Case Title: In Re Adoption of JF

Citation: 392 Pa. Super. 39, 572 A.2d 223

Docket Number: 

State: pennsylvania

Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Date: 1990-03-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
392 Pa. Superior Ct. 39 (1990) 572 A.2d 223 In re ADOPTION OF J.F. Appeal of G.F. Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Submitted January 16, 1990. Filed March 27, 1990. *41 Paul Sotak, Scranton, for appellant. James Van Wie, Scranton, for appellee. Peter C. Povanda, Scranton, for adoptive parents M.D. & M.D., participating party. Before McEWEN, TAMILIA and FORD ELLIOTT, JJ. TAMILIA, Judge: Appellant/mother, G.F., and appellee/father, M.C.D., are the natural parents of J.F., who was born on June 9, 1976.[1] M.C.D. and his wife, M.D., filed a petition for involuntary termination of the parental rights of appellant on November 15, 1985, which the court granted on May 25, 1988. Appellant filed exceptions to the Order which were dismissed on June 14, 1989, and she now brings this appeal. A discussion of the background of this case and the people involved is necessary before addressing the issues raised. J.F. was born out of wedlock while her father was still residing with his parents, J.F.'s paternal grandparents. When J.F. was nine months old, appellant relinquished physical custody to appellee and his parents but still maintained *42 contact with her daughter. The child resided in her grandparents' home until October, 1982, even though appellee father married his present wife and moved out of his parents' residence in April, 1979. In June, 1981, appellant and paternal grandparents filed a petition for the involuntary termination of appellee father's parental rights. Appellant was willing at that time to voluntarily relinquish her parental rights to allow the paternal grandparents to adopt J.F. Their petition was denied, however, and in February, 1982, following a custody action by appellee father, a master issued a report and recommendation that legal custody be awarded to appellee father with liberal visitation rights to appellant and paternal grandparents. The paternal grandparents then filed a petition for blood testing to determine paternity of J.F. since they were claiming their son was not the natural father. The trial court dismissed this petition and this Court subsequently affirmed the trial court's Order. Commonwealth ex rel M.D. v. M.D. and I.D., 343 Pa.Super. 621, 494 A.2d 488 (1985). Appellee father and his wife filed their petition for involuntary termination of parental rights on November 15, 1985, claiming appellant had evidenced a purpose of relinquishing her parental rights for at least six months. Hearings were held on three separate occasions in 1986 to dispose of the matter and the court eventually concluded appellant failed to perform parental duties for at least three years or take reasonable, affirmative action to maintain communication and relationship with her daughter. Finding appellant could have done much more to demonstrate a place of importance in her child's life under the circumstances and that her child's best interest was at stake, the court granted appellees' petition. Appellant raises ten issues on appeal as follows: All of appellant's issues claim trial court error in some form as it relates to the court's decision to terminate her parental rights. After reviewing the record, we find no error on the part of the trial court in making its determination and will address the issues simultaneously except for appellant's first issue which requires separate analysis. Appellant claims the court erred in allowing M.D. to join her husband as a petitioner and in refusing to sequester her as a witness. She argues that M.D. had no right, under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2512, to petition for the involuntary *44 termination of appellant's parental rights. While we agree with appellant that M.D. was not a proper petitioning party, we find appellant suffered no prejudice by this error as M.D.'s husband, M.C.D., was a proper petitioning party.[2] The statute provides as follows: 23 Pa.C.S. § 2512(a). M.D. did not technically have custody of J.F., although her husband M.C.D. did. "Custody" in part (3) above (the section under which the court found M.D. to be a proper petitioning party) means legal custody, not merely physical custody. In re Adoption of Crystal D.R., 331 Pa.Super. 501, 480 A.2d 1146 (1984). Therefore, it is of no consequence that J.F. resided with M.C.D. and M.D.; even foster parents who have cared for a child for years have no standing to petition for the involuntary termination of a parent's rights. See id. M.C.D., however, was a proper petitioner and could have advanced his petition without his wife. The presence of M.D.'s name on the petition did not in any way prejudice appellant. Also we point out that a parent may not petition to terminate the parental rights of the other parent unless it is established that there is an adoption contemplated by the spouse of the petitioner. (Emphasis added.) In re B.E., 474 Pa. 139, 377 A.2d 153 (1977), has construed this section to mean that a parent may not terminate the other parent's right unless adoption is contemplated. In an indirect fashion, M.D.'s participation in this case satisfied a requirement that she was the intended adopter required by In re B.E., supra. Additionally, we find appellant was not prejudiced by the court's refusal to sequester M.D. as a witness. Appellant claims M.D. was allowed to hear her husband's testimony and thereby was in a position to conform her subsequent testimony to his. We find the court did not err in refusing to sequester M.D. as she had every opportunity prior to the hearing to conform her testimony to her husband's if that was their intent. The relevant statute sections governing involuntary termination of parental rights state: 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (b). The trial court found appellant showed a finality of purpose to relinquish her parental claim when, for three years, she failed to take reasonable, affirmative action to preserve her parental rights. The court concluded that appellees proved the statutory requirements by clear and convincing evidence and appellant failed to overcome this evidence. In re J.G.J., Jr., 367 Pa.Super. 425, 432, 532 A.2d 1218, 1220 (1987) (citations omitted). We find the record supports the trial court's determination, therefore, we affirm the Order terminating appellant's parental rights. The testimony offered by appellant and her witnesses and appellees was, of course, contradictory. The trial court, however, found appellant's testimony lacked sincerity and credibility and we agree. Appellant testified she visited her daughter at the paternal grandparents' home until October of 1982 when J.F. moved to her father's home. From that date through 1986, appellant had no visits with her daughter although she had been granted visitation rights. Appellant detailed her attempts to see J.F. and claims she stopped at appellees' home once every month in *47 1983, 1984 and 1985 but never got to see her daughter because no one was home or no one answered the door. During this time, however, appellant never attempted legal action to enforce her visitation rights. Appellant claims this Court did not decide the issue of custody until March 15, 1985, so she could not take any legal action while the custody issue was pending. The issue before us at that time, however, was not to determine custody but to decide whether the trial court was correct in dismissing the paternal grandparents' petition for blood testing. Appellant could certainly have pursued legal action to enforce her visitation rights without waiting for a decision from this Court on the issue of blood testing. Appellant's failure to take legal action is but one part of the evidence which, as a whole, indicates appellant did not take reasonable action to see her child which she could have, had she so desired. Even assuming appellees hindered appellant's attempts to contact J.F., as appellant testified, by not answering their door or shielding J.F. in public from seeing appellant, appellant was not faced with insurmountable obstacles or barriers that were out of her control. In re Shives, 363 Pa.Super. 225, 229-30, 525 A.2d 801, 803 (1987) (citations omitted). We find, under the circumstances, appellant did not utilize all available resources to preserve the parent-child relationship and, in fact, has evidenced a purpose of giving up her parental rights.[3] We agree with the trial court that appellees have proven by clear and convincing evidence appellant failed to perform her parental responsibilities for at least six months. Upon finding the requirements of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 were met, the court was free to examine the evidence and determine the child's best interest. Here, the court determined the child needed a permanent, stable environment without the squabbling between appellant and appellees or appellees and the paternal grandparents. Pursuant to section 2511(b), the court was correct in making such a determination and we find no error occurred. Order affirmed. [1] Appellee father testified this was the date of J.F.'s birth although appellant said the date of birth was September 9, 1976. [2] The trial court, in its Opinion Sur Exceptions, claims M.D. was a proper party petitioner because she resided with her husband and J.F. since her marriage. As reviewed below, this is not a basis for allowing M.D. to be a petitioner. [3] The trial court notes that most of the litigation over the child occurred between appellee father and his parents. Although appellant was joined with the paternal grandparents in the legal actions, it is apparent the grandparents were the ones more intimately involved in seeking custody, as appellant was willing to voluntarily terminate her parental rights to allow the grandparents to adopt J.F., should they succeed in terminating M.C.D.'s parental rights.