Case Title: STATE v KYLE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 80-104

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1980-07-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 80-104 I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1980 STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, V S . M I K E K. KYLE, Defendant and Appellant. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Powell, Honorable Robert Boyd, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Byron W. Boggs, Anaconda, Montana For Respondent : Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Ted L. Mizner, County Attorney, Deer Lodge, Montana Submitted on b r i e f s : May 27, 1980 Decided: JUL 2 8 7 9 8 0 M r . J u s t i c e John Conway Harrison d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Appellant Kyle appeals from h i s conviction i n t h e D i s t r i c t Court, Third J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Powell County, of t h e charge of felony escape i n v i o l a t i o n of s e c t i o n 45-7- 306 (3) (b) , MCA. The case w a s submitted t o t h e D i s t r i c t Court on an agreed statement of f a c t s . O n October 18, 1978, t h e D i s - t r i c t Court, Cascade County, sentenced a p p e l l a n t Kyle t o seven years i n t h e Montana S t a t e Prison f o r criminal m i s - chief and e i g h t y e a r s f o r burglary. The sentences w e r e t o be served concurrently. O n February 27, 1979, Kyle was t r a n s f e r r e d from t h e S t a t e Prison t o t h e Swan River Youth F o r e s t Camp. Kyle l e f t t h e Youth Camp without a u t h o r i z a t i o n on August 23, 1979. O n November 2 , 1979, Kyle turned him- s e l f over t o F l o r i d a a u t h o r i t i e s f o r r e t u r n t o Montana. Based on t h e s e f a c t s , Kyle was found g u i l t y of felony escape under s e c t i o n 45-7-306(3) ( b ) , MCA, and was sentenced t o t h r e e years i n t h e S t a t e Prison. The sentence was t o run consecutively with any o t h e r unserved sentences. The s o l e i s s u e f o r review i s whether Kyle's d e p a r t u r e from t h e Youth Camp i s a felony escape under s e c t i o n 45-7- 306 (3) (b) , MCA. Appellant argues a s h i s s o l e defense t h a t t h e r e c e n t case of S t a t e v. Whiteshield (1980), - Mont. , 605 P.2d 189, 37 St.Rep. 89, c o n t r o l s here. I n t h a t case, w e held t h a t a departure from a work furlough i s n o t an escape from t h e S t a t e Prison. W e hold here t h a t t h e Whiteshield r a t i o n a l e does n o t apply. I n Whiteshield t h i s Court c i t e d t h r e e reasons why an escape of a prisoner on furlough does n o t c o n s t i t u t e a felony escape. F i r s t , we noted t h a t the defendants i n White- s h i e l d each escaped while they had freedom t o move about t h e cities where they were on furlough. Second, w e examined the furlough s t a t u t e and found it inadequate when read with t h e escape s t a t u t e t o demonstrate a l e g i s l a t i v e i n t e n t t h a t escape while on furlough j u s t i f i e s a felony punishment. And t h i r d , we emphasized the Commission Comment accompanying t h e escape s t a t u t e . Appellant's case i s distinguishable from Whiteshield within the context of each of the t h r e e reasons applied by t h i s Court. F i r s t , persons incarcerated a t the Swan River Youth Forest Camp a r e not f r e e t o move about i n t h e same manner a s a person on furlough. Detention a t the Swan River f a c i l i t y i s s i m i l a r t o a minimum s e c u r i t y s t a t u s a t the main prison. I n f a c t , a l l of t h e r e s i d e n t s of the Swan River f a c i l i t y have come t h e r e from the prison through a c l a s s i - f i c a t i o n process. A s t r i c t e r c r i t e r i a f o r furlough e l i g i - b i l i t y along with t h e necessity of approval from the Board of Pardons demonstrates a l e s s e r r i s k f a c t o r with r e s p e c t t o t h e inmates on furlough. Persons assigned t o Swan River Youth Forest Camp a r e s t i l l very much i n prison and s u b j e c t t o i t s authority. Second, section 45-7-306 ( 3 ) (b) (i) , MCA, contemplates escape from the Swan River f a c i l i t y . That section provides: "A person convicted of the offense of escape s h a l l be: " ( b ) imprisoned i n t h e s t a t e prison f o r a term n o t t o exceed 10 years i f he: "(i) escapes from a s t a t e prison, county j a i l , o r c i t y j a i l . . ." The t e r m " a s t a t e prison" i s not defined i n t h e Criminal Code. However, t h e l e g i s l a t u r e ' s use of t h e modifier "a" r a t h e r than "the" i n d i c a t e s t h a t it d i d n o t intend t h a t t h e t e r m be read exclusively. To paraphrase t h i s C o u r t ' s lan- guage i n Whiteshield, it f l i e s i n t h e f a c e of common sense t o say t h a t Swan River i s n o t a "prison." Only f e l o n s are committed t o Swan River and only through t h e Montana S t a t e Prison. F i n a l l y , t h e purposes expressed i n t h e Commission Comment accompanying t h e escape s t a t u t e support t h e conclu- s i o n t h a t escape from t h e Swan River Youth F o r e s t Camp i s a felony escape. The f i r s t paragraph of t h e Commission Com- ment reads: "[This s e c t i o n ] c l a s s i f i e s escapes according t o t h e r i s k they c r e a t e . Punishment i s more severe f o r t h e offense when committed by t h e use of o r t h r e a t of f o r c e , physical violence, weapon o r simulated weapon. The grading of t h e offense by r e l y i n g on t h e p r i s o n e r ' s use of f o r c e i s a c t u a l l y a r e t u r n t o t h e common law, s i n c e e a r l y common l a w c l e a r l y distinguished between escapes with and without use of force. The grading scheme i m p l i c i t i n t h e o l d code by which punishment i s provided i n r e f e r e n c e t o t h e type of confinement, i s n o t e n t i r e l y aban- doned i n s e c t i o n 94-7-306. [Now s e c t i o n 45-7- 306, MCA.] For example, use of f o r c e i n escap- i n g from a n o n i n s t i t u t i o n a l d e t e n t i o n c a l l s f o r a lesser punishment than escape from t h e prison o r county o r c i t y j a i l . Further, an escape without use of f o r c e from a n o n i n s t i t u t i o n a l detention a s provided i n subsection 3 ( e ) removes t h e offense from t h e felony category a l t o g e t h e r . " The above comment draws a c l e a r d i s t i n c t i o n between i n s t i t u t i o n a l and noncustodial o r n o n i n s t i t u t i o n a l d e t e n t i o n by i t s use of t h e l a t t e r t e r m s . There i s no question t h a t t h e Swan River Youth F o r e s t Camp i s a detention f a c i l i t y , s t a f f e d by persons charged a t least i n p a r t with t h e t a s k of preventing escape from t h e f a c i l i t y . C e r t a i n l y t h e r i s k c r e a t e d by an escape from Swan River i s much g r e a t e r than the risk created by the escape of an individual who is on furlough. Consistent with the legislative purpose of classi- fying escapes in accordance with the risks they create, we find the District Court properly deemed appellant's escape to be of felony proportions. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. We concur: Chief Justlce Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy dissenting: This case is controlled by State v. Whiteshield (1980), Mont . , 605 P.2d 189, 37 St.Rep. 89. The majority in - - this case is backtracking from the position we took in White- shield to the effect that whether escape is a felony or a misdemeanor depends upon the degree of risk which the escape creates. This was obviously the intent of the commission that drew up the statute and it was also our intent in handing down the decision in Whiteshield. To be clear about it, Swan River Youth Forest Camp is not a state prison. It is true that only felons are committed to the camp, but it is also true that only felons are placed on furlough, and in Whiteshield, that single factor was not enough for us to decide that an escape from a furlough was a felony. Under sections 41-5-523(2) (b) and 41-5-523(3), MCA, a delinquent youth between sixteen and twenty-one years of age may not be committed or transferred to a penal institution or other facility used for the execution of sentence of able persons convicted of crimes unless there is first a determina- tion made as to whether the youth should be assigned to the Youth Forest Camp. Contrary to what is said in the majority opinion, the Youth Forest Camp is not a prison, but is rather a place where a work program is established by the camp super- intendent and the Department of Natural Resources and Conser- vation (section 53-30-205, MCA) to rehabilitate the youthful offender. The very purpose of the legislature in establishing a Youth Forest Camp was to avoid imprisonment of youthful offenders in the state prison. While Youth Forest Camp residents are not free to move about like persons on furlough, this should not be a point of emphasis in our decision. Our escape statute places less emphasis on the type of confinement than on the type of risk created by the escape. I would reverse the District Court.