Case Title: State v Duane Kirkland

Citation: 2008 MT 107

Docket Number: eab5742a-c1e3-4cfa-8162-8956136cfa14

State: montana

Court: Montana Supreme Court

Date: 2008-04-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
FILED
DA 06.0749 ‘aon 2008
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA.

2008 MT 107

 

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

. FILED

DUANE EUGENE KIRKLAND, ‘APR 0-1 2008
Defendant and Appellant. name EE Smith
Siar HR

 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twenty-First Judicial District,
In and For the County of Ravalli, Cause No, DC-05-151
Honorable Jefirey H. Langton, Presiding Judge

 

 

COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:

Edmund F. Sheehy, Regional Deputy Publie Defender,
Missoula, Montana

For Appellee:

Hon. Mike McGrath, Montana Attorney General; Jonathan M.
Krauss, Assistant Attomey General, Helena, Montana

George H. Com, Ravalli County Attorney; T. Geoffrey Mahar
Deputy County Attomey, Hamilton, Montana

 

Submitted on Briefs: November 21, 2007
Decided: April 1, 2008

Filed

 
Chief Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court.

‘1 Duane Eugene Kirkland (Kirkland) appeals from the judgment entered by the Twenty-

 

First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, on its order revoking Kirkland’s deferred
imposition of sentences for his convictions on two counts of felony issuing a bad check and
imposing suspended sentences. We affirm.

{2 Theissue on appeal is whether the District Court imposed an illegal sentence when it

 

ordered Kirkland to pay the costs of his court-appointed counsel incurred during, the
revocation proceedings.
BACKGROUND,

{B__ InFebruary of 2006, Kirkland pled guilty to two counts of felony issuing a bad check

 

At the subsequent sentencing, the District Court deferred imposition of sentence for a five-

 

year period on each count, to run concurrently, subject to conditions. ‘The court also ordered
Kirkland to pay restitution to the victims and set forth a specific time frame in which
Kirkland was to make his restitution payments.

$4 In July of 2006, the State of Montana (State) filed an amended petition to revoke

Kirkland’s deferred sentences. The amended petition alleged Kirkland had violated several

 

of the terms and conditions of his sentences, including that he had failed to pay hs restitution

 

in accordance with the court-ordered schedule, Following several hearings, the District
‘Court revoked the deferred imposition of sentences and sentenced Kirkland to two five-year

commitments to the Montana Department of Corrections, to run concurrently. The court

2
suspended the sentences upon the same conditions as were contained in the original judgment
and further ordered Kirkland to pay $654 for the costs of counsel appointed to represent him
in the revocation proceeding. Kirkland objected to the condition that he pay costs for
counsel, asserting the condition was unconstitutional. He did not object to the condition on
‘any other basis. The District Court included the condition that Kirkland pay costs of counsel
for the revocation proceeding in its written judgment entered on November 1, 2006,
Kirkland appeals
STANDARD OF REVIEW
‘15 Kirkland challenges only the legality of his sentence. When reviewing a criminal
‘sentence for legality, we determine whether the sentence falls within the applicable statutory
parameters. State . Kotwicki, 2007 MT 17, $5, 335 Mont. 344, 4 5, 151 P.3d 892,45,
DISCUSSION

{6 Did the District Court impose an illegal sentence when it ordered Kirkland to pay
‘the costs of his court-appointed counsel incurred during the revocation proceedings?

{7 Kirkland contends the District Court imposed an illegal sentence when it ordered him
to pay costs of court-appointed counsel without making specific findings as to his financial
resources and ability to pay such costs as required by § 46-8-113, MCA. He relies on State v.
Hirt, 2005 MT 285, 329 Mont. 267, 124 P.3d 147 and State v. Hubbel, 2001 MT 31, 304
‘Mont, 184, 20 P.3d 111 (overruled on other grounds in State v. Hendricks, 2003 MT 223,317
Mont. 177,75 P.3d 1268), in support of his contention, Kirkland also argues that the District
Court erred by failing to expressly order in its judgment that payment of counsel costs must

3
‘be made to the Office of the State Public Defender, as required by § 46-8-114, MCA. In

response, the State rai

 

8 the threshold issue of whether Kirkland is barred from raising these

 

‘arguments on appeal because he failed to raise them in the District Court. Kirkland concedes

he did not present these arguments to the District Court, but asserts that he still may rai

 

them on appeal because he is challenging the legality of his sentence.

18 While we generally refuse to address issues or arguments on appeal which were not

 

raised in the trial court, we have created an exception to this general rule which allows
appellate review of a criminal sentence alleged to be illegal ot in excess of statutory
‘mandates, even where the defendant did not object to the sentence in the trial court. See
‘State v. Lenihan, 184 Mont. 338, 343, 602 P.2d 997, 1000 (1979). We recently clarified,
however, that “a sentencing court's failure to abide by a statutory requirement rises to an
objectionable sentence, not necessarily an illegal one that would invoke the Lenihan
exception.” Kotwicki, $13.

19 In Konvick, the defendant argued that the tral court imposed an illegal sentence when

it ordered him to pay a $25,000 fine and applied $5,303.84 in cash seized from the defendant

 

‘on his arrest toward that fine, because the court failed to make specific findings as to his
financial resources and ability to pay the fine as required by § 46-18-231(3), MCA. ‘The
defendant conceded he did not object to his sentence on this basis at sentencing, but relied on
Lenihan as authority allowing him to raise the issue for the first time on appeal. Konwicki,

7. In addressing whether the Lenihan rule applied, we observed that § 46-18-231, MCA,
 

authorized the tial court to impose a fine not exceeding $50,000 for each felony offense
instead of, o in addition o, a term of imprisonment. Thus, the $25,000 fine imposed by the
‘court fell within the parameters ofthe authorizing statute and was not illegal. Korwicki,§ 16.
‘The court's failure to consider the financial resources and ability to pay factors set forth in §
46-18-231(3), MCA, rendered the sentence “objectionable” rather than “illegal.” Korwicki,§
21. Asa result, the defendant, “although alleging an “illegal sentence,’ fails to present a
colorable claim that his sentence fell outside statutory parameters as to Warrant our review
‘under the Lenihan rule.” Konwicki, $22.
{10 Section 46-8-113(1), MCA, provides that a court may require as part of a criminal
sentence that the defendant pay the costs of court-appointed counsel. ‘Thus, the District
Court's imposition of court-appointed counsel costs as a condition of Kirkland’s sentence
‘was statutorily authorized—that is, within the parameters of the statute—and, therefore, not
illegal. In tum, § 46-8-113(3), MCA, provides that a

court may not sentence a defendant to pay the costs for assigned counsel unless

the defendant is or will be able to pay them. In determining the amount and

method of payment of costs, the court shall take into account the financial

resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of costs

will impose.

are substantially similar to the § 46-18-231(3), MCA,

 

‘The requirements of this subsecti

requirements at issue in Konwicki, and we similarly conclude here that the District Court's,

 

failure to make specific findings regarding the § 46-8-113(3), MC:

Kirkland’s sentence “objectionable” rather than “illegal.”
II Kirkland contends that we previously have held in Hirt and Hubbel that a court's

lure to make findings regarding a defendant's finan

 

I resources and ability to pay under
§ 46-8-113(3), MCA, when imposing court-appointed counsel costs renders a sentence
illegal. He thus argues that, in light of our holdings in those cases, Korwick’is not applicable
here, Kirkland is correct that, in both Hirt and Hubbel, we reversed sentence provisions.
requiring the defendants to pay costs of court-appointed counsel on the basis that the
respective district courts failed to comply with the § 46-8-113(3), MCA, requirements. Hirt,

9 23-24; Hubbel, 4 37. We observe, however, that neither Hirt nor Hubbel involved the

 

question of whether the defendant had waived his right to appeal the issue by failing to raise
it in the district court. As a result, neither case is of assistance in determining the issue
presented here of whether a trial court’s failure to abide by the § 46-8-113(3), MCA,
requirements renders a sentence illegal for purposes of invoking the Lenihan rule

$12 Kirkland also argues that Konwick! is distinguishable because the statute a issue in
that case provided for a maximum fine of $50,000. See § 46-18-231(4), MCA. Asa result, it
was easily determined that the imposed fine of $25,000 fell within statutory parameters
Kirkland observes that § 46-8-113, MCA contains no similar provision for a set maximum
‘amount of costs that can be imposed by a court, thus rendering it impossible to determine
‘whether imposition of court-appointed counsel costs fall within statutory parameters. We
observe, however, that § 46-8-113(2), MCA, provides that such costs must be limited to the

‘amount incurred by the Office of the State Public Defender for providing the defendant with
Counsel in the criminal proceeding. Thus, while the statute does not set a specific dollar
‘amount cap on court-appointed counsel cots, it does contain an outer limit on the amount a
defendant may be required to pay. We conclude that Kirkland’s argument in this regard ails

{13 We further conclude that Kirkland’s contention that the District Court was required to

 

specify in its written judgment that payment of court-appointed counsel costs must be made
{othe Office ofthe State Public Defender, as required by § 46-8-1 14, MCA, does not present
‘a colorable claim that his sentence is illegal. As stated above, the District Court's imposition
of these costs was authorized by, and within the parameters of, § 46-8-113(1), MCA. The
‘court's alleged failure to abide by the statutory requirements of § 46-8-1 14, MCA, renders
imposition of the costs merely objectionable, not illegal.

{14 We conclude that Kirkland fails to present a colorable claim that his sentence fell
‘outside statutory parameters and warrants review under the Lenihan rule. Consequently, we

decline to consider his arguments raised for the first time on appeal,

$US Affirmed. A

ef MRtige