Case Title: Kenneth Louis Dessaure v. State of Florida

Citation: 

Docket Number: SC09-393

State: florida

Court: Florida Supreme Court

Date: 2010-10-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
Supreme Court of Florida 
 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-393 
____________ 
 
KENNETH LOUIS DESSAURE,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
STATE OF FLORIDA,  
Appellee. 
 
____________ 
 
No. SC09-1551 
____________ 
 
KENNETH LOUIS DESSAURE,  
Appellant, 
 
vs. 
 
WALTER A. McNEIL, etc., 
Appellee. 
 
[October 7, 2010] 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Kenneth Dessaure appeals an order of the trial court denying his motion to 
vacate his conviction for first-degree murder and sentence of death filed under 
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851.  He also petitions this Court for a writ 
2 
 
of habeas corpus.1  For the reasons explained below, we affirm the trial court‘s 
order denying postconviction relief.  We also deny the habeas petition. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Dessaure was charged with the 1999 murder of Cindy Riedweg.  Dessaure v. 
State, 891 So. 2d 455, 457 (Fla. 2004).  The jury found Dessaure guilty of first-
degree murder.2  And the trial court sentenced Dessaure to death.3  Id. at 457. 
 
The evidence presented at Dessaure‘s trial revealed that Dessaure lived with 
two other people in an apartment in Oldsmar, Florida, and that Ms. Riedweg 
moved into the apartment next door a couple of weeks before the murder.  Id.  On 
the day of the murder, another neighbor testified that he encountered Dessaure in 
the parking lot, and Dessaure told him that he thought someone was dead or dying 
in Ms. Riedweg‘s apartment.  Id.  The neighbor asked Dessaure how he knew this, 
and Dessaure replied that he went to Ms. Riedweg‘s apartment to ask for ice and 
looked in.  Id.  The neighbor said Dessaure appeared nervous and that he told 
Dessaure to call 911 because he wanted nothing to do with the situation.  Id.  
                                          
 
 
1.  We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(1), (9), Fla. Const. 
 
2.  ―The jury, utilizing a general verdict form, found Dessaure guilty of first-
degree murder as charged.  It did not specify whether he was found guilty of 
premeditated first-degree murder, felony first-degree murder, or both.  However, 
the jury was instructed as to both premeditated murder and felony murder.‖  
Dessaure, 891 So. 2d at 457 n.1. 
 
3.  Dessaure waived his right to a penalty phase jury. 
3 
 
Thereafter, Dessaure called 911 and reported to the operators that his next-door 
neighbor was dead.  Id.  On the 911 tape, which was played for the jury at trial, 
Dessaure stated that he saw Ms. Riedweg outside sunbathing, he went to her 
apartment to see if she had any ice, and when she did not answer the door, he went 
in through the unlocked door and found her lying in the middle of the floor.  Id. at 
458.    
 
When the paramedics arrived, they entered Ms. Riedweg‘s apartment and 
found her lying face down on the floor in a pool of blood.  Id.  She had stab 
wounds on her upper back and shoulders, she had no pulse, and she was not 
breathing.  Id.  After they rolled her over, they discovered that her throat had been 
slashed.  Id.  The assistant medical examiner testified that Ms. Riedweg had a total 
of fifty-three wounds including bruises, scrapes, pick marks, cuts, and stab 
wounds, and that her throat was slashed.  Id. at 461.  The assistant medical 
examiner further testified that  
[t]here were five defensive wounds to the hands, three wounds that 
penetrated the trachea, three that damaged and collapsed the lungs, 
two that cut the exterior jugular vein, one that cut the liver, one that 
struck a vertebra, and one that cut a spinal nerve.  [The assistant 
medical examiner] testified that Riedweg could have remained 
conscious for four to six minutes after her lungs collapsed, and she 
could have survived from four to ten minutes.  Electrical activity 
could have continued for a few minutes more, perhaps ten to fifteen 
minutes.  Multiple stab wounds of the torso and neck were the cause 
of death. 
 
 
4 
 
Id.   
 
Other evidence established that several blood stains matching Ms. 
Riedweg‘s DNA profile were found on Dessaure‘s shorts.  Id.  Dessaure‘s footprint 
was discovered in Ms. Riedweg‘s kitchen, and Dessaure‘s semen was found on a 
towel in her bathroom and on a piece of fabric from her bedroom comforter.  Id.  
 
In imposing the death sentence, the trial court found four aggravating 
circumstances:  (1) the crime was committed while Dessaure was previously 
convicted of a felony and under community control; (2) Dessaure had been 
previously convicted of a felony involving the use or threat of violence; (3) the 
crime was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and (4) the crime was committed 
during a burglary.  Id. at 464.  The trial court found no statutory mitigating 
circumstances, but noted the following nonstatutory mitigating circumstances:  
(1) Dessaure was twenty-one years old (some weight); (2) Dessaure 
has the capacity and desire to be a loving parent (little weight); (3) 
Dessaure‘s family life was dysfunctional while he was growing up, 
his parents abandoned him to be raised by his grandmother, and his 
older brother died in a traffic accident (some weight); (4) Dessaure 
has the capacity to form personal relationships (little weight); and (5) 
Dessaure was well behaved in court (little weight). 
 
Id. n.4.  
 
 
This Court affirmed Dessaure‘s conviction and sentence.  Id. at 473.  
Dessaure subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief in the trial court, 
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which the trial court denied.4  Dessaure now appeals the denial of postconviction 
relief.  Dessaure has also filed a habeas petition alleging that his appellate counsel 
was ineffective. 
II.  DESSAURE’S PENALTY PHASE CLAIMS 
 
Dessaure claims that the trial court erred in finding that Dessaure‘s trial 
counsel was not ineffective for (1) failing to move for a competency determination 
after Dessaure waived the presentation of mitigation evidence to a penalty phase  
jury; and (2) failing to present the mitigation testimony of Dr. Michael Maher at 
his Spencer5 hearing.  Because Dessaure has failed to prove that his counsel‘s 
performance was deficient or that the deficient performance prejudiced him, we 
                                          
 
 
4.  Dessaure‘s postconviction motion alleged:  (1) his counsel was 
ineffective in failing to investigate and file pretrial motions; (2) his counsel was 
ineffective during jury selection; (3) his counsel was ineffective for failing to 
develop a theory of defense other than one of mere reasonable doubt; (4) his 
counsel was ineffective for allowing Dessaure to waive a jury at the penalty phase; 
(5) he was denied effective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase; (6) his 
due process rights were violated because the State failed to disclose exculpatory or 
impeaching testimony and presented false evidence, testimony, and argument to 
the jury; (7) his counsel was ineffective for failing to discuss his right to testify at 
the penalty phase; (8) execution by lethal injection is cruel and unusual 
punishment; (9) he should be allowed to withdraw his waiver of the right to present 
mitigation to a jury at the penalty phase, his waiver of argument for a life sentence, 
and his waiver of presentation of additional mitigation evidence; and (10) the 
cumulative effect of constitutional error throughout the proceedings denied him his 
constitutional rights.   
 
5.  Spencer v. State, 615 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1993). 
6 
 
affirm the trial court‘s denial of relief.   See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 687 (1984).    
 
A.  Competency Evaluation After Dessaure Waived Mitigation  
 
Dessaure first claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for allowing 
Dessaure to waive his right to a jury in the penalty phase without ordering a 
competency hearing.  Dessaure particularly relies on language contained in the 
forms he signed in waiving a penalty phase jury, namely that Dessaure joined the 
State in seeking the death penalty.  Dessaure claims that this language is 
―extraordinary‖ and proves that he should have been given a second competency 
hearing.  We disagree.   
Florida law provides that a defendant must be given a competency 
examination only if the court or defense counsel ―has reasonable ground to believe 
that the defendant is not mentally competent to proceed.‖  Fla. R. Crim. P. 
3.210(b).  Once a defendant has been deemed competent, the presumption of 
competence continues throughout all subsequent proceedings.  Boyd v. State, 910 
So. 2d 167, 187 (Fla. 2005) (citing Durocher v. Singletary, 623 So. 2d 482, 484 
(Fla. 1993)).  A subsequent competency hearing is only required ―if a bona fide 
question as to the defendant‘s competency has been raised.‖  Id. (citing Hunter v. 
State, 660 So. 2d 244, 248 (Fla. 1995)).  If there is ―no reason to suspect that a 
defendant is incompetent,‖ then ―it cannot be deficient performance if counsel does 
7 
 
not request a competency examination.‖  Nixon v. State, 932 So. 2d 1009, 1020 
(Fla. 2006) ( ―[T]rial counsel had no reason to request a competency determination 
[because defendant] had been examined by a mental health expert who did not give 
trial counsel any reason to delve further into competency.‖). 
Here, defense counsel was not ineffective for not requesting an additional 
competency hearing for Dessaure.  Prior to the beginning of trial, Dr. Maher 
evaluated Dessaure for competency and concluded that Dessaure was competent to 
stand trial and to make penalty phase decisions, even in light of his posttraumatic 
stress disorder and history of suicide attempts.   In addition, three of Dessaure‘s 
defense attorneys, Messrs. Cobb, Schwartzberg, and Watts, testified at an 
evidentiary hearing regarding their confidence in Dessaure‘s competency.  Mr. 
Cobb testified that he could not recall anything about the results of that 
examination that suggested Dessaure was not competent to stand trial and assist 
counsel.  Mr. Schwartzberg stated that he stood by Dessaure‘s decision to waive 
his right to a penalty phase jury because Dessaure gave a considerable amount of 
thought to the waiver and that all three talked to Dessaure about it.  Mr. Watts 
testified that he consulted Dr. Maher about the penalty phase, and both believed 
Dessaure was competent to make waiver-type decisions.  Mr. Watts further 
testified that he spent roughly thirty hours with Dessaure discussing the case, 
8 
 
Dessaure‘s background, and the penalty phase, and that Dessaure consistently 
maintained that he did not want a penalty phase.   
The record also shows that the trial judge engaged in multiple colloquies 
with Dessaure to confirm that his waivers were knowing and voluntary, that 
Dessaure understood his right to present mitigation evidence, and that his decision 
not to present mitigation was against his attorneys‘ advice.  In sum, nothing in the 
trial proceedings raised a bona fide question about Dessaure‘s competency.   
We also disagree that the language contained in the signed waiver was 
―extraordinary‖ or by itself draws Dessaure‘s competency into question.  The 
record makes clear that Dessaure‘s lawyers explained to him on multiple occasions 
that he should reconsider his decision to waive mitigation.  His attorney was 
prepared to present mitigation and also proffered the mitigating circumstances in 
court.  Dessaure had many opportunities to change his mind regarding mitigation.  
Therefore, the waiver was nothing extraordinary, but rather a signed 
acknowledgement of the possible result of his actions. 
Accordingly, defense counsel cannot be rendered ineffective for not 
requesting additional competency testing when Dessaure waived his right to 
present mitigation. 
 
 
9 
 
B.  Testimony of Dr. Maher at the Spencer Hearing  
Dessaure next claims that his counsel was ineffective for not presenting the 
testimony of Dr. Maher at the Spencer hearing.  We disagree.   
 
The law is well-established that a competent defendant may control 
decisions pertaining to his defense, including the presentation of mitigation 
evidence, and that counsel will not be rendered ineffective for following a 
competent defendant‘s wishes.  See Hamblen v. State, 527 So. 2d 800, 804 (Fla. 
1988) (―[I]n the final analysis, all competent defendants have a right to control 
their own destinies.‖).   
 
Here, Dessaure repeatedly made it clear that he did not want to present 
mitigation to a penalty phase jury.  Yet, despite Dessaure‘s insistence that he did 
not want a penalty phase and despite his lack of cooperation, Dessaure‘s defense 
counsel investigated all possible mitigation in preparation for the penalty phase.  
Defense counsel then proffered the mitigation to the trial court, including that Dr. 
Maher diagnosed Dessaure with posttraumatic stress disorder arising from 
childhood trauma within his family and that as a result of that disorder, at the time 
he committed the crime, he would have had difficulty conforming his behavior to 
the requirements of the law and would have been under extreme emotional 
disturbance. 
10 
 
 
After each proffer of mitigation testimony, the trial judge asked Dessaure if 
he understood that this testimony could be used to establish a mitigating factor for 
the court to consider, and also if he understood that by not allowing counsel to 
present any evidence to support this proffer, the court would not consider it in 
sentencing.  To each question, Dessaure answered that he understood.  Dessaure 
also reaffirmed his decision not to present any evidence to support the mitigation 
and not to present any legal argument against any aggravating circumstance.  After 
each proffer of mitigation, Dessaure was asked whether he was continuing to 
exercise his right not to present evidence of mitigation; and he insisted that he was.   
 
Later, at his family‘s prompting, Dessaure decided that he did want to 
present some mitigation at his Spencer hearing.  As a result, defense counsel 
presented the mitigation testimony of Mary Parent, the mother of Dessaure‘s child, 
and Louise Randal, Dessaure‘s grandmother.  Dessaure also testified on his own 
behalf and asked the judge to impose a life sentence.  Thereafter, defense counsel 
informed the court that Dessaure waived his right to present any additional 
testimony or evidence, and the following exchange took place: 
Court:  What are you waiving now, Mr. Watts? 
 
Defense Counsel:  Judge, further evidence.  I have advised Mr. 
Dessaure that we‘ve prepared a complete penalty phase and that 
we‘ve proffered some and then we‘ve presented some evidence.  We 
could have asked this Court for more time to present Dr. Mayer or 
anybody else on the witness list.  And that is the purpose of the 
waiver. 
11 
 
 
Court:  So, Mr. Dessaure, at this point you‘re waiving your right to 
present any additional testimony or evidence at this time; is that right? 
 
Dessaure:  Yes, sir. 
 
Then, Dessaure signed a written waiver stating that (1) he was aware that 
additional mitigating evidence existed and could be presented to the trial court as 
evidence; (2) he understood that the mitigation that was proffered was not evidence 
that could be weighed by the trial court; (3) his attorneys had advised him that they 
would be glad to call additional witnesses and present additional evidence and that 
the court would likely allow the presentation of evidence; and (4) ―[h]aving been 
advised of the above, and understanding, I hereby waive presentation of additional 
mitigation and rely on the record as it stands, for the Court‘s consideration of my 
sentence.‖ 
 
In sum, Dessaure‘s counsel was prepared and proffered all mitigation at a 
sentencing hearing, including the findings of Dr. Maher.  When Dessaure changed 
his mind about presenting some mitigation at the Spencer hearing, defense counsel 
presented the testimony of Ms. Randal and Ms. Parent.  Mr. Watts then informed 
the trial court that he could also present the testimony of Dr. Maher, but that 
Dessaure did not wish to present additional mitigation.  And Dessaure signed a 
waiver acknowledging as much.  Defense counsel cannot be ineffective for 
12 
 
following Dessaure‘s direction under these circumstances.  Accordingly, we affirm 
the trial court‘s denial of this claim. 
III.  DESSAURE’S HABEAS CLAIMS 
 
Dessaure also filed a petition for habeas corpus claiming that his appellate 
counsel was ineffective for (1) failing to raise on direct appeal that the jury 
instructions constituted fundamental error by improperly instructing the jury on 
felony murder and other charges not contained in the grand jury indictment; and 
(2) failing to raise instances of prosecutorial misconduct.  
 
 ―[W]hen evaluating a claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, 
this Court must determine:  (1) whether the alleged omissions are of such 
magnitude as to constitute a serious error or substantial deficiency falling 
measurably outside the range of professionally acceptable performance, and (2) 
whether the deficiency in performance compromised the appellate process to such 
a degree as to undermine confidence in the correctness of the result.‖  Lowe v. 
State, 2 So. 3d 21, 42 (Fla. 2008) (citing Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So. 2d 798, 800 
(Fla. 1986)).  Because Dessaure has not shown that his appellate counsel was 
ineffective according to these standards, we hold that he is not entitled to habeas 
relief.     
 
 
 
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A.  Challenging the Jury Instructions on Direct Appeal 
 
Dessaure first claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not 
challenging the jury instruction on first-degree felony murder when the indictment 
charged first-degree premeditated murder.  However, this Court has long held that 
this type of instruction is proper.  See Williams v. State, 967 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 
2007).  In Williams, this Court explained:  
―It is well established that an indictment which charges premeditated 
murder permits the State to prosecute under both the premeditated and 
felony murder theories.‖  Parker v. State, 904 So. 2d 370, 382-83 (Fla. 
2005).  We have further held that ―[t]he State need not charge felony 
murder in an indictment in order to prosecute a defendant under 
alternative theories of premeditated and felony murder when the 
indictment charges premeditated murder.‖  Kearse v. State, 662 So. 2d 
677, 682 (Fla. 1995).  Similarly, this Court has ―repeatedly rejected 
claims that it is error for a trial court to allow the State to pursue a 
felony murder theory when the indictment gave no notice of the 
theory.‖  Gudinas [v. State], 693 So. 2d [953, 964 (Fla. 1997)].   
 
Williams, 967 So. 2d at 758-59.  ―Appellate counsel cannot be deemed ineffective 
for failing to raise a claim which ‗would in all probability‘ have been without merit 
or would have been procedurally barred on direct appeal.‖  Mansfield v. State, 911 
So. 2d 1160, 1178 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Williamson v. Dugger, 651 So. 2d 84, 86 
(Fla. 1994)).  Consequently, appellate counsel cannot be considered ineffective 
here. 
 
Dessaure also asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
assert that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on sexual battery when it was 
14 
 
not charged in the indictment and when there was insufficient evidence to support 
it.  But this Court has also rejected the claim that the indictment must provide 
notice of the underlying felonies used to prove felony murder.  See id. at 1178-79.  
―Because the State has no obligation to charge felony murder in the indictment, it 
similarly has no obligation to give notice of the underlying felonies that it will rely 
upon to prove felony murder.‖  Id. at 1179 (quoting Kearse v. State, 662 So. 2d 
677, 682 (Fla. 1995)).  And despite Dessaure‘s assertion to the contrary, there was 
ample evidence here to support that a sexual battery occurred—the victim was 
found naked and face down on the floor; Dessaure‘s semen was found on a towel 
near the victim‘s body and on her bed linens; and a witness testified that Dessaure 
told him he struck the victim and began having sex with her.  Therefore, this claim 
is meritless, and counsel cannot be ineffective for not raising it on appeal. 
 
B.  Raising the Issue of Prosecutorial Misconduct 
 
Dessaure also argues that appellate counsel should have argued that the 
prosecutor‘s arguments during closing were improper.  He specifically objects to 
the last comments made after the prosecutor led the jury through all the evidence in 
the case: 
And when we started this trial he had a presumption of innocence and 
he only enjoyed that presumption at the start of the trial.  Once the 
first witness was called, once the evidence began to be presented, the 
State chipped and chipped away at that cloak, that shield he can hide 
behind.  And as you sit here now, he no longer enjoys that 
presumption because we have proven our case. 
15 
 
 
 
 
We reject this claim for two reasons.  First, this claim was not preserved by 
trial counsel with an objection, and, in the absence of fundamental error, ―appellate 
counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to raise claims which were not preserved 
due to trial counsel‘s failure to object.‖  Brown v. State, 846 So. 2d 1114, 1127 
(Fla. 2003) (quoting Johnson v. Singletary, 695 So. 2d 263, 266 (Fla. 1996)); see 
also Rodriguez v. State, 919 So. 2d 1252, 1281-82 (Fla. 2005) (―Appellate counsel 
is not ineffective for failing to raise issues not preserved for appeal.  However, an 
exception is made where appellate counsel fails to raise a claim which, although 
not preserved at trial, represents fundamental error.‖ (citations omitted)).  Second, 
this claim is meritless.   
 
In Easterly v. State, 22 So. 3d 807 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), the First District 
Court of Appeal distinguished a prosecutor‘s comment which states his opinion or 
belief that the evidence is strong from a prosecutor‘s comment which projects a 
statement of the law.  In Easterly, the prosecutor stated during closing:  
The testimonial evidence in this case, the physical evidence in this 
case, has not only removed the presumption of innocence from this 
man, it has torn it away and shown him for what he did to [K.D.] on 
[sic] May of 2004 when he raped her. 
 
22 So. 3d at 816.  The First District held that the comment did not constitute 
fundamental error because it ―was tied directly to the prosecutor‘s perspective on 
the strength of the evidence.‖  Id. at 817; see also Dailey v. State, 965 So. 2d 38, 
16 
 
44 (Fla. 2007) (―Regarding the prosecutor‘s statements concerning Dailey‘s 
presumption of innocence, we agree with the trial court that when read in context, 
the comments appear to be a statement by the prosecutor of her belief that the State 
satisfied its burden of proof.  Therefore, counsel‘s failure to object was not 
deficient.‖).   
 
Likewise here, the prosecutor‘s comments do not constitute error because 
the comments were directly tied to the prosecutor‘s perspective on the strength of 
the evidence.  Specifically, after the prosecutor reviewed all of the evidence 
presented in the case, she stated that, although Dessaure enjoyed the presumption 
of innocence at the beginning of the trial, ―the State chipped and chipped away at 
that cloak [and] he no longer enjoys that presumption because we have proven our 
case.‖  These comments clearly reflect the prosecutor‘s opinion of the evidence 
and are not projecting a statement of the law.  Accordingly, this issue is without 
merit.  And appellate counsel cannot be rendered ineffective for not raising an 
unpreserved and otherwise meritless claim on appeal.   
 
Dessaure also argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
raise on direct appeal that the prosecution knowingly presented the false testimony 
of two jailhouse informants who testified about statements Dessaure made to them.  
This claim is meritless because Dessaure has not proven that the informants‘ 
17 
 
testimony was false or that the prosecution knew the testimony was false.  See 
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).   
 
 
Accordingly, we reject this claim. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court‘s order denying Dessaure‘s 
rule 3.851 motion, and we deny his habeas petition.   
 
It is so ordered. 
CANADY, C.J., and PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, POLSTON, LABARGA, 
and PERRY, JJ., concur. 
 
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND 
IF FILED, DETERMINED. 
 
 
Two Cases: 
 
An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County,  
Richard A. Luce, Judge – Case No. CRC99-15522CFANO 
And Original Proceeding – Habeas Corpus 
 
Eric C. Pinkard of Robbins Equitas, St. Petersburg, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellant/Petitioner 
 
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, and Stephen D. Ake, 
Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, 
 
 
for Appellee/Respondent