Case Title: City Council of Alexandria v. Lindsey Trusts

Citation: 

Docket Number: 982573

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 1999-09-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
PRESENT: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan, and 
Koontz, JJ., and Whiting, Senior Justice  
 
THE CITY COUNCIL OF ALEXANDRIA 
 
 
 
 
OPINION BY 
v.  Record No. 982573 
SENIOR JUSTICE HENRY H. WHITING 
 
 
 
September 17, 1999 
THE LINDSEY TRUSTS 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA 
 
 
 
 
John E. Kloch, Judge  
 
In this appeal, we decide whether a city charter authorizes 
the city to adopt a zoning ordinance that modifies the 
"grandfathered" rights of property owners. 
Carol A. Lindsey and Riggs Bank, co-trustees of The Lindsey 
Trusts and owners of property located at 101-103 King Street in 
Alexandria (collectively, the Property Owners), brought this 
declaratory judgment action against the City of Alexandria, its 
city council, mayor, and council members (collectively, the 
City).  The Property Owners sought to have the court declare 
part of an amendment to the Alexandria zoning ordinance null and 
void because the City's charter did not authorize its enactment. 
Upon considering the parties' stipulated facts, and oral 
and written argument, the court agreed with the Property Owners 
and entered a declaratory judgment declaring the contested part 
of the zoning amendment void and unenforceable.  The City 
appeals. 
In 1976, the Old Town Food Service Corporation began 
operating the Fish Market Restaurant at 105 King Street as a use 
that was allowed by right under the existing zoning ordinance.  
In May 1979, the City amended its zoning ordinance to require a 
special use permit for the operation of restaurants.  However, 
restaurants such as the Fish Market Restaurant that were then 
operating without a special use permit were excepted from the 
amendment's requirement, and were therefore considered 
"grandfathered" uses. 
Afterward, but some time before February 1983, the Fish 
Market Restaurant expanded its operations into the adjacent 
buildings located at 101 and 103 King Street.  In February 1983, 
the zoning ordinance was again amended to provide that: 
For any use now requiring a special use permit, 
regardless of whether or not a special use permit has 
been granted previously, the enlargement, extension or 
increase in the intensity of that use shall require a 
separate special use permit. 
 
Alexandria Code § 7-6-193 (emphasis added). 
 
 
In 1994 and 1995, this portion of the ordinance was amended 
to provide:   
For any use that now requires a special use permit, 
whether or not a special use permit has been granted 
previously, any change in the nature of the use or any 
enlargement, extension or increase in the intensity of 
that use shall require a separate special use permit. 
 
 
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Alexandria Ordinances 3711 (1994) and 3800 (1995)(emphasis 
added). 
In 1996, when the lessee ceased its operations and vacated 
the 101 and 103 King Street locations (the Premises), the 
Property Owners attempted to lease the Premises to another 
restaurant tenant. Modifications of the premises were necessary 
to operate a restaurant independent of the operation of the 
restaurant at 105 King Street.  Because the City regarded those 
modifications as an intensification of the use of the Premises, 
it advised the Property Owners that a special use permit would 
be required. 
The Property Owners brought this declaratory judgment 
action to determine whether the city charter authorized the City 
to enact the intensification-of-use provision of the zoning 
ordinance.  The trial court agreed with the Property Owners 
that, since there was no such authorization, the contested 
portion of the zoning ordinance was void and unenforceable as a 
violation of Dillon's Rule.  Accordingly, the court entered a 
declaratory judgment to that effect and the City appeals. 
The Property Owners contend that the court correctly 
applied Dillon's Rule, which we have described in the following 
language: 
The Dillon Rule of strict construction controls our 
determination of the powers of local governing bodies. 
This rule provides that municipal corporations have 
 
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only those powers that are expressly granted, those 
necessarily or fairly implied from expressly granted 
powers, 
and 
those 
that 
are 
essential 
and 
indispensable. 
 
Ticonderoga 
Farms 
v. 
County 
of 
Loudoun, 242 Va. 170, 173-74, 409 S.E.2d 446, 448 
(1991); City of Richmond v. Confrere Club of Richmond, 
239 Va. 77, 79, 387 S.E.2d 471, 473 (1990).  When a 
local ordinance exceeds the scope of this authority, 
the ordinance is invalid.  See City of Richmond, 239 
Va. at 80, 387 S.E.2d at 473; Tabler v. Board of 
Supervisors, 221 Va. 200, 204, 269 S.E.2d 358, 361 
(1980). 
 
City of Chesapeake v. Gardner Enterprises, Inc., 253 Va. 243, 
246, 482 S.E.2d 812, 814 (1997). 
We turn to the charter to ascertain whether the legislature 
has given the City the requisite authority.  Section 9.09 of the 
charter gives the City the power to adopt a comprehensive zoning 
plan, which  
shall provide for the regulation and restriction of 
the use of land, buildings and structures in the 
respective zones and may include but shall not be 
limited to the following:  
 
 
. . . . 
 
 
(g) It may . . . require that such 
[nonconforming] buildings or structures and the use 
thereof shall conform to the regulations and 
restrictions prescribed for the zone or zones in which 
they are situated whenever they are enlarged, 
extended, reconstructed or structurally altered; and 
may require that such buildings or structures and the 
use thereof shall conform to the regulations and 
restrictions prescribed for the zone or zones in  
which they are situated, in any event within a 
reasonable period of time to be specified in the 
ordinance. 
 
Alexandria City Charter § 9.09 (emphasis added). 
 
 
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The parties agree that charter provisions such as § 9.09 
"must be construed to be a qualified amendment of the general 
law, and controlling in the locality to which it applies."  
Pierce v. Dennis, 205 Va. 478, 484, 138 S.E.2d 6, 15 (1964). 
Among other things, the City argues that since § 9.09 of 
the charter specifically authorizes the eventual termination of 
existing uses that do not conform to zoning amendments, it 
necessarily includes the power to regulate those uses.  The 
Property Owners counter by claiming that the City had no express 
or implied charter power to regulate the intensification of 
"grandfathered" uses.  They argue that the charter's enumeration 
of the powers to regulate the enlargement, extension, 
reconstruction, or structural alteration of such buildings or 
their uses necessarily excludes the power to regulate the 
intensification of their use. 
In Ticonderoga Farms, Inc. v. County of Loudoun, 242 Va. 
170, 174, 409 S.E.2d 446, 448 (1991), we held that a county's 
power to prohibit solid waste disposal activities necessarily 
included the power to regulate those activities.  But, as we 
noted in Ticonderoga Farms, "[c]onditions imposed upon the 
exercise of an act which a governmental body has the power to 
prohibit may not, of course, be arbitrary, capricious, or impair 
constitutional rights."  242 Va. at 174-75, 409 S.E.2d at 448. 
 
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Here, had the City chosen to treat restaurants operating 
with no special use permit as nonconforming uses, it could have 
required the termination of their operation after a reasonable 
period of time under the powers given it by § 9.09(g) of its 
charter.  However, the City chose not to exercise that power in 
1979.  Instead, its ordinance provided that existing restaurants 
"shall not be subject to this special use permit requirement, 
nor shall they be deemed nonconforming as result of this special 
use permit requirement."  Later, it decided to exercise its 
power to regulate the uses of such restaurants by requiring 
special use permits should the restaurants be expanded or their 
use intensified.  Because the City had the power to terminate 
such "grandfathered" uses, we conclude that it also had the 
power to regulate them and that it exercised that power by 
enacting and enforcing an ordinance requiring a special use 
permit should the use be intensified. 
The Property Owners also contend that because their use was 
not a nonconforming use but a "grandfathered" one expressly 
exempted from the requirements of the earlier zoning ordinance, 
the City had no authority to affect those rights.  We do not 
agree with the Property Owners. 
The Property Owners' use became what the parties have 
described as a "grandfathered" use when the city council chose 
not to classify it as nonconforming by excepting such a use from 
 
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the requirements of the amended ordinance.  However, the 
Property Owners had no vested right in the continuation of their 
property's "grandfathered" status protecting them against the 
application of an amended zoning ordinance.  See Board of Zoning 
Appeals of Bland County v. CaseLin Systems, Inc., 256 Va. 206, 
210, 501 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1998)(noting that property owners have 
no vested property right in the continuation of their property's 
existing zoning status). 
The ordinance in question seeks only to regulate future 
changes in the use of the restaurant and does not attempt to 
modify already existing uses.  Hence, we find no merit in this 
contention.*
Accordingly, we will reverse the declaratory judgment of 
the trial court and enter a final judgment that the City had the 
authority to enact the contested amendments to the zoning 
ordinance. 
Reversed and final judgment. 
                     
* We have examined and find no merit in the remaining contentions 
of the Property Owners. 
 
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