Case Title: State v. Tory M. Meyer

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1996AP002243-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1998-03-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-2243-CR 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
Tory M. Meyer,  
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
 
 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at:   (No Cite) 
 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
March 20, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
December 15, 1997 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Sheboygan 
 
JUDGE: 
Gary Langhoff 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
BABLITCH, J., (opinion filed) 
 
 
STEINMETZ and WILCOX, J.J., joins 
 
 
 
GESKE, J., (opinion filed) 
 
 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., BRADLEY and CROOKS, J.J., 
 
 
joins 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner the cause 
was argued by Stephen W. Kleinmaier, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
 
 
For the defendant-appellant there was a brief by 
Richard B. Hahn and Holden & Hahn, S.C., Sheboygan and oral 
argument by Richard B. Hahn. 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by Nicholas L. Chiarkas, 
state public defender, Madison and William J. Tyroler, first 
assistant state public defender, Milwaukee for the State Public 
Defender. 
 
 
Amicus curiae was filed by David R. Karpe, 
Madison for the Wisconsin Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers. 
 
No. 96-2243-CR 
 
1 
  
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
No. 96-2243-CR  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner, 
   
     v. 
 
Tory M. Meyer,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant.  
 
FILED 
 
MAR 20, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Modified and 
affirmed and, as modified, cause remanded. 
¶1 
N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.   The State of Wisconsin 
("State") seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court 
of appeals1 reversing the conviction of Tory M. Meyer ("Meyer") 
for possession of tetrahydrocannabinols ("THC") with the intent 
to deliver, as a party to a crime, contrary to Wis. Stat. 
§§ 939.05 and 161.41(1m)(h)2.2  The Sheboygan County Circuit 
Court, Honorable Gary Langhoff presiding, denied Meyer's motion 
to 
suppress 
evidence 
seized 
during 
the 
execution 
of 
an 
                     
1 State v. Meyer, No. 96-2243-CR, unpublished slip op. (Wis. 
Ct. App. May 28, 1997). 
2 All future references to the Wisconsin Statutes will be to 
the 1993-94 volumes unless otherwise noted. 
No. 96-2243-CR 
 
2 
anticipatory search warrant.3  The circuit court also determined 
that 
the 
officers' 
act 
of 
dispensing 
with 
the rule of 
announcement in executing the warrant was reasonable.   Meyer 
was convicted of possession of THC with the intent to deliver, 
as a party to a crime.  On appeal the court of appeals reversed 
the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case, concluding 
the no-knock entry during the execution of the search warrant 
was in violation of Meyer's rights under the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. 
¶2 
We conclude that the anticipatory search warrant is 
constitutional because it is supported by probable cause.  We 
further conclude that the warrant is not unconstitutional merely 
because it lacks explicit conditional language stating that the 
warrant may not be executed until delivery of the contraband is 
made to the premises to be searched.  Finally, we conclude that 
under Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 1416 
(1997), an officer may dispense with the rule of announcement4 
                     
3 An anticipatory warrant is "a warrant based upon an 
affidavit showing probable cause that at some future time (but 
not presently) certain evidence of crime will be located at a 
specified place."  2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure 
§ 3.7(c), at 362 (3d ed. 1996). 
4 The rule of announcement, also known as the "knock and 
announce" rule, "requires the police to do three things before 
forcibly entering a home to execute a search warrant: 1) 
announce their identity; 2) announce their purpose; and 3) wait 
for 
either 
the 
occupants 
to 
refuse 
their 
admittance 
or . . . allow the occupants time to open the door."  State v. 
Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 423, 511 N.W.2d 591 (1994).  The rule 
serves three purposes:  1) protecting the safety of police 
officers and others; 2) protecting the limited privacy interests 
of the occupants of the premises to be searched; and 3) 
preventing the physical destruction of property.  See State v. 
Williams, 168 Wis. 2d 970, 981-82, 485 N.W.2d 42 (1992), 
overruled on other grounds, Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d at 430. 
No. 96-2243-CR 
 
3 
when executing a search warrant if the officer has a reasonable 
suspicion, based upon the particular facts of a given case and 
the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, that knocking and 
announcing the officer's presence would be dangerous or futile 
or 
inhibit 
the 
effective 
investigation 
of 
the 
crime.  
Furthermore, in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, 
an officer's training and prior experience in similar situations 
may be considered in combination with the particular facts.  
Accordingly, we remand the case to the circuit court for a 
determination  whether, in consideration of the particular facts 
presented in this case, the officers had a reasonable suspicion 
that exigent circumstances existed to justify their no-knock 
entry. 
                                                                  
The rule of announcement is long-established: 
In the 15th century, it was recorded that the sheriff 
could not break the door of a man's home to arrest 
him.  The [federal] common law, however, did recognize 
the right of police officers to break the doors to 
arrest for a felony.  Although the authorities 
differed somewhat as to what circumstances justified 
the breaking of doors, they universally required that 
the officer demand entry and announce his purposeand 
be refused entrybefore he could break in. 
 
Patrick Crooks, Recent Decision, Federal Rules of Criminal 
ProcedureArrestState Law Governs Propriety of Arrest Made 
Under Federal Warrant Where Federal Rules Are Silent, 36 Notre 
Dame Lawyer 432, 432 (1961).  American courts have recognized 
the rule of announcement as a common law requirement as early as 
1813.  See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure §4.8(a), at 598 
(3d ed. 1996) (citing Bell v. Clapp, 10 Johns. 263 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 
1813)).  Recently, the United States Supreme Court determined 
that 
the 
rule 
of 
announcement 
is 
also 
a 
constitutional 
requirement, holding that "this common law 'knock and announce' 
principle forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the 
Fourth Amendment."  Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 929 
(1995). 
No. 96-2243-CR 
 
4 
I. 
¶3 
The facts are undisputed for purposes of our review.  
On November 17, 1995, Sheboygan County Sheriff's Detective 
Alonna Koenig ("Koenig") applied for a warrant to search the 
premises located at 1033 St. Clair Avenue in the city of 
Sheboygan.  In the affidavit supporting the warrant, Koenig 
stated the following:   
¶4 
Koenig had received information from United States 
Postal Inspector Dan Kakonis ("Kakonis") regarding a package 
Kakonis had intercepted which he believed to contain controlled 
substances.  Kakonis, who had eight years of experience working 
as a postal inspector, had worked with Koenig on prior occasions 
and provided her information which subsequently led to the 
interception of packages containing controlled substances and 
related paraphernalia.  Pursuant to his training and personal 
experience, Kakonis had informed Koenig that packages containing 
controlled 
substances 
often 
contain 
handwritten 
labels, 
incorrect or fictitious names or addresses, a perfumed odor to 
disguise any pungent odor from the controlled substance, that 
such packages are often sent via Express Mail, and that the 
source of the packages is  often a state from which controlled 
substances are generally shipped, such as California. 
 ¶5 Koenig further stated that on November 16, 1995, at 
the Post Office in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Kakonis profiled a 
package being sent Express Mail to a Tory "Mayor" at 1033 St. 
Clair Avenue, Sheboygan, Wisconsin.  A mail carrier for that 
route informed Kakonis that there was an individual by the name 
of Tory Meyer residing at 1033 St. Clair Avenue.  The return 
No. 96-2243-CR 
 
5 
address indicated the package was en route from California.  
Kakonis intercepted the package and brought it to the Sheboygan 
County Sheriff's Department.  On November 17, 1995, a K-9 Unit 
(i.e., canine) from the Sheboygan County Sheriff's drug unit 
located the package from among other similar shaped and sized 
packages by scratching and biting at the package, indicating 
that the trained dog detected controlled substances in the 
package.  Based upon this information, Koenig stated she 
believed that there would be "illegal controlled substances" 
located at 1033 St. Clair Avenue in Sheboygan, including cocaine 
and/or marijuana, and possibly related drug paraphernalia, 
including 
identifiers, 
drug 
ledgers, 
packaging 
materials, 
scales, and items used to ingest drugs. 
¶6 
Sheboygan County Circuit Court Commissioner Terence T. 
Bourke issued a search warrant at 1:30 p.m. on November 17, 
1995, finding probable cause to believe that there were 
controlled substances "now located and concealed in and upon" 
the premises occupied by Tory Meyer at 1033 St. Clair Avenue, 
Sheboygan.  The warrant authorized a search for controlled 
substances, drug  ledgers or records, packaging materials, 
identifiers, scales, and items used for the consumption of 
illegal drugs. 
¶7 
Koenig 
delivered 
the 
intercepted 
package 
to 
an 
individual identifying himself as Tory Meyer at 1033 St. Clair 
Avenue on November 17, 1995, at approximately 2:20 p.m.  Ten 
minutes later the drug enforcement unit executed the search 
warrant.  The police knocked on the door and then broke the door 
in with a battering ram.  The officers announced their presence 
No. 96-2243-CR 
 
6 
while crossing the threshold of the premises.  The officers  
searched the premises and found marijuana and other drug-related 
paraphernalia.  As a result of the evidence seized, the State 
charged Meyer with possession of THC with the intent to deliver, 
as a party to a crime, contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 939.05 and 
161.41(1m)(h)2, and possession of a Schedule I5 controlled 
substance without a tax stamp, as a party to a crime, contrary 
to Wis. Stat. §§ 939.05 and 139.95(1) and (2). 
¶8 
Meyer brought a motion to suppress the evidence seized 
during the execution of the warrant, asserting violations of his 
rights as guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution6 and Article I, § 11 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution.7 First, Meyer argued that the warrant was an 
                     
5 THC is a Schedule I controlled substance under Wis. Stat. 
§ 161.14(4)(t). 
6 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants 
shall 
issue, 
but 
upon 
probable 
cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
 
7 Article 1, § 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, 
papers, 
and 
effects 
against 
unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported 
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
 
No. 96-2243-CR 
 
7 
unconstitutional anticipatory or conditional warrant as it was 
not supported by probable cause.  Second, Meyer argued that the 
police entry was unconstitutional because the police did not 
knock and announce their presence, and that there was no 
probable cause for the police to dispense with the knock and 
announce requirement.  Third, Meyer argued that the detention of 
his mail was illegal and, therefore, the search warrant based 
upon that detention was illegal.8   
¶9 
The circuit court denied Meyer's motion to suppress. 
The circuit court found that the postal inspector had a 
reasonable suspicion to detain the package and that the length 
of detention under the circumstances was reasonable.  The court 
also found that there was a substantial basis for determining 
that probable cause existed to issue the search warrant.   The 
                                                                  
We limit our decision to an analysis of Meyer's rights 
under the federal constitution as this court has "consistently 
and routinely conformed the law of search and seizure under the 
Wisconsin Constitution to the law developed by the United States 
Supreme Court under the Fourth Amendment."  State v. Richards, 
201 Wis. 2d 845, 850-51, 549 N.W.2d 218 (1996) (citations 
omitted), aff'd 520 U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 1416 (1997). 
8 Meyer also brought a motion to dismiss Count II of the 
information, charging him with possession of a Schedule I 
controlled substance without a tax stamp, as a party to a crime, 
contrary to Wis. Stat. §§ 939.05 and 139.95(1) and (2).  The 
circuit court denied this motion to dismiss.  Meyer does not 
raise the issue on appeal since the charge was later dismissed 
on motion of the State.  
We note that in State v. Hall, 207 Wis. 2d 54, 67, 557 
N.W.2d 778 (1997), this court struck down the stamp law 
requiring dealers to purchase tax stamps for illegal drugs in 
their possession, concluding it unconstitutionally compelled 
self-incrimination.   
 
 
No. 96-2243-CR 
 
8 
circuit court determined that the warrant was not "technically 
an anticipatory search warrant," and did not specifically 
address Meyer's assertion that the warrant lacked the requisite 
conditional language.  However, without correction from the 
court, defense counsel clarified his understanding that the 
circuit court was denying Meyer's argument that the lack of 
conditional language rendered the warrant unconstitutional.   
The circuit court further determined that the police were 
justified in making the no-knock entry.    
¶10 Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement Meyer agreed 
to plead no contest to the charge of possession of THC with 
intent to deliver, as a party to a crime, and the State agreed 
to 
move 
to 
dismiss 
the 
charge 
of 
possessing 
controlled 
substances without a tax stamp, as a party to a crime.  Based on 
this plea, the circuit court found Meyer guilty of possession of 
THC with the intent to deliver, as a party to a crime, contrary 
to Wis. Stat. §§ 939.05 and 161.41(1m)(h)2.  Meyer appealed. 
¶11 The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the 
circuit court and remanded the case.  The court of appeals 
recognized that the "blanket rule," allowing officers to 
dispense with the rule of announcement in cases involving felony 
drug investigations, set forth by this court in State v. Stevens9 
and reaffirmed in State v. Richards ("Richards I")10 had been 
rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Richards v. 
Wisconsin ("Richards II").11  The court of appeals concluded that 
                     
9 181 Wis. 2d 410, 423, 511 N.W.2d 591 (1994). 
10 201 Wis. 2d  845, 848, 549 N.W.2d 218 (1996). 
11 117 S. Ct. at 1421. 
No. 96-2243-CR 
 
9 
the execution of the search warrant was in violation of Meyer's 
rights 
under 
the 
Fourth 
Amendment 
to 
the 
United 
States 
Constitution pursuant to Richards II.  The court of appeals 
rejected the State's reliance on Segura v. United States, 468 
U.S. 796 (1984) to support its argument that regardless of the 
constitutionality of the entry, the evidence need not be 
suppressed because it was obtained in accordance with a valid 
search warrant issued by a neutral and detached commissioner.  
The court distinguished Segura, noting that the disposition in 
Segura was "carefully limited" to the facts presented in that 
case.  The court of appeals also rejected the State's argument 
that the court should adopt a good faith exception to the 
exclusionary rule12 in this instance.  The court of appeals 
declined the invitation, stating that it "is a function of our 
supreme court" to adopt an exception to the exclusionary rule.13 
II. 
 
¶12 Before addressing the State's assertion that the no-
knock entry was constitutional, we first consider Meyer's 
arguments that the warrant is unconstitutional because it (1) is 
not supported by probable cause; and (2) does not contain 
sufficient 
conditional 
language 
as 
is 
required 
in 
an 
                     
12 Under the exclusionary rule, evidence will be suppressed 
if it is "obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or 
seizure" or "later discovered and found to be derivative of an 
illegality."  Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984). 
13 The court of appeals did not address the validity of the 
search warrant, finding such a determination unnecessary in 
light of its holding that the execution of the search warrant 
violated Meyer's rights as guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. 
No. 96-2243-CR 
 
10
anticipatory search warrant.  We address each of Meyer's 
objections to the warrant in turn. 
A. 
¶13 Anticipatory warrants are not unconstitutional per se. 
 See State v. Falbo, 190 Wis. 2d 328, 335, 526 N.W.2d 814 (Ct. 
App. 1994) (citing United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 702 
(2d Cir. 1989));  United States v. Leidner, 99 F.3d 1423, 1426 
(7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 1434 
(1997);  2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.7(c), at 364 
(3d ed. 1996).  Although an anticipatory warrant is "issued 
before the necessary events have occurred which will allow a 
constitutional search of the premises," such search warrants 
must still be based upon probable cause.  Garcia, 882 F. 2d at 
702.   
¶14  In reviewing whether probable cause exists to issue a 
search warrant, we give great deference to the warrant-issuing 
commissioner.14  See State v. Kerr, 181 Wis. 2d 372, 379, 511 
N.W.2d 586 (1994).  As such, we are confined to the record as it 
                     
14 In United States v. Leidner, 99 F.3d 1423, 1425 (7th Cir. 
1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S. Ct. 1434 (1997), the 
court determined that, based upon its prior holding in United 
States v. Navarro, 90 F.3d 1245, 1251 (7th Cir. 1996),  probable 
cause determinations with regard to the issuance of search 
warrants are to be reviewed de novo.  We disagree.  This court 
has previously determined that the "'deferential standard of 
review is appropriate to further the Fourth Amendment's strong 
preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.'"  
State v. DeSmidt, 155 Wis. 2d 119, 133, 454 N.W.2d 780 (1990) 
(quoting Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 733 (1984)).  The 
factual scenario in Navarro did not involve a search warrant; 
rather, it involved the consensual search of a vehicle after a 
probable cause stop and a consensual search of the defendant's 
home.  See Navarro, 90 F.3d at 1249-50. 
No. 96-2243-CR 
 
11
existed before the commissioner and must consider whether he or 
she was "'apprised of sufficient facts to excite an honest 
belief in a reasonable mind that the objects sought are linked 
with the commission of a crime, and that they will be found in 
the place to be searched.'"  Id. at 378 (quoting State v. 
Starke, 81 Wis. 2d 399, 408, 260 N.W.2d 739 (1978)).  The 
commissioner's decision to issue a warrant will be upheld unless 
the facts before the commissioner at the time the warrant was 
issued were "'clearly insufficient to support a finding of 
probable cause.'"  Kerr, 181 Wis. 2d at 380 (quoting State v. 
Higginbotham, 162 Wis. 2d 978, 989, 471 N.W.2d 24 (1991)). 
¶15 "Anticipatory warrants are peculiar to property in 
transit."  Leidner, 99 F.3d at 1425.  Such warrants may be 
issued prior to the contraband being located at the premises.  
Thus, in the context of an anticipatory warrant,  
 
[t]he probable cause doctrine does not require that 
the contraband to be seized must presently be located 
at the premises to be searched, only that there is 
probable cause to believe that a crime has been (or is 
being) committed and that evidence of it can likely be 
found at the described locus at the time of the 
search. 
United States v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 1993).  
See also Leidner, 99 F.3d at 1427. 
¶16 In determining whether probable cause exists to issue 
an anticipatory search warrant, we must consider the "totality 
of the circumstances."  Falbo, 190 Wis. 2d at 337.  See also 
Leidner, 99 F.3d at 1427.  The probable cause standard will not 
be 
satisfied 
unless 
the 
affidavit 
demonstrates 
that 
the 
contraband is on a "sure course" to the premises to be searched. 
 Leidner, 99 F.3d at 1427 (citations omitted).  We recognize 
No. 96-2243-CR 
 
12
that "government-controlled deliveries may be more likely to 
reach their destination than those deliveries expected within 
the normal course of a drug organization's operations."  Id. at 
1429.   
¶17 In the present case, Koenig's affidavit stated that 
Kakonis is an experienced and reliable source who had on 
previous 
occasions 
provided 
her with 
accurate 
information 
regarding drug dealing.  Koenig further stated that the package 
addressed to Mayor (i.e., Meyer) was intercepted because its 
appearance evidenced several indicia of drug dealing, and that 
the package was subsequently identified in a canine sniff as 
containing controlled substances.  Further, as an officer with 
extensive training and experience in the identification of 
controlled substances, Koenig stated it was her belief that 
"there will be located in and upon those premises evidence of a 
crime."  Finally, the package was delivered by Kakonis in a 
controlled manner, monitored by the officers, and the officers' 
execution of the search warrant occurred very soon after the 
delivery.  Based upon the "totality of the circumstances," 
Leidner, 99 F.3d at 1427, we determine that there were 
sufficient facts provided to the court commissioner to establish 
probable cause to believe that controlled substances were on a 
"sure course," id., to the premises and would be present at 1033 
St. Clair Street in Sheboygan at the time the warrant was 
executed.   
B. 
No. 96-2243-CR 
 
13
¶18 Meyer 
also 
argues 
that 
the 
warrant 
was 
an 
unconstitutional anticipatory 
warrant 
because 
it 
does not 
contain any conditional language, that is, the warrant does not 
limit the officers' discretion in executing the warrant and does 
not sufficiently detail the events that must occur prior to its 
execution.  Whether the language of the warrant satisfies the 
requisite constitutional requirements is a question of law.  We 
review such issues of constitutional guarantees de novo.  See 
State v. Andrews, 201 Wis. 2d 383, 389, 549 N.W.2d 210 (1996). 
¶19 In Leidner, 99 F.3d 1423, the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals addressed the need for specific conditional language in 
an anticipatory search warrant.  The United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Illinois had determined that 
an anticipatory warrant's lack of an explicit requirement that 
the contraband be delivered prior to the execution of the 
warrant rendered the warrant invalid. See id. at 1425.  In 
reversing the district court, the Leidner court stated that it 
found "no cases from this circuit requiring (as a matter of 
constitutional law) anticipatory warrants to explicitly state 
that the expected delivery must occur prior to execution of the 
warrant."  Id. at 1427.  The court recognized that although some 
courts 
appear 
to 
prefer 
conditional 
language, 
the 
only 
constitutional requirement in issuing an anticipatory search 
No. 96-2243-CR 
 
14
warrant is that it be supported by probable cause.15  Id. (citing 
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983)).  We have already 
determined that the court commissioner had probable cause to 
issue the anticipatory search warrant; therefore, the warrant is 
valid.16 
III. 
¶20 We next consider whether the officers' no-knock entry 
into the premises during the execution of the anticipatory 
search warrant was an unconstitutional entry in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  "Whether 
searches and seizures pass constitutional muster is a question 
of law, which this court reviews without deference to the lower 
courts."  State v. Guy, 172 Wis. 2d 86, 93, 492 N.W.2d 311 
(1992).  Our  analysis of this issue is appropriately preceded 
                     
15 Although language conditioning the execution of the 
warrant is not constitutionally required, the warrant in the 
present case is sufficient even if such conditional language 
were required.  In her affidavit in support of the warrant,  
Koenig stated she believed that "illegal controlled substances" 
"will be located" on the premises, inferring that the search 
warrant would be executed only after the controlled delivery 
took place.  See Leidner, 99 F.3d at 1427 n.4 ("We do not think 
an explicit conditioning statement is necessary where, as here, 
such a requirement is logically implicit."); United States v. 
Rey, 923 F.2d 1217, 1221 (6th Cir. 1991) ("A reasonable 
inference can be made that the warrant authorizes a search only 
after the controlled delivery has occurred.").  
16 We recognize that the warrant in this case did not 
authorize a search for the intercepted mail package alone; 
rather, the warrant also authorized a search for other drug 
related 
paraphernalia. 
This 
does 
not 
render 
the 
warrant 
unconstitutionally overbroad.  Where a search warrant is "based 
only on the knowledge of a controlled delivery," the warrant may 
authorize 
"a 
search 
for 
drug 
paraphernalia 
as 
well 
as 
contraband."  Rey, 923 F.2d at 1220 (citations omitted). 
No. 96-2243-CR 
 
15
by a history of the development of Wisconsin precedent setting 
forth the rule of announcement and exceptions under which a no-
knock entry is constitutional in cases involving felony drug 
investigations. 
¶21 In State v. Cleveland, 118 Wis. 2d 615, 628, 348 
N.W.2d 512 (1984), this court determined that police officers 
are justified in making a no-knock entry "only if they have 
particular grounds in the given case to give them reasonable 
cause to believe" that exigent circumstances exist.17  Despite 
the State's argument that drug dealers are generally likely to 
attempt to destroy evidence and are often armed, this court 
rejected the application of a "blanket rule" in narcotics cases 
that would allow an unannounced entry.  See id.   In a 
subsequent application of Cleveland this court held that a no-
knock entry is justified if police have specific knowledge that 
an individual is in "possession of both firearms and large 
quantities of illegal drugs."  State v. Williams, 168 Wis. 2d 
970, 985, 485 N.W.2d 42 (1992). 
¶22 In Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d at 425, we overruled our 
holding in Cleveland and adopted a blanket rule that police were 
justified in making a no-knock entry in an instance where there 
                     
17 Exigent circumstances "include a reasonable belief that 
announcement of police presence would endanger the safety of the 
police or others, or a reasonable belief that unannounced entry 
is required to prevent the destruction of evidence."  State v. 
Cleveland, 118 Wis. 2d 615, 624, 348 N.W.2d 512 (1984) (citation 
omitted), overruled on other grounds, Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d at 
430.  Exigent circumstances may also exist "when it is evident 
from the circumstances that the authority and purpose of the 
police is already known to those within the premises" rendering 
the rule of announcement "a superfluous act."  2 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.8(f), at 620 (3d ed. 1996) 
(citations omitted). 
No. 96-2243-CR 
 
16
was evidence of felony drug delivery or dealing.18  Our decision 
in Stevens was based upon our determination that "the easily 
disposable nature of narcotics provides police with evidence 
sufficient to form a reasonable belief that no-knock entry is 
necessary 
to 
prevent 
the 
destruction 
of 
evidence." 
Id. 
(citations omitted).    
 
¶23 We reaffirmed our adoption of the blanket rule in  
Richards I, 201 Wis. 2d at 847-48, holding that "exigent 
circumstances are always present in the execution of search 
warrants involving felonious drug delivery:  an extremely high 
risk of serious if not deadly injury to the police as well as 
the potential for the disposal of drugs by the occupants prior 
to entry of the police."  (footnote omitted).  We concluded that 
police officers need not comply with the rule of announcement in 
the execution of a search warrant for evidence of felonious drug 
delivery.  See id.  Our decision to espouse the blanket rule was 
not unanimous, however.  Justice Abrahamson concurred in the 
opinion in light of the facts presented in Richards I but 
rejected the blanket rule, advocating for dispensing with the 
rule of announcement only where the particular facts in a given 
case evince exigent circumstances such that the officer's no-
knock entry is reasonable.  See id. at 878. 
                     
18 On remand in Stevens the circuit court denied Stevens' 
motion to affirm the suppression order, relying on this court's 
holding in State v. Richards, 201 Wis. 2d 839, 549 N.W.2d 218 
(1996).  Stevens appealed, and the court of appeals reversed his 
conviction, relying on the United States Supreme Court's 
decision in Richards v. Wisconsin, 117 S. Ct. 1416.  See State 
v. Stevens, 213 Wis. 2d 324, 570 N.W.2d 593 (Ct. App. 1997).  
The State petitioned this court for review, and we ordered the 
petition held in abeyance pending our decision in the present 
case. 
No. 96-2243-CR 
 
17
 
¶24 On appeal the United States Supreme Court affirmed our 
judgment in Richards I but overruled our reaffirmation of the 
blanket rule approach first adopted in Stevens.  See Richards 
II, 117 S. Ct. at 1421.  The Supreme Court recognized that 
although drug investigations often involve special safety risks 
and the likely destruction of evidence, such is not the case in 
every drug investigation.  See id.  The Supreme Court also 
acknowledged concern regarding the relative ease of applying a 
blanket rule exception to other crimes, such as bank robberies, 
where risks of danger and evidence destruction are frequent.  
See id.  In sum the Supreme Court agreed with the concurrence in 
Richards I.   
 
Thus, the fact that felony drug investigations may 
frequently present circumstances warranting a no-knock 
entry cannot remove from the neutral scrutiny of a 
reviewing court the reasonableness of the police 
decision not to knock and announce in a particular 
case.  Instead, in each case, it is the duty of a 
court 
confronted with 
the question to 
determine 
whether the facts and circumstances of the particular 
entry justified dispensing with the knock-and-announce 
requirement. 
 
In order to justify a "no-knock" entry, the police 
must have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and 
announcing 
their 
presence, 
under 
the 
particular 
circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that 
it would inhibit the effective investigation of the 
crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of 
evidence.  This standard . . . strikes the appropriate 
balance 
between 
the 
legitimate 
law 
enforcement 
concerns at issue in the execution of search warrants 
and the individual privacy interests affected by no-
knock entries.  This showing is not high, but the 
police should be required to make it whenever the 
reasonableness of a no-knock entry is challenged. 
Id. at 1421-22 (internal citations omitted).   
No. 96-2243-CR 
 
18
 
¶25 The Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Richards 
II in a recent unanimous opinion.  See United States v. Ramirez, 
___ U.S. ___, 118 S. Ct. 992, 1998 WL 88055 (1998).  In Ramirez, 
the Supreme Court stated that it rejected a blanket rule 
exception 
to 
the 
rule 
of 
announcement 
in 
felony 
drug 
investigations in Richards II.  See id. at *4.  Rather, an 
officer must consider the "particular circumstances" in each 
case.  Id. (quoting Richards II, 117 S. Ct. at 1421).  "Under 
Richards, a no-knock entry is justified if police have a 
'reasonable suspicion' [under the particular circumstances] that 
knocking 
and 
announcing 
would 
be 
dangerous, 
futile, 
or 
destructive to the purposes of the investigation."  Ramirez, 
1998 WL 88055 at *4. 
¶26 The parties in the present case agree that the blanket 
rule exception to the rule of announcement was rejected in 
Richards II but disagree regarding what type of particular 
information or evidence will satisfy the reasonable suspicion 
test justifying a no-knock entry.  
 ¶27 The State contends that police officers may rely on 
their training and previous experience in similar situations to 
satisfy the particularity requirement.  The State bases its 
argument in large part on Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and 
language therein which provides that an officer's reasonable 
suspicion may be based upon the nature of the crime.  From this, 
the State apparently advocates that: (1) based upon prior 
experience in similar cases, an officer may reasonably infer 
that complying with the rule of announcement would result in 
danger or the destruction of evidence; and (2) such prior 
No. 96-2243-CR 
 
19
experience satisfies the reasonable suspicion test of Richards 
II for dispensing with the rule of announcement, as long as 
there is no specific evidence that would negate an officer's 
reasonable suspicion of danger or destruction in a particular 
case.   
¶28 Meyer, on the other hand, argues that facts specific 
to a particular party must be shown to support reasonable 
suspicion that exigent circumstances exist.  Meyer cites to 
language in Stevens which enumerated factors that may be 
considered 
in 
justifying 
dispensing 
with 
the 
rule 
of 
announcement, such as evidence of a party's prior sales of 
controlled substances or evidence of the amount of drugs 
involved in a particular case, and argues that no similar 
information was available to the officers in this case.  
¶29 We hold that particular facts must be shown in each 
case to support an officer's reasonable suspicion that exigent 
circumstances exist.  As such, we reject the State's proffered 
reasonable suspicion test which is essentially equivalent to the 
blanket rule rejected in Richards II.   
¶30 In Richards II the Supreme Court placed an affirmative 
duty on officers to show reasonable suspicion under the 
particular circumstances that exigent circumstances exist to 
dispense with the rule of announcement.  See Richards II, 117 S. 
Ct. at 1421.  The State's proposed rule authorizes a no-knock 
entry during the execution of a search warrant in a felony drug 
investigation under any circumstance, absent information that 
would negate such generalized reasonable suspicion.  Such a test 
would permit an officer to presume that there is reasonable 
No. 96-2243-CR 
 
20
suspicion in all cases involving felony drug investigations, 
thereby allowing the officer to step beyond the mandates of 
Richards II.  
¶31 An adoption of the State's proposed test would hamper 
the protections against unreasonable search and seizure afforded 
to individuals under the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.  The "scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes 
meaningful only when it is assured that . . . the conduct of 
those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the 
more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the 
reasonableness of a particular search . . . in light of the 
particular circumstances."  Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.  See also 
Richards, 117 S. Ct. at 1421.  In instances where no particular 
facts are presented to show exigent circumstances allegedly 
justifying a no-knock entry, there is nothing upon which a 
reviewing 
court 
can 
base 
a 
determination 
of 
reasonable 
suspicion. 
¶32 Our holding that reasonable suspicion must be shown 
from particular facts does not thwart an officer's ability to 
also rely on his or her training and/or prior experience in 
similar cases.  As the Supreme Court recognized in relation to 
the facts presented in Richards II, the "actual circumstances—
petitioner's apparent recognition of the officers combined with 
the 
easily 
disposable 
nature 
of 
the 
drugs—justified 
the 
officers' ultimate decision to enter without first announcing 
their presence and authority."  Id. at 1422 (emphasis supplied). 
¶33 The State cites to several United States Supreme Court 
cases that allow an officer to consider the nature of a crime as 
No. 96-2243-CR 
 
21
well as an officer's training or experience to satisfy the 
particularity requirement for reasonable suspicion.  Our holding 
is consistent with each of those cases as in every instance the 
generalized 
knowledge 
of 
the 
officer 
was 
considered 
in 
combination with specific, particular facts.  See, e.g., Terry, 
392 U.S. at 27 ([D]ue weight must be given . . . to the specific 
reasonable inferences which [an officer] is entitled to draw 
from the facts in light of his experiences."); Florida v. 
Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 6 (1984) (Stop was reasonable in light of 
"strange movements in [defendant's] attempt to evade the 
officers," "contradictory statements," and officer's "special 
training in narcotics surveillance and apprehension."); United 
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (Inferences can be 
made from "objective observations, information from police 
reports . . . and consideration of the modes of patterns of 
operation of certain kinds of lawbreakers."); United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 565 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) 
(Officers "observed respondent engaging in conduct that they 
reasonably associated with criminal activity.").  An officer's 
experience and training are valid, relevant considerations.  
However, without an application of generalized knowledge to the 
particular facts of a given case, such considerations are 
insufficient to support a determination of reasonable suspicion. 
¶34 Although we reject the State's proposed reasonable 
suspicion test, we do recognize that there may be instances 
where 
specific 
facts 
may 
negate 
an 
officer's 
otherwise 
reasonable act of dispensing with the rule of announcement.  The 
reasonableness of an officer's decision to enter a premise 
No. 96-2243-CR 
 
22
without first knocking and announcing his or her presence must 
be evaluated by a reviewing court as of the time of the entry.  
See Richards II, 117 S. Ct. at 1422.  Therefore, even if the 
particular facts initially available to an officer provide 
reasonable suspicion of exigent circumstances, that reasonable 
suspicion may be negated where additional facts are revealed 
prior the execution of the search warrant that would negate an 
officer's earlier suspicion of exigent circumstances.  Cf. 
Cleveland, 118 Wis. 2d at 627 (Where a no-knock warrant has been 
issued "[c]ircumstances which justify noncompliance with the 
rule 
of 
announcement . . . might 
change . . . before 
the 
officer's entry."). 
¶35 We thus conclude that pursuant to Richards II, 
reasonable 
suspicion of 
exigent circumstances 
allowing an 
officer to dispense with the rule of announcement must be shown 
by the particular facts in each case.19  See Ramirez, 1998 WL 
88055, at *4.  Accordingly, the mere absence of specific facts 
that would negate reasonable suspicion is insufficient to 
justify a no-knock entry.   
¶36 Our decision to affirm the court of appeals' reversal 
of 
the 
judgment 
of 
conviction 
is 
qualified. 
 
Although 
affirmation is appropriate given our holding, the remedy 
                     
19 In United States v. Ramirez, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S. Ct. 
992, 1998 WL 88055 (U.S. 1998), the United States Supreme Court 
held that the Fourth Amendment does not hold officers to a 
heightened standard of reasonable suspicion when a no-knock 
entry results in the destruction of property.  Thus, although 
the officers used a ram to break down Meyer's door in the 
present case, the officers were not required to show more 
specific inferences of exigency to support their reasonable 
suspicion. 
No. 96-2243-CR 
 
23
afforded Meyer must be appropriate to the constitutional 
violation that may have occurred in this case.  See Waller v. 
Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49-50 (1984); State v. Webb, 154 Wis. 2d 
320, 327, 453 N.W.2d 628 (1990), rev'd on other grounds, 160 
Wis. 2d 622, 467 N.W.2d 108 (1991).  The proper remedy is to 
remand this case to the circuit court for a new suppression 
hearing.  See id.  At the hearing the circuit court must 
determine whether, consistent with Richards II, the officers had 
a reasonable suspicion based upon the particular facts of this 
case that exigent circumstances existed to justify dispensing 
with the rule of announcement. If the evidence at the hearing 
satisfies the circuit court that reasonable suspicion existed to 
justify the no-knock entry, the judgment of conviction should be 
reinstated. See Webb, 154 Wis. 2d at 327. 
IV. 
 
¶37 In sum, we conclude that the anticipatory search 
warrant in the present case was constitutional as it was 
supported by probable cause.  We also conclude that there is no 
constitutional requirement that an anticipatory search warrant 
contain explicit conditional language limiting the execution of 
the warrant until after the delivery of the contraband.  Finally 
we conclude that, consistent with the requirements set forth by 
the United States Supreme Court in Richards II, an officer may 
dispense with the rule of announcement when executing a search 
warrant if the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based upon 
the particular facts in a given case and the reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom, that knocking and announcing the 
No. 96-2243-CR 
 
24
officer's presence would be dangerous or futile or inhibit the 
effective 
investigation 
of 
the 
crime. 
 
Furthermore, 
in 
determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, an officer's 
training and prior experience in similar situations may be 
considered in combination with the particular facts.20  
 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
modified and affirmed and, as modified, cause remanded with 
directions. 
                     
20 Because we conclude the warrant was constitutional and we 
are 
remanding 
this 
case 
for 
a 
determination 
of 
the 
constitutionality of the officers' no-knock entry, we find it 
unnecessary to consider an application of the exclusionary rule 
or the State's proffered argument that a good faith exception 
should apply. 
No. 96-2243-CR.wab 
¶38 WILLIAM A. BABLITCH, J. (Concurring).   Although I 
concur with the mandate, I respectfully disagree with the 
majority’s standard regarding the issue of when the police may 
forego the rule of announcement in drug dealing cases. 
¶39 The foundation for government action under the Fourth 
Amendment is reasonableness.  (“The right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable search and seizures, . . . .”  U.S. Const. amend. 
IV.).  In determining a reasonable standard with respect to the 
question of when the police must abide by the rule of 
announcement, the underlying question should be this: if you 
were a police officer, would you be the first one through the 
door after knocking, announcing, and awaiting a response? 
¶40 To place this issue in context, it is important to 
note the requirements of the rule of announcement, referred to 
as “knock and announce."21  The rule of announcement “requires 
police officers to do three things before forcibly entering a 
home to execute a search warrant: 1) announce their identity; 2) 
announce their purpose; and 3) wait for either the occupants to 
refuse their admittance or, in the absence of an express 
refusal, allow the occupants time to open the door.”  State vs. 
Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 423, 511 N.W.2d 591 (1994).  Federal 
courts have similar requirements.  See, e.g., U.S. v. Markling, 
7 F.3d 1309, 1318 (7th Cir. 1993); U.S. v. Leichtnam, 948 F.2d 
                     
21 Given that there are actually three requirements, it 
should more accurately be termed the rule of “knock, announce, 
and await a response."  
No. 96-2243-CR.wab 
 
2 
370, 374 (7th Cir. 1991); U.S. v. Moore, 91 F.3d 96, 98 (10th Cir. 
1996); U.S. v. Knapp, 1 F.3d 1026, 1031 (10th Cir. 1993).   
¶41 The 
majority 
states 
that, 
absent 
“particularized 
facts” about the particular case, the police must abide by the 
rule of announcement before executing the search warrant for 
evidence of drug dealing.  The problem with the majority rule is 
not that it requires particularized facts to dispense with the 
rule of announcement.  The problem is it demands too many 
“particularized facts.”  Because the majority demands too much, 
I respectfully disagree.   
¶42 The majority requires police to knock, announce, and 
await a response when executing a search warrant for evidence of 
drug dealing even when all of the following conditions are 
present:  1) reasonable grounds to believe that drugs are being 
sold on the premises, concurred in by a neutral magistrate who 
issued the search warrant; 2) a belief based upon past 
experience 
and/or 
training 
that knocking, 
announcing, and 
awaiting a response poses a very dangerous situation to the 
officers;  3) knowledge based upon past experience and/or 
training that the evidence inside the house might be destroyed; 
and, 4) nothing in the particular case to negate their beliefs 
that knocking, announcing, and awaiting a response poses a 
serious danger to them and/or potential destruction of evidence.  
¶43 The majority says the police must have more; without 
more 
“particularized” 
knowledge 
about 
the 
particular 
dangerousness of this particular situation, the police must 
first knock, announce, and await a response before entering the 
No. 96-2243-CR.wab 
 
3 
premises.  I disagree.  I conclude that when all of the above 
conditions are met, the police are not required to comply with 
the rule of announcement.  
¶44 The 
serious, 
in 
fact 
deadly 
danger 
potentially 
awaiting the police in these circumstances can scarcely be 
understated.  The United States Solicitor General’s Office filed 
an amicus brief in Richards v. Wisconsin, 117 S.Ct. 1416 (1997), 
reciting what is now the universally recognized tie between 
drugs and firearms. 
 
Indeed, the courts have frequently recognized that 
there is a well-established association between guns 
and drugs; firearms are 'tools of the [narcotics] 
trade.'  United States v. Bonner, 874 F.2d 822, 824 
(D.C. Cir. 1989).  And the guns that drug traffickers 
prefer are often machine guns and other heavy weaponry 
that pose the greatest danger to police officers and 
bystanders.  See, e.g., United States v. Kirk, No. 94-
50472, 1997 WL 40602 [105 F.3d 997, 1002-03 n.1], at 
*9 n.1 (5th Cir. Feb. 3, 1997) (en banc) (opinion of 
Higginbotham, J.) (citing 29 recent federal appellate 
cases). 
 
Once an officer has announced his intention to enter a 
home to execute a search for contraband or to make an 
arrest, the drug trafficker has a heightened incentive 
to prevent the officer from attaining those goals.  
See Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of 
Justice, Drugs, Crime, and the Justice System: A 
National Report, 5 (Dec. 1992) ('To avoid being 
arrested and punished for trafficking, drug dealers 
commit violent crimes against police and threaten 
informants or witnesses.').  Accordingly, 'the law has 
uniformly 
recognized 
that 
substantial 
dealers 
in 
narcotics possess firearms' and that 'entrance into a 
situs of drug trafficking activity carries all too 
real dangers to law enforcement officers.'  United 
States v. Kennedy, 32 F.3d 876, 882-883 (4th Cir. 
1994) 
(internal 
quotation 
marks 
omitted; 
citing 
cases), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 939 (1995). 
No. 96-2243-CR.wab 
 
4 
Amicus Curiae Brief for the United States Solicitor General's 
office at 13-15 (footnote omitted), Richards, 117 S.Ct. at 
1416.22  
¶45 I do not believe the standard set by the majority is 
what the U.S. Supreme Court demands under Richards.  See 117 
S.Ct. at 1421-22.  I agree with the state that under Richards 
the police may dispense with the rule of announcement when 
executing a search warrant involving drug dealing when there is 
no specific evidence that would negate an officer’s reasonable 
suspicion of danger to themselves or destruction of evidence, 
based on the officer’s training and experience.  This was also 
the position taken by the Solicitor General of the United States 
in Richards.   I conclude that the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Richards adopted the position of the Solicitor General.   
¶46 There is no question that a particularity requirement 
must be met to satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard.  
However, as the state points out, courts have not demanded the 
same kind of specific information that is needed to satisfy the 
probable cause standard.  In reasonable suspicion cases, the 
police and courts can rely on their training and experience in 
similar situations to satisfy the particularity requirement.  
See, e.g., Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1, 6 (1984); United 
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981); United States v. 
                     
22 The United States also cited a series of cases supporting 
a police officer’s reasonable suspicion that the occupants would 
attempt to throw away or destroy the evidence.  See Amicus 
Curiae Brief for the United States Solicitor General's office at 
19-20 n.9, Richards v. Wisconsin, 117 S.Ct. 1416 (1997).  
No. 96-2243-CR.wab 
 
5 
Mendenhall, 
446 
U.S. 
544, 
565-66 
(1980) 
(Powell, 
J., 
concurring); United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29, 
36 (2nd Cir. 1980). 
¶47 The Court's reasoning in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 6-
7 (1968), cited by the majority, is illustrative with respect to 
the particularity requirement.  The Court said that frisking a 
suspect for weapons on reasonable suspicion is allowed 
 
where [the officer] has reason to believe that he is 
dealing with 
an armed 
and dangerous 
individual, 
regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest 
the individual for a crime.  The officer need not be 
absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the 
issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the 
circumstances would be warranted in the belief that 
his safety or that of others was in danger.  And in 
determining whether the officer acted reasonably in 
such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to 
his 
inchoate 
and 
unparticularized 
suspicion 
of 
'hunch,' but to the specific reasonable inferences 
which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light 
of his experience. 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (citations and footnote omitted). 
¶48 Do the police in drug dealing cases have “reason to 
believe” that they are dealing with armed and dangerous 
individuals?  In the absence of evidence negating their belief, 
police have every reason to believe based on the overwhelming 
documentation that this situation is fraught with danger. 
¶49 Are the police in drug dealing cases “warranted in the 
belief that (their) safety or that of others [may be] in 
danger?”  In the absence of evidence negating their belief, it 
is difficult to see how that question can be answered in anyway 
but the affirmative. 
No. 96-2243-CR.wab 
 
6 
¶50 The 
state 
in its 
brief 
in 
this 
case makes a 
particularly 
telling 
argument 
in 
its 
summation 
of 
the 
significance of Terry to the issue before us:   
 
In Terry, the officer’s reasonable suspicion that the 
suspects were armed was based on the nature of the 
crime that he suspected they were about to commit.  He 
had no other specific information about the suspects 
that indicated they were armed or dangerous.  In 
finding that the information known to Officer McFadden 
warranted his belief that the suspect was armed and 
thus presented a threat to the officer’s safety, the 
Court said in Terry, 392 U.S. at 28:  
 
We think on the facts and circumstances Officer 
McFadden 
detailed 
before the trial 
judge a 
reasonably prudent man would have been warranted 
in 
believing petitioner 
was 
armed and 
thus 
presented a threat to the officer's safety while 
he was investigating his suspicious behavior.  
The actions of Terry and Chilton were consistent 
with McFadden's hypothesis that these men were 
contemplating a daylight robbery – which, it is 
reasonable to assume, would be likely to involve 
the use of weapons – and nothing in their conduct 
from the time he first noticed them until the 
time he confronted them and identified himself as 
a police officer gave him sufficient reason to 
negate that hypothesis. 
 
The Court’s comments are significant in at least three 
respects.  First, the Court made it clear that it was 
reasonable for Officer McFadden to conclude that the 
suspect 
was 
armed 
and 
dangerous 
based 
on 
the 
reasonable suspicion to believe that he was armed.  In 
other words, once there was reasonable suspicion to 
believe the suspect was armed, the officer could 
conclude that the suspect was dangerous.  Second, the 
Court relied only on the nature of the crime of which 
Terry was suspected of planning in assuming that a 
weapon would be involved.  The Court cites no other 
information specific to Terry except the nature of the 
crime as a basis for reasonably suspecting that he was 
armed.  Third, Officer McFadden could assume that 
Terry was armed based on the nature of the crime when 
No. 96-2243-CR.wab 
 
7 
no other information negated that hypothesis.  Thus, 
where no information otherwise negates the hypothesis, 
the officer can rely on his experience and the nature 
of the suspected crime to conclude that the suspect is 
armed. 
Brief of State of Wisconsin at 32-33, Meyer, No. 96-2243-CR. 
¶51 The state in its brief goes on to explain that in 
Richards the Supreme Court adopted the arguments made by the 
Solicitor General that the police are entitled to rely on their 
experience and training in the absence of information that 
negates the threat of danger or destruction of evidence.   
 
During the argument, one justice asked the Wisconsin 
Attorney General why the blanket rule was necessary 
when in most cases the police could justify the no 
knock entry with ‘virtually no trouble.’  1997 WL 
143822 at 28 (hereafter the oral argument transcript 
will be cited as T:__).  The justice indicated that 
the state could probably always justify the no knock 
entry in drug cases except in the rare case where the 
informant said there were no guns or the marijuana was 
stored in bales in the barn so there was no risk of 
destruction (T:28).  When the Attorney General said 
the justice was stating the position of the Solicitor 
General (the United States), there was no dispute from 
the court (T:30).   
 
When the Court issued its opinion, it appeared to 
again take the position of the United States because 
it said several times that felony drug investigations 
may frequently involve both danger and the threat of 
destruction of evidence.  Richards, 117 S.Ct. at 1420, 
and 1421 (twice).  In addition, after explaining that 
the standard was reasonable suspicion, the Court said 
that the ‘showing is not high.’  Richards, 117 S.Ct. 
at 
1422. 
 
By 
recognizing 
that 
felony 
drug 
investigations 
frequently 
involve 
danger 
and 
the 
threat of destruction of evidence and by recognizing 
that the showing the state must make is not high, the 
Court took the same position as the justice at oral 
argument and as the United States in its brief. 
 
No. 96-2243-CR.wab 
 
8 
The Brief of the United States took the same position 
that the Supreme Court took in Terry, 392 U.S. at 28, 
which is that police experience can provide reasonable 
suspicion when there are no particular actions or 
information from the suspect to negate the suspicion. 
 In rejecting the blanket rule the Supreme Court again 
approved the United States’ argument because the 
reasons the Court gave for the blanket rule being 
overgeneralized were essentially the same as the 
reasons the United States gave for the officers’ 
general experience being negated: the dangerous drug 
dealer might not be present when the police come and 
the police may have information showing that the 
evidence cannot be destroyed.  Richards, 117 S.Ct. at 
1421.   
 
Therefore, in light of the cases that have considered 
stop and frisk situations, in light of the cases cited 
in the Brief of the United States and in light of the 
response of the United States Supreme Court to the 
arguments of the Solicitor General both during oral 
argument and in the opinion, it is proper for the 
police to rely on experience in similar cases to infer 
that danger or threat of the destruction of evidence 
is present in a specific case.  The police are 
entitled to rely on that experience in absence of 
information that negates it.  This approach to no 
knock cases differs from the blanket rule because it 
is based on experience in similar cases and on the 
nature of the crime; and it acknowledges that the no 
knock entry is improper when the police possess the 
negating information.  This approach is the one the 
Untied States took in Richards v. Wisconsin, which was 
apparently approved by the United States Supreme 
Court.   
Brief of the State of Wisconsin at 43-45, State v. Meyer, No. 
96-2243-CR. 
¶52 The rule announced today by the majority is deeply 
troubling.  Because it is so unworkable in the reality of the 
street, the consequences are potentially devastating.  It may, 
at worst, result in serious injury if not death to police 
officers attempting to conform with the majority’s mandate.  It 
No. 96-2243-CR.wab 
 
9 
might result in less, not more, drug enforcement due to refusal 
of the police to secure or execute search warrants when they do 
not have the “particularized knowledge of exigent circumstances” 
demanded by the majority because of the danger presented to them 
when required to knock, announce, and await a response.  
¶53 To end as I began, assume you are a police officer 
standing outside the door with 1) a reasonable belief, concurred 
in by a neutral magistrate, that evidence of drug dealing is 
present; and, 2) a belief based on your experience and training 
that when you enter that door you are faced with a situation 
fraught with potential serious danger to yourself and the other 
police present; and, 3) nothing in the circumstances of this 
case negates that belief; and, 4) based on the majority’s rule, 
you knock, announce your presence, identity, and purpose, and 
await a response.   Would you be the first one through the door? 
   
¶54 Not I.     
¶55 I am authorized to state that Justices Donald W. 
Steinmetz and Jon P. Wilcox join in this opinion. 
 
No. 96-2243-CR.jpg 
 
1 
¶56 JANINE P. GESKE, J. (Concurring).  I join the majority 
opinion.  I write separately to address the concurring opinion 
of Justice Bablitch. 
¶57 Justice Bablitch takes issue with the majority's 
requirement of "too many 'particularized facts.'"  Conc. op. at 
2.  He believes, because of the "deadly danger potentially 
awaiting the police in these circumstances," concurring op. at 
3, that when four conditions23 are met the police should not be 
required to knock, announce, and await a response when executing 
a search warrant for evidence of drug dealing.  See id.   
¶58 I agree with Justice Bablitch's policy concerns, just 
as I agreed with him in State v. Richards, 201 Wis. 2d 839, 549 
N.W.2d 218 (1996) and State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 511 
N.W.2d 591 (1994)24.  In those cases, the majority held that 
                     
23 Those four conditions are: 
 
1) reasonable grounds to believe that drugs are being 
sold on the premises, concurred in a by a neutral 
magistrate who issued the search warrant; 
 
2) a belief based upon past experience and/or training 
that knocking, announcing, and awaiting a response 
poses a very dangerous situation to the officers; 
 
3) 
knowledge 
based 
upon 
past 
experience 
and/or 
training that the evidence inside the house might be 
destroyed; and 
 
4) nothing in the particular case to negate their 
beliefs that knocking, announcing, and awaiting a 
response poses a serious danger to them and/or 
potential destruction of evidence. 
24  Then Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson wrote concurrences in 
both State v. Richards, 201 Wis. 2d 839, 549 N.W.2d 218 (1996) 
and State v. Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d 410, 511 N.W.2d 591 (1994).  
No. 96-2243-CR.jpg 
 
2 
because exigent circumstances were always present in the 
execution of a search warrant involving a felonious drug 
delivery, the police were not required to knock and announce 
their identity before making a forced entry.  See Richards, 201 
Wis. 2d at 847-48, Stevens, 181 Wis. 2d at 424-25.  However, our 
majority view in Richards was rejected by a unanimous United 
States Supreme Court which held that a blanket exception for 
felony drug investigations 
to the 
knock-and-announce 
rule 
violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
 See Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. __, 117 S. Ct. 1416, 1421 
(1997).  As state supreme court justices we are bound to follow 
the constitutional decisions of the highest court in the land.   
¶59 Neither today's decision in this case, nor the Supreme 
Court's decision in Richards, go so far as to require "too many 
particularized facts."  What those holdings require is for a 
reviewing court to determine only "whether the facts [however 
many 
exist 
in 
that 
situation] 
and 
circumstances 
of 
the 
particular entry" justify dispensing with the knock-and-announce 
requirement.  Richards, 117 S. Ct. at 1421; see, also, majority 
op. at 25.  
¶60 Justice Bablitch's test would preserve a blanket rule 
unless police possess evidence "to negate their beliefs that 
knocking, announcing, and awaiting a response poses a serious 
danger to them and/or potential destruction of evidence."  
Concurring op. at 2.  Were this court to adopt the "negative 
evidence" condition suggested by the state and endorsed by 
Justice Bablitch, we would be ignoring the United States Supreme 
No. 96-2243-CR.jpg 
 
3 
Court's requirements that the facts and circumstances of the 
particular situation justify a "no-knock" entry.  See Richards, 
117 S. Ct. at 1421, majority op. at 21.  Nowhere in the Richards 
opinion 
does 
the 
Court 
include 
this 
"negative 
evidence" 
condition.  Instead, the Court balanced the public policy 
concerns for the personal safety and evidentiary destruction in 
felony drug investigations against the privacy protections 
mandated by the Fourth Amendment.  See id., 117 S.Ct. at 1421-
22. 
¶61 This case-specific balancing is consistent with a long 
line of Supreme Court decisions.  The Court conducted a similar 
balancing in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968), wherein it 
stated: "[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police 
officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts 
which, taken together with rational inferences, from those 
facts, reasonably warrant intrusion" (footnote omitted).  The 
arresting officer in Terry had at least 30 years of patrol 
experience.  See 392 U.S. at 5.  To legally conduct the search 
and seizure of the individual suspects, he needed more than 
professional longevity.  Even the Terry quotation used by 
Justice 
Bablitch 
to 
dilute 
the 
particularity 
requirement 
operates to support the requirement: "due weight must be given . 
. . to the specific reasonable inferences which [the officer] is 
entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience."  
392 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added).  The majority opinion today is 
consistent with Richards. 
No. 96-2243-CR.jpg 
 
4 
¶62 Despite Justice Bablitch's fears, the Supreme Court 
does not require that police officers take unnecessary risks in 
the performance of their duties, and neither does this court.  
See Terry, 392 U.S. at 23.  But the final assessment of whether 
the risks to police safety or to evidence preservation in a 
particular case justify a no-knock entry must rest in "the 
neutral scrutiny of a reviewing court."  It is for the court to 
determine "whether the facts and circumstances of the particular 
entry 
justified 
dispensing 
with 
the 
knock-and-announce 
requirement."  Richards, 117 S.Ct. at 1421.  The majority's 
decision today accurately reflects that we are bound by this 
rule. 
¶63 For the reasons set forth, I concur. 
¶64 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Shirley S. 
Abrahamson, Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, and Justice N. Patrick 
Crooks join this opinion.