Case Title: State v. Meharry

Citation: 

Docket Number: S52988

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2006-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: December 21, 2006
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STATE OF OREGON,
 Petitioner on Review,
v.
KATHY LOUISE MEHARRY,
Respondent on Review.
(CC CFH030171; CA A124222; SC S52988)
On review from the Court of Appeals.*
Argued and submitted May 8, 2006.
Douglas F. Zier, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued
the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review.  With him
on the brief were Hardy Myers, Attorney General, and Mary H.
Williams, Solicitor General.
John J. Tyner, III, Tyner & Associates, Hillsboro, argued
the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review.  With him
on the brief was Annetta L. Spicer, Kuhn & Spicer, Hermiston.
Before De Muniz, Chief Justice, and Carson, Gillette,
Durham, Riggs, Balmer, and Kistler, Justices** 
KISTLER, J.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The order
of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded to the
circuit court for further proceedings.
Durham, J., concurred and filed an opinion.
*Appeal from Umatilla County Circuit Court, Phillip A. Mendiguren, Judge. 201 Or App 609, 120 P3d 520 (2005).
**Riggs, J., retired September 30, 2006, and did not
participate in the decision of this case.  Walters, J., did not
participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
KISTLER, J.
Police officers searched defendant's van without a
warrant after arresting her for driving under the influence of
intoxicants.  At issue in this case is whether that search came
within an exception to the warrant requirement of Article I,
section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.  The trial court concluded
that it did not, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.  State v.
Meharry, 201 Or App 609, 120 P3d 520 (2005).  For the reasons set
out below, we reverse.
We state the facts consistently with the trial court's
factual findings and its decision granting defendant's motion to
suppress.  See State v. Juarez-Godinez, 326 Or 1, 7, 942 P2d 772
(1997) (stating standard).  While driving in the city of
Umatilla, the local fire chief, Michael Roxbury, saw defendant
driving her van erratically, failing to maintain her lane, and
nearly rear-ending a car that had stopped for a pedestrian.  He
also noticed a child in the back seat, moving from one side of
the van to the other.  He trailed defendant and, while doing so,
called the police department on his cell phone to report his
observations.  Defendant eventually pulled into the parking lot
of a convenience store, the Zip Trip, missing the driveway and
driving over the curb as she entered.  She parked, and Roxbury
pulled into the parking lot beside her. 
Police officer Brian Tarvin responded to Roxbury's
call.  As he was driving out of the police station parking lot,
he saw defendant and Roxbury pass in front of him.  Tarvin
watched as defendant's van pulled into the Zip Trip parking lot,
which was about one and one-half blocks from the police station. 
Tarvin followed and pulled into the Zip Trip parking lot in time
to see defendant get out of her van and "stagge[r]" into the
store.  He parked behind defendant's van, noticed the child in
the van, and then spoke briefly with Roxbury, who again relayed
what he had observed.
Tarvin followed defendant into the Zip Trip and found
her hunched over the counter with her head down.  He described
her as being "lethargic, dazed, [and] very stuporous," swaying
back and forth, and moving in a slow, deliberate manner.  Her
speech was "slow, slurred, almost incoherent," and she had
"difficulty putting her words together."  He also noticed blood
trickling down her right hand from a puncture wound near her
little finger.  Tarvin asked defendant if she had been taking any
medications.  After initially denying doing so, defendant
admitted that she had taken a number of prescription medications.
Tarvin told defendant that he believed she was under
the influence of intoxicants and asked if she would perform some
field sobriety tests in the parking lot outside the store. 
Having agreed to perform the tests, defendant failed each of
them.  Defendant told Tarvin that she had not been drinking, and
he could not smell alcohol on her breath.  However, he believed
that she was otherwise impaired and placed her under arrest for
driving while under the influence of intoxicants.  
After arresting defendant, Tarvin searched her and
found a syringe in her pocket.  He then searched the inside of
her van, including its glove box and center console, for "[a]ny
substance which would impair a person's ability to drive a motor
vehicle."  Inside the van, Tarvin found more syringes and several
prescription medications, some of which had been prescribed to
other people.  Based in part on the evidence found in the van,
the state charged defendant with 11 counts of tampering with drug
records, ORS 167.212; two counts of possession of a controlled
substance, ORS 475.992 (2003), amended by Or Laws 2005, ch 708,
§ 39, and renumbered as ORS 475.980 (2005); seven counts of
tampering with physical evidence, ORS 162.295; driving under the
influence of intoxicants, ORS 813.010; and recklessly endangering
another person, ORS 163.195.
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress the evidence
found in the van, arguing that Tarvin had violated her rights
under the state and federal constitutions by searching the van
without a warrant.  The trial court granted defendant's motion,
and the state appealed.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's order, concluding that the warrantless search did not
fall within any exception to the warrant requirement and that the
search, therefore, violated defendant's rights under Article I,
section 9, of the Oregon Constitution.  Meharry, 201 Or App at
617-18.  We allowed review and now conclude that Tarvin's search
fell within an exception to the warrant requirement, making the
search of the van permissible under Article I, section 9.  
Article I, section 9, guarantees "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure."  Under that
section, a search conducted without a warrant is deemed
unreasonable unless it "fall[s] within one of the few
specifically established and carefully delineated exceptions to
the warrant requirement."  State v. Bridewell, 306 Or 231, 235,
759 P2d 1054 (1988).  One exception -- the exigent circumstances
exception -- allows the police to conduct a search without a
warrant if the search is both supported by probable cause and
conducted under exigent circumstances.  State v. Snow, 337 Or
219, 223, 94 P3d 872 (2004).  Exigent circumstances include,
among other things, situations in which immediate action is
necessary to prevent the disappearance, dissipation, or
destruction of evidence.  See State v. Stevens, 311 Or 119, 126,
806 P2d 92 (1991) (explaining that "[a]n exigent circumstance is
a situation that requires the police to act swiftly to prevent
danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall a
suspect's escape or the destruction of evidence").
In State v. Brown, 301 Or 268, 274, 721 P2d 1357
(1986), this court recognized, as a subset of the exigent
circumstances exception, an "automobile exception" to the warrant
requirement.  The court reasoned that the mobility of a vehicle,
by itself, creates an exigency "'because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought.'"  Id. at 275-76 (quoting Carroll v.
United States, 267 US 132, 153, 45 S Ct 280, 69 L Ed 2d 543
(1925)).  Recognizing the difficulty in predicting whether a
mobile vehicle -- and any evidence inside that vehicle -- will
remain in the same location once police officers relinquish
control over it, the court sought to provide police officers with
a "clear guideline[] by which they can gauge and regulate their
conduct."  Id. at 277.  It held that police officers may search a
vehicle if they have "probable cause to believe that a lawfully
stopped automobile which was mobile at the time of the stop
contains contraband or crime evidence." (1)  Id. 
In this case, Tarvin had probable cause to search
defendant's van for evidence of drug use, and defendant does not
argue otherwise. (2)  Because Tarvin had probable cause to
search the van, the only issue that remains is whether the van
was mobile and thus presented an exigent circumstance.  This
court has had few occasions to consider that issue.  Ordinarily,
when the police search a vehicle, they do so after stopping it on
the side of the road.  In those instances, this court has
declared that such a vehicle is mobile for the purposes of the
automobile exception because it was moving when the officer
stopped it and nothing demonstrated that the vehicle would not be
mobile once the officer relinquished control over it.  See State
v. Kosta, 304 Or 549, 555, 748 P2d 72 (1987) (recognizing that
vehicle's inherent mobility creates exigency); State v. Bennett,
301 Or 299, 301, 721 P2d 1375 (1986) (same); Brown, 301 Or at 278
(same).
This court's decision in State v. Kock, 302 Or 29, 725
P2d 1285 (1986), represents the only occasion on which this court
has analyzed that issue outside of the context of a roadside
stop.  In Kock, the police had the defendant's vehicle under
surveillance while it was parked in the parking lot of a store
where the defendant worked.  302 Or at 31.  They watched the
defendant leave the store, put a package in his vehicle, and
return to work.  Id. at 31-32.  Suspecting that he had stolen
property from the store, the police searched the defendant's
vehicle, finding a package containing diapers.  Id. at 32.  The
state charged the defendant with theft, and the defendant moved
to suppress the evidence seized from his vehicle, arguing that
the search had violated his rights under Article I, section 9. 
Id.  
This court concluded that the "automobile exception"
did not justify the warrantless search in that case.  Id. at 33. 
Although the court assumed that the police had probable cause for
the search, it held that, because the vehicle had been "parked,
immobile and unoccupied at the time the police first encountered
it in connection with the investigation of a crime * * *," the
vehicle was not mobile for the purposes of the automobile
exception.  Id. 
Applying this court's decisions in Brown and Kock, the
trial court in this case ruled that the van was not mobile when
the police first encountered it.  The Court of Appeals agreed. 
Meharry, 201 Or App at 618.  It reasoned that, because
defendant's van was parked when Tarvin first encountered her in
the Zip Trip, the van was not mobile for purposes of the
automobile exception.  Id.  The Court of Appeals explained:
"The 'encounter' in this case first occurred when
Tarvin confronted defendant inside the store.  At that
point in time, there was no exigency relating to the
mobility of the car."
Id.
We think that the Court of Appeals' reasoning is
problematic in two respects.  First, we agree with the state that
Tarvin first encountered defendant's van in connection with a
crime when he saw her drive by the police station.  At that
point, the van was mobile and Roxbury's reported observations
gave Tarvin reasonable suspicion to believe that defendant was
driving under the influence of intoxicants.  See State v. Lichty,
313 Or 579, 584-85, 835 P2d 904 (1992) (stating standard for
reasonable suspicion and recognizing that officer may rely on
report from named citizen).  Second, the Court of Appeals'
reasoning fails to give effect to the exigency that ordinarily
justifies the warrantless search of a vehicle.  As this court
explained in Brown, the exigency that permits the police to
conduct a warrantless search of a mobile vehicle arises from the
fact that the "vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."  Brown, 301
Or at 275 (quoting Carroll, 267 US at 153).
In this case, Tarvin saw defendant drive her van into
the Zip Trip parking lot; he followed after her to the Zip Trip
and parked his police car behind her van.  He spoke briefly with
defendant in the store, conducted field sobriety tests, arrested
her for driving under the influence of intoxicants, and then
searched the van.  The search occurred shortly after he had
observed the van in motion and had parked his police car behind
her van.  Nothing occurred between that time and the search that
rendered the van immobile.  Tarvin had not impounded the van, and
there was no physical or mechanical impediment to the van's being
driven away once Tarvin relinquished control over it.  In short,
the van remained mobile and the exigency continued.
Defendant argues, however, that no exigency existed
under the reasoning in Brown because Tarvin did not stop her.  It
is true, as defendant notes, that Tarvin did not effect a stop,
as the officer did in Brown, by causing defendant to pull her van
over to the side of the road and bring it to a stop.  Tarvin,
however, did stop defendant when he followed her into the Zip
Trip parking lot and parked his police car behind her van,
preventing her from leaving once she finished her errand.  See
State v. Holmes, 311 Or 400, 409, 813 P2d 28 (1991) (defining
when a "seizure" occurs for the purpose of Article I, section 9). 
The issue that defendant's argument thus poses is whether
stopping an otherwise mobile car from resuming its journey (as
Tarvin did here) differs for purposes of the automobile exception
from causing a moving car to come to a stop (as the officer did
in Brown).
We cannot see a difference, for constitutional
purposes, between the two situations.  The fact that Tarvin did
not have time to effectuate a stop before defendant pulled into
the Zip Trip parking lot but instead effectuated a stop by
preventing defendant from continuing her journey does not make
her van any less mobile, nor does it make it any less likely that
her van -- and any evidence inside the van -- could have been
moved once Tarvin relinquished control over it.  Rather, the van
remained mobile, and the circumstances in this case were as
exigent as they were in Brown.  Because the same exigency that
justified the warrantless search of the defendant's car in Brown
justified Tarvin's search of defendant's van in this case, we
hold that the rule announced in Brown extends to this case. (3)
The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
order of the circuit court is reversed, and the case is remanded
to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Durham, J., concurring.
I join the majority's decision.  Given this court's
opinion in State v. Brown, 301 Or 268, 721 P2d 1357 (1986), the
"mobility" of defendant's van created an exigent circumstance
that supported the officer's decision to search it without a
warrant.  The presence in the van of an unsupervised minor might
have contributed to the exigency, or perhaps created another
exigency, but the state did not argue those points below.
The proposition that Article I, section 9, of the
Oregon Constitution allows the police to search every stopped
vehicle in Oregon without a warrant based on a flexible criterion
like "mobility" remains controversial.  The Brown majority
adopted that proposition to lend certainty to the decisionmaking
process of law enforcement officers.  That is, of course, a
worthwhile goal.  But, in my view, the Brown court's decision
oversold the notion that it would lead to certainty.  Whether a
vehicle is "mobile," or sufficiently mobile under the particular
facts to permit a warrantless search, can change with every stop.
The decision in Brown also understated the
constitutional policy requiring a judicial examination of the
particular facts to determine whether a particular search is
reasonable.  The one-size-fits-all rule of Brown for searching a
citizen's property is difficult to harmonize with the state
constitutional prohibition on searches that are not reasonable
under all the particular circumstances.
Defendant asserts no argument that this court erred in
deciding Brown.  It is appropriate, therefore, to wait for a
different case before taking up the questions that surround the
Brown decision.
Accordingly, I concur.
1. That mobility requirement is specific to the Oregon
Constitution.  As this court noted in State v. Kock, 302 Or 29,
33, 725 P2d 1285 (1986), under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, the police may search a stationary vehicle
solely on the basis of probable cause.  See California v. Carney,
471 US 386, 394-95, 105 S Ct 2066, 85 L Ed 2d 406 (1985) (holding
that a warrantless search of a parked motor home was justified
under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement because the search was supported by probable cause). 
2. Tarvin had received a report from Roxbury that he had
seen defendant driving her van erratically.  Tarvin had watched
defendant pull her van into the Zip Trip parking lot and then
"stagger" into the store.  Once in the store, he watched her sway
back and forth as she spoke in a "slow, slurred, almost
incoherent" manner, and he noticed a fresh puncture mark near her
little finger.  She admitted to him that she had taken a number
of prescription medications.  After she failed the field sobriety
tests, Tarvin arrested and searched her, finding a syringe but
none of the drugs that she claimed to have used.  At that point,
Tarvin had probable cause to believe that the van contained
evidence that defendant had driven the van under the influence of
intoxicants.  See State v. Nagel, 320 Or 24, 32, 880 P2d 451
(1994) (stating probable cause standard).
3. To the extent that defendant argues that Tarvin's
search violated her rights under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, our conclusion that the search was
supported by probable cause brings the search within the Fourth
Amendment's automobile exception.  Carney, 471 US at 394-95.