Case Title: Elms v. Olson

Citation: 81 N.W.2d 117

Docket Number: 

State: north-dakota

Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

Date: 1957-02-21T00:00:00Z

Document:
81 N.W.2d 117 (1957) Gladys D. ELMS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Willard OLSON, Defendant and Respondent. No. 7662. Supreme Court of North Dakota. February 7, 1957. As Amended February 21, 1957. Duffy & Haugland, Devils Lake, for plaintiff and appellant. Walter O. Burk, Williston, for defendant and respondent. JOHNSON, Judge. This is a statutory action to quiet title covering the South Half of the Northeast Quarter (S½NE¼) and Lots 1 and 2, Section 5, Township 155 North of Range 96 West, Williams County, North Dakota. The plaintiff claims title as the former owner. The defendant claims title as purchaser from Williams County, North Dakota. The county acquired the property under tax deed proceedings. The defendant by way of counterclaim asserts that he is the owner of the property and pleads the 10 and 20 year statutes of limitations as a bar to the plaintiff's action. The only challenge to the defendant's title is based upon the contention that the notice of expiration of the period of redemption is invalid, in that it included 1926, 1927 and 1928 taxes levied subsequent to the sale of the 1925 taxes; that there were, therefore, included in the notice of expiration of the period of redemption taxes which were delinquent less than three years. The notice of expiration of the period of redemption was issued by the county auditor of Williams County, on January 15, 1930 It describes the property involved as follows: and then states: The trial court found for the defendant upholding the validity of the defendant's title. The plaintiff appeals and requests a trial de novo. The issue before us is whether the inclusion of taxes which were delinquent less than 3 years invalidated the notice of expiration of the period of redemption. That depends upon whether the law in force governing tax sale procedure permitted the county to include in the notice of expiration of the period of redemption, not only the original tax for which the property was sold, but also all subsequent taxes then due and delinquent. It is apparent that the procedure taken for the acquisition of this property by Williams County was conducted under the statutes as they existed prior to enactment of chapter 298, 1931 S.L. The trial court stated that the tax title proceedings were in compliance "with the statutes as they existed at the time they were conducted and that no defect therein has been established." This conclusion is based on statements made in the case of Kelsch v. Miller, 73 N.D. 405, 15 N.W.2d 433, 438, 155 A.L.R. 1186. In that case it is stated: It is contended that this statement is dicta; that the opinion overlooks certain statutory provisions; and that the opinion sanctions statements of the amount due by years and not by lump sum. It also asserted that under present law, the tax title would be defective. Grandin v. Gardiner, N.D., 63 N.W.2d 128; Wilson v. Divide County, N.D., 76 N.W.2d 896. That is true but the cases cited arise under different statutes. We need not concern ourselves with whether the quoted statement from Kelsch v. Miller, supra, is dicta. The discussion relates to the historical development of the statutes. An examination of the statutes bears out the conclusion reached. Section 4, Chapter 199, 1925 Session Laws, amending section 2197 of the 1913 Compiled Laws says: It is true that subsection (2) of Section 4 of this law provides for permissive partial redemption. But such permissive partial redemption does not eliminate the requirement that when tax proceedings are taken for the forfeiture of the property all subsequent taxes then due and delinquent shall be included in the notice of expiration of period of redemption. There is no requirement in this statute that the taxes be separated by years. As far as we can determine, that requirement first came into our law as a part of Chapter 286 of the 1941 Session Laws, Section 3, now Section 57-2803, NDRC 1943. The notice of expiration of the period of redemption involved in this action sets out the requirements of Section 5 of Chapter 199 of the 1925 Session Laws, which states: We have here only one description. The amount due is set opposite thereto, which was required to redeem the property. In DeNault v. Hoerr, 66 N.D. 82, 262 N.W. 361, 366, a case arising under the statutes as they existed prior to 1931, states: The notice of expiration of the period of redemption in the case at bar conformed to the requirements of the statutes in existence at the time of its issuance and was in complete compliance therewith. Kelsch v. Miller, 73 N.D. 405, 15 N.W.2d 433, 155 A.L.R. 1186; DeNault v. Hoerr, supra. The case of Hodges v. McCutcheon, 72 N.D. 150, 5 N.W.2d 83, does not militate against our conclusion. In that case taxes for two years prior to those which were the basis of the tax sale were included in the notice of expiration of the period of redemption. It might possibly be inferred from that case that the taxes were separately stated. While that no doubt could be done in any notice of expiration of the period of redemption, there was no statutory requirement to state them separately or by years under the statutes governing the issuance of the notice of expiration of the period of redemption involved in the case at bar. In view of our determination that the defendant's tax title is valid it is unnecessary *120 to discuss the defenses of the statutes of limitations. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. GRIMSON, C. J., and BURKE, MORRIS, and SATHRE, JJ., concur.