Case Title: Ex parte George N. Yocum et al. PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: CIVIL (In re: Elizabeth W. Brown v. Cahaba Valley Timber Company, Inc., et al.)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1060309

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2007-02-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 02/16/2007 Ex parte Yocum
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334)
242-4621), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made
before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2006-2007
_________________________
1060309
_________________________
Ex parte George N. Yocum et al.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re:  Elizabeth W. Brown
v.
Cahaba Valley Timber Company, Inc., et al.)
(Jefferson Circuit Court, CV-06-3064)
LYONS, Justice.
George N. Yocum, Cahaba Valley Timber Company, Inc.,
Cahaba Valley Mulch, Inc., and Cahaba Valley Lumber Company,
Inc., four of the defendants in an action pending in the
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Jefferson Circuit Court, petition this Court for a writ of
mandamus directing the Jefferson Circuit Court to transfer
this case to the Dallas Circuit Court pursuant to § 6-3-21.1,
Ala. Code 1975, the forum non conveniens statute.  We deny the
petition.
I. Procedural Background
Elizabeth W. Brown, a resident of Dallas County,
commenced an action in the Jefferson Circuit Court against
Cahaba Valley Timber Company, Inc. ("Cahaba Timber"); Cahaba
Valley Lumber Company, Inc. ("Cahaba Lumber"); Cahaba Valley
Mulch, Inc. ("Cahaba Mulch"); Cahaba Valley Services, Inc.
("Cahaba Services"); Pallet Source, Inc.; James A. Yocum, Jr.;
and George N. Yocum, alleging breach of a contract that Brown,
a former employee of Cahaba Timber, argues entitled her to a
percentage of the profits of Cahaba Timber.  Brown also
asserted claims of fraud, suppression, and conversion against
the Yocums and Cahaba Timber based on statements made to her
while she was working for Cahaba Timber in Dallas County and
asserted claims of interference with business relations
against the Yocums, Cahaba Lumber, Cahaba Mulch, Cahaba
Services, and Pallet Source based on their allegedly charging
1060309
Cahaba Services did not join in the motion to transfer
1
the case to Dallas County.  
3
Cahaba Timber "exorbitant" fees or refusing to pay for Cahaba
Timber's services in order to decrease its profitability and
lessen the amount due Brown as a percentage of the profits. 
Cahaba Timber, Cahaba Lumber, Cahaba Mulch, and George
Yocum, all of whom reside or have their principal place of
business 
in 
Dallas 
County 
(hereinafter 
referred 
to
collectively as "the Dallas County defendants") moved to
transfer the action to Dallas County pursuant to § 6-3-21.1,
Ala. Code 1975, which permits transfer of a civil action "for
the convenience of parties and witnesses, or in the interest
of justice."   The Dallas County defendants submitted the
1
sworn testimony of George Yocum in support of their motion.
Brown submitted no evidence in opposition to the transfer.
The trial court denied the motion to transfer.  The Dallas
County defendants then petitioned this Court for a writ of
mandamus. 
II. Factual Background
According to Brown's complaint, she is a resident of
Dallas County; Cahaba Timber's principal place of business is
in Dallas County; Cahaba Services' principal place of business
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is in Dallas County; Cahaba Mulch's principal place of
business is in Dallas County; Cahaba Lumber's principal place
of business is in Dallas County; and George Yocum resides in
Dallas County.  Pallet Source's principal place of business is
in Jefferson County, and James Yocum resides in Jefferson
County. 
Brown further alleges that she left her long-time
employment with another company in Selma to work as general
manager of Cahaba Timber pursuant to an employment contract
that she says ultimately entitled her to 10% of the net
profits of Cahaba Timber.  Brown alleges that George Yocum and
James Yocum operated and controlled several corporations that
had entered into agreements with Cahaba Timber, including
Cahaba Services, which, she alleges, charged Cahaba Timber
excessive trucking costs, and Cahaba Mulch, Cahaba Lumber, and
Pallet Source, which, she alleges, charged Cahaba Timber
inflated prices for products they sold to Cahaba Timber.
According to Brown, all the defendants engaged in such conduct
in an effort to create the appearance that Cahaba Timber was
in financial trouble, thus driving down the amount due Brown
as her share of the profits in Cahaba Timber.  Brown says that
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James Yocum and Pallet Source (hereinafter referred to
collectively 
as 
"the 
Jefferson 
County 
defendants")
participated in this activity with full knowledge of her right
to participate in a percentage of the net profits of Cahaba
Timber. 
III. Standard of Review 
The proper method for obtaining review of a denial of a
motion for a change of venue in a civil action is to petition
for a writ of mandamus.  Lawler Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Tarver,
492 So. 2d 297, 302 (Ala. 1986).  "When we consider a mandamus
petition relating to a venue ruling, our scope of review is to
determine if the trial court abused its discretion, i.e.,
whether it exercised its discretion in an arbitrary and
capricious manner."  Ex parte Integon Corp., 672 So. 2d 497,
499 (Ala. 1995).  "A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary
remedy, requiring the showing of: (1) a clear legal right in
the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty on
the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so;
(3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly
invoked jurisdiction of the court."  Ex parte Nichols, 757 So.
2d 374, 376 (Ala. 1999).  As the petitioners, the Dallas
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County defendants have the burden of proving that the trial
court exceeded its discretion in refusing to transfer the case
to Dallas County.  757 So. 2d at 377.  The trial court should
give deference to the plaintiff's choice of a proper forum.
Ex parte Bloodsaw, 648 So. 2d 553, 555 (Ala. 1994).  "[T]he
burden is on the party moving for the transfer to prove that
the transferee forum is significantly more convenient than the
plaintiff's chosen forum, see Ex parte Auto-Owners Ins. Co.,
630 So. 2d 435, 436 (Ala. 1993)."  Ex parte Nichols, 757 So.
2d at 378.  
IV. Analysis
The Dallas County defendants do not contend that venue in
Jefferson County is improper.  Instead, they contend only that
venue should be changed to Dallas County for the convenience
of the parties and the witnesses or in the interest of
justice. 
The Dallas County defendants contend that all documents
relating to Brown's complaint are located in Dallas County and
that the employees of Cahaba Timber, Cahaba Mulch, Cahaba
Lumber, and Cahaba Services live primarily in Dallas County;
they do not specifically identify the documents or the
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employees.  Unless we are to assume that Pallet Source
maintains no records at its principal place of business in
Jefferson County, this statement, on its face, cannot be
correct.  Further, as this Court stated in Ex parte Nichols,
757 So. 2d at 378, "'A party who claims that the location of
documents is a consideration in a forum non conveniens dispute
must make a showing on the factors such as volume, necessity,
and inconvenience that would support such a claim.'"  (Quoting
Ex parte Wiginton, 743 So. 2d 1071, 1076 (Ala. 1999)).
Because the Dallas County defendants make no such showing, we
cannot consider the location of the documents in determining
whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in denying the
motion to transfer.  Further, the inconvenience to nonparty
witnesses does not weigh heavily where, as here, those
witnesses are employees of the Dallas County defendants and
their presence at trial can be secured by those defendants.
See Ex parte Nichols, 757 So. 2d at 379 ("The location of the
nonparty witnesses in this case also does not figure heavily
into this Court's determination.  The nonparty witnesses are
all employees of PBI whose presence at trial can be obtained
by PBI.").
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With respect to the interest of justice, the Dallas
County defendants rely upon Ex parte First Family Financial
Services, Inc., 718 So. 2d 658, 659 (Ala. 1998), and Ex parte
Independent Life & Accident Insurance Co., 725 So. 2d 955
(Ala. 1998).  In First Family, this Court dealt with a
situation where the plaintiff never resided in the forum
county, no transaction between the plaintiff and the defendant
ever occurred there, and the defendant had no office,
employees, or documents in the forum county.  Under those
circumstances, this Court concluded that the interest of
justice required that the action be transferred.  In
Independent Life, all of the transactions at issue took place
in Montgomery County; the plaintiffs lived in Montgomery
County; the three insurance agents all worked out of the
Montgomery office of Independent Life; and it appeared that
the one agent who lived in Lowndes County, where the action
was commenced, did not sell any of the policies at issue, and,
at most, played a minor role in the events giving rise to the
action.  We concluded that "this case has no nexus with
Lowndes County that would justify burdening that county with
the trial of this case."  725 So. 2d at 957.  
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The Jefferson County defendants, two of the alleged
principal wrongdoers, operate out of Jefferson County.  The
facts here are substantially different from those before this
Court in First Family and Independent Life, where the forum
county had little, if any, contact with the matters made the
basis of the action.  Because of the nexus between Jefferson
County and the alleged participation of the two Jefferson
County defendants in the alleged scheme to overcharge Cahaba
Timber so as to deflate its profits and hence the amount due
Brown, we cannot say that the trial court exceeded its
discretion in failing to conclude that, in the interest of
justice, Jefferson County should not be burdened with the
trial of this case.
V. Conclusion
The Dallas County defendants have not made a sufficient
showing that the trial court exceeded its discretion in
denying their motion to transfer this action to Dallas County.
We therefore deny their petition for a writ of mandamus.  
PETITION DENIED.
Cobb, C.J., and Stuart, Bolin, and Murdock, JJ., concur.