Case Title: Welch v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: CR97-378

State: arkansas

Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Date: 1997-10-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
Billy Edward WELCH v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 97-378                                          ___ S.W.2d ___

                    Supreme Court of Arkansas
                Opinion delivered October 9, 1997


1.   Appeal & error -- sufficiency of evidence considered first. -- Because
     the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial when a
     judgment of conviction is reversed for insufficiency of the
     evidence, the appellate court first considers a challenge to
     the sufficiency of the evidence.

2.   Motions -- directed verdict -- specific grounds not stated -- sufficiency
     issue procedurally barred. -- Where defense counsel at no time
     stated any grounds for his directed-verdict motion in
     violation of Rule 33.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal
     Procedure, the trial judge had no opportunity to rule on
     specific grounds with respect to any of the charges, and
     appellant was procedurally barred from raising the sufficiency
     issue on appeal.

3.   Motions -- suppression of evidence -- standard of review. -- When
     reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, the appellate
     court makes an independent examination of the evidence based
     on the totality of the circumstances and will not reverse the
     trial judgeþs decision unless it is clearly against the
     preponderance of the evidence.

4.   Search & seizure -- inventory search -- exempted from probable-cause and
     search-warrant requirement. -- Inventory or administrative searches
     are excepted from the requirement of probable cause and a
     search warrant; the purpose of an inventory search is to
     protect the property, the police, and the public; the
     rationale is that police officers can better account for the
     property if they have an accurate record of what is contained
     in a vehicle when it is impounded; moreover, the police and
     the public are protected by ensuring that the vehicle does not
     contain explosives or other harmful items; as part of an
     inventory search, the police are permitted not only to search
     the vehicle, but also the containers within the vehicle.

5.   Search & seizure -- inventory search -- standard operating procedures
     required. -- For a search of a properly detained vehicle to fall
     within the inventory-search exception to the search-warrant
     requirement, there must be standard operating procedures
     established by the law enforcement agency conducting the
     search; the procedures must be followed and the inventory
     search must not be conducted solely for investigative
     purposes; there is no requirement that the procedures for the
     inventory search be in writing.

6.   Search & seizure -- inventory search -- purpose of search not invalidated
     by expectation. -- Absent a showing that the true intent of the
     police officers was to conduct an evidentiary search, the
     testimony of police officers that they always take inventory
     of impounded vehicles and that they always search containers
     is sufficient; the fact that police officers have some idea or
     expectation of what they might find does not invalidate the
     purpose of the search; indeed, the police are not required to
     weigh the individual's privacy interest against the
     probability of finding hazardous materials before opening a
     container in the vehicle.

7.   Search & seizure -- inventory search -- standard procedures not required
     to be in writing. -- While written procedures are preferable to
     oral procedures, neither Arkansas nor federal case law
     requires that the standard policy be in writing for an
     inventory search to pass constitutional muster; the essential
     points are that the practice be uniform and that no discretion
     be left to the police officers to decide the boundaries of the
     inventory search.

8.   Search & seizure -- inventory search -- evidence of standard policy. --
     Where, although he was not a member of the sheriff's
     department, a wildlife officer testified that he knew the
     department's procedures on opening containers, having worked
     in conjunction with the department for seven years, and where
     a sheriff's deputy further testified that the inventory
     search, which included the search of an ammunition box in the
     bed of appellant's vehicle, was according to normal procedure,
     the supreme court concluded that there was evidence of a
     standard policy.

9.   Motions -- suppression of evidence -- no abuse of discretion in trial
     court's refusal to grant. -- Where the circumstances surrounding
     the search of appellant's vehicle (no proof of ownership of
     the vehicle, a warrant outstanding for appellant's arrest, and
     a weapon in the vehicle) were suspicious, and where it would
     be unreasonable to expect police officers in the everyday
     course of business to make fine and subtle distinctions in
     deciding which containers or items may be searched and which
     must be sealed as a unit, the supreme court held that there
     was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in refusing to
     suppress the evidence.

10.  Search & seizure -- inventory search -- no finding of ulterior motive --
     trial court's ruling upheld. -- To suppress an inventory search, a
     defendant must show that the police officers were conducting
     the inventory search in bad faith for the sole purpose of
     collecting evidence; the trial court did not find that there
     was an ulterior motive on the part of the sheriff's
     department, and the supreme court declined to superimpose its
     view of the testimony over that of the trial court's where the
     law enforcement officers were following standard procedure and
     in the absence of proof that the sole motivation for the
     search was to collect evidence.

11.  Appeal & error -- even constitutional issues must be presented to trial
     court to preserve for appeal. -- In criminal cases, even
     constitutional issues must be presented to the trial court to
     preserve them for appeal.

12.  Criminal procedure -- speedy trial -- issue had no merit where defense
     consented to trial date. -- A defendant's failure to move for a
     dismissal of charges for a lack of speedy trial constitutes a
     waiver of his rights under the rules of criminal procedure;
     where the defense had plenty of opportunity to object to the
     trial date but instead consented to it even after the trial
     court, who is not required to make the motion for him,
     referred to a potential speedy-trial problem, appellant's
     speedy-trial issue had no merit.

13.  Appeal & error -- cumulative error -- failure to raise objection at trial
     barred appellate review. -- Regarding cumulative error, not only
     must each of the negative rulings be objected to individually
     but a defendant must also raise the cumulative-error objection
     to the trial court and obtain a ruling in order to argue the
     point on appeal; where appellant did not raise the cumulative-
     error objection in the trial court, he was barred from raising
     it on appeal.


     Appeal from Dallas Circuit Court; John Graves, Judge;
affirmed.
     Norman Mark Klappenbach, for appellant.
     Winston Bryant, Att'y Gen., by:  C. Joseph Cordi, Jr., Asst.
Att'y Gen., for appellee.

     Robert L. Brown, Justice.
     Appellant Billy Edward Welch was convicted of possession of a
controlled substance with intent to deliver, felon in possession of
a firearm, simultaneous possession of a controlled substance and a
firearm, and possession of drug paraphernalia.  He was sentenced as
a habitual offender to two terms of life in prison for the
possession-with-intent charge and the simultaneous possession
charge, six years for being a felon in possession of a firearm, and
ten years for the drug paraphernalia.  All of Welch's convictions
arise out of a traffic stop and the subsequent impoundment and
search of his vehicle.  On appeal, he raises the issues of
sufficiency of the evidence, speedy trial, and suppression of the
evidence seized from his vehicle.  We affirm.
     On the evening of July 28, 1995, the Dallas County Sheriff's
Department conducted a safety inspection at the intersection of
State Highways 8 and 9 in Dallas County.  Deputy sheriffs stopped
all vehicles and checked the drivers' licenses and other
documentation relating to ownership of the vehicle and insurance. 
Welch came upon the deputies while driving his Chevrolet El Camino
with a friend.  He was approached by Deputy Bill Still, an
Auxiliary Deputy Sheriff for Dallas County.  
     Deputy Still later testified that Welch was unable to provide
a legible driverþs license, proof of insurance, or proof of
ownership of the vehicle.  Deputy Still reported this situation to
his supervisor on the scene, Deputy Sheriff Kenneth Seale.  The
deputies then checked Welch's license plate and found that it was
registered to another vehicle.  Both deputies also testified at the
suppression hearing that the initial computer report on Welch
indicated that there was a warrant out for his arrest for failure
to appear in court in a different county.
     Welch was asked if he had any weapons, drugs, or alcohol in
his vehicle.  According to the deputies, he initially denied having
any drugs or weapons.  Later, however, he surrendered a nine
millimeter handgun from behind the seat of his El Camino.  The
deputies then asked if they could search the vehicle, whereupon
Welch became angry and refused to allow them to do a search and
insisted that he be allowed to go home.  Welch was then arrested
for the traffic violations, and his car was impounded.  
     Before impounding the vehicle, the deputies took an inventory
of its contents.  At trial, the law enforcement officers, including
Auxiliary Deputy Still, Deputy Seale, and Arkansas Game and Fish
Wildlife Officer Mike Knoedl, testified about their involvement in
the search.  Officer Knoedl testified that he occasionally assisted
the Dallas County Sheriff's Department in investigations.  On this
occasion, Deputy Seale asked Officer Knoedl to assist in the search
of Welch's vehicle because the El Camino was extremely cluttered. 
Deputies Still and Seale testified that other law enforcement
officers brought them items from the car, and they recorded on a
log sheet everything that was found in the vehicle and where it was
found.  Both of the deputies testified that the purpose of the
search was to keep Welch from later claiming that something was
missing from his vehicle.  Deputy Still also stated that he was
searching the vehicle to determine if there were more guns.
     While conducting the inventory search, the law enforcement
officers found several syringes, a bag containing more than thirty-
three grams of methamphetamine, a set of scales, and several
spoons.  Most of these items were found in an ammunition box that
was located in the bed of the El Camino.  The officers also found
Welch's proof of insurance and proof of ownership of the vehicle in
the ammunition box with the drugs.  Prior to trial, Welch moved to
have all of the items found in the search suppressed.  The motion
was denied, and Welch was tried by jury, convicted, and sentenced
as set out above.

                 I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
     We first consider Welch's argument regarding sufficiency of
the evidence because the double jeopardy clause precludes a second
trial when a judgment of conviction is reversed for insufficiency
of the evidence.  King v. State, 323 Ark. 671, 916 S.W.2d 732
(1996); Jones v. State, 323 Ark. 655, 916 S.W.2d 736 (1996).
     After the State rested its case, the following exchange took
place:
          COUNSEL FOR DEFENSE: Your Honor, the State has
     rested and at this point the defense would move for a
     directed verdict.
          THE COURT: Is that all you've got to say?
          COUNSEL FOR DEFENSE: Yes, sir, that's all I'm
     saying.  (The court then gave the State a chance to
     comment after which the following took place.)
          THE COURT:  The motion for directed verdict is
     denied.
          COUNSEL FOR DEFENSE:  Your Honor, then the defense
     would now rest and we renew our motion for a directed
     verdict and I would like to say that the defense is
     resting without calling the defendant, or a witness,
     after discussing that with my client and he is in
     agreement, is that right, Mr. Welch?
The court then denied the renewed motion.  At no time did defense
counsel state any grounds for his motion, which violates Rule 33.1
of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure.  See also Dixon v.
State, 327 Ark. 105, 937 S.W.2d 642 (1997); Smallwood v. State, 326
Ark. 813, 935 S.W.2d 530 (1996).  Thus, the trial judge had no
opportunity to rule on specific grounds with respect to any of the
charges.  We hold that Welch is procedurally barred from raising
this issue on appeal.

                 II. Suppression of the Evidence
     Welch's next point concerns the items seized by the Dallas
County Sheriff's Department while conducting a warrantless search
prior to impoundment of his vehicle.  When reviewing the denial of
a suppression motion, this court makes an independent examination
of the evidence based on the totality of the circumstances, and we
will not reverse the trial judgeþs decision unless it is clearly
against the preponderance of the evidence.  Brunson v. State, 327
Ark. 567, 940 S.W.2d. 440 (1997), reh'g denied, 327 Ark. 576-A, 940 S.W.2d 440 (1997).
     We initially examine the general law relating to inventory
searches.  Inventory or administrative searches are excepted from
the requirement of probable cause and a search warrant.  Florida v.
Wells, 495, U.S. 1 (1990).  The purpose of an inventory search is
to protect the property, the police, and the public.  Id.  The
rationale is that police officers can better account for the
property if they have an accurate record of what is contained in a
vehicle when it is impounded.  Moreover, the police and the public
are protected by ensuring that the vehicle does not contain
explosives or other harmful items.  As part of an inventory search,
the police are permitted not only to search the vehicle, but also
the containers within the vehicle.  Id.  Colorado v. Bertine,