Case Title: Crawford v. Haddock

Citation: 

Docket Number: 050236

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2005-11-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
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Present:  All the Justices 
 
DESTINY JOY CRAWFORD, ET AL. 
 
v.  Record No. 050236 
 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
November 4, 2005 
 
TERRY B. HADDOCK, ET AL. 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 
Frederick B. Lowe, Judge 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred 
in its judgment that Code § 51.1-510 bars imposition of a 
constructive trust upon proceeds from a Virginia Retirement 
System group life insurance policy.  For the reasons discussed 
herein, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
 
This appeal arises from an interpleader action filed by 
Minnesota Life Insurance Company ("Minnesota Life") requesting 
the trial court to determine the proper distribution of 
proceeds of a life insurance policy insuring the life of 
Steven Mark Crawford ("Steven").  Steven was insured under a 
group life insurance policy issued to the Virginia Retirement 
System ("VRS") pursuant to Title 51.1 of the Code of Virginia.  
On January 24, 2000, Steven designated his sister, Terry B. 
Haddock ("Terry"), as the sole beneficiary of his life 
insurance policy.  Steven died on January 13, 2003. 
 
In addition to Terry, Minnesota Life named Eloisa O. 
Crawford ("Eloisa"), Destiny Joy Crawford ("Destiny"), Scott 
 
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Zachary Crawford ("Scott"), and Micah Zebulon Crawford 
("Micah") as defendants in its interpleader action.  Eloisa 
was Steven’s third wife and his surviving legal spouse at the 
time of his death.  Destiny is Steven’s daughter from his 
second marriage.  Scott and Micah are Steven’s sons from his 
first marriage. 
 
Minnesota Life paid the life insurance proceeds, plus the 
accrued interest, into the trial court and was discharged.  
The trial court then ordered each of the defendants to file 
written statements as to the nature of their respective 
claims.  Terry claimed that she was entitled to the benefits 
because she was the sole designated beneficiary.  Eloisa 
responded that, as Steven’s surviving legal spouse, she was 
either the sole beneficiary of Steven’s life insurance policy 
or entitled to her elective share of Steven’s augmented 
estate.  Destiny stated that she was entitled to the proceeds 
because the separation agreement between Steven and Destiny’s 
mother, entered on February 7, 2000, named her as the "primary 
irrevocable beneficiary" of Steven’s life insurance policy.1  
                     
1 Entitled "Life Insurance Policies for the Child," 
Article 3.4 of the separation agreement stated in relevant 
part:  "[Steven] agrees to maintain in full force and effect, 
his existing employer-provided life insurance policy, with a 
$15,000 death benefit unless he dies from an employment-
related injury, in which instance the benefit is $250,000, and 
to designate [Destiny] as the primary irrevocable beneficiary 
thereof." 
 
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Finally, Scott and Micah argued that, pursuant to the 
separation agreement between Steven and their mother entered 
on April 7, 1992, they were each entitled to $25,000 from the 
proceeds of Steven’s life insurance policy.2  With the 
exception of Terry, each of the defendants also asked the 
trial court to impose a constructive trust upon the life 
insurance proceeds. 
 
After the defendants filed their respective answers, 
Terry filed a motion for summary judgment.  In it she claimed 
that there was no material fact in dispute and that Code 
§ 51.1-510 exempted Steven’s life insurance proceeds "from 
levy, garnishment[,] and other legal process including 
imposition of [the] constructive trust" sought by the other 
defendants.  Therefore, Terry argued that she was entitled to 
all of the proceeds because she was the sole designated 
beneficiary. 
 
The trial court granted Terry’s motion for summary 
judgment, stating that the "anti-alienation, anti-attachment 
provisions set forth [in Code § 51.1-510] bars [sic] the 
                     
2 Paragraph 17 of the separation agreement stated that 
Steven "agrees to purchase and maintain and provide evidence 
to the Wife of a life insurance policy payable to each child 
in the amount of $25,000.00 upon the death of the Husband.  
Husband agrees from time to time to provide the Wife upon her 
written request any documentation which may be desired 
concerning his maintaining this policy in full force and 
effect." 
 
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imposition of [the] constructive trust" sought by Eloisa, 
Destiny, Scott, and Micah.  The trial court noted that Eloisa 
had filed a separate suit asserting her elective share in 
Steven’s augmented estate and specifically did not rule 
regarding the validity of this claim by Eloisa. 
 
Destiny, Scott, and Micah filed timely appeals,3 which we 
subsequently granted in order to consider two assignments of 
error:  (1) error by the trial court "in denying the 
imposition of a constructive trust by declining to apply the 
child support exception provided in" Code § 51.1-124.4 to Code 
§ 51.1-510; and (2) error by the trial court "in not 
distinguishing the enforcement of the life insurance 
obligations of the insured to his children from ordinary 
commercial debts." 
II.  Analysis 
 
In the instant case, no material facts are in dispute.  
This appeal is a matter of statutory interpretation and is 
therefore "a pure question of law subject to de novo review."  
Horner v. Dep't of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, & 
Substance Abuse Servs., 268 Va. 187, 192, 597 S.E.2d 202, 204 
(2004).  When interpreting statutes, 
                     
3 Eloisa did not note an appeal and, despite being given 
notice of the appeals of Destiny, Scott, and Micah, did not 
file a brief, make an appearance, or otherwise participate in 
this appeal. 
 
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courts must ascertain and give effect to the 
legislature's intention, which is to be deduced 
from the words used, unless a literal 
interpretation would result in a manifest 
absurdity. When, as here, the General Assembly 
uses words that are clear and unambiguous, 
courts may not interpret them in a way that 
amounts to a holding that the legislature did 
not mean what it actually has expressed.  In 
other words, courts are bound by the plain 
meaning of clear statutory language. 
 
Id. at 192, 597 S.E.2d at 204 (citations omitted).  In a 
situation where " 'one statute speaks to a subject generally 
and another deals with an element of that subject 
specifically, the statutes will be harmonized, if possible, 
and if they conflict, the more specific statute prevails.' 
This is so because 'a specific statute cannot be controlled or 
nullified by a statute of general application unless the 
legislature clearly intended such a result.' "  Gas Mart Corp. 
v. Board of Supervisors, 269 Va. 334, 350, 611 S.E.2d 340, 348 
(2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 259 Va. 697, 706, 529 
S.E.2d 96, 101 (2000)). 
 
On appeal, Destiny, Scott, and Micah argue that the 
exceptions enumerated in Code § 51.1-124.4 apply to all of 
Title 51.1, and that these exceptions are not modified by Code 
§ 51.1-510.  They argue that the trial court failed to 
properly harmonize the statutes and incorrectly held that a 
constructive trust could not be imposed upon Steven's life 
 
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insurance proceeds.  The arguments advanced by Destiny, Scott, 
and Micah are incorrect. 
 
Code § 51.1-124.4, part of the "General Provisions" 
addressing the Virginia Retirement System ("VRS") in Chapter 1 
of Title 51.1, states that an individual's VRS assets "shall 
not be subject to execution, attachment, garnishment, or any 
other process whatsoever."  Code § 51.1-124.4(A).  One of 
several enumerated exceptions to this general prohibition is 
"any court process to enforce a child or child and spousal 
support obligation."  Code § 51.1-124.4(A).  Code § 51.1-510, 
which specifically addresses the "Group Insurance Program" of 
the VRS in Chapter 5 of Title 51.1, states that "the insurance 
provided for in this chapter, including any optional 
insurance, and all proceeds therefrom shall be exempt from 
levy, garnishment, and other legal process."  Code § 51.1-
510(A). 
 
In the instant case, Steven's life insurance was a VRS 
group term life insurance policy.  As such, the general 
provisions of Chapter 1 and the specific provisions of Chapter 
5 of Title 51.1 control it, and our analysis.  Generally, all 
assets of the VRS "shall not be subject to execution, 
attachment, garnishment, or any other process whatsoever."  
Code § 51.1-124.4(A).  One exception to this general rule is 
"any court process to enforce a child or child and spousal 
 
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support obligation."  Code § 51.1-124.4(A).  Thus, at first 
glance, it would appear that a constructive trust could be 
imposed on the life insurance proceeds in order to enforce 
Steven's obligation to provide for Destiny, Scott, and Micah. 
 
However, the specific provisions of Chapter 5 further 
qualify the general provisions found in Chapter 1 of Title 
51.1.  While, generally, an exception exists for a "child or 
child and spousal support obligation," the General Assembly 
has clearly stated that this exception does not apply in the 
specific context of the VRS Group Insurance Program.  Code 
§ 51.1-510 clearly exempts both a VRS group life insurance 
policy and any resulting proceeds "from levy, garnishment, and 
other legal process."  The constructive trust sought by 
Destiny, Scott, and Micah is a type of "other legal process." 
 
Therefore, the trial court correctly held that it was 
prohibited as a matter of law from imposing a constructive 
trust on Steven's VRS group life insurance proceeds.  The 
language employed by the General Assembly evidences a clear 
intent to protect an individual's assets in the Group 
Insurance Program "from levy, garnishment, and other legal 
process."  While Code § 51.1-124.4 provides exceptions that 
apply generally to VRS assets, Code § 51.1-510 speaks directly 
to the specific issue in this appeal.  Because the specific 
controls the general, and there is no indication that the 
 
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General Assembly clearly intended the general to nullify the 
specific, see Gas Mart, 269 Va. at 350, 611 S.E.2d at 348, the 
exceptions enumerated in Code § 51.1-124.4 do not apply to the 
Group Insurance Program because of the plain language of Code 
§ 51.1-510.  Furthermore, the exemption found in Code § 51.1-
510 is without exception and it was unnecessary for the trial 
court to distinguish "the enforcement of the life insurance 
obligations of the insured to his children from ordinary 
commercial debts" in the context of this case. 
 
We will affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
Affirmed.