Case Title: State v. Jeffcoat

Citation: 403 So. 2d 1227

Docket Number: 81-K-0811

State: louisiana

Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Date: 1981-09-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
403 So. 2d 1227 (1981) STATE of Louisiana v. Michael JEFFCOAT. No. 81-K-0811. Supreme Court of Louisiana. September 8, 1981. *1228 William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Harry F. Connick, Dist. Atty., Clifford R. Strider, III, Louise Korns, Asst. Dist. Attys., for plaintiff-relator. James C. Lawrence, Orleans Indigent Defender Program, New Orleans, for defendant-respondent. DENNIS, Justice.[*] This is a review of a trial court order suppressing evidence seized by police officers under a search warrant. We granted the state's application for a writ and now reverse the trial court's ruling. The issue presented is whether the warrant was based on probable cause for its issuance established by facts presented to the magistrate by a search warrant application which, in pertinent part, provided: The facts necessary to show probable cause may be established by hearsay evidence. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S. Ct. 725, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1960); State v. Paciera, 290 So. 2d 681 (La.1974). The Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct. 1509, 12 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1964), laid down the test by which information given the affiant by an unidentified informant could be considered by the magistrate in determining if there was probable cause upon which a search warrant should issue. "[T]he magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were there where he claimed they were and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed ... was `credible' or his information `reliable.'" 378 U.S. at 114-15, 84 S. Ct. at 1514, 12 L. Ed. 2d at 729. A careful analysis of Aguilar reveals that its two-part test is designed to perform different functions. The first part is designed to insure that the informant obtained his information by personal observation, or in some other dependable manner rather than through mere rumor. This "basis of knowledge" test is a corollary of the Fourth Amendment's requirement that the magistrate, and not the police officer-affiant or his informant, shall weigh the facts and decide whether they establish probable cause. See Spinelli v. United States, infra, 393 U.S. at 424, 89 S. Ct. at 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d at 648 (White, J., concurring); State v. Cann, 392 So. 2d 381, 384 (La.) (concurring opinion); Moylan, Hearsay and Probable Cause: An Aguilar and Spinelli Primer, 25 Mercer L.Rev. 741, 751-52 (1974). The second prong of Aguilar's two-prong test is aimed at determining the veracity of the source of the hearsay information. Aguilar held that this test could be satisfied in either of two ways: (1) the affidavit may recite facts from which the magistrate could conclude that the informant is credible, or (2) it may recite facts from which the magistrate could conclude that the informant's information is credible. The "veracity prong" of Aguilar's two-part test is designed to perform the same function that the oath and the magistrate's direct observation serve in evaluating the truthfulness of the affiant. As the oath serves as a hedge against issuing an affidavit based on false allegations, so too does the requirement that there be included in the affidavit facts which indicate a reason for believing in the veracity of the source of the information. Where the internal recitation about the informant or about the circumstances under which the information was furnished fail to establish that the informant was "credible" or that his information was otherwise "reliable," then the independent observations made by the officers-affiants themselves might be looked to by way of verification. See Spinelli v. United *1230 States, supra 393 U.S. 410, 89 S. Ct. 584, 21 L. Ed. 2d 637; State v. Paciera, supra; State v. Cann, supra; Moylan, supra, at 750-51. The affidavit in this case is sufficient as measured by each prong of the Aguilar test. It passes the "basis of knowledge" test because the magistrate was informed of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that property stolen from Johansen's house was located in defendant Jeffcoat's residence at 13039 River Road. The informant claimed to have seen the property which fit the description of some of the items stolen while visiting the Jeffcoat residence. This provided an adequate basis to assure that the informant, if credible, obtained his information by personal observation, and not through mere rumor. The affidavit also passes the "veracity" test because the affidavit recited circumstances under which the information was furnished, including partial verification of the informant's story by the officer-affiant's independent investigation, from which the magistrate reasonably could conclude that the informant was credible or that his information was reliable. The informant described the articles he had seen in the Jeffcoat residence, some of which were unusual, such as the deer-scene rug and the cap-and-ball type pistols. The affiant officer's independent investigation verified that the informant's description of the articles fit that of property recently taken in burglaries of the Johansen house and a Plaquemines Parish residence. The informant stated that Jeffcoat informed him the property had been stolen and that the pistols were taken in a Plaquemines Parish burglary. This admission by Jeffcoat appeared plausible because it was unlikely the informant would furnish information regarding a crime in which he was involved and unlikely that he would have any source of knowledge, other than Jeffcoat, that the items were stolen. Altogether these facts included in the affidavit provided a reason for believing in the veracity of the source of information. The ruling of the trial court granting the motion to suppress is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings. SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE REVERSED. [*] Judges Frederick S. Ellis, Morris A. Lottinger, Jr. and Elven E. Ponder of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, participated in this decision as Associate Justices pro tempore, joined by Associate Justices Calogero, Dennis, Watson and Lemmon.