Case Title: MB West Chester, L.L.C. v. Butler Cty. Bd. of Revision

Citation: 2010-Ohio-3781

Docket Number: 20091900

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-08-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
MB West Chester, L.L.C. v. Butler Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3781.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-3781 
MB WEST CHESTER, L.L.C., APPELLEE, v. BUTLER COUNTY BOARD OF 
REVISION ET AL., APPELLEES; LAKOTA LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF 
EDUCATION, APPELLANT. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as MB West Chester, L.L.C. v. Butler Cty. Bd. of Revision, Slip 
Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-3781.] 
Taxation — Board of Tax Appeals — Necessary party — Failure to serve notice 
of appeal on a party — Jurisdiction to hear motion to vacate. 
(No. 2009-1900 — Submitted May 26, 2010 — Decided August 19, 2010.) 
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, No. 2009-M-238. 
__________________ 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J. 
{¶ 1} This is an appeal from an order of the Board of Tax Appeals 
(“BTA”) in a real property valuation case.  The order denied a motion by the 
Lakota Local School District Board of Education (“school board”) that sought to 
vacate the decision the BTA had previously issued in the case.  For the reasons 
that follow, we reverse the BTA’s order and remand for further proceedings. 
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Facts 
{¶ 2} The procedural history of this case is crucial to resolving the 
jurisdictional issues presented. 
{¶ 3} The school board filed a valuation complaint seeking an increase in 
the value of three parcels owned by MB West Chester, L.L.C., for tax year 2007.  
The school board asserted that the parcels had a value equal to the sale price 
reflected on a conveyance-fee statement filed by MB West Chester, the new 
owner, on October 31, 2007. 
{¶ 4} On January 29, 2009, the Butler County Board of Revision 
(“BOR”) issued three “Notices of Result,” one pertaining to each parcel.  The 
allocated values add up to the sale price, $64,800,000, which is a 73 percent 
increase over the original aggregate valuation of the parcels. 
{¶ 5} On February 13, 2009, MB West Chester filed a notice of appeal 
from the BOR decisions to the BTA.  In its filing, MB West Chester did not use 
the standard form that is prescribed by the Tax Commissioner for appealing a 
board of revision decision.  Instead, MB West Chester composed its own notice of 
appeal.  The notice of appeal names only the BOR as appellee and fails to identify 
the party – the school board – that had filed the valuation complaint.  The 
certificate of service attached to the notice of appeal reflects service solely on the 
BOR through two certified mailings – one to the BOR directly, the other to the 
prosecuting attorney as counsel for the BOR.  Absent is any indication of service 
on the school board.  Moreover, the BOR failed to provide the school board with 
a copy of the notice of appeal as required by R.C. 5717.01.  We draw this 
conclusion for the reasons set forth later in this opinion. 
{¶ 6} Substantively, the notice of appeal raised objections focusing on 
the allocation of the sale price among the parcels.  The three parcels, according to 
the notice of appeal, all relate to a single tract of land and constitute an 
administrative means of effectuating an enterprise-zone agreement and certain 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
tax-increment-financing resolutions.  The notice asked that 75 percent of the value 
of improvements on these parcels be allocated to the parcel that was fully tax 
exempt under the enterprise-zone agreement. 
{¶ 7} On June 12, 2009, MB West Chester and the BOR stipulated to 
new values for the parcels, and the BTA issued its decision on June 23, 2009, 
adopting those values.  The values as found by the BTA totaled $51,628,210, 
reflecting a reduction of $13,171,790 in the value assigned to one of the three 
parcels that, according to MB West Chester’s notice of appeal to the BTA, was 
subject to payments in lieu of taxes under a tax-increment-financing resolution.  
Because the BOR and MB West Chester stipulated to a value and the school 
board was never even notified of the appeal to the BTA, no party filed an appeal 
from the BTA decision. 
{¶ 8} On August 7, 2009, the BOR mailed notices of the BTA’s decision 
to adopt the stipulated values for the parcels.  Those mailings were the first notice 
to the school board that MB West Chester had appealed the BOR’s determination 
of value.  However, by the time the school board received the notice, more than 
30 days had passed since the BTA had journalized its June 23, 2009 decision. 
{¶ 9} On September 4, 2009, the school board filed a motion before the 
BTA seeking to vacate the BTA’s order approving the stipulation of value.  The 
motion states that “[i]t is undisputed that the Board of Education was never 
notified of the notice of appeal [to the BTA] by the Butler County Board of 
Revision.”  The motion also states that the receipt of the BOR’s new statement of 
values during the week of August 17, 2009, was the first notice to the school 
board that the BTA appeal had been filed.  Arguing that it had a statutory right to 
be named an appellee on appeal and to be notified by the BOR of the appeal, the 
school board asked that it be made a party to the BTA appeal and that the June 23, 
2009 decision be vacated. 
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{¶ 10} In its memorandum opposing the motion, MB West Chester did 
not take issue with the assertion that the school board had not been notified of the 
appeal.  Instead, MB West Chester contended that the school board was not an 
automatic or necessary party to its appeal from the BOR decisions – even though 
the school board was the complainant before the BOR.  Additionally, MB West 
Chester argued that because the 30-day period for appealing the June 23, 2009 
BTA decision had expired, the BTA had no jurisdiction to entertain the school 
board’s motion to vacate. 
{¶ 11} On September 22, 2009, the BTA issued an order denying the 
school board’s motion on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction to vacate the 
earlier decision because the appeal period had expired.  The school board has 
appealed to the court, and we now reverse. 
Analysis 
The BTA’s September 22 order was final and appealable. 
{¶ 12} We first address a threshold jurisdictional issue.  Although none of 
the parties raised this issue, we have an independent duty to assure that we have 
jurisdiction over this appeal.  Instead of appealing the June 23 decision of the 
BTA that assigned value to the three parcels at issue, the school board has 
appealed the September 22 order denying its motion to vacate.  R.C. 5717.04 
provides for judicial review of BTA decisions “determining appeals from decision 
of county boards of revision.”  We must decide whether the school board had the 
right to appeal the September 22 decision, which denied its motion to vacate, 
given that the time for appealing the BTA’s June 22 decision had expired. 
{¶ 13} In Southside Community Dev. Corp. v. Levin, 116 Ohio St.3d 1209, 
2007-Ohio-6665, 878 N.E.2d 1048, ¶ 5, the court clarified that R.C. 2505.02’s 
definition of a final order applies to BTA appeals.  Accordingly, the question 
presented is whether the order from which the school board appeals is one that 
January Term, 2010 
5 
 
“affects a substantial right made in a special proceeding.”  Id.; R.C. 
2505.02(B)(2). 
{¶ 14} The order in this case is appealable for the same two reasons set 
forth in Southside.  First, a “substantial right” is a “right that * * * a statute * * * 
entitles a person to enforce or protect.”  R.C. 2505.02(A)(1).  In the present case, 
the statutes confer on the school board the right to seek an increase in value of 
property within the county and to defend an increase on appeal.  The BTA’s 
denial of the school board’s motion to vacate affected a substantial right of the 
school board because it prevented the school board from defending the increase in 
valuation of the property on appeal.  Second, the order affects a substantial right 
because it “qualifies as an order that ‘if not immediately appealable, would 
foreclose appropriate relief in the future.’ ”  Southside, ¶ 7, quoting Bell v. Mt. 
Sinai Med. Ctr. (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 60, 63, 616 N.E.2d 181.  That maxim 
plainly applies to the BTA’s denial of the school board’s motion, because the 
denial deprived the school board of a legal remedy for obtaining a change in the 
valuation of the property. 
{¶ 15} Because the September 22 order denying the school board’s 
motion to vacate affects a substantial right in a special proceeding, it is a final, 
appealable order. 
The BTA had jurisdiction to consider and grant  
the school board’s motion to vacate. 
{¶ 16} Having determined that the order by which the BTA denied the 
school board’s motion to vacate constituted a final, appealable order, we now turn 
to the jurisdictional ground on which the BTA denied the school board’s motion.  
The BTA noted that the school board filed its motion more than 30 days after the 
BTA certified the June 23 decision.  See R.C. 5717.04, fifth paragraph (“Such 
appeals shall be taken within thirty days after the date of the entry of the decision 
of the board of tax appeals on the journal of its proceedings”).  The BTA found 
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that it has authority to reconsider a decision only “until a timely appeal is taken or 
the time period for instituting such appeal has passed.”  MB West Chester, L.L.C. 
v. Butler Cty. Bd. of Revision (Sept. 22, 2009), BTA No. 2009-M-238, at 2, citing 
State ex rel. Borsuk v. Cleveland (1972), 28 Ohio St.2d 224, 57 O.O.2d 464, 277 
N.E.2d 419, paragraph one of the syllabus.  The BTA also cited  Lutz v. Evatt 
(1945), 144 Ohio St. 635, 636, 30 O.O. 223, 60 N.E.2d 473, for the proposition 
that “once the thirty-day period for filing a notice of appeal had expired, the 
Board of Tax Appeals was without authority to vacate an earlier decision and to 
refile another decision so that an appeal might be filed.”  MB West Chester at 2.  
On that basis, the BTA found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion to 
vacate and therefore denied it. 
{¶ 17} We disagree with the BTA’s application of Lutz.  An 
administrative tribunal generally loses jurisdiction to vacate or modify a decision 
when the period for appealing the decision expires and no appeal has been 
instituted.  But we note that the BTA’s analysis overlooked one crucial aspect of 
the Lutz decision. 
{¶ 18} In Lutz, the BTA confronted a motion that presented a twofold 
request:  the taxpayer wanted the BTA to vacate the entry of its decision and then 
“re-file the same and notify him [thereof] by registered mail so that he might have 
the opportunity of appealing the same to the Supreme Court of Ohio.”  (Brackets 
sic.)  Lutz, 144 Ohio St. at 635, 30 O.O. 223, 60 N.E.2d 473.  In affirming the 
BTA’s denial of the motion, the court relied on two circumstances.  First, the 
court found that the copy of the board’s entry had been “sent to the appellant’s 
then attorney of record by registered mail” on the day following entry of the 
BTA’s decision, and thereby concluded that notice of the BTA decision had been 
provided in accordance with the statute.  Id. at 636.  Second, “no appeal having 
been taken from the board’s entry or decision * * * within thirty days from its 
filing * * *, the board was without power or authority to * * * vacate such 
January Term, 2010 
7 
 
decision and refile it in order to confer the right of appeal contrary to statute.”  Id.  
Accord Natl. Tube Co. v. Ayres (1949), 152 Ohio St. 255, 40 O.O. 312, 89 N.E.2d 
129, paragraph one of the syllabus (“The Board of Tax Appeals has control over 
its decisions until the actual institution of an appeal or the expiration of the time 
for appeal”); Meadows Dev., L.L.C. v. Champaign Cty. Bd. of Revision, 124 Ohio 
St.3d 349, 2010-Ohio-249, 922 N.E.2d 209, ¶ 25 (same is true of boards of 
revision). 
{¶ 19} Conspicuous by its absence from the BTA’s order in this case is 
any reference to the failure to notify the school board of the BTA’s June 23 
decision.  Yet on June 23, 2009, R.C. 5717.03(B) specifically required the BTA to 
certify its decision by certified mail to “all persons who were parties to the appeal 
before the board.”1  Although the school board had not appeared and participated 
in the BTA proceedings, the BTA’s own rule conditioned the requirement of a 
formal appearance on the school board’s receipt of notice of the appeal from the 
BOR – an event that in this case never occurred.  Ohio Adm.Code 5717-1-03(B) 
(“Any party before the board of revision, who desires to participate in an appeal 
before the board of tax appeals as an appellee, shall enter an appearance with the 
board of tax appeals within thirty days of the mailing of notice of such appeal by 
the board of revision”).  Generally, the BTA is entitled to rely on a certification 
from the board of revision that all parties have been notified of the appeal.  But 
when it is later shown that the board of revision did not in fact notify the party, 
the lack of notice from the BTA of its decision compounds the deprivation of the 
party’s hearing rights.  Under these circumstances, the party’s failure to appear at 
the BTA did not waive its rights as a statutory party, and the school board thereby 
retained its right to receive notice of the BTA’s decision pursuant to R.C. 
5717.03(B). 
                                                 
1.  By statutory amendment effective October 2009, the BTA is no longer required to “certify” 
using certified mail.  2009 Sub.H.B. No. 1. 
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{¶ 20} MB West Chester advances an additional argument that the school 
board does not constitute a necessary and indispensable party to the BTA appeal.  
In this regard, MB West Chester does not deny that the auditor had a duty to 
notify the school board; instead, MB West Chester maintains that the BOR 
adequately represented the interests of governmental entities in the case, including 
the school board itself. 
{¶ 21} We disagree.  The school board expended its own resources in 
bringing the valuation complaint, and the General Assembly specifically required 
that it be notified of an appeal.  While the caselaw supports the proposition that 
the owner possesses a more fundamental constitutional right of due process in 
regard to property valuation, the school board plainly possesses a statutory right 
to be heard in the context of valuation appeals.  Nor do any of the cases on which 
MB West Chester relies preclude a school board from defending an appeal at the 
BTA when the school board was the complainant and the taxpayer is appealing 
from an increase ordered by the board of revision. 
{¶ 22} Having determined that the BTA was obliged by statute to certify 
its decision to the school board, we turn to whether that in fact occurred.  
Although the record does not directly establish the fact, three reasons lead us to 
conclude that the BTA did not certify its June 23 decision to the school board. 
{¶ 23} First, the school board has repeatedly asserted that the first notice it 
received that MB West Chester had appealed to the BTA was the August 2009 
order of the BOR effectuating the BTA decision, and MB West Chester has never 
contested that assertion.  Second, at oral argument, MB West Chester’s counsel 
repeatedly admitted that the school board had not been notified of the BTA 
decision.  Third, the BOR failed to notify the school board of the filing of the 
appeal at the outset, and that omission set in motion a chain of events that led to 
the BTA’s failure to certify its decision to the school board.  Because the BOR 
failed to notify the school board, the BTA was induced into believing that the 
January Term, 2010 
9 
 
school board had waived its right to participate and to receive notification of the 
BTA’s decision. 
{¶ 24} The failure to give the school board notice — both the BOR’s 
failure to notify the school board of the appeal and the BTA’s failure to notify the 
school board of its decision — materially distinguishes the present case from 
Lutz.  Because the school board did not receive notice of the filing of the appeal 
or of the BTA decision, the running of the appeal period does not operate to 
extinguish the school board’s right to participate, nor does the BTA lose 
jurisdiction to vindicate that right.  That is so because, under Lutz and similar 
cases addressing the authority of administrative agencies, the jurisdictional 
significance of the expiration of the appeal period is that the parties to the appeal 
have been notified of the agency’s decision and have waived any claim of error by 
not appealing or otherwise objecting.  However, when a statutory party has been 
unlawfully deprived of notice of both the BTA proceedings and the BTA 
decision, that party has not waived its right to participate, and the BTA has not 
lost jurisdiction to vindicate it. 
{¶ 25} Our decision in Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 87 Ohio St.3d 
363, 721 N.E.2d 40, does not dictate a contrary result.  It is true that in Cincinnati 
School Dist., we held that a board of revision did not have jurisdiction to vacate 
an earlier void decision under circumstances similar to those of the present case.  
But we cannot apply the doctrine of that case to the present circumstances 
because of our intervening decision in Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Lake Cty. Bd. 
of Revision, 96 Ohio St.3d 165, 2002-Ohio-4033, 772 N.E.2d 1160.  Cleveland 
Elec. Illum. Co. modified the outcome of the situation presented in Cincinnati 
School Dist.  Because the board of revision in Cincinnati School Dist. failed to 
certify its decision to the owner, the period for appealing from that decision would 
never have begun to run under Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co.  As a result, the 
jurisdictional bar we recognized in Cincinnati School Dist. would not arise again 
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because, under Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co., the appeal period would never have 
begun to run. 
The BTA’s June 23 decision should be vacated because the school 
board was never notified of MB West Chester’s appeal. 
{¶ 26} R.C. 5717.01 explicitly states that when an appeal is filed from a 
board of revision decision to the BTA, the board of revision “shall by certified 
mail notify all persons thereof who were parties to the proceeding before such 
county board of revision, and shall file proof of such notice with the board of tax 
appeals.”  The school board premised its motion below on the assertion that the 
required notice had not been given and argued that as a result, the BTA’s June 23 
decision was a nullity.  We agree. 
{¶ 27} In Knickerbocker Properties, Inc. XLII v. Delaware Cty. Bd. of 
Revision,  119 Ohio St.3d 233, 2008-Ohio-3192, 893 N.E.2d 457, the board of 
revision sent notification to the owner that the school board had filed a complaint, 
and later mailed notice of a hearing in the case.  Both times the board of revision 
used an incorrect address that was not the current address of the owner that had 
been given to the auditor.  The owner did not appear at the hearing, and the board 
of revision ordered an increase in value. 
{¶ 28} When the board of revision finally certified its decision to the 
correct address, the owner appealed to the BTA.  The BTA rejected the owner’s 
jurisdictional arguments and affirmed the board of revision’s adoption of an 
arm’s-length sale price as the value of the property. 
{¶ 29} On appeal, this court reversed and remanded.  Of particular 
importance for the present case is our holding that the failure to give proper notice 
of the hearing to the owner “rendered the BOR’s decision a nullity.”  Id. at ¶ 22.  
In so holding, we relied on our discussion in Cincinnati School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 
87 Ohio St.3d at 366-367, 721 N.E.2d 40.  We remanded for the giving of proper 
notice and a new hearing.  Knickerbocker Properties at ¶ 24.  Accord Gasper 
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11 
 
Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Preble Cty. Budget Comm., 119 Ohio St.3d 166, 2008-
Ohio-3322, 893 N.E.2d 136, ¶ 15 (vacating BTA decision and remanding so that 
proper notice could be given and a new evidentiary hearing held).2  Of similar 
import are cases that address the lack of service in civil cases:  a “trial court is 
without jurisdiction to render judgment or to make findings against a person who 
was not served summons, did not appear, and was not a party in the court 
proceedings.”  State ex rel. Ballard v. O’Donnell (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 182, 553 
N.E.2d 650, paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 30} The present case does differ from Knickerbocker in one respect.  In 
Knickerbocker, the record before us showed what actions the board of revision 
had taken, and that record permitted us to determine the owner’s proper address.  
By contrast, the present case lacks a full record of the BTA and BOR proceedings.  
Missing, among other things, is the form DTE 3 prescribed by the Tax 
Commissioner for boards of revision to submit to the BTA when they transmit the 
administrative transcript.  On that form, the auditor, as secretary of the board of 
revision, certifies that the board of revision has received a copy of the notice of 
appeal and that “all parties have been notified by certified mail.”  That statement 
typically assures the BTA that the board of revision has satisfied the notification 
requirement of R.C. 5717.01. 
{¶ 31} The absence of that form is significant, because ordinarily the 
certification on Form DTE 3 would raise a presumption that the parties had been 
properly notified of the appeal.  Under those circumstances, a movant in the 
school board’s position would have to shoulder the burden of proving that the 
auditor had misrepresented the notification. 
                                                 
2.  MB West Chester’s attempted reliance on Gasper Twp. is unavailing, because that case 
supports the school board’s contention that the lack of statutorily required notice to the parties 
deprives the tribunal of jurisdiction to hold a hearing.  Contrary to MB West Chester’s suggestion, 
our resolution of the other main issue in the case – whether the mailing of the notice of appeal by 
the township properly initiated the appeal – has no bearing on the issues in this case. 
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{¶ 32} That issue does not arise under the present circumstances for three 
reasons.  First, MB West Chester itself failed to name the school board when it 
filed its notice of appeal, an omission that clearly contravenes Ohio Adm.Code 
5717-1-04(B) and (E).  Those provisions require (i) the naming of appellees on a 
notice of appeal to the BTA and (ii) the use of the form prescribed by the Tax 
Commissioner for appealing a board of revision’s decision — a form that itself 
calls for naming appellees as well as for naming the party that filed the valuation 
complaint.  Had MB West Chester complied with the administrative rule, the 
school board’s role would have been immediately evident.  And while pursuant to 
Knickerbocker, 119 Ohio St.3d 233, 2008-Ohio-3192, 893 N.E.2d 457, ¶ 10, 14, 
the formal insufficiency of MB West Chester’s notice of appeal did not by itself 
deprive the BTA of jurisdiction, the notice’s failure to identify the school board 
set in motion the eventual failure of the BOR and the BTA to notify the school 
board. 
{¶ 33} Second, in opposing the school board’s motion at the BTA, MB 
West Chester never asserted that the BOR had notified the school board, nor did 
MB West Chester insist that the school board prove the failure to give notice.  
Indeed, in responding to the school board’s motion at the BTA, MB West Chester 
fully accepted as the premise for its arguments that the BOR did in fact fail to 
give notice.  Instead of demanding that the school board prove lack of notice, MB 
West Chester argued that the BOR’s “failure to notify the other parties before it 
does not invalidate the notice of appeal or deprive the Board of Tax Appeals of 
jurisdiction.” 
{¶ 34} Third, the BOR itself was a party at the BTA and stipulated to a 
value with MB West Chester, but it did not respond to the school board’s motion, 
which asserted that the BOR had defaulted in its statutory duty to notify the 
school board.  The BOR’s failure to answer the motion and assert compliance 
with R.C. 5717.01 supports the conclusion that the notification never occurred. 
January Term, 2010 
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{¶ 35} For all these reasons, and given the absence of the Form DTE 3 
from the record before us, we find that the BOR failed to give the school board 
notice of MB West Chester’s appeal. 
{¶ 36} Additionally, MB West Chester argues that the school board is not 
truly a necessary and indispensible party at the BTA.  As a result, the failure to 
notify the school board about the appeal is allegedly innocuous.  We previously 
discussed this issue and concluded that the school board was an appellee at the 
BTA by operation of law.  We reject MB West Chester’s argument for the same 
reasons in this context. 
{¶ 37} We hold that the BTA lacked jurisdiction to issue its June 23 
decision, because the school board had not been notified of the pending appeal as 
required by R.C. 5717.01. 
Conclusion 
{¶ 38} For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the order of the BTA 
denying the school board’s motion to intervene and to vacate, and we remand 
with the instruction that the motion be granted and that further proceedings be 
held as appropriate. 
Decision reversed 
and cause remanded. 
 
BROWN, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and 
CUPP, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., Lawrence D. Walker, and J. Donald 
Mottley, for appellee MB West Chester, L.L.C. 
 
Ennis, Roberts & Fischer Co., L.P.A., and Gary T. Stredronski, for 
appellant. 
______________________