Case Title: Herrington v. State

Citation: 287 Ark. 228, 697 S.W.2d 899

Docket Number: CR 85-135

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1985-10-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
697 S.W.2d 899 (1985) 287 Ark. 228 Michael Daniel HERRINGTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. No. CR 85-135. Supreme Court of Arkansas. October 28, 1985. Switzer & Switzer by Bruce D. Switzer, Crossett, for appellant. Steve Clark, Atty. Gen. by Sandra Tucker Partridge, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee. HOLT, Chief Justice. Petitioner, Michael Herrington, was convicted by a jury of possession of a controlled substance. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to quash the search warrant since the supporting affidavit did not mention the time during which the criminal activity was observed. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction in a threethree decision. Herrington v. State, 15 Ark.App. 248, 692 S.W.2d 251 (1985). As we granted petitioner's petition for review, our jurisdiction is pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. 29(6). We reverse. The primary issue in this case involves the application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S. Ct. 3405, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984), and adopted by this court in McFarland & Soest v. State, 284 Ark. 533, 684 S.W.2d 233 (1985); Lincoln v. State, 285 Ark. 107, 685 S.W.2d 166 (1985); Toland v. State, 285 Ark. 415, 688 S.W.2d 718 and State v. Anderson, 286 Ark. 58, 688 S.W.2d 947 (1985). As we explained in Anderson, the Supreme Court in Leon held that "`objective good faith reliance' by a police officer upon the acceptance of his affidavit by a detached, neutral magistrate will avoid application of the exclusionary rule in the event the magistrate's assessment is found to be *900 in error." This is because "the exclusionary rule is designed to deter misconduct on the part of the police rather than to punish errors of judges and magistrates." Anderson, supra. We further noted in Anderson that: Here, the warrant's validity is being questioned because there is no indication in the affidavit of when the criminal activity was observed. The warrant was based on a form affidavit with the information inserted in the blanks on the form. The affidavit provided as follows: Our review of the probable cause for the issuance of the warrant is confined to the information contained in the affidavit as that was the only information before the magistrate when he issued the warrant. Baxter v. State, 262 Ark. 303, 556 S.W.2d 428 (1977). In Collins v. State, 280 Ark. 453, 658 S.W.2d 877 (1983), as here, we were reviewing a three-three decision by the court of appeals on the validity of an affidavit which was the basis for the issuance of a search warrant. That affidavit likewise did not mention when an informant had seen marijuana growing in the petitioner's home. We stated: Pursuant to Leon and Collins, we do not hold that the absence of a reference *901 to time in an affidavit makes the subsequent warrant automatically defective. Rather, in such a situation, we look to the four corners of the affidavit to determine if we can establish with certainty the time during which the criminal activity was observed. If the time can be inferred in this manner, then the police officer's objective good faith reliance on the magistrate's assessment will cure the omission. Here, however, the omission of any reference to time is so complete that none can be inferred. The only statements that are in the present tense are those pre-printed on the form. The information supplied by the affiant is imprecise ("I have probable cause to believe that on or in" (emphasis added)) and is worded in the past tense. There are no terms such as "recently" or "now" and no reference to an urgent situation as mentioned in Collins, supra, which would enable the court to ascertain the time factor. Accordingly the affidavit is defective and the warrant invalid. In Leon, the Supreme Court not only announced the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, it also delineated four errors which an officer's objective good faith cannot cure. These occur (1) when the magistrate is misled by information the affiant knew was false; (2) if the magistrate wholly abandons his detached and neutral judicial role; (3) when the affidavit is "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable", quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2265, 45 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1975); and (4) when a warrant is so facially deficient "that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid", Leon, supra, 104 S.Ct. at pp. 3421-22. In its discussion of the third exception, the Court explained, "sufficient information must be presented to the magistrate to allow that official to determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others," quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983). An affidavit such as this, with absolutely no reference to a time frame, does not provide sufficient information upon which a probable cause determination can be made. The issuance of a warrant on such an affidavit accordingly violates Ark. Const. art. 2, § 15 and results in an unreasonable search and seizure. The evidence obtained in this manner should have been suppressed. We need not address petitioner's second point since he prevails on his first argument. Reversed. PURTLE, J., not participating.