Case Title: Commonwealth v. Hernandez

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12089

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2016-08-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12089 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  AARON HERNANDEZ. 
 
 
 
Suffolk.     May 3, 2016. - August 19, 2016. 
 
Present:  Gants, C.J., Spina, Cordy, Botsford, Duffly, Lenk, & 
Hines, JJ.1 
 
 
Cellular Telephone.  Search and Seizure, Warrant.  Practice, 
Criminal, Warrant. 
 
 
 
 
Civil action commenced in the Supreme Judicial Court for 
the county of Suffolk on December 1, 2015. 
 
 
A petition for relief  under G. L. c. 211, § 3, filed on 
March 29, 2016, was reported by Botsford, J. 
 
 
 
Teresa K. Anderson, Assistant District Attorney (Patrick M. 
Haggan & Janis DiLoreto Smith, Assistant District Attorneys, 
with her) for the Commonwealth. 
 
James L. Sultan (Charles W. Rankin with him) for the 
defendant. 
 
 
 
SPINA, J.  In this case, here on a reservation and report 
from a single justice of the county court, we consider whether 
                     
 
1 Justice Spina participated in the deliberation on this 
case and authored this opinion prior to his retirement.  
Justices Cordy and Duffly participated in the deliberation on 
this case prior to their retirements. 
2 
 
 
the Commonwealth, by means of an anticipatory search warrant, 
can obtain possession of a cellular telephone that the 
defendant, Aaron Hernandez, gave to his attorney for the purpose 
of obtaining legal advice.  For the reasons that follow, we 
conclude that, pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 1, a search warrant 
may issue for the seizure of the telephone because, absent such 
issuance, there is probable cause to believe that the telephone 
will be secreted from view.2  Accordingly, we vacate the order of 
the Superior Court that reached a contrary conclusion. 
 
1.  Background.  On July 16, 2012, Daniel de Abreu and 
Safiro Furtado were murdered in an alleged drive-by shooting in 
the South End section of Boston.  During the investigation of 
the crimes, Alexander Bradley stated that he witnessed the 
defendant shoot at five occupants of a 2003 BMW sedan on the 
date in question.  He further stated that on February 13, 2013, 
while he and the defendant were on vacation together in Florida, 
the defendant shot him in the head.  Bradley also indicated 
that, following this incident, he communicated with the 
                     
 
2 General Laws c. 276, § 1, states, in relevant part:  "[N]o 
search and seizure without a warrant shall be conducted, and no 
search warrant shall issue for any documentary evidence in the 
possession of a lawyer, psychotherapist, or a clergyman, . . . 
who is known or may reasonably be assumed to have a relationship 
with any other person which relationship is the subject of a 
testimonial privilege, unless, in addition to the other 
requirements of this section, a justice is satisfied that there 
is probable cause to believe that the documentary evidence will 
be destroyed, secreted, or lost in the event a search warrant 
does not issue." 
3 
 
 
defendant on multiple occasions between February 14, 2013, and 
June, 2013, either by calling the defendant or sending him text 
messages on his cellular telephone.  During these conversations, 
Bradley threatened to sue the defendant and to publicly expose 
his violent behavior.  Around June 16, 2013, the defendant 
purportedly delivered his cellular telephone to his attorney at 
Ropes & Gray LLP (Ropes & Gray) for the purpose of seeking legal 
advice on several matters.3 
 
On March 24, 2014, the Commonwealth filed a motion in the 
Superior Court pursuant to Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.8 (f), 426 Mass. 
1397 (1998), for judicial approval of a grand jury subpoena 
duces tecum to compel Ropes & Gray to produce the telephone.  
Following a hearing, a judge denied the motion, but noted that 
his denial was without prejudice to refiling based on a showing 
of probable cause in conformity with the requirements of G. L. 
c. 276, § 2B (affidavit in support of search warrant 
                     
 
3 Ropes & Gray LLP (Ropes & Gray) had begun to represent the 
defendant in April, 2013.  On June 13, 2013, Alexander Bradley 
commenced a civil action against the defendant in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida 
(Miami), alleging assault, libel, and slander.  Approximately 
two weeks later, the defendant was arrested and charged with 
murder in the shooting death of Odin Lloyd in Bristol County.  
Shortly thereafter, Rankin & Sultan joined the defendant's legal 
team.  On April 15, 2015, a jury convicted the defendant of 
murder in the first degree, and he was sentenced to the 
mandatory term of life in prison without the possibility of 
parole.  On March 14, 2016, Bradley's civil action against the 
defendant was dismissed with prejudice after the parties reached 
a settlement. 
4 
 
 
application).  The Commonwealth immediately filed a second 
motion for judicial approval of the grand jury subpoena directed 
at Ropes & Gray.  Following another hearing, the judge 
authorized the issuance of the subpoena after finding probable 
cause to believe that the telephone contained evidence of a 
crime under investigation by the grand jury and was in the 
possession of Ropes & Gray.  However, the judge stayed the 
issuance and execution of the subpoena to allow the defendant to 
file a petition for relief in the county court pursuant to G. L. 
c. 211, § 3.  The judge also ordered that, if Ropes & Gray 
indeed had the telephone in its possession, it not alter, 
transfer, dispose of, return, or otherwise render the telephone 
unavailable pending further court order.  The defendant filed 
his G. L. c. 211, § 3, petition, and the single justice reserved 
and reported the matter to the full court.4 
                     
 
4 While these proceedings were ongoing, a Suffolk County 
grand jury indicted the defendant on May 15, 2014, in connection 
with the drive-by shooting in the South End on July 16, 2012.  
He was charged with murder in the first degree, G. L. c. 265, 
§ 1 (two counts); armed assault with intent to murder, G. L. 
c. 265, § 18 (b) (three counts); assault and battery by means of 
a dangerous weapon, G. L. c. 265, § 15A (b); and carrying a 
firearm without a license, G. L. c. 269, § 10 (a).  
Approximately one year later, on May 8, 2015, a Suffolk County 
grand jury indicted the defendant on an additional charge of 
witness intimidation, G. L. c. 268, § 13B.  The Commonwealth 
alleged that the defendant sought to intimidate Bradley by 
shooting him in the head because the defendant was concerned 
that Bradley would implicate him in the murders of Daniel de 
Abreu and Safiro Furtado. 
5 
 
 
 
On January 12, 2015, this court allowed the defendant's 
petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, and reversed the 
judge's order authorizing the issuance of a subpoena, concluding 
that the attorney-client privilege protected the defendant 
against compelled production of the cellular telephone by Ropes 
& Gray, and that the protection afforded by such privilege could 
not be set aside based on a showing of probable cause.  Matter 
of a Grand Jury Investigation, 470 Mass. 399, 400, 403-407 
(2015) (Grand Jury Investigation), citing Fisher v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 391, 402-405 (1976).5  We pointed out that 
because the Commonwealth had sought to obtain the telephone via 
a subpoena, the provisions of G. L. c. 276, § 1, governing the 
issuance of search warrants, had no bearing on the court's 
analysis.  Grand Jury Investigation, supra at 410.  Instead, the 
court's holding was predicated on its determination that "the 
compelled production of the telephone via a subpoena directed at 
                     
 
5 In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 402 (1976), the 
United States Supreme Court held that "compelled production of 
documents from an attorney does not implicate whatever . . . 
privilege [under the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution] the [target of an investigation] might have 
enjoyed from being compelled to produce them himself."  However, 
the Court also concluded that, separate from the right against 
self-incrimination, the attorney-client privilege protects 
certain materials from production by an attorney.  If a client 
"transferred possession of . . . documents . . . from himself to 
his attorney in order to obtain legal assistance . . . , the 
papers, if unobtainable by summons from the client, are 
unobtainable by summons directed to the attorney by reason of 
the attorney-client privilege."  Id. at 405. 
6 
 
 
[the defendant] would violate the act of production doctrine, 
[which derives from the privilege against self-incrimination,] 
and consequently that the compelled production of the telephone 
via a subpoena directed at [Ropes & Gray] would violate the 
attorney-client privilege under Fisher."6  Id.  Significantly, 
the court's analysis was confined to the limited record that was 
before the Superior Court judge in March, 2014.  Id. at 400, 
416. 
                     
 
6 Although the Commonwealth sought to acquire the cellular 
telephone via a subpoena, it also indicated that if the court 
declined to authorize the issuance of a subpoena, the 
Commonwealth would apply for a search warrant to seize the 
device.  Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, 470 Mass. 399, 
410 (2015) (Grand Jury Investigation).  That being the case, 
this court proceeded to consider the availability of a search 
warrant under G. L. c. 276, § 1, and to "reject the 
Commonwealth's contention that documentary evidence is 
'secreted' whenever an attorney invokes the Fisher rule to 
resist its compelled production."  Id. at 414.  Instead, we 
concluded that the exception to the general prohibition on the 
issuance of a search warrant for documentary evidence in the 
possession of a lawyer applies only where, based on a fact-
specific determination, "there is probable cause to believe that 
the documentary evidence will be destroyed, secreted, or lost in 
the event a search warrant does not issue."  Id., quoting G. L. 
c. 276, § 1.  In Grand Jury Investigation, nothing in the record 
that was before the Superior Court judge in March, 2014, 
suggested that Ropes & Gray was no longer engaged in providing 
legal advice to the defendant.  Id.  Therefore, the court stated 
that "[t]he privileged retention of client documents in such 
circumstances [could not] be said to be the secretion of those 
documents."  Id.  We left for another day "the question whether 
and under what circumstances the prolonged retention by counsel 
of client documents unprotected or no longer protected by any 
privilege might qualify as secreting under the meaning of G. L. 
c. 276, § 1."  Id. 
7 
 
 
 
In a concurring opinion, three Justices agreed that Fisher, 
425 U.S. at 402-405, controlled the subpoena question raised in 
the case, and that the record was inadequate to make a judgment 
about the propriety of the issuance of a search warrant.  Grand 
Jury Investigation, 470 Mass. at 417 (Cordy, J., concurring).  
Nonetheless, the concurring Justices emphasized that "placing 
the cell[ular] [tele]phone (or any other incriminating 
documentary evidence) in the hands of an attorney does not 
sequester it under Massachusetts law from the reach of law 
enforcement pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 1, where it is not 
claimed that the cell[ular] [tele]phone itself is privileged or 
contains privileged material, where there is probable cause to 
believe that it contains evidence of crimes under investigation 
by the grand jury, and where it is no longer being retained for 
the purpose of rendering legal advice."  Id.  It was the view of 
the concurring Justices that G. L. c. 276, § 1, "was never 
intended to permanently shield from seizure unprivileged 
evidence of criminal activity placed in the hands of an attorney 
by a client under investigation, or to create a depository for 
the secretion or sequestration of such evidence from law 
enforcement."7  Id. at 419. 
                     
 
7 The concurring Justices in Grand Jury Investigation, 470 
Mass. at 420, articulated a protocol for the seizure, by way of 
a search warrant, of unprivileged evidence of criminal activity 
held by an attorney for a client under investigation.  They 
8 
 
 
 
On May 4, 2015, the Commonwealth, in reliance on the 
protocol articulated by the concurring Justices in Grand Jury 
Investigation, 470 Mass. at 420, see note 7, supra, filed an 
application for a search warrant pursuant to G. L. c. 276, §§ 1-
7, together with a supporting affidavit, to seize the telephone 
from Ropes & Gray.  Five months later, on October 6, 2015, the 
Commonwealth filed a motion pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 17, 
378 Mass. 885 (1979), for production of the telephone by Ropes & 
                                                                  
concluded that in circumstances "where it appears that an item 
of evidence sought by the Commonwealth cannot be obtained from 
[a] law firm by the issuance of a subpoena because of its 
client's privilege regarding production, and where, as a 
consequence, a search warrant would ordinarily be necessary, the 
warrant application should be presented to a judge, with those 
circumstances set out in an affidavit.  The judge should then 
issue a short order of notice to the law firm, giving it an 
opportunity to raise any privilege that might protect the item 
from seizure.  Along with the short order of notice, the judge 
should issue an order barring the law firm from transferring or 
destroying the item pending further ruling of the court.  In 
this manner, the unprivileged and relevant evidence [would] not 
[be] lost to the Commonwealth, and there [would be] an 
opportunity prior to a search for privileges to be raised and 
litigated.  If the judge concludes that no privilege applies to 
the item and that its retention by the law firm is no longer for 
the purpose of or necessary to the rendering of legal advice, 
the judge may properly order the warrant to issue.  In such 
circumstances, the continued retention of the evidence would 
constitute its concealment within the meaning of the term 
'secreted' as used in G. L. c. 276, § 1.  The judge may further 
direct the parties to fashion a protocol unlikely to pose a risk 
to the privileges of other documents or clients or to result in 
a production that is testimonial and incriminating" (footnotes 
omitted).  The majority opinion acknowledged the protocol 
articulated by the concurring Justices, but took no view as to 
its propriety.  Grand Jury Investigation, 470 Mass. at 416 n.7. 
9 
 
 
Gray (rule 17 motion).8  Following several hearings, the Superior 
Court judge made proposed findings of fact relating to whether 
the telephone, if in the possession of Ropes & Gray, continued 
to be held in connection with and for the purpose of providing 
legal advice and services to the defendant.  Distribution of 
these proposed findings to the Commonwealth was stayed pending 
the filing of a petition for interlocutory relief by the 
defendant, and certain of the proposed findings were placed 
under seal until further order of the court. 
 
On December 1, 2015, the defendant filed a petition for 
relief in the county court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
challenging the process employed by the Superior Court judge to 
adjudicate the Commonwealth's pending application for a search 
warrant and rule 17 motion, and seeking to preclude the judge 
from releasing his proposed findings of fact to the 
Commonwealth.  Following several hearings, the single justice 
ordered that the petition be allowed to the limited extent that 
publication and distribution to the Commonwealth of the judge's 
sealed proposed findings of fact remain stayed until further 
order of the county court.  The single justice also ordered that 
                     
 
8 Rule 17 of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
378 Mass. 885 (1979), governs the issuance of subpoenas in 
criminal cases.  See Preventive Med. Assocs., Inc. v. 
Commonwealth, 465 Mass. 810, 819 (2013).  Under rule 17 (a) (2), 
a subpoena may issue for the production of "books, papers, 
documents, or other objects designated therein." 
10 
 
 
the matter be remanded to permit the judge to decide the 
Commonwealth's pending submissions. 
 
On March 7, 2016, the Superior Court judge denied the 
Commonwealth's application for a search warrant and rule 17 
motion.  With respect to the latter, the judge determined that, 
consistent with Grand Jury Investigation, 470 Mass. at 403-407, 
and Fisher, 425 U.S. at 402-405, the attorney-client privilege 
shielded the cellular telephone, which had been given to Ropes & 
Gray in connection with its representation of the defendant in 
several matters, from the Commonwealth's reach.  The judge also 
found that as a consequence of the court's prior order 
precluding Ropes & Gray from returning, transferring, or 
disposing of the telephone, the defendant's successor counsel, 
Rankin & Sultan, had not been able to access the device in 
connection with their provision of legal services to the 
defendant.  The judge stated that it would be appropriate to 
vacate the prior order so the telephone could be transferred to 
Rankin & Sultan, subject to the limitations set forth in Mass. 
R. Prof. C. 3.4 (a), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1425 (2015),9 but 
the judge did not actually vacate this order. 
                     
 
9 Rule 3.4 (a) of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional 
Conduct, as appearing in 471 Mass. 1425 (2015), states that a 
lawyer shall not "unlawfully obstruct another party's access to 
evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy, or conceal a document or 
other material having potential evidentiary value." 
11 
 
 
 
With respect to the Commonwealth's application for a search 
warrant, the judge found that there was probable cause to 
believe that the data on the telephone would provide evidence of 
"the relationship between Bradley and the defendant" and "their 
presence together in Florida in February, 2013," and that text 
messages would reference "the circumstances surrounding Bradley 
being shot and the defendant's role and possible culpability in 
that criminal incident."  The judge stated that such evidence 
undoubtedly was relevant to the defendant's indictment on a 
charge of witness intimidation.  See note 4, supra.  However, 
the judge also stated that there was good reason to believe that 
continued possession of the telephone by counsel still was 
necessary for the provision of legal services to the defendant.  
Accordingly, the judge concluded that the Commonwealth had not 
shown probable cause to believe that the telephone was at risk 
of being "destroyed, secreted, or lost in the event a search 
warrant [did] not issue."  G. L. c. 276, § 1. 
 
On March 17, 2016, the Commonwealth filed a motion in the 
Superior Court to compel Ropes & Gray to transfer the cellular 
telephone to Rankin & Sultan by a date certain.  The 
Commonwealth did not dispute the judge's finding that Rankin & 
Sultan needed a reasonable period of time to review the device 
and conduct a forensic examination of its contents.  However, 
the Commonwealth asserted that counsel could download and 
12 
 
 
preserve the contents of the telephone within a matter of days, 
if not hours.  Once that occurred, the Commonwealth continued, 
Rankin & Sultan would no longer have to possess the telephone, 
and the protections afforded by Fisher would no longer apply.  
See note 5, supra.  In the Commonwealth's view, counsel did not 
need prolonged, indefinite, or unilateral access to the 
telephone itself in order to render legal advice.  The 
Commonwealth also requested that the court maintain its prior 
order which precluded defense counsel from returning, 
transferring, or disposing of the telephone, pending further 
court order, with notice to the Commonwealth and an opportunity 
to be heard. 
 
On March 18, 2016, the single justice in the county court 
held another hearing on the defendant's December 1, 2015, 
petition for relief pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3.  She ordered 
that the matter be remanded to the Superior Court for further 
proceedings, including, but not limited to, motions previously 
filed or anticipated to be filed by the Commonwealth.  The 
single justice stated that, following the issuance of the 
judge's rulings on these motions, counsel for any aggrieved 
party could again petition the county court for interlocutory 
appellate relief.  The single justice further ordered that the 
sealed proposed findings of fact made by the Superior Court 
judge on November 17, 2015, remain under seal, and that their 
13 
 
 
publication and distribution to the Commonwealth remain stayed 
until further order of the county court. 
 
On March 22, 2016, the Commonwealth filed in the Superior 
Court an application for an anticipatory search warrant to seize 
the cellular telephone from Rankin & Sultan at the conclusion of 
a "legal advice period."  In an affidavit in support of the 
search warrant, Boston police Sergeant Detective Kevin 
Witherspoon, the director of the computer forensics laboratory 
at the Suffolk County district attorney's office, stated that, 
based on his research and past experience, the extraction of 
data from the telephone should take less than two hours to 
complete.  If the device's battery was not already charged, one 
additional hour would be required.  The defendant opposed the 
Commonwealth's application for an anticipatory search warrant. 
 
By memorandum of decision and order dated March 25, 2016, 
the judge allowed, in part, the Commonwealth's motion to compel 
the transfer of the cellular telephone.  The judge ordered Ropes 
& Gray to transfer the telephone to Rankin & Sultan on or before 
March 28, 2016, so that the defendant could obtain legal advice 
from his current attorneys.  Based on the uncontested affidavit 
of Sergeant Detective Witherspoon, the judge determined that 
fourteen days would be a reasonable period of time for Rankin & 
Sultan to retain the telephone for the provision of such legal 
advice.  A limited extension of time could be allowed, if 
14 
 
 
necessary.  The judge directed Rankin & Sultan, and its agents, 
not to "alter, transfer, dispose of, return, or otherwise render 
the telephone unavailable pending further court order," but the 
judge expressly permitted Rankin & Sultan to transfer the 
telephone to its agents or experts, if any, to conduct a review 
of the device.  Immediately after the expiration of the 
reasonable period of time, Rankin & Sultan was ordered to place 
the telephone in a sealed envelope or box and to retain it until 
further order of the court.  Ropes & Gray was directed to file a 
written notice with the court on or before March 29, 2016, 
indicating whether it had complied with the court's order.  In 
his memorandum of decision and order, the judge also denied, 
without prejudice, the Commonwealth's application for an 
anticipatory search warrant to seize the telephone from Rankin & 
Sultan at the end of the "legal advice period."  The judge's 
conclusion was based on the fact that the concurring opinion in 
Grand Jury Investigation, 470 Mass. at 416-421, and the protocol 
articulated therein, had no precedential value.  See note 7, 
supra. 
 
On March 29, 2016, the Commonwealth filed a petition for 
relief in the county court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3, 
challenging the denial of its application for an anticipatory 
search warrant.  On March 31, 2016, in accordance with the order 
of the Superior Court judge, Ropes & Gray filed a certification 
15 
 
 
stating that the cellular telephone had been delivered to Rankin 
& Sultan on March 30.  On April 7, 2016, the single justice 
reserved and reported the matter without decision to the full 
court. 
 
2.  Discussion.  The Commonwealth contends that where an 
attorney's continued retention of documentary evidence is no 
longer necessary for the provision of legal services to a 
client, such evidence is being "secreted" within the meaning of 
G. L. c. 276, § 1, and a search warrant properly may issue for 
its seizure.  We agree. 
 
In Grand Jury Investigation, 470 Mass. at 417, the 
concurring Justices pointed out that G. L. c. 276, § 1, was 
amended in 1986 to protect from search and seizure, except in 
limited circumstances, "documentary evidence" in the possession 
of lawyers, psychotherapists, and clergymen.10  See St. 1986, 
c. 691.  The Legislature recognized that "the law provides 
special privileges to the consultations [these professionals] 
have with their clients, patients, or parishioners," and that "a 
                     
 
10 For purposes of this statutory provision, the term 
"documentary evidence" includes, but is not limited to, 
"writings, documents, blueprints, drawings, photographs, 
computer printouts, microfilms, X-rays, files, diagrams, 
ledgers, books, tapes, audio and video recordings, films or 
papers of any type or description."  G. L. c. 276, § 1.  This 
broad definition would encompass a cellular telephone, which may 
contain any and all of these enumerated categories of evidence.  
See Grand Jury Investigation, 470 Mass. at 412 (stating that 
search for cellular telephone is search for "documentary 
evidence" within meaning of G. L. c. 276, § 1). 
16 
 
 
search of their files for nonprivileged documents (pursuant to a 
search warrant) would pose a significant risk that the 
privileges of innocent third parties would be compromised."  Id. 
at 417-418 (Cordy, J., concurring), and sources cited.  
Consequently, as pertinent here, the Legislature determined that 
a search warrant shall not issue for documentary evidence 
transferred to a lawyer by a client for the provision of legal 
advice unless "a justice is satisfied that there is probable 
cause to believe that the documentary evidence will be 
destroyed, secreted, or lost in the event a search warrant does 
not issue."11  Notwithstanding this limitation on the powers of 
search and seizure, the concurring Justices in Grand Jury 
Investigation, supra at 419, also pointed out that nothing in 
the extensive legislative history of the 1986 amendment to G. L. 
c. 276, § 1, suggested that the Legislature intended for its 
provisions "to permanently shield from seizure unprivileged 
evidence of criminal activity placed in the hands of an attorney 
by a client under investigation, or to create a depository for 
the secretion or sequestration of such evidence from law 
enforcement."  That being the case, we construe the statute in 
                     
 
11 The 1986 amendment to G. L. c. 276, § 1, also provided 
that a search warrant for such documentary evidence could issue 
if there was probable cause to believe that the lawyer in 
possession of the evidence had committed, was committing, or was 
about to commit a crime.  St. 1986, c. 691.  This provision is 
not relevant to the matter before us. 
17 
 
 
accordance with the Legislature's intent and proceed to consider 
whether the necessary factual showing has been made for the 
issuance of a search warrant to Rankin & Sultan for the cellular 
telephone.  In so doing, we resolve the question left unanswered 
in Grand Jury Investigation, supra at 414, mindful of our 
observation that nothing in that opinion should be interpreted 
as suggesting that "a lawyer, having received materials whose 
contents are not themselves privileged for purposes of rendering 
legal advice, may retain such materials indefinitely, absent a 
continuing bona fide need and purpose related to the provision 
of legal advice."  Id. at 415.  See note 6, supra. 
 
This court's discussion in Grand Jury Investigation, 470 
Mass. at 410-416, about the availability of a not yet requested 
search warrant under G. L. c. 276, § 1, was confined to the 
limited record that was before the Superior Court judge in 
March, 2014.  Id. at 414, 416.  At that time, nothing in the 
record suggested that Ropes & Gray was no longer engaged in the 
provision of legal services to the defendant.  Id. at 414.  
Consequently, the law firm's retention of the telephone could 
not be said to be the "secretion" of documentary evidence.  Id.  
Since the issuance of our decision in that case, however, the 
circumstances surrounding the defendant's cellular telephone 
have changed. 
18 
 
 
 
First, the Commonwealth now has filed an application for 
the issuance of an anticipatory search warrant.  Second, no 
claim has been raised that the telephone itself is privileged, 
or that it contains any privileged communications.  Third, the 
judge already has found probable cause to believe that the 
telephone contains evidence of the crimes under investigation.  
Finally, the judge accepted and credited the representations set 
forth in Sergeant Detective Witherspoon's affidavit that the 
contents of the telephone could be downloaded in a few hours.  
That being the case, the judge determined that, after a 
fourteen-day period of time during which the download could 
occur, Rankin & Sultan no longer needed to retain possession of 
the telephone itself for the provision of legal services to the 
defendant.12 
 
In order to obtain the search warrant, the Commonwealth was 
required to show that "there is probable cause to believe that 
the documentary evidence will be . . . secreted . . . in the 
event a search warrant does not issue."  G. L. c. 276, § 1.  The 
term "secrete" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary 1557 (10th 
ed. 2014) as meaning "[t]o remove or keep from observation, 
. . . to conceal . . . to hinder or prevent officials . . . from 
                     
 
12 The seizure of the telephone by law enforcement officials 
pursuant to a search warrant does not involve an act of 
production by Rankin & Sultan implicating the attorney-client 
privilege.  See Grand Jury Investigation, 470 Mass. at 404, 415, 
citing Fisher, 425 U.S. at 405. 
19 
 
 
finding it."  Once Rankin & Sultan has downloaded the contents 
of the telephone, it has no legitimate purpose for the 
telephone's retention.  Rankin & Sultan no longer requires 
possession of the telephone for the provision of legal advice to 
the defendant.  In such circumstances, the continued retention 
of this device can only be understood as having the effect of 
concealing or removing it from the observation of others, namely 
the Commonwealth.  The Superior Court judge's order directing 
Rankin & Sultan not to "alter, transfer, dispose of, return, or 
otherwise render the telephone unavailable pending further court 
order" merely is designed to preserve the status quo.  Because 
continued retention of the telephone by Rankin & Sultan means 
that the device is being "secreted" within the meaning of G. L. 
c. 276, § 1, the limited exception to the prohibition on the 
issuance of a search warrant for documentary evidence in the 
possession of a lawyer is applicable.13  A search warrant may 
issue for the seizure of the telephone.14 
                     
 
13 We do not suggest, in any way, that Rankin & Sultan 
intentionally sought to conceal the telephone from law 
enforcement officials or acted unprofessionally in retaining 
possession of the telephone pending further court order. 
 
 
14 The manner by which the Superior Court judge handled the 
Commonwealth's application for an anticipatory search warrant, 
in conformity with the protocol articulated by the concurring 
Justices in Grand Jury Investigation, 470 Mass. at 420, see note 
7, supra, was reasonable and appropriate.  The judge correctly 
noted that a search warrant "must have conditions relating to 
the manner of [its] execution . . . , recognizing the inherent 
20 
 
 
 
3.  Conclusion.  We remand this matter to the single 
justice for entry of a judgment allowing the Commonwealth's 
petition for relief under G. L. c. 211, § 3, vacating the order 
of the Superior Court that denied the Commonwealth's application 
for an anticipatory search warrant, and remanding the matter to 
the Superior Court for such other proceedings as are consistent 
with this opinion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
                                                                  
privileges associated with a search of a law firm or an 
attorney's offices."  The judge should further direct the 
parties to fashion a protocol that eliminates the need for law 
enforcement officials to rummage through the files of Rankin & 
Sultan until they find the telephone.  Incorporated in this 
protocol shall be language stating that the Commonwealth, at 
trial, will be required independently to authenticate the 
telephone without reference to the circumstances surrounding its 
seizure from Rankin & Sultan. 
 
 
 
 
LENK, J. (concurring, with whom Duffly and Hines, JJ., 
join).  I agree with the court's conclusion that a search 
warrant may issue for the defendant's cellular telephone 
pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 1, to the extent that the procedure 
employed "recogniz[es] the inherent privileges associated with a 
search of a law firm" and "eliminates the need for law 
enforcement officials to rummage through the [firm's] files."  
Ante at note 14.  I write separately to underscore two points. 
 
First, the court concludes that Rankin & Sultan's continued 
retention of the telephone, beyond a period "reasonably 
necessary for purposes of representation," see Matter of a Grand 
Jury Investigation, 470 Mass. 399, 420 n.2 (2015) (Cordy, J., 
concurring), constitutes "secretion" of evidence under G. L. 
c. 276, § 1.  I emphasize, as stated by the court in a footnote, 
see ante at note 13, that there is no suggestion that the firm 
acted improperly in declining to provide the Commonwealth with 
access to the telephone before it could be established (a) that 
the firm was in fact required to provide such access and 
(b) that doing so did not conflict with the firm's duties to its 
client.15  Cf. Mass. R. Prof. C. 8.5 comment 3, as appearing in 
                     
 
15 While the term "secrete" may, in other contexts, refer to 
an act of improper concealment, see Black's Law Dictionary 1557 
(10th ed. 2014), that is not so here.  Indeed, the 
interpretation given by the court to the word "secrete" in G. L. 
c. 276, § 1, is not claimed to reflect that word's most natural 
or common meaning.  Rather, it reflects the court's 
2 
 
 
454 Mass. 1301 (2009) (rules of professional conduct "provide[] 
protection from discipline for lawyers who act reasonably in the 
face of [legal] uncertainty"). 
 
Second, the court notes that the "seizure of the telephone 
by law enforcement officials pursuant to a search warrant does 
not involve an act of production by Rankin & Sultan implicating 
the attorney-client privilege."  Ante at note 11.  As a 
corollary to this, the fact that the telephone was in the firm's 
possession cannot be construed as "an admission 'that the [items 
of evidence extracted from the device] . . . were in [the 
defendant's] possession or control, and were authentic."  Matter 
of a Grand Jury Investigation, supra at 403, quoting United 
States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 36 (2000).  See ante at note 14 
(evidence seized from firm must be "independently . . . 
authenticate[d]").  Were this not so, the warrant procedure 
might, indeed, implicate the attorney-client privilege.  See 
Matter of a Grand Jury Investigation, supra at 420 (Cordy, J., 
                                                                  
understanding that the statute must be construed "in accordance 
with the Legislature's intent," and that "nothing in the 
[statute's] extensive legislative history . . . suggest[s] that 
the Legislature intended for its provisions 'to permanently 
shield from seizure unprivileged evidence of criminal activity 
placed in the hands of an attorney by a client under 
investigation, or to create a depository for the secretion or 
sequestration of such evidence from law enforcement.'"  Ante 
at      .  See Commonwealth v. Scott, 464 Mass. 355, 358 (2013) 
("construction of a word or phrase may vary from its plain 
meaning when such a meaning would 'involve a construction 
inconsistent with the manifest intent of the law-making body'" 
[citation omitted]). 
3 
 
 
concurring) (seizure pursuant to warrant does not implicate 
attorney-client privilege if does not "result in a production 
that is testimonial and incriminating").