Case Title: In re Child of Olivia F.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2019 ME 149

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2019-10-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2019 ME 149 
Docket: 
And-19-128 
Submitted 
On Briefs: September 10, 2019 
Decided: 
October 1, 2019 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE CHILD OF OLIVIA F. 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
[¶1]  Olivia F. appeals from a judgment of the District Court (Lewiston, 
Martin, J.) terminating her parental rights to her child pursuant to 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4055(1)(A)(1)(a), (B)(2)(a), and (B)(2)(b)(i)-(iv) (2018).1  She argues that 
the court erred as a matter of law in concluding that her failure to appear on 
the second day of the two-day termination hearing constituted “abandonment,” 
and she asserts that there was not clear and convincing evidence to support the 
court’s finding that she had the “intent to forego parental duties.”  22 M.R.S. 
§ 4002(1-A) (2018).  The mother further argues that the court abused its 
discretion in determining that termination of her parental rights is in the best 
interest of the child because, in making that determination, the court went 
                                               
 
1  The child’s father has not been identified, and his parental rights were terminated after he did 
not respond to notice via newspaper publication of the child protection proceedings.  That judgment, 
entered after the judgment now on appeal, is not at issue here.   
 
2 
beyond the scope of a termination proceeding and speculated about who would 
adopt the child post-termination.  We affirm the judgment.   
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  The Department petitioned for a child protection order and a 
preliminary protection order for the child in October 2017, when the child was 
two years old.  One year later, following the entry of a preliminary protection 
order and a jeopardy order, the Department filed a petition to terminate the 
mother’s parental rights to the child.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4052 (2018).  The court 
held a consolidated hearing on that petition and on the issue of placement on 
January 25 and February 25, 2019.2  The mother was present at the first day of 
the hearing, but at the outset of the second day, the mother’s attorney stated on 
the record that although her client had “been in the courthouse this morning,” 
she was “not in the courtroom,” had “chosen not to come in,” and may in fact 
have “left the courthouse.”  The mother was paged to the courtroom, and the 
court recessed while two Department caseworkers tried to locate her.  The 
parties, other than the mother, and counsel returned to the courtroom, and the 
                                               
 
2  In January 2018, the court (Beliveau, J.) entered an order for an expedited decision on placement 
of the child with his maternal grandfather pursuant to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of 
Children.  See 22 M.R.S. §§ 4191-4247 (2018).  By January 25, 2019, the first day of the termination 
hearing, the suitability of that placement had not yet been decided.  The court issued a written order 
scheduling a second day of hearing to allow the parties to present evidence as to the issue of 
placement. 
 
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mother’s attorney reported on the record that she had reached the mother by 
telephone and learned that the mother “is not present in the courthouse, and 
does not plan to return.”  The court proceeded with the hearing, taking 
additional evidence, including evidence related to placement.  Before us, the 
mother does not dispute these facts.   
[¶3]  The court entered a judgment in March 2019 granting the petition 
to terminate the mother’s parental rights after finding by clear and convincing 
evidence all four statutory grounds of parental unfitness and that termination 
is in the best interest of the child.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(a), (b)(i)-(iv) 
(2018).  The court found as follows:  
[The mother] is 19 years-old and suffers from chronic 
substance use.  Evidence reveals that [the mother’s] drug use is 
longstanding and significant.  Much of it stems from her own 
trauma suffered as a young child.  Nonetheless, her drug abuse and 
chaotic lifestyle has landed her in jail on several occasions 
throughout the reunification process.  In fact, initially the 
Department’s obligation to reunify with [the mother] was 
suspended until [the mother] was released from jail.  Over the 
course of the reunification process [the mother] has done little to 
alleviate jeopardy. 
 
The Jeopardy Order . . . required [the mother] to participate 
actively and consistently in services; sign all necessary releases; 
not to use or possess alcohol, illicit drugs, or prescription drugs 
except when used as prescribed by a qualified health professional; 
subject to random drug and alcohol testing; maintain safe and 
stable housing free from domestic violence, drugs and alcohol; and 
 
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refrain from any/all criminal involvements and abide by the terms 
of probation conditions, if any.   
 
Although there is evidence that [the mother] did well in 
services between July 2018 and September 2018 when she 
attended Crossroads (substance abuse recovery program), she has 
failed to successfully complete the reunification process including 
Crossroads aftercare plan.  For example, despite her successes 
during these 2 ½ months, she’s had no contact with [the child] since 
September 2018; was incarcerated on three different occasions; 
her whereabouts were unknown during the months of November 
and December 2018 and she was arrested again on January 2, 2019 
with a release date of January 31, 2019; was not consistent in 
individual or substance abuse counseling; did not follow 
recommendations of engaging in the Maine Enhancement 
Parenting Program (MEPP) and/or the Family Treatment Drug 
Court (FTDC); and did not complete the CODE evaluation.  There 
simply has been no substantial progress over the last 16 months on 
[the mother’s] part.  [The mother] has failed to make a good faith 
effort to rehabilitate and reunify with [the child].   
 
. . . . The Court finds that [the mother] has a chronic substance 
use disorder that has not been alleviated and has prevented her 
from taking responsibility for her child.  In fact, [the mother] tested 
positive for cocaine just a day prior to the second day of trial in this 
case—just one of the reasons she chose not to attend the second 
day of the termination hearing.   
 
The Court further finds that [the mother] abandoned [the 
child] by failing to attend the second day of the termination trial.  
22 
MRS 
§ 
4002(1-A)(E) 
and 
(F); 
see 
also, 
22 
MRS 
[§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(iii)].  Such a refusal to participate in the 
termination proceeding indicates a strong “intent to forego 
parental duties.”  Id. § 4002(1-A)(F); see e.g., In re Child of Kaysean 
M., 2018 ME 156, 197 A.3d 525 (Me. 2018). 
 
The Court is tasked in determining whether [the mother] is 
willing or able to protect [the child] from jeopardy, or, will be able 
 
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to take responsibility for [the child] within a time reasonably 
calculated to meet [the child]’s needs, and she simply cannot. . . . 
This case has been pending since October 19, 2017, when [the 
child] was 2 ½ years old, for a period of over 16 months.  Each 
month is a long time in the life of a child this age.  With no certain 
timeline in sight it is clear that [the mother] cannot take 
responsibility for [the child] within a time reasonably calculated to 
meet the needs of this young boy. 
 
 
 
. . . .  
 
[The child] is a few months away from turning 4 years-old.  
He has been placed with the maternal great-grandmother . . . since 
the onset of this case.  There is no question that [she] has the ability 
to provide a safe home for [the child], which she has done for the 
last 16 months.  There is also ample evidence to support a close 
emotional bond between [the great-grandmother] and [the child].  
[She] has also shared a willingness and ability to make an informed, 
long-term commitment to [the child].  By all accounts, [she] and her 
husband have provided [the child] with exemplary care and 
support for the last 16 months.  
 
The GAL testified that it would not be in [the child]’s best 
interest to keep open the continued possibility of change, that he 
needs permanency, and that termination of parental rights is in 
[the child]’s best interest.  The GAL recommends termination of 
[the mother]’s parental rights and adoption as the permanency 
plan.  Based on the evidence presented, the Court finds that it is in 
[the child]’s best interest to terminate [the mother’s] parental 
rights and proceed with adoption. 
 
(Footnotes omitted.)  At the end of the judgment, the court ordered a 
permanency plan of adoption.   
[¶4]  The mother timely appealed the judgment.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4006 
(2018); M.R. App. P. 2B(c)(1).   
 
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II.  DISCUSSION 
[¶5]  We review the court’s findings of fact for clear error and the court’s 
ultimate determination that termination of the parental rights is in the child’s 
best interest for an abuse of discretion.  In re R.M., 2015 ME 38, ¶ 7, 114 A.3d 
212.  We will “affirm an order terminating parental rights when a review of the 
entire record demonstrates that the trial court rationally could have found clear 
and convincing evidence in that record to support the necessary factual 
findings as to the bases for termination.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  
A.  
The Mother’s Unfitness 
[¶6]  A court need find only one of four statutory grounds of parental 
unfitness to find that a parent is unfit to parent his or her child.  22 M.R.S. 
§ 4055(1)(B)(2)(b).  “Where the court finds multiple bases for unfitness, we 
will affirm if any one of the alternative bases is supported by clear and 
convincing evidence.”  In re M.B., 2013 ME 46, ¶ 37, 65 A.3d 1260.  Here, the 
court found the mother unfit based on all four grounds of unfitness, see 
22 M.R.S. § 4055(1)(B)(2)(b), and the mother concedes that the evidence is 
sufficient to support at least one of those grounds.  We agree, and we affirm the 
court’s finding of at least one ground of parental unfitness. 
 
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[¶7]  The mother, nevertheless, asks us to review in particular the court’s 
finding as to one ground of unfitness—that she abandoned the child by failing 
to attend the second day of the hearing—because that finding could be used 
against her in any future child protective proceedings.  See 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4002(1-B)(A)(1) (2018).  A parent’s failure to respond to a notice of a child 
protection proceeding, including the parent’s failure to attend any portion of 
the termination hearing, may be taken by the court as evidence of the parent’s 
intent to forego his or her parental duties.  See 22 M.R.S. §§ 4002(1-A)(E), (3), 
4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(iii) (2018); In re Children of Anthony N., 2019 ME 64, ¶¶ 6, 
10, 207 A.3d 1191; In re Child of Kaysean M., 2018 ME 156, ¶¶ 3-4, 6-7, 197 A.3d 
525; In re Child of Tanya C., 2018 ME 153, ¶¶ 1, 12, 14, 198 A.3d 777.  A court 
may find that the parent did not abandon a child, however, if the parent shows 
good cause for the absence.  See In re Child of Kaysean M., 2018 ME 156, ¶ 7, 197 
A.3d 525; In re A.M., 2012 ME 118, ¶ 19, 55 A.3d 463; In re Robert S., 2009 ME 
18, ¶ 16 n.1, 966 A.2d 894. 
[¶8]  The mother failed to attend the second day of the hearing, and the 
court did not find that she had shown good cause for her absence.  Accordingly, 
the court did not err in finding that she had the intent to forego her parental 
duties and had therefore abandoned the child.  See 22 M.R.S. §§ 4002(1-A)(E), 
 
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(3), 4055(1)(B)(2)(b)(iii).  Because the court did not err in finding 
abandonment, we need not consider whether, if the finding of abandonment 
had not been supported by the evidence, such a finding would be vacated—
despite the presence of one or more other, supported, findings of unfitness—
because of possible future consequences in other child protection matters.  See 
id. § 4002(1-B)(A)(1). 
B. 
The Best Interest of the Child 
[¶9]  The mother argues that the court erred in speculating that the child 
would be placed with the great-grandmother while simultaneously 
determining that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best 
interest of the child.  Where a court consolidates a hearing on a petition for 
termination of parental rights with a hearing on permanency planning, a court 
may determine both whether termination of an unfit parent’s parental rights is 
in the best interest of the child and, if so, what the permanency plan for the child 
will be given the termination of parental rights.  See In re Children of Nicole M., 
2018 ME 75, ¶ 15, 187 A.3d 1; In re Thomas H., 2005 ME 123, ¶ 28, 889 A.2d 
297.  The ultimate “question of who is the best person to adopt the child” is, 
however, “beyond the scope of a termination proceeding because that question 
 
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must be addressed in a separate adoption action.”  In re Children of Nicole M., 
2018 ME 75, ¶ 17, 187 A.3d 1; see 18-C M.R.S. §§ 9-301 to 9-315 (2018).3 
[¶10]  The court here acted within the scope of its authority because, 
although the court noted that the great-grandmother has “shared a willingness 
and ability to make an informed, long-term commitment to” the child and that 
the plan for the child is to “proceed with adoption,” “it did not declare that to be 
the inevitable result of its termination judgment,” In re Children of Bethmarie R., 
2019 ME 59, ¶ 8, 207 A.3d 197, or state a permanency plan of adoption by the 
child’s great grandmother.  The court did not err or abuse its discretion in 
determining that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s 
best interest. 
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rory A. McNamara, Esq., Drake Law, LLC, Berwick, for appellant mother 
 
Aaron M. Frey, Attorney General, and Hunter C. Umphrey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Office 
of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee Department of Health and Human 
Services 
 
 
Lewiston District Court docket number PC-2017-87 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY 
                                               
 
3  The Probate Code was amended and recodified effective September 1, 2019, replacing former 
Title 18-A with new Title 18-C.  See P.L. 2019, ch. 417; P.L. 2017, ch. 402.