Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Lee

Citation: 2016-Ohio-85

Docket Number: 2014-1744

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2016-01-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Lee, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-85.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-85 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. LEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Lee, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-85.] 
Attorneys at law—Misconduct—Violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct 
and a Rule for the Government of the Bar—Indefinite suspension. 
(No. 2014-1744—Submitted May 5, 2015—Decided January 14, 2016.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 2013-036. 
_______________________ 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Raymond Thomas Lee III of Dublin, Ohio, Attorney 
Registration No. 0040765, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1983.  
Lee’s license to practice law has been suspended four times for his failure to register 
as an attorney and once for his failure to comply with the continuing legal education 
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(“CLE”) requirements of Gov.Bar R. X.1  Lee has failed to rectify the conditions 
underlying his CLE and fourth attorney-registration suspensions.  Thus, he has been 
suspended from the practice of law in Ohio continuously since December 17, 2010.2   
{¶ 2} On June 10, 2013, a probable-cause panel of the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline3 certified to the board a two-count 
complaint filed by relator, disciplinary counsel, against Lee.  The complaint alleged 
that Lee, who primarily practices federal employment law on behalf of the Federal 
Educators Association (“FEA”) and its members,4 had neglected the Kentucky 
licensing matter of a union member.  The complaint further alleged that Lee had 
failed to reasonably communicate with that client; engaged in dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit, or misrepresentation; practiced law in a jurisdiction in violation of the 
regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction; and failed to cooperate in the 
ensuing investigation. 
{¶ 3} A panel of the board conducted a hearing and issued a report in which 
it rejected Lee’s claim that federal labor law rendered him immune from state 
                                                 
1 See In re Attorney Registration Suspension of Lee, 107 Ohio St.3d 1431, 2005-Ohio-6408, 838 
N.E.2d 671, and In re Reinstatement of Lee, 110 Ohio St.3d 1480, 2006-Ohio-4761, 854 N.E.2d 207 
(suspended from December 2, 2005, to July 26, 2006, for his failure to register for the 2005-2007 
biennium); In re Attorney Registration Suspension of Lee, 116 Ohio St.3d 1420, 2007-Ohio-6463, 
877 N.E.2d 305, and In re Reinstatement of Lee, 118 Ohio St.3d 1523, 2008-Ohio-3532, 890 N.E.2d 
331 (suspended from December 3, 2007, to April 29, 2008, for his failure to register for the 2007-
2009 biennium); In re Attorney Registration Suspension of Lee, 123 Ohio St.3d 1475, 2009-Ohio-
5786, 915 N.E.2d 1256, and In re Reinstatement of Lee, 126 Ohio St.3d 1603, 2010-Ohio-4979, 935 
N.E.2d 48 (suspended from November 3 to December 2, 2009, for his failure to register for the 
2009-2011 biennium); In re Attorney Registration Suspension of Lee, 130 Ohio St.3d 1441, 2011-
Ohio-5890, 957 N.E.2d 302 (effective November 15, 2011); In re Continuing Legal Education 
Suspension of Lee, 127 Ohio St.3d 1467, 2010-Ohio-6302, 938 N.E.2d 368 (effective December 17, 
2010).   
2 Lee is also licensed to practice law in the state of California, but at the May 5, 2015 oral argument 
of this case, he stated that he had not reported his Ohio suspensions to the California bar. 
3 Effective January 1, 2015, the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline has been 
renamed the Board of Professional Conduct.  See Gov.Bar R. V(1)(A), 140 Ohio St.3d CII. 
4 The FEA is a union that represents educators working in the Department of Defense school system 
who are charged with educating the children of military members.  Federal Education Association, 
Inside FEA, www.feaonline.org/inside/ (accessed Dec. 9, 2015); Department of Defense Education 
Activity, About DoDEA, http://www.dodea.edu/aboutDoDEA/index.cfm (accessed Dec. 9, 2015). 
January Term, 2016 
 
3
attorney disciplinary proceedings in this case.  The panel also found that based on 
Lee’s conduct, an implied attorney-client relationship arose between Lee and the 
union member and that relator had proven each of the alleged ethical violations by 
clear and convincing evidence.  Based on those violations, the panel recommended 
that Lee be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in Ohio. 
{¶ 4} The board adopted the panel report with minor modifications and 
agreed that an indefinite suspension is the appropriate sanction for Lee’s 
misconduct.  Lee objects to the board’s findings that (1) he is not immune from 
discipline, (2) an attorney-client relationship arose between him and the union 
member, and (3) he failed to cooperate in relator’s investigation.  We overrule Lee’s 
objections, adopt the board’s findings of fact and misconduct, and indefinitely 
suspend Lee from the practice of law in Ohio. 
Count I:  The Buhl Matter 
{¶ 5} At all times relevant herein, Lee was on a regular retainer with the 
FEA and received a fixed monthly fee to handle disciplinary matters involving 
members of the FEA’s collective-bargaining unit; more than 50 percent of those 
matters involved teacher discipline.  His primary contact at the FEA was his ex-
wife, Dorothy Lee (“Dorothy”), who served as general counsel for the FEA 
Stateside Region. 
{¶ 6} In 2007, Patricia Lee-Buhl (“Buhl”), a teacher and member of the 
FEA, was employed by the Fort Knox Community Schools5 (“the school district”) 
in Fort Knox, Kentucky.  During the summer of 2007, Buhl’s husband, who served 
in the United States Army, was transferred from Fort Knox to the Marshall Islands, 
and the school district granted Buhl a 90-day leave of absence.  In October 2007, 
Buhl resigned her teaching position at the school district. 
                                                 
5 The Fort Knox Community Schools district is operated by the United States Department of 
Defense.  Department of Defense Education Activity, Fort Knox Community Schools, 
http://www.am.dodea.edu/knox/fkcsco/ (accessed Dec. 9, 2015). 
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{¶ 7} Buhl contacted Lee and Dorothy in early November 2007 to inquire 
about the possibility of filing a grievance in connection with an investigation by the 
school district that had been pending against her at the time of her resignation.  Lee 
responded and advised Buhl that her resignation had weakened the position of the 
FEA because she was no longer a member of the collective-bargaining unit and that 
the school district could therefore challenge the union’s standing to bring an action 
on her behalf.  The record indicates that Buhl never filed a grievance about the 
matter. 
{¶ 8} On November 28, 2007, the Kentucky Education Professional 
Standards Board (“the state licensing board”)—the state agency responsible for 
issuing teaching certificates for all public-school teachers in Kentucky, 
Ky.Rev.Stat.Ann. 161.030(1)—sent Buhl a letter (at her new address in the 
Marshall Islands) to inform her that she had been accused of teacher misconduct 
and to request her response to the allegations. 
{¶ 9} After receiving the state licensing board’s letter, Buhl prepared a draft 
reply to the allegations and e-mailed that draft to Lee and several FEA staff 
members for their review.  Lee reviewed her draft, provided comments, and 
recommended that she submit the revised draft as the reply.  He also indicated that 
he and Dorothy were preparing a “lawyer supplement” to be submitted after Buhl’s 
reply.  Buhl made Lee’s proposed changes and sent the letter back to him so that he 
could submit it on her behalf.  Lee faxed Buhl’s letter to the state licensing board, 
but he did not submit any supplemental materials. 
{¶ 10} In March 2008, the state licensing board notified Buhl and Lee that 
it would hold a hearing on the disciplinary complaint against Buhl.  The following 
month, Buhl e-mailed Lee and other FEA staff members seeking advice, and Lee 
replied that no action should be taken until the state licensing board assigned her 
case to a judge and set a prehearing conference date.  He further stated, “We will 
naturally review the charges and take whatever action is appropriate based on the 
January Term, 2016 
 
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charges brought, if any.”  Although Buhl inquired about the status of the complaint 
in October 2008 and June 2009, neither Dorothy nor Lee responded to her inquiries. 
{¶ 11} In March 2010, attorney Courtney Baxter sent a letter to Buhl at her 
former address stating that she would be prosecuting the complaint before the state 
licensing board and advising Buhl that Lee had not responded to any of her 
telephone calls.  Although the state licensing board had previously sent 
correspondence to Buhl in the Marshall Islands, Baxter’s letter was sent to Buhl’s 
former Kentucky address.  Apparently unaware of Baxter’s letter, Dorothy 
responded to an April 2010 e-mail from Buhl, telling her that she should take no 
action and that there was no reason to believe the complaint was still under review. 
{¶ 12} Baxter filed the formal complaint against Buhl with the state 
licensing board on February 11, 2011.  After several attempts to serve the wrong 
attorney and to serve Buhl at her former address, Baxter finally reached Lee, who 
told her that he had not heard from Buhl recently and that he was not sure whether 
he “still” represented her.  Lee told Baxter that he would make an inquiry and be in 
touch.  After Baxter did not hear again from Lee, she moved for a default judgment 
on March 7, 2011. 
{¶ 13} Six days after Baxter moved for default, Buhl e-mailed Lee and 
Dorothy to inform them that she had received a copy of the prehearing-conference 
order, which had been forwarded to her, and to request that they contact the state 
licensing board to clear up any misunderstanding and avoid defaulting.  Just two 
days later—on March 15, 2011—the hearing officer issued a recommended order 
of default.  That afternoon, Lee e-mailed Baxter, stating that Buhl had authorized 
him to represent her but that he would need to move for admission to the Kentucky 
bar pro hac vice.  He forwarded that e-mail to Buhl and promised to file a notice of 
appearance and request to be admitted pro hac vice later that day. 
{¶ 14} Lee and Baxter exchanged e-mails the next day, agreeing to seek a 
new prehearing-conference date and to begin settlement talks.  Lee then sent a letter 
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to the hearing officer requesting a date for a new prehearing conference and stating 
his intent to move for admission pro hac vice.  But Baxter soon informed him that 
she had received a court order granting her motion for default judgment—and 
permanently revoking Buhl’s Kentucky teaching certificate—and recommended 
that he move to set the default judgment aside.  Later that afternoon, Lee sent Buhl 
a copy of the letter he had sent to the hearing officer promising to get “something 
else” filed on the following Monday. 
{¶ 15} Notwithstanding Lee’s multiple representations and promises to 
Buhl, Baxter, and the hearing officer that he would take action on Buhl’s behalf, he 
never filed a notice of appearance, never moved for admission pro hac vice, and 
never moved to set aside the default judgment.  He also never responded to Buhl’s 
subsequent inquiries about the status of her case or to her requests for assistance. 
{¶ 16} On November 2, 2011, Buhl received a notice that Pennsylvania 
sought to revoke her teaching certification in that state based on the Kentucky order.  
Again, Lee failed to respond to Buhl’s inquiries, and although he told her new 
attorney that he “hope[d] to devote tomorrow [i.e., December 17, 2011] to this 
matter,” he never provided Buhl’s file to the new attorney.  Despite Lee’s inaction, 
Buhl’s new counsel negotiated a settlement that vacated the revocation of her 
Kentucky teaching certificate and, instead, imposed a two-year suspension 
retroactive to May 16, 2011. 
{¶ 17} At his disciplinary hearing, Lee testified that he was not a Kentucky 
attorney, did not know how to get admitted pro hac vice or how to vacate a default 
judgment, had no experience with teacher-licensing issues, and had more work than 
he could handle at the time of the default judgment.  He also admitted that he never 
shared any of these facts with Buhl. 
{¶ 18} The board found that Lee abandoned Buhl and her legal matter, 
failed to act with reasonable diligence or promptness, failed to keep her informed, 
ignored reasonable requests for information, and failed to turn over her file when 
January Term, 2016 
 
7
she retained new counsel.  The board also found that Lee’s inaction was 
compounded by his failure to tell Buhl that he could not represent her while 
simultaneously allowing her to believe that he was handling her matter.  
Consequently, the board found that Lee violated the following Kentucky Rules of 
Professional Conduct:6 S.C.R. 3.130-1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable 
diligence in representing a client), 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep the client 
reasonably informed about the status of a matter), 1.4(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to 
comply as soon as practicable with reasonable requests for information from the 
client), 1.16(d) (requiring a lawyer to take steps to surrender papers and property to 
which the client is entitled upon termination of representation), 5.5(a) (prohibiting 
a lawyer from practicing law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the 
legal profession in that jurisdiction), and 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging 
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). 
Federal Labor Law Does Not Render Lee Immune from Discipline in Ohio 
{¶ 19} The first of two defenses that Lee raised below is that federal labor 
law grants him immunity from all federal- and state-law claims arising from his 
representation of the FEA. 
{¶ 20} The board found that Lee’s claim of immunity was predicated on a 
body of federal law that renders an attorney who represents a union immune from 
tort-liability claims arising from that representation.  See Atkinson v. Sinclair 
Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 248-249, 82 S.Ct. 1318, 8 L.Ed.2d 462 (1962) (holding 
that Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (“LMRA”), 29 
U.S.C. 185(a), provides that when a private-sector union is liable for damages for 
                                                 
6 Because Lee’s conduct involved a matter pending before the Kentucky Education Professional 
Standards Board, the choice-of-law provision of Ohio Prof.Cond.R. 8.5 makes it clear that Kentucky 
law governs the relationship between Lee and Buhl.  See Prof.Cond.R. 8.5(b)(1) (providing that for 
conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which 
the tribunal sits apply unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise).  The Kentucky rules at 
issue here are virtually identical to the corresponding Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct.   
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violation of a collective-bargaining contract, its officers, members, and agents 
cannot be held personally liable for those damages); Peterson v. Kennedy, 771 F.2d 
1244, 1259 (9th Cir.1985) (holding that outside counsel retained by a private-sector 
union is not subject to individual liability for acts performed on behalf of the union 
in the collective-bargaining process). 
{¶ 21} The board found, however, that “[d]isciplinary actions fall within 
that inherent exclusive power of the Supreme Court of Ohio to admit, disbar, or 
otherwise discipline attorneys admitted to practice law in the State of Ohio.”  See 
Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Franko, 168 Ohio St. 17, 151 N.E.2d 17 (1958), 
paragraph three of the syllabus.  See also Ohio Constitution, Article IV, Section 
2(B)(1)(g) (granting this court original jurisdiction over “[a]dmission to the practice 
of law, the discipline of persons so admitted, and all other matters relating to the 
practice of law”).  And because the purpose of this disciplinary action against Lee 
is to protect the public and to ensure that members of the Ohio bar are “competent 
to practice a profession imbued with the public trust,” Fred Siegel Co., L.P.A. v. 
Arter & Hadden, 85 Ohio St.3d 171, 178, 707 N.E.2d 853 (1999)—rather than to 
bring a tort claim to further Buhl’s private interests—the board concluded that the 
federal statutes and cases cited by Lee do not confer immunity or offer a defense in 
an attorney-discipline matter before this court. 
{¶ 22} Lee objects to this finding, arguing that this disciplinary action “is a 
state law proceeding seeking to adjudicate the quality of representation provided 
by a Federal sector union” that involves an alleged violation of federal labor law.  
He also contends that because Buhl was a member of a collective-bargaining unit 
working for a federal employer (as opposed to a private employer), Title VII of the 
Civil Service Reform Act (“CSRA”), 5 U.S.C. 7101 et seq., affords him even 
greater protection than is conferred by the LMRA, Atkinson, and its progeny on 
persons acting on behalf of private-sector unions.  He asserts that his actions were 
not taken on behalf of Buhl but on behalf of the federal-sector union, and he 
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therefore posits that the CSRA preempts all state-law causes of action arising out 
of that representation and renders him immune from this disciplinary proceeding. 
{¶ 23} However, the conduct at issue here occurred neither in the context 
of an adverse personnel action taken against a federal employee nor during the 
review of such an action.  Rather, the conduct occurred in a separate state action 
regarding a former federal-sector union member’s Kentucky teaching license.  
Thus, this disciplinary proceeding is not intended to vindicate the individual 
employment rights of a federal-sector employee or the collective-bargaining rights 
of a federal-sector union.  Rather, it is intended to further the state’s independent 
and compelling interest in regulating the conduct of persons who are licensed to 
practice law within its borders.  See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 
792-793, 95 S.Ct. 2004, 44 L.Ed.2d 572 (1975) (recognizing that “the States have 
a compelling interest in the practice of professions within their boundaries, and that 
as part of their power to protect the public health, safety, and other valid interests, 
they have broad power to establish standards for licensing practitioners and 
regulating the practice of professions”). 
{¶ 24} Lee has not identified any provision in the CSRA or its legislative 
history manifesting a congressional intent to preempt a state’s inherent interest in 
protecting the public from attorneys who are unethical, unscrupulous, or no longer 
competent to practice law.  See Retail Clerks Internatl. Assn., Local 1625 v. 
Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103, 84 S.Ct. 219, 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963) (noting that 
congressional purpose is the “ultimate touchstone” in determining whether a federal 
regulatory scheme will preempt or displace state regulation in the same field).  Nor 
has he shown how state regulation of attorney conduct under the circumstances of 
this case will undermine the CSRA’s comprehensive system of labor regulation.  
See Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 131 L.Ed.2d 
385 (1995) (recognizing that a federal statute may implicitly preempt state law 
when the scope of the statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to occupy 
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the field exclusively or when the state law is in actual conflict with federal law).  
Therefore, we reject Lee’s defense that federal labor law preempts our professional 
conduct rules and renders him immune from these disciplinary proceedings. 
An Attorney-Client Relationship Arose Between Lee and Buhl 
{¶ 25} In his second objection, Lee urges us to reject the board’s finding 
that an attorney-client relationship arose between him and Buhl because he did not 
give his “clear consent” to represent her individually in the context of her state 
licensing matter. 
{¶ 26} The board rejected Lee’s claim that the clear consent of both parties 
was required to create an attorney-client relationship.  Instead, the board found that 
under Kentucky law,7 an implied attorney-client relationship arose because Buhl 
had a reasonable expectation or belief, based upon Lee’s conduct, that he had 
undertaken her representation.  See Pete v. Anderson, 413 S.W.3d 291, 296 
(Ky.2013) (“[A]n attorney-client relationship may be created as a result of a party’s 
‘reasonable belief or expectation,’ based on the attorney’s conduct, that the attorney 
has endeavored to undertake representation”), quoting Lovell v. Winchester, 941 
S.W.2d 466, 468 (Ky.1997), overruled on other grounds by Marcum v. Scorsone, 
457 S.W.3d 710 (Ky.2015). 
{¶ 27} It is evident from Buhl’s testimony that she believed that Lee was 
representing her in her state licensing matter, and Lee’s interactions with her and 
with others made this belief reasonable.  Indeed, the record shows that Lee (1) gave 
Buhl advice regarding the state licensing board’s investigation on numerous 
occasions, (2) suggested that he had drafted and would submit a “lawyer 
supplement” to her written rebuttal of the initial inquiry, and (3) made various 
                                                 
7 The choice-of-law provision of Ohio Prof.Cond.R. 8.5 makes it clear that Kentucky law governs 
the relationship between Lee and Buhl.  See Prof.Cond.R. 8.5(b)(1) (providing that for conduct in 
connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal 
sits apply unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise).  The licensing matter at issue here was 
pending before the Kentucky Education Professional Standards Board. 
January Term, 2016 
 
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affirmative representations to Buhl, the hearing officer, and opposing counsel to the 
effect that he represented Buhl, would enter an appearance in the action, would 
move to be admitted pro hac vice, and would “get something else in [the following] 
Monday.” 
{¶ 28} Despite having made these representations, Lee failed to do anything 
on Buhl’s behalf.  Instead, he stood by while the state of Kentucky revoked her 
teaching certificate, he failed to advise her that a default judgment had been entered 
against her, and he failed to take any action to have that judgment set aside.  He 
also ignored multiple inquiries from Buhl regarding the status of her case and failed 
to comply with requests for her file once she obtained new counsel. 
{¶ 29} Even if Lee intended his representation of Buhl to be limited to 
certain matters, the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct place the burden of 
defining the scope of the representation squarely on the attorney.  S.C.R. 3-130-
1.2(c) provides, “A lawyer may limit the scope of the representation if the limitation 
is reasonable under the circumstances and the client gives informed consent.”  
Similarly, Comment 4 to S.C.R. 3.130-1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client) cautions that when 
the lawyer has handled matters for a client on an ongoing basis, the client may 
assume that the lawyer’s representation will continue.  Comment 4 specifies that 
“[d]oubt about whether a client-lawyer relationship still exists should be clarified 
by the lawyer, preferably in writing, so that the client will not mistakenly suppose 
the lawyer is looking after the client’s affairs when the lawyer has ceased to do so.”  
But Lee admitted that he made no effort to expressly limit the scope of his 
representation or to make it clear to Buhl that he represented only the union. 
{¶ 30} Because Buhl believed that Lee was representing her in her state 
licensing matter and Lee’s conduct made that belief reasonable, we conclude that 
an attorney-client relationship arose, at least by implication.  We therefore overrule 
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Lee’s objections and adopt the board’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
this regard. 
{¶ 31} Having overruled both of Lee’s objections with respect to the Buhl 
matter, we conclude that the board’s findings of fact and of misconduct with regard 
to Count I are supported by clear and convincing evidence, and we adopt them as 
our own. 
Count II:  Failure to Cooperate 
{¶ 32} The board found that Lee failed to respond to relator’s first two 
letters of inquiry and failed to appear for two scheduled depositions, even though 
relator served him with subpoenas for both depositions by taping them to the front 
door of his home.  After relator e-mailed Lee to advise him of the numerous 
attempts that had been made to reach him and to inform him that a formal 
disciplinary complaint was being prepared for filing, Lee e-mailed relator claiming 
that he had submitted a response to the first letter of inquiry and denying that he 
had ever represented Buhl. 
{¶ 33} Although relator asked Lee to send a copy of the response that he 
claimed to have submitted, he failed to do so.  Lee also denied having received 
relator’s second letter of inquiry and the two subpoenas for deposition, and he 
claimed that he had responded to all of the communications that he had received.  
In May 2013, relator provided Lee with a copy of the draft complaint.  Lee 
responded to the draft complaint and all of the letters of inquiry—approximately 
one year after relator’s first inquiry and six months after he first communicated with 
relator—but failed to address one issue raised by relator. 
{¶ 34} On these facts, the board found that Lee violated Gov.Bar R. V(4)(G) 
(requiring a lawyer to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation) and Prof.Cond.R. 
8.1(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from knowingly failing to respond to a demand for 
information by a disciplinary authority during an investigation). 
January Term, 2016 
 
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{¶ 35} Lee objects and contends that there is insufficient evidence to 
support these findings.  Our review of the record, however, shows that there is 
ample evidence to support the board’s finding that Lee failed to cooperate in 
relator’s investigation.  We therefore overrule Lee’s objections and adopt the 
board’s findings with regard to Count II as our own. 
Sanction 
{¶ 36} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider 
relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated and the 
sanctions imposed in similar cases.  Stark Cty. Bar Assn. v. Buttacavoli, 96 Ohio 
St.3d 424, 2002-Ohio-4743, 775 N.E.2d 818, ¶ 16.  In making a final determination, 
we also weigh evidence of the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B).8 
{¶ 37} In this case, the board found that the following aggravating factors 
are present: (1) a dishonest or selfish motive, (2) a pattern of misconduct, (3) 
multiple offenses, (4) a lack of cooperation in the disciplinary process, (5) a refusal 
to acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, and (6) the vulnerability of and 
resulting harm to Buhl, who testified that the matter took a toll on her health, her 
family, and her children, caused her to fear for her husband’s military career, and 
caused her to fear returning to the classroom.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(b), 
(c), (d), (e), (g), and (h).  The only applicable mitigating factors that the board found 
are the absence of prior discipline and two letters attesting to Lee’s character and 
reputation apart from this misconduct.  See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a) and (e). 
{¶ 38} Relator argued that the appropriate sanction for Lee’s misconduct is 
an indefinite suspension.  Noting that we frequently impose indefinite suspensions 
on attorneys who neglect client matters and fail to cooperate in the ensuing 
disciplinary investigations, the board agreed that the sanction is appropriate in this 
                                                 
8 Effective January 1, 2015, the aggravating and mitigating factors previously set forth in BCGD 
Proc.Reg. 10(B) are codified in Gov.Bar R. V(13), 140 Ohio St.3d CXXIV. 
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case.  See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Mathewson, 113 Ohio St.3d 365, 2007-
Ohio-2076, 865 N.E.2d 891 (indefinitely suspending an attorney who neglected a 
client matter, engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice when 
he failed to ensure documents were prepared and filed in three criminal appeals, 
and failed to cooperate in the resulting disciplinary investigation); Disciplinary 
Counsel v. Meade, 127 Ohio St.3d 393, 2010-Ohio-6209, 939 N.E.2d 1250 
(indefinitely suspending an attorney who neglected a client’s appeal of a 
deportation ruling and failed to cooperate in multiple disciplinary investigations); 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Bogdanski, 135 Ohio St.3d 235, 2013-Ohio-398, 985 
N.E.2d 1251 (indefinitely suspending an attorney who abandoned client matters, 
engaged in acts of dishonesty, failed to acknowledge the wrongful nature of her 
conduct, and failed to cooperate in the disciplinary investigation). 
{¶ 39} In light of Lee’s conduct, the significant aggravating factors present, 
and the sanctions we have imposed for comparable misconduct, we find that an 
indefinite suspension is warranted. 
{¶ 40} Accordingly, Raymond Thomas Lee III is indefinitely suspended 
from the practice of law in Ohio.  Costs are taxed to Lee. 
Judgment accordingly. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, 
FRENCH, and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Scott J. Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, and Donald M. Scheetz, Assistant 
Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
Raymond Thomas Lee III, pro se. 
_________________