Case Title: Ocello v. Koster

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC91563

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2011-11-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
 
 
MICHAEL OCELLO, et al., 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Appellants,  
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC91563 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
CHRIS KOSTER, in his official  
 
) 
capacity as Missouri Attorney  
 
) 
General, 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Respondent.  
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cole County 
The Honorable Jon E. Beetem, Judge 
 
Opinion issued November 15, 2011 
 
Michael Ocello, Passions Video Inc., Genova’s Chestnut Lounge Inc., and certain 
other Missouri residents and businesses (collectively “the businesses”) appeal the circuit 
court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings against them in their challenge to the validity 
of sections 573.525 to 573.540, RSMo Supp. 20101 (“the Act”), which regulate sexually 
oriented businesses in Missouri. They argue that the limitations contained in these 
statutes concerning touching of dancers by patrons, buffer zones around dancers, the 
banning of nudity in their establishments, alcohol and hours restrictions, and 
                                             
 
1 Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory references are to RSMo Supp. 
2010. 
requirements that booths for viewing books and films be open to view violate their 
freedom of speech as protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.  
They also assert that, prior to the Act’s adoption, the General Assembly violated an 
aspect of section 23.140, RSMo 2000, regarding a bill’s fiscal note and that this violation 
voids the Act. 
For the reasons set forth below, this Court finds that the restrictions are not 
content-based limitations on speech but rather are aimed at limiting the negative 
secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses on the health, welfare and safety of 
Missouri residents.  Applying the intermediate level of review that City of Los Angeles v. 
Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 437-39 (2002) (plurality opinion), states is 
appropriate for use in such cases, this Court finds that the statutes are reasonable time, 
place and manner or comparable restrictions and that the legislature relied on evidence it 
“reasonably believed to be relevant” to establish a connection between the statutory 
provisions under attack and the suppression of negative secondary effects of sexually 
oriented businesses.  Accordingly, the Act does not unconstitutionally limit speech.  This 
Court also rejects the argument that any failure to follow statutory procedures governing 
preparation of a fiscal note amounts to a failure to follow the Missouri Constitution and 
thereby voids the legislation.  The Missouri Constitution does not require fiscal notes or 
address how they should be prepared.  The judgment is affirmed. 
I. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Sections 573.525 to 573.540 (the “Act”), adopted by the Missouri legislature in 
2010, regulates certain aspects of sexually oriented businesses by: (1) banning nude 
dancing in public; (2) requiring that semi-nude dancers not touch or come within six feet 
of customers; (3) prohibiting alcohol in sexually oriented businesses; (4) requiring 
sexually oriented businesses to close between midnight and 6 a.m.; and (5) requiring 
viewing booths in sexually oriented businesses to be visible from a central operating 
station.   
Before the legislature passed the Act, legislative committees heard extensive 
testimony and received reports and other evidence from police officers, health officials, 
dancers, and concerned citizens and business owners related to the connection between 
sexually oriented businesses and a variety of detrimental secondary effects, including 
crimes such as prostitution and drug use, health and sanitation problems, and decreased 
property values.  
In addition, the legislature heard from experts such as Dr. Richard McCleary, a 
professor of social ecology at the University of California-Irvine.  Dr. McCleary testified 
that based on his extensive research – much of which, including numerous scientific 
studies, was provided to the legislature – sexually oriented businesses increase crime, 
drug use and other negative effects. 
The legislature also reviewed dozens of judicial opinions as well as studies 
conducted by municipalities and states around the country concerning problems 
associated with sexually oriented businesses, including increased crime inside and 
outside those establishments, unsanitary and unhealthy conditions inside the 
establishments, and the deleterious effect of such businesses on property values and 
neighborhoods. 
 
3
The legislature also considered evidence offered by opponents of the legislation.  
This included: (1) testimony from police officers and business owners who believed that 
sexually oriented businesses did not cause crime, blight or other negative secondary 
effects in their neighborhoods; (2) the testimony of Dr. Daniel G. Linz, a professor of 
communication, law and society at the University of California-Santa Barbara, who 
disputed the validity of many of the studies relied upon by proponents of the legislation; 
and (3) studies stating there is little correlation between sexually oriented businesses and 
crime and other negative secondary effects in the surrounding communities. 
After holding these hearings, the legislature adopted the Act.  On August 10, 2010, 
shortly before the effective date of the Act, the businesses filed a two-count petition in 
the Cole County circuit court challenging its validity.  In Count I, the businesses claim 
that the Act is void because the General Assembly failed to hold a hearing regarding the 
accuracy of a fiscal note assessing the expected cost of the Act as required by section 
23.140 and article III, section 35 of the Missouri Constitution.  In Count II, the businesses 
claim that the Act restricts sexually oriented speech in violation of the First Amendment 
to the United States Constitution because the evidence that the General Assembly relied 
on to show that sexually oriented businesses cause negative secondary effects was 
constitutionally inadequate.   
The State filed an answer in which it denied that the Act is unconstitutional or that 
the manner of its adoption was improper or rendered it void.  It attached to its answer and 
incorporated by reference the legislative record upon which the Act was adopted, 
including the judicial opinions, crime, health and land use studies and reports, expert 
 
4
testimony, and anecdotal evidence offered by both proponents and opponents of the 
legislation.  It then filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the General 
Assembly followed proper legislative procedures in passing the Act, that any deviations 
did not affect the validity of the legislation, and that the General Assembly reasonably 
had relied on evidence establishing a connection between sexually oriented businesses 
and negative secondary effects.  The State’s motion was granted as to both counts.2  The 
businesses appeal.  Because they challenge the constitutional validity of section 23.140, 
appeal is directly to this Court.  Mo. Const. art. V, § 3.  
II. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews the constitutional validity of a statute de novo.  In re Brasch, 
332 S.W.3d 115, 119 (Mo. banc 2011).  A statute is presumed valid, and the Court will 
uphold it unless it “clearly and undoubtedly” conflicts with the constitution.  Prokopf v. 
Whaley, 592 S.W.2d 819, 824 (Mo. banc 1980).  This Court “resolve[s] all doubt in favor 
of the [statute’s] validity.” Westin Crown Plaza Hotel Co. v. King, 664 S.W.2d 2, 5 (Mo. 
banc 1984). 
 
In reviewing grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, this Court must 
decide “whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the face of 
the pleadings.” RGB2, Inc. v. Chestnut Plaza, Inc., 103 S.W.3d 420, 424 (Mo. App. 2003).  
This Court will not “blindly accept the legal conclusions drawn by the pleaders from the 
facts.”  Westcott v. City of Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990).  “The well-
                                             
 
2 Judgment was granted as to Count I regarding the fiscal note in November 2010 and, as 
to Count II regarding the alleged First Amendment violation, in January 2011. 
 
5
pleaded facts of the non-moving party’s pleading are treated as admitted for purposes of 
the motion.” Eaton v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 224 S.W.3d 596, 599 (Mo. banc 2007).  Exhibits 
attached to the pleadings are incorporated therein and will be considered in determining 
whether judgment on the pleadings should have been granted.  Rule 55.12. 
III. 
FAILURE TO HOLD A FISCAL NOTE HEARING DID NOT INVALIDATE 
THE ACT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The businesses first challenge the process by which the Missouri General 
Assembly adopted the Act.  The businesses’ argument is grounded on article III, section 
35 of the Missouri Constitution, which states in pertinent part: 
There shall be a permanent joint committee on legislative research, selected 
by and from the members of each house as provided by law. … The 
committee shall meet when necessary to perform the duties, advisory to the 
general assembly, assigned to it by law. 
 
(emphasis added).   
The businesses focus the Court’s attention on the requirement of article III, section 
35 that the joint committee on legislative research (the “Committee”) “shall meet when 
necessary to perform the duties, advisory to the general assembly, assigned to it by law.” 
Mo. Const. art. III, § 35 (emphasis added). They argue that because the constitution 
requires the creation of the Committee, any failure to properly and fully carry out duties 
assigned to the Committee by the legislature constitutes a failure to fulfill a constitutional 
duty and, necessarily, voids any legislation so passed.   
The businesses suggest that this argument has particular application here.  They 
note that section 23.140 requires that “[l]egislation, with the exception of appropriation 
bills, introduced into either house of the General Assembly shall, before being acted 
 
6
upon, be submitted to the oversight division of the committee on legislative research for 
the preparation of a fiscal note,” § 23.140.1, and that, once prepared, a fiscal note must 
“accompany [a] bill throughout its course of passage.”  § 23.140.3.  It is undisputed for 
purposes of this appeal that initial preparation of the fiscal note was procedurally proper. 
Section 23.140 also states that a legislator may challenge or seek to amend the 
contents of a fiscal note by so indicating “in writing … to the chairman of the legislative 
research committee and a hearing before the committee or subcommittee shall be granted 
as soon as possible.”  § 23.140.3.  It is uncontested that a legislator wrote a letter to the 
chairman of the Committee requesting a hearing related to the Act’s fiscal note but that 
no hearing was held.  The businesses argue that this was a deviation from the provisions 
of section 23.140.3, and that this deviation constituted an inherent violation of article III, 
section 35 of the constitution, because holding hearings is one of the duties “assigned to 
[the Committee] by law” pursuant to article III, section 35.  The businesses argue that the 
Act, therefore, is unconstitutional and void. 
The businesses’ argument fails.  Article III, section 35 of the constitution merely 
requires that the Committee be formed, that it meet and that it perform an advisory role to 
the General Assembly.  The constitution itself does not set out any specific requirements 
for the Committee, require hearings or establish any specific duties for the Committee.  
And, importantly here, article III, section 35 does not require preparation of fiscal notes, 
nor does it mandate hearings related thereto. 
 
7
Of course the legislature has established, in section 23.140, requirements for 
writing fiscal notes and has set forth methods for challenging and amending them.  But 
the Committee “has only the power granted it by the constitutional provision that creates 
it.”  Thompson v. Comm. on Legislative Research, 932 S.W.2d 392, 395 (Mo. banc 1996).  
The General Assembly cannot increase the authority of the Committee beyond the 
powers set forth in the constitution.  Id.  Article III, section 35 does not state that the 
legislature must follow the advice of the Committee or that the Committee’s failure to 
correctly carry out its duties as to a particular piece of legislation voids that legislation.  
The constitution says that the Committee is merely advisory to the General Assembly; 
therefore, the legislature would not have the authority to give the Committee effective 
veto power over legislation merely by failing to hold a particular hearing.  “To hold 
otherwise would permit the legislature to amend the constitution with a statute.”  
Thompson, 932 S.W.2d at 395. 
Nor has the legislature attempted to give the Committee such veto power here.  
While section 23.140 sets out duties the Committee shall perform, it contains no penalty 
for non-compliance and says nothing about the effect of failing to follow the procedures 
outlined therein.  Neither does it purport to give the Committee power to delay or quash 
otherwise validly enacted legislation should the Committee fail to fulfill each of its 
assigned duties completely or timely.  The absence of such provisions does not preclude 
finding that the provision is mandatory when other circumstances and rules of 
construction so indicate, see, e.g., State v. Teer, 275 S.W.3d 258, 261 (Mo. banc 2009), 
but in the absence of such circumstances the lack of sanctions for failure to comply has 
 
8
been found to mean that the provision is directory only,  see, e.g., State v. Parkinson, 80 
S.W.3d 70, 76 (Mo. banc 2009); State v. Tisius, 92 S.W.3d 751, 770 (Mo. banc 2002); 
Farmers & Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 896 S.W.2d 30, 32-33 (Mo. 
banc 1995). 
The businesses submit that while the statute here does not provide a sanction for 
failure to follow it, it should nonetheless be held mandatory because it involves a failure 
by the General Assembly to follow applicable procedural rules when enacting a statute.  
They argue that, in such a case, the resulting statute is constitutionally defective and, 
therefore, void, even in the absence of a specifically codified penalty, citing 
Hammerschmidt v. Boone Cnty., 877 S.W.2d 98 (Mo. banc 1994). 
Reliance on Hammerschmidt is misplaced.  The Court there deemed a bill void 
after finding a violation of a constitutional requirement, contained in article III, section 
23, that no bill shall contain more than one subject.  Id. at 104-05.  By contrast, article III, 
section 35 does not require a fiscal note, much less does it set forth any procedural 
requirements related to the fiscal note process.  Neither does the constitution elsewhere 
provide that a failure to follow procedural requirements in passing legislation 
automatically shall void any bill so enacted.3 
                                             
 
3 Indeed, article III, section 30 of the constitution provides, in relevant part: 
No bill shall become a law until it is signed by the presiding officer of each 
house in open session, who first shall suspend all other business, declare 
that the bill shall now be read and that if no objection be made he will sign 
the same.  If in either house any member shall object in writing to the 
signing of a bill, the objection shall be noted in the journal and annexed to 
the bill to be considered by the governor in connection therewith. 
 
9
 
In sum, the constitution merely requires that the Committee be established, that it 
meet and that it undertake an advisory role to the General Assembly.  Neither article III, 
section 35 nor section 23.140 require this Court to invalidate the Act on the basis of a 
procedural error in regard to the fiscal note for the bill in question.  
IV. 
THE ACT IS CONTENT-NEUTRAL AND SUBJECT TO INTERMEDIATE 
RATHER THAN STRICT SCRUTINY 
 
 
The businesses also allege that the Act is a content-based restriction on speech 
subject to strict scrutiny because the purpose of the Act is the suppression of sexually 
oriented speech.  Alternatively, the businesses argue that even were the purpose of the 
Act not to limit speech, it fails to pass intermediate scrutiny because its provisions reduce 
protected speech and do not serve the substantial government interest in reducing the 
negative secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses.   
In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), the United States 
Supreme Court held that the level of scrutiny used to determine whether restrictions on 
sexually oriented speech are constitutional depends on whether the statutory provisions at 
issue are considered content-based or content-neutral.  Id. at 46-48.  If restrictions on 
sexually oriented speech are content-neutral, they will be reviewed under an intermediate 
scrutiny standard.  Id.   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
By so providing, the constitution offers members of the General Assembly a mechanism 
by which to challenge perceived violations such as the Committee’s failure to hold a 
fiscal note hearing and to ensure that the governor is made aware of the objection prior to 
enactment of the legislation.  In this case, the record demonstrates that no such objection 
was lodged.  This Court is not called on to address whether other remedies also may be 
constitutionally permissible.  
 
10
Under an intermediate scrutiny standard, legislation is examined to determine 
whether: (1) it is aimed at the negative secondary effects associated with the restricted 
activity and not the content of the restricted speech; (2) it is a time, place and manner 
restriction and not a total ban on speech; and (3) it is designed to serve a substantial 
government interest and leaves open alternative avenues of communication.  Renton, 475 
U.S. at 50. 
A. The Act is Content Neutral and Aimed at Negative Secondary Effects of Speech  
 
Legislation that is focused on reducing the secondary effects of sexually oriented 
businesses long has been considered “content-neutral.”  This is because, although the 
legislation nominally looks at the content of the speech in the sense that it is aimed at 
sexually oriented conduct, it is nevertheless “content-neutral” if the “‘predominate 
concerns’ motivating [it] ‘[are] with the secondary effects [caused by the speech], and not 
with the content of [the speech].’” Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 440-41 (plurality 
opinion), quoting, Renton, 475 U.S. at 47.4   
By contrast, content-based restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny.  Id. at 434.  An 
example of a content-based law would be legislation prohibiting sexually oriented speech 
                                             
 
4 Justice Kennedy’s Alameda Books concurrence explains that calling restrictions on 
sexually oriented speech content-neutral is a legal fiction because such restrictions clearly 
target speech based on content; they simply do so for the permissible purpose of 
regulating the secondary effects of the speech rather than the speech itself.  525 U.S. at 
448-49 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  While believing the “content-neutral” label thus was a 
misnomer, he agrees with the plurality that intermediate scrutiny, as defined in Renton 
and United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968), is still the proper standard of 
review because the restrictions are justified based on the secondary effects caused by the 
speech not the content of the speech itself.  Id.  For ease of understanding this opinion 
 
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based on a desire to suppress the speech itself.  Renton, 475 U.S. at 46-48.  Under strict 
scrutiny, legislation is presumptively invalid and will be declared unconstitutional unless 
it is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.” Pleasant Grove City 
v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009).   
This Court applies these principles here to determine whether the Act is subject to 
intermediate or strict scrutiny.  The express purpose of the Act is set out in its preamble: 
[T]o regulate sexually oriented businesses in order to promote the health, 
safety, and general welfare of the citizens of this state, and to establish 
reasonable and uniform regulations to prevent the deleterious secondary 
effects of sexually oriented businesses within the state. The provisions of 
sections 573.525 to 573.537 have neither the purpose nor effect of 
imposing a limitation or restriction on the content or reasonable access to 
any communicative materials, including sexually oriented materials. 
Similarly, it is neither the intent nor effect of sections 573.525 to 573.537 to 
restrict or deny access by adults to sexually oriented materials protected by 
the [F]irst [A]mendment, or to deny access by the distributors and 
exhibitors of sexually oriented entertainment to their intended market. 
Neither is it the intent nor effect of sections 573.525 to 573.537 to condone 
or legitimize the distribution of obscene material. 
 
§ 573.525.1 (emphasis added).   
In keeping with these stated purposes, the Act does not ban sexually oriented 
businesses of any type.  Rather, it seeks to reduce negative secondary effects associated 
with such businesses, including detrimental health and sanitary conditions, prostitution 
and drug-related crimes both inside and outside these locations, as well as deterioration of 
the surrounding neighborhoods, by prohibiting nude dancing in public; requiring no 
contact and a six-foot buffer between dancers and patrons; banning alcohol in and 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
continues to call such time, place and manner restrictions on sexually oriented speech 
“content-neutral.” 
 
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restricting the operating hours of sexually oriented businesses; and banning the use of 
closed booths for viewing sexually oriented films or books.   
The preamble to the Act also states that the General Assembly found that:   
 
Sexually oriented businesses, as a category of commercial enterprises, are 
associated with a wide variety of adverse secondary effects, including but not 
limited to personal and property crimes, prostitution, potential spread of disease, 
lewdness, public indecency, obscenity, illicit drug use and drug trafficking, 
negative impacts on surrounding properties, urban blight, litter, and sexual assault 
and exploitation. 
 
§ 573.525.2(1).  For these reasons, section 2(3) of the preamble continues by stating that 
the General Assembly also finds that: 
 
Each of the foregoing negative secondary effects constitutes a harm which 
the state has a substantial interest in preventing or abating, or both.  Such 
substantial government interest in preventing secondary effects, which is 
the state’s rationale for sections 573.525 to 573.537, exists independent of 
any comparative analysis between sexually oriented and nonsexually 
oriented businesses.   Additionally, the state’s interest in regulating sexually 
oriented businesses extends to preventing future secondary effects of 
current or future sexually oriented businesses that may locate in the state. 
  
§ 573.525.2(3).  The Act states that its purpose is to provide “content-neutral” time, place 
and manner or comparable restrictions on sexually oriented businesses so as to limit their 
secondary effects; therefore, it is subject to intermediate rather than strict scrutiny. 
The businesses assert, however, that the second of the three sentences of section 
2(3) of the Act’s preamble, just quoted, reveals that the true purpose of the Act is not to 
regulate but rather to suppress sexually oriented speech.  That sentence states that the 
government’s “substantial interest in suppressing the secondary effects [associated with 
sexually-oriented businesses], which is the state’s rationale for sections 573.525 to 
573.537, exists independent of any comparative analysis between sexually oriented and 
 
13
nonsexually oriented businesses.” § 573.525.2(3).  The businesses argue that this is an 
admission that the Act is intended to suppress sexually oriented speech.   
  
The businesses misread the above sentence.  It does not state that the legislature 
adopts the Act regardless of whether it will reduce secondary effects.  The sentence is in 
a series of paragraphs in which the legislature specifically finds that sexually oriented 
businesses do have negative secondary effects, in which it lists such effects, and in which 
it says the purpose of the enactment is to reduce such secondary effects.  
In the sentence in question, the legislature makes clear that the State’s substantial 
interest in reducing these secondary effects is sufficient to support the legislation.  In so 
doing, it rejects the position of opponents of the legislation that to regulate sexually 
oriented businesses it must show that such businesses have more substantial secondary 
effects than do other businesses.  Regardless of whether other businesses also have 
secondary effects, the legislature said, it found that negative secondary effects are 
associated with sexually oriented businesses and a desire to reduce those effects is the 
basis for this legislation. 
This determination was within the General Assembly’s legislative prerogative.  A 
legislature is free to and does regulate all sorts of businesses through all sorts of health 
and safety laws.  Indeed, such laws take up many chapters of the Missouri statutes.5  The 
legislature is not required to undertake comparative studies before enacting such laws.  
To the contrary, it is well-settled that a legislative body may choose which evil to 
                                             
 
5 See, e.g., chapter 311, Liquor Control Laws; chapter 292, Health and Safety of 
Employees; chapter 196, Food, Drugs, and Tobacco; chapter 572, Gambling.      
 
14
regulate first and “need not strike at all evils at the same time or in the same way.”  
Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 610 (1935).  In large part 
for this reason, numerous cases have recognized that the fact that other, less-regulated 
businesses may also have negative secondary effects does not make regulating sexually 
oriented businesses “arbitrary, discriminatory, or unreasonable.” Peek-A-Boo Lounge of 
Bradenton, Inc. v. Manatee Cnty., No. 8:05-CV-1707, 2009 WL 4349319, *6 (M.D. Fla. 
Nov. 25, 2009), aff’d 630 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 2011); accord, Flanigan’s Enterprises, 
Inc. v. Fulton Cnty., 596 F.3d 1265, 1281 (11th Cir. 2010).  This Court agrees. 
The businesses also argue that certain statements of a member of the General 
Assembly disparaging sexually-oriented businesses demonstrate the legislature’s intent to 
suppress sexually oriented speech.  This contention ignores the well-settled principle that 
“[a court] will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an 
alleged illicit legislative motive. … What motivates one legislator to make a speech about 
a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are 
sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork.”  United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 
384 (1968).  Therefore, assuming one member of the General Assembly sought to 
suppress sexually oriented speech based on its content, that motive cannot be imputed to 
the legislature.   
For the foregoing reasons, the Act properly is reviewed as a content-neutral 
restriction on speech; therefore, it is subject to intermediate scrutiny.   
B. 
Test for Determining Whether the Act Places Reasonable Time, Place 
and Manner Restrictions on Speech  
  
 
15
Having determined that the legislative restrictions on sexually oriented businesses 
in question are aimed at the negative secondary effects associated with sexually oriented 
activity rather than on restricting the speech itself, this Court turns to whether the 
restrictions meet the other two requirements of Renton, 475 U.S. at 46-48, by determining 
whether they constitute time, place and manner restrictions rather than a total ban on 
protected speech and whether they are designed to serve a substantial government interest 
and leave open alternative avenues of communication. 
The restrictions that the businesses ask this Court to strike down are: (1) a no-
contact requirement; (2) a six-foot buffer requirement; (3) a ban on nude dancing in 
public; (4) an alcohol ban; (5) an hours-of-operation restriction; and (6) an open-booth 
requirement.  See § 573.531.  
These restrictions, except for the nudity ban, are all on their face time, place and 
manner restrictions.6  While the nudity ban bars nudity entirely, for reasons discussed 
further below, the United States Supreme Court has held that bans on nudity are to be 
examined under the same evidentiary standard as that applied to time, place and manner 
restrictions.  City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 297 (2000).  Therefore, the validity 
of all of these restrictions will rise or fall based on whether the government has 
reasonably relied on evidence establishing the restrictions are designed to serve a 
substantial government interest. 
 The United States Supreme Court clarified the method for determining whether 
restrictions on sexually oriented businesses meet this standard in Alameda Books, 535 
 
16
U.S. at 437-39 (plurality opinion).  The government has the initial burden of showing that 
it relied on “evidence that is ‘reasonably believed to be relevant’ for demonstrating a 
connection between speech and a substantial, independent government interest.”  Id. at 
438, quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52.  Little evidence is required to meet this initial 
burden.  Id. at 451 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  The evidence does not need to be directly 
related to the government’s rationale as long as it “fairly supports” the rationale.  
Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438-39 (plurality opinion).  Furthermore, the government 
“need not ‘conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already 
generated by [other government entities]’ to demonstrate the problem of secondary 
effects, ‘so long as whatever evidence the [government] relies upon is reasonably 
believed to be relevant to the problem that the [government] addresses.’”  Pap’s A.M., 
529 U.S. at 296-97, quoting, Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52.  If the government finds it is 
reasonable to rely on prior judicial opinions that uphold similar restrictions and those 
opinions fairly support its enactments, that is sufficient to meet this standard.  Id.   
In addition, in reviewing the government’s evidence, courts must show deference 
to the legislature’s superior knowledge of the negative secondary effects caused by 
sexually oriented businesses.  Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 451-52 (plurality opinion) 
(“[t]he Los Angeles City Council knows the streets of Los Angeles better than we do.  It 
is entitled to rely on that knowledge; and if its inferences appear reasonable, we should 
not say there is no basis for its conclusion”).  Finally, although the initial burden is slight 
and the government’s findings are entitled to deference, the government cannot rely on 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
6 Further, the businesses do not allege that the restrictions are a total ban on speech. 
 
17
“shoddy 
data 
or 
reasoning” 
to 
satisfy 
its 
burden. 
 
Id. 
at 
437-39.  
  
If the government meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the challenger to 
“cast direct doubt on [the government’s] rationale, either [1] by demonstrating that the 
[government’s] evidence does not support its rationale or [2] by furnishing evidence that 
disputes the [government’s] factual findings.”  Id. (emphasis added).  This type of direct 
doubt must be cast on every rationale the government used to justify its restrictions.  
SOB, Inc. v. Cnty. of Benton, 317 F.3d 856, 863 (8th Cir. 2003); World Wide Video of 
Washington, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 368 F.3d 1186, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004).   
This is a heavy burden.  To understand it better, it is helpful to understand what 
the test does not require and what evidence is not sufficient to meet the challenger’s 
burden.  It is not the usual burden-shifting test used by courts to determine which side 
will prevail under a preponderance of the evidence test.  This is because the issue for 
First Amendment purposes is not whether a court would find the challenger’s evidence 
on this issue more persuasive than that relied on by the legislature.  The government has 
to show only that the legislature relied on evidence “reasonably believed to be relevant” 
to establish a connection between its restrictions and the suppression of negative 
secondary effects.  Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 437-39 (plurality opinion).   
In determining whether the government has made such a showing, neither this 
Court nor any court has the right to reweigh the evidence relied on by the legislature.  
G.M. Enterprises, Inc. v. Town of St. Joseph, 350 F.3d 631, 639-40 (7th Cir. 2003).  The 
court will not look to see whether the challenger has shown an issue of fact exists as to 
whether the statute’s provisions will limit secondary effects.  To the contrary, the 
 
18
question is whether the challenger has cast direct doubt on the government’s rationale – 
here the prevention of secondary effects – either by demonstrating that the evidence does 
not support its rationale that the restrictions will limit secondary effects or by 
demonstrating that, while it appears to do so, the evidence is faulty and does not in fact 
support the legislature’s factual findings.  Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 437-39 (plurality 
opinion).  To meet this burden, challengers cannot simply make conclusory generalized 
allegations in their pleadings that the restrictions are invalid or are aimed at speech.  They 
must discredit all rationales offered.  Unsystematic or anecdotal evidence, or evidence 
that merely attacks one type of evidence (such as a lack of controlled studies), would not 
be enough to cast direct doubt on the government’s evidence.  Richland Bookmart, Inc. v. 
Knox Cnty, 555 F.3d 512, 527-28 (6th Cir. 2009).   
 If the challenger fails to cast direct doubt on the government’s evidence, the 
intermediate scrutiny test of Renton and Alameda Books is satisfied and the government 
will have established that the legislation is designed to serve a substantial government 
interest.  Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438-39 (plurality opinion).  In such cases, there is 
no need for an evidentiary hearing such as the businesses say was required here.  Only if 
the challenger succeeds in casting direct doubt on the government’s evidence in either 
manner described above does “the burden shift[] back to the [government] to supplement 
the record with evidence renewing support for a theory that justifies its ordinance.”  Id. at 
439.   
The Court thus turns to the issues of whether the government met its initial burden 
and whether the challenger businesses cast direct doubt on the government’s rationale. 
 
19
 C. 
Reliance by Legislature on Evidence Reasonably Believed to be Relevant 
The legislature based its adoption of the provisions now under attack on evidence 
introduced at legislative hearings.  At those hearings, proponents and opponents of the 
legislation presented voluminous evidence supporting their disparate positions.  The State 
attached to and incorporated in its pleadings the full legislative record of evidence offered 
both by those supporting and opposing adoption of the Act.  That evidentiary record 
included: (1) judicial opinions; (2) crime, land use and health impact reports; (3) expert 
testimony; and (4) anecdotal evidence.  All of this evidence was appropriately before the 
trial court for consideration in determining whether the government met its initial burden 
and whether the challengers undercut it.  Rule 55.12; Gould v. Missouri State Bd. of 
Registration for Healing Arts, 841 S.W.2d 288, 290 (Mo. App. 1992).   
This Court has reviewed this evidence (as well as additional evidence offered in 
the trial court below), in determining whether the government met its burden of showing 
that the legislature relied on evidence “reasonably believed to be relevant” to reducing 
negative secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses in enacting the provisions now 
challenged and whether the businesses have cast direct doubt on the government’s 
evidence so as to preclude the entry of judgment on the pleadings.7   
                                             
 
7 The businesses did not attach any evidence to their initial petition; however, they did 
attach additional evidence to motions submitted to the trial court.  Although this evidence 
was included in the appellate record, the parties disagree as to whether the evidence was 
properly before the trial court and included in the record.  See Castle v. Castle, 642 
S.W.2d 709, 711 (Mo. App. 1982).  Because this Court finds that consideration of the 
evidence offered by the businesses in the trial court does not change this Court’s 
resolution of the issues before it, this Court need not resolve the parties’ disagreement as 
to whether this evidence was properly before the trial court. 
 
20
In so doing, this Court looks at the evidence supporting and casting direct doubt 
on the particular provisions under attack, rather than taking the challengers’ invitation to 
determine simply whether this Court believes that the challengers have shown that there 
may be equal or better ways to regulate secondary effects in general.  This follows from 
the fact, noted above, that a challenger of a statute regulating sexually oriented businesses 
must cast direct doubt on every rationale the government used to justify each separate 
challenged provision.  SOB, Inc., 317 F.3d at 863; World Wide Video, 368 F.3d at 1196.   
Here, the legislature believed that the approaches it adopted would assist the State 
in ameliorating the negative secondary effects caused by sexually oriented businesses 
including, “personal and property crimes, prostitution, potential spread of disease, 
lewdness, public indecency, obscenity, illicit drug use and drug trafficking, negative 
impacts on surrounding properties, urban blight, litter, and sexual assault and 
exploitation.”  § 573.525.2(1).  Therefore, this Court will look at each restriction and 
determine whether the legislature reasonably relied on evidence establishing a connection 
between the restriction and one or more of these negative secondary effects. 
1. 
The challengers failed to cast direct doubt on evidence the 
legislature reasonably relied on regarding negative secondary 
effects of the open-booth, no-touch and six-foot buffer restrictions. 
 
 
  The government relied on a number of types of evidence to support the 
provisions of the Act requiring open booths and establishing a requirement that patrons 
not touch or come within six feet of the dancers.8  This evidence included a study from 
                                             
 
8 Section 573.531  states in regard to these restrictions: 
 
 
21
                                                                                                                                                 
 
No employee shall knowingly or intentionally, in a sexually oriented 
business, appear in a semi-nude condition unless the employee, while semi-
nude, shall be and remain on a fixed stage at least six feet from all patrons 
and at least eighteen inches from the floor in a room of at least six hundred 
square feet. 
 
No employee, who appears in a semi-nude condition in a sexually oriented 
business, shall knowingly or intentionally touch a patron or the clothing of 
a patron in a sexually oriented business. 
 
A sexually oriented business, which exhibits on the premises, through any 
mechanical or electronic image-producing device, a film, video cassette, 
digital video disc, or other video reproduction, characterized by an 
emphasis on the display of specified sexual activities or specified 
anatomical areas shall comply with the following requirements: 
 
(1) The interior of the premises shall be configured in such a manner that 
there is an unobstructed view from an operator’s station of every area of the 
premises, including the interior of each viewing room but excluding 
restrooms, to which any patron is permitted access for any purpose; 
 
(2) An operator’s station shall not exceed thirty-two square feet of floor 
area; 
 
(3) If the premises has two or more operator’s stations designated, the 
interior of the premises shall be configured in such a manner that there is an 
unobstructed view of each area of the premises to which any patron is 
permitted access for any purpose from at least one of the operator’s 
stations; 
 
(4) The view required under this subsection shall be by direct line of sight 
from the operator’s station; 
 
(5) It is the duty of the operator to ensure that at least one employee is on 
duty and situated in an operator’s station at all times that any patron is on 
the portion of the premises monitored by such operator station; and 
 
(6) It shall be the duty of the operator and of any employees present on the 
premises to ensure that the view area specified in this subsection remains 
unobstructed by any doors, curtains, walls, merchandise, display racks, or 
other materials or enclosures at all times that any patron is present on the 
premises. 
 
22
Tucson, Arizona, documenting the unsanitary conditions in closed booths.  The Tucson 
study found that of the dozens of samples collected from closed booths in ten different 
sexually oriented businesses more than 88 percent contained semen.  The government 
also relied on testimony from health department officials in Missouri describing the 
health problems associated with sexually oriented businesses.  Among other issues, the 
officials discussed that people infected with sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV, 
frequent sexually oriented businesses, and often engage in anonymous and unprotected 
sex.   
In addition to studies and testimony, the government relied on judicial opinions, 
including Bamon Corp. v. Dayton 923 F.2d 470, 473 (6th Cir. 1991), and DLS, Inc. v. 
City of Chattanooga, 107 F.3d 403, 410-11 (6th Cir. 1997).  These opinions found, based 
on testimony from police officers and other government officials, that closed booths and 
touching or close proximity between dancers and patrons led to unsanitary conditions and 
the spread of disease.  
The United States Supreme Court has held that in meeting its initial evidentiary 
burden a legislature may reasonably rely on studies, anecdotal evidence and judicial 
opinions of the type relied on by the Missouri legislature in adopting restrictions on 
sexually oriented businesses.  Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 434-39 (plurality opinion); 
Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 296-97.  This is true regardless of whether, as here, some of the 
evidence concerned other locations and other statutes in other states. The legislature 
“need not ‘conduct new studies or produce evidence independent of that already 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
 
 
23
generated by [other government entities]’ to demonstrate the problem of secondary 
effects, ‘so long as whatever evidence the [government] relies upon is reasonably 
believed to be relevant to the problem that the [government] addresses.’”  Id., quoting 
Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52.  As a result, this Court finds the State met its initial burden 
and the burden shifted to the businesses to cast direct doubt on the government’s 
evidence about closed booths, no-touch policies and buffer zones.   
To support their challenge to the Act generally, the businesses principally relied 
on Dr. Linz.  Dr. Linz’s testimony and studies concerned whether the legislature had 
chosen the best method of attacking negative secondary effects, and argued that the 
alleged deleterious effects of sexually oriented businesses on crime and property values 
are overblown or unsupported, and that such businesses cause no more crime in 
surrounding areas than do various other types of businesses.9  But, even had the 
legislature given credit to Dr. Linz’s views, the evidence in support of its open-booth, 
buffer zone and no-touching requirements was equally based on evidence that such 
restrictions would improve sanitation and health within sexually oriented businesses and 
reduce opportunities for prostitution and other crimes in those businesses.  Dr. Linz’s 
views and studies about crime and property values in surrounding areas were not directed 
toward these issues and could not and did not cast direct doubt on the government’s 
evidence related to health concerns.  
The businesses also offered various affidavits from dancers and business owners. 
While some of this anecdotal evidence provided alternative views as to whether sexually 
 
24
oriented businesses present health or safety concerns, they simply offered an alternative 
viewpoint that at best would have supported an alternative conclusion.  As set out above, 
that is not enough.  The businesses needed to cast direct doubt on all of the legislature’s 
rationales for adopting these provisions.  See SOB, Inc., 317 F.3d at 863.  Their evidence 
largely failed to address, much less cast direct doubt on, the government’s rationale for 
believing that there were health and safety issues that could reasonably be ameliorated by 
the open-booth, no-touch and six-foot buffer provisions of the Act.  As a result, the 
challengers failed to meet their burden of proof of casting “direct doubt” to shift the 
burden of proof back to the government.  Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 437-40.  The trial 
court did not err in granting judgment on the pleadings as to these provisions. 
2. 
The nudity ban is valid under the evidentiary standard from Renton 
and Alameda Books. 
 
The nudity ban, unlike the others provisions in the Act at issue on this appeal, is a 
restriction on expressive conduct in the form of a total ban on nudity in sexually oriented 
businesses rather than a time, place or manner restriction on such nudity.10  The United 
States Supreme Court held in O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, that such a restriction on 
expressive conduct is valid if: “[1] it is within the constitutional power of the 
[g]overnment; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if 
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the 
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
9 Dr. Linz’s testimony and studies are discussed thoroughly below in section IV.B.3.  
10 The nudity ban states, “No person shall knowingly or intentionally, in a sexually 
oriented business, appear in a state of nudity.” § 573.531.3. 
 
25
to the furtherance of that interest.”   
Thereafter, in 1986, the Supreme Court in Renton adopted a slightly different test, 
for time, place and manner restrictions. As described above, that test, as modified by 
Alameda Books, requires the government to show initially that the legislature reasonably 
relied on evidence that the legislative restrictions would serve the substantial government 
interest in suppressing the negative secondary effects caused by sexually oriented 
businesses.  Alameda Books, 525 U.S. at 437-39 (plurality opinion).  If the government 
meets this requirement, the burden then shifts to the challengers and, unless they can cast 
direct doubt on the government’s evidence, the evidentiary standard from Renton is met.   
Id. 
In Ward v. Rock Against Racism 491 U.S. 781 (1989), the Supreme Court held that 
because both tests focus on whether the legislation furthers an important governmental 
interest, the O’Brien test “in the last analysis is little, if any, different from the standard 
applied to time, place, or manner restrictions.”  Ward, 491 U.S. at 797-98, quoting Clark 
v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984).  Then, in Pap’s A.M., 529 
U.S. at 296-97, the Supreme Court held that because of the similarities between the tests, 
the evidentiary test from Renton controls in the case of nudity bans, as it does in the case 
of time, place and manner restrictions.  Accord, Peek-A-Boo Lounge, 630 F.3d at 1354-
55.  As a result, this Court will apply the evidentiary standard from Renton to the nudity 
ban in this case.  
In the present case, the legislature principally relied on Supreme Court decisions, 
as well as numerous federal courts of appeals decisions, upholding nudity bans similar to 
 
26
the one at issue in this case, including Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 289-90.  In Pap’s A.M., 
the Supreme Court ruled that nude dancing is a form of expressive conduct, but that it 
“falls only within the outer ambit of the First Amendment’s protection.”  529 U.S. at 289.  
Therefore, while a public nudity ban “has some minimal effect on the erotic message by 
muting that portion of the expression that occurs when the last stitch is dropped, 
[dancers] are free to perform wearing pasties and G-strings [and] [a]ny effect on the 
overall expression is de minimis.”  Id. at 294.   
The Supreme Court went on to uphold the ban.  To support its judgment, it relied 
almost entirely on citations to its prior opinions in Renton, Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, 
Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), and California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972), which found a 
connection between sexually oriented businesses and negative secondary effects.  Pap’s 
A.M., 529 U.S. at 296-97.  Pap’s A.M. also credited the city of Erie’s reliance on its city 
council’s first-hand knowledge of the negative secondary effects associated with nude 
dancing in public.  Id. at 297-98.  The Court found it inconsequential that Renton and 
American Mini Theatres dealt with zoning ordinances rather than a nudity ban, holding 
that “it was reasonable for Erie to conclude that …  nude dancing was likely to produce 
the same secondary effects.  And Erie could reasonably rely on the evidentiary foundation 
set forth in Renton and American Mini Theatres.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
Other cases decided by the Supreme Court and numerous federal courts of appeals 
similarly have affirmed nudity bans in reliance on Pap’s A.M. and the cases it cited.  See, 
e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); Daytona Grand Inc. v. City of 
Daytona Beach, 490 F.3d 860, 873-76 (11th Cir. 2007); Peek-A-Boo Lounge, 630 F.3d at 
 
27
1355-56.  This makes sense, for once the Supreme Court has determined that a nudity ban 
is a reasonable exercise of government authority in this area, it would be pointless to 
require governments to relitigate this issue in individual cases.  See Alameda Books, 535 
U.S. at 451-53 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
The legislature also reviewed anecdotal evidence describing the health concerns 
related to nude dancing.  For instance, the legislature heard from a former dancer who 
explained that dancers constantly rub against stripper poles and lay on the floor and that 
performing these actions while completely nude leaves their bodies exposed to bacteria, 
contributing to the spread of disease.  This testimony may have caused particular concern 
in light of a report from Jefferson County, Missouri, in which a health worker discussed 
the high and increasing incidence of hepatitis, a virus that often is spread through contact 
with the body fluids of others.    
As the analysis above shows, in enacting the nudity ban, the legislature relied on 
precedent from the Supreme Court and numerous United States courts of appeals as well 
as anecdotal evidence describing the health concerns related to nude dancing.  The 
businesses did not offer any evidence casting direct doubt on Pap’s A.M. or any of the 
other cases relied on by the State, nor did they cast doubt on the government’s anecdotal 
evidence concerning the health problems associated with nude dancing.  As a result, the 
businesses failed to meet their burden of casting direct doubt on the government’s 
evidence; therefore, the trial court properly granted judgment on the pleadings as to this 
statutory provision. 
 
 
28
3. 
Ban on Alcohol Use and Restriction on Hours of Operation. 
 
The government relied on a variety of evidentiary sources to justify the alcohol 
ban and hours-of-operation restrictions on sexually oriented businesses,11 including 
numerous United States courts of appeals opinions upholding both alcohol bans and 
hours restrictions.  For example, in Ben’s Bar, Inc. v. Village of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702 
(7th Cir. 2003), the challenger claimed that the government did not meet its evidentiary 
burden because it failed to provide reports showing that serving alcohol aggravated the 
secondary effects associated with sexually oriented businesses.  Id. at 724-26.  The 
Seventh Circuit relied on LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, in rejecting the challenger’s claim.12  
LaRue found that it was reasonable for the government to conclude that alcohol and 
erotic dancing should not be combined.  Id. at 118.  Ben’s Bar explained that the 
government reasonably could rely on LaRue in determining that “barroom nude dancing 
was likely to produce adverse secondary effects at the local level, even in the absence of 
specific studies on the matter.”  316 F.3d at 725-26.   
                                             
 
11 The restrictions state, “No operator shall allow or permit a sexually oriented business 
to be or remain open between the hours of 12:00 midnight and 6:00 a.m. on any day.  No 
person shall knowingly or intentionally sell, use, or consume alcoholic beverages on the 
premises of a sexually oriented business.”  §§ 573.531.8-9.   
12 Although LaRue upheld the liquor ban using a rational basis analysis, a later Supreme 
Court case dealing with restrictions on advertising alcohol, 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode 
Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996), referenced American Mini Theatres and Barnes, which dealt 
with adult entertainment restrictions analyzed under intermediate scrutiny. Numerous 
United States courts of appeals cases have held that Liqourmart’s reference to the earlier 
cases “makes clear that the [Supreme] Court is of the opinion that adult entertainment 
liquor regulations, like the ones at issue in LaRue, will pass constitutional muster even 
under the heightened intermediate scrutiny tests outlined in [American Mini Theatres and 
Barnes].”  Ben’s Bar, 316 F.3d at 712-713; Giovani Carandola Ltd. v. Bason, 303 F.3d 
507, 513 n.2 (4th Cir. 2002).    
 
29
The legislature also relied on Schultz v. City of Cumberland, 228 F.3d 831 (7th 
Cir. 2000), to support its hours-of-operation restriction.  Schultz upheld a far more 
restrictive provision requiring sexually oriented business to close between midnight and 
10 a.m. Monday through Saturday and all day Sunday.  Id. at 846.  The Seventh Circuit 
held that the restriction was valid because the government reasonably relied on secondary 
effects studies showing a connection between sexually oriented businesses and crime as 
well as legislative research suggesting that operating sexually oriented businesses at night 
strained the limited overnight resources of the local police.  Schultz, 228 F.3d at 846; see 
also Flanigan’s, 596 F.3d 1265 (upholding alcohol ban); BZAPS, Inc. v. City of Mankato, 
268 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 2001) (same); Andy’s Restaurant & Lounge, Inc. v. City of Gary, 
466 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 2006) (upholding hours restriction); Sensations, Inc. v. City of 
Grand Rapids, 526 F.3d 291 (6th Cir. 2008) (same).   
As with the nudity ban, in deciding to enact its alcohol and hours-of-operation 
limitations, the legislature was entitled to and did rely on prior cases finding alcohol and 
late hours of operation are associated with negative secondary effects.   
The legislature also relied on extensive anecdotal evidence of conditions inside 
sexually oriented businesses that the legislature could find would be improved by its 
restrictions. In addition to the evidence already noted, this included evidence from the 
firsthand experiences of dozens of strippers and former strippers who recounted the drug 
use, prostitution and sexual abuse they frequently faced inside of sexually oriented 
businesses.  For instance, strippers described how men grabbed their breasts, buttocks 
and genitals in the sexually oriented businesses and how some of their bosses would force 
 
30
them to engage in prostitution with the customers.     
The businesses did nothing to challenge the government’s reliance on the above 
cases and anecdotal evidence.  Accordingly, it stands unchallenged.   
Instead, the businesses attacked the government’s additional reliance on dozens of 
studies showing a connection between sexually oriented businesses and increased crime 
and lower property values.  Some of these studies also found that alcohol and late-night 
operating hours contributed to these negative secondary effects.  For instance, a study 
from Dallas, Texas, found that operating late at night contributed to the crime risk by 
encouraging loitering, which attracted prostitutes.  In another study, conducted by the 
American Center for Law and Justice, researchers found that alcohol service increased 
the negative secondary effects associated with sexually oriented businesses. The 
government also relied on expert testimony from Dr. McCleary, who found that 
criminological theory predicted alcohol would increase crime at sexually oriented 
businesses by lowering patrons’ inhibitions, thereby making them more susceptible to 
predatory criminals.   
The businesses sought to cast direct doubt on this evidence in a number of ways.  
First, they submitted affidavits from Missouri residents, and even from a former agent of 
the Missouri Division of Alcohol and Tobacco Control, recounting their beliefs that 
sexually oriented businesses do not cause harmful secondary effects. In addition, they 
offered affidavits from other dancers, sexually oriented business owners and neighboring 
residents, who said they believed that sexually oriented businesses provide high-paying, 
stable jobs and help maintain well-kept safe communities.   
 
31
The legislature was free to rely on the businesses’ anecdotal evidence in deciding 
whether to adopt one or more of the proposed restrictions on sexually oriented 
businesses, but it found the contrary evidence more persuasive.  This it was entitled to do.  
As the Sixth Circuit noted in Richland Bookmart, simply offering conflicting anecdotal 
evidence cannot meet the challenger’s burden of casting direct doubt on the government’s 
evidence because such evidence “suggests merely that the [legislature] ‘could have 
reached a different conclusion during its legislative process’ with regard to the need to 
regulate … sexually oriented businesses.”  555 F.3d at 527-28, quoting, Daytona Grand, 
490 F.3d at 881. “[E]vidence suggesting that a different conclusion is also reasonable 
does not prove that the [legislature’s findings] were impermissible or its rationale 
unsustainable.”  Id.  This is because the government “does not bear the burden of 
providing evidence that rules out every theory … that is inconsistent with its own.”  
Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 437 (plurality opinion).  It merely has to show that it relied 
on evidence “reasonably believed to be relevant” to establishing a connection between 
the Act and the suppression of negative secondary effects.  Id. at 437-38.   
The businesses also relied on testimony, studies and an affidavit from Dr. Linz to 
try to cast direct doubt on the government’s evidence about the need to ban alcohol in and 
restrict the hours of sexually oriented businesses.  Dr. Linz claimed that many of the 
studies were not scientifically sound because they were not based on empirical studies 
comparing the incidence of crime and the change in property values between areas with 
sexually oriented businesses and areas with other types of late-night businesses.  He 
believes that such empirical studies are necessary to get a true picture of the effect of 
 
32
sexually oriented businesses, and he says that his studies show that other businesses cause 
at least as much crime and lowering of property values as do sexually oriented 
businesses.  Similarly, Dr. Linz also argues that, while the studies relied on by the State 
do show a correlation between sexually oriented businesses and crime and reduced 
property values in the areas surrounding sexually oriented businesses, the correlation is 
not significant and it is unclear that sexually oriented businesses caused these negative 
effects because the studies used improper control groups, limited measuring times and 
non-random surveys.  Basically, he argues that the studies did not meet the standards 
required of controlled scientific studies. 
While it is evident that Dr. Linz would require such empirical and controlled 
studies before adopting statutory provisions similar to those in the Act, the legislature 
made it clear in the very sentence discussed in section IV.A. above that it rejected Dr. 
Linz’s belief that such comparative studies are necessary, stating: 
[the government’s] substantial interest in suppressing the secondary effects 
[associated with sexually oriented businesses], which is the state’s rationale 
for sections 573.525 to 573.537, exists independent of any comparative 
analysis between sexually oriented and nonsexually oriented businesses.  
 
§ 573.525.2(3).  This the legislature was free to do, for the United States Supreme Court 
itself has stated that such empirical or scientific studies are simply unnecessary.  It 
rejected a similar suggestion that empirical evidence that a particular approach will work 
must be offered before the legislature may enact restrictions on sexually oriented 
businesses, stating “[the dissent] asks the [government] to demonstrate, not merely by 
appeal to common sense, but also with empirical data, that its ordinance will successfully 
 
33
[reduce secondary effects].  Our cases have never required [the government] to make 
such a showing ….”  Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 439-40 (plurality opinion) (emphasis 
added).   
The Supreme Court’s refusal to require empirical studies follows from its belief 
that the government should be given a “reasonable opportunity to experiment with 
solutions” to the problems caused by sexually oriented businesses.  Renton, 475 U.S. at 
52.  Such experimentation is not possible if the government first must study empirical 
data and make controlled comparisons before it can even undertake the experiment.  
Therefore, the Supreme Court has held that it is reasonable for a legislature to enact a 
statute that is supported merely “by appeal to common sense.”  The government does not 
need to conclusively prove that its restrictions will reduce negative secondary effects, but 
only that the evidence “fairly supports” the rationale for the legislation.  Alameda Books, 
535 U.S. at 437-40 (plurality opinion).   
The Eleventh Circuit relied on these principles in Peek-A-Boo Lounge.  It found 
insufficient the challenger’s criticisms of the government’s studies based on allegedly 
inadequate control groups, sample sizes, length of data study and lack of empirical data, 
stating that the government is not precluded from relying on studies that do not use the 
scientific method.  Peek-A-Boo Lounge, 630 F.3d at 1359.   
In addition to criticizing the government’s studies, Dr. Linz also presented his own 
studies that he believed affirmatively showed little or no correlation between sexually 
oriented businesses and increased crime.  While the legislature was free to accept this 
evidence, the fact that Dr. Linz so firmly believes it to be true does not mean the 
 
34
legislature also must accept it.  For instance, Dr. McClearly noted that many of Dr. Linz’s 
studies just measure the number of 911 calls originating from different areas and 
conclude that sexually oriented businesses did not cause an increase in such calls.  The 
crimes caused by sexually oriented businesses, however, are often so-called victimless 
crimes such as prostitution and drug dealing.  These crimes rarely are reported because 
there is no “victim” to report the crime.  See Daytona Beach, 490 F.3d at 882-83 
(questioning experts’ studies that relied on 911 call data because “many crimes do not 
result in calls to 911 … especially … for crimes, such as lewdness and prostitution”).  
Therefore, a lack of additional 911 calls would not necessarily mean such “victimless” 
crimes were not occurring, particularly in the face of the substantial anecdotal evidence 
and other studies mentioned earlier showing there was such a connection.   
To the extent that Dr. Linz’s studies and criticisms were valid, they at best show 
that the legislature could have reached a different conclusion about the connection 
between sexually oriented businesses and crime and property values. As repeatedly 
noted, however, this is not sufficient to cast direct doubt on the government’s evidence 
because “evidence suggesting that a different conclusion [about the relationship between 
the government’s restriction and negative secondary effects] is also reasonable does not 
prove that the [government’s] findings were impermissible or its rationale unsustainable.”  
Richland Bookmart, 555 F.3d at 527-28.   
This principle has particular application here, for Dr. Linz’s criticisms and studies 
addressed only his belief that sexually oriented businesses do not lead to greater 
neighborhood crime or to a loss of property value.  His evidence did not address and so 
 
35
did not cast direct doubt on the legislature’s adoption of such measures to attack crime, 
health, prostitution and drug issues within the businesses themselves based on the prior 
cases, anecdotal reports and specific studies relied on by the legislature.  The trial court 
did not err in granting judgment on the pleadings as to the alcohol and hours-of-operation 
restrictions. 
 
4. 
Proportionality Test  
Finally, the businesses argue that even if the government met its evidentiary 
burden under Renton and Alameda Books, the Act is nevertheless unconstitutional under 
the proportionality test established by Justice Kennedy’s controlling concurrence in 
Alameda Books.13  
The proportionality test arose from Justice Kennedy’s concern that the plurality’s 
analysis in Alameda Books did “not address how speech will fare under the [statute].”  
535 U.S. at 449-50 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justice Kennedy explained that the 
government is not permitted to reduce secondary effects by the simple expedient of 
reducing the amount of protected speech that occurs, even though it may be logical to 
assume that fewer sexually oriented businesses will mean fewer customers and so fewer 
secondary effects.  Id.  Therefore, courts should look to whether the statutes in question 
leave “the quantity and accessibility of speech substantially intact.”  Id.   
The businesses claim that the Act violates this principle because its restrictions 
                                             
 
13 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence provided the crucial fifth vote in Alameda Books, and 
because it was the narrowest opinion, it is controlling under United States v. Marks, 430 
U.S. 188 (1976).  Ctr. for Fair Pub. Policy v. Maricopa Cnty., 336 F.3d 1153, 1161 (9th 
Cir. 2003).   
 
36
have caused sexually oriented businesses’ revenue to decline, forcing many to close, 
thereby substantially reducing the quantity of sexually oriented speech.  The businesses’ 
overread Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion.  He did not state that the government 
could not adopt any statute that reduced patronage of sexually oriented businesses or 
affected their income.  He said that a legislature could not adopt statutes that were 
effective in reducing secondary effects only because they reduced the opportunities for 
speech, such as by barring more than a certain number of businesses from locating in a 
community without there being alternative locations for such speech.  For this reason, 
some courts have questioned whether Justice Kennedy’s proportionality test has any 
logical application at all where, as here, the restrictions at issue do not relate to zoning 
but instead pertain to the clothing and activities within the business itself.  See, e.g., 
Fantasy Ranch, Inc. v. City of Arlington, 459 F.3d 546, 562 (5th Cir. 2006); Ctr. for Fair 
Pub. Policy v. Maricopa Cnty., 336 F.3d 1153, 1162 (9th Cir. 2003).   
In any event, even if applicable, it is evident that Justice Kennedy’s concern was 
with protecting opportunities to engage in the protected aspects of speech at issue in 
sexually oriented businesses, not with protection of the economic interests of adult 
businesses in and of themselves by permitting unprotected conduct to occur at the 
location of the expressive speech.   
Indeed, at least since Renton, the Supreme Court has held that the “economic 
impact” of a statute regulating sexually oriented businesses is not relevant in determining 
whether the statute is valid under the First Amendment.  475 U.S. at 54, quoting Young, 
427 U.S. at 78 (Powell, J., concurring). The proportionality test does not affect this 
 
37
principle.  Its concern is not with the economic impact of a statute but rather any intrinsic 
limitations on speech embodied in the statute.  Spokane Arcade, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 
75 F.3d 663, 667 (9th Cir. 1996); Ben’s Bar, 316 F.3d at 726-27 (upholding alcohol ban 
even though many businesses would not be viable without the ability to serve alcohol).   
In this case, the restrictions in question reduce negative secondary effects while 
“leaving the quantity and quality of speech substantially intact.”  Alameda Books, 535 
U.S. at 449-50 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  The only restrictions that place intrinsic 
limitations on speech are the nudity ban and the hours-of-operation restriction.  As 
previously noted, the Supreme Court has specifically stated that even if a nudity ban “has 
some minimal effect on the erotic message by muting that portion of the expression that 
occurs when the last stitch is dropped, [dancers] are free to perform wearing pasties and 
G-strings [and] [a]ny effect on the overall expression is de minimis.” Pap’s A.M., 529 
U.S. at 294.  This statement makes clear that the Supreme Court believes that nudity bans 
reduce negative secondary effects while placing a minimal burden on speech.  The nudity 
ban at issue in this case is valid under the proportionality test.     
Based on the evidence discussed above, the legislature reasonably determined that 
the overnight hours are a particularly troublesome time for sexually oriented businesses 
to operate; so, closing the businesses at night should substantially reduce negative 
secondary effects.  Forcing sexually oriented businesses to close overnight, however, will 
not substantially reduce the quantity and availability of sexually oriented speech because 
such businesses still will have an ample amount of time, 18 hours a day, to convey their 
erotic message.  84 Video/Newsstand, Inc. v. Sartini, No. 09-3920, 2011 WL 3904097, at 
 
38
*13 (6th Cir. Sept. 7, 2011) (finding a midnight to 6 a.m. hours restriction left open 
ample time to convey sexually-oriented speech when the secondary effects are less 
severe).  Because the hours-of-operation restriction, like the nudity ban, only places a 
minimal burden on protected speech it is valid under Justice Kennedy’s proportionality 
analysis.     
    The other restrictions in the Act place no intrinsic limitations on protected 
speech but instead restrict opportunities for conduct that does not receive First 
Amendment protection.  Challengers concede there is no First Amendment right to touch 
or sit within a few feet of erotic dancers, to read books and watch movies in a closed 
booth, or to drink alcohol throughout the night while so doing.  Instead the protected First 
Amendment right is to dance expressively, to read books and to view videos.  The 
legislation does not restrict the right to engage in these protected activities directly, and 
its hours and nudity restrictions are minimal and reasonable for the reasons noted above.  
It simply prohibits such illegal and unsanitary conduct as touching dancers, sexual 
conduct with or without clothes, and use of closed booths for masturbation or for sex 
between those in adjoining booths.   
As such, to the extent that the no-touch, six-foot buffer, alcohol ban and open-
booth restrictions reduce patronage at sexually oriented businesses, it is not because the 
restrictions unduly reduce speech but because they reduce the very types of secondary 
effects that the government is entitled to and intends to reduce.  That this reduction in 
secondary effects may make these businesses less appealing to some of their former 
patrons is not the result of the government restricting free speech but simply 
 
39
demonstrates that it was not speech that drew those customers to the establishments. 
Protecting the economic security of these establishments by allowing its customers 
to engage in non-speech related activities is not protected by the First Amendment and 
the unprotected activities are subject to reasonable government restrictions of the type at 
issue here.  The Act places only minimal restrictions on speech and does not 
disproportionately limit speech.      
V. 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the Supreme Court stated, it is not the judiciary’s “function to appraise the 
wisdom of [the government’s] decision to [regulate] adult theaters” or other adult 
businesses based on such evidence.  Renton, 475 U.S. at 52.  Instead the question is 
limited to (1) whether the government reasonably relied on evidence fairly supporting its 
rationale for regulating sexually oriented businesses; and (2) whether the challenger 
succeeded in casting direct doubt on the government’s evidence. 
In the present case, the government reasonably relied on a plethora of evidence. 
While the businesses attacked and sought to undermine some of this evidence, they failed 
to cast direct doubt on other evidence or on the government’s rationale of trying to limit 
the negative secondary effects within the establishments themselves.  For these reasons, 
this Court finds that the government presented at least some evidence to support the 
legislature’s reasonable belief that the restrictions in question are designed to serve the 
substantial government interest in minimizing the negative secondary effects caused by 
sexually oriented businesses.  Under the test set out by the United States Supreme Court 
in Renton and Alameda Books, this is sufficient to justify the legislation.  As such, the 
 
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Act does not violate article III of the Missouri Constitution or the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
___________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   LAURA DENVIR STITH, JUDGE 
 
Teitelman, C.J., Russell, Breckenridge, Fischer 
and Price, JJ., and Francis, Sp.J., concur.  Draper, 
J., not participating.