Case Title: In the Matter of the Adoption of a Child by W.P. and M.P.

Citation: 

Docket Number: a-124-98

State: new-jersey

Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Date: 2000-04-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
(This syllabus is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Office of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court. Please note that, in the interests of brevity, portions of any opinion may not have been summarized). GARIBALDI, J., writing for a majority of the Court. The issue in this appeal is whether after a child is adopted by non-relatives, the child's biological grandparents can compel visitation with the child under the Grandparent Visitation Statute, N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1, if the adoptive parents oppose visitation. To answer the question, the Court must decide whether permitting visitation in these circumstances would conflict with the public policy of the New Jersey Adoption Act, N.J.S.A. 9:3-37 to -56. The child, V, was born on August 11, 1994. Her parents, JH and TS, were not married. When V was six months old, her mother, JH, placed her with WP and MP, a couple unrelated to either parent, and subsequently signed a consent for V's adoption. At the time, V's father, TS, was incarcerated. The Ps filed a complaint for adoption, to which TS filed a formal answer objecting to the adoption. His parents, KS and MS, sought to intervene in the adoption proceedings to obtain custody of V, to permit grandparental visitation with V, and to file their own complaint for adoption. The court permitted them to intervene on the issues of custody and visitation if the adoption by the Ps was not granted, but denied their application to adopt V themselves. When TS was released from prison in July 1995, he was given visitation rights, ultimately only with his parents present. Although TS initially resided with his parents and worked for his father, he was arrested again in January 1996 for stealing handguns from his parents' home. His parents obtained a domestic violence restraining order against him, which remains in effect. TS's parental rights were terminated over his objection; the decision was affirmed on appeal in 1998. The court held an adoption hearing in March 1998 and ordered that the grandparents' visitation with V on the third Sunday of every month was to continue on an interim basis and directed the parties to address whether visitation should continue following entry of a final order of adoption. On April 1, 1998, the court entered a final judgment of adoption that terminated all relationships between V and the birth parents and all rights, duties, and obligations of any person founded on the relationships between V and her birth parents. Concluding that there was not an inherent conflict between the Adoption Act and the Grandparent Visitation Statute, the trial court directed on October 29, 1998, that a hearing be held to determine whether it was in V's best interests, as determined by the factors set forth in the Visitation Statute, for her grandparents to continue to have visitation following her adoption by the Ps. The court permitted the ongoing visitation to continue pending the hearing. The Appellate Division granted the motion for leave to appeal filed by WP and MP, but subsequently dismissed the appeal as improvidently granted. The court concluded that consideration of the interplay between the two statutes could benefit from the holding of the best-interests hearing that had been ordered by the trial court and noted its conclusion that the Adoption Act implicitly contemplates post-adoption visitation by members of the adopted child's biological family. The Supreme Court granted the motion for leave to appeal filed by WP and MP. HELD: In the case of a child adopted by non-relatives, the statute that gives visitation rights to biological grandparents conflicts with and is overridden by the statute that governs adoptions; courts cannot order grandparent visitation over the objection of the adoptive parents. 1. The Legislature revised the Adoption Act in 1993 to facilitate adoptions, not to conform or harmonize the Act with the Grandparent Visitation Statute. (pp.6-15) 3. Additional evidence that the Legislature did not intend the Grandparent Visitation Statute to apply when a child is adopted by non-relatives is the fact that when it amended the Adoption Act in 1993, the Legislature specifically rejected a proposed amendment providing for open adoption, by which biological family members could continue to have contact with the adopted child if the adoptive parents consented. Permitting post-adoption visitation in this case would conflict directly with the legislative rejection of open adoption. (pp. 20-21) 4. Application of the Grandparent Visitation Act to cases in which a child has been adopted by non-relatives or in which parental rights have been terminated involuntarily would discourage-- if not prevent-- adoption, a concern of the New Jersey Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS). The vast majority of the adoptive homes for children with whom DYFS is involved have no connection to the child's biological family. An adoptive family must not be tied to the very relationship that put the child in the position of being adopted. (pp. 22-27) The judgment of the Appellate Division is VACATED and the order of the Chancery Division, Family Part filed October 29, 1998, is REVERSED. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ, dissenting, believes that the Adoption Act and the Grandparent Visitation Statute, each having a focus on the best interests of the child, are consonant with one another. In this case, the visitation statute does not impinge impermissibly on parental rights because of the showings that must be made before visitation would be allowed and because of restrictions that can be imposed to protect those interests. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ would uphold the Grandparent Visitation Statute and remand the matter for the trial court to decide after a hearing whether visitation by the biological grandparents is in the child's best interests. JUSTICES O'HERN, COLEMAN, LONG, and VERNIERO join in JUSTICE GARIBALDI's opinion. CHIEF JUSTICE PORITZ filed a separate dissenting opinion in which JUSTICE STEIN joins. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF A CHILD BY W.P. AND M.P. _____________________________ Argued October 26, 1999 -- Decided April 6, 2000 On appeal from the Superior Court, Appellate Division. James W. Miskowski and Harriet Dinegar Milks argued the cause for appellants W.P. and M.P., (MacFall, Riedl & Miskowski, attorneys). Toby Solomon argued the cause for respondents K.S. and M.J.S., (Ms. Solomon, attorney; Ms. Solomon and Kathleen Morehouse, on the briefs). Ann Marie Seaton, Senior Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for amicus curiae Division of Youth and Family Services (John J. Farmer, Jr., Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; Mary C. Jacobson, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel). The opinion of the Court was delivered by GARIBALDI, J. In revising N.J.S.A. 9:3-50, the Legislature deleted language appearing to terminate, in the adoption setting, the rights, duties and obligations of any person founded upon a relationship between the child and the biological parents. That amended statute became effective on April 27, 1994. The grandparents assert that the Legislature, in revising the Adoption Act in 1993, intended to harmonize the Adoption Act with the Visitation Statute, enacted earlier in the same year. However, an examination of the legislative history of the two statutes reveals that the Legislature did not revise the Adoption Act to conform it, or harmonize it, with the Grandparent Visitation Statute, but amended the Adoption Act to facilitate adoptions. C. Legislative History of the Grandparent Visitation Statute On May 20, 1993, the General Assembly gave final approval to the Grandparent Visitation Statute. The bill was signed into law by Governor Florio on June 29, 1993, and became effective that same day. As previously stated, the new law eliminated the requirement that a child's parents be deceased, divorced or separated in order for a grandparent to apply for visitation rights. Instead, the statute provides that a grandparent or any sibling of a child residing in this State may apply for visitation, and it instructs the Superior Court to consider eight enumerated factors when determining whether the grant of such visitation is in the best interests of the child. In its original form, the bill did not enumerate factors, requiring only that visitation be in the best interests of the child, with no guidance to the courts. In an apparent response to concerns that it constituted a gross invasion of the sanctity and privacy of the family unit, the bill was amended, setting forth the eight factors as a way of limiting the intrusive elements of the act. See Letter from Cary B. Cheifetz, Esq., Skoloff & Wolfe, to Gov. Jim Florio (Dec. 22, 1992) (enclosing proposed bill setting forth specific criteria that protect child's best interests). A precursor to the current statute Assembly Bill No. 1475 was prefiled for introduction in the 1990 session. That bill expressly would have required that the court consider the objections of a parent to an application for visitation by that parent's parent (i.e., the child's grandparent). See Assembly Bill No. 1475, Prefiled for Introduction in the 1990 Session. According to the bill statement accompanying Bill No. 1475, the purpose of that provision was to ensure that the court does not grant visitation to a parent's own blood relatives without considering whether the parent may object to such visitation. Id. at 2 (emphasis added). Although that provision was not enacted in the final bill, it suggests that the Legislature believed that parental autonomy should be afforded deference. Moreover, we observe that the statement was written in terms of a parent's own blood relatives. That suggests that, at least in its earlier form, the Grandparent Visitation Statute was not intended to apply to a nonrelative adoption. D. Legislative History of the Adoption Act On December 16, 1993, almost 7 months after it enacted the Grandparent Visitation Statute, the Assembly gave final approval to Assembly Bill No. 1418/Senate Bill No. 685. That enactment revised and updated New Jersey's Adoption Act. The revisions, many in number, represented the first set of comprehensive changes to the adoption laws in nearly 14 years. The amendatory act contained twenty-three separate sections including revised N.J.S.A. 9:3-50. The legislative history reveals that section 18 of the Adoption Act was the most controversial of all the revisions. That section, now found at N.J.S.A. 9:3-39.1, permits the use of intermediaries in non-agency settings to facilitate private adoptions. The passed-bill memorandum from Chief Counsel Scott Weiner to Governor Jim Florio summarized the amendatory sections of the bill without reference to the Grandparent Visitation Statute. See Memorandum from Scott A. Weiner, Chief Counsel, to Gov. Jim Florio (Dec. 21, 1993) (summarizing amendatory sections of Adoption Act). The legislative history reveals that the amendments to N.J.S.A. 9:3-50 were a small part of a larger package of revisions to the adoption laws, the first set of such revisions in early 14 years. Typically, the newspaper articles reported that: New Jersey's adoption laws would be revised with the aim of providing more options for prospective adoptive parents, including allowing the use of unpaid intermediaries to arrange adoptions, . . . State lawmakers on Thursday approved a measure that revamps New Jersey's adoption laws to legalize private adoptions and allow unpaid intermediaries to arrange adoptions. [Dunston McNichol, Adoption Law Revision Advances, Bergen Record, Dec. 17, 1993.] See also Letter from Nicholas R. Scalera, Director, Division of Youth and Family Services of New Jersey Department of Human Services, to Emery J. Ungrady, Jr., New Jersey Senate (June 8, 1993) (questioning the advisability of intermediary involvement, and continuing recommendation that adoption be authorized only by approved agencies); letter from Thomas R. Curtin, New Jersey State Bar Association President, to Gov. Jim Florio (Dec. 23, 1993) (supporting bill because it makes adoption easier in New Jersey and clarifies current adoption laws). Nowhere in the available documents pertaining to the Adoption Act is there a specific reference to the issue of grandparent visitation. The legislative history does contain some references addressing the standards by which a parent may object to termination of parental rights, but not to grandparent visitation. Indeed, N.J.S.A. 9:3-50, including its very heading, rights of inheritance, suggests that the Legislature was concerned with rights of inheritance and other issues, not grandparental visitation rights. The absence of a discussion of grandparent visitation indicates that the Legislature did not revise the Adoption Act to harmonize it with the Grandparent Visitation Statute. That is further evidenced by the passage of time -- nearly 7 months - between the two enactments. If the Legislature had wanted to harmonize the Grandparent Visitation Statute with the Adoption Act, it could have done so expressly at the time it revised the latter act. Based on an examination of the legislative history of the Grandparent Visitation Statute and the Adoption Act, we find that the Legislature did not intend to harmonize or conform the two statutes. The two statutes are separate. Moreover, we believe that the statute that permits visitation rights of parents of the biological parents of a child adopted by intact nonrelative adoptive parents is in conflict with the provisions of the Adoption Act. An examination of the statutory scheme of the Adoption Act further supports that conclusion. E. Statutory Scheme of the Adoption Act It is a well-established principle that [i]n discerning [the Legislature's] intent we consider not only the particular statute in question, but also the entire legislative scheme of which it is a part, Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 234 (1998)(quoting Kimmelman v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 108 N.J. 123, 129 (1987)). The statutory scheme of the Adoption Act emphasizes the complete termination of the biological parents' rights, thus having the logical effect of terminating a biological grandparent's right to visitation. We also observe that the confidentiality of the entire adoption procedure also supports the conclusion that the Adoption Act bars the continued visitation of the biological grandparent of a child adopted by nonrelative adoptive parents. N.J.S.A. 9:3-38(f) -- defines parent to include a parent or parents by adoption. N.J.S.A. 9:3-41(a) provides in part that: Prior to the execution of the surrender, the approved agency shall, directly or through its agent, inform the person executing the surrender that the instrument is a surrender of parental rights by the signatory and means the permanent end of the relationship and all contact between the parent and child. N.J.S.A. 9:3-41.1(a) provides in pertinent part that an approved agent shall provide a prospective parent with all available information, other than information which would identify or permit the identification of the birth parent of the child, . . . N.J.S.A. 9:3-51 was amended to provide that all records of judgment of adoption: N.J.S.A. 9:3-52(a) provides that: [a]ll records of proceedings relating to adoption, including the complaint, judgment and all petitions, affidavits, testimony reports, briefs, orders and other relevant documents, shall be filed under seal by the clerk of the court and shall at no time be open to inspection or copying unless the court, upon good cause shown, shall otherwise order. As the above-cited provisions of the Adoption Act reveal, the traditional adoption process is characterized by closed and confidential proceedings. Once the adoption is final, the records are sealed, and can be opened for inspection only by court order. All legal ties of the child to its natural parents are completely and permanently severed. The child becomes the child of the adoptive parents and part of their extended family. The intent of the Legislature is to promote the creation of a new family unit without fear of interference from the natural parents. In re Adoption of a Child by D.M.H., 135 N.J. 473, 491 (1994), cert. denied. sub nom. Hollingshead v. Hoxworth, 513 U.S 967 (1994). That intent did not change upon the enactment of the 1993 amendments to the Adoption Act. No New Jersey court has directly addressed the issue of whether the statutory visitation rights of a child's biological grandparent can continue following the termination of parental rights and adoption of the child by nonrelatives. However, in Mimkon v. Ford, 66 N.J 426 (1975), this Court considered the application of the Grandparent Visitation Statute in the context of a stepparent adoption. After the child's birth mother died, the child's father remarried and the child was adopted by her stepmother . Ibid. The child's maternal grandmother subsequently instituted an action to visit the child over the objections of the natural father and the child's stepmother. Ibid. This Court upheld the grandmother's right to visitation, holding that the statutory right to grandparental visitation, in the context of stepparent adoption, was not in conflict with the policies of the Adoption Act. Id. at 436. Mimkon was decided prior to the 1993 amendments to the Grandparent Visitation Statute and the 1993 amendments to the Adoption Act. Therefore, Mimkon does not conclusively resolve this case. However, this Court's observations regarding the policies underlying the Adoption Act in Mimkon merit discussion. In Mimkon, we stressed that the Adoption Act was primarily designed to protect children placed for adoption because their parents were unwilling or unable to care for them. Mimkon, supra, 66 N.J. at 434. That is why the judgment of adoption terminates all relationships between the child and his natural parents. Ibid. The Court emphasized that different considerations apply in cases involving stepparent, rather than nonrelative adoption. With stepparent adoption, the policy of insulating the adoptive child from his natural parents is not so clearly compelling as it would be in other situations. Id. at 435. Specifically, we observed that nothing in this opinion is intended to suggest that the grandparent could invoke the visitation statute after the child of the grandparent has in fact been adjudicated to have 'forsaken his parental obligations and adoption ordered.' In that case the policy of N.J.S.A. 9:3-17(c).30, subd. A plainly controls. Ibid., n.3. That statute provided that to give effect to the public policy of the state regarding the welfare of children requiring placement for adoption it was necessary to protect the adopting parents . . . from later disturbance of their relationships to the child by the natural parents. Id. at 432. We reaffirm our observation in Mimkon that visitation in the context of nonrelative adoption conflicts with the policies underlying the Adoption Act. The holding of Mimkon should not be extended to nonrelative adoption. Courts in other jurisdictions have addressed the tension between their grandparent visitation and adoption statutes. However, those decisions are guided mainly by the specific statutory provisions, which differ from New Jersey's, and are of limited precedential value. Jurisdictions with adoption and visitation statutes similar to ours have declined to impose grandparental visitation rights in nonrelative adoption settings. See, e.g., Sowers v. Tasmolias, 941 P.2d 949, 951 (Kan. 1997) (holding that after adoption, parents of birth parents no longer grandparents of the child within the meaning of the visitation statute); Hicks v. Enlow, 764 S.W 2d 68, 73 (Ky. 1989) (interpreting interplay between visitation statute and adoption statute to allow visitation in case of stepparent adoption, but to disallow visitation in the case of nonrelative adoptions); L.F.M. v. Department of Soc. Serv., 507 A.2d 1151, 1159 (Md. App. Div. 1986) (holding that grandparents had no right to visit children over objection of confidential prospective adoptive parents). IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF A CHILD BY W.P. AND M.P. _____________________________ PORITZ, C.J., dissenting. This case raises the issue whether grandparents who have had a relationship with their granddaughter since she was born can seek visitation rights under N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1 (the Grandparent Visitation Statute )See footnote 11, after the child at age four is adopted by non-relatives. The child's adoptive parents claim, and a majority of the Court agrees, that the Grandparent Visitation Statute conflicts with policies enunciated in the Adoption Act, N.J.S.A. 9:3-37 to -56, and should not be given full force and effect. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 6-7). The adoptive parents also claim that application of the visitation statute to them would violate their right of privacy, and more specifically, their right of parental autonomy. I believe that the Adoption Act and the Grandparent Visitation Statute are consonant with one another, each designed to provide for the best interests of the children who come under the Acts' provisions. I further believe that the visitation statute, as applied in this case, does not impinge impermissibly on parental rights because of the showings that must be made by the grandparents before visitation may be allowed, and because of the restrictions that may be placed on visitation to protect the parents' interests. I would therefore uphold the Grandparent Visitation Statute. Because every case is highly dependent on the facts adduced under the statutory standards, I would remand the matter to the trial court to determine, after a hearing, whether visitation would be in the child's best interests. shall terminate all relationships between the child and the birth mother, [JH], and putative father, [TS], as well as all rights, duties, and obligations of any person founded on those relationships . . . except for any rights which may have vested prior to the entry of this judgment. The trial court also ordered further briefing on the issue of grandparent visitation, and stayed the final hearing of adoption pending the submission of an updated adoption home study. On September 28, 1998, the trial court issued a written opinion rejecting WP's and MP's claims that the Grandparent Visitation Statute, N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1, is unconstitutional as applied to this case, and that the statute conflicts with the Adoption Act, N.J.S.A. 9:3-37 et seq. The court awarded the grandparents continued visitation and scheduled another hearing to determine how visitation should proceed. WP and MP appealed. Although initially they agreed to visitation, they later sought and obtained a stay from the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division, however, subsequently dismissed the appeal as improvidently granted in an opinion dated May 14, 1999. We granted WP's and MP's motion for leave to appeal on July 16, 1999. V is now five years old. a. A grandparent or any sibling of a child residing in this State may make application before the Superior Court, in accordance with the Rules of Court, for an order of visitation. It shall be the burden of the applicant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the granting of visitation is in the best interests of the child. b. In making a determination on an application filed pursuant to this section, the court shall consider the following factors: (1) The relationship between the child and the applicant; (2) The relationship between each of the child's parents or the person with whom the child is residing and the applicant; (3) The time which has elapsed since the child last had contact with the applicant; (4) The effect that such visitation will have on the relationship between the child and the child's parents or the person with whom the child is residing; (5) If the parents are divorced or separated, the time sharing arrangement which exists between the parents with regard to the child; (6) The good faith of the applicant in filing the application; (7) Any history or physical, emotional or sexual abuse or neglect by the applicant; and (8) Any other factor relevant to the best interests of the child. c. With regard to any application made pursuant to this section, it shall be prima facie evidence that visitation is in the child's best interest if the applicant had, in the past, been a full-time caretaker for the child. Generally, the court is required to consider the relationships between the various family members and the child, always with a view toward the impact of those relationships on the best interests of the child. N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1(a). The entry of judgment of adoption shall . . . terminate all parental rights and responsibilities of the parent towards the adoptive child except for a parent who is the spouse of the petitioner and except those rights that have vested prior to entry of the judgment of adoption. That provision remains in the Adoption Act today. The Act passed in both houses and was signed into law by Governor Florio on December 28, 1993. Interference by a natural parent with the relationship between the child and the adopting parents introduces alternative and conflicting authority figures in the child's life, creating tremendous emotional tension in the child and ultimately threatening to undermine the authority of the adoptive parents and their ability to make parental decisions. Grandparents ordinarily play a very different role in the child's life; they are not authority figures and do not possessively assert exclusive rights to make parental decisions. At best, they are generous sources of unconditional love and acceptance, which complements rather than conflicts with the roles of the parent. [G]randparent visitation involves a much lesser risk of threat to the physical or psychological well being of the child or to the development of a healthy and natural relationship between the child and the adopting parents than might continued contact by the natural parent. It is biological fact that grandparents are bound to their grandchildren by the unbreakable links of heredity. It is common human experience that the concern and interest grandparents take in the welfare of their grandchildren far exceeds anything explicable in purely biological terms. A very special relationship often arises and continues between grandparents and grandchildren. The tensions and conflicts which commonly mar relations between parents and children are often absent between those very same parents and their grandchildren. Visits with a grandparent are often a precious part of a child's experience and there are benefits which devolve upon the grandchild from the relationship with his grandparents which he cannot derive from any other relationship. Neither the Legislature nor this Court is blind to human truths which grandparents and grandchildren have always known. The Court ordered a hearing for a determination as to whether or not, at the present time and as circumstances now exist, it would be in the child's best interests to enter an order for continued visitation. Id. at 438. A footnote in Mimkon contained dicta distinguishing cases in which a parent had been adjudicated unfit and a grandparent sought visitation after an adoption had been ordered. Id. at 435 n.3. At that time, the visitation statute only applied when either or both of the parents of a minor child . . . are deceased, or divorced or living separate and apart in different habitats. L. 1973, c. 100, 1. It is therefore not surprising that the Court, speculating about cases involving unfit parents, turned to the now-repealed public policy of the 1953 Adoption Act, which then provided: [i]t is necessary and desirable . . . to protect the adopting parents . . . from later disturbance of their relationships to the child by the natural parents. L. 1953, c. 264, 1 (repealed 1977). That provision has since been replaced with language requiring that due regard be given to the rights of all persons affected by an adoption. L. 1999, c. 53, 1 (effective Mar. 31, 1999). It is now the Court's obligation, twenty-five years after Mimkon, to consider grandparent visitation in the context of a non-relative adoption and under substantially modified statutory schemes. B. Legislative Intent: Open Adoption The majority characterizes the application of the Grandparent Visitation Statute to non-relative adoptive families as an open adoption arrangement,See footnote 44 and notes that the Legislature has expressly disapproved of such arrangements. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 20-21). The majority concludes that the Legislature's reluctance to pass a broad open adoption provision, indicates disapproval of grandparent visitation after non relative adoptions. Ante at ___ (slip op. at 22). The original version of the 1993 Adoption Act had contained an open adoption provision that read: With the consent of the adopting parent the court may provide in the adoption order for visitation or other type of communication with the child after the adoption by any person who had a relationship with or was biologically related to the adopted child. This provision may be modified by the court subsequent to the adoption on petition of the adoptive parent for good cause shown. [A. 1418, 13(d), 205th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.J. May 14, 1992) (above language was never enacted).] This provision was deleted before final passage of the bill in the Senate. In the Statement to the bill, the Judiciary Committee explained: While it is not the intent of the committee in deleting this language to discourage open adoptions, it was felt that the issue of open adoption represents a significant policy issue which should be addressed in separate legislation. Statement accompanying A. 1418, 205th Leg., 2d Sess. (N.J. Mar. 18, 1993). The Court apparently believes that the decision not to pass a broad open adoption provision is an expression of legislative intent to prevent any post-adoption visitation by biological relatives -- an expression strong enough to overcome the actual language of the Grandparent Visitation Statute. It is, in my view, more plausible that grandparent and sibling visitation was as far as the Legislature wished to go in providing for possible contact with members of a child's biological family after a non relative adoption. Most telling, two months after deleting the open adoption provision, the Senate passed the Grandparent Visitation Statute. When the Senate passed the final version of the visitation statute, I must presume that it was fully aware of its position on open adoption and its actions with respect to the Adoption Act. See Brewer v. Porch, 53 N.J. 167, 174 (1969). The plain language of the Grandparent Visitation Statute allows any grandparent to apply for visitation rights, regardless of the status of the child's parents, and regardless of whether the child lives with her natural or adoptive parents.See footnote 55 Sociological literature has documented and analyzed the benefits children receive from a healthy relationship with their grandparents. Contact with grandparents produces children who are rooted in and proud of their family and culture, emotionally secure, and highly socialized. Additionally, interaction between grandparents and grandchildren mitigates ageism in children because older people love them, mitigates sexism because grandmothers and grandfathers do essentially the same thing, and eliminates fear of old age because grandparents serve as ancestor role models. Finally, grandparents can give grandchildren an emotional sanctuary from the everyday world. These findings are consistent with those of other experts on child development, who generally agree that it is important for children to maintain ongoing meaningful relationships. In New Jersey, six percent of children under eighteen, 107,287 children, live in grandparent-headed households. See New Jersey State Legislature Assembly Task Force on Grandparenting, Report of Findings and Recommendations, 1 (Jan. 2000). As demographics change and family configurations evolve, state legislatures and courts have increasingly embraced a larger concept of family autonomy extending beyond nuclear families. See Moore, supra, 431 U.S. at 505, 97 S. Ct. at 1938, 52 L. Ed. 2d at 541 ( [T]he accumulated wisdom of civilization, gained over the centuries and honored throughout our history . . . supports a larger conception of family. ). Indeed, the trend toward recognizing extended family relationships is nationwide in scope; all fifty states have passed statutes that allow grandparents some form of visitation,See footnote 99 although all of these statutes have not been sustained by the courts. See supra at ___ (slip op. at 29 30). This trend does, however, demonstrate broad recognition of the role of extended families in our society; it also acknowledges the benefit that children derive from nurturing relationships with relatives other than parents and, specifically, with grandparents and siblings. In my view, there is ample support for the states' strong interest in encouraging those relationships. In respect of the impact of the Grandparent Visitation Statute, I would find that the statute permits only a limited intrusion, if any, on parents' constitutionally protected interests. The statute is not about the termination of parental rights, or about who should have physical custody of the child; it is about whether and under what circumstances visitation should occur. Cf. Zack v. Fiebert, 235 N.J. Super. 424, 426 (App. Div. 1989). New Jersey is one of fourteen states that provide detailed standards for determining an application for visitation. The trial court is required to consider eight factors bearing largely on various relationships within the family and their duration and quality. N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1(b)(1) (8); see supra at ___ (slip op. at 7-8). Also, visitation may not be awarded unless the applicant [] prove[s] by a preponderance of the evidence that the granting of visitation is in the best interests of the child. N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1(a). The best interests benchmark is, therefore, circumscribed by the multiple-factor test, which guides but does not limit judicial discretion in making these sensitive determinations. See N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1(b). Unlike other state visitation statutes that extend standing to any person, New Jersey's statute is limited to blood relationships that the Legislature has determined have special importance, i.e., grandparents and siblings. Under our statute, only a grandparent who has a significant relationship with a grandchild would make it past the first step of the test, and only if the application has been filed in good faith. See N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1(b)(1), (3), and (6). I also interpret N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1(b)(4) to require that grandparent visitation cannot threaten the stability of the parent-child relationship in any way. If a court determined that a grandparent posed any threat or any risk of a threat to the child's relationship with his or her parents, N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1(b)(7), the petition for visitation would be summarily dismissed. In my view, the statute mandates that courts give deference to parents' objections to visitation and to their beliefs concerning the best interests of their child. See N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1(b)(2), (4). If visitation is permitted, it can be conditioned on safeguards to protect the interests of parents, including supervised visits and other restrictions. Only when a grandparent has acted in loco parentis to a grandchild should there be a presumption in favor of visitation. N.J.S.A. 9:2 7.1(c). Like most such statutes, the Grandparent Visitation Statute does not provide a right to visitation, only standing to petition the court for visitation. See N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1(a). When a petition cannot support visitation, as in a case where the applicant is unfit, or where the child has been adopted as an infant and there has been little or no contact with the grandparents, the court should dismiss the petition forthwith. Cf. R. 5:8-6 (providing for a custody hearing only if the court finds that there is a genuine and substantial issue ). I expect that the family courts would quickly recognize insubstantial pleadings and that visitation petitions would only be filed when there is merit to the petitioner's claim. The result in each case is dependent on the facts in each case. If warranted under the statutory standards, I believe that the limited intrusion effected by grandparent visitation is constitutionally permissible. I observe that here, V was not adopted by a non-relative family shortly after birth, and that the child has had ongoing contact with her grandparents for five years. The California Supreme Court has explained that in such circumstances, the law should not and cannot ignore the fact that an adopted person may not in many respects be cut off from his natural family. If affection and regard remains between members of a natural family, the law should not in the name of consistency undertake to thwart the expression of those feelings when the encouragement thereof does not hinder the adoptive relationships. [In re Estate of Zook v. Zook, 399 P.2d 53, 56 (Cal. 1965) (en banc)]. I would remand this case to the trial court for findings based on the statutory standards. I would require the court to consider, among other factors, whether visitation would unduly interfere with the manner in which the adoptive parents have chosen to raise V, the nature of their objections to visitation (including their concerns about V's father), whether the adoptive parents previously consented to visitation, and the scope of visitation sought. I believe that the trial court should decide whether it would be in V's best interests to permit visitation with her biological grandparents despite the countervailing concerns expressed by her adoptive parents. NO. A-124 IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF A CHILD BY W.P. AND M.P. DECIDED April 6 , 2000 Chief Justice Poritz