Case Title: Britt v. State

Citation: 180 N.E.2d 235, 242 Ind. 548

Docket Number: 30,111

State: indiana

Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Date: 1962-02-27T00:00:00Z

Document:
242 Ind. 548 (1962)
180 N.E.2d 235
BRITT
v.
STATE OF INDIANA.
No. 30,111.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
Filed February 27, 1962.
*550 John G. Bunner, of Evansville, for appellant.
Edwin K. Steers, Attorney General, and Carl E. Van Dorn, Deputy Attorney General, for appellee.
ARTERBURN, J.
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction of appellant of the crime of assault and battery with intent to kill under Burns' § 10-401a. Under the motion for a new trial the appellant claims error in the giving of instructions numbered 1, 2 and 4 by the court. Instruction number 1, with the objections thereto, reads as follows:
The objection is an indirect attack upon the affidavit and is not one directed to the instruction itself. The appellant in his brief contends that the instruction "is incomplete for the reason that the instruction tells the jury simply that they may presume malice and intent from the use of *551 a deadly weapon." The objection as made is not sufficient to sustain the points raised. Under Rule 1-7 of this court the objections must be specifically directed to the instruction itself. Allman v. Malsbury (1946), 224 Ind. 177, 65 N.E.2d 106.
Instruction number 2, with the objection thereto, is as follows:
The appellant contends that the instruction is bad because it omits the element of malice. The instruction *552 does not attempt to give the jury all the elements of the crime of assault and battery with intent to kill. It is basic that an instruction need not contain all the law on the subject. All instructions must be considered together. Ewbank's Indiana Criminal Law, Symmes Ed., Vol. 1, § 414.
This instruction does state that "the law transfers a previous felonious intent from the intended victim to the one upon whom the offense has been committed." (Our italics) The felonious intent referred to includes the malice and the elements necessary to make it felonious.
Instruction number 4, with these objections thereto, is as follows:
*553 Appellant's brief states that it is not contended that the search of the house and the arrest of the appellant after the shooting of the officer was illegal. "The question raised by appellant was whether or not officer Hoover was legally justified in entering appellant's house prior to the shooting." The evidence in this case shows that the appellant at the time of the alleged crime was under a restraining order from molesting his wife or entering the home where his wife lived, but nevertheless he broke into the home and the officer arrested him at the time at that place. He was in no position to object to the entry or search of his wife's home. We see no error in the instruction given. McCoy v. State (1960), 241 Ind. 104, 170 N.E.2d 43; Tyler v. State (1931), 202 Ind. 559, 177 N.E. 197; May v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 523, 112 N.E.2d 439.
The appellant made no motion to quash the affidavit but now questions the sufficiency of the charge by a motion in arrest of judgment.
It is contended that the Act of 1959, ch. 49, § 1, p. 119 did not contain a proper title, since the Act amended a prior Act by merely increasing the penalty. We feel there is no substance to such objection. The title of the Act reads: "An Act defining the crime of assault or assault and battery with intent to kill." The title of a legislative Act is not required to contain a complete abstract of the contents of the statute, and certainly the penalty involved is comprehended within the title of an Act defining a crime. State, P.R.R. Co., et al. v. Iroq. Cons. Dist. Ct. et al. (1956), 235 Ind. 353, 133 N.E.2d 848; Sarlls, City Clerk v. State ex rel. (1929), 201 Ind. 88, 166 N.E. 270, 67 A.L.R. 718; Tinder, *554 Pros. Atty., et al. v. Music Op. Inc. (1957), 237 Ind. 33, 142 N.E.2d 610.
The appellant further contends that the affidavit is insufficient because it does not allege "that the defendant did in any manner touch the person of the victim." However, the affidavit does allege that the appellant did "in a rude, insolent and angry manner shoot and wound" the victim. This is sufficient.
We need not give full consideration to these contentions for the reason that such points must be raised by a motion to quash rather than a motion in arrest of judgment. Although a defective affidavit may be held insufficient on a motion to quash, such a defect on a motion in arrest of judgment would be cured by verdict.
Finally, it is contended that State's Exhibit #3, which was a written confession of the appellant, was not voluntarily made and was admitted in evidence over the objections of appellant on that ground. The court heard evidence upon the question and the evidence is in *555 conflict. The appellant at one point testified that the confession was voluntarily given. The substance of his testimony was as follows:
Appellant in his brief admits that he was not threatened with physical violence, and all the officers deny that there were any threats of such a nature made. The appellant contends however, that he was unduly interrogated, yet by his own admissions he voluntarily made the statement. The court was the trier of the facts in this regard.
In Matthews v. State (1959), 239 Ind. 252, 255, 156 N.E.2d 387, 389, this court said:
The burden of showing a confession is incompetent is upon the defendant challenging it.
On appeal it is not our privilege to weigh the evidence. The trial court heard the witnesses and could determine better than we their credibility. The fact that a defendant does not have counsel at the time he gave a confession does not make it inadmissible or incompetent for that reason alone. Eiffe v. State (1948), 226 Ind. 57, 77 N.E.2d 750; May v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 523, 112 N.E.2d 439; Kelley v. State (1953), 231 Ind. 671, 110 N.E.2d 860.
We find no error committed by the trial court sufficient to warrant a reversal.
The judgment is affirmed.
Achor, C.J., and Bobbitt and Landis, JJ., concur.
Jackson, J., concurs in result.
NOTE.  Reported in 180 N.E.2d 235.