Case Title: People v. Williams

Citation: 

Docket Number: 85625

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2000-05-25T00:00:00Z

Document:
Opinion filed May 25, 2000.
JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the Court:
Following a trial in the circuit court of Cook County, a jury convicted 
defendant Michael Williams of first degree murder, aggravated kidnaping, and 
armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a), 10-2(a)(3), 18-2 (West 1992)). At a separate 
sentencing hearing, the same jury found defendant eligible for the death penalty 
and found that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude 
imposition of that sentence. The trial judge accordingly sentenced defendant to 
death on the murder conviction and consecutive 30-year prison terms on the 
aggravated kidnaping and armed robbery convictions. Defendant's death sentence 
has been stayed pending direct review by this court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, 
§4(b); 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 603, 609(a). For the reasons which follow, we affirm 
defendant's conviction and death sentence.
BACKGROUND
On January 12, 1994, Estelle Jones attended a party at the home of Anthony 
"Bruce" Smith in Gary, Indiana, with her cousins Angela King and Karolyn 
Summers. In the early morning hours of January 13, Jones drove King and Summers 
home, then left to return to Smith's party. Jones' relatives reported her 
missing when she failed to return, and the police found her body later that day, 
in a deserted lot in Riverdale, Illinois. Medical testimony revealed that her 
death was the result of a gunshot wound to the head, which had been inflicted by 
a shotgun fired at close range. The car she had been driving was found 
approximately a month later, in a wooded area in east Gary. It had been burned, 
and the remains of a gasoline can were found inside it.
Smith testified as follows. Among the other people at his party were his half 
brother, Curtis "Junior" Hosea; his uncle, James "Puko" Thompson; and his 
friends David Carroll and Chelsea Golden. The victim and her friends arrived 
around 11:30 p.m. They left after a few hours, but the victim returned to the 
house approximately one hour later, after having dropped her friends off at 
home. Smith and the victim went to Smith's bedroom and became sexually involved. 
While in the bedroom, Smith heard the doorbell ring and heard the voices of 
defendant and Dennis Moreland.
Smith had a "business relationship" with defendant and Moreland in which 
Smith was paid $150 per week to sell cocaine for the two men. Accordingly, when 
Smith heard their voices, he left the bedroom and let the men into the house. 
Smith, defendant and Moreland returned to the bedroom. There, in the presence of 
the victim, defendant and Moreland inventoried Smith's supply of cocaine. After 
determining that everything was in order, they replaced the cocaine and money in 
a small bag which was left in the bedroom. Defendant and Moreland then joined 
the party. Shortly thereafter Smith left the bedroom, to use the bathroom. The 
victim, whom Smith had left alone in the bedroom with the bag containing the 
drugs, "jumped" when he returned. When he asked her what was wrong, she simply 
stated that Smith had startled her.
A few minutes later, Smith heard the doorbell ring again. Defendant knocked 
at the bedroom door and said a customer had arrived. Smith gave defendant the 
bag containing the drugs and closed the bedroom door. Less than a minute later, 
Smith heard defendant shout "Hell, no," and Smith exited the bedroom to see what 
was the matter. Defendant told Smith several rocks of cocaine and some powder 
cocaine were missing from the bag. After Smith denied taking the drugs, 
defendant, Smith and Moreland returned to the bedroom, searched the victim, and 
discovered that she had hidden approximately $50 worth of drugs in her sock.
Moreland pulled a 9-millimeter handgun out of his waistband and pointed it at 
the victim, but Smith convinced him not to shoot her. However, when Smith went 
to the kitchen to talk with defendant and Moreland, defendant told Chelsea 
Golden to "beat" the victim. Golden grabbed a wine cooler bottle and attacked 
the victim with it. As the two were wrestling, defendant stepped in and began 
punching the victim in the face. Moreland continued the beating after defendant 
stopped. Hosea, Carroll and Thompson also hit her once or twice. During the 
beating, Golden took off the victim's shoes. As defendant and Moreland were 
hitting the victim, they said that she had "violated" and had to be punished. 
Defendant suggested that the victim should perform oral sex on everyone present. 
Moreland and defendant then separately went into the bedroom with the victim. 
While defendant was in the bedroom with her, Smith heard scuffling and heard the 
victim screaming no and saying "stop."
After defendant exited the bedroom, he and Moreland went to the kitchen to 
talk, and Smith followed. He heard Moreland tell defendant to "do something 
about this here" because the victim could "jeopardize our spot" if she went to 
the police and reported that she had been assaulted at the house. Defendant 
agreed, and moved the victim's car to the rear of the house. When he re-entered 
the house, Moreland told him not to worry about anyone "snitching," because if 
anyone did, everyone in the house would be in trouble. Moreland flashed a 
"pitchfork," which Smith testified was a gang sign for the Disciples street 
gang, and used the term "folks," which Smith testified was another name for the 
Disciples. Defendant went into the bedroom and carried the victim out over his 
shoulder, with a pillowcase over her head. He brought her outside and put her in 
the trunk of her car. Moreland got a shotgun Smith kept in his house and gave it 
to defendant, telling him not to worry because Moreland would kill anyone who 
said anything. Defendant took the shotgun, got into the victim's car, and drove 
off. Moreland made a call on a cellular phone and, a short while later, a white 
car pulled up to the house. Moreland said "those are my folks," made the 
pitchfork symbol, and got into the car with the men and drove away. Several 
hours later, defendant returned to the house to retrieve the victim's shoes and 
jacket. When Smith asked him what he had done with the victim, defendant replied 
that he had "smoked" her. Smith also overheard a later conversation between 
Moreland and defendant in which defendant told Moreland that he had taken the 
victim's car to the east side of Gary and burned it and that he had buried the 
shotgun.
Defense counsel cross-examined Smith extensively regarding statements he made 
to the police shortly after the murder. When Smith first talked to the police he 
said that the victim had not come back to the house after leaving with her 
cousins. Smith subsequently admitted that the victim had returned, but stated 
that defendant had committed all of the physical violence. On redirect 
examination Smith testified that he had initially lied to the police because of 
defendant and Moreland's threat to kill anyone who said anything about what had 
happened.
Hosea, Golden, and Carroll's testimony corroborated Smith's version of 
events, but these witnesses added that Hosea had used the victim's car to get 
cigarettes and drive Thompson home while defendant and Moreland were in the 
bedroom with the victim. They also stated that they heard the victim pleading 
for help as defendant carried her from the bedroom to the trunk of her car. The 
witnesses recalled seeing the 9-millimeter handgun in Moreland's possession, 
although Carroll testified that defendant was handling the gun when the men 
first entered the house. None of these witnesses recalled having seen a shotgun 
at the house during the party.
Riverdale Police Officer Michael Horn participated in a search of Smith's 
house after the murder. Horn testified that he recovered three guns during the 
search, one of which was a 9-millimeter handgun. Horn testified that after the 
police impounded the weapons, defendant told Horn that the 9-millimeter handgun 
was his and asked Horn how to retrieve it.
Deputy Commander Edward Davies of the Lake County, Indiana, sheriff's 
department testified that he spoke with defendant on two occasions. First, on 
March 8, 1994, defendant voluntarily spoke with Davies about the crime for 
approximately one hour. He was not arrested, and he left the police station 
after the interview. Later on March 23, defendant was arrested for the crime, 
and he spoke with Davies again. Davies transcribed a statement defendant made 
concerning the crime.
In his statement, which was introduced into evidence, defendant recounted the 
following version of events. He had gone to Smith's house around 2 or 3 a.m.; he 
did not mention Moreland being with him. A customer had come to the door and 
defendant got the drugs to make the sale from Smith, who was in the bedroom with 
a woman. Defendant noticed that the "count" was not right, and told Smith so. 
Smith then talked to Thompson and searched him in the bathroom, after 
which Smith said that "that bitch must got [sic] it." Smith then 
searched the girl he had been with in his bedroom and found the drugs in her 
possession. Smith and Thompson began to slap her, Golden hit her with a bottle, 
and then everyone started hitting her. Defendant admitted that he, too, hit the 
victim, but stated that he only did so because he believed that she had hit him 
while she was being beaten by the others.
Smith suggested that the victim perform oral or sexual intercourse with the 
men. Defendant admitted that the victim performed an act of oral intercourse on 
him after she had done so to Thompson. The other men then resumed beating the 
victim, while defendant went outside to her car to verify her claim that Smith 
had previously given her drugs, some of which were in the car. When defendant 
returned, a person, "James or Mike," knocked the victim unconscious with a 
skillet. Defendant did not know James/Michael's actual name, but stated that he 
was "some kin to" Smith. Once the victim was unconscious, everyone began to talk 
about what had occurred and the trouble that it could cause. Someone pointed out 
that the victim "just can't leave." Eventually it was agreed that she should be 
taken to Chicago and killed there. James/Michael gave defendant a shotgun after 
the group arrived at this decision, then told defendant to put the victim in the 
trunk of her car and to meet him at "Archibee's." Defendant picked James/Michael 
up at Archibee's, and they drove the victim's car to Riverdale, where 
James/Michael decided to commit the murder. Defendant held the shotgun while 
James/Michael got the victim out of the car. After he gave the gun back to 
James/Michael, defendant asked him if they were doing the right thing, to which 
James/Michael replied that they would "talk about that later." Defendant 
reentered the car, and heard a gunshot as he turned the key in the ignition. The 
men drove the victim's car back to Gary and defendant left the car with 
James/Michael, who said he would take care of it and the gun.
The defense called Karolyn Summers, who testified that she was at the party 
at Smith's house on the evening of January 12. While there she had seen a 
shotgun near the table where people were playing cards. She testified that other 
people had seen the shotgun as well-in fact, they were playing with it. The 
defense also introduced a stipulation that, in prior testimony, Golden had 
stated that Smith had told her he had thrown the victim's shoes away because the 
police were investigating his house.
Following closing arguments, the jury returned general verdicts finding 
defendant guilty of first degree murder, aggravated kidnaping, and armed 
robbery. At the eligibility phase of sentencing, the jury found defendant 
eligible for the death penalty on the basis of two statutory aggravating 
factors: first, that defendant committed the murder with the intent to prevent 
the victim from giving "material assistance" to law enforcement authorities in 
an investigation or prosecution; and second, that the murder was committed "in a 
cold, calculated and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme 
or design to take a human life by unlawful means" and defendant's conduct 
"created a reasonable expectation" that the victim's death would result. See 720 
ILCS 5/9-1(b)(8), (b)(11) (West 1994). The case proceeded to the 
aggravation-mitigation phase.
The State presented testimony in aggravation concerning defendant's behavior 
in Cook County jail while awaiting trial. In September 1995, all of the inmates 
on defendant's cell tier, including defendant, jammed their cell doors open, an 
incident for which those inmates were disciplined. The State also established 
that defendant had been disciplined for a physical altercation with another 
prisoner on November 3, 1994.
Other evidence in aggravation included testimony by the victim's mother, 
Birdia King, who read a prepared victim impact statement regarding the emotional 
impact the victim's death had on her and her family. The State also demonstrated 
that it was at least a 30-minute trip from Smith's house in Gary to the location 
where the victim was found, evidence intended to show that defendant had more 
than sufficient time to change his mind.
The State also offered in aggravation the testimony of Leon Anderson, an 
inmate at the Illinois Department of Corrections. He stated that he had shared a 
cell with defendant at Cook County jail while he was awaiting trial and had 
regular contact with him for a total of 10 to 12 months. Defendant told Anderson 
that he was a "regent," or chief of security, for the Gangster Disciples before 
being incarcerated and he continued in this role in jail. Defendant controlled 
the weapons and drugs that ran through Division One-the maximum security 
division of the jail-and had the power to order "violations," or beatings, for 
infractions of gang rules. On at least nine separate occasions while they were 
cellmates, Anderson had personally seen defendant beat other inmates, the 
earliest such incident being in December 1994.
Defendant told Anderson that he had "shot a girl in the face" and that he was 
concerned about his codefendant informing on him. Defendant said he would have 
his codefendant killed if he did so. Defendant also told Anderson that he was 
trying to get money together to have the other witnesses in the case killed.
Anderson admitted that he was a member of a gang which was a rival of 
defendant's gang. He further admitted that because one of the offenses for which 
he was currently incarcerated was predatory aggravated criminal sexual assault 
of a child, the State's Attorney had the power to institute proceedings within 
one year of his release date to have him held indefinitely as a predatory 
offender. However, Anderson testified that he had been promised nothing in 
exchange for his testimony. He stated that he was testifying because "[t]hat 
could have been my sister."
The State also called Sergeant Bennett of the Cook County department of 
corrections. Bennett, who worked in Division One of the Cook County jail, knew 
defendant when defendant was in the jail and was aware that defendant was one of 
the leaders in his gang. Bennett did not know defendant's exact rank, but stated 
that defendant did have the power to call violations. However, on 
cross-examination, Sergeant Bennett testified that defendant had not been 
"hanging with the gangs" for approximately the last 18 months. Defendant had 
adjusted to incarceration and was "institutionalized," i.e., was an 
"ideal inmate, knows the rules and regulations and abides by the rules, no 
problems."
In mitigation, defendant first called Dr. Douge Barthelemy, his pediatrician. 
Dr. Barthelemy testified that defendant was born with a rare incurable 
neurological/dermatological condition known as Sturge-Weber disease. The main 
effect of this disease was a port-wine-colored stain on the face, one side of 
the upper chest, the neck, pharynx, mouth, brain and brain covering, or 
meninges. The disease was progressive, and caused a gradual asphyxiation of that 
portion of the brain which it covered, leading to the death of that part of the 
brain. The affected area of the brain controlled several functions, including 
discrimination and judgment. Defendant also had a condition called Blount 
disease, which caused severe bowing of his legs.
Pastor Thomas Nelson testified that he had known defendant since he was four 
years old, and that defendant had always been an active participant in church 
and church activities. Defendant was very cordial and polite, would do whatever 
was asked of him, and did not misbehave. Pastor Nelson counseled defendant when 
defendant was teased about his facial deformity and his limp. He stated that 
things were difficult for defendant because he was in the "shadow" of his very 
successful older brother, S.T.
Pastor James Wetzstein testified that he had known defendant since December 
1993, when Pastor Nelson's church closed and defendant's family transferred to 
his congregation. He often visited defendant in prison after his arrest and 
testified that defendant was "filled with remorse" for what had happened to the 
victim. Defendant was also very upset about what his family was going through. 
Pastor Wetzstein admitted on cross-examination that defendant never admitted 
having killed the victim; he merely expressed remorse for the part he had played 
and for what had happened to the victim and her family.
Another mitigation witness, Johnny Robinson, knew defendant from working with 
him at Bethlehem Steel. He stated that defendant was a good worker who would do 
whatever was asked of him. Robinson also associated with defendant outside of 
work, enjoying such activities as fishing and movie-going. He felt defendant was 
a good person, who was also very polite. He admitted on cross-examination that 
defendant never talked about his gang involvement with him.
Defendant's mother testified as follows. Defendant was always helpful around 
the house and worked with her at several of her jobs, cleaning and/or cooking. 
Defendant was a "follower," in that he would "give in" to his family or friends 
if they asked him to do something. Defendant never had trouble making friends, 
because he was very generous with them and would "share whatever he had." 
Defendant's four-year-old son enjoyed talking to defendant and always asked 
about him, even though defendant was already in jail when his son was born. The 
witness did not believe that defendant was a gang member or that he ever had 
been one.
Defendant's older brother, Pastor S.T. Williams, testified that defendant had 
problems in school from an early age. He was a slow learner and often missed 
school because of his medical conditions. Defendant often expressed frustration 
about his medical conditions to his brother when they were growing up. Pastor 
Williams testified that both he and defendant were very involved in church 
activities during their youth. Although defendant did not finish high school, he 
obtained certifications in both building maintenance and carpentry through Job 
Corps. After obtaining his certifications, he was steadily employed until the 
events of this case.
Defendant also introduced evidence that the only disciplinary reports he had 
received while incarcerated in Cook County jail were those previously described, 
one for fighting and one for jamming his cell door.
The jury found that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude 
the imposition of the death penalty. Accordingly, the trial court sentenced 
defendant to death on the murder charge. This appeal followed.
Additional relevant facts will be discussed in the context of the issues 
raised on appeal.
ANALYSIS
Defendant raises several issues on appeal. They may be separated into 
arguments pertaining to the guilt phase of trial and arguments relating to the 
propriety of his death sentence.
Guilt Phase of Trial
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant first argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel 
during the guilt phase of his trial. His argument is based on counsel's 
contentions in opening and closing argument that the statement defendant gave to 
police was truthful and accurate. Defendant argues that this concession was 
tantamount to a complete abandonment of a defense, because if the statement were 
true, the jury would have had no choice but to convict defendant of kidnaping, 
armed robbery and murder.
In making this argument defendant contends that the appropriate standard for 
assessing counsel's conduct is provided by United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 80 L. Ed. 2d 657, 104 S. Ct. 2039 (1984), and People v. 
Hattery, 109 Ill. 2d 449 (1985). Unlike the familiar two-part test from 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), which requires a defendant to establish both a deficiency in 
counsel's performance and prejudice resulting therefrom, Cronic 
requires a court to presume that counsel's error, if established, was 
prejudicial. The presumption is properly invoked when, for example, "counsel 
entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial 
testing, [which constitutes] a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the 
adversary process itself presumptively unreliable." Cronic, 466 U.S.  at 
659, 80 L. Ed. 2d  at 668, 104 S. Ct.  at 2047. This court applied the 
Cronic standard in Hattery, in which defense counsel conceded 
in opening statement his client's guilt to murder charges, did not introduce any 
evidence at trial, and did not make a closing argument to the jury.
In the instant case Strickland, not Cronic and 
Hattery, supplies the appropriate standard for assessing trial 
counsel's performance. In People v. Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d 133 (1996), 
and People v. Chandler, 129 Ill. 2d 233 (1989), this court concluded 
that Strickland, rather than Cronic, provided the proper test 
for evaluating a defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Like 
defense counsel in the present case, counsel in Shatner and 
Chandler admitted the veracity of a statement in which the client 
admitted participation in a felony in the course of which a victim was killed, 
but denied having been the actual killer. In both cases, we rejected the 
argument that this concession was tantamount to a total lack of meaningful 
adversarial testing. Hattery was distinguished on the basis that 
counsel in Hattery completely and unequivocally conceded defendant's 
guilt, whereas in Shatner and Chandler counsel only conceded 
what defendant had admitted to the police, but submitted the ultimate question 
of guilt to the jury. Thus there was no "breakdown of the adversarial process" 
as described by the Supreme Court in Cronic. As in Shatner and 
Chandler, the instant case did not lack an adversarial character. 
Defense counsel aggressively cross-examined the State's witnesses, argued for a 
not-guilty verdict on murder and armed robbery in opening and closing 
statements, and moved to suppress defendant's statement during pretrial 
proceedings.
After rejecting the Cronic analysis, the Shatner and 
Chandler courts went on to determine whether defense counsel's conduct 
constituted ineffective assistance according to the traditional standard 
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), and adopted by this court in 
People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 525-26 (1984). As this court 
summarized the test in People v. Todd, 178 Ill. 2d 297 (1997):
Defendant argues that even if this case is not governed by Cronic, 
our Strickland analysis should follow Chandler, in which we 
found counsel's performance ineffective under Strickland because the 
jury could have found defendant not guilty "only if it had chosen to disregard 
the jury instructions." Chandler, 129 Ill. 2d  at 247. However, as we 
have since noted, the determination in Chandler that counsel was 
ineffective was not based simply on counsel's apparent failure to comprehend the 
law of accountability. See Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d  at 147; People v. 
Page, 155 Ill. 2d 232, 267-68 (1993). Rather, we found that counsel's 
misapprehension of accountability had infected the entire conduct of the trial, 
resulting in counsel conducting no cross-examination of several key prosecution 
witnesses and only cursory cross-examination of others, and calling no witnesses 
himself. Chandler, 129 Ill. 2d  at 248-49.
The instant case is more analogous to Shatner than 
Chandler. In Shatner, after having determined that counsel's 
conduct should be judged by the Strickland standard, rather than 
Cronic, we found that defendant had failed to establish ineffective 
assistance. In Shatner, as here, counsel conceded the truth of his 
client's statement admitting his involvement in a crime, but claiming that an 
accomplice actually killed the victim. However, counsel cross-examined witnesses 
in order to challenge their alternate version of events, and argued that 
although defendant might be guilty of the underlying felony, he should not be 
convicted of murder because of his minimal involvement in the scheme. This court 
noted that
Here, too, defendant was convicted by his own statement, not by his counsel's 
struggles against the substantial evidence against him. Defendant maintains that 
Shatner is distinguishable because counsel's statement in the instant 
case conceded not only defendant's guilt, but also his eligibility for the death 
penalty. We disagree. In Shatner the defendant argued that counsel's 
concession of the accuracy of his statement admitted felony murder, although it 
did challenge the charges of intentional and knowing murder. Shatner, 
174 Ill. 2d  at 144. This court found that any argument by defense counsel 
against defendant's eligibility for the death penalty would have been "doomed to 
fail" because the general guilty verdict against defendant meant defendant was 
guilty of felony murder. Shatner, 174 Ill. 2d  at 149-51. Thus in 
Shatner just as here the statement established not only defendant's 
guilt but also his eligibility for the death penalty. Shatner cannot be 
distinguished on this basis. We therefore reject defendant's claims of 
ineffective assistance.
Handgun Evidence(1)
Defendant also maintains that the trial court erred in allowing Riverdale 
Police Officer Michael Horn to testify regarding the guns and ammunition found 
during the search of Smith's house and about defendant's claim of ownership of 
the 9-millimeter handgun. Defendant contends that since this gun was not used in 
the murder, its introduction only served as evidence of his "bad character," 
which is impermissible and entitles him to a new trial.
The State notes that defendant did not object to this evidence at trial or in 
his post-trial motion, and thus the issue has been waived for review. Defendant 
acknowledges that the issue was waived, but contends that we should reach the 
issue under the plain error exception to waiver. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a).
It is well established that plain error will be invoked in criminal cases 
only "where the evidence was closely balanced or the error was of such magnitude 
that the accused was denied a fair trial." People v. Alvine, 173 Ill. 2d 273, 292 (1996). Neither of these factors is present in the guilt phase of 
the instant case. The evidence of guilt was not closely balanced. Four separate 
eyewitnesses testified that defendant agreed with his codefendant's suggestion 
that he had to "do something" so that the victim did not "jeopardize" their drug 
operation. Defendant, in possession of a shotgun, then drove off in the victim's 
car with the victim in the trunk, with a pillowcase over her head. The victim 
was found dead from a shotgun wound to the head hours later, still wearing the 
same pillowcase. Moreover, defendant himself confessed to all of the above; his 
only defense was an attempt to shift responsibility for the actual shooting to a 
stranger he had met at the party whom he had picked up in the car after driving 
away from the house. In light of this evidence, we do not consider the case to 
have been closely balanced. Alvine, 173 Ill. 2d  at 292. Nor, as we 
explain below, was any error in the introduction of this evidence "of such 
magnitude that the accused was denied a fair trial." Alvine, 173 Ill. 2d  at 292. Indeed, we believe there was no error in introducing the 
evidence.
First, as the State notes, the defense elicited the fact that the 
9-millimeter weapon was found during the search during cross-examination of 
Smith before Officer Horn testified. On cross-examination, defense counsel 
questioned Smith about the search of his house in January 1994:
A criminal defendant cannot complain on appeal of the introduction of 
evidence which he procures or invites. People v. Payne, 98 Ill. 2d 45, 
50 (1983); People v. Menssen, 263 Ill. App. 3d 946, 951 (1994).
Moreover, even had defendant not opened the door to the introduction of this 
evidence, we would see no error in its introduction. All of the witnesses 
testified to seeing Moreland in possession of a 9-millimeter pistol at the 
house, and the fact that such a weapon was recovered there buttressed their 
version of events. Further, at least one witness, Carroll, testified that 
defendant, not Moreland, had the gun in his possession when the men first 
entered the house. Even had he not, all of the witnesses' testimony was to the 
effect that defendant and Moreland were working together. The fact that 
defendant had claimed ownership of a gun of the same type as that seen in 
Moreland's possession would thus tend to support the State's case. For these 
reasons, plain error does not excuse defendant's procedural default of this 
issue.
Closing Argument
Defendant also contends that he was denied a fair trial by the purportedly 
improper closing argument by the prosecution in the guilt phase of the trial. 
Accordingly, he contends that his conviction must be reversed and the cause 
remanded for a new trial. Defendant refers specifically to the following remarks 
by the prosecution in the rebuttal portion of close:
The State responds that this claim has been waived due to defendant's failure 
to both object to the arguments at trial and include it in his post-trial 
motion. Defendant admits as much, but contends again that we should consider his 
contentions under the plain error exception to the waiver rule, under this 
court's Rule 615(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)). We again disagree.
As previously noted, the evidence was not closely balanced. Further, the 
comments did not deprive defendant of a fair trial. It is well-established that 
prosecutors are afforded wide latitude in closing argument (Alvine, 173 
Ill. 2d at 292-93; People v. Cisewski, 118 Ill. 2d 163, 175 (1987)) and 
may argue facts and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence (People v. 
Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 151 (1998)). In reviewing a challenge to remarks 
made by the State during closing argument, the comments must be considered in 
the context of the entire closing statements of the parties. People v. 
Wiley, 165 Ill. 2d 259, 295 (1995). Even if prosecutorial comment exceeds 
the bounds of proper argument, the verdict must not be disturbed unless it can 
be said that the remark caused substantial prejudice to the defendant 
(People v. Williams, 164 Ill. 2d 1, 24 (1994)), taking into account 
"the content and context of the language, its relationship to the evidence, and 
its effect on the defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial" 
(Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 152). "[E]rrors in opening statements or 
closing argument must result in substantial prejudice such that the result would 
have been different absent the complained-of remark before reversal is 
required." People v. Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d 483, 507 (1993). None of the 
complained-of statements suffer this degree of infirmity. Although there was no 
direct evidence that defendant had intimidated witnesses during trial, all of 
the eyewitnesses testified that defendant had been involved in intimidating them 
at the time of the crime. Smith stated that he initially lied to the police 
because of the fear engendered by defendant and Moreland's threats. This alone 
distinguishes the instant case from prior decisions in which courts have 
reversed convictions because of witness-intimidation arguments when there was 
no evidence of any witness intimidation. Cf. People v. 
Mullen, 141 Ill. 2d 394 (1990); People v. Rivera, 277 Ill. App. 3d 
811 (1996); People v. Hood, 229 Ill. App. 3d 202 (1992).
Arguably the contention that defendant intimidated the witnesses "now" is an 
acceptable inference from the facts that defendant was involved in threatening 
to kill the witnesses at an earlier time and that defendant was a high-ranking 
member of a street gang. It is entirely reasonable that, given these facts, the 
witnesses might remain intimidated by defendant at the time of trial. Moreover, 
even if this argument did not constitute a proper inference, the fact that 
defendant did threaten the witnesses on one occasion established his guilty 
mind, which is the proper purpose for introducing such evidence. People v. 
Smith, 141 Ill. 2d 40, 66 (1990). Since defendant's guilty mind had been 
established by competent evidence to which defendant makes no objection, 
defendant could have been prejudiced only slightly by the comment regarding him 
intimidating witnesses "now" even if it was improper. The State did not, in this 
argument, suggest that defendant had threatened witnesses with respect to whom 
there was no evidence of intimidation or coercion.
Defendant argues that reversal is required by this court's decision in 
Mullen. Mullen is distinguishable. In Mullen, the 
prosecution in closing argument in a close case deliberately and forcefully 
argued that a witness was afraid of being shot in the back if he testified 
against defendant. The trial court had previously specifically excluded any 
mention of the witness' fear of defendant. We concluded that such a comment was 
improper and prejudicial because (1) there was "no evidence in the record that 
defendant in any way threatened or intimidated any witness"; (2) the argument 
evinced an "egregious" disregard "as to proper argument and the orders of the 
trial court"; and (3) the evidence of guilt was closely balanced. In the instant 
case, on the other hand, the record established that defendant had 
intimidated the witnesses; the prosecution's argument did not transgress any 
court order; and the evidence was not closely balanced. Mullen is thus 
distinguishable, and, as we stated in Mullen, " '[e]ach case of 
this kind must be decided upon its own facts.' " Mullen, 141 Ill. 2d  at 407, quoting People v. Weathers, 62 Ill. 2d 114, 120 (1975). 
Mullen thus does not compel reversal in the instant case.
Nor do we find plain error in any of the other comments of which defendant 
complains. Rather than contending that the jury should be afraid of defendant, 
or that defendant might attempt to intimidate the jury members, the remarks 
clearly suggested the opposite-that the jury should not be afraid of 
defendant. It is well established that to exhort the jury to perform its 
function without fear is entirely proper. E.g., People v. 
Harris, 129 Ill. 2d 123, 159 (1989). Nor do we find the prosecutor's 
comments that defendant feared the jury to constitute an impermissible attempt 
to align the jury with the State. Rather, this constitutes a continuation of the 
theme that the jury should not be afraid of him. None of these remarks rise to 
the level of plain error. Accordingly, we do not believe that the plain error 
rule requires this court to excuse defendant's procedural default.
Sentencing Issues
Disparate Sentences
Next, defendant argues that his sentence of death must be vacated because it 
is unconstitutionally disparate from the sentence imposed on his codefendant, 
Moreland, in his separate trial. Moreland was sentenced to a term of 60 years' 
imprisonment for murder, with a concurrent 15-year sentence for aggravated 
kidnaping and a consecutive 30-year sentence for armed robbery.(2)
Although this court has the duty under both the Illinois and United States 
Constitutions to ensure that a sentence of death is not imposed arbitrarily or 
capriciously (People v. Burt, 168 Ill. 2d 49, 80 (1995)), there is no 
constitutional requirement that we engage in comparative proportionality review 
(People v. Towns, 174 Ill. 2d 453, 479 (1996)). Nevertheless, this 
court has previously chosen to exercise its discretion and consider whether a 
sentence of death in a particular case is disproportionately harsh in comparison 
with a less severe sanction imposed on a codefendant convicted of the same 
crime. Towns, 174 Ill. 2d  at 479. In reviewing a death sentence, we 
examine the facts of the particular case and the evidence introduced at the 
guilt and sentencing phases of trial. The relevant factors in comparative 
proportionality review include the offenders' extent of involvement in the 
offense, the nature of the offense, the character and background of the 
offenders, including any criminal record, and their potential for 
rehabilitation. Similarly situated individuals must not receive arbitrary or 
unreasonably disparate sentences. Burt, 168 Ill. 2d  at 80; People 
v. Kitchen, 159 Ill. 2d 1, 44 (1994). We will generally not interfere with 
a trial court's sentencing determination absent an abuse of discretion, although 
we are less deferential to the trial court in cases involving a sentence of 
death. People v. Smith, 177 Ill. 2d 53, 97-98 (1997).
We find no unconstitutional disparity in the sentences imposed on defendant 
and Moreland because the two defendants were not similarly situated. Defendant 
suggests they were because Moreland was the ringleader with respect to all of 
the crimes committed against the victim. However, although Moreland initially 
pointed a weapon at the victim, told defendant to "do what you got to do" before 
defendant left to commit the murder, and threatened the witnesses, it was 
defendant who instigated the actual violence against the victim, by telling 
Golden to attack the victim and then by intervening and punching the victim 
repeatedly in the face before Moreland or anyone else. Moreover, the overriding 
distinction between the two perpetrators is that it was defendant, not Moreland, 
who carried the victim outside with a pillowcase over her head on a January 
night, without a coat or shoes, put her in the trunk of her car, drove miles 
away to a secluded area, and discharged a shotgun into her head at close range, 
leaving her to die alone on the ground in a deserted lot, the pillowcase still 
covering her face. This fact alone justifies defendant's more severe sentence. 
People v. Easley, No. 84418, slip op. at 29 (_____ 2000)
Defendant argues that the sentencing disparity cannot be "excused" simply 
because defendant was the actual killer, citing People v. Gleckler, 82 Ill. 2d 145 (1980). Gleckler is distinguishable. There, this court 
vacated defendant's death sentence and remanded for a sentence other than death 
in light of the fact that others involved in the crime received only terms of 
imprisonment. However, in that case when the defendant shot the two victims his 
accomplice had already shot both victims with a shotgun. Moreover, the defendant 
was in the company of his accomplice, the ringleader, at the time he shot the 
two victims and there was considerable evidence supporting the defendant's 
testimony at trial and sentencing that his accomplice ordered him to shoot the 
victims, threatening his life if he did not. In the instant case, there was no 
evidence suggesting that Moreland threatened defendant if he failed to carry out 
the killing and defendant was acting on his own from the time he drove away from 
the house through the time he ended the victim's life with a shotgun in 
Riverdale. Moreland and defendant are not equally culpable, and defendant's 
sentence was not unreasonably disparate to Moreland's. Easley, slip op. 
at 29; see also People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 176 (1998) (sentence 
of death for defendant not unreasonably disparate to 60-year sentence for 
codefendant who hired defendant to kill victim)(3) (and 
cases cited therein).
Evidentiary Rulings During Aggravation-Mitigation 
Phase
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in two evidentiary rulings 
during the aggravation-mitigation phase of trial. First, he contends that the 
court should have barred the State from introducing the testimony of Leon 
Anderson. Second, he contends the court erred in prohibiting defendant's mother, 
Mary Williams, from answering the question, "Can you give the ladies and 
gentlemen of the jury any reasons why they should spare [defendant's] life?"
A. Leon Anderson
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing 
Leon Anderson to testify over defense counsel's objection that Anderson's 
identity was not disclosed until the day before he testified.
Defendant filed a pretrial motion seeking disclosure of all nonstatutory 
aggravating evidence which the State would seek to introduce at sentencing. The 
court entered an order, agreed to by the State, that the State would furnish 
defense counsel with the names and updated addresses of any witnesses whom it 
intended to call in aggravation, along with any reports relevant to those 
witnesses. Before trial, the State informed the court and defense counsel that 
the State would have no evidence in aggravation beyond evidence of drug dealing 
by defendant and matters mentioned in jail records which had been tendered to 
defense counsel. However, the day before closing arguments in the guilt phase of 
trial, the State mentioned that it would have "different aggravation."
On the day of closing arguments in the guilt phase, the State revealed that 
in the aggravation-mitigation phase it would call two witnesses who knew 
defendant during his pretrial incarceration.(4) The 
prosecution refused to reveal the witnesses' names until it could be determined 
whether they were in protective custody. However, the State agreed to comply 
with the trial court's order to begin obtaining disciplinary reports and 
criminal record sheets immediately, in order to make them available to defense 
counsel as quickly as possible.
The State did not reveal Anderson's name to the defense until the day before 
he testified. On the day Anderson was to testify, defense counsel objected to 
his testimony on the basis that he had had insufficient time to investigate the 
witness. The prosecutor explained to the court that the witness had only been 
located through an "exhaustive search of five years of records" regarding 
defendant's cell mates during his confinement. The assistant State's Attorney 
informed the court that the first time a representative of his office had 
interviewed Anderson was that very day, and that the State had tendered all 
available materials. The trial court refused to bar Anderson from 
testifying.
Defense counsel then asked for a continuance to investigate Anderson. The 
State responded that they had tendered to the defense Anderson's "rap sheets" 
from both the State of Illinois and the City of Chicago, as well as an appellate 
court opinion describing the underlying facts of one of Anderson's convictions. 
However, the State represented that it would not be possible to obtain his 
Illinois Department of Corrections records until the next day. The court denied 
the request for a continuance, but stated that Anderson, who was normally 
incarcerated in an Illinois Department of Corrections facility in Centralia, 
would be held overnight in Chicago so as to be subject to recall by the defense 
the next day. However, after Anderson's testimony defense counsel stated that 
Anderson could be remanded to Centralia that evening. The next day, defense 
counsel informed the court that the State had tendered a disciplinary hearing 
report on Anderson, but defense counsel did not feel any need to recall 
Anderson.
Defendant concedes that the Constitution does not entitle defendants in 
capital cases to discover the evidence the State intends to introduce in 
aggravation. People v. Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130, 160 (1998); 
People v. Williams, 147 Ill. 2d 173 (1991). Nevertheless, defendant 
argues that because the trial court did enter an order directing the 
State to disclose such evidence, the court erred in failing to bar Anderson from 
testifying when the State failed to disclose his name until the day before he 
testified. We disagree.
A trial court's rulings on admissibility of evidence in aggravation are 
reviewed only for abuse of discretion. People v. Thomas, 137 Ill. 2d 500 (1990). We also review only for abuse of discretion any penalty imposed by a 
trial court for violation of a discovery order. People v. Newberry, 166 Ill. 2d 310, 317-18 (1995). We do not find the trial court to have abused its 
discretion in refusing to bar Anderson's testimony when defendant was not 
constitutionally entitled to the information and there was no showing that the 
prosecution acted in bad faith in failing to disclose Anderson earlier.
Defendant's reliance on Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 114 L. Ed. 2d 173, 14 S. Ct. 1723 (1991), is misplaced. In that case the trial court 
sentenced defendant to death even though the prosecution had formally stated 
that it was not seeking the death penalty. See Lankford, 500 U.S.  at 
119-20, 114 L. Ed. 2d  at 183-84, 111 S. Ct.  at 1729. The Court held that the 
proceeding violated defendant's due process rights because at the sentencing 
hearing defense counsel was unaware that there was even a possibility that 
defendant might be sentenced to death, and accordingly made no arguments against 
such a sentence. Lankford in no way resembles the case before us, in 
which defendant merely complains that the trial court punished the prosecution 
insufficiently for what the record reveals to have been an innocent failure to 
provide him with information he was not constitutionally entitled to receive. 
Moreover, defendant has not shown how the abbreviated disclosure inhibited his 
defense efforts, in that he has not suggested how counsel might have attacked 
Anderson's credibility if the State had disclosed him before trial. We find no 
basis for reversal. Cf. People v. Guest, 166 Ill. 2d 381, 
405-06 (1995) (counsel not ineffective for failing to move the State to disclose 
evidence in aggravation since defense was not constitutionally entitled to 
discovery and defendant failed to indicate what counsel could have done to 
challenge the aggravating evidence).
B. Mary Williams
Defendant next argues that the court erred in sustaining the prosecution's 
objection when defense counsel asked defendant's mother if she could "give the 
ladies and gentlemen of the jury any reasons why they should spare [defendant's] 
life." We find no error. When defense counsel posed this question to the 
witness, the State objected and a sidebar was called. The trial court sustained 
the objection and instructed defense counsel that she could not "ask a witness 
anything with respect to the death penalty. That [means] why he shouldn't get 
it, why he should get it, whatever." The court explained that counsel could 
elicit facts about defendant from the witnesses and then, in closing argument, 
argue that the facts constituted mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude 
imposition of the death penalty. However, counsel had to structure her questions 
"without going into why somebody should not get the death penalty which is 
tantamount to saying do you think the defendant should get the death 
penalty."
The trial court's ruling was correct. A witness' opinion that a defendant 
should not be sentenced to death is not admissible at a death penalty 
proceeding. People v. Williams, 161 Ill. 2d 1, 70 (1994); People v. 
Stewart, 105 Ill. 2d 22, 67 (1984). Witnesses may testify concerning 
matters relating to the record and character of the and the nature and 
circumstances of the offense, but not as to their opinions regarding the 
appropriate sentence. This determination is left to the sentencing authority 
based on the evidence adduced, and a witness' opinion thus is irrelevant. 
Williams, 161 Ill. 2d  at 70. The trial court drew exactly this 
distinction in sustaining the State's objection to the question. A witness 
giving reasons that a defendant should not be sentenced to death is implicitly 
arguing that the defendant should not be sentenced to death. The trial 
court correctly foreclosed this attempted "end-run" around the rule that witness 
opinions regarding the appropriate penalty are inadmissible. The court also made 
clear to defense counsel that the proper procedure was to elicit the facts from 
the witness and then use closing argument at the aggravation-mitigation phase to 
show the jury why the facts militated against a sentence of death. Thus, 
reversal on this ground is unwarranted.
Closing Argument During Sentencing
Defendant next argues that his death sentence must be vacated and the cause 
remanded for resentencing because of certain remarks by the prosecution during 
closing argument during the sentencing phase of trial.
We begin our analysis by reviewing the general principles applicable to such 
claims. Prosecutors are allowed great latitude in their closing arguments, and a 
trial court's determination of the propriety of remarks will not be disturbed 
absent a clear abuse of discretion. People v. Byron, 164 Ill. 2d 279, 
295 (1995). The State may comment on the evidence and all reasonable inferences 
therefrom, and any allegedly erroneous comments must be viewed in context and 
the argument must be considered as a whole. People v. Blue, 189 Ill. 2d 99, 128 (2000). However,
Defendant makes numerous separate claims of error in the State's closing 
argument. However, defendant did not contemporaneously object to many of the 
arguments of which he now complains, and with respect to those few arguments to 
which he did object at trial, he failed to raise the points as grounds for 
reversal in his post-trial motion. It is well established that in order to 
preserve for appeal an objection to argument in the aggravation-mitigation phase 
of trial, a defendant must both object contemporaneously and raise the point in 
his post-trial motion. See, e.g., People v. Buss, 187 Ill. 2d 144, 239 (1999); People v. Nielson, 187 Ill. 2d 271, 296 (1999). 
Accordingly, all of defendant's arguments regarding the State's closing argument 
have been waived.
However, defendant contends that we ought to consider his arguments under the 
plain error doctrine. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a). As previously noted, the plain 
error rule may be invoked only if the evidence was closely balanced, or the 
error was of such magnitude as to create a substantial risk that the accused was 
denied a fair and impartial trial. The second prong of the rule applies "only if 
the error is so fundamental to the integrity of the judicial process and so 
prejudicial to the defendant that the trial court could not cure the error by 
sustaining an objection or instructing the jury to disregard the error." 
People v. Brooks, 187 Ill. 2d 91, 136 (1999), citing People v. 
Vargas, 174 Ill. 2d 355, 363-64 (1996). We shall examine each of the 
allegedly improper remarks with these principles in mind.
One of defendant's allegations of error concerns comments by the State that 
for defendant prison would be like a "Holiday Inn" or a "frat house." In the 
opening portion of the State's closing argument, the prosecutor asked the 
jury:
And in rebuttal, the prosecutor contended that:
These comments do not constitute plain error. For her "crime" of stealing 
approximately $50 worth of cocaine, defendant instigated a prolonged, savage 
beating of the 19-year-old victim, raped her, and threw her in the trunk of her 
own car, driving her miles away before he discharged a shotgun into her head, 
leaving her to die in an empty trash-strewn lot in mid-January, a pillowcase 
over her head. Moreover, it was uncontroverted that defendant had risen to a 
high rank in his gang, and that he used his power to order beatings of other 
prisoners while in jail.
Defendant's mitigating evidence consisted chiefly of testimony that he had 
been a decent youth who had been teased about his facial deformity and 
bowleggedness and had recently ceased his gang involvement. As the State notes, 
there was no testimony that defendant's case of Sturge-Weber disease had 
progressed to a point where his judgment was impaired or that any such 
impairment could have caused him to commit the crime in question. Indeed, 
defendant's evidence in mitigation established that he was able to be polite 
when he desired to be.
The brutal facts of this murder, balanced against the evidence offered in 
mitigation, render a conclusion that the evidence was not closely balanced. See 
People v. Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d 289, 321 (1997) (finding aggravating 
evidence "overwhelming, consisting chiefly of the brutal circumstances of the 
defendant's crimes").
Nor did these comments create any risk that defendant was denied a fair and 
impartial trial. While colorful, the State's "Holiday Inn" and "frat house" 
metaphors were based on the evidence, specifically the testimony of Anderson 
regarding defendant's status and the conditions in which he lived while 
incarcerated in Cook County jail. We see no merit to defendant's argument that 
the conditions of his incarceration in Cook County jail cannot form a basis for 
an argument regarding the conditions he would endure while incarcerated at the 
Illinois Department of Corrections. It was a reasonable inference that if 
defendant enjoyed certain privileges or luxuries in one correctional facility, 
because of his status within the Gangster Disciples, he might enjoy similar 
privileges or luxuries in other correctional facilities. Plain error therefore 
does not excuse defendant's procedural default of this statement.
As with the preceding claim, the remainder of defendant's claims regarding 
closing argument are cognizable only as plain error. As we have determined that 
the evidence in aggravation and mitigation was not closely balanced, we need 
only consider, for these next several claims, whether defendant was denied a 
fair and impartial trial such that the second prong of the plain error rule has 
been met.
Defendant next objects to the State's contention in closing argument that the 
jury's decision was "collective," rather than, as defense counsel suggested, one 
the jurors had to make "individually in your hearts and in your conscience." 
Again, we find plain error does not excuse defendant's procedural default. This 
argument was not prejudicial. First, the argument was in at least some sense 
correct, in that all jurors had to sign whichever verdict form was to be 
returned. Second, the State did tell the jury that it was "okay to agree to 
disagree." Finally, we believe that any confusion which might have resulted from 
the prosecution's argument would have been sufficiently cured by the jury 
instructions that the jury had to sign and return the verdict form directing the 
court not to sentence defendant to death unless the jury unanimously found that 
there was no mitigating factor sufficient to preclude imposition of the death 
sentence. See People v. Towns, 174 Ill. 2d 453, 472 (1996) (finding no 
plain error in trial court having told jury during voir dire that all 
decisions, including the decision whether to impose the death penalty, had to be 
unanimous, because jury was properly instructed prior to beginning its 
deliberations during the aggravation-mitigation phase). Plain error does not 
excuse defendant's procedural default.
Defendant further contends that the prosecution exceeded the bounds of proper 
argument by commenting on the possibility that he might be paroled. In context, 
the comments of which defendant complains are as follows:
Again, we do not find plain error. As we have previously noted, "[e]ach 
instance of error of this kind must be examined on the facts of the case." 
People v. Pitsonbarger, 142 Ill. 2d 353, 401 (1990). We believe that 
the prosecutor's comments are distinguishable from comments made in cases in 
which this court has set aside a death sentence. In People v. Gacho, 
122 Ill. 2d 221 (1988), upon which defendant relies, a death sentence was set 
aside because of the prosecutor's repeated comments on the possibility of 
parole, though he knew there was no possibility of parole, together with other 
objectionable comments including one which mentioned the possibility of future 
violence against guards or other inmates. We held that the repeated comments 
diverted the jury's attention from the aggravating and mitigating factors of the 
case. Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d  at 257. See also People v. Hooper, 
133 Ill. 2d 469, 500 (1989) (holding improper prosecutor's speculation that 
defendant might kill a guard, along with comments concerning parole). In 
contrast, when the State's comments in the instant case are viewed in context, 
we must conclude that the comments were not naked speculation, nor were they 
immaterial to the jury's relevant considerations. Given the evidence adduced 
concerning defendant's behavior during his pretrial incarceration, defendant's 
rehabilitative potential was a proper matter for consideration by the sentencing 
authority during the aggravation-mitigation phase. See People v. 
Henderson, 171 Ill. 2d 124, 138 (1996). Moreover, the prosecutor here did 
not specifically ask the jury to consider the possibility that defendant might 
be paroled if not sentenced to death. See People v. Fields, 135 Ill. 2d 18, 59 (1990). Finally, these were brief, isolated comments in the context of an 
opening portion of closing argument which spanned nearly 13 pages of transcript. 
Thus, while we do not condone these remarks, we cannot conclude that they were 
of such substantial error as to threaten the integrity of the judicial process 
or to deny defendant a fair trial so as to satisfy the second prong of our plain 
error rule.
Nor did the State commit plain error by its brief exhortation to the jury to 
prevent defendant from "prey[ing] on innocent people." Although it is improper 
for the State to make an unsupported reference to hypothetical future 
crimes a defendant might commit (Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d  at 174; People 
v. McNeal, 175 Ill. 2d 335, 365 (1997)), comment on future dangerousness is 
proper if based on the evidence (People v. Johnson, 146 Ill. 2d 109, 
148-49 (1991)). Here there was ample evidence from which to infer that defendant 
might present a danger to others, including the evidence that he called 
"violations" on others and that while in jail awaiting trial he had been 
attempting to effectuate the killing of his codefendant as well as the other 
witnesses in this case.
Finally, defendant argues it was impermissible for the State to argue that 
defendant had "manipulated" or "controlled" Sergeant Bennett by "fear" or 
"terror." This argument refers to the following comments from the rebuttal 
portion of the State's closing argument:
Although we believe that this argument was improper, we do not believe that 
it rises to the level of plain error. The record reveals that the comment was an 
isolated one made in the context of an argument that, as transcribed, consists 
of over 25 pages. We note that the trial court properly instructed the jury that 
arguments did not constitute evidence. Given the fact that the remark was not 
repeated and that the jury was properly instructed as to the function of 
argument, we cannot say that this error was so egregious as to have denied 
defendant a fair sentencing hearing.
Constitutionality of the Death Penalty
Finally, defendant raises several constitutional challenges to the death 
penalty. Defendant contends that the death penalty is unconstitutional because 
(1) the jury weighed the aggravating factor that the murder was committed in a 
"cold, calculated and premeditated manner," which defendant asserts is 
unconstitutionally vague; (2) it is inevitable that the death penalty will be 
imposed on innocent persons; (3) death penalty procedure "places a burden of 
proof on the defendant which precludes meaningful consideration of mitigation" 
and allows the sentencing authority to weigh the purportedly vague aggravating 
factor of "any other reason"; and (4) numerous features of Illinois death 
penalty practice cumulatively render the statute unconstitutional for failure to 
sufficiently minimize the risk of arbitrarily or capriciously imposed death 
sentences. Defendant's challenges have all previously been considered and 
rejected by this court. See People v. McLaurin, 184 Ill. 2d 58, 99 
(1998) ("cold, calculated, and premeditated manner" aggravating factor is not 
unconstitutionally vague) (and cases cited therein); People v. Bull, 
185 Ill. 2d 179, 211-20 (1998) (rejecting argument that death penalty is 
unconstitutional because it is "inevitab[le] that innocent persons will be 
wrongly convicted of capital crimes and executed"); People v. Jackson, 
182 Ill. 2d 30, 93-95 (1998) (Illinois death penalty statute not 
unconstitutional in placing burden on defendant to prove mitigating 
circumstances sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty); 
People v. Burgess, 176 Ill. 2d 289, 322-23 (1997) (statutory 
requirement that the death sentence be imposed unless there exists mitigating 
evidence sufficient to preclude it does not prevent the sentencing authority 
from giving full effect to mitigating evidence introduced in a capital 
defendant's behalf, and none of the features of death penalty practice of which 
defendant complains render the statute unconstitutional individually or in 
combination). We see no reason to revisit our earlier decisions, and accordingly 
reject defendant's arguments.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above stated, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cook 
County is affirmed. We direct the clerk of this court to enter an order setting 
Tuesday, November 28, 2000, as the date on which the sentence of death, entered 
by the circuit court of Cook County, shall be carried out. Defendant shall be 
executed in the manner provided by law. 725 ILCS 5/119-5 (West 1996). The clerk 
of this court shall send a certified copy of the mandate in this case to the 
Director of Corrections, the warden of Tamms Correctional Center, and the warden 
of the institution where defendant is confined.
Affirmed.
CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree that Williams' convictions should not be disturbed. In my view, 
however, his sentence of death cannot be allowed to stand. For the reasons set 
forth in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in People v. Bull, 
185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty law violates the eighth and 
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. 
VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 
1970, art. I, §2). Williams' sentence of death should therefore be vacated and 
he should be sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(j) (West 
1992).
1. 1We are discussing the issues out of the order 
in which they are presented in defendant's brief to this court. However, we will 
discuss each of the issues raised in defendant's brief. 

2. 2 Moreland was also sentenced to a term of 30 
years for aggravated criminal sexual assault, sentence to run consecutive to the 
sentence for murder and concurrent with the sentence for armed robbery. However, 
this conviction was overturned on appeal. People v. Moreland, 292 Ill. 
App. 3d 616 (1997). 

3. 3Defendant might object that in 
Kliner this court differentiated between defendant and his codefendant 
in terms of their character and background, not just their relative culpability, 
in upholding defendant's death sentence against his proportionality challenge. 
See Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d  at 176-77. While we did also distinguish the 
two perpetrators on these grounds, we clearly stated that the differences in 
character and background merely constituted "an additional basis for 
the sentence disparity." (Emphasis added.) Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d  at 177. 

4. 4The State ultimately called only one such 
witness, Anderson.