Case Title: Hill v. Cross Country

Citation: 402 Md. 281

Docket Number: 4/07

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2007-12-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Kathleen Hill v. Cross Country Settlements, LLC, No. 4, September Term 2007.
UNJUST ENRICHMENT - GENERALLY A PLAINTIFF IS NOT A VOLUNTEER AND
THUS NOT PROHIBITED FROM RECOVERY IN UNJUST ENRICHMENT WHEN HE
OR SHE ACTS UNDER A LEGAL DUTY, ACTS TO PROTECT HIS OR HER
PROPERTY INTERESTS, ACTS UNDER A MORAL DUTY, ACTS AT THE REQUEST
OF THE DEFENDANT, OR ACTS PURSUANT TO A REASONABLE OR JUSTIFIABLE
MISTAKE AS TO THE AFOREMENTIONED CATEGORIES.  
SUBROGATION - ALTHOUGH SUBROGATION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
SHARE MANY OVERLAPPING PRINCIPLES, SUBROGATION MERELY IS A
REMEDY, AND, IN ORDER TO RECOVER, A PLAINTIFF REQUIRES ANOTHER
UNDERLYING LEGAL THEORY. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - AFFIDAVITS IN SUPPORT - AN AFFIDAVIT
CONTAINING A MERE ALLUSION TO A DOCUMENT, WITHOUT ATTACHING
THAT DOCUMENT OR RECITING ITS RELEVANT TERMS, IS INSUFFICIENT TO
ASSERT LEGAL SUPPORT TO GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Circuit Court for Baltimore Cou nty
Case No. 03-C-04-011853
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF MARYLAND
No. 4
September Term, 2007
                                                                             
KATHLEEN HILL
v.
CROSS COUNTRY SETTLEMENTS, LLC
                                                                             
 
Bell, C.J.
Harrell
Battaglia
Greene 
Eldridge, John C. (Retired,
specially assigned)
Wilner, Alan M. (Retired,
specially assigned)
Cathell, Dale R. (Retired,
specially assigned)
JJ.
                                                                             
Opinion by Harrell, J.
                                                                             
Filed:   December 3, 2007
-1-
The only thing that is crystal clear about this case is that the grant of summary
judgment, on this record, was inappropriate.  Although we cannot state conclusively that no
conceivable set of facts that may be developed on remand, based on the analysis here, could
support disposition of this dispute by summary judgment, we suggest that it is quite likely
that this litigation presents triable issues. 
I.
Mary Sasso acquired the residential property at 533 S. Chester Street in Baltimore City
(the "Property") on 28 March 1991.  Approximately six months later, she conveyed the
Property to her daughter, Kathleen Hill, reserving for herself, however, a life estate with the
power to encumber the Property.  In 1999, Sasso obtained a home equity loan from Provident
Bank ("Provident") using the Property as security for the loan.  Provident recorded among
the land records of Baltimore City on 22 April 1999 the Deed of Trust associated with that
loan.  Sasso refinanced the loan with Provident, and a new Deed of Trust was executed, on
25 October 2002.  Provident issued a certificate of satisfaction for the 1999 loan and properly
recorded the new Deed of Trust. 
Sasso died on 18 May 2003.  Provident continued to receive from Hill regular
payments on the 2002 loan until a last payment on 25 June 2004.  In June 2004, Adedayo
Mseka (the "Buyer") agreed with Hill to purchase the Property for $175,000.  Cross Country
Settlements, LLC ("Cross Country"), was engaged by the Buyer to conduct the closing.
During its title search, Cross Country discovered the outstanding 2002 Deed of Trust in favor
1Apparently unrecognized by the participants, a link to the answer to the mystery of
the ostensibly unreleased 2002 Deed of Trust and loan was hidden in plain sight.  In the
bottom right corner of the 2002 Deed of Trust appears the super-imposed number 96038807,
which, as hindsight reveals, was the correct account number at Provident for the 2002 loan.
This is but one of several critical junctures in a parade of miscues where the legal morass that
this case became might have been averted.
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of Provident. Cross Country contacted Provident to obtain payoff information. At this point
in time, the only relevant information Cross Country had was the name of the borrower
(Sasso) and other self-explanatory information revealed by the four corners of the recorded
Deed of Trust. The record does not contain written documentation of the initial
communications between Provident and Cross Country.  The communications were
characterized, however, in an affidavit of Cross Country's President, Rebecca L. Raras,
submitted in support of Cross Country's motion for summary judgment, as "difficult." In
essence, Cross Country was unable to obtain payoff information from Provident.
At some point after Cross Country contacted Provident initially, with no success,
Cross Country asked for further information from Hill about the 2002 Deed of Trust loan.
Hill gave Cross Country what she thought was the correct account number at Provident,
number 96021899.  This account number, as it turns out, was for the original 1999 loan on
the Property, not the 2002 loan.  Hill also supplied to Cross Country Sasso's death certificate,
which contained such information as Sasso's Social Security Number.1 
Cross Country,  using the account number provided by Hill, contacted Provident again
in an effort to obtain payoff information for the 2002 loan.  Provident responded on 6 July
2Later, when the litigation that is the present case was before the Circuit Court for
Baltimore County, the Circuit Court, in dismissing certain counts in the Fourth Amended
(continued...)
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2004 with a letter stating "the above referenced loan was paid in full on October 30, 2002.
Deed and Certificate of Satisfaction sent to customer on January 24, 2003."  Cross Country
nonetheless deemed it odd that a loan would be paid in full only five days after it had been
executed and recorded.  Cross Country renewed its request to Provident for payoff
information for the 2002 loan.  Provident responded by faxing a copy of the 6 July 2004 letter
to Cross Country, with a cover sheet that said, "[t]his was faxed to you on 7-6-04.  PS Loan
has been pd in full."  There is nothing in the record to indicate that Cross Country solicited
a confirmatory release or certificate of satisfaction from Provident regarding the 2002 loan.
The Hill-Mseka closing on the Property occurred on 15 July 2004.  At settlement,
Raras claimed, in her summary judgment affidavit, that Hill inquired about a Provident
account being paid off.  Raras showed Hill the 6 July 2004 payoff letter from Provident and
inquired as to whether there were outstanding mortgages on the Property.  Hill responded that
the Provident account she had in mind when earlier she supplied the number 96021899 was
a credit card account in her mother's name.  Raras also claims that Hill informed her that the
payoff letter from Provident was accurate. The form "Owner's Affidavit" signed by Hill at
closing  states, "THAT no agreement or contract for conveyance, or deed, conveyance,
written lease, or writing whatsoever, is in existence, adversely affecting the title to said
premises, except that in connection with which this Affidavit is given."2   The settlement
2(...continued)
Complaint, stated, "one fact is clear; it is the opinion of this Court that [Hill] did not
intentionally utter a false representation with the intent to deceive or defraud [Cross
Country]."
3No copy of this policy or any of its terms were made a part of the record. 
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proceeded, with Hill receiving the proceeds of the sale of the Property without deduction for
any amount due on the 2002 Provident loan.  Cross Country, as agent for Stewart Title
Guaranty Company ("Stewart"), issued a title insurance policy to the Buyer.3
On 16 September 2004, two months after the closing and the last payment on the 2002
loan, Provident faxed Cross Country a payoff sheet for the outstanding loan, account number
96038807.  The amount of the payoff was $70,261.26.  On 21 September 2004, Cross
Country sent a letter to Hill demanding that Hill "forward to Cross Country Settlements, LLC
a certified check [for $70,261.26] made payable to Provident Bank . . . ."  Hill did not
respond to the demand letter.  On 22 December 2004, Provident informed the Buyer that the
Property would be sold at foreclosure in early 2005.  Provident initiated foreclosure
proceedings in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City.  The Buyer made a claim against her title
insurer, Stewart. Stewart paid the $70,261.26 to Provident, without apparent protest or
mounting a defense to the foreclosure on behalf of the Buyer, its insured.  Because the title
insurance policy was not made a part of the record here, there is no basis upon which to
evaluate Stewart's decision to pay.
Stewart then made demand upon its issuing agent, Cross Country, for reimbursement
of the funds paid to Provident.  Cross Country paid Stewart on 18 February 2005.  Cross
4Hill, the defendant, was a resident of Baltimore County at the time.
5Hill filed a motion to dismiss all counts.  The motion was granted only as to the three
misrepresentation counts.  The motion was denied as to the remaining two claims, unjust
enrichment and monies had and received.  The Circuit Court's Memorandum Opinion and
Ruling, dated 5 October 2005, purported to hold that "[Cross Country] is entitled to
restitutionary relief including [Cross Country's] fifth claim of Monies Had and Received."
Such a ruling was improper in disposition of a motion to dismiss, and is entitled to no legal
force or effect.  
6Cross Country supported its motion for summary judgment with Raras's affidavit.
Hill filed no affidavit, either in support of its counter-motion or in opposition to Raras's
affidavit. 
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Country claims it was required to reimburse Stewart by the terms of an underwriting
agreement between them, although that agreement also was not made part of the record.  The
sole basis in the record in support of Cross Country's claim that it was obligated by contract
to reimburse Stewart is a bare assertion to that effect in the affidavit of Raras.
Cross Country filed its first Complaint against Hill on 12 November 2004 in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore County.4  After a series of dismissals and amended complaints,
the Fourth Amended Complaint (the final complaint) and Cross Country's motion for partial
summary judgment were filed on 8 March 2005, after Cross Country paid Stewart.
The Fourth Amended Complaint contained five counts: intentional misrepresentation,
intentional misrepresentation - concealment, negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment,
and monies had and received.  The misrepresentation counts were dismissed by the Circuit
Court on Hill's motion on 5 October 2005.5  Upon the parties' cross-motions for summary
judgment,6 the Circuit Court granted summary judgment to Cross Country on Count IV,
7Cross Country moved for summary judgment only on the unjust enrichment claim.
Thus, it is the only claim at issue before this Court.
8Hill's Petition for Writ of Certiorari presented three questions for our consideration:
I.  Where, in response to a payoff request, a lender issues two
written payoff statements to a settlement company, which
unequivocally state that there is no balance due under a
mortgage, and the settlement company, acting in reliance upon
those representations, disburses the net settlement funds to the
seller, is that lender estopped from later foreclosing against the
property to recover the amount which it subsequently contends
it discovered was due under the mortgage?
II.  Where the lender described above forecloses against the
property to collect the amount it claims to have erroneously left
out of the payoff statements, and the buyer makes a claim
against the title insurer, if the title insurer merely pays the lender
instead of defending on the basis of estoppel, is the settlement
company liable to indemnify the title insurer?
III.  Where the settlement company described above merely
reimburses the title insurer instead of defending on the basis that
it did not commit any error in conducting the settlement, may the
settlement company bring an unjust enrichment action against
the seller of the house for reimbursement of the amount which
the settlement company paid to the title insurer?
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unjust enrichment, on 2 December 2005.7  Hill filed a timely appeal to the Court of Special
Appeals.  The intermediate appellate court, in a reported opinion, affirmed the judgment of
the trial court.  Hill v. Cross Country Settlements, LLC, 172 Md. App. 350, 914 A.2d 231
(2007).  We granted certiorari, on Hill's petition, to consider whether the trial court was
correct in granting summary judgment to Cross Country.  Hill v. Cross Country Settlements,
LLC, 398 Md. 314, 920 A.2d 1058 (2007).8
-7-
II.
Maryland law is well settled regarding the appellate standards to be applied in
reviewing a grant of summary judgment.  Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact" and "the party in whose favor judgment is entered
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."  Maryland Rule 2-501(f).  "In granting or denying
a motion for summary judgment, a judge makes no findings of fact."  King v. Bankerd, 303
Md. 98, 111, 492 A.2d 608, 615 (1985).  The appellate court will "review the record in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and construe any reasonable inferences that may
be drawn from the facts against the moving party."  Myers v. Kayhoe, 391 Md. 188, 203, 892
A.2d 520, 529 (2006).  "In reviewing a grant of summary judgment under Md. Rule 2-501,
we independently review the record to determine whether the parties properly generated a
dispute of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law."   Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. v. Neal, 398 Md. 705, 714, 922 A.2d 538,
543 (2007) (quoting Livesay v. Baltimore County, 384 Md. 1, 9-10, 862 A.2d 33, 38 (2004)).
As iterated above, if there is a genuine dispute as to any material fact, summary
judgment is improper.  Even where the underlying facts are undisputed, "if they [are]
susceptible of more than one inference, the party against whom inferences [are] to be drawn
. . . [is] entitled to the inferences most favorable to his contentions."  Roland v. Lloyd E.
Mitchell, Inc., 221 Md. 11, 14, 155 A.2d 691, 693 (1959) (citing White v. Friel, 210 Md. 274,
285, 123 A.2d 303, 308 (1956)).  If the facts are subject to more than one inference, those
9Because of chaotic and disjointed development in this area, the body of law of unjust
enrichment, restitution, subrogation, and related causes and remedies is both voluminous and
disorganized.  See DANIEL B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.1 n.18
(1973):
It is said that sooner or later, monkeys in the British Museum,
typing at random, will by sheer chance reproduce exactly all the
works of Shakespeare, and that somewhere in Tibet monks are
diligently compiling the billions of names for God.  There is no
similar legend that restitution materials will eventually appear
under every conceivable digest topic and word index entry, but
there should be.
-8-
inferences should be submitted to the trier of fact.  Porter v. Gen. Boiler Casing Co., 284
Md. 402, 413, 396 A.2d 1090, 1096 (1979); Fenwick Motor Co. v. Fenwick, 258 Md. 134,
138, 265 A.2d 256, 258 (1970).
III.
In 2000, this Court identified the elements of a claim of  unjust enrichment,9
previously considered by the Court of Special Appeals in Everhart v. Miles, 47 Md. App.
131, 136, 422 A.2d 28, 31 (1980).  Unjust enrichment consists of three elements:
1.  A benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff;
2.  An appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the
benefit; and
3.  The acceptance or retention by the defendant of the benefit
under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the
defendant to retain the benefit without the payment of its value.
Berry & Gould, P.A. v. Berry, 360 Md. 142, 151-152, 757 A.2d 108, 113 (2000) (quoting
County Comm'rs v. J. Roland Dashiell & Sons, Inc., 358 Md. 83, 95 n. 7, 747 A.2d 600, 607
n. 7 (2000)).
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Unjust enrichment is a claim, however, that may not be reduced neatly to a golden
rule.  See Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the Appropriation of
Property or the Commission of a Wrong, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 504, 504-05 (1980)  ("[U]njust
enrichment is notoriously difficult to define.  It has on occasion been regarded as too
indefinite and vague to be recognized as a general legal principle, with concern expressed
that its adoption might undermine legal stability, confuse legal thinking, and jeopardize clear,
systematic organization of the law.").  A successful unjust enrichment claim serves to
"deprive the defendant of benefits that in equity and good conscience he ought not to keep,
even though he may have received those benefits quite honestly in the first instance, and even
though the plaintiff may have suffered no demonstrable losses." Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Dev.
v. Mullen, 165 Md. App. 624, 659, 886 A.2d 900, 921 (2005), cert. denied, 391 Md. 579, 894
A.2d 546 (2006)  (quoting DOBBS, supra, § 4.1).  "A person who receives a benefit by reason
of an infringement of another person's interest, or of loss suffered by the other, owes
restitution to him in the manner and amount necessary to prevent unjust enrichment."  Berry
& Gould, P.A. v. Berry, 360 Md. 142, 151, 757 A.2d 108, 113 (2000) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Restitution § 1 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1983)).  "The restitution claim . . . is not
aimed at compensating the plaintiff, but at forcing the defendant to disgorge benefits that it
would be unjust for him to keep."  Mass Transit Admin. v. Granite Const. Co., 57 Md. App.
766, 775, 471 A.2d 1121, 1126 (1984).  "The defendant who has received money from the
plaintiff by mistake, even though the mistake is an honest one, may be compelled to make
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restitution of the money."  DOBBS, supra, § 4.1. 
A defendant, however, "is not unjustly enriched, and therefore not required to make
restitution where the benefit was conferred by a volunteer or intermeddler."  DOBBS, supra,
§ 4.9 (citing Restatement (First) of Restitution § 112 (1937)).  This principle is based on the
notion that "one who confers a benefit upon another without affording that other the
opportunity to reject the benefit, has no equitable claim for relief against the recipient of the
benefit in the absence of some special policy . . . ."  DOBBS, supra, § 4.9.
"If plaintiff pays defendant's debt under the mistaken apprehension that he was
himself under a duty to do it . . . there is less reason to treat him as being officious, and the
courts will usually grant restitution."  John W. Wade, Restitution for Benefits Conferred
Without Request, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1201 (1996); see Boney v. Cent. Mut. Ins. Co. of
Chi., 197 S.E. 122 (N.C. 1938) (holding that plaintiff insurance broker is entitled to recovery
from defendant insurance carrier where the plaintiff paid claim denied by carrier out of moral
responsibility); but see Gallagher, Magner & Solomento, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 252
A.2d 206, 207 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1969) (denying recovery where plaintiff insurance broker paid
claim denied by insurance carrier because "where the plaintiff is not liable for the debt, he
has no right to volunteer a payment"); Gaul v. McLaughlin, 217 A.2d 757 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1966).  
An  unjust enrichment claim is "equitable in nature, and the right to restitution is
therefore subject to any counter-equities that the recipient of benefits may assert."  DOBBS,
10Dobbs identifies four distinct and independent considerations that may balance the
equities in favor of the recipient of un-earned benefits:
(1) that the recipient of the benefit has in fact gained no
net benefit from the transaction, because, without fault,
he has fairly passed the benefit to others;
(2) that the recipient of the benefit has changed his
position in reliance upon the benefit in some way, so that
restoration would work a hardship on him;
(3) that some broad social policy, as distinguished from equities
and hardships, is opposed to restitution;
(4) that the recipient of the benefit may not have changed
position, but for reasons of convenience in judicial
administration, or for reasons of transactional stability, courts
will not re-open the transaction.
DOBBS,  supra, § 11.9.
-11-
supra, § 11.9.  Although the basis for recovery in unjust enrichment is not based on fault,
misconduct or fault of one of the parties is sometimes considered in determining whether to
permit recovery.  DOBBS, supra, § 11.9.10  
III.
The parties to the present case vigorously contest the application of the elements of
unjust enrichment to the record.  Hill argues that, as a matter of law, none of the required
elements, especially the second element, can be satisfied, and therefore summary judgment
was inappropriate.  Cross Country contends that all three elements have been satisfied, and
demands affirmance of the trial court's judgment. 
A.
Regarding the first element, whether the plaintiff conferred a cognizable benefit on
the defendant, Hill argues that Cross Country was not capable of bestowing a benefit, as it
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did not pay over to Hill monies belonging to Cross Country.  As a settlement agent, Hill
contends, Cross Country had no financial stake in the closing transaction, other than its own
fees.  Cross Country's role in the transaction essentially was to act as an intermediary and
conduit for monies belonging to others.  Cross Country counters by pointing out that a
representative of Cross Country at the closing handed Hill a check drawn on a Cross Country
checking account.  Cross Country contends that there is no doubt that Hill received a benefit
from Cross Country.
Both parties largely are incorrect.  Although the consummation of the real estate
closing did not constitute a conveyance of a benefit to Hill by Cross Country for the purposes
of analysis of an unjust enrichment claim, the events alleged to have occurred subsequent to
the closing may support a conclusion that a benefit was conferred.  As a matter of law, the
payment of the debt of another constitutes a benefit conferred, and thus may satisfy the first
element of an unjust enrichment claim.  THE RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 76
(1937) states, "[a] person who, in whole or in part, has discharged a duty which is owed by
him but which as between himself and another should have been discharged by the other, is
entitled to indemnity from the other, unless the payor is barred by the wrongful nature of his
conduct."  Thus, when a plaintiff pays the liability of the defendant, the defendant's balance
sheet improves as a result of such payment.  See Wade, supra, at 1186 ("One is enriched not
only when he receives an asset but also when someone else performs for him a duty which
would be a burden to him.  The clearest case is that of one person paying another's debt.  The
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elimination of this obligation is clearly a benefit . . . .").  Moreover, we have not required
always that a benefit conferred in an unjust enrichment action come necessarily and directly
to the defendant from the plaintiff's own resources.  See Plitt v. Greenberg, 242 Md. 359,
364, 219 A.2d 237, 241 (1966) ("'It is immaterial how the money may have come into the
defendant's hands, and the fact that it was received from a third person will not affect his
liability, if, in equity and good conscience, he is not entitled to hold it against the true
owner.'" (quoting Empire Oil Co. v. Lynch, 126 S.E.2d 478, 479 (Ga. Ct. App. 1963))); Plitt,
242 Md. at 364, 219 A.2d at 241 ("[A] plaintiff could recover money from even an innocent
transferee who was without knowledge that he possessed the plaintiff's money.").  
Cross Country, by reimbursing Stewart, paid an asserted debt which it contends is
more properly chargeable to Hill.  If Hill were found to be liable to Stewart, and as a result
of the payment by Cross Country that liability was erased, Hill may be said to have received
a benefit from satisfaction of that claim.  By contrast, if Hill should be determined not to be
liable to Provident or Stewart in an action brought directly against Hill, Hill received no
benefit as Cross Country paid a debt that Hill did not owe. 
B.
Hill contends that the second element of an unjust enrichment claim is not present
because, viewing the well-pleaded facts in the light most favorable to her as the nonmoving
party, she was unaware of the 2002 mortgage at the time she received the overpayment at
closing.  This argument fails to for two reasons.  
11We express no view as to what a trier of fact might make of the asserted fact, if
admitted in evidence, that Hill allegedly submitted to Provident the monthly payments due
on the 2002 loan for 12 consecutive months following Sasso's death.
12The purpose behind this requirement is to prevent a true officious intermeddler from
maintaining an action for unjust enrichment or quantum meruit when the intermeddler claims
he should be compensated for services rendered or value provided to the defendant.  Dobbs
(continued...)
-14-
First, as discussed above, the alleged benefit being litigated in this case is Cross
Country's reimbursement to Stewart.  The essence of the requirement that the defendant have
knowledge or appreciation of the benefit is that the defendant have an opportunity to decline
the benefit.  "It is quite appropriate to say . . . that the opportunity may exist later; and that
the defendant has a true opportunity to decline by insisting that he pay the debt himself.  This
would produce a . . . result . . . which should be encouraged."  Wade, supra, at 1213.  Hill
apparently had knowledge and appreciation of that payment, as she received a written
demand from Cross Country that she pay the balance owed on the mortgage to Provident.
In fact, this litigation was initiated prior to the payment from Cross Country to Stewart.  Hill
had a fair opportunity to decline the alleged benefit ultimately conferred by Cross Country
by making the payment herself.11
Second, Hill misunderstands the purpose behind the requirement that the defendant
against whom a successful unjust enrichment claim is lodged have knowledge or appreciation
of the benefit conferred.  When the benefit conferred is money, there is no requirement that
a defendant necessarily have knowledge or appreciation of the benefit precisely at the time
the benefit is conferred.12  Some courts have held that when a defendant declines a plaintiff's
12(...continued)
provides an apt example.  While the homeowner is away, a house painter paints the entire
house, without the owner's consent, thereby adding value to the homeowner's property.  The
added value of the home cannot be separated easily and returned to the house painter.
Therefore, a court should not permit the house painter to recover.  Dobbs notes that, although
the homeowner is enriched, this result "is preferable to payment of the intermeddler, who
should not thus be encouraged to invade another's freedom of choice about his own affairs."
DOBBS, supra, § 4.9.  If, however, the benefit is something that can be easily returned, such
as money or personal property, "the fact that it is retained and used is a choice.  When this
choice is available, the choice principle is satisfied and restitution . . . ought to be required."
DOBBS, supra, § 4.9.
-15-
request to return a conferred benefit, the defendant has been afforded a fair opportunity to
reject the benefit, and thus, recovery may be permitted.  See Consol. Fisheries Co. v. Consol.
Solubles Co., 112 A.2d 30, 35 (Del. 1955) ("As a general rule, also, even a volunteer who
pays the obligation of another is entitled to reimbursement from the obligor when he takes
advantage of the act of the volunteer."); Beacon Homes, Inc. v. Holt, 146 S.E.2d 434 (N.C.
1966) (holding that when plaintiff erroneously built a house on defendant's land, and
defendant refused to permit plaintiff to remove the structure, plaintiff was entitled to
recovery because defendant had a choice of retaining the benefit).  In other words,
restitutionary recovery may be permitted under a theory of unjust enrichment when the
recipient of the benefit "in fact retains a choice of keeping or returning it . . . ."  DOBBS,
supra, § 4.9.  If a plaintiff is mistaken as to the duties or rights that he or she owes another
and "because of his mistake confers a benefit upon another, that [plaintiff] is often entitled
to recover the value of that benefit, in spite of the fact that the recipient was given no
opportunity to decline it."  DOBBS, supra, § 4.9. 
-16-
C.
The final element of an unjust enrichment claim is a fact-specific balancing of the
equities.  "The task is to determine whether the enrichment is unjust."  Wade, supra, at 1185.
In making fact-specific determinations, a reviewing court considers the facts in the record,
and the reasonable inferences drawn from those facts, in a light most favorable to the non-
moving party, Hill in this case.  Harford County v. Saks, 399 Md. 73, 82, 923 A.2d 1, 6,
(2007).  Hill presents two related arguments.  First, Hill argues that, because either Cross
Country or Stewart could have avoided enforcement of any asserted liability owed to
Provident by asserting the doctrine of equitable estoppel, Cross Country was a volunteer and
therefore prohibited from recovery against her.  Second, Hill argues that an unjust enrichment
claim should not be allowed to be maintained in lieu of a subrogation claim which, if
anything, was the more proper form of remedy, if any remedy existed.  Under subrogation,
Hill contends, she would be able to assert the defense of equitable estoppel against Cross
Country and defeat recovery.  We will address each of these arguments in turn.
1.
It is undisputed that once properly yoked with the label of "mere volunteer" or
"officious payor," a plaintiff is prohibited from recovering under theories of unjust
enrichment or subrogation.  It less clear, however, precisely when a plaintiff's payment to a
third party satisfying the liability of the defendant renders a plaintiff a volunteer and casts
him or her "into legal outer darkness."  DOBBS, supra, § 4.3.  Palmer notes that "[w]hen one
-17-
person, without request, knowingly pays the debt of another . . . restitution will normally be
denied." GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 10.2 (1978).
In ancient Roman law, volunteering to interfere and manage the business of another
was encouraged and rewarded.  Edward W. Hope, Officiousness, 15 CORNELL L. Q. 25, 25
(1929).  In the course of the development of the English common law, however, a prohibition
on the recovery of volunteers became accepted.  "With considerable truth, it has been said
whenever the courts for some reason see fit to refuse subrogation, they denote the
unsuccessful plaintiff a 'volunteer.'  It may be pointed out also that even where subrogation
is allowed, the courts almost invariably pay lip service to the rule."  Note, Subrogation and
the Volunteer Rule, 24 VA. L. REV. 771, 772 (1938).  Although older surveyed cases strictly
and harshly applied the volunteer rule, more recent cases map a trend to a "liberal attitude
toward those who pay the debt of another, taking the form of a pronounced reluctance to
designate the claimant a 'volunteer.'" Note, supra, at 774; See Daniel Friedmann, Unjust
Enrichment, Pursuance of Self-Interest, and the Limits of Free Riding, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
831, 854 (2003) ("The modern approach in American law is more liberal and tends to relax
the traditional rule and allow the payor, who has an interest in discharging the debt or a moral
duty to do so, to recover from the real debtors.")
The drafters of the Restatement (First) of Restitution avoided the difficulty associated
with defining the circumstances by which one becomes a "volunteer" prohibited from
recovery in unjust enrichment largely by ignoring the term altogether.  See Restatement
13For the purposes of this opinion, we deem "officious payor," "intermeddler," and
"volunteer" as having identical meanings.
-18-
(First) of Restitution §162 cmt. b (1937) ("Where a person discharges an obligation owed by
another, or a lien upon the property of another, and does so officiously, he is not entitled to
reimbursement from the other . . . and is not entitled to be subrogated to the position of the
obligee or lien-holder. . . .  On the other hand, where the plaintiff is not officious, and he uses
his property or his property is used in discharging the obligation of another or a lien upon
another's property, he is entitled to reimbursement and is entitled to the remedy of
subrogation to obtain reimbursement."). The Restatement's definition of "officiousness" is
no more helpful to the present inquiry than its approach to "volunteer."  See Restatement
(First) of Restitution § 2 (1937) cmt. a ("Officiousness means interference in the affairs of
others not justified by the circumstances under which the interference takes place.").13  
The legal principles regarding subrogation contain a parallel prohibition against
volunteers from recovering. 
Although it is difficult to lay down a general rule applicable to
all cases in which subrogation is sought, the essential elements
necessary for legal subrogation (as distinguished from
conventional and statutory subrogation) are: (1) the existence of
a debt or obligation for which a party, other than the subrogee,
is primarily liable, which (2) the subrogee, who is neither a
volunteer nor an intermeddler, pays or discharges in order to
protect his own rights and interests. (emphasis added)
George L. Schnader, Jr., Inc. v. Cole Bldg. Co., 236 Md. 17, 23, 202 A.2d 326, 330 (1964)
(citing James Morfit Mullen, The Equitable Doctrine of Subrogation, 3 MD. L. REV. 201, 203
14Palmer describes the two problems that arise when a plaintiff settles a claim brought
by a third party where the defendant solely was liable for the claim.  PALMER, supra, § 22.2
The first question is whether the circumstances take the plaintiff out of the "volunteer
category."  PALMER, supra, § 22.2.  The second is whether the plaintiff may recover the
entire amount that the plaintiff paid to settle the claim.  PALMER, supra, § 22.2.  Because
there is no dispute as to the amount of the underlying claim, we need not consider further the
latter scenario. 
-19-
(1939).  
The foregoing descriptions of how subrogation and unjust enrichment should operate
are helpful, but lacking in a significant respect, as applied to the present case, because of the
vaguely defined terms "volunteer" and "intermeddler."  The issues become more complex in
cases such as this, where it is asserted that a "plaintiff settled and paid a . . . claim asserted
by a third party on which the defendant was solely liable." PALMER, supra, § 22.2.14  In
McNiece v. Eliason, 78 Md. 168, 27 A. 940 (1894), an unsecured creditor of an estate sought
to pay an overdue mortgage on property owned by the estate and thereby become subrogated
to the rights of a mortgagor.  The Court held that the general creditor had no such right and
would be a mere volunteer.  In Robertson v. Mowell, 66 Md. 530, 8 A. 273 (1887), we
enforced a plaintiff's subrogation rights when she paid her brother's mortgage with the
understanding that she was to be subrogated.  In holding that she was not a volunteer, we
noted:
It is true she was under no legal obligation to make this
payment, but, under the circumstances stated, she cannot be
regarded as a mere stranger or volunteer, officiously
intermeddling with a matter which in no way concerned her.
There are no intervening incumbrances or rights of creditors to
-20-
be interfered with, nor any superior or equal equities to be
displaced.
Robertson, 66 Md. at 538, 8 A. at 277.
In  Springham v. Kordek, 55 Md. App. 449, 462 A.2d 567 (1983), children made
payments on their mother's mortgage after her spouse abandoned her.  The Court of Special
Appeals held that, although the children acted without legal compulsion, they were not
prohibited from recovery on the bases that: (1) they had a moral obligation to assist their
mother; (2) they were protecting their own property interest; and, (3) they acted at the request
of their mother. 
Absolute legal compulsion is not required in order for a plaintiff to avoid the fatal
designation of "officious." See Restatement (First) of Restitution (1937) § 79. ("A person .
. . who was claimed by the creditor to be an obligor, upon an obligation which, as between
such person and another, the other had a primary duty to discharge, and who has paid the
creditor in discharge of the obligation at a time when it existed against the other, is entitled
to indemnity from the other, although originally or at the time of payment, the payor was
under no duty to make the payment, unless his payment was officious.") (emphasis added);
PALMER, supra, § 22.1 ("If one person mistakenly pays the debt of another, usually in the
mistaken belief that it is his own debt, the policy against intervention of in the affairs of
another loses its force . . . .").  The issue turns on whether the plaintiff made a "justified
intervention in the defendant's affairs." PALMER, supra, § 22.2.
The factual novelty of the present case requires us to adopt a rule to guide future
15Public policy is best served by striving, where logical and fair to do so, to achieve
consistency in the interpretation and application of the overlapping theories of subrogation
and unjust enrichment.  Consistent with that, we believe the definition of "volunteer" must
be identical, regardless of the case, in dealing with unjust enrichment or subrogation.  It
makes little sense to enable a plaintiff to choose between such closely related legal theories
and obtain different results.  Beall v. Beall, 291 Md. 224, 234 n.2, 434 A.2d 1015, 1021 n.2
(1981) (interpreting the common law in such a way as to avoid "anomalous results").
Public policy also is best served by liberally permitting a plaintiff to be subrogated to
the rights of a third-party creditor.  In traditional insurance subrogation cases, a narrow
definition of the volunteer rule serves to encourage insurers to defend their insured even
where there is a dispute over liability or coverage, thus avoiding unnecessary delay in the
settlement of claims.  "[P]ayment is not voluntary if it is made with a reasonable or good-
faith belief in obligation or personal interest in making that payment."  COUCH ON INSURANCE
§ 223:27 (3d ed. 2005).  "If plaintiff pays defendant's debt under the mistaken apprehension
that he was himself under a duty to do it . . . there is less reason to treat him as being
officious, and the courts will usually grant restitution."  Wade, supra, at 1201.
 
-21-
unjust enrichment and subrogation actions.  We agree with the Restatement (First) of
Restitution (1937) § 79, that a plaintiff may recover for a payment or payments to a third
party as long as the plaintiff was not officious in making such payment or payments.
Although we shall not supply an exhaustive list of situations where a plaintiff would not be
deemed officious, generally a plaintiff is not officious when he or she acts under a legal
compulsion or duty, acts under a legally cognizable moral duty, acts to protect his or her own
property interests, acts at the request of the defendant, or acts pursuant to a reasonable or
justifiable mistake as to any of the aforementioned categories.15
Applying the considered rules regarding volunteers to the present case, Hill would be
allowed to defend on the ground that Cross Country was an officious payor, if Cross Country
had no legal or moral obligation to pay Stewart or that any mistake by Cross Country
-22-
regarding its legal obligations was unreasonable and unjustified. 
Cross Country implied in the Circuit Court that its payment to Stewart was not
voluntary by asserting baldly that the payment was required pursuant to an underwriting
agreement between them.  Maryland Rule 2-501(a) requires that a motion for summary
judgment be supported by an affidavit if it is "based upon facts not in the record."  In its
motion for partial summary judgment, Cross Country relied upon Raras's attached affidavit,
which stated, "Stewart made demand upon Cross Country, in accordance with the terms of
our underwriting agreement, for reimbursement of the funds it paid to Provident.  On
February 18, 2005, Cross Country paid Stewart the $76,402.94 incurred by it to avert the
foreclosure." Raras's affidavit, by mere allusion to a document and without attaching that
document or reciting its relevant terms, sought to imply a legal conclusion.  In essence, Cross
Country argues for the legal proposition that it was obligated contractually to pay Stewart,
and thus, suffered financial loss. 
Maryland Rule 2-501(c) requires that an affidavit supporting a motion for summary
judgment "set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence."  The wholly legal
conclusions, explicit and implicit, contained in Raras's affidavit regarding the asserted legal
effect of the alleged underwriting agreement are neither facts nor would they be admissible
in evidence, notwithstanding whether the document itself, had it been attached, would have
been admissible.  "The interpretation of a contract . . . is a question of law . . . ."  Sy-Lene of
Wash., Inc. v. Starwood Urban Retail II, LLC, 376 Md. 157, 163, 829 A.2d 540, 544 (2003);
16Maryland Rule 5-1004 permits a party to prove the contents of a writing by other
evidence in four narrow situations.  There is no indication here that any of these four unusual
circumstances apply in this case. 
17Maryland Rule 610 (1957, 1971 Repl. Vol.).
-23-
see Langston v. Langston, 366 Md. 490, 506, 784 A.2d 1086, 1095 (2001), abrogated on
other grounds, Bienkowski v. Brooks, 386 Md. 516, 873 A.2d 1122 (2005); Wells v. Chevy
Chase Bank, 363 Md. 232, 250, 768 A.2d 620, 629-30 (2001); Auction & Estate Reps. v.
Ashton, 354 Md. 333, 340, 731 A.2d 441, 445 (1999); Calomiris v. Woods, 353 Md. 425,
434-35, 727 A.2d 358, 362-63 (1999).  Maryland Rules 5-1002 and 5-1003 require that a
party prove the content of a writing by entering into evidence the original document or a
duplicate.16 
Interpreting the predecessor to Maryland Rule 2-501,17 we opined that
"a person who claims the existence of a document which is material . . . to a
motion for summary judgment . . . should explain in his affidavit why he cannot
produce it . . . .  He cannot merely allude to its existence, and without more,
hope to raise the specter of dispute over a material fact which would defeat the
motion for summary judgment . . . ." 
Brown v. Suburban Cadillac, Inc., 260 Md. 251, 256-257, 272 A.2d 42, 45 (1971); see also
Hurt v. Sillman & Dolan, Inc., 35 Md. App. 644, 646, 371 A.2d 1137, 1138 (1977) ("An
unsupported conclusion is not the proper way to show an issue of a material fact." (citing
Carter v. Baltimore Gas & Electric Co., 25 Md. App. 717, 724, 336 A.2d 790 (1975))).  
There appears to us no good reason that the same standards should not apply to the
affidavit in the instant case offered in support of a motion.  If Cross Country desired to rely
18The Fourth Circuit recently summarized the difficulties facing a court in interpreting
a contract in summary judgment analysis:
A court faces a conceptually difficult task in deciding whether
(continued...)
-24-
on the legal conclusion that the alleged underwriting agreement required it to indemnify
Stewart, Cross Country was required to produce the underwriting agreement or, at a
minimum, recite the relevant operative terms.  Just as we do not permit the non-moving party
to defend against summary judgment based on bald conclusions of law, a moving party may
not rely on unsupported conclusory statements to justify the grant of summary judgment.  
In Wyand v. Patterson Agency, Inc., 266 Md. 456, 295 A.2d 773 (1972), we addressed
the effectiveness of an affidavit in support of summary judgment consisting of a "bald
assertion amounting to a naked legal conclusion" that the defendant was indebted to the
plaintiff.  We held that a "general allegation of a legal conclusion without detailed and
precise facts to support it erects no foundation upon which a summary judgment can rest .
. . ." Wyand, 266 Md. at 461, 295 A.2d at 776; see also Champion v. United Va. Bank, 87
Md. App. 439, 441, 589 A.2d 1328, 1329 (1991) (holding that an affidavit filed in support
of summary judgment pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-501(a) "must contain evidentiary facts,
not conclusions, and it should be full, certain and exact").  Cross Country's asserted
entitlement to summary judgment rests to a similar extent on such an unsupported legal
conclusion regarding the interpretation and/or legal effect of the absent underwriting
agreement with Stewart.18  Therefore, summary judgment must be reversed for that reason
18(...continued)
to grant summary judgment on a matter of contract
interpretation. Only an unambiguous writing justifies summary
judgment without resort to extrinsic evidence, and no writing is
unambiguous if susceptible to two reasonable interpretations.
The first step for a court asked to grant summary judgment
based on a contract's interpretation is, therefore, to determine
whether, as a matter of law, the contract is ambiguous or
unambiguous on its face. If a court properly determines that the
contract is unambiguous on the dispositive issue, it may then
properly interpret the contract as a matter of law and grant
summary judgment because no interpretive facts are in genuine
issue.  Even where a court, however, determines as a matter of
law that the contract is ambiguous, it may yet examine evidence
extrinsic to the contract that is included in the summary
judgment materials, and, if the evidence is, as a matter of law,
dispositive of the interpretative issue, grant summary judgment
on that basis.  If, however, resort to extrinsic evidence in the
summary judgment materials leaves genuine issues of fact
respecting the contract's proper interpretation, summary
judgment must of course be refused and interpretation left to the
trier of fact.  (citations omitted).
Wash. Metro.  Area Transit Auth. v. Potomac Inv. Props., Inc.,  476 F.3d 231, 235 (4th Cir.
2007).
-25-
alone.  
Even had Cross Country produced the underwriting agreement and its terms called for
the reimbursement claimed, there could remain an issue regarding whether Cross Country
successfully could maintain an argument that Stewart was a volunteer when it paid Provident
to forestall the threatened foreclosure of Mseka's interest in the Property.  It appears from the
record that Stewart may have had available a defense of equitable estoppel against
Provident's foreclosure action.  We have defined equitable estoppel generally:
-26-
Equitable estoppel is the effect of the voluntary conduct of a
party whereby he is absolutely precluded both at law and in
equity, from asserting rights which might perhaps have
otherwise existed, either of property, of contract, or of remedy,
as against another person, who has in good faith relied upon
such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position
for the worse and who on his part acquires some corresponding
right, either of property, of contract, or of remedy.
Cunninghame v. Cunninghame, 364 Md. 266, 289, 772 A.2d 1188, 1201 (2001) (citing 3 J.
POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 804 (5th ed.1941). 
Mortgage foreclosure is an equitable remedy in Maryland.  Wells Fargo Home
Mortgage, Inc. v. Neal, 398 Md. 705, 728 922 A.2d 538, 551 (2007).  It long has been held
that "he who comes into equity must come with clean hands."  Thomas v. Klemm, 185 Md.
136, 142, 43 A.2d 193, 197 (1945).  "[C]ourts of equity will not lend their aid to anyone
seeking their active interposition, who has been guilty of fraudulent, illegal, or inequitable
conduct in the matter with relation to which he seeks assistance."  Hlista v. Altevogt, 239 Md.
43, 48, 210 A.2d 153, 156 (1965); see also Hicks v. Gilbert, 135 Md. App. 394, 400, 762
A.2d 986, 989-90 (2000).  "When the plaintiff asserts an equitable remedy, equitable
defenses can be invoked even if they could not be invoked against a 'legal' claim."
Alternatives Unlimited, Inc. v. New Balt. City Bd. of School Comm'rs, 155 Md. App. 415,
458-59, 843 A.2d 252, 278 (2004).  Equitable estoppel, it seems, may be invoked as a
defense to a foreclosure action, at least in concept.  See Schaller v. Castle Dev. Corp., 111
Md. App. 40, 45 680 A.2d 528, 530 (1996) (applying principles of equitable estoppel to
foreclosure sale audit) vacated on other grounds, 347 Md. 90, 698 A.2d 1106 (1997); cf.
-27-
Wright v. Wagner, 182 Md. 483, 490, 34 A.2d 490, 445(1943) (applying equitable estoppel
to prevent mortgagee from imposing liability on mortgagor instead of mortgagor's grantee);
E. End Loan & Savs. Ass'n of Balt. City v. Berman, 170 Md. 536, 541, 185 A. 332, 337
(1936) (holding that equitable estoppel could prevent mortgagee from obtaining deficiency
judgment against mortgagor); Barasso v. Rear Still Hill Rd., LLC, 842 A.2d 1134, 1139
(Conn. App. Ct. 2004) (holding that equitable estoppel is a defense to a foreclosure action);
Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. F.D.I.C., 936 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Tenn. Ct. App.) (1996) (holding
that equitable estoppel prevented lender's successor from foreclosing).  
Equitable estoppel essentially consists of three elements: "voluntary conduct or
representation, reliance, and detriment."  Mona Elec. Co. v. Shelton, 377 Md. 320, 334, 833
A.2d 527, 535-36 (2003) (citing Creveling v. Gov't. Employees Ins. Co., 376 Md. 72, 102,
828 A.2d 229, 246 (2003)).  Stewart, viewing the facts on this record in a light most
favorable to Hill, may have had a colorable equitable estoppel argument, which, if interposed
and successful, might have precluded Provident from obtaining foreclosure relief.  As noted
above, however, payment, absent legal liability, does not necessarily make a payor officious.
The payor, in order to be deemed a volunteer, must have been unreasonable in its mistake
regarding the legal obligation to pay.  Thus, Hill could emerge victorious from the suit
against her by Cross Country if Cross Country was not liable to Stewart (either because
Stewart was a volunteer or because the underwriting agreement did not require Cross
Country's indemnification of Stewart) and Cross Country was unreasonably mistaken as to
-28-
its legal liability to Stewart. 
2.
  
Hill contends that the proper remedy, if any, befitting Cross Country's claim is an
action in subrogation or indemnification, not for unjust enrichment.  Hill's argument has two
implications: that Hill should be entitled to assert equitable estoppel as a defense against
Cross Country; and Stewart, by not asserting equitable estoppel against Provident, was a
mere volunteer when it paid Provident. 
As a preliminary matter, we note that Cross Country appears to have pleaded the
elements required for a legal subrogation claim, albeit without mentioning subrogation by
name.  A plaintiff does not need to mention specifically subrogation in order to obtain relief
under the doctrine.  See Bachmann v. Glazer & Glazer, Inc., 316 Md. 405, 412, 559 A.2d
365, 368 (1989) ("We are here presented with another situation where a plaintiff has not
specifically invoked the doctrine of subrogation, but, as in Schnader and Maryland Title, all
of the elements of this doctrine have been pleaded and proved.  [The plaintiff] is thus entitled
to recover under the doctrine of subrogation." (citing George L. Schnader, Inc. v. Cole Bldg.
Co., 236 Md. 17, 202 A.2d 326 (1964);  Md. Title & Escrow Corp. v. Kosisky, 245 Md. 13,
225 A.2d 47 (1966))).
Maryland recognizes three distinct categories of subrogation: legal subrogation,
conventional subrogation, and statutory subrogation.  Fin. Co. of Am. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar.
19Only legal subrogation could be relevant in the present case.  Conventional
subrogation arises by the operation of an agreement between the parties.  Statutory
subrogation, naturally, arises pursuant to a statute.  Fin. Co. of Am. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co.,
277 Md. 177, 182, 353 A.2d 249, 252 (1976).  In this case, only legal subrogation may apply
because there is no relevant statute governing this situation or an agreement between Hill and
Cross Country. 
20The overlap between the theories of unjust enrichment and legal subrogation are
obvious when comparing the elements of each.  The first element of unjust enrichment
requires that the plaintiff convey a benefit to the defendant.  By contrast, legal subrogation
requires that the plaintiff pay an existing debt of the defendant. In that respect, legal
subrogation is a more specific description for unjust enrichment generally where the value
received by the plaintiff is that his obligation to a creditor has been discharged by a third
party. 
Both legal theories prohibit a volunteer or officious payor from recovery.  Both legal
theories also conclude with a general "balancing of equities" test.  Both legal theories seek
to obtain a fair, equitable result.  In fact, the only significant difference between the two is
the singular requirement in unjust enrichment that the defendant have some knowledge or
appreciation of the benefit conveyed to her or him.
-29-
Co., 277 Md. 177, 182, 353 A.2d 249, 252 (1976).19  "Legal subrogation . . . arises by
operation of law when there is a debt or obligation owed by one person which another
person, who is neither a volunteer nor an intermeddler, pays or discharges under such
circumstances as in equity entitle him to reimbursement to prevent unjust enrichment."20  Md.
Title, 245 Md. at 20, 225 A.2d at 50.  
Subrogation and unjust enrichment are related legal theories and share many
overlapping legal principles.  We previously described the relationship between subrogation
and unjust enrichment: 
"'The object of subrogation is the prevention of injustice. It is
designed to promote and to accomplish justice, and is the mode
which equity adopts to compel the ultimate payment of a debt by
one, who, in justice, equity, and good conscience, should pay it.
-30-
It is an appropriate means of preventing unjust enrichment . . .
.'"
Podgurski v. OneBeacon Ins. Co., 374 Md. 133, 141, 821 A.2d 400, 405 (2003) (quoting 10
S. WILLISTON,  A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1265 (Walter. H .E. Jaeger 3d ed.
1957)).
Subrogation is "'the substitution of one person to the position of another, an obligee,
whose claim he has satisfied. . . .  The basic principles underlying subrogation are the same
as those in constructive trusts, prevention of merger, and equitable liens, i.e., restitution to
prevent forfeiture and unjust enrichment.'"  G.E. Capital Mortgage Servs., Inc. v. Levenson,
338 Md. 227, 231, 657 A.2d 1170, 1172 (1995) (quoting G.E. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF MORTGAGES § 277 (2d ed. 1970).  The substituted person "'can exercise no right not
possessed by his predecessor, and can only exercise such right under the same conditions and
limitations as were binding on his predecessor.'" George L. Schnader, Jr., Inc. v. Cole Bldg.
Co., 236 Md. 17, 23, 202 A.2d 326, 330 (1964) (quoting Poe v. Phil. Cas. Co., 118 Md. 347,
353, 84 A. 476, 478 (1912)).  "Subrogation, like lien, trust, and contract, may arise by
agreement of the parties.  But subrogation is also a remedy invoked by courts . . . to prevent
unjust enrichment, and for this purpose it is appropriate in any case where restitution is
warranted and the remedy can be given without working injustice." DOBBS, supra, § 4.3.
Dobbs further elaborated:
Subrogation simply means substitution of one person for
another; that is, one person is allowed to stand in the shoes of
another and assert his rights.  There are many ways this right
-31-
may come about, but the pattern almost always looks something
like this: A debtor owes money to a creditor. For some reason,
perhaps due to mistake or fraud, the plaintiff pays the debtor's
debt, thus satisfying the creditor's claim against the debtor. If
there is no legitimate reason for the plaintiff's intervention . . .
the plaintiff will be described in derogatory terms as a volunteer
and cast into legal outer darkness.
DOBBS, supra, § 4.3.
Subrogation, in its relationship to unjust enrichment, is best thought of as a remedy,
not as an independent cause of action.  See Pulte Home Corp. v. Parex, Inc., 174 Md. App.
681, 742, 923 A.2d 971, 1005, cert. granted, 401 Md. 172, 931 A.2d 1095 (2007)
("[S]ubrogation is not a cause of action in and of itself.  Rather, the doctrine of subrogation
allows a party to step into the shoes of another in order to pursue a cause of action."); Riemer
v. Columbia Med. Plan, Inc., 358 Md. 222, 231, 747 A.2d 677, 683 (2000), superseded by
statute, Chapter 569 of the Acts of 2000 (defining subrogation as "'[t]he substitution of one
person in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim, demand or right, so that he
who is substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to the debt or claim, and its
rights, remedies, or securities'" (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1427 (6th ed.1990)));
 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1467 (8th ed. 2004) (defining subrogation as the "equitable
remedy by which . . . a substitution takes place"); Restatement (First) of Restitution § 162
(1937) ("[W]here the plaintiff is not officious, and he uses his property or his property is used
in discharging the obligation of another or a lien upon another's property, he is entitled to
reimbursement and is entitled to the remedy of subrogation to obtain reimbursement.")
21The nature of subrogation as a remedy may be illustrated best through the typical
subrogation case.  A homeowner enters into a contract with an insurer to insure the
homeowner's property.  A tortfeasor negligently or intentionally destroys the homeowner's
property.  The insurer compensates the homeowner for his loss and then is said to be
subrogated (likely conventional subrogation by contract) to the homeowner's rights against
the tortfeasor.  The insurer could sue the tortfeasor under a theory of negligence or
intentional torts, not under a theory of subrogation.  There would be little confusion
regarding the role of subrogation in this hypothetical.  
The situation becomes less clear, however, in a case such as the present one, where
the underlying claim is framed as one of unjust enrichment, which shares overlapping
principles with subrogation.  Only adding to the confusion is the fact that restitutionary
actions brought at common law in assumpsit also share many principles with an unjust
enrichment actions.  See Ver Brycke v. Ver Brycke, 379 Md. 669, 698 n.13, 843 A.2d 758,
775 n.13 (2004) ("'[S]ome restitution claims were equitable.  However, many were not.
Many restitution claims were brought under the common law writ of assumpsit, using its
common counts such as the count for money had and received.  These claims are claims at
law in every sense, first because they seek simply money relief, and second because they
were historically brought in the separate law courts.'"  (quoting DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES
§ 2.6(3)(2d ed. 1993))). 
-32-
(emphasis added); Note, supra, at 774 ("In truth . . . subrogation is a remedy, to be accorded
as a measure of relief from fraud or mistake, or to prevent unjust enrichment.").  Although
there is substantial overlap between the legal theories of unjust enrichment and subrogation,
the remedy of subrogation nonetheless requires an underlying and independent legal basis
upon which Cross Country may assert its claims.21
Assuming, arguendo, that Cross Country's claim is one for subrogation, the result is,
nonetheless, the same.  Subrogation as a remedy is particularly apt in cases where a plaintiff
pays the secured debt of another and then seeks to assert the creditor's rights in the collateral.
For example, in Milholland v. Tiffany, 64 Md. 455, 2 A. 831 (1886), a husband with pre-
existing debt purchased a piece of property financed by a purchase money mortgage.  After
22Milholland also represents the interaction and overlap between the legal theories of
subrogation and unjust enrichment.  If the friend in Milholland were not subrogated to hold
the first mortgage on the property, the husband's creditors would have been unjustly enriched
by permitting them to recover their pro rata share of both the unencumbered property and the
disbursement of the loan as general unsecured creditors.  In this respect, the remedy of
subrogation prevented the unjust enrichment of the creditors.  
-33-
the husband subsequently conveyed the parcel to his wife, he then convinced a friend to pay
off the purchase money mortgage and accept a new mortgage in its place.  The husband's
creditors successfully petitioned the trial court to set aside the transfer of the property to the
wife. This Court held, however, that the friend was entitled to be subrogated and hold the
first mortgage position on the property.22  See also, e.g., Fin. Co. of Am. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar.
Co.,  277 Md. 177, 353 A.2d 249 (1976).  If the particular creditor enjoys preferred rights to
that of a general unsecured creditor, subrogation becomes an attractive remedy to a plaintiff.
In the present case, however, neither Provident nor Stewart has any special rights against Hill
that are greater than those of an unsecured claimant.  Cross Country is not seeking to obtain
either Provident's or Stewart's security interest in the Property.  See Restatement (First) of
Restitution § 162 cmt. g (1937) ("Where one person is entitled to be subrogated to the
position of another, and the other had a claim which was not secured and not entitled to
priority over the claims of other creditors, the person who is entitled to subrogation ordinarily
derives no advantage from exercising his right to subrogation, since he thereby secures no
advantage over other creditors, and his direct remedy against the obligor is just as good as
his remedy by subrogation.")   Indeed, the only security interest figuring in this case was an
-34-
interest in the Property that Hill no longer owned after the fateful closing.  
Hill's argument implies that, if this case were to be decided under subrogation
principles, she would be entitled to assert the defense of equitable estoppel against Cross
Country.  On this record, Hill is not correct. 
As discussed above, equitable estoppel essentially consists of three elements:
"voluntary conduct or representation, reliance, and detriment." Mona Elec. Co. v. Shelton,
377 Md. 320, 334, 833 A.2d 527, 536 (2003) (citing Creveling v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co.,
376 Md. 72, 828 A.2d 229, 246 (2003)).  Hill's claim of equitable estoppel, on this record,
fails because she has suffered no detriment.  As a result of Provident's errors in the main, Hill
received $70,261.26 more at settlement than she otherwise would have received.  While
acknowledging she suffered no detriment, Hill, in the same breath, asserts that Cross Country
or Stewart, had Provident brought an action against them, would have been at risk of
suffering detriment and therefore could have asserted equitable estoppel as a defense.  Hill
implies that if Provident's theoretical claims were subrogated to Cross Country, then
somehow the defense available to Cross Country would be available to her.  Hill offers no
support for this assertion.  In fact, the Maryland cases relied on in her brief stand for quite
the opposite conclusion.  For example, to illustrate how equitable estoppel applies in real
estate transactions, Hill quotes Jurgensen v. New Phoenix Atl. Condo. Council of Unit
Owners, 380 Md. 106, 126, 843 A.2d 865, 876 (2004).  The Court in Jurgensen noted "the
party claiming to have been influenced by the conduct or declarations of another to his injury
-35-
was himself . . . ." (emphasis added).  Jurgensen requires that the party asserting the defense
of equitable estoppel actually suffer the injury.  Hill, on this record, appears not to have
suffered injury and thus could not assert that defense.  Nowhere in Hill's brief could we find
persuasive authority where a seller of real estate was allowed to assert equitable estoppel
against a mortgagee who gives an incorrect payoff amount.  Nowhere in Hill's brief is there
tendered legal support for the assertion that when an independent obligor-plaintiff pays a
third-party creditor, a defendant is entitled to all defenses that the plaintiff had against the
third-party creditor.  In essence, Hill seeks to employ Cross Country's financial loss (an
injury) as an equitable defense.
The second implication of Hill's argument that this case should have been brought in
subrogation is that Stewart and Cross Country should be considered volunteers because they
paid without asserting the defense of equitable estoppel.  As discussed above, Hill may argue
and attempt to prove on remand that Cross Country was a volunteer as to the unjust
enrichment claim.
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF
SPECIAL 
APPEALS 
REVERSED;
CASE 
REMANDED 
TO 
THAT
COURT WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO
REVERSE THE JUDGMENT OF THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE
COUNTY AND REMAND TO THE
CIRCUIT COURT FOR FURTHER
P R O C E E D I N G S  
N O T
INCONSI S T E NT 
W I T H  
T H IS
OPINION; COSTS IN THIS COURT
AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL
-36-
A PP E A L S 
T O  
B E  
D I V ID E D
EQUALLY BY THE PARTIES.