Case Title: Robinson v. Nabisco, Inc.

Citation: 

Docket Number: S43918

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2000-09-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED: SEPTEMBER 28, 2000  
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of the Compensation ofKATHLEEN A. ROBINSON, Claimant.
	Petitioner on Review,
	v.
NABISCO, INC.,
	Respondent on Review.
(WCB 93-02515; CA A85643; SC S43918)

	On review from the Court of Appeals.*
	Argued and submitted November 3, 1997.  Reassigned February
3, 1998.
	Robert Wollheim, of Welch, Bruun, Green & Wollheim,
Portland, argued the cause and filed the petition for petitioner
on review.  
	David L. Johnstone, of Vavrosky, Maccoll, Olson & Miller,
Portland, argued the cause for respondent on review.  With him on
the briefs were Karli L. Olson, Portland, and Patric J. Doherty,
Portland.
	Kimberley Chaput, of Pozzi, Wilson, Atchison, LLP, Portland,
filed a brief on behalf of amici curiae Oregon Workers'
Compensation Attorneys and Oregon Trial Lawyers Association.
David L. Runner, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, filed a brief on behalf of amici curiae SAIF Corporation and Max J. Kuney Company.

	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Van Hoomissen,
Durham, and Kulongoski, Justices.**
	DURHAM, J.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The order
of the Workers' Compensation Board is reversed, and the case is
remanded to the Workers' Compensation Board for further
proceedings.  
	*Judicial review from the Workers' Compensation Board.	143 Or App 59, 923 P2d 668 (1996).
	**Fadeley, J., retired January 31, 1998 and did not
participate in this decision.  Graber, J., resigned March 31,
1998 and did not participate in this decision.  Leeson and Riggs,
JJ., did not participate in the consideration or decision in this
case.
	DURHAM, J.
	In this workers' compensation case, the issue is
whether claimant is entitled to compensation for an injury
suffered during a compelled medical examination (CME) under ORS
656.325(1)(a) (1) that her employer requested.  The Workers'
Compensation Board (Board) upheld employer's denial of
compensation, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.  Robinson v.
Nabisco, Inc., 143 Or App 59, 923 P2d 668 (1996).  For the
reasons stated below, we reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals and the order of the Board, and remand the case to the
Board for further proceedings.
	The facts in this case are undisputed.  In 1981,
claimant sustained a compensable low back strain and leg
radiculopathy, both on her right side, while working.  Between
1981 and 1991, claimant aggravated her back condition several
times.  Claimant received permanent partial disability benefits
and was treated at various times during that period.  Claimant
has not worked since April 1988.  In April 1991, claimant and
employer entered into a disputed claim settlement in which
employer denied an upper-back injury as a new injury or
occupational disease, but continued acceptance of claimant's
other conditions as an aggravation of her original 1981 claim.
	In June 1992, at employer's direction, claimant
participated in a CME with Dr. Watson.  During the examination,
claimant complained of back pain.  Watson directed claimant to
raise her legs while lying on her back.  Claimant stated that she
could not raise her right leg.  Watson then asked claimant to
raise her left leg.  When claimant raised her left leg, Watson
moved it to a position beyond the point where claimant had moved
it.  Claimant felt immediate pain in the left low back and hip
area.  Medical tests indicated that Watson's maneuver had caused
a new injury, specifically, a disc herniation on the left side. 
Doctors recommended surgical treatment for that injury. 
	 Claimant sought workers' compensation for the
treatment and surgery.  Employer partially denied the claim, and
claimant requested a hearing.  In March 1993, claimant underwent
surgery with another doctor to repair the disc herniation on the
left side.  
	Before the administrative law judge (ALJ), claimant
argued that her CME injury was compensable for either of two
reasons, which we identify below.  Her compensability arguments
concern the application of ORS 656.005(7), which provides, in
part: 
		"(a) A 'compensable injury' is an accidental
injury, or accidental injury to prosthetic appliances,
arising out of and in the course of employment
requiring medical services or resulting in disability
or death; an injury is accidental if the result is an
accident, whether or not due to accidental means, if it
is established by medical evidence supported by
objective findings, subject to the following
limitations:
		"(A) No injury or disease is compensable as a
consequence of a compensable injury unless the
compensable injury is the major contributing cause of
the consequential condition.
		"(B) If an otherwise compensable injury combines
at any time with a preexisting condition to cause or
prolong disability or a need for treatment, the
combined condition is compensable only if, so long as
and to the extent that the otherwise compensable injury
is the major contributing cause of the disability of
the combined condition or the major contributing cause
of the need for treatment of the combined condition."
(Emphasis added.)  
	First, claimant contended that the CME injury was a new
compensable injury and that the injury and her need for treatment
arose out of and within the course of employment. (2)  ORS
656.005(7)(a).   Second, claimant contended that the CME injury
was compensable as a consequence of a compensable injury under
ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A).  
	After a hearing in May 1993, the ALJ upheld employer's
partial denial of claimant's injury.  The ALJ did not analyze the
facts to determine whether claimant's CME injury arose out of and
in the course of her employment.  The ALJ determined that the CME
injury was a new injury that was a "consequence" of claimant's
original injury.  Accordingly, the ALJ applied the major
contributing cause standard that governs the compensability of
consequential conditions.  See ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A) (setting out
that standard).  The ALJ concluded that claimant's CME injury was
not compensable, because the major contributing cause of that
injury was Watson's conduct during the CME "or the combination of
that injury with some degree of preexisting degenerative disc
disease in the spine," not claimant's original 1981 injury.
	On review, the Board adopted the ALJ's order.  The
Board agreed with the ALJ that claimant had not demonstrated that
the 1981 compensable injury was the major contributing cause of
the 1992 CME injury.  As noted, the Court of Appeals affirmed. 
This court allowed claimant's petition for review. 
	On review, petitioner contends that her CME injury is
compensable under the following test stated by this court in
Andrews v. Tektronix, Inc., 323 Or 154, 162, 915 P2d 972 (1996): 
		"In particular factual circumstances, various
tests may prove helpful in measuring and
conceptualizing the strength of the connection between
the claimant's injury and employment.  Still, the
ultimate test is the same:  Considering all the
pertinent circumstances, are the temporal, spatial,
circumstantial, and causal connections between the
claimant's injury and employment sufficient to justify
compensation, when sufficiency is evaluated in the
light of the Act's policy of providing financial
protection to workers who are injured in the course of
employment, regardless of fault?  Thus, when confronted
with a test that purports to determine whether an
injury sustained under a particular set of factual
circumstances is compensable, we must ask, 'Is the test
compatible with that formulation?'"  
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the connection
between claimant's 1992 CME injury and her employment is
sufficient to justify compensation.  In addition, we conclude
that the limitation in ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A), regarding a
consequential condition, is inapplicable to this case.  It
follows from those conclusions that claimant's 1992 CME injury is
a compensable injury.
	Our task is to determine whether claimant's 1992 CME
injury is a "compensable injury" under ORS 656.005(7)(a). 
Because we must construe the statute, the principles set out in
PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610-12, 859
P2d 1143 (1993), guide our interpretation.  We begin by
considering the text and context of the statute.  Id. at 610-11. 
We also consider, at the first level of analysis, prior case law
from this court that interprets the same statutory wording, as
well as other related statutes.  State v. Toevs, 327 Or 525, 532,
964 P2d 1007 (1998).  
	The text of ORS 656.005(7)(a) describes a series of
legal issues that govern the determination whether an accidental
injury is compensable.  Under that statute, the first question is
whether the claim concerns an accidental injury that "aris[es]
out of and in the course of employment * * *."  If the answer to
that question is "yes," then the injury is compensable.  ORS
656.005(7)(a)(A) and (B) state the bases, which the statute
describes as "limitations," for determining the compensability of
injuries and diseases denominated as "consequential" and
"combined" conditions.  Under the limitation that employer
asserts is pertinent here, ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A), no injury or
disease is "compensable as a consequence of a compensable injury"
unless the compensable injury is the "major contributing cause"
of the consequential condition.  The phrase "compensable as a
consequence of a compensable injury" indicates that the major
contributing cause standard in that limitation applies only if
the compensability determination depends on a showing that the
injury or disease is a consequence of a compensable condition.   
	Following the analytical path that the text of ORS
656.005(7)(a) describes, we first inquire under that statute
whether claimant's injury "aris[es] out of and in the course of"
her employment.  This court views the two prongs of that
compensability test as two parts of a unitary "work-connection"
inquiry that asks whether the relationship between the injury and
the employment is sufficiently close that the injury should be
compensable.  Krushwitz v. McDonald's Restaurants, 323 Or 520,
526, 919 P2d 465 (1996); see also ORS 656.012(1)(c) (stating
legislative finding that "those injuries that bear a sufficient
relationship to employment * * * merit incorporation of their
costs into the stream of commerce").  Thus, although the "arising
out of" and "in the course of" prongs provide guidance, the
unitary work-connection test does not supply a mechanical formula
for determining whether an injury is compensable.  We evaluate
those factors in each case to determine whether the circumstances
of a claimant's injuries are sufficiently connected to employment
to be compensable.  As this court stated in Rogers v. SAIF, 289
Or 633, 643, 616 P2d 485 (1980) quoting Allen v. SAIF, 29 Or App
631, 633-34, 564 P2d 1086 (1977):
			"'The statutory phrase "arising out of
and in the course of employment" must be
applied in each case so as to best effectuate
the socio-economic purpose of the Worker's
Compensation Act:  the financial protection
of the worker and his/her family from poverty
due to injury incurred in production,
regardless of fault, as an inherent cost of
the product to the consumer.  1 Larson,
Workmen's Compensation Law § 2.20.  Various
concepts have arisen from attempts to
rationalize that purpose, e.g., the going and
coming rule, special errands, lunch hour
cases, dual purpose trips, impedimenta of
employment, horseplay, etc.  Each is helpful
for conceptualization and indexing, but there
is no formula for decision.  Etchison v.
SAIF, 8 Or App 395, 398, 494 P2d 455 (1972). 
Rather, in each case, every pertinent factor
must be considered as a part of the whole. 
It is the basic purpose of the Act which
gives weight to particular facts and
direction to the analysis of whether an
injury arises out of and in the course of
employment.'" 
	Claimant's injury must satisfy both prongs of the
work-connection test to some degree; neither is dispositive. 
Krushwitz, 323 Or at 531.  However, if many facts support one
element of that test, fewer facts may support the other.  Redman
Industries, Inc. v. Lang, 326 Or 32, 35, 943 P2d 208 (1997). 
	This court has explained that the "arising out of"
prong of the compensability test in ORS 656.005(7)(a) requires
that "some causal link exist" between the worker's injury and his
or her employment.  Krushwitz, 323 Or at 525-26.  The "in the
course of" employment prong requires that the time, place, and
circumstances of the injury justify connecting the injury to the
employment.  Id. at 526. 
	We begin our analysis of the work-connection test by
applying the "arising out of" prong to claimant's CME injury. 
Claimant's injury arises out of employment if employment exposes
her to some risk from which the injury originates.  Fred Meyer,
Inc. v. Hayes, 325 Or 596, 601, 943 P2d 197 (1997).  
	ORS 656.325(1) entitles only three persons or entities
to request a CME:  the Director of the Department of Consumer and
Business Services, an insurer, and a self-insured employer.  Only
one person is subject to the duty to submit to a CME:  a worker
entitled to receive compensation.  The predicate for any CME is a
work-related injury or disease that entitles the worker to
receive compensation.  Thus, it is a condition of the employment
relationship -- specifically, an injury or disease that occurs on
the job -- that gives rise to the respective rights and duties of
the parties described in ORS 656.325(1).
	The injured worker must comply with a request for a CME
or face suspension of the right to compensation.  In no sense is
the worker's participation in a CME a voluntary act carried out
for personal reasons.
	ORS 656.325(1) does not state explicitly the purpose of
a CME but, in context, the purpose is clear.  A CME is designed
to provide the director, the self-insured employer, or the
employer's insurer with information about claimant's condition
from a doctor who has no fiduciary relationship with claimant,
such as that of an attending physician.  See ORS 656.005(12)(b)
(defining "attending physician," in part, as "a doctor or
physician who is primarily responsible for the treatment of a
worker's compensable injury * * *").  An employer or insurer that
requests a CME, as in this case, might use the examining doctor's
information to protect the employer's legal position on the claim
vis-a-vis the claimant, for example, by challenging the
continuing compensability of the injury or disease, the extent of
any resulting disability, or the nature of medical or
psychological treatment that the claimant may require.
	ORS 656.325(1)(b) obligates the employer's insurer or a
self-insured employer to pay the costs of a CME.  The costs
include the claimant's net lost wages, unless he or she already
receives temporary disability benefits under ORS 656.210(4), as
well as expenses connected with the examination, including child
care, travel, meals, and lodging.
	The statute gives claimants no role in selecting the
person who performs the CME but, by implication, leaves that
matter to the person or entity that requests the examination.  In
the present case, claimant's employer requested the CME, and the
employer's chosen medical examiner, Watson, controlled completely
the examination procedures and the conditions that lead to
claimant's injury.
	The foregoing discussion of the characteristics of a
CME, as described in ORS 656.325(1), demonstrates that some
causal link does exist between claimant's injury during the CME
and a risk connected to a condition of employment.  Claimant's
workplace injury was the event that exposed her to the
possibility that employer might request a CME.  In requesting a
CME, employer was exercising a statutory right granted to it
because of its status as an employer of a worker with a
compensable injury.  Claimant faced a loss of her compensation if
she failed to submit to the examination.  Employer bore the
responsibility of paying claimant's costs connected to the
examination, including, as appropriate, net lost wage
reimbursement.  Finally, the purpose of the examination was to
aid employer in monitoring its continuing exposure to liability
for a work-related injury.  The examination was not an activity
in which claimant chose to participate to serve her personal
interests unconnected to her work.
	The characteristics of a CME, summarized above, show
how the risk of an injury during a CME is one that is distinctly
associated with employment.  Phil A. Livesley Co. v. Russ, 296 Or
25, 29-30, 672 P2d 337 (1983).  Indeed, the fact of employment
and the occurrence of a workplace injury are the minimum
circumstances that give rise to the use of a CME. 
	This court has stated that "'[i]njuries sustained by a
worker in doing the appointed task are normally compensable,
absent self-inflicted injury.'"  Wilson v. State Farm Ins., 326
Or 413, 418, 952 P2d 528 (1998), (quoting Clark v. U.S. Plywood,
288 Or 255, 261, 605 P2d 265 (1980)).  ORS 656.325(1) obligated
claimant, by reason of her status as an employee with a
compensable injury, to carry out the "appointed task" that
employer requested, i.e., submission to a CME administered by
Watson.  Claimant's fulfillment of that statutory obligation
exposed her to the risk that produced her injury.  We are
satisfied that a sufficient causal link exists between claimant's
injury and a risk connected with employment to justify the
conclusion that claimant's injury arose out of employment under
ORS 656.005(7)(a).
	We now turn to the "in the course of" factor of the
work-connection test.  As explained above, that factor "'point[s]
to the time, place and circumstance under which the accident
takes place.'"  Rogers, 289 Or at 639 (quoting Larson v. State
Ind. Acc. Com., 135 Or 137, 139-40, 295 P 195 (1931).  In Fred
Meyer, this court stated:  
		"An injury occurs 'in the course of' employment if
it takes place within the period of employment, at a
place where a worker reasonably may be expected to be,
and while the worker reasonably is fulfilling the
duties of the employment or is doing something
reasonably incidental to it."  
325 Or at 598. 
	Here, the fact that employer exercised control over
claimant at the time of her injury indicates that that injury
occurred in the course of employment.  As already discussed,
employer chose the time, place, and circumstances of claimant's
medical evaluation.  Employer directed claimant to attend and
controlled the circumstances of the CME that lead to claimant's
injury.  Claimant did not volunteer to participate.  But for
employer's directive, claimant would not have attended the
examination.  Claimant's entitlement to compensation for her
costs in attending the CME also suggests that the CME injury
occurred in the course of employment.  See Adams v. Compensation
Department, 249 Or 530, 532-33, 439 P2d 628 (1968) (fact that
deceased worker was compensated for work that occurred during
accident supported finding that accident arose in course and
scope of employment). 
	Claimant participated in the CME for employer's
benefit.  Claimant acknowledges, as she must, that her attendance
at the CME was motivated in part by a desire to avoid the
suspension of her worker's compensation benefits, as described in
ORS 656.325(1)(a).  But her desire to avoid that penalty is
comparable to the desire of all employees to avoid discipline or
discharge by complying with their employer's lawful directives. 
The proper focus is whether the activity promotes some interest
of the employer.  As stated above, the CME in this case served
the interest of employer by providing employer with pertinent
information about claimant's compensable injury.      
	Applying the criteria identified in Fred Meyer, 325 Or
at 598-99, we conclude that claimant's CME injury occurred in the
course of employment.  Because the circumstances of claimant's
injury satisfy, at least to some degree, each prong of the test
stated in ORS 656.005(7)(a), we also conclude that the
relationship between claimant's injury and employment is
sufficient to justify compensation.  See Andrews, 323 Or at 162
(stating analysis).	
	Because claimant's 1992 CME injury arose out of and in
the course of employment, it was, for that reason, a compensable
injury under ORS 656.005(7)(a).  The Board should have
determined, in the first instance, whether the CME injury
occurred while claimant was engaged in a work-connected activity. 
The Board erred in assuming that the CME injury was compensable
only as a consequence of a compensable condition.  If, as here,
the injury is compensable due to its connection to work, the
limitation in ORS 656.005(7)(a)(A) is not applicable.  ORS
656.005(7)(a) does not require claimant to meet the additional
proof requirement that the 1981 injury was the major contributing
cause of the 1992 CME injury.
	In summary, we conclude that claimant's 1992 CME injury
did arise out of and in the course of employment and is a
compensable injury under ORS 656.005(7)(a).  Because that injury
is compensable due to its connection to employment, claimant need
not prove that the 1981 compensable injury was the major
contributing cause of the 1992 CME injury.
	The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.  The
order of the Workers' Compensation Board is reversed, and the
case is remanded to the Workers' Compensation Board for further
proceedings. 	

1.  	ORS 656.325(1) provides:
		"(a) Any worker entitled to receive compensation
under this chapter is required, if requested by the
Director of the Department of Consumer and Business
Services, the insurer or self-insured employer, to
submit to a medical examination at a time reasonably
convenient for the worker as may be provided by the
rules of the director.  However, no more than three
examinations may be requested except after notification
to and authorization by the director.  If the worker
refuses to submit to any such examination, or obstructs
the same, the rights of the worker to compensation
shall be suspended with the consent of the director
until the examination has taken place, and no
compensation shall be payable during or for account of
such period.  The provisions of this paragraph are
subject to the limitations on medical examinations
provided in ORS 656.268.
		"(b) The insurer or self-insured employer shall
pay the costs of the medical examination and related
services which are reasonably necessary to allow the
worker to submit to any examination requested under
this section.  As used in this subsection, 'related
services' includes, but is not limited to, child care,
travel, meals, lodging and an amount equivalent to the
worker's net lost wages for the period during which the
worker is absent if the worker does not receive
benefits pursuant to ORS 656.210(4) during the period
of absence.  A claim for 'related services' described
in this section shall be made in the manner prescribed
by the director."

2. 	For that argument, claimant relied on the dissenting
opinion of Judge Rossman in Beardslee v. Diamond Wood Products,
107 Or App 224, 227, 810 P2d 1352 (1991) (Rossman, J.,
dissenting).  In that opinion, Judge Rossman examined the
relationship between the claimant's work and his attendance at an
employer-requested medical examination and concluded: 
	"* * * I would hold that the relationship between
claimant's injury [incurred while traveling to the
medical examination] and his employment is sufficiently
close to render the injury compensable.  Given
employer's specific directive -- a directive that was
simply being carried out by claimant -- the connection
is too strong to ignore." 
Id. at 228.