Case Title: State v. Mark D. Jensen

Citation: 2007 WI 26

Docket Number: 2004AP002481-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2007-02-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
2007 WI 26 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2004AP2481-CR 
 
 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent, 
     v. 
Mark D. Jensen, 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
February 23, 2007   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
January 11, 2006   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Kenosha   
 
JUDGE: 
Bruce E. Schroeder 
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
CONCUR/DISSENT: 
BUTLER, JR., J., concurs in part, dissents in 
part (opinion filed). 
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant-cross-respondent the cause was 
argued by Marguerite M. Moeller, assistant attorney general, 
with whom on the briefs was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney 
general. 
 
For the defendant-respondent-cross-appellant there were 
briefs by Craig W. Albee and Glynn, Fitzgerald, Albee & Strang, 
S.C., Milwaukee, and oral argument by Craig W. Albee. 
 
 
2007 WI 26
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2004AP2481-CR  
(L.C. No. 
2002CF314) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin, 
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Respondent, 
 
     v. 
 
Mark D. Jensen, 
 
          Defendant-Respondent-Cross-Appellant. 
 
 
 
FILED 
 
FEB 23, 2007 
 
A. John Voelker 
Acting Clerk of Supreme 
Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from an order of the Circuit Court for Kenosha 
County Circuit Court, Bruce E. Schroeder, Judge.  Affirmed in 
part; reversed in part; and cause remanded.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This case comes before us on a 
petition 
to 
bypass 
the 
court 
of 
appeals 
pursuant 
to 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.60 (2005-06).  The State of Wisconsin 
appealed an order of the Kenosha County Circuit Court, Bruce E. 
Schroeder, Judge, denying the admissibility of Julie Jensen's 
(Julie) letter to the police and her voicemail message and other 
oral statements to Officer Ron Kosman (Kosman).  The defendant, 
Mark D. Jensen (Jensen), cross-appealed the same order of the 
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
2 
 
circuit court denying his motion to exclude statements Julie 
made to her neighbor, Tadeusz Wojt (Wojt), and her son's 
teacher, Theresa DeFazio (DeFazio).   
¶2 
We affirm the order of the circuit court as to its 
initial rulings on the admissibility of the various statements 
under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  That is, the 
statements Julie made to Kosman, including the letter, are 
"testimonial," while the statements Julie made to Wojt and 
DeFazio are "nontestimonial."  However, we reverse the circuit 
court's decision as to the applicability of the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing doctrine.  Today, we explicitly adopt this doctrine 
whereby a defendant is deemed to have lost the right to object 
on confrontation grounds to the admissibility of out-of-court 
statements of a declarant whose unavailability the defendant has 
caused.  As such, the case must be remanded to the circuit court 
for a determination of whether, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, 
Jensen 
caused 
Julie's 
unavailability, 
thereby 
forfeiting his right to confrontation. 
I 
¶3 
A criminal complaint charging Jensen with first-degree 
intentional homicide in the December 3, 1998, poisoning death of 
his wife was filed in Kenosha County on March 19, 2002.     
¶4 
At Jensen's preliminary hearing conducted on April 23, 
2002, and May 8, 2002, before the Honorable Carl M. Greco, Court 
Commissioner, 
the 
State 
presented 
testimony 
from 
several 
witnesses including Wojt, Kosman, and Detective Paul Ratzburg 
(Ratzburg).   
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
3 
 
¶5 
Wojt testified that just prior to Julie's death, she 
gave him an envelope and told him that if anything happened to 
her, Wojt should give the envelope to the police.  Wojt also 
stated that during the three weeks prior to Julie's death, she 
was upset and scared, and she feared that Jensen was trying to 
poison her or inject her with something because Jensen was 
trying to get her to drink wine and she found syringes in a 
drawer.  Julie also allegedly told him that she did not think 
she would make it through one particular weekend because she had 
found suspicious notes written by her husband and computer pages 
about poisoning.   
¶6 
Kosman testified that he received two voicemails 
approximately two weeks prior to Julie's death.  Julie told 
Kosman in the second voicemail that she thought Jensen was 
trying to kill her, and she asked him to call her back.  Kosman 
returned Julie's call and subsequently went to her home to talk 
with her.  Julie told Kosman that she saw strange writings on 
Jensen's day planner, and she said Jensen was looking at strange 
material on the Internet.1  Julie also informed Kosman that she 
had photographed part of his day planner and gave the pictures, 
along with a letter, to a neighbor (Wojt).  Julie then retrieved 
the picture, but not the letter from the neighbor, and gave it 
to Kosman telling him if she were found dead, that she did not 
                                                 
1 After Julie's death, police seized the computer in the 
Jensen's home and found that on various dates between October 15 
and December 2, 2002, several websites related to poisoning were 
visited; including one entitled "Ethylene Glycol."  
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
4 
 
commit suicide, and Jensen was her first suspect.  Kosman also 
testified that in August or September of 1998, Julie told him it 
had become very "cold" in the residence and that Jensen was not 
as affectionate as he used to be.  She claimed that when Jensen 
came home from work, he would immediately go to the computer. 
¶7 
Finally, Ratzburg testified at the preliminary hearing 
that on the day after Julie's death, he received a sealed 
envelope from Wojt.  The envelope contained a handwritten 
letter,2 addressed to "Pleasant Prairie Police Department, Ron 
Kosman or Detective Ratzenburg" and bearing Julie's signature 
that read as follows: 
I took this picture [and] am writing this on Saturday 
11-21-98 at 7AM.  This "list" was in my husband's 
business daily planner——not meant for me to see, I 
don't know what it means, but if anything happens to 
me, he would be my first suspect.  Our relationship 
has deteriorated to the polite superficial.  I know 
he's never forgiven me for the brief affair I had with 
that creep seven years ago.  Mark lives for work [and] 
the kids; he's an avid surfer of the Internet. . . .  
Anyway——I do not smoke or drink.  My mother was an 
alcoholic, so I limit my drinking to one or two a 
week.  Mark wants me to drink more——with him in the 
evenings.  I don't.  I would never take my life 
because of my kids——they are everything to me!  I 
regularly 
take 
Tylenol 
[and] 
multi-vitamins; 
occasionally take OTC stuff for colds, Zantac, or 
Immodium; have one prescription for migraine tablets, 
which Mark use[s] more than I. 
I pray I'm wrong [and] nothing happens . . . but I am 
suspicious of Mark's suspicious behaviors [and] fear 
                                                 
2 After comparing the letter to known writing samples from 
Julie, a document examiner with the State Crime Lab concluded 
that the letter was written by Julie.   
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
5 
 
for my early demise.  However, I will not leave David 
[and] 
Douglas. 
 
My 
life's 
greatest 
love, 
accomplishment and wish:  "My 3 D's"——Daddy (Mark), 
David [and] Douglas.   
¶8 
Following the preliminary hearing, Jensen was bound 
over for trial, and an information charging Jensen with first-
degree intentional homicide was filed.  Jensen subsequently 
entered a plea of not guilty at his arraignment on June 19, 
2002.   
¶9 
Among the pretrial motions Jensen filed were motions 
challenging the admissibility of the letter received by Ratzburg 
and the oral statements Julie allegedly made to Wojt and Kosman.  
Jensen also challenged the admissibility of oral statements 
Julie purportedly made to her physician, Dr. Richard Borman 
(Borman), and her son's teacher, DeFazio.3  These motions were 
                                                 
3 The criminal complaint provides the following summary of 
DeFazio's conversations with Julie on November 25, 1998:   
[W]hen I coaxed her, she told me how she was afraid 
her husband was going to kill her last weekend.  When 
I asked her why she thought such a serious thing was 
going to happen, she explained why.  She had found a 
paper listing things to buy in her husband's stuff.  
She said it listed syringes and names of drugs on it.  
Then she said that she thought he might try to kill 
her with a drug overdose and make it look like a 
suicide.  I asked her why she thought he would do 
this.  She said that there were other things she 
couldn't explain.  She also wondered aloud if the 
drugs were for himself, but she didn't ever see him 
taking drugs so she didn't think that was the reason 
for the list. . . . One other time she had mentioned 
that it bothered her how every time she walked into 
the room when her husband was on the computer, he 
always turned it off or covered it quickly.  She asked 
him why once, but he said he was doing business stuff, 
and he was done.  
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
6 
 
extensively briefed and argued before the court.  The circuit 
court 
evaluated 
each 
of 
Julie's 
disputed 
statements 
independently to determine its admissibility under the hearsay 
rules and the then-governing test of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 
56 (1980).  The court ruled that most, but not all, of the 
statements were admissible.  Julie's entire in-person statements 
to Kosman and the letter sent to Ratzburg were admitted in their 
entirety.  The State conceded the voicemails were inadmissible 
hearsay.   
¶10 On May 24, 2004, Jensen moved for reconsideration on 
the admissibility of Julie's statements in light of the United 
States Supreme Court's ruling in Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.  After a 
hearing on the motion, the circuit court orally announced its 
decision on June 7, 2004, and concluded that Julie's letter and 
voicemails were testimonial and therefore inadmissible under 
Crawford.  The court rejected the State's argument that the 
statements were admissible under the doctrine of forfeiture by 
wrongdoing.  The court also determined that Julie's statements 
to Wojt and DeFazio were nontestimonial, and therefore, the 
statements were not excluded.  On August 4, 2004, the circuit 
court issued a written order memorializing its oral rulings.      
¶11 The State appealed the court's ruling with respect to 
Julie's letter and her voicemail message to Kosman.4  Jensen 
                                                 
4 The district attorney conceded that the statements Julie 
made to Kosman during a conversation on November 24, 1998, were 
testimonial.  With respect to these statements, the State is 
arguing only that they are admissible under the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing doctrine, which is discussed in Section IV. 
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
7 
 
subsequently cross-appealed the ruling that the statements of 
Wojt and DeFazio were not excluded.  After the State and Jensen 
had filed opening briefs in the court of appeals, the State 
filed a petition to bypass, which Jensen did not oppose.  We 
granted the petition. 
II 
¶12 Reduced to their essence, the appeal and cross-appeal 
concern the circuit court's determinations on the testimonial or 
nontestimonial nature of various statements of Julie's that the 
State seeks to introduce.5  "Although a circuit court's decision 
to admit evidence is ordinarily a matter for the court's 
discretion, whether the admission of evidence violates a 
defendant's right to confrontation is a question of law subject 
to independent appellate review."  State v. Williams, 2002 WI 
58, 253 Wis. 2d 99, ¶7, 644 N.W.2d 919 (citing State v. Ballos, 
230 Wis. 2d 495, 504, 602 N.W.2d 117 (Ct. App. 1999)).  For 
purposes of that review, the appellate court must accept the 
circuit court's findings of fact unless they are clearly 
erroneous.  State v. Jackson, 216 Wis. 2d 646, 575 N.W.2d 475 
(1998). 
III 
                                                 
5 In State v. Manuel, 2005 WI 75, ¶60, 281 Wis. 2d 554, 697 
N.W.2d 811, this court held that nontestimonial statements still 
should be evaluated for Confrontation Clause purposes under the 
test of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).  The circuit 
court's findings under Roberts admitting some statements and 
excluding others were not reduced to a written order and they 
are not the subject of either the State's appeal or Jensen's 
cross-appeal.   
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
8 
 
¶13 "'The Confrontation Clause of the United States and 
Wisconsin Constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right 
to confront witnesses against them.'"  State v. Manuel, 2005 WI 
75, ¶36, 281 Wis. 2d 554, 697 N.W.2d 811 (quoting State v. Hale, 
2005 WI 7, ¶43, 277 Wis. 2d 593, 691 N.W.2d 637); U.S. Const. 
amend. VI;6 Wis. Const. art. I, § 7.7  We generally apply United 
States Supreme Court precedents when interpreting these clauses.  
Hale, 277 Wis. 2d 593, ¶43.        
¶14 In 2004 the U.S. Supreme Court fundamentally changed 
the Confrontation Clause analysis in Crawford, 541 U.S 36.  
Michael Crawford was charged and convicted of assault and 
attempted murder for stabbing a man, who allegedly tried to rape 
Crawford's wife, Sylvia.  Id. at 38.  At trial, the State played 
for the jury Sylvia's tape-recorded statement to the police 
describing the stabbing.  Id.  Sylvia did not testify at trial 
due to Washington's marital privilege; the privilege, however, 
did not extend to a spouse's out-of-court statements admissible 
under a hearsay exception.  Id. at 40.  Crawford contended that 
this procedure violated his rights under the Confrontation 
Clause.  Id.  Relying on Roberts, the trial court concluded that 
the 
admission 
of 
Sylvia's 
statement 
was 
constitutionally 
                                                 
6 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him[.]" 
7 Article I, Section 7 of the Wisconsin Constitution states 
that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to meet the witnesses face to face."   
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
9 
 
permissible.  Id.  Under Roberts, when an out-of-court declarant 
is unavailable, his or her statement is admissible if it bears 
an adequate indicia of reliability, which could be satisfied if 
the statement fell within a firmly rooted hearsay exception or 
bore particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.  Roberts, 448 
U.S. at 66.  The circuit court admitted the statement on the 
latter ground, and Crawford was convicted.  Crawford, 541 U.S. 
at 40-41.  The Washington Court of Appeals reversed, and the 
Washington Supreme Court then reinstated the conviction.  Id. at 
41-42.   
¶15 On certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that 
Crawford's constitutional right to confrontation was violated, 
and his conviction was reversed.  Id. at 68-69.  Justice Scalia, 
writing 
for 
the 
majority, 
announced 
a 
major 
shift 
in 
Confrontation 
Clause 
jurisprudence 
away 
from 
the 
Roberts 
reliability standard:   
Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not 
think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's 
protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, 
much 
less 
to 
amorphous 
notions 
of 
"reliability." . . .  
To 
be 
sure, 
the 
Clause's 
ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, 
but it is a procedural rather than a substantive 
guarantee. 
 
It 
commands, 
not 
that 
evidence 
be 
reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a 
particular manner: by testing in the crucible of 
cross-examination. 
Id. at 61.  The Court determined that the Confrontation Clause 
bars admission of an out-of-court-testimonial statement unless 
the declarant is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior 
opportunity to examine the declarant with respect to the 
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
10 
 
statement.  Id. at 68-69.  The Roberts test remains when 
nontestimonial statements are at issue.  See Manuel, 281 
Wis. 2d 554, ¶¶54-55; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.   
¶16 The 
Court, 
unfortunately, 
did 
not 
spell 
out 
a 
comprehensive definition of what "testimonial" means.  What we 
do know is that "[w]hatever else the term covers, it applies at 
a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a 
grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations."  
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.  The Court also noted that "testimony" 
is typically a "'solemn declaration or affirmation made for the 
purpose of establishing or proving some fact.'"  Id. at 51 
(quoting An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)).  
"An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers 
bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual 
remark to an acquaintance does not."  Id.    
¶17 The Court mentioned various formulations that had been 
proposed to define the "core class of 'testimonial' statements" 
but did not choose among these formulations.  Id. at 51-52.  In 
the Court's words, these formulations "all share a common 
nucleus and then define the Clause's coverage at various levels 
of abstraction around it."  Id. at 52: 
[E]x 
parte in-court testimony or its functional 
equivalent——that is, material such as affidavits, 
custodial 
examinations, 
prior 
testimony 
that 
the 
defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar 
pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably 
expect to be used prosecutorially. 
 . . . . 
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
11 
 
[E]xtrajudicial 
statements . . . contained 
in 
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, 
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions. 
 . . . . 
[S]tatements that were made under circumstances which 
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe 
that the statement would be available for use at a 
later trial. 
Id. at 51-52.   
¶18 This court subsequently adopted all three of the 
Crawford formulations, and reserved for another day whether 
these formulations or perhaps a different formulation would 
become the rule.  Manuel, 281 Wis. 2d 554, ¶39.  Applying this 
third formulation in Manuel, we concluded that a witness's 
statements to his girlfriend, Anna Rhodes (Rhodes), were 
nontestimonial.  Derrick Stamps (Stamps), the witness, told 
Rhodes that Manuel had shot the victim.  Id., ¶9.  When Stamps 
was subsequently taken into custody, Rhodes informed police that 
Manuel had shot the victim.  Id.  At trial, the State sought to 
introduce the statements Stamps made to Rhodes that incriminated 
Manuel.  However, Stamps refused to testify, so the State was 
forced to admit the statements through the arresting officer.  
Id., 
¶13. 
 
Manuel 
argued 
this 
violated 
his 
right 
to 
confrontation.  Id., ¶35.  We reasoned that statements "'made to 
loved 
ones 
or 
acquaintances . . . are 
not 
the 
kind 
of 
memorialized, 
judicial-process-created 
evidence 
of 
which 
Crawford speaks.'"  Id., ¶53 (quoting United States v. Manfre, 
368 F.3d 832, 838 n.1 (8th Cir. 2004)).  Moreover, we reasoned 
that Stamps' girlfriend was not a government agent, and there 
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
12 
 
was no reason to believe that Stamps expected his girlfriend to 
report to the police what he told her.  Id. (citing People v. 
Cervantes, 12 Cal. Rptr. 3d 774, 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)).  
Because the conversation was private with no eye towards 
litigation, we determined the statements were nontestimonial and 
thus subject to Roberts to determine whether there was a 
Confrontation Clause violation.  Id., ¶¶53, 60.   
¶19 In 
deciding 
subsequent 
cases 
involving 
the 
Confrontation Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court retained its 
position from Crawford that it would not define the term 
"nontestimonial" beyond the three formulations of the classes of 
testimonial statements.  Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 
2273 (2006)(also deciding Hammon v. Indiana).  The Court did 
find it necessary to slightly expand its previous discussion of 
what constitutes testimonial statements to resolve the cases 
presented, which involved police interrogations.  It held as 
follows:  "Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course 
of 
police 
interrogation 
under 
circumstances 
objectively 
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency."  Id. at 
2273. 
¶20 In deciding this case, we are again left with the 
three formations of testimonial statements from Crawford.  Like 
Manuel, only the third formulation listed above is applicable to 
the statements at issue in this case, as there was no ex parte 
in-court 
statements 
or 
extrajudicial 
statements 
made 
in 
formalized testimonial materials.  For the reasons that follow, 
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
13 
 
we hold that under the third Crawford formulation and the facts 
and circumstances of this case, the circuit court properly 
concluded, as a matter of law, that Julie's statements to the 
police and the letter are testimonial and Julie's statements to 
her neighbor, Wojt, and her son's teacher, DeFazio, are 
nontestimonial. 
¶21 Generally stated, the State argues that in determining 
whether a statement was "made under circumstances which would 
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the 
statement would be available for use at a later trial" what 
matters is the expectation of a reasonable person in the 
declarant's position rather than the subjective purpose of the 
particular 
declarant. 
 
The 
State 
further 
contends 
that 
government 
involvement 
in 
creating 
a 
statement 
is 
an 
indispensable 
feature 
of 
a 
testimonial 
statement.  
Alternatively, 
Jensen's 
basic 
thrust 
is 
that 
testimonial 
statements need not be elicited by the police, and accusatory 
statements directed to the police are testimonial. 
¶22 The parties' opposing positions represent the standard 
schools of thought of Crawford's intended breadth and scope of 
testimonial statements.  See State v. Davis, 613 S.E.2d 760, 
767-68 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005).  The narrow definition championed 
by Professor Akhil Reed Amar suggests that the Confrontation 
Clause "'encompasses only those "witnesses" who testify either 
by taking the stand in person or via government-prepared 
affidavits, deposition, videotapes, and the like.'"  Id. at 767 
(quoting A. Amar, Confrontation Clause First Principles: A Reply 
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
14 
 
to Professor Friedman, 86 Geo. L.J. 1045 (1998)).  Amar's focus 
is "what was the common understanding of being a witness against 
someone during the Founding Era[,]" and he contends that 
Crawford is implicated only when the circumstances surrounding 
the statement are formal.  Id. 
¶23 The broader definition is championed by Professor 
Richard Friedman.  Under this school of thought, "'a declarant 
should be deemed to be acting as a witness when she makes a 
statement if she anticipates that the statement will be used in 
the prosecution or investigation of a crime.'"  Id. (quoting 
Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation:  The Search for Basic 
Principles, 86 Geo. L.J. 1011, 1040-43 (1998)).  
¶24 We note that there is support for the proposition that 
the hallmark of testimonial statements is whether they are made 
at the request or suggestion of the police.  See State v. 
Barnes, 854 A.2d 208, 211 (Me. 2004).  In our view, however, the 
Sixth Circuit's decision in United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 
662 (6th Cir. 2004), aptly describes why such an inquiry is 
insufficient under Crawford: 
Indeed, the danger to a defendant might well be 
greater if the statement introduced at trial, without 
a right of confrontation, is a statement volunteered 
to police rather than a statement elicited through 
formalized police interrogation.  One can imagine the 
temptation that someone who bears a grudge might have 
to volunteer to police, truthfully or not, information 
of the commission of a crime, especially when that 
person 
is 
assured 
he 
will 
not 
be 
subject 
to 
confrontation. . . . If 
the 
judicial 
system 
only 
requires cross-examination when someone has formally 
served 
as 
a 
witness 
against 
a 
defendant, 
then 
witnesses and those who deal with them will have every 
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
15 
 
incentive 
to 
ensure 
that 
testimony 
is 
given 
informally.  The proper inquiry, then, is whether the 
declarant 
intends to bear testimony against the 
accused.  That intent, in turn, may be determined by 
querying 
whether 
a 
reasonable 
person 
in 
the 
declarant's position would anticipate his statement 
being used against the accused in investigating and 
prosecuting the crime. 
Id. at 675.  Thus, we believe a broad definition of testimonial 
is required to guarantee that the right to confrontation is 
preserved.  That is, we do not agree with the State's position 
that the government needs to be involved in the creation of the 
statement.8  We believe such a narrow definition of testimonial 
could create situations where a declarant could nefariously 
incriminate a defendant. 
                                                 
8 We note that recently in State v. Hemphill, 2005 WI App 
248, 287 Wis. 2d 600, 707 N.W.2d 313, the court of appeals held 
that a declarant's spontaneous statement to responding police 
officers implicating the defendants in a crime was deemed 
nontestimonial.  The court reasoned, in part as follows: 
The statement made by [the declarant] in the instant 
case does not fall into any of the identified 
categories of "testimonial" statements.  This was not 
a statement extracted by the police with the intent 
that it would be used later at trial.  It was not an 
interrogation situation.  [The declarant] offered the 
statement without any solicitation from police.  It 
was a spontaneous statement made to a responding 
police officer.  Like the foreign cases cited by the 
State in its brief, the [declarant's] statement was 
offered unsolicited by the victim or witness, and was 
not generated by the desire of the prosecution or 
police to seek evidence against a particular subject. 
Id., ¶11.  We do not read Crawford in such a restrictive light.  
Under the definition of testimonial adopted today we must 
overrule Hemphill. 
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
16 
 
¶25 The State cites to United States v. Summers, 414 F.3d 
1287 (10th Cir. 2005), for its contention that the subjective 
purpose of the declarant is not important to the analysis.  
However, this is not a correct interpretation of the Summers 
decision.  The Tenth Circuit concluded that "the 'common 
nucleus' present in the formulations which the Court considered 
centers on the reasonable expectations of the declarant."  Id. 
at 1302 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).  The Tenth Circuit 
rejected the narrow approach argued in this case by the State, 
and held that "an objective test focusing on the reasonable 
expectations of the declarant under the circumstances of the 
case more adequately safeguards the accused's confrontation 
right and more closely reflects the concerns underpinning the 
Sixth Amendment."  Id. (citing Confrontation:  The Search for 
Basic Principles, supra, at 1040-43).  In other words, "a 
statement is testimonial if a reasonable person in the position 
of the declarant would objectively foresee that his statement 
might be used in the investigation or prosecution of a crime."  
Id.9 
¶26 With these considerations in mind, we turn to the 
facts and circumstances of this case.  We begin first with the 
statements Julie made in her letter.  The circuit court 
                                                 
9 As noted in Summers, other federal circuits have created 
similar standards.  United States v. Summers, 414 F.3d 1287, 
1302 n.9 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing United States v. Cromer, 389 
F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 
173 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223 (2d 
Cir. 2004)).   
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
17 
 
concluded that the letter was testimonial as it had no apparent 
purpose other than to "bear testimony" and Julie intended it 
exclusively 
for 
accusatory 
and 
prosecutorial 
purposes.  
Furthermore, the circuit court stated, "I can't imagine any 
other purpose in sending a letter to the police that is to be 
opened only in the event of her death other than to make an 
accusatory statement given the contents of this particular 
letter."  Indeed, the letter even referred to Jensen as a 
"suspect." 
¶27 In light of the standard set out above, we conclude 
that under the circumstances, a reasonable person in Julie's 
position would anticipate a letter addressed to the police and 
accusing another of murder would be available for use at a later 
trial.  The content and the circumstances surrounding the letter 
make it very clear that Julie intended the letter to be used to 
further investigate or aid in prosecution in the event of her 
death.  Rather than being addressed to a casual acquaintance or 
friend, the letter was purposely directed toward law enforcement 
agents.  The letter also describes Jensen's alleged activities 
and conduct in a way that clearly implicates Jensen if "anything 
happens" to her.   
¶28 Furthermore, the State insists that the letter is 
nontestimonial because it was created before any crime had been 
committed so there was no expectation that the letter would 
potentially be available for use at a later trial.  However, 
under the standard we adopt here it does not matter if a crime 
has already been committed or not.  The focus of the inquiry is 
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
18 
 
whether a "reasonable person in the position of the declarant 
would objectively foresee that his statement might be used in 
the investigation or prosecution of a crime."  Id.  We conclude 
that the letter clearly fits within this rubric.     
¶29 Perhaps most tellingly, Julie's letter also resembles 
Lord Cobham's letter implicating Sir Walter Raleigh of treason 
as discussed in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44.  At Raleigh's trial, a 
prior examination and letter of Cobham implicating Raleigh in 
treason were read to the jury.  Id.  Raleigh demanded that 
Cobham be called to appear, but he was refused.  Id.  The jury 
ultimately convicted Raleigh and sentenced him to death.  Id.  
In the Supreme Court's view, it was these types of practices 
that the Confrontation Clause sought to eliminate.  Id. at 50.  
While Julie's letter is not of a formal nature as Cobham's 
letter was, it still is testimonial in nature as it clearly 
implicates Jensen in her murder.  If we were to conclude that 
her letter was nontestimonial, we would be allowing accusers the 
right to make statements clearly intended for prosecutorial 
purposes without ever having to worry about being cross-examined 
or confronted by the accused.  We firmly believe Crawford and 
the Confrontation Clause do not support such a result. 
¶30 For many of the same reasons, we also determine that 
the voicemails to Kosman are testimonial.10  The crux of Julie's 
                                                 
10 Additionally, 
although the circuit court considered 
whether 
the 
admission 
of 
the 
voicemails 
violated 
the 
Confrontation Clause under Crawford, the court already had 
excluded the voicemails as inadmissible hearsay.  Thus, even if 
the voicemails are nontestimonial, they must still be excluded 
under Roberts, 448 U.S. 56. 
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
19 
 
message was that Jensen had been acting strangely and leaving 
himself notes Julie had photographed and that she wanted to 
speak with Kosman in person because she was afraid Jensen was 
recording her phone conversations.  Again, the circuit court 
determined that these statements served no other purpose than to 
bear 
testimony 
and 
were 
entirely 
for 
accusatory 
and 
prosecutorial purposes.  Furthermore, Julie's voicemail was not 
made for emergency purposes or to escape from a perceived 
danger.  She instead sought to relay information in order to 
further 
the 
investigation 
of 
Jensen's 
activities. 
 
This 
distinction convinces us that the voicemails are testimonial.  
See Pitts v. State, 627 S.E.2d 17, 19 (Ga. 2006) ("Where the 
primary 
purpose 
of 
the 
telephone 
call 
is 
to 
establish 
evidentiary facts, so that an objective person would recognize 
that the statement would be used in a future prosecution, then 
that phone call 'bears testimony' against the accused and 
implicates the concerns of the Confrontation Clause.").  
¶31 Finally, we consider the statements Julie made to Wojt 
and DeFazio.  Jensen argues that if the circumstances reveal 
that the declarant believed her statements to nongovernmental 
actors would be passed on to law enforcement officials, those 
statements 
are 
testimonial. 
 
While 
we 
reiterate 
that 
governmental involvement is not a necessary condition for 
testimonial statements, we conclude that under the circumstances 
of this case, Julie's statements to Wojt and DeFazio were 
nontestimonial. 
 
Essentially, 
we 
are 
not 
convinced 
that 
statements to a neighbor and a child's teacher, unlike the 
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
20 
 
letter and voicemails——which were directly intended for the 
police——were made under circumstances which would lead a 
reasonable person in the declarant's position to conclude these 
statements would be available for later use at a trial.   
¶32 Our decision in Manuel, 281 Wis. 2d 554, guides us to 
this conclusion.  In Manuel, we determined that statements made 
to loved ones or acquaintances are not the memorialized type of 
statements that Crawford addressed.  Id., ¶53.  Moreover, we 
determined that the witness's girlfriend was not a governmental 
agent, and there was no reason to believe the declarant expected 
his girlfriend to report to the police what he told her.  Id.  
Here, Julie confided in Wojt and DeFazio about the declining 
situation in the Jensen household and are wholly consistent with 
the statements of a person in fear for her life.  As one court 
put it, "when a declarant speaks with her neighbor across the 
backyard fence, she has much less of an expectation that the 
government will make prosecutorial use of those statements."  
State v. Mizenko, 127 P.3d 458,  (Mont. 2006); see also Compan 
v. People, 121 P.3d 876, 880-81 (Colo. 2005) (holding that 
victim's statement to an acquaintance made after an assault were 
nontestimonial). 
¶33 In essence, we conclude that Julie's statements were 
informally made to her neighbor and her son's teacher and not 
under circumstances which would lead an objective witness to 
reasonably conclude they would be available at a later trial, 
and as such are nontestimonial.  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51 
("An accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers 
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
21 
 
bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual 
remark to an acquaintance does not.").11 
¶34 In sum, under Crawford, we conclude that Julie's 
letter and voicemail messages are testimonial, while her 
statements to Wojt and DeFazio are nontestimonial.  We now turn 
to a discussion of the State's argument regarding the forfeiture 
by wrongdoing doctrine.   
IV 
¶35 Essentially, the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine 
states that an accused can have no complaint based on the right 
to confrontation about the use against him or her of a 
declarant's statement if it was the accused's wrongful conduct 
that prevented any cross-examination of the declarant.  In this 
case, the State argues that Julie's statements, even if 
testimonial, should be admitted if the State can prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that Jensen murdered his wife.  
For support of this argument, the State contends we look no 
further than Crawford.   
¶36 As discussed in Crawford, the right of confrontation 
is "most naturally read as a reference to the right of 
confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions 
established at the time of the founding.  As the English 
authorities [] reveal, the common law in 1791 conditioned 
                                                 
11 While we conclude that Julie's statements to Wojt and 
DeFazio were nontestimonial, this is not the same as concluding 
that they are admissible.  When considering the admissibility of 
such evidence, the test from Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, applies.  
Manuel, 281 Wis. 2d 554, ¶60.   
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
22 
 
admissibility 
of 
an 
absent 
witness's 
examination 
on 
unavailability 
and 
a prior opportunity to cross-examine."  
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54.  The Court recognized that there may 
have been some exceptions to the general rule of exclusion of 
hearsay evidence, but "there is scant evidence that exceptions 
were invoked to admit testimonial statements against the accused 
in a criminal case."  Id. at 56.  Here, the Court noted that one 
such deviation was for dying declarations; however, Crawford did 
not decide whether the Sixth Amendment incorporated such an 
exception for testimonial dying declarations.  Instead, the 
Court stated that "[i]f this exception must be accepted on 
historical grounds, it is sui generis."  Id. at 56 n.6.   
¶37 After this discussion of historical exceptions to the 
Confrontation Clause, the Court turned its focus to the 
abrogation of the Roberts analysis to testimonial statements.  
In this discussion, the Court made the following statement:   
The Roberts test allows a jury to hear evidence, 
untested by the adversary process, based on a mere 
judicial 
determination of reliability.  It thus 
replaces the constitutionally prescribed method of 
assessing reliability with a wholly foreign one.  In 
this respect, it is very different from exceptions to 
the Confrontation Clause that make no claim to be a 
surrogate 
means 
of 
assessing 
reliability. 
 
For 
example, the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which 
we 
accept) 
extinguishes 
confrontation 
claims 
on 
essentially equitable grounds; it does not purport to 
be an alternative means of determining reliability.  
See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158-59 
(187[8]). 
Id. at 62.   
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
23 
 
¶38 Reynolds was one of the first federal decisions to 
elaborate on the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine.  In 
Reynolds, the defendant, George Reynolds, claimed that his right 
to confront a witness was violated when the lower court admitted 
into evidence testimony that was given at a former trial for the 
same offense with the same parties but under another indictment.  
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 153.  The witness, who was the alleged 
second wife of the accused, testified at a former trial against 
Reynolds.  Id. at 160.  At the former trial, the accused was 
present during her testimony and given the full opportunity to 
cross-examine the witness.  Id. at 161.  Prior to and after the 
commencement of the second trial, an officer attempted to 
deliver a subpoena to the witness but was unsuccessful on three 
separate 
occasions. 
 
Id. 
at 
159-60. 
 
The 
trial 
court 
subsequently ruled that the witness's previous testimony could 
be admitted at trial because Reynolds did not refute that he had 
been instrumental in concealing or keeping the witness away.  
Id. at 160.   
¶39 The Reynolds Court began its analysis with the 
following: 
The Constitution gives the accused the right to a 
trial at which he should be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; but if a witness is absent by 
his own wrongful procurement, he cannot complain if 
competent evidence is admitted to supply the place of 
that which he has kept away.  The Constitution does 
not guarantee an accused person against the legitimate 
consequences of his own wrongful acts. It grants him 
the privilege of being confronted with the witnesses 
against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses 
away, 
he 
cannot 
insist 
on 
his 
privilege. 
If, 
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
24 
 
therefore, when absent by his procurement, their 
evidence is supplied in some lawful way, he is in no 
condition to assert that his constitutional rights 
have been violated. 
Id. at 158.  In other words, while the Constitution does grant a 
privilege of confronting ones accusers, that privilege is lost 
if the accuser causes the witness's unavailability at trial.    
¶40 Since the Reynolds decision, the Court has continued 
to acknowledge the concept that a defendant can forfeit through 
misconduct his or her confrontation rights.12  See, e.g., Diaz v. 
United States, 223 U.S. 442, 451-53 (1912) (holding that a 
defendant waives13 right to object to a hearsay statement on 
confrontation grounds when he or she offers the statement); 
                                                 
12 The forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine did not arise 
related to the Court's holding in Davis v Washington, 126 S. Ct. 
2266, 2273 (2006), but the Court addressed it because the 
States, and their amici, raised it as an issue.  Seemingly as 
dicta, the Court stated the following: "We reiterate what we 
said 
in 
Crawford: 
 
that 
'the 
rule 
of 
forfeiture 
by 
wrongdoing . . . extinguishes 
confrontation 
claims 
on 
essentially equitable grounds.'  That is, one who obtains the 
absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional 
right to confrontation."  Id. at 2280 (quoting Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004)) (citations omitted).   
 
13 Although Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 451-53 
(1912), and other courts have used the term waiver in this 
context, we conclude the term forfeiture is more appropriate 
"because the phrase 'forfeiture by wrongdoing' better reflects 
the legal principles that underpin the doctrine."  Commonwealth 
v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 168 n.16 (Mass. 2005).  That is, 
there is an important distinction between the concept of waiver 
and forfeiture.  "Unlike waiver, which requires a knowing and 
intentional relinquishment of a known right, forfeiture results 
in the loss of a right regardless of the defendant's knowledge 
thereof and irrespective of whether the defendant intended to 
relinquish the right."  United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 
1100 (3d Cir. 1995). 
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
25 
 
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934) overruled 
by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (holding that defendant 
was permissibly excluded from going to view the scene of the 
crime as part of his trial.  In dicta, Justice Cardozo stated 
that, 
"[n]o 
doubt 
the 
privilege 
[afforded 
by 
the 
Sixth 
Amendment] may be lost by consent or at times even by 
misconduct"); and Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970) 
(holding that a defendant can lose his right to be present at 
trial, if after a warning by the judge, he continues his 
disruptive behavior). 
¶41 The Eighth Circuit appears to be the first federal 
court to apply the forfeiture doctrine to a situation where the 
defendant had no prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.  
See United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), 
cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).  Carlson held that the 
defendant waived his right to confrontation when he intimidated 
a witness into not testifying at trial; therefore the admission 
of the witness's prior grand jury testimony was permissible.  
Id. at 1360. 
¶42 The Carlson court first noted that "[t]he Sixth 
Amendment does not stand as a shield to protect the accused from 
his own misconduct or chicanery."  Id. at 1359 (citing Diaz, 223 
U.S. at 458; Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 159).  The court acknowledged 
the distinction between its case and Reynolds, in that Reynolds 
was afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the 
time the former testimony was recorded.  Id. at 1359 n.12.  
Carlson, however, was never afforded such an opportunity.  Id.  
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
26 
 
In the Eighth Circuit's view, "[t]o that extent, this case 
presents a more difficult question than Reynolds.  However, by 
focusing on the defendant's conduct . . . there is a similarity 
and we are guided by the precept articulated in Reynolds that 
'no one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong.'"  
Id. (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 159).  Ultimately, the court 
believed that permitting the defendant to "profit from such 
conduct would be contrary to public policy, common sense and the 
underlying purpose of the confrontation clause."  Id. at 1359.  
However, the court did not go so far as to say that all 
extrajudicial statements may be admitted.  Id. at 1360 n.14.  
Earlier in its opinion, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the 
witness's grand jury testimony was admissible hearsay pursuant 
to the residual exception of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Id. 
at 1353-55.  In other words, the court determined that Carlson's 
right to confrontation was forfeited by misconduct and the 
disputed statement was admissible under the residual hearsay 
exception. 
¶43 Subsequent to Carlson and a host of other cases from 
various federal and state jurisdictions, the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing doctrine was codified in 1997 in the Federal Rules of 
Evidence as a hearsay exception.  Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6).  This 
rule reads as follows:   
Rule 804. Hearsay Exceptions; Declarant Unavailable 
 . . . . 
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
27 
 
(b) Hearsay exceptions.  The following are not 
excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is 
unavailable as a witness: 
 . . . . 
(6) Forfeiture by wrongdoing.  A statement offered 
against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in 
wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the 
unavailability of the decedent as a witness. 
Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6).  The Advisory Committee on Rules 
enacted such a rule because it believed there was a need for "a 
prophylactic rule to deal with abhorrent behavior 'which strikes 
at the heart of the system of justice itself.'"  Notes of 
Advisory Committee on Rules——1997 Amendments to Federal Rules of 
Evidence (quoting United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 
273 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984)).  
Furthermore, the Committee recognized that "[e]very circuit that 
has resolved the question has recognized the principle of 
forfeiture by misconduct, although the tests for determining 
whether there is forfeiture have varied."  Id. (list of cited 
cases omitted).         
¶44 One notable example of a post-Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6) 
decision is United States v. Emery, 186 F.3d 921 (8th Cir. 
1999).  In Emery, the court concluded that the defendant 
forfeited his right to confrontation under Carlson, 547 F.2d 
1346, and further he forfeited his right to object on hearsay 
grounds under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6).  Emery asserted that the 
admission of hearsay statements of a federal informant he was 
charged with murdering violated his right to confrontation.  Id. 
at 926.  Emery argued that the principles of the forfeiture by 
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
28 
 
wrongdoing doctrine as stated in Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6) "should 
apply only in a trial on the underlying crimes about which he 
feared [the informant] would testify, not in a trial for 
murdering her."  Id.  The Emery court concluded the following:  
We believe that both the plain meaning of Fed. R. 
Evid. 804(b)(6) and the manifest object of the 
principles just outlined mandate a different result.  
The rule contains no limitation on the subject matter 
of the statements that it exempts from the prohibition 
on hearsay evidence.  Instead, it establishes the 
general proposition that a defendant may not benefit 
from 
his 
or 
her 
wrongful 
prevention 
of 
future 
testimony 
from 
a 
witness 
or 
potential 
witness.  
Accepting Mr. Emery's position would allow him to do 
just that.   
Id.  Thus, the court held that Emery forfeited his right to 
object on both confrontation and hearsay grounds.     
¶45 Since the release of Crawford, many jurisdictions have 
either adopted the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine if they had 
not done so before, or they have expanded the doctrine to 
encompass more testimonial statements.  For example, in State v. 
Meeks, 88 P.3d 789 (Kan. 2004), the defendant, Meeks, shot Green 
during a fight in the street.  Id. at 791.  The first officer on 
the scene asked Green who shot him, and he responded, "Meeks 
shot me."  Id. at 792.  This statement was later admitted at 
trial, and after Meeks was convicted, he argued on appeal his 
right to confrontation had been violated when the trial court 
admitted the statement because the statement lacked adequate 
indicia of reliability.  Id. at 792-93.   
¶46 The Kansas Supreme Court, citing to Reynolds, held 
that a defendant forfeits his right to confrontation, and waives 
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
29 
 
any hearsay objections if the witness's absence was due to the 
defendant's wrongdoing.  Id. at 794.  The Meeks court fully 
recognized that the underlying crime and the crime by which 
Meeks rendered the witness unavailable were the same, but the 
court concluded this was immaterial to the analysis.  For 
support, Meeks quoted an amicus brief of Crawford authored by a 
number of law professors and ultimately concluded the following: 
"If the trial court determines as a threshold matter 
that the reason the victim cannot testify at trial is 
that the accused murdered her, then the accused should 
be deemed to have forfeited the confrontation right, 
even though the act with which the accused is charged 
is the same as the one by which he allegedly rendered 
the witness unavailable." 
Id. at 794 (citing Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and the 
Definition of Chutzpa, 31 Israel L. Rev. 506 (1997) [hereinafter 
Chutzpa]).   
¶47 Indeed, Professor Friedman, a renowned expert on 
Confrontation Clause law, was one of the first to argue for a 
broad forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine.  In Chutzpa, Professor 
Friedman argued that identity between the victim and the 
declarant should not have any bearing on whether to apply what 
he phrased as the "reflexive forfeiture principle."  Chutzpa, 
supra, at 521. 
I do not believe [] that this identity presents a 
reason not to apply the forfeiture principle.  The 
identity should not distract us from the importance of 
deciding the evidentiary predicate.  If the predicate 
is 
true, 
then . . . the 
defendant's 
inability 
to 
confront the declarant is attributable to his own 
misconduct.  And if that is true, the defendant should 
not be able to keep the declarant's statement out of 
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
30 
 
evidence by a claim of the confrontation right.  A 
court should not decline to decide the predicate 
question, for evidentiary purposes, simply because the 
same question must also be decided in making the 
bottom-line determination of guilt.   
Id. at 522.   
¶48 After Crawford was released, Friedman again reiterated 
his view on the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine in an article 
exploring the meaning of "testimonial" statements.  See Richard 
D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of "Testimonial", 71 
Brook. L. Rev. 241 (2005).  In discussing whether a crime has to 
already have been committed in order for a statement to be 
considered testimonial, Friedman gave the following example:  
"Not necessarily: here I have in mind the cases in which an 
eventual 
murder 
victim, 
fearing 
her 
assailant, 
tells 
a 
confidante information to be used in the event that he does in 
fact assault her and render her unable to testify. . . .  Again, 
forfeiture is probable in this situation."  Id. at 250 n.27. 
¶49 Other post-Crawford decisions also aid our analysis.14  
One of the most persuasive for our purposes is United States v. 
Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364 (6th Cir. 2005).  In that case, 
Garcia-Meza was on trial for the first-degree murder of his 
wife, Kathleen.  Id. at 367.  Five months prior to her murder,  
                                                 
14 Other cases in which courts have applied the forfeiture 
by wrongdoing doctrine to situations where the defendant is 
charged with the same homicide that rendered the declarant 
unavailable include the following:  People v. Moore, 117 P.3d 1 
(Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (applying similar reasoning as State v. 
Meeks, 88 P.3d 789 (Kan. 2004)); Gonzalez v. State, 155 S.W.3d 
603 (Tex. App. 2004) (same); and United States v. Mayhew, 380 F. 
Supp. 2d 961 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (same).   
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
31 
 
Garcia-Meza had assaulted Kathleen, and the district court 
permitted the government to introduce testimony from the 
investigating officers about what Kathleen told them.  Id. at 
369.  After his conviction, Garcia-Meza argued that admission of 
this evidence violated his Confrontation Clause rights.  Id.   
¶50 Without deciding whether Kathleen's statements were 
testimonial or not, the Sixth Circuit determined that  Garcia-
Meza had forfeited his right to confront Kathleen because his 
wrongdoing was responsible for her unavailability.  Id. at 370 
(citing Crawford, 541 U.S. 36; Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145).  After 
noting that it was undisputed that Garcia-Meza killed his wife,15 
the Sixth Circuit dispelled the notion that in order for the 
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine to apply,  Garcia-Meza had to 
commit the murder with the specific intent to prevent her from 
testifying:   
There is no requirement that a defendant who prevents 
a witness from testifying against him through his own 
wrongdoing only forfeits his right to confront the 
witness 
where, 
in 
procuring 
the 
witness's 
unavailability, he intended to prevent the witness 
from testifying.  Though the Federal Rules of Evidence 
may contain such a requirement, the right secured by 
the Sixth Amendment does not depend on, in the recent 
words of the Supreme Court, "the vagaries of the Rules 
of Evidence."  The Supreme Court's recent affirmation 
of the "essentially equitable grounds" for the rule of 
forfeiture 
strongly 
suggests 
that 
the 
rule's 
applicability 
does not hinge on the wrongdoer's 
motive.  The Defendant, regardless of whether he 
                                                 
15 Garcia-Meza's defense was that he did not have the 
necessary premeditation for first-degree murder because he was 
too intoxicated.  United States v. Garcia-Meza, 403 F.3d 364, 
367 (6th Cir. 2005).   
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
32 
 
intended 
to prevent the witness from testifying 
against him or not, would benefit through his own 
wrongdoing if such a witness's statements could not be 
used against him, which the rule of forfeiture, based 
on principles of equity, does not permit. 
Id. at 370-71 (internal citations omitted).   
¶51 The general timeline of events in Garcia-Meza and this 
case are substantially similar.  Specifically, in Garcia-Meza 
the events of the case played out as follows: (1) the declarant 
gave a statement; (2) the defendant commits a crime rendering 
the declarant unavailable; (3) the defendant is charged with the 
declarant's death; and (4) the government seeks to introduce the 
declarant's prior statement.  The difference between these cases 
is that there was no dispute in Garcia-Meza that the defendant 
was responsible for the declarant's unavailability.  However, we 
do not believe that this distinction means the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing doctrine cannot apply.  If the circuit court 
determines, in a pre-trial decision by the court, that Jensen  
caused his wife's unavailability, then the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing doctrine applies to Jensen's confrontation rights, 
and otherwise testimonial evidence may be admitted. 
¶52 In essence, we believe that in a post-Crawford world 
the broad view of forfeiture by wrongdoing espoused by Friedman 
and utilized by various jurisdictions since Crawford's release 
is essential.  In other words, after "[n]oting the broad embrace 
of the doctrine" by courts nationwide and "recognizing the 
compelling 
public 
policy interests behind its enactment," 
Commonwealth v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 165 (Mass. 2005), we 
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
33 
 
elect to adopt the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine in 
Wisconsin.   
V 
¶53 Having concluded the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine 
is appropriate in Confrontation Clause cases, we now analyze the 
appropriate standard of review for the circuit court to apply on 
remand. 
¶54 As Justice Prosser noted in his concurrence in Hale, 
most jurisdictions require proof of the defendant's wrongdoing 
by a preponderance of the evidence.  Hale, 277 Wis. 2d 593, ¶96 
(Prosser, J., concurring) (citing Emery, 186 F.3d at 927; United 
States v. White, 116 F.3d 903, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United 
States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1280 (1st Cir. 1996); Steele 
v. Taylor, 684 F.2d 1193, 1201 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. 
Rivera, 292 F. Supp. 2d 827, 831 (E.D. Va. 2003) ; State v. 
Hallum, 606 N.W.2d 351, 355-56 (Iowa 2000)).  See also Edwards, 
830 N.E.2d at 172 nn. 24, 25 (collecting cases).  A few courts, 
however, use the "clear and convincing evidence" standard of 
proof.  Hale, 277 Wis. 2d 593, ¶96 (citing United States v. 
Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 631 (5th Cir. 1982); People v. Giles, 19 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 843, 848 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)). 
¶55 Citing to Professor Friedman's view, Jensen argues 
that "given the importance of the confrontation right, the court 
should not hold that the accused has forfeited it unless the 
court is persuaded to a rather high degree of probability that 
the accused has rendered the declarant unavailable."  Chutzpa, 
supra, at 519.  In other words, Jensen argues that given the 
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
34 
 
seriousness of the charges against him and given the presumption 
that he is innocent until proven guilty, a higher standard of 
clear and convincing evidence should be used. 
¶56 As noted by one court, "[r]equiring the court to 
decide by a preponderance of the evidence the very question for 
which the defendant is on trial may seem, at first glance, 
troublesome."  United States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 961, 967 
(S.D. Ohio 2005).  For the following reasons, however, the 
Mayhew 
court, 
like 
the 
jurisdictions 
cited 
in 
the 
Hale 
concurrence, concluded that equitable considerations demand such 
a result.  The court based its conclusion on the "equitable 
principles outlined in Crawford, the jury's ignorance of the 
court's threshold evidentiary determination, and the analogous 
evidentiary paradigm of conspiracy."  Id. at 968.  On this last 
point, Mayhew aptly describes the similarity between conspiracy 
and the application of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine and 
why the idea of "bootstrapping" should not be worrisome to us:      
For example, statements offered against a defendant to 
prove his participation in a charged conspiracy are 
admissible 
if 
the 
court 
first 
finds, 
by 
a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the conspiracy for 
which defendant is on trial existed. Bourjaily v. 
United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1987) . . . .  
The same principle applies to the forfeiture doctrine 
when the court makes a preliminary determination as to 
whether the defendant committed the crime for which he 
is [] charged. See Emery, 186 F.3d at 926 (basing its 
approach to the forfeiture doctrine on the co-
conspirator cases, noting "the functional similarity 
of the questions involved . . . ."); see also White, 
116 F.3d at 912 ("[T]he forfeiture finding is the 
functional equivalent of the predicate factual finding 
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
35 
 
that a court must make before admitting hearsay under 
the co-conspirator exception."). 
Id.  We agree with the reasoning of Mayhew, and the multitude of 
other jurisdictions and adopt a preponderance of the evidence 
standard.16   
¶57 In short, we adopt a broad forfeiture by wrongdoing 
doctrine, and conclude that if the State can prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the accused caused the 
absence of the witness, the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine 
will apply to the confrontation rights of the defendant.   
VI 
¶58 To conclude, we affirm the order of the circuit court 
as to its initial rulings on the admissibility of the various 
statements under Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.  That is, the statements 
Julie made to Kosman, including the letter, are testimonial, 
while the statements Julie made to Wojt and DeFazio are 
nontestimonial.  However, we reverse the circuit court's 
decision as to the applicability of the forfeiture by wrongdoing 
doctrine.  Today, we explicitly adopt this doctrine whereby a 
defendant is deemed to have lost the right to object on 
confrontation grounds to the admissibility of out-of-court 
statements of a declarant whose unavailability the defendant has  
caused.  As such, the cause must be remanded to the circuit 
                                                 
16 Related to the proper burden of proof, the Court in Davis 
stated the following: "We take no position on the standards 
necessary to demonstrate such forfeiture, but federal courts 
using Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), which codifies the 
forfeiture doctrine, have generally held the Government to the 
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard."  Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 
2280 (citations omitted). 
No. 
2004AP2481-CR   
 
36 
 
court for a determination of whether, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, 
Jensen 
caused 
Julie's 
unavailability, 
thereby 
forfeiting his right to confrontation. 
By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed in 
part; reversed in part; and the cause is remanded. 
 
 
 
 
No.  2004AP2481-CR.lbb 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶59 LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR., J.   (concurring in part, 
dissenting in part).  The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "In all 
criminal 
prosecutions, 
the 
accused 
shall 
enjoy 
the 
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him" 
(emphasis added).  Article I, section 7 of the Wisconsin 
Constitution similarly provides: "In all criminal prosecutions 
the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to meet the witnesses 
face to face" (emphasis added).1  The operative word in each of 
these constitutional provisions is the word "all".  Neither 
provision creates a homicide exception to the constitutional 
guarantee of confrontation.  Yet, the majority's misconception 
of the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing does precisely that, 
defeating the confrontation guarantee contained within the state 
and federal constitutions.  Moreover, the majority fails to 
properly apply the recent decision of Davis v. Washington, 547 
U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006), in ascertaining whether 
statements 
made 
to 
certain 
witnesses 
in 
this 
case 
are 
testimonial or nontestimonial.  Accordingly, I respectfully 
concur in part, and dissent in part. 
I 
¶60 At issue in this case are numerous statements made by 
the homicide victim, Julie Jensen (Julie), to her neighbor, 
                                                 
1 As the majority notes, we generally apply United States 
Supreme Court 
precedents when interpreting these clauses.  
Majority op., ¶13. 
No.  2004AP2481-CR.lbb 
 
2 
 
Tadeusz Wojt (Wojt), police officer Ron Kosman (Kosman), her 
physician, Dr. Richard Borman (Borman), and her son's teacher, 
Theresa DeFazio (DeFazio), as well as a letter she wrote to 
Detective Paul Ratzburg (Ratzburg).  The circuit court on 
September 4, 2003, reviewed over 100 statements made by Julie 
and evaluated the reliability of these statements using the 
balancing test established in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 
(1980).  The court ruled that parts of many of her statements 
were not excluded, while other parts were excluded.  The court 
also reserved its ruling with respect to some of the statements 
until the trial, and reserved the right to reverse itself based 
on how the evidence was offered at trial.  In addition, Julie's 
in-person statements to Kosman and her letter to Ratzburg were 
admitted in their entirety.   
¶61 Mark 
Jensen 
(Jensen), 
the 
defendant, 
moved 
for 
reconsideration on the admissibility of Julie's statements in 
light of the United States Supreme Court ruling in Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).  After a hearing, the circuit 
court concluded that Julie's letter to Ratzburg and voicemail 
messages to Kosman were testimonial and therefore inadmissible 
under Crawford.  The circuit court also determined that Julie's 
statements to Wojt and DeFazio were nontestimonial, and, 
therefore, the court's prior rulings on the admissibility of 
such statements remained in effect.   
¶62 The majority concludes that the statements that Julie 
Jensen made to Kosman prior to her death and the statements made 
by her in her letter to Ratzburg constitute testimonial 
No.  2004AP2481-CR.lbb 
 
3 
 
evidence, while the statements she made to Wojt and DeFazio 
constitute nontestimonial evidence.2  Majority op., ¶2.  The 
majority concludes that the nontestimonial evidence was properly 
admitted at trial.  Majority op., ¶58.  As to the testimonial 
evidence, however, the majority adopts a broad forfeiture by 
wrongdoing doctrine and remands the case to the circuit court to 
determine whether the State can prove, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that Mr. Jensen caused the unavailability of his wife.  
Id.   
¶63 I disagree that all of the statements made by Julie to 
Wojt and to DeFazio are nontestimonial.  I do agree with the 
majority that this court should adopt the doctrine of forfeiture 
by wrongdoing, and that, under a proper application of the 
doctrine, the burden be placed upon the State to establish the 
doctrine's applicability by a preponderance of the evidence.  
Because 
I 
conclude, 
contrary 
to 
the 
majority, 
that 
the 
forfeiture doctrine should be applied (1) where the defendant 
caused the absence of the witness and (2) did so for the purpose 
of preventing the witness from testifying, I respectfully 
dissent in part. 
II 
¶64 As noted previously, under the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
                                                 
2 I agree with and join that part of the majority opinion 
that concludes that the statements to Kosman and the letter to 
Ratzburg were testimonial.  I do not discuss these statements 
further.  I also agree that the statements made by Julie to 
DeFazio are nontestimonial, for reasons stated later in this 
opinion.  At issue are the statements made by Julie to Wojt.  
No.  2004AP2481-CR.lbb 
 
4 
 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him [or her]."  In order to properly interpret 
this right of confrontation, we must understand the original 
intent of the Framers in adopting the Sixth Amendment.   
¶65 In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court examined 
the historical background that culminated in the creation of 
this Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.  Crawford, 541 U.S. 
at 
43.  
The 
founding fathers' immediate source of the 
Confrontation Clause was English common law.  Id.  That common 
law tradition is one of live testimony in court subject to 
adversarial testing.  Id. 
¶66 The Court explained that in the 16th and 17th 
centuries, witnesses' statements against an accused could be 
read to the jury, and the accused was offered no opportunity to 
cross-examine his or her accuser.  In reaction to some of these 
cases, "English law developed a right of confrontation that 
limited these abuses."  Id. at 44.  First, courts developed 
relatively strict rules of unavailability.  Id. at 44-45.  
Second, "[o]ne recurring question was whether the admissibility 
of an unavailable witness's pretrial examination depended on 
whether the defendant had had an opportunity to cross-examine 
him."  Id. at 45.  For example, in 1696 the Court of King's 
Bench 
ruled that 
"even though a witness was dead, his 
examination was not admissible where 'the defendant not being 
present when [it was] taken before the mayor . . . had lost the 
benefit of a cross-examination.'"  Id. (quoting King v. Paine, 5 
Mod. 163, 165, 87 Eng. Rep. 584, 585 (1696)).  By the mid-1700s, 
No.  2004AP2481-CR.lbb 
 
5 
 
the right of an accused to confront any witness against the 
accused was firmly rooted in English common law, and the right 
of confrontation was included in declarations of rights adopted 
by at least eight of the original colonies.  Id. at 48.  This 
right was ultimately included in the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  Id. at 48-49.  Indeed, several 
American authorities flatly rejected any special status that 
would allow for the admissibility of statements made to a 
coroner absent cross-examination.  Id. at 47 n.2. 
¶67 The Crawford court also reviewed the first judicial 
interpretations of the Confrontation Clause because these cases 
"shed light upon the original understanding of the common-law 
rule."  Id. at 49.  For example, the court in State v. Webb 
concluded "that depositions could be read against an accused 
only if they were taken in [the defendant's] presence."  Id. 
(citing State v. Webb, 2 N.C. 103 (Super. L. & Equ. 1794)).  
Similarly, in State v. Campbell, South Carolina excluded the 
deposition of a deceased witness because the deposition was 
taken in the absence of the accused.  Id. (quoting State v. 
Campbell, 30 S.C.L. 124 (App. L. 1844)).  That court concluded:  
[N]otwithstanding the death of the witness, and 
whatever the respectability of the court taking the 
depositions, the solemnity of the occasion and the 
weight of the testimony, such depositions are ex 
parte, and, therefore, utterly incompetent. 
Id. (quoting Campbell, 30 S.C.L. 124). 
¶68 The court in Crawford concluded that the history of 
the Confrontation Clause supports two inferences.  Id. at 50.  
First, the principal purpose of the Confrontation Clause was to 
No.  2004AP2481-CR.lbb 
 
6 
 
exclude the use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the 
accused.  Id.  Second, "the Framers would not have allowed 
admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not 
appear at trial unless he [or she] was unavailable to testify, 
and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination."  Id. at 53-54 (emphasis added).  The Crawford 
court emphasized that this right of confrontation under the 
Sixth Amendment "is most naturally read as a reference to the 
right of confrontation at common law, admitting only those 
exceptions established at the time of the founding."3  Id. at 54 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).  Moreover, the United 
States Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed its reliance on 
this narrow, historical interpretation of the Confrontation 
Clause as described in Crawford.  Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2274 n.1.   
¶69 Based on this historical approach, the court in 
Crawford 
explicitly 
rejected 
the 
admission 
of 
otherwise 
inadmissible testimonial evidence based on the reliability test 
established in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).4   
This 
[Roberts] 
test departs from the historical 
principles identified above in two respects.  First, 
it is too broad:  It applies the same mode of analysis 
                                                 
3 This principle has been totally abandoned by the majority 
in its adoption and application of a broad forfeiture by 
wrongdoing doctrine, as I will discuss later in this opinion. 
4 We have previously recognized that Wisconsin follows the 
reliability standard established in Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 
(1980), for evaluating the admissibility of nontestimonial 
evidence.  State v. Manuel, 2005 WI 75, ¶3, 281 Wis. 2d 554, 697 
N.W.2d 811. 
 
No.  2004AP2481-CR.lbb 
 
7 
 
whether or not the hearsay consists of ex parte 
testimony.  This often results in close constitutional 
scrutiny in cases that are far removed from the core 
concerns of the Clause.  At the same time, however, 
the test is too narrow:  It admits statements that do 
consist of ex parte testimony upon a mere finding of 
reliability.  This malleable standard often fails to 
protect against paradigmatic confrontation violations. 
 . . . . 
. . . Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge 
is 
fundamentally 
at 
odds 
with 
the 
right 
of 
confrontation. To be sure, the Clause's ultimate goal 
is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a 
procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It 
commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that 
reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by 
testing in the crucible of cross-examination.  
 . . . . 
The Roberts test allows a jury to hear evidence, 
untested by the adversary process, based on a mere 
judicial 
determination 
of 
reliability. 
It 
thus 
replaces the constitutionally prescribed method of 
assessing reliability with a wholly foreign one.  
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60-62. 
¶70 The court recognized that although there existed 
exceptions to the general rule of exclusion, "there is scant 
evidence that exceptions were invoked to admit testimonial 
statements against the accused in a criminal case."  Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 56 (emphasis in original).  The Crawford court 
explained that this historical context suggests that the 
requirement of a prior opportunity for cross-examination was 
"dispositive, and not merely one of several ways to establish 
reliability."  Id. at 55-56.  The Crawford court unequivocally 
concluded:  
Our cases have thus remained faithful to the Framers' 
understanding: Testimonial statements of witnesses 
No.  2004AP2481-CR.lbb 
 
8 
 
absent from trial have been admitted only where the 
declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant 
has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. 
Id. at 59 (footnote omitted). 
III 
¶71 Testimonial statements cause the declarant to be a 
"witness" within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.  
Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273.  The court in Crawford did discuss a 
historical dictionary definition of "testimony."  Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 51.  The court noted that the dictionary defined 
"testimony" as "[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for 
the purpose of establishing or proving some fact."  Id. (quoting 
2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 
(1828)).  Relying on this definition of "testimony," the 
Crawford court concluded that "testimony" constitutes "[a]n 
accuser who makes a formal statement to government officers 
[and] bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a 
casual remark to an acquaintance does not."  Id.  The Crawford 
court, however, declined to spell out a comprehensive definition 
of "testimonial."5  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.     
                                                 
5 In Wisconsin, at a minimum, testimonial evidence includes 
ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent (such 
as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony not 
subject to cross-examination by the defendant, or similar 
pretrial statements declarants would reasonably expect to be 
used prosecutorially), extrajudicial statements contained in 
formalized 
testimonial 
materials 
(such 
as 
affidavits, 
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions), and statements 
made under circumstances that would lead an objective witness 
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for 
use at a later trial.  Manuel, 281 Wis. 2d 554, ¶¶37, 39.   
No.  2004AP2481-CR.lbb 
 
9 
 
¶72 In Davis, the United States Supreme Court recently 
shed some additional light on the difference between testimonial 
and nontestimonial evidence, in the limited context of police 
questioning: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course 
of 
police 
interrogation 
under 
circumstances 
objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet 
an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no 
such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose 
of the interrogation is to establish or prove past 
events 
potentially 
relevant 
to 
later 
criminal 
prosecution.  
Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74.   
¶73 The Court in the Davis matter concluded that the 
declarant was speaking to the police officer about events as 
they were actually happening, rather than describing past events 
about an ongoing emergency, and that consequently the statements 
in question were not testimonial.  Id. at 2276-77.  The court 
later clarified that the police officer's interrogation of the 
witness in the Hammon6 matter was testimonial because it was 
clear that the interrogation was part of an investigation of 
past criminal events and that there was "no emergency in 
progress."  Id. at 2278. 
¶74 The court noted that this description was in the 
context of interrogations because the cases they were examining 
involved interrogations.  The court explicitly recognized that 
simply because a statement is made in the absence of any 
                                                 
6 Hammon v. Indiana, 547 U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006) 
(decided in the same opinion as Davis v. Washington). 
No.  2004AP2481-CR.lbb 
 
10 
 
interrogation does not necessarily mean the statement is 
nontestimonial.  "The Framers were no more willing to exempt 
from cross-examination volunteered testimony or answers to open-
ended questions than they were to exempt answers to detailed 
interrogation."  Id. at 2274 n.1 (emphasis added).  It is with 
the above constitutional principles in mind that I examine the 
statements of Wojt and DeFazio. 
A 
¶75 I begin with the statements allegedly made by Julie 
Jensen to Tadeusz Wojt.  During the week of November 9, 1998, 
Julie Jensen told Mr. Wojt that she was upset because her 
marriage was in trouble, that she and the defendant argued about 
everything, that she suspected that the defendant was having an 
affair, and talked about a number of marital problems between 
the two of them.  Similarly, Julie had conversations with 
Malgorzata Wojt on December 1 and 2, 1998, that were about day 
care 
and 
school, 
Julie 
getting 
a 
job, 
Julie's 
doctor 
appointment, some medicine she took, and the defendant being 
good 
to 
her. 
 
Because 
the 
"primary 
purpose" 
of 
these 
conversations between Julie and the Wojt's was not "to establish 
or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution[,]" I agree with the majority that the statements 
made during the week of November 9, and on December 1 and 
December 2, 1998, were nontestimonial.  See majority op., ¶¶31-
33. 
¶76 The majority's analysis does not hold true for the 
remainder of the statements made by Julie to Mr. Wojt.  On 
No.  2004AP2481-CR.lbb 
 
11 
 
November 21, 1998, Julie told Wojt that the defendant was going 
to poison her.  She described past events that would be 
potentially relevant to a criminal prosecution, including the 
defendant leaving syringes in a drawer and looking up something 
on the computer having to do with poison, and her finding notes 
written by him which had to do with poison.  Wojt told her to 
call the police. 
¶77 The very next day, Julie gave Wojt an envelope with 
instructions to give it to the police if anything happened to 
her.  She also gave him a roll of undeveloped film, indicating 
that these were photographs of things the defendant would look 
up or note referencing poisoning.  Earlier that day, she told 
Wojt that the defendant was trying to pressure her to eat or 
drink, and that he would become angry when she refused.  She 
told Wojt that she called the police, but that they were not 
available.  She did not sleep that night, and did not think she 
would live out the weekend. 
¶78 On November 24, 1998, she asked Wojt to return the 
roll of film to her, as she was going to give it to the police.  
She repeated her fears to Wojt between November 24 and November 
28, 1998, and to Ms. Wojt on November 29, 1998.       
¶79 Clearly, 
the 
primary 
purpose 
of 
each 
of 
these 
conversations was to establish or prove past events potentially 
relevant to a later criminal prosecution, that of Julie's 
husband, the defendant.  Indeed, as to the purpose of the 
statements, the circuit court recognized as much when it wrote:  
"Mrs. Jensen's statements to the Wojts . . . could be viewed as 
No.  2004AP2481-CR.lbb 
 
12 
 
remarks which were intended for the ears of the police, when 
viewed in conjunction with the conversations which she had with 
Officer Kossman."  The reason that the circuit court rejected 
that conclusion was twofold.  
¶80 First, the circuit court's decision of August 4, 2004, 
was based in part upon the fact that the United States Supreme 
Court "did not adopt in Crawford the argument that 'testimonial 
statements' 
include 
any 
'statements 
that 
were 
made 
in 
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably 
to believe that the statement would be available for use at a 
later trial.'"  Based on our decision in State v. Manuel, 2005 
WI 75, ¶3, 281 Wis. 2d 554, 697 N.W.2d 811, we now know that the 
circuit 
court's 
conclusion 
was 
in 
error, 
as 
Wisconsin 
subsequently adopted that standard for testimonial evidence.   
¶81 Second, in ruling on the evidence that would be 
available to the jury, the circuit court believed it would have 
to abandon neutrality and embrace the theme offered by the 
defendant 
that 
Mrs. 
Jensen's 
motives 
were 
suicidal 
and 
malicious.  Yet, the circuit court recognized that Julie's 
statements could have been motivated by those purposes, as well 
as driven by many other considerations.  The standard for 
determining whether evidence is testimonial is its potential 
relevance to a later prosecution.  Given that the circuit court 
acknowledged that multiple purposes could be deduced from the 
proffer of evidence, and based its ruling on an erroneous view 
of the law, I would conclude that the statements in question 
meet the requisite standard for "testimonial."     
No.  2004AP2481-CR.lbb 
 
13 
 
¶82 The statements were also relevant to establish or 
prove past events that were potentially relevant to the 
prosecution of the defendant.  The syringes had already been 
left in the drawer.  The notes about poisoning had already been 
made by the defendant.  She had already viewed the computer in 
relation to poisoning.  She had already taken pictures of a 
number of these items.  He had already tried to pressure her to 
eat or drink.  As she indicated to Wojt when she gave him the 
envelope to give to the police, she wanted the police to have 
that information should anything happen to her.  It is obviously 
relevant to the defendant's prosecution, or the State would not 
attempt to use it.  And it was expressly her purpose to identify 
her killer should anything happen to her.  These statements, 
given by Julie to the Wojts, were simply as testimonial as they 
come.  I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion to 
the contrary. 
B 
¶83 Whether the statements made by Julie to DeFazio are 
testimonial presents a tougher question.  After reviewing the 
statements from November 25 and December 2, 1998, made by Julie 
to DeFazio, I conclude that the majority is correct in its 
determination 
that 
these statements are nontestimonial in 
nature.  See majority op., ¶¶31-33.  While these statements 
reflect, in part, past events potentially relevant to later 
prosecution, it cannot be seriously argued that Julie's purpose 
when making these statements was to establish or prove those 
past events. 
No.  2004AP2481-CR.lbb 
 
14 
 
IV 
¶84 The right of confrontation is not absolute.  The 
Crawford court explicitly recognized that one exception to the 
inadmissibility of testimonial evidence under the Confrontation 
Clause is the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception.  Crawford, 591 
U.S. at 62.  That exception "is most naturally read as a 
reference to the right of confrontation at common law, admitting 
only those exceptions established at the time of the founding."  
Id. at 54 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).   
¶85 The Crawford court relied on Reynolds v. United 
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), in concluding that the rule of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing exception "extinguishes confrontation 
claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not purport to 
be an alternative means of determining reliability."  Id. at 62 
(citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158-159).   
¶86 In Reynolds, the United States Supreme Court discussed 
the application of the forfeiture by wrongdoing rule to the 
Confrontation Clause: 
The Constitution gives the accused the right to a 
trial at which he should be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; but if a witness is absent by 
his own wrongful procurement, he cannot complain if 
competent evidence is admitted to supply the place of 
that which he has kept away.  The Constitution does 
not guarantee an accused person against the legitimate 
consequences of his own wrongful acts.  It grants him 
the privilege of being confronted with the witnesses 
against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses 
away, he cannot insist on his privilege.  If, 
therefore, when absent by his procurement, their 
evidence is supplied in some lawful way, he is in no 
condition to assert that his constitutional rights 
have been violated. 
No.  2004AP2481-CR.lbb 
 
15 
 
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 158.  Reynolds, in turn, relied on Lord 
Morley's Case, from 1666, in which the House of Lords held: 
[I]n case oath should be made that any witness, who 
had been examined by the coroner and was then absent, 
was detained by the means or procurement of the 
prisoner, and the opinion of the judges asked whether 
such examination might be read, we should answer, that 
if their lordships were satisfied by the evidence they 
had heard that the witness was detained by means or 
procurement of the prisoner, then the examination 
might be read; but whether he was detained by means or 
procurement of the prisoner was matter of fact, of 
which we were not the judges, but their lordships.   
Id. at 158 (emphasis added).  
¶87 The court in Reynolds also noted that in Regina v. 
Scaife (17 Ad. & El. N. S. 242), a unanimous court determined 
that "if the prisoner had resorted to a contrivance to keep a 
witness out of the way, the deposition of the witness, taken 
before a magistrate and in the presence of the prisoner, might 
be read."  Id.   
¶88 The Reynolds court explained that the forfeiture by 
wrongdoing rule "has its foundation in the maxim that no one 
shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong."  Id. at 
159.  Applying this principle to the facts before the court, 
where the witness had testified at a prior trial and the 
defendant had full opportunity of cross-examination, the court 
in Reynolds held the testimony admissible, explaining that 
[t]he accused  . . .  had full opportunity to account 
for the absence of the witness, if he would, or to 
deny under oath that he had kept her away.  Clearly, 
enough had been proven to cast the burden upon him of 
showing 
that 
he 
had 
not 
been 
instrumental 
in 
concealing or keeping the witness away.   
No.  2004AP2481-CR.lbb 
 
16 
 
Id. at 160.7 
¶89 The United States Supreme Court again reaffirmed the 
forfeiture exception in Davis, stating "one who obtains the 
absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the constitutional 
right to confrontation."  Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. at 
2280.  The Davis court reasoned: "[W]hen defendants seek to 
undermine the judicial process by procuring or coercing silence 
from witnesses and victims, the Sixth Amendment does not require 
courts to acquiesce."  Id.  The Court took no position on the 
standards necessary to justify application of the doctrine of 
forfeiture by wrongdoing, although it did cite Federal Rule of 
Evidence 804(b)(6) as codifying the doctrine, and that under the 
federal rule, the government has generally been held to the 
                                                 
7 The majority does not address the fact that the doctrine 
of forfeiture by wrongdoing at common law merely provided that 
"if a witness is kept away by the adverse party, his testimony, 
taken on a former trial between the same parties upon the same 
issues, may be given in evidence."  Reynolds v. United States, 
98 U.S. 145, 158-59 (1879) (emphasis added).  See also Adam 
Sleeter, Injecting Fairness into the Doctrine of Forfeiture by 
Wrongdoing, 83 Wash. U. Law Quarterly 1367, 1370-71.  Thus, the 
historical rule was limited to where the witness was corruptly 
and wrongfully kept away, and the rule only allowed former trial 
evidence between the same parties upon the same issues to be 
admitted.  This case does not involve former testimony at an 
earlier trial.  In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 
(2004), the court stated that it would recognize "only those 
exceptions established at the time of the founding," which 
included the forfeiture doctrine (emphasis added).  In Davis v. 
Washington, 547 U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2280 (2006), the 
court then discussed, without adopting, the version of the 
doctrine codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), which 
does not limit the doctrine to cases in which testimony was 
given at an earlier trial.  Neither Crawford nor Davis answered 
whether the scope of the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception must 
be limited to that which was recognized at the founding.   
No.  2004AP2481-CR.lbb 
 
17 
 
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.  Id.  The Court also 
noted that state courts tend to follow the same practice as the 
federal rule.  Id.      
¶90 At common law, the forfeiture doctrine was applied in 
situations where the defendant's wrongful acts are committed 
with the purpose of preventing a witness from testifying, see 
Hon. Paul W. Grimm and Professor Jerome E. Diese, Jr., Hearsay, 
Confrontation, and Forfeiture by Wrongdoing:  Crawford v. 
Washington, a Reassessment of the Confrontation Clause, 35 U. 
Balt. Law Forum 5, 32-33 (2004), and most modern courts have 
held to this rule.  See e.g. United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 
1271, 1278 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Lentz, 282 F. Supp. 
2d 399, 426 (E.D. Va. 2002).  In other words, the forfeiture 
exception has been applied when an accused has made a witness 
unavailable, and when the accused's intent was to deny that 
witness's presence at the trial.   
¶91 Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(4), adopted in 1997, 
even goes so far as to codify this requirement as an element of 
the Rule.  It states that if the declarant is unavailable as a 
witness, the hearsay rule does not apply to any "statement 
offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in 
wrongdoing 
that 
was 
intended 
to, 
and 
did, 
procure 
the 
unavailability of the declarant as a witness" (emphasis added).  
See, e.g., United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 654 (2d Cir. 
2001) (requiring that the government prove “the defendant (or 
party against whom the out-of-court statement is offered) acted 
with the intent of procuring the declarant's unavailability as 
No.  2004AP2481-CR.lbb 
 
18 
 
an actual or potential witness" for a statement to be admitted 
under 
the 
forfeiture 
by 
wrongdoing 
doctrine) 
(citations 
omitted); State v. Alvarez-Lopez, 136 N.M. 309, 314 (2005) ("The 
elements that must be shown for Rule 804(b)(6) to apply are:  
(1) the declarant was expected to be a witness; (2) the 
declarant became unavailable; (3) the defendant's misconduct 
caused the unavailability of the declarant; and (4) the 
defendant intended by his misconduct to prevent the declarant 
from testifying.") (citations omitted).  A defendant that is put 
on trial for murder cannot be deemed to have killed that person 
with the intent to deny that person's presence at the witness's 
own murder trial, unless a preponderance of the evidence 
establishes that the defendant in fact possessed the intent to 
keep the witness from testifying.8 
¶92 The majority's discussion of United States v. Emery, 
186 F.3d 921 (8th Cir. 1999) is illustrative.  Majority op., ¶44.  
In Emery, the court concluded that the defendant forfeited his 
right to confrontation where he murdered a federal informant to 
keep the informant from testifying in another trial.  Id. at 
926.  The court declined to accept his argument that the 
forfeiture doctrine should only be applied where the defendant 
procured the absence of the witness is the same case the witness 
                                                 
8 The court in Davis took "no position on the standards 
necessary 
to 
demonstrate" 
forfeiture 
by 
wrongdoing, 
but 
recognized that federal courts, relying on the Federal Rules of 
Evidence § 804(b)(6) (codifying the forfeiture doctrine) "have 
generally held the Government to the preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard."  Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2280.  I accept that, 
for purposes of this opinion, the majority is not in error in 
adopting this standard.  See majority op., ¶57. 
No.  2004AP2481-CR.lbb 
 
19 
 
was to testify in, as opposed to a subsequent homicide trial.  
Id. 
¶93 The majority relies on recent cases from other 
jurisdictions that adopt the broad forfeiture doctrine the 
majority seeks to employ in this case.  Majority op., ¶¶45-52.  
That doctrine is based on a newly created "reflexive forfeiture 
principle" first advocated by Professor Richard D. Friedman, in 
Confrontation and the Definition of Chutzpa, 31 Israel L. Rev. 
506 (1997) (hereinafter Chutzpa).9  By doing so, however, the 
majority abandons the substantive doctrine that was adopted by 
the founders in favor of a far more expansive doctrine not 
contemplated by the founders or by the Sixth Amendment, contrary 
                                                 
9 Professor Friedman recognizes that reflexive application 
of the forfeiture doctrine is controversial, as well as "quite 
far-reaching."  Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and the 
Definition of Chutzpa, 31 Israel L. Rev. 506, 508 (1997) 
(hereinafter Chutzpa).  The majority declines, however, to adopt 
Professor Friedman's recommendation that "the court should not 
hold that the accused has forfeited [the confrontation right] 
unless the court is persuaded to a rather high degree of 
probability 
that 
the 
accused 
has 
rendered 
the 
declarant 
unavailable[.]"  Id. at 519.  
No.  2004AP2481-CR.lbb 
 
20 
 
to Justice Scalia's admonition.10  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 54 
(explaining that the right of confrontation under the Sixth 
Amendment "is most naturally read as a reference to the right of 
confrontation at common law, admitting only those exceptions 
established at the time of the founding") (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added).  The Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution 
does 
not 
state 
that, 
"[i]n 
all 
criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him [or her], except in 
homicide cases."  While other courts may feel free to disregard 
the very principles upon which the Confrontation Clause rests, 
our decision must be limited by the Constitution and the United 
States Supreme Court decisions interpreting it, i.e., Reynolds, 
Crawford and Davis.   
¶94 In Crawford, Justice Scalia wrote that "[d]ispensing 
with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is 
akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is 
obviously guilty."  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.  In a similar 
                                                 
10 Professor Friedman's far-reaching approach, if fully 
embraced by the majority, would clearly lead to nonsensical 
applications.  For example, Friedman suggests that "[t]he 
prosecution should bear the burden of taking all reasonable 
steps to protect whatever aspects of confrontation are possible 
given the defendant's conduct, and of demonstrating that it has 
done so."  Chutzpa at 525.  Thus, under the reflexive forfeiture 
principle advocated by Friedman, once Julie left the voicemail 
to Officer Kosman that indicated that she thought Jensen was 
trying to kill her, the State had an obligation to notify Jensen 
that Julie made the statement, and give him an opportunity to 
cross-examine her by way of videotape or deposition.  Id.  For 
obvious reasons, the majority does not advance that view.  Yet, 
this is the proper application of Professor Friedman's reflexive 
forfeiture doctrine adopted by the majority in this case.       
No.  2004AP2481-CR.lbb 
 
21 
 
vein, applying the forfeiture doctrine to admit testimonial 
evidence when the defendant is on trial for the crime that 
rendered the witness unavailable, absent any showing that the 
defendant's purpose was to procure the absence of the witness to 
keep him or her from testifying at trial, places the cart before 
the horse. 
¶95 The circuit court got it right when it noted that the 
broad forfeiture doctrine advocated by the State, which the 
majority now adopts, would render superfluous the doctrine of 
dying declarations.  See generally Michael J. Polelle, The Death 
of Dying Declarations in a Post-Crawford World, 2006 Mo. L. Rev. 
285.  The circuit court discerned that both doctrines coexisted 
at common law at the time the Constitution was ratified.  Thus, 
the circuit court properly reasoned that a current application 
of the forfeiture doctrine may not do away with the dying 
declaration doctrine.  To quote the circuit judge: 
If an accused forfeits or waives the right of cross-
examination merely by killing the victim to "put her 
out of the way," then there would have been no reason 
for the development of the Dying Declaration Rule, 
which 
contains 
the 
added 
requirement 
that 
the 
declarant's statement have been made "while believing 
that the declarant's death was imminent."  The 
existence of the Dying Declaration Rule makes sense 
only in an evidentiary framework in which the mere 
fact that the defendant can be convincingly shown to 
the judge to have killed the declarant does not, by 
itself, justify exception to the requirements of the 
Confrontation Clause. 
¶96 I have no objection to applying the forfeiture 
doctrine in a criminal trial.  That doctrine does not, however, 
create a homicide exception to the Confrontation Clause.  I 
No.  2004AP2481-CR.lbb 
 
22 
 
would not adopt the broad forfeiture doctrine set forth by the 
majority in this case.  I would remand this matter to the 
circuit court to apply the common law forfeiture doctrine, as it 
existed at the time that the Constitution was ratified.  The 
majority's broad new rule, I conclude, is unconstitutional. 
¶97 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in 
part and dissent in part.        
 
 
No.  2004AP2481-CR.lbb 
 
 
 
1