Case Title: James v. IRRIGATION MOTOR AND PUMP COMPANY, INC.

Citation: 503 P.2d 1025

Docket Number: C-199

State: colorado

Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Date: 1972-12-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
503 P.2d 1025 (1972) Alan JAMES, Industrial Commission of Colorado and The Director of The Industrial Commission of Colorado, Petitioners, v. IRRIGATION MOTOR AND PUMP COMPANY, INC., and Aetna Insurance Company, Respondents. No. C-199. Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc. December 4, 1972. Rehearing Denied December 26, 1972. *1026 Doty, Johnson & Summers, Bruce R. Johnson, Boulder, for petitioner, Alan James. Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., John P. Moore, Deputy Atty. Gen., Peter L. Dye, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for Industrial Commission of Colorado and The Director of the Industrial Commission of Colorado. Duane O. Littell, Peter F. Jones, Denver, for respondents, Irrigation Motor and Pump Co., and Aetna Ins. Co. KELLEY, Justice. This is a Workmen's Compensation case which is here for review of a judgment of the Court of Appeals, 30 Colo.App. 289, 494 P.2d 144. Our review is limited "to a summary review of questions of law." 1969 Perm.Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 81-14-17. The claimant, Alan James, is a petitioner here, together with the Industrial Commission of Colorado and the Director of the Industrial Commission. Irrigation Motor and Pump Company, Inc., the employer, and Aetna Insurance Company, the insurer, are the respondents. As stated by the Court of Appeals in its opinion, The Court of Appeals, relying upon its application of the statute of limitations, agreed with the assertion of the employer and the insurer and reversed the Industrial Commission order reopening the case for consideration of permanent injuries. We disagree with the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reverse. The statute of limitations provides: The critical facts show that claimant received a compensable injury to his eye on April 1, 1964; that the accident report was timely filed; that on May 7, 1964, Aetna filed a general admission of liability for compensation "at $40 per week beginning April 9, 1964 and continuing during disability;" also, "for such permanent disability as may hereafter be determined to exist"; that Aetna, on the same day, filed a "Notice of First Payment of Compensation" in the amount of $22.85, being compensation for the period from April 9, 1964, to April 13, 1964; that Aetna paid the doctor bills; that on December 10, 1969, an operation to remove a cataract from claimant's injured eye was performed; and that on March 2, 1970, claimant notified the Industrial Commission of the operation, advising that it was necessitated by the April 1, 1964 industrial accident. *1027 In his letter claimant asked for advice on, On March 27, 1970, still within the six-year period, claimant filed a petition furnished by the Commission, the prayer of which asks, and that the matter be set for further hearing. The employer and the insurer objected to claimant's petition to reopen on the ground that the petition "is not supported by any medical report." The Director of the Division of Labor on April 10, 1970, entered an order denying the petition to reopen. No petition to review this order was filed. Although a detailed operative report from the claimant's doctor accompanied the March 27, 1970 petition to reopen, it did not "set forth the disability in terms of a percentage." It was on the basis of this technicality that the April 10 order was entered. Subsequently, on June, 1970, petitioner filed a second petition to reopen. The employer again answered, relying on the statute of limitations, stating that, Chronologically, we should note at this point that the respondent-insurer filed with the Commission on June 3, 1970, its "final receipt," showing the payment of $22.85 as payment in full of compensation and the payment of $338.00 in medical payments. However, this document was not signed by either the injured employee or by the insurer and in the factual context of these proceedings it would have no legal effect. The critical order of July 10, 1970, revoking the order of April 10, 1970, followed. A memorandum from the Supervising Referee to the Director of the Division of Labor dated July 2, 1970, is of sufficient import to record here. It read: The preamble to the order of July 10, 1970, revoking the April 10, 1970 order, reads: The employer and the insurer then applied for review, claiming that the Director, in entering the July 10, 1970 order acted without and in excess of his power; abused his discretion; and that order was based upon speculation and was contrary to the facts and the law. The Commission denied the petition for review. After further proceedings the matter reached the Court of Appeals. We approach the solution to the problem presented, mindful that the Workmen's Compensation Act is to be liberally construed to effectuate its humanitarian purpose of assisting injured workers. Mascitelli v. Giuliano & Sons, 157 Colo. 240, 402 P.2d 192. Our basic concern is with the statute of limitations. It applies differently where no compensation has been paid than it does where compensation has been paid. In the former situation there is a flat six-year period of limitation from the date of the accident. Where compensation has been paid the Director may reopen "at any time within two years after the date last payment becomes due and payable or within six years from the date of accident, whichever is longer." There is nothing in the file to indicate the date the last payment became due and payable. The respondents filed notices of first payment of compensation and general admission of liability admitting that claimant sustained an eye injury in the course of his employment. The general admission of liability was approved by the then Industrial Commission on May 8, 1964, "subject to further claim according to law." There were no additional medical reports submitted nor did the respondents file a final receipt, compromise agreement or request that the file be closed. In short, so far as the files in the case disclosed, the matter was open and the insurer might still have been making payments. In any event, "the date last payment becomes due and payable" was not determinable from the files of the Commission. Since it was a compensable injury and compensation was paid, there necessarily must come a time when the last payment becomes due and payable in order for the statute to commence to run. The Court of Appeals, in striking down the claimant's argument that the Commission had continuing jurisdiction because the case remained open, cited Harlan v. Industrial Commission, 167 Colo. 413, 447 P.2d 1009, as dispositive of the issue. We disagree. That decision is distinguishable on the facts. In Harlan, both the Industrial Commission (fifteen months after the injury) and the Fund (seventeen and twenty-two months after the injury) informed the claimant that it considered the matter closed, and that if he felt otherwise, he should so notify the Commission. The claimant's failure to act, in any way whatsoever, for over seven years after the Fund's last communication with him, must be considered as implied acceptance of the closing of his case. Such inexcusable inaction is not present in the instant case. Under the circumstances here the claimant by his letter of March 2, 1970, and his formal petition to reopen, which was filed March 27, 1970, with a medical report showing a change in the condition of his eye, effectively tolled the statute of limitations before the lapse of six years from the accident (April 1, 1964). Mascitelli v. Giuliano, supra. This is true even assuming that the statute commenced to run on April 1, 1964. Consequently, the claimant does not need to rely on, nor do we need to consider, the question of when the last payment became due and payable. The order of April 10, 1970, was entered without hearing or notice thereof to the claimant. 1969 Perm.Supp., C.R.S. 1963, 81-14-19. It was therefore an invalid *1029 order. The Director had jurisdiction to correct the error by the order of July 10, 1970. Gregorich v. Industrial Commission, 117 Colo. 423, 188 P.2d 886. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court for further proceedings consonant with the views herein expressed. GROVES, J., concurs in the result. DAY and ERICKSON, JJ., not participating. GROVES, Justice (concurring in the result): Aetna filed a general admission for temporary disability and "for such permanent disability as may hereafter be determined to exist." There was no hearing concerning permanent disability and no award was made concerning it. While petitioner called his pleading a Petition to Reopen, in reality it was simply a petition for an award for permanent disability. The Commission should have acted on the subject for the first time. To me, reopening of the case or the running or tolling of the statute of limitations are not involved.