Case Title: HAUCK v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 00-215

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2001-12-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
HAUCK v. STATE2001 WY 11936 P.3d 597Case Number: 00-215Decided: 12/07/2001

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2001

 

                                                                                                            

 

ROBERT 
HAUCK,                                             

 Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING, 

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

 

Appeal 
from the District Court of Natrona County

The 
Honorable David B. Park, Judge 

 

Representing 
Appellant:

Sylvia 
Lee Hackl, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Tina N. 
Kerin, Assistant Appellate Counsel.

 Representing 
Appellee:

Gay 
Woodhouse, Wyoming Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; 
D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Georgia L. Tibbetts, 
Senior Assistant Attorney General.

 

Before 
LEHMAN, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

 

GOLDEN, 
Justice.

 [¶1]           
After 
the district court determined that Appellant Robert Hauck (Hauck) was 
incompetent to stand trial for controlled substance violations, escape, and 
interference with a peace officer, his trial was delayed for almost two years 
until he was found competent.  Hauck 
claims that the delay violated his right to a speedy trial, he was entitled to a 
hearing on his request to represent himself at one of his competency hearings, 
and he was denied the right to be present at a hearing on a motion for a 
continuance of the trial setting.  
We affirm the judgment and sentence of the district 
court.

 

 

 

[¶2]           
The 
parties agree that the issues for our review are:

 

1. Was 
Appellant denied his right to a speedy trial?

 

2. Was 
Appellant denied his right to self-representation, without a hearing by the 
trial court?

 

3. Was 
Appellant denied his right to be present at a critical stage of the 
proceedings?

 

 

FACTS

 

[¶3]           
On 
July 6, 1998, as Casper 
police approached Hauck to arrest him on an outstanding warrant, he fled and 
physically resisted arrest.  Hauck 
was subdued and arrested, and police searched his fanny pack, finding 
methamphetamine, marijuana, and money.  
While being transported to the detention center, Hauck ran and was 
promptly apprehended.  On July 8, 
1998, Hauck again escaped from officers and was apprehended just outside of the 
building.  He was charged with two 
counts of escape, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-206; misdemeanor 
interference with a peace officer, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204; 
two counts of possession of a controlled substance, and further as an individual 
who had been convicted of possession of a controlled substance on three separate 
occasions, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(c); and two counts of 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, in violation of 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-1-1031. 

 

[¶4]           
Bond was 
set on July 9, 1998, and Hauck's counsel filed a demand for a speedy trial on 
August 13, 1998.  Hauck was 
arraigned on August 27, 1998, pleading not guilty to all charges.  The parties stipulated to a continuance 
on September 4, 1998, and new defense counsel entered an appearance on September 
14, 1998.  On September 29, 1998, 
Hauck's counsel filed a motion to have Hauck examined because of a history of 
mental illness and inability to understand the legal consequences of his 
actions.  The trial court held a 
hearing on this motion, and Hauck requested new counsel, stating that he did not 
want to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness.  He reasoned that he had a state hospital 
mental examination eight times and had been found competent all but one 
time.  He also requested that the 
court grant him a speedy trial.  
After defense counsel explained that he and the defendant were having 
difficulty communicating, the trial court did not make any ruling on the mental 
evaluation motion, and instead suggested that new counsel be appointed.  

 

[¶5]           
An order 
appointing new counsel was signed on October 13, 1998, and on October 28, 1998, 
counsel requested a continuance of the trial then set for November 2, 1998.  At a hearing on that motion, the 
district court granted the continuance but made specific findings pursuant to 
W.R.Cr.P. 48 that previous delays were due to defense counsel substitutions and 
that this delay was necessary for the due administration of justice.  

  

[¶6]           
Defense 
counsel filed a motion to suppress on November 18, 1998, which was denied, and 
at the hearing on November 25, 1998, defense counsel again requested a mental 
examination.  That motion was 
granted, and criminal proceedings were suspended on that date.   An order to continue the trial was 
entered on January 4, 1999. 

 

[¶7]           
A mental 
evaluation was completed on January 29, 1999, and the district court found Hauck 
incompetent to stand trial.  On 
March 26, 1999, the trial court entered an order that Hauck was not triable by 
reason of mental illness, was found incompetent to refuse treatment, ordered to 
be medicated at the jail, and if that proved impracticable, that Hauck be 
transported to the state hospital.  

 

[¶8]           
Defense 
counsel entered into a stipulated order dated March 31, 1999, to transport Hauck 
to the state hospital.  Hauck was at 
the state hospital between April 7 and April 27, 1999.  On May 26, 1999, the State submitted an 
Addendum to Forensic Evaluation, which was a letter advising the court that 
Hauck had been treated with Olanzapine.  
On June 9, 1999, the district court determined this information did not 
permit it to set a trial date and ordered another evaluation on June 15, 
1999.  Hauck was again evaluated at 
the state hospital between June 28 and July 15, 1999.  

 

[¶9]           
On June 
24, 1999, at Hauck's request, his attorneys filed a motion to withdraw.  On June 25, 1999, Hauck sent a letter to 
the trial court stating that the year-long delay violated his right to a speedy 
trial.  On August 25, 1999, another 
competency hearing was held and, although the prosecution and defense counsel 
stipulated to Hauck's competency, the trial court ordered further 
evaluation.  Defense counsel was 
permitted to withdraw on September 3, 1999.   Because of the district court's 
observations of Hauck at his August 25, 1999, competency hearing, the district 
court determined that Hauck exhibited symptoms of paranoia that left the court 
with serious concerns regarding his ability to stand trial and requested that 
two doctors conduct further evaluation.  

 

[¶10]       
On 
October 27, 1999, Hauck moved pro se for the court to dismiss the charges for 
failure to provide a speedy trial, and that same day the trial court again held 
a competency hearing and determined that Hauck remained incompetent to stand 
trial.  On November 22, 1999, the 
trial court signed an order committing Hauck to the state hospital, finding him 
incompetent to refuse medication, and ordering that he be medicated over his 
objection.  The state hospital's 
investigational review committee advised the trial court that legal and ethical 
considerations prevented it from forcibly medicating Hauck.  That report also advised that Hauck was 
competent to stand trial. 

 

[¶11]       
The 
State again requested a competency hearing.  The record does not contain a 
transcript, but the State advises us that the hearing was held on February 17, 
2000.  Hauck was declared competent, 
and his trial began on March 6, 2000.   At a hearing on the State's motion 
in limine, the State argued that Hauck should be prohibited from arguing that 
mental illness negated intent or justified using illegal narcotics because Hauck 
had not entered a plea of not guilty by reason of mental illness.  Hauck's defense counsel advised the 
court that Hauck would not be presenting these arguments.  Hauck was convicted on all seven 
counts.  This appeal 
followed.

 

 

 

Speedy 
Trial

 

[¶12]       
The 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal 
defendant the right to a speedy trial.  
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 
92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972).  
A speedy trial claim is reviewed under the mandates of Rule 48(b) of the 
Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure and, if necessary, evaluated by the 
four-part constitutional test articulated in Barker.  Campbell v. State, 999 P.2d 649, 
655 (Wyo. 2000).  The constitutional 
factors that must be considered are: 1) the length of the delay; 2) the reason 
for the delay; 3) the defendant's assertion of his right; and 4) the prejudice 
to the defendant.  Id. Speedy 
trial analysis must consider both W.R.Cr.P. 48 and constitutional factors 
because a constitutional speedy trial violation could still occur despite 
compliance with the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 48(b).  Id.

 

[¶13]       
We begin 
by calculating the time between defendant's arraignment and trial, excluding the 
time periods specified in W.R.Cr.P. 48(b).1  Taylor v. State, 2001 WY 13, ¶5, 17 P.3d 715, ¶5 (Wyo. 2001).  Delays of 
fewer than 120 days are permissible, and if a delay has exceeded 120 days, we 
determine whether the defendant has made a written demand for a speedy trial or 
otherwise vigorously asserted his rights under W.R.Cr.P 48.   Id.  

 

[¶14]       
Hauck 
first contends that the trial court's suspension of proceedings was improper, 
and if found to be proper, delay between arraignment and trial was 123 days and 
W.R.Cr.P. 48 (b) mandates dismissal and retrial.  Where the primary reason for the delay 
is the determination of the defendant's mental competency to stand trial, 
Wyoming law requires suspension of all criminal proceedings until the district 
court can make a determination of the defendant's mental competency to stand 
trial.  Smith v. State, 871 P.2d 186, 190 (Wyo. 
1994) (citing Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303(a)).  Once there exists reasonable cause to 
question a criminal defendant's competency, due process protections of the state 
and federal constitutions also mandate such a suspension.  Id.  Under W.R.Cr.P. 48, all proceedings 
related to the mental illness or deficiency of the defendant are excluded in 
computing the time for trial.  
W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(3)(A).  
Without reviewing time periods caused by defendant's change of counsel as 
permitted under W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(3)(E), our review of the record indicates that 
ninety days passed between the date of arraignment, August 27, 1998, and the 
date that the district court suspended criminal proceedings, November 25, 
1998.  From the date that Hauck was 
found competent on February 17, 2000, and the date trial began on March 6, 2000, 
seventeen days passed.  The total 
elapsed time is one hundred and seven days, and presents no violation of 
W.R.Cr.P. 48(b).   

 

[¶15]       
Hauck 
next contends that an unconstitutional 607-day delay occurred between the date 
charges were filed and the date of his trial because the trial court improperly 
suspended proceedings.  The state 
hospital doctors consistently found him competent, and Hauck contends that the 
trial court improperly refused to find him competent and set trial.  The record shows that the trial court 
also had the opinion of another doctor, Dr. Vuola, who disagreed with the state 
hospital that Hauck suffered from an anti-social disorder.  It was Dr. Vuola's opinion that Hauck 
was an incompetent paranoid schizophrenic when not medicated.  Dr. Hitt from the state hospital did not 
rule out this diagnosis.  Under 
these circumstances, it was reasonable for the trial court to continue to find 
Hauck incompetent and suspend proceedings in accordance with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 
7-11-303.2  Furthermore, any delay caused by Hauck's 
incompetency was compelled by his due process rights that he be tried only if 
competent.  We find no violation of 
Hauck's constitutional speedy trial right.

 

 

Self-Representation

 

[¶16]       
The 
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires that a defendant in 
state court shall have the right to represent himself if the accused himself 
timely, knowingly, and intelligently requests the right to forgo counsel, and 
does not do so to cause delay.  Williams v. State, 655 P.2d 273, 274, 
276 (Wyo. 1982); and see Faretta 
v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975). Article 
1, § 10 of the Wyoming Constitution says:  
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to defend 
in person and by counsel * * *."  Williams, 655 P.2d  at 274.   The defendant need not have the 
skill and experience of a lawyer, but the court must make him aware of the 
disadvantages and the dangers of self-representation.  Id. at 275.

 

[¶17]       
Hauck 
contends that counsel withdrew because of Hauck's desire to represent himself at 
a hearing, and that he requested at the competency hearing held October 27, 
1999, that he be allowed to proceed pro se.  That request was summarily denied, and 
he claims that the trial court erred in not holding a hearing on his 
request.  Hauck provides us with no 
explanation how the trial court could have found his self-representation request 
knowing and intelligent before his competency was determined or once he was 
found incompetent.  The State 
contends that it would have been a logical impossibility.  On this record, we must agree and find 
no error.  The United States Supreme 
Court has held that the degree of competence necessary for a defendant to waive 
counsel is the same degree of competence required for him to stand trial.  Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399-400, 
113 S. Ct. 2680, 2686-87, 125 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1993).   While the issue of whether this 
standard would apply under a state constitutional analysis is not before us, Godinez does represent the very minimum 
that the standard could be and supports our determination that the district 
court could not logically decide that Hauck was incompetent to stand trial, but 
competent to represent himself.  The 
district court, therefore, did not err in failing to hold a hearing on the 
self-representation request.

 

 

Right to 
be Present

 

[¶18]       
Hauck 
next contends that when he was not present at the October 29, 1999, hearing on 
the motion for a continuance of the trial setting, his statutory and 
constitutional right to be present at a critical stage of the proceedings was 
violated.  The State responds that a 
contention that a defendant has any right to be present at a continuance hearing 
is without basis in the law.  "The 
Sixth Amendment and the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States are held to guarantee an 
accused the right to be present during every stage of the criminal proceeding 
that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness 
of the procedure."  Seeley v. State, 959 P.2d 170, 177 (Wyo. 
1998).  The constitutional guarantee 
has been embodied into Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-202 and W.R.Cr.P. 43(a).  Id. In none of these laws is it 
mandated that a defendant be present at a continuance hearing, and we are not 
provided with any authority that Hauck's presence was constitutionally 
required.  We find no 
violation.

 

[¶19]       
The 
order of judgment and sentence are affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) 
states:

(b) Speedy trial. -- 

            
(1) It is the responsibility of the court, counsel and the defendant to 
insure that the defendant is timely tried.

            
(2) A criminal charge shall be brought to trial within 120 days following 
arraignment unless continued as provided in this 
rule.

            
(3) The following periods shall be excluded in computing the time for 
trial:

            
(A) All proceedings related to the mental illness or deficiency of the 
defendant;

            
(B) Proceedings on another charge;

            
(C) Delay granted by the court pursuant to paragraph (4) or 
(5);

            
(D) The time between the dismissal and the refiling of the same charge; 
and

            
(E) Delay occasioned by defendant's change of counsel or application 
therefor.

            
(4) Continuances not to exceed six months from the date of arraignment 
may be granted by the trial court as follows:

            
(A) On motion of defendant supported by affidavit; 
or

            
(B) On motion of the attorney for the state or the court 
if:

            
(i) The defendant expressly consents;

            
(ii) The state's evidence is unavailable and the prosecution has 
exercised due diligence; or

            
(iii) Required in the due administration of justice and the defendant 
will not be substantially prejudiced; and

            
(C) If a continuance is proposed by the state or the court, the defendant 
shall be notified.  If the defendant 
objects, the defendant must show in writing how the delay may prejudice the 
defense.

            
(5) Any request to continue a trial to a date more than six months from 
the date of arraignment must be directed to the court to which appeals from the 
trial would be taken and may be granted by that court in accordance with 
paragraph (4).

            
(6) Any criminal case not tried or continued as provided in this rule 
shall be dismissed 120 days after arraignment.

            
(7) If the defendant is unavailable for any proceeding at which the 
defendant's presence is required, the case may be continued for a reasonable 
time by the trial court but for no more than 120 days after the defendant is 
available or the case further continued as provided in this 
rule.

            
(8) A dismissal for lack of a speedy trial under this rule shall not bar 
the state from again prosecuting the defendant for the same offense unless the 
defendant made a written demand for a speedy trial or can demonstrate prejudice 
from the delay.

2Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-303(a) 
(LexisNexis 2001) states:

(a) If it appears at any stage of a 
criminal proceeding, by motion or upon the court's own motion, that there is 
reasonable cause to believe that the accused has a mental illness or deficiency 
making him unfit to proceed, all further proceedings shall be suspended.