Case Title: Yetter v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1999-09-03T00:00:00Z

Document:
Yetter v. State1999 WY 123987 P.2d 666Case Number: 98-270Decided: 09/03/1999Supreme Court of Wyoming

THERESA YETTER, Appellant (Defendant),

v.

THE STATE OF WYOMING, Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

 

                                 

Appeal from the District Court of Hot Springs County, 
The

Honorable Gary P. Hartman, 
Judge.

   

Sylvia Lee Hackl, State 
Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Diane E. Courselle, 
Director of the Wyoming Defender Aid Program; and Joseph S. Huey, Student Intern 
for the Wyoming Defender Aid Program, representing 
appellant.

  Gay 
Woodhouse, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. 
Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Theodore E. Lauer, Director 
of the Prosecution Assistance Program; and Theodore C. Preston, Student Intern 
for the Prosecution Assistance Program, representing 
appellee.

 

     Before LEHMAN, 
C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN & HILL, JJ.

 

     MACY, 
Justice.

    
[¶1]     Appellant Theresa Yetter appeals from 
the amended judgment and sentence entered by the trial court after a jury found 
her guilty of interference with a peace officer.

 

   [¶2]     We affirm.

 

                                
ISSUES

 

    [¶3]  Yetter presents the following issues for 
our review:

 

I.  Did 
the trial court deprive Theresa Yetter of the opportunity to put on a defense in 
refusing an instruction on self-defense when it was a proper statement of the 
defense theory and it was supported by sufficient evidence at 
trial[?]

 

II.  Did 
the prosecution of Theresa Yetter in this action deprive her of the protections 
against double jeopardy, namely multiple prosecutions or punishments for the 
same offense[?]

 

                                 
FACTS

 

   [¶4]     Near midnight on November 4, 1997, 
William Motley, a police officer for the Town of Thermopolis, noticed a vehicle 
moving slowly and weaving in its lane on a Thermopolis street. Yetter was 
driving the vehicle. The officer decided to stop the car after he observed it 
straddle the dotted white line between the two west-bound lanes. He activated 
his overhead lights, but Yetter did not stop. When Yetter left the town limits, 
Officer Motley also activated his 
siren.

 

   [¶5]     Approximately one mile out of town, 
Yetter turned into the Sage Valley Subdivision. She claimed that she did not 
notice the patrol vehicle's lights until she neared the turnoff for the 
subdivision. She did not stop when she saw the lights because her house was a 
just short distance away and she wanted to get her children home. Yetter stopped her vehicle in 
front of her house. Officer Motley directed the occupants of Yetter's vehicle to 
remain inside the car. Ignoring the officer's instruction, Yetter got out of the 
vehicle and allowed her children to get out and go to the house. Yetter's 
husband, who was intoxicated, remained in the vehicle.

 

   [¶6]     Officer Motley requested Yetter's 
registration, proof of insurance, and driver's license. Yetter gave him her 
registration and proof of insurance and stated that her license was in the 
house. Officer Motley directed Yetter to remain next to her vehicle, and he 
returned to his patrol car to ask the dispatcher to check Yetter's driver's 
license. While Officer Motley was waiting for the license check, he returned to 
the vehicle and spoke with Yetter's husband. Yetter left the vehicle and went to 
the house to check on the children while the two men were conversing.

 

   [¶7]     The dispatcher informed Officer Motley 
that Yetter's license had been suspended. The officer then ran to the house, 
told Yetter that she was under arrest, and grabbed her wrist. He succeeded in 
securing one of Yetter's wrists with handcuffs, but he could not restrain the 
other wrist because Yetter was struggling with him. The officer placed Yetter 
over the hood of a car and handcuffed her other wrist. During this 
episode, Yetter's children became 
very upset. They yelled at Officer Motley, and one of the children threw a 
squirt gun, striking the officer. Officer Motley threatened to spray Yetter with 
pepper spray if she did not cooperate. Yetter's husband declared that the 
officer was using excessive force and threatened to hit 
him.

 

   [¶8]     Officer Motley proceeded to escort 
Yetter to his patrol car. She did not cooperate and "flopped" herself down on 
the ground.  She also resisted being 
placed inside the car, and, after the officer got her into the car, she put her 
foot on the door hinge to prevent him from closing the door.  At some point during the struggle, the 
officer sprayed Yetter with pepper spray.

 

   [¶9]     Deputy Sheriff Tom Christensen and 
Undersheriff Michael Raymond arrived at the scene to assist Officer Motley. The 
officers noticed that Yetter had removed the handcuffs from one of her wrists 
while she was inside the patrol car. Officer Motley and Deputy Sheriff 
Christensen got Yetter out of the car and replaced the handcuffs. Yetter stated that she was unwilling 
to ride to the jail with Officer Motley but that she would ride with 
Undersheriff Raymond.

 

   [¶10]  When they arrived at the jail, Yetter 
was allowed to wash her face and rinse her eyes. The officer in charge of the 
jail noticed that Yetter had bruises, scratches, and red marks on her body. 
Nevertheless, when Undersheriff Raymond inquired as to whether she was injured, 
Yetter stated only that her arms and shoulders were sore. She subsequently received 
medical attention for her injuries.

 

   [¶11]  The Town of Thermopolis charged Yetter 
with driving while under the influence of alcohol, driving while under 
suspension, and eluding police. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Yetter pleaded 
guilty in the municipal court to the charge of eluding police in exchange for 
having the other two charges dismissed. The county attorney charged Yetter for interference with a peace 
officer under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-5-204(a) (LEXIS 1999). She pleaded not guilty 
to the charge, and the trial court held a jury trial in May 1998. The jury found 
her guilty of the crime, and the trial court entered a judgment against Yetter 
and sentenced her.  The trial court 
subsequently filed an amended judgment and sentence, and Yetter appealed to this 
Court.

 

                              
DISCUSSION

 

   A.  Jury Instructions

 

   [¶12]  Yetter claims that the trial court 
improperly deprived her of the opportunity to put on a defense when it refused 
to give one of her proposed self-defense instructions to the jury. The state 
maintains that the trial court's refusal to give the jury instruction was 
appropriate because the evidence did not support giving the instruction and 
that, in any event, Yetter's theory of defense was presented to the jury in 
another instruction. We agree with the state.

 

   [¶13]  Yetter filed a number of instructions 
with the trial court.  The trial 
court did not submit one of her proposed instructions addressing the law of 
self-defense to the jury. The jury instruction conference was not recorded, and 
Yetter did not object on the record to the trial court's refusal to give the 
instruction. We must, therefore, apply the plain error standard in order to 
review this issue. "Plain error exists when 1) the record is clear about the incident alleged as error; 
2) there was a transgression of a clear and unequivocal rule of law; and 3) the 
party claiming the error was denied a substantial right which materially 
prejudiced him."  Sandy v. State, 
870 P.2d 352, 358 (Wyo. 1994); see also Hodges v. State, 904 P.2d 334, 341 (Wyo. 
1995). This issue can be resolved by 
turning directly to the second element of the plain error test; i.e., whether a 
clear and unequivocal rule of law was transgressed.

 

   [¶14]  A defendant is entitled to have the jury 
instructed on her theory of defense:

 

when the proposed instructions sufficiently inform 
the jury of her theory of defense and when competent evidence supports the law 
expressed in the requested instructions. The trial court may, however, properly 
refuse to give a requested instruction, even though it is correct, when other 
instructions have been given which sufficiently cover the principles which are 
being offered in the requested instruction.

 

Gilliam v. State, 890 P.2d 1104, 1108 (Wyo. 1995) (citation omitted); see also Candelaria v. State, 895 P.2d 434, 437 (Wyo. 1995). Weak or inconclusive evidence may justify instructing 
the jury on self-defense; however, an instruction need not be given unless a 
reasonable person could conclude that the evidence presented at trial supports 
the defendant's position. Ortega v. State, 966 P.2d 961, 966 (Wyo. 1998); 
Chavez-Becerra v. State, 924 P.2d 63, 67 
(Wyo. 1996). In determining if a defendant is entitled to an instruction, we 
view the evidence in a light favorable to the accused. Id.

 

   [¶15]  In this case, the jury was instructed in 
relevant part as follows:

 

                             
INSTRUCTION NO.   
4

 

    The elements of the crime of 
Interference with a Peace Officer, as charged in this case, 
are:

 

            1.  On or about the 5th day of November, 
1997

 

            2.  In Hot Springs County, 
Wyoming

 

            3.  The Defendant, THERESA 
YETTER

 

            4.  Knowingly obstructed, impeded or 
interfered with or resisted arrest by a peace officer

 

            5.  While that peace officer was engaged in 
the lawful performance of his official duties.

 

If you find from your consideration of all the 
evidence that each of these elements has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, 
then you should find the defendant guilty.

 

If, on the other hand, you find from your 
consideration of all the evidence that any of these elements has not been proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not 
guilty.

 

                             
INSTRUCTION NO.   
7

 

You are instructed that there may be situations that 
police activities are so provocative and resistance so understandable that it 
can only be concluded that the police were not engaged in the lawful performance 
of their official duties and that such conduct by the officer may give rise to a 
right of self-defense, i.e., a right to resist the use of excessive 
force.

 

Yetter claims that these 
instructions were not adequate to inform the jury of a person's right to defend 
herself against an officer's use of excessive force. She claims that the trial 
court should have also given the following instruction to the 
jury:

 

It is lawful for a person who is being arrested to 
resist and defend himself from the use of excessive force by a peace officer if 
he has reasonable grounds for believing and does believe that bodily injury is 
about to be inflicted upon him. In doing so he may use all force which would 
appear to a reasonable person, in the same or similar circumstances, to be 
necessary to prevent the injury which appears to be 
imminent.

 

   [¶16]  This Court has addressed the law 
concerning a person's right to defend herself against a law enforcement officer 
who is using excessive force while arresting her. See, e.g.,  Ortega, 966 P.2d 961; Best v. State, 736 P.2d 739 (Wyo. 1987). Any act of self-defense by a person against an officer who 
is attempting to arrest her also amounts 
to resisting arrest. Best, 736 P.2d  at 745. Nevertheless, when an officer uses 
excessive force to accomplish an arrest, he is not considered to be engaged in 
the lawful performance of his official duties. Id. Under those circumstances, 
the law permits a person to use the force she reasonably believes is necessary 
to protect herself against an officer's use of excessive force. Id.; see also 
Simonds v. State, 762 P.2d 1189, 1191-92 
(Wyo. 1988).

 

   [¶17]  Ortega made an argument in his case that 
was very similar to Yetter's argument in this case. Ortega, 966 P.2d  at 965-66. 
He argued that the trial court erred by failing to adequately instruct the jury 
on the law of self-defense. Id. We ruled that the evidence did not support the 
giving of the instruction. 966 P.2d  at 966. We also concluded that, in any 
event, the trial court adequately instructed the jurors on the law of 
self-defense when it informed them that 
an officer who uses excessive force is not considered to be engaged in the 
lawful performance of his duties. Id.

 

   [¶18]  The evidence presented at trial did not 
support Yetter's theory that she acted in self-defense, and, consequently, she 
was not entitled to an instruction on her theory of defense. Yetter did not 
testify that she struggled with the officer because she feared that she was in 
imminent danger of bodily harm. To the contrary, she testified that she struggled with the 
officer because she wanted to be free to calm her children. That reason does not 
justify her resistance to Officer Motley's attempts to arrest 
her.

 

   [¶19]  Even though Yetter was not technically 
entitled to have the jury instructed on her theory that she acted in 
self-defense, the trial court did adequately instruct the jury on her theory. 
The trial court instructed the jury that it should acquit Yetter if it 
determined that Officer Motley was not engaged in the lawful performance of his 
official duties. The jury instructions also indicated that an officer who uses 
excessive force is not considered to be engaged in the lawful performance of his 
official duties. Those instructions were sufficient to present Yetter's theory of defense to the jury. The jury 
obviously did not accept Yetter's theory because, when it convicted her, it 
necessarily determined that Officer Motley did not act outside the scope of his 
official duties by using excessive force when he arrested her. Consequently, the 
trial court did not violate a clear and unequivocal rule of law when it did not 
give Yetter's proposed instruction to the jury.

 

   B. Double 
Jeopardy

 

   [¶20]  Yetter maintains that she was placed 
twice in jeopardy for the same offense when she was tried for interference with 
a peace officer after she had been convicted in municipal court of eluding the 
police. We are unable to decide the merits of Yetter's 
claim.

 

   [¶21]  Yetter did not raise the double jeopardy 
issue with the trial court. This Court generally does not consider issues raised 
for the first time on appeal. Meerscheidt v. State, 931 P.2d 220, 225 (Wyo. 
1997). A criminal defendant waives the defense of double jeopardy if she does 
not present her double jeopardy if she does not present her double jeopardy argument to the trial 
court. Taylor v. State, 612 P.2d 851, 861 (Wyo. 1971); see also W.R.Cr.P. 12(b); 
United States v. Denogean, 79 F.3d 1010, 1012 (10th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 519 U.S. 856, 117 S. Ct. 154, 136 L. Ed. 2d 99 (1996).

 

   [¶22]  Affirmed.