Case Title: Koontz v. Town of South Superior

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-03-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
Koontz v. Town of South Superior1986 WY 79716 P.2d 358Case Number: 85-155Decided: 03/27/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming
IRA 
E. KOONTZ AND VELMA A. KOONTZ, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS),

v.

TOWN OF 
SOUTH SUPERIOR, WYOMING, APPELLEE 
(PLAINTIFF).

Appeal from the District 
Court, SweetwaterCounty, Kenneth G. Hamm, 
J.

Jay Dee Schaefer 
and Paul Schierer (argued), of Schaefer & Newcomer, Laramie, for appellants.

Edward J. Hess 
(argued), and Warren W. Dill, Jackson, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and ROONEY,* BROWN, CARDINE and URBIGKIT, 
JJ.

* Retired November 30, 
1985.

CARDINE, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     In this appeal we must 
determine whether a district court may decide a case upon briefs submitted by 
the parties when those briefs are not accompanied by either a motion for 
judgment or a stipulation of facts. We reverse the district court's order and 
remand for further proceedings without reaching the 
merits.

[¶2.]     On October 9, 1984, the 
town of South Superior filed a civil complaint against Ira and Velma 
Koontz in the district court. The town sought a declaratory judgment stating 
that it had acquired a prescriptive easement for a road through the Koontzes' 
real property. After the Koontzes filed an answer, the town moved for an order 
permitting it to file a brief on the legal issues likely to arise in the case. 
This motion led to a stipulation in which both parties agreed that the legal 
issues should be briefed. The court approved a briefing schedule and briefs were 
submitted.

[¶3.]     The parties did not 
formally stipulate to any facts prior to briefing but instead made short, and to 
some extent, contradictory statements of facts in their briefs. Some of the 
factual contentions were supported by affidavits and maps appended to the briefs 
but most were simply bald assertions that remained to be 
proven.

[¶4.]     In its brief, the town 
contended, as a matter of law, that a municipality can acquire an easement by 
prescription in Wyoming. The town also brought up the 
possibility that the disputed real estate had been dedicated to it by common 
law, a claim which it had never pled. The Koontzes argued in their brief that a 
Wyoming 
municipality lacks the power to acquire an easement by prescription. They also 
maintained that their property had never been dedicated to the town's use, 
either statutorily or by common law.

[¶5.]     After the briefs had 
been filed, the Koontzes moved the court to order oral arguments on the briefs. 
In that motion, the Koontzes inaccurately stated that "[t]he Parties hereto 
entered into a Stipulation submitting the above-entitled matter to the Court on 
Briefs." In reality, the parties' stipulation to a briefing schedule did not 
indicate that the court should make a decision based only on the briefs. The 
Koontzes admitted in their motion for oral argument that the affidavits 
accompanying the briefs were an insufficient factual basis for a decision. Their 
motion said:

"A review of said Briefs 
will show an imposing array of facts which oral arguments might help clarify. * 
* * All evidentiary facts must be presented by Affidavit attached to the 
respective Briefs. Oral arguments may very well help clarify and explain those 
Affidavits."

[¶6.]     Apparently relying on 
the Koontzes' statement that the case had been submitted on stipulated facts, 
the district court issued an opinion letter without granting oral argument and 
without taking any evidence in the case. In that opinion letter the court 
stated:

"I have assumed that the 
parties, in requesting a briefing schedule, intended that the Court decide this 
case on the basis of those briefs."

The court held 
in favor of the town and issued an order which stated:

"[T]he Town of Superior has acquired title by adverse possession in the 
portion of Lot 20, 21, and 22 of Block 12, 
Original Plat to the Town of Superior, Wyoming that is traversed by Division Street."1

The Koontzes 
have appealed from the court's order.

[¶7.]     The orderly 
administration of our court system depends on adherence to the established rules 
of civil procedure. Hickey v. Burnett, Wyo., 
707 P.2d 741 (1985). Novel procedures created by the parties or a district court 
will often cause surprise and unfairness. Larsen v. Roberts, Wyo., 676 P.2d 1046, 1048 
(1984). Even if the participants are not surprised at the trial level, novel 
procedures force the appellate courts to enter uncharted territory beyond any 
familiar guidelines and standards. Almost twenty-five years ago this court held 
that the time had passed for lenient application of the rules of civil 
procedure. The court stated that "hereafter there must be careful adherence to 
all of the provisions of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure." Ruby v. 
Schuett, Wyo., 360 P.2d 170, 172 (1961). We also 
pointed out that ignorance of the rules is no excuse. Id. at 
173.

[¶8.]     The case at bar 
represents an excessive departure from established procedures and must be 
remanded. We cannot treat the court's order as one granting summary judgment to 
the town of South Superior. "The appropriate procedure for seeking summary 
judgment is by making a motion under Rule 56,"2 yet neither of the parties made 
such a motion - either orally or in writing. Even if such a motion had been made 
orally, it would not have been proper under Rule 7(b), W.R.C.P., which requires 
all motions, except those made at a hearing or trial, to be made in writing, to 
state with particularity the grounds therefor, and to set forth the relief or 
order sought.

[¶9.]     Nor could we style the 
procedure employed as a motion for judgment on the pleadings which was converted 
to a motion for summary judgment. No motion for judgment on the pleadings under 
Rule 12(c), W.R.C.P., was ever made; and, even if it was, it could not have been 
converted into a motion for summary judgment absent notice to the parties. See 
Kimbley v. City of Green River, Wyo., 642 P.2d 443, 445 (1982).

[¶10.]  In several recent cases we have permitted 
district courts to decide cases based upon briefs and stipulated facts without a 
summary judgment motion. State ex rel. Scholl v. Anselmi, Wyo., 640 P.2d 746 (1982); Goodwin v. Upper Crust of Wyoming, Inc., Wyo., 624 P.2d 1192 
(1981). This procedure, which is sometimes called an agreed case, really amounts 
to a condensed trial by the court under Rule 39(b), W.R.C.P., in which the 
parties stipulate to the facts and submit briefs which are the equivalent of 
pretrial memoranda. Rule 16, W.R.C.P.; 3 Am.Jur.2d Agreed Case § 1. It is 
justified by Rule 1, W.R.C.P., which states that the Rules of Civil Procedure 
should be construed "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of 
every action." 

[¶11.]  This is not to say that we can approve 
the procedure followed in every agreed case on the grounds of speed and 
efficiency. "Rule 1 places the objectives of `speedy' and `inexpensive' on a 
plane of equality with `just.'" 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice 
and Procedure: Civil § 1029 at 131 (1969).

[¶12.]  In order to make an agreed case a just 
proceeding there are certain requirements that must be met. First, there must be 
"a clear statement of the facts agreed on." 3 Am.Jur.2d Agreed Case § 12 at 732; 
see Fugate v. Mayor and City Council of Town of Buffalo, Wyo., 348 P.2d 76, 81, 
97 A.L.R.2d 243 (1959). Second, the statement of facts must "be sufficient in 
itself to enable the court directly to draw conclusions of law determinative of 
the matter in controversy." 3 Am.Jur.2d Agreed Case § 14 at 733. Finally, "the 
statement of facts constituting an agreed case should be made part of the record 
in the proceeding, lest there be no basis for review of the judgment." 
Id. § 16 at 
734.

[¶13.]  It is clear from the record that the 
parties did not present an agreed case that could produce a just result. They 
did not enter a stipulation of facts from which the district court could draw 
legal conclusions. Nor can a stipulation be found in the record upon which we 
can ground our appellate review. The district court rendered judgment on its 
assumption that the parties had submitted the case for determination on the 
briefs. Yet there was no motion by either party indicating that the facts had 
been sufficiently developed for such a decision. Consequently, the surprise 
order was based only on conflicting and inadequate affidavits. The adjudication 
may have been speedy and inexpensive as encouraged by Rule 1, W.R.C.P., but it 
was unjust.3

[¶14.]  The town has argued that the Koontzes are 
estopped from denying the validity of the court's order because they invited 
that order in their motion for oral argument. We disagree. Although the Koontzes 
stated in their motion for oral argument that the parties had entered into a 
stipulation submitting the case on briefs, they did not admit that the case was 
factually ripe for an adjudication. In fact, they stated in the motion that oral 
argument was necessary to clarify the affidavits. We note also that the town 
admitted at oral argument that it was surprised when the district court issued 
its order deciding the case. If the Koontzes' motion for oral argument clearly 
requested an immediate decision by the court, then we wonder why the town was 
surprised when the court made that decision.

[¶15.]  In a sense, the town is playing with fire 
when it argues in support of the procedure employed in this case. There was 
insufficient evidence before the court to support the town's adverse possession. 
Were we to hold that the procedure in this case was adequate, then we would 
reverse the trial court's decision on the merits because the town failed to 
carry its burden of proving adverse possession. The town would be barred by res 
judicata from any future action on the adverse possession claim. This is exactly 
what happened in State ex rel. Scholl v. Anselmi, supra, which was a case 
properly submitted to the district court on stipulated facts and briefs. When 
the plaintiff in Anselmi failed to include sufficient proof of damages in the 
parties' stipulation, we held that his "claim for damages must fail in the 
absence of any proof." Id. at 750. 

[¶16.]  When we reverse and remand a case due to 
procedural errors, we sometimes address the legal issues that are likely to 
arise again after remand. We do so with the intent of saving judicial resources. 
Kimbley v. City of Green 
River, supra. Such a procedure is not appropriate, 
however, when the parties "may present material which will create a dispute as 
to material facts, and which may make it necessary to inquire into them to 
clarify the application of the law." Id. at 446. In this case it is apparent that 
the parties must develop facts, some of which could render a decision on the 
legal issues unnecessary. Under these circumstances, we decline to render an 
advisory opinion upon the adverse possession, prescriptive easement and common 
law dedication issues.

[¶17.]  Reversed and 
remanded.

ROONEY, J., 
filed a dissenting opinion.

FOOTNOTES

1 The court's order is of 
concern substantively as well as procedurally. The court granted the town a fee 
title to the disputed property by adverse possession although the town prayed 
only for a prescriptive easement in its complaint.

2 10A C. Wright, A. Miller 
& M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2719 at 3 
(1983).

3 We believe that the 
affidavits attached to the parties' briefs would have been insufficient to 
support summary judgment in the town's favor even if a proper summary judgment 
motion had been made. None of the affidavits or exhibits even mentioned whether 
the public's use of the roadway was adverse. Adversity is a key element of both 
prescription and adverse possession. Yeckel v. Connell, Wyo., 
508 P.2d 1200, 1202 (1973). Moreover, we have recently held that a court may not 
grant summary judgment based on facts which are not properly before the court. 
Hickey v. Burnett, 
Wyo., 707 P.2d 741 (1985). Perhaps 
after remand the parties will be able to eliminate the factual issues by 
presenting additional affidavits. Then the district court might be able to enter 
summary judgment after a proper motion. It is possible also that a trial will be 
necessary.

ROONEY, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶18.]  I find the record completely adequate to 
support the procedure and action taken by the district 
court.

[¶19.]  The parties filed a "Stipulation and 
Motion Regarding Order to File Briefs" in which they recited, among other 
things:

"WHEREAS the attorneys 
for both parties feel that there exists a substantial body of law which supports 
these respective positions, * * *"

Attached to the 
motion and stipulation was an order which was eventually entered. It set a 
briefing schedule as requested in the motion and 
stipulation.

[¶20.]  In effect, the parties stipulated that 
there was no issue as to a material fact and recognized that the matter should 
be decided on the legal issues to be briefed. Whether this amounted to a joint 
motion for summary judgment or whether it amounted to that referred to in the 
majority opinion as an "agreed case" (which was recognized therein as having 
been approved by this Court in the cases there cited), the obvious intent of 
both parties and the court at that point in the proceedings was that the matter 
should be determined on the legal issues as argued in the briefs. Having set up 
the trial court in this fashion, we should not allow or approve a contest of the 
procedure by one of the parties against whom the court ruled in accordance with 
the procedure to which that party agreed. If not subject to estoppel, Amfac 
Mechanical Supply Co. v. Federer, Wyo., 645 P.2d 73 (1982); National Crude, Inc. 
v. Ruhl, Wyo., 600 P.2d 716 (1979); Pickett v. Associates Discount Corporation 
of Wyoming, Wyo., 435 P.2d 445 (1967), at least appellants invited any 
error.

[¶21.]  The majority opinion notes appellants' 
contention that a municipality cannot acquire an easement through adverse 
possession. The opinion questions the existence of the adverse nature of 
appellee's possession of the disputed real property, and it comments on the 
trial court's holding that appellee was to have the real property in fee simple 
rather than having an easement over it. The letter opinion of the trial court 
reflected the propriety of its holding on these issues. In it Judge Hamm sets 
forth the basis therefor in a manner requiring no enhancement by me. In it he 
said:

"Section 
1-32-202, W.S., 1977 provides:

"`An action may be 
brought by a person in possession of real property against any person who claims 
an estate or interest therein adverse to him, for the purpose of determining the 
adverse estate or interest. The person bringing the action may hold possession 
himself or by his tenant.'

"This section 
was apparently renumbered 1-33-301 by the Wyoming Session Laws of 1977, although 
there is no indication of such change that I could find in Volume 2 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure.

"Consolidated 
Const., Inc. v. Smith, 634 P.2d 902 (Wyo. 1981) held, quoting Section 8-1-102 
(a)(vi), W.S., 1977:

"`Section 8-1-102(a)(vi) 
provides:

"[`"](a) As used in the 
statutes unless the legislature clearly specifies a different meaning or 
interpretation or the context clearly requires a different 
meaning:

* * * * * 
*

"[`"] (vi) `Person' 
includes an individual, partnership, corporation, joint stock company or any 
other association or entity, public or private; * * * ["] (Emphasis 
added.)

"`This section was 
designed to provide a general definition of the term "person" to be applied to 
all of the Wyoming Statutes unless the legislature clearly specifies a different 
meaning or interpretation or the context clearly requires a different meaning. 
When we read this quoted passage, which we might add is also clear and 
unambiguous, the obvious intent of the legislature was to have the definition of 
"person" apply unless the legislature superseded its application with specific 
language, or the context of the specific statutory provision requires a 
different meaning.'

"I am unable to 
find or hold here that the legislature intended any different meaning with 
respect to the power of a town to claim property by adverse 
possession.

"Amick v. 
Elwood, 77 Wyo. 269, 277, 314 P.2d 944, 
(Wyo. 1957) 
seems to speak for the proposition that a town can maintain a quiet title 
action. Footnote 4, 77 Wyo. 269 says:

"`Where town acquired 
title to property and undertook to convey good title to property to federal 
bureau, and federal bureau was in position analogous to that of tenant, and had 
some buildings on part of property, town could maintain action to quiet title 
against lien claimant who was not in possession.'

"The Court's 
actual language, on is:

"`The town council of 
Glendo had title and it undertook, it seems, to give the Federal Bureau of 
Reclamation a good title. The latter, while not exactly a tenant, occupied a 
position analogous thereto, and it has 
been held that is sufficient to enable the owner to bring an action to quiet 
title under a statute such as ours. 74 C.J.S. § 32, p. 
59.'

"I see no 
inconsistency in the language. The court held that `The owner' could bring a quiet title action, 
and at some point in those proceedings the town of Glendo was the 
owner.

"It is evident 
from the record that the street has existed probably since at least 1911, and 
certainly since 1947, and was maintained by the county up until about 1957. 
After that, the street has been, and is being, maintained by the town of 
South Superior 
without objection by defendants or their predecessors in title. It has been used 
by the public for well over 38 years, which no one denies. Clearly, the 
possession, maintenance and use by the town has been `actual, open, notorious, 
exclusive and continuous for the statutory period, and under color of title or 
claim of right.' Thus, in City of Rock Springs v. 
Sturm, 39 Wyo. 
494, 273 P. 908, 910, 97 A.L.R. 1, it is said:

"`The specific character 
of possession necessary to make the bar effective is not specified, but courts 
have uniformly required it to be adverse and have generally stated, as did this 
court in Bryant v. Cadle, 18 Wyo. 64, 104 P. 23, 106 P. 687, that in order that 
possession may be adverse it must be actual, open, notorious, exclusive and 
continuous for the statutory period, hostile and under color of title or claim 
of right. Courts are agreed that when actual possession is had, as in the case 
at bar, color of title is not necessary unless expressly required by statute. 
Bryant v. Cadle, supra; 2 C.J. 125.'

"The same case 
also stated as follows, which statement was also quoted with approval in Meyer 
v. Ellis, 411 P.2d 338, 343 (Wyo. 1966):

"`* * * The law 
contemplates that rights in land may be lost to another by means of adverse 
possession. We are not the judges of the wisdom of that. The prime object in 
prescribing how such adverse possession shall be made manifest, of what elements 
or requisites it shall be composed, is to advise the real owner that his 
ownership is in danger, and the law has deemed the time fixed as sufficiently 
long, so as to give him ample opportunity to protect his right; and if he fails 
to do so, when thus advised, within the time fixed, he is considered as having 
acquiesced in the transfer of ownership. Monnot v. Murphy, 207 N.Y. 240, 100 N.E. 742. Bearing this in mind, it is a reasonable rule that, when a man has 
occupied a piece of ground, though under a mistaken belief as to the true 
boundary, for the period prescribed by law, openly, notoriously, exclusively, 
and in a manner plainly indicating that he acted as owner thereof, the 
presumption should be, in the absence of explanatory circumstances showing the 
contrary, that he occupied the land adversely and under a claim of right, 
casting the burden of explaining such possession upon the person who disputes 
his right. * * *'

"I am fully in 
accord with plaintiff where it states.

"`Throughout their brief, 
the Koontzes repeatedly point to the 1981 proposed Agreement (Koontz Exhibit D) 
as proof that the Town made no prior claims of ownership or prescriptive use as 
required. Both the Federal Rules of Evidence 408 and W.R.E. 408 state that 
evidence of offering a valuable consideration in compromising a claim which was 
disputed as to either validity or amount is not admissable (sic) to prove 
liability for the claim or its amount. The Advisory Committee Notes to F.R.E. 
408 states that the evidence is irrelevant since the offer may be motivated by a 
desire for peace rather than from any concession of weakness of 
position.'

"Also in Doeng 
v. Garber, 665 P.2d 932, 937 (Wyo. 1983) the Court 
held:

"`Nonpayment of taxes on 
adversely possessed land, while a consideration, does not in itself destroy an 
adverse possession claim. Rutar Farms and Livestock, Inc. v. Fuss, supra [651 P.2d 1129]; Meyer v. Ellis[,] Wyo., 411 P.2d 338 (1966). Nonpayment of taxes 
by the claimant is usually the case where use to a fence line rather than deed 
line is the primary basis of the claim. As pointed out in Meyer our Wyoming statute does not 
require payment of taxes in order to establish adverse possession as do some 
states. All the other facts and circumstances in the case now before us override 
any question of taxes. There was no error in that regard.'

"For the above 
reasons, as well as any additional reasons cited in plaintiff's briefs 
consistent herewith, I find that the Town of South Superior, which I have heard 
has changed its name to Superior, has acquired title by adverse possession to 
the lands occupied by Division Street where it is now, and has been, physically 
located, and that the defendants are estopped from exercising any right of 
ownership over said lands and should remove the trailer they have placed 
thereon. Even if I am in error on the fee title aspects, I also believe that at 
the least the town has acquired an easement by prescription. It matters little 
as the result is the same." (Emphasis in original.)

I would 
affirm.