Case Title: YEAGER v. FORBES

Citation: 

Docket Number: 02-167

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2003-10-24T00:00:00Z

Document:
YEAGER v. FORBES2003 WY 13478 P.3d 241Case Number: 02-167Decided: 10/24/2003
OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2003

 

                                                                                                
    

 

JOHN 
YEAGER, LAWRENCE A.

DURANTE, 
JOHN REILLY, and

GEORGE 
ROGERS,

 

Appellants(Defendants/Counter 
Claimants) ,

 

v.

                                                                                                

WALDO 
E. FORBES, WILLIAM C.

FORBES, 
SARAH P. FORBES and

EDITH 
L. FORBES, as TRUSTEES

OF 
THE BECKTON TRUST, and

WALDO 
E. FORBES and WILLIAM

C. 
FORBES AS TRUSTEES OF THE

HILLSIDE 
STREET TRUST,

 

Appellees(Plaintiffs) 
.

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Sheridan County

 

Representing 
Appellants:

Timothy 
C. Kingston of Graves, Miller & Kingston, P.C., Cheyenne, 
Wyoming

 

Representing 
Appellees:

Tom 
C. Toner of Yonkee & Toner, LLP, Sheridan, Wyoming

 

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

 

            
HILL, Chief Justice.

 

[¶1]      This is a dispute 
over public access along the Soldier Creek Trail or Toll Road (the Trail) that 
crosses private land abutting the Big Horn National Forest in Sheridan County. 
 John Yeager, Lawrence A. Durante, 
John Reilly, and George Rogers (collectively the Defendants) appeal a summary 
judgment granted by the district court permanently enjoining them from entering 
upon or traveling across lands owned by Waldo E. Forbes, William C. Forbes, 
Sarah P. Forbes, and Edith L. Forbes, as Trustees of the Beckton Trust, and 
Waldo E. Forbes and William C. Forbes as Trustees of the Hillside Street Trust 
(collectively the Forbeses).  The 
Defendants also appeal a summary judgment order of the district court denying a 
Motion to Intervene filed by the Wyoming Wildlife Federation, Raymond Hutson, 
Dan Biebel, Fred Kusel, and Dan Reinke (collectively 
interveners).

 

[¶2]      Initially, we 
conclude that the Defendants have not timely appealed the district court's 
decision on the Motion to Intervene.  
We also find that the Trail is not a public road under Wyoming law and 
that the Defendants have not alleged facts sufficient to support a claim for a 
private or public prescriptive easement.  
Therefore, we affirm the summary judgment.

 

ISSUES

 

[¶3]      The Defendants 
set forth three issues for review:

 

1.      
Is 
the Soldier Creek Toll Road or Soldier Creek Trail a public road or trail 
pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 932?

 

2.      
Do 
the [Defendants] and the general public enjoy a prescriptive easement right in 
the use of the Soldier Creek Toll Road or Trail?

 

3.      
Should 
the proposed interveners have been allowed to intervene in the 
case?

 

The 
Forbeses respond with a list of seven issues:

1.      
Where 
the Board of County Commissioners never determined that the Soldier Creek Trail 
was necessary or important for public use and did not officially record the 
Soldier Creek Trail as a public road by January 1, 1924, as required by 1919 
Session Laws, ch. 112 and 1921 Session Laws, ch. 100, did the District Court 
correctly determine that the Soldier Creek Trail is not a public 
road?

 

2.      
Did 
the District Court correctly determine that there was no public prescriptive 
easement over the Soldier Creek Trail?

 

3.      
Did 
the District Court correctly determine that the Defendants had no private 
prescriptive easement over the Soldier Creek Trail?

 

4.      
Did 
the District Court correctly refuse to grant Defendants' motion to determine 
that the Soldier Creek Trail was a public road as a matter of 
law?

 

5.      
Was 
the notice of appeal of the order denying intervention timely 
filed?

 

6.      
Do 
the Defendants have standing to appeal from an order denying a motion to 
intervene filed by a third party?

 

7.      
Did 
the District Court properly deny the Intervenor's [sic] motion to intervene as 
of right under Wyo. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2)?

 

FACTS

 

[¶4]      Many of the facts 
underlying this case are the subject of dispute between the parties, especially 
those relating to the establishment and historical use of the Trail.  Our view of the evidence on appeal is 
determined by the procedural status of the case:

 

Summary 
judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and 
the prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. A 
genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, 
would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the 
cause of action or defense which has been asserted by the parties. We examine 
the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the 
motion, and we give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may 
fairly be drawn from the record. We evaluate the propriety of a summary judgment 
by employing the same standards and by using the same materials as were employed 
and used by the lower court. We do not accord any deference to the district 
court's decisions on issues of law.

 

Matlack 
v. Mountain West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company, 
2002 WY 60, ¶6, 44 P.3d 73, ¶6 (Wyo. 2002) (quoting Baker v. Pena, 2001 
WY 122, ¶6, 36 P.3d 602, ¶6 (Wyo. 2001) (citations 
omitted)).

 

[¶5]      The Forbeses' 
ranch contains lands in Sections 22, 29, 30, and 31 of Township 55 North, Range 
86 West, 6th P.M., Sheridan County, Wyoming.  The parcels of land were added to the 
Forbeses' ranch over time through patenting by their ancestors or through 
purchase from other parties between 1903 and 1939.  The Soldier Creek Trail or Toll Road 
provides access to the Big Horn National Forest and adjacent state trust 
lands.  It begins at the western 
terminus of the Beckton Big Horn Mountain Road (County Road No. 52 also commonly 
referred to as the P K Lane).  The 
Trail begins on property owned by the Forbeses at the western terminus of the P 
K Lane and winds across state land and crosses back onto the Forbeses' property 
before it enters the Big Horn National Forest. 

 

[¶6]      While there is a 
serious dispute between the parties as to whether or not the Trail existed prior 
to the Forbeses' homestead of the land, there is some evidence suggesting that 
The Sheridan, Bald Mountain and Big Horn Basin Toll Road Company may have 
constructed the Trail in 1891 or 1892 to provide miners access to the Big Horn 
Mountains.  According to the 
Defendants' affidavits, the public has used the Trail since its inception.  The use of the Trail has ranged from 
running of cattle to state grazing lands at Walker Prairie since the early 
1900's to outfitters and guides taking hunters into the Big Horn National 
Forest.  The individual Defendants 
also set forth their own use of the Trail.  
John Yeager has used it to take clients to hunting camps in the Big Horn 
National Forest as a licensed outfitter since the late 1970's.  George Rogers has used the Trail 
personally and as a licensed outfitter and guide since 1981.  Larry Durante and John Reilly have used 
the Trail for personal enjoyment since 1990 and 1981 
respectively.

 

[¶7]      Historically, the 
Forbeses have maintained signs along the Trail.  While there is a dispute between the 
parties as to when the signs were originally put up, the Defendants acknowledged 
in their depositions that they have been in place since at least the early 
1980's.  The signs informed users 
that they had permission to use the Trail to access the Big Horn National Forest 
and if they desired to use the Trail for any other purpose, they had to obtain 
prior permission from the Forbeses.  
There were also signs prohibiting hunting on the Forbeses' 
property.

 

[¶8]      In 2001, the 
Forbeses apparently became exasperated with gates being left open along the 
Trail, interfering with their ranching operations.  Accordingly, the Forbeses rerouted the 
Trail at its eastern terminus at the end of the P K Lane.  A new sign was erected informing the 
public that they could use the new route at their discretion, but that if they 
desired to use the old route, they had to call in advance for permission.  The Defendants disputed the right to 
alter the Trail because they believed that it was a public road.  At least two of the Defendants were 
cited for trespassing for using the old route without obtaining the prior 
permission from the Forbeses.

 

[¶9]      On November 6, 
2001, The Board of County Commissioners of Sheridan County held a public 
meeting.  One of the items on the 
agenda was the dispute over the public or private nature of the Trail.  The Board's minutes describe the 
consideration given to the issue:

 

     The 
Board now addressed a request from Cam and Spike Forbes regarding clarification 
on the Soldier Creek Toll Road. Chairman Brad Waters addressed the public, and 
read the following statement, which was prepared by the County Attorney, Matt 
Redle.  "1) Interested parties have 
indicated their belief that the trail crossing the Forbes' property is a public 
road. Some have suggested that the trail lies along the route of the Soldier 
Creek Toll Road established by the Soldier Creek Toll Road Company in 1889 
pursuant to Wyo. Rev. Stat. § 525 (1887).  
2)  A review of  pertinent  records  of Sheridan County fails to show that 
Sheridan County ever established the trail in question as a county road pursuant 
to applicable Wyoming statute.  3) 
In 1907 Sheridan County did establish the Beckton-Big Horn Mountain Road (now 
known at "PK Lane") as a county road.  
It has been suggested by interested parties that the Beckton-Big Horn 
Mountain Road overlies the lower portion of the Soldier Creek Toll Road.  4) A review of pertinent records of 
Sheridan County fails to disclose that the County ever claimed the portion of 
the trail under dispute.  Neither do 
those records disclose that the County has ever expended any funds for 
construction, maintenance or other improvement to the trail in dispute.  5) This does not necessarily resolve the 
issue of whether the trail in question is a public thoroughfare.  Neither is it within the jurisdiction of 
this Board to determine the rights, if any, of the Forbes' or interested members 
of the public to the use of the trail.  
Jurisdiction to determine the property rights of the interested parties 
lies with the courts."  Attorney 
Charles E. Graves, representing the "Citizens for Public Access" handed out a 
letter and addressed the Board at this time, Mr. Graves stated that he agreed 
with the statement prepared by the County Attorney and requested the 
Commissioners urge both sides to try to settle this issue, rather than have the 
courts decide the issue.

 

The 
Commissioners' exhortations were apparently insufficient.  On November 20, 2001, the Forbeses filed 
a complaint in the district court requesting a declaration that the Defendants 
did not have any right to enter upon or travel across the Forbeses' land and 
asking for a permanent injunction prohibiting them from doing so.  The Defendants 
responded by counterclaiming that:  
(1) The Trail was an established public road under Federal Revised 
Statute 2477 (1866), later codified at 42 U.S.C. § 932 (repealed 1976); (2) 
public use had established a public prescriptive easement; and (3) the 
Defendants' 
use had established a private prescriptive easement.

 

[¶10]   On January 16, 2002, the Wyoming 
Wildlife Federation, Raymond Hutson, Dan Biebel, Fred Kusel, and Dan Reinke 
filed a Motion to Intervene as a matter of right pursuant to W.R.C.P. 
24(a)(2).  The district court denied 
the motion.  The court noted that 
the Forbeses' request for injunctive relief was specifically limited in scope to 
the named Defendants 
and that the proposed interveners had acknowledged in their motion that, "Even 
if the Court were to render a judgment in favor of one or the other side in the 
case, it would not have the effect of addressing any other person's or entity's 
use of the [Trail]." Accordingly, the district court denied the Motion to 
Intervene because the proposed interveners had not alleged that any of their 
individual rights were being harmed or that they would be precluded from 
pursuing legal action to enforce those rights, if any.

 

[¶11]   Subsequently, both parties filed 
motions for summary judgment, including supporting affidavits and exhibits.  Without holding a hearing, the district 
court granted the Forbeses' motion.  
The district court concluded that it did not have "the authority to 
declare the existence of a public road by mere public use."  The court also found that the 
Defendants 
had failed to show any notice to the Forbeses to support their prescriptive 
easement claims.  The Defendants 
have appealed the grant of the Forbeses' motion for summary judgment and the 
denial of the proposed interveners' motion to intervene as a matter of 
right.

 

STANDARD 
OF REVIEW

[¶12]   As noted, this is a review of a 
summary judgment.  In addition to 
the standard set forth above for reviewing the factual context, we review issues 
of law by according no deference to the district court's conclusions and may 
affirm its decision on any legal grounds appearing in the record.  WCCC v. Casper Community College, 2001 
WY 86, ¶11, 31 P.3d, 1242, ¶11 (Wyo. 2001).

 

[¶13]   Resolution of this matter requires 
application of our standards for interpreting statutory 
language:

 

[W]e 
look first to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words to determine if the 
statute is ambiguous. Olheiser v. State 
ex rel. Worker's Compensation Div., 866 P.2d 768, 770 (Wyo. 1994), citing Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Game & 
Fish Comm'n, 845 P.2d 1040, 1042-43 (Wyo. 1993).  A statute is clear and unambiguous if 
its wording is such that reasonable persons are able to agree on its meaning 
with consistency and predictability. Parker Land & Cattle, at 1043.  Conversely, a statute is ambiguous if it 
is found to be vague or uncertain and subject to varying interpretations. Id. * * * Ultimately, whether a statute 
is ambiguous is a matter of law to be determined by the court.  Id. 

. 
. . .

When 
a statute is sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we give effect to the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the words and do not resort to the rules of statutory 
construction.  Tietema v. State, 926 P.2d 952, 954 
(Wyo. 1996); Butts v. State Board of 
Architects, 911 P.2d 1062, 1065 (Wyo. 1996). Instead, our inquiry revolves 
around the ordinary and obvious meaning of the words employed according to their 
arrangement and connection. In doing so, we view the statute as a whole in order 
to ascertain its intent and general purpose and also the meaning of each part. 
"We give effect to every word, clause and sentence and construe all components 
of a statute in pari materia."  Parker, 845 P.2d  at 
1042.

 

In 
Re Termination of Parental Rights to IH, 
2001 WY 100, ¶17, 33 P.3d 172, ¶17 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Murphy v. State Canvassing Board, 12 P.3d 677, 679 (Wyo. 2000)).  "We 
endeavor to interpret statutes in accordance with the legislature's 
intent."  Wyodak Resources Development v. Board of 
Equalization, 2001 WY 92, ¶7, 32 P.3d 1056, ¶7 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Exxon Corporation v. Board of County 
Commissioners Sublette County, 987 P.2d 158, 161-62 (Wyo. 1999)).  When examining a statute, we presume 
"that the legislature enacts legislation with full knowledge of existing law and 
with reference to other statutes and decisions of the courts.  Such legislation should, therefore, be 
construed in a way that creates a consistency and harmony within the existing 
law."  Hoff v. City of Casper-Natrona Health 
Department, 2001 WY 97, ¶30, 33 P.3d 99, ¶30 (Wyo. 2001) (quoting Capwell v. State, 686 P.2d 1148, 1152 
(Wyo. 1984)).

 

DISCUSSION

Denial 
of Motion to Intervene

[¶14]   A motion to intervene as a matter of 
right pursuant to W.R.C.P. 24(a)(2)1 was filed by the Wyoming Wildlife Federation and 
four individuals.  
The district court denied the motion on April 25, 2002.  The denial of a 
motion to intervene is a final and appealable order pursuant to W.R.A.P. 
1.05.  James S. Jackson Company v. Horseshoe Creek Ltd., 650 P.2d 281, 284-85 (Wyo. 
1982).  An 
appeal must be taken within thirty days from the entry of the appealable 
order.  W.R.A.P. 
2.01(a).  The 
Defendants filed their notice of appeal from the district court's 
denial of the motion to intervene on July 19, 2002, in conjunction with their 
notice of appeal of the district court's summary judgment order.  The Defendants' notice of appeal of the denial of the motion to intervene 
was not filed within the prescribed thirty-day period for final orders.  The failure to timely 
file a notice of appeal deprives this Court of jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal.  
W.R.A.P. 1.03; Harding v. Glatter, 2002 WY 124, ¶6, 53 P.3d 538, ¶6 (Wyo. 
2002).  
Accordingly, we must dismiss the Defendants' appeal of the denial of the motion to intervene.2

 

R.S. 2477

[¶15]   The Defendants contend that a company constructed the Trail across what 
was then federal land in 1891 or 1892 to provide access for miners and their 
equipment to the Big Horn Mountain and Walker Prairie areas.  The public used the 
Trail from its inception for logging, hunting, ranching, and recreation.  According to the 
Defendants, the public's use predated the entry and patent of the 
surrounding land by the Forbeses' predecessors in the early twentieth 
century.  The 
Defendants assert that the public use of the Trail was sufficient to 
establish a public road under R.S. 2477.

 

[¶16]   R.S. 2477 was enacted as Section 8 of 
the Act of July 26, 1866, 14 Stat. 253, and later codified at 43 U.S.C. § 932.3  The provision provided simply:

 

[That] the right of way for the construction of highways 
over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted.

 

The purpose of the statute was to enable the public to 
acquire a roadway to traverse public lands.  However, the offer or grant set forth in R.S. 
2477 "is but an offer of the right of way for the construction of a public 
highway on some particular strip of public land, and can only become fixed when 
a highway is definitely established and constructed in some one of the ways 
authorized by the laws of the state in which the land is situated."  Richter v. Rose, 1998 MT 165, ¶27, 962 P.2d 583, ¶27 (Mont. 1998) (quoting State v. Nolan, 58 
Mont. 167, 173, 191 P. 150, 152 (1920)).  
In other words, R.S. 2477 is merely an offer from the federal government 
that could be accepted by actions taken locally.  Barbara G. Hjelle, Ten 
Essential Points Concerning R.S. 2477 Rights-of-Way, 14 Journal of Energy, 
Natural Resources, & Environmental Law, 301, 303 (1994).  The question of 
whether a road is a public road under R.S. 2477 is answered by reference to the 
law of the state where the land is located.  Richter, 962 P.2d, 
¶27; Western Aggregates, Inc. v. County of Yuba, 101 Cal. App. 4th 278, 296 (Cal. App. 3rd Dist. 2002); Sierra Club v. 
Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1083 
(10th Cir. 1988); Hjelle, Ten Essential Points Concerning R.S. 2477 Rights-of-Way, 
supra, at 305-08.

 

[¶17]   Like the road system in many states in 
the American West, the road system in Wyoming developed from a haphazard diagram 
of trails established by Indians, pioneers, stockmen, miners and loggers, and 
more "proper" roads set out by railroads, stagecoaches, the federal government, 
and territorial, state, and local governments.  As early as 1869, the Territorial Legislature 
enacted a law seeking to bring some sense of order to this system:

 

All roads within this Territory shall be considered public 
highways, which have been, or may hereafter be, declared Territorial roads by 
act of the Legislative Assembly, or which have been, or may be, declared public 
roads by the board of county commissioners of any county, within such county, or 
which have been, or shall hereafter be, used and traveled by the public, so that 
the same would, according to the course of the common law, be deemed public 
highways.

 

1876 Comp. Laws, ch. 102, Sec. 1 (1869).  That law provided 
for the recognition of public roads through declaration by the Territorial 
Legislative Assembly or the relevant board of county commissioners.  In a nod to the 
unique history of the development of roads and trails in the West, it also 
recognized that roads used by the public could be deemed a public highway under 
the common law. 

 

[¶18]   In 1877, the Territorial Legislature 
amended Chapter 102 of the 1869 law and gave the board of county commissioners 
broad powers to declare public roads:

 

That the board of county commissioners of the several 
counties of the Territory of Wyoming shall have power to adopt, and by 
resolution entered of record, appropriate to county and public uses any road or 
route publicly traveled, within their respective counties, whether originally 
opened and laid out by them or not, and any road so adopted and appropriated to 
public purposes shall be and is hereby declared a public or county road to all 
intents and purposes, the same as if originally opened or laid out by them and 
subject to the same laws and regulations in all respects.

 

Session Laws of Wyoming, Wagon Roads, Sec. 1, at 135 
(1877).  The 
1877 law continues to recognize that roads may be created by public use beyond 
the ordinary planning of a county.  The law, however, appears to recognize such 
roads as public or county roads only when the board of county commissioners 
adopted and appropriated the road to county and public use.  The specific 
language from the 1869 law authorizing the creation of roads by public use 
pursuant to the common law has been eliminated from this statute.  This appears to be 
an attempt by the Territorial Legislature to impose some order on the chaotic 
creation of roads in the Territory's early years.

 

[¶19]   The 1877 law lasted until 1886 when the 
Territorial Legislature again amended the statute:

 

     That all county roads shall be 
under the supervision of the board of county commissioners of the county wherein 
said road is located, and no county road shall be hereafter established, nor 
shall any such road be altered or vacated in any county in this Territory except 
by authority of the county commissioners of the proper county.

 

Session Laws of Wyoming Territory, ch. 99, sec. 1 
(1886).  This 
was an obvious attempt by the legislature to further reduce the chaos in the 
creation of public roads.  The statute placed authority for county roads 
under the supervision of the board of county commissioners and specifically 
stated that no future county roads could be created, vacated, or altered except 
by the authority of those commissioners.

 

[¶20]   Then, in 1891 just before the Trail was 
constructed, the State legislature passed a law amending and re-enacting an 1890 
territorial law that had slightly modified the 1869 law. That law provided:

 

All roads within this state shall be considered public 
highways, which have been or may be declared by law to be state, territorial or 
county roads. All county roads shall be under the supervision, management and 
control of the board of the county commissioners of the county wherein said road 
is located, and no county road shall hereafter be established, nor shall any 
such road be altered or vacated, in any county in this state, except by the 
board of the county commissioners of the county wherein such roads are located, 
except as is in this act provided.

 

Wyoming Session Laws, ch. 97, sec. 1 (1891).  The 1890 law does 
not substantively change the 1886 law.  The new statute adds the introductory phrase 
recognizing that some public roads are established under the law apart from the 
role played by the counties.  The remainder of the statute simply reiterates 
the authority of the boards of county commissioners to establish, vacate, or 
alter county roads.

 

[¶21]   The legislature returned to a broader 
definition of what constituted a public road in 1895:

 

§ 2513.  Public roads 
defined.  All roads within this state shall be public 
highways which have been or may be declared by law to be national, state, 
territorial or county roads. All roads that have been designated or marked as 
highways on government maps or plats in the record of any land office of the 
United States within this state, and which have been publicly used as  traveled  highways,  and which have not 
been closed or vacated by order of the board of the county commissioners of the 
county wherein the same are located, are declared to be public highways until 
the same are closed or vacated by order of the board of county commissioners of 
the county wherein the same are located, and the board or officer charged by law 
with such duty shall keep the same open and in repair the same as in the case of 
roads regularly laid out and opened by order of the board of the county 
commissioners.

 

1910 Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. ch. 168, sec. 2513 (1895).  The 1895 law 
continues to recognize as public highways those declared by law to be national, 
state, territorial or county roads.  However, it also contained a provision 
recognizing roads marked on federal and state maps or plats, which were used by 
the public.  The 
law treated these roads as public highways unless and until some affirmative 
action was taken by the responsible board of county commissioners to vacate or 
close the road.

 

[¶22]   The 1895 statute was in effect when this 
Court was called upon to consider R.S. 2477 for the first time.  In Hatch Brothers Company v. Black, 165 P. 518 (1917), affirmed on rehearing, 171 P. 267 (1918), the 
plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant from blocking access on a road running 
across the defendant's land.  The road in question had been established 
around 1875 or 1876 and used continuously since that time by the public.  The plaintiff used 
the road to transport his sheep.  In 1912, the defendant made a homestead entry 
onto the lands over which the road ran.  The defendant began fencing off the road to 
prevent damage to his crops from the plaintiff's sheep.

 

[¶23]   Initially, we concluded that a public 
road could be established pursuant to R.S. 2477 through public use:

 

The grant [contained in R.S. 2477] is unconditional and 
contains no provision as to the manner of its acceptance. We think it is quite 
well settled that when land is granted for a right of way for a public highway, 
the grant may be accepted by the public without action by the public 
authorities. The continued use of the road by the public for such a length of 
time and under such circumstances as to clearly indicate an intention on the 
part of the public to accept the grant has generally been held sufficient.

 

Hatch, 165 P.  at 519.  The opinion then briefly reviewed Wyoming's 
statutory history relating to public roads noted above.  Id., at 519-20.  We concluded that there was "nothing in these 
several statutes, as we understand them, prohibiting the public from accepting 
the grant of the right of way; but on the contrary, they appear to recognize 
that right."  Id.  After distinguishing between acceptance of a 
grant by the public and establishment of a road by prescription, the Court 
remanded the case for a determination by a jury whether the grant had been 
accepted by the public prior to the defendant's homestead entry.  Id. at 520.

 

[¶24]   On rehearing in Hatch, the question before the Court was the propriety 
of its conclusion that a public road could be established through the actions of 
the public without any official action by a governmental entity.  171 P.  at 267.  The Court's opinion 
expanded at length upon its conclusion that the 1895 statute did not impede 
public acceptance of a grant under R.S. 2477.  It is worth quoting from the opinion at some 
length:

 

This dedication [R.S. 2477] by Congress to the public of 
rights of way for highways over the public lands of the United States is a 
valuable right, and it is not to be presumed that the 
Legislature in this state, where distances are great, county funds from 
taxation applicable to road work comparatively small and inadequate to meet the 
demands of the inhabitants in different parts of the county, where roads in new 
and sparsely settled portions of the state of necessity have to be made and 
traveled by the public without the aid of the county authorities, intended to abrogate and annul this right and open the 
way to legalized blackmail of the county authorities by fencing up such used 
roads and requiring the county thereafter to condemn and pay damages for a way 
otherwise belonging to the public, unless such intention 
is so clearly expressed by the enactment that no other conclusion can be 
reached. . . . The original act of 1869 (Laws 1869, c. 26, p. 330) in the 
first section mentions all the different kinds of highways, and recognized the 
common-law doctrine of establishment of highways by user without declaring any 
specific method or enacting any new law in this regard. It will be observed that 
the early act, while prescribing the method by which roads might be changed, 
altered, or new roads laid out by the county, does not anywhere enjoin on the 
county authorities the duty to maintain or keep in repair the highways mentioned 
in the act. . . .

            
This act remained in force until the act of March 12, 1886, which appears 
as chapter 99, Laws of 1886, and was entitled an act concerning roads and 
highways. . . . 

            
. . . .

            
This is the first legislative word in Wyoming that specifically placed 
any roads under the supervision of the county commissioners and enjoined a duty 
upon the county officials to maintain and keep them in repair. This act provides 
for the election or appointment of road supervisors, and prescribes their 
duties, and the means for working the roads, but it is significant that wherever 
a duty is imposed by the act upon county officials in this chapter, it mentions 
county roads, and prescribes the width of county roads, etc.  This act repeals in terms the act 
of 1869 which had become chapter 102 of the Compiled Statutes of 1876, but did 
not repeal any common-law doctrine thereby, and that it still recognized that 
the congressional grant could be accepted by public user, and that other 
highways existed and could be established besides those county roads provided 
for in the act . . . [.] 

            
. . . .

. . . This act clearly shows that the object sought to be 
accomplished by the Legislature was prescribing those roads and highways in 
regard to which a duty was imposed to maintain or keep in repair. And this is in 
accord with the authorities that a dedication for a highway which is accepted by 
public user, while binding upon the dedicator and those holding under him, does 
not require the public authorities to maintain or care for the highway.

            
. . . .

            
The act of 1890 (Laws 1890, c. 86) did not in any way change the law in 
this respect, and the act of 1891 (Laws 1890-91, c. 97) merely amended the act 
of 1890, although it amended the first section of the act of 1890 by 
specifically adding to the declared public highways others beside county roads, and then specifically declares, as in the 
acts of 1869 and 1890, that county roads shall be 
under the management and control of the county commissioners, and shall not be 
established or vacated except by them. The act of 1895 (Laws 1895, c. 69), which 
is the present law of the state at all affecting this matter, in Section 1, 
reenacts the first paragraph of the law of 1891, and adding "national" to state, 
territorial, and county roads then enacts, in a separate sentence, the provision 
which led to the instruction declared erroneous in the original opinion in this 
case:

"All roads that have been designated or marked as highways 
on government maps or plats in the record of any land office of the United 
States within this state, and which have been publicly used as traveled 
highways, and which have not been closed or vacated by order of the board of the 
county commissioners of the county wherein the same are located, are declared to 
be public highways until the same are closed or vacated by order of the board of 
county commissioners of the county wherein the same are located, and the board 
or officer  
charged  
by  
law  
with  
such duty shall keep the same open and in repair the same as in the case of roads 
regularly laid out and opened by order of the board of the county 
commissioners."

This provision clearly designates such roads as are to be 
added to those which the county authorities are required to maintain and repair, 
and in no way affects other highways upon which this duty may not be imposed. . 
. .

            
. . . .

It is evident it was not the legislative intention to take 
from the public a valuable right of acceptance of the federal grant, but to 
preserve to it every and all rights it had.

. . . .

We hold, as in the original opinion, that there is nothing in our statutes that takes away the right 
of the public to accept by unofficial user the federal grant of rights of way 
over the public domain so as to bind subsequent grantees of the government, 
but our statutes seem to distinctly recognize that right.

 

Hatch, 171 P.  at 268-69, 271 (italics in original; emphasis 
added).  The 
opinion interpreted the 1895 statute and its predecessors to mean that the 
common law right and the right expressed in R.S. 2477 for the public to 
establish public rights of ways by usage was not abrogated.  Instead, the 
legislature intended by the statutes to explicitly set forth what roads the 
counties were required to financially and physically maintain.  The holding of the 
two opinions in Hatch was to the effect that public 
roads could be created by the public's use but the counties could not be forced 
to maintain them.  
There are two salient points that we can extract from the Hatch cases relevant to this case today:  (1) the opinions 
make it clear that state law governs the status of public roads under R.S. 2477; 
and (2) the noted bold-faced passages indicate that the legislature has the 
power to abrogate the public's right under R.S. 2477.

 

[¶25]   Eleven months after the decision on 
rehearing in Hatch, the Wyoming Legislature amended 
the public roads statute:

 

On and after January 1st, 1922, all roads within this State 
shall be highways, which have been or may be declared by law to be national, 
state, territorial or county roads or highways.  It shall be the duty of the several Boards of 
County Commissioners, within their respective counties, prior to said date, to 
determine what if any such roads now or heretofore travelled [sic] but not 
heretofore officially established and recorded, are necessary or important for 
the public use as permanent roads, and to cause such roads to be recorded, or if 
need be laid out, established and recorded, and all roads recorded as aforesaid, 
shall be highways.  
No other roads shall be highways unless and until 
lawfully established as such by official authority.

 

Session Laws of Wyoming, ch. 112, sec. 1 (1919)4 (emphasis added).  We presume that this statute was enacted with 
full knowledge of and with reference to the recent decisions in Hatch.  Greenwalt v. Ram 
Restaurant Corporation, 2003 WY 
77, ¶22, 71 P.3d 717, ¶22 (Wyo. 
2003) (citing Almada v. State, 994 P.2d 299, 306 (Wyo. 
1999) ("We presume the legislature enacts statutes with full knowledge of the 
existing condition of the law and with reference to it.")).  The legislative 
intent behind this statute is clear from its plain language:  The various boards 
of county commissioners were to officially establish and record all roads 
necessary or important for the public use.  The last sentence clearly states that no other roads were to be 
considered highways unless and until the respective board of county 
commissioners had lawfully established them as such.  It would be 34 
years, however, before this Court would consider R.S. 2477 within the context of 
the 1919 statute and, even then, no definitive ruling on the continued vitality 
of R.S. 2477 roads would be forthcoming.

 

[¶26]   In 1953 this Court decided the case of 
Nixon v. Edwards, 264 P.2d 287 (Wyo. 
1953).  The 
question before us was whether or not a road was a public road.  The plaintiff built 
a road along the east side of his property sometime between 1931 and 1934. The 
defendants' land lay to the north and they began using the road to access their 
property around 1941.  
There was also evidence that at least some members of the public had been 
using the road since 1934.  The road was never established as a public 
road by the county pursuant to the 1919 statute.  The defendants had contended that the road was 
a public road through public use pursuant to R.S. 2477 and Hatch or a public easement had been established by 
prescription.

 

[¶27]   We began our analysis in Nixon by reviewing pre-1919 legislation.  We prefaced our 
review by affirming our statements in Hatch that 
whether or not a road was public was determined by reference to the statutes of 
Wyoming:

 

It cannot be questioned, it seems, that what shall or shall 
not be public roads or highways is, subject to constitutional limitations, 
exclusively within the province of the legislature.

 

Nixon, 264 P.2d  at 289.  After noting the progression of the statutes 
pre-1919, we addressed the affect of the decision in Hatch:

 

The case of Hatch Bros. Co. v. 
Black, supra,  is in no way in conflict with our 
conclusion herein. The case is based on the doctrine of public dedication and 
acceptance of the dedication by the public. The road in question was over public 
land and was used by the public since about 1875. A homestead was located on the 
land over which the road ran in 1912, and the question was as to whether or not 
the road over the land could be closed by locator. By an act of 1866, the United 
States provided that right of way for the construction of highways over public 
lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted.'  43 U.S.C.A. § 
932.   
The  
court held that the grant by Congress could be accepted by user alone, 
and further stated that: We discover nothing in these several statutes, as we 
understand them, prohibiting the public from accepting the grant of the right of 
way; but on the contrary, they appear to recognize that right.' The court, in 
connection with the language just quoted, relied (1) upon the fact (apparently) 
that the road was shown on maps of the United States as mentioned in section 1 
of the legislation of 1895, and further (2) upon the provisions of section 64 
which preserved all rights previously acquired. Since the road in question in 
that case was established as early as 1875, the decision in the case was 
correct. The court, it is true, also mentioned (3) the words in section 57 of 
the Act reading: When any public road heretofore laid out or traveled as such 
or hereafter to be laid out or 
traveled as a public road, * * *.' Section 57 did not relate to the 
establishment of any public road. It merely provided that when it was 
necessary  
in  
traveling  
on  
a  
public road to cross a stream, the crossing over the stream should 
be considered a part of the public road. The section is not necessarily 
inconsistent with section 2, when we the consider the general policy of the 
latter that rural public roads should hereafter be established only officially. 
If inconsistent, it is by reason  of  the  use  of  or'  instead  of  and'.  See 82 C.J.S., Statutes, § 335, page 673. It may be, however, that the court in the foregoing decision 
by italicizing the words above italicized meant that section 57 indicated that 
roads hereafter traveled publicly need not necessarily be established 
officially, and thus there might be roads which, if running over public land, 
might become public roads by user alone, thereby accepting the grant of the 
government. However this may be, it is not necessary 
to dwell upon the matter. It has no effect on the case at bar. The road in 
dispute herein does not run over public land.

 

Nixon, 264 P.2d  at 290-91 (internal citations omitted, underlining 
and bold added).  
The Defendants in this case have placed much stock in the underlined 
portion of the opinion quoted above.  They suggest that this language means that the 
Nixon court upheld the continuing validity of the 
holding in Hatch that a public road could be 
established through public use even after the enactment of the 1919 
statute.  The 
Defendants' argument does not hold up to scrutiny when the sentence is read 
within the context of the paragraph quoted above.  After noting an apparent inconsistency in the 
Hatch case regarding its interpretation of part of 
the 1895 law, the Nixon court noted that the 
inconsistency could be explained by the use of the connecting word "or" instead 
of "and."  In 
the next sentence  the one cited by the Defendants  the Nixon court goes on to say that the court in Hatch could have meant to say 
section 57 of the 1895 statute "indicated that roads hereafter traveled publicly 
need not necessarily be established officially" and that roads could thus be 
established without official action if they ran over public land.  In context, the 
statement is merely a commentary on what the court in Hatch may have concluded in 
reference to the meaning of section 57 of the 1895 statute.  The opinion 
expresses some doubt about that interpretation but then goes on to conclude that 
the matter is irrelevant to the case before it because the road in question was 
not established over public land before the land it was located on was 
homesteaded.  
Furthermore, the discussion by the Nixon court 
is in reference to the 1895 statute and does not touch at all upon the effect of 
the 1919 statute.  
Thus, contrary to the Defendants' assertions, the opinion in Nixon has no relevance as to whether a road established 
by public use but not officially recognized was still a public road in light of 
the 1919 statute.

 

[¶28]   After dismissing the contention that the 
road in question could be a public road through public use under R.S. 2477, the 
opinion in Nixon turned to the effect of the 1919 
statute on the claim that the road was public by virtue of a prescriptive 
easement.  While 
the specific holding on that issue is not relevant to this case, the discussion 
regarding the 1919 statute does provide some relevant considerations for 
interpreting the legislature's intent in adopting it:

 

It may be noted at once, that while this court in [Board of County Commissioners of Sheridan County v. 
Patrick, 18 Wyo. 130, 104 P. 531 (Wyo. 1909)], construed the then existing statutes as permitting the 
establishment by county commissioners informally, that is by mere recognition of 
a road, such as working it, the legislation of 1919 required that roads 
recognized as public to be made of record, thus carrying to its ultimate 
conclusion the former policy that it should be made certain and definite as to 
what were public roads, and thus superseding in that respect the ruling in the 
Patrick case, supra.  The Act directed the board of county 
commissioners to determine what roads theretofore traveled, but not officially 
established and recorded, were necessary for the public use, and then cause 
those thus found to be necessary, to be made of record.  That included all roads marked on Governmental plats and 
maps, as well as all roads, the rights to which had been recognized by former 
legislative acts. It was meant to be all inclusive, and then specifically 
provided that No other roads shall be highways 
unless and until lawfully established as such by official authority.'  Highways are public 
roads, and substituting the synonymous term public roads', the act provided 
that no roads should be public roads unless and until duly established as the 
act provided.  
We do not see how any language could be plainer.

            
. . . .

What we have said is strengthened, if need of strengthening 
exists, by the provisions of Chapter 100 of the Legislative Acts of 1921, now § 
48-301, W.C.S. 1945.  
In that legislation, for the phrase at the beginning On and after 
January 1st, 1922,' the legislature substituted, 
On and after January 1st, 1924.'  No other change in 
the legislation of 1919 was made.  The purpose quite apparent.  The legislature 
evidently found that the various boards of county commissioners had not been 
given sufficient time to cause all rural public roads to be shown on the 
records, and therefore extended the time in which that might be done for another 
two years.  The 
intent to put a finishing touch to the policy inaugurated at least in 1886 is 
clear.  It shows how thoroughly the legislature was convinced that 
all rural public roads should be shown on the public records.

 

Nixon, 264 P.2d  at 293-94 (internal citations omitted; emphasis 
added).  After 
analyzing a similar statute from Arizona, the opinion concluded:

 

It would seem clear that the meaning and effect of the 
Arizona statute that all roads in the territory of Arizona now in public use, 
which do not come within the foregoing provisions of this section, are hereby 
declared vacated' is substantially the same as the provisions of our statute 
that no other roads shall be highways unless and until lawfully established as 
such by official authority.'

 

264 P.2d  at 295.  It is clear that Justice Blume, the author of 
Nixon, considered that all roads not recognized by 
the respective boards of county commissioners per the requirements of the 1919 
statute were effectively vacated.5  This principle was not directly applied to 
claims under R.S. 2477, however, because that statute was not relevant to the 
road in question.  
It would be another 27 years before the issue was discussed again.

 

[¶29]   The final case before the current one, 
in which the possibility of establishing public roads under R.S. 2477 and the 
Wyoming statutes was raised, was McGuire v. McGuire, 
608 P.2d 1278 (Wyo. 
1980).  In that 
case, the appellees filed a petition to establish a private road with the Platte 
County Board of Commissioners to establish a private road to provide access to 
their landlocked property.  Since the main focus of McGuire was on the establishment of a private road, much 
of the discussion and the ultimate holding are not relevant to the case before 
us.  However, 
the question of a public road was tangentially raised when the appellants 
claimed that the appellees "real objective is to cross the lands of the 
appellants  to join up with what is identified as the BLM road across lands of 
the United States, which road joins with a public road."  608 P.2d  at 
1287.  The 
question presented to the McGuire court was whether 
or not connecting to the BLM road satisfied the requirements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 
§ 24-9-101 (Michie 1977 Rep. Ed.) and constituted a convenient public road with 
which the appellees could connect the private road they sought to 
establish.  Id.  The McGuire court 
concluded that the 1919 statute and the decision in Nixon were not relevant to the situation before it:

 

The statutory section we examine does not define public 
road.[6]  Nixon v. Edwards, 1953, 72 Wyo. 274, 264 P.2d 287, cited by 
appellants, is not helpful because it involves no question of connecting to a 
federal road across public lands, such as we have here.  State statutes 
pertaining to state and county roads and which do contain some definitions are 
not applicable to roads such as the BLM road, the latter being under the 
jurisdiction of the United States.  We cannot adjudicate its status so as to in 
any fashion bind the United States.  [Footnote]  We are limited to generally describing it in 
the light of the statute we have before us.

 

608 P.2d  at 1287 (emphasis added).  In the footnote 
cited above, the opinion stated, "As pointed out in Finding No. 21 of the county 
commissioners, supra, 43 U.S.C. 932 [R.S. 2477] was 
repealed effective October 21, 1976.  However, a public road had been established 
long before that.  
When land is granted for a public road, the public may accept the grant 
without action by public authorities.  Hatch Bros. Co. v. 
Black, 1917, 25 Wyo. 109, 165 P. 518."  Id.

 

[¶30]   The precise issue before us here  the 
effect of the 1919 statute on the establishment of public roads under R.S. 2477 
 was not before the court in McGuire.  As we noted in that 
case, Wyoming statutes pertaining to state and county roads were simply not 
applicable because the road in question was located entirely on federal 
land.  
Nevertheless, the Defendants point to the McGuire 
footnote cited earlier and argue that it supports the continual validity of 
our decision in Hatch.  The footnote correctly cites the holding in Hatch.  However, neither the footnote nor the body of 
the opinion addresses the impact of the 1919 statute or the Nixon decision.  Since the road in question was not within the 
jurisdiction of the State of Wyoming, it is no surprise that the McGuire opinion did not do so.  The footnote is 
merely a statement of the holding in the Hatch case 
without reference to current law and, as such, is dicta.  Therefore, we find 
the Defendants' reliance on McGuire to be 
unpersuasive.

 

[¶31]   We now turn to the issue presently 
before us.  
Since this case comes to the Court on appeal from summary judgment, we 
view the record from the perspective most favorable to the party who opposed the 
motion.  The 
Defendants have alleged that the Trail was established as a public road prior to 
the homesteading of the land over which it runs.  Pursuant to this Court's decision in Hatch, public use without any official action was 
sufficient to establish a road under the grant from Congress in R.S. 2477.  For purposes of this 
opinion, we will assume that the Trail was established as a public road prior to 
the Forbeses' predecessor's entry onto the land.  Accordingly, we must determine what effect, if 
any, the passage of the 1919 law defining and regulating the establishment of 
public roads had upon roads established pursuant to R.S. 2477.

 

[¶32]   We hold that the 1919 statute 
effectively vacated the public status of any road, including those established 
pursuant to R.S. 2477, which were not recorded and established by the pertinent 
board of county commissioners.  R.S. 2477 roads are regulated under the law of 
the state in which the road is located.  Richter, ¶27; Western Aggregates, Inc., 101 Cal. App. 4th  at 
296; Hodel, 848 F.2d  at 1083.  The 1919 law was 
clear and unambiguous: "[T]he act provided that no roads should be public roads 
unless and until duly established as the act provided."  Nixon, 264 P.2d  at 293.  In Nixon, this 
Court interpreted the 1919 statute to mean that no road could be a public road 
unless it was recorded and duly established as such under the terms of the 
statute.  We 
equated that prohibition with an Arizona statute that specifically stated that 
roads not properly recorded pursuant to statute were considered vacated as 
public roads.  
We see no reason to deviate from that interpretation today.  The records of 
Sheridan County do not show that the Trail had ever been recorded and 
established as a public road as required by statute.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the Trail is not a public road.

 

Prescriptive Easement

 

[¶33]   The Defendants claimed that they, 
individually, and that the public in general had acquired a prescriptive 
easement to use the Trail.  To establish a prescriptive easement, one must 
show adverse use:  
(1) under color of title or claim of right; (2) such as to put the owner 
of the servient estate on notice that an adverse right was being claimed; and 
(3) that the adverse use was continuous and uninterrupted for ten years.  Lincoln County Board of Commissioners v. Cook, 2002 WY 23, ¶39, 39 P.3d 1076, ¶39 (Wyo. 2002).  
The Defendants contend that the district court erred in granting the 
Forbeses' motion for summary judgment upon their prescriptive easement 
claims.  The 
district court held that the Defendants had failed to offer any evidence that 
they or the public had provided notice to the Forbeses of an adverse claim.  The Defendants 
attack this ruling arguing that they had produced evidence showing continuous 
use of the Trail by the public since its inception in the early 1890's, and by 
the individual Defendants since the 1970's and 1980's.  This use, they 
contend, was under the color of right and was adverse to the Forbeses' interest 
in the land over which the Trail ran.  Furthermore, the Defendants argued that there 
were material facts in dispute as to when the Forbeses placed signs along the 
Trail ostensibly giving the public permission to use the Trail and what effect, 
if any, these signs had on the adverse nature of their, and the public's, use of 
the Trail.

 

[¶34]   After a careful review of the record, we 
affirm the district court's summary judgment ruling.  The Defendants did 
not provide evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption that their use was 
permissive.7  "The party claiming an easement has the burden 
of proof, and such a claim is not favored."  Lincoln County, ¶39 
(citing Prazma v. Kaehne, 746 P.2d 586, 589 (Wyo. 1989)).  As we have explained:

 

Adverse or hostile use is use inconsistent with the owner's 
rights, without permission asked or given, such as would entitle the owner to a 
cause of action against the intruder. [Koontz v. Town of 
Superior, 746 P.2d 1264, 1268 (Wyo. 
1987)] (quoting 7 R. Powell and P. Rohan, Powell on Real Property § 1013[2] at 91-18 (1987)).  The claimant must 
demonstrate how its actions would give notice to the landowner of the adverse 
use and adverse nature of his claim.  Prazma, 768 P.2d  at 
589.  Use "by 
permission or sufferance" cannot ripen into title, "no matter how long 
continued."  Board of County Com'rs of Sheridan County v. Patrick, 18 
Wyo. 130, 104 P. 531, 532-33 (1909); 
see Koontz, 746 P.2d  at 1268.  However, a property 
owner's failure to interrupt or object to the public use of his property for the 
statutorily prescribed period cannot be equated with permissive use.  Koontz, 746 P.2d  at 1268.

 

Open, notorious, and continuous use is not sufficient, in 
and of itself, to justify granting a prescriptive easement; the use still must 
be adverse.  Weiss v. Pedersen, 933 P.2d 495, 501 (Wyo. 
1997) (quoting Shumway v. Tom Sanford, Inc., 637 P.2d 666, 670 (Wyo. 
1981)); [A.B. Cattle Co. v. Forgey Ranches, Inc., 943 P.2d 1184, 1189 (Wyo. 
1997)].

 

Lincoln County, ¶¶40-41.

 

[¶35]   The Defendants rely solely on the 
historical use of the Trail by themselves and the public to support the 
contention that the use was adverse.  This is simply insufficient.  The burden was on 
the Defendants to demonstrate how the public's and their individual actions gave 
notice to the Forbeses that the use was adverse.  This could have been accomplished through deed 
or by words.  
Our precedent has made it clear that the use is presumed to be 
permissive.  To 
overcome that presumption we have found the claimant must provide evidence that 
the landowner was aware specifically that the claimant claimed exclusive right 
to the easement.  
"To rebut this presumption the claimant must introduce evidence of the 
facts which demonstrate the manner in which the hostile and adverse nature of 
his use was brought home to the owner of the adjacent land."  A.B. Cattle Company v. Forgey Ranches, Inc., 943 P.2d 1184 at 1188 
(Wyo. 1997) (quoting Weiss v. Pedersen, 933 P.2d 495 at 501 (Wyo. 
1997)).  The 
only evidence offered by Defendants with regard to putting the Forbeses on 
notice was the fact that the Forbeses were aware of the use by the public and 
could see the Trail from their ranch.  Those facts do not show the public's and 
Defendants' adverse claim was "brought home" to the Forbeses as those uses were 
not exclusive of the Forbeses' use.  Further, a presumption of adverse use does not 
"arise where the user is shown to be permissive in its inception, or where it is 
not shown to have continued for the prescriptive period; nor, in the absence of some decisive act indicating separate 
and exclusive use, does it arise where the user is not inconsistent with the 
rights of the owner, as, for instance, where the user is in connection with that 
of the owner or the public or is claimed with respect to unoccupied, uninclosed, 
[sic] and unimproved lands, the use in such cases 
being presumed to be permissive and in subordination to the owner's title."  Shumway v. Tom 
Sanford, Inc., 637 P.2d 666 at 669 (Wyo. 1981) (quoting 28 C.J.S. Easements § 68 at 736-37 (1941)) 
(emphasis in original); Lincoln County, ¶47.  The Defendants' 
failure to present any evidence demonstrating an adverse nature of their use or 
notice of the landowner's knowledge of the use itself, is fatal to their 
claim.

 

CONCLUSION

[¶36]   The district court's orders denying the 
motion to intervene and granting summary judgment in favor of the Forbeses are 
affirmed.

 

FOOTNOTES

 

  1Rule 24. Intervention  .

(a)     
Intervention of right.  Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to 
intervene in an action:

. . . .

            
(2) When the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or 
transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated 
that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede 
the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's 
interest is adequately represented by existing parties.

 

2The Forbeses also challenge 
the standing of the Defendants to appeal the denial of the motion to intervene. 
Since the notice of appeal was not timely, we need not address that issue.

 

3  The Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) of 1976 repealed R.S. 2477 in 1976.  43 U.S.C. §§ 
1701-1784.  
FLPMA specifically provided that any rights vested under R.S. 2477 prior 
to its repeal, however, remained valid.

 

4The legislature further 
amended this statute in 1921 by altering the first sentence to read:  "On and after 
January 1st, 1924, all roads within this State shall be highways, which have 
been or may be declared by law to be national, state, territorial or 
highways."  
Session Laws, ch. 100, Sec. 1 (1921).  The remainder of the 1919 statute was retained 
in the identical form.  
For the sake of simplicity, when we refer to the 1919 statute, we are 
incorporating the 1921 amendment.  We are also referring to the statute as it is 
currently codified at Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-1-101 (LexisNexis 2003), which 
retains the language of the 1919 statute and the 1921 amendment verbatim.

 

  5The ultimate holding in Nixon was that the 1919 statute eliminated the common 
law cause of action for public prescriptive easements.  264 P.2d  at 
296.  The 
legislature reinstated the cause of action in 1955.  Session Laws, ch. 
199, Sec. 1 (1955).  
The legislature has amended the law several times since then to expand 
the statute to include the elements and the legal procedures to be followed when 
seeking to establish a public road by prescription.  See Session Laws, ch. 56, Sec. 1 (1967), and Session 
Laws, ch. 74, Sec. 1 (1973).  The 1919 statute, incorporating the 1921 
amendment and the subsequent additions relating to prescription, remains the law 
of Wyoming.  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-1-101 (a) (LexisNexis 2003).

 

  6The 
statutory section referenced in this sentence is the one concerned with the 
establishment of private roads.  Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-9-101 (Michie 1977 Rep. 
Ed.). 

 

  7The Forbeses contend that the Defendants' public 
prescriptive easement claim should be dismissed because they failed to follow 
the specific procedural and substantive requirements set forth in Wyo. Stat. 
Ann. § 24-1-101(a) to establish a county road by prescription.  The Defendants reply 
that the statute is not relevant because it was enacted after the acts 
establishing the public prescriptive easement over the Trail were 
satisfied.  
Since we conclude that the Defendants failed to produce evidence to meet 
one of the elements of a claim for a prescriptive easement, we need not address 
this issue.