Case Title: State v. Matusky

Citation: 343 Md. 467

Docket Number: 124/95

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1996-09-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 124
September Term, 1995
___________________________________
STATE OF MARYLAND
v.
MICHAEL STEWART MATUSKY
___________________________________
Murphy, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Raker
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Raker, J.
Rodowsky, J. dissents
___________________________________
        Filed: September 18, 1996  
We granted certiorari in this case to determine whether the
trial court correctly applied the declaration against penal
interest exception to the rule precluding admission of hearsay
evidence.  We shall hold that the trial court interpreted the
exception too broadly, erroneously admitting collateral portions of
the hearsay declaration that did not directly incriminate the
declarant.      
I.
In May, 1993, Respondent Michael Stewart Matusky was indicted
in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County on two counts of first-
degree murder in connection with the stabbing deaths of Gertrude
and Pamela Poffel.  When the police initially investigated the
crime in January, 1993, they questioned Matusky, as well as Pamela
Poffel's estranged husband, Richard Dean White, and White's
fiancée, Rebecca Marchewka.  In these interviews, White told the
police that he knew nothing about the crimes.  He also told the
police that he spent the entire day of the crime shopping with
Marchewka.  Marchewka corroborated White's account.
According to Marchewka's subsequent testimony at trial, three
months after the initial police interviews, White told Marchewka in
confidence that he knew who committed the crimes.  White's
declaration to Marchewka implicated Matusky as the murderer.  Two
days after White related his account to Marchewka, she contacted
the police.  Marchewka retracted her prior statements, which
4
corroborated White's alibi, explaining that she lied at White's
request because he feared revocation of his parole if the police
knew he had actually been drinking at a bar.  Marchewka then
recounted White's statements to the police.
White and Matusky were both indicted on two counts of first-
degree murder in violation of Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol.,
1996 Cum. Supp.) Article 27, § 410.  They were tried separately,
and Matusky's trial was scheduled to take place before White's.
Prior to the commencement of Matusky's trial, both the State and
defense counsel sought a ruling on the admissibility of White's
declaration to Marchewka.  At the initial pre-trial hearing, the
court denied the defense motion to exclude the declaration without
hearing Marchewka's testimony, but informed the State that the
declaration might later be excluded, depending on Marchewka's live
testimony.
Immediately before trial, the court again considered the
admissibility of the declaration.  At this hearing, the court heard
testimony from Marchewka, outside the presence of the jury.  After
hearing Marchewka's testimony as well as oral argument from
counsel, the court again concluded that the declaration was
admissible, stating that:
[Defense counsel's] argument with respect to
the penal interests would be the thing that I
really have to make the call on, talking here
about admissibility not the weight; the jury
will decide that.  I find, from a reasonable
person standard, as [the State's Attorney]
articulated, 
would 
know 
that 
there 
is
      Following Matusky's conviction, White was tried on the
1
murder charges and acquitted.
5
something against your pecuniary, proprietary
or penal interests by discussing a homicide or
violent act and then driving someone to the
place where that act was to be carried out and
driving them away, then giving a statement to
the police which was a truthful statement; so,
assuming the declarant is unavailable, in
accordance with the other standard, I am
prepared to rule that the statements are
admissible.
Matusky was tried before a jury in January, 1994.  White did
not testify at Matusky's trial because he asserted his Fifth
Amendment privilege.  The court therefore found that White was
unavailable.   Marchewka, the State's key witness at trial, gave
1
the following testimony regarding White's statements to her:
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: Did [White] say anything to you on
the ride home [from the bar]?
[MARCHEWKA]: He said that he was very upset and unhappy.
* * * * * * 
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  Did he appear upset to you?
[MARCHEWKA]: Yes, he did.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]: Could you tell if he had been
drinking?
[MARCHEWKA]:  Yes, he had been drinking.
* * * * * * 
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  What happened next. . . 
[MARCHEWKA]:  He laid down in the bed and told me that he
had something that he wanted to tell me but he couldn't
and I asked him why and he said because it would hurt me.
6
And I asked him to tell me any way.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  When you asked him to tell you did
he, in fact, tell you something?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Objection, Your Honor.
[THE COURT]:  Objection noted for the record and
overruled.
[MARCHEWKA]:  Yes, he did.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  What did he tell you, tell the
ladies and gentlemen of the jury.
[MARCHEWKA]:  He told me that he knew who killed Pam and
Trudy [Gertrude] Poffel and I asked him who and he said
Michael Matusky and I asked him how he knew and he said
because he was in the car.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  Did he indicate whose car he was in?
[MARCHEWKA]:  Michael's.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  Did he indicate to you how he got to
Pam and Trudy's residence in Michael's car?
[MARCHEWKA]:  He said he drove.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  Did he tell you where he had been
prior to going to Pam and Trudy's?
[MARCHEWKA]:  Yes, they had been at The Pit and at
Wargo's [local bars].
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  When you say they, who are you
referring to?
[MARCHEWKA]:  Michael [Matusky] and Richard [White].
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  This is what Richard told you?
[MARCHEWKA]: Yes.
* * * * * * 
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  Did he tell you what occurred at
Wargo's?
7
[MARCHEWKA]:  Yes, he said that he and Michael had a
discussion, that Michael wants to kill Pam and Trudy
because of what he did, what they did to Ted and he said
he tried to talk Michael out of it.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  This conversation occurred prior to
going to the Poffels?
[MARCHEWKA]:  Yes.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  Did Richard say whether or not he
went inside the house?
[MARCHEWKA]:  He said no, he sat in the car.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  Did he tell you what he did after
that?
[MARCHEWKA]:  Said they drove away.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  When he told you that what was your
reaction?
[MARCHEWKA]:  I was very upset, it's hard for me to
believe.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  When Richard saw how upset you were
what did he say or do?
[MARCHEWKA]:  He was concerned about who I was going to
tell, what I was going to do with the information.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  Did he specifically ask you that?
[MARCHEWKA]:  Yes, he did.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  When he asked you what you were
going to do with that information what did you tell him?
[MARCHEWKA]:  I told him at that time I did not know what
I was going to do.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  When you told him that what did he
say?
[MARCHEWKA]:  He wanted--he asked me to take him to back
to the bar.
[STATE'S ATTORNEY]:  Prior to going back to the bar did
       Although it did not appear on the record, at oral argument,
2
Respondent also represented to this Court that White inherited
$26,000 as a result of Pamela Poffel's death.
8
you discuss with Richard his involvement and what
happened?
[MARCHEWKA]:  Yes, but he said that he didn't--he didn't
do anything wrong, that he was just in the car and I
tried to tell him that he was considered an accomplice
and he said no.
 
In addition to Marchewka's testimony, the State also presented
evidence of a bloody shoeprint found at the crime scene.  A police
expert testified that the shoeprint was consistent with the size
and style of a pair of shoes belonging to Matusky, although the
expert could not declare a conclusive match between Matusky's shoe
and the shoeprint.  No other physical evidence connected Matusky to
the crime scene.  
Matusky testified in his own behalf and denied any involvement
in the crimes.  Contrary to Marchewka's account, he testified that
he did not drive to the Poffels' home with White on the night of
the murders.  He also denied harboring any animosity toward the
Poffels for the death of Ted Poffel, instead attributing Ted
Poffel's suicide to his cocaine addiction.  Matusky also suggested
that White had a much stronger motive to kill the Poffels.  Matusky
testified that White, who was Pamela Poffel's estranged husband and
Gertrude Poffel's son-in-law, was angry with the Poffels for
depriving him of money and investments.2
The jury convicted Matusky on both counts of first-degree
9
murder.  The court sentenced him to two terms of life imprisonment
without possibility of parole, to be served consecutively.  
Matusky noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals,
challenging the trial court's admission of White's hearsay
declaration to Marchewka.  The Court of Special Appeals reversed
Matusky's convictions, concluding that the trial court should not
have admitted White's declaration in toto.  Matusky v. State, 105
Md. App. 389, 660 A.2d 935 (1995).  Writing for the court, Judge
Joseph Murphy, Jr., reasoned that:
Applying Simmons, Wilson, and Williamson to
the facts of this case, we conclude that the
trial 
judge 
should 
have 
excluded 
the
statements 
in 
White's 
declaration 
that
identified 
appellant 
as 
the 
killer 
and
supplied appellant's motive for the murders.
Those 
statements 
were 
simply 
not 
self-
inculpatory as to White. . . . With respect to
those portions of the declaration in which
White described his role, cross-examination of
White would have been of marginal utility to
appellant.  The same cannot be said, however,
about other statements in the declaration.  It
is obvious that appellant had an important
interest in cross-examining White with respect
to those portions of the declaration in which
White (1) identified appellant as the killer
and (2) discussed appellant's motive for the
murders.  Those statements should have been
redacted from White's declaration against
interest.
Id. at 403, 660 A.2d at 941.  We granted the State's petition for
a writ of certiorari to answer the following question:
Under the hearsay exception for a declaration
against penal interest, is the admissible
statement the extended declaration or only
those remarks that are individually self-
       Matusky's trial took place in January, 1994.  The Maryland
3
Rules of Evidence did not become effective until July 1, 1994.  In
trials commencing after July 1, 1994, the declaration against
interest exception is governed by Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(3),
provided that: "(1) any trial or hearing commenced prior to July 1,
1994 shall continue to be governed by the law and Rules in effect
on June 30, 1994, and (2) no evidence shall be admitted against a
defendant in a criminal action in proof of a crime committed prior
to July 1, 1994, unless that evidence would have been admissible
under the law and Rules in effect on June 30, 1994 . . . ."  Court
of Appeals of Maryland, Rules Order, 21 Md. Reg. 1 (1994).
Maryland Rule 5-804(b) provides, in pertinent part, that:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness:
* * * * * *
(3) Statement Against Interest.--A statement
(continued...)
10
inculpatory?
II.
The State contends that the outcome of this case is governed
by our decision in State v. Standifur, 310 Md. 3, 526 A.2d 955
(1987).  Under our holding in Standifur, the State argues, the
hearsay exception for declarations against penal interest applies
to both individually self-inculpatory statements and collateral
statements.  In addition, the State maintains that the Supreme
Court decision in Williamson v. United States,    U.S.   , 114 S.
Ct. 2431 (1994), does not control our decision, because Williamson
interprets Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), while the present
case was decided under Maryland common law.   Finally, the State
3
(...continued)
which was at the time of its making so
contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or
proprietary interest, so tended to subject the
declarant to civil or criminal liability, or
so tended to render invalid a claim by the
declarant against another, that a reasonable
person in the declarant's position would not
have made the statement unless the person
believed it to be true.  A statement tending
to expose the declarant to criminal liability
and offered to exculpate the accused is not
admissible unless corroborating circumstances
clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the
statement.
11
argues that even if the test articulated in Williamson applies, the
circumstances in this case indicate that White was not merely
attempting to shift blame to Matusky or to minimize his own
culpability.  Therefore, the State maintains, White's extended
declaration to Marchewka should be admitted in its entirety.
Respondent argues that Williamson should govern the decision
to admit a declaration against penal interest.  Under both
Williamson and prior Maryland cases, Respondent contends, at least
those portions of the declaration shifting blame from White to
Matusky should have been excluded.  Respondent maintains that only
those portions of White's declaration that individually implicated
White should have been admitted.
III.
The declaration against penal interest exception to the rule
       Earlier common law decisions did not recognize any
4
exception to the rule against hearsay for declarations against
penal interest.  See Standifur, 310 Md. at 10 n.2, 526 A.2d at 958
n.2.  
12
precluding the admission of hearsay evidence is predicated on the
assumption that the declarant would not make a statement adverse to
his or her penal interest unless that declarant believed it to be
true.  State v. Standifur, 310 Md. 3, 11, 526 A.2d 955, 959 (1987).
While this rationale supports admitting individual statements that
are contrary to the declarant's penal interest, courts and
commentators differ on whether the rationale applies to other
portions of a hearsay declaration that do not directly implicate
the declarant.4
 
Wigmore, for example, proposed that if part of a hearsay
declaration was self-inculpatory, then the entire declaration
should be admissible, reasoning that:
Since the principle is that the statement is
made under circumstances fairly indicating the
declarant's sincerity and accuracy . . . it is
obvious that the situation indicates the
correctness of whatever he may say while under
that influence.  In other words, the statement
may be accepted, not merely as to the specific
fact against interest, but also as to every
fact contained in the same statement. . . .
All parts of the speech or entry may be
admitted which appear to have been made while
the declarant was in the trustworthy condition
of mind which permitted him to state what was
against his interest.
5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §1465, at 339-41 (Chadbourn
rev. 1974 & 1996 Supp.).  Other commentators took the opposite
       Jefferson rejected Wigmore's rationale for admitting
5
collateral portions of declarations against penal interest, writing
that:
Wigmore  . . .  suggests that . . . "All parts
of the speech or entry may be admitted which
appear to have been made while the declarant
was in the trustworthy condition of mind which
permitted him to state what was against his
interest."  This test states a justification
for the doctrine, namely, that a declarant is
in a trustworthy frame of mind when he makes a
declaration against interest, and that this
frame of mind continues for other statements
made at the same time.  But when a self-
serving statement is made along with a
disserving one, it may well be doubted that
the declarant is in a trustworthy frame of
mind when he makes the self-serving statement.
It would appear that a self-serving statement
lacks trustworthiness whether it accompanies a
disserving statement or not.  The basis of
this exception is not that a declarant is in a
general trustworthy frame of mind.  The
probability of trustworthiness comes from the
facts asserted being disserving in character.
Once 
those 
facts 
are 
left 
behind 
the
probability of trustworthiness for other
statements 
seems 
highly 
speculative 
and
conjectural.  It would seem, therefore, that
the courts are not justified in admitting
self-serving statements merely because they
accompany disserving statements, and a neutral
collateral statement should fare no better.
Jefferson, supra, at 60.
13
position, i.e., that none of the collateral portions of
declarations against interest should be admitted.  See B.
Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest:  An Exception to the
Hearsay Rule, 58 HARV. L. REV. 1, 60-61 (1944).5
Professor McCormick, among others, advocated an intermediate
14
approach, permitting the admission of some but not all collateral
portions of declarations against penal interest.  He suggested that
courts separate the self-serving from the disserving portions of
the declaration against interest, excluding only the self-serving
portions.  C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 279(d), at 677
(E. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972).  Thus, "collateral neutral"
statements, i.e., those that neither incriminate the declarant nor
shift blame to a third party, could be admitted under Professor
McCormick's approach.
In State v. Standifur, 310 Md. 3, 5, 526 A.2d 955, 956 (1987),
we considered the question of whether a declaration against the
penal interest of an unavailable declarant, offered by the State
against the accused in a criminal trial, was sufficiently reliable
to qualify under the common law exception to the hearsay rule.  We
analyzed the alternative views of the scope of the declaration
against penal interest exception discussed above, and adopted the
intermediate position advocated by Professor McCormick.  We
articulated a test for trial judges to apply in deciding whether or
not to admit a statement against interest.  First, the proponent of
the declaration must demonstrate that the declarant is unavailable.
Id. at 12, 526 A.2d at 959.  Once the proponent establishes
unavailability, the court must:
carefully 
consider 
the 
content 
of 
the
statement in the light of all known and
relevant circumstances surrounding the making
of the statement and all relevant information
       Courts and commentators have propounded differing
6
interpretations of the "reasonable person" test set forth in
Federal Rule 804(b)(3).  As one commentator explained:
Courts might interpret the "reasonable man"
test in three ways.  First, a court might
ignore 
the 
declarant's 
subjective
understanding and ask only whether an ordinary
person would recognize the disserving effect
of his statement.  Second, the court might
explore what the declarant actually thought,
but 
ignore 
his 
understanding 
if 
it 
is
unreasonable.  Finally, the court may admit
the statement if the declarant thought the
statement was against his interest, regardless
of whether either the statement was in fact
disserving or a normal person would have so
thought.  Under the third approach, a court
would exclude the statement if the declarant
had not actually recognized its disserving
effect, even if a normal person would have
recognized it.  Under this approach, the court
would ask what the normal person would have
thought only if it could not determine the
declarant's actual understanding.
P. Tague, Perils of the Rulemaking Process:  The Development,
Application, and Unconstitutionality of Rule 804(b)(3)'s Penal
Interest Exception, 69 GEO. L.J. 851, 931-33 (1987).  We addressed
this issue in Standifur, noting that:
Unless the declarant . . . believed [at the
time the declaration was made that] the
statement . . . [was] against his penal
interest, there is no basis for presumed
reliability. 
 
However, 
because 
of 
the
(continued...)
15
concerning 
the 
declarant, 
and 
determine
whether the statement was in fact against the
declarant's penal interest and whether a
reasonable person in the situation of the
declarant would have perceived that it was
against his penal interest at the time it was
made.
Id. at 17, 526 A.2d at 962.   If the hearsay statement passes this
6
(...continued)
unavailability of the declarant and other
problems of proof, the party urging this
exception is not required to prove the actual
state of mind of the declarant but must prove
sufficient surrounding facts from which the
trial judge may inferentially determine what
the state of mind of a reasonable person would
have 
been 
under 
the 
same 
or 
similar
circumstances.
Standifur, 310 Md. at 12, 526 A.2d at 962.  See also United States
v. Palumbo, 639 F.2d 123, 133 & n.11 (3d Cir. 1981) (Adams, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 819 (1981); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§ 280, at 827 (E. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984 & 1987 Supp.).
       In addition to these requirements, Maryland Rule 5-
7
804(b)(3) also requires "corroborating circumstances" when the
hearsay declaration inculpates the declarant and exculpates the
accused.  The Rule does not explicitly require corroborating
circumstances when the declaration incriminates the accused.  A
number of federal circuits, however, have required corroboration
for both inculpatory and exculpatory declarations.  See, e.g.,
United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1420-21 (7th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Riley, 657 F.2d 1377, 1383 & n.7, 1387 n.12 (8th
Cir. 1981); United States v. Palumbo, 639 F.2d 123, 131 & n.5 (3d
Cir.) (Adams, J., concurring), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 819 (1981);
United States v. Oliver, 626 F.2d 254, 261 & n.9 (2d Cir. 1980);
United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694, 701-02 (5th Cir. 1978).
The Supreme Court did not reach the corroboration issue in
Williamson.  See Williamson v. United States,    U.S.   , 114 S.
Ct. 2431, 2437 (1994).
The ABA Trial Evidence Committee of the Litigation Section
(continued...)
16
part of the test, the trial judge must next consider:
whether there are present any other facts or
circumstances, including those indicating a
motive to falsify on the part of the
declarant, that so cut against the presumption
of 
reliability 
normally 
attending 
a
declaration 
against 
interest 
that 
the
statements should not be admitted.
Id., 526 A.2d at 962.7
(...continued)
discussed the corroboration requirement of Federal Rule 804(b)(3),
observing that:
While Rule 804(b)(3) provides that "a
statement tending to expose the declarant to
criminal liability and offered to exculpate
the 
accused 
is 
not 
admissible 
unless
corroborating circumstances thereby indicate
the trustworthiness of the statement," the
Rule 
has 
no 
similar 
requirement 
for
inculpatory 
declarations 
offered 
by 
the
prosecution.  Several circuits, however, have
judicially 
imposed 
a 
requirement 
that
inculpatory 
declarations 
be 
similarly
corroborated 
by 
other 
"indicia 
of
reliability."  It has been held that the
Confrontation Clause of the Constitution
requires no less.
As judicially supplemented, then, an
inculpatory statement against penal interest
is admissible against the defendant if:  (1)
the 
declarant 
is 
unavailable; 
(2) 
the
statement 
is 
so 
far 
contrary 
to 
the
declarant's penal interest that a reasonable
person in his position would not have made the
statement unless he believed it to be true;
and (3) corroborating circumstances clearly
indicate the statement's trustworthiness. In
practice, the second and third requirements
frequently merge into one--was the declarant's
statement, under all the circumstances, in
fact against his penal interest?
AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, TRIAL EVIDENCE COMMITTEE, EMERGING PROBLEMS UNDER THE FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE (1991), reprinted in FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED
STATES COURTS 524-25 (1993) (Appendix II) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).  See also State v. Mason, 194 W. Va. 221, 460
S.E.2d 36, 45 n.14 (1995) (quoting United States v. Garcia, 897
F.2d 1413, 1420-21 (7th Cir. 1990), for the proposition that
Federal 
Rule 
804(b)(3) 
requires 
proof 
of 
corroborating
circumstances).
In determining whether a declaration against penal interest
(continued...)
17
(...continued)
was sufficiently corroborated, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit suggested a number of factors for trial court
to consider:
(1) whether there is any apparent motive for
the out-of-court declarant to misrepresent the
matter, (2) the general character of the
speaker, (3) whether other people heard the
out-of-court 
statement, 
(4) 
whether 
the
statement was made spontaneously, (5) the
timing of the declaration and [(6)] the
relationship between the speaker and the . . .
[declarant].
Alvarez, 584 F.2d at 702 n.10.
Imposing a corroboration requirement for both inculpatory and
exculpatory declarations is not inconsistent with our approach in
Standifur.  While we did not expressly state in Standifur that
corroborating circumstances must be proven in all instances, we
required the trial court to consider whether any circumstances
indicated a motive to falsify, or otherwise undermined the
reliability of the declaration.  Standifur, 310 Md. at 17, 526 A.2d
at 962.
Moreover, even if hearsay evidence satisfies the requirements
of the declaration against penal interest exception, it must also
meet the requirements of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment to be admissible.  Wilson v. State, 334 Md. 313, 323, 639
A.2d 125, 129-30 (1994); Chapman v. State, 331 Md. 448, 454-55, 628
A.2d 676, 679-80 (1993).  The Confrontation Clause requires proof
that the hearsay statements are reliable.  Wilson, 334 Md. at 323,
639 A.2d at 130; Simmons v. State, 333 Md. 547, 556, 636 A.2d 463,
467, cert. denied,   U.S.  , 115 S. Ct. 70 (1994); Chapman, 331 Md.
at 455, 628 A.2d at 679.  Reliability may be proven by
demonstrating that the hearsay falls within a "firmly rooted"
exception, or by showing that it bears "particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness."  Wilson, 334 Md. at 323, 639 A.2d at 131
(quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L.
Ed. 2d 597 (1980)).  We have previously concluded that the
declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule is
not "firmly rooted," and therefore, the proponent must demonstrate
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." Simmons, 333 Md. at
560, 636 A.2d at 469.
18
19
Even if a statement passes these threshold requirements for
admissibility, however, Standifur also requires the trial judge to
conduct a final inquiry.  Standifur provides that 
A statement against interest that survives
this analysis, and those related statements so
closely connected with it as to be equally
trustworthy, are admissible as declarations
against interest.
310 Md. at 17, 526 A.2d at 962 (emphasis added).  Thus, even after
determining that the proffered evidence passes the first three
requirements for admissibility, Standifur requires that the trial
judge parse the entire declaration to determine which portions of
it are directly contrary to the declarant's penal interest, and
which collateral portions are so closely related as to be equally
trustworthy.
Applying this test to the declaration at issue in Standifur,
we concluded in that case that the entire declaration was
inadmissible because it was not a declaration against penal
interest.  First, we determined that the State had not established
that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would have
believed the declaration to be self-incriminating, because
"[r]ather than confessing criminal misconduct, these statements
appear to represent an attempt to satisfy the police while avoiding
criminal involvement."  Id. at 19, 526 A.2d at 963.  Even if the
declaration had passed this prong of the test for admissibility,
however, we observed that it would have failed the reliability
20
prong of the test.  The declarant made the declaration to the
police, during custodial interrogation, fearing revocation of his
parole.  Id. at 20, 526 A.2d at 963.  He "apparently wished to
curry favor with the authorities."  Id. at 20, 526 A.2d at 963.
Under these circumstances, we concluded that "the statement [was
not]. . . sufficiently reliable to be admitted for the purpose of
inculpating an accused in a criminal case."  Id., 526 A.2d at 963.
Because we concluded that the statement was not admissible as an
exception to the hearsay rule, we did not consider "separate issues
that are possibly generated by the Confrontation Clause."  Id. at
20, 526 A.2d at 963.
Similarly, in Brown v. State, 317 Md. 417, 564 A.2d 772
(1989), 
we 
applied 
the 
Standifur 
test 
to 
determine 
the
admissibility of two declarations against penal interest.  In
Brown, the hearsay declarant, Bruce, and a co-defendant, Williams,
were both charged with unlawful possession of handguns.  When Bruce
pled guilty to the charge, he told the court under oath that the
guns belonged to a third participant, Brown.  Id. at 419-20, 564
A.2d at 773.  Bruce also testified at Williams' trial, stating that
Brown had asked him to hold the guns until Brown could sell them.
Id., 564 A.2d at 773.  At Brown's revocation of probation hearing,
however, Bruce refused to testify to the source of the guns;
therefore, the court permitted the state to introduce the
transcripts of Bruce's prior testimony in evidence.  Id. at 420-21,
21
564 A.2d at 773.  Brown objected, contending that these statements
were inadmissible hearsay.
Applying Standifur, we concluded that both of Bruce's prior
statements were inadmissible collateral statements outside the
scope of the declaration against penal interest exception.  Id. at
423, 564 A.2d at 775-76.  We explained that:
The first statement offered by the State--that
given by Bruce at the time of the entry of his
guilty plea--was collateral to his admission
of guilt and carries with it precious little
intrinsic or extrinsic indicia of reliability
. . .  This is not a situation where the
admission of guilt by Bruce, in and of itself,
furnishes any evidence against Brown.  Rather,
this is a case of a criminal, who has already
admitted his guilt, being pressed by the judge
who will soon sentence him, and by the
prosecutor who may make a recommendation
concerning 
his 
sentence, 
to 
disclose
information that may lead to a subsequent
criminal 
prosecution. 
 
Under 
these
circumstances, Bruce may well have been
motivated by the desire to curry favor with
the authorities, and by the desire to reduce
his own culpability--motives that we have
identified as frequently present in these
situations, 
and 
which 
combine 
to 
make
`inevitably suspect' statements of this type.
Id. at 423-24, 564 A.2d at 775.  Similarly, we concluded that
Bruce's second statement, given at Williams' trial, was also
"wholly collateral," as well as unreliable because of Bruce's
apparent motive to exculpate Williams.  Id. at 425, 564 A.2d at
776. 
IV.
A.
       In evaluating the admissibility of Marchewka's testimony,
8
we consider only the testimony she gave at trial.  Although the
trial court ruled on admissibility at the pre-trial hearing on the
motion in limine, only the testimony given by Marchewka before the
jury could result in prejudice to the defendant.
       As we explained in State v. Ward, 284 Md. 189, 396 A.2d
9
1041 (1978):
An accessory before the fact is one who is
guilty of felony by reason of having aided,
counseled, 
commanded 
or 
encouraged 
the
commission 
thereof, 
without 
having 
been
present either actually or constructively at
the moment of perpetration.  An accessory
after the fact is one who, with knowledge of
the other's guilt, renders assistance to a
felon in the effort to hinder his detection,
arrest, trial or punishment.
Id. at 197, 396 A.2d at 1046-47.   
22
Applying the Standifur analysis to the facts of the instant
case, we conclude that the trial court should not have admitted
Marchewka's testimony in its entirety.   We shall assume, arguendo,
8
that the trial court correctly determined that White's declaration
was in fact adverse to his penal interest,  and that a reasonable
9
person in White's circumstances would have realized that his
declaration was contrary to his penal interest.  Standifur also
required, however, that the trial court parse the hearsay
declaration to admit only those individual statements that were
contrary to White's penal interest, along with the additional
portions that were "so closely connected with it as to be equally
trustworthy[.]"  Standifur, 310 Md. at 17, 526 A.2d at 962.  This
the trial court failed to do.
23
Based on our review of the record, we agree with the Court of
Special Appeals that the trial court erroneously admitted
Marchewka's testimony in toto rather than analyzing the declaration
statement by statement to determine whether collateral portions of
White's account should be redacted.  As the intermediate appellate
court concluded, the trial court should have redacted those
portions of White's declaration identifying Matusky as the murderer
and suggesting Matusky's motive for the crime.  105 Md. App. at
403, 660 A.2d at 941.  These portions of the declaration did not
directly incriminate White.  Moreover, these non-incriminating
statements are not as trustworthy as self-incriminating statements,
because they serve to shift blame from White to Matusky.  Because
the trial court failed to properly analyze White's hearsay
declaration, we agree with the Court of Special Appeals that
Respondent's convictions must be reversed.
B.
For further guidance on remand, we observe that the Standifur
test also requires the trial court to consider "whether there are
any other facts or circumstances, including those indicating a
motive to falsify on the part of the declarant, that . . . cut
against the presumption of reliability normally attending a
declaration against interest."  Id., 526 A.2d at 962.  The trial
court's assessment of the declaration's reliability is a fact-
24
intensive determination which we shall not ordinarily reverse
unless it is clearly erroneous.  See Wamsley v.Wamsley, 333 Md.
454, 462, 635 A.2d 1322, 1326 (1994); see also Garcia, 897 F.2d at
1421; Alvarez, 584 F.2d at 701.  The trial court below did not
discuss on the record any of the factors undermining the
reliability of White's statement.  If, on remand, the trial court
concludes that White's declaration was unreliable, then none of
Marchewka's testimony should be admitted under this hearsay
exception.
      Harris first gave a statement to the police in a telephone
10
interview, in which he implicated not only Williamson, but an
unnamed third party.  114 S. Ct. at 2433.  He later gave a second
statement to the police, which was inconsistent with the first in
some respects.  Id.  Harris did not reveal that Williamson was the
drug dealer until he learned that the police planned a controlled
delivery of the drugs to Williamson.  Id. at 2433-34.
25
V.
A.
Because the case on remand will be governed by the Maryland
Rules of Evidence, we shall next address the effect of Maryland
Rule 5-804(b)(3) on the scope of the declaration against penal
interest exception.  See supra note 3. In Williamson v. United
States,   U.S.   , 114 S. Ct. 2431 (1994), the Supreme Court
considered the admissibility of an extended hearsay declaration
under Federal Rule 804(b)(3), which closely corresponds to Maryland
Rule 5-804(b)(3).  The police arrested the hearsay declarant,
Harris, after discovering nineteen kilos of cocaine in Harris's car
during a traffic stop.  Id.  Following his arrest, Harris gave a
statement to the police that implicated Williamson as the head of
a drug distribution scheme.  Harris's statement was also self-
incriminatory, albeit implicating him in a more minor role as a
drug courier.   Id.  Despite an offer of immunity, Harris refused
10
to testify at Williamson's trial.  Id. at 2434.  The State
introduced Harris's hearsay declaration through testimony of the
investigating police officer.  Williamson objected to the admission
of Harris's hearsay declaration, but the trial court overruled the
     
  Justice O'Connor, like Professor Jefferson, rejected the
11
Wigmore view that a declarant, while making a declaration against
penal interest, is in a trustworthy state of mind.  See supra note
5.  She reasoned that: 
The fact that a person is making a broadly
self-inculpatory confession does not make more
credible the confession's non-self-inculpatory
parts.  One of the most effective ways to lie
is to mix falsehood with truth, especially
truth that seems particularly persuasive
because of its self-inculpatory nature. . . .
(continued...)
26
objection, concluding that Harris's statement was admissible as a
declaration against penal interest. Id.  Williamson was convicted
of several drug trafficking offenses.  On appeal, the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the convictions without opinion.  981 F.2d 1262
(11th Cir. 1992).
The Supreme Court reversed the convictions and remanded the
case for a new trial, concluding that the trial court failed to
properly analyze the admissibility of Harris's hearsay declaration.
Id. at 2437-38.  Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the
Court, stating that:
[T]he most faithful reading of Rule 804(b)(3)
is that it does not allow admission of non-
self-inculpatory statements, even if they are
made within a broader narrative that is
generally self-inculpatory.  The [trial] court
may not just assume for purposes of Rule
804(b)(3) that a statement is self-inculpatory
because it is part of a fuller confession, and
this is especially true when the statement
implicates someone else.
Id. at 2435.  
11
(...continued)
Self-exculpatory statements are exactly the
ones which people are most likely to make even
when they are false; and mere proximity to
other, self-inculpatory, statements does not
increase 
the 
plausibility 
of 
the 
self-
exculpatory statements.
114 S. Ct. at 2435.  
The Supreme Court previously described this problem as one of
"selective reliability" within an extended hearsay declaration.
See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 824, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 111 L.E.2d
638 (1990).  See also United States v. Matthews, 20 F. 3d 538, 545
(2d Cir. 1994) ("The difficulty is that if the statement against
penal interest is multi-faceted, its facets may not be uniformly
trustworthy.").
     
  Six Justices adopted the test articulated by Justice
12
O'Connor.  Although all of the Justices agreed that some portions
of Harris's declaration should have been redacted, however, the
Court was divided on the appropriate standard to apply in defining
the scope of the declaration against penal interest exception.
Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, agreed with the approach
articulated by Justice O'Connor, but further explicated the
standard.  He noted that:
A statement obviously can be self-inculpatory
. . . without consisting of the confession `I
committed X element of Y crime.' . . .
Moreover, a declarant's statement is not
magically transformed from a statement against
penal interest into one that is inadmissible
merely because the declarant names another
person or implicates a possible codefendant.
114 S. Ct. at 2438 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Justice Ginsburg, in a concurring opinion joined by three
other Justices, also adopted the test articulated by Justice
O'Connor, but disagreed with Justice O'Connor's application of the
test to the facts of the case.  Id. at 2438-39 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).  In Justice Ginsburg's view, the facts of the case
(continued...)
27
The Court held that only those portions of the extended
declaration that incriminate the declarant should be admitted.  Id.
12
(...continued)
were so suggestive of blame-shifting that the declaration was
presumptively unreliable, and thus Harris's entire declaration
should have been excluded.  Id. at 2439.  Justice Ginsburg,
concurring in the result, determined that the State should be
permitted an opportunity to argue on remand that the erroneous
admission of Harris's statement was harmless error.  Id. at 2440.
Finally, Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion joined by
two other Justices, adopted an interpretation of Federal Rule
804(b)(3) analogous to our earlier interpretation in Standifur.
Id. at 2440-41 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justice Kennedy
interpreted Rule 804(b)(3) to permit admission of some collateral
statements, consistent with Professor McCormick's approach.  Id. at
2441.  Thus, self-serving collateral statements would be
inadmissible, 
but 
collateral 
neutral 
statements 
would 
be
admissible.  Id. at 2444.  Justice Kennedy also acknowledged that
declarations against penal interest made to the authorities should
not be admitted if the declarant was "motivated by a desire to
curry favor with the authorities."  Id. (citations omitted).
28
at 2435.  This approach requires the trial court to parse the
entire extended declaration to admit only the self-incriminating
portions.  Id. at 2436-37.
  
As Justice O'Connor further explained, however, the trial
court must consider the surrounding circumstances to determine
whether an individual statement is self-incriminating:
[W]hether a statement is self-inculpatory or
not can only be determined by viewing it in
context.  Even statements that are on their
face neutral may be against the declarant's
interest. . . . [S]tatements that give other
significant details about the crime may,
depending on the situation, be against the
declarant's interest.  The question . . . is
always whether the statement was sufficiently
against the declarant's penal interest `that a
reasonable man in the declarant's position
would not make the statement unless believing
it true,' and this question can only be
answered in light of all the surrounding
     
  Although the Supreme Court did not actually proceed to
13
redact the extended hearsay declaration in Williamson, the Court
provided a number of hypotheticals to illustrate what types of
statements could be admitted as declarations against penal
interest.  For example, Justice O'Connor noted that the statement
"`I hid the gun in Joe's apartment' may not be a confession of a
crime; but if it is likely to help the police find the murder
weapon, then it is certainly self-inculpatory."  114 S. Ct. at
2437.  In addition, Justice O'Connor observed that the statement
"Sam and I went to Joe's house" could also be admitted if a
"reasonable person . . . would realize that being linked to Joe and
Sam would implicate the declarant in Joe and Sam's conspiracy."
Id.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia also noted that:
[I]f a lieutenant in an organized crime
operation described the inner workings of an
extortion and protection racket, naming some
of the other actors and thereby inculpating
himself on racketeering and/or conspiracy
charges, I have no doubt that some of those
remarks could be admitted as statements
against penal interest.
Id. at 2438 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Thus, the Court intended
that, under some circumstances, statements incriminating both the
declarant and a third party could be admitted as declarations
against penal interest.  
In the case before us, we note that the declaration against
penal interest exception to the hearsay rule was the sole basis the
State offered to support admission of White's statement to
Marchewka that he drove Matusky to the Poffels' house.  The State
did not offer the statement under the co-conspirator exception to
the hearsay rule.  See State v. Rivenbark, 311 Md. 147, 149, 533
A.2d 271, 272 (1987); see also Md. Rule 5-803(a)(5).  Indeed, even
if they had, the statement does not appear to qualify under that
exception because it was not made in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Rivenbark, 311 Md. at 149, 533 A.2d at 272.
29
circumstances.
Id. at 2436-37.   Accord United States v. Sasso, 59 F. 3d 341, 349
13
     
  Justice O'Connor expressly stated in Part II.C of her
14
opinion that "we need not address Williamson's claim that . . . the
statements were also made inadmissible by the Confrontation
Clause[.]"  114 S. Ct. at 2437.  Because in the case before us we
conclude that the trial court failed to properly analyze the
declaration under the hearsay rules, we also need not reach the
Confrontation Clause issue.
     
  The dissent relies on Chandler v. Commonwealth, 249 Va.
15
270, 455 S.E.2d 219, cert. denied,   U.S.  , 116 S. Ct. 233 (1995).
In Chandler, the Supreme Court of Virginia completely rejected the
(continued...)
30
(2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Nagib, 56 F. 3d 798, 804 (7th Cir.
1995); United States v. Canan, 48 F. 3d 954, 959-60 (6th Cir.
1995); United States v. Rothberg, 896 F. Supp. 450, 453 (E.D. Pa.
1995); United States v. Sims, 879 F. Supp. 828, 832 (N.D. Ill.
1995); Ciccarelli v. Gichner Systems Group, 862 F. Supp. 1293,
1298-1300 (M.D. Pa. 1994); Smith v. State, 647 A.2d 1083, 1088
(Del. 1994); State v. Coates, 661 So. 2d 571, 580-81 (La. App.
1995); State v. Ford, 539 N.W.2d 214, 227 (Minn. 1995); Williams v.
State, 667 So.2d 15, 19 & n.1 (Miss. 1996); Cofield v. State, 891
S.W.2d 952, 956 (Tex. Cr. App. 1994); State v. Mason, 194 W. Va.
221, 460 S.E.2d 36, 44-45 (1995). 
The Supreme Court's interpretation of Federal Rule 804(b)(3)
in Williamson,   U.S.   , 114 S. Ct. 2431 (1994), is not binding on
the states, because it does not rely on federal constitutional
principles.   Nonetheless, we find the analysis in Williamson
14
persuasive, and we shall adopt it as part of Maryland law, in
accord with a number of other states.   See, e.g., Smith v. State,
15
(...continued)
Supreme Court's interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(3) in Williamson and admitted the declarant's entire
statement as a declaration against penal interest.  Id. at 225.  As
we noted, supra, while the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
federal rule is not binding on us, we find it persuasive.
Moreover, even if we did not elect to follow Williamson, Chandler
would be inconsistent with our approach in Standifur, which also
required the trial court to evaluate the reliability of each
statement within a declaration rather than admitting the
declaration in toto.  Standifur, 310 Md. at 17, 526 A.2d at 962.
31
647 A.2d 1083, 1088 (Del. 1994) ("Although not bound by the Supreme
Court's interpretation of F.R.E. 804(b)(3) in construing our
identical [rule], . . . [w]e find Justice O'Connor's reasoning to
be persuasive and we therefore adopt it in construing the Delaware
rule.")  Accord State v. Coates 661 So. 2d 571, 580-81 (La. App.
1995) (same); Williams v. State, 667 So.2d 15, 19 & n.1 (Miss.
1996); Cofield v. State, 891 S.W.2d 952, 956 (Tex. Cr. App. 1994)
(same); State v. Mason, 194 W. Va. 221, 460 S.E.2d 36, 45 (1995)
(adopting the Williamson test).  Although Standifur essentially
adopted the federal rule as Maryland common law, prior to adoption
of the Maryland Rules of Evidence, Standifur was decided without
the benefit of the Williamson decision.  See Standifur, 310 Md. at
10-11, 526 A.2d at 958-59. 
The central distinction between the Williamson approach and
our approach in Standifur is that "proximity" between the self-
inculpatory and "collateral" portions no longer guarantees
admissibility.  As the Delaware Supreme Court observed in Smith v.
       
Other state and federal courts have adopted similar
16
interpretations of the Williamson decision.  In United States v.
Sims, 879 F. Supp. 828 (N.D. Ill. 1995), the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois stated that:
The fact that an inculpatory portion is
closely 
related 
to 
the 
portion 
against
interest may be an input into finding that the
`closely related' portion turns out to be
against interest itself.  After Williamson,
the key is that a finding that an inculpatory
portion is `closely related' to an against-
interest portion will not itself warrant
804(b)(3) 
admissibility. 
 
Each 
admitted
statement or portion of statement must be
found to be against the penal interests of the
declarant. 
Id. at 832 n.3.  See also Ciccarelli v. Gichner Systems Group, 862
F. Supp. 1293 (M.D. Pa. 1994).
32
State, 647 A.2d 1083 (Del. 1994), in adopting Williamson:
[T]here is no theoretical basis for the
admission of neutral, collateral statements.
Hearsay statements are generally inadmissible.
. . . A hearsay declaration is admissible,
usually under a specific exception only where
the declaration has some theoretical basis
making it inherently trustworthy. See Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 65
L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980).  Thus, absent some
special 
indicia 
of 
reliability 
and
trustworthiness, 
hearsay 
statements 
are
inadmissible.  Neutral, collateral statements
enjoy no such guarantees of reliability and
trustworthiness.  Williamson,   U.S. at   ,
114 S.Ct. at 2435.
Id. at 1088 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).   Therefore,
16
"when ruling upon the admission of a narrative under this rule, a
trial court must break down the narrative and determine the
separate admissibility of each `single declaration or remark.'"
       Furthermore, if the trial court finds that any portion
17
of the declaration is admissible as a declaration against penal
interest, it must then proceed to decide whether that portion
satisfies the Confrontation Clause.  See Simmons,  333 Md. at
555, 636 A.2d at 467; Chapman, 331 Md. at 453-54, 628 A.2d at
679.
33
State v. Mason, 194 W. Va. 221, 460 S.E.2d 36, 45 (1995) (quoting
Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2437).  The test for admissibility to be
applied to each statement within a declaration is whether a
reasonable person in the declarant's circumstances would have
believed the statement was adverse to his or her penal interest at
the time it was made. 
As we have indicated, in this case, the trial court
erroneously permitted Marchewka to testify to the entire
conversation she had with White.  On remand, if the State chooses
to offer portions of Marchewka's declaration in evidence, under
Maryland Rule 5-804(b)(3), the trial court should admit only those
portions of White's communication to Marchewka that truly
incriminate White.17
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL
APPEALS AFFIRMED.  COSTS TO BE 
PAID BY BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND.
Dissenting Opinion follows next page:
     In explaining my views, I too "shall assume, arguendo, that
1
the trial court correctly determined ... that a reasonable person
in WhiteUs circumstances would have realized that his declaration
was contrary to his penal interest."  ____ Md. at ____, ____ A.2d
at ____ [Majority slip opinion at 18-19].
It should also be noted that there was no cross-petition
filed.  Consequently, any issue involving the Confrontation
Clause that may be lurking beneath the surface in this matter is
not an issue that is before this Court.
1
Rodowsky, J., dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the holding of the Court set forth
in Part IV.A of the majority opinion.  That holding is that "the
trial court should have redacted those portions of WhiteUs
declaration identifying Matusky as the murderer and suggesting
MatuskyUs motive for the crime."  _____ Md. at ____, ____ A.2d at
____ [Majority slip op. at 19].   
1
The hearsay problem under consideration is plagued with
semantic difficulties.  In any given case the universe of the data
is the whole of what the declarant had to say that is relevant to
the charges pending against the accused.  The task is to determine
whether the universe is admissible against the accused in its
entirety, partially, or not at all, as declarations against the
penal interest of the declarant.  Within this universe of data
2
there can be gradations ranging from hard core, clear cut
declarations against penal interest, through varying degrees of
inculpatory matter, to the clearly exculpatory or, at least, self-
serving statement.  In my view a conceptual rule, phrased in terms
such as "extended narrative," "statement," "confession," and
"declaration," can only be understood when legal holdings are made
on specific facts.
Preliminarily, I do not believe that the majority has given
appropriate precedential weight to this CourtUs opinion in State v.
Standifur, 310 Md. 3, 526 A.2d 955 (1987).  Nor does Standifur
differ substantially from the analysis presented in Parts I, II.A,
and II.B of the opinion of Justice OUConnor, joined by five other
justices, in Williamson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct.
2431, 129 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1994).  Both Williamson and Standifur
require consideration of all of the known facts and circumstances
surrounding the obtaining of the universe of data in order to
determine reliability, and the entire universe may be excluded as
unreliable at that level of analysis.  114 S. Ct. at 2436-37; 310
Md. at 11-13, 526 A.2d at 959-60.  Looking at portions of the
universe, both opinions exclude matter that is self-serving or
exculpatory of the declarant.  114 S. Ct. at 2434-35; 310 Md. at
12-15, 526 A.2d at 959-61.  Both opinions would test the
inculpatory nature of the portion of the universe under
consideration by a reasonable person test.  114 S. Ct. at 2435,
3
2436-37; 310 Md. at 12-13; 526 A.2d at 959-60.  
With respect to portions of the universe that are "collateral"
or "related" to the core declaration against penal interest, both
opinions seem to take substantially the same approach.  Williamson
directs a "statement" by "statement" analysis of the portions under
the reasonable person test.  114 S. Ct. at 2436-37.  Under
Standifur, the hard core declaration against penal interest "and
those related statements so closely connected with it as to be
equally trustworthy, are admissible as declarations against
interest."  310 Md. at 17, 526 A.2d at 962.  Of course, what makes
the "closely connected" statements "equally trustworthy" is that a
reasonable person would have perceived them as contrary to penal
interest.  Id. 
Consequently, the majority inaccurately presents Standifur
when it states that "[t]he central distinction between the
Williamson approach and our approach in Standifur is that UproximityU
between the self-inculpatory and UcollateralU portions no longer
guarantees admissibility."  ____ Md. at ____, _____ A.2d at ____
[Majority slip op. at 27].  "[P]roximity," denotes spacial
nearness, presumably in the written presentation of the universe
under consideration.  WebsterUs Third New International Dictionary
1828 (1976).  Nowhere in Standifur does the word, "proximity,"
     The term, "proximity," is found in Part II.A of Justice
2
OUConnorUs opinion in Williamson. There it is stated that the
"mere proximity to other, self-inculpatory, statements [of self-
exculpatory statements] does not increase the plausibility of the
self-exculpatory statements."  114 S. Ct. at 2435.
4
appear.   Proximity is not the test for admissibility under
2
Standifur, as shown above.
Even if there are differences between Maryland common law, as
enunciated in Standifur, and the application of Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(3), and even if those differences justify adopting
Williamson as expressing Maryland common law, there is nothing in
Williamson that compels the exclusion of the identity and motive
portions of WhiteUs conversation with Marchewka.  Williamson
involved a declarant who was arrested while possessing nineteen
kilograms of cocaine in two suitcases in the trunk of a rental car
driven by the declarant.  114 S. Ct. at 2433.  He admitted knowing
that the drugs were there.  Id.  In his post-arrest statements to
Drug Enforcement Administration agents, he said that he was
transporting the cocaine for the accused, Williamson, who, in
another vehicle, had been preceding the declarant and who had seen
the traffic stop and the search of the vehicle driven by the
declarant.  Id.  The quantity possessed by the declarant would
support finding the declarantUs intent to distribute.  Id. at 2439.
In Williamson, four justices, joining in a concurrence by Justice
Ginsburg, found the blame-shifting to Williamson so self-serving as
     I understand the majority of this Court to hold that any
3
reference to Matusky is inadmissible, and not simply the
conclusory statement that Matusky was the murderer that appears
at the beginning of WhiteUs conversation with Marchewka.  Of
course, if WhiteUs conversation with Marchewka had stopped at
that point, the conclusory statement would not be admissible
because White had not yet made any declarations against penal
interest.  Later incriminating portions of the conversation
(continued...)
5
to render the universe wholly inadmissible.  Id. at 2439-40.  Five
justices in Williamson, however, in three separate opinions,
remanded for a "statement" by "statement" parsing of the universe.
Williamson does not say that the identity of a criminal
confederate of the declarant must be excised from a declaration
against penal interest.  If that were the law, even the remainder
of the hard core declaration against penal interest ordinarily
would not be connected to the accused and likely would be
inadmissible for lack of relevancy.  Five justices in Williamson
remanded for parsing the universe in order possibly to reach an
admissible declaration against penal interest.  That exercise would
be pointless if an ultimate, expurgated version could not even
mention the name of the accused in the very case in which the
declaration was to be used.  
In any event, even a statement by statement parsing of WhiteUs
conversation with Marchewka results in the admissibility of the
identification of Matusky and of his communication of his motive to
White.  They are important, integrated parts of WhiteUs declaration
against penal interest.   In his conversation with Marchewka, White
3
     (...continued)
3
support the conclusion expressed earlier.
6
incriminates himself as an accomplice, or principal in the second
degree, to the murders of Trudy Poffell and her daughter, Pam
Poffell, and as an accessory after the fact to those murders.
Knowledge that a murder was to be committed, or had been committed,
is an element of either theory of criminal responsibility.  1 C.
Torcia, WhartonUs Criminal Law §§ 31 and 33 (15th ed. 1993).  The
knowledge element of the crimes admitted in WhiteUs declaration
against penal interest is greatly reinforced by the inclusion of
the parts of WhiteUs conversation with Marchewka in which Matusky
is named as the person declaring an intent to kill and expressing
the reason for having formulated that intent.
A little background is needed to place WhiteUs conversation in
perspective.  At the time of trial Marchewka had been employed for
twenty-five years by AT & T.  She was raising her teenage son and
preteen daughter.  White had been living with her in her home since
March of 1989.  The two had become engaged in 1991, although White
was not divorced from his estranged wife, one of the victims, Pam
Poffell.  Through White, Marchewka had met Matusky.  White and
Matusky were "very close friends" who would see one another or go
out "[a] couple times a week."  The murders occurred on January 24,
1993.  When the police interviewed White because he was the
estranged husband of one of the victims, Marchewka falsely informed
the police that White was shopping with her at the time of the
7
murders.  She did this because White was on parole, and he had told
Marchewka that, at the time of the murders, he was drinking in a
bar in violation of his parole.  WhiteUs declaration against penal
interest to Marchewka was made on Easter Sunday, April 11, 1993,
after White had been drinking.  The majority points to nothing
indicating that the murder investigation had focused on White at
that time, much less that he was suspected of being the actual
killer. 
The legal test as to what constitutes a declaration against
penal interest is whether a reasonable person would perceive the
statement to be incriminating.  One way to test whether WhiteUs
references to Matusky and to his motive are integral parts of the
declaration against penal interest would be to look at a similar
declaration that did not contain those references.  In that
analytical framework a prosecutor would be seeking to convict White
of being a principal in the second degree to murder based on WhiteUs
admission as a party opponent that White met someone in a bar whom
White did not know, that that person said that he wanted to murder
Trudy and Pam Poffell for reasons that were not expressed, and that
White drove the stranger to the Poffell home in the strangerUs car.
Although our hypothetical illustration contains some evidence of
knowledge, the knowledge element is greatly diminished from the
standpoint of any weight that would be attributed to it.
To a
reasonable person, the expurgated version sounds more like the
statement of a mentally disturbed individual than a declaration
8
against penal interest.  
Much the same argument that the majority of this Court today
accepts was rejected by the Supreme Court of Virginia in Chandler
v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 270, 455 S.E.2d 219, cert. denied, ____
U.S. ____, 116 S. Ct. 233, 133 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1995).  In Chandler
the Virginia court unanimously affirmed a death sentence imposed
for a murder committed in the course of the armed robbery of a
convenience store.  The unavailable declarant, Bernice Murphy, was
the girlfriend of the accused, Chandler.  The witness was a special
agent of the Virginia State Police who had taken a statement from
Murphy as part of the murder investigation.  455 S.E.2d at 224.
"In her statement, Murphy described riding in the car with Chandler
[and others] to obtain the gun, and ChandlerUs discussion about
Ugoing in, robbing the store and leaving.U"  Id.  Murphy remained in
the car during the robbery and murder.  Murphy described ChandlerUs
statements made when he returned to the car, including, "U[W]hy
didnUt the man open the register?U and U[H]e got shot over money that
wasnUt even his.U"  Id.
Chandler argued to the Virginia court that under Williamson
"only those portions of the statement which directly implicate
Murphy are admissible" and that "MurphyUs statements regarding
[ChandlerUs] accounts of the robbery would be inadmissible."  455
S.E.2d at 225.  The Virginia court first observed that Williamson
"concerned the interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence"
9
which were "not applicable here."  Id.  The court then held:
"Furthermore, in the present case, MurphyUs recitations
of statements made by Chandler showed her knowledge of
and complicity in the criminal act and exposed her to
liability as an accessory to the crimes.  Accordingly,
MurphyUs entire statement is admissible as a declaration
against penal interest."
Id.
Similarly, in the instant matter, WhiteUs statements that it
was Matusky who communicated the intent to murder and the reason
why "showed [WhiteUs] knowledge of and complicity in the criminal
act and exposed [him] to liability as an accessory to the crimes."