Case Title: Richard v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1992-05-15T00:00:00Z

Document:
Richard v. State ex rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div1992 WY 106835 P.2d 365Case Number: 91-128Decided: 08/28/1992Supreme Court of Wyoming

IN THE 
MATTER OF THE WORKER'S COMPENSATION OF: NANCY RICHARD, surviving spouse of BARRY 
P. RICHARD, Appellant (Employee-Claimant),

 
 
v.

 
 
STATE OF 
WYOMING, ex 
rel. WYOMING WORKER'S COMPENSATION DIVISION, Appellee 
(Objector-Defendant).

 
 
Appeal 
from the DistrictCourtofSweetwaterCounty, the Honorable Jere 
Ryckman, Judge.

 
 
Stephen 
J. Jouard, Fort Collins, CO, for 
appellant.

 

Joseph 
B. Meyer, Attorney General; John W. Renneisen, Deputy Attorney General; and J.C. 
DeMers, Senior Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

 
 
Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, and MACY, JJ., and LEHMAN, District 
Judge.

 
 
THOMAS, 
Justice, dissenting.

 
 

[¶1.]     I dissent from the 
decision of the majority in this case. It is flawed by error in failing to apply 
settled jurisprudential rules and by a logical fallacy. Because the majority 
opinion is in error in these respects, the decision of the district court ought 
to be affirmed. The principle of liberal interpretation of the workers' 
compensation statutes could lead to a remand of the case to the district court 
with instructions for a further remand to the Workers' Compensation Division for 
additional factual consideration, but that is the limit of any effort this court 
should undertake to assist Richard's widow.

 
 

[¶2.]     I have two difficulties 
with the approach taken by the majority. The first is that, by indulging in the 
invocation of a factual presumption, the court has improperly substituted itself 
in the fact-finding role, which is the prerogative of the hearing examiner 
according to our jurisprudence. The second difficulty, perhaps even more 
important, is that the presumption upon which the majority relies to affirm the 
hearing examiner does not resolve the issue in this case and, in fact, the 
invocation of that presumption simply begs the question.

 
 

[¶3.]     Our rule is, "The court 
must accept the agency's finding of fact when it is supported by substantial 
evidence." Cheyenne Policeman Pension Bd. v. Perreault, 727 P.2d 702, 704 
(Wyo. 1986) (citing First Nat'l Bank of 
Worland v. Financial Institutions Bd., 616 P.2d 787, 793-794 (Wyo. 1980)). In honoring 
this rule we accord deference to the findings of fact made by the administrative 
agency, examining them only to determine whether the record encompasses 
substantial evidence to support them. Union Pacific R.R. v. WyomingState 
Bd. of Equalization, 802 P.2d 857, 859 (Wyo. 1990). Following these rules we have 
reversed a district court in a workers' compensation case holding that the 
district court could not make the requisite findings of fact to award 
compensation. We reversed even though we agreed with the ruling of the district 
court that substantial evidence did not support the finding of fact by the 
hearing examiner that the activities of the injured workman amounted to an 
injurious practice resulting in the forfeiture of his award of compensation. 
Wyoming Workers' Comp. Div. v. 
Hollister, 794 P.2d 886, 891 (Wyo. 1990). 

 
 

[¶4.]     The proper authority 
for finding the facts is the hearing examiner for the Workers' Compensation 
Division. The hearing examiner found facts to support a theory of employment 
coverage that is different from the one adopted by this court. This court has no 
more authority to make its independent factual determination to support a 
different theory than the district court had in 
Hollister.

 
 

[¶5.]     The question for 
resolution in this case was whether Barry Richard died because of any harmful 
change in the human organism "arising out of and in the course of employment 
while at work in or about the premises 
occupied, used or controlled by the employer" or "incurred while at work in 
places where the employer's business requires an employee's presence * * 
*." Wyo. Stat. § 27-14-102(a)(xi)(1991) (emphasis added). Specifically, 
the issue is whether Richard was "at work in or about the premises occupied, 
used or controlled by the employer" or "at work in places where the employer's 
business requires" his presence at the time of the accident that resulted in his 
death. The majority attempts to resolve that question by invoking a presumption 
from 1 Arthur Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 10.32 (1990). That 
presumption, however, depends upon the employee being "found dead under 
circumstances indicating that death took place within the time and space limits 
of the employment * * * [i.e. 'while at work']."

 
 

[¶6.]     In the context of 
Wyoming's 
statutory language, the presumption could only be useful in determining whether 
Richard's death fits within the language "arising out of and in the course of 
employment" if he was at work in accordance with the latter phrase of the 
statute. The presumption serves to provide the causal connection or nexus factor 
only if the predicate condition, i.e. the employee is "at work in or about the 
premises occupied, used or controlled by the employer," is satisfied. The 
language of the presumption assumes the existence of the critical fact that is 
in issue in this case, and for that reason the presumption is of no use in 
attempting to resolve the case. Invoking this presumption simply begs the 
question and involves the court in circular reasoning.

 
 

[¶7.]     A review of the history 
of Wyoming's 
statutory language is helpful to an understanding of the correct application of 
the presumption adopted from Larson. We begin with the provisions of the 
Wyoming 
statute found in Wyo. Stat. § 124-106-7(1) (1931). By the time this court 
decided In re Jensen, 63 Wyo. 88, 178 P.2d 897 (1947), the statute had 
been finally reenacted in 1937 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 128 § 2, and read as 
follows: 

 
 
(1) The 
words "injuries sustained in extra-hazardous employment," as used in this 
chapter, shall include death resulting from injury, and injuries to employees, 
as a result of their employment and while at work in or about the premises 
occupied, used or controlled by the employer, and injuries occurring elsewhere 
while at work in places where their employer's business requires their presence 
and subjects them to extra-hazardous duties incident to the business, but shall 
not include injuries of the employee occurring while on his way to assume the 
duties of his employment or after leaving such duties, the proximate cause of 
which injury is not the employer's negligence * * *.

 

In 
Jensen, the court adopted an exception to the almost universal rule 
encompassed in the last phrase of the statutory definitions, and held that 
coverage under the statute did exist when the employer provided transportation 
to or from the place where the duties of employment actually begin. In the 
course of explaining and construing the statute, this court 
said:

 

Just 
here we may recall that the language 
"while at work" appearing in subdivision (1) of section 124-106-7, W. R. 
S. 1931 hereinbefore quoted has been 
decided to be synonymous in meaning with the phrase "in the course of [his] employment." It 
was so held, and it would seem correctly, by the Supreme Court of New Mexico in 
McKinney v. Dorlac, 48 N. M. 149, 146 P.2d 867 construing the statute of that 
state which as before noted so closely resembles our subdivision "(l) aforesaid. 
(Emphasis added.) In re Jensen, at 63 Wyo. 117-118, 178 P.2d 908.

 
 

[¶8.]     The statute retained 
that form in Wyo. Sat. § 72-106(l) (1945), except that a 
parenthetical reference to "[article]" was inserted after the word "chapter." 
The fact that in the published statute paragraph (l) was merged into paragraph 
(k), without separate spacing, was the cause of some consternation to the 
Jensen court, which complained that it had been "(erroneously designated 
as subdivision '1' under subdivision (k) * * *)" In re Jensen, 63 Wyo. at 
99, 178 P.2d  at 900. The same statutory language was used in Wyo. Stat. § 
27-49[III.](a) (1957), except that the phrase "as used in this chapter" was 
deleted, and the phrase "including exposure to ionizing radiation" was added 
after the phrase "subjects them to extra-hazardous duties incident to the 
business" by 1967 Wyo. Sess. Laws 1967, ch. 55 § 1.

 
 

[¶9.]     The statute remained in 
this form until 1975 when the Wyoming Worker's Compensation Act was adopted in 
1975 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 149, at which time Wyo. Stat. § 27-311(n) (1957) was 
enacted to read:

 
 
(n) 
"Injury" means any harmful change in the human organism other than normal aging, 
and includes damage to or loss of a prosthetic appliance and death, arising out of and in the course of 
employment while at work in or about the premises occupied, used or controlled 
by the employer, incurred while at work in places where the employer's business 
requires an employee's presence and which subjects the employee to extra 
hazardous duties incident to the business. (emphasis 
added).

 

The 
statute still retains this language except that in 1986, when the Wyoming 
Worker's Compensation Act was recreated after repeal of the existing provisions, 
the words "any artificial replacement" were substituted for the words "a 
prosthetic appliance." Wyo. Stat. § 27-14 102(a)(xi) 
(1977).

 
 

[¶10.]  If the teaching of In re Jensen is 
applied, it is clear that the redundant language in the statute is found in the 
phrases "in the course of 
employment" and "while at work 
in or about the premises occupied, used or controlled by the employer, incurred 
while at work in places where the employer's business requires an employee's 
presence." In applying what is essentially the current language of the 
statute this court said in Matter of Willey, 571 P.2d 249, 250 (Wyo. 
1977): 

 
 
Although 
the language contained in § 27-311(n), supra [Wyo. Stat. § 27-311(n) (1957 & 
Supp. 1975)], is somewhat different from that contained in its predecessor, the 
meaning has remained the same. The provision acknowledges that injuries may 
occur on or off the premises of the employer. In either case, the injury 
is compensable if it arises out of and in the course of employment. This 
requirement emphasizes the need for a causal connection between the injury and 
the employment. Such a causal connection is supplied when there is a nexus 
between the injury and some condition, activity, environment or requirement of 
the employment. Parrott v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 145 Ohio St. 66. 60 N.E.2d 660. See, Standard Oil Co. v. Smith, 56 Wyo. 537, 111 P.2d 132; 
In re Jensen, supra [63 Wyo. 88, 178 P.2d 897]; Wyoming State 
Treasurer ex rel. Workmen's Compensation Department v. Boston, Wyo., 445 P.2d 548. Cf., White Ditching Company v. Giddeon, Wyo., 
413 P.2d 45. It is this requirement, and only this requirement, which is 
envisioned by the language contained in § 27-311(n), 
supra.

 

The 
court already had quoted the language from In re Jensen to the effect 
that while at work means the same thing as course of employment. My 
understanding of the reading of the state by this court in 1977 is that "while 
at work" has the same significance and connotation in Wyoming that "in the 
course of employment" has in our sister jurisdictions. The entire phrase "arises out of and in the course of employment" 
then means the same thing as "arises out of" means in our sister jurisdictions, 
and serves to connote the causal connection between the injury and the 
employment that the statute demands.

 
 

[¶11.]  Upon reflection it appears that this 
court went astray in Matter of Injury to Corean, 723 P.2d 58 (Wyo. 1986). We there 
refused to adopt the premises rule because we related it to the phrase "in the 
course of employment," relying upon Matter of Willey. The 
proposition adopted in Matter of Willey was not changed or expanded in 
Cottonwood Steel Corp. v. Hansen, 655 P.2d 1226 (Wyo. 1982), or Baker 
v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., 687 P.2d 855 (Wyo. 1984), both of which are 
cited in Matter of Injury to Corean. Our reasoning in Corean was 
that, if the court were to adopt the premises rule any harm suffered by the 
employee on the employer's premises would be compensable because it 
automatically would arise out of the employment. If we had been more discerning, 
we would have recognized that in Wyoming the premises rule would depend upon the 
showing that the injury occurred while 
at work in or about the premises occupied, used or controlled by the employer, and we would not have 
achieved automatic compensation because evidence of the causal relationship or 
nexus demanded by the phrase arising 
out of and in the course of employment still would have been 
required.

 
 

[¶12.]  In Matter of Injury to Corean, 723 P.2d  at 60, we said: 

 
 
The 
critical statutory phrase emphasized above [arising out of and in the course of 
employment] is found in the worker's compensation statutes of most 
states. The courts in these states recognize a subtle distinction between the 
phrases "arising out of" employment and "in the course of employment." An 
accident arises out of employment if it is causally connected to the employment; 
it occurs in the course of employment if it occurs at the time or place, or 
under the circumstances of the employment. 1 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation 
Law § 6.10 at 3-3 (1985). In a majority of the states, when an employee is hurt 
on the employer's premises, it is conclusively established under the premises 
rule that the employee was acting within the course of his employment. 
Id., § 15.00 
at 4-3. This does not mean, however, that the worker is necessarily entitled to 
benefits. He still must show that the harm arose out of his employment, i.e, was 
causally connected to his employment. Id. § 12.32 at 3-348.79.

 

It may 
be true that the distinction is subtle, but Larson treats with the two phrases 
in separate chapters of the treatise. Compare the language introducing the 
subjects:

 
 

§ 6.00 
Of the two components of the almost-universal coverage formula -- "arising out 
of and in the course of" employment -- the "arising out of" test is 
primarily concerned with causal connection.

 

1 
Larson, supra, § 6.00 at 3-1.

 
 

§ 14.00 
An injury is said to arise in the course of the employment when it takes place 
within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee reasonably 
may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or engaged in doing something 
incidental thereto.

 

1 
Larson, supra, § 14 at 4-1.

 

Larson 
relies upon Matter of Injury to Corean to conclude that Wyoming's interpretation 
of its statue is unique. 1 Larson, supra, § 6.10 at 3-2 
n.2.

 
 

[¶13.]  What seems to be even more subtle is the 
fact that it apparently escaped Larson and this court that the same distinction 
that Larson describes is embedded in the law of Wyoming, but the first function 
is ascribed to arising out of and in the course of 
employment, and the second function is ascribed to while at work in or about the premises 
occupied, used or controlled by the employer. This court rather readily 
adopted the premises rule in Archuleta v. Carbon Co. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
787 P.2d 91, 92 (Wyo. 1990), when we 
said:

 

Consistent 
with that principle [liberal construction of the workers' compensation 
statutes], we have construed the introductory paragraph of W.S. 27-14-102(a)(xi) 
to require that, for an injury to be compensable, there must exist some causal 
nexus between that injury and some condition, activity, environment or 
requirement of the employment. Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., 687 P.2d 885, 892 (Wyo. 1984); Cottonwood Steel 
Corporation v. Hansen, 655 P.d 1226, 1232-33 (Wyo. 1982); Matter of Willey, 571 P.2d 248, 250 
(Wyo. 1977). 

 

In 
Archuleta, 787 P.2d  at 93, 94, the language of the statute, "while at work in or about the premises * * * controlled by 
the employer, * * *" was emphasized by the court as well as the phrase "arising 
out of and in the course of employment." The court then held that where the 
elements of the premises rule are established, alluding to "employees having 
fixed hours and place of work, injuries occurring on the premises while they are 
going to and from work before or after working hours or at lunchtime" (1 A. 
Larson, Law of Workmen's Compensation § 15.00 at p. 4-3 (1989)), a rebuttable 
presumption of the causal connection to employment arises. This is a fairly 
straightforward distinction between our statutory 
phraseology.

 
 

[¶14.]  The majority, in the case at bar, chooses 
to eschew the premise relied upon by the hearing examiner, which was that 
Richard was traveling to and from his employment and was being reimbursed for 
that travel. That basis of coverage was rejected by the district court in 
reversing the decision of the hearing examiner. If the majority agrees with the 
district court, which apparently it does, then the district court should be 
affirmed. Instead, however, the majority invokes a presumption that is even more 
far reaching in its effect than the premises rule without reaching the reason 
offered for the rejection of the premises rule in Matter of Injury to 
Corean. Succinctly, the rule espoused by the majority is that if nobody was 
present when the employee died, there is a rebuttable presumption that the death 
arose out of and in the course of employment without regard to situs or 
circumstance.

 
 

[¶15.]  To repeat the unexplained death rule 
espoused in the majority:

 
 
When an 
employee is found dead under circumstances indicating that death took place 
within the time and space limits of the employment, in the absence of any 
evidence of what caused the death, most courts will indulge a presumption or 
inference that the death arose out of the employment 1 A. Larson, Law of 
Workmen's Compensation § 10.32 (1990).

 

Note the 
similarity of this language to the elements of the premises rule. I am satisfied 
that before the unexplained death rule can be invoked it is necessary to 
demonstrate that the employee was at 
work in or about the premises occupied, used or controlled by the 
employer or at work in places 
where the employer's business requires an employee's presence. In this 
instance the majority concludes that the unexplained death rule leads to 
coverage because application of the rule invokes a presumption that the death 
arose out of the employment. How do we know that the circumstances exist 
indicating that death took place within the time and space limits of the 
employment? It must be because the death arose out of the employment. This truly 
is circular reasoning.

 
 

[¶16.]  In addition to the proposition stated in 
the majority opinion, by quotation from 1 Larson, supra, § 10.32(c) at 
3-142, these statements are pertinent:

 
 
Generally, 
when an employee has a fixed time and place of work, and the fatal injury takes 
place outside these boundaries, with no reasonable basis from which to infer 
some work-connected activity, the unexplained-death rule cannot take 
hold.

 

1 
Larson, supra, § 10.32(c) at 3-142.

 
 
When an 
employee has no fixed hours or place of work, the present problem is complicated 
by the necessity of determining whether the particular errand was business or 
personal.

 

1 
Larson, supra § 10.32(c) at 3-144.

 

The 
first language quoted immediately above is entirely consistent with the theory 
of liability invoked by the hearing examiner that depended upon Richard's 
traveling to his place of employment. The latter language is a classic 
description of this case, and it should not be resolved by invoking the 
unexplained death rule without establishing that "death took place within the 
time and space limits of the employment."

 
 

[¶17.]  It appears that there is evidence in the 
record that well might justify a conclusion that Richard died "while at work in 
[a place] where the employer's business" required his presence. Wyo. Stat. § 
27-14-102(a)(xi). The hearing examiner did not so find, however, and the only 
justification for a remand would be to have the hearing examiner further 
consider the significance of a prior telephone conversation between Richard and 
his supervisor, McConnell, to determine if an inference could be supported of a 
similar purpose for this trip.

 
 

[¶18.]  Since I conclude that it is inappropriate 
for this court to inject itself into the fact finding function and it is not 
sound legal reasoning for this court to find as a fact that the statutory 
provisions were satisfied by invocation of the Larson presumption, I would 
affirm the decision of the district court. I agree that the justification 
invoked by the hearing examiner is not supportable on this record, and I am 
satisfied that the case cannot he rationally solved by invocation of the Larson 
presumption.