Case Title: Commonwealth v. Washington

Citation: 

Docket Number: 010913

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2002-03-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
OPINION BY JUSTICE LEROY R. HASSELL, SR. 
v.  Record No. 010913  
March 1, 2002 
 
DARRELL WASHINGTON 
 
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 
 
 
In this appeal, we consider whether a defendant waived 
his double jeopardy protections afforded by the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.   
I. 
 
Darrell Washington was indicted by a grand jury in 
Arlington County for robbery in violation of Code § 18.2-58 
and use of a firearm during the commission of a robbery in 
violation of Code § 18.2-53.1.  His trial commenced in the 
Circuit Court of Arlington County on December 15, 1999.  The 
jury panel consisted of 20 persons.  One juror, identified as 
Juror No. 5, informed the court that he was excused from jury 
service for the next day.  Four other jurors also informed the 
court that they had been excused from jury service for the 
following day.  The court, however, permitted each of these 
jurors to remain seated as members of the panel.   
 
Before counsel began to conduct their voir dire, the 
circuit court asked the jurors how many were excused for the 
next day and directed defendant's counsel and the 
Commonwealth's Attorney to observe the members of the panel 
 
2
who raised their hands.  After voir dire had been conducted, 
and before counsel began to exercise their peremptory strikes, 
the court asked members of the panel to raise their hands if 
they were excused from jury service the next day. 
 
Defendant's counsel approached the bench and informed the 
court that she was not going to exercise her peremptory 
strikes based upon the availability of members of the jury 
panel.  The court responded that she was not required to do so 
and that it would seek to seat a jury and alternates.  
Defendant's counsel and the Commonwealth's Attorney exercised 
their peremptory strikes.  After the oath had been 
administered to the jury, the court directed the jurors who 
were excused the following day to raise their hands, and one 
juror did so.  The court suggested seating an alternate.  
 
There were only two potential veniremen available to 
serve as an alternate who were not among the original 20 
individuals selected as members of the jury panel.  The 
circuit court suggested that it would use the two members of 
the venire who were not called among the original 20 panel 
members, and the court decided to add two of the jurors who 
had been stricken by defendant's counsel and the 
Commonwealth's Attorney.  Defendant's counsel and the 
Commonwealth's Attorney objected to this procedure. 
 
3
 
Next, the following colloquy occurred among the court, 
the Commonwealth's Attorney, and defendant's counsel:   
 
"[DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL]:  But, Your Honor, under 
normal circumstances, an alternate would not know 
that [he was an alternate]. . . .  I would object to 
that system being used. 
 
 
"THE COURT:  Commonwealth. 
 
 
"[COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY]:  Again, I have the 
same position because now I'm basically out of a 
strike, and [defendant's counsel] is left with the 
potential of picking who is going to be the 
alternate. 
 
 
"THE COURT:  [Code § ] 8.01-360 says, In no 
event shall alternates be told they are alternates. 
 
 
"[COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY]:  I have --  
 
 
"THE COURT:  You are both objecting? 
 
 
"[COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY]:  Well, I'm 
objecting not so much because the other person is 
going to know they are an alternate, but because I 
don't have a decision in who gets to be the 
alternate. 
 
 
 
"THE COURT:  That's a mistrial.  
 
 
"[DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL]:  Your Honor, and I'm 
going to say this --  
 
 
"THE COURT:  Now you are going to have 
jeopardy. 
 
 
"[DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL]:  We have jeopardy, but 
the Court -- 
 
 
"THE COURT:  The Commonwealth won't agree to 
the cure.   
 
 
"[COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY]:  There wasn't a 
jury sworn. 
 
4
 
 
"THE COURT:  No, sir. 
 
 
"[DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL]:  The jurors were sworn. 
 
 
"THE COURT:  I tried to get this case tried and 
tried to get it done, but we are going to fight over 
this.  And you want your statutory right.  You want 
your statutory right. 
 
"We do not have sufficient jurors to have a 
replacement for the juror sworn. 
 
"That's a mistrial. 
 
 
"[DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL]:  Thank you, Your Honor. 
 
 
"[COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY]:  I'm going to ask, 
Your Honor -- could we place it on the docket for 
another day? 
 
 
"THE COURT:  Well, of course that's what we are 
going to do. 
 
 
"[DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL]:  Well, I think there's 
really an argument about --  
 
 
"THE COURT:  Now [defendant's counsel is] going 
to claim that jeopardy attaches. 
 
 
"[DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL]:  Well, it did attach 
because the jurors were sworn. 
 
"We will get the transcript -- 
 
 
"THE COURT:  Now [defendant's counsel] is going 
to move to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. 
 
"You're objecting to my attempted cure to get a 
jury in the box, and you have a right to do that, 
and you have statutory authority for it. 
 
 
"[DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL]:  And we can set a 
date." 
 
 
At a subsequent trial, the defendant made a motion to 
dismiss the indictments on the basis that he was placed in 
jeopardy twice in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the 
 
5
Constitution of the United States.  The circuit court, with a 
different judge presiding, denied the motion, and the case 
proceeded to trial.  The jury convicted the defendant of both 
charges and fixed his punishment at five years in the 
penitentiary on the robbery charge and three years in the 
penitentiary on the use of a firearm charge.  The circuit 
court confirmed the judgment of the jury, and the defendant 
appealed to the Court of Appeals. 
 
The Court of Appeals held that the Double Jeopardy Clause 
of the Constitution of the United States barred the 
defendant's second trial, and the Court entered a judgment 
that reversed the judgment of the circuit court and dismissed 
the defendant's convictions.  Washington v. Commonwealth, 35 
Va. App. 202, 220, 543 S.E.2d 638, 646 (2001).  The 
Commonwealth appeals.   
II. 
 
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States provides that no person shall "be subject for the same 
offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."  
Explaining this constitutional provision, which is referred to 
as the Double Jeopardy Clause, the United States Supreme Court 
has stated:   
"The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained 
in at least the Anglo-American system of 
 
6
jurisprudence, is that the State with all its 
resources and power should not be allowed to make 
repeated attempts to convict an individual for an 
alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to 
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him 
to live in a continuing state of anxiety and 
insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility 
that even though innocent he may be found guilty." 
 
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957); accord 
Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 732 (1998); Digital Equip. 
Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 869-70 (1994);  
Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661-62 (1977); Allen v. 
Commonwealth, 252 Va. 105, 108-09, 472 S.E.2d 277, 279 (1996).  
 
The Double Jeopardy Clause also grants a defendant the 
right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal, 
Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689, reh'g denied, 337 U.S. 921 
(1949), which means "the right . . . to have his trial 
completed before the first jury empaneled to try him."  Oregon 
v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673 (1982); accord Allen, 252 Va. at 
109, 472 S.E.2d at 279. 
 
Even though jeopardy attaches once the jury has been 
sworn, a defendant's double jeopardy protection can be waived.  
For example, we have stated that "[a] person on trial for a 
capital or lesser offense may waive his right to plead former 
jeopardy.  This waiver may be expressed or implied."  Mack v. 
Commonwealth, 177 Va. 921, 930, 15 S.E.2d 62, 65 (1941).  
Indeed, other courts have recognized that a defendant's double 
 
7
jeopardy protection is not an absolute bar to reprosecution 
once a jury has been empaneled and sworn and that the right 
guaranteed by the Double Jeopardy Clause may be waived by 
consent.  United States v. Nichols, 977 F.2d 972, 974 (5th 
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 833 (1993); United States 
v. DiPietro, 936 F.2d 6, 9-12 (1st Cir. 1991); United States 
v. Bauman, 887 F.2d 546, 549 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub 
nom. Talamas v. United States, 493 U.S. 1077 (1990); United 
States v. Miller, 742 F.2d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 1216 (1985); Raslich v. Bannan, 273 F.2d 420, 
420-21 (6th Cir. 1959).   
 
The various United States Courts of Appeals have held 
that a defendant's consent to a mistrial is implied when a 
defendant had an opportunity to object to a mistrial but 
failed to do so.  United States v. Buljubasic, 808 F.2d 1260, 
1265-66 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 815 (1987); United 
States v. Puleo, 817 F.2d 702, 705 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 
484 U.S. 978 (1987); United States v. Goldstein, 479 F.2d 
1061, 1067 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 873 (1973).  And, 
in Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991), the 
Supreme Court cited with approval the legal principle 
articulated in United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335, 1365 
(11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom. Hobson v. United 
 
8
States, 472 U.S. 1017, and cert. denied sub nom. Waldrop v. 
United States, 472 U.S. 1021 (1985), that the absence of an 
objection by a defendant constitutes a waiver of the 
defendant's double jeopardy protection. 
 
We have repeatedly and consistently held that a litigant 
must object to a ruling of the circuit court if that litigant 
desires to challenge the ruling upon appeal.  Remington v. 
Commonwealth, 262 Va. 333, 356, 551 S.E.2d 620, 634 (2001) 
(defendant could not challenge a verdict form on appeal 
because he failed to make an objection to that form in the 
circuit court); Schmitt v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 127, 138, 547 
S.E.2d 186, 194 (2001), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 
840 (2002) (defendant could not challenge on appeal the 
admissibility of evidence because he failed to object to that 
evidence in the circuit court and, therefore, his objection 
was waived); Lenz v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 467, 544 
S.E.2d 299, 308, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 481 
(2001) (defendant could not challenge jury instruction on 
appeal because he did not object in the circuit court); 
Overton v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 599, 603-04, 539 S.E.2d 421, 
423 (2000), cert. dismissed, 532 U.S. 968 (2001) (defendant 
could not challenge the admissibility of photographs that had 
been admitted in the circuit court because he failed to make 
 
9
an objection); Vinson v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 459, 466, 522 
S.E.2d 170, 175 (1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1218 (2000) 
(defendant could not challenge the admissibility of certain 
expert testimony because he failed to raise an objection in 
the circuit court); Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 292, 310, 
513 S.E.2d 642, 654, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 873 (1999) 
(defendant could not challenge the circuit court's failure to 
advise the jury of his eligibility, or lack thereof, for 
parole because he failed to object in the circuit court and 
his failure to object constituted a waiver); Barnabei v. 
Commonwealth, 252 Va. 161, 177, 477 S.E.2d 270, 279 (1996), 
cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1224 (1997) (defendant could not 
challenge jury instructions on appeal because he failed to 
object in the circuit court when the instructions were given).   
 
We hold that based upon the record before this Court, the 
defendant implicitly consented to the circuit court's 
declaration of a mistrial.  Having consented to the mistrial, 
the defendant waived his double jeopardy rights.  We note that 
during oral argument of this appeal, defendant's counsel 
conceded that she could point to no part of the record of the 
defendant's first trial to show that she had made an express 
objection to the circuit court's declaration of a mistrial.   
 
10
 
In this case, the defendant does not contend that he was 
deprived of an opportunity to make a meaningful objection to 
the circuit court's declaration of a mistrial.  Indeed, after 
the circuit court declared the mistrial, defendant's counsel 
and the Commonwealth's Attorney continued a dialogue with the 
circuit court, and the defendant made no objection.     
 
We observe that our holding is consistent with our 
decision in Allen v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 105, 472 S.E.2d 277 
(1996).  In Allen, a jury convicted a defendant of breaking 
and entering in violation of Code § 18.2-91 and grand larceny 
in violation of Code § 18.2-95.  The circuit court dismissed 
the jury and continued the case for sentencing.  The following 
day, the Commonwealth's Attorney moved for a mistrial on the 
basis that one of the jurors was a non-resident of the county 
where the case was tried.  The circuit court stated in a 
letter opinion that "the defendant concurred that there was an 
improper jury but requested that the case be dismissed on the 
basis that jeopardy had already attached and the case could 
not be retried."  The circuit court overruled the defendant's 
objection to a new trial, sustained the Commonwealth's motion 
for a mistrial, and ordered the case continued to the next 
criminal docket call.  252 Va. at 107, 472 S.E.2d at 278. 
 
11
 
The defendant's second trial concluded in a hung jury and 
a second declaration of mistrial.  The circuit court ruled 
that "the defendant has not waived his right to object to a 
[third] trial . . . based on the [D]ouble [J]eopardy [C]lause 
[but that] a [third] trial . . . will not amount to double 
jeopardy."  At a third trial, a police officer testified that 
the defendant had refused to make a statement to the police.  
Invoking the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-
incrimination, the defendant moved for a mistrial, which was 
granted.  At a fourth trial, the defendant was convicted on 
both charges.  Id.
 
We held that the defendant in Allen did not consent to 
the prosecutor's motion for a mistrial in the first trial.  We 
stated: 
 
"As we read the record, [the defendant] never 
consented to the prosecutor's motion for mistrial.  
[The Commonwealth's] motion [to dismiss] had 
multiple objectives, viz., vacation of the penalty 
verdict rendered by a jury mistakenly believed to be 
unqualified, the assembly of a new jury, and a new 
trial by that jury.  [The defendant], laboring under 
the same misconception, 'concurred that there was an 
improper jury'.  Nowhere does the record before us 
show that [the defendant] ever agreed that 'the 
verdicts were invalid'; or that the judge should 
'set aside the jury verdicts'; or that there should 
be a new trial by a new jury.  Rather, as the 
[circuit court's] letter opinion indicates, [the 
defendant] merely 'requested that the case be 
dismissed on the basis that jeopardy had already 
attached and the case could not be retried.'" 
 
 
12
Id. at 111, 472 S.E.2d 280.  The circuit court ruled that the 
defendant in Allen had "preserved the objection to a [second] 
trial . . . by noting his objection on the record" and that 
"the defendant has not waived his right to object to a [third] 
trial . . . based upon the [D]ouble [J]eopardy [C]lause."  Id.   
 
Unlike the defendant in Allen, the defendant in this case 
tacitly consented to the mistrial.  For example, defendant's 
counsel in this case did not object to a new trial once the 
circuit court had declared a mistrial.  Indeed, defendant's 
counsel in this case actually requested that the court set a 
date for a new trial and she participated, without objection, 
in the selection of the new trial date.  Moreover, the record 
in this case clearly shows that during the first trial, 
defendant's counsel made clear and unequivocal objections to 
rulings of the circuit court that were adverse to her 
position.  When she desired to object, she made specific 
objections.  And, as we have already stated, she made no such 
objection to the court's declaration of a mistrial. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals, and we will enter a final judgment reinstating the 
defendant's convictions.  
 Reversed and final judgment. 
JUSTICE KOONTZ, with whom JUSTICE LACY and JUSTICE KEENAN 
join, dissenting. 
 
13
 
 
I respectfully dissent.  The record in this case clearly 
establishes, as the Court of Appeals of Virginia determined, 
that Darrell Washington was twice put in jeopardy in violation 
of his rights under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of 
the United States as a result of his two jury trials in the 
Circuit Court of Arlington County for the same offenses.  I 
cannot join an opinion which nevertheless declines to address 
and enforce those rights by concluding, in effect, that 
Washington is procedurally precluded on appeal from asserting 
his constitutional claim because he did not expressly object 
to the original trial judge’s sua sponte declaration of a 
mistrial during the first trial.  In this particular case, the 
undisputed facts do not support the majority’s application of 
a procedural bar and, moreover, those facts considered under 
established legal principles do not support the majority’s 
holding that Washington “implicitly consented” to the mistrial 
and, thus, “waived his double jeopardy rights.” 
 
The following well established principles are pertinent 
to the proper analysis of this case.  The right not to be 
subjected to double jeopardy attaches in a criminal case when 
the jury is impaneled and sworn.  Serfass v. United States, 
420 U. S. 377, 388 (1995); see also Martin v. Commonwealth, 
242 Va. 1, 8 406 S.E.2d 15, 18 (1991).  The Double Jeopardy 
 
14
Clause not only protects the accused from retrial after being 
acquitted, but also gives the accused a “valued right to have 
his trial completed by a particular tribunal,” Wade v. Hunter, 
336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949), that is, “the right . . . to have 
his trial completed before the first jury impaneled to try 
him.”  Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 673 (1982); see also 
Allen v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 105, 109, 472 S.E.2d 277, 279 
(1996). 
 
However, there are well recognized circumstances in which 
a defendant may be retried even though a prior jury was 
impaneled and sworn, and a mistrial was declared before that 
jury reached a verdict.  Downum v. United Stated, 372 U.S. 
734, 735-36 (1963); Wade, 336 U.S. at 688.  When those 
circumstances arise in a particular case, the underlying 
rationale for permitting a retrial is that the defendant’s 
right to have his trial completed by a particular jury is 
“subordinated to the public’s interest in fair trials designed 
to end in just judgments.”  Wade, 336 U.S. at 689. 
 
In this regard, the United States Supreme Court has 
developed a two-part test to be used in determining whether 
double jeopardy principles have been violated when a trial 
results in a mistrial.  The first part of the test requires 
the court to determine whether the accused consented to the 
 
15
declaration of a mistrial.  If so, then double jeopardy 
principles do not apply, and no further inquiry need be made 
unless it appears that improper actions of the prosecutor or 
the trial court were intended to provoke the mistrial.  Oregon 
v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. at 676; United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 
600, 611 (1976).  If the accused did not consent to the 
declaration of a mistrial, then, under the second prong of the 
Supreme Court’s test, the mistrial will bar retrial unless 
there was a “manifest necessity” for the mistrial.  United 
States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824); see also Allen, 252 
Va. at 109, 472 S.E.2d at 279. 
 
In the present case, it is undisputed that the first jury 
was sworn and, thus, that Washington was put in jeopardy at 
his first trial.  Neither counsel requested that an alternate 
juror be seated.  The original trial judge1 thereafter sua 
sponte declared a mistrial because there were not sufficient 
prospective jurors in the venire from whom to select an 
alternate juror in accord with the requirement of Code § 8.01-
360 that alternate jurors initially not be made aware of that 
status.  Beyond question, the judge simply wanted to 
accommodate a juror who was to be excused from jury service 
                     
1 Judge Paul F. Sheridan presided at Washington’s first 
trial.  Judge William T. Newman, Jr. presided at Washington’s 
second trial. 
 
16
the following day.  The judge explained his declaration of a 
mistrial in the following way: 
 
The alternative . . . was to try the case and 
see if it got in and done by 6 o’clock tonight. 
 
 
It is 12:18 on the Court’s clock.  I’m told 
there were seven or eight Commonwealth witnesses.  
Both attorneys imply that they couldn’t do that. 
 
 
Therefore, rather than make this jury wait 
around all day and see if it can be done properly, 
the mistrial for the inability to have 12 jurors 
hear and decide this case properly is equivalent to 
a sick juror or a missing juror, taking us under the 
12 [required by Code § 19.2-262(B)]. 
 
 
The record further establishes that the judge was fully 
aware of the constitutional implications of his sua sponte 
declaration of a mistrial.  Indeed, he explained to the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney that “[i]t is very important 
constitutionally.  The jury was sworn.”  Moreover, the judge 
was aware that Washington was not consenting to a mistrial in 
light of Washington’s repeated assertions that jeopardy had 
attached when the jury was sworn.  Again, the judge stated 
that “[n]ow [Washington’s counsel is] going to claim that 
jeopardy attaches.”  In this context, the judge’s statements 
reflect that he considered the inability properly to select an 
alternate juror to create a manifest necessity for a mistrial 
so that a retrial would not violate Washington’s double 
jeopardy rights.  The judge was simply wrong. 
 
17
The majority, acknowledging as it must that Washington 
did not expressly consent to the mistrial, concludes that he 
“implicitly” or “tacitly” consented to the mistrial because he 
failed to make an “express objection” in the circuit court 
during the first trial.  The express objection to which the 
majority refers is that contained in our Rule 5:25, which is 
frequently referred to as the contemporaneous objection rule.  
Its counterpart is Rule 5A:18 applicable in the Court of 
Appeals.  Rule 5:25, in pertinent part, provides that:  “Error 
will not be sustained to any ruling of the trial court . . . 
unless objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the 
time of the ruling.”  This rule requires that an objection be 
made with sufficient specificity to enable the trial judge to 
rule intelligently and, thus, to avoid unnecessary reversals 
on appeal.  Absent such objection, the issue will not be 
considered for the first time on appeal.  See, e.g., Fisher v. 
Commonwealth, 236 Va. 403, 414, 374 S.E. 46, 52 (1988), cert. 
denied, 490 U.S. 1028 (1989).  The majority correctly states 
that we have repeatedly and consistently held that a litigant 
must object to a ruling of the trial court if that litigant 
desires to challenge the ruling on appeal and cites numerous 
prior decisions of this Court that confirm that proposition.  
None of those decisions, however, requires the use of the 
 
18
specific words “object” or “objection” as if such words are 
somehow magic talismans which the majority now seems to 
suggest are required by Rule 5:25.  Facially, this rule merely 
requires that an objection be made “with reasonable 
certainty.” 
In any event, the procedural bar of Rule 5:25 is not 
applicable in this particular case for a number of reasons 
that also distinguish this case from those cited by the 
majority.  Initially, I note that at Washington’s second 
trial, the Commonwealth asserted that the mistrial of the 
first trial was the result of a manifest necessity when the 
prospective jury pool proved inadequate to permit the trial to 
be heard on the scheduled day.  The Commonwealth did not 
contend at that time that Washington had waived his right to 
assert former jeopardy by failing to make an express objection 
to the original trial judge’s declaration of a mistrial.  The 
Commonwealth makes this assertion for the first time on 
appeal.  The trial judge merely acquiesced in the original 
trial judge’s determination of a manifest necessity for a 
mistrial as being a matter of discretion.  In this context, 
surely Washington had objected to the mistrial with sufficient 
certainty to satisfy Rule 5:25 because the original trial 
judge, the Commonwealth, and the subsequent trial judge were 
 
19
aware that Washington was asserting that a retrial would 
violate his double jeopardy rights.  Manifest necessity was 
the focus of the issue to be resolved; waiver was not. 
Moreover, the issue to be determined in this appeal is 
whether, under the circumstances of this particular case, 
Washington implicitly consented to the mistrial so as to have 
waived his double jeopardy claim, or in the absence of such 
consent, whether a manifest necessity existed at the time of 
the mistrial to permit a retrial.  The Commonwealth does not 
assert that the original trial judge was unaware of the 
constitutional implications of his sua sponte declaration of a 
mistrial and the record would refute such an assertion had it 
been made.  Thus, for purposes of satisfying the requirements 
of Rule 5:25, there is no dispute that Washington did not 
consent to the mistrial.  Whether the failure expressly to 
object to the mistrial constitutes a waiver of Washington’s 
constitutional claim is a separate and distinct issue from the 
issue of consent, although the two are closely related.  
Because the record establishes beyond question that the 
original trial judge was made aware that Washington was 
asserting that his constitutional right against double 
jeopardy would be violated by retrial, the procedural bar of 
 
20
Rule 5:25 is not applicable.  Accordingly, the merits of the 
issues presented by this appeal must be addressed. 
The Commonwealth contends that in the absence of an 
express objection, there is an implied consent to the 
declaration of a mistrial and urges that we adopt the rule, 
applied by several of the federal circuits, that if the 
defendant had an opportunity to object to a declaration of a 
mistrial, but failed to do so, the consent thus implied acts 
as a waiver to any subsequent claim of double jeopardy.2  See, 
e.g., United States v. DiPietro, 936 F.2d 6, 9-10 (1st Cir. 
                     
2 Although the United States Supreme Court has never squarely 
held that retrial is permissible following a defendant’s 
implied consent to a declaration of a mistrial, see, e.g., 
Escobar v. O’Leary, 943 F.2d 711, 716 n.3 (7th Cir. 1991), it 
has recognized that there can be no question of consent where 
the defendant was not given the opportunity to object.  United 
States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 487 (1971). 
 
Among the federal circuits that have considered the 
issue, some have taken a more restrictive view than that 
advocated here by the Commonwealth, holding that the totality 
of the circumstances attendant on a declaration of a mistrial, 
and not merely the opportunity for and the absence of an 
express objection by the defendant, are to be considered in 
determining whether there has been an implied consent which 
would justify finding a waiver of double jeopardy rights.  
See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 621 F.2d 350, 352 (9th Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1087 (1981); United States v. 
Goldstein, 479 F.2d 1061, 1067 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 
U.S. 873 (1973).  At least one circuit has been even more 
restrictive, holding that consent should be implied “ ‘only 
where the circumstances positively indicate a defendant’s 
willingness to acquiesce in the [mistrial] order.’ ”  Glover 
v. McMackin, 950 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting 
Jones v. Hogg, 732 F.2d 53, 57 (6th Cir. 1984)). 
 
21
1991); Camden v. Circuit Court of Second Judicial Dist., 
Crawford County, Ill., 892 F.2d 610, 614-18 (7th Cir. 1989), 
cert. denied, 495 U.S. 921 (1990); United States v. Puleo, 817 
F.2d 702, 705 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 978 (1987). 
In determining whether, and to what extent, the failure 
to make an express objection to a declaration of a mistrial 
should act as an implied consent, the focus must be on the 
consequence that the implied consent is also an implied waiver 
of the defendant’s “valued right to have his trial completed 
by a particular tribunal.”  Wade, 336 U.S. at 689.  In Allen, 
we recognized that “ ‘[w]aiver is ordinarily an intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege,’ 
and with respect to fundamental constitutional rights, ‘courts 
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.’ ”  252 
Va. at 111, 472 S.E.2d at 280 (citations omitted).  In that 
case, the Commonwealth requested a mistrial and the defendant 
did not make an express objection to the trial court’s 
granting that request.  Rather, “[the defendant] merely 
‘requested that the case be dismissed on the basis that 
jeopardy had already attached and the case could not be 
retried.’ ”  Id.  Agreeing with an opinion expressed by the 
trial court in a subsequent proceeding, we held that the 
 
22
defendant had thus “‘preserved the objection to a [second] 
trial.’ ”  Id.
Although we did not expressly adopt in Allen the “implied 
consent rule” urged by the Commonwealth in this case, our 
reasoning in that case is closely analogous to that used by 
the federal circuits which have applied a “totality of the 
circumstances” standard in determining whether the absence of 
an express objection to a declaration of a mistrial amounts to 
an implied consent thereto and a waiver of double jeopardy 
rights thereafter.  Moreover, our reasoning in Allen is 
inconsistent with the Commonwealth’s position in the present 
case that the failure to expressly object to a mistrial, 
standing alone, will constitute an implied consent to a 
declaration of a mistrial.  Accord Minnesota v. Olson, 609 
N.W.2d 293, 300 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); Benson v. Nevada, 895 
P.2d 1323, 1327 (Nev. 1995); Ex parte Little, 887 S.W.2d 62, 
66 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); Missouri v. Tolliver, 839 S.W.2d 
296, 299 (Mo. 1992). 
Contrary to the majority’s view, I am of opinion that the 
circumstances of Washington’s case are virtually 
indistinguishable from those in Allen.  As in that case, 
Washington’s counsel, while not expressly objecting to the 
mistrial, asserted that jeopardy had attached and that any 
 
23
retrial would violate the defendant’s double jeopardy rights.  
Indeed, in the present case, this assertion was more 
forcefully made.  Accordingly, this assertion precludes a 
finding of an implied consent to the sua sponte declaration of 
a mistrial that would act as a waiver of the very 
constitutional rights Washington’s counsel was asserting.  In 
its attempt to distinguish Allen from the present case, the 
majority effectively overturns this Court’s decision in that 
case sub silentio. 
Absent consent, express or implied, to the declaration of 
a mistrial, the question becomes whether manifest necessity 
permitted Washington’s retrial.  A trial court “may discharge 
the jury when it appears . . . that there is a manifest 
necessity for such discharge.”  Code § 8.01-361.  “There is no 
general rule as to what facts and circumstances constitute 
such a necessity but the trial court is authorized by the 
statute to exercise its discretion in making the determination 
according to the circumstances of the case.”  Turnbull v. 
Commonwealth, 216 Va. 328, 335, 218 S.E.2d 541, 546 (1975).  
“[T]he key word ‘necessity’ cannot be interpreted literally; 
instead . . . there are degrees of necessity and . . . a ‘high 
degree’ [is required] before . . . a mistrial is appropriate.”  
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978).  Because the 
 
24
defendant’s right to have his trial concluded by a particular 
tribunal is frustrated by any mistrial, the Commonwealth has 
the burden of justifying the mistrial to avoid the double 
jeopardy bar and that “burden is a heavy one.”  Id. at 505.  
Thus, “any doubt ‘in favor of the liberty of the citizen, 
rather than exercise what would be an unlimited, uncertain, 
and arbitrary judicial discretion,’ ” will be resolved in the 
favor of the defendant.  Downum, 372 U.S. at 738 (quoting 
United States v. Watson, 28 F. Cas. 499, 501 (1868)). 
In Arizona v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court 
recognized “the spectrum of trial problems which may warrant a 
mistrial and which vary in their amenability to appellate 
scrutiny.”  434 U.S. at 510.  In that context, I am of opinion 
that the appropriate standard of review for a double jeopardy 
claim following a mistrial is to be determined by whether the 
underlying reasons for the mistrial concern issues best left 
to the informed discretion of the trial judge or issues that 
more nearly invoke questions of law for which closer appellate 
review is appropriate. 
In Smith v. Commonwealth, 239 Va. 243, 389 S.E.2d 871, 
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 (1990), for example, we upheld the 
trial court’s determination that a single misstatement by the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney in closing argument, which was 
 
25
immediately noted by the trial court and retracted by the 
Commonwealth’s Attorney, did not warrant granting the 
defendant’s request for a mistrial.  Id. at 266-67, 389 S.E.2d 
at 884.  Implicit in the Court’s holding is that this issue 
was clearly a matter best left to the discretion of the trial 
court because the trial judge was in the better position to 
evaluate the effect of the misstatement and the subsequent 
curative efforts on the jury.  However, for the reasons that 
follow, such deference to the original trial judge’s 
discretion is not appropriate in the present case.  Rather, 
the record must be reviewed to determine whether it 
establishes that the judge “acted responsibly and 
deliberately, and accorded careful consideration to [the 
defendant’s] interest in having the trial concluded in a 
single proceeding.”  Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. at 516. 
In exercising his discretion to declare a mistrial in 
this case, the original trial judge was required to consider 
whether there were less severe alternatives “to assure that, 
taking all the circumstances into account, there was a 
manifest necessity for the sua sponte declaration of this 
mistrial.”  Jorn, 400 U.S. at 487; see also Gilliam v. Foster, 
61 F.3d 1070, 1081 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that the critical 
inquiry is whether less drastic alternatives were available to 
 
26
the court); Harris v. Young, 607 F.2d 1081, 1085 (4th Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1025 (1980) (“If less drastic 
alternatives than a mistrial were available, they should have 
been employed in order to protect the defendant's interest in 
promptly ending the trial”).  Thus, the judge should have 
considered the possibility of a trial continuance before 
abruptly declaring a mistrial and discharging the jury.  Jorn, 
400 U.S. at 487; see also United States v. Shafer, 987 F.2d 
1054, 1058 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that an abuse of 
discretion occurs if the trial judge fails to fully consider 
all alternatives, including a continuance, before declaring a 
mistrial). 
It is the duty of the trial judge to apply the statutes 
governing jury selection in order to procure an impartial jury 
for the defendant.  Slade v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1099, 1106, 
156 S.E. 388, 391 (1931); Code §§ 8.01-357 and -360.  The 
record of this case is clear that before the voir dire process 
began, the judge was aware that the number of prospective 
jurors in the jury pool was barely adequate to provide 
Washington with a jury properly selected in accordance with 
the governing law.  Nonetheless, the judge elected to proceed 
to “see if we don’t cure this as we go.”  Moreover, when it 
became apparent that the jury that had been selected and sworn 
 
27
                    
would not be able to hear the case in the timeframe that the 
judge desired, he first attempted to fashion a remedy outside 
that permitted by the governing statutes and then abruptly 
declared a mistrial.  In doing so, the judge did not consider 
a continuance of the trial as an alternative. 
A continuance of the trial, either prior to voir dire or 
after the jury was sworn but before any evidence was heard, 
would not have injured Washington’s interest in having his 
trial concluded in a single proceeding.  Though a continuance 
might have caused some inconvenience to all concerned, that 
inconvenience would have been no greater than that occasioned 
by the mistrial.3  Under these circumstances, the judge gave 
insufficient consideration to other alternatives before 
reaching the conclusion that there was a manifest necessity to 
declare a mistrial.  Indeed, the Commonwealth has not borne 
its burden to establish that a manifest necessity for a 
mistrial existed.  The possible inability to complete a felony 
criminal trial in one day does not constitute a manifest 
necessity for a mistrial.  Accordingly, in my view, the Court 
of Appeals did not err in reversing the judgment of the trial 
 
3 There is no indication in the record that there were any 
speedy trial concerns that would have arisen as a result of 
the judge’s ordering a continuance of Washington’s first 
trial. 
 
28
court in Washington’s second trial deferring to the discretion 
of the original trial judge on that issue. 
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court and 
dismissing the indictments against Washington with prejudice.