Case Title: STATE v HALL

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 1983-05-05T00:00:00Z

Document:
Yo. 82-232 I N T H E SUPREME C O U R T O F TEE STATE OF MONTANA 1983 STATE O F MONTANA, P l a i n t i f f and Respondent, -vs- KEVIN D. HALL, Defendant and Appellant. Aspeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , I n and f o r t h e County of Cascade, The Honorable John M. McCarvel, Judge ? r e s i d i n g . Counsel of Record: For Appellant: Thomas E. Boland, Great F a l l s , Montana For Respondent: Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great F a l l s , Montana Submitted on B r i e f s : March 17, 1983 Decided: MaY 5 1 1983 F i l e d : MAY 5 - 1983 -- Clerk M r . J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e C o u r t . Kevin H a l l was charged w i t h t h e crime of f e l o n y t h e f t i n t h e E i g h t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , County of Cascade. An i n f o r m a t i o n , f i l e d on J a n u a r y 11, 1982, a l l e g e d t h a t H a l l p u r p o s e l y or knowingly o b t a i n e d c o n t r o l o v e r a 1964 C h e v r o l e t 3/4 t o n p i c k u p t r u c k , knowing t h a t t h e t r u c k had been s t o l e n by a n o t h e r , and p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly used, concealed o r abandoned t h e p r o p e r t y i n such a manner as to d e p r i v e t h e owner. These a l l e g a t i o n s , i f s u p p o r t e d , would e s t a b l i s h commission of t h e o f f e n s e of the£ t p u r s u a n t to s e c t i o n 45-6-301 ( 3 ) ( b ) , MCA. The d e f e n d a n t pled n o t g u i l t y and t h e case was p r e s e n t e d to a jury. The j u r y r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t o f g u i l t y . The d e f e n d a n t was r e l e a s e d on h i s own r e c o g n i z a n c e pending i m p o s i t i o n of s e n t e n c e . P r i o r to sen- t e n c i n g , d e f e n d a n t f i l e d a motion f o r a new t r i a l . Hearing on t h e motion was h e l d May 7, 1982. The c o u r t denied t h e motion. T h e r e a f t e r , on May 1 0 , 1982, d e f e n d a n t was sentenced to t e n y e a r s imprisonment as a p e r s i s t e n t f e l o n y o f f e n d e r and f i v e y e a r s imprisonment f o r t h e crime of the£ t. The f i v e - y e a r s e n t e n c e was suspended. A t t h e s e n t e n c i n g h e a r i n g , d e f e n d a n t made known h i s i n t e n t i o n s to s e e k r e v i e w i n t h i s C o u r t , and i n c o n n e c t i o n t h e r e w i t h made an o r a l motion t o s t a y t h e e x e c u t i o n of s e n t e n c e pending a p p e a l . The w r i t t e n motion and t h e n o t i c e of appeal were f i l e d on t h a t same day. The c o u r t denied t h e s t a y of e x e c u t i o n , and d e f e n d a n t was s e n t to t h e s t a t e p r i s o n a t Deer Lodge. On August 31, 1982, t h e d e f e n d a n t f i l e d a motion i n t h i s C o u r t to s t a y t h e a p p e a l and to remand t h e case to t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . D e f e n d a n t ' s motion w a s based upon t h e claim of newly- d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e . On September 3 , 1982, t h i s Court g r a n t e d d e f e n d a n t ' s motion and t h e c a s e was a g a i n b e f o r e t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of whether a new t r i a l s h o u l d be g r a n t e d because of t h e new e v i d e n c e . On November 1 5 , 1982, t h e District Court heard arguments and on November 30 e n t e r e d f i n d - i n g s of f a c t and c o n c l u s i o n s of law and denied d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r a new t r i a l . I n e f f e c t , t h e c o u r t r u l e d t h a t t h e r e was no new e v i d e n c e on which to award a new t r i a l . The d e f e n d a n t h a s r a i s e d t h r e e i s s u e s f o r o u r review; (1) whether t h e r e is s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e t o s u p p o r t t h e v e r d i c t of g u i l t y , ( 2 ) whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d by not g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l , and ( 3 ) whether t h e r e was a d e n i a l of e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l a t t r i a l . W e have c a r e f u l l y reviewed t h e r e c o r d and f i n d no merit i n a p p e l l a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n s , t h e r e f o r e t h e District C o u r t I s judgment and s e n t e n c e is af f irmed . On or a b o u t November 13, 1980, a black-colored 1964 C h e v r o l e t 3/4 t o n p i c k u p was r e p o r t e d s t o l e n from Lucky Motors i n Great F a l l s . The p i c k u p was n o t s e e n a g a i n u n t i l more t h a n a y e a r l a t e r when Wayne Thody s p o t t e d it i n t h e parking l o t of a Great F a l l s r e s t a u r a n t . Thody had owned t h e t r u c k p r i o r to t r a n s - f e r r i n g it to Lucky Motors. Thody knew t h a t Chuck P l a n t , t h e owner of Lucky Motors , had r e p o r t e d t h e t r u c k s t o l e n . Thody t e l e p h o n e d P l a n t who i n t u r n telephoned t h e p o l i c e d e p a r t m e n t . Thody had t h e f o r e s i g h t to r e l a y t h e l i c e n s e p l a t e number, which was 2T-41247. The p o l i c e i n v e s t i g a t e d . The l i c e n s e p l a t e number belonged t o a 1963 g r e e n GMC p i c k u p t r u c k owned by M r . F l a d s t o l , t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s s t e p f a t h e r . A p o l i c e o f f i c e r c o n t a c t e d Mrs. F l a d s t o l c o n c e r n i n g t h e l i c e n s e p l a t e . Mrs. F l a d s t o l showed t h e o f f i c e r a v e h i c l e r e g i s t r a t i o n , con£ irming t h a t t h e number 2T-41247 was r e g i s t e r e d f o r a 1963 GMC pickup. Mrs. F l a d s t o l also informed t h e o f f i c e r t h a t t h e GMC t r u c k had r e c e n t l y been involved i n an a c c i d e n t i n which h e r s o n , t h e d e f e n d a n t , w a s t h e d r i v e r . The o f f i c e r who i n v e s t i g a t e d t h e a c c i d e n t noted t h a t t h e l i c e n s e p l a t e number of t h e GMC w a s 2T-41247; t a k e n from t h e f r o n t l i c e n s e p l a t e on t h e v e h i c l e . The o f f i c e r d i d n o t n o t i c e whether t h e v e h i c l e had a rear l i c e n s e p l a t e . A t t h i s p o i n t , t h e p o l i c e were confused. They had r e c e i v e d a r e p o r t t h a t a s t o l e n 1964 C h e v r o l e t p i c k u p was s e e n b e a r i n g t h e same l i c e n s e p l a t e number as a 1963 GMC p i c k u p which had r e c e n t l y been involved i n an a c c i d e n t . The p o l i c e thought t h a t Thody had i n c o r r e c t l y r e l a y e d t h e number on t h e s t o l e n 1964 C h e v r o l e t . However, t h e p o l i c e would soon l e a r n t h a t no m i s t a k e was made. Dave Richardson c a l l e d t h e p o l i c e and informed them t h a t he t h o u g h t h i s r e c e n t l y a c q u i r e d 1964 b l a c k C h e v r o l e t p i c k u p t r u c k was a s t o l e n v e h i c l e . About two weeks earlier, Richardson a c q u i r e d t h e 1964 C h e v r o l e t , w i t h o u t t i t l e or keys, from t h e d e f e n d a n t , Kevin H a l l . With t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n , t h e p o l i c e con- t a c t e d Chuck P l a n t who p o s i t i v e l y i d e n t i f i e d t h e t r u c k as t h e one t h a t was s t o l e n from h i s used car l o t . The p o l i c e t h e n impounded t h e v e h i c l e . When t h e p o l i c e f i r s t viewed t h e s t o l e n t r u c k it had no l i c e n s e p l a t e s . However, when q u e s t i o n e d a b o u t t h e matter, Richardson r e t r i e v e d from t h e garbage a l i c e n s e p l a t e w i t h t h e number 211-41247, which should have been on t h e 1963 GMC owned by M r . F l a d s t o l . Richardson had removed t h e p l a t e a t t h e urging of t h e d e f e n d a n t . Richardson t e s t i f i e d a t t r i a l t h a t when he g o t t h e t r u c k from t h e d e f e n d a n t t h e p l a t e was on t h e v e h i c l e ; a p p a r e n t l y an arrangement whereby t h e t r u c k could be d r i v e n on t h e streets. According t o t h e s t a t e ' s v e r s i o n of t h e f a c t s , t h e d e f e n d a n t began to worry when he l e a r n e d t h a t t h e p o l i c e had c o n t a c t e d h i s mother concerning t h e l i c e n s e p l a t e . The d e f e n d a n t t h e n con- t a c t e d Richardson and t o l d him t h a t he should remove t h e l i c e n s e p l a t e and throw it away, and t h a t he should d i s g u i s e t h e t r u c k by p a i n t i n g it w i t h g r a y primer p a i n t because t h e t r u c k was s t o l e n . I t w a s a f t e r l e a r n i n g t h e s e t h i n g s t h a t Richardson c o n t a c t e d t h e p o l i c e . The d e f e n d a n t a d m i t s t h a t he t r a n s f e r r e d a p i c k u p t r u c k to Richardson i n exchange f o r a n a i r compressor and a wheel b a l a n c e r . However, t h e d e f e n d a n t claims t h a t t h e s t o l e n 1964 C h e v r o l e t w a s n o t t h e p i c k u p involved. H e claims t h a t he gave Richardson a n o t h e r pickup, a 1962 C h e v r o l e t h a l f - t o n . Concerning t h e l i c e n s e p l a t e , d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h a t Richardson must have removed t h e p l a t e from t h e 1963 GMC when it had been towed to a wrecking yard a f t e r t h e a c c i d e n t . H e f u r t h e r a d m i t s t h a t he con- t a c t e d R i c h a r d s o n , n o t to t e l l him t h e t r u c k was s t o l e n , b u t to q u e s t i o n him a b o u t t h e l i c e n s e p l a t e t h a t he s u s p e c t e d Richardson had t a k e n . The j u r y d i d n o t b e l i e v e d e f e n d a n t ' s v e r s i o n of t h e f a c t s and r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t of g u i l t y . Defendant a r g u e s t h a t t h e v e r d i c t is n o t s u p p o r t e d by s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e . W e d i s a g r e e . I n d e t e r m i n i n g whether s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e e x i s t s to s u p p o r t t h e v e r d i c t , w e w i l l view t h e evidence i n a l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o t h e p r e v a i l i n g p a r t y . The evidence may be i n h e r e n t l y weak and it may c o n f l i c t w i t h o t h e r e v i d e n c e y e t still be deemed substan- t i a l . Gunnels v. Hoyt ( 1 9 8 1 ) , Mont . , 633 P.2d 1187, 38 St.Rep. 1492. A p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e o n l y e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t him comes from t h e t e s t i m o n y of Dave Richardson, t h e p e r s o n who w a s i n p o s s e s s i o n of t h e s t o l e n t r u c k when t h e p o l i c e began t h e i r i n v e s t i g a t i o n . A p p a r e n t l y , t h e a p p e l l a n t sees a r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e d e f i n i t i o n of s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e and Richardson 's q u e s t i o n a b l e a c t i o n s i n t h i s c a s e . Richardson admitted d u r i n g d i r e c t examination t h a t he accepted t h e 1964 C h e v r o l e t w i t h o u t a t i t l e and w i t h o u t k e y s . A l s o , upon l e a r n i n g t h a t t h e v e h i c l e d i d n o t have a V I N ( v e h i c l e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n number) p l a t e , Richardson a d m i t t e d t h a t he i n s t a l l e d a f a k e number p l a t e and o b t a i n e d a f a k e t i t l e to match. N o n e t h e l e s s , Richardson maintained t h a t he d i d n o t know t h e t r u c k was s t o l e n u n t i l a f t e r t h e d e f e n d a n t t o l d him so. R e g a r d l e s s of R i c h a r d s o n ' s a c t i o n s , c o n c l u s i o n s drawn a b o u t h i s v e r a c i t y are q u e s t i o n s f o r t h e jury. A s we s a i d i n -- Gunnels, - - -- -- Mont. a t - , 633 P.2d a t 1191, 38 St.Rep. a t 1495, where t h e r e c o r d c o n t a i n s con£ l i c t ing e v i d e n c e , " t h e c r e d i b i l i t y and w e i g h t g i v e n to such c o n f l i c t i n g e v i d e n c e is t h e p r o v i n c e of t h e j u r y and n o t t h i s Court ." While Richardson 's t e s t i m o n y was i m p o r t a n t to t h e state's case , it cannot be s a i d t h a t it was t h e o n l y e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t . Michael Barsotti t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t t o l d him t h a t t h e p i c k u p was s t o l e n and t h a t he ( B a r s o t t i ) s h o u l d t e l l Richardson to g e t some p a i n t to c o v e r t h e o r i g i n a l color. Barsotti also t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t s a i d he had l e n t t h e l i c e n s e p l a t e t o Richardson so t h e t r u c k could be d r i v e n on t h e streets. W e f i n d s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e to s u p p o r t t h e v e r d i c t of g u i l t y . Next, w e c o n s i d e r whether t h e c o u r t e r r e d i n denying d e f e n d a n t ' s motion f o r a new t r i a l . T h i s i s s u e concerns t h e f i r s t motion, n o t t h e motion made w h i l e a r g u i n g f o r newly- d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e . A p p e l l a n t ' s argument is two-fold . F i r s t, a p p e l l a n t claims t h a t t h e c o u r t d i d n o t r e c o g n i z e its i n h e r e n t d i s c r e t i o n , and a s a r e s u l t , f a i l e d to e x e r c i s e d i s c r e t i o n . Second, a p p e l l a n t a r g u e s t h a t t h e c o u r t e r r e d by n o t s p e c i f y i n g its r e a s o n s f o r denying t h e motion. These c o n t e n t i o n s w i l l be d e a l t w i t h i n t u r n . W e f i n d it d i f f i c u l t to imagine how t h e c o u r t could deny t h e motion w i t h o u t e x e r c i s i n g d i s c r e t i o n . A p p e l l a n t cites t h e f o l l o w i n g comment by t h e District Court judge: "Well, I have some p e r s o n a l d o u b t s i n my own mind about t h i s case. It is n o t up to me to d e c i d e t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e w i t n e s s e s , t h a t is f o r t h e j u r y to d e c i d e . The t e s t i m o n y of one w i t n e s s who is e n t i t l e d to f u l l c r e d i t is s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h e proof of any f a c t . And, of c o u r s e , twelve people i n t h e j u r y decided t h e c r e d i b i l i t y of t h e w i t n e s s e s , so I c a n ' t see how I c a n t u r n around now and t r y to s a y t h e i r judgment of c r e d i b i l i t y was wrong. So, t h e r e - f o r e , I ' m going to deny t h e Motion f o r new t r i a l . " W e do n o t see t h e above as a j u d i c i a l d e n i a l of its own d i s c r e t i o n a r y power, r a t h e r it shows t h a t t h e c o u r t w a s w e l l aware of t h e l i m i t s of its d i s c r e t i o n . A s we s a i d i n Lyndes v. S c o f i e l d ( 1 9 7 9 ) , 180 Mont. 177, 180, 589 P.2d 1000, 1002, " ' t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n is exhausted when it f i n d s s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e to s u p p o r t t h e v e r d i c t . ' ( c i t a t i o n omitted ) N e i t h e r may a D i s t r i c t Court g r a n t a new t r i a l o n l y on t h e b a s i s t h a t it chose to b e l i e v e one l i n e of t e s t i m o n y d i f f e r e n t from t h a t which t h e j u r y b e l i e v e d . " The j u d g e ' s comments o n l y r e f l e c t an awareness o f t h e above p r i n c i p l e s . Next, we c o n s i d e r a p p e l l a n t ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e c o u r t f a i l e d to s p e c i f y r e a s o n s f o r d e n i a l of t h e motion. A p p e l l a n t assumes t h a t such r e a s o n s a r e r e q u i r e d . W e are c i t e d to S t a t e v. W i l l i a m s ( 1 9 8 1 ) , - Mont . -- - , 632 P.2d 328, 38 St.Rep. 1253, f o r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t when a t r i a l c o u r t d e n i e s a motion f o r new t r i a l , it must state its r e a s o n s t h e r e f o r e . A p p e l l a n t m i s r e a d s t h e c a s e . I n W i l l i a m s , we reviewed an o r d e r g r a n t i n g --- - - t h e d e f e n d a n t a new t r i a l . I n g r a n t i n g t h e new t r i a l , t h e c o u r t d i d n o t s p e c i f y its r e a s o n s . W e noted t h a t s e c t i o n 46-16-702, MCA, "does n o t r e q u i r e t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t Court e x p r e s s l y state its r e a s o n s f o r t a k i n g whatever a c t i o n it deems a p p r o p r i a t e r e g a r d i n g [motions f o r new t r i a l ] ." However, w e h e l d t h a t t h e mandates of Rule 5 9 ( f ) , M.R.Civ.P. are a p p l i c a b l e to motions f o r new t r i a l i n c r i m i n a l a c t i o n s . Rule 59 ( f ) , M.R.Civ.P. r e q u i r e s t h a t " [ a J n y o r d e r of t h e c o u r t g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l , s h a l l spe- c i f y t h e grounds t h e r e f o r w i t h s u f f i c i e n t p a r t i c u l a r i t y as to a p p r i s e t h e p a r t i e s and t h e a p p e l l a t e Court of t h e r a t i o n a l e u n d e r l y i n g t h e r u l i n g , and t h i s may be done i n t h e body of t h e o r d e r , or i n an a t t a c h e d opinion." W i l l i a m s h o l d s t h a t r e a s o n s - - - - must be s t a t e d when g r a n t i n g a new t r i a l , it does n o t h o l d as s u c h when a c o u r t d e n i e s a motion f o r new t r i a l . Even i f a p p e l l a n t ' s r e a d i n g of W i l l i a m s were correct, h i s - argument would n o t p e r s u a d e t h i s C o u r t . The d i s t r i c t judge d i d s t a t e h i s r e a s o n s f o r d e n i a l of t h e motion. I t is e v i d e n t from t h e j u d g e ' s comments c i t e d above t h a t he d e f e r r e d to t h e j u r y as t h e f i n d e r of f a c t ; i n e f f e c t , r u l i n g t h a t s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e e x i s t e d t o s u p p o r t t h e v e r d i c t . Next, w e a d d r e s s a p p e l l a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n t h a t he was denied e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l a t t h e t r i a l l e v e l . A p p e l l a n t a l l e g e s numerous i n s t a n c e s of e r r o r , conceding t h a t no s i n g l e i n s t a n c e i n and o f i t s e l f would w a r r a n t r e v e r s a l . However, a p p e l l a n t a s k s t h i s Court t o c o n s i d e r t h e c u m u l a t i v e e f f e c t of t h e many " e r r o r s and omissions." W e have recognized t h a t t h e claim of i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e o f c o u n s e l may be p r e d i c a t e d upon t h e c u m u l a t i v e e f f e c t of r e p r e - s e n t a t i o n . I n S t a t e v. McElveen ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 168 Mont. 500, 509, 544 P.2d 820, 824, we s t a t e d : " ' [ a l d e q u a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n i n a cri- m i n a l proceeding is t h e cumulative act of a f f o r d i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t a n a d e q u a t e d e f e n s e . " ( c i t i n g Smotherman v. Beto ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 276 F.Supp. 579, 5 8 6 ) . I n s u p p o r t of h i s argument, a p p e l l a n t a l l e g e s more t h a n t h i r t y i n s t a n c e s of e r r o r . W e have c a r e f u l l y reviewed t h e r e c o r d and conclude t h a t a p p e l l a n t was e f f e c t i v e l y r e p r e - s e n t e d by t r i a l c o u n s e l . I n reviewing t h e r e c o r d , we have been m i n d f u l o f t h e s t a n d a r d adopted by t h i s Court i n S t a t e v. Rose (1980 . - - . - .- Mon t . - - . . , 608 P.2d 1074, 1081, 37 St.Rep. 642, 649-50; " ' [ p l e r s o n s accused of crime are e n t i t l e d to t h e e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l a c t i n g w i t h i n t h e range of com- p e t e n c e demanded of a t t o r n e y s i n c r i m i n a l cases. " A p p e l l a n t ' s claim is g r o u n d l e s s . W e are d i s t u r b e d and irri- t a t e d by what is an unfounded a t t a c k on t h e competence of t r i a l c o u n s e l . It is obvious t h a t a p p e l l a t e c o u n s e l scoured t h e r e c o r d i n an e f f o r t t o make h i s cumulative total as high as p o s s i b l e ; a p p a r e n t l y n o t c a r i n g whether h i s arguments had s u b s t a n c e . I n s e v e r a l i n s t a n c e s t h e r e c o r d is m i s s t a t e d . S e n t e n c e s are t a k e n o u t of c o n t e x t . Many of t h e a l l e g e d e r r o r s are not errors a t a l l , and i f t h e r e are i n s t a n c e s of error, they are t r i v i a l . A p p e l l a n t seems to conclude t h a t t h e b a s i s of a l l error was i n a d e q u a t e p r e p a r a t i o n . A s i l l u s t r a t i v e of t h i s p o i n t , we are c i t e d to a p o r t i o n of t h e t r a n s c r i p t where d e f e n s e c o u n s e l sup- p o s e d l y t e l l s t h e j u r y i n c l o s i n g argument t h a t "he d i d n o t meet w i t h D e f e n d a n t ' s w i t n e s s e s and p r e p a r e them f o r t h i s t r i a l . . ." I n o t h e r words, a p p e l l a n t would have u s b e l i e v e t h a t d e f e n s e c o u n s e l f a i l e d to i n t e r v i e w h i s own w i t n e s s e s p r i o r to t r i a l , and even a d m i t t e d it to t h e jury. T h i s is n o t s o . Defense c o u n s e l was a t t e m p t i n g to e x p l a i n i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s i n t h e t e s t i m o n y of h i s w i t n e s s e s . H e s t a t e d , "I d i d n ' t ask them to g e t t o g e t h e r and s t r a i g h t e n t h e i r s t o r i e s o u t because I wanted them to a l s o be h o n e s t , and t h e y came and t o l d you what they remembered ." T h i s is c l e a r l y n o t an admission of f a i l u r e to i n t e r v i e w w i t n e s s e s . T h i s is c l e a r l y an e f f o r t to mislead t h i s Court. I n a n o t h e r i n s t a n c e of a l l e g e d error, a p p e l l a n t c l a i m s t h a t t r i a l c o u n s e l , i n c l o s i n g argument, s t a t e d t h a t he d i d n o t know i f t h e g r e e n GMC had a r e a r l i c e n s e p l a t e a t t h e t i m e of t h e a c c i d e n t ; t h i s s t a t e m e n t being c o n t r a r y to d e f e n d a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n t h a t t h e r e was a r e a r l i c e n s e p l a t e on t h e v e h i c l e . A p p e l l a n t s u g g e s t s t h a t d e f e n s e c o u n s e l c a s t doubt on h i s own c l i e n t ' s s t a t e m e n t s . A r e a d i n g of t h e t r a n s c r i p t i n d i c a t e s t h a t d e f e n s e c o u n s e l made t h e s e remarks i n r e f e r e n c e to t h e testimony of t h e a c c i d e n t i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f f i c e r , who t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e , t h e - - - o f f i c e r , d i d n o t know i f t h e r e was a r e a r l i c e n s e p l a t e . I n . - - o t h e r words, d e f e n s e c o u n s e l was merely r e l a t i n g t h e o f f icer's testimony. Again, t h i s is an e f f o r t to mislead t h i s Court. I n a n o t h e r i n s t a n c e , a p p e l l a n t r e f e r s t o a p o r t i o n of t h e t r a n s c r i p t where t h e " T r i a l Court reprimands t h e p r o s e c u t o r f o r c o n t i n u a l l y a s k i n g h e a r s a y q u e s t i o n s ( i n s p i t e of no o b j e c t i o n from t h e Defense Counsel) and t h e Court t h e n l e c t u r e s t h e P r o s e c u t o r on t h e d e f i n i t i o n of h e a r s a y and t h e r e a s o n s f o r t h e h e a r s a y r u l e . " W e see no h i n t of a reprimand from t h e c o u r t ; r a t h e r , we see an e x p l a n a t i o n t o t h e j u r y of t h e hearsay r u l e . Furthermore, w e n o t e t h a t it was d e f e n s e c o u n s e l ' s hearsay objec- t i o n t h a t prompted t h e c o u r t ' s comments. A p p e l l a n t ' s r e a d i n g of t h e t r a n s c r i p t is s t r a i n e d . S e v e r a l o t h e r a l l e g e d errors i n d i c a t e to u s t h a t a p p e l l a n t was s t r i v i n g t o make t h e " e r r o r c o u n t " a s high a s p o s s i b l e . A p p e l l a n t complains of t h r e e q u e s t i o n s asked by t h e p r o s e c u t o r of a p o l i c e d e t e c t i v e . Each of t h e t h r e e q u e s t i o n s could have been o b j e c t e d to a s h e a r s a y , y e t d e f e n s e counsel made no o b j e c t i o n s . The q u e s t i o n s focused on s t a t e m e n t s made by Dave Richardson con- c e r n i n g t h e f a k e V I N p l a t e . A p p e l l a n t contends t h a t d e f e n s e c o u n s e l s h o u l d n o t have l e t t h i s t e s t i m o n y i n . Y e t , i n a n o t h e r s p e c i f i c a t i o n of a l l e g e d error , a p p e l l a n t c r i t i c i z e s t r i a l coun- sel f o r a p e r c e i v e d f a i l u r e t o cross-examine Richardson con- c e r n i n g h i s q u e s t i o n a b l e a c t i o n s i n o b t a i n i n g t h e f a k e VIN p l a t e . A p p e l l a n t sees error both ways, f i r s t f o r l e t t i n g t h e t e s t i m o n y i n , and t h e n f o r n o t g e t t i n g it i n . Many o t h e r i n s t a n c e s are not error a t a l l or d e a l w i t h a q u e s t i o n of t a c t i c s . A p p e l l a n t claims t h a t d e f e n s e c o u n s e l s h o u l d have o b j e c t e d t o t h e admission of s e v e r a l p h o t o g r a p h s of t h e s t o l e n t r u c k , y e t he o f f e r s no p o s s i b l e grounds f o r t h e o b j e c t i o n . A p p e l l a n t f a i l s to r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e p h o t o g r a p h s were u s e f u l ; h i s w i t n e s s e s viewed t h e photographs and t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e y d i d n o t r e p r e s e n t t h e p i c k u p t h a t d e f e n d a n t t r a n s f e r r e d t o Richardson. A l s o , i n connect i o n w i t h t h e photographs; a p p e l l a n t claims t h a t an e x c e l l e n t o p p o r t u n i t y was missed to v o i r d i r e Chuck P l a n t concerning t h e i d e n t i t y of t h e v e h i c l e s i n c e it had been m i s s i n g f o r o v e r a y e a r and s i n c e it was o n l y on P l a n t ' s l o t f o r a couple of weeks. W e do n o t see a missed o p p o r t u n i t y ; r a t h e r , w e see w i s e r e s t r a i n t on t h e p a r t of d e f e n s e c o u n s e l . P l a n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t he recognized h i s t r u c k i n t h e p h o t o g r a p h s because of t w o d i s t i n c t i v e f e a t u r e s , homemade mud£ l a p s and body damage on t h e door. A c h a l l e n g e of P l a n t on t h e s e p o i n t s could have been d e t r i m e n t a l to d e f e n d a n t , n o t b e n e f i c i a l . A p p e l l a n t lists s e v e r a l i n d i v i d u a l s who s h o u l d have been c a l l e d as w i t n e s s e s by d e f e n s e c o u n s e l . Supposedly, t h e s e i n d i - v i d u a l s had a d d i t i o n a l and material in£ o r m a t i o n . It was p a r t l y on t h e b a s i s of a f f i d a v i t s from t h e s e people t h a t a p p e l l a n t moved for a new t r i a l on t h e grounds of newly-discovered e v i d e n c e . I n denying a new t r i a l , t h e c o u r t c o n s i d e r e d t h e i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e s e a f f i d a v i t s as e i t h e r c u m u l a t i v e , n o t p r o b a t i v e or n o t material. S e v e r a l o t h e r a l l e g e d errors are d i s c u s s e d by a p p e l l a n t , none o f which d e s e r v e d i s c u s s i o n . These i q c l u d e : e r r o r of d e f e n s e c o u n s e l f o r r e s e r v i n g h i s opening s t a t e m e n t u n t i l t h e close of t h e s t a t e ' s case f a i l u r e to o b j e c t to p r o s e c u t o r i a l comments d u r i n g opening s t a t e m e n t t h a t d e f e n d a n t was g u i l t y ; s e v e r a l missed o b j e c t i o n s to l e a d i n g q u e s t i o n s and q u e s t i o n s c a l l i n g f o r h e a r s a y ; e r r o r of d e f e n s e counsel f o r r e f e r r i n g to t h e 1963 GMC as a 1964 model; f a i l u r e of d e f e n s e c o u n s e l to o f f e r a j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n on d e f e n d a n t ' s " t h e o r y of t h e case ," y e t a p p e l l a n t d o e s n o t s u g g e s t what might have been o f f e r e d ; f a i l u r e of d e f e n s e c o u n s e l t o o b j e c t to p r o s e c u t o r i a l s t a t e m e n t s on c l o s i n g argument vouching f o r t h e t r u t h f u l n e s s of Dave Richardson; and f a i l u r e of d e f e n s e c o u n s e l to e x p l a i n t h e concept of r e a s o n a b l e doubt to t h e j u r y . Where i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l is c l a i m e d , t h e d e f e n d a n t must show error of c o u n s e l stemming from n e g l e c t or i g n o r a n c e and r e s u l t i n g i n p r e j u d i c e to t h e d e f e n d a n t . S t a t e v. Morigeau ( 1 9 8 2 ) , - Mon t . -. , 656 P.2d 185, 39 St.Rep. 2311. W e see no error, s i n g l y or c u m u l a t i v e l y , which p r e j u d i c e d defen- d a n t . The a s s e r t i o n of i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l is a s e r i o u s c h a r g e . An a t t o r n e y ' s r e p u t a t i o n is h i s most p r i z e d p o s s e s s i o n . A p p e l l a t e c o u n s e l might have conducted t h e t r i a l d i f f e r e n t l y , however, " t h e f a c t t h a t some o t h e r lawyer . . . would have done d i f f e r e n t l y . . . is no ground f o r branding t h e appointed a t t o r n e y w i t h t h e opprobrium of i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s , or in£ i d e l i t y , or incompetency . . . A s no t w o men can be e x a c t l y a l i k e i n t h e p r a c t i c e of t h e pro- f e s s i o n , it is b a s i c a l l y unreasonable t o judge a n a t t o r n e y by what a n o t h e r would have done, o r s a y s he would have done, i n t h e , b e t t e r l i g h t of h i n d s i g h t . " S t a t e v. Lopez (198O), I -- Mont . 605 P.2d 178, 180-81, 37- S t . ~ e p . 3%, -38-9-. ( C i t i n g W i l l i a m s v. B e t o ( 5 t h C i r . 1 9 6 5 ) , 354 F.2d 698, 706.) Our f o l l o w i n g comments are n o t intended t o d i s c o u r a g e v a l i d and s u b s t a n t i a t e d a s s e r t i o n s of i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of coun- sel. The r i g h t to e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel is g u a r a n t e e d b y t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and t h i s S t a t e ' s C o n s t i t u t i o n . S t a t e v. Rose, s u p r a . An a t t o r n e y would be remiss i n h i s d u t i e s i f he f a i l s t o act when he r e a s o n a b l y b e l i e v e s h i s c l i e n t is d e n i e d t h i s r i g h t . However, i n t h i s c a s e , a p p e l l a t e c o u n s e l a t t e m p t e d to manufacture a n i s s u e . H i s argument is n o t o n l y f r i v o l o u s , it is based i n p a r t on b l a t a n t m i s s t a t e m e n t s of t h e r e c o r d . Such a c t i o n s w i l l n o t be t o l e r a t e d . Counsel is reminded o f D i s c i p l i n a r y Rules 7-102(A)(2) and ( 5 ) which state: " I n h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of a c l i e n t , a lawyer s h a l l n o t : " ( 2 ) knowingly advance a claim or d e f e n s e t h a t is unwarranted under e x i s t i n g l a w ; " ( 5 ) knowingly make a f a l s e s t a t e m e n t of l a w or f a c t . Canons of P r o f e s s i o n a l E t h i c s , 160 Mont. x x i i i , x l i v . " F i n a l l y , w e c o n s i d e r a matter r a i s e d i n a p p e l l a n t ' s r e p l y b r i e f . A p p e l l a n t reasserts h i s i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l argument i n view of an e x h i b i t c o n t a i n e d i n r e s p o n d e n t ' s b r i e f . A p p e l l a n t claims t h a t e x h i b i t 3 of r e s p o n d e n t ' s b r i e f is "proof p o s i t i v e t h a t t h e A p p e l l a n t , Kevin H a l l , d i d n o t r e c e i v e ef fec- t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l a t h i s t r i a l and h i s c o n v i c t i o n -- must be r e v e r s e d . " E x h i b i t 3 is an a f f i d a v i t signed by d e f e n s e c o u n s e l , s t a t i n g t h a t "Kevin D. H a l l a d v i s e d af f i a n t t h a t H a l l r e c e i v e d t h e t r u c k from one P e t e P e t e r s o n .I1 Furthermore, d e f e n s e counsel states he t r a v e l e d to t h e Montana S t a t e P r i s o n to i n t e r v i e w P e t e r s o n who w a s s e r v i n g time f o r f o r g e r y . Apparently, P e t e r s o n t o l d d e f e n s e c o u n s e l t h a t he knew nothing of t h e b l a c k 1964 C h e v r o l e t . Respondent included t h i s e x h i b i t t o c o u n t e r arguments by a p p e l l a n t t h a t P e t e r s o n should have been c a l l e d a s a w i t n e s s ; and s i n c e he w a s n o t c a l l e d , it helped i l l u s t r a t e i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l . A p p e l l a n t u r g e s t h a t d e f e n s e c o u n s e l v i o l a t e d t h e Canons of P r o f e s s i o n a l E t h i c s by f a i l i n g to p r e s e r v e t h e c o n f i d e n c e s and secrets of a c l i e n t . W e r e f u s e to c o n s i d e r t h e e x h i b i t and t h e a s s e r t i o n s of a p p e l l a n t . They are n o t rele- v a n t to t h e i s s u e s r a i s e d on a p p e a l , nor are they p a r t of t h e r e c o r d . W e w i l l n o t t o l e r a t e a t t e m p t s to i n t r o d u c e e x t r a n e o u s i n f o r m a t i o n by a t t a c h i n g appendices to b r i e f s . Farmers S t a t e Bank of Conrad v. I v e r s o n and Bouma ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 6 2 Mont. 130, 509 A£ f irmed . . W e concur: