Case Title: Van Horn v. State

Citation: 1895 WY 31, 40 P. 964, 5 Wyo. 501

Docket Number: 116805

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 1895-07-01T00:00:00Z

Document:
Van Horn v. State1990 WY 148802 P.2d 883Case Number: 90-131Decided: 12/14/1990Supreme Court of Wyoming
Dennis Milo VAN 
HORN,

 Appellant 
(Defendant),

v.

The STATE of Wyoming, 

Appellee 
(Plaintiff).

Appeal from the District 
Court, Crook County, Timothy J. Judson, J.

Leonard D. 
Munker, State Public Defender, Steven E. Weerts, Senior Asst. Public Defender, 
and David Gosar, Appellate Counsel, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, 
Atty. Gen., Sylvia L. Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Mary B. Guthrie, Senior 
Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before 
URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.

URBIGKIT, Chief 
Justice.

[¶1]            
Appellant argues a municipal peace officer may not execute a municipal 
bench (arrest) warrant outside the boundaries of that municipality. We agree and 
reverse appellant's conviction for interference with a municipal peace 
officer.

[¶2]            
Appellant, Dennis Milo Van Horn, was found guilty of interference with a 
peace officer and sentenced to fifteen days in the Crook County, Wyoming jail 
and ordered to pay $850 for the cost of his court-appointed attorney and $50 to 
the Victims of Crime Compensation Fund.1

[¶3]      The parties 
stipulate that officers of Moorcroft's municipal police force observed an 
automobile driving erratically within the municipal limits of Moorcroft and 
activated their patrol car's overhead lights; the automobile was stopped outside 
the municipal limits; after they made the stop, the officers identified 
appellant, who was a passenger in the automobile, and arrested him outside the 
Moorcroft municipal limits; and appellant's arrest was based on an outstanding 
municipal bench warrant signed by the Moorcroft municipal judge. Appellant's 
conduct during this arrest led to the misdemeanor charge for interference with a 
peace officer. All of this is based on a July 8, 1988 charge of battery as the 
only other offense with which appellant had been involved. From what is provided 
in this record, it appears that on July 21, 1988, appellant, as the result of 
the battery offense, had been sentenced to $276 restitution, $120 fine and six 
months unsupervised probation. The bench warrant followed in December 1988 
reflecting a remaining balance of $96 unpaid on the restitution and fine. The 
next event was this occurrence in May 1989. At the scene, appellant's brother 
gave appellant the necessary money to settle the claim balance which was 
tendered to the arresting peace officer who stated that appellant had to be 
arrested, taken to the police station and booked in before he could tender that 
balance for satisfaction of the previous fine. The warrant itself provided 
"Defendant is to be admitted to bail in the sum of $96." At the scene, appellant 
became overtly and admittedly upset about being arrested for the 
$96.

[¶4]      In his appeal, 
appellant asks: "Is a municipal police officer engaged in the lawful performance 
of his official duties when executing a municipal bench warrant outside the city 
limits?"2

[¶5]      Our standard of 
review requires us to conduct a plenary review of the choice, interpretation, 
construction, and application of the controlling legal precepts. ANR Production 
Company v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Com'n., 800 P.2d 492 (Wyo. 
1990).

[¶6]            
Appellant argues the Wyoming statutes and court rules do not authorize a 
municipal peace officer to arrest under a municipal bench warrant outside the 
municipal limits which is the entity by which the officer is employed. In short, 
appellant contends that he should not have been convicted for interference with 
a peace officer because the municipal police were outside their jurisdiction 
when they arrested him. He first argues that the jurisdiction of Wyoming 
municipal police to execute municipal bench warrants is limited to the municipal 
borders. He then argues that for a peace officer to be interfered with, the 
peace officer must first be engaged in the "lawful performance of his official 
duties." W.S. 6-5-204(a). Because the legislature and judiciary have limited the 
jurisdiction of municipal police to the municipal borders, an extraterritorial 
arrest cannot be considered "lawful performance." Thus, appellant contends, the 
Moorcroft municipal police were not engaged in the "lawful performance" of their 
official duties when they arrested him outside their jurisdiction. We 
agree.

[¶7]      The legislature 
and the judiciary3 have delineated the jurisdiction of 
municipal judges and municipal peace officers. Pursuant to W.R.Cr.P.J.C. 4(a), 
municipal judges shall issue arrest warrants "to any officer authorized by law 
to execute it." Those "officers" authorized to execute arrest warrants are 
labeled "peace officers" under W.S. 7-2-101(a)(iv). Accordingly, "[a] peace 
officer may arrest a person when * * * [he] has a warrant commanding that the 
person be arrested * * *." W.S. 7-2-102(a)(i). Included within the statutory 
definition of "peace officers" are "[a]ny duly authorized member of a municipal 
police force * * *." W.S. 7-2-101(a)(iv)(B). In the case of municipal police 
executing municipal bench warrants, W.R.Cr.P.J.C. 4(c)(2) further provides that 
"[t]he warrant may be executed or the summons may be served at any place within 
their territorial jurisdictions when issued by municipal judges * * *."4 Thus, reading the statutes and 
rules together, municipal police must execute municipal arrest warrants within 
the "territorial jurisdiction" of the municipal judge who issued the 
warrant.

[¶8]      In response, the 
State argues our holding in Roberts v. State, 711 P.2d 1131 (Wyo. 1985) controls 
and, therefore, we should uphold appellant's conviction. We disagree. In 
Roberts, municipal police, relying on a warrant, arrested an individual 
within the municipal limits. We began our analysis, in Roberts, by 
stating that one of the statutory (official) duties of peace officers is to 
execute arrest warrants. We then reasoned that a peace officer is "lawfully 
performing his official duty when he makes an arrest even if it later appears 
that the arrest warrant is invalid. A person who resists such an arrest can be 
convicted under our resisting arrest statute." Id. at 1134.

[¶9]      The rationale of 
Roberts is that police officers - acting in good faith - should not be required 
to determine the validity of a bench warrant before fulfilling their statutory 
duty of executing it. Neither the holding nor the rationale behind Roberts is 
implicated in this case. This case does not involve municipal peace officers 
making sometimes difficult judgment calls as to a particular warrant's validity. 
Rather, this case involves a clear line of demarcation - the jurisdiction of the 
municipal police force. Under the statutes and court rules, the municipal police 
force's authority to arrest individuals pursuant to municipal bench warrants 
simply does not extend beyond the municipal boundaries.5 Cf. Katona v. City of Cheyenne, 686 F. Supp. 287, 291 (D.Wyo. 1988) ("The municipal court commissioner is not a 
justice and hence an arrest warrant issued under his authority is a 
nullity.")

[¶10]   In result, the present Wyoming 
statutory and rule structure for the city officer enforcement of the municipal 
warrant retains confined arrest jurisdiction of the municipal peace officer to 
the long established historical common law rule. The rule is directly and 
explicitly stated with an extended history and application:

     In the absence of 
statute, the power of a sheriff or officer is limited to his own county, and he 
cannot execute a writ out of his own county. Outside his county, his authority 
to make arrests is no greater than that of a private citizen.

5 Am.Jur.2d, 
Arrest § 19 at 710 (1962) (footnote omitted). The case of Ex parte Crawford, 148 
Wn. 265, 268 P. 871 (1928) serves to provide the historical and since continued 
definition of the law.

It is elementary law 
that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a warrant of 
arrest cannot be lawfully executed by arresting the accused beyond the 
territorial jurisdiction of the justice or court issuing it. 1 Chitty's Criminal 
Law, 48; 1 Bishop's New Criminal Procedure (2d Ed.) p. 140.

Id. 268 P.  at 
872.

[¶11]            
Annotation, Territorial Extent of Power to Arrest Under a Warrant, 61 
A.L.R. 377, 377 (1929), which follows Ex parte Crawford in the volume, quotes 2 
R.C.L. 469:

Generally speaking it may 
be said that "a public officer appointed as a conservator of the peace for a 
particular county or municipality . . . has no official power to apprehend 
offenders beyond the boundaries of the county or district for which he has been 
appointed [whether he acts under color or of a warrant or without 
one]."

The annotation 
cites a history of cases commencing with Chorley's Case, 1 Salk. 176, 91 Eng. 
Reprint 161 (1699). Other cases to be found include an early American case, 
Lawson v. Buzines, 3 Harr. (Del.) 416 (1842) (cited in Newburn v. Durham, 88 
Tex. 288, 31 S.W. 195 (1895)), where the rule is stated. Newburn does recognize 
a statutory extension of arrest authority for prevention and suppression. See 
likewise City of Fairborn v. Munkus, 28 Ohio St.2d 207, 277 N.E.2d 227 (1971), 
which, after citing the common law rule, recognizes a statutory extension of 
expanded jurisdiction. Following or recognizing the common law rule, see Zanks 
v. Fluckiger, 22 Conn. Sup. 311, 171 A.2d 86 (1961); State v. Carson, 374 So. 2d 621 (Fla.App. 1979); Drake v. Keeling, 230 Iowa 1038, 299 N.W. 919 (1941); State 
ex rel. Malone v. Dreiling, 136 Kan. 78, 12 P.2d 735 (1932); State v. Harnum, 
143 Me. 133, 56 A.2d 449 (1947); and Irwin v. State, Department of Motor 
Vehicles, 10 Wn. App. 369, 517 P.2d 619 (1974). Wyoming has no statute nor has 
this court provided a rule which serves to abrogate the common law rule of 
confined territorial jurisdiction for municipal peace officers.

[¶12]   In summary, we hold that, under the 
circumstances presented by this case, the municipal peace officers had no 
authority to execute the municipal arrest warrant outside the boundaries of the 
municipality by which they were employed.

[¶13]            
Appellant's conviction for interference with a municipal peace officer is 
reversed.

THOMAS, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶14]   I, too, must dissent from the 
opinion of the court in this case. I agree with, and join in, the dissenting 
opinion of Justice Golden. I find, however, that the majority opinion is more 
straitened than plenary, as claimed, and I am constrained to suggest some 
additional reasons that justify this court in affirming the trial court. The 
Moorcroft police officers had other adequate cause to arrest Van Horn, without 
relying upon or invoking the municipal bench warrant, and that fact serves to 
justify his prosecution under § 6-5-204(a), W.S. 1977.

[¶15]   There is no question raised in this 
instance that the arrest of the driver of the vehicle that Van Horn owned, and 
in which he was riding, was not lawful. Section 31-5-1204(a), W.S. 1977 (June 
1989 Repl.), provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) The authority of a 
police officer to make an arrest is the same as upon an arrest for a felony when 
the officer has reasonable and probable grounds to believe that the person 
arrested has committed any of the following offenses and the manner of making 
arrests shall be as in misdemeanor cases:

* * * * * *

"(ii) Driving or being in 
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any 
substance as prohibited by W.S. 31-5-233; * * *."

Section 7-2-103, 
W.S. 1977 (June 1987 Repl.), sets forth the authority to arrest without a 
warrant and provides:

"(a) A peace officer may 
arrest a person without a warrant and detain that person until a legal warrant 
can be obtained when:

"(i) Any criminal offense 
is being committed in his presence by the person to be arrested;

"(ii) He has probable 
cause to believe that a felony has been committed and that the person to be 
arrested has committed it; * * *."

The definition 
of "peace officer" in § 7-2-101(a)(iv), W.S. 1977, includes "any duly authorized 
member of a municipal police force."

[¶16]   With this authority to arrest 
established, § 31-5-1202, W.S. 1977 (June 1989 Repl.), becomes 
significant:

"Every person who 
commits, attempts to commit, conspires to commit, or aids or abets in the 
commission of, any act declared herein to be a crime, whether individually or in 
connection with one (1) or more other persons or as a principal, agent or 
accessory, is guilty of the offense, and every person who falsely, fraudulently, 
forcibly or willfully induces, causes, coerces, requires, permits or directs 
another to violate any provision of this act is likewise guilty of the 
offense."

There was ample 
probable cause in this instance for the Moorcroft police officers to arrest Van 
Horn for aiding and abetting the driver in committing the offense of driving 
while under the influence of alcohol without relying on the bench warrant in any 
way.

[¶17]   The essence of the majority opinion 
is that, when an arrest is lawfully made by a peace officer, he still must 
subject himself to the hazard of resistance or interference if he makes mention 
of an arrest warrant that he may not have authority to execute at that place. 
This is not sound public policy and is antithetical to the policy justification 
for Roberts v. State, 711 P.2d 1131 (Wyo. 1985). Neither is it sound or logical 
jurisprudence. Obstruction, impedance, interference, or resistance of arrest by 
a peace officer who is engaged in the lawful performance of his duties can 
hardly ever be justified and, as Roberts correctly suggests, only in the most 
compelling circumstances. That exception is not satisfied in this 
case.

[¶18]   One of our rules of appellate 
jurisprudence is that we can, and will, affirm the trial court on any legal 
ground appearing in the record. Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982); 
Jones v. State, 602 P.2d 378 (Wyo. 1979). I am in accord with Justice Golden's 
thesis that the controlling authority for this case is Roberts. The application 
of Roberts depends upon whether there was a lawful arrest, and it should not be 
read in a stilted fashion so as to limit its scope to only those situations in 
which a warrant is relied upon. It follows that if, as in this case, there is a 
lawful arrest, the prosecution of the arrested person, or anyone else, for a 
violation of § 6-5-204(a), W.S. 1977, should not be denied. The fact that the 
arresting officers also presented a municipal warrant does not justify the 
conduct of Van Horn in interfering with a police officer.

[¶19]   For the foregoing reasons, and for 
the reasons articulated by Justice Golden in his dissenting opinion, I would 
affirm Van Horn's conviction.

GOLDEN, Justice, 
dissenting.

[¶20]            
Respectfully, I must dissent. I have several concerns that cause me to 
have a view different from that of the majority. In the interests of time and 
space, I only sketch briefly what troubles me about the court's 
holding.

[¶21]   Having carefully read the trial 
transcript, I find that officer Hagemann of the Moorcroft Police Department had, 
when arresting appellant, a good faith belief that he was inside the town's 
territorial limits. On his first day on the job, several years before the 
incident in question, the chief of police and the town clerk had told him that 
the town's limits included "right to the edge of the tennis courts" which, as 
shown on trial exhibit 1, a copy of a plat of the town, is well beyond the place 
where the arrest was made. As marked by officer Hagemann on that trial exhibit, 
the point of arrest was within the town's limits as understood by the officer 
when he arrested appellant. The trial transcript reveals that appellant 
presented no evidence to contradict officer Hagemann's good faith belief. In 
Roberts v. State, 711 P.2d 1131 (Wyo. 1985), this court held that an arrestee 
cannot lawfully resist an arrest based on an invalid warrant which the arresting 
officer in good faith believes is valid. The reason driving the rule is to 
prevent dangerous confrontations between an arrestee and the arresting officer. 
We promote the public policy that an arrestee must not take the law into his own 
hands, but must take the peaceful route of judicial remedy.

[¶22]   I find no significant difference in 
principle between Roberts and this case. I would hold that an arrestee cannot 
lawfully resist an arrest based on a valid warrant being executed by an officer 
who in good faith believes he is executing it within the territorial limits of 
his jurisdiction. The reason driving this rule is identical to the rule driving 
Roberts. The public policy we promote is the same.

[¶23]   That the Moorcroft police officers 
were engaged in the lawful performance of their official duties at all times 
surrounding the incident is beyond question. Without challenge, the evidence at 
trial established that the officers identified appellant's truck being 
erratically operated within the town's limits. The officer driving the police 
car turned on the overhead lights signalling the driver of appellant's truck to 
stop. This happened within the town's limits. Appellant's vehicle travelled 
about a quarter of a mile further before it stopped, partially blocking the 
two-lane road. The officers lawfully arrested the driver of appellant's truck 
for driving while under the influence. W.S. 31-5-1204(a)(ii) (June 1989 Repl.); 
and see Coryell v. Town of Pinedale, 745 P.2d 883, 885 (Wyo. 1987).

[¶24]   After arresting the driver, the 
police learned that appellant, a passenger, was the registered owner of the 
truck. Under W.S. 31-5-1203 (June 1989 Repl.), it is unlawful for a motor 
vehicle owner, such as appellant, to knowingly permit an intoxicated person to 
drive his vehicle. In any event, the driver of appellant's vehicle told the 
police that he was more sober than his two passengers, appellant and appellant's 
brother. At this point it was apparent to the police that they needed to take 
charge of the situation because of the inebriated condition of the threesome and 
the fact that the truck was blocking the road. During the efforts of the police 
officers to reason with appellant, his brother peaceably got out of the truck; 
however, appellant refused to leave the truck and locked the doors. He 
frustrated the officers' attempts to unlock the doors as well. For twenty-five 
minutes the police and appellant's brother tried to persuade appellant to get 
out of the truck; he refused.

[¶25]   Under these facts, I am satisfied 
the jury was correct in finding that appellant interfered with the officers' 
lawful performance of official duties. I would affirm the 
conviction.

 FOOTNOTES

1      "A person 
commits a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, 
a fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or both, if he 
knowingly obstructs, impedes or interferes with or resists arrest by a peace 
officer while engaged in the lawful performance of his official duties." W.S. 
6-5-204(a).

     The propriety of the 
charge and method of assessment for the indigent to pay the cost of court 
appointed counsel is not presented as an appellate issue. See W.S. 7-6-106. The 
transcript reflected that the appellant was required to "reimburse the county 
and the state attorney's fees in the amount of $850."

     However, the judgment 
and sentence provided:

     2. The defendant shall 
reimburse the County and State in the amount of $850.00 for the cost of his 
court-appointed attorney to be paid to the Clerk of District Court, P.O. Box 
904, Sundance, WY 82729.

No 
basis for the computed amount was included in this record.

2      This appeal 
involves neither fresh pursuit, State v. Tillman, 208 Kan. 954, 494 P.2d 1178 
(1972); People v. Welfel, 29 Misc.2d 62, 212 N.Y.S.2d 650 (1961); cf. Appeal of 
Cowell, 243 Pa. Super. 177, 364 A.2d 718 (1976); nor contention of a citizen's 
arrest when the officer acts without authority when beyond his jurisdiction, 
Davis v. United States, 409 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir. 1969); State v. Crum, 323 So. 2d 673 (Fla.App. 1975); Stevenson v. State, 287 Md. 504, 413 A.2d 1340 (1980); 
State v. Harp, 13 Wn. App. 239, 534 P.2d 842 (1975); or even without any 
warrant, Perry v. State, 303 Ark. 100, 794 S.W.2d 141 (1990); Annotation, 
Validity, In State Criminal Trial, of Arrest Without Warrant by Identified Peace 
Officer Outside of Jurisdiction, When Not in Fresh Pursuit, 34 A.L.R.4th 328 
(1984).

     There is a separate 
subject that develops in cases of the officer's injury or a civil suit for false 
arrest where the arrest occurs outside of the municipal jurisdiction. Street v. 
Cherba, 662 F.2d 1037 (4th Cir. 1981); Drake v. Keeling, 230 Iowa 1038, 299 N.W. 919 (1941); Wilson v. Town of Mooresville, 222 N.C. 283, 22 S.E.2d 907 
(1942).

3      The Wyoming Supreme Court 
in accordance with the constitution, the statutes of the State of Wyoming, and 
under its plenary powers, has promulgated and adopted:

* * * * * *

     Wyoming Rules of 
Criminal Procedure for Justice Courts[.]

W.R.Cr.P.J.C. at 
263.

4      W.R.Cr.P.J.C. 
4(c)(2) goes on to provide that the warrant may be executed "at any place within 
the State of Wyoming when issued by the justices of the peace." The legislature 
has also granted statewide jurisdiction to county and justice of the peace 
courts, but not to municipal courts. "A warrant or summons issued by any justice 
of the peace court or county court based upon a complaint or information 
charging any criminal offense may be executed or served at any place within the 
jurisdiction of the state of Wyoming." W.S. 7-8-103(a).

5      We note that the 
municipal bench warrant issued for appellant is addressed to the municipal 
police, and to "any peace officer in the State of Wyoming." The issue is not 
presented for statutory interpretation to determine whether a deputy sheriff or 
other "peace officer" while acting within established jurisdiction could have 
lawfully made this arrest. See People v. Rowe, 95 Mich. App. 204, 289 N.W.2d 915 
(1980).