Case Title: Gary Lee Thorp v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC91-663

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2000-11-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme 
Court 
of 
Florida
 
____________
No. SC91663
____________
GARY LEE THORP,
Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
[November 16, 2000]
PER CURIAM.
We have on appeal the judgment and sentence of the trial court imposing the
death penalty upon Gary Lee Thorp.  We have jurisdiction.  Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.
Const.  For reasons which follow, we reverse appellant’s conviction for first-
degree murder because we find harmful error in the admission of improper
evidence at trial and remand for a new trial.    
MATERIAL FACTS
1The court instructed the jury on both first-degree felony murder and first-degree premeditated
murder.  The jury returned a general verdict of guilt.
2The medical examiner testified that Chase died from asphyxiated strangulation due to fractures
in the victim's neck cartilage.  The medical examiner also testified that absent evidence of strangulation,
death could have resulted from the extensive cocaine present in the victim's blood or from narrowing of
the victim's coronary artery.  Several other injuries were observed, including bruising and abrasions to
the face, right arm, upper back, and legs.  However, the medical examiner testified that there was no
external bleeding by the victim such as would stain the clothing of someone who came in contact with
her.  While a small amount of menstrual blood was discovered inside the victim's uterine cavity,
indicating the end of her menstrual cycle, there were no injuries to her genitalia, although there was
some plant material in the victim's trachea and vagina.  The medical examiner testified that the victim
probably sucked the plant material into her trachea as she attempted to inhale while being strangled. 
She also had numerous ant bites on her body.
-2-
Gary Thorp was convicted of first-degree murder1 and sentenced to death
for the murder of Sharon Chase.  The record reflects that Chase’s nude body was
discovered in the bushes in Bean Park on June 24, 1993.  Her body was lying face
up, with her legs spread apart and knees partially bent.  Her shirt had been pulled
down to her waist, and her shorts were discovered some thirty feet away from the
body.  Semen discovered inside the victim's vagina matched Thorp's DNA profile. 
The medical examiner opined that death was caused by strangulation.2  Thorp
subsequently was arrested for the murder of Sharon Chase in October of 1996.
Evidence presented at trial indicates that at approximately midnight on June
23, 1993, the victim and a white male were seen together crossing a bridge into
Bean Park near U.S. 1 in Melbourne, Florida.  The witness, Paul Symeon, was
fishing in the marina across the street from the park and observed Chase and a man
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enter the park.  Symeon described the man as "skinny or lanky," taller than the
victim, with a dark complexion and dark, wavy hair.  Symeon testified that the two
"milled around for a while" and were then approached by another unidentified
couple.  After approximately ten minutes, Symeon heard rustling sounds in the
bushes for a couple of minutes and then heard a sound similar to a moan.  When he
turned to look, he could not see what was causing the noises.  However, Symeon
noticed that no one was in the park at that time.  At trial, Symeon identified Chase
as the woman he had seen in the park.  However, Thorp did not fit the physical
description given by Symeon of the man he saw with Chase and Symeon could not
identify Thorp as being present in the park the night of the crime.  
Other evidence at trial revealed that Thorp and another man, William Deering,
had been living at the Christ Is The Answer (CITA) Mission in Melbourne.  On the
night of the homicide, Thorp and Deering both missed the 11 p.m. bed check at the
mission and, as a result, were not permitted to sleep there that night.  David
Gallamore, an employee at the mission, saw Thorp around 1:15 a.m. and noticed
Thorp had been drinking and had blood on his shirt and bruises on his knuckles. 
Gallamore asked Thorp why he missed the earlier bed check.  Thorp stated that he
had been in a fight at a Burger King restaurant.  He also asked Gallamore if Deering
had been at the mission that night.  In fact, Gallamore saw Deering at the mission at
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around 12:30 a.m.   
Finally, the State presented Timothy Bullock, an inmate housed with Thorp
at the Brevard County Jail during the spring of 1994 where Thorp was serving time
for an unrelated crime.  Bullock testified that Thorp told him that he and another
man “took a hooker down by the bridge and did her," during which he got a lot of
blood on himself.  Bullock testified that Thorp admitted that he expected to be
blamed for the Chase murder.  In addition, and over defense counsel's objection,
Bullock was allowed to testify that he interpreted Thorp's statement that he "did a
hooker" to mean that Thorp killed her.  Finally, Bullock testified that Thorp had
admitted that, in order to be allowed into the mission with blood on his clothes that
night, he had told the mission employee that the blood was caused by a fight at
Burger King.  
The defense did not present any witnesses during the guilt phase of the trial. 
After deliberation, the jury found Thorp guilty of first-degree murder.  During the
penalty phase, the State presented two witnesses, the prosecutor and the lead
investigating officer in a 1994 murder case in which Thorp pled nolo contendere to
a charge of second-degree murder for the fatal stabbing of Randy Appleman.  The
defense presented several witnesses of their own who testified that Thorp got along
with others, was a hard worker, and assisted the mission director as his “right hand
3In imposing death, the trial court found three aggravating factors: (1) the defendant was
previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence (i.e., second-degree murder
committed after the offense in the instant case); (2) the murder was committed during the course of a
felony (i.e., sexual battery); and (3) the murder was heinous, atrocious or cruel.  The trial court did not
find any statutory mitigators, but found the following two nonstatutory mitigators: (1) Thorp's
disadvantaged and painful childhood caused by his premature birth and pain associated with cerebral
palsy ("some weight") and (2) Thorp's family background, including his problems with drugs and
alcohol ("some weight"). 
4These issues include:  (1) whether the trial court erred in denying Thorp’s motion to suppress
Thorp’s blood sample on the ground that it had been obtained on the basis of a false affidavit; (2)
whether the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for first-degree murder; (3) whether the trial
-5-
man” at the mission where he lived.  Both of Thorp’s parents testified that Thorp
was born prematurely, suffered from cerebral palsy as a child, and ultimately
developed a serious drinking problem.  Thorp testified on his own behalf about his
difficult early life, his cerebral palsy, his struggles with drugs and alcohol, and his
checkered educational and employment history.  During his testimony Thorp
admitted to having consensual sexual intercourse with the victim but denied killing
her.  Thorp also denied killing Appleman, although he admitted to stealing
Appleman's property and forging some of Appleman's checks.  Thorp expressed
remorse for his past lifestyle but denied killing anyone.  The jury recommended a
sentence of death by a vote of ten to two, and the trial court followed this
recommendation.3   
APPEAL
On appeal, Thorp raises seven issues for this court’s review.4  We agree with
court erred in admitting opinion testimony from a lay witness; (4) whether the trial court precluded
impeachment of the State’s key expert witness; (5) whether the trial court erred in admitting testimony
of DNA evidence; (6) whether the trial court improperly excused a potential juror; and (7) whether the
trial court improperly considered aggravating factors and failed to consider mitigation evidence. 
-6-
Thorp that reversal is required on two of his claims:  claim (1), concerning the trial
court’s failure to suppress evidence obtained from a substantially misleading
affidavit for search warrant, and claim (3), concerning the trial court’s error in
allowing improper opinion testimony to go to the jury.  Because we are reversing
Thorp’s conviction and sentence based on those asserted errors, we do not
address claims (4), (5), (6), and (7) as they are now moot.
 
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Thorp argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of
acquittal because the State's evidence failed to exclude the reasonable hypothesis of
innocence that someone other than Thorp killed the victim.  He contends that the
DNA evidence proved only that he had sexual intercourse with the victim, not that
he killed her.  In addition, Thorp further contends that the evidence at trial
contradicts the State's theory of how the murder occurred.  Although we find
prejudicial error with regard to two aspects of the State’s case, we nevertheless find
that the evidence was sufficient to overcome Thorp’s motion for judgment of
acquittal.    
-7-
Because there were no eyewitnesses or other direct evidence of Thorp’s
commission of the murder, the State’s case against Thorp was predicated chiefly
upon circumstantial evidence.  As we stated in State v. Law, 559 So. 2d 187 (Fla.
1989):
A special standard of review of the sufficiency of the
evidence applies where a conviction is wholly based on
circumstantial evidence.  Jaramillo v. State, 417 So. 2d
257 (Fla. 1982).  Where the only proof of guilt is
circumstantial, no matter how strongly the evidence may
suggest guilt, a conviction cannot be sustained unless the
evidence is inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis
of innocence.  McArthur v. State, 351 So. 2d 972 (Fla.
1977); Mayo v. State, 71 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1954).  The
question of whether the evidence fails to exclude all
reasonable hypotheses of innocence is for the jury to
determine, and where there is substantial, competent
evidence to support the jury verdict, we will not reverse. 
Heiney v. State, 447 So. 2d 210 (Fla.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 920, 105 S. Ct. 303, 83 L. Ed. 2d 237 (1984); Rose
v. State, 425 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 909, 103 S. Ct. 1883, 76 L. Ed. 2d 812 (1983), 
disapproved on other grounds, Williams v. State, 488 So.
2d 62 (Fla. 1986).
Law, 559 So. 2d at 188.  On the basis of the above rule, we held in Law that where
the State fails to present evidence from which the jury can exclude every reasonable
hypothesis except that of guilt, the court should grant a motion for judgment of
acquittal.  Id. 
Thorp contends that the State’s evidence fails to exclude the possibility that
-8-
someone other than Thorp killed the victim since several people were seen in the
park on the night of the murder and none of the witnesses could actually identify
Thorp as the person they observed walking with the victim prior to the murder.  He
also points out there is no physical evidence that Thorp killed the victim.    
The State’s principle evidence linking Thorp to the crime includes the DNA
evidence, Thorp’s statements to his cellmate Bullock, and Thorp’s physical
appearance and condition on the night of the crime (i.e., that he was observed with
blood on his clothing).  We conclude that this evidence was sufficient to require
this case to be submitted to the jury.  
As noted above, the DNA evidence indicates that Thorp was with the victim
and had sexual intercourse with her the night of the murder.  We recognize that
while the DNA evidence, like fingerprint evidence, does not conclusively prove that
Thorp committed the murder, cf. Jaramillo v. State, 417 So. 2d 257, 257 (Fla.
1982) (disregarding fingerprint evidence where State failed to prove the defendant’s
fingerprints could only have been placed on items in victim’s home at time murder
was committed), the DNA evidence supports the State’s contention that Thorp was
with the victim in the park around the time she was killed.  
The other significant evidence against Thorp is his supposed confession of
the murder to cellmate Timothy Bullock.  While Bullock testified that Thorp
5Thorp challenges the admission of a portion of Bullock’s testimony.  That issue will be
addressed in further detail later in this opinion.  
6It is not clear from the record who this “other man” was.  We presume that Thorp was
referring to Deering.  However, Deering was not called as a witness and his involvement is not further
explained by the record.  
-9-
admitted he expected to be blamed for the murder of a prostitute, Bullock did not
testify that Thorp ever directly admitted to killing the victim.5  His actual statement,
according to Bullock was that Thorp and another man “did a hooker.”6 However,
direct evidence was also presented that Thorp was seen with injuries and blood on
his clothes on the night of the crime, injuries that could be consistent with a
physical struggle with the murder victim who had considerable bruises and
abrasions on her body even if she did not bleed extensively.  Obviously, the
victim’s assailant could also have been injured and bled.  
On the face of the record before us, we find this evidence legally sufficient to
convict Thorp of first-degree murder.  While the State’s evidence may not have
been conclusive, it strongly suggests that Thorp struggled with and killed the
victim.  It was up to the jury to determine if this evidence proved Thorp’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court
denying Thorp’s motion for judgment of acquittal. 
Motion to Suppress
-10-
On the other hand, we find the trial court committed prejudicial error by
failing to exclude Thorp’s blood samples and the resulting DNA evidence obtained
from those samples.  The record in this case reflects that approximately a year after
the murder occurred, the police obtained a search warrant to take a blood sample
from Thorp.  The affidavit filed by the police stated that Thorp matched the
description of the person Symeon observed walking with the victim on the night of
the murder.  The affidavit further provided the following facts:  that Chase was a
known prostitute who worked in the Melbourne area; that on the night of the
murder Symeon heard moaning (muffled screams) emanating from the park after
the suspect and victim had entered it; that semen was discovered in the vaginal
cavity of the victim in an amount sufficient to conduct a DNA comparison; that
Thorp was the primary suspect in a unrelated stabbing incident in which the victim
was also found nude; that Thorp frequented the Melbourne area near Bean Park
and had lived at the CITA mission; that Thorp despised prostitutes; that Thorp and
Deering had not spent the night at the mission on the night of the murder; that one
of the them was observed with blood on his clothes; and that the suspect was
observed wearing a ball cap and that Thorp consistently wore ball caps.  Based on
these facts, the magistrate judge issued a search warrant to obtain two vials of
Thorp’s blood for the purpose of conducting a DNA comparison with the semen
-11-
recovered from the victim.
During pretrial proceedings, Thorp moved to suppress the physical evidence
obtained as a result of the search warrant.  At an evidentiary hearing on the matter,
Thorp asserted the affidavit contained false statements and material omissions
which, when considered in light of the remaining factual allegations, defeated a
finding of probable cause.  The State hesitantly conceded that the statement
concluding that the suspect matched Thorp’s description and the statements
concerning the existence of a ball cap should be redacted.  It maintained, however,
that the remaining factual allegations in the affidavit were sufficient to establish
probable cause.  The trial court found that the affidavit falsely indicated that the
description given by Symeon matched Deering and Thorp.  However, the court
concluded that the misstatement was not willful and, even if it was removed, the
remaining content of the affidavit established probable cause.  We disagree with the
trial court’s conclusion.
If an affidavit for search warrant contains intentional false statements or
statements made with reckless disregard for the truth, the trial court must excise the
false material and consider whether the affidavit’s remaining content is sufficient to
establish probable cause.  See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156 (1978); Terry
v. State, 668 So. 2d 954, 958 (Fla. 1996).  This rule contains two components. 
-12-
First, the trial court must determine whether the affidavit contains an intentional
false statement or a statement made in reckless disregard for the truth.  Mere
neglect or statements made by innocent mistake are insufficient.  See Franks, 438
U.S. at 171.  Second, if the court finds the police acted deceptively, the court must
excise the erroneous material and determine whether the remaining allegations in the
affidavit support probable cause.  See id. at 171-72.  If the remaining statements are
sufficient to establish probable cause, the false statement will not invalidate the
resulting search warrant.  See Terry, 668 So. 2d at 958.  If, however, the false
statement is necessary to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be
voided and the evidence seized as a result of the search excluded.  See id. (citing
Franks, 438 U.S. at 156). 
Thorp points to several critical and substantial misstatements set out in the
affidavit, the falsity of which were known to the police officer affiant.  The first
pertains to the identification of Thorp as the person last seen with the victim.  The
affidavit states that “the description of the male that was seen walking with the
female (that is most probably Sharon Chase), prior to the murder, is consistent with
the description of Thorpe and Deering.”  As noted above, the State conceded that
the statement in the affidavit that Thorp and Deering matched the description given
by Symeon should be stricken from the affidavit.  The affidavit describes Thorp as
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a white male, approximately six feet tall, 220 pounds, with blue eyes and
bald/brown hair.  Deering is a white male, approximately five feet, eight inches tall,
165 pounds, with brown eyes and brown hair.  According to the statement Paul
Symeon gave to the police shortly after the victim’s body had been discovered,
however, the person he observed with the victim was a white male, approximately
six feet tall, seemingly thin, with medium to long dark brown hair, and a dark
complexion.  Symeon initially described the suspect as a minority and later, during
a hypnotic session with the police, characterized the suspect as possibly Spanish. 
None of these known and obviously relevant facts about the suspect’s complexion
were included in the affidavit.  Moreover, the officer who prepared the affidavit
improperly likened Thorp to the person last seen with the victim.  From the
descriptions above, there appears to be little or no similarity between Thorp,
Deering, and the person Symeon described as walking with the victim prior to the
murder.  Based on the patent differences in physical characteristics of the three
persons involved and the crucial importance of this information in establishing
probable cause, we find at least a patent and reckless disregard for the truth in this
misstatement.  See Franks. 
In addition to the above, we find the affidavit patently misstates Symeon’s
description of the events in the park that night.  The affidavit states that Symeon
-14-
heard “moaning (muffled screams)” emanating from the park.  The parenthetical
was added not by the witness Symeon, but by the police, and obviously was
intended to give meaning to the word “moaning.”  However, Symeon never
described the sounds he heard as “muffled screams.”  In fact, in his initial
statement to the police, Symeon stated that the sound he heard was “definitely not a
scream and it was not a moan, it was something in between that.”  While under
hypnosis, Symeon again described the noise he heard as a “moan” but made no
reference to “muffled screams.”  He never saw what caused the moans.  Thus, the
affiant improperly inserted a misstatement as to what Symeon heard, and the
affidavit’s reference to “muffled screams” should also have been redacted.   
Before considering the affidavit absent the misstated facts, we must also
address other relevant facts known to the police, but which Thorp claims were
improperly omitted from the affidavit.  Thorp’s contention is that had the omitted
facts been included in the affidavit for search warrant, they would have defeated a
finding of probable cause.  Omissions made with intent to deceive or with reckless
disregard must also be considered in considering a motion to suppress.  See
Johnson v. State, 660 So. 2d 648, 656 (Fla. 1995).  The only difference between
omitted facts and misstated facts is that in the case of omitted facts, the reviewing
court must first determine whether the omitted facts, if added to the affidavit, would
7As we did in Johnson, we recognize that a significant number of facts are collected during
police investigations and that police may often intentionally exclude facts which they in good faith
believe to be marginal, extraneous or cumulative.  Id.  Therefore, only material omissions should be
considered in assessing the magistrate’s probable cause determination.  
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have defeated probable cause.  See id.  The reviewing court must further find that
the omission resulted from intentional or reckless police conduct that amounts to
deception.  See id.7  “When a material fact is omitted from the affidavit filed in
support of the probable cause determination, such fact constitutes a material
omission if a substantial possibility exists that the omission would have altered a
reasonable magistrate’s probable cause determination.”  State v. Van Pieterson, 550
So. 2d 1162, 1164 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). 
Here, several important and relevant facts were omitted which, when
considered together with the other errors, appear to indicate a lack of probable
cause.  For example, the medical examiner had examined the victim’s body shortly
after it was discovered and concluded that the victim had not bled profusely.  Yet
this fact was not included in the affidavit.  This omitted material is important in light
of the fact the affidavit states that Thorp was seen with blood on his clothes, giving
the impression that he had been involved in a bloody struggle.  Had the magistrate
been told the victim did not shed blood, the evidence that Thorp had blood on his
clothes might have carried less weight in the probable cause determination.  
8In Florida, statements elicited during and after hypnosis are considered unreliable and may not
be admitted into evidence at a criminal trial.  See Stokes v. State, 548 So. 2d 188, 195-96 (Fla.
1989); Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9, 18 (Fla. 1985).
9At the suppression hearing, the State conceded that the court should redact the portion of the
affidavit relating to the ball cap.  
-16-
Other omissions concern Symeon and the actual description he provided to
the police.  For example, the affidavit does not reveal that Symeon was hypnotized
and that several of his statements relied upon in the affidavit were the result of a
hypnotic session.8   One such statement induced during hypnosis concerns the fact
that Symeon purportedly stated that the suspect was wearing a baseball cap.  It is
undisputed that Symeon never mentioned a baseball cap during his initial interview
with the police.  While under hypnosis, however, Symeon claimed that the man he
saw with the victim was wearing a baseball cap.  During that same session, he later
reversed himself and stated that the suspect was not wearing a baseball cap or hat. 
The affidavit does not mention this patent inconsistency in Symeon’s various
statements to the police or the circumstances under which they were provided.9 
These omissions are material because the affidavit also claims that Thorp
consistently wears baseball caps, a fact obviously intended to strengthen the
connection to Thorp as the perpetrator, but which becomes irrelevant if the
10Thorp also claims that the affidavit omitted the fact that Symeon had seen a photograph of
Thorp but could not identify him as the man he saw walking with the victim in the park on the night of
the murder.  However, this fact came out during Symeon’s deposition in January 1997, several years
after the affidavit for search warrant was filed, when he admitted to seeing Thorp’s picture in the
newspaper.  It is not known from the record whether the police were aware of the fact that Symeon
had seen Thorp’s photo and did not recognize him.  According to Symeon, he was never shown a
photographic lineup.  Thus, we find no error with regard to this issue because Thorp failed to establish
that at the time the affidavit was filed the police knew Symeon had seen a picture of Thorp and could
not identify him.
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perpetrator was not wearing a cap on the night of the murder.10
We find that once the misstated facts are redacted and the omitted facts are
included, the remaining factual allegations in the amended affidavit do not establish
probable cause to believe that Thorp committed murder.  Notably, despite the
lengthy factual recitations in the affidavit, none of the truthful allegations identified
Thorp as the person last seen with the victim or even placed Thorp in the park on
the night of the homicide.  At most, the affidavit indicates Thorp had been in an
altercation that night and that he lived at the CITA mission.  There is nothing within
the affidavit’s factual recitations to lead a magistrate to reasonably believe that
Thorp was the person observed with the victim and was the person who caused the
victim’s death.  Indeed, the affidavit also reveals that at least two other men were in
the park that night, neither of whom was identified.  On the strength of the amended
affidavit, we cannot say the factual allegations therein are sufficient to establish
11Contrary to the State's posture, the good faith exception to an invalid search warrant does not
apply in this case because the search warrant was based on a misleading or false affidavit.  See United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984) ("Suppression therefore remains an appropriate remedy if
the magistrate or judge in issuing a warrant was misled by information in an affidavit that the affiant
knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth."); see
also Van Pieterson, 550 So. 2d at 1165 (holding “good faith” exception does not apply where police
officer omitted relevant facts that would have defeated probable cause).
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probable cause to believe Thorp was involved in the instant murder.11 
Accordingly, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying Thorp’s
motion to suppress the blood samples and the DNA test results from those
samples.  See Jones v. State, 343 So. 2d 921, 922 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
We must next determine whether the erroneous admission of the blood
samples and resulting DNA analysis from those samples constitutes harmful error. 
See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986).  Upon the record in this case,
we find that it does.  The State presented three experts in DNA analysis.  The first
expert conducted a Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphisms (RFLP) test on
the semen found in the victim’s vagina and compared the results to Thorp’s and
Deering’s blood samples.  After comparing the known samples, the expert was able
to exclude Deering as the semen donor but indicated a possible match with
Thorp’s DNA profile.  Dan Nippes, the second expert, performed a different DNA
analysis on the samples, known as the Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) test, and
concluded that the semen found in the victim matched Thorp’s DNA profile. 
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Nippes further opined that the chance of such a match occurring in the population
is approximately one in one thousand Caucasians.  The third expert testified that the
statistical probability of finding a male unrelated to Thorp who matched both the
RFLP DNA test result and the PCR DNA test result would be approximately one in
3.6 billion.  During closing arguments, the State relied on this evidence in arguing
that there is no reasonable doubt that the semen found in the victim belonged to
Thorp.
The only other significant evidence of guilt included Thorp’s statements to a
fellow inmate and a witness’s testimony that Thorp had blood on this clothes on
the night of the murder.  Based on the conclusive nature of the DNA evidence,
however, and because it is the only physical evidence placing Thorp at the scene of
the crime, we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the improperly admitted
DNA evidence had no effect on the verdict in this case. See DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d at
1136; see also Goodwin v. State, 751 So. 2d 537, 546 (Fla. 1999) (reaffirming
harmless error analysis in DiGuilio).  Thus, the court’s error in failing to exclude the
blood samples and DNA test results was harmful error, requiring reversal. 
Admission of Opinion Testimony  
We further find harmful error in the admission of improper opinion testimony
by a lay witness.  Thorp contends the trial court erred in permitting Bullock to
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testify as to what he thought Thorp meant when Thorp told him that he (Thorp)
"did a hooker."  The State, on the other hand, argues that Thorp failed to preserve
this claim for appellate review and, even if preserved, the claim is meritless.  We
disagree with both of the State’s contentions.  
At trial, the following colloquy occurred between the State and Bullock:
     [State] Q.  Did you ever have any conversations with
Gary Lee Thorp about the death of the prostitute under
the bridge?
     [Bullock] A.  Yes, I did.
     Q.  Did he indicate to you that he knew about this
incident?
     A.  Yes, he did.
     Q.  And did he indicate to you that he expected that
he might be charged with this?
     A.  He told me he expected to be.
     Q.  What did he expect the charge to be?
     A.  Murder.
     Q.  What did he say about that incident?
     A.  He told me that he knew the girl, that he had taken
her down by the bridge and did her, that she was a
hooker.
     Q.  Those were his words, that he did her?
     A.  Yes.
     Q.  What did you take that to mean?
     A.  That he had– 
     [Defense counsel]: I object.  That's not relevant. 
That's speculation.  This gentlemen has not been qualified
to interpret anything that he thought was said.  It's just
irrelevant and immaterial.
     [The court]: Overruled.
     Q.  You may answer the question.  What did you take
that to mean?
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     A.  I took that to mean that he was the one that killed
her.
     Q.  Did he indicate to you whether or not there was
any other person associated with this incident?
     A.  Yes, he did.
     Q.  How did he describe that to you?
     A.  I believe his words were, me and another guy took
her down by the bridge and did her.
Contrary to the State’s posture, we find that the claim was sufficiently
preserved for review.  Defense counsel objected to Bullock’s testimony on the
grounds that the opinion of the witness was not relevant, that it was immaterial, and
that it called for speculation.  Defense counsel further stated that the witness "has
not been qualified to interpret anything that he thought was said."  The objection
sufficiently apprised the court of the issue, namely, whether the witness could
provide an opinion or inference as to what he thought Thorp meant.  Thus, Thorp
preserved this issue for appellate review. 
As for the merits of Thorp's contention, we find that the trial court erred in
allowing Bullock to testify as to what he believed Thorp’s statement to mean.  As a
general rule, lay witnesses may not testify in the form of opinions or inferences; it is
the function of the jury to draw those inferences.  Cf. Kersey v. State, 73 Fla. 832,
840, 74 So. 983, 986 (1917); see also Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence §
701.1, at 538 (1999 ed.).  An exception to this rule is found in section 90.701,
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Florida Statutes, which permits a lay witness to proffer testimony in the form of an
inference and opinion where:
     (1) The witness cannot readily, and with equal
accuracy and adequacy, communicate what he or she has
perceived to the trier of fact without testifying in terms of
inferences or opinions and the witness's use of inferences
or opinions will not mislead the trier of fact to the
prejudice of the objecting party; and
     (2) The opinions and inferences do not require a
special knowledge, skill, experience, or training.
§ 90.701, Fla. Stat. (1997); see also Kersey, 73 Fla. at 840, 74 So. at 986;
Alexander v. State, 627 So. 2d 35, 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).  Both prerequisites
must be satisfied before a lay witness is allowed to testify in the form of an opinion
or inference.  See § 90.701; Ehrhardt, supra, at 540.    
There is no claim in this case that Bullock’s testimony required specialized
skill or training.  Accordingly, the second prong of section 90.701 is satisfied. 
However, it does not appear from the record that Bullock could not “readily, and
with equal accuracy and adequacy, communicate what he . . . has perceived to the
trier of fact without testifying in terms of inferences or opinions.”  Bullock had no
difficulty conveying to the jury what Thorp said to him while in prison.  He testified
that Thorp admitted that he “did a hooker” and that he expected to be charged with
murder.  The exact meaning of Thorp’s words and the inferences that could be
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drawn from them, however, were matters for the jury to consider.    Accordingly,
any inferences that may have been drawn from Thorp’s statement that he “did a
hooker” should have been made by the jury and not by the witness.  See Kight v.
State, 512 So. 2d 922, 929 (Fla. 1987) (holding that there is no need to resort to lay
opinion testimony where witness adequately conveyed his perception of
defendant's words and actions to jury), receded from on other grounds, Davis v.
State, 698 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1997).  Under these circumstances, there was no need
to resort to testimony concerning Bullock’s interpretation of Thorp’s words.  See
id.  Hence, the trial court erred in allowing this opinion testimony.
By permitting Bullock to interpret the meaning of Thorp’s words, the trial
court committed harmful error because it effectively turned Thorp’s obvious
admission of involvement in a crime into a confession of murder.  As the record
reflects, however, Thorp never confessed to murdering Sharon Case.  Rather,
during the penalty phase of the trial, he admitted only to having sexual intercourse
with the victim, an act which is equally consistent with his admission to Bullock.  
Therefore, Bullock’s opinion testimony that Thorp’s statement that he “did a
hooker” meant that he killed her, was undoubtedly prejudicial and we cannot say
beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not affect the jury’s verdict in this case. 
Under DiGuilio, the admission of  Bullock’s opinion testimony constitutes harmful
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error.   
CONCLUSION
In sum, we find substantial error in the improper admission of certain highly
prejudicial and damaging evidence against Thorp.  We cannot find that error
harmless under State v. DiGuilio, 491 So. 2d 1129 (Fla. 1986).  Accordingly, we
reverse Thorp’s conviction for first-degree murder and vacate his sentence of
death.  This case is remanded to the trial court with directions that a new trial be
promptly conducted.  Because we are remanding for a new trial, we need not
address Thorp’s remaining issues on appeal.   
It is so ordered.
SHAW, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., concur.
WELLS, C.J., dissents with an opinion.
QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion, in which HARDING, J., concurs.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND
IF FILED, DETERMINED.
WELLS, C.J., dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s reversal of Thorp’s first-degree murder
conviction and remand for a new trial because the evidence the majority suppresses
would have lawfully been procured from either an independent source or through
inevitable discovery doctrines.  Upon remand, the evidence suppressed today will
-25-
lawfully be secured by the State and again used against Thorp in his new trial. 
Thus, I conclude that the search conducted pursuant to the warrant obtained with a
defective affidavit is harmless error and its fruits cannot be excluded.  I also dissent
from the majority’s conclusion that the admission of opinion testimony by a lay
witness was improper and constituted harmful error.  The opinion testimony was
properly admitted.
Motion to Suppress
The issue of whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated by police
conduct is distinct from whether the exclusionary rule is appropriately imposed. 
See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 223 (1983).  The Fourth Amendment itself does
not preclude the use of illegally seized evidence.  See United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 906 (1984).  In fact, the use of fruits tainted by an unlawful search and
seizure “work[s] no new Fourth Amendment wrong.”  United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974).  The exclusionary rule is simply a judicial remedy created
to protect Fourth Amendment rights through deterrence of unlawful searches and
seizures.  See Leon, 468 U.S. at 906.  When determining whether the exclusionary
rule should be applied, a court must weigh the benefits of the rule’s deterrence of
police misconduct against the costs of precluding trustworthy tangible evidence in
the prosecution’s case-in-chief.  Id.  In resolving this issue, the Supreme Court held
-26-
in Leon that the exclusionary rule will not bar evidence the police obtained in
reasonable reliance on a search warrant later found invalid on appeal.  See Leon,
468 U.S. at 925-26.  Accordingly, the exclusionary rule cannot be imposed upon
evidence obtained through the unlawful conduct of the police that ultimately would
lawfully and independently have been discovered or obtained through an
independent source.  See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984); Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); see also Maulden v. State, 617
So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1993); Craig v. State, 510 So. 2d 857 (Fla. 1987).  In Nix, the
Supreme Court determined that the proper balance between society’s interest in
deterring unlawful police conduct and the public interest in having juries receive all
probative evidence of a crime would be to place police in the same position they
would have been in absent the police misconduct.  See Nix, 467 U.S. at 443-44. 
Forever excluding illegally obtained evidence would be a drastic and socially costly
course of action.  Id.
The facts here indicate that despite the police misconduct, the police would
have procured factual allegations sufficient to establish probable cause to issue the
warrant through ordinary and routine investigative procedures.  The State presented
Timothy Bullock, an inmate housed with Thorp at the Brevard County Jail during
the spring of 1994.  At that time, Thorp was being held for another unrelated
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homicide.  Bullock testified that Thorp told him that he got a lot of blood on
himself when he and another man took “a hooker” down by a bridge and “did her.” 
Bullock also testified that Thorp admitted that he expected to be blamed for the
murder of Chase.  Id.  Such information, in combination with the allegation that
Thorp was seen with blood on himself at the CITA mission on the very night of
Chase’s murder, minutes away from where her body was found, constitutes
sufficient probable cause to secure a search warrant.
Moreover, upon remand, there is clearly a basis to obtain a valid search
warrant, secure Thorp’s blood samples, and obtain the same DNA analysis that
was used in the first trial.  I believe the Court does not have to ignore the fact that
the DNA is what it is and does not change.
Furthermore, for the sake of maintaining prison security or inmate health and
safety, Thorp was and is subject to warrantless searches and seizures.  See Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559-60 (1979) (on the assumption that pretrial detainees
have a diminished expectation of privacy, warrantless body cavity searches are not
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment when balanced against the interest of
maintaining prison security); Brown v. State, 493 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
(inmates retain a diminished expectation of privacy such that warrantless searches
and seizures of an inmate’s hair, blood, or fingerprints are not unreasonable where
-28-
the inmate has been implicated in the commission of a crime).  Therefore,
independent of the defective affidavit, the police could and can legally secure
inmate Thorp’s blood samples.  See Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 392.
DNA is a modern advance in identification in criminal cases to which a lesser
standard of probable cause should be adopted than is used by the majority. 
Testing for DNA is in modern reality no more invasive of privacy than getting a
person’s name or fingerprints.  The use of Thorp’s name or fingerprints as
evidence would not be excluded.  Thorp’s blood samples should not be excluded
either.  To the contrary, the use of DNA should be encouraged by our law as a tool
serving the ends of justice as to both the not guilty and the guilty.  However, to
remand for a new trial is legally and practically unsound.
Admission of Opinion Testimony
I conclude that the trial court did not err in allowing Bullock to testify as to
the meaning of Thorp’s statement.  A jury bears the responsibility of drawing
inferences from facts that are within the ordinary experience of jurors.  See 
McGough v. State, 302 So. 2d 751, 755 (Fla. 1974).  Therefore, generally, a lay
witness may not testify in the form of opinion.  See Floyd v. State, 569 So. 2d
1225, 1232 (1990).  Section 90.701, Florida Statutes (1997), permits a lay witness
to testify in the form of opinion and inference where the
-29-
witness cannot readily, and with equal accuracy and adequacy,
communicate what he or she has perceived to the trier of fact without
testifying in terms of inferences or opinions and the witness’s use of
inferences or opinions will not mislead the trier of fact to the prejudice
of the objecting party.
§ 90.701, Fla. Stat.; see also Kersey v. State, 73 Fla. 832, 74 So. 983, 986 (1917). 
“Lay witness opinion testimony is admissible if it is within the ken of an intelligent
person with a degree of experience.” Floyd, 569 So. 2d at 1232.
The majority’s reliance on Kight v. State to find Bullock’s opinion testimony
inadmissible is misplaced.  512 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1987), receded from on other
grounds, Davis v. State, 698 So.2d 1182 (Fla. 1997).  In Kight, we excluded
testimony that elaborated on whether the codefendant encouraged the murder of the
victim by the gesture of pressing his hand over the hand of the defendant who was
pressing the knife against the victim’s throat.  See Kight, 512 So. 2d at 929.  In
Kight the gesture obviously encouraged the killing of the victim; thus, the
interpretation of the gesture improperly invaded the province of the jury.  Id.  Here,
the phrase “I did her” is slang not of ordinary usage, foreign to the understanding
of the average juror.  Bullock could not testify fully, nor could the jury understand
adequately and accurately Bullock’s perception without his testimony ascribing
meaning to this slang phrase.  Indeed, it was because Bullock testified as to the
slang phrase’s meaning that the jury was not misled.  Moreover, Bullock, unlike the
-30-
average juror, is a lay witness whose range of experience as an inmate has ordinarily
exposed him to such slang, thus qualifying him to ascribe meaning for the jury.  See
Floyd, 569 So. 2d at 1232.  Appropriately left to the jury was the determination of
the credence and weight to be given the witness.  See Jones v. State, 440 So. 2d
570, 574 (Fla. 1983).  As in other jurisdictions, clearly the law of Florida should
permit participants in conversations to explain their understanding of the meaning of
the words used in the conversations.  See United States v. Delpit, 94 F.3d 1134,
1145 (11th Cir. 1996) (“There is no more reason to expect unassisted jurors to
understand drug dealer’s cryptic slang than antitrust theory or asbestosis.”); United
States v. Flores, 63 F.3d 1342, 1359 (5th Cir. 1995) (witness’s testimony on
meaning of code phrases was essential to jury’s understanding); United States v.
Awan, 966 F.2d 1415 (11th Cir. 1992) (witness who was a police officer familiar
with finance and money laundering could properly explain terms used in the
conversation to the jury); Parker v. State, 968 S.W.2d 592, 599-600 (Ark. 1998)
(witness who was familiar with terminology around neighborhood could properly
testify to meaning of colloquial phrase “I got him,” as it aided jury, which was free
to disregard the witness’s opinion testimony); State v. Johnson, 706 A.2d 1160,
1172 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (witness who was former prisoner and had
knowledge of street terminology properly assisted jury in explaining slang phrase
12The federal cases were decided under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, which states: 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’ testimony in the form of
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally
based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the
witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.
The state cases cited were decided under a lay witness statute identical to the Federal Rule of
Evidence 701.  I do recognize that the language of section 90.701 varies from the language of the lay
opinion testimony statutes that were used to decide the cases cited above.  However, I do not read the
different language of section 90.701 to render inadmissible a lay witness’ interpretation of terms
unfamiliar to the average juror.
-31-
“get paid,” that was unfamiliar to average juror); Johnson v. State, 975 S.W.2d 644,
654 (Tex. App. 1998) (witness who was police officer could interpret slang for
jury).12  Here, the trial court properly admitted the opinion testimony.
Accordingly, I would affirm the conviction of first-degree murder.
QUINCE, J., dissenting.
While I agree with the majority that the admission of the jailhouse informant’s
testimony interpreting the meaning of the term “did her” was error, this case also
raises the question of whether there is sufficient evidence on which to base a
conviction for first-degree murder.  At best the evidence presented only
demonstrates that Thorp, at some point on the night of the murder, had sex with the
victim since the semen found in her vagina matched Thorp’s DNA.  
In addition to the DNA evidence, the State presented a witness who saw the
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victim crossing a bridge in Bean Park during the late hours on the night of her
death.  The witness gave a description of the male he saw with her.  That
description did not fit Thorp, and the witness could not identify Thorp as the
person he saw that night.  The jailhouse informant testified that Thorp admitted to
being with a “hooker” down by the bridge.  Thorp allegedly also admitted he got
blood on his clothing at that time but told the mission personnel that he was in a
fight at Burger King.  The State also presented evidence that there was some blood
on Thorp’s clothing; however, the medical examiner testified that there was no
external bleeding by the victim which would have stained someone’s clothing.
This evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from it are simply
insufficient to demonstrate premeditated or felony murder beyond a reasonable
doubt.  I would reverse this conviction based on insufficient evidence.
HARDING, J., concurs.
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Brevard County,
Tonya Rainwater, Judge - Case No. 95-21810-CF-A
James B. Gibson, Public Defender, and James R. Wulchak, Chief, Appellate Division,
Assistant Public Defender, Seventh Judicial Circuit, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Appellant
-33-
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, and Kenneth S. Nunnelley, Assistant
Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida,
for Appellee