Case Title: Mandeville v. Gaffney

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12980

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2021-04-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12980 
 
R.H. MANDEVILLE  vs.  ERIN GAFFNEY.1 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     February 3, 2021. - April 29, 2021. 
 
Present:  Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt, 
& Georges, JJ. 
 
 
Practice, Criminal, Postconviction relief. 
 
 
 
 
Certification of a question of law to the Supreme Judicial 
Court by the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts. 
 
 
 
Dana Alan Curhan for the petitioner. 
 
Randall E. Ravitz, Assistant Attorney General, for the 
respondent. 
 
 
 
CYPHER, J.  After this court affirmed the petitioner R.H. 
Mandeville's convictions of murder in the first degree and armed 
assault with intent to murder in 1982, he filed a series of 
State and Federal court challenges to his convictions.  In 2017, 
he filed his most recent Federal habeas petition, which the 
 
 
1 Superintendent, Old Colony Correctional Center. 
2 
 
respondent, the superintendent at the correctional facility in 
which Mandeville is held (superintendent), moved to dismiss as 
untimely under the one-year deadline set forth in the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) 
for filing a habeas petition in Federal court.  See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(d)(1).  Because the one-year deadline in the AEDPA is 
tolled while an application for postconviction or other 
collateral review is pending in State court, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(d)(2), whether the petition is untimely under the AEDPA 
turns on whether motions for a new trial that were denied before 
Mains v. Commonwealth, 433 Mass. 30, 36 n.10 (2000), were 
subject to the time limitation announced therein, in which this 
court held that "[h]ereinafter . . . a gatekeeper petition 
pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, [must] be filed within thirty 
days of the denial of a motion for a new trial."  Before Mains, 
there was not a time limitation on filing a gatekeeper petition.  
See G. L. c. 278, § 33E. 
Confronted with the application of Mains, a judge of the 
Federal District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
certified the following question to this court: 
"Does the thirty-day time limitation established by the 
Court in Mains for filing a gatekeeper petition under 
[G. L. c.] 278, § 33E, apply to denials that had occurred 
prior to December 13, 2000, so as to permit only gatekeeper 
petitions regarding those prior denials that were filed 
within thirty days of the publication of the Mains opinion, 
3 
 
or do those pre-Mains denials continue to be not subject to 
any time limitation as under the prior practice?" 
 
We answer that the thirty-day time limitation established in 
Mains does not apply to denials that occurred before 
December 13, 2000.  Therefore, pre-Mains denials continue not to 
be subject to any time limitation, as under pre-Mains practice. 
Background.  1.  Legal framework.  We begin with an 
overview of the legal framework to provide context for the 
following discussion. 
a.  The AEDPA.  The AEDPA established a one-year time limit 
to file an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the 
Federal courts.  28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).  As relevant to the 
matter before us, the one-year time limit runs from the 
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for 
seeking such review in the State court.2  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(d)(1)(A).  The time limit is tolled while an application 
for postconviction review or other collateral review is pending 
in State court.  28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).  "[A] petition 
continues to be 'pending' during the period between one court's 
 
2 The one-year time limit runs from the latest of the 
conclusion of direct review in the State court; the removal of 
an unconstitutional impediment to filing an application; the 
recognition of a new right by the United States Supreme Court, 
asserted by a petitioner and retroactively applicable to cases 
on collateral review; or the date on which the factual predicate 
for the habeas claim or claims could have been discovered 
through the exercise of reasonable due diligence.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2244(d)(1). 
4 
 
decision and a timely request for further review by a higher 
court."  Currie v. Matesanz, 281 F.3d 261, 266 (1st Cir. 2002), 
quoting Fernandez v. Sternes, 227 F.3d 977, 980 (7th Cir. 2000). 
b.  Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 and G. L. c. 278, § 33E.  In 
Massachusetts, a defendant seeking postconviction review in a 
capital case after issuance of the rescript on direct review may 
file a motion for a new trial in the Superior Court under Mass. 
R. Crim. P. 30, as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001).  To appeal 
from the denial of such a motion, a defendant must seek leave to 
pursue the appeal from a single justice of this court under 
G. L. c. 278, § 33E (gatekeeper provision).  See Currie, 281 
F.3d at 263.  The single justice must determine that the 
petition presents "a new and substantial question" for the 
defendant to be entitled to review by the full court.  G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E.  For purposes of the AEDPA time limitation, the 
denial of a gatekeeper petition constitutes "final resolution 
through [Massachusetts's] postconviction procedures."  Drew v. 
MacEachern, 620 F.3d 16, 21 (1st Cir. 2010), quoting Carey v. 
Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220 (2002). 
c.  The Mains decision.  General Laws c. 278, § 33E, does 
not contain a deadline for filing a gatekeeper petition after 
the denial of a motion for a new trial; however, in Mains, which 
was decided on December 13, 2000, this court imposed a deadline:  
"Hereinafter, in the interests of consistency and finality, we 
5 
 
shall require that a gatekeeper petition pursuant to G. L. 
c. 278, § 33E, be filed within thirty days of the denial of a 
motion for a new trial."  Mains, 433 Mass. at 36 n.10.  This 
thirty-day deadline was imposed prospectively.  See Weaver v. 
Commonwealth, 437 Mass. 1028, 1029 (2002). 
2.  The petitioner.  After trial in 1977, Mandeville was 
convicted of murder in the first degree and armed assault with 
intent to murder.  Commonwealth v. Mandeville, 386 Mass. 393, 
394, 407 (1982).  This court affirmed his convictions on direct 
appellate review.  Id. at 413. 
 
Since his conviction was affirmed, Mandeville has filed 
multiple motions for a new trial, gatekeeper petitions, and 
habeas petitions, none of which has been successful. 
 
In 2017, Mandeville filed his most recent motion for a new 
trial and gatekeeper petition, both of which were denied.  In 
his gatekeeper petition, he noted that the 1982 and 1991 denials 
of his motions for a new trial were pending before the single 
justice.  After his gatekeeper petition was denied, he filed 
another habeas petition.  The superintendent moved to dismiss 
the habeas petition on the ground that it was not filed within 
the AEDPA's one-year deadline.  Mandeville opposed the motion, 
asserting that the Mains deadline applied only to the filing of 
a gatekeeper petition for denials of new trial motions after 
Mains.  The superintendent argued that all gatekeeper petitions 
6 
 
that could have been filed as of the date of the decision in 
Mains had to be filed within thirty days from December 13, 2000.  
Therefore, the superintendent maintained, a defendant with a 
pre-Mains denial had to file a gatekeeper petition by January 
12, 2001; otherwise, he or she would be foreclosed from doing so 
by Mains.  As the judge noted, if the superintendent's view is 
correct, the time to file a habeas petition would have begun to 
run from January 13, 2001, and would have expired before 
Mandeville filed his petition in August 2017.  Presented with 
the two differing interpretations of Mains, the judge certified 
the above question to this court, asking us to determine the 
application of the Mains time limitation to denials of motions 
for a new trial that occurred before December 13, 2000. 
Discussion.  Mandeville argues that the thirty-day time 
limitation established in Mains does not apply to pre-Mains 
denials of motions for a new trial.  He further asserts that 
such denials are not subject to any time limitation, absent a 
further decision from this court.  The superintendent disagrees 
with Mandeville's interpretation of Mains.  We conclude that the 
thirty-day time limitation established in Mains does not apply 
to denials that occurred before December 13, 2000. 
As discussed supra, G. L. c. 278, § 33E, does not contain a 
time limit for filing a gatekeeper petition, but the court in 
Mains imposed a thirty-day time limit, to be applied 
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prospectively.  Mains, 433 Mass. at 36 n.10.  Since Mains, we 
have not addressed directly the applicability of the Mains rule 
to pre-Mains denials of motions for a new trial, but we did 
touch on the issue in Commonwealth v. Nassar, 454 Mass. 1008 
(2009).  In Nassar, we denied a petitioner's appeal from the 
denial of a gatekeeper petition filed in 2008, seeking review of 
a 1982 denial of a motion for a new trial.  Id. at 1008-1009.  
In denying Nassar's gatekeeper petition, the single justice 
wrote: 
"[Nassar] claims that, at the time [of the denial of his 
motion for a new trial in 1982], there was no time limit 
for appealing the denial of his motion for a new trial. 
. . .  First, he is wrong.  The appeal period always has 
been thirty days.  Second, even if there were some 
ambiguity about the appeal period, the defendant's reliance 
on [Mains] is fatal.  The Mains case was decided on 
December 13, 2000.  Therefore, if Mains settled the issue, 
the defendant's application should have been filed within 
thirty days after December 13, 2000." 
 
Commonwealth vs. Nassar, Supreme Judicial Court, No. SJ-2008-
0352 (Dec. 4, 2008). 
 
The subsequent full court opinion, however, did not adopt the 
single justice's view that the appeal period always had been 
thirty days, nor did it apply the same reasoning regarding the 
application of Mains.  The full court concluded that Nassar's 
appeal was barred by the rule that "the decision of the single 
justice, acting as a gatekeeper pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, 
is 'final and unreviewable.'"  Nassar, supra at 1009, quoting 
Commonwealth v. Herbert, 445 Mass. 1018, 1018 (2005), and 
8 
 
Commonwealth v. Perez, 442 Mass. 1019, 1019 (2004).  The court 
observed in a footnote that Nassar "[m]anifestly . . . did not 
file the instant gatekeeper petition within a reasonable time," 
noting that his "gatekeeper petition was filed more than twenty-
five years after the 1982 denial, [and] more than seven years 
after we announced, albeit prospectively, that a gatekeeper 
petition must be filed within thirty days of the denial of a 
motion for a new trial."  Id. at 1009 n.2.  It therefore appears 
that the court did not view Nassar as being subject to the Mains 
deadline. 
Federal cases reflect the ambiguity.  In Currie, 281 F.3d 
at 271, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
noted that Mains created a thirty-day time limit, but that 
"finality concerns [that underlie AEDPA's statute of 
limitations] are limited to a relatively small subset of 
petitioners:  Massachusetts [S]tate prisoners who were convicted 
of first degree murder and whose new trial motions had been 
denied, but not appealed, when the [Supreme Judicial Court] 
imposed the new [thirty]-day limit in December, 2000."  The 
court went on to note that "Massachusetts appears to have been 
alone -- at least within this Circuit -- in its decision to 
impose no time limit on a certain class of appeals from the 
denial of post-conviction relief."  Id. at 271 n.12.  In the 
nonprecedential ruling on Mandeville's earlier habeas 
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application, the Federal District Court judge relied on Currie, 
writing that "because Mains only applies prospectively, motions 
for a new trial that were denied before the decision, but never 
appealed, are still governed by the rules of procedure as they 
existed beforehand –- and there was apparently no time limit 
whatsoever for filing a gatekeeper petition."  Mandeville vs. 
Spencer, U.S. Dist. Ct., No. CV 14-12220-FDS, slip op. at 11 (D. 
Mass. July 23, 2015), citing Currie, supra at 271. 
Moreover, although the superintendent is correct that Mains 
discussed the interests of consistency and finality, Mains, 433 
Mass. at 36 n.10, those interests do not compel us to adopt the 
position that the Mains deadline applies to pre-Mains denials of 
motions for a new trial.  Where, as here, there is legitimate 
disagreement regarding the application of a rule that would 
foreclose a specific class of defendants from seeking certain 
postconviction relief, finality and consistency interests do not 
always override the defendants' interest in their ability to 
seek postconviction relief.3  See Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 481 
 
3 In addition, the superintendent supports this position 
with an analogy to statutes or judicial decisions providing for 
new or shortened time limits for civil claims.  See, e.g., 
Massachusetts Gen. Hosp. v. Grassi, 356 Mass. 1, 2-4 (1969) 
(court rule shortening time during which no action could be 
taken in pending suit before dismissal applied to suits already 
filed, but only if adequate notice was provided to litigants).  
The civil cases, however, do not mandate retroactive application 
of a new deadline. 
10 
 
Mass. 582, 596 (2019) ("finality principle remains fundamental 
to our system of justice, yet other well-settled principles 
regarding the effect of a conviction and the scope of the right 
to an appeal remind us that it is not altogether inviolable"). 
We also decline to impose a requirement that a gatekeeper 
petition must be filed within a specific time after the denial 
of a pre-Mains motion for a new trial.  Because we conclude that 
Mandeville is not subject to Mains, we need not reach his 
argument that "the absence of fair notice that the thirty-day 
time limit may apply to decisions that predated Mains, 
extinguishing [his] right to pursue gatekeeper petitions on 
decisions that predated Mains, would violate his right to due 
process." 
Conclusion.  We answer the reported question that the 
thirty-day time limitation established in Mains does not apply 
to denials that occurred before December 13, 2000. 
The Reporter of Decisions is to furnish attested copies of 
this opinion to the clerk of this court.  The clerk in turn will 
transmit one copy, under the seal of the court, to the clerk of 
the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts, as the answer to the question certified, and also 
will transmit a copy to each party.