Case Title: In re Estate of Washburn

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2020 ME 18

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2020-01-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2020 ME 18 
Docket: 
And-19-47 
Argued: 
November 4, 2019 
Decided: 
January 30, 2020 
Revised: 
June 23, 2020 
 
Panel: 
SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HUMPHREY, JJ.* 
 
 
ESTATE OF DAVID H. WASHBURN 
 
 
JABAR, J. 
 
[¶1]  Laurie Kennedy appeals from an order of the Androscoggin County 
Probate Court (Dubois, J.) denying her petition for formal adjudication of 
intestacy and appointment of personal representative of the estate of her 
former husband, David H. Washburn, on behalf of their minor son.  Laurie 
contends that the Probate Court erred in finding that (1) David Washburn had 
the requisite testamentary capacity to execute a will, and (2) there was 
insufficient evidence to support a claim of undue influence.  We affirm the 
judgment.  
I.  BACKGROUND 
[¶2]  The following facts are derived solely from the court’s explicit 
factual findings.  See Klein v. Klein, 2019 ME 85, ¶ 6, 208 A.3d 802.  David 
                                         
*  Although Justice Hjelm participated in the appeal, he retired before this opinion was certified. 
 
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Washburn died in 2016 at the age of fifty-one, survived by his wife, Michelle 
Washburn, and his son.  Laurie Kennedy is the mother of David’s son.  David 
and Laurie are both deaf.  Despite his disability, David lived an active and 
independent life, working as a welder at Bath Iron Works (BIW) for more than 
twenty-seven years.  He owned his own home and engaged in multiple financial 
transactions, including real estate transactions and the purchase of 
automobiles on credit.  He listed Michelle as the beneficiary of his BIW 
retirement account.  These transactions were accomplished without the aid of 
sign language interpreters.   
[¶3]  Laurie and David’s son was born in 2002.  Sometime thereafter, 
David and Laurie litigated a parental rights and responsibilities action 
concerning their son, and David retained attorneys William Cote and Heather 
Seasonwein to represent him in that matter.  During the course of that 
representation, sign language interpreters were employed at court events, but 
were not used during meetings or consultations between David and his 
attorneys.   
[¶4]  David and Michelle met in 2007 or 2008 and were married a short 
time thereafter.  Michelle is not deaf and, at the beginning of their relationship, 
did not know how to communicate using American Sign Language (ASL).  
 
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Michelle learned some sign language over the course of her marriage to David, 
and took a formal class on the subject in 2012.  Although Michelle does not 
speak ASL well enough to qualify as an interpreter, she was able to 
communicate adequately with David using ASL, notes, lip reading, and text 
messages.   
[¶5]  In 2014, Michelle and David retained the services of Attorney 
Seasonwein, this time in connection with their petition to adopt Michelle’s 
grandson.  The Probate Court requested that David and Michelle execute wills 
incident to the adoption proceedings.  Accordingly, David and Michelle 
executed wills prepared by Seasonwein.  Seasonwein met with Michelle and 
David to draft the wills and communicated in her usual manner with David, 
while also enlisting Michelle to interpret via ASL.  David made clear to 
Seasonwein, through these mixed forms of communication, that he wanted 
Michelle to have his house in the event of his death and that, if she predeceased 
him, the house should go to his son and Michelle’s grandson.  In addition, David 
wanted specific bequests set aside for his son.  Seasonwein was certain that 
David knew what assets made up his estate.  The parties stipulated to the fact 
that David’s will was duly executed.   
 
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[¶6]  Not long after they executed their wills, David and Michelle 
separated.  Despite their separation, they did not divorce and remained friends.  
David did not amend or revoke his will, nor did he change the beneficiary 
designation on his retirement account.   
[¶7]  On September 22, 2016, shortly after David’s death, Michelle filed 
with the Androscoggin County Probate Court an application for informal 
probate of David’s will and appointment of her as personal representative.  She 
was duly appointed as personal representative of David’s estate on October 10, 
2016.  Laurie later filed a petition on behalf of her and David’s son to remove 
Michelle as the personal representative and for formal adjudication of 
intestacy, seeking to invalidate the will that Michelle had submitted for probate 
on the grounds of lack of capacity and undue influence.  See 18-A M.R.S. § 3-401 
(2018).  The court held a two-day hearing on the petition.  At the close of 
Laurie’s case-in-chief, Michelle moved for a judgment as a matter of law on both 
the capacity and undue influence issues.  The court granted the motion in part, 
entering judgment in favor of Michelle with regard to Laurie’s claim that 
Michelle had exerted undue influence over David when he executed his will, but 
the court denied the motion as to Laurie’s claim that David lacked testamentary 
capacity.   
 
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[¶8]  On December 11, 2018, following the completion of the bench trial, 
the court entered an order denying Laurie’s petition, “finding that [David] had 
the requisite testamentary capacity to execute his last will and testament.”  
According to the court, “[there] is nothing that suggests [David] did not 
understand the terms of [his] will . . . .”  Laurie filed a motion for additional 
findings, which the court also denied.  See M.R. Prob. P. 52; M.R. Civ. P. 52(b).  
Laurie timely appeals from the denial of her petition pursuant to 14 M.R.S. 
§ 1851 (2018) and M.R. App. P. 2.   
II.  DISCUSSION 
A. 
Testamentary Capacity 
[¶9]  Laurie first argues that the Probate Court erred in finding that David 
had sufficient testamentary capacity to create a valid will.  “Testamentary 
capacity is an issue of fact that we review for clear error,” and because Laurie 
bore the burden of proof in the Probate Court, we “will not disturb the Probate 
Court’s findings unless the evidence compels a different result.”  Estate of 
O’Brien-Hamel, 2014 ME 75, ¶¶ 26-27, 93 A.3d 689.  Because Laurie filed a 
motion for further findings of fact, see M.R. Civ. P. 52(b); M.R. Prob. P. 52, we 
will not infer any findings from the record.  See Klein, 2019 ME 85, ¶ 6, 208 A.3d 
802.  “When a party’s motion for further findings, M.R. Civ. P. 52(b), has been 
 
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denied, we cannot infer findings from the evidence in the record.  We confine 
our review to the court’s explicit findings and determine whether those 
findings are supported by the record.”  Sulikowski v. Sulikowski, 2019 ME 143, 
¶ 11, 216 A.3d 893. 
[¶10]  The party that contests the validity of a will bears “the burden of 
establishing lack of testamentary intent or capacity.”  18-A M.R.S. § 3-407 
(2018).  Such a lack of capacity must be proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  Estate of O’Brien-Hamel, 2014 ME 75, ¶ 21, 93 A.3d 689.  We have 
described testamentary capacity as follows: 
A disposing mind involves the exercise of so much mind and 
memory as would enable a person to transact common and simple 
kinds of business with that intelligence which belongs to the 
weakest class of sound minds; and a disposing memory exists when 
one can recall the general nature, condition and extent of his 
property, and his relations to those to whom he gives, and also to 
those from whom he excludes, his bounty.  He must have active 
memory enough to bring to his mind the nature and particulars of 
the business to be transacted, and mental power enough to 
appreciate them, and act with sense and judgment in regard to 
them.  He must have sufficient capacity to comprehend the 
condition of his property, his relations to the persons who were or 
should have been the objects of his bounty, and the scope and 
bearing of the provisions of his will.  He must have sufficient active 
memory to collect in his mind, without prompting, the particulars 
or elements of the business to be transacted, and to hold them in 
his mind a sufficient length of time to perceive at least their obvious 
relations to each other, and be able to form some rational judgment 
in relation to them.   
 
 
7 
Id. ¶ 28 (quoting Estate of Siebert, 1999 ME 156, ¶ 5, 739 A.2d 365); see also 
Estate of Record, 534 A.2d 1319, 1321 (Me. 1987).  “This standard requires only 
a modest level of competence and a general knowledge of one’s assets.”  Estate 
of O’Brien-Hamel, 2014 ME 75, ¶ 28, 93 A.3d 689; see also Estate of Dodge, 576 
A.2d 755, 757 (Me. 1990); Estate of Record, 534 A.2d 1319, 1321 (Me. 1987). 
 
[¶11]  We have not previously addressed the impact, if any, of deafness 
upon testamentary capacity, nor is there a well-established body of case law in 
other jurisdictions.  However, in a majority of those cases that have reached this 
issue, deafness alone has been deemed insufficient to conclude that the testator 
lacked testamentary capacity—the focus is still on the mental capacity to 
understand the will.  See, e.g., Estate of Domenica G. Halsey, 2008 N.Y. Misc. 
LEXIS 4957, at *10 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. July 25, 2008) (“Old age, forgetfulness, 
deafness, blindness, illiteracy, or alcoholism, standing alone, do not establish 
that the testator lacked testamentary capacity.”); Estate of Johnson, 
No. A05-2262, 2006 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1041, at *7-8, 11, 13 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Sept. 12, 2006) (no abuse of discretion in finding that testamentary 
capacity existed despite the decedent’s “frail physical health and deafness,” 
Parkinson’s disease, and fourteen medications); Hayward v. Hayward, 299 So. 
2d 207, 210 (Miss. 1974) (“Neither deafness, blindness nor the infirmities of 
 
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old age, if they do not destroy or gravely impair the mental faculties, are 
sufficient to deprive one of the valuable right to dispose of his property by will, 
according to his own wishes.”); Teegarden v. Webster, 199 S.W.2d 728, 729 (Ky. 
Ct. App. 1947) (“Deafness and retarded speech are physical and not mental 
handicaps.”); Tidholm v. Tidholm, 62 N.E.2d 473, 477 (Ill. 1945) (“Old age, 
deafness and infirmity do not of themselves constitute proof of lack of mental 
capacity.”). 
 
[¶12]  In this case, the court’s factual findings are grounded in competent 
evidence in the record and fully support a conclusion that David had the 
requisite capacity to execute a valid will.  Laurie does not argue that David was 
suffering from a cognitive deficiency or did not understand the natural objects 
of his bounty.  Rather, she argues that the methods of communication employed 
at the meeting among David, Michelle, and Seasonwein were so inadequate that 
he could not possibly have understood the contents of the will he signed.  
 
[¶13]  The court was not persuaded that the communication barrier 
between David and Seasonwein was as significant as Laurie contends.  The 
court explicitly found that David “had engaged in multiple financial 
transactions, to include purchasing real estate, mortgaging property, and 
financing automobiles . . . .  No evidence was presented to establish that [David] 
 
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engaged in these transactions with the assistance of any sign language 
interpreters.”  The ability to engage in such significant financial transactions 
despite purported communication barriers demonstrates that David possessed 
a “disposing mind . . . as would enable a person to transact common and simple 
kinds of business with that intelligence which belongs to the weakest class of 
sound minds . . . .”  Estate of O’Brien-Hamel, 2014 ME 75, ¶ 28, 93 A.3d 689.  
These facts were supported by competent evidence in the record and 
corroborated by multiple witnesses.    
 
[¶14]  Not only was David able to conduct financial business of significant 
magnitude without an interpreter, but the court also found that David had 
collaborated with Seasonwein successfully without a sign language interpreter 
in the past.  Using the combination of communication methods she had 
employed in her previous dealings with David, Seasonwein understood that 
David wanted his home to go to Michelle or, if she predeceased him, for the 
house to eventually be sold and the proceeds split between his son and 
Michelle’s grandson.  Seasonwein incorporated these bequests into a draft will 
and went through the document with David, giving him an opportunity to 
indicate his understanding as to each element of the will.  The court concluded, 
“Seasonwein was confident that [David] was aware of the assets of his estate 
 
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and that part of his wishes provided for specific bequests to Christopher.”  
These findings fully support a conclusion that David understood the natural 
objects of his bounty and possessed “sufficient active memory to collect in his 
mind . . . the particulars or elements of the business to be transacted . . . and be 
able to form some rational judgment in relation to them.”  Estate of 
O’Brien-Hamel, 2014 ME 75, ¶ 28, 93 A.3d 689.  
 
[¶15]  The court’s findings are fully supported by the record evidence and 
do not compel a result contrary to the court’s ultimate determination that 
Laurie had not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that David lacked 
testamentary capacity.   
B. 
Undue Influence 
[¶16]  Laurie also argues that the court erred by granting Michelle’s 
motion for judgment as a matter of law regarding the issue of undue influence.  
In reviewing a disposition of a motion for judgment as a matter of law, we “view 
the evidence together with all justifiable inferences in the light most favorable 
to the party opposing the motion.”  Lewis v. Knowlton, 1997 ME 12, ¶ 6, 688 A.2d 
912.  If “any reasonable view of the evidence could sustain a verdict for the 
opposing party pursuant to the substantive law that is an essential element of 
the claim,” then “[t]he motion should not be granted.”  Id. (quotation marks 
 
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omitted).  Our review of this issue is different than our review of the court’s 
finding of mental capacity following the conclusion of the bench trial.  Because 
Laurie’s undue influence claim was disposed of in a judgment as a matter of law, 
we review the entire evidentiary record before the trial court at the time of the 
motion in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.1  Chapman v. 
Robinson, 2012 ME 141, ¶ 9, 58 A.3d 1123.   
[¶17]  The party contesting the will on the basis of undue influence has 
the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the will was 
the result of undue influence.  18-A M.R.S. § 3-407; Estate of Lewis, 2001 ME 74, 
¶ 7, 770 A.2d 619.  Undue influence has been defined as  
[i]nfluence in connection with the execution of the will, and 
operating at the time the will is made, amounting to moral 
coercions, destroying free agency, or opportunity which could not 
be resisted, so that the testator, unable to withstand the influence, 
                                         
1  We again note that in a jury-waived proceeding, when a defendant moves for judgment as a 
matter of law at the close of the plaintiff’s case, a court has two options.  It may review the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and, on that basis, determine whether that party 
has presented evidence that could support a judgment in that party’s favor.  Alternatively, the court 
may make provisional factual findings based on the evidence presented to that point in the 
proceedings and rule on the defendant’s motion based on those findings.  See Nightingale v. Leach, 
2004 ME 22, ¶ 2, 842 A.2d 1277; Smith v. Welch, 645 A.2d 1130, 1132 (Me. 1994).  The court’s election 
between these two approaches will have a significant effect on our standard of review.  If the court 
proceeds with the former alternative and grants the defendant’s motion, we examine the record to 
determine if the record contains any evidence and justifiable inferences that would allow the plaintiff 
to survive the motion.  Nightingale, 2004 ME 22, ¶ 2, 842 A.2d 1277.  If, on the other hand, the court 
proceeds with the latter alternative, on appeal we will accept the facts as found by the court if 
supported by the record and determine if those findings support the court’s ruling on the motion.  Id.  
Here, the court made clear that it was examining the evidence in the light most favorable to Laurie, 
thus invoking the former approach, and the resulting standard of review is more favorable to Laurie.  
 
12 
or too weak to resist it, was constrained to do that which was not 
his actual will but against it. 
 
Estate of Horne, 2003 ME 73, ¶ 18, 822 A.2d 1177 (quotation marks omitted).  
“The most prominent circumstances regarded as evidence of undue influence 
are: (1) the existence of a confidential relationship between the testator and the 
one who is asserted to have influenced him; [and] (2) the fact that the testator 
has disposed of his property in an unexpected or unnatural manner.”  Estate of 
Bridges, 565 A.2d 316, 317 (Me. 1989); see also Estate of Dodge, 576 A.2d 755, 
757 (Me. 1990).  The presence of these circumstances gives rise to a permissive 
inference:  
[P]roof of such circumstances does not raise a presumption of 
undue influence.  It simply permits the drawing of an inference that 
such was present.  Furthermore, that inference must be based on 
more than mere suspicion and conjecture, and mere opportunity, 
interest or inequality in distribution is insufficient proof of undue 
influence.  
 
Estate of Bridges, 565 A.2d at 317 (quotation marks omitted).  We have noted 
that “undue influence by its nature . . . is difficult to establish through direct 
evidence and must admit of proof by circumstantial evidence and the 
inferences to be drawn therefrom.”  North Am. Life & Casualty Co. v. Butler, 623 
A.2d 180, 182 (Me. 1993) (quotation marks omitted).  
 
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[¶18]  In this case, the evidence presented to the court at hearing, viewed 
in the light most favorable to Laurie, could not support a finding that David and 
Michelle were in a confidential relationship.  Knowlton, 1997 ME 12, ¶ 6, 688 
A.2d 912.  In arguing that a confidential relationship did exist, Laurie relies 
heavily on the fact that Michelle acted as a nonprofessional sign language 
interpreter for David during their meetings with Seasonwein, describing 
Michelle as “the conduit of [David’s] desired testamentary disposition.”  
However, the evidence demonstrates that David also communicated with 
Seasonwein via gestures, notes, and lip reading.  Further, David had 
successfully consulted with Seasonwein on other legal matters without any 
interpreter present, with no evidence of having had any difficulty doing so.  The 
evidence cannot support a conclusion that Michelle was an informational 
gatekeeper for David, using her ability to hear and speak to exert her influence 
over David.  Further, the evidence does not indicate that Michelle held explicit 
or implicit power over David.  She did not have power over his finances or hold 
a power of attorney.  Cf.  Butler, 623 A.2d at 182; In re Will of Fenwick, 348 A.2d 
12, 14 (Me. 1975).  David was not enfeebled mentally or physically.  Id.  The 
evidence before the court at hearing, even when viewed in the light most 
favorable to Laurie, could not sustain a finding of a confidential relationship of 
 
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the sort that normally underpins cases of undue influence.  Knowlton, 1997 ME 
12, ¶ 6, 688 A.2d 912.   
[¶19]  Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Laurie, we 
conclude that the court did not err in determining that there was no evidence 
that could sustain a finding of undue influence by a clear and convincing 
standard.  
The entry is: 
Judgment affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Laura P. Shaw, Esq. (orally), Camden Law LLP, Camden, for appellant Laurie 
Kennedy 
 
Matthew P. Mastrogiacomo, Esq. (orally), The Mastrogiacomo Law Office, PA, 
Lewiston, for appellee Michelle Washburn 
 
 
Androscoggin County Probate Court docket number 2016-394 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY