Case Title: Mellin v. Flood Brook Union School District

Citation: 173 Vt. 202, 790 A.2d 408

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 2001-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Mellin v. Flood Brook Union School District  (2000-143); 173 Vt. 202; 
790 A.2d 408

[Filed 21-Dec-2001]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal  revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter  of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of 
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.

                                No. 2000-143

Ann Mellin                                    Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
  v.                                          Bennington Superior Court

Flood Brook Union School District,            March Term, 2001
Department of Education, et al.

Richard W. Norton, J.

       Eileen M. Blackwood of Blackwood Associates, P.C., Burlington, for
  Plaintiff-Appellant.

       Christopher D. Roy of Downs Rachlin Martin PLLC, Burlington, for
  Defendants-Appellees Flood Brook Union School District, Coleman, Harper,
  Henson, Smith, Frauman, Farrar and Wylie.

       William Sorrell, Attorney General, and Joseph L. Winn, Assistant
  Attorney General, Montpelier, for Defendants-Appellees Pallas and
  Department of Education.

PRESENT:  Dooley, Morse, Johnson and Skoglund, JJ., and Allen, C.J.
          (Ret.), Specially Assigned
	

       JOHNSON, J.   Plaintiff Ann Mellin challenges the Bennington Superior
  Court's grant of  summary judgment and judgment on the pleadings to
  defendants Flood Brook Union School District,  Flood Brook Union School
  Board members in their individual and official capacities, the Vermont 
  Department of Education ("DOE") and the DOE's licensing officer, Patricia
  Pallas, in her official and  individual capacities.  Plaintiff contends the
  trial court erred by dismissing her claims against 

 

       the school defendants (FN1) for (1) disability discrimination in
  violation of Vermont's Fair  Employment Practices Act ("VFEPA"), 21 V.S.A.
  § 495(a)(1); (2) retaliation for requesting  accommodations for her
  disability and filing complaints under the Vermont Occupational Health and 
  Safety Act, 21 V.S.A. § 231 and Vermont Workers' Compensation Act, 21
  V.S.A. § 710; and (3)  damages and equitable relief through the doctrines
  of laches, waiver and estoppel.  She also contests  the court's conclusion
  that the individual school board members were entitled to qualified
  immunity  on all of her claims.  As to the State defendants, plaintiff
  seeks reversal of the court's orders  dismissing her claims for estoppel,
  violations of procedural and substantive due process under the  Vermont and
  United States Constitutions and negligence.  Finally, plaintiff appeals the
  court's denial  of her request to amend her complaint to allege gross
  negligence against defendant Pallas.  We  reverse the trial court's order
  on plaintiff's retaliation claim and its conclusion that the school board 
  members individually are entitled to qualified immunity, but affirm the
  remainder of the court's  decisions.

       This case arises out of two key events: plaintiff's March 1994
  termination from her teaching  position at Flood Brook Elementary School
  and the revocation of her license to teach elementary  level students which
  DOE and defendant Pallas had erroneously issued and reissued to plaintiff
  over  the course of several years.  We set out the facts and history
  relevant to each claim separately  because they are somewhat complex and so
  they may be understood in context.  

                                     I.

       Plaintiff's complaint alleged that the school defendants discriminated
  against her on the basis  of her disability, which consists of severe
  migraines and allergies triggered by various environmental 

 

       conditions, by terminating her employment, not renewing her teaching
  contract, and refusing to  accommodate her, actions all contrary to VFEPA. 
  The trial court granted summary judgment to the  school defendants on this
  claim, concluding that plaintiff failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of 
  material fact existed regarding whether she was substantially impaired in a
  major life activity and  could perform the essential functions of her
  teaching position.  See 21 V.S.A. § 495d(5)(A) (a person  with a physical
  or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life
  activities is  disabled); id. § 495d(6) (individuals able to perform the
  essential functions of their jobs with  accommodation are "qualified
  individual[s] with a disability").  We affirm because the parties are 
  precluded by a prior arbitration award from relitigating whether a
  particular job requirement was an  essential function of plaintiff's
  teaching position at Flood Brook.  See In re Handy, ___ Vt. ___, ___,