Case Title: State v. Raschke

Citation: 

Docket Number: 98861

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 2009-10-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 
 
No. 98,861 
 
STATE OF KANSAS, 
Appellee, 
 
v. 
 
DARREN L. RASCHKE, 
Appellant. 
 
 
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 
 
 
1.  
A sentence is not unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. 
Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), because it was based in part on criminal history not 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.   
 
2. 
Generally an issue not raised in the district court cannot be the basis for an appeal, and 
K.S.A. 60-404 requires a contemporaneous objection to admission or exclusion of 
evidence by the district court in order to preserve an issue for appeal.  The imposition of a 
criminal fine does not involve an evidentiary ruling; thus the specific contemporaneous 
objection rule of K.S.A. 60-404 does not apply.  In addition, despite any general 
common-law rule that an issue must be raised for the first time in the district court to be 
properly preserved for appeal, the instant case is appropriate for application of an 
exception permitting pursuit of an appellate issue involving purely legal questions arising 
on proved or admitted facts that will be finally determinative of a case. 
 
3. 
Statutory interpretation and construction are subject to unlimited appellate review.  
 
 
4. 
The following factors are among those to be considered in determining whether the 
legislature's use of the word "shall" makes a particular provision mandatory or directory: 
(1) legislative history; (2) substantive effect on a party's rights versus merely form or 
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procedural effect; (3) the existence or nonexistence of consequences for noncompliance; 
and (4) the subject matter of the statutory provision, e.g., elections or notice on charges 
for driving under the influence.  
 
5. 
The minimum fines for forgery set forth in K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(2)-(4) are mandatory.  
 
6. 
When a sentencing judge imposes a mandatory minimum fine, he or she need not take 
into account the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that its 
payment will impose, per K.S.A. 21-4607(3).  
 
7. 
When a legal argument advanced by a criminal defendant may or may not benefit all such 
defendants, the rule of lenity does not compel its acceptance.  
 
Review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed September 19, 2008.  
Appeal from Rice district court; HANNELORE KITTS, judge.  Judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the district 
court is affirmed.  Judgment of the district court is affirmed.  Opinion filed October 30, 2009.   
 
Carl Folsom III, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant. 
 
Kristafer R. Ailslieger, assistant solicitor general, argued the cause, and Scott E. McPherson, county 
attorney, and Steve Six, attorney general, were with him on the brief for appellee.   
 
The opinion of the court was delivered by 
 
 
BEIER, J.:  This appeal by defendant Darren L. Raschke addresses whether a sentencing 
court must consider on the record the financial resources of a defendant and the nature of the 
burden that payment of a minimum fine would impose before setting the fine. 
 
 
Raschke also challenges his 19-month prison sentence as unconstitutional under Apprendi 
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), because it was based in 
part on criminal history not proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.  We reject this claim as 
controlled by our previous decision in State v. Ivory, 273 Kan. 44, 41 P.3d 781 (2002).  It 
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requires no further discussion.   
 
 
Raschke pleaded guilty to four counts of forgery in violation of K.S.A. 21-3710(a)(1).  
Subsections (b)(2), (b)(3), and (b)(4) of the statute set forth fine amounts for first, second, and 
third or subsequent forgery convictions:  For a first conviction, "a person shall be fined the lesser 
of the amount of the forged instrument or $500"; for a second conviction, "a person shall be 
fined the lesser of the amount of the forged instrument or $1000"; for a third or subsequent 
conviction, "a person shall be . . . fined the lesser of the amount of the forged instrument or 
$2,500."    
 
 
The sentencing judge imposed a total fine of $325 on Raschke's four counts; this amount 
was the sum of the values of the four forged instruments involved.  The defense did not object. 
 
 
On appeal to our Court of Appeals, the panel affirmed the fine.  We granted Raschke's 
petition for review.   
 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE FOR APPEAL 
 
 
As a preliminary matter, we consider whether Raschke's challenge to his fine is properly 
before this court on appeal.   
 
 
Generally an issue not raised in the district court cannot be the basis for an appeal.  See 
State v. Shopteese, 283 Kan. 331, 339, 153 P.3d 1208 (2007).  And we have recently emphasized 
the procedural bar raised by K.S.A. 60-404, which requires a contemporaneous objection to 
admission or exclusion of evidence by the district court in order to preserve an issue for appeal.  
See State v. King, 288 Kan. 333, 204 P.3d 585 (2009); State v. Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. 157, 
194 P.3d 1195 (2008).  The absence of a defense objection to the fine at Raschke's sentencing 
requires brief discussion of these rules. 
 
 
Raschke's challenge to his fine does not involve an evidentiary ruling.  Thus the specific 
contemporaneous objection rule of K.S.A. 60-404 does not apply here.  In addition, despite any 
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general common-law rule that an issue must be raised for the first time in the district court to be 
properly preserved for appeal, we believe this case is appropriate for application of one of our 
recognized exceptions–for appellate issues involving purely legal questions arising on proved or 
admitted facts that will be finally determinative of a case.  See In re Care & Treatment of Miller, 
289 Kan. 218, 224-25, 210 P.3d 625 (2009). 
 
CONSIDERATION OF DEFENDANT'S FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN SETTING MINIMUM FINE 
 
 
Raschke argues that the word "shall," as used in K.S.A. 21-3710(b), should be read as 
directory rather than mandatory.  He also urges us to consider and apply the language of K.S.A. 
21-4607(3).  Finally, he invokes the rule of lenity, which requires us to interpret ambiguous or 
unclear statutory provisions to benefit a criminal defendant rather than the State.  See State v. 
Paul, 285 Kan. 658, 662, 175 P.3d 840 (2008).   
 
 
The prosecution, for its part, distinguishes the statutory language at issue in Johnson from 
that in the forgery statute and argues that K.S.A. 21-4607(3) comes into play only when fines are 
discretionary or when they exceed a minimum prescribed by statute, neither being the situation 
in Raschke's case.    
 
 
Because the outcome of this case will rest on statutory interpretation or construction, our 
review is unlimited.  See Higgins v. Abilene Machine, Inc., 288 Kan. 359, 361, 204 P.3d 1156 
(2009).  When called upon to interpret a statute, we first heed a statute's express language, giving 
ordinary words their ordinary meaning.  See State v. Stallings, 284 Kan. 741, 742, 163 P.3d 1232 
(2007); State v. Robinson, 281 Kan. 538, 539-40, 132 P.3d 934 (2006).  
 
"If . . . a plain reading of the text of a statute yields an ambiguity or a lack of clarity, statutory 
construction becomes appropriate.  In such circumstances, a court must move outside the text of 
the provision at issue and examine other evidence of legislative intent, such as legislative history, 
or employ additional canons of statutory construction to [determine] the legislature's meaning."  
Board of Leavenworth County Comm'rs v. Whitson, 281 Kan. 678, 685, 132 P.3d 920 (2006). 
 
 
Should a statute's meaning not be evident from its plain language, we move from 
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interpretation to construction, employing study of legislative history, application of canons of 
statutory construction, and appraisal of other background constructions.  See Double M. Constr. 
v. Kansas Corporation Comm'n, 288 Kan. 268, 271-72, 202 P.3d 7 (2009).  Further when 
examining statutes to determine legislative intent, we must consider various provisions of an act 
in pari materia with a view toward reconciling and bringing them into harmony if possible.  See 
State v. Breedlove, 285 Kan. 1006, 1015, 179 P.3d 1115 (2008).  In addition, we have often 
noted that a specific statute controls over a general statute.  In re K.M.H., 285 Kan. 53, 82, 169 
P.3d 1025 (2007).  
 
"Shall" in K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(2)-(4) as Mandatory or Directory 
 
 
Raschke is correct that prior decisions of this court have interpreted the legislature's use 
of the word "shall" in some contexts as mandatory and in other contexts as merely directory.  Its 
meaning is not plain, and construction is required.   
 
Legislative context and history can be crucial to the distinction between a mandatory 
"shall" and a directory "shall."  In Curless v. Board of County Commissioners, 197 Kan. 580, 
584-88, 419 P.2d 876 (1966), we considered a provision stating that a governing body of a city 
"shall issue a license."  We decided the provision was mandatory because the legislature had 
stricken more permissive language from previous versions of the enactment.   
 
In last June's case of State v. Phillips, 289 Kan. 28, ___, 210 P.3d 93 (2009), we 
examined arguments by criminal defendants that docket fees, booking fees, Board of Indigents' 
Defense Services (BIDS) attorney fees, and BIDS application fees required certain findings as 
well as announcement in open court in the presence of the defendants.  The defendants made 
both statutory arguments under K.S.A. 22-3405 (defendant "shall" be present at imposition of 
sentence) and K.S.A. 22-3424(a) (judgment "shall" be rendered in open court) and a 
constitutional due process argument.  We rejected the statutory arguments, ruling that none of the 
fees at issue were part of the sentence and that K.S.A. 22-3803 specifically dealt with parties' 
notification of taxation of costs and allowed notice outside of open court.  289 Kan. at 39-40.  On 
the due process argument, however, we remanded part of the case for findings to be made by the 
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district court because we noted the distinction between mandatory docket and booking fees on 
the one hand and discretionary BIDS attorney and application fees on the other.  We observed 
that the legislature permitted the court to set the attorney fee after considering the defendant's 
finances, see K.S.A. 21-4603d(i); State v. Robinson, 281 Kan. 538, 546-47, 132 P.3d 934 (2006); 
and that the legislature permitted the application fee to be waived, see K.S.A. 22-4529; K.S.A. 
21-4603d(a)(9).  289 Kan. at 42-43.  In other words, even though K.S.A. 22-3803 provided that 
the court "shall" tax costs other statutory provisions demonstrated that some costs were 
mandatory in existence and amount and others dependent upon court evaluation and decision.  
Although Phillips did not focus explicitly on the mandatory/directory dichotomy, it treated a 
statutory "shall" as directory because of the discretionary effect of other provisions.  
 
Unfortunately, we have no such guidance on K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(2)-(4).  See L. 1969, ch. 
180, sec. 21-3710 (enacting K.S.A. 21-3710); L. 2001, ch. 186, sec. 1 (mandating a minimum 
fine for each forgery conviction); 2001 House and Senate Judiciary Committees' notes 
(discussing mandatory jail time).   
 
 
When we examine our precedents on the mandatory/directory dichotomy we find our first 
differentiation between the two possible implications of the word "shall" in Jones v. State of 
Kansas, ex rel. Atherby and Kingbury, 1 Kan. *273 (1863).  Then Chief Justice Nelson Cobb 
wrote: 
 
"[U]nless a fair consideration of the statute shows that the legislature intended compliance with 
the provision in relation to the manner to be essential to the validity of the proceeding, it is to be 
regarded as directory merely . . . .  
 
 
"' . . . Statutory requisitions are deemed directory only when they relate to some 
immaterial matter, where a compliance is a matter of convenience rather than substance.'"  Jones, 
1 Kan. at *271-81.       
 
 
In the long history since, we have stated that mandatory provisions deal with substance 
and directory provisions with form.  In 1907's Goodnough v. Webber, 75 Kan. 209, 211, 88 P. 
879, for example, we observed that departure from a directory statute "'will cause no injury to 
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any person affected by it.'"  By 1942, we had established a guideline for distinguishing a 
mandatory "shall" from a merely directory one:     
 
"[I]t is a general rule that where strict compliance with the provision is essential to the 
preservation of the rights of parties affected and to the validity of the proceeding, the provision is 
mandatory, but where the provision fixes a mode of proceeding and a time within which an 
official act is to be done and is intended to secure order, system and dispatch of the public 
business, the provision is directory."  City of Hutchinson v. Ryan, 154 Kan. 751, Syl. ¶ 1, 121 P.2d 
179 (1942).   
 
See also Shriver v. Board of County Commissioners, 189 Kan. 548, 556, 370 P.2d 124 
(1962) ("Generally speaking, statutory provisions directing the mode of proceeding by 
public officers and intended to secure order, system and dispatch in proceedings, and by a 
disregard of which the rights of parties cannot be injuriously affected, are not regarded as 
mandatory, unless accompanied by negative words importing that the acts required shall 
not be done in any other manner or time than that designated.").  As recently as 2006, we 
said that, while "shall" has at times been defined to be "directory, as opposed to 
mandatory, the former is related to matters of mere form, not substance."  Hawley v. 
Kansas Dept. of Agriculture, 281 Kan. 603, 132 P.3d 870 (2006) (citing Wilcox v. 
Billings, 200 Kan. 654, 657, 438 P.2d 108 [1968]).   
 
 
In Hooper v. McNaughton, 113 Kan. 405, 214 P. 613 (1923), we added the concept of 
consequences for explicit noncompliance to the mix of factors to be considered in determining 
the import of "shall."  We said:  "The distinction between mandatory and directory provisions of 
a statute lies in consequence of nonobservance.  An act done in disobedience of a mandatory 
provision is void.  While a directory provision should be obeyed, an act done in disobedience of 
it may still be valid."  113 Kan. at 407.   
 
 
We echoed this principle in 1968's Wilcox:    
 
 
"The difference between directory and mandatory statutes, where their provisions are not 
adhered to, is one of effect only; the legislature intends neither to be disregarded.  However, 
violation of the former is attended with no consequences but failure to comply with the 
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requirements of the latter either invalidates purported transactions or subjects the noncomplier to 
affirmative legal liabilities . . . .  
 
 
"No absolute test exists by which it may be determined whether a statute is directory or 
mandatory.  Each case must stand largely on its own facts, to be determined on an interpretation of 
the particular language used.  Certain rules and aids to construction have been stated.  The primary 
rule is to ascertain legislative intent as revealed by an examination of the whole act.  Consideration 
must be given to the entire statute, its nature, its object, and the consequences which would result 
from construing it one way or the other.  It has been said that whether a statute is directory or 
mandatory depends on whether the thing directed to be done is of the essence of the thing 
required, or is a mere matter of form.  Accordingly, when a particular provision of a statute relates 
to some immaterial matter, as to which compliance with the statute is a matter of convenience 
rather than substance, or where the directions of a statute are given merely with a view to the 
proper, orderly, and prompt conduct of business, it is generally regarded as directory . . . where no 
substantial rights depend on it, no injury can result from ignoring it, and the purpose of the 
legislature can be accomplished in a manner other than prescribed, with substantially the same 
results.  On the other hand, a provision relating to the essence of the thing to be done, that is, to 
matters of substance, is mandatory, and when a fair interpretation of a statute, which directs acts or 
proceedings to be done in a certain way, shows that the legislature intended a compliance with 
such provision to be essential to the validity of the act or proceeding, or when some antecedent 
and prerequisite conditions must exist prior to the exercise of power or must be performed before 
certain powers can be exercised the statute must be regarded as mandatory."  Wilcox, 200 Kan. at 
657-58.   
 
See also Paul v. City of Manhattan, 212 Kan. 381, Syl. ¶ 2, 511 P.2d 244 (1973) (provision for 
penalty, other consequence for noncompliance indicates mandatory provision); Griffin v. Rogers, 
232 Kan. 168, 174, 653 P.2d 463 (1982) (absence of penalty for noncompliance, lack of effect on 
essential rights from noncompliance indicates directory provision).  
 
 
Certain other patterns also have emerged over the years in our mandatory/discretionary 
cases. 
 
 
For example, we have long held that "provisions for notice of the time and place of an 
election are mandatory," City of Wichita v. Robb, 163 Kan. 121, 124, 179 P.2d 937 (1947), 
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in State ex rel. Johnson v. Schmidt, 182 Kan. 
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593, 595, 322 P.2d 772 (1958); thus failure to comply with such provisions renders an election 
void.  Baugh v. Rural High School District, 185 Kan. 123, Syl. ¶ 3, 340 P.2d 891 (1959); see also 
Lambert v. Unified School District, 204 Kan. 381, 383, 461 P.2d 744 (1969) ("statutory 
provisions for notice of a special election are mandatory"); cf. West v. Unified School District, 
204 Kan. 29, 35, 460 P.2d 103 (1969) (notice of the time and place of an election are mandatory 
but "departures from directory provisions of the statute, did not vitiate such elections where such 
irregularities did not frustrate or tend to prevent the free expression of the electors' intentions").  
 
 
We have also held that a statutory provision requiring officers to provide oral and written 
notice to individuals suspected of driving under the influence before administering a breath test 
is mandatory; failure to do so requires suppression of the test results.  See State v. Bishop, 264 
Kan. 717, 720, 957 P.2d 369 (1998); Meigs v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 251 Kan. 677, 680, 840 
P.2d 448 (1992); State v. Luft, 248 Kan. 911, 811 P.2d 873 (1991); Barnhart v. Kansas Dept. of 
Revenue, 243 Kan. 209, 755 P.2d 1337 (1988). 
 
 
As the various iterations of the relevant factors have stated, provisions governing order 
and timing of procedures are more likely to be determined to be directory only.  See Nguyen v. 
IBP, Inc., 266 Kan. 580, 972 P.2d 747 (1999) (statute requiring administrative law judge to issue 
award within 30 days from case submission); State v. Green, 260 Kan. 471, 920 P.2d 414 (1996) 
(statute requiring preliminary hearing within 10 days of first appearance); Sunflower Racing Inc. 
v. Board of Wyandotte County Comm'rs, 256 Kan. 426, 885 P.2d 1233 (1994) (Board of Tax 
Appeals' failure to comply with statute's requirements that written order be signed by agency 
head, that findings of fact, conclusions of law be set forth "not essential to" preserving party's 
appeal to district court); State v. Ratley, 253 Kan. 394, 855 P.2d 943 (1993) (statute requiring 
prosecuting attorney to file information in office of clerk when defendant bound over from 
municipal court); City of Overland Park v. Pavelcik, 248 Kan. 444, 806 P.2d 969 (1991) ("'when 
an appellant has complied with the part of the appeal statute which requires him to take action, 
any subsequent procedural steps to be taken by some officer, such as a clerk or judge, are 
directory, not mandatory, and the review proceeding is not defeated by defects created by such 
officers'"); City of Garnett v. Zwiener, 229 Kan. 507, 625 P.2d 491 (1981) (provision for 
municipal judge to certify complaint, warrant, any appearance bond to district court within 10 
10 
 
days of filing of appeal; appeal not defeated if municipal judge fails to follow time line); State v. 
Costa, 228 Kan. 308, 613 P.2d 1359 (1980) (statute providing for prosecuting attorney to 
endorse names of all witnesses at time of filing; endorsement of additional witnesses after filing 
within judge's discretion); Spalding v. Price, 210 Kan. 337, 339-40, 502 P.2d 713 (1972) 
(assessor's notice of value change 2 weeks after directory statutory deadline); Bruffett v. State, 
205 Kan. 863, 472 P.2d 206 (1970) (provision for district court to sentence defendant within 5 
days of plea or jury verdict directory); State v. Brown, 205 Kan. 457, 461-62, 470 P.2d 815 
(1970) (provision on return, certification directory under rule applicable to "'statutes which direct 
the doing of a thing within a certain time without any negative words restraining the doing of it 
afterwards'"); State v. Nelson, 200 Kan. 411, 413-14, 436 P.2d 885 (1968) (time limit for 
imposition of sentence after denial of motion for new trial); In re L.C.W., 42 Kan. App. 2d 293, 
___, 211 P.3d 829 (2009) (failure to issue adjudication in child in need of care proceeding within 
60 days not fatal; "shall" in K.S.A. 2008 Supp. 38-2251(c) directory only).       
 
 
"Shall" provisions affecting a party's rights are more likely to be seen as mandatory.  See 
State v. Deavers, 252 Kan. 149, 167-68, 843 P.2d 695 (1992) (late notice in violation of statute 
would prejudice defendant); Griffin, 232 Kan. at 174 (mandatory requirement essential to 
preserve rights of parties).    
 
 
Several of our most recent cases have treated "shall" as a kind of trigger to a default 
reading as substantive or mandatory.  See State v. Andelt, 289 Kan. ___, ___, ___ P.3d ___ (Nos. 
98,665 and 98, 699, filed October 9, 2009); State v. Bee, 288 Kan. 733, 738-39, 207 P.3d 244 
(2009) (citing State v. Drayton, 285 Kan. 689, Syl. ¶ 19, 175 P.3d 861 [2008]; State v. Robinson, 
281 Kan. 538, 543, 132 P.3d 934 [2006]).  However, we have still noted that the context of a 
statutory scheme and case law is ultimately determinative.  See Bee, 288 Kan. at 739 (citing 
State v. Johnson, 286 Kan. 824, 850, 190 P.3d 207 [2008]); State v. Keeley, 236 Kan. 555, 560, 
694 P.2d 422 (1985) (reconciling K.S.A. 21-4618, K.S.A. 21-4503).  And we have been 
periodically careful to note that there is no absolute test to determine whether a "shall" in a 
statute makes the provision mandatory or directory.     
 
11 
 
 
"[T]he words mandatory and directory as applied to the construction of a particular 
provision in a statute are merely descriptive of the effect that it has been decided to give the 
provision.  The mandatory 'shall' appears [in statutes], but that is not a hard and fast identifying 
mark which can foretell the character to be assigned to any statutory provision.  [Citations 
omitted.]  It can safely be said that the legislature does not intend any statutory provision to be 
totally disregarded.  So, when the consequences of not obeying a particular statute are not 
prescribed by the legislature, as in the present case, the court must decide the consequences.  In 
determining the consequences of failure to comply with a statute, courts necessarily consider the 
importance of the literal and punctilious observance of the provision in question with regard to the 
ultimate object which the legislature sought to serve.  [Citation omitted.]   
 
 
"Generally in construing the effect of noncompliance with a statute, courts first inquire 
into the purpose behind the statutory provision."  City of Kansas City v. Board of County 
Commissioners, 213 Kan. 777, 783, 518 P.2d 403 (1974).  
 
In the end, again, "[e]ach case must stand largely on its own facts, to be determined on an 
interpretation of the particular language used."  Brown v. Wichita State University, 217 
Kan. 279, 289, 540 P.2d 66 (1975), overruled on other grounds by Brown v. Wichita 
State University, 219 Kan. 2, 547 P.2d 1015 (1976); see also Marais des Cygnes Valley 
Teachers' Ass'n v. U.S.D. No. 456, 264 Kan. 247, 250-52, 954 P.2d 1096 (1998) 
(reconciling K.S.A. 72-9003 with balance of act).  
 
 
Raschke calls our attention in particular to Johnson, 286 Kan. at 850-51, to support his 
proposition that the minimum sentence prescribed in K.S.A. 21-3710 is directory.  There, parties 
disputed K.S.A. 21-4704(e)(1), which stated:  "The sentencing court has discretion to sentence at 
any place within the sentencing range.  The sentencing judge shall select the center of the range 
in the usual case and reserve the upper and lower limits for aggravating and mitigating factors 
insufficient to warrant a departure."  (Emphasis added.)  Raschke is correct; in Johnson, we held 
that the use of the word "shall" in K.S.A. 21-4704(e)(1) was directory.  But Raschke fails to 
acknowledge that we made this decision in light of the provision's first sentence, which provided 
the sentencing court had discretion to sentence a defendant at any place within the sentencing 
range.  Thus Raschke's argument based on Johnson is unpersuasive.  The statutory provision at 
issue in Johnson also included clearly permissive language.  The statute at issue here does not.   
12 
 
 
 
Given all of this background, the following factors are among those to be considered in 
determining whether the legislature's use of "shall" makes a particular provision mandatory or 
directory:  (1) legislative context and history; (2) substantive effect on a party's rights versus 
merely form or procedural effect; (3) the existence or nonexistence of consequences for 
noncompliance; and (4) the subject matter of the statutory provision, e.g., elections or notice on 
charges for driving under the influence.   
 
 
Moving to comparison of this list to this case, we have, as mentioned, no helpful 
legislative history to guide us.  Our assessment of the substantive/procedural factors above 
militates in favor of a mandatory reading.  Prescription of a minimum criminal sentence certainly 
is material; it is not simply a mode of procedure intended to secure order, system, and dispatch of 
the public business.  In addition, although consequences for noncompliance are implicit rather 
than explicit, they are real.  It appears that a forgery sentence without a fine in some amount 
would be illegal under K.S.A. 22-3504 and subject to vacation and correction at any time.  
Regarding the fourth factor, the subject matter of K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(2)-(4) is not one in which 
we have an established pattern in our mandatory/directory precedents.   
 
 
We are convinced here that the factors relevant in this case dictate reading the "shall" in 
K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(2)-(4) as mandatory rather than directory.  At least the minimum fine must be 
imposed upon every forgery conviction.   
 
Intersection with K.S.A. 21-4607 
 
 
Having determined that the minimum fine set forth in the forgery statute, K.S.A. 21-
3710(b)(2)-(4) is mandatory, we turn to how these provisions intersect with K.S.A. 21-4607(3).  
K.S.A. 21-4607(3) states: "In determining the amount and method of payment of a fine, the court 
shall take into account the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that 
its payment will impose."  Raschke contends that the only possible path to workable harmony, 
see State v. Hawkins, 285 Kan. 842, 850-53, 176 P.3d 174 (2008), requires grafting K.S.A. 21-
4607's requirement for an examination of the defendant's financial circumstances onto the 
13 
 
forgery statute, even when the only fine being set is the mandatory minimum.  See State v. 
McGlothlin, 242 Kan. 437, 747 P.2d 1335 (1998).  He also urges us to address two earlier Court 
of Appeals' cases dealing with the mandatory minimum fine in K.S.A. 8-1567 on driving under 
the influence, State v. Shuster, 17 Kan. App. 2d 8, 9, 829 P.2d 925 (1992), and State v. Segovia, 
19 Kan. App. 2d 493, 872 P.2d 312 (1994).   
 
 
The question of how these two statutes fit together cannot be settled by reference to the 
plain language of their text.  Neither mentions the other, and they conflict as to the mandatory 
minimum fines under K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(2)-(4).   
 
 
We thus turn to legislative history; canons of construction; and background 
considerations, including the two Court of Appeals' decisions reconciling analogous provisions.   
 
 
The history of these two enactments is somewhat helpful.  Both statutes were originally 
passed in 1969.  See L. 1969, ch. 180, sec. 21-3710 (enacting K.S.A. 21-3710); L. 1969, ch. 180, 
sec. 21-4607 (enacting K.S.A. 21-4607).  At that point, K.S.A. 21-3710 did not provide for 
mandatory minimum fines for first, second, and third or subsequent forgery convictions.  The 
fine provisions were added in 2001, after four other amendments not relevant to the issue before 
us.  See L. 2001, ch. 186, sec. 1.  House and Senate committee notes from 2001 suggest that the 
legislature wanted to match Kansas' forgery penalties to those from surrounding states, but the 
lawmakers' discussions focused on a need for mandatory jail time, not mandatory fines.  The 
notes also do not reference the overlay of K.S.A. 21-4607.  See 2001 House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees' notes.  The language of K.S.A. 21-4607 has not changed in any relevant part since 
original enactment.  See L. 1986, ch. 123, sec. 8 (adding "or assignment to a community 
correctional services program").  K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(2)-(4) is thus the newer of the two statutes 
and presumably the more recent statement of legislative intent.  See State v. Keeley, 236 Kan. 
555, 559-60, 694 P.2d 422 (1985).     
 
 
Moreover, construing K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(2)-(4) as the controlling of the two statutes is 
consistent with our rule of construction that allows the specific to supersede the general.  See 
Keeley, 236 Kan. at 560.  K.S.A. 21-3710(b)(2)-(4) deals specifically with fines for forgery; 
14 
 
K.S.A. 21-4607(3) deals with criminal fines generally.   
 
 
Turning to the two Court of Appeals' cases, we note that Shuster distinguished 
discretionary fines from mandatory fines.  The panel stated:  "Discretionary fines . . . are fines 
with set limits that a court 'may' impose in addition to or instead of incarceration for felonies or 
misdemeanors.  Mandatory fines . . . are fines that are mandatory which 'shall' be imposed along 
with set ranges of confinement."  Because the fine imposed was greater than the statutory 
minimum, i.e., discretionary rather than mandatory, the panel determined that the district judge 
abused his discretion by failing to abide by the requirements of K.S.A. 21-4607, including 
subsection (3) on consideration of a defendant's finances.  Shuster, 17 Kan. App. 2d at 9-10.   
  
 
Two years later, in State v. Segovia, 19 Kan. App. 2d 493, 872 P.2d 312 (1994), another 
panel of our Court of Appeals stated unequivocally that K.S.A. 21-4607 did not apply when a 
mandatory minimum fine was imposed under K.S.A. 8-1567(f).  Only "'[i]f the judge, in his or 
her discretion, imposes a fine exceeding the mandatory minimum, [must] K.S.A. 21-4607 criteria 
. . . be taken into consideration.'"  Segovia, 19 Kan. App. 2d at 494 (quoting Shuster, 17 Kan. 
App. 2d at 9).   
 
 
We agree with the reasoning of Shuster and Segovia and the most recent Court of 
Appeals' case examining a mandatory fine for driving under the influence and K.S.A. 21-4607, 
State v. Wenzel, 39 Kan. App. 2d 194, 202-03, 177 P.3d 994 (2008).  In Wenzel, the panel said:  
 
"The specific [DUI] statute here . . . has no provision allowing the district court to waive the fine, 
so there would be no purpose in making findings about the defendant's ability to pay it.  It is only 
when a court imposes more than the minimum fine . . . that the [sentencing] court is required to 
consider the defendant's financial resources."  Wenzel, 39 Kan. App. 2d at 202-03.    
 
 
The concept of inflexible mandatory minimum fines–which we have held K.S.A. 21-
3710(b)(2)-(4) to be examples of–is incompatible with the malleability inherently injected into 
fine setting by consideration of defendant's financial circumstances.  Should the legislature want 
to resolve this conflict in favor of consideration of such circumstances when a defendant is 
convicted of forgery or another crime for which conviction prompts a mandatory minimum fine, 
15 
 
it need only amend K.S.A. 21-4607 to state clearly that its subsection (3) overrides any such fine.    
 
Rule of Lenity 
 
 
Raschke's final argument that the rule of lenity requires any statutory ambiguity to be 
resolved in his favor has no application.  Consideration of a defendant's financial circumstances 
may or may not lead to a favorable fine outcome for that defendant.  When a legal argument 
advanced by a criminal defendant may or may not benefit all such defendants, the rule of lenity 
does not compel its acceptance.   
 
 
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.  The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
affirmed.   
 
JOHNSON, J., not participating. 
ELLIOTT, J., assigned.