Case Title: Highland Manor Associates v. Michele Bast

Citation: 2003 WI 152

Docket Number: 2002AP002799

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2003-12-30T00:00:00Z

Document:
2003 WI 152 
 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
02-2799 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
Highland Manor Associates, a limited  
partnership,  
          Plaintiff-Respondent, 
     v. 
Michele Bast,  
          Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner. 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
2003 WI App 130 
Reported at: 265 Wis. 2d 455, 665 N.W.2d 338 
(Ct. App. 2003-Published) 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
December 30, 2003   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
November 11, 2003   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Michael N. Nowakowski   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the defendant-appellant-petitioner there were briefs by 
Mark A. Silverman, Jeffrey R. Myer, Larry J. Dupuis and Legal 
Action of Wisconsin, Inc., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Mark 
A. Silverman. 
 
For the plaintiff-respondent there was a brief by David R. 
Friedman and Friedman Law Firm, Madison, and oral argument by 
David R. Friedman. 
 
 
2003 WI 152 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound  
volume of the official reports.   
No. 02-2799  
(L.C. No. 
02 SC 8745) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
Highland Manor Associates, a limited 
partnership     
 
 
Plaintiff-Respondent     
 
 
v. 
 
Michele Bast   
 
 
 
Defendant–Appellant-Petitioner   
FILED 
 
DEC 30, 2003 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
REVIEW of a decision of the court of appeals.  Affirmed.   
 
¶1 
SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   This is a review of a 
published decision of the court of appeals.1  Michele Bast filed 
a notice of appeal from an order of the circuit court for Dane 
county, Michael N. Nowakowski, Judge, denying her motion to 
reconsider a judgment of eviction.  The court of appeals 
dismissed the appeal because Michele Bast's notice of appeal was 
not timely filed.  
¶2 
The judgment of eviction was entered in an eviction 
action, 
a 
small 
claims 
proceeding 
governed 
by 
                                                 
1 Highland Manor Assocs. v. Bast, 2003 WI App 130, 265 
Wis. 2d 455, 665 N.W.2d 388.   
No. 
02-2799   
 
2 
 
Wis. Stat. § 799.01(1)(a) and chapter 799 (2001-2002),2 in favor 
of Highland Manor Associates, the landlord, and against Bast, 
the tenant.  The judgment of eviction against Bast was entered 
on September 13, 2002, after a hearing on that date before the 
circuit court for Dane County, Robert DeChambeau, Judge. 
¶3 
Two issues are presented.  The first issue is whether 
a tenant defendant in a small claims eviction proceeding may 
move for reconsideration of a judgment of eviction against the 
tenant using Wis. Stat. § 805.17(3).  Assuming that the tenant 
may move for reconsideration, the second issue is whether a 
motion for reconsideration extends the tenant's time to appeal 
from a judgment of eviction prescribed by Wis. Stat. § 799.445.   
¶4 
We conclude that a tenant in an eviction action 
governed by chapter 799 may move for reconsideration of the 
eviction judgment under Wis. Stat. § 805.17(3).  We further 
conclude that a tenant in an eviction action who moves for 
reconsideration must nevertheless take an appeal from the 
judgment of eviction within the time for appeal set forth in 
Wis. Stat. § 799.445.  Because the time for appeal from a 
judgment of eviction runs from the date of the entry of the 
judgment of eviction under § 799.445 and not from the date of 
denial of the motion for reconsideration, we affirm the decision 
of the court of appeals that the notice of appeal from the 
judgment of eviction was not timely filed in the present case. 
                                                 
2 All references to the Wisconsin statutes are to the 2001-
02 version unless otherwise indicated. 
No. 
02-2799   
 
3 
 
¶5 
The only relevant facts in this review are the date of 
entry of the judgment of eviction against Bast, the date of the 
order denying Bast's motion for reconsideration, and the date on 
which the notice of appeal was filed.  No dispute exists 
regarding these dates, which are as follows. 
¶6 
The date of entry of the judgment of eviction was 
September 13, 2002.  On September 20, 2002, seven days after 
entry of the eviction judgment, Bast filed a motion for 
reconsideration under Wis. Stat. § 805.17(3).  On October 4, 
2002, more than 15 days after the September 13 entry of 
judgment, 
the 
circuit 
court 
denied 
the 
motion 
for 
reconsideration.  On October 21, 2002, Bast filed her notice of 
appeal from the October 4, 2002, denial of her motion for 
reconsideration.  
¶7 
The parties agree that if Wis. Stat. § 799.445 governs 
the time frame for filing an appeal in this case, the 15-day 
time period to file a notice of appeal ran from September 13, 
the date of entry of the judgment, and Bast's appeal was 
untimely. 
¶8 
The questions presented require the interpretation of 
statutes.  The interpretation of statutes is a question of law 
that this court decides independently of the circuit court and 
court of appeals, but benefiting from the analyses of both.3 
                                                 
3 See State v. Cole, 2003 WI 59, ¶12, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 663 
N.W.2d 700. 
No. 
02-2799   
 
4 
 
¶9 
Our goal in interpreting statutes is to discern and 
give effect to the intent of the legislature.4  Statutory 
interpretation begins with the language of the statute.  Each 
word should be looked at so as not to render any portion of the 
statute superfluous.5  But "courts must not look at a single, 
isolated sentence or portion of a sentence" instead of the 
relevant language of the entire statute.6  Furthermore, a 
statutory provision must be read in the context of the whole 
statute to avoid an unreasonable or absurd interpretation. 
Statutes relating to the same subject matter should be read 
together and harmonized when possible.7  A cardinal rule in 
interpreting statutes is to favor an interpretation that will 
fulfill the purpose of a statute over an interpretation that 
defeats the manifest objective of an act.8  Thus a court must 
ascertain the legislative intent from the language of the 
statute in relation to its context, history, scope, and 
                                                 
4 Cole, 262 Wis. 2d 167, ¶13 (citing State v. Szulczewski, 
216 Wis. 2d 495, 504, 574 N.W.2d 660 (1998)). 
5 Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 2001 WI 86, ¶16, 
245 Wis. 2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 893; Alberte v. Anew Health Care 
Servs., Inc., 2000 WI 7, ¶10, 232 Wis. 2d 587, 605 N.W.2d 515. 
6 Landis, 
245 
Wis. 2d 1, 
¶16 
(quoting 
Alberte, 
232 
Wis. 2d 587, ¶10). 
7 Cole, 262 Wis. 2d 167, ¶13 (citing State v. Leitner, 2002 
WI 77, ¶30, 253 Wis. 2d 449, 646 N.W.2d 341). 
8 State v. Davis, 2001 WI 136, ¶13, 248 Wis. 2d 986, 637 
N.W.2d 62. 
No. 
02-2799   
 
5 
 
objective, 
including 
the 
consequences 
of 
alternative 
interpretations.9    
¶10 To answer the question presented, we must examine the 
interplay between Wis. Stat. §§ 799.445 and 805.17(3). 
¶11 We 
begin 
with 
an 
examination 
of 
chapter 
799.  
Wisconsin Stat. § 799.01(1)(a) provides, in relevant part, that 
chapter 799 is "the exclusive procedure to be used in circuit 
court" in eviction actions.  Section 799.01(1)(a) provides as 
follows: 
799.01  Applicability of chapter. (1) Exclusive use of 
small claims procedure.  Except as provided in ss. 
799.02(1) and 799.21(4) and except as provided under 
sub. (2), the procedure in this chapter is the 
exclusive procedure to be used in circuit court in the 
following actions: 
(a) Eviction actions. Actions for eviction defined in 
s. 799.40 regardless of the amount of rent claimed 
therein.   
¶12 Although 
chapter 
799 
explicitly 
governs 
eviction 
actions, the chapter does not set forth all the provisions 
governing practice and procedure in eviction actions.  Section 
799.04 provides that "except as otherwise provided in this 
chapter, the general rules of practice and procedure in chs. 750 
to 758 and 801 to 847 shall apply to actions and proceedings 
under this chapter." (emphasis added).10   
                                                 
9 Cole, 262 Wis. 2d 167, ¶13 (citing State v. Davis, 2001 WI 
136, ¶13, 248 Wis. 2d 986, 637 N.W.2d 62). 
10 Wisconsin Stat. § 799.04(1) provides in relevant part as 
follows: 
  
No. 
02-2799   
 
6 
 
¶13 Chapter 799 neither includes a mechanism for motions 
for reconsideration nor proscribes the use of such motions.11  We 
therefore look to Wis. Stat. § 799.04 and the general rules of 
practice and procedure in chapters 750 to 758 and 801 to 847 for 
rules relating to motions for reconsideration to determine 
                                                                                                                                                             
Relation of this chapter to other procedural rules. 
(1) GENERAL.  Except as otherwise provided in this 
chapter, the general rules of practice and procedure 
in chs. 750 to 758 and 801 to 847 shall apply to 
actions and proceedings under this chapter. 
11 Highland Manor argues that Wis. Stat. § 799.28, which 
creates a procedure for a new trial in an eviction action, 
provides an adequate remedy for a defendant in an eviction 
action.  Nothing in chapter 799 demonstrates that this provision 
was intended to preclude the entirely separate procedure of a 
motion for reconsideration.  It does not make sense to us that 
the 
legislature 
would 
deny 
the 
use 
of 
a 
motion 
for 
reconsideration, a mechanism aimed at the summary disposition of 
disputes, while favoring the lengthier procedure of providing an 
entirely 
new 
trial. 
 
Furthermore, 
§ 799.28 
refers 
to 
a 
"verdict," implying that the availability of a new trial is 
limited to cases involving juries.  Section 805.15 apparently 
applies to motions after a verdict, and § 805.17 applies to 
trials to the court.  The inference we draw from these statutes 
is that the legislature did not intend to preclude a tenant from 
bringing a motion for reconsideration of a judgment of eviction 
in a chapter 799 proceedings.  
No. 
02-2799   
 
7 
 
whether any provision in these chapters governing a motion for 
reconsideration applies to a chapter 799 proceeding.12  
¶14 Wisconsin Stat. § 805.17(3) 
governs 
motions 
for 
reconsideration after a trial to the court.  It allows a party 
to move a court to amend its findings, conclusions of law, and 
judgment within the time prescribed therein.  Section 805.17(3) 
states in relevant part:   
Upon its own motion or the motion of a party made not 
later than 20 days after entry of judgment, the court 
may 
amend 
its 
findings 
or 
conclusions 
or 
make 
additional findings or conclusions and may amend the 
judgment accordingly (emphasis added).  
¶15 Because nothing in chapter 799 expressly provides for 
or expressly prohibits a motion for reconsideration, the 
                                                 
12 Highland 
Manor 
reasons 
that 
because 
Wis. Stat. § 799.01(1) declares chapter 799 to be the exclusive 
procedure for eviction actions without referring to § 799.04, 
the legislature did not intend § 799.04 to apply to eviction 
actions.  Highland Manor appears to base this argument on 
several 
provisions 
in 
chapter 
799 
that 
explicitly 
and 
extensively refer to particular sections in chapters 801, 806, 
807, and 814.  It asserts that the legislature did not intend to 
rely on the general wording of § 799.04 to incorporate other 
sections not mentioned in chapter 799.  Rather, Highland Manor 
asserts that the legislature provided specific references in 
order to clarify precisely which provisions of chapter 799 are 
governed by 799.04 and which are controlled by § 799.01.  
Because no reference to § 805.17(3) appears in chapter 799, 
Highland Manor argues that the legislature did not intend for 
§ 805.17(3) to apply in eviction actions.  Highland Manor's 
interpretation is not compelling.  Nothing in the language, 
statutory history, or objective of the small claims statute 
supports Highland Manor's reading.  We agree with the court of 
appeals that § 799.04(1) "recognizes that there are many rules 
and statutes governing procedure and practice in circuit court 
that do not appear in ch. 799."  Highland Manor, 265 
Wis. 2d 455, ¶7. 
No. 
02-2799   
 
8 
 
question is whether anything about the nature of eviction 
actions and small claims practice would prohibit a motion for 
reconsideration under Wis. Stat. § 805.17(3).  
¶16 A consideration pointing away from allowing such a 
motion for reconsideration is that the legislature intended 
eviction proceedings to be as summary as possible because there 
is seldom an issue for trial.13    
¶17 A consideration pointing toward allowing such a motion 
for reconsideration is that public policy favors allowing a 
circuit court to reconsider its decisions.  Motions for 
reconsideration pending appeal serve an important function.14  A 
circuit court's reconsideration may obviate the need for an 
appeal.  Allowing such motions could, therefore, not only spare 
the parties unnecessary expense, but could also serve the goal 
of judicial economy.  Even if an appeal is not avoided, a motion 
for reconsideration enables a circuit court to hone its analysis 
and thus expedite the appellate review process.  
¶18 Another consideration pointing toward allowing motions 
for reconsideration in eviction actions is that such motions may 
                                                 
13 Scalzo v. Anderson, 87 Wis. 2d 834, 847, 275 N.W.2d 894 
(1979) (relying on Robert F. Boden, 1971 Revision of Eviction 
Practice in Wisconsin, 54 Marq. L. Rev. 298 (1971)); Mock v. 
Czemierys, 113 Wis. 2d 207, 210, 336 N.W.2d 188 (Ct. App. 1983) 
(expediency is the nature of small claims proceedings); King v. 
Moore, 95 Wis. 2d 686, 690, 291 N.W.2d 304 (Ct. App. 1980) 
(philosophy of small claims proceedings is to resolve disputes 
more speedily than normal civil litigation would afford). 
14 State v. Brockett, 2002 WI App 115, ¶16, 254 Wis. 2d 817, 
827, 647 N.W.2d 357; Metro. Greyhound Mgmt. Corp. v. Wis. Racing 
Bd., 157 Wis. 2d 678, 698, 460 N.W.2d 802 (Ct. App. 1990). 
No. 
02-2799   
 
9 
 
be made while an appeal is pending and therefore will not delay 
the appeal or the eviction proceedings.  Section 808.075(1) 
provides that "in any case, whether or not an appeal is pending, 
the circuit court may act under . . . s. 805.17(3) . . . ."15  
Therefore, a party in a small claims action may simultaneously 
move for reconsideration and initiate an appeal.  Allowing a 
tenant to move for reconsideration under § 805.17(3) thus does 
not contravene the legislative intent to provide a "speeded-up" 
forum for eviction proceedings. 
¶19 Accordingly, 
we 
conclude 
that 
the 
considerations 
favoring motions for reconsideration outweigh any considerations 
not favoring such motions, and that a tenant's motion for 
reconsideration of an eviction judgment is compatible with small 
claims procedure and practice in eviction actions.  Thus a 
tenant against whom an eviction judgment has been rendered in a 
small claims eviction action may bring a motion to reconsider 
the judgment under Wis. Stat. § 805.17(3).16   
                                                 
15 Cf. Chase Lumber & Fuel Co. v. Chase, 228 Wis. 2d 179, 
203, 596 N.W.2d 840 (Ct. App. 1999) (circuit court can order 
enforcement of judgment pending appeal pursuant to § 808.075); 
Riley v. Lawson, 210 Wis. 2d 478, 488, 565 N.W.2d 266 (Ct. App. 
1997) (circuit court can adjudicate motion for relief despite 
pending appeal); Cmty. Nat'l Bank v. O'Neill, 157 Wis. 2d 244, 
249, 458 N.W.2d 385 (Ct. App. 1990) (circuit court has authority 
under § 808.075(1) to confirm foreclosure sale while appeal 
pending). 
16 The court of appeals concluded that "because Bast's 
notice of appeal was filed more than fifteen days from the 
notice of entry of . . . judgment, [it] need not consider 
whether motions for reconsideration filed and heard within that 
fifteen days are inconsistent with small claims eviction" 
procedure.  See Highland Manor, 265 Wis. 2d 455, ¶12. 
No. 
02-2799   
 
10 
 
¶20 Having addressed the first issue, we now consider 
whether a motion for reconsideration extends the time to appeal 
from a judgment of eviction prescribed by Wis. Stat. § 799.445.  
Again, chapter 799 guides us in this endeavor.   
¶21 Wisconsin Stat. § 799.445, which governs eviction 
actions, explicitly sets forth the time in which an appeal from 
a judgment of eviction shall be taken.  In an eviction action, 
an appeal shall be initiated within 15 days of the entry of 
judgment.17  Wisconsin Stat. § 799.445 provides in relevant part 
as follows:  
An appeal in an eviction action shall be initiated 
within 15 days of the entry of judgment or order as 
specified in s. 808.04(2).  An order for judgment for 
restitution of the premises under s. 799.44(1) or for 
denial of restitution is appealable as a matter of 
right under s. 808.03(1) within 15 days after the 
entry of the order for judgment for restitution or for 
denial of restitution.[18]   . . . No appeal by a 
                                                 
17 The express requirement in § 799.445 that an appeal from 
a judgment of eviction must be taken within 15 days of an entry 
of judgment or order is supported by Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 
808.04(2). 
 
Section 
808.04(2) 
provides 
that 
"an 
appeal 
under . . . s. 799.445 shall be initiated within 15 days after 
entry of judgment or order appealed from."  
18 Wisconsin Stat. § 808.03(1)(b) provides:  
 
(1) Appeals as of right.  A final judgment or a final 
order of a circuit court may be appealed as a matter 
of right to the court of appeals unless otherwise 
expressly provided by law.  A final judgment or final 
order is a judgment, order, or disposition that 
disposes of the entire matter in litigation as to one 
or more of the parties, whether rendered in an action 
or special proceeding, and that is one of the 
following: 
 . . . . 
No. 
02-2799   
 
11 
 
defendant of an order for judgment for restitution of 
the premises may stay proceedings on the judgment 
unless the appellant serves and files with the notice 
of appeal an undertaking to the plaintiff, in an 
amount and with surety approved by the judge who 
ordered the entry of judgment.  
¶22 If Wis. Stat. § 799.445 applies to the present case, 
Bast filed the notice of appeal too late.  Bast argues that 
Wis. Stat. § 805.17(3), governing a motion for reconsideration, 
provides the applicable time period for a notice of appeal from 
an order denying a reconsideration motion and that this time 
period should apply to her notice of appeal.  If this time 
period applies, Bast argues that her notice of appeal from the 
judgment of eviction was timely filed.  
¶23 Section 805.17(3) provides, in relevant part, the time 
for initiating an appeal as follows: 
If the court denies a motion filed under this 
subsection, the time for initiating an appeal from the 
judgment commences when the court denies the motion on 
the record or when an order denying the motion is 
entered, whichever occurs first.  If within 90 days 
after entry of judgment the court does not decide a 
motion filed under this subsection on the record or 
the judge, or the clerk at the judge's written 
direction, does not sign an order denying the motion, 
the motion is considered denied and the time for 
initiating an appeal from the judgment commences 90 
days after entry of judgment.  
¶24 The friction at the heart of this dispute is between 
Wis. Stat. § 799.445, providing that "an appeal in an eviction 
action shall be initiated within 15 days of the entry of 
                                                                                                                                                             
(b) Recorded in docket entries in ch. 799 cases. 
 
No. 
02-2799   
 
12 
 
judgment or order," and Wis. Stat. § 805.17(3), providing that 
"the time for initiating an appeal from the judgment commences 
when the court denies the motion on the record or when an order 
denying the motion is entered."  Thus if § 805.17(3) applies and 
a circuit court denies a motion for reconsideration, the time 
for an appeal from a judgment of eviction is extended, as the 
court of appeals explained.  The time for appeal from a judgment 
of eviction would be extended under § 805.17(3), according to 
the court of appeals, to something in excess of 20 days after 
entry of judgment and possibly as much as 110 days after entry 
of judgment.19 
¶25 The 
conflict 
between 
Wis. Stat. §§ 799.445 
and 
805.17(3) regarding the time of appeal of a judgment of eviction 
is, 
we 
conclude, 
resolved 
by 
§ 799.04. 
As 
we 
explained 
previously, § 799.04 provides that, except as otherwise provided 
in chapter 799, the general rules of practice and procedure in 
chapters 750 to 758 and 801 to 847 apply to actions and 
proceedings under chapter 799.  As we have shown, § 799.445 does 
explicitly provide the allowable time for appeal from a judgment 
of eviction, and it therefore trumps the time for appeal set 
forth in § 805.17(3).  We need go no further.  Under 
Wis. Stat. § 799.445, a tenant must appeal from a judgment of 
eviction within 15 days of judgment, and Wis. Stat. § 805.17(3) 
does not extend the time for initiating an appeal from an 
eviction judgment.  
                                                 
19 See Highland Manor, 265 Wis. 2d 455, ¶10 n.4. 
No. 
02-2799   
 
13 
 
¶26 We conclude that although a motion for reconsideration 
under the first part of Wis. Stat. § 805.17(3) is available in 
an eviction proceeding, § 799.445, not the latter part of 
§ 805.17(3), governs the time frame for appealing a judgment of 
eviction.  This conclusion works under both chapter 799 and 
Wis. Stat. § 805.17(3), because as we explained previously, a 
tenant 
may 
pursue 
both 
an 
appeal 
and 
a 
motion 
for 
reconsideration at the same time.20  Because Bast filed her 
notice of appeal more than 15 days from the entry of judgment, 
it was untimely.21  Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the 
court of appeals. 
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is 
affirmed. 
 
                                                 
20 See Wis. Stat. § 808.075. 
21 We agree with the court of appeals that there are several 
matters the parties discuss but that are not present on appeal. 
Like the court of appeals, we do not consider the applicability 
of Wis. Stat. § 799.28, which pertains to motions for a new 
trial, nor do we consider the applicability of Ver Hagen v. 
Gibbons, 55 Wis. 2d 21, 197 N.W.2d 752 (1972), which holds that 
a motion for reconsideration not raising new issues does not 
toll the time to file a notice of appeal.  See Highland Manor, 
265 Wis. 2d 455, ¶12. 
No. 
02-2799   
 
 
 
1