Case Title: Baker v. Delaware

Citation: 

Docket Number: 501, 2018

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2019-07-18T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 
 
JOSEPH BAKER, JR., 
 
Respondent Below,  
Appellant, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF DELAWARE, 
 
Petitioner Below,  
Appellee. 
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No.  501, 2018 
 
Court Below:  Family Court  
of the State of Delaware 
 
I.D. No. 1711009663 (K)  
 
 
Submitted:  May 8, 2019 
 
Decided:  July 18, 2019 
 
Before VAUGHN, SEITZ, and TRAYNOR, Justices. 
 
Upon appeal from the Family Court.  REVERSED AND REMANDED 
 
Nicole M. Walker, Esquire, Assistant Public Defender, Wilmington, Delaware for 
Appellant, Joseph Baker, Jr. 
 
John Williams, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Dover, Delaware for Appellee, 
State of Delaware. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VAUGHN, Justice: 
 
 
 
2 
This is an appeal from an order of the Family Court adjudging the appellant, 
Joseph Baker, Jr.,1 a minor child, delinquent for having committed an act of Rape 
in the Second Degree.  Initially, Baker was charged with three counts of Rape in the 
Second Degree.  Count Two was voluntarily dismissed by the State before trial.  At 
trial, the Family Court judge found Baker delinquent on Count One and acquitted 
him on Count Three.  On appeal, Baker argues that the judgment of delinquency for 
the one count of Rape in the Second Degree should be reversed because of 
evidentiary errors made by the Family Court judge at trial.  We agree that errors 
were made and reversal is required. 
It is alleged that the two counts of Rape in the Second Degree that went to 
trial occurred in Kent County.  The alleged victim in both counts is Baker’s younger 
sister, S.B.  She was six years of age at the time of the alleged offenses.  Baker was 
thirteen years of age at the time of the alleged offenses.  The acts of rape are alleged 
to have occurred in S.B.’s home when Baker was there for weekend visitations.  
They are alleged to have occurred in Baker’s bedroom. 
II. 
A. 
The first claim of error made by Baker relates to the testimony of Emily 
Brown, a friend of S.B.’s mother.  Brown was the first witness called by the State.  
                                                 
1 A pseudonym was assigned on appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 7(d). 
 
 
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She testified that her two sons were playing with S.B. on a trampoline in her 
backyard.  She testified that she overheard S.B. say, “Junior showed me his 
privates,” and that one of her sons responded, “Who’s Junior?”2  S.B. explained that 
Junior was her brother.  According to Brown, when her sons asked S.B. why her 
brother did that, S.B. “was like, ‘He made me’—you know, ‘He’—she said, ‘I don’t 
know.  He showed me his privates and made me touch them . . . .’”3 
Brown testified that she put an end to the conversation and called S.B.’s 
mother to report what S.B. had said.  She also spoke to S.B. and said, “I heard what 
you said on the trampoline, about Junior.”4  “Yeah,” responded S.B.5  Brown then 
asked, “Where were your parents at, when he did this?”6  S.B. said that her parents 
were sleeping at the time. 
Baker’s counsel made a timely objection to Brown’s testimony on the ground 
that it contained inadmissible hearsay.  The State argued that S.B.’s statements as 
related by Brown were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but instead 
were offered for information as to what S.B. eventually told her mother and to show 
that S.B. was not being coached.  Baker’s counsel responded that she had not made 
                                                 
2 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A18. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at A18-19. 
5 Id. at A19. 
6 Id. 
 
 
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any argument or assertion that S.B. was coached.  The Family Court judge 
overruled the objection. 
This Court reviews “a trial court’s ruling admitting or excluding evidence for 
abuse of discretion.”7  Baker contends that Brown’s testimony did not satisfy the 
requirements of Delaware Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), which provides that a 
statement is not hearsay if “[t]he declarant testifies and is subject to cross-
examination about a prior statement, and the statement . . . is consistent with the 
declarant’s testimony and is offered . . . to rebut an express or implied charge that 
the declarant recently fabricated it or acted from a recent improper influence or 
motive in so testifying.”8  The State argues in response that the trial judge did not 
abuse his discretion in admitting Brown’s testimony relating to S.B.’s statements 
because during the testimony of the first witness the trial judge had no idea what 
further evidence might reveal. 
In this case, both sides waived opening argument, Brown was the first witness 
called by the State, and there was simply no evidentiary basis upon which the trial 
judge could have concluded that Brown’s testimony relating to S.B.’s statements 
was offered to rebut an express or implied charge that S.B. had recently fabricated 
                                                 
7 Milligan v. State, 116 A.3d 1232, 1235 (Del. 2015). 
8 D.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B)(ii). 
 
 
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her accusations against Baker or that she acted from a recent improper influence or 
motive.  Admission of S.B.’s hearsay statements overheard by Brown was error. 
The State also argues that any error in admitting Brown’s testimony was 
harmless because S.B.’s out-of-court statements could have been admitted under 11 
Del. C. § 3507.  Section 3507, however, applies “[i]n a criminal prosecution.”9  
“[A] Family Court adjudication of delinquency is a civil proceeding.”10  Because 
the delinquency proceeding involved here was not a “criminal prosecution,” § 3507 
does not apply. 
B. 
The second evidentiary issue Baker raises on appeal relates to the testimony 
of Kitty Nelson, a child-protective-services investigator for the Department of Social 
Services in Caroline County, Maryland.  Nelson interviewed S.B in connection with 
the allegations.  Nelson’s testimony at trial focused on the use of anatomical dolls 
during her interview with S.B.  She testified that through the use of the anatomical 
dolls, S.B. illustrated the alleged acts of rape Baker committed upon her.  Baker’s 
trial counsel made a timely objection that any statements made by S.B. during the 
interview, including, by implication, the nonverbal statements made through S.B.’s 
use of the anatomical dolls, were inadmissible hearsay.  The State responded that 
                                                 
9 11 Del. C. § 3507(a). 
10 G.D. v. State, 389 A.2d 764, 765 (Del. 1978).  
 
 
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what Nelson saw S.B. demonstrate with the dolls was not hearsay.  The objection 
was overruled. 
Hearsay is “a statement that . . . the declarant does not make while testifying 
at the current trial or hearing” that is “offer[ed] in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted in the statement.”11  For hearsay purposes, “statement” is defined as 
“a person’s oral assertion, written assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person 
intended it as an assertion.”12  Although this issue has not been directly addressed 
by this Court, it is generally accepted that a child’s use of anatomical dolls to show 
someone what happened to the child—especially when used to respond to questions 
about what happened—is nonverbal conduct intended as an assertion and, therefore, 
a “statement” for purposes of the hearsay rule.13  The child’s use of anatomical dolls 
is effectively a substitute for orally asserting what happened. 
                                                 
11 D.R.E. 801(c). 
12 Id. 801(a). 
13 E.g., People v. Bowers, 801 P.2d 511, 523 (Colo. 1990) (en banc) (“K.B.’s use of anatomical 
dolls during the interviews by the detective and the counselor, as well as the child’s gesturing 
during these interviews, constituted a form of nonverbal conduct that was intended by the child to 
be communicative. . . . .  [T]he child’s use of the dolls and gesturing were intended to be no less 
communicative than the child’s verbal responses.”); State v. Townsend, 635 So. 2d 949, 959 (Fla. 
1994) (“When an expert testifies regarding how a child behaved with anatomically correct dolls, 
the expert is repeating the communications of the child witness.”); Stringer v. Commonwealth, 956 
S.W.2d 883, 886-87 (Ky. 1997) (“[W]e [have] held that a social worker could not describe to the 
jury the child victim’s out-of-court manipulation of anatomically detailed dolls, because the 
manipulation of the dolls was a nonverbal communication, thus hearsay.”  (citing Souder v. 
Commonwealth, 719 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1986), overruled on other grounds by B.B. v. 
Commonwealth, 226 S.W.3d 47 (Ky. 2007))); see also Ray v. State, 587 A.2d 439, 440, 443-44 
(Del. 1991) (finding reversible error in the admission of a child victim’s out-of-court statements, 
which included using anatomically correct dolls to depict the assault, where the proper foundation 
under 11 Del. C. § 3507 was not provided); cf. United States v. Caro, 569 F.2d 411, 416 n.9 (5th 
 
 
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Because S.B.’s manipulation of the dolls was a statement for hearsay 
purposes, done outside of court, and offered for its truth, Nelson’s testimony as to 
S.B.’s manipulation of the dolls was inadmissible hearsay absent an applicable 
exception to, or exclusion from, the rule against hearsay.  Other than 11 Del. C. § 
3507, which as explained is inapplicable here, the State has not offered a potential 
hearsay exception or exclusion.  Therefore, Nelson’s testimony as to S.B.’s 
manipulation of the dolls was inadmissible hearsay, and admission of this testimony 
was error. 
In its ruling, the Family Court specifically discussed the consistency of S.B.’s 
testimony with the testimony of Brown and Nelson.  Because we have found that 
the testimony of both Brown and Nelson contained inadmissible hearsay, it cannot 
be said that these evidentiary errors are harmless. 
C. 
Next, Baker contends that the Family Court judge erred in admitting evidence 
that Baker had committed other, uncharged sexual abuse against S.B. in Maryland.  
Several witnesses made references to allegations of abuse in Maryland.  This claim 
of error is reviewable only for plain error because no objection to the mention of the 
Maryland allegations was made at trial.14 
                                                 
Cir. 1978) (explaining that “pointing out” constitutes assertive conduct and is therefore hearsay); 
United States v. Ross, 321 F.2d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 1963) (same). 
14 E.g., Zhurbin v. State, 104 A.3d 108, 113 (Del. 2014) (“To warrant review on appeal when the 
 
 
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It was not plain error for the Maryland police officer who testified at trial 
about his interview of Baker (who made admissions in that interview that 
undermined his general credibility) to explain that he interviewed Baker because of 
allegations made to the Caroline County Department of Social Services.  This 
information was admissible for the limited purpose of informing the trial judge as to 
why a Maryland police officer was testifying in a Delaware trial regarding sexual 
abuse allegedly occurring in Delaware.  Under Delaware Rule of Evidence 404, the 
officer’s testimony regarding the details of the Maryland allegations was not 
admissible, and on remand this portion of his testimony shall not be considered, as 
evidence tending to make it more likely that Baker actually committed the Delaware 
allegations.15  For this same reason, testimony from other witnesses regarding the 
details of the Maryland allegations was not admissible under Rule 404 and, 
therefore, shall not be considered on remand. 
D. 
The final two claims of error are related and will be considered together.  The 
first is that the trial judge erred by admitting evidence that Baker’s stepfather may 
have sexually abused another one of Baker’s sisters, M.B.  The second is that the 
                                                 
issue has not been fairly presented [to the trial court], there must be ‘plain error.’”); see also Supr. 
Ct. R. 8. 
15 See D.R.E. 404(b)(1) (“Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a 
person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance 
with the character.”). 
 
 
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trial judge erred by permitting the State to present a “learned behavior” theory based 
on Baker’s knowledge that his stepfather had allegedly abused M.B. 
The State first presented the alleged sexual abuse of M.B. during the direct 
examination of the investigating officer.  The State asked him whether S.B.’s 
mother was on the Child Abuse Registry.  Baker’s trial counsel objected on grounds 
of relevance.  According to the State, the relevance was that she was on the Registry 
for not protecting her own child.  “And here,” the State explained, “the State feels 
strongly that she’s doing the same exact thing, by hindering her son in the interview 
process.”16  The Family Court judge overruled the objection.  The officer then 
testified that the incident that led to the mother being placed on the Child Abuse 
Registry involved sexual abuse of her daughter, M.B. 
The State returned to the subject during the cross-examination of Baker.  At 
that time, the State initially indicated to the trial judge that it wanted to ask Baker “if 
he’s aware of the history of his Step-Dad, not his current Step-Dad, but his Step-Dad 
from [M.B.], because I do think that his Step-Dad potentially molested him.”17  
Baker’s trial counsel objected on the grounds of relevance, and the trial judge 
overruled the objection.  After further discussion, the State indicated that it had only 
two questions it wished to ask—how long the prior stepfather, S.D., had been his 
                                                 
16 App. to Appellant’s Opening Br. at A52. 
17 Id. at A101. 
 
 
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stepfather and whether Baker was aware that S.D. had abused M.B.  In support of 
these questions, the State argued that “[t]he relevance, again, it goes to was he 
abused, to see his motive, where, why?  It’s opportunity, [it’s] a learned behavior, 
[it’s] my whole argument.”18  Baker’s trial counsel continued to object.  The court 
allowed the State to ask its questions, and Baker replied that S.D. had been his 
stepfather for about ten years and he was aware that S.D. allegedly abused his sister, 
M.B. 
The State’s summation included an argument based on “learned behavior”: 
Your Honor, the State’s position is that something 
terrible happened to [Baker].  That he had a Step-Dad that 
did heinous things to his sister.  And we know that 
because it was litigated in Sussex County Court. 
But what we don’t know is the extent of what else 
occurred in that house.  Whether this was a learned 
behavior, by his Step-Dad, or if it was just motivated by 
hormones.  It’s the State’s contention that it was learned 
behavior.19 
Although this issue has not been directly addressed in the courts of this state, 
evidence of “learned behavior” or “battering parent syndrome”—the idea that a 
person who was abused as a child by a parent or parent figure is more likely to repeat 
this behavior—has been held inadmissible by many courts across the country.20  
                                                 
18 Id. at A103. 
19 Id. at A108. 
20 E.g., State v. Pulizzano, 456 N.W.2d 325, 336 (Wyo. 1990) (citing Thomas N. Bulleit Jr., Note, 
The Battering Parent Syndrome: Inexpert Testimony as Character Evidence, 17 U. Mich. J.L. 
Reform 653 (1984)). 
 
 
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These courts have reasoned that such evidence is clear propensity evidence, rendered 
inadmissible by Rule 404 (or analogous rule).21  Simply put, “to the extent that such 
evidence is relevant at all, it is character evidence that may not be admitted as proof 
of guilt.”22  And when the State’s case depends largely (if not exclusively) on the 
credibility of the alleged victim in comparison to the credibility of the defendant, 
courts have held that admission of this “learned behavior” evidence constitutes 
reversible error.23 
Although the prosecutor expressed a suspicion that Baker himself had been a 
victim of abuse, the theory it presented was that Baker “learned” sexual abuse 
“behavior” from an awareness of an allegation that S.D. had sexually abused his 
sister, M.B.  We see no significant difference between a theory that a person’s 
                                                 
21 E.g., State v. Jahnke, 353 N.W.2d 606, 610 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (“To ask a defendant accused 
of incest whether she was sexually abused as a child is highly prejudicial and cannot be 
condoned.”); Kirby v. State, 208 S.W.3d 568, 573 (Tex. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that evidence of 
the defendant’s sexual abuse as a child, whether viewed as a character trait under rule 404(a) or an 
act under rule 404(b), was inadmissible); Pulizzano, 456 N.W.2d at 336 (“The admissibility of 
evidence of the battering parent syndrome has been controversial among the courts.  If admissible 
at all, however, the courts have been uniform that it must be supported by expert testimony, both 
with respect to the theory itself and whether the defendant exhibits character traits consistent with 
that profile.”  (citations omitted)); see also Nelson v. State, 782 P.2d 290, 297 (Alaska Ct. App. 
1989) (“Particularly in light of the widespread belief that sexual abusers of children are frequently 
people who have themselves been victims of abuse as children, the evidence of Nelson’s abuse as 
a child carried a strong and unmistakable potential for prejudice.”). 
22 Kirby, 208 S.W.3d at 573 (citing Tex. R. Evid. 404). 
23 E.g., id. at 574-575 (reversing a conviction for sexual abuse of a child where the success of the 
case depended on a credibility determination between the alleged child victim and the defendant 
because “[t]he testimony that [the defendant] had been the victim of sexual abuse, even when 
discounted by expert testimony, improperly called into play the commonly held belief that victims 
of sexual abuse are more likely to abuse others” and, therefore, likely influenced the jury’s 
credibility determination); see also Nelson, 782 P.2d at 297. 
 
 
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alleged sexual abuse of another is learned behavior because the person was a victim 
of abuse or is learned behavior because another member of the family was the victim.  
In both contexts, it is propensity evidence.  We agree with the aforementioned 
courts and hold that “learned behavior” evidence is inadmissible propensity evidence 
under Delaware Rule of Evidence 404.  It was error for the Family Court judge to 
admit such evidence and to allow argument relating to it in closing.   
For similar reasons, it was also error to admit evidence that the mother was 
on the Child Abuse Registry.  First of all, it is unclear to us how this fact is relevant 
under Delaware Rule of Evidence 401.  The evidence that the mother is on the 
Registry for an incident involving M.B. does not have “any tendency to make a fact” 
of consequence the State sought to prove—the mother’s alleged hindering of her son 
in the interview process—“more or less probable than it would be without th[at] 
evidence.”24  Furthermore, even if this evidence is somehow relevant to that fact of 
consequence (or some other, unidentified fact of consequence), it is inadmissible 
character evidence under Rule 404. 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Family Court finding the 
appellant delinquent for having committed an act of Rape in the Second Degree is 
                                                 
24 D.R.E. 401. 
 
 
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reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion.  Jurisdiction is not retained.