Case Title: Sabia v. Neville

Citation: 165 Vt 515, 687 A.2d 469

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1996-10-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Sabia v. Neville  (95-405); 165 Vt 515; 687 A.2d 469

[Opinion Filed 18-Oct-1996]

       NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under
  V.R.A.P. 40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont
  Reports.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
  Vermont Supreme Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of
  any errors in order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes
  to press.


                                 No. 95-405


Terri A. Sabia                                    Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            Chittenden Superior Court

Anna Neville, Meta Strick &                       April Term, 1996
Dennis LaPlant


Linda Levitt, J.

       Kurt M. Hughes of Murdoch & Hughes, Burlington, for
  plaintiff-appellant

       Jeffrey L. Amestoy, Attorney General, Montpelier, and Michael O.
  Duane, Assistant Attorney General, Waterbury, for defendants-appellees


PRESENT:       Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley and Johnson, JJ., and
               Teachout, Super. J., Specially Assigned


       DOOLEY, J.   This is a companion case to Sabia v. State, 164 Vt. ___,
  669 A.2d 1187 (1995) (Sabia I), in which we decided that two sexually
  abused minors could bring a tort action against the State of Vermont when
  state social workers neglected their statutory duty to provide assistance
  to stop the abuse.  While Sabia I was pending in the trial court, one of
  the plaintiffs in that action brought this separate suit against the social
  workers, Anna Neville and Meta Strick, in their personal capacities, and
  against the alleged abuser, plaintiff's stepfather Dennis LaPlant.  The
  Chittenden Superior Court granted summary judgment for the social workers
  (hereinafter, defendants), holding that they enjoyed qualified immunity
  from the tort claims against them.(FN1)  Plaintiff challenges this ruling, as
  well as defendants' other arguments in support of dismissal of the
  complaint.  We reverse and remand.

 

       The basic allegations were stated in Sabia I as follows:

      Plaintiff Toni Patterson, who was twenty-two years old when she
      filed suit in May 1992, was first sexually abused by her stepfather,
      Dennis Laplant, at the age of six or seven.  She was thirteen years
      old in 1983 when she reported the abuse to a teacher, who
      informed SRS.  An SRS supervisor met with Toni and the teacher
      in March 1983, at which time the supervisor stated that she would
      be in touch, and that either Toni or her stepfather would be
      removed from the home.  No action was taken.

      Plaintiff Terri Sabia, who is three years younger than her
      sister, was sexually abused by her stepfather beginning at age five.
      When Terri was approximately seven years old, a babysitter
      reported to SRS that she had observed physical signs of sexual
      abuse while bathing Terri.  Apparently, nothing was done in
      response to the report.  In 1983, when Terri was eleven years old,
      she reported to the school nurse and principal that Laplant had
      sexually assaulted her.  School officials notified the director of the
      Franklin County Family Center, who investigated and reported to
      SRS that Laplant had admitted having sexual intercourse with Toni
      and "touching" Terri.  SRS took no action in response to the
      report.  The continuing abuse was reported to SRS again in 1986,
      but again nothing was done.  Laplant's sexual abuse of plaintiffs
      continued unabated until 1987.

  Id. at ___, 669 A.2d  at 1190.

       The above facts were based solely on the allegations in the complaint. 
  As discussed below, this action has had some factual development in support
  of the cross-motions for summary judgment, and defendants have denied any
  knowledge of the sexual abuse of plaintiff. Also, plaintiff's sister, Toni
  Patterson, has not joined in this action.

       In her complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendants were negligent and
  grossly negligent and that they intentionally inflicted emotional distress
  on plaintiff.  Defendants immediately moved to dismiss the negligence
  counts on the ground that a damage action based on the negligence of a
  state employee must be brought against the state.  See 12 V.S.A. § 5602(a).
  The court granted the motion to dismiss, and plaintiff has not contested
  that decision on appeal.

       Defendants moved for summary judgment on the remaining counts based on
  affidavits that are summarized below.  Defendants argued that based on the
  undisputed facts they were not grossly negligent and did not intentionally
  inflict emotional distress on plaintiff.  They also

 

  argued that their actions were protected by qualified immunity.  After
  plaintiff responded with affidavits, the superior court granted summary
  judgment for defendants based on qualified immunity and did not reach
  defendants' other arguments.  Plaintiff argues here that the qualified
  immunity decision is erroneous and further that none of defendants' grounds
  for summary judgment are valid.  We agree that it was error to grant
  summary judgment based on qualified immunity, but do not reach the other
  arguments because they have not been considered by the trial court.

       Plaintiff has relied upon three affidavits in opposition to
  defendants' motion for summary judgment.  The affidavit of plaintiff states
  that Dennis LaPlant sexually abused her from age five and had sexual
  intercourse with her from age six.  The acts continued until she was at
  least fifteen years old.  She stated that the acts were first disclosed in
  1979 to a neighbor who reported them to SRS.

       According to plaintiff's affidavit, her older sister Toni reported the
  ongoing sexual abuse of herself to a school teacher in 1982.  The report
  was relayed to defendants, and defendant Strick interviewed Toni Sabia, who
  was then thirteen years old.  At the interview, Toni told Strick that she
  had been sexually abused by LaPlant since she was six or seven years old.
  Defendant Strick promised to remove Toni or LaPlant from the home.

       Also according to the affidavit, plaintiff reported the ongoing sexual
  abuse to a school nurse, who reported it to the director of the Franklin
  County Family Center.  The director interviewed Dennis LaPlant, who
  admitted sexual abuse of both Toni and plaintiff.  The director "reported
  the results of her investigation to SRS . . . ."

       Finally, plaintiff stated in her affidavit that she reported the abuse
  to an SRS investigator in 1986.  According to the affidavit, she reported
  to the investigator that LaPlant had touched her under her clothes, the
  abuse was ongoing, and it had not been discontinued.  She stated she was
  scared during the interview.

       The teacher submitted an affidavit, dated April 15, 1993, confirming
  what plaintiff stated

 

  about her actions.  There is no specific statement in this affidavit that
  Toni disclosed that plaintiff was also being sexually abused by LaPlant. 
  Her affidavit ends, however, with the following paragraph:

     12.  It is very clear to me that the failure of SRS to act on Toni's
     report that she and Terri were being sexually abused was directly
     responsible for extreme emotional distress on the part of both girls,
     not to mention myself.

  The teacher also submitted an affidavit for defendants.  This affidavit,
  dated December 20, 1994, states that neither Toni nor plaintiff told her of
  LaPlant's abuse of plaintiff at any time during the 1980s.  She states that
  she first learned of the abuse of plaintiff from Toni following the
  institution of criminal charges against LaPlant in 1991.

       The director of the Franklin County Family Center prepared an
  affidavit on October 14, 1983, stating that she had learned of the sexual
  abuse of Toni from a school guidance counselor and that she interviewed
  Toni.  Toni at first stated that she did not believe that LaPlant had
  sexually abused plaintiff, but on September 21, 1983 called the director to
  tell her that LaPlant "had molested Terry."  The director met that day with
  Toni and the neighbor to whom, according to her affidavit, plaintiff had
  first reported the sexual abuse.  The neighbor described being present in
  the bathroom of plaintiff's house, while plaintiff was bathing, and
  noticing that plaintiff's vagina was red and swollen.  The neighbor started
  asking plaintiff questions, and plaintiff disclosed LaPlant's sexual abuse
  in response.  The director then met with plaintiff, who described the
  sexual abuse, and the mother of Toni and Terri, who admitted it was
  happening.

       The affidavit goes on to an entry for the next day as follows:
  "Contacted SRS 9/22 - Spoke to Meada regarding this family."  On the same
  day Dennis LaPlant called for an appointment, which was set up for
  September 29th.  According to the affidavit, the Director again contacted
  SRS on the 29th and "spoke to Meada to see if Gary could be present when
  Dennis would be there."  The "Gary" in the affidavit is apparently Gary
  Greenfield, an investigator for the Franklin County State's Attorney.  The
  affidavit goes on to describe the

 

  director's meeting with LaPlant, in which he admitted the sexual abuse of
  both Toni and Terri.

       Defendants submitted affidavits which contradicted in numerous
  respects the statements contained in the affidavits submitted by plaintiff. 
  Generally, defendants denied knowledge of LaPlant's abuse of plaintiff.

       Defendant Neville states that she was the District Director of the St.
  Albans SRS office up until September 1987 and "supervised SRS investigative
  social workers."  She denies receiving any "written report or written
  statement by" the director of the Franklin County Family Center.  As to the
  1986 investigation, she asserts that plaintiff "denied that she had been
  abused by LaPlant since SRS' [sic] had last investigated this matter" and,
  therefore, that no further intrusion into the family was warranted because
  there was no current abuse and plaintiff was not seeking protection.

       Defendant Strick states in her affidavit that her SRS work
  responsibility from 1977 until May 1985 was to "perform child abuse and
  neglect investigations."  She states that she interviewed Toni in 1983, but
  no information from that interview "constituted a report . . . of child
  abuse regarding" plaintiff.  She further states that she never received a
  copy of the director's affidavit and she was not employed by SRS in 1986.

       Based on the above record, the superior court found that defendants
  were protected by qualified immunity because they acted in good faith.  The
  court's reasoning was as follows:

     Defendants investigated a report of abuse concerning plaintiff's
     sister.  At that time there were no allegations of abuse of the
     plaintiff, herself.  Defendant Strick interviewed plaintiff's sister
     and did not receive any information which warranted a child abuse
     investigation with respect to plaintiff.  Based on an objective
     standard, defendants did not violate any clearly established rights
     of plaintiff.  Plaintiff has failed to show that defendants should
     reasonably have known that their acts or omissions violated
     plaintiff's rights.

       The general rule in Vermont is that lower-level government employees,
  like defendants, are protected from tort liability by qualified immunity
  when they perform discretionary acts in good faith during the course of
  their employment and within the scope of their authority.  See

 

  Hudson v. Town of East Montpelier, 161 Vt. 168, 171,