Case Title: Haselhuhn v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1986-10-31T00:00:00Z

Document:
Haselhuhn v. State1986 WY 196727 P.2d 280Case Number: 85-268Decided: 10/31/1986Supreme Court of Wyoming

Darwin HASELHUHN, Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Martin J. McClain, Deputy State Public Defender, 
and Julie Naylor, Appellate Counsel, for 
appellant (defendant).

A.G. McClintock, 
Atty. Gen., Gerald A. Stack, Deputy Atty. Gen., Allen C. Johnson, Sr. Asst. 
Atty. Gen., and John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee (plaintiff).

Before THOMAS, C.J., and BROWN, CARDINE, URBIGKIT 
and MACY, JJ.

THOMAS, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1.]     In this appeal, which 
is taken from a conviction of aggravated robbery, in violation of § 
6-2-401(c)(ii), W.S. 1977 (June 1983 Replacement), Darwin Haselhuhn asserts a 
series of errors relating to his trial. The issues to be addressed include a 
claim that a witness should not have been permitted to testify because he had 
been hypnotized; error for failing to grant a continuance in order to obtain 
expert testimony relating to hypnosis; the failure of the prosecution to make 
available evidence perceived to be of assistance to the defendant; error in 
introducing the results of a polygraph examination relating to a third person; 
improper argument in the form of testimony by the prosecutor; and a claim of a 
denial of the right of confrontation because a codefendant, at the time the oath 
was administered to witnesses, asserted that he would rely upon his Fifth 
Amendment right and refuse to testify. It is our conclusion that no reversible 
error is found in any of the matters asserted by Haselhuhn, and the judgment and 
sentence entered in the district court is affirmed.

[¶2.]     On April 21, 1984, the 
Safeway Store in Green 
River, Wyoming was 
robbed by two male individuals, one armed with what appeared to be a sawed-off 
shotgun and the other armed with a knife. Thereafter a criminal complaint was 
filed in the county court charging the appellant with armed robbery. After a 
preliminary hearing, the appellant was bound over to the district court for 
further proceedings. An information charging the identical offense as that 
charged in the complaint subsequently was filed in the district court, and 
appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned upon that information. The case was 
tried to a jury, and it returned a verdict finding Haselhuhn guilty of 
aggravated robbery. Haselhuhn was sentenced to a term of not less than eight 
years nor more than twelve years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. It is from 
this judgment and sentence that Haselhuhn appeals.

[¶3.]     In his brief in this 
court Haselhuhn presents a statement of the issues by listing six arguments as 
follows:

"I. Whether Appellant was 
denied his due process rights to notice and the opportunity to be heard because 
the trial court denied his motion for a continuance.

"II. Whether hypnotically 
enhanced recollections should be admissible and whether it is the State's burden 
to establish at a hearing out of the jury's presence that any hypnosis done by 
the State did not alter the witness' recall in any fashion. 

"III. Whether the 
prosecution failed to abide by its constitutional obligation `to assist the 
defense in making its case' and whether a reversal is mandated because the 
evidence the prosecution did not disclose was material to a just resolution of 
the facts.

"IV. Whether the 
prosecutor improperly used closing argument to testify to the jury that neither 
he nor Officer Jaramillo had hidden anything from the defense.

"V. Whether it was plain 
error for the prosecution to introduce the results of a polygraph 
exam.

"VI. Whether Appellant 
was denied his right to due process by the presentation to the jury of his 
co-defendant's invocation of the Fifth Amendment."

The statement of 
the issues by the State of Wyoming is:

"I. The denial of 
Appellant's motion for a continuance was proper and did not result in 
abridgement of his due process rights.

"II. The State did not 
offer hypnotically-enhanced testimony. Appellant had adequate notice and 
opportunity to impeach the testimony of the witnesses who were 
hypnotized.

"III. The Prosecution did 
not withhold from Appellant any material that can be considered Brady 
material.

"IV. The Prosecutor's 
rebuttal argument was a fair response to the Appellant's assertions that he was 
denied access to exculpatory information, and was in any event 
harmless.

"V. No reversible error 
resulted from the mention of a polygraph exam.

"VI. There was no 
reversible error committed when the Appellant's accomplice said he would take 
the Fifth Amendment if called to testify."

[¶4.]     While some additional 
detail will be alluded to in connection with the disposition of the several 
issues in this case, the significant facts begin in the evening hours of April 
21, 1984. Prior to closing time for the Safeway Store, three employees saw 
Haselhuhn enter the store. He was known to the store employees because he was a 
member of the crew employed by the contractor who maintained the floors in the 
store. None of the employees saw Haselhuhn leave. Haselhuhn admitted that he was 
present in the store the night of the robbery but asserted that he was there in 
connection with his work on the maintenance crew. Haselhuhn's co-defendant also 
was observed in the store prior to closing time, and, as with Haselhuhn, no one 
saw him leave. Haselhuhn admitted that he spent the evening with his 
co-defendant, but, of course, denied participation in the robbery. Not long 
after the store was closed at 10:00 P.M., the assistant store manager and a 
store clerk were balancing the books and working on the cash accounting in a 
cage which was locked most of the time. They observed two men, one wearing a ski 
mask and the other a Halloween mask, approaching the cage from the rear of the 
store. One of the men was armed with what appeared to be a sawed-off shotgun and 
the other with a knife. When the men reached the cage, they demanded the store 
money from the assistant store manager and the clerk.

[¶5.]     Then they took the two 
victims to the rear of the store, bound them with duct tape, and left through a 
delivery door which could be opened only from the inside. It was necessary for 
them to take a key from the clerk in order to open the delivery door. Soon after 
the robbers left, the store employees managed to free themselves and summoned 
the police. When the police arrived, the assistant store manager and the clerk 
gave statements as to what had occurred. The assistant store manager advised the 
police officers that he was able to peek under the duct tape which the robbers 
had placed over his eyes and see one of them who had removed his ski mask. The 
store manager was able to furnish a physical description of the robber, describe 
the robber's clothing, and advise the officers that he recognized the robber as 
one of the cleaning men but that he could not remember the man's name. Later 
when the assistant store manager was shown a xeroxed array of photographs, he 
indicated that the photograph of the appellant might be the robber but pointed 
out that the hair was styled differently. The store clerk who had been a victim 
identified the photograph in the array as that of Haselhuhn, but she had not 
seen the robber without his mask. The store clerk, however, did furnish a 
description of the clothes, masks and weapons. Both the assistant manager and 
the clerk identified the voice of the co-defendant from a taped voice 
array.

[¶6.]     Some time later, both 
the assistant manager and the clerk were interviewed under hypnosis by a 
non-professional with meager training in hypnotic techniques. This interview 
occurred prior to the preliminary hearing. At the preliminary hearing, the 
assistant store manager positively identified Haselhuhn as the robber he had 
seen. He even explained that he had removed his glasses to make the 
circumstances as similar as possible to the situation in the store at the time 
of the robbery, and he testified that he knew for sure that Haselhuhn was the 
robber. In his testimony at the trial the assistant manager again identified 
Haselhuhn as the robber.

[¶7.]     Other testimony at the 
trial was introduced from three witnesses who testified that Haselhuhn had made 
statements to them which connected him with the robbery. A different witness 
testified that Haselhuhn and the co-defendant had visited him at his home on the 
night of the robbery. He stated that he did not know precisely what time they 
were at his home and conceded that they may have been there during the time that 
the robbery occurred or they may not have been there at that time.

[¶8.]     As part of his trial 
strategy, Haselhuhn endeavored to focus suspicion upon a third party who was 
connected to a sawed-off shotgun that had been retrieved from the Black's 
ForkRiver. In the course of 
examination concerning this shotgun, counsel for Haselhuhn asked one of the 
police officers what follow up had been accomplished with respect to the 
ownership of that shotgun and the reason for its presence in the river. The 
police officer testified that another detective had interviewed the third person 
and secured a polygraph examination of the third person. Thereafter the 
prosecution pinpointed the result of the polygraph examination which was 
exculpatory with respect to the robbery so far as the third person was 
concerned.

[¶9.]     In his rebuttal 
argument the prosecuting attorney felt compelled to deny closing argument by 
counsel for Haselhuhn that evidence had not been made available to Haselhuhn. 
When objection was made the district judge permitted the prosecutor to proceed 
with his argument.

[¶10.]  The co-defendant was subpoenaed as a 
witness at Haselhuhn's trial although he never was called to testify. In 
accordance with the practice of the court, all witnesses were sworn at once 
prior to the trial. At that time, it was observed that the co-defendant had not 
been sworn, and the district judge directed that the oath be administered to 
him. The co-defendant, however, then advised the court that he would rely upon 
his right not to testify against himself and that he would refuse to testify at 
the trial. In response to this occurrence, Haselhuhn requested a mistrial, but 
he made no request for any cautionary instruction.

[¶11.]  We shall address first the issues 
relating to the admissibility of the testimony of identification by the store 
manager and the refusal of the trial court to grant a continuance. We have 
adopted the rule that hypnosis raises an issue of credibility with respect to 
the testimony of a witness, but the fact that the witness has been hypnotized 
does not render the witness incompetent to testify. Chapman v. State, Wyo., 638 P.2d 1280 
(1982). While this court has been divided on the question, that rule was 
followed in Gee v. State, Wyo., 662 P.2d 103 
(1983), and Pote v. State, Wyo., 695 P.2d 617 (1985). Haselhuhn argues 
that the court now should adopt a rule of incompetency of the witness rather 
than the rule of credibility. Haselhuhn argues that because the assistant 
manager could not remember the name of the cleaning crew member he thought to be 
the robber and because he could not identify a xeroxed photo of Haselhuhn with a 
different hair style as either the robber or a member of the cleanup crew, we 
must conclude that his testimony was enhanced by the hypnosis. The assistant 
store manager, as we have noted, was able to make a positive identification of 
Haselhuhn when he saw him in person at the preliminary hearing.

[¶12.]  This case is like Pote v. State, supra, 
with respect to the fact that the testimony of the assistant store manager was 
not enhanced by virtue of the hypnotic interview. At the trial the assistant 
manager denied that his testimony was enhanced by the hypnotic session. The 
hypnotist also testified that the interview did not elicit any additional 
information from the assistant store manager beyond that which he had previously 
furnished. The testimony of the assistant store manager at the preliminary 
examination and at the trial was consistent with the statement first given to 
the police on the night of the robbery. The only difference was that the 
assistant store manager was able to identify Haselhuhn as the robber when he saw 
him in person. His explanation of his ability to identify Haselhuhn at that time 
rules out any impact of the interview under hypnosis. This case is similar to 
Chapman v. State, supra, in which defense counsel did not elicit any indication 
that the testimony of the witness was enhanced by hypnosis. It also is similar 
to Gee v. State, supra, in that the identification factors remained the same 
following hypnosis, and further, the identification by the assistant store 
manager was cumulative to other strong evidence of Haselhuhn's guilt. We hold 
that the store manager did not offer testimony that had been enhanced by 
hypnosis, and no error occurred in permitting him to testify for that reason. In 
light of these factors we will not reconsider the rule of competency in this 
case.

[¶13.]  Haselhuhn also complains of the failure 
of the prosecutor to advise him of the hypnosis of the assistant store manager 
which this court has said the prosecutor is required to do. Gee v. State, supra. 
We do not recede from our position that the state must advise the defendant of 
the fact that a witness has been previously hypnotized and make available to the 
defendant on request all statements and proceedings relating to the hypnosis. 
However, we do not discern a failure by the prosecution to comply with those 
requirements in this instance. The record demonstrates that the state complied 
with a discovery order entered by the district court. When examining the 
exhibits maintained by the Green River police 
department on the day prior to trial, defense counsel discovered a tape of the 
hypnotic interviews of the store manager and the store clerk. He had been 
offered access to this information well in advance of trial, but he did not 
discover the tapes until that moment. There is no reason to believe that the 
prosecutor was aware of the hypnotic interviews prior to that time. The 
prosecutor advised the court that he had not been aware of the fact that the 
witnesses had been hypnotically interviewed until the day prior to trial, and 
there is no reason to doubt him. Moreover, defense counsel from the time that he 
knew about the tapes of the hypnotic sessions had the opportunity to listen to 
them. We said in Gee v. State, supra, 662 P.2d at 104:

"To make such an attack 
on credibility, the attacking party must of necessity have knowledge of the fact 
of the pre-trial hypnosis of the witness."

In this case 
defense counsel had that knowledge. His examinations of the assistant store 
manager and the hypnotist were accomplished with a good deal of skill based upon 
that information. He asked the assistant store manager about the hypnotic 
interview and what occurred. He also thoroughly addressed that subject with the 
person who had conducted the interview and raised numerous questions concerning 
the skills and abilities of the hypnotic interviewer. Under these circumstances 
the prosecution's failure to specifically advise defense counsel of the hypnotic 
sessions did not violate Haselhuhn's constitutional rights. 

[¶14.]  Haselhuhn insists, however, that under 
the same circumstances the trial court was guilty of an abuse of discretion in 
denying his motion for continuance which he asserted was necessary for him to 
obtain an expert witness on hypnosis. He contends that without an expert 
available to attack the testimony of the hypnotized witness he was denied due 
process of law. While we are cognizant of the right of a defendant in a criminal 
case to adequate representation, we are reluctant to structure a rule which 
would justify a continuance in every instance in which the defendant first 
becomes aware of information on the eve of trial which he could have learned 
about in ample time to prepare an adequate defense. The rule is firm that a 
motion for continuance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. 
Wilde v. State, Wyo., 706 P.2d 251 (1985), and cases cited 
therein. No manifest injustice is demonstrated. The denial of a continuance does 
not appear from the record to have inhibited Haselhuhn's attack upon the 
previously hypnotized witness. The absence of the proffered testimony of an 
expert witness who could have explained the impact upon the self-confidence of 
the hypnotized witness does not constitute a deprivation of Haselhuhn's right to 
a fair trial required by due process of law. We hold that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying the continuance in this case.

[¶15.]  Haselhuhn's next argument is that the 
prosecution failed to preserve and present to his counsel a statement of the 
witness who testified that Haselhuhn and his co-defendant visited the home of 
the witness on the night of the robbery, perhaps during the robbery. Haselhuhn 
asserts that this failure violated his right to be informed of exculpatory 
information under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963). It seems almost trite to remind Haselhuhn that substantive and 
procedural legal rules are not an end in themselves. They are the means to an 
end. That end is to secure to a party a right to a fair trial. If any perceived 
failure to comply with those rules does not adversely impact the right to a fair 
trial, then this court is not disposed to reverse on the basis of purely 
technical error. If the witness testified truthfully, then Haselhuhn also must 
have known that he was present at the home of the witness on the night of the 
robbery. With this information already in Haselhuhn's possession, any failure of 
the law enforcement officers to record the statement of the witness and then 
make that information available to Haselhuhn could not have had any material 
impact upon the presentation of his defense. We note also that the prosecution 
is under no duty to create evidence; the duty is only that of preserving 
evidence which may be helpful to the defense. Chapman v. State, 
supra.

[¶16.]  Furthermore, it is questionable whether 
this statement is exculpatory. Brady v. Maryland, supra, established the proposition 
that the prosecution must provide evidence which is material to the defense. In 
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 
2398, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976), the Supreme Court of the United States 
explained that material evidence is that which "might have affected the outcome 
of the trial." The Brady-Agurs test is a demanding one. Buzbee v. Donnelly, 96 
N.M. 692, 634 P.2d 1244 (1981). In light of the fact that Haselhuhn had equal 
knowledge of this information, we do not perceive how the failure of the police 
to disclose that evidence could have had any effect upon the outcome of the 
trial. The information was presented to the jury, and apparently the jury found 
that it did not establish an alibi in view of the other evidence which placed 
Haselhuhn at the scene of the accident. We hold that there was no error in this 
regard.

[¶17.]  Haselhuhn also argues that reversible 
error occurred when the prosecutor introduced the subject of the polygraph 
examination which was made of a third party who was a suspect in the robbery and 
that this violated the rule adopted by this court in Schmunk v. State, Wyo., 714 P.2d 724 (1986). A police officer who was called by Haselhuhn testified on 
direct examination by Haselhuhn's counsel as followed:

"Q. Now, we've already 
gone over yesterday the fact of how this particular shotgun was traced to an 
owner, a man named John Hamilton?

"A. That's 
correct.

"Q. And that was done 
through tracing a serial number on it?

"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. All right. And your 
office contacted this fellow?

"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. And received his 
explanation for how this gun got in the river?

"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. What I'd like to know 
is what investigative steps you took after that point.

"A. I turned that part of 
the investigation over to Detective Thompson."

Defense counsel 
chose to follow up the preceding examination in this way:

"Q. Okay. What did he end 
up doing?

"A. He went up and 
interviewed Mr. Hamilton. Like I says, he traced the steps of where the shotgun 
had gone, from what point to what point. He then ran the gentleman on a 
polygraph test. And his conclusion was that the gentleman was telling the truth 
on the shotgun."

The prosecutor 
asked when he examined the police officer the following questions to which the 
indicated answers were given:

"Q. Now, according to 
your testimony today, that gun originally belonged to a John 
Hamilton?

"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. And you ran a 
polygraph, or someone ran a polygraph, about how it got into the river and 
why?

"A. That's 
correct.

"Q. And he 
passed?

"A. That's my 
understanding.

"Q. Didn't show any 
deception? The polygraph didn't indicate that he was lying?

"A. No, sir."

No objection was 
made to this testimony at trial, and Haselhuhn now argues that this constitutes 
plain error. We are not satisfied that the criteria for plain error articulated 
in Hampton v. State, Wyo., 558 P.2d 504 
(1977), and subsequently followed in this court are satisfied by these 
circumstances. Rather, we are persuaded that if there was any error it was 
invited by Haselhuhn who opened the door. Schmunk v. State, supra; Sanville v. 
State, Wyo., 593 P.2d 1340 (1979); Palato v. 
State, Wyo., 591 P.2d 891 (1979); Burns v. 
State, Wyo., 574 P.2d 422 (1978); Pack v. 
State, Wyo., 571 P.2d 241 (1977); Daellenbach 
v. State, Wyo., 562 P.2d 679 (1977).

[¶18.]  With respect to Haselhuhn's claim that he 
was denied his constitutional right to cross-examine witnesses against him, we 
understand his argument to be that when his co-defendant, upon the occasion of 
being administered the oath of a witness in this case, volunteered the 
information that he would exercise his constitutional right and would refuse to 
testify. This, in effect, was testimonial conduct by the co-defendant, and 
Haselhuhn was deprived of an opportunity to cross-examine the co-defendant about 
that testimonial conduct. As we have indicated, the co-defendant was not called 
as a witness, and he did not testify. The right of confrontation which is 
inherent to any fair trial involves cross-examination with respect to testimony 
that a witness has given. It does not, however, extend to a right to 
cross-examine a witness who is not called to testify with respect to conduct 
such as that which occurred in this case. Nothing material to the issues would 
have been elicited by such cross-examination and the possibility of harm to 
Haselhuhn would be great indeed. The probability that Haselhuhn wanted the 
co-defendant to testify truthfully in this case is quite limited. It would 
appear instead that Haselhuhn prefers to have the claimed error to rely upon in 
his appeal. We note that Haselhuhn did request a mistrial, but did not ask for 
any cautionary instruction to the jury. While such incidents should be avoided 
in the trial of a case, this occurrence is not a ground for reversal. See 
Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 632 P.2d 79 (1981), 
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 (1982).

[¶19.]  The final contention of Haselhuhn relates 
to his argument that the prosecutor testified in rebuttal argument and this was 
reversible error. Haselhuhn's counsel in closing argument said:

"Why are they so 
interested in distorting the evidence that way? * * * And we never had the 
chance to nail that [Hunter's statement as to time] down at that time, because 
it wasn't reported.

* * * * * *

"They'll write down 
things like that and they'll make notes, but they won't write down anything 
about a man who says, `Darwin couldn't have been in the store between 
ten and ten-thirty.' * * *"

When the 
prosecutor made his rebuttal argument, he made these comments and counsel for 
Haselhuhn objected:

"The other thing that 
really angered me while Mr. Flynn was speaking, is * * * he stands up here and 
tries to put Joe Jaramillo on trial again, tries to put me on trial again. And 
you know, he suggested that we hid things from him. I want to tell you right 
now, ladies and gentlemen, there's a discovery order on file in this case. The 
Judge has ordered the State to give all of our evidence to the Defendant. We had 
to do that prior to this trial, prior to you coming in here for voir dire and 
being questioned. This man had every police report that we had and had offered 
to have him examine every piece of evidence -

"MR. FLYNN: Excuse me, 
Your Honor. I wish to object at this point. I don't want to state reasons in 
front of the jury because I think that would be improper, but the Court, I'm 
sure, is very much aware of the conference that we had in chambers regarding the 
hypnosis tape immediately prior to the trial. Because of that basis alone, I 
think it's improper for this line of argument to continue.

"THE COURT: You may 
continue. You were given the opportunity to examine everything they 
had.

"MR. MONEYHUN: So then he 
suggests to you, after having all our evidence, that we're trying to hide 
something from him. He knows what our evidence was. He knows what we had. If he 
could prove to you that we tried - that we did hide something from you, why 
didn't he?"

In Browder v. 
State, Wyo., 
639 P.2d 889 (1982), we held that the prosecutor is not permitted to testify in 
his closing argument. We also have held in a number of cases that when a 
defendant opens the door to response such as this, he will not be heard to 
complain on appeal. If it is a fair response, which we find this to be, to the 
defendant's argument then entertaining a claim such as this on appeal simply 
permits a defendant to structure his own reversible error. In accordance with 
our earlier cases we will not treat this as reversible error. Sanchez v. State, 
Wyo., 694 P.2d 726 (1985); Bishop v. State, 
Wyo., 687 P.2d 242 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1219, 105 S. Ct. 1203, 84 L. Ed. 2d 345 (1985); Freeze v. State, Wyo., 662 P.2d 415 (1983). As we said in 
Freeze v. State, supra, 662 P.2d  at 418, "[t]he appellant opened the door and 
the prosecutor merely closed it."

[¶20.]  We can discern no reversible error in the 
record in this case. The judgment and sentence is affirmed.

BROWN, Justice, dissenting, in 
which URBIGKIT, Justice, 
joins.

[¶21.]  Once a member of this court takes a 
position, nothing short of direction from on high, accompanied by a flash of 
light and a clap of thunder would cause him to reconsider. I say this because 
the majority resolutely holds on to a discredited rule of law which it announced 
in Chapman v. State, Wyo., 638 P.2d 1280 (1982), despite weak, if any, support 
for that position. According to the majority here, this court adopted a rule in 
Chapman that "hypnosis raises an issue of credibility with respect to the 
testimony of a witness, but the fact that the witness has been hypnotized does 
not render the witness incompetent to testify." 

[¶22.]  In this case two eyewitnesses to the 
robbery were hypnotized in order to enhance their memories. The hypnotist was a 
maintenance man at Pacific Power and Light Company. Witness Barney admitted he 
was initially unable to positively identify appellant as one of the robbers. It 
was only after having been hypnotized that he was able to positively identify 
appellant as one of the robbers.

[¶23.]  Courts that have addressed the 
hypnotically enhanced testimony problem have employed three different 
approaches. One group admits all posthypnotic testimony by holding that pretrial 
hypnosis affects only the credibility of a witness rather than his or her 
competency to testify. The second approach admits hypnotically enhanced 
testimony if procedural safeguards are followed. The third category adopts a 
rule of per se inadmissibility, allowing the witness to testify only to matters 
recalled before hypnosis.

[¶24.]  Wyoming falls into the first group, that is, 
hypnosis affects credibility but not admissibility. Chapman v. State, supra. It 
is not clear whether the rule followed by Wyoming was ever a majority rule. It is clear, 
however, that it is not the majority rule today.

[¶25.]  Courts in eleven jurisdictions follow the 
rule that pretrial hypnosis affects only the credibility of such testimony 
rather than its admissibility. Twenty-eight jurisdictions have rejected the 
admissibility of hypnotically enhanced testimony or have restricted its 
admissibility through the application of procedural safeguards or balancing 
tests. Trial by Trance: The Admissibility of Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony, 20 
Colum.J.L. & Soc.Probs. 237 (1986).

[¶26.]  In developing the Chapman rule this court 
cited Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied 395 U.S. 949, 89 S. Ct. 2030, 23 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1969), as its primary authority. Since 
Chapman, however, Harding has been overruled. Collins v. State, 52 Md. App. 186, 447 A.2d 1272 (1982). As additional support for its determination in Chapman the majority 
also relied on cases from Florida, 
Georgia and North Carolina as 
authority. The cases relied upon from these states have also been overruled. 
Bundy v. State, Fla., 471 So. 2d 9 (1985); 
Walraven v. State, 255 Ga. 276, 336 S.E.2d 798, (1985); State v. 
Peoples, 311 N.C. 515, 319 S.E.2d 177 [¶26.]    (1984).

[¶27.]  When the authority upon which a rule of 
law is based becomes seriously eroded, the court adopting the repudiated rule 
should reexamine its position. Not so in this court. In my specially concurring 
opinion in Pote v. State, Wyo., 695 P.2d 617 (1985), citing cases, I 
noted that Chapman represents a rapidly shrinking minority view; it continues to 
shrink. See Contreras v. State, Alaska, 718 P.2d 129 (1986); State v. Moreno, Hawaii, 709 P.2d 103 (1985); State v. Haislip, 237 
Kan. 461, 701 P.2d 909 (1985); People v. Nixon, 
421 Mich. 79, 
364 N.W.2d 593 (1985). Furthermore, I have not found any recent case which 
adopts the Chapman rule, nor does the majority cite any. I conclude, therefore, 
that there are none.

[¶28.]  As previously noted, the cases upon which 
the Chapman majority based its decision have been generally overruled. This 
court was then left with citing Chapman in support of its decision in Gee v. 
State, Wyo., 662 P.2d 103 (1983), and citing Chapman and Gee in support of its 
decision here. This court is now basing decisions on previous errors because 
that is about all there is left.

[¶29.]  Legal treatises, generally, condemn the 
rule that "hypnosis affects credibility but not admissibility." Some treatises 
suggest safeguards. Casenote, Look into My Eyes: The Admissibility of 
Hypnotically-Enhanced Testimony, 19 Creighton L.Rev. 995 (1985-1986); Trial by 
Trance: The Admissibility of Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony, 20 Colum.J.L. 
& Soc.Probs. 237 (1986); Mesmerizing Justice: The Use of 
Hypnotically-Induced Testimony in Criminal Trials, 34 Syracuse L.Rev. 927 
(1983); Note, People v. Zamarripa: To Hypnotize or Not to Hypnotize, 13 
WesternState U.L.Rev. 651 (1986); 
Note, Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony and the Balancing Pendulum, 4 
U.Ill.L.Rev. 921 (1985); Case Comment, Criminal Law - Admissibility of Evidence 
- Testimony Refreshed by Hypnosis Fails to Satisfy General Acceptance in 
Scientific Community Standard, People v. Hughes, 8 Thur.Mar.L.Rev. 451 (1983); 
Case Comment, A New Standard for Admissibility of Hypnotically Refreshed 
Testimony, 63 Wn.U.L.Q. 325 (1985); Comment, Hypnosis of the Accused: 
Defendant's Choice, 75 J.Cr.Law & Criminology 995 (1984).

[¶30.]  Hypnosis is an investigative or 
therapeutic tool, and its credibility is suspect as an evidentiary tool. Cases 
from other jurisdictions and scholarly treatises are contrary to the rule of law 
as set forth in Chapman and Gee. Furthermore, most scientists in the medical or 
psychology fields insist that hypnosis is not reliable, and therefore has no 
place in the courtroom. See 19 Creighton L.Rev. 995, supra. The court should 
abandon the rule in Chapman.

URBIGKIT, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶31.]  A series of trial errors compounds the 
problem discussed by Justice Brown in his dissent, with which I join. The 
cumulative effect of these additional occurrences deprived Haselhuhn of a fair 
trial. Schmunk v. State, Wyo., 714 P.2d 724 (1986). Therefore, I 
further dissent by addressing arguments I, III, V, and VI, presented in the 
appellant's brief.

"* * * It is a 
fundamental facet of due process that a defendant charged with a crime be 
afforded the right to establish and present a defense." State v. Delgado, 8 
Conn. App. 
273, 513 A.2d 701, 706 (1986).

See also State 
v. Corchado, 188 Conn. 653, 453 A.2d 427 (1982).

ARGUMENT I

Denial of the Motion for 
A Continuance

[¶32.]  A substantial number of appeals have been 
heard by this court recently which raised the issue of whether a continuance 
should have been granted. The frequency with which district courts have been 
denying substantive motions for continuance is alarming, as is the frequency 
with which this court affirms where fairness, due process and justice are 
denied. Gentry v. State, Wyo., 724 P.2d 450 
(1986), Urbigkit, J., dissenting; Tageant v. State, Wyo., 683 P.2d 667 (1984); Sims v. State, Wyo., 530 P.2d 1176 
(1965).

[¶33.]  On the day before trial, Haselhuhn's 
lawyer first learned that the two eyewitnesses, Safeway employees Mr. Barney and 
Ms. Shively, had been hypnotized in an effort to enhance their recollections of 
the robber's appearance.1 This hypnosis occurred after Mr. 
Barney had been unable to identify the defendant Haselhuhn in a photo line-up 
and before his positive identification at the preliminary hearing. Haselhuhn's 
attorney quickly enlisted an expert witness from Lakewood, Colorado, to testify on the effects of 
hypnosis. However, that witness was unable on such short notice to make the trip 
from Lakewood to Green River, Wyoming. In order to secure the needed 
testimony only then recognized, counsel immediately presented a motion for 
continuance with an affidavit and an overview of that proposed testimony. The 
motion for continuance was rejected by the court. Denied a minimal opportunity 
to counter a significant development known only at the last moment involving a 
clearly questionable trial event, the resulting inability to present available 
expert testimony singularly affected the fairness and due process of the 
criminal trial.

[¶34.]  In this case, the generally established 
criteria for determining whether or not there has been a violation of court 
discretion in denying a continuance align in appellant's favor:

(A) Substantial prejudice to the litigative 
rights of the movant party. Tomash v. Evans, 
Wyo., 704 P.2d 1296 (1985); Urich v. Fox, 
Wyo., 687 P.2d 893 (1984); and other cases cited in the dissent in Gentry v. State, supra. The 
witnesses against the appellant had been hypnotized by a maintenance person at 
Pacific Power and Light Company who had taken one 32-hour course to learn his 
craft. This is a perfect example which merits application of Justice Brown's 
advice in his specially concurring opinion to his own majority opinion in Pote 
v. State, Wyo., 695 P.2d 617, 632 (1985), that "People who do not know what they 
are doing ought not `monkey around' with hypnotism lest they jeopardize an 
important case and cost the state a lot of money." 695 P.2d  at 632. Haselhuhn 
had a substantial interest in presenting evidence to explain how the hypnotic 
session may have distorted the witness' recollection and instilled in the 
witness a suggestion that the accused had committed the crime. His attorney 
explained to the trial court:

"* * * [Y]ou don't need 
to have the witness's story changed in order to have hypnosis take an effect. * 
* * [I]t's possible simply to enhance the witness's own belief in what he - in 
whatever story it is that he is telling. And I submit to the Court that a 
careful review of the evidence we got indicates that's just what happened - has 
happened in the case of Mr. Barney. As time went by he progressed from an 
uncertain identification to one that he's dead positive of now. And we've 
observed in the record here the very effect that the doctor has warned about."2

(B) Presence or absence of contributory 
responsibility of the litigant to the prejudice. Sharp v. Sharp, Wyo., 671 P.2d 317 (1983); Cates v. Eddy, Wyo., 669 P.2d 912 
(1983); Craver v. Craver, Wyo., 601 P.2d 999 (1979); and other cases 
cited in the dissent in Gentry v. State, supra. The appellant did not contribute 
to the prejudice. The appellant lacked the knowledge and a way of obtaining the 
knowledge that the two witnesses had been hypnotized. A continuance was 
necessary to allow the appellant to prepare a defense.

(C) Fairness and justice to the opposing 
litigant. Higgins v. Johnson, Fla. App., 422 So. 2d 16 (1982); Winkelman v. Allen, 214 
Kan. 22, 519 P.2d 1377 (1974); Bairas v. 
Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375 (1962). The opposing 
litigant, the State, would not have suffered a denial of fairness and justice 
had a continuance been granted. No showing was made that any witness or evidence 
would have been lost because of a continuance, or that the State would have been 
otherwise prejudiced.

(D) Court docket control and maintenance, and 
the general necessity of reaching a conclusion. Gentry v. State, Urbigkit, 
J., dissenting, supra. The grant of a continuance to allow the appellant's 
proposed expert witness an opportunity to travel to Green 
River would have been sufficient. Court docket control should not 
prevail over the right of an appellant to present a defense, United States v. 
Burton, 189 A.D.C. 327, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 1069, 99 S. Ct. 837, 59 L. Ed. 2d 34 (1979), nor over the interests of 
justice. Budget Laundry Company v. Munter, 450 Pa. 13, 298 A.2d 55, 59-60 (1972), Roberts, J. 
concurring.

[¶35.]  I agree with Justice Brown and Justice 
Rose, dissenting in Gee v. State, Wyo., 662 P.2d 103, 107 (1983):

"Discovery during trial 
that a state's witness has been hypnotized is useless information. Advice that a 
witness has been hypnotized immediately before trial is not much better. When a 
defendant's counsel receives late information on hypnotism, his ability to 
prepare for trial is impaired. He needs time to prepare cross-examination 
questions, consult and perhaps call expert witnesses of his own, review the law, 
check circumstances surrounding the hypnotic sessions, check the qualifications 
of the person who hypnotized the witness, and review the record of the hypnotic 
session. Such a process cannot be accomplished immediately before trial or 
during trial. 

"When the ability to 
prepare for trial is impaired, the right to effective counsel guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution is rendered meaningless. The 
difficulty of adequately cross-examining a previously hypnotized witness 
constitutes a serious infringement of the right of confrontation."

I also agree 
that:

"[T]he State should have 
an affirmative duty to specifically advise defendant of the hypnotism before 
trial; making the State's files available to defendant is not sufficient to 
discharge that duty." 662 P.2d  at 107.

[¶36.]  We have recently defined discretion 
criteria in Martin v. State, Wyo., 720 P.2d 894 (1986) as a composite of many 
things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria as right under 
the circumstances, determined from the facts of the case without being arbitrary 
or capricious. These objective criteria, applied to the facts of this case, 
define abuse of discretion as well as constitutional error, in contradistinction 
to the majority decision.

[¶37.]  A continuance for the purpose of 
providing time for the attendance at trial of appellant's expert witness on 
hypnotism was indispensable for constitutionally required due process, fairness 
and justice. Neither the Wyoming Constitution in Art. 1, § 7 (no 
absolute, arbitrary power), and Art. 1, § 10 (right of accused to defend), nor 
the United States Constitution in Amendments V, VI and XIV countenance this 
roughshod violation of procedural due process. See People v. Sorscher, 151 
Mich. App. 
122, 391 N.W.2d 365, 369 (1986), "so long as the defendant is allowed to 
establish the fact of hypnosis and to introduce expert evidence regarding the 
inherent possibility of confabulation" the danger (of affected recall) is 
minimized. In this case, not only was evidence as tainted by hypersuggestibility 
and hypercompliance then used against the defendant, but he was denied an 
indispensable responsive opportunity to present knowledgable expert testimony in 
defense. See discussion of hypnotically enhanced identification by the majority, 
and concurring and dissenting comments in Vester v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 713 S.W.2d 920 (1986). See also Harker v. Maryland, 800 F.2d 437 (4th Cir. 1986); 
Beck v. Norris 801 F.2d 242 (6th Cir. 1986); State v. Moreno, Hawaii, 709 P.2d 103 (1985); Recent Developments, State v. Moreno: The Admissibility of Hypnosis 
Enhanced Testimony in Hawaii, 8 Hawaii L.Rev. 655 (1986).

ARGUMENT III

Nondisclosure of 
Exculpatory Information

[¶38.]  This issue raised several violations of 
the prosecutor's duty to abide by his constitutional obligation to assist the 
defendant in a fair presentation of his case under Brady v. State of Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), and United States v. Bagley, 
___ U.S. ___, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 87 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1985). In addition to the failure 
to disclose the use of hypnosis, Gee v. State, supra, the prosecutor purposely 
did not disclose to the defense that the State's witness, Dean Hunter, had told 
the police officer that Haselhuhn was at his home approximately the same time 
that the robbery was occurring. The police officer did not make a written record 
of the statement, and the defense first heard Mr. Hunter's statement during 
trial.

[¶39.]  The majority conclude that this 
information was not material because Haselhuhn also knew that he (Haselhuhn) was 
at Hunter's home on the night of the robbery. That conclusion is at best faulty 
and perhaps further described as totally unjustified. It is not what Haselhuhn 
knew that is of issue but rather what confirmatory information, if available, 
could be supportive to his testimony. This is the essence of the prosecutorial 
duty to disclose.

"The question of the 
materiality of evidence in the prosecutor's control arises in `three quite 
different situations,' [United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 
2397, 49 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976)]. First, where the prosecutor has knowingly used 
perjured testimony, the judgment must be set aside `if there is any reasonable 
likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the 
jury.' Id. at 103-104, 96 S. Ct.  at 2397. Second, where defendant has made a 
specific pretrial request for exculpatory evidence, the judgment must be set 
aside if `the suppressed evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial.' 
Id. at 104, 96 S. Ct.  at 2397 (emphasis added); see id. at 104-06, 96 S. Ct.  at 
2397-98. Third, where defendant has made `a general request for Brady material,' 
or has made no request at all, the judgment must be set aside `if the omitted 
evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.' Id. at 112, 
96 S. Ct.  at 2401 * * *." Chaney v. Brown, 730 F.2d 1334, 1339-1340 (10th Cir.), 
cert. denied 469 U.S. 1090, 105 S. Ct. 601, 83 L. Ed. 2d 710 (1984).

[¶40.]  In this case, the appellant made a 
general request for Brady information, invoking the standard discussed in 
Chaney. Hunter's testimony could create and likely would have created a 
reasonable doubt, especially if the defendant had been given the information 
before trial so he could subpoena or at least question the other participants in 
the trivial-pursuit game at Hunter's house regarding their recollection of the 
time that he stopped by to use the telephone. The majority assume that because 
Hunter remembers where Haselhuhn was on a certain date at a certain time, 
Haselhuhn would also identically remember. Each of us has a different capability 
or a different reason for recalling dates and events. The criminal complaint and 
warrant were issued on June 6, 1984 for a crime committed on April 21, 1984. It 
is reasonable to believe that Haselhuhn did not know exactly what time he 
stopped at Hunter's house to use the phone on April 21, six weeks before the 
complaint was filed against him, as is reasonably found with the average person 
who may not reconstruct his exact whereabouts on a date six weeks 
past.

[¶41.]  The information, which Hunter gave to the 
police and of which the policeman chose not to make a record, located Haselhuhn 
at a place other than the crime scene at the time of the crime. Certainly it was 
exculpatory, and, since it established an alibi, the evidence created a 
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist. When corroborated by other 
witnesses, a leak-proof defense might have existed if the facts known to the 
police and prosecution had been made available to the defense.

[¶42.]  The opinion of the court can be construed 
to encourage law enforcement officers to deliberately exclude exculpatory 
evidence from police records as a means of avoiding the requirements of Brady. A 
reversal on this point would send law enforcement officers a different signal. 
United States v. Bagley, supra. Criminal prosecution rather than a game of 
one-upmanship is the most solemn responsibility of society in enforcing its 
rules of behavior while affording constitutional rights of the individual 
charged with the violation. Constitutions, not sporting events, set the 
determinative standards and principles. Either we have a society ennobled by 
consistent rules, or a despotism of individual arrogance. As a society, we 
should not choose to travel the road by paving the pathway with violated 
principles justified by good intentions. In violation of societal standards, the 
enforcer lowers himself to an equivalency standard of the accused 
criminal.

ARGUMENT V

Evidence of The Polygraph 
Test

[¶43.]  The court quotes the portion of the 
transcript wherein the jury was informed that a polygraph examination had been 
administered to a suspect in the robbery, and then concludes that the 
plain-error criteria of Hampton v. State, Wyo., 558 P.2d 504 (1977) are not 
satisfied and that the error was invited by Haselhuhn. Our reasoning that the 
plain-error criteria were met will require a more detailed explanation of the 
facts.

[¶44.]  During the week after the robbery, the 
investigating detective received the message that a Sweetwater County Jail 
prisoner wanted to visit with him. The prisoner, Milt Albaugh, told the 
detective that his son Rick Albaugh knew about the robbery, that Haselhuhn and 
co-defendant Rick Prime had committed the robbery, and "that they threw all the 
weapons and the clothing and everything else in the Black's Fork River." Rick 
Albaugh later gave the detective the same information, told the detective that 
he knew where the search of the river was being conducted, and to continue 
searching at that location. The detective testified that Rick wanted to work a 
deal to get his father out of jail.

[¶45.]  After a concentrated search of the 
specified location, the police eventually found a sawed-off .20-gauge shotgun in 
the river. Ownership was traced through the gun's serial number to John 
Hamilton. Hamilton passed a polygraph examination concerning how his gun got 
into the river, and the State asserted at trial that the shotgun retrieved from 
the river was not the one used in the robbery. The jury was told that Hamilton 
passed a polygraph examination about his explanation why his sawed-off shotgun 
was in the river, but the jury was never given that actual 
explanation:

"Q [By the Prosecutor]: 
What reason did he [Hamilton] give for throwing the shotgun in the 
river?

"A [The Detective]: If my 
memory serves me correctly - this is just what I'm getting from detective 
Thompson, that he had bought the shotgun and -

"Q I'll tell you what. 
Let's let Detective Thompson, I assume that he'll be called, let's let him 
explain."

Detective 
Thompson was never called.

"* * * When review is 
sought under the plain error doctrine, this Court must be able to discern from 
the record, without resort to speculation or equivocal inference, what occurred 
at trial, that is, we are entitled to know the particular facts. [Citations.] 
Further, the proponent of plain error must demonstrate the existence of a clear 
and unequivocal rule of law which the particular facts transgress in a clear and 
obvious, not merely arguable, way. [Citations.] If these criteria are met, the 
error or defect must adversely affect some substantial right of the concept 
procedurally expressed in Rule 49(a), W.R.Cr.P. [Citations.]" Hampton v. State, 
supra, 558 P.2d  at 507.

[¶46.]  The first two criteria of Hampton are 
clearly present. The transcript has fully revealed what occurred at trial. The 
jury was told that Mr. Hamilton explained how his shotgun got into the Black's 
Fork River, that a polygraph examination was run on Hamilton, and that he 
"passed" - that the polygraph didn't indicate that he was lying. Second, there 
is a clear and unequivocal rule of law which these facts clearly 
transgress.

"Generally, the results 
of a polygraph examination are not admissible in evidence. Cullin v. State, 
Wyo., 565 P.2d 445, 455 (1977). Improper reference to the results of a polygraph 
examination has been held reversible error. See, e.g. Birdsong v. State, Okla. 
Crim. App., 649 P.2d 786 (1982); State v. Green, 271 Or. 153, 531 P.2d 245, 92 
A.L.R.3d 1301 (1975). We have approved, upon stipulation of the parties, 
admission of the results of a polygraph examination. Daniel v. State, Wyo., 644 P.2d 172, 178 (1982); Cullin v. State, supra, at 455. In the absence of a 
stipulation for admission, a conviction must be reversed when the results of a 
polygraph are revealed to the jury. State v. Sutherland, 94 Wn.2d 527, 617 P.2d 1010 (1980); State v. Kilpatrick, 2 Kan. App. 2d 349, 578 P.2d 1147 (1978). The 
reluctance to admit the results of a polygraph or `lie detector' examination 
stems from the fact that the results of these examinations have not been 
established as reliable. It also stems from a fear that jurors may give too much 
weight to the results of the examination, even perhaps accepting it as proof of 
guilt or innocence." Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d  at 731.

[¶47.]  Finally, the error adversely affected a 
substantial right of the accused. The jury was informed by a police officer that 
another investigating officer was convinced that Hamilton, who never testified, 
was telling the truth in a polygraph examination regarding how his shotgun came 
to be in the Black's Fork River. Not only was Haselhuhn denied the right to 
cross-examine Hamilton, but the statement included one officer's testimony 
regarding another officer's evaluation of the veracity of the out-of-court 
statement of another person who was himself a potential suspect, then to be 
substantiated by a questionable polygraph exam. See Schmunk v. State, supra. 
This is simply not creditable evidence material to the trial issues upon which 
defendant was convicted. The fact that Milt Albaugh, who was in jail when the 
crime was committed, knew that a shotgun was used to commit the crime and knew 
that the shotgun was in the Black's Fork River at a particular location, and the 
fact that the shotgun was found at that location, are too corroborating to allow 
the jury to rely on the investigating officer's conclusion, substantiated by 
polygraph, that this particular shotgun was not used in the robbery. The 
testimony violated Haselhuhn's Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine another 
potential suspect. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562, (1975). I am satisfied that the plain-error criteria of Hampton v. 
State, supra, have been met by the appellant. Additionally the believability 
quotient of the total events reminds us why polygraph is rejected as 
scientifically reliable. Everyone in Sweetwater County is not in the habit of 
leaving sawed-off shotguns in Black's Fork River3 at the identical place where the 
informant said the robbery weapon could be found. The old expression, "You lie, 
and I will swear to it," might be replaced by "You lie, and we will prove it is 
true by polygraph." State v. Beachman, 189 Mont. 400, 616 P.2d 337 (1980). See, 
however, Sevilla, General Symposium, The Polygraph and the Courts, Polygraph 
1984: Behind the Closed Door of Admissibility, 16 U.W.L.A. L.Rev. 5 
(1984).

"In sum, while the 
polygraph shows promise, the research on its validity is too limited in 
quantity, relevance, and generalizability to support its use as evidence. 
Further, problems with drugs, countermeasures, effects of repeated testing, 
friendly polygrapher effects and the statistical rates of true guilt, suggest 
the lie detector results could be very misleading to triers-of-fact. 
Additionally, problems with biases against innocent subjects and anticipated 
hung trials and court costs argue that as a matter of social policy, this 
evidence will simply cost too much. The current data do not support the 
necessity of creating a new forensic industry: the truth business." Beaber, 
General Symposium, The Polygraph and the Courts, Not Guilty by Reason of 
Polygraph, 16 U.W.L.A. L.Rev. 27, 35 (1984).

ARGUMENT VI

Co-defendant's Invocation 
of The Fifth Amendment

[¶48.]  Appellant's final assertion of error is 
an example of prosecutorial misconduct which should not be accepted by this 
court. Appellant's co-defendant, Rick Prime, who was scheduled for trial after 
the appellant, was subpoenaed as a witness by the State. Four days before 
appellant's trial began, Rick Prime's attorney notified the prosecutor in 
writing of Prime's intention to exercise his Fifth Amendment rights and to 
remain silent at appellant's trial in response to each and every question. 
Despite this notice, Prime was called by the State, appeared at appellant's 
trial and invoked his Fifth Amendment rights in front of the jury when he was 
sworn in as a witness. This obviously would have an effect on the jury and 
consequently elicited a reaction from counsel for defendant: 

"Your Honor, if I might 
be heard on it. It's my opinion, Your Honor, that simply calling this man [Rick 
Prime] to have him stand in front of the jury and take the Fifth is in and of 
itself testimonial. And aside from that, I don't think I need to talk at all 
about the prejudicial effect that's going to have on the jury. The Court was 
there yesterday and saw what happened with the jury when Rick Prime took the 
Fifth when he was sworn in. And I think for the prosecution to call a witness 
under these circumstances, knowing what they know, is tantamount to 
prosecutorial misconduct."

[¶49.]  It is not possible to discern from the 
record how the jury reacted. Everyday experience bears out the prejudicial 
effect which this probably had on the jury which apparently the defense attorney 
observed. The most offensive part of this is the prosecutor's advance knowledge 
that the co-defendant would remain silent and then his blatant use of that 
co-defendant to prejudice the jury in appellant's trial by a kind of 
nontestimonial evidence.

[¶50.]  This is probably the most egregious error 
of all defects found in this record. This is the "If you do not have the 
evidence, try prejudice" prosecutorial opportunity. The courtroom event of that 
individual later to be identified as a co-conspirator, in being called before 
the jury at that early stage to take the oath of a witness with anticipated and 
realized Fifth Amendment response, probably determined the jury verdict before 
any evidence was ever introduced. The testimony of the defendant when given 
later had essentially been destroyed in advance.

[¶51.]  The Washington Supreme Court has 
explained the rule which applies here:

"* * * It is forbidden 
for a prosecutor to call a witness, knowing that the witness will invoke 
privilege, for the purpose of having the jury see the witness exercise his 
constitutional right. DeGesualdo v. People, 147 Colo. 426, 364 P.2d 374, 86 
A.L.R.2d 1435 (1961); State v. Mitchell, 268 Minn. 513, 130 N.W.2d 128 (1964), 
cert. denied 380 U.S. 984, 85 S. Ct. 1351, 14 L. Ed. 2d 276; United States v. 
Tucker, 267 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1959); United States v. Maloney, 262 F.2d 535 (2d 
Cir. 1959). It is also error for the prosecutor to call a co-defendant, knowing 
that he will invoke the privilege. See State v. Tanner, 54 Wn.2d 535, 341 P.2d 869 (1959). There is no reason for distinguishing these cases on the basis that 
the party calling the witness was the government." State v. Smith, 74 Wn.2d 744, 
446 P.2d 571, 581 (1968), judgment vacated in part, 408 U.S. 934, 92 S. Ct. 2852, 
33 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1972), and overruled on other grounds sub nom. State v. Gosby, 
85 Wn.2d 758, 539 P.2d 680 (1975).

[¶52.]  The Michigan Supreme Court has explained 
the reason for the rule:

"* * * The American Bar 
Association standards relating to the prosecution and defense functions provide 
that it is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor or a lawyer representing a 
defendant

* * * * * *

"- `to call a witness who 
he knows will claim a valid privilege not to testify, for the purpose of 
impressing upon the jury the fact of the claim of privilege.'

"The rationale 
of the rule has been explained by the Supreme Court of Iowa:

"`When an alleged 
accomplice invokes the privilege in the presence of the jury, prejudice arises 
from the human tendency to treat the claim of privilege as a confession of 
crime, creating an adverse inference which an accused is powerless to combat by 
cross-examination.' State v. Allen, 224 N.W.2d 237, 241 (Iowa, 
1974).

"A number of 
state courts have reversed convictions where a prosecutor called an accomplice 
knowing that he would exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege. State v. Duhon, 
332 So. 2d 245 (La. 1976); Johnson v. State, 158 Tex.Crim. R., 252 S.W.2d 462 
(1952); DeGesualdo v. People, 147 Colo. 426, 364 P.2d 374, 86 A.L.R.2d 1435 
(1961). Cf. State v. Vega, 85 N.M. 269, 511 P.2d 755 (Ct.App. 1973)." 

People v. Giacalone, 399 
Mich. 642, 250 N.W.2d 492, 494-495 (1977).

See also People 
v. Dyer, 425 Mich. 572, 390 N.W.2d 645 (1986).

[¶53.]  None of the recognized exceptions to the 
rule of law are present in this case. See, People v. Scheidt, 182 Colo. 374, 513 P.2d 446 (1973), where the prospective witness had been granted immunity and the 
State was not required to assume that the witness would violate the rule by 
refusing to testify. See also State v. Moya, 138 Ariz. 7, 672 P.2d 959 (1983), 
where the prosecutor had no prior knowledge that the witness would invoke her 
Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent. Comment, Exercise of the Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination by Witnesses and Codefendants: The Effect Upon the 
Accused, 33 U.Chi. L.Rev. 151 (1965).

[¶54.]  The citation of Hopkinson v. State, Wyo., 
632 P.2d 79 (1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 1280, 71 L. Ed. 2d 463 
(1982), is weak or nominal authority to contravene the well-established general 
principle relating to prejudice in exposing a nontestifying witness to the jury 
as a form of nonverbal testimony for prosecutorial jury impact.

"* * * The jury may think 
it high courtroom drama of probative significance when a witness `takes the 
Fifth.' In reality the probative value of the event is almost entirely undercut 
by the * * * fact that it is a form of evidence not subject to 
cross-examination." Bowles v. United States, 142 A.D.C. 26, 439 F.2d 536, 
541-542 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995, 91 S. Ct. 1240, 28 L. Ed. 2d 533 (1971).

[¶55.]  It is noted that the author of the 
majority opinion has recently authored a highly emotional philosophic dissent in 
Chambers v. State, 726 P.2d 1269 (1986). Differing completely, I would believe 
that procedural due process cannot suitably be measured by self-determined guilt 
in abject disregard of recognized constitutional, statutory and procedural 
standards.

[¶56.]  Only as a recognition of that dissent 
which is here applied, I would believe that the state and federal constitutions 
and Bill of Rights cannot be denigrated so that they become available only if 
innocence is first empirically accepted by the appellate tribunal. This is 
result-oriented adjudication of the rankest kind. Albert Einstein said it well: 
"Whoever undertakes to set himself up as a judge in the field of truth and 
knowledge is shipwrecked by the laughter of the gods."

[¶57.]  Critically obvious is the fact that the 
jury decides with the evidence presented. To say that in believing the defendant 
to be guilty I then say that the jury was not misled by failure of due process 
and proper evidence is only to challenge the right and reason of the jury in a 
fairly conducted trial inquiry. If this is not so, then why did the framers of 
our constitutions, both state and federal, mandate a right not only of fairness 
and due process, but of criminal conviction to be accomplished through the jury 
decision. I cannot accept in this case or any criminal proceeding that there is 
to be a supervening standard that the end justifies the means. I do know with 
historical perspective, as more recently demonstrated in the world in crisis and 
near extinction of the 1930's and 1940's, that the road to hell can truly be 
paved with self-defined good intentions.

[¶58.]  It is a curiosity of high improbability 
that combined in affirmance of the conviction of Haselhuhn in this case is 
hypnosis, polygraph, denied continuance, withheld information, and testimony by 
Fifth Amendment. If he is guilty, which is certainly in some question on this 
record, then conviction can surely be achieved in a proper trial, with fairness 
and due process.

[¶59.]  Based on this accumulation of errors, 
several of which are reversible in and of themselves, I would 
reverse.

FOOTNOTES

1 The hypnotist, a 
maintenance person at a local power plant, experienced and trained by a 32-hour 
home course, was admitted by the prosecution to be unqualified as an 
expert.

2 See People v. Shirley, 
31 Cal. 3d 18, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 272, 723 P.2d 1354, ___, cert. denied 459 U.S. 860, 103 S. Ct. 133, 74 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1982).

3 Black's ForkRiver is 
a small mountain stream headwatered in the WasatchMountains in Utah, 
running generally easterly through UintaCounty 
and western SweetwaterCounty in Wyoming to 
join with the Green River. It is not a likely 
place for two people to each deposit a sawed-off shotgun at about the same 
location within its approximately 70-mile journey in western Wyoming.