Case Title: BENDER v. UNITA COUNTY ASSESSOR

Citation: 

Docket Number: 00-73

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2000-12-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
BENDER v. UNITA COUNTY ASSESSOR2000 WY 20714 P.3d 906Case Number: 00-73Decided: 12/07/2000Supreme Court of Wyoming
 
DONALD E. BENDER, 
Appellant (Petitioner), v.THE UINTA COUNTY ASSESSOR; THE 
UINTA COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION; and WYOMING STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, 
Appellees (Respondents).

W.R.A.P. 12.09(b) 
Certification from the District Court of Laramie County The Honorable Nicholas 
G. Kalokathis, Judge.

Donald E. 
Bender, Appellant, pro se.V. Anthony Vehar of Vehar Law Offices, 
P.C., Evanston, Wyoming, for Appellee Uinta County Assessor.No 
appearance, for Appellees Uinta County Board of Equalization and Wyoming 
State Board of Equalization:

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and THOMAS, GOLDEN, HILL & KITE, JJ.

KITE, 
Justice.

[¶1] Appellant 
Donald E. Bender appealed to the State Board of Equalization (SBOE) from the 
Uinta County Board of Equalization's (CBOE) decision that Appellee Uinta County 
Assessor's refund calculations for the 1995 and 1996 residential property taxes 
were correct. The assessor's calculations were based on an earlier SBOE decision 
which affirmed the property's 1995 and 1996 construction classifications of 3.0 
and fair market values of $128,000. The SBOE dismissed this second appeal 
concluding Mr. Bender was collaterally estopped from challenging the refund 
calculation because it constituted a relitigation of the valuation issue which 
had been fully and finally adjudicated. We affirm and award the assessor costs 
pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.05.

ISSUES

[¶2] Mr. Bender 
frames the issues as follows:

1. Did the Uinta County 
Assessor use the WYS CAMA system that was provided to her by the Wyoming State 
Department of Revenue pursuant to W.S. 39-13-103(b)(ii) to determine the "Total 
Value Used to Calculate Tax" for 1995 and 1996?

2. Did the Uinta County 
Assessor calculate the "Total Value Used to Calculate Tax" for 1995 and 1996 in 
accordance with Chapter 9 Ad Valorem Valuation Methodology and Assessment (Local 
Assessments) rules and regulations of the Wyoming State Department of Revenue 
pursuant to W.S. 39-13-103(b)(ii)?

3. Whether there is 
statutory or other legal authority superior to W.S. 39-13-103(b)(ii) to support 
the July 26, 1999 dismissal decision of the Uinta County Board of Equalization 
without a hearing, or briefing of the facts and the law?

4. Whether there is 
statutory or other legal authority superior to W.S. 39-13-103(b)(ii) to support 
the February 12, 1999 "affirmed" Order, and the November 30, 1999 "dismissed 
with prejudice" Order of the Wyoming State Board of Equalization without a 
hearing, or briefing of the facts and the law, when it is acting in [its] 
"adjudicatory capacity?"

[¶3] The 
assessor presents the issues in the following manner:

A. Was the decision of 
the State Board of Equalization finding Appellant collaterally estopped from 
pursuing his petition for review and dismissing Appellant's petition for review 
according to procedures required by law, supported by substantial evidence and 
neither arbitrary, capricious nor inconsistent with law?

B. Is there a lack of 
reasonable cause for Appellant's appeal such that he should be sanctioned 
pursuant to W.R.A.P. Rule 10.05?

FACTS

[¶4] In 1995 and 
1996, the assessor valued Mr. Bender's residential property located in Uinta 
County.1 Mr. Bender appealed from both 
valuations to the CBOE. On August 5, 1996, the CBOE issued two separate 
decisions for the 1995 and 1996 valuations pursuant to which it determined the 
3.5 construction classifications2 applied by the assessor were 
incorrect and the proper classifications were 3.0. The assessor appealed from 
both decisions to the SBOE. The SBOE consolidated the appeals and remanded the 
matters back to the CBOE, instructing it to supplement its factual bases for the 
decisions. The CBOE complied, submitting its Supplemental Findings of Fact. 
Throughout the course of these first SBOE proceedings, Mr. Bender contended the 
CBOE decisions should be affirmed. On February 12, 1999, the SBOE issued its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order (SBOE Value Decision) 
affirming the CBOE's decisions for 1995 and 1996 as supplemented. Specifically, 
the SBOE affirmed the CBOE's determination that the evidence justified a 
construction class of 3.0 and a fair market value of $128,000 for tax years 1995 
and 1996.3 No appeal was taken from the SBOE 
Value Decision.

[¶5] Six months 
later, on August 24, 1999, Mr. Bender filed a second "protective" appeal with 
the SBOE from a CBOE letter dated July 26, 1999. The letter advised Mr. Bender 
that the assessor's computation of the residential property tax refunds, 
totaling $94.35 for 1995 and 1996, was computed based on the $128,000 property 
value affirmed by the unchallenged SBOE Value Decision.4 On November 3, 1999, the SBOE 
issued a notice of intent to dismiss this second appeal with prejudice. 5 The notice advised the parties 
that, despite Mr. Bender's description of his appeal issue as "the correct 
method to calculate the 1995 and 1996 refund," it was in fact a second appeal of 
the 1995 and 1996 fair market values and was therefore barred by the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel. The parties were provided fifteen days to file written 
objections to the dismissal. Mr. Bender filed an objection in which he asserted 
the new appeal was not an attempt to relitigate the 1995 and 1996 fair market 
values of his property. He further contended the SBOE Value Decision, which he 
did not appeal, was erroneous and not supported by the prior CBOE decisions and 
the Supplemental Findings of Fact. The SBOE dismissed this second appeal with 
prejudice (SBOE Dismissal). Mr. Bender filed a request for reconsideration which 
was denied. He appealed to the district court which certified the case to this 
Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b).

STANDARD OF 
REVIEW

[¶6] When a case 
is certified to this Court pursuant to W.R.A.P. 12.09(b), we examine the 
decision as if we were the reviewing court of first instance and will affirm the 
decision on any legal ground appearing in the record. Van Gundy v. Wyoming 
Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, Department of Employment, State of 
Wyoming, 964 P.2d 1268, 1269 (Wyo. 1998); Sheridan Planning Association v. Board 
of Sheridan County Commissioners, 924 P.2d 988, 990 (Wyo. 
1996).

DISCUSSION

A. Collateral 
Estoppel

[¶7] The SBOE 
Value Decision held in pertinent part as follows:

The decisions of the 
Uinta County Board of Equalization for both 1995 and 1996 establishing a 3.0 
construction classification for the residential property located at . . . 
Evanston, Uinta County, Wyoming and fair market value of $128,000.00, shall be, 
and the same are hereby affirmed.

[¶8] This 
holding was consistent with Mr. Bender's argument urging the SBOE to affirm the 
CBOE's decisions. The SBOE Value Decision also reflected the following notice to 
the parties:

Pursuant to Wyo. Stat. § 
16-3-114 and Rule 12, Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure, any pe rson 
aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by this decision may seek judicial 
review in the appropriate district court by filing a petition for review within 
30 days of the date of this decision.

[¶9] Neither the 
assessor nor Mr. Bender filed an appeal from the SBOE Value Decision. However, 
Mr. Bender's second appeal to the SBOE, in effect, challenged the original SBOE 
Value Decision. It is evident from the manner in which Mr. Bender framed this 
second appeal that he was challenging the validity of the property value 
established by the SBOE Value Decision and the subsequent application of that 
value by county officials to determine the 1995 and 1996 tax refunds. For 
example, Mr. Bender contends the CBOE application of the $128,000 as the fair 
market value constituted a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 39-2-102 (Michie 
1997).6 This tax code provision mandates 
annual valuation of all property at its fair market value pursuant to the rules 
and regulations as promulgated by the Department of Revenue. Mr. Bender's 
argument that the $128,000 valuation affirmed by the SBOE Value Decision 
violated § 39-2-102 can have only one possible interpretation: It is a renewed 
attack on the question of value.

[¶10] Mr. Bender 
also argues that the SBOE Value Decision was in error because it incorporated 
the CBOE's Supplemental Findings of Fact regarding the $128,000 value and the 
original CBOE decisions of August 5, 1996, were not separately amended or 
supplemented to include those findings. Therefore, he argues the only CBOE 
holding the SBOE could affirm was the determination of the 3.0 construction 
class which did not refer to the $128,000 value. Mr. Bender provides no 
authority for the proposition that the SBOE cannot base its decision on the 
CBOE's Supplemental Findings of Fact in addition to the underlying CBOE 
decisions. Furthermore, this argument again presents what can only be construed 
as a blatant effort to relitigate the value established by the unchallenged SBOE 
Value Decision.

[¶11] We 
conclude this case is not the proper or timely vehicle for presentation of these 
arguments.

[¶12] We have 
held that the related doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to 
final determinations by administrative agencies. In [Slavens v. Board of County 
Commissioners for Uinta County, 854 P.2d 683 (Wyo. 1993)], we applied collateral 
estoppel, sometimes described as issue preclusion, in reviewing the final 
decision of the board of county commissioners because such agencies deal 
primarily with issues rather than with claims that can be pleaded in an action 
in court. The doctrine of issue preclusion prevents the relitigation of issues 
actually and necessarily decided previously in an action between the same 
parties. Collateral estoppel forecloses relitigation when the issue presented is 
identical to one determined in a prior proceeding; when the prior proceeding 
produced a decision on the merits of the issue; when the party against whom 
issue preclusion is asserted was a party, or in privity with the party, in the 
prior proceeding; and when the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted 
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior 
proceeding.

[¶13] University 
of Wyoming v. Gressley, 978 P.2d 1146, 1153 (Wyo. 1999) (citations omitted). The 
SBOE made the following analysis in the SBOE Dismissal:

9. The four part test set 
out in Gressley is met in this matter. The issue presented in the present 
appeal, at its heart, is the 1995 and 1996 fair market valuation of Petitioner's 
property. This is identical to the issue which was presented to the SBOE in 
consolidated dockets 95-137 and 96-114. The prior proceeding reached a decision 
on the merits as evidenced by the February 12, 1999 decision. . . . [Mr. 
Bender], the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted, was clearly a 
party in the prior proceedings. Finally, [Mr. Bender] was provided a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior 
proceedings.

[¶14] We agree 
with this analysis. "A full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue is all 
that is required for the collateral estoppel doctrine to apply." Wilkinson v. 
State ex rel. Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division, 991 P.2d 1228, 
1234 (Wyo. 1999).

[¶15] Faced with 
the SBOE Dismissal based solely on the doctrine of collateral estoppel, Mr. 
Bender failed to even address this issue in his opening brief before this Court. 
He eventually addressed the issue in his reply brief, in response to the 
assessor's argument, and then only in the most deficient and cursory manner. Mr. 
Bender's failure to provide any degree of cogent argument to refute the 
application of collateral estoppel is remarkable. He instead spends his efforts, 
and this Court's time, challenging the $128,000 valuation which he failed to 
contest within thirty days of the SBOE Value Decision. Subsequent actions are 
barred when no appeal was taken from the initial administrative decision. See 
Slavens v. Board of County Commissioners for Uinta County, 854 P.2d 683, 686-87 
(Wyo. 1993). The SBOE properly applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to 
dismiss the appeal with prejudice, and for this reason we will not address Mr. 
Bender's additional issues.

B. 
Sanctions

[¶16] The 
assessor has asked this Court to sanction Mr. Bender pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
10.057 and award it costs and attorneys 
fees. W.R.A.P. 1.02(a) provides in relevant part:

(a) All appeals, reviews 
pursuant to Rule 12, certifications under Rules 11 or 12, and petitions for 
review shall be governed by these rules.

[¶17] This case 
was certified to this Court pursuant to the provisions of W.R.A.P. 12.09(b). As 
provided in W.R.A.P. 1.02(a), W.R.A.P. 12.09(b) certifications are governed by 
the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure. On this authority, we conclude that 
the sanctions provided in W.R.A.P. 10.05 govern certifications arising under 
W.R.A.P. 12.09(b).

[¶18] As 
reflected by this Court's docket, during the past two years Mr. Bender has 
appeared as an appellant in numerous cases of various kinds and character. He 
seems to personify the term "litigious" to the effect it describes one who is 
"fond of litigation; prone to engage in suits." 8 We are confronted with a case 
clearly barred from review by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Even if 
review were not barred, his claim of error is unsupported by cogent argument and 
fails to meaningfully address the primary issue, namely the SBOE application of 
collateral estoppel. See Mead v. State, 2 P.3d 564 (Wyo. 2000). In the best 
light, this case is an intentional rehash of the valuation cases previously 
litigated.

[¶19] Mr. Bender 
appears pro se. As we noted in Stone v. Stone, 7 P.3d 887, 890-91 (Wyo. 2000) 
(citations omitted):

[W]e expect pro se 
litigants to comply with the Wyoming rules of appellate procedure in the same 
way that trained lawyers are expected to perform. While we may make allowances 
for pro se litigants, they are not excused from the requirement that their brief 
be supported by cogent argument and citations to pertinent 
authority.

[¶20] We 
conclude there is no reasonable ground for this certification and this is one of 
those rare circumstances where sanctions pursuant to W.R.A.P. 10.05 are 
appropriate. See Small v. Convenience Plus Partners, Ltd., 6 P.3d 1254 (Wyo. 
2000).

[¶21] The SBOE 
Dismissal is affirmed. The assessor shall submit a statement of costs and 
attorney fees associated with the response to this certification to this Court. 
Upon review, we will award an appropriate amount in the form of 
sanctions.

Footnotes

1 In 1995, 
Mr. Bender appealed from the 1995 valuation to the CBOE. The CBOE issued an 
order affirming the assessor's valuation. Mr. Bender appealed to the SBOE. The 
parties (the assessor and Mr. Bender) then requested that the 1995 valuation be 
remanded to the CBOE for rehearing. The SBOE remanded the case. In the meantime, 
the 1996 valuation was issued, and Mr. Bender appealed to the CBOE. The CBOE 
held a rehearing on the 1995 valuation and an initial hearing on the 1996 
valuation.

2 
Construction classification is one factor input into the Assisted Mass. 
Appraisal System maintained by the Department of Revenue and used by assessors 
to annually develop residential property fair market values. It reflects the 
quality of construction as it impacts the physical attributes and relevant 
physical data of the property. See Department of Revenue Rules, Ad Valorem 
Valuation Methodology and Assessment (Local Assessments), ch. 9, § 6(a) & 
(b)(ii).

3 The 
specific language of the CBOE's Supplemental Findings of Fact affirmed by the 
SBOE Value Decision was as follows: "The preponderance of evidence as presented 
in [this] case justifies a construction class type 3.0 and a fair market value 
of $128,000.00."

4 The July 
26, 1999, CBOE letter stated in its entirety:

We have 
reviewed your July 21 letter. We are of the opinion that you are due ninety-four 
dollars and thirty-five cents ($94.35). The only difference in your calculations 
and the Assessor's calculations is the value placed on the land in question. The 
Assessor uses the figure of $128,000 for 1995 and 1996. You use the figures 
$123,855 and $123,124, respectively. You make several interesting points about 
how that figure was arrived at and the authority of the State Board of 
Equalization, but we are not the proper body to address the 
points.

After the 
State Board of Equalization's decision declared the value of your property to be 
$128,000, you had thirty (30) days to appeal that decision to the Wyoming Court 
System. For whatever reason you chose not to appeal. We will not now take up a 
de[]facto appeal on this issue.

Further, the 
Board will no longer entertain or respond to issues dependent on a 1995 or 1996 
value different than the adjudicated $128,000.

We thank you 
for your time and effort put forth in your explanation. Enclosed is the check 
for $94.35.

5 State Board 
of Equalization Rules, Rules of Practice and Procedure for Appeals Before the 
State Board of Equalization from a County Board of Equalization, ch. 3, § 5(c) 
states:

(c) Board 
Action on Own Motion - For good cause, the Board may take action on its own 
motion by providing notice of its intent to take the action and the reasons 
therefore to all parties. The notice of intent shall advise the parties they may 
file written objections within fifteen (15) days of service of the 
notice.

6 Section 
39-2-102 provided: "All taxable property shall be annually valued at its fair 
market value. Except as otherwise provided by law for specific property, the 
department shall prescribe by rule and regulation the appraisal methods and 
systems for determining fair market value using generally accepted appraisal 
standards." This section was repealed by 1998 Wyo. Sp. Sess. Laws ch. 5, § 4 and 
recreated at § 39-13-103(b)(ii) by 1998 Wyo. Sp. Sess. Laws ch. 5, § 1 effective 
March 6, 1998.

7 W.R.A.P. 
10.05 provides:

If the 
judgment or appealable order is affirmed in a civil case, appellee shall recover 
the cost for publication of the brief with the cost to be computed at the rate 
allowed by law for making the transcript of the evidence. If the court certifies 
there was no reasonable cause for the appeal, a reasonable amount for attorneys' 
fees and damages to the appellee shall be fixed by the appellate court and taxed 
as part of the costs in the case. The amount for attorneys' fees shall not be 
less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor more than five thousand dollars 
($5,000.00). The amount for damages to the appellee shall not exceed two 
thousand dollars ($2,000.00).

8 Black's Law 
Dictionary 934 (6th ed. 1990).