Case Title: Malone v. Malone

Citation: 379 So. 2d 926

Docket Number: 51619

State: mississippi

Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Date: 1980-02-13T00:00:00Z

Document:
379 So. 2d 926 (1980) Nettie S. MALONE, Executrix of the Estate of Robert Crowe Malone, Deceased, v. Robert C. MALONE, Jr., et al. No. 51619. Supreme Court of Mississippi. February 13, 1980. *927 Holcomb, Dunbar, Connell, Merkel, Tollison & Khayat, Charles M. Merkel, Clarksdale, for appellant. Jacobs, Griffith, Pearson, Eddins & Povall, Charles C. Jacobs, Jr., Cleveland, for appellees. Before ROBERTSON, P.J., and WALKER and LEE, JJ. WALKER, Justice, for the Court. This appeal is taken from a decree of the Chancery Court of the Second Judicial District of Bolivar County, Mississippi, entered on December 26, 1978, construing the will of Robert Crowe Malone, a lifetime resident of Bolivar County, Mississippi, who died testate on August 30, 1978. The last will and testament of the testator, dated January 9, 1978, was duly admitted to probate on September 28, 1978, and letters testamentary were granted unto Nettie Singleton Malone as executrix of the estate of Robert Crowe Malone. After the will was duly probated, the executrix, Nettie Singleton Malone, filed a petition seeking a construction of certain provisions of the will. Several questions were posed for construction and answered by the lower court, but the only question involved on this appeal is whether the chancellor was in error in holding that the vested interest of Nettie Singleton Malone in all of the property of decedent contained and allocated to Share No. 1 was less than a fee simple interest. The pertinent provisions of the will are as follows: It was from this language that the chancery court was asked to determine precisely the type or character of interest which the testator intended to leave to his surviving spouse. The chancellor in a well-reasoned opinion concluded: The appellant, Mrs. Nettie Singleton Malone, contends that the chancellor was in error and that the dominant intent of the testator was to pass to the surviving spouse an outright bequest of a fee simple interest in Share No. 1. In support of this contention the appellant stated that the language, "upon the death of my wife any property remaining in Share No. 1 shall be added to and distributed to Share No. 2 to the same extent as if it had been an original part thereof," was merely superfluous and noncontrolling, having been inadvertently carried over by a scrivener from a marital trust pour-over provision of a preceding will. The duty of the lower court and this Court in construing wills and trusts is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the testator. In arriving at this intention, the court is required to consider the entire instrument, sometimes said "From the four corners of the instrument." Where the instrument is susceptible of *929 more than one construction, it is the duty of the court to adopt that construction which is most consistent with the intention of the testator. Deposit Guaranty National Bank v. First National Bank, 352 So. 2d 1324 (Miss. 1977). Further, effect should be given, if possible to all words, clauses, and provisions of the instrument. Paine v. Sanders, 242 Miss. 392, 135 So. 2d 188 (1961); First National Bank of Laurel v. Commercial National Bank & Trust Co., 247 Miss. 677, 157 So. 2d 502 (1963). Construing this will in the light of the above rules, we are of the opinion that the chancellor correctly construed it. The wills executed by Mr. Malone in 1958 and 1966, granted the income from Share No. 1 to Mrs. Nettie S. Malone and she was given a power to appoint by her will beneficiaries as to any part of Share No. 1 remaining at the time of her death. The wills (1958 and 1966), both went on to provide that in the event she failed to make such appointment during her lifetime, that any remaining portion of Share No. 1 should become a part of Share No. 2. However, in the 1975 will, the language that gave Mrs. Malone the right to appoint by her will beneficiaries as to any part of Share No. 1 remaining at the time of her death, was deleted, and on the third page of the 1975 will the testator provided only that, Upon the death of my wife, any property remaining in Share No. 1 shall be added to and distributed to Share No. 2." This same identical language which appeared in the 1975 will was brought forth in the 1978 will which was admitted to probate, and we are unable to say that this language in the 1978 will was other than deliberate. It is readily apparent that the testator intended for Nettie S. Malone to have Share No. 1 to use as she saw fit during her lifetime with the full, complete and absolute power to dispose thereof; that she was limited only to the extent that any portion of said property remaining at her death was not subject to a testamentary power of appointment in her, but passed to the remaining beneficiaries of Share No. 2. Justice Patterson, speaking for the Court in Seal v. Seal, 312 So. 2d 19 (Miss. 1975) stated: There was some ambiguity about the beneficiary of Share No. 1, but this ambiguity was explained away by other provisions of the will and the parties agreed. For the reasons stated, we are of the opinion that the chancellor was imminently correct in holding it was the intention of the testator that the interest of Nettie S. Malone be limited only to the extent that such property, if any, allocated to Share No. 1 as may remain at the time of her death, is not subject to a testamentary power of appointment in her, but will pass in accordance with the provisions of the will of Robert Crowe Malone relating to the ultimate disposition of Share No. 2. Therefore, the decree of the chancery court must be and is affirmed. AFFIRMED. PATTERSON, C.J., SMITH and ROBERTSON, P. JJ., and SUGG, BROOM, LEE, BOWLING and COFER, JJ., concur. [1] For other cases dealing with similar provisions in wills, see Selig v. Trost et al., 110 Miss. 584, 70 So. 699 (1915); Spiva v. Coleman, 122 Miss. 142, 84 So. 144 (1920); Cross v. Cavanah, 198 Miss. 137, 21 So. 2d 473 (1945); Vaughn, Executrix v. Vaughn, 238 Miss. 342, 118 So. 2d 620 (1960).