Case Title: Ruby Drilling Co., Inc. v. Billingsly

Citation: 

Docket Number: 5785

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-03-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Ruby Drilling Co., Inc. v. Billingsly1983 WY 30660 P.2d 377Case Number: 5785Case Number: 5785Decided: 03/22/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
RUBY DRILLING CO., INC., 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

JAY BILLINGSLY, DEBORAH 
BILLINGSLY, HUSBAND AND WIFE, AND ANDREW CORNELIUS, APPELLEES (PLAINTIFFS). No. 
5785

Appeal from the District 
Court, CampbellCounty, Terrence L. O'Brien, 
J.

Michael A. 
Maycock of Daly, Maycock, Anderson & Taylor, P.C., Gillette, for appellant.

No appearance for 
appellees.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROSE and 
BROWN, JJ.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This is an appeal from 
a judgment rendered in favor of the appellees Jay Billingsly, Deborah Billingsly 
and Andrew Cornelius for damages resulting from an alleged trespass committed by 
the appellant Ruby Drilling Co., Inc. Appellant argues that the district judge 
erred in finding that appellant committed a trespass and in awarding the 
appellees damages for continuing trespass.1 The issue to be addressed is 
whether or not, under the facts as developed at trial, the appellant is liable 
for trespassing upon the appellees' property. We will hold that Ruby Drilling 
Co., Inc. did not commit a trespass and will reverse.

FACTS

[¶2.]     On July 6, 1972, the 
Campbell County Planning and Zoning Commission approved a platted subdivision to 
be known as Concho Valley Estates. The plat and map of the subdivision were 
approved by the Board of County Commissioners of CampbellCounty on July 7, 1972, and these 
instruments were filed and recorded on that date. The plat and map revealed that 
each street appearing thereon was to have its own name and that these streets 
resulted in the creation of a 60-foot-wide right-of-way easement. The effect of 
the easement was that each of the 45 lots was encumbered by a 30-foot 
right-of-way easement for street purposes and the easements traversed such areas 
of the properties as would otherwise belong, unencumbered, to the various lot 
owners.

[¶3.]     The appellees are the 
owners of two adjoining lots in the Concho Valley Estates. Their property is 
bordered on the west by an access road designated in the recorded plat as 
Falcon 
Avenue. At the time of trial no provision had been 
made for establishing a central water supply or distribution system for the 
subdivision, but the record reveals that the appellees shared a water well which 
supplied their residences.

[¶4.]     In 1976, the appellant 
Ruby Drilling Co., Inc. drilled a deep-water well near the subdivision and ever 
since has been trying to reach some kind of an agreement with the lot owners for 
the sale of the water. During the summer of 1980, the owner of Ruby Drilling 
Co., Inc. met with a group of Concho Valley Estates homeowners but no agreement 
to supply water was reached. However, one homeowner, a Mr. Don Meis, desired to 
hook up to appellant's well.

[¶5.]     On January 11, 1981, as 
a result of discussions with Meis, appellant installed a water line. This 
installation required the digging of a trench, the laying of a four-inch pipe, 
and backfilling. The trial court found that the pipeline was installed in the 
barrow ditch east of the traveled portion of Falcon Avenue, but within a distance of 22 
feet from the road's center line. The evidence, therefore, established that the 
water line was located within the lines designated on the plat as the 
Falcon 
Avenue easement. It was also established that the 
pipeline was laid without the permission of any of the 
appellees.

[¶6.]     Because appellant 
failed to obtain permission, appellees filed a complaint alleging that Ruby 
Drilling had trespassed on their property causing them damage. Appellant 
generally denied the commission of a trespass upon the properties of the 
appellees and filed a counterclaim. The counterclaim was dismissed on appellees' 
motion for summary judgment and the case went to trial on the trespass claim 
resulting in the previously mentioned judgment entered in appellees' 
favor.

THE 
LAW

[¶7.]     As we noted above, the 
cause of action filed by appellees in this case was for an alleged trespass that 
occurred as a result of Ruby Drilling's laying of the water line. We have also 
made mention of the fact that the evidence established that the water line was 
installed within the boundaries of the 60-foot Falcon Avenue easement described 
on the plat filed with the county clerk in 1972. Given these facts, the sole 
question to be answered concerns whether or not the appellees had any claim to 
possession of the portion of the easement used for the water line, so that an 
action for trespass would in fact lie.2

[¶8.]     A resolution of the 
question requires us to determine the effect of the dedication of the easement 
on the plat. The appellant argues that it is of no significance that the 
notation on the plat does not state that the roadway easements are dedicated to 
the public because the language of § 34-12-104, W.S. 1977,3 requires a finding that the 
recording of the plat operates as a dedication of the 60-foot Falcon Avenue to the 
public. Appellant goes on to argue that, given the above dedication, the 
appellees could not maintain an action for trespass since they had no right of 
possession in any portion of the Falcon Avenue easement.

[¶9.]     We have construed the 
predecessors of § 34-12-104, supra, in the past and those cases are applicable 
here since the language of the statute has not changed substantially over the 
years.

[¶10.]  In Tissino v. Mavrakis, 67 Wyo. 560, 228 P.2d 106 (1951), we held that the language of the statute intending the platting 
of a subdivision, and the sale of lots in accordance therewith, constituted a 
public dedication of the streets which are shown upon the plat. We also held 
that the platting and recording of a subdivision in accordance with the 
statutes4 resulted in the county or city 
acquiring fee title to all streets and ways set out 
therein.

[¶11.]  We modified the above holding in Tissino v. Mavrakis, supra, in two later 
cases that had to do with the power of municipalities to sell or transfer 
property formerly dedicated to the public through operation of the statute. In 
Gay Johnson's Wyoming Automotive Service 
Co. v. City of Cheyenne, Wyo., 367 P.2d 787 (1961), and Payne v. City of Laramie, Wyo., 398 P.2d 557 (1965), we held that the intent of the language of § 34-115, W.S. 1957 
(predecessor to § 34-12-104, W.S. 1977) was not to vest the city or county with 
fee title to the land underlying a street or alley but rather the terms of the 
statute merely conveyed to the public authority a title in trust for the 
public's benefit. This position was reiterated in Morad v. Brown, Wyo., 549 P.2d 312 
(1976).

[¶12.]  These cases at least stand for the 
proposition that the language of present § 34-12-104, W.S. 1977, was intended to 
grant the public an interest in streets and ways set out on a properly platted 
and recorded subdivision map. We assume, however, that had appellees submitted a 
brief, they would argue that the plat as filed expressed no intent that 
Falcon 
Avenue be dedicated to the "public" but rather all it 
says is that "[e]ach street bears its own name and has a 60' right of way 
easement as shown." We also assume that they would rely on our decisions in Carr v. Hopkin, Wyo., 556 P.2d 221 (1976), and Gregory v. Sanders, 
Wyo., 635 P.2d 795 (1981), for the authority for the proposition that no public dedication of 
Falcon 
Avenue occurred.

[¶13.]  Carr v. Hopkin, supra, involved a case 
in which appellant had constructed a water line across certain property claimed 
by appellee, which lands had been designated for use as a street on a plat of 
the subdivision. Although in that case we held that appellee had an action for 
trespass, that holding is to be distinguished from what we say here, because 
there the plat had never been filed or recorded, nor had the disputed easement 
ever been used for a street. We believe the holding in Gregory v. Sanders, 
supra, has little bearing on the present circumstances because there some of the 
disputed roads had clearly been reserved on the plat for private use of the lot 
owners.

[¶14.]  Given these authorities, we are of the 
opinion that, under the facts of record in this case, the 60-foot-wide 
Falcon 
Avenue easement was in fact dedicated to the public 
through operation of the applicable statutes. The roadway was established 
(appellees claimed no ownership rights to the roadway), they bought their lots 
with reference to the recorded plats, and nothing on the plat suggests an intent 
that Falcon Avenue was designated as a private 
right-of-way.

[¶15.]  Having come to this conclusion, we must 
also conclude that appellees could not maintain an action for trespass. This 
holding flows from the fact that the entire 60-foot-wide area was dedicated to 
the public and the dedication was not restricted to only that portion being used 
for a roadway. This being so, the appellees as owners of lots in the subdivision 
only have a right to the use of the Falcon Avenue easement for ingress and 
egress to their property; they have no possessory interest in that area 
sufficient to provide the underpinning for an action in 
trespass.

[¶16.]  It may be said that appellees could have 
maintained an action for interference with their right to use the easement, but 
such allegations were never made. It appears from the record that the case was 
tried on the theory of trespass and we hold that no action could be maintained 
on that ground. The above resolution obviates the need to discuss appellant's 
remaining issue having to do with the award of damages for continuing 
trespass.

[¶17.]  Reversed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Appellees Billingslys 
and Cornelius chose not to file a brief or appear at oral 
argument.

2 The gist of an action 
for trespass in Wyoming is injury to possession, and a 
plaintiff must show possession or the right to immediate possession at the time 
of the trespass. Noble and Carmody v. 
Hudson, 20 Wyo. 227, 122 P. 901 
(1912).

3 Section 34-12-104, W.S. 
1977 provides:

"The acknowledgment and 
recording of such plat, is equivalent to a deed in fee simple of such portion of 
the premises platted as is on such plat set apart for streets, or other public 
use, or is thereon dedicated to charitable, religious or educational 
purposes."

4 The platting and 
recording of a subdivision are controlled by the general provisions found in §§ 
34-12-102 and 34-12-103, W.S. 1977. Section 34-12-102 
reads:

"Every original owner or 
proprietor of any tract or parcel of land, who has heretofore subdivided, or 
shall hereafter subdivide the same into three (3) or more parts for the purpose 
of laying out any town or city, or any addition thereto, or any part thereof, or 
suburban lots, shall cause a plat of such subdivision, with references to known 
or permanent monuments, to be made, which shall accurately describe all the 
subdivisions of such tract or parcel of land, numbering the same by progressive 
numbers, and giving the dimensions, and length and breadth thereof, and the 
breadth and courses of all the streets and alleys established therein. 
Descriptions of lots or parcels of land in such subdivisions, according to the 
number and designation thereof, on said plat contained, in conveyances, or for 
the purposes of taxation, shall be deemed good and valid for all intents and 
purposes. The duty to file for record a plat, as provided herein [§§ 34-12-101 
to 34-12-104, 34-12-106 to 34-12-115], shall attach as a covenant of warranty, 
in all conveyances of any part or parcel of such subdivisions by the original 
owners or proprietors, against any and all assessments, costs and damages, paid, 
lost or incurred by any grantee, or person claiming under him, in consequence of 
the omission on the part of said owner or proprietors to file such 
plat."

Section 
34-12-103 reads:

"Every such plat shall 
contain a statement to the effect that `the above or foregoing subdivision of 
(here insert a correct description of the land or parcel subdivided) as appears 
on this plat, is with the free consent, and in accordance with the desires of 
the undersigned owners and proprietors,' which shall be signed by the owners and 
proprietors, and shall be duly acknowledged before some officer authorized to 
take the acknowledgement of deeds. The plat shall meet the approval of the board 
of county commissioners if it is of land situated without the boundaries of any 
city or town or by the governing body of the city or town if situated within the 
boundaries of such city or town. When thus executed, acknowledged and approved, 
said plat shall be filed for record and recorded in the office of the clerk of 
the proper county; provided, however, that any such plat of land adjacent to any 
incorporated city or town, or within one (1) mile of the boundaries of any such 
city or town, shall be jointly approved by both the board of county 
commissioners of said county and the governing body of said city or town before 
same shall be filed and recorded in the office of the county clerk as 
aforesaid."

ROONEY, Chief Justice, 
specially concurring.

[¶18.]  I concur, but I take exception to the 
statement in the majority opinion that:

"the holding in Gregory v. Sanders, supra [Wyo., 635 P.2d 795 
(1981)], has little bearing on the present circumstances because there some of 
the disputed roads had clearly been reserved on the plat for private use of the 
lot owners."

[¶19.]  As pointed out in my dissent to that 
case, the plats of the five subdivisions involved in that case, clearly and 
unambiguously dedicated the roads thereon to the public. Notarized statements on 
plats for Subdivisions 1, 2, 3, and 4 so dedicated the roads "as shown on the 
foregoing Plat," and a notarized statement on the plat for Subdivision 5 
dedicated "to the public use existing roads and ways." The roads under 
consideration were then existing 
roads. There was no reservation for private use on the 
plats.

[¶20.]  Although the majority opinion in Gregory v. Sanders, supra, does not 
harmonize with this opinion, the dissent in it does, and the holding in this 
case is proper.