Case Title: State v. Carter

Citation: 164 Vt 545, 674 A.2d 1258

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1996-01-12T00:00:00Z

Document:
STATE_V_CARTER.94-412; 164 Vt 545; 674 A.2d 1258

[Filed 12-Jan-1996]

  NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P.
  40 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports. 
  Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
  Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
  order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 94-412


State of Vermont                                  Supreme Court

                                                  On Appeal from
    v.                                            District Court of Vermont,
                                                  Unit No. 3, Orleans Circuit

Bernard Carter                                    June Term, 1995


Walter M. Morris, Jr., J.

Jane Woodruff, Orleans County State's Attorney, Newport, for plaintiff-appellee

Norman R. Blais, Burlington, for defendant-appellant


PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


       DOOLEY, J.   Defendant Bernard Carter appeals his conviction by jury
  of aggravated sexual assault, in violation of 13 V.S.A § 3253(a), raising
  three claims of error: (1) the trial court impermissibly excluded evidence
  that substantiated and explained his reasoning for leaving Vermont after he
  was charged with the crime; (2) the court erroneously allowed one of the
  State's witnesses to corroborate the victim's account of events through
  prior consistent statements; and (3) his Fifth Amendment rights under the
  United States Constitution were violated when the trial court allowed a
  state police officer to testify that defendant refused to discuss the
  charges with him.  We conclude that defendant's first two claims of error
  are valid, but because these errors were harmless beyond a reasonable
  doubt, we affirm.

                                     I.

       Defendant and the victim had separate apartments in the same complex
  in Newport, Vermont and were formerly romantically involved.  During the
  evening of October 24, 1992, defendant entered the victim's apartment and
  accused her of giving him a sexually transmitted

 

  disease.  Later that night, he entered the apartment again, accompanied by
  his nephew, and refused to leave.  According to the victim, defendant held
  a knife to her throat and threatened to forcibly rape her and to kill her. 
  Thereafter, according to the victim, he forcibly sexually assaulted her. 
  According to defendant, who also testified, he never threatened the victim,
  and they had consensual intercourse.

       Defendant was charged with aggravated sexual assault, unlawful
  mischief, and petty larceny.  He was eventually apprehended in Arizona in
  February 1993, and stood trial in May 1994.  Although he was acquitted of
  the unlawful mischief and petty larceny charges,(FN1) he was convicted of
  aggravated sexual assault.  The allegation on which he was found guilty
  specified that he sexually assaulted the victim, that at the time of the
  assault, he threatened to cause serious bodily harm to her, and that she
  reasonably believed he had the present ability to carry out the threat.(FN2)

                                     II.

       The first issue on appeal relates to the State's evidence that
  defendant fled the state to avoid prosecution.  The victim gave a statement
  to the police on October 26, 1992, and they went to defendant's apartment
  where he was seen running from the premises.  Along with his nephew and
  girlfriend, he traveled from state to state thereafter until he was finally
  apprehended in Arizona.  During his flight, defendant threatened to kill
  the victim and threatened to kill both his nephew and his girlfriend if
  they testified against him.

 

       The State called on both the nephew and the girlfriend to show
  defendant's flight.  The issue of an alternative explanation for the
  flight, consistent with innocence, first surfaced with the nephew, who
  wanted to testify that he fled in response to an inaccurate newspaper
  story. He offered a copy of the story, which said that both he and
  defendant had committed the crime, that they had used a knife to rape the
  victim, and that the maximum punishment faced was life imprisonment.  The
  court refused to allow the newspaper story to be introduced and also
  prohibited the nephew from describing it.

       The issue then arose with respect to defendant, who made a claim
  similar to that of the nephew.  When defense counsel asked defendant what
  he had heard about why the police were looking for him, the trial judge
  intervened and eventually ruled defendant could not testify to "any
  information gained from newspapers or the like" or make any statements
  about defendant's belief about the maximum punishment for the offense. 
  Defendant did testify that he understood the police were looking for him
  for a knife-point rape, that he did not commit such a rape, and that he
  fled out of fear.  On cross-examination, he testified that he learned about
  the charge from the newspaper, which had a front-page article with his
  picture and the statement that he and his nephew were wanted for a
  knife-point rape.

       We have held that the State may introduce evidence of flight by a
  criminal defendant to show consciousness of guilt.  At the same time, we
  have questioned the probative value of such evidence.  See State v.
  Pelican, 160 Vt. 536, 542,