Case Title: State v. Harris

Citation: 2015-Ohio-166

Docket Number: 2013-0414

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2015-01-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Harris, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-166.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2015-OHIO-166 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. HARRIS, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as State v. Harris, Slip Opinion No. 2015-Ohio-166.] 
Evidence—R.C. 2945.371(J)—Mental-capacity defenses—Court-ordered mental 
evaluations—Allegations of malingering—When defendant asserts mental-
capacity defense and then abandons it, psychologist’s testimony regarding 
defendant’s feigning of mental illness is inadmissible under R.C. 
2945.371(J)—Admission of such testimony also violates defendant’s right 
against self-incrimination guaranteed by Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio 
Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution—
Admission is not harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. 
(No. 2013-0414—Submitted March 11, 2014—Decided January 22, 2015.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, 
No. C-110472, 2012-Ohio-349. 
_________________ 
 
KENNEDY, J. 
{¶ 1} In this discretionary appeal from the First District Court of 
Appeals, we consider whether R.C. 2945.371(J) permits the state to introduce, in 
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its case-in-chief, the testimony of the psychologist who conducted the court-
ordered evaluation on the issues of competency and sanity when the defendant 
asserts, but then wholly abandons, the defenses.  The appellant, the state of Ohio, 
advances the following proposition of law: “A psychologist’s trial testimony 
regarding a defendant’s feigned mental illness during a competency and sanity 
evaluation is admissible under R.C. 2945.371(J) when it does not include factual 
evidence of guilt.  It is admissible during the state’s case-in-chief to show the 
accused’s intent to mislead and defraud authorities to escape prosecution.” 
{¶ 2} For the reasons that follow, based on these facts, we hold that 
when a defendant asserts a mental-capacity defense or defenses, causing the court 
to order a psychiatric evaluation, but then wholly abandons that defense or 
defenses, a psychologist’s testimony regarding the defendant’s feigning of mental 
illness during the evaluation is inadmissible in the state’s case-in-chief pursuant to 
R.C. 2945.371(J).  We further hold that the admission of a psychologist’s 
testimony opining on the defendant’s feigning of mental illness under these 
circumstances violates the defendant’s right against self-incrimination guaranteed 
by Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and that the violation was not harmless error.  We 
affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 
I.  Facts and Procedural History 
{¶ 3} In late September 2010, Shane Gulleman contacted defendant-
appellee, Joseph Harris, in order to purchase Oxycontin from Harris.  On 
September 26, 2010, Shane drove from Indiana to the Winton Terrace 
neighborhood of Cincinnati, Ohio, to purchase the drugs.  Shane’s body was later 
discovered in his car.  He had been shot multiple times.  Two hundred ten dollars 
in cash was on the seat under Shane’s body, and his wallet contained $20. 
{¶ 4} On October 29, 2010, Harris was indicted for aggravated murder, 
murder, aggravated robbery, and having weapons under disability.  Subsequently, 
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Harris filed a suggestion of incompetence to stand trial (“IST”) and a plea of not 
guilty by reason of insanity (“NGRI”). 
{¶ 5} The trial court appointed the Court Clinic Forensic Services to 
examine Harris under R.C. 2945.371.  Carla Dreyer, a clinical psychologist with 
the Court Clinic, evaluated Harris.  She determined that Harris was competent to 
stand trial and that he did not meet the criteria for an NGRI plea.  On February 2, 
2011, the trial court filed an entry finding Harris competent to stand trial.  Harris 
never requested an independent evaluation or a competency hearing, and he never 
challenged the trial court’s determination. 
{¶ 6} On May 12, 2011, Harris filed a notice of alibi, indicating his 
intention to introduce evidence that he could not have perpetrated the murder.  
Harris asserted that he had spent the entire day of the murder with his sister, 
Joeisha Harris, her children, and his sister’s friend, Tasha Clayton, at Joeisha’s 
home. 
{¶ 7} During the discovery phase, Harris did not formally withdraw his 
NGRI plea, but on June 7, 2011, in response to the state’s demand for discovery, 
he provided the names of the witnesses that he intended to call at trial.  The 
witness list did not include Dreyer or any other mental-health expert.  While 
Harris reserved the right to supplement his response, he never filed a 
supplemental witness list. 
{¶ 8} The matter proceeded to a jury trial on June 15, 2011. 
{¶ 9} The state called Dreyer as a witness in its case-in-chief.  Harris 
objected to Dreyer being allowed to testify.  In response, the state pointed out that 
the notice of IST had been filed and that Harris’s NGRI plea was before the jury, 
as it had not been withdrawn.  The state indicated that Dreyer was going to testify 
that Harris was malingering.  At that time, Harris’s counsel represented to the 
court that the defense had no intention of proceeding on any mental-capacity 
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theory and withdrew the suggestion of incompetence and the NGRI plea on the 
record at that time.  The trial court overruled Harris’s objection. 
{¶ 10} Dreyer testified that Harris had been referred by the trial court for 
an evaluation of his competence to stand trial and for a determination whether he 
was legally insane at the time of the offense.  She stated that it was her opinion 
that Harris was competent and that he did not meet the criteria for an NGRI plea.  
She also testified that when she evaluated Harris, “he was malingering both 
cognitive and psychiatric difficulties” and that Harris was “feigning some 
symptoms and probably exaggerating others.”  She described Harris as having 
antisocial personality disorder, which is characterized by “impulsivity, 
aggressiveness, irresponsibility, lack of regard for the rights of others, [and] lack 
of remorse.”  The state referred to this diagnosis in its closing argument and 
added that a person with this disorder “commits crimes.” 
{¶ 11} Khristina Willis and Sherron Peoples both testified that they knew 
Harris prior to the murder and that they saw him at or near the location of the 
murder when the murder occurred.  Willis heard gunshots coming from the 
parking lot where Shane’s body was found and saw Harris and another man 
running away from the parking lot immediately afterwards.  Peoples was sitting in 
a car in the parking lot when Shane drove in and parked.  She saw Harris get into 
the front passenger side of Shane’s car and then she heard gunshots.  Peoples saw 
Harris and another man run by her with guns drawn. 
{¶ 12} Four inmates from the Hamilton County Justice Center testified.  
They described various conversations with Harris in which he had stated that he 
planned to rob Shane and had shot him multiple times with a .45 caliber gun.  He 
had talked about acting like he was crazy.  Harris also had stated that because the 
NGRI plea did not work, he was going to deny committing the murder and pin the 
crime on another person. 
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{¶ 13} Harris testified in his own defense.  He admitted that he had met 
Shane in order to sell him Oxycontin pills.  Harris testified that when he got in 
Shane’s car, Shane was acting shifty and seemed to be trying to distract Harris’s 
attention from the exchange of cash for drugs.  When Shane reached into the back 
seat, Harris believed that Shane was reaching for a gun.  Harris jumped out of the 
car, started shooting, and ran off. 
{¶ 14} On June 28, 2011, the day after the jury began deliberations, the 
trial court filed an entry finding that Harris had withdrawn his NGRI plea before 
the case was submitted to the jury.  On June 29, 2011, the jury found Harris guilty 
as charged in the indictment.  The trial court merged the counts of aggravated 
murder and murder before sentencing. 
{¶ 15} Harris appealed his convictions to the First District Court of 
Appeals.  He argued that the trial court had erred when it allowed Dreyer to testify 
as the testimony violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.  State v. Harris, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-110472, 2012-Ohio-349, 
¶ 19.  The state countered that Dreyer’s testimony did not contain any statement 
by Harris on the issue of guilt, but was evidence of his consciousness of guilt.  
The First District rejected the state’s argument that Dreyer’s testimony was 
admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt.  The court cited R.C. 
2945.371(J)’s prohibition on the use of statements made by a defendant in a 
psychiatric evaluation against the defendant on the issue of guilt in a criminal 
action and concluded that evidence of consciousness of guilt is evidence of guilt 
itself.  Id. at ¶ 23.  The First District then applied the constitutional harmless-error 
standard of review and determined that the error was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt, because Dreyer’s testimony might reasonably have affected the 
jury’s view of Harris’s credibility when he testified that he had not intended to rob 
Shane.  The court reversed Harris’s convictions for aggravated murder and 
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aggravated robbery and remanded the cause for a new trial on those charges and 
accompanying specifications.    
II.  Law and Analysis 
A. 
Bases for Harris’s Mental-Health Evaluation  
 
1. 
Competence  
{¶ 16} Consistent with the notions of fundamental fairness and due 
process, a criminal defendant who is incompetent may not be tried or convicted.  
See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (1966); State v. 
Berry, 72 Ohio St.3d 354, 359, 650 N.E.2d 433 (1995).  A defendant is presumed 
competent to stand trial.  R.C. 2945.37(G).  A defendant shall be found 
incompetent to stand trial only if, “after a hearing, the court finds by a 
preponderance of the evidence that, because of the defendant's present mental 
condition, the defendant is incapable of understanding the nature and objective of 
the proceedings against the defendant or of assisting in the defendant's defense.”  
Id. 
 
2. 
NGRI Plea 
 
{¶ 17} A plea of NGRI must be made in writing.  Crim.R. 11(A) and R.C. 
2943.04.  NGRI is an affirmative defense that must be proven by a preponderance 
of the evidence.  State v. Hancock, 108 Ohio St.3d 57, 2006-Ohio-160, 840 
N.E.2d 1032, ¶ 35; R.C. 2901.05(A).  While the assertion of the defense is 
controlled by rule and statute, there is no corresponding rule or statute governing 
its withdrawal. 
{¶ 18} Precedent demonstrates that a defendant can withdraw the defense 
formally, by entering a guilty or no-contest plea, by failing to pursue the defense, 
or by pursuing a new defense at trial.  See State v. Caudill, 48 Ohio St.2d 342, 
342-343, 358 N.E.2d 601 (1976) (written withdrawal of plea); State v. 
Langenkamp, 3d Dist. Shelby Nos. 17-07-08 and 17-08-09, 2008-Ohio-1136, 
¶ 28-29 (plea of no contest); State v. McQueeney, 148 Ohio App.3d 606, 2002-
January Term, 2015 
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Ohio-3731, 774 N.E.2d 1228, ¶ 34 (guilty plea);  In State v. Monford, the court 
determined that an NGRI jury instruction was not warranted, even though the 
defendant had not withdrawn the affirmative defense, because the evidence 
presented failed to support it.  190 Ohio App.3d  35, 2010-Ohio-4732, 940 N.E.2d 
634, ¶ 74-76.  Additionally, in Miller v. State, the Supreme Court of South Dakota 
rejected a postconviction-relief argument that the trial court failed to properly 
instruct the jury on the defense of insanity, concluding that the record 
overwhelmingly demonstrated that the NGRI plea had been abandoned to pursue 
a theory of not guilty by reason of justification at trial.  338 N.W.2d 673, 676-678 
(S.D.1983).  See 5 LaFave, Israel, King & Kerr, Criminal Procedure, Section 
20.5(c), 481 (3d Ed.2007) (after entering an NGRI plea, a defendant is free to 
pursue another defense theory at trial). 
B. 
The Fifth Amendment and Compelled Psychiatric Evaluations 
{¶ 19} Our examination of the admissibility of the psychologist Dreyer’s 
testimony pursuant to R.C. 2945.371(J) must begin with a historical overview of 
the Fifth Amendment and its application to information garnered through a court-
ordered psychiatric evaluation of the accused.  Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio 
Constitution provides, “No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself * * *.”  This language is essentially identical to the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.  Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6, 84 S.Ct. 
1489, 12 L.E.2d 653 (1964).  This basic constitutional principle requires at its 
core that “the State * * * produce the evidence against [the defendant] by the 
independent labor of its officers, not by the simple, cruel expedient of forcing it 
from his own lips.”  Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581-582, 81 S.Ct. 
1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961).  The availability of the Fifth Amendment rests 
“upon the nature of the statement or admission and the exposure which it invites.”  
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). 
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{¶ 20} The United States Supreme Court has examined the applicability 
of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination to 
psychiatric evaluations.  In Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 456, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 
L.Ed.2d 359 (1981), the court considered “whether the prosecution’s use of 
psychiatric testimony at the sentencing phase of [the defendant’s] capital murder 
trial to establish his future dangerousness violated his constitutional rights.”  In 
concluding that such evidence violated the privilege against self-incrimination, 
the court reasoned that the “psychiatric evaluation of [the defendant was ordered] 
for the limited, neutral purpose of determining his competency to stand trial, but 
the results of that inquiry were used by the State for a much broader objective that 
was plainly adverse to [the defendant].”  Id. at 465. 
{¶ 21} Further, the court noted that the defendant had “introduced no 
psychiatric evidence, nor had he indicated that he might do so.  Instead, the State 
offered information obtained from the court-ordered competency examination as 
affirmative evidence to persuade the jury to return a sentence of death.”  Id. at 
466.  It was the view of the court that under these circumstances, “[the 
psychiatrist] went beyond simply reporting to the court on the issue of 
competence and testified for the prosecution * * *.”  At that point, “his role 
changed and became essentially like that of an agent of the State recounting 
unwarned statements made in a postarrest custodial setting.”  Id. at 467.  The 
court concluded that “[a] criminal defendant, who neither initiates a psychiatric 
evaluation nor attempts to introduce any psychiatric evidence, may not be 
compelled to respond to a psychiatrist if his statements can be used against him at 
a capital sentencing proceeding.”  Id. at 468. 
{¶ 22} In Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 107 S.Ct. 2906, 97 
L.Ed.2d 336 (1987), the court examined whether the Fifth Amendment privilege 
was violated by the state’s introduction of a psychiatric report to rebut the 
defendant’s affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance.  The court 
January Term, 2015 
9 
 
recognized its acknowledgment in Estelle that the state may have an interest in 
presenting psychiatric rebuttal evidence in some circumstances.  Id. at 422.  
Accordingly, the court reasoned that the holding in Estelle “logically leads to 
another proposition:  If a defendant requests such an evaluation or presents 
psychiatric evidence, then, at the very least, the prosecution may rebut this 
presentation with evidence from the reports of the examination that the defendant 
requested.”  Id. at 422-423.  The court, therefore, concluded that the introduction 
of the psychiatrist’s general observations about the mental state of a defendant for 
the limited purpose of rebutting the defendant’s defense of extreme emotional 
disturbance did not violate the Fifth Amendment.  Id. at 424. 
C. 
History and Purpose of R.C. 2945.371 
{¶ 23} In 1978, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 2945.37, 2945.371, 
and 2945.39 to address for the first time the procedures for evaluating the mental 
condition of a defendant who has raised the issue of competency or entered a plea 
of NGRI.  Am.Sub.H.B. No. 565, 137 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2943-2952.  This 
enactment included former R.C. 2945.38(J), which prohibited the use in any 
criminal action of any statement made by a defendant in an evaluation for 
competence to stand trial on the issue of guilt.  See id. at 2950-2951. 
{¶ 24} In April 1980, the legislature amended R.C. 2945.39 to add 
subsection (D), which prohibited the use in any criminal action of any statement 
on the issue of guilt made by a defendant in an evaluation for his mental state at 
the time he committed the offense.  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 297, 138 Ohio Laws, Part I, 
991. 
{¶ 25} In State v. Cooey, 46 Ohio St.3d 20, 544 N.E.2d 895 (1989), we 
considered the constitutionality and effect of R.C. 2945.39(D).  Richard Cooey, 
charged with capital murder, entered an NGRI plea but withdrew it upon the 
submission of the psychiatric report.  He was found guilty, and the trial court 
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proceeded with the penalty phase.  The presentence investigation report (“PSI”) 
that was considered by the court contained quotes from the psychiatric report. 
{¶ 26} Cooey challenged the constitutionality of former R.C. 2945.39(D), 
arguing that by prohibiting the use of such statements only on the issue of guilt, 
its language implied that statements made by the defendant during the evaluation 
may be introduced on the issue of penalty, which, Cooey claimed, was 
inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment.  Id. at 31.  We found the statute 
constitutional, concluding that the language of (D)  “distinguishes * * * between 
the issues of guilt—i.e., factual guilt—and insanity” and, therefore, “statements 
made in the course of a court-ordered psychological examination may be used to 
refute his assertion of mental incapacity, but may not be used to show that he 
committed the acts constituting the offense.”    Id. at 32.  We further stated that 
the use of the report was “limited to the issue of his mental condition.”  Id.  But 
we concluded that the admission of certain statements in the PSI violated former 
R.C. 2945.39(D), as the statements went to the degree of his involvement in the 
crimes, i.e., his guilt, and were not admitted to rebut evidence of Cooey’s 
psychological state.  Id. 
{¶ 27} In 1997, the General Assembly substantially expanded the 
procedures for evaluating the mental condition of a defendant who had raised the 
issue of IST or entered a plea of NGRI.  Am.Sub.S.B. No. 285, 146 Ohio Laws, 
Part VI, 11168.  R.C. 2945.39 was completely rewritten, and R.C. 2945.371(J) 
appeared for the first time, containing both of the formerly separate prohibitions.  
R.C. 2945.371(J) provides:  
 
 
No statement that a defendant makes in an evaluation or 
hearing under divisions (A) to (H) of this section relating to the 
defendant's competence to stand trial or to the defendant's mental 
condition at the time of the offense charged shall be used against 
January Term, 2015 
11 
 
the defendant on the issue of guilt in any criminal action or 
proceeding, but, in a criminal action or proceeding, the prosecutor 
or defense counsel may call as a witness any person who evaluated 
the defendant or prepared a report pursuant to a referral under this 
section. Neither the appointment nor the testimony of an examiner 
appointed under this section precludes the prosecutor or defense 
counsel from calling other witnesses or presenting other evidence 
on competency or insanity issues. 
 
{¶ 28} While the legislative history for R.C. 2945.371(J) is scant, the 
plain language of the statute strictly prohibits the use of a defendant’s statements 
on the issue of guilt.  Further, it provides the Fifth Amendment protection 
recognized in Estelle, Buchanan, and Cooey.  Accordingly, R.C. 2945.371(J) also 
prohibits the admission of evidence from the defendant’s psychiatric evaluation if 
the defendant neither initiates the evaluation nor attempts to introduce any 
psychiatric evidence. 
{¶ 29} Notwithstanding these restrictions on such testimony, the statute 
preserves the state’s right to use such testimony for other matters.  See Buchanan, 
483 U.S. at 423-424, 107 S.Ct. 2906, 97 L.Ed.2d 336 (no Fifth Amendment 
violation in admission of excerpts from psychological report containing general 
observations of examiner concerning defendant’s mental state); State v. Franklin, 
97 Ohio St.3d 1, 2002-Ohio-5304, 776 N.E.2d 26, ¶ 64 (no error in instructing 
jury that defendant’s statements during psychological evaluation could be 
considered only on the issue of insanity and not on guilt). 
D. 
Application to Harris  
{¶ 30} Prior to trial, Dreyer reported to the trial court that Harris did not 
meet the criteria for either incompetence or legal insanity.  Harris did not request 
an independent evaluation or a competency hearing, nor did he challenge the trial 
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court’s entry finding him competent.  Therefore, Harris had abandoned his 
assertion that he was IST. 
{¶ 31} Additionally, the record demonstrates that Harris had abandoned 
his NGRI defense after Dreyer’s report.  Harris filed a notice of alibi on May 12, 
2011, almost a month before trial began, signaling the abandonment of the 
defense of NGRI in pursuit of another defense.  An alibi defense, which proclaims 
that the defendant could not have been the perpetrator, is incompatible with an 
NGRI defense, which admits that he was the perpetrator of the offense, but 
disclaims legal responsibility. 
{¶ 32} Moreover, at trial, Harris objected to Dreyer’s testimony, 
acknowledging to the court that he did not meet the criteria for legal insanity, that 
he had no intention of proceeding with the defense, and that he would withdraw 
the NGRI plea at that time. 
{¶ 33} Accordingly, the record demonstrates that Harris had abandoned 
his NGRI plea and would not be introducing psychiatric evidence at trial.  
Therefore, Dreyer’s testimony regarding Harris’s feigning of mental illness was 
inadmissible during the state’s case-in-chief pursuant to R.C. 2945.371(J). 
{¶ 34} We also find to be without merit the state’s contention that Harris’s 
statements are admissible in the state’s case-in-chief because they do not include 
factual evidence of guilt, but instead are evidence of his consciousness of guilt, 
which, the state contends, shows his intent to mislead authorities and escape 
prosecution.  Consciousness of guilt is no different from guilt itself.  State v. 
Eaton, 19 Ohio St.2d 145, 160, 249 N.E.2d 897 (1969), vacated on other grounds 
sub nom. Eaton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 935, 92 S.Ct. 2857, 33 L.Ed.2d 750 (1972); 
State v. Williams, 79 Ohio St.3d 1, 11, 679 N.E.2d 646 (1997).  Moreover, the 
state’s claim that the evidence was offered not to prove guilt but to prove Harris’s 
intent to avoid prosecution is disingenuous.  The state reveals its true purpose 
when it argues in its brief to this court that Dreyer’s testimony was relevant to 
January Term, 2015 
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show Harris’s “continuing efforts to manipulate witnesses and the court in order 
to cover up his guilt in Gulleman’s robbery and murder.”  (Emphasis added.) 
E. 
Harmless Error  
{¶ 35} As the trial court erred in permitting Dreyer to testify, we must 
consider whether the admission of her testimony was harmless. 
{¶ 36} Crim.R. 52(A) defines harmless error in the context of criminal 
cases and provides:  “Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not 
affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”  Under the harmless-error standard 
of review, “the government bears the burden of demonstrating that the error did 
not affect the substantial rights of the defendant.”  (Emphasis sic.)  State v. Perry, 
101 Ohio St.3d 118, 2004-Ohio-297, 802 N.E.2d 643, ¶ 15, citing United States v. 
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 741, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993).  In most 
cases, in order to be viewed as “affecting substantial rights,”  “ ‘the error must 
have been prejudicial.’ (Emphasis added.)”  State v. Fischer, 99 Ohio St.3d 127, 
2003-Ohio-2761, 789 N.E.2d 222, ¶ 7, quoting Olano at 734.  Accordingly, 
Crim.R. 52(A) asks whether the rights affected are “substantial” and, if so, 
whether a defendant has suffered any prejudice as a result.  State v. Morris, ___ 
Ohio St.3d ___, 2014-Ohio-5052, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 24-25. 
{¶ 37} Recently, in Morris, a four-to-three decision, we examined the 
harmless-error rule in the context of a defendant’s claim that the erroneous 
admission of certain evidence required a new trial.  In that decision, the majority 
dispensed with the distinction between constitutional and nonconstitutional errors 
under Crim.R. 52(A).  Id. at ¶ 22-24.  In its place, the following analysis was 
established to guide appellate courts in determining whether an error has affected 
the substantial rights of a defendant, thereby requiring a new trial.  First, it must 
be determined whether the defendant was prejudiced by the error, i.e., whether the 
error had an impact on the verdict.  Id. at ¶ 25 and 27.  Second, it must be 
determined whether the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 
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¶ 28.  Lastly, once the prejudicial evidence is excised, the remaining evidence is 
weighed to determine whether it establishes the defendant’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Id. at ¶ 29, 33. 
{¶ 38} In this instance, the erroneous admission of Dreyer’s testimony 
violated Harris’s right against self-incrimination guaranteed by Article I, Section 
10 of the Ohio Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  There is no question that Harris placed his state of mind at issue 
when he filed the suggestion of IST and entered a plea of NGRI.  Nonetheless, at 
the time Dreyer testified in the state’s case-in-chief, Harris had wholly abandoned 
any mental-capacity defense and was not going to be introducing any psychiatric 
evidence.  
{¶ 39} Further, Dreyer’s testimony regarding Harris’s feigning of mental 
illness was an opinion as to Harris’s credibility.  Judging Harris’s credibility was 
not Dreyer’s role.  See State v. Goff, 128 Ohio St.3d 169, 2010-Ohio-6317, 942 
N.E.2d 1075, ¶ 64.  Additionally, her opinion that Harris lacked veracity would 
have caused a reasonable juror to judge Harris harshly.  For example, her expert 
opinion that Harris was feigning mental illness could reasonably have enhanced 
the credibility of the jailhouse informants.  More importantly, given the weight 
the jury would likely have assigned to Dreyer’s testimony, a reasonable juror 
would be inclined to view with suspicion Harris’s own testimony about the events 
surrounding the shooting and his contention that he had not intended to rob Shane.  
Consequently, there is a reasonable possibility that Dreyer’s testimony 
contributed to Harris’s convictions.  Therefore, the erroneous admission of 
Dreyer’s testimony had an impact on the verdict and was not harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
{¶ 40} We next turn to a review of the strength of the remaining evidence 
against Harris.  Willis and Peoples testified that they knew Harris prior to the 
murder and that they saw him at or near the location of the murder when the 
January Term, 2015 
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murder occurred.  Willis testified that she heard gunshots coming from the area 
where Shane’s body was found and that she saw Harris and another man running 
away from the parking lot immediately after she heard the shots.  Peoples testified 
that she was sitting in a car in the parking lot when Shane drove in and parked.  
She stated that she saw Harris get into the front passenger side of Shane’s car.  
She then heard gunshots and saw Harris and another man run by her with guns 
drawn. 
{¶ 41} Harris testified that he had met Shane on that day to sell him 
Oxycontin pills.  Harris testified that when he entered Shane’s car, Shane was 
acting shifty and seemed to be trying to distract Harris’s attention from the 
exchange of cash for drugs.  When Shane reached into the back seat, Harris 
believed that he was reaching for a gun.  Harris jumped out of the car, started 
shooting, and ran off. 
{¶ 42} Although four inmates testified that Harris had told them that he 
had intended to rob and did, in fact, rob Shane, other trial testimony indicated that 
Shane was found with $210 under his body with his wallet still in the car after the 
shooting. 
{¶ 43} The state’s only evidence of robbery was the testimony of the 
inmates, which directly contradicted Harris’s own testimony.  Therefore, the 
state’s robbery case hinged on the jury’s determination of whose testimony was 
more credible, the inmates’ or Harris’s.  Because of Dreyer’s improperly admitted 
testimony, the jury was unable to properly weigh credibility.  Once Dreyer’s 
testimony as to Harris’s credibility is excised, leaving the jury with that much less 
of a basis for discounting Harris’s denials, it cannot be said that the inmates’ 
testimony established Harris’s guilt of the robbery charge beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
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{¶ 44} After applying the analysis established in Morris, we hold that the 
improper admission of Dreyer’s testimony was not harmless, as it affected 
Harris’s substantial rights.  Therefore, Harris is entitled to a new trial. 
III.  Conclusion 
{¶ 45} Based on these facts, we hold that when a defendant asserts a 
mental-capacity defense or defenses, causing the court to order a psychiatric 
evaluation, but then wholly abandons that defense or defenses, a psychologist’s 
testimony regarding the defendant’s feigning of mental illness during the 
evaluation is inadmissible in the state’s case-in-chief pursuant to R.C. 
2945.371(J).  We further hold that the admission of a psychologist’s testimony 
opining on the defendant’s feigning of mental illness under these circumstances 
violates the defendant’s right against self-incrimination guaranteed by Article I, 
Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and that the violation was not harmless error. 
{¶ 46} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and O’NEILL, JJ., 
concur. 
FRENCH, J., concurs separately. 
_________________ 
FRENCH, J., concurring in judgment. 
{¶ 47} I join the majority’s conclusion that Dr. Dreyer’s testimony 
violated Harris’s constitutional right against self-incrimination and that the error 
was not harmless.  I disagree, however, with the majority’s determination that Dr. 
Dreyer’s testimony was inadmissible under R.C. 2945.371(J).  That statute 
prohibits the state from introducing certain statements that “a defendant makes in 
an evaluation or hearing.”  (Emphasis added.)  In this case, the state did not 
introduce any statements that Harris made during his evaluation; rather, it 
January Term, 2015 
17 
 
introduced Dr. Dreyer’s opinion that Harris was feigning mental illness.  In my 
view, R.C. 2945.371(J) simply does not apply, and the court of appeals erred by 
relying on it. 
_________________ 
 
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Judith 
Anton Lapp, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
 
The Law Office of Wendy R. Calaway Co., L.P.A., and Wendy R. 
Callaway, for appellee. 
 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Kristopher A. Haines, 
Assistant Public Defender, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Public 
Defender. 
___________________