Case Title: In re Paige L.

Citation: 

Docket Number: 2017 ME 97

State: maine

Court: Maine Supreme Court

Date: 2017-05-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
Reporter of Decisions 
Decision: 
2017 ME 97 
Docket: 
Ken-16-423 
Submitted  
     On Briefs: February 23, 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decided: 
May 18, 2017 
 
 
 
Panel: 
ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ. 
 
 
IN RE PAIGE L. 
 
 
ALEXANDER, J. 
[¶1]  The Legislature enacted 22 M.R.S. § 4036(1-A) (2016) authorizing 
a court that has made a finding of jeopardy in a title 22 child protection 
proceeding to “enter an order awarding parental rights and responsibilities” 
pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 1653 (2016), “if the court determines that the order 
will protect the child from jeopardy and is in the child’s best interest.”  A title 
19-A parental rights and responsibilities order can provide more permanent 
protection for a child when, as in this case, at least one parent is fit to care for 
the child. 
[¶2]  Section 4036(1-A)(A) provides that when, “upon request of a 
parent,” a court presiding over a child protection proceeding determines that 
entry of a parental rights and responsibilities order is appropriate, the court 
“shall direct the clerk to open a family matters case on behalf of the parties . . . 
without a separate initial filing by the parties.”  The trial court in this case did 
 
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not direct the opening of a family matters case, instead it amended the 
parental rights and responsibilities order that had been issued in the parties’ 
divorce judgment three years earlier and that was in effect at the time of the 
jeopardy hearing.  In this appeal, we address the application of section 
4036(1-A) to preexisting parental rights orders. 
[¶3]  The father of Paige L. appeals from a judgment entered in the 
District Court (Augusta, E. Walker, J.) after a jeopardy hearing was conducted 
pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4035 (2016).  The court’s initial jeopardy judgment 
dismissed the child protection action and awarded sole parental rights over 
the child to the mother by amending a preexisting parental rights and 
responsibilities order pursuant to section 4036(1-A).  See 22 M.R.S. 
§ 4036(1-A)(D-1)(1).  Then, in response to a motion for findings of fact and 
conclusions of law filed by the father, the court made a specific finding that the 
father created circumstances of jeopardy for his child.  The father also appeals 
from the court’s order on his motion for findings of fact and conclusions of law 
and the denial of his motion to alter or amend the amended judgment. 
[¶4]  The father argues that the court erred by (i) improperly admitting 
child hearsay testimony and evidence of prior incidents of abuse at the 
jeopardy hearing, (ii) failing to clearly explain what would constitute a future 
 
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substantial change of circumstances in the initial amended order, and 
(iii) denying his motion to amend the amended judgment in the family matter.  
Because competent evidence in the record supports the court’s finding of 
jeopardy, and because the court did not abuse its discretion by amending the 
preexisting parental rights and responsibilities order pursuant to section 
4036(1-A), we affirm. 
I.  PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
[¶5]  The mother and father were married in 2009, and Paige was born 
in January 2010.  The father initiated a divorce action in September 2012, and 
the parties were divorced by a judgment (Chandler, M.) dated April 4, 2013.  
Pursuant to the divorce judgment, the parties were awarded shared parental 
rights and responsibilities, the mother was awarded primary physical 
residence of the child, and the father was awarded contact every weekend 
“and other times by agreement of the parties.”  In July 2013, by agreement of 
the parties, the court (Fowle, J.) granted the mother a final order for protection 
from abuse against the father.  Although the protection from abuse order was 
also issued on behalf of Paige, the only substantive change it made to the 
contact schedule was to name a third party who was to “facilitate” transfers of 
the child. 
 
4 
[¶6]  On October 8, 2015, the Department of Health and Human Services 
(the Department) filed a child protection petition and a request for a 
preliminary protection order.  See 22 M.R.S. §§ 4032, 4034 (2016).  The 
Department’s petition alleged that the child was in jeopardy in the care of her 
father based on the father’s extensive history of child abuse and recent 
reports to law enforcement that the father’s current wife, a convicted sex 
offender and a direct caregiver for Paige, had sexually abused her minor 
children.  The petition also asserted that Paige was not in jeopardy in the care 
of her mother and stated, “The Department is asking that the court provide 
protection for Paige [L.] by granting [the mother] full custody of Paige to 
ensure that she can fully protect her daughter from threats of immediate harm 
by [the father] and [his wife].” 
[¶7]  The court (Mullen, J.) issued a preliminary protection order that 
day, awarding custody of the child to the mother.  That order also provided 
that the father could have no unsupervised contact with Paige.  The father 
waived his right to have a summary preliminary hearing, and, as a result, that 
order remained in place for the next four months.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4034(4). 
[¶8]  The court (E. Walker, J.) conducted a two-day jeopardy hearing in 
February 2016.  At the beginning of the hearing, the Department presented a 
 
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proposed order of “nonjeopardy” as to the mother, which the court issued 
without objection.  The court also noted on the record that—if it found 
jeopardy concerning the father—it could modify the parties’ preexisting 
parental rights and responsibilities order.1 
[¶9]  The evidence at the jeopardy hearing consisted of testimony from 
several witnesses including the mother, the father, a detective from the 
Augusta Police Department, the guardian ad litem, and five social workers, 
and exhibits including a child’s drawing of a wooden paddle, the temporary 
and final protection from abuse orders against the father, a doctor’s report, 
the father’s military discharge paperwork, and a reunification plan. 
[¶10]  On April 8, 2016, the court issued a “dispositional” order in the 
child protection proceeding, and, as authorized by section 4036(1-A), attached 
an amended parental rights and responsibilities order modifying the parental 
rights and responsibilities order issued in the divorce judgment.  The 
dispositional order was docketed in the child protection matter.  In that order, 
the court stated only that the “[c]hild is doing well in mother’s care and all 
parties agree that the child is not in Jeopardy in mother’s care.”  The order 
                                         
1  By referencing its capacity to modify the parental rights and responsibilities order, the court 
provided the required notice “that the child protective case may be disposed of through an order 
awarding parental rights and responsibilities.”  22 M.R.S. § 4036(1-A) (2016).  The sufficiency of 
that notice is not an issue in this appeal. 
 
6 
contained no finding of jeopardy as to the father.  Through the dispositional 
order, the court also purported to dismiss the child protection action pursuant 
to 22 M.R.S. § 4036(1-A)(D-1)(1). 
[¶11]  The amended parental rights and responsibilities order, docketed 
in the preexisting family matter, awarded sole parental rights and 
responsibilities to the mother and supervised contact to the father pursuant 
to 19-A M.R.S. § 1653.  The amended order stated that “[i]t shall be a 
significant change of circumstances if the father addresses the issues that 
resulted in this Order.”  Otherwise, the amended order did not contain any 
findings of fact but noted that it “was entered as part of a disposition in a 
related matter” after notice and hearing.2 
[¶12]  The father timely filed a motion for findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and a motion to alter or amend the judgment.  
See M.R. Civ. P. 52(a)-(b), 59.  The captions for the father’s motions identified 
the docket number in the child protection matter.  In his motion for findings, 
the father argued that the court had made no findings—oral or written—
regarding the father, how the disposition would protect the child from 
                                         
2  Title 22 M.R.S. § 4036(1-A)(A-1) specifically directs that the parental rights and 
responsibilities order “may not include reference to or discussion of the child protective case.”  This 
is because child protective cases are confidential by statute.  Id.  Because of the confidentiality 
mandate, this opinion will not address information beyond that which is usually stated in opinions 
resolving appeals from child protection matters. 
 
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jeopardy, or how the disposition was in the child’s best interest.  The father 
further argued that the amended order was ambiguous regarding what would 
constitute a future substantial change of circumstances. 
[¶13]  The court granted the father’s motion for further findings of fact 
and conclusions of law, but denied his motion to alter or amend the 
judgment.3  The court issued four pages of factual findings and found “by a 
preponderance of the evidence that [the child] would be in jeopardy to her 
health and welfare if she were returned to the custody of her father.”  The 
court further found that the child is not in jeopardy when she is in her 
mother’s care.  In addition, the court concluded that awarding the mother sole 
parental rights and responsibilities and primary residence, and limiting the 
father to supervised contact based on the overall threat posed to the child by 
the father, was in the child’s best interest.  The court also advised: 
Father asks this court for guidance in addressing his issues that 
resulted in this order so that he may know what the court will 
view as a “significant change of circumstances” for future 
purposes.  This is a reasonable request and the court probably 
should have been more specific about this issue in its order.  This 
court would consider it a significant change of circumstances if 
                                         
3  The Department’s brief correctly points out a misstatement of law in the court’s post-judgment 
order: the court stated that it should have conducted a family matters hearing instead of a jeopardy 
hearing because the Department was not seeking a finding of jeopardy against the mother.  
However, the jeopardy hearing and the court’s action after the jeopardy hearing were appropriate 
because the father was properly served notice pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4035(2)(C) (2016).  See, e.g., 
In re Alivia B., 2010 ME 112, ¶ 2, 8 A.3d 625. 
 
8 
Father were to attend a certified batterer’s intervention program 
and complete at least 26 of the 48 weeks of that program.  
Additionally, Father needs to attend and complete an assessment 
with a licensed psychiatrist and abide by any of his or her 
recommendations for at least 6 months or for a shorter period if 
the psychiatrist feels that that length of treatment is not needed.  
Father must take any and all medications prescribed by the 
psychiatrist if there is such a recommendation.  Lastly, Father 
must take and complete a parenting class so that he can come to 
appreciate the negative effects his behaviors have had on Paige 
and appreciate what help she will need in the future to overcome 
this trauma. 
 
 
[¶14]  The father timely filed a notice of appeal in the child protection 
matter, 22 M.R.S. § 4006 (2016), but did not file a notice of appeal in the 
family matter, 19-A M.R.S. § 1652(5) (2016).  When the child protection action 
is dismissed pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4036(1-A)(D-1)(1), as occurred in this 
case, 22 M.R.S. § 4036(1-A)(F) directs that “the court shall terminate the 
appointments of the guardian ad litem and attorneys for parents and 
guardians.  After the appointments are terminated, the attorneys and guardian 
ad litem have no further responsibilities to their clients or the court.” 
[¶15]  Despite that language, counsel for the father has appropriately 
continued to represent him in this appeal, because the appeal is taken from a 
title 22 jeopardy order.  We will address below the complications created for 
counsel assigned to represent parents in child protection cases when those 
 
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cases convert to parental rights and responsibilities cases, where there is no 
statutory right to assignment of counsel. 
II.  FINDINGS BY THE COURT 
 
[¶16]  Responding to the father’s motion for findings, the court found 
the following facts, by a preponderance of evidence, which are supported by 
competent record evidence.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4035(2); In re Nicholas S., 
2016 ME 82, ¶ 9, 140 A.3d 1226. 
 
[¶17]  The father was verbally and physically abusive to the mother 
during the marriage, including punching or hitting the mother on at least ten 
different occasions.  The father threatened to have the mother followed, to 
have her tires slashed, to hurt her if she called the police, to make false 
allegations to the Department to have the child taken away from the mother, 
and to kill her.  Some of the episodes of domestic violence occurred in the 
presence of the child. 
 
[¶18]  After the parties divorced, the father disciplined the 
then-three-year-old child and other children living with him with a wooden 
paddle.  The father justified paddling the children by referencing his religious 
beliefs.  He disposed of the wooden paddle while a police investigation was 
 
10 
pending.  The father has made derogatory comments to the child such as 
calling her “fat,” “loser,” and “bad.” 
 
[¶19]  In August 2014, the father married a registered sex offender.  The 
father stated that he admired his new wife’s honesty in disclosing her 
conviction and did not consider whether she might pose a danger to Paige 
because his wife’s victim was a male child.  Recently, the father’s new wife’s 
minor children from a prior relationship have witnessed the father physically 
assaulting their mother, and they are afraid of the father.  Paige has stated that 
she does not want to visit her father and became upset to the point of 
hyperventilating at the prospect of a visit. 
 
[¶20]  The father has a lengthy criminal record including convictions for 
assault in 2010 and 2011, violation of a protective order in 2010, and 
domestic violence assault and violation of conditions of release in 2012.  The 
father claims that he has little or no memory of these crimes. 
 
[¶21]  The father admits that he needs anger management counseling 
and that he did not comply with the Department’s reunification plan requiring 
such counseling because he prefers that his pastor provide counseling 
services.  Despite substantial evidence to the contrary, the father asserted that 
 
11 
“everything was fine” until the fall of 2015, when the current investigation 
started, and he asserted that the Department is biased against him. 
 
[¶22]  Regarding the mother, the court found that she has resolved 
some past issues and that her home is safe and secure.  The child is loved in 
the mother’s home. 
III.  LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A. 
Justiciability of Appeal of Amended Parental Rights Order 
 
[¶23]  On appeal, the father purports to challenge the amended parental 
rights and responsibilities order issued in the title 19-A proceeding.  A party 
to a proceeding who wishes to appeal from an order, including an amended 
order, must file a notice of appeal in the proceeding in which the order issued, 
here the title 19-A proceeding.  See In re Melissa T., 2002 ME 31, ¶ 5, 
791 A.2d 98 (dismissing the mother’s appeal challenging a jeopardy order 
when the mother filed a brief but did not file a notice of appeal); see also Costa 
v. Vogel, 2001 ME 131, ¶ 1 n.1, 777 A.2d 827; Town of Mount Desert v. Smith, 
2000 ME 88, ¶ 8, 751 A.2d 445 (holding that the timely filing of a cross-appeal 
to the Law Court will not cure a procedural defect of failing to file a 
cross-appeal to the Superior Court from a District Court order). 
 
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[¶24]  The father never filed a notice of appeal in the family matter case, 
and, ordinarily, the father’s attempt at a direct appeal of the modification of 
the title 19-A parental rights and responsibilities order would be dismissed. 
 
[¶25]  Because the father timely appealed from the jeopardy order in 
the title 22 proceeding, and because we have not before had the opportunity 
to provide any guidance on how to address this overlap of titles 22 and 19-A, 
we will address both the court’s order finding jeopardy and its order 
amending the parental rights and responsibilities order. 
 
[¶26]  Going forward, however, we caution that, in such appeals, the 
parent—or the parent’s counsel—who wishes to challenge a parental rights 
and responsibilities order issued after a jeopardy finding must appeal from 
both the title 22 jeopardy order and the title 19-A parental rights and 
responsibilities order.  That will be required whether the order at issue is 
entered in a newly opened parental rights and responsibilities case, as 
contemplated by section 4036(1-A)(A), or amends a preexisting parental 
rights order, as occurred here.4 
                                         
4  When a parental rights and responsibilities order is issued as the disposition after an order 
that cannot be appealed, e.g., a judicial review order, 22 M.R.S. §§ 4006, 4038 (2016), the notice of 
appeal must identify the parental rights order as the order being appealed and must be filed in the 
parental rights and responsibilities action. 
 
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B. 
Challenges to Findings of Fact 
 
[¶27]  The court’s findings, stated above, are fully supported by 
competent evidence in the record.  The father argues that the court’s factual 
findings are improperly based on hearsay evidence because the amended 
order was entered pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 1653, and, had the hearing been 
conducted in a family matters proceeding rather than a jeopardy hearing, 
child hearsay evidence would have been inadmissible absent the availability 
of an exception to the hearsay rule.  He also contends that the court 
improperly considered incidents that occurred prior to the last modification 
of the parental rights and responsibilities order.5 
 
[¶28]  Although the father did not object at the jeopardy hearing to the 
admission of child hearsay testimony or to the mother’s request that the court 
dispose of the case with a modification of the parental rights and 
responsibilities order, his argument on appeal is properly presented because 
his objections would have been overruled in the jeopardy proceeding, where 
admission of such evidence was proper. 
                                         
5  The father also argues that the court’s factual findings do not support a finding that there was 
a substantial change of circumstances since the prior modification.  The court’s findings that there 
had been recent domestic violence in the father’s home and that the father had married a registered 
sex offender are sufficient to demonstrate that there had been a substantial change of 
circumstances.  See 19-A M.R.S. § 1657(2)(B) (2016); see also 19-A M.R.S. § 1653(3)(R) (2016). 
 
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1. 
Child Hearsay Evidence 
 
[¶29]  “All child protection proceedings shall be conducted according to 
the rules of civil procedure and the rules of evidence, except as provided 
otherwise in” the Child and Family Services and Child Protection Act, 22 M.R.S. 
§§ 4001 to 4099-H (2016).  22 M.R.S. § 4007(1) (2016).  “The court may admit 
and consider oral or written evidence of out-of-court statements made by a 
child, and may rely on that evidence to the extent of its probative value.”  
Id. § 4007(2) (2016); see In re Kayla S., 2001 ME 79, ¶ 7, 772 A.2d 858; 
In re Robin T., 651 A.2d 337, 338 (Me. 1994).  Upon a finding of jeopardy, the 
court shall “make a written order of any disposition under section 4036.”  
22 M.R.S. § 4035(3).  Pursuant to section 4036(1-A), “the court may enter an 
order awarding parental rights and responsibilities pursuant to Title 19-A, 
section 1653 if the court determines that the order will protect the child from 
jeopardy and is in the child’s best interest as defined in Title 19-A, section 
1653, subsection 3.” 
 
[¶30]  Title 22 allows a court to admit child hearsay evidence in a 
jeopardy hearing and to protect a child from jeopardy by issuing a parental 
rights and responsibilities order pursuant to title 19-A.  22 M.R.S. §§ 4007(2), 
4036(1-A).  Moreover, 22 M.R.S. § 4036(1-A)(A-1) provides that “the court 
 
15 
shall seal and keep confidential any documents from the child protective case 
that are made a part of the record of the family matters case . . . .”  Thus, the 
statutory scheme contemplates that a court issuing a parental rights and 
responsibilities order under these circumstances will rely on its factual 
findings from the jeopardy hearing, which may be based on evidence that 
includes child hearsay.  See In re Jacob C., 2009 ME 10, ¶ 9, 965 A.2d 47 
(considering the whole statutory scheme so that a harmonious result, 
presumably the intent of the Legislature, may be achieved).  Therefore, the 
court did not err in considering statements ascribed to the child when 
determining, first, that the father created jeopardy for Paige, and, second, that 
the appropriate disposition was to award the mother sole parental rights and 
responsibilities. 
 
2. 
Consideration of Prior Incidents 
 
[¶31]  “In child protection proceedings, what is past is often prologue 
regarding the threat of serious harm posed by the parent . . . .” In re E.A., 
2015 ME 37, ¶ 9, 114 A.3d 207 (quoting In re E.L., 2014 ME 87, ¶ 14, 
96 A.3d 691).  “Evidence of historical behavior is relevant to a finding of 
jeopardy . . . . [T]he court must consider whether there is prospective jeopardy.  
 
16 
And in making that determination, . . . the trial court must consider what has 
happened in the past.”  Id. 
 
[¶32]  Accordingly, the court properly considered evidence of the 
father’s extensive history of domestic violence and abuse toward children in 
making its jeopardy findings.  Even in a hearing on a motion to modify a 
parental rights order, the evidence could be relevant to the issue of what 
custody arrangement is in the child’s best interest.  See Aranovitch v. Versel, 
2015 ME 146, ¶ 15, 127 A.3d 542 (“Generally, the substantial change inquiry 
is temporally limited to events following the most recent order governing the 
children’s residential care.  However, if the court determines that a substantial 
change in circumstances has occurred since the most recent order, it may 
consider events before that order to provide context for evaluating 
subsequent events, if the pre-order events are relevant to the issue of what 
parental rights arrangement will further the children’s best interests.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 
[¶33]  The trial court properly relied on evidence concerning prior 
incidents when deciding whether the father created jeopardy for Paige and 
when determining how best to alleviate that jeopardy. 
 
 
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C. 
Clarity of Future Substantial Change of Circumstances 
 
[¶34]  The father contends that the court’s direction regarding what 
would constitute a future substantial change of circumstances in the court’s 
amended order is ambiguous, and that the court erred by explaining the 
provision in the child protection matter instead of in the amended order.  
Despite the father’s claims to the contrary, the court’s detailed statement of 
what would constitute a future change of circumstances was properly stated 
in the child protection proceeding and provides the requisite clarity for what 
is expected of the father. 
D. 
Basis for the Amended Parental Rights Order 
 
[¶35]  The father argues that the court abused its discretion by denying 
his motion to amend the parental rights and responsibilities judgment 
because the amended order in the family matter is silent regarding the legal 
predicates upon which it is based.6 
 
[¶36]  The court’s amended parental rights order does not include 
findings of fact or conclusions of law; however, the extensive findings of fact 
                                         
6  The father also contends that the court’s orders should be vacated because section 4036(1-A) 
“indicate[s] that any post-judgment motions filed under circumstances such as these should be 
captioned under the family matter docket, and that any order in response to such motions should 
likewise be issued under the family matter docket number.”  Here, the court properly entered the 
amended order under the family matter docket number.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4036(1-A)(A).  The father 
filed a single post-judgment motion under the child protection docket number, and the court 
responded accordingly.  Thus, there was no error, and the father’s contention is without merit. 
 
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and conclusions of law that formed the basis of the amended order are 
contained in the court’s post-judgment order in the child protection matter.  
Because a parental rights and responsibilities order issued pursuant to 
section 4036(1-A) may not refer to or discuss the originating child protection 
matter, the court was prohibited from including its findings in the amended 
parental rights order.  See 22 M.R.S. § 4036(1-A)(A-1). 
[¶37]  Turning to the findings of fact and conclusions of law, and 
recognizing that the court was deciding both whether the State had proved 
jeopardy and whether the child could be protected from that jeopardy without 
the continuing need for a child protection order, the court did not expressly 
state that it was considering each of the factors listed in section 1653(3).  The 
court did, however, state that “the overall revised parental rights and 
responsibilities order is clearly in [the child’s] best interest.” 
[¶38]  Notably, the court’s findings relate to nine of the nineteen best 
interest factors listed in section 1653(3), including the age of the child; the 
relationship of the child with the child’s parents and any other persons who 
may significantly affect the child’s welfare; the preference of the child; the 
parties’ capacities to give the child love, affection, and guidance; the existence 
of domestic abuse between the parents, in the past or currently; the existence 
 
19 
of any history of child abuse by a parent; the existence of a person residing 
with the parent who has been convicted of certain sex crimes; whether 
allocation of some or all parental rights and responsibilities would best 
support the child’s safety and well-being; and all other factors having a 
reasonable bearing on the physical and psychological well-being of the child. 
[¶39]  As noted above, the order issued by the court could best be 
described as a “hybrid” of a jeopardy order and a parental rights and 
responsibilities order.  Even if it had been exclusively a parental rights and 
responsibilities order, however, the court was not required to address each 
best interest factor in its decision.  See Nadeau v. Nadeau, 2008 ME 147, ¶ 35, 
957 A.2d 108.  The trial court rather evidently evaluated the evidence with the 
best interest factors in mind and did not abuse its discretion in reaching its 
ultimate conclusion. 
The entry is: 
The jeopardy order and the amended parental 
rights 
and 
responsibilities 
order 
issued 
pursuant to 22 M.R.S. § 4036(1-A) are affirmed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Thomas W. Bell, Esq., The Law Office of Thomas W. Bell, Esq., 
Topsham, for appellant father 
 
Lorne Fairbanks, Esq., Lewiston, for appellee mother 
 
Janet T. Mills, Attorney General, and Meghan Szylvian, Asst. Atty. 
Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Augusta, for appellee State of 
Maine 
 
 
Augusta District Court docket number PC-2015-57 
FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY