Case Title: Folta v. Ferro Eng'g

Citation: 2015 IL 118070

Docket Number: 118070

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2015-11-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
2015 IL 118070 
 
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF 
THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 
 
 
(Docket No. 118070) 
ELLEN FOLTA, Indiv. and as Special Adm’r of the Estate of James Folta, 
Deceased, Appellee, v. FERRO ENGINEERING, a Division of ON Marine 
Services Company, Appellant. 
 
 
Opinion filed November 4, 2015. 
 
 
JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 
 
Chief Justice Garman and Justices Karmeier and Burke concurred in the 
judgment and opinion. 
 
Justice Freeman dissented, with opinion, joined by Justice Kilbride. 
 
Justice Thomas took no part in the decision. 
 
OPINION 
 
¶ 1 
 
In this case we are asked to consider whether an employee can bring an action 
against an employer outside of the Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 
et seq. (West 2010)) and the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act (820 ILCS 310/1 
et seq. (West 2010)), when the employee’s injury or disease first manifests after the 
expiration of certain time limitations under those acts. For the following reasons, 
 
 
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we hold that under these circumstances, the employee’s action is barred by the 
exclusive remedy provisions of those acts. 
 
¶ 2 
 
 
 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
¶ 3 
 
For four years, from 1966 to 1970, James Folta was employed as a shipping 
clerk and product tester for defendant Ferro Engineering. During that time period, 
as part of his job duties, he was exposed to products containing asbestos. Forty-one 
years later, in May 2011, James was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a disease 
associated with asbestos exposure. One month later, he brought a civil action in the 
circuit court of Cook County against 15 defendants, including Ferro Engineering, 
to recover damages for the disease he developed allegedly as a consequence of his 
exposure to the asbestos-containing products while employed by Ferro 
Engineering. James specifically sought relief against Ferro Engineering under 
several theories, including, inter alia, negligence. 
¶ 4 
 
Thereafter, Ferro Engineering filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant 
to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) 
(West 2010)), arguing, inter alia, that James’s claims against it were barred by the 
exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 
305/5(a), 11 (West 2010)) and the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act (820 ILCS 
310/5(a), 11 (West 2010)). In response, James maintained that his action fell 
outside the exclusive remedy provisions because his claims were not 
“compensable” under the acts. He asserted that since the symptoms of his injury did 
not manifest until more than 40 years after his last exposure to asbestos, and any 
potential asbestos-related compensation claim was barred before he became aware 
of his injury under the 25-year limitation provision in section 6(c) of the Workers’ 
Occupational Diseases Act (820 ILCS 310/6(c) (West 2010)), his cause of action in 
circuit court was not barred.  
¶ 5 
 
During the pendency of the litigation, James died and his widow, Ellen Folta 
(Folta), was substituted individually and as special administrator of James’s estate. 
The complaint was later amended to assert a claim for wrongful death against Ferro 
Engineering and the other defendants under the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 
180/1 et seq. (West 2010)). 
 
 
- 3 - 
 
¶ 6 
 
The circuit court granted Ferro Engineering’s motion to dismiss, holding that 
the action was barred by the exclusive remedy provisions. Specifically related to 
this appeal, the court found that the running of the limitations period did not render 
the cause of action noncompensable under the acts. Following the resolution of the 
claims against the remaining defendants, which were dismissed after settlement or 
otherwise, Folta appealed from the dismissal of the claims against Ferro 
Engineering.  
¶ 7 
 
The appellate court reversed and remanded. 2014 IL App (1st) 123219. Relying 
on this court’s ruling in Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co., 139 Ill. 2d 455 (1990), 
the appellate court explained that an injured employee may bring a common-law 
action against his employer where “the injury is not compensable under the Act.” 
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) 2014 IL App (1st) 123219, ¶ 27. The appellate 
court determined that the term “compensability” must relate to the “ability to 
recover under the Act.” Id. ¶ 31. It found that Folta’s injury was “quite literally not 
compensable” under the Workers’ Compensation Act because all possibility of 
recovery was foreclosed due to the nature of his injury and the fact that his disease 
did not manifest until after the statute of repose expired. Id. ¶ 36 (“Through no fault 
of his own, [he] never had an opportunity to seek compensation under the Act.”). 
Accordingly, the appellate court held that Folta’s suit against Ferro Engineering 
was not barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act 
and the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act, and remanded for further 
proceedings. Id. ¶ 44. 
¶ 8 
 
We allowed Ferro Engineering’s petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 
(eff. July 1, 2013). We additionally allowed amici curiae briefs in support of both 
parties.1 Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010). 
 
 
                                                 
 
1In support of Folta, we allowed briefs from the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association, the 
Asbestos Disease Awareness Organization, and the Illinois AFL-CIO. In support of Ferro 
Engineering, we allowed a joint brief from various businesses, including Caterpillar Inc., Aurora 
Pump Company, Innophos, Inc., Rockwell Automation, Inc., United States Steel Corporation, F.H. 
Leinweber Company, Inc., Driv-Lok, Inc., Ford Motor Company, and ExxonMobil Oil Corporation, 
as well as briefs from the Illinois Self-Insurers’ Association, the Illinois Defense Trial Counsel, and 
a joint brief from the American Insurance Association, Property Casualty Insurers Association of 
America, and the Travelers Indemnity Company.  
 
 
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¶ 9 
 
 
 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
¶ 10 
 
This case requires us to interpret the exclusive remedy provisions of the 
Workers’ Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/5(a), 11 (West 2010)), and the 
Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act (820 ILCS 310/5(a), 11 (West 2010)). 
Specifically, we are asked to consider whether these provisions bar an employee’s 
cause of action against an employer to recover damages for a disease resulting from 
asbestos exposure which arose out of and in the course of employment even though 
no compensation is available under those acts due to statutory time limits on the 
employer’s liability. The question is one of law, which we review de novo. Cassens 
Transport Co. v. Illinois Industrial Comm’n, 218 Ill. 2d 519, 524 (2006). 
¶ 11 
 
To answer this question, we begin with a brief overview of the well-established 
purpose of the acts. The Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act provides 
compensation for diseases arising out of, and in the course of, employment. 820 
ILCS 310/1(d) (West 2010). That Act is modeled after and designed to complement 
the Workers’ Compensation Act, which provides financial protection for accidental 
injuries arising out of, and in the course of, employment. See 820 ILCS 305/1(d) 
(West 2012). In enacting these statutes, the General Assembly established a new 
framework for recovery to replace the common-law rights and liabilities that 
previously governed employee injuries. Sharp v. Gallagher, 95 Ill. 2d 322, 326 
(1983); Zimmerman v. Buchheit of Sparta, Inc., 164 Ill. 2d 29, 44 (1994) (“[t]he 
[Act] reflects the legislative balancing of rights, remedies, and procedures that 
govern the disposition of employees’ work-related injuries”); Duley v. Caterpillar 
Tractor Co., 44 Ill. 2d 15, 18 (1969) (“ ‘The act was designed as a substitute for 
previous rights of action of employees against employers and to cover the whole 
ground of the liabilities of the master, and it has been so regarded by all courts.’ ” 
(quoting Matthiessen & Hegeler Zinc Co. v. Industrial Board, 284 Ill. 378, 382 
(1918))). 
¶ 12 
 
In exchange for a system of no-fault liability upon the employer, the employee 
is subject to statutory limitations on recovery for injuries and occupational diseases 
arising out of and in the course of employment. The acts further provide that the 
statutory remedies “ ‘shall serve as the employee’s exclusive remedy if he sustains 
a compensable injury.’ ” Sharp, 95 Ill. 2d at 326-27 (quoting McCormick v. 
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 Ill. 2d 352, 356 (1981)). Accordingly, both acts contain 
an exclusive remedy provision as part of the quid pro quo which balances the 
sacrifices and gains of employees and employers. Meerbrey, 139 Ill. 2d at 462. 
 
 
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¶ 13 
 
The exclusive remedy provisions are embodied in two separate sections of the 
acts. Section 5(a) of the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act provides, in pertinent 
part, as follows: 
 
“§ 5. (a) There is no common law or statutory right to recover compensation 
or damages from the employer *** for or on account of any injury to health, 
disease, or death therefrom, other than for the compensation herein provided 
***.” 820 ILCS 310/5(a) (West 2010).  
Similarly, section 11 of the same Act provides: 
 
“§ 11. The compensation herein provided for shall be the full, complete and 
only measure of the liability of the employer bound by election under this Act 
and such employer’s liability for compensation and medical benefits under this 
Act shall be exclusive and in place of any and all other civil liability 
whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to any employee or his legal 
representative on account of damage, disability or death caused or contributed 
to by any disease contracted or sustained in the course of the employment.” 820 
ILCS 310/11 (West 2010).  
The corresponding exclusivity provisions in sections 5 and 11 of the Workers’ 
Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/5(a), 11 (West 2010)), have been viewed 
analogously for purposes of judicial construction. See Dur-Ite Co. v. Industrial 
Comm’n, 394 Ill. 338, 344 (1946) (stating that the acts are “homologous”); James v. 
Caterpillar Inc., 242 Ill. App. 3d 538, 549-50 (1993); Handley v. Unarco 
Industries, Inc., 124 Ill. App. 3d 56, 70 (1984). Thus, cases that have construed the 
exclusivity provisions in the context of the Workers’ Compensation Act would also 
apply in the context of the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act. 
¶ 14 
 
In discussing the scope of the exclusivity provisions under the Workers’ 
Compensation Act, this court has indicated that the Act generally provides the 
exclusive means by which an employee can recover against an employer for a work 
related injury. Meerbrey, 139 Ill. 2d at 462. However, an employee can escape the 
exclusivity provisions of the Act if the employee establishes that the injury (1) was 
not accidental; (2) did not arise from his employment; (3) was not received during 
the course of employment; or (4) was not compensable under the Act. Id. (citing 
Collier v. Wagner Castings Co., 81 Ill. 2d 229, 237 (1980)). 
 
 
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¶ 15 
 
With respect to the first three categories, we have explained that where an 
injury is intentionally inflicted by an employer or does not arise out of and in the 
course of the employment, it is outside the purview of the Act. Therefore, the 
exclusive remedy provisions are not implicated and do not bar the action. See, e.g., 
Collier, 81 Ill. 2d at 239-40 (intentional torts fall outside the scope of the Act as 
they are not accidental and do not arise from the conditions of employment); 
Handley v. Unarco Industries, Inc., 124 Ill. App. 3d 56, 72 (1984) (“we are not 
persuaded that this legislative balance was meant to permit an employer who 
encourages, commands, or commits an intentional tort to use the act as a shield 
against liability by raising the bar of the statute and then shifting liability 
throughout the system on other innocent employers”). 
¶ 16 
 
Folta does not dispute that James’s asbestos exposure resulting in 
mesothelioma was accidental and arose out of and during the course of his 
employment. To escape the exclusivity provisions in this case, Folta relies on the 
fourth category, equating “compensable” with the possibility to recover benefits. 
Folta contends that James’s injury is not compensable because he never had an 
opportunity to recover any benefits under the Act. That is, through no fault of his 
own, the claim was time-barred before his disease manifested. In contrast, Ferro 
Engineering maintains that whether an injury is compensable is defined by the 
scope of the Act’s coverage, and not on the particular employee’s ability to recover 
benefits. 
¶ 17 
 
With respect to the fourth category, this court has had limited opportunity to 
address what we originally meant in Collier when we used the phrase “not 
compensable” to carve out a category of injuries for which the exclusive remedy 
provision would not be applicable.  
¶ 18 
 
In 1965, this court had previously explained that a “compensable” injury was 
one suffered in the line of duty, which meant that the injury arose out of and in the 
course of employment. Sjostrom v. Sproule, 33 Ill. 2d 40, 43 (1965); see also Unger 
v. Continental Assurance Co., 107 Ill. 2d 79, 85 (1985) (explaining that the “line of 
duty” test has been interpreted in the same way as the test of compensability: that is, 
an injury will be found to be compensable if it arose out of and in the course of 
employment).  
¶ 19 
 
Although this court equated “compensable” with “line of duty,” the sole 
question raised in those cases was whether the plaintiff’s injuries arose out of or in 
 
 
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the course of his employment. In another line of cases we further refined our 
inquiry as to what is meant by compensable by considering whether an employee 
was covered under the Act where the essence of the harm was a psychological 
disability, and not a traditional physical injury.  
¶ 20 
 
In Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 62 Ill. 2d 556 (1976), an employee 
brought a claim for disability benefits under the Act as a result of the severe 
emotional shock she suffered after assisting a coemployee whose hand was severed 
in a machine. The court held that “a psychological disability is not of itself 
noncompensable under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.” Id. at 563. The court 
reasoned that this type of injury was within the concept of how we defined an 
accidental injury. The court found that the term “accident” was defined broadly and 
included anything that happened “without design or an event which is unforeseen 
by the person to whom it happens.” Id. Therefore, the court concluded that an 
employee who suffered a sudden, severe emotional shock after witnessing the 
injury of a coemployee had suffered an accident within the meaning of the Act, 
even though the employee sustained no physical trauma or injury. Id. Thus, the 
workers’ compensation claim could proceed. 
¶ 21 
 
Thereafter, in Collier, the court was asked to consider whether an employee 
could bring a common-law action to recover for the emotional distress arising from 
an employer’s conduct in failing to provide medical assistance after he suffered a 
heart attack. In addressing whether the employee could escape the bar of the 
exclusivity provisions, the court set out four categories, without citation, including 
consideration of whether the injury was “compensable” under the Act. Collier, 81 
Ill. 2d at 237. The court merely relied on the decision in Pathfinder to find that 
emotional distress was “compensable” under the Act and, therefore, a claim for 
emotional damages could not escape the bar of the exclusivity provisions. Id.  
¶ 22 
 
Lastly, in Meerbrey, the court considered whether emotional distress suffered 
as a consequence of false imprisonment, false arrest, or malicious prosecution was 
“compensable” under the Act. Although the court recognized that some 
jurisdictions had held that the type of emotional injuries suffered as a result of 
being falsely imprisoned were not the type of “personal injury” covered by 
workers’ compensation laws, the court found they were compensable where the 
employee failed to differentiate the type of emotional injuries from those suffered 
in Pathfinder and Collier. Meerbrey, 139 Ill. 2d at 467-68.  
 
 
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¶ 23 
 
Thus, Pathfinder, Collier and Meerbrey stand for the proposition that whether 
an injury is compensable is related to whether the type of injury categorically fits 
within the purview of the Act. These cases do not stand for the proposition that 
whether an injury is compensable is defined by whether there is an ability to 
recover benefits for a particular injury sustained by an employee. In all of these 
cases, the exclusivity provisions barred a common-law cause of action. 
¶ 24 
 
Here, there is no question that based on the allegations in the complaint, 
James’s disease is the type of disease intended to fall within the purview of the Act. 
An “occupational disease” is defined as one “arising out of and in the course of the 
employment.” 820 ILCS 310/1(d) (West 2010). A disease arises out of the 
employment if there is a “causal connection between the conditions under which 
the work is performed and the occupational disease.” Id. The disease “must appear 
to have had its origin *** in a risk connected with the employment and to have 
flowed from that source as a rational consequence.” Id. There is no dispute for 
purposes of this appeal that James’s disease was precipitated by occupational 
exposure to asbestos.  
¶ 25 
 
Moreover, the Act specifically addresses diseases caused by asbestos exposure 
and, indeed, employees and spouses have recovered for disabilities or death arising 
from workplace asbestos exposure, including mesothelioma. See, e.g., Kieffer & 
Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 263 Ill. App. 3d 294 (1994) (employee, who had been 
exposed to asbestos in the workplace for 40 years, died after being diagnosed with 
mesothelioma, and his widow was entitled to recover benefits); Owens Corning 
Fiberglas Corp. v. Industrial Comm’n, 198 Ill. App. 3d 605 (1990) (widow had an 
independent claim for death benefits arising from her husband’s mesothelioma); 
H&H Plumbing Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 170 Ill. App. 3d 706 (1988) (employee 
who was exposed to asbestos in the workplace as a pipefitter recovered under the 
Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act for his lung disease); Zupan v. Industrial 
Comm’n, 142 Ill. App. 3d 127 (1986) (employee who was exposed to asbestos in 
the workplace for 22 years as a bricklayer recovered under the Workers’ 
Occupational Diseases Act). Thus, it is evident that the legislature intended that 
occupational diseases arising from workplace asbestos exposure are the type of 
injury contemplated to be within the scope of the Act. Accordingly, under 
Pathfinder, Collier and Meerbrey, James’s injury is the type of injury compensable 
under the Act.  
 
 
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¶ 26 
 
Nevertheless, those cases never addressed specifically whether the exclusivity 
provisions would bar a cause of action where there was no possibility of seeking 
compensation benefits under the Act because of certain time limitations on the 
employer’s liability. In Moushon v. National Garages, Inc., 9 Ill. 2d 407 (1956), 
and Duley v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 44 Ill. 2d 15 (1969), however, this court had 
some opportunity to consider the interplay between certain provisions under the 
Workers’ Compensation Act that limit the employer’s liability and the exclusive 
remedy provisions.  
¶ 27 
 
In Moushon, an employee was injured while operating equipment at his 
workplace. The employer provided medical, surgical and hospital services related 
to the injury under the Act, but the employee brought an action to recover damages 
for his resulting permanent impotence. Moushon, 9 Ill. 2d at 410-13. This court 
held that the exclusivity provisions of the Act barred the employee’s cause of action 
even though no compensation for his permanent injury was provided for under the 
Act. Id. at 410-12. 
¶ 28 
 
Notably, the Moushon court did not adopt the view articulated by the dissenting 
judge that where “no compensation benefits are provided in the act for the 
particular injury, so that no remedy is afforded the employee under the act for an 
injury caused by the employer’s negligence, then a common-law action for 
damages should be allowed.” Id. at 418 (Bristow, J., dissenting, joined by Davis, 
J.). 
¶ 29 
 
In Duley, the husband of a deceased employee who was fatally injured in a 
workplace accident brought a wrongful death action against the employer. The 
employer had paid for the burial expenses as a result of the death, but no other 
compensation benefits were payable to the husband under the Workers’ 
Compensation Act because the Act limited compensation to those who were 
dependents of the injured employee. Duley, 44 Ill. 2d at 16-18. This court held that 
the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act barred his 
action even though the husband could not recover for his damages under the Act, 
other than the nominal amount of funeral expenses. Id. at 18. 
¶ 30 
 
Thus, since 1956, this court has held that despite limitations on the amount and 
type of recovery under the Act, the Act is the employee’s exclusive remedy for 
workplace injuries. 
 
 
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¶ 31 
 
With this understanding, we now specifically address Folta’s arguments. 
Essentially, Folta contends that the exclusive remedy provisions assume the 
possibility of a right to compensation. In this case, Folta argues that because of the 
latency of James’s disease, various sections including 6(d) of the Workers’ 
Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/6(d) (West 2010)) and sections 6(c) and 1(f) of 
the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act (820 ILCS 310/6(c), 1(f) (West 2010)), 
precluded her from recovering compensation benefits or even filing an application 
for benefits because James’s injury fell outside those limitations periods of the acts 
and, therefore, any possibility to even seek compensation benefits was foreclosed. 
Therefore, Folta maintains that under these circumstances, the employer should not 
enjoy the benefit of the exclusivity provisions. 
¶ 32 
 
We agree that section 6(c) of the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act does bar 
Folta’s right to file an application for compensation. That section provides that, 
“[i]n cases of disability caused by exposure to *** asbestos, unless application for 
compensation is filed with the Commission within 25 years after the employee was 
so exposed, the right to file such application shall be barred.” 820 ILCS 310/6(c) 
(West 2010); see also 820 ILCS 305/6(d) (West 2010) (analogous 25-year 
limitation period under the Workers’ Compensation Act). Section 6(c) further 
provides that “[i]n cases of death occurring within 25 years from the last exposure 
to *** asbestos, application for compensation must be filed within 3 years of death 
***.” 820 ILCS 310/6(c) (West 2010).  
¶ 33 
 
Based on the plain language of this section, this provision acts as a statute of 
repose, and creates an absolute bar on the right to bring a claim. In contrast to a 
statute of limitations, which determines the time within which a lawsuit may be 
brought after a cause of action has accrued, a statute of repose extinguishes the 
action after a defined period of time, regardless of when the action accrued. 
DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 61 (2006) (citing Ferguson v. McKenzie, 202 
Ill. 2d 304, 311 (2001)). It begins to run when a specific event occurs, “regardless 
of whether an action has accrued or whether any injury has resulted.” Ferguson, 
202 Ill. 2d at 311. Thus, the statute of repose limit is “ ‘not related to the accrual of 
any cause of action; the injury need not have occurred, much less have been 
discovered.’ ” CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. ___, ___, 134 S. Ct. 2175, 
2182-83 (2014) (quoting 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 7, at 24 (2010)). The 
purpose of a repose period is to terminate the possibility of liability after a defined 
period of time. After the expiration of the repose period, there is no longer a 
 
 
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recognized right of action. Evanston Insurance Co. v. Riseborough, 2014 IL 
114271, ¶ 16. 
¶ 34 
 
Thus, the General Assembly intended to provide an absolute definitive time 
period within which all occupational disease claims arising from asbestos exposure 
must be brought. Since James’s last employment exposure to asbestos was in 1970, 
the 25-year period of repose has long since expired. The fact that Folta was not at 
fault for failing to file a claim sooner due to the nature of the disease is not a 
consideration that is relevant to a statute of repose. Although the statute barred 
Folta’s claim before it had yet accrued, that is the purpose of such a provision.  
¶ 35 
 
To construe the scope of the exclusive remedy provisions to allow for a 
common-law action under these circumstances would mean that the statute of 
repose would cease to serve its intended function, to extinguish the employer’s 
liability for a work-related injury at some definite time. Further, this interpretation 
would directly contradict the plain language of the exclusive remedy provision 
which provides that the employer’s liability is “exclusive and in place of any and all 
other civil liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise.” (Emphasis added.) 
820 ILCS 310/11 (West 2010).  
¶ 36 
 
Thus, the fact that through no fault of the employee’s own, the right to seek 
recovery under the acts was extinguished before the claim accrued because of the 
statute of repose does not mean that the acts have no application or that Folta was 
then free to bring a wrongful death action in circuit court. Rather, where the injury 
is the type of work-related injury within the purview of the acts, the employer’s 
liability is governed exclusively by the provisions of those acts. 
¶ 37 
 
We do not find that the provisions in section 1(f) of the Workers’ Occupational 
Diseases Act would lead us to a different result. Generally, section 1(f) provides 
that “[n]o compensation shall be payable for *** any occupational disease unless 
disablement, *** occurs within two years after the last day of the last exposure to 
the hazards of the disease.” 820 ILCS 310/1(f) (West 2010). Specifically, in cases 
of occupational disease caused by the inhalation of asbestos dust, no compensation 
is payable unless disablement occurs “within [three] years after the last day of the 
last exposure to the hazards of such disease.” Id. 
¶ 38 
 
Folta maintains that since James’s disease did not manifest until after the time 
limitation in section 1(f), and since she and James were both precluded from 
recovering any compensation benefits offered by the statute, the effect was to 
 
 
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essentially exclude this latent disease from coverage under the Act. Thus, Folta 
asserts that her recourse against the employer must be found in the common law.2  
¶ 39 
 
In support of her contentions, Folta relies in part on the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court’s decision in Tooey v. AK Steel Corp., 81 A.3d 851 (Pa. 2013). There, the 
court construed the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act, which defined 
“injury” to include “occupational disease” provided that, if occupational disease 
was the basis for compensation, that Act only applied to disability or death 
resulting from such disease and occurring within a 300-week time window. The 
court held, over a dissent, that this time limitation “operate[d] as a de facto 
exclusion of coverage under the Act for essentially all mesothelioma claims,” 
where the average latency period for mesothelioma was found to be 30 to 50 years. 
Id. at 863. Therefore, the court held that the common-law claims were not barred by 
the exclusivity provisions of the Pennsylvania Act. Id. at 865. 
¶ 40 
 
We do not believe that Illinois’s statutory scheme operates as “a de facto” 
exclusion of coverage for latent occupational disease claims. Rather, under our 
statute, whether compensation benefits are awarded for an occupational disease 
depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case based on proof 
presented to the Workers’ Compensation Commission of when a disability 
manifested. See, e.g., Plasters v. Industrial Comm’n, 246 Ill. App. 3d 1 (1993) 
(Commission determined that employee proved disablement within two years of 
his last exposure based on testimony indicating that the claimant was impaired 
from the disease at the time he retired from mining.).  
¶ 41 
 
Given the plain language of the exclusive remedy provisions, which state that 
there is no right to recover damages from the employer for “any injury to health, 
disease, or death therefrom, other than for the compensation herein provided” 
(emphasis added) (820 ILCS 310/5(a) (West 2010)), and that the Act is exclusive 
with respect to “any disease contracted or sustained in the course of the 
employment” (emphasis added) (820 ILCS 310/11 (West 2010)), it would be a 
                                                 
 
2We note that Folta never raised section 1(f) as a basis to defeat Ferro Engineering’s motion to 
dismiss in the trial court and, thus, the trial court never ruled on its impact. Traditionally, we have 
held that an issue not raised in the trial court is forfeited and cannot be raised for the first time on 
appeal. See Daniels v. Anderson, 162 Ill. 2d 47, 58 (1994) (the theory upon which a case is tried in 
the lower court cannot be changed on review, and an issue not presented or considered by the trial 
court cannot be raised for the first time on review). Ferro Engineering did not address the impact of 
section 1(f) either in the appellate court or before this court, but has failed to bring defendant’s 
forfeiture of the issue to the attention of the appellate court or this court. Therefore, we choose to 
address the argument. 
 
 
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radical departure to suggest that the exclusivity provisions apply only for certain 
occupational diseases in which the disability manifests within the time limitation.  
¶ 42 
 
Furthermore, this limitation on the employer’s liability was originally enacted 
in 1936 (1935-36 Ill. Laws 40 (§ 5)). It has remained in the statute unchanged for 
the last 79 years despite numerous amendments to other provisions of the Act. 
Since 1936, section 1(f) has functioned as a temporal limitation on the availability 
of compensation benefits and not as a basis to remove occupational diseases from 
the purview of the Act. Consistent with Collier and Meerbrey, the litmus test is not 
whether there is an ability to recover benefits. Nothing in our statute or the history 
of our jurisprudence suggests that a temporal limitation removes a work-related 
injury from the purview of the Act. 
¶ 43 
 
We are cognizant of the harsh result in this case. Nevertheless, ultimately, 
whether a different balance should be struck under the acts given the nature of the 
injury and the current medical knowledge about asbestos exposure is a question 
more appropriately addressed to the legislature. It is the province of the legislature 
to draw the appropriate balance. It is not our role to inject a compromise but, rather, 
to interpret the acts as written. See Roselle Police Pension Board v. Village of 
Roselle, 232 Ill. 2d 546, 557 (2009) (this court does not “sit as a superlegislature to 
weigh the wisdom of legislation [or] to decide whether the policy which it 
expresses offends the public welfare” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
¶ 44 
 
Finally, we reject Folta’s assertions that to hold that the exclusive remedy 
provisions bar her cause of action would violate the Illinois Constitution’s 
guarantees of equal protection (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2), prohibition against 
special legislation (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, § 13), and the right to a certain remedy 
(Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 12). Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and the 
party challenging the constitutionality of a statute carries the burden of proving that 
the statute is unconstitutional. People v. Hollins, 2012 IL 112754, ¶ 13.  
¶ 45 
 
Equal protection guarantees that similarly situated individuals will be treated 
similarly, unless the government demonstrates an appropriate reason to do 
otherwise. People v. Richardson, 2015 IL 118255, ¶ 9. Equal protection prohibits 
the state from according unequal treatment to persons placed by a statute into 
different classes for reasons wholly unrelated to the purpose of the legislation. 
People v. R.L., 158 Ill. 2d 432, 437 (1994). A special legislation challenge is 
 
 
- 14 - 
 
generally judged by the same standards that apply to equal protection challenges. 
In re Petition of the Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d 117, 123 (1995).   
¶ 46 
 
In an underdeveloped argument, Folta contends that interpreting the exclusive 
remedy provisions to deprive the family of a right to recovery against the employer 
would arbitrarily create two classes of similarly situated injured workers who are 
treated unequally and without any rational basis. Folta argues that those workers 
who suffer from occupational diseases with short latency periods are eligible to 
receive compensation benefits, while those workers who suffer from occupational 
diseases with long latency periods are “categorically” prohibited from a right to 
recover compensation benefits and are additionally prohibited from seeking 
common-law damages. Folta maintains that this distinction is not rationally related 
to any apparent legitimate state interest.  
¶ 47 
 
We disagree. Under this court’s interpretation, these classes of injured workers 
are indeed all treated equally in terms of the right to bring an action for damages. 
All of these workers are precluded from seeking common-law damages. Therefore, 
Folta has not established any disparate treatment in the application and scope of the 
exclusive remedy provisions. 
¶ 48 
 
Furthermore, Folta’s premise that all employees who suffer from occupational 
diseases with long latency periods are “categorically” unable to recover benefits, is 
incorrect. For example, in Stypula v. City of Chicago, Ill. Workers’ Compensation 
Comm’n No. 98-WC-062986 (Nov. 25, 2003), a city employee was exposed to 
asbestos from 1976 through 1998 as a garbage hauler. He then retired and three 
years later, in 2001, he was diagnosed with mesothelioma and died. Even though he 
had a long latency period, his widow was entitled to compensation where she filed 
within three years of the death because the employee’s disability arose within 3 
years of the last day of exposure. See also Kieffer, 263 Ill. App. 3d 294 (claimant, 
who had been exposed to asbestos in the workplace for 40 years, filed a claim 
within two years of his last exposure after being diagnosed with mesothelioma). 
Assuredly, there are examples where the particular facts and circumstances are 
such that they do not allow for recovery of benefits against the employer. But there 
is no “categorical” class without a right to seek benefits against their employer. 
Thus, we find Folta’s equal protection and special legislation arguments lack merit. 
¶ 49 
 
Additionally, we reject Folta’s argument that interpreting the scope of the 
exclusive remedy provisions to bar the wrongful death action would violate the 
 
 
- 15 - 
 
certain remedy clause of the Illinois Constitution. As Folta acknowledges, this 
clause is “ ‘merely “an expression of a philosophy and not a mandate that a certain 
remedy be provided in any specific form.” ’ ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) 
Cassens Transport Co., 218 Ill. 2d at 532 (quoting Segers v. Industrial Comm’n, 
191 Ill. 2d 421, 435 (2000)). Additionally, this court has explained that the 
legislature “may restrict the class of potential defendants from whom a plaintiff 
may seek a remedy” without violating the certain remedy clause. Bilyk v. Chicago 
Transit Authority, 125 Ill. 2d 230, 246 (1988).  
¶ 50 
 
The acts do not prevent an employee from seeking a remedy against other third 
parties for an injury or disease. Rather, in this case, the acts restrict the class of 
potential defendants from whom Folta could seek a remedy, limiting Folta’s 
recourse for wrongful death claims to third parties other than the employer. In this 
case, Folta named 14 defendant manufacturers of asbestos related products. Folta 
was not left without any remedy. Thus, we find no merit to the constitutional claims 
raised by Folta. 
 
¶ 51 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
¶ 52 
 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Folta’s action against Ferro Engineering for 
wrongful death is barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ 
Compensation Act and the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act.  
 
¶ 53 
 
Appellate court judgment reversed. 
¶ 54 
 
Circuit court judgment affirmed. 
 
¶ 55 
 
JUSTICE FREEMAN, dissenting: 
¶ 56 
 
The majority today holds that plaintiff’s common-law action against his former 
employer is barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ 
Compensation Act and the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act. Plaintiff never 
had the right to file an application for compensation under either of these acts, 
whose time limitations expired long before plaintiff’s mesothelioma was manifest. 
Plaintiff sought relief through the instant common-law action. However, in the 
 
 
- 16 - 
 
majority’s view, the acts’ exclusive remedy provisions preclude any such 
common-law claim. Plaintiff thus is completely barred from seeking any 
compensation from his former employer for his asbestos-related disease. I strongly 
disagree with the majority’s decision. Accordingly, I dissent. 
¶ 57 
 
Plaintiff James Folta was employed by defendant Ferro Engineering (Ferro) 
from 1966 to 1970. During that time, as part of his job duties, he worked with 
various asbestos-containing products, allegedly on a daily basis. Forty-one years 
later he was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a disease associated with asbestos 
exposure. He subsequently brought a civil action in circuit court against 15 
defendants, including Ferro, to recover damages for his asbestos-related disease.3 
Ferro filed a motion to dismiss the counts against it, arguing that plaintiff’s claims 
were barred by the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act 
(820 ILCS 305/5(a), 11 (West 2010)) and the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act 
(820 ILCS 310/5(a), 11 (West 2010)). Plaintiff argued, in response, that his action 
fell outside the exclusive remedy provisions under an exception for claims that are 
“not compensable under the Act.” Plaintiff noted that any potential asbestos-related 
claim was barred before he became aware of it under the 25-year limitation 
provision in section 6(c) of the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act (820 ILCS 
310/6(c) (West 2010)),4 and his action in circuit court was not barred. The circuit 
court granted Ferro’s motion to dismiss, concluding the action was barred by the 
exclusive remedy provisions. Following resolution of the claims against the 
remaining defendants, plaintiff appealed from the dismissal of the claims against 
Ferro.  
                                                 
 
3During the pendency of the litigation, James died and his widow, Ellen Folta, was substituted 
as plaintiff. The complaint was subsequently amended to assert a wrongful death claim against 
Ferro and the other defendants. 
 
4Section 6(c) of the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act provides: “In cases of disability 
caused by exposure to *** asbestos, unless application for compensation is filed with the 
Commission within 25 years after the employee was so exposed, the right to file such application 
shall be barred.” 820 ILCS 310/6(c)(West 2010). Section 1(f) of the same act provides: “[I]n cases 
of occupational disease caused by *** the inhalation of *** asbestos dust [no compensation shall be 
payable unless disablement occurs] *** within 3 years after the last day of the last exposure to the 
hazards of such disease ***.” 820 ILCS 310/1(f) (West 2010). Finally, section 6(d) of the Workers’ 
Compensation Act, which is similar to section 6(c) of the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act, 
provides: “In any case of injury caused by exposure to *** asbestos, unless application for 
compensation is filed with the Commission within 25 years after the last day that the employee was 
employed in an environment of *** asbestos, the right to file such application shall be barred.” 820 
ILCS 305/6(d) (West 2010). 
 
 
- 17 - 
 
¶ 58 
 
In a unanimous opinion, the appellate court reversed and remanded. 2014 IL 
App (1st) 123219. Regarding the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ 
Compensation Act and the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act, the court noted 
the scope of these provisions is not absolute. The court pointed to Meerbrey v. 
Marshall Field & Co., 139 Ill. 2d 455, 463 (1990), which listed four exceptions to 
the Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusivity provisions. Under those exceptions, 
an injured employee may still bring a common law action against his employer if he 
can prove that: (1) the injury was not accidental; (2) the injury did not arise from his 
employment; (3) the injury was not received during the course of his employment; 
or (4) the injury is “ ‘not compensable under the Act.’ ” 2014 IL App (1st) 123219, 
¶ 27 (quoting Meerbrey, 139 Ill. 2d at 463); accord Collier v. Wagner Castings Co., 
81 Ill. 2d 229, 237 (1980). Plaintiff argued that the fourth exception, for injuries 
“not compensable under the Act,” should apply to enable him to bring a 
common-law claim against his former employer, where any potential claim for 
recovery under the Workers’ Compensation Act or the Workers’ Occupational 
Diseases Act was time-barred before he became aware of his injury. Ferro argued, 
in response, that the appellate court should adopt a narrow reading of “not 
compensable under the Act,” and find that an injury is not compensable only if it 
does not arise out of and in the course of employment. 2014 IL App (1st) 123219, 
¶ 29. The court rejected Ferro’s argument, correctly noting that Ferro’s proposed 
definition of compensability “would render the fourth Meerbrey exception 
superfluous, since Meerbrey already contains explicit exceptions for injuries that 
did not arise from a worker’s employment and injuries that were not received 
during the course of employment.” Id. ¶ 30. The court held that the fourth Meerbrey 
exception applied to allow plaintiff to bring a common law suit against Ferro. Id. 
¶ 36. In the court’s view, plaintiff’s injury was “quite literally not compensable 
under the Act, in that all possibility of recovery is foreclosed because of the nature 
of plaintiff’s injury.” Id.  
¶ 59 
 
Here, the majority correctly notes that this case is about the interpretation of the 
exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act and the Workers’ 
Occupational Diseases Act. Those exclusivity provisions are set forth in sections 5 
and 11 of each Act. Section 5(a) of the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act 
provides, in relevant part:  
 
“§ 5. (a)There is no common law or statutory right to recover compensation 
or damages from the employer *** for or on account of any injury to health, 
 
 
- 18 - 
 
disease, or death therefrom, other than for the compensation herein provided 
***.” 820 ILCS 310/5(a) (West 2010).   
¶ 60 
Similarly, section 11 of the same Act provides: 
 
“§ 11. The compensation herein provided for shall be the full, complete and 
only measure of the liability of the employer bound by election under this Act 
and such employer’s liability for compensation and medical benefits under this 
Act shall be exclusive and in place of any and all other civil liability 
whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to any employee or his legal 
representative on account of damage, disability or death caused or contributed 
to by any disease contracted or sustained in the course of the employment.” 820 
ILCS 310/11 (West 2010).  
The corresponding exclusivity provisions in sections 5(a) and 11 of the Workers’ 
Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/5(a), 11 (West 2010)) are viewed analogously 
for purposes of judicial construction. James v. Caterpillar Inc., 242 Ill. App. 3d 
538, 549-50 (1993) (exclusivity provisions of Workers’ Compensation Act and 
Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act “are homologous for purposes of judicial 
construction”).  
¶ 61 
 
In interpreting these exclusivity provisions, the majority looks, as did the 
appellate court, to the Meerbrey exceptions, particularly the fourth exception, 
under which an injured employee may still bring a common law action against his 
employer if he can prove that “the injury was not compensable under the Act.”  
Meerbrey, 139 Ill. 2d at 463. However, the majority’s interpretation of the fourth 
exception is quite different from that of the appellate court, which held that the 
exception applied here because plaintiff’s injury was “quite literally not 
compensable under the Act, in that all possibility of recovery is foreclosed because 
of the nature of plaintiff’s injury.” 2014 IL App (1st) 123219, ¶ 36. In contrast, the 
majority appears to agree with Ferro that whether an injury is compensable is 
defined by the scope of the Act’s coverage, and not on the particular employee’s 
ability to recover benefits. See supra ¶ 16. After looking at several of this court’s 
decisions, including Moushon v. National Garages, Inc., 9 Ill. 2d 407 (1956), the 
majority states: “[S]ince 1956, this court has held that despite limitations on the 
amount and type of recovery under the Act, the Act is the employee’s exclusive 
remedy for workplace injuries.” Supra ¶ 30.  
 
 
- 19 - 
 
¶ 62 
 
In Moushon, the plaintiff alleged that during the course of his work, a safety 
device on the man-lift he was riding failed and he suffered internal injuries, 
including a ruptured urethra, and was left impotent. The employer provided 
medical, surgical and hospital services related to the injury under the Workers’ 
Compensation Act. The employer also paid, and the plaintiff received, 
compensation for the period of his temporary disability, in accordance with the 
Workers’ Compensation Act. Moushon, 9 Ill. 2d at 409. However, the plaintiff also 
filed a common-law negligence suit against the employer seeking additional 
damages for his resulting permanent impotence. This court held that the plaintiff’s 
suit for additional damages was barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act’s 
exclusive remedy provision. The court further concluded that even if it were 
assumed that the plaintiff could not recover statutory compensation for every 
element of damages (i.e., his impotence), “[h]e still is covered by the act and 
sustained an accidental injury for which he received compensation benefits.” Id. at 
410-11.  
¶ 63 
 
Moushon fits within the majority’s statement that “despite limitations on the 
amount and type of recovery under the Act, the Act is the employee’s exclusive 
remedy for workplace injuries.” Supra ¶ 30. In Moushon, the plaintiff’s injury was 
within the Workers’ Compensation Act’s “coverage formula” (id. at 411) and the 
plaintiff received compensation for that injury. That the plaintiff might not have 
been able to recover statutory compensation for a particular element said to arise 
from his injury does not entitle him to file a common-law action against his 
employer for additional damages.  
¶ 64 
 
But that is not the situation in the case at bar, where plaintiff was barred from 
recovering any compensation from his former employer for his injury. As the 
appellate court stated: “[P]laintiff’s injury is quite literally not compensable under 
the Act, in that all possibility of recovery is foreclosed because of the nature of 
plaintiff’s injury.” 2014 IL App (1st) 123219, ¶ 36. Plaintiff’s “injury” was 
mesothelioma, which has an average latency period of 30 to 50 years. Tooey v. AK 
Steel Corp., 81 A.3d 851, 863 (Pa. 2013). Plaintiff’s mesothelioma was not 
manifest until 41 years after he left Ferro, far beyond the 25-year statutory 
limitation in effect. “Through no fault of his own, plaintiff never had an opportunity 
to seek compensation under the Act.” 2014 IL App (1st) 123219, ¶ 36.  
¶ 65 
 
At a minimum, Moushon, which formed a basis for the majority’s “exclusive 
remedy” assertion, supra, ¶¶ 26-28, is inapposite to the case at bar. 
 
 
- 20 - 
 
¶ 66 
 
Another difficulty with the majority’s analysis is that, while acknowledging 
that this case requires interpretation of the exclusive remedy provisions of the 
Workers’ Compensation Act and the Workers’ Occupational Diseases Act, the 
majority’s interpretation of these provisions includes, at most, only scant mention 
of the canons of statutory construction.  
¶ 67 
 
The construction of a statute is guided by familiar principles. The primary 
objective in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the 
legislature. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Board of Education of the City 
of Chicago, 2012 IL 112566, ¶ 15. The most reliable indicator of that intent is the 
statutory language, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Hubble v. 
Bi-State Development Agency of the Illinois-Missouri Metropolitan District, 238 
Ill. 2d 262, 268 (2010). A statute is viewed as a whole, with all relevant parts 
considered. Sylvester v. Industrial Comm’n, 197 Ill. 2d 225, 232 (2001). Each 
word, clause and sentence of a statute must be given a reasonable meaning, if 
possible, and should not be rendered superfluous. Chicago Teachers Union, 2012 
IL 112566, ¶ 15; Sylvester, 197 Ill. 2d at 232. The court may consider the reason for 
the law, the problems sought to be remedied, the purposes to be achieved, and the 
consequences of construing the statute one way or another. Hubble, 238 Ill. 2d at 
268. In construing a statute, courts presume that the General Assembly did not 
intend absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. 
County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000); Sylvester, 197 Ill. 2d at 232.  
¶ 68 
 
There is also a principle that expressly applies to the construction of the 
Workers’ Compensation Act. “In construing the provisions of the Workmen’s 
Compensation Act, all portions thereof must be read as a whole and in such manner 
as to give to them the practical and liberal interpretation intended by the 
legislature.” Vaught v. Industrial Comm’n, 52 Ill. 2d 158, 165 (1972); K. & R. 
Delivery, Inc. v. Industrial Comm’n, 11 Ill. 2d 441, 445 (1957).  
¶ 69 
 
Of particular importance here is the rule that, in construing a statute, the court 
may consider the reason for the law, the problems sought to be remedied, the 
purposes to be achieved, and the consequences of construing the statute one way or 
another. Hubble, 238 Ill. 2d at 268.  
¶ 70 
 
This court has described the Workers’ Compensation Act as “a humane law of a 
remedial nature whose fundamental purpose is to provide employees and their 
dependents prompt, sure and definite compensation, together with a quick and 
 
 
- 21 - 
 
efficient remedy, for injuries or death suffered in the course of employment.” 
General American Life Insurance Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 97 Ill. 2d 359, 370 
(1983); see also Pathfinder Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 62 Ill. 2d 556, 563 (1976) 
(“The Act is remedial in nature in that it is intended to provide financial protection 
for the injured worker.”); cf. Collier, 81 Ill. 2d at 241 (“[T]he basic purpose of 
workmen’s compensation [is] to place the cost of industrial accidents upon the 
industry.”).  
¶ 71 
 
The benefits of the Workers’ Compensation Act are not limited to workers, 
however. Advantages accrue to both sides. The Workers’ Compensation Act 
“imposes liability without fault upon the employer and, in return, prohibits 
common law suits by employees against the employer.” Meerbrey, 139 Ill. 2d at 
462.  The Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusive remedy provision thus “is part 
of the quid pro quo in which the sacrifices and gains of employees and employers 
are to some extent put in balance, for, while the employer assumes a new liability 
without fault, it is relieved of the prospect of large damage verdicts.” 9 Arthur 
Larson et al., Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 100.01(1) (2015). This is 
naturally a two-way proposition. 
“[T]he employer should be spared damage liability only when compensation 
liability has actually been provided in its place, or, to state the matter from the 
employee’s point of view, rights of action for damages should not be deemed 
taken away except when something of value has been put in their place.” Id. 
§ 100.04.  
¶ 72 
 
It is instructive to look at the majority’s interpretation of the exclusive remedy 
provisions in terms of the consequences of that interpretation. According to the 
majority, the acts are the employee’s exclusive remedy for workplace injuries, even 
where, as here, plaintiff never had an opportunity to seek such compensation 
because his occupational mesothelioma was not manifest until long after the 
statutory time limitations had elapsed. As the appellate court stated, “plaintiff’s 
injury is quite literally not compensable under the Act, in that all possibility of 
recovery is foreclosed because of the nature of plaintiff’s injury.” 2014 IL App 
(1st) 123219, ¶ 36. “Through no fault of his own, plaintiff never had an opportunity 
to seek compensation under the Act.” Id. Under the majority’s interpretation of the 
exclusivity provisions, plaintiff is barred not only from recovering compensation 
benefits under the acts, but from recovering against his former employer under the 
common law as well. The majority’s interpretation runs directly counter to the acts’ 
 
 
- 22 - 
 
purpose (see General American Life Insurance, 97 Ill. 2d at 370 (describing 
Workers’ Compensation Act as “a humane law of a remedial nature whose 
fundamental purpose is to provide employees and their dependents prompt, sure 
and definite compensation”)), as well as the assertion (regarding the quid pro quo) 
that “rights of action for damages should not be deemed taken away except when 
something of value has been put in their place” (9 Arthur Larson et al., Larson’s 
Workers’ Compensation Law § 100.04 (2015)). In addition, the majority’s 
interpretation contradicts the principle that, in construing a statute, courts presume 
that the General Assembly did not intend absurdity, inconvenience, or injustice. 
Michigan Avenue National Bank, 191 Ill. 2d at 504; Sylvester, 197 Ill. 2d at 232.  
¶ 73 
 
In my view, the majority’s interpretation cannot be the law. In elaborating on 
that interpretation, the majority asserts that section 6(c) of the Workers’ 
Occupational Diseases Act—which imposes a 25-year time limit on applications 
for compensation in asbestos cases—“acts as a statute of repose, and creates an 
absolute bar on the right to bring a claim.” Supra ¶ 33. The majority explains that 
the purpose of a repose period is to terminate the possibility of liability after a 
defined period of time. “After the expiration of the repose period, there is no longer 
a recognized right of action.” Id. That is exactly the point. If there is no longer a 
recognized right of action, then the employee’s injury is not compensable under the 
Act, and the employee may bring (under the fourth Meerbrey exception) a 
common-law cause of action against his employer. As the appellate court below 
noted: “[P]laintiff’s injury is quite literally not compensable under the Act, in that 
all possibility of recovery is foreclosed because of the nature of plaintiff’s injury.” 
2014 IL App (1st) 123219, ¶ 36.  
¶ 74 
 
I find support for this view in Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law, which 
sharply criticizes a case which, unlike Moushon, is almost exactly on point with the 
case at bar. In Kane v. Durotest Corp., 182 A.2d 559 (N.J. 1962), the employee, 
Gloria Kane, worked for defendant Durotest from May 1946 to June 1950, except 
for a short interval in November and December 1947. During the course of her 
work, she was exposed to highly toxic beryllium compounds, the fumes and dust of 
which are capable of producing a pulmonary disease known as beryllium 
poisoning. The disease first manifested itself in her in January 1958, seven and a 
half years after she left Durotest. Gloria died one year later, in January 1959, at the 
age of 34, leaving surviving her husband and three children.  
 
 
- 23 - 
 
¶ 75 
 
New Jersey’s Workmen’s Compensation Act provided, in pertinent part: 
“ ‘[A]ll claims for compensation for compensable occupational disease hereunder 
shall be forever barred unless a petition is filed ***, within five years after the date 
on which the employee ceased to be exposed in the course of employment with the 
employer to such occupational disease; ***.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Kane, 182 A.2d 
at 560. Since Gloria’s last employment exposure to beryllium was in June 1950, 
and her occupational disease did not manifest until January 1958, the five-year 
statutory time limitation elapsed long before she was aware of her illness.  
¶ 76 
 
Gloria’s husband brought a common-law action individually and as 
administrator of her estate to recover damages against Durotest for its negligence in 
exposing her to beryllium poisoning during the course of her employment. 
Defendant moved for judgment, arguing the case was governed by the Workmen’s 
Compensation Act. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case, and 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed, citing the exclusivity of the 
Workmen’s Compensation Act. Id. at 560-62. The court stated: 
“[W]hen compensation benefits for occupational diseases, including 
berylliosis, were authorized and brought within the substantive and 
administrative scheme of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, that remedy, with 
its advantages and its qualifications, was exclusive and in lieu of the former 
common law right. The legislative action must be considered as occupying and 
preempting the field; all other remedies were thereby abrogated.” Id. at 561.  
Professor Larson’s treatise scathingly censures this case:  
 
“Other jurisdictions, including Illinois and Pennsylvania, have refused to 
follow the twisted logic (emphasis added) in Kane that would (1) bar the claim 
because it was unknown at the time the statute of repose expired and (2) bar the 
civil action because of the exclusive remedy provisions of the state’s workers’ 
compensation law.” 9 Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 100.05(3)(b) 
(2015).  
¶ 77 
 
The treatise cites four Illinois cases and one Pennsylvania case that “refused to 
follow the twisted logic of Kane.” The first Illinois case cited is the appellate court 
decision in the case at bar, followed by Meerbrey and two additional appellate court 
decisions. The Pennsylvania case is Tooey v. AK Steel Corp., 81 A.3d 851 (Pa. 
2013), which is briefly discussed in the majority’s opinion, extensively discussed in 
 
 
- 24 - 
 
plaintiff’s (appellee’s) brief, and mentioned in a footnote in defendant Ferro’s 
(appellant’s) brief.  
 
¶ 78 
 
Tooey is a consolidation of two appeals. In the first case, John Tooey worked 
for Ferro Engineering (apparently the same defendant as in the case at bar) as an 
industrial salesman of asbestos products from 1964 until 1982, during which time 
he was exposed to asbestos dust. In December 2007, Tooey developed 
mesothelioma and died less than one year later. In the other case, Spurgeon Landis 
worked for Alloy Rods, Inc., from 1946 until 1982. He, too, was exposed to 
asbestos throughout his employment, and in July 2007 was diagnosed with 
mesothelioma.  
¶ 79 
 
Section 301(c)(2) of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act (Workers’ 
Compensation Act) provided that “ ‘whenever occupational disease is the basis for 
compensation, for disability or death under this act, it shall apply only to disability 
or death resulting from such disease and occurring within three hundred weeks 
after the last date of employment in an occupation or industry to which [the 
employee] was exposed to hazards of such disease.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) Tooey, 
81 A.3d at 857. Both Tooey’s and Landis’s mesothelioma manifested some 25 
years after their last date of employment where they were exposed to asbestos, far 
beyond the 300-week limitation period in section 301(c)(2) of the Workers’ 
Compensation Act.  
¶ 80 
 
In 2008, Tooey, Landis, and their spouses (appellants) filed separate tort 
actions against multiple defendants, including their employers (collectively, 
employers). The employers filed motions for summary judgment, alleging that 
appellants’ causes of action were barred by the exclusivity provision of section 
303(a) of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The appellants responded that a tort 
action is permitted against an employer where, as here, a disease falls outside the 
jurisdiction, scope, and coverage of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The trial 
court agreed with the appellants and denied the employers’ motions for summary 
judgment. On appeal, the Superior Court reversed the trial court’s decision. In the 
instant consolidated appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the decision 
of the Superior Court and remanded.  
¶ 81 
 
The Supreme Court held that claims for occupational disease which manifested 
outside the 300-week period prescribed by the Workers’ Compensation Act did not 
fall within the purview of the Workers’ Compensation Act, and, therefore, the 
 
 
- 25 - 
 
Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusivity provision did not preclude injured 
employees from filing common-law claims against their employers. In reaching 
this conclusion, the court stated:  
“[T]he consequences of Employers’ proposed interpretation of the Act to 
prohibit an employee from filing an action at common law, despite the fact that 
[the] employee has no opportunity to seek redress under the Act, leaves the 
employee with no remedy against his or her employer, a consequence that 
clearly contravenes the Act’s intended purpose of benefitting the injured 
worker. It is inconceivable that the legislature, in enacting a statute specifically 
designed to benefit employees, intended to leave a certain class of employees 
who have suffered the most serious of work-related injuries without any redress 
under the Act or at common law.” (Emphasis in original.) Tooey, 81 A.3d at 
864.  
¶ 82 
 
The Tooey decision is persuasive, as is the decision of the appellate court below 
which, in the words of Professor Larson’s treatise, “refused to follow the twisted 
logic *** that would (1) bar the claim because it was unknown at the time the 
statute of repose expired and (2) bar the civil action because of the exclusive 
remedy provisions of the state’s workers’ compensation law.” 9 Arthur Larson et 
al., Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 100.05(3)(b) (2015).  
¶ 83 
 
For the reasons set forth above, I strongly disagree with the majority’s decision 
in this case, and I therefore dissent. I would affirm the judgment of the appellate 
court. 
 
¶ 84 
 
JUSTICE KILBRIDE joins in this dissent.