Case Title: State Ex Rel. Wallace v. Bone

Citation: 286 S.E.2d 79

Docket Number: 

State: north-carolina

Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Date: 1982-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
286 S.E.2d 79 (1982) STATE of North Carolina, ex rel. James C. WALLACE and David Howells v. Roger W. BONE and Robie L. Nash. Frederick S. BARKALOW and Brenda Armstrong v. J. J. HARRINGTON, R. P. Thomas, Roger W. Bone and Robie Nash. No. 55. Supreme Court of North Carolina. January 12, 1982. *81 Atty. Gen. Rufus L. Edmisten by Asst. Atty. Gen. Thomas F. Moffitt, Raleigh, for defendants-appellees. Thomas S. Erwin, Raleigh, for plaintiffs-appellants. BRITT, Justice. Section 6 of Article I of our state constitution provides: "Separation of powers. The legislative, executive and supreme judicial powers of the State government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other." We hold that the challenged enactment of the General Assembly violates this section of the state constitution and that the judgment appealed from must be reversed. In arriving at this conclusion, we have considered, among other things, the history of the principle of separation of powers in our state and nation, the decisions of other jurisdictions in our nation respecting the principle, and the specific provisions of our constitution and the statutes involved. Since North Carolina became a state in 1776, three constitutions have been adopted: In 1776, in 1868 and in 1970. The first two documents provided that "[t]he legislative, executive and supreme judicial powers of Government, ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other." The 1970 rewrite contains the language first quoted above, changing "ought to be" to "shall be". Thus each of our constitutions has explicitly embraced the doctrine of separation of powers.[1] *82 Section 1 of Article II of our present constitution provides that "[t]he legislative power of the State shall be vested in the General Assembly, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." Section 1 of Article III provides that "[t]he executive power of the State shall be vested in the Governor." Section 1 of Article IV provides: Previous constitutions contained similar provisions. Our first state constitution was adopted on 18 December 1776.[2] While records with respect to the drafting and adoption of our first constitution are sparse, history has recorded the instructions given by their constituents to two county delegations participating in the drafting of the first constitutionthe delegations from Mecklenburg and Orange Counties. Instructions to the Mecklenburg delegation included the following: Instructions to the Orange delegation included the following: The federal constitution was drafted and adopted in 1787, eleven years after our first state constitution was adopted. While the federal constitution contains no explicit provision regarding separation of powers, the principle is clearly implied. Article I, Section 1, provides that "[a]ll legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a senate and house of representatives." Article II, Section 1, provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in a president of the United States of America ...." Article III, Section 1, provides that "[t]he judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish ...." There is abundant evidence that the drafters of the federal constitution had the separation of powers principle in mind, and, for the most part, the principle has been championed and adhered to throughout the history of our republic. Alexander Hamilton, one of the drafters of the federal constitution and keeper of copious notes, wrote: It appears that George Washington, the father of our country, feared the destruction of our form of government by an abuse of the principle of separation of powers. In his Farewell Address, he said: There are many indications that North Carolina, for more than 200 years, has strictly adhered to the principle of separation of powers. One indication is that ours is one of the few states, if not the only state, in the Union that does not provide its governor with the power to veto enactments of the legislature. Numerous efforts to change our constitution to give the governor that power have failed. The clear implication is that our people do not want the chief executive to have any direct control over our legislative branch. Another indication is the absence of cases which have come to this court contending *84 that a branch of our state government violated the separation of powers principle. While the case at hand appears to be one of first impression in our jurisdiction, we have found two instances in which members of the judiciary have expressed themselves on the principle. In the fifth case reported in our reports, Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. 5 (1787), it is recorded that Ashe, J., deviated from the case under consideration to make "a few observations on our Constitution and system of government." Obviously referring to our national government, he said: 1 N.C. at 6. In State v. Bell, 184 N.C. 701, 115 S.E. 190 (1922), this court was confronted with the interpretation and application of a criminal statute relating to support of children. A majority of the court gave the statute a liberal interpretation and upheld the conviction of the defendant. Stacy, J., (later C. J.), dissented on the ground that the statute should be strictly construed. The following is from his dissenting opinion: 184 N.C. at 719, 115 S.E. 190. There should be no doubt that the principle of separation of powers is a cornerstone of our state and federal governments. Numerous decisions from sister states show strict adherence to the separation of powers principle and do not tolerate legislative encroachment or control over the function and power of the executive branch. See Book v. State Office Building Commission, supra; State ex rel. State Building Commission of West Virginia v. Bailey, 151 W.Va. 79, 150 S.E.2d 449 (1966); Greer v. Georgia, 233 Ga. 667, 212 S.E.2d 836 (1975); Stockman v. Leddy, 55 Colo. 24, 129 P. 220 (1912). See also Bradner v. Hammond, 553 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1976); Ahearn v. Bailey, 104 Ariz. 250, 451 P.2d 30 (1969); In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 276 So. 2d 25 (Fla.1973); In re Opinion of the Justices to the Governor, 369 Mass. 990, 341 N.E.2d 254 *85 (1976) (This case stated flexibility in allocation of functions may sometimes be permissible, but only if it creates no interference by one department with the power of another.); Dearborn TP. v. Dail, 334 Mich. 673, 55 N.W.2d 201 (1952); and State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 59 Wis.2d 391, 208 N.W.2d 780 (1973). A review of a representative number of those decisions is in order. In Book v. State Office Building Commission, supra, the Supreme Court of Indiana declared unconstitutional that part of the State Office Building Act which provided that certain members of the legislature should be members of the State Office Building Commission. The court held that this part of the act violated the division of powers provision of the state constitution because it attempted to confer executive-administrative duties upon members of the legislature. Referring to the separation of powers provision of the Indiana Constitution, the court said: 149 N.E.2d at 296. In State ex rel. State Building Commission of West Virginia v. Bailey, supra, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia declared unconstitutional that portion of a statute which named certain members of the legislature to the State Building Commission on the ground that the statute violated the separation of powers provision of the state constitution. We quote from the opinion: 150 S.E.2d at 456. In Greer v. State of Georgia et al., supra, the Supreme Court of Georgia declared unconstitutional legislation naming certain legislators to serve on the governing body of the World Congress Authority. The legislative act created said agency, a public corporation, to plan, construct, erect, acquire, own, repair, remodel, maintain, add to, extend, improve, equip, operate and manage the Georgia World Congress Center. The act also provided that the governing body of the authority would consist of 20 members, six of whom would be members of the General Assembly. In holding that the part of the act providing for members of the legislature to serve on the authority violated the separation of powers provision of the state constitution, the Georgia court said: 212 S.E.2d at 838. In Stockman v. Leddy, supra, the Supreme Court of Colorado declared unconstitutional an act of the Colorado legislature creating a joint committee of its members to conduct an investigation on which the committee would come to a conclusion and act in prosecuting or defending certain actions for the benefit of the state. In holding that the legislation violated the principle of separation of powers, the Colorado court said: 129 P. at 223. In O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 53 S. Ct. 740, 77 L. Ed. 1356 (1933), the U.S. Supreme Court, after stating that our federal constitution distributes the power of government between the three branches, said: 289 U.S. at 530, 53 S. Ct. at 743, 77 L. Ed. at 1360. In his judgment, Judge Bailey recited that he found the decision of the Supreme Court of South Carolina in State ex rel. McLeod v. Edwards, 269 S.C. 75, 236 S.E.2d 406 (1977), to be very persuasive. He also cited State ex rel. Schneider v. Bennett, 219 Kan. 285, 547 P.2d 786 (1976). A study of these cases reveals that South Carolina and Kansas have deviated from the separation of powers principle. In State ex rel. McLeod v. Edwards, supra, the constitutionality of two members of the South Carolina General Assembly serving as ex officio members of the State Budget and Control Board was challenged. This board is composed of the governor, the state treasurer, the controller general, the chairman of the senate finance committee, and the chairman of the house ways and means committee. All members of the board are ex officio. Relying on its previous decisions, the court held that the inclusion of members of the legislature on the board did not violate the separation of powers provisions of the state constitution. In defending its holdings, the court said: 236 S.E.2d 408-09. In State ex rel. Schneider v. Bennett, supra, the question of the constitutionality of members of the legislature serving on the state finance council was presented. This council consists of the governor, the *87 speaker of the house, the president of the senate, the majority and minority leaders of the house and senate, and the chairmen of the ways and means committees of the house and senate. The council was created as a "legislatively oriented" agency to approve the rules and regulations of the department of administration and thereby to check the power of the governor to coordinate the activities of state agencies. The council was specifically authorized to exercise control and authority over the state department of administration as a whole; to approve any and all rules and regulations with respect to the manner of performance of any power or duty of the department and the execution of any business of the department and its relations to and business with other state agencies; to hear and determine appeals by any state agency from final decisions or final actions of the secretary of administration; and to make allocations to, and approve expenditures by a state agency from any appropriations to the state finance council for that purpose, of funds for unanticipated and unbudgeted needs, under conditions and limitations prescribed by the legislature. In commenting on the separation of powers doctrine, the Kansas court said: 547 P.2d at 791. However, the Kansas court also said: 547 P.2d at 792. The Kansas court then proceeded to hold, however, that many, if not most, of the duties assigned to the state finance council were executive in nature and the exercise of those powers by legislators was unconstitutional. We quote again from the opinion: 547 P.2d at 797. Having stated the history of the separation of powers principle, and having considered its application by other states, we now relate the principle to the challenged legislation providing for four members of our General Assembly to serve on the EMC. The Environmental Management Commission exists pursuant to G.S. 143B-282 et seq. Its purpose is stated in G.S. 143B-282 as follows: Within the limitations of G.S. 143-215.9 concerning industrial health and safety, the EMC has the power and duty, among other things, to grant and revoke permits with regard to controlling sources of air and water pollution; to issue special orders pursuant to certain statutes to any person whom the commission finds responsible for causing or contributing to any pollution of water within a watershed or pollution of the air within the area for which standards have been established; to conduct and direct that investigations be conducted pursuant to certain statutes; to conduct public hearings, institute actions in superior court, and agree upon or enter into settlements, all pursuant to G.S. 143-215.3; to direct the investigation of any killing of fish and wildlife pursuant to G.S. 143-215.3; to review and have general oversight and supervision over local air pollution control programs pursuant to certain statutes; to declare an emergency when it finds a generalized dangerous condition of water or air pollution pursuant to certain statutes; to grant permits for water use within capacity use areas pursuant to G.S. 143-215.15; to direct that investigations be conducted when necessary to carry out duties regarding capacity use areas; to approve, disapprove and approve subject to conditions all applications for dam construction pursuant to G.S. 143-215.28; to halt dam construction pursuant to G.S. 143-215.29; to have jurisdiction and supervision over the maintenance and operation of dams pursuant to G.S. 143-215.31; and to have jurisdiction and supervision over all pollution pursuant to Article 21A of Chapter 143. G.S. 143B-282(1). The EMC is also given the power and duty to establish standards and adopt rules and regulations for air quality standards, emission control standards, and classifications for air contaminant sources pursuant to G.S. 143-215.107; for water quality standards and classifications pursuant to certain statutes, to implement the issuance of permits for water use within capacity use areas; and for the protection of sand dunes pursuant to certain statutes. G.S. 143B-282(2). Prior to 1979, the EMC consisted of 13 members, all appointed by the Governor. The statute also sets forth certain vocational qualifications for members of the commission. It is crystal clear to us that the duties of the EMC are administrative or executive in character and have no relation to the function of the legislative branch of government, which is to make laws. We agree with the Georgia court's holding in Greer, that the legislature cannot constitutionally create a special instrumentality of government to implement specific legislation and then retain some control over the process of implementation by appointing legislators to the governing body of the instrumentality. We agree with the Kansas and South Carolina courts that there should be cooperation between the legislative and executive branches of government. For many years North Carolina has recognized and benefited from cooperative efforts between the branches of its government. The best examples of this are various study commissions on which legislators and non-legislators, including persons from other branches of government, have served. Many recommendations of these commissions have been enacted into law beneficial to the citizens of our state. Counsel for defendants have set forth in an exhibit to their brief a list of 49 other boards and commissions on which legislators serve as members pursuant to statutes. We do not find it appropriate to comment on any board or commission except the one which is the subject of this appeal. Suffice it to say, the people of North Carolina on at least three occasionsthe last opportunity being as late as 1970explicitly adopted the principle of separation of powers. It behooves each branch of our government to respect and abide by that principle. *89 For the reasons stated, we conclude that Section 6 of Chapter 1158 of the 1979 Sessions Laws [codified as §§ (d) of G.S. 143B-283] violates Section 6 of Article I of the North Carolina Constitution. Consequently, the judgment appealed from is Reversed. [1] N.C. Constitution, Sec. 4, Declaration of Rights (1776); N.C. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8 (1868); N.C. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 6 (1970). [2] This constitution was adopted at the Fifth Provincial Congress which met in Halifax, N.C. The constitution was not submitted to a vote of the people. The History of a Southern State, North Carolina, Lefler and Newsome, 3rd ed., pg. 221. In commenting on the first constitution, Professors Lefler and Newsome record: "The political theory of the new constitution, stated in Articles 1, 2 and 4, emphasized popular sovereignty, separation of powers, and three separate branches of government." Id. [3] The Colonial Records of North Carolina, Saunders, Vol. X, 870a, 870b. [4] Id., 870g, 870h. Professors Lefler and Newsome tell us that "it was only the pressure from a few county delegations notably Orange and Mecklenburg, that compelled the Congress to add a Bill of Rights to its constitution." The History of a Southern State, North Carolina, supra, pg. 221. [5] Quoted by the Supreme Court of Indiana in Book v. State Office Building Commission, 238 Ind. 120, 149 N.E.2d 273 (1958).