Case Title: Gurney v. Gurney

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1995-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Gurney v. Gurney1995 WY 111899 P.2d 52Case Number: 94-144Decided: 07/18/1995Supreme Court of Wyoming
Renae 
G. GURNEY, n/k/a Renae G. Tollman,

Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

Russell C. GURNEY, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from District 
Court, Goshen County, Keith G. Kautz, J.

Diane M. Lathrop 
of Wiederspahn, Lummis & Liepas, P.C., Cheyenne, for 
appellant.

James A. 
Eddington of Jones & Eddington Law Offices, Torrington, for 
appellee.

Before 
GOLDEN, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, TAYLOR and LEHMAN, JJ.

GOLDEN, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]      In this appeal, 
the primary issue we consider is whether it is necessary to demonstrate a 
substantial change in circumstances in order to modify an order of joint custody 
when both parents inform the district court that the joint custody arrangement 
has failed. Appellant Renae G. Gurney, now known as Renae G. Tollman (Renae), 
and appellee Russell C. Gurney (Russell) shared custody of their daughter 
(Laurie) following their divorce in July of 1993. Within fifty days after the 
divorce decree was filed, Russell petitioned for primary custody of the child. 
Following a stipulated informal hearing, the district court granted his petition 
and Renae now appeals.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

ISSUES

[¶3]      Renae presents 
the following issues:

I.          
Whether the court abused its discretion in finding a material change in 
circumstances, which is not supported by substantial evidence and is contrary to 
the manifest weight of the evidence presented.

II.          
Whether the court abused its discretion in finding that appellant's 
relocation was a material change in circumstance supporting a change of 
custody.

III.         
Whether the court abused its discretion by not considering the effect of 
separating siblings when determining the best interest of the child for purposes 
of changing custody.

IV.        Whether the 
court abused its discretion by considering past relationships of appellant in 
granting custody of the minor child to appellee when the relationships had 
occurred prior to the entry of the original decree and had no present effect on 
the best interests of the minor child.

V.        
Whether the court abused its discretion by not considering that appellant 
was the primary care giver of the minor child.

[¶4]      Russell states 
the issue as follows:

Did the trial court abuse 
its discretion by granting primary custody of the parties' minor child to the 
appellee?

FACTS

[¶5]  Russell and Renae were divorced on July 
19, 1993. The divorce decree incorporated an agreement stipulating joint custody 
of their daughter, Laurie Jane Gurney, born January 22, 1992. Russell was 
granted primary custody for the six month period of April 1, 1993, through 
September 30, 1993, and Renae had primary custody from October through the end 
of March. Primary custody would continue to alternate every six months until the 
child attended school. The noncustodial parent had visitation 
rights.

[¶6]      At the time the 
parents agreed to their joint custody arrangement, both were living in 
Torrington, Wyoming. After the divorce decree was entered, Renae accepted a 
position in Lusk, Wyoming, a distance of about sixty miles from Torrington, and, 
in August 1993, moved to Lusk with Laurie and Laurie's stepsister, Jessie. On 
August 30, 1993, Russell petitioned the court to modify the joint custody 
arrangement and grant him primary custody, alleging Renae had failed to abide by 
the visitation set out in the divorce decree and a substantial change in 
circumstances had occurred warranting the change in custody.

[¶7]      Renae's response 
to Russell's petition denied a material change of circumstances had occurred and 
requested the modification be denied. However, she also counter petitioned for 
primary custody. In December of 1993, Renae requested a hearing on the matter 
because communication between the two had deteriorated and she no longer 
believed joint custody was in the best interest of the child. At the informal 
hearing, each parent presented evidence adverse to the other and evidence 
favorable to himself or herself, as the case may be, on the issue of primary 
custody of Laurie. Following the hearing, the court found a material change in 
circumstances warranted modification and the best interests of the child 
required that she reside in the place providing the greatest sense of security, 
consistency, and permanent relationships; consequently, the court awarded 
primary custody to Russell. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

[¶8]      In these matters, 
we use an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the decisions of the 
district court. Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283, 1286 (Wyo. 1993) (quoting Gaines v. 
Doby, 794 P.2d 566, 570 (Wyo. 1990) (citations omitted)).

[¶9]      Our analysis of 
the issues presented in the instant case is promoted if we recognize this case 
does not involve the usual custody dispute, in which the court earlier awarded 
custody to one parent and the other is now attempting to reopen the order and 
change custody, asserting a substantial change of circumstances as justification 
for the requested reopening of the custodial order. In countless primary custody 
cases we have adhered to the "substantial change of circumstances" test, but in 
past cases we have not had occasion to consider what should be required to 
justify the reopening of a joint custody order as contrasted with a primary 
custody order. In this case, the earlier order under consideration was one 
providing for joint custody1, not one awarding primary custody 
to one of the parents. Recognizing that fact is of central importance in 
determining what should be required to justify reopening the order because we 
see several distinctive features between a primary custody order and a joint 
custody order. One such distinctive feature concerns child placement stability. 
An order awarding custody to one parent fixes that parent as the primary 
nurturer of the child and the one with whom the child shall reside. Once such an 
order is entered, considerations of stability in child placement become of 
central importance. In our case law, we have shown a strong bias against 
reopening the order because a child is almost always harmed by a transfer from 
one parent to the other.

[¶10]   When the reopening of a joint 
custody order is before the court, however, the stability-of-placement 
consideration that is central to our strict reopening standards in the primary 
custodial context appears to be of minimal importance because the joint custody 
order has not fixed one parent as the primary nurturer. We recognize a measure 
of instability is inherent in a joint custody order because it requires two 
parents, who are not residing together, to share custodial rights and 
responsibilities and resolve the logistics of caring for the child. Moody v. 
Moody, 715 P.2d 507, 510 (Utah 1985) (J. Zimmerman concurring); and see Keith v. 
Keith, 429 N.W.2d 276, 279 (Minn.App. 1988) (J. Huspeni, concurring); In Re 
Marriage of Lovejoy, 158 Ill. App.3d 1, 109 Ill.Dec. 768, 510 N.E.2d 636 (1987); 
Blair v. Blair, 34 Ohio App.3d 345, 518 N.E.2d 950 (1986).

[¶11]   A second distinctive feature 
suggests a joint custody order should be more readily opened. The premise of the 
joint custody order is the parents' ability to resolve between themselves the 
custodial details. There can be little question that joint custody requires 
sincere dedication on the part of each parent to safeguard the security and 
stability vital to a child's best interest. When the parents are unable to make 
this cooperative arrangement work, a change of circumstances justifying judicial 
reexamination of the original joint custody order is demonstrated. See Moody, 
715 P.2d  at 510.

[¶12]   Here, both parties asserted joint 
custody was not working. Logically, such assertions end the judicial inquiry. 
Gaines v. Doby, 794 P.2d 566 (Wyo. 1990). In Gaines we recognized a slight 
wrinkle in the "substantial change of circumstances" test for primary custody 
cases. There, we reviewed the custodial parent's challenge of the district 
court's modification of a visitation provision of the original divorce decree. 
The custodial parent contended changes of circumstances did not exist and, 
therefore, the district court's modification action was in error. Noting the 
trial court's possession of both statutory and inherent revisory powers with 
respect to custodial and visitation matters, as well as the possession of broad 
discretion in the exercise thereof, we considered it significant that both 
parents had expressly invited the district court to resolve the visitation 
modification issue. Id. at 569-71. We held neither party could claim error based 
upon such an invitation. Id. at 571. We held modification was warranted in light 
of the parties' invitation that the district court exercise its revisory powers 
and in light of the demonstrated change of circumstances, viz., the parties' 
inability to resolve visitation issues, and in light of the best interests of 
the child. Id.

[¶13]   Here, considering the brief span of 
time between the entry of the divorce decree and the parties' invitations to the 
district court to reopen the custodial issue, and considering the parties' 
express invitations to reopen, common sense dictates the district court should 
reopen the joint custody order and award custody to one parent or the other. 
Here, as in Gaines, each party invited the district court to do so. No error can 
be claimed because that court accepted and, at the parties' behest, acted upon 
the invitations. As Renae contends, her relocation to Lusk is not, in itself, a 
material change in circumstances. Love, 851 P.2d  at 1288-89. However, the 
district court could have reasonably concluded that conditions resulting from 
the move contributed to the parties' inability to agree and communicate. There 
was not abuse of discretion in reopening the custody order.

[¶14]   With respect to the propriety of 
the district court's award of custody to the father, ample evidence supports 
that award. In custody decisions, the best interest of the child is the 
paramount consideration. Love, 851 P.2d  at 1287. WYO. STAT. § 20-2-113(a) 
(1994). "The best-interest criterion of our law as the promise of our society 
should evoke every relevant factor, with the weighting to be vested in the 
discretion of the trial court." Fanning v. Fanning, 717 P.2d 346, 353 (Wyo. 
1986). In the record before us, sufficient evidence exists to show the district 
court took into account several relevant factors in determining the best 
interests of Laurie. The record indicates the district court took into 
consideration which parent had primarily cared for Laurie during the marriage 
and also the abilities of each parent to care for the child during the 
subsequent joint custody arrangement. The district court also considered the 
relationship Laurie shares with her step-sister, Jessie.

[¶15]   Contrary to Renae's contentions, 
the district court did not abuse its discretion by taking into account her past 
romantic relationships, among other factors, in determining the best interests 
of the child. It was reasonable for the district court to consider those past 
relationships to understand the possible effect Renae's present romantic 
relationship could have on Laurie. We find no abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION

[¶16]   When joint custodians inform the 
district court the joint custody ordered by that court has failed, they present 
a sufficient change in circumstances justifying the reopening of the custody 
order and awarding of primary custody to one parent. 

[¶17]   Affirmed.

LEHMAN, Justice, concurring in 
result only, with whom TAYLOR, J., joins.

[¶18]   I do not agree that a court may 
take into consideration at a custody modification hearing romantic relationships 
occurring prior to the original custody agreement. I agree with the majority's 
resolution regarding the reopening of a joint custody decree when the parties 
ask the court to intervene, and concur with the result only because the record 
includes other sufficient evidence to support the trial court's custody 
decision.

[¶19]   When a district court signs a 
decree of divorce incorporating the parties' child custody stipulation, the 
district court makes a finding that the custody provision is in the best 
interests of the child. The trial court is not bound to accept a stipulation, 
but rather must consider independently what custody arrangement is in the 
child's best interest. See Forbes v. Forbes, 672 P.2d 428, 429 (Wyo. 1983). The 
findings are made in the context of all surrounding circumstances regarding the 
parties' lifestyles, parenting abilities and the well being of the child. When 
the court enters a decree awarding the parties joint custody, an assumption can 
be made that the court was even more thorough in its findings because joint 
custody presents many unique questions involving the best interests of the 
child. J.B. Singer & W.L. Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 Md.L.Rev. 
497 (1988) and E. Scott & A. Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 Ohio St. 
L.J. 455 (1984).

[¶20]   Here the stipulation for joint 
custody included representations by the parties that sharing of custody was in 
the best interests of the child, and those representations were made by the 
parties with full knowledge of each other's history. A party, based on that 
representation, should be estopped from later arguing at a modification hearing 
that the other party should lose entitlement to joint custody because of 
premarriage and/or predivorce lifestyle. The determination at a modification of 
custody hearing to go back into time to revisit a party's predivorce, and in 
this instance premarriage, lifestyle seems obtrusive, especially where no 
connection was made depicting how the premarriage lifestyle relates to the 
present lifestyle or parenting abilities.

FOOTNOTE

1                       
It is unclear from the district court's order if the "joint custody" 
ordered includes both physical and legal joint custody. It is important that 
judges, legislators, and writers clearly define what is meant by "joint custody" 
as the lack of a standard definition creates confusion. The case of Thronson v. 
Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah App. 
1991), cert. denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 
1991), discussed the problem:

Custody 
Terminology: Many legislators, judges and writers have been loose with their 
"joint" custody language. Early articles identified this vexing problem as 
follows:

"Both the forms of 
custody [sole, divided, split, joint] following divorce and the terms which 
describe them are vague and overlapping. The lack of standard definitions and 
the courts' tendency to use certain terms interchangeably have created 
confusion."

Folberg 
& Graham, Joint Custody of Children Following Divorce, 12 U.C. Davis L.Rev. 
523, 525 (1979).

"Often, when referring to 
one of these custody arrangements, courts use vague language or inadequately 
defined terms."

Bratt, Joint 
Custody, 67 Ky.L.J. 271, 283 (1978-79).

One author points out 
that considerable semantic confusion has resulted possibly because the "term" 
joint custody predates the "concept" of joint custody as it is known today. He 
states: "I have encountered at least fifteen terms used to refer to various 
alternatives to sole custody: joint legal custody, joint physical custody, 
divided custody, separate custody, alternating custody, split custody, managing 
conservatorship, possessory conservatorship, equal custody, shared custody, 
partial custody, custody `given to neither party to the exclusion of the other,' 
temporary custody, shifting custody, and concurrent custody." Miller, Joint 
Custody, 13(3) Fam.L.Q. 345, 360 n. 79 (1979).

Thronson, 810 P.2d  at 429, fn. 1.

As Thronson also noted, 
legal authorities consider that

"there are 
actually three aspects of joint custody: the legal custody agreement, the 
physical custody agreement and the actual residential arrangement for the child. 
It is important to investigate the three forms of joint custody separately to 
understand the implications of each for the functioning of the post-divorce 
family." Albiston, Maccoby, & Mnookin, Does Joint Legal Custody Matter?, 
Stan.L. & Pol'y Rev. 167, 168 (1990).

Thronson, 810 P.2d  at 
432, fn. 4.