Case Title: State v. McMillan

Citation: 588 P.2d 162

Docket Number: 

State: utah

Court: Utah Supreme Court

Date: 1978-11-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
588 P.2d 162 (1978) STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John Earl McMILLAN, Defendant and Appellant. No. 15654. Supreme Court of Utah. November 27, 1978. Bruce Lubeck, Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant. Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Craig L. Barlow, Asst. Atty. Gen., R. Paul VanDam, Salt Lake County Atty., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent. ELLETT, Chief Justice: The appellant, defendant below, appeals from judgments of conviction of two crimes: 1. Forcible Sodomy, and 2. Forcible Sexual Abuse. The sole basis of his appeal lies in his claim that a child witness was not a competent witness and that two other witnesses were permitted over objection to give hearsay testimony. Four children, two of whom were four years of age and two three years of age, were playing near a house under construction. The mother of two of the children saw them talking to a man who appeared to *163 be a workman on the construction project. The mother was in her kitchen approximately 175 to 200 feet distant. She called to her children to come home. A few minutes later she noticed that the children were not visible and so she went to the unfinished building to look for them, and as she entered the garage part of the house the four kiddies came out of an opening from the house into the garage and the four year old son of her neighbor said: "That man showed us his weenie. He let us feel it, and we tasted it and it tasted yukky." At trial the mother was permitted over objection to testify to the statement made by the neighbor boy. This is the testimony which is claimed to be "hearsay." The court allowed the testimony saying, "The objection is overruled. She may answer; not for the truthfulness of what is said but that it was said." The testimony clearly was hearsay unless it us within one of the exceptions to the rule. Subsection (4) of Rule 63 of our Rules of Evidence provides the following exception to the hearsay rule: The Supreme Court of Washington stated the doctrine properly in the case of Johnston v. Ohls:[1] Likewise, in the instant matter, the probability that the four year old child, within minutes after the occurrence of an event such as he described, would fabricate a falsehood is unthinkable. In the case of State v. Hutchinson[2] a five year old boy was sexually assaulted. Within three or four minutes afterwards when the parents found him near the scene of the offense the child said "That was a bad man, Mommy," and then told his parents what had occurred. The parents were permitted to relate the statement to the court. The annotation in 83 A.L.R.2d at page 1372 states the trend of the law: In the present matter the little boy identified the defendant the next day. He testified at trial and demonstrated unusual intelligence for a five year old boy. His testimony was positive and clear, although counsel for the defendant managed to cause *164 some confusion in the testimony by asking questions with negatives and double negative clauses. The child also was unable to tell the time of the year or the month when the offense occurred, some six months prior to his testimony. However, the judge, sitting without a jury had the duty to decide where the truth of the testimony lay and he chose to believe the positive testimony of the child. The defendant voluntarily made admissions to an officer after being fully advised of his right to remain silent, to have a lawyer present etc. By his own admission he permitted the children to see and feel his penis and at a time when he had an erection. He denied that he caused them to "taste" it. This admission sustains the boy's testimony and gives positive credence to his statements made to the mother of two other children. The court had evidence before it which would justify a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. At sentence the court had evidence to the effect that the defendant had a long history of indecent exposure etc. and that the defendant was not likely to commit any acts of violence. Accordingly, the defendant was placed on probation on condition that he serve nine months in the county jail and thereafter a program for the assistance of sexual deviants given by the Veterans Hospital. The judgments and sentences of the court are hereby affirmed. CROCKETT, MAUGHAN, WILKINS and HALL, JJ., concur. [1] 76 Wash. 2d 398, 457 P.2d 194 at 199 (1969). [2] 222 Or. 533, 353 P.2d 1047 (1960).