Case Title: People v. Baker

Citation: 

Docket Number: S170280

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2021-02-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
PAUL WESLEY BAKER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S170280 
 
Los Angeles County Superior Court 
LA045977 
 
 
February 1, 2021 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the 
Court, in which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Cuéllar, Kruger, 
Groban and Hull* concurred. 
 
Justice Liu filed a concurring opinion. 
 
 
 
 
________________________ 
*  Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate 
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution. 
1 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
S170280 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
Judy Palmer told a friend that she was afraid of defendant 
Paul Wesley Baker and that “if anything happened to her,” “he 
did it.”  Within a few weeks, Palmer disappeared.  Her body was 
found in the desert several weeks later, severely decomposed.  
A jury convicted defendant of first degree murder, among 
several other offenses.  The jury also found true two special 
circumstance allegations — rape and burglary — and returned 
a verdict of death at the close of the penalty phase.  This appeal 
is automatic.  Aside from correcting an error in the abstract of 
judgment, we affirm.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. Guilt Phase 
This case involves three sets of charged offenses.  The first 
concerns Judy Palmer.  A jury convicted defendant of first 
degree murder (count 1); forcible rape (count 2); first degree 
residential burglary (count 3); grand theft auto (count 4), 
regarding a Ford Escort that Palmer’s son provided for her use; 
unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle (count 5), regarding the 
same automobile; and unlawful driving or taking of a vehicle 
(count 14), regarding a Ford Ranger loaned to Palmer by her 
employer after the Escort disappeared.  (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. 
(a) [murder], 261, subd. (a)(2) [rape], 459–460 [burglary], 487, 
subd. (d)(1) [grand theft]; Veh. Code, § 10841, subd. (a) 
[unlawful driving or taking].)  The jury found defendant not 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
2 
guilty of sexual penetration by foreign object (count 15).  (Pen. 
Code, § 289, subd. (a)(1).)  In connection with the murder, the 
jury found true two special circumstance allegations (rape and 
burglary) 
and 
found 
not 
true 
one 
additional 
special 
circumstance allegation (sexual penetration by foreign object).  
(Id., § 190, subd. (a)(17)(C) [rape], (a)(17)(G) [burglary], 
(a)(17)(K) [foreign object].)  The jury also found that the rape 
(count 2) was committed during a residential burglary and 
found true a multiple victim allegation.  (Id., § 667.61.)  
The second set of charged offenses concerns crimes that 
the jury found defendant committed against women other than 
Palmer: forcible rape (count 6) and sodomy by use of force 
(counts 7 and 16) regarding Kathleen S.; and sodomy by use of 
force (count 10) regarding Lorna T.  (Pen. Code, §§ 261, subd. 
(a)(2) [rape], 286, subd. (c)(2) [sodomy].)  The jury found true a 
multiple victim allegation in connection with each of these 
offenses.  (Id., § 667.61.)  The jury also found true a great bodily 
injury allegation in connection with the rape offense (count 6) 
and one sodomy offense (count 7) concerning Kathleen S.   
The third and final set of charged offenses concerns 
crimes, regarding women other than Palmer, of which defendant 
was acquitted.  The trial court entered a judgment of acquittal 
regarding the alleged forcible rape of Monica H. (count 12) after 
she did not appear to testify.  (See Pen. Code, § 1118.1.)  The 
jury acquitted defendant of two counts of sodomy by force 
(counts 9 and 13) regarding Laura M. and one count of forcible 
rape (count 11) regarding Susanne K.  The operative charging 
document did not include a count 8.   
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
3 
1.  Prosecution case 
a.  Relationship between Palmer and defendant 
Judy Palmer was a sixty-year-old grandmother at the time 
of her disappearance on April 17, 2004.  She was an active 
participant in Alcoholics Anonymous (A.A.), sober for nearly 
28 years, and “dedicated a large amount of her time to helping” 
others in the program.   
Palmer met defendant through A.A.  He was roughly 
17 years her junior and very strong.  Testimony suggested that 
the pair became friends around 2000, began dating no sooner 
than 2001, and started living together in Palmer’s apartment no 
later than 2002.  The relationship was on-again, off-again.  It 
appears Palmer and defendant separated at some point in 2003 
and reconciled by early 2004.  
Defendant worked as a handyperson to earn a living.  In 
early 2004, Palmer’s son Robert hired defendant to perform 
work in Robert’s home, at defendant and Palmer’s request.  
Defendant was dissatisfied with the compensation he received 
and told Robert “he could really hurt my mom.”   
On March 11, 2004, there was an incident at a storage 
facility.  Palmer and defendant shared a storage unit beginning 
around September 2003.  A manager at the facility saw 
defendant there several times without Palmer; the manager 
recalled him having visited “pretty much every day” since the 
unit had been rented, often with his dog.  At some unspecified 
time before March 11, defendant appeared without the dog, and 
the manager inquired about it.  The manager testified that 
defendant said, “ ‘[s]he’s got it and if I ever want the dog back, 
I’ll probably have to kill her to get it.’ ”  The manager understood 
defendant to be referring to Palmer.   
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
4 
Palmer appeared at the storage facility in person to make 
a payment on March 11.  Initially, defendant did not seem to be 
with her.  The manager told her that defendant “ ‘made a 
remark that if he wanted [the dog] back, he would have to kill 
you for it.’ ”  The manager testified that Palmer looked at her 
and started shaking.  Defendant appeared immediately after the 
manager’s comment.  The manager told him she thought his 
comment about the dog referred to Palmer.  Defendant grabbed 
Palmer “and just kind of pinched her real hard”; the manager 
related that Palmer “kept looking at me real scared.”   
Palmer’s birthday was around that time.  Her daughter 
Tammy hosted a birthday party on approximately March 11 or 
12.  Palmer was sitting at a table.  Defendant came up behind 
her and laid his forearm and fist in front of her.  She flinched.  
According to Tammy, defendant said, “ ‘I know you want to 
marry me.’  And [Palmer] said, ‘the hell I do.’ ”  Defendant, 
laughing, asked, “ ‘Why don’t you tell her what I gave you for 
your birthday?’ ”  When Palmer did not reply, he added, “ ‘Come 
on.  Come on.  Tell her what I gave you.  It’s pretty and it’s 
pink.’ ”  Defendant continued laughing.  Palmer sat silently, 
then retreated to the bathroom, crying.  Other evidence adduced 
at trial supported an inference that the pink item to which 
defendant referred was a vibrator relevant to the sexual 
penetration by foreign object count and special circumstance 
allegation.  Palmer had told Tammy years earlier that sex toys 
“grossed her out” and “demeaned the act of making love.”   
Within a few days of the party, Palmer told Tammy that 
she (Palmer) and defendant were having problems and that she 
did not want him in her apartment anymore.  Tammy’s 
understanding was that defendant moved out some time during 
the week following the party and “was out on the street.”  
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
5 
Palmer’s relationship with defendant had ended by early 
April 2004.  On April 3 — two weeks before Palmer disappeared 
— defendant called Tammy’s home landline telephone.  Tammy 
described him as “very frantic to speak to” Palmer.  Although 
Palmer was present, Tammy refused.  Tammy and Palmer had 
previously discussed Palmer “trying very hard not to see” 
defendant; he had been calling Palmer and “showing up at 
places,” including Palmer’s home.  After Tammy hung up the 
landline, her cell phone rang.  It was defendant, again.  She 
refused to let him speak with Palmer, again.  Palmer nodded, 
suggesting agreement with the refusal.  At some point, Palmer 
remarked, “I wish the asshole would leave me alone” — the kind 
of language Tammy said Palmer used only when “very angry.”   
On April 5, defendant was arrested in Palmer’s apartment 
and taken into custody.  Palmer’s hearsay statement, admitted 
only as relevant to the state of mind of the testifying officer, 
indicated that defendant had forced himself into her apartment; 
other hearsay, admitted without at least contemporaneous 
limitation, was to similar effect.  Trial testimony indicated that 
officers responded at around 10:00 p.m. that night to a call 
regarding a domestic disturbance.  After they entered Palmer’s 
apartment, defendant removed a narcotics pipe from a pocket of 
his shorts.  He was arrested for possession of that 
paraphernalia.  Officers also recovered a set of keys to Palmer’s 
apartment from his underwear.  Two days after the incident, on 
April 7, defendant was served with a restraining order 
restricting his contact with Palmer.  At some point around this 
time, roughly between April 3 and April 10, Palmer told a friend 
“that she was afraid of him and that if anything happened to her 
that — to look at him, that he did it.” 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
6 
b.  Events preceding Palmer’s disappearance 
Defendant was released from custody shortly after 4:00 
p.m. on Wednesday, April 14, 2004.  A Ford Escort that Palmer’s 
son Robert provided for her use went missing by the next day.  
That vehicle is the one at issue in counts 4 (grand theft auto) 
and 5 (unlawful driving or taking). 
Palmer called her boss on Thursday, April 15, and 
informed him that she lacked transportation to work.  Her boss 
loaned her a white 2002 Ford Ranger pickup truck used by the 
company that employed them.  That truck is the vehicle at issue 
in count 14 (unlawful driving or taking).  At the time the truck 
was loaned to Palmer, it had a metal toolbox with “a diamond-
plate type finish.”  Palmer decided to park it away from her 
regular parking spot, fearing that defendant, whom she believed 
had stolen the Escort, would steal the Ranger as well.   
That same day, around 10:00 or 10:30 a.m., defendant 
called his acquaintance Daniel Mengoni.  Mengoni and 
defendant had used substances together “[a] dozen” times, 
“maybe more,” including cocaine and alcohol.  Defendant 
informed Mengoni that he (defendant) had a car for him 
(Mengoni).  Mengoni was to pay for the car with drugs.  
Defendant turned over the car before noon.  It was a white Ford 
Escort in good condition, with “women’s clothes in the trunk and 
A.A. material.”  Mengoni gave defendant about $50 worth of 
crack, hoping to use the car for at least a day.  Defendant gave 
Mengoni a key and informed him that he (defendant) “never” 
wanted the car back.   
The next night (Friday, April 16), around 9:00 p.m., 
Mengoni was pulled over while driving the car.  Police arrested 
him and told him that the car was stolen.  He recalled telling 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
7 
the arresting officers that he had received the Escort from 
defendant.  An officer called Palmer’s son Robert at 
approximately 10:00 p.m. that night to inform him that the 
missing Escort had been recovered.  
c.  Palmer’s disappearance   
Palmer was last seen alive by friends and family on 
Saturday, April 17, 2004.  She went to work that day.  At some 
point, she spoke with Robert.  They arranged to meet the next 
day to retrieve the impounded Escort.    
Between 4:00 and 5:00 p.m. on the 17th, while in her 
apartment, Palmer called the friend to whom she had earlier 
conveyed that “if anything happened to her . . . he did it.”  
During the call, Palmer reiterated that “she was afraid that 
[defendant] was going to come and hurt her and she didn’t know 
what she should do.” 
At about 5:00 p.m., Palmer spoke with her daughter 
Tammy.  They decided to have dinner together.  Palmer drove 
to Tammy’s in the Ford Ranger, arriving near 6:00 p.m.  Palmer 
was “quiet” and not herself.  She told Tammy that “she was 
really trying to stay away from” defendant.  At some point, 
Palmer cried.  
Palmer left for her apartment, which was about a ten-
minute drive away, at around 8:00 p.m.  Before departing, she 
and Tammy agreed that Palmer would pick up Tammy’s sons 
the next day for an outing.  
On Sunday, April 18, however, there was no word from 
Palmer.  When Tammy called Palmer, she received no answer.  
When she drove to Palmer’s apartment complex, she could not 
find the truck Palmer had been driving, even though she knew 
to look outside of the normal parking spot.  Tammy eventually 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
8 
went to Palmer’s apartment unit.  She knocked on the door, 
yelling, but again received no answer.  At approximately the 
same time, Robert arrived at the place that he and Palmer had 
agreed to meet to retrieve the impounded car.  Palmer did not 
appear.  Tammy filed a missing persons report that day.   
d.  Defendant’s whereabouts the night Palmer 
disappeared 
The timeline evidence least dependent on human memory 
suggested that defendant was at the aforementioned storage 
facility as late as about 6:00 p.m. on Saturday, April 17.  That 
facility assigned a unique pin code to each customer account.  
A code was required to enter past the facility’s gate, and to exit, 
if leaving in an automobile rather than on foot.  A computer-
generated log indicated that the pin code associated with 
defendant’s and Palmer’s account was inputted in an attempt to 
exit the facility at 5:01 p.m. and 6:07 p.m. on Saturday, April 17.  
The pin code was suspended at that time due to nonpayment, 
and, thus, would not operate the gate.  The manager confirmed 
that it was possible for someone without a functional pin code to 
follow someone into the facility and need to wait until someone 
else was leaving to exit.  The record does not reveal precisely 
when the person who inputted the pin code left the storage 
facility.   
Defendant’s acquaintance John Woodard testified that 
defendant appeared at Woodard’s home later that night.  
Woodard told the police that defendant arrived around 9:30 p.m.  
Defendant was driving “a white Ford Ranger, late model,” which 
Woodard, a self-described “Ford Ranger person,” had never seen 
defendant drive before.  (Recall that two days prior, Palmer’s 
boss had loaned her the 2002 Ford Ranger at issue in count 14.)  
Defendant parked in a location hidden from street traffic, which 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
9 
he had not done previously.  Woodard understood defendant to 
want to trade him the toolbox on the back of the Ranger for a 
tile saw defendant had previously given to Woodard as collateral 
for a loan.  Woodard refused.  Within a week or so before this 
meeting, defendant had complained to Woodard that Palmer 
was mistreating him; “he was very angry at her” and “called her 
a cunt.”  Defendant did not mention her that evening, however.  
And Woodard did not see scratches on defendant’s face that 
night.   
The jury also heard testimony from Juan Calhoun, a 
witness whom the prosecution described as “probably not as 
accurate as some of the other[]” witnesses regarding the 
timeline.  As the court put it (outside the presence of the jury), 
“[i]t seems to me that the basic facts were pretty consistent with 
Mr. Calhoun.  The timeline was a bit confusing.”   
Calhoun testified that he encountered defendant the 
morning of either Friday, April 16, or Saturday, April 17; closer 
to the relevant events, he had said the 17th.  Calhoun and 
defendant agreed to rent a motel room later that day, to “buy 
some drugs and get a few girls and get high in the room.”  Among 
other things, Calhoun testified that defendant left the room for 
several hours, returning with “a couple of scratches or some type 
of blood marks on his face.”  According to Calhoun, defendant 
disclosed “that he had beat the pussy up or something like that.” 
Calhoun understood defendant’s terminology to be “like a 
street slang, stating that he might have had aggressive sex with 
his wife or whatever.”  Defendant had previously “mentioned 
something about his wife, that they weren’t together.”  Calhoun 
was not certain, but thought defendant “said he broke in.”  At 
trial, Calhoun seemed not to recall telling detectives that 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
10 
defendant returned at night with a bag of jewelry.  He did 
testify, however, that he saw defendant with what appeared to 
be women’s jewelry not long after.  Mengoni also testified that, 
in May 2004, Calhoun told him defendant returned with jewelry 
and said something about “[b]eating some pussy up real bad.”  
Despite some inconsistencies in the timeline evidence adduced 
at trial, nothing suggested that defendant returned to the motel 
room later than the early morning of Sunday, April 18. 
e.  Palmer’s apartment  
Palmer lived in a studio apartment.  At roughly 8 p.m. on 
April 18 — the day after Tammy last saw Palmer alive — 
Tammy and her husband entered the apartment with the 
assistance of a locksmith.  Tammy (and, it seems, her husband) 
remained inside for no more than 10 minutes.  Her brother 
Robert and his wife also spent a few minutes walking through 
the apartment that night, at some point after Tammy departed.   
As relevant here, Tammy noticed several things about the 
condition of the apartment.  The apartment smelled unusually 
strongly of cleaning product.  A fan was on.  No coffee cup or 
water glass appeared where Palmer usually left one.  The 
glasses that Palmer needed for driving were on top of a table, 
folded; Palmer’s habit was to leave them unfolded, so that she 
could put them on more easily with one hand when crocheting.  
Some of Palmer’s bedding was missing.  Finally, Tammy saw a 
pink vibrator in the area of the bathroom sink.  Embarrassed, 
and aware her brother Robert was en route, Tammy wrapped 
the vibrator in toilet paper and either she or her husband hid it 
in an under-sink cabinet.  Otherwise, Tammy testified, she 
“didn’t touch anything.”   
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
11 
Officers’ 
initial, 
later-occurring 
inspection 
of 
the 
apartment did not lead them to believe that Palmer had been 
killed there.  “This wasn’t a typical-looking crime scene,” one 
officer testified; “This was just a pretty clean apartment.”   
f.  Events preceding identification of Palmer’s body  
On Tuesday, April 20, defendant sold his Bronco truck (not 
the Ranger loaned to Palmer) to a used car dealer for $500.  The 
dealer, who at trial recalled seeing defendant only once before 
the transaction, thought defendant seemed “very upset”; 
“basically he was saying that he wanted to kill himself.”  
Defendant left some personal effects at the dealership.  The 
dealer’s understanding was that defendant would retrieve them, 
presumably the same day.  Defendant never returned.  
Defendant went back to Woodard’s home on foot at about 
that time.  He seemed “very upset” and told Woodard “that he 
[that is, defendant] was gonna be on the news.”  Defendant 
developed a habit of appearing near Woodard’s home 
“[p]ractically every day,” sometimes with a shopping cart.  “[H]e 
was mostly trying to get money.”  At some point, defendant told 
Woodard that defendant was “going to hell and he’s gonna jump 
off a bridge.”   
On Wednesday, April 21, at around 10 p.m., an officer 
responding to a call was directed to a motel room.  Defendant 
answered the door.  The officer observed scratches on 
defendant’s face.  He detained defendant and brought him to a 
police station.  A few hours later, at the station, photographs 
were taken of scratches on defendant’s face and his inner left 
arm.  Defendant was released later that day; that is, Thursday, 
April 22.  
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
12 
Also on April 22, detectives assigned to the missing 
persons division went to the dealership to which defendant sold 
his Bronco.  The vehicle was impounded that day.  A criminalist 
visually inspected the Bronco a few days later.  Among other 
things, he saw a shovel, towels, and the restraining order 
naming defendant.   
The missing persons detectives caused photographs to be 
taken of certain items that defendant left at the used car lot, but 
do not appear to have secured or retained those items at that 
time.  At some point thereafter, the dealer placed defendant’s 
belongings in a dumpster.  A homicide detective retrieved 
miscellaneous papers from the dumpster, including receipts and 
what “looked like a resume for Paul Baker and some other items 
with his name on it.”  One of the roughly 15 receipts from Home 
Depot was dated March 27, 2004 and reflected a purchase of an 
item called “multi color” with a specified item number.  Although 
the significance of that purchase was not apparent at this point 
in the investigation, trial testimony of a Home Depot employee 
and the president and CEO of a rope manufacturer tended to 
indicate that the item reflected on the receipt was rope of the 
kind found wrapped around Palmer’s body when her remains 
were later discovered.  
Law enforcement personnel searched Palmer’s apartment 
several times before her body was identified.  Carpet under a 
coffee table appeared to be stained with blood.  Those areas 
tested preliminarily positive for blood using a phenolphthalein 
test, as did a small drop on the wall and a spot on a piece of 
furniture.  A criminalist with special goggles and lighting also 
identified areas that may have been stained with semen on the 
front part of a couch cushion, down the front of the couch, and 
on the carpet at the base of the couch.  The couch and carpet also 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
13 
tested preliminarily positive for semen using an acid 
phosphatase test.  The criminalist’s testing did not enable him 
to determine how long the semen had been there.  A pink 
vibrator was also collected from an under-sink cabinet. 
Finally, Mengoni, whom defendant had given the stolen 
Escort, was charged with felony joyriding, and remained in 
custody until about Friday, May 7.  Within a week of his release, 
likely in the range of the 11th to 14th, Mengoni encountered 
defendant while on a walk.  Mengoni was angry about the arrest, 
especially because the car appeared to be connected to a missing 
person.  Defendant assured him not to worry about it, saying 
that “nobody would . . . show up to court to press charges.”  If 
this conversation took place on or before May 14, as Mengoni 
recalled, then it occurred before Palmer’s body was identified — 
and tended to show that defendant had special reason to believe 
that Palmer, then missing, would not be found alive. 
g.  Discovery and identification of Palmer’s body  
Palmer’s unidentified body was found on May 11 in a 
desert area of Riverside County.  Due to substantial 
decomposition, much of what remained was skeleton; at an 
autopsy performed the next day, she weighed 22 pounds.  
Palmer’s fingers were rehydrated, and her prints compared to 
DMV records.  She was identified on May 18 or 19, 2004.   
Palmer’s remains were found largely surrounded by foam 
padding.  Two blankets were wrapped around her and held in 
place with a rope, “secur[ing] the body in kind of a fetal position 
or balled-up.”  Her jeans were unzipped and pulled down to her 
thighs, exposing her underwear (which was fully on).  
A sweatshirt was atop her chest between her arms.  An 
unclasped bra was underneath her body.  There were no 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
14 
apparent signs of tearing on the jeans, underwear, sweatshirt, 
or bra.   
Various items were found near Palmer’s body.  They 
included a dental chart bearing the name Judy Palmer; a Notice 
of Privacy Practices bearing the name Paul Baker; and a picture 
with the inscription, “ ‘Judy, I’ll always love you, no matter 
what.  I miss you very much.  Love Paul B.’ ”  Other items found 
nearby are discussed as relevant below.   
Given the extent of decomposition, the doctor who 
performed Palmer’s autopsy was unable to determine the cause 
or time of her death.  “[T]here were no internal organs of any 
kind available,” and “[t]he genitalia, the external genitalia and 
internal genitalia, were absent.”  Although it was possible that 
Palmer had been asphyxiated (or stabbed, or killed by blows to 
the body), the bindings around her appeared to be used so that 
her body would be easier to move.  The doctor did convey, 
however, that he did not think Palmer died of natural causes; 
“[t]he nature of the bindings and the way that the body was 
treated post mortem was — certainly suggests that it wasn’t a 
natural death.”  The doctor also opined that the condition of her 
body was consistent with her having died on April 17 or early 
April 18; been left in the desert soon thereafter; and having 
remained there until May 11.   
h.  Defendant’s arrest and aftermath 
Officers arrested defendant on May 20, 2004, at about 
1:00 p.m.  Items of his property recovered soon after included an 
acknowledgement of receipt regarding a mental health agency’s 
notice of privacy practices.  The prosecution argued that this 
document was identical to the notice found near Palmer’s body, 
except that defendant had signed the version found near 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
15 
Palmer.  None of the items collected appeared to have blood on 
them.   
The missing Ford Ranger loaned to Palmer received 
several parking citations in the days that followed defendant’s 
May 20 arrest — the first shortly after midnight on May 21, the 
last on June 1.  On June 2, an officer recovered the Ford Ranger 
and had it impounded.  An LAPD criminalist searched the 
vehicle two days later.  The Ranger did not contain the toolbox 
defendant attempted to trade to Woodard on the night Palmer 
disappeared.  The criminalist did, however, find “plant material” 
in the bed of the truck and inside the cab on the floor near the 
passenger seat.  The LAPD gave four samples of plant material 
to a botanist; two from the truck, and two from a location in 
Riverside near where Palmer’s body was found.  The botanist 
testified that the samples appeared to be tamarix aphylla, a 
distinctive, uncommon plant found in only a few regions of 
California, including Riverside.  The samples could have come 
from the same plant, but the botanist was not certain they did.   
Finally, Tammy went to clean out Palmer’s apartment 
after Palmer’s body was identified.  The person she was with 
leaned against the couch, and what appeared to be a crack pipe 
fell out.  Tammy’s husband turned the pipe over to a detective.   
i.  Forensic evidence 
Several items collected during the investigation of this 
case were submitted for scientific analysis.  Defendant contends 
that some of the results of that analysis were improperly 
admitted at trial, because the analysts were not available for 
cross-examination.  (See post, pt. II.E.)  This section describes 
only analysis performed by three criminalists who testified at 
trial. 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
16 
One criminalist observed sperm cells on cuttings from 
Palmer’s rug and couch, as well as on a swab of the vibrator.  
The cutting from the rug had “a lot of sperm”; “approximately 
100 to 250 sperm per . . . three microliter drop.”  The swab of the 
vibrator had only two.  The analyst could not determine the age 
of any seminal fluid on the rug, the couch, or the vibrator. 
A different criminalist screened several items for seminal 
fluid using an acid phosphatase test.  A towel in a bag found 
near Palmer’s body screened positive, as did an aqua-colored 
blanket in a different bag nearby.  Microscopic examination of 
extractions from those items revealed sperm cells.  The groin 
area of Palmer’s underwear screened negative for seminal fluid, 
but a later screening of other portions of the underwear was 
“positive, in that it changed color[,] [b]ut inconclusive, in that it 
was different than what I typically see.”  The criminalist did not 
evaluate the relevant areas microscopically.   
The third criminalist specialized in DNA analysis.  She 
testified that a sock found in a bag near Palmer’s body matched 
the DNA profile the criminalist created regarding Palmer, as did 
various other items.   
The criminalist also created a profile of defendant’s DNA.  
Among other things, she compared that profile to sperm and 
nonsperm fractions extracted from the aqua-colored blanket.  
She found defendant’s profile in both the sperm and nonsperm 
fractions.  A cigarette butt from the same bag also matched 
defendant’s profile, as did a sperm fraction extracted from a 
towel cutting. 
The criminalist understood the frequency with which 
defendant’s profile would appear in the population to be “in the 
magnitudes of trillions.”  The profile common to defendant and 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
17 
the cigarette butt would be expected to appear in one in 120 
trillion Caucasians.  The more detailed profile common to 
defendant and the sperm fraction from the towel would be 
expected to appear in one in 740 quadrillion Caucasians.   
The criminalist could not indicate when defendant’s sperm 
was secreted on the blanket or the towel.  Sperm cells could 
remain even after exposure to sunlight or washing in detergent, 
“[b]ut it’s also very possible” for sperm to be removed; “[i]f you 
have a lot, there could be a lot left behind.  If there wasn’t a lot, 
it could be completely washed away.”  Each subsequent washing 
diminishes the likelihood of finding sperm.  Additionally, “[t]he 
constituent of the semen is the acid phosphatase, which is water 
soluble and it tends to wash out.”  The criminalist “would not 
expect to get a positive result with acid phosphatase, which is 
the enzyme that is water soluble,” if underwear had been 
exposed to semen and laundered.   
Finally, as noteworthy here, the criminalist extracted a 
sperm fraction from cuttings of Palmer’s underwear, though she 
did not observe any sperm visually.  Although the criminalist 
could only create a partial profile from that fraction, the profile 
was consistent with defendant; he could “[]not be excluded.”  The 
cuttings were forwarded to another lab for a different type of 
DNA testing. 
j.  Evidence of uncharged offenses 
In addition to the charged offenses, the prosecution also 
introduced evidence of uncharged offenses that defendant 
allegedly committed against other women.  Defendant contends 
that the evidence of uncharged offenses was unduly prejudicial.  
(See Evid. Code, § 352.)  That evidence is discussed as relevant 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
18 
below.  (See post, pt. II.D.)  The balance of this background 
section describes evidence regarding other charged offenses. 
k.  Lorna T. (Count 10) 
The jury convicted defendant of one count of sodomy by 
force regarding Lorna T.  She met defendant at an A.A. meeting 
in approximately the summer of 1994.  They started dating 
about a month later, dated intermittently for about five months, 
and renewed their relationship sometime thereafter.  During 
the time in which they were dating, defendant demonstrated an 
interest in pornographic films featuring anal sex and “whips and 
chains.”   
One evening in mid-December 1995, defendant attacked 
Lorna T. in her bedroom.  They were lying naked on her bed 
shortly before she was to leave for a Christmas party when 
defendant said “ ‘[g]ive me some from the back.’ ”  After Lorna 
T. repeatedly refused, he pushed her from her side onto her 
stomach; held her down by the back of her neck (pressing her 
face into the bed and making it difficult for her to breathe); and 
forced her to have anal sex with him.  Lorna testified that “[i]t 
hurt like he was just ripping me, like, you know, just forcible, 
forcing his self real hard . . . .”  After defendant stopped, she said 
what he did was wrong and asked him why he did it.  He said 
nothing, got dressed, and left.  Lorna feared that if she called 
the police, “he would retaliate.”   
l.  Kathleen S. (Counts 6, 7, and 16) 
Defendant was convicted of three offenses regarding 
Kathleen S.: forcible rape (count 6) and forcible sodomy (count 
7), regarding an incident in June 1997, and forcible sodomy 
(count 16), regarding an incident in April or May 1997. 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
19 
Kathleen met defendant in late 1996 or early 1997.  She 
was homeless at the time and struggling with drugs and alcohol.  
Defendant was living in his van and offered to let her stay with 
him, which she did.  They began an intimate relationship. 
One night in April or May 1997, they were inside the van.  
Defendant told her that he “wanted it from behind,” which she 
understood to mean that “he wanted to anally penetrate me.”  
She told him that she did not want to engage in anal sex.  In 
response, “he took it anyway.”  He told her that “he does this to 
all of his women.”  She did not report the incident to the police 
that night, “[p]robably because of the life I was living at the time 
and fear of going back into the streets.”   
At some point, Kathleen was offered a job as a dog groomer 
and inquired about a job for defendant.  Defendant was hired.  
Her employer eventually discovered that defendant had a 
background as a handyperson.  The employer offered to let 
defendant and Kathleen live in the employer’s garage in 
exchange for defendant working on the employer’s house on 
weekends.  Defendant and Kathleen accepted the offer and 
moved into the garage on June 2, 1997.  
The day they moved in, they went to a nearby bar.  
Kathleen invited a friend to join them.  Defendant knew about 
the invitation but found out only after it had been extended that 
the friend was an ex-boyfriend of Kathleen’s.  After they 
returned to the garage, defendant became angry and assaulted 
her.  He bit her thumb, hit her face, and threw her into the 
garage door.  Testimony from neighbors who heard noises 
coming 
from 
the 
garage 
corroborated 
that 
a 
violent 
confrontation occurred.   
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
20 
Kathleen could not remember much of the event.  But she 
vaguely recalled being on a mattress on her stomach and felt 
pain in her anal and vaginal regions.  Based on her injuries, she 
concluded that she had been raped and sodomized.   
Kathleen also recalled defendant telling her “that he was 
gonna take me out to the desert and tie me up and have his 
friends rape and kill me.”  She further testified that at some 
point “he got ahold of my wrist, I believe, and proceeded to drag 
me out of the garage saying that I’m gonna take you in the house 
and show you what I’ve done to you” — adding, “I knew he would 
kill me if he took me in that house.”  In response to her asking 
why he was doing this to her, “he said he does it to all of his 
women, that same remark.”  As he dragged her out of the garage, 
she broke free and started running.  “I believe at that time I 
heard someone say it was the police.”   
A detective who arrived at the scene testified.  He saw 
Kathleen running out of the garage, followed by defendant.  “The 
right side of her face was completely swollen, her eye swollen 
shut, red and puffy, and she was bleeding from her mouth.”  “As 
she ran past me initially she screamed ‘don’t let him get me 
again.  Don’t let them take me to the desert.’ ”  He believed “she 
used the term ‘he fucked me in the ass.’ ”  She was transported 
by ambulance to a hospital.  
Kathleen recalled “a few bodies . . . trying to restrain me,” 
and then “waking up in the hospital.”  Her memory of her time 
in the hospital is “very vague.”  “I remember speaking to 
somebody who was telling me it was okay, that the police had 
helped me and the doctor needed to examine me.”   
The doctor who examined Kathleen on the morning of 
June 3, 1997, testified.  He explained that he did not remember 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
21 
the examination, but he testified based on records prepared 
around that time.  According to those records, she was 
“disheveled, tearful, [and] cooperative.”  “[S]he had pain in her 
face and jaw area,” as well as injuries around those areas.  “[S]he 
stated she was beaten up and raped by live-in boyfriend Paul 
Baker earlier that evening — that night.  She said that he tied 
her up, both hands and feet, ‘punched and kicked me all over,’ 
put his penis in her mouth, vagina and rectum multiple times.”  
An injury on her right thumb appeared to be a possible human 
bite mark.  The doctor performed a pelvic exam.  She had “a 
small bruise on the right labia” and “an area around her rectum 
that looked like it might be superficial abrasion.”  The doctor 
believed her injuries “were consistent with both physical and 
sexual assault” and supported her description of the attack.  He 
did not notice any tearing or bleeding of her rectum.  He could 
not state exactly when the punctate wound was inflicted and 
“couldn’t say it was yesterday or today” regarding the possible 
abrasion near the rectum.  The sperm the doctor observed could 
have been a few days old.   
m.  Laura M. (Counts 9 and 13) 
Defendant was charged with, but acquitted of, two counts 
of forcible sodomy regarding Laura M.  She and defendant met 
through a mutual acquaintance in 1996 and, intermittently, had 
consensual intimate relations until sometime in 2001.  The first 
charged incident allegedly occurred at a hotel in December 2000.  
Laura testified that defendant tied her to a bed post and forced 
her to have anal sex with him.  The second charged incident 
allegedly occurred at Laura M.’s home in January 2001.  She 
testified that he pulled her out of the shower, threw her to the 
floor, and again forced her to have anal sex with him.   
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
22 
Cross-examination focused primarily on Laura M.’s 
alcohol use and gaps in her memory.  The jury also heard 
testimony that Laura M. had been convicted of several 
misdemeanors, including making a false report to a public 
agency or peace officer.   
n.  Susanne K. (Count 11) 
Defendant was charged with, but acquitted of, one count 
of forcible rape regarding Susanne K.  She and defendant met 
through A.A. in approximately February 2001 and went on a 
first date in May of that year.  They ended up at her home.  
Susanne K. testified that, while there, defendant had sexual 
intercourse with her against her will, despite her repeatedly 
telling him she did not want to do so.  Because Susanne K. 
passed away before trial, the jury did not have an opportunity 
to hear her testify; it heard a reading of her testimony from the 
preliminary hearing in this case. 
2.  Defense case 
The defense called several witnesses relevant to the 
offenses concerning Laura M.  As noted, the jury found 
defendant not guilty of those offenses. 
The defense also elicited various pieces of information 
regarding the offenses related to Palmer.  Among other things, 
questioning probed officers’ interviews of Calhoun and whether 
officers had assisted Mengoni in exchange for his testimony.  
Various other details concerning the investigation were also 
elicited; for example, that Palmer’s apartment door did not 
appear to be damaged about a week after her disappearance, 
and that Woodard said he never reported seeing scratches on 
defendant’s face.  Much of the testimony retraced investigators’ 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
23 
steps, including a conversation in which a victim of an 
uncharged offense did not report that offense.  
B. Penalty Phase 
1.  Prosecution case 
The 
prosecution 
offered 
additional 
photographs 
documenting Kathleen S.’s injuries arising from the incident in 
the garage.  It also offered certified records indicating that 
defendant had been charged with and convicted of possession of 
a controlled substance (cocaine base) in June 1999.   
Palmer’s daughter-in-law Vicki R. testified.  She described 
Palmer as “like my mom” and a doting grandmother to Vicki’s 
children.  Vicki’s daughter “totally shut down” after Palmer’s 
death, as did Vicki’s husband Robert.  Vicki’s two younger sons, 
she added, also missed their grandmother; one of them testified 
to similar effect, as did one of Palmer’s grandsons through her 
daughter Tammy.  When asked what she missed most about 
Palmer, Vicki replied, “[h]er love, her support.”  Palmer’s son-
in-law Casey G., Tammy’s husband, also described Palmer as “a 
great mother-in-law” who “helped so much in our lives.”  
Palmer’s son Robert described her as a “lighthearted, 
really easygoing” person who “wanted to help . . . and listen to 
everybody.”  Her death had changed him; “you just don’t know 
who you can trust, you know.  When you learn that somebody 
who acts like they’re your friend and then waits until your most 
sensitive moment and they want to do such a thing to you . . . .”  
Knowing how Palmer died made it harder for him to enjoy 
memories of their time together.   
Palmer’s daughter Tammy explained that Palmer “had a 
clean bill of health” and had been focused on her well-being 
because “[s]he wanted to be around to watch her grandkids grow 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
24 
up, go to college.”  When Tammy was a young child, she was 
ridiculed due to a facial birth defect.  Palmer counseled her 
concerning how to deal with the situation and Tammy “never 
had any problems after that.”  They remained close even during 
Tammy’s teenage years; “[W]e never had any fallouts.  We never 
had any of that teenage bicker back and forth . . . . I never went 
through that.  I had so much respect for her.”  Although Palmer 
had suffered through a period of “deep depression” when her 
then twelve-year-old son was struck by a car and killed, Palmer 
and Tammy’s time together was largely filled with jokes and 
laughter.  Palmer was Tammy’s best friend.  
Tammy also described her emotions after Palmer 
disappeared.  “I went from frantic to anger, back to frantic” 
when Palmer was missing, Tammy testified, and “didn’t sleep 
for three weeks.”  Learning that her mother had been murdered 
made her and her ten-year-old son very angry.  Tammy was 
different now; “I don’t trust anybody.”  “I feel about 20, 30 years 
older. . . . [I]t took me almost a year to stop shaking.”  Her 
memories of her mother were also tarnished.  “I wish when I had 
those good memories that they didn’t have a picture of her at the 
desert or how she was killed in her apartment.  But it always 
finishes — my good memories always finish with that picture.”   
People who knew Palmer through A.A. also described her 
importance to that community.  “She was an extremely well-
respected human being as far as her willingness to go to almost 
any lengths to help anybody,” one said.  Another described 
Palmer as “the most giving, understanding, dedicated, 
wonderful, generous, nonjudgmental, caring person.”  A third 
recalled Palmer’s sobriety even after Palmer’s twelve-year-old 
son was killed.  Approximately a day after her son’s death, 
Palmer shared the news; “ [‘]if you are hurting,[’] [Palmer] said, 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
25 
[‘]I’m here to tell you that there’s nothing so awful in your life 
that you have to drink again.[’] ”  “And I remember thinking,” 
the witness continued, “if this woman can lose her child right in 
front of her, then I certainly don’t ever have to have another 
drink.  And that’s kept me sober . . .[,] that knowledge that if she 
can stay sober through that, well then I can stay sober.”   
2.  Defense case 
The defense case had two main components.  The first 
involved family members describing defendant’s difficult 
childhood.  The second was the expert testimony of Dr. Jay 
Adams, a clinical psychologist.   
Defendant’s older sister Penny explained that their 
biological father left their household when she was about five 
years old.  They grew up with an aloof stepfather, one of the five 
husbands their mother had had by the time of trial.  The 
household, which at times included Penny, defendant, two of 
their siblings, five step siblings, and a child born to her mother 
and stepfather, struggled financially.  She did not recall any of 
the children ever visiting a dentist before she turned 18, the age 
at which she left home.  Sometimes they did not have food, a 
phone, electricity, or oil for heat and warm water during cold 
Pennsylvania winters.  The children bathed only once per week 
and often wore unwashed clothing.   
Penny was roughly 9 or 10 years old when she became 
aware that her mother and stepfather had problems with 
alcohol.  When her mother was very drunk, “she was abusive.  
I mean, she was a very angry drunk.”  She would hit the children 
with “anything available.  A wooden spoon, a belt, a book.”  
“Sometimes . . . she would go into a rage and wouldn’t be able to 
stop.”  The stepfather would hit them, too; “[h]e was a very 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
26 
muscular man” who “wouldn’t hold back.”  Their mother and 
stepfather would also scream at each other and fight physically.  
At one point Penny called the police, afraid that the stepfather 
would kill her mother.  The police arrived and asked the 
stepfather — a former police officer — whether they needed to 
come in.  The stepfather said no.  The police “just turned around 
and walked away.”  
Defendant was also exposed to sexual content at a young 
age.  When the family was in the living room watching 
television, Penny explained, their stepfather “would put his arm 
around [their mother] and put his hand down the shirt and feel 
her breasts.”  There were pornographic books and magazines 
around the house, accessible to all of the children.  Defendant’s 
half brother testified that defendant’s mother and stepfather 
would watch pornographic videos while the children were 
around.  There was also evidence tending to suggest that 
defendant may have been aware of his mother’s intimate 
activities with other men.   
Defendant, Penny testified, wet his bed “to a very late 
age,” possibly even as a teenager.  Her mother and stepfather 
beat him in response.  Sometimes their stepfather would hit the 
children so hard that they would fall to the ground, and then, 
while on the ground, hit them more.  She never heard him 
apologize.  He left the family when defendant was 
approximately nine years old.  Defendant was largely 
unsupervised from then until he was about 14 years old, when 
his mother relinquished her custody of him at a police station.  
Cross-examination elicited some of his misbehavior to that 
point, without defense objection.   
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
27 
Defendant’s younger sister June gave similar testimony 
about her mother and stepfather’s conduct, including daily 
alcohol consumption and frequent violence.  His half brother 
Clyde also testified similarly.  June recalled defendant having 
seizures and sometimes sleepwalking naked with his stuffed 
monkey.  She recalled that he was hit more than the other 
children.  On at least two occasions, she saw the stepfather pick 
defendant up by the neck when defendant was seven or eight 
years old.  She left the house for good when she was 14; 
“I couldn’t handle it anymore.”  June also conveyed that 
defendant struggled with drugs “on and off through his entire 
life.”  Cross-examination of June addressed an incident in which 
defendant stole from his sister, potentially to obtain drugs.  
Among other things, cross-examination of Clyde elicited, 
without objection, that defendant threatened to kill Clyde when 
defendant was roughly 13 or 14 years old.   
Defendant’s mother testified.  She had not seen him in 
about 15 or 20 years.  She testified that defendant’s biological 
father hit her, including while she was pregnant with defendant, 
and also hit defendant, even though defendant was only a few 
years old before the father left the family.  After defendant’s 
biological father left, he never called to speak with the children, 
never sent them cards, and paid child support only once.  
Defendant’s bedwetting became worse after his father left, and 
worse again when his mother remarried.  She and his stepfather 
would discipline the children physically.  When defendant was 
about eight years old, she took him to counseling at his school’s 
suggestion.  The stepfather attended once; the counselor said 
“he was part of the problem,” and he refused to attend again.   
Defendant’s mother related that she and defendant’s 
stepfather would drink every day.  With or without alcohol, he 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
28 
would sometimes get very angry and hit her (including in front 
of the children) or hit the children themselves.  At one point she 
got carried away hitting defendant and “[t]he rest of the kids 
and the dog” had to pull her off him.  She eventually had 
defendant declared incorrigible and gave him up after he 
threatened her and her daughter.  She did not visit him 
regularly “because it was a long drive” and she had to work.  
Defendant’s mother also described some of defendant’s 
other difficulties as a child.  He was diagnosed with a form of 
epilepsy.  Even at the age of five or six, he would drink his 
mother and stepfather’s alcohol — conduct for which he was not 
disciplined.  He also struggled with schoolwork.  Without 
objection, cross-examination elicited that defendant had 
committed theft, both as an adult (from his mother) and as a 
child (from others).   
Dr. Adams thought it “pretty clear” that defendant 
“suffered from major [recurrent] depression” and “less clear, but 
I think pretty likely, there is a diagnosis of polysubstance 
dependency, which means that the person has used and become 
dependent upon at least three substances.”  Her testimony 
conveyed much of the information on which she relied in 
reaching those conclusions.  She also identified indicia of 
potential dissociative disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, 
and post-traumatic stress disorder.  She thought defendant 
“clearly” met the criteria for antisocial personality disorder, 
with features of borderline personality disorder. 
Difficult 
upbringings, 
she 
explained, 
can 
prevent 
individuals from developing the skills necessary to cope with 
stress in a nondestructive way.  She opined that defendant’s 
relationship with women was characterized by hostile 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
29 
dependency; he “sought out closeness with women” but “doesn’t 
have the skills to maintain a relationship.”  She anticipated 
“that he would have problems coping with stress, that he would 
easily become overwhelmed and not have developed the skills to 
deal with stress very well.”  Regarding rejection, she thought “he 
would find rejection very damaging and very psychologically 
threatening,” the type of threat to which he might impulsively 
“react very aggressively.”   
Although 
at 
some 
point 
another 
mental 
health 
professional had identified defendant as malingering, and it was 
“certainly possible” that there had “been instances where he 
malingered,” Dr. Adams emphasized that just “because someone 
is malingering in a particular instance does not necessarily 
mean that they don’t have other psychiatric diagnoses.” 
Cross-examination elicited, among other things, that 
Dr. Adams did not include her diagnoses in her written report, 
and that those diagnoses were not made available to the 
prosecution until the eve of her testimony.  It also probed the 
reliability of the bases for her testimony, such as self-reported 
information and documents prepared by a defense mitigation 
specialist.  The prosecution also sought to distinguish any 
impulse control issues defendant might suffer from the 
assertedly planned nature of the murder.   
3.  Rebuttal  
The prosecution called one rebuttal witness, John Gaynor, 
a group care counselor at a facility at which defendant arrived 
in 1977.  Gaynor had prepared a memorandum on which the 
defense expert relied.  His testimony clarified an ambiguous 
passage in the document.  As clarified, the thrust of the passage 
was that defendant could behave himself if incentivized to do so 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
30 
but had “little sense of personal motivation . . . to control and 
manage his behavior.”   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. Denial of Batson/Wheeler Motion  
“Peremptory challenges may not be used to exclude 
prospective jurors based on group membership such as race or 
gender.”  (People v. Armstrong (2019) 6 Cal.5th 735, 
765 (Armstrong); see Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 97; 
People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 276 (Wheeler).)  
“Excluding even a single prospective juror for reasons 
impermissible under Batson and Wheeler requires reversal.”  
(People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 227.)  When a party 
opposing a peremptory strike makes a prima facie case that the 
strike was motivated by impermissible discrimination (step 1), 
the proponent of the strike must offer a nondiscriminatory 
reason for that challenge (step 2).  (Armstrong, at p. 765.)  The 
question then becomes (step 3) whether the opponent of the 
peremptory challenge has shown it “ ‘more likely than not that 
the challenge was improperly motivated.’ ”  (Id., at p. 766; see 
also Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 767 (Purkett).) 
The prosecution in this case peremptorily struck both 
prospective jurors who identified themselves as Black and had 
not previously been excused for hardship or cause: Prospective 
Jurors R.T. (No. 7731) and T.P. (No. 9049).  The trial court found 
a prima facie case of discrimination based solely on “sheer 
numbers.”  The prosecutor explained that she struck both 
prospective jurors because she thought it would be difficult for 
them to impose the death penalty, relying in part on R.T.’s 
demeanor during voir dire.  Defense counsel did not dispute the 
sincerity of the prosecutor’s explanation, nor the accuracy of the 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
31 
observations underlying it.  The trial court found that the 
prosecutor was “credible” and “that her observations are based 
on race neutral reasons.”  We affirm the denial of the 
Batson/Wheeler motion.   
1.  Background 
a.  Prospective Juror R.T. (No. 7731) 
Prospective Juror R.T. described herself in her juror 
questionnaire as a 51-year-old Black woman.  She wrote that 
she “believe[d] in the death penalty” and was “moderately in 
favor” of it.  She felt comfortable serving as a juror in a capital 
case, asserting that she would be able to vote for death if 
appropriate under the facts and the court’s instructions.  The 
death penalty was worse than life imprisonment, she added, 
because “[a] life is ended.”  Prospective Juror R.T. indicated that 
she did not belong to any organization that advocates for or 
against the death penalty.  The religious organization to which 
she belonged, she added, does not take a position on the issue.   
The People did not seek to excuse Prospective Juror R.T. 
for cause based on her questionnaire.  During Hovey voir dire 
(see Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 80), defense 
counsel elicited that R.T. could not indicate whether she 
preferred a sentence of death or life imprisonment because she 
“ha[dn’t] heard any facts”; that she would be open to listening to 
mitigating and aggravating evidence; and in particular, that 
evidence about the defendant’s life “would help” in selecting a 
penalty.  Hovey voir dire continued: 
“[PROSECUTION:]  Okay.  I want you to imagine that 
you’ve gone through the whole trial, you’ve gone through the 
penalty phase, you considered the mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances and based — based upon all of that you’ve 
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32 
determined that in this particular case death was an 
appropriate penalty.  I want you to imagine that you’re sitting 
in the jury box and look at the defendant and tell us if you would 
feel comfortable or that you could announce your verdict is 
death?  Could you do that, looking at the defendant right here 
and now? 
“[R.T.:]  I really don’t know.  [¶]  I don’t know if I’d be 
comfortable or if I’d be scared.  [¶]  I don’t know. 
“[PROSECUTION:]  Okay.  Because you don’t know, 
because you have those feelings, do you think it would be 
difficult for you to sit on a trial of this nature and impose the 
death penalty if you believe it is appropriate to do so based upon 
everything you’ve heard? 
“[R.T.]  That’s a possibility. 
“[PROSECUTION:]  Do you think it would be impossible 
for you to impose the death penalty because of those feelings of 
uncertainty? 
“[R.T.:]  No.”  (Italics added.)   
The court then inquired whether R.T. was open to 
weighing mitigating and aggravating factors at the penalty 
phase to reach an appropriate verdict (“Yes,” she responded); 
whether that verdict could be life without the possibility of 
parole or the death penalty (“Yes”); and whether she was open 
to both possible sentences (“Yes, I am”).  Both parties passed for 
cause.  The prosecution later exercised a peremptory challenge 
against R.T.  The defense did not object at that time. 
b.  Prospective Juror T.P. (No. 9049) 
Prospective Juror T.P. described himself on his juror 
questionnaire as a 44-year-old Black man.  He wrote that he was 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
33 
“neutral” about the death penalty and thought it “might be” 
necessary “in some cases of extreme violence.”  He also conveyed, 
however, that he viewed life imprisonment as a worse 
punishment than death.  When asked whether he belonged to 
any organization that takes a position for or against the death 
penalty, he answered “no.”  But when asked whether his 
religious organization had a view on the death penalty, he said 
“yes”; namely, that “God is the only one to give life and take life,” 
a view with which he agreed.  Prospective Juror T.P. indicated 
that he was comfortable serving as a juror in a capital case and 
would not automatically vote for or against death.  But he also 
said that he could not see himself “in the appropriate case 
choosing the death penalty instead of life in prison without the 
possibility of parole.”  
During Hovey voir dire, the court and the parties probed 
some of these apparent inconsistencies.  When the court asked 
why T.P. did not know whether he could impose the death 
penalty, T.P. replied, “I don’t think — I think that belongs to a 
higher authority than myself.  I don’t think I’m — I should be 
one to decide a man’s life.”  When asked “are you against the 
death penalty,” T.P. replied, “Yes, I am.”  When pressed about 
whether he could impose the death penalty, T.P. variously 
indicated: “Well, it’s sort of kind of a mixed feeling with it, you 
know”; “If somebody’s found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 
I think maybe so, yeah”; and that he could impose death “[i]f it’s 
very appropriate.”  When informed by the prosecution that 
felony murder does not require intent to kill and asked whether 
he would “absolutely refuse to impose [the] death penalty if you 
believed the defendant did not intend to kill,” T.P. replied, 
“Right.  In that case, I don’t think death would be merited if it’s 
unintentional,” regardless of any aggravating circumstances.  
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
34 
Prospective Juror T.P. had also indicated, however, that he 
could follow the court’s instructions and be open to imposing the 
death penalty.   
The prosecutor challenged T.P. for cause “based upon the 
fact that he could not impose the death penalty . . . in this 
present case,” citing T.P.’s unwillingness to impose death absent 
proof of intent to kill.  The court denied the challenge:  “Again, 
I have a problem with the juror not being familiar with all the 
facts of the case, not having heard the case, not being given the 
full instruction under the law as to what felony murder is.  
I don’t think I can excuse him for cause based upon that limited 
inquiry.  I just think it would be improper.  So he’ll be retained.”  
The prosecution later exercised a peremptory challenge against 
Prospective Juror T.P.   
c.  Objection and ruling 
Immediately after the prosecution struck Prospective 
Juror T.P., the defense raised an objection “in the nature of a 
[state law] Wheeler motion,” which the court understood to raise 
a federal Batson claim as well.  (Cf. People v. Williams (2006) 
40 Cal.4th 287, 310 & fn. 6 [holding, even after Johnson v. 
California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, that a Wheeler motion preserved 
a Batson claim on appeal].)  This colloquy followed: 
“[DEFENSE]: 
 
. . . 
[F]rom 
my 
recollection 
and 
observations, there are only two black jurors in the venire and 
the prosecution has moved to excuse the two and I believe that 
qualifies as a cognizable group and they should have to show 
good cause as to why they would do such a thing.   
“THE COURT:  I’m making the same observations.  There 
were two blacks left in the jury, one female and one male, both 
[of] which have now been exercised and excused by the people, 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
35 
Juror No. 9049, and Juror No. 7731 who was a female.  [¶]  
Based upon that, there are no additional black jurors left in the 
venire and those are the only two exercised by the [P]eople.  [¶] 
The court is going to find a prima facie case — well, before I do 
that, I would like the [P]eople to offer an explanation as to the 
excuse for these two jurors. 
“[PROSECUTION]:  We weren’t in the position to pull out 
their questionnaires to get verbatim quotes about what they had 
said.  The court’s made a prima facie finding —  
“THE COURT:  Not yet. 
“[PROSECUTION]:  Each of the two African American 
jurors who were excused expressed extreme difficulty in 
imposing the death penalty, which is a race neutral reason for 
exercising a preemptory.  The lady juror who was . . . the 
people’s fourth preemptory challenge, her body language was 
extremely unreceptive both to the prosecution and the idea of 
having to impose the death penalty and she expressed verbally 
that she’d have a great deal of difficulty in doing it.  With regard 
to the prospective alternate whom the [P]eople just kicked, 
I believe he wrote some extremely strong answers in his 
questionnaire in opposition to the death penalty. 
“The decisional law . . . makes it clear that the inability to 
impose the death penalty or even equivocation with regard to 
comfort in imposing the death penalty are race neutral 
rationales for kicking a juror. 
“It’s probably also worth stating because there’s not only 
[w]hat’s in the Wheeler arena, but also a related arena under the 
Sixth Amendment it’s worth pointing out to make a full record 
that the defendant is a non-Hispanic Caucasian and that same 
description describes all of the victims.  They would be what you 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
36 
would call Anglo-Saxons with the exception of one woman who 
may be partly African American — who is a trivial witness to 
the case — I believe Lorna [T.] is.  Everyone else appear to be a 
non-Hispanic Caucasian who is associated with this case as a 
witness.  [¶] I only point that out in case there’s going to be some 
Sixth Amendment challenge also. 
“And, by the way, I do apologize, your honor, if the court 
needs stronger basis for the reason for kicking those two jurors, 
I’d have to get out their questionnaires, which may take a 
moment or two, and it would have to happen in front of the 
jurors.  If that needs to occur, perhaps we can ask the jury to 
step outside. 
 “THE COURT:  The court does find a prima facie case 
based upon the sheer numbers of both African American or black 
jurors being excused; however, in listening to the explanations 
given by counsel, I presume they would be the same.   
“[PROSECUTION]:  Yes. 
 “THE COURT:  They appear to be race neutral.  [¶] There 
are no racial issues in this case that I am aware of, which doesn’t 
necessarily defeat a Wheeler Batson motion, but I find that [the 
prosecutor] Ms. Ford is credible, that her observations are based 
on race neutral reasons that are proper challenges — or proper 
preemptory challenges. 
 “[PROSECUTION]:  Your honor, once the jury has been 
let go, can I ask to raise this topic again and bring out their 
questionnaires?   
 “THE COURT:  Yes. . . . [¶]  . . . You can augment the 
record later.”   
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
37 
The court denied the Batson/Wheeler motion.  The court 
later asked the prosecutor whether she wished to augment the 
record.  She did so, offering details regarding her pattern of 
strikes and the prospective jurors’ reactions to questions 
regarding the death penalty.   
2.  Analysis 
Because the trial court found a prima facie case of racial 
discrimination and the prosecutor stated a reason for the strikes 
at issue, the question before us is whether defendant has shown 
it “ ‘more likely than not that’ ” at least one of the “ ‘challenge[s] 
was improperly motivated.’ ”  (Armstrong, supra, 6 Cal.5th at 
p. 766; see Flowers v. Mississippi (2019) 588 U.S. __ [139 S.Ct. 
2228, 2244] (Flowers) [“ ‘motivated in substantial part by 
discriminatory intent’ ”]; Foster v. Chatman (2016) 578 U.S. __ 
[136 S.Ct. 1737, 1747] (Foster); Davis v. Ayala (2015) 576 U.S. 
257, 270 [135 S.Ct. 2187, 2199] (Ayala); People v. Smith (2018) 
4 Cal.5th 1134, 1147.)  “The existence or nonexistence of 
purposeful racial discrimination is a question of fact.”  (People v. 
Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 469.) 
The answer to this factual question will ordinarily depend 
“on the subjective genuineness of the race-neutral reasons given 
for the peremptory challenge.”  (People v. Reynoso (2003) 
31 Cal.4th 903, 924, italics omitted.)  A justification based on a 
mischaracterization of the record could reveal a discriminatory 
motive (e.g., Foster, supra, 136 S.Ct. at p. 1753), but might 
reflect a mere error of recollection (e.g., People v. Hardy (2018) 
5 Cal.5th 56, 79 (Hardy); People v. O’Malley (2016) 62 Cal.4th 
944, 979; People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630, 661; People 
v. Elliott (2012) 53 Cal.4th 535, 565; People v. Jones (2011) 51 
Cal.4th 346, 366; People v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, 896; 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
38 
People v. Gutierrez (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1083, 1124).  Likewise, a 
justification that is “implausible or fantastic . . . may (and 
probably will) be found to be pretext[ual],” yet even a “silly or 
superstitious” reason may be sincerely held.  (Purkett, supra, 
514 U.S. at p. 768; People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, 
1171 (Gutierrez); cf. O’Malley, at pp. 981–982 [“prosecutor’s 
reliance on [prospective juror’s] interest in amateur magic” did 
not “establish that [the prosecutor] acted with discriminatory 
intent”].)  Of course, the factual basis for, and analytical 
strength of, a justification may shed significant light on the 
genuineness of that justification — and, thus, on the ultimate 
question of discrimination.  (Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003) 
537 U.S. 322, 339.)  But the force of the justification is 
significant only to the extent that it informs analysis of the 
ultimate question of discriminatory motivation.  (People v. Cruz 
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 660.)1 
Given this framework, a trial court’s ruling on that 
ultimate question is ordinarily reviewed with deference.  “ ‘In 
the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question 
will be whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a 
peremptory challenge should be believed.  There will seldom be 
much evidence bearing on that issue, and the best evidence often 
will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the 
challenge.’ ”  (People v. Jones (1997) 15 Cal.4th 119, 162.)  
“A trial court is best situated to evaluate both the words and the 
demeanor of jurors who are peremptorily challenged, as well as 
 
1  
Theoretically, a justification might be a pretext for a 
nondiscriminatory reason; people may lie to advance other ends.  
(See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. (2000) 
530 U.S. 133, 148.)  But this technical exception is unlikely to 
matter often, if ever, and nothing suggests that it matters here. 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
39 
the credibility of the prosecutor who exercised those strikes.”  
(Ayala, supra, 135 S.Ct. at p. 2201; see People v. Stevens (2007) 
41 Cal.4th 182, 198.)  Thus, “[w]hen the trial court makes a 
sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the [proffered] reasons, 
the reviewing court defers to its conclusions on appeal, and 
examines only whether substantial evidence supports them.”  
(People v. Melendez (2016) 2 Cal.5th 1, 15.) 
For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the trial 
court made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the 
genuineness of the prosecutor’s stated reasons, and that 
substantial evidence supports its conclusion that the strikes 
were not discriminatory.   
a.  The trial court made a sincere and reasoned 
effort to evaluate the prosecutor’s stated 
justifications 
A court may make a sincere and reasoned effort to 
evaluate a peremptory challenge even if it does not provide a 
lengthy and detailed explanation for its ruling.  (See, e.g., People 
v. Smith, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1158; People v. Jones, supra, 
51 Cal.4th at p. 361; People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 175–
176; People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 625–626.)  Under our 
precedent, “[w]hen the trial court has inquired into the basis for 
an excusal, and a nondiscriminatory explanation has been 
provided, we . . . assume the court understands, and carries out, 
its duty to subject the proffered reasons to sincere and reasoned 
analysis, taking into account all the factors that bear on their 
credibility.”  (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1049, fn. 26; 
see also id., at pp. 1053–1054; Mills, at p. 180; see also People v. 
Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630, 699–701, 704–717 (dis. opn. of 
Liu, J.) [critiquing that precedent].) 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
40 
That assumption can be overcome.  When “the proffered 
reasons lack[] inherent plausibility or [are] contradicted by the 
record,” the court’s failure to probe, or to explain, may eliminate 
the basis for deference.  (Armstrong, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 777; 
see People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345, 385.)  Deference may 
also 
be 
inappropriate 
when 
the 
court 
evinces 
a 
misunderstanding of the legal inquiry.  (See, e.g., Gutierrez, 
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1172 [“court improperly cited a 
justification not offered by the prosecutor”]; People v. Fuentes 
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 707, 720.)   
The prosecution in this case sought to excuse both 
prospective jurors at issue based on their alleged reluctance to 
impose the death penalty.  “A juror’s reservations about 
imposing the death penalty are an acceptable race-neutral basis 
for exercising a peremptory.”  (Armstrong, supra, 6 Cal.5th at 
p. 770; see, e.g., People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 604.) 
The trial court made a sincere and reasoned effort “ ‘to 
evaluate 
the 
nondiscriminatory 
justifications 
offered.’ ”  
(Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1159.)  Even before finding a 
prima facie case, the court signaled that it was attentive to this 
issue.  As soon as the defense made its motion, the court 
indicated that it was “making the same observations” regarding 
the pattern of strikes — volunteering the sex and juror numbers 
of the prospective jurors at issue.  When the prosecutor stated 
her reasons, the court did not “den[y] the motion without 
comment” (People v. Turner (1986) 42 Cal.3d 711, 727–728); 
it found “that her observations are based on race neutral 
reasons that are proper . . . peremptory challenges.”  Moreover, 
although the court did not separately discuss each of the two 
prospective jurors, it did speak to a “casewide factor[] that it 
found relevant” (People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 115); 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
41 
namely, that the defendant and his alleged victims were 
Caucasian, unlike the prospective jurors stricken.  Finally, the 
court found that the prosecution’s explanation was “credible,” 
reflecting, at least implicitly, that it had considered whether the 
prosecutor’s stated reasons were factually supported (see People 
v. Elliott, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 569; People v. Mills, supra, 
48 Cal.4th at pp. 175–176; People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at 
pp. 625–626).  The court was not required to do more, at least 
when, as here, the defense disputed neither the accuracy of the 
prosecutor’s observations nor the sincerity of her explanation.   
Moreover, the record shows that the trial court was 
attentive 
to 
the 
demeanor of prospective 
jurors 
and 
knowledgeable about their questionnaires during jury selection.  
During the parties’ challenges to prospective jurors for cause 
based on their questionnaire responses, the trial court reviewed 
the responses and voiced its own thoughts about them.  Once, 
for instance, the trial court remarked that one prospective 
juror’s “later answers appear to equivocate indicating that she 
could impose L.W.O.P. or death and that she could follow the 
law,” before refusing to excuse that prospective juror for cause.  
The court was also mindful of the questionnaires when 
conducting Hovey voir dire, explaining that it would allow 
counsel to “have time to prepare to look at those questionnaires 
prior to . . . Hovey.”  (Italics added.) 
The court further remarked about prospective jurors’ 
demeanors during Hovey voir dire.  It granted the prosecution’s 
for-cause challenges to several prospective jurors based in part 
on their demeanor.  For example, the court noted Prospective 
Juror No. 8814’s “body action” and “shaking of his head,” and 
observed that Prospective Juror No. 8891 “was highly excited, 
gesturing wildly.”  The court also denied the defense’s for-cause 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
42 
challenge to Prospective Juror No. 1599 after viewing “his 
demeanor and body language” and hearing his answers.  These 
indications in the record support an inference that the trial 
court had in mind the prospective jurors’ demeanor and 
questionnaire answers when it evaluated the prosecutor’s 
strikes of Prospective Jurors R.T. and T.P. 
That said, the trial court certainly “could have done more 
to make a fuller record.”  (People v. Miles (2020) 9 Cal.5th 513, 
540.)  For example, the trial court could have explicitly brought 
to bear its general awareness of questionnaire answers and 
jurors’ demeanors when specifically assessing whether the 
prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons for striking Prospective Jurors 
R.T. and T.P. were credible.  “Advocates and courts both have a 
role to play in building a record worthy of deference.  Advocates 
should bear in mind the record created by their own questioning 
— where the court and opposing counsel have failed to elicit 
panelist responses in a certain area of interest — as well as their 
explanations for peremptory challenges.”  (Gutierrez, supra, 2 
Cal.5th at p. 1171.)  In particular, when a strike is justified 
based on information that will not appear on a transcript — a 
prospective juror’s tone, visual indicia of demeanor, and the like 
— a court’s description of what it has observed may aid the task 
of appellate review.  (See, e.g., Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 552 
U.S. 472, 479.)  “[A] more detailed colloquy” than occurred here 
may also prove useful.  (Miles, at p. 540; see, e.g., People v. 
Smith, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1158 [“The court engaged actively 
in the third stage analysis, questioning counsel closely on 
certain points.”].)  “Providing an adequate record may prove 
onerous, particularly when jury selection extends over several 
days and involves a significant number of potential jurors.  It 
can be difficult to keep all the panelists and their responses 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
43 
straight.  Nevertheless, the obligation to avoid discrimination in 
jury selection is a pivotal one.  It is the duty of courts and counsel 
to ensure the record is both accurate and adequately developed.”  
(Gutierrez, at p. 1172.)   
The law, however, does not require a court in all 
circumstances to articulate and dissect at length the proffered 
nondiscriminatory reasons for a strike.  The record in this case 
reveals that the trial court made a sincere and reasoned effort 
to evaluate the justifications proffered, and on that basis, 
deference is appropriate under our precedent.         
For its part, defendant’s briefing does not explicitly 
dispute that the court made a sincere and reasoned effort when 
evaluating the Batson/Wheeler motion.  The briefing focuses 
instead on whether substantial evidence supports the motion’s 
denial.  At least one of defendant’s arguments, however, is 
properly understood as bearing on this issue.  Specifically, he 
argues that the court erred by relying on its understanding that 
“[t]here are no racial issues in this case.”  That reasoning, 
defendant continues, “is not race-neutral.”  
Viewing the court’s comment in isolation, we understand 
the basis for defendant’s concern about the trial court’s “no 
racial issues” framing.  Batson and Wheeler “are intended to 
limit reliance on stereotypes about certain groups in exercising 
peremptory challenges.”  (People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 
Cal.4th 970, 1016.)  And stereotypes may infect a lawyer’s 
assessment of a prospective juror regardless of the race of others 
involved in the trial.  (See Powers v. Ohio (1991) 499 U.S. 400, 
416 [“race prejudice stems from various causes and may 
manifest itself in different forms”]; see, e.g., U.S. v. Lee (8th Cir. 
2013) 715 F.3d 215, 221 [discussing “stereotype that ‘African-
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
44 
American jurors are less likely to impose death and are more 
distrustful of the Government than white jurors’ ”]; U.S. v. 
Kehoe (8th Cir. 2013) 712 F.3d 1251, 1252 [similar]; cf. People v. 
Williams, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 652 [trial court: “ ‘in my other 
death penalty cases I have found that the Black women are very 
reluctant to impose the death penalty’ ”].)       
Viewing the court’s comment in context, however, no error 
appears.  No doubt, a litigant may raise a Batson/Wheeler 
objection regardless of the race of the defendant or the victim.  
(See, e.g., Flowers, supra, 139 S.Ct. at p. 2243; People v. Mills, 
supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 173.)  But the trial court evinced no 
confusion on this point, observing that the lack of so-called 
“racial issues . . . doesn’t necessarily defeat a Wheeler Batson 
motion.”  Nor did the trial court conclude that a lack of “racial 
issues” was a race-neutral justification for the prosecutor’s 
strikes.  Instead, it appears the court relied on that 
circumstance as a factor relevant to assessing whether the 
prosecutor’s stated race-neutral reasons were genuine — that is, 
whether the prosecutor’s strikes were in fact motivated by 
concerns about the prospective jurors’ views on the death 
penalty.  This was not error.  (See People v. Bell (2007) 
40 Cal.4th 582, 600 [“that defendant was not a member of any 
of the actual or assumed cognizable groups involved . . . [is] a 
factor that, because it is absent, fails in this case to support an 
inference of discrimination”]; see also, e.g., People v. Rhoades 
(2019) 8 Cal.5th 393, 430; Hardy, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 78; 
People v. O’Malley, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 980–981; People v. 
Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 343–345; People v. Farnam (2002) 
28 Cal.4th 107, 135–137; People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 
119; People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1156; Wheeler, 
supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 281.)  Accordingly, the trial court’s 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
45 
statement is consistent with our conclusion that the trial court 
made a reasoned evaluation of the justifications offered. 
We turn next to the question whether substantial evidence 
supports the court’s conclusion that neither strike was 
motivated by discrimination.   
b.  Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s 
conclusion that the strike of Prospective Juror 
R.T. was not discriminatory   
The prosecutor justified her strike of R.T. (No. 7731) based 
on R.T.’s perceived reluctance to impose the death penalty.  The 
court’s finding that the prosecutor was not motivated by 
impermissible discrimination is supported by substantial 
evidence.  Although many of R.T.’s answers conveyed that she 
would be able to impose the death penalty, when asked whether 
she could announce a death verdict, “looking at the defendant 
right here and now,” R.T. replied, “I really don’t know.  [¶]  I 
don’t know if I’d be comfortable or if I’d be scared.  [¶]  I don’t 
know.”  The prosecution also described R.T.’s “body language” as 
“extremely unreceptive both to the prosecution and the idea of 
having to impose the death penalty.”  Although the record does 
not depict R.T.’s body language, and although demeanor-based 
justifications may in some cases provide a convenient pretext for 
discrimination, 
here, 
the 
prosecution’s 
description 
was 
uncontroverted.  The trial court was in a position to observe not 
only R.T.’s demeanor, but also the demeanor of the prosecutor 
herself, whom the court found credible.  (Cf. People v. Williams, 
supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 658 [“we do not discount the trial court’s 
ability to assess the credibility of the prosecutor, even absent the 
trial court’s personal recollection of R.P.’s demeanor”].) 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
46 
Defendant, now for the first time, complains that the 
prosecutor overstated R.T.’s opposition to the death penalty, 
arguing that R.T. did not, as the prosecutor claimed, “express[] 
extreme difficulty in imposing that death penalty.”  We 
acknowledge that this is a somewhat strong characterization of 
R.T.’s answers, viewed on a cold record.  But in context, this 
statement appears to be based on a combination of R.T.’s words 
and the description of her demeanor.  And those words did not 
so uniformly indicate comfort with imposing the death penalty 
that the prosecutor’s statement was especially suspicious.  (Cf. 
People v. Vines (2011) 51 Cal.4th 830, 850 [evaluating whether 
prospective juror’s answer was “reasonably susceptible of the 
interpretation the prosecutor placed on it”].)  In any event, any 
somewhat strong characterization of R.T.’s answers, during 
argument over the Batson/Wheeler motion, does not reveal that 
the stated reason for the strike was pretextual.2    
 
2 
Defendant also argues that the strikes cannot be upheld 
based on the record the prosecutor made after the motion was 
denied.  As noted, after the court found that the prosecutor was 
“credible” and that her “observations [were] based on race-
neutral reasons that are proper . . . peremptory challenges,” the 
prosecutor asked for permission to “raise this topic again and 
bring out their questionnaires” “once the jury has been let go.” 
The court later asked the prosecutor whether she wished to 
augment the record.   The prosecutor used that record-making 
opportunity to describe the pattern of her strikes and to explain 
some of the factual basis underlying her stated concern about 
the prospective jurors’ views toward the death penalty — not to 
manufacture a new, unrelated reason that “reeks of 
afterthought.”  (Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S.  231, 246.)  
For example, the prosecutor explained, “the People exercised our 
peremptories in this way:  A white female; a white female; an 
Hispanic female; a [B]lack female; a white female; we passed 
 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
47 
Defendant also complains that R.T. “was never questioned 
regarding her ‘body language.’ ”  We note the record contains no 
prohibition preventing defense counsel from stating on the 
record or otherwise preserving his observations of R.T.’s 
demeanor.  It is enough that R.T. was questioned in the presence 
of the court and the parties, whom we have no reason to doubt 
could observe her demeanor.  (People v. Jones, supra, (2011) 
51 Cal.4th at p. 367.) 
Defendant further contends that “the prosecutor asked 
[R.T.] only four questions,” a count apparently limited to Hovey 
voir dire.  It is true that “[u]nder certain circumstances 
perfunctory voir dire can be indicative of hidden bias” (People v. 
Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 698), particularly when there is 
a dearth of questioning “on a subject a party asserts it is 
concerned about” (People v. Huggins, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 234; 
see also, e.g., Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1169–1170).  But 
this consideration is “not particularly probative” in this case.  
(Hardy, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 83.)  In addition to her own 
questioning, the prosecutor “heard questioning during voir dire 
by the court and defense counsel.”  (Ibid.; see People v. Melendez, 
 
twice; white female; Hispanic female; passed; white female; 
Hispanic male; we accepted the panel.  [¶]  With regard to 
alternates, it was Hispanic male; African American male; 
Hispanic male; white male; white male; Hispanic male.  I don’t 
know that the record would otherwise have any references to 
that.”  It suffices to say that the denial of the motion can be 
upheld based solely on the explanation initially given by the 
prosecutor, and that none of the statements made during the 
prosecutor’s record-making opportunity calls that conclusion 
into question, including the prosecutor’s slightly inaccurate 
claim that R.T. “said she would be very uncomfortable and 
scared to impose the death penalty.”  (Italics added.) 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
48 
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 19.)  That questioning gave the prosecutor 
an opportunity to observe the demeanor on which the strike was 
partially based.  (People v. Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 1, 20; 
People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 906–907.)  Finally, even 
assuming the prosecutor asked R.T. few questions relative to 
other prospective jurors (which defendant has not established), 
the prosecutor focused her inquiry on precisely the reason she 
gave for the peremptory strike:  R.T.’s willingness to impose the 
death penalty.   
Defendant asks us to engage in comparative juror analysis 
for the first time on appeal.  We will do so, but “ ‘need not 
consider responses by stricken panelists or seated jurors other 
than those identified by the defendant.’ ”  (People v. Smith, 
supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 1148; see People v. Winbush (2017) 
2 Cal.5th 402, 442–443.)  We also remain “ ‘mindful that an 
exploration of the alleged similarities at the time of trial might 
have shown that the jurors in question were not really 
comparable’ ” (People v. O’Malley, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 976), 
and consider the probative force of such a comparison “in view 
of the deference accorded the trial court’s ultimate finding of no 
discriminatory intent” (People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th at 
p. 624).    
With respect to Prospective Juror R.T., defendant’s 
comparative juror analysis is not persuasive.  Defendant briefly 
compares R.T.’s answers on her questionnaire to the answers of 
other jurors.  But the prosecutor claimed to strike R.T. based on 
her answers and demeanor during voir dire.  Moreover, none of 
the questionnaire answers that defendant identifies is similarly 
equivocal to R.T.’s voir dire statement that she “really [didn’t] 
know” if she would “be comfortable or if [she’d] be scared” to 
announce a death verdict.  And when asked similar questions 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
49 
during voir dire about their ability to impose a death verdict, the 
other prospective jurors defendant identifies (Nos. 1267, 1599, 
1999, 3466, and 6889) indicated that they could do so.  This 
bolsters rather than undermines our conclusion that substantial 
evidence supports the trial court’s finding that the strike of R.T. 
was not motivated by impermissible discrimination.   
We do not suggest, of course, that any conceivable degree 
of hesitation about imposing the death penalty is dispositive of 
a Batson/Wheeler claim.  The less substantial a prospective 
juror’s reluctance to impose the death penalty, the more reason 
there may be to believe that a proffered justification based on 
that reluctance is pretextual.  But the ultimate question is 
whether 
a 
strike 
was 
motivated 
by 
impermissible 
discrimination.  And on this record, substantial evidence 
supports the trial court’s conclusion that the strike of R.T. was 
not so motivated.      
c.  Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s 
conclusion that the strike of Prospective Juror 
T.P. was not discriminatory   
The prosecutor also stated that she struck T.P. based on 
his reluctance to impose the death penalty, noting a “belie[f]” 
that “he wrote some extremely strong answers in his 
questionnaire.”  Here, too, the trial court’s finding of no 
discrimination is supported by substantial evidence.  Although 
T.P.’s questionnaire answers were not consistently opposed to 
the death penalty, and although the trial court declined to 
excuse him for cause, his questionnaire provided the prosecutor 
with reason to doubt T.P.’s willingness to impose the death 
penalty.  He admitted his view that “God is the only one to give 
life and take life.”  And he said that he could not see himself “in 
the appropriate case choosing the death penalty instead of life 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
50 
in prison without the possibility of parole.”  These questionnaire 
answers support the court’s finding that the prosecutor’s stated 
reason was not a pretext for discrimination.  (See, e.g., People v. 
Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 436; People v. Blacksher (2011) 
52 Cal.4th 769, 802.)3  
Defendant argues that because the prosecutor said she 
believed T.P. wrote strong answers in his questionnaire, but did 
not “know[] what those answers were, the prosecutor . . . could 
not properly rely on those unknown answers.”  We disagree.  
Immediately after defendant objected, the prosecutor conveyed 
her recollection that T.P. had written strong statements in his 
questionnaire. In the colloquy that followed, the prosecutor 
offered to augment her explanations with the questionnaires. 
Ultimately the court agreed to the augmentation after it denied 
the motion. The prosecutor’s recollection was supported by the 
record.  The prosecutor was not required to have T.P.’s precise 
answers at the ready, and the fact that she did not casts little 
doubt on the basis for the trial court’s finding.  
 
3  
Those answers also provide a basis for the prosecution’s 
somewhat strong statement that T.P. “express[ed] extreme 
difficulty in imposing the death penalty.”  We further note that, 
during voir dire, T.P. conveyed that he did not know whether he 
could impose the death penalty because he thought “that 
belongs to a higher authority than myself.  I don’t think I’m — I 
should be one to decide a man’s life.”  And when informed by the 
prosecution that felony murder does not require intent to kill 
and asked whether he would “absolutely refuse to impose [the] 
death penalty if you believed the defendant did not intend to 
kill,” T.P. replied, “Right.  In that case, I don’t think death would 
be merited if it’s unintentional,” regardless of any aggravating 
circumstances. 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
51 
Defendant further contends that the prosecutor did not 
ask T.P. many questions.  This contention also lacks force.  The 
court and defense counsel combined to ask T.P. more than a 
dozen questions about his ability to impose the death penalty 
during Hovey voir dire.  Even after hearing those questions (and 
answers), the prosecutor asked five more.  She also had the 
benefit of the “lengthy and detailed questionnaire” she cited to 
explain the strike.  (Hardy, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 83.)  As the 
trial court put it when announcing its intention to give each side 
only a few minutes to question jurors individually during Hovey 
voir dire, “[y]ou are going to have a pretty lengthy questionnaire, 
so you won’t need to do a lot of oral questioning.”  Under these 
circumstances, the lack of further questioning is not 
illuminating. 
Finally, defendant asks us to compare T.P.’s questionnaire 
answers to the answers of several other jurors.  “Although jurors 
need not be completely identical for a comparison to be 
probative” (People v. Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 443), the 
prospective jurors defendant identifies are too different for his 
comparison to be persuasive.  None of the jurors he identified 
espoused a view similar to T.P.’s position that “God is the only 
one to give life and take life,” and none conveyed an inability to 
choose the death penalty in an appropriate case.  It is true, as 
defendant claims, that Prospective Juror No. 1599 stated that 
his religious organization “do[es] not believe in the death 
penalty.”  But immediately below that answer, No. 1599 
indicated that he did not share the organization’s belief.  
Defendant’s comparative juror analysis thus does not 
undermine our conclusion that the trial court’s finding of no 
discrimination was supported by substantial evidence.  
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
52 
B.  Excusing Jurors Based on Their Views about 
the Death Penalty 
A prospective juror may not be excused for cause based on 
that person’s views about the death penalty unless those views 
would at least substantially impair the person’s ability to 
perform a juror’s duties.  (People v. Erskine (2019) 7 Cal.5th 279, 
297; see Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424; 
Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510.)  A trial court’s 
decision to excuse a juror based solely on written questionnaire 
answers is reviewable de novo.  (People v. Zaragoza (2016) 
1 Cal.5th 21, 37.)  When a prospective juror is excused following 
voir dire, however, whether that juror “is substantially impaired 
is an issue for the trial court’s determination.”  (Armstrong, 
supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 751.)  We defer to the trial court’s decision 
so long as the trial court applied the correct legal standard and 
reached a decision supported by substantial evidence.  (See 
ibid.; see also Erskine, at pp. 299–300; People v. Spencer (2018) 
5 Cal.5th 642, 659.)   
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously excused 
two jurors based on their perceived inability to impose the death 
penalty: Prospective Jurors U.A. (No. 8814) and J.W. (No. 8891).  
The thrust of his claim is that the trial court’s decisions were 
not supported by substantial evidence. 
A review of the prospective jurors’ questionnaires and 
answers during Hovey voir dire reveals that the claim lacks 
merit.  U.A.’s questionnaire generally professed an openness to 
imposing the death penalty.  But when asked about the subject 
during voir dire, he replied, “I think I put on my questionnaire 
that I could, but this is the first time I’m in a jury and now I 
have second thoughts.  I’m not sure.”  And although his answers 
during voir dire were somewhat equivocal, he made several 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
53 
statements evincing reluctance to impose the death penalty, 
including “[m]y definite response this time is going to be no, 
I won’t vote for the death penalty.”  Similarly, when asked, 
“[c]ould you in fact vote to execute this man if legally you felt it 
was an appropriate penalty?  Could you actually do that?,” U.A. 
replied, “I don’t know.  I just don’t know.”  (Italics added.)  These 
statements provide substantial evidence supporting the trial 
court’s decision to excuse U.A., which the court made “[a]fter 
observing [U.A.’s] demeanor, his body action, his shaking of his 
head.”   
Prospective Juror J.W. wrote on his questionnaire that he 
“ha[s] problems with the death penalty.”  When asked how he 
might resolve a conflict between his beliefs and the court’s 
instructions, he wrote, “I don’t know.  I will have a hard time 
sentencing someone to death even if it means countering the 
judge.”  At least a dozen of his other answers evinced similar 
concern about his ability to vote for death.  He later volunteered, 
before voir dire, that he had “problems with the death penalty” 
“over and above what I’ve put in the questionnaire,” adding, 
“[y]ou may want to question me about that.”  During voir dire, 
J.W. claimed he could be persuaded to impose the death penalty 
but could not imagine a specific circumstance in which he would 
vote for that penalty.  (Cf. People v. Beck & Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 
548, 607 [no error in excusing a prospective juror even though 
she “offered examples of when she believed the death penalty 
was appropriate”].)  When asked whether he would feel 
comfortable serving as a juror, he indicated that he was “going 
to have a hard time with my own feelings of guilt if I start to 
tend towards the guilty aspect.”  He did, to be sure, convey that 
he would follow the court’s instructions and consider imposing a 
death sentence.  But the court concluded “he could not be a fair 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
54 
and impartial juror in this case,” because “his views would 
substantially prevent his abilities to follow the law and his 
oath.”  Substantial evidence supported this conclusion, which 
was again based in part on the prospective juror’s “demeanor, 
his affect.”  Thus, the excusal for cause of J.W., like U.A., was 
not error.4   
C.  Unbalanced Treatment of Prospective Jurors 
Defendant contends that “the trial court questioned 
prospective jurors differently and exercised its discretion in 
ruling on cause challenges differently depending on the 
prospective jurors’ view of the death penalty.”  He disclaims any 
argument “that the trial court erroneously denied his challenges 
for cause.”   
The complaint about the trial court’s questioning was 
forfeited by a failure to object.  (People v. Pearson (2013) 
 
4  
The trial court also remarked that it was “abundantly 
clear that” J.W. “is anti death penalty.”  An individual’s general 
opposition to the death penalty is, of course, not an appropriate 
basis on which to excuse a prospective juror.  (See People v. 
Peterson (2020) 10 Cal.5th 409, 427 [“Long-standing United 
States Supreme Court precedent makes clear that prospective 
jurors may not be disqualified from service in a capital case 
solely because of their general objections to the death penalty”]; 
People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 529 [“Those who firmly 
oppose the death penalty may nevertheless serve as jurors in a 
capital case as long as they state clearly that they are willing to 
temporarily set aside their own beliefs and follow the law”].)  But 
the trial court did not excuse J.W. based on general opposition 
to the death penalty; as noted, the court concluded that J.W.’s 
views “would substantially prevent his abilities to follow the law 
and his oath,” precluding J.W. from being “a fair and impartial 
juror in this case.”  It is the finding of substantial impairment 
that supports the excusal.      
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
55 
56 Cal.4th 393, 417.)  Defendant contends trial counsel did 
object, relying on a comment made during the discussion of 
whether Prospective Juror U.A. should be excused for cause.  
Counsel inquired whether he could “make one comment for the 
record.”  When permitted to do so, counsel complained that “by 
allowing this juror to be excused for cause, what is happening is 
we are selecting jurors that are only predisposed for death 
without being given the opportunity to hear all of the evidence.”  
This appears to be an objection to the excusal of a particular 
juror, not a complaint about the evenhandedness of the court’s 
questioning.  Regardless, the claim does not warrant reversal.  
(See People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 909 [no reversal 
when defense permitted to participate in voir dire of prospective 
jurors and “defendants do not contend that the court 
erroneously refused to excuse any such jurors for cause”]; see 
also People v. Whalen (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 31; see also id., at 
p. 100 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.).) 
Defendant has also forfeited his complaint that the trial 
court “exercised its discretion in ruling on cause challenges 
differently depending on the prospective jurors’ view of the 
death penalty.”  This claim is not that the court erroneously 
granted the prosecution’s challenges for cause.  Nor is it that the 
court erroneously denied the defense’s challenges for cause.  
Instead, the argument is that even if the court reached results 
that were otherwise within its discretion, it did so in an unfair 
manner.  At bottom, then, this is a claim of bias.  (Cf. People v. 
Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 189 [“judicial misconduct”].)  
Although defendant objected to the content of some of the court’s 
rulings, he has not identified any instance in which trial counsel 
raised a bias objection.  Indeed, a court may be wrong, even 
repeatedly, without revealing any partiality.  (Cf. People v. 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
56 
Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1112 [“a trial court’s numerous 
rulings against a party — even when erroneous — do not 
establish a charge of judicial bias, especially when they are 
subject to review”].)  Accordingly, this aspect of the claim is also 
forfeited.  (See Armstrong, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 540; cf. People 
v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 592 [declining to reach bias 
claim when, among other things, defense neither objected on 
that ground nor “move[d] to disqualify the court on the ground 
of bias”]; People v. Buenrostro (2018) 6 Cal.5th 367, 405 
[“Defendant forfeited the claim of bias by failing to raise it 
during the competency trial”].)5  
D.  Admissibility of Evidence of Uncharged 
Misconduct  
Defendant contends the trial court erred by admitting “an 
unwarranted amount” of evidence that he had committed 
uncharged offenses.  The core of the argument is that this 
evidence was so prejudicial that it caused the jury to wrongly 
convict defendant of raping Palmer — though not quite so 
prejudicial that it prevented the jury from acquitting him of 
forcible rape (count 11), sodomy by force (counts 9 and 13), or 
sexual penetration by foreign object (count 15).  (See Evid. Code, 
§ 352 (section 352).)  There was no error.  
1.  Legal background 
“[E]vidence of a person’s character” is generally 
inadmissible “when offered to prove his or her conduct on a 
specified occasion.”  (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).)  That general 
 
5  
Because defendant has not preserved his claim that the 
court was biased, we also do not address whether any such bias 
makes it inappropriate to deferentially review the court’s 
excusal of Prospective Jurors J.W. and U.A.  
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
57 
rule does not “prohibit[] the admission of evidence that a person 
committed a crime . . . or other act” to prove something other 
than a person’s “disposition to commit such an act.”  (Id., § 1101, 
subd. (b).)  For example, other-acts evidence may be admissible 
to prove motive, intent, or that “a defendant in a prosecution for 
an unlawful sexual act . . . did not reasonably and in good faith 
believe that the victim consented.”  (Ibid.)  The general rule 
against admission of “so-called ‘propensity’ or ‘disposition’ 
evidence” is also subject to exceptions.  (People v. Daveggio & 
Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 822 (Daveggio).)  Evidence Code 
section 1108 provides an exception to the general rule and 
permits evidence that a defendant accused of a sexual offense 
has committed another sexual offense, potentially showing a 
propensity to do so.  (See id., § 1108, subd. (a).)  The exception 
set out in Evidence Code section 1109 applies to certain evidence 
that a defendant accused of an offense involving domestic 
violence has committed other domestic violence.  (See id., 
§ 1109, subd. (a)(1).)  Both sections apply only if the evidence “is 
not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.”  (Id., §§ 1108, 
subd. (a), 1109, subd. (a)(1)).) 
Section 352 is the focus of defendant’s argument here.  As 
relevant, that section provides:  “The court in its discretion may 
exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the probability that its admission will . . . create 
substantial danger of undue prejudice . . . .”  “ ‘ “ ‘ “Evidence is 
not prejudicial, as that term is used in a section 352 context, 
merely because it undermines the opponent’s position or shores 
up that of the proponent.  The ability to do so is what makes 
evidence relevant.  The code speaks in terms of undue 
prejudice. . . . The prejudice that section 352 ‘ “is designed to 
avoid is not the prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally 
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58 
flows from relevant, highly probative evidence.”  [Citations.]  
“Rather, the statute uses the word in its etymological sense of 
‘prejudging’ a person or cause on the basis of extraneous 
factors.” ’ ” ’ ” ’ ”  (Daveggio, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 824.)  In the 
context of Evidence Code sections 1108 and 1109, a defendant’s 
propensity to commit sexual offenses or domestic violence is not 
an extraneous factor; it is relevant to the guilt of the accused — 
and evidence tending to show that propensity has probative 
value.   
Aside from claiming an abuse of discretion under section 
352, defendant does not argue that the evidence at issue in this 
section was inadmissible under Evidence Code sections 1101, 
1108, or 1109.  He does contend, however, that the admission of 
propensity 
evidence 
under 
sections 
1108 
or 
1109 
is 
unconstitutional.   
2.  Constitutionality of admitting propensity evidence 
We held in People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903 
(Falsetta) that “the trial court’s discretion to exclude propensity 
evidence under section 352 save[d] [Evidence Code] section 1108 
from” a “due process challenge.”  (Id., at p. 917.)  Defendant 
concedes as much, but asks us to “revisit the issue,” observing 
that he must raise his objection now to preserve the issue for 
federal review.  We see no persuasive reason to revisit Falsetta 
and reject his claim on the merits.6   
 
6  
Falsetta 
concerned 
Evidence 
Code 
section 
1108.  
Defendant has preserved his argument that the admission of 
propensity evidence under section 1108 denied him due process, 
as well as his argument that the admission of propensity 
evidence under Evidence Code section 1109 denied him due 
process.  Defendant makes no serious effort to argue, however, 
 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
59 
The remaining issue is whether the trial court abused its 
discretion by declining to exclude evidence under section 352. 
3.  Claim of undue prejudice 
Although defendant’s briefing catalogs the evidence 
admitted at trial, he does not appear to argue that any single 
piece of evidence was inadmissible.  Instead, his claim is that 
the trial court admitted too much evidence in total, some of 
which he deems especially prejudicial.  We will describe the 
evidence individually and then analyze it collectively.   
a.  Michelle W. 
Defendant and Michelle W. met telephonically in 1982, 
when she was 17 years old and he was about 20.  (She dialed a 
wrong number, he answered, and after talking several times 
they eventually decided to meet.)  They moved in together when 
she was around 18 years old.  The relationship became rocky; 
“there were many anger issues” and problems related to 
defendant’s drinking.  At some point in 1983, defendant falsely 
accused her of “fooling around on him.”  His voice was raised 
“and he was angry.”  He threw a vase, which hit and cut her 
arm, “and he ripped up a couple of things in the house and then 
he grabbed me by the throat and started to choke me” with both 
hands.  He also spit in her face and called her stupid and ugly.  
 
that the admission of propensity evidence under section 1109 is 
unconstitutional even if we decline to overrule Falsetta’s 
analysis regarding section 1108.  We do not reach that 
additional issue.  We do note, however, that the Court of Appeal 
has rejected the view that section 1109 is distinguishable from 
section 1108 for due process purposes.  (See People v. Hoover 
(2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1024; People v. Johnson (2000) 
77 Cal.App.4th 410, 412.)   
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Michelle moved out.  She was approximately 19 years old 
at the time, in 1983 or 1984, and moved in with her grandmother 
for a month or two.  At some point in 1984, Michelle and 
defendant had an argument.  Defendant wanted to reconcile.  
Michelle had decided to move to Wisconsin, where her parents 
had moved the year prior, and “had a rental van parked in front 
of [her] grandmother’s house.”  “[D]uring the time that we were 
moving things in and out of the van, [defendant] was across the 
street and he had been stalking, watching.”  At some point he 
approached her.  He was “visibly upset” and confronted her with 
a raised voice.  At some point, he hit her in the face with his fist, 
striking her nose and eye.  She fell and hit her shoulder on a 
concrete wall, sustaining a scar.  Defendant left; he did not 
assist her.  No one saw the incident, but the scar remained by 
the time of trial.  Michelle did not call the police; she explained 
that, still then only 19, she was “[s]cared,” “ashamed,” 
“humiliated.”   
Defendant and Michelle encountered each other again 
(still in 1984, during the moving process) at a hamburger stand.  
Defendant cornered her in the parking lot by her car, saying 
something to the effect of “ ‘[w]here do you think you’re going?  
You can’t leave me.’ ”  He kept her there for “20 minutes to half 
an hour, and it was just a standstill with no conversation.”  
When she “finally decided to make a move to [her] car to get out 
of there . . . he kicked [her]” in the upper thigh.  He left after 
that; she returned to her grandmother’s house.  She did not call 
the police, in part because she was scared.  She moved to 
Wisconsin as planned.   
Due to the temporal remoteness of these incidents, the 
probative value of this evidence was perhaps the least 
significant of all the uncharged evidence admitted at trial.  As 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
61 
discussed below, however, the trial court understood this 
evidence to corroborate a pattern of how defendant treated the 
women with whom he was intimately involved, and particularly 
those women who attempted to break off their relationships 
with him.  (Cf. People v. McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1063, 1099 
[no abuse of discretion in admitting evidence of conduct “around 
30 years” before charged offense where it appeared defendant’s 
“sexual interest in young girls persisted despite the long passage 
of time”].)  And the danger of undue prejudice associated with 
these incidents was relatively small.   
At some point while in Wisconsin, Michelle called 
defendant.  She testified that she missed him and “was still in 
love with him.”  She moved back to California at some point in 
1985. After she spent a few months at her grandmother’s, she 
and defendant moved into an apartment together.  They 
married in 1986 and moved to Long Beach. 
There were some good times during the relationship.  
When Michelle and defendant argued, however, he would 
sometimes get violent.  He choked her with both hands at least 
three or four times.  He punched her in the face occasionally; she 
estimated that occurred about once per year.  He struggled with 
drugs and alcohol throughout.  The violence correlated with his 
drinking.   
Defendant and Michelle eventually had a son in 1988.  
Soon after, in 1989, they moved to Wisconsin, to a town near her 
parents.  In August of 1989, Michelle and defendant went to a 
tavern.  The tavern was empty other than the two of them and 
the bartender.  All three were shooting pool.  At some point the 
bartender bumped into her and her bra became unhooked 
accidentally.  Defendant noticed that her bra had become 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
62 
undone and became “extremely angry,” asking whether she was 
having an affair with the bartender.  They went home not long 
after, stopping on the way so that Michelle, who was drunk, 
could throw up.  When they arrived, Michelle went upstairs to 
the bedroom.   
Defendant followed her.  He had vaginal intercourse with 
her, against her will, before turning her onto her face on the bed.  
She tried to move away from him.  (She was five feet, three 
inches tall, and weighed approximately 90 pounds; he was six 
feet tall and weighed approximately 190 pounds.)  At some point 
she fell onto the floor; when she did, he grabbed her hair and 
banged her head on the floor at least five times.  He then threw 
her on the bed and sodomized her more than once.  After he 
stopped, he bit her on the leg, back, and arm.   
She escaped.  She ran to a neighbor’s house, and at some 
point, the police were called.  She told an officer what happened, 
including that defendant said he would kill her if she left the 
house.  Michelle went to a hospital as a result of the attack.  She 
had “several bite marks,” a “really bad headache,” “and some 
rips” in her “rectum area.”  This and photographic evidence 
tended to corroborate that the attack had occurred. 
A criminal case was filed; defendant was arrested; and a 
restraining order was entered that prevented him from coming 
to her home.  Michelle was scared, however, that if she did not 
let him back in, “he would torment me more, he would show up 
at my mom’s house, or he’d hurt my mom or my other family and 
take our son away.”  At some point she informed a prosecutor 
that she did not want to pursue the case, and it was dismissed.   
Michelle, defendant, and their son moved to Florida in 
1990 to obtain employment for defendant.  They had a daughter 
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63 
while there.  Defendant struggled with alcohol and illegal drugs 
and spent at least part of 1991 in a rehabilitation center.  One 
day, a neighbor called to let her know that defendant was 
nearby, “wondering why he wasn’t in the treatment center.”  She 
spoke with defendant through the neighbor’s phone.  Defendant 
informed her that he left rehab because “[h]e was aware of a 
relationship [she] was having with [a] radio station D.J.,” which, 
in fact, she was not having.  He became angry.  After this 
incident, she finally decided to leave him.  She left with her two 
children and moved in with family in California in April 1991.  
She and defendant divorced in 1993.   
Michelle and the children had their own apartment by 
1994.  Within a few months of the Northridge earthquake that 
January, she heard from defendant.  He asked to move in with 
her and the kids in approximately June of that year.  She was 
“scared to say no,” but also “thought . . . it would be a good idea 
to have the kid’s father in their lives.”  She told defendant that 
“it was not to be a permanent move into the house.  It was 
temporary just so he could have a mailing address for his mail 
and get on his feet.”  He moved in that June; she made clear she 
was dating someone and did not want to have a romantic 
relationship with defendant.   
“The first week or so went well.  After that, everything fell 
apart.”  An incident occurred at Michelle’s home on June 12, 
1994, with the children present.  Defendant was angry.  “He 
thought I was pursuing a relationship with him or leading him 
on.  Basically, that we were together[,] and I was still dating 
somebody else.”  “[J]ealous and enraged,” he cornered her and 
threatened to burn her eye with a lit cigarette.  Defendant did 
not ultimately do so; he left.  She called her boyfriend, scared 
that defendant would return.  The boyfriend came over.  When 
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64 
defendant returned, he and the boyfriend saw each other and 
began fighting at defendant’s instigation.  Defendant grabbed 
the boyfriend, “picked him up in the air and threw him.”  He also 
took out a knife and cut the boyfriend’s ear.  “The children were 
just around the corner watching what was going on.”   
The police eventually arrived, but by then, defendant had 
departed.  Michelle reported what happened and later obtained 
a restraining order, which tended to corroborate that this 
incident occurred.  Although there were no additional violent 
incidents in person, defendant would later call her for money, 
which she would give him because she “didn’t want any trouble.”  
Defendant began to leave her alone around the time he started 
dating other women.  
b.  Sandra B. 
Sandra B. and defendant met in July 1994 at an A.A. 
meeting.  They became friends and eventually started dating.  
Within a few months of dating, defendant moved into Sandra’s 
apartment — uninvited, and over her objection.  She eventually 
relented, in part; “It was never no, okay, you can live here.  It 
was like you find a place as soon as you can, you need to get out 
of here.”   
Defendant was in the process of moving out on about July 
24, 1995.  They argued.  Defendant pulled a telephone cord out 
of the wall and told her “what a . . . worthless person I was . . . 
and, you know, I was going to pay for this and I was going to 
regret it.  And it was really quite a terrorizing situation.”  She 
found some cards and letters she had given him torn up and 
shoved into her toilet.   
Roughly a week later, defendant called her, “expressing 
that he was like depressed or upset about what had happened 
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65 
between us and he asked me if I would give him a ride to an A.A. 
meeting.  And I told him that I had somewhere to go and that 
after I’d done that I would come and get him.”  He was “irritated 
because I wouldn’t drop everything and go get him.”  When she 
picked him up and he got in the car, he asked where she had 
gone.  She told him that she had given a ride to a friend whose 
car needed repair, “[a]nd at that point Mr. Baker got really 
irritated because it was an ex-boyfriend of mine.  And he opened 
the car door and jumped out into traffic . . . .”  Sandra, “really 
upset,” pulled over and looked for him, but could not find him.   
Sandra picked up the friend and drove him to the repair 
shop where his car was waiting.  As the friend started to walk 
toward the mechanics, “Mr. Baker was standing about 50 to 100 
feet away and he started yelling at me and my friend.”  “And he 
was really angry and he threatened my friend and kind of was 
going between threatening my friend and demeaning me and 
telling my friend that . . . he had better watch out because he 
wasn’t gonna tolerate him taking me away from him and that I 
was Mr. Baker’s girlfriend and not his anymore and he didn’t 
like this.  And then he even came up at one point and started 
pounding on the hood of my vehicle,” causing damage.  The ex-
boyfriend, who was a deputy sheriff, eventually deescalated the 
situation.   
Sandra broke off her relationship with defendant 
completely after the incident, if not before, and attempted to get 
law enforcement involved.  At their suggestion, she sought a 
restraining order in August or September of 1995.  Around that 
time, defendant “would just show up like at my home, in my 
laundry room, at my apartment building and places that to the 
best of my knowledge he would have no way to know I was going 
to be there, but he would just be there.”  He would also call her 
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“incessantly.  Sometimes he would call me 15 times an hour, just 
keep calling and calling and calling. . . . He would leave 
threatening messages and they would be escalating in anger and 
aggressiveness and threats.”  Defendant wanted to get back 
together; Sandra refused.  He did not take the refusal well; his 
response was “[j]ust anger, degrading me, demeaning me, 
threatening me, telling me I needed to watch my back, telling 
me I didn’t know what he was capable of, and, you know, to 
always be ever mindful that he could do things to me that would 
be detrimental to me.”  Sandra “was terrorized.”   
Defendant would also show up to A.A. meetings Sandra 
attended.  “[O]ftentimes he would sit . . . directly next to me and 
almost . . . lean on me and he would — on one occasion, came in 
with another individual who was wearing something that 
belonged to me and they would just sit like right next to me, like, 
you know, make their presence very apparent, and it was just so 
uncomfortable.”  At a meeting on August 31, 1995, he became 
angry with her.  “[W]hen I was coming into the meeting, he was 
coming out the same door and he asked if he could speak to me 
and I told him no, just leave me alone, I just want to, you know, 
work on my recovery.  And he had a cup of coffee in his hands 
and he threw it at me and — toward my upper torso and it hit 
me on my neck and upper chest, and then he kicked me in my 
leg.”  A restraining order was in place at that time, but it 
permitted defendant to come to the A.A. meetings she attended.  
After that incident, however, an additional ruling prohibited 
him from visiting that location.   
A criminal case was eventually filed against defendant on 
her behalf.  Even in court, “[w]hen he did show up, . . . he would 
make rude, denigrating comments toward me, toward my 
behavior, toward my actions, kind of announcing to the whole 
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room that, you know, I was the problem and he didn’t know why 
he had to even be there.”  “And he would just remind me that he 
— you know, that I knew what he was capable of and that 
I needed to be very careful because he was capable of doing these 
things to me.”  Defendant was eventually convicted.  The court 
in this case took judicial notice that “defendant Paul Baker was 
convicted on August 1st, 1996, . . . of misdemeanor stalking . . . 
and misdemeanor criminal threats.”  Sandra had no contact 
with defendant for several years after the conviction.  The fact 
that defendant was convicted “weighed heavily in favor of 
admission” of the related evidence.  (Daveggio, supra, 4 Cal.5th 
at p. 825.) 
c.  Lorna T.  
The jury found defendant guilty of sodomy by force 
regarding Lorna T.  Lorna T. also testified regarding an 
uncharged incident in mid-1996, in which defendant stole her 
debit or credit card and was arrested.  The court admitted this 
evidence under at least Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision 
(b).  During closing argument, the prosecution relied on this act 
as evidence of “what type of intent the defendant had in his acts 
towards Judy Palmer, his reasons for entering the apartment.”  
Defendant does not dispute that the evidence was relevant for 
that purpose.  Any danger of undue prejudice, in the context of 
this case, is trivial.    
d.  Kathleen S. 
The jury found defendant guilty of two counts of sodomy 
by force and one count of forcible rape regarding Kathleen S.  
Between the first charged incident (in defendant’s van) and the 
second charged incident (in the garage), Kathleen at some point 
decided she needed to leave her relationship with defendant.   
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She told defendant she was leaving him in May 1997.  She 
left the van they were living in and crossed a street.  By the time 
she reached the middle, he ran after her, grabbed her hair or 
head, and threw her to the ground.  Her head hit the asphalt.  
Fortuitously, “at that same moment a police car was coming up 
the street toward her.”  Two officers exited their vehicle and 
arrested defendant.  He was later convicted of misdemeanor 
battery.  (See Pen. Code, §§ 242, 243, subd. (e).) 
At some point after the June 1997 incident in the garage, 
Kathleen returned to work and rented a room from a couple she 
knew through church.  Defendant — uninvited — came to the 
home she was renting on August 31, 1997.  She “was leaving the 
house and I saw [defendant] coming toward me and I was trying 
to hurry up and get into the truck.  And I don’t know what he 
was yelling, but he grabbed the antenna as I started to pull away 
and then he hit the windshield and cracked it.”  She was 
“terrified,” “afraid he was gonna hurt [her] again.”  The incident 
was reported to the police and defendant was eventually 
convicted of misdemeanor vandalism.  Here, too, the convictions 
“weighed heavily in favor of admission” of the related evidence.  
(Daveggio, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 825.) 
e.  Laura M. 
The jury acquitted defendant of two counts of sodomy by 
force regarding Laura M.  As defendant summarizes the 
evidence of uncharged acts, “Laura M. testified that, in 2000, 
[defendant] threatened her and stranded her in Las Vegas.  
[Citations.]  She testified to three acts of sodomy [citations], 
whereas only two such acts were charged [citations].  She 
claimed [defendant] threatened to burn down her house.”   
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The testimony regarding the Las Vegas incident was 
extremely brief and not inflammatory; in essence, it amounted 
to defendant threatened her and left her in Las Vegas.  The 
evidence regarding a threat to burn down Laura M.’s house was 
also quite succinct.  And that evidence was relevant to one of the 
charged offenses; when asked why she informed the police that 
she did not want to prosecute, Laura M. explained, “I was afraid 
because, you know, in the past he had said ‘I’m gonna burn your 
house down.’  You know, he was — he could be violent.”  The 
third act of sodomy regarded an incident in 2000, close in time 
to the charged offenses about which Laura M. testified.  This 
testimony also was brief.  Laura M. testified that she was in a 
camper and had been drinking; defendant forced her to have 
anal sex; and she ran away to a nearby A.A. venue where 
someone helped her get to a hotel.  Cross-examination elicited 
that she did not call the police or seek medical attention and 
returned to the camper after one night at the hotel.  
f.  Theresa T. 
Much of the testimony by Theresa T. was relevant to the 
charged murder, separate and apart from any uncharged act.  
She first met defendant on about November 6, 2003, at an 
inexpensive hotel.  They spent time together for roughly the next 
week, during which they used drugs.  Defendant at some point 
disclosed that his last romantic relationship had been with Judy 
Palmer, whom Theresa knew from a sober living meeting and 
considered to be “an absolutely incredible lady.”  Near the 
beginning of the week Theresa and defendant spent together, 
around November 7 or 8, defendant went to Palmer’s apartment.  
Palmer was not present.  Defendant “used his credit card to get 
into the apartment and told [Theresa that Palmer] was letting 
him in because she left the deadbolt unlocked.”  Defendant 
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retrieved a duffel bag, what seemed to be a toothbrush, and 
possibly some underwear.  He seemed “nervous” and “wanted to 
get out of there”; they left within five minutes of entering. 
Theresa never returned to Palmer’s apartment.  But she 
and defendant spent time in a model unit, shown to prospective 
tenants, in Palmer’s building.  The model unit was directly 
below Palmer’s.  Theresa and defendant also occasionally used 
drugs in a stairwell within the complex during November 2003.   
One morning that month, Theresa and defendant were 
lying side by side in the model unit.  They had had sex 
consensually approximately once by that point and had made a 
few other attempts that were frustrated by drug use.  Defendant 
said “ ‘I want some.’ ”  Theresa was uncomfortable.  When she 
said “ ‘not now,’ ” “he forced me over [onto her back] and pinned 
my shoulders down and he goes ‘I want it.’ ” He was 
“[d]emanding and forceful.”  She unzipped her pants “and he had 
intercourse.”  Afterwards, she was “[v]ery mad, very disgusted.”  
She never saw him after that night.  He called her in December 
2003.  She told him to lose her number.  All of these events 
occurred close in time to Palmer’s April 2004 disappearance.   
At some point in April 2004, Theresa became aware that 
Palmer was missing.  Her first thought was “oh my God, Paul.”  
She called homicide detectives at a number she saw on a 
“missing” poster.  She did not disclose the rape until 
approximately November 20, 2007, thinking, at the time she 
spoke with detectives around April 2004, that finding Palmer 
was the priority.  She also explained that at the time, she 
“wasn’t really ready to face up to” what had happened.   
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g.  Analysis 
The issue is whether the trial court abused its “ ‘broad 
discretion’ ” by not excluding some of this evidence as unduly 
prejudicial.  (People v. Loy (2011) 52 Cal.4th 46, 64.)  Defendant 
argues that evidence of spousal abuse is especially prejudicial, 
as is evidence of acts for which he had not been convicted and 
punished.  But he does not argue that the probative value of any 
particular evidence was “substantially outweighed by the 
probability that its admission will . . . create substantial danger 
of undue prejudice” (§ 352), nor does he explain why individually 
admissible pieces of evidence became inadmissible when viewed 
as a whole.   
Without demonstrating that any individual piece of 
evidence has probative value substantially outweighed by the 
danger of undue prejudice, it may be difficult for a defendant to 
establish that adding pieces of evidence together results in an 
intolerable danger of undue prejudice.  We do not hold, however, 
that a defendant could never show that at some point the unduly 
prejudicial effect of additional evidence would substantially 
outweigh that evidence’s (perhaps cumulative) probative value.  
We hold only that defendant has not established an abuse of 
discretion on this record, considered as a whole.     
As Falsetta explained, courts “must engage in a careful 
weighing process under section 352” when admitting propensity 
evidence.  (Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 917.)  “Rather than 
admit or exclude every sex offense a defendant commits, trial 
judges must consider such factors as its nature, relevance, and 
possible remoteness, the degree of certainty of its commission 
and the likelihood of confusing, misleading, or distracting the 
jurors from their main inquiry, its similarity to the charged 
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offense, its likely prejudicial impact on the jurors, the burden on 
the defendant in defending against the uncharged offense, and 
the availability of less prejudicial alternatives to its outright 
admission, such as admitting some but not all of the defendant’s 
other sex offenses, or excluding irrelevant though inflammatory 
details surrounding the offense.”  (Ibid.) 
Before trial, the court carefully considered proffered 
evidence of uncharged misconduct.  The court analyzed “each 
and every” act under Evidence Code sections 1108, 1109, and 
1101, subdivision (b).  It then evaluated the evidence under 
section 352, considering, among other things, the probative 
value of the testimony (including the remoteness of the 
incidents), its prejudicial effect, and the burden of mounting a 
defense.  Pursuant to that analysis, the court declined to admit 
evidence that defendant: (i) surreptitiously followed and 
photographed a former romantic partner; (ii) recorded, without 
permission, an act of sexual intercourse between himself and 
another woman; (iii) entered that woman’s home without her 
permission and at some point banged on her windows; 
(iv) tapped her phone line; (v) poisoned her cat, nearly killing it; 
(vi) punched his brother at his (defendant’s) wedding for kissing 
the bride; (vii) fought with the husband of a neighbor with whom 
he (defendant) was having an affair; (viii) killed a puppy in the 
presence of his wife and two-year-old son because he was angry 
with her; and (ix) cut her telephone and electrical lines after 
they separated. 
The court concluded that the uncharged acts it deemed 
admissible shed light on “defendant’s propensity to engage in 
sexual assaults and domestic violence against Judy Palmer and 
the other victims named pursuant to Evidence Code 1108 and 
1109.”  As it had earlier explained in ruling on some of the 
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evidence, “defendant has a pattern, a very demonstrable pattern 
of escalating violence towards women that he’s been 
romantically involved with, tending to control these women, 
assaulting them physically, and sexually assaulting them 
particularly when they break up with him or rebuff him.  [¶]  He 
has an M.O. of preferring sodomy o[r] wanting to tie up women, 
breaking into their apartments, taking their property, and this 
appears to be a long-standing pattern.”  “Also,” the court added, 
“the evidence is admissible in many instances to prove the 
defendant’s motive, his intent, his common scheme or plan, lack 
of consent with regard to the sexual offenses, knowledge and in 
his attack on Judy Palmer and other named victims in the 
information.  [¶]  The court finds that the evidence is material, 
it’s relevant, and its probative value outweighs any prejudicial 
effect on the defendant.”   
Regarding that prejudicial effect, the court explained, 
“I felt that all of the acts that I have admitted are not too 
inflammatory.  They are the same or less serious conduct 
compared to the actual charged offenses, the murder and . . . all 
the sexual offenses[,] . . . some with convictions.  [¶] I don’t see 
any probability of confusion.  I think it can be sufficiently laid 
out in a clear, understandable manner I think by the 
prosecution, particularly with the convictions, to show what acts 
are actually being charged . . . . [¶]  I don’t see undue 
consumption of time here.  This is going to be a long case.  Most 
of these acts are against already charged victims.  They don’t 
appear to be lengthy or complicated or will substantially confuse 
the jurors or consume an undue [amount] of time based upon the 
seriousness and the length of the case as it already stands.”  
Regarding the remoteness of some of the acts, the court again 
stressed the similarity of the pattern of domestic violence and 
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abuse, as well as other corroboration, such as “witnesses, 
whether there were injuries, whether there were restraining 
orders, police reports filed, or whether there were convictions 
sought or obtained.”   
When additional instances of uncharged misconduct were 
discussed during trial, the court again paid careful attention to 
the probative and prejudicial value of that evidence.  The court 
excluded evidence tending to show that defendant had slashed 
a woman’s tires; potentially sodomized Laura M. on two other 
occasions; and burned down the shed in which Kathleen S. and 
two others were staying.  And the court “certainly will not let in 
the racial slurs.”   
The trial court’s decision to admit evidence of uncharged 
acts was bolstered by Palmer’s death.  “[T]he case for admission 
of propensity evidence ‘is especially compelling’ where, as here, 
‘[a] sexual assault victim was killed and cannot testify.’ ”  
(Daveggio, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 824.)  That principle applies 
with additional force in this case:  the extensive decomposition 
of Palmer’s body inhibited the search for physical evidence of 
sexual assault and cause of death.  
To demonstrate error, defendant must show that the trial 
court abused its discretion when it did not exclude some 
unspecified portion of this evidence as having probative value 
“substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission 
will . . . create substantial danger of undue prejudice.”  (§ 352, 
italics added.)  The claim is slippery.  Defendant does not 
identify particular evidence that he thinks should have been 
excluded under section 352.  He does not posit a point at which 
the evidence crossed the line between acceptable and excessive.  
And he does not appear to argue that the evidence should have 
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been excluded as confusing or unduly consumptive of time — 
only that, in the aggregate, it was unduly prejudicial.  True, 
defendant argues that the evidence was significant.  But to say 
that evidence was significant is not enough; as noted, 
“ ‘ “ ‘ “[e]vidence is not prejudicial, as that term is used in a 
section 352 context, merely because it undermines the 
opponent’s position or shores up that of the proponent.  The 
ability to do so is what makes evidence relevant.  The code 
speaks in terms of undue prejudice.” ’ ” ’ ”  (Daveggio, supra, 
4 Cal.5th at p. 824.) 
It is apparent that the trial court painstakingly reviewed 
the proffered other-acts evidence and considered whether 
evidence should be excluded under section 352, as Falsetta 
requires.  We conclude that, viewing the other-acts evidence as 
a whole, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining 
to exclude pieces of evidence based on the collective significance 
of that evidence.  The trial court could have reasonably decided 
to further limit the other-acts testimony it admitted.  But we 
cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion on this 
record, in the face of the precise claim of error now raised.  
This conclusion makes it unnecessary to decide whether 
defendant, who at least perfunctorily objected to individual 
pieces of evidence (for example, “We’d object and submit”), 
raised an objection of this type below.    
E.  Admissibility of DNA Evidence  
Defendant claims the trial court erred by admitting 
evidence of DNA testing performed by analysts who were not 
called as witnesses at trial and, thus, were not subject to cross 
examination.  That evidence included the testimony of Dr. Rick 
Staub regarding the analysts’ testing and reports prepared by 
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the analysts themselves.  The focus of the claim is Crawford v. 
Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, in which the high court held, as 
relevant, “that the admission of testimonial hearsay against a 
criminal defendant violates the Sixth Amendment right to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses.”  (People v. Sanchez 
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 670.)  Defendant also contends that the 
reports were not admissible as business records.  We assume 
that these objections are preserved for our review but conclude 
that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
1.  The DNA Evidence  
The evidence at issue concerns analysis performed in two 
Cellmark labs:  one lab in Dallas, Texas, the other in 
Germantown, Maryland.  The most notable evidence produced 
by the Dallas laboratory concerned Palmer’s underwear.  
A profile of defendant, believed to be unique to him and to a 
subset of his male blood relatives, matched a sperm fraction 
extracted from cuttings of Palmer’s underwear. 
The most notable evidence produced by the Germantown 
laboratory concerned the vibrator found in Palmer’s apartment.  
DNA on a swab of the vibrator matched defendant’s DNA (in a 
sperm fraction) and Palmer’s DNA (in a nonsperm fraction).  
The Germantown evidence also indicated that blood stains 
found in Palmer’s apartment matched her DNA profile and that 
sperm on the rug matched defendant’s. 
During deliberations, the jury asked for a readback of 
Dr. Staub’s testimony, specifically “ ‘the parts about the 
underwear and the [vibrator], especially the conclusions.’ ”  
During closing argument, the prosecution described evidence of 
“defendant’s semen . . . in the seat of [Palmer’s] panties” as “a 
bit of a problem for the defendant.” 
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2.  Harmlessness    
The 
evidence 
that 
defendant 
killed 
Palmer was 
overwhelming.  A criminalist testified that the DNA analysis 
she performed linked defendant to sperm fractions extracted 
from an aqua-colored blanket and towel cutting found near 
Palmer’s body, as well as a nonsperm fraction from a nearby 
cigarette butt.  Defendant’s relationship with Palmer had failed 
and he was frantic to reconnect with her.  The night she 
disappeared, he was seen with a Ford Ranger that she drove 
home that evening.  Soon after she disappeared, he expressed 
consciousness of guilt, conveying to others that he was going to 
be on the news, was going to hell, or wanted to kill himself.  He 
also told Mengoni not to worry about anyone showing up to 
testify regarding Palmer’s missing Ford Escort, evincing special 
knowledge that Palmer, then missing, was already dead.  That 
he had purchased rope of the kind found around Palmer’s body 
further pointed toward his involvement in her killing.   
To say that defendant killed Palmer, however, is not to say 
that he committed first degree murder, let alone special 
circumstance murder.  The more significant question is whether 
the DNA evidence may have prejudiced the jury’s assessment of 
whether defendant raped Palmer — an issue relevant to the 
felony murder theory of first degree murder; to the rape 
conviction and special circumstance; and to the burglary 
conviction and special circumstance. 
Here too, however, there was no prejudice.  The jury heard 
Calhoun’s testimony that defendant admitted he had “beat the 
pussy up.”  Clearly admissible physical evidence corroborated 
that confession.  As discussed above, a criminalist testified at 
trial that the DNA analysis she performed linked defendant to 
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sperm fractions extracted from an aqua-colored blanket and 
towel cutting found near Palmer’s body.  The profile common to 
defendant and the sperm fraction from the towel, she explained, 
would be expected to appear in only one in 740 quadrillion 
Caucasians.  The criminalist also extracted a sperm fraction 
from cuttings of Palmer’s underwear and concluded that 
defendant could “[]not be excluded” as the source of the partial 
profile she created from that fraction.  None of that analysis was 
performed at the Germantown or Dallas labs at issue in this 
claim of error.  All of it was performed by an analyst who 
testified at trial, subject to cross-examination.     
Moreover, the jury heard ample evidence demonstrating 
defendant’s propensity to commit sexual assault, something he 
did to “all of his women.”  And it learned the state of Palmer’s 
clothing when she was found — shirt off, jeans pulled down to 
the thighs, fully exposing her underwear.  Viewed in this 
context, any error in admitting additional DNA evidence was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The harmlessness of any error in admitting the 
Germantown evidence is further confirmed by the jury’s 
verdicts.  The jury acquitted defendant of sexual penetration by 
foreign object.  It found not true the sexual penetration by 
foreign object special circumstance allegation.  Because the 
Germantown evidence — most significantly, evidence regarding 
the vibrator — did not persuade the jury that defendant had 
committed sexual penetration by a foreign object, it is difficult 
to see that evidence causing the jury to conclude that defendant 
committed rape or entered with intent to commit rape.  
Accordingly, even assuming error, no basis for reversal appears.  
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F.  Sufficiency of the Evidence that Defendant 
Raped Palmer 
Defendant contends there is insufficient evidence that he 
raped or attempted to rape Palmer.  As discussed, we disagree.   
“The test for evaluating a sufficiency of evidence claim is 
deferential: ‘whether, on the entire record, a rational trier of fact 
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’  
[Citation.]  We must ‘view the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the People’ and ‘presume in support of the judgment 
the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce 
from the evidence.’  [Citation].  We must also ‘accept logical 
inferences that the jury might have drawn from the 
circumstantial evidence.’ ”  (People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 
371, 411.)   
As noted, evidence that defendant raped Palmer included 
the sperm discovered in her apartment and on items found with 
her body; defendant’s admission to Calhoun that he had “beat 
the pussy up”; defendant’s propensity to commit sexual assault; 
and the state of Palmer’s clothing when she was found.   
Defendant argues that any sexual intercourse might have 
been consensual.  The jury could have rejected that contention 
based on the evidence that Palmer had ended her relationship 
with defendant and was afraid of him.  The fact of her murder 
— and the scratches observed on defendant’s face — also suggest 
that any intercourse around the time she disappeared was rape.  
Defendant contends there is no evidence regarding when 
any sperm was deposited.  But defendant’s statement to 
Calhoun tended to indicate that he had sex with Palmer close in 
time to her disappearance, after their relationship had ended.  
The jury also heard testimony that the acid phosphatase in 
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semen “is water soluble and it tends to wash out.”  Accordingly, 
the fact that a towel and aqua blanket found near Palmer’s body 
both screened positive using an acid phosphatase test tended to 
indicate that the sperm found on those items was deposited after 
the last time those items were washed.  Testimony similarly 
conveyed that although sperm may remain after washing, each 
wash diminishes the likelihood of finding sperm.   
Defendant next asserts that if Palmer had been raped, “it 
is likely that sperm would have been deposited in the crotch 
area” of her underwear, adding that the presence of sperm 
elsewhere in the underwear was “indicative of sexual conduct 
other than rape.”  (See People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 676 
[“In this state rape and sodomy are distinct crimes”].)  Putting 
this speculation aside, the jury was not required to conclude that 
the “sexual penetration, however slight,” that is “sufficient to 
complete the crime” of rape resulted in any sperm at all, let 
alone sperm in a particular area of Palmer’s underwear.  (Pen. 
Code, § 263.)  Nor was the jury required to assume that if 
defendant committed sodomy, he did not also commit rape.  For 
example, the jury convicted defendant of both raping and 
sodomizing Kathleen S. during the incident in the garage.   
Moreover, the jury heard Calhoun’s testimony that 
defendant admitted to “beat[ing] the pussy up.”  Defendant 
argues that “no reasonable juror could have reasonably inferred” 
that defendant’s statement to Calhoun meant that defendant 
had raped Palmer.  But a reasonable juror could have 
understood the statement to be an admission that defendant 
and Palmer had vaginal sex — and relied on the surrounding 
circumstances to conclude that the sex was not consensual. 
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Finally, defendant contends there was no evidence that 
Palmer was alive when any intercourse occurred.  “ ‘ “[I]n the 
absence of any evidence suggesting that the victim’s assailant 
intended to have sexual conduct with a corpse [citation], we 
believe that the jury could reasonably have inferred from the 
evidence that the assailant engaged in sexual conduct with the 
victim while [she] was still alive rather than after [she] was 
already dead.” ’ ”  (People v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 280.)  
Likewise, the jury could have reasonably inferred that because 
defendant committed the rape before killing Palmer, he also 
formed the intent to commit rape before she was dead.7 
G.  Burglary Felony Murder Instructions 
The jury was permitted to find defendant guilty of first 
degree felony murder on a theory that the murder was 
committed during the commission of a burglary.  The jury was 
also tasked with considering the truth of a burglary special 
circumstance allegation.  In both contexts, the jury was 
instructed that defendant was guilty of burglary only if he 
entered with intent to commit (i) theft, (ii) rape, (iii) sexual 
penetration by a foreign object, or (iv) sodomy.  Defendant 
argues that “[n]either a burglary-based felony murder nor a 
burglary special circumstance can properly be based on an entry 
with the intent to commit sexual assault.”  We disagree.8 
 
7  
Our conclusion that there was substantial evidence of a 
rape also addresses defendant’s argument that the trial court 
should not have relied on the premise that the murder took place 
in the course of a rape when ruling on the automatic motion to 
modify the verdict.  (See post, pt. II.K.) 
8  
Defendant contends that he may raise this issue on appeal 
even in the absence of an objection below.  We assume without 
 
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The felony murder rule makes certain homicides murder 
(rather than manslaughter) and makes a subset of those 
homicides murder of the first degree. As relevant here, 
“[m]urder is the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with 
malice aforethought.”  (§ 187, subd. (a).)  “Manslaughter is the 
unlawful killing of a human being without malice.”  (§ 192.)  
“Malice is express when there is manifested a deliberate 
intention to unlawfully take away the life of a fellow creature.”  
(§ 188, subd. (a)(1).)  “Malice is implied when no considerable 
provocation appears, or when the circumstances attending the 
killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.”  (§ 188, subd. 
(a)(2).)  “ ‘The felony-murder rule imputes the requisite malice 
for a murder conviction to those who commit a homicide during 
the perpetration of a felony inherently dangerous to human 
life.’ ”  (People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1184 (Chun).)  
A homicide committed during the perpetration of certain 
felonies enumerated by statute — including rape and burglary 
— is murder of the first degree.  (§ 189, subd. (a).)  A homicide 
committed during the perpetration of unenumerated inherently 
dangerous felonies is murder of the second degree.  (People v. 
Bryant (2013) 56 Cal.4th 959, 966.)  Only felonies “inherently 
dangerous to human life” are eligible for the felony murder rule.  
(Id. at p. 965; see People v. Ford (1964) 60 Cal.2d 772.)  The 
merger doctrine applies to a subset of those felonies.   
If construed broadly, the felony murder rule could 
threaten to collapse the distinction between murder (which 
requires malice) and manslaughter (which does not).  The 
merger doctrine limits this threat.  The thrust of the doctrine is 
 
deciding that the claim of error has not been forfeited.  (See 
Daveggio, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p.  845; Pen. Code, § 1259.) 
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that certain felonies “ ‘merge’ with the homicide and cannot be 
used for purposes of felony murder.”  (Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th 
at p. 1189; see also People v. Wilson (1969) 1 Cal.3d 431, 442, 
fn. 5 (Wilson) [“felonies that are an integral part of the homicide 
are merged in the homicide (italics omitted)”].)  “In explaining 
the basis for the merger doctrine, courts and legal commentators 
reasoned that, because a homicide generally results from the 
commission of an assault, every felonious assault ending in 
death automatically would be elevated to murder in the event a 
felonious assault could serve as the predicate felony for purposes 
of the felony-murder doctrine.  Consequently, application of the 
felony-murder rule to felonious assaults would usurp most of the 
law of homicide, relieve the prosecution in the great majority of 
homicide cases of the burden of having to prove malice in order 
to obtain a murder conviction, and thereby frustrate the 
Legislature’s intent to punish certain felonious assaults 
resulting in death (those committed with malice aforethought, 
and therefore punishable as murder) more harshly than other 
felonious assaults that happened to result in death (those 
committed 
without 
malice 
aforethought, 
and 
therefore 
punishable as manslaughter).”  (People v. Hansen (1994) 
9 Cal.4th 300, 311–312, overruled by Chun, at p. 1199.)  Some 
decisions also take the position that deterrence concerns cannot 
justify the felony murder rule when certain types of assaultive 
felonies are at issue, demanding “a felony independent of the 
homicide” to render the merger doctrine inapplicable.  (Wilson, 
at p. 440; see also ibid. [“Where a person enters a building with 
an intent to assault his victim with a deadly weapon, he is not 
deterred by the felony-murder rule”]; but see People v. Farley 
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1120 (Farley).) 
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This court embraced a version of the merger doctrine in 
People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522 (Ireland).  The 
instructions in Ireland permitted the jury to find a second 
degree murder if a killing resulted from an assault with a deadly 
weapon.  (Id., at p. 538.)  We concluded that allowing the “use of 
the felony-murder rule” in such a case “would effectively 
preclude the jury from considering the issue of malice 
aforethought in all cases wherein homicide has been committed 
as a result of a felonious assault — a category which includes 
the great majority of all homicides.”  (Id., at p. 539.)  We forbade 
such “bootstrapping” in the circumstances relevant there.  
(Ibid.; see also Wilson, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 441 [“In Ireland, we 
rejected the bootstrap reasoning involved in taking an element 
of a homicide and using it as the underlying felony in a second 
degree felony-murder instruction”].) 
Several months later, we extended Ireland to reach 
certain first degree felony murders based on burglary.  (See 
Wilson, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 431.)  The prosecution in Wilson 
“sought to apply the felony-murder rule on the theory that the 
homicide occurred in the course of a burglary, but the only basis 
for finding a felonious entry [was] the intent to commit an 
assault with a deadly weapon.”  (Id., at p. 440.)  We forbade 
reliance on a felony murder theory when, among other things, 
“the entry would be nonfelonious but for the intent to commit 
the assault.”  (Ibid.; see also id., at p. 442 [“an instruction on 
first degree felony murder is improper when the underlying 
felony is burglary based upon an intention to assault the victim 
of the homicide with a deadly weapon”].)  We reached this result 
even though, then as now, Penal Code section 189 defined first 
degree murder to include “[a]ll murder . . . which is committed 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
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in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate . . . burglary.”  
(Wilson, at p. 441, fn. 4; see § 189.) 
Stressing the clear language of Penal Code section 189, we 
eventually held in Farley that Wilson “erred in extending the 
merger doctrine to first degree felony murder.”  (Farley, supra, 
46 Cal.4th at p. 1117; see id., at pp. 1111–1122.) Because the 
defendant in Farley had committed his crimes in 1988, “at which 
time it was unforeseeable that we would overrule Wilson,” our 
Farley decision did not apply to that defendant retroactively.  
(Farley, at p. 1122.)  Likewise here:  Although the merger 
doctrine no longer applies to first degree murder, we will apply 
Wilson as though it had not been overruled.   
In the decades that Wilson remained good law, the 
contours of our merger doctrine evolved — and not always 
consistently.  (See Chun, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 1188–1201.)  
Regardless, defendant’s position lacks merit under either of the 
analytical approaches we applied at the time he committed his 
offenses.  First, defendant offers no reason to conclude that rape, 
sodomy, or penetration by foreign object are involved in “a high 
percentage of all homicides” (id., at p. 1198), such that 
application of the felony murder rule to those offenses would 
remove the issue of malice aforethought from myriad homicide 
cases (Ireland, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 539).  And second, in this 
particular case, there was evidence from which the jury could 
conclude that defendant had an independent purpose to commit 
rape, sodomy, or penetration by foreign object, separate and 
apart from any intent to assault or kill.  (See People v. Gonzales 
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 894, 942 [even before Farley, Wilson was 
limited to situations in which “the defendant’s only felonious 
purpose was to assault or kill the victim” (italics added)]; see 
also Chun, at pp. 1193–1195, 1197–1200; People v. Smith (1984) 
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35 Cal.3d 798, 806–807 [“child abuse of the assaultive variety” 
merged when court could “conceive of no independent purpose 
for the conduct”].)   
True: rape, sodomy, and penetration by foreign object may 
fairly be termed “sexual assault,” and so in some sense an intent 
to commit those offenses is assaultive in nature rather than 
independent of an assault.  But as used in the context of the 
merger doctrine — a doctrine which, at least in part, guards the 
line between murder and manslaughter — the term “assault” 
captures only felonies that are more likely to prove fatal; if the 
felony is not sufficiently likely to prove fatal, it does not merge.  
We do not announce any precise test to determine which 
offenses trigger application of what remains of the merger 
doctrine after Farley.  The point is merely that intent to commit 
rape, sodomy, and penetration by foreign object are not 
“assaultive” in the relevant sense; they reflect an independent 
intent for purposes of the merger doctrine.  (Cf. People v. Morgan 
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 619 [no merger problem because 
“unlawful penetration with a foreign object . . . embodies a 
separate felonious purpose apart from the intent to injure or 
kill”]; People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 140 [no merger 
problem when the jury could find burglary only if there was 
entry with intent to commit rape].) 
A 
notable 
omission 
from 
defendant’s 
argument 
underscores the point.  There is a certain symmetry between 
Ireland and Wilson:  If assault with a deadly weapon merges 
(Ireland), then perhaps entry with intent to commit assault with 
a deadly weapon should merge as well (Wilson).  (See People v. 
Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375, 388.)  But here, defendant does not 
dispute that rape itself may provide the basis for special-
circumstance first degree felony murder.  And if rape does not 
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87 
merge, it is difficult to see why entry with intent to commit rape 
would.9 
Defendant also argues there was insufficient evidence to 
support the court’s instruction that the jury could consider 
whether defendant entered with intent to commit theft.  He does 
not frame this as a standalone attack on the verdict, perhaps 
because any error here would obviously be harmless:  The 
exacting Chapman harmlessness standard would not apply (see 
People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1129–1130), and in any 
event, the rape conviction (with the burglary allegation) and 
rape special circumstance leave no reasonable doubt that the 
jury found defendant entered with intent to commit rape. 
Instead, 
we 
understand 
defendant’s 
insufficiency 
argument to be in service of his merger argument:  The burglary 
was not based on entry with intent to commit theft, therefore it 
was based on entry with intent to commit sexual assault, thus 
the merger doctrine applies.  Because the argument fails at the 
final step — there being no merger problem even if the burglary 
was based on entry with intent to commit rape, sodomy, or 
sexual penetration by foreign object — we need not catalog the 
evidence relevant to the theft instruction (such as the jewelry 
described by Calhoun and the theft from Lorna T.).    
 
9  
The nature of defendant’s argument that the special 
circumstance should merge is not entirely clear.  He does not 
appear to argue that if the felony murder instruction was 
permissible, 
the 
special 
circumstance 
instruction 
was 
nevertheless flawed.  The existence of an independent purpose 
would undermine any such argument as well.  (See People v. 
Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 915; see also People v. Clark (1990) 
50 Cal.3d 583, 608–609 & fn. 15.)   
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H.  Parole Revocation Fine 
The trial court imposed a $10,000 parole revocation fine.  
Defendant claims that the fine is improper because, as a person 
sentenced to death, he is ineligible for parole.  The claim fails 
under People v. Brasure because defendant was also sentenced 
to a determinate term.  (See People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 
1037, 1075 (Brasure).)  Defendant concedes that Brasure so 
holds and makes no effort to distinguish it.  He instead criticizes 
Brasure’s statutory interpretation and contends that the case is 
in tension with People v. McWhorter (2009) 47 Cal.4th 318, 380 
(McWhorter).   
We decline to reconsider Brasure.  As relevant here, 
Brasure reasoned that a determinate term carries with it a 
period of parole, triggering a parole revocation fine under Penal 
Code section 1202.45.  (See Brasure, supra, 42 Cal.4th at 
p. 1075; see also Pen Code., § 1202.45, subd. (a) [requiring a fine 
“[i]n every case” in which a person’s “sentence includes a period 
of parole”].)  In McWhorter, we embraced a capital defendant’s 
claim that a parole revocation fine should be stricken, reasoning, 
in full, that defendant “is correct.  (See People v. Oganesyan 
(1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1184–1185 [83 Cal.Rptr.2d 157].)  
Respondent has conceded the point.”  (McWhorter, supra, 
47 Cal.4th at p. 380.)  As is apparent, McWhorter did not 
acknowledge the existence of Brasure; relied solely on a Court of 
Appeal decision (Oganesyan) that Brasure distinguished as 
involving “no determinate term of imprisonment imposed under 
[Penal Code] section 1170” (Brasure, at p. 1075); and never 
considered the significance of any determinate term, omitting 
mention of whether one had been imposed in connection with 
McWhorter’s robbery conviction (see McWhorter, at pp. 324, 
380).  Because “ ‘ “cases are not authority for propositions not 
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considered” ’ ” (Silverbrand v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 
46 Cal.4th 106, 127), McWhorter casts no doubt on the 
significance Brasure afforded to a defendant’s determinate term.  
We note, too, that “[d]efendant is in no way prejudiced by 
assessment of the fine, which will become payable only if he 
actually does begin serving a period of parole and his parole is 
revoked.”  (Brasure, at p. 1075.)10   
I.  Error in Abstract of Judgment 
Penal Code section 286 defines the crime of sodomy and 
addresses different circumstances in which the crime may be 
committed.  One relevant circumstance is the age of the victim.  
(See, e.g., § 286, subd. (c).)  The abstract of judgment indicates 
that defendant thrice committed sodomy with a person under 
14 years of age.  The parties agree that this was error; 
defendant’s victims regarding the relevant counts (7, 10, and 16) 
were adults.  “[A] court has the inherent power to correct clerical 
errors in its records so as to make these records reflect the true 
facts.”  (In re Candelario (1970) 3 Cal.3d 702, 705.)  The abstract 
of judgment will be corrected to reflect that defendant was 
convicted under subdivision (c)(2) — sodomy by “force, violence, 
duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily 
injury.”            
J.  Evidence of Animal Abuse  
Defendant complains that the trial court erred at the 
penalty phase by admitting evidence that he mistreated cats as 
 
10  
Defendant does not contend that, and we do not address 
whether, any other intervening authority casts doubt on 
Brasure’s conclusion. 
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a child.  Even assuming the claim of error is preserved and has 
merit, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.   
The prosecution sought to admit evidence of animal abuse 
through the testimony of defendant’s half brother.  The evidence 
relevant here concerned tying cats’ tails together and throwing 
the cats over a clothesline.  The prosecution contended that the 
evidence was relevant to the anticipated testimony of a defense 
expert psychologist.  Defense counsel conceded that he had 
provided the expert with a transcript of an interview in which 
the half brother discussed the tying together of cats’ tails.  
During a later colloquy, the prosecution stressed “that at no time 
have we said or do we intend to say that any of the things that 
the defendant did as a youth . . . fall under Factor B.  We are not 
characterizing them as aggravating factors.”  The court allowed 
inquiry about the subject, but encouraged the prosecution to “try 
to minimize this testimony,” cautioning that the court would 
“put a halt to it if it becomes too inflammatory.” 
The defense was the first to question the half brother 
regarding the subject.  In full: “Now, did you have occasion to 
see [defendant] — that you personally saw [defendant] get a 
couple cats and tie their tails and put them up on a clothesline 
or something?  [¶]  A[.]  Yeah.  It was getting ready to happen 
and I ran because I didn’t want to see it. [¶]  Q[.]  Okay.  Did you 
actually see any — did you actually ever see anything that 
happened? [¶]  A[.]  No.  I ran.  [¶]  Q[.]  Okay. [¶]  A[.]  But they 
were getting ready to do it.”   
The prosecution picked up where the defense left off.  
Questioning elicited that defendant and a few other boys were 
in a backyard discussing tying cats’ tails together and throwing 
the cats over a clothesline in that yard.  They were trying to 
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catch the cats and had something like “rope or twine.”  The half 
brother did not see defendant harm animals on other occasions.   
The court later had doubts about its decision to admit this 
and other testimony regarding defendant’s conduct during his 
childhood.  The court ultimately instructed the jury that 
“[e]vidence has been presented regarding the defendant’s 
background.  This evidence may be considered by you, if at all, 
as mitigating evidence.  [¶] I’m going to change that last 
sentence.  [¶]  This evidence may only be considered by you, if at 
all, as mitigating evidence.”  (Italics added.)  The court also 
instructed that, other than certain crimes about which the jury 
heard evidence during the guilt phase, the jury should not 
“consider any other evidence pertaining to any other crimes on 
any alleged victim, whether charged or uncharged.”   
Considering all these circumstances, no basis for reversal 
appears.  The testimony at issue was brief.  It concerned the 
behavior of a group of boys, not solely defendant, an adult whom 
the jury had already convicted of murder, rape, and sodomy.  
The witness did not testify that the plan regarding cats was 
defendant’s idea.  Nor did he testify that any cats were ever 
caught, tied, or thrown.  The prosecution asserted at trial that 
it sought to elicit this testimony solely for impeachment 
purposes.  There is no dispute that the prosecution did not rely 
on the evidence regarding cats as evidence in aggravation 
during closing argument.  The defense, by contrast, emphasized 
that “background information” is, if anything, “mitigation and 
only mitigation.”  Likewise, the court’s instructions limited the 
significance that the jury could have given to this evidence.  
Viewed in context, any error in admitting this evidence of 
(potential) animal abuse was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.   
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K.  Denial of Automatic Motion to Modify the 
Verdict   
The trial court denied defendant’s automatic motion to 
modify the verdict.  (Pen. Code, § 190.4.)  Defendant concedes 
that he did not object to the denial and that “[s]uch a failure 
generally constitutes forfeiture of the issue on appeal.”  (People 
v. Sánchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411, 485; People v. Horning (2004) 
34 Cal.4th 871, 912 (Horning); People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 
1153, 1220.)  He contends that the failure to object should be 
excused on grounds of futility, “given the trial court’s adamant 
view of the case.”  We disagree.  The trial court’s belief that the 
motion should be denied does not indicate that the trial court 
could not have been persuaded otherwise after objection.  The 
futility argument is particularly unconvincing to the extent 
defendant argues that the trial court’s reasoning was marred by 
legal error; if informed of an actual legal error by an objection, 
presumably the court would have revisited its reasoning and, 
thus, its conclusion.   
Defendant’s claim fails on the merits in any event.  He 
notes that the trial court concluded that the murder was 
premeditated, surmising that the court’s view was based on 
evidence suggesting that defendant formed an intent to kill 
before entering Palmer’s apartment.  From this, he argues that 
the burglary special circumstance was inapplicable, citing 
People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 646 for the proposition 
that “the burglary-murder special circumstance do[es] not apply 
to a burglary committed for the sole purpose of assaulting or 
killing” the homicide victim.  The problem with defendant’s 
argument is revealed by the language he quotes: “sole purpose.”  
(Ibid., italics added.)  That defendant may have entered with 
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intent to kill does not eliminate the evidence of his entry with 
intent to commit sexual assault.  
Defendant also faults the trial court for relying on a view 
that the treatment of Palmer’s body made the crime 
“ ‘particularly heinous.’ ”  In support, he relies on case law 
relevant to factors that render crimes death eligible; in the 
parlance of California law, special circumstances.  (See Maynard 
v. Cartwright (1988) 486 U.S. 356, 363–364; People v. Superior 
Court (Engert) (1982) 31 Cal.3d 797; People v. Green (1980) 
27 Cal.3d 1, 61 & fn. 51.)  That authority is beside the point.  As 
the other case he cites explains, “defendant argues that the trial 
court erred by considering the ‘heinous’ nature of the crimes as 
a factor in aggravation. . . . But the aggravating circumstance 
addressed in Maynard was one that determined eligibility for 
the death penalty, which requires greater precision than the 
factors that govern the sentence-selection process, at issue here.  
[Citations.]  In any event, the trial court merely used the word 
‘heinous’ . . . as part of its explanation why it found the 
circumstances of the offense an aggravating factor.”  (People v. 
Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 737 (Lucero).)11   
Defendant also points to “significant mitigating evidence 
reducing his culpability.”  The trial court took such evidence into 
account.  Finally, defendant contends that the evidence that 
“Palmer was beloved by her family and was a kind, generous, 
and loving individual” was “not sufficient to justify the decision 
 
11  
Defendant also asserts that “a contention that a murder 
was ‘particularly heinous’ is vague and cannot support 
imposition of the death penalty.”  He identifies no authority in 
support of this proposition — a deficiency that would forfeit the 
issue on appeal even if it had not been forfeited below.  (See 
Daveggio, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 830, fn. 6.)   
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not to modify the verdict.”  The trial court did not rely solely on 
that evidence to justify its decision.  Our independent review 
reveals no reason to disturb the trial court’s denial of the motion.  
(People v. Sánchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 485.) 
L.  Victim Impact Evidence 
Defendant contends that victim impact evidence must be 
limited to the facts or circumstances known to the accused at the 
time of the offense.  The trial court’s failure to embrace this 
principle, 
he 
continues, 
resulted 
in 
evidentiary 
and 
instructional error.  We have rejected this contention in the past 
and see no persuasive reason to revisit our precedent.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Henriquez (2017) 4 Cal.5th 1, 37–38; People v. Pollock 
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1183.)  Accordingly, there was no error.   
M.  Cumulative Error 
We have assumed that the trial court erred in admitting 
certain DNA evidence at the guilt phase and in admitting 
evidence of (potential) animal abuse at the penalty phase; held, 
in the alternative to a finding of no error, that any error in 
imposing a parole revocation fine was harmless; and confirmed 
that the abstract of judgment reflects a clerical error.  We 
further conclude that, even viewed in combination, these errors 
(found or assumed) were not prejudicial.  It is especially clear 
that the parole revocation fine and abstract of judgment could 
not have affected the jury’s guilt or penalty verdict, and that the 
admission of animal abuse evidence at the penalty phase could 
not have affected the guilt phase verdict.    
N.  Miscellaneous Challenges to the Death Penalty 
Defendant raises several challenges to the legality of 
California’s death penalty.  We decline to revisit our precedent 
as follows:    
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Neither Penal Code section 190.2 nor Penal Code section 
190.3 (including its factor (a)) is unconstitutionally vague.  
(People v. Sivongxxay (2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 198 (Sivongxxay); 
People v. Myles (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 1224.)  Section 190.3 “is 
not invalid for failing to specify which factors are mitigating and 
which are aggravating, to limit aggravation to the specified 
aggravating factors, or to define aggravation or mitigation.”  
(Horning, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 913.)  “Nor do these asserted 
deficiencies impermissibly allow the jury to consider mitigating 
evidence, or its absence, in aggravation.”  (Myles, at p. 1223.)  
“Moreover, neither the use of the adjective ‘extreme’ in ‘extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance’ under factor (d), nor the 
absence 
of 
language 
explaining 
that 
these 
identified 
circumstances are mitigating rather than aggravating, renders 
that factor unconstitutionally vague.  Nor does the same 
asserted deficiency invalidate factor (h), regarding impairment 
due to mental disease, defect, or intoxication.”  (Ibid.)  
Defendant’s further claim that “all the remaining factors in 
section 190.3 fail to pass constitutional scrutiny” is too cursory 
to require our discussion of each factor individually.  (See Myles, 
at p. 1223, fn. 16; People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1129.)   
“California’s 
sentencing 
statute 
sets 
forth 
a 
constitutionally adequate burden of proof concerning the 
aggravating factors and the sentencer’s ultimate decision.”  
(Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 198.)  Written findings in 
support of the verdict are not required.  (Id., at p. 199; People v. 
Potts (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1012, 1061 (Potts).)   
“ ‘ “Comparative intercase proportionality review by the 
trial or appellate courts is not constitutionally required.” ’ ”  
(Potts, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 1061.)  A lack of such “review does 
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not deny a defendant the constitutional right to equal 
protection.”  (People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 429.)   
The special circumstances that make an offense a capital 
crime adequately “narrow the class of persons eligible for the 
death penalty.”  (People v. Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 1057; see 
also People v. Stevens, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 211; Lucero, supra, 
23 Cal.4th at p. 740.)  “Prosecutorial discretion to select those 
death-eligible cases in which the death penalty will actually be 
sought is not constitutionally impermissible.”  (People v. 
Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 601; see also People v. Ayala 
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 304.)  “To the extent defendant argues 
that the same incident may not be considered as a special 
circumstance and as an aggravating factor, he is incorrect.”  
(People v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th 214, 254; see also People v. 
Whalen, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 89 [double jeopardy].)   
Finally, “[t]he imposition of the death penalty under 
California’s law does not violate international law or prevailing 
norms of decency.”  (People v. Krebs (2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 351; 
see also, e.g., People v. Rhoades, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 456; 
People v. Johnson (2019) 8 Cal.5th 475, 528; People v. Capers 
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 989, 1017; People v. Molano (2019) 7 Cal.5th 
620, 679.)   
III. DISPOSITION 
The superior court is directed to amend the abstract of 
judgment to reflect the basis for defendant’s convictions on 
counts 7, 10, and 16; and to forward the amended abstract of 
judgment to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.  
The judgment is otherwise affirmed.   
 
 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
97 
 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.  
 
 
We Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
CUÉLLAR, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
HULL, J.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
________________________ 
* Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Third Appellate 
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, 
section 6 of the California Constitution.
 
 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
S170280 
 
Concurring Opinion by Justice Liu 
 
In rejecting defendant’s claims under Batson v. Kentucky 
(1986) 476 U.S. 79 and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 
today’s opinion accords deference to the trial court’s ruling.  
(Maj. opn., ante, at p. 39.)  A trial court is required to make a 
“ ‘sincere and reasoned effort’ ” to assess the prosecutor’s stated 
reasons for striking prospective jurors.  (People v. Gutierrez 
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, 1159.)  Today’s opinion recites our 
precedent that “ ‘[w]hen the trial court has inquired into the 
basis for an excusal, and a nondiscriminatory explanation has 
been provided, we . . . assume the court understands, and 
carries out, its duty to subject the proffered reasons to sincere 
and reasoned analysis, taking into account all the factors that 
bear on their credibility.’ ”  (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 39, quoting 
People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1049, fn. 26 (Mai).) 
I continue to believe the better rule is to require the trial 
court to affirmatively demonstrate on the record that it has 
made a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the prosecutor’s 
explanations for a contested strike.  I see little in the way of 
meaningful appellate review when we assume, in the absence of 
any explicit record of reasoned analysis, that the trial court 
discharged its duty to undertake such analysis.  (See People v. 
Miles (2020) 9 Cal.5th 513, 612 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.) [“[B]ecause 
[the trial court’s] ruling is not accompanied by any reasons or 
analysis, there is nothing to defer to.”]; Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th 
at p. 1060 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.) [“There is no reasoning in the 
PEOPLE v. BAKER 
Liu, J., concurring 
2 
trial court’s statement that ‘no discriminatory intent is inherent 
in the explanations, and the reasons appear to be race 
neutral.’ ”].)  “There is a wide chasm . . . between the absence of 
reasons to conclude that the trial court did not conduct a proper 
Batson analysis and the presence of reasons to conclude that it 
did.”  (Mai, at p. 1061 (conc. opn. of Liu, J.); see People v. 
Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630, 709–717 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.).)   
In this case, the court’s discussion of deference notes that 
“indications in the record support an inference that the trial 
court had in mind the prospective jurors’ demeanor and 
questionnaire answers when it evaluated the prosecutor’s 
strikes of Prospective Jurors R.T. and T.P.”  (Maj. opn., ante, at 
p. 42.)  I would further note that even upon an independent 
review of the record, I would conclude that defendant has not 
shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the prosecutor’s 
reasons for striking R.T. and T.P. were pretextual.  Accordingly, 
defendant’s Batson/Wheeler claims must be rejected. 
 
LIU, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion People v. Baker 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Unpublished Opinion 
Original Appeal XXX 
Original Proceeding   
Review Granted        
Rehearing Granted 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Opinion No. S170280 
Date Filed:  February 1, 2021 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Court:  Superior  
County:  Los Angeles 
Judge:  Susan M. Speer  
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Counsel: 
 
John F. Schuck, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald A. Engler and Lance E. Winters, Chief 
Assistant Attorneys General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Joseph P. Lee, Scott A. 
Taryle and E. Carlos Dominguez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): 
 
John F. Schuck  
Law Offices of John F. Schuck 
885 N. San Antonio Road, Suite A 
Los Altos, Ca 94022 
(650) 383-5325 
 
E. Carlos Dominguez 
Deputy Attorney General 
300 South Spring St., Suite 1702 
Los Angeles, CA 90013 
(213) 269-6120