Case Title: County Commissioners v. Bell Atlantic

Citation: 346 Md. 160

Docket Number: 67/96

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1997-06-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
In the Circuit Court for
Garrett County - Nos. 4059 & 4060
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No.  67
  September Term, 1996
___________________________________
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS 
OF GARRETT COUNTY, MARYLAND
v.
BELL ATLANTIC-MARYLAND, INC.
___________________________________
Bell,  C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Raker
    Wilner
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Karwacki, J.
___________________________________
      Filed:   June 19, 1997       
        
      Unless indicated otherwise, all future statutory references in this opinion
1
will be to Maryland Code (1991 Repl. Vol.), Article 78, § 28A.
      The Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company, Inc. is currently known as Bell
2
Atlantic-Maryland, Inc., the Respondent in the case sub judice.
Maryland Code (1991 Repl. Vol.), Article 78, § 28A,  otherwise
1
known as Maryland's "Miss Utility Act," ("Miss Utility" or "the
Act") was enacted to protect the property of public service
companies and other entities from various traumas in order to
safeguard the public safety, health, and welfare.  This case
requires us to construe that Act.
I.
Sometime in 1967, the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company
("C&P")  buried two separate underground telephone cables in the
2
Orendorf and Mosser Road areas of Garrett County, Maryland ("the
County").  At the time, no written agreement existed between the
County and C&P authorizing the interment.  According to the
Respondent, Bell Atlantic-Maryland, Inc. ("Bell"), unidentified
officials of the County Roads Department granted it oral permission
to lay cables along its roads wherever necessary.
a.
In late 1992, the County Roads Department initiated an
improvement feasibility study for Orendorf Road, and in January of
1993, planning for a major improvement of that road commenced.  The
County 
sought 
both 
to 
realign 
and 
widen 
Orendorf 
Road.
-2-
       Like its statutory creator, the "one-call system" is also popularly known
3
as "Miss Utility."
Accordingly, it advised various utilities, including Bell, of its
intentions.
Preliminary work on the project began in February 1993 with
tree, stump, and brush removal.  The undertaking, however,
eventually required excavation work — the primary target of Miss
Utility.
Inter alia, the statute requires owners of underground
facilities, such as telephone cables, to participate in a "one-call
system."   That system compels owners of such facilities to provide
3
the Public Service Commission ("Commission") with the telephone
number of a person in every county of this State to whom calls from
those contemplating excavation should be directed.  See §
28A(c)(1)-(2)(i)-(ii). 
 
Miss 
Utility 
concomitantly 
obliges
contractors and other persons, in addition to further duties
discussed infra, to use those numbers to inform the contact person
on file with the Commission of the intent to excavate at least
forty-eight hours before doing so, but not more than ten working
days prior to the proposed excavation.  See § 28A(e)(1).
Once notified, the facility owner must determine within forty-
eight hours whether or not the proposed excavation is within five
feet of the horizontal plane of an underground facility or whether
area blasting may disturb or damage any such facility.  See
-3-
§ 28A(c)(2)(iii).  Once that determination is made, the facility
owner must then notify the contractor of the potential for harm and
then appropriately mark the facility on either side of an eighteen
inch horizontal plane, unless the proposed excavation is by
blasting, which requires a demarcation of five feet.  See §
28A(2)(c)(iv-vi). 
In this context and in anticipation of necessary excavation
work, Stuart Sommers, an Area Supervisor employed by the County
Roads Department, contacted the "one-call" center in March of 1993.
Accordingly, Bell began cable location efforts along the affected
portion of Orendorf Road.  
In an inadvertent worksite meeting with a Bell technician,
Sommers allegedly expressed concern over the precise location of
the Orendorf Road cable given that the project involved
approximately one mile of roadway.  According to Sommers, the
technician agreed to "drop by and regulate or check on the progress
of the work" and make additional "locates" if needed.  A second
location attempt was made in late May or early June of 1993.
Despite these contacts between Bell and the County, not every inch
of cable was located along the project route.
As the work progressed, crews encountered a "hump" in the
earth on or about June 23, 1993.  Aware of the presence of the Bell
cable, road engineers restricted excavation to twelve inches,
believing the cable to be buried at least twenty-four inches deep.
-4-
       According to Sommers, the hazard stemmed from the possibility that anyone
4
accidentally leaving the roadway entering or exiting the new development would "drop
into a hole."
The project crew employed a large earth grader in an attempt to
lessen the "hump" within the maximum cut depth established by the
engineers.  After several passes, the grader severed Bell's cable.
No call was made to Miss Utility or any one at Bell to determine if
a cable occupied the area under the "hump."
b.
In 1991, farmland adjoining Mosser Road in Garrett County was
under residential community development.  The entrance to this new
development was located within twenty-five to thirty feet of a
drop-inlet — a concrete box designed to intercept water runoff from
the uphill side of Mosser Road.  Due to increased traffic and the
proximity of the drop inlet to the new development, the County
Roads Department deemed it a safety hazard.   Accordingly, the
4
County decided to raise a traffic-bearing grate traversing the drop
inlet by raising the drop inlet itself.  This necessarily required
the removal of a small amount of earth.  During that excavation,
County workers damaged a Bell-Atlantic telephone cable with a
backhoe.  No call to Miss Utility or any one else preceded the
excavation.
c.
-5-
       The Complaints stemming from the Orendorf and Mosser Road breaks were
5
respectively numbered (No. 0000396-94) and (No. 0000397-94).
As a result of the damage to its cables, Bell filed two
separate complaints against the Garrett County Roads Department in
the District Court of Maryland sitting in Garrett County.   Both
5
complaints sounded in negligence and alleged that the "Garrett
County Roads Department . . . failed to take reasonable precautions
to prevent damage" to Bell's cables, proximately causing their
harm.  Following the presentation of evidence by both Bell and the
County, the District Court entered judgment in favor of Bell in
both actions in the amounts of $1447.66 and $1846.37, respectively.
The County appealed those judgments to the Circuit Court for
Garrett County.  Following a trial de novo, the circuit court
issued a Memorandum and Order, concluding that "[the County] was in
violation of [Miss Utility] in each case" and that "no persuasive
evidence of contributory negligence on the part of [Bell]" was
presented, and the defense, therefore, not established.  However,
the court ordered reargument on the issue of whether Bell fit the
definition of "owner" as contemplated by § 28A(4)(i)-(ii) of the
Act.  Subsequent to reargument, the court agreed that Bell fit that
definition and entered judgment in its favor in both actions.  Upon
the County's Petition, we issued a Writ of Certiorari to review
those judgments.
II.
-6-
The Miss Utility Act was enacted by Chapter 863 of the Acts of
1974, and originally codified as Md. Code (1969 Repl. Vol., 1974
Cum. Supp.), Art. 78, § 28A.  The Act was captioned "Public Service
Commission Law  UNDERGROUND FACILITIES."  It aspired to: 
"protect underground facilities of public
service companies from destruction, damage or
dislocation in order to prevent:
(1)
Death or injury to persons.
(2) Property damage to private and public
property.
(3)
Loss of services of public service
companies to the general public."
Although § 28A has undergone various modifications since its
enactment, its primary objectives have not.  See § 28A(a)(1)-(3).
Miss 
Utility 
discourages 
would-be 
excavators 
from
noncompliance upon peril of liability for damages and civil
penalties.  Section 28A(4)(h) provides:
"If any underground facility is damaged by any
person or contractor who has failed to comply
with any provision of this section, that
person or contractor shall be deemed negligent
and shall be liable to the owner of the
underground facility for the total cost of the
repair."
Similarly, § 28A(h)(i) provides in relevant part:
"Any person or contractor who excavates
without first giving the notice required in
subsection (e) of this section, and who
damages, dislocates or disturbs an underground
facility, shall be deemed negligent and shall
be subject to a civil penalty up to $1,000 for
the 
first 
offense 
and 
$1,000 
for 
each
subsequent offense, or ten times the cost of
repairing the damage to the underground
facility."
-7-
       Miss Utility defines an underground facility in § 28A(b)(6)(i) as
6
"any item of personal property which shall be buried or
placed below ground or submerged for use in connection
with the storage or conveyance of water, sewage,
electronic, telephonic, or telegraphic communications,
electric energy, oil, gas or other substances, and shall
include but not be limited to pipes, sewers, conduits,
cables, valves, lines, wires, manholes, attachments and
those portions of poles below ground."
As indicated, supra, owners of underground facilities are obliged
to participate in the "one-call" notification system established by
Miss Utility.   The Act defines an "owner" as 
6
"a public utility, telecommunications or cable
television corporation, political subdivision,
municipality, authority, or other person that:
(i)
Owns or operates an underground
facility; and
(ii) Has the right to bury an underground
facility."
§ 28A(b)(4)(i)-(ii).
III.
The County seizes upon this language and asserts that Bell is
not an "owner" within the contemplation of Miss Utility because it
did not possess the "right" to inter its cables at either the
Orendorf or Mosser Road locations.  In the County's view, Bell
failed to establish this right because it produced insufficient
evidence of a conveyance from the County to Bell granting the
latter a right-of-way, i.e., an easement.  The County posits that
any such conveyance would necessarily be subject to the statute of
frauds contained in Md. Code (1988 Repl. Vol., 1993 Supp.) § 5-104
-8-
of the Real Property Article.  Thus, the argument goes, because
Bell was not an "owner" as envisioned by Miss Utility, its property
was not entitled to the Act's protection.
For its part, Bell argues that the history and wording of Miss
Utility reveals a legislative intent to identify all public
utilities, including Bell, as "owner[s]" of underground facilities
within the meaning of § 28A(b)(4)(i)-(ii), free of any concomitant
obligation to establish a "right to bury an underground facility."
Although we disagree with Bell's reading of § 28A(b)(4)(i)-(ii), we
nonetheless conclude that the General Assembly granted Bell a
franchise to place its cables in the Orendorf and Mosser Road areas
of Garrett County, thereby bringing it within the definition of
"owner" as envisioned by Miss Utility.
a.
In construing any statute, our principal aim is to effect the
intent of the Legislature, and in order to do so, our first resort
must be to the language of the statute itself.  Klingenberg v.
Klingenberg, 342 Md. 315, 327, 675 A.2d 551, 557 (1996);
Karczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505,
514-15, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987).  Ordinarily, where that language
is clear, our probe for legislative intent begins and ends.
Polomski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 344 Md. 70, 74,
-9-
       See Ch. 440 of the Acts of 1990.
7
684 A.2d 1338, 1340 (1996); Scaggs v. Baltimore W.R. Co., 10 Md.
268 (1856).
 In Bell's view, only "other person[s]" not among the
enumerated entities in § 28A(b)(4) must establish the right to bury
an underground facility before enjoying the protection of Miss
Utility.  Stated otherwise, Bell contends that it possesses the
right to bury its cables anywhere it chooses because it is a
telecommunications 
corporation. 
 
A 
cursory 
perusal 
of 
§
28A(b)(4)(i)-(ii) belies that assertion.
That 
section 
provides 
that 
"a 
public 
utility,
telecommunications or cable television corporation, political
subdivision, municipality, authority, or other person" is an owner
for the purposes of Miss Utility to the extent "that [it] (i)
[o]wns or operates an underground facility; and (ii) [h]as the
right to bury an underground facility."   Subsections (i) and (ii)
clearly modify and qualify subsection (4) insofar as the entities
enumerated therein are not owners within the contemplation of Miss
Utility unless they meet the conditions set forth in subsections
(4)(i)-(ii).
Although it may be true, as Bell points out, that the 1990
amendments to Miss Utility  were designed in part to "expand the
7
protections afforded to owners of underground facilities provided
by the statute," we find nothing in those amendments or their
-10-
legislative history to suggest that Miss Utility granted Bell, much
less any public utility, a license to bury its facilities at whim
without first establishing a corresponding right to do so.  Any
other view of § 28A(b)(4)(i)-(ii) runs contrary to its clear
import.
In essence, Bell asserts the right to sue a property owner for
violations of Miss Utility even though any resultant damage
occurred on property that Bell possessed no colorable right to
occupy.  See Baltimore Gas and Elec. Co. v. Lane, 338 Md. 34, 47,
656 A.2d 307, 313 (1995)(right to exclude others from property is
an incidence of legal possession).  It is absurd to suggest that a
property owner has the right to exclude others, but once Bell, or
any other utility, makes a successful incursion, Miss Utility
protects the interloper's property.  We have long held that "[t]o
a trespasser — one on the property [of another] without permission
— the possessor owes no duty `except to refrain from willfully or
wantonly injuring . . . the trespasser.'"  Lane, supra, 338 Md. 34,
44, 656 A.2d 307, 312 (1995)(quoting Sherman v. Suburban Trust Co.,
282 Md. 238, 242, 384 A.2d 76, 79 (1978)); see also Rosenblatt v.
Exxon, 335 Md. 58, 78, 642 A.2d 180, 190 (1994)(trespass involves
tortiously placing something on the land of another).
We glean no legislative intent in Miss Utility to abrogate
this long-standing common law rule, and indeed, the statute is
perfectly consistent with it.  Thus, an underground facility
-11-
proprietor must show, inter alia, that it had a right to bury the
underground facility before enjoying the protective provisions of
Miss Utility.  Any other conclusion ignores the manifest intent of
Art. 28A(b)(4)(i)-(ii).
Assuming as much, Bell asserts that its right to bury the
Orendorf and Mosser Road cables flowed from two sources — first,
from a statewide franchise granted to Bell by the General Assembly,
and by express permission from officials of the Garrett County
Roads Department.  In order to address these assertions properly,
we must examine the past.
b.
The dawn of the telecommunications age broke with the advent
of the telegraph nearly a century and a half ago.  In response, the
General Assembly in "AN ACT to provide for the Incorporation and
Regulation of Telegraph Companies in this State" granted telegraph
companies the right to, inter alia, 
"construct lines of telegraph along and upon
any of the public roads and highways, or
across any of the waters within the limits of
this State, by the erection of the necessary
fixtures, including posts, piers or abutments,
for sustaining the cords or wires of such
lines; Provided, the same shall not be so
constructed as to incommode the public use of
said 
roads 
or 
highways, 
or 
injuriously
interrupt the navigation of said waters, nor
shall this act be so construed as to authorise
[sic] the construction of any bridge across
any of the waters of this State."  (Original
emphasis).
-12-
       Pub. Gen. Laws (1860), Art. 26, et seq. served as Maryland's first general
8
"Corporations" Article.
See Ch. 369, § 5 of the Acts of 1852.  That Act was first codified
as Public General Laws (1860), Art. 26,  § 107.
8
Law and change being close relatives, by Chapter 471 of the
Acts of 1868, the Legislature repealed Art. 26, and replaced it
entirely.  Lawmakers, however, continued the right of telegraph
corporations respectively to exist, grow through acquisition, and
construct lines of telegraph
"through this State, or from or to any point
or points within this State or upon the
boundaries thereof, and along and upon any
postal roads and postal routes, roads, streets
and highways . . . by the erection of the
necessary fixtures, including posts, piers or
abutments for sustaining the cords or wires of
such lines, without their being deemed a
public nuisance or subject to be abated by any
private party[.]" (Emphasis added).
See Ch. 471, §§ 127-129 of the Acts of 1868.
By 1967, that above-quoted provision was codified and amended
as Md. Code (1957, 1966 Repl. Vol.), Art. 23, § 318 without
substantial modification and is currently codified and amended as
Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 23, § 318.
Nearly two decades following first enactment of the
predecessor to Art. 23, § 318, the Legislature amended Chapter 471
of the Acts of 1868, by additionally conferring upon telegraph
companies the right to
"construct and lay any part of its said line
or lines under ground on any route on which it
-13-
is authorized to construct such lines, in
whole or in part, above ground, and may
acquire by condemnation any easements or
interests in land which may be necessary to
give effect to the purposes for which such
corporation was formed . . . ."
Ch. 161, § 175A of the Acts of 1886.  That Act was codified as
amended in 1967, as Md. Code (1957, 1966 Repl. Vol.), Art. 23, §
340, and is currently codified as Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.),
Art. 23, § 340.  Significantly, the powers initially granted to
telegraph companies by the two aforementioned acts were extended to
telephone companies by Chapter 360 of the Acts of 1884 and by
Chapter 240, § 366 of the Acts of 1908.  See also Md. Code (1957,
1966 Repl. Vol.), Art. 23, § 326.
Bell asserts that the Legislature granted it, under §§ 318 and
340, a State-wide franchise to bury its cables "along and upon any
postal roads and postal routes, roads, streets and highways."  The
county retorts by asserting that "properly" read, § 318 only frees
a public utility from nuisance actions for facilities placed along
those public rights-of-way.  It in no way establishes a primary
right of occupation.  The county similarly maintains that § 340
grants no more rights than those conferred by § 318, save for the
power of condemnation.
c.
Viewed in historical context, §§ 318 and 340, support Bell's
position.  Chapter 369, § 5 of the Acts of 1852, and its
-14-
codification at Public General Laws (1860), Art. 26, § 5, expressly
granted telegraph corporations the right or franchise to employ
"the public roads and highways . . . of this State" to serve its
own ends, so long as such use did not "incommode the public use of
said roads or highways."  Stated otherwise, the Legislature granted
telegraph companies the franchise to use the public roadways for
its cabling purposes, subject only to the avoidance of public
inconvenience.
Upon the repeal of Art. 26, Ch. 471, § 129 of the Acts of 1868
retained without substantial modification the original franchise
formerly granted to telegraph corporations to carry out their
objectives through use of public roadways by erecting the
"necessary fixtures," with the added proviso that such use would
not be "deemed a public nuisance or subject to be abated by any
private party."  (Emphasis added).  Rather than detracting from the
original rights initially enjoyed by telegraph corporations, Ch.
471, § 129 of the Acts of 1868 enlarged the franchise to shield
franchisees from the vexation of nuisance suits.
Shortly thereafter, and as indicated in Part II.b., supra, the
Legislature acted to enlarge the franchise once again.  This time,
telegraph corporations gained the right to inter cables along
above-ground routes and the authority to condemn private property
for public use.  Ch. 161, § 175A of the Acts of 1886.  Since that
-15-
       The only express caveat to the franchise is that expressed in § 340,
9
providing that corporations incorporated under the provisions of § 318 "obtain the
assent and approval of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore City, before using
the streets or highways of Baltimore City, either the surface or the ground beneath
the same." 
     
 See, e.g., American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pearce, 71 Md. 535, 18 A. 910
10
(1889)(notion that statute authorizes public utility to occupy private land prior
to compensation is inconsistent with Md. Const., Art. III, § 40); Postal Tel. Cable
Co. v. State Roads Comm'n., 127 Md. 243, 96 A.2d 439 (1915); C & P Tel. Co. v. State
Roads Comm'n, 132 Md. 194, 103 A. 447 (1918); C & P Tel. Co. v. State Roads Comm'n,
134 Md. 1, 106 A. 257 (1919)(state entitled to recover compensation for
corporation's use of public highways and bridges); Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore v. C & P Tel. Co., 142 Md. 79, 120 A. 229 (1923)(City of Baltimore within
rights to exact a pole rental fee for telephone company's use of the streets);
Johnson v. Consolidated Gas & Elec. Light & Power Co., 187 Md. 454, 50 A.2d 918
(1947)(pole which endangers public safety must be regarded as incommoding the public
and therefore subject to abatement).  See also Md. Code (1957, 1965 Repl. Vol.),
Art. 78, § 24(a)(no public service company shall exercise any franchise granted by
law except to the extent authorized by the Public Service Commission).
time, those Acts have changed little, and in no way pertinent to
the instant case.
Thus, the County's assertion that § 318 only "exempts [the
subject] cables from being deemed public nuisances or being subject
to abatement" lacks merit.  The history of §§ 318 and 340 reveals
that the General Assembly intended telephone and telegraph
corporations make full use of the State's public roadways to
accomplish their objectives  for the benefit of those corporations
9
and the public alike.  That the right to do so is in some measure
conditional  in no way negates its existence.
10
d.
The County also maintains that a public service corporation's
right to occupy public streets and roadways is tantamount to an
-16-
interest in land subject to the statute of frauds codified at
§ 5-104 of the Real Property Article.  It provides:
"No action may be brought on any contract
for the sale or disposition or land or of any
interest in or concerning land unless the
contract on which the action is brought, or
some memorandum or note of it, is in writing
and signed by the party to be charged or some
other person lawfully authorized by him."
As the County sees it, Bell's claim of interest in the
County's roadways is an easement which Bell could have only
acquired via a written instrument — an instrument absent from the
evidentiary record.  To answer this contention, we need only turn
to  Consol. Gas Co. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 101 Md.
541, 61 A. 532 (1905).  In distinguishing the characteristics of an
easement from those of a franchise, our predecessors observed that:
"In every instance of a private easement —
that is, an easement not enjoyed by the public
— there exists the characteristic feature of
two distinct tenements — one dominant and the
other servient.  On the other hand, a
franchise is a special privilege conferred by
government on individuals, which does not
belong 
to 
the 
citizens 
of 
the 
country
generally by common right.  A franchise does
not involve an interest in land — it is not
real estate but a privilege which may be owned
without the acquisition of real property at
all.  (Emphasis added).  The use of a
franchise may require the occupancy, or even
the ownership, of land; but that circumstance
does not make the franchise itself an interest
in 
land." 
(Citation 
omitted)(Original
emphasis).
101 Md. at 545, 61 A. at 534.   Though it is true that "the right
to occupy the street . . . is a franchise" and the "occupation of
-17-
them . . . pursuant to the franchise is the acquisition of an
easement," 101 Md. at 546, 61 A. at 534, the right to acquire the
easement flows from the Legislature, not from private contract.
Thus, the statute of frauds has no applicability to franchise
rights or the exercise thereof. 
IV.
Assuming the applicability of Miss Utility, the County next
contends that the circuit court erred by "proceed[ing] on a theory
of strict liability."  Although both actions below sounded in
negligence, Bell at times argued that strict liability attached to
the County's conceded violations of Miss Utility.  Be that as it
may, we glean no evidence from the record that the trial court
proceeded on any such theory.  Even assuming otherwise, we hold
that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the
trial court's judgment in each of the two negligence actions below.
a.
The County correctly argues that Miss Utility is not a strict
liability statute.  Under § 28A(h), any person or contractor who
violates any section of Miss Utility "shall be deemed negligent and
shall be liable to the owner of the underground facility for the
total cost of the repair."  At trial, Bell contended that § 28A(h)
-18-
      In fact, anyone contemplating excavation "may not begin excavation prior
11
to the marking required by this section or notification by each owner, or by the
one-call system, that marking is unnecessary."  § 28A(f).
imposes strict liability upon the County for its failure to comply
with Miss Utility's notification provisions.  We disagree.
An excavator's primary obligations under Miss Utility are set
forth in § 28A(e)(1)-(4):
"(e) Excavation; notice and due care
requirements. — Each person or contractor who
intends to perform excavation work in this
State shall:
  
(1) Telephone the person identified in
subsection (c) of this section, and notify
that person of the intent to perform the
proposed 
excavation 
at 
least 
48 
hours
(excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and legal
holidays), but not more than 10, working days
before starting excavation;
  
(2) Repeat the notification required in
paragraph (1) of this subsection if:
  
(i) The excavation has not commenced
within 10 working days; or 
  
(ii) The excavation will be expanded
beyond its original location;
  
(3) 
Exercise 
due 
care 
to 
avoid
interference with or damage to an underground
facility 
that 
an 
owner 
has 
marked 
in
accordance 
with 
subsection 
(c) 
of 
this
section; and
  
(4) Immediately notify the owner of an
underground 
facility 
if 
the 
contractor
discovers or causes any disturbance or damage
to that underground facility." (Emphasis
added).11
"Due care" is a negligence concept, and therefore inconsistent
with the genre of strict liability or liability without fault.  See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1422 (6th ed. 1990); see also Mayor and City
Council of Baltimore v. Blibaum, 280 Md. 652, 662-63, 374 A.2d
-19-
      In support of its position, Bell points to a decision by the Supreme Court
12
of Arizona which held that Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-360.21 - 40-360.29 (19__),
Arizona's "Miss Utility" statute, holds violators strictly liable for failing to
comply with its provisions.  See Sedona Self Realization Group v. Sun-Up Water, 123
Ariz. 168, 170, 598 P.2d 987, 989 (1970).  Section 40-360.22.A. of that Act
provides:
"A person shall not make or begin any excavation in any
public street, alley, right-of-way dedicated to the public
use or utility easement or on any express or implied
private 
property 
utility 
easement 
without 
first
determining whether underground facilities will be
encountered, and if so where they are located from each
and every public utility, municipal corporation or other
person having the right to bury such underground
facilities within the public street, alley, right-of-way
or utility easement and taking measures for control of the
facilities in a careful and prudent manner."
Although the Arizona statute employs negligence terms such as "careful and prudent,"
the Arizona Supreme Court nonetheless concluded that § 40-360.22.A. is a strict
liability statute.  For the reasons stated infra, we reject a similar construction
of our own statute.
1152, 1158 (1977) (statute couched in negligence terms is not a
strict liability statute).  Yet according to Bell, a violation of
§ 28A(e)(3) renders violators strictly liable — strictly liable for
failure to exercise due care.  That argument is logically infirm.
Liability for failure to exercise due care is not strict liability,
but rather liability for damages proximately resulting from the
wrongful breach of a legally cognizable duty, i.e., negligence.12
When interpreting any statute, we must look to the entire
statutory scheme, and not any one provision in isolation, to effect
the statute's general policies and purposes.  Morris v. Osmose Wood
Preserving, 340 Md. 519, 539, 667 A.2d 624, 634 (1995); City of
Annapolis v. State, 30 Md. 112, 117 (1869).  In so doing, we must
both harmonize the statute's constituent provisions, Gardner v.
State, 344 Md. 642, 650, 689 A.2d 610, 614 (1997), and avoid
-20-
interpretations which render any part of the statute meaningless or
superfluous.  See Polomski, supra, 344 Md. at 83, 684 A.2d at 1344;
Welsh v. Kuntz, 196 Md. 86, 98-99, 75 A.2d 343, 348 (1950).  
As indicated, "due care" is but one of two duties of those
contemplating excavation under Miss Utility.  Excavators must also
notify owners of underground facilities in the manner specified by
the Act prior to penetrating the earth, § 28A(e)(1)-(2)(i)(ii), and
immediately after disturbing or damaging any such facility.  §
28A(e)(1)-(4).  Bell's interpretation of § 28A(h) focuses only upon
the County's failure to comply with the latter and forsakes the
obvious implication of the provisions specifying the standard of
"due care" to which excavators must conform.  If Miss Utility is a
strict liability statute, as Bell contends, the statute's due care
provisions seemingly lack purpose.  We cannot countenance such a
construction without doing violence to the principles of statutory
construction articulated above.
Moreover, under § 28A(e)(1), an excavator must contact the
owner of the underground facility "at least 48 hours (excluding
Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays), but not more than 10,
working days before starting excavation."   In Bell's view, an
excavator who contacts an owner eleven working days prior to the
excavation, and obtains the appropriate facility markings, but who
otherwise exercises due care, is nonetheless strictly liable for
damages under § 28A(h) for violating "any provision of [Miss
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Utility]."  We ordinarily avoid the construction of a statute which
leads to unreasonable, illogical, unjust or nonsensical results.
D & Y, Inc. v. Winston, 320 Md. 534, 538, 578 A.2d 1177, 1179
(1990); Pan Am. Sulphur v. State Dep't, 251 Md. 620, 627, 248 A.2d
354, 358 (1968).  Yet, the practical implication of the
construction of Miss Utility urged by Bell would rain potentially
enormous liability upon an excavator who did nothing more than
violate a ministerial time provision.  We will not presume that the
Legislature intended such an unjustly harsh result or a radical
departure from the common law of negligence without a plain
statement of its intention to do so. Molesworth v. Brandon,  341
Md. 621, ___, 672 A.2d 608, ___ (1996); Bradshaw v. Prince George's
County, 284 Md. 294, 302, 396 A.2d 255, 260 (1979); Lutz v. State,
167 Md. 12, 15, 172 A. 354, 355-56 (1934).  Viewed in its entirety,
we cannot conclude that Miss Utility commands such a result or
otherwise evidences a legislative intent to substitute strict
liability in situations where principles of negligence would
otherwise and ordinarily apply.
V.
In concluding that Miss Utility is not a strict liability
statute, however, we by no means suggest that violations of the Act
cannot form the basis of civil liability.  This Court has
consistently held that the violation of a statutory duty may
-22-
furnish evidence of negligence.  Atlantic Mutual v. Kenney, 323 Md.
116, 124, 591 A.2d 507, 510 (1991); Aravanis v. Eisenberg, 237 Md.
242, 259-60, 206 A.2d 148, 158 (1965); Ford v. Bradford, 213 Md.
534, 541, 132 A.2d 489, 491-92 (1957).  The positive evidentiary
value of a statutory violation, however, is subject to the
condition that "the person alleging negligence is within the class
of persons sought to be protected, and the harm suffered is of the
kind which the statute was intended, in general, to prevent."
Atlantic Mutual, supra, 323 Md. at 124, 591 A.2d at 510-11; Owens
v. Simon, 245 Md. 404, 409, 226 A.2d 548, 551 (1967).
Clearly, Bell is among the persons or entities that Miss
Utility seeks to protect.  Much the same can be said regarding the
harm that befell Bell's cables.  A statute that requires
underground facilities to be marked prior to excavation in the
vicinity is obviously designed to prevent damage to those
facilities.  Indeed, the Act's preamble leaves no ambiguity on
either score.  § 28A(a)(1)-(3).  Regardless, no action lies for the
alleged breach of a duty — whether imposed by statute or by common
law — unless the resultant harm proximately results from the
breach.  Atlantic Mutual, 323 Md. at 127, 591 A.2d at 512 (citing
Cramer v. Housing Opportunities Comm'n, 304 Md. 705, 712-13, 501
A.2d 35, 93 (1985)).
a.
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  Bell suggests that Miss Utility is among those statutes that place the
13
entire responsibility for the harm that has occurred upon a defendant, because Bell
is among a "certain class of persons [who are unable] to protect themselves."  See
Brady v. Parson's Company, 327 Md. 275, 292, 609 A.2d 297, 305 (1992).  Brady
illustrated this point by pointing to those statutes that prevent the sale of
firearms to minors.  In so doing, this Court observed that "the purpose of [these]
statute[s] would be defeated if the contributory negligence of the minor were
permitted to bar his [or her] recovery.  The predicate for that observation is the
presumption that minors are legally unable to protect themselves.  327 Md. at 292,
609 A.2d at 305.  Bell is entitled to no such presumption.
Conceding violations of Miss Utility, the County attempts to
implicate Bell's agency in the Orendorf and Mosser Road events.
Under Maryland law, contributory negligence of a plaintiff will
ordinarily bar his, her, or its recovery.  Contributory negligence
is that degree of reasonable and ordinary care that a plaintiff
fails to undertake in the face of an appreciable risk which
cooperates with the defendant's negligence in bringing about the
plaintiff's harm.  Wegad v. Howard Street Jewelers, 326 Md. 409,
418, 605 A.2d 123, 128 (1992); Menish v. Polinger Co., 277 Md. 553,
559, 356 A.2d 233, 236 (1976).  As with any affirmative defense,
contributory negligence will not bar a plaintiff's claim unless and
until the defendant has proven its elements by a preponderance of
the evidence.   Myers v. Bright, 327 Md. 395, 403, 609 A.2d 1182,
13
1186 (1992); Baltimore & Ohio Rail Co. v. State, 60 Md. 449, 462
(1883).
In this context, the County argues that the circuit court
erroneously declined to find Bell contributorily negligent for
failing to bury its cables in accordance with its own internal
guidelines and pursuant to an alleged agreement between the County
-24-
and Bell.  Trial testimony revealed that in 1967, both Bell and the
County deemed twenty-four inches to be an appropriate depth at
which to bury telephone cables.  Yet, both parties presented
conflicting testimony concerning the depth of the cables when the
damage to them occurred.
Predictably, the County presented testimony tending to show
that the cables were well above the twenty-four inch standard,
while Bell presented testimony indicating that the cables were
interred below, and in some cases, well below that depth.  Bell
additionally presented testimony that suggested that accurate
measurements were difficult to obtain because the cut areas had
already been excavated to some degree and because the force of the
cut dislocated the cable upwards toward the surface.
Significantly, the County presented no testimony establishing
the depth at which the Orendorf and Mosser Road cables were buried
in 1967, relying instead on an inference that it was somewhat less
than the "requisite" twenty-four inches.  In response, Bell
presented witnesses who testified that forces such as erosion,
ground 
settlement, 
general 
excavation, 
and 
road 
widenings
potentially affect the depth of a cable over time.
The trial judge concluded that the County failed to establish
a defense of contributory negligence.  In fact, the trial judge
expressly found the County's depth evidence "unpersuasive," as he
was entitled to do as the trier of fact.  See Jones v. State, 343
-25-
Md. 448, 460, 682 A.2d 248, 254 (1996)(trier of fact decides which
evidence to accept and which to reject).  In reviewing that
conclusion after considering the evidence in Bell's favor as we
must, our sole function is to determine whether the trial court's
finding is supported by substantial evidence.  Urban Site v.
Levering, 340 Md. 223, 230, 665 A.2d 1062, 1065 (1995); Goodwin v.
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 199 Md. 121, 129, 85 A.2d 759, 762
(1952).  We conclude that it was.
Given that the burden fell to the County to establish
contributory negligence on Bell's part, the court found that the
lack of precise measurements at the damage locations precluded such
a finding.  Moreover, the court chose to accept the testimony
presented by Bell that the "depth of [a] cable will change over the
years from a variety of causes."  Those findings are not clearly
erroneous or otherwise unsupported by substantial evidence, and
they adequately support the trial court's rejection of the County's
contributory negligence defense — a defense, we note, that may be
available under Miss Utility in an appropriate case, as it
ordinarily would be in any negligence action.
b.
In conjunction with its belief that the circuit court
proceeded on a theory of strict liability, the County also contends
that Bell proffered no evidence of negligence.  Though conceding
-26-
      The County also suggests that, at least with regard to the Orendorf Road
14
location, because Bell was contacted early in the process, and at times was on-site,
its notice of the project gave it the greater opportunity to prevent the harm that
had occurred.  In our view, however, this latter view is nothing more than a renewed
contributory negligence argument, which the trial court rejected.
      See Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. 435, 449, 620 A.2d 327, 333 (1993)(seriousness
15
of potential harm, as well as its probability, contributes to the duty to prevent
it); Flaccomio, v. Eysink, 129 Md. 367, 381, 100 A. 510, 515 (1916)(it is the duty
of every person to so conduct his business as not to expose, knowingly or
negligently, others to imminent danger).
that statutory violations may serve as such evidence, the County
maintains that its violations of Miss Utility were not the
proximate cause of the damages suffered by Bell.  Thus, the County
argues, its violations of Miss Utility were of no evidentiary
value.  See part V., supra.
The County mounts this argument on the belief that Bell's
cables were buried less than twenty-four inches from the surface.
At least with respect to the Orendorf Road location, the County
maintains that, based upon this belief, it modified its engineering
plans and restricted excavation work to twelve inches, and
encountered the Bell cable between eight and twelve inches below
the surface.  As to the Mosser Road location, the County's witness
indicated that a backhoe struck Bell's cable "[o]h, approximately
six, eight, [or] ten inches" deep.  As we have previously
indicated, however, the trial court found those assertions
"unpersuasive."  Again, we will not disturb those findings.14
Undoubtedly, the County bore a legal obligation to avoid
Bell's cables, both at common law  and under the various provisions
15
of Miss Utility.  See, e.g., § 28A(e)(3).  In fact, Miss Utility
-27-
     
  There was also evidence adduced that suggested that Bell had agreed to
16
relocate its cables but that the County prematurely began excavation work, depriving
Bell of the opportunity to do so.
places the sole obligation on those contemplating excavation to
employ its notification provisions prior to excavation and to
exercise "due care" in the performance of their subterranean work
to avoid damage to underground facilities.  Section 28A cannot be
read in any other fashion.  
At the very least, the County breached its duty to notify Miss
Utility in the manner specified by the Act.  It made no attempt at
notification prior to excavation at the Mosser Road site.  On
Orendorf Road, not only was notification untimely, it is undisputed
that marking requests were not made in the area where the cable
strike occurred.16
We are further convinced that the record adequately shows that
the County breached its obligation of due care in both locations.
At Mosser Road, the County utterly failed to comply with Miss
Utility and made no independent attempt to determine whether any
underground facility occupied the excavation site.  The same can be
said for Orendorf Road.  Although the County knew of the cable's
presence, excavation proceeded without knowledge of its exact
interment site.  Moreover, Bell suffered a loss — namely, the
damage to its cables and the resultant expense in repairing them.
  Thus, the only issue seriously contested by the County with
respect to its negligence is that of proximate cause.  We have
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defined proximate cause as "1) a cause in fact, and 2) a legally
cognizable cause."  Atlantic Mut., 323 Md. at 127, 591 A.2d at 512.
 As to the latter, foreseeability of harm and manner of occurrence
are the primary indicia of legal cause.  Quoting from the
Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), we have observed that:
"(1) If the actor's conduct is a substantial
factor in bringing about harm to another, the
fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should
have foreseen the extent of the harm or the
manner in which it occurred does not prevent
him from being liable.
(2) The actor's conduct may be held not to be
a legal cause of harm to another where after
the event and looking back from the harm to
the actor's negligent conduct, it appears to
the court highly extraordinary that it should
have brought about the harm."
323 Md. at 129-30, 591 A.2d at 513.
The crux of the County's argument in this regard is that had
it complied fully with Miss Utility, the strikes still would have
occurred.  Thus, its violations of the Act were not the proximate
cause of the accident.  The County overlooks § 28(A)(d).  It
provides:
"(d) 
Burden 
of 
Care. 
— 
Obtaining
information as required by this section does
not excuse any person or contractor making any
excavation from doing so in a careful and
prudent manner, nor shall it excuse any person
or contractor from liability for any damage or
injury resulting from the excavation."
Although strictly speaking, mistiming notification under Miss
Utility may not form a predicate for proximate cause, the County
-29-
did far more than fail to timely notify Miss Utility.  Bell's
cables were damaged for the simple and sole reason that the County
failed to apprise itself of the precise location of those
underground facilities prior to commencing excavation operations.
Not only was this failure a substantial factor in bringing about
the harm to Bell's property, but in retrospect, such a failure was
highly likely to do so.
While it is true, as the County observes, that Miss Utility
does not expressly require an owner to identify the depth of its
underground facilities while marking them, we simply cannot credit
an argument that suggests that excavating without accurate
knowledge of what lies below the surface is "making [an] excavation
. . . in a careful and prudent manner," as required by the Act.  To
do so would sanction carelessness in the face of risk and
completely subvert the intent of Miss Utility.  
Though owners of underground facilities have considerable
duties under the statute, it is clear that Miss Utility places the
overwhelming burden of ensuring the integrity of those facilities
squarely upon excavators and those in their employ.   By failing to
do so, the County breached its legal duty and as a result, damaged
Bell's subterranean telephone cables, inconveniencing Bell and the
public alike.
Of the many underground facilities buried across this State,
telephone cables rank among the most benign.  In that regard, the
County's negligence met with fortuity.  Had the County's backhoe or
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grader struck a natural gas or high voltage line, the results may
have been far more costly and tragic.  The County's suggestion that
Miss Utility protects only the property of public service
corporations strains credulity and ignores the obvious intent and
plain language of the Act.  This case should serve as fair warning
to anyone contemplating excavation.  Compliance with Miss Utility
is not a matter of discretion or convenience.
JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.