Case Title: Plaintiff v. Defendant

Citation: 2013 WI 96

Docket Number: 2013AP000329-D

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2013-11-29T00:00:00Z

Document:
2013 WI 96 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2013AP329-D   
COMPLETE TITLE: 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Ronald J. Moore, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
          Complainant, 
     v. 
Ronald J. Moore, 
          Respondent.   
 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST MOORE  
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
November 29, 2013 
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
      
 
JUDGE: 
      
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2013 WI 96
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2013AP329-D 
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings  
Against Ronald J. Moore, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation, 
 
          Complainant, 
 
     v. 
 
Ronald J. Moore, 
 
          Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
NOV 29, 2013 
 
Diane M. Fremgen 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY 
disciplinary 
proceeding.   Attorney's 
license 
suspended.   
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the report and recommendation 
of the referee, Reserve Judge Robert E. Kinney, that the license 
of Attorney Ronald J. Moore to practice law in Wisconsin should 
be suspended for a period of three years and that Attorney Moore 
should be required to pay the full costs of this disciplinary 
proceeding, which were $1,254.43 as of June 27, 2013.  The 
referee's 
findings 
of 
fact, 
conclusions 
of 
law, 
and 
recommendation regarding discipline were based on a stipulation 
No. 
2013AP329-D   
 
2 
 
and no contest plea entered by Attorney Moore.  No appeal has 
been filed in this matter.  Accordingly, our review proceeds 
pursuant to SCR 22.17(2).1 
¶2 
After fully reviewing this matter, we agree with the 
referee that the facts of the complaint, which Attorney Moore 
has admitted, adequately support the conclusion that Attorney 
Moore engaged in the six counts of professional misconduct 
alleged in the complaint filed by the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation (OLR).  We conclude that a three-year suspension of 
Attorney Moore's license to practice law in this state is the 
appropriate level of discipline for the misconduct committed by 
Attorney Moore.  Finally, in light of the fact that Attorney 
Moore did not stipulate to the underlying facts or enter his no 
contest plea until after a referee had been appointed, we impose 
the full costs of this proceeding on Attorney Moore. 
¶3 
The OLR filed the present complaint against Attorney 
Moore in February 2013.  The complaint set forth six counts of 
professional 
misconduct 
arising 
from 
Attorney 
Moore's 
representation 
of 
a 
husband 
and 
wife 
in 
a 
guardianship 
proceeding and his drug-related actions involving another 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.17(2) states: 
 
If no appeal is filed timely, the supreme court 
shall review the referee's report; adopt, reject or 
modify the referee's findings and conclusions or 
remand the matter to the referee for additional 
findings; 
and 
determine 
and 
impose 
appropriate 
discipline.  The court, on its own motion, may order 
the parties to file briefs in the matter. 
No. 
2013AP329-D   
 
3 
 
client, which ultimately led to Attorney Moore's conviction of 
two misdemeanor crimes.  The complaint asked for a three-year 
suspension of Attorney Moore's license and an award of costs. 
¶4 
Attorney Moore filed an answer in which he admitted 
some of the factual allegations of the complaint, denied other 
factual allegations, and denied having committed any of the rule 
violations charged by the OLR. 
¶5 
After Reserve Judge Kinney was appointed as referee, 
Attorney Moore entered into a stipulation with the OLR.  
Pursuant to the stipulation, Attorney Moore withdrew his answer, 
agreed that the referee could use the allegations of the 
complaint as a factual basis for a determination of misconduct, 
and pled no contest to each of the six counts set forth in the 
OLR's complaint.  The stipulation requested the referee to 
recommend that the court impose a three-year suspension, as 
initially requested by the OLR.  In the stipulation, Attorney 
Moore represents that he fully understands the allegations of 
misconduct against him and his right to contest those charges of 
misconduct, that he understands the ramifications of entering 
into the stipulation, that he understands his right to consult 
with counsel and has indeed been represented by counsel in this 
disciplinary proceeding, and that he is entering into the 
stipulation knowingly and voluntarily. 
¶6 
Pursuant to the stipulation, the referee accepted the 
factual 
allegations 
of 
the 
complaint 
as 
true. 
 
Those 
allegations, which constitute the referee's findings of fact, 
are summarized in the following paragraphs. 
No. 
2013AP329-D   
 
4 
 
¶7 
Attorney Moore was admitted to the practice of law in 
this state in 1984.  He most recently was engaged in the private 
practice of law in Wausau.  He has not been the subject of prior 
professional discipline.  
¶8 
The first three counts of the complaint relate to 
Attorney 
Moore's 
representation 
of 
M.K. 
and 
B.K. 
in 
a 
guardianship proceeding regarding their granddaughter, J.A.R.  
In December 2009 J.A.R.'s mother, who lived in California, sent 
J.A.R. to live with M.K. and B.K., who resided in Marathon 
County, Wisconsin.  J.A.R. began residing in the home of M.K. 
and B.K. on December 10, 2009.  In February 2010 M.K. and B.K. 
retained Attorney Moore to pursue a guardianship proceeding with 
the aim of becoming the legal guardians of J.A.R.  Attorney 
Moore filed a guardianship petition in the Marathon County 
circuit court on their behalf a few days later. 
¶9 
The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), 
which has been adopted in Wisconsin, requires that a minor child 
must reside in the state for a minimum of six months in order 
for a court of that state to exercise jurisdiction over a 
guardianship proceeding involving the minor.  Because J.A.R. had 
been living with M.K. and B.K. in Marathon County for only 
approximately two months at the time the guardianship petition 
was filed, the Marathon County circuit court lacked jurisdiction 
to proceed with the guardianship petition. 
¶10 By April 2010 Attorney Moore was aware that the 
child's mother had objected to the guardianship petition, which 
meant that even if the guardianship case could have proceeded to 
No. 
2013AP329-D   
 
5 
 
a resolution, he would have been obligated to prove that 
J.A.R.'s mother was not fit to care for her. 
¶11 By June 2010 J.A.R. had been living continuously with 
M.K. and B.K. in Marathon County for more than six months.  
Attorney 
Moore, 
however, 
did 
not 
dismiss 
the 
pending 
guardianship proceeding and file a new proceeding in order to 
comply with the six-month jurisdictional requirement. 
¶12 By July 2010 J.A.R.'s mother had retained Attorney 
Peter C. Rotter to represent her in the guardianship proceeding.  
Attorney Rotter entered a special appearance in the guardianship 
case on the mother's behalf, specifically reserving her right to 
challenge the court's jurisdiction over the petition.  Attorney 
Moore did not give a copy of Attorney Rotter's notice to M.K. 
and B.K., nor did he explain to them that the petition he had 
filed was subject to dismissal for failure to comply with the 
six-month residency requirement. 
¶13 The court scheduled a hearing on the guardianship 
petition for July 29, 2010.  Although Attorney Moore met with 
M.K. and B.K. a few days before the hearing and told them that 
things were "in good shape" and he was ready for the hearing, he 
had not obtained any school or medical records for J.A.R., had 
not obtained any written records at all regarding J.A.R.'s 
mother, had not issued any interrogatories or subpoenas to the 
mother, and had not deposed the mother.  Indeed, according to 
Attorney Moore's billing records, he had not done any work on 
the guardianship matter in either May or June 2010. 
No. 
2013AP329-D   
 
6 
 
¶14 On July 27, 2010, Attorney Moore filed a motion for an 
adjournment of the guardianship hearing due to an illness for 
which he had been briefly hospitalized.  He did not advise M.K. 
and B.K. that he had any medical issues that might affect his 
ability to perform his duties as an attorney.  The court granted 
the motion and rescheduled the hearing for October 7, 2010. 
¶15 Attorney Moore did not serve interrogatories or 
document requests on J.A.R.'s mother until August 30, 2010.  He 
did not take her deposition until September 20, 2010.  He did 
not receive her responses to the interrogatories until after he 
had deposed her.  Not until October 4, 2010, just three days 
prior to the scheduled hearing, did Attorney Moore submit 
requests to facilities and persons in California for records 
that might be relevant to the issues for the guardianship 
hearing.  Although he asked for the records to be provided to 
him in time for the October 7 hearing, he had not received some 
of the requested records as of October 6, 2010.  At no point 
prior to the scheduled hearing date did Attorney Moore attempt 
to cure the jurisdictional defect with the guardianship petition 
that he had filed in February 2010. 
¶16 By September 27, 2010, Attorney Moore knew that 
criminal charges would soon be filed against him.  He did not 
promptly advise M.K. and B.K. of this fact or discuss how this 
would impact his ability to represent them at the guardianship 
hearing.  On October 4, 2010, a criminal complaint charging 
Attorney Moore with two misdemeanors was filed in the Marathon 
County circuit court.  State v. Moore, Marathon County Case No. 
No. 
2013AP329-D   
 
7 
 
2010CM1952.  The filing of the complaint generated media 
coverage in the community, which displeased Attorney Moore. 
¶17 On October 6, 2010, just one day prior to the 
guardianship hearing, Attorney Moore finally advised M.K. and 
B.K. of the criminal charges against him, although he told them 
that the charges were unfounded.  Given the lack of time prior 
to the guardianship hearing, M.K. and B.K. were unable to make a 
fully informed decision on whether they should continue to be 
represented by Attorney Moore or hire a different attorney to 
replace him.   
¶18 Later that same day, Attorney Moore advised M.K. and 
B.K. that he was too emotionally distraught to be able to 
represent them at the guardianship hearing the next day.  He 
then filed a motion to adjourn the hearing, claiming that the 
filing of the criminal complaint and other occurrences had 
caused him to suffer a temporary mental condition that was 
impairing his ability to represent his clients.  The circuit 
court granted the motion and rescheduled the hearing for 
December 6, 2010.   
¶19 On October 16, 2010, J.A.R.'s mother appeared at the 
door of M.K. and B.K.'s home with law enforcement to regain 
custody of J.A.R.  She then took J.A.R. back to California. 
¶20 The guardian ad litem (GAL) who had been appointed for 
J.A.R., Attorney Peter Karoblis, spoke with Attorney Moore and 
proposed filing a new petition for temporary guardianship.  He 
believed that by doing so he could bring the guardianship matter 
in front of the circuit court quickly without the need to serve 
No. 
2013AP329-D   
 
8 
 
J.A.R.'s mother and could obtain an ex parte order granting 
temporary guardianship to M.K. and B.K.  Attorney Moore doubted 
that the GAL's proposed course of action would be successful.  
He discussed it with M.K. and B.K., but did not share his 
concerns with them.  Attorney Moore also did not tell M.K. and 
B.K. that although the GAL would be filing the new petition, he 
would be performing legal research and drafting documents to 
support the petition, for which he would be billing them. 
¶21 On November 6, 2010, the circuit court ruled that it 
lacked jurisdiction over the initial petition filed by Attorney 
Moore because J.A.R. had not resided with M.K. and B.K. in 
Wisconsin for at least six consecutive months prior to the 
filing of the petition.  It also ruled that it lacked 
jurisdiction to hear the temporary guardianship petition filed 
by the GAL because J.A.R. was no longer physically present in 
Wisconsin at the time that petition had been filed.  On 
November 11, 2010, M.K. and B.K. directed Attorney Moore to 
cease doing any further work on their behalf. 
¶22 There was also a discrepancy between the retainer 
agreement that Attorney Moore had presented to M.K. and B.K. for 
their signatures and the monthly billing statements that he 
subsequently sent to them.  The retainer agreement stated that 
on execution of the agreement, M.K. and B.K. were to pay $500, 
which was a non-refundable advanced fee that would be placed 
into Attorney Moore's business account.  It further provided 
that Attorney Moore would provide monthly itemized billing 
statements, that the clients were required to pay all costs and 
No. 
2013AP329-D   
 
9 
 
fees by the 15th of the following month, and that the clients 
consented to the placement of all advanced fees into Attorney 
Moore's business account.  The billing statements, however, 
stated that the clients were required to maintain a $1,000 
balance in Attorney Moore's client trust account by the 15th of 
each month.  There was no such requirement in the retainer 
agreement. 
¶23 The referee concluded that these facts were sufficient 
to prove that Attorney Moore had committed each of the three 
ethical violations alleged in the OLR's complaint regarding this 
matter.  First, by failing to file a new guardianship petition 
after J.A.R. had resided in this state for six months in order 
to cure the jurisdictional defect, and by failing in a timely 
manner to obtain documents, discovery responses, and deposition 
testimony needed for the guardianship hearing, Attorney Moore 
failed to act with reasonable diligence, in violation of 
SCR 20:1.3.2  Second, the referee concluded that these facts 
demonstrated that Attorney Moore had failed to communicate 
adequately with his clients, in violation of SCR 20:1.4(a) and 
SCR 20:1.4(b).3  Third, by failing to communicate in a clear and 
                                                 
2 SCR 20:1.3 states that "[a] lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." 
3 SCRs 20:1.4(a) and (b) state as follows:  Communication. 
 
(a) A lawyer shall: 
 
(1) Promptly inform the client of any decision or 
circumstance with respect to which the client's 
informed consent, as defined in SCR 20:1.0(f), is 
required by these rules;  
No. 
2013AP329-D   
 
10 
 
consistent manner the basis and rate of his fees, what fees were 
required to be paid in advance, and how advanced fees would be 
handled, and by stating in the retainer agreement that advanced 
fees 
would 
be 
nonrefundable, 
Attorney 
Moore 
violated 
SCR 20:1.5(b).4 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
(2) reasonably consult with the client about the 
means by which the client's objectives are to be 
accomplished; 
 
(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the 
status of the matter;  
 
(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests by 
the client for information; and 
 
(5) consult with the client about any relevant 
limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer 
knows that the client expects assistance not permitted 
by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. 
 
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent 
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make 
informed decisions regarding the representation. 
4 SCR 20:1.5(b) states:   
 
(1) The scope of the representation and the basis 
or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client 
will be responsible shall be communicated to the 
client in writing, except when the lawyer will charge 
a regularly represented client on the same basis or 
rate as in the past.  If it is reasonably foreseeable 
that the total cost of representation to the client, 
including attorney's fees, will be $1000 or less, the 
communication may be oral or in writing. Any changes 
in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also 
be communicated in writing to the client.   
 
(2) If the total cost of representation to the 
client, including attorney's fees, is more than $1000, 
the purpose and effect of any retainer or advance fee 
that is paid to the lawyer shall be communicated in 
writing.  
No. 
2013AP329-D   
 
11 
 
¶24 Counts Four through Six of the complaint involve 
Attorney Moore's representation of A.E.P., an 18-year-old 
defendant 
in 
a 
felony 
criminal 
case, 
and 
the 
criminal 
convictions against Attorney Moore that arose out of that 
representation.  Attorney Moore began representing A.E.P. at 
least by the summer of 2009 and appeared with him at his initial 
appearance in June 2009.  In the early stages of the case, 
Attorney Moore hoped to negotiate a plea agreement that would 
allow A.E.P. to avoid a felony conviction.  While the case was 
pending, however, the State filed additional charges against 
A.E.P. in a series of new cases.  Ultimately, there were six 
cases pending against A.E.P. in the Marathon County circuit 
court.  Consequently, Attorney Moore was not able to negotiate a 
plea agreement acceptable to both the State and A.E.P. 
¶25 A.E.P. was able to post bond and obtain his temporary 
release from custody in the pending cases.  On February 3, 2010, 
Attorney Moore advised A.E.P. that law enforcement would be 
raiding his home and that he should therefore bring any drug-
related items to Attorney Moore's law office.  A.E.P. did as 
instructed by Attorney Moore.  Among the items he brought to 
Attorney Moore's office were some homemade marijuana pipes.  
While A.E.P. was at Attorney Moore's office, Attorney Moore 
asked him what was the usual price at the time for an ounce of 
marijuana.  A.E.P. replied that $400 was the going price. 
                                                                                                                                                             
           
No. 
2013AP329-D   
 
12 
 
¶26 The 
next 
day 
Attorney 
Moore 
called 
A.E.P. 
and 
instructed him to come back to Attorney Moore's office.  When 
A.E.P. arrived at the office, Attorney Moore gave him $400 in 
cash and told him to purchase an ounce of marijuana.  Attorney 
Moore also called A.E.P.'s employer and told the employer that 
A.E.P. would not be coming to work that day because Attorney 
Moore had something for him to do. 
¶27  After 
A.E.P. 
left 
Attorney 
Moore's 
office, 
he 
contacted an individual for the purpose of buying the marijuana 
that Attorney Moore wanted.  He then stopped at his place of 
employment and showed his employer the cash.  He told his 
employer that he had to go buy marijuana for his attorney to 
help him with his case.  He left his employer to purchase the 
marijuana. 
¶28  Before A.E.P. could conclude the marijuana purchase, 
his father telephoned and confronted him about what was 
happening.  The father directed A.E.P. to meet him at a parking 
lot.  When the two reached the meeting place, A.E.P. told his 
father that Attorney Moore had given him $400 and had instructed 
him to buy an ounce of marijuana.   
¶29  A.E.P.'s 
parents 
subsequently 
went 
to 
Attorney 
Moore's office and confronted him.  Attorney Moore denied that 
he had given any cash to A.E.P. or that he had directed A.E.P. 
to purchase marijuana for him.   
¶30  While this discussion was occurring, A.E.P. arrived 
at Attorney Moore's office.  A.E.P.'s father asked him about the 
fact that Attorney Moore had denied what A.E.P. had previously 
No. 
2013AP329-D   
 
13 
 
reported to his father.  At that point, A.E.P. took out the $400 
in cash and placed it on Attorney Moore's desk to corroborate 
what he had told his father.  A.E.P. subsequently picked up the 
cash again and made a comment to the effect that if the money 
did not belong to Attorney Moore, then it must belong to him.   
¶31  At that point, Attorney Moore asked A.E.P. if he 
could tell A.E.P.'s parents "what was going on."  A.E.P. 
responded affirmatively.  Attorney Moore then told the parents 
that the $400 in cash had been given to A.E.P. so he could make 
a "good faith buy."  Attorney Moore further stated that the 
assistant district attorney handling A.E.P.'s pending cases and 
other law enforcement officials knew about the proposed buy.  He 
also told the parents that this was just a good faith buy and 
that if A.E.P. wanted to work with law enforcement, an actual 
written contract would need to be drafted.  Attorney Moore then 
took back the $400. 
¶32  Several days after this conversation, A.E.P. and his 
parents terminated Attorney Moore's representation.  They then 
met with successor counsel and described the events that had 
taken place at Attorney Moore's office on February 4.  Successor 
counsel contacted the assistant district attorney and confirmed 
that he had not been aware of any proposed good faith buy 
involving A.E.P. and Attorney Moore. 
¶33  A special investigator by the name of Nathan Pauls 
was prepared to testify that he had spoken with A.E.P. following 
a January 2010 arrest and had told A.E.P. that he would be 
willing to speak with A.E.P. once he was out of jail.  Special 
No. 
2013AP329-D   
 
14 
 
Investigator Pauls, however, also would have testified that he 
had not had any contact with A.E.P. or Attorney Moore since that 
initial brief conversation and had not made any arrangements for 
A.E.P. to cooperate with law enforcement by making drug buys or 
otherwise.  Special Investigator Pauls further would have 
testified that his law enforcement unit never attempted to 
obtain a search warrant for the residence of A.E.P.  
¶34  The assistant district attorney would have testified 
that he had a 30-second telephone conversation with Attorney 
Moore, who suggested that A.E.P. would be willing to cooperate 
with law enforcement in exchange for consideration on his 
pending charges.  The assistant district attorney, however, 
would also have testified that he immediately dismissed the idea 
because of the seriousness of the pending charges against A.E.P.5  
In addition, the assistant district attorney never told Attorney 
Moore that A.E.P. should clear his residence of illegal drugs 
due to a coming search of the residence by law enforcement.   
¶35  As a result of Attorney Moore's interactions with 
A.E.P., the State charged Attorney Moore with two unclassified 
misdemeanors:  (1) possession of a controlled substance (THC), 
as a party to a crime-conspiracy, and (2) possession of drug 
paraphernalia.  Attorney Moore entered no contest pleas to both 
charges. 
                                                 
5 Attorney Moore's billing records do not show any entries 
for a conversation with the assistant district attorney about 
A.E.P. working with law enforcement to conduct drug buys. 
No. 
2013AP329-D   
 
15 
 
¶36  At the time that Attorney Moore asked A.E.P. to 
purchase marijuana for him, A.E.P. was out on bond in several 
felony cases.  If he had purchased and possessed marijuana, his 
bond would have been subject to revocation and he could have 
been charged with additional felony offenses. 
¶37  Based on these facts, the referee found that Attorney 
Moore 
had 
committed 
three 
violations 
of 
the 
Rules 
of 
Professional Conduct for Attorneys.  As alleged in Count Four of 
the complaint, by engaging in conduct that resulted in his 
conviction of the two misdemeanors identified above, Attorney 
Moore violated SCR 20:8.4(b).6  Attorney Moore also violated 
SCR 20:8.4(c)7 when he made multiple misrepresentations to 
A.E.P.'s parents in his office on February 4, 2010.  Finally, by 
attempting to cause A.E.P. to purchase marijuana for him, which 
could 
have 
been 
detrimental 
to 
A.E.P., 
Attorney 
Moore 
represented A.E.P. while having a concurrent conflict of 
interest, in violation of SCR 20:1.7(a)(2).8 
                                                 
6 SCR 20:8.4(b) states it is professional misconduct for a 
lawyer to "commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the 
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in 
other respects; . . . ." 
7 SCR 20:8.4(c) provides that it is professional misconduct 
for a lawyer to "engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, 
deceit or misrepresentation; . . . ." 
8 SCR 20:1.7(a)(2) states:   
 
Except as provided in par. (b), a lawyer shall 
not represent a client if the representation involves 
a concurrent conflict of interest.  A concurrent 
conflict of interest exists if: 
 
. . .  
No. 
2013AP329-D   
 
16 
 
¶38 As requested by the OLR and stipulated to by Attorney 
Moore, the referee recommended that the court suspend Attorney 
Moore's license to practice law in Wisconsin for a period of 
three years.  The referee also recommended that the court impose 
the full costs of the disciplinary proceedings on Attorney 
Moore. 
¶39  Our review of a referee's report and recommendation 
in an attorney disciplinary proceeding follows well-established 
standards.  We affirm the referee's findings of fact unless they 
are found to be clearly erroneous, but we review the referee's 
conclusions of law on a de novo basis.  In re Disciplinary 
Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 
740 N.W.2d 125. 
 
We 
determine 
the 
appropriate 
level 
of 
discipline to impose given the particular facts of each case, 
independent of the referee's recommendation, but benefiting from 
it.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, 
¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686. 
¶40  Given the parties' stipulation that the allegations 
of the complaint are true, we adopt those allegations as the 
referee's findings of fact.  We agree with the referee that 
those findings are sufficient to support a legal conclusion that 
Attorney Moore committed each of the six counts of professional 
misconduct alleged in the OLR's complaint. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
(2) there 
is 
a 
significant 
risk 
that 
the 
representation 
of 
one 
or 
more 
clients 
will 
be 
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to 
another client, a former client or a third person or 
by a personal interest of the lawyer. 
No. 
2013AP329-D   
 
17 
 
¶41  Turning 
to 
the 
issue 
of 
the 
proper 
level 
of 
discipline, we conclude that a three-year suspension is the 
appropriate sanction for Attorney Moore's misconduct.  Attorney 
Moore's 
ethical 
violations 
are 
serious 
breaches 
of 
his 
obligations as an attorney.  Not only did he conspire with 
another to violate the criminal law of this state, he directed 
his own client, a young man already facing multiple criminal 
charges, to break the law again to serve Attorney Moore's own 
personal cravings.  Instead of helping his client to gain a 
respect for the laws of this state, Attorney Moore demonstrated 
to his young client his own disdain for the rule of law.  
Moreover, when confronted by his client's parents, Attorney 
Moore lied to them, first by essentially claiming that his 
client was a liar and then by trying to spin a story of an 
alleged "good faith buy" to cover his own criminal acts.  In the 
other matter, Attorney Moore showed a troubling lack of 
diligence to address a clear problem that he had caused.  His 
failure 
to 
take 
relatively 
simple 
steps 
to 
cure 
the 
jurisdictional defect his premature filing had caused cost his 
clients their opportunity to seek a legal role in the upbringing 
of their granddaughter.  A lengthy suspension, with the 
accompanying requirement that Attorney Moore must prove his 
character and fitness to resume the practice of law, is an 
appropriate result of this professional misconduct. 
¶42  We further conclude that there is no reason in this 
matter to deviate from our general policy of imposing the full 
costs of a disciplinary proceeding on the respondent attorney 
No. 
2013AP329-D   
 
18 
 
who is found to have committed professional misconduct.  See 
SCR 22.24(1m).  Although Attorney Moore did ultimately enter 
into a stipulation and no contest plea, he initially filed an 
answer that denied many of the material factual allegations in 
the OLR's complaint and denied having committed any of the six 
charged rule violations.  This denial required the appointment 
of a referee and the accompanying costs of litigating this 
matter.  It is therefore appropriate that Attorney Moore pay the 
full costs associated with this proceeding. 
¶43  Finally, we do not include any restitution obligation 
in our order.  The OLR did not request any restitution award 
against Attorney Moore as the two representations did not meet 
the OLR's restitution criteria.   
¶44 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Ronald J. Moore to 
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of three 
years, effective December 30, 2013.  
¶45 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order, Ronald J. Moore shall pay to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation the costs of this proceeding.  
¶46  IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Ronald J. Moore shall 
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of 
a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been 
suspended. 
¶47  IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all 
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement.  See 
SCR 22.29(4)(c). 
 
No. 
2013AP329-D   
 
19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. 
2013AP329-D   
 
 
 
1