Case Title: State v. Philip Warren

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1997AP000851

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 1998-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
Case No.: 
96-2441 and 97-0851 
 
 
Complete Title 
of Case: 
 
96-2441: 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Philip I. Warren,  
 
Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
v. 
David H. Schwarz, in his capacity as 
Administrator, Department of Administration, 
Division of Hearings and Appeals,  
 
Respondent-Respondent. 
_____________________________________________ 
 
97-0851 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
v. 
Philip Warren, 
 
Defendant-Appellant. 
  
96-2441: 
ON REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Reported at 211 Wis. 2d 708, 566 N.W.2d 173 
 
 
 
(Ct. App. 1997-PUBLISHED) 
97-0851: 
ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
Opinion Filed: 
July 1, 1998 
Submitted on Briefs: 
 
Oral Argument: 
April 28, 1998 
 
 
Source of APPEAL 
 
COURT: 
Circuit 
 
COUNTY: 
Richland 
 
JUDGE: 
Kent C. Houck 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
Concurred: 
 
 
Dissented: 
 
 
Not Participating:  
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
96-2441:  For the petitioner there were briefs by 
Ralph A. Kalal and Kalal & Associates, Madison and oral argument 
by Ralph A. Kalal. 
 
For the respondent-respondent, the cause was argued by Marguerite 
M. Moeller, assistant attorney general, with whom on the brief 
was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
 
97-0851:  For the defendant-appellant there was a 
brief and oral argument by David D. Cook, Monroe. 
 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent the cause was argued 
by Michael R. Klos, assistant attorney general, with whom on the 
brief was James E. Doyle, attorney general. 
 
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
1 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further editing and 
modification.  The final version will appear in 
the bound volume of the official reports. 
 
 
Nos.  96-2441, 97-0851  
 
STATE OF WISCONSIN               :        
        
 
 
 
 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin ex rel. Philip I.  
Warren,  
 
          Petitioner-Appellant-Petitioner, 
 
     v. 
 
David H. Schwarz, in his capacity as  
Administrator, Department of  
Administration, Division of Hearings and  
Appeals,  
 
          Respondent-Respondent.  
FILED 
 
JUL 1, 1998 
 
Marilyn L. Graves 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
Madison, WI 
 
 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Philip Warren,  
 
          Defendant-Appellant.  
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.  Affirmed.   
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Richland County, 
Kent C. Houck, Judge.  Affirmed. 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   These cases have arrived at the 
court's threshold from divergent paths.  Case No. 96-2441 is a 
review of a published decision of the court of appeals, State ex 
rel. Warren v. Schwarz, 211 Wis. 2d 708, 566 N.W.2d 173 (Ct. 
App. 1997), which affirmed an order of the circuit court for 
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
2 
Richland County, Kent C. Houck, Judge.  The circuit court 
affirmed a decision of the Department of Administration, 
Division of Hearings and Appeals (Department), revoking the 
defendant Philip Warren's (Warren) probation. 
¶2 
Our review of the court of appeals' decision presents 
only one issue: was Warren's right to due process violated when 
the State of Wisconsin (State), following Warren's entry of an 
Alford plea, later revoked his probation for failing to 
successfully complete a sex offender treatment program which 
required him to admit his guilt?  We hold that Warren's right to 
due process was not violated by the revocation of his probation 
and, accordingly, we affirm the decision of the court of 
appeals. 
¶3 
Case No. 97-0851 is before the court on certification 
from the court of appeals following an order of the circuit 
court for Richland County, Kent C. Houck, Judge.  In this case, 
the circuit court denied Warren's motions for post-conviction 
relief and for appointment of counsel.  On certification, we 
consider the following issues: (1) Did the circuit court's 
failure to inform Warren at the time of his Alford plea that he 
would be required to admit his guilt during a sex offender 
treatment program render that plea unknowing and involuntary in 
violation of his right to due process; (2) did the State violate 
the terms of the Alford plea agreement when it revoked Warren's 
probation for failing to admit his guilt; (3) did the circuit 
court properly conclude that the evidence against Warren 
provided "strong proof of guilt" justifying acceptance of an 
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
3 
Alford plea; and (4) was the circuit required as a matter of due 
process to appoint counsel to represent Warren at the post-
conviction proceedings in this case? 
¶4 
We hold first that the circuit court's failure to 
inform Warren at the time of his Alford plea that he would have 
to admit his guilt during a probationary sex offender treatment 
program did not render his Alford plea unknowing or involuntary. 
 Second, we hold that the State did not violate the terms of the 
Alford plea agreement when it revoked Warren's probation for 
failing to admit his guilt.  Third, we hold that the circuit 
court properly concluded that the evidence before it established 
"strong proof of guilt" so as to justify acceptance of Warren's 
Alford plea.  Finally, we hold that the circuit court was not 
required as a matter of due process to appoint counsel to 
represent Warren at the post-conviction proceedings in this 
case.  Accordingly, we affirm the order of the circuit court. 
¶5 
The facts relevant to our disposition of both cases, 
though lengthy, are not in dispute.  On February 26, 1990, 
Warren was charged with two counts of sexual assault of a child, 
J.K., the ten year old daughter of a woman with whom Warren had 
lived in 1989.  On March 20, 1990, the circuit court held a 
preliminary hearing at which J.K. testified.  J.K. began her 
testimony by indicating that on more than one occasion, Warren 
had "touch[ed] me in the wrong places."  She then proceeded to 
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
4 
describe the events of a particular incident which occurred 
sometime after May 22, 1989, in more detail:1 
 
Q:  Okay.  Can you tell us what happened that dayhow 
the whole thing started out? 
 
A:  Well, I was watching t.v. and he told me to come 
over on the couch. 
 
Q:  Okay.  And after he told you to come over to the 
couch, what happened? 
 
A:  He started touching me. 
 
Q:  And where did he touch you? 
 
A:  On my breasts and on my crotch. 
 
Q:  How long did this touching go on? 
 
A:  Fifteen to twenty minutes. 
 
. . . 
 
Q:  When you say that Phil gives you bad touches, what 
do you mean? 
 
A:  Like rubbing. 
 
Q:  And where does he do it?  Where does he rub you? 
 
A:  My crotch. 
¶6 
Later, J.K. proceeded to describe the particulars of a 
separate and discrete incident: 
 
Q:  Okay.  Now what was the second time? 
 
. . .  
 
                     
1 These portions of the preliminary hearing testimony appear 
in Record on Appeal, No. 97-0851 at 63 (Prelim. Hrg. March 20, 
1990).  
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
5 
A:  He was in the bedroom. 
 
Q:  Okay.  And what happened that time? 
 
A:  He told me to come in there. 
 
Q:  Okay.  And after he told you to come in, what 
happened? 
 
A:  He told me to lay down on the bed. 
 
Q:  Okay.  And after he told you to lay down on the 
bed, what happened? 
 
A:  He started touching me. 
 
Q:  And where did he touch you? 
 
A:  My breasts and my crotch. 
When asked upon cross-examination whether she would "describe 
this touching by Phil more like tickling," J.K. responded, "No." 
¶7 
The circuit court also received testimony from Officer 
Virginia Cupp (Cupp), who related to the court statements made 
by J.K. at an interview conducted in February of 1990.2  
According to Cupp, J.K. told her that Warren "unzipped, 
unbuttoned and upzipped her pants and put his handsand as I 
remember she describes more like two or three fingersin her 
crotch area underneath her underpants." 
¶8 
Following the preliminary hearing, a plea hearing was 
held on July 10, 1990.  At the hearing, Warren entered an Alford 
plea to one of the sexual assault counts, and the State agreed 
to dismiss the remaining count.  Before accepting the plea, the 
                     
2 The hearsay implications of Officer Cupp's testimony were 
resolved in the circuit court, and are not a subject before us 
on review.  
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
6 
circuit court informed Warren of the important rights he was 
waiving, questioned defense counsel on the voluntariness of 
Warren's plea, and cautioned the defendant that his probation 
would be revoked if he failed to complete the terms of his 
probation.  The following exchange then occurred: 
 
THE COURT: . . . 
 
One other thing that I should perhaps address.  In the 
event that the Court grants probation, probable [sic] 
or very likely one item that is going to be ordered is 
counseling, and you will be expected to enter into 
good 
faith 
counseling 
as 
part 
of 
the 
term 
of 
probation, and that carries with itI realize that 
you, by making your plea of no contest, are not 
admitting anything in court, but you still would have 
an obligation to enter into counseling in good faith 
with the counselor, the psychiatrist, or doctor, 
whoever, so that's something that you should realize. 
 Now, given all of the things that I told you about 
the effect of your plea, do you have any questions 
about it? 
 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  No, your Honor. 
Record on Appeal, No. 96-2441 at 8:68 (Plea Hrg. July 10, 1990). 
¶9 
Following 
this colloquy with the 
defendant, the 
circuit court concluded that the testimony at the preliminary 
hearing on March 20, 1990, was sufficient to constitute strong 
proof of guilt as required by an Alford plea.  Accordingly, the 
circuit court accepted the plea and entered a judgment of 
conviction against Warren for sexual assault of a child. 
¶10 On November 5, 1990, the circuit court imposed a five-
year prison sentence, which it stayed in favor of an eight-year 
term of probation.  As a condition of that probation, the 
circuit court ordered that Warren obey the rules of the 
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
7 
probation department and "that he attend any and all counseling 
that is ordered by the Department [of Corrections] including an 
alcohol and drug 
assessment, psychological 
or 
psychiatric 
assessment; and that he follow all the recommendations that any 
study or any counselor comes up with."  Record on Appeal, No. 
97-0851 at 66:17 (Sentencing Hrg. Nov. 5, 1990). 
¶11 After 
being 
sentenced, 
Warren 
served 
under 
probationary supervision for approximately five years.  During 
this time, he participated in the Attic Correctional Services' 
Denial Focus Sex Offender Group on three separate occasions in 
1991, 1992 and 1995.3  Although Warren attended every session and 
participated in the group discussions, he consistently and 
repeatedly denied any culpability in his conviction for sexual 
assault of a child.4 
¶12 In apparent response to his unwillingness to take 
responsibility for his actions, Warren's probation rules were 
amended on April 3, 1995, to include Rule 15F, which stated: 
"You 
shall 
enter 
and 
successfully 
complete 
sex 
offender 
treatment groups at an approved outpatient treatment program, 
attend weekly, and abide by the rules of the contract . . . ."  
                     
3 The program director for Attic's Madison office testified 
that the main goal of the group is to "break denial."  Record on 
Appeal, No. 96-2441 at 17:6 (Prob. Revocation Hrg. Nov. 10, 
1995).  The requirement that Warren complete the Attic group 
first appeared as a rule of probation on March 27, 1991. 
4 One counselor noted that he "continues to portray himself 
as the victim of an over-zealous judicial system that trumped up 
molestation charges against him . . . ."  Record on Appeal, No. 
96-2441 at 8:10 (Attic Correctional Servs. Mem. Sept. 27, 1995). 
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
8 
Record on Appeal, No. 96-2441 at 8:35 (Amended Probation/Parole 
Rules April 3, 1995). 
¶13 On December 11, 1995, the Department revoked Warren's 
probation for failure to admit his guilt during counseling, and 
ordered Warren to begin serving the five year sentence imposed 
in 1990.5  The following month, Warren sought review of the 
Department's revocation decision by petition for writ of 
certiorari in the Richland County Circuit Court pursuant to Wis. 
Stat. § 781.01 (1993-94).  Raising substantially the same 
arguments which he presents to this court, Warren sought to be 
placed back on probation.  Finding "no merit in [Warren's] 
contention that he has a special right to maintain his denial 
during treatment because he was allowed to enter an Alford 
plea," the circuit court affirmed the Department's decision to 
revoke Warren's probation.  Record on Appeal, No. 96-2441 at 
12:2 (Mem. Decision July 25, 1996). 
¶14 Upon review of Warren's subsequent appeal, the court 
of appeals affirmed.  The court reasoned that entry of an Alford 
plea does not imply an assurance that the defendant will not 
have to admit his guilt during the conviction or punishment 
phases of his prosecution.  See Warren, 211 Wis. 2d at 718.  The 
court also rejected Warren's argument that the Department failed 
                     
5 Specifically, 
the 
Department 
listed 
one 
reason 
for 
revoking Warren's probation: "On or about 08/31/95, Philip I. 
Warren failed to successfully complete the Attic's Denial Focus 
Sex Offender Group in violation of rule #15f of the Rules of 
Probation and Parole signed on 04/03/95."  Record on Appeal, No. 
96-2441 at 8:90 (Admin. Decision Nov. 17, 1995).  
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
9 
to explore the alternatives it had to revocation of his 
probation.  See id. at 727.  We granted Warren's petition for 
review on October 14, 1997, and now affirm.  Additional facts 
which are relevant to our disposition of Case No. 97-0851 are 
set forth below. 
¶15 On October 9, 1996, Warren filed a post-conviction 
motion pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 974.06 (1995-96),6 and a motion 
for appointment of counsel.  At the post-conviction hearing on 
October 30, 1996, Warren testified that he would not have 
entered an Alford plea if he had known that he would have to 
admit his guilt during probationary counseling.  He therefore 
sought to withdraw his plea. 
¶16 The circuit court subsequently denied Warren's motion 
to withdraw his plea on grounds that the plea colloquy was 
sufficient to inform the defendant of the required counseling.  
Second, the court determined that there was no breach of a plea 
agreement 
since 
the 
court 
had 
informed 
Warren 
of 
the 
consequences of violating his terms of probation.  Third, the 
circuit court reassessed the strength of the preliminary hearing 
evidence and determined that the preliminary hearing provided 
sufficient basis for the court's finding of strong proof of 
guilt. 
 
Finally, 
the 
court 
denied 
Warren's 
motion 
for 
appointment of counsel.  Warren appealed from the circuit 
court's final order. 
                     
6 All future statutory references are to the 1995-96 volume 
unless otherwise noted.  
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
10
¶17 The court of appeals certified the case to this court 
pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61.  On December 16, 1997, 
we granted the court of appeals' request for certification, and 
consolidated the cases for our review.  We now affirm. 
DUE PROCESS CHALLENGE 
¶18 The first issue we consider is whether Warren's right 
to due process7 was violated when the State, following Warren's 
entry of an Alford plea, later revoked his probation for failing 
to successfully complete a sex offender treatment program which 
required him to admit his guilt.  Appellate review of a 
probation revocation by the Department is limited to four 
inquiries: (1) whether the Department acted within the bounds of 
its jurisdiction; (2) whether it acted according to law; (3) 
whether its action was arbitrary, oppressive, or unreasonable 
and represented its will, not its judgment; and (4) whether the 
evidence was sufficient that the Department might reasonably 
make the determination that it did.  See Van Ermen v. State, 84 
Wis. 2d 57, 63, 267 N.W.2d 17 (1978); Von Arx v. Schwarz, 185 
Wis. 2d 645, 655, 517 N.W.2d 540 (Ct. App. 1994). 
                     
7 The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law."  This court 
has interpreted Wis. Const. art. I, § 1, of the Wisconsin 
Constitution to be the "functional equivalent" of the federal 
provision.  See, e.g., Reginald D. v. State, 193 Wis. 2d 299, 
306-307, 533 N.W.2d 181 (1995) (citations omitted).  Article I, 
§ 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution provides: "All people are born 
equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights; 
among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; to 
secure these rights, governments are instituted, deriving their 
just powers from the consent of the governed."  Wis. Const. art. 
I, § 1. 
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
11
¶19 Today's decision requires an examination of the second 
inquiry: whether the Department acted according to law.  Because 
Warren alleges that the Department's enforcement of a particular 
condition of probation violated his constitutional right to due 
process, we are presented with a question of law which we review 
de novo, without deference to the conclusions of the circuit 
court or the court of appeals.  See State v. Carrizales, 191 
Wis. 2d 85, 92, 528 N.W.2d 29 (Ct. App. 1995); State v. Miller, 
175 Wis. 2d 204, 208, 499 N.W.2d 215 (Ct. App. 1993). 
¶20 Warren's due process argument requires this court to 
tangle with the fundamental principle upon which all Alford 
pleas 
turn: 
that 
an 
accused 
may 
plead 
guilty, 
while 
simultaneously protesting his or her innocence.  The plea finds 
its roots in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), where 
the defendant affirmatively protested his innocence, yet pled 
guilty to second-degree murder in order to avoid the death 
penalty he may have otherwise received.  See id. at 26-29.  The 
Supreme Court upheld the trial court's acceptance of such a 
plea, and stated: 
 
while most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver of 
trial and an express admission of guilt, the latter 
element is not a constitutional requisite to the 
imposition of criminal penalty.  An individual accused 
of 
crime 
may 
voluntarily, 
knowingly, 
and 
understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison 
sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit 
his participation in the acts constituting the crime. 
Id. at 37. 
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
12
¶21 The Alford plea, though not uncontroversial,8 has been 
accepted in Wisconsin.  See State v. Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d 845, 
532 N.W.2d 111 (1995); State v. Johnson, 105 Wis. 2d 657, 314 
N.W.2d 897 (Ct. App. 1981).  See also State v. Smith, 202 
Wis. 2d 21, 549 N.W.2d 232 (1996).  Warren argues that 
acceptance of an Alford plea necessarily contemplates that 
defendants will be allowed to maintain their factual innocence, 
even while completing the terms of probation which have been 
imposed upon them.  In Warren's terms, "the State cannot be 
allowed to act inconsistently with the bargains which it makes 
to induce a guilty plea in a criminal case."  Warren Brief, No. 
96-2441 at 17.  We disagree. 
¶22 Before addressing these arguments, however, we first 
clarify the practical effect, and legal consequence, of an 
Alford plea.  An Alford plea is a guilty plea in the same way 
                     
8 See, e.g., State v. Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d 845, 869, 532 
N.W.2d 111 (1995) (Wilcox, J., concurring) (recommending "that 
the trial courts in this state act with great reticence when 
confronted with an Alford plea."); Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 advisory 
committee note, "1974 Amendment" ("The defendant who asserts his 
innocence while pleading guilty or nolo contendere is often 
difficult to deal with in a correctional setting, and it may 
therefore be preferable to resolve the issue of guilt or 
innocence at the trial stage rather than leaving that issue 
unresolved, 
thus 
complicating 
subsequent 
correctional 
decisions.").  Cf. Curtis J. Shipley, Note, The Alford Plea: A 
Necessary but Unpredictable Tool for the Criminal Defendant, 72 
Iowa L. Rev. 1063, 1089 (1987) (concluding that "[t]he Alford 
plea is a necessary option for the criminal defendant within the 
context of the plea bargaining system.").  For a discussion of 
the pros and cons of accepting Alford pleas, see generally 2 
David Rossman, Criminal Law Advocacy ¶ 9 (1995). 
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
13
that a plea of nolo contendere or no contest is a guilty plea.9  
Alford itself makes this clear: 
 
The fact that [Alford's] plea was denominated a plea 
of guilty rather than a plea of nolo contendere is of 
no constitutional significance with respect to the 
issue now before us, for the Constitution is concerned 
with 
the 
practical 
consequences, 
not 
the 
formal 
categorizations, of state law. 
. . . 
. . . [W]e [do not] perceive any material 
difference between a plea that refuses to admit 
commission of the criminal act and a plea containing a 
protestation of innocence when, as in the instant 
case, a defendant intelligently concludes that his 
interests require entry of a guilty plea and the 
record before the judge contains strong evidence of 
actual guilt. 
Alford, 400 U.S. at 37. 
¶23 We have frequently held that a plea of no contest 
places the defendant in the same position as though he had been 
found guilty by the verdict of a jury.  See, e.g., State v. 
Rachwal, 159 Wis. 2d 494, 503-504 n.6, 465 N.W.2d 490 (1991); 
Ellsworth v. State, 258 Wis. 636, 638-39, 46 N.W.2d 746 (1951); 
Brozosky v. State, 197 Wis. 446, 450, 222 N.W. 311 (1928).  The 
same is true for an Alford pleaa view supported by the 
Wisconsin Jury Instructions.  See Wis JICriminal SM-32A at 10 
(1995) ("There is no doubt that an Alford plea supports a fully 
                     
9 The key distinction between the two pleas is that "[a]n 
Alford plea goes beyond a no contest plea in the sense that the 
former involves an outright claim of innocence while the latter 
involves something less than an express admission of guilt."  
Wis JICriminal SM-32A at 1 (1995).  
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
14
effective criminal judgment.  This is especially clear since a 
true Alford plea is a plea of guilty."). 
¶24 These considerations lead us to conclude that when the 
State required Warren to admit to the sexual assault in this 
case,10 it did not act inconsistently with the "bargain" it had 
made to "induce" his guilty plea.  A defendant's protestations 
of innocence under an Alford plea extend only to the plea 
itself. 
¶25 A defendant may choose to enter an Alford plea for 
various reasons.  He may wish to take advantage of the state's 
offer for a reduced sentence.  He may wish to spare himself or 
his family of the expense and embarrassment of a trial.  
Whatever the reason for entering an Alford plea, the fact 
remains that when a defendant enters such a plea, he becomes a 
                     
10 It is a central tenet of sex offender treatment to 
require the offender to admit his or her guilt.  See, e.g., 
State v. Carrizales, 191 Wis. 2d 85, 95, 528 N.W.2d 29 (Ct. App. 
1995) ("[C]ounselors view this admission as a first step toward 
rehabilitation" since "untreated sex offenders pose a risk in 
the community" and a defendant's "refusal to admit guilt makes 
it difficult for his probation officer to ensure the safety of 
the community."); Barbara E. Smith, et al., The Probation 
Response to Child Sexual Abuse Offenders: How is it Working? at 
8 (ABA Study January 1990) ("With few exceptions, the therapists 
interviewed said they would not accept anyone in their program 
who absolutely denied sexual conduct with children."); Kim 
English, et al., Managing Adult Sex Offenders in the CommunityA 
Containment Approach at 5 (Nat'l Inst. Justice January 1997) 
("In pursuing safe and effective treatment of sex offenders in 
the community, therapists must obtain full disclosure of 
offenders' sexual histories.").  This requirement, like any 
other condition of probation, serves the goals of rehabilitation 
and protection of the state and community interest.  See 
Carrizales, 191 Wis. 2d at 93. 
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
15
convicted sex offender and is treated no differently than he 
would be had he gone to trial and been convicted by a jury. 
¶26 On this point, we agree with the conclusions of both 
the circuit court and the court of appeals.  The circuit court 
stated: 
 
[t]here are no grades of conviction in the criminal 
law of Wisconsin.  If a person is convicted, after an 
Alford plea is accepted, they stand convicted in the 
same manner as a person who has had a full jury trial. 
 All convicted persons are subject to the same rules 
laid down by the Department of Corrections if they are 
placed on probation or in an institution. 
Record on Appeal, No. 96-2441 at 12:2 (Mem. Decision July 25, 
1996). 
¶27 The court of appeals reached the same conclusion by 
stating: "An Alford plea does not imply a promise or assurance 
of anything. . . . There is nothing inherent in the nature of an 
Alford plea that gives a defendant any rights, or promises any 
limitations, with respect to the punishment imposed after the 
conviction."  Warren, 211 Wis. 2d at 718. 
¶28 These conclusions are well-founded.  Put simply, an 
Alford plea is not the saving grace for defendants who wish to 
maintain their complete innocence.  Rather, it is a device that 
defendants may call upon to avoid the expense, stress and 
embarrassment 
of 
trial 
and 
to 
limit 
one's 
exposure 
to 
punishment.  See Alford, 400 U.S. at 37; Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d at 
856-57. 
¶29 Warren argues that fundamental fairness principles of 
due process dictate that defendants who enter an Alford plea 
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
16
must have notice at the time the plea is entered that they will 
be required to admit to their offense in order to satisfy the 
terms of their probation.  Warren did not raise this "notice" 
argument before the court of appeals in Case No. 96-2441.  See 
generally Warren, 211 Wis. 2d 708.  Although we retain the 
discretion to do so, this court generally does not consider 
issues raised for the first time on appeal.  See Flynn v. Dep't 
of Admin., 216 Wis. 2d 520, 554, 576 N.W.2d 245 (1998) 
(citations omitted).  In this instance, we decline to address 
Warren's "notice" argument and its corresponding use of case law 
in Case No. 96-2441.11 
¶30 In sum, we hold that the revocation of Warren's 
probation for failure to admit his guilt after acceptance of his 
Alford plea did not violate 
his 
right to 
due process.  
Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeals in Case No. 
96-2441 is affirmed.12 
                     
11 We note that when asked at oral argument about the 
difference between his due process "notice" argument and his 
knowing and voluntary plea (due process) argument in Case No. 
97-0851, counsel for Warren conceded: "I think those arguments 
are basically the same argument." 
12 In two paragraphs of his reply brief, Warren asserts, as 
he did before the court of appeals, that the Department failed 
to explore all of its available alternatives to revocation 
before revoking Warren's probation in this case.  See Warren 
Reply Brief, No. 96-2441 at 11-12.  Because Warren does not 
raise this argument as a separate issue for our review, and 
because 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
adequately 
addressed 
this 
assertion, we find it unnecessary to comment further on this 
issue.  See State ex rel. Warren v. Schwarz, 211 Wis. 2d 708, 
721-28, 566 N.W.2d 173 (Ct. App. 1997). 
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
17
KNOWING AND VOLUNTARY ENTRY OF PLEA 
¶31 We next consider whether the circuit court's failure 
to inform Warren at the time of his Alford plea that he would be 
required to admit his guilt during a sex offender treatment 
program 
rendered 
that 
plea 
unknowing 
and 
involuntary 
in 
violation of his right to due process.  As a remedy for this 
claim, Warren seeks to withdraw his plea. 
¶32 Permitting  withdrawal of a guilty or no contest plea 
is a matter left to the circuit court's discretion.  Therefore 
the circuit court's decision to deny Warren's motion to withdraw 
his Alford plea will be upset only if the circuit court has 
erroneously exercised its discretion.  See State v. Johnson, 207 
Wis. 2d 239, 244, 558 N.W.2d 375 (1997); State v. Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d 246, 288-89, 389 N.W.2d 12 (1986); State v. Spears, 147 
Wis. 2d 429, 434, 433 N.W.2d 595 (Ct. App. 1988).  In order to 
sustain this discretionary decision, we must ensure that the 
circuit court's determination was made upon the facts of record 
and in reliance on the appropriate and applicable law.  Bangert, 
131 Wis. 2d at 289. 
¶33 After sentencing, a defendant who seeks to withdraw a 
guilty or no contest plea carries a heavy burden.  The defendant 
must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the circuit 
court should permit the defendant to withdraw the plea to 
correct a "manifest injustice."  See State v. Reppin, 35 Wis. 2d 
377, 385-86, 151 N.W.2d 9 (1967); State v. Krieger, 163 Wis. 2d 
241, 249, 471 N.W.2d 599 (Ct. App. 1991).  It is well-settled 
that 
a 
guilty 
plea 
must 
be 
knowingly, 
voluntarily 
and 
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
18
intelligently entered, see Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 
(1969); Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 257; a manifest injustice occurs 
when the plea is entered involuntarily, as Warren asserts here. 
 See, e.g., State v. James, 176 Wis. 2d 230, 237, 500 N.W.2d 347 
(Ct. App. 1993). 
¶34 In this case, we need not delve into the record to 
determine whether the circuit court followed the necessary 
procedures, since it is well-established that in informing 
defendants of their rights, courts are only required to notify 
them of the "direct consequences" of their pleas.  Brady v. 
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970).  Defendants do not have 
a due process right to be informed of consequences that are 
merely collateral to their pleas.  See State v. Santos, 136 
Wis. 2d 528, 531, 401 N.W.2d 856 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. 
Madison, 120 Wis. 2d 150, 159-161, 353 N.W.2d 835 (Ct. App. 
1984).  Therefore, we must determine whether the requirement 
that Warren would have to admit his guilt during offense-
specific probationary treatment is a direct or collateral 
consequence of his Alford plea. 
¶35 "The 
distinction 
between 
direct 
and 
collateral 
consequences of a plea . . . turns on whether the result 
represents a definite, immediate, and largely automatic effect 
on the range of the defendant's punishment."  James, 176 Wis. 2d 
at 238 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  When 
the challenged consequence of the plea does not "automatically 
flow" from the conviction, but rather will depend upon the 
defendant's psychological condition at a future proceeding, the 
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
19
consequence is collateral.  See State v. Myers, 199 Wis. 2d 391, 
394, 544 N.W.2d 609 (Ct. App. 1996). 
¶36 In Myers, the court of appeals held that the potential 
for a future Wis. Stat. ch. 980 sexual predator commitment 
following 
a 
sexual 
assault 
conviction 
was 
a 
collateral 
consequence which need not be part of a plea colloquy in order 
to make a defendant's guilty plea knowing and voluntary.  See 
id. at 394-95.  Although chapter 980 commitments require future 
trials and submission of evidence, see id., the same reasoning 
applies here. 
¶37 Warren's probation would not have been revoked had he 
admitted his guilt at the probationary treatment programs he 
attended 
during 
his 
five 
years 
on 
probation. 
 
Stated 
differently, the consequence of probation revocation for failure 
to admit guilt during sex offender counseling is not direct and 
immediate, or even "inevitable" as Warren asserts.  It will 
instead depend upon defendants' willingness to admit their guilt 
in a rehabilitative settinga situation which the circuit court, 
even if it is aware of all the consequences attendant to the 
commission of a sexual offense such as this one, could not be 
expected to anticipate or predict.13 
                     
13 We note the following statement by the circuit court at 
the post-conviction motion hearing on November 14, 1996: "The 
Court did not tell Mr. Warren specifically that if he didn't 
admit guilt, he would fail his counseling and be revoked.  Quite 
frankly, the Court didn't tell him that because the Court didn't 
necessarily know that, but in any event, I think I warned him 
that he would have to go through counseling."  Record on Appeal, 
No. 97-0851 at 68:27 (Motion Hrg. Nov. 14, 1996).  
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
20
¶38 In James, the court of appeals held that resentencing 
upon revocation of one's probation is only a collateral 
consequence to a no contest plea.  See James, 176 Wis. 2d at 
243-44.  Because the consequence of the defendant's plea was 
"contingent on his own behavior," it was "neither a definite, 
immediate, nor largely automatic consequence of his plea but 
only a collateral consequence of which the trial court was not 
bound to inform him."  Id. at 244. 
¶39 In the same way, Warren's probation revocation for 
failure to admit his guilt in treatment was: (1) not definite, 
since some defendants who are unwilling to admit their guilt at 
the plea stage might conceivably be amenable to treatment at the 
rehabilitation stage; (2) not immediate, either in time or in 
impact, since the revocation was contingent upon intervening 
circumstances; and (3) not automatic, since the ability to abide 
by the conditions of probation was well within Warren's 
control.14 
¶40 Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court was not 
required to inform Warren that his probation could be revoked 
for failing to take responsibility for his actions because it 
                     
14 Warren argues that James is of no comfort to the State's 
argument because unlike the defendant in James, Warren's 
behavior after conviction did not changehe continued to 
maintain his innocence as he had always done.  Warren's argument 
is based upon the same faulty premise we rejected in Case No. 
96-2441: that an Alford plea gives a defendant the right to 
maintain his innocence after conviction. 
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
21
was only a collateral consequence of his conviction.  Our 
conclusion is further supported by policy considerations. 
¶41 As the facts of this case make clear, not all 
conditions of probation are imposed at the time the guilty plea 
is entered.15  To require the circuit courts to determine and 
inform the defendant of the current policies of the Department 
of Corrections every time a plea is entered would be both 
unreasonable and impractical.  A circuit court's plea colloquy 
cannot reasonably be expected to encompass all treatment and 
conditions of probation which the defendant might need in the 
future.  The Department of Corrections must be given latitude to 
assess the particular needs of a given defendant, as he or she 
proceeds through the term of probation.  By doing so, the 
Department of Corrections may best serve the twin goals of 
probation: rehabilitation and safety to the community.  See 
Carrizales, 191 Wis. 2d at 95-96. 
¶42 Warren cites four cases from foreign jurisdictions to 
support 
the 
proposition 
that 
the 
State 
cannot 
revoke 
a 
defendant's probation for failing to admit guilt in treatment 
when he or she was not informed of this requirement at the time 
of the Alford plea.  See People v. Birdsong, 937 P.2d 877 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1996); Diaz v. State, 629 So. 2d 261 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1993); State v. Jones, 926 P.2d 1318 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996); 
                     
15 The record shows that the Department of Corrections 
amended Warren's probation rules at least 13 times during his 
five year period of probation.  
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
22
People v. Walters, 627 N.Y.S.2d 289 (Cty. Ct. 1995).  We are not 
persuaded by the foreign authority upon which Warren relies.  
¶43 We begin by noting that the decision by the Colorado 
Court of Appeals has recently been reversed.  See People v. 
Birdsong, No. 96SC828, 1998 WL 251473 (Colo. May 18, 1998).  In 
that case, the defendant, Birdsong, entered an Alford plea to 
third degree sexual assault in exchange for dismissal of other 
felony sexual assault counts.  See id. at *1.  The trial court 
accepted his plea, and imposed a four-year sentence of probation 
conditioned upon Birdsong's successful completion of offense-
specific therapy.  See id. at *1-*2.  By the time that Birdsong 
entered his plea, he had already attended approximately one year 
of sex offender treatment, see id., and thus had actual 
knowledge of the requirements of the sex offender program.  See 
id. at *9 (Scott, J., concurring). 
¶44 When Birdsong failed to admit his guilt during 
subsequent therapy sessions, the trial court revoked his 
probation.  See id. at *2.  Upon review of this decision, the 
court of appeals reversed the probation revocation; the court 
concluded that acceptance of an Alford plea was directly 
inconsistent with a finding that refusal to admit guilt 
constituted a probation violation.  See id. at *3. 
¶45 The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed, relying in 
part on the court of appeals' decision in this case.  See id. at 
*6-*7 ("We find [the Warren court's] reasoning to be wholly 
consistent 
with 
that 
expressed 
by 
the 
Supreme 
Court 
in 
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
23
Alford.").  Although the case is not directly on point,16 the 
Birdsong court shares our view of an Alford plea's significance. 
 The court rejected Birdsong's argument that the plea was 
deficient because the trial court failed to advise him that he 
would have to admit guilt in order to complete treatment, and 
stated: 
 
[w]e view the case differently from the court of 
appeals.  An Alford plea is a guilty plea.  As such, 
the trial court's obligations to advise the defendant 
were no greater than with any other guilty plea. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . [T]he specific requirements of a treatment 
program and the harmony between those requirements and 
the defendant's perception of his guilt does not fall 
within the aegis of the trial court's necessary 
advisement to the defendant. 
Id. at *3, *4. 
¶46 The Colorado Supreme Court further explained that the 
trial court did not have to inform the defendant that his 
probation might be revoked for failing to admit his guilt 
because it was not a direct consequence of the Alford plea: 
 
Here, the possibility that Birdsong's probation would 
be revoked if he continued to maintain innocence as to 
his motives for the inappropriate contact with his 
daughter is not a direct consequence.  Viewed from the 
perspective of the time of the providency hearing, 
revocation would certainly not be automatic, for an 
individual might be willing to admit to something in a 
therapeutic setting but not in a court of law.  
                     
16 The most distinguishing characteristic of the Birdsong 
decision is that the defendant in that case had, as we have 
indicated, actual knowledge of the particular requirements of 
the sex offender treatment program he was obliged to complete.  
See People v. Birdsong, No. 96SC828, 1998 WL 251473, at *2, *9 
(Scott, J., concurring) (Colo. May 18, 1998). 
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
24
Additionally, we do not expect a trial court to 
maintain working familiarity with all requirements of 
certain types of treatment programs so as to be able 
to advise defendants with particularity about those 
requirements 
before 
accepting 
pleas 
that 
involve 
probation.  That responsibility falls to the defendant 
and his or her counsel. 
Id. at *5.  This reasoning is clearly applicable to the facts of 
this case. 
¶47 The remaining decisions upon which Warren relies are 
largely inapposite.  Diaz is of little assistance to our present 
inquiry because the defendant pled guilty in that case.  
Moreover, 
the 
primary 
defect 
in 
the 
revocation 
of 
the 
defendant's probation was the trial court's failure to make 
counseling a condition of probation.  See Diaz, 629 So. 2d at 
261-62.  Neither Jones nor Walters involve a knowing and 
voluntary plea analysis which distinguishes between direct and 
collateral consequences of an Alford plea.  See generally Jones, 
926 P.2d 1318; Walters, 627 N.Y.S.2d 289. 
¶48 In sum, we conclude that Warren's entry of an Alford 
plea in this case was not rendered unknowing and involuntary by 
the circuit court's failure to inform him that he would be 
required to admit his guilt during probationary treatment.  We 
now proceed to address Warren's argument that the State breached 
its plea agreement by revoking his probation. 
BREACH OF PLEA AGREEMENT 
¶49 Warren next argues that the State breached the Alford 
plea agreement and thereby violated his right to due process 
when it revoked his probation solely on his continued assertion 
of innocence.  In this case, Warren concedes that the facts 
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
25
relating to the terms of the plea agreement and the prosecutor's 
actions after sentencing are not in dispute.  Therefore, this is 
a question of law which we review de novo, without deference to 
the conclusions of the circuit court.  See State v. Wills, 193 
Wis. 2d 273, 277, 533 N.W.2d 165 (1995); State v. Ferguson, 166 
Wis. 2d 317, 320-21, 479 N.W.2d 241 (Ct. App. 1991). 
¶50 The plea stage of a criminal prosecution, 
 
and the adjudicative element inherent in accepting a 
plea of guilty, must be attended by safeguards to 
insure the defendant what is reasonably due in the 
circumstances.  Those circumstances will vary, but a 
constant factor is that when a plea rests in any 
significant degree on a promise or agreement of the 
prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the 
inducement or consideration, such promise must be 
fulfilled. 
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).  This concept 
is grounded in a defendant's constitutional right to due 
process.  See State v. Castillo, 205 Wis. 2d 599, 607, 556 
N.W.2d 425 (Ct. App. 1996), review dismissed as improvidently 
granted, 213 Wis. 2d 488, 570 N.W.2d 44 (1997); State v. Bond, 
139 Wis. 2d 179, 188, 407 N.W.2d 277 (Ct. App. 1987). 
¶51 The party seeking to vacate a plea agreement must 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that a "material and 
substantial" breach of the agreement has occurred.  Bangert, 131 
Wis. 2d at 289; State v. Jorgensen, 137 Wis. 2d 163, 168, 404 
N.W.2d 66 (Ct. App. 1987).  We are satisfied that Warren has not 
met this burden here. 
¶52 The record is devoid of any suggestion that Warren was 
promised by the circuit court or the State that he would not 
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
26
have to admit his guilt during probationary treatment.  As the 
court of appeals noted in Case No. 96-2441:  
 
the only comments by the court in this regard informed 
Warren that his not having to "admit . . . anything in 
court" did not affect his obligation to enter in good 
faith into the counseling that would likely be imposed 
as a condition of confinement.  And it is undisputed 
that that probation agent consistently expressed to 
Warren that he did have to admit responsibility for 
the assault in order to successfully complete the 
counseling that was a condition of his probation. 
Warren, 211 Wis. 2d at 718-19. 
¶53 Warren argues that following the entry of his plea, he 
did nothing that would justify the State's "change of position" 
with regard to its promise of a non-custodial sentence: he 
simply continued to assert his innocence as he had always done. 
 In doing so, he cites two cases for the proposition that the 
State must adhere to promised sentence recommendations after the 
original sentence proceeding.  See Castillo, 205 Wis. 2d 599; 
State v. Windom, 169 Wis. 2d 341, 485 N.W.2d 832 (Ct. App. 
1992). 
¶54 We need not examine these cases in detail, because 
once again, Warren's argument is based upon the faulty premise 
that an Alford plea is a promise that a defendant will never 
have to admit his guilt.  Because an Alford plea is not infused 
with any special promises, the State did not "change its 
position" when it revoked his probation for failing to admit 
guilt during probationary treatment. 
¶55 Because the State never promised or assured Warren 
that he would be able to maintain his innocence for purposes 
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
27
other than the plea itself, we conclude that the State did not 
breach its Alford plea agreement with Warren when it revoked his 
probation in this case. 
"STRONG PROOF OF GUILT" 
¶56 "Ordinarily, a judgment of conviction resting on a 
plea of guilty is justified by the defendant's admission that he 
committed the crime charged against him and his consent that 
judgment be entered without a trial of any kind."  Alford, 400 
U.S. at 32.  The situation changes, however, when the defendant 
enters an Alford plea as Warren has done here.  See id. at 37; 2 
David Rossman, Criminal Law Advocacy ¶ 4.02 (1995).  To accept 
an Alford plea in Wisconsin, the circuit court must determine 
that the summary of the evidence the state would offer at trial 
constitutes "strong proof of guilt."  See Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d at 
859-60; Johnson, 105 Wis. 2d at 663.  See also Alford, 400 U.S. 
at 37.17  Because the determination of the existence of a 
sufficient factual basis lies within the discretion of the 
circuit court, we will not overturn that determination unless it 
is clearly erroneous.  See Smith, 202 Wis. 2d at 25. 
                     
17 "The requirement of a higher level of proof in Alford 
pleas is necessitated by the fact that the evidence has to be 
strong enough to overcome a defendant's 'protestations' of 
innocence."  State v. Smith, 202 Wis. 2d 21, 27, 549 N.W.2d 232 
(1996).  As we noted in Garcia, the requirement of "strong proof 
of guilt," together with the procedural safeguards afforded by 
Wis. Stat. § 971.08 and applicable review if the statute is not 
followed, "are sufficient to assure that an Alford plea is 
entered in a constitutionally acceptable manner."  Garcia, 192 
Wis. 2d at 859-60. 
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
28
¶57 "Strong proof of guilt" is not the equivalent of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, but it is "clearly greater than what 
is needed to meet the factual basis requirement under a guilty 
plea."  Smith, 202 Wis. 2d at 27; Spears, 147 Wis. 2d at 435.  
The Johnson court provided more insight into what constitutes a 
sufficient factual basis to accept an Alford plea.  See Johnson, 
105 Wis. 2d at 664.  In that case, the court of appeals examined 
the record to determine whether a "sufficient factual basis was 
established at the plea proceeding to substantially negate [the] 
defendant's claim of innocence."  Id.  We agree with this 
standard, and proceed to apply it to the facts of this case; we 
do so noting that in the context of a negotiated guilty plea, as 
here, a court "need not go to the same length to determine 
whether the facts would sustain the charge as it would when 
there is no negotiated plea."  Smith, 202 Wis. 2d at 25 (quoting 
Broadie v. State, 68 Wis. 2d 420, 423-24, 228 N.W.2d 687 
(1975)). 
¶58 In this case, the circuit court was satisfied that the 
testimony given at the preliminary hearing constituted strong 
proof of guilt.  We agree, and in large part let the victim's 
testimony and that of Officer Cupp speak for itself.  The 
evidence reproduced above provides a sufficient factual basis to 
substantially 
negate 
Warren's 
protestations 
of 
innocence.  
Nevertheless, Warren draws our attention to three specific 
testimonial defects which allegedly illustrate that the evidence 
did not show strong proof of guilt.  We examine these arguments 
in turn. 
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
29
¶59 First, Warren argues that J.K. was unable to provide 
testimony regarding the sexual assault which occurred on October 
2, 1989the charge for which the Alford plea was entered.  We 
disagree.  A fair reading of the information in this case 
illustrates that the State accused Warren of sexual assault on 
more than one occasion for the charge to which Warren pled.  See 
Record on Appeal, No. 97-0851 at 11:1, 65:2-3 (Information April 
30, 1990; Plea Hrg. July 10, 1990).  As the above-reproduced 
testimony of the victim reveals, J.K. testified explicitly about 
the events which occurred on one of those occasions: May 27, 
1989. 
¶60 Second, Warren asserts that J.K.'s testimony was 
contradicted by Cupp's testimony; J.K. testified that the 
assault on May 27, 1989, occurred in the afternoon, in the 
living room and on a couch, while Cupp testified that the same 
incident was supposed to have occurred in the morning, in the 
bedroom and on a bed.  We reject this argument. 
¶61 Officer 
Cupp's 
hearsay 
testimony 
regarding 
the 
specific time and location of the May 27, 1989, assault does not 
command the conclusion that the victim's testimony establishes 
something less than strong proof of guilt.  The circuit court's 
conclusion in this regard was not clearly erroneous. 
¶62 Finally, Warren argues that because J.K. physically 
referenced her "entire upper chest area" at the preliminary 
hearing, and testified that Warren touched her "crotch"areas 
that are not specifically included in the definitions of "sexual 
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
30
contact" or "intimate parts" under Wis. Stat. § 939.22(19)her 
testimony does not establish strong proof of guilt. 
¶63 Not only is this a strained interpretation of the 
facts, but it would be absurd to require a ten-year old child to 
testify with the same language that the state legislature has 
chosen for our statutes.  We have little trouble concluding that 
J.K.'s explicit testimony was sufficient to fall within the 
statutory definitions necessary for a sexual assault conviction. 
 Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court did not 
erroneously exercise its discretion in finding strong proof of 
Warren's guilt so as to justify acceptance of his Alford plea. 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
¶64 In his final argument to this court, Warren asserts 
that he was denied his due process right to appointment of 
counsel for the post-conviction proceedings in this case.  This 
presents a question of constitutional fact which we review de 
novo, without deference to the conclusion of the circuit court. 
 See State v. Dean, 163 Wis. 2d 503, 511, 471 N.W.2d 310 (Ct. 
App. 1991).18 
                     
18 In this case, the circuit court found Warren indigent and 
referred him to the State Public Defender's Office (SPD) for 
appointment of counsel pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 974.06(3)(b).  
The SPD declined to appear on behalf of Warren pursuant to its 
discretionary 
authority 
to 
do 
so. 
 
See 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 977.05(4)(j).  The circuit court also declined, in its 
discretion pursuant to State v. Dean, 163 Wis. 2d 503, 471 
N.W.2d 310 (Ct. App. 1991), to appoint counsel.  Warren does not 
challenge the circuit court's discretionary decision to decline 
to 
appoint 
counsel; 
he 
argues 
instead 
that 
he 
has 
a 
constitutional right to appointed counsel in this case. 
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
31
¶65 It is well established that an indigent defendant has 
a constitutional right to appointed counsel on his or her first 
direct appeal of right from a conviction.  See Douglas v. 
California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963).  The due process 
clause, however, does not require appointment of counsel for 
discretionary appeals.  See generally Wainwright v. Torna, 455 
U.S. 586 (1982); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).  Thus, as 
the United States Supreme Court has stated, "the right to 
appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no 
further."  Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). 
¶66 Warren's motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06 is not a direct appeal from a conviction.  
Rather, a § 974.06 proceeding is considered to be civil in 
nature, and authorizes a collateral attack on a defendant's 
conviction.  See § 974.06(6).19  Defendants do not have a 
                     
19 Wisconsin Stat. § 974.06 provides in relevant part: 
974.06  Postconviction procedure. (1) After the time 
for appeal or postconviction remedy provided in s. 
974.02 has expired, a prisoner in custody under 
sentence of a court or a person convicted and placed 
with a volunteers in probation program under s. 973.11 
claiming the right to be released upon the ground that 
the sentence was imposed in violation of the U.S. 
constitution or the constitution or laws of this 
state, that the court was without jurisdiction to 
impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in 
excess of the maximum authorized by law or is 
otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the 
court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside 
or correct the sentence. 
. . . . 
 
(6) Proceedings under this section shall be 
considered civil in nature, and the burden of proof 
shall be on the person. 
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
32
constitutional right to counsel when mounting collateral attacks 
upon their convictions, such as the § 974.06 postconviction 
motion involved here.  See Finley, 481 U.S. at 555; Johnson v. 
Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 488 (1969).  Therefore, Warren did not have 
a right to appointed counsel at his § 974.06 postconviction 
proceedings. 
¶67 The appellate courts do retain the discretion to 
appoint counsel to an indigent defendant upon appeal from the 
denial of a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion, see Peterson v. State, 
54 Wis. 2d 370, 381-82, 195 N.W.2d 837 (1972); State v. Alston, 
92 Wis. 2d 893, 895, 288 N.W.2d 866 (Ct. App. 1979), but we 
decline to exercise such discretion in this case by imposing the 
cost of this litigation on the State Public Defender. 
¶68 Warren argues that because the State did not revoke 
his probation until well after the time limits for filing a 
direct appeal had expired, he was "deprived . . . of his 
constitutional right to test the validity of his criminal 
conviction on direct appeal with the assistance of court 
appointed 
counsel." 
 
Warren 
Brief, 
No. 
97-0851 
at 
39.  
Therefore, Warren asks this court to conclude that he has a due 
process right to appointed counsel to pursue his claims in 
                                                                  
As we noted in Peterson v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 370, 381, 195 
N.W.2d 837 (1972), "the [§ 974.06] motion was authorized as a 
substantial replacement for the petition for habeas corpus in 
this court.  Matters which usually were presented by petition 
for habeas corpus to this court now are covered by the sec. 
974.06 postconviction motion to the trial court."  
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
33
postconviction proceedings under Wis. Stat. § 974.06.  We are 
not persuaded by Warren's argument. 
¶69 We begin analyzing this argument from our stated 
premise that a defendant does not have a constitutional right to 
appointed counsel in a Wis. Stat. § 974.06 postconviction 
proceeding.  See Finley, 481 U.S. at 555.  Warren attempts to 
circumvent 
this principle 
by bootstrapping 
his 
collateral 
postconviction motion to a direct appeal from his conviction for 
sexual assaulta right of appeal he was allegedly "prevented" 
from exercising. 
¶70 From the outset, this argument is troubling because 
Warren explicitly waived his rights to a direct appeal.  See 
Record on Appeal, No. 97-0851 at 65:7 (Plea Hrg. July 10, 1990). 
 More importantly, pursuant to Warren's theory, the due process 
clause 
would 
guarantee 
court-appointed 
counsel 
in 
a 
postconviction proceeding every time a defendant's probation was 
revoked after the time for filing a direct appeal had expired.  
We decline to stretch the due process clause to such lengths.  
Therefore, we hold that Warren does not have a due process right 
to appointed counsel in this case.20 
                     
20 Warren relies upon Piper v. Popp, 167 Wis. 2d 633, 482 
N.W.2d 353 (1992), for his request that we apply to this case 
the presumption in favor of appointed counsel in civil actions 
where the indigent defendant may be deprived of physical 
liberty.  Piper is inapplicable to the facts of this case; the 
issue in Piper was whether due process requires the appointment 
of counsel to represent an indigent prisoner in defending a 
civil tort action.  See id. at 644.  The analysis employed by 
Piper does not apply to defendants who seek appointed counsel in 
Wis. Stat. § 974.06 postconviction proceedings. 
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
34
¶71 In sum, we conclude that Warren's right to due process 
was not violated when the State revoked his probation for 
failing to admit his guilt during probationary treatment; that 
Warren's plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered; that the 
State did not breach its plea agreement with Warren; that there 
was "strong proof of guilt" sufficient to justify the circuit 
court's acceptance of his Alford plea; and that Warren did not 
have a due process right to appointment of counsel in his 
postconviction proceedings.  Accordingly, the decision of the 
court of appeals in Case No. 96-2441, and the order of the 
circuit court in No. 97-0851 are affirmed. 
¶72 We pause to once again call for heightened diligence  
on the part of circuit courts in accepting Alford pleas 
particularly in cases involving sex offenses.  The acceptance 
of Alford pleas is entirely discretionary,21 and circuit courts 
                     
21 Defendants do not have a constitutional right to enter a 
guilty plea.  As the Alford court stated: 
Our holding does not mean that a trial judge must 
accept every constitutionally valid guilty plea merely 
because a defendant wishes so to plead.  A criminal 
defendant does not have an absolute right under the 
Constitution to have his guilty plea accepted by the 
court . . . although the States may by statute or 
otherwise confer such a right.  Likewise, the States 
may bar their courts from accepting guilty pleas from 
any defendants who assert their innocence. 
 
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
35
should apply a critical eye toward accepting such pleas.  An 
inherent conflict arises when a charged sex offender enters an 
Alford plea: the offender cannot maintain innocence under the 
Alford plea and successfully complete the sex offender treatment 
program, which requires the offender to admit guilt. 
¶73 One recent article stresses the problems inherent with 
accepting Alford pleas by sex offenders.  See Kim English, et 
al., Managing Adult Sex Offenders in the CommunityA Containment 
Approach at 7 (Nat'l Inst. Justice January 1997).  The authors 
advocate consistent public policies to advance the public safety 
priority of sex offender management.  See id.  "Particularly 
important is the development of policies that prohibit pleas or 
dispositions that reinforce sex offenders' frequent refusal to 
admit their crimes, to acknowledge the seriousness of their 
actions, or to take responsibility for the harm they have 
caused."  Id. 
¶74 Two examples of such pleas:  Alford and no contest 
pleas.  See id.  The authors' point is entirely relevant to this 
case: "Such pleas grant sex offenders official justification to 
continue denying their offending behavior after conviction."  
Id.  Given the accepted premise that admission of guilt is a 
                                                                  
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n.11 (1970).  
Wisconsin law also reflects this principle.  See Garcia, 192 
Wis. 2d at 856 ("the circuit courts of Wisconsin may, in their 
discretion, accept Alford pleas") (emphasis added); Wis. Stat. 
§ 971.06(1)(c) (criminal defendant may plead no contest "subject 
to the approval of the court").  See also generally Wis 
JICriminal SM-32A (1995) (illustrating that the circuit courts 
have discretion whether to accept a no contest or Alford plea). 
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
36
necessary "first step towards rehabilitation" of sex offenders, 
Carrizales, 191 Wis. 2d at 95, the circuit courts would be wise 
to avoid these problems in the first place.  See Alice J. 
Hinshaw, Comment, State v. Cameron: Making the Alford Plea an 
Effective Tool in Sex Offense Cases, 55 Mont. L. Rev. 281, 297 
(1994) ("Prohibition of the Alford plea in sex offense cases 
offers the simplest solution to the Alford plea conflict.  
Removing the Alford plea simply eliminates the threat of appeals 
based 
on 
the 
defendant's 
confusion 
or 
misunderstanding 
concerning the consequences of the plea."). 
¶75 Should the circuit courts in their discretion decide 
to accept Alford pleas in such cases, we strongly advise them to 
give Alford-pleading defendants an instruction at the time of 
the plea that their protestations of innocence extend only to 
the plea itself, and do not serve as a guarantee that they 
cannot subsequently be punished for violating the terms of their 
probation which require an admission of guilt.  Because of the 
unique nature of Alford pleas, circuit courts accepting such 
pleas 
should 
take 
extra 
care 
to 
ensure 
that 
defendants 
understand that in order to successfully complete the treatment 
program, 
they 
will 
be 
required 
to 
admit 
guilt. 
 
Such 
instructions will avert any misconceptions by defendants that 
the Alford plea provides any "promises" or "guarantees" of what 
is constitutionally appropriate probationary treatment. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals in Case 
No. 96-2441 is affirmed.  The order of the circuit court in Case 
No. 97-0851 is affirmed. 
Nos. 96-2441, 97-0851 
 
37
 
 
 
 
 
1