Case Title: Branch v. Walker

Citation: 247 P.2d 172, 56 N.M. 594

Docket Number: 

State: new-mexico

Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Date: 1952-08-06T00:00:00Z

Document:
247 P.2d 172 (1952) 56 N.M. 594 BRANCH v. WALKER et ux. No. 5443. Supreme Court of New Mexico. August 6, 1952. Noble & Spiess, Las Vegas, for appellants. *173 A.L. Zinn, Dean S. Zinn, Sante Fe, for appellee. LUJAN, Chief Justice. This action was brought by Alejandro Branch against Cecil R. Walker and Amy E. Walker, his wife, to recover on a promissory note given by the latter to the former, for a part of the purchase money of real estate and personal property, and to foreclose the mortgage given thereon. It appears that Branch sold to the Walkers four tracts of land together with livestock, farming implements and other personal property for $10,150, on which $5,000 had been paid, and the action is to recover the balance. The description of the land in the deed is as follows: The following described four tracts of land situated in Precinct No. 2 of Mora County, New Mexico and better described as follows: Defendants' answer admits the execution of the note and mortgage but denies that they are indebted to plaintiff in any sum whatsoever. They counter-claimed and alleged that the tracts of land described in plaintiff's complaint did not in fact contain the acreage therein alleged. That tract No. 1 contained only 666.55 acres; tract No. 2 contained 108 acres; tract No. 3 contained 58.56 acres; and tract No. 4 contained 320 acres; making a total of 1,153.11 acres. That relying upon plaintiff's representation that the ranch contained 1,902 acres of land they agreed to purchase same. That had they known the true acreage of said land they would not have entered into said agreement. That on or about August 24, 1949, they learned for the first time that the ranch did not contain 1,902 acres but actually contained 1,153.11 acres, showing a deficit of 748.89 acres. That plaintiffs' representation as to the quantity of land included in said ranch was false, was known by plaintiff to be false, was made by plaintiff to induce them to buy the same, and that relying upon the truth of said representation and not knowing the actual acreage contained in said ranch they were induced to purchase same. That there was a partial failure of consideration for and on account of the monies paid by them and agreed to be paid in accordance with the promissory note. By his reply, plaintiff denied the material allegations set forth in defendants' counterclaim. On July 5, 1944, the parties to this action entered into an agreement for the sale of land and certain personal property, the parts of the agreement material to our present inquiry being as follows: At the conclusion of the case the court made the following findings of fact which are supported by substantial evidence. The sum of $1,000 was paid when the agreement was executed. Appellants took possession under the agreement, and thereafter had the land surveyed. It was found to contain 1,153.11, or 428.89 acres less than the area mentioned in the agreement. It seems to be admitted that the actual number of acres embraced in the four tracts were unknown to either party at the time the contract was entered into. If the sale was made by the acre, and the difference held to be a material one, appellants would be entitled to an abatement of the purchase price in a sum equaling the difference between the number of acres mentioned in the contract and the amount ascertained by the survey. On the other hand, if it was a sale of lands per aversionem, or in gross, appellants would be held to the payment of the purchase price, notwithstanding a deficiency in the area. Whether it was a sale in gross or by the acre, depends upon the intention of the parties. In arriving at the intention of the parties, and that is the test to be applied in this class of cases, we must look to the whole contract, rather than to a single recital. In the instant case, the land was not the only subject of the agreement. There were farming implements, livestock and other personal property including growing crops on the land, which also furnished a part of the consideration. It would seem to be manifest, also, that the intent of the vendee was to pay and the vendor to receive the gross sum of $10,150 for the property sold. These items are all suggestive circumstances, tending to show that the sale was in gross. See Annotation in 1 A.L.R.2d beginning on page 9. In an elaborate opinion in the case of Harrison v. Talbot, 2 Dana, Ky., 258, cited by appellants, Chief Justice Robertson reviewed numerous authorities and said: This underlying principle is stated in Morris Canal Company v. Emmett, 9 Paige, N.Y., 168, 37 Am. Dec. 388, in which it was said: Then in Brassell v. Fisk, 153 Ala. 558, 45 So. 70, the general rule is declared as follows: It is to be observed that on May 18, 1948, the plaintiff exercised his option to declare the full amount due on the note for defendants' failure to pay the interest on said note and the 1947 taxes, but in order to prevent the exercise of such option the defendants entered into an agreement to pay plaintiff the sum of $1,000 on the principal and all delinquent taxes then due as well as all incidental expenses. That when defendants failed to abide by the agreement, plaintiff again exercised his option to declare the full amount due on the note, but, that in order to again prevent foreclosure of the mortgage deed defendants entered into another agreement with plaintiff on the 13th day of January, 1949, for the reinstatement of the mortgage deed, which agreement was performed by both parties. That, although the defendants have been in possession of the property prior to and during the process of negotiating these two agreements (upwards of five years) they at no time made any complaint to the plaintiff as to the quantity of the land. Under the facts in evidence, in our opinion, it is clear that by the agreement of July 5, 1944, Branch undertook to sell, and the Walkers undertook to purchase the four tracts of land together with the personal property located thereon for the lump sum of $10,150 and that the present case falls within the general rule hereinabove announced. The court did not err in holding that the sale was in gross and not by the acre. Other questions are presented and argued but the view we take as to the character of the sale renders their consideration unnecessary. The judgment is affirmed, and the cause remanded to the District Court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff (appellee) and against the defendants (appellants) and the sureties on their supersedeas bond, and it is so ordered. SADLER, McGHEE, COMPTON and COORS, JJ., concur.