Case Title: Taylor v. State

Citation: 

Docket Number: 406, 2001

State: delaware

Court: Delaware Supreme Court

Date: 2002-04-17T00:00:00Z

Document:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
HENRY R. TAYLOR, JR.,
Defendant Below-
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF DELAWARE,
Plaintiff Below-
Appellee.
§
§
§  No. 406, 2001
§
§
§  Court Below—Superior Court
§  of the State of Delaware,
§  in and for New Castle County
§  Cr.A. No. IN89-06-0083
§
§
Submitted: March 15, 2002
  Decided:   April 17, 2002
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, WALSH and HOLLAND, Justices
O R D E R
This 17th day of April 2002, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal
and the record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1)
The defendant-appellant, Henry R. Taylor, Jr., filed this appeal
from the August 7, 2001 order of the Superior Court denying his motion for
postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.  We find
no merit to the appeal.  Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
(2)
In his appeal, Taylor claims that: a) the Superior Court abused
its discretion by failing to rule appropriately on all of the claims in his Rule
61 motion and by denying his motion for postconviction relief without an
1On March 27, 2002, after briefing was completed, Taylor filed a motion for
remand requesting an evidentiary hearing on the Superior Court’s jurisdiction to sentence
him as an habitual offender, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and the Superior
Court’s failure to address his postconviction motion in its entirety.  The motion is hereby
stricken as a non-conforming document.  SUPR. CT. R. 34.  
2DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4214(b) (2001).  Taylor had two prior convictions for
second degree burglary.
3Taylor v. State, Del. Supr., No. 500, 1989, Christie, C.J. (Mar. 18, 1991).
4Taylor v. State, Del. Supr., No. 265, 1994, Berger, J. (Dec. 7, 1994); Taylor v.
State, Del. Supr., No. 359, 1998, Walsh, J. (Feb. 23, 1999).
-2-
evidentiary hearing;1 and b) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance
by failing to reveal to the jury that the State had relied on perjured testimony
and by failing to provide to the jury the evidence that was promised in the
opening statement.
(3)
In 1989, Taylor was convicted by a Superior Court jury of
Burglary in the Second Degree.  He was sentenced to life imprisonment as an
habitual offender.2  On direct appeal, this Court affirmed Taylor’s conviction
and sentence.3  This Court also affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of
Taylor’s two subsequent motions for postconviction relief.4
(4)
Taylor’s claims of abuse of discretion on the part of the Superior
Court are unavailing.  While it is true that the Superior Court did not rule on
5Taylor claimed that he was denied an evidentiary hearing on his habitual offender
status and his plea colloquy was defective.
6Taylor v. State, Del. Supr., No. 359, 1998, Walsh, J. (Feb. 23, 1999); SUPER.
CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (4).
7SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(h) (1) and (3).
8SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (1).  The mandate was issued in May 1991 and Taylor’s
motion for postconviction relief was not filed until June 2001.
9SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (2).
-3-
two claims Taylor sought to add to his complaint,5 those claims had already
been adjudicated6 and, to the extent the Superior Court erroneously failed to
address them, such error was harmless.  The record further reflects that
Taylor’s remaining claims were addressed appropriately by the Superior Court
and, moreover, that the Superior Court was within its discretion to rule on
Taylor’s postconviction motion without an evidentiary hearing.7            
(5)
The Superior Court was also clearly correct in determining that
Taylor’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are procedurally barred.
Not only are the claims barred because they were asserted beyond the 3-year
period permitted under Rule 61,8 they are also barred because they either
were not raised in Taylor’s previous postconviction motions9 or were formerly
10SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (4).
11SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 61(i) (2), (4) and (5).
-4-
adjudicated10 and there is no basis upon which to excuse the procedural
default.11 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the
Superior Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
   s/Joseph T. Walsh
     Justice