Case Title: In the Matter of: Gillian DePrez Keiffner

Citation: 

Docket Number: 49S00-1509-DI-522

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 2017-08-11T00:00:00Z

Document:
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT 
Kevin P. McGoff 
Margaret M. Christensen 
Melissa Buckley Minix 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
ATTORNEYS FOR THE INDIANA SUPREME COURT  
DISCIPLINARY COMMISSION 
G. Michael Witte, Executive Director 
Aaron Johnson, Staff Attorney 
Indianapolis, Indiana 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In the 
Indiana Supreme Court  
_________________________________ 
 
No. 49S00-1509-DI-522 
 
IN THE MATTER OF: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
GILLIAN DEPREZ KEIFFNER, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Respondent. 
_________________________________ 
 
Attorney Discipline Action 
Hearing Officer Robert W. York. 
_________________________________ 
 
 
August 11, 2017 
 
 
Per Curiam. 
 
The Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission filed a “Verified Complaint for 
Disciplinary Action” against Respondent Gillian DePrez Keiffner, charging her with attorney 
misconduct based on actions taken while prosecuting two criminal trials.  Respondent’s 2007 
admission to this state’s bar subjects her to this Court’s disciplinary jurisdiction.  See IND. 
CONST. art. 7, § 4.   
 
This matter is now before the Court on the report of the hearing officer appointed by this 
Court to hear evidence on the verified complaint and on the post-hearing briefing by the parties.  
Based on the record before us, a majority of the Court concludes that Respondent did not engage 
in attorney misconduct as charged.  Accordingly, we enter judgment in Respondent’s favor.  
FILED
C L E R K
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
Aug 11 2017, 10:39 am
 
 
2 
Procedural Background and Facts 
 
 
At relevant times, Respondent served as a deputy prosecuting attorney in Marion 
County.1  In 2012, Respondent represented the State during the trial of Bruce Ryan on charges of 
sexual misconduct with a minor.  In 2013, Respondent represented the State during the trial of 
Brandon Brummett on charges of child molesting and sexual misconduct with a minor.  Both 
trials resulted in convictions and, in the ensuing direct appeals, each defendant’s convictions 
were challenged on grounds of prosecutorial misconduct.  Based on the appellate records that 
were before us, and applying the well-settled standards for reviewing such claims in a criminal 
setting, we concluded that prosecutorial misconduct indeed had occurred in each trial.  We 
reversed Brummett’s convictions, summarily affirming the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that the 
cumulative effect of several of the challenged actions by Respondent and her co-counsel 
amounted to fundamental error.   Brummett v. State, 10 N.E.3d 78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), aff’d on 
reh’g, 21 N.E.3d 840, summarily aff’d in relevant part on transfer, 24 N.E.3d 965 (Ind. 2015).  
We affirmed Ryan’s convictions after concluding the misconduct did not rise to the level of 
fundamental error.  Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663 (Ind. 2014). 
 
 
The Commission thereafter charged Respondent with violating Indiana Professional 
Conduct Rule 3.4(e)2 during the Ryan and Brummett trials and Rule 8.4(d)3 during the Brummett 
trial.  Following a hearing, the hearing officer filed his report to this Court on February 10, 2017, 
concluding the Commission had not met its burden of proving that Respondent violated the rules 
as charged.  
                                                 
1 Respondent has prior discipline involving criminal conduct committed while she was a deputy 
prosecuting attorney in Marion County, and the parties’ agreed resolution of that case stipulated that 
Respondent had resigned her position as deputy prosecutor.  See Matter of DePrez, 928 N.E.2d 198 (Ind. 
2010).  The parties in this case do not explain how Respondent came to resume her prosecutorial role 
shortly after our acceptance of the conditional agreement for discipline in the prior case. 
 
2 Rule 3.4(e) provides, “A lawyer shall not . . . in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not 
reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal 
knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the 
justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence 
of an accused[.]” 
 
3 Rule 8.4(d) provides, “It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is 
prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]” 
 
 
3 
Discussion 
 
The Commission has petitioned this Court to review the hearing officer’s findings and 
conclusions.  The Commission carries the burden of proof to demonstrate attorney misconduct by 
clear and convincing evidence.  See Ind. Admission and Discipline Rule 23(14)(i) (2016).  While 
the review process in disciplinary cases involves a de novo examination of all matters presented 
to the Court, the hearing officer’s findings nevertheless receive emphasis due to the unique 
opportunity for direct observation of witnesses.  See Matter of Brizzi, 962 N.E.2d 1240, 1244 
(Ind. 2012).   
 
The hearing officer relied heavily on our decision in Matter of Smith, 60 N.E.3d 1034 (Ind. 
2016), which we issued after the instant case was charged and tried but before the hearing officer 
issued his report.  Like the instant case, Smith involved a deputy prosecutor charged with 
professional misconduct in the wake of an appellate reversal of a defendant’s conviction on 
grounds that included prosecutorial misconduct.  Also like the instant case, the Commission’s 
prosecution of the disciplinary action in Smith was structured largely around the notion that a 
criminal appellate finding of prosecutorial misconduct was dispositive of the question of 
professional misconduct in disciplinary proceedings.  We rejected this notion in Smith and we do 
so again here: 
 
“It is the exclusive province of this Court to regulate professional legal activity.”  
Matter of Mitthower, 693 N.E.2d 555, 558 (Ind. 1998).  While appellate claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct and disciplinary allegations of Rule 8.4(d) violations 
may share some similarities, the analyses are not exactly the same, nor are the 
parties and interests at stake in the proceedings the same.  A criminal appeal 
examines the propriety of a defendant’s conviction, not whether an attorney’s 
conduct merits professional discipline.  Respondent was not a party to the 
criminal appeal and did not have an opportunity prior to the instant proceedings to 
defend his own professional conduct.  Moreover, disciplinary proceedings afford 
the opportunity for evidentiary development beyond the cold record available to 
the Court of Appeals in a criminal appeal.  We have previously recognized that a 
written trial transcript “presents only a small part of the whole picture,” see 
Whiting v. State, 969 N.E.2d 24, 31 (Ind. 2012), and in a disciplinary proceeding 
the parties may be able to offer additional evidence that paints a more complete 
picture. 
 
Smith, 60 N.E.3d at 1036. 
 
 
4 
 
 
In Smith, the “more complete picture” adduced during disciplinary proceedings 
demonstrated that professional discipline for the deputy prosecutor was not merited.  In sum, of 
the various errors identified by the Court of Appeals as cumulatively warranting reversal of the 
defendant’s conviction, three instances were alleged by the Commission to have involved 
professional misconduct by the respondent.  But extrinsic evidence revealed that one of these 
identified errors did not actually happen (the transcript of closing argument was inaccurate), 
another was wholly the fault of a witness and not attributable to any act or omission by the 
respondent, and the third involved a conscientious (if unsuccessful in hindsight) effort by the 
respondent to craft a particular line of questioning in a manner that conformed with highly fact-
sensitive appellate guidance.    
 
 
At issue in the instant disciplinary proceedings are one portion of Respondent’s closing 
argument during the Ryan trial and six portions of her closing argument in the Brummett trial.  
Most of these instances were addressed and held to have been prosecutorial misconduct in the 
respective criminal appeals.  Similar to the respondent in Smith, Respondent has attempted in 
this disciplinary proceeding to provide additional context for the events at issue.  And like Smith, 
the hearing officer ultimately found Respondent’s testimony credible. 
 
 
The parties and the hearing officer have exhaustively dissected the segments of closing 
argument at issue, as framed by the additional context provided during these disciplinary 
proceedings.  We find Respondent’s post hoc explanations as a whole to be somewhat less 
convincing than the extrinsic evidence adduced in Smith, but we also are hesitant on these facts 
to ground a finding of professional misconduct on a post hoc parsing of semi-spontaneous oral 
statements made during the heat of trial.  Keeping in mind the Commission’s burden of proof 
and the emphasis we afford factual findings arising from the hearing officer’s opportunity to 
observe witnesses directly and adjudge their credibility, a majority of this Court accepts the 
hearing officer’s report and recommendation and concludes that the Commission’s allegations of 
professional misconduct against Respondent have not been clearly and convincingly proven. 
 
 
 
5 
 
We caution that by no means should our opinion today be read as an endorsement of 
Respondent’s actions.  For the reasons outlined in Ryan and Brummett, we continue to 
disapprove of arguments that invite a conviction for reasons other than a defendant’s guilt, 
impugn the integrity of defense counsel, or otherwise create a “good guy / bad guy dichotomy” 
between the respective roles of the State and defense counsel.  Arguments of this nature, whether 
intentionally or carelessly made, endanger the defendant’s right to a fair trial and the probability 
that any resulting conviction will survive appellate review.  It is no small thing for a conviction 
to be reversed and a case retried, particularly in cases such as these involving allegations of sex 
offenses against children; it delays justice, places a strain on limited judicial resources, and 
forces victims and others to testify yet again.  Respondent’s conduct in these cases caused one 
conviction to be lost, placed another at unnecessary risk of being lost, and placed herself at risk 
of professional discipline.  Prosecutors would be well-advised to exercise better care in crafting 
their presentations to juries than Respondent did here.            
 
Conclusion 
 
A majority of the Court concludes that the Commission has not met its burden of proving 
by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated Indiana Professional Conduct Rules 
3.4(e) or 8.4(d). We therefore enter judgment in favor of Respondent.  The hearing officer 
appointed in this case is discharged.