Case Title: State v. David S. Stenklyft

Citation: 2005 WI 71

Docket Number: 2003AP001533-CR

State: wisconsin

Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Date: 2005-06-09T00:00:00Z

Document:
2005 WI 71 
 
 
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN 
 
 
 
 
 
CASE NO.: 
2003AP1533-CR 
COMPLETE TITLE: 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
     v. 
David S. Stenklyft,  
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
 
 
 
ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS 
 
 
OPINION FILED: 
June 9, 2005   
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS: 
        
ORAL ARGUMENT: 
December 7, 2004   
 
 
SOURCE OF APPEAL: 
 
 
COURT: 
Circuit   
 
COUNTY: 
Dane   
 
JUDGE: 
Daniel R. Moeser   
 
 
 
JUSTICES: 
 
 
 
PROSSER and ROGGENSACK, J.J., join the lead 
opinion. 
 
CONCUR/DISSENT: 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., concurs in part, dissents in 
part (opinion filed). 
BRADLEY, CROOKS, and BUTLER, J.J., join the 
concurrence/dissent. 
CROOKS, J., concurs in part, dissents in part 
(opinion filed). 
ABRAHAMSON, C.J., and BRADLEY and BUTLER, J.J., 
join the concurrence/dissent. 
 
CONCURRED: 
        
 
DISSENTED: 
        
 
NOT PARTICIPATING:         
 
 
 
ATTORNEYS: 
 
For the plaintiff-appellant the cause was argued by James 
M. Freimuth, assistant attorney general, with whom on the briefs 
was Peggy A. Lautenschlager, attorney general. 
 
For the defendant-respondent there was a brief and oral 
argument 
by 
Suzanne 
L. 
Hagopian, 
assistant 
state 
public 
defender. 
 
 
2005 WI 71 
 
NOTICE 
This opinion is subject to further 
editing and modification.  The final 
version will appear in the bound 
volume of the official reports.   
No.  2003AP1533-CR 
(L.C. No. 
00 CF 1806) 
STATE OF WISCONSIN  
 
 
   : 
IN SUPREME COURT 
 
 
State of Wisconsin,  
 
          Plaintiff-Appellant, 
 
     v. 
 
David S. Stenklyft,  
 
          Defendant-Respondent. 
 
FILED 
 
JUN 9, 2005 
 
Cornelia G. Clark 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
 
 
 
 
 
APPEAL from the orders of the Circuit Court for Dane 
County, Daniel R. Moeser.  Reversed and remanded.   
 
¶1 
JON P. WILCOX, J.   This case is before the court on a 
motion to bypass, pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 808.05 (2003-04)1 and 
Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.60.  The State appeals from a Dane 
County Circuit Court, Daniel R. Moeser, Judge, order, granting 
the petition of the defendant, David Stenklyft, for sentence 
adjustment under Wis. Stat. § 973.195 and an order denying the 
State's motion for reconsideration.   
                                                 
1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to 
the 2003-04 version unless otherwise indicated.   
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
2 
 
 
I. 
ISSUES 
¶2 
The State asserts that the circuit court proceeded 
under an incorrect theory of law in granting Stenklyft's 
petition.  The following issues are presented on appeal:  1) 
Does § 973.195 apply to inmates who were sentenced under the 
first phase of Truth-in-Sentencing (TIS-I), enacted by 1997 Wis. 
Act 283?; 2) If so, was Stenklyft's petition premature?; 3) If 
Stenklyft's petition was timely filed, was the circuit court 
nonetheless 
required 
to 
deny 
Stenklyft's 
petition 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 973.195(1r)(c) because the prosecutor objected to 
the petition?; 4) If the circuit court was required to deny the 
petition 
based 
on 
the 
prosecutor's 
objection, 
does 
§ 973.195(1r)(c) violate the separation of powers doctrine or 
procedural due process?; and 5) If the prosecutorial veto power 
is unconstitutional, is § 973.195(1r)(c) severable from the 
remainder of § 973.195?   
¶3 
We conclude, in accordance with State v. Tucker, 2005 
WI 46, ¶¶22-24, ___Wis. 2d ___, 694 N.W.2d 926, that § 973.195 
applies to inmates sentenced under TIS-I and that the felony 
classification system employed by the second phase of Truth-in-
Sentencing 
(TIS-II), 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 939.50, 
should 
be 
utilized to determine the "applicable percentage" of the term of 
initial confinement an inmate sentenced under TIS-I must serve 
in order to file a petition for sentence adjustment.  That 
"applicable 
percentage" 
is 
then 
applied 
to 
the 
sentence 
originally imposed to determine if the inmate is eligible to 
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
3 
 
file a petition under Wis. Stat. § 973.195(1g).  Id., ¶23.  
Because the crime for which Stenklyft was convicted is now 
classified as a Class F felony and there is no dispute that he 
served 75 percent of the initial confinement portion of his 
sentence, we conclude that his petition for sentence adjustment 
was not premature under § 973.195(1g).   
¶4 
In addition, we hold that the plain language of 
§ 973.195 requires the circuit court to dismiss the petition 
upon the objection of the district attorney.  Finally, we 
conclude that § 973.195 is not unconstitutional.  Section 
973.195 does not violate the separation of powers doctrine 
because it does not intrude upon the judiciary's inherent power 
to modify sentences.  Rather, the statute allows for early 
release by creating a new power of sentence adjustment that is 
shared among all three governmental branches.  The legislature 
is entitled to grant the judiciary new discretionary authority 
subject to enumerated conditions.  The legislature, through 
§ 973.195, simply has provided courts with a discretionary power 
they previously did not have that is subject to certain 
conditions precedent.   
¶5 
Furthermore, § 973.195 does not violate procedural due 
process because an inmate has no protected liberty interest in 
early release from prison through sentence adjustment.  The 
statute creates no legitimate expectation of sentence adjustment 
because 
the 
circuit 
court's 
decision 
to 
grant 
sentence 
adjustment is purely discretionary under the statute and 
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
4 
 
Stenklyft is not entitled to sentence adjustment under any set 
of facts.   
¶6 
Therefore, 
because 
we 
determine 
§ 973.195 
is 
constitutional and the district attorney vetoed Stenklyft's 
petition, we reverse the decision of the circuit court granting 
his petition for early release and its decision denying the 
State's motion for reconsideration.2  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
¶7 
In this case we are called upon to interpret § 973.195 
and 
determine 
whether 
certain 
portions 
of 
it 
are 
unconstitutional.  Statutory interpretation is a question of law 
that we review de novo.  Columbus Park Hous. Corp. v. City of 
Kenosha, 2003 WI 143, ¶9, 267 Wis. 2d 59, 671 N.W.2d 633.  The 
applicable 
standards 
for 
interpreting 
statutes 
have 
been 
discussed at length in numerous recent cases and need not be set 
forth in full.  It is sufficient to say that our goal in 
interpreting statutory provisions is to give effect to the 
                                                 
2 The concurrences/dissents are the opinion of the majority 
of the court.  It is possible that this matter is moot, as 
Stenklyft petitioned for sentence adjustment with two months 
remaining on his initial term of confinement and, according to 
his sentence, should be on extended supervision at the time this 
opinion is released.  However, the parties did not argue 
mootness 
before 
this 
court. 
 
On 
remand, 
any 
sentence 
modification must be made in conformity with Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.195(1r)(g).  As Stenklyft did not have grounds for 
sentence adjustment under § 973.195(1r)(b)3., the circuit court 
would be limited under § 973.195(1r)(g)1. to reducing "the term 
of confinement in prison by the amount of time remaining in 
[Stenklyft's] term of confinement in prison portion of [his] 
sentence . . . and [] corresponding[ly] increase[ing] . . . the 
term of extended supervision."  (Emphasis added.) 
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
5 
 
intent of the legislature, which we assume is expressed in the 
text of the statute.  State ex rel. Kalal v. Dane County Cir. 
Ct., 2004 WI 58, ¶44, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.  To this 
end, absent ambiguity in a statute, we do not resort to 
extrinsic aids of interpretation and instead apply the plain 
meaning of the words of a statute in light of its textually 
manifest scope, context, and purpose.  Id., ¶¶45-46.  A statute 
is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable 
understanding.  Id., ¶47.  If a statute is ambiguous, we may 
examine extrinsic sources in order to guide our interpretation.  
Id., ¶50.   
¶8 
Regarding the constitutionality of § 973.195, "[t]he 
statute is presumed constitutional.  A court will strike down a 
statute only when it is shown to be unconstitutional beyond a 
reasonable doubt."  Panzer v. Doyle, 2004 WI 52, ¶65, 271 
Wis. 2d 295, 680 N.W.2d 666 (citing State ex rel. Friedrich v. 
Dane County Cir. Ct., 192 Wis. 2d 1, 13, 531 N.W.2d 32 (1995)).  
Further, "[w]here the constitutionality of a statute is at 
issue, courts attempt to avoid an interpretation that creates 
constitutional infirmities.  Courts must apply a limiting 
construction to a statute, if available, to eliminate the 
statute's 
overreach, 
while 
maintaining 
the 
legislation's 
constitutional integrity."  Id. (citations omitted).  This court 
must "indulge every presumption in order to preserve the 
constitutionality of a legislative enactment."  Friedrich, 192 
Wis. 2d at 24.     
 
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
6 
 
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE 
¶9 
On August 14, 2000, the State filed a criminal 
complaint against Stenklyft, charging him with one count of 
causing great bodily harm by operating a motor vehicle while 
under 
the 
influence 
of 
an 
intoxicant, 
contrary 
to 
Wis. Stat. § 940.25(1)(a) (1999-2000), and one count of causing 
great bodily harm by operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited 
alcohol concentration, contrary to Wis. Stat. § 940.25(1)(b) 
(1999-2000).  An information was filed on October 17, 2000, 
alleging the same.   
¶10 Subsequently, Stenklyft entered a plea of no contest 
to the charge of causing great bodily harm by operating a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant, and the 
State dismissed the remaining charge.  Stenklyft was convicted 
of violating § 940.25(1)(a)(1999-2000) on November 27, 2000.  
The circuit court sentenced Stenklyft to two years and six 
months initial confinement and five years extended supervision, 
for a total term of imprisonment of seven and one-half years.  
Stenklyft challenged the effectiveness of his counsel at 
sentencing, and the court of appeals summarily affirmed the 
sentence in an unpublished opinion.   
¶11 By letter dated March 5, 2003, Stenklyft petitioned 
the 
circuit 
court 
for 
sentence 
adjustment 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 973.195.3  Stenklyft noted that he had served over 
                                                 
3 Stenklyft's 
letter 
incorrectly 
cited 
"state 
statute 
973.95."   
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
7 
 
75 percent of his sentence and had not received a conduct 
report.4  In addition, he cited his success in completing alcohol 
treatment 
programs, 
his 
extensive 
community 
service 
and 
volunteer work while in prison, and his work with other inmates 
as 
reasons 
for 
his 
adjustment 
request. 
 
See 
Wis. Stat. § 973.195(b)(1). 
 
Stenklyft 
also noted that he 
intended to continue his volunteer and community work after 
release. 
¶12 At the hearing on the petition, the State objected to 
Stenklyft's early release and argued that his good behavior 
would not qualify as a "new factor" and thus should not form the 
basis for sentence adjustment under § 973.195.  The State noted 
that while Stenklyft had been a model prisoner, his behavior and 
efforts at rehabilitation were what is expected of prisoners.  
Further, the State argued that Stenklyft's original sentence was 
"somewhat on the low side in terms of confinement initially, 
based on primarily the seriousness of the nature of the offense 
being terribly serious, [the victim] losing a leg and so on."  
In addition, the State brought to the court's attention that it 
had a right to unilaterally veto the petition, and that its veto 
should automatically terminate the petition.   
¶13 The circuit court discussed concerns it had with the 
sentence adjustment provision: 
But I think a lot of judges around the state view 
this law with some skepticism . . . because there are 
                                                 
4 As of the date of his petition, Stenklyft had served a 
total of one year, ten months, and 25 days in confinement.   
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
8 
 
no standards in the statutes that tell us what we're 
supposed to be looking at. 
I think there is a lot of concern about the 
absolute veto that a prosecutor's office has, no 
matter what someone has done in prison. . . .  
 . . . . 
There are some who feel that the statute giving 
the prosecution absolute veto is unconstitutional, 
which may invalidate other parts of the Truth in 
Sentencing laws, while some think just the statute 
that gives the DA veto is the part that should be 
stricken as unconstitutional.  I'm not reaching those 
issues today, except to say I don't believe the 
district 
attorney can 
have absolute one 
hundred 
percent veto over these cases.  There would be no 
reason to have a provision to file petitions if there 
was absolute veto.  It seems to me there have to be 
some reasons for the various positions that people 
take.   
¶14 Discussing the merits of the petition, the circuit 
court stated:   
But it seems to me you have done very well in 
prison.  You have apparently taken advantage of all 
the opportunities available to you and gone beyond 
what you had to do to try to rehabilitate yourself, 
but also, to provide some use to the community to keep 
things like this from happening again.   
The circuit court concluded:  "[b]ut as I read your petition, 
I'm thinking if you're not a person that's entitled to early 
release based on what they've done in prison, who is?"  
Therefore, the circuit court granted Stenklyft's petition and 
directed that he be released on August 1, 2003.   
¶15 The State filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that 
§ 973.195 applied only to crimes committed after February 1, 
2003——crimes governed by TIS-II.  A hearing on the motion was 
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
9 
 
held June 6, 2003.  After a discussion as to whether § 973.195 
applies to TIS-I offenders, the circuit court affirmed its 
earlier decision, concluding:  "And I can't think of a reason 
that the law would not apply to Mr. –- the new law, the early 
release law should apply to Mr. Stenklyft as well as anybody 
else sentenced under either TIS I or TIS II, as long as the 
crime qualifies."  The State appealed from the circuit court's 
initial decision granting Stenklyft's petition for sentence 
adjustment and its decision denying the State's motion for 
reconsideration.  This court granted the State's motion to 
bypass on May 14, 2004.     
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. 
 
¶16 As is well known by the bench and bar in this state, 
Wisconsin enacted its determinate sentencing scheme, Truth-in 
Sentencing, in two phases.  "The first phase, TIS-I, was enacted 
in June 1998 and applied to offenses committed on or after 
December 31, 1999.  See 1997 Wis. Act 283.  The second phase, 
TIS-II, was enacted in July 2002 and became effective February 
1, 2003.  See 2001 Wis. Act 109."  State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, 
¶7, n.3, 270 Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197.  See also State v. 
Cole, 2003 WI 59, ¶4, 262 Wis. 2d 167, 633 N.W.2d 700.  The main 
feature of TIS-I was § 973.01(1) (1999-2000), under which "a 
circuit court was required to impose a bifurcated sentence 
consisting of a term of confinement in prison followed by a term 
of extended supervision whenever it sentence[d] a person to 
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
10 
 
'imprisonment in the Wisconsin state prisons.'"  Cole, 262 
Wis. 2d 167, ¶16.   
¶17 Furthermore, pursuant to Wis. Stat. §§ 973.01(4) and 
(6) (1999-2000), TIS-I established that "those serving a 
bifurcated 
sentence 
were 
not 
eligible 
for 
parole," 
and 
eliminated the possibility for a reduction in confinement time 
for good behavior.  State v. Trujillo, 2005 WI 45, ¶4, 
___Wis. 2d ___, 
694 
N.W.2d 933. 
 
Thus, 
"'[w]ith 
limited 
exceptions, § 973.01 removed all statutory provisions that might 
serve to reduce an inmate's confinement based on the inmate's 
rehabilitation.'"  Id. (quoting State v. Champion, 2002 WI App 
267, ¶7, 258 Wis. 2d 781, 654 N.W.2d 242).  One result of the 
determinate 
sentencing 
scheme 
of 
TIS-I 
was 
that 
inmates 
sentenced under TIS-I generally served longer periods of 
confinement in prison than inmates sentenced under the old 
indeterminate scheme, as inmates subject to the indeterminate 
system were entitled to mandatory release after serving two-
thirds of their sentence.  See Wis. Stat. § 302.11 (1999-2000). 
¶18 It has been recognized that TIS-I was not a completed 
work when passed: 
The legislature established an 18-month window between 
the date TIS-I was passed and the date it was to go 
into effect in order to give the newly established 
Criminal Penalties Study Committee (CPSC) time to 
supplement and complete the existing legislation.  
While the CPSC timely completed its task, producing a 
lengthy report and 
statutory 
proposals 
for 
full 
implementation of truth-in-sentencing, the legislature 
failed to enact the proposals before TIS-I went into 
effect. 
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
11 
 
Cole, 262 Wis. 2d 167, ¶41 (footnote omitted).  Instead,  
During the next two and one-half years, the assembly 
and senate each passed bills that largely tracked the 
CPSC's recommendations, but differences between those 
bills were never reconciled.  Finally, during a 
special session called by Gov. McCallum in 2002 to 
deal with Wisconsin's budget crisis, both legislative 
houses agreed on budget adjustment legislation that 
included nearly all of the CPSC's proposals.  On July 
26, 2002, the governor signed [2001 Wis. Act 109] into 
law.   
Michael 
B. 
Brennan 
et 
al., 
Fully 
Implementing 
Truth-in-
Sentencing, Wisconsin Lawyer, Nov. 2002, at 12.   
¶19 TIS-II made several modifications to TIS-I, three of 
which are pertinent to this appeal.  First, TIS-II adopted a new 
nine-category 
A-I 
system 
of 
classifying 
felonies.  
Wis. Stat. § 939.50. 
 
Cf. 
Wis. Stat. § 939.50 
(1999-
2000)(classifying felonies into six categories:  A, B, BC, C, D, 
& E).  Although almost all previously unclassified felonies were 
classified under the new system, "[a] few offenses remain 
unclassified, even after Act 109, due to oversight or the 
vagaries of the legislative process."  Michael B. Brennan et 
al., Fully Implementing Truth-in-Sentencing, Wisconsin Lawyer, 
Nov. 2002, at 47.   
¶20 Second, as part of the reclassification, Act 109 
adjusted the length of the initial term of confinement for 
crimes, because "[t]he CPSC concluded that the maximum initial 
term of confinement for each crime in the new truth-in-
sentencing system ought to roughly parallel the maximum the 
person could serve in prison before reaching MR under the 
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
12 
 
indeterminate sentencing law that preceded [TIS-I]."  Id. at 12.  
As a result of this change and the delay between TIS-I and TIS-
II, "defendants convicted of felonies between December 31, 1999, 
and February 1, 2003, generally serve longer periods of 
confinement than the maximum provided for in TIS-II."  Trujillo, 
___Wis. 2d ___, ¶6.     
¶21 Finally, TIS-II created a number of methods for 
adjusting 
and 
modifying 
a 
bifurcated 
sentence, 
including 
mechanisms for allowing an inmate to be released early from 
prison.  See Wis. Stat. § 302.113(7m)(allowing an inmate to 
petition the sentencing court to modify the conditions of 
extended supervision set by the court); Wis. Stat. § 302.113(9g) 
(allowing an inmate to petition for release from initial 
confinement 
based 
on 
age 
or 
terminal 
illness); 
Wis. Stat. § 973.195 (allowing inmates to petition for sentence 
adjustment under certain conditions).  These provisions create 
additional procedures for adjusting a bifurcated sentence but do 
not alter or affect a circuit court's inherent power to modify a 
sentence based on "new factors" or other established common-law 
grounds.  Michael B. Brennan et al., Fully Implementing Truth-
in-Sentencing, Wisconsin Lawyer, Nov. 2002, at 53.5   
                                                 
5 However, 
in 
State 
v. 
Trujillo, 
2005 
WI 
45, 
¶2, 
___Wis. 2d ___, 694 N.W.2d 933, this court reaffirmed that 
courts 
should 
continue 
to 
apply 
existing 
new 
factor 
jurisprudence in the aftermath of truth-in-sentencing.     
 
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
13 
 
¶22 TIS-II went into effect February 1, 2003.  2001 Wis. 
Act 
109, 
§ 9459. 
 
However, 
by 
virtue 
of 
the 
"Initial 
applicability" provisions of 2001 Wis. Act 109, § 9359, certain 
enumerated provisions of TIS-II first apply to crimes committed 
on or after February 1, 2003.  
¶23 Unlike many of the provisions of TIS-II, § 973.195 was 
not proposed by the CPSC.  Michael B. Brennan et al., Fully 
Implementing Truth-in-Sentencing, Wisconsin Lawyer, Nov. 2002, 
at 54, n.80.  "Rather, it was devised by senate and assembly 
budget negotiators during the final stages of the 2002 special 
session of the legislature."  Id.  A similar but much broader 
provision was proposed by the Criminal Law Section of the State 
Bar but was never adopted.  John A. Birdsall & Raymond M. 
Dall'Osto, 
Problems 
with 
the 
New 
Truth-in-Sentencing 
Law, 
Wisconsin Lawyer, Nov. 2002, at 13.   
¶24 Section 973.195 allows an inmate serving a bifurcated 
sentence pursuant to § 973.01 to petition the sentencing court 
to adjust his sentence if he has served the "applicable 
percentage" 
of 
his 
initial 
term 
of 
confinement.6  
Wis. Stat. § 973.195(1r).  However, the text of the provision 
explicitly excludes inmates convicted of Class B felonies.  Id.7 
                                                 
6 As recognized by those involved in the development of TIS-
II, "Wis. Stat. Section 973.195 does not provide an offender 
with a statutory right to counsel when filing such a petition."  
Michael 
B. 
Brennan 
et 
al., 
Fully 
Implementing 
Truth-in-
Sentencing, Wisconsin Lawyer, Nov. 2002, at 54.   
7 Section § 973.195(1r) provides:   
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
14 
 
The "applicable percentage" of the initial term of confinement 
varies depending on the classification of the felony for which 
the inmate was convicted.  In order to be eligible for a 
sentence adjustment, an inmate convicted of a Class C to E 
felony must have completed 85 percent of his initial term of 
confinement, whereas an inmate convicted of a Class F to I 
felony must have completed 75 percent of the term of his initial 
confinement.8 
¶25 However, an inmate who has completed the "applicable 
percentage" of his initial term of confinement is not entitled 
to an automatic sentence adjustment; rather, he must establish 
one of the grounds specified in Wis. Stat. § 973.195(b).  This 
section provides: 
Any of the following is a ground for petition 
under par. (a): 
1. 
The 
inmate's 
conduct, 
efforts 
at 
and 
progress 
in 
rehabilitation, 
or 
participation 
and 
                                                                                                                                                             
Confinement In Prison. 
(a) An inmate who is serving 
a sentence imposed under s. 973.01 for a crime other 
than a Class B felony may petition the sentencing 
court to adjust the sentence if the inmate has served 
at least the applicable percentage of the term of 
confinement in prison portion of the sentence.  If an 
inmate is subject to more than one sentence imposed 
under this section, the sentences shall be treated 
individually for purposes of sentence adjustment under 
this subsection. 
8 Section 973.195(1g) provides:  "Definition.  In this 
section, 'applicable percentage' means 85% for a Class C to E 
felony and 75% for a Class F to I felony."  Thus, sentence 
adjustment is also unavailable for Class A felons (who are 
subject 
to 
a 
penalty 
of 
life 
imprisonment 
under 
Wis. Stat. § 939.50(3)).   
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
15 
 
progress 
in 
education, 
treatment, 
or 
other 
correctional programs since he or she was sentenced.   
3. 
A change in law or procedure related to 
sentencing 
or 
revocation 
of 
extended 
supervision 
effective after the inmate was sentenced that would 
have resulted in a shorter term of confinement in 
prison or, if the inmate was returned to prison upon 
revocation of extended supervision, a shorter period 
of confinement in prison upon revocation, if the 
change had been applicable when the inmate was 
sentenced.   
4. 
The inmate is subject to a sentence of 
confinement in another state or the inmate is in the 
United States illegally and may be deported.   
5. 
Sentence adjustment is otherwise in the 
interests of justice.   
Wis. Stat. § 973.195(1r)(b).   
¶26 The statute then sets forth the procedure by which a 
circuit court may consider the petition and allows the district 
attorney (and sometimes the victim)9 to object to the petition: 
Upon receipt of a petition filed under par. (a), 
the sentencing court may deny the petition or hold the 
petition for further consideration.  If the court 
holds the petition for further consideration, the 
court shall notify the district attorney of the 
inmate's petition.  If the district attorney objects 
to adjustment of the inmate's sentence within 45 days 
of receiving notification under this paragraph, the 
court shall deny the inmate's petition.  
Wis. Stat. § 973.195(1r)(c).  Next, the statute describes the 
circumstances under which the circuit court may grant the 
petition: 
If the sentencing court receives no objection to 
sentence adjustment from the district attorney under 
                                                 
9 Wis. Stat. § 973.195(1r)(d).   
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
16 
 
par. (c) or the victim under par. (d) and the court 
determines that sentence adjustment is in the public 
interest, the court may adjust the inmate's sentence 
as provided under par. (g).  The court shall include 
in the record written reasons for any sentence 
adjustment granted under this subsection. 
Wis. Stat. § 973.195(1r)(f).  As such, § 973.195(1r)(c) & (f) 
seemingly allow the district attorney to unilaterally veto an 
inmate's petition without providing any explanation therefor.   
¶27 If the circuit court grants the petition for sentence 
adjustment, it may change the structure of the inmate's sentence 
only as provided by statute.10  Finally, an inmate is allowed to 
                                                 
10 (g) 
Except as provided under par. (h), the 
only sentence adjustments that a court may make under 
this subsection are as follows: 
1. 
If the inmate is serving the term of 
confinement in prison portion of the sentence, a 
reduction in the term of confinement in prison by the 
amount of time remaining in the term of confinement in 
prison portion of the sentence, less up to 30 days, 
and a corresponding increase in the term of extended 
supervision.   
2. 
If the inmate is confined in prison upon 
revocation of extended supervision, a reduction in the 
amount of time remaining in the period of confinement 
in prison imposed upon revocation, less up to 30 days, 
and a corresponding increase in the term of extended 
supervision. 
(h) 1. 
If the court adjusts a sentence under 
par. (g) on the basis of a change in law or procedure 
as provided under par. (b)3. and the total sentence 
length of the adjusted sentence is greater than the 
maximum sentence length that the offender could have 
received if the change in law or procedure had been 
applicable when the inmate was originally sentenced, 
the court may reduce the length of the term of 
extended supervision so that the total sentence length 
does not exceed the maximum sentence length of that 
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
17 
 
submit only one petition for each sentence imposed under truth-
in-sentencing.  Wis. Stat. § 973.195(1r)(i).11 
B.  
¶28 The 
first 
question 
we 
must 
address 
is 
whether 
§ 973.195 applies to inmates who were sentenced under TIS-I.  In 
Tucker, this court held that § 973.195 applies to inmates 
sentenced 
under 
TIS-I 
and 
determined 
that 
the 
felony 
                                                                                                                                                             
the offender could have received if the change in law 
or procedure had been applicable when the inmate was 
originally sentenced. 
2. 
If the court adjusts a sentence under par. 
(g) on the basis of a change in law or procedure as 
provided under par. (b)(3). and the adjusted term of 
extended supervision is greater than the maximum term 
of extended supervision that the offender could have 
received if the change in law or procedure had been 
applicable when the inmate was originally sentenced, 
the court may reduce the length of the term of 
extended supervision so that the term of extended 
supervision does not exceed the maximum term of 
extended supervision that the offender could have 
received if the change in law or procedure had been 
applicable when the inmate was originally sentenced.   
Wis. Stat. § 973.195(1r)(g)-(h).   
 
11 Section 973.195(1r)(i) provides:  " An inmate may submit 
only one petition under this subsection for each sentence 
imposed under s. 973.01."  Furthermore, as commentators have 
recognized, an inmate does not have a statutory right to appeal 
the denial of a petition.  Michael B. Brennan et al., Fully 
Implementing Truth-in-Sentencing, Wisconsin Lawyer, Nov. 2002, 
at 55.  See also Wis. Stat. § 809.30(1)(c)(excluding petitions 
for sentence adjustment under § 973.195 from the definition of 
post-conviction relief); Legislative Reference Bureau, Wisconsin 
Briefs 02-7:  Truth-in-Sentencing and Criminal Code Revision, 
August 2002 at 5 ("There is no provision for appeal of denial of 
the petition."). 
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
18 
 
classification system employed by TIS-II, under § 939.50, should 
be utilized to determine the "applicable percentage" of the term 
of initial confinement an inmate sentenced under TIS-I must 
serve in order to file a petition for sentence adjustment.  
Tucker, ___Wis. 2d ___, ¶¶22-24.  That "applicable percentage" 
is then applied to the sentence originally imposed to determine 
if 
the 
inmate 
is 
eligible 
to 
file 
a 
petition 
under 
§ 973.195(1g).  Id., ¶23.   
¶29 Stenklyft was convicted of causing great bodily harm 
by operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an 
intoxicant, contrary to § 940.25(1)(a) (1999-2000).  At the time 
he was convicted, his offense was classified as a Class D 
felony.  Wis. Stat. § 940.25(1) (1999-2000).  However, under 
TIS-II, the crime for which Stenklyft was convicted is now a 
Class F felony.  Wis. Stat. § 940.25(1)(a).  Thus, while 
Stenklyft remains convicted of a Class D felony, for purposes of 
determining what "applicable percentage" of his term of initial 
confinement he must serve in order to be eligible for sentence 
adjustment, we look to how the crime for which he was convicted 
is currently classified under TIS-II.   
¶30 Because the crime for which Stenklyft was convicted is 
now classified as a Class F felony, he must have served 75 
percent of his initial confinement time in order to be eligible 
for sentence adjustment.  Wis. Stat. § 973.195(1g).  As there is 
no dispute that Stenklyft had completed 75 percent of the 
initial confinement portion of his sentence at the time his 
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
19 
 
petition was filed, we hold that Stenklyft's petition in this 
case was not premature.   
C. 
  
¶31 Next, we address whether the circuit court is required 
to dismiss a petition for sentence adjustment upon the objection 
of the district attorney.  The prosecutorial veto is contained 
in 
two 
separate 
subsections 
of 
§ 973.195. 
 
Section 
973.195(1r)(c) requires the court to notify the district 
attorney of an inmate's petition for sentence adjustment if the 
court decides to hold the petition for further consideration.  
Section 973.195(1r)(c) then goes on to provide that "[i]f the 
district attorney objects to adjustment of the inmate's sentence 
within 45 days of receiving notification under this paragraph, 
the 
court 
shall 
deny 
the 
inmate's 
petition."  
Wis. Stat. § 973.195(1r)(c)(emphasis added).  Next, subsection 
(1r)(f), which governs the circumstances under which the court 
may grant the petition, provides: "If the sentencing court 
receives no objection to sentence adjustment from the district 
attorney under par. (c) or the victim under par. (d) and the 
court determines that sentence adjustment is in the public 
interest, the court may adjust the inmate's sentence as provided 
under par. (g)."  Wis. Stat. § 973.195(1r)(f)(emphasis added).   
¶32 The 
operation 
of 
§ 973.195(1r)(c) 
and 
(f) 
thus 
purportedly grants the prosecutor a unilateral, absolute veto 
over a petition for sentence adjustment by requiring the court 
to dismiss the petition if the prosecutor objects and by 
conditioning the ability of the court to grant the petition on 
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
20 
 
the absence of objection from the prosecutor.  While some may 
argue that we could avoid addressing the constitutionality of 
§ 973.195 by reading limiting language into the statute, this is 
not the case. 
¶33 Specifically, it has been suggested that the court 
could read "shall" in § 973.195(1r)(c) as "may," thus rendering 
the provision directory.  However, there are two problems with 
this approach.  First, this court has clearly stated that the 
word "shall" in a statute is presumed to be mandatory, 
especially where the legislature uses the words "shall" and 
"may" in the same statutory section.  State v. Sprosty, 227 
Wis. 2d 316, 324-25, 595 N.W.2d 692 (1999).  Here, the statute 
provides: "Upon receipt of a petition filed under par. (a), the 
sentencing court may deny the petition. . . . If the district 
attorney 
objects 
to 
adjustment 
of 
the 
inmate's 
sentence . . . the court shall deny the inmate's petition."  
Wis. Stat. § 973.195(1r)(c)(emphasis 
added). 
 
In 
such 
circumstances, we presume that the legislature was aware of the 
different meanings of these words and intended these terms to be 
given their precise meaning.  Sprosty, 227 Wis. 2d at 325.   
¶34 Second, reading "shall" as "may" in § 973.195(1r)(c) 
would not solve the problem.  As noted, the prosecutorial veto 
is contained to two separate statutory sections.  In addition to 
the provision in § 973.195(1r)(c),  § 973.195(1r)(f) provides 
that a court may grant a petition for sentence adjustment only 
if it determines that sentence adjustment is in the public 
interest and "[i]f the sentencing court receives no objection to 
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
21 
 
sentence adjustment from the district attorney[.]"  (Emphasis 
added.) 
¶35 Moreover, it is this court's duty to "apply [a] 
statute as written, not interpret it as we think it should have 
been written."  Columbus Park Hous. Corp., 267 Wis. 2d 59, ¶34.  
Here, the legislature has allowed the circuit court the 
discretion to dismiss a petition for sentence adjustment 
outright.  Also, it has provided the court with discretion to 
grant the petition if it determines it is in the public interest 
to do so.  However, the legislature has clearly conditioned the 
court's discretionary power in the second instance upon the 
district attorney not objecting to the petition.  Therefore, we 
conclude 
that 
the 
plain 
language 
of 
§ 973.195(1r)(c)&(f) 
requires a circuit court to dismiss a petition for sentence 
adjustment upon the objection of the district attorney.   
D. 
¶36 We now turn and address the constitutionality of 
§ 973.195.  Stenklyft argues that § 973.195 violates the 
separation of powers doctrine because the prosecutorial veto 
intrudes upon the judiciary's inherent and exclusive power to 
modify sentences.  Alternatively, he contends that the statute 
is unconstitutional because it substantially interferes with the 
judiciary's shared sentencing authority.  For the reasons 
discussed below, we reject both arguments.   
¶37 This court has frequently discussed the separation of 
powers doctrine.   
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
22 
 
"The doctrine of separation of powers, while not 
explicitly set forth in the Wisconsin constitution, is 
implicit in the division of governmental powers among 
the 
judicial, 
legislative, 
and 
executive 
branches." . . . Each branch, separate but co-equal, 
is not subordinate to another, no branch to arrogate 
to itself control of the other.  
State 
v. 
Horn, 
226 
Wis. 2d 637, 
643, 
594 
N.W.2d 772 
(1999)(quoting Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 13).  A separation of 
powers analysis involving judicial power has two steps.  First, 
we must determine if the power allegedly intruded upon is 
"within the judiciary's core zone of exclusive power."  Id. at 
645.  If so, then "[a]ny exercise of power by the legislature or 
executive branch within such an area is an unconstitutional 
violation of the separation of powers."  Id. (emphasis added).  
If, on the other hand, the power at issue is "within an area of 
shared powers[,]" then a statute that relates to such power "is 
constitutional if it does not unduly burden or substantially 
interfere with either branch."  Id.   
¶38 "It is well established that a circuit court has 
inherent 
authority 
to 
modify 
a 
sentence." 
 
Trujillo, 
__Wis. 2d ___, ¶10.  "Courts have those inherent powers that are 
necessary 
'to 
enable 
the 
judiciary 
to 
accomplish 
its 
constitutionally or legislatively mandated functions.'"  State 
v. Crochiere, 2004 WI 78, ¶11, 273 Wis. 2d 57, 681 N.W.2d 524 
(quoting Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 162).  However, even power 
that is inherent in the judiciary may be a shared power.  See 
Friedrich, 
192 
Wis. 2d at 
19-21 
(examining 
whether 
the 
judiciary's inherent power to set compensation for court-
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
23 
 
appointed counsel is shared or exclusive and concluding such 
power is shared).   
¶39 The parties disagree as to whether the judiciary's 
inherent authority to modify sentences is an exclusive or shared 
power.  We need not reach this issue because even assuming, 
arguendo, that the power to modify sentences is an exclusive 
power of the judiciary, we conclude that § 973.195 does not 
relate to the judiciary's inherent power to modify a sentence.  
Rather, the statute creates a new, shared power that vests 
discretionary authority in the judiciary once certain conditions 
have been met.   
¶40 We reach this conclusion for several reasons.  First, 
the legislative history of § 973.195 supports this conclusion.  
As the statute itself is silent as to how it relates (if at all) 
to the judiciary's inherent power to modify a sentence, it is 
appropriate to examine legislative history to determine the 
legislative intent in enacting the provision.  
¶41 The original version of 2001 Wis. Act 109, § 1143m, 
governing 
petitions 
for 
sentence 
adjustment, 
contained 
a 
provision stating:  "Filing a petition under this section does 
not affect a person's right to file a petition for sentence 
modification under s. 809.30 or 973.19 or to petition the 
sentencing court for sentence modification on the basis of a 
[']new factor.'"  See Legislative Reference Bureau, Jr2 Drafting 
Request:  LRBb3085 (2001).  While there is no indication in the 
legislative history of this provision as to why it was not 
included in the final bill, we believe the most logical reason 
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
24 
 
the provision was removed is because it was deemed unnecessary 
and superfluous.   
¶42 It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that 
"this court must assume that the legislature knew the law in 
effect at the time of its actions."  State v. Olson, 175 
Wis. 2d 628, 641, 498 N.W.2d (1993).  The inherent power of a 
court to modify sentences is well established under our common 
law, and this court has repeatedly defined the parameters within 
which that power can be exercised.  See Crochiere, 273 
Wis. 2d 57, ¶12.  As explained supra, § 973.195(1r)(b) sets 
forth a limited number of bases upon which an inmate may file a 
petition for sentence adjustment.  Two of these grounds are not 
legitimate bases upon which a circuit court may modify a 
sentence based on our common law "new factor" jurisprudence, and 
the final ground in § 973.195(1r)(b) is much broader than the 
traditional common-law test to determine whether a new factor is 
present.  Compare § 973.195(1r)(b)1.-5. with Crochiere, 273 
Wis. 2d 57, ¶¶14-17 (describing the test for a "new factor" and 
collecting cases concluding "new factors" were not present) and 
State 
v. 
Hegwood, 
113 
Wis. 2d 544, 
548, 
335 
N.W.2d 339 
(1983)(holding that a change in the law of sentencing does not 
constitute a "new factor").   
¶43 Thus, if § 973.195 were construed as involving this 
court's inherent power to modify sentences, the statute would 
have the practical effect of overruling several of our cases 
defining what constitutes a "new factor."  However, it is black 
letter law that "an intent to change the common law must be 
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
25 
 
clearly expressed" by the legislature when enacting a statute.  
Gaugert v. Duve, 2001 WI 83, ¶41, 244 Wis. 2d 691, 628 
N.W.2d 861.  As there is no clear intent expressed in § 973.195 
to overturn this court's "new factor" jurisprudence, we must 
conclude that the statute does not relate to the judiciary's 
common-law power to modify sentences.   
¶44 Also, the legislature specifically rejected a proposal 
by the Criminal Law Section of the State Bar that would have 
established a ground for sentence adjustment based on a "new 
factor."  John A. Birdsall & Raymond M. Dall'Osto, Problems with 
the New Truth-in-Sentencing Law, Wisconsin Lawyer, Nov. 2002, at 
13.  In addition, we find it significant that § 973.195 is 
specifically titled "Sentence adjustment" rather than "Sentence 
modification."   
¶45 Further, those intimately involved in the drafting of 
TIS-II have recognized that § 973.195 does not relate to the 
judiciary's inherent power to modify sentences: 
A Wisconsin circuit court possesses the inherent 
authority to modify a previously imposed sentence 
based on either new factors or a conclusion that the 
original 
sentence 
was 
"unduly 
harsh 
or 
unconscionable."  Act 109 does not alter an offender's 
right to seek sentence modification on these grounds.  
It does, however, create additional procedures for 
modifying a bifurcated sentence.   
Brennan 
et 
al., 
Fully 
Implementing 
Truth-in-Sentencing, 
Wisconsin Lawyer, Nov. 2002, at 53 (footnote omitted).   
¶46 Moreover, while this court in Trujillo held that we 
will continue to apply existing new factor jurisprudence in the 
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
26 
 
aftermath of TIS-II and § 973.195, we did not conclude in 
Trujillo that § 973.195 in any way mandated that we adhere to 
our 
existing 
jurisprudence. 
 
Rather, 
we 
recognized 
that 
"'Wisconsin Stat. § 973.195 reflects the legislature's intent to 
create 
a 
separate 
and 
specific 
statutory 
procedure 
for 
requesting 
a 
sentence 
reduction' . . . ." 
 
Trujillo, 
___Wis. 2d ___, ¶24 (quoting State v. Torres, 2003 WI App 199, 
¶9, 267 Wis. 2d 213, 670 N.W.2d 400).  As such, contrary to the 
premise underlying the dissent, § 973.195 does not relate to the 
judiciary's inherent power to modify a sentence. 
¶47 Finally, if we were to accept Stenklyft's position 
that § 973.195 relates to the judiciary's inherent power to 
modify sentences and that such power is an exclusive zone of 
judicial authority, we would be required to strike down the 
entire sentence adjustment statute, not just the prosecutorial 
veto sections.  As noted, "[a]ny exercise of power by the 
legislature or executive branch within such an area is an 
unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers."  Horn, 
226 Wis. 2d at 645 (emphasis added).  Section 973.195 contains 
many restrictions on the court's ability to grant sentence 
adjustment beyond simply securing the approval of the district 
attorney.  As discussed previously, the statute:  1) requires 
that an inmate serve a certain portion of his sentence before 
petitioning for adjustment; 2) limits the grounds which he may 
assert; and 3) requires the court to find that adjustment is in 
the public interest in order to grant the petition.  As all of 
these provisions limit a court's authority under the statute, we 
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
27 
 
would be required to declare them all invalid if we were to 
accept Stenklyft's position.     
¶48 Therefore, we conclude that § 973.195 does not relate 
to the judiciary's inherent authority to modify sentences.  This 
court remains free to follow or alter its existing "new factor" 
jurisprudence as it sees fit.   
¶49 However, Stenklyft argues that even if the statute 
does not relate to the judiciary's inherent power to modify 
sentences, it nonetheless impermissibly interferes with the 
judiciary's shared power in sentencing.   
If the subject matter of the statute is within 
the powers constitutionally granted to the judiciary 
and the legislature, the statute is within an area of 
shared powers.  Such a statute is constitutional if it 
does not unduly burden or substantially interfere with 
either branch.  "The focus of this evaluation is on 
whether 
one 
branch's 
exercise 
of 
power 
has 
impermissibly intruded on the constitutional power of 
the other branch."   
Horn, 226 Wis. 2d at 645 (citations omitted)(quoting Friedrich, 
192 Wis. 2d at 15).   
¶50 Stenklyft is correct that the judiciary's sentencing 
power is among its shared constitutional powers.  Id., at 644-
46.  "'It is the function of the legislature to prescribe the 
penalty and the manner of its enforcement; the function of the 
courts to impose the penalty; while it is the function of the 
executive to grant paroles and pardons.'"  State v. Borrell, 167 
Wis. 2d 749, 767, 482 N.W.2d 883 (1992)(quoting Drewniak v. 
State ex rel. Jacquest, 239 Wis. 475, 488, 1 N.W.2d 899 
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
28 
 
(1942)).12  Yet, once a criminal sentence becomes final, the 
court's power to impose a sentence is at an end.  "[O]nce a 
defendant has been charged with a crime, tried, defended, 
convicted, sentenced, and gone through an appeal if desired, the 
litigation is over and the judicial process has ended. . . . The 
judiciary phase of the criminal process——imposing a penalty——is 
complete."  Horn, 226 Wis. 2d at 650.   
¶51 However, section 973.195 does not affect a court's 
power to fashion a sentence in the first instance.  Rather, it 
establishes the prerequisites to the exercise of the court's 
discretion when deciding to grant a petition for "sentence 
adjustment" after the court has already imposed a criminal 
disposition and such disposition has become final.13  In other 
words, § 973.195 allows the court to grant reprieve from a 
sentence already imposed.   
                                                 
12 "Thus, the sentencing court is required to exercise 
discretion to fashion a sentence[] within the range provided by 
the legislature . . . ."  State v. Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d 749, 
765, 482 N.W.2d 883 (1992).  Furthermore, this court has clearly 
held that "[t]he legislature has authority to determine the 
scope of the sentencing court's discretion."  State v. Horn, 226 
Wis. 2d 637, 646, 594 N.W.2d 772 (1999).   
13 We disagree with Stenklyft that § 973.195 represents a 
"reactivation" of the court's sentencing powers in the first 
instance.  Section 973.195(1r)(g)-(h) limits the types of 
"adjustments" that can be made to an inmate's sentence.  
Additionally, while § 973.195(1r)(f) requires the court to 
provide written reasons for granting a sentence adjustment, it 
does not prescribe the same detailed rationale that is required 
when a court sentences a defendant in the first instance.   
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
29 
 
¶52 Stenklyft 
has 
not 
identified 
any 
constitutional 
provision that vests the power of "sentence adjustment" in the 
judiciary.  Rather, similar to other discretionary powers of the 
judiciary, the authority to grant a "sentence adjustment" 
springs solely from the statutes.  See Horn, 226 Wis. 2d at 648 
("Without [statutory] authority, a court could not place a 
defendant on probation.").   
¶53 "'It is within the legislative power to give the 
courts discretionary powers, when certain conditions have been 
judicially determined to exist, or to direct the court's action 
in the premises without discretion.'"  State v. Lindsey, 203 
Wis. 2d 423, 441, 554 N.W.2d 215 (Ct. App. 1996)(quoting Jones 
v. Manesewitz, 267 Wis. 625, 633, 66 N.W.2d 732 (1954)(emphasis 
provided by Lindsey).  See also Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d at 768 
(same).  Here, the legislature has provided the courts with 
discretionary authority to grant a petition for sentence 
adjustment if certain conditions exist:  1) the inmate has 
served the "applicable percentage" of his sentence; 2) the 
inmate asserts one of the statutory grounds for adjustment; 3) 
the district attorney does not object to the petition; and 4) 
the court determines it is within the public interest to grant 
the petition.  In addition, when the district attorney does 
object, the legislature has simply "'direct[ed] the court's 
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
30 
 
action in the premises without discretion.'"  Lindsey, 203 
Wis. 2d at 441 (quoting Jones, 267 Wis. at 633).14   
¶54 We note that the focus of Stenklyft's separation of 
powers challenge is on the power the legislature has provided to 
the executive branch to veto a petition for sentence adjustment.  
The main feature of § 973.195 is that it allows an inmate to 
petition 
for 
early 
release 
from 
prison 
through 
sentence 
adjustment.  We agree with the State that § 973.195 is somewhat 
analogous to the old system of parole in that it provides a 
mechanism for early release from prison.  While we are cognizant 
that the purpose of truth-in-sentencing was to abolish parole 
and that the function of the circuit court under § 973.195 is 
not the equivalent of the parole board, we nonetheless find the 
analogy to be appropriate, given the nature of the power at 
issue.  Specifically, while the mechanisms of parole and 
sentence adjustment are surely different, they both serve the 
same purpose:  to allow inmates early release from prison once 
they have begun to serve their sentences.  See Legislative 
Reference Bureau, Wisconsin Briefs 02-7:  Truth-in-Sentencing 
and Criminal Code revision 4 (Aug. 2002)(noting that inmates 
                                                 
14 In State v. Lindsey, 203 Wis. 2d 423, 441, 554 N.W.2d 215 
(Ct. App. 1996), the court of appeals upheld Wisconsin's "three-
strikes" law in the face of a separation of powers challenge.   
The defendant argued that the "legislature's grant of sole 
sentencing discretion to the prosecution violates the separation 
of powers doctrine . . . ."  Id. at 439.  The court of appeals 
rejected this challenge, noting "there is no inherent power of 
the judiciary to absolutely determine the nature of the 
punishment." 
 
Id. 
at 
441 
(citing 
State 
v. 
Sittig, 
75 
Wis. 2d 497, 499-500, 249 N.W.2d 770 (1977)).   
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
31 
 
sentenced under the old indeterminate system may not petition 
for sentence adjustment because they are eligible to be released 
early through parole).  
¶55 Historically, the power to grant an inmate reprieve 
from his sentence was a purely executive function.   
In Wisconsin's early years of statehood, all 
criminal sentences were for definite periods of time 
and were to be fully served.  Early discharge for 
rehabilitation or for good behavior was unknown.  In 
fact, the only reward for good behavior was a lack of 
further punishment.  There existed one method of early 
release and that was through the use of the executive 
pardon power by the Governor.  
Wisconsin Legislative Council, Information Memorandum 78-43:  
The Wisconsin Parole Board, Sept. 18, 1978.  The legislature 
later created an executive agency empowered to grant paroles.  
Id.  While the legislature abolished parole under TIS-I, it 
created several new mechanisms for early release in TIS-II, 
including § 973.195.15  See, e.g., § 302.113(9g)(allowing inmates 
to obtain early release based on age or deteriorated physical 
condition).   
¶56 The ability to obtain early release under the system 
of parole existed solely as a matter of legislative grace:  "The 
legislature not only can specify when a person convicted of a 
                                                 
15 We emphasize that we do not purport to hold that sentence 
adjustment is the equivalent of parole.  We merely recognize 
that both sentence adjustment and parole are legislative 
mechanisms designed to afford an inmate reprieve from his 
sentence 
by 
granting 
him 
early 
release. 
 
The 
statutory 
mechanisms are different, but the nature of the power involved 
is similar.   
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
32 
 
particular crime may be eligible for parole but can also 
disallow or abolish the right to parole for any or all crimes."  
Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d at 764.  Likewise, the legislature has no 
constitutional obligation to provide courts with the power of 
"sentence adjustment;" it could repeal the statute tomorrow.  In 
other words, the legislature gave the judiciary a discretionary 
power it does not otherwise possess.  As such, the legislature 
is entitled to specify under what conditions a court is able to 
exercise its discretionary power and grant an inmate's petition 
for sentence adjustment.  
¶57 In enacting § 973.195, the legislature created a new 
mechanism for obtaining early release from prison.  In doing so, 
it created a system whereby power is shared among the three 
branches.  Under § 973.195, the legislature sets the threshold 
requirements for sentence adjustment by defining what crimes are 
subject to sentence adjustment and prescribing the length of 
time an inmate must serve before being eligible for sentence 
adjustment.  The executive branch retains its historical power 
to grant early release from prison, as the executive, through 
the district attorney, has the right to object and veto any 
petition for sentence adjustment.  The legislature has vested 
the courts with new discretionary power to grant a sentence 
adjustment if the district attorney does not object: "If the 
sentencing court receives no objection to sentence adjustment 
from the district attorney . . . and the court determines that 
sentence adjustment is in the public interest, the court may 
adjust the inmate's sentence as provided under par. (g)."  
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
33 
 
Wis. Stat. § 973.195(1r)(f)(emphasis added).  Thus, the approval 
of the district attorney is but one of the many prerequisites 
the legislature has provided before the court may exercise its 
new discretionary power.   
¶58 Given that the legislature is entitled to place 
"reasonable regulation[s]" on inherent judicial power that 
cannot be withdrawn, Horn, 226 Wis. 2d at 651, we cannot 
conclude that setting conditions precedent for the exercise of a 
power that can be withdrawn is unconstitutional.  Therefore, we 
conclude that the prosecutorial veto provisions in § 973.195 do 
not violate the separation of powers doctrine.16   
                                                 
16 We note that a court in Indiana addressing a similar 
statute reached the same conclusion:  
By the present statute, the jurisdiction of the 
sentencing court to modify the sentence remains but 
the court had no authority to render the particular 
modification of [the inmate's] sentence because 365 
days had passed since he had begun to serve his 
sentence and the prosecuting attorney had not approved 
the modification.  The legislature was free, through 
the statute, to give the trial court authority to 
render a modification of the sentence with whatever 
conditions 
and 
within 
whatever 
time 
it 
deemed 
appropriate.  The legislature chose to subject the 
authority to reduce or suspend a sentence to the 
approval of the prosecuting attorney if 365 days had 
passed.  Even though the authority to modify is 
subject to such a condition, the statute does not take 
judicial power away from the trial court and give it 
to the prosecuting attorney.  The statute gives the 
sentencing 
court 
authority, 
subject 
to 
certain 
conditions, to change the sentence of the defendant 
after the court has pronounced sentence and after the 
defendant has begun to serve that sentence.  In other 
words, the statute gives the court authority it does 
not otherwise have and does not transfer power between 
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
34 
 
¶59 We again emphasize that the power to grant a petition 
for sentence adjustment under § 973.195 is a power entirely 
separate and distinct from the judiciary's inherent power to 
modify sentences, despite the fact that the end result of the 
exercise of each power may be similar.  Section 973.195 
"reflects the legislature's intent to create a separate and 
specific 
statutory 
procedure 
for 
requesting 
a 
sentence 
reduction . . . ." 
 
Trujillo, 
___Wis. 2d ___, 
¶25 
(quoting 
Torres, 267 Wis. 2d 213, ¶9)(emphasis added).  Thus, the fact 
that a district attorney vetoes a petition for sentence 
adjustment in no way affects a court's inherent power to modify 
a sentence.   
¶60 A circuit court has the inherent power to modify a 
sentence based upon a showing of a new factor.  Trujillo, 
___Wis. 2d ___, ¶10.  In Trujillo, "[w]e reiterate[d] that the 
decision to modify a sentence upon the finding of a new factor 
is left to the sound discretion of the circuit court."  Id., 
¶29.  See also Tucker, ___Wis. 2d ___, ¶10 (accord). In 
addition, "'a court has the power to correct formal or clerical 
errors or an illegal or a void sentence at any time.'  Also, a 
court 
has 
the 
inherent 
authority 
to 
modify 
a 
sentence 
if . . . the sentence is 'unduly harsh or unconscionable.'"  
Chrochiere, 273 Wis. 2d 57, ¶12 (quoting Hayes v. State, 46 
                                                                                                                                                             
branches of government.  The scheme therefore does not 
violate the separation of powers. 
Beanblossom v. State, 637 N.E.2d 1345, 1348 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1994). 
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
35 
 
Wis. 2d 93, 101-02, 175 N.W.2d 625 (1970); Cresci v. State, 89 
Wis. 2d 495, 504, 278 N.W.2d 850 (1979)).   
¶61 We see no reason why an inmate may not bring a motion 
seeking 
sentence 
reduction 
on 
multiple 
grounds, 
invoking 
separate powers of the circuit court at the same time.  That is, 
there is nothing to prevent an inmate from bringing a motion 
seeking sentence reduction which:  a) invokes the court's new 
power 
under 
§ 973.195 
to 
grant 
a 
petition 
for 
sentence 
adjustment subject to the conditions of that statute, and b) 
invokes the court's inherent power to modify a sentence based on 
a new factor, an unduly harsh sentence, and/or a legal error.  
While each invocation of the court's power must be evaluated 
under the constraints and legal standards pertinent to the power 
being addressed, there is no reason why a circuit court 
presented with such a motion could not modify a sentence based 
on a bona fide new factor, even if it must dismiss the petition 
for sentence adjustment based on a veto by the district 
attorney.   
¶62 We reiterate:  the ability of a district attorney to 
veto a petition for sentence adjustment under § 973.195 has 
absolutely no bearing on the court's inherent power to modify a 
sentence based on a new factor or a showing of an unduly harsh 
or illegal sentence and vice versa.  The court's inherent power 
to modify a sentence on such bases remains subject to only those 
common-law standards set forth by this court.  The court's power 
to grant a petition for sentence adjustment remains subject to 
the conditions precedent set forth in § 973.195.  However, there 
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
36 
 
is no reason why an inmate may not invoke both powers 
simultaneously.   
¶63 In addition to his separation of powers argument, 
Stenklyft also argues that the prosecutorial veto provisions of 
§ 973.195 violate his right to procedural due process by 
depriving him of a fair and impartial decision-maker and by 
allowing the district attorney to arbitrarily deny a petition 
for sentence adjustment without providing any reasons.  While 
Stenklyft has not specified whether he is asserting a due 
process violation under the state or federal constitution, 
"[t]his court has repeatedly stated that the due process clauses 
of 
the 
state 
and 
federal 
constitutions 
are 
essentially 
equivalent and are subject to identical interpretation."  State 
v. Hezzie R., 219 Wis. 2d 848, 891, 580 N.W.2d 660 (1998).  
"Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental 
decisions which deprive individuals of 'liberty' or 'property' 
interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment."  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319, 332 (1976).   
¶64 A procedural due process analysis is a two-part 
inquiry:  "the first asks whether there exists a liberty or 
property interest which has been interfered with by the State; 
the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that 
deprivation were constitutionally sufficient[.]"  Kentucky Dep't 
of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)(citations 
omitted).  Thus, it is essential that the person claiming the 
constitutional violation establish that the state deprived him 
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
37 
 
of a constitutionally protected interest in life, liberty, or 
property before the court may address whether the state employed 
constitutionally adequate process.  Capoun Revocable Trust v. 
Ansari, 2000 WI App 83, ¶15, 234 Wis. 2d 335, 610 N.W.2d 129; 
Robinson v. McCaughtry, 177 Wis. 2d 293, 300, 501 N.W.2d 896 
(Ct. App. 1993).  "The procedural guarantees of the due process 
clause apply only to the deprivation of interests encompassed by 
the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of liberty and property."  
State ex rel. First Nat'l Bank v. M & I Peoples Bank of Coloma, 
95 Wis. 2d 303, 310, 290 N.W.2d 321 (1980).  Therefore, if an 
inmate cannot prove a protected liberty or property interest, 
"he is not entitled to any due process protections."  State ex 
rel. 
Gendrich 
v. 
Litscher, 
2001 
WI 
App 
163, 
¶10, 
246 
Wis. 2d 814, 632 N.W.2d 878.   
¶65 Stenklyft largely ignores the first step in this 
analysis, instead concentrating his argument on why the process 
provided by § 973.195 is constitutionally infirm.  Stenklyft 
simply makes a conclusory statement that § 973.195 "creates a 
procedure under which persons have a right to petition the 
sentencing court for a reduction of their sentence.  By doing 
so, it triggers [due process protections]."  Resp't Br. at 26.  
Therefore, we assume Stenklyft is grounding his procedural due 
process challenge on a deprivation of a constitutionally 
protectible liberty interest.  To obtain a protectible liberty 
interest:  "'a person clearly must have more than an abstract 
need or desire for it.  He must have more than a unilateral 
expectation of it.  He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of 
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
38 
 
entitlement to it.'" Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal 
and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (quoting Bd. of Regents 
v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)).   
¶66 Stenklyft correctly notes that § 973.185 provides a 
procedure whereby an inmate may petition to be released before 
he has served his entire initial term of confinement.  As 
explained supra, insomuch as the statute provides a mechanism 
whereby an inmate may obtain early release from prison, 
§ 973.195 is somewhat analogous to parole statutes.  Thus, we 
shall turn to case law involving procedural due process 
challenges to parole, as the same interest Stenklyft asserts is 
implicated by the parole statutes.  In the parole context: 
There is no constitutional or inherent right of a 
convicted person to be conditionally released before 
the expiration of a valid sentence.  The natural 
desire 
of 
an 
individual 
to 
be 
released 
is 
indistinguishable from the initial resistance to being 
confined.  But the conviction, with all its procedural 
safeguards, has extinguished that liberty right[.]   
Id.  "That the state holds out the possibility of parole 
provides no more than a mere hope that the benefit will be 
obtained."  Id. at 11.   
¶67 However, courts have recognized that "[w]hile there is 
no constitutional right to parole, a state may create a 
protected liberty interest in parole through its statutes and 
regulations 
governing 
the 
parole 
decision-making 
process."  
Heidelberg v. Ill. Prisoner Review Bd., 163 F.3d 1025, 1026 (7th 
Cir. 1998)(citing Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12).  See also Felce 
v. Fiedler, 974 F.2d 1484, 1490 (7th Cir. 1992)(accord).   
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
39 
 
¶68 Stenklyft has not shown that there is a constitutional 
right to "sentence adjustment."  Thus, he must demonstrate that 
§ 973.195 creates a protected liberty interest in early release 
through sentence adjustment.  In other words, Stenklyft must 
demonstrate that, by virtue of the language utilized in 
§ 973.195, he has a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to early 
release through sentence adjustment.  Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7 
(quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577).   
¶69 In the context of parole, "[a] state creates an 
expectation of release that rises to the level of a liberty 
interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause if its 
parole system requires release whenever a parole board or 
similar authority determines that the necessary prerequisites 
exist."  Heidelberg, 163 F.3d at 1026 (emphasis added).  Thus, 
statutes that mandate release if, when, or unless certain 
conditions are met "create[] a presumption that parole release 
will be granted" and give rise to a protected liberty interest.  
Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 378 (1987).  In contrast, 
statutes do not give rise to a protectible liberty interest if 
they provide that parole is discretionary, by stating that 
parole "may" be granted in certain circumstances.  Id., n.10.  
In other words, parole statutes that create a "legitimate 
expectation of release" give rise to a protected liberty 
interest.  Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 12.   
¶70 As 
such, 
Wisconsin's 
mandatory 
parole 
scheme, 
Wis. Stat. § 302.11(1), creates a protectible liberty interest 
by providing that "each inmate is entitled to mandatory release 
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
40 
 
on parole" after serving two thirds of his sentence.  Gendrich, 
246 Wis. 2d 814, ¶7.  In contrast, Wisconsin's discretionary 
parole scheme, Wis. Stat. § 304.06(1)(b), does not create a 
protectible liberty interest because it provides that "the 
parole commission may parole an inmate" after he has served 25 
percent of his sentence.  Gendrich, 246 Wis. 2d 814, ¶7.  See 
also Frederick v. Frank, 2004 WL 2915316, *3 (W.D. Wis. Dec. 10, 
2004)(summarizing 
Wisconsin 
law). 
 
Likewise, 
Wisconsin's 
presumptive mandatory release scheme does not give rise to a 
protectible liberty interest because it "permits the Commission 
to deny mandatory release to otherwise eligible prisoners when, 
in its discretion, the prisoner either poses a risk to the 
public or refuses to participate in necessary counseling and 
treatment."  Gendrich, 246 Wis. 2d 814, ¶10.  See also State v. 
Gamble, 2002 WI App 238, ¶21, 257 Wis. 2d 689, 653 N.W.2d 143 
(accord).   
¶71 Applying these standards to § 973.195, we conclude 
that the statute does not create a legitimate expectation of 
early 
release 
through 
sentence 
adjustment. 
 
Section 
973.195(1r)(f) provides:  
If the sentencing court receives no objection to 
sentence adjustment from the district attorney under 
par. (c) or the victim under par. (d) and the court 
determines that sentence adjustment is in the public 
interest, the court may adjust the inmate's sentence 
as provided under par. (g).  The court shall include 
in the record written reasons for any sentence 
adjustment granted under this subsection. 
(Emphasis added.) 
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
41 
 
¶72 First, it should be patently obvious that the mere 
existence of the prosecutorial veto in § 973.195(1r)(c) & (f) 
precludes any legitimate expectation of early release through 
sentence adjustment.  As discussed previously, § 973.195(1r)(c) 
requires the circuit court to dismiss the petition for sentence 
adjustment 
upon 
the 
objection 
of 
the 
district 
attorney.  
Likewise, 
§ 973.195(1r)(f) 
conditions 
the 
circuit 
court's 
discretionary power to grant the petition upon there being no 
objection from the district attorney.   
¶73 Second, 
and 
more 
importantly, 
§ 973.195(1r)(f) 
provides that when there is no objection from the district 
attorney, "the court may adjust the inmate's sentence" if "the 
court determines that sentence adjustment is in the public 
interest." 
 
(Emphasis 
added.) 
 
Thus, 
ultimately, 
§ 973.195(1r)(f) leaves it to the circuit court's discretion 
whether to grant the petition.  The statute does not state that 
the court "must" grant the petition if it finds it is in the 
public interest.  Rather, once the statutory prerequisites have 
been satisfied, the circuit court "may," in its discretion, 
grant the petition.  Wis. Stat. § 973.195(1r)(f).  In other 
words, while § 973.195(1r)(c) mandates that the circuit court 
dismiss 
the 
petition 
under 
certain 
circumstances, 
§ 973.195(1r)(f) does not require or mandate that the circuit 
court grant the petition under any set of circumstances.  
¶74 As such, § 973.195 creates no presumption of early 
release through sentence adjustment.  The statute does not 
provide inmates with a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to 
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
42 
 
sentence adjustment.  Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7 (quoting Roth, 
408 U.S. at 577).  The sentence adjustment statute provides no 
"legitimate expectation of release."  Id. at 12.  Rather, 
§ 973.195 merely "holds out the possibility" of sentence 
adjustment and provides "no more than a mere hope that the 
benefit will be obtained."  Id. at 11.  Under § 973.195, "there 
is no set of facts which, if shown, mandate a decision favorable 
to the individual."  Id. at 10 (emphasis added).  In other 
words, Stenklyft "is not entitled to release" through sentence 
adjustment under any set of facts.  Gendrich, 246 Wis. 2d 814, 
¶10.  Therefore, because § 973.195 creates no legitimate 
expectation of early release through sentence adjustment, it 
does not give rise to a protectible liberty interest and 
Stenklyft's procedural due process claim must fail.   
¶75 Stenklyft's final argument is that if § 973.195 is 
constitutional, then district attorneys could categorically deny 
petitions from inmates in a discriminatory fashion or approve 
only the petitions of inmates who contribute to organizations 
favored by the prosecutor.  However, Stenklyft has presented no 
evidence of these sorts of practices in this case.  While 
inmates may well 
be able 
to pursue 
other 
"as applied" 
constitutional challenges to the use of the prosecutorial veto 
in § 973.195, Stenklyft has failed to establish the necessary 
predicate of his procedural due process claim.   
V. 
SUMMARY 
¶76 We 
conclude, 
in 
accordance 
with 
Tucker, 
___Wis. 2d ___, ¶¶22-24, that § 973.195 applies to inmates 
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
43 
 
sentenced under TIS-I and that the felony classification system 
employed 
by 
TIS-II 
should 
be 
utilized 
to 
determine 
the 
"applicable percentage" of the term of initial confinement an 
inmate sentenced under TIS-I must serve in order to file a 
petition for sentence adjustment.  That "applicable percentage" 
is then applied to the sentence originally imposed to determine 
if 
the 
inmate 
is 
eligible 
to 
file 
a 
petition 
under 
§ 973.195(1g).  Id., ¶23.  Because the crime for which Stenklyft 
was convicted is now classified as a Class F felony and there is 
no dispute that he served 75 percent of the initial confinement 
portion of his sentence, we conclude that his petition for 
sentence adjustment was not premature under § 973.195(1g).   
¶77 In addition, we hold that the plain language of 
§ 973.195 requires the circuit court to dismiss the petition 
upon the objection of the district attorney.  Finally, we 
conclude that § 973.195 is not unconstitutional.  Section 
973.195 does not violate the separation of powers doctrine 
because it does not intrude upon the judiciary's inherent power 
to modify sentences.  Rather, the statute allows for early 
release by creating a new power of sentence adjustment that is 
shared among all three governmental branches.  The legislature 
is entitled to grant the judiciary new discretionary authority 
subject to enumerated conditions.  The legislature, through 
§ 973.195, simply has provided courts with a discretionary power 
they previously did not have that is subject to certain 
conditions precedent.   
No. 
2003AP1533-CR  
 
44 
 
¶78 Furthermore, § 973.195 does not violate procedural due 
process because an inmate has no protected liberty interest in 
early release from prison by sentence adjustment.  The statute 
creates no legitimate expectation of sentence adjustment because 
the circuit court's decision to grant sentence adjustment is 
purely discretionary under the statute and Stenklyft is not 
entitled to sentence adjustment under any set of facts.   
¶79 Therefore, 
because 
we 
determine 
§ 973.195 
is 
constitutional and the district attorney vetoed Stenklyft's 
petition, we reverse the decision of the circuit court granting 
his petition for early release and its decision denying the 
State's motion for reconsideration.     
¶80 I am authorized to state that Justices DAVID T. 
PROSSER and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join this opinion.   
By the Court.—The orders of the circuit court are reversed 
and remanded.   
 
 
No.  2003AP1533-CR.ssa 
 
1 
 
 
¶81 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, C.J.   (concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  I agree with the lead opinion that the 
order of the circuit court should be reversed.  Because I 
disagree with the lead opinion's conclusion that Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.195 should be interpreted to allow a district attorney to 
veto a petition for sentence adjustment and that the statute so 
interpreted is constitutional, I conclude that the matter should 
not be remanded for the circuit court to deny the petition for 
sentence adjustment.  I would, as Justice Crooks explains, 
remand for the circuit court to exercise its discretion whether 
to grant the petition for sentence adjustment.  I do not address 
mootness; mootness has not been raised, argued, or briefed. 
¶82 Because Justices Ann Walsh Bradley, N. Patrick Crooks, 
and Louis B. Butler join this concurrence/dissent and because 
Justices Ann Walsh Bradley and Louis B. Butler and I join the 
concurrence/dissent of Justice N. Patrick Crooks, we four form a 
majority (1) to declare that Wis. Stat. § 973.195 should be 
interpreted, to save its constitutionality, so that a circuit 
court has discretion to consider (but is not bound by) a 
district attorney's objection to a petition for sentence 
adjustment, and (2) to declare unconstitutional the lead 
opinion's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 973.195 to grant a 
district attorney a veto power over a petition for sentence 
adjustment.   
¶83 The 
net 
effect 
of 
the 
two 
concurring/dissenting 
opinions is that read together, "shall" is interpreted as 
No.  2003AP1533-CR.ssa 
 
2 
 
directory, thereby giving a circuit court discretion to accept 
or reject an objection from a district attorney on a petition 
for sentence adjustment under Wis. Stat. § 973.195.  Thus, this 
cause goes back to the circuit court for a full consideration of 
the factors set forth in Justice Crooks' concurring opinion. 
¶84 We conclude that the judicial power is compromised 
when the district attorney is given the unilateral power to end 
a circuit court's consideration of an inmate's petition for 
sentence adjustment.  A district attorney's exercise of a core 
judicial function is barred by the separation of powers 
doctrine.17 
¶85 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.195(1r)(c) is unconstitutional 
if read to grant a district attorney veto power over a petition 
for sentence adjustment.  A district attorney's veto power 
invades the exclusive core constitutional power of the judiciary 
to impose a criminal penalty.  It empowers an executive branch 
officer to direct a court decision on the merits of a case, 
thereby violating the doctrine of separation of powers under the 
state constitution.18     
                                                 
17 State v. Olson, 325 N.W.2d 13, 18 (Minn. 1982). 
18 I would treat the district attorney's veto as a severable 
provision and excise it. 
The lead opinion goes to great length, making numerous 
arguments to uphold the statute.  I do not undertake an 
analytical critique of each argument, although I could.  The 
lead opinion builds its case on weak underpinnings, supported by 
quotations taken out of context.  Very little research by a 
reader will quickly reveal the weaknesses that permeate the lead 
opinion. 
No.  2003AP1533-CR.ssa 
 
3 
 
¶86 Even if we were to conclude that the statute does not 
invade 
the 
exclusive 
core 
constitutional 
powers 
of 
the 
judiciary, the elimination of a circuit court's power to decide 
an inmate's petition without the approval of the district 
attorney is an impermissible burden and substantial interference 
with the judicial branch's authority.19  The statute interferes 
with the impartial administration of justice by delegating 
judicial power to one of the parties in the litigation.   
I 
¶87 The Wisconsin Constitution vests the legislative power 
in the two houses of the legislature20 and the executive power in 
the governor.21  The Wisconsin Constitution vests the judicial 
power of the state in the unified court system as follows:  
The judicial power of this state shall be vested in a 
unified court system consisting of one supreme court, 
a court of appeals, a circuit court, such trial courts 
of general uniform state-wide jurisdiction as the 
legislature may create by law, and a municipal court 
if authorized by the legislature under section 14.22 
¶88 The doctrine of separation of powers is implicit in 
the 
division 
of 
governmental 
powers 
among 
the 
judicial, 
legislative, and executive branches.23  The principles of 
                                                 
19 State ex rel. Friedrich v. Dane County Circuit Court, 192 
Wis. 2d 1, 14, 531 N.W.2d 32 (1995). 
20 Wis. Const. art. IV, § 1.  
21 Wis. Const. art. V, § 1. 
22 Wis. Const. art. VII, § 2. 
23 Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 15; State v. Holmes, 106 
Wis. 2d 31, 38, 68-69, 315 N.W.2d 703 (1982). 
No.  2003AP1533-CR.ssa 
 
4 
 
separation of powers are easy to state but the boundaries that 
separate the powers of the three branches are "shadowy and not 
well defined.  It is the duty of the court to define them, and 
see that they are respected."24 
¶89 A well-accepted principle is that each branch has 
exclusive core constitutional powers upon which no other branch 
may intrude.25 
 This court 
explained 
the exclusive 
core 
constitutional powers of each branch more than 70 years ago.  
This explanation remains good law today: "The co-ordinate 
branches of the government . . . should not abdicate or permit 
others to infringe upon such powers as are exclusively committed 
to them by the constitution."26  As this court has said: 
In Wisconsin the jurisdiction and power of the courts 
is conferred, not by act of the Legislature, but by 
the Constitution itself.  While the Legislature may 
regulate in the public interest the exercise of the 
judicial 
power, 
it 
cannot, 
under 
the 
guise 
of 
regulation, withdraw that power or so limit and 
circumscribe it as 
to 
defeat 
the constitutional 
purpose.27 
                                                 
24 Thoe v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 181 
Wis. 456, 195 N.W.407 (1923).  See also Barland v. Eau Claire 
County, 216 Wis. 2d 560, 573, 575 N.W.2d 691 (1998); Demmith v. 
Wisconsin 
Judicial 
Conference, 
166 
Wis. 2d 649, 
663, 
480 
N.W.2d 502 (1992); State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 42-43, 315 
N.W.2d 703 (1982). 
25 In re Complaint Against Grady, 118 Wis. 2d 762, 778, 348 
N.W.2d 559 (1984).  
26 Rules of Court Case, 204 Wis. 501, 514, 236 N.W. 717 
(1931). 
27 John F. Jelke Co. v. Hill, 208 Wis. 650, 660, 242 N.W. 
576 (1932). 
No.  2003AP1533-CR.ssa 
 
5 
 
¶90 Many powers are not, however, exclusively committed to 
one of the branches, but are shared powers.  The court has 
admonished that as to shared powers "there should be such 
generous co-operation as will tend to keep the law responsive to 
the needs of society."28  With regard to shared powers, the 
legislature cannot impose an unreasonable burden and substantial 
interference with the judicial branch's authority.29     
¶91 Sentencing 
a 
defendant 
is 
an 
area 
of 
shared 
responsibility,30 and, broken down to its component parts, 
requires each of the three branches of government to exercise a 
core power.  The legislature prescribes the penalty and the 
manner of its enforcement.31  The courts impose the penalty (the 
sentence).  The executive branch decides what criminal charges 
to file, carries out the court-imposed sentence, and grants 
pardons.32   
¶92 What is at issue in the present case is not a 
legislative 
enactment 
prescribing 
a 
penalty 
or 
fixing 
a 
                                                 
28 Rules of Court Case, 204 Wis. at 514.  See also Demmith 
v. 
Wis. 
Judicial 
Conference, 
166 
Wis. 2d 649, 
663, 
480 
N.W.2d 502 (1992). 
29 Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 14. 
30 State v. Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d 749, 767, 482 N.W.2d 883 
(1992). 
31 State v. Setagord, 211 Wis. 2d 397, 407, 565 N.W.2d 506 
(1997) (citing In Matter of Judicial Administration Felony 
Sentencing Guidelines, 120 Wis. 2d 198, 203, 353 N.W.2d 793 
(1984)); 
State 
v. 
Lindsey, 
203 
Wis. 2d 423, 
440-41, 
554 
N.W.2d 215 (Ct. App. 1996). 
32 Borrell, 167 Wis. 2d at 767. 
No.  2003AP1533-CR.ssa 
 
6 
 
sentencing range.  Nor is the executive's act of charging, 
executing the sentence, or granting clemency at issue.  Rather, 
Wis. Stat § 973.195 implicates the court's constitutional power 
to impose a criminal sentence.  And as the lead opinion 
acknowledges, a circuit court's power to impose a sentence 
embraces the court's power to modify the sentence.  Lead op., 
¶38.  "To reduce a sentence by amendment alters the terms of the 
judgment itself and is a judicial act as much as the imposition 
of the sentence in the first instance."33  Wisconsin Stat. § 
973.195 involves a court's power to examine the act committed 
and the person committing it in adjusting a sentence the circuit 
court has imposed.  
¶93 The question then is whether a circuit court's power 
to decide a petitioner's request for sentence adjustment under 
Wis. Stat. § 973.195 involves an exclusive core judicial power 
or involves a power shared with district attorneys, members of 
the executive branch of government.  We conclude that this 
statute overreaches the legislative power to define and punish 
criminal conduct.  Wisconsin Stat. § 973.195 directly affects 
the judicial branch's role in the sentencing process: imposing 
the sentence penalty and exercising discretion in adjusting the 
length of a sentence that a court has imposed.   
                                                 
33 United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 311 (1931).  See 
also State v. Nardini, 445 A.2d 304, 312 (Conn. 1982) ("The 
power 
[to 
adjust 
a 
sentence 
under 
the 
legislative 
enactment] . . . is in effect only a change of judgment, and for 
that reason [is] a radically different thing from [executive 
action upon a sentence, such as a pardon]" (quoted source 
omitted)). 
No.  2003AP1533-CR.ssa 
 
7 
 
¶94 The text of the statute evinces a clear violation of 
the separation of powers doctrine:  
973.195  Sentence Adjustment.34 
. . . . 
(1r) Confinement in Prison.  (a) An inmate who is 
serving a sentence . . . may petition the sentencing 
court to adjust the sentence . . . . 
. . . . 
(c) Upon receipt of a petition filed under par. 
(a), the sentencing court may deny the petition or 
hold the petition for further consideration.  If the 
court holds the petition for further consideration, 
the court shall notify the district attorney of the 
inmate's petition.  If the district attorney objects 
to adjustment of the inmate's sentence within 45 days 
of receiving notification under this paragraph, the 
court shall deny the inmate's petition. 
. . . . 
(f) If the sentencing court receives no objection 
to sentence adjustment from the district attorney 
under par. (c) or the victim under par. (d) and the 
court determines that sentence adjustment is in the 
public interest, the court may adjust the inmate's 
sentence as provided under par. (g).  The court shall 
include in the record written reasons for any sentence 
adjustment granted under this subsection. 
                                                 
34 The lead opinion finds it "significant that § 973.195 is 
specifically titled 'Sentence adjustment' rather than 'Sentence 
modification.'"  Lead op., ¶44.  Statutory interpretation has 
reached a new level if the difference between "sentence 
modification" 
and 
"sentence 
adjustment" 
qualifies 
as 
"significant."  This court, which so frequently resorts to the 
dictionary for statutory interpretation, fails to look up the 
words "adjustment" and "modification."  If it did, it would find 
them synonyms.  The American Heritage Dictionary of the English 
Language defines "adjustment" as "a modification, fluctuation, 
or correction" and "modification as "[a] small alteration, 
adjustment, or limitation."  The American Heritage Dictionary of 
the English Language 22, 1161 (3d ed. 1992) (emphasis added). 
No.  2003AP1533-CR.ssa 
 
8 
 
. . . . 
(i) An inmate may submit only one petition under 
this subsection for each sentence imposed under s. 
973.01. 
¶95 According to the statute, an inmate first files a 
petition with the circuit court that originally sentenced the 
inmate.35  When an inmate files a petition under Wis. Stat. 
§ 973.195, the inmate is requesting a judicial determination on 
the merits of the petition, namely that he or she has met one of 
the criteria in § 973.195(1r)(b).36  If, based on the merits of 
                                                 
35 Wis. Stat. § 973.195(1r)(a).  It is notable that the 
petition must be filed with the sentencing court, not just any 
circuit court.  This requirement further supports the notion 
that sentence adjustment is a continuation of a circuit court's 
sentencing power. 
36 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.195(1r)(b) reads: 
Any of the following is a ground for a petition under 
par. (a): 
1.  The inmate's conduct, efforts at and progress in 
rehabilitation, 
or 
participation 
and 
progress 
in 
education, treatment, or other correction programs 
since he or she was sentenced. 
3.  A change in law or procedure related to sentencing 
or revocation of extended supervision effective after 
the inmate was sentenced that would have resulted in a 
shorter term of confinement in prison or, if the 
inmate was returned to prison upon revocation of 
extended supervision, a shorter period of confinement 
in prison upon revocation, if the change had been 
applicable when the inmate was sentenced. 
4.  The inmate is subject to a sentence of confinement 
in another state or the inmate is in the United States 
illegally and may be deported. 
5.  Sentence adjustment is otherwise in the interests 
of justice. 
No.  2003AP1533-CR.ssa 
 
9 
 
the petition, the circuit court decides not to grant the 
petition, the proceedings end.  The inmate loses.  So far so 
good.  No problem. 
¶96 If, however, a circuit court is considering the 
possibility of granting the petition, it must notify the 
district attorney.  If the district attorney objects to the 
circuit court's adjustment of the inmate's sentencing, the 
circuit court must deny the petition.  And once an inmate files 
under the statute and the district attorney objects to a circuit 
court's adjustment of the inmate's sentencing, the inmate may 
never 
seek 
another 
sentence 
adjustment 
under 
Wis. 
Stat. 
§ 973.195 for that sentence,37 no matter how meritorious his or 
her claim for relief may be, and even if granting the petition 
would be in the "interests of justice."38 
¶97 The fundamental problem with the statute is that it 
requires the circuit court to render a particular decision, 
namely a denial of a petition brought by the inmate, not upon 
the merits of the a petition but upon the decision of a district 
attorney.  And the district attorney's "No adjustment for you!" 
is final for all time.  The district attorney holds the keys to 
the inmate's ability to get a decision on the merits from the 
circuit court. 
¶98 This court has declared numerous times that the power 
to decide an individual case is an exclusive core judicial 
power.  The power to decide a case on the merits is the "essence 
                                                 
37 Wis. Stat. § 973.195((1r)(i). 
38 Wis. Stat. § 973.195(1r)(b)5. 
No.  2003AP1533-CR.ssa 
 
10 
 
of the court's function."39  A statute cannot "compel the circuit 
court to decide a case in a particular way", thus "mandat[ing] 
the result of the case."40   
¶99 Several 
cases, 
old 
and 
of 
recent 
vintage, 
are 
illustrative of the well-established principles governing the 
instant statute: the power to decide an individual case is an 
exclusive core judicial power, and any invasion of the exclusive 
core constitutional powers of the judiciary violates the 
doctrine of separation of powers under our state constitution.  
The legislature cannot compel a circuit court to decide a case 
in a particular way. 
¶100 In Davis v. Village of Menasha, 21 Wis. 491, 497 
(1867), this court struck down as a violation of separation of 
powers a law that required a trial court to grant a new trial 
upon the request of either party if the presiding judge died or 
left the state before expiration of the time for settling a bill 
of exceptions.  The court invalidated the statute, explaining:  
No room is left for the exercise of the judgment and 
discretion of the court, but the judgment must be set 
aside and a new trial allowed in the specified case, 
providing the application is made at the time and in 
the manner there prescribed.  It seems to us that this 
law, then, may well be held to be the exercise of 
judicial functions, not vested in the legislature, but 
                                                 
39 State v. Mitchell, 144 Wis. 2d 596, 618, 424 N.W.2d 698 
(1988) (upholding rape shield statute against a separation of 
powers attack, but citing four Wisconsin Supreme Court cases for 
the proposition that a statute's mandating the result in a case 
is unconstitutional). 
40 Id. 
No.  2003AP1533-CR.ssa 
 
11 
 
belonging to another department of the government 
under our constitution.41 
¶101 Again, this time in City of Janesville v. Carpenter, 
77 
Wis. 
288, 
46 
N.W.2d 128 
(1890), 
this 
court 
held 
unconstitutional a statute that required a trial court to issue 
an injunction, even though the petitioner did not prove damages 
justifying an injunction.  Because the statute "takes away the 
jurisdiction of the courts to inquire into the facts and 
determine the necessity and propriety of granting or refusing an 
injunction," the court held the statute unconstitutional.42 
¶102 In Thoe v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co., 
181 
Wis. 
456, 
195 
N.W. 
407 
(1923), 
this 
court 
held 
unconstitutional a statute prohibiting a trial court from 
granting a directed verdict before submitting the case to the 
jury.43  We said a motion to direct a verdict calls for the 
exercise of legal judgment, an exercise of judicial power, and 
is not to be decided by legislative fiat.  The court wrote: 
                                                 
41 Davis v. Village of Menasha, 21 Wis. 491, 497, (1867). 
42 City of Janesville v. Carpenter, 77 Wis. 288, 301, 46 
N.W. 128 (1890), explained: 
The legislature usurped the judicial power of the 
courts 
by 
the 
enactment 
of 
this 
statute. 
 
It 
adjudicates 
an 
act 
unlawful 
and 
presumptively 
injurious and dangerous, which is not and cannot be 
made 
to 
be 
so 
without 
a 
violation 
of 
the 
constitutional 
rights 
of 
the 
defendant, 
and 
imperatively commands the court to enjoin it without 
proof that any injury or danger has been or will be 
caused by it. 
43 Thoe v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 181 Wis. 
456, 195 N.W. 407 (1923). 
No.  2003AP1533-CR.ssa 
 
12 
 
Neither has the legislature power to declare in 
advance that the evidence is legally sufficient in 
every case.  It may or it may not be.  Whether it is 
or not is for the court to determine in the exercise 
of the powers conferred upon it by the constitution.  
A motion to direct a verdict calls for the exercise of 
legal judgment by applying the law to the facts of 
each case.  It cannot be done wholesale by legislative 
fiat.44 
¶103 In re E.B., 111 Wis. 2d 175, 186, 330 N.W.2d 584 
(1983), this court held that the legislature could require a 
circuit court to give the jury a copy of written instructions 
but could not mandate reversal if the circuit court did not 
abide by the statute.  "Legislation which mandates automatic 
reversal of trial court judgments upon [the statute's] violation 
impermissibly limits and circumscribes judicial power."45   
¶104 In Joni B. v. State, 202 Wis. 2d 1, 8, 549 N.W.2d 411 
(1996), the court held that it was a violation of separation of 
powers for the legislature to prohibit a court from appointing 
counsel for anyone other than the child in CHIPS proceedings.  
The court stated that a circuit court's power to appoint counsel 
is an inherent power to serve the interests of the circuit court 
and that a court may use its inherent authority to appoint 
counsel for the orderly and fair presentation of a case.  The 
legislative enactment impermissibly infringed upon that judicial 
power.  
¶105 Because deciding the merits of a case is the essence 
of a court's function, and because the statute delegates to a 
district attorney the power to mandate the denial of a petition 
                                                 
44 Id. at 465. 
45 In re E.B., 111 Wis. 2d 175, 186, 330 N.W.2d 584 (1983). 
No.  2003AP1533-CR.ssa 
 
13 
 
in each case, we conclude that the legislation in question is an 
unconstitutional violation of the doctrine of separation of 
powers. 
II 
¶106 To make matters worse, if that is possible, the 
district attorney has represented the State as its attorney in 
investigating, charging, and prosecuting the criminal charges 
against the inmate.46  Once charges are filed, the district 
attorney becomes the attorney for the State, a party to the 
criminal proceedings, and is subject to the court's authority.47  
Thus the statute allows a circuit court's deliberative process 
and judgment to be circumvented by one of the parties involved 
in the litigation: the district attorney.48  The statute allows 
the 
district 
attorney 
to 
decide——unilaterally——whether 
an 
inmate's 
sentence 
will 
be 
adjusted, 
and 
thereby 
                                                 
46 Wisconsin Stat. § 973.195 does not state who is a party 
to the adjustment proceedings other than the inmate if the 
district attorney does not object to an adjustment.   
47 Once the prosecution has commenced, the case is subject 
to the court's exclusive authority in many ways.  See State v. 
Prihoda, 2000 WI 123, ¶19, 239 Wis. 2d 244, 618 N.W.2d 857 
(changes to the sentence portion of a written judgment of 
conviction can be authorized only by a judge); State v. 
Comstock, 168 Wis. 2d 915, 927, 485 N.W.2d 354 (1992) (district 
attorney may not bind a court to a plea agreement, nor may a 
district attorney amend charges without permission from the 
court); State v. Johnson, 231 Wis. 2d 58, 64-65, 604 N.W.2d 902 
(Ct. App. 1999) (court determines whether probable cause exists 
to believe the defendant committed the charged crime; if 
probable cause is lacking, the court dismisses the charge); 
State v. Dums, 149 Wis. 2d 314, 321-22, 440 N.W.2d 814 (Ct. App. 
1989) (district attorney cannot, sua sponte, dismiss charges). 
48 Wis. Stat. § 973.195(1r)(c). 
No.  2003AP1533-CR.ssa 
 
14 
 
unconstitutionally impairs the judiciary's duty to administer 
justice 
impartially, 
as 
well 
as 
being 
violative 
of 
the 
separation of powers doctrine.49 
¶107 We know of no other instance in the law in which a 
party to a judicial proceeding can unilaterally determine the 
outcome of the proceeding on its merits.  Even when a party 
defaults or concedes the correctness of an opposing party's 
cause, an independent court decision is required. 
¶108 Thus, even if we were to conclude that the statute 
does not invade the exclusive core constitutional powers of the 
judiciary, the elimination of a circuit court's power to decide 
an inmate's petition without the approval of the district 
attorney 
is 
an 
impermissible 
burden 
and 
a 
substantial 
interference with the judicial branch's ability to administer 
justice impartially.50 
                                                 
49 Other state courts have declared invalid a statute giving 
the prosecutor the ability to veto a court's sentence.  See 
State v. Prentiss, 786 P.2d 932, 936 (Ariz. 1989) (statutory 
provision that allowed a judge to impose an alternative sentence 
only upon prosecutor's consent was invalid as a violation of 
separation of powers); People v. Superior Court (On Tai Ho), 520 
P.2d 405, 407 (Cal. 1974) (statutory provision that gave 
prosecutor 
the 
power to 
veto 
a 
court's decision 
to an 
alternative sentence was 
an 
unconstitutional 
violation of 
separation of powers); State v. LeCompte, 406 So. 2d 1300, 1311 
(La. 1981) (statutory provision that only allowed a judge to 
reduce a sentence if it was the prosecutor who moved for the 
change violated separation of powers); State v. Olson, 325 
N.W.2d 13, 17-19 (Minn. 1982) (The question presented was: "Can 
the legislature, having granted authority to the courts to 
sentence without regard to the mandatory minimum provisions [of 
the statute], condition that authority upon a discretionary act 
of the prosecutor?"  Id. at 17.  The court said no, it violates 
separation of powers.).  
50 Friedrich, 192 Wis. 2d at 14. 
No.  2003AP1533-CR.ssa 
 
15 
 
III 
¶109 The State argues, and the lead opinion agrees, that 
Wis. Stat. § 973.195 can be upheld as the equivalent of parole, 
an executive function that the district attorney may exercise.  
How can that be?  Everyone knows that Truth in Sentencing was 
designed to eliminate parole.  In any event, if sentence 
adjustment is parole, then the circuit court should not be 
involved.  The judicial process ends at sentencing, at which 
point the executive branch of government takes over and the 
defendant is "directed to the correctional and rehabilitative 
process. . . . The judiciary phase of the criminal process——
imposing a penalty——is complete."51  
¶110 Parole is gone under Truth in Sentencing, and more 
importantly for this case, Wis. Stat. § 973.195 does not 
resurrect parole.  Section 973.195 creates a judicial procedure 
in which an inmate seeks to have the sentencing court amend the 
judgment of conviction and have a lesser term of confinement or 
extended supervision imposed.  The United State Supreme Court 
recognized in 1931 that only the court, not the executive 
branch, has the power to reduce a sentence by amending the 
judgment.52  
¶111 The lead opinion opines that this procedure is 
constitutional, 
declaring 
that 
the 
district 
attorney's 
permission is just a "condition precedent" that must be met.  
                                                 
51 State v. Horn, 226 Wis. 2d 637, 650, 594 N.W.2d 772 
(1999). 
52 United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 311 (1931). 
No.  2003AP1533-CR.ssa 
 
16 
 
Lead op., ¶51.  The lead opinion's reasoning contravenes the 
clear words of the statute and is without weight.  Permission by 
the prosecutor cannot be said to be a "condition precedent" 
because the plain text of the statute grants a circuit court 
power to consider the merits of an inmate's petition even before 
the district attorney is notified of the petition.  If the 
district 
attorney's 
permission 
were 
simply 
a 
"condition 
precedent" to the consideration of an inmate's petition, the 
circuit court would be utterly lacking discretion to consider 
the merits of the petition.  The circuit court would have to 
notify the district attorney immediately upon filing of the 
petition and await the district attorney's green light to 
proceed. 
¶112 But Wis. Stat. § 973.195(1r)(c) explicitly provides 
otherwise: "Upon receipt of a petition filed under par. (a), the 
sentencing court may deny the petition or hold the petition for 
further consideration."53  The plain language grants the circuit 
court the discretion to consider the merits of an inmate's 
petition.  Only if the sentencing court fails to deny the 
petition on the merits and holds the petition for further 
consideration does the district attorney come into play. 
¶113 This statute granting the district attorney a veto 
power over a circuit court's decision-making process on an 
inmate's petition for sentence adjustment is constitutionally 
over the top. 
 
                                                 
53 Wis. Stat. § 973.195(1r)(c). 
No.  2003AP1533-CR.ssa 
 
17 
 
IV 
¶114 The lead opinion carefully explains that despite the 
statute, a circuit court has inherent power over sentence 
modification.54  We agree with the lead opinion that a circuit 
court has inherent power over sentence modification.  In a 
different sentencing era, this court significantly limited a 
circuit court's power over sentence modification.  Those 
limitations made sense when the legislature gave the executive 
branch the power to allow an inmate's early release from 
incarceration. 
¶115 Under our decisions that limit a circuit court's 
inherent power to modify a sentence, a circuit court may modify 
a sentence when the sentence is unduly harsh or unconscionable 
or has a legal error or on the basis of a new factor.  If there 
                                                 
54 On 
this 
basis, 
the 
present 
case 
is 
significantly 
different from the Indiana court of appeals case cited by the 
lead opinion, Beanblossom v. State, 637 N.E.2d 1345 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1994).  Lead op., ¶69 n.16.  In Beanblossom, the court of 
appeals was very explicit in stating that trial courts in 
Indiana do not have inherent power to modify a sentence, and 
that if they did, the result of the case might very well be 
different.  The court said: 
[The argument that the statute violates the separation 
of powers] presupposes that the trial court has the 
inherent power to effect the modification of a 
sentence and that the statute somehow takes this power 
away from the court.  If the trial court had such 
inherent authority, then the statute in question might 
well be considered to have usurped that authority.  
The case law [in Indiana], however, indicates that the 
trial court does not have such inherent power under 
the circumstances. 
Beanblossom, 637 N.E.2d at 1347.  
No.  2003AP1533-CR.ssa 
 
18 
 
are cases that overturn a sentence on the grounds that the 
sentence was too harsh or unconscionable they are few and far 
between.  Few cases arise in which a circuit court has committed 
a legal error in sentencing.  If a legal error occurs, clearly 
the circuit court should amend the sentence.  
V 
¶116 Although the court must take care not to expand the 
judicial branch's exclusive judicial authority, the lead opinion 
in this case goes too far the other way. 
¶117 Eighty years ago this court warned judges of their 
solemn duty to maintain the boundaries of judicial power 
unimpaired as follows: 
[I]t is the solemn duty of every judge, as a sworn 
officer of the state, to maintain the boundaries of 
that power unimpaired. 
. . . . 
Courts have not, as some people suppose, any option in 
the matter.  The people through the constitution have 
vested in the courts certain powers and charged the 
court with the responsibility for the exercise of 
those powers.  Every judicial officer takes an oath 
that he [or she] will support and maintain the 
constitution. . . . [The judicial officer] may not 
fritter or barter away the power committed to his [or 
her] hands.  He [or she] has assumed a responsibility 
which must be discharged with the utmost fidelity.55 
¶118 Sadly, the lead opinion here has willingly conceded to 
the executive branch the most central aspect of the judiciary's 
power: the power to render a judgment in a case properly before 
it.   
                                                 
55 Thoe, 181 Wis. at 467-68. 
No.  2003AP1533-CR.ssa 
 
19 
 
¶119 We therefore write separately on the issue of the 
unconstitutionality of the statute if it is interpreted as 
granting a district attorney veto power over a petition for 
sentence adjustment. 
¶120 I am authorized to state that Justices ANN WALSH 
BRADLEY, N. PATRICK CROOKS, and LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. join this 
opinion. 
 
 
No.  2003AP1533-CR.npc 
 
1 
 
 
 
¶121 N. PATRICK CROOKS, 
J.   (concurring 
in 
part and 
dissenting in part).  Here, it is necessary to construe "shall" 
as 
directory 
and 
permissive, 
in 
order 
to 
save 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
the 
statute. 
 
I 
agree 
with 
the 
concurrence/dissent 
of 
Chief 
Justice 
Abrahamson 
that 
the 
statute, if interpreted as mandatory, is unconstitutional.  If 
we interpret "shall" as mandatory, such interpretation "invades 
the exclusive core constitutional power of the judiciary to 
impose 
a 
criminal 
penalty." 
 
Chief 
Justice 
Abrahamson's 
concurrence/dissent, ¶83.  If the circuit court is left with no 
discretion other than to deny an inmate's petition for sentence 
adjustment 
when 
the 
district 
attorney 
objects, 
such 
an 
interpretation interferes with the circuit court's inherent 
power to modify a sentence.  I also agree with the Abrahamson 
concurrence/dissent that a district attorney's exercise of a 
core judicial function would be a clear violation of the 
separation of powers doctrine.  See id., ¶¶3, 18-22; State v. 
Olson, 325 N.W.2d 13, 18 (Minn. 1982); Joni B. v. State, 202 
Wis. 2d 1, 8, 549 N.W.2d 411 (1996); In Matter of E.B., 111 
Wis. 2d 175, 186, 330 N.W.2d 584 (1983); Thoe v. Chicago, 
Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 181 Wis. 456, 195 N.W. 407 (1923); 
City of Janesville v. Carpenter, 77 Wis. 288, 46 N.W.2d 128 
(1890); Davis v. Vill. of Menasha, 21 Wis. 497 (1867).   
¶122 If at all possible, we should construe a statute in a 
way that will save it as constitutional.  When this court 
decided In re Hezzie, 219 Wis. 2d 848, 580 N.W.2d 660 (1998), we 
No.  2003AP1533-CR.npc 
 
2 
 
concluded that "[s]tatutes are presumed to be constitutional; 
therefore, 'every presumption must be indulged to uphold the law 
if at all possible.'"  Id. at 862 (quoting Norquist v. Zeuske, 
211 Wis. 2d 241, 250, 564 N.W.2d 748 (1997); see also State ex 
rel. Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Lake Dist. Bd., 82 Wis. 2d 491, 
505, 263 N.W.2d 178 (1978)("The cardinal rule of statutory 
construction is to preserve a statute and find it constitutional 
if it is at all possible to do so."); White House Milk Co. v. 
Reynolds, 12 Wis. 2d 143, 150-51, 106 N.W.2d 441 (1960) ("It is 
an elementary principle of law in this state that this court 
will search for a means to sustain a statute. . . .  In fact, 
this court has in the past and will continue to sustain the 
constitutionality of a statute if any facts can be reasonably 
conceived which will support its constitutionality.").  In this 
case, the lead opinion makes no effort to interpret the so-
called 
veto 
provision 
in 
a 
way 
that 
will 
save 
the 
constitutionality of the statute.  Instead, the lead opinion 
simply states: "While some may argue that we could avoid 
addressing 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
§ 973.195 
by 
reading 
limiting language into the statute, this is not the case."  Lead 
op., ¶43.  The lead opinion then proceeds to ignore much of our 
case law, and relies only on State v. Sprosty, 227 Wis. 2d 316, 
595 N.W.2d 692 (1999).             
¶123 I concur with the mandate of the lead opinion to 
reverse, but I would decide this case by holding that the 
apparent veto given to a district attorney by the Wisconsin 
No.  2003AP1533-CR.npc 
 
3 
 
Legislature in Wis. Stat. §§  973.195(1r)(c) and (f) (2003-04)56 
is one where a circuit court has discretion to accept or reject 
the objection of a district attorney on a sentence adjustment 
petition.  The use of the word "shall" is, I believe, not 
mandatory, but rather was intended by the legislature to be 
directory and permissive.  I do not believe that the legislature 
intended to enact a statute that would interfere with a circuit 
court's inherent power and run afoul of the separation of powers 
doctrine.     
¶124 This court has, in several instances, considered 
whether the use of the word "shall" was directory, rather than 
mandatory.  See State ex rel. Marberry v. Macht, 2003 WI 79, 
¶15, 262 Wis. 2d 720, 665 N.W.2d 155; Eby v. Kozarek, 153 
Wis. 2d 75, 79, 450 N.W.2d 249 (1990); Karow v. Milwaukee County 
Civil Serv. Comm., 82 Wis. 2d 565, 571, 263 N.W.2d 214 (1978); 
Merkley v. Schramm, 31 Wis. 2d 134, 138, 142 N.W.2d 173 (1966); 
Kamuchey v. Trzesniewski, 8 Wis. 2d 94, 100, 98 N.W.2d 403 
(1959); Galewski v. Noe, 266 Wis. 7, 16, 62 N.W.2d 703 (1954); 
Wallis v. First Nat'l Bank, 155 Wis. 533, 536, 145 N.W.2d 195 
(1914).  In order to determine whether "shall" is mandatory or 
directory, "we must consider several factors, including 'the 
existence 
of 
penalties 
for 
failure 
to 
comply 
with 
the 
limitation, the statute's nature, the legislative objective for 
the statute, and the potential consequences to the parties, such 
as injuries or wrongs.'"  Fond du Lac County v. Elizabeth M.P., 
                                                 
56 Unless 
otherwise 
indicated 
all 
references 
to 
the 
Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2003-04 edition. 
No.  2003AP1533-CR.npc 
 
4 
 
2003 WI App 232, ¶22, 267 Wis. 2d 739, 672 N.W.2d 88 (quoting 
Macht, 262 Wis. 2d 720, ¶15).  "Thus, 'the determination of 
whether "shall" is mandatory or directory is not governed by a 
per se rule.'"  Macht, 262 Wis. 2d 720, ¶15 (quoting State v. 
R.R.E, 162 Wis. 2d 698, 707, 470 N.W.2d 283 (1991)).  The lead 
opinion fails to analyze and apply these factors and fails to 
probe legislative intent and history.  See GMAC Mortgage Corp. 
v. Gisvold, 215 Wis. 2d 459, 479, 572 N.W.2d 466 (1998); 
Wauwatosa 
v. 
Milwaukee 
County, 
22 
Wis. 2d 184, 
191, 
125 
N.W.2d 386 (1963).   
¶125 In light of the above cases, I take issue with the 
lead opinion's conclusion that the language cannot be read in 
Wis. Stat. §§ 973.195(1r)(c) and (f), in order to find that 
"shall" is directory.  Lead op., ¶¶43-46.  While I agree with 
the mandate to reverse and agree with the lead opinion's 
assertion that the legislature's use of the word "shall" in a 
statute is presumably mandatory, I strongly disagree with its 
attempt to make this presumption, in effect, a per se rule.  It 
is not.  If "shall" and "may" are used by the legislature in the 
same statutory provision, a court should consider the other 
factors noted above before determining whether the use of the 
word "shall" was intended to be mandatory or directory, 
especially where such determination involves the question of 
whether 
the 
statute 
is 
constitutional. 
 
Here 
the 
most 
significant factor is the one that acknowledges the legislative 
objective and furthers it by construing the statute in a manner 
that preserves its constitutionality.  
No.  2003AP1533-CR.npc 
 
5 
 
¶126 If the statutes at issue were to be interpreted as 
containing a directory and permissive "shall," then the record 
of the proceedings must clearly demonstrate that the circuit 
court exercised its discretion and weighed the appropriate 
factors when the court reached its decision on sentence 
adjustment.  An example of such balancing would be a record that 
showed that the circuit court considered the nature of the 
crime, character of the defendant, protection of the public, 
positions of the State and of the victim, and other relevant 
factors such as "[t]he inmate's conduct, efforts at and progress 
in rehabilitation, or participation and progress in education, 
treatment, 
or 
other 
correctional 
programs. . . ."  
Wis. Stat. § 973.195(1r)(b)(1).  Here, the record does not show 
that the circuit court weighed all of the appropriate factors 
when 
the 
court 
reached 
the 
decision 
to 
grant 
sentence 
adjustment.57  Therefore, the decision of the circuit court 
should be reversed, and I would remand this matter for a full 
consideration of the factors listed above.  The lead opinion 
would remand for the circuit court to deny the petition for 
                                                 
57 While the circuit court considered some of these factors 
in 
the 
motion 
hearings 
for 
sentence 
adjustment 
and 
for 
reconsideration, the court did not make a sufficient record 
demonstrating an exercise of discretion in light of all of the 
appropriate factors.  The circuit court did discuss the need for 
balancing, 
but 
only 
in 
regard 
to 
the 
incentive 
for 
rehabilitation of the defendant against the harm suffered by the 
victim and the victim's desire for punishment.  The circuit 
court was correct when the court expressed concern over whether 
the absolute veto given to the district attorney would stand up, 
but stopped short of finding such a veto unconstitutional, 
stating that "I'm not reaching those issues today."     
No.  2003AP1533-CR.npc 
 
6 
 
sentence adjustment, because the district attorney exercised the 
veto provision of § 973.195, which the lead opinion claims is 
mandatory and not directory.  I dissent from that conclusion, 
and from the purpose for which the lead opinion would remand 
this matter.58 
¶127 Additionally, if the provisions of the statute at 
issue are interpreted as being directory, then there is no need 
to address the issue of severability, as discussed in the briefs 
of counsel.  Also, I do not address mootness, since no question 
in that regard was raised, argued or briefed by counsel.     
¶128 In summary, in order to preserve the statute and find 
it constitutional, it must be construed as giving the circuit 
court discretion to accept or reject an objection from the 
district attorney on a petition for sentence adjustment.  The 
use of "shall" here is directory, not mandatory.   
¶129 For the reasons discussed herein, I respectfully 
concur in part and dissent in part. 
¶130 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. 
ABRAHAMSON and Justices ANN WALSH BRADLEY and LOUIS B. BUTLER, 
JR. join this concurrence/dissent. 
 
                                                 
58 Since Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson, Justices Ann 
Walsh 
Bradley, 
and 
Louis 
B. 
Butler, 
Jr. 
join 
this 
concurrence/dissent, and since I join the concurrence/dissent of 
Chief Justice Abrahamson, we form a majority on the directory 
nature of the statute and the reason for remand to the circuit 
court. 
No.  2003AP1533-CR.npc 
 
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No.  2003AP1533-CR.npc 
 
 
 
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