Case Title: Davis v. Weyerhaeuser Co.

Citation: 231 Or. 596, 373 P.2d 985

Docket Number: 

State: oregon

Court: Oregon Supreme Court

Date: 1962-08-14T00:00:00Z

Document:
Affirmed August 14, 1962.
*597 Harl H. Haas, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Bailey, Swink & Gates, Portland.
Bruce Spaulding, Portland, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Mautz, Souther, Spaulding, Kinsey & Williamson, Portland.
Before McALLISTER, Chief Justice, and ROSSMAN, PERRY and GOODWIN, Justices.
AFFIRMED.
ROSSMAN, J.
This is an appeal by the plaintiff, Houston Davis, from a judgment of involuntary nonsuit which the circuit court entered in favor of the defendant, Weyerhaeuser Company, upon its motion after the plaintiff had presented all of his evidence and had rested. The action was of the kind which is commonly termed personal injury. There were two defendants during the course of the trial in the circuit court. We have mentioned one of them, Weyerhaeuser. The other was a co-employee of the plaintiff by the name of Carl Johnson. Both the plaintiff and Johnson worked in the Klamath Falls plant of Weyehaeuser. The exact place where they worked was near a planer which was located in a large structure that formed a part of the mill and that housed the hard board plant. Johnson was one of those who fed material into the planer. The plaintiff, as a checker, worked in the vicinity of the planer. The plaintiff worked upon a shift that went off duty about an hour after Johnson's *598 shift began. This appeal in no way affects the liability of Johnson. Immediately after the trial judge sustained Weyerhaeuser's motion for an involuntary nonsuit as to the plaintiff, the latter moved for judgment of voluntary nonsuit as to Johnson. The motion was allowed. Hereafter, when we employ the term "the defendant" we will refer to Weyerhaeuser.
The defendant's motion for an order of involuntary nonsuit reads as follows:
The plaintiff contends that on September 3, 1959, shortly after midnight when his shift had about completed its duties, he was squatted down near the planer in front of his tool chest and was putting his tools away preparatory to returning to his home. In describing his posture he said that he was almost sitting on his heels. According to him, Johnson approached him from the rear and without saying anything took hold of each of his shoulders and pulled him backward. He attributed no ill will to Johnson. The plaintiff cried out, "Turn me loose, you are hurting my back," and Johnson immediately righted him. The plaintiff thereupon stood up, and the occurrence *599 was over. The plaintiff shortly wrote his day's report and went home. The following day he experienced pains and difficulties in his back. He has not been able to return to his work since the incident in question  September 3, 1959. December 1, 1959, he underwent surgery in an effort to improve his condition.
The plaintiff was unable to say how far he was pulled back, but knew that he did not fall to the floor and that no part of his body except his feet came into contact with the floor. He could not recall whether Johnson, in performing the act just mentioned, thrust forward a knee into contact with him.
The plaintiff's single assignment of error contends that the circuit court erred when it sustained the motion for an involuntary nonsuit which we quoted. We will now consider it.
The complaint charged the defendant with negligence in the following:
A second count of the complaint alleges:
The plaintiff's brief states:
Beginning about 1948 or 1949 the plaintiff began to experience trouble with his back. He described the affliction as "soreness." Occasionally the pain troubled him sufficiently so that he lost a day or more from his work. By April 23, 1959, the condition of the plaintiff's back had deteriorated sufficiently so that he underwent surgical treatment in *601 an effort to improve matters. He did not return to his employment until August 10, 1959. He then felt able to do his work. As we have said, he underwent surgery again December 1, 1959, that is, after the occurence of September 3, 1959.
The plaintiff entered the employ of the defendant's Klamath Falls plant in 1949 or 1950 and remained in its employ until his injury September 3, 1959. In 1956 or 1957 he was transferred to the hardboard phase of operations; the latter were conducted in the building in which the injury occurred. About three and one-half years before the injury Johnson also went to work in the hardboard plant. The two men became acquainted. They were not ill-disposed to each other.
As is evident from the averments of the complaint that are set forth in a preceding paragraph, the plaintiff contends that the defendant permitted horseplay by its employees and thereby failed to provide him with a safe place in which to work. He also claims that Johnson's act in bending him (the plaintiff) backward was done in the course of Johnson's employment and that its purpose was to gain the attention of the plaintiff so that the two could discuss a matter pertaining to the planer.
The plaintiff asserts that when Johnson came upon him and pulled him backward Johnson had the double purpose of (1) gaining the plaintiff's attention and (2) of discussing with him the planer. In that way the plaintiff says that Johnson was acting within the scope of his employment. The contention is based solely upon an excerpt from the transcript of evidence which we will shortly quote. The entire excerpt consists of a single question which plaintiff's counsel propounded to Johnson and of the latter's answer *602 thereto. The excerpt represents all of the testimony that Johnson gave. Before quoting it we explain that the plaintiff does not cite anything else in support of his contention that Johnson pulled him back for the purpose of talking to him. The excerpt follows:
It will be noticed that Johnson did not say that he tilted the plaintiff backward for the purpose of getting information from him. The tilting backward is the crux of this case. We will presently show that Johnson did not  either before or after tilting the plaintiff backward  ask him for information concerning the planer.
The deposition which the question mentioned was not produced and we have no access to it. We are uninformed as to its contents. We do not know when the deposition was taken. The trial judge, in construing that item of evidence, declared:
The trial judge, as is seen from the foregoing, treated Johnson's answer to the question propounded to him (Johnson) by plaintiff's counsel as "evidence tending to show that Johnson may have had some sort of an intention like this in approaching Mr. Davis." Defendant's counsel agrees that that interpretation of the question and answer was proper. We will, therefore, adopt the same interpretation, that is, that Johnson had in mind, as he saw the plaintiff ahead of him, an intention to ask him a question about the planer. Intentions, however, can be fleeting and are subject to abandonment. It may be that the intention to ask a question was discarded when Johnson saw the favorable opportunity for a bit of horseplay.
The trial judge, as is seen from his quoted ruling, commented upon the fact that the plaintiff conceded that Johnson asked nothing about the planer after he (the plaintiff) had stood up. We, too, believe that it is significant that after the plaintiff arose from his squatting position and the two men spent a moment in conversation Johnson asked nothing about the planer. If, when Johnson touched the plaintiff, he really intended to ask the plaintiff something about the planer, it is impossible to understand why he didn't do so after the plaintiff stood up and the two spoke to each other. The plaintiff arose promptly and *604 did not say at that time that he was in pain or distress. Pertaining to the conversation that then took place between Johnson and himself, he testified:
1, 2. We do not believe that the plaintiff presented any evidence indicating that when Johnson took hold of his (the plaintiff's) shoulders and drew him back he was acting pursuant to or within the scope of his employment. He was then doing nothing for the defendant. Restatement of the Law, Agency 2d, § 228, states:
Barry v. Oregon Trunk Railway, 197 Or 246, 253 P2d 260. We therefore dismiss as unsupported the contention that Johnson was acting within the scope of his employment when he pulled the plaintiff backward. It is our belief that Johnson's act was purely one of horseplay.
The plaintiff called as witnesses several employees of the defendant who worked in the same structure as he and who related acts of horseplay which took place there from time to time. The building evidently was large and housed not only the planer which we have mentioned but also other machinery. One of the witnesses spoke of a motor truck that he drove in the structure; its operation in the building may indicate that the latter was sizable. We refer to the spaciousness *605 of the structure because the witnesses, in mentioning acts of horseplay, did not always state the place in the building where the act occurred. If the act, such as throwing a wad of paper or pinching some one, did not take place in the general area where the plaintiff worked, it would seem that it could not have affected his safety.
Although the plaintiff had worked for the defendant longer than any of his witnesses, he mentioned no horseplay or other antics that ever occurred. He also testified that Johnson never before played any prank upon him; the following is taken from his testimony:
One of the plaintiff's witnesses who was present when Johnson bent the plaintiff back testified that on another occasion he saw Johnson "take a long *606 pry bar that they use for loading cars, sharp on one end and stand back and throw it at a box * * * and I have seen him put spikes in the claws of hammers and throw it at the box." He testified that Johnson didn't throw those tools "very far." He didn't mention where the acts occurred. The plaintiff made no mention of them. It is not claimed that those acts were done in a manner that endangered anyone. They were not practical jokes but were apparently efforts of Johnson to test his marksmanship. The same witness also testified that he saw Johnson at times throw chalk at other employees. Another witness also mentioned chalk throwing. The first of those two witnesses, before the day of the trial, wrote a summary of the acts of horseplay that he had observed. The following is taken from it.
By "this incident" he referred to plaintiff's injury. As a witness he testified that he made a mistake in phrasing his report in that manner, and gave the following testimony:
*607 Another witness described a bit of horseplay by a foreman which assumed the form of squaring off in feigning fashion for a fight. The witness said that the foreman was "just playing." He added that the make-believe fighter is no longer a foreman.
We have mentioned the fact that a witness spoke of a truck that he drove in the structure in which the plaintiff's injury occurred. He testified that on one occasion Johnson threw a four-by-four under it. The witness' testimony indicates that the truck was near the planer when Johnson took a four-by-four from the planer and threw it under the truck. No one testified that the truck was moving when the incident occurred or that it passed over the board.
A witness testified that he saw an occasional employee pull a tallyman backward who was sitting on his haunches counting material so that he was thrown off-balance and toppled backward. In that way he lost his count. No one claimed that any tallyman was injured in that way. We infer the loss of the count rather than the tip-over of the tallyman was the nub of the antic.
Some witnesses mentioned "goosing" and attributed a part of it to Johnson. Plainly such an act of buffoonery would be unbecoming in any gathering which observed even the amentities of society, but no one claims that it endangered anyone's safety. The fact that an employee resorted to something of a coarse nature does not establish the plaintiff's charges.
The throwing once in a while of a piece of wadded paper by one employee at another, which an employee swore occurred, could scarcely be deemed an act that endangered safety.
The above does not mention all of the acts of horseplay that the witnesses related, but it affords *608 an impression of their nature. No witness stated that any one, except the plaintiff, had suffered an injury from any of the antics.
Some of the witnesses described action taken by the defendant and its foremen which sought to suppress, if not end, the horseplay. The company posted in its plant a sheet of printed "Company Safety Rules" which included this:
Another set of "Posted Company Rules" listed as cause for "immediate Discharge" any "Violation of safety rules as established by the Employer." Witnesses mentioned gatherings of employees in which foremen reiterated the defendant's attitude against horseplay. We quote the following from the testimony given by one of the witnesses:
One of the witnesses mentioned an employee who "was fired" because of an act of horseplay. A foreman who either participated in an act of horseplay or countenanced it was relieved of his employment. We quote the following from the testimony of another of the witnesses:
It may be that all of the foremen whom the witnesses mentioned did not work upon the same shift as that of the plaintiff, but all acts of horseplay that the witnesses described were not committed by men who worked on the same shift with the plaintiff. Evidently, the witnesses sought to describe the entire situation rather than limit themselves to some specific time of the day.
The foregoing completes our review of the evidence. We have omitted some details.
Section 1.15 of the Basic Safety Code, which was promulgated pursuant to authority granted by ORS 654.035, says:
Section 1.6 of the code provides:
*610 Many of the items of horseplay mentioned by the witnesses were of a kind that could not have readily brought injury to anyone. We have in mind such acts as throwing wadded paper or pinching some one. Possibly those phases of camaraderie were bits of friendly recognition. Every act of horseplay that the witnesses described seemingly resulted from well disposed motives and not from ill will. At any rate, nothing to the contrary was claimed. If a person who is seated upon his haunches is violently pulled back to the floor by some one as a result of ill will, an injury may be sustained; but if a friend pulls another backward so as to throw him off balance, it is not likely that any one could suffer injury thereby.
3. We do not believe that the evidence above reviewed indicates that the horseplay in which the men engaged was of a character that constituted a hazard to the workmen's safety within the contemplation of our Basic Safety Code. No one testified that any employee complained to the defendant or to a foreman about the horseplay or asked that action be taken for its suppression. As we have seen, no one was injured by any of the antics until injury befell the plaintiff. But the impaired condition of his back was such that it could not withstand pressure. Mention has been made of the fact that one of the employees, after relating several items of horseplay that he had seen, testified that none of them would "hurt anybody." Still another characterized as "just play" the incident which he described.
4. If the parties to this case were subject to the Oregon Workmen's Compensation Law (ORS 656.002 through 656.824) the plaintiff would receive compensation as prescribed by that act: Stark v. State Industrial Accident Commission, 103 Or 80, 204 P 151. *611 But, our Workmen's Compensation Law does not require a claimant to establish negligence as a basis for compensation. He is required to go no further than to prove that the injury for which he asks compensation arose out of and in the course of his employment: ORS 656.202. One who seeks damages in a case such as this must establish that his injury resulted from negligence or wantonness for which the employer was responsible: Copeland v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company, 291 F2d 119; Sheaf v. Minneapolis St. P. & S.S.M.R. Co., 162 F2d 110; Barry v. Oregon Trunk Railway, 197 Or 246, 253 P2d 260; Kelley v. Oregon Shipbuilding Corp., 183 Or 1, 189 P2d 105.
In Newkirk v. Oregon-Washington R.R. & Nav. Co., 128 Or 28, 273 P 707, and in Cook v. Kinzua Pine Mills Co., 207 Or 34, 293 P2d 717, this court quoted approvingly the following which it took from 39 CJ 1292, § 1487:
In both the Newkirk and the Cook cases the scope of employment of the tortious employee included performance of the act which brought about the injury. In the case now before us the scope of employment did not include the horseplay which caused the plaintiff's injury.
We quote the following from Cook v. Kinzua Pine Mills Co.:
But the Barry decision is not distinguishable upon that basis from the one now at bar. Johnson, like Faherty in the Oregon Trunk Railway case, "was serving a purpose solely his own." Faherty intended to inflict some injury. Johnson did not. He wished to do nothing except engage in levity.
We take the following from Restatement of the Law, Torts, § 317:
Comment c following the statement of the rule just quoted declares:
It will be observed that the rule written by the Restatement requires evidence that the master "knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control."
In Kelley v. Oregon Shipbuilding Corp., 183 Or 1, 189 P2d 105, the defendant had in its employ a workman by the name of Archer who is described in the decision as "most vicious and brutal known about the plant as `onery' and quarrelsome." The plaintiff was Archer's superior, but when it developed that Archer would not obey the plaintiff's orders, the defendant, upon the plaintiff's request, discharged him. Archer thereupon, amid the use of profanity, threatened the plaintiff and said, "I'll stomp the hell out of you." Although Archer was discharged in that manner the defendant at once re-employed him, but for work in *614 a different part of its yard considerably removed from the area where the plaintiff worked. Two months later while the plaintiff was engaged in the performance of his duties upon the defendant's premises Archer assaulted and beat him. The jury's verdict was in favor of the plaintiff. The trial judge entered judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict. In sustaining that judgment our decision declared:
5. In the case now at bar we have declared that the acts of horseplay were not of a kind that endangered anyone's safety and we quoted from witness's testimony that he saw nothing done by Johnson that was harmful.
We do not believe that the circuit court erred when it sustained the defendant's motion for an order of involuntary nonsuit.
Affirmed.