Case Title: Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. White

Citation: 

Docket Number: 80ag/14

State: maryland

Court: Maryland Supreme Court

Date: 2016-05-23T00:00:00Z

Document:
Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Erica S. White, Misc. Docket AG No. 80, 
September Term, 2014.  Opinion by Hotten, J.  
 
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE — SANCTIONS — INDEFINITE SUSPENSION WITH 
THE RIGHT TO APPLY FOR READMISSION AFTER SIX MONTHS — Court of 
Appeals ordered indefinite suspension with the right to apply for readmission after six months 
for an attorney who admitted ignorance of trust account rules; failed to remediate her 
misconduct or adhere to the protocols under consecutive Conditional Diversion Agreements 
with Bar Counsel for prior misconduct concerning her trust account; failed to cooperate with 
Bar Counsel while under investigation; and failed to implement law practice safeguards during 
an illness or otherwise protect her clients’ interests in conformance with the Rules of 
Professional Conduct. Respondent engaged in conduct in violation of Maryland Lawyers’ Rule 
of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”), 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a) and (b), 1.15(a), 1.16(d), 8.1(a) and (b), 
8.4(a), (c), and (d), and Md. Rules 16.606.1(a)(1)-(3), 16-607, 16-609(b) and (c), and § 10-306 
of the Business Occupations & Professions Article.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
OF MARYLAND 
 
Misc. Docket AG No. 80 
 
September Term, 2014 
_________________________________ 
 
 
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION 
OF MARYLAND 
v. 
ERICA S. WHITE 
 
____________________________________ 
 
Barbera, C.J. 
*Battaglia, 
Greene, 
Adkins, 
McDonald, 
Watts, 
Hotten, 
 
JJ. 
______________________________________ 
 
Opinion by Hotten, J. 
______________________________________ 
 
Filed:  May 23, 2016 
 
*Battaglia, J., now retired, participated in the 
hearing and conference of this case while an 
active member of this Court; after being recalled 
pursuant to the Constitution, Article IV, Section 
3A, she also participated in the decision and 
adoption of this opinion. 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
Case No. 24-C-15-000156 
Argued: February 9, 2016 
 
 
This attorney discipline action involves a lawyer who, while representing her clients 
in separate legal matters, failed to comply with remedial conditions as required under 
consecutive Conditional Diversion Agreements (“CDA”)1 for prior misconduct concerning 
her trust account; failed to secure safeguards during an illness to ensure a timely appeal for 
her client or otherwise protect her client’s interests in conformance with the Rules of 
Professional Conduct; and mismanaged her attorney trust account by repeatedly 
accumulating negative balances, depositing unearned fees, and maintaining improper 
record-keeping practices.  
Respondent, Erica S. White, a member of the Bar of Maryland, represented Keith 
Fleming (“Mr. Fleming”) in a divorce and custody matter (“Fleming matter”) and Karma 
Sewell-Carpenter (“Ms. Sewell-Carpenter”), in a landlord-tenant dispute (“Sewell 
matter”).  Between March 2012 and November 2013, Respondent was under a CDA with 
Bar Counsel for prior misconduct involving mismanagement of her attorney trust account.  
Respondent’s CDA was later amended (“Amended CDA”), then subsequently revoked in 
                                                          
 
1 Conditional diversion in attorney disciplinary matters is distinguishable from the 
imposition of a sanction.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Cappell, 389 Md. 402, 419-
20, 886 A.2d 112, 122 (2005).  Maryland Rule 16-712(b)(3) grants Bar Counsel the 
authority to “enter into and implement Conditional Diversion Agreements” with attorneys 
in order to remedy misconduct.  An attorney may be eligible for conditional diversion when 
his or her professional misconduct was not the result of the following: any willful or 
dishonest conduct, the cause or basis of the misconduct can be resolved through 
remediation or alternative programs or mechanisms, and the disposition is in the best 
interest of the public and the attorney’s clients both present and prospective. See id. at 421, 
886 A.2d at 123. 
 
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April 2014 due to Respondent’s non-compliance with the terms of the CDA. (collectively, 
“CDA matter”). 
On December 30, 2014, Petitioner, the Attorney Grievance Commission of 
Maryland, acting through Bar Counsel, filed with this Court a Petition for Disciplinary or 
Remedial Action (“Petition”) against Respondent, based upon her representation of Mr. 
Fleming and Ms. Sewell-Carpenter, non-compliance with the CDA and Amended CDA, 
and the mishandling of her trust account throughout this period (“Trust Account matter”). 
Bar Counsel alleged that Respondent violated the following Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of 
Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”): Rule 1.1 (Competence), Rule 1.3 (Diligence), Rule 
1.4(a) and (b) (Communication), Rule 1.15(a) and (d) (Safekeeping Property); 1.16(d) 
(Declining or Terminating Representation); 8.1(a) and (b) (Bar Admission and 
Disciplinary Matters); and Rule 8.4(a), (c), and (d) (Misconduct). 
Bar Counsel also alleged that Respondent violated Maryland Rules 16-606.1 
(Attorney Trust Account Record-Keeping), 16-607 (Commingling of Funds), 16-609 
(Prohibited Transactions), and Md. Code (1989, 2010 Repl. Vol) § 10-306 of the Business 
Occupations & Professions Article (“Bus. Occ. & Prof.”) (Misuse of Trust Money).   
By Order dated January 9, 2015, this Court transmitted the matter to the Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City and designated the Honorable Edward R.K. Hargadon (“hearing 
judge”) to render findings of fact and conclusions of law.  On April 17, 2015, both parties 
participated in a scheduling conference call with the hearing judge, setting a hearing for 
June 24, 2015 at 9:30 a.m.  On or about June 22, Respondent informed the court that she 
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was unable to attend the hearing due to her representation of a client in a murder trial that 
day.   
On July 14, 2015, a hearing was conducted.  Present were Bar Counsel and 
Respondent.  Ms. Sewell-Carpenter, Edwin Karr (“Mr. Karr”), Investigator for the 
Attorney Grievance Commission, Anne Deady, Esquire (“Ms. Deady”), the law practice 
monitor assigned to Respondent under her Amended CDA, and Laura Burrows, an attorney 
who worked with Respondent on an unrelated matter, testified on behalf of Bar Counsel.  
Respondent represented herself and testified.  On September 4, 2015, the hearing judge 
filed with this Court findings of fact and conclusions of law, determining that: (1) relative 
to the Fleming matter and Respondent’s CDA and Amended CDA violations, she violated 
MLRPC 1.1, 1.4, 1.15,2 8.4(a) and (d), and Md. Rule 16.606.1; (2) regarding Respondent’s 
false statements and misrepresentations to Bar Counsel, she violated MLRPC 8.1(a) and 
(b), 8.4 (a), (c), and (d); (3) relative to the Sewell matter, she violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 
1.4, 1.16(d), 8.4(d); and (4) regarding the Trust Account matter, she violated MLRPC 1.1, 
1.15(a), 8.4(d), Md. Rules 16-606.1(a)(1)-(3), 16-607, 16-609(b) and (c), and Bus. Occ. & 
Prof. § 10-306.  
On September 22, 2015, Bar Counsel filed its recommendation for sanctions, 
requesting indefinite suspension with the right to apply for readmission after six months, 
and took no exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact or conclusions of law.  On 
September 23, 2015, Respondent filed general exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings 
                                                          
 
2 A subsection of this Rule was not specified. 
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and conclusions, which she subsequently amended on September 30, 2015 and February 
9, 2016.3  On February 9, 2016, we heard oral argument.  Respondent conceded that she 
engaged in professional misconduct relative to the alleged charges, but attributed her 
actions to illness, recuperation after surgery, and difficulties experienced as caretaker of 
her mother until her death, which collectively impacted her practice during those periods.  
For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 
1.4(a) and (b), 1.15(a), 1.16(d), 8.1(a) and (b), 8.4(a), (c), and (d), Md. Rules 
16.606.1(a)(1)-(3), 16-607, 16-609(b) and (c), and Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 10-306, and will 
indefinitely suspend her from the practice of law in this State with the right to apply for 
readmission after six months.  
BACKGROUND 
The hearing judge rendered the following findings of fact, which we summarize:  
A. 
Respondent’s CDA, Subsequent Amended CDA, and the Fleming Matter 
 
Respondent was admitted to the Bar of Maryland on November 3, 2007, and 
currently maintains a law office in Baltimore, Maryland.  On March 21, 2012, Respondent 
entered into a one-year CDA with Bar Counsel.   
 
                                                          
 
3 During oral argument, Respondent asserted that the February 9 amendment 
excepting to the hearing judge’s findings and conclusions corrected errors in her prior 
filing.  However, upon our review, both filings appear to be the same. 
 
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Pursuant to Md. Rule 16-736(c)(2)(A),4 Respondent acknowledged that she had 
engaged in professional misconduct relative to her representation of Mr. Fleming.5  Under 
the CDA, Respondent was required to review a Continuing Legal Education DVD on trust 
account management.  However, two months prior to completing the CDA, Respondent 
failed to fulfill her obligations due to a failure to timely deposit funds into her trust account 
and to provide client records to Bar Counsel.  As a result, on November 25, 2013, Bar 
Counsel amended Respondent’s CDA and assigned Ms. Deady as her law practice monitor.  
The Amended CDA contained the following conditions: 
Respondent will provide [Ms. Deady] with a copy of her general ledger, 
individual client ledgers, monthly trust account reconciliation, trust account 
statement, and corresponding cancelled checks on a monthly basis for her 
monitor to submit to Bar Counsel for the remainder of the Amended CDA. 
 
Respondent 
will 
attend 
a 
meeting 
with 
Certified 
Public 
Accountant/Commission Investigator Charles Miller [(“Mr. Miller”)] to 
review Respondent’s financial records and to discuss Respondent’s trust 
                                                          
 
4 Md. Rule 16-736(c)(2)(A) provides, “[b]y signing the Agreement, the attorney (A) 
acknowledges that the attorney has engaged in conduct that constitutes professional 
misconduct or is currently incapacitated[.]” 
 
5 In its Petition, Bar Counsel recounted the following facts relative to Respondent’s 
representation of Mr. Fleming, which we summarize: On September 11, 2011, Mr. Fleming 
retained Respondent to represent him in his divorce and custody matter in the General 
Court of Justice, District Court Division, North Carolina (“General Court”).  On that same 
day, Mr. Fleming signed Respondent’s retainer agreement and agreed to pay a $1500 non-
refundable retainer.  Although Respondent initiated pro hac vice admission to the North 
Carolina bar, she did not complete the process because she had no record that the retainer 
had been paid.  Respondent did not maintain trust account records or advise Mr. Fleming 
of the status of his case.  Respondent communicated with the General Court on two 
occasions, but never entered an appearance on Mr. Fleming’s behalf.  Respondent 
contended that she did not seek pro hac vice admission because Mr. Fleming did not pay 
the full $1,500 retainer.  In reliance on Respondent’s representation, Mr. Fleming did not 
seek other counsel and missed his scheduled hearing in the General Court.   
 
- 6 - 
 
account questions.  Respondent will bring a copy of her general ledger, 
individual client ledgers, monthly reconciliation and monthly trust account 
statements from the previous three months with her to the meeting for Mr. 
Miller to review.  Respondent will set a meeting date with Mr. Miller by no 
later than seven [ ] days after the new effective date of the Amended CDA.  
The meeting date shall occur within twenty [ ] days of the effective date of 
the Amended CDA.  
 
[Ms. Deady] shall be required to attend a formal hearing/court proceeding 
with Respondent within two [ ] months from the new effective date of the 
Amended CDA and to complete a client observation form in connection with 
the hearing/proceeding.  
 
[Ms. Deady] shall continue to provide reports to Bar Counsel on a monthly 
basis and submit each report on the 30th day of the month.  In addition, 
Respondent shall meet with [Ms. Deady] on a monthly basis on the twentieth 
[ ] day of each month.  During the meeting, Respondent shall discuss her 
Amended CDA in detail, provide any needed trust account records and/or 
billing documentation to the monitor, and to submit her written report of her 
biggest challenges and/or goals/accomplishments for the month. 
 
Respondent’s Amended CDA shall remain in effect until July 31, 2014.  
 
i. 
Respondent’s Interactions with Ms. Deady  
Respondent admitted that during November 2013 through February 2014, she failed 
to provide the information to Ms. Deady and Mr. Miller regarding her general ledger, 
individual client ledgers, monthly reconciliation, trust account bank statement, and 
corresponding cancelled checks on a monthly basis.  On November 8, 2013, Respondent 
met with Ms. Deady in her law office, to review her files.  Respondent promised to submit 
copies of her client ledgers, trust account reconciliation statements, and trust account bank 
statements per CDA requirements by November 20, 2013.  Due to Respondent’s other 
- 7 - 
 
commitments,6 Ms. Deady did not timely receive the proper documents for her November 
2013 report to Bar Counsel.  
 Ms. Deady submitted her second monthly report to Bar Counsel on January 10, 
2014, which reflected that she contacted Respondent on January 6, 2014 for the required 
documents.  However, Respondent advised that she was unable to comply due to scheduled 
surgery that same day.  Although Respondent promised to provide the documentation after 
her recuperation, she did not. 
Ms. Deady left a voicemail for Respondent on January 30, 2014.  In Ms. Deady’s 
third monthly report to Bar Counsel, she advised that Respondent had not contacted her 
since January 6, 2014.  Bar Counsel granted Respondent an eight-day extension to submit 
her documentation to Ms. Deady.  Ms. Deady’s fourth monthly report to Bar Counsel on 
February 28, 2014, reflected that she contacted Respondent on February 25, 2014 to 
schedule an appointment on February 27, 2014, and noted Respondent’s failure to provide 
any documents or meet with her since November 2013.   However, Respondent was unable 
to meet with Ms. Deady on February 27, citing a need to prepare for a motion and 
complications from her surgery.  
 
 
 
                                                          
 
6 On November 20, 2013, Respondent informed Ms. Deady that she had not 
prepared the requested documents because she had new clients and “had to attend to their 
cases.”  Respondent was also unable to meet with Ms. Deady on November 22, 2013 after 
being requested to do so.  
- 8 - 
 
ii. 
Respondent’s Interactions with Attorney Grievance Commission 
Investigator, Mr. Karr 
 
 
 
In February 2014, Mr. Karr contacted Respondent regarding the impending 
revocation of her Amended CDA.  Mr. Karr conducted an interview of Ms. Sewell-
Carpenter on March 6, 2014, but received no response from Respondent after leaving voice 
messages on March 7 and 10, 2014.  On March 11, 2014, Mr. Karr contacted Respondent 
and scheduled an interview for March 25, 2014, at 11:00 a.m.   
During the hearing, Mr. Karr testified that Respondent attempted to cancel the 
interview, citing an impending trial and inquired whether he could provide her with written 
questions in advance.  Mr. Karr directed her to Assistant Bar Counsel JaCina Stanton (“Ms. 
Stanton”).  Mr. Karr and Ms. Stanton subsequently cancelled the interview and agreed that 
Respondent could provide a statement under oath. 
iii. 
Respondent’s Failure to Protect Client’s Interests 
In light of Respondent’s upcoming surgery and anticipated recuperation period, Ms. 
Stanton requested information from Respondent on November 26, 2013 regarding the 
status of her cases scheduled for January 2014.  In a reply e-mail sent on December 5, 
2013, Respondent stated: 
I have already discussed the matter with most of my clients and am in the 
process of discussing it with the rest.  I have already addressed the issue of 
court dates as I have explained to the [c]ourt what my situation is and 
requested court dates in accordance with my expected return to work.  I also 
advised the [c]ourt that I will notify them if anything changes or I need more 
time. . . . 
 
- 9 - 
 
On January 24, 2014, Ms. Stanton requested that Respondent provide further information 
regarding three separate cases that were scheduled for jury trial.7  Although Respondent 
indicated that she postponed the cases, they nonetheless remained on the docket for trial.  
Contrary to Respondent’s December 5 e-mail that she was communicating with her clients 
about their cases, she failed to advise Ms. Sewell-Carpenter about her pending hearing 
scheduled for January 24, 2014.  On March 17, 2014, Respondent informed Bar Counsel 
that she contacted her clients and the court involving her cases, without providing an 
explanation regarding the trial date in the Sewell matter.8 
B. 
Sewell Matter 
 
On December 3, 2005, Ms. Sewell-Carpenter signed a commercial lease agreement 
with ELT Corporation to rent space for a dance studio she operated named Karma’s Dance 
Factory.  Rachel Oziel (“Ms. Oziel”) and her husband, Madgi Oziel owned ELT.  On or 
about September 4, 2012, Ms. Oziel filed suit against Ms. Sewell-Carpenter on her own 
behalf, in the amount of $5,997 in the District Court for Baltimore County for failure to 
                                                          
 
7 Bar Counsel requested updates regarding the following cases: State v. Nathaniel 
Simmons (trial date January 23, 2014); State v. Jordan Rogers (trial date January 28, 2014); 
and Rachel Oziel v. Karma Sewell-Carpenter (trial date January 24, 2014).  
 
8 In Rogers, Respondent requested a postponement and had the case scheduled for 
January 28 because she mistakenly thought her surgery would take place in November or 
December.  Substitute counsel appeared on January 28, to request an additional 
postponement.  In Simmons, Respondent requested postponement on October 25, 2013 and 
was allowed to appear via telephone on January 23, 2014.  Respondent provided no 
explanation for Sewell, but withdrew as counsel six days prior to sending correspondence 
to Bar Counsel on March 17, 2014.  
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pay rent. (Oziel v. Sewell, Case No. 080400197772012).  On November 27, 2012, the 
District Court entered judgment against Ms. Sewell-Carpenter in the amount of $6,907.   
Twice during November or December 2012, Respondent discussed possible 
representation with Ms. Sewell-Carpenter.  Ms. Sewell-Carpenter advised Respondent of 
the November 27 judgment, but Respondent never recommended that Ms. Sewell-
Carpenter file an appeal or a motion to revise judgment within thirty days.  During the 
disciplinary hearing, Respondent indicated that she thought she had ninety days to seek an 
amended or revised judgment.   
On February 23, 2013, Ms. Sewell-Carpenter formally retained Respondent after 
submitting two credit card payments totaling $1,500.  That same day, Respondent sent Ms. 
Sewell-Carpenter an e-mail, outlining the legal services that she would provide, but did not 
address the likelihood of success.  Ms. Sewell-Carpenter never responded to the February 
23 e-mail9 or executed a retainer agreement. 
On February 26, 2013, Respondent filed a “Motion to Set Aside Judgment” 
(“Motion to Set Aside”), ninety-one days after the judgment was entered against Ms. 
Sewell-Carpenter, based on fraud, mistake or irregularity.  The motion was denied on 
March 13, 2013.  Respondent also filed a “Motion for Reconsideration” of the denial of 
the Motion to Set Aside.  During the hearing on June 11, 2013, Respondent neglected to 
bring Ms. Sewell-Carpenter’s file.  The court subsequently denied the motion.  Throughout 
                                                          
 
9 Alternatively, Bar Counsel states in its proposed findings of fact and conclusions 
of law that Ms. Sewell-Carpenter denied that she responded to Respondent’s e-mail.  
During Ms. Sewell-Carpenter’s cross-examination at the hearing, she also testified that she 
did not recall responding to Respondent’s e-mail.  
- 11 - 
 
this period, Respondent never provided Ms. Sewell-Carpenter with copies of the motions 
filed on her behalf.  Although Respondent advised Ms. Sewell-Carpenter that she would 
send a copy of her file, she did not do so until December 2013, two months after Ms. 
Sewell-Carpenter filed a complaint with the Attorney Grievance Commission against 
Respondent on October 8, 2013. 
On November 27, 2013, Ms. Sewell-Carpenter filed a Motion to Vacate Judgment 
pro se.  A hearing on the matter was scheduled for January 24, 2014.  Ms. Sewell-Carpenter 
was officially notified of a motions hearing and notice was also sent to Respondent, who 
remained counsel of record.  Respondent claimed that she was absent from her law office 
throughout the month of January due to illness, neglected to check her mail, and never 
implemented forwarding procedures during her period of recuperation.   
Although Respondent’s representation of Ms. Sewell-Carpenter ended in June 2013, 
she failed to file a motion to strike appearance with the court.  Ms. Sewell-Carpenter’s 
motion was subsequently dismissed for her failure to appear for the hearing on January 24.  
As a result, her wages were garnished in the amount of $6,907 to satisfy the judgment.  On 
February 11, 2014, Ms. Sewell-Carpenter’s subsequent motion to reset a hearing date was 
denied.  Respondent did not file a motion to withdraw her appearance as counsel until 
March 11, 2014.  
 
 
 
 
- 12 - 
 
C. 
Trust Account Matter 
 
Bar Counsel subpoenaed Respondent’s trust account bank statements from 
December 2012 to March 2014.  During the hearing, Respondent conceded that she had 
not maintained accurate records or retained checks for her trust account during this period.  
Between May and July 2013, attorney’s fees for two unspecified clients were applied to 
negative balances.  Respondent was unable to identify the particular clients whose funds 
were affected by the negative balances.   
In July 2013, Respondent made a cash withdrawal and subsequently wrote a check 
payable in October 2013 from her trust account without a memo, both in the amount of 
$50.00.  Respondent also wrote a check payable to “Cash” in the amount of $420, with a 
memo indicating “USCIS Fee Wolf Case.”  During the hearing, Respondent conceded that 
this transaction was violative of trust account rules.   
Beginning October 31, 2013, Respondent’s trust account had a negative balance of 
$11.20.  The trust account remained in that status for the next five months until March 31, 
2014, when her ending trust account balance was $36.00.  Respondent conceded that during 
the period of her CDA or Amended CDA, she neglected to note clients’ names on the 
majority of her checks and deposit slips.   
 
 
 
 
 
- 13 - 
 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“This Court has original and complete jurisdiction over attorney disciplinary 
proceedings.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Barton, 442 Md. 91, 119, 110 A.3d 668, 684 
(2015) (citations omitted).  “Bar counsel ha[s] the burden of proving [the] allegations in 
the disciplinary petition by clear and convincing evidence.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n 
v. Edib, 415 Md. 696, 706, 4 A.3d 957, 964 (2010).  See also Md. Rule 16-757(b) (“The 
[Commission] has the burden of proving the averments of the petition by clear and 
convincing evidence.”).   
We conduct an independent review of the record and accept the hearing judge’s 
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. See Barton, 442 Md. at 119, 110 A.3d at 
684 (citation omitted).  Deference is accorded to the hearing judge’s findings, who is in the 
best position, as the fact-finder, to assess the credibility of a witness. See Edib, 415 Md. at 
706-07, 4 A.3d at 964. See also Md. Rule 16-759(b)(2)(B) (“The Court [of Appeals] shall 
give due regard to the opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of 
witnesses.”).  “Findings of fact to which neither party takes exception may be treated by 
us as conclusively established.” Edib, 415 Md. at 707, 4 A.3d at 964.  See also Md. Rule 
16-759(b)(2)(A).   
 
 
 
 
- 14 - 
 
However, if exceptions are filed, “the Court of Appeals shall determine whether the 
findings of fact have been proven by the requisite standard of proof” outlined in Md. Rule 
16-757 (b).10  See Md. Rule 16-759(b)(2)(B).  We review de novo, the hearing judge’s 
conclusions of law. See Edib, 415 Md. at 707, 4 A.3d at 964. See also Md. Rule 16-
759(b)(1) (“The Court of Appeals shall review [de novo] the [hearing] judge’s conclusions 
of law.”). 
DISCUSSION 
A. 
Findings of Fact 
Bar Counsel does not except to any of the hearing judge’s findings of fact.  
However, Respondent excepts to the findings relative to her interactions with Commission 
Investigator, Mr. Karr.  Respondent contends that her exhibits evidenced a series of 
communications with Bar Counsel, reflecting that she asked whether Mr. Karr could 
provide questions in advance to ensure that the interview “was productive and went 
smoothly.”  Respondent asserts that she did not refuse to meet with Mr. Karr, although the 
hearing judge adopted the position that Bar Counsel and Mr. Karr decided that Respondent 
would provide a statement under oath, in lieu of her meeting with Mr. Karr. 
                                                          
 
10 Md. Rule 16-757(b) provides,  
 
(b) Burdens of Proof.  The [Commission] has the burden of proving the 
averments of the petition by clear and convincing evidence.  A respondent 
who asserts an affirmative defense or a matter of mitigation or attenuation 
has the burden of proving the defense or matter by a preponderance of the 
evidence. 
- 15 - 
 
We shall overrule Respondent’s exceptions.  Although the evidence does not reflect 
that Respondent refused to meet with Mr. Karr,11 it does demonstrate that she did request 
questions “ahead of time,” which prompted the alternate resolution agreed upon by Ms. 
Stanton and Mr. Karr.  In response to her request, Ms. Stanton advised, in part: 
You advised Commission Investigator, [Mr.] Karr that you would not sit for 
an interview unless you were provided with written questions in advance.  
The Maryland Rules do not require us to provide respondents with written 
questions prior to interviews.   
 
Pursuant to [Md.] Rule 16-732, we are requesting that you attend a Statement 
under oath for this matter. . . . 
 
Thus, the hearing judge’s findings that 1) Respondent “inquired whether Mr. Karr would 
provide her with written questions prior to being interviewed[;]” 2) Mr. Karr subsequently 
                                                          
 
11 In Mr. Karr’s second interim report, he noted: 
 
This writer asked [Respondent] what dates she would be available for an 
interview.  [Respondent] was hesitant to provide any dates for the interview. 
. . . 
 
[Respondent] stated that she wanted to cooperate with the investigation and 
be interviewed.  [Respondent] stated that she would be able to be interviewed 
on March 25, 2014[,] this writer immediately told [Respondent] that I would 
meet her at her office on that date . . . and [Respondent] reluctantly agreed.  
 
[Respondent] then attempted to back out of the interview stating that she had 
a trial the next week and doesn’t like to “do anything” a week prior to a trial.  
[Respondent] went onto state[] that she now preferred not to be interviewed 
that date since she would have this complaint “on her mind.” 
 
This writer again advised [Respondent] that it appears that she doesn’t want 
to be interviewed and was attempting to stall this investigation.  
[Respondent] stated that she did want to be interviewed and grudgingly 
agreed to the interview date. . . . 
 
 
- 16 - 
 
advised that this was not standard protocol; and 3) Mr. Karr and Ms. Stanton agreed that 
Respondent would provide a statement under oath in lieu of an interview, were consistent 
with the evidence.  
Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s findings regarding the extent of her 
communications with clients, as reflected in her March 17, 2014 correspondence to Bar 
Counsel.  She contends that those client communications began on November 26, 2013, 
and during that time, the averments were accurate, with the exception of Ms. Sewell-
Carpenter.  Although Respondent concedes that she neglected the Sewell matter, she 
nonetheless avers that she did not have a duty to Ms. Sewell-Carpenter because she “acted 
on her own” without Respondent’s knowledge when she filed motions pro se. 
We overrule Respondent’s exceptions.  As an initial matter, the fact that Ms. Sewell-
Carpenter filed motions pro se, is of no consequence to the hearing judge’s findings that 
she failed to advise Ms. Sewell-Carpenter about the January 2014 hearing—after receiving 
notification from the court.  Moreover, the December 5, 2013 e-mail to Bar Counsel, 
Respondent stated: 
I have already discussed the matter with most of my clients and am in the 
process of discussing it with the rest. . . .   
 
Although Respondent references the March 17 correspondence to Bar Counsel, it was 
Respondent’s December 5 e-mail that the hearing judge relied upon in determining that 
Respondent misrepresented the client communications regarding their cases.   Respondent 
neglected to correct any prior misrepresentations in the March 17 correspondence.  
- 17 - 
 
Additionally, Respondent conceded that she neglected the Sewell matter, although she 
remained counsel of record until she withdrew her representation in March 2014. 
Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s findings regarding initial conversations 
with Ms. Sewell-Carpenter, where the hearing judge stated, in part, “Ms. Sewell[-
Carpenter] advised Respondent of the judgment, but Respondent never informed Ms. 
Sewell[-Carpenter] that she had to file an appeal, or a motion to revise judgment, within 
thirty days of the judgment.”  Respondent contends that if Mr. Karr’s statements in his 
interim report are believed, his interview with Ms. Sewell-Carpenter in March of 2014 
reflects that Respondent was not hired until after her trial and entry of judgment on 
November 27, 2012, and that her $1,500 fee payment was not made until February 23, 
2013.  Respondent further contends that Mr. Karr’s report demonstrated Ms. Sewell-
Carpenter’s understanding that Respondent would not perform any work on her behalf until 
she remitted full payment. 
We shall overrule Respondent’s exceptions.  We acknowledge that Ms. Sewell-
Carpenter conceded that she did not consider Respondent her attorney until January or 
February of 2013.  However, Respondent’s contentions do not negate that once Respondent 
became aware of Ms. Sewell-Carpenter’s judgment, she failed to inform her of the urgency 
of the situation or the time-sensitive nature of an appeal in the matter.   
It is well settled that in forming an attorney-client relationship, a formal contract or 
retainer agreement is not necessary.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Shoup, 410 Md. 
462, 489, 979 A.2d 120, 136 (2009). (“[A]n explicit agreement or payment arrangement is 
not a prerequisite to the formation of an attorney-client relationship.”).  Thus, “the 
- 18 - 
 
determination of whether an attorney-client relationship exists can, and often must, be 
implied from facts and circumstances of a given case.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n of 
Maryland v. Shaw, 354 Md. 636, 650-51, 732 A.2d 876, 883 (1999).  See also Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Brooke, 374 Md. 155, 175, 821 A.2d 414, 425 (2003) 
(“The [attorney-client] relationship may arise by implication from a client’s reasonable 
expectation of legal representation and the attorney’s failure to dispel those expectations.”). 
Although payment was not remitted until February 23, based upon the initial 
communications12 between Respondent and Ms. Sewell-Carpenter, it was reasonable for 
the hearing judge to presume the existence of an attorney-client relationship, thereby 
triggering Respondent’s obligations to advise accordingly, under MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, and 1.4.  
Moreover, although the evidence reflects that Respondent advised Ms. Sewell-Carpenter 
that she would not work on her case until full payment was received, the evidence does not 
                                                          
 
12 Ms. Sewell-Carpenter testified as follows: 
 
[Ms. Stanton]: And when did you initially have your first conversation with 
[Respondent]? 
 
[Ms. Sewell-Carpenter]: It had to be the early part of—it had to be 
September—I mean, October or November. . . . 
 
[Ms. Stanton]: And when did you consider [Respondent] your attorney? 
 
[Ms. Sewell-Carpenter]: In February when I—we discussed everything, 
January/February. . . .  So I think it was the early part of February that we 
actually started talking and then mid-February, towards the end, is when we 
made arrangements to—I paid her and then we really started going on with 
the case after that.  But she told me prior to me paying her what she can and 
can’t—you know, what can happen.  So it wasn’t anything that was in black 
and white.  It was conversation-wise. . . . 
- 19 - 
 
demonstrate that Respondent “dispelled” any expectations of legal representation prior to 
that point.  
Respondent also excepts to the hearing judge’s finding that Ms. Sewell-Carpenter 
did not respond regarding the scope of her representation and fees, because the evidence 
reflects that Ms. Sewell-Carpenter stated in a reply e-mail, “[t]his will be fine.  I agree.”  
Although we sustain Respondent’s exception, Ms. Sewell-Carpenter’s reply to 
Respondent’s February 23 e-mail as expressed, supra, does not impact any of the charges 
asserted by Bar Counsel.  Respondent neglected the Sewell matter and violated several 
Rules of Professional Conduct and Maryland trust account rules.    
Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s findings regarding her responsibility for 
Ms. Sewell-Carpenter filing a pro se motion to vacate the November 27, 2012 judgment 
against her.  Respondent contends that “[t]here was no testimony” indicating that Ms. 
Sewell-Carpenter considered Respondent as her attorney at that time or that she had 
informed Respondent of the Motion to Vacate and reset of the hearing date.  Respondent 
also contends that she had already “wound down” her practice due to her surgery.  We shall 
overrule Respondent’s exceptions.  As noted supra, Respondent conceded, and we agree, 
that she neglected matters pertaining to the Sewell matter.  Without express termination, 
Respondent remained counsel of record until she withdrew her representation in March 
2014.    
Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s findings that she did not provide Ms. 
Sewell-Carpenter with copies of the motions filed on her behalf during the course of her 
representation.  She asserts that copies of the motions were attached to an e-mail she sent 
- 20 - 
 
on March 20, 2013, to the e-mail addresses Ms. Sewell-Carpenter verified during the 
hearing.   
We shall overrule Respondent’s exceptions and accept the hearing judge’s findings 
in light of his opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses.  See Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Siskind, 401 Md. 41, 54, 930 A.2d 328, 335 (2007) (noting that “we accept the 
hearing judge’s findings of fact as [prima facie] correct unless shown to be ‘clearly 
erroneous,’ and we give due regard to the hearing judge’s opportunity to assess the 
credibility of witnesses.”).  The hearing judge found credence in Ms. Sewell-Carpenter’s 
testimony that she did not receive copies of motions until July 2014, approximately four 
months after Respondent withdrew as counsel.  We conclude that this finding was not 
erroneous based upon the evidence presented.  
Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s findings regarding the negative balances 
in her trust account.  She contends that the balances were a result of maintenance fees 
assessed to the account, which were subsequently refunded.  Respondent also contends that 
the maintenance fees were assessed during a period when there was no activity because she 
was “winding down” her practice in preparation for surgery.  We shall overrule 
Respondent’s exceptions.  Although the negative balances were due to maintenance fees 
that were subsequently refunded, she failed to maintain the account in accordance with the 
trust account rules discussed, infra. 
Respondent excepts to the hearing judge’s findings regarding the $420 USCIS check 
made payable to “Cash.”  She contends that a copy of the check admitted into evidence 
indicates that the cash withdrawal was immediately payable as a bank check to USCIS, 
- 21 - 
 
with a confirmation receipt verifying same.  Nonetheless, we shall overrule her exceptions.  
As we discuss infra, Respondent’s practices contravened the trust account rules requiring 
proper record-keeping.  
B. 
Conclusions of Law 
In light of the foregoing findings of fact, the hearing judge concluded that 
Respondent engaged in professional misconduct in violation of the MLRPC 1.1 (Sewell, 
Trust, and CDA/Fleming Matters), 1.3 (Sewell Matter), 1.4 (Sewell and CDA/Fleming 
Matter, 1.15(a) (Trust and CDA/Fleming Matter), 1.16(d) (Sewell Matter), 8.1(a) (Sewell 
Matter) and (b) (CDA/Fleming Matter), 8.4(a), (c) (CDA/Fleming Matter), and (d), Md. 
Rules 16-606.1(a)(1)-(3) (Trust and CDA/Fleming Matter), 16-607, 16-609(b) and (c), and 
Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 10-306 (collectively, Trust Account matter).13  
Bar Counsel does not except to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law.  Although 
Respondent generally excepts to the hearing judge’s findings of fact, none of her 
exceptions specifically address the hearing judge’s conclusions of law.  For the reasons 
that follow, we shall uphold the conclusions of law. 
 
 
                                                          
 
13 The hearing judge concluded that Respondent violated MLRPC 1.1, 1.4, 1.15, 
8.4(a) and (d), and Md. Rule 16.606.1 in connection with her representation of Mr. Fleming 
and by defaulting on the conditions contained in the CDA, then failing to fulfill the 
conditions of the Amended CDA.  In Respondent’s Amended CDA, she conceded to 
violations of the foregoing Rules.  Accordingly, we uphold the conclusions of the hearing 
judge relative to the violations alleged in connection with the Fleming and CDA matters 
without extensive discussion.  
- 22 - 
 
MLRPC 1.1 (Competence)  
MLRPC 1.1 provides, “[a] lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.  
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”  MLRPC 1.1 requires that an 
attorney act with the “requisite preparation and thoroughness” when representing a client. 
See Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Maryland v. Mitchell, 445 Md. 241, 252, 126 A.3d 72, 
78 (2015).  An attorney also violates this Rule by failing to act or acting in an untimely 
manner, which results in harm to a client. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brown, 426 
Md. 298, 319, 44 A.3d 344, 357 (2012).  
Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that 
Respondent violated MLRPC 1.1 when she filed the Motion to Set Aside Ms. Sewell-
Carpenter’s November 27, 2012 judgment beyond the thirty-day deadline. Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Walker-Turner, 428 Md. 214, 228, 51 A.3d 553, 561-62 (2012) 
(stating that an attorney’s “failure to file a necessary appeal or revisory motion within the 
allowable time period may constitute incompetence in the practice of law.”).  See also 
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Costanzo, 432 Md. 233, 253, 68 A.3d 808, 819 (2013) 
(stating that “[a] failure to make the proper and required filings in a client matter 
demonstrates a lack of the appropriate preparation and thoroughness necessary to provide 
competent representation” in violation of MLRPC 1.1.).  
The evidence demonstrates that Respondent also violated MLRPC 1.1 by failing to 
sufficiently explain the likelihood of her success in filing the motion ninety-one days after 
the judgment was entered.  Respondent’s confusion regarding the deadline for filing post-
- 23 - 
 
judgment motions under the Maryland Rules and the lack of effort to clarify her 
misunderstandings is also violative of this Rule. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Zhang, 
440 Md. 128, 158, 100 A.3d 1112, 1129 (2014) (“Evidence of a failure to apply the 
requisite thoroughness and/or preparation in representing a client is sufficient alone to 
support a violation of [MLRPC] 1.1.”) (internal quotations omitted).  
An attorney’s failure to properly maintain his or her trust account demonstrates 
incompetence, in violation of MLRPC 1.1.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mungin, 
439 Md. 290, 305, 96 A.3d 122, 130 (2014).  Additionally, “[s]ound record-keeping is an 
essential part of competent representation.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. London, 427 
Md. 328, 353, 47 A.3d 986, 1001 (2012).  Thus, competent representation requires, inter 
alia, that an attorney maintain detailed, accurate, and accessible records. Id.   
Clear and convincing evidence also supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that 
Respondent violated MLRPC 1.1 by: 1) failing to maintain proper client records throughout 
the entirety of her CDA and Amended CDA; 2) failing to comply with the basic 
requirements of appropriate trust account management in her accounting practices; 3) 
failing to pay attention to her trust account, which resulted in repeated negative balances 
from October 31, 2013 through March 31, 2014; and 4) admitting ignorance of the trust 
account rules.   
Respondent’s actions involving tracking her time, disbursing funds, and 
maintaining client ledgers also demonstrated a lack of competence in appropriate billing 
practices and handling of client funds.  Moreover, as the hearing judge concluded, 
Respondent’s non-compliant record-keeping and accounting practices demonstrated a lack 
- 24 - 
 
of competence in “this vital area of law practice management[,]” which violated MLRPC 
1.1. 
MLRPC 1.3 (Diligence) 
 
MLRPC 1.3 provides, “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client.”  Inexcusable delay in withdrawing as counsel 
constitutes a violation of this Rule. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Steinberg, 395 Md. 
337, 363, 910 A.2d 429, 444 (2006).  
 
Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that 
Respondent’s failure to withdraw as counsel in the Sewell matter until March 11, 2014, 
when the case concluded in June 2013, violated Rule 1.3.  See id. (holding that attorney’s 
“inexcusable six-month delay in withdrawing formally from the court case, after his 
representation was terminated, demonstrates a lack of requisite diligence and 
promptness.”).  Accordingly, Respondent also violated Rule 1.3 for failing to timely deliver 
Ms. Sewell-Carpenter’s file upon her request beyond the conclusion of the case. See 
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Awuah, 374 Md. 505, 522, 823 A.2d 651, 661(2003) 
(holding that the attorney violated MLRPC 1.3 by failing to deliver his client’s file after 
termination of the representation, despite the client’s repeated requests).  
 
 
 
 
 
- 25 - 
 
MLRPC Rule 1.4 (Communication) 
MLRPC 1.4 provides: 
 
(a) A lawyer shall: 
 
(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance 
with respect to which the client’s informed consent, as defined 
in Rule 1.0(f), is required by these Rules; 
 
(2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the 
matter; 
 
(3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; 
and 
 
(4) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the 
lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows that the client 
expects assistance not permitted by the Maryland Lawyers’ 
Rules of Professional Conduct or other law. 
 
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary 
to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the 
representation. 
 
“[MLRPC] 1.4 requires a lawyer to comply promptly with reasonable requests from 
the client for information, to explain on-going matters to the extent reasonably necessary 
to allow a client to make informed decisions, and to keep the client informed about the 
status of pending matters.” Steinberg, 395 Md. at 363, 910 A.2d at 444. 
Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that 
Respondent violated MLRPC 1.4 by failing to advise Ms. Sewell-Carpenter of the statutory 
time to appeal a judgment and file a motion to revise same, then failing to advise regarding 
their impact on her case.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brown, 426 Md. 298, 321-
22, 44 A.3d 344, 358-59 (2012) (holding that the attorney’s failure to adequately 
- 26 - 
 
communicate matters relevant to her client’s case, advise client about notice of 
contemplated dismissal issued in his claim, or of the discovery sanctions and motion for 
default judgment against him, violated MLRPC 1.4).  Ms. Sewell-Carpenter’s ability to 
appeal the judgment entered against her was significantly diminished due to Respondent’s 
handling of her post-judgment appeal. See Steinberg, 395 Md. at 363, 910 A.2d at 444 
(noting that client “suffered significant set-backs in her efforts to overturn the sanctions 
imposed due to the omissions of [the attorney].”). 
Clear and convincing evidence also demonstrates that Respondent violated MLRPC 
1.4 when she failed to return Ms. Sewell-Carpenter’s file until several months after her 
request.  See Steinberg, 395 Md. at 363, 910 A.2d at 444 (holding that the attorney violated 
MLRPC 1.4 by failing to return her client’s file until “much later” after representation was 
terminated, despite client’s repeated requests). 
MLRPC Rule 1.15(a) and (d) (Safekeeping Property) 
 
 
MLPRC 1.15(a) provides: 
 
A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer’s 
possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer’s 
own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained pursuant 
to Title 16, Chapter 600 of the Maryland Rules, and records shall be created 
and maintained in accordance with the Rules in that Chapter. Other property 
shall be identified specifically as such and appropriately safeguarded, and 
records of its receipt and distribution shall be created and maintained.  
Complete records of the account funds and of other property shall be kept by 
the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of at least five years after the 
date the record was created. 
 
“MLRPC 1.15(a) requires an attorney to maintain client funds in a trust account, 
separate from the attorney’s personal and operating funds.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n 
- 27 - 
 
v. Moeller, 427 Md. 66, 73, 46 A.3d 407, 411 (2012).  Thus, an attorney’s failure to 
maintain a trust account separately from his or her personal funds is violative of this Rule. 
See id.  
 
Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that 
Respondent violated Rule 1.15(a) by: 1) failing to hold property of clients and third persons 
in trust separate from her own property; 2) failing to remove her earned fees to a separate 
operating account before making cash disbursements to herself; 3) failing to create and 
maintain a record of account funds in accordance with the Maryland Rules under Title 16, 
Chapter 600;14 and 4) failing to create and maintain records that accurately reflected her 
receipt and distribution of client funds, or distribution of earned fees. See Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Gage-Cohen, 440 Md. 191, 202, 101 A.3d 1043, 1049 (2014) 
(holding that the attorney’s failure to maintain trust account records and mismanagement 
of client funds violated MLRPC 1.15(a) and (c), among other trust account management 
rules);  Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Obi, 393 Md. 643, 660, 904 A.2d 422, 432 (2006) 
(“[A]n attorney may not avoid responsibility for misuse of his or her trust account, even if 
such misuse was inadvertent.”).   
 
                                                          
 
14 Title 16, Chapter 600 is a counterpart rule to MLRPC 1.15 and Md. Code § 10-
301 et seq., and outlines the rules applicable to attorney trust accounts. See Md. Rule 16-
600 et seq.  
 
- 28 - 
 
Although Bar Counsel alleged that Respondent also violated MLRPC 1.15(d),15 the 
hearing judge did not address it.  Nonetheless, Respondent’s failure to properly maintain 
client trust account funds and records similarly violates MLRPC 1.15(d). Additionally, 
given Respondent’s violation of MLRPC 1.15(a) and (d), and her concession to a violation 
of Md. Rule 16.606.1(a)(1)-(3)16 (Attorney Trust Account Identification Records, Deposits 
                                                          
 
15 Subsection (d) provides: 
Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has 
an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person.  Except 
as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the 
client, a lawyer shall deliver promptly to the client or third person any funds 
or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon 
request by the client or third person, shall render promptly a full accounting 
regarding such property. 
 
16 Md. Rule 16.606.1 provides, in pertinent part: 
 
(a) Creation of Records.  The following records shall be created and 
maintained for the receipt and disbursement of funds of clients or of third 
persons: 
 
(1) Attorney Trust Account Identification.  An identification of all 
attorney trust accounts maintained, including the name of the financial 
institution, account number, account name, date the account was 
opened, date the account was closed, and an agreement with the 
financial institution establishing each account and its interest-bearing 
nature. . . . 
 
(2) Deposits and Disbursements.  A record for each account that 
chronologically shows all deposits and disbursements[.] . . . 
 
(3) Client Matter Records.  A record for each client matter in which 
the attorney receives funds in trust[.] . . . 
 
Md. Rule 16-606.1(a)(1)-(3).  
 
- 29 - 
 
and Disbursement Records, and Client Matter Records) in her Amended CDA, clear and 
convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that Respondent also violated 
Md. Rules 16-60717 (Commingling of Funds) and 16-609(b) and (c)18 (Prohibitions Against 
Cash Disbursements and Negative Balances in Attorney Trust Accounts), and Bus. Occ. & 
Prof. § 10-30619 (Trust Money Restrictions).  
Specifically, clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that Respondent: 1) 
conceded to mishandling client matter records and failing to create and maintain required 
trust account records, in violation of Md. Rule 16-606.1(a)(1)-(3); 2) admitted to 
commingling personal funds with client funds by incorrectly depositing earned attorney’s 
fees into her trust account for two cash transactions, in violation of Md. Rule 16-607; 3) 
                                                          
 
17 Md. Rule 16-607 provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) General Prohibition.  An attorney or law firm may deposit in an attorney 
trust account only those funds required to be deposited in that account by 
Rule 16-604 or permitted to be so deposited by section b. [not applicable] of 
this Rule. 
 
18 Md. Rule 16-609 provides, in pertinent part: 
(b) No Cash Disbursements.  An instrument drawn on an attorney trust 
account may not be drawn payable to cash or to bearer, and no cash 
withdrawal may be made from an automated teller machine or by any other 
method.  All disbursements from an attorney trust account shall be made by 
check or electronic transfer. 
(c) Negative Balance Prohibited.  No funds from an attorney trust account 
shall be disbursed if the disbursement would create a negative balance with 
regard to an individual client matter or all client matters in the aggregate. 
 
Md. Rule 16-609(b) and (c).  
 
19 Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 10-306 provides, “[a] lawyer may not use trust money for any 
purpose other than the purpose for which the trust money is entrusted to the lawyer.” 
- 30 - 
 
maintained client ledgers, which indicated that she made cash disbursements to herself for 
earned fees on three separate occasions in 2013; 4) maintained negative trust account 
balances from October 2013 to March 2014, in violation of Md. Rule 16-609(b) and (c); 
and 5) failed to maintain two unknown clients funds in trust, in May 2013 and August 
2013. See Gage-Cohen, 440 Md. at 200-02, 101 A.3d at 1048-49 (acknowledging that the 
attorney’s violation of MLRPC 1.15(a) was also violative of the attorney trust account rules 
outlined in Md. Rule 16-600 et seq. and Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 10-306). See also id. at 201, 
101 A.3d at 1048 (“Consistent with MLRPC 1.15, this [R]ule requires attorneys to keep all 
client funds in a trust account until earned as fees or otherwise distributed in accordance 
with the representation agreement.”).  
MLRPC Rule 1.16(d) (Declining or Terminating Representation) 
 
 
MLRPC 1.16(d) provides: 
 Upon termination of representation, a lawyer shall take steps to the extent 
reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving 
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other 
counsel, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and 
refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned 
or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers relating to the client to the extent 
permitted by other law. 
 
In the absence of a proper charging lien, “[w]hen a client requests his or her file from an 
attorney at the end of the representation, MLRPC 1.16(d) requires the attorney to surrender 
the portions of the file (or a copy) to which the client is entitled. . . .” Brown, 426 Md. 298, 
322, 44 A.3d 344, 359 (2012).   
Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that 
Respondent violated MLRPC 1.16(d) when Ms. Sewell-Carpenter attempted to retrieve a 
- 31 - 
 
copy of her file from Respondent on several occasions after the case or representation was 
terminated, to no avail.  See id. (holding that the attorney’s failure to comply with clients 
request for files after termination of representation violated MLRPC 1.16(d)).  
MLRPC 8.1(a) (Knowingly Making a False Statement of Material Fact) and (b) 
(Failure to Cooperate with Bar Counsel Requests for Information) 
 
MLRPC 8.1 provides: 
 
An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or a lawyer in 
connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a 
disciplinary matter, shall not: 
 
(a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or 
 
(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a 
misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the 
matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for 
information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, 
except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information 
otherwise protected by Rule 1.6. 
 
Under Rule 8.1(a), an attorney shall not knowingly make a false statement of 
material fact in connection with, inter alia, a disciplinary matter.  See MLRPC 8.1(a).  “A 
violation of MLRPC 8.1(a) will result whenever an attorney makes intentional 
misrepresentations to Bar Counsel.” Mitchell, 445 Md. at 259, 126 A.3d at 82. See also 
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Wills, 441 Md. 45, 56, 105 A.3d 479, 486 (2014) (noting 
that MLRPC 8.1(a) is violated “when an attorney intentionally misleads Bar Counsel about 
the attorney’s knowledge and ability to provide information to assist in the investigation.”).   
Similarly, MLPRC 8.1(b) is violated when an attorney fails to respond to Bar 
Counsel’s lawful requests for information. Id. “MLRPC 8.1(b) compels attorneys to 
- 32 - 
 
demonstrate candor and cooperation with the admission and disciplinary authorities of the 
Bar.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hamilton, 444 Md. 163, 191, 118 A.3d 958, 974 
(2015).   
Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusions that 
Respondent violated MLRPC 8.1(a) when she represented to Bar Counsel that she was 
communicating with, and protecting her clients’ interests during the months of December 
2013 and January 2014, yet she failed to provide Ms. Sewell-Carpenter with the court’s 
notice of her January 2014 hearing.  Although the notice was delivered to Respondent’s 
office, she did not check her mail or implement forwarding procedures to ensure receipt 
during her recuperation period.    
Accordingly, Respondent’s misrepresentation of the handling of her clients’ cases 
to Bar Counsel was violative of MLRPC 8.1(a). See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
Kapoor, 391 Md. 505, 523, 530-31, 894 A.2d 502, 513, 517 (2006) (holding that the 
attorney violated MLRPC 8.1(a) when he made a knowing and false statement of material 
fact to Bar Counsel during disciplinary investigation regarding his client’s payment for 
legal services).   
Clear and convincing evidence also supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that 
Respondent violated MLRPC 8.1(b) when she failed to provide Ms. Deady with documents 
related to her CDA violation.  The evidence demonstrates that Respondent failed to provide 
Ms. Deady with the documents requested and displayed evasive behavior throughout Bar 
Counsel’s investigation in violation of Rule 8.1(b). See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
Fraidin, 438 Md. 172, 200, 91 A.3d 1078, 1094-95 (2014) (holding that the attorney 
- 33 - 
 
violated MLRPC 8.1(b), “‘by failing to timely provide information and documentation 
requested by Bar Counsel’ regarding [her] bank accounts[.]”).  See also Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Butler, 441 Md. 352, 359, 107 A.3d 1220, 1224-25 (2015) (holding that the 
attorney violated MLRPC 8.1(b) by repeatedly and untimely failing to respond to Bar 
Counsel’s requests during disciplinary investigation). 
MLRPC 8.4(c) (Dishonesty, Fraud, Deceit or Misrepresentation) 
MLPRC 8.4(c) provides, “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage 
in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation[.]”  “Dishonest acts, in 
and of themselves are violative of [MLRPC] 8.4(c).” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
Barnett, 440 Md. 254, 266, 102 A.3d 310, 318 (2014) (citation omitted). 
Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that 
Respondent violated MLRPC 8.4(c) by misrepresenting to Bar Counsel on December 5, 
2013 and March 17, 2014 that she protected her clients’ interests during her illness.  See 
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brown, 415 Md. 269, 278-79, 999 A.2d 1040, 1046 (2010) 
(holding that attorney’s false statements to Bar Counsel violated MLRPC 8.4(c)). See also 
Wills, 441 Md. at 57, 105 A.3d at 487 (holding that the attorney’s misrepresentation to Bar 
Counsel, inter alia, was “laden with deceit and dishonesty,” in violation of MLRPC of 
8.4(c)).  Moreover, “misappropriation of client funds is ‘dishonest conduct’ that also is 
‘prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of [MLRPC] 8.4(c). . . .’” Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Kum, 440 Md. 372, 385, 102 A.3d 777, 784 (2014). 
 
 
- 34 - 
 
MLRPC Rule 8.4(d) (Conduct that is Prejudicial to the Administration of 
Justice) 
 
MLRPC 8.4(d) provides, “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage 
in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]”  A lawyer violates this Rule 
“where the [attorney’s] conduct would negatively impact the perception of the legal 
profession of a reasonable member of the public.” See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
Haley, 443 Md. 657, 674-75, 118 A.3d 816, 826 (2015).   
The misappropriation of client funds constitutes dishonest conduct that is prejudicial 
to the administration of justice.  See Kum, supra.  See also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. 
Carithers, 421 Md. 28, 56-57, 25 A.3d 181, 197-98 (2011) (holding that the attorney’s 
misappropriation of funds and failure to maintain a client trust account was conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice). See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Davy, 435 
Md. 674, 707, 80 A.3d 322, 341 (2013) (noting that “the commingling of personal and 
client funds, including the failure to maintain a separate [client] trust account, is prejudicial 
to the administration of justice.”).   
Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that 
Respondent’s negligent trust account management and admitted errors was conduct 
prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of MLRPC 8.4(d).  See Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Moeller, 427 Md. 66, 74, 46 A.3d 407, 411-12 (2012) (holding that 
a violation of MLRPC Rule 1.15(a) was prejudicial to the administration of justice and 
thus, violative of MLRPC Rule 8.4(d)).  
Clear and convincing evidence also supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that  
- 35 - 
 
Respondent violated MLRPC 8.4(d) by failing to protect Ms. Sewell-Carpenter’s interests 
when she neglected to check her mail or implement forwarding procedures during her 
surgical recuperation.  As a result, Ms. Sewell-Carpenter was denied the opportunity to 
continue her case.  “Not every unnecessary delay or failure to carry out duties expeditiously 
violates [Rule 8.4(d)].” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Smith, 442 Md. 14, 31, 109 A.3d 
1184, 1194 (2015).  However, “[a]n attorney [violates] MLRPC 8.4(d) when the attorney’s 
conduct ‘reflects negatively on the legal profession and sets a bad example for the public 
at large.’” Id. (citation omitted).  Respondent’s failure to implement proper safeguards 
during her illness to protect Ms. Sewell-Carpenter’s interests reflects negatively on the 
legal profession, in further violation of this Rule.   
MLRPC 8.4(a) (Violating the MLRPC)  
 
MLRPC 8.4(a) provides, “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . violate 
or attempt to violate the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly 
assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another[.]”  An attorney 
violates MLRPC 8.4(a) by violating any of the accompanying rules of professional 
conduct.  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gerace, 433 Md. 632, 645, 72 A.3d 567, 574 
(2013) (“Rule 8.4(a) is violated when other Rules of Professional Conduct are breached.”).   
Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that by 
violating MLRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.15(a), 1.16(d), 8.1(a) and (b), and 8.4(c), and (d), 
Respondent also violated MLRPC 8.4(a).  See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Adams, 441 
Md. 590, 611, 109 A.3d 114, 126 (2015) (“The violation of any other rule of professional 
misconduct is thereby a violation of MLRPC 8.4(a).”) (citation omitted).    
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Sanction 
It is well settled that the purpose of attorney discipline is not to punish the erring 
attorney, but rather, to protect the public. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mixter, 441 Md. 
416, 527, 109 A.3d 1, 68 (2015).  Attorney discipline is also intended to deter other lawyers 
from violating the MLRPC and maintain the integrity of the legal profession. See Adams, 
441 Md. at 611-12, 109 A.3d at 126.  Thus, “[w]e evaluate an attorney grievance matter on 
its own merits and impose sanctions ‘that are commensurate with the nature and gravity of 
the violations and the intent with which they were committed.’” Mixter, 441 Md. at 527, 
109 A.3d at 68.  We also “consider the nature of the ethical duties violated in light of any 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.” Id.    
Respondent did not recommend a sanction.  However, Bar Counsel recommended 
that Respondent be indefinitely suspended, with the right to apply for readmission after six 
months.  Bar Counsel submits that the “core violations” supporting indefinite suspension 
are “the nature and severity, as well as the type of charges involved, in violation of 
[MLPRC] 1.1, 1.15(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d)[]” and Respondent’s “failure to create and 
maintain accurate records of client trust money, in violation of [MLPRC] 1.15(a).”   
Bar Counsel directs this Court’s attention to our opinion in Attorney Grievance 
Comm’n v. Mba-Jonas, 397 Md. 690, 919 A.2d 669 (2007) (“Mba-Jonas I”) and Attorney 
Grievance Comm’n v. Mba-Jonas, 402 Md. 334, 936 A.2d 839 (2007) (“Mba-Jonas II”) in 
particular, for the proposition that indefinite suspension is the appropriate sanction for 
numerous trust account violations and misrepresentations to Bar Counsel during a 
disciplinary investigation.  
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In Mba-Jonas I, the attorney entered into a CDA with Bar Counsel to remediate his 
failure to maintain records of fee disbursements from his escrow account. See id. 397 Md. 
at 695, 919 A.2d 672.  While under the CDA, the attorney’s law practice monitor reported 
to Bar Counsel several instances of irregularities and improper fee disbursements in the 
attorney’s escrow account. Id. at 695-97, 919 A.2d at 672-73.  Specifically, the attorney’s 
account was overdrawn on three occasions, which resulted in overdraft fees, the attorney 
improperly notated settlement checks, and he used settlement checks for unintended 
purposes. Id. at 696, 919 A.2d at 673. 
The monitor also reported that the attorney maintained inaccurate settlement sheets 
with minimal accounting records, failed to maintain a ledger, and routinely “post dated 
check[s] to accommodate clients.” Id. at 697, 919 A.2d 673.  The attorney also conceded 
that he failed to reconcile his account on a monthly basis and left Personal Insurance 
Protection funds in the account to cover fees. Id.  As a result of the attorney’s misconduct 
and non-compliance, the CDA was subsequently revoked. Id. at 695, 919 A.2d 672.  
This Court upheld the conclusions of the hearing judge relative to violations of 
MLRPC 1.15, 8.4(a), and Md. Rules 16-604 and 16-607.  However, we further concluded 
that the attorney also violated Md. Rule 16-609 and Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 10-306, given that 
both rules related to the attorney’s misuse of his escrow account, see id. at 700, 919 A.2d 
at 675, as well as MLRCP 8.4(d), because his conduct was “prejudicial to the 
administration of justice.” Id. at 701, 919 A.2d at 676.  
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In ordering indefinite suspension with the right to apply for readmission after 
ninety-days, this Court determined that the attorney’s prior opportunity to remediate his 
conduct under the CDA was particularly relevant.  We reasoned: 
[Mba-Jonas] was afforded the opportunity of a conditional diversion 
agreement.  That agreement was terminated when the monitor charged with 
checking and keeping an eye on [his] escrow account, signaled a problem 
and it was learned that [he] had not changed his accounting practices. . . .  
Moreover, we are satisfied that [an indefinite suspension] should require 
[Mba-Jonas] to demonstrate lessons learned and, critically, that the 
sloppiness[20] which has characterized his handling of his escrow account will 
no longer obtain. 
 
Id. at 690, 703-04, 919 A.2d at 677. 
 
We subsequently readdressed the attorney’s misconduct in Mba-Jonas II, 402 Md. 
334, 936 A.2d 839 (2007).  In that matter, the attorney continued to mismanage his escrow 
account by incurring negative balances and overdrafts, withdrawing more funds from the 
account than what was received into same, and used funds directed for one client matter in 
other matters on four occasions. Id. at 339-40, 936 A.2d at 841-42.  As a result, we upheld 
the hearing judge’s conclusions that the attorney violated MLRCP 1.15, 8.4(a) and (d), and 
Md. Rules 16-607, 16-609, and Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 10-306.  Id. at 340-46, 936 A.2d at 
842-46.  
We also acknowledged the hearing judge’s conclusion that the attorney violated 
MLRPC 8.1 by failing to respond to Bar Counsel’s request for an explanation regarding 
the overdrafts in his escrow account on three occasions, then subsequently responded to 
                                                          
 
20 The hearing judge determined that the attorney’s mismanagement was not a 
product of intentional deceit or dishonesty, but of “sloppiness.” See Mba-Jonas, 397 Md. 
at 697, 919 A.2d at 674.  
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Bar Counsel with a letter that was “totally non-responsive.”  Id. at 339, 936 A.2d at 842.  
Given the overlap in the time between the two disciplinary matters and the substantially 
similar violations involved, we considered the attorney’s present conduct, including his 
prior violations in Mba-Jonas I, as a whole. Id. at 346, 936 A.2d at 846.   
In determining the attorney’s sanction, we emphasized the absence of intentional 
deceit or dishonesty in the attorney’s misconduct.  Thus, recounting the hearing judge’s 
findings in both Mba-Jonas I and Mba-Jonas II, we stated: 
Neither of the actions against Mba–Jonas involves an intent to defraud, 
deceive, or steal from his clients.  [The hearing judge] found in the previous 
case that ‘[c]learly, he had no intent to defraud or steal from his clients.  In 
fact, many of his problems resulted from his desire to accommodate his 
clients and to keep them satisfied with his representation.’  Likewise, in the 
present matter, [the hearing judge] found that the ‘[c]ourt does not believe—
nor has it been suggested—that the state of [Mba–Jonas’s] escrow account is 
the result of dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.’ 
 
Id. at 346-47, 936 A.2d at 846 (internal citation omitted).  As a result, we ordered a 
continuation of his indefinite suspension with the right to apply for readmission after six 
months. Id. at 349, 936 A.2d at 847. 
Bar Counsel submits that “Respondent’s case is more significant than Mba-Jonas I 
in that, she received two CDAs and had numerous trust account violations.”  In comparison 
to Mba-Jonas II, Bar Counsel posits that based upon Respondent’s “numerous Rule 
violations and conduct surrounding Ms. Sewell-Carpenter’s case” she should receive a 
sanction similar to the attorney in Mba-Jonas II.  
We agree.  Although Respondent’s misconduct and resulting Rule violations bear 
resemblance to that of the attorney in Mba-Jonas I, the instant matter is distinguishable 
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because Respondent had the benefit of two CDAs to remediate the exact misconduct that 
precipitated the charges against her.  Additionally, the evidence demonstrated that 
Respondent repeatedly failed to respond to Ms. Deady’s and Bar Counsel’s requests for 
information during this time.  Although this is unlike the circumstances in Mba-Jonas I, 
where we ordered indefinite suspension with the right to apply for readmission after ninety-
days, it is akin to the attorney’s failure to adequately respond to Bar Counsel’s requests in 
Mba-Jonas II, where, in addition to several trust account violations, we determined that an 
indefinite suspension with the right to apply for readmission after six months was 
warranted.   
We also acknowledge that the circumstances in the instant matter are similar to 
Mba-Jonas I and Mba-Jonas II, where the hearing judge concluded that the attorney’s 
misconduct was not due to intentional dishonesty or deceit, but “sloppiness.”  Here, the 
hearing judge did not find that Respondent’s misconduct was a product of intentional 
dishonesty or deceit, but instead, was due to ignorance of trust account rules, poor law 
office management, and her illness.  
Nonetheless, in determining the appropriate sanction for Respondent’s misconduct, 
we must also consider the aggravating and mitigating factors.  Pursuant to Standard 9.22 
of the American Bar Association Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, this Court has 
recognized the following aggravating factors in attorney disciplinary cases: 
(a) prior disciplinary offenses; (b) dishonest or selfish motive; (c) a pattern 
of misconduct; (d) multiple offenses; (e) bad faith obstruction of the 
disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or 
orders of the disciplinary agency; (f) submission of false evidence, false 
statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary process; (g) 
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refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct; (h) vulnerability of 
victim; (i) substantial experience in the practice of law; (j) indifference to 
making restitution. 
 
See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bleecker, 414 Md. 147, 176-77, 994 A.2d 928, 945-46 
(2010).  This Court also recognizes the following mitigating factors: 
[A]bsence of a prior disciplinary record; absence of a dishonest or selfish 
motive; personal or emotional problems; timely good faith efforts to make 
restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct; full and free disclosure 
to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; 
inexperience in the practice of law; character or reputation; physical or 
mental disability or impairment; delay in disciplinary proceedings; interim 
rehabilitation; imposition of other penalties or sanctions; remorse; and 
finally, remoteness of prior offenses. 
 
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Coppola, 419 Md. 370, 407, 19 A.3d 431, 453 (2011). 
The hearing judge acknowledged that despite Respondent’s illness during the period 
of 2014—when she conceded to having no safeguards in place to check mail or her attorney 
trust account during recuperation from surgery—she still had a professional obligation to 
protect her clients.  The hearing judge also concluded that Respondent’s illness does not 
explain her “uncooperative behavior” towards Mr. Karr, Ms. Deady, and Bar Counsel.  The 
hearing judge expressed concern regarding Respondent’s testimony on July 14, 2015, 
stating: 
[Respondent] represented that the reason she felt a sense of urgency in 
February of 2013 for Ms. Sewell[-Carpenter] to file a post-judgment motion 
was that she believed she had to file the motion within ninety days.  However, 
in her letter dated August 10, 2015, Respondent stated that she only testified 
to that because she heard a ‘more experienced’ attorney tell her that, and she 
thought she would throw it ‘in the pot’ in her disciplinary case before this 
[c]ourt.  It is therefore not clear to this [c]ourt of the extent to which 
Respondent was being completely forthright in her testimony on July 14, 
2015. 
 
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Nonetheless, the hearing judge acknowledged Respondent’s surgery and period of 
recuperation in early 2014 as a mitigating factor, despite the fact that Respondent submitted 
limited documentation21 evidencing her medical conditions for the time period apart from 
her testimony concerning her health condition.22  
A CDA generally serves as a remedial tool to assist attorneys’ compliance with the 
Maryland Rules and Rules of Professional Conduct.  Thus, we share in Bar Counsel’s 
concern that Respondent’s failure to adhere to the terms under the CDA and Amended 
CDA, while continuing to engage in conduct which precipitated her CDA, demonstrates a 
lack of appreciation of the problem. 
While we accept the mitigating factor of Respondent’s illness during the relevant 
period, it does not excuse her admitted ignorance of trust account rules; her failure to 
remediate her misconduct or adhere to the protocols under consecutive CDAs; her lack of 
cooperation with Ms. Deady and Bar Counsel while under investigation; or her failure to 
                                                          
 
21 On November 26, 2013, Respondent sent an e-mail to Bar Counsel stating that 
she had major surgery scheduled for late December 2013.  On December 26, 2013, 
Respondent sent Bar Counsel a one-page note, via fax from Mercy Medical Center 
indicating that she was scheduled to have surgery on January 6, 2014.  
 
22 In her exceptions, Respondent contends that while it is understood that she did 
not meet with Ms. Deady except for one time, there is a significant mitigating circumstance 
that established that her conduct was not willful.  Specifically, that there were several 
instances in which she and Ms. Deady requested extension of time to prepared reports that 
were denied by Bar Counsel.  We conclude that this contention does not mitigate her 
misconduct and overrule her exception.  The evidence demonstrates that Respondent’s 
Amended CDA was revoked for non-compliance, which included, in substantial part, her 
failure to meet with Ms. Deady, or otherwise adhere to the protocols as agreed under the 
CDA.    
 
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implement safeguards during an illness or otherwise protect her clients’ interests in 
conformance with the foregoing Rules.  Although, during oral argument, Respondent 
admitted to experiencing difficulties as her mother’s caretaker until her death, which may 
have also impacted her practice, we could not ascertain whether this was shared with Bar 
Counsel or the hearing judge.  Accordingly, we order Respondent indefinitely suspended 
with the right to apply for readmission after six months.  
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT 
SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED 
BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, 
INCLUDING 
COSTS 
OF 
ALL 
TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MD. 
RULE 16-761(b), FOR WHICH SUM 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR 
OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE 
COMMISSION AGAINST ERICA S. 
WHITE.