Case Title: Disciplinary Counsel v. Gittinger

Citation: 2010-Ohio-1830

Docket Number: 20092290

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2010-05-04T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Gittinger, Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1830.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2010-OHIO-1830 
DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. GITTINGER. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 
may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Gittinger,  
Slip Opinion No. 2010-Ohio-1830.] 
Attorneys — Misconduct — Convictions on federal charges of bank fraud and 
money laundering — Indefinite suspension with credit for time served 
under interim felony suspension. 
(No. 2009-2290 — Submitted February 17, 2010 — Decided May 4, 2010.) 
ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and 
Discipline of the Supreme Court, No. 09-031. 
__________________ 
 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} Respondent, Steven C. Gittinger, last known business address in 
Cincinnati, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0011887, was admitted to the 
practice of law in Ohio in 1984.  On October 16, 2008, we suspended 
respondent’s license to practice on an interim basis pursuant to Gov.Bar R. 
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V(5)(A)(4) upon receiving notice that he had been convicted of a felony.  In re 
Gittinger, 119 Ohio St.3d 1491, 2008-Ohio-5339, 894 N.E.2d 1247. 
{¶ 2} The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline 
recommends that we now indefinitely suspend respondent from practice 
retroactively to October 16, 2008, on the condition, however, that respondent 
cannot petition for reinstatement until his criminal case order permits.  The board 
made this recommendation based on findings that respondent had engaged in 
federal bank fraud and money laundering, causing a loss between $400,000 and 
$1,000,000.  We agree that respondent violated ethical duties incumbent upon 
Ohio attorneys and adopt the board’s recommendations. 
{¶ 3} Relator, Disciplinary Counsel, charged respondent with violating 
three Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility: DR 1-
102(A)(3) (a lawyer shall not engage in illegal conduct involving moral 
turpitude), 1-102(A)(4) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct involving 
dishonestly, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 1-102(A)(6) (a lawyer shall 
not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law). 
{¶ 4} A panel appointed by the board heard the case on the parties’ joint 
exhibits and written stipulations regarding the facts and the rules violated.  The 
parties proposed to the panel that respondent receive an 18-month suspension 
from the practice of law beginning on October 16, 2008, the date on which 
respondent was placed on interim remedial suspension under Gov.Bar R. V(5).  
However, the panel recommended that respondent be suspended indefinitely, 
“retroactive to October 16, 2008, thus permitting him to apply for restoration 
under the rules and show his fitness for [the] practice of law when the terms of his 
supervised release are wholly satisfied.”  The board adopted the panel’s report 
and recommended sanction. 
Misconduct 
January Term, 2010 
3 
 
{¶ 5} The parties stipulated to the respondent’s violations of DR 1-
102(A)(3), 1-102(A)(4), and 1-102(A)(6), and to the following facts: 
{¶ 6} “1. Respondent, Steven Charles Gittinger, was admitted to the 
practice of law in the State of Ohio on May 7, 1984.  Respondent is subject to the 
Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules for the Government of the Bar 
of Ohio. 
{¶ 7} “2. On October 16, 2008, the Supreme Court of Ohio suspended 
respondent from the practice of law on an interim basis due to his August 5, 2008 
felony convictions, which are described herein. 
{¶ 8} “3. Respondent’s interim remedial suspension is still in effect. 
{¶ 9} “4. In 2003, respondent was a principal of a business in Cincinnati, 
Ohio known as Classic Title Agency, Inc., which owned Classic Title Agency, 
LLC (‘Classic Title’) a title insurance agency licensed in the State of Ohio and 
formed in 2004. 
{¶ 10} “5. Among the business activities that Classic Title performed 
were services to close real estate sales. 
{¶ 11} “6. In 2003 respondent received business and made money for 
performing closings on behalf of Toby Groves, as well as a business that Groves 
owned known as Groves Funding Corporation (‘Groves Funding’). 
{¶ 12} “7. Beginning by at least June 20, 2003, Groves was engaging in a 
scheme to defraud federally insured financial institutions as follows: 
{¶ 13} “a. Groves Funding was engaged in the business of loaning 
moneys to individuals who would use the funds to purchase residences. 
{¶ 14} “b. Groves Funding obtained the moneys to make these loans from 
a line of credit obtained from Regions Bank, a federally insured financial 
Institution. 
{¶ 15} “c. After making loans to buyers of real estate, Groves Funding 
would sell these loans to other federally insured financial institutions. 
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{¶ 16} “d. Both Regions Bank, when it funded the line of credit, and the 
financial institutions that bought loans from Groves Funding relied upon the 
information in the real estate closing packages to make their business decisions 
related to Groves Funding. 
{¶ 17} “8. During the period between June 2003 and continuing through 
2005 Groves falsified material information on real estate closing documents such 
as loan application forms and HUD-1 Settlement Statements. 
{¶ 18} “9. Among the occasions where Groves provided materially false 
information to lenders were a series of transactions relating to Groves’ purchase 
of his own residence at 5416 Edwardsville Road, Clarksville, Ohio. 
{¶ 19} “10. On June 20, 2003, Groves purchased the Edwardsville Road 
property, but caused Kevin Moore, a Groves Funding employee, to sign the 
paperwork and act as if Moore was the purchaser of the property. 
{¶ 20} “11. The June 20th purchase price of the Edwardsville Road 
property was $615,000 and the loan used to pay the seller was supplied by Groves 
Funding. 
{¶ 21} “12. After June 20, 2003, Groves Funding sold the June 20, 2003 
loan to Washington Mutual Bank, a federally insured financial institution. 
{¶ 22} “13. On September 3, 2003, Groves conducted and caused to be 
conducted another purported sale of the Edwardsville Road property from Moore 
to Groves. 
{¶ 23} “14. Groves solicited the assistance of respondent to complete the 
September 2003 closing through respondent’s Classic Title business. 
{¶ 24} “15. Before the September 2003 closing, respondent and Groves 
agreed to make the following misrepresentations on the closing documents, which 
were then forwarded to financial institutions that funded loans for Groves. 
{¶ 25} “a. The closing documents, including the HUD-1 Settlement 
Statement, indicated that Moore sold the Edwardsville Road property to Groves 
January Term, 2010 
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for $815,000 and that Groves provided a down payment of $168,236.36, making 
the transaction appear to lenders as a loan of eighty percent of the purchase price. 
{¶ 26} “b. In reality, Groves Funding was supplying a loan for the entire 
purchase price and Groves obtained the property without any down payment 
towards the purchase price. 
{¶ 27} “c. Respondent also caused the production of a Classic Title check 
in the amount of $168,236.36 made payable to Moore. 
{¶ 28} “d. Moore never received the $168,236.36 and the check was later 
voided. 
{¶ 29} “16. As a part of the purported September 3, 2003 sale of the 
Edwardsville Road property, Groves Funding received credit for a new loan from 
its line of credit funded by Regions Bank. 
{¶ 30} “17. Respondent and Groves caused an interstate wire transfer of 
funds in an amount of $649,872.35 from Regions Bank to Washington Mutual 
Bank for the purpose of paying off the original loan sold by Groves Funding after 
the September 3, 2003 sale where Groves used Moore to buy the Edwardsville 
Road property. 
{¶ 31} “18. This wire transfer of funds was a financial transaction done 
with the proceeds from the bank fraud. 
{¶ 32} “19. Any specific amount of loss attributable to respondent as a 
result of his actions in the matters undetermined. 
{¶ 33} “20. On April 18, 2008, an Information was filed in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division under 
Criminal Case No. 1:08-CR-47 charging respondent with one count of conspiracy 
to commit bank fraud, a felony violation of 18 U.S.C. §1349, and one count of 
money laundering, a felony violation of 18 U.S.C. §1957. 
{¶ 34} “21. On May 1, 2008, an arraignment and formal plea hearing was 
held before Judge Herman Weber in Criminal Case No. 1:08-CR-47. 
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{¶ 35} “22. At the May 1, 2008 hearing, respondent waived his rights to 
prosecution by indictment and the court accepted respondent’s guilty pleas to both 
counts in the Information. 
{¶ 36} “23. On August 5, 2008, respondent appeared before Judge Weber 
for sentencing. 
{¶ 37} “24. At the August 5, 2008 sentencing hearing, respondent 
received an aggregate twelve-month and one-day sentence followed by an 
aggregate five-year period of supervised release.  In addition, respondent was 
ordered to pay an aggregate fine of $6,000 plus a $200 special assessment fee. 
{¶ 38} “25. Following his sentence, respondent was placed in the custody 
of the Bureau of Prisons. 
{¶ 39} “26. Respondent served his prison sentence at the FCI Gilmer 
Satellite Camp, P.O. Box 7000, Glenville, WV 26351, and has completed his 
sentence.” 
{¶ 40} We accept these stipulations and find that respondent violated DR 
1-102(A)(3), 1-102(A)(4), and 1-102(A)(6). 
Sanction 
{¶ 41} In determining the appropriate sanction for an attorney’s 
misconduct, we consider sanctions imposed in similar cases and whether 
aggravating or mitigating factors under Section 10(B) of the Rules and 
Regulations Governing Procedure on Complaints and Hearings Before the Board 
of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline (“BCGD Proc.Reg.”) warrant 
harsher or more lenient disposition.  Disciplinary Counsel v. Bennett, 124 Ohio 
St.3d 314, 2010-Ohio-313, 921 N.E.2d 1064, ¶ 23.  The parties stipulated to the 
mitigating factors that respondent (1) lacks a prior disciplinary record, (2) has 
fully cooperated in these proceedings, and (3) accepts responsibility and expresses 
remorse for his misconduct.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(a) and (d).  Respondent 
also offered positive character evidence.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(2)(e).  
January Term, 2010 
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Respondent fulfilled his pledge to the panel to become compliant with all 
requirements for continuing legal education, consistent with the terms of his 
interim remedial suspension.  Respondent has amended his attorney-registration 
status from “inactive” to “active.” 
{¶ 42} However, respondent’s denial that any loss resulted from his 
conduct does not provide any mitigation and is in fact an aggravating factor.  
BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(g) (refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of 
conduct).  Respondent’s assertion is contrary to the stipulation before the panel 
that he accepts responsibility for his actions and with his statement in the plea 
agreement in the United States district court that the amount of the loss 
attributable to him exceeds $400,000.  In this regard, respondent’s denial of harm 
suggests that he does not accept responsibility for or acknowledge the wrongful 
nature of his conduct. BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(g). 
{¶ 43} Moreover, respondent’s witness at the hearing is further indication 
that the wrongfulness of the conduct is not acknowledged.  Although he denied 
that he was excusing respondent’s misconduct, the witness seemed to condone or 
justify it as an understandable lapse of attention, and he supported respondent’s 
position that no one had suffered a loss.  BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B)(1)(g).  
Respondent’s criminal conduct also evidences a motive to defraud others in an 
apparent effort to retain a lucrative business client, thus manifesting dishonesty 
and selfishness, which are aggravating factors under BCGD Proc.Reg. 
10(B)(1)(b). 
{¶ 44} As we noted above, the parties stipulated to an 18-month 
suspension.  The panel and board, however, recommended that respondent’s 
license be suspended indefinitely, retroactively to the date respondent was placed 
on interim remedial suspension, and that respondent could apply for reinstatement 
upon satisfaction of his five-year period of supervised release from his criminal 
case. 
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{¶ 45} We agree with the recommendations made by the panel and the 
board.  A key term of the sentence in respondent’s criminal case is that he will be 
on supervised release for a period of five years upon his release from 
imprisonment.  The sentence further provides that during the supervised release, 
respondent “shall not be employed in the title business, either directly or 
indirectly, and shall not practice law during the term of supervised release.”  At 
the hearing, the panel expressed concern that the adoption of the parties’ 
stipulated 18-month suspension would create an inconsistency between the 
disciplinary sanction and the conditions imposed in the supervised release.  In 
support of the 18-month suspension stipulation, respondent submitted an affidavit 
stating that his probation officer would petition the district court to lift the 
condition prohibiting respondent from practicing law after respondent had served 
one year of his postrelease supervision.  We find that indefinite suspension is the 
proper sanction in these circumstances.  Imposing an indefinite suspension will 
avoid inconsistency between this court’s disciplinary sanction and the federal 
court’s criminal sentence and will allow for proper resolution of the underlying 
criminal case prior to any application for reinstatement to the practice of law. 
{¶ 46} We also find that crediting respondent for his interim suspension is 
appropriate.  In Disciplinary Counsel v. Lash (1993), 68 Ohio St.3d 12, 623 
N.E.2d 28, respondent pleaded guilty to a single count of bank fraud for 
overstating his income to obtain a loan.  We adopted the panel and board’s 
recommendation that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one 
year, with the suspension retroactive to the date of his interim suspension.  In 
Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Garfield, 109 Ohio St.3d 103, 2006-Ohio-1935, 846 
N.E.2d 45, respondent was convicted of a single count of felony bank fraud.  
Garfield was a managing director of an investment company and had pledged a 
certificate of deposit of the company as collateral for a $250,000 loan to obtain 
January Term, 2010 
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funds for his personal use.  He was suspended from the practice of law for 18 
months with credit for time served under the interim suspension. 
{¶ 47} Respondent's misconduct is similar to the misconduct in Lash and 
Garfield.  All three respondents were suspended on an interim basis after their 
convictions on federal bank-fraud charges.  All three cases involve one-time 
violations.  All three involve significant mitigating evidence, including 
attestations to the respondents' good reputations in the community, indicating that 
the misconduct was out of character and unlikely to recur.  Another factor 
favoring credit in this case is the fact that respondent did not realize any tangible 
personal gain or profit from his misconduct.  Moreover, respondent did not 
engage in a lengthy pattern of misconduct or cause grave harm to others. Compare 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Margolis, 114 Ohio St.3d 165, 2007-Ohio-3607, 870 
N.E.2d 1158 (no credit for time served for attorney who engaged in antitrust 
conspiracy lasting several years and causing may millions in damages in others); 
Erie-Huron Counties Bar Assn. v. Evans, 123 Ohio St.3d 103, 2009-Ohio-4146, 
914 N.E.2d 381 (no credit for time served for attorney who committed multiple 
disciplinary violations over several years with serious resulting harm to clients). 
{¶ 48} Based on the foregoing, we accept the recommendation of the 
panel, the board, and the parties that respondent receives credit for the time served 
under his interim suspension. 
{¶ 49} Respondent is therefore indefinitely suspended from the practice of 
law in Ohio.  Respondent may petition for reinstatement once he has either 
completed, or otherwise satisfied, all the conditions imposed by the federal court 
and his underlying criminal case is resolved.  We also grant credit to respondent 
for the time he has served under the October 16, 2008 interim suspension, which 
credit may be applied against the two-year period that respondent must wait 
before petitioning for reinstatement under Gov.Bar R. V(10)(B).  Costs are taxed 
to respondent. 
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Judgment accordingly. 
 
PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and 
CUPP, JJ., concur. 
 
BROWN, C.J., not participating. 
__________________ 
 
Jonathan E. Coughlan, Disciplinary Counsel, and Phillip A. King, 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 
 
Robert W. Cettel, for respondent. 
______________________