Case Title: State v. Brian H. Duchow

Citation: 2008 WI 57

Docket Number: 2005AP002175-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2008-06-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
2008 WI 57 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2005AP2175-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Brian Harold Duchow, 
          Defendant-Appellant-Cross Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 303 Wis. 2d 744, 735 N.W.2d 192 
(Ct. App. 2006-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 10, 2008   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 13, 2007   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Milwaukee   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael B. Brennan   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For 
the 
plaintiff-respondent-petitioner 
the 
cause 
was 
argued by David J. Becker, assistant attorney general, with whom 
on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-appellant-cross petitioner there were 
briefs and oral argument by Melinda A. Swartz, assistant state 
public defender. 
 
 
 
 
2008 WI 57
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2005AP2175-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2003CF2648) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Brian Harold Duchow, 
 
          Defendant-Appellant-Cross Petitioner. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 10, 2008 
 
David R. Schanker 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Reversed.   
 
¶1 
PATIENCE 
DRAKE 
ROGGENSACK, 
J.   We 
review 
an 
unpublished court of appeals decision1 reversing a circuit 
court's2 denial of Brian Duchow's (Duchow) motion to suppress 
threatening statements he directed to a disabled child aboard a 
public school bus.  The child, Jacob M., surreptitiously 
recorded 
Duchow's 
statements using a voice-activated tape 
recorder that his parents placed in his backpack.  The circuit 
                                                 
1 State v. Duchow, 2007 WI App 162, 303 Wis. 2d 744, 735 
N.W.2d 192. 
2 The Honorable Michael B. Brennan of Milwaukee County 
presided. 
No. 
2005AP2175-CR   
 
2 
 
court concluded that the tape-recorded statements were not "oral 
communication" as defined by the Electronic Surveillance Control 
Law, Wis. Stat. §§ 968.27-.33 (2005-06),3 and accordingly, the 
strictures of the Law did not operate to prevent use of the 
statements.  In contrast, the court of appeals concluded that 
the statements were oral communication and that the oral 
communication was lawfully intercepted.  However, the court of 
appeals also concluded that, notwithstanding the statements' 
lawful interception, the statements could not be admitted at 
trial because they were not intercepted in accord with the 
"under color of law" requirement of Wis. Stat. § 968.29(3)(b).  
State v. Duchow, 2007 WI App 162, ¶42, 303 Wis. 2d 744, 735 
N.W.2d 192. 
¶2 
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether 
Duchow's tape-recorded statements were "oral communication" as 
defined in Wis. Stat. § 968.27(12), a part of the Electronic 
Surveillance Control Law.  We conclude that the statements were 
not "oral communication" because Duchow had no reasonable 
expectation 
of 
privacy 
in 
the 
statements. 
 
Because 
the 
statements are not "oral communication," they do not fall within 
the scope of the Electronic Surveillance Control Law; and 
therefore, the Electronic Surveillance Control Law provides no 
                                                 
3 All further references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2005-06 version, unless otherwise noted. 
No. 
2005AP2175-CR   
 
3 
 
basis for suppression.4  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
¶3 
Duchow, a former public school bus driver,5 was charged 
in a criminal complaint with one count of physical abuse of a 
child, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.03(2)(b), and one count of 
disorderly conduct, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 947.01, as a result 
of his alleged statements and acts while driving Jacob M. to and 
from school on April 29, 2003.  
¶4 
Jacob, who suffers from Downs Syndrome and Attention 
Deficit Disorder, was nine years old at the time the complaint 
was filed.  Each morning, he was the first child to board the 
school bus driven by Duchow.   
¶5 
In 
the 
spring 
of 
2003, 
Jacob's 
parents 
became 
concerned about recent adverse changes in Jacob's behavior.  
Jacob had allegedly spit at Duchow.6  In addition, Jacob's 
parents had observed him punch his toys, "kick at" the family 
dog and resist boarding the school bus in the morning.  
Moreover, Jacob's teacher relayed to his parents that Jacob had 
                                                 
4 We do not address whether the Electronic Surveillance 
Control Law permits vicarious consent by a parent or whether the 
statements were recorded "under color of law." 
5 Duchow's employer suspended him from duty after the State 
filed the complaint against him.  The circuit court judge 
subsequently ordered that, while the case is pending, Duchow is 
prohibited from driving any bus with children aboard.   
6 Duchow had filed written complaints that Jacob had spit at 
him during bus rides.   
No. 
2005AP2175-CR   
 
4 
 
cried at school when it was time for him to board the bus to go 
home.  Previously, Jacob had not exhibited such behavior. 
¶6 
Jacob's parents suspected something was amiss on the 
school bus.  They feared Jacob's bus driver, whom they knew was 
Duchow, might be verbally or physically abusing him.  As a 
result of their concern, Jacob's parents placed a voice-
activated recorder in Jacob's backpack before he boarded the 
school bus on April 29, 2003.  Jacob's parents listened to the 
tape when Jacob returned home from school that day.  The tape 
recorded Duchow making the following statements to Jacob: 
• "Stop before I beat the living hell out of you." 
• "You'd better get your damn legs in now." 
• "Do I have to tape your mouth shut because you know I 
will." 
• "Do you want another one of these?" 
• "I'm gonna slap the hell out of you." 
• "Do you want me to come back there and smack you?" 
The sound of what Jacob's parents believed to be a slap was also 
recorded. 
¶7 
Jacob's parents played the tape before a Milwaukee 
Police Officer, who investigated the matter.  The officer 
visited Duchow's home and conducted brief interviews with him on 
three occasions.  According to the complaint, during these 
interviews, Duchow admitted that he had threatened Jacob.  
Duchow described the threats he had made as threatening to have 
Jacob removed from the bus, threatening to slap Jacob, and 
No. 
2005AP2175-CR   
 
5 
 
threatening to tape Jacob's mouth shut.  Duchow further admitted 
that on April 29, 2003 he slapped Jacob twice in the face with 
an open hand. 
¶8 
After the State filed the information against Duchow, 
Duchow moved to suppress the contents of the tape recording on 
grounds that the recording was made in violation of the 
Electronic 
Surveillance 
Control 
Law. 
 
The 
circuit 
court 
initially granted Duchow's motion to suppress, but later 
reversed that decision when it revisited the issue as a result 
of the State's motion for reconsideration.  On reconsideration, 
the 
circuit 
court 
concluded 
that 
Duchow's 
tape-recorded 
statements were not "oral communication" within the meaning of 
the Electronic Surveillance Control Law; and therefore, it held 
against Duchow.   
¶9 
Duchow pled guilty to physical abuse of a child and 
the State dismissed the disorderly conduct charge.  Judgment was 
entered convicting Duchow of physical abuse of a child. 
¶10 Duchow appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the 
circuit court's order denying Duchow's motion to suppress his 
tape-recorded statements.  The court of appeals concluded that 
the statements had been lawfully intercepted, but they could not 
be admitted at trial because they were not intercepted "under 
color of law" as Wis. Stat. § 968.29(3)(b) requires.  Duchow, 
303 Wis. 2d 744, ¶42.  The State petitioned for review, which we 
granted.   
No. 
2005AP2175-CR   
 
6 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Standard of Review 
¶11 This case requires us to interpret and to apply 
portions of the Electronic Surveillance Control Law.  We review 
questions 
of 
statutory 
interpretation 
and 
application 
independently, but benefiting from the decisions of the court of 
appeals and the circuit court.  Marder v. Bd. of Regents of the 
Univ. of Wis. Sys., 2005 WI 159, ¶19, 286 Wis. 2d 252, 706 
N.W.2d 110.   
B. 
Oral Communication 
1. 
Wisconsin Stat. § 968.27(12)  
¶12 Resolution of the question of whether Duchow's tape-
recorded statements constitute "oral communication" under the 
facts of this case requires us to interpret and to apply Wis. 
Stat. § 968.27(12), a provision of the Electronic Surveillance 
Control Law.  "[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with the 
language of the statute.  If the meaning of the statute is 
plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.'"  State ex rel. Kalal v. 
Circuit Court for Dane County, 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 
681 N.W.2d 110 (quoting Seider v. O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 
236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659).  If the words of the statute 
exhibit a "plain, clear statutory meaning," without ambiguity, 
the statute is applied according to the plain meaning of the 
statutory terms.  Id., ¶46 (quoting Bruno v. Milwaukee County, 
2003 WI 28, ¶20, 260 Wis. 2d 633, 660 N.W.2d 656).  However, if 
a statute is "capable of being understood by reasonably well-
informed persons in two or more senses[,]" then the statute is 
No. 
2005AP2175-CR   
 
7 
 
ambiguous, and we may consult extrinsic sources to discern its 
meaning.  Id., at ¶¶47-48, 50.   
¶13 We begin our discussion with the plain language of 
Wis. Stat. § 968.27(12), which defines "oral communication": 
"Oral communication" means any oral communication 
uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that the 
communication is not subject to interception under 
circumstances justifying that expectation.  "Oral 
communication" 
does 
not 
include 
any 
electronic 
communication. 
We note that the statute does not include every oral statement, 
but 
rather, it is restricted to those made in certain 
circumstances. 
¶14 The parties offer competing interpretations of Wis. 
Stat. § 968.27(12).  On the one hand, Duchow argues that an 
"oral communication" is a statement uttered under circumstances 
in which the speaker has a reasonable expectation that the 
statement will not be intercepted.  On the other hand, the State 
argues that an "oral communication" is a statement uttered under 
circumstances in which the speaker has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy.  In the context of the Electronic Surveillance 
Control Law, which limits the interception and use of oral 
statements, 
Duchow's 
interpretation 
and 
the 
State's 
interpretation are both reasonable.  When comparing wire 
communication with alleged oral communication, without the 
competing interpretation asserted by Duchow, we have employed 
the State's interpretation that an oral communication is one 
made under circumstances in which the speaker maintains a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.  State v. Smith, 149 
No. 
2005AP2175-CR   
 
8 
 
Wis. 2d 89, 95 n.4, 438 N.W.2d 571 (1989).  Yet, from the face 
of the statute, one could reasonably argue that it is unclear 
whether the legislature intended to codify the "reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy" test.  The statute's ambiguity in this 
respect permits us to consult extrinsic sources.  Kalal, 271 
Wis. 2d 633, ¶¶47-48.   
¶15 Extrinsic sources include legislative history.  Id.  
The drafting records of the Electronic Surveillance Control Law 
state that the law "represents Wisconsin implementation of the 
electronic surveillance portion of [Title III]," the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.7  Drafting File for 
ch. 427, Laws of 1969, Analysis by the Legislative Reference 
Bureau of 1969 A.B. 860, Legislative Reference Bureau, Madison, 
Wis.  Although the legislative history of the Electronic 
Surveillance Control Law is silent on whether the definition of 
"oral communication" was meant to incorporate the speaker's 
"reasonable expectation of privacy," the legislative history of 
Title III provides guidance.  State v. House, 2007 WI 79, ¶14, 
302 Wis. 2d 1, 734 N.W.2d 140 (stating that because the 
Electronic Surveillance Control Law is "patterned after Title 
III[, our] interpretation . . . benefits from the legislative 
history and intent of Title III").  Our interpretation is 
assisted as well by the federal decisions that have considered 
Title III.  State v. Gilmore, 201 Wis. 2d 820, 830, 549 N.W.2d 
                                                 
7 The 
federal 
counterpart 
of 
Wisconsin's 
Electronic 
Surveillance Control Law is found in 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq.  
No. 
2005AP2175-CR   
 
9 
 
401 (1996) (recognizing that in interpreting the Electronic 
Surveillance Control Law, we may look to federal decisions 
interpreting Title III).   
¶16 The legislative history of Title III indicates that 
Congress intended the definition of "oral communication" in 
Title III, which reads nearly identically to the definition 
contained in the Electronic Surveillance Control Law,8 to 
incorporate 
the 
"reasonable 
expectation 
of 
privacy 
test" 
introduced in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
S. Rep. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 
2113, 2153, 2178 ("Title III was drafted to . . . conform with 
Katz . . . .").9  Accordingly, nearly all of the federal circuit 
courts 
that 
have 
considered 
the 
definition 
of 
"oral 
communication" in Title III have concluded that it requires the 
speaker to have a reasonable, as well as a subjective, 
expectation of privacy.  Kee v. City of Rowlett, Texas, 247 F.3d 
206, 211 n.8 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing id.); United States v. 
Longoria, 177 F.3d 1179, 1181 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing same); In 
re John Doe Trader Number One, 894 F.2d 240, 242 (7th Cir. 1990) 
                                                 
8 Title 
III 
defines 
"oral 
communication" 
as 
follows:  
"'[O]ral communication' means any oral communication uttered by 
a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is 
not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such 
expectation, but such term does not include any electronic 
communication[.]"  18 U.S.C. § 2510(2). 
9 Specifically, the legislative history states that the 
definition of oral communication "is intended to reflect 
existing law," and then cites Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 
347 (1967).  S. Rep. No. 90-1097 (1968), reprinted in 1968 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2178.   
No. 
2005AP2175-CR   
 
10 
 
(citing same); United States v. McIntyre, 582 F.2d 1221, 1223 
(9th Cir. 1978) (citing same). 
¶17 Indeed, it appears that only the Sixth,10 Eighth11 and 
Eleventh12 Circuits have interpreted "oral communication" in 
Title III as Duchow urges us to define it, i.e., that the 
speaker 
have 
merely 
a 
reasonable 
expectation 
of 
non-
interception.  However, more recently, the Eighth and Eleventh 
Circuits have modified their views.  For example, although the 
Eighth and Eleventh Circuits once defined "oral communication" 
as involving a reasonable expectation of non-interception in 
Angel v. Williams, 12 F.3d 786, 789-90 (8th Cir. 1993) and in 
Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1579 (11th Cir. 1990), 
respectively, those circuits have more recently eschewed the 
"reasonable-expectation-of-non-interception" standard in favor 
the "reasonable-expectation-of-privacy" standard that a majority 
of the federal circuit courts employ.  United States v. Peoples, 
250 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. McKinnon, 985 
F.2d 525 (11th Cir. 1993).13  
                                                 
10 Boddie v. Am. Broad. Cos., 731 F.2d 333, 339 (6th Cir. 
1984). 
11 Angel v. Williams, 12 F.3d 786, 789-90 (8th Cir. 1993). 
12 Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1579 (11th Cir. 1990). 
13 Neither United States v. Peoples, 250 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 
2001) nor United States v. McKinnon, 985 F.2d 525 (11th Cir. 
1993) explains the shift in analysis or the difference between 
the two standards.   
No. 
2005AP2175-CR   
 
11 
 
¶18 We employed reasoning from federal decisions in the 
past in interpreting the Electronic Surveillance Control Law.  
In Smith, 149 Wis. 2d at 95 n.4, we relied on federal law in 
deciding that the term, "oral communication," in Wis. Stat. 
§ 968.27(12) is to be understood as applying to those statements 
made only under circumstances in which the speaker has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy (concluding that § 968.27(12) 
is a "particularized statutory codification of the [F]ourth 
[A]mendment right.").14  In Smith, we held that the communication 
at issue, a cordless telephone conversation, did not constitute 
                                                 
14 Later in State v. Smith, 149 Wis. 2d 89, 438 N.W.2d 571 
(1989), we explained that in order to protect a telephone 
conversation from interception, the expectation of privacy in 
the conversation must be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment 
standards set out in Katz.  Smith, 149 Wis. 2d at 104.  Katz 
held that communications receive Fourth Amendment protection 
when the speaker has an expectation of privacy that society is 
willing to recognize as reasonable.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 
(Harlan, J., concurring).   
We rely on Katz as authority for our decisions relating to 
Wisconsin law.  In Katz, the United States Supreme Court applied 
the 
protections 
of 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
to 
intercepted 
communications.  Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.  Because the Fourth 
Amendment and the Wisconsin Constitution's analogous provision, 
Article I § 11, contain nearly identical language (see infra, 
notes 16 and 17), we generally interpret Article I § 11 of the 
state 
constitution 
in 
accord 
with 
the 
Supreme 
Court's 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.  See, e.g., State v. 
Guzman, 166 Wis. 2d 577, 586-87, 480 N.W.2d 446 (1992) ("We have 
consistently and routinely conformed the law of search and 
seizure under the Wisconsin Constitution to the law developed by 
the United States Supreme Court under the Fourth Amendment.").  
We also did so in Smith, citing the reasoning in Katz as support 
for our decision that an expectation of privacy must be 
reasonable in order to receive protection under the Wisconsin 
Constitution.  Smith, 149 Wis. 2d at 95 n.4.  
No. 
2005AP2175-CR   
 
12 
 
an 
"oral 
communication" 
as 
defined 
by 
the 
Electronic 
Surveillance Control Law because "objectively there could be no 
reasonable expectation of privacy" in the speech.  Id. at 105 
(emphasis added).  
¶19 The legislative history of the Electronic Surveillance 
Control Law expressly states that the legislature intended the 
Electronic 
Surveillance 
Control 
Law 
to 
effect 
the 
state 
"implementation" of Title III.  The Electronic Surveillance 
Control Law and Title III define "oral communication" using 
nearly identical language, which Congress intended to "reflect" 
the law as set out in Katz.  Katz explained the "reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy" standard.  We also explained in Smith 
that the Electronic Surveillance Control Law incorporated the 
Katz standard of reasonableness into the definition of "oral 
communication."  Smith, 149 Wis. 2d at 95 n.4.  Furthermore, 
Smith is consistent with six out of seven federal circuit courts 
that have addressed the meaning of "oral communication" in Title 
III.  Accordingly, we follow the overwhelming abundance of 
federal case law that interprets "oral communication" to 
incorporate a reasonable expectation of privacy, and we conclude 
that, in enacting Wis. Stat. § 968.27(12), the legislature did 
incorporate a reasonable expectation of privacy into the meaning 
of "oral communication."  
2. 
Reasonable expectation of privacy 
¶20 An individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy 
when he or she has both (1) an actual subjective expectation of 
privacy in the speech, and (2) a subjective expectation that is 
No. 
2005AP2175-CR   
 
13 
 
one that society is willing to recognize as reasonable.  State 
v. Bruski, 2007 WI 25, ¶23, 299 Wis. 2d 177, 727 N.W.2d 503; 
accord Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000); Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 
(Harlan, J., concurring).  Because the parties agree that Duchow 
has exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy in his speech 
to Jacob, we focus on whether Duchow's expectation is one 
society is willing to recognize as reasonable. 
¶21 This second component reflects that protections from 
unreasonable searches and seizures, as described in the Fourth 
Amendment of the federal constitution15 as well as Article I, 
§ 11 of the state constitution,16 must be determined by reference 
to the "'scope of privacy that a free people legitimately may 
expect.'"  State v. Whitrock, 161 Wis. 2d 960, 973, 468 N.W.2d 
696 (1991) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 151 
                                                 
15 The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides:  
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects, 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
16 Article I, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides:   
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable 
cause, 
supported 
by 
oath 
or 
affirmation, 
and 
particularly describing the place to be searched and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
No. 
2005AP2175-CR   
 
14 
 
(1978)). 
 
"A 
reasonable 
expectation 
is 
one 
[that] 
is 
constitutionally 'justifiable.'"  Id. at 974 (citation omitted).  
No single factor is determinative in resolving whether one has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy; rather, we investigate the 
totality of the circumstances to resolve the question.  Id. at 
973-74. 
¶22 Recognizing that the law requires an examination of 
the totality of the circumstances in determining whether an 
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, courts have 
identified a non-exclusive list of factors to discern whether an 
individual's 
expectation 
of 
privacy 
in 
his 
or 
her 
oral 
statements is objectively reasonable.  The factors include the 
following:  (1) the volume of the statements; (2) the proximity 
of other individuals to the speaker, or the potential for others 
to 
overhear 
the 
speaker; 
(3) 
the 
potential 
for 
the 
communications to be reported;17 (4) the actions taken by the 
speaker to ensure his or her privacy; (5) the need to employ 
technological enhancements for one to hear the speaker's 
                                                 
17 See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751 (1971) 
(concluding that the speaker assumes the risk that the hearer 
will relay his statements when there is reason to relay them); 
United States v. Longoria, 177 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) 
("[T]he Fourth Amendment offers no protection for 'a wrongdoer's 
misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides 
his wrongdoing will not reveal it.'"). 
No. 
2005AP2175-CR   
 
15 
 
statements; and (6) the place or location where the statements 
are made.18  See, e.g., Kee, 247 F.3d at 213-15. 
¶23 Duchow 
advances 
five 
arguments 
to 
support 
his 
contention that his subjective expectation that his statements 
would not be revealed is objectively reasonable.  First, he 
asserts that it is uncommon for school bus riders to carry a 
tape recorder in their backpacks.  Second, Duchow points out 
that he and Jacob were the only individuals on the bus.  Third, 
Duchow made the statements in an enclosed vehicle, rather than 
in a public place.  Fourth, Duchow claims that the volume at 
which he delivered the statements was sufficiently low that a 
                                                 
18 We forgo applying the factors we most recently cited in 
State v. Bruski, 2007 WI 25, 299 Wis. 2d 177, 727 N.W.2d 503, 
for determining whether an individual's expectation of privacy 
is reasonable.  We do so because the Bruski factors apply to 
assertions of a privacy interest that were taken from the 
context of an expectation of privacy in real property.  State v. 
Fillyaw, 104 Wis. 2d 700, 711-12 n.6, 312 N.W.2d 795 (1981).  
Bruski then applied them to personal property, i.e., a vehicle 
in which Bruski had no property interest and in which he took no 
precautions to protect his privacy.  Bruski, 299 Wis. 2d 177, 
¶¶27-28.  Accordingly, the Bruski factors are less helpful in 
cases such as this one where the assertion of a privacy interest 
is made in connection with oral statements.  For example, the 
factors we listed in Bruski are the following:  (1) whether the 
individual had a property interest in the premises; (2) whether 
the individual was lawfully on the premises; (3) whether the 
individual had complete dominion or control over the premises 
and therefore retained the right to exclude others; (4) whether 
the individual took precautions ordinarily taken by one seeking 
privacy; (5) whether the property was put to private use; and 
(6) whether the claim of privacy is consistent with historical 
notions of privacy.  Id., ¶24.  While these factors may be 
instructive, we conclude that their focus on criteria relating 
to property renders them not directly applicable in evaluating 
whether an individual has an expectation of privacy in oral 
statements.  
No. 
2005AP2175-CR   
 
16 
 
third party outside of the bus could not overhear them.  
Finally, he argues that this court's acceptance of the State's 
contention that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in 
statements made to a victim during a crime would be tantamount 
to a ruling that all intercepted communications during the 
commission of a crime may be recorded without compliance with 
the Electronic Surveillance Control Law.  We conclude that 
Duchow's arguments are discordant with what society is willing 
to recognize as reasonable.   
¶24 In so concluding, we apply certain factors among those 
listed above.  The factors we have selected are neither an 
exclusive, nor a mandatory, list.  The relevant factors will 
vary, depending on the facts each case presents.  Here, we 
conclude that the place or location where the statements were 
made and the potential for the statements to be reported are the 
most significant factors.19   
                                                 
19 In identifying these two factors as most relevant, we do 
not diminish the importance of the remaining factors in other 
contexts.  However, they are of less relative importance under 
the facts presented here.  Nonetheless, many of these factors 
cut against Duchow.   
First, the volume of Duchow's statements is relatively less 
important because Duchow and Jacob were the only individuals on 
the school bus when Duchow made the statements at issue.  
Although there is no evidence that others were present to 
overhear Duchow's statements, Duchow may fairly be said to have 
shouted at Jacob.  
Second, the record does not indicate that Duchow took any 
specific measures to ensure that his statements remained 
private. 
No. 
2005AP2175-CR   
 
17 
 
¶25 We begin by considering the place where Duchow spoke.  
Duchow and Jacob were on a public school bus being operated to 
transport children to school.  Duchow was an employee of the 
school district and Jacob was a grade school pupil.  Courts have 
held that an individual-employee's expectation of privacy is 
diminished in places that the individual shares with others, as 
compared with places retained for his or her exclusive use.  
Plock v. Bd. of Educ. of Freeport Sch. Dist. No. 145, No. 
07 C 50060, 2007 WL 4553071 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2007);20 see 
also, State v. McLellan, 744 A.2d 611 (N.H. 1999) (holding that 
school janitor did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in public school classroom, as it was open to students and staff 
and was not his "personal space").   
                                                                                                                                                             
Finally, although an electronic device recorded Duchow's 
statements, 
nothing 
in 
the 
record 
indicates 
that 
any 
"technological enhancements" were needed to do so.   
20 Plock v. Bd. of Educ. of Freeport Sch. Dist. No. 145, No. 
07 C 50060, 2007 WL 4553071 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 2007), is an 
unpublished opinion from the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois.  That court adheres to the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, permitting citation to 
unpublished opinions.  Fed. R. App. P. 32.1.  
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 32.1 provides in 
relevant part: 
(a) Citation Permitted. A court may not prohibit or 
restrict the citation of federal judicial opinions, orders, 
judgments, or other written dispositions that have been: 
(i) 
designated 
as 
"unpublished," 
"not 
for 
publication," "non-precedential," "not precedent," or the 
like; and 
(ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007. 
No. 
2005AP2175-CR   
 
18 
 
¶26 In Plock, a group of teachers filed suit against their 
school district after the district proposed installing audio and 
video 
recording 
equipment 
in 
classrooms 
as 
a 
result 
of 
allegations that students were being abused.  Plock, 2007 WL 
4553071, at *1.  The court held that the teachers did not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their classrooms.  Id. at 
*3.  It reasoned as follows: 
A classroom in a public school is not the private 
property of any teacher.  A classroom is a public 
space in which government employees communicate with 
members of the public.  There is nothing private about 
communications which take place in such a setting.  
Any expectations of privacy concerning communications 
taking place in . . . classrooms such as those subject 
to the proposed audio monitoring in this case are 
inherently unreasonable and beyond the protection of 
the Fourth Amendment. 
Id. 
¶27 School bus drivers endure a similarly diminished 
expectation of privacy inside the school buses they operate.  
Goodwin v. Moyer, No. 3:CV-05-781, 2006 WL 839342 (M.D. Pa. 
Mar. 29, 2006).21  In Goodwin, a school bus driver sued various 
school district officials, claiming that the installation of a 
video camera on his school bus invaded his privacy.  Id. at *1-
                                                 
21 Goodwin v. Moyer, No. 3:CV-05-781, 2006 WL 839342 (M.D. 
Pa. Mar. 29, 2006), is an unpublished opinion of the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  
The court rules for that district had not prohibited citation to 
unpublished opinions issued prior to January 1, 2007.  The court 
now adheres to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, which 
prohibits the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit from forbidding citation to unpublished opinions issued 
on or after January 1, 2007.  Fed. R. App. P. 32.1. 
No. 
2005AP2175-CR   
 
19 
 
2.  The court held that the presence of a video camera did not 
violate the bus driver's reasonable expectation of privacy.  Id. 
at *9.  In so holding, the court reasoned that society, as well 
as the government, retains an interest in ensuring that the 
children and the bus driver alike are protected from "misdeeds" 
against each other.  Id.  In addition, the camera presented a 
minor intrusion because a school bus is not a private space; 
rather, it is a "public conveyance" in which the bus driver is 
"surrounded by others and in view of the public through the 
bus's windows."  Id.   
¶28 We are persuaded by the reasoning of Plock and 
Goodwin:  (1) The bus Duchow operated was not his personal 
space; nor did it become his personal property because he 
operated it; (2) the bus was being operated to convey public 
school students when the statements were made; (3) Jacob was a 
public school student; and (4) the bus had windows through which 
Duchow and Jacob could be seen.   
¶29 The totality of the circumstances here includes more 
than a public place; it also includes statements that are likely 
to be reported because they are threats to injure the person to 
whom the statement was made.   
¶30 A person's reasonable expectation of privacy is 
compromised when he or she knowingly exposes statements to 
others, rather than keeping them to himself or herself.  
Longoria, 177 F.3d at 1182 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 
(Harlan, J., concurring)).  Moreover, a subjective expectation 
of privacy is not reasonable when the words spoken are ones the 
No. 
2005AP2175-CR   
 
20 
 
hearer is likely to report, such as threats to injure the person 
to whom the statement was made.  Id. at 1183; see also, United 
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) ("Inescapably, one 
contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk that his 
companions may be reporting to the police.") 
¶31 In Longoria, federal agents sought to thwart a drug 
smuggling operation by outfitting a tire shop, from which drugs 
were allegedly transported, with audio and video surveillance 
equipment.  Longoria, 177 F.3d at 1181.  The tire shop's owner 
acted as the government's informant, and he saw to it that 
Longoria's statements were recorded.  Id.  Based on the 
recordings, Longoria was indicted on multiple drug counts.  Id. 
¶32 The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's denial 
of Longoria's motion to suppress.  Id. at 1182.  It concluded 
that Longoria had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
conversations.  It reasoned that Longoria voluntarily entered 
the tire shop and "knowingly made incriminating statements in 
the informant's presence" because he assumed the informant could 
not understand Spanish, the language in which he was speaking.  
Id. at 1183.  The court concluded that Longoria had "no 
reasonable expectation that the person in whose presence he 
conduct[ed] conversations [would] not reveal those conversations 
to others[,]" simply because the informant did not speak 
Spanish.  Therefore, the court concluded that Longoria "assumed 
the risk that the informant would reveal his incriminating 
statements to law enforcement," and in assuming that risk, he 
No. 
2005AP2175-CR   
 
21 
 
relinquished any reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
speech.  Id.   
¶33 Longoria's reasoning applies to the circumstances 
here.  Duchow's threats to harm Jacob, a person who could not 
personally repeat the words Duchow said, are analogous to 
Longoria's incriminating statements made in the presence of the 
informant, a person who could not repeat the statements in 
English that Longoria had made in Spanish.  Duchow's threat to 
harm Jacob, such as his threat to slap Jacob's face, was the 
type of statement that is likely to be reported to others.  
Duchow had no right to prevent Jacob from telling others what 
Duchow said or did.  And in his own way, Jacob did tell.  He 
told his parents when he began acting in an aggressive, angry 
fashion with his toys and his dog, and he told his school 
teacher when he cried when it was time for him to ride the 
school bus home.22  See id. at 1183.  By telling Jacob that he 
                                                 
22 Duchow cannot circumvent our conclusion that his threats 
to Jacob that he would harm him were likely to be reported by 
presuming that Jacob would not report them to anyone because 
Jacob is a mentally disabled child with a significant speech 
impairment.  Statements are "knowingly exposed" even when the 
speaker harbors doubts about the hearer's comprehension and 
ability to repeat them.  Longoria, 177 F.3d at 1183.  Longoria 
held that the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his statements because he spoke in Spanish and 
believed that the informant did not understand Spanish: 
[W]e find no precedent recognizing expectations of 
privacy based on a listener's ability to comprehend a 
foreign 
language 
and 
decline 
to 
find 
such 
an 
expectation in this case  . . . .  [C]omprehension is 
a malleable concept not easily measured by either the 
defendant or the court.  Attempting to delineate a 
No. 
2005AP2175-CR   
 
22 
 
would harm him, Duchow, like Longoria, assumed the risk that his 
threatening statements would be revealed to others. 
¶34 Moreover, 
preservation of a privacy interest in 
threats to harm the person to whom the threat is made is not 
what "free people legitimately may expect."  Whitrock, 161 
Wis. 2d at 973.  To the contrary, those types of threats to harm 
are precisely the type of statements that one would reasonably 
expect to be reported. 
¶35 State v. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d 1272, 1275 (Fla. 
1985), further supports our conclusion that individuals do not 
retain an expectation of privacy in threats to harm the person 
to whom the threat is made.  In Inciarrano, the Florida Supreme 
Court held that a conversation and an ensuing homicide by 
gunshot, which were tape-recorded by the victim, did not 
constitute an "oral communication" under a statutory definition 
nearly identical to Wisconsin's.23  Id. at 1275-76.  The court 
concluded that, because "Inciarrano went to the victim's office 
with intent to do him harm," Inciarrano was a trespasser who had 
                                                                                                                                                             
standard based on subjective evaluations of linguistic 
capabilities would be unworkable to say the least.  
Id. 
23 At the time State v. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 
1985), was issued, Florida statutes defined "oral communication" 
as follows:  "'Oral communication' means any oral communication 
uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such 
communication is not subject to interception under circumstances 
justifying such expectation and does not mean any public oral 
communication uttered at a public meeting."  Id. at 1275 
(quoting Fla. Stat. § 934.02(2) (1981) and adding emphasis). 
No. 
2005AP2175-CR   
 
23 
 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in regard to the statements 
he made on the premises.  Id. at 1275.   
¶36 While Inciarrano may be interpreted to hold that an 
individual's expectation of privacy hinges to some extent on his 
or her right to be on a premises, it may also reasonably be 
interpreted to hold that an individual does not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in statements that evince an 
intent to harm the person to whom the statement was made.  
Either interpretation, however, is consistent with the notion 
that individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in statements to others that are likely to be reported.  
Accordingly, the Florida Supreme Court concluded that the 
recorded conversation did not constitute "oral communication" 
within the meaning of Florida statutes.  Id. at 1275-76.  Stated 
otherwise, Inciarrano assumed the risk that his victim was 
recording 
their 
encounter 
for 
relay 
to 
police, 
thereby 
extinguishing any reasonable expectation of privacy in what he 
said.  White, 401 U.S. at 752-53. 
¶37 Our review of the totality of the circumstances 
presented here leads us to conclude that Duchow had no 
reasonable expectation in the privacy of his threats and abuse 
of Jacob on the school bus.  The school bus was public property, 
being operated for a public purpose.  The statements Duchow 
seeks to protect were threats directed at a child while the 
child 
was 
being 
transported 
to 
school. 
 
Because 
Duchow 
threatened Jacob, Duchow engaged in speech that was likely to be 
reported.  Duchow assumed the risk of disclosure.  Accordingly, 
No. 
2005AP2175-CR   
 
24 
 
we conclude that Duchow's abusive speech had no reasonable 
expectation of privacy attendant to it.  Therefore, his threats 
to Jacob are not "oral communication" within the meaning of Wis. 
Stat. § 968.27(12).   
¶38 Duchow's argument that he and Jacob were the only 
individuals on the bus is of no consequence.  As the court in 
Plock explained, "There is nothing private about communications 
[that] take place in [] a [public] setting."  Plock, 2007 WL 
4553071, at *3.   
¶39 Duchow's arguments that bus riders rarely carry tape 
recorders in their backpacks and that he did not speak in an 
overly loud voice are also unavailing.  Duchow never was vested 
with exclusive control of the school bus he drove, which cuts 
against his having any reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
passenger area of the bus.  Id. at *1.  Moreover, the presence 
of a recording device on a bus is a minor intrusion on a driver, 
because society retains a significant interest in ensuring the 
safety of those traveling on public school buses.  See Goodwin, 
2006 WL 839342, at *9. 
¶40 In sum, because Duchow's statements were made on a 
public school bus, being used for the public purpose of 
transporting school children; because they were threats to harm 
Jacob for which Duchow assumed the risk that Jacob would report, 
Duchow 
had 
no 
reasonable 
expectation 
of 
privacy 
in 
his 
statements.  Accordingly, his statements do not constitute "oral 
communication" as defined by the Electronic Surveillance Control 
No. 
2005AP2175-CR   
 
25 
 
Law; and therefore, the Electronic Surveillance Control Law 
provides no basis for suppression. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
¶41 The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether 
Duchow's tape-recorded statements were "oral communication" as 
defined in Wis. Stat. § 968.27(12), a part of the Electronic 
Surveillance Control Law.  We conclude that the statements were 
not "oral communication" because Duchow had no reasonable 
expectation 
of 
privacy 
in 
the 
statements. 
 
Because 
the 
statements are not "oral communication," they do not fall within 
the scope of the Electronic Surveillance Control Law; and 
therefore, the Electronic Surveillance Control Law provides no 
basis for suppression.  Accordingly, we reverse the decision of 
the court of appeals.   
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
reversed. 
 
No. 
2005AP2175-CR   
 
 
 
1