Case Title: James v. Montoya

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-08-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
James v. Montoya1998 WY 101963 P.2d 993Case Number: 97-97Decided: 08/13/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
Beverly JAMES and Michael "Mick" James, spouse of Beverly 
James, Appellants (Plaintiffs),

v.

Linda MONTOYA and Steve 
Short, Appellees (Defendants).

 

Appeal from the District 
Court, Natrona County, Spangler, J.

 

Maureen T. 
Donohoue of Donohoue Law Office, Lander, for 
Appellants(Plaintiffs).

Bradley D. 
Bonner of Gifford & Bonner, Casper, for 
Appellees(Defendants).

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* 
JJ.

* Chief Justice at time of 
conference.

TAYLOR, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellant, 
Beverly James (James), suffered work-related injuries from exposure to 
chemicals. The culpable negligence suit filed by James and her husband against 
her co-workers, appellees, was dismissed as time barred. We 
affirm.

I. 
ISSUE

[¶2]      As stated by 
appellees, the issue presented for our consideration is:1

Did the District 
Court properly dismiss Plaintiffs complaint with prejudice because the action 
was not commenced within four years as required by W.S. § 1-3-105, Wyoming's 
statute of limitations governing negligence actions?

II. 
FACTS

[¶3]      On June 30, 1992, 
James was exposed to chemicals used in the manufacture of pepper mace devices 
used for personal protection. She sought medical attention, and received 
worker's compensation benefits for her injuries resulting from this exposure. 
Four years later, on July 1, 1996, James and her husband filed suit claiming 
appellees' culpable negligence caused James' injuries. Service of the summons 
and complaint on appellees was not accomplished until October 9, 1996, 100 days 
after suit was filed.

[¶4]      Appellees sought 
dismissal of the suit pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) (1997) and 
W.R.C.P. 3. One day before the hearing on appellees' motion to dismiss, James 
filed her affidavit and medical records, which appellees moved to strike. The 
affidavit outlines the course of treatment James received for her chemical 
exposure. It alleges her injuries were not correctly diagnosed as arising from 
the chemical exposure until sometime in the spring of 1993. The district court 
granted appellees' motion to dismiss, finding that appellants' complaint was not 
filed within the four year statute of limitations. The district court 
acknowledged the late filed affidavit, but found that the allegations it 
contained did not change the fact that the statute of limitations began to run 
on June 30, 1992.

III. STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶5]      Although 
fashioned as a motion to dismiss, appellees' motion became one for summary 
judgment pursuant to W.R.C.P. 12(b) when the district court considered James' 
affidavit. See Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Dunkelberger, 918 P.2d 987, 990-91 
(Wyo. 1996). The standard of review for summary judgment is well 
known:

Summary judgment 
is proper only where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. * * * This court evaluates the 
propriety of a summary judgment using the same standards and materials used by 
the district court. * * * The record is reviewed from the vantage most favorable 
to the nonmoving party, awarding that party all favorable inferences which may 
be drawn from the facts. * * * The movant has the initial burden of proving the 
nonexistence of a genuine issue of material fact. * * * Once a prima facie 
showing is made, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to present 
specific facts showing that a genuine issue of material fact does 
exist.

Ahearn v. 
Anderson-Bishop Partnership, 946 P.2d 417, 421-22 (Wyo. 
1997).

IV. 
DISCUSSION

[¶6]      Wyo. Stat. § 
1-3-105(a)(iv)(C) requires appellants to commence their negligence action within 
four years from the time it accrued. W.R.C.P. 3 explains when an action is 
deemed to be commenced:

(a) How 
commenced. - A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the 
court.

(b) When 
commenced. - For purposes of statutes of limitation, an action shall be deemed 
commenced on the date of filing the complaint as to each defendant, if service 
is made on the defendant * * * within 60 days after the filing of the complaint. 
If such service is not made within 60 days the action shall be deemed commenced 
on the date when service is made.

Since more than 
sixty days had passed between the filing of appellants' complaint and service on 
appellees, this action was commenced on the date of service, October 9, 1996. 
The date on which James suffered chemical exposure was June 30, 1992; thus, more 
than four years passed between the date of injury and commencement of 
appellants' suit. Unless the statute of limitations accrued on a different date, 
appellants' suit is time barred.

[¶7]      Wyoming is a 
"discovery state," meaning the statute of limitations is not triggered until the 
plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the existence of a cause of action. 
Woodard v. Cook Ford Sales, Inc., 927 P.2d 1168, 1169 (Wyo. 1996); Hiltz v. 
Robert W. Horn, P.C., 910 P.2d 566, 570 (Wyo. 1996); Barlage v. Key Bank of 
Wyoming, 892 P.2d 124, 126 (Wyo. 1995). Citing our precedent in the worker's 
compensation arena as support, appellants argue that their claim was not 
discovered and therefore did not accrue until James' condition was correctly 
diagnosed in the spring of 1993.

[¶8]      In worker's 
compensation cases, we have held that an employee does not discover his claim 
for a compensable injury, as that term is defined in the worker's compensation 
context, until he has received a diagnosis of his condition from his physician. 
See, e.g., Pittman v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Compensation Div., 917 P.2d 614, 617 (Wyo. 1996) and Olheiser v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation 
Div., 866 P.2d 768, 773 (Wyo. 1994). This rule is premised on the statute of 
limitations found in Wyoming's worker's compensation statutes, which 
specifically permits claims brought within one year after "a diagnosis of injury 
is first communicated to the employee * * *." Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-503(b) (1997). 
Appellants urge us to apply this standard to their claim because the underlying 
injury was suffered in the workplace.

[¶9]      James has already 
received worker's compensation benefits for her occupational injury. The action 
before us does not assert any claims with respect to her receipt of those 
benefits; it is simply a negligence suit alleging damages resulting from the 
wrongful acts of co-workers. We see no reason to deviate from the law regarding 
statutes of limitations applicable to negligence actions.

[¶10]   A tort cause of action accrues when 
the plaintiff knows or has reason to know that she has suffered damage due to 
another's wrongful act. Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334, 337 (Wyo. 
1986) (quoting Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316, 1321 (Wyo. 1984)). The statute 
of limitations begins to run at that time, even when the consequences of the 
wrongful act are not fully known until later. Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 
343-44 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 863, 100 S. Ct. 132, 62 L. Ed. 2d 86 (1979). 
James' affidavit makes it clear she knew of the wrongful act, and knew she had 
suffered injury as a result, on June 30, 1992, the day she was exposed to the 
chemicals. Even though she was not fully aware of the extent of her injury until 
the following spring, her cause of action accrued and the statute of limitations 
began to run on that date.

[¶11]   Statutes of limitation do not 
discriminate between the just and unjust claim. They operate regardless of the 
merits, and courts have no right to deny their operation. Duke, 589 P.2d  at 340. 
James' injury occurred on June 30, 1992, and the statute of limitations began to 
run on this negligence action on that date. Appellants' action was commenced on 
October 9, 1996, more than four years later. There is no dispute of material 
fact, and the law is clear that this claim is time barred. The district court 
was correct in dismissing this case.

V. 
CONCLUSION

[¶12]   Appellants did not commence this 
action within four years after the underlying injury occurred. Accordingly, it 
is barred by the statute of limitations. The order of the district court 
dismissing this case is affirmed.

Footnotes

1 Appellants' 
brief does not include a separate statement of issues. See W.R.A.P. 7.01. See 
also 37 Gambling Devices (Cheyenne Elks Club and Cheyenne Music and Vending, 
Inc.) v. State, 694 P.2d 711, 713 (Wyo. 1985).