Case Title: Meza v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC

Citation: 

Docket Number: S242799

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2019-02-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
JULIA C. MEZA, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
 
S242799 
 
Ninth Circuit  
15-16900 
 
Northern District of California 
5:14-cv-03486-LHK 
 
 
February 15, 2019 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the court, 
in which Justices Chin, Liu, Corrigan, Kruger, Groban, and 
Jenkins* concurred. 
 
                                        
* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate 
District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
S242799 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
This state recognizes a subset of civil actions, known as 
limited civil cases, in which the amount in controversy does not 
exceed $25,000 and the parties seek only certain types of relief.  
(See Code Civ. Proc., § 85.)1  The rules in limited civil cases 
concerning subjects such as pleading, discovery, and the 
presentation of evidence differ in some respects from the 
procedures followed in other civil matters.  As indicated by their 
shared heading within the code, “Economic Litigation for 
Limited Civil Cases” (§§ 90-100), these departures from normal 
procedural practices are designed to make it more affordable to 
pursue and defend actions falling within the limited civil 
classification.   
This case involves one of the economical litigation rules.  
Statements made outside of trial are generally regarded as 
hearsay when they are offered for their truth (see Evid. Code, 
§ 1200, subd. (a)), and hearsay statements are normally 
inadmissible unless they fit within a statutory exception to the 
hearsay rule (id., subd. (b)).  But in limited civil cases, a sworn 
written statement, the contents of which otherwise might 
constitute inadmissible hearsay, may sometimes be admitted on 
the same terms applicable to live witness testimony.  One such 
scenario arises when a party offers into evidence an affidavit or 
                                        
1  
Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the 
Code of Civil Procedure. 
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
2 
declaration 
(with 
these 
terms 
hereafter 
being 
used 
interchangeably) and “a copy [of the affidavit] has been served 
on the party against whom it is offered at least 30 days prior to 
the trial, together with a current address of the affiant that is 
within 150 miles of the place of trial, and the affiant is available 
for service of process at that place for a reasonable period of 
time, during the 20 days immediately prior to trial.”  (Code of 
Civ. Proc., § 98, subd. (a) (hereafter section 98(a)).) 
We have accepted a request by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to decide a question of state law 
associated with this provision.  (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 
8.548(a).)  That court asks, “Under section 98(a) . . . must the 
affiant be physically located and personally available for service 
of process at the address provided in the declaration that is 
within 150 miles of the place of trial?”   
Upon our review of the language, purpose, and history of 
section 98(a), we answer this question as follows:  A section 98(a) 
affiant’s personal availability for service at an address within 
150 miles of the place of trial often will be required for his or her 
affidavit to be admissible as evidence under that section, but 
such presence is not invariably necessary for all affiants.  To 
explain, section 98’s limited exception to the hearsay rule is 
predicated on the party or parties against whom a sworn 
statement is offered having an opportunity to examine the 
maker of the statement under oath.  Section 98(a) thus requires 
the provision of an address within 150 miles of the place of trial 
at which the affiant can be lawfully served with a form of process 
designed to secure his or her appearance at trial, at which time 
the affiant can be called as a witness.  Although one such type 
of process, a subpoena ad testificandum (i.e., a subpoena to 
testify), typically must be personally served, there are 
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
3 
exceptions to this general rule, and at least some prospective 
witnesses can be called to appear at trial through another form 
of process that does not require personal service.  Section 98(a) 
therefore does not categorically require that all affiants be 
personally present for service at an address within 150 miles of 
the place of trial for a reasonable period during the 20 days prior 
to trial.  Such personal presence is required only if it is necessary 
for lawful service, at the specified location, of process that 
directs the affiant to appear at trial, under the standard rules 
prescribing the pertinent types of process and how such process 
is to be served.   
I.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In 2010, defendants Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC; 
Hunt & Henriques; Michael Scott Hunt; Janalie Ann Henriques; 
and Anthony DiPiero (hereafter collectively referred to as 
defendants) filed a limited civil case against plaintiff Julia Meza 
in San Mateo County Superior Court.  Defendants sued to collect 
a debt from Meza.  Meza had incurred this debt through a 
consumer credit account with Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.  After 
Meza defaulted on the account, Portfolio Recovery Associates, 
LLC acquired the right to pursue the obligation and then 
referred the debt to Hunt & Henriques, a law firm, for collection 
purposes.  The remaining defendants (DiPiero, Hunt, and 
Henriques) were attorneys with Hunt & Henriques during the 
relevant time period.   
Prior to trial in the state court proceeding, Meza was 
served with a declaration bearing the caption, “Declaration of 
Plaintiff in Lieu of Personal Testimony at Trial (CCP § 98).”  
Section 98, the statute identified in the caption, provides in full 
as follows: “A party may, in lieu of presenting direct testimony, 
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
4 
offer the prepared testimony of [relevant] witnesses in the form 
of affidavits or declarations under penalty of perjury.  The 
prepared testimony may include, but need not be limited to, the 
opinions of expert witnesses, and testimony which authenticates 
documentary evidence.  To the extent the contents of the 
prepared testimony would have been admissible were the 
witness to testify orally thereto, the prepared testimony shall be 
received as evidence in the case, provided that either of the 
following applies:  [¶] (a) A copy has been served on the party 
against whom it is offered at least 30 days prior to the trial, 
together with a current address of the affiant that is within 150 
miles of the place of trial, and the affiant is available for service 
of process at that place for a reasonable period of time, during 
the 20 days immediately prior to trial.  [¶]  (b) The statement is 
in the form of all or part of a deposition in the case, and the party 
against whom it is offered had an opportunity to participate in 
the deposition.  [¶]  The court shall determine whether the 
affidavit or declaration shall be read into the record in lieu of 
oral testimony or admitted as a documentary exhibit.”  
This declaration was sworn to by Colby Eyre, who 
identified himself as a custodian of records for Portfolio 
Recovery Associates, LLC.  Eyre attested that he had 
“personally reviewed the books and records pertaining to 
[Meza’s] credit card account number,” which revealed a balance 
of more than $11,000 owed on the account.  Eyre also declared 
that “[p]ursuant to CCP § 98 this affiant is available for service 
of process: c/o Hunt & Henriques, 151 Bernal Road, Suite 8, San 
Jose, CA 95119 for a reasonable period of time, during the 
twenty days immediately prior to trial.”  Eyre’s declaration did 
not explain how service was to occur at the 151 Bernal Road 
location, or what the effect of that service would be. 
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
5 
Meza undertook no efforts in the state court proceeding to 
serve Eyre with a subpoena ad testificandum at the 151 Bernal 
Road address, or anywhere else.  For reasons not apparent in 
the record, the action was dismissed in July 2014, five days prior 
to the noticed trial date.  Had the trial occurred, the place for 
trial identified in the clerk’s notice of court trial was the Hall of 
Justice in Redwood City, California.  As any map of the area will 
show, the San Jose address provided in Eyre’s declaration is well 
within 150 miles of the Redwood City courthouse.   
Meza initiated her federal action in August 2014.  In her 
lawsuit, framed as a putative class action under the Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act, 15 United States Code section 1692 et 
seq. (hereafter the FDCPA), Meza alleges that when Eyre 
submitted his section 98 declaration, both his “principal office” 
and his residence were located more than 150 miles from the 
Redwood City courthouse and that Eyre “was not reasonably 
available for service of process at 151 Bernal Road, Suite 8, San 
Jose, California 95119, between July 3, 2014, and July 22, 2014, 
as stated” in his declaration.  Meza further alleges that “[i]t is 
the standard practice and policy of Defendants to use 
Declarations in Lieu of Personal Testimony at Trial . . . which 
falsely represent or imply that the declarant signor is personally 
available for service of process within 150 miles of the place of 
trial.”  Meza asserts that the practice of filing section 98 
declarations under such circumstances represents a “false, 
deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection 
with the collection of [a] debt” and an “unfair or unconscionable 
means to collect or attempt to collect [a] debt” under the FDCPA.  
(15 U.S.C. §§ 1692e, 1692f.)   
Defendants moved for summary judgment in the federal 
action.  In connection with that motion, defendants supplied 
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
6 
another declaration by Eyre in which he swore that he resided 
and worked in California when he signed his declaration in the 
state court proceeding.  Defendants did not claim that Eyre 
would have been personally present for service of process at an 
address within 150 miles of the Redwood City courthouse prior 
to trial in the state case, however.  Instead, they asserted that 
Hunt & Henriques would have accepted service for Eyre had 
Meza delivered process to the law firm, demanding that Eyre 
appear in person at trial.  Hunt averred in a declaration that his 
“firm has implemented a policy of agreeing to accept service of 
process on behalf of declarants who submit declarations in 
support of our clients.  We accept process that is delivered to us 
by any means, including mail, fax, email, overnight courier or 
personal delivery. . . .  If our firm receives any form of written 
notice requesting that a declarant appear at trial, it is our policy 
to honor that request and treat it as satisfying the requirements 
of section 98 of the Code of Civil Procedure.  In the event a 
process server or other individual arrives at our firm with any 
form of written notice requesting that a section 98 declarant 
appear at trial, our staff has been instructed to inform the 
individual that we are authorized to accept service, and we do, 
in fact, accept service of anything delivered in this fashion.”  
Defendants further represented in their summary judgment 
briefing that “[h]ad Meza attempted service of process on [Hunt 
& Henriques], it would have been binding on Mr. Eyre and he 
would have been notified that he was being compelled to testify 
at trial.”   
The federal district court granted defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment.  (Meza v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC 
(N.D.Cal. 2015) 125 F.Supp.3d 994, 1007 (Meza).)  The court 
agreed with defendants that Eyre’s declaration complied with 
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
7 
section 98(a), and therefore provided no basis for a claim under 
the FDCPA.  (Meza, at p. 1007.)  Beginning with the language 
of the state statute, the district court observed that section 98(a) 
does not explicitly demand that the affiant be physically located 
at the address provided, and the court did not perceive the 
statute’s “available for service of process” language as implicitly 
incorporating a personal presence requirement.  (Meza, at 
p. 1001.)  The court read the statute as calling only for an 
address at which the affiant could be served by any means 
recognized as appropriate for service of some form of process 
under state law.  The court noted that “[i]n California, service of 
process may be effected by means other than personal delivery, 
including by sending the documents to the mailing address of 
the person to be served or by delivering the documents to a 
person authorized to receive service of process on another’s 
behalf.”  (Ibid., citing §§ 415.20 [concerning service of a 
summons], 415.30 [same], 416.90 [same], 684.120 [concerning 
service under the Enforcement of Judgments Law, § 680.010 et 
seq.].)  Thus, the district court determined, “a mailing address 
or other address where the affiant is authorized to be served 
under California law would be a current address for the affiant 
at which the affiant is available for service of process, satisfying 
the literal requirements of Section 98.”  (Meza, at p. 1001.)2   
The 
district 
court 
rejected 
Meza’s 
alternative 
interpretation of section 98(a), which would construe this 
                                        
2  
In a footnote, the district court also opined that in light of 
the representations in Eyre’s declaration, binding service could 
have occurred at the Hunt & Henriques address had Meza 
attempted to serve him at that location.  (Meza, supra, 125 
F.Supp.3d at p. 1002, fn. 3.)  
 
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
8 
provision as concerned with service of a particular type of 
process — a civil subpoena ad testificandum — for which state 
law expressly contemplates only personal service.  (Meza, supra, 
125 F.Supp.3d at pp. 1001-1002; see also §1987, subd. (a) [“the 
service of a subpoena is made by delivering a copy, or a ticket 
containing its substance, to the witness personally”].)  The court 
regarded such a construction as not only foreclosed by the 
statute’s plain language, but also contradicted by the available 
legislative history.  (Meza, at pp. 1002-1004.)   
Reviewing this history, the district court observed that as 
introduced in the Legislature, proposed legislation (Assembly 
Bill No. 3170 (1981-1982 Reg. Sess.)) (Assembly Bill No. 3170) 
would have permitted the use of an affidavit if a copy, “together 
with the current address of the affiant, has been received by the 
party against whom it is offered at least 15 days prior to the 
trial, and the affiant is subject to subpena for the trial.”  (Id., as 
introduced Mar. 10, 1982, § 1.)  As this bill progressed through 
the legislative process, it was amended to delete the reference to 
a subpoena.  As amended, the measure provided that an 
affidavit could be used if “[a] copy, together with the current 
address of the affiant, has been served on the party against 
whom it is offered at least 30 days prior to the trial, and the 
affiant is available for service of process at a place designated by 
the proponent, within 150 miles of the place of trial, at least 20 
days prior to trial.”  (Id., as amended Apr. 21, 1982, § 1, italics 
added.)  This revised language was ultimately enacted into law 
as part of the set of economical litigation laws.  (See Stats. 1982, 
ch. 1581, § 1, p. 6229.)3   
                                        
3  
As will be detailed post, section 98 was amended in 1983 to 
incorporate the current language within subdivision (a). 
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
9 
The district court concluded from this sequence that 
because the Legislature had replaced language expressly 
demanding that an affiant be subject to subpoena with more 
general “available for service of process” phrasing, an 
interpretation of section 98 that required a declarant to be 
available within a 150-mile radius for personal service of a 
subpoena ad testificandum would improperly “ ‘reinsert what 
the Legislature intentionally removed.’ ”  (Meza, supra, 125 
F.Supp.3d at p. 1003, quoting People v. Soto (2011) 51 Cal.4th 
229, 245.)   
The district court acknowledged that section 98(a) had 
been construed differently in CACH LLC v. Rodgers (2014) 229 
Cal.App.4th Supp. 1 and Target National Bank v. Rocha (2013) 
216 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1.  (Meza, supra, 125 F.Supp.3d at 
p. 1005.)  In Rodgers and Rocha, the Appellate Divisions of the 
Superior Courts of Ventura County and Santa Clara County, 
respectively, each had regarded the admissibility of a section 98 
affidavit as conditioned on the affiant’s susceptibility to effective 
service of a subpoena ad testificandum.  (Rodgers, at pp. Supp. 
6-7; Rocha, at p. Supp. 9.)  The federal court rejected these 
rulings as being “at odds with both the plain meaning of Section 
98 and its legislative history.”  (Meza, at p. 1005.)  The district 
court also noted that unpublished decisions issued by appellate 
divisions of the superior courts of this state had read section 
98(a) as not requiring the affiant’s personal presence within 150 
miles of the place of trial.  (Meza, at p. 1006.) 
Meza appealed.  After briefing and oral argument, the 
Ninth Circuit posed its request that we construe section 98(a), 
which we have accepted. 
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
10 
II.  DISCUSSION 
We begin with a review of pertinent background principles 
concerning the statutory scheme for limited civil cases, what 
“process” entails, and how process is to be served.  Our analysis 
then turns to the language, purpose, and history of section 98(a).  
We ultimately conclude that section 98(a)’s reference to 
“process” refers to specific types of process that direct a 
prospective witness — here, the affiant — to appear at trial.  
Because nothing within section 98(a) or its history clearly 
indicates that the Legislature sought to depart from the 
prevailing rules specifying how service of these kinds of process 
is to occur, we then return to the above-referenced background 
principles and conclude that section 98(a) does not invariably 
require that the affiant be personally present for service of 
process at an address within 150 miles of the place of trial.  
Instead, personal presence at the specified address is required 
only if it is necessary for lawful service of process, under the 
conventional rules applicable to service of the relevant types of 
process. 
A.   The Statutory Framework 
Before delving into the language of section 98(a), it is 
helpful to review what limited civil cases are, what “process” 
entails under state law, and the prevailing rules governing 
service of process. 
1. Limited Civil Cases 
A limited civil case is one in which the amount in 
controversy does not exceed $25,000, and the relief sought is of 
a kind deemed suitable for this type of proceeding.  (§ 85.)  
Limited civil cases involve some of the same procedures that 
generally apply in other civil matters.  (§ 90.)  But the 
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
11 
Legislature also has crafted procedures specific to limited civil 
cases, which are designed to simplify and thereby reduce the 
cost of pursuing and defending these actions.  (See Stats. 1982, 
ch. 1581, § 5, p. 6230.)  These distinctive procedures include the 
sworn statements authorized by section 98, restrictions on the 
types of pleadings that are permitted (§ 92), an optional case 
questionnaire through which a plaintiff may provide and elicit 
relevant case information (§ 93), and streamlined discovery 
procedures (§§ 94, 95).  The rules for economical litigation also 
include a fail-safe provision; pursuant to section 91, subdivision 
(c), “[a]ny action may, upon noticed motion, be withdrawn from 
the provisions of this article [§§ 90-100], upon a showing that it 
is impractical to prosecute or defend the action within the 
limitations of these provisions.”   
2. Process and Service of Process 
“ ‘Process’ signifies a writ or summons issued in the course 
of a judicial proceeding.”  (§ 17, subd. (b)(7); see also Gov. Code, 
§§ 22 [defining “process” as “includ[ing] a writ or summons 
issued in the course of judicial proceedings of either a civil or 
criminal nature”], 26660 [defining “process,” as used in title 3 of 
the Government Code, as “includ[ing] all writs, warrants, 
summons, and orders of courts of justice, or judicial officers”]; 
Carol Gilbert, Inc. v. Haller (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 852, 859 
[discussing what “process” involves].)  A subpoena represents a 
commonly used form of process (Code Civ. Proc., § 1985, subd. 
(a)), as does a summons served upon a defendant along with a 
complaint (see id., § 412.20).   
“A subpoena is a command to appear at a certain time and 
place to give testimony upon a certain matter.”  (Black’s Law 
Dict. (6th ed. 1990) p. 1426; see also § 1985, subd. (a) [“[t]he 
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
12 
process by which the attendance of a witness is required is the 
subpoena”].)  Service of a civil subpoena “may be made by any 
person.”  (§ 1987, subd. (a).)  The manner of serving a civil 
subpoena is specified by statute:  “[T]he service of a subpoena is 
made by delivering a copy, or a ticket containing its substance, 
to the witness personally, giving or offering to the witness at the 
same time, if demanded by him or her, the fees to which he or 
she is entitled for travel to and from the place designated, and 
one day’s attendance there.”  (Ibid.)  The personal service 
requirement for subpoenas found in section 1987, subdivision (a) 
perpetuates a long-standing rule of state procedure, one that 
predates even the codification of state law.  (See Stats. 1851, 
ch. 5, § 404, p. 115 [“The service of a subpoena shall be made by 
showing the original, and delivering a copy . . . to the witness 
personally”].)  A strict personal service requirement for civil 
trial subpoenas has been justified on the ground that 
disobedience of a “duly served” subpoena represents a form of 
contempt (§ 1209, subd. (a)(10)), and the potentially severe 
consequences associated with a contempt finding make it 
especially important to ensure that a prospective witness knows 
that he or she has been subpoenaed to testify (In re Abrams 
(1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 685, 690).  Furthermore, because 
personal delivery is the form of service most likely to provide 
notice of a demand to appear at trial, requiring personal service 
of a trial subpoena minimizes the likelihood that a trial will be 
disrupted by a subpoenaed person’s failure to appear.   
There are a few established exceptions to the general 
requirement that, in order for a party to compel a person to 
appear at a civil trial, that person must be personally served 
with a subpoena.  When the subpoenaed person is a minor, the 
subpoena must be served on a parent, guardian, or other person 
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
13 
identified by statute.  (§ 1987, subd. (a).)  Likewise, certain 
public employees (such as police officers and firefighters) need 
not be personally served with subpoenas to secure their 
appearance at trial, at least when their testimony would concern 
matters associated with their professional duties.  In these 
situations, effective service of a trial subpoena can occur by 
personal service or by “delivering two copies to [the prospective 
witness’s] immediate superior at the public entity by which he 
or she is employed or an agent designated by that immediate 
superior to receive that service.”  (Gov. Code, § 68097.1, subd. 
(a); see also id., §§ 68097.1, subd. (b), 68097.3.) 
Furthermore, no subpoena at all is required for the 
production at a civil trial of a party, or “a person for whose 
immediate benefit an action or proceeding is prosecuted or 
defended or . . . anyone who is an officer, director, or managing 
agent of any such party or person.”  (§ 1987, subd. (b).)  Such a 
party or person may be summoned to appear at trial through 
service “upon the attorney of that party or person” of “written 
notice requesting the witness to attend . . . a trial,” with service 
to occur no less than “10 days before the time required for 
attendance unless the court prescribes a shorter time.”  (Ibid.)  
“The giving of the notice shall have the same effect as service of 
a subpoena on the witness, and the parties shall have those 
rights and the court may make those orders, including the 
imposition of sanctions, as in the case of a subpoena for 
attendance before the court.”  (Ibid.)  The notice to attend 
mechanism does not oblige a person who resides outside of this 
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
14 
state to appear at trial, a limitation that applies to subpoenas, 
as well.  (See § 1989.)4   
The relative strictness of the statutory scheme for service 
of subpoenas becomes clear when contrasted with the rules 
concerning service of summons.  A summons accompanying a 
complaint may be served personally (§ 415.10), but service by 
other methods is also permitted, including service by mail 
(§§ 415.30, 415.40) and (as a matter of last resort) by publication 
(§ 415.50).  Also, with some parties, service may occur by 
providing copies of the summons and the complaint “to a person 
authorized [by the person to be served] to receive service of 
process.”  (§ 416.90.)  
B.   Interpretation of Section 98(a) 
The question before us involves the interpretation of a 
statute.  “ ‘When we interpret a statute, “[o]ur fundamental 
task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to 
effectuate the law’s purpose.  We first examine the statutory 
language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning.  We do 
not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the 
                                        
4  
In 1872, a trial subpoena was effective only to oblige 
attendance by persons residing less than 30 miles from the place 
of trial.  (Former § 1989.)  This radius was increased to 50 miles in 
1915 (Stats. 1915, ch. 162, § 1, p. 330), to 100 miles in 1935 (Stats. 
1935, ch. 257, § 1, p. 942), to 150 miles in 1957 (Stats. 1957, ch. 
1560, § 1, p. 2918), to 500 miles in 1980 (Stats. 1980, ch. 591, § 1, 
p. 1603), and finally made congruent with state boundaries in 1981 
(Stats. 1981, ch. 184, § 3, p. 1106).  A narrow exception to section 
1989 appears at Government Code section 68097.3, which applies 
to subpoenas served upon nonresident California Highway Patrol 
officers called to testify in civil actions or proceedings regarding 
matters associated with their professional duties.    
 
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
15 
statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope 
and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the 
enactment.  If the language is clear, courts must generally follow 
its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in 
absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.  If the 
statutory language permits more than one reasonable 
interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the 
statute’s purpose, legislative history, and public policy.”  
[Citation.]  “Furthermore, we consider portions of a statute in 
the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme of 
which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase, 
sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative 
purpose.” ’ ”  (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (2017) 2 Cal.5th 
608, 616-617.)  
Section 98(a) requires “a current address of the affiant 
that is within 150 miles of the place of trial,” at which he or she 
is “available for service of process.”  This language admits of two 
different interpretations.  One construction, advanced by 
defendants and accepted by the federal district court, would 
regard the statute as satisfied by the affiant providing an 
address at which he or she is amenable to any form of service 
recognized as appropriate for some type of process — such as a 
mailing address, regarded as suitable for service of a summons 
— with the consequence being that the affiant’s personal 
presence at an address would not be required for the affiant to 
be “available for service of process” there.  (Ibid.)  Under a 
second construction, the statute could have the affiant’s 
availability for a specific type or types of process in mind, with 
this process to be served in the conventional manner.  Under the 
latter reading of section 98(a), if an affiant normally could be 
summoned to appear at trial only through service of a subpoena 
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
16 
ad testificandum, availability for personal service of this sort of 
process would be necessary — meaning that the affiant would 
need to be personally present within 150 miles of the place of 
trial — unless an exception to the personal service requirement 
were to apply.   
This second construction finds support in the statute’s 
text.  The requirement that the affiant be “available for service 
of process” does not necessarily signify that availability for 
service of any type of process will suffice.  (§ 98(a).)  In fact, 
certain aspects of section 98 suggest that the Legislature was 
concerned with particular types of process and regarded 
conventional service rules as applicable.  Section 98’s 
alternative method of securing the admission of a hearsay 
statement offers one such indication of legislative intent.  
Section 98, subdivision (b) permits the introduction of a written 
statement that “is in the form of all or part of a deposition in the 
case,” provided that “the party against whom it is offered had an 
opportunity to participate in the deposition.”  This limitation on 
the admissibility of deposition testimony conveys that such 
statements should be admitted only when a party against whom 
they are offered has already received an opportunity to develop, 
clarify, or challenge the testimony through examination, cross-
examination, or evidentiary objections at the deposition.  The 
two avenues of admissibility of a sworn statement within section 
98 are synchronized only if section 98(a) is construed as 
requiring amenability to a form of process, such as a subpoena, 
that can secure an affiant’s presence at trial.  At that time, the 
affiant-witness can be called to testify regarding the subjects 
addressed in the affidavit.  This testimony can function as a 
check on the representations made in the affidavit, much as 
examination or cross-examination by an opposing party in a 
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
17 
prior deposition might serve the same purpose when introduced 
in response to deposition testimony offered under section 98, 
subdivision (b).  
Moreover, the 150-mile radius specified by section 98(a), 
as well as the statute’s requirement that the affiant be present 
“at that place for a reasonable period of time, during the 20 days 
immediately prior to trial,” reflect a concern with the affiant’s 
physical whereabouts that is in harmony with the traditional 
personal service requirement for trial subpoenas.  Read with 
personal service in mind, these provisions serve to reduce the 
time and expense required for a party to perform service, at least 
when the party resides close to the place of trial.  In contrast, 
these terms do not resonate with a scheme such as the one 
defendants propose, in which a party against whom an affidavit 
is offered normally would have a variety of service options (such 
as mail service) at his or her disposal.  Under that framework, 
parties would be expected to personally serve an affiant with 
process only rarely, if ever, and the same amount of postage 
could serve process to a witness in a given case regardless of 
whether he or she lived in Crescent City or Blythe.  If the 
Legislature had such a scheme in mind, the emphasis section 
98(a) places on the affiant’s physical location prior to trial would 
be difficult — although perhaps not impossible — to explain. 
Given the statute’s ambiguity, the discussion below 
evaluates the two interpretations offered above by further 
considering, first, whether the purpose and history of section 
98(a) convey that an affiant must be available for service of a 
particular type or types of process; and second, whether in 
enacting the law, the Legislature sought to deviate from 
prevailing rules that define the pertinent forms of process and 
how this process should be served.   
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
18 
1. The Purpose and History of Section 98(a) Establish 
That the Statute Is Concerned with Process That 
Directs an Affiant To Appear at Trial 
As will be explained below, we perceive the purpose and 
history of section 98(a) as establishing that the statute 
contemplates an address at which the affiant can be served with 
process that directs him or her to appear at trial.   
Construing section 98(a) as concerned with service of 
process that summons an affiant to appear at trial is logically 
consistent with the purpose of the affidavit procedure.  A section 
98 sworn statement functions as a substitute for live testimony.  
Conditioning the use of a section 98(a) affidavit on the affiant’s 
availability for service of a trial subpoena or comparable process 
ensures that if another party disputes the contents of the 
affidavit, that party can insist that the affiant appear as a 
witness at trial and examine him or her at that time regarding 
the contents of the statement.  If, on the other hand, the affidavit 
is uncontroversial, the party or parties against whom an 
affidavit is offered may decline to subpoena or otherwise 
demand the trial attendance of its author.  That way, they will 
avoid having to pay statutory witness fees, a not insignificant 
consideration in limited civil cases.  (See Gov. Code, §§ 68093, 
68097 [addressing the payment of witness fees].)   
The legislative history of section 98 corroborates that the 
statute’s language regarding “service of process” has in mind the 
specific forms of legal process that direct a person to appear at 
trial.  This history begins in 1976, when the Legislature 
authorized the Economical Litigation Pilot Project.  With this 
project, the Legislature ordered the Judicial Council to conduct 
short-term pilot programs in two counties (Los Angeles County 
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
19 
and Fresno County were selected) to audition simplified 
procedures for use in civil cases with limited amounts in 
controversy.  (Former §§ 1823, 1823.1, added by Stats. 1976, ch. 
960, § 1, p. 2192 and repealed by Stats. 1994, ch. 146, § 26, 
p. 1311.)  In endorsing this project, the Legislature found and 
declared “that the costs of civil litigation have risen sharply in 
recent years.  This increase in litigation costs makes it more 
difficult to enforce smaller claims even though the claim is valid 
or makes it economically disadvantageous to defend against an 
invalid claim.”  (Former § 1823, added by Stats. 1976, ch. 960, § 
1, p. 2192 and repealed by Stats. 1994, ch. 146, § 26, p. 1311.)  
The Legislature also found and declared “that there is a 
compelling state interest in the development of pleading, 
pretrial and trial procedures which will reduce the expense of 
litigation to the litigants and there is likewise a compelling state 
interest in experimentation on a small scale with new 
procedures to accomplish that result before those procedures are 
adopted statewide.”  (Ibid.)   
The Legislature scripted some of the procedures that 
would apply in the pilot programs.  Among them, the 
Legislature directed that “[w]ritten submissions of direct 
testimony shall be permitted if the court determines that such 
submissions will result in a saving of time for the court and 
counsel.”  (Former § 1826.6, added by Stats. 1976, ch. 960, § 1, 
p. 2195 and repealed by Stats. 1994, ch. 146, § 26, p. 1311.)  The 
Legislature also instructed the Judicial Council to develop 
additional rules of procedure for the pilot programs.  Consistent 
with the use of these trial efforts as laboratories for innovation, 
the Legislature specifically provided that these rules could, as 
revised in light of experience, eventually deviate from the initial 
framework designed by the Legislature.  (Former § 1823.4, 
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
20 
added by Stats. 1976, ch. 960, § 1, p. 2193 and repealed by Stats. 
1994, ch. 146, § 26, p. 1311.)   
The Judicial Council’s initial rules of court for the 
Economical Litigation Pilot Project provided for the limited use 
of documents in lieu of live testimony at trial.  The rules on this 
subject conditioned the admissibility of written testimony on the 
ability of other parties to cross-examine the witness or author at 
trial, if such cross-examination was desired.  Initially, the rules 
permitting the use of documents provided that “if any party, not 
less than 10 days before trial or 10 days after receipt of the 
documents, whichever date is first, delivers to the proponent of 
the evidence a written demand that the witness or author of a 
report, bill, or estimate be produced in person to testify, no 
statement or document shall be received in evidence . . . unless 
the witness is present and available for cross-examination.”  
(Cal. Rules of Court, former rules 1741(b), 1849(b), repealed 
May 1, 1980.)  Later, the rules were revised to permit the 
introduction of an affidavit only when, in addition to other 
conditions being satisfied, “a copy [of the affidavit], together 
with the current address of the affiant, has been received by the 
party against whom it is offered at least 15 days prior to the 
trial, and the affiant is subject to subpena for the trial.”  (Cal. 
Rules of Court, former rules 1741(c)(3), 1849(c)(3), repealed 
July 1, 1983.)   
When the pilot efforts had run their course, the 
Legislature sought to codify some of the most effective 
procedural reforms developed through these programs.  (See 
Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3170 
(1981-1982 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 10, 1982, p. 1.)  As introduced in the 
Assembly, proposed legislation that would implement these 
procedures drew from the pilot programs in allowing the use of 
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
21 
affidavits in place of live witness testimony, while conditioning 
the admissibility of these statements on the maker’s 
susceptibility to service of a subpoena.  This measure, Assembly 
Bill No. 3170, originally provided that “[a]ny party may call as 
a witness, for direct or cross-examination, the author of any such 
affidavit,” and further specified that an affidavit would be 
admissible only if “[a] copy [of the affidavit], together with the 
current address of the affiant, has been received by the party 
against whom it is offered at least 15 days prior to the trial, and 
the affiant is subject to subpena for the trial.”  (Id., as introduced 
Mar. 10, 1982, § 1.) 
This bill was amended during the legislative process.  The 
amendments to Assembly Bill No. 3170 included the addition of 
the provision, now found at section 98, subdivision (b), allowing 
prior statements from a deposition to be introduced at trial as 
evidence against a party that had an opportunity to participate 
in the deposition.  Also, language demanding that the affiant 
supply his or her local (i.e., within 150 miles of the place of trial) 
address at which he or she would be “available for service of 
process” prior to trial was inserted in place of the subpoena 
requirement, with the revised bill authorizing an affidavit when 
“[a] copy, together with the current address of the affiant, has 
been served on the party against whom it is offered at least 30 
days prior to the trial, and the affiant is available for service of 
process at a place designated by the proponent, within 150 miles 
of the place of trial, at least 20 days prior to trial.”  (Assem. Bill 
No. 3170, as amended Apr. 21, 1982, § 1.)  This phrasing became 
law later that year, after the Assembly measure was folded into 
a Senate bill that was then approved by both legislative bodies 
and signed by the Governor.  (See Stats. 1982, ch. 1581, § 1, 
p. 6229.)   
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
22 
Notwithstanding the change in phrasing within Assembly 
Bill No. 3170, the relevant legislative materials bespeak a 
continued belief that the admissibility of a section 98 affidavit 
hinged on the affiant’s availability for service of process that 
would direct him or her to attend trial.  Significantly, a Senate 
Judiciary Committee Analysis of Assembly Bill No. 3170 that 
circulated after that measure was amended described the 
affidavit procedure as follows:  “A party could, in place of 
presenting direct testimony, offer the testimony of witnesses in 
the form of affidavits or declarations under . . . penalty of 
perjury if — the copy of the affidavit was served on the other 
party at least 30 days prior to trial, and — the affiant was 
available to be subpoenaed by the other party; and — the 
statement was in the form of a deposition, and the other party 
had an opportunity to participate in the deposition.”  (Sen. Com. 
on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3170 (1981-1982 Reg. 
Sess.) as amended Apr. 21, 1982, at pp. 4-5, italics added.)5   
This analysis indicates that the replacement of the specific 
reference to a subpoena within Assembly Bill No. 3170 with 
more generic language referencing the affiant’s availability for 
service of process did not reflect a rejection of the intent behind 
the earlier phrasing.  On the contrary, although the Legislature 
removed the express mention of a subpoena, it replaced this 
language with phrasing reasonably read as communicating 
essentially the same standard:  In order for an affidavit to be 
admissible under section 98(a), the affiant must be available for 
a form of process designed to secure his or her presence at trial.  
                                        
5  
We construe “and,” as it precedes the Committee Analysis’s 
description of the use of deposition testimony, as in fact meaning 
“or.” (Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 3170 
(1981-1982 Reg. Sess.), supra, at p. 5.) 
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
23 
Although the legislative history does not provide a reason for the 
change in wording, the broader reference to “process” could 
simply recognize that the notice to attend mechanism under 
section 1987, subdivision (b) also can be used to procure the 
appearance of some potential affiants, meaning that the statute 
would be unduly narrow if it referenced only a subpoena. 
Section 98 has since been amended, but these alterations 
do not suggest that the Legislature has changed its mind with 
regard to the issue before us.  The present language of section 
98 reflects amendments made one year after the statute’s 
original enactment.  (Stats. 1983, ch. 102, § 4, p. 267.)  The 
primary purpose of these modifications was to clarify that a 
section 98(a) affiant had to be available for service of process 
within the 150-mile radius only for a reasonable period of time 
within the 20 days prior to trial, as opposed to some other time 
frame.  The amendments also made other changes to the 
statute’s wording.  Most notably, the reference to “the” current 
address of the affiant in section 98(a), as enacted the prior year, 
was changed to “a” current address.  This address also was 
equated with the one at which the affiant would be available for 
service, whereas there had been no explicit connection between 
the two in the original version of the statute.  The legislative 
history for Assembly Bill No. 1474 (1983-1984 Reg. Sess.), the 
measure through which the Legislature revised section 98 in 
1983, yields no rationale for these rephrasings, and they do not 
suggest any change in the Legislature’s views regarding the 
need to supply an address at which an affiant could be 
effectively served with process intended to secure his or her 
presence at trial.   
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
24 
2.  Section 98(a) Does Not Implicitly Alter Prevailing 
Rules Regarding Service of Process 
Defendants also raise the possibility that even if section 
98(a) is concerned with service of forms of process that direct an 
affiant to appear at trial, the Legislature intended that effective 
service of such process upon a section 98(a) affiant could be 
made through methods that would be inadequate for proper 
service of the same types of process in other contexts.  
Consistent with their position in federal court, defendants 
assert here that “Eyre . . . was available for service of process as 
required by the statute,” because if Meza had attempted to serve 
process on Eyre at the 151 Bernal address, “the attorneys at 
Hunt & Henriques would have accepted service for him,” and 
such service “would have been binding on . . . Eyre.”  In effect, 
defendants argue that simply by supplying an address at which 
he was assertedly “available for service of process,” Eyre 
effectively made it so.  Furthermore, defendants posit, had Meza 
not delivered some suitable form of process to that address prior 
to trial, she would have forfeited the opportunity to later object 
to Eyre’s declaration on the ground that it did not comply with 
section 98(a).   
Defendants’ construction of the statute has some 
superficial appeal, but does not withstand close scrutiny.  For 
this interpretation to be correct, section 98(a) must contemplate 
either a form of process not presently recognized by law or a 
novel method of serving the types of process implicated here.  As 
previously noted, there are two basic mechanisms a party can 
employ to direct a person to attend trial: a subpoena and, when 
appropriate, a notice to attend.  Effective use of a notice to 
attend is limited to situations in which the witness whose 
attendance is desired is a party or someone closely affiliated 
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
25 
with a party, as specified by statute.  (§ 1987, subd. (b).)  
Because Eyre is neither, his appearance as a witness at trial 
could be secured only by a subpoena, which by law must be 
personally served, absent an exception — none of which applies 
here.  We presume that the Legislature is aware of laws in 
existence when it enacts a statute.  (In re Greg F. (2012) 55 
Cal.4th 393, 407.)  Had the Legislature sought to deviate from 
these basic rules regarding process and proper service with 
section 98(a), we believe it would have more clearly said so.  (Cf. 
California Cannabis Coalition v. City of Upland (2017) 3 Cal.5th 
924, 945 [invoking the general principle of statutory 
interpretation disfavoring repeal by implication].)  Indeed, the 
Legislature has had little difficulty articulating different rules 
for service of a subpoena when it has chosen to depart from the 
norm of personal service.  (See § 1987, subd. (a) [articulating 
alternative service rules when the subpoenaed person is a 
minor]; Gov. Code, § 68097.1, subds. (a), (b) [articulating 
alternative service rules for certain government employees].)   
If anything, the language and history of section 98(a) 
indicate that the Legislature intended for litigants to work 
within the existing framework for service of process.  As 
mentioned earlier, section 98(a)’s requirement that the affiant 
supply an address for service within 150 miles of the place of 
trial and be available at that place for a “reasonable period” 
immediately prior to trial suggests that the Legislature sought 
to maintain a personal service requirement for subpoenas.  If, 
as defendants have argued, “available for service of process” 
(§ 98(a)) were read to connote availability through any method 
deemed acceptable for service of any form of process, such as 
mail service (§§ 415.30, 415.40), the statute’s concern with the 
affiant’s 
whereabouts 
would 
seem, 
at 
a 
minimum, 
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
26 
disproportionate to how often personal service likely would 
occur.  And as also noted above, section 98 was enacted only 
after pilot programs had auditioned different approaches toward 
the use of affidavits.  The original Judicial Council rules 
regarding 
affidavits 
incorporated 
an 
informal 
notice 
mechanism.  (See Cal. Rules of Court, former rules 1741(b), 
1849(b), repealed May 1, 1980.)  But instead of adopting this 
approach, or an alternative phrasing that also would have 
clearly communicated a deviation from prevailing service 
conventions, section 98(a) refers only to an affiant’s 
“availab[ility] for service of process.”  It seems doubtful that the 
Legislature would have adopted this generic phrasing if it had 
intended a wholesale break from existing service rules, even in 
this narrow context.  
The support for defendants’ interpretation of section 98(a), 
meanwhile, is relatively weak.  Defendants note that as 
amended, section 98(a) references “a current address” of the 
affiant, as opposed to “the current address.”  But the use of the 
article “a” does not establish that section 98(a) is satisfied 
through the provision of any sort of address within 150 miles, 
regardless of whether effective service of an appropriate form of 
process normally could occur at that address.  This phrasing is 
better read as simply recognizing that an affiant may have more 
than one address at which he or she may be personally served 
with a subpoena, such as different work and home addresses.  
Moreover, an affiant who is a party or closely affiliated with a 
party, and therefore falls within the parameters of section 1987, 
subdivision (b), might supply the address of an attorney upon 
whom a notice to attend could be served.  The use of “a,” instead 
of “the,” is therefore consistent with the Legislature adhering to 
normal service practices with section 98(a).   
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
27 
Defendants also stress that section 98(a), like the other 
rules for limited civil cases, is intended to reduce the costs of 
litigating these matters.  They observe that a construction of 
section 98(a) that would require most remote affiants to spend a 
“reasonable period” of time prior to trial at a location within 150 
miles of the trial site would prove more expensive than a 
construction that would allow for service of process by mail or 
through a designated agent.  Defendants may be correct that the 
interpretation we adopt is more expensive for the proponents of 
affidavits than their construction would be and could discourage 
the use of section 98(a) affidavits when remote witnesses are 
involved.  But there is a countervailing consideration in play, as 
well:  This form of evidence can shift a subtle but significant 
threshold expense upon party opponents.   
Specifically, most witnesses who are subpoenaed to testify 
at a civil trial are entitled to demand up-front payment of 
witness fees (Gov. Code, § 68097), which include a charge of 20 
cents per mile actually travelled to and from the place of trial 
(id., § 68093).  Defendants’ construction of section 98(a) 
facilitates the use of affidavits, with the affiants then having to 
be subpoenaed (or summoned through a notice to attend) if an 
opposing party wants them to appear in person at trial.  If 
accepted, defendants’ approach would open the section 98(a) 
mechanism to a broader array of affiants, and thereby lead to 
more affidavits being offered.  Given that these affiants can 
demand the statutory fees they are owed as witnesses, it could 
be prohibitively expensive for an opposing party in a limited civil 
case to call them to testify — particularly when affidavits from 
several persons are submitted.  This prepayment requirement 
could significantly compromise the opponent’s ability to pursue 
or defend a case, and thereby prevent them ever from recouping 
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
28 
these expenditures after trial as a prevailing party.  (See 
§ 1033.5, subd. (a)(7).)   
The cost-shifting consequences of section 98(a) affidavits 
complicates any portrayal of these statements as uniformly 
beneficial from a cost perspective to the parties involved.  We 
presume the Legislature weighed these costs and benefits in 
crafting what is, after all, an exception to generally applicable 
evidentiary rules.  Our application of the standard tools of 
statutory interpretation leads us to conclude that the 
Legislature’s response was to limit the potential shift in 
litigation expenses associated with the affidavit procedure by 
adhering to conventional service rules.   
Defendants also note section 1989’s qualification that 
residents of other states cannot be obliged to attend trial, even 
when served with a subpoena.  They contend that a construction 
of section 98(a) that requires an affiant to be available for 
service of a form of process that, as a matter of law, compels 
attendance at trial would effectively prohibit section 98(a) 
affidavits from this out-of-state cohort — even when an affiant 
makes himself or herself personally present for service of 
process within 150 miles of the place of trial for an adequate 
pretrial period.  But even if we were to assume that defendants 
are correct in viewing the geographical limitations of section 
1989 as applicable to section 98(a) affiants, such a conclusion 
would not provide compelling support for their interpretation of 
the statute.  Our review of the history of section 98 yields no 
significant indication that the Legislature was particularly 
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
29 
concerned with encouraging the use of affidavits from out-of-
state residents.6   
In sum, section 98(a) is concerned with types of process 
through which a party can summon a person to appear at trial 
and inherits rather than alters the basic framework of rules 
governing service of these forms of process.  With a civil trial 
subpoena ad testificandum, personal delivery upon the 
subpoenaed person is generally required for effective service.  
(See § 1987, subd. (a).)  Thus, when an affidavit is submitted by 
someone who can be directed to appear in person at trial only 
through such a subpoena, a local address at which the affiant is 
personally present for pretrial service is necessary — unless, of 
course, the person fits within a recognized exception to the 
personal service rule, in which case an address that permits 
proper service upon an appropriate representative will suffice.  
When an affiant also can be summoned to appear at trial 
through a notice to attend served on an attorney (§ 1987, subd. 
(b)), however, either a local address where the affiant will be 
                                        
6  
This case does not provide an occasion for determining 
whether, or under what circumstances, an affiant could be 
“available for service of process” under section 98(a) if the relevant 
parties and persons in a particular case agree upon service 
arrangements that deviate from statutory norms.  (Cf. Holt v. 
Nielson (Utah 1910) 109 P. 470, 475 [“we think a witness within 
the distance that he could be legally required to attend court when 
served with a subpoena may waive the manner of service and may 
accept service in some other form, though not in strict compliance 
with the statute, and, when he does so, he will be required to 
respond in obedience to the subpoena the same as though served 
in strict conformity with the statute”].)  The record reflects no such 
agreement here. 
 
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
30 
personally present for service of a subpoena or a local address of 
the attorney will suffice.7  
III.  CONCLUSION 
We answer the Ninth Circuit’s question as follows:  
Section 98(a) requires an affiant to provide an address within 
150 miles of the place of trial at which lawful service can be 
made of a form of process that directs the affiant to attend trial.  
Although a subpoena normally must be personally served, in 
some circumstances witnesses can be summoned to appear at 
trial without service of process upon the witness personally.  
Thus, section 98(a) does not categorically require that all 
affiants be personally present at a location within 150 miles of 
the place of trial for a reasonable period within the 20 days prior 
to trial.  Such presence is required only if it is necessary for 
lawful service at that address of process designed to secure the 
affiant’s attendance at trial.   
                                        
7  
Defendants also assert that an interpretation of section 98(a) 
that would expose debt collectors to liability under the FDCPA 
would raise constitutional concerns, insofar as it would impose 
statutory tort liability based on acts (i.e., debt collection actions) 
characterized as having been taken in furtherance of the right to 
petition the government.  To the extent this contention entails an 
interpretation of the FDCPA and the merits of plaintiff’s claims 
under that statute, it lies outside of the scope of the question of 
state law that has been posed to us, and we do not address it here.  
For present purposes, it suffices to say that we do not perceive any 
constitutional problems with our interpretation of section 98(a), on 
its own.  
MEZA v. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCIATES, LLC 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
31 
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.  
 
 
We Concur: 
CHIN, J. 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J.  
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J.*
                                        
* 
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate 
District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion Meza v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal 
Original Proceeding XXX on request pursuant to rule 8.548, Cal. Rules of Court 
Review Granted 
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S242799 
Date Filed: February 15, 2019 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court: 
County: 
Judge: 
 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
Consumer Law Center, Inc., Fred W. Schwinn, Raeon R. Roulston, Matthew C. Salmonsen; Horwitz, 
Horwitz & Associates and O. Randolph Bragg for Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Sharon Djemal, Robin Wetherill, Leigh E. Ferrin, Kari E. Gibson, Arthur D. Levy and Noah Zinner for 
East Bay Community Law Center, Public Law Center and Housing and Economic Rights Advocates as 
Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
 
Simmonds & Narita, Tomio B. Narita, Jeffrey A. Topor and Jennifer L. Yazdi for Defendants and 
Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
Raeon R. Roulston 
Consumer Law Center, Inc. 
1435 Koll Circle, Suite 104 
San Jose, CA  95112-4610 
(408) 294-6100 
 
Tomio G. Narita 
Simmonds & Narita 
44 Montgomery Street, Suite 3010 
San Francisco, CA  94104 
(415) 283-1000