Case Title: State v. Deanda

Citation: 2013-Ohio-1722

Docket Number: 2012-0471

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2013-05-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 
State v. Deanda, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-1722.] 
 
 
 
NOTICE 
This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in 
an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports.  Readers are requested 
to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 
65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or 
other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be 
made before the opinion is published. 
 
SLIP OPINION NO. 2013-OHIO-1722 
THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. DEANDA, APPELLEE. 
[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets,  
it may be cited as State v. Deanda, Slip Opinion No. 2013-Ohio-1722.] 
Criminal law—Lesser included offenses—Attempts as charged offense—
Attempted murder and felonious assault by causing serious physical harm. 
(No. 2012-0471—Submitted January 22, 2013—Decided May 1, 2013.) 
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Seneca County, 
No. 13-10-23, 2012-Ohio-408. 
__________________ 
O’NEILL, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we are called upon to determine whether felonious 
assault through causing serious physical harm is a lesser included offense of 
attempted murder.  Based on our interpretation of the applicable statutes and 
extension of our holdings in State v. Smith, 117 Ohio St.3d 447, 2008-Ohio-1260, 
884 N.E.2d 595, and State v. Evans, 122 Ohio St.3d 381, 2009-Ohio-2974, 911 
N.E.2d 889, we hold that it is. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
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Factual and Procedural Background 
{¶ 2} On September 23, 2009, the Seneca County Grand Jury returned an 
indictment charging David L. Deanda with one count of attempted murder, in 
violation of R.C. 2923.02 and 2903.02(A).  Deanda entered pleas of not guilty and 
not guilty by reason of insanity.  Evidence was presented at trial that Deanda 
confronted David Swartz outside Deanda’s residence and that an altercation 
erupted between the two.  Deanda attacked Swartz with a stick until Swartz 
wrested the stick from Deanda and began to hit him with it.  Deanda grabbed a 
nearby knife and began to stab Swartz.  Deanda repeatedly stated, “I’m gonna kill 
you,” during and after the altercation.  Swartz sustained seven stab wounds to his 
back, neck, and face, though none of the wounds was deep enough to be life-
threatening. 
{¶ 3} At the end of his jury trial for attempted murder, Deanda requested 
an instruction on the lesser included offenses of assault and aggravated assault but 
opposed the state’s request for an instruction on felonious assault.  After 
consulting Ohio Jury Instructions, the trial court concluded that it would provide 
instructions on all lesser included offenses requested by both parties.  The jury 
returned verdicts of not guilty on the charge of attempted murder but guilty on the 
charge of felonious assault. 
{¶ 4} On Deanda’s appeal, the Third District Court of Appeals reversed 
his conviction, holding that felonious assault is not a lesser included offense of 
attempted murder, pursuant to State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 759 N.E.2d 1240 
(2002), and State v. Deem, 40 Ohio St.3d 205, 533 N.E.2d 294 (1988).  The state 
appealed the Third District’s determination to this court, and we granted 
discretionary review.  132 Ohio St.3d 1409, 2012-Ohio-2454, 968 N.E.2d 491. 
Analysis 
{¶ 5} Although the concept of lesser included offenses is easily 
understood in theory, it can be downright baffling in practice.  See Bandy v. State, 
January Term, 2013 
3 
 
102 Ohio St. 384, 386, 131 N.E. 499 (1921).  The origin of the lesser-included-
offense doctrine rests in the common law.  Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 633, 
100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980).  The rule was intended to protect the state 
from a complete acquittal when the evidence was inadequate to support a 
conviction on the offense charged but supported a conviction on some lesser, 
uncharged offense.  Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 208, 93 S.Ct. 1993, 36 
L.Ed.2d 844 (1973).  Inherent in the lesser-offense doctrine is the defendant’s 
constitutional right to receive notice before trial of all charges against him.  Ex 
parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 7 S.Ct. 781, 30 L.Ed. 849 (1887).  “It is ancient doctrine 
of both the common law and of our Constitution that a defendant cannot be held 
to answer a charge not contained in the indictment brought against him.”  
Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 717, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 
(1989).  The lesser-included-offense doctrine is codified in Ohio law in R.C. 
2945.74 and Crim.R. 31(C), which are substantially similar.  R.C. 2945.74 
provides: 
 
 
The jury may find the defendant not guilty of the offense 
charged, but guilty of an attempt to commit it if such attempt is an 
offense at law. When the indictment or information charges an 
offense, including different degrees, or if other offenses are 
included within the offense charged, the jury may find the 
defendant not guilty of the degree charged but guilty of an inferior 
degree thereof or lesser included offense. 
 
See also Crim.R. 31(C). 
{¶ 6} The question of whether a particular offense should be submitted to 
the finder of fact as a lesser included offense involves a two-tiered analysis.  State 
v. Evans, 122 Ohio St.3d 381, 2009-Ohio-2974, 911 N.E.2d 889, ¶ 13.  The first 
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tier, also called the “statutory-elements step,” is a purely legal question, wherein 
we determine whether one offense is generally a lesser included offense of the 
charged offense.  State v. Kidder, 32 Ohio St.3d 279, 281, 513 N.E.2d 311 (1987).  
The second tier looks to the evidence in a particular case and determines whether 
“a jury could reasonably find the defendant not guilty of the charged offense, but 
could convict the defendant of the lesser included offense.”  Evans at ¶ 13, 
quoting Shaker Hts. v. Mosely, 113 Ohio St.3d 329, 2007-Ohio-2072, 865 N.E.2d 
859, at ¶ 11.  Only in the second tier of the analysis do the facts of a particular 
case become relevant.  In this case, the state challenges only the court of appeals’ 
holding that felonious assault can never be a lesser included offense of attempted 
murder.  Therefore, we do not address whether the specific facts of Deanda’s 
offense merited a particular instruction.  We are thus concerned only with the first 
tier of the foregoing analysis. 
{¶ 7} Although Ohio’s courts have implemented some version of the 
statutory-elements step of the lesser-included-offenses analysis since the 
beginning of the state’s history, the distinct three-part subset of the statutory-
elements step that we now use was first articulated in State v. Wilkins, 64 Ohio 
St.2d 382, 384, 415 N.E.2d 303 (1980): 
 
An offense may be a lesser included offense of another only 
if (i) the offense is a crime of lesser degree than the other, (ii) the 
offense of the greater degree cannot be committed without the 
offense of the lesser degree also being committed and (iii) some 
element of the greater offense is not required to prove the 
commission of the lesser offense. 
 
{¶ 8} This court started to veer away from its multiple-tiered analysis in 
the per curiam decision of State v. Rohdes, 23 Ohio St.3d 225, 492 N.E.2d 430 
January Term, 2013 
5 
 
(1986).  In Rohdes, the defendant had been indicted for murder but convicted of 
involuntary manslaughter through aggravated menacing after the trial court 
granted the state’s request for an instruction on that lesser charge.  Id. at 225-226.  
Our decision agreed with the instruction, rejecting the defendant’s argument that 
murder can be committed without committing aggravated menacing, stating that 
the focus is “on what elements a trier of fact could reasonably find from the 
evidence” and that “a cold comparison of the statutory elements to determine 
whether they always coincide is irrelevant.”  Id. at 227. 
{¶ 9} We subsequently modified Rohdes and returned to the analysis 
articulated in Wilkins in State v. Kidder, 32 Ohio St.3d 279, 513 N.E.2d 311 
(1987).  Although Rohdes correctly held that an involuntary-manslaughter 
instruction may be proper for a murder charge, Kidder clarified that it had been 
the “longstanding rule that the evidence presented in a particular case is irrelevant 
to the determination of whether an offense, as statutorily defined, is necessarily 
included in a greater offense.”  Kidder at 282.  We provided clarification in 
Kidder by adding language to the second part of the Wilkins statutory-elements 
analysis: “(ii) the offense of the greater degree cannot, as statutorily defined, ever 
be committed without the offense of the lesser degree, as statutorily defined, also 
being committed.”  (Emphasis added.) Kidder at paragraph one of the syllabus. 
{¶ 10} Soon thereafter, in order to resolve confusion between analyses for 
lesser-degree offenses and lesser included offenses, this court further modified the 
Wilkins statutory-elements test in State v. Deem, 40 Ohio St.3d 205, 533 N.E.2d 
294 (1988), paragraph three of the syllabus:  
 
An offense may be a lesser included offense of another if 
(i) the offense carries a lesser penalty than the other; (ii) the greater 
offense cannot, as statutorily defined, ever be committed without 
the lesser offense, as statutorily defined, also being committed; and 
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(iii) some element of the greater offense is not required to prove 
the commission of the lesser offense. 
 
{¶ 11} We applied the newly stated rule to conclude that although 
aggravated assault is not a lesser included offense of felonious assault, it is an 
inferior-degree offense.  Id. at 210-211. 
{¶ 12} We stop here in our historical review of lesser included offenses to 
note that we have held that felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) is 
not a lesser included offense of attempted murder in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A) 
and 2923.02(A).  State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002).  We 
did not tread any new ground with our lesser-included-offense analysis, but 
merely applied the strict statutory-elements test set forth in Deem.  Further, our 
discussion in Barnes focused solely on felonious assault through using a deadly 
weapon, and the decision did not extend to the statutory provision at issue in this 
case, which is felonious assault through causing serious physical harm, in 
violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1).  Because the specific statutory provision 
discussed in Barnes is not at issue in this case, we refrain from comment as to its 
application here. 
{¶ 13} The Deem statement of the rule remained the norm in Ohio for 20 
years, until it was further reworded in State v. Evans, 122 Ohio St.3d 381, 2009-
Ohio-2974, 911 N.E.2d 889.  In Evans, we were faced with the question of 
whether robbery as defined in R.C. 2911.02(A)(2) was a lesser included offense 
of aggravated robbery as defined in R.C. 2911.01(A)(1).  Under these statutes, 
robbery required proof of a threat or attempt to inflict harm or actual infliction of 
harm during a theft offense, and aggravated robbery required proof of displaying, 
brandishing, indicating possession of, or actually using a deadly weapon during a 
theft offense.  The defendant-appellee argued that one could commit theft while 
indicating possession of a deadly weapon without threatening to inflict harm, such 
January Term, 2013 
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as a scenario where one shoplifts while purchasing the deadly weapon.  Id. at 
¶ 24.  Borrowing from recent holdings regarding allied offenses, we rejected this 
argument as far-fetched and implausible.  Id. at ¶ 24, citing State v. Winn, 121 
Ohio St.3d 413, 2009-Ohio-1059, 905 N.E.2d 154, ¶ 24.  We explained: 
 
While [the elements of robbery and aggravated robbery] are not 
identically phrased, we have recognized: “This test is not a word 
game to be performed by rote by matching the words chosen by the 
legislature to define criminal offenses. Some offenses, such as 
aggravated murder and murder, lend themselves to such a simple 
matching test; others do not. * * * We would also note that the 
elements of the offenses are ‘matched’ only in part (iii) of the test 
to determine if ‘some element’ of the greater offense is not found 
in the lesser offense. The proper overall focus is on the nature and 
circumstances of the offenses as defined, rather than on the precise 
words used to define them.”  State v. Thomas, 40 Ohio St.3d 213 at 
216–217, 533 N.E.2d 286 [1988]. Thus, the test does not require 
identical language to define the two offenses, but focuses upon 
whether the words used in the statute defining the greater offense 
will put the offender on notice that an indictment for that offense 
could also result in the prosecution of the lesser included offense. 
 
Evans at ¶ 22.  Thus, in order “to ensure that such implausible scenarios will not 
derail a proper lesser included offense analysis” in the future, we made one minor 
change in the phrasing of the second step of the statutory-elements test stated in 
Deem, by deleting the word “ever.”  Id. at ¶ 25.  The second step now requires 
that “the greater offense as statutorily defined cannot be committed without the 
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lesser offense as statutorily defined also being committed.”  Id. at paragraph two 
of the syllabus. 
{¶ 14} Finally, although we have not made any further alterations to the 
general statutory-elements test, before Evans we did create an additional, separate 
rule to apply in cases where the statute for the greater offense sets forth multiple 
alternative methods of committing the offense, in State v. Smith, 117 Ohio St.3d 
447, 2008-Ohio-1260, 884 N.E.2d 595.  In that case, the argument proposed to 
this court was that theft could not be a lesser included offense of robbery because 
it was possible to commit robbery through committing a theft or merely 
attempting to commit a theft.  Id. at ¶ 22; R.C. 2911.02(A).  In rejecting this 
argument, we held that “when a statute sets forth mutually exclusive ways of 
committing the greater offense, a court is required to apply the second part of the 
[statutory-elements test for determining whether an offense is a lesser included 
offense] to each alternative method of committing the greater offense.”  Id. at 
¶ 28.  This modified approach allows for lesser-included-offense instructions for 
either one of the alternative methods of committing robbery, because the robbery 
statute puts the defendant on notice of both of those separate alternatives. 
{¶ 15} What we glean from the foregoing is that the statutory-elements 
test for lesser included offenses has been repeatedly refined, clarified, modified, 
and amended, but it has never been overruled.  While the test may produce severe 
results in some cases, we have learned in the aftermath of Rohdes that it is 
essential to divorce the facts of a particular case from the statutory-elements 
analysis in order to preserve the defendant’s right to notice of the charges against 
him. 
{¶ 16} The proposed lesser included offense in the matter before us is 
felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1), which states, “No person 
shall knowingly * * * [c]ause serious physical harm to another * * *.”  The crime 
forming the foundation of the greater offense is murder in violation of R.C. 
January Term, 2013 
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2903.02(A), which states, “No person shall purposely cause the death of another 
* * *.”  Finally, Ohio’s general attempt statute states, “No person, purposely or 
knowingly, * * * shall engage in conduct that, if successful, would constitute or 
result in the offense.”  R.C. 2923.02(A). 
{¶ 17} The General Assembly created the general attempt statute in order 
to consolidate and replace a number of specific attempt crimes.  Legislative 
Service Commission 1973 comments to R.C. 2923.02.  The General Assembly 
also consolidated and replaced a number of special assault offenses by creating 
the offense of felonious assault.  Legislative Service Commission 1973 comments 
to R.C. 2903.11.  In particular, in explaining the newly created offense of 
felonious assault, the Legislative Service Commission staff stated that “the 
offense of felonious assault complements the section on murder” and that 
felonious assault “is a lesser included offense to attempted murder.”  Legislative 
Service Commission 1973 comments to R.C. 2903.12 and 2903.11. 
{¶ 18} In looking at the crime of attempted murder through an updated, 
more pragmatic lens in light of Evans and Smith, we reiterate that the specific 
facts of a particular case are still irrelevant to the first step of the lesser-included-
offenses analysis.  However, we no longer want to look at the elements in a 
vacuum.  Nor do we want to bring out a menu of unrelated, fact-specific 
hypotheticals.  Rather, it is more instructive to consider the charged crime’s 
relationship with potential lesser included offenses, and then follow the language 
of the applicable statutes in order to ensure the defendant’s constitutional right to 
notice. 
{¶ 19} Returning to the statutory elements that are applicable in this case, 
the core offense of murder requires purposely causing the death of another.  R.C. 
2903.02(A).  One type of felonious assault involves knowingly causing serious 
physical harm to another.  R.C. 2903.11(A)(1).  Clearly, the offense of murder 
necessarily includes the commission of felonious assault through causing serious 
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physical harm, because purposely causing death necessarily involves knowingly 
causing serious physical harm.  Also included in the offense of murder is 
attempted murder.  R.C. 2923.02(A) and 2945.74.  The elements of attempt 
include “engag[ing] in conduct that, if successful, would constitute or result in the 
offense.”  R.C. 2923.02(A). 
{¶ 20} The problem with a strict statutory comparison of the above two 
offenses lies in the fact that the greater charged offense (attempted murder) is not 
accomplished, whereas the lesser offense (felonious assault) is a completed crime.  
Certainly it seems illogical to impose the requirement that the greater offense 
cannot be committed without the lesser offense also being committed, because an 
attempt offense almost always involves not committing the crime charged.  
Instead, when attempt is charged, the requirement is simply that the charge give 
notice of the proposed lesser included offenses.  Ensuring the notice that the 
constitution requires is, after all, the purpose of any analysis of lesser included 
offenses.  And a charge of attempt gives notice that the prosecution may try to 
prove any element of the completed crime and elements necessarily included 
within those elements. 
{¶ 21} The only practical difference between attempted murder and 
felonious assault through causing serious physical harm is whether the defendant 
intended to kill the victim when he engaged in the particular conduct or whether 
he intended merely to injure the victim with that conduct.  Since the desire to 
physically harm is a subset of, and necessarily included in, the desire to kill, and 
since one cannot intend to kill without also intending to cause physical harm, we 
conclude that felonious assault through causing serious physical harm is a lesser 
included offense of attempted murder. 
{¶ 22} Although the wording of the statutes for felonious assault through 
causing serious physical harm and attempted murder do not cleanly match up, we 
hold that a charge of attempted murder reasonably puts the defendant on notice 
January Term, 2013 
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that he may be convicted of felonious assault by causing serious physical harm.  
To hold otherwise would lead to untenable results and would defeat the obvious 
intent of the General Assembly to allow felonious assault to constitute a lesser 
included offense of attempted murder.  By following the General Assembly’s 
intent, we allow the jury to do its job with proper instructions, and ensure that 
justice is done. 
{¶ 23} Accordingly, we hold that the Seneca County Court of Common 
Pleas correctly provided the jury with an instruction for felonious assault as a 
lesser included offense at the close of Deanda’s trial.  We reverse the judgment of 
the Third District Court of Appeals and remand the cause to that court for 
consideration of additional assignments of error that were mooted by its original 
holding. 
Judgment reversed 
and cause remanded. 
LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and FRENCH, JJ., concur. 
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER and O’DONNELL, JJ., concur in judgment 
only. 
__________________ 
 
Derek W. DeVine, Seneca County Prosecuting Attorney, and Brian O. 
Boos, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant. 
John M. Kahler II, for appellee. 
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Jeremy J. Masters, Assistant 
Ohio Public Defender, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Office of the Ohio 
Public Defender. 
______________________