 
and 
the 
overall 
strength 
of 
the 
prosecution's case.45      
¶94 Upon 
examining 
the 
record 
and 
applying 
these 
guidelines I conclude that the error was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
¶95 For the reasons set forth, I dissent.  I would reverse 
the convictions and remand for a new trial. 
¶96 I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY joins part I of this opinion. 
 
                                                 
45 See, e.g., State v. Norman, 2003 WI 72, ¶48, 262 
Wis. 2d 506, 664 N.W.2d 97.  
No.  02-1869-CR.ssa 
 
 
 
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