Case Title: Milton J. Christensen v. Michael J. Sullivan

Citation: 2009 WI 87

Docket Number: 2006AP000803

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2009-07-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
2009 WI 87 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP803 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Milton J. Christensen, Alisa Jamieson, Erika 
Henderson, William Noggle and Troy Briggs and 
all others similarly situated, 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
     v. 
Michael J. Sullivan, Robert Kliesmet and Lev 
Baldwin, 
          Defendants, 
Milwaukee County and David A. Clarke, Jr., 
Milwaukee County Sheriff, 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS  
2008 WI App 18 
Reported at: 307 Wis. 2d 754, 746 N.W.2d 553 
(Ct. App 2008-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
July 21, 2009   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
October 8, 2008   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Clare L. Fiorenza   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY and CROOKS, JJ., join the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
defendants-respondents-petitioners 
there 
were 
briefs by William J. Domina, Milwaukee County Corporation 
Counsel, John E. Schapekahm, Principal Assistant Corporation 
Counsel, Milwaukee; and Charles H. Bohl, Nathan A. Fishbach, 
Andrew A. Jones, and Whyte Hirschboeck Dudek, S.C., Milwaukee, 
and oral argument by Andrew A. Jones. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Lori M. Lubinsky, 
Timothy D. Edwards, and Axley Brynelson, LLP, Madison, on behalf 
of the Wisconsin Counties Association. 
 
 
 
2 
For the plaintiffs-appellants there was a brief by Peter M. 
Koneazny, litigation director for the Legal Aid Society of 
Milwaukee, Inc., Milwaukee; Patrick O. Patterson, Law Office of 
Patrick O. Patterson, S.C., Fox Point, Cooperating Counsel for 
Legal Aid Society of Milwaukee, Inc. and ACLU of Wisconsin 
Foundation, Inc.; and Laurence Dupuis, legal director, American 
Civil Liberties Union of Wisconsin Foundation, Inc., Milwaukee; 
and oral argument by Patrick O. Patterson. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Pamela R. McGillivray, 
Carlos A. Pabellon, Madison, on behalf of Robert J. Martineau, 
Gordon G. Myse, David Schwartz, Vincent M. Nathan, and Pamela 
Susan Karlan. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Grant F. Langley, City 
Attorney, Rudolph M. Konrad, Deputy City Attorney, and Stuart S. 
Mukamal, Assistant City Attorney, Milwaukee, on behalf of The 
City of Milwaukee. 
 
An amicus curiae brief was filed by Daniel J. La Fave, 
Cheri L Baden, and Quarles & Brady LLP, Milwaukee, on behalf of 
The Benedict Center, Disability Rights Wisconsin and the 
Milwaukee Branch of the National Association for the Advancement 
of Colored People. 
 
 
 
 
2009 WI 87
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2006AP803   
(L.C. No. 
1996CV1835) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Milton J. Christensen, Alisa Jamieson, Erika 
Henderson, William Noggle and Troy Briggs and 
all others similarly situated, 
 
          Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
 
     v. 
 
Michael J. Sullivan, Robert Kliesmet and Lev 
Baldwin, 
 
          Defendants, 
 
Milwaukee County and David A. Clarke, Jr., 
Milwaukee County Sheriff, 
 
          Defendants-Respondents-Petitioners. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
JUL 21, 2009 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
DAVID T. PROSSER, J.   This is a review of a published 
decision of the court of appeals, Christensen v. Sullivan, 2008 
WI App 18, 307 Wis. 2d 754, 746 N.W.2d 553. 
¶2 
The decision reversed a 2006 order of the Milwaukee 
County Circuit Court, Clare L. Fiorenza, Judge, denying the 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
2 
 
plaintiffs' motion for monetary damages as a remedial sanction 
for the defendants' repeated violations of a Consent Decree 
involving the Milwaukee County Jail (the Jail).  The Consent 
Decree was approved by the circuit court in 2001.  Although the 
circuit court found that the defendants were in contempt of 
court, it declined to impose monetary damages as a remedial 
sanction or for breach of contract.  When the court of appeals 
reversed, it remanded the case to the circuit court instructing 
it to determine the sum of money sufficient to compensate the 
inmates at the Jail who were held in violation of the Consent 
Decree. 
¶3 
The first issue presented in this class action is 
whether the circuit court was required to order monetary damages 
for certain members of the class who were inmates at the Jail 
between 2001 and 2004 as a remedial sanction against the 
defendants for their repeated violations of the Consent Decree, 
when there is no dispute that "the violations ha[d] ceased."  
The second issue is whether the aforementioned inmates are 
entitled to monetary damages for emotional distress based upon 
breach of contract, i.e., breach of the Consent Decree. 
¶4 
We conclude, based on the facts of this case, that the 
circuit court had no discretion to impose a remedial sanction 
against the defendants after their contempt of court had ceased.  
Remedial sanctions are "imposed for the purpose of terminating a 
continuing contempt of court."  Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) (2007-08)1 
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
3 
 
(emphasis added).  Punitive sanctions may be "imposed to punish 
a past contempt of court."  Wis. Stat. § 785.01(2) (emphasis 
added).  Because breaches of the Consent Decree had ceased 
before the action for contempt was filed, the circuit court was 
correct in refusing to impose a remedial sanction against the 
defendants for their past contempt.  For multiple reasons, we 
also conclude that the plaintiff class is not entitled to 
monetary damages for emotional distress for breaches of the 
Consent Decree.  Consequently, we reverse the decision of the 
court of appeals. 
I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
¶5 
The material facts related to this appeal are not in 
dispute. 
 
On 
March 
12, 
1996, 
Milton 
J. 
Christensen 
(Christensen), an inmate in the Jail, filed a handwritten, pro 
se 
writ 
of prohibition alleging constitutional violations 
stemming from substandard and dangerous conditions in the Jail.  
Among the specific conditions complained of were the following: 
dangerous overcrowding in the Jail; sharing of single-occupancy 
cells with other inmates; insufficient time outside the cell; 
and 
exposure 
to 
communicable 
diseases 
due 
to 
inadequate 
screening of new inmates.  At the time of filing, Christensen 
had been held at the Jail as a pre-trial detainee for more than 
a year. 
 
¶6 
On May 8, 1996, the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, 
Michael Skwierawski, Judge, appointed the Legal Aid Society of 
Milwaukee, Inc. (Legal Aid) to represent Christensen.  On July 
25, 1996, with the assistance of counsel, Christensen amended 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
4 
 
his complaint in an effort to bring a class action "on behalf of 
all persons who are now or in the future will be confined in the 
Milwaukee 
County 
Jail." 
 
The 
amended 
complaint 
alleged 
constitutional 
violations 
at 
the 
Jail 
for 
substandard 
conditions. 
 
¶7 
The 
amended 
complaint 
alleged 
that 
the 
Jail's 
conditions caused the infliction of needless pain and suffering 
and created a threat to inmates' mental and physical well-being.  
The class sought relief "from conditions that fall below 
contemporary standards of human decency, deny basic human needs, 
inflict needless pain and suffering, and threaten plaintiffs' 
physical and mental well-being." 
 
¶8 
According to the amended complaint, when the Jail 
opened in 1993, it was designed to hold 798 inmates.  This 
included 54 disciplinary and medical beds designated for 
temporary or special use.  However, the average daily population 
in the Jail in 1995 was more than 1,200.  Paragraph 27 of the 
amended complaint read as follows: 
 
27. The Jail is seriously overcrowded.  Although 
it is designed to hold a maximum of 798 inmates, the 
population on July 10, 1996 was 1304 inmates.  Of 
these, 547 were in the Jail post-sentencing, arguably 
making them the responsibility of the State of 
Wisconsin.  Specifically, there were 260 with parole 
or probation violations and other charges, 62 with 
only 
parole violations, 30 sentenced felons, 88 
awaiting sentencing, 31 with division of intensive 
sanctions 
penalties, 
7 
state 
correctional 
center 
inmates, 44 awaiting transfer to the state, and 25 on 
orders to produce and return.  On the other hand, 
there 
were 
757 
there 
who 
are 
the 
county's 
responsibility. 
 
Specifically, 
this 
includes 
427 
pretrial 
felony, 
236 
pretrial 
misdemeanor, 
84 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
5 
 
misdemeanor sentenced and 10 municipal commitments.  
If the population of the Jail were reduced by the 
number of inmates who are the State's responsibility, 
the Jail would not be overcrowded.  The annual average 
daily population in the Jail was over 1200 in 1995; 
and the monthly average daily population in June, 1996 
was 1222. 
¶9 
Paragraph 28 continued with the following: 
 
28. As a result of the high population of 
inmates, two inmates are confined to cells built for 
one.  The second inmate is routinely forced to sleep 
on a mattress on the floor because each cell is 
equipped with only one bed.  Because the mattress on 
the floor is so close to the toilet, the toilet 
"sweats" and water spills or urine splashes from the 
toilet onto the floor and gets the mattresses and 
bedding wet.  For most inmates, there are no pillows 
for persons sleeping on the floor and there is only 
one blanket even when it is cold in the Jail. 
¶10 The amended complaint pointed to the special problem 
of women in the Jail.  Women were serving misdemeanor sentences 
in the Jail, and women also were held in the Jail for violations 
of probation or parole because there were no alternative 
facilities, such as the House of Corrections.  In addition, 
inmates lacked sufficient access to adequate mental health care, 
medical care, and dental care, and women specifically lacked 
equal access to educational and job-training opportunities. 
 
¶11 Defendants included the Secretary of the Wisconsin 
Department of Corrections, the Milwaukee County Sheriff, and 
Milwaukee County (collectively referred to as "the County").   
¶12 On October 15, 1996, the class was certified by the 
Milwaukee County Circuit Court, Jacqueline D. Schellinger, 
Judge.  It included "all individuals who are now or in the 
future will be confined in the Milwaukee County Jail . . . and 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
6 
 
all such confined individuals who are now or in the future will 
be subject to the policies and practices of Defendants." 
 
¶13 After 
several 
years 
of 
motions, 
discovery, 
and 
negotiation, the parties submitted a settlement agreement (the 
Consent Decree) to the court for approval.  The circuit court, 
Thomas E. Donegan, Judge, held hearings and on May 29, 2001, 
approved the 48-page Consent Decree. 
¶14 At the hearings on the Consent Decree, the parties 
made clear that the suit was about injunctive and declaratory 
relief, not damages.  Plaintiffs' counsel stated the following: 
"[T]he relief applies to all inmates.  There are no damages." 
 
¶15 The 
Consent 
Decree 
addressed 
two 
broad 
issues: 
overcrowding and medical services provided to inmates.  The 
overcrowding section set a cap on the total population of the 
Jail at 1,100, limited the number of inmates in the booking–open 
waiting area (the BKOW) to 110, and stipulated that no 
individual would remain in the BKOW longer than 30 hours.  The 
"Medical 
Services" 
section included provisions to improve 
medical and mental health screenings conducted on new inmates, 
decreased the wait time for sick inmates to receive a physical 
examination, 
improved 
the 
medication 
distribution 
system, 
developed a mental health program, and increased staffing levels 
of mental health professionals. 
 
¶16 At issue in this case are the provisions addressing 
the inmates' length of stay in the BKOW.  The relevant 
provisions of the Consent Decree read as follows: 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
7 
 
 
C. 
As of 3/21/01, and thereafter, no jail 
inmate shall be required to sleep on a mattress on the 
jail floor or on the jail floor.  There shall be no 
inmate in the jail for longer than thirty hours 
without 
being 
assigned 
to 
a 
bed 
approved 
by 
regulations of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections 
for overnight housing (see ¶D, next following). 
 
D. 
Best efforts shall be made to assure that 
there will be no more than 110 inmates in booking at 
the midnight count.  If the number exceeds 110, there 
shall be a plan for adequate emergency staffing in the 
booking room.  The plan shall limit the number of 
inmates in the locked rooms surrounding the open 
waiting area in the booking room and shall specify how 
often those side rooms are checked.  The maximum 
permanent population limit for the jail shall be 1100 
at the midnight, "11:59," count (according to the so-
called "Daily Census Reports").  The 1100 permanent 
capacity limit on the jail assumes that there will be 
a reasonable number of persons held on a short-term 
basis in the booking area.  Since there are no beds in 
the booking room, a number of inmates may be placed 
there for not more than thirty hours.  County 
defendants will exercise best efforts to limit any 
inmate's stay in booking—open waiting to twenty-four 
hours. 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
¶17 Following court approval of the Consent Decree, the 
parties skirmished about attorney fees for Legal Aid.  On August 
27, 2001, Judge Donegan awarded attorney fees against the 
defendants (except the Wisconsin Department of Corrections).  
The court entered judgment on attorney fees on January 15, 2002.  
The defendants appealed but ultimately sought a voluntary 
dismissal.  Defendants satisfied the judgment on January 22, 
2003. 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
8 
 
 
¶18 The circuit court, Clare Fiorenza, Judge, held a 
status conference on November 25, 2003.  The court then 
adjourned the matter until May 27, 2004. 
 
¶19 On March 23, 2004, plaintiffs moved to conduct 
discovery. 
 
On 
April 
1, 
2004, 
the 
Principal 
Assistant 
Corporation Counsel, John Schapekahm, objected to discovery and 
filed a lengthy affidavit, which is described infra at ¶25.  On 
April 6, 2004, the court conducted a motion hearing and then 
authorized plaintiffs to conduct discovery. 
 
¶20 The court held a new status conference on June 2, 
2004, and scheduled a tour of the Jail for June 21. 
 
¶21 Another status conference was held on July 13, 2004.  
The docket entry reads in part: "Court met with counsel in 
chambers, off the record.  Matter then called on the record.  
Matter here for a status conference. Plaintiff to file a 
contempt motion for violation that occurred prior to 4/28/04.  
There have been no new violations since that date."  (Emphasis 
added.) 
 
¶22 On September 13, 2004, the plaintiff class filed a 
motion alleging that the County had breached the Consent Decree, 
specifically the 30-Hour Rule, by holding more than 13,000 
inmates in the BKOW for over 30 hours.  The plaintiff class 
requested 
both 
contempt-of-court 
and 
breach-of-contract 
remedies. 
¶23 On November 15, 2004, the circuit court, Jeffrey 
Kremers, Judge, found that the defendants had violated the 
Consent Decree and authorized the plaintiff class to conduct 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
9 
 
discovery to determine whether they were entitled to either 
contempt or contract remedies, or both. 
 
¶24 Discovery uncovered a large number of violations, but 
the parties disagreed about what caused the violations and 
whether the defendants' attempts to comply with the Consent 
Decree were made in good faith.  The plaintiff class reported 
that, between November 2001 and April 2004, the County had 
violated the 30-Hour Rule on 16,662 occasions.  At least 4,811 
inmates were held in the BKOW for more than two days, 719 
inmates were held for more than three days, and 39 inmates were 
held for more than 100 hours. 
 
¶25 In 
his 
affidavit 
of 
April 
1, 
2004, 
Assistant 
Corporation Counsel Schapekahm had claimed that the Consent 
Decree 
called 
for 
substantial 
compliance 
by 
the 
County 
defendants as well as semi-annual reports on compliance from the 
plaintiffs.  He claimed that the plaintiffs had failed to file 
these reports.  In response, the plaintiffs submitted a detailed 
18-page letter alleging that booking room violations were not 
disclosed to them and were "in fact denied and otherwise 
obscured for months in which the plaintiffs were seeking 
information about this problem."  According to the letter, 
defendants did not provide month-by-month breakdowns of the 
number of 30-Hour Rule violations until early April 2004.  The 
June 2 letter added the following: "For the past four weeks that 
defendants have been giving weekly reports of the over-30-hour 
violations[,] the number has been zero for each of those four 
weeks."  (Emphasis added.) 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
10 
 
 
¶26 The County asserted that it made good faith efforts to 
comply with the Consent Decree.  In a letter to the court, dated 
July 12, 2004, Attorney Schapekahm explained that the violations 
were 
the 
result 
of 
breakdowns 
in 
communications 
among 
administrators and were not intentional.  He stated that 
"I . . . can 
testify 
to 
the 
shock 
written 
across 
the 
administrators' faces when the gravity of the situation became 
apparent." 
 
¶27 The defendants blamed general overcrowding in the Jail 
as a primary cause of the 30-Hour Rule violations.  According to 
Deputy Inspector Jerianne Feiten, who was largely responsible 
for overseeing the Jail from late 2002 to early 2004: "Orally or 
in writing, everyday it was reinforced that we would do——make 
every feasible attempt possible to reduce facility population.  
By reducing facility population, that would open up beds 
upstairs to which those beds would be filled from the booking 
room . . . ."  The defendants emphasized, however, that reducing 
facility population was largely out of their control because the 
police 
and 
the 
courts 
controlled 
the 
number 
of 
inmates 
populating the Jail.  The Jail population was a function of 
arrests, sentencings, court dates, and other factors not 
controlled by the defendants. 
 
¶28 The defendants explained that, if the permanent cells 
in the Jail were full, they had no place to move BKOW inmates.  
As a result, the BKOW population increased, and with it, the 
amount of time inmates stayed in the BKOW.  Thus, the defendants 
maintained that, despite their substantial compliance with the 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
11 
 
Consent Decree as a whole, their "best efforts," and an increase 
in the County's funding of the Jail from $42.5 million in 2001 
to $53.7 million in 2004, they violated the Consent Decree due 
to circumstances beyond their control. 
 
¶29 The defendants also attributed 30-Hour Rule violations 
to the Jail's "objective housing classification system" used to 
place inmates in permanent cells.  The Jail examined criteria 
such as age, gender, prior criminal history, pending or 
sentenced charges, escape history, institutional disciplinary 
history, alcohol or drug abuse history, and various stability 
factors to ensure the safety of inmates and staff.  While this 
system served important interests, the defendants said it also 
slowed the process of placing BKOW inmates in permanent cells.  
Furthermore, because some inmates could not be placed together——
because of gang affiliation, gender, pending charges, or other 
factors——not every permanent bed in the facility could be 
utilized and that exacerbated the BKOW population problem. 
 
¶30 Despite the various circumstances contributing to the 
30-Hour Rule violations, the County quickly remedied the 
situation after the plaintiffs forced the issue in April 2004.  
No 30-Hour Rule violations have been documented since May 2004.  
This fact is notable, defendants claimed, considering that the 
County voluntarily imposed a stricter population cap on itself 
than was required by the Consent Decree.  Defendants said that 
approval of funding in April 2004 to open a new dormitory in the 
House of Corrections was critical to easing population pressures 
in the Jail. 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
12 
 
 
¶31 The plaintiff class took a sharply different view of 
the County's violations.  In a letter to the circuit court on 
August 25, 2004, the plaintiffs asserted the following:  
 
The problems were well known in the [J]ail throughout 
many months in which the plaintiffs were expressly 
asking for the booking information and during which 
the 
defendants 
provided 
misleading 
and 
false 
information.  The problem did not just "come to light" 
in April 2004 simply because upper level officials 
claim to be unaware of the conditions and practices in 
their jail. 
The plaintiffs later pointed to the depositions of several 
administrators who admitted to knowing about the 30-Hour Rule 
provisions of the Consent Decree and that it was not being 
followed. 
 
¶32 The plaintiffs cited the existence of a 72-hour shower 
list as evidence that 30-Hour Rule violations were well-known.  
BKOW guards maintained a list that kept track of the number of 
hours each inmate had been held in the BKOW.  Any inmate held in 
the BKOW for 72 hours was to receive a shower.  The existence of 
such a list, the plaintiffs said, should have raised red flags 
regarding 30-Hour Rule violations. 
 
¶33 The plaintiffs further contended that the County 
intentionally 
hid 
the 
BKOW 
population 
limit 
violations.  
Interviews with inmates affected by the 30-Hour Rule violations 
and analysis of BKOW logs revealed that inmates were often moved 
out of the BKOW to other temporary locations in the Jail shortly 
before the nightly "11:59 P.M." count.  The purpose of these 
temporary moves was purportedly to reduce the inmate population 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
13 
 
in the BKOW artificially in order to comply with the BKOW 
population cap imposed by the Consent Decree. 
 
¶34 In response to these opposing views, Judge Fiorenza 
made various findings about the County's compliance with the 
Consent Decree: 
Milwaukee County was put on notice of problems in the 
booking area in December of 2002 and January of 2003 
when the County Board Judiciary Committee was forced 
to respond to complaints from Sheriffs' Deputies that 
overcrowding in the booking area was creating unsafe 
working conditions . . . .  Moreover, conditions in 
the [BKOW] area alleged by members of the Plaintiff 
class 
are 
unacceptable, 
if 
not 
appalling . . . 
[including] overly crowded conditions, inmates who 
were forced to sit or sleep on the floor next to 
urinals, inmates who had to sit-up for hours and 
hours, lack of hygiene, unsanitary conditions, inmates 
who were not given pillows or blankets to sleep on, 
cells that were infested with bugs, cold temperatures, 
bodily fluids on the floor and bad odors. 
¶35 The circuit court found that the "staggering" number 
of violations and extended period of time during which the 
violations occurred were clear evidence that the violations were 
"intentional."  The County did not dispute these findings.  Also 
undisputed was the court's finding that "the thirty-hour 
violations ceased immediately after the Plaintiffs filed this 
motion" to enforce their rights under the Consent Decree. 
 
¶36 In January 2006, the circuit court declared that the 
County's 
intentional 
violations 
of 
the 
Consent 
Decree 
constituted contempt of court.  However, the circuit court 
declined the plaintiffs' request to award money damages as 
remedial sanctions to "members of the plaintiff class who were 
subjected to violations of the [C]onsent [D]ecree."  The court 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
14 
 
said that, because remedial sanctions are "imposed for the 
purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court," Wis. 
Stat. § 785.01(3), and because it was undisputed that the 
County's violations had ceased, remedial sanctions could not be 
imposed. 
 
¶37 The 
court 
rejected 
the 
argument 
that 
it 
could 
circumvent the legislature's regulation of the contempt power 
and exercise its inherent contempt power to force a party to 
comply with a court order.  The court stated, "Because the 
statutory language is clear, the Court will not exercise its 
inherent powers to impose sanctions." 
 
¶38 The court then considered whether breach of contract 
remedies were available to the plaintiff class.  The circuit 
court found that the County's actions constituted a breach of 
the Consent Decree.  However, although both sides agreed that 
"contract law applies in interpreting the terms of the Consent 
Decree," the court held that monetary damages for the breach 
were not warranted because the Consent Decree did not mention 
money damages as a remedy for a violation.  Furthermore, the 
plaintiff class did not initiate its suit seeking monetary 
damages, and the class was certified for declaratory and 
injunctive relief only. 
 
¶39 The plaintiffs appealed, and the court of appeals 
reversed on the issue of remedial sanctions.  The court did not 
address the breach of contract issue.  In analyzing the circuit 
court's reliance on the contempt statute, the court of appeals 
stated that: 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
15 
 
[section] 
785.04(1)(a), 
specifically 
authorizes 
payment of money to compensate a victim for an "injury 
suffered by the party as the result of a contempt of 
court."  Use of the past tense in the statute plainly 
authorizes payment for injuries that occurred in the 
past.  The legislature apparently recognized that 
bringing a party into compliance with a court order 
did not necessarily cure the harm the victim of the 
noncompliance had already sustained because of the 
violation of the court order.   
Christensen, 307 Wis. 2d 754, ¶12.  The court of appeals also 
relied on this court's decision in Frisch v. Henrichs, 2007 WI 
102, 304 Wis. 2d 1, 736 N.W.2d 85,2 to determine that the 
defendants' contempt was "continuing" for purposes of Wis. Stat. 
ch. 785, and therefore, remedial sanctions could be awarded:  
[W]hen the purpose of the court's order has been 
thwarted 
for 
a 
substantial 
period 
of 
time 
by 
noncompliance, and the victim(s) of the noncompliance 
have suffered unremedied injury as a direct result of 
that noncompliance, a remedial sanction is not limited 
to belated technical compliance with the face of the 
court's order. 
Christensen, 307 Wis. 2d 754, ¶23.  
 
¶40 The court of appeals remanded the case to the circuit 
court instructing it to determine a "sum of money sufficient to 
compensate the inmates held in violation of the Consent Decree 
for the loss or injury suffered."  Id., ¶24 (internal quotations 
omitted).  Because it found remedial sanctions to be an 
appropriate remedy, the court of appeals did not reach the 
question of whether money damages for breach of the Consent 
Decree could be awarded. Id. 
                                                 
2 Frisch v. Henrichs, 2007 WI 102, 304 Wis. 2d 1, 736 
N.W.2d 85, was decided after the circuit court's decision 
rejecting remedial sanctions. 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
16 
 
 
¶41 The County petitioned this court for review, which we 
granted on May 13, 2008. 
II. Standard of Review 
¶42 The issues presented in this appeal are reviewed de 
novo.  First, to determine whether the circuit court had the 
statutory authority under Wis. Stat. ch. 785 to impose remedial 
sanctions against the County for its contemptuous conduct, even 
though the contemptuous conduct had ceased at the time the 
plaintiff class initiated the contempt proceedings, requires 
this court to interpret and apply statutes.3  The interpretation 
                                                 
3 The plaintiff class requests that we also consider the 
circuit court's inherent authority to impose remedial sanctions.  
Also, the dissent advocates, as an alternative to its proposed 
statutory interpretation, that the circuit court can "protect 
enforcement of its orders" by utilizing its inherent powers.  
Dissent, ¶¶134-136.  We decline, however, to delve into the 
court's inherent contempt authority because the legislature has 
enacted reasonable regulations and limitations upon courts' use 
of the contempt power.  See Frisch, 304 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶32-33, 
("The legislature has regulated contempt in Wis. Stat. ch. 
785."); Douglas County v. Edwards, 137 Wis. 2d 65, 88, 403 
N.W.2d 438 (1987) ("Despite the fact that the power exi[s]ts 
independently of statute . . . when the procedures and penalties 
for contempt are prescribed by statute, the statute controls."); 
Evans v. Luebke, 2003 WI App 207, ¶17, 267 Wis. 2d 596, 671 
N.W.2d 304 ("[T]he court has proscribed the exercise of [the 
contempt] power outside of the statutory scheme."); State v. 
Aaron D., 214 Wis. 2d 56, 69, 571 N.W.2d 399 (Ct. App. 1997) 
("[T]he contempt procedures contained in ch. 785, STATS., are 
reasonable regulations . . . ."); State ex rel. N.A. v. G.S., 
156 Wis. 2d 338, 341, 456 N.W.2d 867 (Ct. App. 1990) ("The 
remedies authorized by statute are the exclusive remedies 
available . . . .").   
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
17 
 
and application of statutes are questions of law that we review 
de novo.  Frisch, 304 Wis. 2d 1, ¶29. 
¶43 Second, determining whether the County's admitted 
violations of the Consent Decree entitle the plaintiff class to 
monetary damages requires the court to interpret the Consent 
Decree as it relates to damages for breach.  The interpretation 
of a written agreement between two parties is a question of law 
that we review de novo.  Columbia Propane, L.P. v. Wis. Gas Co., 
2003 WI 38, ¶12, 261 Wis. 2d 70, 661 N.W.2d 776; Klein v. Bd. of 
Regents, 2003 WI App 118, ¶8, 265 Wis. 2d 543, 666 N.W.2d 67. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Wisconsin 
courts have consistently declared that the 
legislature's regulation of the contempt power controls as long 
as such regulation does not render the court's power impotent or 
meaningless.  State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Circuit Court for 
Eau Claire County, 97 Wis. 1, 8, 72 N.W. 193 (1897) ("Doubtless, 
[the contempt] power may be regulated, and the manner of its 
exercise prescribed, by statute, but certainly it cannot be 
entirely taken away, nor can its efficiency be so impaired or 
abridged as to leave the court without power to compel the due 
respect and obedience which is essential to preserve its 
character as a judicial tribunal."); State ex rel. Lanning v. 
Lonsdale, 48 Wis. 348, 367, 4 N.W. 390 (1880) ("[W]henever a 
statute prescribes the procedure in a prosecution for contempt, 
or limits the penalty, the statute controls."); see also Note, 
§ 11, ch. 257, Laws of 1979, at 1355 ("The supreme court has 
often 
acknowledged . . . the 
power 
of 
the 
legislature 
to 
regulate and limit how [the contempt] power is exercised by the 
courts, so long as the contempt power is not rendered 
ineffectual.").  We do not consider the legislature's regulation 
of the contempt power to have rendered the circuit court's power 
impotent or meaningless in this case, especially given the 
circuit court's ability to appoint a special prosecutor to 
pursue punitive sanctions.  See Wis. Stat. § 785.03(1)(b).  
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
18 
 
 
III. Discussion 
¶44 The defendants assert that the circuit court was 
correct in determining that it did not have authority to impose 
a remedial sanction against the County for contempt of court.  
The circuit court reasoned that it could not impose a remedial 
sanction because the contempt of court——namely, the County's 
violations of the 30-Hour Rule component of the Consent Decree——
had ended before the plaintiff class filed its motion for 
contempt, and only a continuing contempt warrants imposition of 
a remedial sanction.  The circuit court concluded that a 
continuing contempt of court is a prerequisite to the imposition 
of a remedial sanction under Wis. Stat. ch. 785. 
¶45 The plaintiff class responds that the circuit court 
does have statutory authority to impose the remedial sanction 
"of a sum of money sufficient to compensate a party for a loss 
or injury suffered," even when contemptuous behavior has ceased 
and is no longer continuing.  See Wis. Stat. § 785.04(1)(a).  
Specifically, the plaintiff class postulates the following: 
Chapter 785, when read as a whole and in light of its 
legislative intent, history and purpose, gives the 
trial court discretion to impose remedial sanctions 
for any contempt of court that has caused a party to 
suffer loss or injury, and to regard the contempt as 
"continuing" so long as the loss or injury goes 
unremedied.  
¶46 The plaintiff class does not assert that remedial 
sanctions must be imposed when a loss or injury goes unremedied; 
it argues only that the circuit court has discretion to impose 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
19 
 
them in such circumstances.  Thus, according to the plaintiff 
class, the circuit court erred in failing to exercise its 
discretion because it did not recognize its statutory authority 
to impose a remedial sanction after a contempt of court has 
terminated.  We disagree. 
¶47 Determining whether the circuit court has discretion 
to impose a remedial sanction against the County for its past 
contempt requires us to interpret the statutes found in 
Wisconsin Statute Chapter 785.  "[S]tatutory interpretation 
begins with the language of the statute.  If the meaning of the 
statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.  Statutory 
language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, 
except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are 
given their technical or special definitional meaning."  State 
ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 
271 
Wis. 2d 633, 
681 
N.W.2d 110 
(internal 
quotations 
and 
citations omitted).  Moreover, "[i]n construing or interpreting 
a statute the court is not at liberty to disregard the plain, 
clear words of the statute."  Id., ¶46 (internal quotations and 
citation omitted).   
A. 
Wisconsin Contempt Law  
¶48 We begin our analysis by focusing on the provisions of 
Wis. Stat. ch. 785, which codifies the law on "Contempt of 
Court."  Wisconsin Stat. § 785.01(1) defines "contempt of court" 
as intentional: 
(a) Misconduct in the presence of the court 
which interferes with a court proceeding or with the 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
20 
 
administration 
of justice, or which impairs the 
respect due the court; 
(b) Disobedience, resistance or obstruction of 
the authority, process or order of a court; 
(bm) Violation of any provision of s. 767.117(1); 
(c) Refusal as a witness to appear, be sworn or 
answer a question; or 
(d) Refusal to produce a record, document or 
other object. 
¶49 Wisconsin Stat. § 785.02 provides that a court of 
record "may impose a remedial or punitive sanction for contempt 
of court under this chapter."  The terms "remedial sanction" and 
"punitive sanction" are defined in Wis. Stat. § 785.01 as 
follows:  
 
(2) "Punitive sanction" means a sanction imposed 
to punish a past contempt of court for the purpose of 
upholding the authority of the court. 
 
(3) "Remedial sanction" means a sanction imposed 
for the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt 
of court. 
¶50 As 
noted, 
in 
Wisconsin, 
contempt 
sanctions 
are 
classified as either punitive or remedial.4  See Wis. Stat. 
                                                 
4 Prior to 1979, Wisconsin contempt law distinguished 
between two types of contempt——criminal and civil——rather than 
between two types of sanctions that may be imposed for any 
contempt of court.  See Frisch, 304 Wis. 2d 1, ¶33 n.15; Note, 
§ 11, ch. 257, Laws of 1979, at 1353-54.  Rather than be 
concerned over the type of contempt at issue, the "statute now 
draws a distinction based on the purpose of the sanction sought 
to be imposed."  Frisch, 304 Wis. 2d 1, ¶33 n.15.   
 
"Traditionally, a remedial sanction was the type of 
sanction imposed for civil contempt.  The purpose of the 
sanction was remedial in that it was designed to force a person 
into complying with an order of the court and terminating a 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
21 
 
§ 785.04.  "The remedies authorized by statute are the exclusive 
remedies available . . . ."  State ex rel. N.A. v. G.S., 156 
Wis. 2d 338, 
341, 
456 
N.W.2d 867 
(Ct. 
App. 
1990). 
 
The 
"imposition of either a punitive or a remedial sanction does not 
preclude imposition of the other type of sanction."  Robert J. 
Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating the Confusion Between 
Civil and Criminal Contempt, 50 U. Cin. L. Rev. 677, 704 (1981) 
(interpreting Wis. Stat. § 785.04(3) and acknowledging that a 
punitive sanction may be imposed for past conduct which was a 
contempt of court even though similar present conduct is a 
continuing contempt of court).  However, "punitive sanctions may 
                                                                                                                                                             
present contempt of court."  Note, § 11, ch. 257, Laws of 1979, 
at 1355.  Today, "[t]hat concept is continued here, even though 
without the civil contempt designation."  Id.  On the other 
hand, "[u]nder prior law, criminal contempt involved sanctions 
imposed on past conduct designed to vindicate the authority of 
the court.  Again here, the concept is retained in the 
definition of punitive sanction . . . ."  Id. 
 
Therefore, because "[t]he distinction between the purposes 
of the contempt is retained in the current statute without the 
criminal and civil contempt designations," D.L.D. v. Circuit 
Court for Crawford County, 110 Wis. 2d 168, 179, 327 N.W.2d 682 
(1983), case law interpreting pre-1979 contempt statutes may be 
used as persuasive authority when interpreting the present 
contempt statutes, see, e.g., Frisch, 304 Wis. 2d 1, ¶35 (citing 
State v. King, 82 Wis. 2d 124, 262 N.W.2d 80 (1978), with 
approval), State ex rel. Larsen v. Larsen, 165 Wis. 2d 679, 685, 
478 N.W.2d 18 (1992) (same), D.L.D., 110 Wis. 2d at 180 (same).  
However, because the 1979 legislation was a complete overhaul of 
the contempt statutes, case law interpreting pre-1979 contempt 
statutes is not mandatory authority and should not be viewed as 
decisive when interpreting the current contempt statutes.  See 
Griffin v. Reeve, 141 Wis. 2d 699, 706, 416 N.W.2d 612 (1987) 
("[Chapter] 
785 . . . substantially 
restates 
the 
law 
of 
contempt.").   
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
22 
 
not be imposed in remedial sanction proceedings."  N.A., 156 
Wis. 2d at 341. 
¶51 Punitive sanctions are "imposed to punish a past 
contempt of court for the purpose of upholding the authority of 
the court."  Wis. Stat. § 785.01(2) (emphasis added).  As the 
definition implies, punitive sanctions are to be imposed for 
"past contempt of court" only.  Id. (emphasis added); Wis. Stat. 
§ 785.04(3) ("A punitive sanction may be imposed for past 
conduct . . . .");  Frisch, 304 Wis. 2d 1, ¶34 (quoting Wis. 
Stat. § 785.01(2)); Evans v. Luebke, 2003 WI App 207, ¶21, 267 
Wis. 2d 596, 671 N.W.2d 304 (same); B.L.P. v. Circuit Court for 
Racine County, 118 Wis. 2d 33, 42, 345 N.W.2d 510 (Ct. App. 
1984) ("The 'punitive sanction' . . . is imposed to punish a 
past contempt of court . . . ."); Martineau, supra, at 694 ("The 
punitive sanction is concerned with past conduct . . . .  [The 
punitive 
sanction 
is] 
concerned 
exclusively 
with 
past 
conduct . . . ."); see also State v. King, 82 Wis. 2d 124, 131-
32, 262 N.W.2d 80 (1978) (determining that the circuit court did 
not have authority to impose punitive sanctions in a civil 
contempt proceeding because the underlying dispute was settled, 
and thus, the contempt was no longer continuing, which was a 
requirement for civil contempt under the previous statute). 
¶52 Therefore, a court imposing a punitive sanction is not 
specifically concerned with protecting private rights.  Frisch, 
304 Wis. 2d 1, ¶34; Martineau, supra, at 694 ("[B]ecause the 
sanction is directed only at past conduct, its imposition cannot 
directly aid a litigant harmed by the contempt."); see also 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
23 
 
Griffin v. Reeve, 141 Wis. 2d 699, 706-07, 416 N.W.2d 612 (1987) 
(stating that the sanctions in that case must be remedial 
because the case was brought on behalf of a private litigant); 
Marna M. Tess-Mattner, Comment, Contempt of Court: Wisconsin's 
Erasure of the Blurred Distinction Between Civil and Criminal 
Contempt, 66 Marq. L. Rev. 369, 377 (1983) (noting that, under 
the previous contempt statutes, criminal contempt was "not 
intended to benefit anyone," its "sole purpose" was to vindicate 
the court's authority). 
¶53 The imposition of punitive sanctions for past contempt 
serves at least two important objectives: it upholds the court's 
authority and it punishes the contemnor.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 785.01(2); Frisch, 304 Wis. 2d 1, ¶34; Griffin, 141 Wis. 2d at 
708; Evans, 267 Wis. 2d 596, ¶21; Diane K.J. v. James L.J., 196 
Wis. 2d 964, 969, 539 N.W.2d 703 (Ct. App. 1995); B.L.P., 118 
Wis. 2d at 42; Martineau, supra, at 694.  In fact, imposing 
punitive sanctions is much akin to imposing a criminal penalty, 
which is why the legislature has required that proceedings for 
punitive sanctions be brought exclusively by "[t]he district 
attorney of a county, the attorney general or a special 
prosecutor appointed by the court" in a nonsummary procedure.  
Wis. Stat. § 785.03(1)(b); see also D.L.D. v. Circuit Court for 
Crawford County, 110 Wis. 2d 168, 179, 327 N.W.2d 682 (1983) 
("Traditionally, a punitive sanction was imposed for criminal 
contempt . . . ."); Martineau, supra, at 693 (demonstrating the 
commonality 
between 
the 
current 
statute's 
definition 
of 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
24 
 
"punitive sanction" and the previous statute's definition of 
"criminal contempt"). 
¶54 Conversely, remedial sanctions are "imposed for the 
purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court."  Wis. 
Stat. § 785.01(3) (emphasis added).  Logically, this means that 
remedial sanctions may be imposed only when action or inaction 
constituting contempt of court is ongoing and needs to be 
terminated.  Id.; Note, § 11, ch. 257, Laws of 1979, at 1355 
("[A] remedial sanction is appropriate only when the contempt is 
continuing . . . .") (emphasis added); see also Frisch, 304 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶4, 31 (imposing remedial sanction for continuing 
contempt for failing to timely comply with a filing required by 
court order, thereby depriving the opposing party of her 
traditional remedy under the law); Griffin, 141 Wis. 2d at 707-
08 (continuing contempt and imposition of remedial sanctions for 
the father's failure to pay past-due child support even after 
the child reaches the age of majority); Evans, 267 Wis. 2d 596, 
¶¶22, 27 (continuing contempt with remedial sanctions imposed 
for the guardian ad litem's ongoing failure to deposit funds as 
ordered).  Without a continuing contempt of court, nothing 
remains to be terminated, and thus, a remedial sanction is 
unwarranted.  See Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3); Note, § 11, ch. 257, 
Laws of 1979, at 1355 ("[A] remedial sanction . . . cannot be 
imposed if for any reason the contempt has ceased, even as the 
result of the settlement of the case."); see also King, 82 
Wis. 2d at 131-32, 138 (disallowing civil contempt proceedings 
under the previous contempt statutes after the underlying 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
25 
 
dispute settles); 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contempt § 145 (2004) ("When 
the parties settle the underlying case that gave rise to a civil 
contempt sanction, the contempt proceeding is moot, since the 
case has come to an end.").   
¶55 A continuing contempt is required for the imposition 
of a remedial sanction because remedial sanctions are not 
designed 
to 
punish 
the 
contemnor, 
vindicate 
the 
court's 
authority, or benefit the public.  See Frisch, 304 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶35.  Rather, the stated and principal objective of a remedial 
sanction is to force the contemnor into compliance with a court 
order for the benefit of a private party——the litigant.  Id. 
("Remedial contempt is concerned with the private interests of 
the litigant and is 'designed to force one party to accede to 
another's 
demand.'" 
(quoting 
King, 
82 
Wis. 2d at 
130 
(interpreting 
civil 
contempt 
under 
the 
previous 
contempt 
statutes))); Griffin, 141 Wis. 2d at 707 ("The purpose of a 
remedial 
sanction . . . is 
to 
insure 
present 
and 
future 
compliance . . . ."); D.L.D., 110 Wis. 2d at 179 ("A remedial 
sanction means a sanction imposed for the purpose of terminating 
a continuing contempt of court.") (internal quotations omitted); 
Evans, 
267 
Wis. 2d 596, 
¶22 
("[T]he 
circuit 
court 
imposed . . . remedial sanctions, i.e., ones imposed for the 
purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court.") 
(internal quotations omitted); Benn v. Benn, 230 Wis. 2d 301, 
309, 602 N.W.2d 65 (Ct. App. 1999) ("Remedial contempt seeks to 
procure 
present 
and 
future 
compliance 
with 
court 
orders . . . ."); Diane K.J., 196 Wis. 2d at 968 ("Remedial 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
26 
 
contempt is imposed to ensure compliance with court orders."); 
B.L.P. 118 Wis. 2d at 42 ("'[R]emedial sanctions' . . . [are] 
imposed for the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of 
court.").5  The private nature of a remedial sanction is 
evidenced by the fact that only a party "aggrieved by a contempt 
of court may seek imposition of a remedial sanction . . . in the 
proceeding to which the contempt is related," Wis. Stat. 
§ 785.03(1)(a), "for the purpose of terminating a continuing 
contempt of court," Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3).6 
¶56 The court may impose the following remedial sanctions 
for the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court: 
                                                 
5 See 7 Jay E. Grenig, Wisconsin Pleading and Practice 623 
(4th ed. 2007) ("[R]emedial sanctions [are] imposed for the 
purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court."); Robert 
J. Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating the Confusion 
Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 50 U. Cin. L. Rev. 677, 
693-94 (1981) ("A remedial sanction . . . is a sanction imposed 
for the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of 
court. . . .  [It] is concerned only with future conduct, it 
lacks a punitive element; rather, it is designed to coerce 
compliance with the directives of the court.") (internal 
quotations and footnote omitted); see also Grenig, supra, at 535 
(noting that the previous statute's civil contempt power was 
imposed "for the benefit of another party"); Marna M. Tess-
Mattner, Comment, Contempt of Court: Wisconsin's Erasure of the 
Blurred Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 66 
Marq. L. Rev. 369, 377 (1983) (recognizing that civil contempt 
under the previous statute was primarily concerned with coercing 
the contemnor into compliance with a court's order for the 
benefit of a private party). 
6 See also Larsen, 165 Wis. 2d at 683-84 (noting that 
remedial sanctions under Wis. Stat. § 785.04(1) are "designed to 
enforce a private right of a party in an action"). 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
27 
 
 
(a) Payment of a sum of money sufficient to 
compensate a party for a loss or injury suffered by 
the party as the result of a contempt of court. 
 
(b) Imprisonment if the contempt of court is of 
a type included in s. 785.01(1)(b), (bm), (c) or (d).  
The imprisonment may extend only so long as the person 
is committing the contempt of court or 6 months, 
whichever is the shorter period. 
 
(c) A forfeiture not to exceed $2,000 for each 
day the contempt of court continues. 
 
(d) An order designed to ensure compliance with 
a prior order of the court. 
 
(e) A 
sanction 
other 
than 
the 
sanctions 
specified in pars. (a) to (d) if it expressly finds 
that those sanctions would be ineffectual to terminate 
a continuing contempt of court. 
Wis. Stat. § 785.04(1).   
¶57 The sanctions listed under Wis. Stat. § 785.04(1) "are 
essentially the same as under prior law."  Note, § 11, ch. 257, 
Laws of 1979, at 1357.7  Moreover, all but one of the remedial 
sanctions described in Wis. Stat. § 785.04(1) expressly reflect 
the prerequisite of a continuing contempt of court.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 785.04(1)(b) ("The imprisonment may extend only so long 
as the person is committing the contempt of court or 6 months, 
whichever is the shorter period.") (emphasis added), (1)(c) ("A 
forfeiture not to exceed $2,000 for each day the contempt of 
                                                 
7 Compare Wis. Stat. § 785.04(1)(a)-(e) with Wis. Stat. 
§ 295.02(1)-(3) 
(1975-76) 
(allowing, 
subject 
to 
maximum 
limitations, 
the 
following 
sanctions: 
payment 
of 
money 
"sufficient to compensate the party for losses, costs and 
expenses"; indefinite imprisonment until compliance is realized; 
and forfeiture of money for each day the contempt of court 
continues). 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
28 
 
court continues.") (emphasis added), (1)(d) ("An order designed 
to ensure compliance with a prior order of the court.") 
(emphasis added), (1)(e) ("A sanction other than the sanctions 
specified in pars. (a) to (d) if it expressly finds that those 
sanctions would be ineffectual to terminate a continuing 
contempt of court.") (emphasis added).  
¶58 Section 785.04(1)(a), if read in isolation, could be 
somewhat ambiguous on this score.8  Standing alone, the paragraph 
could be interpreted as allowing payment of a sum of money for a 
loss 
or 
injury suffered in the past; however, such an 
interpretation would ignore the fact that the continuing nature 
of the contempt is what authorizes the court to impose a 
remedial sanction as opposed to a punitive sanction.9  See Wis. 
                                                 
8 "[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the context in 
which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in 
relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related 
statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable 
results."  State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 
2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (emphasis 
added). 
9 In 1981, Robert J. Martineau, analyzing Wisconsin's 
recently created law of contempt under Wisconsin Statutes 
Chapter 785, made the following observation: 
Arguably, 
imposition 
of 
absolute 
rather 
than 
conditional money damages as a remedial sanction 
violates the distinction between remedial and punitive 
sanctions 
made 
in subsections 785.01(2) and (3) 
because the sanction is based upon past conduct and is 
not designed to terminate a continuing contempt. 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
29 
 
Stat. § 785.01(3) ("'Remedial sanction' means a sanction imposed 
for the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of 
court."); Note, § 11, ch. 257, Laws of 1979, at 1355 ("[A] 
remedial sanction . . . cannot be imposed if for any reason the 
contempt has ceased, even as the result of the settlement of a 
case.") (emphasis added); see also King, 82 Wis. 2d at 131-32, 
138 (disallowing civil contempt proceedings under the previous 
contempt statutes after the underlying dispute settles); 17 Am. 
Jur. 2d Contempt § 145 ("When the parties settle the underlying 
case that gave rise to a civil contempt sanction, the contempt 
proceeding is moot, since the case has come to an end.").  
                                                                                                                                                             
Martineau, supra, at 701-02.  Professor Martineau argues, 
however, that such an interpretation would be mistaken because 
imposition of absolute "money damages for contempt" can serve as 
a remedial sanction.  Id. at 702.  Professor Martineau does not 
cite the Wisconsin contempt statutes to support this contention.  
In fact, he offers his own modification to the definition of 
"remedial sanction" under Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) to account for 
his interpretation: 
 
Of course, any apparent inconsistency could be 
eliminated 
by 
modifying 
Wis. 
Stat. 
Ann. 
§ 785.01(3) . . . to read as follows: 
(3) "Remedial sanction" means a sanction 
imposed 
for 
the 
purpose 
of 
terminating 
a 
continuing contempt of court or of compensating a 
party for loss or injury suffered as the result 
of a contempt of court. 
Id. at 702 n.147.  Quite obviously, Professor Martineau's 
proposed language for Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) is significantly 
different from the actual language in Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3).  
As a result, Professor Martineau's discussion lends further 
credence to the conclusion that remedial sanctions can be 
imposed only when the contempt continues.  
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
30 
 
Permitting the imposition of a remedial sanction in a situation 
where there is no continuing contempt would effectively rewrite 
the statute.10  Therefore, the key to the issue in this case is 
whether the County's contempt of court was continuing on and 
after the September 13, 2004 motion for a finding of contempt 
and imposition of remedial sanctions.   
¶59 Chapter 785 does not define "a continuing contempt of 
court."  If the court is required to interpret a statute and the 
words in the statute are not defined, the court must apply the 
ordinary meaning of the words to give effect to the statutory 
language.  Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45. 
¶60 The word "continuing" has many definitions.  However, 
when using "continuing" in the context of determining whether 
something has either been terminated or is ongoing, as in this 
statute, see Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3), the word generally means 
                                                 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 785.01(2) defines "punitive sanction" 
as a "sanction imposed to punish a past contempt of court for 
the purpose of upholding the authority of the court."  (Emphasis 
added.)  Admittedly, there is no difficulty in conceiving of a 
sanction imposed to punish a past contempt of court for the 
purpose of aiding a litigant.  One interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 785.04(1)(a) is that payment of "a sum of money sufficient to 
compensate a party for a [past] loss or injury" is that kind of 
sanction.  Wis. Stat. § 785.04(1)(a).  The problem with this 
analysis is that trying to remedy a litigant's past loss or 
injury by means of a remedial sanction deprives the party in 
contempt of the protections afforded in punitive sanction 
procedure and deprives the party of the ability to purge the 
contempt by complying with a court order.  The statutory scheme 
establishes two kinds of sanctions, each with specific criteria.  
There may be a void in this statutory scheme, but this void 
cannot be filled by judicial interpretation without doing 
violence to the statutes. 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
31 
 
"[t]o go on with a particular action or in a particular 
condition; persist,"  The American Heritage Dictionary of the 
English Language 408 (3d ed. 1992), see also Black's Law 
Dictionary 316 (7th ed. 1999) ("(Of an act or event) that is 
uninterrupted .").   
¶61 This definition of "continuing" is consistent with our 
prior case law interpreting whether a contempt of court is 
"continuing" so that a remedial sanction may be imposed. 
¶62 For instance, one obvious example of a continuing 
contempt justifying a remedial sanction is where a parent is 
delinquent in paying child support.  See Larsen, 165 Wis. 2d at 
682, 685 (upholding remedial sanctions and purge conditions 
imposed for the father's complete failure to pay child support 
as ordered); Griffin, 141 Wis. 2d at 700-01, 707-08 (holding 
remedial sanctions to be appropriate, even after the child 
reaches the age of majority, where the father has refused to pay 
court-ordered 
support); 
Benn, 
230 
Wis. 2d at 
306-07, 
315 
(upholding remedial sanctions and purge condition for the 
father's repeated failure to pay child support as ordered).   
¶63 In Griffin, the mother initiated contempt proceedings 
against the father, after the child reached the age of majority, 
for his failure to make child support payments as required by 
the divorce decree.  Griffin, 141 Wis. 2d at 701.11  The father 
                                                 
11 In this case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court overruled 
previous case law that disallowed the enforcement of child 
support orders after the child reached the age of majority.  
Griffin, 141 Wis. 2d at 704 (overruling, in part, Halmu v. 
Halmu, 247 Wis. 124, 19 N.W.2d 317 (1945)). 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
32 
 
disputed the court's authority to impose a remedial sanction in 
that case, arguing that his contempt could no longer be 
continuing.  Id. at 707.  His theory was that once a child 
reaches the age of majority, "the parent's duty to support 
ceases, and a delinquent parent's contempt ends."  Id.  The 
father contended that any sanction the court imposed against him 
for his delinquent child support payments would be a punitive 
sanction because his contempt had been terminated by the child's 
18th birthday and was no longer continuing.  Id. at 708.   
¶64 In response, this court concluded that the father's 
contempt was continuing because, while the court could not 
modify or terminate the support order after the child reached 
majority age, "the force of the order does not expire until the 
parent complies."  Id.  In other words, "A parent's failure to 
pay child support after the child reaches majority is a 
continuing disobedience of a court order.  The contempt is not 
past; it is ongoing."  Id. (emphasis added).  Therefore, the 
court determined that the circuit court did have authority to 
impose remedial sanctions against the father for his continuing 
contempt of court.  Id. at 708-09.  
¶65 A second example of a continuing contempt of court is 
found in Evans.  There, the original guardian ad litem, 
appointed by the court to obtain approval of settlement 
agreements for four minors in two personal injury lawsuits, 
failed to deposit the settlement awards in restrictive trust 
accounts 
as ordered by the circuit court.  Evans, 267 
Wis. 2d 596, ¶¶1 n.1, 4-5.  After learning of the original 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
33 
 
guardian ad litem's delinquency, the circuit court replaced her 
with a new guardian ad litem who then moved the circuit court to 
order the original guardian ad litem to repay the missing funds.  
Id., ¶¶5-6.  Because the original guardian ad litem failed to 
repay the funds as ordered, the circuit court entered judgment 
against her for the full amount of the funds using its power 
under Wis. Stat. § 805.03.12  See id., ¶¶8, 10.   
¶66 In affirming the circuit court, the court of appeals 
modified the circuit court's rationale by employing the contempt 
statutes rather than Wis. Stat. § 805.03.  Id., ¶ 20 ("[W]e 
conclude that the circuit court's authority to sanction [the 
guardian ad litem] for noncompliance with its substantive order 
directing the disposition of the minors' settlement proceeds is 
more firmly grounded in Wis. Stat. ch. 785, specifically in 
§ 785.03(1)(a) 
[(describing 
procedure 
for 
remedial 
sanctions)].").  The court of appeals concluded that the circuit 
court had actually imposed remedial sanctions in the case but 
did not follow the nonsummary procedures required under Wis. 
Stat. § 785.03(1)(a).  Id., ¶¶22, 25.  Therefore, the court of 
appeals remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions 
                                                 
12 Failure to prosecute or comply with procedure 
statutes.  For failure of any claimant to prosecute or 
for failure of any party to comply with the statutes 
governing procedure in civil actions or to obey any 
order of court, the court in which the action is 
pending may make such orders in regard to the failure 
as are just . . . . 
Wis. Stat. § 805.03. 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
34 
 
to follow the procedures set forth in Wis. Stat. § 785.03(1)(a) 
and determine whether the original guardian ad litem's failure 
to deposit the minors' funds as ordered was intentional and 
therefore, qualified as contempt.  See id., ¶30.  The court of 
appeals noted that, if the circuit court found the original 
guardian ad litem in contempt, it could then impose monetary 
remedial sanctions because the contempt would be continuing.13  
Id., ¶22 ("So long as no properly restricted accounts containing 
the 
settlement 
proceeds 
existed, 
[the] 
alleged 
contempt 
continued.") (emphasis added). 
¶67 In contrast, the most obvious case of a contempt of 
court that has been terminated and is no longer continuing 
occurs when the underlying dispute between the parties has been 
settled.  For example, in King, under the pre-1979 contempt 
statutes, this court decided that the circuit court did not have 
the authority to conduct civil contempt proceedings after the 
                                                 
13 The court of appeals suggested what the monetary remedial 
sanctions should be if the circuit court found contempt:  
[The sanctions] may include, under § 785.04(1)(a), 
requiring 
[the 
original 
guardian 
ad 
litem] 
to 
compensate the minors for their losses suffered as a 
result of her contempt and requiring her to pay the 
costs of procuring the restoration of the minors' 
funds.  If the court deems additional monetary 
sanctions necessary or appropriate, such sanctions 
must be tied to the purposes set forth in paragraphs 
§ 785.04(1)(c)-(e). 
Evans, 267 Wis. 2d 596, ¶30.  But see id., ¶28 (refusing to 
vacate, as a remedial sanction, the original guardian ad litem's 
attorney 
fees, 
which 
were 
earned 
by 
negotiating 
the 
settlements).  
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
35 
 
principal action between the parties was settled and no longer 
continuing.  King, 82 Wis. 2d at 138.   
¶68 King was an opinion dealing with violations of an 
injunction that required certain state employees to refrain from 
picketing and other strike-related activities.  Id. at 126.  
Three days after the strike was settled and the employees 
returned to work, the Attorney General commenced civil contempt 
proceedings against those state employees who violated the 
injunction.  Id. at 127-28, 132.  After noting the distinctions 
between civil and criminal contempt,14 id. at 129-30, the supreme 
court held that civil contempt proceedings were inappropriate 
under these facts because the strike was no longer continuing 
and "[t]he only purpose for a contempt action brought at the 
time the contempt was sought in these cases was punishment to 
vindicate the authority of the court," id. at 132.  The court 
did state, however, that "the acts complained of could have been 
the basis for criminal contempt," and "all the indicia of 
contempt point toward criminal contempt."  Id. at 131.  In fact, 
                                                 
14 Civil contempt looks to the present and future and 
the civil contemnor holds the key to his jail 
confinement by compliance with the order.  On the 
other hand, the criminal contemnor is brought to 
account for a completed past action, his sentences are 
not purgeable and are determinate.  Criminal contempt 
is punitive.  It is not intended to force the 
contemnor to do anything for the benefit of another 
party. 
King, 82 Wis. 2d at 130 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added); see 
also, supra, ¶50 n.4 (explaining the relationship between 
criminal 
and 
civil 
contempt 
with 
punitive 
and 
remedial 
sanctions, respectively). 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
36 
 
the court explained, "These cases would have presented no 
foreseeable problems if they had been brought as criminal 
contempt."  Id. at 131-32.  
¶69 The King court rejected the state's theory of a third 
category of contempt, a hybrid approach that would allow 
punitive sanctions in civil contempt.  Id. at 134.  Its decision 
was aided by the legislature's determination to "no longer 
recognize[] punitive sanctions for civil contempt" after 1975.  
Id. at 134-35 (citing Wis. Stat. § 295.02(5) (1975-76) ("No 
person may be imprisoned, nor required to pay any sum of money 
to the court or to a party, under this chapter except as 
specified in subs. (1) and (2) [(concerning remedial and 
coercive sanctions but not punitive sanctions)].")). 
¶70 The plaintiff class in this case relies on Frisch, a 
case decided just two years ago by this court.  In Frisch, the 
underlying dispute was related to child support and the 
disclosure of the father's financial information.  Frisch, 304 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶6.  In particular, the divorce judgment between the 
father and mother incorporated their settlement agreement, which 
required the father to provide the mother with a copy of his tax 
returns and all supporting schedules.  Id.  The required tax 
information would permit the mother to monitor the father's 
financial situation and to seek modifications in the support 
payments if warranted.  Id., ¶4.  After the father failed to 
disclose his tax returns, which would have shown a substantial 
increase in income, the mother initiated contempt proceedings.  
Id., ¶7.  The court dismissed the contempt proceedings but 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
37 
 
revised the father's payment schedule and reiterated his 
financial disclosure obligations.  Id., ¶¶7-8.  This time, 
however, the court ordered the father to make his tax returns 
and schedules available to the mother "by May 12 of each year as 
long as he had an ongoing child support obligation."  Id., ¶8.   
¶71 After many months of court proceedings, the mother was 
forced to move for contempt again, alleging that the father had 
failed to make the necessary financial disclosures.  Id., ¶12.  
However, before a finding of contempt could be made, the father 
complied with the financial disclosure order and produced his 
tax returns for the mother.  Id., ¶¶14, 26.  Despite the 
father's belated attempt at compliance, the circuit court found 
him in contempt and imposed a $100,000 sanction against him.  
Id., ¶23.  On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that a 
remedial sanction was improperly imposed against the father 
because he had complied with the circuit court's order before it 
found him in contempt.  Id., ¶26.  As the contempt was no longer 
continuing, the court of appeals concluded, the circuit court 
was without authority to impose a remedial sanction against the 
father.  Id. 
¶72 On review, this court reinstated the imposition of the 
remedial sanction against the father for his repeated failure to 
abide by the court's order requiring the timely disclosure of 
his tax return information.  Id., ¶4.  The sole dispute in 
relation to the contempt issue was "whether remedial contempt 
was properly employed in this case because [it is] dispute[d] 
whether [the father's] contempt was continuing at the time the 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
38 
 
circuit court found [him] in contempt."  Id., ¶37; see also id., 
¶53 ("[T]he real question today is whether the contempt is 
continuing.").  The court answered this question in the 
affirmative.  Specifically, this court stated the following 
about the father's belated attempt at compliance and how it did 
not suffice to terminate his contempt of court: 
Although 
[the 
father] 
did 
produce 
all 
the 
required documents before the circuit court found him 
in contempt, his contempt was continuing . . . because 
his production of documents came too late to undo the 
problems 
he 
had 
created 
by 
failing 
to 
produce 
documents on time. . . .  Failure to timely produce 
income information 'as required' was really the 
essence of [the father's] contempt because it shielded 
him from exposure to regular, contemporary court-
ordered modifications of child support.  If [he] had 
supplied the information timely, he would likely have 
been paying more support than he did.  By his repeated 
failures, [the father] deprived [the mother] of the 
information 
necessary 
to 
seek 
the 
periodic 
modification of support she was entitled to request 
under the law, and he deprived the court of its 
authority to timely modify its child support order.  
The contempt was continuing because [the father's] 
failure to comply with the court order deprived [the 
mother] of her ability to utilize traditional remedies 
in the law.   
Id., ¶47 (emphasis added).   
¶73 In Frisch, the father paid all the child support that 
the court had ordered.  See id., ¶23.  But he did not pay all 
the child support he would have had to pay if he had complied 
with the court's order by disclosing his tax returns by May 12 
of each year.  Id., ¶23 n.10.  Timely disclosure was the essence 
of the order.  Id., ¶47.  Delinquent disclosure was ineffectual 
because it deprived the mother of her traditional remedies in 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
39 
 
the law, as the court was blocked by statute from retroactively 
modifying the father's child support obligations.  Id.   
¶74 In the present case, the circuit court found that the 
County had been in contempt of court, that is, the County had 
violated the 30-Hour Rule component of the Consent Decree in the 
past.  But the court found, and the plaintiff class conceded, 
that the 30-Hour Rule was not being violated in May, June, July, 
August, or September 2004, meaning that none of the members of 
the plaintiff class had a complaint that they were being 
detained in violation of the 30-Hour Rule at the time the motion 
for contempt was filed.  In short, the County's contemptuous 
conduct was no longer continuing,15 and there is no suggestion 
that the County has violated any part of the Consent Decree 
                                                 
15 Under the statute, the key to whether the circuit court 
may impose a remedial sanction is the word "continuing."  The 
dissent attempts to undercut the significance of the word 
"continuing" by avoiding the past tense of the word, namely, 
"continued" and instead using the past tense of the word "is," 
namely, "was."  See dissent, ¶¶109-10 ("[T]he County's contempt 
was continuing[, i.e., it continued] for almost three years.  
Why therefore does this case not present a case of continuing 
contempt?") 
(emphasis 
added). 
 
However, 
the 
phrase 
"was 
continuing," does not connote the same meaning as the word 
"continuing."  To illustrate, the Thirty Years War continued or 
"was continuing" for 30 years, but the Thirty Years War is not 
continuing.  For the same reason, we can say the County's 
contempt continued or "was continuing" for almost three years, 
but the County's contempt is not continuing.   
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
40 
 
since April 2004.16  Thus, we are left with the question of 
whether the circuit court, under these circumstances, had the 
statutory authority to impose a remedial sanction of any sort 
against the County for its past contempt.  The answer to this 
question is "No."   
¶75 Because the County's violation of the Consent Decree 
had indisputably terminated before the contempt proceedings 
began, there is no way we can justify the plaintiff class's 
request for monetary damages on grounds of "a continuing [or 
persistent or uninterrupted] contempt of court."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 785.01(3); The American Heritage Dictionary, supra, at 408; 
Blacks Law Dictionary, supra, at 316; see also King, 82 
Wis. 2d at 132 (disallowing the maintenance of civil contempt 
proceedings because the contemptuous conduct was terminated 
prior to the initiation of the contempt proceedings).  As the 
County's contempt was not continuing, the court could not impose 
a remedial sanction against the County "for the purpose of 
terminating a continuing contempt of court."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 785.01(3); see also Note, § 11, ch. 257, Laws of 1979, at 1355 
("[A] remedial sanction is appropriate only when the contempt is 
                                                 
16 The dissent suggests that this decision permits the 
County to resume violations of the Consent Decree without fear 
of penalty as long as the County ceases its violations before 
any party is able to file a motion for contempt.  See dissent, 
¶¶97, 111.  Although we do not decide this issue on hypothetical 
facts not before us, we note that repeated violations of a court 
order after a finding of contempt may constitute a continuing 
contempt, and the circuit court has statutory authority to issue 
an "order designed to ensure compliance with a prior order of 
the court."  Wis. Stat. § 785.04(1)(d). 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
41 
 
continuing . . . ."); D.L.D., 110 Wis. 2d at 179 ("A remedial 
sanction means a sanction imposed for the purpose of terminating 
a continuing contempt of court.") (internal quotations omitted); 
B.L.P., 118 Wis. 2d at 42 (stating that remedial sanctions are 
imposed only to terminate a continuing contempt of court).  In 
fact, the principal objective that would be served by the 
imposition of a contempt sanction in this case now would be the 
punishment of the County and the vindication of the circuit 
court's 
authority——both 
of 
which 
are 
punitive 
sanction 
objectives.  See Wis. Stat. § 785.01(2); Frisch, 304 Wis. 2d 1, 
¶34; Griffin, 141 Wis. 2d at 708; Evans, 267 Wis. 2d 596, ¶21; 
Diane K.J., 196 Wis. 2d at 969; B.L.P., 118 Wis. 2d at 42; 
Martineau, supra, at 694.   
¶76 This is not a case where a contempt of court causes 
irreparable harm by depriving a victim of her "ability to 
utilize 
traditional 
remedies 
in 
the 
law." 
 
Frisch, 
304 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶47.  For instance, the plaintiff class may be able 
to seek damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).  With adequate 
proof, individual plaintiffs may be able to recover damages in 
personal injury suits.17  The County's contempt of court cannot 
be said to have deprived the plaintiff class of its "traditional 
remedies in the law," and consequently, we cannot say the 
                                                 
17 In 
a 
significantly 
different 
fact 
situation, 
an 
appropriate authority may seek a punitive sanction and request 
that probation be imposed upon the contemnor in place of 
imprisonment, and then seek restitution as a condition of 
probation.  See Wis. Stat. §§ 785.04(2)(a) and 973.09(1)(a).  
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
42 
 
County's contempt is continuing on that basis.  See Frisch, 304 
Wis. 2d 1, ¶47.   
¶77 Finally, 
simply 
because 
the 
monetary 
remedial 
sanctions set forth in Wis. Stat. § 785.04(1)(a) do not 
expressly recognize that they can be imposed only "for the 
purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court" does not 
carry the day for the plaintiff class.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 785.01(3).  All the sanctions listed under Wis. Stat. 
§ 785.04(1) carry the label of "Remedial sanction."  "Remedial 
sanction" is a defined term that "means a sanction imposed for 
the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court."  
Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) (emphasis added).  Because the definition 
of "remedial sanction" is clear on its face, we are "not at 
liberty to disregard the plain, clear words of the statute."  
Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (internal quotations and citation 
omitted).  Therefore, regardless of whether all the remedial 
sanction 
provisions 
contained 
in 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 785.04(1) 
expressly recognize that they can be imposed only "for the 
purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court," Wis. 
Stat. § 785.01(3), the fact that they are "remedial sanction[s]" 
and the definition of "remedial sanction" clearly requires a 
continuing contempt of court means that, to impose any sanction 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
43 
 
listed under Wis. Stat. § 785.04(1), there must be a "continuing 
contempt of court," see Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3).18 
¶78 Inasmuch as the County's contempt of court had ceased 
and 
was 
no longer continuing at the time the contempt 
proceedings were initiated, remedial sanctions could not be 
imposed.  Consequently, we affirm the circuit court's judgment 
denying the plaintiff class remedial sanctions in this case. 
B. 
Breach of the Consent Decree 
¶79 As an alternative to requesting monetary compensation 
as a remedial sanction, the plaintiff class seeks monetary 
damages for breach of the Consent Decree.  The plaintiff class 
seeks monetary damages for emotional distress suffered by 
inmates on account of the breach.  The circuit court denied this 
request, primarily on grounds that "[m]onetary damages for a 
                                                 
18 The dissent offers an alternative interpretation for the 
definition of remedial sanction under Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3): "A 
contempt is a continuing one and is not terminated as long as 
the loss or injury to the victim of the contempt has not been 
compensated."  Dissent, ¶112.  First, this interpretation 
eviscerates the distinction between remedial and punitive 
sanctions found in Wis. Stat. ch. 785.  More specifically, 
however, the dissent's interpretation would mean that a party's 
contempt would not cease until remedial sanctions——better termed 
"compensatory sanctions" under such circumstances——were actually 
imposed.  According to that interpretation, two outcomes are 
possible: (1) the circuit court would be required to impose 
remedial sanctions, thus depriving the court of its discretion 
under Wis. Stat. § 785.02; or (2) the circuit court would refuse 
to impose remedial sanctions and the contemnor would remain in 
contempt of court indefinitely because "the victim of the 
contempt has not been compensated."  Id.  Therefore, the 
dissent's interpretation would not only ignore the definition of 
"continuing" but also would lead to absurd results. 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
44 
 
violation of the Consent Decree are not even mentioned in the 
agreement." 
¶80 The circuit court found that "the parties did not 
enter into the Consent Decree with the expressed intention of 
creating the opportunity for the award of damages . . . .  
[Moreover, t]he class action complaint was filed seeking 
declaratory judgment or injunctive relief.  Nowhere in the 
complaint are monetary damages requested or mentioned."  
¶81 The circuit court quoted the plaintiffs' trial counsel 
three different times as saying that the case was not about 
damages.  The court said that monetary damages for breach of the 
Consent Decree "are inappropriate by the very terms of the 
agreement and by the nature of the pleadings of this action.  
The court will not exercise its equitable powers to award 
monetary damages when the language of the Consent Decree clearly 
does not provide for them." 
¶82 Monetary damages were not the objective of this class 
action suit.  The original plaintiff, Christensen, filed a pro 
se writ of prohibition in March 1996.  In July 1996, Christensen 
amended his complaint, with the assistance of counsel, to bring 
a class action under Wis. Stat. § 803.08.  In October 1996, the 
class was certified by Judge Schellinger.  "The determination 
that a class action is appropriate is discretionary with the 
trial court."  Preloznik v. City of Madison, 113 Wis. 2d 112, 
125, 334 N.W.2d 580 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing Mercury Records 
Prods., Inc. v. Econ. Consultants, Inc., 91 Wis. 2d 482, 491, 
283 N.W.2d 613 (Ct. App. 1979)).  A party that radically alters 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
45 
 
its position after it has successfully invoked a court's 
exercise of discretion should anticipate that the court will 
bind the party to its prior position. 
¶83 In May 2001, Judge Donegan approved the 48-page 
Consent Decree.  Judge Fiorenza found that the Consent Decree 
was the product of extensive negotiation among the parties.  
That decree, she determined, did not contemplate monetary 
damages.  "Damages in breach of contract cases are ordinarily 
measured by the expectations of the parties."  Handicapped 
Children's Educ. Bd. v. Lukaszewski, 112 Wis. 2d 197, 206, 332 
N.W.2d 774 (1983). 
¶84 Even 
if 
we 
were 
able 
to 
overlook 
these 
clear 
deficiencies, we would not approve monetary damages in this 
case.  The plaintiff class claims damage "for humiliation, 
emotional distress, and mental anguish."  In essence, these are 
damages in tort for a purported breach of contract. 
¶85 The plaintiff class contends that the County could 
reasonably foresee that damage of this nature would result from 
holding prisoners for more than 30 hours without a bed and that 
"[m]onetary damages are the most effective remedy to put the 
victims of this breach in the position they would have been in 
had the settlement agreement not been breached . . . ."  The 
plaintiff class points to Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 353 (1981), "Loss Due to Emotional Disturbance," which 
provides the following: "Recovery for emotional disturbance will 
be excluded unless the breach also caused bodily harm or the 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
46 
 
contract or the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional 
disturbance was a particularly likely result."   
¶86 Wisconsin 
has 
not 
adopted 
§ 353 
of 
Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts.  On the contrary, the court has stated 
that mental suffering, while recognized as an injury, "has been 
held not a proper element of recoverable damages in actions on 
contract."  Koerber v. Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 464, 102 N.W. 40 
(1905).  The antiquity of the cited case does not negate the 
validity of the principle.  See Bourque v. Wausau Hosp. Ctr., 
145 Wis. 2d 589, 596 n.2, 427 N.W.2d 433 (Ct. App. 1988) (citing 
Mursch v. Van Dorn Co., 627 F. Supp. 1310, 1317 (W.D. Wis. 
1986)). 
¶87 Moreover, even if we adopted § 353 of Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, the plaintiff class still would not be 
able to recover for emotional distress.  In particular, Comment 
a. to § 353 of Restatement (Second) of Contracts reads in part: 
Damages for emotional disturbance are not ordinarily 
allowed.  Even if they are foreseeable, they are often 
particularly difficult to establish and to measure.  
There are, however, two exceptional situations where 
such damages are recoverable.  In the first, the 
disturbance accompanies a bodily injury.  In such 
cases the action may nearly always be regarded as one 
in tort . . . .  In the second exceptional situation, 
the contract or the breach is of such a kind that 
serious 
emotional 
disturbance 
was 
a 
particularly 
likely result. . . .  [I]f the contract is not one 
where this was a particularly likely risk, there is no 
recovery for such disturbance. 
(Emphasis added.)  The plaintiff class has not provided 
sufficient evidence of compensable injuries to overturn the 
circuit court's decision to deny the claim.  Cf. Pleasure Time, 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
47 
 
Inc. v. Kuss, 78 Wis. 2d 373, 387, 254 N.W.2d 463 (1977) ("[T]he 
burden rests on the [plaintiff] to prove by credible evidence to 
a reasonable certainty that damages were suffered and to 
establish at least to a reasonable probability the amount of 
these damages.").  The plaintiff class has also failed to 
demonstrate that this contract "is of such a kind that serious 
emotional 
disturbance 
was 
a 
particularly 
likely 
result."  
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 353 cmt. a.  
¶88 Although we acknowledge that some members of the 
plaintiff class may have suffered bodily injury, isolated 
incidents 
of 
bodily 
injury, 
even 
if 
proven, 
are 
nearly 
inevitable in a jail population of approximately 150,000 people 
over the period of three years (March 2001 to April 2004).  
Generalized claims of such injuries do not support an award of 
contract damages for widespread emotional disturbance among the 
16,000 members of the class. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶89 We conclude, based on the facts of this case, that the 
circuit court had no discretion to impose a remedial sanction 
against the defendants after their contempt of court had ceased.  
Remedial sanctions are "imposed for the purpose of terminating a 
continuing contempt of court."  Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) (emphasis 
added).  Punitive sanctions may be "imposed to punish a past 
contempt of court."  Wis. Stat. § 785.01(2) (emphasis added).  
Because breaches of the Consent Decree had ceased before the 
action for contempt was filed, the circuit court was correct in 
refusing to impose a remedial sanction against the defendants 
No. 
  2006AP803 
 
48 
 
for their past contempt.  For multiple reasons, we also conclude 
that the plaintiff class is not entitled to monetary damages for 
emotional 
distress 
for 
breaches 
of 
the 
Consent 
Decree.  
Consequently, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
 
No.  2006AP803.ssa 
 
1 
 
¶90 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  This case 
involves the civil rights of individuals who were arrested and 
confined in the booking area of the Milwaukee County jail.  
These arrested persons (not convicted of any crime and presumed 
innocent) alleged (without direct contradiction) that they were 
held for more than 30 hours awaiting booking, crowded into cold 
cells without blankets, sitting up or lying down on cell floors 
splashed with bodily fluids, sleeping next to urinals, confined 
in an unsanitary and bug-infested space.  The circuit court 
found that thousands of inmates were held in these conditions 
for more than two days.  Hundreds were held for more than three 
days.  Some were even held in excess of 100 hours.   
¶91 You do not see these substandard and dangerous 
conditions on TV when booking is portrayed.  But these 
conditions 
apparently 
existed 
right 
here 
in 
Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin.1   
¶92 The Legal Aid Society of Milwaukee, Inc., representing 
these arrestees, sued the County and officials (collectively 
referred to as the County in the majority opinion and here) for 
maintaining such conditions.  The circuit court for Milwaukee 
County entered an order, a Consent Decree, in which the County 
agreed to correct various conditions.  Under the Consent Decree 
arrested persons could be kept in the booking area (without 
                                                 
1 The circuit court found the government officials in 
contempt for a "staggering" pattern of confining thousands of 
people in the jail's booking area in "unacceptable, if not 
appalling" conditions for extended periods in direct violation 
of the explicit terms of the consent decrees. 
No.  2006AP803.ssa 
 
2 
 
beds) for not more than 30 hours.   At no time since the entry 
of the Consent Decree did the County seek relief from the decree 
because 
the 
requirements 
proved 
to 
be 
too 
onerous 
or 
impractical.  Nevertheless the County violated the Consent 
Decree for nearly three years.    
¶93 The circuit court found that the County intentionally 
violated the 30-hour provision of the court's Consent Decree on 
16,662 occasions over nearly a three-year period, November 2001 
to April 2004, keeping inmates in the booking area longer than 
30 hours without assigning them to a bed.2  The County did not 
challenge this finding in the court of appeals or in this court.   
¶94 After the Legal Aid Society sought discovery in April 
2004 to prove violations of the Consent Decree, the County 
immediately remedied the conditions and began obeying the court 
order.3  In July 2005 the Legal Aid Society asked the circuit 
                                                 
2 Majority op., ¶35: "The circuit court found that the 
'staggering number of violations and extended period of time 
during which the violations occurred were clear evidence that 
the violations were 'intentional.'"   
Neither the court of appeals nor this court has been asked 
to review the circuit court's determination that the County was 
in contempt of the consent decree.  Relevant to the present 
case, the contempt statute defines "[c]ontempt of court" to mean 
"intentional . . . [d]isobedience, resistance or obstruction of 
the authority, process or order of a court."  Wis. Stat. 
§ 785.01(1)(intro) & (1)(b).  The court of appeals has stated 
that "[a] finding of contempt rests on the trial court's factual 
findings.  The critical findings are that the party was able to 
comply with the order and that the refusal to comply was willful 
and with intent to avoid compliance."  Evans v. Luebke, 2003 WI 
App 207, ¶24 n.12, 267 Wis. 2d 596, 671 N.W.2d 304. 
3 Majority op., ¶¶30, 35. 
No.  2006AP803.ssa 
 
3 
 
court to hold the County in contempt of court for intentionally 
failing to obey the court order.  The circuit court so held.   
¶95 The circuit court also held that even though the 
County intentionally violated the court order and was in 
contempt of court, the circuit court could not award monetary 
damages under chapter 785 of the statutes as a remedial 
sanction.   
¶96 The issue before this court, stated in general terms, 
is the power of a circuit court to ensure compliance with its 
orders.  More specifically, the issue before this court is the 
power of a circuit court to ensure compliance with its order by 
awarding monetary damages for a party's intentional violation of 
a court order that constitutes contempt of court. 
¶97 The majority opinion holds that because a remedial 
sanction is statutorily defined as "a sanction imposed for 
purposes of terminating a continuing contempt of court," Wis. 
Stat. § 785.01(3) (emphasis added), a circuit court is powerless 
to impose the sanction of compensatory damages provided in 
§ 785.04 (1)(a) "when breaches of the Consent Decree had ceased 
before the action for contempt was filed."4  In other words, 
under the majority opinion if the contempt of court lasts for 
nearly three years and ceases before the motion for contempt is 
filed, a court cannot require the contemnor to pay "a sum of 
money sufficient to compensate a party for loss or injury 
suffered by the party as the result of a contempt of court" as 
provided in Wis. Stat. § 785.04(1)(a).  Thus in the present 
                                                 
4 Majority op., ¶4.  See also id., ¶¶74, 75. 
No.  2006AP803.ssa 
 
4 
 
case, according to the majority opinion, the County can violate 
the circuit court order without penalty for two and one half 
years and may even be free to do so again so long as the County 
again stops the violations before a motion for contempt is 
filed.5  
¶98 I write separately, agreeing with the court of appeals 
that monetary damages are permitted under the statute in the 
present case.  I would remand the cause to the circuit court to 
determine the sum of money, if any, sufficient to compensate the 
persons held in violation of the Consent Decree for the loss or 
injury suffered.6 
                                                 
5 Without deciding the issue, the majority opinion suggests 
that although the County was able to terminate its contempt of 
court (and preclude the use of remedial sanctions) by ceasing 
its repeated violations of the court order before a motion for 
contempt was filed, the County might be unable to do the same 
thing a second time.  See majority op., ¶74 n.16 ("[R]epeated 
violations of a court order after a finding of contempt may 
constitute a continuing contempt . . . .").  In other words, the 
majority opinion suggests that under the contempt statute a 
contemnor has one freebie opportunity——but "may" not have two 
freebie opportunities——to repeatedly violate a court order with 
impunity prior to a motion for contempt.   
The majority opinion also seems to imply that if the County 
resumes 
violating 
the 
court 
order 
and 
again 
ceases 
its 
violations before a motion for contempt is filed, the circuit 
court may exercise its authority under Wis. Stat. § 785.04(1)(d) 
"to issue an 'order designed to ensure compliance with a prior 
order of the court.'"  Majority op., ¶74 n.16 (quoting Wis. 
Stat. § 785.04(1)(d)).  Section 785.04(1)(d), however, is a 
remedial sanction and under the majority opinion's reasoning may 
not be used except for the purpose of terminating a continuing 
contempt of court.  
6 The circuit court concluded as a matter of law that 
remedial sanctions were not available under the circumstances of 
the present case.  The circuit court therefore never determined 
what sum of money, if any, would be sufficient compensation.   
No.  2006AP803.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶99 I reach this conclusion for several reasons.  First, 
the majority opinion's interpretation of the phrase "remedial 
sanction" in chapter 785 of the statutes is erroneous as a 
matter of statutory interpretation.  The interpretation of the 
statute is inconsistent with the text of chapter 785 of the 
Statutes, represents a sharp break from the traditional law of 
contempt in Wisconsin, is contrary to the statutory and 
legislative history, and produces an absurd result.  Two years 
ago, the court declared that "the intent behind the contempt 
statute . . . is to provide the court with a mechanism, or 
toolbox, to effect compliance with court orders."7  Today, the 
court removes tools from the toolbox, tools that are needed to 
effect compliance with court orders, and eviscerates the 
function of the contempt statute and the circuit court's 
authority to enforce its own orders.  
¶100 Second, 
the 
interpretation 
contravenes 
Frisch 
v. 
Henrichs, 2007 WI 102, 304 Wis. 2d 1, 736 N.W.2d 85, a case 
decided a mere two years ago.   
¶101 Third, if chapter 785 is to be interpreted to create a 
void in a court's power to enforce an order through contempt, I 
conclude that a circuit court may award compensatory damages 
under its inherent powers over contempt in a case that falls 
into the statutory void.     
I 
¶102 Chapter 785 has to be interpreted in light of the 
texts of Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) and § 784.04(1)(a), the context 
                                                 
7 Frisch, 2007 WI 102, ¶82, 304 Wis. 2d 1, 736 N.W.2d 85. 
No.  2006AP803.ssa 
 
6 
 
and structure of the chapter, the statutory and legislative 
history of the chapter, contempt law in Wisconsin, and the 
purpose of the contempt statute.  
¶103 Section 785.01(3) provides: "'Remedial sanction' means 
a sanction imposed for the purpose of terminating a continuing 
contempt of court." 
¶104 Section 785.04(1)(a) provides in relevant part: "A 
court may impose one or more of the following remedial 
sanctions: (a) Payment of a sum of money sufficient to 
compensate a party for a loss or injury suffered by the party as 
the result of a contempt of court." 
¶105 A plain reading of Wis. Stat. § 785.04(1)(a) is that 
the circuit court may order contemnors to compensate others for 
losses or injuries suffered as a result of a contempt of court.   
Wisconsin Stat. § 785.04(1)(a) explicitly authorizes payment of 
money to compensate a victim "for a loss or injury suffered by 
the party as the result of a contempt of court" (emphasis 
added).  The word "suffered" makes sense only if Wis. Stat. 
§ 785.04(1)(a) applies to payment for losses or injuries that 
already have occurred and that resulted from past conduct.   
¶106 Relying on the "clear language of the statute," Judge 
Fine wrote in his concurring opinion in the court of appeals 
decision in the present case: "Under Wis. Stat. § 785.04(1)(a)'s 
forthright 
and 
unambiguous 
directive, 
the 
plaintiffs 
are 
entitled to be compensated for the losses and injuries they 
suffered as a result of Milwaukee's clear and blatant contempt."8 
                                                 
8 Christensen v. Sullivan, 2008 WI App 18, ¶25, 307 
Wis. 2d 754, 746 N.W.2d 553 (Fine, J., concurring). 
No.  2006AP803.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶107 The majority opinion recognizes the validity of this 
interpretation.  It states that "[s]tanding alone, [Wis. Stat. 
§ 785.04(1)(a)] could be interpreted as allowing payment of a 
sum of money for a loss or injury suffered in the past . . . ."9      
¶108 The majority opinion nevertheless concludes that Wis. 
Stat. § 785.04(1)(a) should not be interpreted according to its 
plain meaning, in light of Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3)'s definition 
of a remedial sanction as a sanction imposed for the purpose of 
terminating a "continuing" contempt.    
¶109 The court therefore must determine the meaning of the 
statutory phrase "a continuing contempt."  This phrase is not 
defined in the statute.  The majority opinion concedes that the 
word "continuing" has many dictionary meanings and selects the 
meaning "to go on with a particular action."10  Of course, here 
the County did "go on with a particular action" for nearly three 
years. 
¶110 In ordinary, plain English, the County's contempt was 
continuing for almost three years.  Why therefore does this case 
not present a case of continuing contempt?  Where in the statute 
does it say that the contempt has to continue after the motion 
for contempt has been filed?  Ah, says the majority opinion, by 
                                                 
9 Majority op., ¶58. 
10 Majority op., ¶60. 
"[R]esort to a dictionary can be, as Justice Scalia has 
written of the use of legislative history, 'the equivalent of 
entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of 
the guests for one's friends.'"  Noffke v. Bakke, 2009 WI 10, 
¶60, 
315 
Wis. 2d 350, 
760 
N.W.2d 156 
(Abrahamson, 
C.J., 
concurring) (quoting Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511 (1993)). 
No.  2006AP803.ssa 
 
8 
 
statutory definition (Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3)) the remedial 
sanction has to "terminate a continuing contempt," and here the 
County "terminated" its own continuing contempt by obeying the 
court order.  
¶111 The 
majority 
opinion's 
reading 
of 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 785.01(3) creates an unnecessary conflict between § 785.01(3) 
and 
§ 785.04(1)(a); 
renders 
meaningless 
§ 785.04(1)(a)'s 
specific grant of authority to a court to award compensatory 
damages to those who have suffered a loss or injury as a result 
of a party's contempt of court; and allows the contemnor to  
repeatedly violate a court order and to inflict harm without 
fear of being required to compensate its victims so long as the 
contemnor ceases violations before a motion for contempt is 
filed.   
¶112 There is an alternative interpretation of the language 
in Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) defining a remedial sanction as a 
sanction "imposed for the purpose of terminating a continuing 
contempt": A contempt is a continuing one and is not terminated 
as long as the loss or injury to the victim of the contempt has 
not been compensated.  This interpretation of the contempt 
No.  2006AP803.ssa 
 
9 
 
statute harmonizes Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) and § 785.04(1)(a) and 
is consistent with the purposes of contempt.11   
¶113 One purpose of a remedial sanction in a civil contempt 
proceeding is to enforce an individual litigant's rights by 
ensuring a remedy for the litigant.12 Monetary damages in a 
                                                 
11 Contrary to the majority opinion's assertion at ¶77 n.18, 
this interpretation preserves the distinction between remedial 
and punitive sanctions.  Punitive sanctions are imposed for the 
purpose of punishment, do not involve compensation to a victim, 
and may be imposed whether or not any harm to the victim has 
been remedied.  See Wis. Stat. § 785.01(2) (defining "punitive 
sanction" as a sanction "imposed to punish a past contempt of 
court for the purpose of upholding the authority of the court"); 
Wis. Stat. § 785.04(2) (listing only fines and imprisonment as 
the sanctions that a court may use for a punitive purpose).  
Nor does this interpretation eliminate a court's discretion 
to impose remedial sanctions.  Nothing in chapter 785 requires a 
court to impose a sanction in every instance that a party is in 
contempt of court.  Section 785.02 states that "[a] court of 
record may impose a remedial or punitive sanction for contempt 
of court under this chapter" (emphasis added). 
12 See Schroeder v. Schroeder, 100 Wis. 2d 625, 637, 302 
N.W.2d 475 (1981) (stating that a contempt sanction "seek[ing] 
to enforce a private right of one of the parties in an action is 
a civil [rather than criminal or punitive] contempt" sanction 
(quoting State v. King, 82 Wis. 2d 124, 129, 262 N.W.2d 80 
(1978))); Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 
512 U.S. 821, 828 (1994) ("[A] contempt sanction is considered 
civil 
if 
it 
is 
remedial, 
and 
for 
the 
benefit 
of 
the 
complainant." (quotation marks and citation omitted)).  
See also Margit Livingston, Disobedience and Contempt, 75 
Wash. L. Rev. 345, 345 (2000) ("Courts use contempt citations to 
compensate injured parties, [and to] coerce reluctant defendants 
and witnesses . . . ."); Dan B. Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A 
Survey, 56 Cornell L. Rev. 183, 235 (1971) ("If the contempt 
proceeding is a civil one, its purpose is remedial——that is, its 
purpose is to compel obedience to the court's order, or, failing 
that, to get some substitute relief for the benefit of the 
opposing party." (footnote omitted)). 
No.  2006AP803.ssa 
 
10 
 
contempt action may serve two purposes: (1) to compensate the 
individuals for loss or injury suffered, and (2) to deter the 
disobedient party from engaging in similar illegal conduct in 
the future.  Thus monetary damages are consistent with the 
purpose of remedial contempt sanctions which, as the majority 
opinion acknowledges, are imposed for the benefit of the 
litigant and to procure present and future compliance with court 
orders.13 
¶114 Although 
the 
majority 
opinion 
acknowledges 
the  
conflict between § 785.04(1)(a)'s plain language authorizing 
compensation as a remedial sanction and the statutory definition 
of "continuing contempt," it strangely declares that "the 
definition of 'remedial sanction' is clear on its face."  
Majority op., ¶77. 
¶115 If Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) were clear on its face, 
Justice Prosser would not have needed to write two lengthy 
opinions in the course of two years attempting to explain what 
Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) means.14   
¶116 The statutory and legislative history of chapter 785 
helps resolve any perceived conflict between § 785.04(1)(a)'s 
express authorization of compensatory damages as a remedial 
sanction for contempt and 785.01(3)'s definition of remedial 
                                                 
13 Majority op., ¶55.   
14 For 
the 
other 
decision 
interpreting 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 785.01(3), see Frisch v. Henrichs, 2007 WI 102, 304 Wis. 2d 1, 
736 N.W.2d 85, which I discuss in Part II of this dissent.   
No.  2006AP803.ssa 
 
11 
 
sanctions as a sanction imposed for the purpose of terminating a 
continuing contempt.    
¶117 Before the 1979 repeal and recreation of chapter 785 a 
court's authority to impose the sanction of compensatory damages 
in a civil15 contempt proceeding did not depend upon whether the 
sanction served the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt 
of court.  Every version of the Wisconsin Statutes from 1849 
through 1977 stated that the sanction of compensatory damages 
could be imposed in a civil contempt proceeding.16  No version of 
the contempt statutes limited a court to using the sanction of 
compensatory damages as a means of terminating a continuing 
                                                 
15 A court may determine whether to impose a "remedial" 
contempt sanction in an ordinary civil proceeding.  In contrast, 
when determining whether to impose a "punitive" contempt 
sanction, a court ordinarily must comply with the statutes 
governing criminal procedure.  Compare Wis. Stat. § 785.03(1)(a) 
(stating that a court may impose a remedial contempt sanction 
upon a motion from a party and after notice and a hearing) with 
Wis. Stat. § 785.03(1)(b) (stating that when a punitive sanction 
is sought, the district attorney, attorney general, or a special 
prosecutor must issue a complaint charging the alleged contemnor 
with contempt of court and that such complaint "shall be 
processed under chs. 967 to 973 [pertaining to matters of 
criminal procedure]").   
16 See, e.g., Wis. Stat. ch. 115, § 21 (1849) ("If an actual 
loss or injury has been produced to any party by the misconduct 
alleged, the court shall order a sufficient sum to be paid by 
the defendant to such party, to indemnify him and to satisfy his 
costs and expenses . . . ."); Wis. Stat. § 295.02(1)(a) (1977) 
("If an actual loss or injury has been produced to any party by 
the misconduct of the contemnor, which it is not efficacious to 
remedy by execution or garnishment, the court may order the 
defendant to pay such party a sum sufficient to compensate the 
party for losses, costs and expenses . . . ."). 
In 1979, prior to enacting the current contempt statute, 
the legislature renumbered chapter 295 of the statutes as 
chapter 785.  See § 62, ch. 32, Laws of 1979. 
No.  2006AP803.ssa 
 
12 
 
contempt of court.  Indeed, in 1906 this court stated that the 
statutes relating to civil contempt proceedings sought "to 
indemnify parties to the action for their actual loss or injury" 
as well as "to compel the performance of duties still within the 
contemnor's power."17 
¶118 The pre-1979 contempt statutes were consistent with 
the law of other jurisdictions, which seem uniformly to 
recognize that contempt sanctions in a civil contempt proceeding 
may be imposed either for the purpose of terminating a 
continuing contempt or for the purpose of compensating a party 
for losses resulting from a contempt of court.  The United 
States Supreme Court, for example, has stated that in civil 
contempt proceedings, sanctions "may, in a proper case, be 
employed for either or both of two purposes: to coerce the 
defendant into compliance with the court's order, and to 
compensate the complainant for losses sustained."18  Numerous 
                                                 
17 Emerson v. Huss, 127 Wis. 215, 224-25, 106 N.W. 518 
(1906), overruled on other grounds by State v. King, 82 
Wis. 2d 124, 262 N.W.2d 80 (1978).   
King overruled the Emerson decision to the extent that 
Emerson permitted "imposition of punitive sanctions in civil 
contempt which have no remedial or coercive attributes."  King 
82 Wis. 2d at 134.  The sanction of compensatory damages is not 
a "punitive" sanction.  Chapter 785 includes the sanction of 
compensatory damages in its list of "remedial" sanctions and 
omits it from the list of "punitive" sanctions.  See Wis. Stat. 
§ 785.04(1)-(2). 
 
See 
also 
Doug 
Rendleman, 
Compensatory 
Contempt: Plaintiff's Remedy When a Defendant Violates an 
Injunction, U. Ill. L.F. 971, 972 (1980) ("Courts utilize 
compensatory contempt to restore the plaintiff as nearly as 
possible to his original position.  The remedy is not penal, but 
rather remedial."). 
18 United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 304 
(1947) (emphasis added). 
No.  2006AP803.ssa 
 
13 
 
state supreme courts follow the United States Supreme Court's 
approach.19     
                                                                                                                                                             
See also Int'l Union v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 829, 838 
(1994) ("A contempt fine . . . is considered civil and remedial 
if it either 'coerce[s] the defendant into compliance with the 
court's order, [or] . . . compensate[s] the complainant for 
losses sustained.' . . . Our holding . . . leaves unaltered the 
longstanding 
authority 
of 
judges . . . to 
enter 
broad 
compensatory 
awards 
for 
all 
contempts 
through 
civil 
proceedings." (quoting Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 303-304)). 
19 See, e.g., In re Contempt of Dougherty, 413 N.W.2d 392, 
398 (Mich. 1987) ("[T]here are two types of civil contempt 
sanctions, coercive and compensatory. . . . Thus, there are 
three sanctions which may be available to a court to remedy or 
redress contemptuous behavior: (1) criminal punishment to 
vindicate 
the 
court's 
authority; 
(2) 
coercion, 
to 
force 
compliance with the order; and (3) compensatory relief to the 
complainant."); Odom v. Langston, 213 S.W.2d 948, 951-52 (Mo. 
1948) ("A proceeding for civil contempt has as its object 
remedial punishment by way of a coercive imprisonment, or a 
compensatory fine, payable to the complainant." (quotation marks 
and citation omitted)); City of Cincinnati v. Cincinnati Dist. 
Council 51, 299 N.E.2d 686, 694 (Ohio 1973) ("It is . . . well 
settled that 'judicial sanctions in civil contempt proceedings 
may, in a proper case, be employed for either or both of two 
purposes: to coerce the defendant into compliance with the 
court's order, and to compensate the complainant for losses 
sustained.'" (citing United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 303)); 
DeMartino v. Monroe Little League, Inc., 471 A.2d 638, 642 
(Conn. 1984) (same); Johnson v. Bednar, 573 So. 2d 822, 824 
(Fla. 1991) (same); Hawaii Pub. Employment Relations Bd. v. 
Hawaii State Teachers Ass'n, 520 P.2d 422, 427 (Haw. 1974) 
(same); Mahoney v. Commonwealth, 612 N.E.2d 1175, 1178-79 & n.9 
(Mass. 1993) (same); Bata v. Central-Penn Nat'l Bank, 293 A.2d 
343, 354 & n.21 (Penn. 1972) (same); School Comm. v. Pawtucket 
Teachers Alliance, 221 A.2d 806, 813 (R.I. 1966) (same). 
No.  2006AP803.ssa 
 
14 
 
¶119 The County correctly acknowledges that prior to 1979, 
"a [Wisconsin] court had the power to order that damages be paid 
to indemnify a party for an injury resulting from a contempt of 
court" and that the pre-1979 versions of the contempt statute 
did not require "that the contempt be continuing for such 
damages to be available."20  The County argues that the 1979 
legislature intended to impose a new limit on a court's power to 
impose 
the 
contempt 
sanction 
of 
compensatory 
damages 
by 
requiring that the sanction not be imposed except for the 
purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court.21   
¶120 The legislative history tells a different story about 
the legislature's intent. 
¶121 The 1979 contempt statutes were enacted in their 
present form as a result of the work of the Contempt and 
                                                                                                                                                             
See also Margit Livingston, Disobedience and Contempt, 75 
Wash. L. Rev. 345, 347, 351-52 (2000) ("Civil contempt serves to 
benefit the plaintiff to the action by providing compensation or 
coercion. . . . Remedial civil contempts serve to compensate 
plaintiffs for damages suffered because of the defendant's 
disobedience of a court order. . . .  Remedial civil contempt is 
merely another 
form of compensatory damages[.]" (footnote 
omitted)); Robert J. Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating 
the Confusion Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 50 U. Cinn. 
L. Rev. 677, 701 (1981) ("The payment of money damages is one of 
the traditional types of sanctions used in civil contempt to 
enforce the rights of a litigant." (footnote omitted)); Doug 
Rendleman, Compensatory Contempt: Plaintiff's Remedy When a 
Defendant Violates an Injunction, U. Ill. L.F. 971, 971 (1980) 
("Compensatory contempt is a money award for the plaintiff when 
the defendant has injured the plaintiff by violating an 
injunction.  Compensatory and coercive contempt are both civil 
sanctions."). 
20 Reply Brief of Petitioners at 2. 
21 Reply Brief of Petitioners at 3.   
No.  2006AP803.ssa 
 
15 
 
Extraordinary Remedies Committee of the Judicial Council.22  The 
Judicial Council's notes appear as explanatory notes to chapter 
257, § 11, Laws of 1979.     
¶122 The 
Judicial 
Council 
Notes, 
available 
to 
the 
legislature as part of the bill during enactment of the bill, 
advised the legislature that in repealing and recreating Chapter 
785, the legislature was not changing the substantive law 
relating to contempt sanctions.  The Notes explain that the 1979 
contempt statute's definitions of "remedial" and "punitive" 
contempt reflect no "intent . . . to change the basic law of 
contempt."23  The Notes also state that "[t]he sanctions listed 
in this section [785.04] are essentially the same as under prior 
law"24 and identify a "remedial sanction" as the type of contempt 
sanction that traditionally could be imposed in a civil 
                                                 
22 The Judicial Council is a body legislatively created in 
1951.  Wis. Stat. § 758.13.  Its notes are a legitimate, 
admissible source of insight into the legislative intent behind 
the 
statute. 
 
"Generally . . . reports 
or 
comments 
of 
nonlegislative 
committees 
are 
considered 
a 
valid 
aid 
in 
interpreting a statute which originated from such committee."  
In re Haese's Estate, 80 Wis. 2d 285, 297, 259 N.W.2d 54 (1977).  
See also State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 
2004 WI 58, ¶69, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (Abrahamson, 
C.J., concurring). 
23 Note 3 (Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3)), § 11, ch. 257, Laws of 
1979, at 1355. 
24 Note (Wis. Stat. § 785.04), § 11, ch. 257, Laws of 1979, 
at 1357. 
No.  2006AP803.ssa 
 
16 
 
proceeding.25  The Notes generally suggest that the 1979 contempt 
statute preserves the substantive law of the past rather than 
abolishing it.26      
                                                 
25 See Note 2 (Wis. Stat. § 785.01), § 11, ch. 257, Laws of 
1979, at 1355 ("Traditionally, a remedial sanction was the type 
of sanction imposed for civil contempt. . . . That concept is 
continued 
here, 
even 
though 
without 
the 
civil 
contempt 
designation."). 
26 At most, the Notes may show that the Judicial Council, 
while attempting to preserve the substantive law of contempt, 
misunderstood 
the 
purposes 
for 
which 
remedial 
sanctions 
historically had been imposed in civil contempt proceedings.  
The Notes state that traditionally, the purpose of a contempt 
sanction that could be imposed in a civil proceeding "was 
remedial in that [the sanction] was designed to force a person 
into complying with an order of the court and terminating a 
present contempt of court."  Note 2 (Wis. Stat. § 785.01), § 11, 
ch. 257, Laws of 1979, at 1355.  This description of the purpose 
for which contempt sanctions could be imposed in a civil 
proceeding is incomplete.  As the County's reply brief correctly 
concedes, Wisconsin courts historically have been able to impose 
compensation as a sanction in civil contempt proceedings 
regardless of whether a contempt was "continuing" or could be 
terminated in response to a sanction.  
Retired Judge Gordon Myse, a member of the Contempt and 
Extraordinary Remedies Committee of the Judicial Council, and 
Professor Robert Martineau, a member of the Committee and 
Reporter for the Committee, filed a third-party brief with this 
court in support of the plaintiffs.  See Non-Party Brief of 
Robert J. Martineau, Gordon G. Myse, David S. Schwartz, Vincent 
M. Nathan, and Pamela Susan Karlan.   
No.  2006AP803.ssa 
 
17 
 
 
¶123 The statutory and legislative history does not support 
the County's view, accepted by the majority, that Wis. Stat. 
§ 785.01(3) reflects the legislature's intent to diminish the 
courts' authority to impose compensation as a contempt sanction.  
Rather, the history appears to show that the Judicial Council 
understood the 1979 contempt statute as leaving the courts' 
traditional powers intact.  According to the statutory and 
legislative history, Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) must not be read as 
limiting 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 784.04(1)(a)'s 
provision 
authorizing 
compensation as a remedial contempt sanction.   
¶124 In sum, as interpreted by the majority opinion, Wis. 
Stat. § 785.01(3) leaves the Wisconsin courts unable to impose 
the remedial contempt sanction of compensation except for the 
purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court and 
"terminating a continuing contempt" is narrowly interpreted.  
This limitation on a court's contempt authority did not exist 
between 1849 and 1979 in Wisconsin and does not appear to exist 
in other jurisdictions.  Moreover, the legislature apparently 
                                                                                                                                                             
I do not rely upon Judge Myse's or Professor Martineau's 
communications 
in 
the 
third-party 
brief 
as 
evidence 
of 
legislative intent.  I agree with the County that after-the-fact 
statements by legislators and drafters of statutes should not be 
relied upon to interpret the meaning of a statute.  Labor & Farm 
Party v. Elections Bd., 117 Wis. 2d 351, 356, 344 N.W.2d 117 
(1984) ("It is inappropriate . . . for a court to rely on the 
statements of a member of the legislature as to what the 
legislature intended when enacting a statute.").  I note, 
however, that the court has, in the past, relied upon private 
communications between a member of the legislative council staff 
and a single legislator as evidence of legislative intent.  See 
Maurin v. Hall, 2004 WI 100, ¶¶77, 89, 274 Wis. 2d 28, 682 
N.W.2d 866. 
No.  2006AP803.ssa 
 
18 
 
did not intend to change the substantive law of contempt 
sanctions when it repealed and recreated Chapter 785 in 1979.  
The interpretation of chapter 785 adopted by the majority 
opinion produces absurd results limiting the contempt power of a 
court.  For all these reasons, I conclude that the majority 
opinion's interpretation of the statute is erroneous. 
II 
¶125 Regardless of the correct interpretation of Wis. Stat. 
§ 785.01(3), I agree with the court of appeals that the County's 
flagrant violations of the court order represent "a continuing 
contempt" under Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) as the statute was 
interpreted and applied by this court in Frisch v. Henrichs, 
2007 WI 102, 304 Wis. 2d 1, 736 N.W.2d 85.27  The majority 
opinion significantly undercuts the Frisch decision.   
¶126 The Frisch decision teaches that when a party is in 
contempt of the circuit court's order to perform actions by a 
specified time, the party cannot terminate its contempt by 
performing the required actions too late to undo its intentional 
violation of the circuit court's command respecting timeliness.  
The Frisch lesson applies in the present case, and under the 
                                                 
27 See Christensen v. Sullivan, 2008 WI App 18, ¶1, 307 
Wis. 2d 754, 746 N.W.2d 553 ("When the trial court concluded 
that sanctions or compensation for continuing contempt were not 
available because Milwaukee County (County) had ceased violating 
the Consent Decree on which the trial court based its finding of 
contempt, it did not have the benefit of our supreme court's 
holdings in Frisch v. Henrichs, 2007 WI 102, 304 Wis. 2d 1, 736 
N.W.2d 85, decided in July 2007, while this appeal was pending. 
We conclude that the remedy of sanctions under Wis. Stat. 
§ 785.04 for continuing contempt, as described in Frisch, is 
applicable to the contempt found by the trial court here."). 
No.  2006AP803.ssa 
 
19 
 
reasoning of Frisch, this case therefore falls within chapter 
785's provisions relating to remedial contempt. 
¶127 In Frisch, a circuit court order required an ex-
husband to provide his ex-wife with certain tax information by 
May 12 of each year.  At the time of the contempt hearing, the 
ex-husband had complied with the circuit court's order insofar 
as it required him to provide the tax information to his ex-wife 
but had not complied (and no longer could comply) with the 
court's order insofar as it required him to provide the 
information timely.  Furthermore, the ex-husband's failure to 
provide the tax information timely had harmed the ex-wife in a 
way that the ex-husband could not cure by providing the 
information too late to comply with the circuit court order.  
Because of the ex-husband's conduct, the ex-wife had missed 
opportunities to seek timely modification of a child support 
order in her favor and likely had not received the full amount 
of child support to which she was entitled.       
¶128 This court concluded, with Justice Prosser writing for 
the majority, that the ex-husband's contempt was continuing at 
the time of the contempt hearing because the husband could not 
undo his violation of the circuit court's order respecting 
timeliness and was in continuing violation of that portion of 
the order.  The Frisch court stated that "[t]he timely provision 
of information was an essential element of the [circuit] court's 
order."28  Furthermore, the husband's "[f]ailure to timely 
                                                 
28 Frisch, 304 Wis. 2d 1, ¶4.   
No.  2006AP803.ssa 
 
20 
 
produce income information 'as required' was really the essence 
of [his] contempt because it shielded him from exposure to 
regular, contemporary court-ordered modifications of child-
support."29  Due to the ex-husband's contempt of the circuit 
court's order respecting timeliness, "full compliance with the 
court's order [was] impossible."30  The Frisch court explained 
that the husband "could not and did not turn back time when he 
produced the required information too late to be acted on[.]"31   
¶129 The contempt in the present case, like the contempt in 
Frisch, consists of an intentional failure to perform actions 
timely as required by the circuit court's order.  The Consent 
Decree required the County to implement the 30-hour rule "[a]s 
of 3/21/01, and thereafter[.]"32  At the time of the contempt 
hearing, the County had complied with the Consent Decree insofar 
as it required the County to implement the 30-hour rule but had 
not complied (and no longer could comply) with the Consent 
Decree insofar as it required the County to implement the 30-
rule timely.  Furthermore, the County's failure to implement the 
30-hour rule timely harmed members of the plaintiff class in a 
way that the County could not cure by implementing the 30-hour 
                                                                                                                                                             
See also id., ¶47 ("Producing documents was only part of 
the court's order.  Producing documents on time . . . was an 
equal part of the order.").     
29 Id.   
30 Id., ¶62.   
31 Id., ¶4.   
32 Majority op., ¶16 (emphasis added; quoting the Consent 
Decree).   
No.  2006AP803.ssa 
 
21 
 
rule too late to comply with the Consent Decree.  Because of the 
County's conduct, many members of the plaintiff class were 
forced to spend more than 30 hours in the County jail without a 
bed, contrary to the Consent Decree's explicit mandate.   
¶130 The Frisch court's reasoning applies cleanly and 
clearly to the facts of the present case.  The County cannot 
undo its violation of the Consent Decree's provision respecting 
timelines and is in continuing violation of that portion of the 
Consent Decree.  Timely implementation of the 30-hour rule 
unquestionably was an essential element of the Consent Decree.  
Due to the County's contempt of the circuit court's order 
respecting timeliness, full compliance with the Consent Decree 
now is impossible.  The County could not and did not turn back 
time when it implemented the 30-hour rule too late to benefit 
the many inmates who spent more than 30 hours in the County jail 
without a bed, contrary to the Consent Decree. 
¶131 The only obvious difference between Frisch and the 
present case that might seem to matter under the majority 
opinion relates to when the contumacious conduct stopped 
relative to when the motion for contempt sanctions was filed.  
In Frisch the contemnor began complying with the court order 
after the motion for contempt was filed (but before a finding of 
contempt).  In the present case the contemnor began complying 
with the court order about three years after the order but 
months before a motion for contempt was filed.  The timing 
issue, however, was not even mentioned in Frisch and certainly 
was not determinative.  
No.  2006AP803.ssa 
 
22 
 
¶132 The majority opinion seems to distinguish Frisch by 
declaring that "[t]his is not a case where a contempt of court 
causes irreparable harm by depriving a victim of her 'ability to 
utilize traditional remedies in the law.'"33  Majority op., ¶76 
(quoting Frisch, 304 Wis. 2d 1, ¶47).  Frisch, however, imposed 
no requirement that a contempt must deprive a plaintiff of any 
existing remedy under the law in order to be "continuing" and to 
trigger the possibility of compensatory sanctions.  Frisch did 
not hold that all other potential avenues of relief must be 
exhausted before contempt sanctions are used.  Indeed, the 
Frisch court stated that remedial contempt was properly employed 
although the ex-wife potentially could have been entitled to 
relief under Wis. Stat. § 806.07.34    
¶133 The contempt statute offers no textual basis for the 
position that whether a contempt is "continuing" for purposes of 
Wis. Stat. § 783.01(3) depends on whether other remedies are 
available to the victim of contempt.  The majority should not be 
distinguishing 
Frisch 
by 
rewriting 
the 
contempt 
statute, 
                                                 
33 Without explanation, reasoning, or citation to authority, 
the majority cavalierly declares that the plaintiff class may be 
able to bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for damages and that 
individual plaintiffs may file personal injury lawsuits. It is 
not clear that the individual members of the class may bring 
their own actions for damages.  The majority opinion decides the 
issue without analyzing claim preclusion, the federal Prisoner 
Reform Litigation Act and its state progeny, or other practical 
barriers to such suits.  As a practical matter and as a matter 
of judicial administration I do not think it a good idea for the 
majority opinion to encourage 16,662 individuals to file 
individual actions or to suggest personal liability for public 
officials in the present case. 
34 See Frisch, 304 Wis. 2d 1, ¶27 n.12. 
No.  2006AP803.ssa 
 
23 
 
engrafting a requirement onto Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) that is 
extrinsic to the statute and unsupported by the statute's text.  
III 
¶134 If the majority opinion's statutory interpretation is 
accepted, the result is that a circuit court has no power to 
impose remedial compensatory damages to sanction a contumacious 
party for intentionally violating a court order for nearly three 
years, a clear contempt of court, so long as the party ceases 
its contumacious behavior before a motion for contempt sanctions 
is filed.  Thus there is a void in the statute relating to a 
circuit court's power to protect enforcement of its orders.  
Under such circumstances, the circuit court may use its inherent 
power to fill the void in the contempt statutes.35  Filling in a 
void in the statute does not contravene the statute.  
¶135 "A court's power to use contempt stems from the 
inherent authority of the court" and a court's contempt power 
may not be "rendered ineffectual" by statute.36  A court's power 
of contempt exists independently of and outside the statutes; 
courts have retained their inherent contempt power in addition 
to the statutory power prescribed by the legislature.37  When the 
                                                 
35 As the majority opinion explains: "The statutory scheme 
establishes two kinds of sanctions, each with specific criteria.  
There may be a void in this statutory scheme . . . ."  Majority 
op., ¶58 n.10.  The majority concludes without analysis that 
this void cannot be filled by judicial interpretation without 
doing violence to the statutes.  Yet the majority recognizes 
that the statute does not deprive a court of its inherent powers 
to protect enforcement of its order.   
36 Frisch, 304 Wis. 2d 1, ¶32. 
37 In the Interest of D.L.D., 110 Wis. 2d 168, 178, 327 
N.W.2d 682 (1983).  
No.  2006AP803.ssa 
 
24 
 
procedures and penalties for contempt are prescribed by statute, 
the statute controls as long as the statute does not render the 
court's power impotent or meaningless.38  To the extent that the 
legislature unreasonably burdens or substantially interferes 
with the contempt power of the judiciary, such interference with 
the 
courts' 
power 
to 
enforce 
their 
orders 
violates 
the 
separation of powers doctrine.39 
¶136 "The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all 
courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order 
in 
judicial 
proceedings, 
and 
to 
the 
enforcement 
of 
the 
judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently to 
the due administration of justice."40  A court has an "inherent 
power to protect its own decrees and the private rights 
attendant on those decrees."41  Intentional defiance of a court's 
judgment or order cannot be condoned.  A party must be able to 
employ civil contempt proceedings to enforce its adjudicated 
rights.  I therefore conclude that when a contempt has 
terminated 
and 
no 
remedial 
sanction 
is 
available 
under 
                                                 
38 Evans v. Luebke, 2003 WI App 207, ¶17, 267 Wis. 2d 596, 
671 N.W.2d 302; Douglas County v. Edwards, 137 Wis. 2d 65, 87-
88, 403 N.W.2d 438 (1987); State v. King, 82 Wis. 2d 124, 136, 
262 N.W.2d 80 (1972); State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Circuit 
Court for Eau Claire County, 97 Wis. 1, 8, 72 N.W. 193 (1887); 
Note, § 11, Laws of 1979, at 1355.  
39 Kenosha County Dep't of Human Servs. v. Jodi W., 2006 WI 
93, ¶20, 293 Wis. 2d 530, 716 N.W.2d 845; State v. Holmes, 106 
Wis. 2d 31, 46, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982). 
40 Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510 (U.S. 1873). 
41 Upper Lakes Shipping, Ltd. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 22 
Wis. 2d 7, 18, 125 N.W.2d 324 (1963).  
No.  2006AP803.ssa 
 
25 
 
chapter 785, a court may exercise its inherent power to award 
compensatory damages to effectuate its order.42    
¶137 For the reasons set forth, I write separately in 
dissent.   
¶138 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY and N. PATRICK CROOKS join this opinion. 
 
                                                 
42 Furthermore, Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 805.03 provides, without 
regard to remedial contempt, that a court in which an action is 
pending may make such orders as are just for any party's failure 
to obey any order of the court.  A circuit court may determine 
that the compensation requested by the Legal Aid Society may be 
a just order against the County, which intentionally failed to 
comply with a court order for nearly three years.  See Wis. 
Stat. § 805.03 ("[F]or failure of any party to comply with the 
statutes governing procedure in civil actions or to obey any 
order of court, the court in which the action is pending may 
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, including 
but 
not 
limited 
to 
orders 
authorized 
under 
s. 804.12(2)(a). . . .").   
No.  2006AP803.ssa 
 
 
 
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