Case Title: Damiani-Melendez v. Delaware

Citation: 

Docket Number: 164, 2012

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2012-10-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
PABLO DAMIANI-MELENDEZ, 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  No. 164, 2012 
 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
 
Appellant,  
 
 
§  Court Below – Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  of the State of Delaware, 
 
v. 
 
 
 
 
§  in and for New Castle County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§  Cr. ID. No. 1012004307A 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
    Submitted:  September 19, 2012 
 
 
 
 
       Decided:  October 26, 2012 
 
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and JACOBS, Justices. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  AFFIRMED. 
 
 
Nicole M. Walker, Esquire and Bradley V. Manning, Esquire, Office 
of the Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant. 
 
 
Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., Esquire and Paul R. Wallace, Esquire, 
Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
HOLLAND, Justice: 
 
 
2 
 
The defendant-appellant, Pablo Melendez (“Melendez”),1 appeals 
from his convictions after a Superior Court jury trial stemming from 
numerous actual and attempted robberies.  Melendez was convicted of:  
eighteen counts of Robbery in the First Degree, thirty-three counts of 
Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, eleven counts 
of Wearing a Disguise, six counts of Conspiracy in the Second Degree, six 
counts of Aggravated Menacing, eight counts of Attempted Robbery in the 
First Degree, and one count of Reckless Endangering in the First Degree.   
In this appeal, Melendez claims that the trial judge erred by admitting 
“improper witness bolstering and needlessly cumulative evidence when, 
despite their lack of personal knowledge, [two] police [officers] were 
allowed to provide their own interpretations and opinions of what happened 
during the [crimes].”2  We have concluded that Melendez waived his claim 
by failing to raise it at trial.  Therefore, the judgments of the Superior Court 
must be affirmed. 
 
 
                                          
 
1 The appellant also uses the name “Pablo Damiani-Melendez.”  The State’s brief refers 
to the appellant as “Melendez.”  The appellant’s brief refers to the Appellant as 
“Damiani.”  The two names, “Melendez” and “Damiani,” in fact refer to the same person. 
2 Melendez also raises other claims, such as a “pro se issue, ineffective assistance of 
counsel, Illegal detention, [and] Illegal arrest,” in a letter that he sent to his attorney and 
filed with this Court.  To the extent that Melendez has not raised these claims in his brief, 
they are waived.  See Morgan v. State, 962 A.2d 248, 250 n.1 (Del. 2008) (noting that 
claims not briefed on appeal are waived). 
 
3 
 
Facts 
 
 
 
Over a three-month period during the fall of 2010, Melendez and his 
alleged co-conspirators either robbed or attempted to rob various retail stores 
in New Castle County.3  This string of robberies shared several similarities, 
e.g., the robbers all wore masks, gloves, and black clothing, and Melendez 
typically carried a shotgun.  In December 2010, the State Police observed 
Melendez entering and leaving a liquor store during a robbery of that store.  
The State Police then arrested Melendez and charged him with various 
felonies arising from the three-month string of twelve robberies and two 
attempted robberies. 
 
During Melendez’s September 2011 jury trial, the State presented the 
testimony of Chief Investigating Officer Daniel Grassi and Officer Gary 
Potts, who testified about all fourteen crimes.4  The officers based their 
testimony on videotapes and photographs of the robberies.  These videotapes  
 
 
                                          
 
3 Melendez’s alleged co-conspirators were not tried with Melendez at trial, and are thus 
not parties in this appeal.  
4  Although the officers testified about all fourteen crimes, Melendez claims that the 
officers gave their own allegedly improper “interpretations and opinions” with respect to 
only nine of the fourteen crimes.   
4 
 
and photographs, however, were not played for the jury for all nine crimes at 
issue here.5  Victims of the nine crimes also testified to similar facts.6   
 
Before the State called Officer Grassi as its first witness, Melendez’s 
counsel made the following statement for the record:  
[Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, briefly, while the jury’s out, 
we should probably put on the record—the prosecutor and I 
discussed this.  It is a little unusual. 
 
 
I have no objection to [the State] kind of allowing the 
CIO [Grassi] to give this overview of the case because, 
obviously, some of the things he’s saying are hearsay.  And in 
putting evidence in, my understanding is that the State, as the 
case progresses, is going to call all the actual witnesses who are 
going to testify to what he’s testifying to today.  So, that’s why 
I don’t have any objection to doing it in this manner.  
 
THE COURT: Okay. 
 
[Defense Counsel]:  With that understanding, obviously. 
 
[Prosecutrix for the State]: Yes, that was discussed between 
counsel, just to try to help the jury to have—I don’t know if it’s 
more confusing or—it’s in hopes of being helpful to the jury to 
sort of summarize. 
 
THE COURT: That’s fine. 
 
The record does not show that Melendez ever objected to the officers’ 
testimony during the remainder of the trial.  Multiple victims testified, and 
                                          
 
5 Specifically, Officer Potts testified about reviewing the videotape for only one of the 
fourteen crimes.  The record does not show that the videotape was ever shown to the jury.  
6  Although Melendez originally claims that victims only testified in eight crimes, he later 
concedes that a victim testified about the ninth crime as well.  
5 
 
the State introduced numerous exhibits of physical evidence linking 
Melendez to the crimes.   
No Trial Objection 
 
 
On appeal, Melendez now claims for the first time that Officers Grassi 
and Potts not only testified to “summar[ies]” of the fourteen crimes during 
the trial, but also provided their own impermissible “interpretations and 
opinions” with respect to nine of the fourteen crimes.  Melendez argues that 
the officers’ testimony improperly bolstered the videotapes, photographs, 
and victims’ testimony, thereby rendering the entire trial so “fundamentally 
unfair” that this Court must reverse all of his convictions.7 
 
A “[f]ailure to make an objection at trial constitutes a waiver of [a] 
defendant’s right to raise that issue on appeal, unless the error is plain.”8  
Plain error occurs when the error is “so clearly prejudicial to substantial 
rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process.”9  On 
plain error review, this Court may consider the claimed error even though 
the defendant failed to raise the issue in the court below.10 
                                          
 
7 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096 (Del. 1986). 
8 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986) (citation omitted); see Supr. Ct. 
R. 8. 
9 Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d at 1100.   
10 See D.R.E. 103(d).  
6 
 
 
It is undisputed that Melendez did not raise the issue of the 
admissibility of the officers’ testimony in the Superior Court.  Melendez 
argues that he “agreed only to the hearsay and narrative provided by 
Detective Grassi,” but “did not affirmatively waive any arguments with 
respect to the improper admission into evidence of Grassi’s personal 
opinions, speculation and bolstering.”  Melendez concedes elsewhere in his 
brief, however, that the “error [was] not challenged below.”  Thus, 
Melendez’s claim regarding both Officer Grassi’s and Potts’ testimony is 
waived absent plain error.   
No Plain Error 
 
Neither officer’s testimony constituted plain error for several reasons.  
First, as Chief Investigating Officer, Grassi did not provide cumulative 
testimony.  Rather, he was uniquely qualified to highlight similar facts that 
linked the fourteen crimes together.  For example, Officer Grassi testified 
that one of the suspects usually wore gray gloves during the robberies, and 
that the suspect holding the shotgun frequently wore red gloves.  Moreover, 
Melendez conceded at trial that he had no objection to Officer Grassi 
providing an “overview” of the case, so long as victims would later testify 
and corroborate Officer Grassi’s statements.  Melendez cannot now claim 
that Officer Grassi’s testimony is duplicative, when Melendez expressly 
7 
 
stated the opposite—that he had no objection to Officer Grassi’s allegedly 
duplicative testimony—at trial. 
 
Melendez did not make a similar concession at trial with regard to 
Officer Potts’ testimony.  Officer Potts’ testimony was based on a videotape 
that was not admitted into evidence at trial.  However, a victim later testified 
to the same facts.  In addition, Officer Potts’ brief testimony concerned only 
one of the fourteen crimes.  Therefore, even if the videotape on which 
Officer Potts’ testimony was based should have been admitted into evidence, 
the admission of Officer Potts’ testimony was not “clearly prejudicial” to 
Melendez’s rights.   
 
Finally, the record reflects that the State’s evidence against Melendez 
was overwhelming and not merely circumstantial.  The testimony of 
numerous victims, plus the physical evidence in Melendez’s possession that 
linked Melendez to the crimes were sufficient for the jury to determine 
Melendez’s guilt.   
Conclusion 
 
The judgments of the Superior Court are affirmed.