Case Title: STATE v STRANDBERG

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1986-09-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 8 5 - 1 0 5 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1 9 8 6 STATE OF MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and R e s p o n d e n t , -vs- KENNETH C. STRANDBERG, D e f e n d a n t and A p p e l l a n t . APPEAL FROM: D i s t r i c t C o u r t of the E i g h t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and for t h e C o u n t y of C a s c a d e , T h e H o n o r a b l e Joel G. R o t h , Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF RECORD: F o r A p p e l l a n t : J u l i e A. M a c e k , P u b l i c D e f e n d e r , G r e a t F a l l s , Montana F o r R e s p o n d e n t : Hon. Mike G r e e l y , A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , H e l e n a , Montana K i m b e r l y A. K r a d o l f e r , A s s t . A t t y . G e n e r a l , H e l e n a P a t r i c k L. P a u l , C o u n t y A t t o r n e y , G r e a t F a l l s , M o n t a n a B a r b a r a B e l l , D e p u t y C o u n t y A t t o r n e y , G r e a t F a l l s S u b m i t t e d on B r i e f s : J u l y 2 4 , 1 9 8 6 D e c i d e d : S e p t e m b e r 8 , 1 9 8 6 8" ;&h F i l e d : C l e r k M r . J u s t i c e Frank B. Morrison, Jr. d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. Defendant Kenneth Strandberg appeals h i s August 28, 1984, jury conviction i n t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court, County of Cascade, on one count of felony escape. W e affirm. O n February 13, 1984, defendant was confined i n t h e Cascade County J a i l following h i s a r r e s t on t h e charge of felony t h e f t . Defendant was placed i n t h e p o s i t i o n of t r u s t e e which allowed him g r e a t e r freedom i n t h e f a c i l i t i e s and required t h e performance of c e r t a i n d u t i e s . O n February 24, 1984, defendant s t r u c k another t r u s t e e i n response t o a r a c i a l s l u r d i r e c t e d a t defendant. Defendant d i d not r e p o r t t h e incident. However, one of t h e j a i l e r s questioned him about it and defendant r e p l i e d t h a t h i s problems with t h e o t h e r t r u s t e e w e r e not serious. O n February 25, 1984, defendant walked away from t h e Cascade County J a i l . A n a r r e s t warrant was issued and an information f i l e d charging defendant with felony escape. O n May 25, 1984, t h e Cascade County S h e r i f f ' s Department received an anonymous t i p t h a t defendant was hiding a t 1712 Colorado Avenue i n Black Eagle. That same day o f f i c e r s searched t h e residence and found defendant hiding i n a bedroom c l o s e t . The record does not i n d i c a t e who was i n l e g a l possession of t h e residence, nor whether t h e o f f i c e r s had obtained a search warrant. Defendant was a r r e s t e d and charged with escape pursuant t o 5 45-7-306, MCA. Defendant was represented by A r t Tadewaldt, a Cascade County public defender, u n t i l J u l y 3, 1984. O n t h a t d a t e , defendant's case was t r a n s f e r r e d t o another p u b l i c defender, Joe Engel. Engel appeared with defendant a t t h e omnibus hearing on August 2 , 1984, a t which time defendant i n d i c a t e d he d i d not wish t o be represented by anyone from t h e p u b l i c defender's o f f i c e . T r i a l was scheduled f o r August 28, 1984. Engel attempted t o meet with defendant several times p r i o r t o t r i a l but defendant refused t o see him. The County Attorney offered a plea bargain agreement which Engle forwarded t o defendant. The matter came on f o r t r i a l August 28, 1984. Engel informed the d i s t r i c t judge t h a t he was not familiar with t h e case due t o defendant's f a i l u r e t o cooperate. The d i s t r i c t judge questioned defendant whether he desired t o represent himself, t o which defendant responded, "I might a s well, because I ' m not s a t i s f i e d with t h e public defender's services." T r i a l was commenced with defendant a c t i n g pro s e t and Engel present t o a s s i s t i f necessary. Engel conducted v o i r d i r e of t h e p o t e n t i a l jurors, r a i s e d objections throughout t h e t r i a l , a s s i s t e d defendant i n admitting evidence, p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e s e l e c t i o n of jury i n s t r u c t i o n s , and delivered the summation. Defendant waived h i s opening statement, but conducted cross-examination of each prosecution witness, and c a l l e d two witnesses t o t e s t i f y on h i s behalf. Additionally, defendant took t h e stand t o t e s t i f y . Defendant presented t h e defense of j u s t i f i c a t i o n , claiming t h a t he had been threatened by t h e o t h e r t r u s t e e s and escaped t o procure h i s own s a f e t y . However, t h e j a i l supervisor, and one of t h e j a i l e r s , each t e s t i f i e d t h a t defendant did not r e p o r t concern f o r h i s own s a f e t y p r i o r t o h i s escape, nor did defendant contact anyone a t t h e j a i l subsequent t o h i s escape. The jury found defendant g u i l t y of felony escape. Defendant appeals and r a i s e s t h e following issues: 1) Whether defendant was afforded e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel? 2 ) Whether t h e D i s t r i c t Court's r e f u s a l t o g r a n t a continuance was an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n ? Prior to commencement of the trial, defendant informed the district judge that he was not satisfied with the services of the public defender's office, yet he was indigent and could not afford an attorney. Defendant further stated that he would represent himself. The district judge permitted the trial to go on as scheduled, with Engel present to assist defendant if necessary. Defendant contends he did not assert his right to self-representation, nor did he knowingly waive his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. We do not agree. Defendant's statements to the district judge prior to trial amount to an assertion of his right to self-representation. Defendant admitted that his indigency precluded his having a private attorney, and yet he was not satisfied with anyone in the public defender's office. The district judge, although not required to do so, permitted defendant to act pro se with Engle's assistance. ~othing more could be done. A review of the trial transcript reveals that defendant raised the only possible defense available to him, which was justification. In State v. Stuit (1978), 176 Mont. 84, 576 P.2d 264, this Court held that four conditions must exist at the time of escape for justification to be an available defense : 1) The defendant was faced with a specific threat of death, or substantial bodily injury in the immediate future. 2) There is no time for a complaint to the authorities or there exists a history of futile complaints which make any result from such complaints illusory. 3) There is not time or opportunity to resort to the courts. 4) The prisoner immediately reports to the proper authorities when he has attained a position of safety from the immediate threat. In Stuit, we adopted an objective standard which requires defendant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence t h a t escape is o b j e c t i v e l y t h e only v i a b l e and reasonable choice a v a i l a b l e under t h e circumstances. 176 Mont. 90, 576 P.2d 267. Defendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t another t r u s t e e had threatened him t h e day p r i o r t o h i s escape. Defendant d i d not complain nor voice concerns about h i s s a f e t y t o anyone. I n f a c t he denied having s e r i o u s problems with t h e o t h e r t r u s t e e s when questioned by one of t h e j a i l e r s . Defendant t e s t i f i e d he had done some amateur boxing and had won o t h e r f i g h t s he'd been i n while incarcerated. Viewed o b j e c t i v e l y defendant was not facing a s p e c i f i c t h r e a t of death, o r s u b s t a n t i a l bodily i n j u r y . Additionally, t h e evidence was weak t h a t conditions ( 2 ) and (3) were m e t , and it i s undisputed t h a t condition ( 4 ) was not met. Defendant contends t h a t h i s p u b l i c defender should have f i l e d a motion t o suppress evidence on grounds t h a t t h e a r r e s t i n g o f f i c e r s had no search warrant a t t h e time of h i s a r r e s t . The circumstances surrounding defendant's a r r e s t a t t h e residence a r e not i n t h e record, and a claim t h a t a search warrant was necessary is mere speculation. Defendant ' s claim of i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f counsel has absolutely no m e r i t . F i r s t , a defendant who r e f u s e s t o cooperate i n h i s own defense cannot argue he was afforded i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel. S t a t e v. Long (Mont. 19831, 669 P.2d 1068, 1072, 40 St.Rep. 1493, 1498. Secondly, t h e method i n which defendant's defense was conducted was not s o d e f i c i e n t a s t o show any prejudice t o defendent. There i s s u b s t a n t i a l evidence i n t h e record supporting t h e jury v e r d i c t . To show prejudice, a defendant must show t h a t , but for counsel's unprofessional e r r o r s , t h e r e was a reasonable p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e r e s u l t of t h e proceeding would have been d i f f e r e n t . S t a t e v. Robbins (Mont. 1985), 708 P.2d 227, 232, 4 2 St.Rep. 1 4 4 0 , 1 4 4 4 . Next, defendant asserts the district judge erred in refusing to grant a continuance. We do not agree. Pursuant to § 46-13-202, MCA, the trial court has discretion whether to grant a continuance. Section 46-13-202 (3) , MCA, specifically provides that the trial court shall consider the diligence shown on the part of the movant. In this case, an order setting the trial date for August 28, 1984, was sent to defendant on July 2, 1984. Defendant appeared at his omnibus hearing approximately four weeks prior to trial. Defendant moved for a continuance on the morning of trial. This Court has previously ruled that moving for a continuance on the morning of trial does not show diligence on the part of the movant. State v . Klemann (Mont. 1981) , 634 P.2d 632, 634, 38 St.Rep. 1627, 1629. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in refusing to grant a continuance in this instance. The District Court is affirm We concur: