Case Title: DARRAH v MILBANK MUTUAL INS CO

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1983-02-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
N O . 8 2 - 4 0 4 I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1 9 8 3 KATHERINE J. D A R R A H , P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t , V S . MILBANK MUTUAL INSURANCE C O . , a f o r e i g n c o r p o r a t i o n , D e f e n d a n t a n d R e s p o n d e n t . A p p e a l f r o m : D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n a n d f o r t h e C o u n t y o f M i s s o u l a H o n o r a b l e J a c k L . G r e e n , J u d g e p r e s i d i n g . C o u n s e l o f R e c o r d : F o r A p p e l l a n t : T i p p , Hoven, S k j e l s e t & F r i z z e l l , M i s s o u l a , Montana D o u g l a s G . S k j e l s e t , M i s s o u l a , Montana F o r R e s p o n d e n t : G a r l i n g t o n , Lohn & R o b i n s o n , M i s s o u l a , Montana P a u l C . M e i s m e r , M i s s o u l a , Montana S u b m i t t e d o n b r i e f s : J a n u a r y 7 , 1 9 8 3 D e c i d e d : February 3 , 1983 - ---4 C l e r k M r . J u s t i c e L . C. Gulbrandson d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court. T h i s a p p e a l stems from a summary judgment, i n f a v o r of t h e r e s p o n d e n t Milbank Mutual I n s u r a n c e Company, denying a p p e l l a n t a $10,000 a c c i d e n t a l d e a t h b e n e f i t . The District Court of t h e F o u r t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Missoula County, found t h a t t h e a p p e l l a n t had n o t purchased t h e a c c i d e n t a l d e a t h b e n e f i t c o v e r a g e . A p p e l l a n t is t h e widow of Richard D . Darrah who w a s k i l l e d i n a n automobile a c c i d e n t on February 24, 1979. A t t h e t i m e of t h a t a c c i d e n t t h e d e c e d e n t was t h e h o l d e r of an automobile i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y i s s u e d by t h e r e s p o n d e n t . P a r t I11 o f d e c e d e n t ' s p o l i c y p r o v i d e s f o r a $10,000 a c c i d e n - t a l d e a t h b e n e f i t . The respondent r e f u s e d to pay on t h e grounds t h a t t h i s was a d d i t i o n a l coverage and w a s n o t paid f o r . However, i n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e p o s i t i o n taken by t h e company t h e r e is an a f f i d a v i t i n t h e record by Mrs. Darrah s t a t i n g t h a t t h e i n s u r a n c e a g e n t who s o l d them t h e p o l i c y t o l d t h e D a r r a h s t h a t they would be covered by t h e $10,000 a c c i d e n t a l d e a t h b e n e f i t . P a r t I o f t h e d e c e d e n t ' s p o l i c y also c o n t a i n s a d e a t h b e n e f i t o f $1,000, which t h e r e s p o n d e n t a d m i t s l i a b i l i t y on. S e v e r a l i s s u e s a r e r a i s e d on a p p e a l by t h e p a r t i e s : 1. Whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n g r a n t i n g summary judgment f o r t h e r e s p o n d e n t i n l i g h t of t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e r e c o r d ? 2. Whether t h e District Court e r r e d by g r a n t i n g summary judgment t h e r e b y r e v i s i n g o r d i s r e g a r d i n g t h e w r i t t e n p o l i c y w i t h o u t f r a u d or mutual m i s t a k e being shown and w i t h o u t d e t e r - mining i n t e n t of t h e p a r t i e s ? 3 . Whether it was e r r o r to g r a n t summary judgment because t h e i n s u r a n c e company is estopped from denying t h e p o l i c y a f f o r d s t h e d e a t h and d i s a b i l i t y coverage when t h e i n s u r e d was h o n e s t l y l e d to b e l i e v e t h a t s a i d coverage was a f f o r d e d ? I n cases i n v o l v i n g summary judgment t h e p r e - t r i a l r e c o r d must b e looked a t t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h e r e are any g e n u i n e i s s u e s of material f a c t , 5 6 ( c ) M.R.Civ.P., Flemmer v. Ming ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 6 2 1 P.2d 1035, 37 St.Rep. 1916, because summary judgment is o n l y p r o p e r under Rule 5 6 ( c ) , M.R.Civ.P. , where t h e record d i s c l o s e s no such i s s u e s e x i s t and t h e moving p a r t y is e n t i t l e d t o judgment as a m a t t e r of l a w . Reaves v. Reinbold (1980)r 615 P.2d 896, 898, 37 St.Rep. 1500, (and cases c i t e d t h e r e i n ) . A s t h e purpose of t h e p r o c e e d i n g is t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h e r e are any material i s s u e s o f f a c t i n v o l v e d , it should be remembered t h a t t h e formal i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d by t h e p l e a d i n g s are not c o n t r o l l i n g . Byrd v. B e n n e t t ( 1 9 8 1 ) , 631 P.2d 695, 38 St.Rep. 1083. The moving p a r t y i n a summary judgment a c t i o n h a s t h e burden o f showing t h e complete absence of material i s s u e s of f a c t . Byrd v . B e n n e t t ( 1 9 8 1 ) , 631 P.2d a t 696; Cereck v. A l b e r t s o n ' s I n c . (1981) 637 P.2d 509, 511, 38 St.Rep. 1986, (and c a s e s c i t e d t h e r e i n ) ; Rumph v. Dale Edwards, I n c . ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 600 P.2d 163, 36 St.Rep. 1022. I n t h e case a t hand, Milbank Mutual I n s u r a n c e Company was t h e moving p a r t y . They have n o t m e t t h e i r burden of showing a complete absence of material i s s u e s of f a c t . T h i s is evidenced by t h e p r e - t r i a l r e c o r d . The p o l i c y i t s e l f is not clear on t h e q u e s t i o n of whether t h e d e a t h b e n e f i t i n P a r t I11 is supplemental c o v e r a g e f o r which an a d d i t i o n a l premium must be p a i d . The premium n o t i c e s i n t h e record are a l s o u n c l e a r as to e x a c t l y what t h e c o v e r a g e s are. T h i s is due t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e s e n o t i c e s are p r i n t e d i n such a f a s h i o n t h a t t h e i n s u r e d would have to have knowledge of t h e system of a b b r e v i a t i o n s used b y t h e company to d e t e r m i n e what type of coverage t h e y had by l o o k i n g a t t h e n o t i c e s . N o where i n t h i s p r e - t r i a l r e c o r d c a n w e f i n d t h a t t h e i n s u r e d w a s made aware of what t h e a b b r e v i a t i o n s used on t h e premium n o t i c e s meant, n o r are they p l a i n i n and of t h e m s e l v e s . The company h a s also i n t r o d u c e d i n t o t h e record a copy of a document c a l l e d t h e "Home O f f i c e D a i l y Report," and claims t h a t it c l a r i f i e s t h e coverage provided to t h e a p p e l l a n t and h e r late husband. However, t h e y f a i l to show t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f o r h e r husband e v e r had any c o n t a c t w i t h or were aware of t h i s document's c o n t e n t s . F u r t h e r , p l a i n t i f f , i n h e r answers to d e f e n d a n t I s r e q u e s t f o r admission number t w o and i n t e r r o g a t o r y number t w o , states t h a t s h e h a s never had any c o n t a c t w i t h t h e "Home Off ice D a i l y Report." F i n a l l y , it should be noted t h a t a t h i r d document on which t h e r e s p o n d e n t relies i n t h i s c a s e , to prove l a c k of material f a c t u a l i s s u e s concerning what coverage was a f f o r d e d to t h e D a r r a h s , is t h e " D e c l a r a t i o n s Page" of t h e i n s u r a n c e p o l i c y . However, t h i s document is a b s e n t from t h e record and t h e r e f o r e c a n n o t be p a r t of t h e b a s i s f o r t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s g r a n t i n g or o u r upholding t h e summary judgment, a l t h o u g h i f it had been pre- s e n t , it may have been s u f f i c i e n t to s u p p o r t t h e g r a n t i n g of t h e summary j udgment . Based on t h e above f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s , t h e r e remain material i s s u e s of f a c t t o be decided i n t h i s c a s e and t h e r e f o r e t h e District Court was i n error i n g r a n t i n g summary judgment. A s t h i s h o l d i n g is d i s p o s i t i v e of t h i s case, we need n o t a d d r e s s t h e o t h e r i s s u e s r a i s e d by t h e p a r t i e s a t t h i s t i m e . The summary judgment is vacated and t h e c a s e h s remanded f o r , / f u r t h e r p r o c e e d i n g s . We concur: