Case Title: State ex rel. Jeany v. Cleveland Concrete Constr., Inc.

Citation: 2005-Ohio-5828

Docket Number: 20041940

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2005-11-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex  rel. Jeany v. Cleveland Concrete Constr., Inc., 107 Ohio St.3d 20, 2005-Ohio-
5828.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. JEANY, APPELLANT, v. CLEVELAND CONCRETE 
CONSTRUCTION, INC. ET AL.; INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, APPELLEE. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Jeany v. Cleveland Concrete Constr., Inc., 
107 Ohio St.3d 20, 2005-Ohio-5828.] 
Workers’ compensation – Impaired-earning-capacity compensation under former 
R.C. 4123.57(A) — Factual stipulations are not binding on a nonparty. 
(No. 2004-1940 — Submitted July 26, 2005 — Decided November 16, 2005.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County,  
No. 04AP-51, 2004-Ohio-5842. 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Appellant-claimant, Aldo Jeany, worked for 45 years as a cement 
finisher.  In 1983, at age 63, Jeany retired and began receiving both his union 
pension and Social Security retirement benefits. 
{¶ 2} After he retired, Jeany filed a workers’ compensation claim 
alleging that as a result of his prior employment, he had contracted an 
occupational disease affecting the nerves in his legs.  Appellee, Industrial 
Commission of Ohio, denied the claim after finding that it was barred by the 
statute of limitations.  Jeany appealed to the Court of Common Pleas for Franklin 
County, naming as defendants his most recent employer, Atlas Construction 
Company, and the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation.  The commission was not a 
party to that action. 
{¶ 3} The three parties made 11 factual stipulations.  Stipulation 2 noted 
that “[Jeany] retired * * * because he was physically unable to perform his job 
because of back and leg pain.”  Stipulation 3 stated that Jeany “left work because 
of back and leg problems.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
{¶ 4} Jeany’s workers’ compensation claim was eventually allowed.  In 
1993, he was determined to have a 35 percent permanent partial disability.  Jeany 
attempted to collect that award as impaired-earning-capacity (“IEC”) 
compensation under former R.C. 4123.57(A).  Am.H.B. No. 1282, 137 Ohio 
Laws, Part II, 3934, 3946.  The commission denied the application after 
concluding that (1) Jeany had voluntarily retired and (2) there was no evidence 
that claimant’s occupational disease prevented him from engaging in other 
employment. 
{¶ 5} For ten years, Jeany did not pursue his IEC application.  In 2004, 
Jeany filed a complaint in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for Franklin 
County, alleging that the commission had abused its discretion in denying his IEC 
application.  The court of appeals disagreed, finding that the stipulations arising 
out of Jeany’s 1987 lawsuit were not binding on the commission.  This cause is 
now before this court on an appeal as of right. 
{¶ 6} The evidence in this case conflicts.  On the one hand, Jeany retired 
after a full 45-year career as a cement finisher.  His retirement coincided with his 
63d birthday as well as his eligibility for Social Security retirement benefits and 
his union pension. 
{¶ 7} On the other hand are the aforementioned stipulations.  Jeany 
ostensibly recognizes the commission’s exclusive authority to evaluate the 
evidence before it.  See State ex rel. Burley v. Coil Packing, Inc. (1987), 31 Ohio 
St.3d 18, 20, 31 OBR 70, 508 N.E.2d 936.  Jeany, however, argues that this 
evidentiary prerogative is overridden by the legally binding nature of the 
stipulations.  This argument fails. 
{¶ 8} The stipulations arose out of a 1987 lawsuit to which the 
commission was not a party.  The only Ohio court to have confronted this 
question – the Seventh District Court of Appeals – has held that factual 
stipulations are not binding on a nonparty.  Clarke v. Bd. of Cty. Commrs. (July 
January Term, 2005 
3 
15, 1997), Mahoning App. No. 96 CA173, 1997 WL 419618.  See, also, Lincoln 
Lumber Co. v. Lancaster (2000), 260 Neb. 585, 595, 618 N.W.2d 676. 
{¶ 9} Here, the court of appeals was equally concerned about the 
precedent Jeany’s proposition might set: 
{¶ 10} “ ‘[W]e * * * are unwilling to force stipulations made in a separate 
lawsuit upon similar parties in subsequent litigation.  Simplifying litigation for 
purposes of narrowing the scope of the litigation is a practical necessity and 
should not be thwarted by fears that the stipulations are going to be binding for all 
later litigation.’ ”  State ex rel. Jeany v. Cleveland Concrete Constr., Inc., 
Franklin App. No. 04AP-51, 2004-Ohio-5842, 2004 WL 2474431, ¶ 13, quoting 
State ex rel. Jeany v. Cleveland Concrete Constr., Inc., Franklin App. No. 02AP-
159, 2002-Ohio-6029, 2002 WL 31465941, ¶ 10. 
{¶ 11} We agree with the court of appeals and find that the commission 
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to accept the disputed stipulations and in 
otherwise finding a lack of persuasive evidence that Jeany’s retirement was 
involuntary – i.e., related to his industrial injury. 
{¶ 12} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
MOYER, C.J., RESNICK, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, 
O’DONNELL and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
Michael J. Muldoon, for appellant. 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Gerald H. Waterman, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee. 
______________________