Case Title: Slupecki v. Administrative Director of the Courts.

Citation: 110 Haw. 407

Docket Number: 

State: hawaii

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Date: 2006-05-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
‘***E0R PUBLICATION***

 

 

00:

 

MOLLY SLUPECKT, Petitioner-Appellant

 

ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR OF THE COURTS,
STATE OF HAWAI'I, Respondent-Appellee

 

No. 27260

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
(CASE NO. JROS-0011)

May 3, 2006
MOON, C.J., LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, ACOBA, AND DUFFY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY ACOBA. J.
We hold that the district court of the first circuit

(the court)! erred in sustaining the notice of default issued by
the Director (Director or Chief Adjudicator) of the
Administrative Driver's License Revocation Office (ADLRO)
revoking the license of Petitioner-Appellant Molly Slupecki
(Petitioner) for a period of three months. Therefore, the
court's April 25, 2005 judgment is vacated and this case is

remanded to the ADLRO to conduct @ hearing on the matter of

‘The Honorable William Cardwell presided
‘***F0R PUBLICATION***

 

default. Prior to such hearing, the ADLRO shall inform
Petitioner of the procedure for motions to set aside a default

and the requirements to be satisfied for setting a hearing for

that purpose.

I
on February 25, 2008, Petitioner was involved in a

moter vehicle accident in which she allegedly sideswiped a parked
vehicle. After a field sobriety test, Petitioner was arrested
and taken to the police station. At the station, Petitioner read
and signed an acknowledgment of receipt of sanction information
and implied consent testing choice form. Petitioner was charged
with operating @ vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant, a
violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 2916-61(a) (Supp.
2005).? Her license was then suspended by the arresting officer

pursuant to HRS § 291E-61(b) (1) (Supp. 2005).? The notice of

+ await Revised Statutes (HRS) § 251E-61(a) provides as follows:

Operating vehicle under the influence of an
intoxicant. (a) person comnits the offense of operating
a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant if the person
Sperates or assunes control of 3 vehicle:

(1) Mille under the Influence of alcohol in an
anount sufficient to inpair the person's normal
ental faculties or ability to care for the
Person and guard against casualty:

(2) Winile under the ingluence of any drug that
Inpairs the person's abliiey to operate the
vehicle in a careful and prudent manner:

(3) With .08 er more grams of alcohol per two
hundred ten Iitere of breathy oF

(4) With! s08 oF more grame of alcohol per one
hundred miliiiiters or cubic centimeters of
Bisos.

 

   

> HRS § 2915-615) states in pertinent part as follows

 

ib) person committing the offense of operating a

vehicle under the influence of sn intoxseant hall be
continued...)
‘**4FOR PUBLICATION*##
administrative revocation, however, was not explained to

Petitioner at this time.

HRS § 2918-37 (Supp. 2005) provides in relevant part as

follows:

Adninisteative review; procedures; decision. (a) The
director autonatically shall review the issuance of a notice
Gf adiniserative revocstion and shall issue » written
Secision administratively revoking the license and privilege
te operate a vehicle, snd actor vehicle registration if
applicable, or rescinding the notice of adzinistrative
revocation,

 

on March 4, 2005, a Notice of Administrative Review Decision was
issued by an ADLRO review officer, sustaining the revocation of

‘The notice stated that, based

 

Petitioner's driver's licen!
upon the preponderance of the evidence considered on review, the
revocation was sustained. As a first time DUI offender,

Petitioner's license was revoked for a three-month period.‘

°(..-eontinued)
Gentenced ag follows without possibility of probation of
‘suspension of sentence:

Ti} for the first offens

 

" iunety-day prompt suspension of license
and privilege to operste a vehicle during
the Suspension period... (.]

(Emphasis added.)

‘at this point, the term of Petitioner's adninistrative revocation
would have expired. ‘We note that a three-month revocation will likely expire
Eefore'an appeal can be heard before an appellate court. Howe

Petitioner's claim is still justiciable because “a court will
case on the grounds of mootness

evade full review becuse the p: ‘ime would prevent any single
plaintit! €rom remaining subject to the restriction complained of for the
Beriod necessary to complete the lawsuit.” Ines thomas, 73 Haw. 223, 226,
832 P.24 253, 256 (2992) (quoting Life of che tand v, Burns, $9 liew. 224, 251,
580 F.2d 405, 409-10 (2578)).

‘Aaditionally, when the question involved affects the public
interest and an authorivative determination ie desirable for the guidance of
public officiais, 2 case will not be considered moct. See United Pub.

AESCWE, Ls Ye Yeas, 101 Hawai de, 58, 62 P36 189, 202
(Zo0e1 theobs, J,, concurring) (stating that “(aJmong the criteria’... are
the public or private nature of the question presented, the desirability of an
(continued. 1

 

      

 

 

 
*+**FOR PUBLICATION*#*

on March 8, 2005, Petitioner requested a hearing on the
revocation. In her sworn statement to the Chief Adjudicator
dated March 18, 2005 (statement), Petitioner stated that, “(ola
March 9, 2005, I came to the ADLRO and paid the $30 fee to
request a hearing. I was informed by the ADLRO staff that the
hearing notice would be mailed to me at my hone address in
Kaneohe.”

on March 10, 2005, the ADLRO mailed to Petitioner a

Notice of Administrative Hearing. The notice stated that

 

Petitioner's hearing was set for March 16, 2005 at 11:00 a.m.
The notice contained a certificate of service, signed by one
Pamela Lau for the “Chief Adjudicator” that stated, “I hereby
certify that the original of this notice of administrative
hearing was served on [Petitioner] on March 10, 2005 by mail,
postage prepaid, at [Petitioner’s home address].”
Petitioner did not appear at the hearing. On March 17,
2005, the hearing officer mailed Petitioner a Notice of
Administrative Hearing Decision and a Notice of Default, revoking

her license for three months. In this regard, HRS § 2915-38

(Supp 2005) states in pertinent part as follows:

 

“{..-continved)
authoritative determination for the future guidance of public officers, ond
the likelihood of future recurrence of the question()* (quoting Jobnatan
ng, $0"Haw. 375, 381, 441 Pu2d 138, 140 (1968) (citations omitced)] 1? gue
ise Avis Fl foal, pei wa 26
Oo Mfaw. L. hey. £57, s48-52 (Sumner 2009) (observing that the “Public
interest” and “capable of repetition, yet evacing review" exceptions are often
merged, but should not be os they are tho distinct exceptions that require
Sifferéne considerations) -

 

     
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Adninisteative hearing: procedure; decision.
(m) If the respondent fails to appear at the hearing
or 1f 4 respondent under the age of eighteen fails to appeal
With a'porent or guardian, adzinistrative revocaticn shell.
take effect for the period and under the conditions
established by the divecter in the administrative review
Gecision ieved by the director under section 2916-37.

 

 

Petitioner maintains that she did not receive the
hearing notice until Thursday, March 17, 2005. Petitioner points
out that she retained her present counsel for the ADLRO hearing
on Tuesday, March 15, 2005, prior to the date the hearing was

t. Upon receipt of the hearing notice, she claims to have

 

notified her counsel immediately.
A notice of representation, authorizing counsel to
represent Petitioner, was received via fax by the ADLRO on

March 17, 2005 at

 

4 a.m, On Friday, March 18, 2005, at 5:39
p.m.,! Petitioner’s counsel faxed a letter to the ADLRO

¢ aside and she be

 

requesting (1) that Petitioner’s default be
given a new hearing, (2) that if the first request was denied,

ide

 

that ADLRO inform Petitioner of the procedure for setting
defaults, (3) that ADLRO indicate what provisions existed for
holding a hearing for that purpose, and (4) that a hearing be
scheduled on the issue of whether the default should be set aside
(the March 18 letter):
Zam writing to request that a new hearing be

scheduled in the above care, It appears that your office

Sent out # notice of hearing showing that the hearing was

Scheduled for March 26,2008 to [Petitioner] on March 10,

2008. Late in the afterncon of March 15, 2005, (Petitioner)
retained ne. I asked [Petitioner] to let me know the minute

+ the letter was apparently received by the ADLAO on Monday, March
2, 2005, at 11:25 a.m,

 

 

«an the letter Petitioner was referred to a2 "Respondent.

5
 

+#*FOR PUBLICATION:

 

that she received the notice. It appears that I entered my
the notice uss mailed te (Petitioner) and
ing was. scheduled
letter, she did x

 
  

2 the detaule should es

Tiglge wish to know what prescribed procedure the
AOLRO has for setting aside defaults that are entered i
Gases such as this ond what provision there is for a hearing
fo 'set aside a reeponcent's default. I hereby request such
Shearing if you are unwilling to set this case for anew
heaving.

 

 

 

(Gmphasis added.) In addition, Petitioner's counsel attached the

 

following sworn statement from Petitione:

I am the [Petitioner] in the above case. on March 9,
2005, 3 came to the ADLRO and paia the $30 fee to request 3
hearing. 1 waa informed by the AULRO staff that the nearing
hotice would be mailed to me at my hone adsress in Kaneohe
Gn March 15, 2005, 1 checked my mail end the notice hed not
Jet been received. On that seme day, 1 hired attorney Earle
A. Partington to represent me in thig matter and snformed
Bim that f would let him know aa soon aa! received the
bearing notice. On March 17, 2008, 1 checked ay mail and
found the hearing notice. The notice stated my hearing hed

been set for the previous day. "Had J knows in advance of

the bearing, 1 would eost certainly have informed ay
ESAS ia neAcee la etther attend cr continue the
hearing.

 

 

 

 

   

 

(Emphasis added.)

on March 22, 2005, the Chief Adjudicator responded to
Petitioner's request ina letter to her counsel, stating that
(1) Petitioner failed to appear at her administrative hearing,
(2) the information submitted was insufficient to set aside the
default, (3) Petitioner's statement was “not credible and no
independent documentation” had been submitted, (4) the default
would not be set aside, nor would a hearing be scheduled,
(5) Petitioner had satisfied the procedure for “a possible

reconsideration of a default,” but no new hearing on revocation
‘**#F0R PUBLICATION*#*
OO

would be held, and (7) Petitioner could seek judicial review

(Warch 22 letter).

‘This responds to your March 18, 2005 written request
to reconsider and set aside the Notice of Adninistrative
Hearing Decieson (*NAND"), issued on March 17, 2008, due to
the failure of (Petitioner) to appear st her arch 16, 2005
fearing. the cecord reflects that [Petitioner's] hearing
Nes tinely set end the Notice of Aduinistrative Hearing
properly mailed to Petitioner's) address. (Petitioner]
Geiles to appear st ner duly scheduled and noticed hearing.

‘The information you provided with this letter, dated
March 18, 2008 ond attached to Petitioner’ s) stavenent,
Gated March 18, 2005, ‘

te i

 

 

PESTESE fence, pursuant to aks § 2s1E-2s im), your
ifuest to set aside the default and schedsle a new hearing
iSthereby denied. fhe administrative driver's License
Fevocstion shell take effect for the period and under the
Eonditions set forth in the Notice of Administrative Review
Decision issued on Yarch 4, 2008. You nay file s Petition
for Judicial Review of the NANO within 30 days of the date
the ecision was issued (See HRS § 2918-40).

Finelly, your submittal of your letter and attachment
have satisfied the procedure established for a possible
feconeideration of a default decision a

 

 

 

(emphases added.)
nu.

Pursuant to HRS § 2918-40 (Supp 2005),” Petitioner
sought judicial review on March 24, 2005. A hearing was held on
April 22, 2005. The court affirmed the adninistrative
revocation.

In its decision, the court recognized that revocation

of a driver's license was subject to due process requirements:

 

HRS § 2928-40, entitied “Judicial review procedure,” r
pertinent part:

 

{a} If the director sustaine the adsinistrative
revocation after sn administrative hearing, the respondent
vere aay file a petition for judicial review within thirty
Gajs after the adpinistrative bearing decision is nailed.
She petition shail De filed with the clerk of the diatrict
courtt-]

 
‘**FOR PUBLICATION***

 

‘The thene in all of the cases is that a driver's
license is a constitutionally protected property right. As
auch, it must not be taken aay without Gue process:
Morecver, courts are hesitant to pave cases decided on
Gefault basis, preferring that decisions be made on the
Berits of the case. Thus, if 2 party defaults, court rules
permit that party to seek to explain the defauit and have it
Set aie

 

 

(Citations omitted.) However, the court found that the issue was

not one of whether procedural due process had been denied, but,

rather,

“whether the record reflects the ADLRO’s willingness to

consider a request to set aside a default and, if so, whether the

ADLRO abused its discretion or committed some other error in

refusing to set aside Petitioner's default or setting a hearing

on the request.”

rendering

The court found that the ADLRO was justified in
its decision. The court stated in pertinent part:

Maile the ADLEO’s Letter in denving the request did not
suplain its procedures, it announced that there were
‘Setablished procedures to reconsider # deZault and that the

‘Sttomey’s letter and attachment satisfies those procedures.
This indicates both s willingness eo consider setting asige
2 default and procedures for doing 30.

‘Indenvina the request, the ADLO’ stated that
pecscsbner's statenent wae nor credible ang that 2o
‘indenendent documentation supporting the request sas
iubuitred: Goth of these statenents seen reasonable given

fhe record. Petitioner oes not claim she failed to receive
the notice, All-she clains Le that 1t was not in her nail
fon March 15, 2005, and was in her mail on March 17, 2005,
fio mention is made of the mail on March 16, 2005. ‘Tf it wa
received on March 17, 2005 and her attorney was already
Fetained as clained, ‘one must ask why the request to set
aeide the default was not subeitted until after business
ours on arch 16, 2005. Moreover, Petitioner's claim is
Snconsistent with’ the know facts of the time of mailing and
receipt of the Notice of Aaministrative Review Decision.
Given these facts, the ADLRO was not required to simply
accept Petitioner's statenent that it took seven days for
tthe notice to reach Kaneohe from Honolulu. Thus, this is
quite different from situations in which counsel
Scknowledges receipt and acknowledges making = scheduling
istake attempting to denonatrate reasons therefor, arguably
making the mistake excusable.

it is too easy for one to simply claim non-receipt or
late receipt to Suggest that Such » claim always Leads tos
setting aside of » default or the requirement of a hearing

 

    

 

 

 

 
*++#FOR PUBLICATION*#*

thereon, especially when the claim is inconsistent with
iaown facts:

(emphases added.) Petitioner then appealed to this court on
Rpril 27, 2005.
un.

on appeal, Petitioner argues that the court “erred in
failing to set aside the default entered against [Petitioner]
because (1) there is no known established procedure at the ADLRO
for setting aside defaults, . . . (2) [Petitioner] was [not
given) prior notice of what procedure would be followed for her
request to set aside the default and [(3) she was denied] an
opportunity to be heard at a hearing as to why the default should
be set aside[.)" Essentially, Petitioner asserts that she was
not afforded procedural due process of law as guaranteed under
article I, section § of the Hawai'i Constitution and the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Respondent answers that (1) Petitioner’s claim
regarding a right to prior notice of the ADLRO’s procedure for
setting aside defaults (and a hearing on setting aside defaults)
does not warrant reversal; (2) the ADLRO provided Petitioner with
notice and the opportunity to be heard prior to her license
revocation; and (3) in the alternative, the court should remand
to case to the ADLRO for a hearing on Petitioner's default.

To this alternative argument, Petitioner replies that
the court “may not remand this case to the ADLRO for a hearing

[on the default] because to do so would violate legislative
+**FOR PUBLICATION***

 

intent that there be no remands,” pursuant to HRS § 2918-40
(Supp. 200)." In addition, Petitioner urges this court to
impose sanctions against the Attorney General, counsel for the
ADLRO, for unethical conduct. Petitioner argues that mention of
Petitioner's intoxilyzer test results is not relevant to the
appeal and that the Attorney General included this information in
“an unethical attempt to prejudice this court against
[Petitioner] ."*

Petitioner asks that this court reverse the decision of
the court upholding her driver’s license revocation and order
that her driver’s license be returned to her.

wv.

“Review of a decision made by a court upon its review
of an administrative decision is a secondary appeal. The
standard of review is one in which this court must determine
whether the court under review was right or wrong in its
decision.’” Freitas v, Admin, Dir, of the Courts, 108 Hawai'i
31, 43, 116 P.3d 673, 685 (2005) (quoting Soderlund v, Admin.
Dir. of the Courts, 96 Hawai'i 114, 118, 26 P.3d 1214, 1218
(2001)) {hereinafter “Exeitas 11").

court shall not renand the

"was § 292-40(¢) states that “re
jange consistent with its

  

+ an Light of the disposition herein, we do not reach this issue.

10
‘***FOR PUBLICATION*#*

 

In connection with Petitioner's first argument, article
I, section 5 of the Hawai'i Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantee, inter
alia, thet “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without the due process of law." In Kernan v, Tanaka,
75 tiaw. 1, 8, 656 P.2d 1207, 1212 (1993), Kernan’s license was
revoked pursuant to HRS chapter 286, part XIV, for violating HRS
§ 291-4, Kernan argued that the Administrative Revocation
Progran law facially violated drivers’ due process rights because
it failed to provide sufficient procedural protections. Id. at
13, 856 P.2d at 1214, In resolving that issue this court said:

IA] claim of a due process right to @ hearing requires 2 two
step analysis: {1)'is the particular interest waich the
Gloinane Seeks co protect by # hearing “property” within the
Reening of the due process Clauses of the federal and sta
Constitutions, and (2) if the interest is “property” wh
Specific procedures are required to protect its

Ida at 21, 956 P.2d at 1218 (quoting Aguiar v, Hawaii Hous.
Auth, 55 Haw. 478, 495, 522 P.2d 1255, 1266 (1974)).

      

As to the first step, this court stated that “la
driver's license is a constitutionally protected interest and due
process must be provided before one can be deprived of his or her
License.” Id, at 21, 856 P.2d at 1218 (citing Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535, $39 (1971)). As to the second step, this court
applied the test outlined in Mathews v, Eldridce, 424 U.S. 319,
335 (1976):

(The) Adentitieation of the specitic dictates of due process
generally requires consideration of three distinct factors:
TiT"the private interest that will be affected by the

cea
‘***FOR PUBLICATION*#*

 

official action; [2] the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
Such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
Value, if any, of additional or substitute procedurel
Sateguards; and [3] the government's interest, including the
fonction involved and the fiacal or administrative Burdens
that the additional procedures would entail.

Kernan, 75 Haw. at 22-23, 856 P.2d at 1216-19 (brackets in
original).

In this case, the application of the Mathews factors to
the procedure employed by the ADLRO in denying Petitioner’ s
request for reconsideration evidences a violation of due process
requirenents. First, the effect of the default decision was to
deprive Petitioner of her driver's license. This court has
already held that 2 driver's license is @ constitutionally
protected property interest. Id. at 21, 856 P.2d at 1218.

Second, notwithstanding the option to appeal the
ADLRO' s decision, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures used is great, as there was no
apparent procedure established by the ADLRO for determining
whether a defualt was appropriately entered. Kernan held that
“fethe fact that Hawaii's procedure provides for a predeprivation
review and hearing ‘abundantly weights this second part of the
(Wathews) analysis(.1'" Id, at 27, 856 P.2d at 1221 (emphasis in
original and enphasis added) (brackets in original). In the
absence of a similar “review and hearing,” there is a high risk
that there will be an erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’ s
property.

Finally, an evaluation of the government's interest,
which includes the function of the ADLRO and the fiscal and

2
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se
administrative burdens that any additional or substitute

procedural requirement would entail, when balanced, are
outweighed by Petitioner's constitutionally protected property
and due process rights. In Kernan, public safety was considered
the main governmental concern, and this court determined that the
“revocation program allowed the State to achieve [its] goals
without overburdening individuals or the judicial system.” Id.
at 29, 856 P.2d at 1229.

Unlike Keenan, this case involves a denial of 2 hearing
altogether. In light of Kernan, there is no governmental
interest which supports denial of such @ hearing on a default
order. Petitioner has been denied her constitutional right to
procedural due process before deprivation of a property interest.
‘Therefore, in applying the Mathews analysis we conclude that the
denial of a hearing on whether to set aside a default order
violates due process requirements.

vr.

As to Petitioner's first argunent, Respondent contends
that the ADLRO provided Petitioner with a “duly scheduled and
noticed hearing” and that Petitioner defaulted with respect to
that hearing. To the contrary, as discussed above, Petitioner
has not had @ hearing with respect to the revocation of her
License or with respect to the default entered by the Director
which precluded the revocation hearing. A hearing is "*a
proceeding where evidence is taken to determine issue(s} of fact
and to render [a] decision on (the] basis of that evidence.’

13
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Takahashi v. Tanaka, 10 Haw. App. 322, 327, 871 P.2d 796, 198
(1994) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 721 (6th ed. 1990)). In
Takahashi, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) held that 2
judgment entered by default does not amount to a hearing. Id.

In this case, Petitioner was clearly denied a hearing
guaranteed by the due process clause. To reiterate, Petitioner
nade three requests of the ADLRO Chief Adjudicator in the
March 18 letter, including one for a new hearing or,
alternatively, a hearing on whether the default should be set
aside. In response, the Chief Adjudicator denied all of
Petitioner’s requests.

Additionally, the Chief Adjudicator apparently made =
determination of Petitioner‘s veracity with respect to her sworn
statement, without a hearing. See Apolskis v. Concord Life Ins.
Go, 445 F.2d 31, 34 n.1 (7th Cir, 1971) (stating that
“[clredibility determinations are the province of the district
judge” but that “a trial judge may not totally disregard
uncontradicted and apparently creditable testimony where no basis

for so doing appears in the record”).

 

© Gp Tekahashs wv. Tanks, 10 Haw. App. 322, 324, 871 P.28 796, 797
(2996), the district court affirmed a default order issued by the ADLRO
pursuant to HRS § 286-259(k) when Takahashi failea to appear at ic scheduled
hearing. Relying on HRS § 286-259(h}, which provides that an administrative
“nearing shall be recordes,” Takahsshi had argued that the district court
erred because “no transcript of the proceedings before the hearing officer was
prepared.” Id, In determining that no error eccurred, the Intermediate Court
Gf Appeals states chat “since there wae no ‘hearing’ within the purview of ARS
§ 286-259ih), there was fo obligation to record the proceedings,” concluding
that @ failure co appear resulting in a default is nets hearing. I, at 328,
871 p.2d at 798, the neues raised by Petitioner in this case wore not raised
in Takghashs

 

 

 

 

   

  

 

4
*+**FOR PUBLICATION*#*
In the instant case, Petitioner’s statement was not so

inherently incredible as to warrant out-right rejection. The
chief Adjudicator stated summarily that “[Petitioner’s] statement
is not credible and no independent documentation in support of
her statement was submitted,” adopting “the expedient of
technically accepting the offered proof but summarily rejecting
its weight or credibility.” Erito Lay, Inc, v. Morten Foods,
Incs, 216 F.2d 298, 301 (10th Cir. 1963) (holding that the
summary rejection of a witness as non-credible is prejudicial and
the proper administration of justice requires more); cf. Barb vs
Stokes, 431 F.3d 1158, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding that a
credibility determination cannot be made on summary judgment) .
vit.

Ae to her second argument, Petitioner contends that the
Chief Adjudicator’ ruling on the merits before a procedure for
setting aside default was made known to Petitioner is a

procedural defect and therefore the court erred in failing to

 

address Petitioner's request for notice and for a hearing on the

 

default issue. Generally, “except in emergency situations[,] due
process requires that when a State seeks to terminate an interest

1 it must afford ‘notice and opportunity for hearing
appropriate to the nature of the case’ before the termination
becones effective.” Guillemard Gionorio v. Contreras Gonez, 301
F. Supp. 2d 122, 133 (D. Puerto Rico 2001) (quoting Bell v.

Burson, 402 U.S. 535, $42 (1971)).

4s
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In Freitas II, Freitas asserted that he was deprived of
due process because HRS chapter 291 failed to outline @ specific
procedure to be employed in an administrative hearing. 108
Hawai'i at 44, 116 P.3d at 686, Freitas requested that the
hearing officer explicitly state what procedure would be employed
in the hearing, who had the burden of proof, and when such burden
shifted. Id. st 41, 116 P.3d at 683. In response, the hearing
officer noted that “the statute [allowed the hearing officer] to
conduct and control the course of [the] hearing and the procedure
that [the court] would follow.” Id.

This court relied on Desmond v, Admin, Dir, of the
Courts, 91 Hawai'i 212, 982 P.2d 346 (App. 1998), rev'd on other
grounds, 90 Hawai'i 301, 978 P.2d 739 (1999), which held that a
hearing officer “did not err in following her procedure rather
than the procedure proposed by [the motorist).” Freitas 11, 108
Hawai'i at 44, 116 P.3d at 686 (citing Desmond, 91 Hawai'i at 219,
982 P.2d at 353) (brackets in original). tn Desmond, the ICA
noted that “it is advisable that, at the commencement of the
administrative hearing, the Hearing Officer inform the parties
what procedure he or she will follow.” 91 Hawai'i at 219, 982
P.2d at 353 (emphasis added).

In rejecting Freitas’s argument, this court observed
that “procedural due process requires that a person have an
‘opportunity to be heard at 4 meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.'" 108 Hawai'i at 44, 116 P.3d at 686 (quoting Farmer ve

Admin. Dir, of the Courts, 94 Hawai'i 232, 238, 11 P.3d 457, 463
16
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(2000); cf, Padilla v, Immigration 4 Naturalization Serv., 21
F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that due process requires
not only notice, but “sufficient information to allow
[Petitioner] to prepare and present objection to the agency's
preliminary action or decision”). Since the hearing officer
had advised Freitas of the procedure that would be followed, this
court declined to overrule Desmond and held that the hearing
officer did not commit reversible error. 91 Hawai'i at 220-21,
982 F.2d at 354-55.

Unlike Freitas II, in which there was meaningful prior
instruction by the ADLRO on the procedure to be followed at the
revocation hearing, the Chief Adjudicator’s March 22 letter did
not inform Petitioner of the procedure available to set aside
default orders. The court did not consider whether the absence
of notification of @ procedure constituted a violation of due
process. Instead, the court decided that the issue it was
concerned with, as mentioned before, was whether “the ADLRO was
willing to consider a request to set aside a default and, if so
whether the ADLRO abused its discretion or committed some other
error in refusing to set aside” the default. The court thus

ruled that it was sufficient that a procedure existed.

in Padilla v. immfaration ¢ Naturalization Servs, 21 F.3d 970, 975
(sth Céz, 1994), the Board of Inigration Appeais’s Notice of Appeal Form
mentions that the opplicant must “specify reasons for this appeal” and to
Neontinde on separate ehects of paper if necessary.” The back of the form
notifies applicants that "if the factusl or legel basis for the appeal is not
Sufticiently deseribed the sppesl may be summarily diemissed.”" Ide

v

 
+**FOR PUBLICATION***

 

But as the court correctly pointed out, no procedure is
ever explained in the March 22 letter, reproduced supra. The
court acknowledged that “(wJhile the ADLRO’s letter in denying
the request did not explain its procedure, it announced that
there were established procedures to reconsider a default [.]”
(Emphasis added.) The letter only advised Petitioner that a
procedure existed and had been applied. In Ereitas II, however,
this court reiterated that it is advisable that “at the
commencement of the administrative hearing, the hearing officer
inform the parties what procedure he or she will follow” prior to
the application of such procedures. Freitas II, 108 Hawai'i at
45, 116 P.3d at 687 (quoting Desmond, 91 Hawai'i at 219, 982 P.2d
at 353). The failure to notify Petitioner of the procedure to
follow in the ADLRO’s “consider[ation of] a request to set aside
default” infringed on Petitioner’s procedural due process right
to be heard “at a meaningful time and in @ meaningful manner.”
Ads at 44, 116 P.3d at 686 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).

We note, also, that in upholding the ADLRO decision,

the court incorrectly determined that

 

while the procedure followed in this ct
she _deiault and provided quidance ai to what it mould take

ustity thet rev either could aot or

 

a te EuppOrt her assertion
of sate receipt

(Emphasis added.) This is not an accurate reading of the March
22 letter. The Chief Adjudicator ruled that the information
submitted with the March 18 letters “[was] insufficient to set

18
‘+*4FOR PUBLICATION*#*

.
aside the default,” but the Chief Adjudicator did not inform
Petitioner in advance of what would be sufficient to set aside a
default. Additionally, the Chief Adjudicator maintained in the
letter that “no independent documentation . . . was submitted,”
but there is nothing in the record to indicate that the Chief
Adjudicator ever informed Petitioner that “independent
documentation” was required or in what form the documentation
should be in or what the contents of the submission should
include, Plainly, Petitioner was not provided with information
sufficient to prepare and present objections to the agency's
decision. See Badilla, supra.

In referring to Petitioner’s choice to “submit such

 

evidence,” the court manifested an expectation that Petitioner
was required to submit what in fact she had not been informed she
must provide. what constitutes “such evidence” was never
defined. The March 22 letter did not set forth what would be
considered sufficient to set aside the default. Thus, contrary
to the court’s statement, the March 22 letter did not “provide(]
guidance as to what it would take to justify that reversal”; it
merely stated that the March 18 letter and Petitioner’s attached
statement were insufficient.

Further, the court was incorrect in stating that
“petitioner either could not or chose not to submit such evidence
to support her assertion of late receipt.” For, after relating
that the matters submitted by Petitioner were insufficient, the
March 22 letter concluded that “hence, pursuant to HRS § 291E-

as
‘***FOR PUBLICATION***

 

38(m), your request to set aside the default and schedule a new

 

hearing is hereby denied.” rt then directed that “[t]he
administrative driver's license revocation shall take effect” and
Petitioner’s only option for recourse was to “file a petition for
judicial review.” (Emphasis added.) Petitioner had no
opportunity and, hence, no choice “to submit such evidence” in
response to the ADLRO letter inasmuch as it as the first time
Petitioner was informed of the need for “such evidence.”
vin.

Respondent urges us to renand the case to the ADLRO.
Petitioner argues that we are prohibited from doing so pursuant
to HRS § 2918-40(d), which states that “[t]he court shall not
remand the matter back to the director for further proceedings
consistent with its order.” Petitioner reninds us that “(w)hen
faced with an issue of statutory interpretation, ‘[olur primary
duty is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
legislature, which is obtained primarily from the language of the
statute iteelf."” Lara vs Tanaka, 83 Hawai" 24, 26, 924 P.2d
192, 194 (1996) (quoting Ine v. Acceptance Ins, Co., 76 Hawai'i
26, 270, 874 P.2d 1091, 1095 (1994). In State v Kalama, 94
Hawas's 60, 63, 8 P.3d 1224, 1228 (2000), this court stated that
“where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, (the
appellate court's} sole duty is to give effect to its plain and
obvious meaning.” (Internal quotation marks and citation
omitted.) In doing such, we note that under HRS § 2916-40 (a),
the reference to the “court” is to the district court and,

20
‘***F0R PUBLICATION*#*
ee
therefore, does not preclude this court from remanding the

 

Moreover, we note that in Freitas v, Admin, Diz, of the
Courts, 104 Hawai'i 483, 484, 92 P.3d 993, 994 (2004)
(hereinafter “Exeitas I”], this court remanded a case back to the
ADLRO to afford the petitioner a hearing on his objections, as is
the case here. In that case, Freitas contended that he was,
denied @ hearing on whether AOLRO hearings were public, thereby
denying him due process. Id. at 484-85, 92 P.3d at 994-95. This
court agreed and renanded. Id, at 489, 92 P.3d at 999.

Specifically, it was stated that “the ADLRO denied Freitas 2

Under HRS § 2916-40(a), the reference to “court” is to the
district courts, HRS § 2910-40 states in relevant part?

(a) If the director sustains the administrative
revocation after an administrative hearing, the respondent

be itn th of the

 

 

tr
Seltt fhe filing of the petitios shail not operste as a stay
Of the administrative revocation,

a ive rev hal cone
er “a o
ou able, a viet the
ical worsvigenee If the petitioner fails

Bueppear without just cause oF, in the case of a petitioner
Under the age of eighteen, the petitioner fails to appear
with a parent or guardian, e

 

Te She Sele issues before the court shall be whether
the dizector

iai ine
au see tue nas ne with

 

(emphases added.) HRS § 2916-40{a) allows for “judicial review" by the
<Gistrict court.” ARS § 291E-€0(b) states that “the court shall schedule the
Judicial review." As the “judicial review" provided for in (a) 18 to be
2ghaucted by the “district court," it follows that references to “the court”
Gnidns § 2918-40 mean the “district court.” Therefore, HRS § 2516-40(a) does
hot preclude this court from renanding the case.

 

 

 

2
‘**4FOR PUBLICATION*#+
hearing on his objections to the identification and sign-in

procedures, . . . [HJe is entitled to show that the procedure

The same action

 

Limiting public access was not warranted.” Id.
48 appropriate in the instant case.
ik.

Based on the foregoing, the court’s April 25, 2005

judgment is vacated and the case is remanded to the ADLRO in

accordance with our decision herein.

on the briefs:

Earle A. Partington for
petitioner-appellant.

Kimberly A. Tsumoto and
Girard D. Lau, Deputy
Attorneys Genéral, for
respondent-appellee,

  

22