Case Title: State ex rel. Shelly Co. v. Steigerwald

Citation: 2009-Ohio-585

Docket Number: 20072189

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2009-02-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Shelly Co. v. Steigerwald, 121 Ohio St.3d 158, 2009-Ohio-585.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. SHELLY COMPANY,  
APPELLANT, v. STEIGERWALD ET AL., APPELLEES. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Shelly Co. v. Steigerwald, 
 121 Ohio St.3d 158, 2009-Ohio-585.] 
Workers’ compensation – Violation of specific safety requirement – Former Ohio 
Adm.Code 4121:1-3-06(D)(2)(a), now 4123:1-3-06(D)(2)(a) – Reverse 
alarm signal for mobile equipment with obstructed rear view – Lack of 
direct evidence that alarm was not working when claimant was struck and 
killed does not invalidate commission’s finding that alarm was not 
working – Commission has substantial leeway in evaluating evidence and 
drawing reasonable inferences therefrom. 
(No. 2007-2189 — Submitted December 16, 2008 — Decided  
February 17, 2009.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 06AP-596, 2007-Ohio-5343. 
__________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} David J. Steigerwald was a heavy-equipment operator for appellant 
Shelly Company1 and was killed in a workplace accident.  His widow, appellee 
Christine Steigerwald, has alleged that Shelly Company violated several specific 
safety requirements, resulting in her husband’s death.  Appellee Industrial 
Commission of Ohio agreed, and the Court of Appeals for Franklin County 
denied Shelly Company’s petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the 
commission to vacate the award. The issue is now presented for our review. 
                                                 
1. Shelly Company is the successor of S.E. Johnson Companies, Inc., the party originally named in 
this action. 
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{¶ 2} On October 30, 2000, Shelly Company employees were repaving 
part of the Ohio Turnpike.  Decedent and co-worker James Pennington spent a 
few minutes conversing while decedent waited for his work equipment to become 
available.  Pennington climbed into his truck to complete some paperwork before 
starting to work.  He then started his truck and began to back up along the 
shoulder of the road.  Maneuvering the truck — a seven-ton Ford F-450 service 
vehicle — was precarious because Pennington had to avoid two vehicles parked 
behind him as well as maneuver around two loaded dump trucks in the adjacent 
lane.  As a result, he backed up extremely slowly, going one, perhaps two, miles 
per hour. 
{¶ 3} After Pennington cleared the vehicles, he continued backing up in 
the adjacent lane and suddenly felt the truck rise on the right-hand side.  He 
immediately stopped and got out, only to find decedent under the truck, entangled 
in the right axle. 
{¶ 4} Pennington screamed for help, and “in just a matter of seconds” the 
rest of the crew was there.  Co-workers jacked up the rear of the truck while 
others worked to remove the right rear tires to free decedent from the axle.  
Despite their efforts, Steigerwald died at the scene. 
{¶ 5} Extensive investigation by the Ohio State Highway Patrol, Shelly 
Company, and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) 
found no witnesses to the accident, since the rest of the crew was approximately 
200 feet in front of the truck when the accident happened.  In the immediate 
aftermath of the fatality, however, the Highway Patrol tested the truck’s reverse 
warning alarm and found that it was not working.  A vehicle inspection by the 
Shelly Company the next day confirmed this finding.  The inspection showed that 
the backing-alarm switch that screwed into the transmission and the connector 
that hooked to it were not making good contact.  As a result, the alarm worked 
January Term, 2009 
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only intermittently.  The wires underneath the truck were loose and could easily 
disconnect from the alarm if they were disturbed. 
{¶ 6} The evidence further revealed that there was no one who could 
definitively declare that the warning alarm was — or was not — working 
immediately before the accident.  Even Pennington, the driver, could not say for 
sure because his windows were up and the cab was noisy due to the radio and 
outside traffic.  He did state that “as far as [he] knew,” the backing alarm was 
working and that the alarm had worked the last time he drove the vehicle.  There 
is no evidence, however, that he had tested the alarm on the morning of the 
accident. 
{¶ 7} The possibility that the backing alarm was not working prompted 
Christine Steigerwald to allege that her husband’s death resulted from violations 
of  specific safety requirements (“VSSR”), including former Ohio Adm.Code 
4121:1-3-06: 
{¶ 8} “(D) Motor Vehicles 
{¶ 9} “* * *  
{¶ 10} “(2) On mobile equipment having an obstructed view to the rear, 
the employer shall: 
{¶ 11} “(a) Provide a reverse signal alarm audible above the surrounding 
noise, or 
{¶ 12} “(b) Provide an observer to signal the assured clear distance.” 
{¶ 13} At the hearing, Steigerwald argued that because the evidence 
indicated that the alarm was not working after the mishap, it was reasonable to 
assume that it was not functioning immediately before it.  Shelly Company 
disagreed, asserting that the alarm could just as easily have been disabled because 
the frantic attempts to rescue decedent dislodged the loose wires underneath the 
truck — a possibility noted by OSHA.  At no time in the hearing or in its 
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posthearing position paper did Shelly Company raise a “first-time equipment 
failure” defense. 
{¶ 14} The staff hearing officer found that Shelly Company had violated a 
specific safety requirement that proximately caused decedent’s death.  She relied 
heavily on the postaccident vehicle inspections that uniformly found that the 
alarm was not working and specifically rejected the theory that the alarm was 
disabled by the rescuers. 
{¶ 15} Shelly Company sought a rehearing.  In its motion, it raised for the 
first time the defense of first-time equipment failure, claiming that the staff 
hearing officer had committed a clear mistake of law in not addressing this issue.  
Rehearing was denied. 
{¶ 16} Shelly Company filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of 
Appeals for Franklin County, alleging that the commission abused its discretion in 
finding a VSSR.  The court of appeals found that the commission’s order had 
evidence to support it and denied the writ.  State ex rel. Shelly Co. v. Indus. 
Comm., Franklin App. No. 06AP-596, 2007-Ohio-5343. 
{¶ 17} Shelly Company now appeals to this court as of right. 
{¶ 18} Shelly Company accuses the commission of abusing its discretion 
by (1) issuing an order without evidentiary support, (2) citing the wrong specific 
safety requirement in the order, (3) failing to address all the elements of the safety 
requirement, and (4) refusing to grant its motion for rehearing.  Upon review, 
none of these propositions are persuasive. 
{¶ 19} Shelly Company’s last three arguments will be addressed first 
because they can be disposed of quickly.  Steigerwald’s VSSR application alleged 
violations of former Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-06(D)(1), (2)(a), and (2)(b).  The 
staff hearing officer found violations of (2)(a) and (b), but incorrectly listed the 
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applicable sections as “4123-3-06(2)(a)(b).”2  Shelly claims that this citation error 
makes the order fatally defective. 
{¶ 20} State ex rel. Ross v. Indus. Comm., 118 Ohio St.3d 73, 2008-Ohio-
1739, 886 N.E.2d 198, undermines Shelly Company’s position.  In Ross, the 
commission denied compensation by quoting extensively from a report by a “Dr. 
Wymyslo.”  The report, however, was actually authored by a Dr. Kale.  There was 
no Dr. Wymyslo.  The claimant asserted that the incorrect reference invalidated 
the report.  We disagreed: 
{¶ 21} “Finally, [the claimant] criticizes the staff hearing officer’s 
repeated reference to a report from Dr. Edmund Wymyslo.  All parties agree that 
no such report exists, but contrary to Ross’s argument, this reference is not fatal.  
Information discussed in the order was taken verbatim from Dr. Kale’s report.  
The hearing officer referred to him repeatedly by the wrong name, but there is no 
doubt to whom, and to which report, the staff hearing officer was referring.”  Id. 
at ¶ 21. 
{¶ 22} In the case at bar, the commission stresses that (1) the code 
sections are properly cited in the VSSR application and (2) both Steigerwald and 
the Shelly Company repeatedly cited the correct section in their position papers.  
Shelly Company also quoted the text of the correct code section verbatim in that 
document.  The commission is accordingly correct in asserting that Shelly 
Company cannot credibly allege that it did not know which specific safety 
requirement was at issue or was found to have been violated. 
{¶ 23} In its third argument, Shelly Company cites the language of former 
Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-06(2)(a) and claims that the commission erred by 
failing to specifically address whether the backing alarm was “audible above the 
surrounding noise.” This assertion has no merit. The commission specifically 
                                                 
2.  The language of former Ohio Adm.Code 4121:1-3-06(D)(2)(a) and (b) now appears verbatim 
in Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-3-06(D)(2)(a) and (b). 
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found that the alarm was not working. Obviously, if it was not working, it was not 
audible. 
{¶ 24} Shelly Company next contends that the commission abused its 
discretion by denying its motion for rehearing.  In that motion, Shelly Company 
claimed that the staff hearing officer committed a clear mistake of law by failing 
to consider a “first-time failure” defense.  Shelly Company, however, never raised 
that defense at the hearing or in the position paper that followed.  Shelly 
Company believes that this omission is irrelevant.  State ex rel. Schlegel v. 
Stykemain Pontiac Buick GMC, Ltd. 120 Ohio St.3d 43, 2008-Ohio-5303, 896 
N.E.2d 143, says otherwise. 
{¶ 25} In Schlegel, the claimant did not raise a particular defense to a 
voluntary-abandonment allegation at either the district or staff hearings.  He 
finally raised it in a motion for rehearing and when that motion was denied, he 
alleged an abuse of discretion.  He did not prevail: 
{¶ 26} “Hearings before district and staff hearing officers are effectively 
as of right.  A hearing before the commission is not.  It is discretionary.  R.C. 
4123.511(E).  So, too, is consideration of evidence submitted after a hearing.  * * 
*  The magistrate reasoned that because the staff hearing officer was not required 
to review belatedly submitted evidence, the commission could not be compelled 
to grant Schlegel’s appeal in order to consider it.  The resultant absence of this 
evidence from the administrative record bars its consideration here.”  Id. at ¶ 16.  
The same reasoning applies in the present case. 
{¶ 27} Shelly Company’s remaining argument contends that the 
commission erred in finding a VSSR because (1) there was no evidence that the 
backing alarm was not working when the accident occurred, (2) there was 
uncontradicted evidence that the alarm was working when the truck was last used, 
and (3) the commission relied upon inspection reports that were based on 
postaccident testing.  The law again favors the commission. 
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{¶ 28} This case is, by necessity, built upon inference, because no one 
witnessed the accident and no one can definitively state that the backing alarm 
was working or not working when the mishap occurred.  The commission has 
substantial leeway in evaluating the evidence before it and drawing inferences 
from it.  State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc. (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 18, 31 
OBR 70, 508 N.E.2d 936; State ex rel. Lawson v. Mondie Forge, 104 Ohio St.3d 
39, 2004-Ohio-6086, 817 N.E.2d 880, ¶ 34. That authority encompasses VSSR 
cases: 
{¶ 29} “This court has never required direct evidence of a VSSR.  To the 
contrary, in determining the merits of a VSSR claim, the commission or its [staff 
hearing officer] like any factfinder in any administrative, civil, or criminal 
proceeding, may draw reasonable inferences and rely on his or her own common 
sense in evaluating the evidence.”  State ex rel. Supreme Bumpers, Inc. v. Indus. 
Comm., 98 Ohio St.3d 134, 2002-Ohio-7089, 781 N.E.2d 170, ¶ 69. 
{¶ 30} Shelly Company particularly objects to the commission’s reliance 
on postaccident vehicle-inspection reports.  Those documents found that the alarm 
was inoperable, and from that, the commission extrapolated that if the alarm was 
not working immediately after the accident, it was not working when Steigerwald 
was struck.  Shelly Company believes that this is an unreasonable inference, but 
recent case law contradicts that argument. 
{¶ 31} In State ex rel. Gilbert v. Indus. Comm.,  116 Ohio St.3d 243, 
2007-Ohio-6096, 877 N.E.2d 979, the claimant sought a VSSR award for a 
respiratory condition allegedly caused by excessive levels of air contaminants in 
the workplace.  OSHA testing conducted shortly after claimant’s diagnosis 
revealed contaminant levels well within permissible limits.  Based largely on this 
evidence, the commission denied an additional award. 
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{¶ 32} The claimant in Gilbert made an argument similar to the one made 
here – that the test results were improperly considered because they did not reflect 
circumstances as they existed when he was exposed.  We rejected that argument:    
{¶ 33} “Gilbert [argues] that the sampling was done after his exposure 
period and thus is irrelevant to the amount of exposure he encountered prior to his 
diagnosis.  We reject this argument.  In some cases, testing after the injurious 
exposure will be irrelevant because the work environment has changed.  New 
exhaust systems may have been installed, ventilation may have been improved, or 
other safety initiatives may have been put into place.  On the other hand, where 
the test environment replicates the earlier exposure conditions, the testing results 
may be significant. 
{¶ 34} “The varying facts that may exist underscore the importance of 
preserving the commission’s evidentiary discretion and authority.  Many times, 
contemporaneous air-sampling data will not be available because —  absent the 
duty to monitor — employers may assume that air quality is satisfactory until 
alerted otherwise.  Consequently, in some situations, the only test results available 
will be either from a prior test or from a test performed after a problem has been 
alleged.  For this reason, it is crucial to maintain the commission’s ability to 
evaluate each situation individually in order to determine whether a particular test 
result is relevant to the claim being made.”  Id., 116 Ohio St.3d 243, 2007-Ohio-
6096, 877 N.E.2d 979, ¶ 26-27. 
{¶ 35} Gilbert affirms the commission’s authority to rely on postaccident 
evidence and to draw inferences from that data.  While Shelly Company correctly 
notes that there is evidence suggesting that the alarm was broken during rescue 
efforts and that OSHA indeed reached that conclusion, this fact is 
inconsequential.  As even Shelly Company acknowledges, the commission is not 
bound by OSHA findings.  More important, so long as the commission’s order is 
supported by “some evidence,” “[i]t is immaterial whether other evidence, even if 
January Term, 2009 
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greater in quality and/or quantity, supports a decision contrary to the 
commission’s.”  State ex rel. Pass v. C.S.T. Extraction Co. (1996), 74 Ohio St.3d 
373, 376, 658 N.E.2d 1055. 
{¶ 36} In this case, postaccident-inspection reports are evidence 
supporting the commission’s conclusion that the warning signal was not working 
when the accident occurred.  The commission did not, therefore, abuse its 
discretion in finding a VSSR. 
{¶ 37} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, 
C.J., 
and 
PFEIFER, 
LUNDBERG 
STRATTON, 
O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Eastman & Smith, Ltd., John T. Landwehr, and Richard L. Johnson, for 
appellant. 
Krugliak, Wilkins, Griffiths & Dougherty Co., L.P.A., Edward D. Murray, 
and Owen J. Rarric, for appellee Steigerwald. 
Richard Cordray, Attorney General, and Stephen D. Plymale, Assistant 
Attorney General, for appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio. 
______________________