Case Title: Baker v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 115, 2005

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2006-08-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
THOMAS E. BAKER, 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  No. 115, 2005 
 
 
Defendant Below,  
) 
 
 
Appellant,  
 
)  Court Below:  Superior Court 
 
 
 
 
 
 
)  of the State of Delaware in 
v. 
 
 
 
 
 
)  and for Sussex County 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
)  Cr. ID. No. 0408027106 
 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
) 
 
 
Appellee. 
 
 
) 
 
Submitted:  June 21, 2006 
Decided: August 28, 2006 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS and 
RIDGELY, Justices, constituting the Court en Banc. 
 
 
Upon appeal from the Superior Court.  REVERSED AND REMANDED 
 
 
Ronald D. Phillips, Jr. and James D. Nutter (argued), Georgetown, Delaware 
for appellant. 
 
 
Kim Ayvazian, Department of Justice, Georgetown, Delaware for appellee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STEELE, Chief Justice: 
 
 
 
 
 
The defendant-appellant, Thomas Baker, appeals from his convictions for 
Second Degree Rape and two counts of Unlawful Sexual Contact. During trial, 
Baker took the stand and testified in his own defense. He categorically denied all 
of the allegations of rape and sexual abuse that the complaining witness, his 
daughter, brought against him. On appeal, Baker argues, among other things, that 
while cross examining him, the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by insinuating 
through a question that Baker had some prior “familiarity with sex offenses.” We 
have concluded that that misconduct about which Baker complains constitutes 
plain error. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.  
FACTS 
 
At the time of his trial, the defendant, Thomas “Eddie” Baker was a sixty-
three year old long distance truck driver. Baker had fifteen children by two 
different wives, and also had several grandchildren.  Before June of 2004, Baker 
lived with his wife Irene Baker, several children, and several grandchildren at their 
home on Lonesome Road in Seaford. Ruth, the complaining witness in this case, is 
Baker’s youngest daughter.  
 
About ten or fifteen years ago, Baker developed diabetes, which caused him 
to suffer from boils, cysts, and swollen feet. At certain times, Baker’s feet swelled 
so much that he could not tie his shoes. He also frequently had a sore back from 
driving. Baker’s wife and several of his children periodically rubbed his feet, 
 
2
massaged his back, and popped his boils or cysts. This activity generally took place 
in his bedroom.  
 
Ruth, who was sixteen at the time of the trial, testified that when she was 
thirteen, she began rubbing her father’s feet, massaging his back, and “doing” or 
popping the bumps on his back and legs. She did this in the bedroom, which had 
only a curtain over the door. At some point during these massages, Ruth testified, 
Baker began sexually abusing her by touching and placing his hands and fingers 
inside her vagina. Ruth also testified that Baker rubbed her breasts inside her 
clothes. The abuse began about the time of Ruth’s thirteenth birthday, which was 
in November, 2001. The contact always took place underneath the covers and 
occurred every week or week-and-a-half until Ruth’s fourteenth birthday. During 
that year, Ruth testified, Baker inappropriately touched her in a similar fashion 
about forty times – every time that she went to give him a massage.  
 
Ruth testified that the sexual abuse worsened as she grew older. When she 
was 14 or 15, Ruth took a trip with Baker on his work truck. During this trip, after 
they had driven for about a day, Baker inserted his penis into Ruth’s vagina while 
they were both in the sleeper area of the truck. Ruth testified to yet another 
 
3
incident of rape when she went with Baker in his personal truck to Parsonsburg, 
Maryland. 1
 
The State proceeded at trial based on two instances of rape that allegedly 
occurred in Delaware. The first occurred during a school day in which Ruth stayed 
home at the residence in Seaford. During that day, Ruth testified, Baker again 
raped her. This incident occurred in Baker’s bedroom, when Ruth was 14 or 15, in 
ninth grade, at the end of 2003 “before the year changed” to 2004, sometime 
around her school’s “state testing,” and “before Christmas.” In an attempt to prove 
when the alleged rape occurred or to at least prove opportunity, the State called the 
investigating officer, Detective Chambers. Chambers compared Ruth’s school 
                                                 
1  
The State only charged Baker with two counts of first degree rape based upon 
penile/vaginal penetration that occurred within Delaware. Nevertheless, Ruth testified to two 
incidents that occurred outside of Delaware. Defense counsel agreed to the admission of the 
testimony for tactical reasons (in her various statements to the authorities Ruth said that Baker 
raped her two, three, or four times, and defense counsel wanted to impeach Ruth by pointing out 
the inconsistencies). The first uncharged incident allegedly occurred in Baker’s work truck when 
Ruth accompanied him on a trip. The second allegedly occurred in Baker’s personal truck on the 
way to Parsonsburg, Maryland. In the jury instructions, the trial judge gave a purported “Getz-
404(b)” instruction that follows:  
 
During this trial there has been testimony that the defendant had alleged sexual 
contact with the complaining witness, occurring in another state, beyond the 
jurisdiction of the State of Delaware. Both the State and the Defense offer this 
evidence, but for different reasons. The State alleges the prior conduct is relevant 
as to the defendant’s intent and motive as to the charged offenses. The Defense 
alleges the prior conduct is relevant as to your assessment of the complaining 
witness’ credibility. I direct that you can only use this testimony for the above 
purposes and you cannot use it for any other purpose. You cannot and must not 
use any incident or sexual conduct occurring outside of the State of Delaware as 
to the allegation of sexual conduct alleged in Count 7- continuous sexual abuse of 
a child.  
 
He also gave a similar instruction immediately after Ruth’s testimony.  
 
4
absence record with Baker’s work record to prove that Baker was home from work 
on the days Ruth was home from school during February 2004 and March 2004. 
Chambers also testified that state testing occurred in March 2004.  
 
Ruth specifically described the alleged rape that occurred in the bedroom. 
According to her testimony on direct examination, Baker put on a condom and 
inserted his penis into her vagina. The rape ended after Baker “cum.” After he did 
so, Baker took off the condom, balled it up in a paper towel, and threw it away.   
 
The second and later of the two instances of rape that occurred in Delaware 
arose during a trip in which Ruth accompanied Baker to the Seaford Wal-Mart. 
Ruth testified that she accompanied Baker on an errand to Wal-Mart. Baker passed 
by Wal-Mart and drove his personal pickup truck to a back road nearby. He 
stopped the truck, stayed in his seat, put a condom on, and asked Ruth to take her 
pants off. Baker then climbed over the seat, placed Ruth’s seat in the reclining 
position, and put his penis in Ruth’s vagina. After the alleged rape, Baker moved 
back over to his seat, took his condom off, and threw it out the window.  
 
Defense counsel attempted to illustrate on cross examination, and heavily 
emphasized during summation, that Ruth’s testimony on direct examination about 
the two incidents of rape that allegedly occurred in Delaware was arguably 
inconsistent with statements she made earlier.  On June 16, 2004, an employee of 
the Child Advocacy Center conducted a videotaped interview of Ruth, which the 
 
5
State played at trial. During the interview Ruth described the incident of alleged 
rape that occurred in the bedroom. She stated that Baker took his pants off, did not 
put a condom on, and stuck his penis in her vagina. Several minutes later Ruth 
stated that Baker ejaculated all over the place and that it was “all gooey and stuff.”  
 
Chambers also testified about certain statements Ruth made to him that 
defense counsel argued were inconsistent with her testimony on direct 
examination. During his investigation, Chambers took Ruth out to the scene of the 
alleged rape on the back roads behind Wal-Mart. Chambers testified that during 
this trip Ruth told him that Baker  pulled off on a stony section of the road, “pulled 
out a condom, placed it on his penis, exited the driver’s side, walked around the 
vehicle, had [Ruth] step out of the passenger seat, at which time he sat in the 
passenger seat and had her get on top of him after removing her pants.” 2   
 
After the first alleged rape in Baker’s bedroom and the second alleged rape 
in Baker’s personal truck, Baker continued to touch Ruth inappropriately in the 
bedroom, and also when Ruth accompanied him on errands. These incidents 
occurred while Ruth was in ninth grade and after the alleged rape in the bedroom, 
                                                 
2  
Interestingly, during her direct examination Ruth very briefly described the alleged rape 
that occurred on the back roads near Wal-Mart in a similar fashion. Ruth testified that Baker “got 
in my side, my door, and he stuck his penis inside of me only once.” This statement is consistent 
with Chambers’ testimony about what Ruth related to him when they visited the scene of the 
alleged rape. The statement does, however, appear to be inconsistent with what Ruth later 
testified on direct examination about Baker climbing over to the passenger seat.  
 
6
which, from her earlier testimony, would indicate a time period of “before 
Christmas” in 2003 until June 12, 2004 at the latest.  
 
On the evening of June 12, 2004, while he was lying in his bed, Baker 
requested that Ruth massage his back and feet. Ruth refused and told Baker that 
she did not feel well. Baker then asked Ruth to get under the covers with him, 
which she interpreted to mean that he was going to “mess” with her. After refusing 
to massage Baker, Ruth called her sister Patty and told her “everything that 
happened” and that she planned to report the sexual abuse to the police. After the 
phone call to Patty, Ruth called Jessica Collins, her brother’s former girlfriend. 
Ruth told Collins that that Baker was sexually abusing her and that she wanted to 
go to the police. Collins came to the Seaford residence, picked up Ruth, and took 
her back to where Collins then lived. Officer Vonthenen of the Blades police 
department met them there. Ruth discussed the history of abuse with Vonthenen, 
who testified about Ruth’s statements. 
 
On direct examination Ruth also testified that she told her mother, her sister, 
Patty Willin, and two of her friends, Jessica David and Ashley Hill, about the 
sexual abuse at various times before she went to the police. During Ruth’s 
testimony, the State also introduced Ruth’s journal as an exhibit. In the journal, 
Ruth described her father “messing” with her and having sex with her.  
 
7
 
After Ruth testified, the State called Irene Baker, who testified that her 
daughter, Patty Willin, called about six months before June 13, 2004 and informed 
her that Ruth claimed that Baker was sexually abusing her. Irene thought that Ruth 
might have complained to Patty about sexual abuse because Baker had grounded 
her. Irene also testified that after coming back from a trip with Baker on his work 
truck, Ruth told Irene that she was no longer going on similar trips, but did not 
explain why.  On cross examination, Irene, who is Ruth’s mother, testified that 
Ruth had “been known to lie to get her way in a few incidents. So I can’t say she’s 
being honest all the time.”  
 
Patty Willin testified that perhaps three to six months before June 12, 2004, 
Ruth called her and related the story of sexual abuse.  After Willin testified, the 
State called Jessica Collins, who explained the events that occurred on June 12, 
2004. On that evening, Ruth called Collins and asked Collins to come pick her up 
because Baker was sexually abusing her. In response to a question from the 
prosecutor, Collins testified that Ruth did not have a good reputation for 
truthfulness in the community.  On cross examination, Collins related her own 
opinion of Ruth’s truthfulness:  “She lies very bad.”  
 
 
The State called several other witnesses including Ashley Hill and Jessica 
David, two of Ruth’s friends, who testified that Ruth told them about Baker’s 
sexual abuse sometime before June 12, 2004. Hill testified that Ruth related the 
 
8
story about sexual abuse and rape between the middle of May and June 2004. 
David testified that Ruth related the story about the inappropriate touching, but not 
rape, within a week of February 3, 2004.  
 
The defense called several of Baker’s children to testify on his behalf: Lina 
Bramble, Mary Polite, Charles Baker, Grace Beachamp, and Cindy Beach. Those 
children testified that, in their opinion, Ruth was untruthful. Some of the female 
children testified that they had accompanied Baker on long truck trips and had 
given him massages and rubbed his feet without incident.  The defense also called 
Nicole Dickenson who testified that she had a conversation with Ruth about Ruth’s 
allegations against Baker. According to Dickenson, Ruth said that she was going to 
get back at Baker because Baker would not let Ruth do what she wanted to do. 
Dickenson also testified that Ruth told her that Baker did not do the things that 
Ruth alleged.  Dickenson later testified that she had spoken to Jessica David, who 
said that she was trying to reach Ruth to ask Ruth what Ruth wanted her to say at 
trial.  Moreover, Dickenson echoed the sentiment that Ruth was untruthful. 
Standing alone, Dickenson’s testimony seemed very damaging to the State’s case.  
The prosecutor did, however, effectively cross examine Dickenson about her 
motives for helping Baker and her delay in coming forward with the information 
that Ruth had made up the allegations of sexual abuse and rape.  
 
9
 
Baker took the stand and testified in his own defense.  He categorically 
denied all of the allegations of sexual abuse and rape against him.  The main focus 
of Baker’s testimony was that he was unable to get an erection.  Five to seven 
years ago, Baker testified, he had a cyst between his legs lanced. After that point, 
he was unable to get a full erection, but could get “not very much of a partial” 
erection. Because of the erectile dysfunction, Baker was unable to have sexual 
intercourse with his wife.  He reported this problem to his doctor about four or five 
years before the trial.  The doctor prescribed Viagra, but after trying the Viagra 
three times with his wife, Baker stopped using it because, even with the Viagra, he 
could not have an erection.   
  
 
On cross examination, Baker testified that on the second of the three times 
he tried the Viagra, around 2000 or 2001, he was able to get three-quarters of an 
erection and ejaculate outside of his wife, but that he stopped using the Viagra after 
the three times because he could not get a full erection.  Baker also admitted that 
the night Ruth went to the police, he asked her to come into his room to massage 
his back under the covers because he was “chilly,” but that she “haul-tailed it” out 
of the bedroom.  Irene Baker corroborated Baker’s testimony about his inability to 
achieve an erection.  
 
10
 
Baker also testified that sometime in the spring of 2004, he sent Ruth to the 
doctor with her mother to see if Ruth was still a virgin. He was concerned because 
Ruth had run away and was not in her bedroom when he came home one night. 
 
The case against Baker went to the jury on seven counts:  (1) First Degree 
Rape occurring between May 1, 2004 and June 5, 2004 in Baker’s personal truck; 
(2) First Degree Rape occurring between February 4, 2004 and March 30, 2004 in 
Baker’s bedroom; (3) Second Degree Rape occurring between November 11, 2001 
and November 10, 2002 by means of digital penetration; (4) Second Degree 
Unlawful Sexual Contact, occurring between November 11, 2001 and November 
10, 2002 by means of rubbing the victim’s vagina and breasts; (5) Second Degree 
Rape occurring between November 11, 2002 and June 2, 2004 by means of digital 
penetration; (6) Second Degree Unlawful Sexual Contact occurring between 
November 11, 2002 and June 2, 2004 by means of rubbing the victim’s vagina and 
breasts; and (7) Continuous Sexual Abuse of a Child occurring between November 
11, 2001 and November 10, 2002.  
 
During their deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial judge indicating 
that they could not reach a unanimous vote on Counts 2, 3, 5 and 7, but could agree 
on Counts 4, 6 , and 1.  While the trial judge considered an Allen charge, however, 
the jury informed the bailiff that they were near a verdict.  Shortly thereafter, the 
 
11
jury returned verdicts of “not guilty” on Counts 1, 2, 3, and 7, and “guilty” verdicts 
on Counts 4, 5, and 6.  
DISCUSSION 
 
On appeal, Baker claims that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct that 
unfairly affected the outcome of the trial by impermissibly “fishing” or asking 
questions for which he did not, in good faith, have a factual predicate. Baker cites 
two incidents of alleged “fishing,” the first of which occurred during direct 
examination of Patty Willin, one of Ruth’s sisters.  Because we have determined 
that the second instance of “fishing” was so unfairly prejudicial that it constitutes 
reversible error in and of itself, we need not address the first instance of “fishing.” 
 
The second instance of alleged misconduct occurred when the prosecutor 
cross examined Baker. To understand fully the nature of the allegedly improper 
cross, it is necessary to quote the relevant portion of Baker’s testimony on direct: 
Q (Defense counsel): 
Was there an occasion where you sent Ruthy 
to the doctor? 
A (Baker):  Yes, there was. 
Q: 
When was that? 
A:  
I don’t remember the date. But it was, I’d say, in the spring of 
2004 or right close to spring. 
Q: 
What did you send her to the doctor for? 
A: 
To see if she’s ever had sex or anything, see if she’s still a 
virgin. 
Q: 
Why did you do that? 
A: 
Because she had run away or wasn’t in her bedroom when I 
come home. 
Q: 
Who did you send her to the doctor with? 
A: 
Her mother. 
 
12
Q: 
What instructions did you give her mother? 
A: 
For her to have her checked to see if she had been sexually 
active, or whatever. 
Q: 
Why was that a concern of yours? 
A: 
Well, she wasn’t home. She run away. They were having a 
party next door. I sent my son over there three or four times, 
and he come back and he kept telling me, Dad, she’s not 
there….And I guess in five minutes she walked in through the 
back door and I said, where have you been, Ruthy. She said, 
well, I’ve been asleep out in the blue car. I got a ’65 Chevelle 
sitting out back. It was a little chilly, not too cold. But, you 
know, at least she had a jacket on. 
 
 
And she said, I just woke up there. Of course, by her eyes 
she looked like she just woke up. So I took her – told her 
mother to send her on to the doctor, anyway. 
Q: 
Did that story that she gave you make sense to you? 
A: 
Well, I took her word for it. 
Q: 
You still felt the need to send her to the doctor? 
A: 
Yes, sir.  
 
During cross examination, the following exchange occurred:  
 
Q (Prosecutor): 
Now, this time that you say you took Ruthy to the 
hospital, it was to see whether or not she was still a virgin? 
A (Baker):  I did not take her to the hospital. 
Q: 
But you directed someone?  
A: 
I directed my wife to. 
Q: 
And you have some familiarity with sex offenses? There are 
other members that you know, other friends, other people that 
you know have been accused of sex offenses? 
 
 
At this point, defense counsel asked the trial judge for permission to 
approach the bench. After approaching, defense counsel appeared to object on the 
 
13
basis that this question was irrelevant and beyond the scope of direct.3  The 
prosecutor (as we construe his position from the record) argued that his question 
was relevant because if Baker were aware of a friend or family member who had 
been investigated for sexual abuse, he might be aware of the medical investigative 
techniques that apply to rape cases. In other words, the prosecutor argued, that if 
Baker had this type of knowledge, he might have sent Ruth to the hospital to 
determine whether she was still a virgin so that if it turned out that she was not, he 
could have intercourse with her without the physical evidence of the fact that his 
daughter was no longer a virgin being attributable to him.  
 
The trial judge and the prosecutor explored this position in detail on the 
basis of the question’s “relevance.”  The trial judge ultimately concluded that the 
prosecutor’s theory was too “clever,” confused him, and therefore would likely 
confuse the jury.  The trial judge then concluded that whatever relevance the 
response might have was substantially outweighed by the possibility of jury 
confusion under D.R.E. 403.  The following exchange then occurred:  
THE COURT: 
…do you even know what his answer is going to 
be, or were you just kind of like – 
Prosecutor: 
How would I know? 
THE COURT:  
So long. I understand that. I did not know if in the 
investigation something came out when you 
talked to the police. 
                                                 
3  
“I’m not exactly sure where he’s going or what the relevance of other people being 
accused is. It didn’t seem to have anything to do with my direct examination. I can’t, for the life 
of me, see where he’s going with it.” 
 
14
Prosecutor: 
I have no statement.  
THE COURT: 
Let’s not go down that row to hoe then.  
 
Immediately thereafter, defense counsel and the prosecutor returned to their tables 
and the prosecutor continued his cross examination.  The trial judge did not give a 
curative instruction, strike the question, sustain the objection in the jury’s presence, 
or in any way tell the jury that the prosecutor’s question(s) may have suggested 
that the prosecutor had knowledge that Baker had “some familiarity with sex 
offenses” when in fact the prosecutor admitted that he had no good faith basis in 
fact to phrase the question as he did. 
 
Our analysis of whether alleged prosecutorial misconduct warrants a reversal 
of a defendant’s conviction begins with whether the issue was fairly presented 
below.4 Over the years, just as we have continuously admonished prosecutors to 
refrain from engaging in misconduct at trial, we have likewise admonished defense 
counsel to raise timely objections to that misconduct. 5 Timely objections to 
prosecutorial misconduct give the trial prosecutor  an opportunity to respond to the 
allegation of misconduct in the first instance and, more importantly, give the trial 
judge the opportunity to consider whether misconduct in fact occurred and if so 
                                                 
4  
Sup. Ct. R. 8, See Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986). 
 
5  
See Trump v. State, 753 A.2d 963, 969-970 (Del. 2000), 753 A.2d at 976-970 (citing 
Mason v. State, 658 A.2d 994, 999 (Del. 1995)); Morris v. State, 795 A.2d 653, 661, n22 (Del. 
2002); Mathis v. State, 2006 WL 2434741, *5, n29. (Del. 2006). 
 
 
15
what, if anything, should be done to remedy it. One factor of the Hughes6 test 
looks to the steps the trial judge took to mitigate the effect of prosecutorial 
misconduct.  Without a timely objection that focuses the trial judge’s attention on 
the specific alleged misconduct, the trial judge rarely can be expected to take steps 
that will mitigate its effects.  
 
Consequently, our standards for reviewing prosecutorial misconduct are 
slightly different depending on whether the issue was fairly presented below. If 
defense counsel raised a timely and pertinent objection to prosecutorial misconduct 
at trial, or if the trial judge intervened and considered the issue sua sponte, we 
essentially review for “harmless error.” If defense counsel failed to do so and the 
trial judge did not intervene sua sponte, we review only for plain error. 7  We take 
this opportunity to restate our case law as it applies to both the harmless and plain 
error standards of review for prosecutorial misconduct. 
Harmless Error 
 
The first step in the harmless error analysis involves a de novo review of the 
record to determine whether misconduct actually occurred.8 If we determine that 
                                                 
6  
Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d 559, 571 (Del. 1981); See Supra pg. 17. 
 
7  
See e.g., Kurzmann v. State, --- A.2d --- 2006 Del. LEXIS 390, *11 (Del. 2006).  
 
8  
Daniels v. State, 859 A.2d 1008, 1011 (Del. 2004) (citing Hunter v. State, 815 A.2d 730 
(Del. 2002)); Price v. State, 858 A.2d 930, 939 (Del. 2004); Flonnory v. State, 893 A.2d 507, 
538 (Del. 2006). 
  
 
16
no misconduct occurred, our analysis ends there. If, however, we determine that 
the trial prosecutor did engage in misconduct, we move to the second step in the 
analysis, because not every instance of prosecutorial misconduct requires reversal.9 
Only improper comments or conduct that prejudicially affect the defendant’s 
substantial rights warrant a reversal of his conviction.10 To determine whether 
prosecutorial misconduct prejudicially affects a defendant’s substantial rights, we 
apply the three factors of the Hughes test, which are: (1) the closeness of the case, 
(2) the centrality of the issue affected by the error, and (3) the steps taken to 
mitigate the effects of the error.11 The factors in the Hughes test are not 
conjunctive and do not have the same impact in every case; for example, one factor 
may outweigh the other two. Moreover, we apply the test itself in a contextual, 
case-by-case, and fact sensitive manner. If after applying the Hughes test we 
                                                 
9  
Daniels, 859 A.2d at 1011 (citing and parenthetically quoting United States v. Sherman, 
171 F.2d 619, 625 (2d Cir. 1948)) (“No prosecution is tried with flawless perfection; if every slip 
is to result in reversal, we shall never succeed in enforcing the criminal law at all.”) 
 
10  
Daniels, 859 A.2d at 1011 (citing Sexton v. State, 397 A.2d 540, 544 (Del. 1979); 
Edwards v. State, 320 A.2d 701 (Del. 1974); Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 52(a) (“Any error … 
which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.”)); Derose v. State, 840 A.2d 615, 
619 (Del. 2003); Bugra v. State, 818 A.2d 964, 967 (Del. 2003); Caldwell v. State, 770 A.2d 522, 
527 (Del. 2001). 
 
11  
Hughes, 437 A.2d at 571  (quoting Dyson v. United States, 418 A.2d 127, 132 (D.C. 
1980); Flonnory, 893 A.2d at 538. 
 
 
17
conclude that the misconduct warrants reversal, we do not reach or apply what has 
been referred to as the Hunter test.12
 
Although several of our recent cases may be read to suggest that the Hunter 
test is simply the fourth factor in a single unified Hughes-Hunter four-factor test,13 
that is not the case.14 The Hunter test only applies in an instance where the 
application of the Hughes test does not lead to a reversal. Where the prosecutorial 
misconduct “fails” the Hughes test (e.g., where the case is not close, the issue 
affected by the prosecutorial misconduct is not central, or the trial judge gives an 
adequate curative instruction), and otherwise would not warrant reversal, we 
examine Hunter – the third step in the harmless error analysis for prosecutorial 
misconduct – considering whether the prosecutor’s statements or misconduct are 
repetitive errors that require reversal because they cast doubt on the integrity of the 
judicial process.15 Under the Hunter test, we can reverse, but need not do so, 
                                                 
12  
Hunter, 815 A.2d at 732. 
 
13  
See e.g., Briscoe v. State, 2006 Del. LEXIS 412, *12, n8 (Del. 2006) (Order); Kurzmann, 
2006 Del. LEXIS 390, *11; Smith v. State, --- A.2d ---, 2006 Del. LEXIS 218,*30, *43-44 (Del. 
2006); Flonnory, 893 A.2d at 538; Thompson v. State, 2005 Del. LEXIS 423, *5-6 (Del. 2005) 
(Order); 
 
14  
By this statement we do not intend to imply that these earlier cases were incorrectly 
decided, for they were not. The articulation of the standard of review in those cases, however, 
was arguably slightly confusing. The application of the prosecutorial misconduct standards in 
those cases would be the same, as would the result under this restatement of the law governing 
prosecutorial misconduct.  
 
15  
Hunter, 815 A.2d at 732. 
 
 
18
notwithstanding that the prosecutorial misconduct would not warrant reversal 
under the Hughes test.16  Where the misconduct does not warrant reversal under 
the Hunter test, we have other options available to address prosecutorial 
misconduct like referring the case to the Attorney General for internal discipline17 
or to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. 
Plain Error 
 
Where defense counsel fails to raise a timely and pertinent objection to 
alleged prosecutorial misconduct at trial and the trial judge does not intervene sua 
sponte, we review only for plain error.18 The first step in the plain error review of 
prosecutorial misconduct mirrors that in the review for harmless error: we examine 
the record de novo to determine whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred. If we 
determine that no misconduct occurred, our analysis ends. If, however, the trial 
prosecutor did engage in misconduct we move to the second step in the plain error 
analysis by applying the familiar Wainwright standard. Under that standard,   
                                                 
16  
See Id. at 737-738;  
  
17  
See Price, 858 A.2d at 941 (“Departure from these ethical and professional obligations 
should be remedied other than by reversing convictions as a means to punish a blundering . . . 
prosecutor. Where (as here) we can fairly conclude the unfair prejudice caused by such a 
prosecutor did not adversely affect the outcome of a trial and did not reflect a pattern of conduct 
that compromises the integrity of the judicial process, we must find other ways to address the 
prosecutor's misconduct.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 
18  
Kurzmann, 2006 Del. LEXIS 390 at *11; Morris, 795 A.2d at 657; Robertson v. State, 
596 A.2d 1345, 1356 (Del. 1991); Mason, 658 A.2d at 996.  
 
19
the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to substantial 
rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process. 
Furthermore, the doctrine of plain error is limited to material defects 
which are apparent on the face of the record, which are basic, serious, 
and fundamental in their character, and which clearly deprive an 
accused of a substantial right, or which clearly show manifest 
injustice.19
 
 
If we determine that plain error occurred under the Wainwright standard, we 
will reverse without reaching the third step of the analysis. As with the harmless 
error analysis, if we conclude that the misconduct would not warrant reversal under 
the Wainwright standard, we proceed to apply Hunter as the third analytical step 
and consider whether the prosecutor's statements are repetitive errors that require 
reversal because they cast doubt on the integrity of the judicial process. Again, 
under the Hunter analysis, we can reverse, but need not do so, even if the 
prosecutorial misconduct would not warrant reversal under the Wainwright 
standard. Other options are available: we can still remedy egregious prosecutorial 
misconduct by referring the case to the Attorney General or to the Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel. 
 
Some of our recent cases appear to have created an unnecessary gloss on the 
plain error standard of review for prosecutorial misconduct, at least for specific 
                                                 
19  
Wainwright, 504 A.2d at 1100. (emphasis added and citations omitted). 
 
 
20
types of misconduct.20 These cases appear to suggest another or additional standard 
by which we determine whether prosecutorial misconduct is plain error. A fair 
reading of these cases would be that prosecutorial misconduct or improper 
comments will only lead to reversal under the plain error standard where 
credibility is a central issue in a close case and the prosecutorial misconduct is so 
clear, and defense counsel’s failure to object so inexcusable, that a trial judge, in 
the interest of fundamental fairness, has no reasonable alternative other than to 
intervene sua sponte and declare a mistrial or issue a curative instruction. We 
regard this gloss as an unnecessary overlay on the familiar Wainwright plain error 
standard. Essentially, the “sua sponte intervention” standard and the Wainwright 
standard are the same and serve the same purpose. Both help us determine whether 
instances of misconduct to which defense counsel did not object, and which the 
trial judge did not address sua sponte, are nonetheless so facially egregious that 
they require reversal of the defendant’s convictions.21 In other words, unremedied 
prosecutorial misconduct that would be plain error under the Wainwright standard 
                                                 
20  
See e.g., Mathis, 2006 WL 2434741, *3; Drummond v. State, 2003 Del. LEXIS 509, *7-8 
(Del. 2003) (Order);  Derose, 840 A.2d at 619; Swan, 820 A.2d at 356 (Del. 2003); Williams v. 
State, 803 A.2d 927, 928 (Del. 2002); Morris 795 A.2d at 660; Churchill v. State, 812 A.2d 224 
(Del. 2002) (Order); Cousins v. State, 793 A.2d 1249 (Del. 2001)(Order); Bruce v. State, 781 
A.2d 544, 554 (Del. 2001); Warren v. State, 774 A.2d 246, 256-257 (Del. 2001); Caldwell, 770 
A.2d at 527; Clayton v. State, 765 A.2d 940, 944 (Del. 2001); Trump 753 A.2d at 965. 
21  
See e.g.,, Bruce v. State, 781 A.2d at 554, n.40 (citing Trump, 753 A.2d at 964-65, 
Robertson, 596 A.2d at 1356); See also Trump, 753 A.2d at 966, n.4 (citing Mason, 658 A.2d at 
996; Robertson, 596 A.2d at 1356).  
 
21
would also be plain error under the sua sponte intervention standard, and vice 
versa. For the sake of maintaining clarity in our law, we think it prudent to 
abandon the sua sponte intervention standard entirely in favor of the Wainwright 
standard. That will lead to doctrinal consistency, promote the clarity of our case 
law, and generally bring our plain error review of prosecutorial misconduct claims 
squarely within that same standard of plain error review that we employ in other 
areas of the criminal law.  
 
Although we abandon the sua sponte intervention standard today as an 
unnecessary overlay on the Wainwright standard, we reemphasize that trial judges 
have a continuing duty to intervene sua sponte, even in the absence of defense 
counsel’s objection, when a trial prosecutor steps out of bounds. The sua sponte 
intervention standard served the purpose of reminding trial judges of their 
obligation to actively intervene in criminal trials, in the interest of fundamental 
fairness, when defense counsel fails to object properly to prosecutorial misconduct. 
Although we abandon the sua sponte intervention standard, we disclaim any intent 
to discourage trial judges from actively intervening to remedy unfairly prejudicial 
conduct. 22
                                                 
22  
This framework assumes a single instance of misconduct. When the prosecutor engages 
in more than one instance of misconduct, “our analysis includes a review of both the statements’ 
[or misconducts’] individual and cumulative effect.” Swan v. State, 820 A.2d 342, 356 (Del. 
2003) (citing Mason, 658 A.2d at 999; Michael v. State, 529 A.2d 752, 765 (Del. 1987)); See 
also Derose,  840 A.2d at 623.  
 
 
22
Application 
 
It is clear that where defense counsel fails to raise any objection at trial to 
alleged prosecutorial misconduct and the trial judge fails to intervene sua sponte, 
we review claims of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal for plain error. Similarly, 
where defense counsel raises a pertinent, specific, and timely objection on the 
grounds of prosecutorial misconduct or the trial judge intervenes sua sponte and 
determines whether prosecutorial misconduct occurred, we will review for 
harmless error. This case presents a more perplexing question because it falls 
somewhere between these two alternatives. Here, defense counsel at least raised a 
misfocused objection on relevance grounds, that arguably triggered an analysis of 
whether the prosecutor’s question caused unfair prejudice under D.R.E. 403. Once 
the trial judge employed a D.R.E 403 analysis based on jury confusion, he was 
merely steps away from the real issue which is whether the prosecutor’s compound 
question unfairly prejudiced Baker. Had the trial judge’s analysis not stopped with 
jury confusion, there is no doubt that he would have considered the Getz 
implications of the first part of the question. The State contends that because the 
objection was misfocused, because defense counsel did not specifically argue that 
the prosecutor did not have a good faith factual predicate for his question, and 
(presumably) because the trial judge did not sua sponte consider this issue, we may 
review only for plain error. But, we need not quibble over whether defense 
 
23
counsel’s misfocused objection triggered harmless or plain error review. We have 
concluded that the prosecutorial misconduct warrants reversal under the plain error 
standard of review. It therefore would ipso facto warrant reversal under the 
harmless error standard as well. 
 
For over twenty-five years, we have admonished prosecutors to follow the 
ABA standards governing the prosecution function.23 One such standard is 3-5.7, 
which governs the prosecutor’s examination of witnesses and provides that “[a] 
prosecutor should not ask a question which implies the existence of a factual 
predicate for which a good faith belief is lacking.”24 That standard of conduct is 
particularly important given the prosecutor’s heightened obligation as a servant of 
the law and the public.25 Prosecutors are “officers of the court and … 
representatives of the State” and, therefore, have a “special duty to ensure that any 
convictions are based on the evidence presented at trial….”26 Members of the jury 
are likely to assume that prosecutors will satisfy their heightened obligations of 
                                                 
23  
See Hunter, 815 A.2d at 735; Williams, 803 A.2d at 928, Brokenbrough v. State, 522 
A.2d 851, 858 (Del. 1987). 
 
24  
ABA Criminal Justice Standards, Prosecution Function, Standard 3-5.7(d), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/pfunc_toc.html;  See also State v. Long, 1992 Del. 
Super. LEXIS 338, *12, n.1 ( Del. Super. 1992) (Steele, J) (citing the former version of Standard 
3-5.7(d))  aff’d by 1993 Del. LEXIS 250 (Del. 1993).  
 
25  
See Miller v. State, 893 A.2d 937, 952 (Del. 2006); Bennett v. State, 53 Del. 36, 43 (Del. 
1960); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (U.S. 1935);  
 
26  
Clayton, 765 A.2d at 943.  
 
 
24
impartiality, and thus may give undue weight to questions that prosecutors ask that 
imply facts not in evidence. As the Maryland Court of Appeals has eloquently 
stated:  
Questions alone can impeach. Apart from their mere wording, through 
voice inflections and other mannerisms of the examiner – things that 
cannot be discerned from the printed record – they can insinuate; they 
can suggest; they can accuse; they can create an aura in the courtroom 
that the trial judge can sense but about which we could only speculate. 
The most persistent denials, even from articulate adult witnesses, may 
not suffice to overcome the suspicion they can engender . . . .27
 
Accordingly, “it is a well-established principle that the prosecutor has a special 
obligation to avoid improper suggestions, insinuations, and, especially, assertions 
of personal knowledge.”28 Moreover, “[a] prosecutor has the responsibility of a 
minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate. This responsibility carries 
with it specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice 
and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence.”29 
  
 
In this case, the underlying improper question was, in fact, two questions:  
(1) And you have some familiarity with sex offenses? 
(2) There are other members that you know, other friends, other 
people that you know have been accused of sex offenses? 
 
                                                 
27  
Elmer v. State, 724 A.2d 625, 632 (Md. 1999) (quoting Craig v. State, 544 A.2d 784, 805 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 560 A.2d 1120 (Md. 1989), jdgmt vacated on 
other grounds, 497 U.S. 836 (1990)).  
 
28  
Trump, 753 A.2d at 968 (citations and internal quotations omitted).  
 
29  
DEL. LAWYERS’ RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8, com.[1]. 
 
 
25
Although the first and second questions are not connected by an “and,” the 
question(s) are very close to being compound – indeed, one might say, they are the 
functional equivalent of a compound question.  The prosecutor phrased the first 
question so as to imply clearly that he had a factual basis to conclude that the 
defendant had some involvement with sex offenses before he committed the ones 
for which he was on trial – enough involvement, at least, to make him “familiar 
with sex offenses.”  From the prosecutor’s question the jury could have drawn 
impermissible inferences that Baker himself (“you”) had been engaged in, 
investigated, arrested, charged, or convicted of earlier sex offenses and then made 
the impermissible conduct-from-character inference against which this Court 
remains ever vigilant.30  
 
At trial, defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial judge focused on only 
the second implication of the prosecutor’s convoluted double question. The 
prosecutor’s second question arguably clarified what he intended by the first, yet 
created a different possible implication (the one that the trial judge and the 
prosecutor explored during their sidebar conversation) – whether Baker sent Ruth 
to the hospital for an examination to establish whether she was still a virgin, to 
determine whether he could have sex with her without leaving behind any physical 
                                                 
30  
See e.g., Getz v. State, 538 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988); DeShields v. State, 706 A.2d 502 (Del. 
1998).  
 
 
26
evidence, i.e., her loss of virginity. In our judgment, although that second possible 
implication is present, it is not clear from the prosecutor’s second question. The 
jury heard only the prosecutor’s questions and heard defense counsel’s request to 
approach the bench. The jury was not privy to the sidebar conversation in which 
the prosecutor explained his “clever” and “confusing” theory to the trial judge.  
Even the trial judge did not understand the thrust of the prosecutor’s questioning 
until after a relatively lengthy discussion with the prosecutor.  The trial judge, 
however, neither gave the jury a curative or cautionary instruction, nor did he tell 
the jury that he had sustained a defense objection. Because the trial judge did not 
give a curative instruction or instruct the jury to disregard the question, and 
because the prosecutor immediately resumed his cross examination after the 
sidebar discussion, the question lingered and Baker never had the opportunity to 
counter or deny the implications of the first question.  
 
We are satisfied that, on the facts of this case, the prosecutor’s question, 
whether simply “inartfully worded” or consciously intended to insinuate prior 
incidents of sexual abuse, constituted clearly egregious misconduct.31 The question 
implied the existence of a predicate fact – that Baker had “some familiarity with 
sex offenses” – from which the jury, in the absence of judicial intervention, could 
                                                 
31  
See Weddington v. State, 545 A.2d 607, 610 (Del. 1988) (prosecutor impermissibly 
injected race into the trial by asking the now infamous “loose white women” question when he 
did not have a factual basis for doing so).  
 
 
27
have drawn extremely damaging character inferences. After the trial judge asked 
whether the prosecutor knew what Baker’s answer to the question would be, the 
prosecutor essentially admitted that he did not have a good faith basis for asking 
the question: “[h]ow would I know?”32  The second question did not sufficiently 
clarify the first question and did not, in any way, draw the focus away from the 
improper implication of the first question. Where even the trial judge had to 
struggle to apprehend the prosecutor’s clever and confusing theory, a fortiori, the 
jury, having heard only the questions that prefaced the exposition of that theory, 
could not have distinguished between the two possible implications embedded in 
the first and second parts of the question.   By asking the questions at issue here, 
the prosecutor failed to satisfy his special obligation to avoid improper 
suggestions, insinuations, and assertions of personal knowledge.  
 
Having determined that the prosecutor’s question was misconduct, we must 
next determine whether the failure to remedy it constitutes plain error. Again, to 
constitute plain error the error complained of must be so clearly prejudicial to 
substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process. 
Furthermore, the doctrine of plain error is limited to material defects that are 
apparent on the face of the record, are basic, serious, and fundamental in their 
                                                 
32  
This response, on a cold record, appears flippant and cavalier given the serious potential 
for unfair prejudice implicit in the confusing double questions. The trial judge’s equally curt and 
clipped reply – “So long” – underscores that inference.  
 
 
28
character, and clearly deprive an accused of a substantial right, or clearly show 
manifest injustice.33 We are satisfied that the prosecutor’s question was a material 
defect so clearly prejudicial to Baker’s substantial rights that asking it constituted a 
manifest injustice. The improper question is apparent on the face of the record, 
basic, serious, and fundamental. Fewer things are more damaging to a defendant’s 
case and credibility, particularly in a he-said, she-said, rape and child sexual abuse 
case, than a lingering, unfounded question that raises Getz issues and permits the 
jury to draw an impermissible conduct-from-character inference that is entirely 
unjustified. This was not a case where there was overwhelming evidence of the 
defendant’s guilt. Rather, it was a close case, without any physical evidence, that 
turned on the jury’s credibility determinations. Many defense witnesses testified 
that the complaining witness was untruthful and her story seemed inconsistent at 
points. Moreover, the jury initially sent a note to the trial judge indicating that they 
could not reach unanimous verdicts on several of the charges, and ultimately 
acquitted the defendant of four of the seven charges against him. To allow the 
defendant’s convictions to stand given these circumstances would amount to 
manifest injustice. Accordingly, we conclude that plain error exists and that we 
must reverse.  
                                                 
33  
Wainwright, 504 A.2d at 1100. 
 
29
 
We find the State’s argument against this result unpersuasive.  The State 
argues, first, that the trial judge feared only that the jury would be confused by the 
prosecutor’s line of questioning and that he “apparently saw no other opportunity 
for unfair prejudice in the question at the time it was asked.” Citing Thompson v. 
State,34 the State suggests that the trial judge is in the best position to observe and 
determine the effect and possible prejudice of prosecutorial questioning. Moreover, 
the State argues, even though the trial judge did not give a curative instruction or 
strike the offending question immediately after the sidebar, his general instruction 
to the jury before they began their deliberations mitigated any possible prejudice. 
The trial judge instructed the jury:  
As to any questions to which an objection was sustained, you must 
not speculate upon what the answer might have been. It’s the answer 
to a question which is evidence and not the question itself. If the 
witness does not know the answer, then there is no evidentiary value 
to the question. (emphasis added).  
 
Because we generally presume that the jury follows the trial judge’s instructions,35 
the State argues, this general instruction “more than adequately informed the jury 
as to the proper consideration of the evidence.” The State’s argument proves too 
much.  
                                                 
34  
399 A.2d 194, 199 (Del.1979) 
 
35  
Price v. State, 858 A.2d 930, 940 (Del. 2004); Shelton v. State, 744 A.2d 465, 483 (Del. 
1999) (citations omitted).  
 
 
30
 
Any time a trial prosecutor asks a question for which he does not have a 
good faith factual predicate, we agree that the trial judge will generally be in the 
best position to assess the potential prejudice stemming from that question.  
Moreover, in most, if not all, cases, a general instruction, like the one given in this 
case, might suffice.  Finally, we do customarily presume that the jury followed the 
trial judge’s instruction.  Although the State correctly states the law, at some point 
our judgment about the prejudicial nature of the improper conduct will overcome 
these presumptions.36 Taken to the extreme, the general principles relied upon by 
the State would likely preclude all appellate review of any improper questioning, 
no matter how egregious – even where the error is apparent on the face of the 
record, is basic, serious, fundamental in its character, clearly deprives the 
defendant of a substantial right, or clearly demonstrates a manifest injustice.37   
 
If the trial judge had given a curative instruction immediately after the 
prosecutor’s question, had stricken the question, or had sustained the defense’s 
objection at the bench in the jury’s presence, the State’s argument might have 
merit.38  But that did not happen here. Accordingly, we are not convinced that the 
State’s argument precludes a finding of plain error.  
                                                 
36  
See Weddington, 545 A.2d at 612-13.  
 
37  
Id.;  Wainwright, 504 A.2d at 1100  
 
38  
 See Pennell v. State, 602 A.2d 48, 52 (Del. 1991) (citing Kornbluth v. State, 580 A.2d 
556, 561 (Del. 1990); Brokenbrough v. State, 522 A.2d 851, 857 Del. (1987); Diaz v. State, 508 
 
31
 
Nor are we convinced that Bromwell v. State39 is persuasive, as the State 
suggests. In Bromwell, the defendant was convicted of robbery. During the trial, 
defense counsel asked the defendant what he, a Maryland resident, was doing in 
Sussex County on the day of his arrest.40 The defendant answered that he “came 
over here for a job employment and had my parole transferred over here.”41 
Defense counsel did not interrupt the defendant’s testimony to request that the trial 
judge remedy the defendant’s mention of parole. On cross examination, the 
prosecutor asked the defendant “you noted on direct examination that you wanted 
to get your parole transferred to the State of Delaware. If you had been paroled, 
have you ever been convicted of a crime?”42 The trial judge sustained a defense 
objection to this question. On appeal, the defendant argued that it was plain error 
for the trial judge not to have sua sponte stricken from the record the defendant’s 
reference to being on parole and not to have cautioned the jury to disregard the 
defendant’s remark in considering his guilt or innocence.43 We found no plain 
                                                                                                                                                             
A.2d 861, 866 (Del. 1986) (“[E]ven when prejudicial error is committed, it will usually be cured 
by 
the 
trial 
judge's 
instruction 
to 
the 
jury 
to 
disregard 
the 
remarks.”) 
 
39  
427 A.2d 884 (Del. 1981).  
 
40  
Id.  at 892.  
 
41  
Id.  
 
42  
Id.   
 
43  
Id.   
 
 
32
error in the trial judge’s treatment of the defendant’s testimony, noting, in part, that 
the defendant “was solely responsible for injecting into his testimony his status as a 
parolee, implying a prior criminal record.”44 We also attributed defense counsel’s 
failure to request a curative instruction to trial strategy.  
 
Here, unlike in Bromwell, the defendant did not inject his “familiarity with 
sex offenses” into his testimony on direct examination. It was the prosecutor who 
injected this issue on cross examination by phrasing a question in a manner that 
would leave the jury with the impression that the prosecutor did, indeed, have 
information in his possession consistent with an affirmative response.  Given the 
flagrant nature of the improper question, Baker’s inability to respond with a denial, 
and the absence of a cautionary instruction, we are satisfied that the facts in this 
case are sufficiently distinguishable from those in Bromwell to render that case 
unpersuasive. 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE and REMAND for proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  
                                                 
44  
Id.  
 
 
33