Case Title: Billado v. Appel

Citation: 165 Vt 482, 687 A.2d 84

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1996-10-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
Billado v. Appel  (94-631); 165 Vt 482; 687 A.2d 84

[Opinion Filed 11-Oct-1996]


       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 No. 94-631


Jeffrey Billado, et al.                           Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            Franklin Superior Court

Janis Appel, et al.                               October Term, 1995


Linda Levitt, J.

       Robert K. Andres, Burlington, and Gordon Nicholson (On the Brief),
  Highgate Springs, for plaintiffs-appellants

       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Michael O.
  Duane, Assistant Attorney General, Waterbury, for defendants-appellees


PRESENT:  Gibson, Dooley and Johnson, JJ., and Burgess, D.J.,
          Specially Assigned (FN1)



       DOOLEY, J.   Plaintiffs Jeffrey Billado and his minor children brought
  this tort and civil rights action against Vermont Department of Social and
  Rehabilitation Services (SRS) workers Janis Appel, Kelly Keefer Woodward,
  and Janet Dunigan, claiming that their actions with respect to the children
  caused plaintiffs' injuries.  Summary judgment for defendants was granted
  by the Franklin Superior Court based on a finding that each was immune from
  suit with respect to the actions alleged.  Plaintiffs have appealed this
  decision with respect to their civil rights claims, brought under 42 U.S.C.
  § 1983.  We affirm.

       The facts are derived from the complaint and the affidavits and
  documents submitted in connection with the motion for summary judgment. 
  Most of the facts are undisputed.

       Jeff and Melanie Billado were married on February 25, 1984.  They had
  three children, Brandi, Courtney, and Jeffrey, Jr., between 1984 and 1987. 
  The marriage was unstable, with recurring domestic violence, and the
  parties separated on many occasions for short periods of

 

  time.  In August 1989, Melanie permanently moved out of Jeff's home to move
  in with her boyfriend, Joe Vincelette, taking the three children with her;
  she eventually went to Florida. In September, she reported to Florida
  authorities and to SRS that her husband had sexually abused the children.

       Melanie's actions resulted in both parents filing abuse prevention
  petitions on September 7, 1989.  At one point, temporary custody of the
  children was awarded to Melanie, and at another point it was awarded to
  Jeff.  Jeff also filed for divorce.  A hearing was held on September 27th,
  resulting in an order that "children are placed in the protective custody
  of SRS to determine proper placement."  There is no indication that SRS was
  a party to the abuse prevention proceedings or sought this order. 
  Apparently, SRS took custody of the children pursuant to the abuse
  prevention order.

       Meanwhile defendant Woodward investigated the charge that Jeff had
  sexually abused the children, and after interviewing Melanie, Jeff and the
  children, concluded that the charge was substantiated with respect to
  Brandi.  To the extent it can be determined from the documents, the
  conclusion is based primarily on a statement of Brandi.  Woodward was also
  concerned about the presence of Vincelette in Melanie's home because
  earlier in the year he had been convicted of committing a lewd act on the
  body of a fourteen-year-old child who was residing temporarily with him. 
  On Woodward's request and based on her affidavit, the Franklin County
  States Attorney brought a CHINS petition with respect to the children and
  sought and obtained an ex parte detention order on September 29, 1989, two
  days after the abuse prevention order.  The children were placed in foster
  care.

       In November 1989, the CHINS petition was dismissed, and another round
  of abuse prevention petitions was filed.  These resulted in a final
  relief-from-abuse order, to last for one year, that provided in pertinent
  part: (1) Melanie was to have custody of the children; (2) Jeff was to be
  given visitation rights; (3) Melanie could not allow contact between the
  children and Joe Vincelette; and (4) both Melanie and Jeff were not to
  consume alcohol or regulated drugs. While this order was in effect, Jeff
  complained on several occasions to SRS that Melanie was

 

  allowing contact between the children and Vincelette and was consuming
  alcohol.  An SRS worker, who is not a defendant in this action, wrote to
  the Franklin Family Court in February 1990 that she had observed Vincelette
  at Melanie's home.  In March, Jeff brought a contempt motion and sought an
  order giving him custody of the children.  Defendants Dunigan and Appel
  appeared in court with Melanie, and Melanie's lawyer argued that SRS
  supported the presence of Vincelette in the home.

       Melanie's situation deteriorated, and on May 11, 1990 she was taken to
  a detox center for alcohol abuse.  By June, it became clear that she could
  not continue to care for her children. At the contempt hearing, the court
  gave Melanie the option of giving SRS custody of the children or granting
  custody to Jeff.  Melanie agreed to place the children in the custody of
  SRS under a voluntary care agreement.  The children were placed by SRS with
  foster parents.  The court order, issued June 5, 1990, allowed Jeff
  visitation at the foster home, prohibited contact between the children and
  Vincelette, and required Melanie to attend Alcoholics Anonymous meetings.

       The court also ordered a family evaluation, and it was performed in
  July and August by Champlain Valley Psychiatric Services.  Three
  professionals interviewed all the persons in or involved with the family
  and conducted home studies.  The report, filed at the end of August,
  disclosed that Melanie lived with Vincelette and that Brandi charged she
  had been sexually abused by Vincelette at some point in the past.  The
  allegation of sexual abuse by Vincelette was communicated to SRS in July
  and investigated by Woodward.  She interviewed Vincelette, Brandi,
  Courtney, Jeff, Melanie, the foster parents, Melanie's aunt, and the doctor
  who had heard the charge in her interview with Brandi.  Woodward determined
  that the charge was not substantiated.

       On learning in July that Vincelette was present when the children
  visited Melanie from the foster home, defendant Appel directed that all
  visitation by Melanie be supervised to ensure Vincelette was not present. 
  Apparently, that direction was carried out.

       Melanie provided defendant Appel a copy of the Champlain Valley
  Psychiatric Services

 

  report when it was issued.  The June order was continued on August 31, with
  a direction that the voluntary care agreement continue to October 5th. 
  Visitation for Melanie was provided "subject to the supervision and/or
  approval of SRS."    Melanie again was ordered not to permit contact
  between Vincelette and the children.

       On the expiration of the voluntary care agreement, with Melanie
  demanding that the children be returned to her, the Franklin County States
  Attorney filed another CHINS petition and obtained an emergency detention
  order to keep the children in foster care.  The supporting affidavit from
  defendant Dunigan itemized the history, including the concern about the
  presence of Vincelette in Melanie's home, and sought continued SRS custody
  to prevent sole custody going to either parent.  On October 29th, the
  petition was dismissed and the detention ended.

       Dueling abuse prevention orders again ensued.  Under one order, Jeff
  was given custody on October 29th.  Four hours later a different judge
  issued another order giving custody to Melanie.  On November 7, 1990, after
  hearing, the family court temporarily awarded custody to Melanie, with
  weekend visitation by Jeff, and again ordered no contact with Vincelette. 
  In July 1991, the order was amended to grant custody to Jeff.  The final
  divorce order, issued in December 1991, granted custody to Jeff.

       On May 5, 1992, Jeff, on behalf of himself and the children as their
  next friend, brought this action against defendants Woodward, Appel and
  Dunigan.  The complaint has forty-one counts and alleges defendants
  committed torts and violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as discussed below.  It was
  brought against defendants in their individual and official capacities.  On
  motion of defendants, the court dismissed the § 1983 counts against
  defendants in their official capacities.  That order has not been appealed. 
  Other motions to dismiss were denied.  On June 14, 1993, plaintiff filed an
  amended complaint that provided that most of the actions were taken by
  defendants along with the State of Vermont.  The State was not named as a
  party.  In January of 1994, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment
  primarily on the ground that defendants were immune from suit against the
  actions itemized in the complaint.  The superior court granted the motion
  with respect to all counts on September 16, 1994.  This appeal involves

 

  only the counts alleging that defendants violated the Civil Rights Act, 42
  U.S.C. § 1983.

       At the outset, we restate the familiar standard for review of a
  summary judgment decision.  Summary judgment should be granted when, taking
  all allegations by the nonmoving party as true, there are no genuine issues
  of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
  Madden v. Omega Optical, Inc., 7 Vt. L.W. 187, 187 (July 12, 1996). This
  court applies the same standard as the trial court.  Id.  As discussed
  below, the issue before us is one of law, and none of the parties contend
  that it was inappropriate to resolve it on summary judgment.

       Plaintiffs' position is that, absent immunity, their allegations made
  out a case for liability under § 1983; that absolute immunity does not
  apply; and that the elements of qualified immunity are not present. 
  Plaintiffs also argue that they should have been allowed to engage in
  discovery before responding to the motion for summary judgment.  Defendants
  contest whether plaintiffs' allegations would, if proven, establish
  liability under § 1983; argue that absolute immunity applies to some of
  defendants' alleged actions; and further argue that if qualified immunity
  applies, it covers all of defendants' alleged actions.  As they did below,
  defendants resist any discovery before the immunity issue is decided.

       A brief review of immunity law in § 1983 cases is helpful to put these
  arguments in context, before we address the specific allegations of
  plaintiffs' complaint.  Immunity is a defense to § 1983 actions for damages
  against persons in their individual capacity.  Those acting in a
  legislative, judicial or prosecutorial capacity are absolutely immune,
  irrespective of whether they act in good faith.  See generally 2 S. Nahmod,
  Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Litigation § 7.01 (3d ed. 1991).  Other
  public officials and employees have qualified immunity that protects them
  if they act in good faith.  Under the objective test of good faith adopted
  by the Supreme Court, government officials performing discretionary
  functions are immune "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
  established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
  would have known."  Harlow v. Fitzgerald,