Case Title: Commonwealth v. Putnam

Citation: 

Docket Number: SJC-12596

State: massachusetts

Court: Massachusetts Supreme Court

Date: 2019-04-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
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SJC-12596 
 
COMMONWEALTH  vs.  STEVEN M. PUTNAM. 
 
 
April 9, 2019. 
 
 
Evidence, Scientific test, Relevancy and materiality.  Practice, 
Criminal, Postconviction relief.   
 
 
 
In March 2006, after a jury trial, the defendant was found 
guilty of home invasion, armed assault in a dwelling, rape, and 
assault and battery; he was sentenced to from twenty to twenty-
five years in State prison.  The defendant here appeals from the 
denial of a motion filed pursuant to G. L. c. 278A (chapter 
278A) seeking postconviction forensic and scientific testing of 
evidence and biological material to support a motion for a new 
trial.  We decide this appeal on the basis of our opinion today 
in Commonwealth v. Williams, 481 Mass.     (2019).1 
 
 
Facts and prior proceedings.  The evidence presented at the 
defendant's trial is summarized in Commonwealth v. Putnam, 75 
Mass. App. Ct. 472, 473-476 (2009), the affirmance of the 
defendant's convictions on direct appeal.  We provide a 
condensed version of events as the jury could have found them. 
 
 
On the evening of January 26, 2004, the defendant, with 
whom the victim was acquainted, knocked at the victim's door, 
seeking to speak with her.  After initially turning the 
defendant away, the victim allowed the defendant to enter her 
home, and the two spoke for a short period of time.  When the 
victim attempted to make a telephone call, the defendant grabbed 
the victim, punched her in the face, and threw the telephone to 
                     
 
1 We acknowledge the amicus brief submitted by the New 
England Innocence Project, the Boston College Innocence Program, 
the Committee for Public Counsel Services, and Dennis Maher. 
2 
 
 
the floor.  After beating the victim, the defendant pulled a 
knife out of his pocket and stated, "You can make this hard or 
you can make this easy." 
 
 
The defendant tore off some of the victim's clothing and 
digitally raped her.  When the defendant paused to pull his 
shirt off, the victim fled.  Naked from the waist down, the 
victim ran to a neighbor's house; the neighbor called the 
police, who arrived at the scene within minutes. 
 
 
At trial, the defendant testified in his own defense that 
the physical contact between him and the victim was consensual 
and did not include penetration.  As for the knife, the 
defendant testified that he had tried to give it to the victim 
because he was afraid that he would hurt himself. 
 
 
The defendant filed the instant chapter 278A motion pro se 
in July 2016, and he supplemented it once he was appointed 
counsel.  In his motion, the defendant asserted his factual 
innocence, claiming that he did not enter the victim's home with 
the intent to commit a crime (and thus was not guilty of home 
invasion); that he neither used force on nor caused injury to 
the victim (and thus was not guilty of either armed assault or 
assault and battery); and that he did not penetrate the victim 
(and thus was not guilty of rape).  Among other things, the 
defendant further asserted, pursuant to G. L. c. 278A, 
§ 3 (b) (4), that the requested forensic testing of clothing 
collected from the victim, and the testing of the sexual assault 
evidence collection kit, had the potential to result in evidence 
material to the defendant's identification as the perpetrator. 
 
 
The Commonwealth opposed the defendant's motion, arguing 
principally that the defendant's claim that no crime occurred 
was categorically barred from chapter 278A relief because it did 
not put identity at issue.  In denying the defendant's motion, 
the judge stated in part: 
 
"The defendant's motion and affidavits do not meet the 
requirements of [G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (4),] in that the 
defendant has not met his burden to show whether any test 
results could be material to the question of identity of 
the perpetrator.  Here the issue is not identity, but 
whether a crime occurred.  Defendant is not entitled to 
relief." 
 
3 
 
 
The defendant appealed, and we granted his application for 
direct appellate review.2 
 
 
Discussion.  The defendant argues that the motion judge 
erred by interpreting G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (4), to exclude 
movants who claim that no crime occurred.  In Williams, 481 
Mass. at    , we concluded that "a defendant who asserts that 
the requested testing has the potential to result in evidence 
that is material to his or her identity as the perpetrator of 
the crime because no crime in fact occurred satisfies the 
§ 3 (b) (4) requirement."  Thus, here we conclude that the 
defendant's motion satisfies the threshold burden of 
§ 3 (b) (4).3 
 
 
Nothing in our decision should be read as a comment on the 
defendant's likelihood of success in obtaining the testing he 
seeks.  We note that at the hearing stage, he still must 
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence each of the 
factors enumerated in G. L. c. 278A, § 7 (b), including that 
"the requested analysis has the potential to result in evidence 
that is material to the moving party's identification as the 
perpetrator of the crime in the underlying case."  G. L. 
                     
 
2 Pursuant to G. L. c. 278A (chapter 278A), an individual 
seeking postconviction forensic testing must present certain 
information by way of motion.  The Commonwealth may provide a 
response, but need not do so at the motion stage, which is 
considered "nonadversarial."  G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (e).  See 
Commonwealth v. Wade, 467 Mass. 496, 503 (2014), S.C., 475 Mass. 
54 (2016).  If the motion is allowed, the Commonwealth at that 
point must file a response, and the court will hold an 
evidentiary hearing.  G. L. c. 278A, §§ 4 (c), 6.  Here, there 
is no indication in the docket that the defendant's chapter 278A 
motion was allowed before the Commonwealth was ordered to 
respond.  The Commonwealth did so citing G. L. c. 278A, § 4, the 
provision requiring the Commonwealth's response once the initial 
motion has been allowed.  A G. L. c. 278A, § 6, hearing was 
scheduled, but the hearing that took place was focused on 
whether the defendant was eligible to seek chapter 278A testing 
and was nonevidentiary in nature.  For these reasons, and 
because the motion judge who issued the ultimate denial cited 
G. L. c. 278A, § 3 (b) (4), we review the matter at the motion 
stage under § 3. 
 
 
3 The Commonwealth does not identify, nor do we discern, any 
defect in the defendant's prima facie case for chapter 278A 
relief under the other § 3 factors. 
4 
 
 
c. 278A, § 7 (b) (4).  More specifically, here the defendant 
will need to demonstrate that the analysis has the potential to 
result in evidence that is material to proving that no crime 
occurred. 
 
 
Conclusion.  The order denying the defendant's chapter 278A 
motion is reversed, and this case is remanded to the Superior 
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and 
our reasoning in Williams, supra. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So ordered. 
 
 
 
Merritt Schnipper for the defendant. 
 
Donna-Marie Haran, Assistant District Attorney, for the 
Commonwealth. 
 
Lisa M. Kavanaugh, Committee for Public Counsel Services, 
Stephanie Roberts Hartung, Isaac N. Saidel-Goley, Sarah L. 
Rosenbluth, Sara J. van Vliet, & Sharon L. Beckman, for New 
England Innocence Project & others, amici curiae, submitted a 
brief.