Case Title: McNally v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 631, 2011

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2012-08-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
TROY McNALLY, 
 
 
§ 
§ 
No. 631, 2011 
Defendant Below,  
 
§ 
Appellant, 
§ 
Court Below–Superior Court of  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
the State of Delaware in and for  
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
Kent County 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
§ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Plaintiff Below, 
 
 
§ 
Cr. ID No. 0701005246  
 
Appellee. 
 
 
 
§ 
 
Submitted:  June 8, 2012 
Decided:  August 17, 2012 
 
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and RIDGELY, Justices. 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
This 17th day of August 2012, upon consideration of the parties’ briefs 
and the Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that: 
(1) 
The appellant, Troy McNally, filed this appeal from the 
Superior Court’s November 16, 2011 order denying his motion for 
postconviction relief under Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”).  
We have determined there is no merit to the appeal and affirm the judgment 
of the Superior Court. 
(2) 
Our decision on direct appeal reflects that on the night of 
January 6, 2007 someone shot four bullets in the direction of the house at 82 
2 
 
Strawberry Drive in Magnolia, Delaware.1  Three bullets struck the house, 
which was occupied by four people at the time of the shooting.  One bullet 
struck a car that was parked at the house next door. 
(3) 
McNally was charged in the shooting and found guilty by a 
Superior Court jury of four counts of Reckless Endangering in the First 
Degree (one count for each of the four people occupying 82 Strawberry 
Drive at the time of the shooting), four companion counts of Possession of a 
Firearm During the Commission of a Felony, and two counts of Criminal 
Mischief.  McNally was sentenced to a total of thirty-eight years at Level V 
suspended after twelve years and five months for probation. 
(4) 
On direct appeal, McNally argued that the Superior Court erred 
when admitting certain ballistics evidence (hereinafter “evidentiary claims”).  
In our decision affirming McNally’s convictions we concluded that the 
evidentiary claims were without merit.2 
(5) 
On August 11, 2010, McNally filed a motion for postconviction 
relief raising the evidentiary claims, a confrontation clause claim, and 
related and overlapping claims of ineffective assistance of trial and/or 
                                            
1 See McNally v. State, 980 A.2d 364 (Del. 2009) (affirming judgment of the Superior 
Court). 
2 Id. at 368-72.       
3 
 
appellate counsel.3  The Superior Court referred the motion to a 
Commissioner for proposed findings and recommendations.  McNally’s trial 
and appellate counsel each filed an affidavit, the State filed a response, and 
McNally filed a reply.  McNally’s reply raised additional claims of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel.4 
(6) 
By report dated August 15, 2011, the Commissioner 
recommended that McNally’s motion for postconviction relief should be 
denied as procedurally barred.5  McNally raised objections to the 
Commissioner’s report in three successive motions to reconsider the report.  
McNally also filed a motion to amend the postconviction motion; however, 
the motion to amend was denied as untimely filed. 
(7) 
Upon de novo review of the matter, the Superior Court adopted 
the Commissioner’s report and recommendation and denied the 
postconviction motion.6  This appeal followed. 
                                            
3 McNally alleged that his trial counsel (i) failed to file a motion for judgment of 
acquittal; (ii) failed to object to the credibility of the ballistics expert; (iii) failed to object 
to alleged evidence tampering, and (iv) failed to investigate and prepare the case for trial.     
4 McNally claimed that his trial counsel failed to file a pretrial motion to suppress and 
that his appellate counsel (i) failed to raise an argument challenging the admission of 
witness statements without cross-examination, (ii) failed to “argue on the verdict,” 
meaning, apparently,  “interracial violent crime,” and (iii) failed to raise an evidence 
tampering argument. 
5 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i) (listing procedural bars to relief). 
6 State v. McNally, 2011 WL 7144815 (Del. Super. Ct.). 
4 
 
(8) 
When reviewing the denial of postconviction relief, this Court 
must consider the procedural requirements of Rule 61 before addressing any 
substantive issues.7  When reviewing the denial of relief premised on 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the Court must consider whether the 
movant has established that counsel’s representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness and was prejudicial.8 
(9) 
Having carefully considered the parties’ positions on appeal, we 
conclude that the Superior Court did not err when barring McNally’s 
evidentiary claims as formerly adjudicated.9  On appeal, McNally has not 
demonstrated that reconsideration of the evidentiary claims is warranted in 
the interest of justice.10  Moreover, to the extent McNally has reconstructed 
the claims into allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, his claims are 
unavailing.  McNally cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced as a result 
of any alleged ineffective assistance of his trial and/or appellate counsel.11 
(10) It does not appear that the Superior Court expressly addressed 
either McNally’s claim that he was denied the right to confront two of the 
four victims occupying 82 Strawberry Drive the night of the shooting or his 
related claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the 
                                            
7 Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990). 
8 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). 
9 Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 
10 Id. 
11 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
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claim on direct appeal.  McNally contends that prior out-of-court statements 
of the two non-testifying victims were admitted into evidence 
notwithstanding his inability to cross-examine those victims. 
(11) The record does not support McNally’s assertion that the 
Superior Court admitted into evidence prior out-of-court statements of the 
two victims who did not testify at trial.  The Court thus concludes that 
McNally’s confrontation clause claim is without merit12 and is procedurally 
defaulted13 without exception.14  To the extent McNally claims ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel to raise the claim on appeal, the claim fails 
for lack of prejudice.15 
(12) Finally, the Court acknowledges McNally’s attempt to raise a 
claim of racial bias for the first time on appeal.  McNally’s claim is based on 
his contention that the jury convicted him of charges associated with 82 
Strawberry Drive where a white family resided but acquitted him of charges 
associated with the house next door where a black family resided.  The 
                                            
12 See generally Wheeler v. State, 36 A.3d 310 (Del. 2012) (holding that State violated 
right to confrontation when it introduced into evidence the substance of inadmissible 
hearsay statements to an investigating police detective (citing Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36 (2004) (holding that prior out-of-court testimonial statement by witness is 
inadmissible if witness is unavailable and there is no opportunity to cross-examine the 
witness)))). 
13 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3) (barring a claim not previously raised absent 
cause for relief from the procedural default and prejudice). 
14 See Del. Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(5) (providing that the procedural bar of (i)(3) shall 
not apply to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a 
constitutional violation). 
15 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
6 
 
Court concludes that McNally’s racial bias claim is best resolved in the 
Superior Court in the first instance.  The Court declines to consider the claim 
for the first time on appeal.16  
          
 
 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 
 
/s/ Myron T. Steele 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
                                            
16 Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8.