Case Title: Downes v. Downes

Citation: 388 Md. 561

Docket Number: 112/04

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2005-08-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
In the Circuit Court for Talbot County
Case No. 20-C-01-004248
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 112
September Term, 2004
______________________________________
SHIRLEY L. DOWNES
v.
GREGORY DOWNES
______________________________________
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
         *Greene,
   JJ.
______________________________________
Opinion by Wilner, J.
           
 Battaglia, J., Dissents
 
 
 
_____________________________________
Filed:    August 15, 2005
* Greene, J.,  participated in the oral argument but
did not participate in the decision or the adoption
of this Opinion.
1 At the time of the relevant events in this case, that provision appeared in an
undivided ET § 3-206(a).  In 2003, that subsection was split, and the authority to extend
the time for making an election was placed in § 3-206(a)(2).  There was no change in
substance.
Maryland Code, § 3-203 of the Estates and Trusts Article (ET), permits the surviving
spouse of a decedent to take a certain share of the decedent’s net Estate – one-half or one-
third, depending on whether there is surviving issue – in lieu of property left to the spouse
by the decedent’s Will.  ET § 3-206 and Maryland Rule 6-411 set a time deadline on the
making of that election, however.  The deadline relevant to this case was seven months after
the date of the first appointment of a personal representative under the Will.  It has since been
changed to the later of nine months after the date of the decedent’s death or six months after
the first appointment of a personal representative under a Will.  
Both the statute and the Rule permit the orphans’ court to grant extensions of that
deadline.  ET § 3-206(a)(2) provides that the court “may extend the time for election, before
its expiration, for a period not to exceed three months at a time, upon notice given to the
personal representative and for good cause shown.”1  (Emphasis added).  Rule 6-411(c)
provides that, “[w]ithin the period for making an election,” the surviving spouse may file a
petition for an extension of time, and that “[f]or good cause shown, the court may grant
extensions not to exceed three months at a time, provided each extension is granted before
the expiration of the period originally prescribed or extended by a previous order.”
(Emphasis added).  
The question before us is whether an orphans’ court, or on appeal from that court, a
2 Because the decedent, petitioner, and respondent share the last name, Downes,
we shall occasionally, for convenience and clarity in identification, refer to them by their
first names.  See Maryland Rule 8-111(b).
-2-
circuit court, has any discretion to grant an extension when the request therefor is not made
within the period originally prescribed or extended by a previous order.  The Orphans’ Court
for Talbot County, the Circuit Court for that county, and the Court of Special Appeals all
held that there was no such discretion.  We agree with that conclusion and shall therefore
affirm.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner, Shirley Downes, is the surviving spouse of Eldridge Downes IV, who died,
testate, on October 23, 1997.2  In his Will, Eldridge left all of his tangible personal property
to Shirley and named her as his personal representative.  He also created two trusts – a
marital trust for Shirley’s benefit in an amount equal to the maximum marital deduction
available for Federal estate tax purposes and a residuary trust for the benefit of his parents
and his son, Gregory.  On November 3, 1997, the Orphans’ Court admitted the Will to
probate and, pursuant to the Will, appointed Shirley as personal representative.  In February,
1998, Shirley filed an Inventory and Information Report that showed the value of the Estate
to be $1,729,517.
On June 2, 1998 – one day prior to the then seven-month deadline for her to decide
whether to renounce the Will and take her statutory share of the Estate – Shirley, acting pro
3 No issue has been raised as to the validity of that extension, which, though sought
prior to the expiration of the initial seven month period, was not granted until after that
period had expired.
-3-
se, filed a petition for an extension of that time.  She explained that the Inventory which, as
personal representative, she had filed in February did not include the value of certain assets
owned by Eldridge, that she was in the process of determining the value of those assets, and
that the determination of that value would affect her personal decision whether to take her
statutory share.  She asked for a three-month extension which, on June 9, 1998, the court
granted.3  Later that month, she filed an amended Inventory showing the value of the Estate
to be $2,052,228.  In July, she asked for an extension of time to file the required
Administration Account, citing her inability to appraise closely held entities in the Estate.
On August 27, 1998, Shirley, again acting pro se, filed a petition for a second extension of
time to elect her statutory share.  As before, she averred that the Inventories did not include
all of the Estate’s assets and that she was having difficulty valuing certain assets.  On
September 1, 1998, the court granted another three-month extension, to December 1, 1998.
On November 30, 1998 – one day before the expiration of the current extension –
Shirley, this time through counsel, filed a petition for a third extension.  She stated that her
late husband had an interest in three businesses – Tidewater Coffee, Inc., Raley Downes
Services, Inc., and Ral-Do Industries, Inc. – that both the assets and liabilities relating to
those businesses might be substantial, and that the value of the interests would have a
significant impact on her decision whether to renounce the Will and elect her statutory share.
-4-
She claimed that, due to a lack of cooperation on the part of those businesses, two of which
were in New Jersey, she had been unable to determine the value of the assets or the extent
of the liabilities.  On December 1, the court granted another three-month extension, until
March 1, 1999.  On February 24, 1999, again through counsel, Shirley requested a fourth
extension, for the same reason.  On March 2, the court granted the extension, until June 2,
1999.  
During the period of that fourth extension, as to which no challenge is made, Shirley
filed an amended Inventory showing Estate assets of $1,963,478, to reflect a decline in the
value of certain corporate stock.  She also filed her First Administration Account, charging
herself with a gross Estate of $3,461,969.  On March 22, she filed a supplemental Inventory
that added $1,498,490 to the value of the Estate, bringing the total to $3,461,969 – the value
reported in the First Administration Account.  That supplemental Inventory included a value
of $374,400 for the decedent’s interest in Ral-Do Industries, Inc. and a value of $325,000 for
his interest in Raley Downes Services, Inc.  The Inventory noted that the third business –
Tidewater Coffee, Inc. – was insolvent and was disputing the extent of the decedent’s
interest.
For whatever reason, Shirley allowed the fourth extension to expire.  On June 24,
1999 – twenty-two days after the expiration of the extension period – she filed a petition for
a fifth extension.  Notwithstanding the values assigned in the last supplemental Inventory,
she again asserted that she had been unable to determine the value of her husband’s interest
-5-
in the three companies.  She added, as well, an assertion that, since the filing of the last
petition for extension, the Estate “has been involved in litigation before the Circuit Court for
Talbot County involving obligations of the decedent,” but she did not further identify or
explain the nature of that litigation.  On July 6, 1999, the court, citing ET §3-206(a), denied
the petition.  Shirley moved for reconsideration of that denial, claiming that she had
substantially complied with the deadline requirement.  In October, 1999, the court, citing
Simpson v. Moore, 323 Md. 215, 228, 592 A.2d 1090, 1096 (1991), denied the motion,
holding that the problem was not one of substantial compliance but of non-compliance with
the statutory requirement.  
Shirley did not seek any immediate review of the Orphans’ Court’s denial of her
petition for fifth extension, but rather completed the administration of the Estate.  On
February 13, 2001, the court approved the Fifth and Final Administration Account showing
a gross Estate of $3,228,701 and a net Estate after payment of taxes and expenses of
$945,291.  On March 15, 2001, she filed an appeal to the Circuit Court from the denial of her
petition for fifth extension and her motion to reconsider that denial.  Gregory, as sole
surviving beneficiary of the residuary trust, moved to intervene in the Circuit Court action,
noting that, if Shirley were permitted to renounce the Will, the value of the residuary trust
would be decreased by about one-third.  He also moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely,
arguing that the denial of Shirley’s request for a fifth extension constituted a final judgment
and that an appeal should have been taken within 30 days after that order.
-6-
On November 15, 2001, the Circuit Court granted Gregory’s motions to intervene in
and to dismiss the appeal.  The court concluded that the order of July 6, 1999 that denied
Shirley’s petition for fifth extension was a final, appealable judgment under Maryland Code,
§ 12-502 of the Cts.& Jud. Proc. Article (CJP) and that her appeal from that order in March,
2001, was untimely.  CJP §12-502(a)(1) permits a party in the orphans’ court to appeal from
a final judgment of that court to the circuit court, in lieu of taking a direct appeal to the Court
of Special Appeals.  Section 12-502(b) requires that the order for appeal be filed with the
register of wills within 30 days after the date of the final judgment from which the appeal is
taken.
Shirley then appealed to the Court of Special Appeals which, in an unreported
Opinion filed November 14, 2002, reversed the Circuit Court ruling.  The intermediate
appellate court concluded that the effect of the July, 1999 order was simply “to preclude
[Shirley] from electing an alternative method of calculation” and that nothing in that order
“suggests a final adjudication of [Shirley’s] claim, or even a specific valuation as to
[Shirley’s] award.”  Because that order did not finally adjudicate her claim in regard to the
Estate, it was not immediately appealable.  The final, appealable judgment, the court held,
was the order approving the Fifth and Final Administration Account.  The case was thus
remanded to the Circuit Court for further proceedings on Shirley’s appeal.
On remand, Shirley focused not on whether the Orphans’ Court had the authority or
discretion to excuse the late filing of the petition for fifth extension or to extend the deadline
-7-
for the filing of that petition, but rather whether the Circuit Court had that discretion or
authority.  She did not, in other words, argue error on the part of the Orphans’ Court but
addressed only what the Circuit Court should do.  In that regard, she noted that an appeal
under CJP § 12-502 was to be heard de novo by the Circuit Court, that it was to be treated
as if it were a new proceeding without any judgment of the Orphans’ Court, and that the
Circuit Court was to “give judgment [according] to the equity of the matter.”  Her position
was that she needed more time to determine whether to renounce the Will and that it would
be inequitable for the court not to extend the deadline.  She explained that the value of the
Estate grew significantly during the period of administration but that, under the terms of the
Will, most of that added value went into the residuary trust rather than the marital trust, so
that Eldridge’s son, Gregory, rather than she, got the benefit of that increase.
The court was not impressed.  It read what is now ET § 3-206(a)(2) as not allowing
the court to grant a subsequent extension once the allowable period or current extension
expired.  The court noted that Shirley was aware of that fact, having complied with the
requirement on four prior occasions, and observed that if the law created a harsh result, the
remedy lay in a legislative change, not one crafted by the Judiciary.
Shirley appealed again, but this time the Court of Special Appeals, in a reported
Opinion, affirmed.  Downes v. Downes, 158 Md. App. 598, 857 A.2d 1155 (2004).  Relying
largely on Barrett v. Clark, 189 Md. 116, 54 A.2d 128 (1947) and Bunch v. Dick, 287 Md.
358, 412 A.2d 405 (1980), the intermediate appellate court held that the period prescribed
-8-
in ET § 3-206 for extending the time for a spousal election may not be enlarged by either an
orphans’ or circuit court.  It rejected Shirley’s argument that a circuit court had greater
authority in this regard than an orphans’ court, either under the Maryland Rules or under
equitable principles, and declared that “if a surviving spouse does not file a petition for
extension of time within the originally prescribed period or, as here, the previously extended
period, the spouse is foreclosed from thereafter obtaining additional time to make the
election.”  Downes v. Downes, supra, 158 Md. App. at 610, 857 A.2d at 1161.  We granted
certiorari to consider the single question of whether an orphans’ court, or a circuit court in
a de novo appeal, has discretion to accept a surviving spouse’s petition for extension of time
to make an election under ET §§ 3-203(a) and 3-206(a) and Maryland Rule 6-411(c) when
the petition seeking the extension is filed after the previous election period has already
expired.
DISCUSSION
The issue is one of statutory construction – the meaning of what is now ET § 3-
206(a)(2) and its counterpart, Maryland Rule 6-411(c) – both intrinsically and in relation to
certain other Rules and common law principles.  Shirley acknowledges that both the statute
and the Rule, on their face, require that any extension, whether an initial or a subsequent one,
be granted by the court prior to the expiration of the preceding allowable period.
Necessarily, she further concedes, that requires that any petition for such an extension must
-9-
be filed prior to that expiration.  She argues, however, that that directive is merely directory,
not mandatory or jurisdictional in nature, and that the Circuit Court, at least, had discretion
to extend the time for filing the petition and thus to excuse an untimely filing.  Gregory, on
the other hand, contends that the statute and the Rule mean precisely what they say and that
the time limit for seeking or obtaining an extension is jurisdictional in nature and therefore
mandatory.  He points out, in support of that view, that statutes relating to decedents’ Estates
generally, and statutes relating to a spouse’s right to renounce a Will and elect a statutory
share of the Estate in particular, are strictly construed.  
We have stated the controlling principles of statutory construction so often that only
the briefest exposition is necessary.  Our predominant mission is to ascertain and implement
the legislative intent, which is to be derived, if possible, from the language of the statute (or
Rule) itself.  If the language is clear and unambiguous, our search for legislative intent ends
and we apply the language as written and in a commonsense manner.  We do not add words
or ignore those that are there.  If there is any ambiguity, we may then seek to fathom the
legislative intent by looking at legislative history and applying the most relevant of the
various canons that courts have created.  See generally State v. Glass, 386 Md. 401, 409-10,
872 A.2d 729, 734 (2005); Piper Rudnick v. Hartz, 386 Md. 201, 218, 872 A.2d 58, 68
(2005); Board of Ed. v. Mann Insurance, 383 Md. 527, 544, 860 A.2d 909, 919 (2004).
In this case, the words of the statute and Rule, as applicable to the orphans’ courts, are
clear and unambiguous.  ET § 3-206(a)(2) permits an orphans’ court to “extend the time for
4 It is clear that those provisions, on their face, apply only to the orphans’ courts.  
Maryland Rule 6-105 applies to the title 6 Rules the definitions contained in ET § 1-101. 
ET § 1-101(f) provides that the word “court” is defined in § 2-101.  Section 2-201 defines
“court” as the orphans’ court.
-10-
election, before its expiration, for a period not to exceed three months at a time.”  (Emphasis
added).  Rule 6-411(c) is even more specific.  It permits a surviving spouse to file a petition
for extension of time “[w]ithin the period for making an election” and allows the orphans’
court, for good cause, to grant extensions up to three months at a time “provided each
extension is granted before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or extended by
a previous order.” 4  The authority of the orphans’ court to grant an extension beyond the
initial period allowed for the making of an election and beyond the period allowed in any
extension previously granted is thus clearly conditioned on a request for the extension being
filed with the court prior to the expiration of the most recent allowable period.  
Three questions flow from that limitation: first, does it apply to the circuit courts in
the context of a de novo appeal from the orphans’ court and, if not, what, if any limitations
do apply in that setting; second, if the limitation stated in the statute and Rule does apply in
the circuit court, is it mandatory, in either a jurisdictional or non-jurisdictional sense, or is
it merely directory or declaratory in nature and, as a result, permits the court to excuse an
untimely petition and grant an extension nunc pro tunc; and third, if the requirement,
intrinsically, is mandatory in nature, are there any extraneous provisions that might serve to
supply a discretion, not apparent in the statute or Rule, that would allow a court to grant a
5 Although the Rule parrots some of the procedural requirements for making an
election, the underlying right of a spouse to take a share of an Estate in contravention of a
Will and any substantive restrictions on the exercise of that right are, and must be,
entirely statutory.  The Court has no authority, by Rule, to create such a right on its own
or to impose non-Constitutional substantive restrictions on a right that is, and may only
be, created by the Legislature.
-11-
late-filed request for extension?
As we have observed, CJP § 12-502(a)(1) provides that an appeal to a circuit court is
to be heard de novo, “as if there had never been a prior hearing or judgment by the orphans’
court,” and that judgment is to be given “according to the equity of the matter.”  Does that
mean that the circuit court is not bound by the limitations set forth in ET § 3-206(a)(2) or
Rule 6-411(c) which, as noted, facially apply only to the orphans’ court? 
We think, and hold, that the circuit courts are bound by those limitations.  The
limitations are statutory ones that govern the exercise of a right that is conferred only by the
statute.5  The Legislature has decreed that the right must be exercised within a specific time
after or before identified and ascertainable events – after the death of the decedent or the first
appointment of a personal representative, before the expiration of any permissible extension
previously granted by the orphans’ court.  The circuit court is, and must of necessity be, as
bound by those limitations as the orphans’ court.  Otherwise, if a spouse could circumvent
them by simply taking an appeal, they would have little practical meaning.  
Such a rule of equivalence is mandated as well by what we said in Estate of Soothcage
v. King, 227 Md. 142, 153, 176 A.2d 221, 227 (1961): “[I]n giving judgment ‘according to
-12-
the equity of the case,’ the Circuit Court may enter any judgment which the Orphans’ Court
might properly have entered on the same evidence.”  If, as a result of the statutory limitations,
the Orphans’ Court could not have granted the fifth extension because the petition was
untimely, neither could the Circuit Court have granted that extension.  See also Kaouris v.
Kaouris, 324 Md. 687, 715, 598 A.2d 1193, 1206 (1991) where, in discussing that statement
from Soothcage, we noted that “the circuit court, although expected to make its own
determination, is limited to those that could properly have been made by the orphans’ court”
and that it “does not exercise its plenary jurisdiction over the matter.”  The same point was
made by the Court of Special Appeals in Mercantile-Safe Dep. & Tr. v. Hearn, 62 Md. App.
39, 47, 488 A.2d 202, 206 (1985), cert. denied, 303 Md. 360, 493 A.2d 1082 (1985):
“We think that a fair reading of Estate of Soothcage leads to the
clear conclusion that Courts Art. § 12-502(a)(1) is not a carte
blanche license to the circuit courts to disregard existing law.
The phrase, ‘give judgment according to the equity of the
matter,’ is a legislative reminder to the circuit courts that their
capacity in appeals from orphans’ courts is identical to that of
the orphans’ courts.”
It follows that a circuit court has no greater ability to ignore the statutory restrictions
imposed on seeking extensions of the time to make an election than does an orphans’ court.
We turn, then, to whether an orphans’ court has any authority to ignore the statutory
limitation and excuse a late request.  That invokes two issues raised by the parties: whether
the statutory limitation is jurisdictional in nature, i.e., whether the court has any “jurisdiction”
to grant an extension when the petition seeking one is not timely filed; and, if not
-13-
jurisdictional in nature, whether the limitation is merely directory, rather than mandatory, and
thus allows the court some discretion to provide relief from it.  In that regard, Shirley points
to Maryland Rules 6-104 and 6-107 which, she argues, provide that discretion.
We do not regard the requirement as jurisdictional in nature, in the sense that our
current case law has defined “jurisdictional.”  In Carey v. Chessie Computer, 369 Md. 741,
755, 802 A.2d 1060, 1068 (2002), we pointed out that, in earlier days, courts seemed more
willing to view limitations on their authority or discretion as jurisdictional in nature, but that
we had moved away from that approach, in part because of its consequences.  An action in
excess of a court’s “jurisdiction” was regarded as utterly void, subject to being disregarded
or attacked at any time and by anyone.  See Fooks’ Executors v. Ghingher, 172 Md. 612, 619,
192 A. 782, 785, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 726, 58 S. Ct. 47, 82 L. Ed. 561 (1937).  That
characteristic of utter nullity, we noted in Carey, necessarily flowed from the very concept
of the rule of law, but carried with it the prospect of serious mischief and thus required some
circumscription.  
The proper balance, we have concluded, is to view jurisdiction in terms of whether
the court “‘is given the power to render a judgment over that class of cases within which a
particular one falls.’”  See Carey v. Chessie Computer, supra, 369 Md. at 756, 802 A.2d at
1069 (quoting First Federated Com. Tr. v. Comm’r, 272 Md. 329, 335, 322 A.2d 539, 543
(1974)).  See also Board of License Comm. v. Corridor, 361 Md. 403, 417-18, 761 A.2d 916,
923-24 (2000).  In furtherance of that approach, we have tended, whenever possible, to
-14-
regard rulings made in violation of statutory restrictions on a court’s authority or discretion
as inappropriate exercises of jurisdiction, voidable on appeal, rather than as an inherently
void excess of fundamental jurisdiction itself.  See also County Commissioners v. Carroll
Craft, 384 Md. 23, 44-45, 862 A.2d 404, 417-18 (2004).   
The time limitation imposed by ET § 3-206(a)(2) is not a jurisdictional impediment.
The orphans’ court clearly has jurisdiction, in the fundamental sense, to extend the time
allowed for a spouse to elect a statutory share.  The requirement that an extension be granted
prior to the expiration of the previously allowed period is merely a limitation on the exercise
of that jurisdiction.  If the court improperly grants an extension in violation of that limitation
and a proper appeal is noted, its action will be reversed by the appellate court and all will be
made right.  To regard an improper extension as an excess of jurisdiction, however, would
allow anyone at any time to challenge it.  Years later, title to both real and personal property,
even in the hands of innocent third parties, could be challenged.  There is no need, and no
justification, for an approach that might lead to that result.
The final question, then, is whether the limitation, though not jurisdictional in nature,
is nonetheless mandatory, or whether, conversely, there is discretion in the court either to
extend it or excuse its violation.  In urging the latter, Shirley points to Maryland Rules 6-
104(a) and 6-107(b).  Rule 6-104(a) provides, in relevant part, that “[w]hen a rule, by the
word ‘shall’ or otherwise, mandates or prohibits conduct, the consequences of
noncompliance are those prescribed by these rules or by statute” and that “[i]f no
-15-
consequences are prescribed, the court may compel compliance with the rule or may
determine the consequences of the noncompliance in light of the totality of the circumstances
and the purpose of the rule.”  Rule 6-107(a) permits an orphans’ court or a register of wills,
upon written request, to extend the time for filing an Inventory, an Information Report, an
application to fix inheritance tax on non-probate assets, or an account.  Rule 6-107(b)
provides:
“Except as otherwise provided in this section, when these rules,
an order of court, or other law require or allow an act to be done
at or within a specified time, the court, upon petition filed
pursuant to Rule 6-122 and for good cause shown, may extend
the time to a specified date.  The court may not extend the time
for filing a claim, a caveat, or a notice of appeal or for taking
any other action expressly prohibited by rule or statute.”
We do not regard either of those Rules, or the combination of them, as permitting the
court to ignore the clear limitation specified in ET § 3-206(a)(2) and Rule 6-411(c) and grant
an untimely request for extension.  As we have observed, both the statute and the Rule clearly
prohibit an orphans’ court from granting an extension after the previously allowable period
has expired.  Such action is therefore “expressly prohibited by rule or statute,” thereby
rendering the general authority conferred in Rule 6-107(b) inapplicable.  As to Rule 6-104(a),
the consequences of noncompliance with the limitation in ET § 3-206(a)(2) and Rule 6-
411(c) are clear: an untimely request for extension must be denied.  There is no other option.
Our predecessors presaged this conclusion in Barrett v. Clark, 189 Md. 116, 54 A.2d
128 (1947).  At the time, the law barred a surviving spouse from electing dower or a statutory
6 At the time, the age of majority was 21, so the prospect of a minor spouse was
perhaps more frequent than it is today.
-16-
share in a decedent’s personal estate unless, within 30 days after the expiration of notice to
creditors, the spouse filed with the orphans’ court or the register of wills a written
renunciation of the Will.  Another section, dealing with minor or incompetent spouses,
permitted a guardian to file the renunciation and allowed the court to enlarge the time for
filing “such renunciation,” prior to its expiration.6  A widow, who was neither a minor nor
an incompetent but, because of pending litigation that would significantly affect the value
of the Estate to her, needed more time to decide whether to renounce the Will, asked for an
extension.  The Orphans’ Court denied the request on the ground that it had no authority to
grant it.  
On appeal, the widow argued that the authority in the section otherwise dealing with
minor and incompetent spouses to grant “such extensions” applied to all spouses.  This Court
disagreed and affirmed the decision of the Orphans’ Court.  We pointed out that the right of
a surviving spouse to renounce a Will had always been strictly construed, and we concluded,
based on normal rules of statutory construction, that the words “such renunciation” were
intended to apply only to renunciations made by guardians on behalf of minor or incompetent
spouses.  We noted as well that it had always been the policy that Estates be administered and
closed expeditiously and that the Legislature may have believed that extending the time for
spouses generally to renounce might lead to delay and litigation in the settlement of Estates.
7 In 1949, in response to the Court’s decision in Barrett, the Legislature amended
Art. 93, § 315 to provide that “[t]he time for renunciation by any spouse may be enlarged
before its expiration by an order of the Orphans’ Court.”  1949 Md. Laws 369, § 1
(emphasis added); see also Senk v. Monk, 212 Md. 413, 419, 129 A.2d 675, 678 (1957). 
This statute is the predecessor of ET § 3-206(a)(2).
-17-
We agreed that the Orphans’ Court had no authority to enlarge the time for the widow to file
a renunciation.
Shirley correctly points out that the law under consideration in Barrett was different
from the law now before us, but it is a difference without a meaningful distinction.  Under
the law construed in Barrett, there was no authority whatever to extend the statutorily-
prescribed time for a competent, adult spouse to renounce the Will in favor of dower or a
statutory share.  Now there is, but only if the request for extension is filed before the current
period expires.7  When that period expires, the authority to extend it expires as well.  The
same underlying principles apply: there has been no retreat from the principle that the ability
to renounce a Will in favor of a statutory share is to be strictly construed (see Bunch v. Dick,
supra, 287 Md. 358, 412 A.2d 405), and the law still favors the expeditious administration
and early settlement of Estates.  See Parshley v. Mott, 241 Md. 577, 578, 217 A.2d 300, 301
(1966); Thomason v. Bucher, 266 Md. 1, 4, 291 A.2d 437, 439 (1972); Matthews v. Fuller,
209 Md. 42, 56, 120 A.2d 356, 363 (1956); Ewell v. Landing, 199 Md. 68, 72, 85 A.2d 475,
478 (1952).  The three lower courts were correct in concluding that the Orphans’ Court had
no authority to grant the untimely request for a fifth extension.
-18-
JUDGMENT OF COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS
AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS.
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
MARYLAND
No. 112
September Term, 2004
SHIRLEY L. DOWNES
v.
GREGORY DOWNES
Bell, C.J.
Raker
Wilner
Cathell
Harrell
Battaglia
         *Greene,
JJ.
Dissenting Opinion by Battaglia, J.
Filed:    August 15, 2005
*Greene, J.,  participated in the oral
argument but did not participate in the
decision or the adoption of this Opinion.
I respectfully dissent.
In this case we have been asked to decide if under Sections 3-203 and 3-206 of the
Estates and Trusts Article and Maryland Rule 6-411(c), the Orphans’ Court, or the Circuit
Court on de novo appeal, has the discretion to accept a surviving spouse’s fifth petition for
extension of time to make a statutory election where the petition was filed after the previous
election period had expired.  According to the majority, both the language of Section 3-206
and Rule 6-411(c) are mandatory restrictions on the Orphans’ Court’s authority to grant
extensions, and any requests for extension that are filed after the prior period has lapsed must
be denied.  
I disagree that the provisions of Section 3-206 and Rule 6-411(c) contain express
language prohibiting the Orphans’ Court from granting an extension request after the
expiration of the previous election period.  In my opinion, the language that the “court may
extend the time for election, before its expiration” contained in Section 3-206(a) and the
corresponding language in Rule 6-411(c) are discretionary or directory rather than mandatory
in nature, so that the Orphans’ Court may fashion an appropriate remedy for the late-filed
request provided that the requesting party shows good cause warranting the extension.
Neither the Orphans’ Court, nor the Circuit Court on appeal, determined whether good cause
existed to grant Mrs. Downes’s request to extend the deadline to make a statutory election.
Therefore, I would reverse the Court of Special Appeals and remand the case for further
proceedings by the Orphans’ Court to make such a determination.
1Section 3-203 states:
(a) General. — Instead of property left to him by will, the
surviving spouse may elect to take a one-third share of the net
estate if there is also a surviving issue, or a one-half share of
the net estate if there is no surviving issue.
(b) Limitation. — The surviving spouse who makes this
election may not take more than a one-half share of the net
estate.
(c) Calculation of net estate. — For the purposes of this
section, the net estate shall be calculated without a deduction
for the tax as defined in § 7-308 of the Tax-General Article. 
Md. Code (1974, 2001 Repl. Vol.), § 3-203 of the Estates and Trusts Article.
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Under Section 3-203(a) of the Estates and Trusts Article 1 a surviving spouse of a
decedent may elect to take a statutory share of the decedent’s net estate instead of property
left to the spouse by the decedent’s will.  Section 3-206(a) provides the procedural deadlines
for a surviving spouse to make that election, including any requests for extension of time to
elect:   
(a) In general; extension. — The election by a surviving spouse
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to take an elective share shall be made not later than seven
months after the date of the first appointment of a personal
representative under a will.  The court may extend the time for
election, before its expiration, for a period not to exceed three
months at a time, upon notice given to the personal
representative and for good cause shown.
Md. Code (1974, 2001 Repl. Vol.), § 3-206(a) of the Estates and Trusts Article.  The broad
purpose of the statute permitting the Orphans’ Court to extend the time to make an election
was designed to provide sufficient time to enable a surviving spouse to determine the
condition of the estate and to make reasoned, informed decisions as to whether he or she
should take under the will or the statutory share.  See Md. Code (1957, 1969 Repl. Vol.), Art.
93 § 3-206, cmt. (stating “[i]t is felt that this [section] will provide sufficient time within
which the surviving spouse may make an informed determination of whether or not the
election should be made, and at the same time will facilitate the early settlement of estates”),
recodified as Md. Code (1974, 2001 Repl. Vol.), § 3-206(a) of the Estates and Trusts Article.
Maryland Rule 6-411(c), its counterpart, contains the same operative provisions for
extensions:
Rule 6-411.  Election to take statutory share.
(c) Extension of time for making election.  Within the period
for making an election, the surviving spouse may file with the
court a petition for an extension of time.  The petitioner shall
deliver or mail a copy of the petition to the personal
representative.  For good cause shown, the court may grant
extensions not to exceed three months at a time, provided each
extension is granted before the expiration of the period
originally prescribed or extended by a previous order.  The court
may rule on the petition without a hearing or, if time permits,
with a hearing.
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The pertinent question is whether the Orphans’ Court, or the Circuit Court on appeal,
has any discretion to grant an extension when the request was not made within the time
prescribed by Section 3-206 and its corresponding Rule.  This Court has often stated that our
goal in interpreting statutes is to “identify and effectuate the legislative intent underlying the
statute(s) at issue.”  Ross v. Board of Elections, 387 Md. 649, 876 A.2d 692, 699 (2005);
Serio v. Baltimore County, 384 Md. 373, 390, 863 A.2d 952, 962 (2004), quoting Drew v.
First Guaranty Mortgage Corp., 379 Md. 318, 327, 842 A.2d 1, 6 (2003), in turn quoting
Derry v. State, 358 Md. 325, 335, 748 A.2d 478, 483 (2000).  We have held that the
principles applied to statutory interpretation also are used to interpret the Maryland Rules.
Davis v. Slater, 383 Md. 599, 604, 861 A.2d 78, 81 (2004); Beyer v. Morgan State
University, 369 Md. 335, 350, 800 A.2d 707, 715 (2002); Pickett v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
365 Md. 67, 78, 775 A.2d 1218, 1224 (2001); see generally Johnson v. State, 360 Md. 250,
265, 757 A.2d 796, 804 (2000).  Like construing a statute, to ascertain the meaning of a rule
of procedure we first look to the normal, plain meaning of the language.  Davis, 383 Md. at
604, 861 A.2d at 81; Luppino v. Gray, 336 Md. 194, 204 n.8, 647 A.2d 429, 434 n.8 (1994);
Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 511, 374 A.2d 900, 902 (1970); Balto. Gas & Elect. Co. v.
Board, 278 Md. 26, 31, 358 A.2d 241, 244 (1976);  Johnson, 360 Md. at 265, 757 A.2d at
804.  If that language is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the provision’s
terms to inform our analysis, Davis, 383 Md. at 605, 861 A.2d at 81; Rand, 280 Md. at 511,
374 A.2d at 902; Johnson, 360 Md. at 265, 757 A.2d at 804; however, the goal of our
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examination is always to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the
evils to be remedied by a particular provision, be it statutory or part of the Rules.  Davis, 383
Md. at 604, 861 A.2d at 81; Morris v. Prince George’s County, 319 Md. 597, 603-04, 573
A.2d 1346, 1349 (1990), citing Dept. of the Environment v. Showell, 316 Md. 259, 270, 558
A.2d 391, 396 (1989); Harford County v. Edgewater, 316 Md. 389, 397, 558 A.2d 1219,
1223 (1989).  To that end, we must consider the context in which a statute or rule appears,
including relevant legislative history.  Davis, 383 Md. at 604, 861 A.2d at 81; Mayor and
City Counsel of Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 129, 756 A.2d 987, 991-92 (2000), citing
Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Counsel of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 628, 632
(1987); Johnson, 360 Md. at 265, 757 A.2d at 804.  Also, where the language of a statute or
rule is ambiguous, external evidence may be referred to for discerning the purpose of the
legislature, including the bill’s title or function paragraphs, relevant case law, and secondary
sources.  Davis, 383 Md. at 604, 861 A.2d at 81; Moore v. Miley, 372 Md. 663, 678, 814
A.2d 557, 567 (2003); Comptroller of the Treasury v. Clyde’s of Chevy Chase, Inc., 377 Md.
471, 483, 833 A.2d 1014, 1021 (2003); Johnson, 360 Md. at 265, 757 A.2d at 804; Schuman,
Kane, Felts & Everngam, Chartered v. Aluisi, 341 Md. 115, 119, 668 A.2d 929, 932 (1995);
Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 515, 525 A.2d at 633. 
In Scherr v. Braun, 211 Md. 553, 128 A.2d 388 (1957), Judge Hall Hammond, writing
for this Court, discussed the factors used to determine whether a deadline contained within
a statute is mandatory or directory, thereby enabling the court to exercise its discretion to act
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outside of the prescribed time limitation:  
Where the directions of a statute look to the orderly and prompt
conduct of business, including the business of a court, it is
generally regarded as directory unless consequences for failure
to act in accordance with the statute are set out.  Statutory
provisions fixing the time for performance of acts are held to be
directory where there are no negative words restraining the
doing of the act after the time specified and no penalty is
imposed for delay.
Id. at 561, 128 A.2d at 391 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added).  In Scherr, the
statute’s language, 
The failure of the court to determine an appeal within a period
of 30 days after the record has been filed in court by the local
board as above provided, shall constitute an automatic
affirmance of the local board’s decision, unless the time has
been extended by the court for good cause shown . . . [,] 
was found to be mandatory in nature, because it contained “specific consequences of a failure
to act [i.e., ‘shall constitute an automatic affirmance of the local board’s decision’], and an
implication in the literal language that [was] a negation of the right to act after the time
specified [i.e., if the court fails to act within thirty days, it has no further jurisdiction in the
matter].”  Id. at 562, 128 A.2d at 391.   
This Court has employed this two prong test in various contexts in order to determine
whether the statute or rule-based deadline is directory in nature rather than mandatory,
emphasizing the lack of explicit consequences for non-compliance with time limitations.  See
In re Dewayne H., 290 Md. 401, 405-07, 430 A.2d 76, 79-80 (1981) (holding that the failure
to prescribe a sanction for non-conformance with time limitations within a statute and its
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corresponding rule indicated that its effect was intended to be directory and not mandatory);
Resetar v. State Board of Education, 284 Md. 537, 547-50, 399 A.2d 225, 230-32 (1979)
(holding that the County Board’s regulation was directory because it “provide[d] no penalty
and ma[d]e no provision in the event of a violation of the limit imposed”); Maryland State
Bar Association v. Frank, 272 Md. 528, 533, 325 A.2d 718, 721 (1974) (holding that statute
requiring bar association or state’s attorney on judge’s order to prosecute charges of
professional misconduct not more than sixty days from the date of order was directory rather
than mandatory with respect to the time limitation because “it [was] of some significance .
. . that the language of the statute provide[d] no penalty for failure to act within the time
prescribed”); Director, Patuxent Institution v. Cash, 269 Md. 331, 305 A.2d 833 (1973)
(holding that the statutory reporting provision deadline for persons awaiting examination and
evaluation at Patuxent was directory and not mandatory); Garland v. Director, Patuxent
Institution, 224 Md. 653, 655, 167 A.2d 91, 92 (1961) (holding that statutory provision for
hearing new trial motions in criminal cases within ten days was directory rather than
mandatory and that failure to hear the motion within time prescribed was not, alone, ground
for relief under the Post Conviction Procedure Act); Scherr, 211 Md. at 566, 128 A.2d at 394
(holding that statute providing that failure of court to determine appeal from Liquor License
Board within thirty days after filing of record was mandatory because the statute provided
an automatic affirmance of the agency’s decision as a sanction for non-compliance with the
deadline). 
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Obviously, when a statute or rule is directory rather than mandatory, a court is not
automatically bound to adhere to time limitations and could grant requests for extensions of
time, despite the expiration of a previous election period.  See Cash, 269 Md. at 341, 305
A.2d at 839 (analyzing former Md. Code (1957), Art. 31B § 7(a), recodified without
substantive change as Md. Code (1999, 2002 Cum. Supp.), § 4-301(b) of the Correctional
Services Article as directory); Garland, 224 Md. at 655, 167 A.2d at 92 (interpreting former
Md. Code (1957), Art. 27 § 594(a), recodified without substantive change as Md. Code
(2001), § 6-105 of the Criminal Procedure Article as directory).  In this case, neither Section
3-206(a) of the Estates and Trusts Article nor its corresponding Rule 6-411(c) uses language
that expressly constrains the Orphans’ Court from granting an extension after the time
specified and no penalty is imposed for delay in granting a request for extension whether
timely filed or not.  See Scherr, 211 Md. at 562, 566, 128 A.2d at 391, 394 (failure of the
court to act within prescribed time period resulted in an automatic affirmance of the local
Liquor Board’s decision).  In the absence of such language or legislative intent to the
contrary, Section 3-206(a) and Rule 6-411(c) should be interpreted as directory rather than
mandatory in nature and Mrs. Downes should be afforded the opportunity to show “good
cause” as to why her fifth petition for extension to file an election was tardy.