Case Title: STATE v SCANLON

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1976-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
No. 13476 I N THE S U P R E M E C O U R T O F THE STATE O F MONTANA 1976 THE STATE O F M O N T A N A , P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, -vs - JACK Me SCANLON, Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Gordon R. Bennett, Judge presiding. Counsel of Record: For Appellant : Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena, Montana Thomas Budewitz argued, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Albert Melloling argued, Special Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana For Respondent : Donald Garrity argued, Helena, Montana Submitted: October 21, 1976 Decided : m c - $a 197~ % Filed: E c % 0 1976 Mr. Justice John Conway Harrison delivered the Opinion of the Court. The state appeals from dismissal of eighteen counts of perjury returned by the grand jury against Jack M. Scanlon, defendant. The grand jury in Lewis and Clark County initiated an investiga- tion into defendant's Workers' Compensation related activities. The foreman of the grand jury stated: "* * * Pursuant to this inquiry, the Grand Jury will examine the activities of Jack Scanlon in his repre- sentation of claimants before the Industrial Accident Board and the Workmen's Compensation Division during the period between mid-1969 and mid-1973 and thereafter. "This inquiry will include a review of each step of Mr. Scanlon's professional representation, commencing with initiation of the attorney-client relationship and continuing through the conclusion of such representa- tion, including any related third-party litigation in- volving subrogation rights ." part of this investigation a number defendant's clients were called and testified to the manner the attorney- client relationship was initiated. After this testimony, the grand jury requested the attorney general to file a complaint with the Commission on Practice charging defendant did solicit without legal cause or permission, the individuals who testified. Defendant was called to testify before the grand jury and refused to answer questions posed to him asserting his right against self-incrimination. Thereafter, in an effort to find where defendant received the information, defendant was granted immunity against prosecution except prosecution for contempt and perjury. He testified for two days before the grand jury,denying he solicited these persons and offered explanation for the manner in which they became his clients. Following defendant's testimony there was further inquiry and some clients were recalled. Some people, whom defendant said referred these clients to him, were called to testify. The grand jury returned anindictment charging eighteen counts of perjury. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss these charges, which was granted. The state appeals. We summarize the issues presented to be: 1. Whether the evidentiary standard required for proof of perjury was met? 2. Whether the allegedly perjured testimony was material? 3. Whether off-the-record statements made to the grand jury were grounds for dismissal? 4. Whether there was sufficient prosecutorial misconduct to warrant dismissal of the indictment? 5. Whether the admonition of secrecy delivered to the grand jury witnesses was grounds for dismissal? First, we consider the strict evidentiary standard required for the proof of perjury. Three Montana statutes are applicable: Section 94-7-202(7), R.C.M. 1947, provides: "No person shall be convicted of an offense under this section where proof of falsity rests solely upon the testimony of a single person other than the de- f endant . ' I Section 93-401-1, R.C.M. 1947, provides: "The direct evidence of one witness who is entitled to full credit is sufficient for proof of any fact, except perjury and treason." Section 93-1401-2, R.C.M. 1947, provides: "Perjury and treason must be proved by testimony of more than one witness; treason by the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act; and perjury by the testimony of two witnesses, or one witness and - . corrobora- - tinp; circumstances." (Emphasis added.) The basis for unusually stringent evidence requirements is set out in an article in 19 UCLA Law Review 638, 642,643 entitled "Perjury and Related Offenses Under the Proposed California Criminal Code." That same a r t i c l e points out a t p. 645, that Tentative Draft No. 6 of the Model Penal Code on t h i s point reads: "Corroboration. Proof of g u i l t beyond a reasonable doubt s h a l l suffice for conviction under t h i s section as i n other criminal cases, without special requirement of two witnesses or corroborating circumstances. " [Alternate,rejected -- - - - by the council: N o person shall be convicted of an offense under t h i s Section where proof of f a l s i t y r e s t s solely upon contradiction by testimony of a person other than the defendant.]" The o f f i c i a l d r a f t of the Model Penal Code, which served as the basis for section 94-7-202(7), R.C .M. 1947, used the alternate provision. I n Montana Criminal Code, 1973, Annotated, Prof. William F. Crowley - Editor, a t page 293 the annotator points out: "The common law rule that falsehood be established by two witnesses i s adopted i n part by subsection (7). A t the common'law t h i s rule was adopted t o deal with the problem of an oath against an oath. The modern rationale is a policy determination based on a balancing of the need for protection of witness and the need t o maintain the sanctions for false testimony. I n adopting the requirement of more than one witness Montana has followed the majority of states i n affording additional protection t o the witness a t the possible cost of being unable t o convict an apparent perjurer. * * *I1 A s noted above, the standard of proof required i n Montana under the new code section 94-7-202(7), R.C.M. 1947, requires that the proof of the f a l s i t y of a statement must be more than the contra- diction testimony of a person other than the defendant. The legis- lature recently made t h i s policy determination and despite the contrary rule urged by the s t a t e , t h i s i s the rule in Montana. The exact requirements of t h i s evidentiary rule i n perjury cases are apparent from an examination of the California cases inter- preting the section of the California Civil Code, identical t o Montana's section 93-1401-2, R.C.M. 1947. In an article entitled "Proof of Perjury: The Two Witness Requirement", 35 Southern California Law Review 86,97, it is stated: I I In summary, the California attitude is, and remains, that direct testimony of at least one witness must always be introduced to prove the falsity of the statement set forth in the indictment; circumstantial evidence alone will not support a perjury conviction." In People v. Roubus, 53 Cal.Rptr. 281, 417 P.2d 865, 866, 867, the California Supreme Court, sitting In Bank, outlined this evidentiary requirement: "Perjury must be proved by the testimony of two witnesses, or of one witness and corroborating circumstances. * * * This statutory provision has been interpreted as pre- scribing not only the amount but also the kind of evidence necessary to support a perjury conviction. * * * Direct, as distinguished from circumstantial, evidence of the falsity of the defendant's testimony by at least one witness is generally required. * * * This does not mean that there must be a denial in the very words of the defendant's testimony * * * but that there muet be testimony by at least one witness furnishing direct evidence of facts contrary to, or absolutely incompatible or physically in- consistent with, that sworn to by the accused * * *, Evidence that establishes facts from which the falsity of an alleged perjured statement may or may not be inferred is insufficient under the direct evidence rule. * * * "The rule requiring proof of falsity by direct evidence has been criticized. * * * However, this requirement was early established in this state by decisions construing our statutory provision. I t is noteworthy that a majority of jurisdictions which apply the rule that falsity must be proved by the testimony of two witnesses, or of one witness and corroborating circumstances, hold that circumstantial evidence alone is generally insufficient to establish falsity.'' An early Montana case indica t E s this is the law in Montana as well, In State v. Gibbs, 10 Mont. 213, 219, 25 P. 289, it is said: "'It is not necessary that there should be two living witnesses in contradiction of the statement of the de- fendant to justify a confiction of perjury. I t is suffi- cient if, in addition to one directly opposing witness, corroborating circumstances sufficient to turn the scale and overcome the oath of the defendant and the legal presumption of his innocence are proved. 1 1 1 The Court i n Gibbs approved t h i s instruction a s to proof of perjury: I f ' * * * that such a c t of perjury has been established t o your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt by more than one witness, o r that the testimony of such witness has been corroborated upon that point by other facts and circumstances proved on the t r i a l . I n other words, the direct evidence of one witness alone i s not sufficient t o convict of the crime of perjury, unless corroborated by other facts and circumstances proved on the t r i a l . t 11 I n Gibbs the Court was construing the then equivalent code section t o section 93-401-1, R.C.M. 1947. Section 93-1401-2 had not been enacted a t that time. I n State v. Jackson, 88 Mont. 420, 293 P. 309, the Court cited Gibbs as authority of the requirement that perjury must be proved by the testimony of two witnesses, or one witness and corroborating circumstances indicating that t h i s was the law even prior t o the passage of section 93-1401-2, R.C.M. 1947. A subsidiary question t o be determined regards the nature of the corroborating circumstances that must be proved. The rule i n *California, that the s t a t e argues we should adopt, is stated i n People v. Casanova, 54 Cal.App. 439, 202 P. 45,47: 'I* * *The s t a t u t e respecting the quantum of evidence necessary i n perjury cases w i l l be satisfied, i f there be the testimony of one witness t o facts that a r e absolutely incompatible with the innocence of the accused, corroborated by circumstances which, of them- selves and independently of such directly inculpatory evidence, tend, with a reasonable degree of certitude, t o show that the accused i s guilty a s charged." See also: People v. Pustau, 39 C.A.2d 407, 103 P.2d 224,228. the Court said that "corroborating circumstances sufficient t o turn the scale and overcome the oath of the defendant and the legal presumption of h i s innocence" are a l l that is required. I n People v. Todd, 9 C.A.2d 237, 49 P.2d 611, 614, it is pointed out : "It i s also well settled that motive and design t o commit a crime, if.proved, may be considered a quilty circumstance * * * and consequently maylserve legally as corroborative evidence; and i n t h i s behalf it has been repeatedly held that where, as here, it is claimed that several offenses have been cormitted as part of one scheme or plan, a l l of the same general character, tending t o the same common end, evidence thereof may be received t o show the process o r motive and design to commit the particular offense with which the accused is charged, and as tending t o show logically that the particular offense for which he i s being t r i e d was part of such common scheme." The second issue involves the requirement that the alleged perjured statement be material. The Montana statute, section 94-7- 202(3), R.C.M. 1947, provides: "Falsification i s material, regardless of the admissibility of the statement under rules of evidence, i f it could have affected the course or outcome of the proceeding. It i s no defense that the declarant mistakenly belidved the f a l s i f i - cation to--be immaterial. Whether a falsification i s material i n a given factual situation i s a question of law." The Commission Comment points out: "The proposed definition of 'materiality' i n subsection (3) does not d i f f e r substantially from that given by prior law. " I n State v. Hall, 88 Mont. 297, 304, 292 P. 734, the Court said : "* * *Also it may be conceded that the general rule is that anything so connected with the matter a t issue as t o have a legitimate tendency t o prove or disprove some material issue by giving weight or probability to, o r detracting from, the testimony of a witness, is material * * * and that, i f evidence is circumstantially material, it i s sufficient t o sustain a perjury charge." The t e s t for materiality a s s e t out by the statute i s not particularly d i f f i c u l t t o meet, it requires only that i n the actual factual situation involved would it be reasonable t o find that the defendant's statement, i f believed, could have altered the course of the in- vestigation. While it i s true that a false answer t o a t r i v i a l o r irrelevant question does not i n and of i t s e l f hamper the £unctioning of the s t a t e , the court, whose integrity depends on the truth, has a special interest i n seeing those who do not t e l l the truth, whether t o a relevant or irrelevant matter, do not go unpunished. See section 94-7-203, R.C.M. 1947, which provides for the punish- ment of a false statement i n an o f f i c i a l proceeding whether that statement was material or not, and makes such false statement a misdemeanor. W e note here that nearly a l l cases cited by both parties involve a post-trial, not post-indictment determination of these required elements. W e are considering here perjury counts before a grand jury and not a f t e r a t r i a l . The grand jury s t a t u t e , section /' (3 95-1&9-(c) , R.C.M. 1947, provides: "The grand jury shall find an indictment when a l l the evidence before it, taken together, i f unexplained or uncontradicted, w o a , i n its judgment, warrant a conviction by a t r i a l jury ." The d i s t r i c t court dismissed each of the eighteen counts based on the absence of one of these elements---lack of direct evidence a s t o the f a l s i t y of the statement, lack of corroboration o r lack of materiality. Several of the counts against defendant arose out of transactions wherein defendant t e s t i f i e d the c l i e n t s were referred t o him by an uncle and aunt, M r . and Mrs. Richard Mullins or by a M r . and Mrs. Herman Meyers, long time family friends. A t the time defendant t e s t i f i e d a l l of these people were deceased. The clients who appeared before the grand jury denied ever knowing ank of the named people, however, these deaths prevented the s t a t e from getting the necessary direct evidence required t o prove perjury. The d i s t r i c t court dismissed these counts for lack of direct evidence as to the f a l s i t y and these dismissals were proper. W e have carefully reviewed a l l other counts, and hold that with the exception of counts 9 and 10, they should have been dismissed. The dismissal of those counts comes from the fact they were not supported by direct evidence of the f a l s i t y of the defendant's statements o r due t o & l a c k of sufficient proof to offset defendant's failure t o remember certain facts. A summary of count 9. charges that Jack M. Scanlon, falsely t e s t i f i e d that Grace A. Rieker f i r s t contacted him on the telephone, when i n truth and f a c t he knew that he had instigated the telephone conversation with claimant for the purpose of i n i t i a t i n g a client- attorney relationship; and that he so t e s t i f i e d t o deceive and frustrate the grand jury in i t s investigation contrary t o section 94-7-202, R.C.M. 1947. A summary of count 10 charges that defendant falsely t e s t i f i e d that prior t o the telephone c a l l from claimant he had L never heard of the claimant nor the fact that she was injured, / while i n truth and f a c t he knew the claimant and that she had been injured prior t o ever talking t o her, and he so t e s t i f i e d for the purpose of deceiving and frustrating the grand jury contrary t o section 94-7-202, R.C.M. 1947. When asked how he came t o represent Mrs. Grace Rieker and her claims before the Industrial Accident Board, defendant i n answer to questions t e s t i f i e d : "Q. H o w did she come t o know you? A. I don' t know you wi.11 have t o ask her that. "Q. The f i r s t contact with Grace Rieker was by her tele- phoning you? A. A s I recall, yes. "Q. Let m e give you your f i l e s , i n case you need them t o refresh your memory. Did she c a l l you in your office i n Helena? A . A s I recall, yes. "Q. What did she say t o you? A. She asked m e about, as I recall, representing her i n her industrial accident claim. "Q. N o w which claim was t h i s ? A. As I r e c a l l , there were two claims. One was f o r a neck injury, and she called m e r e l a t i v e t o t h a t ? "Q. A l l r i g h t . I n response t o her phone c a l l , what did you do? A . I met with her. "Q. Where? A. I n Boulder. "Q, And who was present? A. I think her husband was, but I am not sure. Q . Now, t h i s was the very f i r s t contact t h a t you ever had with her, was when she phoned you? A. A s b e s t I can r e c a l l , yes. "Q. And p r i o r t o her phoning you, you had never heard of Grace Rieker o r her injury o r anything e l s e ? A . No. "Q. But, you a r e confident t h a t you did not s o l i c i t the attorney-client relationship yourself? A. Yes, I am confident I d i d n ' t s o l i c i t the attorney-client relationship myself . I 1 M r . Fuller t e s t i f i e d a s t o h i s recollection of the Rieker case indicating he and defendant were high school friends and they had kept t h a t relationship going over the years. He said t h a t a f t e r he had talked with investigators of the Workmen's Compensation investigation team, and j u s t before he t e s t i f i e d before the grand jury, he c a l l e d Scanlon about the Rieker case because it was one they had asked questions about. He t e s t i f i e d : "Q. Well, did you c h ~ c k with him t o make sure t h a t h i s recollection of the Grace Rieker incident was the same a s yours? J u s t t o make sure t h a t i n your own mind t h a t your memory--- A . Xes I did. "Q. So you went through with him how he developed h i s relationship with Grace Rieker i n so f a r a s you were concerned? A. The only thing I asked him was r e l a t e d t o i f he recalled t h a t there were two c a l l s made by me, i f I ever t o l d him t h a t , o r i f he had made a phone c a l l from m y home. "Q. What did he say? A. H e said no. "Q. I n other words, according t o what Scanlon told you on the phone on March 26th, Grace Rieker made the f i r s t contact with Scanlon? A. Yes. "Q. And it was either that she phoned him, asking for assistance of an attorney --- right? A. Right. "Q. -- or that she came t o h i s office? A. Right. "Q. But did he t e l l you that i n no way that he con- tacted Grace Rieker, telephoned her, o r through, talked t o her? A . Right . I 1 Fuller also t e s t i f i e d he did not remember either giving the Riekers the phone number of Scanlon; or giving Scanlon the Riekers ' number. Mrs. Rieker t e s t i f i e d before the grand jury that she was a secretary-receptionist a t the Boulder Riyer School and on December 22, 1967, she had slipped down the school steps and received an injury that incapacitated her for a period of time. For that period she received no compensation other than from her sick leave. She returned t o work and several years l a t e r on June 18, 1970, she was injured and from t h i s injury she received compensation on an off and on basis. She t e s t i f i e d that during her recovery a M r . Ron Fuller of Boulder asked her i f she was interested i n a lawyer t o help her get her industrial acci- dents payments. H e told her.he had a friend that was a lawyer and would she like him t o come t o t a l k to.her. Her testimony on the Fuller c a l l s was: "Q. A s a result of t h i s difficulty, did someone make a contact with you? Did some attorney make a contact with you, either personally or through someone else? A. Yes. "Q. And what was the name of that attorney? A . M r . Jack Scanlon. "Q. Prior to t h i s contact being made t o you, had you ever personally known Scanlon? A . No. "Q. H o w did t h i s i n i t i a l contact regarding Scanlon take place. A . A gentleman by the name of Ron Fuller--- "Q. So Fuller volunteered over the phone that he had a friend who was a lawyer and might be able t o help you? A. Yes. Q . N o w did you have additional problems with the Industrial Accident Board? A. Y e s . "Q. Did you, as a result of those additional problems say, hey, I remember that fellow Scanlon and go and c a l l Scanlon? A. No. I I Q. Were you contacted a second time? A. Yes. "Q. And who did t h i s ? A. M r . Fuller again. "Q. A l l right. And was t h i s without a request on your part? A . Yes. "Q. Was there anybody else there with Fuller a t that time? A. Yes. "Q. W h o was that? A. M r . Scanlon. "Q. And how do you know that? A. Because M r . Fuller asked m e i f I would l i k e to t a l k t o him on the phone and I said, well, I supposed I could t a l k with him about m y problem, so I did t a l k t o him on the phone. Q . Iday, so what did Scanlon say when he got on the phone? A. Told m e he would like t o handle m y case, he had heard about it, was interested i n it and thought he could help me. Q . Did he eventually come over t o your your house? A. Yes. "Q. And when he talked with you, did he seem t o know the details of your current accident? A. Yes. "Q. H o w did he learn about the 1967 accident? A. H e asked m e a t that point i f I had ever had a previous injury, and I said yes." A 1 Rieker, husband of Grace, t e s t i f i e d corroborating her testimony that a f t e r her 1971 injury she was contacted by Ron Fuller about whether she needed a lawyer and they told him IIno1' . About the second contact by Fuller he testified: "Q. '* * * Now, a t a l a t e r time do you r e c a l l being home when the telephone rang? A. Yes. "Q. Did you answer or did your wife? A. M y wife answered it. "Q. * * * Now, a f t e r she finished talking on the phone did she t e l l you who had called? A. Yes, she did. "Q. And who did she say? A. She said Ron had called and he had put Jack Scanlon on and she talked t o Jack Scanlon. Q . While you were i n the house? A. Yes. "Q. A l l right. Did Scanlon eventually come over t o your home? A , Yes, he did. "Q. Now, when Scanlon came t o your home, did he t e l l you what the reason was that he talked t o your wife over the phone? A. yes, he did. H e said he had been i n contact with Ron Fuller and they had talked over our case and thought we needed a lawyer, o r that he might help. "Q. That he, Scanlon might help? A. Yes. "Q. Okay. So that Scanlon told you he had found out about your wife's claim before talking t o your wife, from Fuller himself. A . Right. "Q. And that was the reason that he had talked t o your wife on the phone? A. That i s correct. "Q. And then l a t e r on, a t a l a t e r t i m e , he came t o your house and he confirmed that t o you. A. Yes. 1 I A s t o these counts there are clearly contradictory statements t o defendant's testimony that prior t o actually speaking t o Grace Rieker, he was both unaware of the claimant o r her injuries. The necessary corroboration is provided by the testimony of A 1 Rieker, whose testimony was that defendant came t o the Rieker home and told them that before talking to Grace Rieker he had been i n contact with Ron Fuller and had talked over the Grace Rieker injuries. Such testimony is adequate t o corroborate that he knew of her injury from Fuller, prior t o coming t o the Rieker home. The remaining three issues do not go t o the actual merits of the charges individually but they alleged general procedural and prosecutorial improprieties as the basis for the dismissal of a l l charges against defendant. These attacks must be viewed against the function of the grand jury. In United States v. I Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L ed 2d 561, 569, the United States Supreme Court pointed out: "A grand jury proceeding i s not an adversary hearing i n which the g u i l t or innocence of the accused i s adjudicated. Rather, it i s an ex parte investigation t o determine whether a crime has been committed and whether criminal proceedings should be instituted against any person.'' These alleged improper procedures do not reach the merits of the individual charges but rather attack the matter i n which the otherwise valid criminal charges are determined and instituted and are a weak basis for asking for dismissal of the charges. The f i r s t of these is the request that the criminal charges be dismissed for off-the-record statements made by the special assistant attorneys general prior t o the returning of the indict- ment. There was no record of what was said because the statute, section 95-1406(e)(l), R.C.M. 1947, requires only that the t e s t i - mony of witnesses be recorded. This session, characterized by the d i s t r i c t court a s a "prep session", could not have resulted i n the grand jury returning improper or unsupported indictments. The s t a t e urged the d i s t r i c t court t o l i m i t i t s examination t o the probable cause and the evidentiary support for each count. The d i s t r i c t court said it "would prefer t o do so and leave the matter up t o the committee on practice but we can not overlook the devastating effect of the grand jury indictment of the person charged .'I While t h i s Court does not overlook the effect of the indictment, it cannot uphold the dismissal of otherwise valid criminal counts because of possible improper statements made t o the grand jury prior t o the indictment. The merits of invalid counts may be challanged individually and the defendant's rights thus protected . The same may be said of the allegation that there was sufficient prosecutorial misconduct to warrant dismissal of the indictment. Nothing in the record here approaches t h i s level. The admonition of secrecy that was given t o witnesses before the grand jury was not proper because it did not follow the procedure outlined i n section 95-1409, R.C.M. 1947. However, the requirement was l i f t e d a f t e r indictment so that defendant's a b i l i t y t o prepare h i s defense has not been impaired. The d i s t r i c t court did not expressly base dismissal of the charges on t h i s error, it said: "While t h i s apparent u t t e r disregard for the orders of t h i s court and the requirements of the law may not have demonstrably prejudiced the defendant, it i s nevertheless suspect a s an unauthorized intimidation of witnesses by the State, which could, i f l e f t standing o r further ignored redound to the prejudice of the defendant. This should not be condoned or disregarded i n considering whether the indictment should be dismissed.'' Under the circumstances disclosed here; the error i s not that f a t a l . The two remaining valid charges are remanded t o the d i s t r i c t court for t r i a l on the merits. ................................. ................................. Justices. i t t i n g i n p l a c e of M r . Wesley C a s t l e s . M r . Justice Gene B. Daly dissenting: I dissent: There w i l l be a change i n the makeup of t h i s Court on January 3 , 1977. Therefore the Court a s presently constituted must complete i t s work assignments no l a t e r than Thursday, December 30, 1976 a t 5:00 p.m. The majority opinion i n t h i s case was delivered t o m y chambers for study and comment FJednesday, December 29, 1976. I was not, previous t o receipt of t h i s opinion, accorded an opportunity t o join with the Court i n conference regarding t h e i r views or t o express mine. I have been present a t Court a t a l l times during which the majority view could have been reached and reduced t o writing. Obviously the time required t o research and properly prepare a responsible legal dissent t o the majority's position is no longer available. Therefore, I would advise that I have strong views that d i f f e r from the majority position and wish t o reserve the right t o prepare and f i l e them a t a l a t e r date. . . @ I% - Justice.