Case Title: State ex rel. Marsh v. Tibbals

Citation: 2017-Ohio-829

Docket Number: 2015-1841

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2017-03-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 
ex rel. Marsh v. Tibbals, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-829.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 
advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested to 
promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 
South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 
formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 
the opinion is published. 
 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2017-OHIO-829 
THE STATE EX REL. MARSH, APPELLANT, v. TIBBALS, WARDEN, ET AL., 
APPELLEES. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State ex rel. Marsh v. Tibbals, Slip Opinion No.  
2017-Ohio-829.] 
Habeas corpus and mandamus—Appellant failed to show that he is entitled to 
immediate release or that he has clear legal right to new parole-revocation 
hearing—Court of appeals’ grant of summary judgment in favor of warden 
and Adult Parole Authority affirmed. 
(No. 2015-1841—Submitted January 10, 2017—Decided March 9, 2017.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Madison County, 
No. CA2015-04-013. 
________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} We affirm the Twelfth District Court of Appeals’ denial of the petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus or, in the alternative, a writ of mandamus filed by 
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appellant, Stacey L. Marsh.  That court correctly held that Marsh is not entitled to 
immediate release and thus is ineligible for habeas corpus relief.  The court of 
appeals also correctly determined that Marsh is not entitled to a writ of mandamus 
to compel the Adult Parole Authority (“APA”) to grant him a new parole-
revocation hearing with court-appointed counsel. 
Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 2} Marsh is an inmate at the London Correctional Institution, where he 
has been serving the remainder of an indeterminate sentence since the APA revoked 
his parole in 2014. 
State and Federal Criminal Convictions 
{¶ 3} In September 1985, the Madison County Court of Common Pleas 
sentenced Marsh to concurrent prison terms of 18 months for various fourth-degree 
felonies.  In October 1985, the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas convicted 
Marsh of one count of receiving stolen property and sentenced him to one year in 
prison. 
{¶ 4} In December 1985, Marsh pleaded guilty to robbery, forgery, and 
receiving stolen property in three separate Franklin County cases and was sentenced 
to an aggregate prison term of 4 to 15 years.  Marsh was granted parole from these 
sentences in April 1989.  But in April 1991, he was arrested in West Virginia and 
charged with multiple federal drug and weapons offenses.  Marsh was convicted of 
all counts, and in February 1992, the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of West Virginia ordered him to serve a 324- to 405-month sentence in 
federal prison. 
{¶ 5} In June 1992, the APA declared Marsh a parole violator effective 
April 2, 1991, as a result of his federal convictions.  The APA also issued a warrant 
and detainer for his return to its custody upon the completion of his federal 
sentence. 
January Term, 2017 
 
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{¶ 6} Beginning in June 2001 and continuing until November 2011, Marsh 
sent letters to various employees of the APA requesting that they lift the detainer, 
“recognize the judgment in [the Franklin County robbery] case * * * as being 
satisfied and complete” based on the time he was incarcerated for his federal 
convictions, and hold a parole-revocation hearing via videoconference. 
{¶ 7} After completing his federal sentence, Marsh was returned to the 
custody of the APA on August 15, 2014.  The APA provided Marsh with written 
notification of a “release violation hearing” to be held on September 15, 2014.  On 
the form, which Marsh signed and dated, he “[a]dmit[ted] with [m]itigation” all the 
alleged parole violations.  He also checked boxes indicating that he did not “request 
the presence of any witnesses/documents” or “representation or counsel” at the 
September hearing. 
{¶ 8} At the hearing, Marsh admitted that his federal convictions were a 
violation of his release conditions and presented mitigating evidence. However, 
after considering the record as a whole, including Marsh’s admissions and 
mitigation, the officer revoked his parole and recommended that the APA impose 
a 48-month sanction.  The APA agreed with the recommendation and imposed a 
48-month sanction.  Marsh will become eligible for parole consideration again in 
August 2018.  Marsh’s request for reconsideration of the APA’s decision was 
denied in December 2014. 
State Habeas Corpus Petition 
{¶ 9} On April 2, 2015, Marsh filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
or, in the alternative, a writ of mandamus against appellees, Warden Terry Tibbals 
and the APA.  He requested an order compelling Tibbals to immediately release 
him from prison “under the same terms and conditions of his original parole.”  
Marsh also requested, in the alternative, an order compelling the APA to credit his 
time served from 2001 to 2011.  Finally, he sought an order “compelling the [APA] 
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to grant [him] a new mitigation/revocation hearing with the appointment of 
counsel.” 
{¶ 10} The court of appeals granted summary judgment in favor of Tibbals 
and the APA and denied Marsh’s requests for relief. 
Analysis 
Summary-Judgment Standard 
{¶ 11} A court properly grants summary judgment “when an examination 
of all relevant materials filed in the action reveals that ‘there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.’ ”  Smith v. McBride, 130 Ohio St.3d 51, 2011-Ohio-4674, 955 N.E.2d 954,  
¶ 12, quoting Civ.R. 56(C).  We review the court of appeals’ decision granting 
summary judgment to Tibbals and the APA de novo.  State ex rel. Anderson v. 
Vermilion, 134 Ohio St.3d 120, 2012-Ohio-5320, 980 N.E.2d 975, ¶ 9, citing 
Troyer v. Janis, 132 Ohio St.3d 229, 2012-Ohio-2406, 971 N.E.2d 862, ¶ 6. 
Habeas Corpus 
{¶ 12} An action in “habeas corpus will lie in certain extraordinary 
circumstances where there is an unlawful restraint of a person’s liberty, 
notwithstanding the fact that only nonjurisdictional issues are involved, but only 
where there is no adequate legal remedy, e.g., appeal or postconviction relief.”  
State ex rel. Jackson v. McFaul, 73 Ohio St.3d 185, 186, 652 N.E.2d 746 (1995).  
However, even when the petitioner has no adequate legal remedy, habeas corpus 
relief generally is appropriate only when “the petitioner’s maximum sentence has 
expired and he is being held unlawfully.”  Heddleston v. Mack, 84 Ohio St.3d 213, 
214, 702 N.E.2d 1198 (1998). 
{¶ 13} “The revocation of parole implicates a liberty interest which cannot 
be denied without certain procedural protections.”  Jackson at 186.  In order to 
safeguard the liberty interests implicated by parole, this court has determined that 
due process requires that parolees have “certain rights, including the right to a 
January Term, 2017 
 
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[revocation] hearing within a reasonable time following arrest.”  Id.  However, the 
“operative event triggering any loss of liberty attendant upon parole revocation” is 
execution of and custody under the warrant issued upon a parole violation.  Moody 
v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 87, 97 S.Ct. 274, 50 L.Ed.2d 236 (1976).  Accord State ex 
rel. Taylor v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 66 Ohio St.3d 121, 125, 609 N.E.2d 546 
(1993) (“[U]nder federal due process principles, no liberty interest attaches until a 
parolee is taken into custody pursuant to the detainer.  If a loss of liberty is 
attributable to detention for new crimes, the parole authority has no constitutional 
duty to hold an immediate parole revocation hearing, regardless of his request 
therefor”); State ex rel. Brantley v. Ghee, 83 Ohio St.3d 521, 522, 700 N.E.2d 1258 
(1998) (“The APA has no legal duty to hold a final parole revocation hearing for 
Brantley during the time he is incarcerated on new criminal charges”). 
{¶ 14} First, Marsh argues that the APA was obligated to hold a revocation 
hearing as soon as the federal prison agreed to make him available for the hearing 
via videoconferencing technology.  Marsh also urges this court to “declare that 
videoconferencing was equivalent to live and in person hearings regardless of 
geographical location.” 
{¶ 15} But irrespective of Marsh’s request that the APA hold a revocation 
hearing by videoconference, the APA was under no duty to do so during Marsh’s 
federal incarceration.  Brantley at 522.  The APA’s duty to hold a revocation 
hearing did not arise until Marsh completed his federal sentence and the federal 
authorities transferred him into state custody in August 2014.  Moody at 87; Taylor 
at 125. 
{¶ 16} Contrary to Marsh’s argument, the availability of videoconferencing 
technology did not trigger the APA’s duty to hold Marsh’s revocation hearing.  
Because Marsh was serving a sentence for federal convictions while on parole from 
his Ohio sentence, he was not entitled to a revocation hearing until the APA took 
custody of him after he completed his federal sentence.  “Neither due process of 
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law nor R.C. 2967.15’s or former Ohio Adm.Code 5120:1-1-19(A)’s ‘reasonable 
time’ requirement compels a final revocation parole hearing while an alleged parole 
violator is imprisoned pending prosecution for, or after conviction of, another 
crime.”  Taylor, 66 Ohio St.3d at 128, 609 N.E.2d 546. 
{¶ 17} Marsh contends that the Tenth District Court of Appeals’ decision in 
Wilkins v. Wilkinson, 157 Ohio App.3d 209, 2004-Ohio-2530, 809 N.E.2d 1206 
(10th 
Dist.), 
conferred 
upon 
him 
a 
“reasonable 
expectation 
to 
a 
revocation/mitigation hearing [via videoconference] when he asserted his right to 
it.”  However, Wilkins did not confer any rights upon Ohio parolees; the court 
determined only that “the use of videoconferencing technology [by the APA] for 
witness testimony during the parole-revocation hearing satisfied the Confrontation 
Clause under the[ ] circumstances” of that case.  Id. at ¶ 1. 
{¶ 18} Second, Marsh contends that had the APA granted his request to hold 
his revocation hearing sooner via videoconference, it would have been required to 
give him credit for time served against any Ohio sentence resulting from the parole 
violations. 
{¶ 19} However, under R.C. 2967.15(D), “[a] person who is a parolee  
*  *  * and who has violated a term or condition of the person’s *  *  * parole  
*  *  * shall be declared to be a violator if the person is committed to a correctional 
institution outside the state to serve a sentence imposed upon the person by a federal 
court.”  R.C. 2967.15(C)(1) provides that “[t]he time between the date on which a 
person who is a parolee or other releasee is declared to be a violator *  *  * and the 
date on which that person is returned to custody in this state under the immediate 
control of the adult parole authority shall not be counted as time served under the 
sentence imposed on that person.”  (Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 20} We have repeatedly rejected the same argument Marsh raises with 
respect to having his federal prison time count toward the 48-month sentence he 
received for violating parole.  See State ex rel. Gillen v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 
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7
72 Ohio St.3d 381, 381-382, 650 N.E.2d 454 (1995); Hignite v. Cardwell, 22 Ohio 
St.2d 146, 258 N.E.2d 443 (1970); Armstrong v. Haskins, 176 Ohio St. 422, 200 
N.E.2d 311 (1964).  Marsh is incorrect in asserting that his federal sentence would 
have been credited toward his state sentence for the parole violation had the APA 
granted him a revocation hearing by videoconference when he requested it. 
{¶ 21} Marsh also claims that the court of appeals failed to address whether 
the September 2014 parole-revocation hearing was unreasonably delayed under the 
dictates of the consent decree established in Kellogg v. Shoemaker, 927 F.Supp. 
244 (S.D.Ohio 1996).  Under the Kellogg consent decree, inmates included in the 
class of persons to which Kellogg applied were entitled to a hearing “to determine 
whether revocation of parole is appropriate,” “[t]he right to advance notice of the 
class member’s rights at the hearing,” and, “[w]here the class member alleges that 
there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make 
revocation inappropriate, and the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult for the 
class member to develop or present, the right to be represented by the Ohio Public 
Defender or private counsel (at the member’s expense).”  Id. at 247 (paragraphs 
V(a)(1), (3), and (6) of consent decree). 
{¶ 22} Even assuming that Marsh is a member of the Kellogg class, his 
revocation complied with the consent decree because Marsh had an opportunity to 
present mitigating evidence and was given the opportunity to request representation 
by counsel. 
{¶ 23} Marsh received a timely revocation hearing one month after being 
released from federal custody to the custody of the APA.  Moreover, the APA 
revoked Marsh’s parole after he admitted to the parole violations and after 
considering his mitigation, and imposed a 48-month sanction, making him not 
eligible for parole consideration again until 2018.  Accordingly, Marsh has not 
served his maximum sentence and has not shown that he is being held unlawfully.  
The court of appeals correctly denied Marsh’s request for a writ of habeas corpus. 
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Mandamus 
{¶ 24} A relator seeking a writ of mandamus must establish (1) a clear legal 
right to the requested relief, (2) a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent 
official or governmental unit to provide it, and (3) the lack of an adequate remedy 
in the ordinary course of the law.  State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 131 Ohio St.3d 
55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6.  The relator must prove entitlement to the 
writ by clear and convincing evidence.  Id. at ¶ 13. 
{¶ 25} Marsh seeks an order compelling the APA to “credit [him] for time 
he was available for return during the years 2001-2011.”  However, as discussed 
above, R.C. 2967.15(C)(1) specifically speaks to that argument—and repudiates it.  
Accordingly, the court of appeals correctly determined that Marsh failed to 
demonstrate a clear legal duty on the part of the APA or a clear legal right on his 
part to have any of his federal time credited toward his revocation time. 
{¶ 26} Marsh argues that the court of appeals erred when it held that he did 
not have a clear legal right to a new parole-revocation hearing with court-appointed 
counsel.  He contends that he was misinformed about his eligibility to have counsel 
appointed to represent him and was deceived into declining representation. 
{¶ 27} We have held that “counsel is not automatically required * * * for 
mitigation hearings.”  State ex rel. Stamper v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 62 Ohio 
St.3d 85, 87, 578 N.E.2d 461 (1991).  Under Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 
790, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973), counsel is constitutionally required 
when the parolee requests counsel “based on a timely and colorable claim *  *  * 
that, even if the violation is a matter of public record or is uncontested, there are 
substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation 
inappropriate, and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or 
present.” 
{¶ 28} The evidence submitted to the court of appeals in support of granting 
summary judgment demonstrates that Marsh’s parole-revocation hearing was not 
January Term, 2017 
 
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one for which counsel was necessary.  Marsh was informed of his right to request 
that any witnesses or documentary evidence be produced or that he be represented 
by counsel at his revocation hearing, and he expressly declined to make either 
request.  He admitted to all the charged parole violations and submitted mitigating 
evidence during the hearing.  Marsh’s mitigation consisted of his personal history 
and claims that his criminal conduct was due to childhood trauma, that his federal 
sentence was disproportionate to his federal crimes, and that he was “no longer the 
same person” that he was when he committed his original crimes in Ohio decades 
earlier.  The APA considered Marsh’s mitigating evidence before revoking his 
parole.  Marsh simply did not make a “ ‘colorable claim’ of substantial, complex, 
or difficult mitigation factors requiring counsel.”  Stamper at 88, quoting Gagnon 
at 790. 
{¶ 29} Marsh has failed to prove his entitlement to a writ of mandamus by 
clear and convincing evidence.  The court of appeals correctly granted summary 
judgment in favor of Tibbals and the APA. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, O’NEILL, FISCHER, 
and DEWINE, JJ., concur. 
_________________ 
Stacey L. Marsh, pro se. 
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and M. Scott Criss, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellees. 
_________________