Case Title: Matter of Cargile

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1998-09-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
Matter of Cargile1998 WY 117965 P.2d 666Case Number: 97-153Decided: 09/23/1998Supreme Court of Wyoming

In 
the Matter of the Worker's Compensation Claim of Edward A. CARGILE, an

Employee of Ruan Transport.

 

Edward A. CARGILE and Maren Kay Felde, Appellants 
(Petitioners),

v.

STATE of Wyoming ex rel., WYOMING WORKERS' SAFETY AND 
COMPENSATION DIVISION, and Wyoming Office of Administrative Hearings, Appellees 
(Respondents).

 

                                

Appeal from the District Court, Laramie County, 
Edward Grant, J.

 

    Maren Kay Felde, Cheyenne, 
for Appellants (Petitioners).

     
William U. Hill, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney 
General; Gerald W. Laska, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Bernard P. 
Haggerty, Assistant Attorney General for Appellees 
(Respondents).

 

    Before LEHMAN, C.J., and 
THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN and TAYLOR,* JJ.

   * Chief 
Justice at the time of expidited conference.

 

    THOMAS, 
Justice.

 [¶1]          Edward A. Cargile and Maren 
Kay Felde (the Petitioners) seek review of an Order Awarding Attorney Fees and 
Costs for Felde's representation of Cargile before the Office of Administrative 
Hearings in a contested case relating to Cargile's application for extended 
permanent disability benefits. Without making any record other than striking certain items from, and 
making notes on, Felde's itemization of costs and fees, the hearing examiner 
reduced the request for fees and costs by $303.01. The record is silent with 
respect to any facts or factors considered by the hearing examiner in making 
this determination. In the absence of a record reflecting the material facts and 
the rationale upon which the hearing examiner proceeded to reduce the fee 
request, we cannot pursue any appropriate judicial review pursuant to WYO. STAT. 
§ 16-3-114(c) (1997). We remand the case to the Office of Administrative 
Hearings with instruction to hold a hearing on the motion for attorney fees and 
costs at which an appropriate record can be made reflecting the facts and the 
rationale accounting for the action of the hearing examiner in reducing the fees 
and costs.

 

[¶2]          In the Brief of Petitioners, 
filed on behalf of Cargile and Felde, these issues are set 
forth:

 

                  
Issue 1

 

            
      
      Did 
the Respondent Wyoming Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) act in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner, 
not in accordance with the law, and in abuse of its discretion, when it 
entered its January 30, 1997 ORDER 
ALLOWING ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS, effectively denying Petitioner Maren K. Felde 
(Felde) her reasonable attorney fees incurred in representing Petitioner Edward 
A. Cargile (Cargile) in his contest of the Respondent Wyoming Workers' Safety 
and Compensation Division's adverse final determination concerning Cargile's 
claim for workers' compensation benefits?

 

         
         Issue 
2

 

                        
Did the Respondent Wyoming Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) act to 
deprive Petitioner Cargile of his 
rights guaranteed by Wyoming's Constitution, including his right 
to equal protection free of 
absolute and arbitrary power of the government, and his right to due 
process provided by law, when it entered 
its January 30, 1997 ORDER ALLOWING ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS, effectively denying 
Petitioner Maren K. Felde (Felde) her reasonable attorney fees incurred in 
representing Petitioner Edward A. Cargile (Cargile) in his contest of the 
Respondent Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division's adverse final 
determination concerning Cargile's claim for workers' compensation 
benefits?

 

  In the Brief of Appellee, State of 
Wyoming, ex rel., Wyoming Workers' Safety and Compensation Division (the 
Division), the issue is stated as:

 

                        
A. A Hearing Examiner denied part of an attorney's fee request he found 
"excessive" and partially denied costs. 
Was the Hearing Examiner's decision an abuse [of] his discretion, contrary to 
law, or contrary to the state constitution?

 

[¶3]          In May of 1989, Cargile was 
involved in a work related accident which resulted in injuries to his legs and 
his heart.  Cargile received various 
awards of benefits from the Division.  
In 1996, he applied for extended permanent disability benefits which were 
denied by the Division on June 24, 1996, in a letter denominated Final 
Determination. In accordance with WYO. STAT. § 27-14-602(d) (Supp. 1996), the 
Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) 
appointed Felde to represent Cargile in connection with the contested case 
hearing. Felde's representation resulted 
in a settlement agreement which was filed with the Division on October 28, 1996. 
Felde then submitted a motion for attorney fees and costs with an attached 
itemization of the time and costs for representing 
Cargile.

 

[¶4]          The parties interpret the 
succeeding events differently.  
Felde contends that all parties had a copy of the motion for attorney 
fees and costs, and that the Division had posed no objection to her fee request. 
According to Felde, the usual protocol within the OAH, the "unwritten rules," 
allowed an attorney to submit a bill for fees and costs. The bill then either 
would be paid, or, if it was questioned, an inquiry would be sent requesting 
more information, and a hearing invoking contested case procedures would be 
held. Felde contends that the departure 
by the OAH from its usual practices in this case is arbitrary and 
capricious.

 

[¶5]          The Division views the 
situation somewhat differently. In its brief, the Division complains that 
Felde's motion was not verified nor was it accompanied by any affidavit, and it 
was not signed. Therefore, the Division contends that it was properly denied. Further, the 
Division argues that Felde failed to request a hearing when she filed the motion 
and that neither the statutes nor the rules of the OAH require the OAH to grant 
a hearing or take additional evidence before denying fees and costs. 
Furthermore, the Division contends that, since Felde did not submit evidence 
that her fees were reasonable, she cannot complain about an adverse decision. 
Finally, while the Division accuses Felde of having no evidence to support her 
assertion that there are "unwritten 
rules," conspicuous by its absence is any denial by the Division that the 
protocol exists.

 

[¶6]          The only information in the 
record in this review proceeding is the Order Awarding Attorney Fees and Costs 
and the attachment thereto. Pursuant to that order, the OAH denied parts of 
Felde's request for attorney fees and costs. The hearing officer accomplished 
this by drawing lines through items he determined should not be paid. All costs 
identified as postage were denied; all copies charged at $0.15 a page were 
reduced to $0.10 a page; and the hearing officer wrote in the margin "Legal 
Research excessive will pay 3 hrs," and he lined out three of the six hours of 
legal research. He also denied the one half hour for filing and mailing the 
settlement agreement and an hour for preparing the motion for fees. He granted 
the remaining $1,451.90 of the $1,754.91 requested.  Felde sought judicial review of the 
Order Awarding Attorney Fees and Costs, and the district court certified the 
case to this Court pursuant to WYO. R. APP. P. 12.09.

 

[¶7]          Our review is accomplished 
pursuant to WYO. R. APP. P. 12.09(a), and it is governed by WYO. STAT. § 
16-3-114(c) (1997) which provides:

 

    The reviewing court 
shall:

 

    * * *

 

    (ii) Hold unlawful and set 
aside agency action, findings and conclusions found to be:

 

      (A) Arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law;

 

      (B) Contrary to 
constitutional right, power, privilege or immunity;

 

      (C) In excess of 
statutory jurisdiction, authority or limitations or lacking statutory 
right;

 

      (D) Without observance of procedure 
required by law; or

 

      (E) Unsupported 
by substantial evidence in a case reviewed on the record of an agency 
hearing provided by 
statute.

 

[¶8]          The Order Awarding Attorney 
Fees and Costs, which denied Felde a part of her requested attorney fees, is an 
adverse order subject to the provisions of WYO. STAT. § 16-3-110 (1997) which 
provides:

 

            A final decision 
or order adverse to a party in a contested case shall be in writing or 
dictated into the record. The final 
decision shall include findings of fact and conclusions of law 
separately stated. Findings of fact 
if set forth in statutory language, shall be accompanied by a concise 
and explicit statement of the 
underlying facts supporting the findings. * * *

 

[¶9]          In this instance, the 
hearing officer failed to include findings of fact and conclusions of law 
separately stated.  Neither did he 
provide any factual or legal grounds to justify his reduction of the requested 
attorney fees. In the absence of this information in the record, we cannot 
accomplish a meaningful review of the final order of the OAH in accordance with 
the provisions of WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c). The only conclusion we can reach is 
that the Order Awarding Attorney Fees and Costs was arbitrary, capricious, 
without observance of procedure required 
by law, and not in accordance with law. WYO. STAT. § 16-3-114(c)(ii)(A) & 
(D). Juroszek v. City of Sheridan Bd. of Adjustment, 948 P.2d 1370, 1373-74 
(Wyo. 1997). We reverse the Order Awarding Attorney Fees and Costs and remand 
the case to the OAH to conduct a hearing and develop an adequate record for 
review. This disposition effectively resolves the second issue claimed by the 
Petitioners, and we do not address it 
further.

 

[¶10]       In resolving the issue with 
respect to attorney fees, the hearing examiner, upon remand, may find it 
desirable to refer to the factors outlined in WYO. STAT. § 1-14-126(b) (1997). 
That statute provides:

 

(b) In civil actions for which an award of attorney's 
fees is authorized, the court in its discretion may award reasonable attorney's 
fees to the prevailing party without requiring expert testimony. In exercising 
its discretion the court may consider the following 
factors:

 

(i) The time and labor required, the novelty and 
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the 
legal service properly;

 

        (ii) 
The likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment precluded other 
employment

      by the 
lawyer;

 

        
(iii) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal 
services;

 

        (iv) 
The amount involved and the results obtained;

 

        (v) 
The time limitations imposed by the client or by the 
circumstances;

 

        (vi) 
The nature and length of the professional relationship with the 
client;

 

        
(vii) The experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer or lawyers 
performing the services; and 

 

        
(viii) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

 

While this statute 
specifically relates to the discretion of a trial court in awarding fees, it 
does encompass a policy of the State of Wyoming which is useful in resolving the 
issues in this case. In any event, we assume that the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law by the hearing examiner will appropriately reflect the 
reasons and the justification for reducing the amount to be awarded as attorney 
fees. See State ex rel. Workers' Compensation Div. v. Brown, 805 P.2d 830, 834 
(Wyo. 1991).

 

 [¶11]     It seems clear to us that in view 
of the position adopted by the Division in this instance, every attorney who 
files a motion for attorney's fees and costs with the OAH will henceforth 
request a hearing at the time the motion is filed.  While that may seem a burden on the 
administrative process, we do not see that the attorney will have any choice. 
Given that situation, the Court wonders if it would not be prudent for the OAH 
to adopt by rule some protocol which would permit an attorney to file a motion 
for attorney's fees and costs without requesting a hearing, but which would automatically 
afford a hearing if there was a challenge to the requested fees and costs or in 
the event that the OAH concluded that some reduction was in 
order.

 

[¶12]       Reversed and remanded for a 
hearing in the Office of Administrative Hearings on the motion for attorney fees 
and costs.