Case Title: Darnell Jackson v. Daniel Buchler

Citation: 2010 WI 135

Docket Number: 2006AP000948

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2010-12-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
2010 WI 135 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2006AP948 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
Darnell Jackson, 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
     v. 
Daniel Buchler and Matthew Frank, 
          Respondents-Respondents. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at: 307 Wis. 2d 442, 745 N.W.2d 87 
(Ct. App. 2007-Unpublished) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 14, 2010   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
September 15, 2010 
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Maryann Sumi 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., dissents (opinion filed).   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the petitioner-appellant-petitioner there were briefs 
by Thomas L. Shriner, Jr., G. Michael Halfenger, Katherine D. 
Spitz and Foley & Lardner, LLP, Milwaukee, and oral argument by 
G. Michael Halfenger. 
 
For 
the 
respondents-respondents there were briefs by 
Abigail C.S. Potts, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general, and oral argument 
by Abigail C.S. Potts. 
 
 
 
2010 WI 135
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.   2006AP948 
(L.C. No. 
2005CV1862) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Darnell Jackson, 
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
Daniel Buchler and Matthew Frank, 
 
          Respondents-Respondents. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
DEC 14, 2010 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
ANN 
WALSH 
BRADLEY, 
J.   The 
petitioner, 
Darnell 
Jackson, seeks review of an unpublished decision of the court of 
appeals affirming an order denying his petition for a writ of 
certiorari.1  In a prison disciplinary proceeding, Jackson was 
found guilty of inciting a riot.  He contends that the 
proceeding violated procedural due process.  
                                                 
1 See Jackson v. Buchler, No. 2006AP948, unpublished slip 
op. (Wis. Ct. App., Dec. 13, 2007), affirming an order of the 
circuit court for Dane County, Maryann Sumi, J. 
No. 
2006AP948   
 
2 
 
¶2 
Video evidence is the focus of Jackson's initial due 
process arguments.  He asserts that the video footage undermines 
or contradicts the other evidence considered by the adjustment 
committee, rendering the evidence of his guilt constitutionally 
insufficient.  Additionally, he contends that the video footage 
is exculpatory or impeaching evidence, which should have been 
disclosed to him under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).   
¶3 
We determine that the video footage is inconclusive 
and neither undermines nor contradicts the evidence considered 
by the adjustment committee.  We further conclude that with or 
without the video footage, there was sufficient evidence of 
Jackson's guilt.  Under the facts presented by this case, we 
need not and do not determine whether any version of Brady——
limited 
or 
otherwise——applies 
to 
prison 
disciplinary 
proceedings.   
¶4 
Additionally, Jackson asserts that his due process 
right to an impartial decisionmaker was violated because a 
member of his adjustment committee also had "substantial 
involvement" in the incident because she participated in the 
investigative process.  Based on this record, we cannot conclude 
as a matter of law that the committee member's involvement in 
the incident was "substantial."         
¶5 
Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals.     
I 
¶6 
At approximately 1:40 p.m. on November 11, 2004, 
several New Lisbon Correctional Institution security guards were 
attacked and injured by three inmates: Jamie Vest, Bernard 
No. 
2006AP948   
 
3 
 
Treadwell, and Alvin Kenney.  The attack occurred at the A Unit 
officers' station, which is located between the A Unit Side 1 
and Side 2 dayrooms.  According to the subsequent investigation, 
many inmates participated in the assaults by purposefully 
rushing toward the officers' station and positioning themselves 
to participate in the riot.    
¶7 
Although the attack itself appears not to have been 
recorded by security cameras, video footage of the Side 1 and 
Side 2 dayrooms was used in the investigation.  Many inmates 
were disciplined as a result of their participation in the riot.     
¶8 
At the time of the riot, Darnell Jackson was working 
in the prison barbershop, which abuts the Side 1 dayroom.  There 
is no evidence or allegation that Jackson directly participated 
in the riot. 
¶9 
Nevertheless, 
staff 
investigators 
uncovered 
information implicating Jackson as a leader responsible for 
inciting the attack.  Two inmates who requested confidentiality 
stated 
that 
they 
had 
direct 
personal 
knowledge 
of 
the 
circumstances which led to the riot.  Both stated that Jackson, 
who used the alias "Wiz," acted in a leadership position in a 
gang called the Vice Lords.  Both indicated that prior to the 
riot, Jackson met with the inmates and instructed them to 
assault the guards.2     
                                                 
2 At least two other inmates gave statements that appeared 
to implicate Jackson.  One inmate stated that Jackson came out 
of the barbershop where Vest, Treadwell, and Kenney were 
located, and then returned to the barbershop prior to the 
assault.  Another inmate stated that Jackson was "a five star 
general for the Vice Lords."   
No. 
2006AP948   
 
4 
 
¶10  A conduct report was issued, which cited Jackson for 
inciting a riot3 and for group resistance.4  The conduct report 
noted: "Tapes from the NLCI A Unit and NLCI exterior cameras 
from 11/11/04 have been utilized by the investigators of the 
11/11/04 riot."   
¶11 As set forth in the conduct report, the informant 
referred to as CI#1 stated in part:  
Darnell Jackson is calling it for the Vice Lords and 
P-Stones.  I saw inmate[s] putting their boots and 
gloves on and I knew something was going to happen.  
Vest, Treadwell, Darnell Jackson and Alvin Kenney were 
all huddled up first in the hallway.  All the people 
who 
assaulted 
the 
staff 
are 
V.L. 
and 
P-Stones 
(Rangers).  I also saw Lipsey and Ward outside in the 
hallway talking to "Wiz" (AKA Darnell Jackson.)  I saw 
Wiz in the hallway, everybody had on boots and gloves.   
The informant referred to as CI#2 stated in part:  
Lipsey (Samuel) was on crutches and came back to the 
unit from HSU.  Lipsey stated to the inmates on the 
unit that he saw Love being attacked and the guards 
had him on the ground and were beating him.  Treadwell 
and Vest then went to Whiz (who is first in command) 
and told him about Love.  Whiz was behind the 
incident.  He stated to them, "You guys know what you 
have to do."  
¶12 The conduct report concluded that "Jackson is in a 
leadership position with the Vice Lords, called for the assault 
                                                 
3 Wisconsin Admin. Code DOC § 303.18 provides: "Any inmate 
who encourages, directs, commands, coerces or signals one or 
more other persons to participate in a riot is guilty of an 
offense.  'Riot' means a disturbance to institutional order 
caused by a group of 2 or more inmates which creates a risk of 
injury to persons or property." 
4 See Wis. Admin. Code DOC §§ 303.20, 303.03(4). 
No. 
2006AP948   
 
5 
 
to happen, and was talking to the three inmates who assaulted 
staff seconds before the assault took place."  Further, it 
stated that the confidential informants "are believed to be 
credible as their statements were obtained separately.  Neither 
inmate had knowledge of the other's statement."  It determined 
that "[t]he statements were consistent with and corroborated one 
another."   
¶13 Jackson was provided with a copy of the conduct report 
and a notice of his right to a hearing.  He submitted an 
affidavit, which asserted that at no time did he talk with 
Treadwell, Vest, or Kenney, and that he had nothing to do with 
the attack.  He further contended that he is no longer a member 
of the Vice Lords, that he was never a member of the P-Stones, 
and that he never acted in a leadership position with those 
gangs.    
¶14 According to his affidavit, on the afternoon of the 
riot Jackson was in the prison barbershop cutting Inmate Piel's 
hair.  He heard a loud commotion and saw inmates gathered around 
the TV monitor.  Jackson contended that he left the shop for 15 
seconds to look at the TV monitor, but he could not see what was 
happening and returned to the shop.  After he finished cutting 
Piel's hair, Jackson left the shop.  At that time, there was a 
commotion at the sergeant's desk, and he saw Treadwell, Vest, 
and Kenney swinging their fists and kicking someone.  He 
proceeded towards his cell. 
¶15 The Security Office granted Jackson's request to 
present the testimony of two inmates, Larry Piel and Bernard 
No. 
2006AP948   
 
6 
 
Treadwell.  It denied Jackson's request to present the testimony 
of two additional inmates, Samuel Lipsey and Jamie Vest, and one 
Department of Corrections (DOC) officer, Captain Harrel.  The 
office explained that Jackson did not provide good cause to 
demonstrate 
that 
the 
additional 
witnesses 
could 
provide 
essential testimony.5       
¶16 Jackson, Piel, and Treadwell testified at the hearing.  
The two confidential informants did not testify.    
¶17 The adjustment committee found Jackson guilty of 
inciting a riot and not guilty of group resistance.  As a result 
of this disposition, Jackson's release date was extended by 179 
days.     
¶18 Lieutenant Pamela Zank completed form DOC-84, entitled 
"Disciplinary Hearing: Reasons for Decision and Evidence Relied 
on," (hereinafter, "Hearing Decision").  As provided in the 
Hearing Decision, the committee found it "more likely than not 
inmate Jackson committed the act of inciting a riot."  The 
Hearing Decision explained that the committee "evaluated all the 
evidence, confidential statements and testimony and reached its 
                                                 
5 Wisconsin Admin. Code DOC § 303.81(1) provides in part: 
"The accused may directly or through an advocate make a request 
to the security office for witnesses to appear at the major 
violation hearing . . . . Except for good cause, an inmate may 
present no more than 2 witnesses in addition to the reporting 
staff member or members."  
During his administrative appeals, Jackson asserted that 
the denial of his request to call these witnesses was a due 
process violation.  However, he has not renewed this argument in 
the circuit court, the court of appeals, or this court.    
No. 
2006AP948   
 
7 
 
conclusion that the statements in the conduct report are 
correct."  It concluded that Jackson's testimony was "less 
credible" 
and 
that 
"inmate 
witness 
testimony 
[was] 
not 
credible."     
¶19 The Hearing Decision form contained a section for the 
adjustment committee to set forth the physical evidence it 
relied upon in reaching its decision.  That section provided 
that among other evidence,6 the committee relied on "video" 
evidence in finding Jackson guilty.   
¶20 Jackson timely appealed to Warden Buchler.7  Among 
other claims, Jackson contended that Lt. Zank's participation in 
the hearing violated DOC rules and his due process right to a 
fair and impartial hearing, and that there was insufficient 
evidence to establish his guilt.  He asserted that Lt. Zank was 
among the officers who investigated the assault, that she had 
interviewed Jackson about the incident, and that she asked 
Jackson to sign a waiver of his hearing rights.  Jackson made no 
claim regarding video evidence. 
¶21 Warden Buchler affirmed the committee's decision, 
concluding that there was sufficient evidence to sustain its 
determination of guilt.  He also found that "Lt. Zank did not 
                                                 
6 The 
other evidence listed in the Hearing Decision 
includes: statement in the conduct report, other testimony, 
confidential witness statements, C-120, diagram, and gang 
coordinator credentials. 
7 See Wis. Admin. Code DOC § 303.76(7). 
No. 
2006AP948   
 
8 
 
have substantial involvement in the incident to warrant not 
being on the hearing committee."  
¶22 Following the inmate complaint procedures outlined in 
Wis. Admin. Code Ch. DOC 310, Jackson filed two offender 
complaints with the institutional complaint examiner.  His first 
complaint raised issues related to the statements of the 
confidential informants.  That complaint was dismissed.  His 
second complaint asserted that the committee violated Wis. 
Admin. Code DOC § 303.82(2)8 by permitting Lt. Zank to 
participate as a member of the adjustment committee.  The 
institutional complaint examiner recommended that the complaint 
be dismissed, concluding that "Lt. Zank did not have substantial 
involvement in the investigative process."  On review, the 
corrections complaint examiner found "no procedural error of 
consequence" 
and 
also 
recommended 
that 
the 
complaint 
be 
dismissed.  Ultimately, the Secretary of the DOC accepted the 
recommendation and dismissed Jackson's complaint.       
¶23 Jackson filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in 
the circuit court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 801.02(5).9  The 
petition advanced four arguments for consideration: (1) the 
                                                 
8 Wisconsin Admin. Code DOC § 303.82(2) provides: "No person 
who has substantial involvement in an incident, which is the 
subject of a hearing, may serve on the committee for that 
hearing.  Committee members shall determine the subject matter 
of the hearing in advance in order to allow replacement of 
committee members if necessary and thereby avoid the necessity 
of postponing the hearing."   
9 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2007-08 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
2006AP948   
 
9 
 
adjustment committee improperly relied on the confidential 
informants' statements; (2) Lt. Zank's participation on the 
committee denied Jackson a fair tribunal; (3) the committee gave 
inadequate reasons in support of its determination of guilt; and 
(4) certain evidence, including the video evidence, should have 
been but was never disclosed.  
¶24 Jackson's 
petition 
for 
certiorari 
triggered 
the 
respondents' obligation to transmit the record to the circuit 
court.  Prior to transmitting the record, Warden Buchler 
reviewed the conduct report and the record once more.10  He 
remanded the Hearing Decision to the adjustment committee and 
instructed the committee to remove from its decision the 
reference to a video:  
I can find no substantiation that there was a video 
showing Mr. Jackson's involvement in this incident.  
However, for the reasons I indicated on the initial 
appeal form . . . , I find no reason to alter the 
decisions 
and 
disposition 
of 
the 
disciplinary 
hearing[.]  Therefore, I am remanding this back to the 
original hearing committee only for a correction of 
the record on form DOC-84 regarding physical evidence 
used for this hearing.     
¶25 As a result of the warden's correction, the record 
that was provided to the circuit court contained an amended 
Hearing Decision in which the word "video" was crossed out.  No 
video was included in the agency's record. 
                                                 
10 See Wis. Admin. Code DOC § 303.76(7)(e). 
No. 
2006AP948   
 
10 
 
¶26 Jackson filed a motion to strike the return.11  Among 
other claims, he asserted that "[t]he video tape which was used 
against the petitioner as physical evidence was not in the 
return and was illegally removed from the record," and that by 
removing this evidence from the record, the respondents were 
attempting to evade judicial review.  In his written brief to 
the circuit court, Jackson explained that video footage of the 
incident "ostensibly would have shown Jackson did not exit the 
Barber Shop and purportedly converse and/or signal participants 
in the disturbance."    
¶27 The respondents disputed Jackson's claim that the 
warden had removed video evidence from the record.  Rather, they 
contended that "[t]he adjustment committee in the instant case 
erroneously included a reference to a videotape in the evidence 
relied on section of the [Hearing Decision]."12  The respondents 
further asserted that even if such a tape existed, Jackson would 
have no right to its production.   
                                                 
11 When an agency transmits its record to a circuit court 
for certiorari review, the agency's record is sometimes referred 
to as the "return." 
In addition to his motion to strike the return, Jackson 
filed a motion to compel the production of certain evidence, a 
motion to stay the proceedings until the court decided the 
merits of the motion to strike, and a motion challenging the 
sufficiency of evidence submitted for in camera review.  In its 
final decision on the merits of the petition, the circuit court 
denied all of Jackson's motions.  
12 To explain this alleged mistake, the brief asserted that 
the November 11 assault "resulted in disciplinary proceedings 
against numerous inmates," many of whom were directly involved 
in the assault and were depicted in video footage of the event.   
No. 
2006AP948   
 
11 
 
¶28 In a written decision, the circuit court affirmed.  It 
conducted an in-camera review of the confidential informants' 
statements and determined that they satisfied the requirements 
for admissibility of confidential statements found in Wis. 
Admin. Code DOC § 303.86.13  The court concluded that substantial 
evidence supported the committee's decision and that based on 
the confidential informants' statements, the committee could 
reasonably conclude that Jackson encouraged and directed the 
inmates to assault staff.    
¶29 Turning to the claims based on video evidence, the 
circuit court stated that Jackson failed to exhaust the 
administrative remedies provided by the DOC.  Nevertheless, the 
court interpreted the warden's August 29 letter as "reflect[ing] 
the fact that no video was actually reviewed during the 
disciplinary process."  Because the adjustment committee found 
the evidence sufficient without any video evidence, the circuit 
court determined that Jackson's arguments about the video were 
moot.  Further, the "mistaken reference to video footage" in the 
Hearing Decision was harmless error because "the committee does 
                                                 
13 Wisconsin Admin. Code DOC § 303.86(4) provides: "If the 
institution finds that testifying would pose a risk of harm to 
the witness, the committee may consider a corroborated, signed 
statement under oath from that witness without revealing the 
witness's identity . . . . The adjustment committee shall reveal 
the statement to the accused inmate, though the adjustment 
committee may edit the statement to avoid revealing the identity 
of the witness. . . . Two anonymous statements by different 
persons may be used to corroborate each other." 
No. 
2006AP948   
 
12 
 
not 
discuss 
video 
evidence 
anywhere 
in 
its 
reasons 
for 
decision."   
¶30 Finally, the circuit court concluded that Lt. Zank's 
participation in the adjustment committee was proper.  It cited 
Wis. Admin. Code DOC § 303.82(2), which provides that "[n]o 
person who has substantial involvement in an incident, which is 
the subject of a hearing, may serve on the committee for that 
hearing."  The court concluded that the type of "involvement" 
contemplated by the code provision is involvement in "the riot 
itself, not the investigation that followed."    
¶31 In an unpublished decision, the court of appeals 
affirmed the circuit court.  Jackson v. Buchler, No. 2006AP948, 
unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App., Dec. 13, 2007).  It agreed 
with the circuit court that the confidential informants' 
statements were admissible, that they corroborated each other, 
and that they provided sufficient evidence to sustain the 
committee's finding of guilt.  Id., ¶¶11-13. 
¶32 With 
regard 
to 
Jackson's 
arguments 
about 
video 
evidence, the court of appeals asserted that "Jackson has not 
provided us with any rule or case law that gives him a right to 
exculpatory evidence."  Id., ¶14.  It concluded that an inmate's 
right to present physical evidence does not establish that the 
inmate is entitled to obtain evidence from prison officials.  
Id.   
¶33 Finally, the court of appeals concluded that Wis. 
Admin. Code DOC § 303.82(2), which bars a person with 
"substantial involvement" in an incident from sitting on the 
No. 
2006AP948   
 
13 
 
adjustment committee, was ambiguous.  The term "involvement" 
could be limited to involvement in the events giving rise to the 
disciplinary charge, or it could also include involvement in the 
investigation of the incident.  Id., ¶5.  Nevertheless, the 
court of appeals declined to interpret the code provision 
because Jackson made no argument that Lt. Zank's participation 
in the investigation was "substantial."  Id., ¶10.  Jackson 
petitioned this court for review.14     
¶34 At the first oral argument, Jackson persuasively 
argued that video footage depicting the hallway outside the 
barbershop could provide extremely relevant evidence.  He 
advanced that the confidential informants' statements would be 
seriously undermined if video footage depicting the hallway 
outside the barbershop existed and Jackson was not shown 
huddling with the assailants.  The respondents countered that 
"[t]here is nothing in the record to indicate whether any 
videotapes exist that might support Jackson's assertion of 
innocence."     
¶35 A majority of this court was troubled by the state of 
the record.  In an order issued after the oral argument, we 
explained: "Because a video that was once in the record is no 
longer in the record, this court is being asked to decide the 
legal issues presented to us without access to the evidence."  
                                                 
14 When we accepted Jackson's petition, we directed the 
parties to address additional questions related to exhaustion of 
administrative remedies and the applicability of Brady v. 
Maryland, 
373 
U.S. 
83 
(1963), 
to 
prison 
disciplinary 
proceedings. 
No. 
2006AP948   
 
14 
 
Jackson v. Buchler, No. 2006AP948, unpublished order (Wis. S. 
Ct., Feb. 2, 2010). 
¶36 We concluded that "the present record is insufficient 
for us to determine whether the petitioner's rights have been 
violated[] under any legal theory."  Id.  Therefore, we retained 
jurisdiction of the appeal, but remanded for the circuit court 
to "receive the video in question and perform an in camera 
review of the video to determine whether it is exculpatory and 
material."  Id. 
¶37 On remand, the circuit court received four video clips 
from the DOC, which have now been added to the record.  The 
circuit court concluded that this evidence was neither material 
nor exculpatory: 
[A]fter having watched the video with counsel, I now 
determine that it is neither exculpatory nor material 
for Darnell Jackson's claim.  This is because it does 
not either support or refute Darnell Jackson's claim 
that he never left the barbershop.  The video itself 
does not continuously or even sporadically show the 
barbershop door.  I think that means that it is simply 
not exculpatory. 
We directed the parties to file simultaneous briefs about the 
effect of the circuit court's oral decision on the case, and we 
scheduled the matter for a second oral argument.15   
                                                 
15 Prior to the argument, Jackson filed a motion seeking 
permission to play a two-minute portion of the video footage 
during oral argument.  We granted the motion and directed the 
parties to file a stipulation of fact, describing in relevant 
detail the events depicted.  
No. 
2006AP948   
 
15 
 
II 
¶38 On certiorari, a court's review of an agency decision 
is limited to four basic inquiries: (1) whether the agency kept 
within its jurisdiction; (2) whether it acted according to law; 
(3) 
whether 
its 
actions 
were 
arbitrary, 
oppressive, 
or 
unreasonable and represented its will and not its judgment; and 
(4) whether the evidence presented was such that the agency 
might reasonably make the determination it did.  State ex. rel 
Staples v. DHSS, 115 Wis. 2d 363, 370, 340 N.W.2d 194 (1983).  
As part of this inquiry, the court may consider whether the 
petitioner was denied due process of law.  State ex rel. Warren 
v. Schwarz, 219 Wis. 2d 615, 628-299, 579 N.W.2d 698 (1998). 
¶39 In the present case, our inquiry is focused on whether 
the procedures employed by the adjustment committee satisfied 
due process.  When evaluating the weight of the evidence on 
certiorari review, a court will affirm the agency's view of the 
evidence 
if 
"reasonable 
minds 
could 
arrive 
at 
the 
same 
conclusion" reached by the agency.  State ex rel. Palleon v. 
Musolf, 120 Wis. 2d 545, 549, 356 N.W.2d 487 (1984).  Whether 
the agency's disciplinary procedures satisfied due process is a 
question 
of 
law, 
which 
we 
review 
independently 
of 
the 
                                                                                                                                                             
The parties' joint stipulation set forth the following 
facts: The video footage depicts Side 1 of the A Unit of the New 
Lisbon Correctional Institution.  The door to the barbershop is 
not shown continuously throughout the video segment.  Jackson is 
not depicted at any time during the video segment.   
Further description of the individuals and events depicted 
in the video clip is set forth below in the analysis.   
No. 
2006AP948   
 
16 
 
determinations rendered by the agency, the circuit court, and 
the court of appeals.  Warren, 219 Wis. 2d at 629.  
III 
¶40 Jackson advances three due process arguments.  Two 
relate to video evidence, and the third relates to the 
impartiality of the adjustment committee.  Before addressing the 
merits of Jackson's due process claims, we address the threshold 
question of whether this court lacks authority to decide 
Jackson's claims related to video evidence under the doctrine of 
exhaustion of remedies.  
¶41 Wisconsin Stat. § 801.02(7)(b) provides: "No prisoner 
may commence a civil action or special proceeding, including a 
petition for a common law writ of certiorari, with respect to 
the prison or jail conditions in the facility in which he or she 
is or has been incarcerated, imprisoned or detained until the 
person has exhausted all available administrative remedies that 
the department of corrections has promulgated[.]"  If an inmate 
wishes to challenge the procedures used by an adjustment 
committee in a prison disciplinary action, he or she must follow 
the procedure outlined in Wis. Admin. Code Ch. DOC.  We have 
interpreted 
§ 801.02(7)(b) 
to 
require 
exhaustion 
of 
constitutional challenges even when raising the challenge in an 
administrative proceeding would be futile.  State ex rel. 
Hensley v. Endicott, 2001 WI 105, ¶9, 245 Wis. 2d 607, 629 
N.W.2d 686.      
¶42 In this case, there is no dispute that Jackson 
commenced an "action"——here a common law writ of certiorari——
No. 
2006AP948   
 
17 
 
that is properly before the court.16  Rather, the parties dispute 
whether Jackson, now properly before the court, is entitled to 
raise specific claims that were not raised in the administrative 
proceedings and were first argued in the circuit court.  
¶43 This inquiry is complicated by the unusual facts of 
this case, as well as ambiguities in the agency record.  On 
certiorari, a court reviews the record of the agency.  In this 
case, however, prior to transmitting the record to the circuit 
court, the warden remanded the case to the original hearing 
committee for "a correction of the record."  He asserted: "I can 
find no substantiation that there was a video showing Mr. 
Jackson's involvement in this incident."   
¶44 The warden's explanation for requesting the change in 
the record leaves unanswered questions.  There is an inherent 
contradiction between the Hearing Decision (which listed "video" 
among the evidence the committee relied upon in determining 
                                                 
16 The inmate must appeal to the warden under Wis. Admin. 
Code DOC § 303.76, and if unsuccessful, must then file an inmate 
complaint following the procedures outlined in Wis. Admin. Code 
Ch. DOC 310.  State ex rel. L'Minggio v. Gamble, 2003 WI 82, 
¶12, 263 Wis. 2d 55, 667 N.W.2d 1.  Here, Jackson appealed the 
decision to the warden, filed a complaint with the inmate 
complaint examiner, sought review from the corrections complaint 
examiner, and ultimately received a decision from the Secretary 
of the DOC.   
No. 
2006AP948   
 
18 
 
guilt) and the warden's statement (which acknowledged that no 
video evidence supported Jackson's guilt).17     
¶45 Inmates and courts alike expect that "some form of 
comprehensible and adequate record should be kept and provided 
for purposes of review."  State v. Goulette, 65 Wis. 2d 207, 
216, 222 N.W.2d 622 (1974).  "[T]he provision for a written 
record helps to insure that administrators, faced with possible 
scrutiny by state officials and the public, and perhaps even the 
courts, . . . will act fairly."  Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 
539, 565 (1974).  Jackson presented a persuasive argument that 
the record from the adjustment committee hearing was incomplete, 
and we remanded so that the record could be supplemented.18   
¶46 This case has been pending in this court for nearly 
two years (at least in part due to uncertainty about the 
adequacy of the agency's record), we have held two oral 
arguments, and upon an interlocutory remand to the circuit court 
                                                 
17 Based on this conflict, at least two inferences are 
possible.  One could infer that the committee reviewed video 
footage and determined that it supported Jackson's guilt——but 
that the warden subsequently concluded that the video footage 
did not actually support guilt and unilaterally removed evidence 
considered by the committee from the record.  Alternately, one 
could infer that the committee did not view any video evidence 
at all in conjunction with Jackson's hearing——but that it 
erroneously reported on the Hearing Decision that a "video" 
provided physical evidence of Jackson's guilt.   
18 During the oral argument, the court asked counsel for the 
respondents: "You are not going to suggest that this is an ideal 
record made by the disciplinary committee, the Department of 
Corrections, or the warden?"  Counsel responded: "It is far from 
ideal."   
No. 
2006AP948   
 
19 
 
the record has now been supplemented with what appears to be the 
missing video evidence.  Given these unusual circumstances, we 
conclude that both parties are better served by a final 
resolution of their dispute than they would be by a robust 
discussion of the exhaustion requirement and the possibility of 
a remand.  Accordingly, we turn instead to address the merits of 
the related claims.   
IV 
¶47 The United States Supreme Court has explained that the 
basic guarantees of procedural due process apply in prison 
disciplinary proceedings.  In Wolff, the Court proclaimed: 
"There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the 
prisons of this country."  Id. at 555-56.  The proposition that 
"prisoners 
in 
state 
institutions 
are 
wholly 
without 
the 
protections 
of 
the 
Constitution 
and 
the 
Due 
Process 
Clause . . . is plainly untenable."  Id. at 555.   
¶48 Nevertheless, prison disciplinary proceedings are not 
equivalent to criminal trials, and an inmate's due process 
rights are "subject to restrictions imposed by the nature of the 
regime to which they have been lawfully committed."  Id. at 556.  
In this setting, an inmate is not given the "full panoply of 
rights due a defendant" in a criminal trial.  Id.   
¶49 In this case, there is no dispute that Jackson's 
procedural due process rights are implicated.  The disciplinary 
committee's 
disposition 
had 
the 
effect 
of 
extending 
his 
mandatory release date.  The question is whether the procedures 
of the committee satisfied due process.   
No. 
2006AP948   
 
20 
 
¶50 The Wolff Court set forth three hallmarks of due 
process that must be satisfied in prison disciplinary actions: 
(1) a written notice of the claimed violation; (2) a written 
statement of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the 
disciplinary action taken; and (3) an opportunity to call 
witnesses and present documentary evidence.  Id. at 563-66.  
Jackson's arguments relate to his disciplinary hearing and thus 
emanate from the third hallmark of due process.   
¶51 Although there is no dispute that Jackson had a 
hearing, he challenges the procedures employed by the committee 
during the hearing.  As with any procedural due process inquiry, 
the touchstone of our analysis is whether the procedures used by 
the committee were fundamentally fair.  See D.M.D. v. State, 54 
Wis. 2d 313, 318, 195 N.W.2d 594 (1972); State v. Marinez, 2010 
WI App 34, ¶21, 324 Wis. 2d 282, 781 N.W.2d 511. 
¶52 In Part V, we address Jackson's claims that relate to 
video evidence.  In Part VI, we address his claim regarding the 
impartiality of the committee. 
V 
¶53 Jackson makes two separate claims regarding the video 
evidence that is now a part of the appellate record.  He argues 
that, considering all the evidence in light of what is portrayed 
on the video footage, there was insufficient evidence to find 
him guilty of inciting a riot.  He also argues that the 
committee had an obligation to produce the evidence under Brady 
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  
No. 
2006AP948   
 
21 
 
¶54 Although Jackson's claims are grounded in two distinct 
legal theories, both are based on his assertion that video 
evidence contradicts or undermines the confidential informants' 
testimony.  We begin by addressing Jackson's sufficiency of the 
evidence claim.19 
A 
                                                 
19 Although the dissent asserts that a review of the 
sufficiency of the evidence is not the proper analysis for our 
certiorari review, dissent, ¶93, it is the very analysis that 
Jackson himself raised and advanced in this court after the 
record was supplemented with the video evidence on remand.  See 
Post-Remand Memorandum of Petitioner Darnell Jackson at 9 
("[T]he video evidence's objective proof that Jackson did not 
meet with the rioters in the hall immediately before the riot 
renders the evidence on which the adjustment committee relied 
legally insufficient.").   
The dissent relies in part on due process arguments that 
Jackson advanced prior to the remand.  For example, Jackson 
initially argued that "[t]he DOC's failure to produce the video 
as part of the record on certiorari review——or at any time——
precluded a fair review by the lower courts and violated 
Jackson's due process rights."  Reply Brief of Petitioner 
Darnell Jackson at 3 (emphasis added).   
This case has evolved now that the record has been 
supplemented with the video evidence on remand.  Post-remand, 
Jackson has not renewed any argument that a deficiency in the 
record precludes fair review.  Rather, in his post-remand 
memorandum to the court, Jackson argues: "[N]ow that the DOC has 
finally produced the video, the parties can meaningfully discuss 
why 
that 
evidence 
fatally 
undermines 
the 
basis 
for 
the 
disciplinary ruling[.]"  Post-Remand Memorandum of Petitioner 
Darnell Jackson at 3-4.  He set forth the remaining three 
issues: (1) sufficiency of evidence; (2) whether Brady applies 
and if so, the standard that should be applied; and (3) 
Lieutenant Zank's participation on the committee.  Id.  These 
are the issues we address in this opinion.      
No. 
2006AP948   
 
22 
 
¶55 Jackson argues first that there was insufficient 
evidence to support the adjustment committee's determination 
that, more likely than not, he incited the riot.20  See Santiago 
v. Ware, 205 Wis. 2d 295, 337, 556 N.W.2d 356 (Ct. App., 1996).  
The question is "whether reasonable minds could arrive at the 
same conclusion reached by" the adjustment committee.  State ex 
rel. Richards v. Traut, 145 Wis. 2d 677, 680, 429 N.W.2d 81 (Ct. 
App. 1988).   
¶56 The primary evidence linking Jackson to the riot were 
the statements of two confidential informants, CI#1 and CI#2.  
Jackson acknowledges that these statements were admissible under 
DOC rules.21  He also acknowledges that without more, the 
statements would be sufficient evidence of guilt to satisfy due 
process.22   
¶57 We agree.  If believed, the confidential informants' 
accounts establish that Jackson was "huddled up" in the hallway 
                                                 
20 In a prison disciplinary proceeding, the adjustment 
committee must find it "more likely than not" that the accused 
committed the violation.  Wis. Admin. Code DOC § 303.76(6)(b).  
Thus, the DOC's burden is lower than a prosecutor's burden in a 
criminal trial. Further, an adjustment committee may consider 
"any relevant evidence, whether or not it would be admissible in 
a court of law."  Wis. Admin. Code DOC § 303.86(2)(a).  
21 Although Jackson raised questions about the admissibility 
of the confidential informants' statements in the circuit court 
and in the court of appeals, he does not renew those arguments 
here.   
22  At oral argument, his counsel conceded: "The evidence of 
the two confidential informants alone . . . , while extremely 
weak, would under the case law, again, if there was no other 
evidence, would be sufficient."  
No. 
2006AP948   
 
23 
 
talking with Treadwell, Vest, and Kenney shortly before those 
inmates attacked the guards.  Further, if believed, they 
establish that Jackson told the other inmates: "You guys know 
what you have to do."  Under the circumstances, reasonable minds 
could interpret Jackson's alleged statement as an instruction to 
attack the guards.  Reasonable minds could conclude that the 
confidential informants' statements, along with other facts set 
forth in the conduct report, established that it was more likely 
than not that Jackson incited the riot.    
¶58 Nevertheless, Jackson asserts that the video evidence 
contradicts the informants' statements, rendering them not 
credible.  In light of the video evidence, Jackson contends that 
there was insufficient evidence to sustain the committee's 
determination.    
¶59 During oral argument, the court viewed a portion of 
the video footage, which Jackson identifies as the crux of his 
argument.23  This two-minute clip depicts Side 1 of New Lisbon's 
A Unit on the day of the riot.  Jackson asserts that the clip 
                                                 
23 Although we directed the parties to describe in relevant 
detail the events depicted in the two-minute clip, the parties' 
stipulation lacks sufficient detail for us to evaluate Jackson's 
claim that the video evidence undermines the confidential 
informants' statements.  During oral argument, both parties went 
beyond the stipulated facts.  Although they appear to largely 
agree on the identities of individuals and events that are 
depicted in the clip, they argue about what inferences should be 
drawn from these facts.   
Our discussion here relies on Jackson's representations 
about the individuals and events depicted.  Accordingly, we 
evaluate the video evidence in the light most favorable to his 
claim.   
No. 
2006AP948   
 
24 
 
begins approximately one minute before the guards were attacked 
and two minutes before additional guards responded to the riot.   
¶60 Throughout the duration of the clip, the camera 
sporadically pans around the Side 1 dayroom.  The door of the 
barbershop, which abuts the dayroom, is sometimes but not always 
visible in the shot.   
¶61 According to Jackson's representations to the court, 
at approximately 49 seconds into the clip, the camera pans to a 
static shot depicting Vest, Treadwell, Kenney, and other unnamed 
inmates.  Jackson is not present.  The inmates are gathered in a 
loose cluster not far from the barbershop door.  At the time 
that the inmates are first depicted, they are walking in the 
direction of the guard station.  The camera remains on the 
inmates for a total of three seconds before panning away.      
¶62 During 
the 
following 
78 
seconds, 
the 
footage 
intermittently 
depicts the barbershop door, which remains 
closed.  Several guards emerge from behind the guard station.  
Shortly thereafter, the guards sprint off camera toward Side 2 
of the A-Unit.  Jackson infers that at that point, the guards 
are responding to the riot. 
¶63 Jackson maintains that the video evidence described 
above "fatally undermines the testimony of the two confidential 
informants who stated that Jackson left the barbershop and met 
with rioting inmates to tell them to start the riot."  We do not 
reach the same conclusion.   
¶64 The 
two-minute segment of video footage neither 
affirms nor disproves the confidential informants' assertion 
No. 
2006AP948   
 
25 
 
that Jackson met with the assailants shortly before the attack.  
It does not provide a consistent shot of the barbershop door or 
the hallway outside the barbershop where the meeting allegedly 
took place.  Likewise, it provides no more than three seconds of 
footage depicting the assailants' actions immediately prior to 
the riot.   
¶65 Rather, by the time the camera first pans to the 
assailants, they have already assembled as a group and are 
already advancing toward the guard station.  From the footage, 
it is impossible to determine how long the assailants had been 
congregating near the barbershop door.  Likewise, it is 
impossible to determine whether any other inmates, including 
Jackson, were present before the assailants were first depicted.  
Certainly, it is conceivable that Jackson met with the inmates, 
"called" the riot, and returned to the barbershop in the seconds 
or minutes before the security camera panned to the assailants. 
¶66 Jackson concedes that the alleged meeting with the 
assailants could have taken place prior to the events depicted 
in the video.  Yet, he contends, a meeting that occurred but was 
not captured on tape would be inconsistent with the conduct 
report's assertion that Jackson met with the assailants "seconds 
before" the riot occurred.24   
                                                 
24 See supra, ¶12.  At oral argument, the following exchange 
occurred between counsel for Jackson and the court: 
Court: Is it possible that Mr. Jackson could have been 
walking with them or huddled with [the assailants] 
before the tape starts or at some time when the camera 
is not on that group? 
No. 
2006AP948   
 
26 
 
¶67 Jackson's contention is not supported by the events 
actually portrayed in the video clip.  Rather than contradicting 
the informants' statements, reasonable minds could conclude that 
the video clip and the informants' statements are consistent.  
The video shows that Treadwell, Vest, and Kenney did in fact 
assemble outside the barbershop shortly before attacking the 
guards.  To that end, the clip may actually corroborate one 
aspect of the confidential informants' account.  
¶68 For the reasons set forth above, we determine that the 
video evidence is inconclusive and neither undermines nor 
contradicts the informants' statements.  With or without the 
video evidence, reasonable minds could arrive at the same 
conclusion reached by the adjustment committee.  Accordingly, we 
conclude that the evidence of Jackson's guilt was sufficient to 
satisfy due process. 
B 
¶69 Having concluded that the video evidence neither 
undermines 
nor 
contradicts 
the 
confidential 
informants' 
statements——and that it may in fact corroborate them——we turn 
next to briefly address Jackson's argument regarding exculpatory 
evidence.  Brady v. Maryland and its progeny provide that the 
government may not withhold exculpatory or impeaching evidence 
from a defendant in a criminal trial.25  Jackson asserts that the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Counsel: It is possible that he could have been in the 
hallway before the tape started, but that would not be 
"seconds before" [the riot began]. 
25 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Strickler v. 
Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (1999). 
No. 
2006AP948   
 
27 
 
government's obligation to disclose exculpatory or impeaching 
evidence also applies in the context of a prison disciplinary 
proceeding, and that the adjustment committee was obligated to 
produce this video evidence.   
¶70 The respondents counter that there is no controlling 
law 
applying 
Brady's 
requirements 
to 
prison 
disciplinary 
proceedings.26  If this court were to recognize a Brady-like 
claim in this context, however, the respondents urge us to 
conclude that its application must be limited by the "needs and 
exigencies of the institutional environment."  See Wolff, 418 
U.S. at 555.   
¶71 In the sufficiency of evidence section set forth 
above, we determined that the video evidence is inconclusive.  
It is that same determination that leads us to conclude that we 
need not and should not decide in this case whether any version 
of 
Brady——limited 
or 
otherwise——applies 
in 
the 
prison 
disciplinary setting.  
¶72 Here, we conclude that the adjustment committee's 
failure to provide the video footage to Jackson did not violate 
his due process right to a fundamentally fair hearing.  The 
                                                 
26 The United States Supreme Court has not addressed this 
question.  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded 
that inmates have a qualified right to the disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence.  See Piggie v. McBride, 277 F. 3d 922 (7th 
Cir. 2002).  We are not bound by the Seventh Circuit's 
interpretation of the United States Constitution. 
No. 
2006AP948   
 
28 
 
video footage adds nothing of evidentiary value for either 
party.27 
VI 
¶73 Finally, 
we 
turn 
to 
Jackson's 
claim 
that 
the 
adjustment committee was not impartial.  Jackson contends that a 
member of the committee, Lt. Zank, also participated in the 
investigation in violation of Wis. Admin. Code DOC § 303.82(2) 
and due process.   
¶74 Inmates are entitled to an impartial adjustment 
committee in disciplinary hearings to prevent "such a hazard of 
arbitrary decisionmaking that it should be held violative of due 
process of law."  Wolff, 418 U.S. at 571.  The DOC has 
promulgated 
a 
rule 
that 
attempts 
to 
codify 
this 
right.  
Wisconsin Admin. Code DOC § 303.82(2) provides: "No person who 
has substantial involvement in an incident, which is the subject 
of a hearing, may serve on the committee for that hearing." 
¶75 The parties dispute the interpretation of the DOC 
rule.  The respondents argue that the rule applies only when the 
committee 
member 
has 
had 
substantial 
involvement 
in 
the 
underlying events upon which the conduct report was based——here, 
the riot.  Jackson contends that the rule also applies when the 
                                                 
27 We are cognizant that a Brady claim is not coextensive 
with 
a sufficiency 
of the evidence claim.  Under some 
circumstances, a criminal defendant may have a valid Brady claim 
even if there would still be sufficient evidence to affirm his 
conviction.  Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 290 (1999).  
Under the facts presented by this case, we need not and do not 
determine whether any version of Brady——limited or otherwise——
applies to prison disciplinary proceedings. 
No. 
2006AP948   
 
29 
 
committee 
member 
has 
had 
substantial 
involvement 
in 
the 
investigation of those events.  We need not resolve this 
question here.  Under either interpretation, the question is 
whether 
the 
committee 
member's 
prior 
involvement 
was 
"substantial."   
¶76 The record does not reveal that Jackson objected to 
Lt. Zank's participation in the adjustment committee at the time 
of the hearing.  As a result, the adjustment committee did not 
make any findings of fact regarding the extent of Lt. Zank's 
involvement.28   
¶77 Without any findings of fact, we are left with only 
Jackson's 
allegations. 
 
Jackson 
alleges 
that 
Lt. 
Zank 
interviewed him after the riot, and that during the interview, 
Lt. Zank asked him to waive his hearing rights.   
¶78 Perhaps because the record on this subject is so 
sparse, both parties attempt to supplement it.  At oral 
argument, the respondents asserted that Lt. Zank met with 
Jackson for the purpose of delivering a copy of the conduct 
report.  Yet, that assertion is not supported by the documentary 
evidence in the record.  The conduct report reflects that H. 
Hermann, Jackson's appointed staff advocate, signed the report 
as the "staff member delivering copy to offender."  
                                                 
28 Although the respondents assert that the warden and the 
inmate complaint examiner both made findings of fact that Lt. 
Zank's involvement was not "substantial," that determination is 
actually a question of law. 
No. 
2006AP948   
 
30 
 
¶79 By contrast, Jackson characterizes Lt. Zank's question 
about waiver as "inappropriate."  However, we note that "[a]n 
inmate may waive the right to a due process hearing in writing 
at any time," and it is standard protocol to provide inmates 
notice of the right to a hearing and the option to waive it.  
See Wis. Admin. Code DOC §§ 303.76(1)(c), 303.76(2).     
¶80 If Lt. Zank did in fact have a substantial role in 
building the case against Jackson, then her impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned.  Yet, there is nothing in the record 
to support such a conclusion.  Based on this sparse record, we 
cannot conclude as a matter of law that Lt. Zank's involvement 
in the incident was "substantial."   
¶81 In sum, we determine that the video footage is 
inconclusive and neither undermines nor contradicts the evidence 
considered by the adjustment committee.  We further conclude 
that with or without the video footage, there was sufficient 
evidence of Jackson's guilt.  Under the facts presented by this 
case, we need not and should not determine whether any version 
of Brady——limited or otherwise——applies to prison disciplinary 
proceedings.   
¶82 Finally, based on this record, we cannot conclude as a 
matter of law that Lt. Zank's involvement in the incident was 
"substantial."  Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed.       
        
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶83 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (dissenting).  Darnell 
Jackson is not a sympathetic figure in seeking relief from this 
court.  Darnell Jackson is in prison.  He was convicted of one 
count of first-degree reckless injury and two counts of first-
degree reckless endangering safety.  He is a repeat offender. 
Furthermore, while he was serving his prison term, Darnell 
Jackson was convicted of battery by a prisoner; he was sentenced 
to a consecutive four-year term for that offense.    
¶84 Jackson is before the courts once again because a 
prison disciplinary committee, called the Adjustment Committee, 
found that Jackson "more likely than not" committed the act of 
inciting a riot.1  As a result of this finding, Jackson was 
sentenced to 360 days in segregation, and he lost 179 days of 
good-time credit.  His mandatory release date was extended so 
that he is serving an additional six months in prison. 
¶85 The essence of Jackson's arguments in the circuit 
court, the court of appeals, and this court is that he did not 
get a due process hearing, that is, that his disciplinary 
proceeding 
did 
not 
comply 
with 
the 
federal 
and 
state 
constitutional guarantees of due process and with the procedures 
set forth in the Department of Corrections administrative 
regulations.   
¶86 Clearly, a prisoner in a disciplinary hearing does not 
have the same panoply of rights as a defendant in a criminal 
                                                 
1 Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 303.18, 303.76(6)(b)(c) (Dec. 
2006). 
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
2 
 
trial or a person who is not institutionalized.  Prisoners' 
rights are limited for the safety and security of inmates, 
prison staff, personnel, and visitors.2   
¶87 Just as clearly, a prisoner does not forfeit all 
rights at the prison gate.  The seminal United States Supreme 
Court case governing the constitutional rights of prisoners is 
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), and this court has 
adhered to its teachings.  The United States Supreme Court has 
declared that though an inmate's "rights may be diminished by 
the needs and exigencies of the institutional environment, a 
prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections 
when he is imprisoned for crime.  There is no iron curtain drawn 
between the Constitution and the prisons of this country."3    
¶88 Beyond the constitutional due process rights due 
prisoners, prisoners are entitled to whatever due process rights 
are afforded them by the prison disciplinary regulations.4  When 
the Department fails to abide by its own regulations, the 
proceedings are rendered invalid.5  
                                                 
2 "Lawful 
incarceration 
brings 
about 
the 
necessary 
withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a 
reaction justified by the considerations underlying our penal 
system."  Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948). 
3 Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974). 
4 State ex rel. Riley v. DHSS, 151 Wis. 2d 618, 623, 445 
N.W.2d 693 
(Ct. 
App. 
1989) 
(Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
binds 
the 
Department of Corrections to the regulations it promulgates). 
5 See State ex rel. Anderson-El v. Cooke, 2000 WI 40 ¶20, 
234 Wis. 2d 626, 610 N.W.2d 821 ("Very simply, the Department 
did not comply with its own notice requirement under § DOC 
303.81.  Because it failed to abide by its own regulations, the 
proceedings are rendered invalid."). 
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶89 The 
Department 
of 
Corrections 
has 
set 
forth 
regulations governing prison discipline for a major violation 
such as inciting a prison riot.  The regulations provide that 
the institution "shall inform the inmate of . . . [t]he right 
the inmate has to a due process hearing . . . ."6  Jackson was 
informed of his right and chose to have a due process hearing. 
¶90 The court's difficulty in deciding Jackson's due-
process-based 
objections 
to 
the 
disciplinary 
hearing 
is 
evidenced in the long and unusual history of the case and the 
majority opinion's failure to come to grips with the due process 
issues Jackson has raised.  
¶91 The case has been pending in this court for an 
unusually long time, from April 2009, the date the petition for 
review was granted, until the mandate, December 14, 2010.  
Jackson filed two sets of briefs and a memorandum brief; the 
State did the same.  The parties have been before the court 
twice in oral argument (once in December 2009; the other time in 
September 2010).  Between the two oral arguments the court 
remanded the matter to the circuit court by an unpublished order 
dated February 2, 2010, to receive the videos.7  On June 4, 2010, 
the court ordered the parties to file memoranda regarding the 
outcome of the remand.   
                                                 
6 Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 303.76(1)(c) (Dec. 2006) (emphasis 
added). 
7 Unpublished 
order 
dated 
Feb. 
10, 
2010 
(Roggensack, 
Ziegler, & Gableman, JJ., dissenting). 
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
4 
 
¶92 Upon consideration of the parties' memoranda regarding 
the outcome of the remand, on June 23, 2010,8 the court ordered 
the parties to address, inter alia, the sufficiency of the 
evidence in the light of the video evidence received on remand 
and 
Brady 
concerns 
(that 
is, 
whether 
the 
Department 
of 
Corrections violated Mr. Jackson's due process rights under 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose 
the video to Mr. Jackson).9  
¶93 The majority opinion recognizes that "our inquiry is 
focused on whether the procedures employed by the adjustment 
committee satisfied due process," majority op., ¶39, and that 
"the touchstone of our analysis is whether the procedures used 
by the committee were fundamentally fair," majority op., ¶51.  
But the majority meanders off course, distracting itself and the 
                                                 
8 The June 23, 2010 unpublished order directed the parties 
to file further briefs addressing the following:  
(1) whether, in light of the video evidence received 
by the circuit court of remand, sufficient evidence 
exists to sustain the adjustment committee's finding 
that Mr. Jackson incited the riot at New Lisbon 
Correctional Institution on November 11, 2004; (2) 
whether the DOC violated Mr. Jackson's due process 
rights under Brady v. Maryland [373 U.S. 83 (1963)], 
by failing to disclose to Mr. Jackson the video 
received by the circuit court on remand (including 
whether the circuit court properly determined that the 
video was neither material nor exculpatory); and (3) 
whether the respondents-respondents agree with and/or 
stipulate to the factual descriptions of the contents 
of the video set forth in Mr. Jackson's post-remand 
memorandum. 
9 The court does not address Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 
(1963).  Majority op., ¶72 n.27. 
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
5 
 
reader from the "focus of," and "the touchstone of," the 
inquiry.  It ignores the procedures used by the Adjustment 
Committee in the disciplinary proceeding and instead reviews 
only the sufficiency of the evidence presented against Jackson.10   
¶94 By avoiding the analysis of whether the Adjustment 
Committee acted according to law, the majority shirks its 
                                                 
10 The majority opinion suggests that the proper analysis is 
the sufficiency of the evidence because Jackson himself raised 
and advanced the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence in 
this court.  Majority op., ¶54 n.19.   
In his first set of briefs, Jackson argues that the lack of 
videos undermined the evidence presented so that he should 
prevail on a due process claim based on insufficient evidence.  
Brief and Appendix of Darnell Jackson at 18-20.   
After remand, when the circuit court received videos, 
Jackson asked this court to allow the parties to submit 
supplemental briefing on the sufficiency of the evidence.  See 
Post-Remand Memorandum of Petitioner Darnell Jackson dated June 
18, 2010, at 19.  On June 23, 2010, the court ordered the 
parties to brief the sufficiency of the evidence issue.  
Jackson's request was for supplemental briefs.  Supplemental 
briefs are briefs in addition to the original briefs, not 
replacements or substitutions for the original. 
Jackson's supplemental argument was initiated by the remand 
order of this court and focused on the impact of the video 
evidence presented to the circuit court as directed by this 
court.  His supplemental arguments do not extinguish his prior 
arguments 
asserting 
that 
the 
disciplinary 
proceeding 
was 
procedurally deficient in a number of ways, thereby violating 
Jackson's due process rights. 
At the second oral argument after the remand, Jackson's 
counsel 
asserted 
that 
the 
conclusions 
of 
the 
Adjustment 
Committee should be reversed on three grounds.  He argued, 
"First, the process that the Department of Corrections used in 
this case was not in accordance with law.  When the Warden 
realized that the video did not substantiate the finding of 
guilt he ordered the video removed rather than instruct the 
disciplinary committee to consider that video in connection with 
the other evidence and reconsider its findings."          
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
6 
 
responsibility on certiorari review to ensure that Jackson was 
afforded his constitutionally and statutorily protected due 
process rights. 
¶95 Rather than focusing on whether due process was 
afforded, 
the 
majority 
concludes 
that 
because 
there 
was 
sufficient evidence on which the Adjustment Committee and Warden 
could have based their decisions, the Adjustment Committee's 
decision stands.   
¶96 But, if the procedure before the Adjustment Committee 
was defective, the sufficiency of the evidence does not save the 
proceeding.  Procedural rules are designed to ensure that 
relevant evidence is brought forth to enable the decision maker 
to reach the correct result.  Defects rendering the procedure 
violative of constitutional and statutory due process render the 
evidence presented suspect.  Thus, the sufficiency of the 
evidence is not the proper analysis when the focus or touchstone 
of the court's inquiry, as the majority opinion acknowledges, is 
whether Jackson got a due process hearing before the Adjustment 
Committee.  
¶97 This 
court 
on 
certiorari 
review 
is 
limited 
to 
reviewing the record.11  It is the Department of Corrections' 
obligation to present the record for judicial review.  Yet on 
the face of the documents in the record before this court it is 
                                                 
11 State ex rel. Meeks v. Gagnon, 95 Wis. 2d 115, 120, 289 
N.W.2d 357 (Ct. App. 1980).  See also Klinger v. Oneida County, 
149 Wis. 2d 838, 846, 440 N.W.2d 348 (1989); State ex rel. 
Whiting v. Kolb, 158 Wis. 2d 226, 233, 461 N.W.2d 816 (Ct. App. 
1990). 
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
7 
 
beyond dispute that this court does not have the record of the 
disciplinary proceedings——the videos are missing.  Because the 
court does not have a record of the evidence upon which the 
Adjustment Committee relied, I conclude that due process has 
been violated and Jackson must be accorded a new hearing that 
complies 
with 
constitutional 
and 
statutory 
due 
process 
requirements.             
¶98 Moreover, a number of other defects are also apparent 
in the record of this disciplinary proceeding.  The totality of 
the circumstances, the cumulative effect of the procedural 
defects, leads me to conclude that Jackson did not get a due 
process 
hearing 
as 
required 
by 
the 
federal 
and 
state 
constitutions 
and 
the 
regulations 
of 
the 
Department 
of 
Corrections.  
¶99 And so here's the puzzle:  What happened to the 
procedures used being the "focus" and "touchstone" of the 
majority's analysis?  When the majority doesn't know what 
evidence was before the Adjustment Committee or Warden, how can 
the majority conclude whether there was sufficient evidence for 
the Committee or Warden to determine Jackson's guilt?  On the 
basis of this defective record, how can the majority conclude, 
on certiorari review of the record, whether the actions of the 
Adjustment Committee or Warden were arbitrary or oppressive or 
unreasonable?         
I 
¶100 Jackson contends, inter alia, that the Adjustment 
Committee relied on videos to find Jackson guilty; that the 
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
8 
 
videos were therefore part of the record that Jackson was 
entitled to have reviewed on certiorari; and that the Department 
of Corrections cannot arbitrarily remove the videos from the 
record.12  He asserts that he "is entitled to have a court review 
the committee's finding based on a full record."13  I agree with 
Jackson's reasoning.  
¶101 On certiorari, courts are limited to reviewing the 
agency record.14 
¶102 On its face, the record is flawed.  The court does not 
have a record of the evidence upon which the Adjustment 
                                                 
12 Brief and Appendix of Darnell Jackson at xii, 26-27.  
13 Reply Brief of Petitioner Darnell Jackson at 1.  "The 
DOC's failure to produce the video as part of the record on 
certiorari review——or at any time——precluded a fair review by 
the lower courts and violated Jackson's due process rights."  
Reply Brief of Petitioner Darnell Jackson at 3.   
"Although the Committee's report identifies the video as 
evidence that it considered before finding Jackson guilty, 
Respondents refuse to produce it.  This is error: Jackson is 
entitled to have a court review the committee's finding based on 
the full record."  Reply Brief of Petitioner Darnell Jackson at 
1. 
14 State ex rel. Meeks v. Gagnon, 95 Wis. 2d 115, 120, 289 
N.W.2d 357 (Ct. App. 1980).  See also Klinger v. Oneida County, 
149 Wis. 2d 838, 846, 440 N.W.2d 348 (1989); State ex rel. 
Whiting v. Kolb, 158 Wis. 2d 226, 233, 461 N.W.2d 816 (Ct. App. 
1990). 
Moreover, the court's review of the agency decision is 
limited to four inquiries: (1) whether the agency acted within 
the bounds of its jurisdiction; (2) whether it acted according 
to law; (3) whether its action is arbitrary, oppressive, or 
unreasonable and represented its will, not its judgment; and (4) 
whether the evidence was sufficient that the agency might 
reasonably make the determination in question.  State ex rel. 
Hoover v. Gagnon, 124 Wis. 2d 135, 140, 368 N.W.2d 657 (1985). 
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
9 
 
Committee relied.  The Adjustment Committee's decision states 
that the Committee relied on videos in finding Jackson guilty.  
No videos were part of the record initially sent to the court.  
No one knows whether the videos sent to the court on remand are 
the videos that the Adjustment Committee viewed and relied upon 
in finding Jackson guilty. 
¶103 "'[A] written statement by the factfinders as to the 
evidence relied on and reasons' for the disciplinary action" is 
a basic due process right.15   
¶104 A comprehensive and adequate record must be kept and 
provided to the courts for purposes of review, as the majority 
opinion acknowledges.16  A written record, according to the 
United States Supreme Court, helps insure that administrators 
will act fairly and protects the rights of the inmate.17  
"Without written records, the inmate will be at a severe 
                                                 
15 Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-65 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 
408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)). 
16 See majority op., ¶45; State v. Goulette, 65 Wis. 2d 207, 
216, 222 N.W.2d 622 (1974). 
17 Wolff, 418 U.S. at 565: 
Written records of proceedings will thus protect the 
inmate against collateral consequences based on a 
misunderstanding 
of 
the 
nature 
of 
the 
original 
proceeding.  Further, as to the disciplinary action 
itself, the provision for a written record helps to 
insure 
that 
administrators, 
faced 
with 
possible 
scrutiny by state officials and the public, and 
perhaps 
even 
the 
courts, 
where 
fundamental 
constitutional rights may have been abridged, will act 
fairly.   
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
10 
 
disadvantage in propounding his own cause to or defending 
himself from others."18   
¶105 The written record may exclude certain items of 
evidence when personal or institutional safety is implicated.  
But in these circumstances the record should indicate the fact 
of the omission and the reason for the omission.19     
¶106 The regulations of the Department of Corrections that 
promise a due process disciplinary hearing envision a written 
record of the hearing made by the Adjustment Committee.  It need 
not be a verbatim record, but a written record has to be made.  
A warden, the courts, or another body that "may take action 
partly in reliance upon the decision of the disciplinary 
committee must not be compelled to guess as to the facts relied 
upon and the reasons for the decision of the committee."20  The 
regulations provide that on appeal, the warden "shall review all 
records and forms pertaining to the appeal."21  Further, a court 
on certiorari review of an agency decision is, as we have stated 
previously, limited to the record.   
                                                 
18 Wolff, 418 U.S. at 565. 
19 Id. 
20 State ex rel. Meeks v. Gagnon, 95 Wis. 2d 115, 124, 289 
N.W.2d 357 (Ct. App. 1980) (holding that a bare listing by the 
disciplinary committee of the reports and statements before it 
is insufficient to meet the procedural due process requirements 
of Wolff and the Department of Corrections' own procedural 
rules; citing Hayes v. Walker, 555 F.2d 625, 633 (7th Cir. 1977) 
("This general finding [merely incorporating the reports before 
it] does not ensure that prison officials will act fairly.  Nor 
will this finding protect against subsequent collateral effects 
based on misunderstanding of the initial decision.")). 
21 Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 303.76(7)(b) (Dec. 2006). 
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
11 
 
¶107 Not only must there be a written record of the 
evidence upon which the fact finder relied, but constitutional 
due process and the regulations envision that the inmate will be 
given a written statement as to the evidence relied upon by the 
decision maker.22  The Department of Corrections' printed form 
for 
the 
decision 
of 
the 
Adjustment 
Committee 
(entitled 
"Disciplinary Hearing—Reasons for Decision and Evidence Relied 
On") envisions that the evidence relied upon is summarized on 
the form and that a copy of the decision, which relates the 
evidence relied on and the reasons for the decision, is given to 
the inmate.23  I am attaching a copy of the Decision of the 
Adjustment Committee in the present case as Exhibit A so the 
reader can see the Decision and more easily follow the 
procedure.  
¶108 The Department of Corrections regulation governing the 
due process hearing (Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 303.76) provides 
that the accused inmate is present at the hearing and may 
present evidence.  These inmate's rights may be limited in some 
instances for security concerns.  In the present case, for 
                                                 
22 Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-64 (one of the procedures that 
must be provided to prisoners to satisfy minimum due process is 
"a written statement of the factfinders as to the evidence 
relied upon and reasons for the disciplinary action taken"); 
Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 303.76(6)(f) (Dec. 2006) ("After the 
hearing the Adjustment Committee [shall]: . . . Provide the 
accused inmate and the inmate's advocate, if any, a written copy 
of the decision with reasons for the decision.")  
23 Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 303.76(6)(f) (Dec. 2006) ("After 
the hearing the adjustment committee [shall]: . . . (f) Provide 
the accused inmate and the inmate's advocate, if any, a written 
copy of the decision with reasons for the decision." 
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
12 
 
example, in compliance with the regulations, Jackson was given a 
summary of the signed statements of witnesses who did not appear 
and whose identity was not revealed because of a risk of harm to 
the witnesses.24  
¶109 The problem in the present case is that the Adjustment 
Committee's Decision states in two places that it relied on 
video evidence in determining Jackson guilty of inciting a riot, 
but no one knows whether the Adjustment Committee or the Warden 
ever saw any video, and if either did, what video was seen.25  If 
the video had been shown at the hearing, then Jackson would have 
viewed the video unless the Committee determined that security 
                                                 
24 Wolff, 
418 
U.S. 
at 
563-64; 
Wis. 
Admin. 
Code 
§ DOC 303.76(5)(b) (Dec. 2006) (witnesses appear at hearing); 
Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 303.81(5) (Dec. 2006) (if testifying 
poses a risk of harm to a witness, the adjustment committee may 
consider a corroborated signed statement under oath from the 
witness without revealing the witness's identity). 
25 A majority of this court, apparently troubled by the 
incomplete record before it and prompted by Jackson's claims 
that Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), applies to prison 
discipline proceedings, remanded this case to the circuit court 
to receive video evidence and determine whether the evidence was 
exculpatory. 
My analysis of the present case does not raise a Brady 
issue.  In Brady, the prosecutor failed to turn over evidence to 
the defendant when the evidence was not used at trial.  In the 
present case the video was apparently used as evidence by the 
Adjustment Committee.  
Jackson acknowledges that there is no requirement that 
prison officials produce physical evidence supporting the 
inmate's guilt for inspection at his disciplinary hearing.  He 
argues, however, that when the record was corrected to indicate 
that the video was not inculpatory, Jackson obtained a right to 
view that evidence under Brady.  Brief and Appendix of Darnell 
Jackson at 23. 
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
13 
 
reasons required that he not see it.  Nothing in the record 
suggests that the Committee determined that he could not be 
present for a viewing of video evidence. 
¶110 Initially, on Jackson's appeal to the Warden, the 
Warden affirmed the Adjustment Committee's Decision, which twice 
referred to videos as evidence to support its conclusion.  The 
Warden could have modified the Adjustment Committee's decision 
or returned the case to the Adjustment Committee to correct the 
record at that time.  See Appeal of Adjustment Committee or 
Hearing Officer's Decision (attached as Exhibit B);  Wis. Admin. 
Code § DOC 303.76(7)(c) (Dec. 2006).26  After Jackson sought 
judicial review of the Warden's decision, the Warden, on August 
29, 2005, issued a memorandum sending the Adjustment Committee's 
Decision back to the Adjustment Committee with instructions to 
change the Decision to remove reference to any video from the 
Decision.  See Warden's memorandum (attached as Exhibit C).  The 
                                                 
26 Wisconsin Admin. Code § DOC 303.76(7)(c) (Dec. 2006) 
provides that on appeal:  
(c) The warden's decision shall be one of the 
following: 
1. Affirm the adjustment committee's decision and the 
sentence. 
2. Modify all or a part of the adjustment committee's 
decision or sentence. 
3. Reverse the adjustment committee's decision, in 
whole or in part. 
4. Return the case to the adjustment committee for 
further consideration or to complete or correct the 
record. 
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
14 
 
Warden's 
memorandum 
appears 
to 
be 
inconsistent 
with 
the 
regulations.  More about this later.27   
¶111 As 
the 
majority 
opinion 
explains, 
the 
Warden's 
memorandum ordering the removal of the Decision's reference to a 
video can be interpreted in different ways.  The Warden wrote 
that he could find "no substantiation that there was a video 
showing Mr. Jackson's involvement in this incident."  The 
memorandum may mean that the Warden concluded the video failed 
to show that Jackson was involved, or that the video was 
irrelevant to the decision, even though the Adjustment Committee 
thought the video supported guilt, or that the Warden concluded 
that no video existed in the record.28  See majority op., ¶44 
n.17.  Any interpretation raises troubling questions.29  The 
first two inferences result in the conclusion that the record 
before this court is not the same as the record before the 
Adjustment Committee.  The third inference suggests, at best, 
sloppy record keeping, and at worst, that the Adjustment 
Committee made a determination of guilt without awareness of the 
evidence supporting that determination. 
                                                 
27 See ¶50-52, infra. 
28 The 
Warden's 
memorandum 
states: 
"I 
can 
find 
no 
substantiation that there was video showing Mr. Jackson's 
involvement in this incident. . . . Therefore, I am remanding 
this back to the original hearing committee only for a 
correction of the record on form DOC-84 [the Decision of the 
Adjustment Committee] regarding physical evidence used for this 
hearing." 
29 No one questions the Warden's motives in changing the 
Decision of the Adjustment Committee.  The issue before the 
court is the Warden's authority and the effect of his act on the 
ability of the courts to perform certiorari review.  
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
15 
 
¶112 The record does not show who received the Warden's 
instructions and who acted on them.  The record does show, 
however, that someone struck one reference to the video on the 
Adjustment Committee's Decision, but not a second reference.  
The initials next to the single strike-out appear to be "PZ," 
which might refer to Lt. Pamela Zank, a person who investigated 
the incident and was also a member of the Adjustment Committee.  
See Exhibit A.   
¶113 When instructions are given in court to strike a 
matter from the record, the matter continues to be included in 
the record but shown as struck.  The matter struck is just not 
considered by the decision maker.  In the present case, every 
video was literally removed from the record.     
¶114 Therefore, even if the Adjustment Committee, the 
Warden, or both saw a video, the court does not know what video 
or videos each viewed.  
¶115 The State produced four video clips on remand of the 
matter to the circuit court, and these clips are now part of the 
record in the present case.  One of these video clips was shown 
to this court at oral argument.  The majority opinion relies on 
this video to conclude that it does not help Jackson (even 
though it is arguable that it impeaches the statements of the 
confidential informants).  
¶116 How can the majority rely on a video when no one knows 
whether that video was the one that the Adjustment Committee or 
the Warden saw?  Neither the Department of Corrections nor the 
State's attorney could attest to whether the videos presented to 
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
16 
 
the circuit court on request of this court were the ones that 
the Adjustment Committee received.  The conduct report states 
that videos from the New Lisbon Correctional Institution A Unit 
dayrooms, A Unit courtyard, and exterior cameras were used in 
investigating the riot.  Neither the Department of Corrections 
nor the State's attorney could verify that the videos presented 
to the circuit court (and to this court) were the ones seen by 
the investigators, the Adjustment Committee, or the Warden after 
the riot.30   
¶117 During oral argument the court questioned counsel for 
the State about how these four video clips came to the State's 
attention.  The Assistant Attorney General responded that she 
asked the Department of Corrections for "all video evidence on 
the riots," and "this is what we got." 
¶118 Thus, we are left with a record stating that the 
Adjustment Committee relied on videos that the Warden wanted 
stricken.  The court can not be sure whether the videos now in 
our record were viewed by the Adjustment Committee or the 
Warden, or neither.  The court has no reason to rely on any 
videos now included in the record.  And so, this court does not 
have a record of the evidence that was before the Adjustment 
Committee.  
                                                 
30 The video clips that are now in the record seemingly 
depict two areas based on their electronic titles, New Lisbon 
Correctional Institution A Unit dayroom side A and side B.  No 
clip is labeled as depicting the A Unit courtyard, or the view 
from any New Lisbon Correctional Institution exterior camera. 
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
17 
 
¶119 The lack of a record of the evidence the Adjustment 
Committee 
viewed 
in 
determining 
guilt 
is 
a 
significant 
procedural defect in the present case.  This is a certiorari 
review limited to the record of the Adjustment Committee.  It is 
the duty of the Department of Corrections to maintain a proper 
record and forward it to the courts for review when review is 
requested.  Because the court does not have a record of the 
evidence upon which the Adjustment Committee relied, I conclude 
that due process has been violated and Jackson must be accorded 
a new hearing that complies with constitutional and statutory 
due process requirements.  
II 
¶120 There are a number of other defects apparent in the 
record of this disciplinary proceeding.  The cumulative effect 
of all the errors is that Jackson did not get a due process 
hearing that complied with constitutional and statutory due 
process requirements.   
¶121 First, the Conduct Report on which the Adjustment 
Committee relied as evidence concluded, on the basis of the 
confidential informant statements, that Jackson met with the 
rioters "seconds before" the riot took place.  Nothing in the 
statements of the confidential informants and nothing else in 
the record supports this temporal element.  
¶122 Jackson argued as follows:  "The video evidence shows 
that the confidential informant testimony that Jackson met with 
the rioters to 'call' the riot 'seconds' before it occurred is 
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
18 
 
inaccurate.  No other evidence supports the DOC's finding that 
Jackson incited the riot . . . ."31  
¶123 The Adjustment Committee concluded, after evaluating 
all of the evidence, that "the statements in the conduct report 
are correct."  See Exhibit A, Disciplinary Hearing Reasons for 
Decision and Evidence Relied On.  The confidential informant 
statements do not support the temporal conclusion in the conduct 
report.  The video evidence presented to the circuit court does 
not support the temporal element that the Adjustment Committee 
concluded was correct.  Under what evidence can reasonable minds 
conclude that the statements in the conduct report, and 
therefore the Adjustment Committee's conclusions, are correct?  
¶124 Second, the Adjustment Committee limited the number of 
Jackson's witnesses to two, the number provided for in the 
regulations.32  It is within the discretion of a hearing entity 
to limit the witnesses.  Here the evidence against Jackson was 
in the form of confidential informant statements.  Although 
confidential informant statements are sufficient evidence in a 
disciplinary hearing, Jackson did not know who the informants 
were and could not cross-examine them.  If the informants were 
fellow inmates, they may have been biased because they were the 
culprits 
themselves 
or 
they 
received 
favors 
for 
their 
statements.  Under such circumstances it would seem that Jackson 
should have been given the benefit of additional witnesses in 
                                                 
31 Reply Brief of Petitioner Darnell Jackson Regarding 
Outcome of Remand at 1, 18-19. 
32 Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 303.81(1) (Dec. 2006). 
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
19 
 
his favor, barring legitimate safety concerns (none of which 
were noted on the record).33  
¶125 Jackson argued in his record of witness testimony that 
the testimony he wished to submit made clear that the hallway 
meeting of which he was accused never occurred.  The Adjustment 
Committee, without elaboration, denied his request, stating that 
Jackson "Did Not Provide Good Cause To Demonstrate Additional 
witnesses could Provide Essential Testimony"  (capitalization in 
original).  Jackson asserts that the Committee ignored this 
evidence.34  
¶126 Third, inmates are entitled to an impartial Adjustment 
Committee.  Constitutional due process so requires,35 as do the 
regulations. 
¶127 Jackson argued that "[t]he DOC violated its own 
regulations in this case when it permitted to Lt. Zank to both 
                                                 
33 Jackson provided the names of two fellow inmates who 
would contradict the statements of the informants and a 
correctional officer who would testify that before the riots 
Jackson denied being in a gang.  The reviewing staff decided 
that these witnesses would not be permitted to attend because 
Jackson "did not provide good cause to demonstrate additional 
witnesses could provide essential testimony." 
Jackson did not make this argument before this court.  He 
raised it in his administrative appeal.  
34 Post-Remand Memorandum of Petitioner Darnell Jackson, 
June 18, 2010, at 6. 
35 Wolff, 418 U.S. at 571.  Cf. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 
133, 136-37 (1955) ("[T]o perform its high function in the best 
way 
'justice 
must 
satisfy 
the 
appearance 
of 
justice.' . . . Having been a part of that [single judge-grand 
jury] process a judge cannot be, in the very nature of things, 
wholly disinterested in the conviction or acquittal of those 
accused."). 
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
20 
 
investigate and judge Jackson's alleged involvement in the 
riot"36 and "Lt. Zank's participation in both the investigation 
and the hearing raises due process concerns.37  I agree.   
¶128 Lt. Zank served on the team that investigated the riot 
and was one of the members of the Adjustment Committee that 
found Jackson guilty  The Department of Corrections regulations 
prohibit individuals "with a substantial involvement in an 
incident" from serving on the Adjustment Committee for a hearing 
on the subject of that incident.38  It is not clear in the 
regulations 
whether 
"involvement 
in 
an 
incident" 
means 
involvement in the riot here or involvement in the investigation 
of the riot.  We do not know whether Lt. Zank was involved in 
the riot.  The record indicates she was involved in the 
investigation. 
¶129 In 
any 
event, 
ordinarily, 
an 
investigator 
or 
prosecutor does not serve on a hearing (decision making) 
committee, to avoid any question of the integrity of the hearing 
procedure or impartiality of the hearing examiners.  Allowing an 
individual substantially involved in investigating a prison 
                                                 
36 Brief and Appendix of Darnell Jackson at 15. 
37 Id. at 16. 
38 Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 303.82(2) (Dec. 2006): 
No person who has substantial involvement in an 
incident, which is the subject of a hearing, may serve 
on the committee for that hearing.  Committee members 
shall determine the subject matter of the hearing in 
advance in order to allow replacement of committee 
members if necessary and thereby avoid the necessity 
of postponing the hearing. 
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
21 
 
incident to sit in judgment of an inmate at a disciplinary 
proceeding involving that incident "may raise such doubts about 
the integrity of the hearing procedure and the impartiality of 
its participants so as to trigger due process considerations."39  
¶130 Lt. Zank was an officer who interviewed Jackson after 
the riot.  Jackson alleges that Lt. Zank requested that he waive 
his due process rights.  Lt. Zank apparently was a leading 
member 
of 
the 
Adjustment 
Committee. 
 
She 
completed 
the 
Disciplinary Hearing Decision form , giving the reasons for the 
decision, including the evidence upon which the Committee 
relied.  She appears to be the person who struck a reference to 
a video from the Decision on the instructions of the Warden.   
¶131 I agree with the majority opinion that the record on 
Lt. Zank's involvement in the riot or the investigation before 
the Adjustment Committee was formed is sparse.  But on the basis 
of the limited written record, the aura and aroma of substantial 
involvement in the investigation are present and raise due 
process concerns, regardless of the meaning of the phrase 
"substantial involvement in an incident" appearing in the 
regulations. 
                                                 
39 Redding v. Fairman, 717 F.2d 1105, 1113 (7th Cir. 1983).  
See also Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 534 (7th Cir. 1995) 
("If an officer is substantially involved in the investigation 
of the charges against an inmate, due process forbids that 
officer from serving on the adjustment committee."); Piggie v. 
Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 667 (7th Cir. 2003) (due process forbids 
"officials who are directly or substantially involved in the 
factual events underlying the disciplinary charges, or the 
investigation thereof, from serving on the board hearing the 
charge").  
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
22 
 
¶132  Fourth, nothing in the regulations gives the Warden 
authority to send the record back for correction of the 
Adjustment Committee's Decision after the Warden had previously 
affirmed the Adjustment Committee's Decision.  I agree with 
Jackson, who asserts: "For certiorari to provide a legitimate 
avenue of independent judicial review, the DOC cannot 'correct' 
the record after a prisoner petitions for review.  Nor does due 
process permit the DOC to modify the record on which its 
decision was based. . . . Respondents [the State officials] 
offer no authority and none of which Jackson is aware supports 
the warden's decision to remove evidence considered by the 
disciplinary committee." 40 
¶133 The regulations state that within 60 days of an 
inmate's appeal of an Adjustment Committee Decision to the 
Warden, the Warden may either affirm the Decision or return the 
Decision to the Adjustment Committee for correction, but may not 
do both.  Wis. Admin. Code § DOC 303.76(7)(c) (Dec. 2006).  The 
Warden's unilateral memorandum returning the record only for 
correction in preparation to transmit the record to the circuit 
court does not cite any regulation supporting his authority to 
                                                 
40 Reply Brief of Petitioner Darnell Jackson at 5, 7. 
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
23 
 
remand the record to the Adjustment Committee after he affirmed 
the Adjustment Committee's Decision and the sentence.41  
¶134 In contrast, § DOC 303.76(7)(e) of the regulations 
authorizes the Warden to "review the conduct report and act on 
it unilaterally as if there were an appeal" (emphasis added).  
In directing the change to the reference to the video in the 
Adjustment Committee's Decision, the Warden was not reviewing 
and acting unilaterally on the conduct report as authorized by 
§ DOC 303.76(7)(e); 
the 
Warden 
was 
reviewing 
and 
acting 
unilaterally on the Decision of the Adjustment Committee.   
¶135 Each of these four defects taken alone may not 
constitute a violation of due process.  However, these defects 
taken together, along with the missing video evidence, add up to 
a proceeding that does not comply with constitutional or 
statutory requirements.   
¶136 In the present case, in which the Adjustment Committee 
must weigh the credibility of Jackson and his supporting 
witnesses against the credibility of confidential informant 
statements, the procedural defects are significant.  The 
                                                 
41 The Warden cites to § DOC 303.76(6)(e) in his memorandum; 
however, that regulation relates to the Adjustment Committee's 
obligation to inform the inmate of the hearing decision. In 
contrast, the majority cites to § 303.76(7)(e).  See majority 
op., ¶24 & n.10 (emphasis added).  That regulation states as 
follows:  "The warden may at any time review the conduct report 
and act on it unilaterally as if there were an appeal" (emphasis 
added).  In directing the change to the reference to the video, 
the Warden was not reviewing the conduct report as authorized by 
§ DOC 303.76(7)(e); the Warden was reviewing the Decision of the 
Adjustment Committee.  Section DOC 303.76(7)(e) therefore does 
not apply in the present case and does not authorize the 
Warden's conduct.  
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
24 
 
cumulative effect of the procedural errors undermines confidence 
in the Adjustment Committee's findings and Decision.42  The 
errors were prejudicial.43    
¶137 On the record before this court, we do not know what 
evidence was before the Adjustment Committee, and with the 
videos gone, the court does not know the basis for the 
Adjustment Committee's Decision.  Courts on certiorari review 
must be able to review the record upon which the Adjustment 
Committee relied or the court must remand the cause for 
rehearing.  A reviewable record does not exist in the present 
case.  On the basis of the procedural deficiencies in the record 
before the court, the court cannot decide that the Adjustment 
Committee's 
actions 
were 
not 
arbitrary, 
oppressive, 
or 
unreasonable and representative of its will and not its 
                                                 
42 State v. Harris, 2008 WI 15, ¶110, 307 Wis. 2d 555, 745 
N.W.2d 397 ("The cumulative effect of several errors may, in 
certain instances, undermine a reviewing court's confidence in 
the outcome of a proceeding.") (citing State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 
111, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305; Alvarez v. Boyd, 225 
F.3d 820, 824 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Rivera, 900 
F.2d 1462, 1469 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Wallace, 848 
F.2d 1464, 1472 (9th Cir. 1988)); State v. Thiel, 2003 WI 111, 
¶60, 264 Wis. 2d 571, 665 N.W.2d 305 (determining that the 
cumulative effect of deficient assistance by counsel may in some 
instances establish prejudice).  
43 Wisconsin Admin. Code § DOC 303.87 (Dec. 2006) provides:  
"If staff does not adhere to a procedural requirement under this 
chapter, the error is harmless if it does not substantially 
affect a finding of guilt or the inmate's ability to provide a 
defense." 
Because the cumulative effect of the errors does affect a 
finding of guilt, the violations of the procedural requirements 
in this case are not harmless error. 
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
25 
 
judgment.  I conclude that Jackson's due process rights have 
been violated.     
¶138 For the reasons set forth, I would reverse the 
decision of the court of appeals denying Jackson's writ of 
certiorari.  I would remand the cause to the Department of 
Corrections for a rehearing.  Accordingly, I dissent. 
 
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
 
 
1 
EXHIBIT A 
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
 
 
2 
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
 
 
3 
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
 
 
4 
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5 
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
 
 
6 
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
 
 
7 
EXHIBIT B 
 
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
 
 
8 
EXHIBIT C 
 
 
No.  2006AP948.ssa 
 
 
 
9