Case Title: MICHAEL LEE V MACOMB COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS

Citation: 

Docket Number: 114700

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2001-07-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court 
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
C hief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JULY 17, 2001  
MICHAEL LEE, BRYAN DUNCIL, MARY 
DUNCIL on behalf of herself and  
JOSEPH DUNCIL, BRYAN DUNCIL, KENNETH 
DUNCIL, and JON DUNCIL, as their 
Next Friend, and the class of all 
others similarly situated,  
Plaintiff-Appellees,  
v  
No. 114700  
THE MACOMB COUNTY BOARD OF  
COMMISSIONERS, and the COUNTY OF 
MACOMB,  
Defendant-Appellants.  
DENNIS D. WALKER, on behalf of 
himself and DAWNELL J. WALKER and  
MELANIE WALKER, their Next Friend, 
and DWAYNE STEAGALL, ERNEST GROCE, 
JERRY GRAY, PAUL ECKLEY, DUANE GORE, 
KENNETH JONES, MORRIS BARTOLOTTA, and 
the class of all others similarly 
situated,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
v  
No. 115259  
_____________________________ 
THE WAYNE COUNTY BOARD OF  
COMMISSIONERS and THE COUNTY  
OF WAYNE,  
Defendants-Appellants.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
TAYLOR, J.  
At issue in these two cases coming to us from Macomb and  
Wayne counties is whether these plaintiffs have standing to  
pursue actions to compel their respective county board of  
commissioners to levy a tax to establish a veterans’ relief  
fund in accordance with the soldiers’ relief fund act, MCL  
35.21 et seq.  It is uncontested that none of the plaintiffs  
actually had sought relief under the act.  Because of this,  
the counties asserted that these litigants had suffered no  
injury and, accordingly, that plaintiffs (1) were without  
standing to sue and (2) had failed to exhaust statutory  
remedies.  In Lee, the Macomb County case, the trial court  
granted summary disposition for the county on those grounds.  
In Walker, the Wayne County case, the trial court denied the  
county’s motion for summary disposition, concluding that  
plaintiffs had standing and were not required to exhaust  
statutory remedies because they alleged a complete failure to  
comply with the act.  The Court of Appeals consolidated the  
appeals and largely reversed in Lee and affirmed in Walker.  
235 Mich App 323; 597 NW2d 545 (1999).  It concluded that  
2  
 
 
plaintiffs had standing to sue to compel implementation of the  
act and that mandamus was a proper remedy. We reverse.  
Statutory Analysis  
In these actions, plaintiffs seek to compel the  
legislative branch of the county government, the board of  
commissioners, to levy a tax to establish a veterans’ relief  
fund pursuant to the soldiers’ relief fund act.  MCL 35.21  
provides in pertinent part:1  
The county board of commissioners of each 
county shall annually levy, a tax not exceeding 
1/10 of a mill on each dollar, to be levied and 
collected as provided by law, upon the taxable 
property of each township and city, for their 
respective counties, for the purpose of creating a 
fund for the relief of honorably discharged  
indigent members of the army, navy, air force, 
marine corps, coast guard, and women's auxiliaries 
of all wars or military expeditions in which the 
United States of America has been, is, or may 
hereafter be, a participant . . . and the indigent 
spouses, minor children, and parents of each such 
indigent or deceased member. . . .  If any money in 
the fund is not necessary for the purpose for which 
it was raised, the money shall remain in the 
treasury of the county as a soldiers' relief fund, 
and shall be considered in raising future sums 
therefor.  
As can be seen, this section requires that the board of  
commissioners create a soldiers’ relief fund by a tax levy.  
It also, however, requires the commissioners to consider the  
amount existing in the fund when determining the amount, if  
1This act was initially enacted in 1899 and amended in 
1984 to update antiquated language.  
3  
any, of the annual levy for the fund.2  
Having thus established the funding mechanism, the act  
then continues by providing a procedure in MCL 35.23 for  
initiating and determining the amount of relief to be granted.  
This section states:  
The supervisor of each township and ward in 
each of the counties of this state, and where there 
is no ward supervisor the aldermen of the several 
wards of every incorporated city in this state, 
shall, on or before the last Monday in September in 
each year, make and place in the hands of the 
soldiers' relief commission of the county, a list 
of all the persons entitled to relief under the 
provisions of this act, and the soldiers' relief 
commission, on the first Monday in October in each 
year, shall proceed to determine the amount  
necessary for aid and relief to be granted such 
persons under this act, which shall be then and 
there recorded in the books to be kept by the 
secretary of said soldiers' relief commission. The  
commission may determine not only the sum to be 
paid, but the manner of paying the same, and may 
discontinue the payment of such relief in their 
discretion.  Appeal may be taken therefrom to the 
circuit court of such county, by certiorari by 
filing application therefor with the clerk within 
fifteen days following the making of such decision. 
The court shall hear the case de novo and its  
decision shall be final.  
What is established, then, is a scheme whereby it is  
2In response to the dissent, we note that, once the fund 
is 
created, 
the 
act 
provides the commissioners with discretion 
regarding the amount of the annual tax levy in light of any 
amount existing in the fund.  Moreover, at oral argument, 
plaintiffs’ 
counsel 
conceded that the record did not establish 
whether Macomb County had, at some time in the past, created 
a fund by levying a tax in compliance with the act. 
Presumably, the record is similarly unclear regarding whether 
Wayne County, at some time in the past, created a fund by 
levying a tax in compliance with the act.  
4  
  
 
anticipated 
that 
the 
township supervisor or ward aldermen will  
annually prepare a list of persons eligible for relief and  
provide this list to the soldiers’ relief commission.3  That  
commission then, in its discretion, determines the amount of  
relief, if any, to grant to the indigent, honorably discharged  
veteran or dependent applicant.  Moreover, the statute  
provides 
that 
aggrieved 
applicants 
can 
appeal 
the 
commission’s  
decision to the circuit court.  
Facts and Proceedings  
Here, without ever having sought relief under the act,  
plaintiffs filed suit to compel Macomb and Wayne Counties to  
levy the annual tax in order to create the fund of which the  
act speaks. Further, they, and presumably others, will soon  
seek damages for those years in which the counties allegedly  
3The statute requires the supervisor or alderman to 
create such a list, but it does not specify the means for 
identifying eligible persons.  Clearly, the supervisor or 
alderman can only place persons on this list if aware or made 
aware that an eligible person is in need. The supervisor or 
alderman can obviously act sua sponte and include on the list 
any known eligible persons. However in order to fulfill the  
duty to “make . . . a list of all the persons entitled to 
relief under the provisions of this act,” he is also obligated 
to add to the list any eligible person who asks to be included 
on it.  (Emphasis added.) This reading of the statute, rather 
than one reposing veto power with the supervisor or alderman 
regarding who will be included on the list, expands the 
opportunities for eligible veterans who, for whatever reason, 
have not been included on the list. We opt for this expansive 
reading because this is a remedial statute and we are  
obligated to read it liberally in favor of the indigent 
veterans it is intended to benefit.  See Chandler v Dowell  
Schlumberger Inc, 456 Mich 395, 398; 572 NW2d 210 (1998).  
5 
 
 
failed to comply with the act.  
Macomb County, in the Lee case, moved for summary  
disposition, claiming, inter alia, lack of standing and  
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.  In support, it  
provided the 1994 affidavit of its Department of Veterans  
Affairs Director, which indicated that the department had,  
through county budget appropriations, maintained a fund of  
$1000 for veterans relief for several years and that no claims  
for such relief had been filed for the past ten years.  The  
trial court granted Macomb County’s motion for summary  
disposition, concluding that plaintiffs lacked standing and  
failed 
to 
exhaust 
administrative remedies because they had not  
requested relief from the local government.  
Wayne County, in the Walker case, sought summary  
disposition on similar grounds. 
It provided documentary  
evidence 
indicating 
that, in 1994, the Wayne County Commission  
approved an appropriation of $1,146,042 for Veterans’ Affairs  
expenditures 
and 
that the Wayne County Soldiers Relief Program  
had been operational since February 1995.  In this case,  
however, the trial court denied Wayne County’s motion for  
summary disposition, concluding that plaintiffs had standing  
because they were in the class intended to be benefitted by  
the act and had been harmed by noncompliance with it and that  
they were not required to exhaust administrative remedies to  
challenge a wholesale failure to comply with the act.  
6  
These two cases were consolidated in the Court of  
Appeals, which largely reversed in Lee and affirmed in  
Walker.4
 The Court of Appeals majority concluded that  
plaintiffs had standing because they are “members of the class  
for whose benefit the Act was enacted” and because they are  
“detrimentally affected in a manner different from the public  
generally.” 235 Mich App 332. The panel held that mandamus  
was 
an 
appropriate 
remedy here because plaintiffs were seeking  
compliance with the act, not the levy of a particular amount  
or the grant of particular benefits.  Id. at 333-334.  
Finally, it concluded that plaintiffs’ actions could not be  
dismissed on the basis of failure to exhaust statutory  
remedies because they were alleging a wholesale failure to  
implement and comply with the act. Id. at 335.  
In dissent, former Justice John Fitzgerald, sitting by  
assignment, disagreed with the majority regarding standing:  
[P]laintiffs have not alleged any specific 
injury as a result of defendants' failure to  
establish a mechanism for evaluation of a claim for  
benefits or of defendants' underfunding of their 
respective veterans' relief funds. [Id. at 337.]  
Explaining further he said:  
[P]laintiffs have not alleged a distinct and 
palpable injury resulting from defendants' failure 
to fully comply with the statute, and consequently 
their claims cannot be differentiated from those of  
4The Court of Appeals ruled that government immunity 
precluded plaintiffs’ negligence and gross negligence claims 
in both cases.  
7  
any other citizen. As a prudential matter, courts 
must 
exercise 
their 
jurisdiction 
to 
address  
tangible, personal, threatened interests, not  
generalized grievances.  I am not persuaded that 
plaintiffs, as private citizens whose individual 
rights under the statute have not been abridged, 
have standing . . . . [Id. (citations omitted).]  
Regarding mandamus, he stated that it was inappropriate,  
assuming 
standing 
existed, 
because 
plaintiffs 
were 
“seeking 
to  
compel defendants’ exercise of discretion in a particular  
manner” that is beyond the scope of mandamus  Id. at 338-339.  
This Court granted leave to appeal.  462 Mich 912 (2000).  
Standard of Review  
Whether a party has standing is a question of law.  This  
Court reviews questions of law de novo.  Stitt v Holland  
Abundant Life Fellowship, 462 Mich 591, 595; 614 NW2d 88  
(2000).  
Standing  
It is important, initially, to recognize that in  
Michigan, as in the federal system, standing is of great  
consequence so that neglect of it would imperil the  
constitutional architecture whereby governmental powers are  
divided between the three branches of government.  
Standing, as a requirement to enter the courts, is a  
venerable doctrine in the federal system that derives from US  
Const, art III, § 1, which confers only “judicial power” on  
the courts and from US Const, art III, § 2's limitation of the  
8  
 
 
 
judicial power to “Cases” and “Controversies.”5  In several  
recent cases, the United States Supreme Court has discussed  
the close relationship between standing and separation of  
powers.  In Lewis v Casey, 518 US 343, 349; 116 S Ct 2174; 135  
L Ed 2d 606 (1996), Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,  
said:  
[T]he 
doctrine 
of 
standing 
[is] 
a  
constitutional principle that prevents courts of 
law 
from 
undertaking 
tasks 
assigned 
to 
the  
political branches.  It is the role of courts to  
provide relief to claimants, in individual or class 
actions, who have suffered, or will imminently 
suffer, actual harm; it is not the role of courts, 
but that of the political branches, to shape the 
institutions of government in such fashion as to 
comply 
with 
the 
laws 
and 
the 
Constitution.  
[Citations omitted.]  
Lewis was foreshadowed in Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife,  
504 US 555, 559-560; 112 S Ct 2130; 119 L Ed 2d 351 (1992),  
5The first clause of US Const, art III, § 2 states:  
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, 
in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, 
the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, 
or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to 
all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public 
Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty 
and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to  
which the United States shall be a Party;—to 
Controversies between two or more States;—between a 
State and Citizens of another State;—between 
Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of 
the same State claiming Lands under Grants of 
different States, and between a State, or the 
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or 
Subjects.  
9  
 
where 
Justice 
Scalia, again speaking for the Court, explained:  
[T]he Constitution's central mechanism of  
separation of powers depends largely upon common 
understanding of what activities are appropriate to 
legislatures, to executives, and to courts. . . . 
One of those landmarks, setting apart the "Cases" 
and "Controversies" that are of the justiciable 
sort referred to in Article III—"serv[ing] to 
identify those disputes which are appropriately 
resolved through the judicial process,"—is the 
doctrine of standing. Though some of its elements 
express merely prudential considerations that are 
part 
of 
judicial 
self-government, 
the 
core  
component 
of 
standing 
is 
an 
essential 
and  
unchanging 
part 
of 
the 
case-or-controversy 
requirement of Article III. [Citations omitted.]  
In Plaut v Spendthrift Farm, Inc, 514 US 211, 219-225;  
115 S Ct 1447; 131 L Ed 2d 328 (1995), Justice Scalia, in  
another majority opinion, provided a detailed analysis of the  
concern with preserving the separation of powers between the  
legislative and judicial branches, that traced its history  
back to the framers of the U.S. Constitution.  
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist even more dramatically  
stated the case in his majority opinion in Raines v Byrd, 521  
US 811, 818, 820; 117 S Ct 2312; 138 L Ed 2d 849 (1997):  
“No principle is more fundamental to the 
judiciary's proper role in our system of government 
than the constitutional limitation of federal-court  
jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.”  
* * *  
“[T]he law of Art III standing is built on a 
single basic idea—the idea of separation of  
powers.”  
In Michigan, standing has developed on a track parallel  
10  
 
to the federal doctrine, albeit by way of an additional  
constitutional underpinning. In addition to Const 1963, art  
6, § 1, which vests the state “judicial power” in the courts,  
Const 1963, art 3, § 2 expressly directs that the powers of  
the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary be  
separate.6  Concern with maintaining the separation of powers,  
as in the federal courts, has caused this Court over the years  
to be vigilant in preventing the judiciary from usurping the  
powers of the political branches.  Early on, the great  
constitutional scholar Justice Thomas M. Cooley discussed the  
concept of separation of powers in the context of declining to  
issue a mandamus against the Governor in Sutherland v  
Governor, 29 Mich 320, 324 (1874):  
Our government is one whose powers have been 
carefully 
apportioned 
between 
three 
distinct  
departments, which emanate alike from the people, 
have their powers alike limited and defined by the 
constitution, are of equal dignity, and within 
their 
respective 
spheres 
of 
action 
equally 
independent.  One makes the laws, another applies 
the laws in contested cases, while the third must 
see that the laws are executed.  This division is  
accepted as a necessity in all free governments, 
and the very apportionment of power to one  
department is understood to be a prohibition of its  
The powers of government are divided into 
three 
branches: 
legislative, 
executive 
and  
judicial.  No person exercising the powers of one 
branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to 
another branch except as expressly provided in this 
constitution.  
11  
6 
 
exercise by either of the others. The executive is  
forbidden to exercise judicial power by the same 
implication which forbids the courts to take upon 
themselves his duties.  
This position followed from the even earlier iteration of the  
standing doctrine by Justice Campbell in 1859 when, speaking  
for this Court, he said:  
By the judicial power of courts is generally 
understood 
the 
power 
to 
hear 
and 
determine  
controversies 
between 
adverse 
parties, 
and  
questions in litigation.  [Daniels v People, 6 Mich  
381, 388 (1859)(emphasis added).]  
Later, in Risser v Hoyt, 53 Mich 185, 193; 18 NW 611 (1884),  
this Court explained:  
The 
judicial 
power 
referred 
to 
is 
the  
authority to hear and decide controversies, and to 
make binding orders and judgments respecting them. 
[Emphasis added.]  
More recently, Johnson v Kramer Bros Freight Lines, Inc, 357  
Mich 254, 258; 98 NW2d 586 (1959), reaffirmed this concept by  
quoting this portion of Risser.  
In fleshing out the tests that a litigant must meet to  
establish standing, the most recent majority iteration from  
this Court7 is found in House Speaker v Governor, 441 Mich  
547, 554; 495 NW2d 539 (1993):  
Standing is a legal term used to denote the 
existence of a party's interest in the outcome of 
litigation that will ensure sincere and vigorous 
advocacy.
 However, evidence that a party will  
7This Court addressed standing in Detroit Fire Fighters  
Ass’n v Detroit, 449 Mich 629; 537 NW2d 436 (1995), but a 
majority did not agree on a standing test.  
12  
 
 
  
engage in full and vigorous advocacy, by itself, is 
insufficient to establish standing. 
Standing 
requires a demonstration that the plaintiff's 
substantial interest will be detrimentally affected 
in a manner different from the citizenry at large.  
House Speaker provided a general description of standing and  
articulated the requirement of an interest distinct from that  
of the public.  However, further explication of the essential  
elements of standing has proven difficult as demonstrated by  
this Court’s experience in attempting to fashion a clear  
majority in Detroit Fire Fighters Ass’n v Detroit, 449 Mich  
629; 537 NW2d 436 (1995). In that case, the separate opinions  
suggested different inquiries as being central to determining  
standing.
 Some focused on whether the plaintiff could  
establish an injury distinct from that of the public, others  
on whether the plaintiffs were in the zone of interest the  
statutory or constitutional provision at issue is designed to  
regulate.  Perhaps the clearest template was set forward by  
Justice Cavanagh who, along with Justice Boyle, advocated  
adopting the United States Supreme Court’s Lujan test. Lujan  
held:  
Over the years, our cases have established  
that the irreducible constitutional minimum of  
standing contains three elements. 
First, the 
plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"—an 
invasion of a legally protected interest which is 
(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) "actual or 
imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.' " 
Second, there must be a causal connection between 
the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury 
has to be "fairly . . . trace[able] to the  
challenged action of the defendant, and not . . .  
13  
th[e] result [of] the independent action of some 
third party not before the court." Third, it must 
be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," 
that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable 
decision."  
The party invoking . . . jurisdiction bears 
the burden of establishing these elements. [504 US 
560-561 (citations omitted).]  
In our view, the Lujan test has the virtues of articulating  
clear 
criteria 
and 
of establishing the burden of demonstrating  
these elements.  Moreover, its three elements appear to us to  
be fundamental to standing; the United States Supreme Court  
described 
them 
as 
establishing 
the 
“irreducible 
constitutional  
minimum” of standing.  We agree. 
Accordingly, we now join  
Justice Cavanagh’s view and adopt the Lujan test, which should  
be seen as supplementing the holding in House Speaker, as well  
as this Court’s earlier standing jurisprudence, e.g., Daniels  
and Risser, supra.  
Applying this test in the present case, it is clear that  
plaintiffs lack standing. In Lujan terms, they have not yet  
suffered any “injury in fact.”  See 504 US 560.  Specifically,  
they have shown no “invasion of a legally protected interest  
which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or  
imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’” Id. at 560.  
Both groups of plaintiffs have alleged and argued only that  
they “should receive” and “should have received, the benefit  
of the property tax levy required by MCL 35.21,” and that the  
failure to levy and collect the tax set forth in the soldiers’  
14  
 
relief fund act “has caused, and continues to cause,  
plaintiffs great harm and damage.”  Even if accepted as true,  
these allegations cannot satisfy the Lujan injury in fact  
requirement because it is not readily apparent how the  
collection of a tax pursuant to the act would have benefitted  
plaintiffs in a concrete and particularized manner.  MCL 35.23  
provides that the soldiers’ relief commission is to determine  
the amount and manner of any relief thereunder and that it may  
discontinue such relief in its discretion. Thus, the amount  
of relief, if any, that plaintiffs might have received under  
this act is solely within the discretion of the commission.8  
“[G]reat harm and damage” is not concrete or particularized.  
Plaintiffs also fail to explain, with particularity, what is  
meant by “the benefit of the property tax levy required by MCL  
8The dissent argues that it is “inescapable” that relief 
under that act would have benefitted the indigent plaintiffs 
in a concrete and particularized manner.  Slip op, p 8. We  
surmise that the idea is that any claimant would be better off 
with more money.  Yet this verity misses the point. The issue  
is whether plaintiffs can demonstrate a concrete and  
particularized injury arising out of the alleged failure of 
the counties to levy a tax in accordance with the act. 
Moreover, even if we jump ahead, as the dissent would, to the 
point where fund distribution to plaintiffs was at issue, it 
is not “inescapable” that plaintiffs would receive funds  
because 
the 
commission would likely exercise its discretion to 
avoid duplicating other government and private social welfare 
programs.  Thus, the commission could, even if plaintiffs were 
indigent, decide not to award funds to them.  
Thus, for all these reasons, what might be received, if 
anything, far from being concrete and particularized, is 
simply uncertain.  
15  
 
 
 
35.21.” At most, we can only speculate how the existence of  
a fund would have helped plaintiffs.  Accordingly, plaintiffs  
lack standing to pursue the present actions.  
In the absence of standing, we will not address  
plaintiffs’ substantive claims.  
Conclusion  
Plaintiffs do not have standing to bring the present  
actions.  We accordingly reverse the Court of Appeals  
determination 
that 
they have standing and remand these actions  
to the respective circuit courts for entry of orders  
dismissing plaintiffs’ actions on the basis of lack of  
standing.  
CORRIGAN, C.J., and YOUNG, 
and MARKMAN, 
JJ., concurred with  
TAYLOR, J.  
16  
 
 
____________________________________ 
____________________________________ 
S T A T E 
O F 
M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MICHAEL LEE, BRYAN DUNCIL, MARY 
DUNCIL on behalf of herself and  
JOSEPH DUNCIL, BRYAN DUNCIL, KENNETH 
DUNCIL, and JON DUNCIL, as their 
Next Friend, and the class of all 
others similarly situated,  
Plaintiff-Appellees,  
v 
No. 114700  
THE MACOMB COUNTY BOARD OF  
COMMISSIONERS, and the COUNTY OF 
MACOMB,  
Defendant-Appellants.  
DENNIS D. WALKER, on behalf of 
himself and DAWNELL J. WALKER and  
MELANIE WALKER, their Next Friend, 
and DWAYNE STEAGALL, ERNEST GROCE, 
JERRY GRAY, PAUL ECKLEY, DUANE GORE, 
KENNETH JONES, MORRIS BARTOLOTTA, and 
the class of all others similarly 
situated,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
v 
No. 115259  
THE WAYNE COUNTY BOARD OF  
COMMISSIONERS and THE COUNTY  
OF WAYNE,  
Defendants-Appellants.  
WEAVER, J. (concurring).  
I concur in the majority’s decision to reverse the  
judgment of the Court of Appeals. I write separately because  
I disagree with the majority’s decision to adopt the Lujan1  
standing requirements. I would find that the plaintiffs have  
standing.
 However, I agree with the decision to reverse;  
because the relief requested is a discretionary act, I would  
find that mandamus is not an appropriate remedy in this case.  
Although I would hold that no relief can be granted in  
this case, I am still cognizant of the great debt that our  
society owes to its veterans.  The soldiers’ relief act was  
first enacted in  1899, “to provide relief outside of the  
soldiers’ home for honorably discharged indigent soldiers,  
sailors and marines, and the indigent wives, widows and minor  
children of such indigent or deceased soldiers, sailors and  
marines . . . .” 1899 PA 214. I think it is appropriate to  
consider the last paragraph of the report on the Spanish- 
American War included in the Michigan Legislative Manual and  
Official Directory for the years 1899-1900, p 693:  
The forces that went into the war with Spain, 
from Michigan, were actuated by the highest 
motives. They came from every employment and walk 
of life, yet none entered that service without a 
sacrifice.
 
All 
left 
peaceful 
homes 
with  
comfortable surroundings and sure sources of income 
to risk their lives in battle or in camp in  
1Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555; 112 S Ct 
2130; 119 L Ed 2d 351 (1992).  
2  
 
  
response to the call of duty and patriotism. Some  
were killed in battle, others died of diseases 
incident to life in camp under new and untried 
conditions.  Some came home comparatively unharmed, 
while others, and very many others, came bringing 
with them the seeds of disease and infirmities from  
which they will always suffer.  There is but one  
proposition to make.  The people of Michigan in 
common with the people of this great nation owe a 
debt of gratitude and love  to those who in any way  
represented them in the glorious contest for  
humanity so happily and successfully ended by our 
treaty of peace with Spain, and we should not 
forget now or hereafter any of the obligations 
imposed on us by this debt.  
I  
Unlike constitutional cases in federal courts, the  
Michigan standing requirements have been based on prudential,  
rather than constitutional, concerns. See, generally, House  
Speaker v State Administrative Bd, 441 Mich 547, 559, n 20;  
495 NW2d 539 (1993), and Justice RILEY’s dissent in Detroit  
Fire Fighters Ass’n v Detroit 449 Mich 629; 537 NW2d 436  
(1995). Both this Court and the United States Supreme Court  
have recognized that we are not required to comply with the  
federal rules regarding standing.2 
I believe that adopting  
2In House Speaker we stated that “this Court is not bound  
to 
follow 
federal 
cases regarding standing,” pointing out that 
“[o]ne notable distinction between federal and state standing 
analysis is the power of this Court to issue advisory 
opinions.  Const 1963, art 3, §8. Under Article III of the  
federal constitution, federal courts may issue opinions only 
where there is an actual case or controversy.”  Id., p 559, 
including n 20.  Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in 
ASARCO Inc v Kadish, 490 US 605, 617; 109 S Ct 2037; 104 L Ed 
(continued...)  
3  
the federal standing test as set forth in Lujan v Defenders of  
Wildlife, 504 US 555; 112 S Ct 2130; 119 L Ed 2d 351 (1992),  
is unnecessary; therefore I decline to supplement the current  
standing doctrine of this Court.  
Applying Michigan’s traditional rules of standing, I  
would find that the plaintiffs have standing to bring the  
present action. In Michigan, it is well settled that all  
disgruntled 
citizens 
do not automatically have standing to sue  
a public body. In House Speaker, supra at 554, we said:  
Standing is a legal term used to denote the 
existence of a party’s interest in the outcome of 
litigation that will ensure sincere and vigorous 
advocacy.
 However, evidence that a party will 
engage in  full and vigorous advocacy, by itself, 
is insufficient to establish standing.  Standing 
requires a demonstration that the plaintiff’s 
substantial interest will be detrimentally affected 
in a manner different from the citizenry at large.  
The usual rule has been that a private citizen has no standing  
to vindicate a public wrong or enforce a public right where  
that citizen has not been hurt in any manner different than  
the citizenry at large.  Waterford Sch Dist v State Bd of Ed,  
98 Mich App 658, 662; 296 NW2d 328 (1980).  
2(...continued) 
2d 696 (1989), acknowledged:  
We have recognized often that the constraints 
of Article III do not apply to state courts, and 
accordingly the state courts are not bound by the 
limitations of a case or controversy or other 
federal rules of justiciability . . . .  
4  
 
However, 
while 
a private suit is generally precluded when  
a violation of a public duty is claimed, a private action can  
be maintained if the public duty also was intended to benefit  
private individuals. Taylor v Lake Shore & M S R Co, 45 Mich  
74, 77; 7 NW 728 (1881).  Justice COOLEY, speaking for the  
Court, explained that “[t]he nature of the duty and the  
benefits to be accomplished through its performance must  
generally determine whether it is a duty to the public in part  
or exclusively, or whether individuals may claim that it is a  
duty imposed wholly or in part for their especial benefit.”  
Id. See also Gardner v Wood, 429 Mich 290; 414 NW2d 706  
(1987).  
The plain language of the soldiers’ relief fund act3  
unequivocally 
supports the notion that the statute was enacted  
solely to benefit citizens in the same class as the  
plaintiffs, i.e., honorably discharged, indigent veterans.  
Clearly, the plaintiffs possess an interest in the soldiers’  
relief fund that is “different from the public at large.”  
Moreover, the relief sought does indeed more directly and  
3  
The county board of commissioners of each 
county shall annually levy, a tax not exceeding 
1/10 of a mill on each dollar . . . for the purpose 
of creating a fund for the relief of honorably 
discharged indigent members of the army, navy, air 
force, marine corps, coast guard, and women’s 
auxiliaries 
of 
all 
wars 
or 
military 
expeditions . . . . See MCL 35.21.  
5  
tangibly benefit the plaintiffs than it does the public at  
large.  In this case, the plaintiffs made a proper showing  
that they were injured in a manner distinct from the citizenry  
at large.  Therefore, I would find that the plaintiffs have  
standing to pursue the instant action.  
II  
Plaintiffs ask that the defendant counties be ordered to  
begin assessing taxes to maintain their soldiers’ relief  
funds.  However, this particular duty, which is covered by MCL  
35.21, is discretionary, and therefore is not a proper subject  
for mandamus. Because I would find that mandamus is not an  
appropriate remedy in this case, I agree with the majority’s  
result.  
It is well settled that an order of mandamus will be  
issued only if the plaintiffs have a clear legal right to the  
performance of the specific duty sought to be compelled and  
the defendant has a clear legal duty to perform the same.  
State Bd of Ed v Houghton Schs, 430 Mich 658, 666; 425 NW2d 80  
(1988).
 The act sought to be compelled must not be  
discretionary.  It must be of a ministerial nature, and it  
must be prescribed by law with such precision and certainty as  
to leave nothing to the exercise of discretion or judgment.  
If any reasonable doubts exist regarding the question of  
6  
discretion or want of discretion, the courts will hesitate to  
interfere.  See In re MCI Telecommunications, 460 Mich 396;  
596 NW2d 164 (1999), Oakland Schs Bd of Ed v Sup’t of Pub  
Instruction, 401 Mich 37; 257 NW2d 73 (1977) and Taylor v  
Ottawa Circuit Judge, 343 Mich 440; 72 NW2d 146 (1955).  
Here, the county board of commissioners is given the  
authority and the discretion to determine the amount of the  
tax to be levied; the only limit it is given is that it not  
exceed 1/10 of a mill.  The first sentence of MCL 35.21  
provides:  
The county board of commissioner of each 
county shall annually levy, a tax not exceeding 
1/10 of a mill on each dollar, to be levied and 
collected as provided by law, upon the taxable 
property of each township and city, for their 
respective counties, for the purpose of creating a 
fund for the relief of honorably discharged  
indigent . . . .  
Further, the last sentence of MCL 35.21 states  
If any money in the fund is not necessary for 
the purpose for which it was raised, the money 
shall remain in the treasury of the county as a 
soldiers' relief fund, and shall be considered in 
raising future sums therefor.  
Additionally, the soldiers’ relief commission is required to  
make an annual report of the money on hand, the money it is  
expending, and how much it believes will be needed for the  
next year.  Therefore the relief requested by the plaintiffs,  
7  
that the defendant counties be ordered to begin  assessing  
taxes under the statute, is a discretionary act, and mandamus  
is not an appropriate remedy.  
There is no specific relief the Court could provide, as  
we cannot require the county to assess a specific amount.  
Accordingly, I concur with the majority opinion’s result  
reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals.  
8  
___________________________________ 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
MICHAEL LEE, BRYAN DUNCIL, MARY 
DUNCIL on behalf of herself and  
JOSEPH DUNCIL, BRYAN DUNCIL, 
KENNETH DUNCIL, and JON DUNCIL, 
as their Next Friend, and the class 
of all others similarly situated,  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
v 
No. 114700  
THE MACOMB COUNTY BOARD OF  
COMMISSIONERS, and the COUNTY OF 
MACOMB,  
Defendants-Appellants.  
DENNIS D. WALKER, on behalf of 
himself and DAWNELL J. WALKER and  
MELANIE WALKER, their Next Friend, 
and DWAYNE STEAGALL, ERNEST GROCE, 
JERRY GRAY, PAUL ECKLEY, DUANE GORE, 
KENNETH JONES, MORRIS BARTOLOTTA, 
and the class of all others similarly 
situated.  
Plaintiffs-Appellees,  
v 
No. 115259  
___________________________________ 
THE WAYNE COUNTY BOARD OF  
COMMISSIONERS and the COUNTY OF  
WAYNE,  
Defendants-Appellants.  
KELLY, J. (dissenting).  
I disagree with the majority's reversal of the Court of  
Appeals decision.  I believe plaintiffs have standing to bring  
the current actions and mandamus has been appropriately  
sought.  I would affirm the Court of Appeals decision that  
reversed summary disposition in favor of Macomb County and  
affirmed denial of Wayne County's motion for summary  
disposition.  
I. THE STATUTES  
Plaintiffs alleged in their complaints that defendants  
violated the soldiers' relief fund act1 by failing to comply  
with their duty to levy and collect a tax and perform other  
obligations.  Section 1 of the act creates a relief fund by  
mandating an annual tax levy and payment of the moneys  
collected to the county treasurer. MCL 35.21.  
The method for disbursing moneys from the fund appears at  
§ 3 of the act.  This section mandates the compilation of a  
list of persons entitled to relief under the act and a  
1MCL 35.21 et seq.  
2  
 
  
determination of the amount of relief to be granted to such  
persons. MCL 35.23.2  
In summary, a relief fund was to be established and an  
annual compilation of the names of persons entitled to monies  
from the fund was to be made.  Many of the actions of the  
county board of commissioners, the township supervisors and  
the soldiers' relief commission that are described in the  
statute are mandatory, as evidenced by use of the word  
"shall."  
Under the act, the county board of commissioners has a  
duty to levy a tax annually.  The supervisor of each township  
and ward is obligated to make a list of persons eligible for  
relief and give that list to the soldiers' relief commission.  
The soldiers' relief commission must determine the amount of  
money to be distributed to the persons on the list.  The  
county board of commissioners is obligated to pay the money  
from the taxes to the county treasurer, who disburses the  
money at the order of the soldiers' relief commission.  
The majority focuses on the discretion that the act gives  
the soldiers' relief commission to set the amount to be  
distributed.
 However, plaintiffs do not allege that the  
2Pursuant to MCL 35.622, the soldiers' relief commission 
was 
declared 
inoperative and its duties and powers transferred 
to the county department of veterans'  affairs. This opinion 
will continue to refer to the soldiers' relief commission for  
the sake of consistency.  
3  
soldiers' relief commission failed to comply with the act, nor  
do they request money from it.  Rather, plaintiffs seek to  
compel the creation of a relief fund through the levy and  
collection of an annual tax. The majority's reliance on the  
discretion 
of 
the 
soldiers' relief commission ignores the fact  
that the act gives no discretion whatsoever regarding whether  
taxes are levied and a fund created. It mandates these acts  
and directs the board of commissioners to accomplish them.  
In the cases before us, plaintiffs claim that the county  
boards of commissioners failed to comply with the act and  
perform their nondiscretionary duties. Plaintiffs alleged in  
their complaints that the county boards of commissioners had  
not at any time levied a tax for the soldiers' relief fund.3  
This failure to comply with the nondiscretionary obligations  
3It appears that the allegation regarding the Macomb 
County Board of Commissioners may have been overstated. 
Plaintiffs' counsel conceded during oral argument that the 
record does not establish whether a fund was created in Macomb  
County at sometime in the past and later eliminated.  
Nevertheless, 
it 
must be remembered that these cases challenge 
rulings made on motions for summary disposition brought under 
MCR 2.116(C)(8).  In ruling on these motions, only the 
pleadings are considered.  Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 
119-120; 597 NW2d 817 (1999).  Therefore, the concession is 
not relevant to the resolution of this appeal.  
Moreover, 
plaintiffs' 
complaints 
alleged 
ongoing 
violations of the act.  Whether a fund went into and out of  
existence during the last century has no bearing on the 
allegation that the Macomb County Board of Commissioners 
failed to comply with the act at the time plaintiffs filed 
their complaint.  
4  
of the act is the basis of plaintiffs' claims.  Hence, the  
majority's focus on the discretionary nature of the soldiers'  
relief commission's duties camouflages the relevant fact:  no  
discretion exists that permits the county boards of  
commissioners not to levy taxes for a soldiers' relief fund.4  
II. STANDING  
The trial court decisions in these matters were made on  
motions for summary disposition and are reviewed de novo.  
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). In  
both cases, defendants challenged plaintiffs' standing under  
MCR 2.116(C)(8). Such motions test the legal sufficiency of  
the complaint, and, when ruling on them, the court may  
consider only the pleadings.  A trial judge may grant summary  
disposition where the claims alleged are "so clearly  
unenforceable as a matter of law that no factual development  
could possibly justify recovery." Id. at 119.  
The majority has concluded that summary disposition was  
properly granted to Macomb County and improperly denied to  
Wayne County.  It adopts the test for standing articulated in  
Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 US 555; 112 S Ct 2130; 119  
4As noted by the majority and the concurrence, the act 
gives the county boards of commissioners discretion in 
determining the amount of the annual tax levy. However, this 
fact does not in any way undermine plaintiffs' claims.  As  
evidenced by the word "shall," there is no discretion 
regarding whether to levy an annual tax.  
5  
L Ed 2d 351 (1992). It then finds that plaintiffs failed to  
establish standing under the test.  
While I agree with the majority's adoption of the Lujan  
test, I cannot agree that plaintiffs lack standing.  That  
conclusion 
ignores the 
nature 
of 
plaintiffs' 
claims.  
Plaintiffs did not appeal from the denial of benefits under  
the act.  Instead, they sought to compel defendants to comply  
with the act.  That the amount of relief "is solely within the  
discretion 
of 
the 
commission" is irrelevant to a determination  
of 
the 
injury 
plaintiffs sustained from defendants' failure to  
establish a relief fund in compliance with the act.  
To withstand summary disposition on the basis of  
standing, plaintiffs must plead that they suffered an injury  
in fact through defendants' failure to comply with the  
mandates of the soldiers' relief fund act.  They have done so.  
They have alleged that they are members of the class of  
persons for whose benefit the fund was intended.  They have  
alleged that defendants failed to (1) levy a tax to establish  
the relief fund, and (2) pay the collected moneys to the  
county treasurer, both of which were for the benefit and  
relief of plaintiffs.  Plaintiffs have asserted that, because  
defendants failed to comply with the act and establish the  
fund, plaintiffs could not apply for or receive benefits to  
which the act entitled them.  
6  
  
Because plaintiffs have alleged failure to establish a  
relief fund and denial of the opportunity to apply for or  
receive its benefits, they have sufficiently asserted an  
injury in fact.  There is no need for them to allege precisely  
how the fund would have helped them.  Had it been established,  
plaintiffs have alleged that they would have applied for  
financial assistance.  
It is inescapable that the creation of a fund and the  
opportunity for indigents to receive its financial assistance  
would 
have 
benefitted 
plaintiffs 
in 
a 
concrete 
and  
particularized manner.  By definition, to be indigent is to be  
"needy and poor, or one who has not sufficient property to  
furnish him a living nor anyone able to support him to whom he  
is entitled to look for support."  Black's Law Dictionary (6th  
ed). Through their assertions, plaintiffs have sufficiently  
alleged "specific, concrete facts demonstrating that the  
challenged 
practices 
harmed 
[them], 
and 
that 
[they] 
personally  
would 
benefit 
in 
a 
tangible 
way 
from 
the 
court's  
intervention." Warth v Seldin, 422 US 490, 508; 95 S Ct 2197;  
45 L Ed 2d 343 (1975).  
The majority determines that plaintiffs' claims are  
"uncertain" 
because 
plaintiffs do not allege a likelihood that  
the soldiers' relief commission would have granted funds to  
them.  Under this test, no plaintiffs could ever have standing  
7  
to contest defendants' failure to establish a relief fund.  No  
plaintiff could know how a soldiers' relief commission would  
have exercised its discretion.  If plaintiffs' had sought  
relief within the discretion of the soldiers' relief  
commission, what could they be required to allege to defeat a  
motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8)?  I  
submit that it is only that, under a reasonable exercise of  
discretion, 
the 
soldiers' 
relief 
commission 
would 
have 
granted  
them relief. Plaintiffs in these cases made that showing by  
alleging their eligibility, as veterans and as indigents.  
However, 
that 
the amount of relief distributed was solely  
within the discretion of the soldiers' relief commissions is  
in no way related to whether plaintiffs suffered an injury in  
fact.  Since plaintiffs alleged injury from defendants'  
failure to establish funds in accordance with the act, the  
issue of discretion in administering the funds is irrelevant.  
Plaintiffs 
also 
adequately 
pleaded 
facts 
that 
established  
the second element of the Lujan test. The causal connection  
between 
their 
alleged 
injuries 
and 
defendants' 
alleged 
conduct  
or failure to act is illustrated in the reasoning above. If  
defendants had complied with the requirements of the act,  
plaintiffs have asserted that they would have applied for  
benefits. There is no indication that the failure to comply  
8  
 
with the provisions of the act was the result of the  
independent action of a third party.  
Finally, plaintiffs have pleaded facts sufficient to  
fulfill the third element of the Lujan test. 
They seek to  
compel defendants' full compliance with the soldiers' relief  
fund act.  On the basis of the pleadings, plaintiffs have  
alleged sufficient facts to establish that their injuries  
would be redressed if these cases were returned for further  
proceedings.  
For these reasons, I would conclude that plaintiffs have  
standing under the test in Lujan.  
III. MANDAMUS  
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that cannot be  
invoked to compel discretionary actions. Teasel v Dep't of  
Mental Health, 419 Mich 390, 409-410; 355 NW2d 75 (1984).  
However, an order of mandamus can be issued where "a body or  
an officer [is] charged with a duty to take action in the  
matter, notwithstanding the fact that the execution of that  
duty may involve some measure of discretion." Id. at 410.  
Therefore, mandamus can compel a body or officer to  
exercise discretion, but cannot compel the manner in which the  
discretion is exercised. Id. To issue an order of mandamus,  
9  
 
a defendant must have a clear legal duty and a plaintiff must  
have a clear legal right to have the duty performed. Toan v  
McGinn, 271 Mich 28, 33; 260 NW 108 (1935).  
The relevant parts of the soldiers' relief fund act are  
phrased in terms of clear legal duties that are applicable to  
defendants.  Under the act, the county board of commissioners  
is charged with the duty of levying taxes on an annual basis.  
It is the exercise of duty that plaintiffs seek to compel, a  
proper purpose for the issuance of an order of mandamus.  
The act also imposes a legal duty on defendants to create  
a fund for the relief of honorably discharged indigent  
veterans and their indigent spouses, minor children, and  
parents.  It establishes a clear legal right to relief for  
certain persons, including the class that plaintiffs seek to  
represent.  Whether persons eligible under the act receive  
relief 
is 
dependent 
on 
compliance 
by 
defendants 
in  
establishing a relief fund.  Defendants have clear legal  
duties and plaintiffs have a clear legal right to have  
defendants perform their duties.  Mandamus is appropriately  
sought.  
IV. CONCLUSION  
The soldiers' relief fund act, however arcane, is valid  
and binding law.  The Legislature could have chosen to repeal  
it at any time during the last century, but did not do so.  
10  
Moreover, it is apparent from the fact that the Legislature  
amended the act in 1984 that it made a conscious decision not  
to repeal it.  
The majority's reliance on that portion of the act giving  
the soldiers' relief commission discretion in granting relief  
ignores the nature of plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs did not  
contend that the soldiers' relief commission failed to comply  
with the act.  Nor did plaintiffs seek relief within the  
discretion of that commission. Therefore, the fact that the  
amount of relief "is solely within the discretion" of the  
soldiers' relief commission, as the majority points out, is  
irrelevant to the claims presented here. What plaintiffs seek  
is to compel the county boards of commissioners to comply with  
their mandatory obligation to annually levy taxes and to  
create relief funds.  
As noted by the majority, the soldiers' relief fund act  
is remedial and should be read liberally in favor of  
plaintiffs, 
its 
intended beneficiaries.  See Chandler v Dowell  
Schlumberger Inc, 456 Mich 395, 398; 572 NW2d 210 (1998).  
Plaintiffs alleged that they suffered an injury in fact  
through defendants' failure to establish relief funds and  
denial of the opportunity to apply for or receive benefits  
under the act.  These claims are not so unenforceable as a  
matter of law that no factual basis could possibly justify  
11  
 
recovery.  
Plaintiffs have satisfied the criteria under the Lujan  
test, establishing standing.  The soldiers' relief fund act  
charges defendants with the duty to take action in plaintiffs'  
interest.  Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly determined  
that plaintiffs had standing to bring suit and that mandamus  
was a proper remedy.  Accordingly, I would affirm the decision  
of the Court of Appeals.  
CAVANAGH, J., concurred with KELLY, J.  
12