Case Title: Duffy v. Brown

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1985-10-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Duffy v. Brown1985 WY 180708 P.2d 433Case Number: 84-307, 84-308Decided: 10/31/1985ROLAND DUFFY, D/B/A DUFFY CONSTRUCTION, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

ARTHUR E. BROWN, JR., AND SHOOTIN' IRON DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, A WYOMING CORPORATION, D/B/A JACKSON HOLE RACQUET CLUB, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS). 

ARTHUR E. BROWN, JR., AND SHOOTIN' IRON DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, A WYOMING CORPORATION, D/B/A JACKSON HOLE RACQUET CLUB, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS), 

v. 

ROLAND DUFFY, D/B/A DUFFY CONSTRUCTION, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).
Supreme Court of Wyoming
ROLAND DUFFY, D/B/A DUFFY 
CONSTRUCTION, APPELLANT (PLAINTIFF), 

v. 

ARTHUR E. BROWN, JR., AND 
SHOOTIN' IRON DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, A WYOMING CORPORATION, D/B/A JACKSON HOLE 
RACQUET CLUB, APPELLEES (DEFENDANTS). 

ARTHUR E. BROWN, JR., AND 
SHOOTIN' IRON DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, A WYOMING CORPORATION, D/B/A JACKSON HOLE 
RACQUET CLUB, APPELLANTS (DEFENDANTS), 

v. 

ROLAND DUFFY, D/B/A DUFFY 
CONSTRUCTION, APPELLEE (PLAINTIFF).

 
 
Appeal from the District 
Court, TetonCounty, Elizabeth A. Kail, 
J.

 
 
Robert N. 
Williams, Jackson, for appellant in Case No. 84-307 and appellee in Case No. 
84-308.

Peter F. Moyer 
of Hartnett & Moyer, Jackson, for appellees in Case No. 84-307 and 
appellants in Case No. 84-308.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and 
ROSE, ROONEY, BROWN and CARDINE, JJ.

ROONEY, 
Justice.

[¶1.]     This dispute arose over 
the construction of a group of townhouses in Jackson, Wyoming. Roland Duffy, d/b/a Duffy 
Construction, appellant in Case No. 84-307 and appellee in Case No. 84-308 
(hereinafter referred to as "plaintiff"), contends that he was hired to 
supervise the construction of the entire project, consisting of thirty-five 
townhouses grouped into eight buildings; Arthur E. Brown, Jr. and Shootin' Iron 
Development Company, d/b/a Jackson Hole Racquet Club, appellees in Case No. 
84-307 and appellants in Case No. 84-308 (hereinafter referred to as 
"defendants"), contend that plaintiff was hired to supervise only one building. 
Plaintiff filed a complaint based on theories of fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, breach of contract and unjust enrichment. Summary judgment 
was granted in favor of the defendants on the first two theories, with the 
remaining being submitted to a jury. The jury denied the breach of contract 
claim and awarded plaintiff $965 on the unjust enrichment claim. Plaintiff 
appealed both the summary judgment and the jury verdict. Defendants in turn 
filed a cross-appeal from the trial court's refusal to award costs to 
them.

[¶2.]     Plaintiff words the 
issues on his appeal as follows:

I. "IS SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
PROPER WHERE THERE ARE MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT CONCERNING FRAUDULENT AND 
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATIONS?"

II. "IS IT REVERSABLE 
ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO REFUSE TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT WHEN NO TIME FOR 
PERFORMANCE IS MENTIONED IN A CONTRACT THAT THE LAW IMPLIES A REASONABLE 
TIME?"

III. "IS IS [sic] PROPER 
FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO ENTER JUDGMENT ON A JURY VERDICT FORM THAT IS AMBIGUOUS 
AND INCONCLUSIVE?"

[¶3.]     Defendants word the 
issue on their appeal as follows:

"When a party makes an 
offer of judgment under W.R.Civ.P.Rule 68, and the judgment obtained by the 
offeree [defendant] is less favorable than the offer, is the offeror entitled to 
reimbursement for costs of depositions * * * and for costs of preparing certain 
trial exhibits?"

[¶4.]     We affirm the holding 
of the district court in Case No. 84-307 and reverse the holding and remand Case 
No. 84-308.

FACTS

[¶5.]     From 1973 to 1982, 
defendant Art Brown managed a joint venture which constructed over thirty 
condominium buildings and commercial facilities at the Aspens, a/k/a Jackson 
Hole Racquet Club, which is approximately three miles from Teton Village Ski 
Resort. Art Brown and his wholly-owned company, Shootin' Iron Development 
Company, bought the interests of his joint venture partners in April, 1982.1

[¶6.]     In 1979, Lot 13 of the Aspens was platted for a 
townhouse/condominium project, with eight buildings. The footings and some 
foundations were completed in 1979, but nothing further was done until 1982. The 
project was designed to proceed on a building-by-building basis, depending on 
"pre-sales" of units within each building; a certain number of pre-sales were 
necessary to qualify for the bank loan for each building. In January 1982, 
pre-sales were sufficient to begin Building 4400, the first of the eight 
buildings.

[¶7.]     At defendant's request, 
plaintiff presented a one-page proposed contract, which read in 
part:

"DATE 

"Jan. 27, 
1982

"Proposal submitted to 
"Art Brown

"JOB 
NAME"

"Jackson Hole Racquet Club Townhouses

"I WILL PROVIDE 
SUPERVISION AS THE PROJECT SUPERVISOR FOR THE ABOVE PROJECT FOR THE AMOUNT OF 
10% OF THE COST OF LABOR AND MATERIAL FOR THE ENTIRE PROJECT. I WILL BE 
PROVIDING THE OFFICE, HALF OF THE TELEPHONE EXPENSE, HALF OF THE COST OF HEATING 
THE OFFICE, AND TEMPORARY STORAGE ON THE JOB SITE."

[¶8.]     Defendant reviewed this 
proposed contract, and then had his secretary type on it:

"BUILDINGS:

"4400"

Both parties 
specifically initialed the number "4400" and signed the 
contract.

[¶9.]     When Building 4400 was 
substantially completed, in October 1982, plaintiff was informed that he would 
not be the supervisor of the next building. The conflict was thus joined. 
Plaintiff claimed that the "BUILDINGS: 4400" was added to the contract to 
specify the order of construction on the buildings, and that the contract 
applied to the entire Lot 13 project. Defendant 
claimed that the "BUILDINGS: 4400" specifically limited the contract to Building 
4400, and that the contract would only be binding for a later building if an 
additional building number was later added and initialed by both 
parties.

I

[¶10.]  A summary judgment

"* * * shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. * * *" Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P.

[¶11.]  The purpose of summary judgment is to 
eliminate formal trials where only questions of law are involved, Johnson v. Soulis, Wyo., 542 P.2d 867, 
871 (1975), and to pierce the formal allegations and reach the merits of a 
controversy where no material issue of fact is present, Siebert v. Fowler, Wyo., 637 P.2d 255, 
258 (1981). Where there are genuine issues of material fact, summary judgment is 
improper; but the purpose behind summary judgment would be defeated if a case 
could be forced to trial merely by asserting that a genuine issue of material 
fact exists. Johnson v. Soulis, 
supra. 

[¶12.]  When a motion for summary judgment is 
granted and appealed to this court, we have the same duty as did the district 
court judge. We review the same material and apply the same standards. The 
propriety of granting a motion for summary judgment depends upon the correctness 
of the court's dual findings that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
This court looks at the record from the viewpoint most favorable to the party 
who is opposing the motion and gives to him all favorable inferences to be drawn 
from the facts contained in affidavits, depositions and other proper material 
appearing in the record. Roth v. First 
Security Bank of Rock 
Springs, Wyo., 684 P.2d 93, 95 
(1984).

[¶13.]  The elements of a claim for relief for 
fraud are a false representation made by the defendant which is relied upon by 
the plaintiff to his damage, the asserted false representation must be made to 
induce action, and the plaintiff must reasonably believe the representation to 
be true. Anderson v. Foothill Industrial Bank, Wyo., 674 P.2d 232, 238 
(1984). A plaintiff who alleges fraud must do so clearly and distinctly, and 
fraud will not be imputed to any party when the facts and circumstances out of 
which it is alleged to arise are consistent with honesty and purity of 
intention. Reed v. Owen, 
Wyo., 523 P.2d 869, 871 (1974). Fraud must be established 
by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence, and will never be presumed. 
Kincheloe v. Milatzo, Wyo., 
678 P.2d 855, 862 (1984).

[¶14.]  The elements of a negligent 
misrepresentation claim are generally recognized to be as follows: False 
information supplied in the course of one's business for the guidance of others 
in their business, failure to exercise reasonable care in obtaining or relating 
the information, and pecuniary loss resulting from justifiable reliance thereon. 
Restatement of Torts (Second) § 552, p. 126 (1977).

[¶15.]  It is clear from the record that a 
showing of fraud or negligent misrepresentation was not made by clear and 
convincing evidence. By his deposition, plaintiff could not designate the 
factual basis for his fraud claim. He testified:

"Q (By Mr. Moyer) Do you 
have any belief or evidence to the effect that Art never intended to let you do 
the whole project right from the beginning; that he always intended to just let 
you do one building?

"A You wonder about 
things.

"Q Do you have anything 
beyond wondering or speculation to indicate that he intended right from the 
beginning to defraud you?

"MR. WILLIAMS: Are you 
talking about any indication at any time?

"MR. MOYER: Any 
indication at the beginning that his intent was to defraud 
you.

"A He didn't perform to 
the agreement that we had.

"Q (By Mr. Moyer) Did you 
have any indication that he never intended to right from the 
beginning?

"A Not from the 
beginning. I'm wondering about the number now, but I'm not a 
lawyer.

"Q So you think that 
because he had entered this language that he might have intended right from the 
beginning to be limiting you to one building, is that 
correct?

"A I never felt that way 
until just recently, and now I'm concerned about it.

"Q (By Mr. Moyer) Would 
you say that was a misunderstanding or are you saying that he actually tried to 
deceive you at that time?

"A I wouldn't 
know.

"Q Do you have any 
evidence based on his conduct since the date you signed this agreement, any 
evidence to the effect that he never intended to let you do more than one 
building, other than the fact that he didn't give you the second 
building?

"A Yes, I think 
so.

"Q What is that 
evidence?

"A A conversation I had 
with Jeff Brown. 

"Q What was the 
conversation?

"A He said that it had 
been going on for some time, that they would perhaps get rid of 
me.

* * * * 
*

"Q Do you have any other 
evidence whatsoever to indicate that Art, right from the beginning, didn't 
intend to give you the whole project and tried to deceive you into thinking that 
you did have the whole project?

"A I don't really 
understand what evidence really is. I had a contract that covered the entire 
project and I don't no longer, apparently, in Mr. Brown's 
view.

"Q (By Mr. Moyer) And in 
your view, that contract has been breached, is that right, by Mr. 
Brown?

"A No longer, I'm not out 
there working.

* * * * * 
*

"A * * * The only thing 
I'm convinced of is that Mr. Brown did not hold up to his 
agreement."

[¶16.]  It is clear from plaintiff's deposition 
testimony that there was no basis for the fraud and negligent misrepresentation 
claims other than the fact that plaintiff believed he had a contract for the 
entire project, and defendant believed otherwise. The dispute was over 
interpretation of the contract, nothing more.

[¶17.]  Furthermore, defendant submitted an 
affidavit wherein he stated:

"6. Any representation or 
statements made by the undersigned to the plaintiff in connection with the 
contractual arrangements with the plaintiff were made in good faith and were not 
false or misleading, the undersigned had no intent to defraud or deceive 
plaintiff, and the undersigned did not enter into any contract with plaintiff, 
on behalf of the owner or otherwise, with the intent to fail to perform that 
contract."

[¶18.]  The motion for a summary judgment was 
properly granted on the fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims for 
relief.

II

[¶19.]  Plaintiff requested and the court refused 
to give the following instruction:

"When no time for 
performance is specified, the law implies a reasonable time depending upon the 
nature of the contract, the terms thereof and the circumstances appearing from, 
the conduct of the parties." Plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 
11.

[¶20.]  As his second issue on appeal, plaintiff 
contends the failure to give this instruction to have been error. The relevance 
of this issue and the argument thereon, consisting of two pages in plaintiff's 
brief, is not apparent. It does not pertain to the question of whether or not 
the contract applied to one or to eight buildings. A specific time frame for 
completing one building or all eight buildings was not specified since such was 
dependent on pre-sales of individual units, a condition which was to some extent 
beyond the control of the builders.

[¶21.]  Plaintiff's proposed instruction is a 
correct statement of the law. Zitterkopf 
v. Roussalis, Wyo., 546 P.2d 436, 439 (1976). However, we agree with 
defendant and the trial court that the instruction is not relevant or proper 
under the facts of this case. The trial court extensively instructed the jury as 
to contract interpretation, and correctly refused plaintiff's requested 
Instruction No. 11.

III

[¶22.]  The following verdict form was submitted 
to the jury:

"VERDICT

"We, the jury, duly and 
regularly impaneled and sworn to try the issue in the above-entitled cause, 
submit the following answers to the questions submitted by the 
court:

"1. Do you find that the 
January 27, 1982 written contract between the parties applied to the entire Lot 
13 Project of eight buildings?

"Yes 
____

"No ____ 

"2. ANSWER ONLY IF YOU 
ANSWERED # 1 "Yes": Do you find that defendants properly terminated the contract 
after substantial completion of Building 4400, for failure of plaintiff to 
properly perform his duties under the contract?

"Yes 
____

"No 
____

"3. ANSWER ONLY IF YOUR 
ANSWER TO # 1 IS "Yes" and your ANSWER TO # 2 IS "No": What is the dollar amount 
of damages to be awarded to plaintiff for the defendant's failure to perform the 
contract?

"$ ____ (if 
applicable)

"4. ANSWER ONLY IF YOUR 
ANSWER TO # 1 IS "No": What is the dollar amount of damages to be awarded to 
plaintiff for his services performed on the foundation and backfill on the Lot 
13 Project?

"$ 
____

" 
____________________________________ Foreman"

[¶23.]  Plaintiff now argues that this verdict 
form was inadequate in that there was no interrogatory asking if the defendant 
was estopped to deny that the written contract applied to the entire Lot 13 
Project.2

[¶24.]  There is no showing in the record that 
plaintiff objected to this aspect of the verdict form. If plaintiff "wanted the 
jury to divulge such information, it should have requested such a form of 
verdict." Rissler & McMurry Company 
v. Atlantic Richfield Company, Wyo., 559 P.2d 25, 30 (1977). As in that 
case, here we find no request for a form of verdict different than that used. 
The submission or failure to submit a form of special verdict with answers to 
interrogatories is in the sound discretion of the trial judge. Rissler & McMurry Company v. Atlantic 
Richfield Company, supra; Anderson v. 
Foothill Industrial Bank, supra; Murphy v. Smith Trailer Sales, Inc., 
Wyo., 544 P.2d 1006, 1010 (1976).

[¶25.]  Inasmuch as plaintiff failed to object to 
the form of verdict given and failed to offer a different form of verdict, he 
cannot now complain. Furthermore, in light of the instruction on estoppel and 
the form of verdict that was in fact used, plaintiff has not shown how he was 
prejudiced.

IV

[¶26.]  On December 22, 1982, defendant made an 
offer of judgment in the amount of $6,001, pursuant to Rule 68, W.R.C.P.3 The offer was rejected by the 
plaintiff. On June 21, 1984, after trial to a jury, plaintiff was awarded $965, 
an amount significantly less than that previously offered by defendant. 
Accordingly, defendant moved the trial court to award reimbursement of $2,579.58 
in costs. The court denied this motion and did not award any costs to defendant. 
Defendant now asks us to review this ruling.

[¶27.]  In opposition, plaintiff raises questions 
as to the timeliness of defendant's notice of cross-appeal, failure to designate 
necessary portions of the record as the record on appeal, and failure by 
defendant to support the cross-appeal by cogent arguments and proper 
authority.

[¶28.]  We disposed of the matter pertaining to 
timeliness of the cross-appeal and designation of record in our order denying 
plaintiff's motion to dismiss and granting permission to designate additional 
material for record on appeal. The notice was timely and a proper record is 
before us. We need not address such again. The citations and argument in 
defendant's brief are sufficient to refute plaintiff's accusations as to lack of 
cogent argument and of supporting authority in such brief.

[¶29.]  In his affidavit in support of his motion 
relating to costs to be reimbursed, defendant's attorney states in part, on 
behalf of defendant:

"7. The Defendants have 
incurred costs aggregating $2,579.58 since the making of such Offer of Judgment, 
consisting of: $2,471.00 in costs charged by court reporters for the taking of 
depositions and the copying of deposition transcripts, and $108.58 in costs of 
preparing enlarged exhibits for trial (Pioneer Press)."

[¶30.]  In Roberts Construction Company v. Vondriska, 
Wyo., 547 P.2d 1171, 1182 (1976), we noted:

"* * * What constitutes 
proper costs in an action * * * is not very clearly established by either 
statute or rule. * * *"

[¶31.]  Sections 1-14-101 through 1-14-127, W.S. 
1977, specify certain costs, e.g., witness fees, service of process fees, etc. 
Section 1-14-126 (Cum.Supp. 1985) thereof provides in pertinent 
part:

"In other actions the 
court may award and tax costs and apportion them between the parties on the same 
or adverse sides as it deems right and equitable. * * *"

We have always 
recognized that the determination of those costs to be taxed pursuant to Rule 
54(d), W.R.C.P.4 are properly within the discretion 
of the trial court. Rule 68, W.R.C.P. (see fn. 3) is mandatory in that it 
provides that the offeree "must" pay costs incurred after making the 
offer.

[¶32.]  The question here presented is whether or 
not deposition expenses made after making of the offer, under Rule 68, W.R.C.P., 
are properly included in reimbursable costs.5 The purpose of the rule is to 
encourage settlement and to penalize the offeree for causing extra expenses when 
he refuses that which is later found to be a reasonable offer. This 
consideration could lead to including expense of depositions taken after the 
offer as properly included costs since the expense would not have been incurred 
but for the refusal to take the offer. On the other side of the argument, there 
seems to be a tendency in some instances to overdo the discovery procedure, both 
with reference to the number of people deposed and with reference to the extent 
of the depositions and interrogatories. It would seem unfair to charge 
unnecessary costs to the offeree. The determining factor, then, in allowing such 
deposition expense as costs would be a reasonable necessity for the deposition. 
The determination of the reasonable necessity is properly left to the discretion 
of the trial judge. We recently said in State and G.M. Kinniburgh v. Dieringer, 
Wyo., 708 P.2d 1 (1985):

"With respect to costs of 
discovery depositions, we espouse the rule that if the discovery deposition is 
reasonably necessary for the preparation of the case, then there is no abuse of 
discretion on the part of the district judge in awarding such costs. See for 
example, Bailey v. Meister Brau, 
Inc., 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir. 1976); Griffin v. Collins, 443 F. Supp. 1010 
(S.D.Ga. 1978); George R. Hall, Inc. v. 
Superior Trucking Co., Inc., 532 F. Supp. 985 (N.D.Ga. 1982); Kraeger v. University of Pittsburgh, 535 F. Supp. 233 (W.D.Pa. 1982); Wade v. 
Mississippi Cooperative Extension Service, 64 F.R.D. 102 (N.D.Miss. 1974); 
Mastrapas v. New York Life Insurance 
Co., 93 F.R.D. 401 (E.D.Mich. 1982). With respect to the exercise of 
discretion as to such costs, however, the burden must be upon the party seeking 
the award of costs to justify to the district court that those costs were 
reasonably necessary for the preparation of the case for trial. If the 
depositions are introduced at the trial, or are used for purposes of impeachment 
or refreshing the recollection of a witness at the trial that would ordinarily 
satisfy the burden of demonstrating that they were reasonably necessary. Other 
uses of the deposition in connection with the trial proceedings such as motions 
for summary judgment might serve to persuade the district court that the 
depositions were reasonably necessary, but it would not be required to so 
conclude. * * *"

[¶33.]  In this case, the trial court indicated 
that it relied on the depositions of Roland Duffy, Arthur Brown and Tony Kimmi 
in granting partial summary judgment in favor of defendant. This fact, coupled 
with the mandatory direction in Rule 68, W.R.C.P., supra, causes us to remand 
case No. 84-308 to allow review of defendant's motion for reimbursement of costs 
under the standard quoted above from State and G.M. Kinniburgh v. Dieringer, 
supra.

[¶34.]  We have found no authority in this state, 
nor have we been cited to any, for the proposition that the expense of preparing 
enlarged exhibits for trial is a taxable cost.

[¶35.]  We affirm Case No. 84-307 and remand Case 
No. 84-308 for the purpose of reconsideration of defendant's motion for 
reimbursement of costs.

1 For the purpose of this 
case, defendants (Art Brown, Shootin' Iron Development Co. and Jackson Hole 
Racquet Club) stipulated that they would be treated as one 
party.

2 Plaintiff requested an 
instruction on estoppel, it being plaintiff's argument that defendant was 
estopped from denying the existence of a contract for the entire Lot 13 Project; 
and the trial court so instructed the jury.

3 Rule 68, W.R.C.P., 
provides in part:

"At any time more than 
ten (10) days before the trial begins, a party defending against a claim may 
serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken against him 
for the money or property or to the effect specified in his offer, with costs 
then accrued. * * * If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more 
favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the 
making of the offer. * * *"

4 Rule 54(d), W.R.C.P., 
provides:

"Except when express 
provision therefor is made either in a statute or in these rules, costs shall be 
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; 
but costs against the state of Wyoming, its officers or agencies, shall be 
imposed only to the extent permitted by law."

5 Our discussion and 
holding in this case relative to deposition expense as costs is restricted to 
the application thereof to Rule 68, W.R.C.P. The question as to application in 
other respects is not before us.