Case Title: In re LaBahn

Citation: 

Docket Number: S48901

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 2003-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
Filed: April 17, 2003
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON
In re: Complaint as to the Conduct of
WILLIAM S. LaBAHN,
Accused.
(OSB 99-2; SC S48901)
	On review of the decision of a trial panel of the
Disciplinary Board.
	Argued and submitted January 7, 2003.
	Mary A. Cooper, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, Lake
Oswego, argued the cause and filed the briefs for the Oregon
State Bar.
	John C. Fisher, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the
brief for the accused.
	Before Carson, Chief Justice, and Gillette, Durham,
Riggs, De Muniz, and Balmer, Justices.*
	PER CURIAM
	The accused is suspended from the practice of law for
60 days, commencing 60 days from the date of filing of this
decision.
	*Leeson, J., resigned January 31, 2003, and did not
participate in the decision of this case.
	PER CURIAM
	In this lawyer disciplinary proceeding, the Oregon
State Bar (Bar) alleged that, among other charges, the accused
violated Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule
(DR) 1-102(A)(3) (prohibiting dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and
misrepresentation) and DR 6-101(B) (prohibiting neglect of legal
matter).  The facts centered on the accused's alleged neglect of
a civil case that the trial court had dismissed for failure to
prosecute and his subsequent failure to tell the client about the
dismissal for over one year.  A trial panel of the Disciplinary
Board concluded that the accused had violated DR 6-101(B), but
not DR 1-102(A)(3), and imposed a 90-day suspension.  The Bar
sought review under ORS 9.536(1) and Bar Rule of Procedure (BR)
10.1. 
	The facts are largely undisputed.  The accused became a
member of the Bar in 1990.  He has one instance of prior
discipline, consisting of a March 1998 letter of admonition that
the Bar issued admonishing the accused for failing to act with
diligence and promptness and for failing to keep his client
informed about the status of her case.
	The alleged violations in this proceeding occurred
after a client, Norris, retained the accused in October 1996 to
pursue claims against a retail store, Wal-Mart, and a store
security employee for false arrest and malicious prosecution. 
The retainer agreement required Norris to pay the accused an
initial retainer of $1,500.  The accused and Norris understood
that the $1,500 would belong to the accused on payment and that
the accused would refund the money only if he failed to file a
complaint.  Before Norris retained the accused, Wal-Mart had
offered Norris a $5,000 settlement, which Norris had rejected.
	On December 16, 1996, the last day to file within the
statute of limitations, the accused filed the complaint.  The
accused sent Norris a copy of the complaint and stated that he
would serve the defendants later that week.  However, the accused
concedes that he did not effect timely service within 60 days
after filing the complaint.  See ORS 12.020(2) (explaining
procedure).
	On May 12, 1997, the court notified the accused that it
would dismiss the action unless he filed a proof of service
within 28 days.  After receiving that notice, the accused, on May
20, 1997, served the summons and complaint on Wal-Mart.  The
accused agrees that he failed to commence the action in a timely
manner for purposes of the statute of limitations.  See ORS
12.020(1) (discussing filing and service requirements).  The
accused did not file a proof of service.  As a result, on July
10, 1997, the court entered a judgment dismissing the case for
failure to return service.  When the accused learned of the
dismissal a few weeks later, he states that he "vaguely"
considered filing a motion to set aside judgment, but did not
because he concluded that the court probably would not grant such
a motion.
	When the accused filed the complaint, the accused told
Norris that he would contact Norris at necessary and important
times.  However, the accused did not contact Norris and did not
inform Norris of the dismissal.  Norris testified that, in the
months after December 1996, he telephoned the accused at least
twice and left messages, but that the accused did not return the
calls.  The accused does not recall receiving those messages.
	In the summer of 1998, Norris contacted another lawyer
in connection with a motor vehicle accident.  Norris asked that
lawyer also to look into the Wal-Mart matter.  The lawyer
informed Norris that the court had dismissed the complaint
against Wal-Mart.  Norris then contacted a law firm to pursue a
malpractice claim against the accused.  Those lawyers informed
Norris that the court had dismissed the case for failure to file
a proof of service.  They also told Norris to contact the accused
and ask him why the court had dismissed the Wal-Mart case.
	In August 1998, Norris telephoned the accused.  The
accused testified that, when he took the call, he knew who Norris
was, because Norris's matter was "something [that had] been
eating at [him] for awhile before he called."  The accused told
Norris that the court had dismissed the complaint for failure to
prosecute.  Norris asked the accused to refund the $1,500
retainer, plus $138 in costs.  The accused agreed to and did
refund the $1,500, but said that he could not remember whether he
or Norris had advanced the costs.  The accused asked Norris to
check his records and call him back.  Norris did not call about
the $138 and, instead, filed a Bar complaint on September 25,
1998.  After establishing that Norris had advanced the costs, the
accused refunded the $138.  The accused admitted that, if Norris
had not contacted him, he would have kept the $1,500.
	The Bar filed a formal complaint against the accused on
September 1, 1999, and amended the complaint on October 23, 2000. 
The Bar's amended complaint charged the accused with violating DR
1-102(A)(3), DR 6-101(B), DR 9-101(A) (prohibiting failure to
deposit client funds in trust account), and DR 9-101(C)(3)
(prohibiting failure to account for client funds).  In his
answer, the accused admitted that he had violated DR 6-101(B),
but denied all the other charges.
	The trial panel concluded that, based on the accused's
admission, the Bar had established that the accused violated DR
6-101(B) for failing to serve the defendants and file a proof of
service within the time permitted by law and for failing to
communicate with Norris for over one year after the court had
dismissed the case.  The trial panel concluded that the accused
did not violate DR 1-102(A)(3), because the failure to inform
Norris of the dismissal did not show that the accused was
"actively scheming" to deceive Norris, nor had the accused made
any affirmative statement about the case to Norris, so he was
under no duty to correct a prior statement.  The trial panel
dismissed the remaining charges, including the DR 1-102(A)(3)
charge, and imposed a 90-day suspension.
	On review, the Bar urges the court to accept the
panel's finding that the accused violated DR 6-101(B), find the
accused guilty of the DR 1-102(A)(3) charge, and impose at least
a four-month suspension and perhaps as much as a one-year
suspension. (1)  In response, the accused requests that this court
impose only the sanction of a public reprimand or, in the
alternative, a suspension.
	We first address the charge under DR 6-101(B), which
provides that "[a] lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to the lawyer."  The accused admits that he violated DR
6-101(B) by failing to serve the defendants, failing to file
proof of service with the court within the statute of
limitations, and failing to inform Norris of the status of the
case from July 1997 to August 1998.  We accept the concession and
conclude that the accused violated DR 6-101(B). 
	We next address DR 1-102(A)(3), which provides that
"[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to * * * [e]ngage
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation[.]"  The Bar alleged that the accused violated
DR 1-102(A)(3) in two respects.  First, the Bar claimed, and the
accused admitted, that from July 1997 until August 1998, "the
Accused failed to advise Norris that his case had been
dismissed."  Second, the Bar alleged that, when the accused did
tell Norris of the dismissal, the accused failed to advise Norris
that dismissal had occurred because the accused had failed to
file a proof of service.  The trial panel rejected the latter
theory, and the Bar does not pursue it before this court.  As a
result, the only issue before the court is whether the accused
engaged in misrepresentation by omission under DR 1-102(A)(3) by
failing for over one year to inform Norris that the court had
dismissed his tort action.
	The Bar has the burden of establishing by clear and
convincing evidence its charge of misrepresentation by omission
under DR 1-102(A)(3).  BR 5.2.  This court is equally divided
with respect to whether the Bar has established that charge. 
Consequently, the court dismisses that charge against the
accused.  The remaining question concerns the appropriate
sanction for the accused's neglect of a legal matter.  We turn
now to that issue.
	To determine the appropriate sanction in a disciplinary
proceeding, the court looks to the American Bar Association's
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1991) (ABA Standards)
and Oregon case law.  In re Huffman, 331 Or 209, 223, 13 P3d 994
(2000).  The court ascertains the appropriate sanction for the
violation present here by considering (1) the duty violated, (2)
the accused's mental state, (3) the actual or potential injury
caused by the misconduct, and (4) the existence of aggravating or
mitigating circumstances.  ABA Standard 3.0.
	Every lawyer owes a duty of diligence to the client. 
ABA Standard 4.4.  In regard to the accused's mental state, the
accused acted with knowledge in neglecting Norris's matter. 
"Suspension is generally appropriate when * * * a lawyer
knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes
injury[.]"  ABA Standard 4.42(a).  
	Several aggravating factors are present, including a
prior disciplinary offense, a selfish motive in not contacting
Norris, and substantial experience in the practice of law.  ABA
Standards 9.22(a), (b), and (i).  The prior disciplinary offense,
as noted above, concerns the letter of admonition that the Bar
issued on March 24, 1998.  The underlying conduct in that matter
similarly involved the accused's failure to represent a client
diligently and to keep the client informed about the status of
the client's legal matter.  The trial panel stated that the Bar
had issued the letter of admonition "after the conduct complained
of in this case, and [thus the letter] could not serve as a
warning to the Accused regarding his conduct herein." 
Consequently, the trial panel accorded little weight to the
letter of admonition.  
	We do not agree with that analysis.  As this court
observed in In re Cohen, 330 Or 489, 500, 8 P3d 953 (2000), a letter of admonition is not a form of sanction or a part of a
record of prior discipline imposed on an accused lawyer. 
However, this court considers a letter of admonition as evidence
of past misconduct "if the misconduct that gave rise to that
letter was of the same or similar type as the misconduct at issue
in the case at bar."  Id.  The letter of admonition that the Bar
issued to the accused in March 1998 satisfies that criterion. 
Because the letter of admonition constitutes evidence of prior
misconduct, we evaluate its seriousness according to the criteria
set out in In re Jones, 326 Or 195, 200, 951 P2d 149 (1997): 
		"We take this opportunity to discuss our
application of the 'prior offenses' aggravating factor. 
First, that factor refers to offenses that have been
adjudicated prior to imposition of the sanction in the
current case.  Second, the following considerations
also are an important part of our analysis:  (1) the
relative seriousness of the prior offense and resulting
sanction; (2) the similarity of the prior offense to
the offense in the case at bar; (3) the number of prior
offenses; (4) the relative recency of the prior
offense; and (5) the timing of the current offense in
relation to the prior offense and resulting sanction,
specifically, whether the accused lawyer had been
sanctioned for the prior offense before engaging in the
offense in the case at bar.  Those considerations are
important, because they can serve to heighten or
diminish the significance of earlier misconduct."
(Footnote omitted.)
	The trial panel relied on one of the Jones criteria --
the timing of the current offense -- in discounting the
seriousness of the letter of admonition.  The Bar issued the
letter of reprimand after the accused began to neglect Norris's
legal matter.  However, the accused continued his neglectful
conduct for approximately five months after his receipt of the
Bar's letter of admonition.  The facts demonstrate that the
accused chose to pay insufficient heed to the message regarding
the lawyer's duty of diligence that the letter of admonition
conveyed.  See In re Brandt/Griffin, 331 Or 113, 148-49, 10 P3d
906 (2000) (discussing aggravating effect of disregarding recent
letter of admonition issued for similar misconduct).
	Following the construct described in Jones, we note
that the accused's prior misconduct was moderately serious and
resulted in a letter of admonition.  The letter of admonition
involved misconduct similar to that involved here, is the
accused's only instance of prior misconduct, and concerned
relatively recent misconduct by the accused.  We conclude, on the
basis of our consideration of the Jones criteria, that the letter
of admonition constitutes evidence of misconduct that heightens,
at least to a moderate degree, the significance of the accused's
neglect of Norris's case.  
	The mitigating factors include cooperation with the
Bar, the imposition of other penalties (in the form of a $15,000
malpractice settlement), and genuine remorse.  ABA Standards
9.32(e), (k), and (l).  In this instance, we conclude that the
aggravating and mitigating factors are in equipoise. 
Preliminarily, our consideration of the ABA Standards indicates
that a suspension is appropriate.
	This court's case law provides some guidance regarding
the appropriate sanction.  In In re Schaffner, 323 Or 472, 918
P2d 803 (1996), the accused lawyer neglected his clients'
representation by failing to return telephone calls from the
clients and the opposing lawyer, failing to respond to discovery
requests, and failing to inform the clients of their scheduled
depositions, a motion for sanctions, and an arbitration hearing. 
The court found that the lawyer's neglect caused damage to the
clients but concluded that it could not determine a particular
amount of damages.  Id. at 475.  The court imposed a 60-day
suspension "for knowing neglect of his clients' case over a
period of time."  Id. at 481.  The court imposed an additional
60-day suspension for a separate disciplinary rule violation. 
Id.
	In In re Butler, 324 Or 69, 921 P2d 401 (1996), the
accused lawyer filed a complaint for a client but failed to serve
the defendant.  As a result, the court dismissed the action with
prejudice.  The lawyer failed to inform the client about the
dismissal and gave false assurances to the client about the
status of the case.  The court noted that the lawyer "has engaged
in a pattern of similar misconduct, spanning about 10 years and
involving three separate clients."  Id. at 76.  The court
concluded that the accused lawyer was guilty of neglect and
dishonesty, and imposed a one-year suspension.
	In In re Kissling, 303 Or 638, 740 P2d 179 (1987), the
accused lawyer violated his promises to multiple clients to
investigate and pursue claims against others and misled the
clients about his inaction.  The court determined that the lawyer
had engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, neglected the legal
matters, failed to carry out a contract of employment, and made
false statements, and ordered a 63-day suspension.  Id. at 641-42.
	In In re Dugger, 299 Or 21, 697 P2d 973 (1985), the
accused lawyer commenced but then abandoned a lien enforcement
proceeding, failed to communicate with the client, and
misrepresented the status of the case.  In discussing the
appropriate sanction for the lawyer's neglect of the client's
legal matter, the court stated:
	"From a client's viewpoint, nonperformance by neglect,
needless and unexplained delay, and especially failure
to communicate or to respond to inquiries no doubt can
be as frustrating as outright prevarication or some
other disciplinary violations can be, even when the
neglect does not result in the ultimate loss of the
client's objective.  In re Holm, 285 Or 189, 194, 590
P2d 233 (1979) (Holman, J., concurring) (60 day
suspension for dilatoriness and neglect); In re Guerts,
290 Or 241, 246, 620 P2d 1373 (1980) (30 day suspension
for neglect, and noting 'potentially disastrous
consequences of procrastination or inattention for the
parties concerned.')"
Id. at 29.  The court concluded that the lawyer was guilty of
neglect, misrepresentation, and failure to cooperate with a Bar
investigation, and imposed a 63-day suspension.  Id. at 29, 30.
	In In re Morrow, 297 Or 808, 688 P2d 820 (1984), the
accused lawyer failed to timely file a legal action and
repeatedly led the client to believe that he had filed the action
and was negotiating a settlement.  The court concluded that the
accused lawyer had neglected the client's case and committed
misrepresentation, and ordered a 60-day suspension.  Id. at 818,
822.
	In In re Fuller, 284 Or 273, 586 P2d 1111 (1978), the
accused lawyer committed conduct that was similar to that
described in Morrow.  The court imposed a 60-day suspension,
albeit for failing to correct the client's false impression about
the status of the legal matter rather than for neglect of the
legal matter.  Id. at 277-78.
	The foregoing discussion of this court's case law
confirms the seriousness of a lawyer's misconduct in neglecting a
legal matter entrusted by a client.  Although the accused's
conduct is similar to the neglectful behavior shown in Butler, it
is far less aggravated.  The one-year suspension ordered in
Butler would not be appropriate here.  The accused's misconduct
resembles the neglect shown in Schaffner, which led to a 60-day
suspension.  Unlike the vague evidence of the extent of client
injury in Schaffner, the evidence in this case shows that the
accused's neglect produced a costly injury to Norris.  
	The facts in Kissling, Dugger, Morrow, and Fuller also
are analogous to the facts in this case.  Those cases also led to
suspensions of approximately 60 days.  In one sense, the
accused's misconduct is more serious than the misconduct shown in
those cases, because the accused failed to respond appropriately
to the Bar's admonition in March 1998 and continued to neglect
Norris's case for five more months.  By contrast, the court
determined that the accused lawyers in those cases were guilty of
multiple charges of misconduct, including misrepresentation to
their clients.  Although we conclude that the accused is guilty
of one charge of neglect of a legal matter, our review of this
court's analogous cases indicates that a 60-day suspension is the
appropriate sanction in this case.  
	After considering our past cases, the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances present here, the accused's state of
mind, and the seriousness of the accused's neglect of the matter
entrusted to him by Norris, we conclude that a 60-day suspension
is the appropriate sanction, and we impose it on the accused.
	The accused is suspended from the practice of law for
60 days, commencing 60 days from the date of filing of this
decision.



1. 	The Bar does not seek review of the trial panel's
dismissal of the DR 9-101(A) and DR 9-101(C)(3) charges.