Case Title: People v. Camacho

Citation: 

Docket Number: S141080

State: california

Court: California Supreme Court

Date: 2022-11-28T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
CALIFORNIA 
 
THE PEOPLE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
ADRIAN GEORGE CAMACHO, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
S141080 
 
San Diego County Superior Court 
SCN 163535 
 
 
November 28, 2022 
 
Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye authored the opinion of the Court, 
in which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and 
Guerrero concurred. 
 
 
 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
S141080 
 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
 
At approximately 5:05 p.m. on June 13, 2003, uniformed 
Officer Tony Zeppetella of the Oceanside Police Department 
detained defendant Adrian Camacho in a traffic stop.  By 
5:09 p.m., defendant had shot the officer no fewer than 13 times, 
beaten him as he laid wounded but conscious on the ground, and 
fled the scene.  Despite receiving immediate medical attention, 
Officer Zeppetella died en route to the hospital. 
At trial, defendant did not contest that he shot and killed 
Officer Zeppetella.  He claimed, however, that he did so during 
a period of delirium and psychosis brought about by a 
combination of illicit substances and prescription medication he 
had ingested.  Defendant argued that, due to the effects of the 
drugs, he did not possess the requisite mental state for first 
degree murder.  (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); all further 
unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.)  
Defendant urged the jury to convict him of a lesser crime, one as 
lenient as involuntary manslaughter, but in any event not more 
severe than second degree murder. 
The jury rejected defendant’s argument, finding him 
guilty of first degree murder.  (§ 189, subd. (a).)  It also found 
true two special circumstance allegations:  (1) defendant 
murdered Officer Zeppetella “for the purpose of avoiding or 
preventing a lawful arrest” (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(5)), and 
(2) defendant “knew, or reasonably should have known, that the 
victim was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
2 
her duties” and intentionally killed Officer Zeppetella while he 
was engaged in the performance of said duties (§ 190.2, subd. 
(a)(7)).  The jury further found true the allegations that 
defendant “personally use[d] a firearm” and “personally and 
intentionally discharge[d] a firearm and proximately cause[d] 
great bodily injury” in committing the murder.  (§ 12022.5, subd. 
(a); § 12022.53, subd. (d).)  Finally, the jury convicted defendant 
of being a felon in possession of a firearm and possessing a 
controlled substance for sale. 
At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the jury 
recommended a sentence of death.  The court so sentenced 
defendant. 
This is defendant’s automatic appeal.  We affirm the 
judgment in its entirety. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. Evidence at the Guilt Phase 
1. Prosecution case 
a. Events at the scene of the shooting 
The shooting and killing of Officer Zeppetella occurred on 
a Friday afternoon in the parking lot of a Navy Federal Credit 
Union in Oceanside.  Because that Friday was payday at a 
military base located close by, the credit union was busy and 
multiple witnesses observed and testified to the events 
surrounding the shooting. 
Eyewitnesses testified to seeing a person later identified 
as defendant driving a blue Toyota.  Officer Zeppetella’s police 
vehicle had pulled into the credit union’s parking lot behind the 
Toyota, partially blocking it.  The officer then walked up to 
defendant, seated in the Toyota.  Defendant handed the officer 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
3 
some sort of paperwork.  The witnesses testified that the 
interaction seemed routine. 
As the officer half turned away from defendant with the 
paperwork, however, defendant opened fire.  Subsequent expert 
testimony established that defendant fired his Ruger pistol, 
hitting Officer Zeppetella multiple times.  After a pause, 
defendant and the officer began to exchange gunfire, and the 
officer hit defendant once in the knee. 
Laura Pallos observed the incident unfolding from her 
vehicle.  She testified that after hearing the initial gunshots, she 
saw an officer “stumbling . . . out from between two cars.”  She 
then saw “a man,” defendant, “come out . . . from between those 
same two cars with a gun pointing at the officer” and “shooting 
at him.”  After falling to the ground, Officer Zeppetella began 
“pulling himself along with his right arm.”  It appeared to Pallos 
that Officer Zeppetella was “looking for some place to crawl 
behind.”  Defendant “watch[ed] very intently” before “following” 
Officer Zeppetella, “taking the shortest path towards the 
officer.”  Having covered the distance to the victim, defendant 
“reached down,” “grabbed the back of the police officer’s collar,” 
“pulled him up,” then swung down with the gun held in his right 
arm, striking the officer on the back of the head three or four 
times.  Defendant subsequently threw the officer “down to the 
asphalt.” 
Pallos testified that she saw defendant then “crouch[] 
down” by the officer and press “at his waist line with both 
hands.”  Testimony by other witnesses indicated that defendant 
had emptied his own firearm at this point, but that he found and 
seized Officer Zeppetella’s Glock handgun, presumably when 
Pallos saw defendant crouched by the officer.  Pallos then saw 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
4 
defendant backing away while maintaining focus on the officer 
“at all times.”  When defendant saw movement from the officer, 
he “stepped back in those two steps that he had backed up and 
shot him again” — this time with the officer’s own handgun — 
“three, four” more times.  “The officer stopped moving.”  
Defendant watched the victim for a second longer, then got into 
the police vehicle and sped away from the scene. 
Corpsman Gabriel Tellez, who specialized in “combat and 
combat-related trauma,” was inside the credit union during the 
shooting.  Once the shooting ceased, Tellez made his way to the 
parking lot and “noticed [an] officer laying on the ground face 
down.”  Based on the color and amount of the blood that “had 
already pooled underneath the officer,” Tellez recognized that 
Officer Zeppetella had “a very life threatening injury.”  
“Working as quickly as [he] possibly c[ould],” Tellez rolled the 
officer onto his back, got his ballistic vest off him, ascertained 
that blood was pulsing from a wound in his chest, and inserted 
his fingers into the wound to clamp off the severed artery that 
was bleeding.  Officer Zeppetella was still alive and responsive 
at this stage, as he “winced in pain” when Tellez inserted his 
fingers in the wound.  Other bystanders joined Tellez in 
rendering aid.  An ambulance arrived.  The paramedics loaded 
Officer Zeppetella and Tellez, whose fingers were still inside the 
officer’s chest maintaining “a critical hold,” into the ambulance.  
Although the paramedics continued to provide medical care 
during the ambulance ride, Tellez noticed “life [was] starting to 
ebb out of Officer Zeppetella.”  The officer was pronounced dead 
at Palomar Hospital slightly more than an hour after the 
shooting began. 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
5 
b. Events following the shooting 
After defendant fled the scene in Officer Zeppetella’s 
patrol vehicle, he drove to a neighborhood where he had 
previously resided with his mother-in-law, Lorraine Camacho.1  
Lorraine lived at a house on Via Isidro, and an eyewitness saw 
defendant on foot and turning onto the street.  The eyewitness, 
together with another individual, Doug Cosley, discovered a 
police car abandoned a short distance away from Via Isidro with 
the engine still running.  The witnesses then heard through a 
radio transmitting from the vehicle that “there was an officer 
down and a car and weapons missing.”  Thinking that the 
missing police vehicle was the one they were standing next to, 
Cosley used the radio to report the car’s location. 
Police officers arrived soon after and followed what 
appeared to be blood stains leading to Lorraine’s residence.  
Surmising that defendant had isolated himself inside, law 
enforcement personnel spent the next few hours securing the 
area and evacuating nearby residents.  By approximately 
9:00 p.m., a SWAT team led by Sergeant Thomas Aguigui was 
ready to make contact with defendant. 
Aguigui testified that he communicated with defendant 
via a bullhorn.  After Aguigui established rapport, defendant 
told the sergeant that he was scared, he had cut his wrists, and 
he did not want to come out of the house for fear of the police.  
Defendant also asked if “the officer died,” to which Aguigui 
replied that he did not know.  Aguigui reassured defendant that 
“it was safe for him to come out” and that “medical attention 
 
1  
We refer to people who share a surname with defendant 
by their first names to avoid confusion. 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
6 
[would be given] to his injuries.”  Defendant agreed to exit the 
residence.  Defendant then followed Aguigui’s directions, turned 
on the porch light, stepped out, dropped a piece of cloth that he 
had in his hand when directed to do so, and walked to the 
officers.  After the SWAT team placed handcuffs on defendant, 
he was turned over to medics for first aid.  When he was on the 
gurney, defendant volunteered that he did not “ ‘know what that 
officer did to make [him] snap.’ ” Based on his interaction with 
defendant, Aguigui testified that although defendant was “in 
some significant amount of pain,” he was “coherent” and able to 
understand the instructions given to him. 
Aguigui’s observations of defendant’s demeanor were 
echoed by medical personnel who treated defendant that night.  
Timothy Huerta, one of the paramedics who transported 
defendant to the hospital, testified he and his partner undertook 
an initial assessment of defendant at 9:41 p.m. after defendant 
walked out of the house on Via Isidro.  Defendant was “alert,” 
“cooperative,” able to relay date, time, and location as well as 
“his age, his weight, whether or not he was in pain, which he 
said he wasn’t, and where he had been shot.”  In communicating 
all this information, defendant’s speech was “normal and clear.”  
Once the paramedics placed defendant into the ambulance, they 
began standard treatment procedure for a patient with a 
gunshot wound, bandaging his injuries, establishing an IV, and 
placing him on oxygen.  Defendant remained “very alert,” 
“looking around” and “watching [the paramedics’] movements.” 
 
Once defendant arrived at the hospital, Dr. Imad Dandan 
treated him at 11:00 p.m.  Dandan’s assessment was that 
defendant was “awake and alert.”  He talked to defendant, who 
was “calm, very courteous, and responsive to . . . questions.”  
Defendant did not have pressured or rapid speech; he was not 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
7 
incoherent; he did not sweat excessively; and his temperature 
was normal.  Defendant did have lacerations on both of his 
forearms, three on the left and one on the right.  The lacerations 
were “a little jagged and superficial,” measuring from two 
centimeters to four centimeters.  Dandan administered local 
anesthesia, 
“cleaned 
the 
wounds 
and 
repaired 
them.”  
Defendant also had a gunshot wound on his right knee.  Dandan 
cleaned the wound and gave defendant antibiotics but did not 
remove the bullet because there was “no danger [from] leaving 
the bullet [in]” and removal would result in more damage. 
 
A nurse drew defendant’s blood at around 11:00 p.m., the 
same time as Dr. Dandan’s examination.  Toxicologist John 
Treuting reported the results of the tests done on the sample 
extracted.  According to Treuting, defendant tested “positive for 
methamphetamine at a qualitative level of 119 nanograms per 
millimeter of blood.”  This was a level that Treuting would 
consider “toxic.” 
In addition to methamphetamine, defendant’s blood also 
contained “morphine at a level of 576 nanograms per ml and a 
codeine level of 98 nanograms per ml.”  Morphine is a byproduct 
of heroin, while the presence of codeine could be explained both 
by an individual using codeine or by the individual “converting 
morphine to heroin.”  Again, Treuting would consider this level 
of morphine “toxic.” 
Treuting further testified that defendant tested positive 
for Valium and Paxil at levels that were within the therapeutic 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
8 
range.2  Based on the levels present in defendant’s blood alone, 
however, it was difficult for Treuting to conclude when 
defendant had ingested the various illicit drugs or what the drug 
concentrations were at a point in time prior to the blood sample 
being taken. 
At approximately the time that defendant was receiving 
medical care, police officers conducted a search of Lorraine’s 
house on Via Isidro.  Defendant had evidently broken into the 
house3 by shattering a rear glass door.  Inside one of the 
bathrooms, there was writing on the walls in what appeared to 
be blood.  One of the writings said, “I,” followed by a picture of a 
heart, and “my wife and kids.”  Two others read, “sorry” and “I’m 
sorry.”  Yet another writing read, “Help me, Ordas.”  As will be 
detailed below, Ordas is the name of a psychiatrist who had been 
treating defendant. 
In the same bathroom were various drug paraphernalia.  
In the toilet was “a small ziploc baggie with brown residue.”  
There was also a glass pipe with white residue and a bag with 
“squares cut out of it.”  Karen Laser, a corporal with the 
Oceanside Police Department and the person who discovered 
the items, testified that the brown baggie contained heroin, the 
 
2  
Valium, the brand name for diazepam, is an antianxiety 
drug.  Paxil, the brand name for paroxetine, is an 
antidepressant.  Treuting described the “therapeutic range” as 
indicating a dosage at which an individual taking the drug is 
“getting the beneficial effects and not the toxic effects or the 
adverse effects.” 
3  
Lorraine Camacho, who still resided at the location, 
happened not to be home. 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
9 
glass pipe contained methamphetamine, and the bag appeared 
to be used to package tar heroin.4 
 
Marilyn Priem, a detective with the Oceanside Police 
Department, searched one of the bedrooms in the house.  Priem 
saw a vacuum cleaner inside a closet and detected a hard object 
inside the vacuum bag.  Believing the object to have been too 
large for a vacuum cleaner to have naturally suctioned up, 
Priem “unzipped the outer portion of the bag” and saw that the 
inner dust collection bag had been either torn or cut open.  Inside 
was a magazine containing bullets, next to which was “the back 
end of a . . . Glock 17 gun.”  Priem believed that both the 
magazine and gun were “placed very carefully” rather than 
“thrown in” the vacuum bag because “they were almost level 
with [each other and had] almost the same amount of dust 
surrounding [them].”  After these two items were removed, 
police personnel discovered a Ruger pistol inside the same 
vacuum bag. 
Officers also searched the blue Toyota that defendant had 
been driving when he was stopped by Officer Zeppetella.  John 
Morgans, an investigator for the Oceanside Police Department, 
processed the vehicle.  Of relevance, Morgans recounted that he 
found a blue nylon bag on the front passenger seat.  Inside the 
 
4  
The items were sent for chemical testing.  Although 
laboratory work confirmed that the glass pipe contained 
methamphetamine, it could not detect heroin from the baggie.  
The criminalist who testified concerning the results explained 
that heroin is “highly soluble” in water.  As such, if a bindle 
containing heroin was left in a toilet sometime between “5:00 in 
the afternoon and 9:15 to 9:30 at night” and the bindle was not 
recovered “out of the toilet until sometime after 4 or 5 o’clock the 
next morning,” that could have “an impact on [the] ability to 
detect . . . heroin.” 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
10 
bag were “tweezers, scissors, small jeweler’s bags, which are 
used to package narcotics,” “small cotton swabs that are 
generally used to dip into a substance that’s been heated up to 
inject,” small plastic and metal spoons, two syringes, “a small 
little ziploc bag that contained . . . some residue,” and small 
glass vials, again, with residue.  Morgans also testified that he 
found a cell phone. 
Finally, officers searched the house that defendant shared 
with his wife, Stacey Camacho.  Christopher Carnahan, another 
Oceanside police officer, testified that both drug paraphernalia 
and ammunition were found in the house.  The police uncovered 
plastic bags containing substances that looked like marijuana, 
methamphetamine, and heroin, as well as spoons and pills.5  
Carnahan was “an experienced narcotics detective,” and he 
testified that the narcotics recovered from the Toyota and the 
house were possessed not for “simple use” but for sale. 
c. Expert testimony at trial 
The prosecution in its case in chief presented various 
experts, including that of a medical examiner and a crime scene 
reconstruction expert.  The medical examiner, Dr. Bethann 
Schaber, performed an autopsy on Officer Zeppetella’s body “to 
determine the cause and manner of [his] death” and testified as 
follows. 
Officer 
Zeppetella 
suffered 
13 
“penetrating 
and 
perforating gunshot wounds.”6  Of these, two were fatal.  The 
 
5  
Many of the items seized from the house were sent to a 
laboratory for testing and tested positive for heroin. 
6  
There appears to have been two additional shots that 
grazed the officer but did not enter his body. 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
11 
first fatal shot entered the victim’s chest, “traveled from front to 
back,” and remained lodged in his neck and back.  In moving 
through the body, the bullet fractured the clavicle and 
perforated the “right internal jugular vein and the right common 
carotid artery,” “two large blood vessels supplying the head.”  
The second fatal shot entered the officer’s back.  “The bullet 
travel[ed] through the body, perforating fat around the kidney, 
perforating the diaphragm or the muscle between the chest and 
abdominal cavity that allows people to breath.  It then 
perforate[d] the spleen and is lodged in the . . . chest below the 
nipple.” 
In addition to these injuries, Officer Zeppetella sustained 
gunshot wounds to the neck, back, left arm, right arm, right 
elbow, right hand, right thumb and wrist,7 thigh, and buttock.  
He also sustained “four separate lacerations or tears in the scalp 
resulting from blunt force injury.”  These injuries were 
consistent with Pallos’s testimony that defendant struck the 
officer in the head with defendant’s gun. 
The crime scene reconstruction expert, Rodney Englert, 
related his opinion based on reports by others, his own 
examination of the physical evidence, and a synthesis of 
eyewitnesses’ accounts.  Although Englert was not able to 
pinpoint the exact sequence of shots, he was able to reconstruct 
the following details regarding the shooting.  Defendant fired 
16 shots from his Ruger pistol, emptying the gun; of these, 
 
7  
Other testimony indicated that Officer Zeppetella held his 
firearm in his right hand.  The bullet that entered his right arm 
fractured the officer’s humerus, the bone connecting his 
shoulder to the elbow.  The bullet through the thumb fractured 
the ulna, one of the two bones in the wrist. 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
12 
11 struck Officer Zeppetella.  Officer Zeppetella, in turn, 
discharged his gun 14 times, hitting defendant once.  In the 
initial volley of shots, defendant fired his gun five times, hitting 
the officer in the chest, neck, and right thumb and wrist.  
Defendant fired the first fatal shot — the one that entered the 
officer’s chest — in this burst of gunfire.  During the subsequent 
exchange of gunfire (when the officer had begun firing back), 
defendant hit the officer another eight times, breaking his 
shooting arm.  After Officer Zeppetella attempted to crawl away, 
defendant beat the officer, causing the head wounds observed by 
the medical examiner.  Defendant then seized Officer 
Zeppetella’s Glock handgun and shot at him another four times, 
emptying this firearm as well.  One of these shots was the fatal 
shot that entered through the officer’s back and perforated his 
diaphragm and spleen. 
2. Defense case 
a. Testimony regarding defendant’s behavior 
prior to the shooting 
At trial, defendant argued that he suffered from a 
diminished mental state at the time of the shooting due to his 
use of drugs.  To support his case, defendant introduced the 
testimony of his wife, coworkers, and neighbor — witnesses who 
recounted defendant’s addiction to heroin and his behavior prior 
to the shooting. 
Defendant’s wife, Stacey Camacho, testified that she had 
known her husband for about ten years.  Defendant was 
addicted to heroin that entire time.  Sometime in March or April 
of 2002, Stacey arranged for defendant to begin seeing a 
psychiatrist, Dr. Dennis Ordas.  From 2002 to 2003, defendant’s 
health was deteriorating.  He “was going to rehab” and 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
13 
“methadone clinics.”  At some point after he began seeing 
Dr. Ordas, defendant was hospitalized at Aurora Hospital, “a 
behavioral health center.”  There he was prescribed Paxil, which 
he continued to take until the day of the shooting.  Between May 
2002 and June 2003, defendant was hospitalized “five or six 
times.”  According to Stacey, defendant was “suicidal,” “had been 
very depressed for a while,” and “was trying to stay off drugs,” 
but “he said he couldn’t handle it anymore.” 
Defense counsel also questioned Stacey concerning 
whether there were “any times . . . when [defendant] exhibited 
bizarre behavior [toward her].”  Stacey answered affirmatively 
and volunteered as examples the fact that defendant “would 
hear voices that nobody else would hear” and “he always thought 
that people were coming to the door, so he constantly was 
staring [out] the window.”  When asked if “there [was] a time 
when he thought suspicious[ly]” of her, Stacey responded that 
sometimes when she “wore a headband,” defendant “would grab 
it” and “cut it up” or tell her that she had “wires in [her] 
headbands” and was “trying to watch him.”  Likewise, defendant 
“thought [she] had hidden cameras in” her platform shoes.8 
Regarding the shooting, Stacey told the jury that 
defendant called her at work sometime after 5:00 p.m. on 
June 13, 2003.  Defendant sounded “real scared” and 
“hysterical.”  He said “he was at [her] mom’s house and that a 
police officer was hurt, and he wanted to die.”  On direct 
examination, Stacey testified that defendant did not tell her 
 
8  
Due to the phrasing of defense counsel’s questions (“were 
there any times” “was there a time”), it is difficult to ascertain 
when defendant “exhibited [the] bizarre behavior” Stacey 
recounted. 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
14 
“how or why or what happened to the police officer,” that he did 
not tell her that “he shot a police officer and a police officer shot 
him,” but merely that “he hurt a police officer.”  After speaking 
to defendant, Stacey called her mother, Lorraine Camacho, 
relating that defendant was “at her house,” “really upset,” and 
that she (Lorraine) needed “to go home.” 
Stacey also left work and drove to Lorraine’s home.  She 
thought defendant “was going to kill himself.”  Stacey 
cooperated with law enforcement personnel she encountered 
around her mother’s residence. After defendant surrendered 
and received medical care, Stacey was able to talk to him at the 
Oceanside police station.  In contrast to the medical personnel’s 
observations, Stacey thought her husband was far from coherent 
or “clear headed” — “he was mumbling things,” “wasn’t making 
any sense,” “was crying,” and still saying that “he wants to die.” 
On cross-examination, Stacey agreed with the prosecutor’s 
description of her conversation with her mother, some of which 
was inconsistent with her testimony on direct examination.  For 
instance, the prosecutor asked if Stacey told her mother “words 
to the effect of, you know, the defendant called me — or 
whatever words you used — and he got scared and he shot a cop, 
and the cop shot him and you know — and he took off, words to 
that effect to your mother.”  Stacey responded, “right.” 
Lorraine 
Camacho 
corroborated 
parts 
of 
Stacey’s 
testimony.  Lorraine stated that Stacey called her on the 
afternoon in question and “was very hysterical” and “crying.”  
After speaking to Stacey, Lorraine immediately went home.  
Like 
Stacey, 
Lorraine 
encountered 
law 
enforcement 
surrounding her home and cooperated with them. 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
15 
When questioned by the prosecution, Lorraine admitted 
that she had given statements to the police that either conflicted 
with certain details in her daughter’s testimony or tended to 
incriminate defendant.  For example, Lorraine stated Stacey 
told her that, during the telephone conversations she (Stacey) 
had with defendant, defendant told her, “I was speeding,” “got 
pulled over in a traffic stop,” and “got scared.”  Furthermore, 
“the essence” of what defendant told Stacey, as Stacey related to 
Lorraine, was that defendant “got scared, shot a cop, [and] a cop 
shot him in the leg.”  Although at trial Lorraine asserted she did 
not remember saying so, in an audiotaped statement to the 
police Lorraine had recounted that defendant told Stacey “he 
shot a cop, and he got shot in the leg, and he — he went to your 
house cause that’s the only place he could think of to hide 
because it was right around there — or words to that effect.” 
The defense also called to the stand two of defendant’s 
coworkers, David Bates and Lonnie Roybal, and a neighbor, 
Walter Priest.  Bates testified that other employees told him 
defendant had a drug problem.  Bates also stated that 
approximately a month before the shooting defendant stopped 
showing up to work at his construction job.  Defendant’s other 
coworker, Roybal, testified that he knew about defendant’s drug 
problem both because defendant confided to him about that, and 
because Roybal observed behavior from defendant such as 
“nodding out in the mornings.” 
Walter Priest, who lived in the same mobile home complex 
as defendant and Stacey, testified that he saw defendant driving 
by between 2:30 and 3:00 p.m. on the day of the shooting.  Priest 
thought defendant’s behavior was unusual because he “stared a 
lot,” looked like he was suspicious, and did not offer a “friendly 
neighbor wave.”   
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
16 
In response to Stacey’s testimony, the prosecution called 
California Highway Patrol Officer William Grant.  Grant had 
assisted with directing traffic around Lorraine’s house on the 
day of the shooting.  When Stacey attempted to reach defendant 
by driving to the residence, Grant stopped her, because no traffic 
was allowed in or out of the area.  Grant recounted that when 
he talked to Stacey, she volunteered her husband had conveyed 
that he shot a police officer, “that he wasn’t going to go back to 
prison and that he was going to kill himself.” 
b. Expert testimony at trial 
In addition to the lay witnesses, the defense introduced 
the testimony of two experts, psychiatrists Dennis Ordas and 
Pablo Stewart.  Ordas maintained a private practice and worked 
at the Vista Detention Facility.  Defendant had been one of 
Ordas’s patients at his private clinic for about a year by the time 
of Officer Zeppetella’s shooting.  When Stacey first brought 
defendant to Ordas in April 2002, defendant was addicted to 
heroin and wanted help.  During the next year, Ordas saw 
defendant about 18 times.  Defendant “struggle[d]” with his 
addiction, trying to quit and relapsing, with “his longest clean 
period [being] about ten days.” 
On March 18, 2003, Dr. Ordas received a telephone 
message from defendant.  The message, as taken down by the 
doctor’s secretary, said, “ ‘Please call.  Hearing buzzing in 
head.’ ”  Ordas called defendant and scheduled an appointment 
for two days later.  When Ordas saw defendant at the 
appointment, defendant told him that he had been “living on the 
streets for a few weeks.”  Defendant also conveyed that he “was 
back to using more heroin, and he had actually done a small 
amount of crystal meth.” 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
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On June 13, 2003, Dr. Ordas received telephone calls from 
Stacey and law enforcement.  Both informed him about the 
events of the shooting, that defendant “was holed up in a house, 
and [the Oceanside Police Department] wanted to see if [Ordas] 
would attempt to talk him out of the house.”  Ordas declined.  
However, because of his work at the jail, Ordas did see 
defendant the next day.  Ordas’s impression was that defendant 
was “mentally beat up” and suffering from “confusion about 
what had just happened.”  Defendant himself told the doctor 
that he was “ ‘out of it.’ ” 
When defendant was held at the jail, Dr. Ordas oversaw 
his mental health care.  Ordas believed defendant was 
experiencing “traumatic recalls or intrusive thoughts” about the 
events surrounding the shooting.  Defendant reported having 
nightmares, and Ordas prescribed him medications to help with 
his anxiety, inability to sleep, and nightmares. 
To lay groundwork for later testimony by Dr. Stewart, the 
defense asked Dr. Ordas about methamphetamine-induced 
psychosis.  Ordas confirmed that such a condition is listed in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders and gave 
a description of the condition.  The defense then inquired about 
the chemical makeup of Paxil and if “it might be similar to 
methamphetamine.”  Ordas responded “no,” but that “[t]here is 
some literature that suggests that Paxil and methamphetamine 
may compete at a similar receptor site in the liver.” 
The defense also explored with Dr. Ordas defendant’s use 
of Paxil.  Ordas confirmed that defendant was prescribed the 
medication during his visit at Aurora Hospital in 2002 and 
Ordas “continued it [the prescription] when [defendant] came to 
see me.”  In fact, Ordas increased the dosage of the medication 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
18 
to treat defendant’s depression.  On March 20, 2003 — the date 
when 
defendant 
told 
Ordas 
that 
he 
was 
using 
methamphetamine — 
Ordas 
prescribed 
defendant 
Paxil, 
keeping the dosage of the drug the same but changing the 
formulation of the medicine to “sustained release” so that the 
active chemical released “throughout the day” instead of in “one 
solid hit.” 
Picking up on the topic of Paxil and methamphetamine, 
the prosecution solicited from Dr. Ordas the view that he was 
“comfortable giving the Paxil knowing [defendant] was taking 
some meth with his heroin.”  Ordas further volunteered that 
such treatment is “fairly common.” 
The prosecution inquired about the diagnoses that 
Dr. Ordas made of defendant based on his provision of care 
when defendant was in the jail.  Ordas stated he diagnosed 
defendant 
with 
heroin 
dependence, 
methamphetamine 
dependence, depression, and antisocial personality disorder.  
The prosecution verified that Ordas was not expressing an 
opinion that defendant had a “methamphetamine-induced 
psychotic episode on June 13th, 2003.”  Ordas responded, 
“I would not be qualified to say that.  I wasn’t there.” 
The defense’s principal expert was a psychiatrist, 
Dr. Stewart, who, unlike Dr. Ordas, did opine that defendant 
had methamphetamine-induced psychosis during the shooting 
of Officer Zeppetella.  In arriving at his diagnosis, Stewart 
reviewed defendant’s medical records, interviewed his family 
members, and talked to defendant.  Stewart diagnosed 
defendant with heroin and methamphetamine abuse.  He noted 
that these diagnoses were the same diagnoses defendant 
received at Aurora Hospital in 2002.  Stewart further noted that 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
19 
defendant was prescribed Paxil by the staff at Aurora Hospital 
and that in March 2003 he was transitioned to a controlled 
release form of Paxil.  In Stewart’s opinion, being on a controlled 
release form of Paxil was comparable to receiving an increased 
dosage of the drug because the drug would stay in the body for 
longer. 
In addition to the above diagnosis, Dr. Stewart opined that 
in June 2003 defendant suffered from two other mental 
disorders:  (1) substance intoxication delirium, with the relevant 
substances being “the mixture of methamphetamine and Paxil, 
and 
. . . 
a 
contribution 
from 
the 
heroin,” 
and 
(2) methamphetamine-induced psychotic disorder.  Regarding 
the first diagnosis, Stewart explained that delirium is like “a 
short-lived dementia.”  A delirious person “may not be fully 
aware of [the environment],” or “fully cognizant of things going 
on,” and may have “memory problems” and “perceptual 
disturbances where [the person is] misinterpreting the 
intentions and . . . behavior of others.”  Such delirium is “short 
lived” and may “wax and wane.”  Substance intoxication 
delirium means that the delirium is “related to the use of 
substances,” 
in 
this 
case 
“methamphetamine 
and 
the 
antidepressant Paxil.” 
 
Dr. Stewart supported his diagnosis by explaining the 
biochemistry 
of 
the 
substances 
involved, 
followed 
by 
observations about defendant’s behavior.  Regarding the 
biochemistry 
of 
Paxil 
and 
methamphetamine, 
Stewart 
explained that Paxil works in the body “basically the same [way] 
. . . methamphetamine works.”  This means that “one drug Paxil 
plus one drug methamphetamine doesn’t equal two”; instead, 
the effect of the drugs is “multiplied so [the individual] get[s] a 
much greater effect from the mixing of these two drugs.”  In 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
20 
addition, an enzyme in the liver, called 2D6, which metabolizes 
methamphetamine, is inhibited by Paxil.  This results in the 
body “seeing more methamphetamine.”  Having both Paxil and 
methamphetamine in the system brings about “changes of 
consciousness, 
[and] 
cognitive 
problems” 
or 
substance 
intoxication delirium. 
 
Such delirium, Dr. Stewart testified, “overlap[s]” with his 
second 
diagnosis — 
that 
defendant 
was 
experiencing 
methamphetamine-induced psychotic disorder.  A person 
suffering from this disorder has “psychotic symptoms, 
hallucinations or delusions, . . . that are temporally related to 
the use of the substance.”  Examples of psychotic symptoms are 
“auditory, [or] visual hallucinations” and “paranoid delusions.”  
Stewart identified the following as evidence that defendant was 
experiencing psychotic symptoms:  the “buzzing in his head” as 
reported to Dr. Ordas; defendant’s belief, as related by Stacey 
Camacho, that Stacey had cameras in her platform shoes and 
wires in her headband; and Stacey’s testimony that defendant 
was hearing people coming up to his door “when in fact they 
really weren’t.” 
 
Turning to the events on the day of the shooting, 
Dr. Stewart opined that defendant’s behavior corresponded to 
his “having both of these conditions” and exhibiting “clouded 
consciousness, 
cognitive 
problems, 
[and] 
perceptual 
disturbances” during the encounter with Officer Zeppetella.  
Stewart characterized the shooting as a “bizarre killing” that 
occurred in the middle of the afternoon, when it was “bright out” 
and there were “a lot of people around.”  In Stewart’s opinion, 
defendant displayed a “lack of . . . awareness of all these 
witnesses that were around him” and engaged in a “single-
minded” act of shooting the officer.  Moreover, defendant acted 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
21 
“odd[ly]” in stealing the police car when “there were plenty of . . . 
civilian vehicles that were readily available to him if in fact he 
was choosing to [escape].” 
 
When asked if delirium and psychosis due to intoxication 
were 
consistent 
with 
witnesses’ 
testimony 
regarding 
defendant’s conduct preceding and following the shooting, 
Dr. Stewart answered affirmatively.  For example, defense 
counsel asked, “when the police removed [defendant] from the 
home [of Lorraine Camacho], he said he blacked out and didn’t 
know what the officer did to set him off, and he wanted to kill 
himself . . . are those statements consistent or inconsistent with 
. . . the diagnoses you’ve described?”  Stewart responded, “You 
certainly can see types of behavior like that, given these 
particular diagnoses that we’ve been discussing today.” 
 
Anticipating the prosecution’s questions, defense counsel 
queried if some of defendant’s seemingly purposeful behavior 
was consistent with delirium and psychosis.  Dr. Stewart replied 
that due to the fluctuating nature of the conditions, defendant 
“could have moments of lucidity followed by moments of 
confusion.”  Moreover, “[t]hings that appear to be purposeful” 
(i.e., that defendant “gets in the police car,” “drives away,” “gets 
weapons and puts them in a vacuum cleaner bag”) do not “rule 
out the presence of a delirium diagnosis” because one “can’t tell 
[delirium] from just looking at the behavior.” 
 
The prosecution cross-examined Dr. Stewart at length, 
focusing on the fact that there were “between 16 and 17,000 
pages” of documents in the case, out of which Stewart reviewed 
only 20 items.  Those 20 items were provided to Stewart by the 
defense, and Stewart did not request any additional documents.  
In particular, Stewart did not review statements given to the 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
22 
police by Lorraine Camacho; he did not read letters that 
defendant wrote while he was in jail even though Stewart had 
testified in a prior matter that “the writings of the person who 
[he] was assessing” were important; and he did not write a 
report documenting his opinion despite having done so in prior 
cases and knowing that “when [he has written such reports, he 
was] cross-examined on the contents of the report.” 
 
The prosecutor also questioned the basis of Dr. Stewart’s 
opinion concerning biochemistry and the effect of combining 
Paxil and methamphetamine.  Stewart had produced to the 
prosecution the abstracts of about two dozen articles, identified 
as the sources on which he based his opinion.  The prosecutor 
asked, and Stewart agreed, that none of the articles concerned 
Paxil, methamphetamine, and their effects on human beings.  
Focusing on the one abstract documenting the function of the 
enzyme 2D6 that Stewart had testified is inhibited by Paxil, the 
prosecutor first elicited an acknowledgment that the article was 
“one of the main” articles “supporting [Stewart’s] theory about 
what happened in this case.”  The prosecutor then elicited from 
Stewart the concession that he had not actually read the article, 
but only the abstract.  Furthermore, Stewart could not recall 
whether the article had concluded that the increase in 
concentration of a key chemical because of 2D6 inhibition was 
“small.”  Likewise, Stewart did not remember whether the 
article had concluded that there were “parallel enzymes” that 
could help to metabolize chemicals when 2D6 was inhibited.  
 
Of the letters that the prosecution mentioned to 
Dr. Stewart, two were introduced into evidence at trial.  
Defendant had written these letters when he was in custody 
facing charges in the present case.  As part of its attempt to 
rebut the defense theory that defendant’s shooting and killing of 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
23 
Officer Zeppetella was explained by drugs and no other motives 
or factors, the prosecutor used the letters to argue that 
defendant harbored animus toward law enforcement. 
 
To further rebut Dr. Stewart’s testimony, the prosecution 
called its own expert, Dr. Daryl Matthews, a board-certified 
forensic psychiatrist.  Matthews stated that he had prepared a 
written report laying out his opinion concerning this case.  He 
confirmed that in connection with the preparation of the report, 
he received from the prosecution 16 to 17,000 pages of 
documents.  He further articulated that if the prosecution had 
“pick[ed] and cho[]se[n] among the material that [it] sent him,” 
his work would have been compromised and he would have 
insisted that the prosecution give him the entire corpus of 
materials. 
 
Dr. Matthews stated that on June 13, 2003, defendant 
suffered opioid dependence and antisocial personality disorder.  
In exploring Dr. Matthews’s opinion, the prosecutor asked a 
series of leading questions to conform the doctor’s testimony to 
the parameters the trial court had imposed, which limited 
discussion of hearsay information the doctor relied on in 
reaching his conclusions.  Matthews enumerated the diagnostic 
criteria for antisocial personality disorder and explained that 
defendant met those criteria.  The most relevant parts of his 
testimony, however, concerned areas in which he disagreed with 
Dr. Stewart. 
 
Dr. Matthews briefly reviewed the diagnostic criteria 
pertaining to delirium, emphasizing that “the essential feature” 
is a disturbance in consciousness, or a drop in a person’s 
alertness, accompanied by an impairment in attention — 
specifically “the ability to focus, sustain or shift attention.”  This 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
24 
means that a delirious person cannot “pay attention very closely 
to something, to handle this task, then go do that task, then 
come back to the original task, [or] to pay long attention to any 
task.” 
Next, Dr. Matthews explained that to determine whether 
defendant experienced delirium or psychosis when he shot 
Officer Zeppetella, it was important to focus on defendant’s 
behavior “close to the time [of] the incident.”  Matthews 
cautioned that the “mental wherewithal for any particular 
action is not the basis for deciding [whether a person is 
impaired]”; instead “it’s looking at the whole pattern of 
interactions over a period of time” that allows one to make a 
diagnosis. 
Dr. Matthews then examined defendant’s actions on 
June 13, 2003, and concluded that they showed defendant was 
not suffering from delirium during the relevant events.  For 
example, in summarizing defendant’s interaction with Officer 
Zeppetella during the traffic stop, Mathews observed that 
defendant was able to converse with the officer and present 
some sort of documentation.  Such actions require “recognizing 
that it’s a police officer and answering appropriately,” 
appreciating that the documentation “was requested, know[ing] 
where it is in your car, get[ting] it, [and] giv[ing] it to the 
[officer].”  The shooting itself indicated corresponding mental 
skills.  For instance, defendant’s action in taking the officer’s 
gun required “recognizing that you don’t have any more bullets, 
that [the] person is not yet dead, that they need more things to 
happen to render them that way, making the decision to [obtain 
the gun], then locating the appropriate object and being able to 
use it properly.”  Matthews also placed significance on 
defendant’s action in fleeing the scene, observing that the 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
25 
conduct implicated “the recognition that . . . he needed to get 
away, . . . and then to recognize that there are better ways of 
fleeing than just running, and recognizing that the car he 
brought wasn’t available to him because it was blocked, and 
then understanding that he could get away using the police 
vehicle, getting into a strange vehicle, . . . operating it in reverse 
and maneuvering it successfully out of a parking [lot] and into a 
street.”  These acts, Matthews continued, “may seem like simple 
things,” but undertaking them “requires visuospatial abilities” 
and the capacity “to pay attention to where you’re going, not just 
drive randomly into a post or make a wrong turn, but to pick a 
destination, select it and then get there.”  Such conduct, he 
asserted, is not consistent with delirium. 
Turning to Dr. Stewart’s diagnosis of methamphetamine-
induced psychosis, Dr. Matthews stated that defendant did not 
suffer from any such psychosis.  Focusing on defendant’s 
behavior after he reached Lorraine’s house, Matthews noted 
that defendant was able to locate a telephone, call his wife, talk 
to her, and describe what happened.  Likewise, defendant’s 
placement of the guns inside the vacuum cleaner was 
“significant” because “it involves recognizing that having those 
things around could get him in serious trouble” and taking 
“careful steps” to hide the weapons and “avoid being 
apprehended.”  When asked about defendant’s statements 
“ ‘I don’t want to go back to prison,’ ” and “ ‘I’m going to kill 
myself,’ ” Matthews opined that “those are statements made by 
someone who knows what’s going on around him and . . . doesn’t 
have any delusions or false beliefs, doesn’t have any difficulty 
communicating and that reflect normal motivation, normal 
response, normal recognition of his environment.”  Addressing 
the writing in blood on the walls and the fact that defendant cut 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
26 
his wrists, Matthews admitted using blood was “kind of 
dramatic” but the writing showed that defendant was able to 
remember the name of his doctor and write it correctly.  
Regarding defendant’s self-harm, Matthews noted that people 
with personality disorders — and according to the doctor, 
defendant had antisocial personality disorder — make such 
suicide gestures “to bring attention to themselves,” “to show how 
much they’re suffering,” or “to divert attention from other 
problems that they’ve created.” 
Dr. Matthews 
gave 
similar 
testimony 
regarding 
defendant’s actions in surrendering and his demeanor as 
observed by medical personnel.  For example, Matthews stated 
that, unlike defendant, “people who are delirious would not 
know their surrounding[s] and would not be able to answer 
questions intelligently and give a good medical history and 
behave cooperatively.  They are prevented from doing that by 
their diminished level of consciousness and by their inability to 
pay attention.” 
 
On cross-examination, Dr. Matthews was asked if certain 
behavior “could be evidence of psychotic delusion.”  The 
behavior, as described, was “believing someone had wires in 
their headband that were monitoring your behavior,” taking the 
headband and cutting it up, “believing someone had hidden 
cameras in their platform shoes that could possibly spy on you,” 
and “hearing foot falls on the steps outside the door, fearing 
people coming when no one’s there.”  Matthews answered that 
such conduct was consistent with psychotic thinking.  On 
redirect examination, however, Matthews clarified that such 
behavior “alone, would [not] mean that you’re psychotic.”  
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
27 
3. Competing theories of the crime 
Based on the foregoing evidence, the defense argued that 
drug intoxication caused defendant’s shooting and killing of 
Officer Zeppetella.  The defense emphasized defendant’s 
addiction, his hospitalizations, and the fact that his blood 
showed “toxic” levels of drugs on the day of the shooting.   
Relying on Dr. Stewart’s testimony, counsel argued that 
defendant suffered from drug-induced delirium and psychosis 
during the relevant events.  In support, counsel highlighted 
evidence of such a diagnosis, including Stacey’s report of 
defendant’s “psychotic symptoms,” Dr. Ordas’s observations of 
defendant’s confusion after the shooting, defendant’s single-
minded and bizarre conduct during the shooting, and his 
statements afterward.  Ultimately, counsel urged the jury not to 
convict defendant of the more serious crimes — first degree 
murder, second degree murder, or voluntary manslaughter — 
because, it was asserted, the prosecution failed to prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that defendant, delirious and psychotic, 
acted with the mental states required for those crimes. 
The prosecution, on the other hand, theorized that the 
killing of Officer Zeppetella constituted a premeditated and 
deliberate first degree murder that defendant perpetrated to 
avoid arrest.  The prosecution pointed out that defendant had 
reason to fear arrest because he had drugs and a stolen gun in 
the car but no driver’s license.9  The prosecution highlighted 
 
9  
The parties stipulated that defendant had felony 
convictions, making him a felon in possession of a firearm.  The 
parties likewise stipulated that the Department of Motor 
Vehicles had not issued a license under any of the names or 
aliases defendant used. 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
28 
details of the crime that, in its view, reflected mental alertness 
and accurate perceptions of reality that were inconsistent with 
an altered mental state like delirium or psychosis.  For example, 
the prosecution emphasized defendant’s marksmanship, how he 
was able to hit Officer Zeppetella multiple times, landing both 
fatal shots and shots that disabled the officer’s shooting arm; 
defendant’s ability to divide his attention — to watch the officer 
to see if he was still moving, and then shift his attention to 
securing a getaway vehicle; defendant’s rational decision to 
break into Lorraine Camacho’s house via a back door because 
defendant was “much less likely to be seen . . . doing it from the 
backyard.”  The prosecution summarized its case as one in which 
the perpetrator was “a dope-selling, armed, dope user . . . in 
command of his faculties . . . who gunned down an officer” 
because he had a “stolen gun, [and] no driver’s license.”  
At the conclusion of the guilt phase, the jury found 
defendant guilty of first degree murder and found true the 
special circumstance allegations. 
B.  Evidence at the Penalty Phase 
1.  Prosecution case 
 
The prosecution introduced victim impact evidence in the 
form of testimony from Officer Zeppetella’s wife, his father, and 
a colleague from the Oceanside Police Department. 
 
Detective Marilyn Priem testified that she was Officer 
Zeppetella’s field training officer.10  From February through 
March of 2003 — just before Officer Zeppetella began patrolling 
in his own car — Priem rode with him ten hours a day, four days 
 
10  
Priem was the individual who discovered Officer 
Zeppetella’s firearm in a vacuum cleaner. 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
29 
a week.  Priem said the developing police officer was “very 
caring,” “good-hearted,” and “compassionate with people.”  
Officer Zeppetella’s death left “a big hole in the [Oceanside 
Police] Department.” 
 
Officer Zeppetella’s father, Tony Mario Zeppetella 
(“Mr. Zeppetella”), told the jury of his son’s upbringing.  
Mr. Zeppetella testified that Officer Zeppetella was the 
youngest of three children and especially close to his mother.  
Growing up, Officer Zeppetella was a “good kid” and “the joy of 
[his parents’] life.”  When contemplating attending college, 
Officer Zeppetella told his parents he would join the Navy so 
they would not have to pay for his education.  After serving in 
the Navy, Officer Zeppetella decided to become a police officer 
because he “wanted to help people.”  He graduated from the 
police academy in October 2002.  The week before he was killed, 
he visited his parents and told them he was looking forward to 
Father’s Day, noting that it would be the first that he would be 
celebrating as a father himself.  When Mr. Zeppetella and his 
wife received news that Officer Zeppetella was killed, “it felt like 
somebody killed us, also.”  Officer Zeppetella’s mother “lost the 
will to live” and now “every day, she’s at the cemetery.” 
 
Officer Zeppetella’s widow, Jamie Zeppetella (“Jamie”), 
testified about the couple’s life together.  Jamie met him in 
January 2002.  “Within the first week” she knew “he was the 
person I wanted to spend the rest of my life with.”  The couple 
got married in May 2002.  In December 2002, shortly after 
Officer Zeppetella graduated from the police academy, the 
couple had their son, Jakob.  Officer Zeppetella was a “very 
involved” father, and on the day he was killed, he spent time in 
the morning with Jakob before heading to work.  When Jamie 
found out later that afternoon that her husband had died, she 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
30 
“started screaming,” “went into . . . a state of shock, and didn’t 
want to talk to anybody.”  Jamie believed that her husband’s 
death had an impact on six-month old Jakob, who now has to 
grow up without his father.  Jamie believed that her own “goals 
and hopes” that she had for her family were “gone.” 
 
In addition to the victim impact evidence, the parties 
stipulated defendant had four prior felony convictions.  Two 
involved possession of controlled substances, one involved 
possession of a firearm by a felon, and the other was for driving 
in willful or wanton disregard for safety of persons or property 
while fleeing from a pursuing police officer. 
2.  Defense case 
 
The defense’s case in mitigation consisted of testimony by 
defendant’s wife, mother, and an emergency room doctor, Karen 
Van Hoesen.  Dr. Van Hoesen told the jury that, based on the 
medical records she reviewed, defendant’s self-inflicted 
lacerations on his arms were “full thickness” lacerations, or “the 
most severe” of lacerations.  She also testified concerning 
defendant’s blood loss, stating that defendant’s hematocrit level, 
or “the amount of red blood cells . . . in [the] body,” was “lower 
than what is expected to be normal.”  Finally, Van Hoesen stated 
that the blood found in the bathtub and scrawled as writing on 
the wall was “consistent with the blood loss” from defendant’s 
self-inflicted wounds.  On cross-examination, Van Hoesen 
conceded that the description of defendant’s lacerations as being 
“full thickness” was recorded only in the paramedic’s report — 
not the treating physician’s (Dr. Dandan’s) — and that, in any 
event, the injuries were not life-threatening. 
 
Diana Gil, defendant’s mother, told the jury that 
defendant was the second of her five children.  Defendant spent 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
31 
the first years of his life with his grandparents at the Daley 
Ranch in Escondido, where his grandfather worked as a 
caretaker.  Gil confirmed that a picture the defense showed was 
of her son at the age of 15.  Gil pointed out various people 
(defendant’s grandfather, grandmother, and oldest brother) who 
were in the gallery during her testimony.  Finally, Gil said that 
she was at defendant’s trial because she “love[s] [her] son.” 
 
Stacey Camacho again testified on her husband’s behalf.  
She related that she and defendant met in 1996 and that they 
married the next year.  They had two children together, Alexis 
and Anthony, who were six and seven years old.  After providing 
more biographical details, Stacey narrated for the jury a number 
of pictures showing defendant with herself, Alexis, Anthony, or 
his coworkers.  Like with defendant’s mother, defense counsel 
ended by asking if Stacey still loved defendant.  Stacey said she 
did.  She also said that his children still loved him. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Guilt Phase Issues 
1.  Verdin error 
a.  Background 
 
Approximately ten months before trial began, the 
prosecution filed a motion seeking a court order requiring 
defendant to submit to psychiatric examination by professionals 
of the People’s choosing for the purpose of rebutting defendant’s 
anticipated mental state defense.  The trial court denied the 
request as premature because the defense had not directly 
placed his mental state at issue.  Citing People v. Danis (1973) 
31 Cal.App.3d 782 (Danis), however, the court indicated that if 
defense counsel “present expert witnesses regarding mental 
health issues, [the prosecution] is going be entitled to . . . have 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
32 
your client examined.”  (See Danis, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d at 
p. 786 [“even in the absence of an authorizing statute, a trial 
court possesses the inherent power to order a defendant who has 
imposed a defense of insanity or of diminished capacity to 
submit to an examination of a psychiatrist selected by the 
People”], disapproved in Verdin v. Superior Court (2008) 
43 Cal.4th 1096 (Verdin).) 
In August 2005, after defense counsel indicated that 
Dr. Stewart would be rendering a medical opinion on 
defendant’s behalf, the court stated that it would sign a “Danis 
order,” allowing the prosecution to conduct a psychiatric 
evaluation of defendant.  Defendant objected to the order on 
statutory and Fifth Amendment grounds.  About a month later, 
defense counsel informed the court that defendant would be 
refusing to submit to the court’s order.  Although defendant’s 
attorney told the court that defendant was refusing to comply 
on the advice of counsel, the court elicited a personal statement 
from defendant that he was declining to cooperate with an 
examination.  The court accepted defendant’s refusal to obey its 
order but, citing People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312 
(Carpenter), told the parties that “the court will be instructing 
the jury that [defendant] has refused.” 
During his testimony, Dr. Matthews — the prosecution’s 
forensic psychiatrist — testified that defendant declined an 
interview with him.  Immediately after this statement, 
Matthews explained the difference between forensic and clinical 
psychiatry.  According to Matthews, forensic psychiatrists do 
not see “patients” and are not involved in treatment; instead, 
they perform examinations on “evaluee[s]” with the goal of 
“learn[ing] enough about the situation so that [they] can be of 
service in some way to the judicial system.”  Furthermore, a 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
33 
forensic psychiatrist is “trained to make decisions largely from 
documentary evidence” and does not depend on “see[ing] the 
patient.”  Matthews also admitted that when he had gone to the 
jail seeking to examine defendant, he brought four questions 
prepared by the prosecution. 
Dr. Stewart, the defense expert, echoed Dr. Matthews’s 
statement that interviews with defendant were not pivotal to his 
opinion.  Stewart acknowledged that, unlike with Matthews, 
defendant did cooperate with his (Stewart’s) efforts to examine 
him, and Stewart interviewed defendant twice.  Stewart 
nonetheless told the jury that “taking away any interview [he] 
did with the defendant” would not change his opinion. 
Both the prosecution and defense referenced defendant’s 
refusal to be examined by Dr. Matthews during closing 
arguments.  In discussing the testimony of Dr. Stewart, the 
prosecution criticized the expert for failing to take notes, 
forgoing a written report, and withholding his opinion until the 
last minute.  The prosecution called such conduct — along with 
defendant’s “refus[al] [of] a court-ordered exam” — “game 
playing” and said that such behavior “stinks.” 
 
In response, the defense explained why defendant 
declined to be interviewed by Dr. Matthews.  Emphasizing that 
Matthews was a forensic psychiatrist and not a clinician, the 
defense counsel asked rhetorically, “Who would subject 
themsel[ves] to this evaluation by Dr. Matthews, who doesn’t 
perceive you as a client . . . [but] as an evaluee?”  Characterizing 
Matthews as someone who was “into it for 50 grand” — the 
amount of money Matthews said he received as his 
remuneration — the defense stated that Matthews’s “opinion is 
not going to change” and as such, “nothing good was going to 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
34 
come of [the doctor meeting with defendant].”  Finally, 
referencing the court’s instruction regarding the refusal, 
defense counsel urged the jury to think of it as “the punishment 
for Mr. Camacho not [being] willing to participate in that 
particular sham.” 
 
The court’s instruction to the jurors read: 
“Pursuant to California law, this court ordered the 
defendant, ADRIAN J. CAMACHO, to submit to a 
psychological examination by a doctor selected by 
the prosecution.  The defendant refused to be 
examined or interviewed by him.  If you find the 
defendant’s 
refusal 
to 
answer 
questions 
or 
participate in the mental examination willful, you 
may take that fact into consideration when weighing 
the defense’s expert opinions about the defendant’s 
mental condition in this case.  You may infer that 
the defendant wanted only his self-chosen experts, 
not others, to evaluate him.” 
b.  Analysis 
As the trial judge’s comments indicate, at the time of 
defendant’s trial “decisional law authorized trial courts to order 
a defendant who placed his or her mental state in issue to 
submit to mental examination by prosecution experts.”  (People 
v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 939 (Clark).)  In 2008, however, 
this court held that such decisions did not survive the 1990 
passage of Proposition 15.  (Verdin, supra, 43 Cal.4th at 
pp. 1102, 1106.)  That proposition added section 1054 to the 
Penal Code, which specifies that “no discovery shall occur in 
criminal cases except as provided by this chapter, other express 
statutory provisions, or as mandated by the Constitution of the 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
35 
United States.”  (§ 1054, subd. (e).)  Because “nothing in the 
criminal discovery statutes (§ 1054 et seq.) authorizes a trial 
court to issue an order” requiring a defendant who has mounted 
a mental state defense to submit to an examination by 
prosecution experts, we concluded in Verdin that trial courts 
lacked the 
needed 
statutory 
authority to order such 
examinations.  (Verdin, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1109.) 
The Legislature responded to our decision in Verdin by 
enacting a statute expressly conferring such power on trial 
judges.  (See § 1054.3, subd. (b)(1) [“whenever a defendant in a 
criminal action . . . places in issue his or her mental state . . . 
through the proposed testimony of any mental health expert, 
upon timely request by the prosecution, the court may order that 
the defendant . . . submit to examination by a prosecution-
retained mental health expert”]; id., subd. (b)(2).)  However, the 
rule announced in Verdin continues to apply to trials — like 
defendant’s — conducted before January 1, 2010, the effective 
date of the newly enacted statute.  (See People v. Gonzales (2011) 
51 Cal.4th 894, 927 (Gonzales); see also, e.g., People v. Banks 
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1193.) 
Because Verdin applies in this case, the trial court erred 
in ordering defendant to be examined by Dr. Matthews, 
admitting Matthews’s testimony that defendant refused to 
submit to the examination, allowing the prosecution to comment 
on such refusal during closing argument, and instructing the 
jury that it could consider defendant’s refusal in considering 
Dr. Stewart’s opinion.  (See, e.g., Verdin, supra, 43 Cal.4th at 
p. 1116 [finding the court’s order to be error]; People v. Wallace 
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1087 (Wallace) [“admission of [a 
prosecution expert’s] testimony regarding defendant’s refusal to 
cooperate with the court-ordered psychiatric examination was 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
36 
also error”]; Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 940 [“comment on 
[the] defendant’s refusal to be questioned” was error]; Gonzales, 
supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 929 [court’s instruction to the jury that 
“it could consider [the defendant’s] refusal to be interviewed” by 
a prosecution-retained expert was “infected by the Verdin 
error”].)  The question before us is whether such errors are so 
prejudicial as to require reversal of defendant’s convictions. 
 
The parties disagree about the standard under which 
these Verdin errors are to be assessed for prejudice.  Defendant 
argues that these errors violated his federal constitutional 
rights and therefore should be subjected to a “harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt” standard.  (Chapman v. California (1967) 
386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman).)  The People, on the other hand, 
contend that “[t]he errors here involve state statutory law” and 
should be analyzed under the lower reasonable probability 
standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson). 
 
Our case law supports the People’s position that Verdin 
errors occurring at the guilt phase are assessed for prejudice 
“under the [Watson] standard for state law error, [i.e.,] whether 
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of trial would 
have been more favorable to [the] defendant” had the errors not 
occurred.  (Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 940–941; see also 
People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892, 941–942 (Hoyt).)  This is 
because, in the circumstances here presented, a defendant does 
not have a constitutional right to refuse to be examined. 
A long line of authorities, from both this court and the 
United States Supreme Court, establishes that the federal 
Constitution does not bar the government from performing a 
mental examination of a defendant “to rebut that defendant’s 
presentation of expert testimony in support of a [mental state] 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
37 
defense.”  (Kansas v. Cheever (2013) 571 U.S. 87, 89–90 [“The 
question here is whether the Fifth Amendment prohibits the 
government from introducing evidence from a court-ordered 
mental evaluation of a criminal defendant to rebut that 
defendant’s presentation of expert testimony in support of a 
defense of voluntary intoxication.  We hold that it does not”]; see 
also, e.g., People v. Nieves (2021) 11 Cal.5th 404, 436 (Nieves) 
[“Once [a] defendant place[s] [his or] her mental state at issue, 
[he or] she waive[s] her Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to 
object to the prosecution examinations”]; Maldonado v. Superior 
Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1112, 1132–1133 (Maldonado) [“by 
electing to present [a mental state defense], [a defendant] will 
waive his privilege against self-incrimination to the extent 
necessary to support his claim and allow fair rebuttal.  Forcing 
him to this choice does not offend the Constitution”]; Clark, 
supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 940 [“Defendant cites no decision, and we 
are aware of none, holding that the Fifth Amendment or any 
other federal constitutional provision prohibits a court from 
ordering a defendant who has placed his or her mental state in 
issue to submit to a mental examination by a prosecution 
expert”]; Gonzales, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 929 [“It is settled that 
a defendant who makes an affirmative showing of his or her 
mental condition by way of expert testimony waives his or her 
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to object to examination by 
a prosecution expert”]; accord Buchanan v. Kentucky (1987) 
483 U.S. 402, 422–423.)  As such, although the trial court in this 
case committed error under state law by ordering an 
examination by the prosecution expert and allowing the jury to 
learn of defendant’s refusal to be examined, this did not violate 
defendant’s federal constitutional rights.  We therefore analyze 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
38 
whether the court’s errors were prejudicial under the Watson 
standard.11 
 
Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude it 
was not reasonably probable that the outcome of the trial would 
have been more favorable to defendant had the errors not 
occurred.  Regarding the refusal, although Dr. Matthews 
referenced the fact that defendant declined to be examined, he 
did not use such refusal to criticize the defense expert’s opinion.  
(Accord People v. Krebs (2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 347 (Krebs) 
[finding harmless an expert’s disclosure of the fact that a 
defendant declined to be interviewed when “the prosecution 
expert . . . ‘did not rely on defendant’s refusal to participate in 
 
11  
To the extent defendant argues that the errors here 
amounted to constitutional violations of his right to remain 
silent — so-called Griffin or Doyle errors — he is mistaken.  
(Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 615 [“the Fifth 
Amendment . . . forbids either comment by the prosecution on 
the accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such 
silence is evidence of guilt”]; Doyle v. Ohio (1976) 426 U.S. 610, 
619 [“the use for impeachment purposes of petitioners’ silence, 
at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, 
violated the Due Process Clause”].)  Neither Griffin nor Doyle 
addressed circumstances in which a defendant has waived his 
privilege against self-incrimination by electing to put in issue 
his mental state, and it is clear that “[a] criminal defendant, who 
neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor attempts to 
introduce any psychiatric evidence, may not be compelled to 
respond to a psychiatrist if his statements can be used against 
him at a capital sentencing proceeding.”  (Estelle v. Smith (1981) 
451 U.S. 454, 468.) 
 
Furthermore, “[t]he same reasoning [explaining why we 
find meritless defendant’s Fifth Amendment arguments] applies 
to defendant’s claim that [his] Fourteenth Amendment right to 
due process was violated.”  (Gonzales, supra, 51 Cal.4th at 
p. 929, fn. 18.) 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
39 
the court-ordered examination’ to criticize his opponent’s 
conclusions”]; Wallace, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1087 [same].)12  
Indeed, both the prosecution and defense experts stated that 
interviews with defendant were not pivotal to their opinions.  
Matthews testified that forensic psychiatrists such as himself 
rely on documentary evidence to form their opinions, not 
examinations of the individuals whose mental states they are 
assessing.  Dr. Stewart likewise stated that without defendant’s 
interviews, he would still reach the conclusions he did.  These 
circumstances tend to reduce the likelihood that defendant was 
prejudiced by Matthews’s comment regarding defendant’s 
refusal to be interviewed.  (Accord Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at 
p. 941 [finding evidence of a defendant’s refusal to be 
interviewed to be harmless when a prosecution expert “did not 
suggest the fact that defendant refused . . . had any bearing on 
his diagnosis” and “nothing in the record shows [the expert] 
found any significance in defendant’s refusal to submit to an 
examination”].) 
 
Similarly, the prosecution’s remarks on defendant’s 
noncooperation were brief and not inflammatory.  (Accord Krebs, 
supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 347 [holding that Verdin errors were 
harmless despite “the prosecutor’s brief comments in closing 
argument highlighting defendant’s refusal to submit to an 
interview”].)  The prosecution criticized various aspects of 
Dr. Stewart’s methodology and included in that criticism 
defendant’s refusal to meet with the prosecution expert.  Some 
 
12  
“We applied the higher ‘reasonable possibility’ standard in 
. . . Wallace [and Krebs], because the error in th[ose] case[s] 
occurred at the penalty phase of a capital trial when the more 
exacting standard applies.”  (Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 941, 
fn. 24.) 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
40 
of the prosecution’s comments — those characterizing defense 
strategy as “game playing” or protesting that defendant’s 
refusal “just stinks” — certainly were pointed.  Nonetheless, the 
prosecution did not dwell on defendant’s noncooperation.  
Rather, the thrust of the prosecution’s comments was properly 
aimed at rebutting Dr. Stewart’s testimony by emphasizing his 
failure to take notes, prepare a written report, disclose his 
opinion in a timely manner, or obtain and consider facts the 
prosecution viewed as crucial to evaluating defendant’s mental 
state.  To the extent the remarks amounted to a targeted attack 
on the defense rather than generalized protests about “fairness,” 
they nonetheless did not prejudice defendant.  (Cf. Krebs, supra, 
8 Cal.5th at p. 346 [finding any error to be harmless despite the 
prosecution complaining about a lack of “ ‘fairness’ ” and 
“ ‘looking for the truth’ ” when the defendant declined to talk to 
the prosecution expert].) 
This is, in part, because defense counsel explained his 
client’s refusal to see Dr. Matthews.  (Accord Krebs, supra, 
8 Cal.5th at p. 347 [“the fact that the defense provided the jury 
with an explanation of why defendant refused to be examined 
by [a prosecution expert] . . . lean[s] against a finding of 
prejudice”].)  Counsel suggested to the jury that Matthews was 
biased because he saw the individuals he interviewed not as 
“patients” but as “evaluee[s]” and that he brought questions 
prepared by the prosecutor when he attempted to examine 
defendant.  In addition, by the time Matthews went to see 
defendant, he had already reached an opinion and billed the 
prosecution a substantial sum of money.  Under such 
circumstances, argued counsel, Matthews was not going to 
change his views regardless of what defendant said to him.  
Knowing this, counsel stated, defendant understandably 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
41 
refused to participate in a “sham” and so declined to subject 
himself to Matthews’s questioning.  This explanation tended to 
blunt the impact of defendant’s refusal to cooperate with 
Matthews and diffused the prosecution’s criticism that such 
refusal “just stinks.” 
 
Finally, the court instructed the jury that it could consider 
defendant’s “refusal to answer questions or participate in the 
mental examination . . . when weighing the defense’s expert 
opinions about the defendant’s mental condition.”  It further 
stated that jurors “may infer that the defendant wanted only his 
self-chosen experts, not others, to evaluate him.”13  This last 
part of the court’s instruction was taken from Carpenter, supra, 
15 Cal.4th at page 413, where we said that “[t]he jury could 
properly infer that defendant wanted only his self-chosen 
 
13  
This instruction is not materially different from that given 
in Gonzales.  There, the trial court told the jury “it had ordered 
examinations by Kaser-Boyd and Dr. Mills [two experts retained 
by the prosecution], that defendant had refused to be examined 
by Dr. Mills, and that her refusal ‘may be considered by you 
when weighing the opinions of the defense experts in this case.  
The weight to which this factor is entitled is a matter for you to 
decide.’ ”  (Gonzales, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 926.)  We held that 
erroneous instruction to be harmless and, in so concluding, 
relied in no small part on the existence of Evidence Code section 
730.  (See Gonzales, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 928; Evid. Code, 
§ 730 [authorizing a trial court “on its own motion or on motion 
of any party” to appoint an expert “to investigate, to render a 
report as may be ordered by the court, and to testify as an expert 
at the trial . . . to the fact or matter as to which the expert 
evidence is or may be required”].)  We do not discuss section 730 
here because the Attorney General has not argued its relevance 
to a determination of whether the Verdin errors were 
prejudicial. 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
42 
experts, not others, to evaluate him, an inference relevant to its 
consideration of all the evidence of his mental condition.”14 
 
Evaluating 
the 
court’s 
instruction 
alongside 
the 
prosecutor’s argument and 
Dr. Matthews’s reference to 
defendant’s refusal to be interviewed, we are not convinced that 
the instruction tips the balance toward reversible error under 
Watson.  First, we do not believe there was much further harm 
in telling the jury it “may” — but, by implication, need not — 
consider defendant’s refusal to be examined in weighing the 
credibility of the defense expert, or infer that defendant wanted 
only some experts, and not others, to evaluate him.  The latter 
is a sort of truism arising from the fact that defendant 
cooperated with his own experts, Drs. Ordas and Stewart, but 
not the prosecution’s expert, Dr. Matthews.  More broadly, the 
jury was not constrained by other instructions from considering 
defendant’s nonparticipation even in the absence of an 
instruction.  Second, to the extent the instruction indicates to 
the jury that it may weigh the defense expert’s opinion 
differently if the defendant thwarts the prosecution expert’s 
process, defense counsel highlighted what he considered to be 
the illogicality of the directive.  Without apparent disagreement 
from the prosecution in rebuttal, counsel made this point, 
arguing that “there’s nothing about Dr. Stewart’s evaluation 
that is assailed” by a missing interview with Dr. Matthews.  
 
14  
Although Carpenter has been overruled to the extent that 
it is inconsistent with Verdin (Verdin, supra, 43 Cal.4th at 
pp. 1106–1107), parts of the decision remain good law.  (See, 
e.g., Gonzales, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 929 [quoting with 
approval Carpenter, Danis, and People v. McPeters (1992) 
2 Cal.4th 1148 (McPeters) — cases that have been disapproved 
in part in Verdin].)  
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
43 
Ultimately, the issue the jury had to decide was the credibility 
of the experts, both the defense’s and the prosecution’s.  With 
regard to that determination, it is true that the parties made 
arguments concerning defendant’s refusal to submit to an 
examination and that the instruction facilitated the argument.  
However, the record indicates that these arguments were 
tangential to the primary dispute over the experts’ methods and 
conclusions.  In sum, a different verdict at the guilt phase absent 
the Verdin errors was not reasonably probable. 
 
In addition to contending that the Verdin errors warrant 
reversal of his convictions, defendant also makes conclusory 
assertions that the errors deprived him of his right to a reliable 
penalty determination.  Defendant forgoes any specific 
argument regarding penalty phase prejudice.  Instead, he 
generically asserts (primarily in the section headings within his 
briefing) that the various errors violated that right. 
To the extent such arguments are not waived for failure to 
support them (see, e.g., People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 
169, fn. 25; People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 206), they 
are meritless.  It does not appear that any mention of 
defendant’s refusal to submit to a court-ordered examination 
was made at the penalty phase.  Certainly, defendant’s own 
recitation of the relevant facts is limited to the guilt phase, and 
he offers no elaboration concerning how evidence relating to the 
Verdin claim may have spilled over to the penalty determination 
and tainted that decision as well.  Under these circumstances, 
there was no reasonable possibility that the Verdin errors 
affected the death judgment.  (See, e.g., Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th 
at p. 941, fn. 24.) 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
44 
 
Defendant advances various counterarguments in an 
attempt to show that the Verdin errors rise to a constitutional 
dimension in this case.  (But see Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at 
p. 940; Hoyt, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 941–942.)  Specifically, 
defendant argues that the trial court violated his privilege 
against self-incrimination because it did not confer upon him 
“ ‘advance assurance of immunity against overbroad direct and 
derivative use of [his] responses to the examiners.’ ”  
We disagree. 
Defendant’s argument rests largely on Maldonado, supra, 
53 Cal.4th at page 1112.  In Maldonado, this court confronted 
the issue of “what general limits, if any, may properly be 
imposed on prosecutorial access to court-ordered examinations 
and their results . . . in order to vindicate or protect the 
defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.”  (Id. at 
p. 1117.)  We concluded that the limits mandated by the 
Constitution are few.  In the context of a court-ordered 
examination, the Fifth Amendment allows “direct or derivative 
use of [a defendant’s] statements to the prosecution examiners,” 
although only to the extent necessary “to rebut any mental-state 
evidence [the defendant] presents through his own experts.”  
(Maldonado, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1129; see also id. at p. 1125 
[“The prosecution is . . . constitutionally permitted to obtain its 
own examination of the accused, and to use the results, 
including the accused’s statements to the prosecution 
examiners, as is required to negate the asserted defense.  If the 
defendant refuses to cooperate with the prosecution examiners, 
the court may impose sanctions, such as advising the jury that 
it may consider such noncooperation when weighing the 
opinions of the defense experts.  On the other hand, except for 
appropriate rebuttal, the defendant’s statements to the 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
45 
prosecution experts may not be used, either directly or as a lead 
to other evidence, to bolster the prosecution’s case against the 
defendant”].) 
Maldonado also elucidated the various ways in which the 
defense can ensure that the prosecution does not misuse 
materials elicited during a court-ordered examination.  This is 
accomplished primarily through litigation at trial.  (See 
Maldonado, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 1137–1138.)  In particular, 
once “the prosecution commences its rebuttal case, the defense 
can raise specific objections to particular evidence.”  (Id. at 
p. 1138.)  “At this stage, the court is in the best possible position 
to determine whether particular rebuttal evidence proffered by 
the prosecution exceeds the scope of the defendant’s Fifth 
Amendment waiver.”  (Ibid.)  Furthermore, because Maldonado 
was decided after the enactment of section 1054.3, we explained 
in a footnote that “[t]o the extent petitioner and other criminal 
defendants are entitled, as a prophylactic protection of their 
Fifth Amendment privilege, to decline to submit to court-
ordered mental examinations until they receive advance 
assurance of immunity against overbroad direct and derivative 
use of their responses to the examiners, we may, and we do, 
judicially declare such an immunity as ‘ “reasonably to be 
implied” ’ from the statutory provision allowing the prosecution 
to obtain such examinations for the limited purpose of rebutting 
anticipated mental-state defenses.”  (Maldonado, supra, at 
p. 1129, fn. 10.) 
Seizing on this language, defendant argues that because 
section 1054.3 did not exist at the time of his trial, no such 
immunity may reasonably be deemed to have been conferred in 
his case.  Pointing to the language of the court’s order, which did 
not provide “advance assurance of immunity against overbroad 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
46 
direct and derivative use of [the defendant’s] responses to the 
examiners,” defendant argues that in fact no such immunity was 
extended.  (Maldonado, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1129, fn. 10.)  
Defendant implies that under such circumstances, he was 
within his constitutional right to refuse to submit to the order — 
or conversely, that by signing such an order, the court violated 
the constitutional guarantee protecting defendant against self-
incrimination. 
We reject defendant’s argument.  First, although we do not 
need to decide the issue because the Attorney General did not 
brief it, defendant’s argument appears forfeited.  It is true that 
defendant objected to the court’s order and ultimately refused to 
cooperate with Dr. Matthews.  Yet, he did not base either his 
objection or refusal on the court’s alleged failure to provide 
“advance assurance” that his statements would be introduced 
only for proper rebuttal purposes.  (Maldonado, supra, 
53 Cal.4th at p. 1129, fn. 10.)  If defendant were concerned 
about the potential overbroad use of his statements, he could 
have said as much.  Even before Maldonado was decided, the 
case law suggested that statements made during a court-
ordered examination could be used only for rebuttal purposes.  
(See, e.g., Danis, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d at pp. 785–786; cf. People 
v. Perez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1, 7–8 (Perez) [“ ‘ “[r]eviewing courts 
have traditionally excused parties for failing to raise an issue at 
trial where an objection would have been futile or wholly 
unsupported by substantive law then in existence” ’ ”].)  Had 
defendant brought the issue to the court’s attention, the court 
could have addressed his concerns about any overbroad use of a 
psychiatric evaluation.  (See, e.g., People v. Simon (2001) 
25 Cal.4th 1082, 1103 [explaining that “the basic rationale of the 
forfeiture doctrine” is “ ‘ “ ‘to encourage a defendant to bring 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
47 
errors to the attention of the trial court, so that they may be 
corrected or avoided and a fair trial had’ ” ’ ”].)  Under such 
circumstances, defendant’s failure to raise the issue may well 
have resulted in forfeiture. 
Second, the record in this case confirms that all parties 
involved understood the intended use of any interview a 
prosecution expert conducted with defendant would be limited 
to rebutting defendant’s mental state defense.  The People’s 
motion requesting that the court issue an order requiring 
defendant to sit for such an examination stated as much.  The 
People’s oral argument in the court and the exchange between 
the trial judge and the parties suggest the same.  And, of course, 
the court referred specifically to Danis — with its attendant 
limiting language — in granting the prosecution’s motion for an 
examination. 
In addition, decisional law relied upon by the trial judge 
underscored the proper role of this evidence as limited to the 
rebuttal of the defendant’s proffered mental state evidence.  (See 
McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1190 [“By tendering his mental 
condition as an issue in the penalty phase, defendant waived his 
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to the extent necessary to 
permit a proper examination of that condition. . . .  Any other 
result would give an unfair tactical advantage to defendants, 
who could, with impunity, present mental defenses at the 
penalty phase, secure in the assurance they could not be 
rebutted by expert testimony based on an actual psychiatric 
examination” (italics added)]; Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at 
p. 412 [same]; Danis, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d at pp. 785–786 [“The 
sole issues are whether the court committed reversible error in 
granting the prosecution’s motion to have a court-appointed 
psychiatrist examine defendant and in permitting the doctor to 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
48 
testify in rebuttal to the medical testimony introduced by 
defendant on the subject of defendant’s diminished capacity” 
and “opinion testimony from a court-appointed psychiatrist 
based upon his examination of a defendant in a criminal case is 
admissible as prosecution rebuttal during the guilt phase of the 
trial, once the defendant has placed his mental condition in 
issue by proffering an insanity or diminished capacity defense” 
(italics added)].) 
Third, defendant’s refusal to be examined was in fact used 
only to rebut defendant’s argument that he lacked the requisite 
mental state for the more serious crimes.  As noted, 
Dr. Matthews referenced defendant’s refusal in his testimony as 
a rebuttal witness; the prosecution mentioned the refusal in 
seeking to refute the defense expert’s opinion that defendant 
suffered from a diminished mental state; and the court’s 
instruction permitted the jury to consider the refusal in 
assessing the same defense expert’s opinion.  Defendant 
therefore had no occasion to “raise [at trial] specific objections to 
particular evidence” regarding his refusal to comply with the 
court’s order.  (Maldonado, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1138.)  In 
such circumstances, to hold that the court nonetheless violated 
defendant’s constitutional rights by not expressly specifying 
that the result of the court-ordered examination would be used 
only in rebuttal is unwarranted. 
 
Defendant claims various other asserted infirmities 
concerning the court’s instruction.  He argues that the court 
compounded its error by denying the defense proposal that the 
court instruct the jury that defendant refused to submit to the 
court-ordered examination on the advice of counsel.  According 
to defendant, “[r]elying on an attorney’s advice for a course of 
action may defeat an allegation of willfulness and the trial court 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
49 
should have instructed the jury that when [defendant] refused 
to submit to the examination, he was acting on the advice [of] 
his attorneys and that fact could be taken into consideration in 
determining if the refusal was willful.” 
Defendant has cited no case establishing the premise that 
“[r]elying on an attorney’s advice for a course of action may 
defeat an allegation of willfulness” in the context of court-
ordered examinations.  (See Nieves, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 437 
[“Defendant cites no authority for her view that she did not 
personally refuse to be examined, and she offers no reason to 
dispel the general rule that absent complaint at trial, the acts of 
her counsel are imputed to her”].)  Furthermore, even if we 
accept that defendant followed his counsel’s advice, this might, 
at most, have led a juror to find that defendant’s refusal was not 
willful.  But in assessing the harm caused by the instruction, we 
have assumed one or more jurors found “the defendant’s refusal 
to answer questions or participate in the mental examination 
[was] willful” and took that into consideration when weighing 
the expert opinions regarding the defendant’s mental condition.  
Given this assumption, the fact that the jury was not instructed 
that defendant followed the advice of his counsel could not have 
prejudiced defendant. 
 
Defendant further argues that the court’s instruction 
allowing the jury to infer from defendant’s refusal to meet with 
Dr. Matthews “that the defendant wanted only his self-chosen 
experts, not others, to evaluate him” was unsupported by 
evidence.  But at trial, the parties presented testimony 
establishing that defendant cooperated with experts chosen by 
the defense, Drs. Ordas and Stewart, yet not with an expert 
retained by the prosecution, Matthews.  The defense also 
explained why defendant did not want Matthews — the only 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
50 
psychiatric expert not selected by defendant — to examine him.  
Upon this record, we cannot say that no evidence supports the 
inference permitted by the court’s advisement.  (Accord, People 
v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 905–906.) 
2.  Admission of letters written by defendant 
a.  Background 
 
Defendant objects to the court’s admission into evidence of 
two letters he authored.  The prosecution sought to introduce 
these letters to show defendant’s motive in the charged crimes.  
Defendant wrote both letters while in pretrial detention on the 
current charges.  The first was written in early August 2003, 
about two months after the June 13 shooting death of Officer 
Zeppetella: 
“I’m doing a lot better, thank you very much, had a 
little problem here and there with these fucks (cops) 
but other than that and all the muthafucking crying 
that goes on here, it’s all good! . . . 
“Today they extracted p-wee’s celli there in E-1 over 
some fuckin bullshit and the only reason I don’t put 
a green light on these fucks is because he’s always 
fucking up.” 
The second letter was written in late August 2003, evidently in 
response to some problem defendant was experiencing with the 
mail system at the jail: 
“I tell you these fucks are really asking for me to 
make an example.  These fucks don’t understand 
how important it was for that letter to get out.  Only 
cause they go home everyday, they think theyre tuff 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
51 
ass’es.  Its going to be a big surprise when I send one 
of them home in a fucken bodybag!” 
 
The prosecution argued that the letters showed “an 
animosity towards law enforcement” and were “relevant on the 
issue of intent” or motive.  The defense objected to admission of 
the letters on the grounds they purportedly constituted 
inadmissible hearsay and should in any event be excluded under 
Evidence Code section 352.  After hearing arguments from both 
sides, the trial court admitted the letters, finding them “directly 
relevant to defendant’s attitude toward law enforcement” and 
“relevant to motive and as to [defendant’s] state of mind in June 
of 2003, the time of the incident.” 
 
At trial, the prosecution mentioned the letters in its 
opening and closing statements.  During opening remarks, the 
prosecution read to the jury portions of the letters and argued 
that they were evidence of defendant’s “special malice, . . . 
special anger directed towards law enforcement.”  The 
prosecution also introduced testimony to clarify that the term 
“green light” — as used in the first letter — “is a prison 
terminology or street terminology [that means] it’s okay to kill 
this person.”  During closing argument, the prosecution again 
argued that the letters showed defendant harbored “special 
malice towards officers.”  Responding to defense questioning of 
witnesses 
and 
anticipating 
opposing 
counsel’s 
closing 
comments, the prosecution asserted that the letters explained 
why defendant engaged in seemingly “[un]necessary” violence 
against Officer Zeppetella.  In contrast to defense counsel’s 
theory that defendant displayed “violence beyond that necessary 
. . . because [of] the drugs and the Paxil,” the prosecution 
attributed defendant’s brutality — his shooting the victim 
13 times — to defendant’s “special malice.” 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
52 
 
The prosecution returned to the letters in its closing 
statement at the penalty phase, using them to cast doubt on 
defendant’s remorse for the killing of Officer Zeppetella. 
b.  Analysis 
 
Defendant argues that the letters should have been 
excluded as inadmissible character evidence under Evidence 
Code section 1101, subdivision (a).  Under that provision, and 
subject to certain exceptions, “evidence of a person’s character 
or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an 
opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances 
of his or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his 
or her conduct on a specified occasion.”  (Evid. Code, § 1101, 
subd. (a).)  Defendant further contends that whether the letters 
constituted “[c]haracter evidence or not,” they were irrelevant to 
the issue of his intent, motive, or state of mind.  Finally, as 
noted, he asserts the letters should have been excluded 
pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, which provides:  “The 
court in its discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission 
will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create 
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, 
or of misleading the jury.”  We address these arguments 
seriatim. 
 
As a preliminary matter, we agree with the People that 
defendant has not preserved the issue for review because he 
failed to argue below that the letters constituted inadmissible 
character evidence.  (See, e.g., People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 
82, 130 (Valdez) [the “defendant’s argument under Evidence 
Code section 1101 is not cognizable on appeal because he failed 
to object on this basis at trial”]; People v. Demetrulias (2006) 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
53 
39 Cal.4th 1, 20–21 (Demetrulias).)  At trial, defendant objected 
to admission of the letters because, in his view, they were 
hearsay, not subject to any exception and their probative value 
was substantially outweighed by the danger of prejudice.  
Defense did not once assert that the letters constituted 
character evidence, or argue that they reflected evidence of a 
trait of his character improperly offered to prove “his . . . conduct 
on a specified occasion.”  (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (a).)  As such, 
defendant cannot be heard now to complain on this ground.  (See 
Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 130.) 
Defendant seeks to excuse his failure to raise a specific 
objection by arguing that “[a]ll of the parties were experienced 
litigators” and therefore “saw no need to identify for the record 
that the letters were character evidence” despite understanding 
them to be such.  The contention fails to persuade.  Experienced 
or not, counsel needed to make a timely and specific objection on 
the ground asserted on appeal.  (See, e.g., Valdez, supra, 
55 Cal.4th at p. 130.)  Furthermore, insofar as the parties 
wrangled over the tendency of the letters to demonstrate 
animosity toward law enforcement and therefore establish 
defendant’s motive in killing a police officer, such arguments do 
not reflect that the litigants and the court all implicitly treated 
the letters as character evidence and, as defendant now asserts, 
“moved directly to the subject of whether they came in as an 
exception under [Evidence Code section] 1101(b).”  Although 
subdivision (b) of section 1101 refers to evidence of motive (along 
with other types of evidence), there is no reason that evidence of 
motive necessarily is also evidence of character.  Moreover, the 
record here makes clear that the prosecution described the 
letters as tending to show motive in response to the court’s query 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
54 
regarding their relevance, not how they fit under an exception 
to character evidence. 
 
On the merits, we are persuaded the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in finding the letters to be relevant 
regarding the issue of motive and as such, admissible under 
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b).  (See, e.g., People v. 
Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 132 (Crittenden) [“The trial court 
has broad discretion in determining the relevance of evidence”]; 
People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 668 (Mickey) [“The 
appropriate standard of review for a ruling on admissibility over 
an objection of irrelevance and/or undue prejudice is abuse of 
discretion”]; People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1239 
(Gordon) [same].)  That provision states:  “Nothing in this 
section prohibits the admission of evidence that a person 
committed a crime, civil wrong, or other act when relevant to 
prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or 
accident . . .) other than his or her disposition to commit such an 
act.”  (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) 
Relevant evidence is that “having any tendency in reason 
to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to 
the determination of the action.”  (Evid. Code, § 210.)  In this 
case, the central fact in dispute was defendant’s state of mind 
when he shot and killed Officer Zeppetella.  The prosecution 
maintained that defendant premeditated and deliberated the 
murder of the victim, and, as part of that charge, had to prove 
that defendant acted with malice aforethought.  The defense, on 
the other hand, urged that defendant killed Officer Zeppetella 
because defendant was delirious and psychotic due to the 
influence of drugs.  The letters were relevant to this dispute 
“because, if the defense version of events were true, one might 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
55 
reasonably expect defendant, upon recovering from the 
psychotic episode and realizing the senseless violence he had 
done” not to engage in thoughts and words showing him to 
contemplate doing further violence to people detaining him.  
(People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 606 (Bell).)  Conversely, if 
the prosecution theory of the crime were correct, defendant’s 
hostility and willingness to resort to violence against persons in 
authority “would more clearly be expected.”  (Ibid.)  More 
directly, although other inferences are possible, one may 
reasonably conclude that the letters showed defendant harbored 
hostility toward law enforcement, and it was this hostility — not 
delusions or psychosis — that drove him to shoot Officer 
Zeppetella 13 times.  Under such circumstances, we cannot say 
that the letters did not have “any tendency” to prove a disputed 
fact.  (Evid. Code, § 210, italics added.) 
Defendant’s arguments to the contrary appear to conflate 
the probative value of a piece of evidence with its relevance.  
Reprising assertions raised before the trial court, defendant 
contends the letters simply “reflected defendant’s attitude 
towards his jailers” and so “were not relevant to any issues 
involving a patrol officer such as Officer Zeppetella.”  Yet, in his 
early August letter, defendant referred to “these fucks” and 
parenthetically clarified that he meant he was having trouble 
with “cops.”  Defendant then mentioned “put[ting] a green light 
on these fucks.”  Likewise, in the later August letter, defendant 
once again alluded to “these fucks” and said it was going to be a 
“big surprise” when he “send[s] one of them home in a . . . 
bodybag.”  
Whether defendant was simply expressing 
frustration with his jailers or manifesting hostility toward law 
enforcement more generally in writing the letters was a factual 
question for the jury.  Likewise, whether the letters reflected 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
56 
sentiments defendant held on the day of the crime was a 
determination for the jury.  Defendant was free to urge the jury 
to discount the letters for the reasons he now suggests.  At 
bottom, although defendant couches his argument as one 
concerning the relevance of the communications, his assertions 
are really aimed at the weight of the evidence.  (See, e.g., People 
v. Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 786, 805 [“ ‘Relevance’ describes 
whether evidence should be heard because it might reasonably 
resolve a dispute.  ‘Weight’ describes the degree to which the 
jury finds the evidence probative”].)  Simply because the letters 
would have had more probative value if they contained a 
“definitive indication” that “the sentiments expressed were long 
held” or directly referenced “the crime or . . . Officer Zeppetella” 
does not render them irrelevant otherwise. 
 
We are further persuaded that the court did not err in 
refusing to exercise its discretion under Evidence Code section 
352 to exclude the letters.  (See, e.g., Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d at 
p. 668; Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1239.)  Any potential 
prejudice arising from admission of the letters was low given 
that the unsavory language and sentiment expressed therein 
were not unduly prejudicial, or “ ‘of such nature as to inflame 
the emotions of the jur[ors], motivating them to use the 
information, not to logically evaluate the point upon which it is 
relevant, but to reward or punish one side because of the jurors’ 
emotional reaction.’ ”  (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 
439.)  Here, undisputed evidence showed that defendant — 
unprovoked by anything the victim did — shot a police officer 
13 times, firing when the officer was already down and crawling 
away, beat the officer’s head repeatedly, and then absconded in 
the patrol car after making sure the victim was no longer 
moving.  In light of the brutality of the charged crimes, 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
57 
admission of evidence that defendant used offensive language in 
describing unperformed acts of violence did not create an 
intolerable risk of prejudice.  (Accord, ibid. [“Although evidence 
of D.’s rape and Hamblen’s mistreatment is unpleasant, it paled 
in comparison to the testimony from four witnesses that 
defendant tried to kill them”]; People v. Eubanks (2011) 
53 Cal.4th 110, 146 (Eubanks) [“here, where the charged 
offenses included four counts of first degree murder based on 
defendant having killed her four children, admission of evidence 
that defendant had mistreated her nephew once by rubbing his 
face in feces” was not an abuse of discretion].)  This conclusion 
is strengthened by the fact that the prosecution “did not suggest 
to the jury that it consider the [letters] for any improper 
purpose,” instead appropriately utilizing the evidence as 
demonstrating defendant’s motive and to rebut the defense 
theory of mental incapacity.  (Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at 
p. 19; accord Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 439; Bell, supra, 
40 Cal.4th at p. 607 [because “the evidence was probative on the 
central factual issue of the case, and as its introduction was 
clearly targeted to that issue rather than to creation of 
prejudicial emotion, we cannot agree with defendant that the 
court’s choice to admit it was arbitrary or capricious”].) 
 
Because we find no merit in defendant’s claims of state 
evidentiary law, “we reject the associated contention that 
introduction of the evidence violated defendant’s constitutional 
rights . . . under . . . the United States Constitution.”15  (Bell, 
 
15  
Defendant also complains about the prosecution’s 
reference to the letters at the penalty phase, arguing that their 
assertedly erroneous admission at the guilt phase deprived him 
 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
58 
supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 607; see also, e.g., Valdez, 55 Cal.4th at 
p. 134 [“Because there was no statutory error, his constitutional 
claims . . . fail”].) 
3.  Exclusion of defense witnesses’ testimony 
a.  Background 
 
Defendant claims the trial court erred when, on three 
occasions, it sustained objections to testimony of defense 
witnesses “that would tend to prove [defendant] was sincere in 
his efforts to end his addiction to drugs.”  Two of these instances 
occurred during the testimony of Stacey Camacho.  During her 
direct examination, Stacey was asked, “Did it appear to you that 
Adrian was sincere in his efforts to get off of drugs [during the 
year preceding the shooting], or did it appear that he was just 
playing you?”  The prosecutor interposed an objection, stating 
“[Y]our Honor:  Speculative.”  The court sustained the objection, 
and defense counsel continued, “If you know, based on your 
relationship with Adrian, did it seem to you — were his actions 
and words and behavior — did they appear sincere?”  The 
 
of a reliable penalty determination.  As discussed, we are of the 
view that there was no error relating to the trial court’s decision 
to admit defendant’s writings.  Moreover, the prosecution made 
proper use of the letters during the penalty phase, employing 
them to suggest that defendant did not experience remorse for 
killing the victim.  “ ‘[R]emorse is universally deemed a factor 
relevant to penalty,” and “[n]o misconduct or constitutional 
error occurred” when, as here, “the prosecutor merely 
anticipated predictable defense argument urging sympathy for 
defendant and sought to negate its mitigating effect by 
highlighting defendant’s apparent lack of concern for the 
murder victim.”  (People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 854–
855 (Bemore).) 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
59 
prosecutor again objected on the same ground, and the court 
once more sustained the objection. 
 
The second occasion in which the court sustained an 
objection concerned Stacey’s testimony regarding a time during 
which defendant was being treated at Aurora Hospital.  Defense 
counsel had asked Stacey, “When he was hospitalized, can you 
describe how his demeanor was, what he was physically 
depicting to you by his demeanor?”  Stacey responded, “He was 
really depressed.  He was — he was crying a lot because he 
wanted to stop using drugs so bad, and he couldn’t.  He would 
try not to use drugs, and if he would go too long without it, he 
would get sick.  He couldn’t get out of bed.  He said that his bones 
would hurt.”  At this point, the prosecutor made a hearsay 
objection, which was sustained. 
 
The third instance involved the testimony of Lonnie 
Roybal, defendant’s coworker.  The following exchange took 
place during Roybal’s examination: 
“Question: 
Okay.  And when [defendant] 
talked with you about his drug 
problem with heroin, what was his 
demeanor like? 
“Answer: 
He cried a couple of times.  He was 
pretty sad about it.  I mean, he 
wanted help, you know, off it. 
“[Prosecutor]: 
I’m going to object, your honor, as 
hearsay what he said. 
“THE COURT: 
Sustained. 
“[Prosecutor]: 
Move to strike.  Ask the jury be 
told to disregard. 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
60 
“THE COURT: 
Answer will be stricken.  Jury to 
disregard. 
“Question: 
When he’d talk with you about his 
problems and he’d cry, did you ever 
know him to also show evidence of 
using, to the extent you might 
know?”16 
The examination thereafter resumed. 
 
In contrast to the above witnesses, Dr. Ordas was 
permitted to testify concerning defendant’s “sincer[ity] in his 
efforts to end his addiction to drugs.”  In setting up Ordas’s 
testimony, defense counsel first asked the doctor to describe the 
symptoms an addict experiences when withdrawing from 
heroin.  Ordas stated, “If . . . not treated, [that is] the addict 
doesn’t actually get some more drugs or gets in treatment, then 
often it [the withdrawal symptoms] progresses to a much worse 
state that can include incredible joint pain — when I say joint, 
I don’t mean just a bit — but serious pain in the joints of the 
body, diarrhea, vomiting, nausea, headaches, that kind of stuff.”  
Counsel subsequently asked Ordas to “describe for the jury 
[defendant’s] demeanor and attitude about treatment with you.”  
Ordas replied, “In general, he was highly motivated.”  Counsel 
then directly inquired whether in Ordas’s interactions with 
defendant, defendant seemed “sincere in his efforts.”  Ordas 
reiterated that defendant was sincere most of the time. 
 
16  
Defense counsel’s question — referring to the prior 
testimony of defendant crying — makes clear it is only the last 
part of Roybal’s answer (that defendant “wanted help . . . off 
[heroin]”) that was struck by the court.  
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
61 
b.  Analysis 
 
Defendant asserts the trial court erred in sustaining the 
prosecution’s objections to the defense witnesses’ testimony.  In 
examining defendant’s claims, we keep in mind that we review 
the trial court’s ruling, “not the court’s reasoning and, if the 
ruling was correct on any ground, we affirm.”  (People v. Geier 
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 582 (Geier); see also, e.g., People v. Chism 
(2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1295, fn. 12 [same]; People v. Jones 
(2012) 54 Cal.4th 1, 50 (Jones); People v. Fuiava (2012) 
53 Cal.4th 622, 668–669 (Fuiava); People v. Zapien (1993) 
4 Cal.4th 929, 976 [“ ‘ “No rule of decision is better or more 
firmly established by authority, nor one resting upon a sounder 
basis of reason and propriety, than that a ruling or decision, 
itself correct in law, will not be disturbed on appeal merely 
because given for a wrong reason.  If right upon any theory of 
the law applicable to the case, it must be sustained regardless 
of the considerations which may have moved the trial court to 
its conclusion” ’ ”].) 
 
Here, although the trial court sustained the prosecution’s 
objections on varying grounds (hearsay and speculation), the 
testimony regarding whether defendant was sincere in his 
efforts to stop using drugs was properly excluded because it was 
irrelevant.  (See Evid. Code, § 350 [“No evidence is admissible 
except relevant evidence”]; see also, e.g., Crittenden, supra, 
9 Cal.4th at p. 132 [“The trial court has broad discretion in 
determining the relevance of evidence [citations], but lacks 
discretion to admit irrelevant evidence”].)  Because defendant 
did not contest that he shot and killed Officer Zeppetella, the 
central issue for the jury was defendant’s state of mind when he 
opened fire.  Whether defendant was sincere in his attempts to 
quit drugs in the year before he shot the officer was at best 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
62 
weakly linked to an impaired mental state on the day of the 
shooting.  Had defendant been sincere about wanting to quit 
drugs, that would presumably increase the likelihood that 
defendant had actually stopped taking drugs at the time of the 
killing, was not then under the influence, and so would be more 
likely to harbor malice.  But this inference was not available in 
this particular case given that all the evidence of defendant’s 
supposed sincerity about stopping use of drugs — all sought to 
be introduced by the defense — was coupled with evidence that 
defendant, in fact, did not cease his drug use.  Dr. Ordas, for 
example, testified that defendant was “sincere in his efforts” to 
quit drugs “most of the time” and yet “always seemed to relapse” 
into drug use.  Because there was no suggestion that defendant 
actually stopped his drug use, the sincerity of his attempts to 
cease his addiction had no “tendency in reason to prove or 
disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the 
determination” of defendant’s state of mind.  (Evid. Code, § 210.)  
As such, testimony intended to show defendant “was sincere in 
his efforts to end his addiction to drugs” was properly excluded. 
 
Defendant offers no argument regarding the relevance of 
the challenged testimony.  Instead, he insists that Stacey should 
have been allowed to answer the question about whether 
defendant’s “actions and words and behavior . . . appear sincere” 
because such question elicited a lay opinion permitted under 
Evidence Code section 800.  Likewise, he contends that Stacey’s 
statement that defendant said “his bones would hurt” 
constituted a statement concerning defendant’s “then existing 
state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation” admissible under 
Evidence Code section 1250.  Last, he asserts that Roybal’s 
statement that defendant “wanted help . . . off [drugs]” was not 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
63 
hearsay but a description of defendant’s demeanor as Roybal 
observed it. 
Yet, none of the grounds of admissibility defendant posits 
allows for the admission of irrelevant evidence.  (See Evid. Code, 
§ 800 [“If a witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony 
in the form of an opinion is limited to such an opinion as is 
permitted by law” (italics added)]; People v. Edwards (2013) 
57 Cal.4th 658, 726 (Edwards) [“Even assuming the evidence 
defendant sought to elicit from [two witnesses] was admissible 
to show defendant’s state of mind, state of mind evidence must 
nonetheless be relevant”]; People v. Hernandez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 
835, 872 [“A prerequisite to this exception to the hearsay rule 
[created by Evidence Code section 1250] is that the declarant’s 
mental state or conduct be factually relevant”]; Geier, supra, 
41 Cal.4th at p. 586 [similar]; Evid. Code, § 702, subd. (a) 
[providing that “the testimony of a witness concerning a 
particular matter is inadmissible unless he has personal 
knowledge of the matter” but does not otherwise establish that 
testimony is admissible whenever a witness has personal 
knowledge of the matter].)  Evidence Code section 350 makes 
clear that “[n]o evidence is admissible except relevant evidence,” 
and defendant has not cleared this hurdle for admissibility. 
Furthermore, even assuming that the trial court erred in 
excluding portions of Stacey’s and Roybal’s testimony, any error 
was harmless given what Dr. Ordas told the jury.  (Accord, 
Edwards, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 726.)  Although Stacey’s 
statement that defendant said his bones would hurt when he 
stopped using drugs drew an objection, Ordas testified to the 
severe joint pain, along with other serious symptoms, that 
someone like defendant would experience when withdrawing 
from drugs.  Ordas further testified that defendant was “highly 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
64 
motivated” and sincere, although unsuccessful, in his efforts to 
quit taking drugs.  And as mentioned, any inference raised by 
evidence of defendant’s supposed sincerity in stopping drug use 
was adverse to defendant’s case of mental impairment on the 
day of the shooting.  Under such circumstances, it was not 
“reasonably probable that a result more favorable to [defendant] 
would have been reached” if the testimony from Stacey and 
Roybal had been admitted.  (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) 
4.  Asserted prosecutorial misconduct 
a.  Background 
 
During closing argument, the prosecutor criticized 
Dr. Stewart’s opinion and methodology at some length.  The 
prosecutor first highlighted Stewart’s failure to produce a report 
or timely render an opinion and then stated, “[h]e does not 
review the entire file, which is a violation of the ethics and 
conduct of forensic psychiatry.”  Defense counsel objected that 
the prosecutor was testifying.  The court asked counsel to clarify, 
and counsel stated, “These are not facts in evidence.”  The 
prosecutor responded, “Dr. Matthews,” whereupon the court 
overruled the objection. 
The prosecutor then told the jury, “Check Dr. Matthews’ 
testimony.  Dr. Mathews told us — remember that — I won’t 
take a case unless I can have the whole file, because it isn’t 
right.”  The prosecutor further commented, “None of us can be 
charged with knowing what the ethical obligations of forensic 
psychiatry [are].  But it was Dr. Stewart’s responsibility to call 
[defense counsel] up and say:  Excuse me.  I cannot consult in a 
case unless I get the run of the file.  Because [counsel] are 
advocates, and we may inject our own bias into the materials 
[we send].” 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
65 
b.  Analysis 
 
Defendant contends the prosecutor committed prejudicial 
misconduct by arguing matters outside the record in stating 
that Dr. Stewart’s failure to review the entire file was “a 
violation of the ethics and conduct of forensic psychiatry.”  
Certainly, “[a] prosecutor commits misconduct by referring in 
argument to matters outside the record.”  (People v. 
Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1026 (Cunningham).)  
Nonetheless, “the prosecution has broad discretion to state its 
views regarding which reasonable inferences may or may not be 
drawn from the evidence” (ibid.) and “ ‘[w]hether the inferences 
the prosecutor draws are reasonable is for the jury to decide’ ” 
(People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 179).  “To 
constitute a violation of the federal Constitution, prosecutorial 
misconduct must ‘ “so infect[] the trial with unfairness as to 
make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” ’  
[Citations.]  Conduct by a prosecutor that does not render a 
criminal trial fundamentally unfair is prosecutorial misconduct 
under state law only if it involves ‘ “the use of deceptive or 
reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court 
or the jury.” ’ ”  (People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 108.) 
Here, 
the 
prosecutor’s 
comment 
was 
based 
on 
Dr. Matthews’s testimony.  Matthews — a board certified 
forensic psychiatrist — discussed the standards for forensic 
psychiatry.  He first described a forensic psychiatrist as “a 
psychiatrist . . . who puts their expertise at the service of the 
legal system,” stating that “[t]he purpose of forensic psychiatry 
is to find the truth and to learn enough about the situation so 
that you can be of service in some way to the judicial system.  
It means that rather than having one’s loyalty to the patient or 
the person you’re examining, that your major loyalty is to 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
66 
principles of honesty and principles of objectivity.”  Matthews 
was subsequently asked whether “it [was] important . . . that a 
forensic psychiatrist be allowed to basically have at the whole 
body of document” and responded that he could not do the work 
without having access to the entire record. 
The prosecutor’s comments did not infect the trial with 
unfairness that rises to the level of prejudicial error.  When 
viewed in context, the prosecutor made clear that he was basing 
his argument on Dr. Matthews’s testimony and not outside 
knowledge regarding “the ethical obligations of forensic 
psychiatry.”  Not only did the prosecutor’s argument following 
the challenged comment closely track Matthews’s testimony, 
but the prosecutor also expressly told the jury to “[c]heck 
Dr. Matthews’ 
testimony” 
and 
“remember” 
“[w]hat 
Dr. Matthews 
told 
us.” 
 
Furthermore, 
the 
prosecutor 
acknowledged that “[n]one of us [advocates] can be charged with 
knowing what the ethical obligations of forensic psychiatry 
[are],” indicating he did not have independent knowledge of “the 
ethics and conduct of forensic psychiatry.”  It was thus not 
reasonably likely that the jury construed the prosecutor’s 
comments in the objectionable manner defendant suggests.  
(See, e.g., Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1001.) 
5.  Alleged errors under Sanchez 
In his supplemental briefing, defendant argues that the 
testimony of two witnesses — Dr. Matthews and Officer 
Carnahan — violated the rule set forth in People v. Sanchez 
(2016) 63 Cal.4th 665 (Sanchez) concerning hearsay and expert 
testimony. 
In Sanchez, we held that “[i]f an expert testifies to case-
specific out-of-court statements to explain the bases for his 
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67 
opinion, those statements are necessarily considered by the jury 
for their truth, thus rendering them hearsay.”  (Sanchez, supra, 
63 Cal.4th at p. 684.)  “Like any other hearsay evidence,” such 
statements must be “properly admitted through an applicable 
hearsay exception” or “an appropriate witness.”  (Ibid.)  
Otherwise, the admission of such statements constitutes error.  
Depending on whether the statements are testimonial, the 
prejudicial effect of their admission is assessed under either the 
standard articulated in Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at page 18 or 
that found in Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at page 818.  (See, e.g., 
People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 310 (Navarro).) 
The failure to object at trial before Sanchez was decided 
does not forfeit a claim raising so-called Sanchez errors.  (Perez, 
supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 9.) 
a. Dr. Matthews’s testimony 
Regarding Dr. Matthews’s testimony, defendant argues 
the doctor ran afoul of Sanchez in conveying to the jury “that he 
relied on inadmissible hearsay to form his opinion regarding 
defendant’s mental state.”  But if all Matthews did was to tell 
the jury that he relied on materials sent to him by the 
prosecution in forming his opinion, then Sanchez does not 
prohibit such testimony. 
As we stated in Sanchez, “[a]ny expert may still rely on 
hearsay in forming an opinion, and may tell the jury in general 
terms that he did so.”  (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 685, 
italics in original; see also id. at p. 686 [recognizing that under 
the court’s holding, an expert may “tell[] the jury the expert 
relied on additional kinds of information that the expert only 
generally describes”].)  The limitations that Sanchez placed on 
expert testimony concern case-specific information that an 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
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68 
expert relates to a jury, not materials upon which the expert 
relies.  (See, e.g., id. at p. 685 [stating that experts cannot 
“present, as facts, the content of testimonial hearsay 
statements” and “only when a prosecution expert relies upon, 
and relates as true, a testimonial statement would the fact 
asserted as true have to be independently proven to satisfy the 
Sixth Amendment” (first italics added)]; id. at pp. 676, 684.)  
Regarding the sources upon which the expert relies, Sanchez 
recognizes that the expert “may still rely on hearsay” and the 
expert is permitted “to relate generally the kind and source of 
the ‘matter’ upon which his opinion rests.”  (Id. at pp. 685–686.) 
Here, Dr. Matthews told the jury very little of the contents 
of the materials he reviewed in forming his opinion.  This was 
deliberate.  Before Matthews testified, the court had an 
extensive discussion with the parties regarding the scope of the 
expert’s testimony.  Defense counsel argued at length that 
Matthews should not be able to relate to the jury details gleaned 
from defendant’s criminal record.  In contrast, counsel accepted 
that Matthews should be able to rely on such records in forming 
his opinion, specifically the opinion that defendant had 
antisocial personality disorder.  Consistent with Sanchez, 
counsel also conceded that Matthews “can say what he relied on” 
but “should not be allowed to speak to hearsay.”  The court 
generally agreed with counsel, ruling, for instance, that the 
expert is “not allowed to talk about the details of the convictions, 
how many, what they are” but what “he can say is I’ve reviewed 
the file, and it does show a criminal history.” 
To ensure that Matthews’s testimony would conform to 
the court’s rulings, the prosecutor asked leading “yes-no” 
questions of the witness.  A typical exchange is as follows: 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
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“Question: 
[By the prosecutor]  Okay.  All 
right.  So let me just kind of 
walk you through it, then. 
“All right.  And these are a 
series 
of 
yes-no 
questions, 
Doctor; okay? 
“Answer: 
[By Matthews]  Yes. 
“Question: 
So part — so the first one we’ve 
talked about in the category A, 
those seven items [that are part 
of the diagnostic criteria for 
antisocial personality disorder], 
three of which have to be met, 
you saw a failure to conform to 
social norms with respect to 
lawful 
behavior, 
repeatedly 
performing 
acts 
that 
are 
grounds for arrest; is that right? 
“Answer: 
Yes. 
“Question: 
You also determined through 
your review of the records that 
the defendant lied repeatedly 
about his date of birth and 
name and has several aliases; is 
that right? 
“Answer: 
Yes.” 
 
The prosecution followed a similar pattern of eliciting yes-
no answers when questioning Dr. Matthews about the sources 
of information upon which he relied.  The inquiry confirmed that 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
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70 
the prosecution sent Matthews “35 three-inch binders full of 
documents,” consisting of “16 to 17,000 pages of stuff.”  The 
prosecution then asked if “those documents included — and I’m 
going to talk generically here, all right — rehab records, police 
records, a wide variety of records like that, correct?”  Matthews 
answered, “Yes,” and conveyed no further information to the 
jury.  
 
Against this backdrop, it is perhaps telling that defendant 
does not specifically identify the portions of Dr. Matthews’s 
testimony he asserts conveyed inadmissible case specific 
hearsay.  Instead, defendant essentially contends that three 
areas of Matthews’s testimony constituted prejudicial error 
under Sanchez:  Matthews improperly opined that defendant 
was not in a drug-induced delirium when he shot Officer 
Zeppetella; Matthews improperly opined that defendant had an 
antisocial personality disorder that accounted for defendant’s 
behavior at the time of the crime; and Matthews emphasized 
that he based his opinions on a swath of documents beyond those 
considered by defense expert Dr. Stewart.  Each of these points 
was independently supported by properly admitted evidence, 
such that either there was no Sanchez violation or that any 
violation was harmless even under Chapman’s “beyond a 
reasonable doubt” standard.17 
 
17  
In his reply brief, defendant contends that “the only way” 
an expert may rely on case-specific hearsay that has been 
admitted through an appropriate witness is to “ ‘assume its 
truth in a properly worded hypothetical question in the 
traditional manner.’ ”  Although we have approved of such an 
approach, we have not limited an expert’s discussion to 
hypothetical questions.  We stated in Sanchez, for example, that 
 
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First, Dr. Matthews opined that defendant was not in a 
drug-induced delirium when he shot Officer Tony Zeppetella.  In 
reaching this conclusion, Matthews relied in part on the facts of 
the offense, stating, for example, that an individual suffering 
from delirium could not drive a car, provide relevant 
identification to a police officer during a traffic stop, reload a 
gun, drive to his mother-in-law’s home, or hide evidence inside 
a vacuum cleaner bag because all of these steps required a 
presence of mind inconsistent with delirium.  He opined, too, 
that defendant’s “normal demeanor” when examined by health 
care workers immediately after the crime indicated defendant 
was not suffering from delirium because “[p]eople who are 
delirious would not know their surroundings and would not be 
able to answer questions intelligently and give a good medical 
history and behave cooperatively.”  Each of these facts was 
independently established in prior testimony; the facts 
themselves were not contested, and the jury was able to weigh 
Matthews’s opinion (that the facts indicated defendant did not 
suffer from delirium) against Dr. Stewart’s opinion (that the 
facts indicated defendant did suffer from delirium).  Any 
Sanchez error that related to Matthews’s description of these 
facts was not prejudicial. 
Second, Dr. Matthews opined that defendant suffered 
from antisocial personality disorder, and that this disorder 
explained defendant’s behavior at the time of the crime.  
Matthews based this diagnosis on defendant’s “failure to 
 
a jury considers certain facts for their truth “[w]hen an expert is 
not testifying in the form of a proper hypothetical question and 
no other evidence of the case-specific facts presented has or will 
be admitted . . . .”  (Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 684, italics 
added.) 
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72 
conform to societal norms with respect to lawful behaviors 
indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are grounds for 
arrest,” that he “lied repeatedly about his date of birth and 
name,” that he “showed irresponsible work behavior and had 
been unemployed for significant periods of time,” and that he 
had been “using heroin and methamphetamine despite being 
made [aware] of their high risk of harmful consequences.”  
Although defendant appears to object to the bases for 
Matthews’s diagnosis as inadmissible case-specific hearsay, the 
diagnosis itself appears uncontested.  Indeed, defendant’s own 
expert, Dr. Ordas, also testified that defendant suffered from 
antisocial personality disorder.  Further, each basis of 
Matthews’s diagnosis was independently established by other 
admissible evidence introduced at trial, including testimony 
from defendant’s wife, Dr. Ordas, Dr. Stewart, and the officers 
investigating the offense.  Defendant’s wife, for example, 
testified that she knew defendant had a drug problem “for a long 
time,” that he used the alias “Roberto Vasquez,” and that he was 
not working for “a couple of months” before killing Officer 
Zeppetella.  Any Sanchez error related to Matthews having 
discussed that diagnosis was harmless given testimony by other 
witnesses.   
Finally, defendant asserts Dr. Matthews bolstered his 
credibility by improperly referring to the documents and records 
on which he relied.  We are not convinced that Matthews went 
further than simply “tell[ing] the jury in general terms” that he 
relied on hearsay in forming his opinion.  (Sanchez, supra, 
63 Cal.4th at p. 685.)  To the extent that he did, any error is 
harmless because, as discussed above, the basis for each of 
Matthews’s opinions was independently established by other 
admissible evidence introduced at trial. 
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73 
b.  Officer Carnahan’s testimony 
In addition to challenging Dr. Matthews’s testimony, 
defendant contends Officer Carnahan’s opinion that defendant 
possessed narcotics for sale was based on inadmissible 
hearsay — Detective Morgans’s statement to Carnahan that he 
(Morgans) found a scale in defendant’s car.  Morgans had 
testified about the items he discovered in defendant’s car 
(including a cell phone and syringes); he did not testify about 
having discovered a scale.  As such, and as the Attorney General 
concedes, Carnahan’s testimony regarding the scale was error 
under Sanchez.  
The error was harmless, however.  Defendant’s sole 
argument related to prejudice is that the scale “was the key 
element of [Officer Carnahan’s] conclusion that the drugs . . . 
were possessed for sale.”  This is not so.  The scale was but one 
of many bases for Carnahan’s conclusion.  The other bases 
included items Carnahan personally seized from defendant’s 
house, including the baggies and balloons used to package 
narcotics for sale, and the ammunition indicating defendant had 
armed himself for protection (a tactic Carnahan stated was 
common for those selling narcotics).  Carnahan also stated that 
the cell phone and syringes found in defendant’s car supported 
his opinion.  Because Detective Morgans testified at trial to 
recovering these items, Carnahan could properly rely on the 
detective’s testimony.  (See, e.g., Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at 
p. 686.)  Carnahan stated that the “totality of what was 
recovered” in defendant’s home and car led to his opinion.  This 
evidence was sufficient to support the officer’s conclusion.  (See, 
e.g., People v. Newman (1971) 5 Cal.3d 48, 53 [experienced 
officers may give their opinion that narcotics are held for 
purposes of sale based on matters including packaging, 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
74 
quantity, and normal use of an individual], disapproved on 
another ground in People v. Daniels (1975) 14 Cal.3d 857, 862.)  
Additionally, Roybal, defendant’s coworker, testified that 
defendant told Roybal he sold drugs, including heroin.  The jury 
was therefore presented with evidence of narcotics sales, and 
testimony that defendant admitted he sold narcotics. 
In light of these facts, we may conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the error in admitting Officer Carnahan’s 
statement regarding the scale did not contribute to the jury’s 
verdict finding defendant guilty of possession of narcotics for 
sale. 
6.  Cumulative effect of asserted errors 
 
Defendant argues that all of the alleged errors occurring 
at the guilt phase cumulated in his not “receiv[ing] a fair trial 
on the issue of his mental state at the time of the shooting” and 
urges us to reverse his convictions on this basis.  We have found 
or assumed errors in three areas:  those relating to the court’s 
order 
that 
defendant 
submit 
to 
an 
examination 
by 
Dr. Matthews; the prosecutor’s remarks regarding the ethics of 
forensic psychiatry; and the testimony implicating Sanchez, 
supra, 63 Cal.4th at page 665.  We do not find these errors to be 
cumulatively prejudicial. 
“Defendant was entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect 
one.”  (Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1009.)  Because 
“[t]he few errors that occurred during defendant’s trial were 
harmless, whether considered individually or collectively” 
(ibid.), we reject defendant’s contention that his constitutional 
right to a fair trial was violated. 
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B.  Penalty Phase Issues 
 
1.  Excusal of prospective juror 
a.  Background 
 
Over defendant’s objection, the trial court excused 
Prospective Juror No. 70 for cause because of her views on the 
death penalty.  Juror No. 70 had indicated in her questionnaire 
that she was “somewhat opposed” to the death penalty.  When 
asked “[f]or what kinds of crimes, if any, do you believe the death 
penalty should be imposed,” she wrote, “Perhaps, serial[] killers 
& serial rapists that are beyond any sort of redemption.”  The 
juror also gave responses indicating that although she was 
willing to consider evidence offered by defendant favoring life in 
prison, she was unwilling to consider evidence offered by the 
prosecution to persuade jurors to vote for the death penalty.   
 
Both the defense and prosecution questioned the 
prospective juror regarding her position on the death penalty.  
During examination by defense counsel, Prospective Juror No. 
70 stated, “I’m not necessarily in support of the death penalty.  
I think too many innocent people have been put to death. . . .  If 
one person is put to death, that’s too many for me.”  She also 
reiterated that “[i]t would be difficult for me to put somebody to 
death.”  In response to the question whether “in some cases you 
could see it [the death penalty] apply,” she replied, “It would be 
difficult for me.  I mean, it would have to be somebody like — 
it’s hard — I know there’s evil that exists in the world . . . but it 
would have to be, you know, a serial killer that . . . beyond any 
kind of reasonable doubt has committed horrible crimes, you 
know, violent crimes against people.”  Defense counsel reminded 
the prospective juror that on her questionnaire she had said the 
death penalty “was appropriate for serial killers and heinous 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
76 
people who are unredeemable” and asked “so . . . you do see it 
[as] appropriate for some people.”  She responded:  “Well, yeah.  
Like I said, I believe evil does exist in our world, but I think 
that’s not a whole lot that would qualify as truly evil.” 
Defense counsel subsequently asked if Prospective Juror 
No. 70 was “open to hearing [aggravating] evidence.”  She 
responded, “Well, I’m open to hearing it.  It would take an awful 
lot to convince me.  I just can’t . . . imagine myself condemning 
somebody to die.”  Counsel followed up with similar questions, 
and the prospective juror confirmed that she was “open to 
listening to both sides.” 
The prosecutor likewise probed the prospective juror 
about circumstances under which she could vote for the death 
penalty.  Upon being asked, “if it’s not a serial killer, . . . you 
can’t really conceive of imposing the death penalty outside that,” 
she answered:  “I think the person themselves would have had 
to have given up on themselves too.”  The prosecutor queried if 
“realistically” there was a way for him to convince the 
prospective juror “that death would be a proper verdict in a case 
where there’s no allegation there’s more than one dead person.” 
She replied, “It would be very difficult.”  She nonetheless 
clarified that she could not “be a hundred percent sure.  
I honestly — I mean, I could imagine coming across someone 
who is without any merit whatsoever and maybe deserves to die, 
but I don’t know if it’s this particular defendant.”  Prospective 
Juror 
No. 70 
also 
agreed 
with 
the 
proposition 
that 
“participat[ing] in rendering a death verdict” “endorses the 
death penalty side of the system.”  The prospective juror did not 
think she would “want to do that” because her “general 
philosophy would sort of impair or prevent [her] from finding 
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77 
death” as part of a “system of death penalty law that [she does 
not] think is fair.” 
The court held a sidebar conference with the attorneys, 
opening the discussion by stating, “I am inclined to excuse 
[Prospective] Juror[] 70 . . . for cause.”  When asked if she 
wished to be heard, defense counsel replied, “With regard to 70, 
I think it’s — it’s one of those borderline questions.”  Defense 
counsel emphasized that the prospective juror was “open to 
listening to see” if defendant was “the kind of defendant that 
would deserve the death penalty.”  She also disputed that “the 
only type of person [Prospective Juror No. 70] could describe 
that would fit that category [of somebody deserving of the 
ultimate punishment] is a serial killer,” arguing that the 
prospective juror also included in that category “someone so evil 
and so unredeemable.”  The prosecutor interjected, contending 
the prospective juror’s answers indicated that her feelings would 
“substantially impair [her] from reaching a verdict of death.”  
The court agreed, stating, “she even went further.  I have down 
a quote.  Quote:  I can’t imagine condemning someone to die.”  
The court elaborated that in its view, the juror was “saying 
hypothetically there may be one person out there — if Ted 
Bundy is in here, I may consider [the death penalty], but I really 
have such strong feelings, I can’t imagine having to be in that 
position.”  The court thus concluded, “we’re in a Witt situation” 
and granted the prosecution’s challenge for cause. 
b.  Analysis 
 
Defendant asserts the court’s excusal of Prospective Juror 
No. 70 violated his right to due process and an impartial jury 
guaranteed by the federal Constitution.  We disagree. 
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“Under federal and state law, a prospective juror may be 
excluded for cause where his views on capital punishment would 
‘ “prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties 
as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.” ’ ”  
(People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 20 (DePriest); see also 
Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 420, 424 (Witt).)  Such 
a standard “does not require that a juror’s bias be proved with 
‘unmistakable clarity.’ ”  (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424.)  
Indeed, “the question [to determine juror bias] is not whether a 
reviewing court might disagree with the trial court’s findings, 
but whether those findings are fairly supported by the record.”  
(Id. at p. 434.)  “[W]here answers given on voir dire are equivocal 
or conflicting, the trial court’s assessment of the person’s state 
of mind is generally binding on appeal.”  (DePriest, supra, 
42 Cal.4th at p. 21.)  “Accordingly, in such situations where the 
trial court has had an opportunity to observe the juror’s 
demeanor, we uphold the court’s decision to excuse the juror so 
long as it is supported by substantial evidence.”  (People v. 
Spencer (2018) 5 Cal.5th 642, 659 (Spencer).) 
Substantial evidence supports the trial judge’s decision to 
excuse Prospective Juror No. 70.  As the court noted, the juror 
stated during voir dire that she “can’t imagine myself 
condemning somebody to die.”  Furthermore, she repeatedly 
made clear that it would be “difficult” or “very difficult” for her 
to vote for the death penalty.  (See People v. Duenas (2012) 
55 Cal.4th 1, 12 [“Comments that a prospective juror would 
have a ‘hard time’ or find it ‘very difficult’ to vote for death 
reflect ‘a degree of equivocation’ that, considered ‘with the 
juror’s hesitancy, vocal inflection, and demeanor, can justify a 
trial court’s conclusion . . . that the juror’s views would 
“ ‘prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
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79 
as a juror . . . .’ ” ’  [Citation.]  On appeal, such a finding binds 
us”]; People v. Poore (2022) 13 Cal.5th 266, 296 [Although “ ‘it is 
true that a prospective juror is not disqualified merely because 
she would find it difficult to impose the death penalty’ 
[citations], these panelists did not merely note the difficulty of 
reaching a penalty decision.  They went on to question their 
actual ability to vote for death under any circumstances.  ‘When 
a prospective juror repeatedly says he does not know whether 
he could realistically impose the death penalty, we will not 
second-guess the trial court’s determination that the juror is 
substantially impaired’ ”].)  As indicia concerning how difficult 
it would be for her, the juror emphasized her feeling that “too 
many innocent people have been put to death” and “[if] one 
[such] person is put to death, that’s too many for me.”  She 
followed by observing that she would not want to participate in 
rendering a death verdict because to do so would be to endorse 
a system of death penalty law that she believed to be unfair.  
Prospective Juror No. 70 also described in her questionnaire 
only a set of narrow circumstances not presented in this case — 
“serial[] killers & serial rapists that are beyond any sort of 
redemption” — as a situation in which she could “perhaps” view 
the death penalty as appropriate. 
The prospective juror’s written answers further bolster 
the inference that she could not consider evidence presented to 
support a verdict of death.  In contrast to her unequivocal 
answer that she would take into account “evidence offered by 
the defendant favoring life in prison without the possibility of 
parole,” the juror indicated that she could only “possibly” 
“consider and give weight to any evidence offered by the 
prosecution favoring the death penalty.”  She further elaborated 
that even if the “evidence is overwhelming” she could only 
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“maybe” consider it.  Likewise, although the juror was clearly 
willing to “consider evidence the defendant introduces about his 
life and history in support of life in prison without the possibility 
of parole,” she was decisively unwilling to consider “evidence the 
prosecution introduces about the defendant and his past to 
arrive at a verdict of death.” 
Under such circumstances, we conclude the trial court did 
not err in excusing Prospective Juror No. 70.  (Accord, e.g., 
Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 660–661 [“the trial court could 
reasonably view Prospective Juror L.’s own statements that she 
could be fair in assessing guilt but not penalty, that she would 
have a ‘real problem’ voting for death, and her agreement that, 
although perhaps not impossible, it would be ‘very unlikely’ she 
ever would vote for death, as establishing that her ability to 
follow the law would be substantially impaired”]; People v. 
Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 165, 181 (Williams) [deferring to the 
trial court’s ruling sustaining a challenge for cause when the 
prospective juror “repeatedly expressed extreme discomfort with 
the prospect of imposing the death penalty, telling the 
prosecutor at one point that even though he had voted for the 
death penalty, if personally called upon to carry it out, ‘I’d have 
to pass’ ”]; People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 471 [similar]; 
Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 43 [similar]; DePriest, supra, 
42 Cal.4th at p. 22 [similar]; People v. Lancaster (2007) 
41 Cal.4th 50, 80 [upholding a trial court’s dismissals when the 
prospective venirepersons “gave answers during voir dire 
indicating there was only a slim possibility they could vote for 
the death penalty, regardless of the state of the evidence”]; 
Spencer, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 661 [citing cases to support the 
proposition that it is not error to excuse members of the venire 
when their responses indicated that scenarios in which they 
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could vote for death did not reflect circumstances in the present 
trials]; People v. Jones (2017) 3 Cal.5th 583, 615 [similar]; People 
v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 999–1000 (Tully) [similar].) 
It is true that Prospective Juror No. 70 also gave answers 
that were somewhat more supportive of her ability to consider 
aggravating evidence and that arguably suggested she would 
not categorically exclude the possibility of imposing the death 
penalty in this case.  But this is simply to say that the 
prospective juror’s answers were equivocal.  As discussed, “the 
proper inquiry in determining whether [Witt] error occurred is 
not whether some evidence exists that the prospective juror 
could vote for the death penalty.”  (Spencer, supra, 5 Cal.5th at 
pp. 660–661.)  “The standard is instead whether substantial 
evidence exists to support the trial judge’s determination that 
the juror was substantially impaired in terms of his [or her] 
ability to do so.”  (Id. at p. 661.)  Here, the trial judge was “left 
with [such a] definite impression that a prospective juror would 
be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law” that she 
was first to suggest that Prospective Juror No. 70 should be 
excused.  (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 426.)  Defense counsel, too, 
conceded that whether the juror was substantially impaired was 
a “borderline question.”  The most that could be said, therefore, 
is that the prospective juror was ambivalent in her responses.  
Such equivocation “requires that we defer to the trial court’s 
assessment of her initial and ultimate state of mind.”  (Jones, 
supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 43.)  In light of such deference, we 
conclude the trial court did not err in excusing the prospective 
juror. 
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82 
2.  Rulings on scope of cross-examination 
a.  Background 
 
Before the penalty phase began, the trial court held a 
hearing to discuss evidence the parties intended to introduce.  
(See Evid. Code, § 402, subd. (b).)  The defense indicated that it 
planned to call defendant’s mother, sister, grandfather, and 
wife.  The defense made the following offer of proof regarding 
these witnesses. 
 
With respect to defendant’s mother, Diana Gil, defense 
counsel stated that the intention was for Gil “to say where and 
how [defendant] grew up and that she’s his mother, and she 
loves him.”  Upon hearing this offer of proof, the prosecutor 
referenced defendant’s juvenile record and remarked, “[u]ntil 
now we have . . . sanitized this case from that, but depending on 
what she says . . . [t]he door opens . . . and I get to start talking 
to her about what happened as he was growing up.”  The trial 
court agreed, indicating that if Gil “start[s] talking about what 
a good child he was . . . that’s going to open the door to a lot of 
this information coming in about his criminal record.”  Defense 
counsel responded, “I agree if we try to paint a picture that he 
was a good boy, then bad boy comes in.”  Counsel emphasized 
that the defense would not present defendant as “a good student, 
. . . a good child,” and “well behaved, because we recognize that 
would open doors.”  Instead, defense counsel asserted, his 
mother’s testimony would simply “paint a picture of this is a 
mother who’s going to be affected and . . . regardless of what 
[jurors] know about her son, she loves him.”  Counsel also stated 
that a photograph of defendant at age 15 would be introduced 
through Gil’s testimony.  The court indicated it would allow the 
photograph and that neither the photograph nor Gil’s testimony, 
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as proffered, would subject the witness to cross-examination 
about defendant’s juvenile record.  
 
Defense counsel next discussed the anticipated testimony 
of defendant’s sister, Tatiana.  The offer of proof concerning that 
testimony, counsel explained, “is that she loves him and that 
she’s his little sister and where she fits in the family.  Rather 
brief.”  The court ruled that it would allow Tatiana to testify, 
finding her testimony not to be cumulative.  It further clarified 
that if Tatiana “wants to say in general he’s my brother and 
I love him, then it would not open the door” to rebuttal evidence.  
However, if Tatiana testified to “details [about] what a 
wonderful person [defendant has] been, character evidence 
about things he’s done for the family, for example, through his 
life . . . that would open the door to impeachment with this 
information that we have discussed.”  Defense counsel 
responded, “Thank you.” 
 
Defense counsel continued the discussion with an offer of 
proof concerning the testimony of defendant’s grandfather, Jose 
Gil Torres. According to counsel, Torres would “draw [a] picture” 
for the jury that defendant and his brother grew up with their 
grandfather on a ranch before they began school and that Torres 
“knew him then and has stayed in his life ever since” and still 
“loves [defendant] today.”  The court remarked that Torres’s 
proffered testimony “doesn’t sound cumulative . . . and I would 
allow it with the caveat about opening doors.”  The prosecutor 
clarified that if Torres “says he was a good kid and always a good 
kid around the ranch and a hard worker, then it seems . . . the 
door is opened.”  The court responded, “Okay.” 
 
Turning to the anticipated testimony of defendant’s wife, 
Stacey Camacho, the parties first focused on the number of 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
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84 
photographs that would be introduced through her narrative.  
The defense stated that it intended to present four pictures of 
defendant on construction sites and 25 pictures of defendant and 
his wife and two children.  The prosecutor objected to the latter 
group, contending that they were cumulative.   The court agreed, 
and after some back and forth, the defense settled on nine 
pictures of defendant’s family.  The defense was thus permitted 
to introduce 14 photographs in total:  one of defendant at age 15, 
four of defendant at his work, and nine of defendant with his 
wife and children. 
 
The prosecutor contended that the introduction of the nine 
photographs of defendant with his family constituted indirect 
evidence that defendant was a “good father and a good 
husband.”  The prosecutor asked that he be allowed to respond 
to those photographs with letters defendant wrote to women 
who were not his wife while he was held in pretrial detention, 
the content of which was “sexually explicit.”  The court said that 
based on a weighing under Evidence Code section 352 it would 
not allow such impeachment.  However, “[i]f the witnesses were 
going to say he’s a wonderful husband, he’s a great father, he’s 
attentive — if they’re going to give character opinions . . . all 
that would open the door.”18  The prosecutor inquired if the court 
would consider revisiting its ruling if “Stacey Camacho takes the 
stand and doesn’t . . . use the word[] ‘good,’ but starts to describe 
 
18  
The court had also summarized the scope of permissible 
impeachment evidence, indicating that such evidence included, 
among other things, “the horrendous facts of the present case, 
the four prior felony convictions, [defendant’s] drug dealing,” 
“long-term drug abuse,” “having the drugs in the home” and 
possibly any prior statements of the witnesses that contradict 
their anticipated testimony. 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
85 
what could only be concluded as she’s saying he’s good.”  The 
court indicated its willingness to do so, stating “none of these 
rulings are etched in stone.” 
 
At trial, the defense elected not to call defendant’s sister 
or grandfather to the stand.  It did introduce the testimony of 
defendant’s mother and wife, both of whom testified consistently 
with the offers of proof. 
b.  Analysis 
 
Despite having agreed with the trial court’s in limine 
rulings and presenting testimony in conformity with the offers 
of proof, defendant now claims that the court erred in deciding 
that, if the witnesses testified generally concerning defendant’s 
good character, the prosecutor would be entitled to rebut with 
evidence of defendant’s juvenile record, gang activities, or other 
discreditable conduct.  Defendant is mistaken. 
 
As an initial matter, the claim is not preserved for appeal.  
(See, e.g., Evid. Code, § 353; Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1010.)  
Before the court made any rulings, defendant outlined the 
anticipated testimony, and the witnesses who testified at trial 
gave accounts that were consistent with the offers of proof.  
Although two of the potential witnesses, defendant’s sister and 
grandfather, did not ultimately take the stand, there is no 
indication that they forwent the opportunity because of the trial 
court’s preliminary rulings.  Moreover, when the court indicated 
that if defendant’s mother testified concerning what a “good 
child” defendant had been, she may be confronted with his 
juvenile record, defense counsel fully concurred, stating “I agree 
if we try to paint a picture that he was a good boy, then bad boy 
comes in.”  Counsel likewise made no objection when the trial 
court sketched the circumstances under which the witnesses’ 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
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86 
testimony may “open the door” to cross-examination.  In 
addition, even though the court told the parties that its rulings 
were preliminary and could be revisited when the witnesses 
testified, defendant made no effort to expand the scope of 
testimony at trial.  Given his conduct below, defendant has 
waived his claim. 
 
In any event, defendant’s argument is without merit.  
“When a defendant places his character at issue during the 
penalty phase of a capital trial, the prosecution may respond by 
introducing character evidence to undermine the defendant’s 
claim that his good character weighs in favor of mercy and to 
present a more balanced picture of the defendant’s personality.”  
(Valdez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 169–170.)  “As in other cases, 
the scope of rebuttal must be specific, and evidence presented or 
argued as rebuttal must relate directly to a particular incident 
or character trait defendant offers in his own behalf.”  (People v. 
Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 792, fn. 24.)  When a 
defendant’s “good character evidence [is] not limited to any 
singular incident, personality trait, or aspect of his background,” 
rebuttal evidence may likewise be tailored to the “breadth and 
generality of [the] good character evidence.”  (People v. Mitcham 
(1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1072 (Mitcham).)  “The trial court has 
broad discretion to determine the admissibility of rebuttal 
evidence and, absent palpable abuse, an appellate court may not 
disturb the trial court’s exercise of that discretion.”  (Valdez, 
supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 170.) 
 
In this case, the court specified that if members of 
defendant’s family testified that he was a “good child,” “a 
wonderful person,” “always a good kid,” “wonderful husband,” or 
“great father,” then the prosecution would be allowed to confront 
the witnesses with evidence of defendant’s misconduct.  Such 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
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87 
rebuttal evidence included not only information already in the 
record — e.g., “the horrendous facts of the present case, the four 
prior felony convictions, [defendant’s] drug dealing,” “long-term 
drug abuse,” “having the drugs in the home” — but also 
information previously excluded from consideration by the jury, 
e.g., defendant’s juvenile record and his gang affiliation.19 
Such a ruling is in line with our precedent and within the 
trial court’s discretion.  (Accord, e.g., People v. Carter (2003) 
30 Cal.4th 1166, 1204 (Carter) [the prosecution was entitled to 
rebut testimony that “as a child, defendant did not cause 
problems at the boys and girls club and wanted to stay in school 
and make his mother proud of him” with evidence of defendant’s 
juvenile adjudications and confinements]; People v. Fierro 
(1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 238 (Fierro) [“The witness had testified 
generally to defendant’s good character and offered specific 
examples of his socially useful activities . . . .  Membership in 
youth gangs was relevant to the issue of defendant’s character 
and activities as a youth and specifically rebutted the direct 
testimony of the witness”]; id. at p. 239 [concluding that the 
defendant “was not entitled to elicit testimony that he was a 
 
19  
With regard to some of the proposed testimony (e.g., that 
of defendant’s sister and grandfather), the trial court stated that 
it had the potential to “open doors,” but did not specify what 
impeaching evidence would be admissible.  We do not take the 
trial court’s comments to mean that all possible rebuttal 
evidence would be admitted should the witnesses “open doors.”  
Rather, the court spoke in general terms, which was 
understandable given that the rulings were tentative and the 
witnesses had yet to take the stand.  In any event, we reiterate 
that proper rebuttal evidence must be tailored to the “breadth 
and generality of [the] good character evidence.”  (Mitcham, 
supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1072.) 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
88 
‘respectful’ youth who ‘would never hurt anybody,’ and preclude 
cross-examination as to whether the witness was aware of 
conduct by the defendant inconsistent with the witness’s 
testimony,” including his trouble with law enforcement while 
growing up]; Mitcham, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 1071–1072 
[similar]; People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 684–685 [finding 
no error when a witness “ ‘express[ed] an opinion as to the good 
character of the defendant’ [citation], viz., that he was 
‘compassionate, warm and considerate of other people’ ” and the 
prosecution was permitted to ask if the witness knew the 
defendant “had been charged with rape and forcible oral 
copulation”].) 
Insofar as defendant claims the trial court erred by 
limiting the number of pictures the court permitted to be 
introduced via Stacey’s testimony, we discern no abuse in the 
court’s ruling.  It is clear that the trial court conscientiously 
examined the proffered evidence and used its judgment in 
reasonably reducing the number of photographs to avoid 
cumulation.  (Accord People v. Virgil (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1210, 
1273 [“It was within the trial court’s discretion to limit the 
number of photographs” of the defendant’s child to five].) 
 
Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
articulating the scope of rebuttal, defendant’s constitutional 
gloss on the same argument, “to the extent it is preserved for 
appeal, also is without merit.”  (Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th at 
p. 670.) 
3.  Instruction on sympathy for defendant’s family 
a.  Background 
 
At the conclusion of the penalty phase, the trial judge 
instructed the jury with, inter alia, CALJIC No. 8.85.  
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89 
In relevant part, the instruction read as follows:  “Sympathy for 
the family of the defendant is not a matter that you can consider 
in mitigation.  Evidence, if any, of the impact of an execution on 
family members should be disregarded unless it illuminates 
some positive quality of the defendant’s background or 
character.” 
b.  Analysis 
 
Defendant argues the trial court’s giving CALJIC No. 8.85 
violated his constitutional rights by precluding the jury from 
being swayed by sympathy for his family.  Our case law is to the 
contrary. 
 
In People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353 (Ochoa), we 
addressed whether capital juries may consider sympathy for a 
defendant’s family in determining the appropriate sentence.  We 
began by noting the unsettled state of the law on the issue, 
which had not been decided previously.  (Id. at p. 455.)  We 
reasoned that capital juries are required to engage in “an 
individualized assessment of the defendant’s background, 
record, and character, and the nature of the crimes committed, 
both as a matter of state law [citations] and as a federal 
constitutional requirement [citations].”  (Id. at p. 456.)  As such, 
in the context of a capital sentence determination, “what is 
ultimately 
relevant 
is 
a 
defendant’s 
background 
and 
character — not the distress of his or her family.”  (Ibid.)  We 
therefore held that “sympathy for a defendant’s family is not a 
matter that a capital jury can consider in mitigation, but that 
family members may offer testimony of the impact of an 
execution on them if by so doing they illuminate some positive 
quality of the defendant’s background or character.”  (Ibid.)  As 
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90 
defendant concedes, this language from Ochoa serves as the 
basis for the portion of CALJIC No. 8.85 that he now challenges. 
 
As defendant must also concede, our court’s adherence to 
Ochoa has been unwavering.  (See, e.g., People v. Rices (2017) 
4 Cal.5th 49, 89 (Rices) [“Defendant contends that Ochoa, supra, 
19 Cal.4th 353, was wrongly decided.  We have rejected 
substantially similar arguments and continue to do so”]; 
Williams, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 197 [“Defendant contends this 
aspect of the standard instruction [of CALJIC No. 8.85] violated 
California’s death penalty statute and his rights under the 
Eighth Amendment.  Established precedent is to the contrary”]; 
Tully, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 1047–1048; People v. Livingston 
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 1145, 1178–1179 (Livingston); Fuiava, supra, 
53 Cal.4th at pp. 723–724; People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 
577, 602 (Bennett); People v. Romero (2008) 44 Cal.4th 386, 425; 
People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 294–295 (Vieira); Carter, 
supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1205; Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 856; 
People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 1000–1001.) 
 
Still, defendant contends that Ochoa must be reconsidered 
in light of Cullen v. Pinholster (2011) 563 U.S. 170 (Pinholster).  
Defendant ignores the fact that many of our cases affirming 
Ochoa postdate Pinholster.  (See, e.g., Rices, supra, 4 Cal.5th at 
pp. 88–89; Williams, supra, 56 Cal.4th at pp. 197–198; Tully, 
supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 1047–1048; Livingston, supra, 
53 Cal.4th at pp. 1178–1179; Fuiava, supra, 53 Cal.4th at 
pp. 723–724.)  This is for good reason, because nothing the high 
court said in Pinholster compels us to reject Ochoa. 
 
In Pinholster, the court examined an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim brought in a habeas corpus petition.  
(Pinholster, supra, 563 U.S. at p. 174.)  The petitioner’s trial had 
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91 
taken place in Los Angeles in 1984.  (See id. at pp. 176, 196.)  
During the penalty phase, the defense called only his mother, 
Burnice Brashear.  (Id. at p. 177.)  Brashear testified to the 
petitioner’s difficult childhood and highlighted positive aspects 
of her son’s character.  (Ibid.)  In concluding that the petitioner’s 
counsel did not perform deficiently by presenting only 
Brashear’s testimony, the court reasoned that because the 
petitioner was “an unsympathetic client,” “it would have been a 
reasonable penalty-phase strategy to focus on evoking sympathy 
for [his] mother,” the so-called “family-sympathy defense.”  (Id. 
at p. 193.)  The court also said that there was “no evidence . . . 
that [a family-sympathy mitigation defense] would have been 
inconsistent with the standard of professional competence in 
capital cases that prevailed in Los Angeles in 1984” and indeed, 
“at the time, the defense bar in California had been using that 
strategy.”  (Id. at p. 196; see also id. at p. 232, fn. 21 (dis. opn. of 
Sotomayor, J.) [“I do not doubt that a decision to present a 
family-sympathy mitigation defense might be consistent ‘with 
the standard of professional competence in capital cases that 
prevailed in Los Angeles in 1984’ in some cases”]; Pinholster v. 
Ayers (9th Cir. 2009) 590 F.3d 651, 707 (dis. opn. of Kozinski, J.) 
[“The main point of Burnice’s testimony was to create sympathy 
for herself and the other members of [the petitioner’s] family in 
the hope that the jury would take pity on them and spare them 
the agony of losing a son and brother to the executioner.  That’s 
what’s known as the ‘family sympathy’ mitigation defense and 
other lawyers in California used it at the time”].) 
 
Defendant argues that although the Pinholster court did 
not say so “in so many words,” the case must be read to mean 
that “sympathy for the family of the accused is a factor in 
mitigation that a jury must be allowed to consider . . . [under] 
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the ambit of the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee of a reliable 
penalty determination.”  That is, not only is sympathy for the 
defendant’s family a permissible consideration for a capital jury, 
but it is constitutionally prohibited for the state to preclude a 
jury from taking such sympathy into account. 
Pinholster cannot be fairly read to establish such a 
constitutional mandate.  We agree with the People that, for our 
present purposes, all Pinholster does is indicate that a family-
sympathy defense was a viable strategy in California in 1984 
when that “capital trial took place.”  This is hardly surprising.  
When we decided Ochoa in 1998, we noted that up until that 
point, the law was unsettled regarding “ ‘whether the jury may 
consider evidence of the impact a judgment of death would have 
upon the defendant’s family.’ ”  (Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th at 
p. 455; see also, e.g., In re Visciotti (1996) 14 Cal.4th 325, 337, 
fn. 3 [observing that this “court has not considered whether 
family sympathy is within any statutory factor (§ 190.3) or an 
aspect of the defendant’s character or record which the jury 
must be allowed to consider” but finding no occasion to 
undertake such an examination]; Fierro, supra, 1 Cal.4th at 
p. 241 [assuming but not deciding that “[a] defendant has a right 
to introduce evidence of the effect of a death sentence on his 
family”]; People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 844, fn. 14 [“We 
need not now decide whether evidence of the impact on the 
defendant’s family comes within this ‘broad’ range of 
constitutionally pertinent mitigation”].) 
We “resolve[d] the point” of ambiguity in Ochoa.  (Ochoa, 
supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 455.)  Accordingly, the law now — and at 
defendant’s trial — is that “execution-impact evidence is 
irrelevant under section 190.3 because it does not concern a 
defendant’s own circumstances but rather asks the jury to spare 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
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93 
defendant’s life based on the effect his or her execution would 
have on his or her family” and “nothing in the federal 
Constitution requires a different result.”  (Bennett, supra, 
45 Cal.4th at p. 602.)  The trial court thus did not err in 
instructing the jury that it should not consider sympathy for 
defendant’s family as a mitigating factor in itself. 
Besides reliance on Pinholster, defendant makes various 
arguments essentially asserting that Ochoa was wrong at its 
inception.  Defendant “identifies no reason to reconsider our 
conclusion.”  (Bennett, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 602.)  Nothing in 
the authorities that defendant cites establishes that sympathy 
for a defendant’s family — when unilluminating of “any 
[positive] aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of 
the circumstances of the offense” (Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 
438 U.S. 586, 604) — is a mitigating factor a capital jury is 
permitted to consider under California law and is required to 
consider 
(when 
proffered) 
under 
federal 
constitutional 
principles. Consistent with the principle of stare decisis, we 
continue to adhere to Ochoa and its line of cases.  (See, e.g., 
Bourhis v. Lord (2013) 56 Cal.4th 320, 327.) 
Finally, defendant makes an equal protection argument, 
asserting that because criminals seeking to obtain probation 
instead of prison can present evidence of the impact on their 
families (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.414(b)(5)), death eligible 
defendants should be able to present family sympathy evidence.  
Defendant has provided no authority to support the proposition 
that capital and probation-eligible defendants are similarly 
situated such that the former are constitutionally entitled to 
introduce certain evidence simply because the latter may do so.  
Indeed, in rejecting a prior challenge to CALJIC No. 8.85, we 
held that reliance on “family considerations in probation 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
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94 
determinations is not on point.”  (Williams, supra, 56 Cal.4th at 
p. 197.)  We explained that was so because section 190.3, and 
our subsequent interpretation thereof — and not the probation 
statutes — 
control 
the 
scope 
of 
matters 
relevant 
to 
“ ‘aggravation, mitigation, and sentence.’ ” (Williams, supra, 
56 Cal.4th at p. 197; see also Bennett, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 602 
[stating that the probation statute has “no bearing upon this 
court’s construction of section 190.3”].)  Defendant attempts to 
circumvent our precedent by stressing that we did not 
previously consider California Rules of Court, rule 4.414.  But 
we do not see how the logic of our case law is undermined by the 
rule of court, nor any indication that the rule itself could give 
rise to a constitutional claim. 
More directly, we do not agree with defendant’s contention 
that “there is no rational distinction to be made that supports 
allowing a judge to consider the impact of imprisonment on [a 
probation-eligible] defendant’s family while enjoining the jury 
from taking into account the impact of a defendant’s execution 
on his family.”  Probation is an act of clemency for which 
individuals convicted of serious crimes are categorically 
ineligible.  (See § 1203, subd. (k) [“Probation shall not be granted 
to . . . any person who is convicted of a violent felony . . . or a 
serious felony”]; see also id., subd. (e).)  There are plausible 
reasons why the Legislature might want to allow consideration 
of how a would-be prisoner could positively impact his or her 
family if put on probation but not allow consideration of 
sympathy evidence — when unconnected to any “positive 
quality of the defendant’s background or character” (Ochoa, 
supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 456) — to influence a decision between a 
sentence of death and life without the possibility of parole.   
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95 
In short, defendant has not persuaded us that he was 
denied equal protection under the law because, unlike, 
probation-eligible defendants, the jury could not take sympathy 
for his family into consideration when deciding his sentence. 
4.  Omission of instruction on remorse 
a.  Background 
 
Before the penalty phase began, defendant submitted a 
proposed instruction concerning the role of remorse.  The 
instruction read, “Remorse, which by definition can only be 
experienced after a crime’s commission, is something commonly 
thought to mitigate aspects of the crime and defendant’s 
culpability.  [¶]  You may consider defendant’s remorse for his 
actions as a factor in mitigation.”  The prosecutor objected to the 
instruction as being “subsumed under factor k” of section 190.3, 
and the court rejected the defense’s proposal.  The court, 
however, left open the possibility that if the jury asked about 
being able to consider remorse, it would “perhaps give 
something along the lines of what you’re requesting.” 
The court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.85.  In 
relevant part, the instruction stated, “In determining which 
penalty is to be imposed . . . [y]ou shall consider, take into 
account and be guided by the following factors . . . :  (k)  Any 
other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime 
even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, and any 
sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s character or 
record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less 
than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is 
on trial.”  (See also § 190.3.) 
 
Both the defense and prosecution highlighted defendant’s 
remorse — or the lack thereof — in their closing statements.  
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96 
Defense counsel informed the jury remorse was a proper 
consideration under factor (k) of the relevant instruction.  
Counsel then summarized the evidence that, counsel believed, 
showed defendant experienced remorse after shooting the 
victim. 
 
The prosecution likewise acknowledged that remorse was 
a mitigating factor that the jury may consider under factor (k).  
The prosecution, however, argued that defendant displayed no 
remorse.  The prosecution urged the jury to find that the 
mitigating factors, including any “so-called . . . remorse,” were 
substantially outweighed by the aggravating factors. 
b.  Analysis 
 
Contrary to defendant’s claim, we find no error in the trial 
court’s refusal to give the proposed instruction on remorse.  “It 
is settled that CALJIC No. 8.85 properly instructs the jury on 
aggravating and mitigating factors, and the court need not give 
pinpoint instructions on mitigation.”  (People v. Gonzales (2012) 
54 Cal.4th 1234, 1297.)  Moreover, although a defendant is 
entitled, upon request, “to an instruction that pinpoints the 
theory of the defense,” he has no right to “an argumentative 
instruction” or “an instruction ‘of such a character as to invite 
the jury to draw inferences favorable to one of the parties from 
specified items of evidence.’ ” (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 
408, 437.)  The proposed instruction at issue here invited the 
jury to “consider defendant’s remorse for his actions as a factor 
in mitigation.”  Such an instruction is argumentative — not 
least because it presupposed that defendant experienced 
remorse, when whether defendant did so was a disputed factual 
issue, as highlighted by the opposing parties’ closing 
statements.  (See People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 
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Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
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673 & fn. 16 (San Nicolas) [“a pinpoint instruction” telling the 
jury it may consider “ ‘[w]hether or not the defendant expressed 
remorse or shame for his crime’ ” “ ‘properly belongs not in 
instructions, but in the arguments of counsel to the jury’ ”].) 
 
In addition, the trial court instructed the jury with 
CALJIC No. 8.85, the relevant portion of which allowed the jury 
to consider “[a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the 
gravity of the crime . . . , and any sympathetic or other aspect of 
the defendant’s character or record.”  (CALJIC No. 8.85.)  “This 
court has interpreted section 190.3 factor (k), which CALJIC 
No. 8.85, factor (k) incorporates, as ‘ “allow[ing] the jury to 
consider 
a 
virtually 
unlimited 
range 
of 
mitigating 
circumstances.” ’ ”  (San Nicolas, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 673–
674.)  As both parties acknowledged in front of the jury, remorse 
is subsumed under factor (k) of CALJIC No. 8.85, meaning that 
the jury may consider it in deliberations as a potential 
mitigating circumstance.  Because “factor (k) is adequate for 
informing the jury that it may take account of any extenuating 
circumstance,” “there is no need to further instruct the jury on 
specific mitigating circumstances.”  (Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th at 
pp. 299–300.)  “It is generally the task of defense counsel in its 
closing argument, rather than the trial court in its instructions, 
to make clear to the jury which penalty phase evidence or 
circumstances 
should 
be 
considered 
extenuating 
under 
factor (k).”  (Id. at p. 300.) 
 
Defendant contends there was “no issue concerning the 
accuracy of the proposed defense instruction” and suggests that 
it was not argumentative nor duplicative.  He asserts that 
“[n]either the prosecutor nor the trial court voiced any concern 
with the instruction as a whole or any of the wording” and “[i]n 
fact, the trial court indicated that it would use the instruction if 
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98 
the jurors had a question about remorse.”  Defendant’s 
contention is belied by the record.  Both the prosecutor and the 
court took exception with the proposed instruction, finding it 
unnecessary in light of CALJIC No. 8.85.  Furthermore, the 
court never said “it would use the instruction” defendant 
proposed.  Instead, it merely suggested that the court would 
“perhaps give something along the lines of what [the defense 
was] requesting” should certain circumstances arise.  Such a 
qualified statement lends no support to defendant’s argument. 
5.  Exclusion of testimony concerning conditions of 
confinement for a prisoner serving a sentence of life 
without the possibility of parole 
a.  Background 
 
Outside the presence of the jury, the defense indicated it 
planned to call an “expert with regard to prison conditions.”  
According to the defense, the expert would testify “just generally 
as to the custodial situation for a person doing life without the 
possibility of parole.”  The court excluded the proposed 
testimony on the ground that a defense expert “may not render 
. . . testimony on general LWOP conditions in the prison 
system.” 
 
Although excluding testimony on the subject, the court 
confirmed that defense counsel was entitled to argue “what 
prison conditions [would] look like for somebody who’s going to 
get a sentence” of life without the possibility of parole.  Counsel 
in fact so argued to the jury during closing remarks. 
b.  Analysis 
 
As defendant acknowledges, our case law rejects the 
notion that he had a statutory or constitutional right to present 
in his case-in-chief evidence regarding conditions of confinement 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
99 
for a defendant sentenced to life in prison without the possibility 
of parole.  (See, e.g., Eubanks, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 149 
[“ ‘evidence of the conditions of confinement that a defendant 
will experience if sentenced to life imprisonment without parole 
is irrelevant to the jury’s penalty determination because it does 
not relate to the defendant’s character, culpability, or the 
circumstances of the offense.  [Citations.]  Its admission is not 
required either by the federal Constitution or by Penal Code 
section 190.3’ ”]; People v. Ervine (2009) 47 Cal.4th 745, 794–
795; People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 735; People v. 
Smith (2005) 35 Cal.4th 334, 365–366; People v. Coddington 
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 636; People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 
385, 415–416; People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 632; 
People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1117; People v. Thompson 
(1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 138–139; cf. People v. Smith (2015) 
61 Cal.4th 18, 58 [“the defense may not introduce such evidence 
[regarding prison conditions] as a factor in mitigation.  The 
defense may, however, respond to aggravating evidence 
suggesting the defendant will be dangerous in prison”].) 
 
Defendant insists that we should reconsider but offers no 
persuasive reason for us to do so.  Although “defendant might 
have an interest in telling the jurors of . . . the rigors of 
confinement in order to impress upon them the gravity of their 
responsibility, that interest could be satisfied in his argument.”  
(People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 877–878.) 
6.  Cumulative effect of asserted errors 
 
Because we have found no error in the penalty phase of 
defendant’s trial, we reject defendant’s claim that his sentence 
of death must be reversed due to the cumulative effect of the 
purported errors discussed above. 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
100 
7.  Constitutionality of California death penalty law 
 
Defendant raises familiar arguments contending that 
California’s death penalty scheme is unconstitutional.  He has 
given us no reason to revisit our precedents holding to the 
contrary.  We therefore continue to hold as follows. 
 
“California’s death penalty laws adequately narrow the 
class of murderers subject to the death penalty.  [Citation.]  In 
particular, the special circumstances of section 190.2, which 
render a murderer eligible for the death penalty, are not so 
numerous and broadly interpreted that they fail adequately to 
narrow the class of persons eligible for death.”  (Navarro, supra, 
12 Cal.5th at p. 345.) 
 
“Section 190.3, factor (a), directs the jury to consider as 
evidence in aggravation the circumstances of the capital crime.  
This has not resulted in the wanton imposition of the death 
penalty in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments by permitting prosecutors to argue that the 
various features of the murder, even features that are the 
converse of those in other cases, are aggravating factors.”  
(People v. Schultz (2020) 10 Cal.5th 623, 683 (Schultz).) 
“ ‘The language “ ‘so substantial’ ” . . . ’ in CALJIC No. 8.88 
‘is not impermissibly vague.’ ”  (People v. Silveria and Travis 
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 327.) 
“Use of adjectives such as ‘extreme’ and ‘substantial’ in 
section 190.3, factors (d) and (g), respectively, does not create a 
constitutionally 
impermissible 
barrier 
to 
the 
jury’s 
consideration of a defendant’s mitigating evidence.”  (People v. 
Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 656.) 
“The 
court’s 
instructions 
regarding 
the 
various 
aggravating and mitigating factors did not act as a barrier to the 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
101 
jury’s consideration of defendant’s mitigating evidence or 
infringe defendant’s constitutional rights.”  (Schultz, supra, 
10 Cal.5th at p. 684.)  In particular, the court is not required to 
“identify which factors are aggravating and which are 
mitigating.  [Citation.]  Directing the jury to consider ‘ “whether 
or not” ’ certain mitigating factors were present does not invite 
the jury to use the absence of such factors as a factor in 
aggravation.”  (Ibid.) 
Contrary 
to 
defendant’s 
suggestion, 
there 
is 
no 
constitutional mandate that the jury be instructed to “find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors in this 
case outweighed the mitigating factors” or that “aggravating 
factors other than prior criminality [must be] proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  (See People v. McDaniel (2021) 12 Cal.5th 
97, 155.) 
“[T]he federal Constitution does not require that the jury 
agree unanimously on which aggravating factors apply.”  
(Navarro, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 345.) 
“Neither the federal Constitution nor state law requires 
the jury be instructed that the prosecution bears some burden 
of proof as to the truth of the aggravating factors (other than 
factor (b) or (c) evidence) or the appropriateness of a death 
verdict.”  (Schultz, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 683.) 
The trial court need not instruct the jury that “it must 
return a sentence of life without the possibility of parole if it 
finds that mitigation outweighs aggravation.”  (People v. 
Johnson (2019) 8 Cal.5th 475, 528.) 
“The penalty phase jury is not required to make written 
findings regarding its penalty choice, and the absence of such 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
102 
written findings does not preclude meaningful appellate 
review.”  (Schultz, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 684.) 
“Contrary to defendant’s assertion, there is no Eighth 
Amendment requirement that California’s death penalty 
scheme provide for intercase proportionality review, either in 
the trial court or on review.”  (People v. Johnson, supra, 
62 Cal.4th at p. 656.) 
“California does not regularly use the death penalty as a 
form of punishment, and ‘ “its imposition does not violate 
international norms of decency or the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition 
against 
cruel 
and 
unusual 
punishment.” ’ ”  
(Navarro, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 346.) 
“Defendant acknowledges that this court has previously 
rejected each of the challenges to California’s death penalty 
scheme that he presents here.  He asserts, however, that our 
analysis of these issues is constitutionally defective because we 
have failed to consider their cumulative impact or to address the 
capital sentencing scheme as a whole.  This court has considered 
and rejected identical arguments before, and we do so again 
here.”  (Schultz, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 685.) 
PEOPLE v. CAMACHO 
Opinion of the Court by Cantil-Sakauye, C. J. 
 
103 
III.  DISPOSITION 
 
Because defendant has not demonstrated reversible error, 
we affirm the judgment in its entirety. 
 
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. 
 
 
We Concur: 
CORRIGAN, J. 
LIU, J. 
KRUGER, J. 
GROBAN, J. 
JENKINS, J. 
GUERRERO, J. 
 
 
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who 
argued in Supreme Court. 
 
Name of Opinion  People v. Camacho 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Procedural Posture (see XX below) 
Original Appeal XX 
Original Proceeding 
Review Granted (published)  
Review Granted (unpublished)  
Rehearing Granted 
 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Opinion No. S141080 
Date Filed:  November 28, 2022 
__________________________________________________________  
 
Court:  Superior 
County:  San Diego 
Judge:  Joan P. Weber 
__________________________________________________________   
 
Counsel: 
 
Barry Morris, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for 
Defendant and Appellant. 
 
Kamala D. Harris and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Dane R. Gillette 
and Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Julie L. 
Garland and James William Bilderback II, Assistant Attorneys 
General, Holly D. Wilkens, Heather F. Crawford and Robin Urbanski, 
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for 
publication with opinion): 
 
Barry Morris 
Attorney at Law 
1407 Oakland Boulevard, #200  
Walnut Creek, CA 94596  
(925) 934-1100 
 
Robin Urbanski 
Deputy Attorney General 
600 West Broadway, Suite 1800 
San Diego, CA 92101 
(619) 738-9115