Case Title: Mason v. Rizzi

Citation: 

Docket Number: 339, 2002

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2004-03-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
JUDITH MASON,  
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 339, 2002 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
MARIA RIZZI, 
 
 
 
)  C.A. No. 99C-09-271 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  August 5, 2003 
Decided:  March 3, 2004 
 
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, STEELE and 
JACOBS, constituting the court en banc. 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
Louis J. Rizzo, Jr. (argued) and Cynthia G. Beam of Reger & Rizzo, 
Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant. 
 
Kenneth M. Roseman of Ciconte, Roseman & Wasserman, Wilmington, 
Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Justice: 
 
 
2
 
In this appeal, consolidated with Eskin v. Carden, No. 322, 2002, decided 
February 13, 2004, we again address the nature and scope of the admissibility of 
biomechanical expert testimony related to a motor vehicle accident alleged to have 
caused personal injuries to a particular plaintiff.1  We also review the trial judge’s 
decision to enter a partial judgment as a matter of law2 on the question of whether 
the accident caused a “soft-tissue” injury, as well as the trial judge’s discretionary 
ruling to allow Plaintiff/Appellee’s medical experts to testify by pretrial video 
deposition despite Plaintiff/Appellee’s counsel’s alleged failure to disclose during 
pre-deposition discovery an expert’s letter suggesting permanent injury arising 
from an earlier accident. 
 
We find that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion, either when she 
barred 
the 
biomechanical 
expert 
testimony 
nor 
when 
she 
allowed 
Plaintiff/Appellee’s medical experts to testify.  We, therefore, affirm her rulings on 
the proffered evidence.  We further find that the record supports her conclusion 
that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence or cause of 
a soft-tissue injury, even when the evidence is examined in the light most favorable 
to the Defendant/Appellant.  Therefore, the trial judge correctly removed this issue 
                                                 
1 Although this case was originally consolidated with Eskin, we decided them separately.  We 
note, however, the importance of reading these cases together in order to understand the complex 
evidentiary subject of biomechanical expert testimony. 
2 Although Plaintiff styled her Motion as one for a “directed verdict,” the trial judge tracked the 
language of Superior Court Civ. R. 50 and entered “judgment as a matter of law.”  We recognize 
the long-standing practice of styling a motion under these circumstances as one “For a Directed 
Verdict.” 
 
3
from among those to be considered by the jury.  Accordingly, we affirm the 
judgment of the Superior Court. 
I. 
On May 8, 1998, Defendant/Appellant Judith Mason rear-ended 
Plaintiff/Appellee Maria Rizzi=s car.  The accident occurred while both were 
stopped at a red light and Mason=s foot came off the brake pedal.  There was no 
damage to either vehicle. 
At the time of the accident, Rizzi had a pre-existing medical condition dating 
back to 1990 that included a disc herniation and degenerative changes to her 
cervical spine.  In April 2001, almost three years after the accident, Dr. Bruce 
Rudin operated on Rizzi’s spine.   
Rizzi brought suit, and the trial took place beginning on March 11, 2002.  
Mason admitted liability before trial, leaving the issues of proximate cause and 
damages for the jury at trial.  Rizzi claimed two types of injury – a soft-tissue 
injury to her neck and back evidenced by pain and muscle spasm, and pain 
associated with trauma requiring surgery on her spine in 2001.  On March 13, 2002 
the jury returned a verdict in favor of Rizzi in the amount of $340,680.29.  Mason 
filed an unsuccessful Motion for a New Trial or Remittitur, and now appeals the 
trial judge’s evidentiary rulings and denial of a new trial. 
 
4
II. 
The Trial Judge correctly granted Rizzi’s Motion In Limine to Exclude 
Mason’s Biomechanical Expert Testimony. 
 
 
Before trial, Rizzi moved to exclude Mason’s proffered biomechanical 
expert testimony.  Mason’s expert would have testified that: 
 
1.  Based upon the scientific analysis outlined above, the loads 
placed on Ms. Rizzi’s cervical and lumbar spine, during the incident 
of May 8, 1998, were comparable to or less than the loads her spine 
experienced during everyday activities. 
 
 
2.  The loads placed on Ms. Rizzi’s spine were significantly less 
than the loads required to produce permanent injury to the structures 
of the spine, as documented in the biomechanical literature. 
 
 
The trial judge excluded the testimony at trial and then expanded upon her 
bases for doing so in her Post-trial Memorandum Opinion.3  She reasoned that 
while the force of impact in the accident may have been no more than “everyday” 
forces from normal activities, the amount of force involved in the accident was 
never put in issue by any expert qualified to render an opinion on “medical 
causation.”  Dr. Townsend, a physician expert retained by Mason, did not opine 
that “everyday forces” could not have caused Plaintiff Rizzi’s injuries.  Dr. 
Townsend offered “no opinion on the amount of force, or lack of force,” required 
to cause Rizzi’s injuries.  Dr. Townsend “did not rely on the biomechanical 
expert’s opinion in any way in forming his medical causation opinion.”  Mason 
                                                 
3 Rizzi v. Mason, 799 A.2d 1178 (Del. Super. Ct. 2002). 
 
5
argued just before the trial judge’s evidentiary ruling and at the time of 
consideration of a post-trial Motion for a New Trial or Remittitur, and now on 
appeal, continues to argue, that the biomechanical expert’s two-pronged opinion 
has relevance, and therefore evidentiary significance, independent of any expert 
opinion on “medical causation.”  Mason’s biomechanical expert – independent of 
Mason’s medical expert’s opinion and contrary to the opinion of Rizzi’s medical 
expert – would have testified that the impact “generated so little force” that Rizzi’s 
injuries could not have been as severe as she claimed, and that “she could have 
received the same injuries performing daily activities.”  Mason would then have 
argued that the jury could reasonably rely upon the opinion that the forces at work 
in the accident were no more “load” generating than, e.g., sealing an envelope or 
peeling an apple.  The biomechanical expert’s opinion, however, did not elaborate 
on what he meant by every day activities or compare Rizzi’s spine to the normal or 
average spine.  The biomechanical expert proffered no validated rate of error in the 
methodology for determining the effect of the loads even on the average person.  
The proffered opinion did not suggest that the expert had considered the effect of 
the “loads” on a spine, like Rizzi’s, which had degenerative weakness and had 
been subjected to surgery before this accident. 
Accordingly, the trial judge identified two reasons that supported her 
decision to exclude the biomechanical expert’s testimony:  
 
6
(1) 
The proffered testimony was “irrelevant, highly prejudicial and should 
be excluded” because Defendant’s medical expert did not testify about the forces 
involved in the accident and whether they could or could not have caused injuries 
as severe as those allegedly suffered by Rizzi; 
(2) 
Defendant’s biomechanical expert proffered an opinion based on 
studies that analyzed the effect of impact forces on normal spines, not on 
previously injured spines, like Rizzi’s.  That factor alone, the trial judge concluded, 
would result in juror confusion, even if the proffer had some “relevance and 
probative value.” The trial judge explained: 
Admission of Cripton’s opinions, in the absence of competent medical 
testimony, and because they were based on studies of normal spines, 
would have resulted in juror speculation, confusion and unfair 
prejudice to Plaintiff.  Cripton’s opinions were properly excluded 
pursuant to Davis v. Maute, Amalfitano v. Baker, and Delaware Rules 
of Evidence 401, 403 and 702.4 
 
 
The trial judge’s reasoning and ruling gives us an opportunity to elaborate 
further our views on biomechanical expert opinion discussed in the companion 
case of Eskin v. Carden.5 
 
First, where there is an objection, we reaffirm the necessity for our trial 
judges to examine carefully the purpose for which a biomechanical expert opinion 
is offered in a particular case.  Like many difficult issues in the law, the question of 
                                                 
4 799 A.2d at 1182. 
5 Eskin v. Carden, 2004 Del. LEXIS 81 (Feb. 13, 2004). 
 
7
whether biomechanical expert testimony should be admitted is highly contextual.  
As we stated in Eskin, we recognize the existence of the biomechanical field and 
that most, if not all proffered experts in that field will be qualified to opine reliably 
in specific situations or contexts.  When those opinions are relevant and directly 
address particular facts in issue and the studies that support them establish their 
reliability, a trial judge may find them helpful to a jury. 
 
In this context, we reject the notion, suggested by the term “medical 
causation,” that biomechanical expert opinion can never be admitted unless the 
opinion is seconded by or relied upon by a physician in forming that physician’s 
opinion about whether an accident caused physical injury to a person.  There may 
well be circumstances where a biomechanical expert’s views will be both relevant 
and reliable.  For example, a patient tells a physician: “My head struck the dash 
during the accident.”  The physician concludes that the statement, in part, confirms 
the existence of or helps explain the severity of the patient’s head injury.  A trial 
judge might find relevant and reliable a biomechanical expert’s view that no 
person meeting the plaintiff’s physical description could have struck the dash with 
his or her head, given the forces generated by the accident.  The biomechanical 
expert’s opinion, thus, may reliably establish the improbability of a factual 
assumption upon which a medical doctor relied in order to form an opinion about 
the causation or severity of an injury.  The biomechanical expert opinion would be 
 
8
relevant because it contradicts an essential fact actually relied upon by a medical 
expert accepting the credibility of a patient’s oral history. 
The trial judge would, of course, in determining the reliability of the 
opinion, consider the error rate of the supporting tests.  If the statistical margin of 
error was within reason, the trial judge could allow the testimony because its 
trustworthiness had been established through validated testing, and the particular 
issue on which it had a bearing could be focused in a way unlikely to mislead or 
confuse the jury.  The opinion could aid the jury in determining whether it was 
more likely than not that the plaintiff’s head could have struck the dash given the 
forces at work in the accident.  If believed, the expert’s opinion would address 
whether the jury should rely upon the physician’s expert opinion which was based, 
in part, on the assumption that the plaintiff’s head did strike the dash.  No juror 
would be in danger of drawing an inference beyond the reliable limits of the 
purpose for which the opinion was offered – namely, that this person did fit into a 
measurable category of average persons reflected in the biomechanical testing 
reported in “the literature.”  Based on such expert testimony, the jury could 
reasonably conclude that the plaintiff’s head probably did not, just like the average 
person’s probably would not, strike the dash.   
There also can be little doubt that a case will arise where no medical history 
or contemporaneous examination reveals a plaintiff’s unique susceptibility to 
 
9
injury.  Medical history, under these circumstances, would have no bearing upon 
the biomechanical expert opinion’s reliability, provided that a reasonable margin of 
error in testing average people had been established.  The plaintiff would fit into a 
statistically measurable category.  The trial judge could accept studies with error 
rates within an acceptable marginal range and conclude that they validate the 
reliability of the opinion, since it applies to persons having the same general 
characteristics as the plaintiff.  Since the opinion would be clearly relevant under 
these circumstances, no rational 403 analysis would likely result in a conclusion 
that the jury would be misled or confused about the significance of the testimony 
or its application to the individual plaintiff.   
Second, to conclude that the trial judge’s role as the gatekeeper for scientific 
or technical expert opinion testimony is fulfilled by concluding, without more, that 
an individual who is properly credentialed in a recognized field of expertise will 
present a reliable expert opinion, is entirely too facile.  The U.S. Circuit Court for 
the Third Circuit has highlighted an equally important inquiry:   
An additional consideration under Rule 702 – and another 
aspect of relevancy – is whether expert testimony proffered in the case 
is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in 
resolving a factual dispute.6 
 
 
Before cross-examination attacks the persuasiveness of expert opinion, the 
trial judge is obliged to satisfy herself that the expert opinion testimony is relevant, 
                                                 
6 United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 
10
reliable, validated, and, therefore, trustworthy.  Then, and only then, can it be 
juxtaposed against other relevant, reliable, validated, trustworthy expert opinion 
for the purpose of the parties contesting, and then the jury evaluating, its 
persuasiveness.   
 
The current controversy over biomechanical expertise and its relationship to 
medical expertise tends to blur the focus upon the trial-judge-as-gatekeeper.  In an 
appropriate case, expertise in each field might assist the jury in resolving a fact in 
controversy by allowing the jury to weigh what the expertise of each field brings to 
the table in the form of a trustworthy opinion.  The opinion of neither field is 
necessarily dependent upon the other.  The essential inquiry, given the particular 
facts of the case, should be whether the expert opinion is sufficiently reliable, as 
well as relevant, so that the trial judge can fairly conclude that it is trustworthy.  
Will the opinion actually assist the trier of fact in fairly resolving the underlying 
factual dispute, or will it confuse the issue by shifting the fact finders’ attention 
from the particular to the universal?7  That is, will the fact finder be confused about 
the expert opinion’s application to the specifics of the case at hand? 
 
Here, as in Eskin, we again confront biomechanical expert opinion that does 
not reliably support its proponent’s argument.  Absent a showing that the 
                                                 
7 “While science attempts to discover the universals hiding among the particulars, trial courts 
attempt to discover the particulars hiding among the universals…” See Eskin v. Carden, 2004 
Del. LEXIS 81(Feb. 13, 2004) (quoting David Faigman, Legal Alchemy: The Use and Misuse of 
Science in the Law 69 (1999)). 
 
 
11
biomechanical literature demonstrated its applicability to a person with Rizzi’s 
medical history, the proffer failed to establish the:  . . . “[an]other aspect of 
relevancy . . . whether [it] is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid 
the jury in resolving a factual dispute.”8  The biomechanical expert’s two-pronged 
opinion9 was that the accident caused “loads” on Rizzi’s spine comparable to or 
less than what Rizzi would confront in “every day activities,” and that those loads 
were “significantly less” than the loads required to produce “permanent injury to 
the structures of the spine, as documented by the biomechanical literature.”  The 
factual dispute still remaining for the jury was whether the accident caused 
physical pain and Rizzi’s ultimate disc surgery following the accident – not 
whether the accident could reasonably have caused these results to the average 
person who had not experienced pre-existing spinal surgery and significant 
degenerative changes to her spine.  It would have been inappropriate and 
unhelpful, we think, for the biomechanical expert’s views about the effects of 
forces of impact upon people generally to be used as a basis to bootstrap a more 
particularized opinion that the ”loads” from those forces “were significantly less 
than the loads required to produce permanent injury to the structures of [Rizzi’s] 
spine,” specifically.   
                                                 
8 Downing, 753 F.2d at 1242. 
9 Based upon the wording of the opinions of the biomechanical experts in Eskin and this case, it 
is apparent that the “field” has standardized its experts’ opinions. 
 
12
The trial judge correctly concluded that the biomechanical expert’s 
supporting studies failed to account for the effect of the forces at impact on a spine 
which had earlier undergone disc surgery.  Allowing the jury to consider the 
biomechanical expert’s generalized opinion could easily have misled the jurors to 
believe that this “one-size-fits-all” biomechanical expert opinion could be relied 
upon to assist them in a fair and objective consideration of the cause or severity of 
the injury to Rizzi.  In this case, the proffered biomechanical expert testimony 
would have misled the jury or confused the issues they were being asked to 
resolve. 
In summary, just as Davis v. Maute10 does not per se bar the admission of 
photographs of the vehicles involved in an accident, biomechanical expert 
testimony is not verboten simply because it is, by its nature, generalized.  In a 
particular case, there may well be circumstances where biomechanical expertise 
based upon reliable and validated studies may assist the finder of fact in 
determining the existence or nonexistence of a fact crucial to resolving an issue, 
without presenting any danger of generalized conclusions that could misdirect the 
finder of fact from the appropriate inquiry.  This is not such a case.   
                                                 
10 770 A.2d 36 (Del. 2002). 
 
13
III. 
The Trial Judge Correctly Granted Partial Judgment as a Matter of Law. 
Mason further contends that the trial judge erred by granting partial 
judgment as a matter of law, thereby removing from the jury the issue of whether 
the accident caused Rizzi’s soft-tissue injury.  We review entry of judgment as a 
matter of law to determine whether the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom raise an issue of material fact when viewed in a light most 
favorable to the party against whom the judgment is entered.11  When undisputed 
facts compel only one conclusion, the trial judge has a clear duty to enter a 
judgment consistent with that conclusion, thereby removing it from the province of 
the jury.12 
After the close of her case-in-chief, Plaintiff moved for a Directed Verdict 
under Superior Court Rule 50(a).13  The Plaintiff contended that she had presented 
undisputed evidence that the May 1998 accident caused both pain and “surgical 
                                                 
11 Fritz v. Yeager, 790 A.2d 469 (Del. 2002). 
12 McNally v. Eckman, 466 A.2d 363 (Del. 1983); Keller v. Farmers Bank of Delaware, 24 A.2d 
539, 543  (Del. Super. Ct. 1942). 
13 Del. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 50(a) Judgment as a matter of law. 
(1) If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally 
sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue, the Court 
may determine the issue against the party and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of 
law against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be 
maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue.  
(2) Motions for judgment as a matter of law may be made at any time before submission 
of the case to the jury. Such a motion shall specify the judgment sought and the law and the facts 
on which the moving party is entitled to the judgment. 
 
14
injuries” (injuries that later required Plaintiff to undergo back surgery.)14  The trial 
judge deferred ruling on the motion until after the defense presented its case.  At 
the prayer conference in the trial judge’s chambers, she readdressed the motion and 
granted it in part and denied it in part, ruling: 
Given Dr. Townsend’s testimony, I’m going to rule as a matter 
of law that causation has been established with respect to the 
soft-tissue injury to the neck and back.  So, I will instruct the 
jury that that is no longer an issue for them to consider, that the 
only issue to consider with respect to the soft-tissue injury…is 
the amount of damages… 
I’m not going to grant your motion with respect to the surgery 
because I think under Rule 50(a), a reasonable jury, even in 
light of Dr. Townsend’s testimony that the accident was a 
proximate cause of surgery, he made it clear in his deposition 
that he bases his opinion on her subjective complaints and that 
if you believe those, then his opinion of causation follows.  So a 
reasonable jury could, it’s conceivable, disregard her subjective 
complaints and reach a different conclusion. 
So, I think the safer ground is to deny your motion on the 
causation on the surgery and leave that for the jury to decide.15 
 
The record confirms the trial judge’s conclusion that the record supports no 
inference other than the conclusion that the accident caused Rizzi’s soft-tissue 
injuries.  Despite the general deference of our courts to the findings of a jury, this 
Court has held that a jury, as a matter of law, must find some quantum of damages 
                                                 
14 See Pl. Motion For Directed Verdict C.A. No. 99C-09-271 (March 12, 2002).  While the 
motion does not explicitly refer to “soft-tissue injuries” as distinct from “pain and surgical 
injuries,” reasonable people could differ on whether the motion asked for a directed verdict on all 
her complaints or just those related to the surgery. 
15 Trial Transcript at 91, 92 (March 12, 2002). 
 
15
where uncontradicted medical testimony establishes a causal link between an 
accident and the injuries sustained.16 
Mason suggests that the trial judge improperly relied on Amalfitano v. 
Baker17 to support her ruling because of the “absence of any objective findings by 
Dr. Townsend, Dr. Rosenfeld and Dr. Bose, or by Plaintiff’s expert and treating 
physician.”  Further, Mason insists in her brief that, “Dr. Townsend stated quite 
clearly that there were no objective findings of injury to Ms. Rizzi from the May 
1998 accident.”  We find these statements in Appellant’s brief troublingly 
inaccurate.  The Court has independently scrutinized the record, and found at least 
two instances where Mason’s own expert, Dr. Townsend, explicitly acknowledged 
objective findings supporting soft-tissue injuries to the Plaintiff resulting from the 
accident: 
Q: (by Mr. Roseman)  Was she examined by a doctor, during her 
presentation at the emergency room? 
A: (by Dr. Townsend) 
Yes. 
Q: 
Did that doctor note the presence of muscle spasm in her neck 
and low back on examination? 
A: 
Yes. 
Q: 
Is muscle spasm considered to be an objective indication of 
injury? 
A: 
Yes. 
                                                 
16 See Amalfitano v. Baker, 794 A.2d 575 (Del. 2001); Maier v. Santucci, 697 A.2d 747, 749 
(Del. 1997). 
17 Id. 
 
16
… 
Q: 
Do you have any reason to disagree with the emergency room 
doctor’s  findings and conclusions? 
A: 
Not at all. 18 
*** 
Q: (by Mr. Roseman) 
After you reviewed all of the medical 
records provided to you by Ms. Beam, did you, then, conduct an 
examination of Ms. Rizzi? 
A: (by Dr. Townsend) 
Actually, I – I examined her first and looked 
at the records later. 
… 
Q:  
Doctor, do you agree that it was your conclusion that Ms. Rizzi 
did suffer an injury as a result of the motor vehicle collision of May 
8th, 1998? 
 
 
A: 
Yes. 
 
Q: 
Do you agree that one of the injuries that Ms. Rizzi suffered as 
a result of that motor vehicle collision is what I’ve heard you refer to 
before as a soft-tissue injury? 
 
 
A: 
That’s correct. 
 
Q: 
And that would be an injury to the muscles and ligaments of 
both the cervical spine and the lumbosacral spine? 
 
A: 
That’s correct.19 
 
Accordingly, Mason’s argument finds no support in the record and is 
patently without merit. 
Finally, we address Mason’s contention that the trial judge’s ruling was 
improper because Plaintiff’s motion sought only a ruling on the issue of the 
causation of the surgical injury.  Our reading of the motion does not support that 
                                                 
18 Trial Dep. of John B. Townsend, M.D., at 40, 41 (March 7, 2002). 
19 Id. at 49, 50. 
 
17
assertion.  The trial judge properly understood that the parties were disputing two 
separate and distinct injuries.  After the close of Mason’s case, it became clear that 
the only injury genuinely disputed was that which led to the subsequent back 
surgery.  The trial judge correctly noted that:  “Had the Court simply instructed the 
jury that the collision caused injury to the Plaintiff, the jury may have improperly 
concluded that they were required to find that the collision caused both the soft-
tissue injury and the surgical injury.”20  Mason’s brief characterizes the partial 
ruling in Rizzi’s favor as an “alternative argument,” insinuating that the trial judge 
made that argument for Rizzi because it had not, in Mason’s counsel’s view, been 
raised by Rizzi’s counsel.  Although Rizzi’s Motion for a Directed Verdict does 
not explicitly request two distinct rulings, two injuries were clearly in dispute at 
the time of the Motion. 
Here, uncontradicted medical evidence confirmed objective findings 
supporting Rizzi’s soft-tissue injuries.  Mason’s own medical expert concluded that 
the accident caused Rizzi’s soft-tissue injuries.  The trial judge correctly ruled that 
even when viewed in a light most favorable to Mason, the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences drawn from it raised no genuine issue of material fact 
regarding the existence and cause of Plaintiff’s soft-tissue injury.   
                                                 
20 Rizzi, 799 A.2d at 1184. 
 
18
Our system of justice relies on trial judges to fashion careful and thorough 
legal rulings that take into account both the complicated nature of personal injury 
disputes, and the often intricate manner in which a jury must be instructed 
regarding those disputes.  We reject the veiled suggestion that the trial judge’s 
ruling was somehow an act of rogue judicial advocacy on behalf of the Plaintiff.  
We remind counsel that when the record is available to us, we do review it 
carefully.  We caution counsel not to make unsubstantiated characterizations of 
trial judges’ rulings that are unsupported by even the most liberal inference from 
the record. 
IV. 
The Trial Judge Fashioned a Legally Correct and Fair Resolution of the Pre-
Trial Discovery Deficiency. 
 
Mason lastly argues that the trial judge erred by denying a Motion in limine 
that sought to exclude the expert testimony of Drs. Rosenfeld and Rudin.  
Alternatively, Mason claims the trial judge erred by not granting a requested 
curative jury instruction.   
Specifically, Mason contends that a letter dated April 3, 1990, addressed to 
Plaintiff's attorney, and allegedly signed by a Dr. Bose, was not produced in a 
timely fashion in response to properly served interrogatories.  Dr. Bose, who 
performed Rizzi’s pre-accident back surgery, opines in that letter that Rizzi "may" 
 
19
require future surgery.  Mason claims that she was unfairly prejudiced when 
Rizzi’s counsel failed to produce the letter before the trial so that it could be used 
to cross-examine Drs. Rosenfeld and Rudin’s in their trial depositions.  Mason 
insists that the Court should have excluded the trial deposition testimony of Dr. 
Rosenfeld and Dr. Rudin altogether because of this alleged discovery violation.  
Alternatively, Mason believes that the discovery violation could have been 
appropriately addressed by an instruction advising the jury that they could draw an 
adverse inference against Rizzi for failing to present critical evidence that raised a 
question about whether the accident itself necessitated her 2001 surgery or whether 
Rizzi would have needed the surgery in any event for reasons unrelated to the 
accident.   
We review a trial judge’s refusal to bar evidence or to provide a curative 
instruction for abuse of discretion.21 
 
The trial judge found no evidence to support a conclusion that Rizzi’s 
counsel intentionally misled Mason’s counsel by failing to produce the Bose letter 
before the trial depositions of Rizzi’s medical experts.  The trial judge set forth a 
lengthy explanation of the discovery “deficiency”: 
                                                 
21 DeAngelis v. Harrison, 628 A.2d 77 (Del. 1993). 
 
 
20
 
Plaintiff's counsel claims that his file does not contain a set of 
interrogatories or request for production that required 
production of the Bose letter, nor does his file contain any 
correspondence informally requesting answers or responses to 
the set of interrogatories and requests for production Defendant 
claims she served.  Moreover, Plaintiff's counsel points out his 
file does not contain a motion to compel answers or responses 
to this discovery.  Plaintiff's counsel stated that he thought he 
produced the Bose letter before trial but indicated he could not 
provide documentation verifying this fact. Defense counsel 
claims she subpoenaed Dr. Bose's records pertaining to Plaintiff 
before trial but the documents provided pursuant to that 
subpoena did not include Dr. Bose's April 3, 1990 letter.  
Before Dr. Rosenfeld's and Dr. Rudin's trial depositions, 
Plaintiff's counsel told defense counsel she was welcome to 
review his complete medical file on Plaintiff.  Defense counsel 
chose not do so until after the trial depositions of Dr. Rosenfeld 
and Dr. Rudin.22 
 
As found by the trial judge, Mason could have cured any prejudice caused by 
Rizzi’s counsel’s failure to find and forward the Bose letter before the trial 
depositions of Drs. Rosenfeld and Rudin, by taking the opportunity to review 
Rizzi’s counsel’s complete medical file before those depositions.   
To grant Mason’s Motion in limine, which sought to exclude altogether the 
expert testimony of Drs. Rosenfeld and Rudin, would have been an extreme, and 
therefore, unlikely remedy in any event.  The trial judge attempted, quite properly, 
                                                 
22 799 A.2d at 1183. 
 
21
to weigh the harm to both parties.  She mitigated any prejudice Mason may have 
suffered at trial because of the late receipt of the Bose letter, as follows: 
First, over the Plaintiff's hearsay and other objections, the Court 
permitted defense counsel great latitude in questioning Dr. 
Townsend, Defendant's medical expert, on the contents of the 
Bose letter, and even allowed Dr. Townsend to read the letter to 
the jury.  The Court advised defense counsel she was permitted 
to attack the bases for Plaintiff's experts' opinions by arguing to 
the jury that they may have testified differently if they had been 
provided with Dr. Bose's opinion regarding the possibility of 
future surgery.  The Court also advised defense counsel she was 
permitted to review the contents of the Bose letter in her 
closing.  The Court permitted this even though, as Plaintiff 
correctly points out, Dr. Bose's 1990 opinion as to the need for 
future surgery was not stated in terms of "reasonable medical 
probability."  Thus, in an attempt to remedy Defendant's claim 
of prejudice, the Court allowed the jury to hear on more than 
one occasion a medical opinion that was otherwise 
inadmissible.23 
 
Thus, the trial judge’s remedy was to give Mason her “best shot” at maximizing 
the impact of the Bose statement without the risk that Drs. Rosenfeld and Rudin 
may have discredited Mason’s interpretation of the Bose letter had they been 
confronted with it.  Given that remedy, we conclude that Mason was not unfairly 
prejudiced by not having the Bose letter available to her at the time of the trial 
depositions.  Accordingly, the trial judge acted appropriately within her discretion 
in denying the motion in limine. 
                                                 
23 799 A.2d at 1183-1184. 
 
22
  Finally, because there is no support in the record for the contention that 
Plaintiff’s counsel intentionally ignored Mason’s discovery requests, the trial judge 
acted appropriately within her discretion by denying the requested curative 
instruction. 
V. 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is Affirmed.