Case Title: State ex rel. Gen. Elec. Corp. v. Indus. Comm.

Citation: 2004-Ohio-5585

Docket Number: 20040299

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2004-11-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Gen. Elec. Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 103 Ohio St.3d 420, 2004-Ohio-5585.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. GENERAL ELECTRIC CORPORATION, APPELLEE, v. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO, APPELLEE; ROSS, APPELLANT. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Gen. Elec. Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 103 Ohio St.3d 420, 
2004-Ohio-5585.] 
Workers’ compensation — Corneal lens implants are corrective, not restorative 
— Judgment of the court of appeals reversed. 
(No. 2004-0299 — Submitted August 17, 2004 — Decided November 3, 2004.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 02AP-1291, 2004-
Ohio-105. 
Per Curiam. 
{¶ 1} In 1996, appellant-claimant, Randall D. Ross, received an 
electrical shock at work.  The accident caused cataracts, and claimant’s vision 
decreased to 20/200 from what was presumed to have been 20/20.  He eventually 
required bilateral surgery and corneal lens implants, which corrected his vision. 
{¶ 2} In 2001, claimant moved appellee Industrial Commission of Ohio 
for a scheduled-loss award under R.C. 4123.57(B) for a total loss of vision in both 
eyes.  The commission granted that award: 
{¶ 3} “Following the industrial injury the claimant developed cataracts 
and the claimant’s vision deteriorated to 20/200.  Dr. Kode considered this level 
of visual acuity to be legally blind. 
{¶ 4} “Subsequently, the claimant had cataract surgery and intraocular 
lens implants for his eyes — the right eye surgery was completed on 12-4-00 and 
the left eye surgery was completed on 2-1-01. 
{¶ 5} “The Staff Hearing Officer finds that claimant is entitled to a total 
loss of vision for his left and right eye, as the claimant had no impairment prior to 
the injury and 20/200 vision after the injury. 
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{¶ 6} “The Staff Hearing Officer finds that the improvement in the 
claimant’s eyesight following the 12-00 and 2-01 surgeries is no more than a 
correction to vision and as such is not to be taken into consideration in 
determining the percentage of vision actually lost. 
{¶ 7} “In coming to this conclusion the Staff Hearing Officer relies on 
Ohio Revised Code 4123.57[B] [and] State ex rel. Kroger Co. v. Stover (1987), 31 
Ohio St.3d 229 [31 OBR 436, 510 N.E.2d 356] * * * .” 
{¶ 8} Appellee-employer General Electric Corporation initiated an action 
in mandamus in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, alleging a commission 
abuse of discretion.  Analysis centered on State ex rel. Kroger Co. v. Stover 
(1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 229, 31 OBR 436, 510 N.E.2d 356, and the debate over 
correction versus restoration.  In 1987, Kroger held that, based on “the current 
state of the medical art,” a claimant’s corneal transplant was only corrective, not 
restorative, and could not be considered in making an award.  Id., paragraph two 
of the syllabus.  Here, the court of appeals ruled that — 16 years later — medical 
procedure had evolved to the point where claimant’s surgery could be considered 
restorative, and therefore the court foreclosed an award. 
{¶ 9} This cause is now before this court on an appeal as of right. 
{¶ 10} After an eye injury, repair frequently consists of one or more of the 
following:  (1) the natural healing process, (2) a transplant, (3) an artificial 
implant that the patient cannot remove, or (4) a temporary prosthetic device to aid 
vision.  See Creative Dimensions Group, Inc. v. Hill (1993), 16 Va.App. 439, 444, 
430 S.E.2d 718. 
{¶ 11} When these measures fail to ameliorate the loss of sight incurred – 
be it full or partial — no one questions the claimant’s right to a scheduled-loss 
award.  Debate often vigorously ensues, however, when improvement is achieved. 
{¶ 12} Ohio, like most states, makes uncorrected vision the standard for 
evaluation.  This standard may have arisen when, in many trades, glasses could 
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3 
not be accommodated.  Jewell Collieries Corp. v. Kenda (1942), 110 Colo. 394, 
395, 134 P.2d 206.  Something like this situation may continue today in work 
settings where smoke, chemicals, dust, or other irritants make wearing contact 
lenses impossible. 
{¶ 13} R.C. 4123.57(B) delineates how partial disability should be 
compensated: 
{¶ 14} “For the loss of the sight of an eye, one hundred twenty-five  
weeks. 
{¶ 15} “For the permanent partial loss of sight of an eye, the portion of 
one hundred twenty-five weeks as the administrator in each case determines, 
based upon the percentage of vision actually lost as a result of the injury or 
occupational disease, but, in no case shall an award of compensation be made for 
less than twenty-five per cent loss of uncorrected vision.  ‘Loss of uncorrected 
vision’ means the percentage of vision actually lost as the result of the injury or 
occupational disease.” 
{¶ 16} The statute bars the commission from considering a correction to 
vision either in making an award or in assessing an amount.  This law continually 
vexes employers who cannot reconcile the concept of loss with a claimant whose 
postinjury vision has been improved to 20/20.  Most jurisdictions, however, have 
recognized this view as short-sighted, with the utility of glasses and contact lenses 
best refuting what may seem, at first glance, to be unassailable logic: 
{¶ 17} “[L]oss having occurred, it continues unless there is recovery.  The 
condition will not improve; it is permanent.  Correction by artificial appliance 
does not effect a recovery.  Recovery and correction are not the same.  The lenses 
and glasses are not instruments to improve or cure.  They are beneficial only 
when in place and are subject to being lost, broken or becoming ill-fitted or 
ineffective.  On the happening of any such event, the loss returns, if it can be said 
that it ever went away.  Corrective lenses are just that, corrective.”  Natl. Union 
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Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Lucio (Tex.App.1984), 674 S.W.2d 
487, 488. 
{¶ 18} The difficult distinction between recovery/restoration and 
correction remains the cornerstone of scheduled-loss-of-vision litigation.  
Although these terms are statutorily undefined, case law returns to two criteria 
again and again:  visual improvement and permanence. 
{¶ 19} Recognizing the miracle that is the eye, we note that the first 
prerequisite encompasses more than just enhancement of distance vision.  In 
Kalhorn v. Bellevue (1988), 227 Neb. 880, 420 N.W.2d 713, for example, an 
intraocular lens implant raised claimant’s postinjury visual acuity from 20/200 to 
20/40.  That improvement, however, was held insufficient to establish restoration.  
The Nebraska Supreme Court declared: 
{¶ 20} “The evidence shows that unlike a human lens, the [claimant’s 
implanted] plastic lens is monofocused, meaning that it focuses only at one 
distance.  A human lens has the capability of changing its focus.  The human lens 
differs from a plastic lens because the human lens has some ability to filter out 
light.  The implant does not have any filtering powers.  Therefore, the eye may 
become sensitive to bright light, according to expert testimony.”  Id., 227 Neb. at 
885, 420 N.W.2d 713. 
{¶ 21} A Virginia court reached the same conclusion: 
{¶ 22} “Even with the lens implant, Dr. Hensle confirmed that the 
claimant still lacked the ability to focus normally and that ‘it’s not unusual to see 
problems with some glare because the implant itself is not the same shape or 
consistency.  Though it’s a highly regulated and high-quality piece of 
merchandise, it’s still not the same as the natural lens in the eye.’ ”  Creative 
Dimensions Group, 16 Va.App. at 442, 430 S.E.2d 718. 
{¶ 23} The second element is permanence.  Case law does not suggest that 
permanence entails an ironclad guarantee of success.  Regardless, glasses and 
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contacts are not permanent improvements for the reasons stated in Lucio.  They 
are simply prosthetic and effectively not different from an artificial limb or brace.  
As stated in Great Am. Indemn. Co. v. Indus. Comm. (1945), 114 Colo. 91, 101, 
162 P.2d 413, “We can see no more logic in holding that the Legislature intended 
to base disability in an eye case after correction, than in holding that in a leg or 
arm case, compensation should be awarded on the extent of disability after the 
attachment of a brace or any other appliance.” 
{¶ 24} Surgical intervention, while considerably more complicated, has 
also not, over the years, risen above its denomination as corrective.  In Ohio, the 
majority in Kroger declined to characterize a corneal transplant as restorative: 
{¶ 25} “To make the distinction Kroger asks would require us to find that 
a corneal transplant is not merely corrective, but restores vision permanently.  We 
decline to accept that position. 
{¶ 26} “Undeniably Stover sustained the substantial vision loss found by 
the commission.  His loss resulted from severe burning and scarring of his 
corneas.  The question is whether a transplant eliminates the loss of vision or is a 
correction of vision.  A corneal transplant does not necessarily result in permanent 
or trouble-free restoration.  This conclusion is substantiated by the medical 
testimony in this case which shows that Stover has twice suffered a rejection of 
the grafts in his right eye, and that at the time there was reason to believe that 
rejection in the left eye was possible. 
{¶ 27} “We acknowledge that advances in medical technology might, at 
some future time, permit the conclusion that a corneal transplant eliminates the 
loss (as for example the re-setting of broken bones could).  But, at the present and 
on this record, a corneal transplant is no more than a correction to lost vision.  
Indeed, a patient might well decide not to have a corneal transplant.  The result 
we reach is fortified by R.C. 4123.95 which requires that R.C. 4123.01 to 
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4123.95, inclusive, be construed in favor of employees and their dependents.”  
Kroger, 31 Ohio St.3d at 233-234, 31 OBR 436, 510 N.E.2d 356. 
{¶ 28} Kalhorn reached the same conclusion regarding a synthetic-lens 
implant: 
{¶ 29} “[T]he evidence demonstrates significant difficulties with 
Kalhorn’s intraocular lens implant and * * * there is no evidence that such 
intraocular lenses will be risk-free in the future.  Synthetic intraocular lenses are 
made of the same type of plastic material as are contact lenses.  Kalhorn’s 
synthetic lens, just like a contact lens, was specially prepared for his left eye, but 
is expected to be a permanent replacement lens. * * *  
{¶ 30} “Prior to the implant surgery, Kalhorn was required to sign a 
consent form which set forth the risks involved with the lens implant. * * *   
Significantly, the consent form states that the long-term effect of a lens 
implantation is not known at the present time, nor is it known how long the eye 
can tolerate an intraocular lens implant.  Some of the complications listed on the 
consent form are:  infection, retinal detachment, corneal edema, edema of the 
macula, hemorrhage inside the eye, iris atrophy, glaucoma and dislocation of the 
implant.”  Kalhorn, 227 Neb. at 885, 420 N.W.2d 713.  Similarly, in Creative 
Dimensions Group, the court stated: 
{¶ 31} “The commission noted that the intraocular lens implant was not 
truly ‘permanent.’  Dr. Hensle, the claimant’s treating ophthalmologist, testified 
by deposition that several possible circumstances might necessitate removal of the 
implanted lens. * * * In addition, the evidence established that claimant had 
suffered a post-surgical inflammation that required periodic instillation of drops 
into his eye.  This medical testimony provides the credible evidence necessary to 
support the commission’s finding that, under the facts of this case, claimant’s 
intraocular lens implant was not a ‘permanent’ restoration of his vision.”  
Creative Dimensions Group, 16 Va.App. at 442, 430 S.E.2d 718. 
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{¶ 32} All three of these opinions rest on the belief that medical 
technology has not progressed to the point where permanent, trouble-free 
improvement can be confidently predicted.  These decisions, however, were 
issued in the 1980s and 1990s — the last in 1993.  The question now is whether 
11 years later, medical advances have transformed a corneal lens implant, once 
considered a correction, into a restoration. 
{¶ 33} There are some who believe this transformation to be impossible.  
In his dissent from the Georgia Supreme Court’s holding in Lee Connell Constr. 
Co. v. Swann (1985), 254 Ga. 121, 327 S.E.2d 222, Justice Smith reflected: 
{¶ 34} “Man has not yet and almost certainly will never be able to 
duplicate human organs to the point where the person suffering an injury to one of 
his organs will be made whole after replacement. 
{¶ 35} “ * * * 
{¶ 36} “I venture to say that there is no member of this court who would 
swap his natural eye for a transplant and a pair of eyeglasses and believe that he 
had been made whole. 
{¶ 37} “ * * * 
{¶ 38} “Medical science has come a long way, but there is no way a 
doctor or anyone else can duplicate God’s work  * * * .”  Id., 254 Ga. at 122, 327 
S.E.2d 222 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
{¶ 39} Others, however, believe that that day has arrived.  Justice Holmes, 
in his dissent in Kroger, asserted that routine eye surgery had crossed the 
threshold from corrective to restorative: 
{¶ 40} “[T]he majority’s characterization of keratoplasties as failing to 
‘eliminate the loss’ because of uncertainties in ‘the current state of the medical 
art’ ignores the reality that such operations have been regularly performed as 
standard medical procedure since the 1940s.  Nor has the ‘current state of the 
medical art’ diminished Stover’s expectations and efforts at surgically obtaining 
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normal, healthy eyes, since he had another transplantation surgery immediately 
following the Industrial Commission’s award to him for permanent loss.  As a 
matter of scientific fact, a successful keratoplasty will eliminate, on a permanent 
basis, any organic loss which Stover originally experienced.  To the degree the 
new corneas do not provide the previously enjoyed standard of vision, their 
function may be corrected by artificial lenses, i.e., glasses.”  Kroger, 31 Ohio 
St.3d at 243, 31 OBR 436, 510 N.E.2d 356 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
{¶ 41} The court of appeals in this litigation reached the same conclusion 
regarding corneal implants: 
{¶ 42} “[B]ased on the evidence in this case, claimant’s eyes were fully 
repaired surgically in a way similar to the way in which a severed finger can be 
reattached. [State ex rel.] Welker [v. Indus. Comm. (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 98, 742 
N.E.2d 622], supra.  There have been significant advances in medical technology 
with regard to cataract surgery.  It is as if the person receives a completely new 
set of eyes.” 
{¶ 43} There are three problems with this reasoning.  First, the court’s 
analogy to Welker is inappropriate.  The case at bar involves the implantation of 
an artificial device.  Welker involved the successful reattachment of claimant’s 
own thumb.  Welker stressed the distinction between the two, quoting with 
approval a Rhode Island case: 
{¶ 44} “ ‘Live tissue from an injured worker’s body applied by a skilled 
surgeon as a replacement for an injured thumb is not equatable with the prosthetic 
device purchased from a surgical appliance dealer.  One is real; the other 
artificial.’ ”  Welker, 91 Ohio St.3d at 100-101, 742 N.E.2d 622, quoting Fogarty 
v. State (1967), 103 R.I. 228, 231, 236 A.2d 247. 
{¶ 45} The second deficiency lies in the medical evidence noted by the 
lower court.  There is none of record.  All of the medical literature cited by the 
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court through its magistrate was outside the record and may well have reflected 
the views of only a segment of the medical populace.   
 
{¶ 46} The final problem lies in the Tenth District Court of Appeals’ 
decision in State ex rel. Parsec, Inc. v. Agin, 155 Ohio App.3d 303, 2003-Ohio-
6186, 800 N.E.2d 1180.  There, just six weeks prior to its opinion in this case, the  
court issued a holding contrary to its decision here.  Citing Kroger, the court held 
that the current state of medical art still had not elevated corneal implants — like 
the ones currently at issue — to the level of restoration.  Claimant’s postsurgical 
improvement, therefore, could not be considered.  The court, moreover, 
specifically distinguished Welker for the reasons mentioned earlier. 
{¶ 47} As always, a decision in this type of case is a difficult one.  
Regardless of precedent, there will always be those who argue that a total-loss-of-
vision award to a claimant who can see constitutes a windfall.  Perhaps the best 
response to that assertion was articulated by a Maryland court of appeals: 
{¶ 48} “Turning to Employer’s argument that the legislature could not 
have intended such a result, because it might give Chin what Employer views as a 
windfall, we observe that the beneficent intent and the social policies underlying 
the worker compensation law do not necessarily produce mathematically logical 
results in every case.  We are not dealing with mere mathematics, but with the 
legislative response to problems of an industrial society.”  Dawson’s Charter 
Serv. v. Chin (1986), 68 Md.App. 433, 444, 511 A.2d 1138. 
{¶ 49} Recognition of the legislature’s role prompts two final 
observations.  First, as claimant stresses, the General Assembly has also 
promulgated R.C. 4123.95, which demands liberal statutory construction in favor 
of claimants.  Second, if the current statutory scheme is outdated, then it is more 
appropriately the legislature’s role to revise it.  For example, the Michigan 
Supreme Court observed: 
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{¶ 50} “If ophthalmological advances and refinements in the use of 
contact lens [have] in fact rendered the amended statute inconsonant with its 
original legislative intent, it is the province of the legislature to say so.  We 
construe the statute in the plain meaning of its wording.”  Lindsay v. Glennie 
Industries, Inc. (1967), 379 Mich. 573, 578, 153 N.W.2d 642. 
{¶ 51} In this case, R.C. 4123.57(B) clearly makes uncorrected vision the 
applicable standard.  Case law, in turn, distinguishes between correction and 
restoration/recovery for purposes of making an award and has presumably left the 
terms deliberately undefined in order to accommodate advances in medical 
procedure.  The court of appeals in this case felt that the time had arrived to 
reclassify corneal lens implants as restorative.  We do not agree and accordingly 
reverse its judgment. 
Judgment reversed. 
 
MOYER, C.J,. F.E. SWEENEY, PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR 
and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur. 
 
RESNICK, J., not participating. 
_________________ 
 
Reminger & Reminger Co., L.P.A., Paulette M. Ivan and Ronald A. 
Fresco, for appellee General Electric Corporation. 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, and Thomas L. Reitz, Assistant Attorney 
General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 
 
Mark Ferestad Law Firm and Mark A. Ferestad, for appellant. 
Philip J. Fulton & Associates, Philip J. Fulton and William A. Thorman 
III, urging reversal for amicus curiae, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers. 
_____________________