Case Title: Ex parte State of Alabama Department of Revenue. PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS (In re: State of Alabama Department of Revenue v. Hoover, Inc.)

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1061766

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2008-03-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
REL: 03/21/2008
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2007-2008
____________________
1061766
____________________
Ex parte State of Alabama Department of Revenue
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
(In re: State of Alabama Department of Revenue
v.
Hoover, Inc.)
(Colbert Circuit Court, CV-04-88;
Court of Civil Appeals, 2060142)
STUART, Justice.
1061766
2
The State of Alabama Department of Revenue ("the
Department") petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to
review the decision of the Court of Civil Appeals in State
Department of Revenue v. Hoover, Inc., [Ms. 2060142, August
31, 2007] ___ So. 2d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2007).  Specifically,
the Department asked this Court to overrule Hoover, Inc. v.
State Department of Revenue, 833 So. 2d 32 (Ala. 2002), and Ex
parte Hoover, Inc., 956 So. 2d 1149 (Ala. 2006) (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "Hoover I").  We granted the writ
on this ground.  However, after reviewing the briefs of the
parties, we determine that we cannot reach the issue necessary
to overrule Hoover I.  
Hoover I involved the same fundamental issue that is the
subject of the present case; the only differences are the tax
years involved and the amounts of sales taxes assessed by the
Department.  In the present case, the Court of Civil Appeals
held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred the
relitigation of any issue in a tax case when the controlling
facts and applicable legal principles are the same as in the
prior litigation.   The Department did not challenge this
holding in its  petition.  Instead, the Department asked this
1061766
3
Court to overrule Hoover I.   We conclude, based on our review
of this case after issuing the writ, that before this Court
can entertain the Department's request to overrule Hoover I,
a determination must be made as to whether collateral estoppel
bars relitigation –- the basis of the decision of the Court of
Civil Appeals.  The Department did not challenge in its
petition the Court of Civil Appeals' application of collateral
estoppel in this case; therefore, we did not grant certiorari
review on that ground, and we cannot review it.  See Rule 39,
Ala. R. App. P.; Ex parte Franklin,  502 So. 2d 828, 828 (Ala.
1987)(recognizing that it is well established that this Court
can address only those issues that are pleaded in the petition
as grounds for certiorari review).  Because the Department did
not challenge collateral estoppel in its petition and because
this ground must be addressed before we can reach the merits
of the ground upon which we granted the petition, i.e.,
whether Hoover I should be overruled, we must quash the writ.
WRIT QUASHED.
Cobb, C.J., and Lyons, Woodall, Smith, and Bolin, JJ.,
concur.
See, J., concurs specially.
Parker and Murdock, JJ., concur in the result.
1061766
4
SEE, Justice (concurring specially).
For the reasons stated in the main opinion, I concur to
quash the writ of certiorari previously granted.  I do not
read the main opinion as holding that this Court is without
the power to overrule Hoover, Inc. v. State Department of
Revenue, 833 So. 2d 32 (Ala. 2002), and Ex parte Hoover, Inc.,
956 So. 2d 1149 (Ala. 2006) (collectively referred to as
"Hoover I"), without first determining whether the case is
barred by collateral estoppel; rather, it holds that it is our
policy to restrict review to the issues upon which we granted
the petition for the writ of certiorari.  Therefore, I concur
in the main opinion, but I also agree with the reasoning
expressed by Justice Murdock in his special writing that,
although we are not required to do so, we should quash the
writ in this case.  
This Court has the authority to issue "such ... remedial
and original writs as are necessary to give to it a general
superintendence 
and 
control 
of 
courts 
of 
inferior
jurisdiction." § 12-2-7(3), Ala. Code 1975.  This Court has
stated that "[o]ur supervisory authority, while broad, is
certainly not unlimited; its use is governed by the particular
1061766
In James, the Court quoted the decision of the Supreme
1
Court of the United States in Panama R. Co. v. Napier Shipping
Co., 166 U.S. 280, 284 (1897), in which that Court stated that
"'while the Court of Appeals may have been limited on the
second appeal to questions arising upon the amount of damages,
no such limitation applies to this court, when, in the
exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction, it issues a writ of
certiorari to bring up the whole record. Upon such writ the
entire case is before us for examination.'" 836 So. 2d at 835-
36 (emphasis omitted).
See Ex parte Apicella, 809 So. 2d 865, 868 (Ala. 2001)
2
("This Court granted certiorari review to consider three
issues. The first two of these issues were raised by [the
appellant] .... This Court raised the third issue ex mero
motu: Whether the statutory provision allowing a trial judge
to override a jury's recommendation in a capital case violates
Art. I, § 11, of the Alabama Constitution of 1901 ...."); Ex
parte State Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 654 So. 2d 1149,
1151 (Ala. 1994) ("'However, because of the public policy
considerations involved in using minors as decoys in enforcing
the laws regulating the sale and purchase of intoxicating
liquors in this State, this Court on April 4, 1992, issued the
writ ex mero motu in order to review the judgment of the Court
5
circumstances of a case in accordance with our 'clear duty to
exercise that power whenever it is made to appear that an
inferior 
court 
is 
guilty 
of 
usurpation 
or 
abuse 
of
jurisdiction.' [Ex parte] Burch, 236 Ala. [662,] 666, 184 So.
[694,] 698 [(1938)]." Ex parte James, 836 So. 2d 813, 836
(Ala. 2002).   When necessary for reasons of constitutional
1
review and issues of great public importance, this Court has
exercised its supervisory authority by issuing the writ of
certiorari ex mero motu.   However, as with all instances in
2
1061766
of Civil Appeals and to set some general guidelines as to when
and under what circumstances minors may be used in undercover
operations.'"(quoting Bartlett v. Alabama Alcoholic Beverage
Control Bd., 654 So. 2d 1139, 1141 (Ala. 1993))).
6
which this Court issues the writ of certiorari, our exercise
of that authority is a matter of judicial discretion and is
reserved for special and important cases. See Rule 39(a), Ala.
R. App. P. ("Certiorari review is not a matter of right, but
of judicial discretion.  A petition for a writ of certiorari
will be granted only when there are special and important
reasons for the issuance of the writ.").
The Department chose not to seek review of the Court of
Civil Appeals' decision regarding the collateral estoppel
issue.  It is intrinsic in the nature of the judicial function
that we do not range about for matters we wish to review;
instead, we generally review only those matters the litigants
choose to bring to us.  In the case now before us, the
Department has asked us to overrule Hoover I.  The Department
has not asked us to review the collateral estoppel issue upon
which the Court of Civil Appeals rendered its decision.  Even
if we were to overrule Hoover I, therefore, our decision on
that issue would not alter the result in this case.  Our
decision would be hypothetical, a futile act, merely
1061766
This Court has held:
3
"The courts of Alabama are not authorized to render
advisory 
opinions, 
except 
in 
very 
limited
circumstances. See, e.g., Carrell v. Masonite Corp.,
775 So. 2d 121, 125 (Ala. 2000) ('Alabama's
Declaratory Judgment Act bars trial courts from
issuing advisory opinions'); Ala. Code 1975, § 12-2-
10 (authorizing the Supreme Court to issue advisory
opinions on 'important constitutional questions' at
the request of the Governor or the Legislature)."
 
Baker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 821 So.
2d 158, 164 (Ala. 2001) (emphasis omitted).
7
advisory.   "'"[I]t is not within the province of this court
3
to decide abstract or hypothetical questions, which are
disconnected from the gravity of actual relief, or from the
determination of which no practical result can follow."'"
Breaux v. Bailey, 789 So. 2d 204, 207 (Ala. 2000) (quoting
Spence v. Baldwin County Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 533 So. 2d 192,
193 (Ala. 1988) (Maddox, J., concurring specially), quoting in
turn Caldwell v. Loveless, 17 Ala. App. 381, 382, 85 So. 307,
307 (1920)).  
For these reasons, I concur with the main opinion's
rationale in quashing of the writ.
1061766
8
MURDOCK, Justice (concurring in the result).
I do not agree with the reasoning of the main opinion
that we would have to make a determination that the doctrine
of collateral estoppel does not bar the Department's action
before we could proceed to consider the Department's request
that we overrule this Court's decision in Ex parte Hoover,
Inc., 956 So. 2d 1149 (Ala. 2006).  Indeed, the converse would
appear to be true, i.e., that we would have to consider and
overrule Ex parte Hoover before we could make a decision
favoring the Department on the issue of collateral estoppel.
See, e.g., Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 600 (1948)
(explaining the manner in which the doctrine of collateral
estoppel applies in tax cases that, though they involve
different tax years, involve "controlling facts and applicable
legal rules [that] remain unchanged" (emphasis added)), quoted
with approval in State v. Delaney's, Inc., 668 So. 2d 768, 772
(Ala. Civ. App. 1995).
I concur in the result, however, because collateral
estoppel was one of two grounds upon which the Court of Civil
Appeals upheld the trial court's judgment in the present case
(the other being that court's holding that Ex parte Hoover
itself directly required that result, see State Dep't of
1061766
Although the Department does address the issue of
4
collateral estoppel in its brief, its discussion focuses on
the fact that the tax years at issue in the present case are
different from the tax years that were at issue in Ex parte
Hoover.  As alluded to in the parenthetical explanation of
Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. at 600, in the text, that is
not enough in the context of a tax dispute such as this.  The
Department's brief thus provides no argument or authority that
would overcome the bar of collateral estoppel.
9
Revenue v. Hoover, Inc., [Ms. 2060142, August 31, 2007] ___
So. 2d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2007)), and yet the
Department's petition does not ask us to address that ground.4
Thus, even if we were to agree with the Department that
Ex parte Hoover should be overruled in light of the United
States Supreme Court's holding in United Haulers Ass'n v.
Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, ___ U.S.
___, 127 S. Ct. 1786 (2007), our doing so would not be enough
to yield the Department any relief in this proceeding.
Accordingly, while I do not agree that we must quash the writ,
I concur in the result of actually doing so.