Case Title: PEOPLE OF MI V RICHARD MENDOZA

Citation: 

Docket Number: 120630

State: michigan

Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Date: 2003-06-20T00:00:00Z

Document:
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________ 
Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan 48909 
Chief Justice 
Justices 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Elizabeth A. Weaver 
Marilyn Kelly 
Clifford W. Taylor 
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Opinion 
Stephen J. Markman 
FILED JUNE 20, 2003  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
v 
No. 120630  
RICHARD J. MENDOZA,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH  
YOUNG, J.  
Defendant was charged with first-degree murder, MCL  
750.316, but convicted by a jury of second-degree murder, MCL  
750.317.  
The 
Court 
of Appeals reversed defendant’s conviction  
and remanded the case for a new trial, reasoning that the  
trial court erred when it declined to give an involuntary­
manslaughter instruction.  This Court granted leave to appeal  
to consider whether manslaughter is an “inferior” offense of  
murder under MCL 768.32(1), and if so, whether a rational view  
of the evidence supported an instruction in this case.  
We conclude that manslaughter is an inferior offense of  
murder.  However, an involuntary-manslaughter instruction was  
not appropriate in this case because a rational view of the  
evidence did not support it.  Accordingly, we reverse the  
judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate defendant’s  
conviction.  To the extent that People v Van Wyck, 402 Mich  
266; 262 NW2d 638 (1978), and its progeny conflict with this  
opinion, they are overruled.  
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY  
Defendant and codefendant Ivan Tims visited the home of  
victim William Stockdale and Stockdale’s nephew, Thurman  
Chillers, with the intent to purchase marijuana.  Tims  
initially waited outside in the car while defendant discussed  
the price of the drugs with Stockdale and Chillers in the  
house.  Agreeing on a price, defendant indicated to Stockdale  
that he had to return to the car to get additional money.  
When defendant returned to the house, he was accompanied by  
Tims. Both men brandished handguns.  
Chillers testified that, upon entering the home,  
defendant instructed Tims to “shoot him.” In response, Tims  
alternately pointed his gun at Chillers and Stockdale.  
Stockdale, in turn, rushed at defendant, grabbed defendant’s  
gun and swung it downwards.  Chillers ran out of the house.  
2  
  
As he ran, he saw Stockdale “tussling” with defendant.  
Chillers further testified that he heard one shot while he was  
in the house and four or five more shots when he was outside.  
In the end, Stockdale was shot twice, once in the leg and once  
in the chest. The chest wound proved fatal.  
Defendant was charged with first-degree murder, MCL  
750.316, and possession of a firearm during the commission of  
a felony, MCL 750.227b.  His defense was that Tims shot  
Stockdale.
 Defendant elicited testimony from various  
witnesses establishing that defendant was not in the house  
when the victim was fatally wounded and that the fatal bullet  
came from a gun traceable to Tims.  
At the close of proofs, defendant requested instructions  
for voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, MCL 750.321, and  
careless, reckless, or negligent discharge of a firearm, MCL  
752.861. The trial court denied the requests and instructed  
the jury on first-degree murder, MCL 750.316, and second­
degree murder, MCL 750.317.  Defendant was convicted of  
second-degree murder and felony-firearm.  
The Court of Appeals reversed defendant’s conviction and  
remanded the case for a new trial.  The panel treated the  
manslaughter-instruction 
requests 
as 
requests 
for 
instructions  
on a “cognate” lesser included offense and concluded that the  
trial court erred in refusing to give the involuntary­
3  
  
  
  
 
 
manslaughter 
instruction 
because 
there 
was 
evidence 
from 
which  
the jury could conclude that the victim’s death was unintended  
and occurred while defendant was engaged in an unlawful act  
not amounting to a felony. Slip op at 2.  
The prosecutor applied for leave to appeal.1  We granted  
leave to consider whether manslaughter is an inferior offense  
of murder within the meaning of MCL 768.32 and, if so, whether  
an involuntary-manslaughter instruction was supported by a  
rational view of the evidence.  
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW  
Whether manslaughter is an inferior offense of murder  
within the meaning of MCL 768.32 is a question of law that the  
Court reviews de novo.  Weakland v Toledo Engineering Co, 467  
Mich 344, 347; 656 NW2d 175 (2003).  
III. ANALYSIS  
A. MCL 768.32  
MCL 
768.32 
governs 
inferior-offense 
instructions.  
Subsection 1 provides in pertinent part:  
. . .[U]pon an indictment for an offense, 
consisting of different degrees, as prescribed in 
this chapter, the jury, or the judge in a trial 
without a jury, may find the accused not guilty of 
the offense in the degree charged in the indictment 
and may find the accused person guilty of a degree  
1Defendant did not cross-appeal to challenge the judgment 
of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s decision 
not 
to 
give 
instructions on voluntary manslaughter or careless 
use of a firearm.  
4  
 
of that offense inferior to that charged in the 
indictment, or of an attempt to commit that  
offense.  
We recently examined this statute in People v Cornell,  
466 Mich 335; 646 NW2d 127 (2002).2  In Cornell, the Court  
considered whether necessarily included lesser offenses3 and  
cognate lesser included offenses4 were “inferior” offenses  
under MCL 768.32.  In consideration of this issue, we examined  
the meaning of the word “inferior”:  
“We believe that the word ‘inferior’ in [MCL 
768.32] does not refer to inferiority in the  
penalty associated with the offense, but, rather, 
to the absence of an element that distinguishes the 
charged offense from the lesser offense.  The  
controlling factor is whether the lesser offense 
can be proved by the same facts that are used to 
establish the charged offense.” [Cornell, supra at  
354, quoting People v Torres (On Remand), 222 Mich  
2The dissent criticizes the construction of MCL 768.32  
set forth in Cornell, arguing that the Court should apply the 
dictionary definition of “inferior.”  
We are confident that we applied the appropriate canon of 
statutory construction in construing MCL 768.32 by giving 
“inferior 
offense” 
its common-law meaning when it was codified 
by the Legislature. See Pulver v Dundee Cement Co, 445 Mich 
68, 75; 515 NW2d 728 (1994)(“words and phrases that have 
acquired a unique meaning at common law are interpreted as 
having the same meaning when used in statutes dealing with the 
same subject”).  
3Necessarily included lesser offenses are offenses in 
which the elements of the lesser offense are completely 
subsumed in the greater offense. Cornell, supra at 356.  
4Cognate offenses share several elements, and are of the 
same class or category as the greater offense, but the cognate 
lesser offense has some elements not found in the greater 
offense. Cornell, supra at 344.  
5  
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
App 411, 419-420; 564 NW2d 149 (1997)].  
Relying on this definition of “inferior,” this Court  
concluded that MCL 768.32 only permitted consideration of  
necessarily included lesser offenses. Cornell, supra at 353­
354. Thus, we held that an inferior-offense instruction is  
appropriate 
only 
if 
the lesser offense is necessarily included  
in the greater offense, meaning, all the elements of the  
lesser offense are included in the greater offense, and a  
rational view of the evidence would support such an  
instruction.5 
Id. at 357.  
5The dissent criticizes the majority opinion for adopting 
“obiter dictum” from Cornell to conclude that inferior  
offenses are limited to necessarily included lesser offenses. 
We disagree with this mischaracterization of Cornell’s  
analysis.  
In Cornell, the Court was charged with the task of 
construing MCL 768.32(1), because MCL 768.32(1) governs when 
instructions are given for “inferior” offenses.  To that end,  
we expressly adopted Justice COLEMAN’s dissent in Jones, infra, 
which 
would 
foreclose 
consideration 
of 
cognate 
lesser 
included 
offenses. Cornell, supra at 353. See also Cornell, supra at  
356 n 9, in which we state, “as we have already explained, the 
wording of MCL 768.32 also limits consideration of lesser 
offenses to necessarily included lesser offenses.” We then 
expressly held that a requested instruction on a necessarily 
included lesser offense is proper if the charged greater 
offense requires a jury to find a disputed factual element 
that is not part of the lesser offense and a rational view of 
the evidence would support it. Id. at 357.  
Accordingly, 
we 
disagree 
with 
the 
dissent’s  
characterization of the Cornell analysis as “obiter dictum.” 
Rather, the Cornell discussion of the limits of MCL 768.32 was  
central to our construction of the statute and thus central to  
the resolution of the issues before the Cornell Court.  
6  
  
B. MANSLAUGHTER IS AN INFERIOR OFFENSE OF MURDER  
Manslaughter is an inferior offense of murder because  
manslaughter is a necessarily included lesser offense of  
murder.  
1. THE ELEMENTS OF COMMON-LAW MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER  
Common-law murder encompasses all killings done with  
malice aforethought and without justification or excuse.  
People v Scott, 6 Mich 287, 292-293 (1859). See also People  
v Potter, 5 Mich 1, 6 (1858)(“Murder is where a person of  
sound memory and discretion unlawfully kills any reasonable  
creature in being, in the peace of the state, with malice  
prepense or aforethought, either express or implied.”).  
First-degree murder is defined in MCL 750.316.6
 All  
6MCL 750.316 provides in pertinent part: 
(1) A person who commits any of the following 
is guilty of first degree murder and shall be 
punished by imprisonment for life:  
(a) Murder perpetrated by means of poison, 
lying in wait, or any other willful, deliberate, 
and premeditated killing.  
(b) Murder committed in the perpetration of, 
or attempt to perpetrate, arson, criminal sexual 
conduct in the first, second, or third degree, 
child abuse in the first degree, a major controlled 
substance offense, robbery, carjacking, breaking 
and entering of a dwelling, home invasion in the 
first or second degree, larceny of any kind, 
extortion, or kidnapping.  
(c) A murder of a peace officer or a corrections  
7  
other murders are murders in the second degree.  MCL 750.317.  
See also People v Goecke, 457 Mich 442, 463-464; 579 NW2d 868  
(1998), which enumerated the elements of second-degree murder  
as (1) death, (2) caused by defendant’s act, (3) with malice,  
and (4) without justification.  
Manslaughter 
is murder without malice.  See Potter, 
supra  
at 9 (noting that without malice aforethought, “a killing  
would be only manslaughter, if criminal at all”).  See also  
People v Palmer, 105 Mich 568, 576; 63 NW 656 (1895),  
remarking:  
“Manslaughter is perfectly distinguishable 
from murder, in this: That though the act that 
causes death be unlawful or willful, though 
attended with fatal results, yet malice, either 
expressed or implied, which is the very essence of 
murder, is to be presumed to be wanting in  
manslaughter.” [Quoting the trial court jury 
instructions.]  
The 
common 
law 
recognizes two forms of manslaughter: voluntary  
officer committed while the peace officer or  
corrections officer is lawfully engaged in the 
performance of any of his or her duties as a peace 
officer or corrections officer, knowing that the 
peace officer or corrections officer is a peace 
officer or corrections officer engaged in the 
performance of his or her duty as a peace officer 
or corrections officer.  
Although first-degree murder is defined by statute, the 
statute is understood to include the common-law definition of  
murder.  See People v Riddle, 467 Mich 116, 125-126; 649 NW2d  
30 (2002). See also People v Utter, 217 Mich 74, 86; 185 NW 
830 (1921).  
8  
 
 
  
 
and involuntary. People v Townes, 391 Mich 578, 589; 218 NW2d  
136 (1974).  
Common-law voluntary manslaughter is defined as:  
[T]he act of killing, though intentional, [is] 
committed under the influence of passion or in heat 
of blood, produced by an adequate or reasonable 
provocation, and before a reasonable time has  
elapsed for the blood to cool and reason to resume 
its habitual control, and is the result of the 
temporary excitement, by which the control of 
reason was disturbed, rather than of any wickedness 
of heart or cruelty or recklessness of disposition 
. . . .[Maher v People, 10 Mich 212, 219 (1862).]  
See also Townes, supra at 590 (“A defendant properly convicted  
of voluntary manslaughter is a person who has acted out of a  
temporary excitement induced by an adequate provocation and  
not from the deliberation and reflection that marks the crime  
of murder.”).  Thus, to show voluntary manslaughter, one must  
show that the defendant killed in the heat of passion, the  
passion was caused by adequate provocation, and there was not  
a lapse of time during which a reasonable person could control  
his passions.  See People v Pouncey, 437 Mich 382, 389; 471  
NW2d 346 (1991).7  Significantly, provocation is not an  
element of voluntary manslaughter.  See People v Moore, 189  
7In addition to common-law manslaughter, the Legislature 
has also determined that manslaughter shall exist in several 
other circumstances.  See, e.g., MCL 750.322 (the willful 
killing of an unborn child by injury to its mother), MCL 
750.323 (the killing of a quick child by use of medicine or an 
instrument, and MCL 750.329 (a killing committed without 
malice by means of an intentionally aimed firearm).  
9  
  
Mich App 315, 320; 472 NW2d 1 (1991).  Rather, provocation is  
the circumstance that negates the presence of malice.  Scott,  
supra at 295.  
Involuntary manslaughter is the unintentional killing of  
another, without malice, during the commission of an unlawful  
act not amounting to a felony and not naturally tending to  
cause great bodily harm; or during the commission of some  
lawful act, negligently performed; or in the negligent  
omission to perform a legal duty. See Townes, supra at 590.  
See also People v Helfin, 434 Mich 482, 507-508; 456 NW2d 10  
(1990)(opinion by RILEY, C.J.).  
2. THE SOLE ELEMENT DISTINGUISHING MANSLAUGHTER AND MURDER IS MALICE  
An examination of the historical development of homicide  
law informs this Court that manslaughter is a necessarily  
included lesser offense of murder because the elements of  
manslaughter are included in the offense of murder.  
a. HOMICIDE IN ENGLISH COMMON LAW  
In early English common law, a killing was either  
justifiable 
homicide; 
excusable 
murder 
committed 
by  
misadventure or accident, or in self-defense; or capital  
murder, characterized by “malice aforethought” and punishable  
by death.  See 2 Pollock and Maitland, The History of English  
Law (Cambridge: University Press, 1952), ch VIII, Crime and  
Tort, § 2, p 485.  However, during the fourteenth and  
10  
 
 
 
fifteenth centuries, an exemption called the “benefit of  
clergy” was widely used as a device to mitigate mandatory  
death sentences.  Hall, Legal fictions and moral reasoning:  
Capital punishment and the mentally retarded defendant after  
Penry v Johnson, 35 Akron L R 327, 353 (2002).  
The “benefit of clergy” was an exemption that allowed an  
offender to be sentenced by the ecclesiastical courts, which  
did not impose capital punishment.8  Though it was initially  
intended to benefit clergy, it also benefitted persons who  
could satisfy its literacy test.  See Kealy, Hunting the  
dragon: Reforming the Massachusetts murder statute, 10 B U Pub  
Int L J 203, 205-206 (2001).  Thus, it was not long before  
persons other than clerics claimed the exemption, so that the  
“benefit of clergy” exemption benefitted anyone who could  
read.
 See Justice Harlan’s discussion in McGautha v  
California, 402 US 183, 197; 91 S Ct 1454; 28 L Ed 2d 711  
(1971), 
noting 
that 
although all criminal homicides were prima  
facie capital cases, the “benefit of clergy” was available to  
almost any man who could read.  
In response to the exemption’s widespread availability,  
statutes were passed throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth  
8The “benefit of clergy” was a political compromise 
between the state and the church, intended to ensure errant 
clerics who were convicted in the royal court were turned over 
to the ecclesiastical courts for sentencing.  
11  
 
  
  
centuries proclaiming the exemption unavailable for homicides  
committed 
under 
particularly 
reviled 
circumstances,  
collectively termed “murder with malice aforethought.”  
Moreland, 
The 
Law 
of 
Homicide 
(Indianapolis: 
The 
Bobbs-Merrill  
Co, Inc, 1952), ch 2, The Development of Malice Aforethought,  
p 9.  The “benefit of clergy” remained available, however, for  
offenders convicted of less culpable homicides. 
Id.  
Thereafter, unjustified and unexcused homicide was divided  
into 
two 
separate 
crimes: 
“wilful 
murder 
of 
malice  
aforethought”, a capital offense for which the “benefit of  
clergy” was unavailable, and manslaughter.  Plucknett, A  
Concise History of the Common Law (New York: The Lawyers Co- 
Operative Pub Co, 1927), ch 2, The Felonies, pp 395-396. The  
critical difference between murder and manslaughter was the  
presence 
or 
absence 
of “malice aforethought.”  Moreland, supra  
at 10.  
b. “MALICE AFORETHOUGHT”  
The phrase “malice aforethought” has evolved over the  
centuries.  During the late fifteenth and early sixteenth  
centuries, “malice aforethought” meant that one possessed an  
intent to kill well in advance of the act itself. Id. at 10.  
Notably, the emphasis was on “aforethought,” so that the  
critical difference between capital and noncapital murder was  
the passage of time between the initial formulation of the  
12  
 
intent to kill and the act itself.  Moylan, Criminal Homicide  
Law (Maryland Institute for Continuing Professional Education  
of Lawyers), ch 2, § 2.7.  The term “malice” alone had little  
significance 
beyond 
meaning an intent to commit an unjustified  
and unexcusable killing.  Id. The purpose of the “malice  
aforethought” element was to distinguish between deliberate,  
calculated homicides and homicides committed in the heat of  
passion. Kealy, supra at 206.  
As more and more defendants claimed they lacked an intent  
to kill before the act was committed, juries and courts  
increasingly rejected this argument. The result was a case­
by-case “semantic erosion” of the term “aforethought,” until  
“malice aforethought” meant nothing more than the intent to  
kill had to exist at the time the act was committed. Perkins  
& Boyce, Criminal Law (3rd ed), Murder, § 1, p 58 (“[a]s case  
after case came before the courts for determination . . .  
there came to be less and less emphasis upon the notion of a  
well-laid plan.  And at the present day, the only requirement  
in this regard is that it must not be an afterthought”).  
There 
was, 
consequently, a parallel erosion of the distinction  
between capital murder, for which aforethought was required,  
and noncapital homicide, for which it was not.  
Interestingly, although the English courts grew weary of  
the oft abused “lack of aforethought” defense, it was  
13  
 
 
nevertheless evident that there was still some interest in  
distinguishing between a homicide committed in “cold-blood”  
and one committed under circumstances that mitigated one’s  
culpability. To express this distinction, the focus shifted  
from “aforethought” to “malice.”  Moreland, supra at 11  
(“[t]he law of homicide seems thus to have now progressed from  
a place where the mental element was of no importance to a  
place where at the beginning of the seventeenth century it had  
become a factor of prime importance”).  
Because there was a need to distinguish the most serious  
homicide from the rest, and because “aforethought” no longer  
had legal significance, malice evolved from being merely an  
intent to kill to also evidencing the absence of mitigating  
circumstances.  Moylan, supra at § 2.7. 
Consequently, the  
presence of malice became both synonymous with the absence of  
mitigating circumstances and the sole element distinguishing  
murder from manslaughter.  
We 
glean 
from 
our 
examination 
of 
manslaughter’s  
historical 
development 
that 
manslaughter 
is 
defined 
to 
reflect  
the absence of malice.  Thus, the only element distinguishing  
murder from manslaughter is malice.  
3. MANSLAUGHTER IS A NECESSARILY LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF MURDER  
A 
necessarily 
lesser included offense is an offense whose  
elements are completely subsumed in the greater offense.  
14  
 
 
Cornell, supra at 356.  
Regarding voluntary manslaughter, both murder and  
voluntary manslaughter require a death, caused by defendant,  
with either an intent to kill, an intent to commit great  
bodily harm, or an intent to create a very high risk of death  
or great bodily harm with knowledge that death or great bodily  
harm was the probable result. 
However, the element  
distinguishing murder from manslaughter–malice–is negated by  
the presence of provocation and heat of passion. See Scott,  
supra at 295. Thus, we conclude, the elements of voluntary  
manslaughter are included in murder, with murder possessing  
the single additional element of malice.  
Regarding 
involuntary 
manslaughter, 
the 
lack 
of 
malice 
is  
evidenced by involuntary manslaughter’s diminished mens rea,  
which is included in murder’s greater mens rea. See People v  
Datema, 448 Mich 585, 606; 533 NW2d 272 (1995), stating:  
“[P]ains should be taken not to define [the 
mens rea required for involuntary manslaughter] in 
terms of a wanton and wilful disregard of a harmful 
consequence known to be likely to result, because  
such a state of mind goes beyond negligence and  
comes under the head of malice.”  
Unlike 
murder, 
involuntary 
manslaughter 
contemplates an unintended result and thus requires 
something less than an intent to do great bodily 
harm, an intent to kill, or the wanton and wilful 
disregard of its natural consequences. [Citations 
omitted; emphasis added.]  
See also United States v Browner, 889 F2d 549, 553 (CA 5,  
15  
1989), stating, “In contrast to the case of voluntary  
manslaughter . . . the absence of malice in involuntary  
manslaughter arises not because of provocation induced  
passion, but rather because the offender’s mental state is not  
sufficiently culpable to reach the traditional malice  
requirements.”  
Thus, we conclude that the elements of involuntary  
manslaughter are included in the offense of murder because  
involuntary manslaughter’s mens rea is included in murder’s  
greater mens rea.  
Accordingly, we hold the elements of voluntary and  
involuntary manslaughter are included in the elements of  
murder.  Thus, both forms of manslaughter are necessarily  
included lesser offenses of murder.  Because voluntary and  
involuntary manslaughter are necessarily included lesser  
offenses, they are also “inferior” offenses within the scope  
of MCL 768.32. Consequently, when a defendant is charged with  
murder, 
an 
instruction 
for 
voluntary 
and 
involuntary  
manslaughter must be given if supported by a rational view of  
the evidence. Cornell, supra.  
4. TODAY’S HOLDING IS CONSISTENT WITH EARLY MICHIGAN COMMON LAW  
Today’s 
holding 
is 
consistent 
with 
our 
courts’ 
historical  
understanding of the law of murder. Michigan courts have  
historically concluded that a manslaughter instruction is  
16  
 
 
 
 
appropriate on a murder charge if a manslaughter instruction  
is supported by a rational view of the evidence. See, e.g.,  
Hanna v People, 19 Mich 316, 321 (1869)(in consideration of  
MCL 768.32's similarly worded predecessor, “without this  
provision, the common law rule would, under the statute,  
dividing 
murder 
into 
degrees, have authorized a conviction not  
only for murder in the second degree, but for manslaughter  
also, under an indictment for murder in the first degree, all  
these 
being 
felonies 
included 
in 
the 
charge”)(emphasis 
added).  
See People v Treichel, 229 Mich 303, 307-308; 200 NW 950  
(1924), stating:  
This Court has repeatedly held, where the 
charge as laid includes murder in the first degree, 
and the proofs establish such degree, and no lesser 
degree, it is not error for the court to instruct 
the jury that, in order to convict, murder in the 
first degree must be found.  But this court has not  
held, under a charge like here laid, the court must  
instruct the jury to find murder in the first 
degree or acquit. Whether such an instruction may 
be given or not depends upon the evidence.  
[Emphasis in original.]  
[In this case, the] information charged murder 
in the first and second degrees, and this was 
inclusive of manslaughter.  The evidence left it  
open for the jury to find defendants guilty of 
manslaughter.  
See also People v Droste, 160 Mich 66, 78-79; 125 NW 87  
(1910)(concluding 
that 
the 
trial 
court 
was 
“clearly 
warranted”  
in instructing the jury on manslaughter in a murder case  
because a jury could have concluded there was sufficient  
17  
 
 
intoxication or passion to “rob [defendant’s] act of the  
necessary elements of murder”); People v Andrus, 331 Mich 535,  
546-547; 50 NW2d 310 (1951)(remarking that it was proper for  
the court to submit the lesser included offenses of second­
degree murder and manslaughter because the evidence was  
sufficient to support the offense).  
It was not until this Court overlooked MCL 768.32, and  
introduced “cognate” lesser included offenses, that the  
relationship between manslaughter and murder became muddled.  
In People v Jones, 395 Mich 379; 236 NW2d 461 (1975), this  
Court, without consideration of MCL 768.32, recognized a new  
category of lesser included offenses called “cognate”  
offenses. 
 
Cognate 
offenses 
differed 
from 
necessarily 
included  
lesser offenses in that cognate offenses share with the higher  
offense several elements and are of the same class or  
category, but they contain elements not found in the higher  
offense.
 See Cornell, supra at 344-346. 
Faced with a  
category 
of 
lesser 
included 
offenses 
not 
previously 
recognized  
in Michigan, this Court, in Van Wyck, supra, concluded that  
manslaughter was a cognate lesser included offense of murder:  
We hold that manslaughter is not a necessarily 
included offense within the crime of murder but  
that it may nonetheless be an included offense if 
the evidence adduced at trial would support a  
verdict of guilty for that crime.  
18  
 
As we noted in People v Ora Jones, supra:  
“The common-law definition of lesser included  
offenses is that the lesser must be such that it is  
impossible to commit the greater without first 
having committed the lesser.” [Citation omitted.]  
* * *  
[With 
regard 
to 
the 
murder/manslaughter 
relationship], 
[t]he 
absence 
of 
mitigating 
circumstances need not be established in order to  
convict one of first- or second-degree murder. 
Consequently, 
it 
cannot 
be 
said 
voluntary 
manslaughter is a necessarily included offense 
within the crime of murder; it is incorrect to 
state that it is impossible to commit first- or 
second-degree murder without having first committed 
manslaughter. [Van Wyck, supra at 268-269.]  
Notably, the Van Wyck Court failed to discuss earlier common­
law 
decisions 
characterizing 
manslaughter 
as 
a 
lesser 
included  
offense of murder before cognate offenses were recognized.  We  
also note that the Van Wyck Court did not give any  
consideration to the unique relationship between murder and  
manslaughter.  
For 
the 
reasons 
discussed 
above, 
we 
conclude 
manslaughter  
is a necessarily included lesser offense of murder. We further  
conclude that Van Wyck’s analysis is flawed inasmuch as it is  
premised on a body of law recognizing cognate lesser included  
offenses in contravention of MCL 768.32. Accordingly, to the  
extent that Van Wyck and its progeny are inconsistent with  
this opinion and our opinion in Cornell, they are expressly  
overruled.  
19  
C. AN INVOLUNTARY-MANSLAUGHTER INSTRUCTION WAS NOT WARRANTED  
Having 
concluded 
that 
manslaughter 
is 
an 
inferior 
offense  
of murder because it is a necessarily included lesser offense,  
we now consider whether the trial court erred in refusing to  
give an involuntary-manslaughter instruction.  
An inferior-offense instruction is appropriate only when  
a rational view of the evidence supports a conviction for the  
lesser offense.  Cornell, supra at 357. 
In this case, the  
Court of Appeals concluded there was sufficient evidence to  
support an involuntary-manslaughter instruction.  In reaching  
this conclusion, the Court relied on defendant’s statement to  
the police recounting what happened:  
I was at a gas station on Seven Mile near 
Hoover when Ivan pulled up in a gray newer model 
car and asked me did I want some bud.  Ivan asked  
me did I have half on it.  I said, yes. I then got 
into the car with Ivan.  Ivan stopped by one house, 
then he went to the bud house. When we got to the 
house, Ivan stayed in the car and I went to the 
house.  When I got to the front door, there was a 
big guy coming out and motioned for me just to go 
on in.  The guy that let me in continued talking to 
a big dark-skinned guy with a deep voice. Another  
guy, kind of frail [Chillers], sitting in a love 
seat asked me how many I needed.  I responded by 
saying, just one back.  That’s when Ivan came to  
the door.  Ivan started talking to the guy with the 
deep voice.  The guy that let me in then left. I  
started to get my stuff from the frail guy. While  
I’m getting my stuff, I heard some tussling.  I  
look back and Ivan was tussling with the big guy 
with the deep voice.  They were tussling over a 
handgun with a dark barrel.  While they were 
tussling, I heard approximately two shots.  They 
then fell into a corner over a chair.  I then heard  
the frail guy holler.  He had pulled out a shiny  
20  
revolver and pointed it at Ivan and the guy he was 
tussling with.  I then tried to knock the gun away  
from [Chillers]. As I was attempting to knock the  
gun away from [Chillers], he pulled the trigger. I  
then tried to run but I tripped over Ivan . . . . 
[Emphasis added.]  
The 
Court 
of 
Appeals 
concluded 
that 
defendant’s 
statement  
that Chillers pulled the trigger when defendant tried to knock  
the gun away from him was sufficient to support an  
involuntary-manslaughter conviction.  The Court reasoned that  
defendant’s statement could support a finding that the  
victim’s killing was an unintended death, without malice, and  
not caused by any action of defendant naturally tending to  
cause death.  
We 
disagree 
and 
conclude 
that 
defendant’s 
statement 
alone  
is insufficient to support an involuntary-manslaughter  
instruction.  
Defendant’s statement does not indicate that the  
shot fired during the struggle struck or killed the victim. In  
fact, during his request for an involuntary-manslaughter  
instruction, defendant argued that the shot fired during the  
struggle was the nonfatal shot to the victim’s leg.9  
9Defense counsel argued in support of the manslaughter 
instruction as follows:  
Alternatively 
there’s 
also 
involuntary 
manslaughter, now that I think about it, in terms 
of that gun potentially accidentally [sic] going 
off during the struggle over the gun at the time 
it’s discharged. That’s how I claim that the shot  
to the leg happened, when they were struggling over  
the gun.” [Emphasis added.]  
21  
   
  
Therefore, because there is no evidence that the shot  
fired during the struggle killed the victim, and in light of  
the substantial evidence that the shot was not the fatal shot,  
we conclude a rational view of the evidence does not support  
an involuntary-manslaughter instruction.  
We further disagree with the conclusion of the Court of  
Appeals that an instruction for common-law involuntary  
manslaughter was premised on defendant’s theory of the case.  
Defendant’s  theory throughout trial was that someone else was  
responsible for the victim’s death. Consider defendant’s  
opening statement, in which he sets forth his theory:  
What really occurred in this situation that 
you’ll see is sure, my client Mr. Mendoza and Mr. 
Tims went over to that location.  They didn’t go 
over there to harm anybody.  They went over there 
to buy what Mr. Stockdale and what Mr. Chillers 
were in the business to sell, which is marijuana 
. . .  
* * *  
You’ll hear that, that Mr. Tims . . . and 
another person were tussling over a handgun.  And  
while they’re tussling, shots went off.  And my 
client went over there to try to prevent that from 
happening. And that’s when the tussle broke out.  
When my client’s running out of that location, he 
gets shot by Mr. Chillers.  
So, it’s not my client that’s doing any  
shooting in there.  It’s Mr. Chillers who’s causing  
all these problems and doing shooting in there.  
Expert testimony established that the leg wound was not the 
fatal injury.  
22  
 
 
 
  
* * *  
So, what happened here is after my client, 
after he’s running away and Mr. Chillers shoots him 
and he’s running to the car wounded, Mr. Tims on 
his own goes back up to that front door with that 
revolver in his hand and started shooting into the 
house. And that’s when Mr. Stockdale gets shot in  
the chest.  
* * *  
This is what I believe the evidence will show  
. . . That gun was never in the possession of Mr. 
Mendoza. That gun was the one identified as being 
in the hands of Mr. Tims when he went back on his  
own. [Emphasis added.]  
It is, therefore, clear that defendant’s theory was that Tims  
was responsible for the victim’s death.  
In sum, we conclude that a rational view of the evidence  
did not support an involuntary-manslaughter instruction.  
Therefore, it was not error for the trial court to deny the  
instruction.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the  
Court of Appeals.  
IV. CONCLUSION  
Manslaughter, in both its forms, is an inferior offense  
of murder within the meaning of MCL 768.32.  Therefore, an  
instruction is warranted when a rational view of the evidence  
would support it.  Van Wyck and its progeny are overruled to  
the extent the Van Wyck analysis of the relationship between  
manslaughter and murder holds otherwise.  
In this case, we conclude a rational view of the evidence  
did not support an involuntary-manslaughter instruction.  
23  
Therefore, the trial court did not err when it refused to give  
the instruction.  Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the  
Court of Appeals and reinstate defendant’s second-degree  
murder conviction.  
Robert P. Young, Jr. 
Maura D. Corrigan 
Elizabeth A. Weaver  
Clifford W. Taylor 
Stephen J. Markman  
24  
___________________________________ 
 
v 
S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N  
SUPREME COURT  
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,  
Plaintiff-Appellant,  
No. 120630  
RICHARD MENDOZA,  
Defendant-Appellee.  
CAVANAGH, J. (concurring).  
This Court granted leave to appeal to determine whether  
MCL 
768.32 
permits 
a 
manslaughter instruction when a defendant  
has been charged with murder.  Because the majority has  
misinterpreted MCL 768.32, I must respectfully dissent from  
its analysis, though I concur in its result.  
The 
majority 
applies obiter dictum from People v Cornell,  
466 Mich 335; 646 NW2d 127 (2002), to hold that an “inferior”  
offense, as articulated by the Legislature in 1846, is limited  
to a necessarily included lesser offense.10  While I agree that  
manslaughter is an offense inferior to and necessarily  
included within the crime of murder, I do not agree that this  
10 MCL 768.32, formerly codified as tit XXX, ch 161, § 16, 
Rev Stat of 1846.  
  
 
Court should limit instructions authorized by MCL 768.32 to  
only those that are necessarily included in the charged  
offense.  Rather, I would hold that, when requested, a jury  
may be instructed on lesser or “inferior” offenses of the  
crime charged, if those offenses are supported by the  
evidence.  
I  
The proper scope of MCL 768.32 presents a question of  
statutory interpretation, which we review de novo.  In re MCI,  
460 Mich 396, 413; 596 NW2d 164 (1999).  
II  
The relevant portion of MCL 768.32 now provides:  
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), upon  
an indictment for an offense, consisting of  
different degrees, as prescribed in this chapter, 
the jury, or the judge in a trial without a jury, 
may find the accused not guilty of the offense in 
the degree charged in the indictment and may find 
the accused person guilty of a degree of that 
offense inferior to that charged in the indictment, 
or of an attempt to commit that offense.[11]  
Relying on established doctrines of interpretation, one  
11 
The 
current 
subsection 
2 
refers 
to 
controlled-substance  
provisions.  The original statute provided:  
Upon an indictment for any offence, consisting 
of different degrees, as prescribed in this title, 
the jury may find the accused not guilty of the 
offence in the degree charged in the indictment, 
and may find such accused person guilty of any 
degree of such offence, inferior to that charged in 
the indictment, or of an attempt to commit such 
offence.  [Rev Stat of 1846, tit XXX, ch 161,  
§ 16.]  
2  
  
cannot disagree that the first step in discerning legislative  
intent requires review of the statutory text adopted by the  
Legislature. 
House Speaker v State Administrative Bd, 441  
Mich 547, 567; 495 NW2d 539 (1993). See also MCL 8.3a (“All  
words and phrases shall be construed and understood according  
to the common and approved usage of the language . . . .”).  
If unambiguous, the Legislature will be presumed to have  
intended the meaning expressed.  Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439  
Mich 370, 376; 483 NW2d 844 (1992).  We often refer to the  
dictionary to discern a statute’s plain meaning.  See Wayne Co  
Prosecuting Attorney v Levenburg & Richmond, 406 Mich 455,  
465-466; 280 NW2d 810 (1979) (dictionaries provide plain  
meaning).  
The dispositive issue presented for review is the scope  
of the term “inferior,” which may be defined as follows:  
Inferior. 1. Lower in place. 2. Lower in 
station, age, or rank in life. 
3. Lower in  
excellence or value; as a poem of inferior merit. 
4. Subordinate; of less importance. [American 
Dictionary of the English Language, Noah Webster, 
Vol. 1, (originally published 1828, reprinted 
1970).12]  
12 See also:  
Inferior.  Is usually employed in law to 
designate the lower of two grades of authority, 
jurisdiction, or power. [Dictionary of Terms and 
Phrases used in American or English Jurisprudence, 
Vol 1, p 603 (1879).]  
(continued...) 
3  
 
This definition has changed little since the nineteenth  
century, and the meaning of an offense “inferior” to another  
continues to suggest a lower offense, or one that is somehow  
less 
than 
the 
charged 
crime.13
 
Applied 
here, 
this  
interpretation supports a “lesser offense” approach.  
In spite of this textual evidence, the majority would  
prefer to adopt a “necessarily included lesser offense”  
interpretation, assigning a meaning to "inferior" that is  
contrary to its everyday usage, while providing no textual  
explanation for its narrow construction.  Instead, the  
majority adopts its obiter dictum from Cornell and relies on  
several prudential (i.e., policy-based) reasons to reject an  
(...continued) 
Inferior. 1. Lower in position; situated below 
. . . 3. Lower in degree, rank, importance,
quality, amount, or other respect; of less value or
consideration; lesser; subordinate.  With to = 
lower than, less than, not so good or great as;
unequal to . . . . [Oxford English Dictionary (2d
ed).] 
Inferior. . . 3. Lower in degree, rank, 
importance, quality, amount, or other respect; of 
less value or consideration . . . b. with to =  
lower than, less than, not so good or great as; 
unequal to. [A New English Dictionary on Historical  
Principles, 
Murray, 
Oxford 
(1901, 
originally 
published 1888).]  
13 Inferior.  adj. 1. Situated under or beneath.  2. Low  
or lower in order, degree, or rank.  3. Low or lower in  
quality, status, or estimation. [American Heritage Dictionary  
of the English Language, New College Edition (1981).]  
4  
 
 
 
interpretation of “inferior” that conforms with its everyday  
usage.  
Foremost among the majority’s rationale may be the  
alleged ease with which the necessarily included lesser  
offense framework may be applied. Cornell, supra. However,  
I cannot agree that the majority’s framework can be applied  
more simply than a “lesser offense” inquiry because each  
varies on the basis of the degree of specificity with which  
one reviews the elements of a crime.  This Court, for example,  
has wavered on the precise issue presented here.  In People v  
Van Wyck, 402 Mich 266; 262 NW2d 638 (1978), this Court held  
that manslaughter was not a necessarily included lesser  
offense of murder:  
The absence of mitigating circumstances need 
not be established in order to convict one of  
first- or second-degree murder.  Consequently, it 
cannot be said that voluntary manslaughter is a 
necessarily included offense within the crime of 
murder; it is incorrect to state that it is  
impossible to commit first- or second-degree murder 
without having first committed manslaughter. [Id.  
at 269.]  
As the majority correctly notes today, when viewed in  
general terms, “the only element distinguishing murder from  
manslaughter is malice.”  Ante at 14. Hence, manslaughter is  
both an “inferior” and a necessarily included lesser offense  
of murder; the difference between Van Wyck and the Court’s  
decision today results from the degree of precision employed  
5  
by the Court in its analysis of the elements of murder and  
manslaughter.  
Instead of addressing such difficulties, the majority  
ignores this and similar inconsistencies.  For example,  
although “felonious assault” is not strictly a necessarily  
included lesser offense of “assault with intent to do great  
bodily harm less than murder” because the former requires the  
use of a dangerous weapon, it is clearly an “inferior” charge  
as prescribed by any reasonable interpretation of the statute  
(i.e., “inferior”), yet the majority’s approach provides no  
means by which to recognize this relationship.  Similarly  
troubling, the crime of “assault with intent to do great  
bodily harm” is plainly included within the crime of “assault  
with intent to murder,” but our Courts have held that  
different degrees of malice (i.e., intent to do great harm  
versus intent to murder) constitute cognate–not necessarily  
included–offenses. See, e.g., People v Norwood, unpublished  
opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued March 20,  
2001 (Docket No. 218207).  In sum, the majority’s doctrine  
cannot logically provide the bright-line rule that it seeks,  
and its narrow construction is not supported by the text.  
III  
Although, I do not dispute that the meaning of MCL 768.32  
6  
 
 
 
 
 
has been subject to debate lately,14 the majority has recently  
acknowledged that, as early as 1869, this Court permitted  
convictions on “inferior” offenses:  
[E]xtending to all cases in which the statute 
has substantially, or in effect, recognized and 
provided 
for the 
punishment 
of 
offenses 
of  
different grades, or degrees of enormity, wherever 
the charge for the higher grade includes a charge 
for the less.  In this view only, can any effect be 
given to it, as declaratory of, or altering the 
common law.  [Hanna v People, 19 Mich 316, 322 
(1869).]  
Before Cornell, this Court repeatedly affirmed this  
lesser offense approach,15 in accord with the plain meaning of  
14 Cornell, supra (noting in dicta that MCL 768.32 limits 
instructions to necessarily included lesser offenses and 
overruling, inter alia, People v Jones, 395 Mich 379; 236 NW2d 
461 [1975], People v Chamblis, 395 Mich 408; 236 NW2d 473 
[1975]).  
15 See also People v Andrus, 331 Mich 535; 50 NW2d 310 
(1951) (noting this Court’s treatment of MCL 768.32, which 
permits an instruction on lesser offenses when supported by 
the evidence); People v Jones, 273 Mich 430; 263 NW 417 (1935) 
(holding that the court erred so as to require reversal when 
it affirmatively excluded a lesser offense from the jury’s 
consideration); People v Abbott, 97 Mich 484; 56 NW 862 (1893) 
(reversing where the court failed to instruct the jury on a 
lesser included offense); People v Courier, 79 Mich 366; 44 NW 
571 (1890) (refusing the defendant’s request for a new trial 
where the court did provide the jury with a lesser included 
rape offense instruction); People v Prague, 72 Mich 178; 40 NW 
243 (1888) (“The crime of an assault with intent to commit the 
crime of murder is one of a higher grade and greater enormity 
than the crime of assault with intent to do great bodily harm 
less than the crime of murder.  It belongs to the catalogue of 
offenses against the lives and persons of individuals, and we 
think the charge was authorized by the opinion of this Court 
in Hanna . . . .”); People v Warner, 53 Mich 78; 18 NW 568 
(1884) (a conviction for simple assault may be had on any 
(continued...) 
7  
 
the statute. In People v Jones, 395 Mich 379, 387; 236 NW2d  
461 (1975), for example, this Court confirmed a case-by-case  
approach to inferior offense instructions, acknowledging that  
the strict, common-law rule, which had permitted lesser  
offense instructions only when necessarily included in the  
crime charged, had been replaced by a statute that authorized  
a broader range of convictions “inferior” to the crime  
charged.  Although, the majority attempts to claim its holding  
has a historical foundation, it, in fact, usurps this Court’s  
longstanding interpretation, which accords with the statute’s  
plain meaning.  
IV  
The majority may claim I have done nothing but pine for  
the “cognate” or related-offense approach, which it expressly  
rejected in Cornell. To the degree that a “cognate” offense  
is “inferior” to the crime charged, I cannot disagree.  I  
remain 
committed 
to 
the 
“lesser 
included 
offense”  
interpretation of “inferior” simply because it is best able to  
honor the statutory text, as noted above.  
(...continued)
information charging assault on an officer and resisting 
arrest); Campbell v People, 34 Mich 351 (1876) (“. . . under 
an indictment charging a specific offense it was competent for 
the jury to find the respondent guilty of a lesser offense 
included in it.  The lesser offense of felonious assault is  
necessarily included in the offense of rape; the completed 
offense being the aggravation of the criminal assault.”).  
8  
 
 
 
Further, it accords with the longstanding doctrine that  
requires courts to construe criminal statutes in favor of  
defendants.  In United States v Wiltberger, 18 US (5 Wheat)  
76, 95; 5 L Ed 31 (1820), Chief Justice Marshall noted:  
The rule that penal laws are to be construed 
strictly, is perhaps not much less old than  
construction itself. 
It is founded on the  
tenderness 
of 
the 
law 
for 
the 
rights 
of  
individuals; and on the plain principle that the 
power of punishment is vested in the legislative, 
not in the judicial department. It is the  
legislature, not the Court, which is to define a 
crime, and ordain its punishment.  
See also People v Webb, 127 Mich 29, 32; 86 NW 406 (1901)  
(“Penal statutes must be strictly construed, and words used  
are to be given their popular, rather than a technical,  
meaning.”); Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (Princeton,  
N.J.; Princeton University Press, 1997), p 29 (“The rule of  
lenity is almost as old as the common law itself, so I suppose  
that is validated by sheer antiquity.”) Its application here  
would give an accused the opportunity to request an 
instruction in conformity with defense theories, when 
supported by the evidence. 
V 
As noted, this Court today unanimously affirms that a  
defendant facing a murder charge may request a manslaughter  
instruction if supported by the evidence.  However, nothing in  
the 
record 
would 
support 
an 
involuntary-manslaughter  
9  
conviction in this case, which requires a finding of death,  
caused by an act of defendant, with gross negligence.  People  
v Datema, 448 Mich 585, 610-613; 533 NW2d 272 (1995)  
(Cavanagh, J., dissenting).  Defendant’s statement to the  
police suggests only that he attempted to prevent the alleged  
gunman from shooting his friend. On the facts presented, if  
the jury did not believe defendant was culpable of murder  
beyond 
a 
reasonable 
doubt, the only reasonable alternative was  
acquittal 
because 
defendant’s 
statement 
to 
police 
indicated 
an  
attempt to save the life of another.  People v Heflin, 434  
Mich 482, 554 n 10; 456 NW2d 10 (1990) (Levin, J., dissenting)  
(noting that the defense of another may justify homicide). To  
permit a manslaughter conviction on the evidence presented  
would result in a conviction against the great weight of the  
evidence.
 Therefore, I agree that the Court of Appeals  
opinion should be vacated and that defendant’s conviction  
should be affirmed.  
VI  
Because 
the 
majority has adopted an interpretation of MCL  
768.32 contrary to its plain text and our long-settled rules  
of statutory construction, I cannot join its rationale.  
However, because I agree that manslaughter is an offense  
“inferior” to murder, and because the evidence does not  
support a manslaughter instruction, I concur in the result  
10  
only.  
Michael F. Cavanagh 
Marilyn Kelly  
11