Case Title: State v. Carter

Citation: 326 So. 2d 848

Docket Number: 

State: louisiana

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Date: 1975-12-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
326 So. 2d 848 (1975) STATE of Louisiana v. Thomas CARTER, Jr. No. 56594. Supreme Court of Louisiana. December 8, 1975. Dissenting Opinion December 23, 1975. Rehearing Denied February 20, 1976. *849 R. Judge Eames, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant. William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ossie Brown, Dist. Atty., Ralph Roy, James E. Boren, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-appellee. DIXON, Justice. Thomas Carter, Jr., was charged with armed robbery (R.S. 14:64) and tried jointly with Mac Brown. The bill of information had originally charged Mac Brown and Ralph Sterling with the robbery; the name of Sterling was later struck out and Carter's name was added (Sterling's whereabouts at the time of the trial were apparently unknown). The jury found the defendants guilty. Appellant Brown's sentence was deferred for five years, and he was remanded to the parish prison. Assignments of Errors Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 22 and 27 were argued together by defendant. All involve the application of the conspiracy statutes (R.S. 14:26 and R.S. 15:455). *850 Over defendant's objections, the prosecutor was allowed to argue the law concerning conspiracy to the jury in the opening statement and in the closing statement, and the trial judge instructed the jury on the law of conspiracy. The substance of the prosecution's evidence was as follows: Diane L. Johnson testified that she was the owner of a 1973 two-door, gold Toyota stationwagon. On the morning of November 5, 1973 Ralph Sterling asked to borrow Miss Johnson's automobile. She loaded her laundry in it at her home and picked up Ralph Sterling a few blocks away. Sterling drove to the laundry, picked up Mac Brown and dropped Miss Johnson off at the laundry at Nicholson Drive and West McKinley at about 10:45 a.m. Sterling was to have returned to pick up Diane at 12:00 o'clock, but, when he arrived at 12:15, accompanied by Brown and the defendant Carter, she was not quite ready. At her request, Sterling and the other two men went to a restaurant and returned with a hamburger for Diane, having taken fifteen or twenty minutes for the errand. They then helped Diane load the clothes, took her home, and left in her automobile. Diane did not thereafter see Mac Brown or the defendant, but within ten or fifteen minutes Sterling returned and requested Diane to take him to the unemployment office for a 1:00 or 1:30 p.m. appointment. Enroute, they were arrested and a gun was found in the car pocketa gun about which Diane testified she knew nothing. She never saw Ralph Sterling again. The victim of the robbery was Mary Ann Armstrong, who was employed in her husband's grocery at 2755 69th Avenue. She testified that after 12:00 o'clock, probably while the noon news was on television, two women and a child and two black men were in the store. When the women and child left, the two men, armed with guns, robbed her. She identified Mac Brown as the taller of the two, who were in the store, she said, approximately five minutes. Although the taller one held a bandanna to his face, she got a better look at him than at the shorter one. Mrs. Armstrong was told to lie on the floor. She did, and "a minute or two" later the "cookie man," Mr. Lambert, came in. When Mrs. Armstrong told Lambert about the robbery, he went outside and notified Mr. Armstrong, who called the police. The police arrived ten or fifteen minutes later. On July 8, 1974 the defendant Carter was included in one of three line-ups viewed by Mrs. Armstrong. She identified another person, not charged, as one of the robbers. She failed to identify Carter. At the trial Mrs. Armstrong stated that the defendant Carter did not look like the second man in the robbery. A. M. Lambert, the cookie distributor, testified he arrived at the store around 1:00 p.m., on his regular route. He did not know the time but was on schedule. Mrs. Armstrong jumped up when Lambert entered the store and told him she had been robbed. Lambert had seen no one leave the store, but had seen a "little light colored foreign car pull off and turn to the left at the corner . . . about a block and a half or 160 yards away." Lambert could not tell the number of occupants in the vehicle. E. L. Pritchard, a deputy sheriff, was transporting a prisoner on November 5, 1973 and between 11:00 and 12:00 o'clock (or perhaps between 10:30 and 12:30), heard a police radio bulletin about an armed robbery in Scotlandville. The bulletin identified the car used in the robbery as a light colored foreign stationwagon. About five minutes or so after hearing the bulletin, while Pritchard was on I10, he noticed an orange colored Toyota stationwagon pass his vehicle. Pritchard then radioed the license number to headquarters. He observed that the vehicle was occupied by three black males. *851 Gregory Nettles, who was fifteen years old at the time, noticed on November 5, 1973 two black men either coming from the Armstrong store or going toward it. He described them as being dressed "in a green coat" and testified that he saw a little gold colored stationwagon parked around the corner from the store. Deputy Knight received a call at 12:20 concerning the robbery, and arrived at the store at 12:30. Deputy Lee was already at the store. Knight obtained a description of the car from Mrs. Armstrong (who had not seen the car but who had talked to Lambert). Police headquarters was already broadcasting a bulletin about the robbery and the involvement of a light colored foreign stationwagon before Knight obtained the description of the automobile from Mrs. Armstrong. Knight later learned that Deputy Littlefield had apprehended the automobile identified on the Interstate by Deputy Pritchard. The record does not disclose why Carter became a suspect, but it does disclose that Knight attempted to intercept Carter at Carter's sister's house on the evening of the robbery, though Carter did not come in. Deputy Littlefield testified that he arrested Sterling and Diane Johnson in the original Toyota stationwagon at approximately 1:30 p.m. on November 5, and recovered a revolver from the glove compartment. Rosa Carter Lunkin, the defendant's sister, had lived with her mother, her two daughters and the defendant for about one year. The defendant did not return to the house on November 5. The witness was unaware of the defendant's intention to absent himself. His personal belongings remained at the house. Carter telephoned her once or twice but the witness testified she did not know where the calls came from. The prosecution relied strongly upon the statutory effect given to acts or declarations of a conspirator, arguing, in effect, that the law attributes to one conspirator responsibility for the conduct and the acts of the other conspirators "even if they weren't present." The trial judge, in his instruction, read to the jury R.S. 15:455: Defendant complains that there was no evidence of conspiracythat, in fact, the only evidence to connect him with the offense was that he was in an automobile at about the time of the robbery, several miles from the scene, which was occupied by one person identified later as a robber and by another person subsequently arrested in the car, which had a gun in the glove compartment. The prosecution, on the other hand, argues that State v. Skinner, 251 La. 300, 204 So. 2d 370 (1967), required that the jury be instructed on the law of conspiracy for the sole reason that the crime charged had been committed by two or more persons. (The State's brief argues extensively from the original opinion in State v. Kaufman, 278 So. 2d 86 (La.1973). That opinion was reversed on rehearing, with a caveat at the conclusion concerning reliance on State v. Skinner, supra, "without necessarily establishing a prima facie case of conspiracy as required by La.R.S. 15:455." State v. Kaufman, La., 278 So. 2d 86, 99). It is true, as stated in Skinner, that the existence of a conspiracy is a jury question. But the effect of conspiratorial acts and statements is never properly before the jury unless the trial court is *852 satisfied that a prima facie showing of conspiracy has been made. The Skinner opinion did not hold otherwise. It cited with approval the statement that, "While it is error to submit the question of conspiracy if there is no evidence thereof, where there is evidence that the defendants had entered into a conspiracy to commit the crime alleged, an instruction on the law of conspiracy is proper, . . ." (204 So. 2d 370, 393). Skinner was criticized in 29 La.L.Rev. 299, 307: R.S. 15:455 is express in making a prima facie showing essential to its applicability; in its final sentence the legislature made its intentions clear: "But to have this effect a prima facie case of conspiracy must have been established." Where the State seeks to introduce evidence of the acts or declarations of one coconspirator against another, the existence of a conspiracy between them is a mixed question of law and fact. The trial court must determine whether a prima facie showing has been made in order to determine whether a defendant will be charged with responsibility for the acts and declarations of another. After such initial determination, the existence of the conspiracy becomes a question of fact for the jury. The two functions are not to be confused. Where the United States Supreme Court has discussed the issue of the admissibility of declarations by one coconspirator against others, it has held that such are admissible notwithstanding the hearsay objection if the trial judge finds that there is substantial, independent evidence of the conspiracy. In Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S. Ct. 457, 86 L. Ed. 680 (1941), the Supreme Court stated the issue as follows: And the court held: In Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 69 S. Ct. 716, 93 L. Ed. 790 (1949), a majority of the United States Supreme Court reversed defendant's conviction, which had resulted from his fourth trial on a charge of violation of the Mann Act, by holding that statements made after the completion of the conspiracy did not come within the coconspirator exception to the hearsay exclusionary rule. In his concurring opinion, Justice Jackson issued what has come to be known as the Krulewitch warning.[1] In this opinion, in which Justices Frankfurter and Murphy joined, Justice Jackson cited the resounding implications of the charge of conspiracy: He recognized the difficulty experienced by the jury in cases involving conspiracy: Justice Jackson further noted the precarious position occupied by the defendant charged with conspiracy: *854 In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039 (1974), a unanimous opinion with one justice not participating, the Supreme Court discussed the admissibility of statements by one coconspirator against others: 14 `As a preliminary matter, there must be substantial, independent evidence of the conspiracy, at least enough to take the question to the jury. United States v. Vaught, 485 F.2d 320, 323 (CA 4 1973); United States v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20, 41-42 (CA 6 1965), aff'd on other grounds, 385 U.S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 408, 17 L. Ed. 2d 374 (1966); United States v. Santos, 385 F.2d 43, 45 (CA 7 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 954, 88 S. Ct. 1048, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1148 (1968); United States v. Morton, 483 F.2d 573, 576 (CA 8 1973); United States v. Spanos, 462 F.2d 1012, 1014 (CA 9 1972); Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 737 (CA 9 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953, 84 S. Ct. 1626, 12 L. Ed. 2d 498 (1964). Whether the standard has been satisfied is a question of admissibility of evidence to be decided by the trial judge." 94 S. Ct. 3090, 3104. (Emphasis added). more other defendants and the declarant and if the declarations at issue were in furtherance of that conspiracy. . . . These formulations, though written in terms of evidentiary rules, acquire basic constitutional overtones when the effect is considered of a rule which would make acts or declarations admissible against a defendant who had nether committed nor authorized them. In California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (1970), the Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause of the Constitution of the United States and the exclusionary rules of hearsay are not co-extensive. However, the court was express in holding that there is an area of overlap: Because of the salutary mandate of R.S. 15:455, we are not compelled to decide whether the rule requiring a prima facie showing of conspiracy prerequisite to admitting evidence of the acts or declarations of one coconspirator against another is a constitutional requirement. Since there was no evidence of a conspiracy, the trial court erred in ruling that the determination whether there was a conspiracy between defendants Brown and Carter was a question solely for the jury. State v. Cryer, 262 La. 575, 263 So. 2d 895 (1972), involved the admissibility of testimony by an officer that one jointly charged but not on trial told the officer he obtained the contraband from the defendants. State v. Skinner, supra, was cited for the proposition that the existence of a conspiracy is a question of fact for the jury. We hold that when the only showing of a conspiracy is that two people committed a crime, and there is no showing that defendant either committed or conspired to commit the criminal act, no prima facie case of conspiracy has been established. We further hold that the fact, alone, that two or more have committed the crime charged is not sufficient to establish a prima facie case of conspiracy. The conviction and sentence are reversed, and the case is remanded to the district court for a new trial. *855 SANDERS, C.J., dissents and will assign written reasons. SUMMERS, J., dissents. MARCUS, J., dissents. BOLIN, J., concurs. There was no evidence of conspiracy. SANDERS, Chief Justice (dissenting). Thomas Carter, Jr. and Mac Brown were jointly charged and tried for armed robbery. The trial judge instructed the jury as to the law of conspiracy. See LSA-R.S. 15:455. The majority[1] now reverses the conviction of Carter, because it finds insufficient evidence of conspiracy. The holding is as follows: The holding is contrary to the holdings of this Court in State v. Dundas, 168 La. 95, 121 So. 586 (1929); State v. Cryer, 262 La. 575, 263 So. 2d 895 (1972); and State v. Brown, La., 326 So. 2d 839 involving the co-defendant, handed down on December 8, 1975. In State v. Cryer, supra, this Court held: In State v. Dundas, supra, this Court stated: In State v. Brown, supra, we held: The holding of these cases is that if there is any evidence of conspiracy, circumstantial or direct, an instruction as to conspiracy is proper so that the jury can determine whether the acts and declarations of each conspirator can be charged against all defendants under LSA-R.S. 15:455. The crime in the present case was the armed robbery of a small grocery store. Two men, both armed, entered the store. Three were observed in the get-away car. Carter was identified as one of the three in the car shortly after the robbery. Quite clearly, there is a circumstantial evidence that the three acted jointly in the furtherance of a "common enterprise." It is difficult to conceive how three persons could have decided spontaneously to rob a store and executed the robbery in the manner shown here without: prior consultation. In any event, in my opinion, the existence of a conspiracy was a question of fact for the jury. [1] See A. Goldstein, The Krulewitch Warning: Guilt by Association, 54 Geo.L.J. 133 (1965); Derby & Orfield, Cases on Criminal Law and Procedure, 64 (1950). [1] There is no majority opinion. Three members of the Court subscribe to a plurality opinion and one concurs.