Case Title: Chilcott v. Chilcott

Citation: 

Docket Number: 

State: vermont

Court: Vermont Supreme Court

Date: 1991-06-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 111 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05602 of any errors in order
 that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.


                                 No. 90-346


 Cynthia R. Chilkott                          Supreme Court

      v.                                      On Appeal from
                                              Chittenden Superior Court
 Robert B. Chilkott
                                              June Term, 1991


 Silvio T. Valente, J.

 Catherine E. Clark, Burlington, for plaintiff-appellee

 Richard W. Affolter of Sheehey Brue Gray & Furlong, Burlington for
    defendant-appellant


 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.


      MORSE, J.   Defendant husband appeals the property award in this
 divorce.  His principal claim is that the trial court's valuation of a
 trust was erroneous because the trust was not subject to the jurisdiction of
 the court within the meaning of 15 V.S.A. { 751 (equitable distribution of
 marital property).  He also argues that, even if the trust was properly
 taken into account in distributing the marital assets, the trial court erred
 in accepting an expert's opinion as to its value.  Finally, husband contends
 that the uneven distribution of the property was unfair and unreasonable.
 Because we conclude that the trust was marital property and the trial court
 did not abuse its discretion in evaluating it and making its overall
 property distribution, we affirm.
      Husband was one of the beneficiaries of an inter vivos trust which his
 father created.  The trust became irrevocable when his father died.  Secu-
 rities funded the trust, and at the time of the final hearing were valued at
 $220,000.  The death of father entitled husband's mother to all the trust
 income for her life.  The trustee had power to invade the principal for the
 mother's health, maintenance and welfare, but had not done so.  Mother,
 eighty-seven-years-old, was alive at the time of trial.
      When mother dies, husband, if he is alive, will receive the income
 from the trust and an unrestricted right to invade the principal.  At
 husband's death, plaintiff wife would receive the income for life.  Upon the
 death of all income beneficiaries, the remainder, if any, will be paid to
 the donor's grandchildren, or if they are deceased, to their issue by right
 of representation, free of the trust.
      At trial, wife called an actuarial expert, who testified that husband's
 present interest in the trust was valued at $128,034.  Husband did not offer
 any evidence contradicting this testimony other than cross-examination, and
 the court adopted this figure in its findings of fact.
      Husband received a property distribution worth approximately $197,000,
 including his interest in the trust, his business, pension, stocks, an
 automobile, and a snowmobile.  Wife was awarded marital property valued at
 approximately $220,000, including the marital residence, her one-half
 interest in real estate located in New Hampshire, the homestead furnishings,
 and personal property associated with her ceramics business.
      Husband and wife were married for approximately 33 years and raised
 four children.  At the time of the divorce, husband was living, rent free,
 with his mother, from whom he also received money for expenses.  A college
 graduate, husband was the primary wage earner during the marriage.  The
 court found that husband's net income after the divorce would be $1,700 per
 month.  Wife, also a college graduate, was currently working in a nursing
 home.  She had worked as a medical secretary in 1958, and then in a school
 lunch program.  Aside from the ceramics business, which had no net earnings
 during its five years of operation, wife had no other employment skills.
 Wife's earned net income was $978 per month, and she was awarded $357 a
 month in maintenance.
     Both parties drank excessively until 1981, when wife addressed her
 drinking habit.  She has abstained from alcohol since 1983.  Denying that he
 had a drinking problem, husband continued to drink, despite the advice of
 physicians and his then-living father.
                                     I.
      Husband initially claims that the trial court abused its discretion by
 including in the property distribution his interest in the trust, because it
 was an asset not "owned" by him within the meaning of 15 V.S.A. { 751.  We
 conclude that husband's interest in the trust was marital property subject
 to distribution under { 751(a).
      Under 15 V.S.A. { 751(a), "[a]ll property owned by either or both of
 the parties, however and whenever acquired" is subject to the court's juris-
 diction.  See also Lynch v. Lynch, 147 Vt. 574, 576,