Case Title: Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Alan D. Eisenberg

Citation: 2007 WI 7

Docket Number: 

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2007-01-19T00:00:00Z

Document:
2007 WI 7 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2002AP386-D 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Alan D. Eisenberg, Attorney at Law: 
 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation f/k/a Board of 
Attorneys Professional Responsibility, 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
     v. 
Alan D. Eisenberg, 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EISENBERG 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
January 19, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
April 25, 2006   
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
        
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
        
 
COUNTY: 
        
 
JUDGE: 
        
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
WILCOX, J., dissents (opinion filed). 
CROOKS and ROGGENSACK, JJ., join the dissent.   
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the respondent-appellant there were briefs by Richard 
J. Cayo, Christopher T. Kolb, and Halling & Cayo, S.C., 
Milwaukee. 
 
For the complainant-respondent there was a brief by Robert 
G. Krohn and Roethe Krohn Pope LLP, Edgerton. 
 
 
2007 WI 7
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2002AP386-D  
 
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Alan D. Eisenberg, Attorney at Law: 
 
Office of Lawyer Regulation f/k/a Board of 
Attorneys Professional Responsibility, 
 
          Complainant-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Alan D. Eisenberg, 
 
          Respondent-Appellant. 
 
FILED 
 
JAN 19, 2007 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
ATTORNEY reinstatement proceeding.   Reinstatement granted.  
 
¶1 
PER CURIAM.   We review the recommendation of the 
referee, Richard M. Esenberg, that Alan D. Eisenberg's petition 
seeking the reinstatement of his license to practice law in 
Wisconsin be denied.  Although the referee found that Attorney 
Eisenberg's conduct during the term of his suspension has been 
exemplary, that he has fully complied with the terms of the 
suspension order, and that he has maintained competence and 
learning 
in 
the 
law 
during 
the 
suspension, 
the 
referee 
nevertheless recommended against granting the petition for 
No. 
2002AP386-D   
 
2 
 
reinstatement because he concluded Attorney Eisenberg has not 
proven by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that he 
has a proper understanding of and attitude toward the standards 
that are imposed upon the members of the bar and that he will 
act in conformity with them, nor has he proven that he can be 
safely recommended to the legal profession, the courts, and the 
public as a person fit to be consulted by others and to 
represent them and otherwise act in matters of trust and 
confidence, and in general to aid in the administration of 
justice as a member of the bar and as an officer of the courts.  
The referee also concluded that Attorney Eisenberg has not 
proven by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that his 
resumption of the practice of law will not be detrimental to the 
administration of justice and will not be subversive of the 
public interest.   
¶2 
Attorney Eisenberg filed a response to the referee's 
report and recommendation, pursuant to SCR 22.32(2),1 requesting 
that this court not adopt the recommendation of the referee and 
instead grant the petition for reinstatement.  This court issued 
an order indicating it would benefit from additional briefing on 
the question of whether Attorney Eisenberg has satisfied the 
requirements for reinstatement.  After consideration of those 
briefs, along with the referee's report and the entire record, 
we conclude that Attorney Eisenberg's petition for reinstatement 
                                                 
1 SCR 22.32(2) states that "[w]ithin 10 days after the 
filing of the referee's report, the petitioner and the director 
may file in the supreme court a response to the report." 
No. 
2002AP386-D   
 
3 
 
should be granted.  We also direct that the costs of the 
reinstatement proceeding, which total $9089.18 as of May 25, 
2006, be paid by Attorney Eisenberg.   
¶3 
Attorney Eisenberg's license to practice law in this 
state was suspended for a period of one year, effective April 6, 
2004, for engaging in eight counts of misconduct committed in 
five separate matters.  See In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  
The misconduct included failing to take steps to protect a 
client's interests upon termination of representation; failure 
to disclose all relevant information to the Office of Lawyer 
Regulation (OLR); engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; knowingly making a false 
statement of fact to a tribunal; engaging in conduct intended to 
disrupt a tribunal; violating the attorney's oath; entering into 
a business transaction with a client; using means which have no 
substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a 
third person in the course of representing a client; and 
knowingly making a false statement of material fact or law to a 
third person.  Attorney Eisenberg had been disciplined for 
professional misconduct on three previous occasions.  Two of 
those proceedings resulted in a suspension of his license to 
practice law.  The third resulted in a public reprimand.   
¶4 
Attorney Eisenberg filed a petition for reinstatement 
of his license on January 11, 2005.  A public hearing was held 
on the reinstatement petition on July 25, 2005.  Several 
witnesses testified in opposition to reinstatement of Attorney 
No. 
2002AP386-D   
 
4 
 
Eisenberg's license, citing his lack of civility and inability 
to take seriously the professional obligations of an attorney. 
¶5 
Attorney 
Eisenberg 
testified 
in 
support 
of 
his 
petition for reinstatement.  He explained that since the 
suspension he had attended continuing legal education (CLE) 
programs totaling 109 credits, 33 1/2 of which were for 
attendance at professional ethics courses.  He said he had been 
heavily involved in the real estate profession, which involved 
negotiating and bringing people together, and he had been an 
active participant in the Greater Milwaukee Association of 
Realtors Ethics Grievance Arbitration Committee.  In addition, 
Attorney Eisenberg testified that he had served as the executive 
secretary of the Wisconsin Umpires Association, was a co-founder 
and executive director of the North Shore Historical Society, 
was a contributing editor of a Latino newspaper, and was active 
in work on behalf of various humane animal societies.  He also 
said he had been elected to the board of directors of an 
organization called Citizens for Responsible Government, which 
analyzes political developments and seeks accountability from 
public officials. 
¶6 
Multiple 
witnesses also testified in support of 
Attorney Eisenberg's petition for reinstatement.  Attorney 
Eisenberg's witnesses described him as forceful, aggressive, 
tough, and bright and said they were convinced he is remorseful 
about the conduct that led to his most recent suspension and if 
he is reinstated he will be a very good attorney again.  
No. 
2002AP386-D   
 
5 
 
¶7 
The referee issued his report and recommendation on 
September 8, 2005.  The referee noted that in assessing whether 
an attorney has demonstrated by clear, satisfactory, and 
convincing evidence that he has met the requirements for 
reinstatement, there is no presumption of rehabilitation upon 
the expiration of a specified term of suspension with no 
evidence of intervening or subsequent misconduct present.  See 
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hyndman, 2002 WI 6, ¶4, 
249 Wis. 2d 650, 638 N.W.2d 293.   
¶8 
The 
referee 
noted 
that 
Attorney 
Eisenberg 
has 
certainly demonstrated that he has maintained learning in the 
law and he has maintained a record of varied community service 
during the period of his suspension.  The referee also noted 
that witnesses who testified on Attorney Eisenberg's behalf 
reflected that at least some of his legal clients were highly 
appreciative of his services and would welcome the opportunity 
to retain him in the future.  The referee also said there was no 
evidence of dishonest conduct during the period of suspension.  
However, the referee was troubled by Attorney Eisenberg's past 
conduct and how that past conduct might predict his future 
behavior.  The referee's comments in this regard include: 
I recognize that there is often a connection between 
overzealous 
advocacy 
and 
misrepresentation 
and, 
therefore, concerns about Mr. Eisenberg's ability to 
restrain himself are not unrelated to the potential 
for misrepresentation as his disciplinary history 
reveals.  Mr. Eisenberg has more often been found 
guilty of misrepresentation in the course of advocacy 
as opposed to efforts at personal gain.   
No. 
2002AP386-D   
 
6 
 
The 
principal 
question 
then, 
regarding 
reinstatement, seems to be Mr. Eisenberg's facility to 
take overly aggressive positions in advocating his own 
interests and, at times, those of his clients.  Each 
of his prior suspensions involved such conduct . . . . 
Zeal in an attorney is a virtue but only to a 
point.  Both effective advocacy and compliance with 
the duties lawyers owe to the courts, the public and 
to participants in the judicial process require the 
ability to discern when an argument is frivolous and 
when the admittedly faint bounds of civility have been 
transgressed. 
Put another way, lawyers need an internal voice 
that tells them when to stop.  Mr. Eisenberg has often 
failed to hear that voice. 
. . . . 
. . .[T]he question here is not whether Mr. 
Eisenberg has heard that cautionary voice in the past 
(clearly, too often, he has not) but whether he will 
hear it in the future. 
¶9 
The referee found it troubling that Attorney Eisenberg 
did not unambiguously apologize for the conduct that led to his 
most recent suspension.  While the referee acknowledged that in 
and of itself, the mere failure to apologize might not be strong 
evidence against reinstatement, the referee said, "[t]he nagging 
sense that Mr. Eisenberg still doesn't get it is strengthened by 
his attitude toward the Referee's findings in the case leading 
to suspension."  The referee noted when asked about the findings 
made by the referee in the suspension matter, Attorney Eisenberg 
asserted that this court had said that the referee's report was 
"biased," that the court "somewhat agreed" that three of the 
counts may not have been proven, and he repeatedly said the 
No. 
2002AP386-D   
 
7 
 
court had somehow modified the referee's credibility findings 
which were "devastatingly critical" of Attorney Eisenberg.   
¶10 The referee in the reinstatement proceeding noted that 
this court did no such thing and although the court did say 
that, on one of the counts, a trier of fact could have gone 
either way, it affirmed each of the referee's findings of fact 
as not clearly erroneous.  The reinstatement referee noted that 
when pressed, Attorney Eisenberg said that this court must have 
disagreed with the suspension proceeding referee to some extent 
because it did not adopt that referee's recommendation of 
revocation.  The reinstatement referee noted that this court 
expressly said that the misconduct that was proven, along with 
Mr. Eisenberg's past disciplinary history, would certainly 
warrant revocation but the court declined to impose that 
sanction because, given Mr. Eisenberg's age, revocation might 
effectively prohibit him from ever practicing law again.  The 
reinstatement referee said somehow Attorney Eisenberg apparently 
interpreted an act of mercy as at least a partial vindication, 
and he said this was troubling.   
¶11 The reinstatement referee also noted that Attorney 
Eisenberg repeatedly made comments suggesting or expressly 
claiming that he has been singled out and treated in ways no 
other lawyer would be.  In the referee's opinion, all of these 
concerns 
raised 
doubts 
as 
to 
whether 
Attorney 
Eisenberg 
understands the standards to which he must conform.  
¶12 The referee recommended that Attorney Eisenberg's 
petition for reinstatement be denied, that he be directed to 
No. 
2002AP386-D   
 
8 
 
turn over the balance of his trust account to the state 
Unclaimed Property Fund, and that he be ordered to pay the costs 
of the reinstatement proceeding.  The referee said that in the 
event this court should reinstate Attorney Eisenberg's license, 
the reinstatement should be conditioned on his reimbursing the 
Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection in the amount of 
$11,500.2   
¶13 As noted above, following receipt of the referee's 
report and the responses thereto filed by Attorney Eisenberg and 
the OLR, this court requested the parties to file additional 
briefs addressing the question whether Attorney Eisenberg has 
satisfied the requirements for reinstatement.  After careful 
consideration of those additional briefs in conjunction with the 
referee's report and the entire record, we conclude that 
Attorney 
Eisenberg's petition for reinstatement should be 
granted.  
                                                 
2 The record indicates that Attorney Eisenberg subsequently 
paid the Wisconsin Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection $11,500 
under protest. 
No. 
2002AP386-D   
 
9 
 
¶14 SCR 22.31(1)3 provides the standard to be met for 
reinstatement.  Specifically, the petitioner must show by clear, 
satisfactory, and convincing evidence that he or she has the 
moral character to practice law, that his or her resumption of 
the 
practice 
of 
law 
will 
not 
be 
detrimental 
to 
the 
administration of justice or subversive of the public interest, 
and that he or she has complied with SCR 22.26 and the terms of 
the order of suspension.  In addition to these requirements, SCR 
22.29(4)4 states related requirements that a petition for 
                                                 
3 SCR 22.31(1) provides:  Reinstatement hearing. 
(1)  The 
petitioner 
has 
the 
burden 
of 
demonstrating, by clear, satisfactory, and convincing 
evidence, all of the following: 
(a)  That he or she has the moral character 
to practice law in Wisconsin. 
(b)  That his or her resumption of the 
practice of law will not be detrimental to the 
administration of justice or subversive of the public 
interest. 
(c)  That his or her representations in the 
petition, including the representations required by 
SCR 
22.29(4)(a) 
to 
(m) 
and 
22.29(5), 
are 
substantiated. 
(d)  That he or she has complied fully with 
the terms of the order of suspension or revocation and 
with the requirements of SCR 22.26. 
4 SCR 22.29(4) provides:  Petition for reinstatement. 
(4)  The petition for reinstatement shall show 
all of the following: 
(a)  The petitioner desires to have the 
petitioner's license reinstated. 
No. 
2002AP386-D   
 
10 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
(b)  The petitioner has not practiced law 
during the period of suspension or revocation. 
(c)  The petitioner has complied fully with 
the terms of the order of suspension or revocation and 
will 
continue 
to 
comply 
with 
them 
until 
the 
petitioner's license is reinstated. 
(d)  The 
petitioner 
has 
maintained 
competence and learning in the law by attendance at 
identified educational activities. 
(e)  The 
petitioner's 
conduct 
since 
the 
suspension or revocation has been exemplary and above 
reproach. 
(f)  The 
petitioner 
has 
a 
proper 
understanding of and attitude toward the standards 
that are imposed upon members of the bar and will act 
in conformity with the standards. 
(g)  The 
petitioner 
can 
safely 
be 
recommended to the legal profession, the courts and 
the public as a person fit to be consulted by others 
and to represent them and otherwise act in matters of 
trust and confidence and in general to aid in the 
administration of justice as a member of the bar and 
as an officer of the courts. 
(h)  The petitioner has fully complied with 
the requirements set forth in SCR 22.26. 
(j)  The petitioner's proposed use of the 
license if reinstated. 
(k)  A full description of all of the 
petitioner's business activities during the period of 
suspension or revocation. 
(4m)  The petitioner has made restitution to 
or settled all claims of persons injured or harmed by 
petitioner's misconduct, including reimbursement to 
the Wisconsin lawyers’ fund for client protection for 
all payments made from that fund, or, if not, the 
petitioner's explanation of the failure or inability 
to do so. 
No. 
2002AP386-D   
 
11 
 
reinstatement must show.  All of these additional requirements 
are effectively incorporated into SCR 22.31(1).   
¶15 We will adopt a referee's findings of fact unless they 
are clearly erroneous. Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.  
See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Carroll, 2001 WI 130, 
¶29, 248 Wis. 2d 662, 636 N.W.2d 718.  We note that the 
referee's conclusions that Attorney Eisenberg has failed to 
prove by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that he 
has a proper understanding of and attitude toward the standards 
that are imposed upon the members of the bar and that he will 
act in conformity with them; that he has failed to prove that he 
can be safely recommended to the legal profession, the courts, 
and the public as a person fit to be consulted by others and to 
represent them; and that he has also failed to prove that his 
resumption of the practice of law will not be detrimental to the 
administration of justice and will not be subversive of the 
public interest are denominated as findings of fact.  We deem 
these statements to be conclusions of law and we will review 
them as such.  
¶16 We determine that the referee's remaining factual 
findings are not clearly erroneous and we adopt them. 
¶17 As previously noted, prior to the 2004 suspension 
Attorney 
Eisenberg 
had 
been 
disciplined 
for 
professional 
misconduct on three previous occasions.  The dissent outlines 
the facts of those earlier cases in some detail and expresses 
the concern that Attorney Eisenberg's disciplinary history 
No. 
2002AP386-D   
 
12 
 
"provides plenty of evidence to garner skepticism about his 
remorse."  Dissent, ¶48. 
¶18 We 
share 
the 
dissent's 
concern 
about 
Attorney 
Eisenberg's disciplinary history, as did the reinstatement 
referee.  The number of prior disciplinary proceedings in which 
Attorney Eisenberg has been involved, as well as the serious and 
unsavory nature of some of the specific counts of misconduct 
that he was found to have committed, do not paint a pretty 
picture.  However, Attorney Eisenberg's disciplinary history was 
taken into account when this court imposed a one year license 
suspension for the most recent misconduct in 2004.  We note, and 
the dissent concedes, that Attorney Eisenberg's history of 
disciplinary problems does not directly affect his petition for 
reinstatement of his license to practice law.  Rather, the focus 
must be on whether Attorney Eisenberg has satisfied the burden 
imposed on him by SCR 22.31(4) and SCR 22.29(4).  We conclude 
that he has done so. 
¶19 The dissent says, "it is [Attorney Eisenberg's] own 
words during his reinstatement hearing that establish that he 
falls well short of satisfying his SCR 22.31(1) reinstatement 
burden."  Dissent, ¶48.  As an example the dissent points to 
testimony presented at the reinstatement hearing regarding an 
incident that occurred with Attorney Michele Ford in September 
2003.  Attorney Ford testified that in a telephone conversation 
she had with Attorney Eisenberg while she was working in her 
capacity as City Attorney for the City of St. Francis, after she 
refused to accept a deal demanded by Attorney Eisenberg, he 
No. 
2002AP386-D   
 
13 
 
hurled a profane insult at her and slammed down the phone.  
Attorney Eisenberg did not admit to using profanity but did 
concede he made an inappropriate remark. 
¶20 In explaining the incident at the reinstatement 
hearing Attorney Eisenberg said he became upset with Ms. Ford 
because he was representing an elderly woman who had no funds; 
that he handled the matter on a pro bono basis; and that he was 
attempting to talk Ms. Ford into dropping the $40 award of costs 
that Ms. Ford proposed as a means of disposing of the case 
because his client could not afford to pay $40.  Attorney 
Eisenberg said he asked that his client be allowed to perform 
community service in lieu of paying the $40 and Ms. Ford said 
she would not agree to that because it was contrary to standard 
policy.  Attorney Eisenberg testified: 
So I started out by saying, we've got a stipulation 
here.  First of all, is there a problem with it, and 
second, this lady has no money.  She's got terrible 
problems.  She's an older woman.  It wasn't her fault.  
I'd like to just explain it to you.  And then she 
started getting on my case. . . .  
And I thought she did raise her voice to me, and the 
more she got upset, the more I got upset. . . . 
And I wish that I hadn't got upset, and I'm sorry that 
I did. 
¶21 The dissent also points out that Attorney Eisenberg 
called Attorney Ford the week before the reinstatement hearing 
and she said she viewed his comments to her as being 
intimidating.  Dissent, ¶54.  When asked about the phone call he 
placed to Attorney Ford, Attorney Eisenberg said, "I wanted to 
No. 
2002AP386-D   
 
14 
 
try to find out what this was about" and he denied any intent to 
intimidate or threaten her.  We note that the reinstatement 
referee drew no conclusion regarding Attorney Ford's perception 
that Attorney Eisenberg's comments were an attempt to intimidate 
her.  The referee said while Attorney Ford's perception was 
certainly plausible, Attorney Eisenberg's denial of any improper 
intent was equally plausible. 
¶22 The 
dissent 
also 
points 
to 
testimony 
from 
the 
reinstatement hearing in which Attorney Eisenberg said he feels 
he must be very circumspect in his professional behavior because 
the OLR had a different set of rules for him as compared to 
other attorneys.  We note that in further explaining this 
statement Attorney Eisenberg said, "Well, it sure has felt that 
way, but I'm not criticizing them.  I think that [the OLR] does 
[its] job." 
¶23 The excerpts from the transcript of the reinstatement 
hearing 
highlighted 
by 
the 
dissent 
reveal 
that 
Attorney 
Eisenberg was, in some of his remarks, cantankerous and grouchy.  
However, those excerpts constitute a small percentage of the 135 
pages of testimony provided by Attorney Eisenberg.  A reading of 
the entire transcript indicates that, at least at times, the 
atmosphere at the hearing was highly charged and the OLR's 
counsel and Attorney Eisenberg had a number of spirited 
exchanges in which both made somewhat querulous remarks.  
Although we agree that Attorney Eisenberg should have been more 
circumspect in some of his comments, at the end of the day, when 
asked by his attorney whether he was resolved to observe the 
No. 
2002AP386-D   
 
15 
 
admonitions this court has issued in its orders and refrain from 
conduct that the court finds offensive, Attorney Eisenberg 
responded, "With all my heart and soul. . . . With every ounce 
of intellect that I can muster up." 
¶24 While some of Attorney Eisenberg's past conduct has 
been far less than exemplary—indeed, at times it has been deeply 
flawed—he has already been disciplined for that bad conduct.  
The pertinent inquiries before us are what was the state of his 
conduct during the term of his suspension, i.e., since April 
2004; whether he currently has a proper understanding of and 
attitude toward the standards that are imposed upon members of 
the bar and whether he will act in conformity with them; and 
whether he can be safely recommended to the legal profession, 
the courts and the public.  After a careful review of the entire 
record, we conclude that the answer to this question is "yes." 
¶25 The referee specifically found, and we agree, that 
Attorney Eisenberg's conduct during the suspension has been 
exemplary and above reproach.  We also note the referee's 
specific findings that since his suspension, Attorney Eisenberg 
has maintained competence in learning in the law by attendance 
at numerous educational activities.  Although the referee was 
concerned that Attorney Eisenberg has not expressed much in the 
way of contrition, nor has he undergone counseling, neither our 
order 
suspending 
his 
license 
nor 
the 
rules 
governing 
reinstatement require counseling, and the record reveals that 
Attorney Eisenberg has expressed remorse for his past conduct.  
No. 
2002AP386-D   
 
16 
 
¶26 After our de novo review of the referee's conclusions 
of law, including the above-referenced statements which were 
denominated 
findings 
of 
fact, 
we 
conclude 
that 
Attorney 
Eisenberg has met his burden imposed by SCR 22.31(1) of 
demonstrating by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence 
that his resumption of the practice of law would not be 
detrimental to the administration of justice or subversive of 
the public interest.  Accordingly, we grant Attorney Eisenberg's 
petition for reinstatement.  We also direct that Attorney 
Eisenberg 
be 
assessed 
the 
costs 
of 
this 
reinstatement 
proceeding. 
¶27 When we suspended Attorney Eisenberg's license, we 
rejected the referee's recommendation for revocation, saying:  
Given 
Attorney 
Eisenberg's 
age, 
revocation 
might 
effectively prohibit him ever practicing law again. 
Age is not necessarily a mitigating factor.  See In re 
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Fennig, 227 Wis. 2d 
379, 595 N.W.2d 710 (1999) (60-day suspension imposed 
for 
70+-year-old 
attorney 
rather 
than 
public 
reprimand).  But under these circumstances we hope 
that a shorter period of forfeiture will suffice to 
deter 
other 
attorneys 
from 
engaging 
in 
similar 
misconduct and motivate Attorney Eisenberg, if he ever 
returns to the practice of law, to conduct himself in 
an ethical manner, without exception. . . .  
Eisenberg, 269 Wis. 2d 43, ¶34.  
¶28 In 
granting 
Attorney 
Eisenberg's 
petition 
for 
reinstatement, we stress that he is not being held to a 
different or higher standard of conduct than other attorneys in 
this state.  All attorneys licensed to practice in Wisconsin are 
held to the highest standard of conduct, and we expect nothing 
less from Attorney Eisenberg. We also stress that we expect the 
No. 
2002AP386-D   
 
17 
 
exemplary behavior which Attorney Eisenberg has exhibited during 
the period of his suspension to continue once he resumes the 
practice of law.   
¶29 IT IS ORDERED that Alan D. Eisenberg's license to 
practice law in Wisconsin is reinstated effective the date of 
this order. 
¶30 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date 
of this order Alan D. Eisenberg shall pay to the Office of 
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding.  If the costs 
are not paid within the time specified, and absent a showing to 
this court of his inability to pay the costs within that time, 
the license of Alan D. Eisenberg to practice law in Wisconsin 
shall be suspended until further order of the court. 
 
No.  2002AP386-D.jpw 
 
1 
 
¶31 JON P. WILCOX, J.   (dissenting).  The court has 
concluded that Attorney Alan D. Eisenberg has satisfied his 
burden and should be reinstated to practice law in Wisconsin.  
Based on his behavior during his suspension, I conclude he has 
fallen well short of the burden imposed by SCR 22.31(1).  He 
should not be reinstated at this time.  Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent. 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶32 Before addressing the specifics that support my 
conclusion that Attorney Eisenberg should not be reinstated, 
background related to his history of disciplinary problems 
provides a helpful context.   
¶33 Four years after being admitted to practice law in 
Wisconsin, 
Attorney 
Eisenberg 
first 
had 
his 
law 
license 
suspended in 1970.  State v. Eisenberg, 48 Wis. 2d 364, 180 
N.W.2d 529 (1970).  He "pursued a course of vindictive and 
reckless harassment and psychological persecution against the 
Honorable John E. Krueger, county judge of Milwaukee county, 
Wisconsin."  Id. at 367-68.  Attorney Eisenberg hired a private 
investigator to investigate Judge Krueger.  The court made the 
following findings: 
(1) That Alan Eisenberg publicly charged Judge Krueger 
with 
conduct 
(unspecified) for which a criminal 
warrant could issue; (2) That Alan Eisenberg predicted 
the Judge would resign for "personal reasons" within a 
short period rather than face prosecution; (3) That 
Alan Eisenberg arranged for and Sydney signed checks 
in payment of newspaper advertisements soliciting 
complaints against Judge Krueger; (4) That in concert 
the defendants pressured the Judge unwillingly to 
appoint them to an advisory committee concerning the 
administration of his court; (5) That in concert the 
No.  2002AP386-D.jpw 
 
2 
 
defendants forced the Judge to publicly read a press 
release announcing their appointment for the purpose 
of aggrandizing themselves and demonstrating their 
subjugation of and their dominance over the Judge; and 
(6) We find that the above acts of the defendants 
constitute unprofessional conduct tending to bring the 
courts into disrepute and contempt and that such 
conduct is contrary to the duties of the defendants as 
licensed attorneys and in violation of their oaths as 
attorneys, taken pursuant to sec. 256.29, Stats. 
Id. at 379.  Attorney Eisenberg's "conduct was of such 
aggravated nature as to cause Judge Krueger great mental 
suffering and anguish, which culminated in his death by his own 
hand on August 28, 1968."  Id. at 368.   
¶34 The pattern of Attorney Eisenberg refusing to accept 
responsibility began during his first disciplinary proceeding.  
"During the[] proceedings Alan Eisenberg gave testimony which 
directly conflict[ed] with the testimony of 13 witnesses.  The 
record show[ed] that as to any testimony which supported the 
allegations of the complaint, Alan refute[d] the same by 
labeling it to be false."  Id. at 377.  
¶35 Attorney Eisenberg had his law license suspended for 
the second time in 1988.  In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against 
Eisenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 284, 423 N.W.2d 867 (1988).  The court 
suspended Attorney Eisenberg for two years for conduct stemming 
out of two cases.  In the first case, Attorney Eisenberg was 
suspended for:  
having made statements to the press prior to a 
criminal 
trial 
which 
concerned 
the 
character, 
credibility and reputation of the accused, whom he 
represented, and his opinion of the evidence, the 
merits of the case and the innocence of his client; 
having 
entered 
into 
a 
contract 
regarding 
the 
publication rights to the story of his representation 
of that criminal defendant; having participated in the 
No.  2002AP386-D.jpw 
 
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preparation and filing of a civil complaint purported 
to have been prepared and filed by an individual pro 
se in connection with a pending extradition proceeding 
against his client; having failed to disclose relevant 
facts concerning the latter conduct in response to 
inquiries from the Board of Attorneys Professional 
Responsibility in its investigation; and having made 
offensive, undignified and discourteous remarks to a 
prosecutor 
concerning 
a 
witness 
and 
in 
closing 
argument to a jury concerning a prosecutor.   
Id. at 287.  In the second case, Attorney Eisenberg "knowingly 
made a false statement intended for publication that the 
Attorney General had written him that counsel for an adverse 
party in pending litigation was chargeable with false swearing 
and perjury."  Id.  
¶36 In suspending Attorney Eisenberg, the court lamented 
that  
[b]y 
that 
misconduct 
Attorney 
Eisenberg 
has 
established a pattern of attempting to influence 
litigation by means prohibited by the rules governing 
the conduct of attorneys, including misrepresentations 
to the court and, through the press, to the public.  
Such abuse of our court system warrants severe 
discipline.  Moreover, as this is not the first 
occasion we have had to discipline him, Attorney 
Eisenberg has shown that severe discipline is needed 
to impress upon him the obligation to comport himself 
in 
accord 
with 
the 
ethical 
standards 
of 
the 
profession.   
Id. at 287-88.   
¶37 Attorney Eisenberg was publicly reprimanded in 1996.  
He failed to arrange for winding up his practice within 15 days 
of the effective date of his 1988 suspension, in violation of 
SCR 22.26(3).  In this case, Attorney Eisenberg had until August 
1, 1988, to terminate his practice.  The Board's investigation 
showed that the balance in Attorney Eisenberg's trust account on 
No.  2002AP386-D.jpw 
 
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August 31, 1988, was $39,011.75.  The account was not closed, 
and approximately two dozen checks were written on the account 
after that date.  The last check cleared the bank in May of 
1989, leaving a balance of $34,771.65. 
¶38 The Board concluded that Attorney Eisenberg failed to 
act with diligence in returning client funds to clients at the 
close of their cases.  Attorney Eisenberg, as a partner in a law 
firm, also failed to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the 
firm had in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that all 
lawyers in the firm conformed to the rules of professional 
conduct.  Finally, Attorney Eisenberg failed to close out his 
trust account, a necessary step in winding up his practice upon 
suspension of his license to practice law. 
¶39 Attorney Eisenberg's third suspension, and final to 
date, occurred in 2004.  In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747.  The 
court suspended Attorney Eisenberg's license for one year.  The 
court concluded he engaged in nine counts of misconduct. 
¶40 Two counts involved a client who elected to have one 
of Attorney Eisenberg's associates continue representing her 
after the associate left Attorney Eisenberg's firm.  Based on 
testimony, the referee found that Attorney Eisenberg had his 
staff fabricate billing statements, which he incorporated into 
his affidavit.  Additionally, the referee found that Attorney 
Eisenberg failed to surrender the unearned retainer and the 
client's file in a timely manner.   
No.  2002AP386-D.jpw 
 
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¶41 Two counts involved Attorney Eisenberg submitting an 
affidavit in support of a California application to appear pro 
hac vice.  In the affidavit, he indicated that he had never been 
suspended from legal practice.  In fact, he had been suspended 
on two previous occasions.   
¶42 Two 
counts arose from Attorney Eisenberg acting 
inappropriately at a Department of Transportation hearing.  He 
took over the hearing, refused to follow procedural rules, and 
left with his client before the hearing was over.  The following 
excerpt from the transcript of the hearing captures some of his 
inappropriate behavior: 
Eisenberg: 
I'm going to conduct an examination of 
my client. 
Examiner: 
You will ask the questions after I ask 
the questions. 
 
Eisenberg: 
No, I will make a statement. 
Examiner:  
You will, I will give you— 
Eisenberg: 
I, I, I'm not interested in your 
procedures or your rules.  I'm going to 
make a statement of explanation.  I'm 
going to ask him a question, and then 
you can ask him whatever you want. 
Examiner: 
I can let you make a statement, but I 
will ask him the questions first. 
Eisenberg: 
I will ask him the questions first. 
Examiner: 
Mr. Eisenberg, this is, this is the way 
we do our hearings (inaudible)— 
Eisenberg: 
This is the way I do your hearings. 
The hearing continued with a similar tone, until Eisenberg and 
his client left before it was over. 
No.  2002AP386-D.jpw 
 
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¶43 Another count involved Attorney Eisenberg entering 
into a business transaction with a client with whom he had 
developed an attorney/client relationship when assisting the 
client with a building code violation.  The client entered into 
a listing contract to sell a property through the Alan Eisenberg 
Real Estate Company.  Attorney Eisenberg failed to advise the 
client of the conflict of interest, the client was not given an 
opportunity to seek independent advice, and the client did not 
waive the conflict in writing. 
¶44 The final two counts arose from a call Attorney 
Eisenberg placed to the Corvallis, Oregon police dispatch.  He 
told the dispatcher that he had a "life or death emergency" in 
demanding to speak with an off-duty detective.  During the phone 
call, he also used vulgar language.  The following excerpt from 
the transcript of the call captures some of his inappropriate 
behavior: 
Eisenberg: 
It's a life or death emergency; if I 
don't get a call from him, you tell him 
I'm going to have his badge. 
Dispatcher: 
Can I tell him what it's about? 
Eisenberg: 
You got—It's a life or death emergency. 
Dispatcher: 
Can I tell him what the emergency is? 
Eisenberg: 
I said what  
Dispatcher: 
It may speed up . . . 
Eisenberg: 
You get the asshole on the phone, you 
have him call me now. 
No.  2002AP386-D.jpw 
 
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The purpose of Attorney Eisenberg's call was to determine why 
the detective had left a business card at the residence of 
Attorney Eisenberg's client. 
¶45 In suspending Attorney Eisenberg for one year, the 
court "hope[d] that a shorter period of forfeiture [would] 
suffice to deter other attorneys from engaging in similar 
misconduct 
and 
motivate 
Attorney 
Eisenberg, 
if 
he 
ever 
return[ed] to the practice of law, to conduct himself in an 
ethical manner, without exception."  Eisenberg, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 
¶34. 
II. EISENBERG'S FAILURE TO SATISFY HIS SCR 22.31(1) BURDEN 
¶46 SCR 22.31(1) imposes a burden on an attorney seeking 
reinstatement. 
 
Among 
other 
things, 
the 
attorney 
must 
demonstrate by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence 
"[t]hat his or her resumption of the practice of law will not be 
detrimental to the administration of justice or subversive of 
the public interest."  SCR 22.31(1)(b).  Part of satisfying the 
SCR 22.31(1)(b) burden includes satisfying the requirements 
under SCR 22.29(4).  Majority op., ¶14.   
¶47 In concluding that Attorney Eisenberg had satisfied 
his burden, the court focused on where it departed from 
agreement with the referee's rationale for his recommendation.  
Mainly, it indicates that the referee made his decision based on 
Attorney Eisenberg neither going to counseling nor having a 
satisfactory level of contrition related to incidents leading to 
his latest suspension.  The court pointed out that the rules 
governing reinstatement require neither and that "the record 
No.  2002AP386-D.jpw 
 
8 
 
reveals that Attorney Eisenberg has expressed remorse for his 
past conduct."  Majority op., ¶25. 
¶48 Attorney Eisenberg's history alone provides plenty of 
evidence to garner skepticism about his remorse.  Nevertheless, 
his history of disciplinary problems does not directly affect 
his petition for reinstatement.  Rather, it is his own words 
during his reinstatement hearing that establish that he falls 
well short of satisfying his SCR 22.31(1) reinstatement burden.  
Some may dismiss Attorney Eisenberg's testimony as including 
some "cantankerous and grouchy" remarks, majority op., ¶23, but 
even a small selection of his testimony found in the record 
leads to the conclusion that he should not be reinstated at this 
time.          
¶49 First, Attorney Eisenberg's testimony at the hearing 
illustrates he lacks "a proper understanding of and attitude 
toward the standards that are imposed upon members of the bar 
and will act in conformity with the standards." SCR 22.29(4)(f).  
A review of his testimony leaves me concluding that his 
understanding of the rules is distorted and his attitude toward 
them is hostile.  Stated another way, he has an improper 
understanding of, and attitude toward, the rules.  
¶50 Attorney Eisenberg's attorney selected an incident 
that occurred with Attorney Michele Ford for Attorney Eisenberg 
No.  2002AP386-D.jpw 
 
9 
 
to express his proper understanding and attitude.1  Attorney Ford 
appeared at Attorney Eisenberg's reinstatement hearing to oppose 
his reinstatement.  She testified in regard to a phone 
conversation that she had with Attorney Eisenberg when she was 
working in her capacity as City Attorney for the City of St. 
Francis.  According to Attorney Ford, after she refused to 
accept a deal demanded by Attorney Eisenberg he said, "I'm going 
to rip you a new asshole" and slammed down the phone.  Attorney 
Eisenberg disputed whether he used the term "asshole," but 
conceded that he said he was "going to rip her a new one."   
¶51 In asking about the incident Attorney Eisenberg's 
attorney said:  
We're obligated, Mr. Eisenberg, to show in connection 
with our petition that you're mindful of the rules 
that are—that bind lawyers and are resolved to conform 
your conduct to them.  And with respect to this phone 
call with Michele Ford—I'd like to have you tell the 
Referee 
what 
you 
can 
about 
the 
effect 
of 
the 
suspension on your attitude towards those kinds of 
interchanges and the likelihood that they're going to 
recur.  
Attorney Eisenberg began his response by saying the following: 
"Well, the effect of the suspension to me felt like an atom 
                                                 
1 Attorney Eisenberg's testimony relating to the incident 
with Attorney Ford highlights his improper understanding of, and 
attitude toward, the rules.  Although the incident itself raises 
unique concerns, my focus is on his testimony.  The majority 
opinion, in reacting to this discussion of the testimony, 
focuses elsewhere.  Specifically, the majority notes that 
Attorney Eisenberg was representing a poor elderly woman on a 
pro bono basis.  Majority op., ¶20.  I respect Attorney 
Eisenberg's pro bono work, but that does not change the fact 
that his testimony highlights his improper understanding of, and 
attitude toward, the rules. 
No.  2002AP386-D.jpw 
 
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smasher on a tsetse fly, and I'm the tsetse fly."  He concluded 
his response with, 
I will tell you that I've had discussions with [my 
attorney], who's told me that if in confession with my 
priest, I look at the priest and I say, You're an 
asshole, I stand a good chance of drawing a Bar 
complaint because there's probably a new set of rules 
for me. 
Attorney Eisenberg chose to say he has a unique set of rules 
applied to him, rather than discussing his understanding and 
appreciation of the rules of professional conduct.   
¶52 Maybe if this were an isolated comment I could be 
convinced 
that 
Attorney 
Eisenberg 
was 
merely 
making 
an 
exaggerated comment for effect.  Yet, this was not an isolated 
comment.  Attorney Eisenberg repeatedly forwarded his distorted 
view that a different set of rules applied to his conduct.  When 
the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) attorney cross-examined 
Attorney Eisenberg, the following exchange occurred: 
OLR: 
Mr. Eisenberg, you mentioned in your 
testimony that you feel you have to be 
very 
circumspect 
in 
terms 
of 
your 
professional behavior because there's 
a, quote, "new set of rules for you," 
end of quote— 
Eisenberg: 
Right. 
OLR:  
 
--do you remember that testimony? 
Eisenberg: 
It's accurate, too. 
OLR: 
In a sense you're telling this Referee 
and us and everyone here that there's a 
different 
set 
of 
professional 
code 
rules for Alan Eisenberg as compared to 
all other attorneys? 
Eisenberg: 
There sure is. 
No.  2002AP386-D.jpw 
 
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OLR:  
 
There is? 
Eisenberg: 
Yes, there is. Yes. It's called State 
of 
Wisconsin 
Office 
of 
Lawyer 
Regulation 
versus 
Alan 
Eisenberg.  
Those are the rules.  That's the law of 
the 
land. 
 
That's 
the 
case 
that 
dictates what I must do, how I must 
behave.  That's the rule of me.  
With such a distorted view of the rules of conduct, I cannot 
agree with the court that Attorney Eisenberg has satisfied his 
burden of proving that he "has a proper understanding of and 
attitude toward the standards that are imposed upon members of 
the bar and will act in conformity with the standards."  SCR 
22.29(4)(f).2    
¶53 Attorney Eisenberg's failure to exhibit a proper 
understanding of, and attitude toward, the rules of professional 
conduct alone should be enough for this court to not reinstate 
him.  Nevertheless, his behavior leading up to his reinstatement 
hearing raises questions about whether his conduct has been 
"exemplary and above reproach," SCR 22.29(4)(e), and he can 
"safely be recommended to the legal profession, the courts and 
                                                 
2 The majority opinion points out that Attorney Eisenberg 
went on to explain the different set of rules that apply to him, 
stating, "'Well, it sure has felt that way, but I'm not 
criticizing them.  I think that [the OLR] does [its] job.'"  
Majority op., ¶22.  In the remainder of his response to the OLR 
attorney he said the following: "In your case when I said to be 
perfectly honest, you made a sarcastic comment to me; in 
essence, calling me a liar before I testified.  So that isn't 
something that I would ever be able to get away with, but you 
can.  I could never get away with it."  I draw no conclusion 
related to the sincerity of Attorney Eisenberg's compliment of 
the OLR.  However, in context, Attorney Eisenberg's isolated 
compliment of the OLR does not offset his otherwise improper 
understanding of the rules of conduct.    
No.  2002AP386-D.jpw 
 
12 
 
the public as a person fit to be consulted by others and to 
represent them," SCR 22.29(4)(g). 
¶54 Attorney Eisenberg's conduct leading up to the hearing 
was described as intimidating.   The week before Attorney Ford 
appeared at the reinstatement hearing in opposition to Attorney 
Eisenberg's 
reinstatement, 
Attorney 
Eisenberg 
called 
her.  
According to Attorney Ford, Attorney Eisenberg said, "You know, 
I'm good friends with your law firm."  Attorney Ford stated that 
"during the course of [the] conversation, I started to feel, you 
know, I got the distinct impression that there was an attempt to 
intimidate me."   
¶55 The intimidating phone conversation with Attorney Ford 
alone may not be enough for this court to not reinstate his 
license, but it indicates concern about his conduct during his 
suspension.  At the very least, it makes me hesitate to join an 
opinion that declares that Attorney Eisenberg's conduct has been 
"exemplary and above reproach." 
¶56 Related to safely recommending Attorney Eisenberg to 
the legal profession, courts and clients, his testimony at his 
reinstatement hearing indicates he is ill-equipped to return to 
his practice.  Specifically, he testified that during his 
suspension he "attempted to stay involved in constructive things 
that would keep him out of trouble . . . in activities that 
would not be adversarial."  He focused on real estate, which he 
described as "negotiating and bringing people together.  It 
doesn't involve getting people off of anything or advocating for 
the defense of people or anything like that or plaintiffs or 
No.  2002AP386-D.jpw 
 
13 
 
civil cases or anything.  It's just the opposite.  So that's one 
of the things that I spent a great deal of time."  He also said 
the following about his latest suspension: "it's brought me to 
the realization that when people do things to stress me out, I 
can't handle [them] the way [I did] when I was younger.  I'm 
much more stressed out now about these kinds of things than I 
was when I was a younger man." 
¶57 For a person that has such a disastrous history with 
disciplinary problems, this is more than a little troubling.  
When he was a "younger man" he got suspended only four years 
after being admitted to practice law for behavior that is 
nothing short of offensive.  The offensive behavior he exhibited 
as a "younger man" has remained a hallmark of his practice of 
law for almost 40 years.  A district attorney, in explaining why 
he 
had 
made 
the 
effort 
to 
oppose 
Attorney 
Eisenberg's 
reinstatement, said, "it's his lack of civility.  It is his 
abrasive approach."     
¶58 If he has avoided all adversarial situations during 
his suspension, and gets more stressed out now than when he was 
younger, it seems difficult to conclude that Attorney Eisenberg 
has satisfied his burden of proving that he "can safely be 
recommended to the legal profession, the courts and the public 
as a person fit to be consulted by others and to represent them 
and otherwise act in matters of trust and confidence and in 
general to aid in the administration of justice as a member of 
the bar and as an officer of the courts."  SCR 22.29(4)(g). 
 
No.  2002AP386-D.jpw 
 
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III. 
CONCLUSION 
¶59 Based on Attorney Eisenberg's own words at his 
reinstatement hearing, he failed to satisfy his SCR 22.31(1) 
burden.  First, he has an improper understanding of the rules 
that apply to attorneys.  Second, he failed to exhibit exemplary 
conduct during his suspension.  Finally, he cannot be safely 
recommended 
to 
the 
profession, 
the 
courts, 
or 
clients.  
Accordingly, he should not be reinstated at this time.  I 
respectfully dissent. 
¶60 I am authorized to state that Justices N. PATRICK 
CROOKS and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join this dissent. 
 
No.  2002AP386-D.jpw 
 
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