Case Title: Stone v. State

Citation: 344 Md. 97

Docket Number: 146/95

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 1996-11-26T00:00:00Z

Document:
Todd Erik Stone v. State of Maryland, No. 146, September Term, 1995
CRIMINAL LAW--It is error to dismiss an appeal to the circuit court
for a trial de novo when the court has information about the
defendant's whereabouts and the defendant's failure to appear was
not wilful, voluntary nor a result of neglect or inaction.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND
No. 146 
September Term, 1995
___________________________________
TODD ERIK STONE
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
___________________________________
    *Murphy, C.J.
Eldridge
Rodowsky
Chasanow
Karwacki
Bell
Raker,
JJ.
___________________________________
Opinion by Raker, J.
___________________________________
   Filed:  November 26, 1996
*Murphy, 
C.J., 
now 
retired,
participated in the hearing and
conference of this case while an
active member of this Court; after
being recalled pursuant to the
Constitution, Article IV, Section
3A, he also participated in the
decision 
and 
adoption 
of 
this
opinion.
 
Following his conviction in the District Court of Maryland,
the Petitioner, Todd Erik Stone, appealed to the Circuit Court for
Worcester County in exercise of his right to trial de novo. Md.
Code (1974, 1995 Repl. Vol., 1996 Cum. Supp.) § 12-401(f) of the
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.  The circuit court
dismissed his appeal.  The question we must decide in this case is
whether the circuit court may consider an appeal withdrawn and
dismiss the appeal in a criminal case from a judgment of the
District Court when the defendant failed to appear because he was
incarcerated out-of-state and his failure to appear was not wilful,
voluntary nor a result of neglect or inaction on his part.  We
shall hold that the circuit court erred in dismissing Petitioner's
appeal.  
I.
This case stems from Petitioner Todd Erik Stone's conviction
in the District Court of Maryland sitting in Worcester County for
theft over the value of $300, in violation of Maryland Code, (1957,
1996 Repl. Vol.) Article 27, § 342.  On September 10, 1993, the
District Court issued a warrant for Stone's arrest for theft.
After the State learned that Stone was incarcerated at the State
Correctional Institution in Cresson, Pennsylvania, the State's
Attorney for Worcester County lodged a detainer against  him for
the theft charge pending in the District Court. 
2
        The Interstate Agreement on Detainers is a compact among
1
forty-eight states, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, the
District of Columbia, and the United States.  See Leslie W.
Abramson, The Interstate Agreement on Detainers:  Narrowing Its
Availability and Application, 21 N.E. J. CRIMINAL & CIVIL CONFINEMENT 1
(1995).  Under the I.A.D., either a prisoner incarcerated in a
penal facility  of another state, or the state in which untried
criminal charges are pending against the prisoner may request his
temporary transfer for trial on the untried charges.  State v.
Hicks,  285 Md. 310, 313 n. 1, 403 A.2d 356, 358 n.1 (1979).  
Petitioner exercised his rights under Article III of the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers (I.A.D.) and requested final
disposition of the theft charge pending in Worcester County, 
Maryland.   Stone was transported to Maryland, the outstanding
1
arrest warrant was served upon him, and his trial was scheduled in
the District Court.  On June 29, 1995, Stone was convicted in the
District Court of theft over the value of $300.  On the same day,
the District Court sentenced him to five years incarceration, all
but eighteen months suspended, three years probation to be served
consecutive to his Pennsylvania sentence.  The Maryland authorities
then returned Stone to Pennsylvania to complete his sentence.  
On July 21, 1995, Stone noted a timely appeal to the Circuit
Court for Worcester County.  See Md. Code (1974, 1995 Repl. Vol.,
1996 Cum. Supp.) § 12-401 of the Courts and Proceedings Article.
The circuit court scheduled Stone's trial for October 12, 1995.
The clerk of the circuit court notified Stone at the Pennsylvania
State Correctional Institute of his trial date.  The notice, a
circuit court summons, advised Stone that his case had been
3
scheduled for a jury trial on October 12, 1995, and commanded him
to appear before the Circuit Court for Worcester County on
September 6, 1995, to answer a charging document (his de novo
appeal) filed in that court, unless counsel entered a appearance
before that date.  On September 5, 1996, the Public Defender
entered an appearance line, entered a plea of not guilty to the
offense on behalf of Stone, elected a trial by jury, and demanded
a speedy trial.  In a letter dated September 6, 1995, the Public
Defender advised Stone that his appeal had been filed in the
circuit court and that he "must file another request for
disposition under the Interstate Detainer Act so that PA. will
bring you for your new trial.  You can get the forms at your jail
in PA and file them immediately." 
Meanwhile, in Pennsylvania, Stone attempted to comply with his
attorney's advice.  On a Pennsylvania Department of Corrections
form,  Stone sent a brief note to a Pennsylvania prison records
administrator, stating: 
I was over to see you last week concerning a
court date I have in Maryland on 10/12/95.  I
believe you were to check on it & get back
with me.  I need to refile the Interstate
Agreement.  Can you see me soon about this
matter?
The documents from Stone's prison institutional file suggest that
the Pennsylvania officials took the position that the I.A.D. was
not available to Stone since he had already been tried and
sentenced on the charges underlying the detainer lodged against
4
     
Petitioner 
does 
not 
fault 
the 
Commonwealth 
of
2
Pennsylvania for refusing to respond to the provisions of the
I.A.D.  Petitioner aptly notes that the I.A.D. apparently  was not
drafted with a two-tiered trial system in mind and, consequently,
it does not address those circumstances where a single charging
document results successively in both a District Court conviction
and sentence, as well as a pending charge in the circuit court.  We
agree with Petitioner's observation that "it is easy to understand
why a prison official in another state would take the position that
a prisoner, who was transported once on an untried charging
document and who has received a sentence for that charge, is not
entitled under the I.A.D. to be transported again."
       This information was not available to the Circuit Court for
3
Worcester County when it dismissed Petitioner's appeal on October
12, 1995.  This information became part of the record on August 23,
1996, when this Court granted Petitioner's motion to supplement the
record.  
him.   Handwritten notes in Stone's file indicate that the
2
Pennsylvania officials believed that Stone was pursuing an appeal
of his sentence on Detainer #61798IO.  The prison record reads:
Called Public Defenders Office in Snow Hill, Md. re:
I.A.D. and appeal of sentence on Detainer # 61798IO. . .
.[T]hey will have to get a Governor's Warrant to take
subj. out since he went out under I.A.D. and was
sentenced.  Mrs. Murphy said she never heard of this and
will check it out . . . .3
Petitioner was not present when his case was called for trial
in the circuit court.  Stone's attorney explained to the court that
Stone was incarcerated in Pennsylvania, and because there was not
a detainer within the I.A.D. in effect against Stone, Stone was
unable to invoke the provisions of Article III of the I.A.D. that
would trigger his transportation to Maryland.  The State's Attorney
contended that the State had done all that was required and that
Stone's absence was due to his failure to follow the proper
5
procedures under the I.A.D.  The court agreed with the State and
dismissed the appeal.  The docket entry in the circuit court reads:
1995, Oct. 12. . . . Case is to be remanded back to
District Court.  The defendant having failed to appear as
required, and lack of action on his part, the appeal is
considered withdrawn and it is DISMISSED by the Circuit
Court. 
Stone appealed to the Court of Special Appeals, and we granted
certiorari before that court considered the matter.  We hold that
the circuit court erred when it dismissed Stone's de novo appeal
and we therefore reverse.
II.
Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in dismissing
his appeal and requests that this Court reinstate his appeal.  He
maintains that the trial court erred in finding that he failed to
appear due to his own inaction.  He argues that without a detainer
lodged against him, he was unable to invoke the provisions of the
I.A.D. that would entitle him to be transported to Maryland. 
The State maintains that the circuit court properly dismissed
Stone's appeal and that Stone did not need a second detainer.  The
State argues that "the charges that Stone faced in the circuit
court, identical to those upon which he was tried in the District
Court, fall within the purview of the I.A.D."  According to the
State, Stone should have asserted his rights under the I.A.D., by
"formally requesting final disposition of the circuit court
6
       See, e.g., Alabama, Ala. Code § 12-12-71 (1996); North
4
Carolina, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-290 (1995);  Rhode Island, R.I. Gen.
Laws § 12-22-1 (1995).
Until January 1, 1994, Massachusetts also had a two-tiered
trial court system.  1993 Mass. Acts ch. 12, § 9; 1992 Mass. Acts
ch. 379, §§ 193, 226.    
charges."  It is the State's position that Stone could have been
transferred to Maryland for his circuit court trial based on the
initial detainer lodged against him before his District Court
trial.  Since he could have invoked the I.A.D. but did not, the
State continues, Stone failed to appear due to his own inaction and
thus dismissal was appropriate.
III.
This case addresses the interaction of Maryland's two-tiered
trial court system and the Interstate Agreement on Detainers.  We
shall begin with an overview of both schemes before we explore how
they interact and how they apply in this case.  
A.
Maryland, along with a several of our sister states, has a
two-tiered trial court system that provides for trial de novo on
appeal to the general jurisdiction trial court.   See, e.g., Hardy
4
v. State, 279 Md. 489, 490, 369 A.2d 1043, 1045-46 (1977).  The
District Court of Maryland has original jurisdiction in all
7
        We observed in State v. Jefferson, 319 Md. 674, 682, 574
5
A.2d 918, 921 (1990), that 
"the District Court trial is complete unto itself.  It
does not act as a preliminary proceeding to a possible de
novo appeal.  Nor does the de novo appeal `wipe the slate
(continued...)
misdemeanor cases, and certain designated felonies, including both
felony and misdemeanor theft in violation of Article 27, §§ 342-
344.  Md. Code (1974, 1995 Repl. Vol., 1996 Cum. Supp.) § 4-
301(b)(2) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.
A defendant convicted in the District Court may appeal to the
circuit court for a trial de novo.  See Md. Code (1974, 1995 Repl.
Vol., 1996 Cum. Supp.) § 12-401(f) of the Courts and Judicial
Proceedings Article (an appeal from District Court to circuit court
shall be tried de novo).  The trial de novo in circuit court
proceeds on the original District Court charging document, Lewis v.
State, 289 Md. 1, 4-5, 421 A.2d 974, 977 (1980), and the District
Court judgment remains in effect pending the appeal to the circuit
court, unless and until superseded by a judgment of the circuit
court or a disposition by nolle prosequi or stet.  Maryland Rule 7-
112; see Stanton v. State, 290 Md. 245, 428 A.2d 1224 (1981).  De
novo appeals, however, are treated "as wholly original proceedings,
that is, as if no judgment had been entered in the lower court."
Hardy v. State, 279 Md. 489, 493, 369 A. 2d 1043 (1977).  Thus,
under the Maryland scheme, the circuit court proceeding occupies a
unique position as both an appeal and a trial.   Because the
5
8
     (...continued)
5
clean.'"
District Court judgment remains in effect after a circuit court
appeal has been dismissed, dismissal of the appeal has different
consequences than the dismissal of charges in an original trial.
Dismissal of the charges in an original trial often benefits the
defendant, particularly when the charges are dismissed with
prejudice.  Dismissal of the circuit court appeal, on the other
hand, deprives the appellant of his right to appeal a District
Court judgment as guaranteed by statute in Maryland.
An appeal from a judgment of the District Court is an appeal
as a matter of right.  Under Maryland Rule 7-114, the circuit court
may dismiss an appeal when "an appeal to be heard de novo has been
withdrawn pursuant to Rule 7-112."  Maryland Rule 7-112 provides in
pertinent part:
(d)  Withdrawal of Appeal;  Entry of Judgment. 
(1)  An appeal shall be considered withdrawn if the
appellant files a notice withdrawing the appeal or fails
to appear as required for trial or any other proceeding
on the appeal.
(2) Upon a withdrawal of the appeal, the circuit court
shall dismiss the appeal, and the clerk shall promptly
return the file to the District Court.  Any order of
satisfaction shall be docketed in the District Court.
Thus, an appellant's failure to appear for trial constitutes a
withdrawal of the appeal, which in turn provides grounds for
dismissal.  
9
We find the rationale in our cases addressing the defendant's
right to be present at trial instructive.  In order to waive the
right to be present at trial, a defendant must have voluntarily
failed to appear, engaged in disruptive conduct in the courtroom,
or at least have agreed to or acquiesced in his absence from the
trial.  Maryland Rule 4-231(c); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 90
S. Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970); Walker v. State, 338 Md. 253,
658 A.2d 239 (1995); Barnett v. State, 307 Md. 194, 202-03, 512
A.2d 1071, 1078-79 (1986).  Likewise, the right to be present at a
trial de novo cannot be considered waived by non-appearance, that
is, withdrawn, when the trial court has information that the
appellant's failure to appear was neither wilful nor voluntary.  
Cf. Maryland Rule 4-231(c); Stewart v. State, 334 Md. 213, 638 A.2d
754 (1994); Barnett, 307 Md. at 212, 512 A.2d at 1079.  Of course,
when a defendant fails to appear at the designated time and place,
and there is nothing before the court to justify the defendant's
absence, it is proper to presume that the defendant has withdrawn
the appeal.  See Maryland Rule 7-112(d).    
Because Petitioner's counsel advised the circuit court of
Stone's whereabouts, we must evaluate what, if any, action
Petitioner could have taken while serving his sentence in
Pennsylvania to facilitate his presence at his de novo appeal in
the circuit court.  We turn now to a brief overview of the I.A.D.
B.
10
       The disadvantages a prisoner may suffer as a result of a
6
detainer were presented to the 91st Congress.  The House and Senate
Reports noted:
[The prisoner] is in custody and therefore in no position
to seek witnesses or to preserve his defense.  He must
often be kept in close custody and is ineligible for
desirable work assignments.  What is more, when detainers
are filed against a prisoner he sometimes loses interest
in institutional opportunities because he must serve his
sentence without knowing what additional sentences may
lie before him, or when, if ever, he will be in a
position to employ the education and skills he may be
developing.  
H.R. Rep. No. 1018, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970); S. Rep. No.
1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970). 
As this case demonstrates, a Maryland defendant's right to two
trials on the same charging document complicates the procedures for
resolving detainers under the I.A.D.  The Interstate Agreement on
Detainers consists of nine articles and is codified at Maryland
Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.) Article 27, § 616A-616R.  The purpose
of the I.A.D. is to encourage the expeditious disposition of
charges and to establish cooperative procedures among member
parties to facilitate such resolution. United States v. Mauro, 436
U.S. 340, 351, 98 S. Ct. 1834, 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978); State v.
Jefferson, 319 Md. 674, 679, 574 A.2d 918, 920 (1990).  The
drafters of the Agreement also desired to remedy the adverse side-
effects that detainers may have on prisoners.   This is reflected
6
in Article I, which states, in pertinent part: 
 
The party states find that charges outstanding against a
11
prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments,
informations or complaints, and difficulties in securing
speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other
jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct
programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation.
Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, §616B.     
  
The I.A.D. is applicable when there is an untried indictment,
information or complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been
lodged against the prisoner. Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.) Art.
27, § 616D(a).  The provisions of the I.A.D. are activated only
when a detainer based on an untried indictment, information or
complaint is filed with the custodial State by a member party.
Mauro, 436 U.S. at 343; Clipper v. State, 295 Md. 303, 307, 455
A.2d 973, 975 (1983); Burns v. State, 523 So.2d 604, 606 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1987), review denied, 534 So.2d 398 (Fla. 1988);
People v. Hood, 223 Ill. App.3d 157, 583 N.E. 2d 1173 (1991), cert.
denied, 591 N.E.2d 271 (Ill. 1992);  State v. Anderson, 121 Wash.2d
852, 855 P.2d 671, 676 (1993);  see also Leslie W. Abramson, The
Interstate Agreement on Detainers:  Narrowing Its Availability and
Application, 21 N.E. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 1 (1995).
Although the I.A.D. does not define detainer, this Court has
described a detainer "within the contemplation of the I.A.D. [as]
`a notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner is
serving a sentence, advising that he is wanted to face pending
criminal charges in another jurisdiction.'"  Jefferson, 319 Md. at
678 n.2, 574 A.2d at 919-20 n.2 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1018, 91st
12
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970) and S. Rep. No. 1356, 91st. Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1970)).  The Supreme Court has more generally defined a
detainer as a "request filed by a criminal justice agency with the
institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking the
institution either to hold the prisoner for the agency or to notify
the agency when the release is imminent."  Carchman v. Nash, 473
U.S. 716, 719, 105 S.Ct. 3401, 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (1985).  Numerous
cases have further refined what constitutes a detainer for purposes
of the I.A.D.  Nash, 473 U.S. 716 (holding that a detainer based on
a parole violation does not qualify under the I.A.D.); United
States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (holding that a writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum does not constitute a detainer for purposes of the
I.A.D.); Hopper v. United States Parole Commission, 702 F.2d 842
(9th Cir. 1983) (same as Carchman); State v. Smith, 316 Md. 223,
557 A.2d 1343 (holding that a felony arrest warrant lodged as a
detainer is effective to invoke the I.A.D.) (1989); Clipper v.
State, 295 Md. 303, 455 A.2d 973 (1983) (same as Carchman); State
v. Boone, 40 Md. App. 41, 388 A.2d 150 (1978) (same as Mauro);
People v. Castoe, 86 Cal. App.3d 484, 150 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1978)
(holding that detainer lodged against a prisoner who has been
convicted but not yet sentenced is not effective to invoke I.A.D.);
People v. Hood, 583 N.E.2d 1173 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), cert. denied,
591 N.E.2d 27 (Ill. 1992) (holding that informal communication
between police departments in two states concerning outstanding
13
warrants against a prisoner did not constitute a detainer); People
v. Randolph, 85 Misc.2d 1022, 381 N.Y.S.2d 192 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976)
(same as Castoe); State v. Barefield, 110 Wash.2d 728, 756 P.2d 731
(1988) (same as Castoe).
The I.A.D. establishes procedures by which a member party may
obtain for trial a prisoner incarcerated in another jurisdiction
and by which the prisoner may demand the speedy disposition of
certain charges pending against him in another jurisdiction.
United States v. Mauro,  436 U.S. at 343.  Either the prisoner or
the prosecutor can initiate proceedings under the I.A.D.  Article
III allows the prisoner to request disposition of pending out-of-
state charges.  Article IV allows the prosecutor in the state where
charges are pending to initiate proceedings and to secure the
defendant's presence for trial. See Laster v. State, 313 Md. 548,
546 A.2d 472 (1988); see also Abramson, supra.   
Article III of the I.A.D., codified at Maryland Code (1957,
1996 Repl. Vol.) Article 27, § 616D, enables the prisoner to
request a final disposition of the charge underlying the detainer.
Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 616D(c).  The prisoner
may make a request for a final disposition of the indictment,
information or complaint underlying the detainer.  Md. Code (1957,
1996 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 616D(a); see Laster, 313 Md. at 554 ,
546 A.2d at 475.  Once the prisoner makes this request, the warden
of the prison completes the required forms and sends them to the
14
        
Article IV also prohibits a prisoner's return to the
7
sending state until the prisoner is tried on the charges underlying
the detainer.  Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 616E(e).
Coined the "anti-shuffling provision," § 616E(e) seeks to avoid the
(continued...)
prosecutor in the receiving state.  See Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl.
Vol.) § 616D(d); Laster, 313 Md. at 554, 546 A.2d at 475.  The
prosecutor prepares and sends two more forms to the warden in
sending state.  See Laster, 313 Md. at 554-55, 546 A.2d at 476.  To
complete the process, the prisoner is transported to the receiving
state.  See Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.) § 616F(a).  Under
Article III, the receiving state must dispose of the detainer, by
trying the prisoner or otherwise, within 180 days of the
prosecutor's receipt of the prisoner's request or face dismissal of
the charges underlying the detainer.  Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl.
Vol.) § 616D(a); see Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 113 S. Ct. 1085,
122 L.Ed.2d 406 (1993); Laster, 313 Md. at 552, 546 A.2d at 474. 
  Article IV, codified at Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.)
Article 27, § 616E, permits the receiving state to initiate
proceedings and to secure temporary custody of an out-of-state
prisoner in order to dispose of the charges underlying the
detainer.  Laster, 313 Md. at 552-53, 546 A.2d at 475.  Under
Article IV, the receiving state must dispose of the charges within
120 days after the prisoner arrives in the state, or risk dismissal
of the charges. Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, §
616E(c).7
15
     (...continued)
7
deleterious effects that constantly moving the prisoner back and
forth between states has on the rehabilitative efforts of the
prison.  See Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 616(B). 
This Court construed the anti-shuffling provision in State v.
Jefferson, 319 Md. 674, 574 A.2d 918 (1990), another case that
involved an out-of-state prisoner's circuit court appeal.  In
Jefferson, we held that returning a prisoner to the sending state
between the District Court trial and the circuit court trial de
novo did not violate the anti-shuffling provision because "[t]he
final judgment rendered . . . in the District Court satisfied §
616E(e)'s requirement that a `trial' be `had.'"  Jefferson, 319 Md.
at 684, 574 A.2d at 922. 
     
IV.
The heart of the issue in this case is whether the trial court
properly concluded that Petitioner's appeal was withdrawn when he
failed to appear for his trial de novo.  As the record indicates,
the trial court concluded that Petitioner's appeal was withdrawn
based on his inaction.  Because we conclude that an appeal may not
be considered withdrawn under Rule 7-112 when the court has
information that an appellant has not failed to appear wilfully or
voluntarily, we must determine whether Stone's absence was wilful
or voluntary.  Specifically, we must determine whether Stone could
have invoked the I.A.D. under the circumstances facing him after
his District Court conviction.  Because we conclude that Petitioner
could not have invoked the I.A.D. successfully and his absence was
not wilful, voluntary, nor a result of inaction or neglect on his
part, we reverse. 
16
     
Section 616E(e) provides that "[i]f trial is not had on
8
any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior
to the prisoner's being returned to the original place of
imprisonment," the court shall dismiss the charging document with
(continued...)
A.
Stone argues that his presence at trial depended on his
ability to invoke the I.A.D. successfully.  The State maintains
that Stone should have filed I.A.D. Form II, formally requesting
final disposition of the circuit court charges.  In order to
determine whether Petitioner was able to undertake any action to
secure his presence in the circuit court to pursue his appeal, we
must decide whether he could have done any more to activate the
provisions of the I.A.D.  No one disputes that Stone properly
invoked the provisions of the I.A.D. to request trial on the
charges in the District Court.  Both parties also agree that the
State did not file a second detainer against Stone.  The State
argues that Stone could have filed another request for disposition
based on the prior detainer.  We disagree.
In State v. Jefferson, 319 Md. 674, 574 A.2d 918 (1990), this
Court held that a detainer lodged against a prisoner for charges he
faces in District Court is removed once the District Court trial
results in a conviction.  Id. at 683, 574 A.2d at 922-23.  The
facts in Jefferson strongly resemble the facts in the present case.
Jefferson, however, dealt with the anti-shuffling provision in
Article IV.  Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 616E(e).8
17
     (...continued)
8
prejudice.  See supra note 7 for a more detailed discussion of 
§ 616E(e), the anti-shuffling the provision.
The prosecutor initiated Jefferson's transfer from the Lorton
Penitentiary in Virginia to Montgomery County, Maryland for a trial
in the District Court of Maryland.  Like Stone, Jefferson was
convicted in the District Court, noted an appeal to circuit court,
and then was returned to Lorton by the Maryland authorities.
Unlike Stone, however, Jefferson sought to have the charges against
him dismissed, claiming that the State was obligated to dispose
completely of the charges against him before returning him to
Lorton.
We rejected Jefferson's claim that the State violated the
anti-shuffling provision because the detainer in his case was
resolved with a District Court conviction against Jefferson.
Jefferson, 319 Md. at 683, 574 A.2d at 922.  Returning Jefferson to
Virginia after the District Court trial did not run afoul of the
anti-shuffling provisions because the District Court trial is
complete unto itself.  Id. at 682, 574 A.2d at 921.  Thus, in the
words of the statute, "trial [was] had" before Jefferson was
returned to Lorton.  See Md. Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27,
§ 616(E)(e).  We noted in Jefferson:
[T]he 
original 
detainer 
lodged 
against 
Jefferson
informing Lorton that he was facing charges in Maryland
was removed once his District Court trial ended in
conviction;  thereafter, a second detainer had to be
issued to inform Lorton that Jefferson was wanted for his
18
de novo appeal. 
 Id. at 683-84, 574 A.2d at 922.
As we established in Jefferson, the District Court trial
represents a complete and discrete proceeding.  Stone's District
Court trial extinguished the detainer based on the charges tried in
that proceeding.  See Jefferson, 319 Md. at 682-83, 574 A.2d at
922.  The only detainer the State filed in this case referred
specifically to the District Court charges.  Without a second
detainer lodged against him,  Pennsylvania understandably took the
position that Stone had no authority under the I.A.D. to request a
resolution of the matter pending in the circuit court.  See State
v. Newman, 367 A.2d 200, 202 (R.I. 1976) (holding that defendant
could not invoke speedy trial provisions of the I.A.D. when the
receiving state had never filed a detainer against him).  As the
record reflects, Stone's efforts to invoke the provisions of the
I.A.D. were unavailing.  Stone attempted to trigger the provisions
under the I.A.D. that would have allowed him to be transported to
Maryland.  His attorney advised him to file a new set of I.A.D.
forms, and Stone attempted to comply.  Stone's efforts, however,
were unsuccessful because Pennsylvania apparently took the position
that there was no active detainer for purposes of the I.A.D. lodged
against him and that the District Court detainer had been removed
as a result of his District Court conviction.  Cf. Jefferson, 319
Md. at 683-84, 574 A.2d at 922.
19
Petitioner dutifully filed the appropriate forms under the
I.A.D. in the first instance, and he was transported to Maryland
for his trial in the District Court.  The detainer that had been
lodged was thereby satisfied.  Following Stone's conviction and
sentencing in Maryland, the Maryland authorities returned him to
prison in Pennsylvania.  The documents in his prison file suggest
that no matter how diligently he pursued his rights under the
I.A.D., he could not have invoked the benefits of the I.A.D. that
would have triggered his transportation to Maryland for his de novo
appeal.
B.
Because a trial de novo in circuit court occupies a unique
position as both a trial and an appeal, the consequences of a
dismissal are different than the consequences of dismissal of
charges in an original trial.  See Maryland Rule 7-112(b)
(providing that District Court judgment remains in effect pending
circuit court appeal).  Upon completion of the Pennsylvania
sentence, Stone would be transferred to Maryland to serve his
District Court sentence.  Whereas dismissing the case in an
original trial may benefit the defendant, the dismissal of Stone's
de novo appeal in the circuit court denied Stone his statutory
right to appeal his District Court judgment. 
20
       As of January 1, 1994, Massachusetts abolished its two-tier
9
system.  1993 Mass. Acts ch. 12, § 9; 1992 Mass. Acts ch. 379, §§
193, 226.    
       In Massachusetts,  the statute provides that if a defendant
10
fails to appear for his trial de novo, he shall be defaulted on his
recognizance and the sentence of the district court may be imposed
upon him as if he had been convicted in the superior court.
Commonwealth v. Bartlett, 374 N.E.2d 1203, 1204 (1978).
Our sister states that also provide for a two-tiered trial
court system similarly have held that a defendant's failure to
appear through no fault of his own is not a basis to dismiss the
appeal.  For example, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts9
has held that a defendant cannot be found to have failed to appear
for her de novo appeal  when she had not received notice of the
10
trial in superior court.  Commonwealth v. Bartlett, 374 N.E.2d 1207
(Mass. 1978).  In Bartlett, the clerk of the court sent the trial
date notice to an incorrect address, and as a result, the defendant
failed to appear on the designated trial date.  The trial court
dismissed the appeal.  The Supreme Judicial Court reversed, holding
that when the Commonwealth did not prove that notice of the trial
date was sent to defendant's address of record, her absence could
not be considered as a failure to appear.  Hence, her appeal was
improperly dismissed.  Id. at 1206.  
  
In sum, we conclude that Stone did not voluntarily fail to
appear nor did his failure to appear result from his own inaction.
The failure of the State to lodge a detainer or to otherwise
provide for Stone's appearance in Maryland should not defeat his
21
right to his appeal.  Dismissal of his appeal was error.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR WORCESTER COUNTY REVERSED.
CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT
WITH DIRECTIONS TO REINSTATE
APPEAL. COSTS TO BE PAID BY
WORCESTER COUNTY.