Case Title: State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Johnson

Citation: 2005-Ohio-4384

Docket Number: 20040394

State: ohio

Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Date: 2005-09-07T00:00:00Z

Document:
[Cite as State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Johnson, 106 Ohio St.3d 160, 2005-Ohio-4384.] 
 
 
THE STATE EX REL. DISPATCH PRINTING COMPANY  
ET AL. v. JOHNSON, DIR., ET AL. 
[Cite as State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Johnson, 
106 Ohio St.3d 160, 2005-Ohio-4384.] 
Public records — R.C. 149.43 — State-employee home addresses not public 
records subject to disclosure. 
(No. 2004-0394 — Submitted May 10, 2005 — Decided September 7, 2005.) 
IN MANDAMUS. 
__________________ 
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT 
State-employee home addresses are generally not “records” under R.C. 
149.011(G) and are thus not subject to disclosure under R.C. 149.43, the 
Public Records Act.  (State ex rel. Public Emp. Retirees, Inc. v. Public 
Emp. Retirement Sys. (1979), 60 Ohio St.2d 93, 14 O.O.3d 331, 397 
N.E.2d 1191, and Police & Fire Retirees of Ohio, Inc. v. Police & 
Firemen’s Disability & Pension Fund (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 231, 18 OBR 
289, 480 N.E.2d 482, overruled to the extent that they are inconsistent 
herewith). 
__________________ 
 
ALICE ROBIE RESNICK, J. 
{¶ 1} In this case, we determine whether state-employee home addresses 
are public records for purposes of the Public Records Act.  For the reasons 
specified, we hold that in general, state-employee home addresses are not 
“records” under R.C. 149.011(G) and 149.43 because they do not document the 
organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other 
activities of the state and its agencies.  Consequently, state-employee home 
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addresses are not subject to disclosure under the Public Records Act, and the 
Dispatch is not entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel disclosure of the 
addresses. 
{¶ 2} Relator the Dispatch Printing Company publishes the Columbus 
Dispatch, a daily newspaper, and relator Alan W. Johnson is a Dispatch reporter 
(collectively referred to as “Dispatch”).  Respondent, Ohio Department of 
Administrative Services (“DAS”), maintains an electronic database of payroll 
records for state employees and an electronic file to facilitate the distribution of 
W-2 forms to state employees.  The payroll records identify a state employee’s 
name, employment address, residential address, position, and salary.  Each W-2 
electronic file contains the names, residential addresses, and salaries of state 
employees. 
{¶ 3} From 1992 to 2002, upon request, DAS provided the Dispatch with 
copies of a computerized file of state-employee payroll records, which included 
state-employee home addresses.  DAS did not redact the home addresses from the 
records provided to the Dispatch. 
{¶ 4} In April or May 2003 and on November 10, 2003, the Dispatch 
requested that DAS provide it with “payroll records for all state employees, 
including names, addresses, job and agency titles and all pay fields.” 
{¶ 5} On December 18, 2003, the Dispatch requested that DAS provide 
it with a copy of the electronic file used to distribute the 2002 W-2 forms to state 
employees.  On January 30, 2004, the Dispatch requested that DAS provide a 
copy of the electronic file used to distribute the 2003 W-2 forms to state 
employees.  In each of these two requests, the Dispatch specified, “In the event 
information other than the names, residential addresses and salaries of state 
employees appears within this file, we have no objection, for purposes of this 
request, to the redaction of this information.” 
{¶ 6} DAS refused the Dispatch’s requests for payroll and W-2 records. 
January Term, 2005 
3 
{¶ 7} On April 12, 2004, the Dispatch requested that DAS and the 
various other state-agency respondents1 provide it with copies of documents, 
mailing lists, rosters, and payroll information containing current employees’ home 
addresses.  The Dispatch requested that the records be provided in electronic 
format insofar as they were kept in that format.  Respondents refused to release 
these records.  On April 14, 2004, the Dispatch again requested that DAS provide 
copies of the W-2 records. 
{¶ 8} In May 2004, the Dispatch requested that the state-agency 
respondents give it copies of biweekly payroll reports provided by DAS from 
January 1 through January 31, 2004, biweekly reports provided to AFSCME or 
any other union or collective bargaining unit during January 2004, and biweekly 
nongovernmental vendor reports provided to any nongovernmental vendor in 
January 2004.  Again, the Dispatch requested these records in electronic format if 
the state agencies kept the records in that format.  The state agencies refused to 
release these records. 
{¶ 9} In responding to the Dispatch’s requests, the state initially took the 
position that state-employee home addresses are not records under the Public 
Records Act.  Ultimately, however, the state notified the agencies of the 
Dispatch’s requests and asked that each agency determine which employees’ 
home addresses should be exempted from disclosure to the Dispatch based upon 
the peace officer, firefighter, or emergency medical technician (“EMT”) 
                                                 
1.  These state-agency respondents are the Adjutant General’s Department, Department of Aging, 
Department of Agriculture, Department of Alcohol and Drug Addiction Services, Office of Budget 
and Management, Department of Commerce, Office of Criminal Justice Services, Department of 
Development, Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Health, Department of Insurance, 
Department of Job and Family Services, Lottery Commission, Department of Mental Health, 
Department of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, Department of Public Safety, 
Department of Natural Resources, Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, Department of 
Taxation, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Workers’ Compensation, and Department of 
Youth Services. 
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residential-and-familial-information exception and the constitutional right of 
privacy. 
{¶ 10} On March 3, 2004, the Dispatch filed this action for a writ of 
mandamus against DAS and its director.  On June 11, 2004, with leave of the 
respondents named in the original complaint, the Dispatch filed an amended 
complaint.  The Dispatch seeks a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to 
produce the requested records immediately and to produce public records in the 
future without delay. 
{¶ 11} On June 28, 2004, respondents DAS and its director moved to 
dismiss the amended complaint.  On July 13, 2004, the remaining respondents 
moved to dismiss the amended complaint by incorporating the motion of 
respondents DAS and its director to dismiss.  On August 27, 2004, we denied 
respondents’ motions to dismiss, granted the motions of Ohio Civil Service 
Employees Association, AFSCME Local 11, AFL-CIO (“OCSEA”), and Ohio 
Education Association (“OEA”), unions representing many state employees, to 
intervene as additional respondents, granted an alternative writ, and issued a 
schedule for the presentation of evidence and briefs.  State ex rel. Dispatch 
Printing Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ohio St.3d 1422, 2004-Ohio-4510, 814 N.E.2d 487.  
On October 1, 2004, we denied the motion of DAS, its director, and the state-
agency respondents for a protective order and extended the schedule for evidence 
and briefs.  State ex rel. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Johnson, 103 Ohio St.3d 1470, 
2004-Ohio-5315, 815 N.E.2d 1122. 
{¶ 12} The parties filed extensive evidence on November 1, 2004.  The 
evidence established that around August 24, 2004, the state-agency respondents 
provided the Dispatch with the home addresses of approximately 1,700 state 
employees from 39 state entities.  In late October 2004, the state-agency 
respondents provided the Dispatch with home addresses of state employees from 
42 additional state entities.  According to the state-agency respondents, DAS and 
January Term, 2005 
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all of the state-agency respondents other than the Department of Rehabilitation 
and Correction (“DRC”) and the Department of Mental Health (“DMH”) provided 
the home addresses of 44,376 state employees and withheld the home addresses 
of only (1) 2,938 peace officers, EMTs, and firefighters and (2) 300 employees 
who fear that disclosure of their home addresses will jeopardize their families’ 
safety.  DRC provided the Dispatch with the home addresses of 121 of its 
employees and withheld the home addresses of 14,274 of its employees on the 
basis that these employees would face a substantial risk of serious bodily harm if 
their residential addresses were disclosed.  DMH provided the Dispatch with the 
home addresses of all of its employees except for (1) 117 peace officers, (2) 3 
firefighters, (3) 3 EMTs, and (4) 1,705 employees who would face a substantial 
risk of serious bodily harm from the disclosure of these addresses. 
{¶ 13} The parties filed their briefs, and the National Fraternal Order of 
Police, Cleveland Municipal Court, and city of Cleveland filed amicus curiae 
briefs in support of respondents.  Briefing was completed on January 24, 2005. 
{¶ 14} On March 16, 2005, the court sua sponte granted oral argument, 
which was conducted on May 10, 2005. 
Mandamus:  General Standards in Public-Records Cases 
{¶ 15} The Dispatch contends that a writ of mandamus should issue 
compelling the state agencies to release the state-employee residential addresses 
they have withheld and that a writ of mandamus should be granted to address the 
state agencies’ unreasonable delay in responding to the Dispatch’s records 
requests. 
{¶ 16} Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel compliance with 
R.C. 149.43, Ohio’s Public Records Act.  State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing 
Co. v. Akron, 104 Ohio St.3d 399, 2004-Ohio-6557, 819 N.E.2d 1087, ¶ 23.  In 
analyzing a public-records mandamus claim, “ ‘R.C. 149.43 [the Public Records 
Act] is construed liberally in favor of broad access, and any doubt is resolved in 
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favor of disclosure of public records.’ ”  (Brackets sic.)  Gilbert v. Summit Cty., 
104 Ohio St.3d 660, 2004-Ohio-7108, 821 N.E.2d 564, ¶ 7, quoting State ex rel. 
Cincinnati Enquirer v. Hamilton Cty. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 374, 376, 662 N.E.2d 
334. 
Mandamus:  R.C. 149.43 and 149.011(G):  Records 
{¶ 17} DRC, DMH, OCSEA, OEA, and amici curiae all assert that the 
Dispatch is not entitled to the requested state-employee home addresses because 
they are not records for purposes of R.C. 149.43.  R.C. 149.43(A)(1) provides:  “ 
‘Public record’ means records kept by any public office, including, but not limited 
to, state [offices].”  It is uncontroverted that the state-agency respondents are 
public offices.  See R.C. 149.011(A) (“ ‘Public office’ includes any state agency”) 
and (B) (“ ‘State agency’ includes every department, bureau, board, commission, 
office, or other organized body established by the constitution and laws of this 
state for the exercise of any function of state government”). 
{¶ 18} At issue is whether state-employee home addresses are records.  
R.C. 149.011(G) defines “records” for purposes of the Public Records Act to 
include “any document, device, or item, regardless of physical form or 
characteristic, including an electronic record as defined in section 1306.01 of the 
Revised Code, created or received by or coming under the jurisdiction of any 
public office of the state or its political subdivisions, which serves to document 
the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other 
activities of the office.” 
{¶ 19} Therefore, in order to establish that state-employee home addresses 
are records for purposes of R.C. 149.011(G) and 149.43, the Dispatch must prove 
that home addresses are (1) documents, devices, or items, (2) created or received 
by or coming under the jurisdiction of the state agencies, (3) which serve to 
document the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, 
or other activities of the office.  If the Dispatch fails to prove any of these three 
January Term, 2005 
7 
requirements, it will not be entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel access to the 
requested state-employee home addresses because those records are not subject to 
disclosure under the Public Records Act. 
{¶ 20} State-employee home addresses satisfy the first two requirements 
of this three-part test for “records” under R.C. 149.011(G):  home addresses are 
(1) items (2) received by state agencies from their employees. 
{¶ 21} Therefore, whether state-employee home addresses are records 
depends upon whether these addresses meet the final requirement specified in 
R.C. 149.011(G), which is that they “serve[ ] to document the organization, 
functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities” of the 
state agencies.  Our paramount concern in construing statutes is legislative intent.  
State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey, 103 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004-Ohio-4960, 815 
N.E.2d 1107, ¶ 21.  “In discerning this intent, we read words and phrases in 
context according to the rules of grammar and common usage.”  State ex rel. Lee 
v. Karnes, 103 Ohio St.3d 559, 2004-Ohio-5718, 817 N.E.2d 76, ¶ 23, citing R.C. 
1.42.  “If the statute is unambiguous, we must apply it as written.”  Id. 
{¶ 22} Applying the rules of grammar and common usage to R.C. 
149.011(G), we determine that the Dispatch must establish that state-employee 
home addresses create a written record of the structure, duties, general 
management principles, agency determinations, specific methods, processes, or 
other acts of the state agencies. 
{¶ 23} The Dispatch relies on evidence that state agencies ask that 
employees provide home addresses and that these addresses be updated when 
employees move.  State agencies at times send paychecks and certain 
correspondence to their employees at their home addresses.  State-employee home 
addresses are contained on paycheck stubs and personnel-action forms.  State 
agencies also provide state-employee unions and vendors such as certain health-
insurance companies and charities with records that include state-employee home 
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addresses.  In addition, state-employee home addresses are included in W-2 forms 
provided to federal and state governments. 
{¶ 24} According to the deposition testimony of a DAS representative, 
residential addresses contained in state-agency records are needed and used as 
part of DAS operations. 
{¶ 25} None of this evidence, however, establishes that state-employee 
home addresses “document the organization, functions, policies, decisions, 
procedures, operations, or other activities” of the state agencies within the 
meaning of R.C. 149.011(G).  At best, home addresses represent contact 
information used as a matter of administrative convenience.  See, for example, 
Exhibit A of evidence filed by respondent OEA, in which Judith L. French, then 
Chief Legal Counsel to Governor Bob Taft, responded to a Dispatch request for 
state-employee home addresses by stating that they do not constitute records and 
that a list containing these addresses instead “serves an administrative function 
and allows cost-effective communication to state employees on matters of 
common concern.” 
{¶ 26} Certainly, any state-agency policy requiring that its employees 
provide and update their home addresses would document a policy and procedure 
of a public office, but the home addresses themselves would not do so.  As amici 
curiae city of Cleveland and the Cleveland Municipal Court cogently observe, 
home addresses generally document the places to which state employees return 
after they have performed the work comprising the “organization, functions, 
policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities” of their state 
agencies.  That is, as DRC and DMH argue, “state employees did not agree to 
become a readily available source for media reports or corroboration of 
newspaper stories when they became public servants.” 
{¶ 27} This conclusion is consistent with the purpose of the Public 
Records Act, “which is to expose government activity to public scrutiny.”  State 
January Term, 2005 
9 
ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Winkler, 101 Ohio St.3d 382, 2004-Ohio-1581, 805 
N.E.2d 1094, ¶ 5; State ex rel. WHIO-TV-7 v. Lowe (1997), 77 Ohio St.3d 350, 
355, 673 N.E.2d 1360.  Disclosure of the home addresses of state employees 
“would reveal little or nothing about the employing agencies or their activities.”  
United States Dept. of Defense v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth. (1994), 510 U.S. 
487, 497, 114 S.Ct. 1006, 127 L.Ed.2d 325 (denying a request under federal law 
for home addresses of federal agency employees based on federal privacy 
statutes).  “Inherent in Ohio’s Public Records Law is the public’s right to monitor 
the conduct of government.”  State ex rel. McCleary v. Roberts (2000), 88 Ohio 
St.3d 365, 369, 725 N.E.2d 1144 (personal information ─ including children’s 
names and addresses ─ kept by city recreation and parks department regarding 
children who used city’s recreational facilities did not constitute public records 
for purposes of R.C. 149.43); State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. 
Bond, 98 Ohio St.3d 146, 2002-Ohio-7117, 781 N.E.2d 180 (juror names and 
addresses and juror questionnaire responses are not records under R.C. 149.43).  
As with the requested records in McCleary and Bond, disclosure of state-
employee home addresses would not further the purposes of R.C. 149.43 — i.e., 
disclosure would not help to monitor the conduct of state government. 
{¶ 28} This conclusion further comports with the holdings of two Ohio 
appellate courts and a United States Court of Appeals.  See State ex rel. Jones v. 
Summit Cty. Children Serv. Bd. (Jan. 24, 2001), Summit App. No. 19915, 2001 
WL 96048, * 4 (“Inasmuch as the home addresses of the employees do not 
document the activities of [the county children services board], nor further the 
public’s knowledge of the internal workings of [the board], they do not meet the 
definition of ‘public records’ ”); Miami Valley Child Dev. Ctr., Inc. v. Dist. 925/ 
Serv. Emp. Internatl. Union/ AFL-CIOM, CLC (Feb. 22, 2002), Montgomery 
App. No. 18928, 2002 WL 253637, * 10 (“Certain [public] employee information 
might be pertinent to an entity’s activities or inner workings.  However, we see no 
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possible relevance of the employees’ home addresses.  Therefore, we agree * * * 
that the home addresses of employees are not ‘records,’ as defined by the 
statute”); Am. Fedn. of Govt. Emp., AFL-CIO, Local 1923 v. United States Dept. 
of Health & Human Serv. (C.A.4, 1983), 712 F.2d 931 (list of home addresses of 
federal agency employees is not an agency record under the Freedom of 
Information Act because addresses have nothing to do with agency’s work and 
would shed no light on agency’s inner workings); see, generally, What Are 
“Records” of Agency Which Must Be Made Available Under Freedom of 
Information Act (5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(3)) (1999), 153 ALR Fed. 571, Section 2 
(“While names and addresses have been held to be agency records in some 
circumstances * * *, several courts determined that names and addresses were not 
agency records”). 
{¶ 29} The Dispatch nevertheless contends that because the requested 
home addresses are contained in documents that are manifestly records, e.g., W-2 
forms, biweekly payroll reports, and personnel files, the addresses contained in 
these records are also records.  But simply because an item is received and kept 
by a public office does not transform it into a record under R.C. 149.011(G).  
“[N]ot all items in a personnel file [or other generally public record] may be 
considered public records.”  State ex rel. Fant v. Enright (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 
186, 188, 610 N.E.2d 997.  “To the extent that an item does not serve to document 
the activities of a public office, it is not a public record and need not be 
disclosed.”  Bond, 98 Ohio St.3d 146, 2002-Ohio-7117, 781 N.E.2d 180, ¶ 9.  If 
the converse were true, the General Assembly would not have included the 
requirement in the R.C. 149.011(G) definition of “records” that the document, 
device, or item in question “document the organization, functions, policies, 
decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the office.”  The court 
cannot delete this statutory prerequisite.  Lee, 103 Ohio St.3d 559, 2004-Ohio-
5718, 817 N.E.2d 76, ¶ 25, quoting State v. Hughes (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 424, 
January Term, 2005 
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427, 715 N.E.2d 540 (“ ‘In construing a statute, we may not add or delete words’ 
”). 
{¶ 30} The Dispatch further asserts that the state-employee home 
addresses are records under R.C. 149.011(G) and 149.43 because of our decisions 
in State ex rel. Public Emp. Retirees, Inc. v. Public Emp. Retirement Sys. (1979), 
60 Ohio St.2d 93, 14 O.O.3d 331, 397 N.E.2d 1191, and Police & Fire Retirees of 
Ohio, Inc. v. Police & Firemen’s Disability & Pension Fund (1985), 18 Ohio 
St.3d 231, 18 OBR 289, 480 N.E.2d 482. 
{¶ 31} In Public Emp. Retirees, this court granted a writ of mandamus to 
compel the Public Employees Retirement System of Ohio to provide access to a 
list of names and home addresses of member retirees.  In that case, we determined 
that a statute did not exempt the list from disclosure under R.C. 149.43. 
{¶ 32} In Police & Fire Retirees, this court relied on Public Emp. Retirees 
to grant a writ of mandamus to compel the Police and Firemen’s Disability and 
Pension Fund to provide access to names and home addresses of the fund’s 
members.  See, also, State ex rel. Natl. Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Cleveland 
(1992), 82 Ohio App.3d 202, 213, 611 N.E.2d 838 (home addresses and telephone 
numbers of police officers held to be public records in a case decided before the 
enactment of the R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(p) exemption for “[p]eace officer residential 
and familial information”).  See 148 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 8624, effective 
December 16, 1999. 
{¶ 33} In these cases, however, this court did not analyze whether home 
addresses of state employees constituted records under R.C. 149.011(G).  In fact, 
Public Emp. Retirees was decided six years before R.C. 149.011 was first 
enacted, and that statute had been effective for only 16 days when Police & Fire 
Retirees was decided.  See 141 Ohio Laws, Part II, 2768, effective July 1, 1985. 
{¶ 34} In light of more recent developments in public records law and 
interpretation, we overrule Public Emp. Retirees and Police & Fire Retirees to the 
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extent that those cases hold that home addresses of state employees are public 
records.  Those cases did not analyze the current statutory definition of “records.”  
Further, other courts ─ including two Ohio appellate courts ─ have held 
otherwise.  Abandoning this aspect of Public Emp. Retirees and Police & Fire 
Retirees is consistent with the plain language of R.C. 149.011(G) and more recent 
precedent, including Bond, McCleary, Jones, and Miami Valley. 
{¶ 35} In Miami Valley, Montgomery App. No. 18928, 2002 WL 253637, 
which we find to be particularly well reasoned, the Second District Court of 
Appeals, after thoroughly examining the relevant considerations, persuasively 
explained why public-employee home addresses are not records for purposes of 
Ohio’s Public Records Act.  The Miami Valley court thoughtfully considered 
whether Public Emp. Retirees and Police & Fire Retirees compelled the opposite 
result and concluded that they did not. 
{¶ 36} The Dispatch claims that like the Social Security numbers 
(“SSNs”) of government employees at issue in State ex rel. Beacon Journal 
Publishing Co. v. Akron (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 605, 640 N.E.2d 164, government-
employee home addresses are records under R.C. 149.011(G).  In Akron, 70 Ohio 
St.3d at 606, 640 N.E.2d 164, we observed that SSNs were “records” under the 
Public Records Act because the city used the SSNs as taxpayer-identification 
numbers in employee-payroll files.  Ultimately, however, the court held that 
release of SSNs of city employees would violate the employees’ constitutional 
right of privacy.  Id. at 607, 640 N.E.2d 164.  Therefore, our discussion in Akron 
concerning whether SSNs constituted records under R.C. 149.011(G) was dictum.  
Moreover, unlike the SSNs in Akron, there is no evidence here that state agencies 
use employee home addresses for taxpayer identification. 
{¶ 37} The Dispatch further claims that because the General Assembly 
recently enacted the peace officer, firefighter, and EMT residential-and-familial-
January Term, 2005 
13 
information exemption,2 which includes “the actual personal residence” of peace 
officers, firefighters, and EMTs, the General Assembly could not have intended 
that the R.C. 149.011(G) definition of “records” excludes any other home 
addresses.  R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(p) and (7)(a)(i).  But the impetus for the enactment 
of this exemption was recent case law involving the constitutional right of privacy 
relating to police officers instead of any consideration of whether home addresses 
constituted records in the first instance.  See, e.g., Kallstrom v. Columbus (C.A.6, 
1998), 136 F.3d 1055, 1063-1064; State ex rel. Keller v. Cox (1999), 85 Ohio 
St.3d 279, 282, 707 N.E.2d 931.  Similarly, the General Assembly added the SSN 
of any peace officer to the exemption even though we had already held that this 
information was exempt in Akron.  See former R.C. 149.43(A)(7)(c), now 
149.43(A)(7)(a)(iii), first enacted in 1999, 148 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 8625. 
{¶ 38} In addition, the mere fact that the state agencies have released this 
information to the Dispatch in the past and have released this information to 
certain state-employee unions and nongovernmental vendors does not transform 
the addresses from nonrecords to records.  “An individual’s interest in controlling 
the dissemination of information regarding personal matters does not dissolve 
simply because that information may be available to the public in some form.”  
United States Dept. of Defense, 510 U.S. at 500, 114 S.Ct. 1006, 127 L.Ed.2d 325 
(home addresses of federal agency employees); Scottsdale Unified School Dist. 
No. 48 of Maricopa Cty. v. KPNX Broadcasting Co. (1998), 191 Ariz. 297, 955 
P.2d 534, ¶ 11.  Based on United States Dept. of Defense, the mere fact that the 
state distributes records containing home addresses to state-employee unions and 
certain nongovernmental vendors or that some addresses are available through 
                                                 
2.  The “peace officer” residential exemption was enacted in 1999.  See 148 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 
8624.  The firefighter and EMT exemptions were added in 2002.  See 149 Ohio Laws, Part II, 
3743. 
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other public records, e.g., voter registration and county property records, does not 
extinguish state employees’ privacy interests in those addresses. 
{¶ 39} Finally, we emphasize that there are limited exceptions in which 
public-employee home addresses may constitute records as defined by R.C. 
149.011(G).  For example, when one of the employment requirements is that the 
employee live within a certain state, county, or municipality, that portion of the 
home address constitutes a record for purposes of the Public Records Act.  Cf. 
R.C. 149.43(A)(7)(a)(i), which defines “[p]eace officer, firefighter, or EMT 
residential * * * information” to include the actual personal residence of the peace 
officer, firefighter, or EMT “except for the state or political subdivision in which 
the peace officer, firefighter, or EMT resides.”  And a different result may also 
occur when the public employee’s work address is also that employee’s home 
address. 
{¶ 40} Therefore, based on the plain language of R.C. 149.011(G), 
persuasive case law interpreting that statute, and the overriding purpose of the 
Public Records Act to shed light on government activities, state-employee home 
addresses do not generally constitute records for purposes of R.C. 149.011(G) and 
149.43.  Hence, the state-agency respondents have no duty under R.C. 149.43 to 
disclose these addresses.  Accordingly, we deny the Dispatch’s request for a writ 
of mandamus to compel respondents to produce the requested state-employee 
home addresses.3 
{¶ 41} We stress that our decision is narrow and focuses solely on the 
status of the addresses as “records.”  We are not signaling a retreat from our 
statements in previous cases that courts in Ohio must construe R.C. 149.43 
                                                 
3.  We note that intervening respondent OCSEA’s claim that R.C. 1347.05(G) prohibits release of 
state-employee home addresses is erroneous.  See R.C. 149.43(D) (“Chapter 1347 of the Revised 
Code does not limit the provisions of this section”); see, also, State ex rel. WBNS TV, Inc. v. Dues, 
101 Ohio St.3d 406, 2004-Ohio-1497, 805 N.E.2d 1116, ¶ 34 (“the General Assembly rejected the 
balancing test by clarifying that the Privacy Act does not limit R.C. 149.43”). 
January Term, 2005 
15 
liberally in favor of broad access to and disclosure of public records.  See, e.g., 
Gilbert, 104 Ohio St.3d 660, 2004-Ohio-7108, 821 N.E.2d 564, at ¶ 7.  Today’s 
holding has no application beyond the specific confines of the issue in this case.  
We will reject as unpersuasive the arguments of governmental bodies in future 
cases attempting to place great weight on this case as precedent in unrelated 
contexts. 
Mandamus:  Applicability of Exemptions 
{¶ 42} The Dispatch next argues that the state-agency respondents 
improperly withheld state-employee residential addresses based upon the peace 
officer, firefighter, or EMT residential-and-familial-information exemption and 
the constitutional right of privacy. 
{¶ 43} We need not determine any of these additional claims.  Because 
the requested state-employee home addresses are not records, a consideration of 
the applicability of exemptions to their disclosure, which assumes that they are 
records under R.C. 149.011(G), is unnecessary.  “This is in accordance with our 
general rule that ‘we will not issue advisory opinions * * * .’ ”  State ex rel. Essig 
v. Blackwell, 103 Ohio St.3d 481, 2004-Ohio-5586, 817 N.E.2d 5, ¶ 34, quoting 
State ex rel. Barletta v. Fersch, 99 Ohio St.3d 295, 2003-Ohio-3629, 791 N.E.2d 
452, ¶ 22.  It is also consistent with the precept that “ ‘[c]ourts decide 
constitutional issues only when absolutely necessary.’ ”  Essig at ¶ 34, quoting 
State ex rel. DeBrosse v. Cool (1999), 87 Ohio St.3d 1, 7, 716 N.E.2d 1114.  We 
have applied this rule in public-records cases.  See, e.g., State ex rel. Beacon 
Journal Publishing Co. v. Akron, 104 Ohio St.3d 399, 2004-Ohio-6557, 819 
N.E.2d 1087, ¶ 48. 
Mandamus:  Delay in Producing Requested Records 
{¶ 44} In its amended complaint, the Dispatch also requests a writ of 
mandamus compelling the state-agency respondents to “produce public records in 
the future without delay.”  (Italics and underlining sic.)  The Dispatch is not 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO 
16 
entitled to the requested writ.  It did not prove that state-employee home addresses 
were records subject to disclosure under R.C. 149.43.  Nor did the Dispatch prove 
that the state-agency respondents unreasonably delayed in responding to the 
Dispatch’s requests, given the breadth of the requests and the concerns over the 
employees’ constitutional right of privacy.  And even if the Dispatch had proved 
unreasonable delay, it would not have been entitled to the requested relief.  See 
State ex rel. Consumer News Servs., Inc. v. Worthington City Bd. of Edn., 97 Ohio 
St.3d 58, 2002-Ohio-5311, 776 N.E.2d 82, ¶ 51 (“We refuse, however, to grant 
the specific request by [relator] that respondents provide public records ‘without 
delay,’ because the statutory standard ‘promptly’ relates only to the right to 
inspection, and access to public records will ultimately be dependent upon the 
facts and circumstances of each request”). 
{¶ 45} Therefore, we deny the Dispatch’s request for a writ of mandamus 
to compel the release of public records in the future without delay. 
Attorney Fees 
{¶ 46} We also deny the Dispatch’s request for attorney fees because its 
mandamus claims lack merit.  See State ex rel. Cranford v. Cleveland, 103 Ohio 
St.3d 196, 2004-Ohio-4884, 814 N.E.2d 1218, ¶ 25, quoting State ex rel. Ohio 
Patrolmen’s Benevolent Assn. v. Mentor (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 440, 448, 732 
N.E.2d 969 (“ ‘Relators are not entitled to attorney fees concerning those [public-
records] claims that were meritless’ ”). 
Motion for Sanctions 
{¶ 47} On October 1, 2004, the Dispatch moved for sanctions based on 
alleged discovery abuses by the state-agency respondents in making witnesses and 
documents available.  Citing Civ.R. 37, the Dispatch sought an order (1) holding 
that the records ─ including the residential addresses ─ are public records, (2) 
precluding the state-agency respondents from introducing any evidence, (3) 
holding that the state-agency respondents failed to timely release the requested 
January Term, 2005 
17 
records, and (4) striking the state-agency respondents’ answer and affirmative 
defenses. 
{¶ 48} Under Civ.R. 37(D), if a party fails to attend his deposition, serve 
answers to interrogatories, or respond to a request for inspection, “the court in 
which the action is pending on motion and notice may make such orders in regard 
to the failure as are just, and among others it may take any action authorized 
under subsections (a), (b), and (c) of subdivision (B)(2)” of the rule.  Civ.R. 
37(B)(2)(a), (b), and (c) permit orders establishing certain facts in accordance 
with the movant’s claim, preventing the disobedient party from submitting 
evidence, striking pleadings, and rendering default judgment against the 
disobedient party. 
{¶ 49} Two of the orders requested by the Dispatch are essentially for 
default judgment on its mandamus claims.  “It is an abuse of discretion for a trial 
court to grant a default judgment for failing to respond to discovery requests when 
the record does not show willfulness or bad faith on the part of the responding 
party.”  Toney v. Berkemer (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 455, 6 OBR 496, 453 N.E.2d 
700, syllabus.  Although the state-agency respondents may have failed to timely 
comply with some of the Dispatch’s discovery requests, the record does not 
establish willful disregard of discovery rules or bad faith. 
{¶ 50} Moreover, it would be unjust to punish innocent third parties ─ 
state employees ─ as a result of their public employers’ possible discovery errors.  
Ultimately, the parties presented sufficient evidence on the dispositive issue of 
whether state-employee home addresses are records, as defined in R.C. 
149.011(G).  Cf. State ex rel. Wallace v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio (2000), 89 Ohio 
St.3d 431, 436, 732 N.E.2d 960 (“the Medical Board cannot unilaterally waive 
others’ privileges to confidentiality, because the Medical Board is not the holder 
of those privileges”). 
{¶ 51} Therefore, we deny the Dispatch’s motion. 
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18 
Conclusion 
{¶ 52} Based on the foregoing, we deny the requested writs of mandamus.  
The Dispatch is not entitled to a writ of mandamus to compel the state-agency 
respondents to disclose state employees’ home addresses because they are not 
records under R.C. 149.011(G) and 149.43.  That is, the requested state-employee 
home addresses do not serve to document the organization, functions, policies, 
decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the state agencies, and 
their release would not reveal anything to shed light on the conduct of state 
government.  By so holding, we need not resolve the parties’ remaining 
contentions concerning whether certain exemptions apply to the requested home 
addresses.  The Dispatch is also not entitled to a writ of mandamus to “address” 
the alleged delay by the state-agency respondents in providing the requested 
records.  We additionally deny the Dispatch’s request for attorney fees and 
motion for sanctions. 
Writs denied. 
MOYER, C.J., PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR, O’DONNELL 
and LANZINGER, JJ., concur. 
__________________ 
 
Zeiger, Tigges, Little & Lindsmith, L.L.P., John W. Zeiger, and Marion H. 
Little Jr., for relators. 
 
Jim Petro, Attorney General, William C. Becker and Randall W. Knutti, 
Assistant Attorneys General, for respondents C. Scott Johnson, Department of 
Administrative Services, Adjutant General’s Department, Department of Aging, 
Department of Agriculture, Department of Alcohol and Drug Addiction Services, 
Office of Budget and Management, Department of Commerce, Office of Criminal 
Justice Services, Department of Development, Environmental Protection Agency, 
Department of Health, Department of Insurance, Department of Job and Family 
Services, Lottery Commission, Department of Mental Retardation and 
January Term, 2005 
19 
Developmental Disabilities, Department of Public Safety, Department of Natural 
Resources, Department of Taxation, Department of Transportation, Bureau of 
Workers’ Compensation, and Department of Youth Services. 
 
Bricker & Eckler, L.L.P., Kurtis A. Tunnell, and Maria J. Armstrong, for 
respondents Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction and Ohio 
Department of Mental Health. 
 
Cloppert, Latanick, Sauter & Washburn, Robert W. Sauter, Ronald H. 
Snyder, and Kristin L. Seifert, for respondent Ohio Education Association. 
 
Linda K. Fiely, Associate General Counsel, for intervening respondent 
OCSEA/AFSCME Local 11, AFL-CIO. 
 
Crabbe, Brown & James L.L.P., Larry H. James, and Laura MacGregor 
Comek, urging denial of the writs for amicus curiae National Fraternal Order of 
Police. 
 
Subodh Chandra, Cleveland Director of Law, Barbara A. Langhenry, 
Chief Assistant Director of Law, Thomas L. Anastos, and Julie A. Lady, Assistant 
Directors of Law, urging denial of the writs for amici curiae Cleveland Municipal 
Court and city of Cleveland. 
____________________