Case Title: Irwin v. Jefferson County Personnel Board

Citation: 

Docket Number: 1161145

State: alabama

Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Date: 2018-04-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
Rel: April 20, 2018
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance
sheets of Southern Reporter.  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions,
Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-
0649), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before
the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.
SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2017-2018
____________________
1161145
____________________
Paul A. Irwin, Jr.
v.
Jefferson County Personnel Board and the City of Trussville
Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court
(CV-17-76)
MAIN, Justice.
Paul A. Irwin, Jr., appeals from a final judgment of the
Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing his claim for injunctive
relief against the Jefferson County Personnel Board ("the
Board") and the City of Trussville ("Trussville"), a
1161145
municipality located in Jefferson County.  We dismiss the
appeal.
I.  Facts and Procedural History
This case arises from Trussville's desire to hire a 
police chief following the retirement of its former police
chief.  The position of police chief is a classified civil-
service position.  Under the provisions of § 45-37-121 et
seq., Ala. Code 1975 (Local Laws, Jefferson County)("the
enabling act"), the Board is vested with the authority to
regulate 
the 
appointment 
procedure 
of 
classified 
civil-service
positions in Jefferson County.  In accordance with rules
established by the Board, Trussville, on January 3, 2017, 
submitted a request to the Board to fill the position of
"Police Chief II."  In response, on January 3, 2017, the Board
provided Trussville with a certified list of 10 eligible
candidates. 
The certified list of candidates–-referred to in the
rules of the Board as the "Certificate of Eligibles" --
provided to Trussville is generated from an eligibility list. 
That eligibility list for the position of police chief had
been created by the Board in 2014 and consisted of qualified
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applicants ranked based on the results of a competitive
assessment examination.  Irwin's name appeared on the
certified list.
Trussville interviewed Irwin and two other candidates
from the certified list.  Trussville did not hire Irwin or any
other candidate from the certified list supplied by the Board
in January 2017.  Instead, Trussville returned the list to the
Board and requested that the Board administer a new test for
the position of Police Chief II.  On January 23, 2017, the
Board "expired" the eligibility list.  On January 27, 2017,
the Board also approved Trussville's request to hire a
provisional police chief until such time as a new assessment
examination could be administered and a new eligibility list
generated.
On March 1, 2017, Irwin sued the Board and Trussville, 
contending that, once the Board issued to Trussville a 
certified list of eligible candidates for the position of
police chief, Trussville was required to hire a candidate from
that list and had no discretion to leave the position
unfilled.  The complaint sought only injunctive relief. 
Specifically, it requested an order:
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"1.
Halting the examination for Chief of Police by
the [Board].
"2
Restraining any appointments unless it is the
name of a candidate that appeared on the
[January 2017] list of eligible police chief
candidates.
"3.
Restraining the [Board and Trussville] from any
other actions in this case that are in
violation of the Enabling Act.
"4.
Directing the City of Trussville to make an
appointment pursuant to the Enabling Act."
Irwin's complaint was accompanied by a motion for a temporary
restraining order ("TRO").  On March 9, 2017, Irwin filed a
motion for a preliminary injunction.  On March 22, 2017, the
trial court denied Irwin's motion for a TRO and set the motion
for a preliminary injunction for an evidentiary hearing.
Before the hearing on the motion for a preliminary
injunction, Irwin accepted the job of police chief with the
City of Pell City.  Upon notice of Irwin's acceptance of a
police-chief position with another municipality, the trial
court invited a written response from Irwin as to whether his
action against the Board and Trussville had been rendered moot
by his accepting a police-chief position with another
municipality.  Irwin responded that the action had not been
rendered moot because, he said, he remained a qualified
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candidate for the Trussville police-chief job and that,
notwithstanding his acceptance of the Pell City police-chief 
job, he still wanted to be the police chief for Trussville. 
On April 19, 2017, the trial court entered an order in which
it concluded that Irwin's action was not moot but that "the
relief he would hereafter pursue would be in the nature of
money damages."  The trial court denied Irwin's motion for a
preliminary injunction and continued the evidentiary hearing.
On April 20, 2017, Irwin moved the trial court to
reconsider its order denying the preliminary injunction.  In
that motion, Irwin explained that his desire to be the
Trussville police chief was born of his family's strong ties
to the Trussville community and that money damages would not
adequately compensate him for the loss of the opportunity to
serve as Trussville's police chief.  The trial court did not
immediately rule on Irwin's motion to reconsider.
On May 22, 2017, Trussville filed a motion to dismiss
Irwin's action or, in the alternative, for a summary judgment. 
On May 31, 2017, the Board also filed a motion to dismiss or,
in the alternative, for a summary judgment.
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On June 2, 2017, the trial court conducted a hearing on
Irwin's motion to reconsider the denial of his preliminary- 
injunction motion and the motions to dismiss filed by the
Board and Trussville. 
On July 10, 2017, Irwin filed a notice in the trial court
indicating that the Board had administered a new police-chief
examination; that he had taken the new examination; and that
he had achieved the highest possible score.  The Board
responded by stating that "[t]he appearance of [Irwin]'s name
on any Certified List requested by the City of Trussville once
the Eligibility List is completed does not create an
obligation on the part of the City of Trussville to hire
[Irwin]."
On August 9, 2017, the trial court entered an order
granting the Board's and Trussville's motions to dismiss.  The
order explained:
"Pending are motions to dismiss filed by
defendants, the [Board] and [Trussville]. [Irwin]
opposes these motions.  Because the court regards
the pending motions as motions to dismiss, the
allegations raised in [Irwin's] filings are viewed
as establishing the material facts at issue.  The
question is whether, based on the allegations made
by [Irwin], the [Board and Trussville] are entitled
to the dismissal of this action as a matter of law.
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"In his complaint and motion for temporary
restraining order, [Irwin] alleges that the [Board]
provided to [Trussville] a certified list of
eligible police chief candidates on January 3, 2017,
but [Trussville] elected not to make an appointment
from that list, causing the list to expire by the
end of January.  In his motion for preliminary
injunction, [Irwin] further alleges that he was
included on that list and was interviewed for the
Trussville vacancy.  The gravamen of [Irwin's]
action is that by failing to make an appointment
from the January eligibles list, the City of
Trussville has violated his legal rights.
"Rule 11.2(b) of The Rules and Regulations of
the Personnel Board of Jefferson County, provides an
appointing authority 'may make an appointment from
the Certificate of Eligibles...'  (Emphasis added). 
Under Rule 11.2(c), once a Certificate of Eligibles
is issued, an Appointing Authority has ten business
days to either make an appointment or give written
notification that the request has been withdrawn. 
Rule 11.2(c) goes on to provide, however, that '[i]f
no appointment is made within thirty (30) days of
the date of the Certificate of Eligibles, then the
Certificate 
of 
Eligibles 
shall 
expire 
unless
extended upon written request of the Appointing
Authority, approved by the Director.' [The Board and
Trussville] argue that this is what happened here.
[Irwin] does not dispute that the events of January
were in keeping with the [Board]'s Rules and
Regulations.
"[Irwin] instead argues that Rule 11.2 violates
the Enabling Act of the [Board].  Section 18 of the
Enabling Act provides among other things the
following:
"'Whenever 
a vacancy 
in an existing
position is to be filled by appointment,
the appointing authority shall submit to
the director a statement of the title of
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the position, and if requested by the
director to do so, the duties of the
position, 
and 
desired 
qualifications of 
the
person to be appointed and a request that
the 
Director 
certify 
the 
Appointing
Authority the names of persons eligible for
appointment to the position.  The Director
shall thereupon certify to the Appointing
Authority 
the 
ranking 
eligibles,
correlating to the 10 highest test scores
from the appropriate register .... Within
10 days after the names are certified the
Appointing Authority shall appoint one of
those whose names are certified to each
vacancy which he or she is to fill.'
"[§ 45-37-121.15, Ala. Code 1975](Emphasis added.) 
Under Rule 11.2, an Appointing Authority 'may' make
an appointment from the list of eligibles provided
to it, while under the Enabling Act, an appointing
authority 'shall' –- and [Irwin] argues, must –-
make such a selection.
"However, other language in Section 18 suggests
that an appointing authority does not bear such an
unconditional obligation.  Specifically, the section
provides the consequences if an appointing authority
fails to make a selection:
"'In the event an Appointing Authority
fails or refuses to fill a vacancy in an
existing position from a certified list of
eligibles the Director may refuse to
certify the payroll, voucher or account of
any 
ineligible 
person 
found 
to 
be
performing the duties of the position.'
"If an appointing authority is unconditionally
obligated to select from a certified list, there is
no reason to have such language.
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"The court finally notes the following language
of Section 18, which expressly provides to the
Personnel Board the authority to proscribe rules
governing this process:
"'The 
Personnel 
Board 
shall 
adopt
appropriate 
rules 
and 
regulations 
governing
all appointments to vacancies in the
classified service to the end that such
rules shall comply with the law and serve
the public interest.'
"There 
are 
numerous 
decisions 
from 
our 
appellate
courts making clear that an administrative agency's
interpretation of its powers and duties is entitled
to 
judicial 
deference, 
so 
long 
as 
that
interpretation is reasonable and in keeping with the
legislation establishing that agency.  Close review
of Rule 11 of The Rules and Regulations of the
Personnel Board of Jefferson County leads this court
to conclude that the process set forth therein is a
reasonable construction of the Enabling Act and in
fact is necessary to fill in the gaps in the
appointment process left unaddressed by the Enabling
Act.  This court therefore cannot conclude that the
[Board and Trussville] stand in violation of any law
by failing to make an appointment from the January
2017 list and letting the list expire.
"Accordingly, [Irwin] has not alleged any facts
that can be interpreted as giving rise to any
actionable claim against [the Board and Trussville]. 
The pending motions to dismiss are therefore
GRANTED, 
and 
this 
action 
is 
dismissed 
with
prejudice, cost taxed as paid."
The trial court also entered a separate order denying Irwin's
motion to reconsider his motion for a preliminary injunction.
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Irwin filed a postjudgment motion, which was denied on
August 30, 2017.  Irwin filed his notice of appeal on
September 14, 2017.  Irwin did not seek from either the trial
court or this court an injunction, under Rule 8, Ala. R. App.
P., to preserve the status quo pending this appeal, and, as
discussed, infra, Trussville has appointed a permanent police
chief.
II.  Analysis
On appeal, Irwin argues that the trial court incorrectly
construed the language of the enabling act.  Irwin contends
that, under the plain language of the enabling act, once
Trussville notified the Board that it intended to fill the
position of police chief and received the January 2017
certified list of eligible candidates from the Board, it was
required to appoint one of the individuals named on the
certified list to the position of police chief.  Before we
turn to the merits of Irwin's argument, however, there are
threshold matters that must first be addressed.
First, we consider the timeliness of Irwin's appeal.
Trussville and the Board contend that this appeal is due to be
dismissed because, they argue, it is untimely.  To this end,
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they note that Irwin demanded only injunctive relief. 
Trussville and the Board contend that, once the trial court
denied Irwin's motions for a TRO and a preliminary injunction,
all of Irwin's claims were adjudicated.  Because Irwin's
motion for a preliminary injunction was denied on April 19,
2017, Trussville and the Board argue that Irwin's September
14, 2017, notice of appeal was untimely.  We disagree.
As the names of the relief sought suggest, orders of a
trial court granting or denying a temporary restraining order
or a preliminary injunction are interlocutory in nature.  See
Momar, Inc. v. Schneider, 823 So. 2d 701, 704 (Ala. Civ. App.
2001); Watchous v. North Creek Baptist Church, 706 So. 2d 1259
(Ala. Civ. App. 1997).  Indeed, the purpose of temporary and
preliminary injunctive relief is to maintain the status quo
pending the resolution of the action on its merits.  Jacobs
Broad. Grp., Inc. v. Jeff Beck Broad. Grp., LLC, 160 So. 3d
345, 349 n. 3 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014).  Irwin, therefore,
necessarily sought a final judgment on the merits and
ultimately, if successful, final permanent injunctive relief. 
It is also clear that the trial court's orders denying the TRO
and the preliminary injunction did not touch on the merits of
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the case and were not intended as final judgments.  Certainly,
the trial court could have reconsidered its decision to deny
the preliminary injunction at any time before the entry of the
final judgment.  Indeed, the trial court withheld ruling on
Irwin's motion to reconsider the preliminary injunction until
it had fully considered the motions to dismiss.
To be sure, Irwin could have directly appealed the denial
of his motions for temporary or preliminary injunctive relief
under the provisions of Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P., but the
fact that he did not does not render his appeal from the trial
court's final judgment untimely.1  Here, the final judgment
was entered on August 9, 2017; Irwin's postjudgment motion was
denied on August 30, 2017; and his notice of appeal from the
final judgment was timely filed on September 14, 2017.  
Although Irwin's appeal is "timely" in the technical
sense, we must nevertheless determine whether, as a practical
matter, it has come too late.  Indeed, it appears that events
occurring since the filing of this appeal have rendered
Irwin's claims moot.  In its brief, Trussville informs this
1To the extent that Irwin seeks direct review of the trial
court's orders denying his motions for a TRO or preliminary
injunction, his appeal is untimely under Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R.
App. P.  Watchous, 706 So. 2d at 1259.  
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Court that, following the entry of the final judgment in the
trial court, it appointed a permanent police chief on October
10, 2017.  It appears that the person appointed as the new
permanent police chief is the former provisional police chief,
an individual who, according to the record, was not on the
January 2017 certified list, but who was, according to
Trussville, on a subsequent certified list of eligible
candidates provided by the Board.  In other words, Trussville
has filled the job sought by Irwin and in a manner Irwin
sought to prevent.
As to mootness, this Court has stated:
"'"A moot case or question is a case or question
in or on which there is no real controversy; a case
which seeks to determine an abstract question which
does not rest on existing facts or rights, or
involve conflicting rights so far as plaintiff is
concerned."'  Case v. Alabama State Bar, 939 So. 2d
881, 884 (Ala. 2006) (quoting American Fed'n of
State, County & Mun. Employees v. Dawkins, 268 Ala.
13, 18, 104 So. 2d 827, 830-31 (1958)).  'The test
for mootness is commonly stated as whether the
court's action on the merits would affect the rights
of the parties.'  Crawford v. State, 153 S.W.3d 497,
501 (Tex. App. 2004) (citing VE Corp. v. Ernst &
Young, 860 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex. 1993)).  'A case
becomes moot if at any stage there ceases to be an
actual controversy between the parties.'  Id.
(emphasis 
added) 
(citing 
National 
Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n v. Jones, 1 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Tex.
1999)). 
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"'There must be 
a 
bona 
fide existing controversy
of a justiciable character to confer upon the court
jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief under the
declaratory judgment statutes, and if there was no
justiciable controversy existing when the suit was
commenced the trial court had no jurisdiction.' 
State ex rel. Baxley v. Johnson, 293 Ala. 69, 73,
300 So. 2d 106, 110 (1974).  ...  'A moot case lacks
justiciability.'  Crawford, 153 S.W.3d at 501. 
Thus, '[a]n action that originally was based upon a
justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on
appeal if the questions raised in it have become
moot by subsequent acts or events.'  Case, 939 So.
2d at 884 (citing Employees of Montgomery County
Sheriff's Dep't v. Marshall, 893 So. 2d 326, 330
(Ala. 2004))."
 
Chapman v. Gooden, 974 So. 2d 972, 983-84 (Ala. 2007). 
Furthermore, we have stated:
"The test, when a motion is made to dismiss an
appeal because the right to an injunction, if it
ever existed, has become moot, is whether the event
which occurred pending appeal makes a determination
of the appeal unnecessary, or renders it impossible
for the appellate court to grant effectual relief." 
Morrison v. Mullins, 275 Ala. 258, 259, 154 So. 2d 16, 18
(1963).
In this case, Irwin has sought only injunctive relief. 
The primary purpose of injunctive relief, however, is to
prevent future injury.  See Williams v. Wert, 259 Ala. 557,
559, 67 So. 2d 830, 831 (1953) ("The court cannot enjoin an
act which has occurred."); 43A C.J.S. Injunctions 17
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(2014)("Equity will not usually issue an injunction when the
act complained of has been committed and the injury has
already occurred.").  The specific actions Irwin sought to
enjoin –- the administration of a new examination for the
position of Trussville's police chief and the appointment of
a candidate to the position of police chief who was not on the
January 
2017 
certified 
list 
–- 
have 
now 
occurred. 
Accordingly, it is now impossible to provide Irwin the relief
he requests.2  See Woods v. SunTrust Bank, 81 So. 3d 357, 363
(Ala. Civ. App. 2011) (holding that a request for injunctive
relief to prevent a foreclosure was moot once the foreclosure
had taken place).
 
Furthermore, we note that Irwin has made no response to
the mootness argument in this Court, and we are not inclined
to make and address legal arguments as to mootness on his
2Even if the trial court could, on remand, restore the
prejudgment status quo by issuance of a permanent mandatory
injunction, such an injunction would amount to a collateral
attack on the appointment of the currently serving police
chief, who is not a party to this action.  Under the
circumstances presented to us, we are not sure this would be
an appropriate exercise of the court's equitable powers.  See
63C Am. Jur. 2d Public Officers & Employees § 472 (2009).  At
any rate, Irwin has not requested such relief.
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behalf.  See Dykes v. Lane Trucking, Inc., 652 So. 2d 248, 251
(Ala. 1994) ("[I]t is not the function of this Court to do a
party's legal research or to make and address legal arguments
for a party ....").
Accordingly, we conclude that Irwin's claims for
injunctive relief have become moot.  Therefore, we are
compelled to dismiss the appeal.  See South Alabama Gas Dist.
v. Knight, 138 So. 3d 971, 976 (Ala. 2013).
III.  Conclusion
Irwin's claims for injunctive relief have become moot. 
"'[T]his Court will not consider the merits of a claim that is
moot.'" Knight, 138 So. 3d at 978 (quoting Town of Elmore v.
Town of Coosada, 957 So. 2d 1096, 1100 (Ala. 2006)).  Thus,
the appeal is dismissed.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Stuart, C.J., and Parker, Bryan, and Mendheim, JJ.,
concur.  
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