Case Title: Judy v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles

Citation: 2003-Ohio-5277

Docket Number: 

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2003-10-08T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as Judy v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 100 Ohio St.3d 122, 2003-Ohio-5277.] 
***Please see 12/11/2003 Case Announcments  #2 to view the Reconsideration 
of Prior Decisions ruling, 2003-Ohio-6611.*** 
 
JUDY ET AL., APPELLEES AND CROSS-APPELLANTS, v. OHIO BUREAU OF MOTOR 
VEHICLES, APPELLANT AND CROSS-APPELLEE. 
[Cite as Judy v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles, 100 Ohio St.3d 122, 2003-Ohio-
5277.] 
Motor vehicles — Driving while intoxicated — Former R.C. 4511.191(L) 
authorized the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles to collect only one 
reinstatement fee from a driver who had made a single request for a 
license reinstatement after receiving both an administrative license 
suspension and a judicial license suspension for a single arrest under 
R.C. 4511.19(A) — Trial court may award postjudgment interest against 
the state pursuant to R.C. 1343.03(A). 
(No. 2002-0293 — Submitted March 11, 2003 — Decided October 8, 2003.) 
APPEAL and CROSS-APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Lucas County, No. L-
01-1200, 2001-Ohio-2909. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  Former R.C. 4511.191(L) authorized the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles to 
collect only one reinstatement fee from a driver who had made a single 
request for license reinstatement after receiving both an administrative 
license suspension and a judicial license suspension for a single arrest under 
R.C. 4511.19(A). 
2.  A trial court may award postjudgment interest against the state pursuant to R.C. 
1343.03(A). 
__________________ 
MOYER, C.J. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
2 
{¶ 1} This case requires us to decide (1) whether former R.C. 4511.191(L) 
authorized the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles (“BMV”) to collect only one 
reinstatement fee from a driver who had made a single request for license 
reinstatement after receiving an administrative license suspension (“ALS”) and a 
judicial license suspension for a single arrest under R.C. 4511.19(A) and (2) if so, 
whether the trial court erred in awarding postjudgment interest against the state 
pursuant to R.C. 1343.03(A). 
I 
{¶ 2} During separate incidents in 1994, Ohio law enforcement officers 
arrested Steven Judy and Mark Poirier for driving under the influence of alcohol 
(“DUI”). Judy and Poirier submitted to breath-alcohol tests, which revealed breath-
alcohol concentrations that exceeded the legal limit. In accordance with R.C. 
4511.191(F), the arresting officers issued both Judy and Poirier a 90-day ALS. Judy 
and Poirier subsequently pled no contest to DUI charges, and each received a 
judicial license suspension for six months under R.C. 4507.16(B). 
{¶ 3} At the conclusion of their suspensions, Judy and Poirier petitioned 
the BMV to reinstate their licenses pursuant to former R.C. 4511.191(L). To that 
end, Judy and Poirier provided proof of financial responsibility, and each tendered a 
$250 reinstatement fee. The BMV, however, interpreted former R.C. 4511.191(L) 
to require a $250 reinstatement fee for each license suspension. Consequently, the 
BMV required both Judy and Poirier to pay $500 — $250 for the ALS and $250 for 
the judicial license suspension. 
{¶ 4} On February 6, 1995, Judy and Poirier filed a class-action lawsuit in 
the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, alleging that the BMV incorrectly 
interpreted former R.C. 4511.191(L) and wrongfully assessed two reinstatement 
fees against the members of the certified class.1 The trial court granted partial 
                                                          
 
1. 
The trial court certified the class to include “[a]ll persons who, having been issued a DUI 
citation, within the State of Ohio after September 3, 1993, consented to testing for driving with a 
January Term, 2003 
 
3 
summary judgment in favor of the certified class and ordered the BMV to pay 
$5,266,650 in restitution and postjudgment interest at the rate of ten percent per 
annum from the date of the partial summary judgment.  The BMV appealed to the 
Sixth District Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court (1) lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction, (2) incorrectly interpreted former R.C. 4511.191(L), and (3) erred in 
awarding postjudgment interest against the state. The court of appeals affirmed the 
judgment of the trial court on the issues of subject matter jurisdiction and statutory 
construction but reversed and remanded on the issue of postjudgment interest. The 
BMV appeals the court of appeals’ statutory construction of former R.C. 
4511.191(L),2 and the certified class cross-appeals the court’s denial of 
postjudgment interest. 
{¶ 5} The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a 
discretionary appeal. 
II 
A 
{¶ 6} We begin our analysis with a review of the relevant statutory 
language. Former R.C. 4511.191(L) provides: 
{¶ 7} “At the end of a suspension period under this section, section 
4511.196, or division (B) of section 4507.16 of the Revised Code and upon the 
request of the person whose driver’s or commercial driver’s license or permit was 
suspended and who is not otherwise subject to suspension, revocation, or 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
prohibited concentration of alcohol, tested positive for that finding, were issued an automatic 
administrative license suspension pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code 4511.191, subsequently were found 
guilty of driving while under the influence of alcohol, received an additional suspension under R.C. 
4507.16(B), waited until all license terminations had been concluded, made a single request for 
license reinstatement under R.C. 4511.191(L) and were then required by defendant to pay two 
separate $250.00 reinstatement fees pursuant to defendant’s interpretation of R.C. 4511.191(L) and 
related statutory provisions.” 
2. 
The BMV did not appeal to this court the issue of whether the court of common pleas had 
subject matter jurisdiction over an action against the state for reimbursement of improperly 
assessed fees.  
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
4 
disqualification, the registrar shall return the driver’s or commercial driver’s 
license or permit to the person upon the occurrence of all of the following: 
{¶ 8} 
“(1) 
A showing by the person that the person had proof of 
financial responsibility, a policy of liability insurance in effect that meets the 
minimum standards set forth in section 4509.51 of the Revised Code, or proof, to 
the satisfaction of the registrar, that the person is able to respond in damages in an 
amount at least equal to the minimum amounts specified in section 4509.51 of the 
Revised Code. 
{¶ 9} 
”(2) 
Payment by the person of a license reinstatement fee 
of two hundred and fifty dollars to the bureau of motor vehicles, which fee shall be 
deposited in the state treasury * * *.” (Emphasis added.) Am.Sub.S.B. No. 82, 145 
Ohio Laws, Part I, 879, 940.3 
{¶ 10} A proper analysis of former R.C. 4511.191(L) requires an 
examination of the suspensions and reinstatement requirements enumerated under 
that section. 
1. The Suspensions Enumerated Under Former R.C. 4511.191(L) 
{¶ 11} The first clause in former R.C. 4511.191(L) enumerates three types 
of license suspensions that operate in tandem. The first type of license suspension—
a suspension “under this section”—is an ALS that an arresting officer issues to a 
defendant immediately upon arrest and that “last[s] at least until the person’s initial 
appearance on the charge.” R.C. 4511.191(D)(1)(a). This suspension is “intended to 
remove from the highway those motorists who are a threat to themselves and to 
others” until the criminal charge can be heard in a judicial forum. State v. Gustafson 
(1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 425, 438, 668 N.E.2d 435. The defendant may appeal an 
ALS “at the * * * initial appearance * * * in the court in which the person will 
                                                          
 
3. 
Effective September 16, 1998, the General Assembly amended R.C. 4511.191 to require 
one reinstatement fee of $405 “if the suspensions arise from a single incident or a single set of facts 
and circumstances.” R.C. 4511.191(L)(2) and (3). Am.Sub.S.B. No. 80, 147 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 
7197, 7209-7210. 
January Term, 2003 
 
5 
appear on the charge.” R.C. 4511.191(H)(1). The ALS continues no later than when 
“the complaint alleging the violation for which the person was arrested * * * is 
adjudicated on the merits.” R.C. 4511.191(H)(2); Gustafson, 76 Ohio St.3d at 441, 
668 N.E.2d 435. 
{¶ 12} The second type of suspension enumerated under former R.C. 
4511.191(L)—a suspension under R.C. 4511.196—is an interim suspension that the 
trial judge may impose if the judge at the initial appearance terminates the ALS but 
nonetheless determines ”that the person’s continued driving will be a threat to 
public safety.” R.C. 4511.196(B)(1). The trial court may also impose such a 
suspension in cases where the ALS is inapplicable, such as when a defendant was 
arrested for DUI but tested below the prohibited concentration of alcohol. R.C. 
4511.196(B)(2). The interim judicial suspension continues “until the complaint on 
the charge resulting from the arrest is adjudicated on the merits.” R.C. 4511.196(C). 
{¶ 13} The final type of license suspension enumerated under former R.C. 
4511.191(L)—a suspension under R.C. 4507.16(B)—is a postconviction judicial 
suspension that takes effect “at the point where a criminal conviction of drunk 
driving is obtained.” Gustafson, 76 Ohio St.3d at 441, 668 N.E.2d 435. This 
suspension endures for “not less than six months nor more than three years” for 
first-time offenders and automatically terminates an ALS or an interim license 
suspension. R.C. 4507.16(B)(1); Gustafson, 76 Ohio St.3d at 441, 668 N.E.2d 435. 
The registrar must credit against a postconviction judicial suspension the time 
during which the license was subject to an ALS or an interim judicial suspension. 
R.C. 4507.16(J); R.C. 4511.196(C). This statutory scheme allows the ALS and 
judicial suspensions to work in tandem, thereby removing dangerous drivers from 
the highway until the criminal charge is adjudicated and then crediting the time 
served against any suspension imposed upon conviction. 
2. The Reinstatement Provisions of Former R.C. 4511.191(L) 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
6 
{¶ 14} Former R.C. 4511.191(L) delineated the procedure by which a 
driver could petition the BMV for reinstatement of a license that was subject to one 
or more of the foregoing suspensions. The general reinstatement provision in 
former R.C. 4511.191(L) provided that the driver must satisfy three requirements 
before the financial-responsibility and reinstatement-fee provisions would apply: 
first, the driver had to wait until the “end of a suspension period”; second, the driver 
had to make a “request” to the BMV for reinstatement; and third, the license must 
not have been “otherwise subject to suspension, revocation, or disqualification.” 
The use of the conjunctive “and” between each of these requirements indicates that 
the financial responsibility and reinstatement-fee provisions did not become 
operative until all of the requirements in the general provision had been satisfied. 
{¶ 15} Given that the requirements in the general provision were conditions 
precedent to the applicability of the reinstatement-fee provision, it follows that the 
third requirement in the general provision—that the license “not [be] otherwise 
subject to suspension, revocation, or disqualification”—must have been satisfied 
before the BMV could collect a reinstatement fee. As a result, the BMV could not 
charge a reinstatement fee—and, hence, could not reinstate a license—until all 
license suspensions had concluded. Because a driver had to wait until all 
suspensions had concluded before applying for reinstatement, the driver necessarily 
applied for only one reinstatement when making a “request” pursuant to former 
R.C. 4511.191(L). 
{¶ 16} With these principles in mind, we turn to the instant case. 
B 
{¶ 17} The BMV asserts that former R.C. 4511.191(L) required a $250 
reinstatement fee for each applicable suspension enumerated under that section. In 
support of this proposition, the BMV advances two primary arguments: (1) the 
plain language of the statute required a separate fee for each suspension, and (2) our 
January Term, 2003 
 
7 
prior case law is consistent with a “separate fee” interpretation. We address each 
argument separately. 
1.  Plain Language of Former R.C. 4511.191(L) 
{¶ 18} The gravamen of the BMV’s argument is that the plain language of 
former R.C. 4511.191(L) allowed the BMV to collect a reinstatement fee for each 
applicable suspension enumerated under that section. Specifically, the BMV asserts 
that the word “a” in the first clause of former R.C. 4511.191(L), which conditions 
the reinstatement of a license on the “end of a suspension period,” is synonymous 
with the word “each.” (Emphasis added.) The BMV reasons, therefore, that the 
legislature in effect said: “At the end of [each] suspension period * * * the registrar 
shall return the driver’s * * * license * * * upon * * * [p]ayment by the person of a 
license reinstatement fee of two hundred fifty dollars.” Such a reading, the BMV 
argues, is buttressed by the Webster’s New World Dictionary, which defines “a” as 
“each; * * * connotes a thing not previously noted or recognized; * * * to each, in 
each, for each,” quoting Webster’s New World Dictionary (3d Ed.1998). (Emphasis 
added.)  
{¶ 19} We disagree with the BMV’s plain-language interpretation of 
former R.C. 4511.191(L). In the context of former R.C. 4511.191(L), the word “a” 
is an indefinite article used to denote a suspension that is “undetermined, 
unidentified, or unspecified.” See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 
(1986) 1. Given that the word “a” is used as an indefinite article—and thus is not 
synonymous with the word “each”—the BMV’s argument amounts to a contention 
that we substitute the word “each” for the word “a.” Such a modification to the 
statutory language, however, is contrary to the well-settled rule that we must “ ‘give 
effect to the words used [in the statute], not * * * delete words used or* * * insert 
words not used.’ ” Gutmann v. Feldman, 97 Ohio St.3d 473, 2002-Ohio-6721, 780 
N.E.2d 562, ¶ 22, quoting Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Cleveland (1988), 37 Ohio 
St.3d 50, 524 N.E.2d 441, paragraph three of the syllabus. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
8 
{¶ 20} We conclude that the phrase “[a]t the end of a suspension” is merely 
an introduction to the reinstatement procedure in former R.C. 4511.191(L), rather 
than an indicator of how many fees the BMV could collect for such reinstatement. 
The number of reinstatement fees is instead determined by the reinstatement-fee 
provision in former R.C. 4511.191(L)(2), which required a driver to tender “a 
license reinstatement fee of two hundred fifty dollars.” We hold that this provision 
clearly and unambiguously required a driver to pay only one reinstatement fee 
when making a single request for license reinstatement. Hubbard v. Canton City 
School Bd. of Edn., 97 Ohio St.3d 451, 2002-Ohio-6718, 780 N.E.2d 543, ¶ 14 
(“where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, it is the duty of the 
court to enforce the statute as written, making neither additions to the statute nor 
subtractions therefrom”). 
{¶ 21} Furthermore, the statutory fee in former R.C. 4511.191(L)(2) is, by 
its express terms, a reinstatement fee. As a result, the fee is tied to the reinstatement 
of the license rather than the suspensions enumerated in the first clause of former 
R.C. 4511.191(L). Indeed, the very nature of a “reinstatement,” together with the 
requirement that the license “not [be] otherwise subject to suspension,” leads to the 
inescapable conclusion that the BMV could reinstate a suspended license only 
once—no matter the number of suspensions to which the license is subject. R.C. 
4511.191(L). As there could be but one reinstatement, there could be but one 
reinstatement fee. 
{¶ 22} Finally, the BMV’s interpretation of former R.C. 4511.191(L) is 
inconsistent with the language of the general driver’s license statute in R.C. 
4507.02.4 That statute provides: “No person whose driver’s * * * license * * * has 
been suspended * * * shall operate any motor vehicle within this state until the 
                                                          
 
4. 
The General Assembly amended R.C. 4507.02 in June 1993 to address the same three 
suspension provisions that are addressed in former R.C. 4511.191(L). Sub. S.B. No. 62, 145 Ohio 
Laws, Part I, 479, 509. 
January Term, 2003 
 
9 
person has paid the license reinstatement fee required pursuant to division (L) of 
section 4511.191 * * *.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 4507.02(C). The use of the 
definite article “the” and the singular word “fee” indicate that, although a license 
may have been subject to multiple suspensions, the statute required only one 
reinstatement fee. Accordingly, we conclude that the plain language of former R.C. 
4511.191(L) authorized the BMV to collect only one reinstatement fee from a 
driver who had made a single request for license reinstatement after receiving an 
ALS and a judicial suspension for a single DUI arrest. 
2. Judicial Interpretation of Former R.C. 4511.191(L) 
{¶ 23} The BMV additionally asserts that our case law supports the 
proposition that former R.C. 4511.191(L) required a separate reinstatement fee for 
each applicable suspension enumerated under that section. The BMV cites two 
cases in support of this proposition—State v. Uskert (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 593, 709 
N.E.2d 1200, and State v. Lewis (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d  632, 710 N.E.2d 699. In 
Uskert, we addressed whether the reinstatement fee paid to the BMV at the 
conclusion of an ALS violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States 
Constitution. Holding that the reinstatement fee did not subject the defendant to 
double jeopardy, we concluded—albeit preliminarily—that the ALS is separate and 
distinct from the judicial suspension. Uskert, 85 Ohio St.3d at 596, 709 N.E.2d 
1200. Consequently, the BMV reasons, “[i]f the ALS and the ALS-based fee are 
both separate from the judicial suspension, then it makes sense that the ALS-based 
fee is separate from the reinstatement fee triggered by the judicial suspension.” 
{¶ 24} In contrast to the BMV’s assertion, however, Uskert did not 
conclude that the reinstatement fee was “ALS-based” in the sense that the ALS, 
rather than the reinstatement of the license, triggered the reinstatement fee. To the 
contrary, Uskert recognized that the fee was “associated with the ALS” because 
only the ALS, and not the judicial suspension, had been imposed (and had 
concluded) when the driver requested license reinstatement. Id. at 600, 709 N.E.2d 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
10 
1200. Such a request for “interim” reinstatement—that is, reinstatement after the 
ALS had concluded but before the judicial suspension was imposed—required the 
driver to then make a second request for reinstatement at the conclusion of the 
judicial suspension. Under the facts of Uskert, therefore, the BMV could have 
lawfully collected two reinstatement fees because the driver would have made two 
requests for reinstatement. 
{¶ 25} The drivers in the instant case, by contrast, made a single request for 
reinstatement after both the ALS and judicial license suspension had concluded. 
Uskert, therefore, is distinguishable to the extent that it acknowledged the collection 
of two reinstatement fees for a single DUI arrest. See, e.g., Uskert, 85 Ohio St.3d at 
596, 709 N.E.2d 1200, fn.1 (“the General Assembly amended R.C. 4511.191 to 
require only one reinstatement fee * * *” [emphasis added]); id. at 602, 709 N.E.2d 
1200 (F.E. Sweeney, J., dissenting) (“This fee was in addition to many other costs * 
* *.  For example, a fee was imposed after the court suspension” [emphasis 
added]). Notwithstanding this distinction, however, Uskert and the instant case 
share a common principle of law: Former R.C. 4511.191(L) required a driver to pay 
a reinstatement fee each time the driver requested, and obtained, license 
reinstatement from the BMV. 
{¶ 26} The second case on which the BMV relies is State v. Lewis, 85 Ohio 
St.3d 632, 710 N.E.2d 699. The trial court in Lewis had rejected the defendant’s 
argument that the imposition of both the ALS and the punishment on the underlying 
charge was a double jeopardy violation and had ordered that the “reinstatement fee 
from ALS * * * be applied to any reinstatement fees due on [the judicial] 
suspension.” Cuyahoga Falls v. Lewis (Sept. 23, 1998), Summit App. No. CA 
19006, 1998 WL 663226. In a two-sentence per curiam decision, we affirmed the 
judgment of the trial court on the authority of Uskert but remanded “to reinstate the 
original * * * Administrative License Suspension reinstatement fee that the trial 
court ordered be applied to any reinstatement fees due on the DUI suspension.” 
January Term, 2003 
 
11 
Lewis, 85 Ohio St.3d at 632, 710 N.E.2d 699. Based on our remand, the BMV 
contends that we have “already read Uskert to mandate the two-suspensions, two-
fees approach.” 
{¶ 27} The BMV’s reliance on Lewis, however, is unavailing for the same 
reason that Uskert is inapposite: the driver in that case would have made two 
requests for reinstatement—one at the conclusion of the ALS and one at the 
conclusion of the judicial suspension. Lewis, therefore, did not consider whether the 
BMV could collect two reinstatement fees from a driver who had made a single 
request for reinstatement. Nevertheless, the “two-fee” reading of Lewis, like that of 
Uskert, is consistent with our conclusion that the reinstatement fee in former R.C. 
4511.191(L) was tied to the reinstatement of a license rather than the suspensions to 
which the license was subject. Accordingly, we conclude that our case law fails to 
support the proposition that former R.C. 4511.191(L) required a separate 
reinstatement fee for each license suspension when a driver has made a single 
request for license reinstatement.5 
III 
{¶ 28} Having concluded that the BMV wrongfully collected two 
reinstatement fees from the members of the certified class, we now consider 
whether the trial court erred in awarding postjudgment interest against the state. We 
begin our analysis with the well-settled rule that “ ‘[i]n the absence of a statute 
requiring it, or a promise to pay it, interest cannot be adjudged against the state for 
delay in the payment of money.’ ” Lewis v. Benson (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 66, 67,  
                                                          
 
5. 
Our case law not only fails to support the BMV’s position, but it may undermine it. In 
State v. Gustafson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d at 438, 668 N.E.2d 435, we held that the “continued 
recognition of an ALS following judicial imposition of criminal penalties” is a second punishment 
and is thus prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution. The BMV’s 
position that a separate fee is “tied” to the ALS thus calls into question whether such a fee would be 
the type of “continued recognition” of an ALS that Gustafson prohibited. Nevertheless, we decline 
to render judgment on the issue because our statutory analysis of former R.C. 4511.191(L) prohibits 
such an application of the statute. See Norandex, Inc. v. Limbach (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 26, 28, 630 
N.E.2d 329 (“[T]he court decides constitutional questions only when absolutely necessary * * *.”). 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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14 O.O.3d 269, 397 N.E.2d 396, quoting State ex rel. Parrott v. Bd. of Pub. Works 
(1881), 36 Ohio St. 409, 1881 WL 12. Our analysis, therefore, turns to whether the 
General Assembly has enacted a statute that requires the state to pay postjudgment 
interest when money became due and payable upon the judgment of the trial court. 
{¶ 29} The certified class relies on R.C. 1343.03 as the statute that requires 
the state to pay postjudgment interest in the instant case. R.C. 1343.03(A) provides: 
“[W]hen money becomes due and payable * * * upon all judgments, decrees, and 
orders of any judicial tribunal for the payment of money arising out of tortious 
conduct or a contract or other transaction, the creditor is entitled to interest at the 
rate of ten per cent per annum.” (Emphasis added.) Relying on this provision, the 
trial court concluded that “[u]pon the issuance of [the trial court] judgment, the state 
became liable for reimbursement of the overpayment to plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs 
became creditors of the state.” The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the 
trial court, holding that R.C. 1343.03 is a general statute that “does not provide 
statutory authority to assess interest against the state.” 
{¶ 30} Contrary to the court of appeals’ decision, however, our case law 
has held that the state is liable for postjudgment interest under R.C. 1343.03. In 
Beifuss v. Westerville Bd. of Edn. (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 187, 525 N.E.2d 20, we 
addressed whether a public board of education was liable for prejudgment interest 
on an order granting back pay to public employees. We determined that the school 
board was a state agency against which interest could not be adjudged absent 
statutory authority. Concluding that there was no “statutory authority requiring the 
payment of prejudgment interest by this governmental entity,” we held that 
prejudgment interest could not be adjudged against the school board. Id. at 190, 525 
N.E.2d 20. 
{¶ 31} Three years later, we again addressed whether a public board of 
education was liable for interest on an award for back pay in State ex rel. Tavenner 
v. Indian Lake Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 88, 578 N.E.2d 
January Term, 2003 
 
13 
464. Unlike Beifuss, however, Tavenner addressed whether R.C. 1343.13 required 
the state to pay postjudgment interest. With the understanding that prejudgment 
interest and postjudgment interest are “clearly distinguishable,” we concluded that 
the public school board was liable for postjudgment interest under R.C. 1343.03(A). 
Id. at 91, 578 N.E.2d 464 (Douglas, J., concurring); see, also, State ex rel. Bowman 
v. Columbiana Cty. Bd. of Commrs. (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d at 401, 674 N.E.2d 694 
(holding that a county board of commissioners is liable for postjudgment interest 
under R.C. 1343.03[A]). 
{¶ 32} Our distinction between prejudgment and postjudgment interest is 
born of good reason. Whereas the policy behind prejudgment interest is to 
encourage prompt settlement and to impose a civil sanction against a party who 
holds money against the lawful claim of another, the policy behind postjudgment 
interest is “ ‘to compensate the judgment creditor for the fact that he has not had the 
use of a certain sum of money that has been adjudged to be his.’ ” S. Farm Bur. 
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brinker (2002), 350 Ark. 15, 21, 84 S.W.3d 846, quoting Equifax, 
Inc. v. Luster (E.D.Ark. 1978), 463 F.Supp. 352. Indeed, Ohio case law has 
consistently recognized that R.C. 1343.03(A) bestows a right to postjudgment 
interest “automatically * * * as a matter of law.” Testa v. Roberts (1988), 44 Ohio 
App.3d 161, 542 N.E.2d 654, paragraph seven of the syllabus; see, also, Cafaro 
Northwest Partnership v. White (1997), 124 Ohio App.3d 605, 608, 707 N.E.2d 4; 
Dayton Sec. Assoc. v. Avutu (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 559, 566, 664 N.E.2d 954. 
{¶ 33} Thus, Beifuss and Tavenner make clear two propositions of law: a 
school board is (1) a state agency for purposes of such litigation and (2) liable for 
postjudgment interest under R.C. 1343.03. These two propositions, taken 
together, stand for the principle that the state is liable for postjudgment interest 
under R.C. 1343.03. See, also, Bowman, 77 Ohio St.3d at 398, 674 N.E.2d 694. 
No one disputes the status of the BMV as a state agency. Accordingly, we hold 
that the BMV is liable for postjudgment interest pursuant to R.C. 1343.03. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
14 
Because the court of appeals concluded that the BMV was not liable for 
postjudgment interest, it did not review the trial court's determination that 
postjudgment interest should accrue from the date of the partial summary 
judgment. We therefore remand the cause to the court of appeals to review that 
determination. 
Judgment affirmed in part, 
reversed in part 
and cause remanded. 
 
MOYER, C.J., F.E. SWEENEY, WALTERS, LUNDBERG STRATTON and WISE, 
JJ., concur. 
 
CARR, J., concurs with the granting of the motion for reconsideration but 
otherwise adheres to her dissenting opinion found at 100 Ohio St.3d 122, 2003-
Ohio-5277, 797 N.E.2d 45, ¶ 34-42. 
 
PFEIFER, J., dissents. 
 
DONNA J. CARR, J., of the Ninth Appellate District, sitting for RESNICK, J. 
 
SUMNER E. WALTERS, J., of the Third Appellate District, sitting for COOK, 
J. 
 
JOHN W. WISE, J., of the Fifth Appellate District, sitting for O’CONNOR, J. 
__________________ 
 
CARR, J., dissenting. 
{¶ 34} I respectfully dissent.  Although the majority focuses primarily on 
the plain language of former R.C. 4511.191(L), it is impossible to construe the 
meaning of former R.C. 4511.191(L) without reference to how the decisions of 
this court have influenced the BMV’s interpretation of that language. 
{¶ 35} In State v. Gustafson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 425, 442, 668 N.E.2d 
435, this court concluded that an administrative license suspension under R.C. 
4511.191 that extended beyond criminal sentencing following a DUI conviction 
would constitute an additional punishment in violation of the Double Jeopardy 
January Term, 2003 
 
15 
Clauses of the United States and Ohio Constitutions.  Consequently, Gustafson 
altered the plain language of R.C. 4511.191 and held that “a sentencing court has 
judicial power * * * to order the termination of an administrative license 
suspension at the time of sentencing, as continuation of the ALS would result in 
unconstitutional application of R.C. 4511.191 to the criminal offender.”  Because, 
despite the language of the statute, continued recognition of the ALS after 
imposition of criminal penalties had been deemed unconstitutional, the BMV and 
courts throughout the state began to construe R.C. 4511.191 as setting forth two 
separate and distinct license suspension periods: the ALS and the judicial license 
suspension. 
{¶ 36} Viewing the ALS and judicial suspension as distinct suspension 
periods, and because an ALS had to end upon imposition of the judicial 
suspension, the BMV apparently routinely charged a reinstatement fee for the 
ALS at or before the time of criminal sentencing.  That was the very situation 
before this court in State v. Uskert (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 593, 709 N.E.2d 1200, 
and State v. Lewis (1999), 85 Ohio St.3d 632, 710 N.E.2d 699. 
{¶ 37} This court’s decisions in Uskert and Lewis (although neither 
directly addressed this issue) implied that reinstatement of a driver’s license under 
former R.C. 4511.191(L) required payment of two reinstatement fees: one for the 
ALS and one for the judicial suspension.  The reinstatement fee at issue in both 
Uskert and Lewis was not the result of a request for reinstatement by the driver at 
the end of the ALS period.  Instead, it appears that the reinstatement fee was 
charged by the BMV before the ALS had expired. 
{¶ 38} The majority’s attempt to factually distinguish Uskert and Lewis 
by indicating that each driver had sought reinstatement of his license at the end of 
the ALS and prior to the judicial suspension is not supported by the decisions of 
either this court or the appellate courts.  In fact, the Lewis appellate opinion 
indicates that the BMV automatically charged Lewis the ALS reinstatement fee 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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prior to sentencing on the criminal charges and only one month into his ALS 
suspension which would have been at least one year, for refusal to submit to a 
breath test.  See Cuyahoga Falls v. Lewis (Sept. 23, 1998), 9th Dist. No. CA 
19006, 1998 WL 663226; R.C. 4511.191(E)(1).  Uskert was likewise 
automatically charged an ALS reinstatement fee without making a request for 
reinstatement, as his ALS was still in effect until the trial court terminated it at the 
time of sentencing.  See State v. Uskert (Dec. 7, 2000), 5th Dist. No. 99-COA-
1329; State v. Uskert (Dec. 19, 1997), 5th Dist. No. 97-COA-01219. 
{¶ 39} Although both Uskert and Lewis raised constitutional challenges to 
former R.C. 4511.191 and did not seek a construction of the statute’s language, 
constitutional challenges to R.C. 4511.191 should not have been considered if, as 
the majority holds today, the BMV had no statutory authority to collect the 
reinstatement fees at issue.  This court has repeatedly held that it will not reach 
constitutional issues unless absolutely necessary.  In re Miller (1992), 63 Ohio 
St.3d 99, 110, 585 N.E.2d 396; In re Boggs (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 217, 221, 553 
N.E.2d 676; Hall China Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 206, 210, 
4 O.O.3d 390, 364 N.E.2d 852.  If the actions of the BMV in Uskert and Lewis 
were in violation of the plain language of former R.C. 4511.191(L), the statutory 
violation should have been addressed then.  By failing to reach that issue, Uskert 
and Lewis implicitly authorized the BMV’s practice of collecting two 
reinstatement fees.  See, also, Uskert, 85 Ohio St.3d at 596, 709 N.E.2d 1200, fn. 
1, where this court seemed to recognize that the statute provided for the collection 
of two fees by observing, “Effective September 16, 1998, the General Assembly 
amended R.C. 4511.191 to require only one reinstatement fee * * *.” 
{¶ 40} Moreover, the majority now indicates that the BMV cannot charge 
a reinstatement fee until three conditions precedent are satisfied: the combined 
ALS and judicial suspension period has ended, a request has been made by the 
driver, and driver is not otherwise subject to suspension.  In Uskert, however, this 
January Term, 2003 
 
17 
court construed former R.C. 4511.191(L) differently, indicating that proof of 
financial responsibility and payment of the reinstatement fee were conditions 
precedent to return of the driver’s license.  Uskert, 85 Ohio St.3d  at 596, 709 
N.E.2d 1200.  This court construed the provision similarly in Gustafson: 
“Following the prescribed term of the suspension, the driver may request the 
BMV to return or reissue the suspended license, which the BMV must do upon 
payment of a $250 reinstatement fee and proof of compliance with Ohio’s 
financial responsibility requirements.  R.C. 4511.191(L).” (Emphasis added.)  
Gustafson, 76 Ohio St.3d at 432, 668 N.E.2d 435. 
{¶ 41} Based on the rationale of this court’s former decisions, I cannot 
concur in the majority’s reasoning that former R.C. 4511.191(L) permitted the 
BMV to collect only one reinstatement fee, only at the end of the suspension 
periods, and only after a request by the driver for reinstatement. 
{¶ 42} Furthermore, under today’s ruling, persons under various 
suspensions for committing multiple drunk-driving offenses would have to pay 
only one reinstatement fee if they had waited until all suspensions were 
terminated.  I do not believe that this was the intended result of former R.C. 
4511.191(L). 
 
LUNDBERG STRATTON, J., concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion. 
__________________ 
Cooper & Walinski and John Czarnecki; Wittenberg, Phillips, Levy & 
Nusbaum and Jerome Phillips, for appellees and cross-appellants. 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, Stephen P. Carney, Associate State Solicitor, 
Michael Gladman and John W. Barron, Assistant Solicitors, for appellant and cross-
appellee. 
__________________