Case Title: WALLINDER v LAGERQUIST

Citation: 

Docket Number: 81-556

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1982-11-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 81-556 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1382 JOHN WALLINDER, Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs- GLENN LAGERQUIST, et al., Defendants and Appellants. Appeal fron: District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and for the County of Cascade, The Honorable H. William Coder, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellants: Paul G Paul; John P. Paul, Great Falls, Montana For Respondent : Asselstine & Cruikshank, Great Falls, Montana Submitted on Briefs: July 2, 1982 Decided: November 10, 1982 M r . J u s t i c e Fred J. Weber d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . T h i s is an a p p e a l from t h e o r d e r of t h e District Court of t h e E i g h t h J u d i c i a l District f o r t h e County of Cascade i n which t h e c o u r t concluded t h a t d e f e n d a n t , Grace Marchwick, had been per- s o n a l l y s e r v e d so t h e c o u r t had p e r s o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r h e r , and i n which t h e c o u r t denied d e f e n d a n t s ' Rule 6 0 ( b ) motion to v a c a t e d e f a u l t judgment because of m i s t a k e , i n a d v e r t e n c e , s u r p r i s e and/or e x c u s a b l e n e g l e c t , because t h e c o u r t l a c k e d j u r i s d i c t i o n . W e a f f i r m t h e District Court. John W a l l i n d e r ( p l a i n t i f f ) f i l e d a n o r i g i n a l c o m p l a i n t which a l l e g e d t h a t he was employed as a t r u c k d r i v e r by t h e d e f e n d a n t , Glenn L a g e r q u i s t , e i t h e r i n d i v i d u a l l y or as a n a u t h o r i z e d a g e n t of one o r more of t h e named d e f e n d a n t cor- p o r a t i o n s . The d e f e n d a n t s , Donald Marchwick and Grace Marchwick (Marchwicks), were n o t named as p a r t i e s d e f e n d a n t i n t h e o r i g i n a l c o m p l a i n t . The o r i g i n a l complaint a l l e g e d t h a t p l a i n t i f f was to be p a i d 20 p e r c e n t of t h e amount r e c e i v e d by v a r i o u s of t h e d e f e n d a n t s p l u s expenses i n c u r r e d i n t h e o p e r a t i o n of a t r u c k . P l a i n t i f f a l s o a l l e g e d a demand f o r payment and r e f u s a l to pay. I n r e s p o n s e to t h e o r i g i n a l c o m p l a i n t , L a g e r q u i s t , p r o se, f i l e d a n answer i n b e h a l f of a l l of t h e d e f e n d a n t s ( n o t i n c l u d i n g Marchwicks ) . The answer c o n t a i n e d d e n i a l s , a l l e g a t i o n s of payments, and u l t i m a t e l y concluded by c l a i m i n g a b a l a n c e due p l a i n t i f f of $75.09. P l a i n t i f f t h e n made a motion f o r judgment on t h e p l e a d i n g s b u t d i d n o t call t h a t motion up f o r con- s i d e r a t i o n , so it was n o t r u l e d upon by t h e c o u r t . On A p r i l 24, 1982, p l a i n t i f f f i l e d an amended c o m p l a i n t w i t h a l l e g a t i o n s s u b s t a n t i a l l y i d e n t i c a l to t h o s e i n t h e o r i g i n a l c o m p l a i n t , w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n t h a t it added t h e Marchwicks as p a r t i e s d e f e n d a n t and added t h e f o l l o w i n g p a r a g r a p h : " T h a t Donald Marchwick and Grace Marchwick, e i t h e r i n d i v i d u a l l y o r a s j o i n t t e n a n t s , or as t e n a n t s i n common, own 49 p e r c e n t of t h e i s s u e d and o u t s t a n d i n g c a p i t a l s h a r e s of Western Automotive S a l e s and S e r v i c e , I n c . [one of named d e f e n d a n t s ] ." By o r d e r d a t e d May 1 3 , 1981, t h e D i s t r i c t Court a u t h o r i z e d t h e f i l i n g of t h e amended c o m p l a i n t . S e r v i c e was made p e r s o n a l l y on t h e Marchwicks on May 26, 1981, a l t h o u g h Grace Marchwick con- t e s t e d t h e p e r s o n a l s e r v i c e . Request t o e n t e r d e f a u l t was f i l e d on J u n e 1 7 , 1981. D e f a u l t judgment was e n t e r e d a g a i n s t o n l y d e f e n d a n t s Marchwicks on J u n e 1 8 , 1981, i n t h e amount of $5,572.20, p l a i n t i f f ' s c o s t s and d i s b u r s e m e n t s of $112, and a t t o r n e y ' s f e e s of $1,142.50, making a total of $6,826.70. N o judgment w a s e n t e r e d as to any of t h e o t h e r named d e f e n d a n t s . On J u n e 25, 1981, seven days a f t e r t h e e n t r y of d e f a u l t judgment, d e f e n d a n t s Marchwicks, moved t h e c o u r t f o r a n o r d e r v a c a t i n g t h e d e f a u l t judgment under Rule 6 0 ( b ) ( l ) r M.R.Civ.P., f o r t h e r e a s o n s of m i s t a k e , i n a d v e r t e n c e , s u r p r i s e and/or excu- s a b l e n e g l e c t , and also moved f o r an o r d e r s e t t i n g a s i d e t h e judgment a g a i n s t Grace Marchwick f o r t h e r e a s o n t h a t she was n o t p r o p e r l y s e r v e d . By o r d e r dated J u n e 26, 1981, t h e District C o u r t set t h e motion f o r h e a r i n g on J u l y 6 , 1981. Rule 6 0 ( c ) p r o v i d e s t h a t motions under Rule 60 ( b ) are to be heard and d e t e r - mined w i t h i n t h e times provided by Rule 59. Rule 59 r e q u i r e s a h e a r i n g on a motion to be had i n t e n days a f t e r it h a s been s e r v e d . I n t h i s case, t h e t e n t h day from J u n e 26, 1981, f e l l on a Sunday so t h a t J u l y 6 , 1981, was p r o p e r under Rule 6 ( a ) . By s t i p u l a t i o n , t h e c o u r t e n t e r e d its o r d e r of J u l y 6 , 1981, con- t i n u i n g t h e h e a r i n g on Marchwicks' motion to J u l y 1 7 , 1981. By o r d e r d a t e d J u l y 1 7 , 1981, t h e District Court s t a t e d t h a t t h e motion had been p r e v i o u s l y set f o r h e a r i n g on J u l y 1 7 , b u t t h e r e b e i n g a c o n f l i c t i n t h e c o u r t ' s c a l e n d a r , t h e matter w a s vacated and reset f o r October 7, 1981. On O c t o b e r 7 , a h e a r i n g was h e l d w i t h t e s t i m o n y being p r e s e n t e d and by o r d e r dated O c t o b e r 20, 1981, t h e D i s t r i c t Court found t h a t Grace Marchwick w a s per- s o n a l l y s e r v e d w i t h a copy of t h e summons and c o m p l a i n t . The c o u r t f u r t h e r o r d e r e d t h a t t h e motion of t h e Marchwicks f o r r e l i e f under Rule 6 0 ( b ) was denied a s t h e c o u r t lacked j u r i s d i c - t i o n to g r a n t such r e l i e f because t h e t i m e f o r h e a r i n g p u r s u a n t to Rule 59 had passed p r i o r to t h e h e a r i n g d a t e . By n o t i c e of a p p e a l d a t e d November 1 2 , 1981, Marchwicks appealed t h e October 20, 1981, o r d e r . The i s s u e s a r e : (1) Did t h e D i s t r i c t Court err i n denying Marchwicks1 Rule 6 0 ( b ) motion t o v a c a t e t h e d e f a u l t judgment? ( 2 ) Did t h e District Court err i n f i n d i n g t h a t Grace Marchwick had been p e r s o n a l l y served and t h a t t h e c o u r t had per- s o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r h e r ? U n f o r t u n a t e l y , n e i t h e r counsel f o r t h e p a r t i e s nor t h e lower c o u r t complied w i t h t h e e x p r e s s r e q u i r e m e n t s of Rules 6 0 ( b ) and 59. The r e s u l t is t h a t t h e d e f a u l t judgment w i l l s t a n d w i t h o u t t r i a l on t h e merits. The motion of t h e Marchwicks under Rule 6 0 ( b ) was s u f f i c i e n t i n form. I n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , Rule 6 0 ( b ) p r o v i d e s : "On motion and upon such terms as are j u s t , t h e c o u r t may r e l i e v e a p a r t y . . . from a f i n a l judgment . . . f o r t h e f o l l o w i n g r e a s o n s : " (1) m i s t a k e , i n a d v e r t e n c e , s u r p r i s e , or e x c u s a b l e n e g l e c t . . ." The t i m e r e q u i r e m e n t s are set f o r t h i n Rule 60 ( c ) which p r o v i d e s : "Motions provided by s u b d i v i s i o n s ( a ) and ( b ) o f t h i s r u l e s h a l l be heard and determined w i t h i n t h e times provided by Rule 59 i n t h e case of motions f o r new t r i a l s . . ." The key p r o v i s i o n s on t i m e as t o t h i s case, are set f o r t h i n Rule 5 9 ( d ) as f o l l o w s : "Hearing on t h e motion s h a l l be had w i t h i n 10 d a y s a f t e r it h a s been s e r v e d . . . e x c e p t t h a t a t any t i m e a f t e r t h e n o t i c e of h e a r i n g o n t h e motion h a s been s e r v e d t h e c o u r t may i s s u e an o r d e r c o n t i n u i n g t h e h e a r i n g - f o r -- n o t to exceed 30 d a y s . I n case t h e h e a r i n g is - - - - - c o n t i n u e d by t h e c o u r t , it s h a l l be t h e d u t y o f t h e c o u r t to h e a r t h e same a t t h e e a r l i e s t p r a c t i c a b l e d a t e t h e r e a f t e r . . , If t h e c o u r t s h a l l f a i l to r u l e upon t h e motion w i t h i n s a i d t i m e , t h e motion s h a l l , a t t h e e x p i r a t i o n of s a i d p e r i o d , be deemed denied. " I f t h e motion is n o t n o t i c e d up f o r h e a r i n g and no h e a r i n g is h e l d t h e r e o n , it s h a l l be deemed denied as of t h e e x p i r a t i o n of t h e p e r i o d of t i m e w i t h i n which h e a r i n g is r e q u i r e d t o be h e l d under t h i s Rule 59." (Underscoring added. ) I n t h i s c a s e , t h e Marchwicks p r o p e r l y made t h e i r motion and s e r v e d t h e same, w i t h h e a r i n g i n i t i a l l y set f o r J u l y 6. T h a t h e a r i n g w a s continued to J u l y 17 , using e l e v e n of t h e t h i r t y days allowed under Rule 59 f o r a c o n t i n u a n c e . On J u l y 1 7 , t h e District Court had t h e power under Rule 59 t o c o n t i n u e a g a i n f o r a maximum of n i n e t e e n days, b u t i n s t e a d continued t h e h e a r i n g to October 7 . By w a i t i n g u n t i l October 7 , c o u n s e l and t h e District C o u r t p l a c e d t h e motion beyond t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e c o u r t . T h i s case is similar to O s t e r v. O s t e r ( 1 9 8 0 ) r Mont . - - , 606 P.2d 1075, 37 St.Rep. 264. I n O s t e r a h e a r i n g was set f o r F e b r u a r y 7. Due to w e a t h e r , t h e D i s t r i c t Court w a s unable to g e t to t h e h e a r i n g and t h e m a t t e r was c o n t i n u e d to March 1 9 , a t which time t h e h e a r i n g was h e l d . I n h o l d i n g t h a t t h e motion c o u l d n o t be g r a n t e d ( i n t h e O s t e r case t h e motion was f o r a new t r i a l , b u t was c o n t r o l l e d by Rule 5 9 ) t h i s Court s a i d : "Rule 5 9 ( d ) s a y s t h a t a h e a r i n g on a motion f o r a new t r i a l s h a l l be had w i t h i n t e n days a f t e r t h e motion h a s been s e r v e d , e x c e p t t h a t t h e c o u r t may c o n t i n u e t h e h e a r i n g n o t to exceed 30 d a y s . I f t h e c o u r t f a i l s t o r u l e upon t h e motion w i t h i n t h e t i m e g i v e n under Rule 5 9 ( d ) t h e n t h e motion s h a l l be deemed d e n i e d . I n t h e p r e s e n t case, t h e motion was made on J a n u a r y 25, b u t t h e h e a r i n g was n o t had u n t i l March 1 9 . T h i s is m o r e t h a n t h e time allowed under t h e r u l e . " I n Cain v. H a r r i n g t o n ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 6 1 Mont. 401, 506 P.2d 1375, t h i s Court c o n s i d e r e d Rule 59 i n a similar c o n t e x t . W e s t a t e d : i"We b e l i e v e t h e purpose of t h e r u l e should be adhered to and w h i l e w e do n o t wish t o be t e c h n i c a l , a t t h e same t i m e we cannot p e r m i t d e v i a t i o n s . ( C i t a t i o n o m i t t e d . ) "The D i s t r i c t Court i n t h e p r e s e n t case was correct i n r u l i n g as it d i d . The District C o u r t - had -- no - j u r i s d i c t i o n to g r a n t a new t r i a l under Rule 59. " (Underscoring added. ) 606 P.2d a t 1078, 37 St.Rep. a t 267-268. I n t h i s c a s e w e f i n d a d i r e c t l y comparable f a c t s i t u a t i o n . The District Court h e r e continued t h e h e a r i n g to O c t o b e r 7 and c o u n s e l concurred i n t h a t o r d e r . When t h e time allowed f o r a c o n t i n u a n c e under Rule 59 e x p i r e d , t h e D i s t r i c t Court l o s t its j u r i s d i c t i o n to g r a n t t h e motion, r e g a r d l e s s of its view of t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e r e a s o n s urged. I n a n o t h e r r e c e n t case of d i f - f i c u l t y w i t h t h e s e r u l e s , Winn v. Winn ( 1 9 8 2 ) , Mont . I -- P.2d , 39 St.Rep. 1831, 1835-1836, t h i s Court s t a t e d w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e matter of j u r i s d i c t i o n : "That t h e p a r t i e s may have s t i p u l a t e d t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e District C o u r t , o r may have agreed n o t to r a i s e t h e q u e s t i o n of l a c k o f j u r i s d i c t i o n , d o e s not c o n f e r j u r i s d i c t i o n on t h e District Court t o d e c i d e a case beyond t h e t i m e l i m i t a t i o n s e x p r e s s l y provided by Rule 59, M.R.Civ.P. Marvel B r u t e S t e e l B u i l d i n g v. Bass ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont . , 616 P.2d 380, 37 St.Rep. 1 A c o u r t w h i c h l a c k s j u r i s d i c t i o n cannot a c q u i r e it by con- s e n t of t h e p a r t i e s . Corban v. Corban ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 1 6 1 Mont. 93, 504 P.2d 985." I n t h e p r e s e n t case, f o l l o w i n g t h e improper o r d e r c o n t i n u i n g t h e motion t o October 7 , t h e h e a r i n g was h e l d and t h e c o u r t d i d make its o r d e r denying t h e motion dated O c t o b e r 20, 1981. T h a t is comparable to - - - - Marvel B r u t e S t e e l Bldg. where t h e c o u r t s t a t e d : "Even though t h e t r i a l c o u r t i s s u e d an o r d e r on May 1 5 , 1979 denying t h e d e f e n d a n t s 1 motion for a new t r i a l , t h e o r d e r was a n u l l i t y because it was i s s u e d a f t e r t h e t i m e had e x p i r e d under Rule 59, w i t h i n which to r u l e on a motion f o r new t r i a l . W e have r e p e a t e d l y h e l d t h a t t h e t i m e and p r o c e d u r a l l i m i t a t i o n s f o r post-judgment motions under Rule 59 are mandatory ( c i t a t i o n s o m i t t e d ) . " 616 P.2d a t 382, 37 St.Rep. a t 1672. I n a similar f a s h i o n , t h e o r d e r of October 20, 1981, also w a s a n u l l i t y , as it was beyond t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n a l power of t h e c o u r t t o make t h a t o r d e r . W e t h e r e f o r e f i n d i n t h e p r e s e n t case t h a t on J u l y 6 , t h e D i s t r i c t Court had t h e a u t h o r i z a t i o n to c o n t i n u e t h e h e a r i n g f o r a p e r i o d n o t to exceed t h i r t y d a y s . A s a r e s u l t , when t h e t h i r t y d a y p e r i o d ended on August 5 , 1981, under Rule 5 9 ( d ) , as i n t e r p r e t e d by t h i s Court, t h e motion w a s deemed d e n i e d . A t t h a t p o i n t , Rule 5 , Mont .R.App.Civ.P. a p p l i e s . Rule 5 s t a t e s : "The t i m e w i t h i n which an a p p e a l from a judgment or an o r d e r must be t a k e n s h a l l be 30 d a y s from t h e e n t r y t h e r e o f . . . "The running of t h e t i m e f o r f i l i n g a n o t i c e o f appeal is suspended a s t o a l l p a r t i e s by a t i m e l y motion f i l e d i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t by a n y p a r t y p u r s u a n t to t h e Montana Rules of C i v i l Procedure h e r e a f t e r enumerated i n t h i s s e n t e n c e , and t h e f u l l t i m e f o r appeal f i x e d by t h i s r u l e commences t o run and is t o be computed from m a i l i n g by t h e c l e r k of n o t i c e of t h e e n t r y of any of t h e following o r d e r s made upon a t i m e l y motion under such r u l e s : . . . ( 3 ) g r a n t i n g o r denying a motion under Rule 59 to a l t e r o r amend t h e judgment ." A s pointed o u t by t h i s Court i n Marvel Brute S t e e l Bldg. a motion - - - f o r new t r i a l o r a motion t o v a c a t e a d e f a u l t judgment under Rule 6 0 ( b ) made p u r s u a n t to Rule 5 9 ( d ) s t o p s the running of t h e t h i r t y d a y period f o r an appeal. The t h i r t y day period s t a r t s running a f t e r t h e t r i a l c o u r t h a s e n t e r e d its o r d e r denying t h e motion a f t e r h e a r i n g . I n t h e absence of a d e t e r m i n a t i o n by t h e c o u r t w i t h i n t h e t i m e p e r i o d s involved, t h e motion is considered o r deemed d e n i e d , and t h e appeal t i m e s t a r t s running. Here t h e a p p e a l t i m e s t a r t e d running on August 5 and terminated t h i r t y d a y s t h e r e a f t e r . The r e s u l t is t h a t the appeal was not f i l e d w i t h i n t h e allowable t i m e period and t h i s Court does not have j u r i s d i c t i o n t o h e a r t h e a p p e a l . Warning. W e renew t h e warning p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e d i n r e c e n t - - c a s e s by t h i s Court. A t t o r n e y s and ~ i s t r i c t Courts must keep i n mind t h e v e r y r e a l r i s k s involved i n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of Rules 59 and 6 0 , M.R.Civ,P. These r u l e s a r e s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from t h e companion r u l e s i n t h e Federal Rules of C i v i l Procedure. The Montana Rules a r e much s t r i c t e r . A s demonstrated h e r e , a f a i l u r e t o comply r e s u l t s i n a l o s s of j u r i s d i c t i o n and i n a b i l i t y of t h e t r i a l c o u r t and t h i s Court t o c o n s i d e r q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d on t h e merits. T h i s c a s e demonstrates t h e p o s s i b l y i n e q u i t a b l e r e s u l t s from a f a i l u r e to comply with t h e s e r u l e s : The complaint a g a i n s t t h e Marchwicks i n s u b s t a n c e s t a t e d o n l y t h a t they were 49 p e r c e n t s t o c k h o l d e r s i n a defendant c o r p o r a t i o n , b u t otherwise f a i l e d to s t a t e a c l a i m f o r r e l i e f a g a i n s t t h e Marchwicks; t h e a f f i d a v i t s f i l e d i n behalf of the Marchwicks i n d i c a t e d t h a t M r . Marchwick had advised L a g e r q u i s t promptly upon s e r v i c e of summons and c o m p l a i n t , and L a g e r q u i s t had advised M r . Marchwick t h a t he would t a k e c a r e of handling a l l of the m a t t e r s r e q u i r e d ; and f u r t h e r t h a t both M r . and Mrs. Marchwick signed an answer prepared by L a g e r q u i s t which was n o t f i l e d i n t h i s c a s e , b u t which l e d t h e Marchwicks to b e l i e v e t h a t e v e r y t h i n g had been taken c a r e o f ; d e f a u l t judgment was e n t e r e d o n l y a g a i n s t t h e Marchwicks and not t h e o t h e r d e f e n d a n t s , r a i s i n g a q u e s t i o n as to t h e e q u i t y of t h i s a c t i o n ; and f i n a l l y t h e District Court o b v i o u s l y thought it had t h e power to c o n t i n u e t h e h e a r i n g to October and having done so w i t h o u t o p p o s i t i o n by c o u n s e l , t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e c o u r t was e l i m i n a t e d . I n t h e second i s s u e p l a i n t i f f a r g u e s t h a t t h e evidence i n b e h a l f of Grace Marchwick shows t h a t she had not been p e r s o n a l l y s e r v e d and t h a t as a r e s u l t t h e District Court d i d not g a i n per- s o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r h e r . The District Court reached its c o n c l u s i o n t h a t Grace Marchwick had been p r o p e r l y served o n l y a f t e r a h e a r i n g i n which t h e D i s t r i c t Court acted a s t h e f i n d e r o f f a c t , f o l l o w i n g t h e p r e s e n t a t i o n of testimony and o t h e r evi- dence i n b e h a l f of both sets of p a r t i e s . The s t a n d a r d of review is set f o r t h i n Rule 5 2 ( a ) , M.R.Civ,P., as f o l l o w s : " F i n d i n g s of f a c t s h a l l n o t be set a s i d e u n l e s s c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s , and due regard s h a l l be given to t h e o p p o r t u n i t y of t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o judge of t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e w i t n e s s e s ." The t r a n s c r i p t does d i s c l o s e a d i r e c t c o n t r a d i c t i o n i n t h e e v i - dence on t h e q u e s t i o n of s e r v i c e . However, t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e i n t h e record t o s u p p o r t t h e f i n d i n g of p e r s o n a l ser- v i c e . A s a r e s u l t , we conclude t h a t t h i s f i n d i n g of f a c t on t h e p a r t of t h e D i s t r i c t Court cannot be set a s i d e because it is not c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s . W e t h e r e f o r e close w i t h t h e warning t h a t Rules 59 and 60 must be c a r e f u l l y followed by counsel and t h e t r i a l c o u r t s , o t h e r w i s e a d d i t i o n a l c a s e s w i l l be dismissed w i t h o u t t r i a l on t h e merits. Af f irmed. We Concur: Chief Justice