Case Title: Balsley v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1983-09-02T00:00:00Z

Document:
Balsley v. State1983 WY 89668 P.2d 1324Case Number: 83-38Case Number: 83-38Decided: 09/02/1983Supreme Court of Wyoming
MICHAEL R. BALSLEY, 
APPELLANT (DEFENDANT),

v.

THE STATE OF 
WYOMING, 
APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, JohnsonCounty, Leonard McEwan, 
J.

Michael K. Davis 
of Redle, Yonkee & Arney, Sheridan, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Margaret M. White, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee.

Before ROONEY, C.J., and RAPER,* THOMAS, ROSE and BROWN, 
JJ.

* Retired June 13, 1983, 
but continued to participate in the decision of the court in this case pursuant 
to order of the court entered June 13, 1983.

ROSE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This appeal asks a 
single question:

"Is homicide by vehicle 
under Wyo. Stat. Section 31-5-1117(b) a lesser 
offense `necessarily included'[1] in the crime of aggravated 
homicide by vehicle under Wyo. Stat. Section 
31-5-1117(a)?"

[¶2.]     On September 7, 1982, 
appellant Michael Balsley was charged by information with a violation of § 
31-5-1117(a), W.S. 1977 in the district court in and for Johnson County, Wyoming. The information 
reads:

"Comes now Greg L. 
Goddard, County and Prosecuting Attorney of the County of Johnson and State of 
Wyoming, and in the name and by the authority of the State of Wyoming informs 
the Court and gives the Court to understand that Michael R. Balsley, late of the 
County aforesaid, on the 17th day of July, A.D. 1982, at the County of Johnson 
in the State of Wyoming did "while driving any vehicle (namely one 1982 
Chevrolet Blazer) under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled 
substance or a combination of both, to a degree which rendered him incapable of 
safely driving said vehicle cause the death of another person, (namely, SHAWN O. 
KINSLOW) in violation of Wyoming Statute 31-5-1117(a) (Rep.Ed. 
1982).

"Contrary to the form of 
the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of 
the State of Wyoming."

[¶3.]     The information recites 
the language of the pertinent statute, § 31-5-1117(a), W.S. 1977, 1982 
Cum.Supp.,2 which 
provides:

"Whoever, while driving 
any vehicle under the influence of either intoxicating liquor or a controlled 
substance, or a combination of both, to a degree which renders him incapable of 
safely driving a vehicle, causes the death of another person shall be guilty of 
aggravated homicide by vehicle, and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished 
by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) 
years."

[¶4.]     The appellant was 
arraigned before the district court judge on September 22, 1982 who advised him 
of the charges against him:

"THE COURT: The 
Information charges that you did on or about the 17th day of July, 1982, County 
of Johnson, State of Wyoming, while driving a vehicle, namely, one 1982 
Chevrolet Blazer, under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled 
substance or a combination of both, to a degree [which] rendered you incapable 
of safely driving said vehicle, cause the death of another person, namely, Shawn 
O. Kinslow, in violation of Wyoming Statute 31-5-1117(a), and that's in the 
pocket supplements of 1982 in the statutes."

The court then 
read the aforesaid relevant part of § 31-5-1117(a) to the defendant and the 
following colloquy ensued:

"THE COURT: Do you 
understand that this is one of those offenses commonly referred to as a felony 
for which you could be sentenced to the penitentiary for a period of up to 
twenty years?

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, 
sir.

"THE COURT: The statute 
also provides for a revocation of license to drive any motor vehicle of any 
person convicted of that offense. Do you understand this?

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, 
sir.

"THE COURT: All right. 
Any question about the charges against you?

"THE DEFENDANT: No, 
sir.

* * * * * 
*

"THE COURT: All right. 
How do you answer to the charge, then, Mr. Balsley - are you guilty or not 
guilty?

"THE DEFENDANT: Not 
guilty."

[¶5.]     The matter proceeded to 
trial before a 12-person jury on January 10, 1983. On January 12, the parties 
submitted jury instructions, and for the first time - when the trial was nearly 
finished - the defendant learned that the State intended to offer instructions 
by authority of § 31-5-1117(b) under the lesser-included-offense provisions of 
Rule 32(c), W.R.Cr.P., supra n. 1. Section 31-5-1117(b) 
provides:

"Whoever, except when the 
violation of law involves culpable neglect or criminal carelessness, unlawfully 
and unintentionally, but with a conscious disregard of the safety of others, 
causes the death of another person while engaged in the violation of any state 
law or ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the 
regulation of traffic, except those laws or ordinances relating to conduct set 
forth in subsection (a) of this section, is guilty of homicide by vehicle when 
the violation is the proximate cause of death and, upon conviction thereof, 
shall be fined not more than two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) or imprisoned in 
the county jail for not more than one (1) year, or both."

[¶6.]     The court instructed 
the jury as follows concerning the elements of § 
31-5-1117(a):

"INSTRUCTION NO. 
7

"The necessary elements 
of the crime of Aggravated Vehicular Homicide are:

"1. That the offense was 
committed on or about July 17, 1982;

"2. That the offense was 
committed in the County of Johnson, State of Wyoming;

"3. That the defendant 
was driving a vehicle;

"4. That at the time the 
defendant was driving said vehicle, the defendant was under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely driving 
said vehicle which caused the death of another person (namely, Shawn 
Kinslow)."

[¶7.]     In Instructions 8, 9 
and 10, the court instructed the jury concerning the availability of what it 
determined was the lesser offense of homicide by vehicle. Instructions 8 and 9 
provide as follows:

"INSTRUCTION NO. 
8

"If you are not satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant is guilty of the offense charged, 
he may, however, be found guilty of any lesser offense, the commission of which 
is necessarily included in the offense charged, if the evidence is sufficient to 
establish his guilt of such lesser offense beyond a reasonable doubt. "The 
offense of Aggravated Homicide by Vehicle with which the defendant is charged, 
includes the lesser offense of Homicide by Vehicle."

"INSTRUCTION NO. 
9

"The necessary elements 
of the crime of Homicide by Vehicle are:

"1. That the offense was 
committed on or about July 17, 1982.

"2. That the offense was 
committed in the County of Johnson, State of Wyoming.

"3. That the defendant 
did unlawfully and unintentionally

"4. With a conscious 
disregard of the safety of others

"5. Cause the death of 
another person (namely Shawn Kinslow).

"6. While said defendant 
was engaged in the violation of any[3] state law or ordinance applying to 
the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of 
traffic.

"7. The violation of said 
law or ordinance being the proximate cause of the death."

[¶8.]     Instruction No. 10 
merely instructed the jury concerning the language of § 31-5-1117(b), as set 
forth above.

[¶9.]     The defendant timely 
objected to the giving of Instructions Nos. 8, 9 and 10:

"MR. YONKEE: * * 
*

"The defendant objects to 
the giving of Instruction Nos. 8, 9 and 10 upon the ground that the crime 
referred to and defined therein as homicide by vehicle is taken from Section 
31-5-1117(b), Wyoming Statutes, and is not an offense included within the 
offense defined in Section 31-5-1117(a), Wyoming Statutes, which is the statute 
under which the defendant was complained against, bound over to District Court 
for trial, and the statute on which the Information in this case is based, and 
the defendant has not been charged in this case with the crime defined in 
Section 31-5-1117(b) of Wyoming Statutes."

Defense counsel 
further objected as follows:

"MR. YONKEE: And the 
defendant further objects, you know, for the same ground that it's not a lesser 
included offense on Instruction No. 10, and is apparently an adoption from 
31-5-1117(b) and leaves out language. * * *"

Defense counsel 
objected to Instruction No. 10 when he said:

"MR. YONKEE: I would like 
to add to our objections that Instruction No. 10 is taken from that statute 
which is vague, uncertain and indefinite, unconstitutionally invalid. That's 
it."

[¶10.]  The jury returned its verdict on January 
13, 1983, finding the defendant guilty of homicide by vehicle (the putative 
lesser-included offense) and judgment and sentence were entered upon the verdict 
on January 24, 1983. The defendant was sentenced to serve one year in the 
Johnson County jail and fined $2,000. From this judgment the defendant has 
timely appealed.

THE 
LAW

[¶11.]  The appellant describes his argument as 
follows:

"WYOMING STATUTES SECTION 
31-5-1117(b) (Homicide by Vehicle) IS NOT A LESSER OFFENSE `NECESSARILY 
INCLUDED' IN WYOMING STATUTE SECTION 31-5-1117(a) (Aggravated Homicide by 
Vehicle) UNDER WYOMING RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 32(c) BECAUSE THE PUTATIVE 
LESSER OFFENSE CONTAINS ELEMENTS NOT INCLUDED IN THE GREATER. THE INFORMATION IN 
THIS CASE DOES NOT CHARGE APPELLANT WITH A VIOLATION OF SECTION 31-5-1117(b), 
AND DOES NOT STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO ALLEGE A VIOLATION OF SAID 
STATUTE."

[¶12.]  We agree and will 
reverse.

[¶13.]  A decision in this case rests upon our 
answering the question which asks whether the offense described in § 
31-5-1117(b) is "necessarily included" (see n. 1) in the offense described in § 
31-5-1117(a). If it is, then it is a lesser offense for which the defendant 
could be found guilty even though the information only charged him with 
violating § 31-5-1117(a). If it is not necessarily included, then it is error to 
instruct and submit for jury consideration the putative lesser-included 
offense.

[¶14.]  In State v. Selig, Wyo., 635 P.2d 786, 
789-790 (1981) we addressed the question having to do with when an alleged 
lesser offense is "necessarily included" in an offense charged within the 
meaning of Rule 32(c), W.R.Cr.P. In Selig we quoted with approval United States v. Chapman, 615 F.2d 1294, 
1299 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 446 U.S. 967, 100 S. Ct. 2947, 64 L. Ed. 2d 827 
(1980), where that court said:

"This Court has held that 
a defendant is entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction when the 
following five elements are present: (1) a proper request is made; (2) the elements of the lesser offense are 
identical to part of the elements of the greater offense; (3) there is some 
evidence which would justify conviction of the lesser offense; (4) the proof on 
the element or elements differentiating the two crimes is sufficiently in 
dispute so that the jury may consistently find the defendant innocent of the 
greater and guilty of the lesser-included offense, and (5) there is mutuality, 
i.e., a charge may be demanded by 
either the United States or the defense. * * *" (Emphasis 
added.)

We then observed 
in Selig, supra, 635 P.2d at 
790:

"* * * The conditions 
provide guidelines from which a determination can be made as to whether or not 
the evidence would permit the jury rationally to find the defendant guilty of 
the lesser offense but not guilty of the greater and whether or not the 
defendant and prosecution had fair notice of such probability. If so, the 
lesser-included offense instructions would be proper."

[¶15.]  For purposes of this appeal, we direct 
attention to the second requirement of the Chapman test, where the greater offense, 
under § 31-5-1117(a), is compared to the putative lesser offense as contained in 
§ 31-5-1117(b). It is immediately apparent that elements of the offense 
described by the latter section are not identical to part of the elements of the 
greater offense. A comparison of Instruction No. 7, which describes the elements 
of aggravated vehicular homicide, with Instruction No. 9, which describes the 
alleged lesser offense of the crime of homicide by vehicle, reveals that the 
latter includes elements that are not contained in the greater offense, 
namely:

1. with conscious 
disregard of the safety of others, cause the death of another 
person,

2. while the defendant 
was engaged in the violation of another state law or ordinance applying to the 
operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic, and that the 
actor's conduct in violating the law or ordinance was the proximate cause of 
death.

[¶16.]  On the other hand, the crime described in 
§ 31-5-1117(a), can be committed by one who causes death through the use of a 
motor vehicle while so intoxicated that he or she cannot drive 
safely.

[¶17.]  It is, thus, clear that the crime of 
homicide by vehicle contains elements which the crime of aggravated vehicular 
homicide does not, and thereby fails the Chapman test which we adopted in Selig.

[¶18.]  Another test for ascertaining whether a 
statutorily defined crime may be said to be a lesser-included offense of another 
is to inquire whether or not the greater offense can be committed without 
committing the lesser offense. In this respect, we said in Evanson v. State, Wyo., 546 P.2d 412, 
416 (1976):

"It was put in a little 
different way by the same court in Kelly 
v. United States, 1966, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 205, 370 F.2d 227, 228, cert. den. 
388 U.S. 913, 87 S. Ct. 2127, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1355, for a lesser offense to be 
`necessarily included' in the offense charged, it must be such that the greater 
offense cannot be committed without also committing the lesser. To the same 
effect, but not stated so concisely, is Brantley v. State, 1900, 9 Wyo. 102, 
108, 61 P. 139, 140."

[¶19.]  An examination of Instructions No. 7 and 
No. 9 reveals that the greater offense described in § 31-5-1117(a) can be 
committed without also committing the putative lesser offense described in § 
31-5-1117(b), because the greater offense can be committed without proof of 
intent, negligence or the violation of other vehicle laws or ordinances 
proximately resulting in death, all of which proof is required for conviction 
under the purported lesser-included offense of homicide by vehicle, § 
31-5-1117(b).

[¶20.]  As we noted in Evanson v. State, 546 P.2d  at 415, Rule 
32(c), W.R.Cr.P. is identical to Rule 31(c), F.R.Cr.P. This court has recognized 
that federal cases interpreting federal rules adopted in Wyoming are "highly 
persuasive." Robertson v. T.W.P., 
Inc., Wyo., 656 P.2d 547, 552 (1983).

The annotation 
at 11 A.L.R.Fed. 173 and the supplement thereto collects cases under the term 
"necessarily included." In that annotation, the authors summarize the holdings 
of cases on this issue:

"The principles emerging 
from the cases demand that two requirements exist concurrently in order for an 
offense to constitute a necessarily included offense under Rule 31(c) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. If either of the two requirements is not 
present, the claimed included offense cannot constitute a necessarily included 
offense under Rule 31(c).

"Firstly, the offense 
which is claimed to be a lesser, necessarily included offense must indeed be 
lesser than the charged offense. This requirement can be met only where the 
included offense involves fewer of the same constituent elements as the charged 
greater offense, and where the claimed lesser offense has a lighter penalty 
attached to it than does the charged offense.

"And secondly, the two 
offenses must share common elements. Thus, the claimed included offense must 
have the same elements as, although fewer of those elements than, the charged 
greater offense." 11 A.L.R.Fed. at 178.

[¶21.]  This summary is clearly consistent with 
the court's holding in Selig and its 
prior rulings in Evanson v. State, 
546 P.2d  at 412. 

Conclusion

[¶22.]  In summary, we hold that a crime 
described by statute may not be necessarily included within another statutory 
offense unless all of the elements within the claimed lesser offense are to be 
found in the greater, and unless the greater offense cannot be committed without 
also committing the putative lesser offense.

[¶23.]  In the case at bar there are actually two 
elements contained in § 35-5-1117(b), which do not appear in § 35-5-1117(a): 
negligence and death resulting from the violation of motor vehicle laws or 
ordinances other than driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 
For these reasons, § 35-5-1117(b), W.S. 1977, 1982 Cum.Supp. is not a 
lesser-included offense within the ambit of § 35-5-1117(a), W.S. 1977, 1982 
Cum.Supp.

[¶24.]  Reversed.

FOOTNOTES

1 Rule 32(c), W.R.Cr.P., 
provides:

"Conviction of lesser offense. - The 
defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included [emphasis added] in 
the offense charged or of an attempt to commit either the offense charged or an 
offense necessarily included therein if the attempt is an 
offense."

2 Section 31-5-117, W.S. 
1977, 1982 Cum.Supp. was renumbered by Ch. 171, § 5, 1983 S.L. of Wyoming, as § 
6-2-106.

3 The statute, § 
31-5-1117(b), W.S. 1977, 1982 Cum.Supp., says in part:

"* * * any state law * * 
* except those laws or ordinances relating to conduct set forth in subsection 
(a) of this section [§ 31-5-1117(a)] * * *."

BROWN, Justice, specially 
concurring, joined by ROONEY, Chief Justice.

[¶25.]  I agree with the result reached by the 
majority, but believe it has adopted a test that is unnecessarily rigid. The 
majority at says:

"In summary, we hold that 
a crime described by statute may not be necessarily included within another 
statutory offense unless all of the elements within the claimed lesser offense 
are to be found in the greater, and, unless the greater offense cannot be 
committed without also committing the putative lesser offense."1

[¶26.]  In Evanson v. State, Wyo., 546 P.2d 412, 
417 (1976), we evidenced more flexibility, "the descending succession of 
offenses can be measured by more than one standard." In United States v. Whitaker, 447 F.2d 314, 
144 A.D.C. 344 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the court held that the offense, "unlawful 
entry," was a lesser included offense of burglary even though "unlawful entry" 
required the elements of entry without lawful authority and against the will of 
the lawful occupant, while in certain circumstances burglary could be committed 
even though the entry was authorized. According to Whitaker, in certain 
circumstances all the elements within the lesser offense need not be found in 
the greater offense, and the greater offense could be committed without 
committing the lesser.

"* * * A more natural, 
realistic and sound interpretation of the scope of `lesser included offense,' in 
line with our own views on the subject, is that defendant is entitled to invoke 
Rule 31(c) when a lesser offense is established by the evidence adduced at trial 
in proof of the greater offense, with the caveat that there must also be an `inherent' 
relationship between the greater and lesser offenses, i.e., they must relate to 
the protection of the same interests, and must be so related that in the general 
nature of these crimes, though not necessarily invariably, proof of the 
lesser offense is necessarily presented as part of the showing of the commission 
of the greater offense. * * *" (Emphasis added.) United States v. Whitaker, 
supra, at 319.

[¶27.]  In United States v. Pino, 606 F.2d 908 
(10th Cir. 1979), the court held that the defendant was entitled to an 
instruction on the offense of "careless driving" as a lesser included offense to 
the involuntary manslaughter by automobile charged in the indictment. The court 
stated:

"* * * [T]he Government 
contends that * * * the lesser offense does not qualify here because `the lesser 
offense must be such that it is impossible to commit the greater without having 
first committed the lesser.' [Citations.] * * * Involuntary manslaughter, it is 
said, can be committed in a number of ways other than by operating a vehicle and 
hence, from the statutory provisions alone, arguably the greater offense could 
be committed without committing an act connected with the 
lesser.

"We are not convinced 
that so strict an application of the rule is proper. It is true that common law 
cases earlier dictated a strict adherence to the statutory elements alone and 
analysis of them as the basis for determining the availability of a lesser 
offense charge. [Citation.] We are persuaded, however, not to apply the 
artificial analysis suggested by the Government and that instead the 
availability of the lesser-included-offense instruction should be decided in 
practical terms of the evidence developed in this case on the offense charged. 
[Citation.]" United States v. Pino, 
supra, at 915-916.

[¶28.]  The test approved in Whitaker and Pino is known as the "inherent 
relationship" test. Subsections (a) and (b) of § 31-5-1117, W.S. 1977, both 
relate to the protection of the same interests. They are aimed at increasing 
road safety and protecting human life, and designed to deter careless driving. 
Under the test it would appear that subsection (b) is a lesser included offense 
of subsection (a). However, in Whitaker, the court also held that due 
process notice requirements must be satisfied, that is, where the information 
charges a defendant with a violation of the greater offense, he must have notice 
that he may be found guilty of the lesser. It is here that I have problems in 
this case because the lesser offense may involve misconduct divorced from 
driving while intoxicated.

[¶29.]  Violation of any traffic safety law may 
be used to convict an individual under subsection (b). The notice, by charging a 
violation of subsection (a), alone, did not apprise appellant that he may be 
called to defend himself under subsection (b).

[¶30.]  In the future, if the facts so justify, 
prosecutors may want to allege violation of both statutes in the information. If 
the defendant seeks to strike, contending that subsection (b) is a lesser 
included offense and therefore surplusage in the information, he can hardly 
object to the instructions later. He will have received 
notice.

[¶31.]  The majority has determined that the 
crime described in § 35-5-1117(b), supra, cannot be a lesser included offense of 
the crime decribed in § 35-5-1117(a), supra. In other words, the majority says 
that they are distinct and separate crimes and therefore, a person could be 
charged, convicted and sentenced for violations of both subsections (a) and (b), 
if there was another traffic violation in addition to the drinking. A person 
driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor almost always violates some 
other traffic regulation such as speeding, driving on the wrong side of the 
road, illegal passing, etc.

[¶32.]  Under the majority's approach prosecutors 
could and likely will charge in one count homicide by vehicle under subsection 
(a), a felony, and in another count homicide by vehicle under subsection (b), a 
misdemeanor. In the latter count the prosecutors could allege an underlying 
traffic violation such as speeding, illegal passing or some other traffic 
offense. If two convictions result, will the majority uphold them where there 
was but a single act causing "the death of another person"? I believe at that 
time the majority here will have to do more than "trip the light fantastic" to 
dance around a multiplicitous charge and conviction.2

[¶33.]  The test set out by the majority to 
determine offenses that are necessarily included or lesser included seems to 
preclude the inherent relationship test. I do not desire to be committed to such 
an inflexible standard.

FOOTNOTES

1 There is a difference 
between an offense "necessarily included" and a "lesser included" offense, but 
the terms are used interchangeably by the courts. An offense "necessarily 
included" denotes a relationship which always exists between two offense 
categories, regardless of the facts of a particular case. A "lesser included" 
offense depends upon particular facts. Olais-Castro v. United States, 416 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1969).

2 A multiplicitous 
information or indictment is one charging the same offense in more than one 
count. 



 
 

Opinions 
      of the Wyoming Supreme Court

Schuler v. StateNo. 
83-33668 P.2d 13331983 WY 90Decided: September 9, 1983Supreme 
Court for the State of Wyoming

SCHULER v. 
STATE, 668 P.2d 1333 (Wyo. 1983) 668 P.2d 1333 JAMES SCHULER, APPELLANT 
(DEFENDANT), v. THE STATE OF WYOMING, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF). 

No. 
83-33

Supreme Court of 
Wyoming.

September 9, 
1983. Rehearing Denied October 11, 1983.

Appeal from the 
District Court, Natrona County, R.M. Forrister, J. 

ARE NOT AN 
OFFICIAL PRODUCT OF THE COURT, THEREFORE THEY ARE NOT DISPLAYED.] 

Leonard Munker, 
Sylvia L. Hackl, State Public Defenders, Cheyenne, Gerald M. Gallivan, Director, 
Wyoming Defender Aid Program, J. Scott Burnworth, Student Intern, Wyoming 
Defender Aid Program, Laramie, for appellant.

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., Terry J. Harris, Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for 
appellee.

Before ROONEY, 
C.J., and THOMAS, ROSE, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROSE, 
Justice.

James Schuler 
appeals from a four- to eight-year burglary sentence which was enhanced to a 
life sentence under the habitual-criminal statute, § 6-1-110, W.S. 1977.1

We will 
affirm.

Schuler and two 
other persons were apprehended in the Mountain Bell building in Casper and were 
thereafter charged with burglary. One defendant pled guilty, while Schuler and 
the other defendant went to trial together. The jury found Schuler guilty of 
burglary and his co-defendant guilty of criminal trespass. Following the 
burglary trial, Schuler was found to be an habitual criminal, as defined by § 
6-1-110, supra. The trial judge sentenced Schuler to four to eight years in the 
state penitentiary for burglary and then enhanced this sentence to life 
imprisonment under the habitual-criminal statute. The issues raised by the 
appellant are described in his brief as follows:

"I. Whether the 
trial court abused its discretion in not considering probation or suspension at 
sentencing even though the only crime appellant was convicted of was 
burglary.

"II. Whether the 
trial court erred in sentencing appellant twice on the separate matters of 
burglary and criminal habituality.

"III. Whether 
there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the appellant based on 
inconsistent verdicts between co-defendants when the evidence against each was 
identical."

The Fourth 
Issue:

After the filing 
of the briefs, a fourth issue surfaced for the first time in argument which asks 
this question:

Is it error to 
charge a defendant with being an habitual criminal in a separate 
information?

Two separate 
informations were lodged against the defendant - the first, in May of 1982, on 
the burglary charges; the second, in November 1982, wherein Schuler was charged 
as a person who would be convicted of burglary and who had previously been 
convicted of three other felonies. The first information, describing the 
underlying burglary charge, was incorporated by reference in the second 
complaint, which asked the jury to find Schuler to be, and the court to sentence 
him as, an habitual criminal.

Rule 16(b)(2), 
W.R.Cr.P.,2 specifies that the trial court may 
not hear a case if the information fails to charge an offense. For the first 
time in argument before this court, the appellant claimed that the trial court 
was without authority to entertain the habitual-criminal proceedings, because, 
contrary to the provisions of § 6-1-111, W.S. 1977,3 the defendant was charged with 
burglary and with being an habitual criminal in two separate criminal 
complaints.

Under normal 
circumstances, we would not consider this contention because it was not brought 
to the attention of the trial court nor was it brought to the attention of this 
court until the issue was raised in argument here.4 We choose to address the question 
in this opinion because some of the prosecutors throughout the state appear to 
be unclear about the manner in which the habitual-criminal issue should be 
brought to the district court's attention.

Prosecutors 
seeking enhanced sentences under the habitual-criminal statute must bring 
allegations of habitual criminality under § 6-1-110, W.S. 1977 (see n. 1) in the 
same information with the underlying felony charge. That is, as in this case, if 
the charge is burglary and the prosecutor seeks to enhance a burglary sentence 
with the life-imprisonment penalty provided for those proven to be habitual 
criminals under § 6-1-110, supra n. 1, then both of these allegations should be 
contained in the same information. The rationale for this will be made more 
clear as the opinion progresses, but, in short, the reason that the 
habitual-criminal sentencing enhancement must not be described in a separate 
information is that being an habitual criminal is not a crime - it is a status. 
To be an habitual criminal under the statute simply changes the sentencing 
process so that the sentence which could be imposed for the crime charged (if 
less than life imprisonment) becomes enhanced to a mandatory life sentence. We 
said as much in Evans v. State, Wyo., 655 P.2d 1214, 1225 (1982), where we 
explained:

"The habitual 
criminal statute does not create a new or separate crime and does not authorize 
or contemplate the conviction of the charge of being an habitual criminal. The 
distinct crime of being an habitual criminal is unknown. The habitual criminal 
act only prescribes a punishment and provides that in cases of a fourth felony 
conviction the penalty shall be enhanced. The repetition of criminal conduct 
aggravates the offense and provides greater penalties. The punishment is for the 
fourth felony, but it is enhanced because the defendant is an habitual criminal. 
The prior felony convictions are not integral parts of the principal offense 
charged in the information, but are instead matters of aggravation concerning 
the punishment to be imposed. Habitual criminality is a status, not an offense, 
and its finding calls for an enhancement of the punishment for the crime 
charged.

"`* * * Since 
habitual criminality is a status, not a crime, * * * a judgment of conviction of 
an accused as an "habitual criminal" is considered null and void, there being no 
such offense, and on conviction under an indictment alleging prior convictions 
there can be but one judgment or sentence imposed.' 24B C.J.S. Sentence of 
Judgment § 1971, p. 521 (1962).

"`* * * Habitual 
criminality is a status rather than an offense, and allegations of previous 
convictions made in indictments or informations brought under an habitual 
criminal statute do not constitute a distinct charge of crime, but go only to 
the punishment of the criminal. * * *' 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations § 
145, p. 1065 (1944), quoted with approval in Waxler v. State, 67 Wyo. 396, 224 P.2d 514, 519 (1950)."

We spoke to the 
question of pleading repeated convictions in Waxler v. State, 67 Wyo. 396, 224 P.2d 514, 518-519 (1950), quoting from 42 C.J.S. Indictments and Informations, § 
145, p. 1057, as follows:

"* * * Where, in 
case of repeated convictions for similar offenses, the statute imposes an 
additional penalty, it is generally held that an indictment for a subsequent 
offense should allege facts showing that the offense charged is a second or 
subsequent crime within the contemplation of the statute, * * * and also that it 
is necessary to allege both the present offense and the previous 
convictions."

The concept was 
earlier announced in Bandy v. Hehn, 10 Wyo. 167, 67 P. 979, 980 (1902), where we 
said:

"But we think 
that, in reason and by the great weight of authority, as the fact of a former 
conviction enters into the offense to the extent of aggravating it and 
increasing the punishment, it must be alleged in the information and proved like 
any other material fact, if it is sought to impose the greater penalty. The 
statute makes the prior conviction a part of the description and character of 
the offense intended to be punished. Tuttle v. Com., 2 Gray, 505; Clark, 
Cr.Proc. 204."

Both Waxler and 
Bandy, supra, were decided under the predecessor of § 6-1-111, 
supra:

"Provisions of 
this Act [the habitual-criminal statute] shall apply only when previous 
convictions are set forth in the information or indictment charging the 
defendant, and proof thereof shall be made." Section 9-111, W.C.S. 
1945.

The predecessor 
statute was enacted in 1937 and remained in effect until the revised 
habitual-criminal statutes were passed in 1973. The language of the predecessor 
statute is unambiguous: the habitual-criminal charge must be brought in the same 
information that charges the current underlying felony. By comparison, we agree 
that the language of § 6-1-111 is not as free from doubt where it 
says:

"In charging a 
person with being an habitual criminal, the information or indictment shall set 
forth the felony committed within the state and shall allege the * * previous 
convictions or felonies relied upon by the state." Section 6-1-111(a), W.S. 
1977.

Some of the 
prosecuting attorneys in our state apparently take the position that this 
statute is open to the interpretation that it only demands that the information 
charging habitual criminality be complete, in the sense that it should set forth 
both the prior and the current felonies but does not require that these charges 
all be made within the four corners of a single information. However, in light 
of the long history of criminal pleading in this state requiring a single 
information to charge both the underlying felony and the prior felonies upon 
which the State relies to enhance the punishment, the proper interpretation of § 
6-1-111(a) leads to the conclusion that one and only one information should be 
brought, despite the fact that two informations would give adequate notice to a 
defendant.

We turn our 
attention here to the question having to do with whether there was error 
committed in this case through the filing of two separate informations, the 
first of which charges the defendant as follows:

"* * * JAMES 
SCHULER * * * did unlawfully

"COUNT 
I

"agree with one 
or more persons, namely: CHRISTOPHER HUSS AKA JOHN ROBERT McCUTCHEON, to commit 
a crime, to-wit: burglary (W.S. 1977, § 6-7-201), and did an overt act to effect 
the object of the agreement, in violation of W.S. 1977, § 6-1-203, which 
is

"COUNT 
II

"and 
intentionally enter a building, to-wit: the Mountain Bell Phone Center store 
building, without the consent of the person in lawful possession and with the 
intent to steal therein, in violation of W.S. 1977, § 6-7-201(a)(i) * * 
*."

Subsequently, a 
criminal information was filed which is in pertinent part as 
follows:

"* * * JAMES 
SCHULER [is] a person who will be convicted in this State of the felony of 
burglary as set forth in the Information filed in Criminal Action Number 8645 in 
the Seventh Judicial District, attached hereto as Appendix A and incorporated 
herein by reference, and who has previously been three (3) times convicted of a 
felony upon charges separately brought and tried, which have arisen out of 
separate occurrences, including the following: the felony of unauthorized use of 
an automobile on or about the 5th day of February, 1975 in the State of Wyoming, 
the felony of attempted escape from the Wyoming State Penitentiary on or about 
October 9, 1979 in the State of Wyoming, and the felonies of escape and grand 
larceny on or about the 17th day of October, 1977 in the State of Wyoming, is a 
habitual criminal, in violation of W.S. 1977, § 6-1-110, which is contrary to 
the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace 
and dignity of the State of Wyoming." (Emphasis added.)

 

Does the Second 
Information Charge an Offense?

Appellant's 
position in arguing this appeal is that the document which urges the 
habitual-criminal sentencing enhancement is fatally defective in that it fails 
to charge an offense. It is to be emphasized, however, that the second 
information incorporates by reference the first information which had properly 
charged the crime of burglary.

Black's Law 
Dictionary (5th Ed. 1968) defines "incorporation by reference" 
as:

"The method of 
making one document of any kind become a part of another separate document by 
referring to the former in the latter, and declaring that the former shall be 
taken and considered as a part of the latter the same as if it were fully set 
out therein."

As applied to 
this case, "incorporation by reference" means that the burglary charge contained 
in the first criminal complaint becomes a part of the second criminal complaint, 
thus amending the face of the second. By this device, the second instrument must 
be read to include both the burglary and the prior felonies and, as so 
interpreted, it meets the requirements of § 6-1-111(a), W.S. 
1977.

The force of the 
record in the instant case is to the effect that the second information stands 
as an amendment to the first one. Rule 9(c), W.R.Cr.P. contemplates that the 
filing of an amended information will be accomplished by leave of court. The 
rule says:

"An information 
may be amended in matter of form or of substance at any time before the 
defendant pleads without leave of court. The court may permit an information to 
be amended at any time before verdict or finding if no additional or different 
offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are not 
prejudiced."

Appellant had 
already been arraigned on the burglary charges, so it would have been preferable 
to obtain leave of court. However, it is not error to amend an information 
without leave of court. Whiteley v. State, Wyo., 418 P.2d 164, 166 (1966); 
Whiteley v. State of Wyoming, 293 F. Supp. 381, 383 (D.Wyo. 1968), rev'd on 
other grounds, sub nom. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S. Ct. 1031, 28 L. Ed. 2d 306 (1971). And where the defendant has raised no question concerning 
the propriety of the amendment, he waives his right to attack it. Whiteley, 
supra, 418 P.2d  at 166. Appellant was given notice of the charges against him, 
raised no objection to the peculiar procedure and, in fact, moved the court to 
consolidate the two informations for trial.

It is customary 
that an amended information be styled as such and that the same criminal action 
number be retained. Here the second information was not designated as an 
amendment and a second criminal action number was assigned. To proceed in this 
manner is misleading and confusing, but does not, however, constitute reversible 
error. It is well established that (formal defects in the pleadings not 
prejudicial to the defendant will be disregarded.)

"* * * [A]ny * * 
* defect or imperfection which does not tend to prejudice any substantial right 
of the defendant upon the merits or to mislead the defendant to his prejudice 
shall not be grounds for dismissal of the indictment or information or for 
reversal of a conviction. * *" Rule 9(a), W.R.Cr.P.

Even before this 
rule was adopted, this court had held that the amendment of an information was 
procedural and not jurisdictional. McGinnis v. State, 17 Wyo. 106, 96 P. 525 
(1908); State v. Kusel, 29 Wyo. 287, 213 P. 367 (1923). More recent cases carry 
forth this rationale under the rules. Fuller v. State, Wyo., 568 P.2d 900 
(1977); Sanville v. State, Wyo., 553 P.2d 1386 (1976). The amendment of an 
information is "one of form and not of substance." Valerio v. State, Wyo., 445 P.2d 752, 753 (1968).

Rule 9(c) allows 
amendment of an information only if no "additional or different" offense is 
charged. The amendment - the second information - does not charge appellant with 
an "additional or different" offense, because habitual criminality is not a 
crime, but serves only to enhance the punishment for the underlying 
felony.

Neither does the 
amendment prejudice substantial rights of the defendant. Rule 9(a), supra, 
provides that when the substantive rights of the defendant on the merits are 
protected, minor defects in the formal proceedings will be 
ignored.

The safeguards 
in habitual-criminal cases are set forth in § 6-1-111(b). See n. 3, 
supra.

Here, appellant 
was tried first on the burglary count. All reference to the prior convictions 
were excluded from the first stage by grant of defendant's motion. Only after 
appellant had been convicted of burglary was the jury informed of the 
habitual-criminal charges, and that trial was held the following morning. Thus, 
the proceedings followed in this case conform to what they would have been had 
one information (either an original or a properly denoted amended information) 
charged the defendant with both burglary and being an habitual criminal. Because 
the protections were the same and adequate, it is difficult to see how the 
result would have been different. No substantial right of the defendant was 
placed in jeopardy. In fact, appellant does not urge that the two informations 
served to prejudice his defense. Thus, the defects in the amended information 
are not grounds for reversal.

ONE 
SENTENCE

It is improper 
to impose two sentences, one for the underlying felony, and one for the habitual 
charges.

"The effect of 
two sentences would be tantamount to sentencing a defendant for being an 
ex-convict. Separate sentences would violate the double jeopardy prohibition." 
Evans v. State, supra, 655 P.2d  at 1225.

A separate 
sentence cannot be imposed for an habitual-criminal conviction because there is 
no "crime" of habitual criminal. Evans v. State, supra, 655 P.2d  at 
1225.

We will hold 
that the trial judge imposed but one sentence: life imprisonment. The burglary 
sentence was enhanced on the basis of the jury finding that defendant was an 
habitual criminal as defined by § 6-1-110, supra.

The record fully 
supports our holding on this issue. Before oral sentencing, in a discussion with 
counsel, the trial judge said:

"* * * [A]s I 
understand, [we must] not regard this as two separate sentences but one 
enhancing sentencing." (Emphasis added.)

The trial judge 
then sentenced the defendant as follows:

"James Schuler, 
it will be Judgment and Sentence of the Court that in the burglary case, Case 
8645, you be remanded to the custody of the Sheriff of Natrona County and be by 
him conducted to the Wyoming State Penitentiary, there to serve a term of not 
more than four years and not - excuse me - not less than four years and not more 
than eight years, with credit against both the minimum and maximum on account of 
the time that you may have spent in jail here, pursuant to this 
charge.

"That further, 
with respect to Case 8827, which is the habitual criminal charge, this sentence 
previously passed, I think is the way to say it, be enhanced per statute to a 
sentence of life imprisonment." (Emphasis added.)

The language in 
the two judgment and sentence orders parallels that at oral 
sentencing:

"NOW, THEREFORE, 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that you, JAMES SCHULER, be remanded to the 
custody of the Sheriff of Natrona County, Wyoming, to await transfer to the 
Wyoming State Penitentiary in Rawlins, Wyoming, to serve a term of not less than 
four (4) years nor more than eight (8) years with credit for 248 days already 
served in the Natrona County Jail, to be deducted from both the minimum and 
maximum terms." Judgment and Sentence, Criminal Action No. 8645, dated January 
11, 1983.

The judgment and 
sentence in Criminal Action 8827 again emphasizes that the sentence is 
enhanced:

"* * * to serve 
a term of life imprisonment which shall be an enhanced sentence for the 
imprisonment ordered in Criminal Action No. 8645, * * *." (Emphasis added.) 
Dated January 11, 1983.

In addition, a 
February 1, 1983, letter from the trial judge to defendant indicates that one 
sentence was imposed.

"There is but 
one sentence of life imprisonment in the burglary case, 8645; in that case the 
sentence to a term of years is enhanced to life by the separate action in which 
you are charged as an habitual criminal. I repeat; There is but one sentence for 
these two cases, not a sentence to a term of years in addition to a life 
sentence." (Emphasis added.)

We refer back to 
the language in Whiteley v. State of Wyoming, supra, 293 F. Supp.  at 386, where 
the defendant also was sentenced first on the underlying felony and then given 
an enhanced sentence (although there was only one judgment and sentence 
form):

"The record does 
not support petitioner's claim that he was * * * given one penalty for the crime 
of breaking and entering and another penalty for being an habitual 
criminal."

In the instant 
case, both the sentencing record and the record as a whole are crystal clear. We 
have said that the record of judgment is not dispositive when it conflicts with 
the actual sentence imposed orally by the trial judge in open court. Lane v. 
State, Wyo., 663 P.2d 175 (1983). No such conflict between the two appears in 
this record.

We cannot say 
why the judge entered two sentence orders to impose but one sentence. Perhaps 
this was a response to the formal defect of two separately numbered informations 
filed in this case. At any rate, the language utilized by the trial judge at 
oral sentencing, in the orders and in the follow-up letter, leaves no doubt that 
a single, enhanced sentence was imposed.

PROBATION

The trial judge 
had no authority to consider probation or suspension of sentence and his failure 
to do so in this case was not error. Defendant was found guilty of burglary, 
under § 6-7-201, W.S. 1977.5 Because of the habitual-criminal 
statute, § 6-1-110, supra, the burglary sentence was enhanced to life. Where a 
crime carries a mandatory life sentence, as does this appellant's enhanced 
conviction of burglary, the trial judge has no discretion to consider probation. 
Section 7-13-301, W.S. 1977,6 specifically excludes from the 
trial court's discretion crimes for which a life sentence is mandatory. We 
adhere to the principle that habitual criminality is not a crime, but a status. 
Evans, supra, 655 P.2d  at 1225. However, by virtue of a particular defendant's 
status as an habitual criminal, his sentence, for whatever his fourth felony may 
be, becomes life imprisonment. The defendant is not thereby sentenced to life 
imprisonment for the "crime" of being an habitual criminal. Rather, because he 
is an habitual criminal, he is sentenced to life imprisonment for his fourth 
felony.

By virtue of § 
7-13-301, supra, the trial judge must consider probation or suspension of 
sentence in the sentencing phase, despite the fact that all criminal statutes 
prescribe mandatory minimum and maximum sentences. The trial judge must do this 
even in an habitual-criminal conviction under § 6-1-109, W.S. 1977,7 which carries a 10-to-50-year 
sentence. It does not follow that the trial court must consider probation in an 
habitual-criminal conviction under § 6-1-110, supra, which carries a life 
sentence. Section 7-13-301, supra, specifically exempts crimes carrying 
mandatory life imprisonment from consideration of probation. The power to punish 
is with the legislature. Chavez v. State, Wyo., 604 P.2d 1341, 1353 (1979), 
cert. denied 446 U.S. 984, 100 S. Ct. 2967, 64 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1980). The courts can 
only impose such a sentence as is authorized by the legislature. Sorensen v. 
State, Wyo., 604 P.2d 1031, 1036 (1977). It is within the legislative 
prerogative thus to allow the trial judge discretion when a sentence is enhanced 
by § 6-1-109, supra, and to remove it when the sentence is enhanced by virtue of 
§ 6-1-110, supra.

"* * * We 
further hold that § 7-13-301, W.S. 1977, is a proper exercise of an inherent 
legislative power to prohibit suspension of sentence in a given case. * * * "The 
legislature is free to retain or delegate sentencing discretion when defining 
and setting punishment. It may properly delegate sentencing discretion in part 
and retain sentencing discretion in part." Evans, supra, 655 P.2d  at 
1224.

The instant case 
is distinguishable from Peterson v. State, Wyo., 586 P.2d 144 (1978), where we 
held that the trial judge read § 7-13-301, supra, too narrowly in refusing to 
consider alternatives to life imprisonment. There the maximum statutory sentence 
was life imprisonment and the minimum was a term of years. We decided only that 
in such cases life imprisonment is not mandatory and thus the trial judge does 
have discretion to order probation under § 7-13-301, supra. However, under § 
6-1-110, supra, the life sentence for the fourth felony is mandatory and it is 
improper for the trial judge to consider probation.

INCONSISTENT 
VERDICTS

Lastly, 
defendant appeals to this court to reverse his conviction on the burglary 
charges because the jury found his co-defendant guilty of the lesser-included 
crime, criminal trespass. The two verdicts are not inconsistent with the finding 
that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of burglary. The evidence 
against the defendant and his co-defendant was not identical in all respects. 
The record reflects an adequate basis for finding defendant guilty of the 
specific-intent crime of burglary while finding that his co-defendant lacked the 
requisite intent to commit a felony within the building.

"Defendant 
argues that the convictions * * * must be reversed because of inconsistency with 
the verdicts acquitting his co-defendant * * *. The character and quality of the 
defenses of Hopkinson and Hickey were so different that the jury had a 
reasonable basis for return of different verdicts. Hopkinson had a motive * * *. 
No motivation is shown for Hickey * * *. In any event, consistency in verdicts 
is not required. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 101, 94 S. Ct. 2887, 
2899, 41 L. Ed. 2d 590. See also United States v. Beitscher, 10 Cir., 467 F.2d 269, 274." United States v. Hopkinson, 631 F.2d 665, 668 (10th Cir. 
1980).

We affirm the 
judgment and the imposition of a single, enhanced life sentence for 
burglary.

1 Section 6-1-110, W.S. 
1977 (now §§ 6-10-201 and 6-10-202, as revised by Ch. 75, 1982 S.L. of Wyoming 
and Ch. 171, 1983 S.L. of Wyoming) provides:

"Every person 
convicted in this state of a felony, who shall previously have been three (3) 
times convicted of a felony upon charges separately brought and tried, which 
have arisen out of separate occurrences either in this state or elsewhere, shall 
be punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for the term of his or her 
natural life; provided, that nothing in this act [§§ 6-1-109 to 6-1-111] shall 
abrogate or effect the punishment of death in any and all crimes for which the 
punishment of death is now, or hereafter, may be 
inflicted."

2 Rule 16(b)(2), W.R.Cr.P. 
provides:

"(2) Defenses 
and Objections Which Must Be Raised. - Defenses and objections based on defects 
in the institution of the prosecution or in the indictment or information other 
than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense may 
be raised only by motion before trial. The motion shall include all such 
defenses and objections then available to the defendant. Failure to present any 
such defense or objection as herein provided constitutes a waiver thereof, but 
the court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver. Lack of jurisdiction 
or the failure of the indictment or information to charge an offense shall be 
noticed by the court at any time during the pendency of the 
proceeding."

3 Section 6-1-111, W.S. 
1977 (now § 6-10-203, as revised by Ch. 75, 1982 S.L. of Wyoming and Ch. 171, 
1983 S.L. of Wyoming) provides:

"(a) In charging 
a person with being an habitual criminal, the information or indictment shall 
set forth the felony committed within the state and shall allege the two (2) or 
more previous convictions or felonies relied upon by the 
state.

"(b) The trial 
on the felony committed within the state shall proceed as in other cases, except 
that the jury shall not be informed of the previous convictions of felonies. If 
the jury returns a verdict of guilty, then the defendant shall be tried 
immediately by the same jury upon the issue of whether or not he has been 
previously convicted of two (2) or more felonies, unless the defendant has 
entered or enters a plea of guilty to the information or indictment charging the 
prior convictions.

"(c) In any 
trial under the provisions of this act [§§ 6-1-109 to 6-1-111], a duly 
authenticated copy of the record of former convictions and judgments of any 
court of record for any of the offenses charged against the defendant indicted 
or informed against by the state shall be prima facie evidence of such 
convictions and may be used in evidence against the 
defendant."

4 Ordinarily the Supreme 
Court refrains from inquiring into questions not raised by the parties or trial 
court. Matter of Parental Rights of PP, Wyo., 648 P.2d 512 (1982); Pritchard v. 
State, Division of Vocational Rehabilitation, Wyo., 540 P.2d 523 
(1975).

5 Now § 6-3-301, W.S. 
1977, as revised by Ch. 75, 1982 S.L. of Wyoming and Ch. 171, 1983 S.L. of 
Wyoming.

6 Section 7-13-301, W.S. 
1977, reads:

"After 
conviction or plea of guilty for any offense, except crimes punishable by death 
or life imprisonment, the court may suspend the imposition of sentence, or may 
suspend the execution of all or a part of a sentence and may also place the 
defendant on probation or may impose a fine applicable to the offense and also 
place the defendant on probation. With the consent of a defendant charged with a 
crime, except a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment, the court may 
suspend trial and place such defendant on probation."

7 Now § 6-10-201, W.S. 
1977, as revised by Ch. 75, 1982 S.L. of Wyoming and Ch. 171, 1983 S.L. of 
Wyoming.

 

 

 

 

 

, 471 F.2d 55 
(8th Cir. 1973).