Case Title: In re Detention of Varner

Citation: 

Docket Number: 90151

State: illinois

Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Date: 2001-10-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
Docket No. 90151-Agenda 11-May 2001.
In re DETENTION OF HERBERT VARNER (The People of the 
 							State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Herbert Varner, Appellant).
Opinion filed October 2, 2003.
 
	JUSTICE FREEMAN delivered the opinion of the court:
	After a trial proceeding in the circuit court of Lake County, a jury
found Herbert Varner to be a sexually violent person under the
Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (the Act) (725 ILCS
207/1 et seq. (West 1998)). As a result, Varner was committed to the
custody of the Department of Human Services for control, custody
and treatment. The appellate court affirmed, rejecting Varner's claims
that the Act is unconstitutional and that he should not have been
committed to institutional care. In re Detention of Varner, 315 Ill.
App. 3d 626 (2000). We granted Varner's petition for leave to appeal
(177 Ill. 2d R. 315) and affirmed, holding that the Act did not violate
substantive due process because it is not limited to persons who lack
volitional control over their behavior. In re Detention of Varner, 198 Ill. 2d 78 (2001).
	The United States Supreme Court subsequently granted Varner's
petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the judgment of this court, and
remanded the cause for our further consideration in light of Kansas
v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 151 L. Ed. 2d 856, 122 S. Ct. 867 (2002).
Varner v. Illinois, 537 U.S. 802, 154 L. Ed. 2d 3, 123 S. Ct. 69
(2002). Upon reconsideration, assisted by supplemental briefing and
oral argument, we again affirm the judgment of the appellate court.



BACKGROUND
	The events which led to Varner's commitment are detailed both
in the original opinion of this court (Varner, 198 Ill. 2d 78 ) and in the
opinion of the appellate court (Varner, 315 Ill. App. 3d 626). We will
repeat here only those facts germane to our analysis.
	In 1988, the State charged Varner with the criminal sexual
assault of his five-year-old niece. 720 ILCS 5/12-13 (West 1998). He
pled guilty to the charge and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment
of 13 years in the Illinois Department of Corrections.
	The State initiated the proceedings at issue here as Varner's
prison term was ending and he was scheduled for entry into
mandatory supervised release. The State sought to have Varner
committed indefinitely to the Department of Human Services
(Department) pursuant to the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment
Act. The circuit court, pursuant to the Act, determined after a hearing
that probable cause existed and ordered Varner transferred to a
Department facility for evaluation. See 725 ILCS 207/30 (West
1998).
	The question of whether Varner was a sexually violent person
was subsequently tried before a jury. The jury heard evidence that
Varner may have been sexually abused as a child by his father. He
had previously committed other sexual offenses involving children,
including his daughter and another niece. At the time he committed
the offense for which he was then incarcerated, he was only 28 years
old. The jury also heard evidence from two clinical psychologists that
Varner was a pedophile who suffered from a personality disorder, the
combination of which created a substantial probability that he will
engage in further acts of sexual violence in the future. A third clinical
psychologist testified on Varner's behalf, stating that the evidence
was inconclusive as to whether Varner was a pedophile. This
psychologist noted that the risk that Varner would reoffend was
moderate but could be reduced to minimal. He further proposed that
Varner's exposure to children be limited and controlled and that he
be treated with Depo Provera, a chemical that lowers testosterone
levels and thereby reduces an individual's sex drive.
	As we noted in our initial opinion in this case:
		"The jury was instructed that it was to determine whether the
State had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Varner was
a sexually violent person. The court's definition of a sexually
violent person tracked the language used in section 5(f) of
the Act (725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 1998)). Specifically, the
jury was told that '[a] sexually violent person means a person
who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense and
who is dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental
disorder that makes it substantially probable that the person
will engage in acts of sexual violence.' The jury was further
instructed that criminal sexual assault constitutes a 'sexually
violent offense,' and it was given the definition of '[m]ental
disorder' set forth in section 5(b) of the Act, namely, 'a
congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or
volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in
acts of sexual violence' (725 ILCS 207/5(b) (West 1998))."
Varner, 198 Ill. 2d  at 81-82.
The jury found that Varner was a sexually dangerous person. The
circuit court then entered an order committing Varner to the custody
of the Department for institutional care and treatment in a secure
facility. See 725 ILCS 207/40(a), (b)(2) (West 1998).
	In his appeal, Varner challenged the constitutionality of the Act
on the grounds that it, inter alia, denies equal protection, violates the
prohibitions against double jeopardy and ex post facto laws, deprives
him of the right to waive a jury trial, and contravenes procedural and
substantive due process guarantees. Following the appellate court's
rejection of each of Varner's claims, Varner sought leave to appeal in
this court, arguing only that Act violated substantive due process. We
granted leave on that basis.



ANALYSIS
	Before we begin our reconsideration of this matter, we believe
it helpful to recount some of the analytical points we made in our
previous opinion. We noted there that Varner contended that his
commitment under the Act violates the principles of substantive due
process because it occurred without a specific finding by the jury that
he lacked volitional control over his sexually violent criminal
behavior. We further noted that Varner's claim, i.e., that commitment
is constitutionally permissible only where the defendant lacks
volitional control over his sexually violent conduct, was based on the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 138 L. Ed. 2d 501, 117 S. Ct. 2072 (1997). See Varner, 198 Ill. 2d  at 83-85 (discussing Hendricks). We observed, however, that
the Illinois law challenged by Varner is similar to the Kansas statute
upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Hendricks. We noted
that
		"the jury here received instructions that tracked the language
of the Act. Under those instructions, the jury's conclusion
that Varner was a sexually violent person necessarily
required a determination that he suffered from a mental
disorder. For the reasons set forth in Hendricks, the
precommitment requirement of a mental disorder, as defined
by the Act, was sufficient to 'narrow[ ] the class of persons
eligible for confinement to those who are unable to control
their dangerousness.' Hendricks, 521 U.S.  at 358, 138 L. Ed. 2d  at 513, 117 S. Ct.  at 2080. Accordingly, there was no
need for the jury to make any additional findings in this case
regarding Varner's ability to control his sexually violent
conduct." Varner, 198 Ill. 2d  at 84-85.
	Nevertheless, at the time we announced our original decision in
this matter, there was support for Varner's position in In re Care &
Treatment of Crane, 269 Kan. 578, 7 P.3d 285 (2000). At that time,
however, the case was pending in the United States Supreme Court,
which had granted a writ of certiorari in the matter. See Kansas v.
Crane, 532 U.S. 957, 149 L. Ed. 2d 372, 121 S. Ct. 1483 (2001)
(order granting certiorari). In his reply brief in the original appeal,
Varner observed that the United States Supreme Court had granted
certiorari in the Kansas decision. He contended: "Because the issue
presented in Crane is identical to the issue presented in this case, the
Supreme Court's decision in Crane will be relevant to, and probably
ultimately dispositive of, the question now before this Court." We
agree. In our original opinion, we found the Kansas decision
unpersuasive, and the United States Supreme Court subsequently
rejected the Kansas court's analysis. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407,
151 L. Ed. 2d 856, 122 S. Ct. 867 (2002).
	We discussed the Kansas Supreme Court's analysis in Crane at
length in our original opinion because Varner cited it as support for
his contentions. We noted that the statute at issue in that case was the
same statute which the Kansas Supreme Court had struck down, but
which the United States Supreme Court subsequently upheld in
Hendricks. Varner, 198 Ill. 2d  at 85. We observed that
			"[t]he problem with the provision, in the Kansas Supreme
Court's view, is that it refers to emotional capacity as well as
volitional capacity. The court reasoned that volitional
capacity refers to the ability to exercise free choice or will
and that a condition affecting the capacity to exercise free
choice or will would, in this context, mean a condition that
renders a person unable to control his or her behavior. By
including emotional capacity, the court believed, the
legislature must have intended to address some alternative
circumstance in which the exercise of free will or choice is
not at issue and the individual acts for reasons other than an
inability to control his behavior. To the extent that such an
individual might be subject to commitment under the statute,
the court believed that the law was inconsistent with
Hendricks' requirement that civil commitment statutes such
as this be limited in their application to persons who cannot
control their dangerous behavior." Varner,198 Ill. 2d  at 85-86.
Notwithstanding the parallels between the Kansas statute and our own
Act, we did not find the reasoning of our colleagues on the Kansas
court to be persuasive. Unlike the Kansas Supreme Court, we
			"[did] not believe that the legislature used the terms
'emotional capacity' and 'volitional capacity' as a way to
differentiate between individuals who are capable of
controlling their sexually violent behavior and those who are
not. The inability to control sexually violent behavior is a
sine qua non under the statute. The terms 'emotional' and
'volitional' are merely adjectives used to describe the
reasons an individual might lack the capacity to control his
behavior. Medical science's understanding of mental
pathology is imperfect and evolving, and the legislature used
these terms simply to insure that everyone who is unable to
control his or her sexually violent behavior is covered by the
law, whatever the precise reason for that lack of control
might be." Varner, 198 Ill. 2d  at 86.
	In addition, we noted that the Kansas Supreme Court gave a
second reason for invalidating that state's statute. We pointed out that
the Kansas court believed that the Kansas provision
			"applies, by its terms, not only to persons suffering from
'mental abnormalities,' but also to persons suffering from
'personality disorders.' There is no definition of 'personality
disorder' in the statute, and the court was concerned that
where an individual suffers from a personality disorder rather
than a mental abnormality, a jury could find him subject to
civil commitment without first making a finding that he was
unable to control his behavior." Varner, 198 Ill. 2d  at 86.
After examining the Illinois provision, however, we found this
problem not to exist and held as follows:
		" In defining '[s]exually violent person,' our statute does not
refer to persons suffering from personality disorders, only to
persons suffering from 'mental disorders.' 725 ILCS 207/5(f)
(West 1998). The term 'mental disorder' is, in turn,
specifically defined by the Illinois Act, and, as discussed
earlier in this opinion, the precommitment requirement of a
mental disorder, as defined by the Act, is sufficient to pass
constitutional muster under Hendricks." Varner, 198 Ill. 2d 
at 86-87.
	In 2002, the United States Supreme Court announced it decision
in Crane, rejecting the reasoning of the Kansas Supreme Court. In
Crane, the Court held that the United States Constitution does not
permit commitment of dangerous sexual offenders without any lack-of-control determination; however, the lack of control does not have
to be a total or complete lack of control. Crane, 534 U.S.  at 411-13,
151 L. Ed. 2d  at 861-63, 122 S. Ct.  at 870; People v. Masterson, No.
93579, slip op. at 12-13 (October 2, 2003) (discussing Crane). Now,
on remand from the United States Supreme Court here, Varner
contends Crane requires a specific lack-of-control finding. We
disagree.
	In our view, Crane did not hold that the Constitution requires a
specific determination by the fact finder in every case that a person
lacks volitional control, because Crane upheld the commitment in
Hendricks as constitutional, even though there was no specific lack-of-control determination in Hendricks. Crane, 534 U.S.  at 413-14,
151 L. Ed. 2d  at 863, 122 S. Ct.  at 871. As we recently observed in
Masterson: "Clearly the justices of the Crane majority did not believe
their decision called into question the continued viability of
Hendricks. Nothing said in the majority opinion explicitly repudiates
or alters principles espoused in Hendricks." (Emphasis in original.)
Masterson, slip op. at 14-15. We acknowledge that Masterson
involved the constitutionality of a commitment under the Sexually
Dangerous Persons Act (SDPA) (725 ILCS 205/0.01 et seq. (West
1998)). Nevertheless, our decision included a thorough analysis of the
Act at issue in this case, i.e., the Sexually Violent Persons
Commitment Act, to the end of conforming the SDPA to the Sexually
Violent Persons Commitment Act. Masterson, slip op. at 10-19. For
this reason, our analysis of the Act in Masterson provides substantial
guidance in this case.
	In Masterson, we noted that several state courts have held that
their sexually violent offender statutes conformed to Hendricks and
Crane where those statutes, like our Act, require proof of the
commission of a prior offense, and include specific definitions of
"mental abnormality" or "mental disorder," as well as a defined
burden regarding the likelihood of future offenses. Those statutes, as
with our Act, contain definitions that supply the constitutionally
required elements for civil commitment. A fact finder properly
instructed with definitions of these and other pertinent statutory terms
need not receive additional separate instruction on lack of control.
Masterson, slip op. at 15-16 (and cases cited therein). Our appellate
court has reached the same conclusion. See In re Detention of Dean,
337 Ill. App. 3d 610, 611-13 (2003); People v. Swanson, 335 Ill. App.
3d 117, 122-23 (2002); In re Detention of Isbell, 333 Ill. App. 3d 906,
911-13 (2002).
	Earlier in this opinion, we detailed the manner is which Varner's
jury was instructed. We believe that the jury was properly instructed
with definitions of the statutory terms relevant to Varner's case so as
to avoid any constitutional impediment. Thus, after considering the
facts in this matter in light of both the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Crane and our decision in Masterson, we reach the same
conclusion as we did in our previous opinion, i.e., that Varner's
commitment does not run afoul of substantive due process.



CONCLUSION
	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court
affirming the circuit court's order committing Varner to the custody
of the Department of Human Services for institutional care and
treatment in a secure facility is affirmed.

Affirmed.