Case Title: Daniels v. Board of Kansas City Comm'rs

Citation: 236 Kan. 578, 693 P.2d 1170

Docket Number: 56,638

State: kansas

Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Date: 1985-01-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
236 Kan. 578 (1985)
693 P.2d 1170
BOSTON DANIELS, EMANUEL NORTHERN, ACCIE L. TAYLOR, WILLA McKINNEY, and LEARNED LATELL JENNINGS, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE CITY OF KANSAS CITY, KANSAS, AND THE CITY OF KANSAS CITY, KANSAS, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 56,638

Supreme Court of Kansas.
Opinion filed January 26, 1985.
Grover G. Hankins, of North, Bryant & Hankins, of Kansas City, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellants.
Michael P. Howe, assistant city attorney, argued the cause and was on the brief for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
PRAGER, J.:
This is an action seeking judicial review of an ordinance adopted by the Board of Commissioners of the City of Kansas City granting a special use permit for the operation of a sanitary landfill to be located within the city. The action was brought, pursuant to K.S.A. 12-712, by certain property owners owning land adjacent to the proposed landfill site. This court has held that an action for injunctive relief may be used to challenge ordinances of a city which grant special use permits. Weeks v. City of Bonner Springs, 213 Kan. 622, 518 P.2d 427 (1974); Gaslight Villa, Inc. v. City of Lansing, 213 Kan. 862, 518 P.2d 410 (1974).
Following a hearing on the application for the special use permit, the Board of Commissioners (Board) of the city made comprehensive findings of fact which set forth the background, *579 chronology, procedure, and the evidence which the Board relied upon as a basis for granting the special use permit. The Board's findings of fact were as follows:
"(b) the historical value of the subject area;
In its resolution granting the special use permit, the Board accepted certain commitments made by Browning-Ferris Industries (BFI) to satisfy some of the objections presented by the landowners at the hearing. The Board ordered that there should be certain conditions precedent to any operational or property site activities on the landfill site by BFI:
In addition to these conditions precedent, the Board established certain conditions subsequent to be complied with by BFI after it undertook actual operation of the sanitary landfill. They are as follows:
In Finding of Fact No. 29, the Board required a separate agreement between the City of Kansas City, Kansas, and BFI in regard to the use of certain city property located within and abutting the proposed landfill site.
Following these extensive Findings of Fact, the Board adopted Conclusions of Law as follows:
Following the adoption of the resolution granting the special use permit for operation of the sanitary landfill, the plaintiff landowners filed this action in district court pursuant to K.S.A. 12-712 to determine the validity and reasonableness of the Board's resolution granting the special use permit. The petition filed by the plaintiffs was essentially a suit in equity for injunctive and declaratory relief. At the outset, a temporary restraining order was issued which was subsequently modified at the time a temporary injunction was issued. In addition, the plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their petition to add new causes of action. This motion was filed one month prior to the set trial date and one week prior to the discovery deadline. This motion was denied. These matters will be discussed later in the opinion.
The case was tried to the court and, after four days of trial, the case was taken under advisement. Thereafter, the trial court rendered its decision adopting certain suggested findings of fact and conclusions of law submitted by the city with certain modifications, and denying the plaintiff's petition for relief. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the defendant city, holding that the decision of the Board of City Commissioners granting the special use permit was not arbitrary or capricious but in fact was based upon substantial competent evidence and was reasonable.
In arriving at its decision, the district court first considered the scope of judicial review. The court noted the basic principles of law to be applied in reviewing a decision of the governing body of a city in a zoning or special use permit case. These rules are stated in Combined Investment Co. v. Board of Butler County Comm'rs, 227 Kan. 17, 28, 605 P.2d 533 (1980), as follows:
"(a) the lawfulness of the action taken, and
"(b) the reasonableness of such action.
These rules were more recently restated in Taco Bell v. City of Mission, 234 Kan. 879, 885-86, 678 P.2d 133 (1984).
The district court, in determining the issue of reasonableness, observed that the Board of City Commissioners had considered the factors which had been established for the granting of special use permits. These factors are set forth in the Board's finding of fact No. 24 noted above. The district court then concluded that the decision of the Board granting the special use permit was lawful, reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious. The plaintiffs appealed, and the appeal was transferred to the Supreme Court for determination.
The plaintiffs raise three points on this appeal. The primary point is that the trial court erred in finding that the action of the Board in granting the special use permit to BFI for the operation of a sanitary landfill in a residential zoned area was lawful and reasonable. The scope of judicial review in matters involving special use permits is set forth above. We have considered the entire record in the case and have concluded that there is substantial competent evidence to support the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law; that the district court properly considered the pertinent factors for determining the reasonableness of the city's action; and that the trial court did not err in determining that the decision of the Board of City Commissioners to grant the special use permit for the landfill was lawful and reasonable.
The plaintiffs next maintain that the trial judge erred in dissolving a temporary restraining order previously entered by another judge. They contend that injunctive relief was necessary *587 to protect the present and future property rights of the plaintiffs. We find no error in this regard. At the outset of the case on application of plaintiffs, a temporary restraining order was granted on March 31, 1983, restraining the city from entering into any lease agreement with the owners for use of city property adjacent to the landfill tract. This temporary restraining order was later modified after a hearing on a motion for a temporary restraining order on April 13, 1983. At that time, the district judge, who ultimately handled the trial of the case on the merits, issued a temporary injunction prohibiting certain physical acts upon the subject property. The effect of the judge's order was to maintain the status quo as far as any changes in the physical use of the property were concerned until the case was finally determined on the merits. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in modifying the previously issued restraining order under the circumstances.
The final issue raised by the plaintiffs is that the trial court abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs' motion to amend their petition. Simply stated, the plaintiffs sought to enlarge the issues in the case in order to raise constitutional issues, certifying class status for the plaintiffs, and permitting the plaintiffs to have a jury trial to determine whether they were entitled to damages in excess of one million dollars. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to amend. This motion was made only one month prior to the set trial date and one week prior to the expiration of the discovery deadline. At that point, a period of ten months had elapsed since the case was filed in which there had been numerous preliminary hearings, discovery, and pretrial conferences. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court.
We wish to emphasize, however, that this holding does not preclude the plaintiffs from seeking relief from the district court at some future time. As noted above, the city, in granting the special use permit for the landfill, conditioned the granting of the permit on stated conditions precedent and conditions subsequent in order to protect the rights of the landowners. If those requirements are not properly complied with or if the plaintiffs, as adjacent landowners, are subjected to intolerable conditions on the landfill property which would constitute a nuisance, then the plaintiffs may seek appropriate relief in the district court.
*588 For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.