Case Title: People v. Rissley

Citation: 

Docket Number: 82536

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2003-06-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 82536-Agenda 1-September 2002.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Appellee, v. 
 								JEFFREY D. RISSLEY, Appellant.
Opinion filed June 19, 2003.
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	Defendant, Jeffrey Rissley, pled guilty in the circuit court of
Bureau County to charges of aggravated kidnapping and murder.
At his capital sentencing hearing, a jury found him eligible for the
death penalty and further concluded that there were no mitigating
factors sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty.
Accordingly, the circuit court sentenced defendant to death on the
charge of murder and to a term of 15 years' imprisonment on the
charge of aggravated kidnapping. On direct appeal, this court
affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence. People v. Rissley,
165 Ill. 2d 364 (1995). The United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari. Rissley v. Illinois, 516 U.S. 992, 133 L. Ed. 2d 432, 116 S. Ct. 525 (1995).
	Defendant thereafter filed a pro se petition for postconviction
relief, which was later amended by his appointed counsel. The
State moved to dismiss the petition. The circuit court granted the
State's motion to dismiss in part, and the matter proceeded to an
evidentiary hearing on the claims which had not been dismissed.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court denied defendant
postconviction relief, and defendant appealed to this court. 134 Ill.
2d R. 651.
	On March 15, 2001, this court issued an opinion in which we
affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that defendant's
late filing of his petition could not be excused under the culpable
negligence exception contained in the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act. Following the issuance of our decision, defendant filed a
petition for rehearing, in which he argued that our opinion failed
to define the term "culpable negligence" and therefore rendered
the exception illusory. While defendant's petition was pending,
this court took under advisement People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89
(2002), a case in which the constitutionality of section 122-1 of
the Post-Conviction Hearing Act was called into question on
several levels. In light of this fact, we granted defendant rehearing
and ordered the parties to file additional briefs. 155 Ill. 2d R. 367.
	 Subsequent to our granting of rehearing, then-governor
George Ryan commuted defendant's death sentence to natural life
imprisonment without possibility of parole or mandatory
supervised relief. Defendant thereafter moved to dismiss his
appeal. We denied the motion on April 4, 2003. As we will
explain, the commutation renders moot the sentencing issues that
defendant has raised in this appeal. We therefore will confine our
discussion to the procedural issue raised by the State and the guilt-phase issues raised in the circuit court. Although we adhere to our
original construction of the statute, and find that defendant's
petition was untimely filed, we agree with defendant that our
original opinion failed to provide a workable definition of the term
"culpable negligence" so as to provide the necessary guidance to
our lower courts.

BACKGROUND
	This court previously detailed the facts surrounding the crimes
for which defendant stands convicted in our opinion on direct
appeal. Rissley, 165 Ill. 2d 364. Instead of repeating them here, we
will note the pertinent facts from the original proceedings where
necessary throughout the body of this opinion.
	In October 1995, defendant filed a pro se postconviction
petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (the Act)
(725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 1994)). The circuit court
subsequently appointed counsel to assist defendant, and counsel
filed an amended petition on March 1, 1996. Defendant's pro se
petition and the amended petition contained, in total, some 21
different claims, including a single claim in which it was argued
that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to incorporate and
brief the 56 issues raised in the various postsentencing motions
filed at the conclusion of the sentencing hearing. The amended
petition also realleged each issue that had been raised in
defendant's direct appeal. Taken together, the pleadings presented
a wide variety of claims regarding the allegedly ineffective
assistance of both defendant's trial and appellate counsel.
	The State initially moved to dismiss the petition as time-barred, arguing that it was filed beyond the time required by
section 122-1 of the Act. In response, defendant maintained that
his petition had been timely filed. Defendant also argued, in the
alternative, that if his petition were to be deemed untimely, the
petition need not be dismissed because the delay in filing was not
the result of defendant's culpable negligence, an exception
provided for in section 122-1. Defendant contended that he had
relied on the advice of his appellate counsel on direct appeal, who
informed him that he had three years from the date of his
sentencing to file a postconviction petition. Defendant submitted
an affidavit from his appellate counsel in which counsel
corroborated defendant's allegations regarding the advice counsel
gave to defendant. After a hearing on the issue, the circuit court
denied the State's motion to dismiss the petition.
	The State thereafter filed a second motion to dismiss
defendant's petitions. In this motion, the State argued that
defendant's claims were barred by principles of res judicata and
waiver. In addition, the State contended that defendant's claims
failed to allege a substantial constitutional violation such that an
evidentiary hearing was warranted. The circuit court heard
arguments on the motion, and ultimately dismissed, without an
evidentiary hearing, all but four of defendant's claims.
Specifically, the court determined that under this court's
precedent, an evidentiary hearing had to be held with respect to
defendant's claims concerning his ingestion of psychotropic drugs
and his failure to receive a fitness hearing. The court further ruled
that a hearing was necessary with respect to defendant's
allegations that his trial counsel, John Hedrich, had lied to him in
conversations leading up to defendant's decision to plead guilty.
According to defendant's allegations, Hedrich misrepresented to
defendant that his co-counsel, J.D. Flood, and another attorney,
Andrea Lyon, both concurred in the decision to plead guilty.
Moreover, the court also found that defendant's allegations that
Hedrich omitted certain facts from defendant's motion to vacate
the guilty plea also necessitated an evidentiary hearing, as did
defendant's claim that Hedrich labored under a conflict of interest.
	The circuit court thereafter held an evidentiary hearing on
each of the claims noted above. At the conclusion of the hearing,
the circuit court denied postconviction relief, and defendant filed
the instant appeal.
 
ANALYSIS
	We begin first by noting the familiar principles regarding
postconviction proceedings. A postconviction action is a collateral
attack on a prior conviction and sentence. People v. Brisbon, 164 Ill. 2d 236, 242 (1995); People v. Free, 122 Ill. 2d 367, 377
(1988). As such, the remedy "is not a substitute for, or an
addendum to, direct appeal." People v. Kokoraleis, 159 Ill. 2d 325,
328 (1994). The scope of the proceeding is limited to
constitutional matters that have not been, nor could not have been,
previously adjudicated. Any issues which could have been raised
on direct appeal, but were not, are procedurally defaulted (People
v. Ruiz, 132 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (1989)) and any issues which have
previously been decided by a reviewing court are barred by the
doctrine of res judicata (People v. Silagy, 116 Ill. 2d 357, 365
(1987)). In addition to these procedural bars, a defendant is not
entitled to an evidentiary hearing unless the allegations set forth in
the petition, as supported by the trial record or accompanying
affidavits, make a substantial showing of a constitutional
violation. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 381 (1998). In
making that determination, all well-pleaded facts in the petition
and affidavits are to be taken as true, but nonfactual and
nonspecific assertions which merely amount to conclusions are not
sufficient to require a hearing under the Act. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 
at 381. The dismissal of a postconviction petition is warranted
only when the petition's allegations of fact-liberally construed in
favor of the petitioner and in light of the original trial record-fail
to make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation.
Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 382. On appeal, the circuit court's decision
to dismiss the petition without an evidentiary hearing is subject to
plenary review. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d  at 388-89. Determinations,
however, made by the circuit court subsequent to an evidentiary
hearing will not be disturbed unless manifestly erroneous. People
v. Morgan, 187 Ill. 2d 500, 528 (1999); People v. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 503 (1998).
 
I
	Before we can address defendant's appellate contentions, we
must first resolve the important threshold matter raised by the
State, namely, whether the circuit court erred in failing to dismiss
defendant's petition on timeliness grounds pursuant to section
122-1 of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1994)). Defendant
replies, as he did in the circuit court, that his petition was timely
or, in the alternative, that the delay can be excused because it was
not due to his culpable negligence. The dates pertinent to the
parties' arguments are as follows: this court issued its opinion
affirming defendant's conviction and sentence on March 30, 1995;
defendant filed for a writ of certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court on August 25, 1995; defendant instituted the
instant postconviction action in early October 1995; and the
Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for certiorari on
November 27, 1995. Defendant, with the aid of counsel,
subsequently filed an amended postconviction petition on March
1, 1996.

Timeliness of the October Petition
	Around the time that defendant filed his postconviction
petition, the legislature twice amended section 122-1 of the Act
(725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1994)), which governed the limitations
period on the institution of postconviction actions. Defendant
refers to both an earlier and a later version of the statute in support
of his arguments, but the parties agree that the controlling version
of the statute is the version in effect in October 1995, when the
petition was filed. See People v. Bates, 124 Ill. 2d 81, 84-86
(1988). That version of the statute provided:
		"No proceedings under this Article shall be commenced
more than 6 months after the denial of a petition for leave
to appeal or the date for filing such a petition if none is
filed or issuance of the opinion from the Illinois Supreme
Court or 6 months after the date of the order denying
certiorari by the United States Supreme Court or the date
for filing such a petition if none is filed or 3 years from
the date of conviction, whichever is sooner, unless the
petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due
to his culpable negligence." 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West
1994).
We note that the statute was amended yet again January 1, 1996.
	The fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to give
effect to the intention of the legislature. We look first to the words
of the statute, as the language of the statute is the best indication
of the legislative intent. When the statutory language is clear, it
must be given effect without resort to other tools of interpretation.
It is never proper to depart from plain language by reading into a
statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions which conflict with
the clearly expressed legislative intent. County of Knox ex rel.
Masterson v. The Highlands, L.L.C., 188 Ill. 2d 546, 556 (1999);
People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443 (1997).
	Pursuant to the controlling version of the statute, the right to
file a postconviction action expired as soon as any of the listed
specified time periods had elapsed. In this case, the parties agree
that the first such event to transpire was the expiration of six
months after the issuance of the opinion from this court affirming
defendant's conviction and sentence. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West
1994). This court issued its opinion affirming defendant's
conviction and sentence on March 30, 1995. Six months elapsed
on September 30, 1995. Defendant mailed his postconviction
petition to the clerk of the circuit court of Bureau County on
October 6, 1995, and the clerk filed the petition on October 10,
1995. Both the mailing and the filing occurred more than six
months after this court filed its opinion. Accordingly, the action
was commenced too late.
	Defendant advocates for a different interpretation of the
statute. Defendant notes that prior to a July 1995 amendment the
statute only barred the commencement of proceedings after the
later of all of the listed events. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West
1992). Indeed, the only change made to this statute by the July
1995 amendment was to change the word "later" to "sooner." See
Pub. Act 88-678, eff. July 1, 1995. Defendant contends that in this
prior version of the statute all of the events listed in the statute
"described the termination of direct appeal." Accordingly,
defendant argues, it is "obvious" that the legislature intended to
create two limitations periods: six months from the end of direct
appeal, or three years after conviction. Defendant urges that the
post-July 1995 version of the statute, applicable to him, should be
read consistently. Thus, defendant contends that the post-July
1995 version of the statute should be understood as allowing a
defendant to file a postconviction petition until the earlier of (a)
six months from the end of direct appeal, or (b) three years after
conviction.
	First, as previously noted, when a statute is clear and
unambiguous it is improper to look beyond the plain meaning of
its terms. County of Knox ex rel. Masterson, 188 Ill. 2d  at 556;
Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d  at 443. Moreover, even if we were to look
beyond the plain language of the statute, defendant's argument is
undercut by the legislature's subsequent amendment of the statute.
Effective January 1, 1996, the legislature again amended the
statute, this time removing all references to the issuance of this
court's opinion and to proceedings before the United States
Supreme Court. Thereafter, a postconviction proceeding had to be
commenced within six months after the denial of a petition for
leave to appeal or the date for filing such a petition if none was
filed, or 45 days after the defendant filed his or her brief in the
appeal before this court (or 45 days after the deadline for filing
that brief if no brief is filed), or three years from the date of
conviction, whichever occurs sooner. 725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West
1996). By this amendment, the legislature removed any doubt that
postconviction petitions must sometimes be filed before the
termination of proceedings on direct appeal. Thus, defendant's
appeal to legislative intent would be unconvincing even if it did
not run counter to the plain language of the statute.
	Defendant also contends that, if read literally, the July 1995
amendment rendered much of the section "meaningless
surplusage." For instance, defendant observes that "six months
after the date for filing a cert. [sic] petition could never occur
sooner than the denial of a petition for leave to appeal, or six
months after the issuance of an opinion the cert. petition sought to
challenge." Defendant argues that the legislature could not have
intended to render superfluous the language regarding certiorari,
and accordingly defendant urges us to give effect to the "true
intent" of the legislature by "eliminating the 'issuance of opinion'
language in construing the statute."
	Defendant bases his argument on the rule that statutes should
be construed, if possible, so that no term is rendered superfluous
or meaningless. Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 397 (1994). However, defendant overlooks the fact that
his suggested interpretation of the statute breaks the very rule of
construction upon which he relies, as defendant would have us
affirmatively ignore the "issuance of opinion" clause. Accordingly,
this argument is not convincing.
	We will not ignore the wording of the statute. Section 122-1
speaks in terms of four events-the first revolves around the time
frames associated with petitions for leave to appeal. Due to the
constitutional requirement of mandatory review of capital cases by
this court, the leave to appeal provisions are of no relevance to
capital cases. In other words, they do not apply. The second event
listed in the statute is the date of the issuance of the opinion from
this court. The third is the denial of certiorari by the United States
Supreme Court, and the fourth is three years from the date of
conviction. By its July 1995 amendment to the statute, the
legislature clearly intended that thenceforth the right to file a
postconviction petition would expire upon the occurrence of the
first of any of the listed events. In this case, this court issued its
opinion on direct appeal on March 30, 1995. Six months from that
date was September 30, 1995. Defendant's date of conviction was
October 9, 1992, three years from which was October 9, 1995.
Given that defendant did not file his petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court until August 25, 1995, it was clear that the
September 30, 1995, date was the sooner of the three potential
dates. Defendant did not commence proceedings under the
postconviction act until more than six months had elapsed after
March 30, 1995. Accordingly, by the plain language of the statute,
his petition was untimely.

Lack of Culpable Negligence
	Having decided that defendant's petition was indeed untimely
under section 122-1, we must next address defendant's alternative
contention, i.e., that even if the petition is deemed untimely, this
court should affirm the circuit court's determination that the delay
was not due to defendant's culpable negligence. See 725 ILCS
5/122-1 (West 1994).
	In his petition, defendant alleged that he filed his
postconviction petition in October, even though the Supreme
Court had not yet then ruled on his petition for certiorari, "due to
the change in the law, which, beginning on July 1, 1995, requires
that a Post-Conviction Petition be filed within three years of the
imposition of the death penalty or within six months of the denial
by the United States Supreme court of a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, whichever is sooner." Moreover, in response to the
State's motion to dismiss the petition, defendant alleged that when
the legislature amended the statute in July 1995, his attorney on
direct appeal contacted him and advised him that if defendant
wished to institute postconviction proceedings he would now have
to do so within three years after his conviction. Defendant attached
an affidavit by his direct appeal counsel to his response to the
State's motion to dismiss. In the affidavit, counsel stated that when
the legislature amended the statute in July 1995 he so notified all
of his incarcerated clients, including defendant. Counsel further
averred that he advised defendant that he could not wait until
certiorari was denied, but would have to file his postconviction
petition within three years of his October 1992 sentencing.
Counsel averred that he did not at any time advise defendant that
there was any relevance to the date that this court's opinion on
direct appeal was filed. Counsel also stated that his office-the
supreme court unit of the office of the State Appellate
Defender-assisted defendant in filing his October 1995 pro se
petition.
	The circuit court found that defendant had made a good-faith
effort to comply with the statutory requirements, and the delay was
caused by defendant's reliance on the advice of his appellate
counsel. The court found that, because of this reliance, the delay
was not due to defendant's culpable negligence.
	Our inquiry, therefore, must focus on whether defendant's
allegations as presented to the circuit court are sufficient to
establish a lack of culpable negligence so as to avoid dismissal of
the petition on the basis that it was time-barred. Defendant
maintains that because he relied, in good faith, upon the advice of
his appellate counsel and made a good-faith effort to comply with
the statutory requirement, he was not culpably negligent in his late
filing of that petition.
	Our resolution of this issue turns upon the meaning of the
term "culpable negligence" contained in section 122-1. We note
that the legislature did not define the term "culpable negligence"
within the body of the Act. This court, however, in our recent
decision in Boclair, spoke at length regarding the meaning of the
term:
		"Culpable negligence has been defined as '[n]egligent
conduct that, while not intentional, involves a disregard of
the consequences likely to result from one's actions.'
Black's Law Dictionary 1056 (7th ed. 1999). Culpable
negligence has also been defined as 'something more than
negligence' involving 'an indifference to, or disregard of,
consequences.' 65 C.J.S. Negligence §19 (2000). Accord
1 R. Rawle, Bouvier's Law Dictionary 736 (3d rev. 1914)
(stating that 'culpable neglect would seem to convey the
idea of neglect for which he was to blame as is ascribed to
his own carelessness, improvidence or folly').
			Our courts have interpreted the 'culpable negligence'
phrase consistently with these definitions. In People v.
Wilson, 143 Ill. 2d 236, 248 (1991), this court impliedly
equated culpable negligence with recklessness. We
approvingly cited an opinion of the highest court of the
State of New York describing culpable negligence as a
' "conscious choice of a course of action, in disregard of
the consequences" ' that might follow. Wilson, 143 Ill. 2d 
at 248, quoting People v. Decina, 2 N.Y.2d 133, 140, 138 N.E.2d 799, 803-04, 157 N.Y.S.2d 558, 565 (1956).
			The culpable negligence phrase also appears in several
state statutes and court rules (e.g., 55 ILCS 5/3-12013,
3-14044 (West 2000) (Counties Code); 65 ILCS
5/10-1-40 (West 2000) (Illinois Municipal Code); 70
ILCS 1210/30 (West 2000) (Park System Civil Service
Act); 70 ILCS 1215/33 (West 2000) (Park Annuity and
Benefit Fund Civil Service Act); 70 ILCS 2605/4.33
(West 2000) (Metropolitan Water Reclamation District
Act); 110 ILCS 70/46 (West 2000) (State Universities
Civil Service Act); 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 2000)
(Post-Conviction Hearing Act); 750 ILCS 50/5 (West
2000) (Adoption Act); 188 Ill. 2d R. 606(c) (Supreme
Court Rule 606(c)) and, in interpreting those statutes and
rules, Illinois courts have almost uniformly held that
culpable negligence entails something greater than
ordinary negligence.
			For example, under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2000)), courts must
often determine whether litigants have exercised due
diligence or, conversely, have willfully disregarded the
process of the court or were so indifferent to it that they
should be chargeable with culpable negligence. See
Pronto Two Ltd. v. Tishman Speyer Monroe Venture, 274
Ill. App. 3d 624, 629 (1995); Klein v. Steel City National
Bank, 212 Ill. App. 3d 629, 638 (1991); Cunningham v.
Miller's General Insurance Co., 188 Ill. App. 3d 689, 694
(1989); Verson Allsteel Press Co. v. Mackworth Rees,
Division of Avis Industrial, Inc., 99 Ill. App. 3d 789
(1981).
			Likewise, other jurisdictions have defined 'culpable
negligence' in similar contexts. For example, in Holway
v. Ames, 100 Me. 208, 60 A. 897 (1905), the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine defined 'culpable neglect' in an
analogous context as 'less than gross carelessness, but
more than the failure to use ordinary care.' Holway, 100
Me. at 211, 60 A.  at 898. In other contexts, other courts
have defined culpable negligence as something more than
mere neglect or more than a mere failure to use ordinary
care. E.g., Ross v. Baker, 632 So. 2d 224, 226 (Fla. App.
1994) (holding that '[c]ulpable negligence is negligence
of a gross and flagrant character which evinces a reckless
disregard for the safety of others'); State v. Giordano, 138
N.H. 90, 95, 635 A.2d 482, 484 (1993) (stating that
'[c]ulpable negligence is something more than ordinary
negligence, mere neglect, or the failure to use ordinary
care-it is negligence that is censorious, faulty or
blameable').
			 *** We find that the 'culpably negligent' standard
contained in section 122-1(c) contemplates something
greater than ordinary negligence and is akin to
recklessness." Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d  at 106-08.
We continue to adhere to the definition enunciated in Boclair. This
definition more than adequately ensures that the portion of the
statute permitting a petitioner to file an untimely petition so long
as he "alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his
culpable negligence" (725 ILCS 5/122-1 (West 1994)) does not
stand as empty rhetoric. Rather, the definition gives heft to the
exception contained in section 122-1, an exception which this
court has historically viewed as the "special 'safety valve' " in the
Act. People v. Bates, 124 Ill. 2d 81, 88 (1988); see also People v.
Wright, 189 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (1999). Finally, this definition comports
with our long-held view that the Act in general must be "liberally
construed to afford a convicted person an opportunity to present
questions of deprivation of constitutional rights." People v.
Correa, 108 Ill. 2d 541, 546 (1985), citing People v. Pier, 51 Ill. 2d 96, 98 (1972). See also People v. Kitchen, 189 Ill. 2d 424, 435
(1999) (acknowledging that "the Act should not be so strictly
construed that a fair hearing be denied and the purpose of the Act,
i.e., the vindication of constitutional rights, be defeated"). In our
view, this construction of this portion of section 122-1 serves to
further the laudable aims of the Act, and we will apply it to the
case at bar.
	Applying the definition to the case at bar, we hold that
defendant has established that the delay in filing was not the result
of his culpable negligence. Defendant's conduct cannot fairly be
labeled blameable or censorious, nor can it be said that defendant's
actions evince an indifference to the consequences. Defendant
remained in constant contact with his direct appeal counsel, whose
advice and interpretation of the statute defendant had no reason to
question. Defendant prepared his petition in what he had every
reason to believe was a timely manner, in fact submitting it to the
circuit court in advance of the date by which counsel had informed
defendant the petition must be filed. The State does not dispute
these facts, but rather argues that, such conduct notwithstanding,
defendant was culpably negligent. We believe, however, that
under the circumstances of this case, defendant did indeed
establish that the untimeliness of the petition was not due to his
culpable negligence. The circuit court in this case specifically
found that defendant and his direct appeal counsel "were not
acting in bad faith" with respect to preparing the petition for filing.
The circuit court also found that "it was reasonable for [defendant]
to rely on that [date] when his lawyer told him that." After
reviewing the facts of this case in conjunction with the Boclair
definition of culpable negligence, we hold that the circuit court did
not err in denying the State's motion to dismiss the petition on
timeliness grounds.

II
	Having concluded that the circuit court did not err in denying
the State's initial motion to dismiss on section 122-1 grounds, we
turn to defendant's appellate contentions. As noted previously,
both defendant's pro se and amended petitions contained
numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. In this
appeal, as it was originally briefed to this court, however,
defendant identifies only six claims of error, three of which
concern the propriety of several rulings made by the circuit court
during the postconviction proceedings. Defendant's final three
claims concern the constitutionality of the Illinois death penalty.
Before we address the claims relating to the guilt phase of the
proceedings, we believe it helpful to set out a somewhat detailed
factual recitation of the events leading up to defendant's
sentencing hearing.

Preplea Proceedings
	Defendant was arrested on charges unrelated to the present
murder on October 10, 1991, in Berrien County, Michigan. While
in custody, defendant, after being advised of his Miranda rights,
voluntarily gave statements to federal agents as well as to law
enforcement officials from both Michigan and Illinois, in which he
admitted his participation in the aggravated kidnapping and
murder of six-year-old Kahla Lansing. Kahla, who resided in
Spring Valley, Illinois, had been reported missing by her mother
on September 28, 1991. Defendant was charged with the crimes
and brought to the Bureau County jail.(1) Defendant's first court
appearance occurred on October 11, 1991, after Bureau County
officials filed criminal informations against him. The circuit court
ruled that probable cause existed to hold defendant on the charges
of aggravated kidnapping and first degree murder and denied bond
in the case. At a hearing held four days later, the prosecutor
advised both defendant and the circuit court of the State's
intention to seek the death penalty in the case. The matter was then
scheduled for a grand jury date. The circuit court determined that
defendant was indigent and, as a result, appointed counsel to
represent defendant. The circuit court also continued its order that
defendant be held without bond.
	Defendant next appeared in court on October 23, 1991,
following the grand jury's return of a two-count indictment
containing charges of aggravated kidnapping and first degree
murder. Defendant appeared with his court-appointed counsel,
Matthew Maloney, who at that time was the public defender of
Bureau County. The prosecutor reiterated the State's intention to
seek the death penalty in the event of a conviction. Defendant
entered a plea of not guilty, and a trial date was set for January 6,
1992.
	On December 9, 1991, the circuit court received a letter from
defendant in which defendant requested the judge's "consent in the
termination of" his attorney. Defendant wrote that he believed his
attorney had little interest in his case and asked the judge to
appoint him another attorney. This matter was addressed at an
emergency status hearing on December 20, 1991. The circuit court
asked defendant about the letter, and defendant stated that
although the letter had reflected defendant's thoughts "at that
time," it did not represent his views "at the present." Defendant
informed the court that he was satisfied with his attorney and that
he wanted the court to disregard the letter. Several days later, at
another status hearing, the court granted the defense's motion for
a continuance, and defendant's trial date was reset to April 27,
1992. The court also allowed the defense to retain the services of
a psychiatrist. On January 8, 1992, the circuit court appointed the
Grundy County public defender, J.D. Flood, as additional defense
counsel in the case.
	On January 14, 1992, Bureau County Public Defender
Maloney resigned from office, although the court did not allow
him to withdraw from defendant's case until January 27, 1992. In
the interim, attorney John Hedrich was appointed public defender,
and Hedrich entered his appearance as defendant's attorney on
January 27, 1992.
	In February 1992, the circuit court granted defendant's motion
for a continuance, which caused defendant's trial date to be
changed from April 27 to June 22, 1992. The circuit court also
granted defendant's motion for psychological testing. In addition,
defense counsel sought the appointment of an investigator in order
to investigate defendant's claims that a satanic cult had kidnapped
Kahla, murdered her in defendant's presence, and then threatened
defendant with harm if he informed authorities of these facts. The
circuit court granted this motion at a status hearing held on March
2, 1992. At that same status hearing, an amended indictment with
respect to the felony-murder count was read in open court.
Defendant was again apprised of the possible penalties he faced in
light of the charges, including the death penalty. Moreover,
defendant was admonished that he could have either a judge or a
jury decide his case, including the death penalty phase. At the
conclusion of the reading of the amended count of the indictment,
defendant entered a plea of not guilty and reaffirmed his desire for
a jury trial. The prosecutor once again noted that the State "does
intend to seek the death penalty in this case if there is a
conviction."
	Defendant thereafter moved to dismiss the murder charges,
arguing that, because the murder took place in Iowa, Illinois courts
lacked jurisdiction over the crime. The circuit court denied the
motion. During this time, the court also heard evidence with
respect to defendant's motion for a continuance due to the
publicity surrounding the crimes. After a two-day hearing, the
circuit court denied the motion in late May 1992.


Guilty-Plea Proceedings


	On June 11, 1992, defendant changed his plea from not guilty
to guilty. The circuit court admonished defendant regarding the
rights he was waiving as a result of the guilty plea and the range
of punishments that were possible upon conviction. Defendant
indicated that he understood his rights and understood the range of
potential sentences. When asked if defendant was promised
anything in exchange for his plea of guilty, defendant responded
in the negative. The State then presented the following information
as the factual basis for the plea.
	Kahla was last seen roller-skating with her friends outside her
home in Spring Valley in the late afternoon of September 28,
1991. When Kahla's mother was unable to find her daughter, she
contacted police, and a search ensued. A witness reported seeing
Kahla talking to a man in a red Ford Ranger pickup truck at
approximately 6:30 p.m. on September 28, 1991. The man was
described as a white male in his mid-thirties, with medium length
brown hair.
	While the authorities in Bureau County were making inquiries
into Kahla's disappearance, investigators in nearby Knox County
were busy looking into an aggravated criminal sexual assault of a
10-year-old child that occurred there on September 27, 1991. As
a result of that investigation, defendant was charged with that
crime, and a warrant for his arrest was filed. Bureau County
authorities learned of the Knox County charges and were informed
by Knox County investigators that defendant left Knox County on
September 28, 1991, and was heading to Berrien County,
Michigan, driving eastward on Route 6, which leads to Bureau
County. Defendant's general appearance and the red Ford pickup
truck that he was driving matched the description of the man seen
talking to Kahla prior to her disappearance. As a result, Bureau
County authorities identified defendant as a suspect in Kahla's
disappearance.
	Law enforcement officials in Berrien County, Michigan,
arrested defendant on the Knox County charges on October 10,
1991. After waiving his Miranda rights, defendant agreed to
provide authorities with information concerning Kahla's
disappearance. Defendant told authorities that he was traveling
from Illinois to Michigan in his red Ford pickup on September 28,
1991. Eventually, defendant detoured into Spring Valley sometime
in the late afternoon. Defendant admitted that he was an "active
pedophile" and that at that time he "hurt inside" and was seeking
a child for "relief." The defendant explained that he saw Kahla,
who was roller-skating in an area defendant described as
residential. Defendant stopped his car and engaged Kahla in
conversation. Kahla entered defendant's car after she agreed to go
with him to a nearby convenience store to buy a soda. Defendant
stopped at the store and purchased two soft drinks and a candy bar.
Defendant and Kahla thereafter left the store and drove together in
an aimless fashion around Illinois.
	Defendant stated that after several hours of travel, he found an
abandoned farm, consisting of several buildings, near Clinton,
Iowa. The farm was located at the end of dirt road off of a state
road. Defendant hid his pickup truck in a pig coop building and
then entered the barn. There, he discovered some blankets and old
mattresses on the bed of an old truck. Defendant and Kahla slept
there. Defendant admitted that, at sunrise, he performed anal
intercourse on Kahla, and then they both fell asleep.
	According to defendant, both he and Kahla later awoke to the
sound of gunshots. Both became frightened because some of the
gunshots sounded close in vicinity. Defendant stated that Kahla
became hysterical at this point and repeatedly told defendant that
they should leave. Defendant was afraid, however, that he might
be discovered, and he began to lose control. He then obtained an
electric cord from inside the barn and, with Kahla standing face to
face with him, he twisted the cord around the back of her neck.
Defendant stated that Kahla's face first turned red, her body then
became limp, and she fell to the ground. Defendant checked for a
heartbeat and found that Kahla was still alive. Defendant then left
the barn in order to find out from where the gunshots had come.
	Defendant reentered the barn after he discovered that no one
was around the farm. He intended to untie the cord from Kahla's
neck, but when he returned to where she was lying, he could no
longer hear a heartbeat. Defendant realized that Kahla was dead
and proceeded to hide her body in the upper loft of the barn.
Defendant then returned to his pickup truck and left the farm.
Defendant proceeded to drive to Michigan, where he remained
until his arrest.
	During the course of defendant's interviews, defendant drew
a map of the farm where Kahla's body could be found. Defendant
described Kahla's clothing in detail and noted that he left her body
fully clothed except for her roller skates. Subsequently, authorities
conducted a search in the area identified by defendant, and Kahla's
body was ultimately found, fully clothed, except for shoes, on the
second floor of an abandoned barn. A white electrical cord was
wrapped tightly around her neck. The cord matched an electric
blanket found at the scene. Investigators also found an old truck,
mattresses, and a blue bed sheet on the premises.
	An autopsy revealed that the cause of Kahla's death was
ligature strangulation from the electrical cord. Kahla sustained
injuries to her anal and vaginal areas. Forensic tests indicated that
seminal matter found on Kahla's underpants and on a bed linen
found in the barn could have come from defendant.
	Before accepting defendant's pleas, the circuit court addressed
defendant again, inquiring if anyone had made any promises to
him or had coerced him to plead guilty. Defendant responded in
the negative. Based on the guilty pleas, the circuit court convicted
defendant of both aggravated kidnapping and first degree murder.
The sentencing hearing was set for August 17, 1992.

Motion to Vacate Proceedings
	On June 22, 1992, defendant moved to vacate his guilty plea
on the grounds that it was not knowingly or intelligently entered.
Defendant argued that his counsel was ineffective for failing to
properly advise him concerning the consequences of pleading
guilty. Specifically, defendant argued that he was not advised by
his attorney that he could waive a trial by jury and that defendant
could request a bench trial. In addition, defendant claimed that he
was not advised that by entering a guilty plea he was waiving the
issue of whether Illinois courts had jurisdiction over the murder
charge.
	The circuit court held a hearing on the motion to withdraw
defendant's guilty plea. The defense called Andrea Lyon, an
experienced death penalty defense attorney, as its only witness.
Lyon testified that she discussed defendant's case with one of
defendant's attorneys. Lyon further testified that she was surprised
to learn during this conversation that defendant had pleaded guilty
without negotiation and without defense counsel's conducting an
extensive investigation of potential mitigation.
	Two witnesses testified for the State. James Reed, a deputy
jailor with the Bureau County sheriff's department, spoke with
defendant on June 20, 1992, at the jail. At that time, defendant told
him that he did not want to withdraw his plea. Troy Wren, the
Bureau County probation officer, also spoke with defendant on
June 23, 1992, and defendant told him that he pleaded guilty in
order to avoid trial.
	After hearing arguments, the circuit court denied defendant's
motion. The court ruled that it had admonished defendant
regarding the consequences of entering a guilty plea, including the
fact that defendant was waiving the right to have his guilt
determined by the court. The court further ruled that it did not
believe that by pleading guilty defendant waived the jurisdictional
defect that defendant claimed existed in the case. The sentencing
hearing was then set to begin August 17, 1992.

Sentencing Hearing Proceedings

		After the circuit court denied defendant's motion to
vacate, J.D. Flood sought to withdraw from the case. The circuit
court granted the motion and appointed Daniel Bute, an assistant
public defender of La Salle County, as co-counsel. According to
the postconviction testimony, Bute acted as primary counsel
during the sentencing hearing and had complete control over the
strategic decisions surrounding the defendant's case.
	During the aggravation portion of the hearing, the State first
presented the testimony of 11-year-old S.A. She testified that in
the afternoon of September 28, 1991, she was walking to a
convenience store with her sister in Kewanee, Illinois. Defendant
pulled his red truck alongside the road and asked S.A. for
directions to Route 34. S.A. replied that she could not help him,
but suggested that he ask for directions at the convenience store.
According to S.A., defendant tried to lure her into his truck by
offering her a ride to the store. She and her sister declined
defendant's offer and ran home. S.A.'s mother also testified that
when she saw her daughters after their return from the store, they
told her that a man in a red pickup truck "tried to get them" into
the truck with him.
	Twelve-year-old A.W. knew defendant because A.W.'s
mother and defendant's ex-fiancee, Debbie, were good friends.
Defendant and Debbie spent the night at A.W.'s house in Knox
County, Illinois, on September 26, 1991. On the next morning,
A.W. was to go to school and defendant was asked to give her a
ride. Defendant, however, did not drive A.W. to school. Instead,
he stopped first at a grocery store and bought some donuts. He also
purchased some makeup for A.W. Defendant then drove around
Galesburg for a short time, and then turned onto a country road.
Defendant told A.W. that he wanted to teach her how to drive and
that there would be "no cops" in the countryside. When they
reached a cornfield, defendant attempted to tie A.W.'s hands with
duct tape. He stopped, however, when A.W. began to cry.
Defendant then took a piece of rope and tied A.W.'s hands
together. Defendant rolled the passenger window down and tied
the other end of the rope around the outside mirror. He laid A.W.
on her back and licked her breasts, and rubbed his penis on her
vagina. Defendant then turned A.W. onto her stomach and
performed anal intercourse upon her. When defendant finished, he
told A.W. that she had a nice body and that, if she wanted to do it
again, she could let him know by signaling to him with a hug and
a pinch.
	Knox County Deputy Sheriff Tina Hartz testified that she
investigated the child sexual abuse case concerning defendant and
A.W. According to Hartz, about a week after the incident, A.W.'s
mother and defendant's girlfriend became suspicious of defendant
when they learned that defendant had given A.W. $40. When they
asked A.W. if defendant had wanted anything in return, A.W. told
them about the incident in the cornfield, and they subsequently
contacted police. A.W. told Hartz that she was too afraid of
defendant to say anything immediately after her assault.
	Special Agent Bill Hammell of the Illinois State Police also
testified for the State. Hammell interviewed defendant after his
arrest. During the interview, defendant admitted to Hammell that
he had sexually assaulted A.W. Hammell asked defendant if
defendant had engaged in sexual contact with any other children.
Defendant replied in the affirmative and told Hammell that there
were possibly 15 other children with whom he had had such
conduct. All lived in Michigan, where defendant had been living
prior to September 1991. Defendant said that all of the children
were between the ages of 8 and 13 and all were the family
members of various people defendant had befriended. According
to Hammell, defendant identified several children by name and
described the different types of sexual activity he had with each of
them, ranging from fondling to oral and anal sex. Hammell
contacted authorities in Michigan and relayed to them the
information defendant had given him.
	Hammell also provided information to the jury regarding
defendant's previous convictions. In July 1983, defendant was
living in Dallas County with friends, who had a seven-year-old
daughter. Defendant molested the girl on numerous occasions
while he stayed at her home. As a result of this activity, defendant
was arrested. He ultimately pleaded guilty to the charge of
indecency with a child. He received a 10-year prison sentence.
Defendant also pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual abuse, which
arose from a August 6, 1983, encounter with a 12-year-old boy. In
that case, defendant performed oral sex on the boy. Defendant
received a 10-year prison term for that crime as well. Defendant
served some of the sentences and was later put on probation with
counseling. Defendant's probation was transferred to Iowa, and
defendant lived there until 1990, when he moved to Michigan.
While living in Michigan, defendant married on April 20, 1990.
Hammell also testified that defendant told him that defendant wet
his bed when he was a child and that his mother punished him by
putting duct tape on his mouth. His stepfather and uncle would
then engage in anal intercourse with defendant.
	V.S., a 13-year-old, testified that she went camping with
defendant and two other minors, including her brother, in Benton
Harbor, Michigan, in the summer of 1991. While en route to the
campgrounds, the van the group was traveling in became stuck in
an orchard. V.S.'s brother and the other minors went to seek help,
leaving V.S. alone with defendant, during which time defendant
committed an act of anal intercourse upon V.S.
	Twelve-year-old T.S. testified that he went to school with
defendant's "stepson" in Benton Harbor during the 1990-91 school
year. One night, T.S. was at the home of defendant's grandmother
with defendant. After watching televison with defendant, T.S. and
defendant went to defendant's bedroom. There, defendant pulled
on T.S.'s penis until he was told to stop.
	Ten-year-old D.H. met defendant at the home of his sister's
friend in Michigan in 1990. While there, D.H. and defendant
worked in a garage on a motor. According to D.H., defendant
grabbed him and attempted to remove D.H.'s clothing.
	 J.S., an 11-year-old girl, recounted that in the summer of
1991, she awoke one night while staying at the home of
defendant's grandmother and found defendant in her room. He had
removed her underwear and was performing oral sex upon her.
	Joann Danfell, a Berrion County, Michigan, deputy sheriff,
testified that she conducted an child sexual abuse investigation in
Michigan at the request of Bureau County authorities. As a result,
she interviewed T.S., D.H., and J.S. Each child told her of
incidents of sexual contact with defendant.
	Bureau County Deputy Sheriff Jim Reed testified that
defendant attempted to escape from the jail by removing bricks
from his cell wall. After Reed had thwarted the attempt and
reported the incident, he found that defendant had attempted
suicide by hanging himself. Reed rescued defendant. Defendant
became violent at that time. Defendant was treated at a hospital for
his injuries and then returned to the jail.
	Finally, the State called the victim's mother to testify as to the
impact defendant's crimes in this case had on her and the rest of
the victim's family.
	Defendant presented several expert witnesses in mitigation in
order to establish that defendant was suffering from a mental
disturbance at the time of the murder. Dr. George Savarese, a
licensed clinical social worker, conducted a psychosocial
developmental history of defendant. In so doing, Dr. Savarese
interviewed defendant and reviewed various police and medical
reports as well as defendant's school records. Dr. Savarese also
reviewed interviews of defendant's family, neighbors, teachers,
and employers. Dr. Savarese concluded from the information that
defendant suffered from mental problems that were attributable to
traumatic events throughout defendant's life. For example,
defendant's father committed suicide five months before
defendant's birth. In order to cope with the loss, defendant's
mother was heavily tranquilized while pregnant with defendant.
After defendant's birth, his mother married a man who also
reportedly committed suicide, and one of defendant's brothers was
diagnosed with leukemia. Another brother died of sudden infant
death syndrome. Dr. Savarese believed that these traumatic events
took a heavy emotional toll on defendant's mother and prevented
the normal mother-child bonding that occurs during a child's
formative years.
	Dr. Lyle Rossiter, a licensed psychiatrist, also testified on
defendant's behalf. According to Dr. Rossiter, defendant suffered
from a severe borderline personality disorder with sociopathic
features and pedophilia. Dr. Rossiter noted the same childhood
events that Dr. Savarese had described and confirmed that the
incidents had a negative effect on defendant's development. Dr.
Rossiter pointed out that there were early indications of
defendant's developmental problems, such as defendant's being
diagnosed with attention deficit disorder and defendant's history
of delayed speech development.
	Both Dr. Rossiter and Dr. Savarese also noted that defendant
reported suffering from sadistic sexual abuse by his stepfather and
mother. Defendant claimed to have been the victim of childhood
incest. Neither witness, however, could confirm whether these
incidents actually occurred or whether they were fabricated by
defendant. Nevertheless, each stated that his diagnosis would not
change even if the events had been fabricated because such
fantasies were consistent with defendant's mental problems.
	Dr. Diane Alber, a psychologist, testified that she treated
defendant as a condition of defendant's release from prison in
1984. She described defendant as being unable to cope with stress
and suffering from depression. Defendant fantasized about
romantic relationships with young girls and that he was impulsive,
immature, and progressively unable to distinguish between reality
and fantasy. 
	The foregoing provides the factual backdrop relevant to our
discussion of the issues arising from the guilt phase of the
proceedings. We address these issues in turn.

Psychotropic Drug Issue
	Defendant maintains that he is entitled to an automatic
reversal for new trial proceedings because he failed to receive a
fitness hearing that he was entitled to receive by statute. Defendant
correctly notes that at the time of his trial proceedings, section
104-21(a) of the Criminal Code of 1961 provided that
			"[a] defendant who is receiving psychotropic drugs of
other medications under medical direction is entitled to a
hearing on the issue of his fitness while under
medication." 725 ILCS 5/104-21(a) (West 1992).
Citing to this court's decisions in People v. Brandon, 162 Ill. 2d 450 (1994), and People v. Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d 151 (1996), defendant
argues that the circuit court erred in concluding that a new trial
was not necessary despite the fact that defendant was taking
psychotropic medication while he was awaiting trial at the Bureau
County jail.
	Defendant alleged in his pro se postconviction petition that on
April 10, 1992, defense counsel filed an emergency motion for a
psychiatric examination in the wake of defendant's attempted
escape from the Bureau County jail and his attempt at suicide.
Defendant further alleged that the circuit court denied the request.(2)
Defendant argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to advise the circuit court that defendant, "for the duration of his
time in the Bureau County Jail, had been receiving prescribed
medication." The petition listed the following drugs that defendant
had been given: propoxyphene, docusate sodium, cephalexin,
imipramine, Xanax, penicillin, and ibuprofen. Defendant claimed
that his trial counsel's ineffectiveness in this area deprived him of
the fitness hearing to which he was entitled, and that a new trial
was necessary.
	The State sought dismissal of this claim on the basis of
waiver. The circuit court denied the State's motion, ruling that
defendant's allegations as set forth in his pro se complaint
warranted further factual inquiry, at an evidentiary hearing,
pursuant to this court's decision in People v. Britz, 174 Ill. 2d 163
(1996).
	Defendant did not present any evidence at the ensuing
evidentiary hearing as to this particular claim because it was
defendant's position that, under this court's opinion in Brandon,
reversal was "automatic" given defendant's ingestion of
psychotropic drugs while awaiting trial. The State called Phyllis E.
Amabile, M.D., who was the principal witness at the hearing. Dr.
Amabile, a licensed physician and board-certified psychiatrist,
examined defendant's medical log and determined that defendant
received four different psychotropic drugs while in custody at the
Bureau County jail-Xanax, Vistaril, Imipramine, and Ativan.
Specifically, from November 1, 1991, through November 13,
1991, defendant received 49 doses of 0.5 milligrams of Xanax.
Defendant, also received on November 1, 1991, one 100-milligram
dose of Vistaril. From December 27, 1991, through January 1,
1992, defendant received six doses of 50 milligrams of
Imipramine. The records further revealed that on January 8, 1992,
defendant received one 2-milligram dose of Ativan, and that on
March 16, 1992, he received one 100-milligram dose of Vistaril.
According to Dr. Amabile, because defendant received only a
single dose of Ativan on January 8, 1992, it was extremely
unlikely that the drug would have had an effect on defendant's
central nervous system. Similarly, the single doses of Vistaril,
administered on November 1, 1991, and once on March 16, 1992,
were also too isolated to have had an adverse effect on defendant.
Dr. Amabile characterized defendant's six doses of Imipramine,
administered December 27, 1991, to January 1, 1992, to be "non-therapeutic" and were not "sufficiently proximate" in time to the
trial proceedings which commenced some six months later in June
1992 to have "affected [defendant's] mental functioning." As for
defendant's ingestion of Xanax, which had been prescribed during
defendant's withdrawal from cigarette smoking, Dr. Amabile
testified that defendant's ingestion of the drug was not proximate
enough in time to have affected defendant's mental functioning in
June 1992. Dr. Amabile noted that the only drug that defendant
took daily while in custody and during his trial proceedings was
docusate sodium, a stool softener, which is not classified in any
way as a psychotropic drug, nor does it share any of the
characteristics of a psychotropic drug. In Dr. Amabile's medical
opinion, none of the drugs ingested by defendant interfered with
his ability to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings
against him or to assist in his own defense.
	Sergeant Bill Redshaw testified that he was the jail
administrator for the Bureau County jail, where defendant was
incarcerated from October 1991 to November 1992. According to
Redshaw, defendant was kept in a solitary cell for security reasons.
Redshaw explained that, due to the nature of the charges against
defendant, jail officials feared that defendant would not be safe in
the general jail population. Redshaw interacted personally with
defendant during the year defendant was held at the jail and the
two men were on a first-name basis. Redshaw found defendant to
be articulate, intelligent, and cooperative. Defendant was alert,
attentive, and did not display any unusual behavior. Redshaw
testified that defendant did not appear to suffer from
hallucinations, delusions, or confusion. The only time Redshaw
saw defendant become agitated was when the Bureau County jail
became a "smoke-free" environment, pursuant to orders of the
Bureau County board. Defendant, a smoker, was consequently
denied his cigarettes and had to adjust accordingly. Redshaw
stated that during this period defendant was taking the drug Xanax,
which seemed to cause defendant to sleep "quite a bit."
	Redshaw further testified that defendant attempted to escape
from the jail on April 7, 1992, and tried to commit suicide.
According to Redshaw, on the days preceding April 7, 1992,
defendant was alert and did not engage in abnormal behavior.
When he returned to the jail, defendant's behavior did not change.
He and Redshaw continued to converse. Redshaw characterized
his conversations with defendant at this point in time as clear and
lucid. When trial proceedings commenced in June 1992, defendant
appeared to understand the nature of his situation and interacted
with his lawyers.
	John Thompson also testified at the hearing. Thompson was
the chief deputy sheriff of Bureau County while defendant was in
custody at the Bureau County jail. During that time, Thompson
saw defendant on a daily basis until March, 1992. Defendant never
appeared to be disoriented or confused. Thompson stated that
defendant was inquisitive and "knowledgeable about things that
were going on around him, sometimes to the point where it
surprised us." Thompson resumed his duties at the jail on June 12,
1992, the day after defendant entered his guilty plea. Thompson
did not notice any difference in defendant's demeanor from
March. Thompson found that defendant remained openly
conversational and attentive to himself. According to Thompson,
defendant "appeared quite aware of what was going on, to the
point of, [defendant] would talk to us with it, about it on a daily
basis." Defendant did not engage in any unusual behavior and
appeared to understand and relate to all of the court proceedings
that were taking place in the summer and fall of 1992.
	James Reed, a deputy for the Bureau County sheriff's
department, also testified. Reed was a jailer during the time that
defendant was in an inmate at the jail, and Reed saw him regularly.
According to Reed, defendant appeared to be "well aware" of his
surroundings and interacted well with everyone. Defendant did not
act or appear confused and seemed alert. One of Reed's duties at
the jail was to dispense medication to the prisoners. Reed never
saw any behaviorial changes in defendant as a result of the
medications he took. Defendant never complained about having
any difficulties in his emotional condition. Reed was also
responsible for defendant's security detail during visits to court.
During the times Reed took defendant to court, defendant never
appeared to be confused or uncomprehending of the nature of the
proceedings or what was going on. According to Reed, while in
court, defendant appeared to be attentive to his lawyers and to the
judge.
	Timothy Pierson, another jailer at the Bureau County jail, also
testified as to defendant's demeanor while in custody. Defendant
appeared to always be well oriented with respect to time, place,
and the circumstances around him. Pierson recalled that defendant
was very courteous and expressed anger only twice-when
defendant lost his smoking privileges and when Bureau County
Public Defender Maloney resigned from office in January 1992.
According to Pierson, defendant interacted well with the jail staff
and knew all of the different jailers' work schedules and hobbies.
	In ruling on this claim, the circuit court specifically relied
upon this court's opinion in People v. Britz, 174 Ill. 2d 163 (1996).
The circuit court determined that, contrary to defendant's
assertions, a new trial was not required because defendant's
psychotropic medicine was not administered to defendant close
enough in time to the legal proceedings to have had an adverse
effect on him. Citing the testimony of Dr. Amabile, the court
found that each of the psychotropic drugs taken by defendant was
out of defendant's system well before the entry of defendant's
guilty plea, the hearing on his subsequent motion to vacate the
plea, and the sentencing proceedings. For these reasons, the court
concluded that defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective for
failing to utilize defendant's ingestion of these drugs as a basis for
a fitness hearing. As we will explain, we cannot conclude that the
circuit court erred in its resolution of this matter.
	The failure to receive a fitness hearing pursuant to section
104-21(a) does not require automatic reversal. People v. Mitchell,
189 Ill. 2d 312 (2000). We acknowledge that defendant's claim, as
originally pleaded, was predicated on cases such as Brandon and
People v. Gevas, 166 Ill. 2d 461 (1995), which predated Mitchell.
Indeed, defendant argues in his brief that the various changes in
law that occurred in this court's psychotropic-drug jurisprudence
over the years prejudiced him because postconviction counsel was
operating under the belief that defendant was entitled to an
automatic reversal and, as a result, did not need to present any
evidence in furtherance of the claim. We disagree.
	At the time of the evidentiary hearing, it was clear from this
court's published opinions that the mere ingestion of psychotropic
drugs while in jail awaiting trial was not enough to trigger an
automatic reversal. In People v. Kinkead, 168 Ill. 2d 394 (1995),
we noted that the bare fact that a defendant was treated with
psychotropic drugs while in jail does not, standing alone, warrant
a new trial. In fact, we remanded the matter in Kinkead for an
evidentiary hearing at which the circuit court was to "conduct an
inquiry into the factual circumstances surrounding defendant's
asserted use of psychotropic medication while in prison." Kinkead,
168 Ill. 2d  at 417. We noted that those circumstances included
"the dates on which [the defendant] received and ingested such
medicine and whether the psychotropic drug treatment [was]
linked closely enough to the time of defendant's plea of guilty and
sentencing to have entitled him to a competency hearing pursuant
to section 104-21(a)." Kinkead, 168 Ill. 2d  at 417. See also Britz,
174 Ill. 2d  at 196 (noting that no fitness hearing is required where
there is no indication that defendant was being treated with
psychotropic medication during the relevant times of the
proceedings).
	Defendant's pleadings in this case did not identify when
precisely defendant received and ingested the psychotropic drugs.
As such, the circuit court correctly ordered a further factual inquiry
into the circumstances of defendant's ingestion of psychotropic
drugs. For this reason, we cannot agree that the change of law
cited by defendant on appeal unduly hampered the presentation of
this claim-defendant's allegations were sufficient to survive the
State's motion to dismiss, but under our case law at the time,
defendant needed a further factual basis to achieve the "automatic"
reversal for which he argued. The circuit court understood this and
correctly undertook an inquiry into the factual circumstances
surrounding defendant's use of psychotropic medication while at
the Bureau County jail. We have reviewed the testimony adduced
at the hearing and conclude that the circuit court's factual findings
were not manifestly erroneous. In light of these circumstances, the
circuit court did not err in denying defendant postconviction relief
on the basis of this claim. Simply stated, the fact that the law
changed while defendant's appeal was pending is of no moment
in this case because defendant's claim would have failed even
under our pre-Mitchell case law.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Guilty Plea Proceedings
	 Defendant contends that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel during the plea proceedings based on his counsel's
misapprehension of the law. In order to resolve this issue fully, we
must set forth, in some detail, (i) defendant's allegations
concerning his attorney's performance at the time the plea was
entered, (ii) the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing, and
(iii) the findings of fact made by the circuit court at the conclusion
of the hearing.
	As we noted previously, defendant's postconviction petition,
as amended, contained numerous claims of ineffective assistance
of trial counsel. In his affidavit filed in support of his amended
petition, defendant alleged that on the morning of June 11, 1992,
Hedrich came to his jail cell at the Bureau County jail and told him
that defendant was to plead guilty to both the murder and
aggravated kidnapping charges that were pending against him.
Defendant claimed that Hedrich told him that if defendant did not
waive the jury, he "would get the death penalty." Moreover,
defendant contended that Hedrich told him that if defendant did
waive the jury, he "would not get the death penalty" and that he
would get "life in prison without parole and that 'is better than
death.' " Defendant claimed that Hedrich told him that both "J.D.
Flood and Andrea Lyon told him to tell me that they wanted me to
plead guilty." Defendant alleged that he would not have pled guilty
if Hedrich had not lied to him about Flood's and Lyon's positions
on the guilty plea because defendant did not have "confidence" in
Hedrich. Moreover, defendant claimed that Hedrich did not tell
him that defendant could have a judge hear the case instead of a
jury. Defendant further maintained that he told Hedrich that he
wanted to testify in his own behalf at the hearing held on
defendant's motion to vacate.(3) The affidavit also contained an
allegation from defendant in which he claimed that Hedrich told
defendant that he (Hedrich) was intimidated by the State's
Attorney.
	In rejecting the State's motion to dismiss, the circuit court
noted that an evidentiary hearing was necessary with respect to
defendant's claims concerning Hedrich's alleged lies to defendant
prior to the entry of the guilty plea and Hedrich's alleged conflict
of interest. The circuit court also wanted to conduct an inquiry into
defendant's allegations that Hedrich mishandled defendant's
motion to vacate.
	Defendant called various witnesses at the hearing. J.D. Flood,
the Grundy County public defender, testified that in early January
1992 he was appointed to defendant's case as co-counsel to
defendant's then-attorney, Bureau County Public Defender
Matthew Maloney. Prior to that time, Flood had taken part in
approximately 10 felony trials, 5 as first chair, and 5 as second
chair. Flood spoke to defendant only once or twice before
defendant entered his plea of guilty, mainly to get to know
defendant and to discuss the circumstances of defendant's case
with respect to the jurisdictional motion that the defense was
preparing. Flood never discussed with defendant the option of
pleading guilty to the charges, and defendant never solicited his
views on the matter. Flood believed that the State had a strong
case against defendant and felt that the defense's best chance for
success in the case rested with the jurisdictional motion, because
"the State of Iowa does not have a death penalty."
	In Flood's view, Hedrich's advice to have defendant enter into
a blind guilty plea was not good advice because the State was
seeking the death penalty. According to Flood, after the June 11,
1992, guilty plea, Flood "took the initiative and started preparing
[the motion to vacate] immediately without any consultation or
direction from defendant." At no point in the case did defendant
ever tell Flood that defendant had changed his mind regarding the
guilty plea. Flood testified that it was he and not Hedrich who had
prepared defendant's motion to vacate the guilty plea. Defendant
never mentioned to Flood that Hedrich told him that Andrea Lyon
was in agreement with the decision to plead guilty. Flood stated
that at the time he prepared the motion, he was unaware that
defendant had been advised by Hedrich that Flood had concurred
in the decision to plead guilty. Had Flood been aware of that fact,
he would have included it in the motion as a another ground for
vacating the plea. Defendant never complained to Flood about any
lies that Hedrich may have told him during the discussion leading
up to the guilty plea.
	Flood further testified that he advised defendant that he would
not be calling defendant to testify at the motion to vacate. Flood
believed that it would be inappropriate for defendant to take the
stand because he did not want to subject defendant to cross-examination. Flood stated that Hedrich had "no say" on the motion
to vacate or how it was litigated. Flood did not consider calling
Hedrich as a witness at the hearing on the motion to vacate
because he believed that Lyon's testimony, in conjunction with
Hedrich's sworn affidavit, would be "enough to cause Judge
Hupp" to vacate the plea.
	John Hedrich also testified at the hearing. Hedrich, who has
been a licensed attorney since 1955, was appointed Bureau County
public defender by the circuit court after the former public
defender, Matthew Maloney, resigned the office in January 1992.
Hedrich, who had been an assistant State's Attorney in the mid-1960s, admitted that he lacked felony experience and had litigated
mostly misdemeanors and civil matters while at the State's
Attorney's office. Indeed, Hedrich conceded that he did not feel
qualified to represent a capital litigant because he lacked
experience in the area. As a result, he attended seminars
concerning death penalty litigation sponsored by the Capital
Resource Center. Through these seminars he met Andrea Lyon,
whom Hedrich considered an expert in capital litigation.
	Hedrich testified regarding his views on defendant's defense.
According to Hedrich, the State had assembled a strong case of
defendant's guilt. Defendant's statements to police had been
accompanied by Miranda warnings, and defendant never
complained of any police misconduct or coercion in their taking
of the statements. The statements were corroborated by both
physical and forensic evidence. Early in the course of Hedrich's
representation, defendant told him that a satanic cult had been
involved in the crimes. Hedrich investigated defendant's
allegations, but could not find any evidence to support the claim.
With respect to Hedrich's own thoughts regarding defense
strategy, Hedrich considered the jurisdictional challenge to the
murder charge to be the strongest legal argument and defense that
defendant had against the charges. Hedrich believed that the State
possessed overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt and that
there was no realistic chance of an acquittal if the case went to
trial. In fact, after discussing matters with J.D. Flood and Andrea
Lyon, Hedrich felt that the case revolved around two issues-the
jurisdictional question and, if that proved unsuccessful, the
defense's attempt to save defendant's life at the sentencing stage
of the proceedings.(4)
	Hedrich testified that, prior to June 11, 1992, he had met with
the State's Attorney, Marc Bernabei, and had discussed the
possibility of a plea. Hedrich told defendant that Bernabei would
not agree to any sentence other than death in the case. During his
discussion with defendant concerning the entry of the guilty plea,
defendant never asked Hedrich what either Andrea Lyon or J.D.
Flood thought of the strategy. Hedrich denied telling defendant
that Flood and Lyon told him to tell defendant that they wanted
defendant to plead guilty. On June 16, 1992, Hedrich met with
Andrea Lyon and told her about the guilty plea. Lyon advised
Hedrich that the guilty plea was ill-advised because by pleading
guilty defendant had nothing left to bargain with and that the plea
waived arguments such as jurisdiction. Based on Lyon's opinion,
Hedrich decided that defendant should move to vacate the plea,
and he put Flood in charge of preparing the motion. Defendant's
motion to vacate was subsequently filed on June 22, 1992.
	Hedrich testified about an altercation that occurred between
him and Bernabei on June 28, 1992, in Judge Wampler's
chambers. At the time, Bernabei "unloaded" a torrent of "abusive
language" on Hedrich regarding the motion to vacate. According
to Hedrich, Bernabei "got up out of his chair, came over and
grabbed me by the muscles, upper muscles in both arms and shook
me and shouted at me." Hedrich was shocked by Bernabei's
conduct and was angered by the unprofessionalism of his conduct.
Hedrich did not feel threatened by the incident or by Bernabei, but
did feel angry. As a result of the encounter, Hedrich determined to
maintain a physical distance from Bernabei so that he would not
"get shaken again."
	During his direct examination, Hedrich was asked to explain
why he advised defendant to plead guilty. The following was the
first colloquy on the subject:
			"Q. Okay. Can you please tell Judge Lanuti why you
told [defendant] you were going to plead guilty. Tell
Judge Lanuti your reason for that?
			A. Well, yes, we were going to have a jury in and they
were going, if we tried it, they were going to go through
the whole thing and then if they found him guilty, which
was pretty certain, then they were going to have another
hearing to decide on the punishment and I said, well, it
would be better that they don't hear all this twice, it's
better they hear it once.
			Q. Did you know that you could have had a bench trial
hear the case in chief and if there was a guilty you could
have had the jury then impaneled, as was impaneled, to
hear the aggravation and mitigation and the death
qualified stage? Did you know that at the time?
			A. No, I didn't think of it, I didn't discuss it, I didn't
discuss it."
Hedrich further stated that he and Flood discussed at length
whether it would be better for a jury or the trial judge, Judge
Hupp, to decide death eligibility and aggravation/mitigation.
According to Hedrich, Flood was more familiar with Judge Hupp
and Flood felt that "we better do aggravation and mitigation before
the jury rather than" Judge Hupp. Hedrich's testimony was
interrupted at this point to accommodate the schedule of another
testifying witness. When Hedrich returned to the stand, the matter
was broached again:
			"Q. Thank you. Can you tell me, sir, I'm trying to pick
up where we left off, can you tell Judge Lanuti why you
plead [defendant] guilty?
			A. Well, it appeared that there wasn't any sense in the
trial and he was going to be found guilty anyway and I
didn't think there was any sense in going through it twice
in front of a jury who is going to, I guess by that time we
determined that the jury was going to hear the aggravation
and mitigation."
Hedrich also stated that he advised the guilty plea because it
allowed the defense more time to prepare in mitigation. He also
considered the move to be an attempt to get the jury to do
something other than impose the death penalty.
	Defendant also testified in his own behalf at the hearing.
Defendant stated that he was more comfortable with Flood and
Andrea Lyon than he was with Hedrich because Hedrich had told
defendant that he did not know what he was doing. According to
defendant, Hedrich told him that, if defendant pleaded guilty, he
would not receive the death penalty. Defendant believed that a
"deal" had been reached between Hedrich and the State. Defendant
further testified that when Hedrich advised him to plead guilty,
defendant specifically asked him what Flood's and Lyon's
positions were on the matter and that Hedrich told him that both
of them had agreed to it. Although defendant had never met Lyon,
he testified that he put "high importance" on her opinion.
Defendant would not have pleaded guilty if he had known that
Flood and Lyon were against it.
	Defendant maintained during the course of his testimony that
he did not understand the ramifications of his decision to plead
guilty when he did so in open court on June 11, 1992. Although
defendant acknowledged that he had told Judge Hupp in open
court that he understood the consequences of pleading guilty and
that he was doing so voluntarily, defendant testified that he had
not been truthful in those responses. This was so, defendant
explained, because Hedrich had previously instructed defendant as
to what he was to say and do when Judge Hupp addressed him.
According to defendant, Hedrich instructed defendant that
defendant was to tell the judge "yes sir" when Hedrich "shook his
head yes" and that defendant was to tell the judge "no" when
Hedrich shook his head "no." Defendant stated that as a result of
these instructions, he did not truly understand any of the
consequences of entering a plea of guilty in open court.
	Defendant testified that after he had pleaded guilty, he spoke
with both Flood and Lyon and they told him that they did not agree
with the decision to plead guilty. Defendant also maintained that
he told Hedrich that he wanted to testify at the motion to vacate
because he wanted to "explain" why he told jailers James Reed
and Tim Wren that he did not want to withdraw his guilty plea.
According to defendant's postconviction testimony, defendant did,
in fact, tell both men that he did not want to withdraw his plea.
However, defendant stated that he had lied to them in attempt to
curry favor with them.
	On cross-examination, defendant acknowledged that when he
pled guilty before Judge Hupp, he understood that he was giving
up his right to have a trial, but that he nonetheless lied to the judge
during the plea proceeding because defendant answered all of the
judge's questions in the manner in which Hedrich coached him.
Hedrich would communicate to defendant "with either a nod yes
or a nod no" while he, Hedrich, and Bernabei were standing in
front of the judge's bench. Defendant acknowledged that his plea
of guilty in this case was not the first time he had pleaded guilty to
charges before a judge. Defendant claimed, however, that in the
prior case, just as in the present case, his lawyer had "instructed"
him in the same manner that Hedrich had. Defendant further
acknowledged that he was in the courtroom on the occasions when
the prosecutor announced that the State would be seeking the
death penalty in the case. Defendant was aware that the State's
Attorney would not be making any deal with the defense in which
defendant would receive a sentence other than death. Defendant
admitted that he told Hedrich that a satanic cult was responsible
for the victim's death and also told police the same story while he
was in custody in the Bureau County jail, but that the story was not
true. Defendant testified that he informed Flood that Hedrich had
told defendant that Flood also wanted defendant to plead guilty.
Defendant, when he pleaded guilty on June 11, 1992, knew that he
was facing a trial date of June 22, 1992, and that it was a "matter
of record" that the circuit court would not allow another delay
unless "something" happened. Defendant discussed the evidence
against him with his attorneys and with the investigator assigned
to assist in the case. Defendant admitted that he knew what the
evidence was that the State would use against him and knew that
the State had a strong case against him.
	At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court made a
lengthy ruling on the contentions raised by defendant. The court
first resolved defendant's claim regarding Hedrich's alleged
conflict of interest. The court found that an altercation had taken
place between Hedrich and Bernabei in one of the judge's
chambers in the courthouse. The circuit court ruled that although
Hedrich had concerns regarding Bernabei's stability as a result of
this episode, there was no credible evidence that the altercation
affected Hedrich's handling of defendant's case. Indeed, the court
concluded that the record showed that defendant's motion to
vacate, which had been the cause of the altercation, had been
litigated fully the very next day. Moreover, the evidence revealed
that the motion was prepared by attorney Flood and was litigated
solely by him so that Hedrich was not involved in the handling of
the motion and, as such, Hedrich was not in a position to affect
litigation of the motion because of any "intimidation." The circuit
court, accordingly, ruled that the evidence presented by defendant
failed to show that the altercation had any prejudicial effect on the
proceedings.
	The circuit court then addressed defendant's remaining claims
and noted that it considered the credibility of each of the witnesses
who had testified. The court specifically stated that it did not
consider defendant's status as a petitioner "with a motive" in its
assessment of credibility. In other words, the court did not find
defendant less credible simply because of his status as a defendant.
With respect to defendant's claim that he requested to testify at the
hearing on the motion to vacate, the court found that defendant's
testimony was at odds with defendant's sworn affidavits.
Specifically, the circuit court noted the following:
			"Now in his affidavit and testimony, the defendant has
indicated that he requested to testify during the motion to
vacate his guilty plea. There is a conflict, however,
between his affidavits. In the first affidavit filed with his
pro se motion to vacate the guilty plea [sic], he indicated
that he requested to testify during the final arguments of
the prosecutor.(5) In his subsequent affidavit filed in his
amended postconviction petition, the defendant inferred
that his request to testify was during the actual testimony
of James Reed and Troy Wren. In his affidavit, the
defendant indicated that he told Attorney Hedrich that he
wanted to testify. That he'd testify Reed and Wren were
lying and that he had never made statements to them that
he did not want to withdraw his guilty plea. Now, at the
hearing before this Court, the defendant has admitted that
this affidavit is false. He now states that he did make a
statement to Reed and Wren but the reason he wanted to
testify was to explain them to the judge. Now, beginning
with the obvious fact that the defendant's admission of a
false affidavit casts doubts on credibility, it also raises the
following issues. First, J.D. Flood testified he was running
the hearing on the motion to vacate. Why would not the
defendant ask Flood if he wanted to testify instead of
directing his comments to Hedrich? Flood does not recall
any such request from the defendant. The Court also does
not find that the seating arrangement at counsel table
presented any obstacle to the defendant's speaking to
Flood.
			Also, Flood testified it was his decision not to call
[defendant] to the stand because he did not want the
State's Attorney to have an opportunity to cross-examine
him.
* * *
			And finally, was it ineffective not to have the defendant
testify at this hearing? He would have gotten on the stand
and verified that the State's witnesses were telling the
truth and he had made such a statement. He would then
had [sic] to tell the Court that he was lying to the State's
witnesses when he made the statement. He would have
then had to argue to the judge to believe that his earlier
statements had been a lie but his testimony now is the
truth. Would this likely have changed the results of the
motion to vacate the guilty plea even if such a request was
made?
			The Court finds as follows: Court finds that there was
never a demand to testify made. There may have been
some discussion but the defendant never made an outright
demand to either lawyer to testify.
			Second, it was not ineffective not to call the defendant
to the stand since he would have corroborated the State's
witnesses and admitted his own lies."
In making these rulings, the circuit court specifically found
Hedrich to be a credible witness, who was "willing to admit to his
own shortcomings, perhaps too readily." The court further found
that Hedrich was "willing to admit if he doesn't recall specific
details of conversations." The court found it "interesting" that
"these are the precise areas where [defendant] is attempting to fill
in the gaps and claim ineffective assistance of counsel." The court
concluded that there was no evidence that defendant was in any
way prevented from testifying at the hearing and that, in sum,
defendant failed to prove facts that demonstrated a constitutional
violation stemming from defendant's not testifying at the hearing
on the motion to vacate.
	The circuit court next addressed defendant's claims that
defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel with respect
to the entry of the guilty plea because of Hedrich's alleged lies to
defendant. The court noted that the basis of defendant's claim was
the misrepresentation Hedrich allegedly made to defendant
concerning the position of J.D. Flood and Andrea Lyon on the
guilty plea. The circuit court made the following findings in this
respect:
			"Now, Attorney John Hedrich has not admitted any
misrepresentation but has testified that he discussed the
guilty plea with Flood. He also testified that he advised
the defendant to plead guilty. Hedrich did not recall the
defendant initiating any inquiry about Flood or Lyon's
position which is in contradiction to the defendant's
testimony. Hedrich also felt the defendant pled guilty
knowingly, although he doesn't specifically recall the
entire conversation. Hedrich denied the specific allegation
in paragraph one of the defendant's affidavit attached to
the amended post-conviction petition.
			Now, in his petition for post-conviction relief and his
amended petitions, the defendant at no time made any
claim that he failed to understand the admonitions and
conversation that he was having with Judge Hupp at the
time of the plea of guilty. Rather, his position was that
since misrepresentations had been made behind the
scenes, that his plea was in a sense involuntary. Now at
this hearing, however, the defendant has decided to have
his cake and eat it, too. Not only is he claiming that
misrepresentations induced him to plead guilty, he now
testifies he didn't understand anything that was going on
during the plea of guilty.
			Now, in their written closing arguments the State has
gone in [sic] detail through the guilty plea that took place
in open court. The plea contains numerous statements by
the defendant in which he indicated to the Court he
understood the nature of the charges, his rights involved,
the possible penalties, and that no promise or threats had
been made in order for him to plead guilty. As was
pointed out in the defendant's cross-examination, the
defendant did not simply answer yes or no. At times he
even pointed out to the Court and to counsel areas that
had already been covered. The defendant would have this
Court believe that he understood none of these matters
and was simply mimicking signals he was receiving from
his attorney. Not only has his attorney denied that, it is
ludicrous for this Court to believe that a trial judge on a
plea of this length and detail would not recognize signals
going back and forth between an attorney and a defendant
who were standing within inches of him in front of the
bench. *** The defendant's testimony that he did not
understand the proceedings in open court on the day of the
plea and that he was being given signals from his attorney
and that he had been promised a life sentence in return for
a plea of guilty simply are not credible. They are totally
contradicted by the record of the plea and by the
testimony of Mr. Hedrich.
			The redirect testimony of the defendant, which I will
not repeat in detail, should be illuminating for any court
reviewing this matter. The defendant was asked a series of
leading questions which helped his position. He willingly
and quickly responded in the affirmative to them. On the
other hand, when the defendant was confronted with the
more difficult questions on cross-examination by the
State's Attorney, he was more evasive, deliberate, and
inconsistent in his answers. It was clear to this Court in
observing defendant's demeanor and manner in answering
questions that the defendant is certainly able to
understand the proceedings that are going on and the
issues before this Court. ***
			It is hard for this Court to believe that the defendant did
not understand what was going on in open court on June
11, 1992. The defendant understood he was pleading
guilty. He understood he was confronted with strong
evidence. He understood the possible penalties involved
and made a decision to plead guilty. The defendant is
simply lying when he testifies that he did not understand
the court proceedings on June 11. If his post-conviction
petition affidavits are true, the defendant wanted to plead
guilty and understood he was pleading guilty, but doing it
based on a misrepresentation. That has been totally
contradicted by his testimony at this hearing where he
now says he didn't understand the proceedings at all. It
appears to the Court that he was making up his testimony
as he went along.
			Now, returning to the original claim that certain
misrepresentations regarding the position of Flood and
Lyon were made to him prior to the guilty plea, as this
Court has previously stated, the defendant has the burden
of proving that this took place. Hedrich does not recall
any such conversation. The only other person to the
conversation was the defendant. This Court, however, has
already determined that the defendant's testimony is not
to be believed on the issue of the guilty plea and the
defendant has already admitted to lying on his affidavit
that he filed in the post-conviction petition. The
defendant, accordingly, is not a credible witness. The
Court does not have to accept his testimony simply
because no one else has contradicted it."
The court went on to note that defendant's testimony regarding
Hedrich's alleged lies was further contradicted by the fact that
defendant never made any attempt to raise the misrepresentations
sooner, despite the fact that defendant presented issues regarding
the motion to vacate the guilty plea centering on Andrea Lyon in
later motions filed in a postsentencing motion. The court found
that defendant failed to prove that any misrepresentations were
made to him. Moreover, the court concluded that defendant failed
to prove that any misrepresentations made to him were the basis
of his guilty plea. The court found defendant's plea was
voluntarily made with complete understanding of the "what the
possible penalties were and what his rights were."
	It is against the foregoing factual backdrop that we address
defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect
to his guilty plea. Defendant makes no attempt in this court to
specifically challenge the majority of the circuit court's findings
from the evidentiary hearing, i.e., (i) that Hedrich lied to him
regarding Flood's and Lyons' positions on the guilty plea, (ii) that
defendant told Hedrich he wanted to testify at the motion to
vacate, and (iii) that Hedrich labored under a conflict of interest.
Rather, defendant contends that his convictions must be reversed
and the cause remanded for a new trial because, as a result of
Hedrich's legal misapprehension, Hedrich failed to explain to
defendant that the law allowed him to have the trial judge hear the
guilt phase of the trial instead of a jury. Defendant argues Hedrich
provided ineffective assistance of counsel because Hedrich's
"goal"-to avoid having the jury hear the evidence "twice"-could
have been achieved without defendant's giving up his right to trial.
	At the outset, we note that defendant urges this court to first
examine Hedrich's utter lack of qualifications and experience and
his "repeated acts of incompetence" before we examine
specifically the improper advice Hedrich gave to defendant during
the plea discussions. According to defendant, these other
considerations will impact our resolution of the claim. We
acknowledge that Hedrich admitted  to having had no experience
in capital litigation. Defendant points to Hedrich's lack of
qualifications and notes that the trial judge recognized this fact by
appointing Flood to assist Hedrich. Defendant's assertion is
incorrect, however, because the record affirmatively establishes
that the circuit court appointed Flood co-counsel in this case
before Hedrich was even appointed. Flood was appointed to serve
as co-counsel to Hedrich's predecessor, Matthew Maloney.
Therefore, we disagree with defendant's intimation that Flood was
appointed as compensation for Hedrich's shortcomings. Moreover,
we will not consider the "repeated acts of incompetence" that
defendant claims Hedrich allegedly committed that do not relate
to the plea discussions Hedrich had with defendant and that have
no bearing on whether defendant's plea was entered into
knowingly and intelligently. Instead, we focus on the argument
that defendant has raised in this appeal, namely, whether the
mistaken advice constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel such
that reversal is required.
	Challenges to guilty pleas which allege ineffective assistance
of counsel are subject to the standard set forth in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052
(1984). Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203, 209,
106 S. Ct. 366, 369-70 (1985); People v. Huante, 143 Ill. 2d 61, 67
(1991). Counsel's conduct is deficient under Strickland if the
attorney failed to ensure that the defendant entered the plea
voluntarily and intelligently. Huante, 143 Ill. 2d  at 69. To establish
prejudice, a defendant must show that there is a "reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill, 474 U.S.  at 59, 88 L. Ed. 2d  at 210, 106 S. Ct.  at 370.
	With respect to the first Strickland prong, we will assume for
purposes of this appeal that Hedrich was deficient in not realizing
that the option existed for a bench trial during the guilt/innocence
phase of the proceedings. We note, however, that defendant's
postconviction testimony reveals that when defendant was asked
whether he understood that the right to trial included both the right
to have either a judge or a jury hear the case, his answers varied.
In some instances, defendant responded that he did not understand
that, but in other instances he responded that he did. In this
respect, we agree with the circuit court's ruling that the
defendant's testimony was oftentimes "evasive" and
"inconsistent." Therefore, it could be said that regardless of
Hedrich's legal misapprehension, defendant did indeed know of
the right to have a judge decide the guilt phase and his plea was
knowingly made. However, because the testimony is equivocal, we
will give defendant the benefit of the doubt and will assume that
defendant did not know he could have chosen to have a judge
determine his guilt. Therefore, we turn to whether defendant was
prejudiced by the Hedrich's legal mistake. In other words, we must
determine whether there is a "reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial." Hill, 474 U.S.  at 59, 88 L. Ed. 2d  at
210, 106 S. Ct.  at 370.
	Courts have stressed that the prejudice prong of the Hill-Strickland test may pose a difficulty in some cases because it is by
no means obvious how a court is to determine the probability that
a defendant would have gone to trial. The United States Supreme
Court noted that a showing that the ineffective performance
affected the outcome of the plea process is required. See Hill, 474 U.S.  at 59-60, 88 L. Ed. 2d  at 210-11, 106 S. Ct.  at 370-71.
However, a bare allegation that had counsel not been deficient
during plea discussions, defendant "would have pleaded
differently and gone to trial" is not enough to establish prejudice.
Key v. United States, 806 F.2d 133, 139 (7th Cir. 1986); accord
Huante, 143 Ill. 2d  at 73; Gargano v. United States, 852 F.2d 886,
891 (7th Cir. 1988).
	Hedrich admitted to his erroneous legal interpretation during
his testimony, which was heard in open court on December 5,
1996. Defendant testified on his own behalf on December 6, 1996.
Despite the fact that Hedrich's mistaken advice was a matter of
record, defendant never stated in his testimony that, had Hedrich
correctly advised him about his right to have a judge hear the
evidence during the guilt phase of the proceedings, defendant
would not have pleaded guilty and would have instead insisted on
going to trial, regardless of what other additional considerations
might have motivated him to plead guilty. Indeed, at no point in
his testimony did defendant assert or intimate anything that would
support such a conclusion. Rather, defendant stated under oath that
he put "no importance on the opinion or advice of Hedrich."
	Notwithstanding the above, defendant argues on appeal that
he was prejudiced because he would not have pleaded guilty had
he known that he could have had a judge determine his guilt at a
bench trial and still have had a jury decide sentencing. As we have
pointed out, however, a defendant alleging ineffective assistance
of counsel during plea proceedings must still establish prejudice.
The bare allegation that, but for the mistaken advice, a defendant
would have insisted on trial, without something more, is not
enough. Standing alone, such an allegation is "subjective, self-serving, and *** insufficient to satisfy the Strickland requirement
for prejudice." Turner v. Tennessee, 858 F.2d 1201, 1206 (6th Cir.
1988), vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 902, 106 L. Ed. 2d 559,
109 S. Ct. 3208 (1989). As the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit has noted,
		"[Appellant's] self-serving statements that, but for his
counsel's inadequate advice he would have pleaded not
guilty, unaccompanied by either a claim of innocence or
the articulation of any plausible defense that he could
have raised had he opted for a trial, is insufficient to
demonstrate the required prejudice." (Emphasis added.)
United States v. LaBonte, 70 F.3d 1396, 1413 (1st Cir.
1995), rev'd on other grounds, 520 U.S. 751, 137 L. Ed. 2d 1001, 117 S. Ct. 1673 (1997).
We believe that the same conclusion obtains in this case.
Defendant does not now allege that he is innocent, nor does he
claim to have any plausible defense that he could have raised had
he chosen a bench trial. At oral argument defense counsel
maintained that the entry of the guilty plea precluded defendant
from investigating a viable defense with respect to defendant's
sanity. However, at no point in these postconviction proceedings
has defendant sought to establish what such an investigation
would have produced. Our review of the total record in this case
convinces us that this is not a case in which psychiatric and
psychological evidence was totally lacking. As we detailed
previously, several mental health practitioners testified upon
defendant's behalf at the sentencing hearing. This testimony
should have served as the basis for further exploration by
postconviction counsel of any potentially viable insanity defense
that was precluded by Hedrich's improper guilty plea advice.
Indeed, at oral argument the following question was asked of
counsel: "During the time since the plea, has there been any
evidence unearthered that would have suggested in any way that
there would have been an insanity defense?" Counsel replied in
the negative. We further note that during the plea proceedings,
defendant admitted to kidnapping Kahla and driving her across
state lines where he sexually assaulted and ultimately strangled
her, and he has never repudiated those sworn admissions. Thus,
defendant " 'does not maintain ... that he is innocent of the charges
in the indictment, or that a plausible defense to those charges
exist[s].' " Czere v. Butler, 833 F.2d 59, 64 (5th Cir. 1987),
quoting United States v. Sutton, 794 F.2d 1415, 1422 (9th Cir.
1986). Given these facts, defendant has not established the
prejudice required under Strickland.
	We have carefully reviewed all of the transcripts in this case,
from both the original trial and subsequent postconviction
proceedings. Defendant was apprised of his constitutional rights
and the range of sentences that he faced upon conviction for each
of the crimes with which he was charged in several court
appearances in addition to the guilty plea proceeding. The State
made clear its intent to seek the death penalty from its earliest
court appearances. Defendant's own postconviction testimony
supports the conclusion that defendant was aware of all of this
when he entered into his plea.
	Our review of the record also convinces us that defendant was
not as passive a participant in the proceedings, as he would now
have this court believe. On the contrary, defendant had the
wherewithal to take the initiative and look out for his own
interests, as his December 9, 1991, letter to the trial judge
complaining about his appointed counsel (Maloney, at that time)
clearly demonstrates. The record further shows that defendant is
not beneath lying to police and his own legal representatives-his
claim of the involvement of a satanic cult in the crimes at issue
and his subsequent testimony that this was a lie stands as a
testament to that fact, as does his admission that he lied to jailers
in an attempt to curry favor. Our review of the plea proceedings
indicates that defendant was paying attention to Judge Hupp and
was following the plea proceedings independent of any "coaching"
from Hedrich. Defendant's unsolicited responses and interaction
with the judge are evidence of that fact, notwithstanding
defendant's postconviction assertion that he was merely
mimicking signals given to him from Hedrich. We also point out
that the testimony from the defendant's jailers and guards provided
yet another perspective into defendant's demeanor and awareness.
Each one indicated that defendant talked about the proceedings
with him in a manner that indicated to him that defendant
understood the nature of the charges against him and the
proceedings he was facing.
	Finally, we cannot ignore the varying and, at times, somewhat
inconsistent positions that defendant has taken during the course
of these postconviction proceedings. In his postconviction
pleadings, defendant alleged simply that Hedrich had lied to him
regarding Flood's and Lyon's concurrences in the decision to
plead guilty and, in light of that fact, his guilty plea was in essence
involuntary. During his testimony at the postconviction evidentiary
hearing, defendant maintained that he put "no importance on the
opinion or advice of Hedrich" and that the single element which
led him to plead guilty was the fact that Hedrich told him that
Flood and Lyon wanted him to do so. Now, in this appeal,
defendant drops all reference to the purported lies Hedrich told
him during their plea discussions and instead focuses on the fact
that he was misadvised by Hedrich during those discussions. We
note that to grant defendant a new trial in this case would require
this court to conclude that defendant relied upon advice from a
lawyer whom defendant swore under oath not to have relied upon.
Defendant's frequent changes of position, as evinced in this
record, are damaging to the credibility of his claims and cannot be
disregarded. Defendant's story changes to suit the exigencies of
the moment.
	In light of all of these facts, we disagree with defendant that
"great doubt" exists about whether defendant knowingly pleaded
guilty, notwithstanding Hedrich's mistaken belief regarding the
availability of a bench trial during the guilt phase of the trial. After
considering the record in its entirety, including all of the testimony
adduced at the postconviction evidentiary hearing, we agree with
the circuit court's finding that defendant entered into the plea in
order to use his admission of guilt to gain leniency from the
sentencing jury. Thus, we are satisfied that defendant entered his
plea knowingly and intelligently, such that our confidence in the
outcome is not "undermined." See Strickland, 466 U.S.  at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 698, 104 S. Ct.  at 2068.

Sentencing Issues
	 As we noted earlier in this opinion, defendant raises several
issues concerning the sentencing phase of his trial. We believe that
these issues have been rendered moot by the Governor's
commutation. An appellate issue is moot when it is abstract or
presents no controversy. People v. Blaylock, 202 Ill. 2d 319, 325
(2002). An issue can become moot if circumstances change during
the pendency of an appeal that prevent the reviewing court from
being able to render effectual relief. People v. Jackson, 199 Ill. 2d 286, 294 (2002). Commutation removes a judicially imposed
sentence and replaces it with a lesser, executively imposed
sentence. People ex rel. Johnson v. Murphy, 257 Ill. 564, 566
(1913); see Black's Law Dictionary 274 (7th ed. 1999). Therefore,
the commutation rendered defendant's sentencing issues moot.
See, e.g., Lewis v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 31, 38, 235 S.E.2d 320, 325 (1977); State v. Mitchell, 239 Or. 87, 88, 396 P.2d 572, 573 (1964).

CONCLUSION
	The circuit court's judgment denying defendant
postconviction relief is affirmed.
Affirmed.
	JUSTICE RARICK, dissenting: 
	I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court because I
believe the instant appeal should have been dismissed pursuant to
defendant's motion to dismiss. This court has stated:
			" 'By numerous decisions this court has held that no
right is more clearly established than that of an appellant
to dismiss his appeal, regardless of the protest of the
appellee. [Citations.] The appellant in an appeal *** may
always dismiss the appeal *** before a decision on the
merits, and the effect of such dismissal is to leave the
parties where they were before the appeal was taken ***."
People ex rel. Waite v. Bristow, 391 Ill. 101, 111 (1945),
quoting First National Bank of Kewanee v. Union State
Savings Bank & Trust Co., 350 Ill. 21, 22 (1932). 
Accord Safeway Insurance Co. v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 247
Ill. App. 3d 355, 358-59 (1993). 
	In this case, defendant moved for dismissal of the appeal after
the Governor commuted his death sentence to natural life
imprisonment. The State did not object to defendant's motion to
dismiss because, from the State's perspective, there was no point
in doing so: dismissal would have left defendant's convictions for
aggravated kidnapping and murder intact, as well as respective
sentences of 15 years and natural life. It makes no sense for this
court to deny defendant's motion to dismiss his appeal so that it
can issue an opinion that leaves him in the same position he would
have been in had the appeal been dismissed pursuant to his
request. In its current procedural posture, this appeal presents no
actual controversy and this court's decision is nothing more than
an advisory opinion. See People ex rel. Partee v. Murphy, 133 Ill. 2d 402, 408 (1990). Under the circumstances, an opinion from this
court is simply unnecessary.
 
 
1.      1Spring Valley is located in Bureau County.

2.      2The record reveals that the circuit court did not deny the motion.
Rather, the court ruled that a previous order, entered in December 1991
and which allowed defendant to retain a psychiatrist, Dr. Rossiter,
covered defense counsel's request. We further note that the circuit
court, in an order entered on February 26, 1992, granted defendant's
motion for psychological testing to be done in conjunction with the
appointment of Dr. Rossiter.

3.      3Both the original pro se petition and the amended petition contained
claims regarding defendant's desire to testify at the hearing held on the
motion to vacate the guilty plea. In the affidavit defendant filed with the
pro se petition, defendant swore, "[C]ounsel never informed me that I
had a right to testify at the hearing on the motion to withdraw my guilty
plea. When the prosecutor argued to the judge that I had not testified on
the motion *** I requested that Attorney Hedrick [sic] permit me to take
the stand to testify. Mr. Hedrick refused that request." In the affidavit
that supported defendant's amended petition, defendant swore that he
told Hedrich to let him testify that he wanted to withdraw his guilty
plea. Defendant further swore that "during the Motion to Withdraw my
guilty plea, when James Reed and Troy Wren testified that I had told
them that I did not want to withdraw my plea of guilty, I again told John
Hedrich in court that I wanted to testify that I never said that, but he told
me that I could not testify. Only Andrea Lyon could testify for me."

4.      4Hedrich's postconviction recollection is corroborated by the
testimony of Andrea Lyon, taken some four years earlier at the hearing
held on defendant's motion to vacate his guilty plea-Lyon testified that
she felt that the focus of defense efforts should have been on the fact
that defendant should have been prosecuted in the jurisdiction where the
death occurred, i.e., Iowa, and on mitigation "given what he [Hedrich]
told me about the nature of the evidence."

5.      5The circuit court incorrectly referred to this affidavit as being filed
with defendant's motion to vacate the guilty plea. This could not be
possible, of course, because that motion was filed several days before
the hearing in question. The circuit court here was referring to the
affidavit filed in support of his pro se petition for postconviction relief,
where defendant first raised the matter.