Case Title: State v. Maugaotega. Dissenting Opinion by J. Acoba, with whom J. Duffy joins [pdf]. By a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the judgment, and remanded the case to the Hawaii Supreme Court, filed 02/20/2007. S.Ct. Notice Regarding Reopening of Appeal No. 26657 and Order to Transmit Trial Records to the Hawaii Supreme Court, filed 05/15/2007 [pdf]. S.Ct. Opinion filed 10/01/2007 [pdf], 115 Haw. 432. Dissenting Opinion by J. Acoba, with whom J. Duffy joins [pdf].

Citation: 107 Haw. 399

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
** FOR PUBLICATION ***

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI'I

 

Nar save

 
 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

aa

OO: HE 6;

STATE OF HAWAT'E,

 

MITI MAUGAOTEGA, JR., Defendant-Appellant

eee

APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT
(CR. NOS. 03-1-1897, 03-1-2727, 3-1-2726, 03-1-2725, 03-1-2724)

No, 26657
JUNE 29, 2005

MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, AND NAKAYAMA, JJ.
AND ACOBA, J., DISSENTING, WITH WHOM DUFFY, 3

OPINION OF THE COURT BY LEVINSON, J.

‘The defendant-appellant Miti Maugaotega, Jr. appeals

JOINS

 

from the judgments of the circuit court of the first circuit, the
Honorable Patrick Border presiding, filed on May 17, 2004 and May
18, 2004, convicting him of and sentencing him for twenty-two
offenses in five criminal cases, see infra Section I.

on appeal, Maugaotega contends that the circuit court
plainly erred in sentencing him to extended terms of imprisonment
as a “multiple offender,” pursuant to HRS § 706-662(4) (a) (1993 &

Supp. 2003),! inasmuch ag the jury did not decide that such

HRS § 706-662 provides in relevant pai

ceiteria for extended terms of isprisonsent.
convicted defendant may be subject to an extended term
(Continued.

 

 
‘+## FOR PUBLICATION **

 

 

 

continued)

Of imprisonment under section 706-661, if the

Convicted defendant satisfies one or more of the

following criteria:

(2) "the defendant 4s 2 peraistent offender whose imprisonment
for an extended term is necessary for protection of the
public. The court shall not make this finding unless the
Sefendant has previously been convicted of two felonies
Committed at different times when the defendant was eighteen
years of age or older.

 

 

(2) Re defendant Le 2 dangerous person whose imprisonment for
an extended term is necessary for protection of the public.
The court shall not make this finding unless the defendant
has been subjected to a psychiatric or psychological
evaluation that documents a significant. history of
Sangerousness to others resulting in criminally violent
conduct, and this history makes the defendant @ serious
Ganger to others. Nothing in this section precludes the
Introduction of victim-related data in order to establish
Gangerousness in accord with the Hawail rules of evidence.

(4) The Gefencant is 2 multiple offender whose criminal actions
were so extensive that a sentence of imprisonment. for an
cxtended tern 1s necessary for protection of the public.
The court shall not make this finding unless:

(a) “The defencent is being sentenced for two or more
felonies or is already under sentence of
Imprisonment for felony: oF

(®) The maximum terms of inprisonment authorized for

ich of the defendant's crines, if made to run

Consecutively, would equal or exceed in length

fhe maximo of the extended ters imposed oF
would equal or exceed forty years if the
extended term inposed is for'a class A felony.

(5) The defendant 19 an offender against the elderly,
handicapped, or @ minor under the age of eight, whose
imprisonment for an extended term is necessary’ for the
protection of the public. The court shall not make this
finding unless:

a)” The defendant attempts or commits any of the
following crimes: murder, manslaughter, 3
Sexual offense that constitutes a felony under
chapter 707, robbery, felonious assault,
burglary, of kidnappingr and

(®) The'defendant, in the course of committing or
attempting to commit the crime, inflicts serious
Or substantial bodily injury upon'a person who
(2) Sixty years of age or olders
(41) Blind, a paraplegic, or a quadriplegic: or
(iL) Eignt years of age or younger? and.

(e) Such’ disabiilty ts know or Feasonably should be
known to the defendant.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

(eontinued. .)
 

FOR PUBLICATION *

 

extended terms of imprisonment were necessary for the protection
of the public, and, therefore, that the extended term sentences
imposed by the circuit court ran afoul of the United states
Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466
(2000), and Blakely v, Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004).

We note that this court’s recent analysis and decision
in State v, Rivera, 106 Hawai'i 146, 102 P.3d 1044 (2004), which
reaffirmed this court’s holding in State v. Kaua, 102 Hawai'i 1,
72 P.3d 473 (2003), that Hawaii's extended term sentencing scheme
does not run afoul of Apprendi, disposes of Maugactega’s point of
error on appeal. Nevertheless, on January 12, 2005, the United
States Supreme Court decided United States v, Booker, 125 8.ct.
738 (2005), holding that federal sentencing guidelines are
subject to the jury trial requirements of the sixth amendment,
and severing provisions making the guidelines mandatory.
Accordingly, we take this opportunity to reassert the viability

 

*(,.-continued)

(6) The defendant Le a hate crime offender whose imprisonment

Tor en excended term is necesesry for the protection of the
public, The court shall not make this finding unles:
fa) he defendant 1a convicted of @ crime under chapter *
707,708, or 7317 and
(b) The defendant intentionally selected a victin, or in
the case of a property crime, the property that was
the object of # crime, becouse of hostility tonard the
actual or perceived race, religion, disability,
Sthniesty, national origin, gender identity oF
igh, or sexual orientation of any person. For
jes of this subsection, “gender identity o:
sion” includes a person's actual or perceived
yas well as a person's gender identity,

id self-image, gender-related appear:
sted expression; regardless of whether
that gender identity, gender-related self-image,
gender-related appearance, oF gender-related
‘pression is different from that traditionally
jociated with the person's 8

  

 

     
  
 
  

 

 

 

  

    

3
 

FOR PUBLICATION *

 

of this court’s analytical “intrinsic-extrinsic” approach to
Hawaii's statutory extended term sentencing scheme.

We hold that our approach to Hawaii's extended tern
sentencing scheme, as explicated in Kaua and Rivera, is not at
odds with United States v. Booker, inasmuch as (1) Booker’s
holding is limited to the federal sentencing guidelines, and (2)
Hawaii's extended term sentencing structure is not mandatory. We

therefore affirm Maugaotega’s sentences.

 

on Septenber 3, 2003, an O'ahu grand jury returned an
indictment against Maugaotega in Cr. No. 03-1-1897, charging him
with the following offenses: (1) attempted murder in the second
degree (Count I), in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS)
$§ 707-701.5 (1993) and 707-500 (1993); (2) use of a firearm in
the commission of a felony (Counts IZ and V), in violation HRS
§ 134-6(a) and (e) (Supp. 2003); (3) robbery in the first degree
(Count 111), in violation of HRS § 708-840(1) (b) (1) and/or (14)
(1993 & Supp. 2003); (4) burglary in the first degree (Count IV),
in violation of HRS § 708-810(1)(c) (1993); (5) place to keep
firearm (Count VI), in violation of HRS § 134-6(c) and (e) (Supp.
2003;
VII and VITI), in violation of HRS § 712-1243 (1993 & Supp.
2003.
TX), in violation of HRS § 329-43.5(a) (1993).

Following a jury trial that ended on March 3, 2004,

 

(6) promoting a dangerous drug in the third degree (Counts

 

and (7) unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia (Count

Maugactega was found guilty as charged on all nine counts. On

4
 

FOR PUBLICATION *#*
April 22, 2004, the prosecution filed a motion for extended terms
of imprisonment, pursuant to HRS § 706-662(4) (a), see supra note
Le
8, 1-1-2727

On December 18, 2003, an O'ahu grand jury returned an
indictment against Maugactega in Cr. No. 03+1-2727, charging him
with the one count of promoting prison contraband, in violation
of HRS § 710-1022(1) (b) (1993).

on March 8, 2004, Maugaotega entered a no contest plea
to the charge. On April 21, 2004, the prosecution filed a motion
for an extended term of imprisonment, pursuant to HRS § 706-
662(4) (a), gee supra note 1.

c. Cr. No, 03-1-2726

on December 18, 2003, an O'ahu grand jury returned an
indictment against Maugactega in Cr. No. 03-1-2726, charging him
with the following offenses: (1) sexual assault in the first
degree (Counts I and 11), in violation of HRS § 707-730(1) (a)
(1993 & Supp. 2003); (2) robbery in the first degree (Count 111),
in violation of HRS § 708-840(1) (b) (11) (1993 & Supp. 2003); (3)
burglary in the first degree (Count IV), in violation of HRS
§ 708-810(1) (c) (1993); (4) use of a firearm in the commission of
‘a felony (Count V), in violation HRS § 134-6(a) and (e) (Supp.
2003); and (5) assault in the second degree (Count VI), in
violation of HRS § 707-711(1) (a) (1993).

on March 8, 2004, Maugaotega entered a no contest plea
to all six counts. On April 21, 2004, the prosecution filed a
motion for extended terms of imprisonment, pursuant to HRS § 706-
*** FOR PUBLICATION ***

662(4) (a), see supra note 1.
D. Cr. No. 03-21-2725
on December 18, 2003, an O'ahu grand jury returned an
indictment against Maugactega in Cr. No. 03+1-2725, charging him
with the following offenses: (1) robbery in the first degree
(Counts I and Ii), in violation of HRS § 708-B40(1) (b) (ii) (1993
& Supp. 2003); (2) burglary in the first degree (Count III), in
violation of HRS § 708-810(1) (c) (1993); and (3) use of a firearm
in the commission of a felony (Count IV), in violation HRS § 134~
6(a) and (e) (Supp. 2003).
on March 8, 2004, Maugaotega entered a no contest plea
to all four counts. On April 21, 2004, the prosecution filed a
motion for extended terms of imprisonment, pursuant to HRS § 706-
662(4) (a), see supra note 1.
E. Cr. No, 3-1-2724
On December 18, 2003, an O'ahu grand jury returned an
indictment against Maugaotega in Cr. No. 03-1-2724, charging him
with burglary in the first degree (Counts I and II), in violation
of HRS § 708-810(1) (c) (1993).
on March 8, 2004, Maugaotega entered a no contest plea
to both counts. On April 21, 2004, the prosecution filed a
motion for extended terms of imprisonment, pursuant to HRS § 706-
662(4) (a), see supra note 1.
Fr. Sentencing
‘The circuit court conducted a sentencing hearing on May
17, 2004, during which it sentenced Maugactega in all five

criminal numbers and considered the prosecution’s five motions
+4 FOR PUBLICATION ***
for extended term sentencing. The circuit court concluded that
Maugactega was a multiple offender under HRS § 706~662(4) (a) and
orally granted each of the prosecution's motions for extended

terms of imprisonment as follows:

 

THE COURT: The next motion by the (prosecution) under
Criminal Nunber 03-1-1697 19a motion for extended term of
Smprisonnent pursuant to (HRS) Section 706-661 and 706-
Gex{d) (a); Under 661, subsection one, the extended term for
(murder in the (©
possibility of parole.
in Count Ty for the charge of [a)ttenpted (mjurder,
the court cites to [HRS] Section 703-500 and 706-662(4) (a)
ae a basis for ite ruling. Under 706-662(4) (a) the
Toguirenent must be that the defendant is a multiple
Otfender whose criminal actions are ao extensive that &
Sentence of imprisonment for an extended term is necest
for the protection of the public.

"Ine court shell not sake this finding unless the
defendant is being sentenced for two or nore felonies
Toaay, (Maugaotege) 1s being sentenced for 22 felonies, 14
Of which involved the named victim, twelve of those
Gavolving the use of a firearm in the commission of the
offense. Yet another offense, (p)ronoting [p]rison
{elontraband in the (f]irst (a)

[nlfecuction inco the prison of a sevice which is dangerous
in nature, to wit, a shankl,] and [this] represents
heightened danger, particularly when introduced into &
Prigon setting.

‘a careful examination of (Maugactega]’s conduct in the
period betwaen May and June of 2003 demonstrates a pattern
Be escalating violence. The. . . first offenses in late
May were burglaries, primarily involving a risk to property.

scond civster of offenses involved ~~ escalated to
Sea with the use of a semi-automatic weapon in
fortherance of crines.

‘The third cluster of offenses involved (sJexual
alssault and (zJobbery, once again facilitated by the use
of a firearm, The most violent of the offenses followed in
Sane 26th with the attempted murder of Eric Kawamoto. There
wore a totel of six naned victims of violent or potentially
Miolent crimes within the relative shore period between late
May and the end of June, 200:

‘Given the facts of these offenses, the court concludk
that (Maugsotega] is a multiple offender under [HRS §) 706~
Ge2(4) (a). These criminal actions were so extensive that
the sentence of imprisonment for an extended term is
hecessary for the protection of the public. Consequentiv.

  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

 

   

 

 

 

Purevant to [HRS $$] 705-500 and 706-661, the court
extends the term of imprisonment in Count 1 to'life without
the possibility of parole; in Counts 11, 11 and V, to life;

7
**4 FOR PUBLICATION ***

An Counts 1V and VI, to 20 years each, and in Counts VII,
VITT, and TK to ten years each. Said extended terms are'to
Yun Concurrent with each other.

‘the’ [prosecution]’s next motion under Criminal Number
3-1-2724 ig 2 motion for extended term of imprisonment of
20 Inasmuch as the offenses under this criminal
onber are (blurgiaries in the [f]irst (degree, these are
Both Clase B felonies for which the extended term would be
20 years per offense. - =~

1 eer oethe multiple offender analysis of this court
that this court hes followed... is identical to that
earlier described in the offense of (a]ttenpted [murder in
the [s]econd. (4) egr

‘Given the facts of these offenses, the court concludes
[that Maugnotega] is a multiple offender whose criminal
actions were so extensive that a sentence of inprisonnent
for an extended tem 1a necessary for the protection of the
public. Section 706~662 subparagraph four. Therefore, the
‘Tocosscution)‘s motion for extended term of imprisonment in

 

   

 

 

Sh hr eount to 21

Next, (4n Ce. No. 03-1-2725,] the [prosecution] noves
(tended term of inprisonnent. As previously stated,
the facts of the offense(s] warrant this court to conclude
thst [Maugaotega] 2 2 multiple offender under [HRS § 706
}62 (4) {a) whose criminal actions were ao extensive that [2]
2ektence of imprisonment for an extended term is necessary
for the protection of the public. Consaquentivi,1 she.

fp moth e

=e Pursuant ro (HRS $] 708
teh the court extends the tere of imprisonment in Counts
and’ 11 to lige and in Count Tir to 20 years.

   

 

liek) [in Cr. No. 03-1-2726,) the (prosecution) noves
for extended term of inprisonnent as to all counts. As
previously stated, the facts of the offenses warrant this
Sourt to conciade that [Maugactega} is a multiple offender
Under [HRS § 706-]662(4) (a) Whose criminal actions were so
lentensive that the sentences of inpriscnment for an extended
form are mandated for the protection of the public.

 

‘Rirsuant te THRE S) 106-661, the court extends the
term of inprisonment £0 1ife as to Counts 1, Tf, TT, and ¥
land te 20 years as to Count IV and to ten yoars’as to Count
VE, seid terme to run concsrrent with one another.

   

We deb how to Criminal Number 03-1-2727.

The [prosecution] ‘then moves for extended ter of
imprisonment. As previously stated, the facts of the
Offense werrant this court to conclude chat [Waugaotega) is
Gimultiple offender under (HRS $ 106"] 6624) (a)  wbe
Criminal actions were so extensive that the sentence of
Geprisonment for an extended term is necessary for the

 

 

 

 
‘** FOR PUBLICATION ***

protection of the public.

erm of inbrisooment in (cr. Newt Os-1-2727 is aranted..
Parsuant to [HRS §] 706-661, this court extends the term of
Imprisonment to 20 years as’ to Count 7

(emphases and brackets added.) Maugaotega neither argued

 

generally that the circuit court was without authority to impose
extended prison terms nor interposed 2 specific Apprendi
objection to the circuit court’s imposition of extended terns of
imprisonment.

on September 8, 2004, the circuit court filed its
written findings of fact (FOFs), conclusions of law (Cols), and
orders granting the prosecution's motions for extended terms of
imprisonment as a multiple offender, wherein the circuit court
entered the following identical FOFs and COLs as to each Criminal
Number:

uwpnics oF ract
1. Mies Maugaotege, dr. is “multiple offender”
RESTIRATBEAreCGs°%bccasse on hay 1101, 2004, before the,
Honorable Fatrick W Border, seid Defendant was sentenced

for two or more felonies, to wit:

 

 

count 1: Attempted Murder in the Second
Desree
count 11: Carrying, Using or Threatening to

 

Use a Firearm in the Commission of =
Separate Felony.

Robbery in the First Degree
Burglazy in the First Degree
Carzying, Using or Threatening to
Use a Firesrm in the Commission of &

count
Count.
Coun

 

  

 

Separate Felony.

count VI: Place to Keep Pistol or Revolver

count Vit Promoting ® Dangerous Drug in the
Third Degre

count Vint: Promoting s Dangerous Drug in the
Third Degree

count Unlawful Use of Drug Paraphernali.

     
‘FOR PUBLICATION

 

Cee Mo, 03-1-2726

count 1: Burglary in the First Degree
count IF Burglary in the First Degree;

 

Gea Nos 0361-2725

count I: Robbery in the First Degree
count 1 Robbery in the First Degree
Count 12 Burglary in the First Degree
Count IV Careying, Using or Threatening to

Use a Fivearm in the Commission of
Separate Felony;

 

Se Nos 3-1-2726

count 1: Sexual Assault in the First Degree
Gount 11: Sexual Assault in the First Degree
Gount 11t+ Robbery in the First Degrs

Count Iv: Burglary in the First Degree
count, Carzying, Using or Threatening to

   

Use a Firearm in the Conmission of
Separate Felony
count VE: Aafault in the Second Degree; and

o 290

 

Promoting Prison Contraband in the First egret

 

2. Mits Maugactega, Jr. is a “multiple offender”
whose commitment for an extended term is necessary for the
Protection of the public because of the following facts:

 

 

a. Befendant has an extensive juvenile
criminal nistory.
b, Defendants criminality has continued

Geepite his prior contacts with the
criminal justice system.

cc. Defendant hes failed co benefit from the
criminal justice systen.
d.  Sefendant has demonstraced a total

Gieregara for the rights of others and a
poor attitude toward the law.
Betendant has denonstrated a pattern of
Criminality whlch indicates that he is
Ulkely to be's reciaivist in that he
cannot conform his behavior to the
Eequirenents of the law
ft. Bae to the quantity and seriousness of the
Enatant offer
threat to the comunity and his long(~
Jterm incarceration is necessary for the
protection of the public-

   

 

10

; Defendant poses a serious
appeal in

**4 FOR PUBLICATION ***

‘CONCLUSIONS OF Lit

1. Based on the foregoing facts , the {court
concluded that she Defendant is a “multiple offender” within
Ene meaning of Section 706-622 (4) (aly H-R-8-y_ who:

Coenlenent for an extended term is necessary’ for the
protection of the public. Section 706-662(4), H.R.S.

 

 

on June 16, 2004, Maugaotega timely filed notices of
the aforementioned five criminal numbers.

[A] sentencing judge generally has broad
discretion in imposing a sentence. State ¥, Gaylord.
$e await 127, 143-48, 090 P.2d 1267, 1163-86 (1998)?
States. Valeza, 74 Baw. 424, 435, 842 P.2d 376,
Shs sy (1993). The applicable’ standard of review
for jentencing oF resentencing matters 1s whether the
Court committed plain and manifest abuse of discretion
Seite Gecteion.” Gavlord, 76 Hawai'i at 144, 990 P24
at 1184; State z. Kupukau, 71 Haw. 218, 227-28, 787
Pi2d 602, 687-08 (1990); State v. Murcav(,] 63/Haw.
432,25, 621 P.2d 334, 342-43 (1980); State w Fry, 62
we 286, 298, 602 Pe2d 13, 16 (1979)
Keaug 2. 'State, 79 Hawai't 261, 264, 901 P.2d 481, 494
(isss]. *{Flactors which indicate ‘a plain and manifest
Moose of diseretion are arbitrary or capricious action by
the judge ands rigid refusal to consider the defendant’ s
Sontentione,” “Erye 61 flaw. at 231, 602 P.2d at 17. Andy
SCigjeneeatiy, fo conetituce an abise it must eppear that
the court clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or
Gisregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the
Substantial detrinent of a party 1itigant.”
Hawai'i at 204, 901 P.24 at 464 (quoting Gavlord, 7
ae 144, 890 P.2d at 118¢ (quoting Kumokau, 71 Haw.
227-28, 767 P.2d at 688)).

 

 

    

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

 

State v. Kaua, 102 Hawai'i 1, 7, 72 P.3d 473, 479 (2003) (quoting

State v. Rauch, 94 Hawa:

(brackets
B.

4315, 322, 13 P.3d 324, 331 (2000)

 

and ellipsis points in original).
seats

ce answer questions of constitutional lew ‘by
exercising our own independent. judgment based ont
SE 'the case,’ and, this, questions of constitutional
Gre reviewed on appeal “onger the ‘right/wrong’ standard,
rP5S hawaii 7, 100, 997 P-2d 23, 26 (2000)

facts

 

 

   

an
 

FOR PUBLICATION **#

(citations omitted) .
102 Hawai'i at 7, 72 P.3d at 479 (quoting State v. Aplaca,

96 Hawas's 17, 22, 25 P.3d 792, 797 (2001)).

C, Statutory Interpretation

[t]he interpretation of a statute.
As a question of law reviewable de nove.”

4 Wawas't 1, 10, 928 P.2d 843, 852
(1996) (quoting State v, Camara, @1 Hawai'i 324,
328, 916 P-2a 1225, 1230 (1898) (citations
onitted)).” See alao State vTovemura, 60
Hawai 8," 16, 904 P.2d-€95, S03 (1998); State
wecliiga, 79 siawai't i, 3, 897 P.2a 928, 930
(1995); state v. Nakata, 76 Hawai'i 360, 365,
278 F.2d 699, TOF (1994). .

 

Gravy. Adainistrative Director of the Court, 64 Hawal's
ise, 16a, 931 P-26 580, 586 (1557) (sone brackets added and
sone in Original). See alec State x, Sota, 84 Hawai'i 229,
2536, 933° P.24 66, 73 (1997) Furthermore, our statutory
Construction is quided by established roles!
hen construing @ statute, our forenast obligation is
fo ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
Tegisiature, which is to be obtained primarily from
the language contained in the statute itself. And we
Bust read statutory language in the context of the
entire statute and construe it in s manner consistent
with ies purpose.

‘When there 18 doubt, doubleness of meaning, or
Andistinetiveness or uncertainty of an expression used
Sha statute, an anbiguity exists. .

In construing an ambiguous statute, “(t]he
meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by.
Guanining the context, with which the ambiguous words,
Phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to

‘certain their true meaning.” HRS § i-15(1)
((1993)]. Moreover, the courts may resort to
Gxtrinale aide in determining Legisietive intent. One

jenue is the use of legislative history as en
interpretive tool.
Grav, #4 Hawai'i at 148, 931 P.2d at $90 (quoting state va
‘Tovomura, 60 Hawai'i €, 18-19, 904 P.2a 893, 903-04 (1995))
{brackets and ellipsis points in original) ‘(footnot.
omitted), ‘This court may ols0 consider "(t]he reason and
Spirit of the law, and the cause which induced the
Legislature to enact it... to discover its true meaning,
ns § 1-15(2) (1993). “Laws in path gatexia, or upon the
Sane subject matter, shall be construed with reference to

ich other. What is clear in one statute may be called pon
Sncaia to explain what is doubtful in another.” HRS § 1-16
11983),

 

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

a2
+## FOR PUBLICATION *

 

Kaua, 102 Hawai'i at 7-8, 72 P.3d at 479-480 (quoting Rauch, 94
Hawai'i at 322-23, 13 P.3d at 331-32 (quoting State v. Kotis, 92
Hawai'i 319, 327, 984 P.2d 78, 86 (1999) (quoting State ve
Dudoit, 90 Hawai'i 262, 266, 978 P.2d 700, 704 (1999) (quoting
State v. Stocker, 90 Hawai'i 85, 90-91, 976 P.2d 399, 404-05
(1999) (quoting Ho vs Leftwich, 88 Hawai'i 251, 256-57, 965 P.2d
793, 798-99 (1998) (quoting Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple v.
Sullivan, 87 Hawai'i 217, 229-30, 953 P.2d 1315, 1327-28
(1998)))))))-
D. Blain Error
ctwe may recognize plain error when the error
connitted affects substantial rights of the defendant.‘
Elace vecosdeizo, 99 Hawaii 390, 405, 56 P.3d 692,707,
‘Beniedy 100 Hawai"t 14, 58 P.3d 72 (2002)

(quoting State va cenking, 93 Mawai'i 87, 101, 997 F.2d 13,

27° (2000) (quoting State v, Cullen, 86 Hawai 1, 8, 946

P24 955, 962 (1997))).- fee algo (Hawas't Roles of’ Penal

Procedure] RPE Rule 52(b) [1998], ("Plain error or defects

affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they

Mere not brought to the attention of the court.*)«
‘State v. Hauge, 103 Hawai'i 38, 48, 79 P.3d 131, 141 (2003)
(quoting State v. Matias, 102 Hawai'i 300, 304, 75 P.3d 1191,

1195 (2003))

 

  

 

IIT. DISCUSSION
Maugaotega argues that the circuit court erred in

granting each of the prosecution’s five motions for extended
terms of imprisonment because the finding that extended terms
were necessary for the protection of the public was not submitted
to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of
the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution.
Maugactega urges this court to reconsider its holding in Rivera,

33
‘+4 FOR PUBLICATION ***
submitting that “(2)llowing a judge to pick and choose which
factors [a]ze ‘intrinsic’ or ‘extrinsic’ leads to the same type
of arbitrariness and absurdity” that the United States Supreme
Court sought to curb in Apprendi and Blakely. We believe that
Maugaotega’s arguments are without merit.

Booker addressed the constitutionality of the statutory
federal sentencing guidelines in the context of the Supreme
Court's recent decisions in Apprendi and Blakely. The Booker
majority held (1) that the federal sentencing guidelines are
subject to Apprendi constraints and (2) that the provisions of
the Federal Sentencing Act making the sentencing guidelines
mandatory were incompatible with Apprendi, thereby requiring
severance of those provisions and rendering the guidelines
advisory only. In our view, Booker’s holdings -- interpreted
through the lenses of Apprendi and Blakely -- are limited to the
mandatory nature of the federal sentencing guidelines.

‘Therefore, inasmuch as Hawaii’s extended term sentencing scheme

 

is purely discretionary and not mandatory, we believe that
Booker, in itself, does not affect this court’s “intrinsic-
extrinsic” analysis as enunciated in Kaua and reaffirmed in

Rivera.’
Booker’ s case illustrates the mandatory nature
of the Guidelines.” the ury convicted nin of
Jing at least 50 gtans of crack in violation of
EP" fonited States Code) '§ 42 (b) (1) (A) (144) Based on
evidence that he had 92.5 crams of crack in his duffel
Bag. Under these facts, the Guidelines specified an

 

 

 

2 or an analysis of the impact of Buorandi and its progeny on our
extended term sentencing schene, as well a history of Hawaii's indetersinate
Sentencing systen, see State v. Kaua, 102 Hawari 1, 72 P.3d 473 (2003), and
State v, Rivera, 106 Hawari 146, 102 P.3a 1044 (2004).

a4
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offense Level of 32, which, given the defendant's
criminal history category, authorized a sentence of
210-to-262 months. ge [United States Sentencing
Guidelines] § 201-1(c) (8). Booker’s is 3
Foncof-the-nill drug case, and does not present any
factors thet were inadequately considered by the
Commission. The sentencing judge would therefore have
been reversed had he not inposed a sentence within the
evel 32 Guidelines range.

Booker’ actual sentence, however, was 360 month
gunost 10 yeare longer than the Guidelines ange supported
by the jury verdict alone, To reach this senvenct
Stage tound faces beyond those found by the jury: nanely,
Ehat Booker possessed S66 grams of crack in addition to the
52.5 grams in his duffel bag. The jury never heard any
evidence of the additional arug quantity, and the judge
found {e true by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus,
just as in Blakely, “the Jury's verdict alone does not
Authorize the sentence. The Judge acquires that authority
‘only upon finding some additional fact.” 542 U.Sey at —
324's.ce-y at 2530. There ia no relevant distinction
betwean the sentence imposed pursuant to the Washington
lseavutes in Blaxaly and the sentences imposed pursuant to
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in these cases.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

   

   

    

 

 

 

 

Booker, 125 S.ct. at 751.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in the first
part of the Court’s opinion in Booker, explained that

[A]E the Guidelines as currently written could be read 2
merely advigory provisions that recommended, rather than
Fequized, the selection of particular sentences in response
fo differing sets of facts, their use would not implicate
the Sixth ARendsent. We have never doubted the authority of
a udae to exercise brosd discretion in imposing a sentence
‘SIMUL atacutory range,

Rooker, 128 S.Ct. at 750 (citations omitted) (emphases added) .

 

 

 

Justice Breyer, writing for the majority in the Court’s
second holding in Booker, explained why, in light of the Court's
first holding, it was necessary to excise the provisions of the
Federal Sentencing Act that made the guidelines mandatory:

As the Court today recognizes in its first opinion in
these cases, the existence of § 3553(b) (1) is a necessary
condition of the constitutional violation, that is to say,
without this provision -~ namely the provision that makes
“the relevant sentencing rules - . = mendat:

binding requirenents on all sentencing judg.
statute falls outside the scope of Auaxandi’s requirement.

   

a5.
‘#4 FOR PUBLICATION *#*

‘The remainder of the Act “function(s) independently.”
without the smandatory” provision, the Act nonetheles:
Teguires judges to take account of the Guidelines together
ith other sentencing goals. See 18 0.S.C.A. § 3553(8)
(Supp, 2004). the Act nonetheless requires judges to
Soesider the Guidelines "sentencing range established for

the applicable category of offense committed by the
appiicable category of defendant,” § 3553(a) (4), the
pertinent Sentencing Commission policy statements, the need
Ro vaveld unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to
provide restitution to victims, $5 3553(a) (1), (3), (5)~(7)
finein ed. and Supp. 2008)

 

   

 

  

dudaes 20 inpose sentences that reflect the seriousness of
the offense, promote respect for the lew, provide just
punishment, afford adequate deterrence,
Ghd effectively provide the defendant with needed
‘Gducetional or vocational training and medical care.
$3583 (al (2) (main ed. and Supp. 2004).

Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 764-65 (some citations omitted) (emphases
added). ‘Thus, the declaration by both majorities in Booker (1)

 

that rendering the federal sentencing guidelines advisory rather
than mandatory remedies their unconstitutionality and (2) that

the Federal Sentencing Act continues to require judges to impose
sentences that, among other things, “protect the public”
essentially erases discretionary extended term sentencing schemes
such as Hawaii's from the decision’s purview.

Hence, Booker does not alter the applicability of Kaua
‘and Rivera to Maugaotega’s current challenge of his extended term
sentences under HRS § 706-622(4) (a) and disposes of his argument

on appeal.

Kaus reaffirmed the *intrinsle-exteinsic” analysis first
Eetlcolated by this court in State v. Schrosder, 76 Hawai's
$15,800, F.2d 192 (1998), and feafTirmed in hate x. Tatova,
51 hawai's 261, 982 P.24 890 (1999), and rejected the
Gefendant’s argunent that Auprendl ‘mandates that a “multiple
Offender” determination, for purposes of HRS

$ s06-862 (4) (al, most be made by the trier of fact, holding
{al thet fRE § 706-662 passed constitutional muster under
the Howai'l and United States Constitutions and (2) chat
Sfeine facts foundational to...» extended terns of
Imprisonment ss pursuant to HRS § 706-662(6) (a), fell.
outside the Aipiendi role, and, thus, the ultinate finding

 

 

16
 

‘#04 FOR PUBLICATION

‘thet [a defendant) was o ‘multiple offender’ whose extensive
Erininel actions warranted extended prison ters was
Sroperly within the province of the sentencing court.”

Kaun 102'Hiawai's at 13, 72 F.3d at 485. In so holding,
this court noted

Ld, at 12-13, 72 Pi3d at 486

The fundamental distinction between the nature of the
predicate facts described in HRS $§ 706-662(1), (3),
eee (aly - sc on the one hand, and those described in
ARS $6 706-862(5) and (6), .... on the other.
Specifically, the facts at issue in rendering an
extended term sentencing determination under RS
$5 Joecseatil, (3), and. (4) implicate considerations
Sinplevely *extrinsie” to the elenents of the offense
with snich the defendant was charged and of which he
Mes convicted? accordingly, they should be found by
the sentencing Judge in accordance with {
Huesean{, 60 Haw. 71, 508 P.2d 394” (1979),] and ite
Progeny, The facts at issue for purposes of ERS
$5 fow-sea(s) and (6), however, are, by thelr very
Pature, “intrinsic” to the offense with which the
Getendant was charged and of which he has been
‘Recoraingiy, they must be found beyond a
Goobt by the trier of fact in order to
Gefendast his constitutional rights to

 

 

 

 

 

stfora tl
Procedural due process and atrial by jury. Tafova,
Bitawai't at 271-72, 982 P.24 at. 900-01; Schroadar,
36 Hawai'i st 528, 860 P.20 at 203.

5 Comp

 

 

added) -

   

Hauge, 103 Hawai'i at 59-60, 79 P.3d at 152-53 (emphases deleted)

(brackets in original).

Rivera reaffirmed our reasoning in Kaua

by holding that “Hawaii's extended term sentencing scheme is not

incompatible with Blakely v. Washington, inasmuch as (1) Blakely

addresses only statutory ‘determinate’ sentencing ‘guideline’

schemes, and (2) this court’s ‘intrinsic-extrinsic’ analysis

culminating in Kaua is compatible with both Blakely and

Apprendi.”

106 Hawai'i at 150, 102 P.3d at 1048. Consequently,

Rivera stated that “this court’s Kaua analysis retains its
vitality with respect to Rivera’s present challenge of HRS
§§ 706-662(1) and (4) (a) and disposes of his claim that the

circuit court erred in imposing extended term sentences.” 106

Hawai'i at 157, 102 P.3d at 1055.

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We acknowledge that the federal sentencing guidelines
differ qualitatively from Hawaii's extended term sentencing
scheme, in that the federal guidelines do not prescribe or
suggest sentences that exceed the statutory maximum as set forth
in the respective federal criminal statutes themselves, wherea
Hawaii's discretionary extended term sentencing schene generally
doubles the relevant statutorily-prescribed indeterminate maximum
prison term. Nonetheless, we do not believe that Booker alters
the essential holdings of Apprendi and Blakely. The factor that
rendered the federal sentencing guidelines unconstitutional was

its mandatory nature.

(t]he Act without {ts “mandatory” provision and
related language ‘renaine consistent with Congress’ initial
fand basic sentencing intent. Congress sought to "provide
Certainty snd fairness in masting the purposes of
Sentencing, [while] avoiding unwarranted sentencing
Gisparities .”- . [and) maintaining sufficient flexibility
fo permit. individualized sentences when warranted.” 26
Orste. $991 (b) (1) (B) [od

Rooker, 125 S.Ct. at 767 (some brackets added and sone in
original).

In the present matter, the circuit court was first
required to consider the factors set forth in HRS $ 706-606
(1993)? “in determining the particular sentence to be imposed.”

 

 

> uRS $ 706-606 provider
Factors to be considered in imposing # sentence. The court.
t sed. shi
‘sonsider:

 

Tt) me nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defensant;

(2) The nead for the sentence inoosed:
{a} “fo reflact the seriousness of the offense, to
promote respect for law, and to provide just
Bunishsent for the offense;

() Fo afford adequate deterrence to criminal

(continued...)

 

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Among the traditional sentencing considerations set forth in HRS
§ 706-606 is the “need for the sentence imposed . . . [to
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.” See

HRS § 706-606(2) (c). As we explained in Rivera,

inasmuch ae both HRS §§ 706-606 and 706-662 require the
ctermination of whether the sentence inposed 1s needed to
Protect the public, the sole . . . factor, beyond those
Elveady enumerated in IRS § 7062606 and already considered
by the sentencing court, which extends an indeterminate
prison term pursuant to HRS § 706-662(4) (a), is the fact
Phat a defendant is a multiple offender- The multiple
offender determination, pursuant to HRS § 706~662(4) (a),
Sirtors the pricr conviction exception in Apprendi because
the defendant has either already pleaded guilty, and thereby
Adnitted guilt, or the trier of fact has found beyond a
Feasonable doubt that the defendant has committed tuo or
hore felonies for which he i currently being sentenced.
See Apprendi, $30 U.S. at 48s, 120 s.ct. 2348 (reasoning
Ehat both the “certainty that’ procedural safeguards attached
fovany “act” of prior conviction, and the reality that (the
Gefendant] sid not challenge. : that ‘fact (/)" . .
aitigated the due process and Sixth Amendment Concerns
Otherwise inplicatea in allowing a judge to determine 3
Sfact’ increasing punishment beyond the maximum of the
statutory range")

106 Hawai'i at 163, 102 P.3d at 1061.
Because Booker merely struck down the compulsory nature

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

of the otherwise legitimate federal sentencing guidelines scheme,
Hawaii’s wholly discretionary extended term sentencing apparatus

does not fall within Booker’s purview. That being so, we hold

 

continued)

 

conduct

© fur
‘efendant anc

(a) Forprovide the defendant with needed educational
Gr vocational training, medical care, or other
Correctional trestment in the most effective

 

 

(3) The Kinds of sentences available; and
(3) The need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities

mong defendants with similar records who nave been
found guilty of similar conduct.

   

 

as
*## FOR PUBLICATION *#*
that Booker has no bearing on this court's disposition of the

present matter.

TV. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing analysis, we affirm the

judgments and sentences of the circuit court.

On the briefs: Gorm
Karen T. Nakasone,
Deputy Public Defender, .
for the defendant-appeiiant BP hrrnar—
Nits Naugaotega, JF.

Janes. Anderson, Ree Oreo
Babul BGEEECEng attorney,
2b Ele pistacitiappelioe
See Seance

20