Case Title: Operation Save America v. City of Jackson

Citation: 

Docket Number: S-11-0149

State: wyoming

Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Date: 2012-04-10T00:00:00Z

Document:
OPERATION SAVE AMERICA v. THE CITY OF JACKSON2012 WY 51Case Number: S-11-0149Decided: 04/10/2012This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.  Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the permanent volume.  
APRIL 
TERM, A.D. 2012
 
OPERATION 
SAVE AMERICA,Appellant (Defendant),v.THE CITY OF 
JACKSON, a Wyoming municipal corporation,Appellee 
(Plaintiff).
 
Appeal 
from the District Court of Teton County
The 
Honorable Timothy C. Day, Judge 
 
Representing 
Appellant:
Jack 
D. Edwards of Edwards Law Office, P.C., Etna, Wyoming
 
Representing 
Appellee:
Audrey 
P. Cohen-Davis of The City of Jackson, Jackson, Wyoming
 
 
Before 
KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, 
JJ.
 
GOLDEN, 
J., delivers the opinion of the Court; KITE, C.J., files a dissenting opinion in 
which HILL, J., joins.
 
GOLDEN, 
Justice.
 
[¶1]      The Town of 
Jackson applied to the district court for an ex parte temporary restraining 
order (TRO) against Operation Save America (OSA), an anti-abortion protest 
group.  The Town sought to restrict 
OSA’s demonstration activities in and around the Jackson Town Square during the 
Boy Scouts’ 2011 annual Elk Fest.  
The district court granted the ex parte TRO, which enjoined OSA “from 
assembling on the Jackson Town Square without a permit or holding posters/signs 
or materials of any graphic nature (e.g., aborted fetus pictures) on the Town 
Square or within a two (2) block radius thereof . . . during the Boy Scouts of 
America Expo and Elk Antler Auction between 5:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on Saturday, 
May 21, 2011.”
 
[¶2]      We find that the 
ex parte TRO was issued in violation of the First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution and Rule 65 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure and 
reverse.
 
ISSUES
 
[¶3]      Both parties 
present numerous procedural and substantive issues for our review.  Appellant, OSA, frames the issues as 
follows:
 
1.         
The district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to issue an 
ex parte temporary protection 
order.
 
a.         
The City of Jackson did not have standing to pursue an ex parte temporary protection order 
against Operation Save America.
 
i.          
The Plaintiff did not allege a potential injury to the Plaintiff or a 
potential violation of Plaintiff’s rights.
 
b.         
The Order Granting Temporary 
Restraining Order was issued ex 
parte and not issued during any litigation.  W.S. § 1-28-102.
 
i.          
Thus no claim for relief had been stated therefore no possible way to 
prevail upon the merits of the case.
 
c.         
There was no attempt to give notice to the defendants of the ex parte Petition for Temporary Restraining Order 
and/or Injunction pursuant to W.R.C.P. 65(b)(2) nor any showing made that it 
is impossible to serve or notify the opposing parties and to give them an 
opportunity to participate in an adversary proceeding pursuant to Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 
(1968).
 
d.         
The Court did not address nor require the posting of a security pursuant 
to W.R.C.P. 65(c).
 
2.         
The district court did not have personal jurisdiction over the 
defendants.
 
a.         
No summons and no complaint were served upon the defendants at any 
time.
 
3.         
The restrictions outlined in the Order Granting Temporary Restraining 
Order are in violation of Art. I, § 21 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.
 
4.         
The restrictions outlined in the Order Granting Temporary Restraining 
Order are in violation of the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.  

 
[¶4]      Appellee, the 
Town of Jackson, presents the issues as follows:
 
1.         
Whether there is a direct appeal from the ex parte Order Granting Temporary Restraining 
Order initially issued by the District Court.
 
1.         
A temporary restraining order differs from an 
injunction.
 
2.         
There should be no direct appeal from this Order Granting Temporary Restraining 
Order.
 
2.         
Whether an appeal from this validly issued Order Granting Temporary Restraining 
Order is moot because it expired on its own terms and no motion to vacate or 
set aside, motion to extend terms of Order Granting Temporary Restraining 
Order or a preliminary injunction issued.
 
1.         
The Order Granting Temporary 
Restraining Order was validly and properly issued pursuant to W.R.C.P. 
65(b).
 
2.         
The Order Granting Temporary 
Restraining Order expired on its own terms w/in time set for rule and no 
motion to vacate or set aside, motion to extend terms of temporary restraining 
order or preliminary injunction issued.
 
3.         
Whether the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction to issue the 
ex parte Temporary Restraining Order 
pursuant to W.R.C.P. 65 and W.S. § 15-1-103(a) (xviii).
 
1.         
The Town of Jackson had standing to pursue an ex parte temporary 
restraining order against Operation Save America.
 
2.         
The Order Granting Temporary 
Restraining Order was issued ex parte pursuant to W.R.C.P. 65(b), which does 
not require that it be issued during a current litigation.
 
3.         
W.R.C.P. 65(b)(2) is the relevant evaluation for a temporary restraining 
order and standing.
 
4.         
The Court did not need to address or require the posting of a security 
pursuant to W.R.C.P. 65(c).
 
a.         
A bond is not necessary where the only damages are those that lie in 
tort.
 
b.         
Under W.R.C.P. 65(c), the Court’s discretion as to whether a bond should 
issue is best analyzed under the “as the court deems proper” language of 
65(c).
 
4.         
Whether the District Court had personal jurisdiction over the Defendant, 
Operation Save America.
 
5.         
Whether the restrictions outlined in the Order Granting Temporary Restraining 
Order were in violation of Art. I, § 21 of the Wyoming 
Constitution.
 
6.         
Whether the restrictions outlined in the Order Granting Temporary Restraining 
Order were in violation of the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
United States Constitution.
 
1.         
The Order Granting Temporary 
Restraining Order was a content neutral reasonable time, place and manner 
restriction within the regulatory powers of the Town.
 
2.         
Even if the restrictions in the Order Granting Temporary Restraining 
Order [against OSA] are deemed content-based, they still meet the strict 
scrutiny standard.
 
a.         
The issuance of the Order Granting 
Temporary Restraining Order against OSA is distinguishable from Lefemine because the TRO meets the 
strict scrutiny test.
 
3.         
The argument that the Order 
Granting Temporary Restraining Order or the Town violated OSA’s Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights is untenable.
 
FACTS
 
[¶5]      OSA is an 
anti-abortion organization incorporated under the laws of Texas.  Approximately twenty of its members 
arrived in Jackson, Wyoming, on Wednesday, May 18, 2011.  The group’s purpose in coming to Jackson 
was to protest against Dr. Brent Blue and his clinic, which clinic OSA reported 
to be the only one in Wyoming performing abortions.  
 
[¶6]      At 7:00 on the 
morning of Wednesday, May 18th, OSA began its demonstrations by assembling at 
the Jackson Hole High School and Jackson Hole Middle School.  The group handed out flyers calling Dr. 
Blue a “killer” and showing photographs of an aborted fetus.  It also held up large photographs, 
approximately four-feet by four-feet, of disfigured and aborted fetus 
images.  In one incident, an OSA 
member boarded an occupied school bus, showed the grade school age children the 
aborted fetus images and asked them if they knew that Dr. Blue is a 
“killer.”  
 
[¶7]      Robert Gilliam, 
Operations Lieutenant for the Jackson Police Department, described the public 
response to the demonstrations and his interactions with 
OSA:
 
8.         
Since Wednesday morning, the group has consistently demonstrated 
throughout the Town of Jackson showing the same graphic photographs.  The group has refused repeated requests 
from me and other law enforcement officials to remove these graphic 
photographs.  This came after police 
received several hundred phone calls, emails, personal visits and face to face 
complaints from citizens who see the photographs as obscene and 
offensive.
 
9.         
I have personally had direct contact with more than 40 citizens who have 
complained to me that the photographs displayed by this group are grossly 
offensive and obscene.  Many of 
these citizens have had tears in their eyes and were extremely upset after 
viewing the photographs; some appeared traumatized.
 
10.       The police 
department, sheriff’s office and the Town of Jackson have all fielded many calls 
and complaints from parents whose children have been forced to view these 
graphic photographs displayed by the Operation Save America group.  The conversations that I have had with 
their leaders, including Pastor Mark Hollick and Mr. Chet Gallagher, regarding 
the graphic signs have been cordial, but matter-of-fact like.  They acknowledge the signs are graphic 
and offend most people, but that is their intent.  They wish to “shock” the public into 
taking their side on the abortion debate in this country.
 
* 
* * * 
 
13.       
Additionally, the group[’]s presence in Jackson has sparked a sizable 
group of counter demonstrators.  On 
Friday, May 20, a counter demonstrator upset after viewing the graphic 
photographs, attempted to strike with his vehicle one of the Operation Save 
America members who was holding one of the graphic photographs.  The driver was arrested and charged with 
aggravated assault. 
 
[¶8]      During the same 
week that OSA was demonstrating in Jackson, the Boy Scouts of America were 
planning to hold their annual Elk Fest in the Jackson Town Square.  The Boy Scouts had, on March 30, 2011, 
applied for and received a permit for the exclusive use of the Town Square for 
the event’s festivities to be held on Saturday, May 21st.  The planned activities were scheduled 
from 5:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. that day, and they included various booths for 
family activities, a Boy Scout Expo and Demonstrations, a Rotary Private Antler 
Sale, the Boy Scout Antler Auction, and a Jackson Youth Baseball food tent.  Approximately two hundred Boy Scouts 
between the ages of seven and fourteen were expected to attend the event.  
 
[¶9]      At some point 
between Wednesday, May 18th, and Friday, May 20th, Lieutenant Gilliam asked 
Pastor Mark Hollick and Chet Gallagher of OSA to refrain from displaying the 
graphic photographs at the Boy Scout event.  Pastor Hollick and Mr. Gallagher 
responded that OSA reserved its right to display the photographs in any public 
setting.  
 
[¶10]   On Friday, May 20, 2011, at 3:29 in 
the afternoon, the Town filed in district court a Petition for Temporary 
Restraining Order and/or Temporary Injunction (Petition).  The Petition requested an order 
restricting protestors and counter-protestors from protesting during the Elk 
Fest between 5:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on Saturday, May 21, 2011, within two 
blocks in any direction from the Town Square.  In support of the Petition, the Town 
stated, in part:
 
9.         
The Town submits that it is a compelling interest to protect the 200(+) 
children and Boy Scouts attending the Elk Fest from being exposed to protestors 
holding and displaying large signs containing pictures of dismembered, aborted 
fetuses, or counter-protestors[’] similar shocking and graphic materials.  (See Lieutenant Bob Gilliam Affidavit 
attached hereto as Exhibit B.)
 
* 
* * * 
 
13.       As set 
forth in the Affidavit of Robert Gilliam attached as Exhibit B, it clearly 
appears that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or damage will result to the 
children of the Town at tomorrow’s Elk Fest.  Moreover, the Jackson Police Department 
has informed Defendant representatives of the Town’s position concerning this 
specific location at this specific time, and they disagree.  Undersigned counsel certifies to this 
court that she personally has not made any efforts to notify the Defendants of 
this temporary injunction due to the hostility of the current situation, 
contrary position of Defendant representatives and the immediate need for 
injunctive relief by this court before tomorrow morning at 
5am.
 
* 
* * * 
 
17.       There will 
be no harm to the Defendant and counter-protest groups because they can protest 
in other public places within the Town during the Elk Fest.  To the contrary, the harm suffered by 
children being exposed to the constant and continuous shocking graphic materials 
during the Elk Fest is enormous and there is no way to place an actual value on 
such damage to over 200 children and they are speculative.  (See Lieutenant Bob Gilliam Affidavit 
attached hereto as Exhibit B.)  
Thus, equitable relief is appropriate.  (Emphasis in original.) 

 
18.       Finally, 
there is a substantial and significant public interest in protecting children 
and Boy Scouts who have been granted a special event permit for exclusive use of 
the Town Square, from large displays of graphic materials during such event and 
during the requested hours.  The 
public interest in preventing such injustice is enormous. 
 
[¶11]   The district court granted the 
Petition, and at 8:43 p.m. on Friday, May 20th, it issued an Order Granting 
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).  
In issuing the TRO, the court did not include counter-protestors in its 
coverage, noting:
 
            
In the body of the petition, Plaintiff has sought to include 
“counter-protestors” in the Temporary Restraining Order.  However, the group has not been named as 
a party.  The Court has not found 
sufficient evidence in the accompanying affidavit of immediate or irreparable 
injury that would justify the inclusion of any counter-protestors in the 
Temporary Restraining Order. 
 
[¶12]   The district court found that the 
Town had made the requisite showing for the TRO to issue ex 
parte.
 
With 
respect to element (1), the Court finds that Plaintiff has made a sufficient 
showing of immediate and irreparable injury.  More specifically, the Court finds, and 
it has been averred by affidavit, that irreparable injury would follow from the 
children being exposed to the constant and continuous shocking graphic materials 
of the protestors, and also from the threat of public disturbance, breach of 
peace and violence.
 
Regarding 
element (2), Plaintiff has certified its efforts and reasons why notice should 
not be required.  The Jackson Police 
Department has informed representatives of Operation Save America of the Town’s 
position with respect to its planned protest at the Town Square during the Boy 
Scout event, and the group has continued to assert its intention of protesting 
on the Square at that time.  In 
light of the hostility of the current situation and the immediate need for 
injunctive relief, the applicant’s attorney has informed the Court that she has 
not attempted to notify the Defendant of this temporary injunction.  Further, the Court has not provided 
notice to Defendant because this Order is being issued after business hours on 
May 20, 2011 without time for a hearing before the scheduled event.  
 
[¶13]   After concluding it could issue the 
order ex parte, the district court then analyzed the proposed restriction under 
First Amendment constraints.  The 
court did not explicitly find that the restriction was content-based and 
intended to restrict speech in a traditional public forum, but it nonetheless 
applied the strict scrutiny required for that type of restriction.  It concluded:
 
[T]here 
is a compelling interest to protect the two hundred plus children and Boy Scouts 
attending the Elk Fest from being exposed to protestors holding and displaying 
large signs containing pictures of aborted fetuses.  Further, the Court finds that the Town’s 
proposed restriction is narrowly tailored to protect and serve that compelling 
state interest in that it is restricting Operation Save America from its protest 
activities for a limited number of hours within a limited geographic area in the 
Town of Jackson.  

 
[¶14]   Based on its findings, the district 
court granted the TRO in the form that the Town requested.  The TRO restricted OSA as 
follows:
 
            
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant is enjoined from assembling on the 
Jackson Town Square without a permit or holding posters/signs or materials of 
any graphic nature (e.g., aborted fetus pictures) on the Town Square or within a 
two (2) block radius thereof, that is, not within the two square block 
area:
 
            
north of Pearl Avenue,
            
west of Willow Street,
            
south of Gill Avenue,
            
and east of Milward Street
 
during 
the Boy Scouts of America Expo and Elk Antler Auction between 5:00 a.m. and 5:00 
p.m. on Saturday, May 21, 2011.  

 
[¶15]   The Boy Scout event went forward as 
scheduled, and the TRO expired by its own terms at the conclusion of the event 
at 5:00 p.m. on May 21, 2011.  On 
May 27, 2011, OSA filed its Notice of Appeal.  
 
STANDARD 
OF REVIEW
 
[¶16]   Jurisdictional questions are legal 
issues that this Court reviews de 
novo.  Dawes v. State, 2010 WY 113, ¶ 10, 236 P.3d 303, 306 (Wyo. 2010) (subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law 
considered de novo, without regard to 
the district court determination); Meyer 
v. Hatto, 2008 WY 153, ¶ 14, 198 P.3d 552, 555 (Wyo. 2008) (“The question of 
whether personal jurisdiction can properly be exercised in Wyoming is therefore 
a question of law to be reviewed de 
novo.”); Northfork Citizens for 
Responsible Dev. v. Park Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 2008 WY 88, ¶ 6, 189 P.3d 260, 262 (Wyo. 2008) (quoting Halliburton 
Energy Services, Inc. v. Gunter, 
2007 WY 151, ¶ 10, 167 P.3d 645, 649 (Wyo. 2007)) 
(“The existence of standing is a legal issue that we 
review de novo.”). 
 
[¶17]   Constitutional challenges present 
issues of law that we likewise review de 
novo.  Sanderson v. State, 2007 WY 127, ¶ 31, 
165 P.3d 83, 92 (Wyo. 2007); Rutti v. 
State, 2004 WY 133, ¶ 9, 100 P.3d 394, 400 (Wyo. 
2004).
 
[¶18]   Actions for injunctive relief are 
by nature requests for equitable relief within the district court’s 
discretion.  CBM Geosolutions, Inc. v. Gas Sensing Tech. 
Corp., 2009 WY 113, ¶ 10, 215 P.3d 1054, 1058 (Wyo. 2009); In re Kite Ranch, LLC v. Powell Family of 
Yakima, LLC, 2008 WY 39, ¶ 21, 181 P.3d 920, 926 (Wyo. 2008).  Because the 
district court’s decision is discretionary, we review its decision for an abuse 
of discretion, keeping in mind that an injunction “is an extreme remedy and the 
court should 'proceed with caution and deliberation before exercising the 
remedy.’”  Kite Ranch, ¶ 21, 181 P.3d  at 926 
(quoting Rialto 
Theatre, Inc. v. Commonwealth Theatres, Inc., 
714 P.2d 328, 332 (Wyo. 1986)).  “Judicial 
discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from 
objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is 
right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or 
capriciously.”  Wilson v. Lucerne Canal & Power Co., 
2003 WY 126, ¶ 11, 77 P.3d 412, 416 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting Pasenelli 
v. Pasenelli, 
2002 WY 159, ¶ 11, 57 P.3d 324, 329 (Wyo. 2002)).
 
[¶19]   In evaluating a court’s exercise of 
discretion in the grant or denial of injunctive relief, this Court has 
observed:
 
In 
Kincheloe 
v. Milatzo, 
Wyo., 678 P.2d 855, 861 (1984), 
we said:
 
“Preliminarily, 
it is to be remembered that, when courts are called upon to employ their 
injunctive authority, they must utilize this power with great caution. We have 
said:
 
“ 
'The extraordinary remedy of an injunction is a far-reaching force and must not 
be indulged in under hastily contrived conditions. It is a delicate judicial 
power and a court must proceed with caution and deliberation before exercising 
the remedy.’ Simpson 
v. Petroleum, Inc., 
Wyo., 548 P.2d 1, 3 (1976).
 
“Injunctions 
are extraordinary remedies and are not granted as of right. In granting an 
injunction, the court exercises broad, equitable jurisdiction. Brown 
v. J.C. Penney Co., 
D.C.Wyo., 54 F. Supp. 488 (1943). 
This discretion is, however, not unfettered, but 'must be exercised reasonably 
and in harmony with well established principles.’ 43 
C.J.S. Injunctions § 14 P. 772.” 

 
In 
re Adoption of RHA, 
702 P.2d 1259, 1266 (Wyo. 1985).
 
DISCUSSION
 
I.          
Mootness
 
[¶20]   The Town contends that OSA’s appeal 
should be dismissed as moot because the event in which OSA desired to 
demonstrate has already occurred and the TRO has expired.  Thus, the Town reasons, a decision by 
this Court can have no effect on the controversy and the matter is moot.  We disagree.  Because the present controversy is one 
of great public importance and is capable of repetition yet evading review, we 
conclude that OSA’s appeal is not moot.
 
[¶21]   The doctrine of mootness considers 
whether a justiciable controversy remains between the parties.  In re Guardianship of MEO, 2006 WY 87, ¶ 
27, 138 P.3d 1145, 1153 (Wyo. 2006).  
“A court should not hear a case where there 
has been a change in circumstances occurring either before or after a case has 
been filed that eliminates the controversy.”  Id. (quoting  Southwestern 
Pub. Serv. Co. v. Thunder Basin Coal Co., 
978 P.2d 1138, 1143 (Wyo. 1999)).  We have explained:
 
The 
doctrine of mootness encompasses those circumstances which destroy a previously 
justiciable controversy. This doctrine represents the time element of standing 
by requiring that the interests of the parties which were originally sufficient 
to confer standing persist throughout the duration of the suit. Thus, the 
central question in a mootness case is “whether decision of a once living 
dispute continues to be justified by a sufficient prospect that the decision 
will have an impact on the parties.”
 
MEO, 
¶ 27, 138 P.3d  at 1153-54 (quoting Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 978 P.2d at 
1143); see also In re AJ, 736 P.2d 721, 723 (Wyo. 1987) 
(“Courts do not sit for the purpose of expounding the 
law upon abstract questions, but to determine the rights of litigants by the 
rendition of effective judgment.”).
 
[¶22]   The rule that a case must be 
dismissed when it becomes moot is not absolute.  If a case presents an issue of great 
public importance or interest, we may rule on the issue even if the dispute is 
technically moot.  Merchant v. Wyo. Dep’t of Corrections, 
2007 WY 159, ¶ 17, 168 P.3d 856, 863 (Wyo. 2007); Bd. of Trustees of Fremont Cty. Sch. Dist. 
No. 25 v. BM, 2006 WY 23, ¶ 3, 129 P.3d 317, 319 (Wyo. 2006); In 
re RM, 
2004 WY 162, ¶ 8, 102 P.3d 868, 871 (Wyo. 2004).  Likewise, we 
have ruled on matters, otherwise moot, where we deemed it necessary to provide 
guidance to state agencies and to produce uniformity in the decisions of the 
district courts, pursuant to our “general superintending control” of all 
district courts.  Morad v. Wyo. Highway Dep’t, 66 Wyo. 12, 
21, 203 P.2d 954, 957 (Wyo. 1949) (reviewing drivers license revocation after 
license reinstated); see also RM, ¶ 8, 102 P.3d  at 871 (“[T]his action 
presents this court with the opportunity to consider the constitution in a 
manner not considered before and is of sufficient importance to warrant a full 
discussion.”); Wyo. Dep’t of Revenue 
& Taxation v. Andrews, 671 P.2d 1239, 1245 (Wyo. 1983) (reviewing moot 
drivers license suspension because it raised “a significant question of public 
interest and importance which could be of a continuing nature, and because of 
its importance with respect to the enforcement of this state’s motor vehicle 
code”).  We have 
stated:
 
In 
Wyoming 
Bd. of Outfitters and Professional Guides v. Clark, 
2002 WY 24, ¶ 15, 39 P.3d 1106, 1109 (Wyo. 2002), 
we dismissed an appeal for mootness where a present ruling could have no effect 
upon a professional license whose temporal life had passed. Certainly the same 
could be said here, where a license to practice clinical social work from 2000 
to 2002 “would be of no practical value to” the appellant. See 
Walker 
v. Board of County Com’rs, Albany County, 
644 P.2d 772, 773-74 (Wyo. 1982) 
(“[a] cause will not be considered when a judgment rendered cannot be carried 
into effect.”). We do not, however, follow this rule blindly and will, despite 
mootness caused by the passage of time, consider issues that may continue to 
arise or are of special significance. Lineberger 
v. Wyoming State Bd. of Outfitters and Professional Guides, 
2002 WY 55, ¶ 1, 44 P.3d 56, 57 (Wyo. 2002) 
(authority of Board to impose conditions on a license); Andrews, 
671 P.2d  at 1244-45 
(questions of sufficient public interest and of a continuing 
nature).
 
            
We find the instant case to be similar to Lineberger and 
Andrews. In particular, the issues of whether an expert must establish 
the standard of care, and whether notice may be accomplished through the State’s 
disclosure statement, have broad application beyond the specific facts of this 
case and are worthy of being addressed. Furthermore, licensing issues are 
peculiarly likely to evade judicial review due to their temporal nature. We will 
not, therefore, dismiss this appeal despite the fact that the issues could, 
technically, be moot. Instead, we will address the issues raised by the 
parties.
 
Penny 
v. Wyo. Mental Health Professions Licensing Bd., 
2005 WY 117, ¶¶ 3-4, 120 P.3d 152, 157 (Wyo. 2005).  

 
[¶23]   An additional exception applies to 
disputes that by their nature may conclude before this Court has an opportunity 
to rule.  If a case presents a 
“controversy capable of repetition yet evading review,” we may rule on the 
matter despite its technical mootness.  
Merchant, ¶ 17, 168 P.3d  at 
863; MEO, ¶ 28, 138 P.3d  at 1154; BM, ¶ 3, 129 P.3d  at 319.  

[¶24]   Our mootness exceptions illustrate 
that Wyoming’s mootness doctrine, like that of many other states, is prudential 
rather than constitutionally based.  
See Matthew I. Hall, The Partially Prudential Doctrine of 
Mootness, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 562, 567 n.14 (2009) (“State courts, whose 
jurisdiction is not, of course, governed by Article III, are similarly reluctant 
to hear moot cases, but generally treat their mootness doctrines as prudential, 
and will hear moot cases when the public interest warrants.”); see also Robert B. Keiter, Tim Newcomb, 
The Wyoming State Constitution: A 
Reference Guide 141 (2011) (“Significantly, this section [Article 5, Section 
2 of the Wyoming Constitution] –  
unlike Article III in the U.S. Constitution – does not limit the Wyoming 
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction to 'cases’ or 'controversies.’”).  Consistent with the differences between 
federal court authority to decide matters and the authority of this Court, we 
have developed a body of case law governing justiciability that is independent 
of federal requirements.  See William F. West Ranch, LLC v. Tyrrell, 
2009 WY 62, ¶ 12 n.2, 206 P.3d 722, 727 n.2 (Wyo. 2009).  Thus, while we may look to federal case 
law for guidance, and our law is similar to federal precedent in many respects, 
that federal case law is not binding on this Court.  Id.  
 
A.        
Matter of Great Public Importance
 
[¶25]   Whether a case presents a question 
of great importance is a determination to be made by this Court.  RM, ¶ 8, 102 P.3d  at 871; Jolley v. State Loan and Inv. Bd., 2002 
WY 7, ¶ 10, 38 P.3d 1073, 1078 (Wyo. 2002); Brimmer v. Thomson, 521 P.2d 574, 578 
(Wyo. 1974).  We have 
stated:
 
This 
exception must be applied with caution and its exercise must be a matter where 
strict standards are applied to avoid the temptation to apply the judge’s own 
beliefs and philosophies to a determination of what questions are of great 
public importance.
 
Jolley, 
¶ 10, 38 P.3d  at 1078 (quoting Brimmer, 521 P.2d at 578).  
 
[¶26]   That the case before us is one that 
presents an issue of great public importance and interest is a determination 
readily made without reference to personal beliefs or philosophies.  As a starting point, the case concerns a 
fundamental constitutional right, the First Amendment right to free speech. See RM, ¶ 8, 102 P.3d  at 871 (addressing 
fundamental right to education as issue of great public importance in an 
otherwise moot student expulsion case); Brimmer, 521 P.2d  at 578 (addressing 
fundamental right to vote as issue of great public importance).  Moreover, the constitutional issue is 
presented in the context of a topic that is of public interest and importance on 
both a national level and local level, that is, the topic of abortion 
rights.
 
[¶27]   Among the issues in the United 
States today that are divisive and inflammatory, none is so hotly debated as 
that of abortion.  On the national 
stage, the issue is front and center in the halls of Congress, on the political 
campaign trail, and in many state legislatures.  See Leigh Ann Caldwell, Democrats Attack Romney for Saying He Wanted 
to “Get Rid” of Planned Parenthood, CBS News Political Hotsheet (March 14, 
2012); Lucy Madson, Virginia Gov. Bob 
McDonnell Signs Virginia Ultrasound Bill, CBS News Political Hotsheet (March 
7, 2012) (Virginia bill requiring women to undergo transvaginal ultrasound prior 
to having abortion “sparked national debate this month”); Stephanie Condon, Abortion Funding Showdown Escalates, CBS 
News Political Hotsheet (Feb. 8, 2011).  
On the Wyoming stage, the issue continues to attract attention in the 
state legislature and in the state capitol building.  See Joan Barron, WyWatch Sues Wyoming Over Anti-Abortion 
Display, http://trib.com (Jan. 5, 2012); Abortion Bill Fails in Wyoming Senate, 
http://trib.com (Feb. 26, 2011); Ben Neary, Wyoming House Rejects Abortion Bill, 
http://trib.com (Jan. 26, 2011).  
Indeed, contending that the abortion issue is not one of great public 
interest and importance is as unsupportable as contending that the Earth is flat 
or the sun rises in the west and sets in the east.
 
[¶28]   The issue of abortion has polarized 
mainstream political parties and energized all manner of public interest groups 
who align with pro-life advocates on the one side and pro-choice advocates on 
the other.  Each side seeks to 
influence public opinion and to attain legal support for its position – in 
legislative halls and in the courts.  
The debate is ubiquitous and abundant.  The topic of abortion incites like no 
other issue in this country today.  
It divides the nation, our religions, our families, our politics, and our 
society.  The issue arouses deep 
passions that find full expression in open and public debate that gives all 
participants the satisfaction of a fair and full hearing.
 
[¶29]   Without resort to personal beliefs 
or philosophies, the case presently before this Court presents issues of great 
public interest and importance.  
They are issues that deserve a ruling from this 
Court.
 
B.        
Capable of Repetition Yet Evading Review
 
[¶30]   In addition to finding this case 
reviewable under the foregoing exception to mootness, we also find this dispute 
to be one that is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”  Under the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness, two 
requirements must be met:  “First, 
the duration of the challenged action must be too short for completion of 
litigation prior to its cessation or expiration. Second, there must be a 
reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subjected to the 
same action again.”  MEO, ¶ 28, 138 P.3d  at 1154 (quoting 
Grant 
v. Meyer, 
828 F.2d 1446, 1449 (10th Cir. 1987)).  
 
[¶31]   In this case, there can be little 
question that the first requirement is met.  The TRO expired within twenty-one hours 
of its issuance, and a temporary restraining order by rule must expire within 
ten days.  See W.R.C.P. 65(b).  As the Texas Supreme Court explained, 
temporary restraining orders that impose prior restraints on free speech at 
planned events are by nature short-lived and evade review.  Iranian Muslim Org. v. City of San 
Antonio, 615 S.W.2d 202, 209 (Tex. 1981).  It is likely that if the controversy 
were to arise again, an order would issue, the event would pass, and the order 
would expire, again concluding the controversy before full litigation of the 
matter could run its course.
 
[¶32]   The second prong of the test 
considers whether a reasonable expectation exists 
that the same complaining party will be subjected to the same action again.  The United States Supreme Court has in 
some circumstances held that the burden is on the party asserting mootness to 
“establish that there is no reasonable likelihood that the wrong will be 
repeated.”  Iron Arrow Honor Soc’y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 72, 104 S. Ct. 373, 375, 78 L. Ed. 2d 58 (1983); see also Wilkinson v. Forst, 591 F. Supp. 403, 410 
(D. Conn. 1984) (defendant failed to meet mootness burden in challenge to 
expired court order requiring weapons search of persons attending KKK rally 
where defendant failed to show no reasonable likelihood of additional 
rallies).  In other cases, the 
Supreme Court has placed the burden on the party asserting a live controversy to 
make the required showing.  City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 1669, 75 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1983) (plaintiff must show “he 
will again be subjected to the alleged illegality”).  
 
[¶33]   In either allocation of the burden 
of proof, the Court’s decisions have varied on what is required to show that a 
dispute is capable of repetition:
 
We 
believe the dissent overstates the stringency of the “capable of repetition” 
test. Although Justice SCALIA equates “reasonable expectation” with 
“demonstrated probability,” the very case he cites for this proposition 
described these standards in the disjunctive, see Murphy 
v. Hunt, 
455 U.S. [478], at 482, 102 S.Ct. [1181], at 1183, 1184 
(“[T]here must be a 'reasonable expectation’ or a 'demonstrated 
probability’ that the same controversy will recur” (emphasis added)), and in 
numerous cases decided both before and since Hunt we have found 
controversies capable of repetition based on expectations that, while 
reasonable, were hardly demonstrably probable. See, e.g., 
Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Maintenance 
of Way Employ[e]es, 
481 U.S. 429, 436, n. 4, 107 S. Ct. 1841, 1846, n. 4, 95 L. Ed. 2d 381 
(1987) 
(parties “reasonably likely” to find themselves in future disputes over 
collective-bargaining agreement); California 
Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 
480 U.S. 572, 578, 107 S. Ct. 1419, 1424, 94 L. Ed. 2d 577 
(1987) 
(O’CONNOR, J.) (“likely” that respondent would again submit mining plans that 
would trigger contested state permit requirement); Press-Enterprise 
Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., Riverside County, 
478 U.S. 1, 6, 106 S. Ct. 2735, 2739, 92 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1986) 
(“It can reasonably be assumed” that newspaper publisher will be subjected to 
similar closure order in the future); Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court of Norfolk County, 
457 U.S. 596, 603, 102 S. Ct. 2613, 2618, 73 L. Ed. 2d 248 
(1982) 
(same); United 
States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 
445 U.S. 388, 398, 100 S. Ct. 1202, 1210, 63 L. Ed. 2d 479 
(1980) 
(case not moot where litigant “faces some likelihood of becoming involved in 
same controversy in the future”) (dicta). Our concern in these cases, as in all 
others involving potentially moot claims, was whether the controversy was 
capable of repetition and not, as the dissent seems to insist, whether 
the claimant had demonstrated that a recurrence of the dispute was more probable 
than not. 
 
Honig 
v. Doe, 
484 U.S. 305, 319 n.6, 108 S. Ct. 592, 602 n.6, 98 L. Ed. 2d 686 
(1988).
 
[¶34]   Our Court has not assigned the 
burden of proof on this question or established a showing more stringent than 
the requirement that the record establish a “reasonable expectation” that the 
dispute is capable of repetition.  
See, e.g., MEO, ¶ 28, 138 P.3d  at 1154 (recurrence 
of dispute “not outside the realm of reasonable possibility”); Penny, ¶ 3, 120 P.3d  at 157 (issue that 
“may continue to arise”); Bd. of Cty. 
Comm’rs for Sublette Cty. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 2002 WY 151, ¶ 18, 55 P.3d 714, 720 (Wyo. 2002) (issue “likely to arise in other cases”); Andrews, 671 P.2d  at 1245 (question 
“could be of a continuing nature”).  
We believe that in this case it would be particularly unfair to place the 
burden on OSA to make a record that the dispute is capable of repetition, given 
that the TRO was issued in this matter without notice to OSA or an opportunity 
for it to be heard.  There was 
simply no point in these proceedings at which OSA could have submitted evidence 
on the likelihood that this dispute is capable of 
repetition.
 
[¶35]   We are satisfied, based on the 
evidence in the limited record before this Court, that there is a reasonable 
expectation this dispute will recur.  
The affidavit supporting the Town’s Petition for the TRO stated that OSA 
targeted Jackson, Wyoming, with a stated intention to “[s]hut down the last 
abortionist in Wyoming.”   The 
affidavit also reported incidents from which it may be inferred, and from which 
the Town has argued, that the group intentionally targets children as the 
audience for its graphic demonstrations.  
These facts, even without specifically identified OSA plans to again 
protest in Jackson, establish a reasonable expectation, beyond mere speculation, 
that OSA will continue its efforts and approach in Jackson, Wyoming.  See Christian Knights 
of Ku Klux Klan Invisible Empire, Inc. v. Dist. of Columbia, 972 F.2d 365, 370-71 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (finding it 
unnecessary to have evidence of definite Klan plans to march in the district – 
mootness exception does not require imminent repetition, and “[w]e are confident 
that eventually [the KKK] will make its way into the city again”).    
 
[¶36]   On the question of how the Town 
might respond under the same or similar circumstances, we have no indication it 
would approach the situation differently.  
The record contains no evidence, and this Court has received no 
information, either at oral argument or through additional submissions, that the 
Town has taken formal steps to adopt measures which would address similar future 
occurrences in a content-neutral, constitutionally permissible manner.  See, e.g., the cases cited in footnote 
two of this opinion, describing content-neutral measures a government may take 
to address concerns like those raised by the Town.  Under these circumstances, where the 
policy debate over abortion continues, where OSA’s approach remains the same, 
and where the Town’s approach remains the same, we conclude there is a 
sufficient likelihood that the controversy will recur.  See, e.g., Grider v. 
Abramson, 994 F. Supp. 840, 843 n.4 (W.D. 
Ky. 1998) (action challenging police procedures at KKK rally not moot even 
though rally already held where future rallies expected and police procedures 
remain unchanged).
 
[¶37]   The Supreme Court reasoned 
similarly in the First Amendment case of Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 
427 U.S. 539, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 49 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1976).  In that case, a Nebraska state trial 
judge, to protect a multiple-murder defendant’s right to a fair trial, entered a 
restraining order barring news media from publishing or broadcasting alleged 
confessions or admissions made by the defendant to law enforcement officers or 
other third parties other than the news media itself.  Id. at 542, 96 S. Ct.  at 2795.  By the time the First Amendment 
challenge to that order reached the Supreme Court, the defendant had been 
convicted and the order had expired.  
The Court nonetheless held that the case was not 
moot:
 
The 
controversy between the parties to this case is “capable of repetition” in two senses. First, if 
Simants’ conviction is reversed by the Nebraska Supreme Court and a new trial 
ordered, the District Court may enter another restrictive order to prevent a 
resurgence of prejudicial publicity before Simants’ retrial. Second, the State 
of Nebraska is a party to this case; the Nebraska Supreme Court’s decision 
authorizes state prosecutors to seek restrictive orders in appropriate cases. 
The dispute between the State and the petitioners who cover events throughout 
the State is thus “capable of 
repetition.” Yet, if we decline 
to address the issues in this case on grounds of mootness, the dispute will evade 
review, or at least considered plenary review in this Court, since these orders 
are by nature short-lived. See, 
e.g., 
Weinstein v. Bradford, 
423 U.S. 147, 96 S. Ct. 347, 46 
L.[Ed].2d 350 (1975); Sosna v. Iowa, 
[419 U.S. 393, 95 S. Ct. 553, 42 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1975)]; Roe 
v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113, 125, 93 S. Ct. 705, 712, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 
(1973); 
Moore 
v. Ogilvie, 
394 U.S. 814, 816, 89 S. Ct. 1493, 1494, 23 L. Ed. 2d 1 
(1969); 
Carroll 
v. Princess Anne, 
393 U.S. 175, 178-179, 89 S. Ct. 347, 350, 21 L. Ed. 2d 325 
(1968).
 
 
Nebraska 
Press Ass’n, 
427 U.S.  at 546-47, 96 S. Ct.  at 2797; see 
also Iranian Muslim Org., 
615 S.W.2d  at 209 (because city policy on parade permits remains same and the 
Iranian protest issue continues, controversy remains viable notwithstanding fact 
that date and conditions for which parade permits were requested no longer 
exist).
 
[¶38]   The decision in Nebraska Press Association demonstrates 
the Supreme Court’s willingness to relax, or dispense with altogether, the 
requirement that the dispute capable of repetition must involve the same 
complaining party.  As one 
commentator observed:
 
            
The classic modern application of the capable-of-repetition exception is 
in an abortion case, such as Roe v. 
Wade.  A plaintiff’s challenge 
to a restriction on her right to obtain an abortion is inherently short-lived, 
and will always be rendered moot by events – either by birth or by termination 
of the pregnancy – prior to completion of appellate review.  Thus, unless an exception were applied, 
the conventional doctrine would require that a court dismiss the case as 
moot.  As discussed more fully 
below, however, courts in such cases routinely ignore the second requirement, 
that there be a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will 
again be subjected to the same action.  
Courts simply apply the capable-of-repetition exception without inquiring 
as to any expectation of recurrence on the part of the plaintiff.  Indeed, federal courts, including the 
Supreme Court, have repeatedly applied the exception where likely recurrence was 
shown only as to other members of the public at large.
 
Hall, 
supra, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 
579-80 (footnotes omitted).
 
[¶39]   Our Court likewise, in considering 
whether a dispute is likely to recur, has not strictly adhered to the 
requirement that it be the same complaining party who may be subjected to the 
same action again.  See Merchant, ¶ 17, 168 P.3d  at 863 
(considering otherwise moot equal protection claim based on “significant 
potential for this controversy to arise again and affect other Wyoming 
prisoners”); Exxon Mobil, ¶ 18, 55 P.3d  at 720 (central issue of administrative appeal by a county “likely to arise 
in other cases, and would evade review if we determined that the case was 
moot”).  As noted above, we find the 
record supports a reasonable expectation that the dispute between OSA and the 
Town will be repeated.  In the 
absence of the same dispute between the same parties, however, we nonetheless 
believe this is a dispute that will recur, and regardless of the parties to that 
dispute, it will present the same fundamental legal issues for 
review.
 
[¶40]   This case presents not only a 
dispute that is capable of repetition and evading review, but also a question of 
great public importance.  It 
concerns the constitutional right of free speech and presents itself in the 
context of a policy debate of significant and continuing public interest.  Under these circumstances, we hold that 
the case is not moot and is one on which this Court has the power to rule and 
should rule.  See Carroll v. President & Comm’rs of 
Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 179, 89 S. Ct. 347, 350, 21 L. Ed. 2d 325 (1968) 
(case not mooted by expiration of ten-day order given that white supremacist 
protests continued and question persisted “whether, 
by what processes, and to what extent the authorities of the local governments 
may restrict petitioners in their rallies and public meetings”). 

 
II.         
Appealability of 
TRO
 
[¶41]   The Town argues as an additional 
basis to dispose of OSA’s appeal that a temporary restraining order is not an 
appealable order.  In support of 
this argument, it cites to a Colorado case reasoning that such orders are of 
“short duration and terminate with the ruling of the preliminary injunction so 
that an immediate appeal is not necessary to protect the rights of the 
parties.”  See O’Connell v. Colorado State Bank, 633 P.2d 511, 513 (Colo. App. 1981).  We 
find this rationale unpersuasive under the present facts and reject the Town’s 
suggestion that the TRO is not an appealable order.
 
[¶42]   Rule 1.05 of the Wyoming Rules of 
Appellate Procedure defines an appealable order as:
 
            
(a)  An order affecting a 
substantial right in an action, when such order, in effect, determines the 
action and prevents a judgment; or
 
* 
* * * 
 
            
(e)  Interlocutory orders and 
decrees of the district courts which:
 
            
(1)  Grant, continue, or 
modify injunctions, or dissolve injunctions, or refuse to dissolve or modify 
injunctions[.]
 
W.R.A.P. 
1.05. Consistent 
with Rule 1.05, this Court has held that “[g]enerally 
a judgment or order which determines the merits of the controversy and leaves 
nothing for future consideration is final and appealable.”  Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Lower Valley Power 
& Light, Inc., 608 P.2d 660, 661 (Wyo. 1980); see also Goodman v. Voss, 2011 WY 33, ¶ 22, 248 P.3d 1120, 1126 (Wyo. 2011) (order final and appealable where merits of 
controversy determined).  

 
[¶43]   The Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals addressed a similar circumstance when it was presented with an appeal 
from a temporary restraining order enjoining the holding of a Roman Catholic 
mass during a municipal festival.  
Doe v. Village of Crestwood, 
917 F.2d 1476 (7th Cir. 1990).  The 
Seventh Circuit found the order appealable, explaining:
 
Although 
28 
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) 
does not authorize appeals from temporary restraining orders, San 
Francisco Real Estate Investors v. Real Estate Investment Trust of 
America, 
692 F.2d 814, 816 (1st Cir. 1982); 
Stricklin 
v. University of Wisconsin, 
420 F.2d 1257, 1259 (7th Cir. 1970), 
the order forbidding the observance of mass is not properly characterized as a 
“temporary” restraint. Drawing a line between appealable preliminary injunctions 
and non-appealable TROs makes sense when the TRO holds things in stasis to 
facilitate an orderly decision. Appellate consideration of such an interim step 
might disrupt the review the order was supposed to permit, and TROs are so short 
in duration that an appeal commonly could not be completed before their 
expiration. Better to allow things to proceed in the district court than to 
fight at length about the brief interlude until a decision may be rendered on 
the merits. Nomenclature does not determine whether an order is a preliminary 
injunction, however, Stringfellow 
v. Concerned Neighbors in Action, 
480 U.S. 370, 107 S. Ct. 1177, 94 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1987); 
Sampson 
v. Murray, 
415 U.S. 61, 86-88, 94 S. Ct. 937, 951-52, 39 L. Ed. 2d 166 
(1974), 
and the name attached to this order is imprecise. It does not create a little 
delay pending decision. Rather it forbids the mass, which will not be 
rescheduled. No further proceedings in the district court concerning this mass 
are in prospect. All questions concerning the 1990 festival have been wrapped 
up, leaving only the plaintiff’s request for an injunction against recurrence. 
This order is an “injunction” within the meaning of § 
1292(a)(1), 
and the notice of appeal therefore invokes our jurisdiction. Belknap 
v. Leary, 
427 F.2d 496, 498 (2d Cir. 1970); 
see also Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper & Eugene 
Gressman, 16 
Federal 
Practice and Procedure 
§ 3922 (1977 & 1990 Supp.) 
(collecting cases).
 
Id. 
at 1477.
 
[¶44]   We understand that the grant or 
denial of a temporary restraining order may not be a final order in the context 
of on-going litigation.  Under those 
circumstances, both parties would have a further opportunity to be heard at the 
preliminary injunction stage of proceedings, and the record would likely be 
better developed for review.  In 
this case, however, there was no on-going litigation.  This action began with the ex parte 
Petition and ended with the issuance of the ex parte TRO, and the TRO is 
therefore a final appealable order.  
See Populist Party v. Herschler, 746 F.2d 656, 661 n.2 (10th Cir. 1984) (temporary restraining order is appealable when 
acts as a final order).
 
III.        
Remaining Jurisdictional 
Issues
 
[¶45]   The remaining jurisdictional issues 
have been raised by OSA as challenges to the district court’s original 
jurisdiction to issue the TRO.  OSA 
contests the standing of the Town to seek a TRO, as well as the district court’s 
subject matter and personal jurisdiction. 
 
A.        
Town’s Standing to Seek TRO
 
[¶46]   OSA asserts that the Town did not 
have, or even allege, a tangible interest in this matter sufficient to confer 
standing to bring its Petition, and that the proper plaintiff in this action 
would have been a parent or guardian of one of the potentially impacted 
children.  We 
disagree.
 
[¶47]   “Standing is a legal concept designed to determine whether a party is sufficiently affected to insure that the court is presented with a justiciable controversy.”  In re Guardianship of Parkhurst, 2010 WY 
155, ¶ 10, 243 P.3d 961, 965 (Wyo. 2010) (quoting In re Adoption of CF, 2005 WY 118, ¶ 39, 
120 P.3d 992, 1004-05 (Wyo. 2005)). This Court has described the standing 
doctrine and its requirements as follows:
 
“The doctrine of standing is a jurisprudential rule of jurisdictional magnitude. At its most elementary level, the standing doctrine holds that a decision-making body should refrain from considering issues in which the litigants have little or no interest in vigorously advocating. Accordingly, the doctrine of standing focuses upon whether a litigant is properly situated to assert an issue for judicial or quasi-judicial determination. A litigant is said to have standing when he has a 'personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.’ This personal stake requirement has been described in Wyoming as a 'tangible interest’ at stake. The tangible interest requirement guarantees that a litigant is sufficiently interested in a case to present a justiciable controversy.” 
 
Parkhurst, 
¶ 10, 243 P.3d  at 965 (quoting CF, ¶ 
39, 120 P.3d at 1004-05).
 
[¶48]   The Town filed its Petition out of 
concern for the welfare of approximately two-hundred Boy Scouts aged seven to 
fourteen.  Government has long been 
recognized as having a compelling interest in the well being of its youth.  Sable Communications of California, Inc. 
v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115, 126, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2836, 106 L. Ed. 2d 93 (1989); Ginsberg v. State of New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638-39, 88 S. Ct. 1274, 1280, 20 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1968).  This interest of the Town is expressly 
recognized by its statutory authority.  
By statute, a town may sue or be sued, and it may “[r]egulate, prevent or 
suppress riots, disturbances, disorderly assemblies or parades, or any other 
conduct which disturbs or jeopardizes the public health, safety, peace or 
morality, in any public or private place.”  
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-103(a)(xviii) (LexisNexis 
2011).
 
[¶49]   We conclude that the Town’s 
asserted interest in protecting its youth gave it a sufficient stake in the 
outcome of these proceedings to allow it standing to bring its 
Petition.
 
B.        
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
 
[¶50]   OSA contends that the district 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to rule on the Petition because the 
Town did not file a complaint invoking the court’s jurisdiction before it filed 
its Petition requesting the TRO.  We 
conclude that the filing of a complaint is not an essential predicate to a 
petition or motion for a temporary restraining order and thus reject this 
jurisdictional challenge.
 
[¶51]   The appropriate procedure for 
seeking a temporary restraining order has been described by one prominent 
authority as follows:
 
The 
appropriate procedure for requesting a preliminary injunction is by motion, although it also commonly is requested 
by an order to show cause. As 
indicated in Rule 7, the motion 
should describe the preliminary injunction sought and state with particularity 
the grounds for granting it. The 
motion may be part of the written notice of the hearing on the preliminary 
injunction. As was observed by Judge Tuttle in an analogous context: “The grant 
of a temporary injunction need not await any procedural steps perfecting the 
pleadings or any other formality attendant upon a full-blown trial of this 
case.” Indeed, although it is 
preferable to file the complaint first, a preliminary injunction may be granted 
upon a motion made before a formal complaint is presented.
 
 
11A 
Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay Kane, Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2949 
(2d ed. 2011) (footnotes omitted).  

 
[¶52]   We agree that while the better 
practice would be to have a complaint on file before a motion or petition for 
temporary restraining order is submitted, the lack of a complaint does not 
deprive the district court of jurisdiction to act.  See Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692, 694 (2nd Cir. 1966) (although it would have been better to file a complaint 
along with motion and affidavit, court could treat affidavit as complaint); Ruscitto v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
& Smith, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 1349, 1352 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (exigent circumstances allow injunction to precede 
filing of suit); Nat’l Org. for Reform of 
Marijuana Laws v. Mullen, 608 F. Supp. 945, 950 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (“Owing 
to the peculiar function of the preliminary injunction, it is not necessary that 
the pleadings be perfected, or even that a complaint be filed, before the order 
issues.”).
 
C.        
Personal Jurisdiction
 
[¶53]   As its final jurisdictional 
argument, OSA asserts the TRO is void because the district court did not have 
personal jurisdiction over it.  We 
find that OSA waived any objection to personal jurisdiction and therefore also 
reject this challenge to the district court’s 
jurisdiction.
 
[¶54]   This Court has held as follows 
concerning personal jurisdiction and its effect on a court’s judgment: 

 
In 
order for a court to acquire jurisdiction over a defendant, that defendant must 
be properly served or must “voluntarily” appear. A judgment entered without the 
court having jurisdiction is null and void. A defendant may waive his right to challenge a court’s 
jurisdiction. Such a challenge should be made at the defendant’s soonest 
opportunity. Failure to timely broach the issue with the court may result in 
waiver of that defense. Most 
importantly for this case, where a defendant appears voluntarily, without 
questioning the court’s personal 
jurisdiction, that appearance is 
the equivalent of proper service of process. Matter 
of Adoption of MSVW, 
965 P.2d 1158, 1162 (Wyo. 1998); 
and see Ostermiller 
v. Spurr, 
968 P.2d 940, 943 (Wyo. 1998) 
(consent to court’s jurisdiction for one purpose may result in court’s 
jurisdiction for any related purpose).
 
JAG 
v. State Dep’t of Family Servs, 
2002 WY 158, ¶ 13, 56 P.3d 1016, 1019 (Wyo. 2002); see also Walton v. State ex rel. Wood, 2002 WY 
108, ¶ 10, 50 P.3d 693, 697 (Wyo. 2002) (failure to question personal 
jurisdiction at earliest opportunity deemed a waiver); CRB v. State, 974 P.2d 931, 936 (Wyo. 
1999) (party must assert lack of personal jurisdiction by W.R.C.P. 12(b) motion 
or its equivalent).
 
[¶55]   OSA did not file a motion to 
dismiss the Petition.  Instead, it 
filed a Notice of Appeal and entered an appearance through its counsel.  OSA then filed a brief with this Court, 
in which it requested a remand to district court for consideration of an 
affirmative award of damages against the Town.  With these actions, OSA waived any 
objection to personal jurisdiction and submitted itself to the jurisdiction of 
the court.  See In re Adoption of MSVW, 965 P.2d 1158, 
1162 (Wyo. 1998) (“When a defendant voluntarily appears without questioning the 
court’s personal jurisdiction over him, his appearance is the equivalent of 
proper service of process.”); Cotton v. 
Brow, 903 P.2d 530, 531 (Wyo. 1995) (defendant’s filing of brief on appeal 
affirmatively invoked jurisdiction of court); Weber v. Johnston Fuel Liners, Inc., 519 P.2d 972, 977-78 (Wyo. 1974) (defendant waived objection to personal 
jurisdiction when he sought damages as affirmative 
relief).
 
IV.       Free Speech 
Infringement
 
[¶56]   We turn next to OSA’s contention 
that the TRO violated its free speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.1  
 
A.        
First Amendment Protections
 
[¶57]   The First Amendment “reflects a 'profound national commitment’ to the principle 
that 'debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open.’”  Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318, 108 S. Ct. 1157, 1162, 99 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1988) (quoting New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S. Ct. 710, 721, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 
(1964)).  “[A]s a 
general matter, the First Amendment means that government has no power to 
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or 
its content.”  United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584, 176 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2010) (quoting Ashcroft 
v. A.C.L.U., 
535 U.S. 564, 573, 122 S. Ct. 1700, 1707, 152 L. Ed. 2d 771 
(2002)); 
see also Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733, 180 L. Ed. 2d 708 (2011).  Its 
general protections are not, however, absolute.  Ashcroft, 535 U.S.  at 573, 122 S. Ct.  at 
1707.
 
[¶58]   Through its numerous decisions 
interpreting First Amendment protections, the United States Supreme Court has 
outlined the required considerations for determining whether a government 
restriction on speech is permissible.  
That determination turns on the type of restraint, the type of speech, 
the forum in which the speech is restrained, and the nature of the restriction, 
that is, whether it is content-neutral or content-based.  See, e.g., Stevens, 130 S. Ct.  at 1584-85 (type of 
speech); Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469-70, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1132, 172 L. Ed. 2d 853 (2009) 
(type of forum); Madsen v. Women’s Health 
Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765, 114 S. Ct. 2516, 2524-25, 129 L. Ed. 2d 593 
(1994) (type of restraint); Forsyth 
County v. The Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-35, 112 S. Ct. 2395, 
2403-04, 120 L. Ed. 2d 101 (1992) (content regulation).  
 
[¶59]   These considerations dictate the 
level of scrutiny that must be used in determining whether a government 
restriction on speech is constitutional, and we thus consider each in turn as 
they apply to the TRO issued in this case.
 
B.        
Application of Scrutiny Factors to TRO
 
1.         
Type of Restriction: Prior 
Restraint
 
[¶60]   The term prior restraint is used to 
describe “administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications when 
issued in advance of the time that such communications are to occur.”  Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2771, 125 L. Ed. 2d 441 (1993) (quoting M. Nimmer, Nimmer on 
Freedom of Speech § 4.03 at 4-14 (1984)).  A temporary restraining order is a 
classic example of a prior restraint.  
Id.
 
[¶61]   The Supreme Court has described 
prior restraints on speech as “the most serious and the least tolerable 
infringement on First Amendment rights.”  
Nebraska Press Ass’n, 427 U.S. 
at 559, 96 S. Ct.  at 2803.  Any prior 
restraint on expression bears “a heavy presumption against its constitutional 
validity.”  New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714, 91 S. Ct. 2140, 2141, 29 L. Ed. 2d 822 (1971); see also CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1317, 
114 S. Ct. 912, 914, 127 L. Ed. 2d 358 (1994); Forsyth County, 505 U.S.  at 130, 112 S. Ct.  at 2401; Vance v. Universal 
Amusement Co., Inc., 445 U.S. 308, 316 n.13, 100 S. Ct. 1156, 1161 n.13, 63 L. Ed. 2d 413 (1980).
 
[¶62]   The Supreme Court has explained the 
presumption against the validity of prior restraints, and the preference for 
other restrictions:
 
The 
presumption against prior restraints is heavier – and the degree of protection 
broader – than that against limits on expression imposed by criminal penalties. 
Behind the distinction is a theory deeply etched in our law: a free society 
prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the 
law than to throttle them and all others beforehand. It is always difficult to 
know in advance what an individual will say, and the line between legitimate and 
illegitimate speech is often so finely drawn that the risks of freewheeling 
censorship are formidable.
 
Vance, 
445 U.S.  at 316 n.13, 100 S. Ct.  at 1161 n.13 (citations omitted).  Along these lines, the Court has further 
commented:
 
A 
criminal penalty or a judgment in a defamation case is subject to the whole 
panoply of protections afforded by deferring the impact of the judgment until 
all avenues of appellate review have been exhausted. Only after judgment has 
become final, correct or otherwise, does the law’s sanction become fully 
operative.
 
            
A prior restraint, by contrast and by definition, has an immediate and 
irreversible sanction. If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil 
sanctions after publication “chills” speech, prior restraint “freezes” it at 
least for the time.
 
Nebraska 
Press Ass’n, 
427 U.S.  at 559, 96 S. Ct.  at 2803 (footnote omitted); see also Madsen, 512 U.S.  at 764, 114 S. Ct.  at 
2524 (injunctions carry greater risk of censorship and discrimination than do 
ordinances).
 
[¶63]   The TRO issued in this case acted 
as a prior restraint on OSA’s speech, and there is thus a heavy presumption 
against its constitutionality.
 
2.         
Type of Speech: Public Issue 
Speech
 
[¶64]   The First Amendment does not offer 
all speech the same degree of protection.  
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 444-45, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 1973, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689 (2006) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting).  The degree of 
protection differs depending on whether the speech is political interest/public 
issue speech, commercial speech or government speech.  Id.  Additionally, certain categories of 
speech are afforded limited or no protection, such as obscenity, fighting words, 
defamation, and fraud.  Stevens, 130 S. Ct.  at 
1584.
 
[¶65]   Speech on public issues or matters 
of public concern “are classic forms of speech that lie at the heart of the 
First Amendment.”  Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New 
York, 519 U.S. 357, 377, 117 S. Ct. 855, 867, 137 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1997).  The Supreme Court has consistently observed the central importance of protecting 
speech on public issues, which has led it to scrutinize carefully any 
restrictions on public issue picketing.  
Boos, 485 U.S.  at 318, 108 S. Ct.  at 1162; United 
States v. Grace, 
461 U.S. 171, 180-81, 103 S. Ct. 1702, 1708-09, 75 L. Ed. 2d 736 
(1983); 
Police 
Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 
408 U.S. 92, 92 S. Ct. 2286, 33 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1972).
 
[¶66]   Speech directed at abortion policy 
is public issue speech.  See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 714-15, 
120 S. Ct. 2480, 2488-89, 147 L. Ed. 2d 597 (2000); Schenck, 519 U.S.  at 377, 117 S. Ct.  at 
867; Madsen, 512 U.S.  at 762-64, 114 S. Ct.  at 2523-25.  “The fact that the messages conveyed by those communications 
may be offensive to their recipients does not deprive them of constitutional 
protection.”  Hill, 530 U.S.  at 715, 120 S. Ct.  at 
2488-89.  “As a general matter, we 
have indicated that in public debate our own citizens must tolerate insulting, 
and even outrageous, speech in order to provide 'adequate “breathing space” to 
the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.’”  Boos, 485 U.S.  at 322, 108 S. Ct.  at 1164 
(quoting Hustler 
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 
485 U.S. 46, 56, 108 S. Ct. 876, 882, 99 L. Ed. 2d 41 (1988)).
 
[¶67]   OSA’s speech is protected public 
issue speech, and based on these precedents, any restriction on that speech must 
be carefully scrutinized.  We find 
that this level of protection must likewise be extended to the graphic 
photographs OSA chooses to use in its demonstrations.  The Supreme Court has stated it will not 
expand the categories of speech that receive limited protection, such as 
obscenity, unless there is a demonstration of a longstanding American tradition 
forbidding such speech or expressive conduct.  Stevens, 130 S. Ct.  at 1585.  In Stevens, a 2010 decision, the Court 
declined to decrease the level of protection to be given depictions of animal 
cruelty.  Id.  Even more recently, in 2011, the Court 
rejected an argument for decreased protection of video games available 
commercially to young children that contain violent images, including sexual 
assault and murder.  Brown, 131 S. Ct.  at 2734.  The Stevens Court 
explained:
 
The 
First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of 
speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits. 
The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the 
benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs. Our 
Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that judgment simply on the basis 
that some speech is not worth it. The Constitution is not a document 
“prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure.” 

 
Stevens, 
130 S. Ct.  at 1585 (quoting Marbury 
v. Madison, 
1 Cranch 137, 178, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803)).
 
3.         
Forum Analysis: Traditional Public 
Forum
 
[¶68]   Streets, sidewalks and parks have 
long been held to be the traditional fora for First Amendment protected speech, 
and government entities are strictly limited in their ability to restrict speech 
in those areas.
 
This 
Court long ago recognized that members of the public retain strong free speech 
rights when they venture into public streets and parks, “which 'have 
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, 
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between 
citizens, and discussing public questions.’” Perry 
Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 
460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S. Ct. 948, 74 L. Ed. 2d 794 (1983) 
(quoting Hague 
v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 
307 U.S. 496, 515, 59 S. Ct. 954, 83 L. Ed. 1423 (1939) 
(opinion of Roberts, J.)). In order to preserve this freedom, government 
entities are strictly limited in their ability to regulate private speech in 
such “traditional public fora.” Cornelius 
v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 
473 U.S. 788, 800, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 87 L. Ed. 2d 567 (1985). 
Reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions are allowed, see Perry 
Ed. Assn., 
supra, 
at 45, 103 S. Ct. 948, 
but any restriction based on the content of the speech must satisfy strict 
scrutiny, that is, the restriction must be narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling government interest, see Cornelius, 
supra, 
at 800, 105 S. Ct. 3439, 
and restrictions based on viewpoint are prohibited, see Carey 
v. Brown, 
447 U.S. 455, 463, 100 S. Ct. 2286, 65 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1980).
 
Pleasant 
Grove, 
555 U.S.  at 469, 129 S. Ct.  at 1132.
 
[¶69]   The TRO in this case restricted 
OSA’s speech in the Town Square – a park, and on the surrounding streets and 
sidewalks.  The Town nonetheless 
contends that the TRO did not apply to a traditional public forum because it has 
enacted a resolution that allows it to issue permits regulating the Town 
Square’s use for larger events.  We 
disagree that the Town’s regulation changed, or could change, the nature of the 
park as a traditional public forum.  
See United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 278 n.9 (3rd Cir. 2010) (“The issuance of a permit to use a public forum 
does not transform its status as a public forum.”); see also Arkansas Educ. Television Comm’n v. 
Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 1641, 140 L. Ed. 2d 875 (1988) 
(“[T]raditional public fora are open for expressive activity regardless of the 
government’s intent.”).  

 
[¶70]   The Town Square and the surrounding 
streets and sidewalk are traditional public fora, and the TRO’s restrictions are 
therefore subject to the heightened scrutiny applicable to that 
fora.
 
4.         
Nature of Restriction: 
Content-Based
 
[¶71]   The final consideration in 
determining the level of scrutiny that must be used in determining the TRO’s 
constitutionality is the nature of the TRO’s restriction, that is, whether the 
TRO is content-neutral or content-based.  
Content-neutral restrictions are those that are justified without 
reference to the content of the regulated speech.  Boos, 485 U.S.  at 320, 108 S. Ct.  at 
1163.  A restriction that seeks to 
protect or shield an audience from disturbing or distressing aspects of speech 
is content-based.  Id. at 321, 108 S. Ct.  at 1164; see also Brown, 131 S. Ct.  at 2733-34.  Likewise, a restriction that is based on 
an audience’s hostile response to the speech is content-based regulation.  Forsyth County, 505 U.S.  at 134-35, 112 S. Ct.  at 2403-04.
 
[¶72]   The Town sought the TRO and the 
district court issued the TRO to protect children from the images contained in 
OSA’s demonstration materials and to address the concern that there may be a 
hostile response to the OSA demonstrations.  The restrictions were thus 
content-based.
 
[¶73]   Because the TRO imposes 
content-based restrictions on OSA’s speech in a traditional public forum, the 
TRO is subject to strict scrutiny.
 
Because 
the Act imposes a restriction on the content of protected speech, it is invalid 
unless [the government] can demonstrate that it passes strict scrutiny—that is, 
unless it is justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn 
to serve that interest. R.A.V. 
[v. City of St. Paul], 505 
U.S. [377], at 395, 112 S.Ct. [2535,] 2538 [120 L. Ed. 2d 305 
(1992)]. 
The State must specifically identify an “actual problem” in need of solving, [United States v.] Playboy 
[Entertainment Group, Inc.], 
529 U.S. [803], at 822-823, 120 S. Ct. 1878 [146 L. Ed. 2d 865 
(2000)], 
and the curtailment of free speech must be actually necessary to the solution, 
see R.A.V., 
supra, 
at 395, 112 S. Ct. 2538. 
That is a demanding standard. “It is rare that a regulation restricting speech 
because of its content will ever be permissible.” Playboy, 
supra, 
at 818, 120 S. Ct. 1878.
 
Brown, 
131 S. Ct.  at 2738.
 
C.        
Application of Strict Scrutiny to TRO
 
[¶74]   We understand the Town of Jackson 
faced a difficult situation with the disturbing materials OSA directed toward 
audiences of children, and with our decision today, this Court does not intend 
to be dismissive of the Town’s legitimate concerns and efforts to address those 
concerns in a limited timeframe.  
Nonetheless, the TRO requested by the Town and issued by the district 
court imposed a prior restraint on the OSA’s public issue speech in a 
traditional public forum, based on the content of that speech.  Any such restriction is presumptively 
invalid and faces the most demanding level of First Amendment scrutiny.  We find the Town did not meet its burden 
under the First Amendment’s rigorous constitutional standards. 

 
[¶75]   The strict scrutiny level of 
analysis requires that the restriction on speech be justified by a compelling government interest and be 
narrowly drawn to serve that interest.  
Brown, 131 S. Ct.  at 
2738; Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. 
Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 358-59, 129 S. Ct. 1093, 1098, 172 L. Ed. 2d 770 (2009); 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395-96, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2549-50, 120 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1992).  The government bears the burden of 
establishing its compelling government interest and that the interest cannot be 
served in a less restrictive manner.  
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita 
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428-29, 126 S. Ct. 1211, 1219, 
163 L. Ed. 2d 1017 (2006).  The 
Supreme Court has explained the government’s burden as 
follows:
 
When 
the Government restricts speech, 
the Government bears the burden of proving the 
constitutionality of its actions. Greater 
New Orleans Broadcasting Assn., Inc. v. United States, 
527 U.S. 173, 183, 119 S. Ct. 1923, 144 L. Ed. 2d 161 (1999) 
(“[T]he Government bears the 
burden of identifying a 
substantial interest and 
justifying the challenged restriction”); [A.C.L.U. v. ] Reno, 
521 
U.S. [844], at 879, 117 S.Ct. 2329[, 138 L. Ed. 2d 874 
(1997)] 
(“The breadth of this content-based restriction of speech imposes an especially 
heavy burden on the Government to explain why a less 
restrictive provision would not be as effective ...”); Edenfield 
v. Fane, 
507 U.S. 761, 770-771, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 123 L. Ed. 2d 543 
(1993) 
(“[A] governmental body seeking 
to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it 
recites are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a 
material degree”); Board 
of Trustees of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 
492 U.S. 469, 480, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 106 L. Ed. 2d 388 (1989) 
(“[T]he State bears the burden of justifying its restrictions ...”); 
Tinker 
v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 
393 U.S. 503, 509, 89 S. Ct. 733, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731 (1969) 
(“In order for the State ... to justify prohibition of a particular expression 
of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused by something more 
than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always 
accompany an unpopular viewpoint”). When the Government seeks to restrict speech 
based on its content, the usual presumption of constitutionality afforded 
congressional enactments is reversed. “Content-based regulations are 
presumptively invalid,” R.A.V. 
v. St. Paul, 
505 U.S. 377, 382, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 120 L. Ed. 2d 305 (1992), 
and the Government bears the burden to rebut that 
presumption.
 
United 
States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 
529 U.S. 803, 816-17, 120 S. Ct. 1878, 1888, 146 L. Ed. 2d 865 
(2000).
 
1.         
Compelling Government 
Interest
 
[¶76]   The Town cites the need to protect 
children attending the Boy Scout Elk Fest from disturbing images of aborted and 
dismembered fetuses as its compelling government interest in support of the 
TRO.  It further asserts an interest 
in preserving the peace, order, safety and tranquility of the Boy Scout Elk 
Fest.  
 
[¶77]   The need to protect the 
psychological well being of children has been recognized as a compelling 
government interest. Sable 
Communications, 492 U.S.  at 126, 109 S. Ct.  at 2836; Ginsberg, 390 U.S.  at 638, 88 S. Ct.  at 
1280.  The Supreme Court, however, 
has declared that that interest is not without boundary.  
 
“[M]inors 
are entitled to a significant measure of First Amendment protection, and only in 
relatively narrow and well-defined circumstances may government bar public 
dissemination of protected materials to them.” Erznoznik 
v. Jacksonville, 
422 U.S. 205, 212-213, 95 S. Ct. 2268, 45 L. Ed. 2d 125 
(1975) 
(citation omitted). No doubt a State possesses legitimate power to protect 
children from harm, Ginsberg, 
supra, 
at 640-641, 88 S. Ct. 1274; 
Prince 
v. Massachusetts, 
321 U.S. 158, 165, 64 S. Ct. 438, 88 L. Ed. 645 (1944), 
but that does not include a free-floating power to restrict the ideas to which 
children may be exposed. “Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor 
subject to some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to 
protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable 
for them.” Erznoznik, 
supra, 
at 213-214, 95 S. Ct. 2268.
 
Brown, 
131 S. Ct.  at 2735-36.
[¶78]   Our concern in the present case is 
not with the general proposition that protecting youth is a compelling 
government interest, but is instead with the record.  The record contains no evidence 
concerning the injury or potential injury to children from viewing the images 
displayed by OSA, and of particular importance in the context of the request for 
injunctive relief, evidence of irreparable harm to the children.  The affidavit of Lt. Gilliam describes 
the contact OSA had with youth in the community and describes the materials OSA 
showed to the young audience, but it does not describe how those materials 
impacted them, or could impact them.  
In the absence of such evidence, the government has not made its required 
showing of an “actual problem” in need of 
solving.  Brown, 131 S. Ct.  at 2738; Playboy, 
529 U.S.  at 816, 120 S. Ct.  at 1888.  
 
 
[¶79]   We turn then to the Town’s concerns 
with a breach of the peace.  While a 
government does have a recognized interest in maintaining peace in its community 
and at its events, the Supreme Court has held that this is not a basis to 
proscribe speech, unless that speech is “directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”  Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2542, 105 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1989); see also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 
89 S. Ct. 1827, 1829, 23 L. Ed. 2d 430 (1969).  The Court has 
observed:
 
The 
State’s position, therefore, amounts to a claim that an audience that takes 
serious offense at particular expression is necessarily likely to disturb the 
peace and that the expression may be prohibited on this basis. Our precedents do 
not countenance such a presumption. On the contrary, they recognize that a 
principal “function of free speech under our system of government is to invite 
dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition 
of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs 
people to anger.” Terminiello 
v. Chicago, 
337 U.S. 1, 4, 69 S. Ct. 894, 896, 93 L. Ed. 1131 (1949). 
See also Cox 
v. Louisiana, 
379 U.S. 536, 551, 85 S. Ct. 453, 462, 13 L. Ed. 2d 471 
(1965); 
Tinker 
v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 
393 U.S., at 508-509, 89 S.Ct., at 737-38; 
Coates 
v. Cincinnati, 
402 U.S. 611, 615, 91 S. Ct. 1686, 1689, 29 L. Ed. 2d 214 
(1971); 
Hustler 
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 
485 U.S. 46, 55-56, 108 S. Ct. 876, 881-882, 99 L. Ed. 2d 41 
(1988). 
It would be odd indeed to conclude both that “if it is the speaker’s 
opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it 
constitutional protection,” FCC 
v. Pacifica Foundation, 
438 U.S. 726, 745, 98 S. Ct. 3026, 3038, 57 L. Ed. 2d 1073 
(1978) 
(opinion of STEVENS, J.), and that the government may ban the expression 
of certain disagreeable ideas on the unsupported presumption that their very 
disagreeableness will provoke violence.
 
            
Thus, we have not permitted the government to assume that every 
expression of a provocative idea will incite a riot, but have instead required 
careful consideration of the actual circumstances surrounding such expression, 
asking whether the expression “is directed to inciting or producing imminent 
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” Brandenburg 
v. Ohio, 
395 U.S. 444, 447, 89 S. Ct. 1827, 1829, 23 L. Ed. 2d 430 
(1969) 
(reviewing circumstances surrounding rally and speeches by Ku Klux Klan). To 
accept Texas’ arguments that it need only demonstrate “the potential for a 
breach of the peace,” Brief for Petitioner 37, and that every flag burning 
necessarily possesses that potential, would be to eviscerate our holding in 
Brandenburg. This we decline to do.
 
Texas, 
491 U.S.  at 408-09, 109 S. Ct.  at 2542 (footnote omitted).
 
[¶80]   The evidence the Town submitted 
concerning the potential for a breach of peace as a result of the OSA 
demonstrations was an incident in which a counter-protestor tried to run over an 
OSA member with his vehicle.  Lt. 
Gilliam’s affidavit reported that this individual was arrested and charged.  The record contains no evidence that OSA 
engages in speech that is directed at inciting violence or is likely to produce 
imminent lawless action, and in the absence of such evidence, we conclude that 
prohibiting OSA’s speech is not supported.  

 
2.         
Narrow 
Tailoring
 
[¶81]   Assuming the Town had established a 
compelling interest in the protection of its youth and in maintaining the peace, 
we would nonetheless find the TRO unconstitutional.   The Town has not met its burden of 
establishing that the TRO ban was necessary to serve the Town’s interest and 
that less restrictive measures would not have been 
adequate.
 
[¶82]   Our first concern is with the 
geographical scope of the TRO.  It 
prohibited OSA from displaying its graphic posters not just in the Town Square, 
but also on the streets and sidewalks two blocks in each direction of the 
park.  This is a broader “buffer 
zone” than the Supreme Court has approved even when the restriction creating the 
buffer zone is content-neutral and thus subjected to a less demanding level of 
scrutiny.  See Schenck, 519 U.S. 357, 117 S. Ct. 855 
(upholding content-neutral buffer zone of fifteen feet from clinic entrance to 
allow patients to freely enter and exit clinic, but overturning floating 
fifteen-foot buffer zone around patients as too restrictive of free speech 
rights); Madsen, 512 U.S.  at 769-75, 
114 S. Ct.  at 2527-30 (upholding 36-foot content-neutral buffer zone around 
clinic, but overturning 300-foot content-neutral buffer zone around staff 
residences as too broad even though targeted picketing of personal residences is 
less protected and the government’s interest in protecting the privacy of a 
residence is an interest of the highest order).
 
[¶83]   We find an Eighth Circuit decision 
holding unconstitutional a content-neutral ordinance that banned protesting 
within fifty feet of church property thirty minutes before or after scheduled 
services or events to be instructive.  
Olmer v. City of Lincoln, 192 F.3d 1176 (8th Cir. 1999).  In that 
case, the court reasoned as follows:
 
      The question is 
whether the ordinance is a “narrowly tailored” effort to protect the legitimate 
interest identified by the District Court. The answer is plainly no. The 
ordinance purports to make the carrying of signs at the indicated times and 
places unlawful, no matter what the signs say or depict, and this prohibition is 
much broader than necessary to protect the psychological interest of young 
children as found by the District Court. Moreover, the ordinance prohibits 
communication with adults as well as with children. While most of the adults 
attending the Westminster Presbyterian Church probably do not like the signs and 
disagree with them, that is hardly a sufficient basis, under the First 
Amendment, to justify what the City is attempting to do here. Expressive 
communication is frequently upsetting, even abrasive. The protection of such 
robust debate is at the core of the First Amendment. Finally, the ordinance bans 
certain forms of communication even if all of those to whom it is directed in 
fact wish to hear it. In sum, the ordinance bans speech directed at adults, and 
is not narrowly tailored to prohibit only that sort of speech that would be 
psychologically damaging to children. For further elaboration, see 23 F. Supp. 2d  at 1100-1102.
 
            
The City also claims that it has a legitimate interest in preserving the 
right of its citizens to exercise their religion freely. Such an interest, in 
the abstract, is undoubtedly substantial and important. If, for example, 
anti-abortion protestors were to attempt to enter a church without permission, 
or to interrupt church services with their own speech, the city could doubtless 
prosecute them under a general trespass or disturbing-the-peace provision, or, 
if necessary, adopt a more specific prohibition directed against disturbing or 
interrupting services of worship. The present ordinance goes way beyond that. It 
goes beyond the church building and church property, and seeks to forbid 
peaceful communication on property belonging to the public, even though the 
communication may be completely truthful, and even though there is absolutely no 
physical interference with access to the church.
 
Olmer, 
192 F.3d  at 1180-81.
 
[¶84]   As in Olmer, the Town has not shown that the 
breadth of the TRO, prohibiting the displays by the OSA within two blocks in any 
direction from the Town Square, was necessary to serve the Town’s interest of 
protecting its children from disturbing images.  The same is true of the Town’s interest 
in maintaining the peace.  The Town 
has not shown that intervention by law enforcement, as was used in the one 
instance of violence cited by the Town, is not adequate to maintain the 
peace.  See Grider v. Abramson, 994 F. Supp. 840, 845 
(W.D. Ky 1998) (employing police procedures to address concerns of violence 
between competing rallies). 
 
[¶85]   In the absence of this required 
showing, the Town has not met its burden under the strict scrutiny analysis.2
 
V.        
Rule 65 Notice and Bond 
Requirements
 
[¶86]   As a final matter, we address OSA’s 
contentions that the district court abused its discretion in issuing the TRO 
without providing OSA notice and an opportunity to be heard, and without 
requiring a security bond.
 
A.        
Notice
 
[¶87]   Rule 65(b) of the Wyoming Rules of 
Civil Procedure governs the issuance of temporary restraining orders.  It allows the issuance of an order 
without notice to the adverse party under limited 
circumstances:
 
            
A temporary order may be granted without written or oral notice to the 
adverse party or that party’s attorney only if: (1) it clearly appears from 
specific facts shown by affidavit  
or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, 
or damage will result to the applicant before the adverse party or that party’s 
attorney can be heard in opposition; and (2) the applicant’s attorney certifies 
to the court in writing the efforts, if any, which have been made to give the 
notice and the reasons supporting the claim that notice should not be 
required.
 
W.R.C.P. 
65(b).
 
[¶88]   The Supreme Court has condemned the 
issuance of ex parte orders restraining speech, stating:
 
There 
is a place in our jurisprudence for ex parte issuance, without notice, of 
temporary restraining orders of short duration; but there is 
no place within the area of basic freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment for 
such orders where no showing is made that it is impossible to serve or to notify 
the opposing parties and to give them an opportunity to 
participate.
 
Carroll, 
393 U.S.  at 180, 89 S. Ct.  at 351.  
The Town contends that the present case and Carroll are wholly distinct from each 
other and Carroll should therefore 
not be controlling.  In particular, 
the Town cites the greater amount of time the town in Carroll had to respond to the 
demonstration activities and the length of the injunction that issued.  Because of these contentions, we find it 
helpful to set forth the facts of Carroll in some detail to determine 
whether the case’s holding should be applied here.
 
[¶89]   In Carroll, a white supremacist group held 
a rally near the courthouse steps in the town of Princess Anne, Maryland.  393 U.S.  at 176, 89 S. Ct.  at 349.  The speeches were described as 
aggressively and militantly racist and “as both a provocation to the Negroes in 
the crowd and an incitement to the whites.”  Id.  During the speeches, one speaker 
announced that the rally would continue the next evening, and he called for the 
audience to return:
 
Petitioner 
Norton said, 'I want you to * * * be back here at the same place tomorrow night, 
bring every friend you have * * *. We’re going to take it easy tonight * * *’ 
and 'You white folks bring your friends, come back tomorrow night. * * * Come on 
back tomorrow night, let’s raise a little bit of hell for the white 
race.’
 
Id. 
at 176 n.1, 89 S. Ct.  at 349 n.1.
 
[¶90]   That next day, town officials 
applied for and received an ex parte restraining order, with no effort to notify 
or informally communicate with the defendants.  Id. at 177, 89 S. Ct.  at 349.  The order restrained the white 
supremacist group for ten days from holding rallies or meetings in the county 
“which will tend to disturb and endanger the citizens of the County.”  Id.  As a result, the scheduled rally was not 
held.  Id.  After a trial, the injunction was 
extended for another ten months.  Id.  A state appellate court reversed the 
ten-month injunction and upheld the ten-day restraining order, which the group 
then appealed to the Supreme Court.  
Id. at 177, 89 S. Ct.  at 
350.
 
[¶91]   In reversing entry of the ten-day 
order for failure to provide the required notice, the Supreme Court explained 
its concerns with ex parte orders restraining free speech.
 
The 
value of a judicial proceeding, as against self-help by the police, is 
substantially diluted where the process is ex parte, because the Court does not 
have available the fundamental instrument for judicial judgment: an adversary 
proceeding in which both parties may participate. The facts in any case 
involving a public demonstration are difficult to ascertain and even more 
difficult to evaluate. Judgment as to whether the facts justify the use of the 
drastic power of injunction necessarily turns on subtle and controversial 
considerations and upon a delicate assessment of the particular situation in 
light of legal standards which are inescapably imprecise. In the absence of 
evidence and argument offered by both sides and of their participation in the 
formulation of value judgments, there is insufficient assurance of the balanced 
analysis and careful conclusions which are essential in the area of First 
Amendment adjudication. 
 
            
The same is true of the fashioning of the order. An order issued in the 
area of First Amendment rights must be couched in the narrowest terms that will 
accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted by constitutional mandate and the 
essential needs of the public order. In this sensitive field, the State may not 
employ “means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end 
can be more narrowly achieved.”  Shelton 
v. Tucker, 
364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S. Ct. 247, 252, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231 
(1960). 
In other words, the order must be tailored as precisely as possible to the exact 
needs of the case. The participation of both sides is necessary for this 
purpose. Certainly, the failure to 
invite participation of the party seeking to exercise First Amendment rights 
reduces the possibility of a narrowly drawn order, and substantially imperils 
the protection which the Amendment seeks to assure. 
 
. 
. . The issuance of an injunction which aborts a scheduled rally or public 
meeting, even if the restraint is of short duration, is a matter of importance 
and consequence in view of the First Amendment’s imperative. The denial of a 
basic procedural right in these circumstances is not excused by the availability 
of post-issuance procedure which could not possibly serve to rescue the August 7 
meeting, but, at best, could have shortened the period in which petitioners were 
prevented from holding a rally.
 
Carroll, 
393 U.S.  at 183-84, 89 S. Ct.  at 352-53 (footnotes 
omitted).
 
[¶92]   In finding no factual basis to 
support the issuance of an ex parte restraining order, the Supreme Court in Carroll stated:
 
In 
the present case, the record discloses no reason why petitioners were not 
notified of the application for injunction. They were apparently present in 
Princess Anne. They had held a rally there on the night preceding the 
application for and issuance of the injunction. They were scheduled to have 
another rally on the very evening of the day when the injunction was issued. And 
some of them were actually served with the writ of injunction at 6:10 that 
evening. In these circumstances, there is no justification for the ex parte 
character of the proceedings in the sensitive area of First Amendment 
rights.
 
Id. 
at 
182-83, 89 S. Ct.  at 352 (footnote omitted).
 
[¶93]   We are unable to discern any reason 
that the holding in Carroll should 
not apply to this case.  The Town’s 
suggestion that the town of Princess Anne had more time to react to the 
situation and thus provide notice to the defendants is not borne out by the 
facts of the case or the Supreme Court’s analysis of those facts.  Nor was the Court’s analysis affected by 
the length of the restraining order.  
We thus conclude that the rule announced in Carroll does apply to this case.  That is, a temporary restraining order 
that operates to restrict free speech rights may only issue ex parte where a “showing is made that it is impossible to serve or 
to notify the opposing parties and to give them an opportunity to 
participate.”  See Carroll, 393 U.S.  at 180, 89 S. Ct.  at 
351.
 
[¶94]   In this case, that showing cannot 
be made.  Based on the affidavit of 
Lieutenant Gilliam, it is apparent that he was in contact with and able to reach 
members of OSA when necessary.  And 
the Town’s Petition does not suggest otherwise.  Counsel for the Town did not allege that 
it was impossible to serve or otherwise notify OSA of the Town’s Petition.  Instead, counsel stated that she made no 
attempt to notify OSA due to “the hostility of the current situation, contrary 
position of Defendant representatives and the immediate need for injunctive 
relief.”  We reject this as a basis 
to avoid the obligation to notify OSA.  
First, the record contains no evidence of hostility by OSA or its 
members.  Indeed, Lt. Gilliam 
described the demeanor of OSA’s representatives as cordial and 
matter-of-fact.  Additionally, in 
every application for a temporary restraining order there is going to be a 
disagreement between the parties and a need for immediate relief.  These facts, standing alone, cannot 
justify a failure to notify the adverse party.3
 
[¶95]   As we noted above, we are not 
unsympathetic to the Town’s concerns or the limited time within which it had to 
address those concerns.  The First 
Amendment, however, is fiercely protective of free speech rights and demands 
close adherence to its procedural safeguards when a government seeks to restrict 
those rights.  In this case, the 
Town’s efforts, while commendable in attempting to work cooperatively and 
courteously with OSA, fell short of the First Amendment’s strict 
requirements.
 
[¶96]   We thus hold that the district 
court abused its discretion in issuing the TRO without notice to OSA and an 
opportunity for OSA to be heard.
 
B.        
W.R.C.P. 65(c) Bond Requirement
 
[¶97]   OSA contends the district court 
also erred in failing to require that the Town post a security for any damages 
OSA might incur as a result of the TRO.  
The Town responds that Rule 65(c) should be read to require a bond only 
if the district court finds a likelihood of harm to the defendant.  
 
[¶98]   We agree with the Town that under 
Rule 65(c), if the district court finds no likelihood of harm to the defendant, 
no bond is necessary.  We 
nonetheless find error because the rule requires that the district court, in the 
exercise of its discretion, expressly consider whether there is a likelihood of 
harm and whether security must be posted, and in this case, the district court 
did not give consideration to these matters.  See Coquina Oil Corp. v. Transwestern Pipeline 
Co., 825 F.2d 1461, 1462 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing Reinders Bros. v. Rain Bird E. Sales 
Corp., 627 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1980); Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth, 583 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1978); System 
Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1145-46 (3rd 
Cir. 1977)) (court must consider whether bond is required and make findings 
otherwise order is “unsupportable”); see 
also Continental Oil Co. v. Frontier 
Refining Co., 338 F.2d 780, 782 (10th Cir. 1964) (if court finds no 
likelihood of harm to defendant, bond is not required).
 
[¶99]   It is unlikely that OSA suffered 
damages as a result of the twelve-hour TRO issued by the district court, and 
during oral argument to this Court, OSA was unable to articulate any particular 
damage it may have suffered.  The 
district court was nonetheless required to make findings as to the likelihood of 
harm to OSA, and it abused its discretion in issuing the TRO without those 
required findings.
 
CONCLUSION
 
[¶100] The district court issued a TRO that, however 
well-intentioned, violated the strict protections of the First Amendment and the 
requirements of Rule 65 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure.  We therefore must reverse the decision 
issuing the TRO.4            

 
KITE, 
Chief Justice, 
dissenting, in which HILL, J., 
joins.
 
[¶101]  I write separately because I disagree 
with the majority’s conclusion that this case is not moot because it falls 
within the special category of disputes that are “capable of repetition, yet 
evading review.”  Were I writing the 
majority opinion, I would conclude that the case is moot because no showing was 
made that it falls within that special category.  
 
[¶102]  In Turner v. Rogers, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 180 L. Ed. 2d 452 (2011), the Court granted a petition for writ of 
certiorari to consider whether a right to counsel existed in civil contempt 
proceedings to enforce child support orders.  The respondent, mother, asserted the 
case was moot because the petitioner, father, had completed his sentence for 
contempt prior to seeking the writ.  
The Supreme Court concluded the case was not moot because it fell within 
a special category of disputes that are “capable of repetition, while evading 
review.”  Id. at 2509.  A dispute falls into this special 
category, the Court stated, and remains live if “(1) the challenged action [is] 
in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or 
expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same 
complaining party [will] be subjected to the same action again.”  Id., citing Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 
149, 96 S. Ct. 347, 349, 46 L. Ed. 2d 350 (1975) (per curiam). 

 
[¶103]  Applying the first prong of this test, 
the Court concluded the challenged action, father’s imprisonment, was in its 
duration too short to be fully litigated through the state courts and arrive in 
the United States Supreme Court before he had completed the sentence.  Applying the second prong, the Court 
concluded there was more than a reasonable likelihood that father would again be 
subjected to the same action.  In 
reaching the latter conclusion, the Court said:  
 
[father] 
has frequently failed to make his child support payments. He has been the 
subject of several civil contempt proceedings. He has been imprisoned on several 
of those occasions. Within months of his release from the imprisonment here at 
issue he was again the subject of civil contempt proceedings. And he was again 
imprisoned, this time for six months. As of December 9, 2010, [father] was 
$13,814.72 in arrears, and another contempt hearing was scheduled for May 4, 
2011. These facts bring this case squarely within the special category of cases 
that are not moot because the 
underlying dispute is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.
 
Turner, 
131 S. Ct.  at 2515.
 
[¶104]  Unlike Turner, where the Court had before it 
numerous facts showing that father would again be subjected to imprisonment for 
civil contempt, no showing was made here that it is reasonably likely Operation 
Save America will again be subjected to a court order restraining it from 
assembling or displaying posters in Jackson.  “The capable-of repetition doctrine 
applies only in exceptional situations, and generally only where the named 
plaintiff can make a reasonable showing that he will again be subjected to the 
alleged illegality.”  L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109, 103 S. Ct. 1660, 1669, 75 L. Ed. 2d 675 (1983), citing DeFunis v. 
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319, 94 S. Ct. 1704, 1707, 40 L. Ed. 2d 164 
(1974).  For there 
to be a “reasonable expectation” that a party will be subjected to the same 
action again, that event must be a “demonstrated probability.” Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 
482, 102 S. Ct. 1181, 1183, 71 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1982); Weinstein, 423 U.S.  at 
149, 96 S. Ct.  at 348.  As 
the Court said in DeFunis, 416 U.S. 
at 320 n.5, 94 S. Ct.  at 1707 n.5,
 
“Speculative 
contingencies afford no basis for our passing on the substantive issues [the 
petitioner] would have us decide,” Hall 
v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 49 (1969), in the absence of “evidence that this is a 
prospect of 'immediacy and reality.’”  
Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109 (1969); Maryland Casualty Co. v. 
Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941).
 
No 
evidence was presented in this case that Operation Save America will return to 
Jackson and attempt to assemble or display posters during another scheduled 
event such as the Boy Scouts expo and auction or, in the event it does, that the 
town will again file for a temporary restraining order without providing notice 
and an opportunity to be heard.  The 
capable of repetition prong necessary for a dispute to fall within the special 
category of cases has not been satisfied.  
I would conclude, therefore, that the case is moot.   
 
FOOTNOTES
1OSA also challenges the TRO under Article 1, § 21 of the Wyoming 
Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  It provides no legal argument or 
authority with respect to its Fifth Amendment claim, and we thus will not 
address that claim.  OSA likewise 
does not provide a separate legal analysis of how the Wyoming provision might 
dictate an outcome that differs from that provided by application of the First 
Amendment.  This Court will not, as 
a matter of policy, consider a state constitutional claim in the absence of a 
sufficient argument supporting “adequate and independent state grounds.” Cohen 
v. State, 2008 WY 78, ¶ 23, 191 P.3d 956, 962 (Wyo. 2008); Rideout v. State, 2005 WY 141, ¶ 15, 122 P.3d 201, 205 (Wyo. 2005); Cotton v. 
State, 2005 WY 115, ¶ 14, 119 P.3d 931, 934 (Wyo. 2005); Vassar v. State, 2004 WY 125, ¶ 14, 99 P.3d 987, 993 (Wyo. 2004).  
Accordingly, we will confine our analysis of OSA’s claims to the First 
Amendment.
2The Town has noted that it has the right to impose reasonable time, 
manner and place restrictions on speech activities in the Town Square.  We do not take issue with this statement 
where such restrictions are imposed in a content-neutral manner.  The reasonable time, manner and place 
restriction analysis does not apply where the restriction at issue is 
content-based.  Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S.  at 469, 129 S. Ct.  at 1132.
 
We likewise agree with the Town that it has the right, through the use of 
content-neutral restrictions and subject to the reasonable time, manner and 
place requirement, to restrict speech in areas reserved for other uses.  See Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna 
Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649-52, 101 S. Ct. 2559, 2565-66, 69 L. Ed. 2d 298 (1981) (state’s interest in protecting the safety and convenience of 
persons using public forum and need to maintain orderly movement of crowd 
justified content-neutral, first-come, first-serve process of allocating 
designated space and limiting dissemination of written materials to that area); 
Mosley, 408 U.S.  at 98, 92 S. Ct.  at 
2292 (“Conflicting demands on the same place may compel the State to make 
choices among potential users and uses.”); Sanders v. United States, 518 F. Supp. 728, 730 (D. D.C. 1981) (government may impose content-neutral restriction on 
speech in an area reserved for another use).
3With respect to the timeframe, the record is not clear as to when Lt. 
Gilliam had the conversation with OSA members concerning the Boy Scout event. 
 The lieutenant’s affidavit does not 
specify the date, so we know only that the conversation occurred sometime 
between Wednesday, the 18th, and Friday, the 20th.  In any event, the time period at issue 
in Carroll was less than twenty-four 
hours, with the restraining order and the scheduled event both occurring on the 
same day, and the Supreme Court was not persuaded that it was impossible to 
provide the required notice and opportunity to be 
heard.
4OSA 
requested that this Court remand to the district court for consideration of an 
award of damages.  OSA did not 
support this request with legal authority or analysis, and we therefore decline 
to remand for any further proceedings.