Case Title: Hoke v. Moyer

Citation: 

Docket Number: 93-46

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1993-12-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
Hoke v. Moyer1993 WY 160865 P.2d 624Case Number: 93-46, 93-54Decided: 12/21/1993Supreme Court of Wyoming
G. 
Bland HOKE, Jr., 

Appellant 
(Intervenor),

v.

Peter 
F. MOYER, 

Appellee 
(Petitioner),

v.

BOARD 
OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF TETON COUNTY, Wyoming, 

Appellee 
(Respondent).

 

BOARD 
OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF TETON COUNTY, Wyoming, 

Appellant 
(Respondent),

v.

Peter 
F. MOYER, Appellee (Petitioner), G. Bland Hoke, Jr. 
(Intervenor).

Appeal 
from the District Court, Teton County, D. Terry Rogers, 
J.

Henry 
C. Phibbs of Phibbs & Resor, and Marilyn S. Kite of Holland & Hart, 
Jackson, for Hoke.

Paul 
O. Vaughn, Teton Deputy Co. Atty., Jackson, for Board of County 
Com'rs.

Peter 
F. Moyer, pro se.

Before 
MACY, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, GOLDEN and TAYLOR, 
JJ.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1]      Appellee, Peter 
Moyer, sought judicial review of several decisions by the Teton County Board of 
Commissioners which affected the zoning density of real estate adjoining 
appellee's property and located in Teton County, Wyoming. The Board of County 
Commissioners and the potential developer of the affected property, Bland Hoke, 
appeal from a judgment of the Teton County District Court reversing the County 
Commissioners' decisions adopting the change in density recommended in the 
planner's "Memorandum of Decision" and approving the final subdivision 
plat.

[¶2]      We 
affirm.

[¶3]      Appellant, Teton 
County Board of Commissioners, raises these issues:

I. 
Whether the procedures followed and decision of the Commissioners of Teton 
County complied fully with the county's regulations.

II. 
Whether the county's regulations require notice and a public review of 
proceedings to correct an environmental mapping error.

III. 
Whether the correction of an environmental mapping error and removal of a zoning 
designation based on environmental constraints constitutes an "amendment" to the 
county's regulations.

IV. 
Whether the court may interpret the county's regulations to require notice and 
public review contrary to the regulations and the county's clear 
intentions.

V. 
Whether the county's procedure for correction of environmental mapping errors 
violates the enabling act.

VI. 
Whether the Administrative Procedure Act is applicable to the procedure for 
correction of environmental mapping errors.

VII. 
Whether the county's regulations regarding correction of environmental mapping 
errors meets constitutional due process requirements.

VIII. 
Whether the petitioner met his burden of proving the matters necessary in order 
to set aside the decision of the county.

IX. 
Whether the petitioner has standing as an aggrieved or adversely-affected party 
to obtain judicial review of the county's action.

X. 
Whether the decision of the district court is erroneous and should be 
reversed.

Appellant, 
Bland Hoke, fails to present a separate statement of the issues as required by 
W.R.A.P. 7.01(d) and 12.11(b). In previous cases where an appellant has 
neglected to include a statement of the issues, we have refused to consider the 
contentions of appellants. Cline v. Safeco Ins. Cos., 614 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Wyo. 
1980). However, the issues presented by the board comprehensively state the 
issues which concern Mr. Hoke.

[¶4]      Moyer presents 
the following issues:

a. 
Did the Teton County Commissioners comply with the Teton County Comprehensive 
Plan in re-zoning the applicable land?

b. 
Did the Teton County Commissioners comply with the State of Wyoming enabling 
statute in re-zoning the applicable land?

c. 
Did the Teton County Commissioners comply with the Wyoming Administrative 
Procedure Act in re-zoning the applicable land?

d. 
Did the Teton County Commissioners comply with due process requirements in 
re-zoning the applicable land?

e. 
Did the Teton County Commissioners comply with the Teton County Comprehensive 
Plan in permitting subdivision of the applicable land into 3 acre 
lots?

FACTS

[¶5]      The Teton County 
Board of County Commissioners (board) adopted and implemented the Teton County 
Comprehensive Plan (the plan), effective January 1, 1978. As part of the plan, 
the board adopted "Land Use and Development Regulations" which "depicts the 
locations, types and intensities of land uses that are consistent with the 
objectives of protecting the public health, safety, and welfare, and preventing 
water pollution and other types of environmental degradation." These land use 
regulations were adopted pursuant to W.S. 18-5-201 through -202 (1977) to 
protect "the public health, safety, and welfare and * * * Teton County's 
priceless environmental quality and scenic beauty," and to maintain and promote 
a healthy economy and the human environment.

[¶6]      Under these 
regulations, all the covered land is divided into "land use districts" according 
to the permissible type of use, e.g., residential/agricultural or commercial, 
and according to the permissible density, e.g., one unit or dwelling per six 
acres. Thus, if a "land use district" is designated RA-6, the property may only 
be used for residential or agricultural purposes and the maximum density allowed 
is one dwelling or unit per six acres. The boundaries of each "land use 
district" are depicted on "land use element maps" and, under the plan, these 
boundaries may be revised through two specific processes, which will be 
discussed later in this opinion. Placement of the boundaries is based on 
"environmental data maps" which contain information on geology, hydrology, 
groundwater and flood hazards.

[¶7]      On September 5, 
1990, appellant Bland Hoke (Hoke) published notification of his intent to file 
for a permit to subdivide 57 acres (John Dodge VII) into 17 lots averaging 3.4 
acres in size. At the same time, Hoke applied for a permit to subdivide. John 
Dodge VII is located adjacent to another subdivision (Wilderness Ranch Estates) 
where appellee Moyer owns a six-acre lot and lives with his family. At that 
time, the land use map designated the 57 acres of John Dodge VII as RA-6/3. 
RA-6/3 allows a maximum density of one dwelling per six acres unless it can be 
shown that the groundwater level will drop below three feet upon removal of 
irrigation. Hoke's subdivision permit application, however, stated that the 57 
acres of John Dodge VII were designated RA-3, which permitted a maximum density 
of one dwelling per three acres.

[¶8]      The record does 
not reflect, directly, why Hoke's subdivision permit application stated that 
John Dodge VII was RA-3 when the county land use map designated it as RA-6/3. 
However, a memorandum, prepared by the Teton County Administrator of Planning 
Services, John Bradley (county planner), provides some insight into the 
inconsistent land use designations. Evidently, these 57 acres of John Dodge VII 
were originally designated RA-6 but then changed to RA-6/3 in 1988 when the 
County adopted new flood maps. There is no record of the process used to 
accomplish this change. Then, between January 1989 and August 1990, two 
groundwater observations were made on the 57 acres of John Dodge VII: first, 
when utility ditches were excavated for the project; and second, when a 
landscape architect, hired by Hoke, excavated several test pits. Both of these 
observations revealed that the groundwater level was below three feet, which 
would permit a density of one dwelling per three acres. Based upon these 
observations, the county planner decided to revise the land use district 
boundaries so that the John Dodge VII acreage became RA-3. Hoke, as a county 
commissioner in addition to being the developer proposing to subdivide the John 
Dodge VII acreage, likely was aware that the county planner had decided to make 
the density change and thus designated the acreage as RA-3 in his subdivision 
permit application.

[¶9]      It was not until 
October 22, 1990, however, when the county planner drafted a "Memorandum of 
Decision" in which he stated that the John Dodge VII acreage should be 
designated RA-3 instead of RA-6/3, that the County attempted to revise the 
boundary. The county planner forwarded the "Memorandum of Decision" to appellee 
Moyer, who then objected to the memorandum in a letter dated October 31, 1990. 
During a board meeting on November 8, 1990, with Moyer present, the 
commissioners adopted the change in density as recommended by the county 
planner. Other than sending the memorandum to Moyer, there was no public notice 
given prior to the board's adoption of this density 
change.

[¶10]   On December 7, 1990, Moyer 
petitioned for judicial review in Teton County District Court of the board's 
decision to adopt the county planner's recommendation to revise the land use 
district boundary so that the John Dodge VII acreage became RA-3. In addition, 
on January 17, 1991, Moyer filed a petition for judicial review of the board's 
decision approving the John Dodge VII final subdivision plat; and on February 
13, 1991, he filed a petition for review of the board's decision approving the 
final plat signature for John Dodge VII. On June 5, 1991, the district court 
consolidated these three petitions. On January 29, 1993, the district court 
entered judgment in these consolidated appeals reversing, because of procedural 
infirmities, the board's decision which adopted the county planner's 
recommendation changing John Dodge VII to RA-3. Both the board and Hoke appeal 
from this judgment.

DISCUSSION

I. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶11]   Wyoming Statute 16-3-114(c) (1990) 
controls the scope of our review and provides:

     (c) To the extent 
necessary to make a decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall 
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory 
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency 
action. In making the following determinations, the court shall review the whole 
record or those parts of it cited by a party and due account shall be taken of 
the rule of prejudicial error. The reviewing court shall:

(i) 
Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; 
and

(ii) 
Hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to 
be:

(A) 
Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance 
with law,

(B) 
Contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege or 
immunity;

(C) 
In excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking 
statutory right;

(D) 
Without observance of procedure required by law; or

(E) 
Unsupported by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an 
agency hearing provided by statute.

II. 
STANDING

[¶12]   Although raised at the end of its 
brief, the board asserts that Moyer lacked standing - could not seek judicial 
review - because he failed to demonstrate that he was "aggrieved or adversely 
affected" by the board's decision to reassign John Dodge VII as RA-3. The 
question of who may obtain judicial review of agency actions in district court 
is controlled by W.S. 16-3-114(a) (1990), which provides:

     Subject to the 
requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted and in the absence of any 
statutory or common-law provision precluding or limiting judicial review, 
any person aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by a final decision of 
an agency in a contested case, or by other agency action or inaction, or 
any person affected in fact by a rule adopted by an agency, is entitled to 
judicial review in the district court for the county in which the administrative 
action or inaction was taken, or in which any real property affected by the 
administrative action or inaction is located, or if no real property is 
involved, in the district court for the county in which the party aggrieved or 
adversely affected by the administrative action or inaction resides or has its 
principal place of business. [emphasis added]

In 
other words, "a potential litigant must show injury or potential injury" by 
"alleg[ing] a perceptible, rather than a speculative, harm resulting from the 
agency action[.]" Foster's Inc. v. City of Laramie, 718 P.2d 868, 872 (Wyo. 
1986). In the context of zoning law, it has been stated 
that

[a]n 
aggrieved or adversely affected person having standing to sue is a person who 
has a legally recognizable interest that is or will be affected by the action of 
the zoning authority in question. An individual having standing must have a 
definite interest exceeding the general interest in community good shared in 
common with all citizens.

E.C. 
Yokley, 4 Zoning Law and Practice § 24-3 at 194 (4th ed. 1979) (footnote 
omitted).

[¶13]   The board argues that Moyer lacked 
standing before the district court because his pleadings did not allege "that he 
is aggrieved or adversely affected." There are no magic words which must be pled 
to establish standing; a party need not state "I am adversely affected or 
aggrieved because * * *." In his petition for review of the board's decision to 
adopt the county planner's recommendation, Moyer alleged that he and his family 
reside in a subdivision adjacent to the John Dodge VII acreage and that the 
effect of the board's decision will be to double the density previously 
permitted. Doubling the density of adjacent property raises a number of 
perceptible harms for a property owner which are different than the harm to the 
general public, such as increased traffic and congestion; therefore, Moyer was 
entitled to judicial review of the board's action by the district court and now 
by this court. 

III. 
PROCEDURAL CONCERNS

[¶14]   Procedural infirmities formed the 
basis of the district court's decision to reverse the board's adoption of RA-3 
for the John Dodge VII acreage. The district court concluded that the board's 
action violated regulatory and statutory procedural requirements. We will 
address each procedural category separately.

A. 
Regulatory Procedure

[¶15]   Under the plan, boundaries of land 
use districts can be revised for the "purpose of correcting an error or 
attaining greater accuracy" through a non-public process, or the land use 
district boundaries can be revised through a public process if the revision goes 
beyond "correcting an error or attaining greater 
accuracy."

[¶16]   The non-public process 
provides:

     Section 5. * * * In 
the event that the accuracy of the data shown on an environmental data map that 
would affect a boundary of a land use district is questioned, the land use 
district boundaries may be revised on the basis of a new authoritative data made 
available in accord with the following procedures.

     a. A notice of the 
purported discrepancy shall be filed with the Administrator of Planning 
Services.

     b. From a list of 
qualified specialists in the appropriate field established by the Board of 
County Commissioners, the property owner or developer may select and retain a 
person or firm to make an impartial technical investigation of the condition at 
issue. Alternately, a specialist or firm not on the official list may be 
selected, provided that the investigator's qualifications are approved in 
advance by the Board.

     c. If the investigator 
concludes that revision of the map or maps is justified, a report containing the 
specific technical information on which the conclusion is based, and showing the 
location of the revised boundary, shall be filed with the Administrator of 
Planning Services.

     d. If the 
Administrator of Planning Services determines that the report on the 
investigation is complete and meets the requirements of this section, the map or 
maps in question shall be revised to show the changes justified by the 
investigation. * * *

     e. If there is any 
question as to the completeness of the report or the validity of the information 
contained therein, the Board of County Commissioners shall be notified, and the 
map or maps shall not be revised unless the Board so orders following its review 
of the report on the investigation.

     f. A copy of the 
report on the investigation shall be placed in permanent files of the 
County.

     g. If the 
investigation justifies revision of the map or maps, the property owner or 
developers may be reimbursed by the County for the cost of the investigation up 
to an amount approved by the Board of County 
Commissioners.

     Nothing in this 
section shall be deemed to provide authority for any change or amendment of the 
boundary of any land use district or environmental protection district, or of 
any environmental data map, other than for the purpose of correcting an error or 
attaining greater accuracy.

[¶17]   Concerning compliance with this 
non-public procedure, the record reflects that, on February 10, 1989, the county 
engineer drafted a memo which recommended that certain property west of the 
Wilderness Estates Subdivision be mapped as having groundwater levels in the 
three- to five-foot range. Then, based on that memo, on October 22, 1990, the 
county planner drafted his "Memorandum of Decision" recommending that the John 
Dodge VII acreage be reassigned as RA-3. On October 31, 1990, Moyer, in writing, 
objected to the county planner's "Memorandum of Decision" reassigning John Dodge 
VII as RA-3. Finally, on November 8, 1990, the two memos from the county 
engineer and the county planner were presented to the board, which adopted the 
county planner's recommendation and authorized revision of district boundaries 
to show John Dodge VII as RA-3.

[¶18]   As Moyer suggests, the process 
which was followed did not comply with the non-public procedures required by the 
plan. There is no evidence of a notice of a purported boundary discrepancy as 
required by paragraph (a) of § 5, nor any evidence demonstrating how a qualified 
specialist was selected or if the specialist was qualified as required by 
paragraph (b) of § 5. Other than the brief memo by the county engineer, there 
appears to be no "report" containing specific technical information gathered 
through an impartial technical investigation as required by paragraph (c) of § 
5.

[¶19]   The board argues that the 
non-public process outlined in the plan for revising boundaries is "automatic 
and self-effectuating" and that no formal written notice need be given to the 
county planner, and instead suggests that the county planner can simply take 
notice of a discrepancy. Whether or not the county planner can notify himself of 
a purported discrepancy is unclear, although subsection (b) of the process 
clearly contemplates that the process will be started by either a developer or a 
property owner. What is clear, however, is that subsection (a) requires that 
notice of the discrepancy be filed with the county planner, and there is no 
evidence of that occurring.

[¶20]   Hoke asserts that the revision of 
boundaries of land use districts is mandatory once an environmental mapping 
error is established. The plain language of the plan says otherwise. The first 
paragraph of the regulatory procedure states: "In the event that the accuracy of 
the data shown on an environmental data map that would affect a boundary of a 
land use district is questioned, the land use district boundaries may be revised 
on the basis of a new authoritative data * * *." The use of the term "may" 
connotes permissive action, not mandatory action. In addition, subsection (e) of 
§ 5 of the regulatory process indicates that the board has discretion to deny 
the revision.

B. 
Statutory Procedure

[¶21]   The parties agree that the board 
did not comply with the public process required under the plan for boundary 
revisions which go beyond "correcting an error or attaining greater accuracy." 
Both Hoke and the board argue that there was no need to comply with that public 
process because the revision was made to correct an error or to attain greater 
accuracy. Whether this land use district boundary change was done simply to 
"correct an error or attain greater accuracy," or whether the change was of 
greater magnitude than correcting a mere error made in adopting the RA 6/3 
designation in the first instance is a close question. The change in designation 
changes the entire character of this subdivision. It is a change of considerable 
magnitude. It is open to serious question whether the initial RA 6/3 designation 
was the result of error. It certainly was not a mathematical error or error in 
transcription or inadvertence. One clear purpose for seeking the change was to 
double the number of building lots and thus double density of the proposed 
subdivision.

[¶22]   The district court held that a 
change in classification of the magnitude and for the avowed purpose here 
involved required observance also of procedures prescribed in Wyoming statutes. 
The district court concluded that the board failed to abide by statutory 
procedures of notice and comment prior to adopting the change in density for the 
John Dodge VII acreage. Wyoming Statute 18-5-202 (Cum.Supp. 1993), which is the 
enabling statute for county planning and zoning commissions, provides in 
part:

     (b) The planning and 
zoning commission may prepare and amend a comprehensive plan including zoning 
for promoting the public health, safety, morals and general welfare of the 
unincorporated areas of the county, and certify the plan to the board of county 
commissioners. Before certifying its plan or amendments thereto to the 
board the commission shall hold at least one (1) public hearing. Notice of the 
time and place of hearing shall be given by one (1) publication in a newspaper 
of general circulation in the county at least thirty (30) days before the date 
of the hearing. Any person may petition the planning and zoning 
commission to amend any zoning plan adopted under the provisions of W.S. 
18-5-201 through 18-5-207.

     (c) The planning and 
zoning commission shall prepare recommendations to effectuate the planning and 
zoning purposes and certify its recommendations to the board of county 
commissioners. Before adopting the recommendations the board shall hold at 
least one (1) public hearing. Notice of the time and place of hearing shall be 
given by one (1) publication in a newspaper of general circulation in the county 
at least fourteen (14) days before the date of the hearing. After public 
hearing has been held, the board shall vote upon the adoption of the planning or 
zoning recommendation. No planning or zoning recommendation shall be adopted 
unless a majority of the board votes in favor thereof. [emphasis 
added]

Under 
this statute, the planning and zoning commission is empowered to prepare and 
amend comprehensive plans and then certify the plan or amendments to the board. 
However, notice and a public hearing are required before the planning and zoning 
commission may certify zoning plans and amendments and before the board may 
adopt commission zoning recommendations. In other words, "the statute mandates a 
notice and public hearing as conditions precedent to the adoption of any 
recommendations of the zoning commission, and no action on such recommendations 
by the board is authorized until the notice and hearing have been affected." 
Schoeller v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 568 P.2d 869, 874 (Wyo. 
1977).

[¶23]   In this case the Teton County 
Zoning and Planning Commission, through its administrator, made a recommendation 
to the board concerning zoning. Notice and a public hearing were required before 
that recommendation could be adopted by the board. There is no evidence in the 
record that the board notified the public that it would be considering the 
adoption of the planning commission's recommendation to redesignate John Dodge 
VII to RA-3. The record does reflect that the planning commission notified the 
public and held public hearings concerning the proposed subdivision of John 
Dodge VII after the subdivision application had already been redesignated as 
RA-3. Those subdivision hearings and notifications were not in compliance with 
the requirements of W.S. 18-5-202.

[¶24]   The procedural requirements W.S. 
18-5-202 exist independently of the Teton County Comprehensive Plan's processes 
for revising district boundaries. Therefore, when the County uses either the 
non-public process or the public process provided in the plan to revise a 
district boundary, it is likely that W.S. 18-5-202(c) will require public notice 
and comment.

CONCLUSION

[¶25]   We affirm the district court's 
judgment of January 29, 1993, concluding that the board failed to follow 
procedures required by the Teton County Comprehensive Plan and because the board 
adopted a Teton County Planning Commission recommendation without complying with 
the notice and hearing requirements of W.S. 18-5-202(c).

[¶26]   Affirmed.