Case Title: P. v. Kelly

Citation: 

Docket Number: S049973

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2007-12-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
1
Filed 12/6/07 
 
 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
) 
 
 
) 
 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
) 
 
 
) 
S049973 
 
v. 
) 
 
 
) 
DOUGLAS OLIVER KELLY, 
) 
 
) 
Los Angeles County 
 
Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
Super. Ct. No. LA015339 
___________________________________ ) 
 
A jury convicted defendant Douglas Oliver Kelly of the first degree murder 
of Sara Weir under the special circumstances of robbery and rape murder and with 
personal use of a deadly weapon.  (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 190.2, subd. (a)(17), 12022, 
subd. (b).)1  After a penalty trial, the jury returned a verdict of death.  The court 
denied the automatic motion to modify the verdict (§ 190.4) and imposed that 
sentence.  This appeal is automatic.  (§ 1239, subd. (b).)  We affirm the judgment. 
I.  FACTS 
A.  Guilt Phase 
1.  Overview 
On September 15, 1993, 10-year-old Eric A. discovered Sara Weir’s nude 
and decomposed body under his bed in the apartment where Eric lived with his 
                                              
1  
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise 
indicated. 
 
2
mother, Michelle T., and, for a while, defendant.2  The evidence presented at trial 
established that defendant had stabbed Sara to death with a pair of scissors several 
days earlier. 
2.  The Evidence 
The prosecution presented evidence regarding defendant’s and Sara’s 
actions in the weeks and, especially, days before defendant killed her.  Defendant, 
who apparently had little money and owned no car, frequented a fitness center in 
Burbank, where he met and befriended a number of women, including Sara, 
Michelle T., and Teri B.  Michelle and Teri testified that at first defendant was a 
friendly and seemingly caring person.  He told them, and they believed him at 
first, that he had a wealthy family in Chicago.  He also led them to believe he was 
a manager or part owner of the fitness center. 
Sara, who was 19 years old when she was killed, lived with a friend and 
had a job at Warner Bros. Studios.  Martha Farwell, Sara’s adoptive mother, 
described her as naïve and trusting.  During the summer of 1993, she visited the 
fitness center quite often, where she met defendant.  Defendant became her 
personal trainer.  One time Sara went with a friend to defendant’s apartment to 
look at a dog.  Sara told people that defendant was her personal trainer but never 
suggested she had any other relationship with him.  She mentioned to one friend 
that defendant had tried to flirt with her but she was not interested.  She had other 
boyfriends that summer. 
Sara spent the Labor Day weekend with her mother and left to go to her 
home the afternoon of Labor Day itself, September 6.  One friend was expecting to 
hear from her sometime that same day, during the evening at the latest.  The next 
morning, September 7, shortly after 9:00 a.m., Sara called her place of work and 
                                              
2  
All further dates are in the year 1993 unless otherwise indicated. 
 
3
said that “she wasn’t going to be at work today because a friend had committed 
suicide and she had to deal with that.”  She sounded upset.  Sara’s mother testified 
that she knew of no such suicide.  Sara had made plans with another friend to see a 
movie around September 8 and to go to the Hollywood Bowl on September 11.  
Neither Sara’s mother nor her friends ever saw or heard from her again until her 
body was discovered. 
Michelle testified that she and defendant began dating.  Eventually, 
defendant moved into her apartment at 4950 Laurel Canyon, apartment 110, in 
North Hollywood, where she lived with her son, Eric A.  The three lived together 
in that apartment for about five months until late August.  Defendant often spoke 
of Sara Weir.  He told Michelle that Sara had hired him to do weight training. 
At some point, defendant offered to become Teri’s personal trainer, which 
she accepted.  He also asked Teri to work in his family business, promising that 
his mother would pay her when she arrived from Chicago.  Teri agreed, and she 
believed she had a working relationship with defendant for about two weeks, 
although she was never paid.  She once told defendant she needed to be paid.  He 
gave her one of Michelle’s checks, in the amount of $2,000, but the check 
bounced. 
During this time, defendant also sought to obtain money from 
acquaintances.  Leticia Busby testified that she met defendant at the fitness center, 
where she worked as an aerobics instructor.  On August 26, defendant asked to 
borrow her credit card so he could take his girlfriend to San Diego for the 
weekend.  She refused. 
Helen Walters also knew defendant from the fitness center.  He told her that 
he had just received a family inheritance, but he needed some money to rent a car 
to go to Disneyland, where he planned to set up a food business.  He asked to use 
Walters’s credit card, offering to pay off the $300 balance on the card account if 
 
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she allowed him to do so.  He showed her his bankbook, which indicated he had 
much money, but he also said he did not have a credit card, so he needed to 
borrow hers.  Walters trusted him and permitted him to use her card.  He charged 
$900 to her card but never repaid her.  She last spoke with him around August 29 
or 30.  He told her then that he would get her the money, but she never heard from 
him again. 
Damon Stalworth owns a restaurant.  He came to know and to trust 
defendant.  Defendant gave him “the impression that he had access to cash.”  
Around August, Stalworth accepted two personal checks from defendant that were 
in someone else’s name, possibly Teri B.’s.  He gave defendant cash.  “It was like 
a loan, just to get cash.”  The checks bounced, and defendant never repaid 
Stalworth.  Teri testified that she did not give defendant permission to write a 
check of hers for cash. 
On Monday, August 30, defendant asked Teri to come to his apartment on 
Laurel Canyon to meet his mother, who was supposedly coming to town.  Teri 
believed the mother would have money to pay her what defendant owed her.  She 
went to the apartment shortly after noon, but defendant said his mother had not yet 
arrived.  Later, when the mother did not appear, Teri began to get concerned and 
wanted to leave.  She went to the bathroom.  When she came out, defendant 
assaulted her with a pair of scissors.  He forced her into the master bedroom, 
where he held the scissors to her throat, drawing blood.  Defendant threatened to 
kill her.  In order to survive, Teri did not resist what followed.  Defendant forced 
her to disrobe, raped her twice, and sodomized her twice.  After that, he poured 
champagne and whiskey into two glasses, from which they drank.  Then he raped 
her again and orally copulated her. 
Afterwards, defendant had Teri get dressed, and they drove to a restaurant 
in her car, where they stayed for about 15 minutes.  Then they drove some more.  
 
5
During this drive, around 6:00 to 7:00 p.m., defendant had a conversation with 
Michelle on his cell phone.  Michelle and defendant argued, and defendant became 
quite angry.  During this conversation, Teri came to realize that much of what 
defendant had said about himself and his family was not true.  Eventually, Teri 
managed to get away from defendant.  She did not report the rape until just before 
she testified at trial because, she said, she was ashamed and, due to defendant’s 
threats, terrified. 
Michelle testified that that same Monday, August 30, she and Eric arrived 
home after his football practice sometime around 8:00 p.m. or a bit later.  The 
apartment was open.  “The balcony doors were wide open and the lights were on 
and wine glasses, empty champagne bottles were in the house.”  They found a 
dirty towel and women’s glasses and underwear that were not Michelle’s.  After 
that, defendant and Michelle spoke on the telephone, but defendant did not return 
home until about midnight. 
When defendant returned, and while he was still outside, Michelle told him, 
“as I had told him previously on the phone, that I didn’t want him to come to the 
house . . . .”  Defendant kicked the door open.  “He almost broke it off the hinges.”  
He grabbed Michelle by the neck and started to strangle her with both hands, hard 
enough to penetrate the skin of her neck with his fingernails.  He spent the night 
with her.  The next day, August 31, defendant permitted her to go with her son to 
his football practice.  When she did so, she called the police and defendant was 
arrested.  The day after that, September 1, she learned that defendant had been 
released from custody.  The same day, she obtained a restraining order to keep him 
from coming to the apartment.  Because she was frightened, she went to live with 
her sister.  She did not return to her apartment again except occasionally to get 
clothing. 
 
6
The manager of Michelle’s apartment building testified that on August 30, 
the door of apartment 110 (Michelle’s apartment) had been kicked in.  The next 
day, the manager had the door fixed.  The day after that she had a new lock put on 
the door.  She gave Michelle, but not defendant, a key to the new lock.  Michelle 
testified that a person could reach the apartment’s balcony from the outside. 
Karrie Marshall worked at a café inside the fitness center and knew 
defendant.  She testified that shortly before Labor Day, defendant called her at her 
home.  He said he was in jail and asked her to help bail him out by obtaining some 
money from a friend of his.  She declined.  Later the same day, defendant called 
her again.  He said he was out on bail and asked if he could come to her apartment 
to pay her some money he owed her.  He arrived around 3:00 to 4:00 p.m.  She 
had a male friend with her.  Defendant seemed surprised to see the friend.  He did 
not have the money and gave no explanation for not having it.  After about half an 
hour, he left.  Around 8:00 that evening, defendant called her again.  He said that 
he had the money this time and would come to her apartment again in about an 
hour.  He arrived around 12:30 a.m. that same night and knocked on her door.  
Karrie did not let him inside, but she observed him through the peephole.  She 
asked defendant what he needed.  He asked if he could come in.  He said, 
“Michelle changed the locks on the apartment doors and I need a place to crash.  
Can I crash on your couch for a couple hours?”  Karrie was alone at this point.  
She was scared and “had a bad feeling” about defendant.  She did not let him into 
the apartment, and defendant left. 
Rosell Momon, who also became acquainted with defendant at the fitness 
center, testified that shortly before Labor Day he received a call from defendant.  
Defendant said he had gotten into an argument with his girlfriend, had been in jail, 
had just gotten out, and wanted a ride.  Momon picked him up.  Defendant said he 
thought he might have a restraining order against him.  He asked if he could stay 
 
7
with Momon for a few days until his girlfriend “cooled down.”  Defendant stayed 
with Momon for about two days.  During that time, defendant occasionally left to 
look for Michelle.  On Labor Day, Momon drove defendant back to the apartment 
on Laurel Canyon.  Defendant expressed concern about whether he would be able 
to get inside the apartment.  Momon observed defendant climb to a balcony to get 
into the apartment.  The next day, defendant called Momon again.  Defendant said 
he was “hanging out” with a girl.  Defendant said it was not his girlfriend but 
another girl.  Momon did not know who the girl was. 
On Labor Day, Michelle visited her apartment.  Nothing about its condition 
suggested to her that someone had visited it since she left.  Michelle observed 
defendant’s briefcase in the apartment.  She thought he had left it there when he 
was arrested.  She looked inside the briefcase and found defendant’s mother’s 
telephone number.  Michelle called his mother and learned that much of what he 
had told her about himself was untrue.  The briefcase also contained some of 
Michelle’s blank checks with her apparent signature and a piece of paper with her 
name written on it three times.  Michelle testified she had not signed the checks 
but the writing looked somewhat like hers, as if someone was trying to copy her 
name. 
Defendant’s briefcase also contained some blank checks with Teri’s 
apparent signature, Teri’s sunglasses, and Teri’s driver’s license.  Teri testified 
that she never gave defendant any of her blank checks, and that she had not signed 
them.  The handwriting on the checks was similar to, but was not, hers.  She did 
not give defendant permission to possess these items. 
Michelle visited her apartment on other occasions after Labor Day.  The 
next time she went to the apartment, she noticed that the piece of wood she had 
placed by the sliding glass door to secure it had been removed.  She also observed 
a consumed bottle of champagne and some wine glasses on the kitchen counter 
 
8
that had not been there previously.  This indicated to Michelle that someone had 
recently been inside the apartment.  Michelle also eventually discovered that some 
of her jewelry was missing. 
After Labor Day, Michele noticed an unusual odor coming from the 
bathroom or hallway area.  The odor got stronger over time.  Eventually, during 
another visit, on September 15, Eric discovered Sara’s body under the bed in his 
bedroom. 
The body was nude and wrapped in a blanket.  Its decomposed condition 
indicated that death had occurred some time previously.  A plastic bag covered the 
head and a baseball helmet belonging to Eric was over the bag.  The bag was 
secured around the neck by tape that was identical to a roll of tape from a box in 
the kitchen.  Defendant’s palm print and fingerprints were found on the roll of 
tape, the helmet, and the bed in Eric’s bedroom. 
The autopsy revealed that Sara had died of a total of 29 stab wounds by a 
single weapon, possibly scissors.  The body provided no physical evidence of a 
sexual assault but, given its decomposed state, this did not mean a sexual assault 
had not occurred.  A few days after the body was discovered, a pair of 
bloodstained scissors was discovered in the box in the kitchen that contained the 
roll of tape.  The scissors could have inflicted the wounds on Sara’s body.  
Michelle testified that she had last left the scissors on the nightstand by her bed.  
Teri testified that the scissors were similar to the ones defendant had used to 
assault her.  The blood on the scissors could not have been Teri’s. 
Robert Coty, the manager of an apartment building across the street from 
Michelle’s apartment, testified that shortly after Labor Day, he observed some 
activity in Michelle’s apartment while looking through a sliding glass window into 
the apartment.  He saw a shirtless man who appeared to be the man who had been 
living in the apartment.  He also observed a “Caucasian” person with dark hair 
 
9
who appeared to be sitting or kneeling.  (Sara’s biological mother was a Canadian 
Blackfoot Indian; Michelle is African-American.)  The person appeared to be 
wearing no clothes.  At one point, Coty used the word “she” when referring to this 
person, but otherwise he said nothing about the person’s gender, using instead the 
neutral word “person.”  Coty observed the man “walk around this person, made 
like two walk arounds and then right after the second walk around of that person, 
he closed up the drapes.”  He testified that “the person who was sitting or 
kneeling, they were kind of crunched up like they were being dominated, like they 
were being scolded or something.” 
Shortly after the body was discovered, the police attempted unsuccessfully 
to find defendant.  Eventually, defendant was detained in Laredo, Texas, on 
November 24 while he was attempting to enter the United States from Mexico.  
He possessed two of Sara’s checks containing her apparent signature.  Sara’s 
mother testified that the handwriting on the checks was not Sara’s.  Sara’s vehicle, 
a Ford Bronco, was found in Mexico.  Her purse was missing from her apartment 
and was never found. 
Jodi D. testified that in December 1987, she was a waitress and defendant a 
cook at a restaurant in Florida.  One night after work, she was with defendant and 
others at another restaurant.  She and defendant started talking about relationships, 
and especially her relationship with her boyfriend.  Defendant seemed sincerely 
interested and honest.  She trusted him and felt comfortable with him.  When the 
group broke up, defendant suggested continuing the conversation elsewhere.  She 
agreed, and they drove to other places.  She drove because defendant did not have 
a car.  During this time, defendant told her he was planning to open a restaurant.  
He showed her a restaurant that he said he was going to rename “Mr. Kelly’s.”  He 
also directed her to a gas station that he claimed to own.  She believed him.  He 
said he wanted to show her a room he rented for when he had to work late.  She 
 
10
agreed.  They parked by a convenience store and walked to a nearby boarding 
house.  Defendant said he wanted to get some money. She still believed him.  
Eventually, they entered one of the rooms.  Inside, defendant raped her repeatedly 
and took some of her jewelry and her watch.  Jodi reported the incident and 
defendant was arrested.  Later he entered into a plea bargain for a lesser crime than 
he was charged with and received “time served.” 
Kim V., a native of South Africa, testified that in 1991 she was visiting 
Miami as part of a tour of the United States.  She met defendant at a youth hostel.  
He seemed friendly.  He told her he was a chef and could get her a job.  They 
socialized after that.  He gave her the impression that he was well off and did not 
have to work because he received a family allowance.  One evening, Kim and 
defendant went to a couple of bars.  Eventually, they went into defendant’s room 
at the hostel, where she had left some items.  Then defendant refused to let her go.  
He covered her mouth with his hand and threatened to kill her if she screamed.  He 
held a knife to her throat and dragged her toward the bed.  He raped her 
repeatedly.  “Between the rapes” he seized some of her jewelry.  Eventually, 
defendant fell asleep, and Kim managed to escape, taking her jewelry in the 
process.  Kim reported the incident, but defendant had left by the time the police 
arrived at the hostel, and he was not arrested. 
Defendant did not present any evidence at the guilt phase. 
B.  Penalty Phase 
Esther D. testified that in 1984 in New Jersey, defendant raped her 
repeatedly.  Later she heard that he had been indicted for the crime, but he served 
only 364 days in custody pursuant to a plea bargain.  After his release, she saw 
him in town several times.  One time he walked past her and said “he was going to 
get me.”  Another time he told her “he was going to kill me.” 
 
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Martha Farwell, Sara’s mother, testified about Sara and the impact her 
death had on her family.  She prepared a videotape of Sara’s life that was played 
to the jury. 
Defendant did not present any evidence at the penalty phase. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Jury Selection Issues 
1.  Excusing Two Prospective Jurors for Cause 
Defendant contends the court erred in excusing two prospective jurors for 
cause over his objection.  The court excused the first prospective juror because the 
deputy district attorney who was prosecuting this case had previously prosecuted 
her son’s uncle on rape charges and obtained a conviction.  The prospective juror 
said she did not know what the charges against the uncle had been, but she knew 
he was in prison at the time of trial.  “A party may challenge a prospective juror 
for actual bias, defined as a state of mind that would prevent that person from 
acting impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party.”  
(People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 488.)  “[T]he qualification of jurors 
challenged for cause [is a] matter[] within the wide discretion of the trial court, 
seldom disturbed on appeal.”  (Odle v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 932, 944.) 
We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in excusing this juror.  A 
trial court could reasonably conclude that a prospective juror would be biased 
against a prosecutor who had personally prosecuted for rape a man who would 
have been her brother-in-law had she married her son’s father.  Moreover, any 
error was harmless.  Generally, error in excusing jurors for reasons not related to 
their views regarding the death penalty does not require setting aside the 
judgment.  (People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1037; People v. Holt 
 
12
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 656.  “Defendant has a right to jurors who are qualified and 
competent, not to any particular juror.”  (People v. Holt, supra, at p. 656.) 
The court excused the second juror because of his views on the death 
penalty.  Unlike error in excusing jurors for cause unrelated to their views on the 
death penalty, “the erroneous exclusion of a prospective juror because of that 
person’s views on the death penalty is reversible per se.”  (People v. Cooper 
(1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 809, italics omitted, citing Gray v. Mississippi (1987) 481 
U.S. 648.)  But we see no error.  “The trial court may excuse for cause a 
prospective juror whose view on the death penalty would prevent or substantially 
impair the performance of the juror’s duties.  On appeal, we uphold the trial 
court’s ruling if the record fairly supports it, and we accept as binding the trial 
court’s determination of the juror’s true state of mind if the juror has made 
conflicting or ambiguous statements.”  (People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 
704, 735.) 
In this case, the prospective juror said some things suggesting that he could 
be fair to both sides and could impose the death penalty if appropriate.  But, in 
response to questioning by the district attorney, he also stated that “morally I’m 
opposed to [the death penalty] because I don’t think anybody really has a right to 
take another person’s life regardless, and it doesn’t make it any more right for the 
government to do it than it is for an individual to do it.”  He reiterated, “That’s 
morally the way I feel.”  In response to the district attorney’s statement that he, the 
district attorney, had “trouble with the idea that you would abandon your own 
morality,” he said, “I have the same trouble.”  He agreed with the prosecutor that 
he “might not be the best juror for a death penalty case although excellent for any 
other murder case . . . .”  The court excused the juror, stating that “the more [the 
prosecutor] questioned, it’s clear to me that [the juror] would never vote for the 
death penalty.”  In light of the juror’s conflicting and ambiguous statements, we 
 
13
must accept the trial court’s determination of his true state of mind.  As the United 
States Supreme Court recently explained, “Deference to the trial court is 
appropriate because it is in a position to assess the demeanor of the venire, and of 
the individuals who compose it, a factor of critical importance in assessing the 
attitude and qualifications of potential jurors.”  (Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 
___, ___ [127 S.Ct. 2218, 2224].)  No error appears. 
2.  Prosecutor’s Use of Peremptory Challenges 
Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly exercised one peremptory 
challenge against one prospective alternate juror because she was African-
American.  (See Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79; People v. Wheeler (1978) 
22 Cal.3d 258.)  The record does not support the contention. 
The prosecutor originally accepted the panel of prospective alternate jurors 
when two members of the panel were African-American.  Then, after defense 
counsel exercised a peremptory challenge to one of the non-African-American 
jurors, the prosecutor challenged one of the African-American jurors.  At this 
point, defense counsel objected that the challenge was discriminatory, and the 
court held a hearing.  The court denied defendant’s objection but invited the 
prosecutor to comment. 
The prosecutor explained that he exercised the peremptory challenge partly 
because the prospective juror indicated she would have difficulty “implementing 
. . . the use of aggravating, mitigating factors.”  This indicated to him that “she 
probably would have some difficulty imposing the death penalty.”  Additionally, 
he was concerned that she had been a social worker.  He explained that “defendant 
in this case had early childhood problems without his father being around.  I don’t 
know if that’s going to come up, but I would suspect defense would bring that out, 
and that I think her empathy for that, she chose for a while a path of counseling 
 
14
children, helping them out, which I think is a wonderful thing, but I think it may 
show a bias or a concern for children in those situations.  I thought she would be 
biased.”  Additionally, he noted that on her questionnaire, “she wrote probably 
five times as much as any other juror, which may have just been helpful.  May 
have been she wanted to be helpful, but I just found it very disturbing.  It was just 
so odd that a person would be so expressive and redundant and repetitive and 
she’d write the same answer three or four or five times.  I just felt very strange 
about her.” 
The second African-American prospective juror became an alternate juror.  
Later, she was substituted in as an actual juror and, ultimately, she became the jury 
foreperson. 
The dispositive question here is whether defendant made a prima facie case 
of group bias.  To do so, the defendant must show that under the totality of the 
circumstances it is reasonable to infer discriminatory intent.  (People v. Bonilla 
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 341.)  Where, as here, it is not clear whether the trial court 
used the “reasonable inference” standard, rather than the recently disapproved 
“strong likelihood” standard, we review the record independently to determine 
whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a juror on a 
prohibited discriminatory basis.  (Id. at pp. 341-342.)  “In deciding whether a 
prima facie case was stated, we consider the entire record before the trial court 
[citation], but certain types of evidence may be especially relevant:  ‘[T]he party 
may show that his opponent has struck most or all of the members of the identified 
group from the venire, or has used a disproportionate number of his peremptories 
against the group.  He may also demonstrate that the jurors in question share only 
this one characteristic ― their membership in the group ― and that in all other 
respects they are as heterogeneous as the community as a whole.  Next, the 
showing may be supplemented when appropriate by such circumstances as the 
 
15
failure of his opponent to engage these same jurors in more than desultory voir 
dire, or indeed to ask them any questions at all.  Lastly, . . . the defendant need not 
be a member of the excluded group in order to complain of a violation of the 
representative cross-section rule; yet if he is, and especially if in addition his 
alleged victim is a member of the group to which the majority of the remaining 
jurors belong, these facts may also be called to the court’s attention.’  (People v. 
Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 280-281, fn. omitted.)”  (Id. at p. 342) 
We find nothing in this record to support the conclusion that the prosecutor 
excused the African-American prospective juror because of her race.  It is true that 
defendant is himself African-American, but that fact alone does not establish a 
prima facie case of discrimination.  Whether his victim, Sara Weir, was a member 
of the group to which a majority of the remaining jurors belong is debatable.  The 
record shows that her biological mother was a Blackfoot Indian.  In any event, the 
race of the victim, by itself, does not also establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination.  Here, the prosecutor used only one peremptory challenge against 
an African-American.  He passed the alternate jurors once with two African-
American jurors remaining, and he never challenged the other African-American 
juror.  The fact that the prosecutor accepted the jury panel once with both African-
American jurors on it, and exercised the single challenge only after defense 
counsel exercised his own challenge, strongly suggests that race was not a motive 
behind the challenge.  (People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 69-70; People v. 
Reynoso (2003) 31 Cal.4th 903, 926.)  Moreover, the prosecutor’s questioning of 
the prospective juror was probing, not desultory. 
Defendant notes that, during selection of the original jury panel, two 
African-Americans, apparently the only two of that group to be called into the jury 
box at that stage, were excused for cause, one on the prosecutor’s motion.  (The 
latter was the prospective juror who was excused because the prosecutor had 
 
16
previously prosecuted her son’s uncle on rape charges.  [See pt. II.A.1.].)  He 
argues that this circumstance shows that the “prosecutor was achieving what he 
wanted:  a jury with few or no African American jurors.”  We disagree.  Many 
prospective jurors are excused for cause.  The prosecutor was entitled to challenge 
for cause the one juror because of a legitimate concern that she might be biased 
against him under the circumstances.  As the trial court stated when defense 
counsel argued this point at trial, whether it correctly excused that prospective 
juror for cause was a separate issue unrelated to whether the prosecutor was acting 
discriminatorily.  The other prospective African-American juror was excused 
pursuant to stipulation because she had been a rape victim, and she said her 
emotions would make it too painful for her to be a juror.  Defendant asserts that 
the prosecutor had “the second African-American prospective juror excused by 
stipulation . . . .”  In fact, the record shows that defense counsel suggested she be 
excused by stipulation.  The prosecutor acquiesced in this suggestion, but before 
he did so he also stated, “If at all possible I would like to keep her because she 
seems very intelligent, very nice and honest, but it does seem like she was tearing 
up just talking about the incident.” 
Although not required to do so, the prosecutor also stated three race-neutral 
reasons for his peremptory challenge.  Defendant challenges these reasons in 
various ways, but, under the circumstances, we see no reason to doubt the sincerity 
of the prosecutor’s explanation.  Because the record does not support the inference 
that the prosecutor used this single peremptory challenge against an African-
American juror on the basis of her race, the trial court properly overruled 
defendant’s trial objection. 
 
17
B.  Guilt Phase Issues 
1.  Defendant’s Absence from Proceedings 
Defendant was apparently absent from a few conferences regarding legal 
matters that were held in the hallway outside the presence of the jury.  Defense 
counsel was present on all occasions.  Defendant contends his absence violated his 
constitutional and statutory rights to be present.  We disagree. 
Defendant complains of five occasions when he was personally absent:  (1)  
during jury selection when one prospective juror was questioned and ultimately 
excused for cause because the prosecutor had personally prosecuted her son’s 
uncle; (2) during jury selection when one juror was excused for cause because of 
his views regarding the death penalty; (3) during jury selection when his objection 
to the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge against the African-American 
prospective alternate juror was argued and denied; (4) when the parties and court 
discussed the admissibility of evidence that the murder victim had consumed 
alcohol on occasions not connected to her death; and (5) when the prosecutor 
informed the court and defense counsel that Teri B. had recently stated that 
defendant had raped her. 
The record does not clearly establish defendant’s absence on these 
occasions.  It merely indicates that the proceedings in question “were held in the 
hallway.”  However, the Attorney General does not deny that defendant was 
personally absent on those occasions, and we will assume that he was absent. 
“Broadly stated, a criminal defendant has a right to be personally present at 
certain pretrial proceedings and at trial under various provisions of law, including 
the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, section 15 of article I of the California Constitution, and 
sections 977 and 1043.”  (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1230.)  Under 
 
18
the decisions, “a defendant’s right to be present depends on two conditions:  (1) 
the proceeding is critical to the outcome of the case, and (2) the defendant’s 
presence would contribute to the fairness of the proceeding.  [Citations.]  Thus a 
defendant may ordinarily be excluded from conferences on questions of law, even 
if those questions are critical to the outcome of the case, because the defendant’s 
presence would not contribute to the fairness of the proceeding.  Examples include 
the exclusion of a defendant from a conference on the competency of child 
witnesses [citation], a conference on whether to remove a juror [citation], and a 
conference on jury instructions [citation].”  (People v. Perry (2006) 38 Cal.4th 
302, 312.) 
The occasions on which it appears defendant was excluded in this case all 
involved legal questions of the type that we have routinely held do not require 
defendant’s personal presence.  Defendant claims, in essence, that had he been 
present, he could have advised counsel to make better legal arguments.  A similar 
claim could be made about any occasion involving legal issues.  Nothing in this 
record suggests that defendant’s presence on these occasions would have made 
any difference.  Defendant relies on cases in which both the defendant and defense 
counsel were excluded from the proceeding.  (People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 
243, 259-269 [excluding defendant and defense counsel from hearing on reasons 
for peremptory challenges was error but harmless]; see also id. at pp. 291-300 (dis. 
opn. of George, C. J.) [arguing that the error was prejudicial]; U.S. v. Thompson 
(9th Cir. 1987) 827 F.2d 1254.)  There is, however, an obvious difference between 
excluding both the defendant and his attorney and merely excluding the defendant.  
In this case, unlike the cases defendant cites, defense counsel was present on all 
occasions and was able to fully represent defendant’s interests. 
 
19
2.  Admission of Evidence of Uncharged Misconduct 
Over objection, the court admitted evidence of three types of uncharged 
misconduct by defendant:  (1) evidence regarding defendant’s financial dealings 
with other women he had met at the fitness center shortly before Sara’s death; (2) 
evidence of defendant’s assault on Michelle T.; and (3) evidence of defendant’s 
rapes of Teri B., Jodi D., and Kim V.  In making its rulings, the court reviewed, 
and was guided by, our then recent decisions in People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 
380 (Ewoldt) and People v. Balcom (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414 (Balcom).  The court 
also explained to the jury the limited use it could make of this testimony.  
Defendant contends the court erred in admitting this evidence. 
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), generally prohibits “evidence 
of a person’s character or a trait of his or her character” when it is “offered to 
prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.”  Subdivision (b) of that section, 
however, provides:  “Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence 
that a person committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to prove 
some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, absence of mistake or accident, or whether a defendant in a prosecution 
for an unlawful sexual act or attempted unlawful sexual act did not reasonably and 
in good faith believe that the victim consented) other than his or her disposition to 
commit such an act.” 
In general, we have explained that “[t]he admissibility of other crimes 
evidence depends on (1) the materiality of the facts sought to be proved, (2) the 
tendency of the uncharged crimes to prove those facts, and (3) the existence of any 
rule or policy requiring exclusion of the evidence.”  (People v. Carpenter (1997) 
15 Cal.4th 312, 378-379.)  The main policy that may require exclusion of the 
evidence is the familiar one stated in Evidence Code section 352:  Evidence may 
be excluded if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value.  
 
20
Because substantial prejudice is inherent in the case of uncharged offenses, such 
evidence is admissible only if it has substantial probative value.  (Ewoldt, supra, 7 
Cal.4th at p. 404.)  This determination lies within the discretion of the trial court.  
(People v. Carpenter, supra, at p. 380.) 
In Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th 380, we discussed specific situations when 
evidence of uncharged crimes may be admitted under Evidence Code section 
1101, subdivision (b):  “[E]vidence of a defendant’s uncharged misconduct is 
relevant where the uncharged misconduct and the charged offense are sufficiently 
similar to support the inference that they are manifestations of a common design 
or plan.  [¶]  In determining whether evidence of uncharged misconduct is relevant 
to demonstrate a common design or plan, it is useful to distinguish the nature and 
degree of similarity (between the uncharged misconduct and the charged offense) 
required in order to establish a common design or plan, from the degree of 
similarity necessary to prove intent or identity. 
“The least degree of similarity (between the uncharged act and the charged 
offense) is required in order to prove intent.  [Citation.]  ‘[T]he recurrence of a 
similar result . . . tends (increasingly with each instance) to negative accident or 
inadvertence or self-defense or good faith or other innocent mental state, and tends 
to establish (provisionally, at least, though not certainly) the presence of the 
normal, i.e., criminal, intent accompanying such an act . . . .’  (2 Wigmore, 
[Evidence] (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979) § 302, p. 241.)  In order to be admissible to 
prove intent, the uncharged misconduct must be sufficiently similar to support the 
inference that the defendant ‘ “probably harbor[ed] the same intent in each 
instance.”  [Citations.]’  [Citation.] 
“A greater degree of similarity is required in order to prove the existence of 
a common design or plan. . . .  [I]n establishing a common design or plan, 
evidence of uncharged misconduct must demonstrate ‘not merely a similarity in 
 
21
the results, but such a concurrence of common features that the various acts are 
naturally to be explained as caused by a general plan of which they are the 
individual manifestations.’  (2 Wigmore, supra, (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979) § 304, 
p. 249, italics omitted.)  ‘[T]he difference between requiring similarity, for acts 
negativing innocent intent, and requiring common features indicating common 
design, for acts showing design, is a difference of degree rather than of kind; for to 
be similar involves having common features, and to have common features is 
merely to have a high degree of similarity.’  (Id. at pp. 250-251, italics 
omitted . . . .) 
“To establish the existence of a common design or plan, the common 
features must indicate the existence of a plan rather than a series of similar 
spontaneous acts, but the plan thus revealed need not be distinctive or unusual. . . .  
[E]vidence that the defendant has committed uncharged criminal acts that are 
similar to the charged offense may be relevant if these acts demonstrate 
circumstantially that the defendant committed the charged offense pursuant to the 
same design or plan he or she used in committing the uncharged acts.  Unlike 
evidence of uncharged acts used to prove identity, the plan need not be unusual or 
distinctive; it need only exist to support the inference that the defendant employed 
that plan in committing the charged offense.  [Citation.] 
“The greatest degree of similarity is required for evidence of uncharged 
misconduct to be relevant to prove identity.  For identity to be established, the 
uncharged misconduct and the charged offense must share common features that 
are sufficiently distinctive so as to support the inference that the same person 
committed both acts.  [Citation.]  ‘The pattern and characteristics of the crimes 
must be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature.’  (1 McCormick [on 
Evidence (4th ed. 1992)] § 190, pp. 801-803.)”  (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 
401-403, fn. omitted.) 
 
22
Applying these standards in Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th 380, a prosecution for 
committing lewd acts on a child, we upheld the admission of prior uncharged lewd 
acts on the complaining witness and her sister.  We held “that the evidence was 
admissible to establish that the charged offenses were committed pursuant to the 
same design or plan used by defendant in committing the uncharged offenses.”  
(Id. at p. 386.)  In Balcom, supra, 7 Cal.4th 414, a prosecution for rape and 
robbery, we upheld the admission of a similar rape and robbery that the defendant 
later committed in Michigan against a different victim.  We held that “evidence 
tending to establish that, soon after the commission of the charged offenses of rape 
and robbery, defendant committed a rape and robbery in Michigan in a manner 
quite similar to the charged offenses, was admissible to demonstrate the existence 
of a common design or plan which, in turn, was relevant to demonstrate that 
defendant either employed or developed that plan in committing the charged 
offenses.”  (Id. at p. 418.) 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence in this 
case.  Defendant discusses each act in isolation and argues it should not have been 
admitted.  But each act did not occur in isolation but as part of a larger pattern, a 
pattern that was highly relevant to understanding what happened to Sara Weir.  
Viewed as a whole, this evidence shows a remarkably similar and consistent 
pattern.  Defendant continually lied to and manipulated women including, in 
particular, women who, like Sara Weir, he befriended at the fitness center.  As a 
specific example of the pattern, he continually led them to believe he came from a 
wealthy family.  He did so consistently to obtain their property.  The evidence 
shows he could be very charming and, at first, convincing.  He also continually 
lured women to his home, where he robbed and raped them. 
Sara’s death did not occur in a vacuum.  She did not survive her encounter 
with defendant to tell her story.  But, fortunately, many others — Michelle T., Teri 
 
23
B., Jodi D., Kim V., Leticia Busby, Helen Waters, Karrie Marshall — did survive 
and can tell their tales.  Their testimony was critical to the jury’s full 
understanding of the circumstances of Sara’s death.  The pattern their testimony 
established helped the jury to understand how and why Sara came to be in the 
apartment with defendant on that fatal occasion.  (Her mother described her as 
naïve and trusting; the jury could reasonably infer that she also believed 
defendant’s stories and was lured to the apartment just like defendant lured other 
trusting women to his home.)  It also helped the jury to understand what defendant 
intended when he assaulted and ultimately killed Sara — both to take her property 
and to rape her. 
Defendant first challenges the testimony of his financial dealings with other 
women he befriended at the fitness center.  This testimony was, however, highly 
probative.  From the evidence at trial, the jury could reasonably conclude that 
defendant took Sara’s vehicle, which was found in Mexico after he was arrested 
when he was attempting to enter the United States from Mexico; at least two of 
her checks, which were found in his possession when he was arrested; and 
probably her purse, which was never found.  Issues contested at trial, and indeed 
still in this appeal, were whether defendant formed the intent to take these items 
before or at the time he applied force or fear and, if so, whether the robbery was 
merely incidental to the murder.  (People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 54, 61.)  
The evidence of defendant’s financial dealings with other women showed that 
defendant continually sought to obtain property from the women, and that virtually 
nothing that he did to obtain property was an afterthought.  This pattern strongly 
suggested that defendant took Sara’s property pursuant to a common plan rather 
than merely as an afterthought. 
Defendant specifically challenges the admissibility of the testimony of 
Leticia Busby and Karrie Marshall.  Although their testimony was not quite as 
 
24
probative as the other evidence, it was also not particularly prejudicial.  Evidence 
that defendant attempted to borrow Busby’s credit card, albeit unsuccessfully, was 
a manifestation of a common plan to obtain money from the women he met at the 
fitness center, which, in turn, helps show that his taking of Sara’s property was not 
merely an afterthought.  Similarly, Marshall’s testimony showed he was 
continually manipulating the women he met at the center.  The jury could 
reasonably infer that defendant was attempting to be alone with Marshall in her 
apartment.  This was a variation of the usual pattern in which defendant lured 
women to his home.  The likely explanation for this variation is that Michelle T. 
had just excluded him from her apartment, so he had no home of his own to use.  
We see no abuse of discretion in admitting this evidence. 
Defendant also specifically challenges the admissibility of Damon 
Stalworth’s testimony that defendant cashed two personal checks at the restaurant 
Stalworth owns that were in someone else’s name — possibly Teri B.’s — and 
that later bounced.  This testimony, however, was just more of the same pattern.  
The jury could reasonably infer defendant’s possession of two of Sara’s checks 
when he was arrested was part of that pattern.  This testimony was also admissible. 
Evidence of defendant’s assault on Michelle T. just a few days before he 
stabbed Sara Weir to death in the same apartment was also admissible as part of 
the pattern of deception followed by violence.  Moreover, as the trial court 
recognized, it was highly probative on the issue of identity, particularly in 
conjunction with the assault and rape of Teri B.  Sara’s body was found in the 
apartment defendant had shared with Michelle.  The jury could reasonably infer 
that she had been stabbed to death inside that apartment.  Evidence that a few days 
before this stabbing defendant violently assaulted inside that same apartment two 
different women he had also befriended at the fitness center was evidence of 
“common features that are sufficiently distinctive so as to support the inference 
 
25
that the same person committed both [indeed, in this case, all] acts.”  (Ewoldt, 
supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 403.)  It would have been a remarkable coincidence if, 
shortly after defendant violently assaulted two women he befriended at the fitness 
center, some different person happened to use that same apartment to assault 
another woman defendant had befriended at the fitness center. 
The rapes of Teri B., Jodi D., and Kim V., were similarly admissible.  All 
three showed a remarkably similar pattern — defendant convinced his victims that 
he was wealthy, he lured them to his home, and then he raped and robbed them.  
The jury could reasonably infer from this evidence that defendant harbored similar 
intents — to rape and to rob — when he similarly lured Sara to the apartment and 
ultimately killed her.  The assault of Teri B. was especially probative, on identity 
as well as intent.  Not only did defendant rape a woman he befriended at the 
fitness center in the apartment where Sara’s body was later found, but he also used 
what the jury could reasonably find was the same weapon — a pair of scissors that 
was conveniently at hand.  These circumstances were distinctive indeed.  
Defendant contends there was  not enough evidence that he intended to rape Sara 
to warrant admission of evidence of the other rapes.  As we explain below, the 
overall evidence, including the evidence of the other rapes, was sufficient to 
permit the jury to find defendant intended to rape Sara.  (See pt. II.B.3.)  No 
reason appears for the trial court to have excluded any of this evidence. 
We also conclude the trial court acted within its discretion in finding the 
probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the potential 
for undue prejudice.  As explained, the evidence had substantial probative value; 
indeed, it was critical to the jury’s full understanding of the circumstances 
surrounding Sara’s death.  Moreover, none of the other misconduct was 
particularly inflammatory compared to Sara’s murder.  (Ewoldt, supra, 7 Cal.4th 
at p. 405.)  We see no error. 
 
26
Defendant also argues that admitting this evidence violated his federal due 
process rights.  (See McKinney v. Rees (9th Cir. 1993) 993 F.2d 1378.)  “We need 
not decide to what extent, if any, evidence solely going to character might violate 
due process (cf. People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 921-922), for, as 
explained, here the evidence” of defendant’s prior misconduct was highly 
probative on several issues at trial.  (People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 
1246.) 
3.  Sufficiency of the Evidence 
Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support a first degree 
murder conviction on either a premeditation theory or a felony-murder theory with 
either robbery or rape the underlying felony, and to support the robbery and rape 
special circumstance findings.  “In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, 
‘the court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the 
judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence — that is, 
evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value — such that a 
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’  
(People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578.)  The same standard of review 
applies when the evidence of guilt is circumstantial and to special circumstance 
allegations.  (People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 104-105.)”  (People v. 
Horning (2004) 34 Cal.4th 871, 901.)  We find the evidence sufficient to support 
each of the jury’s verdicts. 
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding 
that defendant killed Sara in the course of robbing her for purposes of the felony-
murder rule and the robbery-murder special circumstance.  There was certainly 
evidence that defendant stole Sara’s property.  Her vehicle was found in Mexico, 
where defendant went at least for a while after he killed Sara and before his arrest 
 
27
at the Mexico-United States border.  Two of Sara’s checks were on his person 
when he was arrested.  Moreover, her purse was never found.  Defendant also 
certainly used “force or fear” (§ 211) on his victim; indeed, he used the ultimate 
force — he stabbed her to death.  Defendant argues that a reasonable jury had to 
find that the force or fear was unrelated to the taking — i.e., it had to find either he 
did not take the property from Sara’s “person or immediate presence” (§ 211), or 
she gave him the property voluntarily before he used force or fear, or he achieved 
the intent to take the property only after he used the force or fear.  We disagree.  
“ ‘[W]hen one kills another and takes substantial property from the victim, it is 
ordinarily reasonable to presume the killing was for purposes of robbery.’  (People 
v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 688; accord, People v. Hughes [(2002) 27 Cal.4th 
287] at p. 357.)  Murders are commonly committed to obtain money or other 
property.  (Hughes, supra, at p. 357.)”  (People v. Horning, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 
903.)  Defendant notes that often, as to women he befriended but did not lure to 
his home, he obtained, or attempted to obtain, their property by guile rather than 
force or fear.  This circumstance is true, but it does not make the jury’s verdict 
unreasonable.  Defendant definitely used force or fear against Sara.  The jury 
could reasonably find that, as with Teri B., Jodi D., and Kim V., defendant lured 
Sara to his home and then used force or fear — probably both — to take her 
property.  Additionally, the jury could reasonably find that at least some of Sara’s 
property — for example, at least the keys to her car — was on her person or in her 
immediate presence when defendant used force or fear to take it. 
Defendant also argues that any robbery was merely an afterthought and 
thus was only incidental to the killing.  (See People v. Horning, supra, 34 Cal.4th 
at p. 904.)  We disagree here too.  The pattern of defendant’s behavior shows that 
little that he did to acquire property from women he befriended at the fitness 
center and his other victims was merely an afterthought.  He continually sought to 
 
28
obtain property from women and often succeeded.  The jury could reasonably find 
that the intent to steal was at least a concurrent motivation, and that defendant 
killed to facilitate the stealing.  (Ibid.) 
Defendant next argues the evidence was insufficient to support a finding 
that defendant killed Sara in the course of raping or attempting to rape her for 
purposes of the felony murder and the rape-murder special circumstance.  He 
observes that Sara’s body provided no evidence of a sexual assault.  The 
decomposed state of the body when found might readily explain this circumstance.  
Moreover, for the special circumstance or felony-murder rule, there need not be an 
actual rape; an attempted rape is sufficient.  (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 
524-525.)  Accordingly, the verdict would be supported if defendant had intended 
to rape Sara, but she resisted and he killed her without actually raping her.  The 
combination of (1) the fact the body was nude when discovered, (2) Coty’s 
testimony that he observed a man the jury could reasonably infer was defendant 
walk around a person the jury could reasonably infer was Sara while she was 
nude, and (3) defendant’s pattern of raping (as well as robbing) women he lured to 
his home under similar circumstances provides ample evidence for a reasonable 
jury to find that defendant intended to rape Sara when he killed her.  Nothing in 
this case required the jury to find that Sara was an exception to the pattern, and 
that defendant had no sexual intent when he lured Sara to his home.  Defendant 
cites cases that, “as a group, may be read to establish ‘that the victim’s lack of 
clothing . . . is insufficient to establish specific sexual intent.’  (People v. Johnson 
(1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 41.)”  (People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 139.)  But 
here, as in Holloway, supra, at page 139, the finding of an intent to rape rests on 
considerably more than the victim’s nudity. 
Finally, defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to find that he 
premeditated Sara’s killing.  The jury’s true findings regarding the rape-murder 
 
29
and robbery-murder special circumstances show that the jury found that defendant 
killed Sara “in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate . . . rape . . . [and] 
robbery,” which itself makes the killing first degree murder.  (§ 189.)  
Accordingly, we need not decide whether the jury could also have found the 
murder was premeditated.  (See People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 389 
[torture-murder special-circumstance finding made it unnecessary to decide 
whether the murder was also premeditated]; People v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.4th at 
p. 42 [insufficiency of the evidence of rape felony murder was harmless when 
evidence supports other theories of first degree murder].) 
4.  Jury Instructions 
Defendant contends the trial court committed several errors in instructing 
the jury. 
First defendant contends the court “erroneously failed to define rape and 
robbery, the two underlying offenses alleged to support the felony murder charge.”  
However, the court did define the elements of both rape and robbery.  Defendant 
recognizes this circumstance.  But he argues that, due to the organization of the 
instructions and the fact that the court stated that one of the instructions that 
preceded the definitions of rape and robbery “applies only to the special 
circumstance instructions,” the jury would believe those definitions concerned 
only the rape and the robbery special-circumstance allegations and not rape and 
robbery as elements of the rape and the robbery felony-murder rule.  This claim is 
not cognizable on appeal.  The actual instructions correctly stated “the law,  . . . 
and if defendant favored further clarification, he needed to request it.  His failure 
to do so waives this claim.”  (People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 237.)  
Moreover, we see no error.  The trial court used the specific terms “robbery” and 
“rape” consistently in discussing both the felony-murder rule and the special 
 
30
circumstance allegations.  It later defined those terms.  It never suggested those 
terms had different meanings depending on whether they referred to the felony-
murder rule or the special circumstance allegations.  Reviewing the entire charge 
of the court, it is not reasonably likely the jury would believe that the definitions it 
received of robbery and rape concerned only the special circumstance allegations 
and that some different, unspecified, definitions adhered to the felony-murder rule.  
(See People v. Young (2005) 34  Cal.4th 1149, 1202; People v. Kelly, supra, 1 
Cal.4th at pp. 525-526 & fn. 7)  If the jury had thought that some different 
definitions might apply to the felony-murder rule, surely it would have asked for 
clarification. 
Next, defendant contends the court “delivered an erroneous felony murder 
jury instruction that eliminated a finding of intent to commit the underlying 
felonies.”  The court instructed, “The unlawful killing of a human being, whether 
intentional, unintentional or accidental which occurs during the commission or 
attempted commission of the crime or as a direct or casual [sic: in context 
obviously meant to be “causal”] result of robbery and/or rape is murder of the first 
degree when the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit such crime.  [¶]  The 
specific intent to commit rape and/or robbery and the commission or attempted 
commission of such crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  (Italics 
and boldface added; see CALJIC No. 8.21 (5th ed. 1988.).)3  This instruction is 
identical to CALJIC No. 8.21 as it existed at the time of trial except that the Use 
Note to the instruction stated that the italicized words and the words in boldface 
were supposed to be alternative choices depending on when death occurred.  The 
                                              
3  
The written instructions the jury received were identical to the oral 
instructions as transcribed in the reporter’s transcript except that the written 
instructions included the correctly spelled word “causal” and did not include the 
word “or” between the words “direct” and “causal.” 
 
31
Use Note contemplated that the court would use one phrase or the other, but not 
both.4 
Defendant argues that, by using both the phrase in italics and the phrase in 
boldface, the court eliminated the requirement that the jury had to find defendant 
intended to commit the underlying felonies.  Contrary to the Attorney General’s 
argument, we believe this contention is cognizable on appeal despite defendant’s 
failure to object or request a clarification.  Defendant argues the instruction was 
not correct in law and omitted an element of the offense.  If he were correct, the 
error would affect his substantial rights, thus making the claim cognizable.  
(§ 1259; People v. Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 503.)  The argument lacks 
merit, however.  Defendant constructs a complex method whereby, he claims, the 
jury might read this instruction as not requiring an intent to commit the underlying 
crime for purposes of the felony-murder rule.  But reading the entire instruction in 
context, including the last portion of the first sentence (“when the perpetrator had 
the specific intent to commit such crime”) and the second sentence, informing the 
jury that the “specific intent to commit rape and/or robbery . . . must be proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt,” we see no reasonable likelihood the jury would parse 
the instruction in a way that did not require the intent to commit the underlying 
felony. 
Defendant contends the court erred in instructing the jury on first degree 
murder because the information charged him only with malice murder under 
section 187.  The contention lacks merit.  (People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 
                                              
4  
At the time of trial, the Use Note to CALJIC No. 8.21 (5th ed. 1988) stated, 
“If the death occurs substantially contemporaneously with the commission of the 
crime, use the first bracketed phrase [i.e., the language italicized as reprinted in the 
text above] and delete the second.  On the other hand, if death occurs at a later 
period, use the second bracketed phrase [i.e., the language in boldface in the text] 
and delete the first.” 
 
32
591-592; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 368-370.)  To the extent 
defendant contends he received inadequate notice of the prosecution’s theory of 
the case, we have explained that “generally the accused will receive adequate 
notice of the prosecution’s theory of the case from the testimony presented at the 
preliminary hearing or at the indictment proceedings.”  (People v. Diaz (1992) 3 
Cal.4th 495, 557.)  Here, the information alleged that the murder was committed 
under the special circumstances of murder in the course of robbery and rape, thus 
providing notice that the prosecutor would proceed under a felony-murder theory.  
(People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1131-1132.) 
Defendant contends the court erred in failing to instruct on theft as a lesser 
included offense of robbery.  However, he was not charged with robbery.  
“[W]hen robbery is not a charged offense but merely forms the basis for a felony-
murder charge and a special circumstance allegation, a trial court does not have a 
sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on theft.”  (People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th 
at pp. 110-111.) 
The court gave the standard jury instruction informing the jury that motive 
is not an element of the offense, but the jury may consider, for whatever weight it 
finds it to be entitled, the presence or absence of motive as tending to establish 
guilt or innocence.  (See CALJIC No. 2.51.)  Defendant argues that this instruction 
impermissibly (1) allowed the jury to determine guilt based on motive alone, (2) 
lessened the prosecutor’s burden of proof, and (3) shifted the burden of proof to 
imply that he had to prove innocence.  The first of these arguments “merely goes 
to the clarity of the instruction” and hence is not cognizable on appeal.  (People v. 
Cleveland, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 750.)  Moreover, the entire argument lacks 
merit.  (People v. Cleveland, supra, at p. 750; People v. Prieto (2003) 30  Cal.4th 
226, 254; People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 738-739; People v. Hillhouse, 
supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 503-504.)  “The motive instruction did not itself include 
 
33
instructions on the prosecution’s burden of proof and the reasonable doubt 
standard, but it also did not undercut other instructions that correctly informed the 
jury that the prosecution had the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  (People v. Cleveland, supra, at p. 750.) 
Defendant argues that various standard instructions, specifically, CALJIC 
Nos. 1.00, 2.01, 2.21.1, 2.21.2, 2.22, 2.27, 2.51, 2.52, 2.90, 8.83, and 8.83.1, 
“impermissibly undermined and diluted the requirement of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  We disagree.  (People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 847-
848; People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 428-429; People v. Boyette (2002) 
29 Cal.4th 381, 438-439; People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 941.)  Each of 
these instructions “is unobjectionable when, as here, it is accompanied by the 
usual instructions on reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence, and the 
People’s burden of proof.”  (People v. Nakahara (2003) 30 Cal.4th 705, 715.) 
C.  Penalty Phase Issues 
1.  Admission of Victim Impact Evidence 
The prosecution presented a single witness who provided victim impact 
evidence — Sara Weir’s mother, Martha Farwell.  Over objection, the court also 
permitted the prosecution to show the jury a videotape portraying Sara’s life that 
her mother had prepared.  Defendant contends (1) the court should not have 
admitted any victim impact evidence, (2) the court at least should have curtailed 
the mother’s testimony, and (3) the court should not have admitted the videotape. 
The first two of these contentions are not cognizable on appeal.  Defendant 
did not object to the mother’s testimony.  Indeed, he expressly stated that the 
mother’s own testimony “as to impact of Sara’s life and her passing on her and the 
family . . . seems to be permissible by law.”  As is the case with the admission of 
 
34
any evidence, defendant has forfeited the issue by failing to object at trial.  (Evid. 
Code, § 353, subd. (a); People v. Robinson (2005) 37 Cal.4th 592, 652.) 
Moreover, the trial court would have had discretion to admit Farwell’s 
testimony.  “Unless it invites a purely irrational response from the jury, the 
devastating effect of a capital crime on loved ones and the community is relevant 
and admissible as a circumstance of the crime under section 190.3, factor (a).”  
(People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 1056-1057.)  “The federal 
Constitution bars victim impact evidence only if it is ‘so unduly prejudicial’ as to 
render the trial ‘fundamentally unfair.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1056, quoting Payne v. 
Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 825.)  Defendant argues that no victim impact 
evidence was permissible in this case because the jury already heard evidence 
regarding Sara at the guilt phase, substantial other crimes evidence was admitted 
at the guilt and penalty phases, and he did not present any evidence himself.  
However, no such absolute limitations exist.  Permitting victim impact evidence 
would have been well within the court’s discretion even if defendant had objected. 
Defendant also challenges specific portions of Farwell’s testimony.  While 
the court has the discretion to limit testimony, none of that given here was so 
emotionally charged that the court would have been required to exclude it had 
defendant objected.  It properly focused on Sara’s life and the pain her death 
caused her family and friends.  This testimony was rather typical of the victim 
impact evidence we routinely permit.  (See People v. Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 
Cal.4th at p. 1057.) 
Defendant’s challenge to the videotape is cognizable on appeal, as he did 
object to its admission at trial.  The trial court watched the videotape, then ruled:  
“In looking at the tape yesterday, I believe that Mrs. Farwell could testify to 
everything that’s contained in that tape.  It’s a very compelling tape.  I will grant 
you that.  This is a very compelling case.  I think if the People wish to present it, I 
 
35
see no objection to it.  In doing a[n Evidence Code section] 352 analysis, I think 
that it has more probative value than any prejudicial effect.  I think what [the 
prosecutor] said, what this jury has heard from many other people makes this tape 
pale.” 
Some courts, although not all, have permitted the playing of videotapes 
regarding the victim — but very cautiously.  In People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 
1179, the trial court admitted as victim impact evidence a videotape of an 
approximately 25-minute interview with one of the murder victims conducted at a 
local television station.  In addition, the court admitted victim impact evidence 
from several other witnesses.  (Id. at p. 1209.)  We found no prejudicial error.  
“Case law pertaining to the admissibility of videotape recordings of victim 
interviews in capital sentencing hearings provides us with no bright-line rules by 
which to determine when such evidence may or may not be used.  We consider 
pertinent cases in light of a general understanding that the prosecution may present 
evidence for the purpose of ‘ “reminding the sentencer . . . [that] the victim is an 
individual whose death represents a unique loss to society” ’ (Payne v. Tennessee, 
supra, 501 U.S. at p. 825), but that the prosecution may not introduce irrelevant or 
inflammatory material that ‘ “diverts the jury’s attention from its  proper role or 
invites an irrational, purely subjective response.” ’  (People v. Edwards [(1991)] 
54 Cal.3d [787] at p. 836.)”  (People v. Prince, supra, at p. 1288.) 
In Prince, we discussed cases that permitted the admission of videotapes.  
(People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1288.)  These included Whittlesey v. 
State (1995) 340 Md. 30 (90-second videotape of the victim playing the piano, 
stressing the deference afforded to the trial judge), State v. Allen (1999) 2000 
NMSC 2 (three-minute videotape regarding the victim’s life), and State v. Gray 
(Mo. 1994) 887 S.W.2d 369, 389 (videotape of the victim’s family at Christmas).  
Additionally, Hicks v. State (Ark. 1997) 940 S.W.2d 855 upheld the admission of 
 
36
a 14-minute videotape containing about 160 photographs of the victim, his family, 
and friends, and narrated by the victim’s brother. 
As we discussed in People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pages 1288-1289, 
two courts have not permitted the showing of videotapes.  In U.S. v. Sampson 
(D.Mass. 2004) 335 F.Supp.2d 166, the trial court excluded a 27-minute videotape 
consisting of 200 photographs of the victim at various stages of life set to 
“evocative contemporary music.”  (Id. at p. 191.)  We described in detail the 
second case (Salazar v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) 90 S.W.3d 330), the case 
defendant relies on most heavily in challenging the videotape here.  “Reviewing 
facts that we characterized as ‘extreme’ (People v. Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at 
p. 652), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disapproved of similar videotape 
evidence in Salazar v. State, supra, 90 S.W.3d 330, finding that in this noncapital 
case the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting a 17-minute videotape 
tribute to a murder victim.  In remanding for an assessment of prejudice, the court 
stated in Salazar that ‘the punishment phase of a criminal trial is not a memorial 
service for the victim’ (id. at pp. 335-336) and that ‘[w]hat may be entirely 
appropriate eulogies to celebrate the life and accomplishments of a unique 
individual are not necessarily admissible in a criminal trial.’  (Id. at p. 336.)  The 
court complained that the trial court had not seen the videotape before it was 
played to the jury and consequently was unable to weigh the probative value of the 
tape against its prejudicial impact.  (Id. at pp. 336-337.)  The reviewing court 
emphasized the risk of unfair prejudice, noting the video contained many images 
from the adult victim’s infancy and childhood.  (Id. at pp. 337-338.)”  (People v. 
Prince, supra, at p. 1289.) 
We discussed Salazar v. State, supra, 90 S.W.3d 330, further in Robinson:  
“In that murder trial, the court admitted a 17-minute ‘video montage’ tribute to the 
murder victim  —  approximately 140 photographs set to emotional music, 
 
37
including ‘My Heart Will Go On,’ sung by Celine Dion and featured prominently 
in the film Titanic (20th Century Fox 1997).  [Citation.]  Reversing a lower 
appellate court decision finding the presentation admissible, the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals remanded for an assessment of prejudice.  In so ruling, the state 
high court observed, among other things, that ‘the punishment phase of a criminal 
trial is not a memorial service for the victim.  What may be entirely appropriate 
eulogies to celebrate the life and accomplishments of a unique individual are not 
necessarily admissible in a criminal trial’ [citation], and that ‘we caution that 
victim impact and character evidence may become unfairly prejudicial through 
sheer volume.  Even if not technically cumulative, an undue amount of this type of 
evidence can result in unfair prejudice . . . .  Hence, we encourage trial courts to 
place appropriate limits upon the amount, kind, and source of victim impact and 
character evidence.’  [Citation.]”  (People v. Robinson, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 
652.) 
We emphasized in Prince that “[c]ourts must exercise great caution in 
permitting the prosecution to present victim-impact evidence in the form of a 
lengthy videotaped or filmed tribute to the victim.  Particularly if the presentation 
lasts beyond a few moments, or emphasizes the childhood of an adult victim, or is 
accompanied by stirring music, the medium itself may assist in creating an 
emotional impact upon the jury that goes beyond what the jury might experience 
by viewing still photographs of the victim or listening to the victim’s bereaved 
parents. . . .  In order to combat this strong possibility, courts must strictly analyze 
evidence of this type and, if such evidence is admitted, courts must monitor the 
jurors’ reactions to ensure that the proceedings do not become injected with a 
 
38
legally impermissible level of emotion.”  (People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 
1289.)5 
As noted, we found no prejudicial error in admitting the videotape in 
Prince.  “Although we caution courts against the routine admission of videotapes 
featuring the victim, we do not believe that prejudicial error occurred under the 
circumstances of the present case.  The videotaped evidence did not constitute 
‘ “irrelevant information or inflammatory rhetoric that divert[ed] the jury’s 
attention from its proper role or invite[ed] an irrational, purely subjective 
response.” ’  (People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 836.)   . . .  [T]he 
videotaped interview of [the victim] did not constitute an emotional memorial 
tribute to the victim.  There was no music, emotional or otherwise.  The tape did 
not, as the trial court in the present case initially feared it might, display the victim 
in her home or with her family, nor were there images of the victim as an infant or 
young child.  The setting was a neutral television studio, where an interviewer 
politely asked questions concerning the victim’s accomplishments on the stage and 
as a musician and the difficulty she experienced in balancing her many 
commitments, touching only briefly upon her plan to attend college in the fall and 
follow the stage as a profession.  If not for the circumstances of her subsequent 
murder, the videotape admitted at trial likely would be of modest interest to 
anyone apart from [the victim] and her friends and family.  The loss of such a 
talented and accomplished person is poignant even for a stranger to contemplate, 
but the straightforward, dry interview depicted on the videotaped recording was 
not of the nature to stir strong emotions that might overcome the restraints of 
reason.”  (People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 1289-1290.) 
                                              
5  
The first paragraph of the concurring and dissenting opinion transforms this 
“caution” into a “limitation.”  On the contrary, People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th 
1179, stated no categorical rules. 
 
39
We also find no prejudicial error in this case.  We have viewed the 
videotape.  It lasts about 20 minutes.  It consists of a montage of still photographs 
and video clips of Sara Weir’s life, from her infancy until shortly before she was 
killed at the age of 19, narrated calmly and unemotionally by her mother.  
Throughout much of the video, the music of Enya — with most of the words 
unrecognizable — plays in the background; the music is generally soft, not 
stirring.  One segment shows Sara singing a couple of songs with a school group, 
including “You Light Up My Life.”  Part of the time she was singing solo, with 
her mother explaining that every student was required to sing solo.  The videotape 
concerns Sara’s life, not her death.  It shows scenes of her swimming, horseback 
riding, at school and social functions, and spending time with her family and 
friends.  The closest it comes to referring to her death is the mother’s saying near 
the end, without noticeable emotion, that she does not want to dwell on this 
“terrible crime.”  There is no mention of the facts of the murder or of defendant.  
The video ends with a brief view of Sara’s unassuming grave marker followed by 
a video clip of people riding horseback in Alberta, Canada, over which the mother 
says this was where Sara came from and was the “kind of heaven” in which she 
belonged. 
Unlike the situation in Salazar v. State, supra, 90 S.W.3d 330, here the trial 
court watched the videotape and exercised its discretion.  Moreover, this is not a 
case of one witness after another giving repetitive victim impact testimony.  Only 
the victim’s mother testified about the impact of Sara’s murder.  The videotape 
supplemented, but did not duplicate, the mother’s testimony.  For the most part, 
the videotape, including the mother’s narrative, was not unduly emotional and 
presented material that was relevant to the penalty determination.  It humanized 
Sara Weir, as victim impact evidence is designed to do.  It contained a factual 
chronology of Sara’s life, from her infancy to her death in early adulthood, which 
 
40
helped the jury to understand “the loss to the victim’s family and to society which 
has resulted from the defendant’s homicide.”  (Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 
U.S. at p. 822.)  In People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at page 1289, we cautioned 
against a presentation that “emphasizes the childhood of an adult victim . . . .”  
That case did not involve childhood images, so we did not resolve the question.  
Here, the videotape did not emphasize any particular period of Sara’s life but 
reviewed all of it.  Doing so was relevant and, because the presentation was not 
unduly emotional, permissible. 
In particular, the videotape helped the jury to see that defendant took away 
the victim’s ability to enjoy her favorite activities, to contribute to the unique 
framework of her family — she was of Native American descent and adopted into 
a Caucasian home — and to fulfill the promise to society that someone with such a 
stable and loving background can bring.  The videotape further illustrated the 
gravity of the loss by showing Sara’s fresh-faced appearance before she died.  In 
the videotape, Sara appears at all times to be reserved, modest, and shy — 
sometimes shunning the camera.  Her demeanor is something words alone could 
not capture.  Such images corroborated evidence at the guilt phase, that could be 
considered in aggravation of penalty, suggesting that defendant preyed on Sara’s 
naïve and trusting nature.  Jurors could reasonably, and relevantly, conclude that 
defendant, who betrayed and raped other young women, felt comfortable 
exercising the ultimate act of violence and control over someone as vulnerable as 
Sara.  The viewer knew Sara better after viewing the videotape than before, but the 
tape expressed no outrage over her death, just implied sadness.  It contained no 
clarion call for vengeance.  It was longer than some tapes that have been admitted, 
but we see no bright-line limit to how long a videotape may be.  It is only slightly 
longer than the one admitted in Hicks v. State, supra, 940 S.W.2d 855, and is 
 
41
actually slightly shorter than the one admitted in People v. Prince, supra, 40 
Cal.4th 1179. 
Trial courts must be very cautious about admitting such videotape 
evidence.  We have upheld the exclusion of evidence a defendant offers in 
mitigation that was irrelevant.  (People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 778-
779 [trial court properly excluded as irrelevant documentary concerning the life of 
a street child in Guatemala]; People v. Nye (1969) 71 Cal.2d 356, 371-372 [trial 
court properly excluded a film the defendant offered in mitigation that involved a 
paid professional actor].)  Similarly, evidence offered in aggravation must be 
excluded if not relevant.  In this regard, the rules are similar whether the evidence 
is offered in mitigation or in aggravation.  When offered for either purpose, the 
evidence must be relevant to the penalty determination.  Nonfactual dramatization 
of the evidence in a videotape — in the sense of making a presentation in a 
dramatic manner — adds irrelevant factors to the videotape.  The videotape must 
factually and realistically portray the victim’s life and character and not present a 
“staged and contrived presentation . . . .”  (People v. Nye, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 
371.)  Trial courts must not permit irrelevant background music or video 
techniques that enhance the emotion of the factual presentation.  Moreover, the 
videotape, even when presented factually, must not be unduly emotional.  (People 
v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 1286-1287.) 
In some respects, the videotape here might have contained irrelevant 
aspects.  Music is not always impermissible.  The portion of the videotape 
showing Sara’s singing performance seems relevant to the purpose of 
demonstrating what she was like.  It reflects her demeanor in the difficult situation 
her mother described — a shy girl performing solo before her classmates.  Her 
choice of song to sing at that age and in those circumstances also seems relevant to 
forming an impression of the victim.  Her musical performance was not 
 
42
excessively emotional.  But the background music by Enya may have added an 
irrelevant factor to the videotape.  It had no connection to Sara other than that her 
mother said it was some of Sara’s favorite music.  The Enya background music 
seems unrelated to the images it accompanied and may have only added an 
emotional element to the videotape.  The portion at the end, showing a video clip 
of people riding horseback in Alberta, Canada, over which the mother says this 
was the “kind of heaven” in which Sara belonged, was also theatric without 
imparting any additional relevant material. 
We need not decide whether the court abused its discretion in not ordering 
the videotape modified to exclude the Enya background music and the horseback 
riding scene at the end, for any error in this regard was not prejudicial.  Most of 
the videotape was factual, relevant, and not unduly emotional, and the trial court 
had discretion to admit it.  To the extent it contained aspects that were themselves 
emotional without being factual — the background music and the final portion, 
perhaps — we are confident that permitting the jury to view and hear those 
portions along with the rest of the mostly factual and relevant videotape was 
harmless in light of the trial as a whole.  These days, background music in 
videotapes is very common; the soft music here would not have had a significant 
impact on the jury.  We see no reasonable possibility these portions of the 
videotape affected the penalty determination or, to state the equivalent, any error 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  (People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 
932, 960-961.) 
Defendant also contends the victim impact evidence “creates an intolerable 
risk of improper comparisons between the victim and the defendant.”  We see 
nothing in Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 U.S. 808, or our own cases, that 
prohibits comparing the victim and the defendant.  Defendant also asserts that the 
evidence created “the danger that racial discrimination will affect the jury’s 
 
43
decision.”  The claim is specious.  Nothing in the videotape, Sara’s mother’s 
testimony, the prosecutor’s argument to the jury, or anything else in this trial 
suggested the jury should impose the death penalty for racial reasons. 
2.  Refusal to Give Defendant’s Requested Jury Instructions 
Defendant contends the court erred in refusing to give special instructions 
the defense requested at trial that would have told the jury that it need not be 
unanimous to consider mitigating evidence, that it had the power to choose the 
sentence of life solely to show mercy, and that a single mitigating factor could 
outweigh a number of aggravating factors.  The court did not err.  As we have 
repeatedly explained, the standard jury instructions the court gave in this case “are 
adequate to inform the jurors of their sentencing responsibilities in compliance 
with federal and state constitutional standards.”  (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 
Cal.4th 1044, 1176-1177, and cases cited; see also People v. Smith (2003) 30 
Cal.4th 581, 638; People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 314-315.)  No additional 
instructions were required. 
3.  Failure to Provide Intercase Proportionality Review 
Defendant contends California’s death penalty law is invalid because it 
does not provide for intercase proportionality review.  We disagree.  (Pulley v. 
Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37; People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 476.)  
Although we do not provide intercase proportionality review, we “do undertake 
intracase proportionality review to determine whether the penalty is 
disproportionate to defendant’s personal culpability.”  (People v. Steele, supra, 27 
Cal.4th at p. 1269.)  Defendant does not specifically request intracase 
proportionality review, but it would not aid him.  A serial rapist, he repeatedly 
threatened to kill his victims.  Finally, he did kill one.  Acting entirely by himself 
and for his own purposes, he stabbed to death Sara Weir, a naïve and trusting girl 
 
44
who had befriended him.  Then he left the body under the bed of the 10-year-old 
son of his former girlfriend (who herself had become another of his victims) for 
that young child to discover.  “[T]he sentence of death is not disproportionate to 
defendant’s personal culpability.  It does not shock the conscience.”  (Ibid.) 
4.  Other Penalty Contentions 
Defendant reiterates many contentions we have repeatedly rejected.  “The 
jury need not make written findings, or achieve unanimity as to specific 
aggravating circumstances, or find beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating 
circumstance is proved (except for other crimes), that aggravating circumstances 
outweigh mitigating circumstances, or that death is the appropriate penalty.  
[Citations.]  The death penalty statute is not unconstitutional for failing to provide 
the jury with instructions of the burden of proof and standard of proof for finding 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances in reaching a penalty determination.”  
(People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 730-731.)  Recent United States 
Supreme Court decisions do not undermine these conclusions.  (People v. Stevens 
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 182, 212; People v. Morrison, supra, at p. 731.)  The court need 
not “instruct the jury on the presumption of life.”  (People v. Prieto, supra, 30 
Cal.4th at p. 271.)  CALJIC No. 8.88, which the court gave, properly instructs the 
jury on its sentencing discretion and the nature of its deliberative process.  (People 
v. Prieto, supra, at p. 264; People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 161-165; 
People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1242-1244.)  Section 190.3, factor (a), 
is not unconstitutionally overbroad, arbitrary, capricious, or vague.  (People v. 
Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1165.)  The jury’s consideration of unadjudicated 
criminal conduct in aggravation is constitutional, and jury unanimity regarding 
such conduct is not required.  (People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 402.)  The 
trial court need not delete section 190.3’s sentencing factors that may not apply.  
 
45
(People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 305.)  The trial court need not instruct 
the jury which factors it may consider only in mitigation.  (People v. Maury, 
supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 443-444.)  The use of such adjectives in the sentencing 
factors as “extreme” (§ 190.3, factors (d), (g)) and “substantial” (id., factor (g)) is 
constitutional.  (People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 614-615.)  Equal 
protection principles do not require this court to give capital defendants the same 
sentence review afforded other felons under the determinate sentencing law.  
(People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 970.) 
5.  Violation of International Law 
Contrary to defendant’s contention, a sentence of death that complies with 
state and federal constitutional and statutory requirements does not violate 
international law.  (People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 Cal.4th 147, 199.) 
6.  Effect of Alleged Error 
Defendant contends that if either special circumstance finding is reversed, 
we must reverse the death judgment, and that the cumulative effect of the alleged 
errors was prejudicial.  However, we have reversed neither special circumstance, 
and we have found no error to cumulate. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
We affirm the judgment. 
 
CHIN, J. 
 
WE CONCUR: 
 
GEORGE, C.J. 
KENNARD, J. 
BAXTER, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING OPINION BY WERDEGAR, J. 
 
 
The determination whether and to what extent to admit a videotape of the 
victim’s life at the penalty phase of a capital case is within the sound discretion of 
the trial court.  Nevertheless, as the majority recognizes (maj. opn., ante, at p. 38), 
we have previously cautioned courts against the “routine admission of videotapes 
featuring the victim.”  (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1289.)  We have 
recognized the “strong possibility” that a presentation that “lasts beyond a few 
moments, or emphasizes the childhood of an adult victim, or is accompanied by 
stirring music . . . itself may assist in creating an emotional impact upon the jury 
that goes beyond what the jury might experience by viewing still photographs of 
the victim or listening to the victim’s bereaved parents.”  (Ibid.)  For this reason, 
trial courts “must exercise great caution in permitting the prosecution to present 
victim-impact evidence in the form of a lengthy videotaped or filmed tribute to the 
victim.”  (Ibid.) 
Insofar as the majority opinion, consistent with our pronouncement in 
Prince, stands for the proposition that it is an abuse of discretion to admit a 
videotape that is unduly lengthy, has elements of theatricality in the use of 
evocative music and visions of the victim’s place in the hereafter, and goes beyond 
a factual presentation of the victim as she was in life, I concur.  Such was the 
videotape in this case.  As Justice Moreno observes in his separate opinion, it was 
more akin to a eulogy than to conventional victim-impact evidence.  (Conc. & dis. 
 
2 
opn. of Moreno, J., post, at p. 6.)  The trial court therefore erred in admitting it 
without requiring that it be modified. 
For the reasons stated by both the majority opinion and Justice Moreno, 
however, I conclude admission of the videotape in its entirety was nonprejudicial.  
I therefore concur in the court’s judgment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WERDEGAR, J. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY MORENO, J. 
 
 
“Courts must exercise great caution in permitting the prosecution to present 
victim-impact evidence in the form of a lengthy videotaped or filmed tribute to the 
victim.  Particularly if the presentation lasts beyond a few moments, or emphasizes 
the childhood of an adult victim, or is accompanied by stirring music, the medium 
itself may assist in creating an emotional impact upon the jury that goes beyond 
what the jury might experience by viewing still photographs of the victim or 
listening to the victim’s bereaved parents. . . .  In order to combat this strong 
possibility, courts must strictly analyze evidence of this type and, if such evidence 
is admitted, courts must monitor the jurors’ reactions to ensure that the 
proceedings do not become injected with a legally impermissible level of 
emotion.”  (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1289.)  In this case, the 
videotaped eulogy to Sara Weir played for the jury at the penalty phase of 
defendant’s trial exceeded every limitation that this court unanimously set forth in 
Prince.  For that reason, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the 
videotape was admissible, albeit with “irrelevant aspects.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 41.)  In my view, the tape was inadmissible in its entirety and it was error for 
the trial court to have admitted it.  I further conclude, however, that the error does 
not require reversal. 
In holding that the Eighth Amendment “erects no per se bar” to the 
admission of victim impact evidence, the Supreme Court spoke about two types of 
 
2 
evidence; evidence that gives the jury “ ‘a quick glimpse of the life’ which a 
defendant ‘chose to extinguish’ [citation],” and evidence that “demonstrate[s] the 
loss to the victim’s family and to society which has resulted from the defendant’s 
homicide.”  (Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 827, 822.)1  The videotape 
in this case did not fall into the latter category.  The impact of the victim’s death 
on her family was presented at length through her mother’s testimony before the 
videotape was played.  Thus, the videotape falls into the second category 
described by Payne, but it went far beyond providing the jury with the “quick 
glimpse” of Sara’s life necessary to establish her unique individuality.  Rather, it 
contained material, and was produced in such a fashion, as to potentially imbue 
the proceedings with a “a legally impermissible level of emotion.”  (People v. 
Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1289.) 
As the majority notes, we discussed the issue of the use of videotape victim 
impact evidence in Prince where, in response to the defendant’s mitigation 
evidence, the prosecution introduced a 25-minute videotape of a television 
interview with one of the defendant’s victims, Holly Tarr.  (People v. Prince, 
supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1209.)  In light of the specific characteristics of that 
                                              
1  I am concerned also that in this case the defendant did not introduce any 
mitigating evidence at the penalty phase because an analytic linchpin of the 
Supreme Court’s analysis in Payne was the premise that the state “ ‘has a 
legitimate interest in counteracting the mitigating evidence which the defendant is 
entitled to put in, by reminding the sentencer that just as the murderer should be 
considered as an individual, so too the victim is an individual whose death 
represents a unique loss to society and in particular to his family.’ ”  (Payne v. 
Tennessee, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 825; People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal. 4th at 
p. 1286.)  Of course, victim impact evidence is not rendered inadmissible simply 
because a defendant chooses not to put on evidence in mitigation, but where, as 
here, the defendant makes clear that he or she is not going to present such 
evidence, the trial court should exercise greater caution in admitting victim impact 
evidence so as to avoid the possibility of “piling on” such evidence to the point 
that it does become unfair. 
 
3 
videotape, we rejected the defendant’s claim that it went beyond the constitutional 
limits of permissible victim impact evidence.  We noted that the interview was 
filmed by a local news station that was doing profiles “of certain successful local 
high school students” a few months before the  murder.  (Ibid.)  “The trial court 
excluded portions of the videotape depicting Tarr’s musical performances, because 
it determined that this evidence would be cumulative.  The interviewer devoted 
nearly the entire interview to Tarr’s training and interest in acting and singing, 
adding a few questions concerning Tarr’s ability to balance school and artistic 
commitments.  The tape recording exhibits a young female interviewer and Tarr, 
seated in chairs in front of a plain backdrop.  There is no music and there are no 
cuts to other images of Tarr — the interview is a calm, even static, discussion of 
Tarr’s accomplishments and interests that takes place entirely in a neutral, bland 
setting.  Under ordinary circumstances, the two young women’s discussion would 
appear unlikely to invite empathy or emotional response.”  (Id. at p. 1287.) 
We concluded our discussion in Prince with the cautions to which I refer at 
the outset of this opinion regarding the admission of videotaped victim impact 
evidence which is, in effect, “a filmed tribute to the victim” that lasts “beyond a 
few moments,” or “emphasizes the childhood of an adult victim” or is 
“accompanied by stirring music . . . .”  (People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 
1289.)  In our analysis, we considered and distinguished two other cases in which 
victim impact videotapes had been excluded or found prejudicial, U.S. v. Sampson 
(D.Mass. 2004) 335 F.Supp.2d 166 and Salazar v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) 90 
S.W.3d 330. 
In U.S. v. Sampson, supra, 335 F.Supp.2d 166, the district court, in 
explaining why it excluded a 27-minute videotape containing 200 still photographs 
of the victim set to evocative contemporary music, including that of the Beatles 
and James Taylor, explained:  “[A]dmission of the video would have been unfairly 
 
4 
prejudicial in light of the fact that the jury heard powerful, poignant testimony 
about Jonathan Rizzo’s full life and the impact of his loss on his family, and saw 
photographs of him in conjunction with this testimony.  The video, given its length 
and the number of photos displayed, would have constituted an extended 
emotional appeal to the jury and would have provided much more than a ‘quick 
glimpse’ of the victim’s life.  Together with the evocative accompanying music, 
the videotape images would have inflamed the passion and sympathy of the jury.”  
(Id. at pp. 192-193.) 
In Salazar v. State, supra, 90 S.W.3d 330, the murder victim was a 
20-year-old man, Jonathon Bishop.  In rebuttal to mitigation evidence, the victim’s 
mother testified briefly as to impact of his death.  His father also testified, but 
primarily to lay the foundation for the admission of a “seventeen-minute video 
montage of photographs depicting the murder victim’s life.”  (Id. at p. 332.)  
According to the Texas Criminal Court of Appeals:  “This video is an 
extraordinarily moving tribute to Jonathon Bishop’s life.  It consists of 
approximately 140 still photographs, arranged in a chronological montage.  Music 
accompanies the entire seventeen-minute video and includes such selections as 
“Storms in Africa” and “River” by Enya, and concludes with Celine Dion singing, 
“My Heart Will Go On,” from the movie Titanic.  [¶]  Almost half of the 
approximately 140 photographs depict the victim’s infancy and early childhood.”  
(Id. at p. 333.) 
In explaining why the tape was inadmissible, the court said:  “Nearly half 
of the photographs showed Jonathon Bishop as an infant, toddler or small child, 
but appellant murdered an adult, not a child.  He extinguished Jonathon Bishop’s 
future, not his past.  The probative value of the vast majority of these ‘infant-
growing-into-youth’ photographs is de minimis.  However, their prejudicial effect 
is enormous because the implicit suggestion is that appellant murdered this angelic 
 
5 
infant; he killed this laughing, light-hearted child; he snuffed out the life of the 
first-grade soccer player and of the young boy hugging his blond puppy dog. . . .  
While the probative value of one or two photographs of an adult murder victim’s 
childhood might not be substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, 
what the State accurately characterizes as a ‘seventeen-minute montage’ of the 
victim’s entire life is very prejudicial both because of its ‘sheer volume,’ and 
because of its undue emphasis upon the adult victim’s halcyon childhood.”  
(Salazar v. State, supra, 90 S.W.3d at p. 337.) 
The videotape admitted here was in part strikingly similar to the tape found 
inadmissible in Salazar, and, where it differed, was precisely the kind of tape that 
we warned against admitting in Prince.  First, the parallels:  like the victim in 
Salazar, who was 20 years old, Sara Weir, at age 19 years, was a very young 
adult, but an adult nonetheless who had left home and was living on her own.  
However, like the video montage in Salazar, the videotape of Sara’s life is 
chronological and dwells on her childhood in a series of evocative scenes 
(swimming, getting ready for Halloween, with her cat, Smokey).  Both videos are 
even set in part to the same type of music, from the performer, Enya.  
However, while the video montage of Jonathon Bishop in Salazar consisted 
of still photographs, the videotape in this case included considerable video footage 
of scenes from Sara’s life with sound.  Thus, at one point, Sara is shown as a 
young teenager at her junior high school’s talent show singing a solo of the song, 
“You Light Up My Life.”  Finally,  after a closeup of Sara’s grave, the videotape 
ends with what is apparently stock footage, depicting a lone horseman riding 
against a range of mountains, with the comment by Sara’s mother that this is the 
kind of heaven in which she imagines her daughter.  Thus, this videotape was 
longer than the videotape found inadmissible in Salazar, contained video 
 
6 
footage and not merely still photographs, was accompanied by evocative music 
more appropriate to a memorial service, and concluded on a frankly religious note. 
If the cautions we expressed regarding this type of evidence in Prince have 
any application at all, they must apply to this case.  As the court in Salazar 
correctly pointed out, “the punishment phase of a criminal trial is not a memorial 
service for the victim. What may be entirely appropriate eulogies to celebrate the 
life and accomplishments of a unique individual are not necessarily admissible in a 
criminal trial.”  (Salazar v. State, supra, 90 S.W.3d at pp. 335-336.)  The 
videotape in the present case is akin to a eulogy, and should therefore not have 
been admitted as victim impact evidence. 
Having so concluded, however, I further conclude that the error was not 
prejudicial.  Given the extensive and affecting testimony of the victim’s mother, 
the videotape was, at most, cumulative to that testimony.  I cannot say that this 
additional evidence so inflamed the passions and the sympathy of the jury that the 
penalty phase was rendered unfair. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MORENO, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Kelly 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S049973 
Date Filed: December 6, 2007 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: Superior 
County: Los Angeles 
Judge: Michael R. Hoff 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
 
Michael J. Hersek, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Evan Young, 
Deputy State Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Attorneys for Respondent: 
 
Bill Lockyer and Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorneys General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney 
General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Sharlene A. Honnaka and Stephanie C. 
Brenan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Evan Young 
Deputy State Public Defender 
221 Main Street, 10th Floor 
San Francisco, CA  94105 
(415) 904-5600 
 
Stephanie C. Brenan 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street 
Los Angeles, CA  90013 
(213) 897-2056