Case Title: RODIACK v. STATE

Citation: 

Docket Number: 01-114

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2002-09-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
RODIACK v. STATE2002 WY 13755 P.3d 1Case Number: 01-114, 01-115Decided: 09/23/2002
APRIL TERM, A.D. 2002

                                                                                                                                   

CHARLES 
RODIACK,

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

JOHN  RODIACK,

Appellant(Defendant),

 

v.

 

THE 
STATE OF WYOMING,

Appellee(Plaintiff).

 

Representing 
Appellants:

            
Mike Cornia, Evanston, Wyoming.

 
   

Representing 
Appellee:

            
Hoke MacMillan, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney 
General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; and Kimberly A. 
Baker, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

 
         
           
    

Before 
HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN,* KITE, and 
VOIGT, JJ.

*  Chief Justice at time of expedited 
conference.

 
      

            
VOIGT, Justice.

 
 

[¶1]      John Rodiack and 
Charles Rodiack (appellants), father and son, appeal their convictions for 
felony interference with a peace officer.  
They claim that their right to a speedy trial was violated and they raise 
several evidentiary issues.  We conclude that 
the violation of W.R.Cr.P. 48 requires reversal, and we remand to the district 
court for entry of an order of dismissal without prejudice.

 
 
             
           

ISSUES

 

            
1.         
Does the violation of W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) require reversal of the appellants' 
convictions?

            
2.         
Was it error in a joint trial to admit one appellant's out-of-court 
statements?

            
3.         
Was the jury properly instructed on the law?

            
4.         
Was it error not to allow evidence to rebut Officer Davies' direct 
testimony and evidence as to his violent nature?

            
5.         
Was it error to allow evidence of uncharged misconduct as to John 
Rodiack?

            
6.         
Was 
there sufficient evidence to support the convictions?

 
       

FACTS

 

[¶2]      On the evening of 
November 24, 1999, Officers Adam Davies (Davies) and Tim Robinson (Robinson) of 
the Rock Springs Police Department entered the Bomber's Sports Bar to perform a 
bar check.  The appellants were 
present in the bar.  While the 
officers spoke to the bartender, Charles Rodiack approached Davies.  The officers' version and the 
appellants' version of what followed differ considerably.  Given our disposition of this case, the 
detailed facts of the fracas are not too significant.  Suffice it to say that a conversation 
between Charles Rodiack and Davies about Davies' earlier arrest of Charles 
Rodiack's girlfriend, Toni Beard, ended up in a full-scale brawl involving 
Charles Rodiack, John Rodiack, Davies and Robinson.  John Rodiack and 
Charles Rodiack were both arrested and charged with felony interference with a 
police officer, and both were convicted in a joint jury trial.

 
      
            
       

DISCUSSION

 

            
Speedy 
Trial

 

[¶3]      A criminal 
defendant's right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  
However, before embarking on a constitutional analysis, we first review 
claims of a speedy trial violation under W.R.Cr.P. 48(b).  Hauck v. State, 2001 WY 119, ¶ 
12, 36 P.3d 597, 600 (Wyo. 2001).  Relevant to the current inquiry are five 
provisions of W.R.Cr.P. 48(b):

            
(2)       
A criminal charge shall be brought to trial within 120 days following 
arraignment unless continued as provided in this rule.

            
* * *

            
(4)       
Continuances not to exceed six months from the date of arraignment may be 
granted by the trial court as follows:

            
(A)       
On motion of defendant supported by affidavit; or

            
(B)       
On motion of the attorney for the state or the court 
if:

            
(i)         
The defendant expressly consents;

            
(ii)        The 
state's evidence is unavailable and the prosecution has exercised due diligence; 
or

            
(iii)       
Required in the due administration of justice and the defendant will not 
be substantially prejudiced; and

            
(C)       
If a continuance is proposed by the state or the court, the defendant 
shall be notified.  If the defendant 
objects, the defendant must show in writing how the delay may prejudice the 
defense.

            
(5)       
Any request to continue a trial to a date more than six months from the 
date of arraignment must be directed to the court to which appeals from the 
trial would be taken and may be granted by that court in accordance with 
paragraph (4).

            
(6)       
Any criminal case not tried or continued as provided in this rule shall 
be dismissed 120 days after arraignment.

            
* * *

            
(8)       
A dismissal for lack of a speedy trial under this rule shall not bar the 
state from again prosecuting the defendant for the same offense unless the 
defendant made a written demand for a speedy trial or can demonstrate prejudice 
from the delay.[1]

 

[¶4]      For the most 
part, application of W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) is a simple matter of arithmetic.  The rule was designed so that, at the 
outset of the case, the district court would set a trial date within 120 days of 
the arraignment.  If necessary 
during that 120-day period, the district court could continue the trial to a 
later date within the six-month limit.  
When the 120th day arrived, if the 
trial had not been held or continued pursuant to the rule, the case was to be 
dismissed.  If, for some 
reason, the trial could not be reset to a date within the six-month limit, the 
district court had to apply to this Court for approval to hold the trial beyond 
that limit.

 
     
              
               

[¶5]      There does not 
appear to have been much of an attempt in the instant case to meet the 
requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 48(b).  
John Rodiack and Charles Rodiack were arraigned in the district court on 
May 8, 2000.  The rule required the 
trial to take place or be continued as provided in the rule within 120 days of 
the date of arraignment, which was September 5, 2000.  The rule also provided that the district 
court could continue the trial for up to six months from the date of 
arraignment, but once again, only as provided in the rule.  That date was November 4, 2000.  What actually happened was that on July 
14, 2000, sixty-seven days after arraignment, the district court signed an order 
setting a scheduling conference for August 2, 2000.  On August 30, 2000, the district court 
filed another order setting the joint trial for October 17, 2000.  That joint trial date was forty-two days 
beyond the 120-day setting limit and there had been no continuances granted as 
provided by the rule.  These cases 
should have been dismissed on September 5, 2000.  Instead, the joint trial was held on November 
13, 2000.

 
       
  

[¶6]      It is true that, 
on August 3, 2000, the day after the scheduling conference, John Rodiack and 
Charles Rodiack each signed a Waiver of Speedy Trial specifically referencing 
the rule's 120-day limit.  Perhaps 
those waivers were meant to be the equivalent of a motion for continuance by the 
appellants under W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(4)(A), or the equivalent of a consent to a 
similar motion by the State under W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(4)(B)(i).  We cannot tell from the records, which 
contain neither a setting within the 120-day limit nor a motion for a 
continuance beyond the 120-day limit.

 
       
             
    

[¶7]      If this was the 
only speedy trial problem, there might be a stronger argument for the 
proposition that such a technical violation does not warrant reversal and 
dismissal.  But the joint trial was 
not held on its assigned date of October 17, 2000.  During a motion hearing on August 25, 
2000, it came to the attention of the district court and counsel that the joint 
trial might take more than the allotted three days.  After the district court and counsel 
evaluated their calendars, the joint trial was reset for November 13, 2000, 
which is the date it was eventually held.  
That date was 
beyond six months from the date of arraignment.

 
          

[¶8]      The district 
court and counsel were aware of, but not too concerned with, the six-month 
deadline contained in W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(5).  
The following exchange took place during the 
August 25, 2000, motion hearing:

 
           

            
THE COURT:  [Defense 
Counsel], when is the next date you'll be available to try this case if it can't 
be tried on October 17?

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  It would 
have to be in November, your Honor.  
And I think we have problems with the six month thing if we do that.  I'm not certain.

            
THE COURT:  I don't have a 
problem with it.

            
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  I don't 
either.  We can go to 
November.

 
    

[¶9]      Following this 
discussion, the district court addressed both John Rodiack and Charles Rodiack 
on the record, explained to them their right to a speedy trial, and determined 
that neither of them was opposed to the November trial date.  The State does not, however, argue that 
the appellants' waivers of their right to a speedy trial negated this clear 
violation of W.R.Cr.P. 48(b).  
Instead, the State concedes the violation.  This concession is understandable, given 
our previous holdings that the provisions of W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) are mandatory.  Detheridge v. State, 963 P.2d 233, 235 (Wyo. 1998); 
Yung v. State, 906 P.2d 1028, 1032 (Wyo. 1995); 
McDermott v. State, 897 P.2d 1295, 1299 (Wyo. 1995).

 

[¶10]   These violations of both the 
120-day limit and the six-month limit of W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) require reversal of the 
appellants' convictions.  
Consequently, no separate constitutional analysis is necessary on this 
primary issue.  The remaining 
question, however, is whether the appellants may be retried.  W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(8) allows retrial unless 
a "defendant made a written demand for a speedy trial or can demonstrate 
prejudice from the delay."  
W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(8).  Since neither John Rodiack nor Charles 
Rodiack filed a written demand for a speedy trial, the only issue is whether 
they were prejudiced by the delay.

 
 
             
           

[¶11]   The burden of proving prejudicial 
delay in a speedy trial argument lies with the appellant.  Almada v. State, 994 P.2d 299, 
305 (Wyo. 1999).  For some reason, rather than presenting 
evidence of such prejudice, the appellants here simply aver that "the only 
permissible remedy is dismissal with prejudice."  This, of course, flies in the face of 
W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(8), which provides that violation of the rule does not 
automatically bar retrial.  In 
urging us to remand for dismissal without prejudice, the State directs us to the 
four-part test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. 
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1972), 
that we have previously adopted for the consideration of speedy trial issues 
under the constitution:  (1) the 
length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion 
of his right; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant.  See Sides v. State, 963 P.2d 227, 
229 (Wyo. 1998).  The ultimate question is "whether the 
delay in bringing the accused to trial was unreasonable, that is, whether it 
substantially impaired the right of the accused to a fair trial."  Wehr v. State, 841 P.2d 104, 112 
(Wyo. 1992).

 

[¶12]   John Rodiack and Charles Rodiack 
went to trial 189 days after they were arraigned.  The length of the delay was sixty-nine 
days after the 120-day limit and only nine days after the six-month limit.  Although no motions were filed and the 
records are not perfectly clear on the matter, it appears that the delay 
resulted only from the coordination of the district court's and counsels' 
calendars.  Neither appellant ever 
asserted his right to a speedy trial and neither appellant has shown any 
prejudice by the delay.  There was 
nothing about the delay that affected the trial's fairness.  Thus, dismissal of these charges should be 
without prejudice.

 
      
  

            
Other 
Issues

 

[¶13]   Since these cases are being 
reversed on the speedy trial issue, we need not consider whether the other 
issues raised by the appellants require reversal.  The prospect of a retrial, on the other hand, 
prompts us to make the following comments in regard to two of those issues, in 
an effort to avoid error in a retrial:

 
        
              
         

            
1.         
An out-of-court statement by one defendant may not be hearsay as to him, 
but in a joint trial, care must be taken in admitting such evidence because the 
statement may be hearsay as to the other defendant.  W.R.E. 801(d)(2)(A) and 
802.

            
2.         
The crime of misdemeanor interference with a peace officer may be a 
lesser-included offense to the crime of felony interference with a peace 
officer.  Mueller v. State, 
2001 WY 134, ¶¶ 8-17, 36 P.3d 1151, 1155-58 (Wyo. 2001).

 

[¶14]   We decline to address the other 
issues presented.  They are fact-dependent issues involving the admissibility of evidence 
and, not knowing the circumstances under which they may or may not again arise, 
it would not be appropriate for this Court to attempt to guide the discretionary 
decision of the district court.

 
  
          
               
             
 

CONCLUSION

 

[¶15]   Both the 120-day and the six-month 
limits of W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) were violated in these related cases.  Trial was not set within 120 days of 
arraignment, no motions for continuance beyond 120 days were made as provided by 
the rule, and the district court did not seek approval from this Court to set 
the joint trial beyond six months from the date of arraignment.  The appellants did not, however, make demand for a speedy trial nor have 
they shown prejudice by the delay.

 
      
            

[¶16]   We reverse and remand to the district 
court for entry of an order of dismissal without prejudice.

 
      
          

FOOTNOTES

 

  1W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) was amended in 2001, 
with "180 days" substituted for "120 days" throughout, and allowing trial courts 
to grant continuances beyond 180 days.  
The present case is being decided under the version of the rule 
previously in effect.