Case Title: U.S. Bank, NA v. Alexander

Citation: 

Docket Number: 109648

State: oklahoma

Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Date: 2012-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
U.S. BANK, N.A. v. ALEXANDER2012 OK 43Case Number: 109648Decided: 05/01/2012THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN 
THE PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 

U.S. BANK, N.A., as Trustee, for Credit Suisse First Boston HEAT 
2005-4, Plaintiff/Appellee,v.JOHN W. ALEXANDER, III, and LISA ALEXANDER, 
Defendants/Appellants,ANDCITIFINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., Defendant.
ON APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CLEVELAND 
COUNTYHONORABLE TOM A. LUCASDISTRICT JUDGE
¶0 This matter comes before this Court as an accelerated appeal from an order 
granting summary judgment in favor of U.S. Bank National Association, as 
Trustee, for Credit Suisse First Boston HEAT 2005-4, against John W. Alexander, 
III, and Lisa Alexander.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
Sally E. Garrison, BAER, TIMBERLAKE, COULSON AND CATES, P.C., Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma; Mark Edward Hardin, Tulsa, Oklahoma; Kari Y. Hawkins, Oklahoma City, 
Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellee.Michael R. Warkentin, MICHAEL R. WARKENTIN, 
P.C., Norman, Oklahoma, for Defendants/Appellants. 
COMBS, J.
¶1 On May 10, 2005, John W. Alexander, III (Alexander), executed a note to 
MILA, Inc., DBA Mortgage Investment Lending Associates, Inc. (MILA), and a 
mortgage to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), as nominee 
for MILA and its successors and assigns. The mortgage also contains language, 
identifying MERS as the mortgagee under this security instrument.
¶2 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo), filed a foreclosure petition on July 
23 2009, alleging appellant defaulted on the note for installments beginning 
April 1, 2009.1 The petition further states Wells Fargo was the present 
holder of the note and mortgage, and Wells Fargo took the note and mortgage for 
good and valuable consideration from the original lender. A copy of the note and 
part of the mortgage was attached to the original petition. The note attached to 
the original petition contained no indorsements. 
¶3 On October 6, 2009, an Order Granting Motion for Substitution of Plaintiff 
and Modification of Caption was filed in response to a Motion filed that same 
date. Appellee, U.S. Bank National Association, as Trustee, for Credit Suisse 
First Boston HEAT 2005-4 (Appellee) was substituted in place of Wells Fargo. The 
motion stated Wells Fargo had subsequently assigned all of its rights in the 
mortgage to Appellee. Appellee also filed, on October 6, 2009, its First Amended 
Petition. This amended petition re-alleged all of the allegations of Wells 
Fargo's petition and identified additional defendants as parties who may have an 
interest in the property. Appellee attached to the amended petition, a copy of 
the same unindorsed note and mortgage originally executed by the Appellant John 
W. Alexander, III, in 2005.
¶4 Appellants (John W. Alexander, III, and Lisa Alexander) never answered the 
petition and a judgment was entered against Appellants on April 19, 2010. One 
day later, on April 20, 2010, Appellants' counsel made an entry of appearance 
and the judgment was vacated by order of May 19, 2010. 
¶5 On June 8, 2010, Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment. Appellee 
claims, in this motion for summary judgment, it is the holder of the note and 
mortgage, and that Appellants have been in constant default since the July 1, 
2009, installment payment was due. Appellee further alleges 
that Appellants have made no tender sufficient to reinstate the 
loan, and there has been no extension or renewal of the note. Appellee attached 
a copy of the same unindorsed note and parts of the mortgage included in its 
First Amended Petition. It also attached an affidavit and assignment of real 
estate mortgage. The affidavit was executed by a Vice President Loan 
Documentation of Appellee and generally affirms the allegations in the motion. 
The assignment of real estate mortgage reflects an execution date of August 13, 
2009, but made effective March 1, 2005.2 This assignment was from MERS (as nominee for the 
lender) to Appellee of the real estate mortgage "together with the note, 
debts and claims thereby secured." (emphasis added)
¶6 Appellants filed an objection to Appellee's motion for summary judgment 
and later filed a supplement to the objection. Appellants challenged certain 
comments in Wells Fargo's motion to substitute which stated Wells Fargo 
subsequently assigned its rights under the mortgage to Appellee after the filing 
of the original petition on July 23, 2009. The assignment of real estate 
mortgage executed August 13, 2009, is from MERS to Appellee. This document, it 
is asserted by Appellee, provides evidence of the attempt to assign the note. 
The assignment of real estate mortgage from MERS to Appellee, was made 
retroactive to March 1, 2005, seventy (70) days prior to the note and mortgage 
being executed. Appellants assert the retroactive assignment may have been 
designed to cover possible violations of prohibited transactions for retirement 
plans or to demonstrate the transfer occurred prior to MILA filing bankruptcy on 
July 7, 2007. Appellants demanded, in their response to the motion for summary 
judgment, proof that MILA had authority to execute an assignment of the mortgage 
and indorsement of the note.
¶7 Appellants assert the note provided by Appellee does not have an 
indorsement and they claim such indorsement is necessary under the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 12A O.S. 2001, Sections 3-103(a), 3-203 and 3-204. Appellants 
fear without an indorsement they are vulnerable to future liability on the 
original note by another party.3
¶8 A summary order was filed August 18, 2010, denying Appellee's motion for 
summary judgment because there were factual issues to be resolved.
¶9 Appellee filed a second motion for summary judgment on April 15, 2011. 
Appellee attached to the second motion for summary judgment, for the first time, 
a copy of the note with a blank allonge purportedly executed by an assistant 
funding manager of MILA. This allonge reflects "payable to the order of" 
"without recourse." Appellee asserted appellant did not contest the genuineness, 
authenticity and execution of the note and mortgage, and further, Appellants 
admitted at deposition they were behind on their payments.4 Therefore, Appellee 
asserted a prima facie case for foreclosure, specifically a valid mortgage 
exists and there had been a default.
¶10 Appellants filed an objection and cross motion for summary judgment on 
May 4, 2011. Appellants admit Alexander signed the note and mortgage on May 5, 
2005. Appellants allege, on July 7, 2007, MILA filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
in the Western District of Washington, and there has been no relief from the 
automatic stay for the subject property of this action.5 
¶11 The trial court, on June 7, 2011, granted summary judgment in favor of 
Appellee and awarded Appellee costs and attorney fees. On June 10, 2011, 
Appellee alleges counsel for Appellants would not sign the journal entry of 
judgment because he thought attorney fees were unreasonable.6 Appellee filed a motion 
to settle journal entry on June 17, 2011, and Appellants filed an objection on 
June 27, 2011. The basis for the objection is that Appellee's attorney fees are 
unreasonable due to Appellants' inability to determine who was the holder of the 
note by reason of the inconsistencies in the various pleadings, and Appellees 
failure to provide loan transfer documents to Appellants when requested in 
discovery.
¶12 Appellants filed their petition in error on July 7, 2011, and later 
amended the petition in error to include the file stamped copy of the journal 
entry of judgment filed August 15, 2011. The Journal Entry of Judgment favored 
Appellee and found no substantial controversy as to any material fact. The 
Journal Entry of Judgment also denied Appellants cross motion for summary 
judgment. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶13 An appeal on summary judgment comes to this court as a de novo 
review. Carmichael v. Beller, 1996 OK 48, ¶2, 914 P.2d 1051, 1053. All inferences and conclusions 
are to be drawn from the underlying facts contained in the record and are to be 
considered in the light most favorable to the party opposing the summary 
judgment. Rose v. Sapulpa Rural Water Co., 1981 OK 85, 631 P.2d 752. Summary judgment is improper if, 
under the evidentiary materials, reasonable individuals could reach different 
factual conclusions. Gaines v. Comanche County Medical Hospital, 
2006 OK 39, ¶4, 143 P.3d 203, 205.
ANALYSIS
¶14 Appellant asserts nineteen (19) issues on appeal.7 These include error by 
the trial court in not requiring more contemporaneous evidence of the transfer 
of the note and mortgage when allegedly Appellee's counsel and its loan 
servicer, ASC, did not know which entity had standing to enforce the note. 
Appellants argue the trial court committed reversible error by not requiring a 
valid assignment of mortgage prior to commencement of the foreclosure action. 
Essentially, Appellant is arguing Appellee did not have standing to bring the 
foreclosure action because there was a material issue of fact as to whether the 
Appellee was a person entitled to enforce the note at the time Appellee filed 
its amended petition. Standing is the dispositive issue in this case. 
¶15 Appellee argues in its response to petition in error that at no time did 
appellant ever file an answer and no defenses have ever been asserted or 
preserved.8 Appellee asserts that Appellants' nineteen (19) issues 
are either abandoned, expired or are in contravention of established law. 
Appellees acknowledge the only issues preserved for appeal are those raised by 
Appellants in pleadings or oral argument. In the opinion of the Appellee, the 
preserved issues are: 1) did Appellee provide sufficient evidence that it has 
standing to enforce the note and mortgage; 2) does negotiation of the note carry 
with it the security interest independent of a formal assignment; 3) if not, is 
the formal assignment in this matter effective; and 4) are the attorney's fees 
reasonable.
¶16 As previously identified, the dispositive issue is whether or not 
Appellee had standing at the time Appellee filed their first amended petition. 
We hold that the issue of standing as well as other material issues of fact 
remain that must be determined by the trial court. Therefore summary judgment 
was inappropriate.
¶17 This Court has previously held:
Standing, as a jurisdictional question, may be correctly raised at any level 
of the judicial process or by the Court on its own motion. This Court has 
consistently held that standing to raise issues in a proceeding must be 
predicated on interest that is "direct, immediate and substantial." Standing 
determines whether the person is the proper party to request adjudication of a 
certain issue and does not decide the issue itself. The key element is whether 
the party whose standing is challenged has sufficient interest or stake in the 
outcome.
Matter of the Estate of Doan, 1986 OK 15, ¶7, 727 P.2d 574, 576. In Hendrick v. Walters, 
1993 OK 
162, ¶4, 865 P.2d 1232, 1234, this Court also held:
Respondent challenges Petitioner's standing to bring the tendered 
issue. Standing refers to a person's legal right to seek relief in a judicial 
forum. It may be raised as an issue at any stage of the judicial process by 
any party or by the court sua sponte. (emphasis original)
¶18 Furthermore, in Fent v. Contingency Review Board, 2007 OK 27, footnote 19, 163 P.3d 512, 519, this Court stated "[s]tanding 
may be raised at any stage of the judicial process or by the court on its own 
motion." Additionally in Fent, this Court stated:
Standing refers to a person's legal right to seek relief in a judicial forum. 
The three threshold criteria of standing are (1) a legally protected interest 
which must have been injured in fact- i.e., suffered an injury which is 
actual, concrete and not conjectural in nature, (2) a causal nexus between the 
injury and the complained-of conduct, and (3) a likelihood, as opposed to mere 
speculation, that the injury is capable of being redressed by a favorable court 
decision. The doctrine of standing ensures a party has a personal stake in the 
outcome of a case and the parties are truly adverse.
Fent v. Contingency Review Board, 2007 OK 27, ¶7, 163 P.3d 512, 519-520. In essence, a plaintiff who 
has not suffered an injury attributable to the defendant lacks standing to bring 
a suit. And, thus, "standing [must] be determined as of the commencement of 
suit; . . ." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 570, n.5, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2142, 119 L. Ed. 351 (1992).
¶19 To commence a foreclosure action in Oklahoma, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate it has a right to enforce the note and, absent a showing of 
ownership, the plaintiff lacks standing. Gill v. First Nat. Bank & Trust 
Co. of Oklahoma City, 1945 OK 181, 159 P.2d 717.9 An assignment of the mortgage, however, is of no 
consequence because under Oklahoma law, "[p]roof of ownership of the note 
carried with it ownership of the mortgage security." Engle v. Federal Nat. 
Mortg. Ass'n, 1956 OK 
176, ¶7, 300 P.2d 997, 999. Therefore, in Oklahoma it is not possible to bifurcate the 
security interest from the note." BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. White, 
2011 OK CIV APP 
35, ¶ 10, 256 P.3d 1014, 1017. Because the note is a 
negotiable instrument, it is subject to the requirements of the UCC. Thus, a 
foreclosing entity has the burden of proving it is a "person entitled to enforce 
an instrument" by showing it was "(i) the holder of the instrument, (ii) a 
nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder, or 
(iii) a person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce 
the instrument pursuant to Section 12A-3-309 or subsection (d) of Section 
12A-3-418 of this title." 12A O.S. 2001 § 3-301.
¶20 To demonstrate you are the "holder" of the note you must prove you are in 
possession of the note and the note is either "payable to bearer" (blank 
indorsement) or to an identified person that is the person in possession 
(special indorsement).10 Therefore, both possession of the note and an 
indorsement on the note or attached allonge11 are required in order for one to be a "holder" of the 
note.
¶21 To be a "nonholder in possession who has the rights of a holder" you must 
be in possession of a note that has not been indorsed either by special 
indorsement or blank indorsement. No negotiation has occurred because the person 
now in possession did not become a holder by lack of the note being indorsed as 
mentioned. Negotiation is the voluntary or involuntary transfer of an instrument 
by a person other than the issuer to a person who thereby becomes its holder. 
12A O.S. 2001, § 
3-201. Transfer occurs when the instrument is delivered by a person other than 
its issuer for the purpose of giving to the person receiving delivery the right 
to enforce the instrument. 12A O.S. 2001, § 3-203. Delivery of the note 
would still have to occur even though there is no negotiation. Delivery is 
defined as the voluntary transfer of possession. 12A O.S. 2001, § 1-201(b)(15). The transferee 
would then be vested with any right of the transferor to enforce the note. 
12A O.S. 2001, § 
3-203(b). Some jurisdictions have held, without holder status and therefore 
the presumption of a right to enforce, the possessor of the note must 
demonstrate both the fact of the delivery and the purpose of the delivery of the 
note to the transferee in order to qualify as the person entitled to enforce. 
In re Veal, 450 B.R. 897, 912 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011). See 
also, 12A O.S. 2001, § 
3-203. 
¶22 Appellants argue Appellee does not have standing to bring this 
foreclosure action. Appellee claimed in its first amended petition, by 
re-alleging all of the allegations in Wells Fargo's original petition, it was 
the present holder of the note and mortgage. Over a year later in Appellee's 
second motion for summary judgment, it refers to itself as the current holder 
and assignee of the mortgage. Not until the second motion for summary judgment 
did Appellee attach an undated allonge to the note. No other pleading or motion 
prior to this time contained an indorsement on the note. This allonge was signed 
by an assistant funding manager of the lender, MILA. Had this allonge been 
attached to Appellee's first amended petition there would not be an issue as to 
whether Appellee was the holder of the note upon commencement of its action. 
However, there still remains the issue of whether or not MILA had been in 
bankruptcy when the note was transferred and its authority to transfer the note. 
Therefore, we cannot determine whether Appellee was a holder of the note at the 
time it filed its first amended petition. This issue of fact must be resolved 
upon remand to the trial court. Further the assignment of a mortgage which is 
made effective by its own terms to a timeframe prior to the execution of 
the original note and mortgage, raises obvious issues of material fact as to the 
validity of the assignment and the activities of the Appellee. 
¶23 The assignments purport to transfer not only the mortgage but also the 
note. However, these assignments are made by MERS, as nominee for MILA. Neither 
Oklahoma law nor the mortgage documents define the term "nominee." In the 
absence of a contractual definition, the parties leave the definition to 
judicial interpretation. Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) defines a nominee 
as " [a] person designated to act in place of another usu[ally] in a very 
limited way." (9th ed. 2009). "This definition suggests 
that a nominee possesses few or no legally enforceable rights beyond those of a 
principal whom the nominee serves." Landmark Nat. Bank v. Kesler, 289 
Kan. 528, 216 P.3d 158, 166 (2009). By definition a "nominee" is 
substantially the same as the definition of an "agent."12 The legal status of a nominee/agent, then, depends on 
the context of the relationship of the nominee/agent to its principal.
¶24 MERS is only the nominee of the lender for purposes of the mortgage. 
Arguably, MERS may be able to assign the mortgage as nominee of the lender, but 
there is no evidence of authority for MERS to indorse the note. 
¶25 Although Appellee has argued it holds the note, the only evidence in the 
record supporting it was a holder of the note was the allonge which was 
presented over a year after Appellee filed its first amended petition. As shown, 
a party must have standing at the time it commences its action. Deutsche Bank 
National Trust v. Brumbaugh, 2012 OK 3, ___P.3d___. Because standing is the 
dispositive issue, we will not address the remaining issues on appeal. The 
determination of the remaining relevant issues must be made by the trial court 
on remand. 
CONCLUSION
¶26 It is a fundamental precept of the law to expect a foreclosing party to 
actually be in possession of its claimed interest in the note, and to have the 
proper supporting documentation in hand when filing suit, showing the history of 
the note, so that the defendant is duly apprised of the rights of the plaintiff. 
This is accomplished by showing the party is a holder of the instrument or a 
nonholder in possession of the instrument who has the rights of a holder, or a 
person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to enforce the 
instrument pursuant to 12A O.S. 2001, § 3-309 or 12A O.S. 2001, § 3-418. Likewise, for the 
homeowners, absent adjudication on the underlying indebtedness, today's 
decisions to reverse the grant of a motion for summary judgment cannot cancel 
their obligation arising from an authenticated note, or insulate them from 
foreclosure proceedings based on proven delinquency. See, U.S. Bank National 
Association v. Kimball, 27 A.3d 1087, 75 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 100, 2011 VT 81 (VT 
2011); and Indymac Bank, F.S.B. v. Yano-Horoski, 78 A.D.3d 895, 912 N.Y.S.2d 239 (2010). This Court's decision in no way releases or exonerates 
the debt owed by the defendants on this home.
REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
¶27 CONCUR: TAYLOR, C.J., KAUGER, WATT, EDMONDSON, REIF, COMBS, 
JJ.
¶28 DISSENT: WINCHESTER (JOINS GURICH, J.), GURICH (BY SEPARATE WRITING), 
JJ.
¶29 RECUSED: COLBERT, V.C.J.
FOOTNOTES
1 On April 15, 2011, 
Appellee filed a second motion for summary judgment with an attached affidavit. 
The affiant is an employee of Wells Fargo DBA America's Servicing Company and 
was dated November 16, 2010. It states that the appellant defaulted on 
installments due July 1, 2009 and each and every month thereafter. 
2 The original note was signed on May 10, 2005.
3 Appellants also challenge the authority of MILA to 
assign any interest by reason of the bankruptcy action in the Western District 
of Washington; challenge the signature on the assignment made by an attorney of 
the Appellees law firm; assert a federal law which prohibits transfers of 
securitized mortgages ninety days after closing; assert that ASC(Americas 
Servicing Company) a division of Wells Fargo breached a duty of good faith by 
offering a "special forbearance agreement", receiving a payment and returning a 
payment; assert the Uniform Retirement System for Justices and Judges holds 
assets which include securitized loans and possibly the loan subject to this 
action , objecting to a member of the system rendering a decision in the 
matter;
4 December 3, 2010, deposition of John Alexander "[so] at 
the time, we were getting behind on our payments. We were one month behind." 
December 3, 2010, deposition of Lisa Alexander, John's wife, "[We] were behind 
May and June. And in July, I called them to let them know I was going to make 
May, June and July payments, which was approximately July the 2nd. And they said 
that the company had already foreclosed."
5 Appellants objection and cross motion raised many of 
the same issues raised in the response to the first motion for summary judgment 
including but not limited to; disputing the authority of the attorney of record 
to sign as a vice president of MERS; Appellants had made three increased 
payments to ASC, a subsidiary to determine if Appellants could continue in their 
current payments; also asserting ASC intentionally delayed and harassed the 
Appellants forbearance agreement efforts and dropped the Appellants forbearance 
efforts in violation of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP). 
Appellees replied to the objection to their Summary judgment asserting their 
possession of the note and the assignment of the mortgage, notwithstanding the 
effective date stated in the assignment, notwithstanding the assignment of the 
note at a later date, minimizes the importance of the assignment of the 
mortgage. Appellee admits to no evidence to support the allegation of a loss of 
the mitigation effort and forbearance efforts.
6 Plaintiff's Motion to Settle Journal Entry and 
Application to Tax Costs and Attorney fees filed June 17, 2011.
7 (paraphrased) Did the trial court commit reversible 
error: 1) when applying the case law of local community banks being in 
possession of the original note and mortgage as proof of their standing to sue 
when a securitized mortgage trust portfolio is involved; 2) in not requiring 
more contemporaneous evidence of the transfer of note and mortgage in light of 
the loan servicer, ASC and plaintiff's counsel not knowing the real party in 
interest; 3) in not requiring plaintiff to have a valid assignment of mortgage 
prior to commencement of suit; 4) granting the earlier default judgment and 
failure to grant defendant's cross motion for summary judgment; 5) in granting 
substitution of parties without new summons being issued and served; 6) by 
granting summary judgment to plaintiff and not to defendants when pleadings 
state Wells Fargo was the holder of the note on July 23, 2009, and that date and 
October 6, 2009, the note and mortgage were transferred to US Bank NA when the 
assignment of mortgage, filed on August 13, 2009, purported to be effective 
March 1, 2005, seventy (70) days prior to date of note and mortgage; 7) in 
recognizing an assignment of real estate mortgage executed by an attorney whose 
last name is in the firm's name of plaintiff's counsel as an authorized party; 
8) in acknowledging an assignment of real estate mortgage with a prior effective 
date; 9) in acknowledging a corrective assignment of mortgage only filed with 
the court in a reply to a cross motion for summary judgment on May 26, 2011; 10) 
in not requiring proof of plaintiff's loan servicer giving a reason for the 
unexplained discontinuation of the forbearance agreement, even after limited 
discovery responses, when their records show the payments were made; 11) in not 
requiring plaintiff to offer HAMP after or if plaintiff proves it is the real 
party in interest; 12) in not considering the effect of MILA's 
ongoing Chapter 11 bankruptcy on its authority to assign notes and mortgages; 
13) in not considering the effect of plaintiff's own prospectus prohibiting 
transfers into the Trust after ninety (90) days; 14) in granting summary 
judgment in light of this ninety (90) day requirement when plaintiff's own 
counsel argues that the assignment of real estate mortgage also transferred the 
note which date is either August 13, 2009, or, according to the corrective 
assignment, August 18, 2010; 15) in not requiring more substantial proof than 
the accompanying affidavit that the file was in order, as both affidavits 
covered a file that contains an assignment of real estate mortgage bearing an 
effective date seventy (70) days prior to the actual execution of the mortgage; 
16) in not considering whether the Trust's governing state law allows the 
trustee to waive the ninety (90) day transfer requirement; 17) by not finding 
that any Oklahoma court should recuse itself because the Uniform Retirement 
System for Justices and Judges has assets with Credit Suisse First Boston's HEAT 
pooled securitized loans; 18) granting attorney fees which would not have 
occurred but for plaintiff's own timeline pleading errors and admitted by virtue 
of corrective, defective assignments of real estate mortgage; 19) in awarding 
attorney fees that were the result of plaintiff's errors.
8 The order vacating the judgment did not require 
Appellants to file an answer. Rule 13 of the Rules of the District Courts of 
Oklahoma allows a motion for summary judgment to be filed "any time after the 
filing of the action." 12 O.S. Supp. 2002, ch.2, app. (Rule 13(a)). The rule only 
requires a defendant to file a "concise written statement of the material facts 
as to which a genuine issue exists and the reasons for denying the motion." 
12 
O.S. Supp. 2002, ch.2, app. (Rule 13(b)). It also requires the adverse 
party to "attach to the statement evidentiary material justifying the opposition 
to the motion." It appears Appellants substantially complied with this rule by 
their assertions in their counter motion for summary judgment.
9 This opinion occurred prior to the enactment of the 
Oklahoma UCC. It is, however, possible for the owner of the note not to be the 
person entitled to enforce the note if the owner is not in possession of the 
note. (See the REPORT OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE, APPLICATION OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TO SELECTED ISSUES 
RELATING TO MORTGAGE NOTES (NOVEMBER 14, 2011)).
10 12A O.S. 2001, §§ 
1-201(b)(21), 3-204 and 3-205.
11 According to Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) an 
allonge is "[a] slip of paper sometimes attached to a negotiable instrument for 
the purpose of receiving further indorsements when the original paper is filled 
with indorsements." See, 12A O.S. 2001, § 3-204(a). It should be noted 
that under 12A O.S. 2001, § 
3-204(a) and its comments in paragraph 2, it is no longer necessary that an 
instrument be so covered with previous indorsements that additional space is 
required before an allonge may be used. An allonge, however, must still be 
affixed to the instrument.
12 Black's Law Dictionary defines "agent" as "[o]ne who is 
authorized to act for or in place of another; a representative." 9th ed. 2009. 

GURICH, J., with whom WINCHESTER, J. joins dissenting: 
¶1 I respectfully dissent. Although the majority in this case reverses 
summary judgment to resolve factual issues on remand, a careful look at the 
record reveals no issues of material fact remain, and the majority's reversal is 
based solely on the issue of standing. The record in this case indicates that 
after substituting the correct plaintiff, filing an amended petition, and filing 
a motion for summary judgment, which was denied by the trial court because 
issues of material fact remained, Plaintiff filed a second motion for summary 
judgment. Attached to Plaintiff's Second Motion for Summary Judgment was an 
indorsed-in-blank allonge, the mortgage, an assignment of mortgage, and an 
affidavit in support of the motion for summary judgment. Because the Plaintiff 
was the proper party to pursue the foreclosure and because the Plaintiff 
presented the proper documentation at summary judgment to prove such, the trial 
court was correct in granting summary judgment to plaintiff. I would affirm the 
trial court for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinions in Deutsche Bank 
National Trust Co. v. Matthews, 2012 OK 14, ___P.3d___ (Gurich, J., dissenting) and 
Bank of America, NA v. Kabba, 2012 OK 23, ___P.3d___ (Gurich, J., dissenting).1 
FOOTNOTES
1 Although I originally 
concurred in the majority opinion in Deutsche Bank National Trust v. 
Brumbaugh, 2012 OK 
3, 
___P.3d___, which the majority now cites as authority in this case, after 
further consideration, I disagree with the majority's analysis in that case, and 
my views on the issues in these cases are accurately reflected in J.P. Morgan 
Chase Bank N.A. v. Eldridge, 2012 OK 24, ___P.3d___ (Gurich, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); Kabba, 2012 OK 23, ___P.3d___ (Gurich, J., dissenting); 
CPT Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2004-EC1 v. Kham, 2012 OK 22, ___P.3d___ (Gurich, J., dissenting); 
Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Richardson, 2012 OK 15, ___P.3d___ (Gurich, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); and Matthews, 2012 OK 14, ___P.3d___ (Gurich, J., 
dissenting).