Case Title: FLOYD DEWAYNE GRADY v. THE STATE OF WYOMING

Citation: 

Docket Number: 06-287

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2008-12-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
FLOYD DEWAYNE GRADY v. THE STATE OF WYOMING2008 WY 144197 P.3d 722Case Number: No. 06-287Decided: 12/10/2008
OCTOBER 
TERM, A.D. 2008

 
 
FLOYD 
DEWAYNE GRADY,Appellant(Defendant),v.THE STATE OF 
WYOMING,Appellee(Plaintiff).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofTetonCounty

The 
Honorable Norman Young, Judge

 
 

Representing 
Appellant:

Diane 
M. Lozano, Wyoming State Public Defender; Tina N. Kerin, Appellate Counsel; 
David Westling, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel; Kirk A. Morgan, Assistant 
Appellate Counsel.  Argument by Ms. 
Kerin.

 
 

Representing 
Appellee:

Bruce 
A. Salzburg, Wyoming Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Leda M. Pojman, 
Assistant Attorney General.  
Argument by Ms. Pojman.

 
 
Before 
VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, BURKE, JJ.

 
 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 
 
[¶1]      A jury convicted 
Appellant Floyd Wayne Grady of attempted first degree sexual assault and first 
degree murder, for which he was sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment 
of forty to fifty years and life without the possibility of parole.  On appeal, Grady raises issues 
concerning the exclusion of alternate suspect evidence, the denial of a 
continuance, lost evidence, and prosecutorial misconduct.  We affirm.

 
 

ISSUES

 
 
[¶2]      Grady presents 
these issues for our review:

 
 
I.          
Did the trial court commit reversible, constitutional error when it kept 
out evidence of alternate suspects in the death of Ms. Watts and subsequently 
denied a motion for new trial based on those evidentiary 
rulings?

 
 
II.         
Did the trial court err when it denied Appellant's motion for 
continuance, which was based upon the late provision of discovery pertaining to 
a potential alternate suspect in Ms. Watts' death?

 
 
III.        Did 
reversible error occur when a potentially exculpatory note was "lost" by the 
State?

 
 
IV.       Did the 
prosecutors commit prosecutorial misconduct?

 
 
FACTS

 
 
[¶3]      Tammy Watts 
worked as a nurse at the Wyoming Honor Farm located in Riverton, Wyoming.  
On April 15, 2004, and in accordance with her usual practice, Mrs. Watts 
reported to work a few minutes before 6:00 o'clock that morning.  Approximately fifty minutes later, her 
body was discovered in the dental area of the medical office (a.k.a. nurse's 
office), which was located in the basement of the AdministrationBuilding at the Honor Farm.  Mrs. Watts was lying "spread eagle" on 
the floor in a pool of blood.  Her 
shirt was pulled up over her head, her breasts were exposed, and she was nude 
from the waist down.  Mrs. Watts had 
been strangled with an electrical cord and had suffered blunt traumatic injuries 
to her face and head, as well as cerebral contusions.  Mrs. Watts' body showed signs of 
lividity, indicating she was killed shortly after arriving at work that 
morning.  

 
 
[¶4]      Investigators 
initially considered all inmates and staff of the Honor Farm potential 
suspects.  The investigation into 
Mrs. Watts' death, however, ultimately focused on Grady.  As a result of the investigation, the 
State charged Grady with premeditated and felony first degree murder,1 attempted first degree sexual 
assault2 and kidnapping,3 and sought the death penalty.  

 
 
[¶5]      The case first 
went to trial on October 31, 2005, in FremontCounty, and resulted in a hung jury.4  Thereafter, the district court granted 
Grady's request for a change in venue and transferred the case to TetonCounty.  Grady's second trial commenced on April 
10, 2006.  At trial, the State 
presented evidence which placed Grady in the vicinity of the AdministrationBuilding around the time of Mrs. Watts' 
murder.  At approximately 5:45 a.m., 
Grady was seen outside the building's east entrance and, at approximately 6:10 
a.m., in the building's laundry area only a few feet from the medical 
office.  Minutes later, Grady was, 
once again, observed outside the east entrance, at which time he seemed hurried, 
sweaty and pale, and had what appeared to be blood on his nose.  

 
 
[¶6]      The State also 
presented extensive forensic evidence linking Grady to Mrs. Watts' murder.  Mrs. Watts' blood was found on Grady's 
state-issued blue nylon jacket, which he was seen wearing shortly after the 
murder and which was later found in his room.  Mrs. Watts' DNA was found on a 
right-handed leather glove recovered from a drainage ditch not far from the 
AdministrationBuilding, and a mixture of 
Mrs. Watts' DNA and Grady's DNA was found on an identical left-handed glove 
retrieved from Grady's room.  
Biological evidence containing a mixture of Mrs. Watts' DNA and Grady's 
DNA was also found on the jacket Mrs. Watts was wearing at the time of her 
murder and on the bloody carpet in the dental room.  Additionally, evidence consistent with 
Grady's DNA was found on Mrs. Watts' breasts.  Finally, Grady's fingerprints were found 
on the dental chair that was located next to Mrs. Watts' body.  

 
 
[¶7]      In addition, the 
State's evidence revealed, among other things: Grady was never treated in the 
dental office; Grady was at the medical office ten times in the previous two 
weeks, including the day before the murder, and on several occasions Grady was 
waiting for Mrs. Watts outside the medical office when she arrived at work; 
Grady wrote several notes to Mrs. Watts, some of which were sexual in nature; 
Grady was upset with the nursing staff the day before the murder; there was mud 
on the floor in Grady's room, as well as inmate Christopher Wohletz's adjoining 
room and their shared bathroom, which was not there the night before Mrs. Watts' 
murder; and Grady had recently shaved his goatee and pubic hair.  

 
 
[¶8]      At the conclusion 
of trial, the jury found Grady guilty on the charged offenses.  The jury declined to impose the death 
penalty on the murder counts and, 
instead, opted for a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole.  The district court 
subsequently sentenced Grady to forty to fifty years on the attempted first 
degree sexual assault conviction and ordered that the life sentence be served 
consecutively to that sentence.  
This appeal followed.

 
 
[¶9]      Additional facts 
will be set forth in our discussion of the issues raised by 
Grady.

 
 

DISCUSSION

 
 

A.        
Exclusion of Alternate Suspect Evidence5

 
 
[¶10]   Prior to Grady's second trial, the 
State filed a motion to exclude evidence of alternate suspects in the murder of 
Mrs. Watts until Grady produced an adequate evidentiary basis supporting its 
admission.  The State noted that 
Grady had indirectly accused inmates Dale Goss, Thomas Bedsaul, Scott Young and 
Joe Sanchez of murdering Mrs. Watts during his first trial, and that it 
anticipated Grady would employ the same defense strategy in the second 
trial.  The State asserted that 
alternate suspect evidence was not admissible unless it established a probative 
nexus between the alleged suspects and Mrs. Watts' murder.  The district court denied the State's 
motion but ruled it would require Grady to establish at trial a proper 
foundation for the admission of any proffered alternate suspect evidence under 
the standard articulated in United States 
v. McVeigh,  153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 1998).  The district court 
stated:

 
 
As 
a motion in limine, I'm going to deny the State's motion.  I don't perceive that the parties are 
that far apart in what they understand the law to be here.  In fact, -- well, they don't disagree as 
to what the law is, it's just how the Court applies it, I guess, is the central 
issue.  But the quotation from the 
McVay [sic] case, I think, is appropriate and sets forth the 
standard.

 
 
In 
fact, the State cited it in their motion, and they [sic] not only cited it, they 
[sic] highlighted it.  Although 
there is no doubt that the defendant has the right to attempt to establish his 
innocence by showing that someone else did the crime, the defendant still must 
show that is [sic] proffered evidence on the alleged alternative perpetrator is 
sufficient on its own or in combination with other evidence in the record to 
show a nexus between the crime charged and the assertive [sic] alternative 
perpetrator.  It is not sufficient 
for a defendant merely to offer up unsupported speculation that another person 
may have done the crime.  Such 
speculative claiming intensifies the grave risk of jury confusion, and it 
invites the jury to render its findings based on [emotion or] 
prejudice.

 
 
* 
* * *

 
 
Again, 
the way I would anticipate it would happen is that if and when [the] defense 
starts on a line of questioning along those lines, I'll hear an objection.  And we'll resolve it when I hear the 
objection.  And that probably will 
include a request for an offer of proof, otherwise, -- in other words, there has 
to be a foundation before you get to the point, and if there's no foundation, 
then it's not coming in.  

 
 
[¶11]   At trial, and as expected, Grady 
denied killing Mrs. Watts and sought to introduce evidence that one of the 
aforementioned inmates, as well as Taylor Kubiak or Cory Warpness, committed the 
crime.  The State objected and, in 
accordance with its earlier ruling, the district court declined to admit the 
alternate suspect evidence absent an offer of proof establishing the required 
nexus between the crime and the alleged alternate suspect.  Thereafter, Grady provided an offer of 
proof which listed the following evidence:

 
 
(1)  Inmate Dale Goss:  Testimony from Sergeant Davis and Tilton 
Davis (Wyoming State Crime Lab) that Goss' shoes contained an unknown red 
substance, and that there was an unknown red substance on the carpet in the 
medical office.  Testimony from Jim 
Nethercott, a caseworker at the Honor Farm, that Goss suffers from violent 
blackouts during which he commits crimes.  
Grady noted that previous testimony indicated Goss was in the vicinity at 
the time of the murder and that he was mentioned as a possible suspect by 
several people.  

 
 
(2)  Inmate Taylor Kubiak:  Testimony by Sergeant Davis that Kubiak's 
DNA was never tested to see if he was a possible contributor to the unidentified 
DNA found on Mrs. Watts' breasts and the dental office's carpet.  Testimony from Kubiak or his caseworker 
that Kubiak wrote a note in "May or June" that contained lewd, sexual content 
and was "derogatory to women."  
Grady noted that previous testimony indicated Mrs. Watts had received 
notes that contained lewd, sexual content.  

 
 
(3)  Inmate Scott Young:  Testimony from Sergeant Davis that Young 
was very angry at Mrs. Watts the night before the murder about a write-up and 
his whereabouts at the time of the murder could not be verified.  Photographs depicting scrapes on Young's 
arms after the murder.  Grady noted 
that previous testimony showed that Young was still ranting and raving about 
Mrs. Watts at eleven o'clock that night, a mere seven hours before she was 
killed, and that several inmates and staff members mentioned him as a possible 
suspect.  

 
 
(4)  Inmate Joseph Sanchez:  Testimony from Leah Hornecker that Mrs. 
Watts was afraid of an inmate matching Sanchez's description who had told 
Watts, "I had better never catch you 
alone."  Testimony from Correctional 
Officer Patty Davis that Sanchez had a bubble pack of medicine in his room and 
had made comments about it the day after the murder.  Grady noted that previous testimony 
indicated that Sanchez, who worked at the mushroom farm, may have been missing 
from the farm transport bus around the time of the murder.  

 
 
The 
district court ruled admissible the alternate suspect evidence pertaining to 
inmate Young.  The district court, 
however, determined that Grady's offer of proof was insufficient to establish 
the requisite nexus to allow the evidence regarding Goss, Kubiak, and Sanchez to 
be presented to the jury.  

 
 
[¶12]   Grady contends the district court 
deprived him of his constitutional right to present a complete defense when it 
prohibited him from introducing evidence implicating Goss, Kubiak, and Sanchez 
in Mrs. Watts' murder.6  Generally, we review the district 
court's evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion.  To the extent Grady's claim involves a 
constitutional issue, we review it de 
novo.  Hannon v. State, 2004 WY 8, ¶13, 84 P.3d 320, 328 (Wyo. 2004).

 
 
[¶13]   Our recent decision in Bush v. State, 2008 WY 108, 193 P.3d 203 
(Wyo. 2008) controls our resolution of this issue.  In Bush, the defendant was charged with 
first degree murder in connection with the disappearance of his wife.  At trial, the defendant sought to 
introduce evidence implicating his brother in the wife's disappearance.  The district court disallowed the 
evidence.  In affirming the district 
court's decision, we held that a defendant's proffered alternate suspect 
evidence must demonstrate a direct nexus between the alternate suspect and the 
crime charged to be admissible.  
Id., ¶ 62, 193 P.3d  at 218.  If the proffered 
evidence does not sufficiently connect the alternate suspect to the crime, as, 
for example, where the evidence is speculative and does nothing more than raise 
a suspicion, the evidence may properly be excluded.  Id., ¶¶ 68-69, 
­­193 P.3d  at 220.  In Bush, we held that the defendant's 
proffered evidence was properly excluded because it failed to establish the 
requisite link between the brother and the crime charged.   

 
 
[¶14]   In light of Bush, we now consider the evidence Grady 
sought to have admitted to show that Goss, Kubiak or Sanchez committed the 
murder.  The proffered evidence 
concerning Goss merely showed that he had a red substance on his shoes and 
suffered from violent blackouts.  
There was no evidence that the red substance was the same substance that 
was discovered in the medical office, nor was there any evidence indicating Goss 
was under the influence of a violent blackout on the morning of the murder.  In this latter regard, there was no 
evidence indicating the frequency of Goss' blackouts or when they occurred in 
relation to Mrs. Watts' murder.  In 
essence, this proffered evidence was purely speculative and did not link Goss to 
the crime charged.  The district 
court, therefore, did not err in excluding this evidence.

 
 
[¶15]   The proffered testimony concerning 
the absence of DNA testing on Kubiak was apparently intended to show that Kubiak 
might have been the contributor of some unidentified DNA found on Mrs. Watts' 
breasts and the dental carpet.  The 
obvious problem with this proffered evidence is that it did nothing to connect 
Kubiak to the murder.  Furthermore, 
the fact that Kubiak penned a letter derogatory to women in May or June did 
nothing more than raise a suspicion that Kubiak might have written the sexually 
oriented notes previously received by Mrs. Watts.  It did not, standing alone, establish a 
nexus between Kubiak and the crime.  
We conclude the district court properly excluded this 
evidence.

 
 
[¶16]   The same can be said about the 
testimony concerning Sanchez.  At 
most, it indicated that Sanchez may or may not have been on the mushroom farm 
transport bus on the morning of the murder, he possessed a bubble pack of 
medicine, and that Mrs. Watts feared an inmate matching his description.  Furthermore, there was no evidence when 
the inmate matching Sanchez's description made the alleged threatening comments 
to Mrs. Watts.  This evidence did 
not provide a connection between Sanchez and the crime charged and, 
consequently, it was properly excluded. 

 
 
[¶17]   As a final matter, Grady contends 
the district court violated his right to present a defense when it prohibited 
testimony concerning statements made by Scott Young the night before the 
murder.7  The district court excluded the 
statements on relevancy and hearsay grounds.  Grady presents no argument challenging 
the legality of the district court's ruling, but merely asserts the statements 
should have been allowed as alternate suspect evidence.  As we noted in Bush, a defendant "may introduce any legal evidence tending to prove that 
another person may have committed the crime in which the defendant is 
charged.  Legal evidence is evidence 
that would be admissible at trial."  
Bush, ¶ 71, 193 P.3d  at 220 
(emphasis in original).  Absent a 
showing that the statements were legally admissible, we cannot conclude the 
district court erred in excluding them. 

 
 

B.        
Denial of Motion for Continuance

            

[¶18]   We have consistently held that the 
grant or denial of a motion for continuance is a discretionary ruling of the 
district court and, unless a clear showing of an abuse of discretion resulting 
in manifest injustice has been shown by the challenging party, we will not 
disturb that ruling.  Sincock v. State, 2003 WY 115, ¶ 25, 76 P.3d 323, 333-34 (Wyo. 2003); Clearwater v. State, 2 P.3d 548, 553 (Wyo. 
2000).  The determination of whether 
the district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a continuance is 
highly dependant upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case.  Sincock, ¶ 25, 76 P.3d  at 333.  On review, our primary consideration is 
the reasonableness of the district court's decision.  Id.

 
 
[¶19]   On April 13, three days after the 
commencement of trial, the State provided Grady with a report compiled by the 
Wyoming Department of Corrections (DOC) concerning DOC's internal investigation 
at the Honor Farm.  Attached to that 
report was the personal journal of Correctional Officer Hal Shine, who was on 
duty the morning of Mrs. Watts' murder.  
Some of the journal entries, which were written in early 2005, entailed 
Shine's observations of Mrs. Watts' nude body shortly after the murder.  

 
 
[¶20]   On April 17, Grady filed a notice, 
pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-312 (LexisNexis 2007),8 of his intention to introduce the 
journal at trial.  During a hearing 
on April 19, Grady claimed the journal entries suggested Shine was obsessed with 
Mrs. Watts and was stalking her, which made him a viable suspect in her 
murder.  Grady contended that the 
State's late disclosure of Shine's journal, which he maintained violated the 
district court's discovery order, precluded him from adequately investigating 
the journal entries and Shine's possible connection to Mrs. Watts' murder.9 Grady, therefore, orally moved for 
a continuance of trial, which the State opposed.10  The State disputed any discovery 
violation, noting it had received Shine's journal on April 13, the same day it 
was provided to Grady.  The State 
also disputed the relevancy of Shine's journal, and pointed out the lack of a 
probative nexus between Shine and Mrs. Watts' murder.  

 
 
[¶21]   Noting relevancy concerns, the 
district court took the matter under advisement.  The next morning, after allowing further 
argument, the district court denied Grady's request for continuance, 
stating:

 
 
All 
right.  I've read the defendant's 
motion and the addendums and the journals, and I also took time to review Mr. 
Shine's testimony, actually, from the previous proceedings in this matter.  It's information that is interesting, to 
say the least, but I don't think it's such that it would require the Court to 
continue this matter.  And so I'm 
going to deny the defendant's motion to continue at this time.  

 
 
[¶22]   The only legal argument presented 
by Grady on appeal is that a continuance should have been granted because the 
State violated the district court's discovery order pertaining to an 
investigation by DOC at the Honor Farm.  
The procedural facts of this case, however, reveal no such 
violation.  Originally, the district 
court set a discovery completion date on this issue of March 10, 2006.  However, it was known at the time the 
discovery order was entered that the investigation was ongoing, which suggested 
documents might continue to be generated after March 10.  In its oral pronouncement accompanying 
the discovery order, the district court specifically addressed the issue of 
documents from the investigation stating it hoped the documents could be 
produced on time but "if it can't be done by then, we'll deal with that when 
that occurs."  

 
 
[¶23]   The issue was revisited at a 
hearing on April 5, 2006, on Grady's motion to compel production of DOC 
investigative documents.  Such 
documents had been trickling in but Grady suspected more was out there and was 
frustrated by the length of time it was taking DOC to complete its 
investigations and produce final reports.  
The prosecutor assured the district court he was turning over documents 
as soon as they were received, which Grady did not contest.  The prosecutor also put on a DOC 
investigator who testified regarding the status of all ongoing investigations 
and that all available documents had been produced.  The end result was a continuance of the 
status quo.  The district court 
reminded the prosecutor of his continuing duty of production and to produce the 
investigative documents as they became available.  The prosecutor subsequently provided to 
Grady the journal in question the same day he received it, thereby complying 
with the discovery orders of the district court.

 
 
[¶24]   The real question, which Grady 
obliquely refers to on appeal (and argued below), is whether the information in 
the journal was of such significance as to warrant a continuance after the trial 
had begun.  As noted above, the 
district court concluded the newly produced information was not sufficiently 
relevant to necessitate an immediate continuance under the circumstances.  We have reviewed the same documents and 
find the district court did not abuse its discretion in so ruling.  The information on its face has only 
prurient interest.  It is too 
speculative to merit a continuance of the trial.11  

 
 

C.        Lost 
Evidence

 
 
[¶25]   On March 8, 2006, the State 
notified defense counsel about a letter it received from Mr. Watts, the victim's 
husband, near the end of Grady's first trial, which the State had since 
misplaced.  The letter was 
reportedly written by Mrs. Watts' former boyfriend with whom she had an affair 
ten to fifteen years earlier, and whom Mr. Watts had told law enforcement about 
during a June 7, 2004, interview.  
The State also informed defense counsel that the Wyoming State Crime Lab 
had analyzed the letter shortly after its receipt and concluded that Grady was 
not the letter's author.  

 
 
[¶26]   Asserting that the letter was 
exculpatory evidence and material to his defense, Grady thereafter moved to 
dismiss with prejudice the criminal action against him on due process grounds, 
citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S. Ct. 333, 102 L. Ed. 2d 281 (1988), and California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 
104 S. Ct. 2528, 81 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1984).  
The State naturally opposed the motion, arguing that Grady's due process 
claim could not be sustained under either Youngblood or Trombetta.  In support of its argument, the State 
attached the affidavit of Mr. Watts, which states in relevant 
part:

 
 

2.                  
Near 
the end of the last trial in State v. Grady, following the testimony about the 
notes found in Tammy Watts' purse, I went home and started looking for other 
notes.

 
 

3.                  
I 
found a folded piece of paper that [sic] the bottom of a jewelry box that we 
both used.  I opened the folded 
paper, discovered it was a letter, and read the letter.

 
 

4.                  
I 
remember seeing the folded piece of paper in the bottom of the jewelry box many 
time[s] in the past and it was not hidden in any way.

 
 

5.                  
After 
reading the letter, I was sure that Tammy Watts had showed it to me and that I 
had read it in the past.  While I do 
not remember the content of the letter, the letter was clearly from someone with 
whom Tammy Watts was engaged in an intimate relationship.  The letter was in no way threatening or 
sinister, but rather friendly.

6.                  
I 
could not, however, remember exactly when in the past that I had read the 
letter.

 
 

7.                  
The 
next morning, I gave the letter to Ed Newell and told him that I was sure that 
the letter was from a past a [sic] affair, which I knew occurred some 10 or 15 
years earlier and that I was sure that I had read the letter sometime in the 
past.  However, I thought I should 
give it to Ed Newell to make sure that the letter was what I thought it was and 
not something important.

 
 
8.         
I witnessed the State Crime Lab Handwriting Expert examine the letter and 
very quickly determine it had not been written by Floyd 
Grady.

 
 
9.         
I was sure then and I am sure now that the letter was from the boyfriend 
from the long ago extra-marital affair.

 
 
10.       I do not 
know what happened to the letter after that.

 
 
11.       I 
definitely remember reading the letter in the past and I also remember telling 
law enforcement about the old affair.

 
 
The 
State also attached a copy of the June 7, 2004, investigation report reflecting 
Mr. Watts' statements to law enforcement about Mrs. Watts' earlier affair.  

 
 
[¶27]   At the ensuing motion hearing, the 
prosecutor explained why he had not notified the defense about the letter's 
existence during the first trial.  
He also explained what he believed happened to the letter and the steps 
taken to locate it.

 
 
Well, 
Your Honor, as to the why the letter wasn't turned over, it just didn't seem 
like it mattered.  It was evidence 
of a 15-year-old relationship.  It 
just didn't seem like it mattered.  
As to what happened to it, -- and let me expand on that a little 
bit.  That's the information that we 
had.  It was from a 15-year-old 
relationship or a 10-year-old relationship or something like that.  And we had Richard Crivello say, the 
defendant didn't write it.  We had 
it tested to determine whether it was exculpatory.  As I point out in the brief, you know, 
tone of letter, the familiar tone, how did Lee Watts describe it -- it was 
obvious somebody was involved in an intimate relationship with his 
wife.

 
 
If 
the defendant had written it, it would have been exculpatory, and that's why we 
had it tested.  It's turned out it 
was exactly what we thought it was.  
We didn't have any reason to think it wasn't what we were told it was and 
that is that it was evidence of a 15-year-old relationship.  So it just didn't seem important.  We were on the third or fourth day of 
the trial.  Hadn't heard a word 
about the old affair that they already knew about.  Your Honor, it just did not seem 
important.

 
 
In 
hindsight, I wish I would have just given them the letter, but what happened to 
it, I have no earthly idea.  There 
are -- I don't know how many thousands of pages of documents, trial transcripts, 
witness interviews, cassette tapes, attorney's notes, I mean, it's just -- it's 
a lot of information, and I don't know what happened to it.  I remember seeing it sitting down there 
after the trial, after that, I don't know.  
I honestly don't know.

 
 
* 
* * *

 
 
I 
myself have gone through the files in our office.  I also had Detective Saunders go through 
whatever he has in his offices, including the evidence that he's got over 
there.  He says it wasn't 
there.  Detective Murphy from RPD 
and it might have been Detective Saunders and I went through the stuff in the 
CountyAttorney's office again, 
and we still can't find it.  You 
know, unless there's a stash of documents out there that I'm unaware of, which I 
don't think that there is, we've looked everywhere.  Everywhere -- you know, everywhere that 
has anything to do with Grady.  You 
know, if it got stuck in -- I mean, that's what I think happened is it probably 
got misfiled.  It got stuck in some 
random file or slipped in the crack of some box or something.  That's what I think happened, but I 
don't know that, so I'm not going to represent that to the Court.  But we've gone through everything that 
has anything to do with this case.  

 
 
[¶28]   At the conclusion of the hearing, 
the district court denied Grady's motion to dismiss, concluding that Grady had 
not established a due process violation under the tests articulated in Trombetta and Youngblood.12  The district court found that the letter 
had no apparent exculpatory value and that it was collateral evidence not 
directly relevant to the case.  The 
court also determined, based on counsel's representations, that there was no 
evidence of bad faith on the part of the State.  

 
 
[¶29]   On appeal, and without directly 
challenging the district court's ruling, Grady once again claims his 
constitutional due process rights were violated when the State, in bad faith, 
lost what he alleges to be potentially exculpatory evidence.  According to Grady, the letter may have 
been "favorable to the defense in cross-examining the investigators or adducing 
evidence that Ms. Watts was having an extramarital affair with another person at 
the Honor Farm."  Grady also alleges 
the State knew the potential value of the letter to his defense and 
intentionally lost it in order to gain a tactical advantage.  We review Grady's constitutional claim 
de novo and afford no deference to 
the district court's legal determination.  
Wilkening v. State, 2007 WY 
187, ¶ 6, 172 P.3d 385, 386 (Wyo. 2007); Hannon, ¶ 11, 84 P.3d  at 
328.

 
 
[¶30]   In California v. Trombetta, the United 
States Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause does not require law 
enforcement agencies to preserve breath samples in order to introduce the 
results of breath-analysis tests at trial.  
Trombetta, 467 U.S.  at 491, 104 S. Ct.  at 2535.  In doing so, the Court noted the 
officers were acting in good faith and in accord with their normal 
practice.  Id. at 488, 104 S. Ct.  at 2533.  The Court concluded 
that whatever duty the Due Process Clause imposes on the government to preserve 
evidence, it is "limited to evidence that might be expected to play a 
significant role in the suspect's defense."  Id. 
at 488, 104 S. Ct.  at 2534.  Under Trombetta, the government violates due 
process when it destroys evidence (1) whose exculpatory value is apparent before 
its destruction and (2) is "of such a nature that the defendant would be unable 
to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means."  Id. 
at 489, 104 S. Ct.  at 2534.

 
 
[¶31]   In Arizona v. Youngblood, the Supreme Court 
extended Trombetta, holding that 
where the government fails to preserve "evidentiary material of which no more 
can be said than it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which 
might have exonerated the defendant," no due process violation occurs unless the 
defendant demonstrates the government acted in bad faith.  Youngblood, 488 U.S.  at 57, 109 S. Ct.  at 337.  To establish a due 
process violation under Youngblood 
based on the government's failure to preserve evidence, the defendant must show 
(1) the evidence was "potentially useful" and (2) the government acted in bad 
faith.  Id. at 58, 109 S. Ct.  at 337.  The inquiry into bad 
faith "must necessarily turn on the [government's] knowledge of the exculpatory 
value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed."  Id. 
at 56 n.*, 109 S. Ct.  at 336 n.*.

 
 
[¶32]   In this case, Grady's appellate 
argument relies solely on the Youngblood test.  Consequently, our focus is on whether 
Grady has carried his burden of demonstrating that the letter could have been 
beneficial to his defense and whether the State acted in bad faith in losing it. 
 After a careful review of the 
record, we must answer both questions in the negative.

 
 
[¶33]   On the first prong of the Youngblood test, Grady offers only 
speculation that the letter had "potential value to the defense" and a feigned 
suggestion it was written by someone connected with the Honor Farm.  Grady's argument ignores the fact, which 
he has never disputed, that the letter was written ten to fifteen years before 
Mrs. Watts' murder.  Nothing in the 
record suggests that the identity of the letter's author could have been derived 
from the letter's contents, much less that the author was in some manner 
associated with Mrs. Watts or the Honor Farm at the time of the murder.  Nor is there anything in the record 
indicating the letter would have provided Grady with any information beyond that 
which he had received from the June 7, 2004, reported interview of Mr. Watts, a 
copy of which he received before the first trial.  Given the record in this case, we cannot 
reasonably conclude the letter would have benefited Grady's defense to the 
extent it might have exonerated him on the criminal charges.  Youngblood, 488 U.S.  at 57, 109 S. Ct.  at 337.

 
 
[¶34]   Moreover, we find no evidence in 
the record that the State acted in bad faith when it failed to preserve the 
letter.  Grady's contention to the 
contrary lacks any foundation other than his naked allegation that the State 
intentionally lost the letter to gain a tactical advantage.  As the district court determined, the 
State provided a reasonable and innocent explanation for what happened to the 
letter.  While we do not condone the 
State's actions in this case, there is simply no evidence the loss of the letter 
was anything other than a byproduct of the State's negligence.  Mere negligence on the part of the State 
does not equate to bad faith.  Youngblood, 488 U.S.  at 58, 109 S. Ct.  at 337-38.  In sum, we are 
satisfied from our review of the record that the State's failure to make the 
letter available to Grady did not violate his right to due 
process.

 
 
D.        
Prosecutorial Misconduct

 
 
[¶35]   Grady's final contention of error 
alleges several instances of prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments, 
which he claims mandate reversal of his convictions.  Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct 
are settled by reference to the entire record and "hinge on whether a 
defendant's case has been so prejudiced as to constitute  denial of a fair trial."  Mazurek v. State, 10 P.3d 531, 542 (Wyo. 
2000); see also Lafond v. State, 2004 
WY 51, ¶ 15, 89 P.3d 324, 329 (Wyo. 2004).  
To the extent Grady did not object at trial to the alleged instances of 
misconduct, it is incumbent upon him to demonstrate plain error, which demands: 
(1) the record clearly reflect the incident alleged as error; (2) Grady 
demonstrate the error violated an unequivocal rule of law in a clear and 
obvious, not merely arguable, way; and (3) Grady prove the error adversely 
affected a substantial right resulting in material prejudice to him.13  Callen v. State, 2008 WY 107, ¶ 20, 192 P.3d 137, 145 (Wyo. 2008); Talley v. 
State, 2007 WY 37, ¶ 9, 153 P.3d 256, 260 (Wyo. 2007).  To satisfy the prejudice prong, Grady 
must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the outcome of his trial would 
have been more favorable to him absent the alleged misconduct.  Callen, ¶ 20, 192 P.3d  at 
145.

 
 
[¶36]   Grady's first allegation of 
prosecutorial misconduct is directed at the following highlighted statements 
made by the prosecutors during closing argument and rebuttal closing argument in 
the guilt phase portion of the trial, which we have set forth in context 
(emphasis added):

 
 
Instruction 
five provides you with some guidelines that you need and of interest in the 
following passage:  In deciding any 
questions before you in this case, you should be governed solely by the 
evidence.  You should not indulge in 
conjecture or speculation unsupported by the evidence.  However, you may consider the evidence 
presented to you and the reasonable inferences and conclusions which may be 
drawn from the evidence in light of your knowledge, observation, and experience 
in the affairs of life.  So you 
should look at the evidence presented, of course, and, of course, the reasonable 
inferences you can draw from that in deciding whether the State has proven each 
of the elements of each of the charges beyond a reasonable doubt.  But what you cannot do is engage in 
speculation or conjecture that's not supported by the evidence and the 
facts.  And beware because that's exactly what the 
defendant may invite you to do.  

 
 
In 
rebuttal closing argument the prosecutor stated (emphasis 
added):

 
 
Take 
a look at the cover of your jury instructions.  What does it say?  The State of Wyoming versus Floyd 
Dewayne Grady.  It does not say the 
State of Wyoming versus the Riverton Police 
Department.  It does not say the 
State of Wyoming versus the Fremont County Prosecutor's 
Office.  This man is on trial today, 
not the Riverton Police Department, not the Fremont County Attorney's Office, 
not the Division of Criminal Investigation for the State of Wyoming.  The investigation is not on trial.  It is not the sufficiency of the 
investigation that's at question here.  
It is the evidence against the defendant.  That's what's relevant, and that's what 
you, the jury, should be looking at.

 
 
So 
why did defense [c]ounsel spend one hour talking to you about the 
investigation?  Because it's an old 
tried and true tactic.  That's his job.  He wants you to look away from the 
evidence, because the evidence in this case is absolutely overwhelming.  Look at the evidence.  Look at the jury instructions.  What does it talk about?  Does it talk about the 
investigation?  Does it tell you to 
look at the investigation?  No.  The jury instructions instruct you, the 
jury, to look at the evidence against the defendant.  

 
 
* 
* * *

 
 
You 
know, I'm going to leave you with a quote, and the quote talks about the 
disparity and roles between the prosecution and defense.  The difference in our roles as advocates 
derives from the degree of our authority and disparity of our obligations.  Defense [c]ounsel's legitimate and 
necessary goal is to achieve the best possible result for his client.  His loyalty is to the individual client 
alone.  The prosecutor, however, 
enters a courtroom to speak for the people and not just for some of the 
people.  The prosecutor speaks not 
solely for the victim or the police or those who support them but for all of the 
people.  That body of the people 
includes the defendant and his family and those who care about him.  It also includes the vast majority of 
citizens who know nothing about a particular case but who give over to the 
prosecutor the authority to seek a just result in their 
name.

 
 
The 
evidence in this case -- the evidence in this case is absolutely overwhelming, 
through direct and circumstantial evidence.  We, the people, give the case over to 
you and put it in your hands.  Tell 
the defendant that you now know what he knew then; that he is the one that 
silenced Tammy Watts.  Find him 
guilty.  

 
 
[¶37]   Grady contends the prosecutor's 
comments impermissibly disparaged defense counsel by suggesting it was counsel's 
role to "muddy the waters" and divert the jury's attention away from the 
evidence.  He also claims the latter 
argument improperly bolstered the prosecutor's credibility in that the comments 
insinuated the prosecutor had more knowledge of the case than the jury and that 
she was entrusted with this knowledge, as the protector of the community, to 
seek a "just result."  Grady 
acknowledges he did not object to the challenged comments and, accordingly, 
bears the burden of demonstrating plain error which, as previously noted, 
requires him to demonstrate both a transgression of a rule of law and resulting 
prejudice.

 
 
[¶38]   We need not address the propriety 
of the prosecutor's comments because Grady has not met his burden of proving he 
was prejudiced thereby.  Grady's 
prejudice argument consists solely of a single sentence that the "evidence was 
not overwhelming and [he] did present a plausible defense to the charges."  He makes no attempt to explain, in light 
of the facts of this case, how the challenged statements adversely impacted his 
trial and, ultimately, the jury's verdict.  
Suffice it to say, Grady's empty assertion is utterly inadequate to 
satisfy his burden under the plain error standard.  Callen, ¶ 22, 192 P.3d  at 145; Doherty v. State, 2006 WY 39, ¶ 23, 131 P.3d 963, 971 (Wyo. 2006); Bhutto v. 
State, 2005 WY 78, ¶ 44, 114 P.3d 1252, 1268 (Wyo. 2005).  We therefore summarily reject Grady's 
claim.

 
 
[¶39]   Grady also claims that misconduct 
occurred when the prosecutor used the word "rape" twice during closing argument 
in the guilt phase of his trial and four times during the closing and rebuttal 
arguments in the penalty phase.  
According to Grady, the use of the word "rape" violated an order in 
limine of the district court.  In 
support of this claim, Grady cites to the district court's oral ruling on the 
State's second notice of intent to introduce evidence, pursuant to W.R.E. 
404(b), pertaining to his 1994 conviction for first degree sexual assault 
(emphasis added):

 
 
THE 
COURT:  The State's Motion Number 
24, the State's second notice of intent to introduce evidence pursuant to 
Wyoming Rule of Evidence 404(B) [sic] will be granted in part and denied in 
part.  The State will be allowed to 
introduce evidence concerning the following factors from the defendant's prior 
conviction:  Number one, that 
biological samples, including pubic hair have [been] collected from the 
defendant in the past for a sexual assault evidence kit.  I don't want to hear the word rape; 
number two, that forensic testing in the prior case matched the single pubic 
hair found in the back seat of the defendant's car to the victim in that case; 
number three, that the prior victim reported the sexual assault to the 
authorities; number four, that the defendant was convicted of sexual 
assault.  And I will not allow the 
State to introduce evidence of the fifth request; that is, the defendant was 
sentenced to 10 to 30 years for that rape, slash, sexual assault in 1994. . . . 

 
 
                        
* * * *

 
 
Like 
the first notice, the State proffered in this case, this is a very focused set 
of facts that the State wants to and I will allow them to introduce.  And I've focused it further by 
eliminating the term "rape" from what the State proposes to show and even to 
eliminate the jury being informed that he was convicted of First Degree Sexual 
Assault.  

 
 
[¶40]   After a careful review of the 
prosecutor's challenged remarks in light of the district court's ruling, we find 
no merit in Grady's prosecutorial misconduct claim.  As can be seen, the district court's 
ruling only prohibited the prosecutor from utilizing the "rape" term when 
referring to Grady's 1994 conviction for first degree sexual assault.  The instances at issue in the guilt 
phase closing argument occurred during the prosecutor's discussion of the 
instant charges for which Grady was on trial  the attempted sexual assault and 
murder of Mrs. Watts.  That 
discussion did not, in any manner, involve Grady's prior conviction.  The prosecutor's use of the term under 
these circumstances, therefore, was not improper.

 
 
[¶41]   Furthermore, when viewed in 
context, the district court's ruling only purports to restrict the use of the 
word "rape" during the State's presentation of the 1994 conviction evidence in 
the guilt phase portion of Grady's trial.  
We find no clear indication the district court intended its restriction 
to apply to the penalty phase.  
Consequently, we cannot conclude the prosecutor inappropriately employed 
the term during the penalty phase arguments  whether referring to Grady's prior 
conviction or the current charges  in direct contravention of the district 
court's order.  

 
 

CONCLUSION

 
 
[¶42]   We find no reversible error with 
respect to any of the issues raised in this appeal.  Affirmed. 

 
 
FOOTNOTES

 
 

1Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101 
(LexisNexis 2007) defines the crime of first degree murder and states in 
pertinent part:

(a)        
Whoever purposely and with premeditated malice, or in the perpetration 
of, or attempt to perpetrate, any sexual assault . . . kills any human being is 
guilty of murder in the first degree.

 
 

2Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-301 
(LexisNexis 2007) defines the crime of attempt and provides in relevant 
part:

(a)                 
A person is 
guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if:  

(i)  With the intent to commit the crime, he 
does any act which is a substantial step towards commission of the crime.  A "substantial step" is conduct which is 
strongly corroborative of the firmness of the person's intention to complete the 
commission of the crime[.]

 
 
First degree 
sexual assault is defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-302 (LexisNexis 2007) and 
states in pertinent part:

(a)                 
Any actor 
who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits a sexual assault in the first 
degree if:

(i)         
The actor causes submission of the victim through the actual application, 
reasonably calculated to cause submission of the victim, of physical force or 
forcible confinement[.]

 
 

3Kidnapping 
is defined in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-201 (LexisNexis 2007) and states in 
pertinent part:

(a)                 
A person is 
guilty of kidnapping if he unlawfully removes another from . . . the vicinity 
where he was at the time of the removal . . ., with the intent 
to:

(b)                 
 

 
* * * 
*

(ii)                 
Facilitate 
the commission of a felony; or

* * * 
*

(c)                 
A removal . 
. . is unlawful if it is accomplished:

(i)                   
By force, 
threat or deception[.]

 
 

4At the end 
of the State's case-in-chief, the district court granted Grady's motion for 
judgment of acquittal on the kidnapping charge.  

 
 

5There are 
many terms that courts use to describe this type of evidence, including 
"alternative suspect," "alternative perpetrator," "third party suspect," "third 
party perpetrator," and "third party culpability."  Because "alternate suspect" is the term 
coined by Grady, we will use that term in our discussion of this issue.   

 
 

6Grady also 
asserts error in the exclusion of certain evidence involving inmates Thomas 
Bedsaul and Cory Warpness.  That 
evidence, however, was not addressed in Grady's offer of proof in the district 
court and, consequently, we will not consider it on 
appeal.

 
 

7The 
introduction of this testimony was sought before Grady made his offer of proof 
on admissibility of alternate suspect evidence.

 
 

8This 
statutory provision, commonly referred to as the "Rape Shield Law," sets forth a 
specific procedure that must be followed if "evidence of the prior sexual 
conduct of the victim, reputation evidence or opinion evidence as to the 
character of the victim" is intended to be offered in a prosecution involving a 
sexual assault offense.  Grady 
disputed the applicability of § 6-2-312 to the admissibility of the journal 
evidence and filed the notice simply as a cautionary measure.  

 
 

9Grady noted 
that the defense investigator had been investigating the matter, an expert had 
been reviewing the journals, and that he was "having Mr. Shine flown up."  

 
 

10A written 
motion for a continuance was filed later that day.  

 
 

11Grady 
was, of course, free to continue his investigation and renew his motion for a 
continuance if he found information more concretely tying Shine to Watts' murder.  

 
 

12Neither 
party presented any witnesses during the hearing.  The district court based its decision on 
counsel's arguments, its knowledge of the case and the evidence presented during 
the first trial, and the contents of Mr. Watts' affidavit as well as the June 7, 
2004, investigation report. 

 
 

13In a 
footnote in his brief, Grady urges this Court to adopt the plain error standard 
employed in State v. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d 294 (Minn. 2006), which places the burden on the state to prove that the 
prosecutor's misconduct did not prejudice the defendant's substantial 
rights.  We are not convinced that 
we should alter existing law on this issue.