Case Title: LOCAL 514 TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA v. KEATING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 99178

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2003-12-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
LOCAL 514 TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA v. KEATING  LOCAL 514 TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA v. KEATING 2003 OK 110 83 P.3d 835 Case Number: 99178 Decided: 12/16/2003 THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA Local 514 Transport Workers Union of America, Local 627 International Union of Operating Engineers, Local Lodge 898 International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Local 584 International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental & Reinforcing Iron Workers, Local 916 American Federation of Government Employees, Local 1358 National Association of Letter Carriers, Local 1558 International Union, United Auto, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Oklahoma State AFL-CIO and Edwards Pipeline Services, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Frank Keating, Governor of the State of Oklahoma, Oklahomans for Jobs for Justice, Inc., Kent Duvall, Michelle McKenzie, and Stephen Weese, Defendants-Appellees, Eastern Oklahoma Building & Construction Trades Council, Amicus Curiae. CERTIFIED QUESTION OF LAW FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT ¶0 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has certified to us the following questions of state law: 1. Is severability analysis required in light of the preemption of [Okla. Const.] article XXIII, § 1A(B)(1), § 1A(C), and § 1A(E) (insofar as it enforces § 1A(B)(1), § 1A(B)(5), and § 1A(C)) as to workers covered by the NLRA, as opposed to the 'invalidation' of those provisions? 2. If severability analysis is appropriate, are § 1A(B)(1), § 1A(B)(5), § 1A(C), and § 1A(E) (insofar as it enforces § 1A(B)(1), § 1A(B)(5),and § 1A(C) severable from the non-preempted portions of § 1A? We answer "no" to Question 1. Thus, it is unnecessary to answer Question 2. CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED Steven R. Hickman, James E. Frasier, Tulsa, Oklahoma, and Laurence E. Gold, Washington, D.C., for Plaintiffs-Appellants, D. Kent Meyers, Mary H. Tolbert, CROWE & DUNLEVY, and John N. Hermes, McAFEE & TAFT, Oklahoma City, for Defendants-Appellees, Frank Keating, Governor of the State of Oklahoma and Oklahomans for Jobs for Justice, Inc., Kermit M. Milburn, HENSON, HENSON, HENSON, MARSHALL & MILBURN, Shawnee, Oklahoma and John R. Martin, Springfield, Virginia, for Defendants-Appellees, Kent Duvall, Michelle McKenzie, and Stephen Weese, James C. Thomas, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Amicus Curiae, Eastern Oklahoma Building & Construction Trades Council. WATT, C.J., ¶1 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has certified questions of state law to this Court under the Oklahoma Uniform Certification of Questions of State Law Act, 1. Is severability analysis required in light of the preemption of [Okla. Const.] article XXIII, § 1A(B)(1), § 1A(C), and § 1A(E) (insofar as it enforces § 1A(B)(1), § 1A(B)(5), and § 1A(C)) as to workers covered by the NLRA, as opposed to the 'invalidation' of those provisions? 2. If severability analysis is appropriate, are § 1A(B)(1), § 1A(B)(5), § 1A(C), and § 1A(E) (insofar as it enforces § 1A(B)(1), § 1A(B)(5),and § 1A(C)) severable from the non-preempted portions of § 1A? We answer "no" to Question 1. Thus, it is unnecessary to answer Question 2. INTRODUCTION ¶2 In September 2001 the people of Oklahoma approved at a special election State Question 695, a referendum submitted to them by a Joint Resolution of the Oklahoma Legislature. Upon its approval by the people, SQ 695 immediately amended the Oklahoma Constitution by adding Art. 23, § 1A. ¶3 In November 2001, several labor organizations and a pipeline company sued then Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma seeking a declaration that the right to work law was unconstitutional. Later, Oklahomans for Jobs and Justice, a supporter of right to work, and three individual Oklahoma citizens, who are represented by the National Right to Work Legal Defense and Education Foundation, intervened as defendants. ¶4 In the trial court the parties agreed that no discovery would be necessary to resolve the issues and that submission of those issues via cross-motions for summary judgment would be appropriate. The trial court entered an order and final judgment on June 5, 2002, Local 514, Transport Workers of America, et al. v. Keating, et al., 212 F. Supp. 2d 1319 (E.D. Okla. 2002). In its order, the trial court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the right to work law should be declared invalid because it was substantially preempted by the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. 6, Cl. 2, and also rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the amendment violated several provisions of the Oklahoma Constitution. Instead, the trial court held, "Plaintiffs' federal constitutional attack against Oklahoma's right-to-work law has no merit and must be rejected." The trial court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law issues raised by plaintiffs. ¶5 The trial court held that the right to work amendment did not apply to employees covered by the Railway Labor Act, ¶6 The trial court held that § 1A(B)(5) of the right to work amendment, relating to exclusive hiring halls, ¶7 After concluding that § 1A(B)(5) and § 1A(C) of the right to work amendment conflict with and are preempted by federal law, the trial court went on to analyze whether, under Oklahoma law, the remaining provisions, primarily §1A(B)(1)-§1A(B)(4), were capable of standing alone and being executed in accordance with the intent of the people, or were so interdependent with the preempted provisions, it could not be said that the people would have voted to enact the remaining provisions by themselves. The trial court held that the remaining provisions of the right to work amendment, subsections (B)(1)-(B)(4), were "the law's core provisions banning union and agency shops [and] would have been enacted notwithstanding the absence of the invalid provisions." 212 F. Supp. 2d at 1329. ¶8 On appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that § 1A(B)(1) HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ¶9 The Oklahoma right to work law is one of many that have been passed throughout the United States through both legislation and constitutional amendment. Such laws were enacted to protect employees against discrimination on account of their membership or nonmembership in labor organizations. The U.S. Supreme Court first held that such laws were constitutional in 1949 in the companion cases of Lincoln Federal Labor Union No. 19129, A.F. of L. v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., ¶10 In 1947, the congress passed § 14(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 164(b), which specifically authorized states to prohibit agreements between unions and employers requiring membership in a union as a condition of employment. Similarly, § 8 of the same Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158, provided, in effect, that a worker can't be fired for nonmembership in a union if the worker's nonmembership results from the worker's refusal to pay union dues. ¶11 The various forms of collective bargaining agreements between unions and employers that require employees to pay union dues in one form or another are generally characterized as "security agreements." Lincoln Federal, 335 U.S. at 528, 69 S. Ct. at 153. The conflict over right to work laws has arisen because of the opposing attitudes toward security agreements. Right to work advocates believe that every worker should have the right to decline to pay dues to an organization whose views the worker may oppose, but unions believe that no worker should be entitled to benefit from the advantages secured by unions without having contributed to the unions' support. The cases dealing with this issue are collected and discussed in a recent A.L.R. annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Right-to-Work Provisions, 105 A.L.R.5th 243 (2003). DISCUSSION I. Severability Analysis is not Required because the right to work law contemplates that some of its provisions might not operate in some limited circumstances as a result of the interpretation of federal law by federal courts. ¶12 As noted earlier, the trial court held that Oklahoma's right to work amendment did not apply to employees covered by the Railway Labor Act, the Civil Service Reform Act, or the Postal Reorganization Act, and had no application to federal enclaves, such as military bases. Thus, the trial court concluded that no preemption issue existed as to employees covered by these federal acts because the Oklahoma right to work amendment itself contemplated that those employees were excluded from the amendment's ambit. For reasons discussed below, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that the right to work amendment itself contemplated that, because of the operation of federal law, certain employees in certain circumstances might not be covered by the right to work amendment's terms. ¶13 First, we note that whether to apply severability analysis here is a matter of state law. With respect to whether severability analysis is required here, we think it only logical to extend the trial court's analysis concerning the Railway Labor Act, the Civil Service Reform Act, the Postal Reorganization Act, and federal enclaves to those sections of the right to work amendment that have been held to be preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act and the National Labor Relations Act. Consequently, we hold that the right to work amendment contemplates that certain of its provisions might not operate under certain conditions because of the Labor Management Relations Act and the National Labor Relations Act, just as the trial court held that the right to work amendment contemplated that it would not apply to employees covered by the Railway Labor Act, the Civil Service Reform Act, or the Postal Reorganization Act, and had no application to federal enclaves, such as military bases. Thus, severability analysis is not necessary. ¶14 Our conclusion that severability analysis is unnecessary is buttressed by the fact that the Oklahoma right to work law applies to state and local government workers and agricultural workers, regardless of its preemption by federal law with respect to certain classes of employees in certain situations. Plaintiffs argue that this is not important because state employees are currently not subject to security agreements because of legislation. Based on this fact, plaintiffs claim that the right to work law provides no new protections to state workers. But the right to work law is a constitutional amendment, so it will protect state employees from any legislative changes that might otherwise be made to labor laws governing public employees. Thus, the right to work law provides a significant additional protection to public employees. II. Constitutional provisions are entitled to the same presumption of validity as legislative provisions. ¶15 We have held that it is "the cardinal principle of statutory construction" that a statute is constitutional and should be sustained against challenge where it is possible to do so. In re Application of the Oklahoma Dept. of Transp., The issue of severability arises only after an amendment already approved by voters has been challenged. Rather than ignoring the results of the election and requiring the Secretary of State to show that voters would have approved an amendment without the unconstitutional provisions, the burden is properly placed on the challenging party. The analysis urged by appellants would be the antithesis of the purpose underlying severability--to preserve the constitutionality of enactments where it is possible to do so. Accordingly, we conclude that we should adopt the severability analysis that we have applied to legislative enactments. [Emphasis added.] As was the case in Florida, plaintiffs would have us adopt an analysis, which to succeed would require us to ignore the presumption of validity to which the right to work amendment is entitled. This we decline to do. ¶16 Plaintiffs' argument that the people would not have approved the right to work law if they had known that certain of its provisions would not apply because of federal law strikes us as counterintuitive. Why would the people not approve a constitutional change that would protect workers from the involuntary payment of union dues simply because federal courts applying federal law might decide that some of its provisions would not apply to some but not all workers in clearly defined circumstances? We conclude that the possibility that the federal courts might hold that certain employees would not be subject to the right to work law cannot be assumed to be a factor which would have caused the people to vote against its passage. It is clear, therefore, that plaintiffs have failed in their burden, as defined by In re Application of the Oklahoma Dept. of Transp., ¶17 It is important to keep in mind that the federal courts in this matter have not declared any provision of the right to work law unconstitutional. Instead, the federal courts have merely held that the right to work law does not apply in certain circumstances due to the primacy of federal law, not that preemption lead to invalidation of any of the right to work law's provisions. Thus, the cases cited by plaintiffs in which this Court has examined whether a statute containing unconstitutional provisions would have been passed, had the legislature known that part of what it passed was unconstitutional, are inapposite here. See, for example, Comanche Light & Power v. Nix, ¶18 Just as whether some of the right to work amendment's provisions were preempted by federal law was a question of federal law, whether the finding of the federal court's requires us to engage in severability analysis is a question of state law. We hold that severability analysis is not necessary here for the reason that the right to work law contemplated that some of its provisions might be preempted by federal law and because plaintiffs failed to overcome the presumption that the right to work law is valid and enforceable. Thus, we decline to address plaintiffs' various legal arguments in support of their claim that the rulings of the federal courts in this matter establish that the voters were somehow mislead. CONCLUSION ¶19 Although the question whether state law is preempted is a matter of federal law, the severability question is a matter of state law. Under Oklahoma law, constitutional provisions are entitled to the same presumption of validity as are statutes. We hold that rulings by federal courts applying federal law to the effect that certain provisions of the right to work law are subject to preemption (but not "invalidation") of some of its terms as to some but not all workers in some but not all situations fails to overcome the presumption of validity to which the right to work law is entitled under Oklahoma law. Severability analysis is therefore not called for here. Further, to hold the right to work amendment unconstitutional under the circumstances presented here would be to thwart the clearly expressed will of the people. CERTIFIED QUESTIONS ANSWERED WATT, C.J., OPALA, V.C.J., HODGES, HARGRAVE, KAUGER, WINCHESTER, JJ. - concur. LAVENDER, SUMMERS, BOUDREAU, JJ. - concur in result. FOOT