Case Title: BB V. RSR

Citation: 

Docket Number: C-06-05

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2007-01-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
BB V. RSR2007 WY 4149 P.3d 727Case Number: C-06-05Decided: 01/10/2007
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2006

 
 
BB,

 
 
Appellant

(Respondent),

 
 
v.

 
 
RSR,

 
 
Appellee

(Petitioner).

 
 
Appeal from the 
DistrictCourtofAlbanyCounty

The Honorable Robert 
Castor, Judge

 
 
Representing Appellant:

John M. 
Burman, Faculty Supervisor; Alevtyna Popova, Student Director; Katrina Runyon, 
Student Intern; UW Legal Services Program, Laramie, 
Wyoming.

 
 
Representing Appellee:

Kelly 
Neville Heck, Brown & Hiser, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and BURKE, 
JJ.

 
 
BURKE, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      Appellant, BB 
("Mother"), appeals from the district court's order modifying custody and child 
support.  We 
affirm.

 

 
 

[¶2]      Mother presents the 
following issues for review:

 
 

I.                     
Whether the district 
court erred in denying Mother's renewed motion for judgment on the 
pleadings?

 
 

II.                   
Whether the district 
court erred in finding a material change in circumstances allowing modification 
of child custody?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Mother and RSR 
("Father") are the parents of a daughter, born on August 17, 1995.  On May 27, 1998, a default paternity 
order was entered adjudicating RSR as the father and granting physical custody 
to Mother.  Father was ordered to 
pay child support and provide medical insurance.  A visitation schedule was not 
established at that time.  
Thereafter, Father filed a petition for modification of the paternity 
order, but for reasons unclear from the record, the petition was never heard. 

 
 
[¶4]      Seven years 
later, Father filed a second petition for modification seeking custody or, in 
the alternative, a liberal visitation schedule.  In the course of discovery, Father 
sought production of Mother's mental health records.  Mother objected claiming the records 
were privileged.  Both parties 
submitted briefs regarding the scope of the privilege, pursuant to Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 33-38-113 (LexisNexis 2005), in custody modification proceedings.  After considering the issue, the 
district court ordered Mother to produce the records.

 
 
[¶5]      Prior to trial, 
Mother filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings claiming that Father's 
general allegation in his petition that a material change in circumstances had 
occurred justifying a change in custody was insufficient to provide fair notice 
of his claim against her.1  The motion was denied.  A trial on the petition for modification 
was held on December 12, 2005.  
After Father's opening statement, Mother renewed her motion for judgment 
on the pleadings.  The district 
court denied the oral motion.  At 
the conclusion of the trial, the district court entered its Order Modifying 
Order Establishing Paternity, Custody and Support on February 6, 2006, awarding 
custody of the minor child to Father.  
This appeal followed.    

 
 
DISCUSSION

 
 

[¶6]      Before we begin our 
discussion of the issues, we must first address the scope of the record to be 
reviewed.  As the 
appellant, Mother is required to provide this Court with a sufficient 
record to allow proper evaluation of the trial court's decision.  Beeman v. Beeman, 2005 WY 45, ¶ 10, 109 P.3d 548, 551 (Wyo. 2005).  The 
modification hearing was audio taped rather than stenographically recorded by a 
court reporter.2  The appellate record contains the audio 
cassettes of the December 12, 2005, hearing and an "unofficial" transcription of 
those cassettes.  W.R.A.P. 3.02 
governs submission of transcripts for purposes of an appeal and provides in 
pertinent part:

 
 
(b) In all cases other 
than criminal and juvenile matters, if the proceedings in the trial court were 
stenographically reported by an official court reporter, appellant shall, 
contemporaneously with the filing of the notice of appeal, file and serve on 
appellee a description of the parts of the transcript which appellant intends to 
include in the record and unless the entire transcript is to be included, a 
statement of the issues appellant intends to present on appeal. If an appellant 
intends to assert on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by the 
evidence or contrary to the evidence, appellant shall include in the record a 
transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. If appellee 
deems a transcript of other parts of the proceedings to be necessary appellee 
shall, within 15 days after service of the designation of the partial transcript 
by appellant, order such parts from the reporter or procure an order from the 
trial court directing appellant to do so. At the time of ordering, a party must 
make arrangements satisfactory to the reporter for payment of the cost of the 
transcript.

(c) If the 
proceedings in the trial court were electronically recorded, the audio record of 
the proceedings shall be received by the district court, sitting as an appellate 
court, as prima facie evidence of the facts, testimony, evidence and proceedings 
in such audio record. No transcript of the proceedings shall be required, unless 
the district court finds that a transcript, or portion, is necessary for 
appellate disposition. If discretionary review is granted by the supreme court, 
the parties shall prepare a transcript in accordance with subsection (b) 
above.

(d) All transcripts of testimony, evidence and 
proceedings shall be certified by 
the official court reporter, or such other person designated by the trial court 
to prepare the transcript, to be 
true and correct in every particular, and when certified it shall be received as 
prima facie evidence of the facts, testimony, evidence, and proceedings set 
forth in the transcript. The transcript format shall be 8 1/2 x 11 inches 
and a maximum of 25 lines per page and no more than 10 characters per inch. The 
reporter shall indicate at the bottom of each page the name of the witness, the 
name of counsel examining, and the type of examination (e.g., direct, cross). 
Appended to the transcript shall be a table with page references reflecting the 
names of the witnesses, the type of examination and the points at which exhibits 
were offered and admitted or refused. The reporter shall file the original of 
the completed transcript with the clerk of the trial court within the time fixed 
or allowed by these rules. The transcript shall be certified by the clerk as a 
part of the trial court record.

 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Because W.R.A.P. 3.02(d) requires a 
certified transcript for review on appeal, a question arises regarding whether 
Mother's "unofficial" transcript is sufficient to meet the requirements of our 
appellate rules.

 
 

[¶7]      We discussed the 
necessity of providing a proper transcript under former W.R.A.P. 4.02 (now 
W.R.A.P. 3.02) in Lindsey v. State, 
725 P.2d 649, 652 (Wyo. 1986):  

 
 
Although Lindsey does not 
present this contention we also note that, in accordance with Rule 4.02, 
W.R.A.P., the failure to transcribe the tape recordings would be a ground for 
not considering them. 

 . . .

 
 
It has been a 
long-standing policy of this court that the record on appeal should include a proper transcript of the proceedings in 
the trial court, and in the absence of a 
properly certified transcript of those proceedings this court will not consider 
them. Salt River Enterprises v. 
Heiner, Wyo., 663 P.2d 518, 520 (1983), citing Roy v. Union Mercantile Company, 3 Wyo. 
417, 26 P. 996 (1891); In re Basin State 
Bank, 43 Wyo. 1, 296 P. 1074 (1931); Northwestern Terra Cotta Company v. 
Smith-Turner Hotel Company, 47 Wyo. 190, 33 P.2d 915 (1934). An alternative to a transcript is 
recognized in Rule 4.03, W.R.A.P., which permits the appellant to prepare a 
statement of the evidence, to be approved by the district court in those 
instances in which a transcript is unavailable. Delphine Lindsey did not pursue 
that alternative for a transcript in this case.

 
 
(Emphasis added and 
footnote omitted.)  Despite 
Lindsey's noncompliance with our appellate rules, we chose, in the interest of 
justice, to review the materials submitted.  Id.  However, in doing so, we explained 
that:

 
 
We do not intend to 
recede from our rule that a transcript rather than the electronic recordings 
should be provided in this court if claims of error are asserted based upon 
matters in the record and no statement of the case has been prepared in 
accordance with Rule 4.03, W.R.A.P.

 
 

Id. at 
652-653.

 
 

[¶8]      The case before us 
differs slightly from Lindsey in that 
a transcript of the electronic recordings was provided.  However, the transcript is still 
insufficient because it was not certified in accordance with W.R.A.P. 3.02(d).3  A properly certified transcript serves 
an essential function. When certified, a transcript is received as prima facie 
evidence of the facts, testimony, evidence, and proceedings set forth in the 
transcript.  W.R.A.P. 3.02(d).  An uncertified transcript is 
unreliable.  For example, the 
"unofficial" transcript in this case contains many instances where blank spaces 
were left and notations made because the tapes were inaudible.  The transcript omits testimony in places 
where it appears a new tape was inserted.  
The transcript also reflects a summary of testimony made by the court 
because it inadvertently failed to record a portion of the proceeding.  We note also that if a certified 
transcript is unattainable, an appellant may provide an adequate appellate 
record by complying with W.R.A.P. 3.03 and may find an unofficial transcript 
helpful in that regard.4  

 
 

[¶9]      Although we could decline 
consideration of the unofficial transcript, Father did not object to the state 
of the record and referred to the unofficial transcript throughout his appellate 
brief.  In light of the important 
interests at stake and the lack of objection by Father, we have, in the exercise 
of our discretion, determined that review of the record as reflected by the 
unofficial transcript is appropriate.

 
 
I.  Motion for Judgment on the 
Pleadings

 
 

[¶10]   Mother 
claims the district court erred when it denied her motion for judgment on the 
pleadings.  She asserts that such 
judgment was proper because Father's petition for modification was technically 
deficient.  Mother contends that 
Father failed to assert any issues of material fact to support the alleged 
material change in circumstances.  
She claims that, as a result of Father's lack of specificity, she was 
unable to adequately prepare a defense.

 
 

[¶11]   Motions 
for judgment on the pleadings are authorized by W.R.C.P. 12(c), which 
provides:  "[a]fter the pleadings 
are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move 
for judgment on the pleadings."  We 
have stated that "[a] defendant is entitled to judgment on the pleadings if the 
undisputed facts appearing in the pleadings, supplemented by any facts of which 
the trial court may take judicial notice, establish that no relief can be 
granted."  Johnson v. Griffin, 922 P.2d 860, 861-62 (Wyo. 1996).  "Our review is akin to 
consideration of a motion to dismiss under W.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted.  We consider the allegations of the 
complaint to be true, and view them in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff."  Box L Corp. v. Teton County, 2004 WY 75, 
¶ 2, 92 P.3d 811, 813 (Wyo. 2004) (internal citation omitted).

 
 

[¶12]   In 
his petition, Father generally alleged that the "conditions surrounding 
the child and the parties hereto have materially changed."  We have previously determined that 
notice pleading is recognized by our rules of  civil procedure.  Jackson State Bank v. 
Homar, 
837 P.2d 1081, 1085 (Wyo. 1992); W.R.C.P. 8(a)(1).  "Technical forms of pleading are not 
required under the rules. . . ."  
Id. at 1086.  Rather, the "obligation of every pleader 
[is] to apprise his adversary of the nature of the claim against him."  Id. at 1085. 

 
 

[¶13]   In light 
of these standards, we agree with the district court that Father's general 
allegation was sufficient to apprise Mother of the nature of the claim against 
her.  Although Mother contends that 
she arrived at trial with very little knowledge concerning the specific facts to 
support Father's claim, those facts could have been fleshed out during the 
discovery process.5  In Watts v. Holmes, 386 P.2d 718, 719 
(Wyo. 1963), 
we explained that:

  

to the pleadings is 
assigned the task of general notice giving; the task of narrowing and clarifying 
the basic issues, ascertaining the facts relative to those issues, is the role 
of deposition-discovery process aided by the pretrial hearing. In other words, a 
pleading should give notice of what an adverse party may expect, and issues 
should be formulated through deposition-discovery processes and pretrial 
hearings. 

 
 
We find no error in the 
district court's denial of Mother's motion for judgment on the 
pleadings.

 
 
II.  Modification of Child 
Custody

 
 

[¶14]   Mother next challenges 
the district court's decision to modify custody.  First, she claims the district court 
improperly relied on evidence pertaining to the parties' lifestyles prior to the 
May 27, 1998 order ("pre-order evidence") to show a material change in 
circumstances.  Second, she claims 
the district court erred in ordering the discovery of her mental health 
records.

 
 

[¶15]   Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
20-2-204(c) (LexisNexis 2005) provides in pertinent part:

 
 
            
(c) A court having jurisdiction may modify an order concerning the care, 
custody and visitation of the children if there is a showing by either parent of 
a material change in circumstances since 
the entry of the order in question and that the modification would be in the 
best interests of the children pursuant to W.S. 20-2-201(a). . . 
.

 
 
(Emphasis added.)  Father, as the party seeking 
modification of child custody, has the burden of establishing that a change in 
circumstances affecting the child's welfare has occurred after the entry of the 
initial decree, that the change warrants modification of the decree, and that 
the modification will be in the best interests of the child.  DJG v. MAP, 883 P.2d 946, 947 
(Wyo. 
1994).  The modification of a 
paternity decree respecting custody of a child lies within the sound discretion 
of the trial court.  Id.  

 
 
This [C]ourt will not 
interfere with the decision of the trial court in child custody questions unless 
there is a procedural error or unless there is shown to be a clear abuse of 
discretion.  A court does not abuse 
its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason 
under the circumstances, as is said to mean an error of law committed by the 
court under the circumstances. 

 
 

Id.  "Under this standard, we view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the district court's determination.  We give the prevailing party all 
favorable inferences and do not consider the evidence presented by the 
unsuccessful party."  Selvey v. Selvey, 2004 WY 166, ¶ 15, 102 P.3d 210, 214 (Wyo. 2004) (internal citation omitted).  The admission of evidence is a matter 
left to the sound discretion of the district court.  Brown v. Michael Pryor, P.C., 954 P.2d 1349, 1350 (Wyo. 1998).  Evidentiary rulings will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless a clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated.  Id.

 
 

[¶16]   Mother contends the 
district court erred by permitting pre-order evidence as a benchmark to 
determine whether there had been a material change in circumstances.  Mother claims the district court 
improperly allowed Mother to be questioned by Father's attorney "about things 
which happened before the order" and allowed testimony by Father "relating to 
his childhood" over her objection.6  In making her claim, Mother fails to 
identify any specific evidence that she considers improper.  As the appellant, Mother "has the burden 
of directing our attention to those parts of the record on which [s]he 
relies."  State Sur. Co. v. Lamb Constr. Co., 625 P.2d 184, 191 (Wyo. 1981) (citing 
former W.R.A.P. 5.01(3); and Dechert 
v. Christopulos, Wyo., 604 P.2d 1039, 1044 (1980)).  Mother's vague assertions unsupported by 
citation to the record do not comply with the requirements of W.R.A.P. 
7.01(f)(1) and, therefore, we need not consider her contention.  See e.g., Weisbrod v. Ely, 767 P.2d 171, 
176-177 (Wyo. 
1989) (declining to consider the appellant's contention because he failed to 
comply with former W.R.A.P. 5.01(4), now W.R.A.P. 7.01(f)(1)).  

 
 

[¶17]   We would 
also point out that there is no indication that the district court improperly 
relied on pre-order evidence in making its determination that a material change 
in circumstances occurred.  As 
explained by the district court: 

 
 
The 
first issue the Court considers is whether there has been a change of 
circumstances sufficient to warrant modification of the May 27, 1998 Order Establishing Paternity, Custody, and 
Support.  The evidence indicates 
that there has been a significant, positive change in Father's life.  He has secured stable employment and 
continues to advance in his career.  
He has become financially responsible for himself and his family for a 
number of years.  Additionally, his 
home life is stable and healthy for a child:  Father does not engage in illegal or 
disruptive behaviors; he is a devoted family man; and he has placed his family 
and [Daughter] at the forefront of his priorities.  Since 1998, Father has shown steady and 
continuous progress toward becoming [a] positive role model and responsible 
parent.  [Father] has greatly 
improved his situation to the point that he is in the best position to provide 
[Daughter] with a stable, loving, comfortable family environment.  Taken together, these changes are 
significant and truly genuine.

 
 
            
To the contrary, Mother's life 
since 1998 has been anything but responsible.  Her numerous encounters with the 
criminal justice system, failures to maintain employment; disruptive 
relocations; and numerous relationships are a far cry from providing the 
stability that [Daughter] needs.  
She continues her general cycle of unemployment and, even when briefly 
employed, fails to arrange suitable supervision for her child.  She and Mr. Brazelton testify to 
"dreams" that this Court finds somewhat unattainable given their past and 
present situation.  Mother has done 
little to improve her life, to become independent and self sustaining, or to 
establish and maintain a stable family environment for herself and her 
children.  True enough, Mother has 
shown some very recent improvement, but still has not shown an ability to care 
for or to provide any stability for her children for any significant period of 
time.  However, late efforts to 
"patch" a dysfunctional lifestyle are simply insufficient.  The fact that Mother has been employed 
for one month or that [Daughter] had, for the first time, managed no absences or 
tardies at school (so far this year) is not sufficient enough to convince this 
court that [Mother] will continue to improve her life for the benefit of her 
children. . . . In looking at the totality of the circumstances and the 
progress, or lack thereof, made by each parent since 1998, this Court easily concludes 
that Father's ability to act as a responsible parent has surged ahead of that of 
Mother.  The fact that Mother has, 
at best, maintained her ability to act as a parent consistent with her ability at the time of 
the 1998 Order does not preclude a finding that there has been a material 
change of circumstances sufficient to warrant modification.  See Thompson v. Thompson, 824 P.2d 557 
(Wyo. 
1992).  In this case, the evidence 
indicates that there has, in fact, been a material change of circumstance 
sufficient to warrant modification.

 
 
(Emphasis added.)  The decision letter reflects that the 
district court appropriately based its decision upon the change in circumstances 
occurring after entry of the 1998 order.  

 
 

[¶18]   Mother also challenges 
the district court's order requiring production of her mental health 
records.  She claims the records 
were not discoverable because they are privileged.  Father, on the other hand, claims the 
records are discoverable because Mother waived the privilege when she put her 
mental health at issue by asserting she is a fit and proper parent.  

 
 
[¶19] We review a 
district court's ruling on discovery matters under our abuse of discretion 
standard.  Harston v. CampbellCountyMem. Hosp., 913 P.2d 870, 875 
(Wyo. 
1996).   Despite the district court's order, Mother failed to produce 
her mental health records.  The records were never introduced at trial and 
were not relied upon by the court in making its custody determination.  We 
need not address Mother's contention on the merits because regardless of whether 
the district court erred in ordering production of her records, Mother cannot 
establish any prejudicial error.  Inskeep v. Inskeep, 752 P.2d 434, 
436 (Wyo. 
1988) (limiting review to "a showing of prejudicial error from an abuse of 
discretion").  

 
 

[¶20]   Affirmed.

  

FOOTNOTES

 
 

1The petition 
alleged:

 
 

Since 
the ORDER ESTABLISHING PATERNITY, CUSTODY AND SUPPORT was made and entered 
herein, conditions surrounding the child and the parties hereto have materially 
changed, and such changed conditions and circumstances render it necessary and 
advisable that the provisions of the custody of the child in the decree and 
other orders reviewed by the Court, and that primary residential custody and 
control of the 
minor 
child be granted to Father, subject to the reasonable 
visitation 
rights 
of 
the mother at all reasonable times and places to be determined by the 
Court.

 
 

2This case 
began as a paternity action.  
Although not clear from the record, it appears the proceeding may have 
been audio recorded, in part, due to U.R.D.C. 907 entitled, Electronic Audio 
Record for Paternity Cases, which provides:  "[t]he district court in its discretion 
may comply with any requirements to report cases pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
14-2-408 by providing an electronic audio record of the proceedings."  We also note that a circuit court judge 
was assigned this case as authorized by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-3-112 (LexisNexis 
2005).  Although circuit courts are 
permitted to electronically record proceedings when assigned cases from the 
district court, the law and rules governing the district court and appeals 
therefrom apply.  See, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-9-139 
(LexisNexis 2005) (authorizing electronic recordings); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-9-140 
(LexisNexis 2005) (requiring the circuit court to appoint an official 
stenographer to furnish and certify a transcript of the electronic recording); 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-3-112(b) (LexisNexis 2005) (requiring laws and rules of 
district court to apply to case or proceeding 
assigned).

 
 

3The 
"unofficial" transcript also fails to comply with the other technical 
requirements set forth in W.R.A.P. 3.02(d). 

 
 

4No such 
attempt was made in the matter here.  
We would be able to consider an unofficial transcript, or relevant 
portions thereof, if incorporated into a properly approved and settled W.R.A.P. 
3.03 statement of the evidence. 

 
 

5We also note 
that Mother did not file a motion for a more definite statement pursuant to 
W.R.C.P. 12(e), which provides:

 
 
If a 
pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous 
that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the 
party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive 
pleading.  The motion shall point 
out the defects complained of and the details desired.  If the motion is granted and the order 
of the court is not obeyed within 10 days after notice of the order or within 
such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to which 
the motion was directed or make such order as it deems 
just.

 
 

6Mother 
concedes that pre-order evidence may be relevant for purposes of determining the 
best interests of the child.  See, e.g., Selvey, 102 P.3d 210.  She claims, however, that the admission 
of pre-order evidence served no valid purpose in this 
case.