Case Title: Timothy Coffer, Respondent v. Angela Wasson-Hunt, et al., Appellants

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC89605

State: missouri

Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Date: 2009-03-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI 
en banc 
Timothy Coffer, 
 
 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Respondent,  
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
vs. 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
No. SC89605  
 
 
 
 
 
) 
Angela Wasson-Hunt, et al., 
 
) 
 
 
 
 
 
) 
 
Appellants.  
 
) 
 
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County 
Honorable Thomas C. Clark, Judge  
 
This opinion was modified by the Court's own motion on May 5, 2009. 
 
The Kansas City Board of Police Commissioners appeals a judgment setting aside 
the board’s termination of police officer Timothy Coffer.  The board terminated Coffer 
after finding that he had violated several police policies in connection with the arrest of a 
drunk driver.   
FACTS 
 
On September 12, 2003, Coffer, along with officer Aaron Bryant, observed a car 
traveling at a high rate of speed with a flat front tire and sparks emitting from the wheel.  
Coffer and Bryant stopped the car.  Coffer asked the driver, Halgene Lucas, to exit the 
vehicle.  Lucas placed his hands outside the driver’s side window but did not exit the 
vehicle immediately.  Coffer pulled Lucas from the car.  While doing so, Lucas’ hand 
 
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brushed against Coffer’s gun.  Coffer then punched Lucas several times.  Bryant 
handcuffed Lucas.  After Lucas was handcuffed, Coffer punched Lucas at least two more 
times.  Coffer then picked up Lucas and dropped him face-down onto the pavement, spit 
on him, and directed profanities at him.  The arrest was recorded on the patrol car’s video 
system, but there was no audio recording.   
 
Coffer was served with written charges alleging that he had violated policies 
prohibiting the use of excessive force in executing an arrest and was given notice that he 
had a right to a hearing.  Coffer voluntarily waived his right to a hearing before the board 
and opted to present his case to a hearing officer.   
The hearing was public, and Coffer was represented by counsel.  After hearing 
testimony from several witnesses and viewing the videotape, the hearing officer 
recommended that Coffer be reinstated.  The board reviewed the transcript of the hearing, 
the videotape and the recommendations of the hearing officer.  The board voted 
unanimously to terminate Coffer’s employment.  Coffer filed a petition for review in the 
circuit court, which reversed the board’s decision and ordered that Coffer be reinstated.   
ANALYSIS 
 
An appellate court reviews the decisions of the administrative agency, not the 
circuit court.  State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 
146, 152 (Mo. banc 2003).   The standard of review requires the appellate court to 
determine “whether the agency's findings are supported by competent and substantial 
evidence on the record as a whole; whether the decision is arbitrary, capricious, 
unreasonable or involves an abuse of discretion; or whether the decision is unauthorized 
 
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by law.” Community Bancshares, Inc. v. Secretary of State, 43 S.W.3d 821, 823 (Mo. 
banc 2001).  This Court must look to the whole record in reviewing the board’s decision, 
not merely at that evidence that supports its decision.  Lagud v. Kansas City Bd. of Police 
Commissioners, 136 S.W.3d 786, 791 (Mo. banc 2004).  If the evidence permits either of 
two opposing findings, deference is afforded to the administrative decision.  Id. 
I. Timeliness of Appeal 
Coffer asserts that the board’s appeal from the circuit court’s judgment is untimely 
and that the appeal should be dismissed.  A notice of appeal must be filed within 10 days 
after a civil judgment becomes final.  Rule 81.04(a).  The finality of a judgment is 
determined by the date the judgment was entered and whether any post-trial motions are 
filed.  Rule 81.05(a).  “A judgment is entered when a writing signed by the judge and 
denominated ‘judgment’ or ‘decree’ is filed.”  Rule 74.01(a).  Under these rules, the 
board’s notice of appeal is timely if it was filed within 10 days of the later of: (1) 30 days 
from the entry of the judgment or (2) the resolution of all authorized post-trial motions.   
The circuit court issued a judgment and sent it to the parties October 5, 2006.  The 
judgment never was file-stamped with a date, however, and was not entered into the 
docket until November 22, 2006.  Coffer asserts that the judgment was not “filed” until it 
was entered into the docket November 22, 2006, and that the timeline for filing an appeal 
runs from that date.  
Rule 43.02(b) defines “filing” as follows: 
The filing of pleadings and other papers with the court as required by 
Rules 41 through 101 shall be made by filing them with the clerk of 
the court, except that a judge may permit the papers to be filed with 
 
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judge, who shall note thereon the filing date and forthwith transmit 
them to the office of the clerk.  
 
Although not entered immediately into the docket, the trial judge signed the judgment 
October 5 and forwarded it to the court clerk, who then formally sent the judgment to the 
parties as an official document of the court.   Under these facts, therefore, the judgment 
was filed October 5, not November 22.  The November 22, 2006, docket entry simply 
recorded a judgment that already had been entered.  To hold otherwise would conflict 
with Rule 43.02(b) and the basic principle that “a ‘judgment derives its force from the 
court’s judicial act and not from the ministerial act of its entry upon the record.’” State v. 
Collins, 154 S.W.3d 486, 492-493 (Mo. App. 2005)(quoting State v. Patterson, 959 
S.W.2d 940, 941 (Mo. App. 1998).  The judgment was entered October 5, 2006. 
The board filed a motion to reconsider the judgment on November 2, 2006.  The 
motion referenced Rule 75.01, which states that the trial court retains control over a 
judgment for 30 days after entry of judgment.  Based on this reference, Coffer concludes 
that the board’s motion is not an authorized after-trial motion that delays the finality of a 
judgment under Rule 81.05(a).  Despite the reference to Rule 75.01, the board’s motion 
raised alleged factual and legal errors in the judgment and, therefore, qualified as a 
motion for new trial. See Taylor v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 854 S.W.2d 390, 392 
(Mo. banc 1993)(after-trial motions are assessed based on the allegations, not the 
motion’s style or form).  The board’s motion to reconsider was an authorized after-trial 
motion for purposes of Rule  81.05(a).   
 
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The court never ruled on the board’s November 2, 2006, after-trial motion.  The 
motion was deemed overruled, therefore, and the judgment became final 90 days later, on 
January 31, 2007.  Rule 81.05(a)(2)(A).   The board filed its notice of appeal January 25, 
2007.  The board’s premature notice of appeal became effective January 31, 2007, when 
the judgment became final.  Rule 81.05(b).  The board’s notice of appeal was filed 
timely.  
II. Sufficiency of Evidence 
Coffer asserts there was insufficient evidence to support the board’s decision to 
terminate him for excessive use of force, but he is wrong.  There was substantial evidence 
to terminate Coffer’s employment.  The videotape shows Lucas being handcuffed and 
restrained.  Coffer then proceeds to punch Lucas, pick him up and drop him face-down 
on the pavement, and spit on him.   
In addition to the videotape, the hearing officer heard testimony from Sergeant 
William Conroy, Captain Roger Lewis and former Police Chief Richard Easley.  The 
parties stipulated that Conroy was an expert in police procedure.  Conroy testified that 
any contact Lucas had with Coffer’s gun was only incidental because Lucas simply hit 
the weapon as he fell down.  Conroy noted that Coffer made no attempt to secure his 
weapon as he had been trained to do in the event of a “gun grab.” Conroy testified that 
Coffer overreacted by unnecessarily punching Lucas after he had been subdued and then 
dropping him on the pavement and spitting on him.  Conroy characterized the punches as 
unnecessary “pay back,” which met the definition of “excessive use of force.”   
 
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Lewis filed an investigative report in which he offered his opinion that the “actual 
threat felt by Officer Coffer is questionable, as he is never observed to visually or 
physically check the security of his weapon within the holster.”  Like Conroy, Lewis 
observed that Coffer continued to punch Lucas after the threat of a gun grab was 
neutralized.  Finally, Easley testified that that the incident was “an extremely serious 
situation involving excessive use of force” and that the spitting incident caused “an 
extremely negative perception of the police department.” 
The videotape plus the statements of Conroy, Lewis and Easley constitute 
substantial evidence supporting the board’s decision.  Although Coffer and other officers 
testifying on his behalf offered different interpretations of the arrest, the board did have 
substantial evidence on which to base its decision.  That reasonable people disagreed as 
to whether Coffer violated police procedures means only that this Court should defer to 
the board’s findings.  Lagud, 136 S.W.3d at 791, n.5.1 
III. “Sham” Proceeding  
Coffer next asserts that the hearing before the designated hearing officer was a 
“sham” proceeding because the board declined to follow the hearing officer’s findings 
and recommendation.  The result, according to Coffer, is that he was denied his statutory 
right to a public hearing before the board. 
 
                                                 
1 Coffer also argues there was insufficient evidence in the record of the policies he was charged 
with violating.  Coffer raises this argument for the first time on appeal.  The argument is waived.  
Donovan v. Temp. Help, 54 S.W.3d 718, 719 (Mo. App. 2001)(issues not presented to the 
administrative agency are waived on appeal).  
 
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Section 84.600, RSMo 2000, sets forth the procedure by which the board may 
terminate an officer’s employment.  The statute provides that once a disciplinary 
complaint is made against an officer, the officer “shall have the right to appear before the 
board at a public hearing ….”  After reviewing the evidence, the Board is authorized to 
determine what punishment, if any, shall be imposed.  Id.  
Section 84.600 grants officers the right to appear before the board.  As with any 
other statutory right, an officer can waive his or her right to appear before the board.  See 
Shearlock v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 182 S.W.89, 91 (Mo. App. 1916) (holding that a 
statutory right may be waived); State v. Emery, 95 S.W.3d 98, 102-103 (Mo. banc 
2003)(defendant waived statutory right to a jury-recommended sentence).  By electing to 
have his case heard before a designated hearing officer, Coffer waived his right to a 
hearing before the board.  Even though Coffer waived his right to a board hearing, 
section 84.600 specifically vests the board with authority to make the final determination 
regarding what employment action should be taken.   Coffer’s decision to waive his right 
to a hearing did not confer or eliminate any power that the board has under section 
84.600.   
The board’s decision to terminate is affirmed.  The circuit court’s judgment is 
reversed, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for entry of judgment consistent 
with the board’s recommendation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________________  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard B. Teitelman, Judge  
All concur.