Case Title: Sampson v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth.

Citation: 2012-Ohio-570

Docket Number: 2010-1561

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2012-02-16T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
Sampson v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-570.] 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2012-OHIO-570 
SAMPSON, APPELLEE, v. CUYAHOGA METROPOLITAN HOUSING  
AUTHORITY ET AL., APPELLANTS. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as Sampson v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth.,  
Slip Opinion No. 2012-Ohio-570.] 
R.C. 
Chapter 
2744—Political-subdivision 
tort 
liability—Immunity—R.C. 
2744.09(B)—Exception to immunity for civil actions by an employee 
“relative to any matter that arises out of the employment relationship 
between the employee and the political subdivision”—Civil actions 
alleging intentional torts may qualify as a matter that arises out of the 
employment relationship—Political-subdivision employer not immune 
from liability merely because employee alleges intentional tort. 
(No. 2010-1561—Submitted September 20, 2011—Decided February 16, 2012.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 93441,  
188 Ohio.App.3d 250, 2010-Ohio-3415. 
__________________ 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
1.  When an employee of a political-subdivision employer brings a civil action 
against the political subdivision alleging an intentional tort, that civil 
action may qualify as a “matter that arises out of the employment 
relationship” within the meaning of R.C. 2744.09(B). 
2.  An employee’s action against a political-subdivision employer arises out of the 
employment relationship between the employee and the political 
subdivision within the meaning of R.C. 2744.09(B) if there is a causal 
connection or a causal relationship between the claims raised by the 
employee and the employment relationship. 
__________________ 
 
CUPP, J. 
{¶ 1} We are asked to determine whether R.C. 2744.09(B), an exception 
to political-subdivision immunity from tort liability, applies in a civil action for 
damages filed by an employee who alleges that his political-subdivision employer 
committed an intentional tort against him and engaged in negligent conduct.  We 
conclude that R.C. 2744.09(B) may apply in such a circumstance, and we affirm 
the judgment of the court of appeals. 
I. Background 
{¶ 2} Darrell Sampson was employed by the Cuyahoga Metropolitan 
Housing Authority (“CMHA”) in its maintenance department as a Serviceman V 
plumber.  In 2004, CMHA began an investigation into possible employee misuse 
of CMHA gasoline credit cards as a result of an anonymous tip that CMHA 
employees were using CMHA cards to fuel their own personal cars.  At the 
conclusion of the investigation, the Cuyahoga County prosecutor gave the CMHA 
police approval to arrest 13 CMHA maintenance department employees.  After 
considering various alternatives, CMHA officials decided to arrest the 13 suspects 
January Term, 2012 
3 
 
at a scheduled meeting of maintenance department employees at a CMHA 
maintenance warehouse. 
{¶ 3} Sampson was arrested during the employee meeting after he and 
the other 12 employees were called to a separate area out of view of the meeting.  
When Sampson was escorted out of the warehouse and placed into a police 
vehicle, news media were in the parking lot outside.  After the arrests, CMHA 
issued a press release and held a press conference at its headquarters announcing 
the arrests.  Sampson was taken to jail and released the next day.  CMHA placed 
Sampson on paid administrative leave. 
{¶ 4} The county prosecutor charged, and the grand jury indicted, 
Sampson for the felony of theft in office and felony misuse of credit cards.  After 
Sampson was indicted on the charges, CMHA terminated Sampson’s 
employment.  The day before Sampson’s criminal trial, the company that issued 
the gas credit cards, upon being contacted for the first time by the prosecutor, 
declined to send a representative to testify about the credit-card records.  The 
prosecutor had not subpoenaed any company representative to compel the 
company’s presence at the trial.  The charges against Sampson were then 
dismissed with prejudice by the county prosecutor. 
{¶ 5} Sampson filed a grievance pursuant to the terms of his union 
contract, and an arbitrator sustained the grievance, concluding that CMHA had 
failed to present any evidence at the arbitration hearing that Sampson participated 
in gasoline theft.  Based on his determination that CMHA terminated Sampson 
without just cause, the arbitrator ordered that Sampson be reinstated to his former 
position with full restitution of his seniority and lost wages and benefits.  
Sampson returned to work for CMHA as a Serviceman V, but Sampson 
contended that upon his return the atmosphere was no longer tolerable, and he 
later resigned. 
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{¶ 6} Sampson filed a complaint in which he raised various intentional-
tort and negligence claims arising out of his arrest by CMHA.1  CMHA filed a 
motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to all claims, and the trial court 
granted that motion in part, dismissing only the claim for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress.  CMHA later filed a motion for summary judgment on all the 
remaining claims, alleging immunity from suit under R.C. Chapter 2744, the 
Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act, but the trial court denied the motion, 
finding that a genuine issue of material fact still existed as to whether CMHA’s 
conduct was wanton or reckless.  But the trial court also concluded that the 
express exception to immunity contained in R.C. 2744.09(B) did not apply, 
because Sampson’s claims did not arise out of the employment relationship. 
{¶ 7} CMHA appealed from the trial court’s order under R.C. 
2744.02(C).  The appellate court concluded that the express exception to 
immunity in R.C. 2744.09(B) prevented CMHA from raising immunity pursuant 
to R.C. Chapter 2744 and affirmed.  Sampson v. Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., 
8th Dist. No. 93441, 2010-Ohio-1214.  A divided Eighth District on rehearing en 
banc affirmed.  188 Ohio App.3d 250, 2010-Ohio-3415, 935 N.E.2d 98.  We 
accepted CMHA’s discretionary appeal.  127 Ohio St.3d 1460, 2010-Ohio-6008, 
938 N.E.2d 362. 
II. Political-Subdivision Tort Liability 
{¶ 8} In 1985, the General Assembly enacted R.C. Chapter 2744, the 
Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act.  141 Ohio Laws. Part I, 1699.  This act 
sets forth the general rule that political subdivisions are not liable for damages in 
civil actions for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly caused by 
                                                 
1  The claims were intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional 
distress, abuse of process, and negligent misidentification.   
 
January Term, 2012 
5 
 
any act or omission of the political subdivision in connection with a governmental 
or proprietary function.  R.C. 2744.02(A)(1).  The act also contains exceptions to 
a political subdivision’s immunity, as well as certain defenses to those exceptions.  
See, e.g., R.C. 2744.02(B), 2744.03, and 2744.09.0 
{¶ 9} CMHA argues that it is immune from Sampson’s suit pursuant to 
the general rule of immunity contained in R.C. 2744.02.  The parties do not 
dispute that CMHA is a metropolitan housing authority created pursuant to R.C. 
3735.27.  As a consequence, CMHA is a “body corporate and politic,” R.C. 
3735.31, and therefore a political subdivision entitled to invoke the immunity 
provisions of R.C. Chapter 2744.  R.C. 2744.01(F). 
{¶ 10} In response, Sampson contends that R.C. 2744.09(B) applies to 
except his claim from political-subdivision immunity.  R.C. 2744.09(B) states:  
 
This chapter does not apply to, and shall not be construed 
to apply to, the following: 
* * * 
(B) Civil actions by an employee, or the collective 
bargaining representative of an employee, against his political 
subdivision relative to any matter that arises out of the employment 
relationship between the employee and the political subdivision. 
 
{¶ 11} Sampson argues that his “civil action” against his employer, 
CMHA, is “relative to any matter that arises out of the employment relationship 
between” him and CMHA.2  Thus, Sampson continues, the plain language of R.C. 
2744.09(B) precludes CMHA from invoking political-subdivision immunity. 
                                                 
2  In contrast, R.C. 2744.09(C) applies to claims in which the employee challenges the terms of his 
or her employment with the political subdivision, including wages, hours, or working conditions.   
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{¶ 12} CMHA contends that Sampson’s intentional-tort claim is not a 
“matter” that “arises out of the employment relationship,” because an employer’s 
action in committing an intentional tort against an employee in the workplace 
necessarily occurs outside the employment relationship and cannot arise from it.  
In making this argument, CMHA relies on a principle from workers’ 
compensation law, first announced by this court in Blankenship v. Cincinnati 
Milacron Chems., Inc., 69 Ohio St.2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 572 (1982).  That principle 
states that the immunity provided to employers by the Workers’ Compensation 
Act, specifically by R.C. 4123.74, applies only to an injury received “in the 
course of or arising out of” the injured employee’s employment.  Blankenship 
addressed the right of an employee to file a private lawsuit against the employer 
for tort damages, in addition to claiming workers’ compensation benefits.  
According to the rationale applied by the Blankenship court, an employee could 
pursue a common-law action for damages in addition to obtaining workers’ 
compensation benefits because when an employer intentionally harms an 
employee, that injury does not “aris[e] out of” the employment relationship and 
the immunity provided to employers within the Workers’ Compensation Act falls 
away.  CMHA’s argument further relies on a statement from a subsequent case in 
which the court approved and followed Blankenship:  
 
When an employer intentionally harms his employee, that act 
effects a complete breach of the employment relationship, and for 
purposes of the legal remedy for such an injury, the two parties are 
not employer and employee, but intentional tortfeasor and victim.  
* * *  The [employee’s] lawsuit has no bearing upon any question 
relating to employment. 
 
January Term, 2012 
7 
 
Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 61 Ohio St.3d 624, 634, 576 N.E.2d 722 (1991).  
For ease of discussion, we will refer to this very specific type of intentional tort in 
the workplace as a Blankenship tort, although its definition has been significantly 
refined in the years since that case was decided.  See R.C. 2745.01 et seq. (current 
codification of the Blankenship tort); Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Prods. Co., 125 
Ohio St.3d 250, 2010-Ohio-1027, 927 N.E.2d 1066, ¶ 14-57 (detailing the history 
of the evolution of the Blankenship tort). 
{¶ 13} We must now consider whether R.C. 2744.09(B) was meant to 
incorporate the Blankenship rationale.  We hold that it does not.  Initially, there is 
no hint in the language of the statute of any such intention.  The similarity of the 
phrase “relative to any matter that arises out of the employment relationship” in 
R.C. 2744.09(B) to the language of R.C. 4123.74 does not justify importing 
Blankenship’s analysis.  R.C. 2744.09(B) is designed to protect employees by 
allowing them to recover against their employers, who would otherwise be 
entitled to immunity under R.C. Chapter 2744.  To undo those protections in cases 
of the worst of employer misconduct would violate the language and frustrate the 
purpose of the provision. 
{¶ 14} Moreover, we will not presume, without more evidence in the 
language of R.C. 2744.09(B), that the legislature meant to invoke the Blankenship 
rationale in the context of political-subdivision immunity.  This is because the 
context 
of 
political-subdivision 
immunity 
is 
different 
from 
workers’ 
compensation immunity.  In this regard, the foundation for the workers’ 
compensation framework is Section 35, Article II of the Ohio Constitution.  This 
constitutional provision was designed to enable the legislature to craft laws that 
reflect “ ‘the policy compromises necessary to balance the obligations and rights 
of the employer and employee in the workers’ compensation system.’ ”   
Kaminski, 125 Ohio St.3d 250, 2010-Ohio-1027, 927 N.E.2d 1066, ¶ 74-75, 
quoting Bickers v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 116 Ohio St.3d 351, 2007-Ohio-6751, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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879 N.E.2d 201, ¶ 23-24.  The Workers’ Compensation Act that we know today is 
the result of that balancing of interests: workers relinquish their common-law 
remedies in exchange for a more certain recovery, while employers relinquish 
common-law defenses in exchange for a more limited liability.  Blankenship, 69 
Ohio St.2d at 614, 433 N.E.2d 572; Brady, 61 Ohio St.3d at 633-634, 576 N.E.2d 
722.  This limitation of liability was achieved by the grant of immunity from 
common-law suits contained in R.C. 4123.74. 
{¶ 15} In contrast, R.C. 2744.09(B) must be read in light of the entirely 
different policies underlying the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act.  “R.C. 
Chapter 2744 is the General Assembly's response to the judicial abrogation of 
common-law sovereign immunity.  Its manifest purpose is the preservation of the 
fiscal integrity of political subdivisions. Wilson v. Stark Cty. Dept. of Human 
Servs. (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 450, 453, 639 N.E.2d 105.”  Estate of Graves v. 
Circleville, 124 Ohio St.3d 339, 2010-Ohio-168, 922 N.E.2d 201, ¶ 12.  Unlike 
the Workers’ Compensation Act, R.C. Chapter 2744 is not the result of any 
bargain between employer and employee, because the employer-employee 
relationship is not its subject.  Rather, R.C. 2744.09(B) was enacted in the context 
of political-subdivision immunity. 
{¶ 16} Upon consideration of the differences between workers’ 
compensation and political-subdivision tort immunity policies, we decline to 
incorporate the Blankenship rationale and corresponding line of cases into a 
political-subdivision immunity context and the exception contained in R.C. 
2744.09(B).  The policies underlying workers’ compensation are simply too 
different from political-subdivision tort immunity.  And when R.C. 2744.09(B) is 
read without the Blankenship gloss, the phrase “relative to any matter that arises 
out of the employment relationship” is clear.  The phrase requires only a causal 
connection between the subject matter of the civil action and the employment 
relationship. 
January Term, 2012 
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{¶ 17} Therefore, in accordance with the foregoing discussion and with 
our duty to apply plain statutory language as written, we hold that when an 
employee of a political subdivision brings a civil action against the political 
subdivision alleging an intentional tort, that civil action may qualify as a “matter 
that arises out of the employment relationship” within the meaning of R.C. 
2744.09(B). 
{¶ 18} Having concluded that Blankenship has no relevance to political-
subdivision immunity, we now must determine whether there is any genuine issue 
of material fact concerning whether Sampson’s civil action is one that is “relative 
to any matter that arises out of the employment relationship” within the meaning 
of R.C. 2744.09(B).  The trial court found that there was no genuine issue and that 
R.C. 2744.09(B) did not apply.  The appellate court disagreed, holding that “all of 
Sampson’s claims, including his claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, clearly arose out of his employment relationship, thus barring CMHA 
from asserting immunity pursuant to R.C. 2744.09(B).”  We agree with the court 
of appeals. 
{¶ 19} Because this case was decided on summary judgment, our review 
is do novo.  Comer v. Risko, 106 Ohio St.3d 185, 2005-Ohio-4559, 833 N.E.2d 
712, ¶ 8.  We hold that the evidence presented to the trial court established a 
general issue of material fact that would allow Sampson’s claims to survive 
summary judgment.  As set forth below, the facts in this case could lead 
reasonable minds to conclude that Sampson’s claims arose out of his employment 
relationship with CMHA.  See Civ.R. 56(C). 
{¶ 20} First, the record contains evidence that the alleged tort arose from 
an accusation by the employer that the employee had stolen from the employer by 
using the employer-owned gasoline credit cards for personal needs.  This was not, 
for example, conduct that was alleged to have been committed by the employee 
against a third party with no relationship to the employer.  Rather, CMHA 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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accused Sampson of engaging in misconduct in his duties as a plumber, one of 
which included responding to CMHA service calls and emergencies throughout 
the county in a CMHA-owned vehicle assigned by CMHA to the employees on a 
daily basis.  CMHA had policy statements pertaining to the employees’ use of the 
gas cards, in which possible disciplinary actions for improper use of the cards 
were detailed.  Moreover, CMHA investigated all the plumbers in the 
maintenance department, not just Sampson. 
{¶ 21} Second, Sampson presented evidence that the investigation of 
CMHA employees was conducted entirely by CMHA police, based on CMHA 
documents.  Third, Sampson adduced evidence that his arrest occurred at a 
CMHA-called mandatory meeting of all CMHA employees as a part of their 
regular CMHA work day.  The employees were told to report to the off-site 
CMHA warehouse for work assignments.  The arrests were effected by CMHA 
police by prearrangement with CMHA administrators at the CMHA warehouse.  
The arrested employees were handcuffed, searched, and physically removed by 
armed CMHA police in front of their fellow employees to a waiting police van 
with cameras recording the scene.  Fourth, Sampson presented evidence that his 
arrest by CMHA police was publicized by CMHA at the mandatory meeting and 
through a subsequent press release and press conference.  The timing of the arrest 
was intended to send a message of deterrence to other employees of CMHA.  
Fifth, Sampson’s evidence shows that he was terminated from his employment by 
CMHA, that he grieved the termination through his CMHA and union arbitration 
agreement, and that he was reinstated by CMHA. 
{¶ 22} All in all, the facts, supported by the evidence, could lead 
reasonable minds to conclude that Sampson’s civil action arose from the 
employment relationship and, therefore, is excepted from immunity under R.C. 
2744.09(B). 
 
 
January Term, 2012 
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III. Conclusion 
{¶ 23} In view of the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the appellate 
court properly determined that reasonable minds could conclude that the claims in 
Sampson’s civil action, if proven, are matters that arise out of the employment 
relationship between Samson and CMHA and that pursuant to R.C. 2744.09(B), 
CMHA is not entitled to the immunity provided by R.C. Chapter 2744.  
Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 
Judgment affirmed. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’DONNELL, and 
MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur. 
LANZINGER, J., concurs in judgment only. 
__________________ 
LANZINGER, J., concurring in judgment only. 
{¶ 24} I concur in the judgment. 
{¶ 25} In arguing that a political-subdivision employer is immune from 
liability for a workplace intentional tort, appellants rely on decisions by this court 
in workers’ compensation cases holding that an employer’s intentional tort against 
an employee does not arise out of the employment relationship.  Thus, appellants 
argue, political subdivisions remain immune from liability for workplace 
intentional torts because such torts do not “arise[] out of the employment 
relationship” as required by R.C. 2744.09(B). 
{¶ 26} Although certain aspects of appellants’ position are persuasive, I 
believe that we must read the statute as written and, if a legislative response is 
necessary, wait for it to occur.  A political subdivision does not have the 
protection of R.C. Chapter 2744 immunity if its employee asserts a civil action 
“relative to any matter that arises out of the employment relationship between the 
employee and the political subdivision.”  R.C. 2744.09(B).  As it is now defined, 
an intentional tort arises out of the employment relationship. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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{¶ 27} R.C. 2745.01 defines “intentional tort” as follows: 
 
(A) In an action brought against an employer by an 
employee, or by the dependent survivors of a deceased employee, 
for damages resulting from an intentional tort committed by the 
employer during the course of employment, the employer shall not 
be liable unless the plaintiff proves that the employer committed 
the tortious act with the intent to injure another or with the belief 
that the injury was substantially certain to occur. 
(B) As used in this section, "substantially certain" means 
that an employer acts with deliberate intent to cause an employee 
to suffer an injury, a disease, a condition, or death. 
 
(Emphasis added.) 
{¶ 28} The General Assembly has rejected the artificial theory set forth in 
Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems., Inc., 69 Ohio St.2d 608, 433 N.E.2d 
572 (1982), and its progeny that intentional torts arise outside the employment 
relationship and cannot be received in the course of employment.  I believe that in 
this case we are acknowledging that an intentional tort, as it has been redefined by 
statute, may indeed arise in the course of employment.  The legal fiction that such 
a tort arises outside of the employment relationship should be put to rest, and 
language that was invoked initially to broaden workers’ recovery should not now 
be used to immunize political subdivisions. 
{¶ 29} I agree that there are material issues over whether the facts in this 
case set forth a civil action against CMHA “relative to any matter that arises out 
of the employment relationship” between Sampson and CMHA.  I therefore join 
in the judgment.  This case must therefore continue to trial, subject to proof of an 
intentional tort as redefined by R.C. 2745.01—that is, that the employer acted 
January Term, 2012 
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with the intent to injure or with belief that the injury was substantially certain to 
occur, meaning  that the employer acted with deliberate intent to cause the injury.  
See R.C. 2745.01(A) and (B). 
{¶ 30} Because R.C. 2744.09(B) removes the protection of immunity for a 
political-subdivision employer for injuries to its employees that arise out of the 
employment relationship, a political subdivision is at risk for liability in 
intentional-tort suits that satisfy the terms of R.C. 2745.01.  If the General 
Assembly wishes to expand immunity to protect the political-subdivision 
employer and leave only the individual tortfeasor liable, as appellants argue is the 
legislative intent, then the General Assembly must amend the statute to do so. 
__________________ 
 
Nancy C. Schuster, for appellee. 
Roetzel & Andress, L.P.A., Stephen W. Funk, Aretta K. Bernard, and 
Karen D. Adinolfi, for appellants. 
 
Christina M. Royer, Ltd., and Christina M. Royer; Gittes Law Group, 
Frederick M. Gittes, and Jeffrey P. Vardaro; Paul L. Cox; and Hunter, Carnahan, 
Shoub & Byard and Russell E. Carnahan, urging affirmance for amici curiae 
Fraternal Order of Police of Ohio, Inc., Fraternal Order of Police, Capital City 
Lodge No. 9, Akron Firefighters IAFF Local 330, and Ohio Employment Lawyers 
Association. 
 
Schottenstein, Zox & Dunn Co., L.P.A., Stephen L. Byron, Rebecca K. 
Schaltenbrand, and Stephen J. Smith; and John Gotherman, urging reversal for 
amicus curiae Ohio Municipal League. 
______________________