Case Title: Muhammad v. Commonwealth

Citation: 

Docket Number: 041050

State: virginia

Court: Virginia Supreme Court

Date: 2005-04-22T00:00:00Z

Document:
Present:  All the Justices 
 
JOHN ALLEN MUHAMMAD 
 
v.  Record Nos. 041050 & 041051 
OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 
 
 
 
  
April 22, 2005 
 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 
 
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY 
LeRoy F. Millette, Judge 
 
 
In these appeals, we consider two capital murder 
convictions and two death sentences imposed upon John Allen 
Muhammad ("Muhammad"), along with his convictions for 
conspiracy to commit capital murder and the illegal use of a 
firearm in the commission of murder.  This prosecution arose 
from the investigation of a series of sixteen shootings, 
including ten murders that occurred in Alabama, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Washington, D.C., and Virginia over a 47-day period 
from September 5 to October 22, 2002.  For the reasons 
discussed herein, the judgment of the trial court and the 
sentences of death will be affirmed. 
I.  Facts and Proceedings Below 
A.  Facts 
 
On the morning of Wednesday, October 9, 2002, Dean H. 
Meyers ("Meyers") was shot and killed while fueling his car at 
the Sunoco gas station on Sudley Road in Manassas, Virginia.  
Meyers was shot in the head by a single bullet.  The bullet 
entered behind his left ear, where it fragmented into multiple 
small pieces.  The bullet fragments shattered the temporal 
bone and the fragments of bullet and bone then traveled 
through his brain and caused multiple fractures of his skull.  
This gunshot wound was consistent with injuries from a bullet 
fired from a high velocity rifle,1 and was the cause of Meyers' 
death.  Evidence at trial established that the bullet came 
from the .223 caliber Bushmaster rifle Muhammad possessed when 
he was arrested.  An eyewitness testified that she saw 
Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo ("Malvo") in the vicinity of the 
shooting approximately one hour beforehand.  Police 
interviewed Muhammad immediately after the shooting in a 
parking lot across the street from where Meyers was shot.  In 
both encounters, Muhammad was driving a Chevrolet Caprice 
("Caprice") in which he was later arrested.  Muhammad's 
fingerprints were on a map police found in the parking lot 
where Muhammad had been interviewed.   
 
Meyers was killed during a 47-day period, from September 
5 to October 22, 2002, in which ten others were murdered and 
six more suffered gunshot wounds as a result of the acts of 
                                                 
1 Throughout the trial, various witnesses and counsel made 
references to a high velocity rifle, high velocity weapon, and 
high velocity bullet, cartridge, or load.  The technical 
distinctions between these terms are insignificant to the 
analysis in this opinion. 
 
2
Muhammad and Malvo in concert.  The murder of Meyers was the 
twelfth of these sixteen shootings.   
 
The first shooting occurred in Clinton, Maryland on 
September 5, 2002.  Paul J. LaRuffa ("LaRuffa"), the owner of 
Margellina's Restaurant, left the restaurant at closing and 
proceeded to his car with his briefcase and Sony portable 
computer.  Inside the briefcase were bank deposit bags that 
contained $3,500 in cash and credit card receipts from that 
evening.  LaRuffa placed the briefcase and laptop on the 
backseat of his car, and then sat behind the steering wheel.  
He testified that, almost immediately after he sat down, he 
saw a figure to his left and a flash of light.  He heard 
gunshots and the driver's side window shattered. When he 
stepped out of his car, he realized he had been shot.  The 
trauma surgeon who treated him testified that LaRuffa was shot 
six times:  once in the back left side of his neck, three 
times in the left side of his chest, and twice in his left 
arm.   
An employee who left the restaurant with LaRuffa, Paul B. 
Hammer ("Hammer"), witnessed the shooting and called "911."  
Hammer testified that he saw a "kid" run up to LaRuffa's car, 
fire shots into it, and then open the rear door and take the 
briefcase and portable computer.  He was unable to provide a 
detailed description because of lighting conditions, but 
 
3
testified that the shooter was a male in his late teens or 
early twenties.  The briefcase and empty bank deposit bags, 
along with a pair of pants and a shirt, were found six weeks 
later in a wooded area about a mile from the shooting.  Hair 
on the clothing yielded DNA that was consistent with Malvo's 
DNA.   
Four days later, on September 9, Muhammad purchased a 
1990 Caprice automobile from Christopher M. O'Kupski 
("O'Kupski") in Trenton, New Jersey.  O'Kupski testified that 
before the purchase, Muhammad got into the trunk and lay down.  
O'Kupski also testified that, when Muhammad purchased it, the 
Caprice did not have a hole in the trunk or a passageway from 
the backseat to the trunk; the trunk was not spray-painted 
blue; and the windows were not tinted.   
 
The second shooting occurred in Clinton, Maryland on 
September 15, 2002.  Muhammad Rashid ("Rashid") was closing 
the Three Roads Liquor Store.  Rashid testified that he 
noticed the Caprice outside the store shortly before closing.  
He testified that he was in the process of locking the front 
door from the outside when he heard gunshots from behind him.  
At the same time, a young man with a handgun rushed towards 
Rashid and shot Rashid in the stomach.  At trial, Rashid 
identified Malvo as the person who shot him.  Two bullets were 
removed from inside the store.  The bullets had been shot 
 
4
through the front door and the trajectory of the bullets 
placed the shooter in a field across the street from the 
store.     
 
The third and fourth shootings occurred in Montgomery, 
Alabama on September 21, 2002.  Claudine Parker ("Parker") and 
Kelly Adams ("Adams") closed the Zelda Road ABC Liquor Store 
and walked out.  They were shot immediately.  Parker died as a 
result of a single gunshot wound that entered her back, 
transected her spinal cord, and passed through her lung.  
Adams was shot once through her neck, but lived.  The bullet 
exited through her chin, breaking her jaw in half, shattering 
her face and teeth, paralyzing her left vocal cord, and 
severing major nerves to her left shoulder.  Both gunshot 
wounds were consistent with injuries caused by a high velocity 
rifle.  Testing revealed that the bullet fragments recovered 
from the Parker shooting were fired from a Bushmaster rifle 
possessed by Muhammad when he was arrested.   
 
As the rifle shots were fired, a young man, later 
identified as Malvo, ran up to Parker and Adams.  A police car 
happened to pass the scene immediately after the shots were 
fired.  A police officer observed Malvo with a handgun.  He 
was going through the women's purses.  The officer and another 
eyewitness chased Malvo.  Although he escaped, Malvo dropped 
an "ArmorLite" gun catalogue during the chase.  At trial, both 
 
5
the officer and the other eyewitness identified Malvo as the 
young man with the handgun who fled the scene.  Additionally, 
Malvo's fingerprints were on the "ArmorLite" gun catalogue he 
dropped during the chase.  The handgun Malvo carried that 
evening, a .22 caliber stainless steel revolver, was found in 
the stairwell of an apartment building that Malvo ran through 
during the chase.  Forensic tests determined that this .22 
caliber revolver was the same gun used to shoot both LaRuffa 
and Rashid.   
 
The fifth shooting occurred in Baton Rouge, Louisiana on 
September 23.  Hong Im Ballenger ("Ballenger"), the manager of 
the Beauty Depot store, closed the store for the evening.  As 
she was walking to her car, she was shot once in the head with 
a bullet fired from a high velocity rifle.  Ballenger died as 
the result of the single shot.  The bullet entered the back of 
her head and exited through her jawbone.  The wound caused 
massive bleeding and compromised her airway.  Ballistic tests 
determined that the bullet fragments recovered from Ballenger 
were fired from the Bushmaster rifle possessed by Muhammad 
when he was arrested.  An eyewitness saw a young man leave the 
scene with Ballenger's purse.  At trial, this young man was 
identified as Malvo.  Another eyewitness saw Malvo flee the 
scene with Ballenger's purse and get into the Caprice.    
 
6
 
The sixth shooting occurred in Silver Spring, Maryland on 
October 3, 2002.  At approximately 8:15 a.m., Premkumar A. 
Walekar ("Walekar") was fueling his taxicab.  He was shot once 
with a bullet from a high velocity rifle.  The bullet passed 
through his left arm and then entered his chest, where it 
broke two ribs, shredded portions of his lungs, and damaged 
his heart.  A physician, who was fueling her car next to 
Walekar, attempted CPR but was unsuccessful.  Ballistic tests 
established that bullet fragments recovered from the Walekar 
shooting were fired from the Bushmaster rifle possessed by 
Muhammad when he was arrested.   
 
The seventh shooting occurred in Silver Spring, Maryland 
on October 3, 2002.  At approximately 8:30 a.m., Sarah Ramos 
("Ramos") was sitting on a bench in front of the Crisp & Juicy 
Restaurant in the Leisure World Shopping Center.  She was shot 
once with a bullet from a high velocity rifle.  The bullet 
entered the front of her head and exited through her spinal 
cord at the top of her neck.  An eyewitness identified the 
Caprice at the scene prior to the shooting.  Bullet fragments 
recovered from the Ramos shooting were fired from the 
Bushmaster rifle possessed by Muhammad when he was arrested.   
 
The eighth shooting occurred in Kensington, Maryland on 
October 3, 2002.  At approximately 10:00 a.m., Lori Lewis-
Rivera ("Lewis-Rivera") was vacuuming her car at the Shell gas 
 
7
station on the corner of Connecticut Avenue and Knowles 
Avenue.  She was shot once in the back by a bullet from a high 
velocity rifle as she vacuumed her car.  An eyewitness 
testified that he saw the Caprice in the vicinity of the gas 
station approximately 20 minutes before the shooting.  Bullet 
fragments recovered from the Lewis-Rivera shooting were fired 
from the Bushmaster rifle possessed by Muhammad when he was 
arrested.   
 
The ninth shooting occurred in Washington, D.C. on 
October 3, 2002.  At approximately 7:00 p.m., a police officer 
stopped Muhammad for "running" two stop signs.  The police 
officer testified that the windows of the Caprice were heavily 
tinted and that he could not see anyone else in the car.  The 
police officer gave Muhammad a verbal warning and let him go. 
At approximately 9:15 p.m. on that day, Paschal Charlot 
("Charlot") was shot in the chest as he crossed the 
intersection of Georgia Avenue and Kalmia Road.  This 
intersection was about 30 blocks from where the police officer 
stopped Muhammad.  The bullet entered Charlot's chest and 
shattered his collarbone and three ribs before lacerating his 
lungs.  Charlot died before emergency personnel arrived.  
Eyewitnesses testified that they saw the Caprice at the scene 
at the time of the shooting, and that the driver drove away 
without its headlights on immediately after the shooting.  It 
 
8
had been parked in a space on the street with its trunk 
positioned toward Georgia Avenue.  One eyewitness testified 
that he saw a flash of light from the Caprice at the time the 
shot was fired.  Ballistics tests determined that the bullet 
fragments recovered from the Charlot shooting were fired from 
the Bushmaster rifle possessed by Muhammad when he was 
arrested.   
 
The tenth shooting occurred in Fredericksburg, Virginia 
on October 4, 2002.  Caroline Seawell ("Seawell") had finished 
shopping at a Michael's Craft Store, and was putting her bags 
in her minivan, when she was shot once in the back by a bullet 
from a high velocity rifle.  The bullet severely damaged her 
liver and exited through her right breast.  Seawell survived 
the shooting.  An eyewitness testified that he saw the Caprice 
in the parking lot at the time of the shooting.  Ballistics 
tests determined that the bullet fragments recovered from the 
Seawell shooting were fired from the Bushmaster rifle 
possessed by Muhammad when he was arrested.   
 
The eleventh shooting occurred in Bowie, Maryland on 
October 6, 2002.  Tanya Brown ("Tanya") took Iran Brown 
("Brown") to Tasker Middle School.  As Brown was walking on 
the sidewalk to the school, he was shot once in the chest by a 
bullet from a high velocity rifle.  Tanya decided not to wait 
for emergency personnel and drove Brown to a health care 
 
9
center.  Brown's lungs were damaged, there was a large hole in 
his diaphragm, the left lobe of his liver was damaged, and his 
stomach, pancreas, and spleen were lacerated by bullet 
fragments.  Surgeons were able to save Brown's life and he 
spent eight weeks recovering in the hospital. 
 
Two eyewitnesses testified that they saw the Caprice in 
the vicinity of Tasker Middle School the day before the 
shooting and the morning of the shooting.  One of these 
eyewitnesses positively identified both Muhammad and Malvo in 
the Caprice the morning of the shooting.  They were seen in 
the Caprice which was parked at an intersection with a line of 
sight to the school.  Following the shooting, police searched 
the surrounding area and found a ballpoint pen and a shell 
casing in the woods next to the school.  The pen and shell 
casing were located in an area that had been patted down like 
a hunting blind.  This blind offered a clear line of sight to 
the scene of the shooting.  Tissue samples from the pen 
matched Muhammad's DNA.  The shell casing had been fired by 
the Bushmaster rifle possessed by Muhammad when he was 
arrested, and tests determined that the bullet fragments 
recovered from Brown were fired from that rifle.   
 
In the woods, police also found the first communication 
from Muhammad and Malvo.  A tarot card, the one for death, was 
found with handwriting that stated, "Call me God."  On the 
 
10
back of the card was handwriting that stated, "For you, Mr. 
Police.  Code:  Call me God.  Do not release to the Press."   
 
The twelfth shooting, discussed above, was the murder of 
Dean Meyers in Manassas, Virginia on October 9, 2002. 
 
The thirteenth shooting occurred in Massaponax, Virginia 
on October 11, 2002.  Kenneth Bridges ("Bridges") was at an 
Exxon gas station on Jefferson Davis Highway.  He was shot 
once in the chest by a bullet from a high velocity rifle.  The 
bullet damaged his lungs and heart, causing fatal internal 
injuries.  Two eyewitnesses testified that they saw the 
Caprice at or near the Exxon station on the morning of the 
shooting.  Ballistics tests determined that the bullet 
fragments recovered from the Bridges shooting were fired from 
the Bushmaster rifle possessed by Muhammad when he was 
arrested.   
 
The fourteenth shooting occurred in Falls Church, 
Virginia on October 14, 2002.  Linda Franklin ("Franklin") and 
her husband were shopping at a Home Depot store.  As they 
loaded their purchases in their car, Franklin was shot and 
killed by a single bullet from a high velocity rifle.  The 
bullet entered the left side of her head, passed through her 
brain and skull, and exited from the right side of her head.  
An off-duty police officer testified that she saw Malvo 
driving the Caprice in the vicinity of the shooting 
 
11
immediately after it occurred.  Tests determined that bullet 
fragments recovered from the Franklin shooting were fired from 
the Bushmaster rifle possessed by Muhammad when he was 
arrested.   
 
On October 15, the day after Franklin was murdered, a 
Rockville, Maryland police dispatcher received a telephone 
call in which the caller stated: 
Don't say anything, just listen, we're the 
people who are causing the killings in 
your area.  Look on the tarot card, it 
says, "call me God, do not release to 
press."  We've called you three times 
before trying to set up negotiations.  
We've gotten no response.  People have 
died.   
 
The dispatcher attempted to transfer the call to the Sniper 
Task Force, but the caller hung up.   
Three days later, on October 18, Officer Derek Baliles 
("Officer Baliles"), a Montgomery County, Maryland Police 
Information Officer, received a telephone call.  The caller 
told Officer Baliles to "shut up" and stated that he knew who 
was doing the shootings, but wanted the police officer to 
verify some information before he talked further.  The caller 
told Officer Baliles to verify information concerning a 
shooting at a liquor store near "Ann Street."  The caller gave 
Officer Baliles the name and telephone number of a police 
officer in Alabama.  Officer Baliles confirmed the shootings 
 
12
of Parker and Adams.  The caller called Officer Baliles again.  
Officer Baliles told him that he had verified the information 
concerning the shootings of Parker and Adams.  The caller then 
said that he had to find more coins for the call and had to 
find a telephone without surveillance and then hung up.    
On the same day, William Sullivan ("Sullivan"), a priest 
in Ashland, Virginia, received a telephone call from two 
people.  The first voice, a male, told him someone wanted to 
speak with him.  Sullivan testified that a second male voice, 
told him that "the lady didn't have to die," and "it was at 
the Home Depot."  The second voice also told him about a 
shooting at a liquor store in Alabama and then said, "Mr. 
Policeman, I am God.  Do not tell the press."  The second 
voice concluded by telling Sullivan to give this information 
to the police.  
The fifteenth shooting occurred in Ashland, Virginia on 
October 19, 2002.  Jeffrey Hopper ("Hopper") and his wife 
stopped in Ashland to fuel their car and eat dinner.  They 
left the restaurant and were walking to their car when Hopper 
was shot in the abdomen.  Hopper survived the shooting, but 
underwent five surgeries to repair his pancreas, stomach, 
kidneys, liver, diaphragm, and intestines.  In the woods near 
the shooting, police found a hunting-type blind similar to the 
one found at the Brown shooting.  At the blind, police found a 
 
13
shell casing, a plastic sandwich bag attached to a tree with a 
thumbtack at eye level that was decorated with Halloween 
characters and self-adhesive stars, and a candy wrapper.  
Tests determined that the shell casing and bullet fragments 
recovered from the Hopper shooting came from the Bushmaster 
rifle possessed by Muhammad when he was arrested.  
Surveillance videotapes identified Muhammad in a Big Lots 
Store on October 19, 2002 near the shooting from which the 
plastic sandwich bag and decorations were likely obtained.  
The candy wrapper contained both Malvo's and Muhammad's DNA.   
Police also found a handwritten message in the plastic 
sandwich bag that read:  
For you Mr. Police.  "Call me God."  
Do not release to the Press. 
We have tried to contact you to start 
negotiation . . . These people took our 
call for a Hoax or Joke, so your failure 
to respond has cost you five lives. 
If stopping the killing is more 
important than catching us now, then you 
will accept our demand which are non-
negotiable. 
(i)  You will place ten million 
dollar in Bank of america account . . .  
We will have unlimited withdrawl at any 
atm worldwide.  You will activate the bank 
account, credit card, and pin number.  We 
will contact you at Ponderosa Buffet, 
Ashland, Virginia, tel. # . . . 6:00 am 
Sunday Morning.  You have until 9:00 a.m. 
Monday morning to complete transaction.  
"Try to catch us withdrawing at least you 
will have less body bags." 
(ii)  If trying to catch us now more 
important then prepare you body bags. 
 
14
If we give you our word that is what 
takes place. 
"Word is Bond." 
P.S.  Your children are not safe 
anywhere at anytime. 
 
The note was not found until after the deadline had passed.  
The day after Hopper was shot at the Ponderosa, an FBI agent 
operating the "Sniper Tip Line" received a call from a young 
male who said, "Don't talk.  Just listen.  Call me God.  I 
left a message for you at the Ponderosa.  I am trying to reach 
you at the Ponderosa.  Be there to take a call in ten 
minutes." 
 
On October 21, 2002, an FBI agent received a call to the 
FBI negotiations team which had been re-routed from the 
Ponderosa telephone number referenced in the note left after 
the Hopper shooting.  A recorded voice stated: 
Don't say anything.  Just listen.  Dearest 
police, Call me God.  Do not release to the 
press.  Five red stars.  You have our terms.  
They are non-negotiable.  If you choose Option 
1, you will hold a press conference stating to 
the media that you believe you have caught the 
sniper like a duck in a noose.  Repeat every 
word exactly as you heard it.  If you choose 
Option 2, be sure to remember we will not 
deviate.  P.S. – Your children are not safe. 
 
The sixteenth shooting occurred in Aspen Hill, Maryland 
on October 22, 2002.  At approximately 6:00 a.m., Conrad 
Johnson ("Johnson"), a bus driver for the Montgomery County 
Transit Authority, was shot in the chest at the entrance to 
 
15
his bus.  Johnson remained conscious until rescue workers 
arrived, but died at the hospital.  A single high velocity 
rifle bullet killed Johnson.  The bullet entered his right 
chest, and caused massive damage to his diaphragm, liver, 
pancreas, kidneys, and intestines.  Tests determined that the 
bullet fragments recovered from the Johnson shooting were 
fired from the Bushmaster rifle possessed by Muhammad when he 
was arrested.  A hunting-type blind, similar to those found at 
the Brown and Hopper shootings, was found in the woods near 
where Johnson was shot.  A black duffle bag and a left-handed 
glove were found.  A hair from the duffle bag yielded DNA that 
matched Muhammad's DNA.  The police also found another plastic 
sandwich bag which contained a note and self-adhesive stars. 
Muhammad and Malvo were captured and arrested on October 
24, 2002, by agents of the FBI at a rest area in Frederick 
County, Maryland.  They were asleep in the Caprice at the time 
of their capture.  Inside the Caprice, police found a loaded 
.223 caliber Bushmaster rifle behind the rear seat.  Tests 
determined that the DNA on the Bushmaster rifle matched the 
DNA of both Malvo and Muhammad.  The only fingerprints found 
on the Bushmaster rifle were those of Malvo. 
The Caprice had been modified after Muhammad purchased it 
from O'Kupski.  The windows were heavily tinted.  The rear 
seat was hinged, providing easy access to the trunk from the 
 
16
passenger compartment.  The trunk was spray-painted blue.  A 
hole had been cut into the trunk lid, just above the license 
plate.  The hole was blocked by a right-handed brown glove 
that matched the left-handed glove found in the woods near the 
Johnson shooting.  The trunk also had a rubber seal that 
crossed over the hole. 
Inside the Caprice, police found a global positioning 
system (GPS) receiver, a magazine about rifles, an AT&T 
telephone charge card, ear plugs, maps, plastic sandwich bags, 
a rifle scope, .223 caliber ammunition, "walkie-talkies," a 
digital voice recorder, a receipt from a Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana grocery store dated September 27, 2002, an 
electronic organizer, a plastic bag from a Big Lots Store, a 
slip of paper containing the Sniper Task Force phone number, 
and a list of schools in the Baltimore area. 
Police also found LaRuffa's portable computer in the 
Caprice.  Muhammad had loaded software entitled "Microsoft 
Streets and Trips 2002" onto this computer on September 29, 
2002.  In this program, there were various maps showing 
particular routes and places marked with icons, some with a 
skull and crossbones.  Icons had been added to mark the places 
where Walekar, Lewis-Rivera, Seawell, Brown, Meyers and 
Franklin were shot.  There was also a Microsoft Word file 
 
17
titled "Allah8.rtf" that contained portions of the text 
communicated to police in the extortion demands. 
B.  Proceedings Below 
 
Subsequent to his arrest on October 24, 2002, Muhammad 
was indicted by a grand jury on October 28, 2002, for the 
capital murder of Meyers in the commission of an act of 
terrorism, Code §§ 18.2-31(13) and 18.2-46.4; capital murder 
of Meyers and at least one other person within a three-year 
period, Code § 18.2-31(8); conspiracy to commit capital 
murder, Code §§ 18.2-22 and 18.2-32; and illegal use of a 
firearm in the commission of capital murder, Code § 18.2-53.1. 
 
Muhammad waived his right to a speedy trial on November 
13, 2002.  Upon motion by Muhammad, and without objection by 
the Commonwealth, venue was changed from the Circuit Court of 
Prince William County to the Circuit Court of the City of 
Virginia Beach. 
 
From October 20 through November 17, 2003, Muhammad was 
tried before a jury in the Circuit Court of the City of 
Virginia Beach.  The jury convicted Muhammad of all charges in 
the grand jury indictments.  In a separate sentencing 
proceeding from November 17 through November 24, 2003, the 
jury sentenced Muhammad to two death sentences for the capital 
murder convictions, finding both the future dangerousness and 
vileness aggravating factors.  The jury also sentenced 
 
18
Muhammad to 13 years in prison upon the remaining convictions.  
At the conclusion of the sentencing proceeding, venue was 
transferred back to the Circuit Court of Prince William 
County. 
 
On March 9, 2004, the trial court imposed the two death 
sentences and the sentences of imprisonment as fixed by the 
jury.  A final sentencing order was entered on March 29, 2004. 
Muhammad noted appeals of his convictions.  On May 7, 
2004, this Court certified Muhammad's appeals of his non-
capital convictions under Code § 17.1-409 for consolidation 
with the appeals of his capital murder convictions and the 
review mandated by Code § 17.1-313. 
We will recite additional facts and incidents of trial as 
necessary in context as specific assignments of error are 
considered. 
II.  Preliminary Issues 
A.  Issues Abandoned or Waived 
 
Muhammad advances 102 assignments of error in his appeal.  
The Commonwealth maintains that Muhammad failed to 
sufficiently argue in his brief assignments of error 33, 34, 
43, 45, 47, 52, 53, 68, 70, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 88, and 96. 
Rules 5:17(c)(4) and 5:27 require that a brief contain "[t]he 
principles of law, the argument, and the authorities relating 
to each assignment of error," and further require that "[w]ith 
 
19
respect to each assignment of error, the principles, the 
argument, and the authorities shall be stated in one place and 
not scattered through the petition."   In his reply brief, 
Muhammad contests the Commonwealth's assertion only as to 
assignments of error 43, 52, 78, 79, 80, 81, and 83.2  
Accordingly, assignments of error 33, 34, 45, 47, 53, 68, 70, 
82, 88, and 96 are waived.  Consequently, we will consider 
only assignments of error 43, 52, 78, 79, 80 and 83 as being 
in controversy. 
Assignment of error 43 pertains to the admission of crime 
scene and autopsy photographs.  Assignment of error 52 refers 
to testimony of Officer Cindy Martin concerning her 
observations of "brain matter" at the scene of the Ramos  
shooting.  With respect to both of these assignments, there is 
insufficient argument in the brief.  Having been directed by 
Muhammad to particular page citations where he claims to have 
presented these arguments, we agree with the Commonwealth's 
observation that Muhammad merely restates his assignment of 
error and makes reference to pages in the appendix where his 
trial court arguments can be found.  We have previously held 
that such a practice is improper and is insufficient to meet 
the requirements of our Rules.  Schmitt v. Commonwealth, 262 
                                                 
2 The Commonwealth did not claim that Muhammad waived 
assignment of error 81. 
 
20
Va. 127, 138, 547 S.E.2d 186, 194 (2001), cert. denied, 534 
U.S. 1094 (2002).  Failure to adequately brief an assignment 
of error is considered a waiver.  Powell v. Commonwealth, 267 
Va. 107, 135, 590 S.E.2d 537, 554, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 
125 S.Ct. 86 (2004).  Therefore, assignments 43 and 52 are 
deemed waived. 
The remaining assignments of error claimed by the 
Commonwealth to be waived by lack of argument pertain to 
unadjudicated criminal conduct evidence presented at the 
bifurcated sentencing proceeding.  Assignment of error 78 
refers to evidence of the killing of Kenya Cook in Tacoma, 
Washington.  Assignment of error 79 refers to a shooting into 
Temple Beth El Synagogue in Tacoma, Washington.  Assignment of 
error 80 refers to testimony about the presence of a .308 
caliber rifle found pointing to a particular apartment in 
Tacoma, Washington.  Assignment of error 83 refers to evidence 
of a sharpened spoon handle in Muhammad's cell in the Prince 
William County jail. 
For each of these assignments of error related to 
unadjudicated criminal conduct, Muhammad cites pages in the 
section of his brief entitled "Statement of Facts" and one 
page in the "Argument" section of his brief.  The references 
in the "Statement of Facts" are to arguments made in the trial 
proceeding.  Even giving Muhammad the benefit of examining 
 
21
additional pages of his brief not referred to as the location 
of his argument, Muhammad does not make particularized 
arguments in his brief concerning each of the categories of 
evidence he finds objectionable, except for evidence of the 
alleged escape attempt contained in assignment of error 81, 
which the Commonwealth agrees was not waived.  Assignments of 
error 80 and 83 raise issues of lack of notice of presentation 
of unadjudicated criminal conduct; however, there is no 
argument of the question in the brief itself.  Assignments of 
error 78, 79, 80, and 83 are not sufficiently argued in the 
brief.  We will not consider them.  Rule 5:17(c)(4); Rule 
5:27; Elliott v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 396, 422, 593 S.E.2d 
270, 286 (2004), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 875 
(2005); Williams v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 528, 537, 450 S.E.2d 
365, 372 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1161 (1995). 
B.  Sufficiency of the Commonwealth's Capital Murder 
 Theories and of the Evidence to Support These Theories 
 
 
We first address the dominant issue presented in this 
case, namely the legal viability of the Commonwealth's 
theories of capital murder and the sufficiency of the evidence 
to support its theories.  Muhammad's assignments of error 63–
69, 71-74, 97, and 102, present these issues.  We review 
questions of law, and mixed questions of law and fact, 
utilizing a de novo standard of review.  Quatannens v. 
 
22
Tyrrell, 268 Va. 360, 365, 601 S.E.2d 616, 618 (2004), McCain 
v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 489-90, 545 S.E.2d 541, 545 
(2001). 
In accordance with established principles of appellate 
review, we state the facts in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court.  We 
also accord the Commonwealth the benefit of all inferences 
fairly deducible from the evidence.  Riner v. Commonwealth, 
268 Va. 296, 303-04, 601 S.E.2d 555, 558-59 (2004), Armstrong 
v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 573, 576, 562 S.E.2d 139, 140 (2002); 
Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 
534, 537 (1975). 
There is no distinction in the law between the weight or 
value to be given to either direct or circumstantial evidence.  
The finder of fact is entitled to consider all the evidence, 
without distinction, in reaching its determination.  
Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 512-13, 578 S.E.2d 781, 
785, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 972 (2003).  Circumstantial 
evidence is not viewed in isolation.  While no single piece of 
evidence may be sufficient, the combined force of many 
concurrent and related circumstances, each insufficient in 
itself, may lead a reasonable mind irresistibly to a 
conclusion.  Id. at 514, 578 S.E.2d at 786.  We will set aside 
the judgment only if it is clearly wrong or unsupported by the 
 
23
evidence.  Powell v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 233, 236, 602 
S.E.2d 119, 120-21 (2004). 
The jury found Muhammad guilty of capital murder under 
two separate provisions of Virginia law: Code § 18.2-31(8) for 
the "willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of more 
than one person within a three-year period;" and Code § 18.2-
31(13) for the "willful, deliberate and premeditated killing 
of any person by another in the commission of or attempted 
commission of an act of terrorism."  Among the challenges 
made, Muhammad argues that the trial court erred in permitting 
a legally flawed "triggerman" theory to be presented to the 
jury as a result of various rulings and instructions.  
Muhammad further argues that, even under the Commonwealth's 
theory, the evidence was insufficient to prove that he was the 
so-called "triggerman."  Also, Muhammad challenges the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support his capital murder 
conviction based upon acts of terrorism.  His constitutional 
challenges to the capital murder statute based upon terrorism 
are addressed elsewhere in this opinion. 
1. Capital Murder Conviction Based Upon 
Murder of More Than One Person in Three Years 
 
(a) Sniper Team Theory 
 
 
The Commonwealth introduced the testimony of Sergeant 
Major Mark Spicer ("Spicer") of the British Armed Forces as an 
 
24
expert in sniper methodology.  His testimony and the direct 
and circumstantial evidence presented to the jury are more 
than sufficient to support, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
Muhammad's conviction for the capital murder of Dean Meyers 
and others within three years. 
Spicer testified that "sniping is the ability of two men 
to go out and inflict injuries or kill people and more 
importantly spread terror across a much larger force."  While 
acknowledging that a sniper can act alone or in a team of 
three, he stated, "the basic unit for a sniper team . . . is 
. . . a two-man unit."  Spicer testified at length about the 
distinct responsibilities of each member of a two-man sniper 
unit.  Essentially, one member of the team is the long-range 
shooter occupying an obscured position with the opportunity to 
shoot a particular victim.  Because of the intensity and 
discipline required to take advantage of the narrow window of 
opportunity to take the long-range shot, the other member of 
the team, the "spotter," informs the long-range shooter by 
radio that the victim is coming within the zone of potential 
fire and that other circumstances are ripe for the shot.  The 
"spotter" may ultimately give the order to shoot. 
 
Spicer connected the evidence found by police 
investigators in this case to the tools and methods ordinarily 
used by a sniper team.  The .223 caliber Bushmaster rifle used 
 
25
in at least ten of the shootings, including Dean Meyers, is 
equivalent to the M4 rifle used by military snipers.  
Additionally, sniper teams use tools such as those found in 
the Caprice:  a bipod support system for support of the rifle; 
holographic and telescopic scopes to aid sighting; GPS 
equipment to locate and relocate a vantage point for the long-
range shot; "walkie-talkie" handheld radio sets for 
communication; pocket recording equipment for recording data 
in the dark, bungee cords for easy "break down" of the rifle 
for transportation; maps; silencers. 
 
Spicer also testified about the methodology of a sniper 
team which was supported by the evidence in this case.  Spicer 
emphasized the constant training with the rifle to maintain 
skills, the creation of a camouflaged location for firing, the 
use of existing traffic to facilitate escape, and the "team" 
approach with a "spotter" who is armed with a handgun and may 
additionally participate in the assault by firing from close 
range. 
With regard to the Caprice, Spicer testified about the 
alterations made to it to facilitate the methodology of the 
sniper team.  The rear firewall had been removed from the 
Caprice to provide entry into the trunk from the passenger 
compartment.  The trunk compartment had been spray-painted a 
 
26
dark color to minimize contrast and shadow to avoid detection 
in the event the trunk was opened. 
Finally, Spicer gave particular significance to the 
peculiar hole placed in the back of the trunk lid that 
enlarged the field of vision while minimizing the ability to 
see the person in the trunk.  He referred to this special 
process as implementing the "castle principle" making 
reference to ancient methods of protecting the castle while 
minimizing danger to the shooter and maximizing the range of 
fire. 
 
The Commonwealth presented compelling evidence that such 
a sniper team methodology was used by Muhammad and Malvo in 
multiple shootings prior to and after the murder of Dean 
Myers.  Perhaps no one or two incidents could reasonably 
confirm the use of this methodology by the two perpetrators of 
this unique criminal enterprise.  But in its entirety, the 
weight of the direct and circumstantial evidence in the case 
is sufficient to prove that Muhammad and Malvo acted together 
as a sniper team. 
(b) Jury Instructions on Multiple Homicide 
 Theory of Capital Murder 
 
Muhammad was convicted under Code § 18.2-31(8), of the 
willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of Dean Meyers 
and others within a three-year period.  He maintains, "Only 
 
27
the immediate perpetrator of a homicide, the one who fired the 
fatal shot, and not an accessory before the fact or a 
principal in the second degree, may be convicted of capital 
murder."  He claims that under the Commonwealth's theory of 
the case, Muhammad could never be the "triggerman" as defined 
in our cases.   
 
It is well-established that in felony cases: 
 
A principal in the first degree is the actual 
perpetrator of the crime.  A principal in the 
second degree, or an aider or abettor as he is 
sometimes termed, is one who is present, 
actually or constructively, assisting the 
perpetrator in the commission of the crime.  
In order to make a person a principal in the 
second degree actual participation in the 
commission of the crime is not necessary.  The 
test is whether or not he was encouraging, 
inciting, or in some manner offering aid in 
the commission of the crime.  If he was 
present lending countenance, or otherwise 
aiding while another did the act, he is an 
aider and abettor or principal in the second 
degree.  
 
Jones v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 370, 372-73, 157 S.E.2d 907, 
909 (1967).  A principal in the second degree "must share the 
criminal intent of the actual perpetrator or be guilty of some 
overt act."  Hall v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 533, 536, 303 
S.E.2d 903, 904 (1983).  That there may be more than one 
principal in the first degree for a particular offense is 
beyond dispute: 
Where two people engage in criminal conduct 
together, as where they participate in 
 
28
striking and killing another, each participant 
is a principal in the first degree in the 
homicide. Likewise, where part of a crime is 
committed in one place and another part is 
committed in a different place, the author of 
each part is a principal in the first degree. 
 
1 Wharton's Criminal Law § 30 (15th ed. 1993). 
 
 
Generally in Virginia, a principal in the second degree 
is subject to the same punishment as the principal in the 
first degree.  Taylor v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 683, 687-88, 
537 S.E.2d 592, 594 (2000).  However, with the exception of 
capital murder prosecutions for a killing for hire, or a 
killing pursuant to the direction or order of one who is 
engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise, or a killing 
pursuant to the direction or order of one who is engaged in 
the commission of or attempted commission of an act of 
terrorism, "an accessory before the fact or principal in the 
second degree to a capital murder shall be indicted, tried, 
convicted and punished as though the offense were murder in 
the first degree."  Code § 18.2-18.  Accordingly, pursuant to 
the charge of capital murder based upon killing of two or more 
persons within a three-year period, the Commonwealth must 
prove that Muhammad was a principal in the first degree. 
 
The euphemism, "triggerman," is inadequate to describe 
the breadth of criminal responsibility subject to the death 
penalty in Virginia.  Immediately and obviously, capital 
 
29
murder cases are not confined to murders completed by the 
instrumentality of a firearm.  Recognizing this inadequacy, 
our capital murder cases routinely use the term "immediate 
perpetrator" as the appropriate descriptive term.  The term is 
not new, having been used as early as 1880 in our case law.  
Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. (33 Gratt.) 845, 868 (1880). 
Muhammad argues in assignments of error 66 and 69 that 
the trial court erred in giving instructions 4 (capital murder 
finding instruction) and 9 (defining principals in the first 
and second degree), and further argues in assignments of error 
71 and 73 that the trial court erred in refusing to give his 
proffered instruction J (concerning multiple killings) and L 
(concerning the definition of a principal in the first and 
principal in the second degree).  Muhammad's quarrel with the 
instructions is a function of his disagreement over the scope 
of the concept of "immediate perpetrator" for the purposes of 
the capital murder statutes.  He further argues that the 
instructions at issue confuse the concept of principal in the 
first degree with the requirements of principal in the second 
degree and undermine the concept of "aiding and abetting."  
Instruction 4 required Muhammad to be a "princip[al] in 
the first degree, as defined in Instruction No. 9" for the 
jury to convict for capital murder.  The pertinent part of 
Instruction 9 states: 
 
30
A principal in the first degree is the 
immediate perpetrator of the offense. 
Where two or more persons take a direct 
part in inflicting fatal injuries, each joint 
participant is an immediate perpetrator for 
the purpose of proving capital murder. 
The principal in the second degree is a 
person who is present, aiding and abetting, by 
helping in some way in the commission of the 
crime.  Presence and consent alone are not 
sufficient to constitute aiding and abetting.  
It must be shown the Defendant, John Allen 
Muhammad, intended his word, gestures, signals 
or actions to in some way, encourage, advise 
or urge, or in some way help the person 
committing the crime commit it . . . . 
 
In Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482, 404 S.E.2d 
227, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 944 (1991), we reviewed a capital 
murder conviction wherein the "Commonwealth's theory of the 
case was that Strickler and Henderson had acted jointly to 
accomplish the actual killing" of the victim by crushing her 
skull with a 69-pound rock.  Id. at 494, 404 S.E.2d at 235.  
The evidence was consistent with the Commonwealth's argument 
that one of the two men held the victim immobile while the 
other dropped or threw the rock on her head.  Citing Coppola 
v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 256-57, 257 S.E.2d 797, 806 
(1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1103 (1980), where we held that 
a defendant who "jointly participated in [a] fatal beating" 
was subject to conviction and punishment for capital murder, 
we restated the rule of culpability for capital murder as 
follows: 
 
31
We adhere to the view that where two or more 
persons take a direct part in inflicting fatal 
injuries, each joint participant is an 
"immediate perpetrator" for the purposes of 
the capital murder statutes. 
 
Strickler, 241 Va. at 495, 404 S.E.2d at 235.  This rule has 
been reaffirmed in several cases since Strickler.  See Lenz v. 
Warden, 265 Va. 373, 381, 579 S.E.2d 194, 199 (2003); 
Remington v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 333, 349-50, 551 S.E.2d 
620, 630 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1062 (2002); Williams, 
248 Va. at 545, 450 S.E.2d at 376; Hancock v. Commonwealth, 12 
Va. App. 774, 779-81, 407 S.E.2d 301, 304-05 (1991). 
In Lenz and Remington, two criminal actors were immediate 
perpetrators because they "jointly participated in the fatal 
stabbing."  Remington, 262 Va. at 350, 551 S.E.2d at 630.  
Another category of multiple actors who may be immediate 
perpetrators was established in Strickler.  The Court held 
that the evidence supported the Commonwealth's theory that one 
actor held the victim while the other actor dropped a large 
rock on her head.  We observed that "it would have been 
necessary that she be held down by one assailant while the 
other lifted the rock and dropped it on her head."  Strickler, 
241 Va. at 494, 404 S.E.2d at 235.  As established in 
Strickler, conduct of two criminal actors may be such that 
they jointly complete the criminal act.  It is not a matter of 
encouraging, advising, urging, or facilitating another in the 
 
32
commission of the crime.  It is the actual participation 
together in a unified act that permits two or more persons to 
be immediate perpetrators.  In Strickler, the Commonwealth 
advanced its theory concerning how the murder was 
accomplished.  Our review on appeal considered whether the 
evidence supported the theory. 
Similarly, we must consider the evidence in support of 
the Commonwealth's theory of how Muhammad and Malvo acted 
together in the murder of Dean Meyers.  Spicer's expert 
testimony, the evidence recovered from the Caprice, the 
evidence from the 16 shootings, and the additional evidence 
concerning Malvo and Muhammad's relationship and activities 
support the Commonwealth's theory of the case.  Muhammad and 
Malvo and the Caprice were identified in the immediate 
vicinity of Dean Meyers' murder approximately one hour before 
it occurred.  Immediately after the murder, Muhammad was 
identified in the parking lot across the street from where 
Meyers was shot.  Muhammad was driving the Caprice in which he 
and Malvo were later arrested.  Ballistics tests determined 
that the bullet that killed Meyers was shot from the .223 
caliber Bushmaster rifle found in the Caprice with Muhammad 
and Malvo when they were arrested.  The Caprice was located in 
a position providing a direct line of fire to accomplish the 
murder.  Significantly, the shot from the parking lot had to 
 
33
cross nine lanes of traffic on a heavily traveled highway at 
approximately 8:15 p.m. on a weekday evening.  With the 
relatively small portal offered by the hole in the trunk of 
the Caprice and the obstacle presented by nine traffic lanes, 
the evidence supports the Commonwealth's theory of a "shooter" 
and a "spotter" and the direction by the spotter to shoot at 
the opportune time.  As in Strickler, we review the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth to determine 
if it is sufficient to support the Commonwealth's theory.  241 
Va. at 485, 404 S.E.2d at 230.  Upon review of that evidence, 
we cannot say that the trial court was plainly wrong or 
without evidence to support its judgment. 
The jury instructions given by the trial court accurately 
conveyed applicable law without confusion to the jury.  
Furthermore, Instructions J and L offered by Muhammad did not 
embrace a correct definition of immediate perpetrator and were 
properly refused by the trial court. 
The theory of the Commonwealth concerning multiple 
immediate perpetrators acting as principals in the first 
degree accurately encompasses Virginia law.  The jury 
instructions in question properly instructed the jury on the 
law and the facts of the case.  
2.  Capital Murder in the Commission 
 of an Act of Terrorism 
 
 
34
(a)  Sufficiency of Evidence 
 
Muhammad was also convicted of capital murder pursuant to 
Code § 18.2-31(13) for the willful, deliberate, and 
premeditated killing of Dean Meyers in the commission of an 
act of terrorism as defined in Code § 18.2-46.4.  Code § 18.2-
46.4 defines an "act of terrorism" as 
an act of violence as defined in clause (i) of 
subdivision A of § 19.2-297.1 committed with 
the intent to (i) intimidate the civilian 
population at large; or (ii) influence the 
conduct or activities of the government of the 
United States, a state or locality through 
intimidation. 
 
Code § 19.2-297.1 includes, among the acts of violence the 
offenses of first and second degree murder, voluntary 
manslaughter, malicious wounding, and robbery.  Additionally, 
Code § 18.2-18 provides that a person convicted of capital 
murder under Code § 18.2-31(13) is not required to be a 
principal in the first degree to the murder if the killing was 
"pursuant to the direction or order of the one who is engaged 
in the commission of . . . an act of terrorism." 
 
Significantly, Muhammad does not contest the sufficiency 
of evidence to support the charge that acts of violence 
committed by him and Malvo were done with the intent to 
"intimidate the civilian population at large" or to "influence 
the conduct or activities of the government of the United 
States, a state or locality through intimidation."  Rather, he 
 
35
challenges his conviction for capital murder based upon the 
terrorism predicate by attacking the validity of the statute, 
constitutionally and otherwise, and by challenging the 
sufficiency of the evidence that he "directed" or "ordered" 
Malvo with respect to the killing of Dean Meyers.  We will 
consider Muhammad's challenge to the validity of the statute 
elsewhere in this opinion. 
 
The Commonwealth argues that the evidence is sufficient 
to support two separate evidentiary theories upon which 
Muhammad's conviction for capital murder in the commission of 
an act of terrorism is based.  One theory is based upon 
Muhammad committing the murder of Dean Meyers as a principal 
in the first degree because he is an immediate perpetrator of 
the crime.  The second evidentiary theory is based upon 
Muhammad giving a direction or order to Malvo to kill Dean 
Meyers.  Either or both theories are sufficient to sustain the 
proof necessary to affirm Muhammad's conviction for capital 
murder in the commission of an act of terrorism. 
 
As stated above, the proof is sufficient to establish 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Muhammad acted as a principal 
in the first degree, as an immediate perpetrator, in the death 
of Dean Meyers.  The "sniper theory" advanced by the 
Commonwealth is supported through Spicer's expert testimony, 
the ample evidence of such a methodology, and our prior 
 
36
decisions.  As an immediate perpetrator of the death of Dean 
Meyers in a murder that qualifies as an act of violence under 
Code § 19.2-297.1, Muhammad was a principal in the first 
degree in the "willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing 
of [a] person . . . in the commission . . . of an act of 
terrorism."  Code § 18.2-31(13). 
 
Additionally, the combined weight of direct and 
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain Muhammad's 
conviction even if he is considered to have been a criminal 
actor in the second degree who gave an order or direction to 
Malvo to kill Dean Meyers.  Malvo and Muhammad were seen in 
the Caprice in the vicinity of Meyers' shooting approximately 
one hour beforehand.  The Caprice was the same vehicle in 
which Muhammad and Malvo were arrested.  It was altered to 
provide access to the trunk from the inside and a portal for 
firing a rifle through the trunk lid.  Muhammad was 
interviewed by police immediately after the shooting in a 
parking lot across the street from where Meyers was shot.  
Malvo was not seen at the parking lot.  There was a direct 
line of fire between the parking lot and the Sunoco station 
where Meyers was shot.  Between the parking lot and the site 
where Meyers was shot were nine traffic lanes.  The evidence 
shows that Malvo and Muhammad possessed the .223 caliber 
Bushmaster rifle, mittens with open fingers, a GPS receiver, 
 
37
earplugs, maps, rifle scopes, "walkie-talkies," a voice 
recorder, an electronic organizer, and other evidence 
previously described.  The evidence proves that the bullet 
that killed Dean Meyers came from the .223 caliber Bushmaster 
rifle in the possession of Muhammad and Malvo when they were 
arrested.  The evidence also contains direct or circumstantial 
proof of instances where the two men committed similar crimes 
together. 
 
Muhammad and Malvo were seen nearby in the Caprice 
immediately before the murder of Dean Meyers.  Only Muhammad 
was seen immediately afterward.  The weight of the evidence 
supports the conclusion that either Muhammad or Malvo fired 
the fatal shot that killed Dean Meyers.  If it was Muhammad, 
he is a principal in the first degree, with or without the 
sniper theory advanced by the Commonwealth.  The evidence more 
reasonably proves that Malvo was the shooter and was in the 
converted trunk when Muhammad was interviewed in the parking 
lot immediately after the murder. 
 
The circumstances of this murder are consistent with the 
expert testimony concerning a two-man sniper team.  As Spicer 
testified, the "spotter" sets up the shot at a position safe 
from view yet within range of the target.  In this case, the 
relatively limited range of the shooter in the trunk of the 
car requires split-second timing to successfully hit a target 
 
38
that quickly comes into range and just as quickly moves out of 
range.  This abbreviated window of opportunity is made all the 
more difficult by nine lanes of traffic passing between the 
shooter and the target.  According to Spicer, the job of the 
spotter is to communicate with the shooter, give the order or 
direction, and then to provide an undetected getaway.  
 
Furthermore, the record is replete with evidence that 
Muhammad directed and ordered Malvo in the entire criminal 
enterprise.  As the Commonwealth argued based upon evidence 
presented: 
It was Muhammad who brought Malvo to this 
country from Jamaica.  It was Muhammad who had 
the military background in shooting and 
snipering skills and who trained Malvo.  It 
was Muhammad who provided the weapons. It was 
Muhammad who was determined to terrorize his 
ex-wife's area of the country. It was Muhammad 
who was the "father" and Malvo who was the 
"son." All the evidence about their 
relationship – from the Lighthouse Mission and 
friends in Washington state to Muhammad's 
cousin in Baton Rouge and the YMCA personnel 
in Maryland – consistently showed Muhammad 
directing and ordering Malvo's conduct.  
Everyone who saw them together observed that 
Malvo was extremely obedient to Muhammad, not 
the other way around. 
 
On this issue, the trial court held that there was 
"overwhelming circumstantial evidence regarding [Muhammad's] 
direction and ordering of Mr. Malvo."  Upon review of the 
evidence, we cannot say that the trial court was clearly wrong 
 
39
or without evidence to support this conclusion.  Powell, 268 
Va. at 236, 602 S.E.2d at 120-21. 
 
We hold that Muhammad was an immediate perpetrator and as 
such was a principal in the first degree in the commission of 
capital murder during the commission of an act of terrorism.  
We further hold that the evidence proves that Muhammad gave a 
direction or order sufficient to satisfy the requirements of 
Code § 18.2-18 such that even if he were a criminal actor 
ordinarily demonstrating culpability as a principal in the 
second degree, he is nonetheless guilty of capital murder 
under Code §§ 18.2-31(13) and 18.2-18. 
(b)  Jury Instructions on the 
 Terrorism Capital Offense 
 
 
Muhammad maintains that it was error for the trial court 
to give Instructions 5 and 6 and to refuse his Instructions K 
and M. (Assignments of Error 67, 68, 72, 74).  Assignment of 
error 68 regarding instruction 6 has been waived for failure 
to brief the issue.  Upon review of the evidence and the 
instruction, we hold that the trial court did not err in 
granting instruction 5.  With respect to Muhammad's proffered 
instructions K and M, he states in his brief only that they 
properly addressed the terrorism issues.  There is no argument 
concerning why it would be error to refuse them in light of 
 
40
the other instructions given.  We will not consider this 
argument.  Rule 5:17(c). 
C.  Alleged Inconsistent Prosecution Theories 
 
 
The independently elected Commonwealth's Attorneys of 
Prince William County and Fairfax County maintained 
contemporaneous prosecutions of Muhammad and Malvo.  In 
Fairfax County, Malvo was prosecuted for the murder of Linda 
Franklin wherein Malvo interposed an insanity defense.  In 
Prince William County, Muhammad was prosecuted for the murder 
of Dean Meyers.  Much of the same evidence was utilized in 
each prosecution.  In assignments of error 8, 100, and 101, 
Muhammad argues that the Commonwealth violated principles of 
due process "by simultaneously taking materially inconsistent 
positions in the Muhammad case, where it claimed Muhammad 
directed and controlled Malvo, and in the Malvo case where it 
claimed that Malvo was a free agent."  Muhammad further argues 
that the Commonwealth should be judicially estopped from 
maintaining prosecution theories in two cases based upon the 
same evidence because the theories of prosecution are 
"inconsistent" and "irreconcilable."  We need not address the 
legal arguments advanced by Muhammad because we hold that the 
theories of prosecution by the two independent prosecutors 
were not inconsistent. 
 
41
 
Malvo sought to prove in his case in Fairfax County that 
he was insane or "brainwashed" by Muhammad.  Evidence was 
successfully offered to rebut such claims.  In the Fairfax 
County prosecution, the Commonwealth offered expert testimony 
that Malvo was "fully cognizant, conscious, deliberate, [and] 
purposeful."  The Commonwealth argued in Malvo's case that he 
was a "bright, clever human being" who knew what he was doing 
when he acted in concert with Muhammad.  In the Prince William 
County case against Muhammad, the Commonwealth presented 
evidence that Muhammad was the "leader" and "teacher" who 
trained and directed Malvo to perfect his sniper skills.  A 
successful rebuttal of Malvo's affirmative defense of insanity 
is not inconsistent with a theory of prosecution that includes 
Muhammad engaged in training and directing Malvo in their 
sniper team activity.  It is beyond peradventure that 
businesses, sports teams, and military operations involve 
training and direction without insanity of the participants as 
an issue.  The trial court did not err in rejecting Muhammad's 
claim of inconsistent theories of prosecution. 
III.  Indictment and Grand Jury Process 
 
 
Muhammad asserts in multiple assignments of error that 
often overlap that there were fatal flaws in the indictment 
process.  (Assignments of Error 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, 15, 17, 
18, 19, 27).  We will consider them topically. 
 
42
A. Alleged Failure to Accuse Muhammad 
 as the "Triggerman" 
 
 
Muhammad argues the Commonwealth failed to allege facts 
necessary for a death sentence in the indictment because it 
did not allege that he actually fired the shot that killed 
Dean Meyers.  He further alleges that it was error to deny his 
motion for a bill of particulars to accomplish this end.  
Also, he argues that the Commonwealth's notice of intent to 
seek the death penalty does not cure this alleged legal flaw 
in the indictment.  Finally, he argues that the trial court 
should have dismissed the indictment for its failure to indict 
Muhammad for murder in the second degree rather than capital 
murder because of lack of allegations that he was the 
"triggerman." 
 
These related allegations simply advance Muhammad's 
argument that upon the facts of this case, only the person who 
"pulls the trigger" is eligible for the death sentence under 
Virginia law.  As we have set forth, an immediate perpetrator 
of the act is eligible for the death sentence.  The trial 
court did not err in recognizing this principle of law in its 
rulings on these motions. 
B.  Failure to State Aggravating 
Factors in the Indictment 
 
 
Muhammad alleges that the capital murder indictments are 
defective because they failed to recite aggravating factors 
 
43
that would support a death sentence.  He argues that pursuant 
to Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), aggravating factors 
in support of the death penalty are the functional equivalent 
of elements of the offense of capital murder.  He further 
alleges that it was error to refuse his request for a bill of 
particulars specifying the aggravating factors upon which the 
Commonwealth would rely.  Finally, despite the fact that the 
Commonwealth filed a notice of intent to seek the death 
penalty based upon both aggravating factors of vileness and 
future dangerousness, he argues that the Commonwealth's notice 
did not cure the defect in the indictments. 
 
Ring involved the statutory sentencing scheme in Arizona 
where a death sentence may not legally be imposed unless at 
least one aggravating factor is found to exist beyond a 
reasonable doubt.  Ring, 536 U.S. at 596.  Additionally, the 
Arizona statutes provided that the judge, without a jury, was 
to make this determination.  Id. at 592-93.  The issue before 
the Supreme Court of the United States was stated as follows, 
"The question presented is whether that aggravating factor may 
be found by the judge, as Arizona law specifies, or whether 
the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee, made applicable to 
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that the 
aggravating factor determination be entrusted to the jury."  
Id. at 597.  Citing the Court's prior opinion in Apprendi v. 
 
44
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the precise answer was 
provided: "Because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors 
operate as 'the functional equivalent of an element of a 
greater offense,' Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, n.19, the Sixth 
Amendment requires that they be found by a jury."  Ring, 536 
U.S. at 609. 
 
The Virginia statutory scheme does not suffer from the 
infirmities found in Apprendi and Ring.  In Virginia, if the 
defendant elects a jury trial, the existence of one or both 
aggravating factors of vileness or future dangerousness is 
submitted to a jury.  Muhammad recognizes that Virginia's 
statutory scheme provides for jury determination of 
aggravating factors; however, he argues that the indictments 
in his case were defective for failure to set out the 
aggravating factors upon which the Commonwealth would seek the 
death penalty. 
 
In Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), the 
Supreme Court reviewed a conviction under a federal statute 
prosecuted in federal court.  The Court stated, "under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury 
trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than 
prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a 
crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, 
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt."  Id. at 243, n.6.  The 
 
45
Court in Apprendi quoted this statement and added, "The 
Fourteenth Amendment commands the same answer in this case 
involving a state statute."  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476.  
However, in a footnote to the opinion, the Court stated, 
Apprendi has not here asserted a 
constitutional claim based on the omission of 
any reference to sentence enhancement or 
racial bias in the indictment.  He relies 
entirely on the fact that the "due process of 
law" that the Fourteenth Amendment requires 
the States to provide to persons accused of 
crime encompasses the right to a trial by jury 
. . . and the right to have every element of 
the offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
. . . .  That Amendment has not, however, been 
construed to include the Fifth Amendment right 
to "presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury" 
that was implicated in our recent decision in 
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 
224 (1998).  We thus do not address the 
indictment question separately today. 
 
Apprendi, 530 at 477, n.3.  As if to emphasize the point, the 
Court stated in a footnote to Ring, 
Ring does not contend that his indictment was 
constitutionally defective.  See Apprendi, 530 
U.S. at 477, n.3 (Fourteenth Amendment "has 
not . . . been construed to include the Fifth 
Amendment right to 'presentment or indictment 
of a Grand Jury' "). 
 
Ring, 536 U.S. at 597, n.4. 
 
 
Muhammad concedes in his brief, "[w]e have acknowledged 
that states are currently not bound by the federal 
constitution to proceed in felony cases by way of indictment." 
He then makes the argument that is now before this Court: 
 
46
"Nevertheless, having chosen to establish a grand jury system 
in Virginia, there is a federal due process right that demands 
the state properly follow that scheme."  We disagree with 
Muhammad.  A similar argument was made and rejected in 
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987).  In Finley, 
Pennsylvania provided court appointed counsel for collateral 
attacks upon conviction, a right not required by the 
Constitution of the United States.  The Court held that Finley 
could not sustain a federal constitutional claim for deficient 
performance of counsel in such collateral proceedings where 
there was no federal constitutional right to counsel in the 
first place.  Id. at 558-59.  Similarly, Muhammad has no 
constitutional claim for failure to include aggravating 
factors in the two capital murder indictments because 
proceeding by indictment is not constitutionally required of 
the states. 
 
Additionally, in Virginia, if the indictment gives a 
defendant sufficient notice of the nature and character of the 
offense charged so he can make his defense, no bill of 
particulars is required.  Roach v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 324, 
340, 468 S.E.2d 98, 107, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 951 (1996), 
Wilder v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 145, 147, 225 S.E.2d 411, 413 
(1976).  In Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 454, 470 
S.E.2d 114, 123, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 887 (1996), we held 
 
47
that an indictment reciting an offense under Code § 18.2-31 
was sufficient to place the defendant on notice of the nature 
and character of the offense charged.  We noted that: 
The capital murder indictment alleged that "on 
or about October 14, 1994, in the City of 
Richmond, Christopher Cornelius Goins did 
feloniously and unlawfully commit capital 
murder in that he did kill and murder Robert 
Jones in a willful, deliberate and 
premeditated killing of more than one person 
as part of the same act or transaction." 
 
Id. at 454 n.1, 470 S.E.2d at 123 n.1.  We held that the 
indictment in Goins was sufficient.  Muhammad's indictments 
were sufficient as well. 
 
A defendant is not entitled to a bill of particulars as a 
matter of right.  Code § 19.2-230 provides that a trial court 
"may direct the filing of a bill of particulars."  The trial 
court's decision whether to require the Commonwealth to file a 
bill of particulars is a matter committed to its sound 
discretion.  Quesinberry v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 364, 372, 
402 S.E.2d 218, 223, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 834 (1991).  Here, 
the trial court denied Muhammad's motion for a bill of 
particulars identifying the aggravating factors upon which the 
Commonwealth would rely.  After the trial court denied the 
bill of particulars, the Commonwealth nonetheless filed a 
notice of intent to seek the death penalty which fully placed 
 
48
Muhammad on notice that the Commonwealth intended to prove 
both future dangerousness and vileness as aggravating factors. 
 
We hold that aggravating factors are not constitutionally 
required to be recited in a capital murder indictment.  We 
hold that the indictments in this case were sufficient under 
Virginia law.  We hold that the purported violation of 
Virginia's indictment provisions in this case does not rise to 
the level of a federal constitutional claim.  We hold that it 
was not an abuse of discretion to refuse Muhammad's motion for 
a bill of particulars.  Finally, we hold that any error that 
could have been committed by the failure to order a bill of 
particulars was rendered harmless by the provision of the 
information Muhammad sought in the Commonwealth's notice of 
intent to seek the death penalty. 
C.  Alleged Defect in Indictment 
 Because of Disjunctive Language 
 
 
In assignment of error 15, Muhammad asserts that the 
indictment charging capital murder under the terrorism 
predicate is defective because of the use of disjunctive 
terms.  The indictment in question follows the language of 
Code § 18.2-46.4 which states in pertinent part: 
"Act of terrorism" means an act of violence as 
defined in clause (i) of subdivision A of 
§ 19.2-297.1 committed with the intent to (i) 
intimidate the civilian population at large; 
or (ii) influence the conduct or activities of 
 
49
the government of the United States, a state 
or locality through intimidation. 
 
Code § 18.2-46.4 (emphasis added).  Muhammad claims that the 
indictment is defective because it did not specify which of 
the two intents Muhammad had at the time of the killing.  His 
argument is not based upon any constitutional claims; rather, 
his argument is confined to state law issues. 
 
The indictment charges a single offense and not two 
separate offenses.  The single offense can be satisfied upon 
proof of either or both of two mens rea conditions.  A 
reasonable construction of the indictment as rendered by the 
grand jury includes both.  Here, the trial court permitted the 
amendment of the indictment to more particularly express what 
was already a reasonable construction of the meaning of the 
indictment as delivered.  The indictment was amended from "or" 
to "and/or."  
 
Previously, we considered a similar claim of defective 
indictment based upon the use of the disjunctive, "or."  In 
Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 398, 384 S.E.2d 757, 
763 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1063 (1990), the defendant 
was charged with capital murder based upon the killing of more 
than one person as a part of the same act or transaction.  
Buchanan killed four people. We observed that: 
The first indictment charged, in essence, that 
Buchanan killed Buchanan, Sr. as part of the 
 
50
same act or transaction in which he killed 
J.J., Donnie, or, Mrs. Buchanan. 
 
238 Va. at 396, 384 S.E.2d at 762.  We held that this 
indictment reasonably placed Buchanan on notice in the 
following manner: 
Under the first indictment, Buchanan was on 
notice that he had to defend against a claim 
that he killed Buchanan, Sr. and all three of 
the other victims as part of the same act or 
transaction; that he killed Buchanan, Sr. and 
any two of the other victims as part of the 
same act or transaction; or that he killed 
Buchanan, Sr. and any one of the other victims 
as part of the same act or transaction.  
 
Id. at 397, 384 S.E.2d at 762. 
 
Muhammad had notice in the indictment, as originally 
found by the grand jury and as amended, that he was charged 
with a single offense that could be proved by showing: (1) his 
intent to intimidate the civilian population at large, or (2) 
his intent to influence the conduct or activities of the 
government of the United States, a state or locality through 
intimidation; or (3) his intent to do both 1 and 2 above.  The 
trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss the terrorism 
indictment. 
D.  Alleged Deficiencies in the 
 Composition of the Grand Jury 
 
 
Muhammad argues that the process utilized in his 
indictment was fatally flawed because the grand jury that 
indicted him was "improperly constituted in violation of 
 
51
Virginia Law and [his] rights to due process and equal 
protection."  Other than this conclusory statement and the 
further statement that the process is "arbitrary and vague," 
Muhammad makes no constitutional argument in his brief in 
support of his contentions.  His argument is insufficient.  
Rule 5:17(c).  Furthermore, no constitutional argument was 
raised in the trial court.  Rule 5:25.  We will not consider 
this vague and uncertain constitutional challenge to the 
composition of the grand jury. 
Additionally, his statutory challenge is without merit.  
Code §§ 19.2-191 through -205 govern the selection of regular 
grand jurors.  The record reveals that the grand jurors who 
returned indictments against Muhammad were selected pursuant 
to the following routine process.  The clerk of the court 
creates a list of individuals who have been called to serve as 
petit jurors at least three times, but not in the immediately 
preceding three years.  From that list, a smaller list of 120 
names is created.  The list of 120 names is reviewed by all 
the judges of the circuit.  Questionnaires are sent to the 
persons on the list.  At each term of court, seven jurors are 
randomly selected to serve as regular grand jurors.  The chief 
judge of the circuit reviews the questionnaires prior to the 
first meeting of the grand jury.  During his first meeting 
 
52
with the grand jurors, the chief judge discusses their duties 
with them and selects one of them to be the foreperson. 
The procedure employed in this case complies with the 
requirements outlined by statute that the grand jury be 
composed of "persons 18 years of age or over, of honesty, 
intelligence and good demeanor and suitable in all respects to 
serve as grand jurors," Code § 19.2-194, and "a citizen of 
this Commonwealth, eighteen years of age or over, and shall 
have been a resident of this Commonwealth one year and of the 
county or corporation in which the court is to be held six 
months, and is in other respects a qualified juror."  Code 
§ 19.2-195. 
Finally, Muhammad claims that the grand jurors "were not 
properly rotated as required by Section 19.2-194."  There is 
no evidence to support his claim.  The evidence does establish 
that this grand jury was sworn to sit for a two month term in 
October and November 2002.  We hold that the evidence does not 
sustain a claim that there were infirmities in the process, 
selection, or make-up of the grand jury that indicted 
Muhammad. 
IV. Constitutional Challenge 
 to the Terrorism Statute 
 
 
53
 
In assignment of error 17, Muhammad maintains that the 
terrorism statutes, Code §§ 18.2-31(13) and 18.2-46.4 are 
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague.  We disagree. 
 
As the Supreme Court stated in Hoffman Estates v. 
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489 (1982): 
In a facial challenge to the overbreadth and 
vagueness of a law, a court's first task is to 
determine whether the enactment reaches a 
substantial amount of constitutionally 
protected conduct.  If it does not, then the 
overbreadth challenge must fail.  The court 
should then examine the facial vagueness 
challenge and, assuming the enactment 
implicates no constitutionally protected 
conduct, should uphold the challenge only if 
the enactment is impermissibly vague in all of 
its applications.  A plaintiff who engages in 
some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot 
complain of the vagueness of the law as 
applied to the conduct of others.  A court 
should therefore examine the complainant's 
conduct before analyzing other hypothetical 
applications of the law. 
 
Id. at 494-95.  See Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 52 
(1999).  The First Amendment doctrine of overbreadth requires 
proof that a law "punishes a 'substantial' amount of protected 
free speech, 'judged in relation to the statute's plainly 
legitimate sweep.' "  Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 118 
(2003) (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 
(1973)).  While Muhammad utilizes the term "overbroad," he 
offers no evidence or argument in support of the requirements 
 
54
of this doctrine.  Instead, Muhammad confines his argument to 
vagueness. 
 
A successful challenge to the facial validity of a 
criminal statute based upon vagueness requires proof that the 
statute fails to provide notice sufficient for ordinary people 
to understand what conduct it prohibits, or proof that the 
statute "may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement."  Morales, 527 U.S. at 56; 
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).  But "[o]ne to 
whose conduct a statute clearly applies may not successfully 
challenge it for vagueness."  Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 
756 (1974); Commonwealth v. Hicks, 267 Va. 573, 580–81, 596 
S.E.2d 74, 78 (2004); accord Gibson v. Mayor of Wilmington, 
355 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2004); Fuller v. Decatur Public 
School Board of Education School District 61, 251 F.3d 662, 
667 (7th Cir. 2001); Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 
1359-60 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. Tidwell, 191 F.3d 
976, 979 (9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Hill, 167 F.3d 
1055, 1063-64 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 872 (1999); 
Woodis v. Westark Community College, 160 F.3d 435, 438-39 (8th 
Cir. 1998); United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 803 (10th 
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1133 (1998); Love v. 
Butler, 952 F.2d 10, 14 (1st Cir. 1991); Hastings v. Judicial 
Conference of the United States, 829 F.2d 91, 107 (D.C. Cir. 
 
55
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1014 (1988); Hill v. City of 
Houston, 789 F.2d 1103, 1127 (5th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 482 U.S. 
451 (1987); Gallaher v. City of Huntington, 759 F.2d 1155, 
1160 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 
Capital murder pursuant to Code § 18.2-31(13) is defined 
as the "willful, deliberate and premeditated killing of any 
person by another in the commission of or attempted commission 
of an act of terrorism as defined in Code § 18.2-46.4." 
"Act of terrorism" means an act of violence as 
defined in clause (i) of subdivision A of 
§ 19.2-297.1 committed with the intent to (i) 
intimidate the civilian population at large; 
or (ii) influence the conduct or activities of 
the government of the United States, a state 
or locality through intimidation. 
 
Code § 18.2-46.4.  The "act of violence" reference to Code 
§ 19.2-297.1 includes a list of certain specific aggravated 
felonies including murder, voluntary manslaughter, mob-related 
felonies, malicious assault or bodily wounding, robbery, 
carjacking, sexual assault and arson.  The combination of 
these statutes defines criminal conduct that constitutes a 
willful, deliberate and premeditated killing in the 
commission, or attempted commission, of one of the designated 
felonies with the intent to intimidate the civilian population 
or influence the conduct of government through intimidation.  
Additionally, under Code § 18.2-18 the General Assembly 
extended the reach of criminal conduct subject to the death 
 
56
penalty to include "a killing pursuant to the direction or 
order of one who is engaged in the commission of or attempted 
commission of an act of terrorism under the provisions of 
subdivision 13 of § 18.2-31." 
 
Muhammad raises questions about the definition of 
"intimidation," "civilian population at large," and "influence 
the conduct or activities of government."  He suggests that 
failure to statutorily define these phrases renders the 
statutes unconstitutional.  He further complains that "no 
distinction can be drawn between the newly defined crime and 
any 'base offense' which carries with it the same hallmarks of 
intimidation and influence," and that this allows "unguided 
and unbridled law enforcement discretion."  Muhammad further 
maintains that extending the scope of the statute to reach 
those who order or direct a killing in the commission of or 
attempted commission of an act of terrorism somehow violates 
what he calls the "triggerman rule."  In a particularly 
exaggerated statement, Muhammad claims that extending the 
scope of the statute "allows almost any violent criminal act 
to be classified as terrorism and thereby rendering any 
individual charged eligible for the death penalty."  We 
disagree with each of Muhammad's contentions. 
 
By referencing established criminal offenses as acts of 
violence subject to the statutory scheme, the legislature 
 
57
included offenses with previously defined elements and mens 
rea requirements.  Additionally, the term "intimidate" has 
been defined by case law.  See Sutton v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 
654, 663, 324 S.E.2d 665, 669 (1985) (defining intimidation as 
unlawful coercion; extortion; duress; putting in fear). 
 
We have no difficulty understanding that "population at 
large" is a term that is intended to require a more pervasive 
intimidation of the community rather than a narrowly defined 
group of people.  Examples are illustrative.  When used in a 
descriptive sense referring to a prison, the prison 
"population at large" consists of everyone in the prison 
rather than a small subset of prisoners.  Lewis v. Casey, 518 
U.S. 343, 358 (1996); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 210 
(1985).  In a case involving the exclusion of certain people 
from capital juries, the term "population at large" meant the 
community from which the jury pool could be chosen.  Lockhart 
v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 179 (1986).  It is significant to 
note that Muhammad offered a similar understanding of the term 
when he argued below that all potential jurors in his case 
were victims.  We do not believe that a person of ordinary 
intelligence would fail to understand this phrase. 
 
Similarly, we do not believe that a person of ordinary 
intelligence needs further definition of the phrase "influence 
the conduct or activities of government."  Muhammad's argument 
 
58
on this point is essentially a strained "legislative history" 
argument.  Quoting former Attorney General Jerry Kilgore's 
press releases, Muhammad claims that the statutes are designed 
"to address al-Qaeda type attacks – attacks motivated by a 
greater political purpose."  Even if a press release could 
qualify as legislative history, it is quite a leap to impute, 
from the press releases of an Attorney General, the intent of 
the General Assembly.  We find the intent of the General 
Assembly primarily in the words it employs in enacting 
legislation.  Nothing in the words of these statutes evinces 
an intent to limit its application to criminal actors with 
political motives. 
 
Muhammad maintains that there is no distinction between 
the "base offense" and the capital offense based upon 
terrorism.  What he appears to be arguing is that the 
terrorism statute is unnecessary on the one hand because a 
killing in the commission of one of the enumerated violent 
acts could result in the death penalty anyway, and on the 
other hand, its reach is extended too far by including those 
who order or direct such killings.  Clearly, the General 
Assembly has the power to define criminal conduct even if 
statutes overlap in coverage.  Whether a defendant can be 
simultaneously or successively charged with overlapping 
offenses implicates other questions not presented here. 
 
59
 
Muhammad's quarrel with the expansion of the potential 
imposition of the death penalty to those who order or direct 
another in a killing in the commission of or attempted 
commission of an act of terrorism is a policy question well 
within the purview of legislative power so long as it is not 
otherwise unconstitutional.  In that respect, Muhammad argues 
in assignment of error 18 that the provisions of Code § 18.2-
18 allow the death penalty for a defendant with no 
demonstrated intent to kill the victim.  Muhammad incorrectly 
characterizes the extension of the scope of the statute to 
reach traditional "aiders and abettors."  The provisions of 
Code § 18.2-18 do not extend to "aiders and abettors;" rather, 
it extends only to those who "direct" or "order" the killing.  
The criminal actor who "orders" or "directs" the killing is 
not unlike the criminal actor who hires another to kill and is 
potentially subject to the death penalty under Code § 18.2-
31(2).  The criminal actor who "orders" or "directs" the 
killing shares the intent to kill with the one who carries out 
the murder.  The provisions of Code § 18.2-18 do not have the 
effect imagined by Muhammad. 
 
Muhammad's argument concerning vagueness does not focus 
on his conduct.  Indeed, Muhammad does not claim in his brief 
that his actions and those of Malvo were not acts of terrorism 
under the statutory provisions.  Rather, Muhammad 
 
60
hypothetically poses questions about the applicability of the 
statute in other circumstances.  As discussed above, the 
statutes provide notice sufficient for ordinary people to 
understand what conduct they prohibit, and do not authorize 
and/or encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.  
More importantly, Muhammad cannot and does not maintain that 
the statutes do not give him notice that his conduct and 
Malvo's conduct was prohibited.  Nor does Muhammad allege that 
he has been subject to arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement 
of the statutes.  One who engages in conduct that is clearly 
proscribed and not constitutionally protected may not 
successfully attack a statute as void for vagueness based upon 
hypothetical conduct of others.  Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 
494-95. 
V.  Alleged Conflict Between Sentencing Provisions 
 
 
Muhammad argues in assignment of error 27 that he may not 
be sentenced to death because of an "absolute and un-
rectifiable conflict" between the capital murder statute (Code 
§ 18.2-31(13)), and the terrorism statute (Code § 18.2-46.4, 
et seq.).  Capital murder is a Class 1 felony punished by life 
imprisonment or death.  The terrorism statute provides for a 
penalty as a Class 2 felony "if the base offense of such act 
of terrorism may be punished by life imprisonment, or a term 
of imprisonment of not less than twenty years."  Code § 18.2-
 
61
46.5.  Muhammad argues that there is "no discernable 
distinction whatsoever between murder committed under the 
terrorism provision and murder committed under the capital 
murder provision."  He maintains that he may not be subject to 
the greater punishment. 
 
The Supreme Court of the United States resolved this same 
issue in a case involving sentencing provisions under two 
statutes that encompassed the same criminal act.  Holding that 
the prosecutor had discretion to choose which statute to base 
the prosecution upon, the Court stated: 
The provisions in issue here, however, 
unambiguously specify the activity proscribed 
and the penalties available upon conviction.  
That this particular conduct may violate both 
Titles does not detract from the notice 
afforded by each.  Although the statutes 
create uncertainty as to which crime may be 
charged and therefore what penalties may be 
imposed, they do so to no greater extent than 
would a single statute authorizing various 
alternative punishments.  So long as 
overlapping criminal provisions clearly define 
the conduct prohibited and the punishment 
authorized, the notice requirements of the Due 
Process Clause are satisfied. 
 
This Court has long recognized that when 
an act violates more than one criminal 
statute, the Government may prosecute under 
either so long as it does not discriminate 
against any class of defendants. 
 
United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-24 (1979). 
Muhammad makes no constitutional argument in his brief on this 
issue.  He merely recites that there is a conflict.  He does 
 
62
not argue that there is ambiguity in either statute nor does 
he argue that application of the statute discriminates against 
any class of defendants.  The trial court did not err in 
denying Muhammad's motion to preclude a death sentence on this 
basis. 
VI.  Right to Self-Representation 
 
 
Muhammad alleges in briefing assignment of error 35 that 
the trial court violated Muhammad's "Sixth Amendment right to 
self-representation by unduly interfering with his ability to 
consult with standby counsel." 
 
The right of a criminal defendant to represent himself is 
found in the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States.  Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 836 (1975).  
The right is not without limitations and conditions.  Only 
after the jury panel had been sworn, did Muhammad request 
permission to represent himself.  At that time, Muhammad did 
not have a constitutional right to proceed pro se.  As the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has 
held, 
we think it is reasonable, and entirely 
compatible with the defendant's constitutional 
rights, to require that the right of self-
representation be asserted at some time 
"before meaningful trial proceedings have 
commenced," and that thereafter its exercise 
rests within the sound discretion of the trial 
court. 
 
 
63
United States v. Lawrence, 605 F.2d 1321, 1325 (4th Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1084 (1980).  Nonetheless, after 
extensive questioning of Muhammad concerning his decision and 
appropriate admonition concerning the risks involved and the 
manner in which it would be permitted, the trial court 
exercised its discretion and allowed Muhammad to represent 
himself.  The trial court directed his lawyers to be "standby 
counsel."  The trial court informed Muhammad that "standby 
counsel" could sit at counsel table with him, and "you can 
perhaps upon occasion ask them questions, but I don't expect 
you to ask them every question that's being formulated.  That 
would, I think, unduly hinder the trial process." 
 
After two days of self-representation, Muhammad changed 
his mind and requested that his "standby counsel" resume their 
previously assigned role.  Now Muhammad complains about the 
limitations and restrictions placed upon him during those two 
days.  The only issue presented in this assignment of error is 
stated by Muhammad as follows: "whether the court improperly 
prohibited Muhammad from consulting with his standby counsel." 
 
Soon after Muhammad began representing himself, the 
Commonwealth objected to the extensive interaction between 
Muhammad and standby counsel.  The Commonwealth complained 
that standby counsel was actually acting as co-counsel in 
contravention of the trial court's instructions.  An exchange 
 
64
between the trial court and standby counsel appears to confirm 
the Commonwealth's concern.  Standby counsel stated: 
Mr. Muhammad has asked about things such as 
objections – what is hearsay? What is a 
leading question? and so on. And so he's 
inquired about that and the timing of 
objections and so on, which as the court knows 
is obviously crucial or else it's waived. 
That's the context of it. We'd say hearsay, 
and he knew the argument to make to Your Honor 
and same thing as far as leading questions. 
 
It is apparent from this exchange that standby counsel was 
doing far more than responding to inquiries made by Muhammad.  
Rather, as they admit, they were prompting him to make 
objections during the course of testimony. 
 
The trial court indicated that Muhammad would not be 
permitted to have "hybrid" representation where standby 
counsel becomes co-counsel by extensive participation and 
direction of the defense.  "Faretta does not require a trial 
judge to permit 'hybrid' representation."  McKaskle v. 
Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183 (1984).  As Muhammad acknowledges 
in his brief, "[t]he court's solution to the perceived problem 
was to move standby counsel down the table, away from Mr. 
Muhammad, something that Mr. Muhammad had suggested."  
Muhammad does not now complain that he could not have taken an 
extra step or two to consult with counsel.  He cannot be heard 
to complain of a solution he proposed. There is no specific 
ruling of the trial court that Muhammad identifies as error.  
 
65
Muhammad points to no objection made by him concerning the 
trial court's direction or handling of the issue.  The record 
reveals that Muhammad expressly agreed with the trial court's 
instructions to standby counsel.  Upon review of the specific 
arguments made by Muhammad and the relevant portions of the 
record he identifies, we hold that the trial court did not 
abridge his rights under the Sixth Amendment to properly 
consult with standby counsel. 
VII.  Refusal to Permit Expert Healthcare 
 Testimony at Sentencing 
 
The trial court granted Muhammad's motion under the 
provisions of Code § 19.2-264.3:1 for the appointment of 
mental health experts to assist him in his defense.  
Thereafter, Muhammad gave notice of his intent to use expert 
psychiatric testimony at the sentencing phase to prove 
mitigating factors.  In response, the Commonwealth moved the 
trial court for an order appointing an expert for the 
Commonwealth pursuant to Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F). 
 
At the hearing on the Commonwealth's motion for the 
appointment of an expert, the trial court granted Muhammad's 
request that the Commonwealth's expert be prohibited from 
inquiring into circumstances of the crimes alleged or 
Muhammad's relationship with Malvo.  This restriction was 
based upon Muhammad's declaration that he did not intend to 
 
66
present evidence that he acted under extreme mental 
disturbance or failed to appreciate the criminality of his 
conduct.  At that time, the trial court advised Muhammad that 
if he refused to cooperate with the Commonwealth's expert, it 
could result in the exclusion of Muhammad's expert's 
testimony.  Muhammad acknowledged to the trial court that he 
understood the requirements and the potential consequences for 
noncompliance. 
 
Nonetheless, on October 8, 2003, Muhammad refused to be 
interviewed by the Commonwealth's expert without his counsel 
present.  Also, he objected to the expert's use of a video 
camera during the interview.  After a hearing on the matter, 
the trial court permitted counsel to be present at the 
interview by the Commonwealth's expert and further ruled that 
the interview could be recorded by video camera.  Nonetheless, 
the following day, Muhammad refused to meet with the 
Commonwealth's expert under any circumstances. 
 
In response, the Commonwealth moved the trial court under 
the provisions of Code § 19.2-264.3:1 to prohibit Muhammad 
from presenting expert testimony from his court appointed 
experts at sentencing.  At the hearing, the trial court again 
directly addressed Muhammad concerning the potential effect of 
his refusal to cooperate with the Commonwealth's expert.  
Muhammad indicated that he understood and that he had made the 
 
67
choice not to cooperate.  The trial court exercised its 
discretion under the statute and barred Muhammad from 
presenting expert testimony from his court appointed experts 
regarding mitigating factors at the sentencing proceeding. 
 
Despite the trial court's ruling, at the conclusion of 
the evidence in the guilt phase of the trial, Muhammad moved 
the trial court to permit him to present expert testimony from 
one of his court appointed mental health experts, Dr. 
Cunningham, in the sentencing phase.  Muhammad represented 
that Dr. Cunningham would not testify based upon anything he 
learned from his examination; rather, he would testify based 
upon statistical analyses about prison populations.  
Apparently, this testimony would be offered as relevant to the 
question of Muhammad's future dangerousness.  The Commonwealth 
objected, but the trial court overruled the Commonwealth's 
objection at that time and invited Muhammad to present Dr. 
Cunningham's testimony outside the presence of the jury for a 
determination of its admissibility.  Muhammad did not do so. 
 
After all of the evidence had been presented to the jury 
in the sentencing phase and after both sides rested their 
case, Muhammad announced that he would present a proffer from 
Dr. Cunningham.  An affidavit from Dr. Cunningham was 
thereafter submitted to the trial court. 
 
68
 
In assignments of error 29, 75, and 76, Muhammad attacks 
various rulings of the trial court on this matter.  Muhammad 
argues that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court 
to deny him the opportunity to present expert testimony.  He 
further states, in conclusory fashion, that the denial 
violated his constitutional rights under the Fifth, Sixth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.  He further complains that 
he was not able to present lay testimony in mitigation. 
Finally, he argues that, because of the notice of intent to 
use expert testimony in a limited fashion, the Commonwealth 
was not entitled to an expert evaluation of Muhammad. 
 
Considering the Commonwealth's right to an evaluation of 
Muhammad, the trial court found, and Muhammad agreed, that the 
issue of notice of use of evidence in a limited fashion was 
not raised before the trial court ruled on the matter.  It was 
raised for the first time in post trial proceedings.  The 
trial court ruled that it was waived.  Objections must be 
stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the trial 
court's ruling in order to be preserved for appellate review.  
This objection will not be considered on appeal.  Rule 5:25. 
 
Consideration of Muhammad's arguments on these matters 
requires a clear understanding of what the trial court ruled 
concerning these issues.  The trial court ruled that Muhammad 
could not present expert testimony on mitigation factors at 
 
69
sentencing because of his refusal to abide by the trial 
court's order to submit to an evaluation by the Commonwealth.  
The trial court did not bar the presentation of non-expert 
testimony on this issue.  Thereafter, Muhammad sought the 
ability to present limited expert testimony purporting not to 
be based upon expert interviews.  The Commonwealth objected.  
The trial court overruled the Commonwealth's objection and 
gave Muhammad the opportunity to present evidence out of the 
presence of the jury that would allow the trial court to rule 
on its admissibility.  Muhammad did not take advantage of this 
invitation.  Only after all the evidence was presented at the 
sentencing phase and both parties rested their case did 
Muhammad offer an affidavit as a proffer of Dr. Cunningham's 
testimony.  He may not be heard to complain about the 
exclusion of Dr. Cunningham's limited testimony when he did 
not give the trial court the contemporaneous opportunity to 
evaluate its admissibility.  Rule 5:25. 
 
Nothing in the trial court's ruling prohibited non-expert 
testimony on mitigating factors in the sentencing proceeding.  
Muhammad cites Lovitt v. Warden, 266 Va. 216, 257, 585 S.E.2d 
801, 825-26 (2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1006 (2004), and 
suggests that somehow that case further prohibits such 
testimony in the absence of expert testimony.  Nothing in 
Lovitt suggests such a bar. 
 
70
 
Considering the main thrust of Muhammad's argument, we 
turn our attention to the claim that the trial court abused 
its discretion, and that its decision barring expert testimony 
on mitigation factors and the statutes that permit such a 
decision are unconstitutional.  Muhammad makes no argument on 
brief that the statutes are overbroad or vague.  His only 
argument is that their application to him under these 
circumstances violated various constitutional rights. 
The trial court provided Muhammad with the experts he 
requested at state expense.  The trial court granted 
Muhammad's request that his counsel be present during any 
evaluation by the Commonwealth.  The trial court engaged 
Muhammad directly in court on multiple occasions concerning 
the potential consequences of his failure to cooperate with 
the evaluation.  On these occasions, Muhammad affirmatively 
expressed his understanding and further acknowledged that he 
freely decided not to cooperate.  After the trial court made 
its ruling, it even considered permitting expert mitigation 
testimony not based upon his own expert's interview with him.  
Muhammad did not avail himself of the opportunity. 
Muhammad is correct that limiting the evidence that a 
criminal defendant may present in his defense implicates 
numerous constitutional rights.  What Muhammad fails to 
appreciate is that he may, by his knowing and informed 
 
71
decisions, waive such rights.  These rights may be as 
venerated as the right to a jury, the right to counsel, the 
right against self-incrimination, and the right to exclusion 
of evidence seized in an unconstitutional manner.  As the 
Supreme Court recently noted, "Waiver of the right to counsel, 
as of constitutional rights in the criminal process generally, 
must be a 'knowing, intelligent ac[t] done with sufficient 
awareness of the relevant circumstances.' "  Iowa v. Tovar, 
541 U.S. 77, 80 (2004) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 
U.S. 742, 748 (1970)).  We have no difficulty including the 
right to present mitigating testimony within the panoply of 
constitutional rights that may be waived by the accused. 
 
Upon review of the record, we agree with the trial court 
that Muhammad's decision not to cooperate was knowingly and 
intelligently made.  The real issue presented is whether the 
trial court's exercise of discretion was reasonable under the 
circumstances. 
 
The detailed and balanced statutory scheme provided by 
Code § 19.2-264.3:1 anticipates decisions made by the accused 
and the Commonwealth regarding expert mental health 
evaluations and testimony regarding sentencing issues in a 
capital murder trial.  One of those circumstances arises when 
the defendant gives notice of intent to present certain types 
of testimony at sentencing.  In response, the Commonwealth may 
 
72
request an evaluation of the defendant.  The statute 
explicitly provides that the trial court must "advise the 
defendant on the record in court that a refusal to cooperate 
with the Commonwealth's expert could result in exclusion of 
the defendant's expert evidence."  Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F)(1).  
The statute explicitly provides the remedy for lack of 
cooperation: "the court may admit evidence of such refusal or, 
in the discretion of the court, bar the defendant from 
presenting his expert evidence."  Code § 19.2-264.3:1(F)(2). 
 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the prosecution has 
the right to a fair rebuttal of mental health evidence 
presented by the defendant.  In Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 
402 (1987), the defendant challenged the introduction of 
evidence from a psychiatric report prepared upon joint motion 
of the defendant and the prosecution.  The Court stated, "if a 
defendant requests such an evaluation or presents psychiatric 
evidence, then, at the very least, the prosecution may rebut 
this presentation with evidence from the reports of the 
examination that the defendant requested."  Id. at 422-23. 
 
We agree with the Commonwealth's characterization of the 
circumstances presented on this question.  "By his own 
deliberate conduct, the defendant sought to gain an unfair 
benefit by obtaining an evaluation that the Commonwealth would 
be powerless to contest at trial either by meaningful cross-
 
73
examination or by presenting its own expert testimony.  The 
trial court's remedy thus was protective of the interests of 
all parties in a fair trial and was not punitive."  The trial 
court's ruling was not unreasonable, especially considering 
that it was willing to consider expert testimony from Dr. 
Cunningham not based upon interviews with Muhammad, but 
Muhammad did not avail himself of the opportunity.  We hold 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding 
Muhammad's expert witness testimony concerning mitigation 
factors at sentencing. 
VIII.  Discovery Issues 
 
 
In assignments of error 1, 2, 3, 22, 98, and 99, Muhammad 
attacks the constitutionality of criminal discovery rules in 
Virginia, specific rulings of the trial court regarding 
discovery, the refusal of the trial court to permit ex parte 
application for expert witness assistance, and the refusal to 
grant a new trial upon "after-discovered" evidence of an 
alleged exculpatory nature.  There is no merit to any of 
Muhammad's contentions. 
 
Muhammad's claim that criminal discovery rules in 
Virginia are unconstitutional because they provide for limited 
discovery, has been previously decided.  Bailey v. 
Commonwealth, 259 Va. 723, 736, 529 S.E.2d 570, 577, cert. 
denied, 531 U.S. 995 (2000); Walker v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 
 
74
54, 63, 515 S.E.2d 565, 570-71 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 
1125 (2000).  We see no reason to revisit this issue. 
 
Additionally, the trial court did not err in denying 
certain specific requests for discovery: 
a. 
The trial court was correct in denying Muhammad's 
request 1(b) seeking "the specific questions, comments 
or statements of any person involved in the 
conversation with, or interrogation of, John Allen 
Muhammad, which brought about any response."  Rule 
3A:11 requires production of the substance of the 
defendant's statements but does not require production 
of the statements sought by Muhammad in this request.  
Nonetheless, the trial court did order that if a video, 
audio, or otherwise transcribed interrogation existed, 
the entirety of such material would be provided to the 
defendant. 
b. 
The trial court was correct in denying Muhammad's 
request for "any contemporaneously made notes of 
statements attributed to the defendant."  Except for 
specifically designated items, subsection (b) of the 
Rule 3A:11 excludes the production of such notes. 
c. 
The trial court did not err in denying Muhammad's 
discovery request seeking "charged offenses, 
investigation or [items] which allege unadjudicated 
conduct."  Such items are not discoverable under Rule 
3A:11; rather such information and items may be 
provided by motion under Code § 19.2-264.3:2. 
Similarly, Muhammad's request for evidence of 
unadjudicated criminal conduct in request 8 was 
properly denied under Rule 3A:11. 
 
 
Muhammad alleges that it was error for the trial court to 
refuse to permit him to make ex parte application to the court 
"in order to seek funds and authorization to retain expert 
evaluations."  We have previously rejected this argument and 
find no reason to revisit the issue.  Weeks v. Commonwealth, 
248 Va. 460, 473, 450 S.E.2d 379, 388 (1994), cert. denied, 
 
75
516 U.S. 829 (1995); Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 413, 
422, 437 S.E.2d 566, 571 (1993), vacated on other grounds, 512 
U.S. 1217 (1994). 
 
The final issue related to discovery questions involves 
Muhammad's assertion that the trial court erred in failing to 
grant him a new trial because the Commonwealth allegedly 
failed to provide exculpatory evidence to him pursuant to 
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  Malvo wrote 
certain letters from jail addressed to "Pacman," a person who 
remains unidentified.  Counsel for Muhammad state that they 
first became aware of the existence of these letters when they 
were the subject of testimony in Malvo's trial.  The 
Commonwealth represented to the trial court that prosecutors 
in Muhammad's case were unaware of the letters before the 
post-trial motion for a new trial was filed. 
Muhammad claims that the so-called "Pacman letters" are 
exculpatory in nature because of the issue raised by Code 
§ 18.2-18, previously discussed herein, extending the 
potential applicability of the death sentence in a capital 
murder prosecution under the terrorism statute where there is 
proof that the accused "directed" or "ordered" the killing.  
Muhammad maintains that the letters show the independence of 
Malvo from him and demonstrate that Malvo could not have acted 
under Muhammad's "direction" or "order." 
 
76
We have previously stated: 
In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), 
the United States Supreme Court held that "the 
suppression by the prosecution of evidence 
favorable to an accused upon request violates 
due process where the evidence is material 
either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective 
of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution." Id. at 87.  Whether evidence is 
material and exculpatory and, therefore, 
subject to disclosure under Brady is a 
decision left to the prosecution.  
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 59 
(1987).  Inherent in making this decision is 
the possibility that the prosecution will 
mischaracterize evidence, albeit in good 
faith, and withhold material exculpatory 
evidence which the defendant is entitled to 
have under the dictates of Brady.  If the 
defendant does not receive such evidence, or 
if the defendant learns of the evidence at a 
point in the proceedings when he cannot 
effectively use it, his due process rights as 
enunciated in Brady are violated.  United 
States v. Russell, 971 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 
1992); United States v. Shifflett, 798 F. 
Supp. 354 (1992); Read v. Virginia State Bar, 
233 Va. 560, 564-65, 357 S.E.2d 544, 546-47 
(1987). 
 
. . . . 
 
Exculpatory evidence is material if there 
is a reasonable probability that the outcome 
of the proceeding would have been different 
had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense.  "A reasonable probability" is one 
which is sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome of the proceeding.  United States 
v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); Robinson 
v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 142, 151, 341 S.E.2d 
159, 164 (1986). 
 
Bowman v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 130, 133, 445 S.E.2d 110, 111-
12 (1994). 
 
77
 
We need not resolve questions related to when the 
Commonwealth knew of the letters or whether the knowledge of 
Fairfax prosecutors should be imputed to Prince William 
prosecutors because, upon review of the record, we hold that 
the letters were not exculpatory in nature, were not likely to 
be admissible in Muhammad's case, were cumulative of other 
testimony, and the admission of such letters would not result 
in a "reasonable probability that the outcome of the 
proceeding would have been different had the evidence been 
disclosed to the defense." 
The letters do not significantly address the relationship 
between Malvo and Muhammad.  They do suggest the ability of 
Malvo to think and act independently, a subject squarely at 
issue in Malvo's case because Malvo maintained that he was 
"brainwashed" by Muhammad.  As previously discussed herein, 
Malvo's claim of insanity was demonstrably different than the 
issue of his action under "direction" or "order" of Muhammad. 
Also, the ability of Malvo to think and act independently 
was amply revealed in other discovery given to Muhammad, such 
as transcripts of Malvo's confessions to police and drawings 
and writings Malvo made while in custody.  In this respect the 
"Pacman letters" are merely cumulative in nature. 
Muhammad argues that the result of the trial would have 
been different had the jury received the letters in evidence.  
 
78
The admissibility of the letters in Muhammad's case is far 
from established.  Muhammad only states that they were 
admissible in Malvo's case, so they must be admissible in 
Muhammad's.  However, in Malvo's case the letters may have 
satisfied an exception to the hearsay rule as statements of 
the defendant.  Muhammad offers no theory of admissibility of 
this evidence in his trial that would overcome a hearsay 
objection. 
In ruling on the motion for a new trial, the trial court 
stated: 
And I do not believe that the Pacman 
letters are such as to require the granting of 
a new trial. 
I believe that they are cumulative, 
corroborative and collateral . . . they are 
not material, such that they would not produce 
an opposite result on the merits at another 
trial, or, in the other analysis, that they 
are not favorable evidence that could 
reasonably be taken to put the whole case in 
such a different light as to undermine 
confidence in the verdict. 
 
Upon review of the record, we agree with the trial court.  The 
trial court did not err in denying Muhammad's motion for a new 
trial based upon the "Pacman letters." 
IX.  Jury Selection Issues 
 
 
In assignments of error 16, 20, 30, and 31, Muhammad 
complains of error in the jury selection process.  As a 
preliminary matter, he asserts that he cannot be tried by any 
 
79
jury in the United States for capital murder under the 
terrorism statute.  He asserts that this unique charge 
alleging "intent to . . . intimidate the civilian population 
at large" results in the "legal impossibility to impanel an 
impartial jury."  His logic is simply stated: because victims 
of the crime charged cannot be jurors in the case, no one from 
the "civilian population at large" can serve on his jury.  
Taking this tautology to its extreme application, Muhammad 
concludes, "The entire civilian population of Prince William 
County, and indeed, of the entire state and the United States, 
was alleged to be the victim." 
 
We need not address Muhammad's extensive citation of 
cases concerning prohibition of victims of a particular crime 
serving on the jury trying the crime at issue.  The entirety 
of his argument is premised upon the status of jurors in this 
case as victims.  They are not victims.  The victim in the 
capital murder charge based upon terrorism is Dean Meyers.  
Arguably, Muhammad's victims under the facts of the case and 
the evidence presented also included Keenya Cook, Muhammad 
Rashid, Paul LaRuffa, Claudine Parker, Keely Adams, Hong Im 
Ballenger, Premkumar Walekar, Sara Ramos, Lori Lewis-Rivera, 
Paschal Charlot, Caroline Seawell, Iran Brown, Kenneth 
Bridges, Linda Franklin, Jeffrey Hopper, and Conrad Johnson. 
 
80
 
The trial court's task was to empanel an impartial jury.  
This task was accomplished by the application of the 
requirements of carefully drafted statutes in Virginia and the 
use of voir dire in the selection of the panel.  The trial 
court did not err in denying Muhammad's motion to dismiss the 
indictment because of a "legal impossibility" of empanelling a 
jury on the capital murder charge based upon terrorism. 
 
With regard to the voir dire process itself, Muhammad 
maintains that the trial Court erred in precluding counsel 
from propounding certain questions and "limiting voir dire 
. . . regarding capital punishment attitudes, pre-trial 
publicity and other issues."  Additionally, Muhammad makes 
general arguments attacking the process of "death 
qualification" of jurors. 
 
In his brief, Muhammad does not argue that the trial 
court abused its discretion in refusing any question he 
proposed.  In fact, Muhammad does not identify any voir dire 
question he was not permitted to ask.  In this respect, his 
assignments of error on these issues are inadequately 
supported by argument on brief and are waived.  Rule 5:17(c);  
Powell, 267 Va. at 135, 590 S.E.2d at 554.  Muhammad does 
specifically complain in assignment of error 32 that the court 
erred in permitting the Commonwealth to question jurors during 
voir dire concerning the "concept of direction or order of a 
 
81
42 year old over a 17 year old regarding the terrorism 
theory."  His argument consists of one sentence: "the 
Commonwealth should not have been able to telegraph its theory 
of direction or order."  This single sentence does not 
constitute sufficient argument.  The remainder of the specific 
complaints in assignment of error 32 are not mentioned at all 
in the argument.  Consequently, they are deemed waived.  Rule 
5:17(c);  Powell, 267 Va. at 135, 590 S.E.2d at 554. 
 
Finally, with regard to the qualification of the jury, 
Muhammad argues that the "death qualification" process itself 
is unconstitutional.  There is no assignment of error 
concerning this issue; consequently, it is not properly before 
us.  Rule 5:17(c); Powell, 267 Va. at 135, 590 S.E.2d at 554. 
X.  Evidentiary Issues 
 
A.  Sergeant Major Mark Spicer 
 
 
In assignments of error 36, 37, and 62, Muhammad alleges 
that it was error for the trial court to permit the testimony 
of Sergeant Major Mark Spicer concerning the Commonwealth's 
sniper theory.  Spicer's testimony came at a time in the trial 
proceedings when Muhammad was representing himself with the 
aid of standby counsel. 
 
Muhammad maintains that the Commonwealth did not identify 
Spicer as an expert witness pursuant to the requirements of a 
pretrial order.  He further argues that the "slides" used as 
 
82
demonstrative aids in his presentation constituted "reports" 
subject to disclosure under the pretrial order.  The pertinent 
part of the pretrial order required the Commonwealth's 
production of "written reports of autopsies, ballistic tests, 
fingerprint analysis, handwriting analysis, blood, urine and 
breath tests and other written scientific reports and . . . 
oral scientific reports that the Commonwealth intends to offer 
in its case in chief or that are exculpatory."  In 
consideration of Muhammad's motion for a new trial, the trial 
court held that the pretrial order did not require disclosure 
of all experts.  It only required the disclosure of scientific 
tests and results.  Spicer's slides were not in the nature of 
scientific tests and results. 
 
Next, Muhammad asserts that Spicer's testimony was 
irrelevant and that he should not have been permitted to 
testify about "Mr. Muhammad's background, military career, and 
other factors not in evidence."  Upon review of the record, we 
hold that Muhammad did not make contemporaneous objections 
concerning these matters; consequently, they are not preserved 
for appeal and may not be considered.  Rule 5:25.  The trial 
court did not err in refusing to exclude Spicer from 
testifying or in refusing to grant Muhammad's motion for a new 
trial on these grounds. 
B.  Jeffrey Miller 
 
83
 
Muhammad alleges in assignment of error 44 that the trial 
court erred in permitting Fairfax Police Officer Jeffrey 
Miller to "testify as to his opinion."  In argument, Muhammad 
maintains that Miller's testimony was expert opinion testimony 
and that it was based upon conjecture and surmise and facts 
not in evidence.  Muhammad appears to complain in his brief, 
although not in the assignment of error, that he was not given 
notice of Miller's testimony in violation of the pretrial 
discovery order. 
 
Muhammad did not object at trial on the basis that he had 
no notice of Miller's testimony.  He did not object at trial 
that Miller's testimony was based upon conjecture or surmise 
or not supported by facts in evidence.  He did not object at 
trial that Miller's testimony was expert in nature.  We will 
not consider these arguments for the first time on appeal.  
Rule 5:25. 
C.  Edward Bender 
 
In assignment of error 54, Muhammad argues that the trial 
court erred in admitting certain laboratory reports of the 
Virginia Department of Forensic Science through Edward Bender, 
a chemist at the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms.  His assignment of error asserts that admission of 
the report constituted a "violation of a right to confront the 
 
84
person who undertook that analysis pursuant to Crawford v. 
Washington," 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 
Crawford had not been decided at the time of Muhammad's 
trial.  No objection was made at trial based upon Sixth 
Amendment rights.  Muhammad's objections were based upon 
compliance with Code § 19.2-187 not constitutional concerns.  
The objections on appeal based upon the Sixth Amendment and 
Crawford were not preserved at trial.  We will not consider 
them.  Rule 5:25. 
D.  Professor Steven Fuller 
 
George Mason University Professor Steven Fuller testified 
over the defendant's objection about the economic impact of 
the 47 days of turmoil caused by the criminal conduct of 
Muhammad and Malvo.  Assignment of error 60 complains that his 
testimony was permitted without notice required by the 
pretrial discovery order, "and further was without proper 
foundation or a basis in the record for such expert testimony 
to be admitted." 
 
The trial court found that Fuller did not generate any 
reports which were required to be produced by the pretrial 
discovery order.  Although Muhammad claims in his brief that 
"the testimony was wholly irrelevant," he also answers his own 
objection by stating, "[t]his witness was crucial to the 
Commonwealth theory that the October, [2002] shooting 
 
85
influenced the government."  Other than relevance, an issue he 
concedes, Muhammad does not offer any specific basis upon 
which this testimony was admitted without proper foundation.  
Upon review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court 
abused its discretion in permitting Fuller to testify. 
E.  Alleged Victim Impact Evidence 
 Admitted During Guilt Phase 
 
 
In assignments of error 38, 39, 40, 41, and 42, Muhammad 
makes various objections to the introduction of biographical 
information and backgrounds of various victims.  Specifically, 
Muhammad objects to the trial court's admission of "so-called 
'photographs in life'" of various shooting victims and the 
admission of certain "911" calls, particularly that of Ted 
Franklin, husband of Linda Franklin. 
 
At trial, Muhammad did not object to the admission of the 
"photographs in life" of various victims.  He did raise an 
objection to the Commonwealth's use of the photographs during 
opening statement, but did not object to the photographs when 
admitted.  Also Muhammad did not object to the admission of 
the first three "911" tapes received in evidence regarding the 
shooting of Meyers and LaRuffa.  These objections are not 
preserved.  Rule 5:25. 
 
Three other "911" tapes were admitted into evidence.  
Muhammad objected to the tape related to Rashid's shooting as 
 
86
"irrelevant."  With regard to the tapes involving the 
shootings of Brown and Franklin, Muhammad objected that the 
tapes were irrelevant and cumulative.  The trial court ruled 
that the tapes were "very relevant . . . and material 
evidence."  Muhammad objected to the "911" tape of Franklin's 
husband as prejudicial.  Upon consideration of the objection, 
the trial court ruled that the prejudicial impact was 
outweighed by its probative value.  The trial court 
specifically noted that the tape was relevant to the issue of 
terror in the community. 
 
Muhammad objected to a question asked of Meyers' brother 
regarding Meyers' military service.  The trial court sustained 
the objection.  Every objection made by Muhammad to the 
testimony of Parker's sister was sustained.  Muhammad did not 
make a contemporaneous objection to the testimony of 
Ballenger's sister; rather, he waited until her testimony was 
concluded.  Any objection not raised contemporaneously is 
waived.  Rule 5:25.  To the extent that a continuing or 
renewed objection was made to the introduction of a photograph 
of Ballenger, the trial court did not err in admitting Exhibit 
137A.  Similarly, Muhammad's objection to the testimony of 
Ballenger's widower was not timely.  An objection during the 
testimony of Walekar's daughter resulted in a direction from 
the trial court to limit the testimony to biographical 
 
87
information.  The objection made by Muhammad to the testimony 
of Ramos' widower was sustained.  Before Lewis-Rivera's 
widower testified, Muhammad objected to what he expected to be 
"victim-impact" testimony.  The court instructed the 
Commonwealth concerning proper limitations upon the testimony 
and, when it was offered, there was no objection.  Every 
objection to the testimony of Charlot's daughter, Franklin's 
daughter, and Johnson's widow was sustained. 
 
The record reveals that the trial court carefully limited 
the Commonwealth in the guilt phase to short biographical 
information about the victim and the manner in which the 
particular family member found out about the shooting.  The 
testimony was not "victim-impact" testimony allowed in the 
penalty phase.  It did not consist of evidence of economic or 
psychological loss, or grief.  The trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in the admission of such evidence. 
F.  The Rashid Shooting 
 
Muhammad alleges in assignment of error 46 that evidence 
of the robbery and shooting of Muhammad Rashid was immaterial 
and irrelevant to the Commonwealth's theories of the case.  He 
also argues that the probative value of the evidence was 
outweighed by the prejudicial impact upon the jury. 
 
At trial the Commonwealth explained the relevance of the 
evidence.  Rashid was shot and wounded at the Three Roads 
 
88
Liquor Store.  Rashid saw the Caprice outside the store before 
the shooting.  He identified Malvo as the person who shot him 
with a handgun.  At the same time that Malvo shot him, he was 
shot at with a rifle from a distance.  The rifle shot missed 
its target.  The handgun was the same weapon used to shoot and 
wound LaRuffa and the same weapon found at the scene in 
Montgomery, Alabama where Malvo dropped it after Parker and 
Adams had been shot with a high-powered rifle.  The rifle used 
to wound and kill Parker and Adams at the same time that Malvo 
held the handgun during their robberies was the .223 caliber 
Bushmaster rifle recovered from the Caprice with Muhammad and 
Malvo. 
 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in the 
admission of this evidence because it demonstrated a "singular 
strong resemblance to the pattern of the offense charged," 
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 654, 677, 529 S.E.2d 769, 
782, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 981 (2000), and it provided 
significant links connecting Muhammad and Malvo to each other, 
to the weapons used, and supported the theories of the 
Commonwealth concerning the methodology of their cooperative 
criminal efforts. 
G.  Documents Related to the Caprice 
 
During the testimony of Christopher O'Kupski, a used car 
salesman from New Jersey, the trial court admitted certain 
 
89
"paperwork" related to the ownership and transfer of title for 
the Caprice.  In assignment of error 48, Muhammad argues that 
the trial court erred in admitting these documents because 
they were "not properly authenticated" and "were hearsay." 
Exhibit 65 consisted of four documents: the temporary car tag, 
a registration application, a reassignment form, and the 
original title to the Caprice.  Upon questioning by the trial 
court, the witness stated that he had "filled out" the 
documents, with the exception of the registration application 
which is a form regularly used by the New Jersey Division of 
Motor Vehicles.  Assuming, without deciding that the admission 
of any or all of these documents was improper, the error would 
be harmless.  The evidence was offered to show Muhammad's 
purchase of and connection to the Caprice.  Considering 
O'Kupski's testimony apart from the documents themselves, and 
the extensive evidence of Muhammad's connection to the 
Caprice, if the trial court erred, such error was most 
certainly harmless error. 
H.  Charlene Anderson 
 
Charlene Anderson, Muhammad's cousin, testified about her 
encounters with Muhammad and Malvo in Baton Rouge, Louisiana 
in August 2002.  In assignments of error 49, 50, 51, and 62, 
Muhammad asserts that her testimony was irrelevant, that "the 
prejudicial value outweighed any probative assistance to the 
 
90
fact finder," and that the Commonwealth was permitted to 
question Anderson on redirect beyond the scope of cross-
examination. 
 
Anderson testified that Muhammad told her that he and 
Malvo were on a mission for the military to recover 
explosives.  Anderson was a law enforcement officer.  Muhammad 
asked her to provide him with bullets.  Anderson testified 
that Muhammad told her that Malvo was "highly trained." 
 
Muhammad objected to this testimony on the grounds that 
it was hearsay and irrelevant.  The trial court overruled the 
objection on the grounds that it was not offered for the truth 
of its content, namely that Muhammad and Malvo were actually 
on a mission for the military and that Malvo actually was 
"highly trained."  The purpose for the testimony was to show 
Muhammad's attempt to obtain ammunition for his rifle shortly 
before the string of shootings began and also to show the 
nature of the relationship between Malvo and Muhammad. 
 
During cross-examination of Anderson, Muhammad elicited 
testimony suggesting that Muhammad and Malvo did not interact 
or talk to each other.  On redirect, the trial court permitted 
the Commonwealth to ask Anderson about a conversation she 
overheard between Muhammad and Malvo. 
 
Lastly, with respect to Anderson's testimony, Muhammad 
asserts that it was error to permit Anderson to describe the 
 
91
rifle Muhammad showed her.  Muhammad made no such objection at 
trial.  He may not advance this claim of error for the first 
time on appeal.  Rule 5:25. 
 
Upon review of the record and upon the issues preserved 
for appeal, we hold that the trial court did not err in 
admitting Anderson's testimony.  It was relevant and its 
probative value outweighed any claim of prejudicial effect 
upon the jury. 
I.  Demonstrative Evidence – Model 
 of the Caprice Trunk and Video 
 
 
At trial the Commonwealth offered demonstrative evidence 
utilizing a model of the trunk of the Caprice and a video 
demonstrating how a shooting could take place from the trunk.  
The use of demonstrative evidence to illustrate testimony is a 
matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court.  
Mackall v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 240, 254, 372 S.E.2d 759, 768 
(1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925 (1989). 
 
Muhammad claims in assignments of error 55, 56, 57, and 
58 that the trial court erred in admitting this evidence 
because "the reconstruction was not complete," it "was out of 
context," and "did not include the materials in the trunk from 
the time of Mr. Muhammad's arrest or any specific incident."  
Muhammad further argues that it was error to allow the jury to 
inspect the Caprice after viewing the demonstrative replica 
 
92
and the video.  He further complains about the use of "police 
officer stand-ins" in the video and that the evidence 
presented invited the jury to speculate about what occurred in 
the shootings, particularly the shooting of Dean Meyers. 
 
The evidence presented was not expert reconstructive 
opinion testimony.  Rather it was demonstrative evidence, 
illustrative in nature of other evidence presented.  Muhammad 
claims that the demonstration was not supportive of the 
Commonwealth's theory of the case nor based upon other 
evidence presented.  We disagree with Muhammad. 
 
Scientific evidence of the presence of nitroglycerine and 
gunshot residue in the trunk of the Caprice proved that 
gunshots were fired from the trunk.  A witness testified that 
he saw a flash come from the car when Charlot was murdered.  
Muhammad and Malvo were seen in the Caprice immediately before 
the murder of Dean Meyers.  Immediately after the murder of 
Dean Meyers, Muhammad was interviewed in the parking lot 
across the street and in the presence of the Caprice.  Malvo 
was not seen at the parking lot, leaving the reasonable 
inference that Malvo was in the trunk.  Demonstrative evidence 
concerning how a person could get from the passenger 
compartment to the trunk from the inside and how a person 
could shoot a rifle from within the trunk was relevant and 
helpful to the jury. 
 
93
 
The trial court carefully considered the relevance of the 
demonstrative evidence and the foundation for its 
admissibility.  The trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in permitting this demonstrative evidence followed by an 
actual inspection of the trunk of the Caprice. 
J.  Testimony Regarding Terror in the Community 
 
Robert Saady, a convenience store operator in Ashland, 
Virginia testified at trial about the impact of the sniper 
shootings on his business, his employees, and other businesses 
in the Ashland area.  Montgomery County Police Sergeant Robert 
Thompson testified at trial concerning the shootings in the 
Washington D.C. area.  Muhammad argues in assignments of error 
59 and 61 that Saady's testimony was "irrelevant, speculative, 
and immaterial," and that Thompson's testimony was 
"cumulative, irrelevant and immaterial."  He argues that proof 
of actual fear in the community is not probative of Muhammad's 
intent. 
 
School officials in three different school systems also 
testified about the impact of the sniper shooting upon 
personnel, students and parents, and the operation of the 
schools.  However, the only assignments of error before this 
Court involve the testimony of Saady and Thompson. 
With regard to Thompson, Muhammad objected only to 
specific questions not the overall nature of the testimony.  
 
94
None of those specific objections are made the subject of 
argument in his brief.  With regard to Saady, Muhammad did 
object to the relevance of his testimony in its entirety.  
Section 18.2-46.4 required proof that Muhammad intended to 
"intimidate the civilian population at large or . . . 
influence the conduct or activities of the government . . . 
through intimidation."  It is an axiom of law and human 
behavior that one may infer that a person intends to produce 
the consequences reasonably anticipated from his acts.  Wilson 
v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 95, 101, 452 S.E.2d 669, 673, cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 841 (1995); see also Mickens v. Commonwealth, 
247 Va. 395, 408, 442 S.E.2d 678, 687, rev'd on other grounds, 
513 U.S. 922 (1994); Green v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 706, 711, 
292 S.E.2d 605, 608 (1982); Barrett v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 
153, 156, 169 S.E.2d 449, 451 (1969).  As such, testimony 
about what was actually and reasonably produced by Muhammad's 
conduct was relevant to prove his intent.  The trial court did 
not err in permitting such testimony. 
K.  Motion to Quash Eyewitness Identifications 
 
In assignment of error 25, Muhammad alleges that "the 
court erred in denying the motion to quash and suppress as 
unreliable various eyewitness identifications."  In his one 
paragraph argument in his brief, Muhammad offers insufficient 
 
95
argument in support of his assignment of error.  It is waived.  
Rule 5:17(c); Powell, 267 Va. at 135, 590 S.E.2d at 54. 
XI.  Sentencing 
 
A.  Torture, Aggravated Battery, or Depravity of Mind 
 
 
In assignment of error 12, Muhammad asserts that: 
It was error to deny the motion to preclude 
sentence of death based on vileness factor and 
allow the Commonwealth to base its request for 
the death sentence on the "vileness" factor, 
since there was no evidence of torture, 
aggravated battery, or depravity of mind. 
 
Muhammad raised this issue in a pre-trial motion which the 
trial court took under advisement until the evidence had been 
presented.  At the conclusion of the presentation of the 
evidence, Muhammad expressly stated that he objected to the 
case being presented to the jury based upon torture or 
aggravated battery.  Muhammad's assignment of error is in the 
disjunctive.  He claims that there was no evidence of torture, 
aggravated battery, or depravity of mind.  He did not object 
to "depravity of mind" as a predicate finding for vileness.  
The trial court ruled that it would not include "torture" in 
the instructions.  Muhammad's objections in the trial court do 
not preserve assignment of error 12.  Rule 5:25; Rule 5:17. 
B.  Victim Impact Testimony 
 
Muhammad argues in assignment of error 11 that it was 
error under the due process clause to permit victim impact 
 
96
testimony during the penalty phase of his trial.  He argues 
that prior to 1998, the Virginia capital sentencing scheme 
"only contemplated the presentation of victim impact testimony 
to the judge prior to the imposition of sentence."  To the 
extent that this statement provides a separate grounds for his 
assignment of error, it is barred from review because the 
issue was not raised in the trial court.  Rule 5:25.  With 
respect to Muhammad's complaint about victim impact evidence 
presented to a jury, we have previously considered such claims 
and have rejected them.  Beck v. Commonwealth, 253 Va. 373, 
385, 484 S.E.2d 898, 906, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1018 (1997); 
Weeks, 248 Va. at 476, 450 S.E. 2d at 389.  We see no reason 
to revisit our previous decisions. 
C.  Unadjudicated Criminal Conduct 
 
Muhammad alleges in assignments of error 77, 78, 79, 80, 
81, 82, and 83 that the trial court erred in admitting 
multiple instances of unadjudicated criminal conduct.  As 
previously discussed, he has waived assignments of error 78, 
79, 80, 82, and 83 for failure to adequately brief the issues.  
Rule 5:17(c).  We will turn our attention to assignments of 
error 77 and 81.  Assignment of error 77 states: 
The court erred by allowing unadjudicated acts 
to be received into evidence by the jury 
without any standard of proof or 
particularized burden on the Commonwealth to 
prove such acts to a specific standard of 
 
97
proof in violation of Mr. Muhammad's right to 
due process under the Virginia and United 
States Constitutions. 
 
As stated, assignment of error 77 is unspecific.  We must look 
to other assignments of error to place his complaint in a 
particular context.  The only specific issue involving 
unadjudicated criminal conduct properly before us on appeal is 
the subject of assignment of error 81 concerning testimony 
about an alleged escape attempt from the Prince William County 
Adult Detention Center. 
 
The Commonwealth presented evidence of the attempted 
escape through two witnesses, without objection from the 
defendant.  Only after the completion of all the evidence from 
the prosecution and the defense at the sentencing phase and 
after both parties had rested, did Muhammad move to strike the 
evidence of the attempted escape.  The trial court properly 
denied the motion because it was untimely.  In order to 
preserve an issue for appeal, an objection must be made 
contemporaneously or it is waived.  Muhammad has failed to 
preserve assignments of error 77 and 81.  Rule 5:25. 
D.  Testimony of Mildred Muhammad 
 
In assignments of error 84 and 85, Muhammad asserts that 
the trial court erred in allowing Mildred Muhammad, 
("Mildred"), the defendant's former wife, to testify about 
 
98
statements made to her by her lawyer in Tacoma, Washington and 
a statement made by their child, Taalibah. 
 
Mildred testified that the lawyer representing her in a 
custody proceeding told her to leave town quickly because of 
fear that Muhammad would find her and kill her.  Muhammad 
objected to this statement on the grounds of hearsay.  The 
trial court overruled the objection because it was not offered 
for the truth of the matter asserted; rather, it was offered 
to show why Mildred left Washington State and moved to the 
suburbs of Washington, D.C.  The trial court gave the jury a 
limiting instruction directing it that the evidence was to be 
considered only to prove that she moved because of the 
statement made by her lawyer.  After further discussion with 
counsel, the court gave an additional limiting instruction 
drafted by Muhammad.  Also, Mildred testified that her 
daughter, Taalibah, said to her that if Muhammad "gets out," 
she was concerned that he would kill her mother.  Muhammad 
objected on the grounds of hearsay. 
 
Muhammad maintains on appeal that allowing such 
statements violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront 
witnesses against him and violated the rule established in 
Crawford.  Crawford had not been decided at the time of 
Muhammad's trial.  He made no objection based upon the Sixth 
Amendment to the testimony of his former wife.  These issues 
 
99
will not be considered for the first time on appeal.  Rule 
5:25. 
 
The trial court did not err in admitting Mildred's 
testimony regarding her lawyer's statement to her.  It was not 
hearsay because it was not offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted.  Chandler v. Graffeo, 268 Va. 673, 682, 604 S.E.2d 
1, 5 (2004).  A proper limiting instruction was given, not 
once, but twice.  One of the instructions was drafted by 
Muhammad.  A jury is presumed to have followed the 
instructions of the trial court.  Green v. Young, 264 Va. 604, 
611, 571 S.E.2d 135, 139 (2002) (citing Zafiro v. United 
States, 506 U.S. 534, 540 (1993)). 
 
With regard to Mildred's testimony about her daughter's 
statement to her, the record reveals a more complicated 
context.  Muhammad objected on the grounds of hearsay and 
relevancy, not on Sixth Amendment grounds.  It is significant 
that the Commonwealth did not seek to introduce Mildred's 
testimony about her daughter's statement until after the trial 
court, over the Commonwealth's objection, ruled that it would 
allow Muhammad to present to the jury several letters written 
to him from his children, including Taalibah, which gave the 
impression that the children had no fear of him.  After 
considerable argument from counsel, the trial court ruled that 
all the letters Muhammad sought to introduce would be allowed 
 
100
and a single statement from Taalibah to her mother would also 
be allowed.  The trial court ruled that all of this evidence 
was admissible pursuant to the state-of-mind exception to the 
hearsay rule.  The Commonwealth also argued that Taalibah's 
statement should be independently admissible as rebuttal to 
Muhammad's introduction of the letters. 
 
The nature of the evidence offered by Muhammad was to 
show his relationship with his children.  He offered out of 
court statements in the form of letters from his children for 
this purpose.  Similarly, the Commonwealth offered an out of 
court oral statement from Taalibah for the same purpose.  Upon 
review of the record, we hold that, if the admission of 
Taalibah's statement was error, it was invited error.  We will 
not "notice error which has been invited by the party seeking 
to take advantage thereof on appeal."  Saunders v. 
Commonwealth, 211 Va. 399, 400, 177 S.E.2d 637, 638 (1970); 
Clark v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 787, 791, 120 S.E.2d 270, 273 
(1961).  Muhammad's introduction of evidence showing the state 
of mind of his children toward him – arguing that such proof 
was both relevant and not objectionable hearsay – surely 
invited evidence of a similar nature from the Commonwealth.  
Whether as evidence in its case in chief or as rebuttal 
evidence, the trial court did not err in permitting Mildred to 
testify about Taalibah's statement. 
 
101
XII.  Jury Instructions 
 
 
In assignments of error 86, 87, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 
and 95, Muhammad alleges defects in the instruction of the 
jury.   
A.  Aggravated Battery 
 
 
Muhammad objected to the trial court's instruction to the 
jury that it could find the aggravating factor of vileness 
under Code § 19.2-264.2 from proof of aggravated battery in 
the death of Dean Meyers.  Muhammad asserts that a single shot 
has never qualified as an aggravated battery.  We have defined 
aggravated battery as "a battery which, qualitatively and 
quantitatively, is more culpable than the minimum necessary to 
accomplish an act of murder."  Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 
455, 478, 248 S.E.2d 135, 149 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 
967 (1979).  Muhammad asserts that, in a shooting case, this 
Court has always required more than one gunshot to satisfy the 
requirements of aggravated battery. 
In Hedrick v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 328, 513 S.E.2d 634, 
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 952 (1999), we noted that the clear 
language of Code § 19.2-264.2 demonstrates that "the term 
'vileness' includes three separate and distinct factors, with 
proof of any one factor being sufficient to support a finding 
of vileness and hence a sentence of death."  Id. at 341-42, 
 
102
513 S.E.2d at 640.  Those factors are torture, depravity of 
mind, or aggravated battery to the victim. 
The significance and effect of Muhammad’s argument 
attacking the aggravated battery instruction must be assessed 
in the context of the other jury instructions and the jury's 
actual findings.  Jury instruction 14 dealt with the offense 
of “the killing of Dean Meyers as part of the killing of more 
than one person in a three-year period.”  Jury instruction 14A 
dealt with the offense of “the killing of Dean Meyers in the 
commission or attempted commission of an act of terrorism.”  
Each of the instructions included direction to the jury that 
the penalty of death could not be imposed for either of the 
offenses unless the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt at least one of the following aggravating circumstances: 
1.  That, after consideration of his history 
and background, there is a probability that he 
would commit criminal acts of violence that 
would constitute a continuing serious threat to 
society; or 
 
2.  That his conduct in committing the offense 
was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or 
inhuman, in that it involved depravity of mind 
or aggravated battery to the victim beyond the 
minimum necessary to accomplish the act of 
murder. 
 
For each of the offenses, the jury’s verdict forms expressly 
found that Muhammad “would commit criminal acts of violence 
that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society,” 
 
103
and that “the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, 
horrible, or inhuman.”  Additionally, each of the verdict 
forms expressed findings of both “[d]epravity of mind” and 
“[a]ggravated battery to the victim beyond the minimum 
necessary to accomplish the act of murder.”  Based upon these 
multiple findings, the jury unanimously fixed Muhammad’s 
punishment at death for each of the offenses. 
Even if the trial court erred in granting an instruction 
based upon aggravated battery, the error would be harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  The jury’s verdict of death for 
each of the offenses was predicated upon additional and 
independent findings of future dangerousness and vileness 
based upon depravity of mind. 
B.  Future Dangerousness Instruction 
 
Muhammad argues in his brief that the future 
dangerousness instruction given is unconstitutionally vague.  
The Court can find no assignment of error that attacks this 
instruction on that basis.  Furthermore, his one sentence 
conclusory argument is inadequate.  We will not consider the 
argument.  Rule 5:17(c). 
C.  Finding Instruction 
 
In assignment of error 91, Muhammad alleges that the 
trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury "that the 
verdict be unanimous as to any aggravating factors."  
 
104
Muhammad's argument on this point is a one-sentence repetition 
of his assignment of error.  It is inadequate argument and 
will not be considered.  Rule 5:17(c). 
D.  Life Without Parole 
 
In assignments of error 87 and 90, Muhammad maintains 
that the trial court erred in granting the Commonwealth's 
proposed instructions "without including the 'life without the 
possibility of parole' language."  He further argues that the 
trial court should have granted his proposed instruction with 
such language.  Once again, Muhammad, in one sentence 
conclusory arguments, simply repeats the language of the 
assignment of error and offers no argument.  The assignments 
of error are deemed waived.  Rule 5:17(c). 
E.  Remaining Issues Relating to Instructions 
 
Numerous other issues are waived by Muhammad for failure 
to make sufficient argument in his brief.  He makes 
insufficient argument that: 
1. The trial court should have granted his instruction K 
defining mitigation.  Additionally, here the trial court 
did define mitigation, it simply refused to highlight any 
particular evidence as Muhammad wanted; 
2. The trial court should have instructed the jury that it 
could consider life without parole in determining 
aggravating factors and as a mitigating factor; 
3. The trial court should have given his instruction L 
because the jury was  "left directionless" as to how to 
"weigh" mitigation evidence; 
4. The trial court should have instructed the jury that the 
vileness factor applied only to Meyers' killing.  
Additionally, here the instruction offered was incorrect 
 
105
because the vileness factor could be found based upon 
depravity of mind as well; 
5. The trial court should have granted his instruction T 
regarding mitigating evidence to be considered in 
weighing culpability and future violence.  The entirety 
of his argument consists of the following: "The jury was 
entitled to this guidance." 
6. The trial court did not make it clear in instructions 
that the jury could impose life in prison even if it 
found aggravating factors.  The record demonstrates that 
the jury was properly instructed on this matter. 
 
For each of these matters (1 - 6), Muhammad fails to make 
sufficient argument in his brief.  The matters are waived.  
Rule 5:17(c). 
XIII.  Pretrial Publicity and 
 the Right to a Fair Trial 
 
 
In assignments of error 5, 23, 24, and 28, Muhammad makes 
various arguments concerning alleged errors of the trial court 
concerning its handling of pretrial publicity.  Muhammad 
argues that: 
1. 
The trial court erred by denying his motion to issue a 
show cause order, quashing subpoenas related to seeking 
evidence of pretrial leaks of information concerning the 
investigation of Muhammad and Malvo, and denying a 
request for appointment of a special prosecutor to 
investigate pretrial leaks; 
2. 
The trial court erred by denying Muhammad's motion to 
close a hearing on a motion in limine; 
3. 
The trial court erred in failing to prevent information 
leaks and to take appropriate corrective action 
concerning the leaks; 
4. 
The trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the charges 
against Muhammad based upon leaks of information; 
5. 
The leaks "hindered the defendant's ability to seat a 
fair jury despite the change of venue." 
 
 
 
106
This case attracted extensive media coverage.  Counsel 
for Muhammad and the Fairfax Commonwealth's Attorney agreed to 
a consent order in the Fairfax County Circuit Court, where 
Malvo's prosecution was pending, generally prohibiting law 
enforcement officials of the Fairfax County Police Department 
and its civilian employees from disclosing information in 
violation of the Department's own rules, namely, General Order 
401.1.  Among other things, General Order 401.1 and the 
consent order in Fairfax County Circuit Court specifically 
prohibit disclosure of evidence of statements, criminal 
records, opinions of guilt or innocence, testing and test 
results, and statements about expected testimony.  
Additionally, counsel for Muhammad and the Commonwealth's 
Attorney for Prince William County agreed that all discovery 
from the Commonwealth would be sealed to limit dissemination 
of information that might have an effect upon jury selection. 
Due to continued concerns about allegations of leaks of 
information related to the investigation and prosecution of 
Muhammad and Malvo, Muhammad filed a motion for rule to show 
cause in the Prince William County Circuit Court requesting 
that the trial court determine the source of information 
appearing in the media concerning the Malvo and Muhammad cases 
which had been attributed to law enforcement sources, and take 
appropriate action.  In the alternative, Muhammad requested 
 
107
that the trial court appoint a special prosecutor or 
investigator.  The trial court denied the motion.  A similar 
motion had been presented to the Circuit Court of Fairfax 
County and was denied. 
Thereafter, Muhammad and the Prince William County 
Commonwealth's Attorney agreed to the entry of an order on 
August 5, 2003, providing in pertinent part: 
Law enforcement employees, from all agencies 
working as members of the prosecution Task 
Force, or working with the Task Force, whether 
sworn officers/agents or civilian employees 
shall not disclose any information to the 
press or public related to the investigation 
leading to the arrests of John Allen Muhammad 
and Lee Boyd Malvo, and pending prosecution of 
John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo in 
Prince William and Fairfax County Circuit 
Courts.  
 
Approximately two weeks before the commencement of 
Muhammad's trial, a book entitled "Sniper: Inside The Hunt For 
The Killers Who Terrorized The Nation," was released to the 
public.  This 237-page publication contained detailed 
information concerning the investigation of Muhammad and 
Malvo.  Muhammad filed a motion to dismiss the charges or for 
other appropriate relief asserting that there had been a 
flagrant violation of the August 5, 2003 order by numerous and 
unknown law enforcement agents.  In the motion, Muhammad did 
not fault the prosecutors in the case and did not argue that 
there had been any discovery violations under Rule 3A:11. 
 
108
 
The trial court expressed its concern about the matter 
but disagreed regarding Muhammad's proposed remedies.  In the 
absence of any violations of the discovery rules, the trial  
court declined to prohibit introduction of specified evidence 
of the Commonwealth.  The trial court declined to order that 
the Commonwealth could not seek the death penalty.  The trial 
court indicated that it would allow individual voir dire of 
potential jurors on the issue of pre-trial publicity.  The 
trial court had already granted a motion for change of venue 
and the trial was scheduled to be held in Virginia Beach, 
Virginia. 
 
Muhammad asserts that the trial court should have 
dismissed the charges, precluded the death penalty, or limited 
the introduction of evidence pursuant to the authority of Code  
§ 19.2-265.4.  However, this code section recites potential 
remedies for failure to provide discovery under Rule 3A:11.  
Muhammad expressly stated in his motion that no discovery 
violations under the rule had occurred. 
 
In his motion, Muhammad does not suggest that the 
Commonwealth's Attorney's office of Prince William County was 
the source of leaks.  Additionally, there is no evidence that 
the information contained in the book published before trial 
came from leaks after the August 5, 2003 order.  The trial 
court noted that it was likely that most of the information in 
 
109
the book came from communications prior to the time the trial 
court was asked to intervene and prohibit disclosure of any 
information regarding the Muhammad and Malvo investigations. 
 
In his brief on this matter, Muhammad cites one statute, 
which does not apply, and no cases, in support of his argument 
that Muhammad was not tried by a fair and impartial jury or 
that his trial was in any way tainted by pretrial publicity.  
Upon review of the record, we conclude that the trial court 
took appropriate action to limit the effect of pretrial 
publicity in this case.  The trial court entered a consent 
order regarding sealing of discovery responses of the 
Commonwealth; when asked, the trial court entered the August 
5, 2003 order prohibiting law enforcement and civilian 
employees of law enforcement agencies from disclosing to the 
media or the public any information concerning the 
investigation of Muhammad and Malvo; the trial court granted 
Muhammad's motion for a change of venue to a location away 
from the immediate zone of pretrial publicity; and, the trial 
court permitted individualized voir dire of potential jurors 
concerning pretrial publicity. 
Muhammad does not cite any actual tainting of the jury 
selection process or any way in which his trial was 
compromised by pretrial publicity.  He does not cite any 
particular consequences of the trial court's denial of a 
 
110
motion to close a hearing on a motion in limine or the trial 
court's refusal to issue show cause orders or appoint a 
special prosecutor to investigate leaks.  It is most telling 
that at trial, of the 125 potential jurors questioned, only 8 
were challenged on grounds that exposure to pretrial publicity 
made them inappropriate jurors.  We hold that the trial court 
did not err with regard to any of the issues raised in 
Muhammad's assignments of error 5, 23, 24 and 28. 
XIV.  Miscellaneous Constitutional Challenges 
 to the Death Penalty 
 
 
In assignments of error 13, 21, and 26, Muhammad raises 
numerous issues relating to the constitutionality of the death 
sentence generally and as it is applied in Virginia.  Support 
for many of his arguments is not found in his brief.  Rather, 
Muhammad attempts to incorporate by reference various motions, 
memoranda, and argument made in the trial court.  We have 
previously held that such a practice is impermissible.  
Schmitt, 262 Va. at 138, 547 S.E.2d at 194; Burns v. 
Commonwealth, 261 Va. 307, 319, 541 S.E.2d 872, 881, cert. 
denied, 534 U.S. 1043 (2001).  We will not consider such 
arguments.  They are waived.  Rule 5:17(c). 
 
Other matters raised in these assignments of error and 
argued in Muhammad's brief have been previously decided by 
this Court: 
 
111
(1) Virginia statutes fail to provide 
meaningful guidance to the jury because 
the aggravating factors are vague, 
rejected in Jackson, 267 Va. at 205-06, 
590 S.E.2d at 535 (dangerousness); 
Powell, 267 Va. at 136, 590 S.E.2d at 554 
(both); Wolfe, 265 Va. at 208, 576 S.E.2d 
at 480; 
 
(2) The Virginia scheme fails to provide the 
jury with guidance regarding its 
consideration of mitigating evidence, 
rejected in Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 
U.S. 269, 275-76 (1998); Jackson, 267 Va. 
at 206, 590 S.E.2d at 536; Johnson, 267 
Va. at 69, 591 S.E.2d at 56; Jackson v. 
Commonwealth, 266 Va. 423, 429, 587 
S.E.2d 532, 538 (2003); Lovitt, 260 Va. 
at 508, 537 S.E.2d at 874; 
 
(3) The Commonwealth is permitted to prove 
future dangerousness by evidence of 
unadjudicated criminal conduct without 
any standard of proof, rejected in 
Jackson, 267 Va. at 206, 590 S.E.2d at 
536; Powell, 267 Va. at 136, 590 S.E.2d 
at 554; Johnson, 267 Va. at 70, 591 
S.E.2d at 56; Bell v. Commonwealth, 264 
Va. 172, 203, 563 S.E.2d 695, 716 (2002), 
cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1123 (2003).  
Additionally, we note that all Muhammad's 
assignments of error regarding 
unadjudicated criminal conduct have been 
rejected either because they were not 
preserved in the trial court (Rule 5:25) 
or they have been inadequately briefed 
(Rule 5:17(c)). Consequently, no issues 
related to unadjudicated criminal conduct 
are properly before the Court. 
 
(4) The statute allows, but does not require, 
that a sentence of death be set aside 
upon a showing of good cause and permits 
the court to consider hearsay in a post-
sentence report, rejected in Jackson, 267 
Va. at 206, 590 S.E.2d at 536; Powell, 
267 Va. at 136, 590 S.E.2d at 555; 
 
112
Johnson, 267 Va. at 70, 591 S.E.2d at 56; 
Jackson, 266 Va. at 430, 587 S.E.2d at 
539;  
 
(5) This Court fails to conduct an adequate 
proportionality review and 
passion/prejudice review, rejected in 
Jackson, 267 Va. at 206, 590 S.E.2d at 
536; Powell, 267 Va. at 136, 590 S.E.2d 
at 555; Johnson, 267 Va. at 70, 591 
S.E.2d at 56. 
 
XV.  Statutory Review 
 
 
Muhammad does not argue that his sentences of death are 
excessive, arbitrarily imposed, or disproportionate to other 
similar cases.  Nonetheless, pursuant to Code § 17.1-
313(C)(2), we must conduct a review of these issues. 
 
Upon review of the record, we conclude that the trial 
court conducted the proceedings related to this case with 
patience and fairness.  Muhammad was given access to the trial 
court to present each and every issue he desired to present 
and was entitled to present.  The jury selection process was 
untainted by pretrial publicity. The trial court's granting of 
the motion to change venue provided additional protection to 
the right of the defendant to a fair trial.  The record 
contains no reversible error.  Simply stated, we find not even 
a hint of arbitrariness or prejudice in the conduct of the 
trial or the jury's imposition of the sentences of death. 
 
Our proportionality review is not undertaken to "insure 
complete symmetry among all death penalty cases."  Orbe v. 
 
113
Commonwealth, 258 Va. 390, 405, 519 S.E.2d 808, 817 (1999), 
cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1113 (2001).  The review we employ is 
done to "identify and invalidate the aberrant death sentence."  
Id.
 
With regard to the death sentences imposed for the 
killing of more than one person in three years or in the same 
act or transaction we have reviewed our cases involving the 
killing of two or more people.  Of the fourteen cases in which 
the death sentence was given, five involved more than two 
killings.  Buchanan v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 389, 384 S.E.2d 
757 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1063 (1990) (four victims); 
Barnes v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 130, 360 S.E.2d 196 (1987), 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1036 (1988) (two victims); Davidson v. 
Commonwealth, 244 Va. 129, 419 S.E.2d 656, cert. denied, 506 
U.S. 959 (1992) (three victims); Thomas v. Commonwealth, 244 
Va. 1, 419 S.E.2d 606, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 958 (1992) (two 
victims); Stewart v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 222, 427 S.E.2d 
394, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 848 (1993) (two victims); Burket 
v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 596, 450 S.E.2d 124 (1994), cert. 
denied, 514 U.S. 1053 (1995) (two victims); Goins v. 
Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 470 S.E.2d 114, cert. denied, 519 
U.S. 887 (1996) (five victims plus the death of a fetus); Kasi 
v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 407, 508 S.E.2d 57 (1998), cert. 
denied, 527 U.S. 1038 (1999) (two victims); Bramblett v. 
 
114
Commonwealth, 257 Va. 263, 513 S.E.2d 400, cert. denied, 528 
U.S. 952 (1999) (four victims); Walker v. Commonwealth, 258 
Va. 54, 515 S.E.2d 565 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1125 
(2000) (two victims); Zirkle v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 631, 553 
S.E.2d 520 (2001) (two victims); Hudson v. Commonwealth, 267 
Va. 29, 590 S.E.2d 362 (2004) (three victims); Elliott v. 
Commonwealth, 267 Va. 396, 593 S.E.2d 270 (2004), cert. 
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 875 (2005) (two victims); 
Winston v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 564, 604 S.E.2d 21 (2004) 
(two victims). 
 
In the cases in which the death sentence was sought but a 
life sentence was given, of the fourteen cases only four 
involved the killing of more than two persons and three of 
those cases had unusual circumstances.  Woodfin v. 
Commonwealth, 236 Va. 89, 372 S.E.2d 377 (1988), cert. denied, 
490 U.S. 1009 (1989) (two victims); Mundy v. Commonwealth, 11 
Va. App. 461, 390 S.E.2d 525 (1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 
840 (1991) (two victims); Moran v. Commonwealth, No. 1708-90-3 
(Va. Ct. App. Nov. 5, 1991) (two victims); Stephenson v. 
Commonwealth, No. 2080-91-1 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 1993) (two 
victims); Hamlin v. Commonwealth, No. 1279-99-2 (Va. Ct. App. 
Apr. 25, 2000) (four victims killed by arson); Novak v. 
Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 373, 457 S.E.2d 402 (1995), cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. 1006 (1996) (two victims); Pritchett v. 
 
115
Commonwealth, No. 1968-95-3 (Va. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 1996) (two 
victims); Owens v. Commonwealth, No. 2259-95-1 (Va. Ct. App. 
Nov. 19, 1996) (four victims; defendant was 16 years old at 
time of offense); Williams v. Commonwealth, No. 2423-96-2 (Va. 
Ct. App. Oct. 28, 1997) (three victims; defendant was alleged 
to be brain-damaged and border-line mentally retarded); 
Stoneman v. Commonwealth, No. 3069-96-3 (Va. Ct. App. June 9, 
1998) (two victims); Evans v. Commonwealth, No. 2089-99-3 (Va. 
Ct. App. Apr. 26, 2000) (two victims); Burlile v. 
Commonwealth, 261 Va. 501, 544 S.E.2d 360 (2001) (two 
victims); Hairston v. Commonwealth, No. 1722-01-3 (Va. Ct. 
App. Mar. 28, 2002) (two victims); Cooper v. Commonwealth, No. 
0819-03-4 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2004) (three victims). 
 
Additionally, we reviewed two cases in which the 
Commonwealth did not seek the death penalty for the killing of 
two or more persons.  In those two cases there were only two 
murders in each case.  Smith v. Commonwealth, No. 0628-93-1 
(Va. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 1994) (two victims); Hobbs v. 
Commonwealth, No. 1301-99-1 (Va. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2000) (two 
victims). 
 
Apart from the Cooper case, except where unusual 
circumstances existed, all the capital prosecutions in 
Virginia that we have reviewed wherein more than two people 
 
116
were murdered and the prosecution was based upon Code § 18.2-
31(7) or (8) resulted in the death penalty being imposed. 
 
This case represents the first capital murder case with a 
death sentence under the terrorism statute.  We are unaware of 
any state that has reviewed a death sentence predicated upon a 
similar provision. 
 
We think the death penalty is not an excessive nor a 
disproportionate penalty for a case with evidence of ten 
murders and six malicious woundings.  Similarly, the evidence 
presented on the terrorism count independently supports the 
imposition of the death penalty. 
 
Muhammad's crimes cannot be compared to any other case in 
the Commonwealth.  The evidence of vileness and future 
dangerousness in support of the jury's verdict justifies its 
sanction of death. 
 
Muhammad with his sniper team partner, Malvo, randomly 
selected innocent victims.  With calculation, extensive 
planning, premeditation, and ruthless disregard for life, 
Muhammad carried out his cruel scheme of terror.  He did so by 
employing stealth and secrecy using a sniper methodology that 
put his victims at great risk while reducing his own.  He 
employed a weapon with truly awesome power to inflict massive 
injury upon his victims.  Muhammad recruited a younger boy, 
 
117
Malvo, and carefully trained and guided him in this murderous 
enterprise. 
 
His victims came from all walks of life who were engaged 
in everyday pursuits when their lives were tragically ended or 
altered.  Paul LaRuffa, Muhammad Rashid, Hong Im Ballenger, 
Claudine Parker, and Kelly Adams were closing and leaving 
their places of business.  Sarah Ramos was sitting on a bench 
in front of a store.  Lori Lewis-Rivera was vacuuming her car 
at a gas station.  Paschal Charlot was crossing an 
intersection as a pedestrian.  Caroline Seawell and Linda 
Franklin were putting packages in their respective 
automobiles.  Iran Brown was walking to school.  Dean Meyers, 
Kenneth Bridges, and Premkumar Walekar were putting fuel in 
their vehicles at gasoline stations.  Jeffrey Hopper was 
leaving a restaurant after a meal. Conrad Johnson, a bus 
driver, was standing in the doorway of his bus.  Muhammad 
inflicted death or massive injury upon these victims as he 
pursued his mission of terror. 
 
Muhammad's threats to those within the communities he 
stalked including the warning, "Your children are not safe 
anywhere at anytime."  He communicated his desire to extort 
money from the government through the demand to deposit ten 
million dollars in an account connected to a card for 
accessing the account through automated teller machines.  
 
118
Whatever else may have been his intentions, he certainly 
intended to intimidate the civilian population and to 
influence the conduct and activities of government.  He did so 
with breathtaking cruelty.  If society's ultimate penalty 
should be reserved for the most heinous offenses, accompanied 
by proof of vileness or future dangerousness, then surely, 
this case qualifies. 
XVI.  Conclusion 
 
Upon review of the record and upon consideration of the 
arguments presented, we find no reversible error in the 
judgment of the trial court.  Further, we find no reason to 
commute or set aside the sentences of death.  We will affirm 
the judgment of the trial court. 
Affirmed. 
JUSTICE KINSER, concurring. 
 
 
I fully agree with the majority opinion in this case.  I 
write separately to address the dissent’s failure to view the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, to 
consider the circumstantial evidence, and to address the 
Commonwealth’s theory of the case.  Unlike the dissent, I 
conclude that the Commonwealth did indeed prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that John Allen Muhammad was a principal in 
the first degree in the murder of Dean Meyers under Code 
 
119
§ 18.2-31(8), “[t]he willful, deliberate, and premeditated 
killing of more than one person within a three-year period.” 
 
Certain basic and well-established principles must guide 
the appellate review of this case.  When the sufficiency of 
the evidence is challenged on appeal, this Court must view the 
evidence and all reasonable inferences flowing therefrom in 
the light most favorable to the prevailing party at trial, in 
this case the Commonwealth.  Commonwealth v. Norman, 268 Va. 
539, 545-46, 604 S.E.2d 82, 85 (2004); Commonwealth v. Hudson, 
265 Va. 505, 514, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786, cert. denied, 540 U.S. 
972 (2003).  It is our duty to affirm the trial court’s 
judgment unless that judgment is plainly wrong or without 
evidence to support it.  Code § 8.01-680; Barrett v. 
Commonwealth, 268 Va. 170, 179, 597 S.E.2d 104, 108 (2004); 
Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 
534, 537 (1975). 
 
In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the prevailing party at trial, we must consider all the 
evidence, both direct and circumstantial.  “There is no 
distinction in the law between the weight or value to be given 
to either direct or circumstantial evidence.”  Hudson, 265 Va. 
at 512, 578 S.E.2d at 785.  “Indeed, in some cases 
circumstantial evidence may be the only type of evidence which 
can possibly be produced.”  Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 
 
120
260, 272, 257 S.E.2d 808, 817 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 
972 (1980) (citing Toler v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 774, 780, 51 
S.E.2d 210, 213 (1949)). 
 
Instead of adhering to these principles of appellate 
review, the dissent presents the evidence in the light most 
favorable to Muhammad rather than the Commonwealth.  The 
dissent does so by failing to address the compelling 
circumstantial evidence concerning the other 15 shootings that 
occurred during a span of 47 days in addition to the Meyers 
shooting and the similarities among those shootings that 
demonstrate the method employed by Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo 
in the murder of Meyers.  There is no mention of the forensic 
evidence establishing that the .223 caliber Bushmaster rifle 
recovered when Muhammad and Malvo were apprehended was used in 
13 of the 16 shootings, including the Meyers murder, or the 
evidence showing that the rifle is equivalent to a type of 
weapon used by military snipers.  Likewise, the dissent takes 
no notice of the fact that, in 10 of the 16 shootings, the 
Caprice that Muhammad purchased after the first shooting and 
in which he and Malvo were sleeping when arrested was seen in 
the vicinity of those shootings, including the Meyers 
shooting, either before, at the time of, or soon after they 
occurred.  In the Meyers shooting, the Caprice actually was 
seen in the area both before and after the shooting. 
 
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The dissent further makes no reference to the alterations 
to the Caprice enabling the shooter in the two-man sniper team 
to fire a high-velocity rifle from the trunk while minimizing 
the shooter’s visibility.  Finally, there is no mention of the 
many tools used by sniper teams that were recovered in the 
Caprice along with the Bushmaster rifle: a bipod system for 
support of the rifle; holographic and telescopic scopes to aid 
sighting; global positioning system equipment to locate and 
relocate a vantage point for the long-range shot; “walkie-
talkie” handheld radio sets for communication; bungee cords 
for easy “break down” of the rifle for transportation 
purposes; and silencers.  The dissent’s failure to consider 
all the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, in the light 
most favorable to the Commonwealth is contrary to the 
principles of appellate review. 
 
The dissent also does not address the Commonwealth’s 
theory of the case.  The Commonwealth predicated its theory on 
the methodology employed by a two-man sniper team.  The 
testimony of Sergeant Major Mark Spicer clearly demonstrated 
that such a team employs one member as the long-range 
“shooter” and the other member as the “spotter.”  The 
spotter’s job is to determine when the target is within the 
zone of fire and a shot can be taken, given the other 
surrounding circumstances, and to inform the shooter, who is 
 
122
positioned in an obscure place, of these facts and to give the 
order to shoot at the opportune moment. 
It is the order to shoot that differentiates this case 
from the dissent’s analogy to a “lookout” or “wheelman.”  The 
typical lookout or wheelman in a robbery does not direct at 
what moment the robber brandishes a weapon at a bank teller or 
store clerk and demands money.  In the present case, it is 
that direct and immediate action by the spotter in giving the 
order to shoot that forms the basis of the Commonwealth’s 
theory that Muhammad acted as a principal in the first degree.  
Such conduct by the spotter in a two-man sniper team is not 
“indirect” and is not “the quintessence of a principal in the 
second degree.” 
The dissent, however, never explains why such action by 
the spotter would not make that person a principal in the 
first degree.  Instead, the dissent concludes that Malvo made 
the final decision about whom to shoot and when to do so.  The 
dissent states, again not in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, that “Malvo could have picked any target and 
decided at any time to fire or not,” and thereby reduce 
Muhammad’s role to that of merely giving advice about the 
traffic flow on a multi-lane highway.  In other words, the 
dissent does not deal with the Commonwealth’s theory that 
 
123
Muhammad gave the order to shoot and the circumstantial 
evidence that supports the theory. 
Under our case law, “where two or more persons take a 
direct part in inflicting fatal injuries, each joint 
participant is an ‘immediate perpetrator,’ ” i.e., a principal 
in the first degree.  Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482, 
495, 404 S.E.2d 227, 235, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 944 (1991); 
see also Remington v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 333, 349-50, 551 
S.E.2d 620, 630 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1062 (2002); 
Williams v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 528, 545, 450 S.E.2d 365, 
375 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1161 (1995).  In Strickler, 
the Commonwealth’s theory was that Strickler and another 
individual had jointly participated in the actual killing.  
Id. at 494, 404 S.E.2d at 235.  The Commonwealth argued that, 
since the victim’s death was caused by the crushing of her 
skull with a 69-pound rock, it would have been necessary for 
one assailant to hold her down on the ground while the other 
assailant lifted the rock and dropped it on her head.  Id.  We 
agreed and concluded that the weight and size of the rock 
“made it apparent that a single person could not have lifted 
it and dropped or thrown it while simultaneously holding the 
victim down.”  Id.  Even though the evidence did not show 
which assailant wielded the rock, we held that Strickler took 
a direct part in inflicting the fatal injuries and was 
 
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therefore an “immediate perpetrator.”  Id. at 495, 404 S.E.2d 
at 235. 
 
Turning to the evidence in this case and viewing it in 
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, I conclude that 
Muhammad, like Strickler, acted as a principal in the first 
degree.  The dissent does not dispute, nor can it, that 
Muhammad, Malvo, the Caprice, and the Bushmaster rifle were 
all present at the scene of the Meyers shooting.  In fact, 
soon after the shooting, Muhammad and the Caprice were seen in 
a parking lot directly across the street from the gas station 
where Meyers was shot.  A police officer questioned Muhammad 
about why he was in the parking lot.  Muhammad told the 
officer that the police had directed him into that parking 
lot.  However, the officer explained that, after the shooting, 
the procedure was to direct traffic away from the area, not 
into it. 
Also, a map containing both Muhammad’s and Malvo’s 
fingerprints was found in the parking lot.  Forensic evidence 
established that the bullet recovered during the autopsy of 
Meyers’ body was fired from the Bushmaster rifle.  While only 
Malvo’s fingerprints were found on the Bushmaster rifle, DNA 
matching that of both Muhammad and Malvo was found on the 
rifle. 
 
125
The question is whether the “combined force” of this 
evidence along with “many [other] concurrent and related 
circumstances” surrounding not only the Meyers shooting but 
also the other 15 shootings and the sniper tools found in the 
Caprice when Muhammad and Malvo were apprehended establishes 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Muhammad acted as an immediate 
perpetrator in the Meyers killing.  Hudson, 265 Va. at 514, 
578 S.E.2d at 786 (citation omitted).  Each piece of 
circumstantial evidence is not to be viewed in isolation.  Id.
Soon after the Meyers shooting, the Caprice, with 
Muhammad in the driver’s seat, was in a parking lot directly 
across a nine-lane highway from the gas station where Meyers 
was killed.  The location of the parking lot provided a direct 
line of fire to the gas station.  Due to the traffic on this 
multi-lane highway and the small hole in the trunk of the 
Caprice through which to fire the Bushmaster rifle, the jury 
could reasonably have inferred that the shooter fired upon 
order from the spotter because only the spotter could 
determine the opportune moment to fire a shot that would avoid 
oncoming vehicular traffic, then strike and kill the victim.  
See Inge v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 360, 366, 228 S.E.2d 563, 
567-68 (1976) (“it is within the province of the jury to 
determine what inferences are to be drawn from proved facts, 
 
126
provided the inferences are reasonably related to those 
facts”). 
Thus, in this case, Muhammad was either the shooter, 
making him a principal in the first degree, or the spotter, 
also making him a principal in the first degree.  The evidence 
concerning all 16 shootings and the reasonable inferences 
flowing therefrom viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth demonstrate that, in this two-man sniper team, 
the spotter took an immediate and direct action in the Meyers 
murder by giving the order to shoot, an act that, in my view, 
is equivalent to pulling the trigger or holding the victim 
down on the ground as in Strickler.  Such action by the 
spotter goes beyond the conduct of a principal in the second 
degree who merely encourages, incites, or aids in the 
commission of a crime.  See Jones v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 
370, 372-73, 157 S.E.2d 907, 909 (1967). 
For these reasons, I respectfully concur and, like the 
majority, would affirm all the convictions. 
 
JUSTICE AGEE, with whom JUSTICE LACY and JUSTICE KOONTZ join, 
dissenting in part and concurring in part. 
 
 
 
The common law classification of criminal perpetrators 
that distinguished between principals in the first and second 
degree has become of limited significance in modern times.  
 
127
Nearly all jurisdictions have enacted provisions similar to 
Virginia Code § 18.2-18, which erase the distinction between 
principals of the first and second degree by treating both 
categories of criminal actors as principals in the first 
degree for purposes of indictment, trial, conviction, and 
punishment. 
 
However, the common law distinction between principals of 
the first and second degrees remains of significant importance 
in a case of capital murder in Virginia because the General 
Assembly has specifically provided in Code § 18.2-18 that a 
“principal in the second degree to a capital murder shall be 
indicted, tried, convicted and punished as though the offense 
were murder in the first degree.”  Thus, unless the 
Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that John Allen 
Muhammad was a principal in the first degree to the murder of 
Dean Meyers under Code § 18.2-31(8), the plain language of 
Code § 18.2-18 bars conviction and punishment of Muhammad for 
capital murder under Code § 18.2-31(8).  Accordingly, the 
common law distinction between acts sufficient to constitute a 
principal in the first degree and those of a principal in the 
second degree is of vital importance. 
At common law, a principal in the first degree is a 
person who engages in criminal conduct by his own 
hand—he fires the gun that kills, he takes and 
carries away the property of another. 
 
 
128
. . . . 
 
At common law, a principal in the second 
degree is a person who is present at the 
scene of a crime, but does not engage in 
the criminal conduct; he merely aids and 
abets the principal in the first degree in 
committing the crime.  He may be actually 
present, assisting the principal in the 
first degree, standing ready to assist if 
needed, or commanding, counseling, or 
otherwise encouraging the principal in the 
first degree to commit the crime; or, 
although at a distance from the scene of 
the crime, he may be deemed present when 
he is acting as a driver of the getaway 
car or as a lookout with instructions to 
warn the principal in the first degree if 
anyone approaches. 
 
1 Charles Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law §§ 30-31 (15th ed. 
1993). 
 
Based on the record in this case, the Commonwealth did 
not prove that Muhammad was a principal in the first degree to 
the capital murder of Dean Meyers under Code § 18.2-31(8).  
Under established law, Muhammad may be a principal in the 
first degree to the Meyers murder in two circumstances: (1) if 
he actually shot Meyers or (2) if he and Lee Boyd Malvo are 
found to be joint principals, with each acting as an 
“immediate perpetrator” in the killing.  The record does not 
establish that the Commonwealth proved either circumstance. 
Our decision in Rogers v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 307, 410 
S.E.2d 621 (1991), precludes finding that Muhammad is a 
principal in the first degree as the actual shooter of Meyers 
 
129
under the facts of this case.  In Rogers, we reversed a 
defendant’s capital murder conviction because the evidence 
placed the defendant and another man in the victim’s house at 
the time of the murder and the Commonwealth failed to present 
“any evidence . . . which places the murder weapon in 
defendant’s hands.”  Id. at 319, 410 S.E.2d at 628.  “Stated 
differently, the Commonwealth . . . failed to exclude [the 
second man] as the perpetrator.”  Id. 
Following Rogers, Muhammad cannot be a principal in the 
first degree as the actual shooter of Meyers because the 
Commonwealth has not excluded Malvo as that person, and it 
presented no evidence that Muhammad was the actual shooter.  
“Because the circumstances of defendant’s conduct do not 
exclude the reasonable hypothesis that [the second man 
(Malvo)] killed the victim, the capital murder prosecution 
fails.”  Id. at 320, 410 S.E.2d at 629.  Therefore, Muhammad 
may not be convicted of Meyers’ capital murder upon this 
record if the Commonwealth’s position is Muhammad actually 
shot Meyers. 
The Commonwealth primarily relies, however, on an 
expansive reading of the concept of “immediate perpetrator” 
based on Sergeant Spicer’s theory of how a sniper team should 
operate.  The majority opinion adopts this theory and 
concludes both Malvo and Muhammad are culpable as principals 
 
130
in the first degree because “actual participation together in 
a unified act” renders each an immediate perpetrator.  In 
doing so, the Commonwealth and the majority opinion reach 
beyond any precedent of this court and ignore clear 
foundations of the criminal law that have long defined the 
distinction between principals of the first and second degree.  
Our precedent establishes that co-actors in a capital murder 
can only be immediate perpetrators when each actor undertook a 
direct act “in the immediate presence of the victim’s body 
when the fatal blows were struck and, hence, had jointly 
participated in the killing.”  Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 
Va. 482, 494, 404 S.E.2d 227, 235 (1991), cert. denied, 502 
U.S. 944 (1991). 
In Coppola v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 257 S.E.2d 797 
(1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1103 (1980), the victim died 
from blows to the head.  Id. at 246, 257 & n.5, 257 S.E.2d at 
800, 807 & n.5.  In the course of an armed robbery, the 
defendant beat the victim’s head against the floor and a 
codefendant struck her in the head with his fist.  Id. at 246, 
257 S.E.2d at 800.  We affirmed the defendant’s death sentence 
finding him to be “an immediate perpetrator” because both he 
and his codefendant directly assaulted the victim as they 
“jointly participated in the fatal beating.” Id. at 256, 257 
 
131
S.E.2d at 806.  This action rendered the defendant a principal 
in the first degree. 
In Strickler v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 482, 404 S.E.2d 227 
(1991), the evidence showed that the victim was killed by a 
blow to the head from a 69 pound rock.  We noted “a single 
person could not have lifted [the rock] and dropped or thrown 
it while simultaneously holding the victim down.”  Id. at 494, 
404 S.E.2d at 235.  We affirmed the conviction for capital 
murder holding that because the defendant “[took] a direct 
part in inflicting [the] fatal injuries” he was an “immediate 
perpetrator” and thus a principal in the first degree.  Id. at 
495, 404 S.E.2d at 235. 
In Lenz v. Warden, 265 Va. 373, 381, 579 S.E.2d 194, 199 
(2003), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2933 (2004), 
Lenz and another convict, Remington, inflicted “68 stab wounds 
and all the wounds contributed to the victim’s death.”  Lenz 
argued that “he could only be convicted of capital murder in 
the event the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that he was 
the triggerman.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  We 
disagreed, holding that “when two or more persons take a 
direct part in inflicting injuries, each joint participant is 
an immediate perpetrator for the purposes of the capital 
murder statutes.”  Id. (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
132
In Remington v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 333, 551 S.E.2d 620 
(2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1062 (2002), Lenz’ co-
perpetrator was convicted for the same capital murder.  We 
affirmed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s proffered 
jury instructions that would have instructed the jury that he 
was a principal in the second degree unless he inflicted the 
actual fatal blow that caused the victim’s death out of the 
many blows struck.  Because the evidence established “that 
Remington and Lenz jointly participated in [the victim’s] 
death[,]” we found that the trial court did not err in 
refusing the instruction.  Id. at 350, 551 S.E.2d at 630. 
Similarly, the Court of Appeals found the defendant in 
Hancock v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 774, 407 S.E.2d 301 
(1991), to be an immediate perpetrator of attempted capital 
murder by arson when he poured gasoline on a cushion while 
another person immediately ignited it.  The court noted that 
“[b]oth men were principals in the first degree.  Both 
provided the direct means to ignite the fire.  Placing the 
flammable material in place for another to ignite it makes 
that person a perpetrator.” Id. at 781, 407 S.E.2d at 305-06. 
All of these cases involve direct, contemporaneous acts 
on the part of the co-perpetrators that combined to 
proximately inflict the injury on the victim.  In each case, 
both perpetrators were physically present and personally 
 
133
participated by a direct act against the victim to accomplish 
the murder, or to set the fire in Hancock.  In the case at 
bar, however, there is no such evidence of a similar direct 
act by Muhammad. 
Assuming Muhammad acted as hypothesized by the 
Commonwealth's witness, Mark Spicer, in positioning the 
Caprice in the Bob Evans parking lot to face the gas station 
and communicating to Malvo that the coast was clear to fire at 
Meyers, that is not the act of a principal in the first degree 
under Virginia law.  Such conduct is the quintessence of 
activity by a principal in the second degree: “encouraging, 
inciting, or in some manner offering aid in the commission of 
the crime . . . lending countenance, or otherwise aiding while 
another did the act.”  Jones v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 370, 
373, 157 S.E.2d 907, 909 (1967). 
In that regard, Muhammad’s actions were of the same 
character as those of a lookout or wheelman in a robbery.  
Such a person may provide the means and direction for the 
commission of the robbery by driving the actual perpetrators 
to the scene and keeping watch while the others directly 
commit the crime.  Like Muhammad, the wheelman may communicate 
by walkie-talkie or cell phone to the actual perpetrators 
instructing them as to when to commit the robbery and then 
 
134
exit the premises in heavy traffic.3  Undoubtedly these acts 
accord the actual perpetrators, who take the immediate and 
direct action to effectuate the robbery, an easier task with 
an increased likelihood of escape.  Nevertheless, no serious 
argument can be made such a wheelman is a principal in the 
first degree under our jurisprudence. 
That is because the wheelman takes an indirect role, not 
a direct role, in the crime of robbery.  He is present, 
keeping watch and offering his counsel and direction to commit 
the crime to the actual perpetrators, which is Muhammad’s role 
under the Commonwealth's theory of the case.  The wheelman is 
an actual participant in the unified act of disparate persons 
culminating in a robbery, just as Muhammad was an actual 
participant in an act with Malvo that resulted in Meyers’ 
murder.  Neither the wheelman, nor Muhammad, in the given 
circumstances, can be deemed an immediate perpetrator and thus 
a principal in the first degree under Virginia law. 
The crimes in Strickler, Coppola, Lenz, Remington and 
Hancock could not have occurred without the direct, 
contemporaneous, physical act of both perpetrators.  The fire 
                                                 
3 Grant v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 166, 168-69, 217 S.E.2d 806, 808 (1975) (lookout 
and driver of the getaway car convicted as principal in the second degree); Camphor v. State, 
196 A.2d 75, 75 (Md. 1963) (accomplice who distracted the attention of a store clerk while 
immediate perpetrator stole a sewing machine was a principal in the second degree); Vincent 
v. State, 151 A.2d 898, 902-03 (Md. 1959) (lookout and driver of getaway car who provided a 
second set of clothing to the robbers was a principal in the second degree). 
 
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could not have been set without the direct, physical 
participation of both defendants in Hancock.  Similarly, the 
murder in Strickler could not have occurred without both 
perpetrators acting together directly on the victim.  The 
defendants in Coppola, Lenz and Remington each directly 
participated in the physical beating or stabbing of the 
victim.  These direct acts define an immediate perpetrator, 
rendering each actor a principal in the first degree, but 
stand in contrast to Muhammad’s indirect acts.  The record in 
this case, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
Commonwealth, is simply devoid of the direct acts regarding a 
victim that our precedent requires to find Muhammad an 
immediate perpetrator acting as a principal in the first 
degree.   
Assuming that the events occurred as the Commonwealth 
theorizes, it was nonetheless, Malvo, not Muhammad, who 
finally sighted the rifle to its target and made the ultimate 
decision to pull the trigger.  Malvo could have picked any 
target and decided at any time to fire or not.  While the 
range of Malvo’s vision was more restricted than Muhammad’s, 
the record reflects that Malvo was not “blind” and dependent 
on Muhammad in order to shoot Meyers.  Spicer’s own testimony 
confirms the shooter had “a very large field of view by 
slightly moving [his] head left or right while still 
 
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maintaining a very small outward chance of . . . being seen.”  
The prosecutor even argued this point to the jury, noting that 
the shooter had “a much wider field of vision and a much 
narrower exposure.”  Obviously, Muhammad's advice and 
direction to Malvo of the traffic flow along the multiple lane 
highway made Malvo’s choice easier and more likely to succeed.  
But in the end, it was Malvo who had to make the final 
decision to shoot and performed the direct act of firing the 
rifle. 
Put simply, there is a failure of proof to establish 
Muhammad as a principal in the first degree so as to sustain 
his conviction under Code § 18.2-31(8).  The evidence in this 
record, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth 
and indulging all the inferences from its theory of the case, 
establishes Muhammad's actions as those of a principal in the 
second degree, “actually present, assisting the principal in 
the first degree [Malvo], standing ready to assist if needed, 
or commanding, counseling, or otherwise encouraging the 
principal in the first degree to commit the crime,” 1 
Wharton's Criminal Law, supra, at § 31.  Conversely, this same 
evidence of Muhammad commanding and directing Malvo's actions 
effectively proves the requisite conduct for the conviction 
under Code § 18.2-31(13) for "a killing pursuant to . . . 
direction and order."  Code § 18.2-18. 
 
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Virginia law is clear that “a principal in the second 
degree, may [not] be convicted of capital murder under the 
provisions of [the] Code,” Coppola, 220 Va. at 256, 257 S.E.2d 
at 806, unless one of the enumerated exceptions such as under 
Code § 18.2-31(13) applies.  Thus, we have noted that 
[o]nly the actual perpetrator of the crime may 
be convicted of capital murder . . .  Thus, 
neither an accessory before the fact nor a 
principal in the second degree may be so 
convicted. . . . The Commonwealth has the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt 
that one accused of capital murder was the 
actual perpetrator of the crime.  Suspicion of 
guilt, however strong, or even a probability of 
guilt is insufficient to support a conviction. 
 
Rogers, 242 Va. at 317, 410 S.E.2d at 627 (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
The General Assembly has specifically limited a capital 
murder conviction under Code § 18.2-31(8) by its enactment of 
Code § 18.2-18.  In doing so, the General Assembly has 
mandated that a principal in the second degree cannot be 
convicted of capital murder, but his conviction is limited to 
murder in the first degree.  This statutory mandate is binding 
on the judiciary until altered by the General Assembly. 
For the forgoing reasons, Muhammad’s conviction and 
sentence for the capital murder of Dean Meyers under Code 
§ 18.2-31(8) should be reversed and remanded according to the 
statutory directive of Code § 18.2-18.  Accordingly, I 
 
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respectfully dissent from section II(B)(1) of the majority 
opinion regarding the conviction and sentence under Code 
§ 18.2-31(8).  To the extent the conviction under Code § 18.2-
31(13) is based upon a principal in the first-degree analysis, 
I respectfully dissent from section II(B)(2), but I concur in 
the alternative ground in section II(B)(2) and would thus 
affirm the conviction and sentence of death under Code § 18.2-
31(13).  Otherwise, I concur in the majority opinion. 
 
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